PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOB ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
PIEST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A C0NC5URRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
BVBNTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 36
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the InTestigatioD of the Pearl Harbor Attack
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
1--^ JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAKL HARBOK ATTACK
CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION ■
PURSUANT TO
S. Con, Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 36
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of tlie Pearl Harbor Attack
united states
government printing office
79716 Washington : io4g
;
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLBY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel
Jule M. Hannaford, Assistant Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Pages
Transcript
Hearings
No.
pages
1
1- 399
1- 1058
Nov,
. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2
401- 982
1059- 2586
Nov
. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3
983-1583
2587- 4194
Dec.
5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4
1585-2063
4195- 5460
Dec.
14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5
2065-2492
5461- 6646
Dec.
31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946,
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
Jan.
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7
2921-3378
7889- 9107
Jan.
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8
3379-3927
9108-10517
Jan.
30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9
3929-4599
10518-12277
Feb.
7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
Feb.
15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11
5153-5560
13709-14765
Apr.
9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No. Exhibits Nos.
- 12 1 through 6.
13 7 and 8.
14 9 through 43.
15 44 through 87.
16 88 through 110.
17 111 through 128.
18 129 through 156.
19 157 through 172.
20 173 through 179.
21 ISO through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
IV
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATK^N PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
PQ S
CO
O =0
CO ^
CO o
£«
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5269-5291
3814-3826
3450-3519
""6089-5122
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149 t
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
"471-510"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
InvestiEjation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
1 1 "^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r 1 1 Tf CO 1
1 ICO 1 1 1 1 1 lOCO 1
1 : : ;;;;:; 1! 1 :::;;: I : rcL !
(S 1 1 ; ! 1 1 ! 1 '1 : ; 1 : '1 ; 1 1 1 ! 1 "^ i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
Ill 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |<N
, II 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7^
^ i i i : i i ; i i i i i 1 i i i i 1 i i i i i
Joint
Committee
Exliibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
"660-688"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
3105-3120'
2479-2491"
4022-4027"
148-186
2567-2580"
3972-3988
2492-2515
1575-1643"
3720-3749"
1186-1220
1413-1442"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
Juno 15, 1944)
Pages
""391-398"
"'115-134'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJan. 23, 1942)
Pages
203-209
1127-1138
1033-1038
1719-1721'
1219-1224'
"886-951'
1382-1399
""377-389"
1224-1229
"'314-320"
1
Allen, Brooke E., Maj
Allen, Riley H
Anderson, Edward B., Maj
Anderson, Ray
Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm
Anatcy, Alice
Arnold, H. H., Gen
Asher, N. F., Ens
Ball, N. F., Ens
Ballard, Emma Jane
Barber, Bruce G
Bartlett, George Francis
Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr
Beardall, John R., Rear Adm
Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens
Beatty, JFrank E., Rear Adm
Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm
Benny, Chris J
Benson, Henry P
Berquist, Kenneth P., Col
Berry, Frank M., S 1/c
Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen
Bicknell. George W., Col
Bissell, John T., Col
INDEX OF WITNESSES
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VI
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5080-5089
""3826-3838
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
163-181
"418^423"
"451-464"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
"87'-B"
205
'B223-224"
B65-66
B229-231
49-51
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
H
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
495-510
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
4125-4151
1695-1732
2745-2785
4186-4196
3190-3201"
1928-1965
3642-3643
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
179-184
""ios-iii'
96-105
74-85
"368-378"
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
478-483,
301-310
1171-1178"
1178-1186"
1659-1663,
170-198
"812-843,"
1538-1571
504-509
2-32'
365-368
1747-1753'
1
Craige, Nelyin L., Lt. Col
Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN)
Crosley, Paul C, Comdr
Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM)
Curts, M. E., Capt., USN
Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN
Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen
Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm
Dawson, Harry L
Deane, John R., Maj. Gen
DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm
Dickens, June D., Sgt
Dillingham, Walter F
Dillon, James P
DiUon, .John H., Maj
Dingeman, Ray E., Col
Donegan, William Col
Doud, Harold,' Col
Dunlop, Robert H., Col
Dunning, Mary J
Dusenbury, CarUsle Clyde, Col
Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN
Earle, Frederick M., W/0
Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN
INDEX OF WITNESSES
VII
4<
4.
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■* o
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<£>■
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ma
VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
r5 t^oio,-, gooeo(N
1 i i ;I i i i i ; i : i i i i i il;i^7 : iS^sss
i i i I i : i i i i i i i i i i " ■ i sis
Joint
Committee
Esliibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
428^32
414-417
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
2i2-2i3
ioo-ioi
182
"ioo-ioi"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944: July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
p- ' 1 ' ' '
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
;Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
1070-1076
46i-469
"763-772"
si 6-85 i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2030-2090'
3957-3971
"24i-274"
"207-246"
2934-2942
2260-22i4
1914-1917
'"745-778"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
4 i 7-430
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II III 1 1 1 1
IIIIIITjHIIIlOllCOlll llll
iiiiiil:^iilit>iit^iii llll
«iiiiiiiOiiiicOiii*iii llll
^iiiiii,-iilli^ii| III llll
^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 lOi 1 1 1 llll
Cli 1 1 1 1 1 iJh 1 1 1 i4 1 ICO 1 1 1 llll
iiiiiil^iiiicOii-<*iii llll
1 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 III llll
Hamilton, MaxweU M., State Dept
Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen
Harrington, Cyril J
Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator
Hayes, Phihp, Maj. Gen
Heard, WiUiam A., Capt., USN
Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA
Herron Charles D., Maj. Gen
HiU, William H., Senator
Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN_..i...
Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr
Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col
Hornbeck, Stanley K
Home, Walter Wilton
Howard, Jack W., Col
HubbeU, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr
Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN
Hull, Cordell
Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c
Hunt, John A., Col
IngersoU, Royal E., Adm
Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
IX
7V777'7'777 i ok
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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
o 1 1 1 1 1 1 OS CO ^-_ro 1 1
coi oo iiiiiiS;ioit
loiiiii'ocoiiiii £2;x<Mii
^iiiiiiT}*! iiiiiiiiiii^"3icii
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toiO iiiiiiCiTjH iiilliOil
CiOiiiii-lMCO 2St^i"
0,10 1 1 1 1 I lOO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i^^-H 1 1
ic iTf< iiiiiiiiii.o^ioii
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
541-553
182-292
"'140^142
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
103
107-112
186
219-222
102
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
2 ' ' ' '
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
904^918
628^643
"734-746"
""852-885"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2665-2695"
3028-3067
1161-1185"
2787-2802"
1014-1034
1678-1694
3226-3250
2362-2374"
2-54"
T. S. 2-52,
192-226
3126-3152
1816-1913
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
214^225
363-367
.Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
iiOii-iitMLOiiiiOiiiiTfiiiiiO i(M|05
1 iiO it^ iCOOi 1 1 1 CO 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 iiOQOiO
» 1 1 rt 1 rH 1 1 1 1 1 <N 1 1 1 1 10 1 1 1 00 iCO-^O
« , 1^ ,^ ITf^ 1 , ,^ 1 , 1 , 1 , , ,,_, , 1 5^^
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1 1 Tti 110 1 Oil 1 t^ 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 C55 ICO
iii-iii-ii OiiiiMiiii iiit^ 1
1
Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN
Ivroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen
Landreth, J. L., Ens
Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0
Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col
Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC
Lawton, WUliam S., Col
Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN
Leahy, William D., Adm
Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm
Lewis, Fulton, Jr
Litell, S. H
Locey, Frank H
Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA
Lorence, Walter E., Col
Lumsden, George, Maj
Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN
Lynch, Paul J
Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr
MacArthur, Douglas, Gen
Marshall, George C, Gen
Marston, Morrill W., Col
Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen
INDEX OF WITNESSES
XI
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XII
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5210
4933-5009
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1915)
Pages
""387-3S8"
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
CO —1 1 (Mil it^li
TjHii III iioo 1 coii it^ii
IJ5 I 1 111 1 IT 1 '^11 lei 1 1
t^-*^ I 1 1 1 1 1 ig ! i i i"^ i i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Cl:irke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
"5111 III III 1 1 ' ' 1 1 1 1
►^111 111 111 1 1 I 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
1 iiO 111 III •■-j-„-(M"n."(M 1 lo 1 1 00 00
1 i05 1 Zli2i2.°'^^^ 1 '^ 1 lOO
1 1 IT III 111 ^^^2;::: 1 iT 1 1? -
1 1 li 111 111 "ic^J^cii 1 li 1 li^
ll'^ 111 111 c^io§22ll'* ll^^O
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
• July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
1107-1100,"
1240-1252
3636^3640
2375-2398,
3990-3996
3153-3165
2323-2933
3885-3915
1968^1988"
1035-1070
778-789
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
147-169
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJaa.23,1942)
II II 1 1 1 1 .. 1 1 1 1
1 i^-t^M* 1 1 1 ,_-,„-(» 1 1 iCOtH 1 1 1 1
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o
a
Pettigrew, Moses W., Col
Phelan, John, Ens
Phillips, Walter C, Col
Pickett, Harry K., Col
Pierson, Millard, Col
Pine, Willard B
Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov
PoweU, BoUing R., Jr., Maj
Powell, C. A., Col
Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr
Prather, Louise
Pratt, John S., Col
Pye, William S., Vice Adm
Rafter, Case B
Raley, Edward W., Col
Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN
Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
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XIV
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR j^TIACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
: ; : 1 i ;2 : 1 ; ;'i : 1 1 ! i i :|s? :
« 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 '^11
*H||lNNnNi \m\
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
1 1 1 1 1 lo ! 1 1 1 1 icococ^ lo 1 1 1 1
iiiiii— iiiiiiicciooiiciii 1
«iiiiii-^l<iiiliiC0iOCDi^iii 1
1 : : : 1 : icJs 1 1 1 1 1 ici^ti ici. : i : :
U,llllli00lllllit^-^OSl-^lll 1
COi COiOiOi-ifiii 1
Joint
Committeo
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 19H,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
1 1 1 1 1 1 los 1 1 1 1 !cD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 100 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1
1 i i i i i i iS i i i i :3 i i i i i i i
t. 1 1 1 1 1 1 lOO 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1
Joint
Committeo
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
1 i II i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lo 1 1 1 1
llll OS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lO
<! i i i i i i i i i i ij5 i i i i i i i i i
1 00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2722-2744
3120-3124
1989^2007"
2456-2478
134.5-1381"
910-931
3663-3665
3677-3683'
3750-3773
3357-3586"
2580a-2596
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
""279-288"
379^382
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJan.23, 1942)
Pages
1311-1329
496-499
1830-1842
1334^1340"
""247-259"
1525^1538"
1683-1705
S3
Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen
West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col
Whaling, William J., Lt. Col
White, William R., Brig. Gen
Wichiser, Rea B
Wilke, Weslie T
Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm
Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen
Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen
Wilson, Erie M., Col
Wimer, Benjamin R., Col
Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm
Wong, Ahoon H
Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR
Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN.
Woolley, Ralph E
Wright, Wesley A., Comdr
Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col
York, Yee Kam
Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN
Zucca, Emil Lawrence
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 149
[TOP SECRET]
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
A Further Inquiry Into the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor
ON December 7, 1941
Conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy, in accordance
with a precept, dated 2 May 1945, from the Secretary of the Navy
INDEX OF WITNESSES
'Name and rank Page ^
Smedbekg, William R., II, Capt 4
McCoLLUii, Arthur H., Capt 10
RocHEFORT, Joseph H., Capt 43, 541
Mason, Redtield, Capt 68
Fabian, Rudolph J., Comdr 68
Kaeig, Walter, Comdr 80
Kktxey, Welbourn, Lieut 80
OxTTicRBRiDGE, William W., Capt 87
Safford, Laurance F., Capt 97,529,609
Kramer, Alwin D., Capt 128, 576
Linn, George W., Lieut. Comdr 140
BegthEi'.hood, Francis M., Lieut. Comdr 143
Peeing, Alfred V., Lieut. Comdr 148
Freeman, Frederick L., Lieut 149
Notes, Leigh, Rear Admiral (extracts of testimony) 153
Reieirstad, Leo, Lieut. Comdr 158
CoNANT, Joseph M., Lieut, (jg) 158
Delany, Walter S., Rear Admiral 163
Laytox, Edwin T., Capt 182
McMoREis, Charles H., Vice Admiral 293
Smith, William W., Vice Admiral 335
Burr, Harold S., Comdr 376
WooDRL'M, Donald, Lieut 376
Powell, Carroll A., Brig. Gen., USA 387
Wilkinson, Theodore S., Vice Admiral 389
^?TREET, George, Civilian 411
Humphrey, Richard W., RM3c 414
Dyer, Thomas H., Capt 418
FixNEGAN, Joseph, Capt 424
HuBBELL, ]Monroe H., Lieut. Comdr 428
Murray, Allan A., Lieut. Comdr 433
Weight, Wesley A., Comdr 442
Earle, John B., Capt 451
UxDERKOFLEK, Oliver H., Lieut 465
Bblunger, Patrick N. L., Vice Admiral 471
Edgers, JMrs. Dorothy, Civilian 511
Friedman, William F., Civilian 515
Laswell, Alva B., Colonel, USMC 541
Woodward, Farnsley C, Lieut, (jg) 541, 597
Boone, Gilbert E., Lieut. Comdr 554, 607
Mayfield, Irving H., Rear Admiral 558
^ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figrues enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 2
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
Exhibit
No.
Description
Page 1 of
original
exhibit
where
Introduced
1
lA
2
3
4
9
10
11
12
13
14A
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Precept convening investigation
Modification of precept, directing report of findings and
conclusions
Narrative statement by counsel of previous Navy in-
vestigations
CinCPOA Weekly Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of
8 Dec. 1944, relating to the attacking force
A translation of a captured Japanese submarine chart,
showing courses and. location of U. S. ships in Pearl
Harbor
CinCPOA Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of 20 Oct.
1944, containing description of Japanese midget
submarines
ONI document "ONI 220-J, Japanese Submarines"
Berthing plan at Pearl Harbor, 7 Dec. 1941 (Ex. 60 of
Naval Court)
Photostatic copies of Coml4 and Coml6 dispatch esti-
mates of Japanese fleet location and movements, 26
Nov. 1941
ONI Bulletin of 1 Dec. 1941, Japanese fleet locations- .
McCoUum memorandum estimating situation as of 1
Dec. 1941
"Battle Report"
FCC radio intercepts regarding "winds" code (Ex. 65
of Naval Court)
Collection of intercepted Japanese dispatches
14B, 14C, 14D: Photostatic copies of captured Japa-
nese submarine chart, showing courses and location
of U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor
Collection of intercepted Japanese dispatches (Ex. 63
of Naval Court)
Copies of dispatches sent from RI unit, Corregidor,
regarding Japanese fleet movements
Photostat of captured Japanese submarine chart used
for Plate V of "Battle Report"
Log of conversation between WARD and CONDOR
on the morning of 7 Dec. 1941
Tentative copies of Communication Intelligence Sum-
maries, for 1 Nov. 1941 to 6 Dec. 1941, at Pearl
Harbor
Message from Tokyo establishing the hidden word
code
Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin of 27 Nov. 1941 con-
cerning composition of Japanese Navy
Daily Communication Intelligence Summaries, 14 Oct.
1941 to 5 Dec. 1941, prepared by Fleet Intelligence
Officer (Captain Layton) for delivery to Admiral
Kimmel
Memorandum of 1 Dec. 1941 from Fleet Intelligence
Officer to Admiral Kimmel, estimating Japanese ship
locations
Nov. 24th dispatch from CNO to CincPac (Ex. 15 of
Naval Court)
"War Warning" (Ex. 17 of Naval Court)
Layton Intelligence Reports from 6 Oct. 1941 to 2 Dec.
1941
Paraphrased copies of dispatches from various intelli-
gence agencies delivered to CincPac
1
602
2
5
12
17
21
22
31
56
60
66
75
83
91
103
135
185
194
211
238
247
259
264
' Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original
exhibit
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
INDEX OF EXHIBITS— Continued
Description
Page 1 of
original
exhibit
where
introduced
Memorandum from Fleet Intelligence Officer to Ad-
miral Kimmel regarding proposed Army aerial recon-
naissance of Mandated Islands
Intercepted Japanese consular dispatches delivered to
Fleet Intelligence Officer about December 10th
Two Japanese panorama views of Pearl Harbor with
Japanese log on reverse side, recovered from sub-
marine (returned to Captain Layton)
Photostat of Japanese log on reverse of exhibit 30
Translations of exhibits 30 and 30A
Panomara sketch of Pearl Harbor position five miles
south of Pearl Harbor, recovered from submarine
(returned to Captain Layton)
Photostats of exhibit 31
Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from
Japanese midget submarine (returned to Captain
Layton)
Photostat of exhibit 32
Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from
Japanese submarine, showing defensive installations
(returned to Captain Layton)
Photostatic copy of exhibit 33
Staff Instructions, CincPac, 1941
U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow Five (Navy
Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46)
Letter of 9 September 1941 from CNO to CincPac, ap-
proving Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five--
Letter of 25 July 1941 from CincPac to CNO, submitting
Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five
Photostatic copy of schedules setting forth utilization of
patrol planes of Pacific Fleet from 17 Nov. to 31 Dec.
and approved 22 Nov. 1941
Transcripts of intercepted telephone calls of Japanese
Consul and Vice Consul in Honolulu from October
to 2 Dec. 1941 (Consul's marked 38A; Vice Consul's
marked 38B)
Copy of intercepted "Mori conversation"
ONI Summaries of messages sent by Japanese Consul
in Honolulu from 1 Dec. to 6 Dec. 1941
File of work sheets on Jap diplomatic traffic (incorpo-
rated in other exhibit)
Paper showing part of decryption process of Japanese
"PA" code
Duty Officer, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, information
sheets
Extract from signal log of gate vessel of 7 Dec. 1941
• Extract from quartermaster's log of gate vessel of 7
Dec. 1941
Extract from log of Signal Tower, Navy Yard, Pearl
Harbor, of 7 Dec. 1941
Collection of documents, containing Annex VII, Section
VI, Joint Agreements, to Joint Coastal Frontier De-
fense Plan
Collection of dispatches regarding submarine contacts
at Pearl Harbor in November and Dec. 1941
Bellinger "Estimate of Situation"
Letter from ComTaskFor 9 to CinC, 20 Dec. 1941, on
reconnaissance prior to attack
Dispatches cited in exhibit 50
266
272
279
279
280
280
280
281
281
290
291
29S
295
297
297
368
379
382
385
420
421
430
430
431
432
457
461
474
481
482
801
802
804
804
804
805
805
805
805
805
805
806
837
869
871
872
872
908
911
933
935
935
937
938
938
938
942
946
953
95g
• Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original
exhibit.
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
INDEX OF EXHIBITS— Continued
Exhibit
No.
Description
Page ' of
original
exhibit
■where
introduced
51
52
53
54
55
56
56A
57
57A
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69-
70
71
72
ComTaskFor 9 letter of 22 Oct. 1941, file 0026
ComTaskFor 9 letter of 16 Jan. 1941
ComPatWing 2 letter to CNO, of 11 Dec. 1940
Watch and duty schedules of Patrol Wings One and
Two prior to attack
RCA Communications, Inc., statement, listing certain
Japanese cable messages from Honolulu in Nov. and
Dec. 1941
Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at
Honolulu, via RCA, among those listed in exhibit 55,
received by Navy 5 Dec. 1941
Pages 7 to 12 of exhibit 56, containing messages not
decrypted until after the attack
Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at
Honolulu, via RCA, among those listed in exhibit 55,
received by Navy after the attack
Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at
Honolulu, via RCA, received by Navy on night of 7
Dec. and subsequently translated
Collection of dispatches from Naval Communication
files relating to Japanese fleet movements and loca-
tions during the period 27 Nov. to 7 Dec. 1941
Collection of Japanese plain language news broadcasts..
Collection of memoranda relating to messages re-
ceived at Naval Communications in various Japanese
code systems
Memorandum of Naval Communications, surveying
work sheets processed by Navy of Japanese purple
system
Report from DIO, 14th N. D., to Director of Naval
Intelligence, of 19 Apr. 1942, relating to coded dis-
patch traffic of Japanese Consul General, Honolulu..
Certified collection of documents relating to anti-
torpedo baffles for protection against torpeao plane
attacks
Copy of Itr. from Secretary of W-'ar to Secretary of
Navy, dated 7 Feb^ 1941, relating to air defenses at
Pearl Harbor
CincPac secret letter of 7 Aug. 1941 relating to the
organization of the Orange fleet
Map showing the location of ships present at Pearl
Harbor on 7 Dec. 1941
Telephone log of radio unit at Pearl Harbor, showing
calls made and received on 7 Dec. 1941 as to Jap
fleet locations
Photostatic copies of memoranda relating to qustion-
ing of captain of Japanese captured submarine
Pacific Fleet Weekly Intelligence Bulletin for 11 June
1945, containing description of midget submarines
and method of transport to Pearl Harbor
Selected collection of Pearl Harbor dispatches, mis-
cellaneous subjects, taken from CincPac Head-
quarters
Collection of dispatches relating to proposed Army
reconnaissance in November of 1941
Collection of dispatches of Dec. 7 and 8, 1941, from
CincPac
483
484
488
496
542
544
600
550
601
555
555
556
557
569
602
603
603
603
603
604'
604
604
604
605
959
961
965
973
932
982
986
996
1004
1058
1068
1081
1084
1088
1126
1129
1130
1144
1145
1147
1151
1176
1205
1206
1 Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original
exhibit.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
INDEX OF EXHIBITS— Continued
Exhibit
No.
Description
Page' of
original
exhibit
where
introduced
Page
73
CincPac secret letter of 12 Dec. 1941 reporting damage
to ships at Pearl Harbor as result of attack and other
details. . _ -_ _ _
605
605
605
606
606
611
613
613
613
1213
74
75
76
77
78
Photostatic copy of War Diary of Com 14 from 7 Dec.
1941 to 1 Jan. 1942
War Diary of USS WARD; War Diary of 0-in-C, Net
and Boom Defenses, 14th N. D.; War Diary of USS
CONDOR; excerpts from diary of 0-in-C, Net and
Boom Defenses, 14th N. D., WARD, and CONDOR..
Photostatic copy of 1st and 2nd endorsements on Com
14 letter of 30 Dec. 1941 relating to early morning
submarine contact on 7 Dec. 1941
Collection of correspondence relating to combined
operating center for Army and Navy
Typewritten translation and copy of intercepted
Japanese communication contained in exhibit 20,
and notes relating thereto.
1266
1281
1298
1299
1305
79
Photostatic copy of page 44 of volume containing trans-
lations of files of operations orders, orders, memos,
and serials dealing with Japanese Navy plans, re-
covered from Jap CA NACHI _
1306
80
81
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theatre.
Collection of photostatic copies of ONI memoranda
dealing with organization and locations of Jap fleet
as estimated during November and up to Dec. 1,
1941
1306
1314
• Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original
exhibit.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
[/] PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIEY
First Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the ofnces of the Gen-
eral Board, Nav;^ Department, at 2 p. m., Monday, 14 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy, Investigating
Officer; Mr. John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
the Navy, Counsel; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold,
U. S. Naval Reserve, Aide to Admiral Hewitt ; Lieutenant John Ford
Baecher, U. S. Naval Reserve, Assistant to Mr. Sonnett; and Ship's
Clerk Ben Harold, U. S. Naval Reserve, Official Reporter.
The precept, convening the investigation, was read and is appended
hereto as "Exhibit 1."
Admiral Hewitt made the following opening statement:
The precept of the Secretary of the Navy appointing Admiral H.
Kent Hewitt, USN, to conduct further investigation into the facts
concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941,
will be marked "Exhibit 1" in the record of this investigation.
The Secretary's precept forwarded :
(A) Report of Commission appointed by Executive Order, dated
18 December 1941, to investigate the attack made by Japanese armed
forces upon the Territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941.
(B) Copy of Examination of Witnesses, ordered by the Secretary
of the Navy, 12 February 1944.
(C) Copy of record of proceedings of Court of Inquiry, convened
by order of the Secretary of the Navy, 13 July 1944.
The Secretary's precept provides, in part :
7. You are hereby detailed to make a study of the enclosures and then to con-
duct such further investigation, including the examination of any additional
[2] persons who may have knowledge of the facts pertinent to the said Japa-
nese attack, and to re-examine any such person who has been previously examined,
as may appear to be necessary, and to record the testimony given thereby. You
are authorized to obtain such documents relating to said attack as may be
required for inclusion in the record.
A study has been made of the enclosures. In this connection, a
narrative statement of the previous Navy investigations has been pre-
pared by counsel and is designated "Exhibit 2" in these proceedings.
I find that further investigation is necessary in order :
(A) to obtain the information now available concerning the com-
position and movements of the Japanese forces which attacked Pearl
Harbor on 7 December 1941 ;
(B) to obtain the information which was available at Pearl Harbor,
at Cavite, and at Washington, during the period 14 October 1941 to
7 December 1941, concerning the location, composition and move-
ments of Japanese naval forces, including: (1) examination as to the
activities of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor and the
information obtained by it, with particular reference to the location
8 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of tlie major portion of the Japanese carriers, to the loss of radio
contact with units of the Japanese Fleet on or about 1 December 1941,
and to the apparently erroneous belief that on 7 December 1941 the
attacking force was located south of Hawaii; (2) examination as to
the preparation of ONI bulletins, such as the bulletin of 1 December
1941; (3) examination as to the information furnished by the Navy
to the Army, at Washington and at Pearl Harbor, concerning Japa-
nese naval movements and loss of radio contact with Japanese units;
(4) examination as to information of Japanese navaF units obtained
by Army reconnaissance, with particular reference to the War Depart-
ment's directions to General Short, about 26 November 1941, to con-
duct reconnaissance to Jaluit, to the action taken, and to the question
whether Admiral Kimmel was advised of this ;
(C) to determine whether or not Japanese submarines operated in
and around Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December 1941, including: (1)
wdiether a captured Japanese map, as indicated in the Army Pearl
Harbor report, establishes that such submarines were in Pearl Harbor
before that date, or, as indicated in the book entitled "Battle Report,"
that the map was [3] made on that date and erroneously fixed
the positions of United States ships in the harbor ; (2) what submarine
contacts were made in or around Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December
1941; (3) according to "Battle Report," at about 0500 on 7 December
1941, a naval radio station on Oahu intercepted and logged a conver-
sation between the WARD and CONDOR concerning the sighting
of a submarine at approximately 0350. It should be determined what
was done about this and why were the net gates allowed to remain
open from 0445 until 0800 ;
(D) to obtain the information received in Hawaii through the inter-
ception of Japanese telephone and cable messages by the office of Naval
Intelligence, or so obtained by other agencies of the United States
Government or of other governments and communicated to the Naval
Intelligence at Hawaii ;
(E) to determine who obtained the intercepted Japanese messages
concerning ship movements, sent to and from Honolulu, which are
set forth in Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court's Record, and how, when,
and where they were obtained and decoded ;
(F) to determine the basis for the statement at page 6 of "Battle
Report" that "There were two powerful task forces sent against Pearl
Harbor, the major elements of one lurking just over the horizon from
its companion force to overwhelm any American attempt to engage
the invaders. The United States, too, had two task forces at sea, and
Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo."
(G) to determine whether or not there was a "winds code" message
relating to the United States. In connection with the "winds code"
message, it should be noted that according to Captain Safford the
last time he saw the message was when it was sent to the Roberts
Commission. It should be determined whether or not the message
was there or is there now ;
(H) to interview Admiral Wilkinson generally and with particular
reference to combat intelligence and to the "winds code" ;
(I) to interview Captain McCollum generally and with particular
reference to the "winds code" ;
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 9
(J) to determine what the origmal records show concernmg: (1)
Admiral Kimmel's approval of Annex VII to the Joint Coastal De-
fense Plan and the "Bellinger" estimate; (2) Admiral Kimmel's receipt
and evaluation [4] of copies of the Secretary of the Navy's
letter of 24 January 194:1, and the Secretary of War's reply; (3) Ad-
miral Kimmel's receipt and evaluation of the second letter from the
Chief of Naval Operations concerning air torpedo attack; (4) the date
when Admiral Kimmel approved the aircraft schedules which were
submitted covering employment of planes during the period 15 No-
vember 1941 to 31 December 1941 ;
(K) to determine what were the reasons for the air reconnaissance
which Admiral Kimmel directed on or about July, 1941, toward the
Jaluits.
In accordance with the Secretary's precept, having found that such
further investigation is necessar}^, the purpose of this proceeding will
be to examine persons having knowledge of the facts in question and
to obtain such documents as may be relevant thereto.
Counsel in this investigation will be John F. Sonnett, Special As-
sistant to the Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting in the investiga-
tion are Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNIl, and
Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNK.. The reporter at this meeting
is Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, was read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you give your name and rank ?
Captain Smedberg. William R. Smedberg, III, Captain, U. S. Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. What is your present duty ?
Captain Smedberg. I am the Assistant Combat Intelligence Officer,
Staff, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Admiral Hewitp. Will you give me the information that you now
have available and can testify to concerning the Japanese forces which
attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Smedberg. A Japanese prisoner wdio was captured on
Saipan [S] during the Marianas Campaign has given a very
complete account of the preparations and movements of the Jap Fleet
in the Fall of 1941, up to and including December 7, 1941. This
prisoner was a chief yeoman in the Japanese Navy, attached to the
Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, Admiral Yama-
moto. He has reconstructed the events preceding and leading up to
the Pearl Harbor attack. Much of the information given by this
chief yeoman has been substantiated and verified by other information
which we have received, and we believe the reliability which can be
placed on this information to be very high.
The best reconstruction can be found in the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, a confidential bul-
letin dated 8 December 1944, volume 1, number 22. This gives a very
complete story of the preparations for the attack and also gives a
reconstruction of the Operation Order, as I remember it, on which the
attack was based.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you submit a copy of this as an exhibit?
Captain Smedberg. Yes, sir.
(The Weekly Intelligence Bulletin referred to was received and
marked "Exhibit 3.")
1() CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This secret Operation Order is dated 1 November 1941 and starts
off with the statement that "The Japanese Empire will declare war on
the United States, Great Britain and the I^ etherlands," that "War
will be declared on X-daj^," and that "This order will become effective
onY-Day."
It gives the composition of the striking force, which sortied from
Etorofu To in the Kuriles on or about 27 November (all times used
here are East Longitude times and dates) and headed eastward under
heavy front before turning south to the attack.
[6] The late Vice Admiral Nagumo, who was then CinC 1st Air
Fleet, was in command and his force consisted of the six carriers
KAGA, AKAGI, SORYU, HIRYU, SHOKAKU, and ZUIKAKU;
two battleships, the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA; three cruisers, the
TONE, CHIKUMA, and ABUKUMA; elements of Destroyer Squad-
ron One, and about twenty submarines.
This document tells of the plan to coordinate midget submarine
unit attacks with the Main Fleet attack and states that the Sixth
Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within Pearl Harbor. The
Sixth Fleet was the Japanese submarine fleet. The submarine fleet,
according to the chief yeoman prisoner of war, had almost its entire
strength off the mouth of Pearl Harbor, with the object of attacking
those ships which attempted to escape from the plane attacks of
carrier divisions one, two, and five.
One of the documents which the prisoner previously referred to has
reconstructed from memory was a Combined Fleet Secret Operation
Order Number 2, elated 5 November, which stated that Y-Day. will
be 23 November. He also reconstructed Combined Fleet Secret Oper-
ation Order Number 3, dated 10 November, which stated, "X-Day
will be 8 December." (It should be noted that 8 December is 7 Decem-
ber Pearl Harbor date.)
From the prisoner's reconstruction of the original Secret Operation
Order Number 1, it was his belief, and he so stated, that the striking
force (carrier task force) would depart its naval bases or operating
areas about X minus 16 days and will proceed by way of Tankan
Bay, Etorofu Island in the Kuriles for Pearl Harbor, where it would
deliver a surprise attack.
It further stated that the commander of the surprise attack force
(submarine force), having the Sixth Fleet (submarine fleet) as its
main elementj will have most of the submarines leave the western
part of the [7] Inland Sea on X minus 20 day to attack Pearl
Harbor.
It is interesting to note here that the commander of this surprise
attack force was charged with carrying out reconnaissance before
the attack and also carrying out surprise attacks on enemy warships
with midget submarines. The prisoner states that the time for such
attacks was to be after the flights of planes have attacked Oahu.
There is on page 16 of the Intelligence Bulletin which we have been
discussing a copy of a captured track chart of the Japanese carriers,
covering the period, showing, among other things, the departure of
the carriers from their home bases, departure from Etorofu Island
on November 27th, arrival to the northwest of Oahu on December
8th (East Longitude time), and a retirement initially to the north-
west and then to the southwest. This indicates that the Jap aircraft
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 11
took off from their carriers about 200 miles due north of Oahu, and
this information checks with the document recovered from a crashed
enemy plane shortly after the raid.
Admiral Hewitt. There is reference in the exhibit just introduced,
and in other publications concerning the Pearl Harbor attack, to a
map which was recovered from a Japanese midget submarine, show-
ing courses and the location of ships inside Pearl Harbor. Can you
produce the original or a copy of this map and discuss it?
Captain Smedberg. I cannot produce the original. Admiral. My
division had not been formed up to the time of Pearl Harbor, and I
have asked that the records of the Japanese Section of the Far East-
ern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence be checked to see if it
can be located — without result. I have here, however, a copy, which,
I am assured by Captain E. S. Pearce, present head of the Japanese
Section of the Far [8] Eastern Division of ONI, was made
from the English translation of the Japanese chart taken from the
captured midget submarine. This chart indicates to me the courses and
times which the submarine captain laid down beforehand and hoped to
follow. He hadn't gotten into Pearl Harbor, as he later testified
after his capture, so that the chart could not have been prepared by
him either while in Pearl Harbor or after his emergence from Pearl
Harbor.
I leave you a cop}' of this chart as exhibit 4.
(The chart referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 4.")
Admiral Hewitt. What information can you give as to the charac-
teristics of the midget submarine?
Captain Smedberg. There are several descriptions of Jap midget
subs which have been developed from captured documents and pris-
oner of war interrogations, one of the best being found in Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Confidential Intelligence Bul-
letin of 20 October 1944, volume 1, number 15, a copy of which I will
bring to you for use as an exhibit.
(The Intelligence Bulletin referred to was received and will be
marked "Exhibit 5.")
The sum of the information on the midget sub used at Pearl
Harbor is that it was carried by and launched from a mother sub-
marine. The sub at Pearl Harbor was 41 feet in length and had a
reported cruising range of 175 to 180 miles maximum at its most
economical speed of 4 to 6 knots. The full details are available in an
Office of Naval Intelligence publication known as "ONI 220-J, Japa-
nese Submarines." I will obtain this document and bring it to you
for use as an exhibit.
[9] (The publication referred to was received and will be marked
"Exhibit 6.")
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know any information about whether
these two-man midget submarines were equipped with radio?
Captain Smedberg. The best information that I can recall on this
submarine which was used at Pearl Harbor is that it had no radio.
A much larger type midget submarine which Japan used one year
later had a high frequency radio with a range of about fifty miles,
but this sub was twice as long as the type used at Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Hewitt. Exhibit 60 from the Naval Court of Inquiry
record will be marked as an exhibit in this investigation.
12 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(The document referred to was received and market "Exhibit 7.")
Admiral Hewitt. Have you anything further, Captain?
Captain Smedberg. No, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Then, that will be all. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
Admiral Hewitt. That is all for today.
(The investigation was then, at 3:15 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m.
the next day.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 13'
im PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIKY
Second Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the Gen-
eral Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Tuesday, 15 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNE; Lieutenant
John F. Baecher, USNPv; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. State your name and rank.
Captain McCollum. Arthur H. McCollum, Captain, U. S. Navy.
Admiral Hewttt. Will you state the duties to which you were as-
signed in December, 1941, and the period preceding that?
Captain McCollum. I was Ofticer-in-Charge of the Far Eastern
Section of the Division of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department,
Washington.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you please give us the details of your duties
in that connection ?
Captain McCollum. My duties consisted of evaluating all forms
of intelligence received concerning the Far East, correlating it, and
advising the Director of Naval Intelligence and through him the Chief
of Naval Operations on political developments in the Far East and
all forms of information concerning the Japanese Navy and other
countries in the Far East and their defenses and state of preparation
for war.
Admiral Hewitt. What was the relationship of your unit wdth
Op-20-G, Captain Safford's unit?
Captain McCollum. Captain Safford's unit produced a source of
intelligence. Intelligence from that source was shown to me and was
one of our most valued sources of intelligence concerning the Far East.
Briefly, the intelligence [i7] received from that source con-
sisted of decryptions of secret Japanese code despatches, inferences
drawn from the analyses of Japanese radio traffic, and inferences
drawn from changes in procedure of Japanese radio traffic. There
was from time to time intelligence of this same general nature received
from non-Japanese sources, but the bulk of it was from Japanese
sources.
Admiral Hewitt. Concerning the location, composition, and move-
ments of the Japanese forces in general, what information or estimate
was received from and sent to the Pearl Harbor unit and to Cavite?
Captain McCollum. By the end of November we were almost
wholly dependent upon radio intelligence for information concerning
the location of Japanese naval forces, except those that were sighted
by our observation posts along the China coast.
The system for serving radio intelligence consisted of a three-point
system, one serving the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; one
serving the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet ; one serving the Cliief
14 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of Naval Operations at the Navy Department in Washington. All
intelligence derived from radio intelligence means in either one of
these three centers was passed through and back to these three centers.
In order words, information from radio intelligence sources available
in Manila were also available at Pearl and also available at Washing-
ton, and vice versa. That was passed as a matter of routine back and
forth among the three radio intelligence centers serving between the
three major command centers, Asiatic, Pacific, and Washington.
Admiral Hewitt. That applies not only to the information but also
to the inferences that they drew from them ?
Captain McCollum. Definitely. I am not so denite about decodes
of diplomatic traffic. I am not certain whether items concerning the
Japanese [i^] diplomatic traffic, that is, traffic in diplomatic
cyphers, was invariably available to all three or not. The volume of
that was very great, and, if I remember correctly, the principal head-
quarters for that type of traffic was here in Washington and, to my
mind, it is doubtful that all decodes of Japanese diplomatic traffic were
ever sent back out again. I don't think it was. I don't think it
could have been with the existing radio facilities.
Admiral Hewitt. I have here a series of photostatic copies of cer-
tain dispatches, which I submit to you for your identification.
Captain McCollum. I identify these. I have seen them.
(The photostats referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 8.")
Admiral Hewitt. Will you give us your comment on the salient
points of this exhibit?
Captain McCollusi. As I have indicated before, in general radio
intelligence consists of three distinct procedures. One is an actual
translation of the enemy's code despatch ; another is inferences drawn
from the volume of enemy radio traffic and its divergence from a
norm.
Admiral Hewitt. What you call traffic analysis?
Captain McCollum. That is traffic analysis. Another is from a
study of call signs, the ships' radio call, and so on.
Before Pearl Harbor we never had very good intelligence on Japa-
nese naval type messages from decryption. With the disappear-
ance of means which we had devised for keeping Japanese naval ves-
sels and naval movements under observation, such as reports by mer-
chant ships, reports by agents located in various ports in Japan and
on the Asiatic continent, reports by our consular authorities, which
all had been set up and was functioning — these sources [13]
whereby our radio intelligence could be confirmed from time to time
by actual visual sighting had disappeared by early November due to
a number of natural causes. One was the enforcement of our em-
bargoes against Japan, which in a very short period of time swept
normal merchant traffic out of the North Pacific so that by mid-No-
vember it is hardly too much to say that there were no ship movements
of any nature to and from Japan in the North Pacific. One other
point that we watched and carefully checked, had a world-wide system
for observing, was the world-wide movement of Japanese merchant
shipping in all the ports of the world. Due again to the operation of
our embargoes, the Japanese merchant shipping in the Americas was
gone. Due to the war in Europe, the Japanese merchant shipping
lines had been disrupted; so that source of intelligence had disap-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 15
peared. One other point, the Japanese progressive closing in of secu-
rity measures made it almost impossible for agents in Japan to get
information out of Japan that would be timely in a tactical situation.
So that by the middle of November it was apparent that so far as ob-
serving and locating the Japanese fleet were concerned, our major
dependence was perforce based on radio intelligence without the bene-
fit of check by visual observations from time to time.
As a result of this situation, this dispatch of the 24th of November
was sent out. It was intended to point out to our major commanders
that our information was unsatisfactory and that every effort had to
be made by using the one remaining instrument we had to determine
the location and direction of movement of Japanese naval forces.
As a result of this dispatch, we got the benefit of estimates of the
situation as it applied to the location and possible movements of the
Japanese fleet from both ComFOUETEEN and ComSIXTEEN.
These two addresses and the code system which was sent indicates
that this estimate was made [14] by the radio intelligence
organizations which went under that cover call in both of these places.
The estimates are virtually the same. They differ only in minor
degree. You will find that you had two task forces being organized
under the over-all command of Commander Second Fleet. One was
thought to be fairly well located in the general Formosa-Southern
Japan area; another was possibly in the Mandated Islands. There
was some discussion as to whether carriers were present with this lat-
ter force or not. That was one of the points of disagreement between
these two here.
Greater reliance was placed on ComSIXTEEN's dispatch because
physically he was in a much better position to intercept a larger vol-
ume of Japanese radio traffic than ComFOURTEEN was and his
radio intelligence organization was stronger in numbers and in conti-
nuity of operation than that of ComFOURTEEN.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, then, will you read the part of the
ComFOURTEEN message which relates to the possible task force
in the Mandates and then give me SIXTEEN's comments on that ?
Captain McCollum. This is ComFOURTEEN's :
There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in
the Marshalls which comprise AIRON TWENTY FOUR at least one carrier
division unit plus probably one third of the submarine fleet.
Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in South
Eastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.
Now, ComSIXTEEN in referring to that states as follows :
Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force and are in
Mandates X our best indications are that all known first and second fleet car-
riers still in Sasebo-Kure area.
[i<5] Admiral Hewitt. What were the dates of those ?
Captain McCollum. The 26th, sir; the 24th, which was our out-
going, and ComFOURTEEN's is 260110, November, sir, and
ComSIXTEEN's is 261331.
Admiral Hewjtt. Which would be 27 our time ?
Captain McCollum. Which would be about 27 our time. These
are all GCT, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Those are all GCT ?
16 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. ComSIXTEEN added to his gen-
eral evaluation of the situation that he considered the evaluation
reliable.
Admiral Hewitt. What further information on this subject was
received in Washington during the period from November 27th to
December 7th ?
Captain McCollum. Pursuing the directive issued, there ComSIX-
TEEN from day to day issued fragmentary reports concerning the
movement of such Japanese naval units as became apparent to him.
There was never received in Washington, to my knowledge, anything
that changed the general view of fleet organization and concentration
areas as set forth in those dispatches of the 26th.
Admiral Hewitt. It appears from i^rior investigations that on or
about December 1st radio contact with the Japanese forces was either
greatly diminished or was lost. Can you tell us anything about that?
Captain McCollum. If I might presume, sir, I don't think it is
exactly accurate to say that radio contact was lost. What occurred
was a change in the call signs and frequency allocations of the fleet.
In other words, presumably the communication plan of the Jap fleet
was changed at that time, which meant that a period of time must
elapse before we could build up identifications of specific naval units
based on call signs, and so on. In other words, the actual radios were
still going out, but we [16] couldn't get anything out of them
very much.
Admiral Hewitt. Then there was no perceptible diminution of
traffic?
Captain McCollum. Not that I know of. There are other people
possibly better qualified to advise you on that score than I am, but
my impression of what had occurred was what is generally known
as a general call sign change. In other words, the old call book went
out and a new one was eifective that date. There may have been some
differences in frequencies ; there probably were some two or three new
allocations. But some time would have to elapse before a radio in-
telligence organization would be able to draw inferences from mes-
sages intercepted.
Admiral Hewitt. That was a situation which had occurred previ-
ously, was it not ?
Captain McCollum. It had occurred from time to time previously.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you remember the approximate elate of the
previous change ?
Captain McCollum. No, sir, I do not. Normally in peacetime those
things do not change often, possibly every six months or every year
or so, but we had had partial changes from time to time as new task
organizations developed presumably in Jap forces, sir. It was a
shorter period of time since the last change to this change than had
occurred normally before.
Admiral Hewitt. As far as you know, had a change of that sort
ever previously accompanied a major movement by the Japanese such
as a movement to French Indo-China ?
Captain McCollum. No, sir. There had been minor changes in
that, but a wholesale change hadn't occurred for some time previously
to that that I remember now.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 17
[i/] Admiral Hewiit. As far as you know, there was no discus-
sion or concern about apparent radio silence of any major part?
Captain McCollum. There was concern not of the radio silence
but the fact that we had lost at this particular time an exceedingly
valuable source of intelligence which for the time being was going
to be much less valuable than it had been before. It wasn't possible
to connect at the time that particular change with that specific move-
ment, except that which had been outlined. We were certain at that
time there were reorganizations and regroupings of forces going on.
We knew that the Japanese fleet was ready for action. We knew that
it had been called home, docked and extensively repaired and was look-
ing for action. Therefore, it was interpreted, along with this other
stuff, as a possible indication of action to come.
Admiral Hewitt. Am I correct in stating, then, that as the intelli-
gence unit in Hawaii would have this same information as ComFOUR-
TEEN, therefore CincPac would be as well informed as to these
changes of radio calls and frequencies, and so forth, as you were in
the Navy Department?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. The ONI Bulletin of 1 December 1941 stated as
to Japanese naval forces : "Major capital ship strength remains in
home waters as well as the greater proportion of carriers."
(The ONI Bulletin referred to was received and marked "Ex-
hibit 9.")
Was that statement correct ?
Captain McCollum. This statement is correct, based on the best
intelligence available at the time. It was based on the intelligence
then available. At this late date I can't make a specific statement
as to the [18] exact time lag, but as I remember it, this state-
ment was based on intelligence that would be at least three to four
days prior to the date of the document itself.
Admiral Hewitt. What was understood by the term "home waters"
as used in that bulletin ?
Captain McCollum. This paper developed out of a scheme for keep-
ing track of the Japanese fleet which had been followed for a number
of years in the Far East Section of ONI, and the term "home waters"
was generally understood to mean the normal cruising grounds of the
Japanese fleet. That would roughly be west of the 180th meridian of
longitude and north of the southern end of Formosa and included the
Kurile Islands but not the Aleutians.
Admiral Hewitt. In your opinion, would the recipients of this bul-
letin, such as the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, interpret the term
"home waters" in the same way ? In other words, was that definition
of "home waters" generally known ?
Captain McCollum. Admiral, this paper was originally designed
for circulation within the Department alone. At various times from
1939 on Commanders-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had visited the
Department and on two occasions had expressed a desire for this docu-
ment. The general basis on which the document was prepared, and
the charts showing the delimitation of areas, was discussed with these
officers at that time, including both Admiral Richardson and Admiral
Kimmel. Whether the term was ever formally defined and a defini-
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, voL 1 3
18 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tion issued to the fleet, I doubt. If the term was ever formally
defined and issued to the fleet, I doubt. However, it was well under-
stood here in the Department and in discussions with officers from the
fleet at various times, the term was understood to mean the normal
cruising grounds of the Jap fleet. That is, north of southern Formosa,
[19] west of the 180th meridian, and including the Kurile Islands,
Admiral Hewitt. In this particular case, the information on which
the estimate was apparently based, Exhibit number 8, was that the
forces under discussion were generally in the Sasebo-Kure area.
Captain McCollum. The major battleship and carrier strength was
in the Kure-Sasebo area.
Admiral He^witt. So that, really in this case the term apparently
meant home waters in the home islands ?
Captin McCoLLUM. That is right, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What information, if any, was sent out to the fleet
after December 1st concerning the location and movements of Japanese
fleet units ?
Captain McCollum. The fleet, as I explained to you, had informa-
tion from radio intelligence as to fleet locations, had the same informa-
tion available to them as we had here in the Department. So far as I
am aware, no dispatch was sent from the Department specifically to
the fleet, calling attention to the location and movements of the Jap-
anese fleet. Such messages as they would have received would have
been common not only to the Pacific Fleet but to the Asiatic Fleet
and to the Department, and they consisted, after the 1st of December,
of reports of our observers on the China coast and of our naval forces
which had contacted a Jap task force moving south of Formosa in
the direction of Hainan and from there on farther south towards the
Kra Peninsula.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you tell me what was the system or whether
any one was specifically charged with the duty of dissemination of
information which was necessary to the major fleet commanders?
Captain McCollum. I can't answer that question specifically, sir.
[£0] The radio intelligence organization, as I have pointed out, cer-
tain of their information was passed automatically to the three centers.
The system in the Department at the time was that the Intelligence
Division, with the information it had available to it, prepared state-
ments of intelligence which were presumed to be factual, without mak-
hig an estimate of enemy intention. This statement of fact, or pre-
sumed fact, was submitted then by the Intelligence Division to the
Plans Division and to the Chief of Naval Operations, who made the
decision as to what, if anything, was to be disseminated to the fleet
Admiral Hewitt. "Wliat would be your own action in the case of
receipt of information which you considered to be of serious import ?
Would you attempt to call special attention to it?
Captain McCollum. I would. My responsibility was definitely to
bring that to the attention of my Director of Intelligence immediately
and to recommend most strongly to him that he take such action as I
deemed necessary further up, and in almost every case we had direct
access to both Admiral Turner, Director of the Plans Division, and
to the Chief of Naval Operations himself.
I might remark in that connection that on the 1st or December I
prepared an analysis of the situation as it looked to me at that time
which I submitted to Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Naval In-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 19
telligence, on the morning of December 1st. I had actually prepared
this the day before and had slept over it overnight. He took this up
and made an appointment for us to see Admiral Stark, and about
noon on the 1st Admiral Wilkinson took me into Admiral Stark's
office and I read this statement and made verbal comments on my
views on it, and both Admiral Wilkinson and I urged that a dispatch
of "warning be sent to the fleet at [21] that time. We were
assured at that time that such a dispatch had been sent on the 27th
of November which definitely included the term, "This is a war warn-
Subsequent to this, the situation further deteriorated and I recom-
mend to Admiral Wilkinson and we did send dispatches out to our
naval attaches and various naval agencies throughout the Far East,
directing that they destroy all their codes and ciphers, and so on and so
forth, and to affirmatively report when these had been destroyed.
That dispatch was sent so that the fleet commanders on the chain going
out and coming back would have the information that that order
had been issued. Some time after the 1st, possibly around the 4th, I
prepared this
Admiral Hewitt. That is a copy of the memorandum to which you
refer ?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 10.")
Captain McCollum. I took that, coupled with additional informa-
tion, and drafted the general situation up in dispatch form, which
I presented to Admiral Wilkinson with the recommendation that it
be sent. Whether that was sent or not, I do not know.
Admiral Hewitt. What information regarding the Japanese naval
forces was furnished to the Army during the period from October
to 7 December?
Captain McCollum. The Far Eastern Section of the Military In-
telligence Division had full information on the situation. We were
in daily consultation. I saw Colonel Bratton or one of his assistants
daily. They usually came to my office in the afternoon. They had
full access to my charts showing the location and movements of ships,
and they had full [2^] access to all of the radio intelligence
information available in the Xavy Department. That was given by
me personally and verbally and the situation discussed from day to
day with officers of the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelli-
gence Division in the War Department, and that had been true for
some months past. We made no major move, for instance, such as
withdrawing our naval language officers from Japan or sending a
dispatch out to destroy all codes and ciphers, and so forth, as we did
to the naval attaches and other places, without notifying my oppo-
site number in the War Department what we intended to do.
Admiral Hewitt. That was Colonel Bratton?
Captain McCollum. That was Colonel Bratton, or his assistant,
who, I believe, at the time was Colonel Pettigrew. The people who
had access to that stuff in detail were Colonel Bratton, Colonel Petti-
grew, and Colonel Dusenberry, I believe.
Admiral Hewitt. Would the like apply to the information which
the Army received from their sources? Was that made available to
you?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir, so far as I know, sir.
20 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Hewitt. What, in general, sources of information did the
Army have?
Captain McCollum. The Army had information from their usual
attaches and observation posts such as they had in the Far East, and
the Army also had a radio intelligence organization which produced
certain information along this same line.
Admiral Hewitt. Which confirmed, in this case, your own infor-
mation ?
Captain McCollum. The Army had nothing to do with the Navy
systems. They didn't touch the Jap Navy systems. They were do-
ing work on Japanese diplomatic ciphers at that time and some minor
Japanese Army system. They [£3] weren't so well developed
or anywhere near as good as our naval radio intelligence service at
the time. But any information that they got through their services,
as far as I am aware, was made available to me through Colonel
Bratton's office in the War Department.
Admiral Hewitt. As I understand it, there was no particular
organization or system for effecting cooperation between your organi-
zation and the Army organization other than the mutual unofficial
relations you established ?
Captain McCollum. Those relations were unofficial, but they had
the official sanction and approval of both the Director of Naval Intel-
ligence and of the Director of Military Intelligence, Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, I think he is called, who were both not only glad of
that mutual confidence and trust and exchange of information, but
thoroughly encouraged it.
Admiral Hewitt. AVhat information have you concerning the
movements of Japanese submarines ? What information can you give
me concerning the movements of Japanese submarines in and around
Pearl Harbor on or prior to December 7th ?
Captain McCollum. I remember nothing specific, except we had
suspected for some time that Japanese submarines were keeping our
fleet based in Pearl Harbor under observation. At various times
through the preceding six months there had been reports of contact
by our destroyers on Japanese submarines. At one time, I think it
was in July or August, we actually suggested a search of a certain
sjDot in the ocean to the north of Midway where we believed that a
Jap provision ship and tanker might be rendezvousing with Jap sub-
marines who were observing our fleet movements. It was felt here,
and I feel that it was felt in the fleet, that our movements were
124] under Japanese submarine observation.
Admiral Hewitt. What was the nature of these contacts ? Under-
water sound by destroyers?
Captain McCollum. They would be underwater sound by de-
stroyer and sighting of a periscope and that sort of thing.
Admiral Hewitt. Sighting of a periscope ?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. Wliether it was actually a periscope
or not, I don't know.
Admiral Hewitt. Were any of them well authenticated ?
Captain McCollum. One or two seemed to us at the time to be fairly
well authenticated.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you remember the general location of those
contacts ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 21
Captain McCollum. Most of them weren't close in to Honolulu, but
one contact, if I remember correctly, was made in Molokai Channel
somewhere off Lahuna Roads — most of this is memory — in the ap-
proaches to and from the drill grounds of the fleet from Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Hew^itt. I have here two charts which have been submit-
ted as exhibits which purport to be reproductions in translated form
of a chart which was'taken from a Japanese midget submarine which
was stranded on the north side of Pearl Harbor. One is in a Pacific
Fleet Intelligence Bulletin and the other one came from another
source. They appear to be generally the same, except that as to the
captions in English, if you will notice, off Ford Island to the eastward,
one of them sajs, "Attack and sink enemy ship"; in the other one it
says, "Enemy ship sunk," and there are similar differences.
I would like to have you examine those and from your knowledge
of the Japanese lang-uage give us your ideas on that. What I have
in mind [^^5] generally is whether this is a record of an actual
trip by a submarine or whether it might have been an attack plan
with points marked at which certain actions should be taken. The
oriofinal is not available to me.
Captain McCollum. This, in the Pacific Fleet Bulletin dated 8
December 1944, I don't remember having seen before. This other
chart, marked "secret" here, is a translation of a photostat, later backed
up b}^ the original, of a Japanese chart which, to the best of my belief,
was recovered from, a Japanese midget submarine that was sunk in the
East Loch. I remember the original quite well and went over it per-
sonally, together with the best translators in the Far East Section of
the Division of Naval Intelligence, and it was my opinion at the time,
and it is my opinion now, that this was an attack plan. In other words,
this thing here was the planned scheme that the submarine commander
was going to utilize in making his entry to Pearl Harbor.
(A cop3^ of the book "Battle Report" was received and marked
"Exhibit 11.")
Captain McCollum. Take, for instance, the four Japanese ideo-
graphs appearing in the photostat in the book "Battle Report." I
point out these four ideographs here._ In the Japanese language the
tense of verbs is shown in general — there are exceptions — by append-
ing the ka7ia symbols which indicate the tense. Wliere the ideograph
alone is used it is not possible to determine the tense of the verb. Here
you have only four ideographs, which might be translated present,
past, future, or imperfect as the situation might warrant, because there
are no kmia symbols here showing the tense of the verb. It is not
possible to infer from this as to whether this is past tense or future
tense. The words "attack and sink enemy ship" [£6] in Ex-
hibit 4 are a literal translation. It is impossible to make a literal
translation in English without an English indication of tense. The
best you can do is to take each word for its value and put it down. In
this particular instance (referring to Exhibit 4), the word "and" is
interpolated.
Admiral Hev/itt. You stated that to the best of your knowledge
this came from a submarine which was sunk inside the Loch. The
other exhibit, the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin, makes the state-
ment that this was taken from a midget submarine which was stranded
on the north coast of Oahu. Could there have been two charts ?
22 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. One from one submarine and tlie other from
another ?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir, I think so, but it would have been
most unusual had they been exactly the same.
Admiral Hewitt. Unless they were attack plans.
Captain McCollum. That is true.
The stuff that is run in circles is stuff that was pencilled notations,
if I remember correctly. In other words, there was a distinction made
here (referring to Exhibit 4). In other words, what I am calling to
your attention here is you will notice certain of these things are circled,
like this (indicating). It is circled on this other chart (referring to
Exhibit 11). I think that those circles represent pencilled notations
by the submarine commander. In other words, he had his plan and
these notations were aid memoirs in assisting him in carrying out
this plan.
Admiral Hewitt. I notice here (referring to Exhibit 11) several
characters appearing in heavy black
Captain McCollum. Well, sir, that may be the way they are repro-
duced. These "are hand-written characters here (indicating), written
in by hand and [27~\ not by printing. They are both printing
and typewritten stuff. Now this stuff here (indicating) is hand-
written by the man himself.
Admiral Hev/itt. Can you tell me what this (indicating) is about?
Captain McCollum. I am not much good at this translation any
more, sir. I wouldn't venture a translation of that for you, sir. I can
get it done for you and check it, but I am not very good at this any
more. This first two is Hawaii. It is something about ships anchor-
ing off at certain times in Hawaii. I think, sir. In other words, ships
are sometimes anchored off in this general area or genferal direction
(indicating) . That is not shown on this (referring to Exhibit 4) .
Admiral Hewitt. One more question on this exhibit (referring to
Exhibit 4) . With respect to the times which are noted, the turning
point and arrival and so forth, there is a question in my mind whether
it relates to some zone time or whether it may be based on an H-Hour
for an attack, if it is an attack 'plan. Can you give me any comment
on that ? If it were a dawn attack, it wouldn't be Honolulu time.
Captain McCollum. No, sir. If it were any one of the standard
times at all, it would be Item time. All the Japanese Navy runs on
Item time, which is Tokyo time. That is standard' or has been standard
in the past. The impression that I have from this is that it is time
based on a zero hour.
Admiral Hewitt. Have you any information as to the probable
source of the other map, in the Intelligence summary, which differs ?
Captain McCollum. No, sir, I haven't.
Admiral Hewitt. Now we go back to the communication questions.
We have here Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court record, which contains
certain decrypted communications. Can you tell us how they were
obtained, decoded, evaluated, and distributed ?
[£8] Captain McCollum. These that I see here are decrypted
copies of Japanese diplomatic and consular dispatches. These dis-
patches were received in the Navy Department from the intercepting
stations in a variety of ways, some by direct transmission in the origi-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 23
nal by radio, others telegraph, and others by mail. AVhen they arrived
in the communication intelligence center, Navy Department, they were
decoded and translated. A nmnber of copies of the translations were
made, and books containing these translated dispatches were made up.
Those books were distributed by officer messenger to the Chief of
Naval Operations, Secretary of the Navy, Director of War Plans,
Director of Intelligence, Chief of Far Eastern Section of Naval In-
telligence, within the Navy Department, and the Naval Aide to the
President. A complete book was also taken by officer messenger to
the Secretary of State. Another complete books was taken over and
shown to the Far East Section of the Military Intelligence Division
of the Army and by them was distributed to the Secretary of War,
Under Secretary, and Chief of Staff, War Plans Division of the Gen-
eral Staff, and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and, I think, to the
head of what they called the Intelligence Branch of G-2, which was
the Foreign Intelligence Section. The book, in whole or in part, went
to the President, depending on what the Aide to the President thought
about it.
Admiral He^vitt. Now will you discuss the question of the "winds"
code and the messages using that code, the dispatch which previous
testimony indicates you prepared and which was allegedly not sent?
Captain McCollum. I don't quite understand your question.
Admiral Hewitt. I would like to have you discuss the subject of the
'•winds" code, what it was, the messages that were received using the
code.
[29] Captain McCollum. All right, sir. If we may lead up a
little bit, by the latter part of November it was apparent that the
Japanese were doing a great many things, that they expected that war
with the United States, Great Britain, or both might possibly break
out at any time, and that they were taking every possible step to make
sure that their intelligence organization and their diplomatic repre-
sentatives would be well advised. One of the schemes for this was
to use a Tokyo weather broadcast, which was normally with the ordi-
nary voice news broadcasts that came out from the commercial or
so-called commercial radio stations at Tokyo from time to time. There
was a message setting forth that by arrangements of using this
weather code and for having the thing repeated in certain sequence in
a broadcast, that in one instance it meant war with Russia ; in the next
instance it meant war with England, and another one was that it meant
war with the United States. Those were the three possibilities.
Admiral Hewitt. Was that war or a break in diplomatic relations ?
Captain McColluim. Well, a break in diplomatic relations. Instead
of war, the term used was, "In case relations are in danger," "danger
of cutting off our diplomatic relations." There is the verbatim trans-
lation ; in Japanese this says, "In case there is danger of cutting off
our diplomatic relations." The system followed that they used, a
term which was a smooth translation and in important cases the exact
rendition followed that in parenthesis. That was the Navy's system.
The Navy translators did that, in general.
Admiral Hewitt, Read that here (indicating), for instance.
Captain McCollum. (Referring to Document 15 of the Exhibit)
"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)
and the cutting off of international communications, the following
24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
warning will be [30] added in the middle of the Japanese lan-
guage daily short-wave news broadcast."
There is another dispatch (referring to Document 13 of the Exhibit) .
This (indicating) is circular 2353; this (indicating) is circular 2354.
It was another code. He coded it differently. It is a different message.
This says, "When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous,
we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general
intelligence broadcasts."
Admiral Hewitt. In your opinion, that is merely a different trans-
lation of the same phraseology?
Captain McCollum. No, sir, I think it is different phraseology in
the Japanese. In other words, I think that two different messages
were sent out, and possibly more, by the Japanese Foreign Office, which
may have been and probably were phrased differently in the original,
which gave differing translations on this answer.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know whether the actual message con-
taining the phrase which indicated the emergency with any particular
country was actually transmitted?
Captain McCollum. About the middle of the week 1-7 December,
the Federal Communications Commission reported the occurence of
one of the words in a Japanese news broadcast from Tokyo which
indicated war with Russia. In studying the message at the time, it
did not appear that this was a bona fide warning in the terms as set
forth. It did not appear in the proper sequence and proper number of
times in the broadcast, as I remember it, and it was thought at the
time that this was a bona fide weather report which happened to use
the code word for Russia. I know of no message receive prior to the
attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December which indicated [31]
tliat diplomatic relations with the United States would be ruptured.
After the attack on Pearl Harbor had been made, either late afternoon
of the 7th, Washington time, or some time on the 8th, a dispatch was
translated which indicated war with England. I think you have got
some exhibits on that point there.
(Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record was received and
marked "Exhibit 12.").
This is the Federal Communications Commission dispatch which I
referred to. It is Document number 2 Exhibit number 65.
Admiral Hewitt. That, in your opinion, is a bona fide weather
report ?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir, I think so. We don't have the ver-
batim Japanese of this thing about Russia here, but the translation
would indicate that it was other than as given here. For instance,
all this in here [indicating] is exact. Now, this translation indicates
that "Tokyo today, north wind slightly stronger, may become cloudy."
You see, there is too much in there. This is an abbreviated sort of
an imperative form used here. And besides, the announcer in this
thing starts out by saying, "This is in the middle of the news, but
today especially I will give a weather broadcast at this point." I
mean this is what he says in this [indicating].
The Document number 2 is from the Federal Communications
Commission, which came verbally to me and later on the thing written
out, which was from a plain language broadcast and it was our opinion
at the time, considering all of the facts, that this was probably a
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 25
bona fide weather broadcast and not the warning signal. If it were
the warning signal, it [32] would have applied to Eussia.
The Document number 4 of Exhibit 65, which was transmitted
between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, was the "winds" code
message announcing dangerous diplomatic relations with England.
The wording used in there meant Japan-British relations.
That is what is shown on Exhibit 12.
Admiral Hewitt. You have no knowledge of any message trans-
mitted which indicated the breaking of diplomatic relations with
the United States?
Captain McCollum. Not in the "winds" code, no, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you have it in any code ?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. By afternoon of Saturday, Decem-
ber 6th, a very long diplomatic dispatch was coming in to the Japanese
ambassador at Washington. On the morning of — that is Washington
time — December 7th, I was on duty in my office in the Navy Depart-
ment when the last parts of this very long diplomatic note were trans-
lated. Following this, a dispatch was translated, instructing the
Japanese ambassadors to present this note to the Secretary of State
at 1 o'clock, Washington time, December 7, 1941. The context of the
diplomatic note as contained in the dispatch which the Japanese
ambassador was directed to present to the Secretary of State indicated
a discontinuance of the negotiations between Japan and the United
States, with the strong inference that diplomatic relations would be
ruptured.
(Referring to Documents 38 and 89 of Exhibit 63 of the Naval
Court of Inquiry record). This first one doesn't make any particular
impression. There had been so many of these things along this line,
including telephone conversations backward and forward, that we
Iniew something was coming. And on the fourteen-part message, all
hands were up all night, working on it to [33] get it through.
Admiral Hewitt. That was the night of the 6th-7th ?
Captain McCollum. That was the night of the 6th-7th, yes, sir.
By late Saturday night, we had, if I remember correctly, thirteen of
the parts. They were transmitted, almost as soon as received, to the
Secretary of State, to the President, to the Chief of Naval Operations,
and to people over here in the War Department.
Early Sunday morning, when I arrived to take over the duty in my
office, where we had a special watch set since early November, the
fourteenth part was coming in ; and while Admiral Wilkinson and I
were discussing the situation about 9 o'clock Sunday morning, or
possibly earlier, nearer 8 : 30, with Admiral Stark, the instruction
which directed the delivery of the note to the Secretary of State
was brought in, shown to Admiral Stark, who immediately called
the "Wliite House on the telephone, and the draft was taken over to
the Secretary of State and to the White House. At the time, the
possible significance of the time of delivery was pointed out to all
hands.
Admiral Hewitt. You are referring to the 1 p. m. delivery time?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. In other words, it was pointed out
that 1 p. m. Washington time would mean about 8 o'clock in the
morning Honolulu time.
Admiral Hewitt. 7 : 30.
26 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain McCollum. 7 : 30, yes, sir, and very early in the morning
out in the Far East, that is, out in the Philippines and those places ;
and that we didn't know what this signified, but that if an attack
were coming, it looked like the timing was such that it was timed for
operations out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii at the time.
We had no way of knowing, but because of the fact that the exact
time for delivery of this note had [34-] been stressed to the
ambassadors, we felt that there were important things which would
move at that time, and that was pointed out not only to Admiral
Stark, but I know it was pointed out to the Secretary of State.
I was present and assisted in pointing it out to Admiral Stark and it
was taken over, with instructions to point that out, to the Secretary of
State. I was not present at that. I do not know. I would add, how-
ever, that the Secretary of State was not available at the time that the
Japanese ambassador desired to deliver their note, and it is my recol-
lection in the discussion at the time with the Chief of Naval Operations
and his admirals in there that that was a deliberate move on our part.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you remember who it was delivered the mes-
sage to tlie Secretary of State and the White House?
Captain McCollum. No, sir, I do not, but it was probably Lieutenant
Commander, now Captain, Kramer. I can't say that for sure because
some of these things Admiral Turner himself would run over to see the
Secretary, or Captain Schuirman would run over. The normal routine
would have been for Kramer to have delivered it.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall who was present when
Captain McCollum. Yes. May I elaborate a little bit ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
Captain McCollum. By mid-November the situation in the Far
East had appeared so acute that in addition to the usual duty watches
in the Division of Naval Intelligence, one of the three regular officers
assigned to the Far East Section — that is, Commander Watts, Colonel
Boone and myself — was constantly on duty in oiir offices, with adequate
office help, on a twenty-four hour basis.
I arrived at the Navy Department about 7 :30 or a quarter of eight
[SS] Sunday morning, December 7th, to take over the watch from
Commander Watts. Shortly after my arrival in the Navy Depart-
ment, Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Intelligence, arrived and
sent for me and we had a discussion concerning the situation in the Far
East. After fifteen or twenty minutes of the discussion, we received
word that Admiral Stark had arrived in the Navy Department and both
Admiral Wilkinson and myself went down to talk to Admiral Stark.
At that time he was alone. While we were in there discussing the
situation with Admiral Stark, various officers of the Division of Oper-
ations came into the office. I belicA^e Admiral Ingersoll was present.
Admiral Brainard, Admiral Noyes, Admiral Turner, and possibly Cap-
tain Schuirman. Tliere may have been others; I don't know. Cer-
tainly, Admiral Turner and Admiral Ingersoll yere present. Whether
they were present all the time, I do not know. There was considerable
going in and out at that time.
About 9 o'clock or a little earlier, I received word from the outside
room that one of my officers wished to see me urgently and I stepped
outside and received the last part of the message, concerning the final
note to be delivered on the United States by the Japanese ambassadors.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 27
Admiral Hewitt. The last part of the lon^ message ?
Captain McCollum. The long message. And the dispatch directing
its presentation on the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock Washington time.
1 held a short discussion with Lieutenant Commander Kramer as to
the significance at the time, and he it was who pointed out the times at
Honolulu as 7 :30 and in the Far East as dawn, and so on.
Admiral Hewitt. Before dawn. Wouldn't that be before dawn ?
Captain McCollum. Before dawn, yes, sir. That would be about
2 o'clock in the morning oiit there.
[36] I took that in to Admiral Stark and pointed out the possible
significance of the time in conjunction with the note, and it was also
pointed out to other officers of the Division of Operations who were
present at the time. Admiral Stark talked over the telephone, I think,
with the Chief of Staff of the Army, who presently came over with
Colonel Bratton. I was not there the whole time, and later on I came
back in and by 10 o'clock that morning we were given to understand
that a warning message had been sent to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, via Armj^ channels. In other words, the warning was to
go to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, with
instructions to transmit it to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, to go back to the "winds" code message,
there has been other testimony in prior inA'estigations that you, about
the 4th of December, prepared a long warning message to CincPac and
CincAsiatic, summarizing the significant events up to that date and
quoting the "winds" message. Can you tell us anything about that?
Captain McCollum. I did draft in dispatch form a general sum-
mary of the Far Eastern sitiiation, indicating the probability that dip-
lomatic relations might be ruptured at almost any time. I do not
remember specifically quoting any "winds" message or referring speci-
fically to a "winds" message in that dispatch. Normally I should not
have done it as that would have been passed over all radio intelligence
channels rather than the type of dispatch I had formulated, which was
in effect a cumulation of the situation, the moves made by the Japanese
and an estimate of the probable enemy reaction or probable Japanese
reaction to the situation.
Admiral Hewitt. It embodied
Captain McCollum. Yes. In effect it embodied the contents of my
[37] memorandum of the 1st of December, plus such additional
factors, such as the sighting of the Jap task force, and so on, which we
had at the time.
Admiral Hewitt. You say you submitted that draft. What hap-
pened to that ? Was the message sent ?
Captain McCollum. Well, sir, that draft, I don't know. That draft
was submitted to Admiral Wilkinson and before a thing of that sort
left the Navy Department, it had to be passed on by higher authority.
I do not believe that it was sent, but time passed and I am not certain
as to what became of it.
Admiral Hewitt. You say you submitted that to Admiral Wilkin-
son?
Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you remember what his comment or reaction
to it was ?
28 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain McCollum. I think he tried to get it out. As a matter of
fact, hindsight now, or recollection, I am quite sure that he tried to get
it out.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you have any particular conversation with
Captain Safford with respect to that ?
Captain McCollum. I don't remember having a conversation wholly
on the subject of the "winds" code. Safford and I discussed certain
aspects of radio intelligence from time to time because when I was un-
clear on the possible meaning or interpretation to be placed on some-
thing from the radio intelligence viewpoint, I made it a custom to go
down and see Safford and talk to him about it.
And as I say again, this "winds" message was a definite message, but
it was only one of various other communications we had. For instance,
we had a message directing the Japanese intelligence chief for the
Americas [38] to clear out of the country. We had another
message directing the consuls to burn all their papers. We had con-
stant messages regarding the presence of our ships in West Coast ports.
All of those we had. The Japanese had for some years, until the Divi-
sion of Naval Intelligence had been successful in breaking it up, a sys-
tem of reporting United States naval movements out of the West Coast
ports. That was done through the consuls, and starting in November
the number of messages coming in showed in effect, "For goodness sakes,
get these reports in promptly," and caused some note to be taken of
them.
(Referring to Document 40) This was a sample of a routine report
made by Japanese consuls throughout the Americas on the location
and movement of United States warships.
(Referring to Document 46) This document wasn't available be-
fore December 7th, nor, to my memory, was one couched in quite such
urgent terms transmitted to any other consulate in the United States.
However, it was evident from a study of general messages sent to
Japanese consuls, particularly in our West Coast ports, that the Japa-
nese were particularly anxious to learn the location and movements of
our naval forces on the West Coast.
Admiral Hewitt. How about Hawaii ?
Captain McCollum. Hawaii we didn't have in that detail yet. We
had some, but the general instruction covering Hawaii would cover all
the rest of it. The general instruction went out in a general circular
and Hawaii would be included.
These dispatches were to come — the one referring to ship movements
and location is under date of 18 November 1941. It is a routine war-
ship report from the Consul General at Honolulu to Tokyo, presum-
ably intercepted [39] by the radio intelligence organization
which translated it. It was translated on the 6th of December 1941.
This message must have been transmitted by the Japanese Consul
General in Honolulu and therefore originated at that station. It is
not possible to tell from the exhibit whether this dispatch was physi-
cally acquired in Honolulu or at one of the various intercept stations
located in other parts of the world.
Admiral PIewitt. What information can you give me on the in-
terception in Hawaii of Japanese telephone and cable messages by
ONI and the FBI or otherwise?
Captain McCollum. I know very little about that subject, sir. The
ONI had been making an effort to get a workable arrangement with
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 29
the telephone and cable companies, which, as I remember it, "was only
partially successful. Both the Federal Communications Commission,
so far as I am aware, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation came
much later into this field than we were, and, so far as I am aware, made
no serious effort to obtain this type of intelligence until a very brief
time before the outbreak of war with Japan.
Admiral Hewitt. Is'nt it a fact that there was a law which forbade
the commercial companies from furnishing that information?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Are there any other facts bearing on this ques-
tion that have not been previously mentioned, that you think would
be of assistance to me ?
Captain McCollum. I think. Admiral, that you have all the facts.
I would like to venture some observation of the general organiza-
tion of intelligence as it operated in the Navy before the war with
Japan and substantially as it is operated todaj' that I am not certain
in my own mind [40] are quite clear to people that might
read the records.
The ONI was not an omnipotent and over-all intelligence center
for the fleet as a whole. It operated primarily as an intelligence
center for the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy Department;
equipped to supply combat type of intelligence, which prior to out-
break of war is nearly ahvays closely related with diplomatic nego-
tiations. Each of our major commanders in the Pacific was equipped
with a staff of intelligence and with a radio intelligence staff which
served him directly. With the exception of more static types of
intelligence, such as the design of a Japanese battleship, and so on,
your combat intelligence was designed to function in the Navy De-
partment to advise the Chief of Naval Operations, at Pearl Harbor
to advise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, through his fleet
intelligence officer, and out in the Philippines
Admiral Hev/itt. May I interrupt you for a moment? You say
at Pearl Harbor to advise the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet. I
think you have mentioned before it was attached to the Commandant
of the FOURTEENTH Naval District.
Captain McCollum. It was attached to him, sir, but actually the
function was to advise CincPac. Similarly, such personnel were
administratively attached to ComSIXTEEN, but they worked opera-
tionally directly under CincAsiatic.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. Go ahead.
Captain McCollum. And in the Asiatic Fleet, which in some re-
spects, from an intelligence point of view, was our strongest organiza-
tion, to keep the CinC, Asiatic Fleet, advised.
The Division of Naval Intelligence, in addition to that, did try to
set up certain over-all intelligence agencies in foreign countries which
would [4-?] produce intelligence. In each case in the Asiatic
Theatre those intelligence agencies operating out there were made
known to the CinC, Asiatic Fleet, and their reports in every case
funneled to him and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Our
naval attaches, for instances, were under orders to submit copies
of every report that they made bdth to the Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic Fleet, and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as well
as to the Department. So, you had in effect a three point system
30 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in which combat intelligence common to any one of them was com
mon to all the others, with each Commander-in-Chief supreme in
his own area. And that is essentially the way it was functioned
throughout the war.
Admiral Hewitt. What would be the responsibility of the Asiatic
unit, for instance, to insure that intelligence wliich they received
was disseminated to the other commands ?
Captain McCollom. They would be guided in that by the policies
of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, as in turn they would be
guided by the over-all policy of the Chief of Naval Operations.
In general, that was for the Asiatic Fleet to keep CincPac and the
Department informed. In other words, they went right up the
chain of every one in the Pacific into the Department and it worked
back the other way.
Admiral Hewitt. The Office of Naval Intelligence was well or-
ganized apparently for the collection and evaluation of intelligence.
What means were used to disseminate the intelligence?
Captain McCollitm. Reports were disseminated by letter, in book
form, and by dispatch. In February, I think it was, of 1941 the Divi-
sion of Naval Intelligence, if it had ever had the authority, didn't have
it after that date of issuing estimates to the fleet of probable enemy
intentions. [4^] That was considered to be a function of the
higher echelon of command within the Department, and the Division
of Naval Intelligence was restricted to presenting what appeared to be
the facts of a situation for determination of what a prospective enemy
might do by higher authority within the Navy Department.
I might add, sir, some time prior to that, to be perfectly frank with
you, we had here from time to time issued a memorandum of just
what we thought about the situation. About February, 1941, that was
done away with and that stuff had to be cleared through Plans and,
I think, through Admiral Ingersoll.
Admiral Hewitt. 1941 ?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. Now, we continued from time to time
to prepare stuff, but a lot of things there, who prepared it and who
put out estimates of probable enemy intentions weren't clear to the
Division of Intelligence.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 4: 20 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m.
the next day.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 31
m PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIEY
Third Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the Gen-
eral Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Wednesday, 16 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's
Clerk Ben Harold, USNR
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. State your name and rank.
Captain Rochefort. Joseph J. Rochefort, Captain, U. S. Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. From about 15 May 1941 to about the end of
1941 you were in charge of communication intelligence, assigned to
the FOURTEENTH Naval District?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. As we understand it, there were two other com-
munication intelligence units, one in the Far East at Cavite and the
other in Washington, D. C.
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir, insofar as the Navy is concerned.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes, I am speaking of the naval communication
intelligence units.
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Who was in charge of the other units ?
Captain Rochefort. The unit in Washington was in charge of Cap-
tain E. F. SafFord, and the unit in Cavite was in charge of R. J. Fabian.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you tell me what in general was the mission
and scope of each ?
^4] Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. The mission of all three
stations was in general to exploit all cryptographic systems employed
by foreign powers and to develop what was then known as radio intel-
ligence but is now known as traffic intelligence organizations, and to
develop radio direction finder nets.
Admiral Hewitt. That was the general mission ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Wliat was the scope of each of those units ? What
was each one supposed to cover in area or in type of traffic or what ?
Captain Rochefort. During the latter part of 1941, the station at
Pearl Harbor was assigned the specific tasks of attacking personnel
code, administrative code, the code in use in the Marshalls Islands area,
and to exploit those systems. They were also directed to conduct re-
search on all Japanese naval systems except the five-numbered system.
Cavite was charged with the exploitation of information contained
in diplomatic systems and in five-numbered system.
The station in Washington was charged with the general control of
all three plus Japanese diplomatic systems and such other systems as
might have been directed by higher authority.
32 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Hewitt. As head of this unit, to %Yhom were you responsi-
ble for your work, the Navy Department, the FOURTEENTH Naval
District, or the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
Captail RocHEFOKT. My orders to that duty read to report to the
Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District. I assumed that
he was my immediate superior and I made all reports, other than
purely technical reports, to the Commandant.
Admiral Hewitt. What in general was the relation of your unit to
[4S] the District Intelligence Officer and the Fleet Intelligence
Officer?
Captain Rochefokt. The relationship with the District Intelligence
Officer was on the basis of a frank and over-all exchange of informa-
tion and views on a personal basis other than any information ob-
tained from ultra sources. The relationship with the Fleet Intelli-
gence Officer was to exchange all information available and to en-
deavor to obtain information as desired by him.
Admiral Hewitt. You have stated in your previous testimony that
your unit consisted of an interception unit, direction finder unit, and a
cryptographic research group. You will explain what each of these
are and how it functioned and who was in charge of each.
Captain Rochefort. The station at Pearl Harbor consisted in the
main of an interception unit which was stationed at Aiea radio sta-
tion in charge of Chief Radioman Langf ord ; a mid-Pacific direction
finder net with stations at Dutch Harbor, Samoa, Pearl Harbor, and
Midway. These were controlled in Pearl Harbor under the supervi-
sion of the then Lieutenant Commander Huckins. The decryption
Unit was responsible for the attack, exploitation, translation, and dis-
semination of all intercepted traffic. I was in direct charge of that
section as well as directly in charge of all sections.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, you stated in your previous testimony that
your sources of information, in addition to the work of your own unit,
were the other two combat intelligence units and other government
agencies, such as the FBI, the Army, and the FCC at Honolulu. You
also stated that the information furnished by these latter agencies was
of no value prior to December 7th, and stated before the Court of
Inquiry that the collaboration of these agencies was on a personal basis.
Will you explain what the [46] relationships were with the
FBI, the Army, the FCC, and the other intelligence agencies with
whom you dealt ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. With regard to the FBI, I met with
Mr. Shivers, the agent in charge, on frequent occasions and discussed
the general situation, particularly pertaining to Japanese in Hawaii,
but did not discuss any ultra matters. Mr. Shivers on his part kept
me informed as to what he was doing, possibly with some limitations.
The relationship with the Army dealt primarily with the G-2, Col-
onel Fielder, and was similar in nature to that carried out with the
FBI.
The relationship with the FCC was limited to technical matters,
particularly those pertaining to direction finding, location of unau-
thorized stations, and other similar matters.
Admiral Hewitt. Your relationship with the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, did that include matters concerning getting infor-
mation from commercial transmissions, telephone and cable ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 33
Captain Rochefort. No, sir. The reason for that was, sir, that the
FCC was not authorized to handle any ultra and I knew from personal
experience that all matters pertaining to the acquisition of traffic were
handled by the Washington unit.
Admiral Hewitt. You stated before Admiral Hart that any mes-
sage originating in one of the communication intelligence centers was
automatically sent to the other two, and before the Naval Court that
at Pearl Harbor they received all information of a technical nature
from Washington. I would like to ask you what information was so
received during October, November, and December, that is, from the
other combat units and from Washington.
Captain Rociiefort. I could not state in detail, sir, every message
because I do not have the files, but a typical message would be the
receii)t [47] of the so-called "winds" message from Cavite
on or about November 27th and the receipt from Washington of the
frequencies then employed by the Japanese in making voice broad-
casts. By "winds" message, I mean the message which established the
procedure for indicating war.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know of any intercept of any message
using that so-called "winds" code?
Captain Rochefort. What we referred to as the execute or the
message indicating war based on the code established in the "winds"
message has not been seen by me and I have made an exhaustive
search into all available records and can find no trace of any execute
of the "winds" message prior to the evening of 7 December Washington
time.
Admiral Hewitt. That message related to war w4th England, did
it not?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Was Pearl Harbor monitoring for that execute?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. Shortly after the receipt of the
message from Cavite previously referred to, we received a dispatch
from Washington directing us to establish a listening watch on the
most likely frequencies. I thereupon sent four language officers to
the intercept station at Aiea, where they covered on a twenty-four hour
basis one or more frequencies in addition to all the known broadcasts
from Tokyo. Results were nil.
Admiral Hewitt. With respect to your estimate of the location of
the Japanese fleet on November 26th, you stated before Admiral Hart
that it was your opinion that at least two Japanese carriers were at
that time in the Marshalls area. What was the basis of that estimate ?
Captain Rochefort. The estimate was arrived at after mature con-
sid- [4S] eration by the three or four officers best qualified
in the Pearl Harbor unit and embraced their considered opinion,
considering all tlie traffic which they had studied and including the
results of their past experiences with the Japanese in such operations
as the Hainan occupation the previous year. It was based entirely
on radio intelligence.
Admiral Hewitt. I hand you Exhibit 8. Will you identify those ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes. I don't recall this one (referring to
the first dispatch). I do not recall the receipt of this message from
OpNav to CinCAF, ComSIXTEEN, Chungking, Shanghai, Tokyo,
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 4
34 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and CincPac, 242239. I might have seen it, but I can't recall it.
This (referring to the second dispatch) I identify as the so-called
estimate by ComFOURTEEN, 260110, and I recognize the dispatch
from ComSIXTEEN, 261331.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, with respect to ComFOTIRTEEN's dis-
patch of the 26th, which was based on your estimate, you testified be-
fore Admiial Hart that the Commander-in-Chief and Commander
FOURTEENTH Naval District came to your office and discussed
the matter at great length, at least for an hour and a half, and in
answer to a question from Admiral Hart as to whether you recalled
the disagreement vrhich came to you from the other unit in the east
and was likewise communicated to the Commander-in-Chief, you
stated that you were almost positive that it was by reason of the fact
that all messages of that type were given to the Commander-in-Chief.
Wliat was said during the discussion between the Commander-in-
Chief, ComFOURTEEN, and you at that time in discussing that
situation ?
Captain Rochefort. In general terms, the Commander-in-Chief
wished to know the basis for the estimate, why we placed certain units
in certain areas, wished to know the distinction or difference between
the estimates of ComFOURTEEN and ComSIXTEEN, and what our
opinion was regarding the [49] location and direction of
movement of the "various Japanese forces. ComFOURTEEN also
inquired about the same information. Each point, as I recall, was
discussed in some detail by both admirals in my office. To the best
of my belief, that would be the 27th of November.
Admiral Hewitt. Was that before or after the war warning?
Captain Rochefort. I am quite sure it was after the receipt of the
war warning. My reason for saying that was, as I recall, the Com-
mander-in-Chief wanted to know what Washington's reaction was
and my reply was apparently the war warning or something of that
nature, but that was their reply.
Admiral Hewitt. I assume, then, you saw the war warning.
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir, I did see the war warning. That is,
the war warning of the 27th, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. How many carriers did the Japanese have at that
time ?
Captain Rochefort. They were generally considered as having
seven, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What was your estimate as to the location of the
other Japanese carriers, that is, after you placed two in the Mandates?
Captain Rochefort. We did not know, sir, where they were.
Admiral Hewitt. And that lack of knowledge was communicated
to Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What conferences. Captain, did you have with
Admiral Kimmel after November 27th and prior to December 7th and
who else was present and what was said at those conferences?
Captain Rochefort. There were several conferences in my office
[50] at which the Commander-in-Chief and the Commandant were
present to discuss what information our unit had available and to elab-
orate upon our daily summaries of location and disposition of Japanese
forces.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 35
Admiral Hewitt. Can you summarize in general terms the infor-
mation and deductions that were made as to the movements of the
Japanese fleet during the period 27 November to 6 December ?
Captain Eochefort. The communication intelligence summaries as
prepared by the ComFOURTEEN unit during the period 27 Novem-
ber to 6 December, inclusive, contained the following information :
(A) The fact that a large task force commanded by the CinC
Second Fleet and whose composition was fairly definitely established
and whose destination was likewise fairly well established.
(li) Several other items, including on 27 November the fact that
there was no further information regarding the presence of CarDiv
Five in the Mandates and that an air unit in the Takao area addressed
a dispatch to the SORYU and SHOKAKU.
It was further stated on November 27th that carriers are still located
in home waters.
On 28 November it was stated that there was no indication of move-
ments of any combined fleet units and that CinC Second Fleet was
particularly attentive in his dispatches to CarDiv Five and Seven.
On 30 November it was stated that the only tactical circuit heard
was one that the AKAGI and several Marus, and that CinC Second
Fleet sent a dispatch which included the HIYEI as an addressee,
which indicated that that vessel was a member of the Second Fleet
task force.
It was also stated on 30 November that the presence of a unit of
plane guard destroyers in the Marshalls indicated at least one carrier
in [51] the Marshalls, although this was not confirmed.
On 1 December all service radio calls were changed, and that this
indicated an additional progressive step in preparing for active opera-
tions on a large scale.
On 1 December, referring to carriers, a notation was made "no
change."
On 2 December from inconclusive evidence it appeared as if there
might have been a split or division in the normal or combined fleet
staff and that these might be two supreme commanders with
staffs; also a complete lack of information in regard to carriers, and
that despite the partial identification of 200 service calls, not one
carrier call had been located, which was a new low ebb.
On 3 December there was no information on submarines or carriers.
Also, on 5 December it was stated that there was no traffic from
the commander carriers or commander submarine force.
On 6 December it was noted that CinC combined fleet sent several
messages to the carriers, to the Fourth Fleet, and other major com-
manders. Commander submarines originated two messages, which
were his first since 1 December. He was believed to be definitely in
the Marshalls.
Admiral Hewitt. Captain, referring to Exhibit 3, which is a U. S.
Pacific Fleet Weekly Intelligence Bulletin of 8 December 1944, at page
13 you will find a statement of the composition of the Japanese forces
which attacked Pearl Harbor. Is that description of those forces
accurate, to the best of your knowledge ?
Captain Rochefort. It is accurate, to the best of my knowledge.
Admiral Hewitt. It was a fact, Captain, that the AKAGI was one
of the carriers in the force which attacked on December 7th, was
it not?
36 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Rochefort. Yes.
[S2] Admiral Hewitt. And also the SHOKAKU?
Captain Rochefort. Yes.
Admiral Hewitt. And tlie battleship HIYEI was also in that force,
was it not ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes.
Admiral Hewitt. Referring to the daily summaries of intelligence
information in your unit at Pearl Harbor during the period 27 No-
vember to 7 December 1941, Captain, what references do you find
to those three ships?
Captain Rochefort. On 27 November the communication intelli-
gence summary stated that an air unit in the Takao area addressed a
dispatch to the SORYU and SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located
in home waters.
On 30 November the statement was made in the above-mentioned
summary that the only tactical circuit heard was one that the AKAGI
and several Marus.
On 30 November it was stated that the CinC Second Fleet sent a
dispatch which included the HIYEI as an addressee and which placed
the HIYEI as a member of his task force.
Admiral Hewitt. In the light of later information, to what extent
are the statements made in that intelligence bulletin correct?
Captain Rochefort. In the light of later information, it appears
that the statements made in the answer above were correct or could
have been correct, except the one in regard to the HIYEI.
Admiral Hewitt. Caj)tain, what is the significance to be given to
the tactical dispatch which was, according to your information, sent
to the AKAGI on the 30th of November 1941 ?
Captain Rochefort. Normally whenever tactical circuits were
established within units of the fleet, it signified that an operation, such
as [o3] a fleet problem or a maneuver, was about to begin or
had already commenced.
Admiral Hewitt. What was your procedure. Captain, for dissemi-
nating this tjq^e of information between 27 November and 7 Decem-
ber and who received the information ?
Captain Rochefort. Copies were airmailed to the other communi-
cation intelligence units. Information considered to be of great im-
portance was sent by radio to the other communication intelligence
units. A copy of the communication intelligence summary was sent
to the Fleet Intelligence Officer daily during the early afternoon, ac-
companied by a trained RI officer for any discussions which the Fleet
Intelligence Officer had wish to conduct.
Admiral Hewitt. You stated before Admiral Hart that between
November 26 and December 7 very little radio information was ob-
tained by means of radio intelligence due to the lack of traffic. That
lack of traffic, as I understand it, was not over-all, but was lack of
traffic from ships at sea. Is that correct ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir, except as noted in the communication
intelligence summary, the volume of total traffic remained about the
same or increased, but the traffic which contained as an addressee or
as an originator one of the major units or major vessels was almost
non-existent.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 37
Admiral Hewitt. And some of the actual traffic, as I understand it,
consisted of repetitions of old messages which might, in the light of
later information, have been padding, is that correct?
Captain Rochefoet. Yes, sir. There was perhaps a certain amount
of padding or repeating of messages, but in our opinion at the time,
and our opinion today, of all of the trained RI personnel, there was no
attempt on the part of the Japanese to practice radio deception in
any of its forms.
Admiral Hewitt. You also stated in your previous testimony that
[54] 5^our unit did not assume that because you did not hear from
the large Japanese ships or units that they were all in port and that
it occurred to your unit that this silence definitely presaged another
offensive movement and that this was called to the attention of the
Commandant and the Fleet Intelligence Officer. That is correct?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What information was received concerning this
lack of traffic and its significance from the Far Eastern unit?
Captain Rochefort. I do not recall any specific message or messages
from the Far Eastern unit and therefore believe that any messages
they may have sent us in all probability added nothing to the picture.
Admiral Heavitt. What was the reaction of the Commandant and
the Fleet Intelligence Officer to this question of lack of traffic?
Captain Rochefort. Both officers were concerned and enjoined us
to make every effort to at least estimate or ascertain the location of
the missing units.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you recall on what date this was brought to
their attention ?
Captain Rochefort. I would say, sir, it was brought to their at-
tention almost daily. It was brought to their attention daily by means
of the communication intelligence summary and in addition to that
by telephonic conversations.
Admiral Hewitt. Did Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel or Cap-
tain Leighton know that on a prior occasion when similar traffic con-
ditions existed it preceded the advance and occupation of Hainan?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Did they make any comment to the effect that
this [55] might indicate another offensive movement?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir, I think it was generally agreed that
there was a definite offensive movement by every one connected with
the fleet or with my organization. The only error made was in the
direction.
Admiral Hewitt. In other words, they probably connected that
with the other indications of a large movement to the south?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. There was an air reconnaissance toward Jaluit
which was ordered by Admiral Kimmel in July, 1941. Have you any
information about that?
Captain Rochefort. No, sir, I have no information about any air
reconnaissance on Jaluit.
Admiral Hewitt. What was the relative period of silence prior to
the Hainan operation as compared with the period of silence which oc-
curred prior to December 7th and how was the first period of silence
evaluated by the intelligence unit?
38 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Rochefort. About the same, and the evaluation at the time
of the Hainan occupation included the statement of occupation of
Hainan.
Admiral Hewitt. The ONI Bulletin of 1 December 1941 stated that
the major portion of the Japanese carriers was in home waters. Did
you see this between December 1st and December 7th ?
Captain Rochefort. No, sir, I did not see any ONI estimate dated
1 December prior to 7 December.
Admiral Hewitt. Apart from the information of the movement
of Japanese naval forces and apart from the information from Ja-
panese telephone or cable messages, what other intelligence did you
receive during the period 1 December to 7 December 1941 ?
IS6] Captain Eochefort. Apart from telephonic, sir?
Admiral Hewitt. Excepting the Japanese telephone or cable mes-
sages.
Captain Rochefort. We received several messages from the Wash-
ington and Cavite units pertaining to the destruction of Japanese
cryptographic systems. We also received a report through the District
Intelligence Officer that the Japanese consulate in Honolulu was burn-
ing its papers and presumably cipher systems. This information was
passed on to all concerned.
Admiral Hewitt. The book "Battle Report" states that the United
States shortly before 7 December 1941 had two task forces at sea
and that Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo. What do you
know about that?
Captain Rochefort. To the best of my knowledge, Tokyo was not
informed of the presence at sea of the two task forces ?
Admiral Hewitt. Now, v/ith relation to the communications with
which the Japanese consul general at Honolulu was concerned that
you previously testified you had received about 1 December and of
which some, which you were able to decode prior to the attack, were
unimportant, and others were decoded after — how did you receive
those communications ?
Captain Rochefort. They were received from an officer messenger
from the District Intelligence Officer's office. I did not know, nor did
I inquire, as to how he had obtained them.
Admiral Hewitt. What communications were the}'? Do we have
copies of those?
Captain Rochefort. I do not have copies and do not know what
happened to the copies received from the ^DIO, FOURTEENTH
Naval District, but believe that duplicates will be in the Washington
file but unable to identify the same.
(A certified collection of dispatches supplied by Naval Commimica-
[57] tions. Navy Department, Washington, was received and
marked "Exhibit 13?')
Admiral Hewitt. There are three dispatches to which I direct your
attention. Captain, in that exhibit and request that you examine them
and explain whether or not you have ever seen them, and give us your
comments concerning them.
Captain Rochefort. I do not recall having seen Honolulu to Tokyo,
dated 6 December, number 253. I do not recall having seen Honolulu
to Tokyo, December 6, number 254. I do recall having seen Hono-
lulu to Tokyo, dated 3 December, number 245. This last message was
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 39
one of the group of messages received by the Pearl Harbor unit from
the District Intelligence Officer and due to the difficulties inherent
in the system, involving research, it was not deciphered until the night
of 10 December by the Pearl Harbor unit. It was shown to the Com-
mandant, who gave it to the Secretary of the Navy, who had just ar-
rived. At the Secretary's direction, it was shown to no one except the
Commander-in-Chief and the District Intelligence Officer, who was di-
rected verbally to take whatever action was necessary with the local
officials, including the FBI.
This message referred to above prescribed a set of signals to be
made, indicating the types of ships in the Hawaiian area, the types
of American vessels in the Hawaiian area, and their activities, and
included arrangements for various lights in houses, on beaches, signals
on boats, want ads in Honolulu radio stations, and signals on Maui
Island.
Admiral Hewitt. What was the source of that message?
Captain Rochefort. The source, sir ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes, of that message you just discussed.
Captain RociiEroRT. From Honolulu to Tokyo.
Admiral Hewitt. The source from which you received it.
[S8] Captain Eochefort. The District Intelligence Officer, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Captain, that was one of the group of messages
which, I believe, you said you received on or about December 2nd or
3rd, is that correct ?
Captain Rochefort. That is correct.
Admiral Heavitt. Do you recall the substance of any of the other
ones of that group of messages ?
Captain Rochefort. I do not.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you at any time before December 7th receive
copies of any Japanese reports concerning American ships in Pearl
Harbor or American preparations in Pearl Harbor to meet attack?
Captain Rochefort. Not to the best of my knowledge. I have here
all the messages we could dig up on the subject and it is not there.
Admiral Hewitt. In addition. Captain, to the message concerning
the signals which you have just discussed, you examined, did you not,
a message of December 6th from Honolulu to Tokyo, number 253,
and a message from Honolulu to Tokyo of December 6 bearing the
number 254? Would you read the two messages into the record and
call attention to the date of translation?
Captain Rochefort. The message number 253, dated 6 December
1941, from Honolulu to Tokyo in system PA-K2, reads as follows:
1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage
balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four
or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are eonsideriug the use
of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii
is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl
Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, [59] nor have they
selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any
training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present
time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult
to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have
actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water
and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. Hickam, Ford
and Ewa. there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine
that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage
for a surprise attack against these places.
40 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. In my opinion the battlesliips do not liave torpedo nets. Tlie details are
not known. I will report the results of my investigation.
A notation on the bottom of this dispatch indicates that it was trans-
lated on the 8th of December 1941 by the Army.
The message number 254, from Honohilu to Tokyo on December 6,
1941, also in system PA-K2, states as follows :
1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were
and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor
on the 6th :
9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in
addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy
cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).
2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air
arm.
This message was translated on the 8th of December 1941 by the
Army.
Admiral Hewitt. Do j^ou know how the Army secured those mes-
sages ?
Captain Rociiefort. No, sir, I do not know how they secured them
or [60] when. Safford can answer that question, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. There has been testimony to the effect that both
the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation tapped telephone wires of the Japanese Consul General at
Hawaii. What do you know about this ?
Captain Rochefort. I know nothing about it, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, concerning the movement of Japanese sub-
marines in and around Pearl Harbor on or prior to 7 December, what
do you know of the captured Japanese map which apparently shows
either the actual or proposed movement of a Japanese submarine?
Captain Rochefort. I have a copy of a chart in four sections.
Admiral Hewitt. Photographic copy?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir, photographic copy of a chart in four
sections, which is a copy of the chart removed from the Japanese sub-
marine which went aground off Bellows Field, Oahu, shortly after
7 December. This chart indicates courses and distances into Pearl
Harbor and around Ford Island counterclockwise and also contains
several notations written in pencil.
It is my considered opinion that the submarine from which this
chart was obtained did not transit Pearl Harbor on 7 December and
that the marks in pencil, which had been erroneously translated as
"begin firing" and "attack and sink enemy ship" or "enemy ship
sunk", were actually notations made by the submarine commander
prior to his arrival in the Hawaiian area and were merely his plan of
approach and entry into Pearl Harbor (referring to Exhibits 3
and 4).
(The four photostatic sections referred to were received and marked
respectively "Exhibit 14A," "Exhibit 14B," "Exhibit 14C," and "Ex-
hibit 14D.")
[6J] I had received a copy of the original chart from which
this photographic copy has been made shortly after its being obtained
from the submarine in question and did study the chart in its original
form on or about 8 December. It is impossible to state with regard
to the Japanese characters referring to "begin firing" and "attack and
sink enemy ship" whether they are in the past, present, or future tense.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 41
However, in view of the fact that the submarine when obtained did
have its two torpedoes aboard, it would appear that the vessel did not
at that occasion sink or fire any torpedo at American vessels in Pearl
Harbor.
Admiral Hewitt. What is your deduction as to the meaning of the
times indicated at the different points that the courses have ?
Captain RocHEroRT. My deductions as to the times at the various
turning points are that they were the submarine commander's pro-
posed times for arriving at such points, all times being minus 9 or
Tokyo time.
Admiral Hewitt. Which is how many hours different from Hono-
lulu time ?
Captain Rochefort. Which is four and one-half hours ahead of
Honolulu local time, which is plus lOi/^.
He would have been off the entrance to Pearl Harbor at 0510 Sun-
day morning Honolulu time and he would have arrived at the gate
on or about 0530 Honolulu time.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall at about what time the actual
midget submarine was sunk in Pearl Harbor and at about what part
of the harbor ?
Captain Rochefort. A midget submarine was sunk in the vicinity
of East Loch during the forenoon of 7 December. The exact time
I do not recall.
Admiral Hewitt. Was there a similar map recovered from the sub-
ma- [62] rine that was sunk inside Pearl Harbor ?
Captain Rochefort. If so, I have never seen it, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. On the original map (Exliibit 14 A) were the lo-
cations of ships plotted in pencil or in ink ?
Captain Rochefort. They were plotted in ink.
Admiral Hewitt. And what were the notations as to the
Captain Rochefort. The notations adjacent to each ship marker
were the names of the ships.
Admiral Hewitt. Were those in pencil or in ink ?
Captain Rochefort. I don't remember that. There they looked to
be in ink.
Admiral HE^VITT. And the times of the turning point are in ink?
Captain Rochefort. The times of the turning point are in ink.
Admiral Hewitt. And the remarks "prepare to fire" and "attack and
sink" are in pencil ?
Captain Rochefort. Pencil, yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. That is not the photograph of the original chart,
but it is a photograph of a copy of it (referring to Exhibit 14A) ?
Captain Rochefort. No, sir, this is a photograph of the original, I
am pretty sure about that.
In connection with the track of the submarine on course 295 between
times 0500 and 0510, both Tok3'0 time, it would appear impossible for
the submarine to have steered such a course due to the fact that at that
time United States vessels were anchored or moored in the area trav-
ersed by that course.
Admiral Hewitt. What do you know about submarine contacts that
were made prior to December 7th ?
[6o] Captain Rochefort. During my service in the fleet imme-
diately preceding my detail to the FOURTEENTH Naval District, we
42 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
had at least several submarine contact reports in the immediate vicinity
of the entrance to Pearl Harbor. None of these contacts developed into
actual submarines.
Admiral He\\t;tt. Do you mean by that that they were never actually
determined to be submarines ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. I was trying to avoid the use of the
word "negative" there because we didn't know.
Admiral Hewitt. They weren't positively determined to be sub-
marines ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Is that v/hat you mean ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. None of these contacts were positively
determined to be submarines.
Admiral Hewitt. According to this book "Battle Report," about
0500 on 7 December a naval radio station on Oahu intercepted and
logged a conversation between the WARD and CONDOR concerning
the sighting of a submarine some time earlier. What do you know
about that ?
Captain Rochefort. I haven't heard of such a conversation prior to
this, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, it appears from previous testimony that it
was believed on 7 December after the initial air attack that the attack-
ing force was located to the south of Pearl Harbor and that certain
orders were sent out to search for and intercept Japanese forces in
that direction. What information do you have on that?
Captain Rochefort. Wlien the attack commenced, the unit at Pearl
Harbor lost all communication with the direction finder stations, one
of which was located at Lualualei and the other at Aiea ; consequently,
no [64] bearings were received from the direction finders at
these two locations by the communication intelligence unit. The direc-
tion finder at Lualualei, being unable to deliver its bearings, finally
broadcast by radio a bearing obtained of one of the attacking units.
This bearing was allegedly received by the Commander-in-Chief as
being an alternate bearing, either 357 true or 178 true. The direction
finder station stated later to me that they had transmitted the bearing
as 357. If a reciprocal bearing was given to the Commander-in-Chief
by radio, it was the first instance, to my knowledge, that that particular
type of direction finder, namely, a CXK, gave a reciprocal bearing.
Admiral Hewitt. In other words, that type was capable of obtaining
a unilateral bearing?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. That was the number one direction
finder that we had at that time in the Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. And that is all the information on that particular
occurrence that you have ?
Captain Rochefort. That is all that I have on that, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What was your system of communication with
Lualualei ?
Captain Rochefort. The system of communication with Lualualei
was by telephone which utilized short stretches of wire between Pearl
Harbor and Lualualei, partly Army cable and partly commercial tele-
phone lines. It was claimed at the time that the communication sys-
tems failed because of sabotage, but after considerable study and re-
search on our part, we believed it was due to actions of our own per-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 43
sonnel, that is, United States personnel, whereby in setting up new
circuits, telephone and otherwise, our circuits were discontinued.
Admiral Hewitt. That action, then, would have been by the Army?
[65] Captain Kochefgrt. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, concerning relationship with the Army in
Oahu, what information, to your knowledge, was furnished to the
Army, particularly during the critical period 27 November to 7 De-
cember ?
Captain Eochefort. The war warning was given to the Army, as
was stated in the dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief. In my sev-
eral talks with Colonel Fielder subsequent to the 27th, in which we
exchanged opinions, I gathered the impression that he was as well
informed on current affairs as we were in Pearl Harbor. I did not
give the Army G-2 any ultra information, first because the only ultra
that was available pertained to destruction of cryptographic material
and had no bearing on the local G-2 situation; secondly, because the
Army G-2 in Honolulu was being furnished such ultras as was con-
sidered necessary by the War Department. It is my recollection
that the Army received the information regarding burning of papers
in the Japanese consulate in Honolulu at the same time that we
received it.
Admiral Hewitt. Did they receive any information as to your
estimates of the location and movements of the Japanese fleet?
Captain Eochefort. Not from me, they did not, sir. If they re-
ceived such information, they would have received it from the Com-
mander-in-Chief.
Admiral Hewitt. May I ask who Colonel Fielder was?
Captain Eochefort. Colonel Fielder was G-2, sir, to General
Short, the opposite number to Layton.
Admiral Hewitt. The relationship with the Army, as I under-
stand, was entirely on a personal basis? There was no official system
set up for joint operations?
Captain Eochefort. No, sir, there was not.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know whether any reconnaissance was
conducted [66] bj^ Army planes at any time ?
Captain Eochefort. No, sir, I do not know of any air reconnais-
sance conducted by the Army, except that which was being conducted
during 1941 at the direction of the Commander-in-Chief, which was
an inshore patrol.
(Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record was received and
marked "Exhibit 15.")
Admiral Hewitt. I would like to ask you what information you
had on the messages in that exhibit prior to 7 December.
Captain Eochefort. The only ones that I have seen, sir, are these
here because these are the onlv ones transmitted by Washington to
CincPac and ComFOUETEEN (indicating those of 1 and 3 De-
cember). It tells London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to
destro}^ the purple machine, and one on 1 December about giving
plans to entice the British to invade Thailand; one on 26 November
covering the Tokyo voice; and one on 13 November which went to
ComSIXTEEN, but it doesn't say whether it went to CincPac or not,
giving the U. S. military situation in the Philippines. That is all we
got.
44 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The messages referred to above were received by the Pearl Harbor
unit from the Navy Department.
In addition, I have seen the gist of the message of November 19th
(contained in Exhibit 15) .
Other than the above, I haven't seen any, to the best of my knowl-
edge, of the messages contained in this exhibit.
Admiral Hewitt. There has been previous testimony relating to
a commercial telephone conversation between Tokyo and a Japanese
resident at Hawaii some time during this critical period between the
1st and 6th of [67] December. It has been termed the "Mori
conversation" and it was more or less unintelligible. Do you know
anything about that ?
Captain Rochefort. No, sir, I do not.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, as you know, the purpose of this investiga-
tion is to supplement previous investigations in order to obtain all
the facts. Is there any fact bearing on this matter, of which you have
Iviiowledge, which hasn't been mentioned ?
Captain Rochefort. No, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. That is all.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 4: 40 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m.
the next day.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 45
[.68] PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIRY
Fourth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the
General Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Thursday, 17 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John F. Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
Two witnesses entered, each read the precept, and each was duly
sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. Will each of you state his name and rank.
Captain Masox. Redfield Mason, Captain, U. S. Navy.
Commander Fabian. Eudolph J. Fabian, Commander, U. S. Navy.
Admiral HE^\^:TT. Captain Mason, for the benefit of the record,
will you state what your duties were during 1941 ?
Captain Mason. I was Fleet Intelligence Officer on the staff of
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, sir.
Admiral Heavitt. Will you do the same. Commander?
Commander Fabian. I had been the Officer-in-Charge of the radio
unit on Corregidor and had been relieved in September, but my
orders were, by the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to remain
there and to assist as much as I could.
Admiral He^\t;tt. That was in view of the situation existing at the
time ?
Commander Fabian. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Commander Fabian, what was the mission of
the radio intelligence unit at Corregidor ?
Commander Fabian. Our mission. Admiral, was to maintain a unit
for \69^ study of enemy fleets and communications in order,
first, to keep track of their peacetime intentions; second, to prevent
against a surprise attack, insofar as possible, or an attack without a
declaration of war ; and, third, to keep as well up as possible on the
organization, methods, and so forth, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Of the Japanese fleet ?
Commander Fabian. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What equipment did you have there ?
Commander Fabian. I had twenty-six radio receivers, ranging
from low frequency to high frequency, had a set of business machinery
and the appurtenances necessary for the interception of both high
speed and low speed enemy transmissions.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you have a direction finder?
Commander Fabian. Yes, sir. In addition to that, we had a direc-
tion finder.
Admiral Hewitt. And what about decrypting?
Commander Fabian. For the decryption of naval traffic, we had
seven officers, and nineteen men, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What, in general, were the arrangements for dis-
semination of radio intelligence information to the Asiatic Fleet,
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and to the Army out there ?
46 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander Fabian. The American Navy radio intelligence organ-
ization had a private cryptographic system which was held by
ComSIXTEEN, which was our unit, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic
Fleet, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, and OpNav, sir. Now, as for
dissemination to the Army, locally all of our information was handed
to the Fleet Intelligence Officer in Manila, who provided for liaison
with the Army. Insofar as the Army in Washington, [70] it
was all carried on by OpNav, sir.
Admiral Hewiti'. Did you have any specific tasks which were as-
signed by the Navy Department, any particular types of traffic to
watch, and so forth?
Commander Fabian. No, sir. In general, we were assigned the mis-
sion that I indicated previously, and in carrying out that mission, we
covered certain circuits from which we could get most of the informa-
tion we desired, sir, and the greatest volume of material. In addi-
tion to that, we provided for intercept of diplomatic traffic. In con-
nection with the dij)lomatic traffic, sir, certain types were immediately
enciphered and sent back to Washington as soon as it was intercepted.
Admiral Hewitt. Did that go to Pearl Harbor also, the Pearl Har-
bor unit ?
Commander Fabian. No, sir. To the best of my knowledge, they
weren't performing any cryptanalysis or reading of diplomatic system.
Admiral Hewitt. Captain Mason, have j^ou got anything to add to
that?
Captain Mason. I can add a little bit about the dissemination to
the Army locall}^ The Army was furnished daily a copy of all dip-
lomatic translations that had been made by the unit at Corregidor.
The purely naval matters, when our intelligence came from purely
naval traffic, inasmuch as there wasn't any translating going on as a
matter of fact, they weren't furnished any copies of either dispatches
that we sent to CincPac or Washington or received from them, but I
conferred quite frequently with the head of the intelligence depart-
ment in the Philippine Army Department and always provided at
least — I can't be too specific on the point of how frequently, but quite
frequently — our estimate of the locations of the Japanese fleet. A.s I
recall now, I didn't give him the source of this [7i] information
but graded it as "doubtful" or "possible" or whatever we thought of it.
Admiral Hewitt. Did the Army out there have any similar sources
of information ?
Captain Mason. No, sir. That is correct, isn't it?
Commander Fabian. They had an intercept unit, but they made no
local attack, I believe, sir.
Captain Mason. It was copying Army and diplomatic traffic.
Commander Fabian. That is right.
Admiral Hewitt. Was the exchange of information between you
and the Army complete? I mean did you receive all the information
they had as well as giving them all the information you had?
Captain Mason. So far as I know, yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. You were in close contact most of the time?
Captain Mason. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What diplomatic codes were assigned to the unit
in the Philippines for reading ?
Captain Mason. There were assigned the machine cipher known as
purple, machine cipher known as red, and the diplomatic code known
as J with the current one being 19.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 47
Admiral Hewitt. What was the relative order of importance of
those codes?
Captain Mason. You mean as we deemed it?
Admiral Hewitt. As you deemed it.
Captain Mason. Well, we considered that the information of the
greatest value would more likely be obtained from the purple. It
should be made clear, I think, in the record that the exploitation of
this traffic [7£] was for the purpose of local information
chiefly, seeing that we might be the first to intercept the message and
that the unit was not responsible for the recovery of the keys neces-
sary to read it. That was done in Washington and forwarded back
to it. And all purple traffic intercepted and certain other traffic in
the red and J-19 codes were immediately enciphered and sent to Wash-
ington. That is whether we read it later or not.
Admiral Hewitt. What, in general, was the information obtained
from the Japanese diplomatic codes during the period 27 November to
7 December ?
Captain Mason. Well, we knew from purple dispatches that nego-
tiations then being carried on in Washington between the Japanese
and ourselves were not progressing satisfactorily and would probably
be broken off. I think that is as general as I can make a statement.
Admiral Hewitt. You saw the war warning dispatch from OpNav
on November 27th ?
Captain Mason. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Did that contain any information which was new
to you or surprising?
Captain Mason. Not of a surprising nature, no, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. I have here a file of dispatches which has been
previously submitted in evidence and marked "Exhibit 15." I would
like to have both of j^ou look them over and let me know which, if
any, you saw. They are a file of diplomatic and consular dispatches.
Captain Mason. I have seen this file, Admiral, both Commander
Fabian and I. The only message which we specifically remember hav-
ing received or seen was number 15 of Exhibit 15, which we received
from the Britisli unit at Singapore and sent to OpNav, information to
ComSIXTEEN, CincPac, and [73] ComFOURTEEN, in
CinCAF dispatch 281430 of November, 1941.
Admiral Hewitt. Wliat was the gist of that ?
Captain Mason. That was the setting up of the "winds" code.
Admiral Hewitt. I have here a file of Japanese dispatches which
have been marked "Exhibit 13" which T would like to have you examine
and state what messages, if any, you had seen.
Captain Mason. I do not recall having seen any messages in tliis
exhibit.
Admiral Hewitt. Commander Fabian ?
Commander Fabian. Yes, sir. I can't specifically remember any
of these. Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall having seen any messages referring
to the ships or locations of ships at Pearl Harbor ?
Captain Mason. I do not.
Commander Fabian. Nor I, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Wliat Japanese naval codes had been broken at
Corregidor ?
48 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander Fabian. The Corregidor unit, Admiral, was working
on the naval system known as JN-25, which was the system containing
the greatest volume of Japanese dispatches.
Admiral Hewitt. To what extent were you successful in breaking
the code ?
Commander Fabian. We were in the initial stages, sir. We had an
established liaison with the British unit at Singapore. We were ex-
changing values, both code and cipher recoveries, but we had not de-
veloped either to the point where we could read enemy intercepts.
Admiral Heavitt. Is it a fac't, then, that most of your information
[74] as to the location and movements of the Japanese fleet were
obtained entirely from traffic analysis rather than decryption?
Commander Fabian. That is true, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Concerning your estimates of the location and
movements of Japanese naval forces from 26 November to 7 December
1941, are you familiar with the dispatches contained in exhibit number
8, which I submit to you ?
Commander Fabian. Yes, sir.
Captain Mason. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What difference, if any, existed between the esti-
mate of the ComFOURTEEN unit and the ComSIXTEEN unit?
Commander Fabian. The ComFOURTEEN unit indicated a strong
concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls and also
indicated that one CarDiv unit was present in the Marshalls. In the
same dispatch in which they gave their estimate, they requested our
comment, to which we rej^lied that we could not confirm their thought
that there were carriers and submarines in force in the Mandates. We
believed that all the First and Second Fleet carriers were in the Sasebo-
Kure area.
Admiral Hewitt. Then your dispatch was rather a statement that
you were unable to confirm the FOURTEENTH District estimate
rather than a f)ositive disagreement?
Commander Fabian. That is correct, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What dispatches relating to Japanese movements
were sent by ComSIXTEEN or Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, to
OpNav or CincPac after the 26th of November dispatch ?
Commander Fabian. From the standpoint of the RI unit on Corregi-
dor, sir, we initiated a dispatch around the 1st of December containing
the [7-5] movement report of the Commander-in-Chief, Second
Fleet, on his departure from the Empire area and his prospective move-
ments through the various communication zones down to the Indo-
China area, sir.
In addition to the dispatch just mentioned, ComSIXTEEN trans-
mitted to CincPac, OpNav, and ComFOURTEEN, comment on AS-
TALUSNA Shanghai 270830, regarding locations of enemy ships and
added information indicative of a shift of 4,000 men to the Mandates.
On 30 November we originated a dispatch indicating a change of
"orange" call signs, and on 1 December a message indicating enemy
fleet movements or enemj'^ ship movements, plus indication of the CinC
Second's movement from the Kure-Sasebo comnmni cation zone prob-
ably en route to South China waters.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you identify these (handing dispatches to
the witness) as the dispatches which you sent?
Commander Fabian. Yes.
(The dispatches referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 16.")
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 49
Admiral Hewitt. What other information did. you have concerning
the Japanese fleet movements from 26 November to 7 December 1941?
Captain Mason. Is that other than RI ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
Captain Mason. Information concerning Japanese fleet movements,
other than that obtained from traffic analysis, consisted of one or two
reports, the exact nature of whicli I am not certain, from the Assist-
ant Xaval Attache, Shanghai, and in addition a number of sighting
reports obtained from our reconnaissance planes. There was one on 2
December from CincAF to OpNav, information CincPac, dispatch
020315, reporting the sighting of nine [76] submarines. I
don't remember just where they were now, but it will be contained
in that dispatch. Another on 2 December at 0730, the same originator
and the same addressees, reporting the sighting of three submarines
and twent3'-one transports and the presence of enemy patrol planes
over Camranh Bay. One on 6 December, same originator, same ad-
dressees, at 1255, reporting a convoy in Camranh Bay. Those are all
the messages that have been found and to which I can positively testify.
I have a fairly clear recollection of another one or two, and one
made by the British which included the sighting of the heavy fleet
units, the battleships and the cruisers, after they had turned westward
around Poulo Condore, French Indo-China, which was probably about
twenty-four to forty-eight hours prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
I can't recall positively, but I feel certain that our own reconnaissance
planes had sighted at least the cruisers of that task force about twelve
hours or more previously, which we reported also. I don't recall any
other information that we had on movements during that period, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. During the critical period from 26 November to
7 December, did you have any information, by deduction or other-
wise, as to the location and movements of any Japanese carriers?
Commander Fabian. Our estimate summarized in ComSIX-
TEEN's 261331 indicated that v:e believed all carriers, all known car-
riers, were in the Kure-Sasebo area.
Admiral Hewitt. You mentioned the aerial reconnaissance, your
own aerial reconnaissance. Can j^ou give me an idea of the extent
of that and approximate dates?
Captain Mason. I can't give the exact dates, Admiral, except that
I know some of it was going on before we received the war warning
and that l??] it was intensified thereafter. We flew such
aerial reconnaissance so as to insure that no surface force could ap-
proach Luzon from any of what might be termed the expected direc-
tions and escape detection. Chieflj^, as I recall it now, we put most
stress on the lines from slightly eastward of the east coast of Formosa
down through Bako, where they had a naval base, and Hainan, where
they also had a naval base, and also towards Comranh Bay in the later
days after the sighting of these various units moving south. We also
had in the late days some sort of an agreement with the Dutch about
reconnaissance toward Palau, thinking that perhaps an attack on the
Mindanao and Davao area would come from that direction. I am not
prepared to try to give exact details of that because I can't recall that,
sir. The Dutch were flying, I am certain, something up from the
general Halmahera area towards Palau and, I think, we were flying
something along the general Davao-Palau line. And the British, too,
in the final days were flying reconnaissance out of Singapore towards
79716—46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 5
50 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Camranli Bay and over the Gulf of Siam. I think that is about all I
can really recall about the reconnaissance.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall receiving any information from
the British and Dutch sources?
Captain Mason. From the British, yes, sir. I have mentioned it
previously. They sighted the task force that was to eventually in-
vade Malaya somewhere in the general Poulo Condore area.
Admiral Hewitt. I have here an exhibit which is a Pacific Area
Intelligence Bulletin. It gives information obtained from a Japanese
prisoner of war as to the composition of the task force which attacked
Pearl Harbor. Will you look at that and see if you had anj^ radio
intelligence concerning any of those ships in the period 26 November
to 7 December?
Commander Fabian. No, sir. I feel sure our last definite informa-
[78] tion about carriers was summarized in the dispatch I referred
to which was originated on the 26th.
Admiral Hewitt. Concerning the "winds" code in the dispatch of
28 November which you recalled having seen, what steps were taken to
monitor for the use of this code and what were the results'?
Commander Fabian. We assigned one receiver to cover the Tokyo
voice broadcasts and each broadcast was listened to by a linquist.
In addition to that, we assigned one receiver on a twenty-four hour
basis to the Navy Morse press broadcast. The materials therefrom
were copied constantly and delivered to the linguists and no indication
of any of the phrases set up in the "winds" message appeared.
Captain Mason. The British unit at Singapore was also monitoring
the same circuits and it was agreed that anything received by either
unit would immediately be exchanged.
Admiral Hewitt. Nothing was received ?
Captain Mason. Nothing was received from that.
Admiral Hewitt. This book called "Battle Report," which I show
you, contains a statement that the United States had two task forces
at sea shortly before the Pearl Harbor attack and that the Japnese
espionage had so informed Tokyo. Have you any information as to the
basis for that statement?
Captain Mason. I have none, sir.
Commander Fabian. Nor I, sir.
Admiral Hewitt, Did you receive any information by means of in-
terception of Japanese cable or telephone messages ?
Captain Mason. None, sir.
Commander Fabian. No, sir.
Admiral Hev>^itt. Have you any information concerning the opera-
tion [79] of Japanese submarines in and around Pearl Harbor ?
Commander Fabian. None, sir.
Captain Mason, None, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. As you Icnow, the purpose of this investigation is
to supplement the previous investigations in order to obtain all the
facts. Are there any facts bearing on this matter of which you
have knowledge which have not previously been mentioned ?
Commander Fabian. None that I recall, sir.
Captain Mason. No, sir.
(The witnesses were excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 2: 50 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m.
the next day.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 51
[SO] PKOCEEDINGS OF^THE HEWITT INaUIRY
Fifth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General
Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m,, Friday, 18 May 19i5.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John F. Baecher, USNE ; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
Two witnesses entered, each read the precept, and each was duly
sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. Will each of you state his name and rank.
Connnander IL^rig. Walter Karig, Commander, IT. S. Naval Re-
serve.
Lieutenant Kelley. Welbourn Kelley, Lieutenant, U. S. Naval Re-
serve.
Admiral Hewitt. You gentlemen were the authors of "Battle Re-
port," a book published in 1944?
Commander Karig. Yes, sir.
Lieutenant Kelley. Yes, sir.
Admiral PIewitt. Turning to page 6 of that book, what was the
basis of the statement that, "There were two powerful task forces sent
against Pearl Harbor, the major elements of one lurking just over the
horizon from its companion fleet to overwhelm any American attempt
to engage the invaders," and, ''The United States, too, had two task
forces at sea, and Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo"?
Commander Karig. That question. Admiral, was in several parts.
Can we work at it backwards? Can we take the last part of that
question first?
Admiral BDewitt. Yes.
Commander Karig. "That Japanese espionage had so informed
Tokyo"?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
[81] Commander Karig. That was made in the form of a declar-
ative sentence, and is not the most cautious kind of writing. It was
based on the Robert's Report, and I would like to read two paragraphs
of that report into the record, if I may.
Admiral Hewitt. Go ahead.
Commander Karig. (reading) :
It was believed that the center of Japanese espionage in Hawaii was the
Japanese consulate at Honolulu. It has been discovered that the Japanese
consul sent to and received from Tokyo in his own and other names many
messages on commercial radio circuits. This activity greatly increased toward
December 7, 1941. The contents of these messages, if it could have been learned,
might have furnished valuable information. In view of the peaceful relations
with Japan, and the consequent restrictions on the activities of the investigating
agencies, they were unable prior to December 7 to obtain and examine messages
transmitted through commercial channels by the Japanese consul, or by persons
acting for him.
It is now apparent that through their intelligence service the Japanese had
complete information. They evidently knew that no task force of the United
52 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
States Navy was anywhere in the sector northeast, north, and northwest of the
Hawaiian Islands. They evidently knew that no distant airplane reconnaissance
was maintained in any sector. They evidently knew that up to December 6
no inshore airplane patrol was being maintained around the periphei-y of Oahu.
They knew, from maps which they had obtained, the exact location of vital air
fields, hangars, and other structures. They also gnew accourately where certain
important naval vessels would be berthed. Their flyers had the most detailed
maps, courses, and bearings, so that each could attack a given vessel or field.
Each seems to have been given a specified mission.
Lieutenant Kjekley. May I say something also, sir? In conversa-
tion [82] with Secretary Knox he gave us the background of
the Japanese attack as he knew it — how he knew it, we don t know —
and he said that his belief was there were two Japanese task forces, as
we have it here.
Admiral Hewitt. That was the basis for your statement, then?
Commander Kj^rig. Our conclusions were drawn as a deduction
from the Robert's Report although there was no specific proof that the
Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo.
Admiral Hewitt. Relative to the conversation between the WARD
and CONDOR on pages 13-14 relative to a submarine contact, will
you tell me where you obtained that information ?
Commander Karig. I will let Lieutenant Kelly answer that. Ad-
miral, please sir.
Lieutenant Kelley. Sir, from the skipper of the WARD, then Lieu-
tenant W. W. Outerbridge, USN, who went to the station on Bishop's
Point and got a transcript of that conversation as intercepted by the
naval radio station on Bishop's Point, the conversation between the
CONDOR and WARD. At approximately 0500, the following con-
versation between the USS CONDOR and the USS WARD was
intercepted by the naval radio station on Bishop's Point :
WARD. What was the approximate distance and course of the submarine you
sighted ?
CONDOR. The course was about what we were steering at the time, 020 mag-
netic and about 1,000 yards from the entrance.
WARD. Do you have any additional information on the sub?
CONDOR. No additional information.
WARD. When was the last time approximately that you saw the submarine?
CONDOR. Approximately 0350 and he was apparently heading for the entrance.
[83] Admiral He^vitt. Concerning the Japanese map, Plate V,
and this diagram. Figure 3, you take the position, I believe, that the
Japanese submarine from which this map was obtained was in Pearl
Harbor on December 7 and inaccurately charted the position of our
ships in the Harbor that day. Will you tell me on what you base
that belief?
Commander Karig. Again I'll ask Mr. Kelley to answer that be-
cause he interviewed Admiral Furlong here in Washington,
Lieutenant Kelley. Admiral, that map as contained in Plate V
was quite widely published and was released officially by the Navy
Department some time after Pearl Harbor. I don't remember the
exact date. A news story widely printed at that time was to the effect
that this chart was made by a submarine in the harbor. I discussed
this chart with Admiral Furlong on a visit to Washington. I dis-
cussed the whole Pearl Harbor attack with Admiral Furlong at great
length. I don't remember specifically saying to Admiral Furlong,
"Do you think this was made by the submarine?" I couldn't say that
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 53
he said that to me. He did describe how the chart was brought into
the submarine base and spread out on the deck. They all looked at it.
I am sure he told me that it was from a submarine. That is, I think,
pretty well known and my memory is that it came from the submarine
which was sunk by the MONAGHAN and the CURTISS inside the
harbor.
Admiral Hewitt. But you wouldn't be positive?
Lieutenant Kellet. We cannot prove that.
(A photograph of a captured Japanese chart, showing courses and
location of United States ships in Pearl Harbor, from which Plate V
in "Battle Report" was taken, was received and marked "Exhibit 17.")
Commander Karig. Shall we read into the record the official title
of the picture ?
[84] Admiral Hewitt. Will you please?
Commander Karig. "CHART OF PEARL HARBOR FOUND
IN CAPTURED JAP SUBMARINE.— This Japanese map is an ex-
cellent example of ' subversive Japanese activities mentioned by Sec-
retary Knox upon his return from Hawaii. Japanese sj^mbols drawn
on the chart indicate the anchorage of ships and details of military
establishments around the inner harbor of Pearl Harbor, U. S. Naval
Base in Hawaii. Note misspelling of 'Southeast Loch' (lower right) ."
WATCH YOUR CREDIT
No objection to reproducing or publishing
this photograph provided credit line
"OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAFE'
is used
This photograph may be used for commercial
advertising if accompanying copy and layout are
submitted, prior to publication,
to the
OFFICE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
Photographic Section
Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you see the translation with notations on
that chart ?
Lieutenant Kelley. Yes, sir.
Admiral He"\^ttt. I have here two Exhibits, 3 and 4, of reproduc-
tions of the chart with the English translations. If you will note,
the notations are different. You will notice off the position of the
TENNESSEE one says, "Attack and sink enemy ship," and the other
one says, "Sunk enemy ship." For your information, that confusion
may be because they are translations of the Japanese ideographs,
which have no tense and could mean either past or future.
Commander Karig. They don't even have a number. It could be
"enemy shij)s."
Lieutenant Kelley. We haven't seen this translation.
Admiral Hewitt. You haven't seen either?
[85] Lieutenant Kelley. Not this one, no, sir.
Commander Karig. No, sir. The translations we supplied in the
book were made by a civilian. The only translations that were made
for us anyhow were made in the so-called syllabic, and not ideograph.
Admiral Hewitt. On page 26 of "Battle Report" there is the fol-
lowing : "At one point on his chart, and as if to bolster the evidence
54 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of his own vision, he wrote in Japanese, 'I saw it with my own eyes.' "
You don't know what part of the chart that was?
Lieutenant Kelley. It was the southeast, as I remember it, along
here (indicating) about the cruisers.
Commander Karig. That is just trusting to memory— where that
was penciled into the chart from which the cut was made.
Admiral Hewitt. Concerning the times noted on the chart, what
was your opinion as to the zone time that they were in ?
Commander Karig. Honolulu time was our assumption, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you read the statement on page 23 as to the
source of the submarine map?
Commander Karig. On page 23, Chapter Two, part two :
At 0430 on the morning of December 7th a Japanese two-man submarine was
inside Pearl Harbor just off Hospital Point.
From the log of this submarine, subsequently beached outside Pearl Harbor
and recovered intact, it is not difficult to reconstruct its survey of the harbor,
leg by leg.
Admiral Hewitt. By the "log" of this submarine, do you mean the
chart which has been under discussion?
Commander Karig. Yes, sir. The only copy of the Japanese chart
from which we worked in preparing the text of chapter two was Ex-
hibit 17, supplied [86] by the Pictorial Section, Office of
Public Relations.
Lieutenant Kelley. That is not a complete chart as taken from the
submarine.
Commander Karig. Nor did it show that part of the channel
below
Lieutenant Kelley. Below the Hospital Point entrance.
Admiral Hewitt. The Army Pearl Harbor report, apparently based
on testimony of an FBI agent, states that the diiference between the
charted positions of the United States ships and the actual positions
on December Ttli shows conclusively that a submarine had been in
the Harbor prior to December 7th. Did you investigate the location
of ships in the Harbor prior to December 7th ?
Commander Karig. No, sir.
Lieutenant Kjslley. No, sir, we did not. The information was not
available to us.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know the location of the original map?
Commander Karig. No, sir.
Adniiral Hewitt. If you have anything else or any other informa-
tion or any leads that you can give that would permit me to obtain
additional information about this affair, I would be very glad to
have it.
Commander Karig. We have nothing further. That is, first-hand
information.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much.
(The witnesses were excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 2: 40 p. m., adjourned until 10: 30
a. m., Monday, 21 May 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 55
[87-] PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY
Sixth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General
Board, Navy Department, at 10 : 30 a. m., Mondaj^, 21 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's
Clerk Ben Harold, USNK.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral HEwrrr. State your name and rank.
Captain Outerbridge. William W. Outerbridge, Captain, U. S.
Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. You were the Commanding Officer of the WARD
on the morning of 7 December 1941?
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. And during the early hours of that morning, you
had several actual contacts with submarines ? Is that so ?
Captain Outerbridge. Several actual contacts ?
Admiral Hewitt. Well, reported contacts.
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir. We had one alert and one actual
contact and then later, after the attack, we had several outside.
Admii'al Hewitt. There has been reported and logged the conversa-
tion which you had with the CONDOR along about 0520 Honolulu
time and later there is in evidence the report of your actual attack on
the submarine. Will you give me your story of the events of the
morning, beginning with the report from the CONDOR about 0400 ?
Captain OuTERBRrooE. That doesn't appear on this record, but she
signalled us by flashing light that she believed she had seen an object
that looked like a submarine proceeding to the westward, and I believe
she [55] had just come out and was sweeping, magnetic sweep
out in the channel, but she said, "The submarine is standing to the
westward."
Admiral Hewitt. "Wliat was her location ?
Captain Outerbridge. She was in the channel, sweeping with her
magnetic sweeps.
Admiral Hewitt. The approach channel to Pearl Harbor ?
Captain Outerbridge. Outside of the actual channel, between the
reefs, but on the approach channel to Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Hewitt. Swept channel?
Captain Outerbridge. Swept channel, yes, and we went to General
Quarters and proceeded to her position, as close as we could get to
her without fouling her sweeping gear, and then we stood to the west-
ward, slowed to ten knots, and searched. It was a sonar search. We
couldn't see anything.
Admiral Hewitt. About what time did you get that signal ?
56 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Outerbridge. We got that signal about 0358, visual signal
about 0358, and we searched for about an hour and didn't find any-
thing; so I got in contact with her ^igain and asked her for a verifi-
tion. Then she said — this is in the record here. We asked her first,
"What was the approximate distance and course of tlie submarine that
you sighted?" and she said, "the course was about w^hat we were steer-
ing at the time 020 magnetic and about 1000 yards from the entrance
apparently heading for the entrance." Well, I knew then that we
had been searching in the wrong direction. We went to westward,
and, of course, there was still doubt as to whether she had actually
seen a submarine because there hadn't been any other conversation,
except by flashing light with us, and I wondered whether they were
sure or not; so I did ask them, "Do you have any additional informa-
tion on the sub?" and they said, "No additional information," and
I then asked them, "When was [89] the last time approxi-
mately that you saw the submarine?" and they said, "Approximate
time 0350 and he was apparently heading for the entrance." Then
we thanked them for their information and asked them to notify us
if they had any more information and then we just kept on search-
ing in our area, in the restricted area outside of the buoys. That was
the end of this incident for the first search.
Admiral Hewitt. You made no report of that to higher authority?
Captain Outerbridge. No, sir, I didn't make any report of it.
Admiral Hewitt. What was your evaluation of that?
Captain Outerbridge. Well, at the time I though perhaps it wasn't
a submarine, because they didn't report it. This conversation was
taken over another circuit entirely. This is not in either his log or
mine. They didn't report it and I thought if he didn't report it, he
must not think it is a submarine. It was his initial report and I
thought it may not be. It may have been anything ; it may have been
a buoy. Since then, I don't believe it was a buoy. I believe the Com-
manding Officer of the CONDOR saw a submarine. I don't know
where he is. I think he was killed, killed in action. But at that time
I didn't know whether or not it was a submarine.
Admiral Hewitt. You say you think the Commanding Officer of the
CONDOR was killed?
Captain Outerbridge. I believe he was killed.
Adiniral Hewitt. Do you remember his name ?
Captain Outerbridge. No, sir, I don't know, but I met some people
who told me about him.
Admiral Hewitt. Well, now about the later contact. -
Captain Outerbridge. The later contact — I turned in again and was
sleeping in the emergency cabin, as usual, and Lieutenant Goepner
[90] had the deck. He was a j. g. He called me and said, "Cap-
tain, come on the bridge." The helmsman was the first one to sight
this object and he saw this thing moving. It looked like a buoy to
him, but they watched it and after they had watched it for a while,
they decided probably it was a conning tower of a submarine, although
we didn't have anything that looked like it in our Navy, and they had
never seen anything like it. I came on the bridge as fast as I could
and took a look at it. I don't know where it appeared to them at first,
but at that time it appeared to me to be following the ANTARES in.
The ANTARES had been reported to me and at that time I thought
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 57
tlie ANTAKES had been heading into the harbor. She also had a
tow, towing a lighter, and it appeared to me the submarine was fol-
lowing astern of the tow.
Admiral Hewitt. Astern of the tow?
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir. It may or may not have been. I
think other people can testify it was standing in to Honolulu. To
me it appeared to be following the ANTARES in and I thought, "She
is going to follow the ANTARES in, whatever it is." It was going
fairly fast.. I thought she was making about twelve knots. It seemed
to be a little fast to me. I was convinced it was a submarine. I was
convinced it couldn't be anything else. It must be a submarine and
it wasn't anything that we had and we also had a message that any sub-
marine operating in the restricted area — not operating in the sub-
marine areas and not escorted — should be attacked. We had that
message ; so there was no doubt at all in my mind what to do. So, we
went to General Quarters again and attacked. That was 0740-0640.
Admiral Hewitt. And you attacked and you reported, I believe
that — —
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir, we reported.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you identify those exchanges of messages?
Will [91] you identify the messages on the racTio log ?
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir. The Executive Officer was on the
bridge at the time. We made the attack and we dropped depth charges
in front of the submarine. The first report was, "We have dropped
depth charges upon sub operating in defensive sea area." I thought,
''Well, now, maybe I had better be more definite," because we did fire
and if we said we fired, people would know it was on the surface, be-
cause saying it was a sub and dropping depth charges, they may have
said it might have been a blackfish or a whale. So I said, "We have
attacked fired upon and dropped depth charges upon submarine oper-
ating in defensive sea area," so they would feel, well, he shot at some-
thing. We sent the message at 0653, the second one.
(The radio log of the Naval Radio Station. Bishop's Point, Oahu,
containing the conversation between the WARD and CONDOR and
the ward's report of attack upon a submarine, was received and
marked "Exhibit 18.")
Admiral Hewitt. What do you feel was the effect of your attack?
Captain Outerbridge. I think we sank the submarine.
Admiral Hewitt. What do you base that on ?
Captain Outerbridge. On the gun hit, only on the gun hit.
Admiral Hewitt. There was a gun hit on it ?
Captain Outerbridge. There was a gun hit on it, and I looked these
submarines over and there is no hatch between the conning tower and
the tube of the submarine, where I believe it was hit, right at the
waterline, the base of the conning tower.
Admiral Hewitt. And the submarine disappeared after that?
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir, it disappeared.
Admiral Hewitt. That was before you made the depth charge at-
tack?
[92] Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir, we fired at the submarine
before we made the depth charge attack, and as she was going under
the stern, we dropped over the depth charges.
Admiral Hewitt. Your dej)th charges were close to her ?
58 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Definitely?
Captain Outerbridge. Definitely, they were there. I didn't claim
a kill
Admiral Hewitt. Whom were those reports addressed to ?
Captain Outerbridge. I believe it was Commander Inshore Patrol.
We were working for inshore patrol, but the interpretation is here
Admiral Hewitt. You got the calls ?
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir, we got the calls.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you remember what they mean ?
Captain Outerbridge. No, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Those were the only reports of that attack you
made ?
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir, two messages on that.
Admiral Hewitt. "\Yliat was your action after the completion of that
attack ?
Captain Outerbridge. Well, I saw one of these large white sampans
lying to out there in the defensive area.
Admiral Hewitt. Was that against regulations?
Captain Outbridge. That was against standing rules. They weren't
supposed to be in the defensive area, but he was in there. So, I turned
around and went after him and we chased him out towards Barber's
Point. He was going pretty fast.
Admiral Hewitt. He tried to get away from you ?
[93^ Captain Outerbridge. It appeared that way to me. He
could have stopped much sooner, but he appeared to be going around
Barber's Point. When we did catch up to him, he came up waving
a white flag. I thought that was funny. I thought, "We will just
send for the Coast Guard." That was what we always did when we
caught a sampan in the defensive area. We sent for the Coast Guard
and they were very prompt. They sent a cutter out to take him in.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you identify for the record those two mes-
sages you sent about the sampan, which are on the Bishop's Point
record ?
Captain Outerbridge. "We have intercepted a sampan into Hono-
lulu. Please have Coast Guard send cutter to relieve us of sampan."
And, "We have intercepted sampan and escorting sampan into Hono-
lulu. Please have cutter relieve us of sampan." We sent that.
That is a little garbled, but that looks like it.
Admiral Hewitt. lYliat was the time of it?
Captain Outerbridge. That was 0833 and 0835.
Admiral Hewitt. Well, then, I understand that several days later
you saw a midget submarine which was recovered off Bellow's Field.
Is that correct?
Captain Outerbjridge. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Admiral Hewitt. Was the appearance of the conning toAver simi-
lar to the one that you saw?
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What was the condition of that submarine off
Bellow's Field? Did it have its torpedoes?
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir, it was in good condition and I went
inside and there was a torpedoman — I believe he was a chief tor-
pedoman — [94-] working on the torpedoes, trying to get them
out without exploding them, and I saw the torpedoes inside.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 59
Admiral Hewitt. "Well, I think, that is all I had planned to ask
you. I am naturally interested in any information you can pro-
vide on this Pearl Harbor attack. Is there anything that you might
think would be pertinent to this investigation that you can
volunteer ?
Captain Outeebridge. Well, I suppose it would be a matter of
opinion, which probably wouldn't do you much good, but I was even
a little surprised at the attack which followed. I mean I had no
idea that the air attack was going to follow. We brought the sam-
pan in and we got another submarine attack. We dropped four
depth charges on another submarine in the area. We got depth
charges that morning and at 11 o'clock we ran out. When the at-
tack started, we were still at General Quarters. We hadn't secured
from the attack. We were still at General Quarters and we saw the
planes coming in, but not until after the bombs began to fall, be-
cause the bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor, and the Exec and I
were standing on the bridge. Lieutenant Commander Dowdy was
the Exec and he said, "They are making a lot of noise over there
this morning. Captain." I said, "Yes, I guess they are blasting the
new road from Pearl to Honolulu." He said, "Look at those planes.
They are coming straight down." I looked at them, and he said,
"Gosh, they are having an attack over there." I said, "They cer-
tainly are," and that was the time the attack actually began.
Admiral Hewitt. That was about OToO?
Captain Outeebridge. 0750, yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. That must have been about the time, judging
from this report here, that you were engaged in bringing the
sampan in.
Captain Outeebridge. Yes, sir, we were still standing in with the
sampan.
[95] Admiral Hewitt. You mentioned just then several other
submarine attacks that you had the same morning.
Captain Outeebridge. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. That was after the ones you have already dis-
cussed. What were they?
Captain Outeebridge. They were good metallic contacts, although
I was a little surprised at them at first, before things began to pop.
I didn't think we would get so many, but we did get a lot of them.
We got good metallic contacts and the only thing to do was to bomb
them. They gave us a good sharp echo. We bombed them until we
ran out of depth charges and went in and got sorne more.
Admiral Hewitt. That was in the same general area?
Captain Outerbeidge. Right in that defensive area.
Admiral Hewitt. Off the entrance to the swept channel ?
Captain Outeebeidge. Yes, sir. There was another thing we saw.
That was a lot of explosions along the reefs. I thought that they were
explosions of torpedoes fired into the reefs. I didn't see any other
submarines the whole morning. We didn't actually see any, but we
did see a lot of explosions that looked like shallow water explosions
of torpedoes.
Admiral Hewitt. What would make you think they were torpedoes
rather than bombs ?
Captain Outeebeidge. They were right along the coast, along the
reef, and I didn't see any planes overhead. They were inside the coast
60 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in Pearl Harbor, bombing Pearl Harbor, and I didn't think they would
all miss that far. I thought they would do better than that. They
did do better than that in general.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall approximately how many different
[96] contacts you bombed ?
Captain Outerbridge. I think we had three or four that morning,
sir.
Admiral Hewitt. After the one
Captain Outerbridge. In the first ten days we had eighteen con-
tacts, clay and night, but we didn't actually see any more submarines.
I heard that they were there, but we didn't actually see any more.
We don't know what the effect of the attacks were on the submarines.
There was one other one, on the 2nd of January. We were with our
division, making the attack, and the ship astern of us, after I got in
port, told us that she saw a submarine come up under our starboard
depth charge. I hadn't, up until then, claimed any hit for it. We
had a pretty good contact. It was our turn to make the run. We
made the run and kept on going, and that is what the Commanding
Officer of the ALLEN said. That was the 2nd of January. But we
didn't actually see that from the ship.
Admiral Hewitt. That is of general interest to show the probable
submarine activity out there on the first day.
I think that is about all I have, then. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
[97] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. State your name and rank.
Captain S afford. Laurance F. Safford, Captain, U. S. Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you state your duties during 1941?
Captain Safford. 1941, 1[ was the Chief of the Communications Se-
curity Section, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.
Admiral Hfavitt. What was the mission of that activity ?
Captain Safford, Our mission was twofold: Intelligence, intelli-
gence on foreign nations, particularly Japan — in fact, almost exclu-
sively Japan ; and security, to furnish our own codes and ciphers and
to supervise the security of our own communications of the U. S. Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. What was the relation between that activity and
Commander, now Captain, McCollum's unit, which, I believe, was
lmownasOp-16-FE?-
Captain Safford. We" were furnishing intelligence or information
to Op-16-F2, who evaluated the information and combined it with
other intelligence and were responsible for its dissemination. My
section had no authority or responsibility for the dissemination of any-
thing except what we called technical information ; that is, the codes
and ciphers. Japanese frequencies, and so forth, which would aid us in
our work, which would aid the organization in its work, rather.
Admiral Hewitt. It appears from your testimony before Admiral
Hart that there were three main radio intelligence units, one in the
Navy Department, which was concerned with intelligence relating to
naval operations in the Atlantic and to the plans and intentions of
foreign governments ; the second at Pearl Harbor, with subsidiary in-
tercept stations at Oahu, Midway, Samoa, and Dutch Harbor, which
dealt with the dispositions and plans of naval forces [98] in
the Pacific and surveilland of naval Japanese communications, exclu-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 61
sive of diplomatic communications ; and the third at Corregidor, which
early in 1941 had been concerned primarily with diplomatic commimi-
cations, but which, in the fall of 1941, shifted its main attention to
Japanese naval communications.
The so-called Japanese "iDurple" code was a diplomatic code, was it
not? ^. -, 1 .
Captain Safford. It was a machine, sir, a very complicated electri-
cal machine.
Admiral Hewitt. But it was used for
Captain Safford. It was used for diplomatic purposes to the higher
embassies, or more important ones, such as Washington, London, and
they also held it at Singapore and Batavia, Tsinking, and a few other
places which I would hesitate to say from memory ; also Berlin and
Tokyo.
Admiral Hewitt. The unit at Pearl Harbor was assigned the pro-
blem of intercepting Japanese communications using the "purple"
code?
Captain Saft'ord. It never was, sir. They hadn't been assigned any
diplomatic circuits since about 1932.
Admiral Hewitt. Was the unit at Corregidor ever assigned the
problem of intercepting communications in the "purple" code?
Captain Safford. The unit at Corregidor had been intercepting
messages in the Japanese "purple" code and other diplomatic systems
for several years and continued to do that up to and including December
7, 1941. Their main attention was on the local Asiatic circuits for the
information of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, but very late
in November, 1941, they were given the additional duty of covering
the Berlin-Tokyo circuit because we couldn't get adequate coverage
from all other stations combined. [99] These were forwarded
to Washington and weren't touched locally.
Admiral Hewitt. What in general were the arrangements for the
exchange of information among the three units, that is, Corregidor,
Pearl Harbor, and Washington ?
Captain Safford. If Corregidor translated a message which they
thought important, they would encipher the translation and forward
it to Washington. Everything they intercepted on the Tokyo-Berlin
circuit was enciphered ; that is, the intercept was enciphered and for-
warded to Washington by radio. Corregidor also had liaison with the
British unit at Singapore and anything of interest or importance re-
ceived from Singapore was forwarded to Washington. In like manner,
any translations of particular importance to the Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic Fleet, were sent out from Washington. We also had a very
free and continuous exchange of technical information between the two
units, by which I mean the keys for the "purple" machine and keys
for another system which we called Jig-19, and any other information
which would help either unit in its performance of duty.
With regard to communications between the Navy Department and
our unit at Pearl Harbor, there were comparatively few. Pearl
Harbor's main mission was in attack on the Japanese flag officers
system. This particular code and cipher had been in effect since
about 1 December 1940 and remained in effect for some time after
Pearl Harbor. We were also attacking this code with another group
in the Navy Department and, I believe, the British were working on
62 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
it. We never succeeded in a solution. From about 1926 to Decem-
ber, 1940, most of our knowledge about the Japanese Navy came from
this code. We thought it the most important system the Japanese
Navy was using and we had our most skilled and most experienced
officers and men working on it. After the attack on Pearl Harbor,
about December 10th, the Hawaiian unit [100] discontinued
their attack on this code and put all their attention on to a lesser
system which used numerals and was held by all ships, or practically
all ships, of the Japanese Navy. We continued attack on the flag
officer cipher back in the Navy Department until the system went out
of use.
Will you repeat the question so I know what I am answering ?
Admiral Hewitt. I can ask another amplifying question here.
Was there free exchange of intelligence information between the
Corregidor unit and the Pearl Harbor unit?
Captain Safford. There was in so far as it pertained to the proj-
ects they were assigned. Corregidor and the Navy Department ex-
changed by radio information on the "purple" machine and on what
we called the Jig-19 system and other diplomatic systems, but Pearl
Harbor was not addressed in these messages.
Admiral Hewett. What about the information gained from break-
ing the code, information as to enemy movements and locations?
Captain Safford. The information gained from breaking enemy
messages, dissemination was a function and responsibility of Naval
Intelligence. We were bending over backwards not to try to take
over the functions of Niival Intelligence in this respect, and at the
same time we were insisting that Naval Intelligence keep out of the
communications field of activity and disband the amateur intercept
stations which various ambitious District Intelligence Officers had
set up without authority from the Navy Department. We insisted
that both parties adhere strictly to approved war plans.
Admiral Hewitt. Well, then, am I correct in stating that any
enemy intelligence, intelligence as to movements or locations of
enemy ships which was gained by the Corregidor unit would not
necessarily be passed by them to the Pearl Harbor unit ?
[101] Captain Safford. It would normally be passed to the
Commander-in-Chief, Asiastic Fleet, or to the Fleet Intelligence Of-
ficer, and they would make further dissemination.
Admiral Hewitt. Before Admiral Hart, you testified that on No-
vember 26th estimates were received from Pearl Harbor and from
ComSIXTEEN relating to the organization and disposition of the
Japanese fleet. Can you identify this exhibit number 8 as
Captain Safford. These are the messages referred to.
Admiral Hewitt. Is it correct, as Captain Layton testified, that the
principal difference between the estimate was that ComSIXTEEN's
unit couldn't confirm the supposition by ComFOURTEEN's unit that
Japanese carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandates?
Captain Safford. To my mind, the chief difference between the two
reports was that ComSIXTEEN gave a great deal of supplementary
information which was not available to ComFOURTEEN. The only
respect in which ComSIXTEEN disagreed with ComFOURTEEN
was in his statement, "Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and
submarines in force are in Mandates. Our best indications are that
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 63
all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area."
Admiral Hewitt. Is it correct that both units believed that the
major j^ortion of Japanese carriers was in home waters?
Captain Safford. It is correct for that particular date.
Admiral Hewitt. Is it also correct that, as you previously testified,
ONI sent a dispatch on November 24th to CinCAF, indicating that
the SIXTEENTH District intercepts were considered most reliable,
and requesting that future reports be submitted from ComSIXTEEN
to OpNav witli copies to CinCPac for information ?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
[102^ Admiral Hewitt. Is it also correct that ONI did not ad-
vise the FOURTEENTH Naval District that they, ONI, considered
ComSIXTEEN's report to be more accurate because of the geograph-
ical location of the ComSIXTEEN unit?
Captain Safford. That was not stated in the dispatch.
Admiral Hewitt, It has been testified previously that on or about
December 1, 1941, radio contact with the Japanese forces was either
lost or greatly diminished. Did you know about this at the time
and, if so, when did you learn it ?
Captain Safford. I do not believe that statement is correct. We
received an immediate report from one of the two stations that the
Japanese had changed their call sign system for forces afloat at mid-
night on December 1, 1941, and until they made a reasonable number
of identifications, any information on the "Orange" fleet through radio
alone would be rather limited. The Daih^ Communication Intelli-
gence Summary which was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, by our unit in Pearl Harbor contained detailed informa-
tion as to not hearing messages from various ships and particularly
the Commanders-in-Chief, Second and Third Fleet, but that an un-
usual number of messages were being broadcast or otherwise addressed
to these forces, and that they believed that these fleets had already
commenced or were about to commence their southward movement.
This information was not forwarded to the Navy Department at that
time, so far as I know, and we did not get the details until copies of
these summaries were received by air mail some time after the attack
on Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you introduce such information as you have
on those communication summaries that you mentioned ?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir. This exhibit, we have copies of Com-
munication Intelligence Summary at Pearl Harbor for the period 1
November 1941 [103] to 6 December 1941, inclusive. The
Navy Department copy could not be located in 1944, When Com-
mander Rochefort reported for duty in 20-G shortly before the Navy
Department Court of Inquiry under Admiral Murfin, he made a
thorough search personally throughout the records of 20-G and could
find no trace or record of this paper ; so he sent a dispatch out to Pearl
Harbor and had them prepare copies out there, which they forwarded
to him for use with that investigation. I signed for one of those
copies and prepared additional copies for the use of this investiga-
tion. It is obvious that there are two or three clerical errors or typo-
graphical errors in copying because some of the sentences seem to be
incomplete or else somebody used a very queer style of English. I
64 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
think they tell the story, with one or two exceptions where we have
to guess.
Admiral Hewitt. We will receive that copy and mark it as an ex-
hibit, subject to correction when the originals are obtained.
(The document referred to was received and marked, "Exhibit 19,")
Admiral Hewitt. We have here Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court's
record, which concerns a series of decoded Japanese diplomatic and
consular dispatches. Will you look at those and tell me, if you can,
how they were obtained, decoded, evaluated, and distributed i
Captain Safford. They were initially obtained from intercepts of
Japanese diplomatic messages between Tokyo and foreign points;
mostly radio intercepts and occasionally. land wire or cable. Some
were photographs of station copies as they passed through the various
commercial communication facilities, but roughly ninety-five per cent
were obtained by radio intercept of the U. S. Army and U. S. Navy
at various points. They were all decoded by means of reconstructed
Japanese sj^stems. The principal was the "purple," [^04-]
which is a complicated electrical machine solved bj^ the Army and
machines made both by the Army and the Navy and two machines, in
fact, sent to London for the use of the British. The Jig-19 at this
period was solved by cryptographic analysis. That had to be done
over again each day, and it really took more time and effort to keep
abreast of the Jig-19 than it did the "purple" once we had the ma-
chine reconstructed. In all these sj^stems, "purple," Jig-19, and the
minor systems, we had an exchange between Washington, Singapore,
Corregidor, and London. We pooled our efforts on that.
Admiral Hewitt. How were these messages evaluated as to their
importance and what distribution was made ?
Captain Safford. They were translated in the translation sections
of the Navy Department unit and the War Department unit and the
senior translator decided which were of relative unimportance, not
worth writing up smooth, mostly connected with financial matters and
visas and things like that ; and the others were all typed smooth and
turned over to Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, respec-
tively. Originally the two intelligence organizations had prepared
briefs or memorandums giving a summation or a paraphrase of the
messages and they were clistributed to the higher officials in the War
and Navy Departments and to the Secretary of State and [lOo]
to the President.
In the Navy Department the people that saw them were, specifically,
the Chief of Naval Operations and his aide usuall}^ saw them; the
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of the
War Plans Division. The Secretary of the Navy also saw them and
usually his aide saw them. The Naval Aide to the President saw them
and took them in to the President.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 65
In the War Department they went to the Military Intelligence, Chief
Signal Officer, Director of the War Plans Division, and the Chief of
Staff, War Department, aid also to the Secretary of War.
Later on, in November, when things became critical, at the request
of the President and after conference agreement between Military In-
telligence and Naval Intelligence, the system of summaries and briefs
was dropped and the original messages were prepared in folders and
each day the folder was taken through. By agreement, all dissemina-
tion to the White House was handled through the Navy Department,
and in return all dissemination to the State Department was handled
through the Army, but the two things were duplicates. Anything the
Navy was sending around, the copy was sent to the Army, and anything
the Army was sending around, a copy was sent to the Navy ; and they
put on a serial number. Ours were JD-1 and the Army's were SI-X,
with a serial ; so they were substantially duplicates unless something
went wrong.
In addition, it was the habit to put notations on the bottom as to
references, and Kramer, when he took his stuff around, everything
that was referenced to anything bearing on this subject was put on the
off side of the page, so that you had the message on one side and the
references on the other side, the left hand side, of the folder. Then,
anybody seeing them had a complete picture. And Kramer went with
them and stood in the [^06] doorway or outside and if there
was any doubt, he could be called in to explain further to anybody
who was interested in the subject. Kramer also went to the White
House, I believe twice. Normally he would explain things to the
Naval Aide to the President and the aide would depend on his memory
to answer any questions the President might want to ask. The Presi-
dent insisted on seeing the original messages because he was afraid
when they tried to condense them, some one would change the meaning.
Admiral Hewitt. If the information contained in these messages
was disseminated to naval agencies outside the Navy Department, that
was the responsibility of the Director of Naval Intelligence or the
Chief of Naval Operations himself, is that true?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir. Well, Kramer was serving under me
and had space in my section. He was officially attached to the rolls
of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence and our foreign
translators were paid from ONI funds. I think Naval Communica-
tions furnished one officer and two or three yeomen because Intelli-
gence couldn't furnish enough people to help them out. We did that
as a favor in cooperation. Kramer had to do a job. But when any
information was passed over to Kramer or Op-20-GZ, Naval Com-
munications' responsibility was finished. From that time on it was
the clear responsibility of Naval Intelligence and we were very care-
ful not to cross the line.
One thing I would like to add. There was only one copy of it
sent around. It made the rounds and everybody took a look at it.
The one exception was on the night of December 6th, when the mes-
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1-
66 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sage was so important and time so short that Kramer made individual
copies for each person who was to see it.
Admiral Hewitt. Here are some additional messages, which have
been introduced as Exhibit 13, also relating to Japanese movements
and the [107] . "winds" code.
Captain Safford. These are the same as the others, except they are
mostly, I notice, in the minor systems.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you examine the messages which are marked,
relating to ship movements, and give me your comment as to how
they were translated, how they would have been translated, apparent
reason for the delays in effecting translation ?
Captain Safford. The JD serial 7029 was an Army translation. I
believe the long delay is due to the fact that the Army forwarded
it from Honolulu by air mail, but only the Army can give the positive
answer to that. Number 7029, dated November 20, 1941, was trans-
lated on December 4, 1941, by the Army.
The next is JD serial 7179, dated 6 December 1941, translated De-
cember 8, 1941, by the Army. That message was in one of the minor
systems, which is known as PA-K2. The notation shows it inter-
cepted at Station 2, San Francisco, and forwarded by teletype. The
War Department unit at that time was observing normal office hours
and secured from work at noon on Saturday, December 6, 1941, with
intention of doing no work until 8 'clock on Monday, December 8,
1941. The Army unit received an urgent call from the Navy about
8 p. m., Saturday afternoon, December 6, 1941, and there were cer-
tain officers over there, working overtime to get back work caught
up. They telephoned and got some of the Army people back and they
assisted the Navy throughout the night of December 6th in translating
the very long and very important fourteen-part message which has
been referred to in earlier investigations. I believe that this mes-
sage, JD 7179, simply laid in the basket until they got all these urgent
messages over and then it was decrypted and translated as a matter
of routine. We had a rigid system of [108] priorities, first
by systems and second by the priorities the Japanese assigned their
own messages, and a message like this in the normal course of events
would only be looked at after the most urgent messages had been
caught up to date.
The JD serial 8007, dated December 2, 1941, and translated by the
Army on December 30, 1941, was intercepted at Station 5, which is
Honolulu. This is an Army translation and I believe the Army are
investigating this themselves to see if they can determine what was
the trouble. Superficially, it was intercepted at Station 5, which is
Fort Shafter, and I think it was forwarded by air mail and just got
delayed in the excitement. The Army gave instructions to encipher
and forward by radio Japanese diplomatic messages intercepted
at Fort Shafter, beginning December 3rd or December 4th, as I remem-
ber. This order was faithfully complied with, but the messages of
earlier date went by air mail as in the past. That is how I account
for this delay, though it is only my supposition. May I add, there
was a notation on the message which said, "This message was received
here on December 23."
Referring to Exhibit 63, JD serial 7086, message was sent from
Tokyo to Honolulu on 29 November 1941 and translated by the Navy
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 67
Department on December 5, 1941. This message was intercepted at
Station 2, San Francisco, and forwarded by air mail or ordinary mail,
because it doesn't have the "TT" which means teletype. Station 2
is an Army unit at the Presidio. Seven days is about the average
time of solution or translation of Jig-19 messages. They normally
weren't forwarded by teletype and also got second priority in transla-
tion. This delay is average and not unusual.
The next is JD serial 7063, dated November 18, 1941, translated
December 5th by the Army. Again, I can't account or give the exact
reason for the delay. It was intercepted at the Navy station at Bain-
bridge Island, [109] Station S, was not forwarded by teletype.
Part of the delay was caused in transmission ; part possibly by delay
in solving the message or solving the Jig-19 key. This was one of
the longest delays we had in the Jig-19 system, but it was by no means
unique.
The next is JD 7111, dated November 19, 1941, translated December
6, 1941, by the Army. This message was intercepted by the Army
station at San Francisco and was not forwarded by teletype. It is
my estimate that the long delay in this message was waiting for enough
messages or a long enough message in this particular system to be
received so that we could solve the cipher. Sometimes we would get
Jig-19 key in a day and sometimes we would have to wait a week
or ten days until we were able to break it.
We have one more, JD 7381, dated December 6, 1941, and translated
December 12, 1941. This was also an Army translation ; so I can only
guess at the reason for the delay. It was intercepted at Station 5,
Army station. Fort Shafter. It is in the PA-K2 system, which
probably had the last or next to the lowest priority in decipherment
and translation. The system had been in effect for several years and
there was no difficulty at all in reading messages in it. But with one
or two exceptions, the message was so unimportant they were never
typed smooth for distribution.
Incidentally, if I may look through, there was one other message
about the same time which I would like to look for, because there were
two messages — the only two messages to or from Honolulu at that time
went on the air twelve hours and eighteen hours respectively before
the attack on Pearl Harbor and there simply wasn't time enough to
get those messages into the War and Navy Departments and have
them translated and get any information out. So, though they may
have been several days late, v^e couldn't have possibly made the grade
on it. This (indicating) may be one [i^O] of the messages I
am thinking about. I am not certain of it. I looked that up way
way back. It is possible that the other message I referred to hasn't
been submitted in evidence.
An additional fact was this : As I said before, the Army were cov-
ering the even days and the Navy the odd dates; that is, the filing
date. And if the Army had been standing continuous watches, the
way the Navy had been since the 1st of February 1941, they might
have picked up these messages in time to have done something with
them, but when they came back on the Navy's call, they only handled
the messages the Navy was looking at and the other messages didn't
get looked at until Monday at best. However, I do not believe we
68 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
could have handled these messages in the minor systems within eight-
een hours of the time they were on the air.
Admiral Hewitt. Were any of the codes used by the Japanese for
reports on United States ships being read at Pearl Harbor ?
Captain S afford. They weren't, sir, and if they were, it was not
known to us.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know whether or not Pearl Harbor knew
of these Japanese reports ?
Captain Safford. I did not know at the time and I only have at
second-hand now and would prefer not to attempt to answer that
question. If I might add for my own answer, we had at Pearl Har-
bor a copy of the old keys in what we called our radio intelligence
publication on Japanese diplomatic systems. We had two or three
spares there and we sent them all out the printed changes, but we
didn't keep them up to the minute and they did not get the day to
day changes by radio which went out to ComSIXTEEN and also
went out to London, and therefore, if they got into those and were able
to read anything, it was only one some of the minor systems, such as
the [ii^] LA system which had been in effect since 1925, and
the PA-K2.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know whether or not any of these dis-
patches which indicated interest in locations of ships in Pearl Harbor
and which were translated before December 7th were ever sent to
CinCPac?
Captain Safford. To the best of my knowledge, none of them ever
were. That would have been Naval intelligence's province and they
would know better than I would, but I have no personal knewledge
of ever sending them, and I did look through the outgoing message
files once and do not recall seeing anything like that.
Admiral Hewitt. Concerning the so-called "winds" message, it
appears from your previous testimony that in all the Navy received
four reports of the establishment of that code and that two reports said
that the use of the code would signify a break in diplomatic relations
and the other two said that it would signify war; that efforts were
immediately made to monitor for a message using that code ; that the
FCC intercepted some messages, set forth in Exhibit 65, which did not
use the words relating to the United States ; that you said that at 0800
on December 4th, Lieutenant Murray or Lieutenant Commander
Kramer came in with a pencilled message which used the words relat-
ing to the United States ; that you said that you had not seen a copy
of this message since December 15, 1941 ; that at that time you checked
the various papers which were being assembled by Kramer, which
included the "winds" message relating to the United States, and then
turned the messages over to the Director of Naval Communications
for use as evidence before the Robert's Commission; that you were
certain that the "winds" message had been distributed both in the
Navy and to the Army ; that no copy could be found in the Navy's files
and that the Army had been unable to furnish a copy; that on the
afternoon of December 4th, Commander McCollum prepared a dis-
patch [i^^] summarizing the situation to date with direct
reference to that "winds" message, and which said that it was con-
sidered to be the signal to execute Japanese war plans ; that you said
that you were present when Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Noyes
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 69
discussed the advisability of sending McCollum's dispatch; that
Admiral Wilkinson wanted to send it but Admiral Noyes did not want
to send it; that you understood that Admiral Wilkinson was going to
try to get the dispatch cleared ; and that you believed, until you read the
Kobert's Report, that the dispatch had been sent. You further indi-
cated that you had conducted some investigation into this matter;
that Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood told you that he knew the
disposition of the copies of the message but did not care to tell you ;
and that you, through very second-hand and devious sources, learned
what happened to the Army copies.
What investigation into this matter did you conduct?
Captain Saffgrd. The statements there are substantially correct.
In the fall of 1943 it appeared that there was going to be a trial or
court martial of Admiral Kimmel. It was hinted in the newspapers
and various people in the Navy Department were getting testimony
ready for it. I realized I would be one of the important witnesses,
that my memory was very vague, and I began looking around to get
everything that I could to prepare a written statement which I could
follow as testimony. That was the time when I studied the Robert's
Report carefully for the first time and noted no reference to the
"winds" message or to the message which McCollum had written and
which I had seen and I thought had been sent. And then I began
talking to everybody who had been around at the time and who I knew,
had been mixed up m it to see what they could remember to straighten
me out on the thing and give me leads to follow down to where I could
put my hands on official messages and things so that it would be a
matter of fact l^i^] and not a matter of memory. I also
talked the thing over with whatever Army people were still around
at the time and had anything in this thing, and bit by bit these facts
appeared to come together. The investigation was conducted, if you
call it that, for the purpose of preparing myself to take the stand as
a witness in a prospective court martial of Admiral Kimmel.
Admiral Hewitt. When and where did you have the conversation
with Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood as to the disposition of
copies of that message ?
Captain Saffgrd. That was not a conversation. I wrote him a
letter about the thing because that was looked for throughout a period
of six months repeatedly. Various people looked for it in the Army
and finally couldn't find it, and I asked him if he knew anything about
it. He said yes, but he didn't care to tell me about it then ; but when he
came back to the States, I asked him about it and found out he hadn't
understood. We were working at cross purposes. I found out he
was referring to the false "winds" message which we had thrown in
the wastebasket. This is document number 2 of Exhibit 65, which was
telephoned from the FCC to Lieutenant Brotherhood, who was on
watch. Kramer identified that as being not what we were looking
for and threw it in the wastebasket.
Admiral Hewitt. Is that the message, then, which Lieutenant Com-
mander Brotherhood referred to when he said that he did not care
to tell you what the disposition of it was ?
Captain Saffgrd. That was the one.
Admiral Hewitt. It was the result of a misunderstanding?
70 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Safford. That was the result of a misunderstanding. We
were talking about different things. He didn't want to get — par-
ticularly [ii4] unofficially, he didn't want to get Kramer into
any trouble on the thing. He didn't mind telling me first-hand when
he got back here.
Admiral Hewitt. Then you have no information that the Army
ever got copies of the "winds" message relating to the United States
to which you testified ?
Captain Safford. I have no information which would be acceptable
as evidence before this Court. I heard the story and I believe it
true, but it is very third-hand.
Admiral Hewitt. The information that you have, even though
second- or third-hand, may be of assistance in furnishing a lead. Will
you tell us your information ?
Captain Safford. The information that I got was that written
copies of the "winds" message had been destroyed in the War Depart-
ment by then Colonel Bissell on the direct orders of General Marshall.
Admiral Hewitt. You don't recall the direct source of that in-
formation ?
Captain Safford. I would prefer not to give the direct source, but
I think it may be confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Sadler before
the Army investigation.
The investigation then, at 12 : 27 p. m., recessed for lunch until 1. 30
p. m., at which time it reconvened.
Present : The same parties as during the morning session.
Captain Laurance F. Safford, USN, resumed his seat as witness.
Admiral Hewitt. Before proceeding any further, I would like to
make sure that the message now under discussion was actually the
message relating to the breaking of diplomatic relations or war with
the United I-^-^-^] States rather than the false message which
indicated war with Russia.
Captain Safford. I am certain that Colonel Sadler did not have
them confused.
Admiral Hewitt. In order to clear this matter up and to permit
further investigation of the allusions to high officers in the Army,
I feel that you should give me the complete story of the source of
this information.
Captain Safford. That story came through Mr. W. F. Friedman,
Principal Cryptanalyst in the War Department, the man who was
responsible for the solution and reconstruction of the "purple" ma-
chine, although at the time of Pearl Harbor he was working on
German systems rather than Japanese and was not directly concerned
with anything that took place at that time, but he did have a fatherly
interest in the Japanese section.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you give me his name ?
Captain Safford. William F. Friedman, Principal Cryptanalyst,
War Department. I have only answered half that question, inciden-
tally. The other is more direct.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes. Will you go ahead ?
Captain Safford. There is another angle, which is very much older
than this destruction. When Colonel Bratton first learned of the
"winds" execute message, he was not entirely satisfied in his mind
and telephoned to Admiral Noyes, requesting to be furnished the
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 71
original intercept so that he could verify the translation. This was
customary in highly important messages because the Japanese lan-
guage was very tricky and sometimes the translations varied, in which
case both translations were sent to higher authority and they could
have their choice. Admiral Noyes refused to comply with this request,
told Colonel Bratton that the Navy translation was correct and the
Army would not be given a copy of the original message. For this
reason, [^^6] Bratton did not take very much stock in the
"winds" execute message; at least, he did not take it as seriously as
Colonel Sadler and the officers in SI-X.
Admiral Hewitt. You are speaking again of this execute
"winds"
Captain Safford. I am talking of the "winds" execute.
Admiral Hewitt. For the United States?
Captain Safford. For the United States. And that story should
appear in Colonel Bratton's testimony before the Army investigation.
1 might add, furthermore. Captain Schukraft knew that the "winds"
execute had been received and that it meant the United States, although
he may never have seen the original message or known the exact
wording.
Admiral Hewitt. Wlio was that ?
Captain Safford. Captain Robert F. Schukraft. He is now a
Colonel, U. S. Army.
Admiral Hewitt. What were the names of the four watch officers
in your section through one of whom this or any similar message
must have passed?
Captain Safford. They were Lieutenant — do jou want their then
ranks or present ranks?
Admiral Hewitt. It is immaterial as long as we can identify them.
Captain Safford. Lieutenant Commander George W. Lynn, U. S.
Navy; Lieutenant Commander Francis M. Brotherhood; Lieutenant
Commander A. V. Pering; and Lieutenant Commander Allan A.
Murray, U. S. Naval Reserve. The first three are in Washington.
Murray is with the Allied Military Government somewhere in the
Pacific.
(The witness desired to augment his testimony relating to the
question beginning on page 111 and continuing on page 112.)
[117] Captain Safford. To supplement the very long summary
in the previous question, Lieutenant Commander Kramer of Murray
or both came in with a teletype message on which was noted in pencil
the translation and meaning of the Japanese words which constituted
the war warning. Kramer has informed me within the past month
that a copy of the "winds" message and other papers relative to the
break in diplomatic relations with Japan were not turned over to the
Robert's Commission but were given to Assistant Secretary of the
Navy Forrestal about 9 December 1941 while he was Acting Secre-
tary in the absence of Mr. Knox, who had flown to Hawaii. So far
as Kramer knows, this folder was never turned over to the Robert's
Commission. I had stated it was my impression — not that it was
a fact, but it was my impression. Kramer said that he went over
this folder with Mr. Forrestal and spent about two hours explaining
the significance of the various messages. Kramer did not recall the
"winds" execute specifically.
72 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Hewitt. What did Kramer tell you about his recollection
of the "winds" message?
Captain Saftord. Kramer's recollection of the "winds" message
now is that it came in, that he and the watch officer, whom he is not
certain of, came up to my office and showed it to me, and then the
watch officer took it upstairs to deliver it to Admiral Noyes, in
accordance with instructions that the Admiral had given Kramer and
were posted in writing at the watch officer's desk at that time, though
I had forgotten that point. Kramer says that we walked down the
corridor together to his office, discussing the message. It was my
custom to talk over ultra secret matters with Kramer, walking up
and down the corridor. We were so horribly overcrowded. My
office had about five people in it and his had an equal number. We
had to go out in the corridor to get any privacy. I recall that the
message was [-?-?5] fouled up somehow and did not come in
the exact form which we expected and Kramer remarked, "You can
alwavs count on those monkeys to do something that you don't ex-
pect. That is a little off from what he told me. That is my recol-
lection getting mixed up in that. And Kramer now is not certain
whether the United States was specifically mentioned or not, but he
is certain there was a "winds" execute message which we were
expecting and that it came in the middle of the week before Pearl
Harbor. I wouldn't say exactly what date. In fact, I had to check
up some outgoing messages to make sure whether it was Thursday
or Friday and Kramer couldn't remember whether it was Wednes-
day or Thursday.
Kramer informed me that no written copy was furnished the Army
and no written copy was distributed in the Navy Department in the
customary manner because Admiral Noyes had given specific orders
not to do so and that he would handle dissemination of this message
himself.
I would like to add, McCollum's message of warning was very
long. The part referring to the "winds" message was very short,
but was the last item in the message.
That covers all the discrepancies on that I had any reason to want
to correct.
Admiral Hewitt. You testified before Admiral Hart that :
The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to
monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the "winds" message when it should be sent, and
this was done. From November 28 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo
broadcast schedules were monitored by about 12 intercept stations, as follows :
N. E. I. at Java ; British at Singapore ; U. S. Army at Hawaii and San Francisco ;
U. S. Navy at Corregidor, Hawaii, Bremerton, and four or five stations along the
Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept stations in the [119] continental
United States were directed to forward all Tokyo plain language broadcasts by
teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran up bills of sixty dollars per day for this ma-
terial alone. The "winds" message was actually broadcast during the evening of
December 3, 1941 (Washington time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time
and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propa-
gation was such that the "winds" message was heard only on the East Coast
of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations that
were listening for it.
Now the question is : What was the frequency and time of day and
condition of radio propagation which resulted in the message being
received only bv one or two of the Navy stations on the East Coast of
the United States?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 73
Captain Safford. That is a question I cannot refer to, having no
station log available. It now appears more likely that it was received
early in the morning of December 4th, Washington time, rather than
late the night before, because the watch officers who were on at that
time only recollect the false "winds" message and not the true "winds"
message. There is a possibility that it was heard by the Dutch at
Java, although such information as I had available indicated the
Dutch did not get it, and it also could have been heard by the Austral-
ians and may have been the basis of the story that was told to Senator
Ferguson by the Australian Minister to this country, who was, I be-
lieve, Minister of National Defense in Australia at the time of tlie at-
tack on Pearl Harbor.
I can illustrate some of the vagaries of high frequency radio by two
or three actual examples of about that time, if I may refresh my mem-
ory here.
Before giving these examples, I would like to state that radio com-
munications over long distances in a north-south direction is much
easier and more reliable than in an east-west direction, and our recep-
tion of the [120] Tokyo radio was always in an east-west di-
jection.
The long fourteen-part Tokyo serial number 902 or JD serial 7143
was intercepted solid at Bainbridge Island, Washington. This mess-
age, incidentally, was received by Radio San Francisco. Part 2 of
this message and the message immediately before, which was Tokyo
serial number 904 or JD serial 7144, were also copied at Cheltenham,
Maryland, were forwarded to the Navy Department by telegraph,
and were used for the actual description of those messages. This is
verified in the GY log for 6 December 1941. The other thirteen parts
of Tokyo serial number 902 were uncopyable at Cheltenham, that is,
they were either not heard or were failing so hard they couldn't make
an intelligible message. Part 2 of the very important part 3 Tokyo
to Berlin, number 985, JD serial 6943, that was dated around the 1st
of December, were missed, but the first and third parts were copied
solid. Incidentally, this came from England and not from this coun-
try.
As I have stated earlier in my testimony, we had to call on Corregi-
dor to cover the Tokyo-Berlin circuits as the combined efforts of in-
tercept stations on the East Coast, West Coast, Hawaii, and England
could not provide better than about fifty per cent coverage.
I would like to add that all hands had been very nervous about our
ability to receive this "winds" execute when it shoiild come in, because
we were not certain of the power or the frequency, of the time or any-
thing, and every day I would come in and I would ask Welker, in
charge of GX, or the watch officer, if we had it and we would call the
Army or they would call us to see if we had it, and I think on one oc-
casion Kramer came down and said that Admiral Wilkinson wanted
to know if there was any chance of our missing it and I told him then
I didn't see how we could because there were so many stations, so
widely scattered, listening for it. When the message first came
[121] in to me, my heart sank like an elevator to think that the Japs
really had the nerve to attack the United States, because as soon as I
saw it, to me it was war and nothing else. And then later, particularly
when I talked with Welker, we had a great sense of i-elief because the
74 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
thing had come in and we hadn't missed it. We had done our part
properly. We had gotten the warning to higher authority and we felt
very thankful that we had put these East Coast stations on it, though it
seemed like a wild goose chase. It was like the center fielder backing
up the second baseman. It was a wild chance, but it paid us dividends.
That was our feeling on the thing.
Admiral Hewitt. Have you any record at all of what East Coast
stations the message could have come in from or did come in ?
Captain Safford. We were intercepting foreign transmissions at
Winter Harbor, Maine, which was a main intercept station and was
always attempting to copy Tokyo; Cheltenham, Maryland, which is
also a main intercept station and guarding it regularly at that time;
Jupiter, Florida, which is primarily a direction finder station but had
an intercept unit attached ; and Amagansett, Long Island, also a direc-
tion finder, but with an intercept unit attached.
Admiral Hewitt. You have no knowledge, then, of what station
this message came in from?
Captain Safford. I have no knowledge which station it came in
from, though I would give firet guess to Cheltenham and second guess
to Winter Harbor, because they had much better facilities than the
others.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know whether the logs of these stations
iiave been searched for any record of this message ?
Captain Safford. We searched for the logs of those stations and in
the Navy Department they had been destroyed during one of the
numerous moves [1^2] and no record kept of them. They
simply couldn't be found.
Admiral Hewitt. When was that search made ?
Captain Safford. This search was made in November or December,
1943, and again in the spring of 1944 — I wouldn't place that any
closer — after we got notice that Admiral Hart would conduct his in-
vestigation. Thfe logs of Winter Harbor, Maine, were destroyed in
the spring of 1943 simply to make room; they destroyed everything
for about six months back. Cheltenham's logs were destroyed when
the intercept unit left Cheltenham and moved up to Chatham, Massa-
chusetts, which was some time earlier than that. I camiot say offhand
what happened to the logs of the other two stations, but they could
produce nothing.
Admiral Hewitt. We have here in exhibit 65 four documents which
are copies of weather messages which were intercepted by the FCC.
They indicate war with Russia rather than war with the United States.
What is your explanation of that?
Captain Safford. I never saw these documents until the day or the
day before I went on the stand before the Navy Court of Inquiry
under Admiral Murfin. The document number 1 was the information
which Major Guest gave the FCC in requesting their cooperation.
I did not know about this request or else had forgotten it completely.
Welker might know something about it. Document number 2 is
obviously a part of a true weather forecast and bears no relation to
the "winds" execute we were expecting. However, it was telephoned
in to Brotherhood and this is what he was referring to by the winds"
message. Not having a copy of the message before our eyes, we were
working at cross purposes there.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 75
Admiral Hewitt. In other words, one of you was referring to one
message and the other to the other message, the one about Russia ?
[123] Captain Safford. Yes, sir, to this one here.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
Captain Safford. Brotherhood said he called Admiral Noyes and
Admiral Noyes said, "That is a funny direction for the wind to blow
from, isn't it?" and Brotherhood said, "Yes," and the Admiral said,
"I don't think there is anything in it. Don't take any further action
until tomorrow morning," and then Kramer took one look at it and
said, "That is not what we want," and threw it in the wastebasket.
For the sake of the record, this was received — it was intercepted at
approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941, and was telephoned to
Brotherhood at 9: 05 p. m., Eastern Standard Time, from the Wash-
ington office of the Federal Communications Commission. This mes-
sage came in twelve hours or more after what I referred to as the true
"winds" execute had been intercepted and received.
Now, document number 3 was intercepted by the FCC and telephoned
to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7 : 50 p. m.. Eastern Standard
Time, December 5, 1941. That also is apparently a part of a true
weather forecast because it mentioned south and south did not come
in as part of the "winds" code. We only had the three directions:
north, east, and west. If it had been a "winds" code message, it would
have referred to Russia because it does specifically mention north.
Admiral Hewitt. But does it follow the form which was specified
for the "winds" code message in the dispatch which established that
code as to the location of the reference in the broadcast, and so forth ?
Captain Safford. In document number 3 the reference to north wind
does not follow the form or location specified in their set up, but, for
that matter, neither did the true "winds" message. The Japanese fol-
lowed that [1^4] one up, though I can t remember just how
it was. I know in discussing it afterwards, Welker and I congratu-
lated ourselves that we had required all plain language to be for-
warded to Washington to be looked over here instead of telling the
stations what to look for and relying on them to segregate true from
false.
Admiral Hewitt, What is your recollection of the wording of the
true message ?
Captain Safford. May I get into number 4 before I get into that ?
Admiral Hewitt. Oh, yes.
Captain Safford. Document number 4 is a true "winds" execute
message, the way we expected to see it, but mentions England only.
It was sent about twelve hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, what is your recollection of the wording of
the so-called true "winds" message ?
Captain Safford. My recollection was that they sent the voice
form by Morse code and made some other departure from what was ex-
pected. Murray says that in addition they sent the negative form
of "north wind cloudy."
Admiral Hewitt, That isn't quite clear to me. What do you mean
there? You say they sent the negative form of the north wind. If
that was south wind
Captain Safford. No, it wasn't south. The three winds were speci-
fically named ; that is, Kita, north, or Hussia ; Nishi, west, or England ;
76 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that included the Netherlands East Indies ; and Higashi, east, or the
United States. They had the other expressions in Japanese which
accompanied these words in the voice form of the message.
The "winds" execute message as translated gave east wind, war with
the United States; west wind, war with England, including N. E. I. ;
and the [i^5] negative form of north wind, meaning no war
with Russia, or which could have been interpreted as no war with
Russia.
Admiral Hewitt. Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court record indicates
that a "winds" code execute message relating to England was received
and transmitted to Lieutenant Commander C. C. Dusenberry, U. S.
Army Service Corps, at approximately 8 p. m.. Eastern Standard
Time, December 7, 1941. If a "winds" code execute relating to the
United States and England had been sent on December 4th, as you
previously testified, why was a "winds" code message relating to Eng-
land alone sent on December 7th ?
Captain Safford. This message was broadcast about twelve hours
after the attack on Pearl Harbor, which had been announced on all
the radios of the world. It may have been to remind the Japanese con-
sulates, and so forth, that Japan was still going to attack England or
British possessions and it may have been to amplify the hidden word
message received in Washington a little before 11 o'clock, Eastern
Standard Time, December 7, 1941, which was translated differently by
the Army and Navy but seemed to stop short of war. I am referring
to Tokyo circular number 2494 or JD serial 7148.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you describe to me what is meant by the
hidden word code ?
Captain Safford. The hidden word code was set up by Tokyo cir-
cular number 2409, dated 27 November 1941, JD serial 6985, and was
subsequently added to by three or four other messages. It provided
a means of sending out secret information in ostensibly plain lan-
guage, certain words being given as a secondary or hidden meaning,
constituting the true message. This system was designated or indi-
cated by adding the word "stop" in English as the last word of the
message, whereas the rest of the message was in Japanese. The hidden
word message of December 7th referred to had thirteen \^126'\
words of text, exclusive of the indicator "stop" and the signature
"Togo." Three of these words constituted the true message, namely,
Koyanagi^ Ration^ Minami. This message was translated in such a
hurry Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, that the third word, Min-
ami, was overlooked and the message delivered to the Chief of Naval
Operations and the President merely said, "Relations between Japan
and England aren't in accordance with expectations." The Army
translation was considerably stronger and added "America." We did
not get this information until 1944. I do not know when the Army
discovered that Minami had been omitted.
Admiral Hewitt. And the significance of Minami was United
States?
Captain Safford. United States. In fact, we didn't know it until
the Army pointed it out to us. I would like to add one thing more.
While the Japanese set up a very elaborate system for reporting mili-
tary movements, declarations of war, smuggling of critical materials,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 77
and so forth, tliis one message is the only time that I recall that they
ever used the hidden word code.
Admiral Hewitt, It was not used, then, so far as you know
Captain Safford. So far as I can recall offhand, it was never used
again. If it were, it was nothing important and it was just lost in the
maze.
Admiral Hewitt. Well, thank you very much. Captain.
Captain Safford. May I add one more thing to this hidden word ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes. Add anything that you think would be
pertinent and of value.
Captain Safford. I would like to add this : The hidden word set up
was translated by the Navy on December 2, 1941, and from that time
on we could not be certain whether the Japanese decision as to peace
or war would come in the hidden word code or in the "winds" message,
and apparently [127] they used them both. As a matter of
fact, they did use them both. .
Admiral Hewitt. That is all. Thank you very much, Captain.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 2:30 p. m., adjourned until 12:30
p. m. the next day.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 79
urn PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY
Seventh Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General
Board, Navy Department, at 12 :oO p. m., Tuesday, 22 May 1945.
Present : Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN ; Mr. John' F. Sonnett ;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's
Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. State your name and rank.
Captain Kramer. Alwin D. Kramer, Captain, U. S. Navy.
Admiral He^vitt. What was your duty or assignment in 1941 ?
Captain Krajsier. I was attached to Op-16, Far Eastern Section, but
working in Op-20-G.
Admiral Hewitt. Under Captain SafFord ?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. And you were the head of the Translation Sec-
tion ?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, Op-20-GZ.
Admiral Hewitt. And on some occasion you evaluated messages as
well as translated them, evaluated them as to their possible impor-
tance ?
Captain Kramer. For information I expressed my opinion on them,
yes, sir, which can be construed as an evaluation. The evaluation was
normally done by Commander McCollum, the head of the Far Eastern
Section, or Admiral Wilkinson, but I gave them the benefit of my opin-
ion about it, too.
Admiral Hewitt. You were in this section that was headed by Cap-
tain Safford, but you were also responsible, I believe, to Captain Mc-
Collum of ONI?
[i^P] Captain Kramer. I was primarily responsible to Captain
McCollum of ONI, yes, sir. That arrangement may seem a little
unusual, but it was one that had been in effect since the early 20's for
several reasons. One was since all the language talent available in
the Navy at that time were language officers who had been to Tokyo
in that three year language course and as a result were well known
to the Japanese and were normally in social contact with the Japa-
nese in town here, naval attaches and assistants and the embassy
people, it was felt preferable to have them attached to the office of
Naval Intelligence than to a section of Naval, Communications. That
was one reason. There were a number of others.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes. Well, that is very logical. Exhibit 63,
64, and 65 of the Naval Court's record and exhibit 13 of this record —
have you had an opportunity to examine those?
80 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Kra'mer. I looked at them briefly yesterday afternoon,
yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. I -would like to ask you if you can identify the
messages in exhibit 63 and exhibit 64 which establish or give the so-
called "winds" code.
Captain Kramer. There are two messages in 63, numbers 13 and
15. Both concern the setting up of that plain language so-called
"winds" code, one applicable to Morse code transmission, the other to
voice broadcast. In exhibit 64 there is also one that I saw in 1941,
namely, number 2. The dispatch marked number 3 from ALUSNA,
Batavia, I do not recall having seen.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you tell me what steps were taken to listen
for and monitor any message using the "winds" code ?
Captain Kramer. I was familiar only in a general way with the
[130] allocations of circuits to be monitored by our intercept sys-
tem and the Army intercept system. I do know that because of the
considerable interest in this particular "winds" code message, an un-
usually wide coverage was directed; but regarding the details of
which stations were so ordered to watch for it, I cannot give any
testimony from first-hand knowledge.
Admiral Hewitt. Are you familiar with the messages in exhibit 13
setting up the so-called hidden word code? If so, will you explain
what this code was?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, I am familiar with these messages
marked number 6 in exhibit 13. As the messages themselves indi-
cate, it was a system set up by the Japanese Foreign Office whereby
in the case of disruption of encoded traffic, they could make use of
plain language words to get across hidden meanings as set forth in
the code. We were very interested in seeing any of this traffic after
the thing was set up, which was about the end of November, but
traffic did not appear in this system until the 7th of December and
the latter part of December, '41.
Admiral Hewitt. How was the use of the hidden word code indi-
cated in a message ?
Captain Kramer. That we did not know until the first traffic ap-
peared. Based on experience, we assumed that it would be an in-
nocuous sounding Japanese Romagi message.
Admiral Hewitt. I think in one of those messages, at least, if my
recollection is correct, it says look for the hidden meaning if the Eng-
lish word "stop" is used at the end of the message instead of the
Japanese word.
Captain Kjiamer. That is correct. That refreshes my memory
now. I remember, now that you remind me of it, that these reams of
plain language traffic that we were getting in several weeks before
Pearl Harbor were searched [^-^-?] for that indicator. That,
however, I didn't recall specifically because I didn't do the searching.
It was done by the GY watch officers.
Admiral Hewitt. I believe that about the middle of the first week
of December there was a teletype message which, to the best of your
recollection, one of the watch officers had in his possession and which
was subsequently delivered to Admiral Noyes. Will you tell me
about that, to the best of 3^our recollection ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 81
Captain Kramer. I previously testified on that matter at Pearl
Harbor, Admiral. I would like to go over that previous testimony
again in the light of thinking it over since that time. I had no re-
collection of that message at the time it was first mentioned to me in
the spring of '44. However, after being given some of the details of
the circumstances surrounding it, I did recall a message some days
before 7 December '41, I believe about the middle of the week 1-7
December, and I do recall definitely being shown such a message
by the GY watch officer and walking down with him to Captain
Safford's office and being present while the GY watch officer turned
it over to him. A brief conversation ensued and Captain Safford then
took it, I assumed, to Admiral Noyes, since that message we had all
been on the qui vive about for a week or ten days. That is the last I
saw of such a message.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you recall what the general subject of the
message was ?
Captain Kramer. It was, as I recall it, a "winds" code message.
The wording of it I do not recall. It may have been, ^^Higashi no
haze ame^'' specifically referring to the United States, as I have previ-
ously testified at Pearl Harbor, but I am less positive of that now than
I believe I was at that time. The reason for revision in my view on
that is the fact that \^132'\ in thinking it over, I have a rather
sharp recollection in the latter part of that week of feeling there was
still no overt mention or specific mention of the United States in any
of this traffic, which I was seeing all of and which also was the only
source in general of my information since I did not see, as a rule, the
dispatches from the fleet commanders or going out to them from Opera-
tions.
Admiral Hewitt. Then it is still your belief, the best you can recall
in view of that, there was no indication
Captain Kra^nier. I would like to continue that statement, Admiral,
by saying : For that reason, I am now at least under the impression
that the message referred to England and possibly the Dutch rather
than the United States, although it may have referred to the United
States, too.
Admiral Hewitt. Or possibly it may have referred to Russia?
Captain Kramer. I just don't recall.
Admiral Hewitt. Reference to one or more of the messages supplied
by the FCC is in exhibit 65. Can you recall whether any of those
may have been seen by you ?
Captain Kramer. This document 1 is not a message and document 4
is the one of the 8th of December about midnight GMT. I may have
seen these specific messages. I cannot be certain, however, because we
saw a great many messages of this kind in looking for this particular
type of "winds" code message. When we started monitoring all Jap-
anese plain language some weeks before Pearl Harbor, the volume of
material coming in was simply tremendous, swamping. We had only
three linguists at the time for translation purposes, with a pretty
heavy volume of coded traffic concerning the negotiations. Conse-
quently, we felt the extra burden or having to scan all this Japanese
plain language stuff and there were many instances of \13S'\
weather occurring in that, but because of the fact that the particular
code thing we were looking for, we felt it was incumbent on us to ex-
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 7
82 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
amine it all. The reason I cannot state specifically that these par-
ticular ones were ones I had seen, but they were of the same nature
as many I did see.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall any message which arrived in the
forenoon of 7 December using the hidden word code ?
Captain Kramer. I didn't recall it until I looked over these exhibits
yesterday afternoon. I had been under the impression since the hear-
ing of last summer that it was a "winds" message.
Admiral Hewitt. The one you saw, this hidden word, you decided
that was the message
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. Now that I have reexamined the ex-
hibits, I recognize that as being a hidden word message.
Admiral Hewitt. My understanding is that when that was first
decoded, the word minami, Avhich related to the United States, was
overlooked, so that the translation merely referred to England. Is
that your recollection ?
Captain Kramer. Last summer when that question of the late
morning of 7 December had come up at Pearl Harbor, my recollection
had been that it was a "winds" message. It wasn't until I saw these
exhibits yesterday afternoon that my recollection was refreshed to the
extent that I thought it was one of these hidden word messages rather
than the "winds." I do recall on that that after my return from the
State Department near 10 : 30 the morning of 7 December, we had just
had translated a message specifying the time of delivery of the four-
teen-part note from the Japanese Government to the United States.
That item, together with several other minor messages, one thanking
the Ambassador for his services and another to the embassy staff and
another directing final destruction of codes, all added up in my
[JS4-] mind to a crisis to take place at 1 o'clock. Consequently,
I was in very much of a hurry to get the word out. The books were
made up in the course of a couple of minutes and as I was leaving the
office, I looked at another short plain language message that had just
come in, had just been brought in, and I recognized, as I recall it now,
the first word in there as being a code word in this plain language
text, a code word referring to estranged relations or breaking rela-
tions. As I recall it now, I dictated to a chief yoeman the sence of
the message, glasing through the entire message, spotting another code
word referring to England, and then two minutes after that was on
my way. It wasn't until I returned to the office approximately an
hour later and was looking over the marning's traffic again that I
again examined more closely this particular plain language message,
which was one of many in the traffic that morning, and noted the
omission referring to the United States.
Admiral Hewitt. I show yout a copy of a Tokyo dispatch dated 7
December and ask if you can identify it.
Captain Kjramer. I believe this is the one I saw that morning, yes,
sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you read it for the benefit of the record ?
Captain Kj?amer. It is a message from Tokyo to the legation in
Panama, classified urgent, serially numbered as a circular number
2494, the initial 9 in that figure group indicating circular, and reading:
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 83
Koyanagi rijiyori seirinoUigoo arunituki hattori minami kinebimko seturitu
kikino kyokaingaku sikyuu denpoo aritasi stop — Togo.
It is. to be noted that this is a "stop" message ; therefore of the
hidden word code. My recollection of the handling of this par-
ticular message that morning was as I have earlier indicated and on
seeing this message now, my recollection tends to [^35] be
confirmed in that the initial word of the mesage referred to England.
The fifth word of the message referred to estranged relations. May
I have my previous answer read.
(The former answer referring to this message was read.)
Now on seeing the message, I can see that the initial word refers
to England and the seventh word of the message, at the beginning
of the second line, refers to the estranged relations. It was on
the basis of those two words that I hastily dictated something to
go along with the folder I was already on my way out with and
did not note the omission in translation of an additional code word
appearing in this message until return to the office and reexamina-
tion of the morning's traffic an hour or more later. My recollec-
tion is not clear cut as to the time when the discrepancy was noted.
I do, however, have a rather vague recollection of making two or
more phone calls at the time the discrepancy was noted, which,
if correct, would indicate that that discrepancy was noted perhaps
a quarter of one or 1 o'clock. I do definitely recall, however, that
no retranslation of that message was made for distribution be-
cause of the fact that before it could be delivered to the recipients
of this traffic, who had left meetings respectively in the State De-
partment and Chief of Naval Operations' office for lunch, that it would
be well after the time of delivery, 1 o'clock, about which there had
been so much excitement late in the morning. I might further add
that when the attack was first learned, I recall definitely feeling that
there was no point in making the delivery at that time. That was
perhaps 1 : 30.
Admiral Hewitt. Referring back to document 11 of exhibit 13
there, can you identify that as the original translation which you
made that you dictated hurriedly?
[136] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, I do. In this connection, how-
ever, I might add that I do have a recollection of making an insertion
in, I believe, the file copy of this message of the words "United States,"
with a view to making a distribution of a corrected copy, but that no
actual corrected copy was distributed because of the attack taking
place about 1 : 30.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall, during the latter part of December,
'41, during the absence of Secretary Knox, assembling a collection of
intercepted traffic bearing on Pearl Harbor and discussing this with
Mr. Forrestal ?
Captain Kjiamer. Yes, sir, I do.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you recall whether or not this message of
7 December, this hidden word message of 7 December, was among
that group of messages ?
Captain Kramer. I cannot specifically recall. Admiral, but I am
almost certain that it was. We broke out a sizeable folder of that
84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
traffic for Mr. Forrestal, and I recall going through it rather hastily
in the course of three-quarters of an hour or so, giving him the general
tenor of the way the things shaped up from this traffic because of the
fact that Mr. Forrestal hadn't normally seen this material before that
time.
Admiral Hewitt. Referring to the so-called one p. m. message,
document 41 of exhibit 63, which you have previously mentioned, will
you tell me what you remember about delivery of that message?
Captain Kramer. I have already touched on what took place in my
office as regards the haste of getting this out to recipients on my re-
turn from the State Department about 10 : 30. Wliile the folders for
recipients were being made up, I recall drawing a navigator's time
circle to see if this one p. m. Washington time tied up at all with the
developments in the [137] Malay area, which we had been fol-
lowing in considerable detail the previous week. I recall being im-
pressed with the fact that one p. m. here was several hours before sun-
rise in the Kra Peninsula area, where we knew the Japanese had been
contemplating an attack on Kota Bharu with the connivance of the
Thaiian Chief of Staff. That further tied up with the movement of
a large Japanese convoy down the coast of China the previous three
or four days. For that reason, I felt that on the way over to the
State Department it might be well to point that out for Mr. Knox'
benefit, and when the folder for Mr. Knox was turned over to Mr.
Hull's private secretary, I did point that out and repeated that matter
to Colonel Bratton, who was also in Mr. Hull's outer office with a
similar folder for Mr. Stimson as well as Mr. Hull.
Admiral HEwm. Then you knew the fact that this particular time
was before daylight in the Far East but shortly after daylight in the
Hawaiian area was significant?
Captain Kramer. My mention of the time 7 : 30 at Pearl Harbor
was incidental in passing this explanation on for Mr. Knox' benefit.
I mentioned that point too because of the fact that I had just com-
pleted two years sea duty operating out of Pearl Harbor, was
thoroughly familiar with the IOI/2 time zone, and more or less auto-
matically inserted Hawaiian time into that time circle.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you call the attention of any one else to the
significance of this time ?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, I think that I repeated that item perhaps
to eight or ten different people, including people in my office, I believe
Commander McCollum, and I am not certain but possibly to Admiral
Wilkinson ; several people in the State Department, Colonel Bratton,
and, I think. Captain Safford. But I don't believe that I mentioned
it specifically, [138] although again I may have, on delivery
to the CNO's office.
Admiral Hewitt. I would like to refer you now to the intercepted
Japanese messages which referred to ships and the location of ships
in Pearl Harbor, in particular documents 14, 15, 22, and 24 of ex-
hibit 13. The notations on those messages indicate whether they were
intercepted by the Army or the Navy and give the times of translation.
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you explain or discuss the time lag between
the dates of the interception and the dates of translation of those
messages ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 85
Captain Kramer. Numbers 14, 15, and 24 are Army translations.
Number 22 was a Navy translation which, however, was intercepted
by an Army intercept station, station number 7. Date of origin was
3 December; date of translation 11 December. I recall seeing this
message for the first time Monday morning, the 8th of December. In
view of what had happened the previous day and further in view
of the rather badly garbled and partly unrecovered form of the mes-
sage we had, it took about two days before this translation was com-
pleted. At that time, namely, when the translation was completed,
a message giving the essential points in it was sent to Pearl Harbor
or was sent to CinCPac, suggesting that it be passed on to the District
Intelligence Officer. Even in this form here, there are several gaps
and undecipherable spots, after having worked on it for a couple of
days and comparing additional copies of this message with the one
we were working on.
Admiral Hewitf. Would some of the time lag possibly have been
due to the volume of traffic which was being intercepted arid decoded?
Captain Kramer, I will refer specifically to number 22 again, but I
think it applies to all four of those. The time lag in the case of mes-
sage number 22, the so-called "lights" message, between the date of
origin [139] and the date we got it I cannot account for
specifically, but can give this background on this type of code. The
machine systems, when the key had been recovered and was being used
again, were usually very promptly decoded, a case in point being the
previous afternoon, when between 3 o'clock in the afternoon and
about 8 : 30 in the evening thirteen parts of that f ourteen-part note
were coming in at intervals and the whole job was completed, as re-
gards decrypting, translation, and typing:, by 9 o'clock, when I com-
menced delivery after calling Admiral Wilkinson. In the case of the
codes, however, as compared with these machine ciphers, it depended
on the volume of traffic whether or not a key for that day's traffic was
broken. Sometimes, with luck, a day with a small amount of traffic
could be broken. Many days, however, never were broken. This par-
ticular exhibit 22, I can't state from first-hand knowledge whether
such factors entered into the delay or whether the delay was due to lag
between time of origin and transmission by the Japanese consulate
or lag between time of intercept and delivery here.
Admiral Hewitt. Have you any other information which has not
been brought out before which you think would be interesting or
pertinent to this investigation.
Captain Kramer. I think that I have covered my part of this thing
fairly completely. Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
[I40] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. State your name and rank.
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. George W. Linn, Lieutenant Commander,
U. S. Naval Reserve.
Admiral Hewitf. What duty were you assigned during 1941?
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. I was in OP-20GY, which was a decrypting
section of the Communications Intelligence Section, and I was as-
signed, I think it was probably about February or March — ^a watch
was started, a twenty-four hour watch started, and I was assigned to
86 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that watch and later became the senior officer of that watch. Some
time, maybe a month or so, before December 7th, I was taken off the
watch list and put on days, principally for decrypting reasons. I had
more experience than most of the others and Captain Safford wanted
to be sure we would get the keys in this machine cipher as soon as
possible during the night so that we would have them the next morn-
ing. So that took me off the watch list. Then — I am not sure about
this date — a couple of days before the Tth of December we started our
Christmas leaves and one of our watch officers started his leave and
I went on the watch list in his place, and that put me on watch from
1600 to 2400 on the 6th.
Admiral Hewitt. How many watch officers were there standing
that watch during the first week in December ?
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. Well, at the early part of the first week there
were the four watch officers, including the one that I replaced. From
about the 4th or 5tli on — I am not sure about this date — there were
three others besides myself.
Admiral Hjewitt. Can you give me their names?
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood,
[i^i] Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, and Lieutenant Com-
mander A. A. Murray, all Naval Reserve.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you know of the existence of the "winds"
code at the time ?
Lieutenant Commander ETA shrdl
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. Well, I saw the translations of the documents
that set up the "winds" code and I knew that steps were taken to get
the raw material in and the watch was assigned the task of looking
over that raw material outside of normal working hours. Lieutenant
Commander Kramer, who was in Op-20GZ at that time, handled that
himself during the day, anything that came in during normal working
hours. At night the watch looked over this raw material. It came
in mainly from the West Coast, plain language Japanese; came in by
teletype.
Admiral Hewitt. Then if anything came in on that subject, it would
have been seen by you or one of the officers that you have mentioned ?
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. Yes. If it had come in outside of normal
working hours, some one of the officers should have seen it. I myself
have no knowledge of it. I will say this, that we wouldn't of necessity
know about it
Admiral Hewitt. But one of vou
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. If it did come in. But the man who received
it would.
Admiral Hewitt. What I am trying to bring out is it must have
gone through one of the officers that you mentioned, one of those four
watch officers, outside of working hours ; is that right ?
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. That is right.
Admiral Hewitt. And Commander Kramer during the day time?
Lieut. ComdT. Linn. Yes. Well, he was in during the evenings a
lot. [^4^1 It is pretty hard to draw the line. Commander
Kramer worked sometimes as late as 9 o'clock. It is pretty hard to
draw the line at 1630.
Admiral Hewttt. What I am trying to bring out is if an execute or
any message having to do with that "winds" code had come in, it would
have been seen by at least one of those officers ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 87
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. Yes, if Commander Kramer wasn't there at
the time. We were the GY watch and we had the responsibility for
anything that came in if it came in through Naval Communications
or anything else. The only way in which they might not would be if
something came in at 8 o'clock and he just took the raw material and
handed it to Commander Kramer without looking it over.
Admiral Hewitt. Then Commander Kramer would have seen it?
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. He would would had it himself. That is right.
Admiral Hewitt. Are you able to state positively that you never saw
any intercept which used the code words indicating the breaking of
relations with the United States or war with the United States ?
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. Prior to December 7th, yes. I have seen the
one from the FCC, but that was afterward. That was a part of the
previous investigation. I didn't see anything before that I remember.
My memory in some phases of this is good and others not too good
at all. I knew nothing about the FCC being mixed up in this until
at the time of the inquiry, when I saw that copy.
Admiral Hewitt. That is all. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
[14^] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. State your name and rank.
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Francis M. Brotherhood, Lieutenant
Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve.
Admiral Hewitt. It appears from previous testimony that during
1941 you were connected with the security section of Naval Communi-
cations in Washington and that you have some knowledge of the so-
called "winds" code. What were your duties in 1941 ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Admiral, I was one of the watch offi-
cers in charge of the decryption and preparation of diplomatic dis-
patches, especially the Japanese.
Admiral Hew^itt. Will you tell us what you know about the "winds"
code and the efforts to monitor for the "winds" code ? State what your
understanding of the "winds" code is and what steps were taken to
listen for a message using that code.
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Some time in the month of November,
Admiral, we got a dispatch which we succeeded in breaking out, that
told us that the Japanese were planning to inform their consular
officials around the world by voice radio from Tokyo to the effect
that they intended to break relations with certain countries, among
them the United States, Russia, and Great Britain. I don't remember
whether any one else was included. It would be in the way of a
weather broadcast. A certain weather expression was to indicate
that Japan planned to break diplomatic relations with the United
States, and another expression meant that they planned to break
with Great Britain, and still another that they planned to break
with Russia. As one of the watch officers through whom they hoped
to have the message transmitted to the authorities at the Navy Depart-
ment, I had been [J4j] drilled as to what to watch for and
had very specific instructions as to how to handle any such dispatch
that was intercepted.
In connection with the intercept facilities, I wasn't a part of the
people that set up the intercept organization, but it was my under-
standing at the time that whatever facilities the Navy had that could
be diverted to the reception of voice signals as against conventional
88 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
radio telegraphic signals had been diverted and had been set up for
the purpose. We regarded the possible intercept of such an execute
order as being of great importance. We had been instructed further
that the FCC had been informed of what we were looking for and
that under certain circumstances we might hear from them, and the
Army, who was working this diplomatic project with us jointly,
and my understanding at the time was that they were also diverting
certain facilities in an effort to get this broadcast. That is the back-
ground, as I understand it.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall what, if any, messages were re-
ceived using this "winds" code ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. I was on duty there the evening of,
I believe it was, the Ith of December — I rightly don't remember at
this moment whether it was the 4th or the 5th — when the FCC called
and asked for some one to whom they could deliver a certain dispatch
and the officer of the FCC at the other end indicated to me some way
that I understood what he was driving at, and I said, "I am authorized
to take it," and I did so and it was an expression that just didn't quite
fit the code. In other w^ords, it was not what we were looking for.
I would say not what we were looking for. In other words, it did
not indicate that we might expect a break in relations on the part
of Japan with the United States, but it was suggestive of a break in
relations with Russia. However, as I remember the [^4^] dis-
patch in question, without refreshing my memory here, it was not
accurate in its fitting the formula insofar as Russia was concerned.
At the time, I myself was not in position to evaluate the value of that
dispatch. I had only my orders to pass it on, which I did. However,
I did so with a reservation in my own mind that it was not fitting
the formula setting up this dispatch.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you examine this exhibit number 65 of the
Naval Court of Inquiry and see if any of those fits the message which
you just described?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. This one (indicating) is somewhat
like the message that I have just described, although this is in English,
a translation of Avhat I actually received.
Admiral Hewitt, That is document number 1 ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. This is document number 1.
Admiral Hewitt. Look at the others also. What about document
number 2 ? Could that have been the message to which you referred ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. That doesn't strike me. Admiral
Hewitt, as being the one.
Admiral Hew^itt, Number 1 to which you refer is not a message,
but it might be the code ?
Lieut, Comdr. Brotherhood. Yes, sir, but that was the point I
made, Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. I will rephrase the question. Document number
2, then, as I understand it, refers to the north wind, but in referring
to the north wind, it did not follow the form which had been more
or less specified in the message that set up the "winds" code, is that
correct ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Yes, sir. That was the impression I
had at the time.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 89
[14.6] Admiral Hewitt. Will you discuss to whom this message
was delivered ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Admiral Hewitt, my instructions were
to first get in touch with the communication watch officers upstairs
and pronounce the words that I had heard from whoever sent them
to me, in this case the FCC, and I would receive further instructions.
The communication watch officer instructed me in these words : "You
want to see the Admiral." I called the Admiral on the telephone
directly and without delay got him on the other end of the wire and
told him verbally what I had received. The reaction on the part of
Admiral Noyes, who was then the Director of Naval Communications,
was that he thought the wind was blowing from a funny direction,
and he used words to that effect. As I said, when I telephoned this
thing through, 1 didn't think personally, although I was not supposed
to think in the matter — I didn't think it was in the nature of an execute.
Admiral Noyes further gave me to believe from what I heard him say
over the telephone — I can't quote his words, but the impression I got
was, however he would pass the information on for what it was worth.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall what conversation you had with
Captain Safford concerning this ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Admiral Hev/itt, I haven't had my
memory refreshed on that conversation, although Captain Safford
says that I called him that morning and told him such a dispatch had
arrived. That was in accordance with my instructions, too.
Admiral Hewitt. But you can't remember now actually whether
you did it or what was said ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. No, sir. If I hadn't seen Captain
Safford here a half hour ago, I wouldn't be able to say that I had
called him, but Captain Safford said I did and I believe I had called
him.
[IW] Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall ever seeing any message
which referred to the United States ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. No, Admiral, I do not.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you give me the names of the other officers
who stood the same watch that you did ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Yes, sir. I relieved Lieutenant Com-
mander Linn, Lieutenant Commander George Linn, at midnight —
well, 1201, December 7th — and I was relieved in turn by Lieutenant
Commander A. V. Pering some time after 7 the same morning, and
the other officer, whom I did not see that day, was Lieutenant Com-
mander Murray. I don't remember his initials.
Admiral Hewitt. Were there any officers who stood watch earlier?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Well, sir, we had another member of
the group. There were five of us. The other member of the group
managed to get in his Christmas vacation that week — I mean his
annual leave — so he was not present, and that was Lieutenant Com-
mander Brown.
Admiral Hewitt. The only other officer besides those you have
mentioned who would have direct knowledge of such messages or
through whom such messages would pass would be Commander
Kramer, is that right?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Well, Commander Kramer should
certainly be considered, yes, sir.
90 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Hewitt. As I understand it, he would have the messages
that came in during the day and one of these watch officers, one of
you watch officers, would be sure to see any messages that came in
during the night outside of working hours. Is that correct ?
Lieut Comdr. Brotherhood. Yes, sir. That would also be true of
the day time. We had a teletype set up there in which all this stuff,
if it was intercepted by any of the outside stations, was being trans-
mitted to us.
[14^] Admiral Hewitt. I think that is all then. Thank you
very much.
(The witness was excused.)
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Heavittt. State your name and rank.
Lieut. Comdr. Pering. Alfred V. Pering, Lieutenant Commander,
USNE._
Admiral Hewitt. Wliat were your duties during 1941 ?
Lieut. Comdr. Peking. I was the watch officer in Op-20G.
Admiral Hewitt. And you were carrying out that duty during the
first week in December, 1941 ?
Lieut. Comdr. Peking. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Who were the other watch officers?
Lieut. Comdr. Peking. Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood, Lieu-
tenant Commander Murray, Lieutenant Commander Linn. At the
time there was a four section watch.
Admiral Hewitt. You knew of the existence of the "winds" code?
Lieut. Comdr. Peking. Yes, sir. We had instructions to look for a
certain set of conditions in plain language Japanese which was being
intercepted.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you ever see any intercept using that code
which referred to the breaking of relations with the United States?
Lieut. Comdr. Peking. I did not, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you see any referring to breaking relations
with any other nation ?
Lieut. Comdr. Peking. No, I saw none.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
[149] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. State your name and rank.
Lieutenant Freeman. Frederick L. Freeman, Lieutenant, U. S.
Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. What were your duties during 1941, Mr. Freeman ?
Lieutenant Freeman. I was in the section that was identified as sec-
tion GI of Intelligence, which was a correlating section and dissemi-
nating section. We disseminated intelligence received by us from the
field radio intelligence units to ONI. We wrote up our own reports on
the basis of information sent to us and delivered them to ONI.
Admiral Hewitt. Did 3'ou stand a watch in connection with those
duties?
Lieutenant Freeman. We had been on a watch basis, sir, for about
a month, I would say — I don't recall exactly how long, but it was
about that long — ^before Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Hewitt. What other officers shared that watch with you
the first week of December, 1941 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 91
Lieutenant Freeman. Lieutenant M. W. Lyon, Chief Yeoman —
he is Ensign now — Nine, and Chief Yeoman Stalter.
Admiral Hewitt. You were acquainted with the so-called "winds"
code then ?
Lieutenant Freeman. Yes, sir, I was.
Admiral Hewitt. What do you know about the efforts made to
monitor, intercept, a message referring to that code or in that code?
Lieutenant Freeman. Well, I am aware that we made every effort.
We were expecting the signal to execute and I know that every effort
was made, all stations were alerted to listen for it; but from personal
knowledge I don't know that we ever actually got the signal.
[ISO] Admiral Hewitt. You never knew personally of any in-
tercept?
Lieutenant Freeman. No, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you recall what discussions you may have
had with Captain Safford concerning this?
Lieutenant Freeman. I had a discussion with Captain Safford some
time last year about it and he was requesting me as to my memory of
the circumstances, as to whether or not we had gotten such a message.
I was standing duties adjacent to the section that was responsible for
decrypting, and so forth, at that time and we worked fairly closely
with them and he thought that I might personally recall having seen
the message executing.
Admiral Hewitt. But you never did?
Lieutenant Freeman. I never did, no, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. That is all. Thank you.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 4: 10 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m.
the next day.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 93
[151^ PKOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIRY
Eighth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General
Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Wednesday, 23 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin .H. Griswold, USNB.; and Ship's
Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
Admiral Hewitt. Careful consideration has been given to the evi-
dence concerning the so-called "winds" message with a view to deter-
mining whether or not Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN, formerly
Director of Naval Communications, should be called as a witness.
It appears from the testimony of Captain Safford that he thought
that a "winds" message relating to the United States was received
about 4 December 1941 and was shown to him by Captain Kramer
and a watch officer and then delivered to Admiral Noyes. It appears
from the testimony of Captain Kramer that be believes that there was
some such message at about that time, but that he cannot recall
whether or not it referred to the United States, and he is under the
impression that it referred to England and possibly to the Dutch
rather than to the United States, although it may have referred to
the United States also. Captain Kramer believed that the message
in question was delivered to Admiral Noyes. There is yet no other
evidence to the effect that a "winds" code message relating to the
United States was received.
Upon review of the sworn testimony of Admiral Noyes, given be-
fore the Naval Court of Inquiry, it appears that he recalled no such
message and that he did not believe that any such message relating
to the United States had ever been received by the Navy, although
he had some recollection of a "false alarm." Accordingly, I find that
no useful purpose would be served [1-5^] by calling Admiral
Noyes as a witness in this investigation, and direct that the portions
of his previous testimony relating to this subject be incorporated in
this record. This decision will be reconsidered should further evi-
dence be developed indicating that a useful purpose would be served
by reexamining Admiral Noyes.
(The extracts of testimony of Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN,
before the Naval Court of Inquiry, follow. )
[iJS] Extracts of Testimony of Rear Admiral, Leigh Notes Before Naval
Court of Inquiry
37.' Q. I would like to show you document 15 of Exhibit 63, which has been
familiarly termed the "winds message" and ask you to examine it and state
whether you had seen this document on or after the date of its translation, which
is noted in the right-hand corner as being 28 November 1941?
A. Yes.
38. Q. What action did you take with reference to this document when it was
brought to your attention?
94 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. We took steps to get immediate notice from our intercept stations to cover
this point.
39. Q. Subsequent to the date of your having taken these steps to get inter-
cepts from your stations, will you state whether any of the code words as set out
in document 15 were received in the Navy Department, either in Japanese or in
plain English?
A. They were not.
40. Q. I show you Exhibit 65, and refer you to Document No. 2 and Document
No. 3. These are intercepts by Federal Communications Commission. I ask you
whether you were ever acquainted with the information contained in these docu-
ments prior to the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941.
A. I have no recollection of ever having seen this document.
41. Q. Either 2 or 3 — either document?
A. No, sir.
42. Q. Had you ever been informed of the contents of either 2 or 3 prior to
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941?
A. Not to the best of my knowledge.
43. Q. Can you recall whether or not an oflBcer in your Division made any
telephone calls to you with reference to any subject matter contained in the winds
code, of document 15, that you have previously been shown?
A. No.
44. Q. Do you recall at any time prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
on 7 December 1941, having been informed by some officer in the Navy Depart-
ment that there had been received in the Navy Department certain information
about winds, and that your reply was. "The wind seems to be blowing in a strange
direction," or words to that effect? Do you have any recollection of such a con-
versation ?
A. I do not."
78. Q. At any time prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 De-
cember 1941 was there brought to your attention a dispatch that had been pre-
pared by Commander McCollum in the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Far
Eastern Division in which there was a summary or resume of intelligence infor-
mation to be transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?
[154] A. I believe that Admiral Wilkinson discussed such a message with
me which was an estimate of the situation based on purely communication intel-
ligence coming from the Director of Naval Intelligence. I told him that in my
opinion estimates of the situation should come from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions.
79. Q. Do you have any knowledge of whether or not that message was ever
transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?
A. I do not.
80. Q. Can you state what action was taken in the Navy Department with
regard to releasing this dispatch?
A. I cannot. I exercised no censorship in regard to dispatches except to see
that they were properly released.
The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he did
not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
81. Q. At the time that you saw this McCollum dispatch that was prepared and
being considered for transmission to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet,
do you remember whether any reference was made to the winds code system?
A. I do not.
82. Q. What special circumstances or procedures were set up in your office for
the handling of the execution signal of the winds code system if and when the
execution signal was received?
A. We had a siwcial 24-hour watch for all communication intelligence matters.
83. Q. Were there any special cards prepared giving the Japanese words that
were expected and these cards, six sets of them, delivered to persons in the Navy
Department who would be particularly interested upon the receipt of the execu-
tion of that signal?
A. I couldn't say.
84. Q. As a possible refreshing of your memory, there has been testimony given
before this court that prior to the receipt of the execution signal you had prepared
a series of six cards and these had been delivered to officials in the Navy Depart-
ment who would be particularly anxious to know of this execute signal at the
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 95
earliest moment it was received. Do you now recall that any such system was
established?
A. No, I couldn't say.
85. Q. There has been testimony before this court to the effect that the execu-
tion of the winds code system was received and that a thorough search in the
Navy Department files had failed to receive a copy of the execution signal.
Would the Director of Naval Communications files be the normal place in which
the record would be kept?
A. If it was received by naval means, yes ; if not, no.
86. Q. Will you please answer the question. Are not the files of the Director
of Naval Communications the normal repository of such messages?
[155] A. If received by naval means, yes. Otherwise, the OflBce of Naval
Intelligence.
87. Q. The testimony before this court was that it had been received by naval
intercepting means and therefore the record of this message would naturally be
kept in the files of the Director of Naval Communications, would it not?
A. Yes.
88. Q. Can you explain why this document is missing from the files of the
Director of Naval Communications?
A. I don't think that your assumption is correct. I don't think that any such
message was received by naval means.
89. Q. Then at no time did you learn from anyone of the execution of the winds
message in any form, and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any
form of the winds message? Is that the way you want to leave your testimony on
that subject?
A. That is right ; yes.
136. Q. Referring to this "Winds Message" and the execute of the "Winds
Message" : Have you any recollection whether Lieutenant Commander Kramer
came in with the execute of the "Winds Message" and said, "Here It is"?
A. As I remember it, we received some outside information which afterwards
turned out not to be correct. That information was taken to mean that an
execute of this "Winds Message" had been received. It turned out not to be
correct.
141. Q. In my previous examination I asked you, "At no time did you learn
from anyone of the execution of the 'Winds Message' in any form and at no
time did you tell anyone of the execution in any form." I ask you if that is the
way you wish to leave your testimony on that subject? I now invite your atten-
tion to the fact that you have just testified that you received some information.
From where did this information come?
A. I beg your pardon. I said, to the best of my recollection, that there was a
false alarm about it.
142. Q. But that was information about the "Winds Message", was it not?
The mere fact that it turned out to be false afterwards did not take it away from
that particular subject, did it?
A. I would be very glad to give you a better answer if I could.
143. Q. Then, you did hear from some source about the execution of the "Winds
Message" ; is that right?
A. I can only say that to the best of my remembrance no execution of the
so-called "Winds Message" was finally received.
Reexamined by the court :
144. Q. Did you ever discuss this "Winds Message" or the receipt of it with the
Chief of Naval Operations?
A. When the message came in, as I remember it, we considered it more impor-
tant than a later study of it indicated. The message only said that relations were
strained.
[156] 145. Q. I asked you whether you discussed it?
A. With the Chief of Naval Operations personally?
146. Q. Yes.
A. No.
147. Q. Did you give him any information?
A. He got a copy of it.
Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
148. Q. I show you document 3 of Exhibit 64, which is a message from Alusna
Batavia to OpNav, No. 031030, and ask you whether or not you have seen that
dispatch, or whether you recognize it, and if so, at what time did you see it?
96 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I couldn't say the time I saw it. I did see it.
149. Q. Will you read the first part of the dispatch to the court, please?
A. (Reading) "From Thorpe for Miles, War Department."
150. Q. And continue for the first three lines.
A. (Continuing) "Code intercept. Japan will inform her consuls of war de-
cision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end."
151. Q. Does that not indicate more than just strained relations?
A. It was his interpretation apparently of the same message that had already
been received.
152. Q. Was it not entirely possible that the translators in the War Depart-
ment of the Japanese code would have reached about the same conclusion, in that
they had the same words to work from?
A. This was not necessarily-
The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, made the follow-
ing statement : I call the court's attention to the fact that this was not a trans-
lation made in the War Department. This came from Batavia that way.
The witness made the following statement : Somebody in Batavia had gained
that information.
153. Q. But the dispatch represents the translation of the same code system
which was sent out by Japan, does it not, namely, the "Winds Code" system?
A. Probably, We discussed it with the War Department. They did not have
much confidence, as I remember it, in the information from there as against the
rechecking that was done in Washington.
154. Q. Can you state from where this false report on the "Winds Message"
was received ; that is, who gave it to you?
A. No.
155. Q. But you do recollect that you did hear about the execution of this before
7 December 1941?
A. It has been stated and it has been testified to that there were six [157]
copies made of this dispatch, and also I won't trust my i-ecoUection for three years
back as against my assistants. These people who handled the details were my
subordinates, and their recollection of details is probably better than mine.
Reexamined by the judge advocate :
156. Q. Will you state, exactly as you remember having seen it, what this false
report of the execute of the "Winds Message" was?
A. I can only say that, in the phrasing of the questions, I believe there must
have been some discussion about it. I am convinced that it was not finally found
to be correct.
157. Q. What I am trying to ascertain, Admiral, is the wording of the report
which you received and which later you determined to be false?
A. I don't know.
158. Q. Do you know from whom it was received?
A. I don't.
[158] Two witnesses entered and each was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. Will each of you gentlemen state his name and
rank.
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. Leo Eeierstad, Lieutenant Commander,
USNR.
Lieutenant (jg) Conant. Jo.seph M. Conant, Lieutenant (jg),
USNR.
Admiral Hewitt. Lieutenant Commander Eeierstad, what are your
duties ?
Lieut. Comdr. Reiekstad. I am in charge of the translating unit in
Op-16FE.
Admiral Heavitt. That involves translating Japanese ?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Wliat are your qualifications in Japanese?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. Well, I am a graduate of the Navy's
School of Oriental Languages and Japanese language and then I had
nine years of residence in China, during which time I studied Chinese,
which, of course, has some relation to the Japanese language as far as
the written form is concerned.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 97
Admiral Hewitt. Lieutenant Conant, will you answer the same
questions with regard to your duties and qualifications?
Lieutenant (jg) Conant. I am a translation sub-section head under
Lieutenant Commander Reierstad and my qualifications are solely
that I graduated from the Boulder Language school.
Admiral Hewitt. Have you examined this exhibit number 14, which
I present to you ?
Lieutenant (jg) Conant. Yes, sir.
Lieut. Comclr. Reierstad. This looks like the one that we had and
actually examined.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you examine it closely enough to tell whether
this is the same one or a copy of it? This is a photographic copy.
[159] Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you state whether this is the one that you
looked over to translate ?
Lieutenant (jg) Conant. Yes, that is the one.
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. I present you with exhibit number 4 and ask you
to testify if the printed part of the exhibit, with the additional pencil
notations, is your translation of the exhibit number 14?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad, It is.
Lieutenant (jg) Conant. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. How does your translation compare in general
with this exhibit number 3 ?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. This (referring to exhibit number 3) we
haven't examined prior to this time, sir. Admiral, I point out here,
sir, that this translation, which is a possibly correct one, also might
be translated ''establish position." I should like to make clear that
the time element, whether it is past, present, or future, is not definitely
ascertainable from the characters as appearing here.
Admiral Hewitt. That would also be true where this caption is "en-
emy ship sunk" in exhibit 3 and in exhibit 14 it is "attack and sink"?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. That is also true. Simply on the basis
of the original Japanese it is not possible to say definitely whether it
is past or future action. "Attack and sink enemy battleship" could be
correct, or "enemy ship attacked and sunk" would also be correct, in
our opinion.
Admiral HEWiT-r. I call your attention to the fact that the entrance
channel is marked here by rings through a lighthouse here and through
t he Sugar Mill stack at Waihapu, that a vessel entering the channel at
these [JGO] outer buoys should be on this range (indicating).
Will you confirm my idea that possibly this notation "position estab-
lished" could be a note to get on that range at that point ?
Lieut, Comdr, Reierstad. I would say definitely. Wouldn't you,
Conant ?
Lieutenant (jg) Conant. Yes, I would say that.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you state the date on which you last looked
over exhibit 4 and added the pencil notations ?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. 22 May was the last time we handled this
chart and put our final remarks, on.
Admiral Hewitt. Are you willing to certify as to the accuracy of
this translation within the limitations of tense which you have already
expressed ?
79716— 4C— Ex. 149, vol. 1- S
98 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. And we would like to add within the
limitations of this being a photostatic copy and certain parts of it
being impossible for us to accurately discern.
Admiral Hewitt. But to the extent that there is a translation here
on exhibit 4 it is accurate ?
Lieut, Comdr. Reierstad. Yes sir.
Admiral Hewitt. In other w^ords, your translation is not complete,
but what you have translated is correct ?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. Yes, sir, with the further qualification,
of course, that the Admiral just made, that we cannot undertake to
state whether this is past or future tense.
Admiral Hewitt. In the book "Battle Report" on page 26 there is
a statement, referring to this chart or another photographic copy of
the same chart: "At one point on his chart, and as if to bolster the
evidence [^67] of his own vision, he wrote in Japanese, 'I saw it
with my own eyes'!" Could you find anything on this chart which
might be the basis for that statement, any notation on this chart?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. In this connection, sir, all we can say is
on the basis of the photo copy made available to us for examination,
there is no evidence we have been able to locate of any Japanese writ-
ing that could be so translated.
Admiral Hewitt. Calling your attention to the notations which are
in ink near the times 0115 and 0410, one is translated as "fight."
Could that possibly refer to the initiation of a general attack or a
zero hour for an attack ?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. In my opinion, it definitely could.
Lieutenant (j. g.) Conant. Yes, sir.
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. It is very possible, but again there is no
way of saying whether that is a future action or a past action.
Admiral, there is just one idea that occurred to me, whether it might
not be worthwhile in connection with this project to get the original
and to also make from the original a study of the calligraphy which
appears here in different places to establish first of all whether it
was all written by the same man, if possible, whether some of it might
not have been written in considerably greater haste. A good deal of
information could be obtained from a study of that kind. Don't you
think so, Joe ?
Lieutenant (j. g.) Conant. Yes, sir.
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. The interesting thing here is. Admiral,
that all of these signals appear to have been written in pencil. If
anything had been fixed up in advance, I think that that happening
would have been written on in ink, if we assume that these other
things were also written [162] on in ink, well in advance.
Also the question of the effect of what damage on some parts of the
document as against the others which would make some of these stand
out more clearly.
Admiral Hewitt. That is all. Thank you very much.
(The witnesses were excused.)
The investigation was then, at 2 : 30 p. m., adjourned until 11 a. m.
Friday, 25 May 1945.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 99
[163] PROCEEDINCtS of THEmEWITT INQUIEY
Ninth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General
Board, Navy Department, at 11 a. m., P'riday, 25 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNE.; and Ship's
Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. State your name and rank.
Eear Admiral DeLany. Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLany, U. S.
Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. You were Assistant Chief of Staff in the Opera-
tions Office of CinCPac?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes. sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Prior to 7 December 1941 ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. You are, of course, familiar with exhibit number 8
of the Naval Court's record. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41
on the security of Pearl Harbor. One of the assumptions is —
That a declaration of war may be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in
Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, (3)
a combination of the two.
And also at the end of the letter a statement was made that —
It must be remembered, too, that a single submarine's attack may indicate the
presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accom-
panied by a carrier. •
Is that correct ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Exhibit 52 of the Court of Inquiry's record, which
[WJ,.'] is Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, established the
task groups then in effect ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Task forces, yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. You can identify that ^
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Also we have exhibit 69A and B of the Court of
Inquiry, which purport to be memoranda gotten up for the Com-
mander-in-Chief by Captain, now Admiral, McMorris. Can you iden-
tify those from your recollection ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, that exhibit, tliose two memoranda, as I un-
derstand it, were somewhat in the nature of a check-off list of steps to
be taken
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir. They were given to the Duty
Officer.
/
100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Hewitt. — a running check-off list of steps to be taken in
case war was declared ?
Rear Admiral DeLant. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, before tlie Roberts Commission you stated
that as far as you recalled, the question of an air raid on Pearl Harbor
was not discussed between 27 November and 7 December. Is that still
in accordance with your memory?
Rear Admiral DeLany. You mean a surprise attack
Admiral Hewitt. It says :
The possibility of an air raid on Pearl Harbor was not discussed between 27
November and 7 December.
Rear Admiral DeLant. I take it that you mean a joint discussion or
as a matter within the Staff or personal discussion. "Never from the
point of view of what liappened" ; yes, sir, I confirm that statement,
[16S] Admiral Hewitt. The question was :
Had you any discussions between November 27 and December 7 as to the proba-
bility of Japanese naval action or air action?
Never from the point of view of what happened.
Then the next question was :
The possibility was not discussed, the possibility of an air raid?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir, that is still my
Admiral Hewitt. But it was not specifically discussed after the ar-
rival of the war Avarning on November 27th?
Rear Admiral DeLany. No, sir. The same answer there ; not in the
light of what happened, an attack of that nature.
Admiral Hewitt. What I was trying to bring out was whether the
possibility of what actually did happen was discussed during that criti-
cal period from November 27th to December 7th in the Staff or with
Admiral Kimmel.
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir, within the Staff, even before this
time, and when this order Avas formulated, it was stated in there that
the possibility of an air raid existed ; but with the information that
we had, it wasn't discu^ed as a matter that was actually going to
happen. There always was a possibility of it.
Admiral Hewitt. About that time was an estimate of the Pacific
situation made?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. In which various enemy courses of action were
considered ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Was that in written form or was it just a mental
estimate made by the Commander-in-Chief or some of the members
of the Staff?
[lOG] Rear Admiral DeLany. Well, Admiral, I think that the
war plans that came out of the Pacific Fleet, and I think must be on
file here, gave consideration to that.
Admiral Hewitt. The Pacific Fleet war plans.
Rear Admiral Delany. There was a Rainbow plan and shipping
raid plans.
Admiral Hewitt. Let's refer to that.
Rear Admiral DeLany. I can't give you the contents of those war
plans after all this time, but I know there was a running estimate of
the situation and plans based on those estimates.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 101
Admiral Hewitt. You expect it to appear in the assumptions to
the war phm, do you not?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Looking at this Pacific Fleet Operating Plan,
Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-l), they are general assumptions:
That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British
Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in
Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, com-
prising either :
1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.
Note: As of 22 June war exists between tiie European Axis and Russia,
and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of
the Axis but not necessarily against Japan,
b. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility
of their intervention must be taken into account —
and other general assumptions of that nature, and one special assump-
tion —
That the [167] Pacific Fleet is virtually mobilized and is based at Pearl
Harbor, but regular navy yard overhauls are in progress which would reduce
forces immediately available by about one-fifth.
Now, I might read the following into the record, I think. In Chap-
ter III, paragraph 1331, of this reference, the Estimate of Enemy
Action includes the following:
1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited
to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket
battleship or heavy cruiser.
1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows :
a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia
(including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.
b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American
and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean,
and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.
c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.
d. The principal defensive efforts to be :
1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.
2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central
and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced
bases.
3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.
1.333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action
will be toward :
a. Capture of Guam.
[168] b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea. Philippine
waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of
advanced bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval
forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.
c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas
area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval
forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.
e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval
forces.
f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying
United States positions.
1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:
a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong
concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines,
and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.
b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position
(possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the
Mandates.
102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probably main base
in Halmahera).
d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces
in that area.
[169] e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft
in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported
there.
Those are the essential ones. Take this sub-paragraph "f" here:
Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines
in the Hawaiian area.
That would seem to indicate that a raid on the Hawaiian area by
forces other than submarines was not seriously contemplated then^
Rear Admiral DeLany. That is right ; to the extent that it actually
happened, that is correct, and I think it might be pertinent to say
that I believe that that plan was submitted to the Navy Department and
approved by the Navy Department. I don't know the date because I
am not familiar enough with the thing three years from then to say
what the thing is, but I know that those things were submitted to the
Navy Department.
Admiral Hewitt. I read from the letter of distribution of this book :
From : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To : Distribution List for WPPac-46.
Subject : WPPac-46.
1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet
been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect prior
to the receipt of such approval.
You don't remember whether that
Eear Admiral DeLant. I don't know that the thing was actually
approved, but the concept of the whole thing was that it was to be
approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, because it is intimated
in that letter that approval hadn't yet been received and if the occasion
arose before the approval was forthcoming, it would be placed in effect
anyhow,
[170] Admiral Hewitt. So as to have something ready?
Rear Admiral DeLant. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Well, I gather a picture of this, from reading the
testimony and so forth, that you had a great many warnings of dif-
ferent sorts. You knew about that time that the relations were
strained — there was a good deal in the papers about it, as I recall —
and you had the messages of November 24th, particularly, and Novem-
ber 27th, The message of November 24th, with which you are un-
doubtedly familiar, was from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and the Naval Districts con-
cerned. The one of the 24th was : "Chances of favorable outcome of
negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. This situation coupled
with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval
and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam
is a possibility," This says any direction but puts emphasis on the
attack on the Philippines or Guam,
Do you recall what discussion was held of that and what other
directions besides those indicated, the Philippines or Guam, were
considered ?
Rear Admiral DeLant. Yes, sir, I think that the fact that air-
craft carriers were sent out to place planes on both Midway and Wake
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 103
and that patrol strength at Midway was increased is indicative of the
fact that we thought that the attack would not probably be limited to
the Philippines and Guam but it would extend farther to the eastward
as far as Midway and Wake.
Admiral Hewitt. What made you feel that it might not be extended
farther east or probably wouldn't be ?
Eear Admiral DeLany. Well, Admiral, I think Intelligence indi-
cated that there weren't any forces in that area.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you glance over these intelligence sum-
maries [i7i] (exhibit 19) and see if you can recall whether
those or something like that were the ones that were available to you ?
Rear Admiral DeLant. Yes, sir, these are summarized in the daily
conferences in which the Intelligence Officer of the fleet presented
the
Admiral HEW^TT. The general tenor of those was that there was
considerable movement of forces in the direction of Indo-Cliina and
the Kra Peninsula and to the south and southeastward generally but
there might be some forces in the Mandates, particularly submarines.
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. There was a question whether or not there might
be a carrier unit there, is that correct ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. And that the main body of the carriers was in
home waters ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What did you generally understand out there by
"home waters"?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Generally to the westward and southern
of the Philippines and in the homeland itself.
Admiral Hewitt. Close to the homeland ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, then, you got this war warning dispatch
on November 27th which contained the words, "Thit dispatch is con-
sidered a war warning," and went on, "The negotiations have ceased
and an aggressive move by Japan is expected in the next few days,"
and went on to mention these forces to the southeast. What was the
general feeling out there as to what that dispatch meant? That was
considered a war warning. Was that [-?7~'] taken particu-
larly seriously?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Very definitely so. Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. I mean it meant more than the other warning
dispatches that they had had before ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir, and the operating forces at sea
were all put on condition watches, darken ship, required to steam
continuously in anti-submarine defense dispositions.
Admiral Hewitt. As a matter of fact, that had been the case for
almost
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir, but it had been tightened up after
this thing here.
Admiral Hewitt. Now as to the message addressed to both the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, "Ex-
ecute defense deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks assigned
in WPL 46." You had at that time two carrier task forces out there
delivering planes?
104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. So that you did have some forces to the west-
ward?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. But, as I understand it, there was nothing else
done in the matter of defensive deployment which was considered
possible or necessary. Am I correct in that ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Well, so far as the relations between the
Army and Navy were concerned, there were conferences and I believe
that the same concept existed then as existed previously, that the
greatest danger in the Hawaiian area lay from submarine attacks
and sabotage in view of the intelligence information that we had.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know whether an attack of the nature
whicli [173] actually was carried out was ever investigated
carefully as a possible course of action? Was there an investigation in
which you figured out the distances and times necessary to cover the
distance of a carrier running from the home waters
Rear Admiral DeLany. As I recall, it wasn't possible, between the
time of the attack and the receipt of the war warning, in the event
that the intelligence was correct about the fleet being in home waters.
Admiral Hewitt. Well, the home waters would have been anywhere
in the home islands ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Well, the evidence indicates that that force actu-
ally left the harbor up there at Etorofu Island on the ^'7th, which
was the date of the war warning. I haven't laid this thing out myself
yet to figure out the speeds and so forth, but apparently it clemon-
strate„d that it could be done. I just wondered if they had been laid
down and thought of
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir, I am sure — well, I know that in
the Operations Section and with the plans that had been put on a
piece of paper.
Admiral Hewitt, That would have been McMorris's job, wouldn't
it? He would have known the details of that and what study was
made of it?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Speaking of the conferences and so forth between
the Army Staflf and the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, also with Com-
FOURTEEN's I suppose, as to courses of action and defensive meas-
ures, did you have a staff command post or communications center
or an operations room which was to be put into effect in case of war
or strained relations, or was there ever an exercise, joint exercise,
carried out?
[174] Rear Admiral DeLany. In all the exercises that were con-
ducted prior to this, there was a joint setup as much as was possible
with the facilities and communications and other requirements in
effect, because as required by the Commander-in-Chief out there, there
had been numerous air raid exercises and the Army's installation was
fairly well complete, as I recall it, for their own particular control
of planes, but the hookup into a central joint operational room never
had been made.
Admiral Hewitt. Was it planned?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, there were complete plans for the
installation of a complete warning net on the island and the joint ar-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 105
rangement up there in the caves in the liill was all down on paper and
the thing was definitely an acconii)lished plan.
Admiral HEwrrr. Did that include a command post, or whatever
you want to call it, for ComFOURTEEN?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. And CinCPac, too, if he was there?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, because the whole joint defense of the
island was planned in those arrangements.
Admiral HEwrrr. But it had never actually been tried out in an
exercise ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Not with that installation as existed sub-
sequent to the 7th of December, because there just weren't any mate-
rials available to establish this radar warning set hookup or anything
like that. I think all the material was ordered according to plans,
but it never had been delivered, never had been set up, by the Tth of
December.
Admiral Hewitt. .There is a lot of testimony through here in vari-
ous jilaces of efforts which w^ere made to get the various things which
were needed to improve the defenses. We have the letters which were
written about the [^75] deficiencies in defenses in the first
part of 1941, the requests for planes; of course, the supply of addi-
tional planes, except in the operations, would not have been your
function, but do 3'ou happen to know whether that was kept after,
the importance of that was realized ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir, I am positive of it. The Com-
mander-in-Chief made a trip back here in the summer of '41. The
thing was completely outlined in that, and I believe the records show
the efforts that were made by everybody to get more planes, more
anti-aircraft batteries, more communication facilities. We took pains
to get officers w^lio had been familiar with the defense of Great Brit-
ain out into the Islands to instruct and lecture and guide everybody
in their island defense installations. That had been going on for
months.
Admiral HswrrT. I recall a reply to the request for additional
planes, made by the Navy Department, which stated in effect that
the planes weren't available. Was any reason ever given for the non-
availability of these planes, why they weren't available? Was it be-
cause they did not exist or because they were distributed elsewhere ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. As I recall it, it is the latter case ; they were
being distributed elsewhere.
Admiral Hew^itt. And shortly after the attack took place, addi-
tional planes were sent very promptly, is that correct?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes. There was no question of their ability
to deliver planes to us after the Tth of December.
Admiral Hew^itt. Do you recall where those came from ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. They came from continental United States.
I don't know where they started out from initially, sir. That same
thing is true of [77^] a lot of material that wasn't available
before the Tth of December, that flowed out to us out here.
Admiral HEwrrT. Referring to Exhibit 8 of the Naval Court's rec-
ord, Assumption B, that indicates that a surprise air attack on Pearl
Harbor is possible, does it not ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes.
106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Hewtett. And that letter was issued on October 14, 1941 ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. I believe that the letter was orio;inally is-
sued in March or April, 1941, because reference (a) is PacFleet letter
2CL-41. "Reference (a) is revised herewith." This is a revision.
The original order, which was almost identical with this, was issued.
I believe, in March, 1941.
Admiral Hewitt. And this revision was issued on October 14, 1941 ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. That is what the date says; yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. So that from the date of the first letter up to and
including October 14, 1941, I take it it was an assumption that a sur-
prise air attack on Pearl Harbor was possible ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, I think it is correct to say that.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know whether there was any written esti-
mate or assumption made after October 14, 1941, which changed or
modified that assumption in any way ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. No, because I think it was as correct in
March, 1941, or October, 1941, as it is on the 25th^of May, 1945.
Admiral Hewitt. Referring to Exhibit 19, Admiral, which contains
communication intelligence summaries, and particularly to the sum-
maries for the period November 27 to December 6, 1941, do you recall
that on or [177] about December 1, 1941, there was a change
in the radio call signs of the Japanese ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. No, I can't answer that.
Admiral Hewitt. Would it refresh your recollection if you exam-
ined the communication intelligence summary for December 1, 1941,
contained in that exhibit ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. The question now was what ?
(The question asked was read back as follows :)
Referring to Exhibit 19, Admiral, which contains communication intelligence
summaries, and particularly to the summaries for the period November 27 to
December 6, 1941, do you recall that on or about December 1, 1941, there was a
change in the radio call signs of the Japanese?
Rear Admiral DeLany. My answer is still that I do not remember
now whether I knew it then or not. I mean this doesn't refresh my
memory. I do not recall whether I knew that or not.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall that there was any noticeable dimi-
nution in radio traffic from Japanese fleet units after December 1,
1941?
Rear Admiral DeLany. I believe that the subject was mentioned
at the morning conference by the intelligence officer in the fleet out
there.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you recall the substance of that discussion
at that time ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. No, I can't. I don't recall it at all.
Admiral Hewitt. But you do recall that there was some discussion
of the change ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, I recall there was a discussion, be-
cause, as I say, this information here, particularly this one here about
the carriers [i78] are still located in the home waters, was well
covered by the intelligence officer out there on all the discussions around
that time. Whether it was the 27th of December or the 27th of No-
vember, or the 1st of December, or anything like that, I am not pre-
pared to say now.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 107
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall whether or not Admiral Elimmel
was present during the conference concerning the change in Japanese
radio traffic which you have just mentioned?
Rear Admiral DeLant. Yes, because the conferences that I men-
tioned were held in his office and included the Admiral, the Chief of
Staff, Plans, Operations, and Intelligence Officers.
Admiral Hewitt. I take it, then, that both you and Admiral Mc-
Morris as well as Admiral Kimmel were present at each of those con-
ferences ?
Rear Admiral DeLant. I would say, generally, yes. I can't answer
that I was there every morning.
Admiral Hewitt. There were daily conferences, Admiral?
Rear Admiral DeLant. Yes.
Admiral Hewitt. And were such conferences held daily, to the best
of your recollection, during the period November 27th to December 7,
1941?
Rear Admiral DeLant. I think so, yes.
Admiral Hewitt, Now, referring. Admiral, to Exhibits 69A and B
of the Naval Court record, would you examine those and give us the
dates and tell us what they are ?
Rear Admiral DeLant. As I recall these — this is dated the 30th
of November 1941, and they are the check-off lists that were prepared
to be in the possession of the duty officer out there in the event that
war would occur in the next twenty-four hours.
Admiral Hewitt. And the second one, 69B, is dated what date.
Admiral ?
[179] Rear Admiral DeLant. 5th of December.
Admiral Hewitt. Admiral, will you point out where in those ex-
hibits 69A or B any provision is made in light of Assumption B of
the October 14th letter, namely, that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
was a possibility ?
Rear Admiral DeLant. Well, If I may be frank again, you read
this the same as I can ; I don't think you will find it in that. This
daily reconnaissance of Task Force Two and Three all provides for
reconnaissance, but it is not stated any place in here that there was
going to be an attack on Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Hewitt. What reconnaissance is provided for in those
exhibits, Admiral ?
Rear Admiral DeLant. There is no reconnaissance provided in here
until
Admiral Hewitt. Until war has broken out?
Rear Admiral DeLant. Probably so, yes.
Admiral Hewitt. Was there any discussion of reconnaissance dur-
ing the period November 27th to December 7, 1941 ?
Rear Admiral DeLant. The usual reconnaissance was conducted,
yes.
Admiral Hewitt. Was there any discussion of increasing the recon-
naissance.
Rear Admiral DeLant. Yes, the planes on Midway were increased.
The planes were put on Wake.
Admiral Hewitf. What reconnaisance was being conducted during
that period, sir?
Rear Admiral DeLant. The usual reconnaissance within the area.
108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Hewiti\ That is, I take it, a reconnaissance of the fleet
operating areas to the soiitliward of Oahu and reconnaissance from
Midway and Wake ?
[180] Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir, and partially to the
northward. There was always an anti-submarine reconnaissance
around the island.
Admiral Hewitt. How far out was that?
Rear Admiral DeLany. It depended on the number of planes avail-
able and the condition of the planes. The reconnaissance to the north-
ward was usually conducted as part of the training and testing of
planes that were on the roll call.
Admiral Hewitt. That was done by the PB Y's ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Admiral, would you say that the information,
particularly from radio intelligence, wliich was available from Novem-
ber 27th to December 6, 1941, at Pearl Harbor indicated that Japanese
naval forces were on the move and that the direction of some' of those
forces could not be known or was not known ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. It is perfectly possible for them to be on
the move without our knowing anything about it.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall whether or not the radio intelligence
indicated that they were on the move?
Rear Admiral DeLany. I think the intelligence indicated there was
a move to the southward.
Admiral Hew^itt. Do you recall what the intelligence indicated in
the week preceding December 7, 1941, concerning the whereabouts of
the major portion of the Japanese carrier fleet ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. As I recall it, the information was that the
carriers were in the home waters and the report, that was not well
founded, that there was a possibility of some of the smaller carriers
being around [^5i] Truk or some place like that.
Admiral Hewitt, Was there any discussion during the period
November 27th to December 7th concerning the desirability of recon-
naissance from Oahu in the direction of Truk?
Rear Admiral DeLany. There was a lot of discussion about the
desirability of the reconnaissance and the reconnaissance would have
been conducted had there been planes available to do it and at the
same time maintain their material condition, which was considered
of vital importance.
Admiral Hewitt. In your opinion, as far as the plane reconnais-
sance was concerned, if you had employed all the planes for recon-
naissance, that could not have been maintained very long, and if you
were to use sufficient planes, the maximum number of planes, for daily
reconnaissance, the sectors to be covered would have been entirely
limited and just a choice?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir. There weren't enough planes for
a complete 360° search around the island, and even in the limited
sectors in any direction that you would have chosen, the number of
planes and replacement pilots available was such that the search could
not have been kept up for a very long time because of the material
condition of the planes, the scarcity of relief crews, and the fact that
everybody there was convinced that you had to give continued thought
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 109
to maintaining the number of planes that you had in the best material
condition so that if something did break, you would have them avail-
able, and by saying "break," I mean some information commg to us
that would require the use of these planes.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The meeting was then, at 12 : 10 p. m., adjourned until a tune and
place to be set.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY HI
[182-] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIRY
Tenth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag
Officer's Office, Headquarters, Conimander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific
Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 2 p. m.,
Tuesday, 29 May 1915.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, III, USNR; Lieu-
tenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold,
USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn. '
Mr. SoxxETT. Will you please state vour name and rank.
Captain Layton. Edwin T. Layton, Captain, U. S. Navy.
Mr. Sonnett. What is your present assignment. Captain?
Captain Layton. Staff, CincPac.
Mr. Sonneti. And what is the nature of your present duties?
Captain Layton. I am assigned as Combat Intelligence Officer,
Staff, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Mr. Sonnett. On December 7, 19-11, what was your assignment?
Captain Layton. Fleet Intelligence Officer, United States Pacific
Fleet.
Mr. Sonnett. And for how long prior to December 7, 1941, were
you in that assignment ?
Captain Layton. One year to a day.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you state, Captain, the nature of your duties
as Fleet Intelligence Officer for the Pacific Fleet ?
Captain Layi^on. With your permission, I will refresh my memory
]_183'\ when appropriate.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes, do.
Captain Layton. I will read from the Staff Instructions, Com-
mander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, dated 1941 :
214. InteUigence Officer — 25.
(a) Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluates same, dissemi-
nating to various members of staff, indicating where action is required.
(b) Provides Operation Officer and War Plans Officer information essential
for current estimates (monograph material).
(c) Maintains Section II (a), (b), (c). (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Estimate
of Situation (Enemy Forces). Maintains location plot of Fleets of possible
enemy or allies.
(d) Directs counter espionage and counter information.
(e) Maintains Intelligence Records (See Naval Intelligence Manual).
(f ) Prepares Fleet Intelligence Bulletins.
(g) Evaluates Intelligence Information received of procedures or practices of
other navies and prepares definite recommendations as to any action to be taken
within own Fleet.
(h) In charge of censorship,
(i) Internal Security of ships.
112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(j) Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.
215. Assistant Intelligence Officer — 26.
In addition to assisting "25" in all duties of the Intelligence section, performs
the following additional assignments :
(a) Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analysis.
(b) Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination
to Fleet.
(c) Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of Enemy information.
(d) Maintenance of Current Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces) and loca-
tion plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.
[184-^ Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, in the discharge of the Staff In-
structions which you have just quoted, what sources of information
did you have ?
Captain Layton. Principally from the Office of Naval Intelligence,
Naval Operations, Navy Department ; also from communication intel-
ligence sources, from American Naval Attaches and observers, and
information obtained by them through foreign observers and ship
masters, plus information passed to me from British intelligence
sources in the Far East, and in some instances information from
consuls or State Department representatives in the Far East.
Mr. SoNNETT. Of those sources of information. Captain, which
would you characterize as your principal source of intelligence or
information during the months of October, November, and up to
December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Latton. Principally dispatch reports from Naval Attaches
and observers in the Far East, and daily, communication intelligence
analyses of traffic flow and delivery, and reports from ONI on Japanese
naval organizations, activity, movements, and intentions.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you a photostatic copy of a letter dated
November 27, 1941, and enclosed intelligence bulletin number 45-41,
and ask you if you can identify that.
Captain Layton. I can. I wrote it; I prepared it; I proof-read it,
and had it released by the Admiral.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state what that document is. Captain?
Captain Layton. That document shows a summation of the effort
made in the CincPac Intelligence Section to assemble all pertinent and
timely information on the Japanese naval organization and the
Japanese forces and installations in the Mandated Islands.
[185] Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark this as an exhibit. Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 21.")
Captain Layton. That is as of 27 November 1941,
Mr. SoNNETT. Eef erring to Exhibit 21, which is the document you
have just identified. Captain, will you state the highlights of the in-
formation therein contained concerning the Japanese carrier forces?
Captain Layi'on. Previous bulletins from OpNav and previous in-
telligence bulletins on the Japanese fleet organization disseminated by
CincPac had carried the Japanese carrier division attached to the
First and Second Fleets, two divisions to each fleet respectively, plus
their plane guard destroyers. Some time between April and July,
1941, as I recall it, a reorganization within the Japanese Fleet took
place in which a Commander of Number One Air Fleet was detected.
He acted as a type commander such as our ComCarrier Divisions,
Pacific, in those days.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 113
From all sources available, it was believed that the Japanese Carrier
Fleet, as we called it then, was organized as follows : KAGA, Flag-
ship ; Cardiv 1 ; AKAGI and KAGA plus Desdiv 7, plane guards of
four destroyers ; Cardiv 2, consisting of the SORYU and the HIRYU
with Desdiv 23; (4 destroyers) as plane guards; Cardiv 3: RYUJO
and HOSHO with Desdiv 17 of 3 destroyers as plane guard ; Cardiv
4 : ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU with Desdiv 3 of 4 destroyers as plane
guard ; Cardiv , consisting of the carriers KOR YU and KASUGA
(MARU) — totaling ten carriers and sixteen destroyers.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you Exhibit 3 of this investigation and ask
3^ou if you can identify the document.
[186] Captain Layton. I can.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you state what it is, Captain ?
Captain Layton. It is CinPac-CincPoa Weekly Intelligence Bul-
letin, the successor to the previous Fleet Intelligence BuUetms I prev-
iously identified. It serves the same purpose of keeping the Fleet in-
formed of all matters of general interest regarding the enemy, his
techniques, practices, and in some cases historical examples.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is the date of that bulletin, Captain?
Captain Layton. 8 December 1944. It is Volume 1, Number 22.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the contents of Exhibit 3 describing the
composition and movements of the Japanese task force which attacked
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, will you state whether or not you
are familiar with the information therein contained?
Captain Layton. I am.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you have a hand in the preparation of that
bulletin. Captain ?
Captain Layton. I did, with one exception. There is an error. It
is not "Cardiv 5 less HOSHO." The HOSHO did not belong in
Cardiv 5.
Mr. Sonnett. For the sake of the record, Captain, referring to page
13 of Exhibit 3, will you state exactly what the error is to which you
have just referred?
Captain Layton. That states, "SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (Cardiv 5
less HOSHO)." That is an error in that the words "less HOSHO"
should be omitted.
Mr. Sonnett. With that exception, Captain, I take it that the infor-
mation contained in the exhibit concerning the Japanese forces which
attacked Pearl Harbor is corrected ?
[187] Captain Layton, Again may I suggest that the last line,
stating, "elements of Desron 1 ; and about twenty subs" is incorrect,
inasmuch as I do not believe that twenty subs ever sortied from Etorofu
as was stated. I believe that a minimum of three and a maximum
of six accompanied the task force in their trip from Etorofu to a posi-
tion north of Oahu, arriving there the morning of December 7th.
Mr. Sonnett. The information contained in Exhibit 3, Captain,
was obtained from what source?
Captain Layton. This came principally from the interrogation of a
prisoner of war who had the position of secret yeoman to the Opera-
tions Officer of the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet; also from
interrogation of other prisoners of war who were a part of the task
force, and from captured documents, diaries, maps, and other infor-
mation.
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 9
114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Are you able to state, Captain, on the basis of all of
the information which you have received since the attack, whether,
with the exceptions you have just noted, the information contained in
Exhibit 3 is or is not correct ?
Captain Layton. With the exceptions I have mentioned above, the
information in Exhibit 3 referred to previously is correct. I have
since seen in the original Japanese a photostatic copy of Combined
Fleet Operation Order Number 1 from the NACHI sunk in Manila
Bay, and while it does not lay down specifically each ship by name,
it Isijs down the forces in such terms that, putting it with other task
unit designations and compositions, I am positive that this force
sortied from Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, on or about 27 November
and is composed of the ships listed herein, with the exceptions I have
named.
Mr. SoNNETT. For the sake of the record. Captain, would you re-
state [iSS] the information on page 13 of Exhibit 3 concerning
the composition of the attacking Japanese forces correctly so that we
have in the record a correct statement of the available information
that you now have?
Captain Latton. Task title. Striking Force ; Commander, Vice Ad-
miral Chuichi Nagumo ; Cardiv 1, AKAGI, KAGA ; Cardiv 2, HIRYU,
SOEYU; Cardiv 5, SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU; Batdiv 3, first section,
HIYEI, KIRISHIMA; Crudiv 8, TONE and CHIKUMA; elements
of Desron 1 headed by Desron 1 flagship, the light cruiser ABUKU-
MA, some submarines, five or six tankers.
Mr. SoNNETT. On the basis, Captain, of the information which was
available when Exhibit 3 was prepared and on the basis of other in-
formation which you have subsequently received, can you state the
movements of the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Layton. To my best recollection, about 20 or 22 November
the forces of the striking force departed Saeki Anchorage near the
Bungo Channel and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, and
there assembled and fueled, departed on or about 27 November 1941,
East Longitude date. According to the diagram on page 16 of Exhibit
3, they proceeded on an easterly course to a little east of the 180th
meridian, whence they struck southeast to a point to the north of Oahu,
arriving December 8, 1941, East Longitude date. A subsequently cap-
tured map, which was on exhibit in San Francisco, incidentally, showed
an easterly course to a position almost north of Oahu, with a subse-
quently southerly course to a position just north of Oahu.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, do you recall on or about November 27, 1941,
that a dispatch was received which has been referred to as a war
warning ?
Captain Latton. I do.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state when and how you learned of that
[J89] dispatch and what action was taken concerning it that day ?
Captain Layton. In mid-afternoon I learned that such a dispatch
had been received and was shown the tape copy in the communication
office. Subsequently, Admiral Kimmel sent for me and told me he
wanted me to take this dispatch to General Short. I asked him if he
wanted me to take this dispatch, as I had done on previous occasions,
and show it to him or should I give him a paraphrased copy thereof.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 115
He directed me to make a paraphrased copy and return that para-
phrased copy with the dispatch to him for his perusal, which I did.
This paraphrased dispatch was prepared and shown to the communica-
tion officer to obtain his concurrence that the pliraseology did not de-
stroy the import of the original dispatch nor change in any way its
import.
When this was completed, I went outside the Admiral's office and
awaited an opportmiity to enter as there was a large conference with
closed door, which meant no admittance. At the first opportunity, I
entered and asked if the Admiral desired to see the paraphrase. He ex-
amined the paraphrase and about that time, as I recall it, the Chief of
Staff of the 14th Naval District, Captain Earle, arrived in civilian
clothes and requested the Admiral's pardon for being in civilian clothes,
but stated in substance that he had a very urgent message which General
Short had delivered to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and
to be further delivered for the perusal of the Commander-in-Chief. He
presented the dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief, who showed it to
the Chief of Staff and others. Their remarks were in the general tenor
that, "This is the same dispatch in substance that we have just re-
ceived." I should add that the Chief of Staff, 14th Naval District,
stated that General Short had requested that no copies be made of
their dispatch. There was some discussion then concerning this
[IW] dispatch and the Army dispatch, their similarity, when
Admiral Kimmel turned to me, handed me the paraphrase, and said,
"Get this to General Short right away." At the same time, he deliv-
ered the dispatch from General Short to the Chief of Staff, 14th Naval
District, and we left the Admiral's cabin.
Outside was the officer who had brought General Short's dispatch.
Lieutenant Commander Burr, USNR, the Naval Liaison Officer with
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. The Chief of Staff, 14th Naval
District, urged me to give Burr the dispatch Admiral Kimmel had
given me for delivery to General Short so that they could be delivered
simultaneously and by the officially accredited liaison officer, to which
I assented. I did not immediately check on his delivery, but I subse-
quently checked and was told by Lieutenant Commander Burr that it
had been delivered.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I show you Exhibit 8 of this investigation,
which consists of photostatic copies of various dispatches, and ask you
if you can identify those as copies of dispatches which you saw.
Captain Latton. I don't have a good recollection of this, but I think
we received it.
Mr. SoNNETT. That is referring to the dispatch on November 24,
1941, from OpNav to CincAF ?
Captain Layton. Info ComSIXTEEN; ALUSNA, Chungking;
ASTALUSA, Shanghai; ALUSNA, Tokyo; CincPac.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the other two dispatches in that exhibit,
Captain, will you simply state as to those whether you can identify
them?
Captain Layton. The dispatch from COMFOURTEEN dated 26
November 1941, time date group 260110, was sent by the communica-
tion intelligence unit, 14th Naval District, at the direction of Admiral
Kimmel, transmitted through [J 91] me to Commander Roche-
fort, as a result of the daily traffic analyses, intelligence reports which
116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Admiral had seen, and of the discussions we had had concerning
the formation of these forces and their movement to the south, with
amphibious warfare being noted as paramount,
Mr. SoNNETT. How about the third one, Captain ?
Captain Layton. ComSIXTEEN's dispatch of 26 November 1941,
time date group 261331, 1 recognize as the dispatch reply by ComSIX-
TEEN to the dispatch sent by ComFOURTEEN on 260110 in which
they gave their estimate of the Japanese naval organization and move-
ments as pertaining to the time in question. We specifically noted at
that time that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the supposi-
tion by ComFOURTEEN that submarine and carriers in force were
in the Mandates, and noted their best indications were that all First
and Second Fleet carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would it be correct to state. Captain, that the dis-
patches to which you have just referred summarized the intelligence
available to ComFOURTEEN and ComSIXTEEN concerning the
Japanese naval movements during the preceding month or so?
Captain Layton. I would say that. Additionally, I would say that
summarized the information also made available to CincPac and
CincAF as of those times because those units each served the Fleet
Commander of that area and all of that information was made avail-
able to the Fleet Commanders.
Admiral Hewitt. What was understood by the term "First and
Second Fleet carriers" contained in the ComSIXTEEN dispatch?
Captain Layton. I believe that ComSIXTEEN was referring to the
naval organization as promulgated by ONI on 29 July 1941, in which,
as I have previously stated, there were two carrier divisions attached
to each of \192'] the First and Second Fleets. ONI listed
Cardiv 3, ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU, with Desdiv 34 plane guards
(four destroyers), and Cardiv 5, RYUJO and HOSHO with a four
destroyer plane guard, division number unknown, as attached to the
First Fleet. ONI listed Cardiv 1, AKAGI, KAGA, and Desdiv 3 of
four destroyers as plane guards, plus Cardiv 2, SORYU, HIRYU,
with Desdiv 23 of four destroyers as plane guards, attached to the
Second Fleet. This would be a total of eight carriers assigned to the
First and Second Fleets, with no other carriers being listed as assigned
to any other fleets.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that in substance. Captain, the ComSIXTEEN
dispatch of November 26th, in stating that all known First and Second
Fleet cariers were believed to be in the Kure-Sasebo area, was under-
stood by you to mean that they estimated that all known Japanese
carriers were in that area ?
Captain Layton. Yes, all known operating carriers.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that estimate differed with the ComFOUR-
TEEN estimate in that ComFOURTEEN was of the opinion that at
least one Japanese carrier was in the Marshalls at that time ?
Captain Layton. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Subsequent to those dispatches of November 26th,
Captain, it was the fact, was it not, that daily communication intelli-
gence summaries were delivered by the radio intelligence unit to you
and to Admiral Kimmel ?
Captain Layton. They were delivered to me for my presentation to
Admiral Kimmel.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 117
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you have copies of the daily summaries which
were so presented through you to Admiral Kimmel ?
Captain Latton. I have.
[193] Mr. SoNNETT. I note, Captain, on the photostatic docu-
ments which you have presented, commencing with October 14, 1941,
and ending with December 1941, initials in the lower right hand
corner. Can you identify those initials?
Captain Layton. Those are Admiral Kimmel's initials.
Mr. SoNNETT. And do they appear on the original ?
Captain Latton. They do.
Mr. SoNNETT. I also note that certain of these daily communication
intelligence summaries have portions underscored. Can you state
who underscored those portions?
Captain Latton. Certain of the underscoring was performed by
Admiral Kimmel as he read them. Certain other marks, including
marks by direction finder bearings and positions of ships, were made
by myself in plotting them,
Mr. SoNNETT. To the best of your knowledge. Captain, are the
photostatic copies which you have presented true copies of the original
daily communication intelligence summaries presented to Admiral
Kimmel ?
Captain Layton. This is the original copy. They only presented
one copy and this is the original. The}'- kept a copy in combat intelli-
gence, 14th Naval District, but this is the original copy as prepared.
. Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the document you have*bef ore you ?
Captain Latton. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the document or collection of documents which
I show you and which you have supplied are photostatic copies of the
original ?
Captain Latton. They are.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark them as an exhibit, Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes,
[194] (The documents referred to were received and marked
"Exhibit 22,")
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to Exhibit 22, Captain, and to the daily
communication intelligence summaries from November 27 to De-
cember 5, inclusive, 1941, will you give us in general the substance
of the movements of Japanese forces therein noted ?
Captain Layton, On 27 November 1941, there was some tactical
traffic intercepted from the carriers. There was other traffic addressed
to the commanders to play the leading roles in the days that followed
on the Southern Expedition; that is. Chiefs of Staff, Second Fleet,
Third Fleet, and Combined Air Force were addressed by Southern
Theater Commands, It is to be noted that the Commander Combined
Air Force commands all naval shore-based air and all naval tender-
based planes. He does not have any connection whatsoever with the
carriers except in inter-joint force maneuvers.
(The following was read:)
That is, Chipfs of Staff, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, and Combined Air Force
were addressed by Southern Theater Commands.
(Continuing) — Bako, Pescadores, Hainan Island, and Saigon. De-
stroyer Squadrons 4 and 5, who were earmarked for the southern move-
118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ment, were also addressed, with information to Chief of Staff, Second
Fleet.
Direction finder net was active and it was noted that the Marshall
Island stations were also sending bearings in after having been
silenced for several days.
It was noted that Destroyer Squadron 3, earmarked for the southern
move, could not be positively identified in the Hainan area but was
believed to be in company with Cruiser Division 3 there.
[195] It was noted that there was no further detected movement
from the Kure-Sasebo area.
There were four enciphered addresses noted. An enciphered ad-
dress always indicates a new command who has no position in the
call sign book, so that these then were placed in a fairly simple cipher.
From these forces one was aware of newly formed units becoming
active and generally in an operational or maneuver stage and not as
administrative or routine appearance. These were the number 82 unit
at Taihoku, Formosa; in care of the Yamashita unit addressed for
delivery via the RYUJO; Koroku (Naha. Okinawa) air base com-
mander; the military stores depot chief at Keijo, Korea.
It was also noted that there was nothing to indicate the movements
yet of the CinC, Third Fleet (corresponding to our Commander
Amphibious Force) .
It was noted that the commander of the Mandates was addressing
dispatches to his defense forces there; that Jaluit was sending mes-
sages to the Commander Submarine Force and several submarine
units ; that there was communication between Jaluit. the Saipan Air
Command, and the Commander of the Mandates Field; that work
was still in progress there was inferred by communications seen from
the civil engineering units at Imieji, Jaluit and Eniwetok.
Traffic analysis located the Chitosa Naval Air "Corps" in Saipan
and Naval Air Squadron number 24 in the Marshalls. It was noted
that there was no further information on the presence of Carrier
Division 5 in the Mandates. It was, however, noted that an air unit
in the Formosa area (Takao) addressed the carriers SHOKAKU
and KORYU. It was stated that [196] "Carriers are still
located in home waters." No information of further movement of
the shore-based air forces to Hainan.
Of signijBcance was the location of the Commander of the sub-
marine forces in the Chichijima area.
The unit at Cavite informed us that they had noted Armv type
ciphers being handled on Navy circuits for the past couple of days,
during which an Army officer named Oka was in communication on
these naval circuits with the Combined Army Forces. Imperial
Headquarters.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was that by dispatch. Captain Layton ?
Captain Latton. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you identify the dispatch ?
Captain Layton. I don't have the time-date requirement.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you supply us with a copy of each of the dis-
patches to which you make reference in your testimony ?
Captain Layton. Yes. Also that this officer, Oka. was associated
with the Combined Army, Taiwan, and the Combined Army Forces,
Sama (Hainan).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 119
On the 27th of November the Naval Attache at Shanghai in his
dispatch 270855 reported the sightings by master of a foreign vessel
which left Hong Kong en route Shanghai of many transports proceed-
ing south singly or in small groups — they averaged three or four ships
on each VN^atch Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday — and that the military
wharves at Shanghai were abnormally empty of stores.
Dispatch from OpNav, addressed to CincPac and CincAF, informa-
tion Cinclant, dispatch 272337, which was a war warning and stated
that OpNav had been informed by the Chief of Naval Operations that
negotiations between Japan and America regarding the stabilization
of conditions in 1 he Pacific had ended and an aggressive move by the
Japanese was expected within the [J97] next few days. The
number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of
Navy task forces indicated an amphibious expedition against either
the Philippines, Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.
It directed appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying
out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 and said to inform only the district
and Army authorities. It stated the War Department was sending
a similar warning, and directed continental naval districts, plus Guam
and Samoa, to take appropriate measures against sabotage.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, if I may interrupt you for just a moment, the
daily communication summary to which you have ]ust referred, that
was for 27 November 1941, was it not?
Captain Layton. That was.
Mr. SoNNEiTr. When was that delivered to you. Captain, and by you
to Admiral Kimmel ?
Captain Layton. As I recall it, it was delivered to me in the morn-
ing of the 28th of November, 1941, and, as was my custom, I presented
it to Admiral Kimmel at about 8 : 15.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was that presentation to Admiral Kimmel of avail-
able intelligence information done daily during this period ?
Captain Layton. This was done daily throughout the period of my
association with Admiral Kimmel.
Mr. SoNNETT. And in addition to the communication intelligence
summary of 27 November, to which you have referred, and to other
daily communication intelligence summaries, I take it you also would
present whatever other intelligence information you then had avail-
able?
Captain Layton. That is true.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence sum-
mary [i^S] of 27 November and to the statement that "car-
riers are still located in home waters," will you state what was com-
prehended by the term "home waters"?
Captain Layton. "Home waters" was the term used to consist of
Japanese home waters, that is, the drill grounds of the Inland Sea
and the approaches to Kyushu, the coastal offshore area, the Isei Bay
Area; in general, the waters surrounding Honshu, Shikoku, and
Kyushu.
Admiral Hewitt. Did that include Etorofu?
Captain Layton. No, sir. Locations in northern Japan, including
northern Hokkaido and the Kuriles, were referred to as the high
north area.
120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. To what point east of Japan would the scope of
"home waters" extend ?
Captain Layton. Forty, fifty, sixty miles perhaps; maybe more;
about the same distance that our fleet operations would take us west of
San Clemente or San Pedro or San Diego.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was that definition of "home waters" which you have
given, Captain, the accepted definition in the radio intelligence unit
and in CincPac headquarters ?
Captain Layton. It was. It was also understood by Admiral Kim-
mel, who had queried me on these standard phraseology terms used
in writing those traffic intelligence summaries.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence sum-
maries for 28 November and there on up to December 5th, Captain,
will you give us the highlights of those ?
Captain Layton. The highlight on 28 November was the activity
shown by what was believed to be the Tokyo intelligence broadcast
net, plus the direction finder net, and it was stated and underscored
that the Japanese radio intelligence net "is operating at full strength
upon U. S. Naval [199] Communications and IS GETTING
results:'
It was noted that Tokyo originators were sending high precedence
traffic to the Commander-in-Chief of the Second and Third Fleets and
Combined Air Force, the three commands for the south movement.
Previous indications that Palao was concerned with this southern
movement were shown by a typical dispatch where the Chief of the
Naval General Staff addressed the Chiefs of Staff (normally Chiefs
of Staffs are addressed in operational matters) of the Combined Air
Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet (Mandates Fleet), Third Fleet
(Amphibious Force), French Indo-China force, Second Fleet, and
Resident Naval Officer, Palao.
It was noted that no Combined Fleet units movements were detected ;
that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was sending his usual
dispatches to the Third Fleet and the Combined Air Force ; and that
he, Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was paying particular atten-
tion in his communications to Crudivs 5 and 7, Desrons 2 and 4, and
Cardiv 5. It is to be noted in the original it stated "attention to
Cardivs 6 and 7." This was corrected in pencil to read "Crudivs
5 and 7."
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know when that correction was made.
Captain ?
Captain Layton. I do not recall, but it was either prior to show-
ing to Admiral Kimmel or upon his noting that there was no Cardiv 7
and therefore there was something wrong. I think it was before.
The impression was gained this date that the First Base Force, that
is, the first section of the Amphibious Force, consisting of about a
minelayer division, two minesweeper divisions, one gunboat division,
one subchaser squadron of four subchaser divisions, and twenty-seven
transports, was not present at that time with the bulk of the Third
Fleet in Sasebo but could not be exactly located elsewhere.
[SOO] It was noted that the Army commander on Formosa was
holding communications with the Commander-in-Chief of the Am-
phibious Force, generally a sure sign of amphibious operations.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 121
It was noted that two Third Fleet units had arrived in the Pescadores
but were apparentlj^^ to return to Kure from Bako.
Nothing significant was noted in the Mandates on the 28th of
November summary.
It was observed that Sama, Hainan, addressed the Omura Naval Air
Corps in several messages which were for information to Saigon and
Tokyo. This would indicate the future location of the Omura Air
Corps to be Saigon in the near future.
Takao, Formosa, was addressing French Indo-China forces, the
Combined Air Force, and the Chiefs of Staff, Combined Fleet and
Second Fleet.
It was noted that the Takao Naval Air Corps was addressing the
Sukugawa Air Corps and the Yokosuka Naval Air Corps.
It was noted that a representative of the Hainan office, which had
moved to Saigon, was sending messages to the naval bases at Sasebo
and Kure.
Additionally, the Commander-in-Chief of the China Fleet was
addressing the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, and the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Third Fleet, the two prime movers in the
southern movement, indicating his assistance in some degree.
No submarine traffic of note was observed.
On the 28th of November, ComFOURTEEN addressed to OpNav,
information CincAF, and stated :
Following received by British Consul from usually reliable source X Japanese
will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on one \_201] December without
ultimatum or declaration in order get between Bangkok and Singapore X Attack-
ers will proceed direct from Hainan and Formoso X Main landing to be made at
Songkhola X (Singora).
This dispatch from CincAF, addressed to OpNav, CincPac, Com-
FOURTEEN and ComSIXTEEN for action, established the "winds"
code in two variations, one from Tokyo to the diplomatic net and the
other from Japanese language foreign broadcasts for more generalized
receipt.
ComSIXTEEN in a dispatch of the 28th addressed to CincAF,
OpNav, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, stated that an unidentified ship
believed to be a light cruiser had apparently relieved the KASHII as
flagship. Southern Expeditionary Fleet ; that this ship was now in the
Camranh Bay-Saigon area.
OpNav, in dispatch 281633, addressed CincAF, info CincPas, Com-
SIXTEEN, ComFOURTEEN, and supplied information from State
Department, from Saigon, dated November 26th, which stated that
five days previously Orange troops and supply vessels began to put
in at Saigon, taking up all available quay space; that 20,000 troops
had landed and that 10,000 had arrived from the north by rail during
the same period; that the total troops in South Indo-China totalled
70,000. It observed that there was an estimate of some 128,000, but
considered that too high. It reported that many trucks had landed
and were moving troops and supplies to the interior. It observed that
this movement is of large proportions and indicates hostilities against
Thailand may begin soon. It also forwarded information from
Hanoi, also from the State Department, dated November 26th, that
said supplies and military equipment, particularly railway, rolling
stock, gasoline, landing at "Haiphong even recently augmented and are
122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
being trans-shipped south. Among recently landed artillery are anti-
tank guns: that the Japanese had recently purchased a considerable
number of native boats along the coast of Tongking [W2]
Province. It was reported they desired to purchase 500. These boats
were being sent south. Further reports from Hanoi, dated November
25th, said that the American Consul had received reliable informa-
tion that the Governor General had ascertained from an agent that
around 1 December, without either declaration of war or ultimatum,
NijDpon Navy will attack Kra Isthmus. Simultaneously the Army
would advance on Thailand ; that great increased troop landings and
movements were noted south; that during last few days about 4,000
men have landed. On November 25th and 26th, 1,500 would go south
by special train; that in Tongking there were approximately 25,000
Jap troops and at Gillam there were approximately ninety airplanes.
Dated November 26th, Hanoi, was the report that on early November
25th the Haiphong mayor had advised all interested persons that the
Japanes intended to sequester all freight en route to China, that the
Japanese had demanded keys to all warehouses by noon November
25th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to November 29, 1941, Captain, will you
point out the highlights of the communication intelligence summary
of that day, together with any dispatches of interest received that daj^,
November 29, 1941 ?
Captain Layton. Communication intelligence summary noted again
Tokyo intelligence sending eleven messages during the day to major
commanders, both afloat and ashore, and that the radio intelligence
activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to major commanders. It
noted that the direction finder net controlled by Tokyo was active dur-
ing the night, with much activity, and that the Jaluit radio direction
finder station included Commander Submarines as an information ad-
dressee in a dispatch, indicating, as has previously been shown, that
Commander Submarines was somewhere in the approaches to or about
to enter the Mandated Islands and likely the [B03'\ Marshalls.
A new air group, the 103rd Naval Air Group, was noted as originating
a dispatch whose address was composed completely of enciphered
calls, confirming that he was new as he had no call sign book. One of
the addresses was a new organization, the 11th Air Fleet. It was
noted that this address had appeared before and therefore was not a
mistake, that the use of the word "fleet" was not a mistake. And it
was added that its composition was unknown.
The highlight from an operational point of view was the confirma-
tion of the arrival of Air Squadron Seven in the Takao area. This
unit consisted normally of three CHITOSE class seaplane tenders.
It was noted that the presence of Cruiser Division 4 in the Takao
area could not be confirmed nor denied, but dispatches and their han-
dling indicated the following units under the immediate command of
CinC Second Fleet, who, it had been shown previously, was in com-
mand of the Southern Invasion Force. The commands under this
Commander were CarDiv 3, SubRon 5, SubRon 6, CruDiv 5, CruDiv
7, Des Ron 2, DesRon 4, Third Fleet (Amphibious Force) , and French
Indo China Force.
It was further noted that associated with the Third Fleet were two
battleships. It was further noted that the Commander-in-Chief,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 123
Third Fleet, sent a message to ComDesRon 5, Number Two Base Force
(consisting of one minelayer division, with at least five other men-of-
war, and seventeen merchant ships suspected of being transports and
cargo carriers). Number One Base Force, Defense Division One, and
ComDesRons 2 and 4.
It was noted also that CinC Third Fleet held extensive communi-
cation with CinC Second Fleet and Bako.
Fourth Fleet was noted as relatively inactive, and that the Com-
mander of the Submarine Force had his traffic routed through Saipan,
noting that the previous day's traffic had been routed through Chichi-
jima, indicating [^204] a southerly or southeasterly movement.
It was noted that ComCruDiv 7 made a movement report type of
dispatch from the Sama, Hainan, area and the direction of this move-
ment was not indicated.
The communication intelligence unit a Cavite sent a dispatch on
the 29th of November which noted recent developments from radio
intelligence: encrypted addresses noted in traffic the last two days,
"Commander First Patrol Force"; headquarters this unit apparently
at either Yokosuka or Palao ; "Fifth Air Battalion" at Takoa ; "Com-
mander Airborne Troops," location undetermined; "French Indo-
China Billeting Detachment" in Saigon area; "Third Fleet Head-
quarters" probably at Yokosuka. The CinC Third Fleet shifted his
flag from the ASHIGARA to the NAGARA. The CinC Southern
Expeditionary Fleet shifted flag from KASHII to CHOKAI (tenta-
tive identification).
New arrivals in the Takao area that may be placed in the first section
of the task force he referred to in his 261331 : DesRon 4, Air Squadron
7, and one command that appears to be a submarine squadron. It
appears that the HIYEI and KONGO are definitely associated with
these units in the first section, but no movement has been noted on these.
CinC Second Fleet told the key radio stations today and also CinC
Combined Fleet that he would leave the Kure zone 0400 hours today,
that he would leave Sasebo zone midnight the 1st and enter Bako
zone midnight the 2nd.
On the 29th we received OpNav's 290110, addressed to Commander
North Pacific Naval Frontier, Commander South Pacific Naval Fron-
tier, information CincPac and Commander Panama Naval Coastal
Frontier, which stated that the Army had sent to the Western Defense
Command :
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes
with only the barest possibility [205] that the Japanese Government might
come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but
hostile action possible at any moment X if hostilities cannot be avoided the
United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X this policy should
not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize
your defense X prior or hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake
such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these meas-
ures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose
intent X report measures taken * * * should hostilities occur you will carry
out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 so far as they pertain to Japan X limit
dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers' X
WPIi 52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that
area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific sub area and Panama Naval
Coastal Frontier X undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an
overt act X be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they
apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.
124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
He referred in this dispatch to OpNav's 272337, but in error sent
it as referring to his 272338, wliich was the war warning.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the connnunication intelligence sum-
mary for 29 November 1941 and to the dispatches just mentioned by
you, Captain, is it correct that tlie only reference to carriers was the
reference in the communication intelligence summary to the elfect that
CarDiv 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander-in-
Chief, Second Fleet?
Captain Layton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was the composition of CarDiv 3 at that time?
Captain Layton. At that time we believed CarDiv 3 to be composed
of the RYUJO and HOSHO plus three plane guard destroyers.
120€] Mr. SoNNETT. So that, aside from that information, there
was, on 29 November, no other information relating to Japanese car-
riers ?
Captain Latton, There was no other information relating to Jap-
anese carriers.
Mr. SoNNEiT. Now, referring to 30 November 1941, will you give us
the highlights of the communication intelligence summaries and of
any dispatches received that day ?
Captain Laytox. In general the traffic volume was less, indicating
less circuit activity and that back-dated traffic, some as far back as
26 November, was being transmitted. This sort of practice generally
indicated a reduction in the urgency of the general over-all picture
plus the possibility of the importance of the re-transmitted dispatches.
The only tactical circuit heard was one with the carrier AKAGI and
several MARUS.
Mr, SoNNETT. Wliat was the significance of the use of the term "tac-
tical" in that connection, Captain ?
Captain Layton. The term "tactical" implies the use of radio by the
vessel itself, calling up directly other vessels and working them directly
rather than working vessels through shore stations via the broadcast
method, which is the common practice by the Japanese communications.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did it connote any operation of the carrier AKAGI ?
Captain Layton. No. If the AKAGI had been working with other
carriers, it would indicate that they were exercising or operating, but
working with MARUS would indicate more that she was making ar-
rangements for fuel or some such administrative function. A carrier
would i-arely address a MARU except an oiler or repair vessel or air-
craft tender in matters of administration and function rather than in
the tactical concept of operations,
[207] It was noted that one urgent dispatch was sent from the
Chief of the Naval General Staff to the Chiefs of Staff of the following
fleets : Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, Combined Air Force, Sub-
marine Force, China Fleet, and Fifth Fleet. The last fleet, the Fifth,
was a new fleet of which little or nothing was known, but it was in-
ferred from long practice that it most likeh^ was a minor force con-
cerned with the northern area.
Mr, SoNNETT, What was the northern area to which you referred,
Captain ?
Captain Layton. North Japan, from Ominato on Honshu north.
Mr, SoNNETT, And therefore including the Kuriles?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 125
Captain Latton. Including the Kuriles. The traffic on the 30th
located the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet at
Kure. By that same message the Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet
was not shown in any location, but other indications suggested he was
at sea .
It was noted that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, sent a
dispatch to his "usual addressees" of the Third Fleet and Combined
Air Force, but he also included therein the battleships KONGO and
HIYEI, which placed them as members of the CinC Second's task
force.
Mr, SoNNETi. Captain, if I may interrupt you for a moment at that
point, the HIYEI was one of the battleships which was part of the
force which later attacked Pearl Harbor, was it not ?
Captain Latton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. And on 30 November 1941 that battleship was at sea,
having left Etorofu Island?
Captain Latton. That is correct. I believe
Mr. SoNNETT. Therefore, is the statement contained in the communi-
cation intelligence summary correct or incorrect?
[£08] Captain Latton. I believe the statement in the connnuni-
cation intelligence summary is correct in this regard. It is verv
likely that the HIYEI is a bad identification for the HARUNA,
which, with the KONGO, took part in the southern expedition. It
is believed that this mis-identification, which frequently occurs with
ships of one type and within one organization, is an error in fact
but not an error in substance.
It is noted that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was no
longer adding the activities at Palao in his addresses and had not
done so for the past two days.
It was noted that the Resident Naval Officer at Palao was holding
traffic with Taiwan Army Headquarters.
Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet, was seen addressing two mes-
sages to ComDesRon 2, ComDesRon 4, ComDesRon 5, ComCruDiv 5,
First and Second Base Forces,, and Defense Division One, being sent
for information to CinC Second Fleet. The location of the CinC
Third Fleet was not indicated, but there was a strong impression
that he was underway.
It was noted that the Jaluit radio addressed the Commander Sub-
marine Force and Naval Air Squadron 24 in one dispatch. The con-
tinued association of Jaluit and the Commander Submarine Force,
plus his known progress from Japan through the Chichi jima area
to the Saipan zone, made his destination obviously the Marshalls.
Since one of his large units had arrived in the Marshalls some time
previously, the communication intelligence summary pointed out that
this bore out ComFOURTEEN's unit's previous contention that
there was a submarine concentration in the Marshalls, not only the
small Fourth Fleet submarines, but also a good portion of the Fleet
submarines of the Submarine Force.
It was stated that Naval Air Squadron 24 plus the Yokohama
Naval Air [^00] Corps, being in the Marshalls, pointed to-
ward air-submarine operations from the INIarshalls.
It was also noted that the presence in the Marshalls of a unit of
plane guard destroyers would indicate the presence of at least one
126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
carrier in the Mandates, although the presence of that carrier was
not confirmed.
Continued activity was observed with dispatches to the Second and
Third Fleets from the Pescadores, activities including also the Com-
bined Air Force and Hainan as addressees ; also that the Commander-
in-Chief of the China Fleet was becoming more and more an origina-
tor of dispatches to the task force, which was then believed to be
southbound. The CinC China Fleet made a movement report, with
the South China Fleet as an information addressee, indicating his
intention to proceed south.
Mr. SoNNETT. I note. Captain, that on the original of the communi-
cation intelligence summary of November 30, 1941, which you have
before you, that various portions are underlined in red and in blue
pencil. Can you state who made the underlining?
Captain Latton. I believe that I did. I am not positive.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was that made before or after the submission of
the summary to Admiral Kimmel ?
Captain Layton. I believe it was made after the submission,
although it may have been before.
Mr. SoNNETT. I note also on the November 30th commimication
intelligence summary that in the left-hand lower corner of the page
there are other initials. Would you state whose initials they are ?
Captain Laytgn. They are Admiral McMorris' initials. He was
at that time head of the War Plans Section.
[210] We received a dispatch late the 30th from ComSIX-
TEEN, addressed to OpNav, information CincAF, CincPac, and
ComFOURTEEN, to the effect that a reassignment of all Japanese
naval calls had occurred at midnight, that they followed the same
garble table pattern as before, and that the shore addressees' call
signs hadn't changed.
We received a dispatch, time 301T09, from OpNav, addressed to
CincAF, information CincPac, referring to his dispatch 300419, in
which he had directed CincAF to cover by air search the line
Manila-Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt of said
dispatch in order to ascertain the destination of the overseas expedi-
tions, based on the information that Japan was about to attack points
on the Kra Isthmus. He was told in this dispatch that if the expe-
dition was approaching Thailand, he was to inform MacArthur.
In this dispatch, 301709, he referred to the above dispatch and re-
quested priority dispatch of any contacts, and in case of no contacts
being made, to report once a day if the information was all negative.
Mr. SoNNErrr. Captain, I show you an original memorandum, dated
December 1, 1941, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer to Admiral and
ask you if you can identify it.
Captain Layton. I do.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state what that document is ?
Captain Layton. This document was prepared by me late the after-
noon of Sunday, 30 November 1941, at the direction of Admiral Kim-
mel. As my yeoman was absent, the write-up of this memorandum
was delayed until December 1st. Admiral Kimmel's directions, as I
recall them were that he wanted the following day, Monday, 1 De-
cember, a list of Japanese fleet [^-?^] locations, and eveiy
Monday thereafter. After this was written up, certain substantiating
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 127
and additional information was obtained from the officer who wrote the
daily communication intelligence summary as to any future indicated
movements and these changed movements were made in red pencil
prior to being submitted to Admiral Kimmel. There was, however,
one typographical error that was not found until Admiral Kimmel
read the paper, in which a typographical error meaning "2 OCL"
became "20 CL," which Admiral Kimmel pointed out to me and in his
handwriting wrote, "2-OCL" at the side on page 4.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, may we mark this document as an exhibit?
Admiral Hewitt, Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 23.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, referring to Exhibit 23, which is the memo-
randum you have just identified, do I understand your testimony to be
that it was delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 1, 1941?
Captain Layton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you have a discussion with Admiral Kimmel
concerning this memorandum after he had read it ?
Captain Layton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. I note on page 1 of the exhibit the word "Japan"
written in pencil opposite certain ships listed under Yokasuka area
and similarly the word "Japan" written in pencil opposite certain
ships listed under the Kure-Sasebo area. In whose handwriting are
those words ?
Captain Layton. Admiral Kimmel's.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to Exhibit 23, Captain, will you state the
information therein contained concerning the location of Japanese
carriers ?
Captain Layton. On page 3, under the Bako-Takao area, was car-
ried [£12] Cadiv 4 : 2 CV plus 4 DD ; and Cardiv 3 : 2 CV and
3 DD. On the last page the supposed carrier KORYU ( ? ) plus plane
guards, 1 CV, 4 DD, was carried under the Marshalls area. On page 2
under the Bako-Takao area was carried the KASUGA MARU,
IXCV.
Mr. SoNNETT. Summarizing the information, then, Captain, in this
exhibit concerning the whereabouts of Japanese carriers, it appeared
that there were Carrier Division 3 and Carrier Division 4 plus the
KASUGA MARU thought to be in the Bako-Takao area and the
KORYU thought to be in the Marshalls area, is that correct?
Captain Layton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. There is no reference in this memorandum, Captain,
to Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Was there any discussion between you
and Admiral Kimmel concerning the whereabouts of those carrier
divisions ?
Captain Layton. There was. Admiral Kimmel noted almost im-
mediately that neither Carrier Division 1 nor Carrier Division 2 was
listed in this memorandum, and asked me where they were. I said
that I had no recent good indications of their locations, but that if I
had to guess, I would estimate them in the general Kure zone.
Mr. Sonnett. Did he inquire whether it was possible that those
carriers weren't in that zone but were in the Hawaiian area ?
Captain Layton. Not in those words.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you state the substance of what he said and what
you said, as best you recall it?
128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Layton, As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, "What !
You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2
ajre^" and I replied, "No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home
waters, but 1 do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I
feel pretty confident of [^iJ] their location." Then Admiral
Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern
countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do
you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you
wouldn't know itT' or words to that effect. My reply was that, "I
hope they would be sighted before now," or words to that effect.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to Exhibit 23, Captain, it appears that
on each of the pages, at the bottom, there is an X mark. Can you
explain that ?
Captain Layton. That X mark was not on this memorandum this
morning prior its being photostated. I presume that it was placed on
there by the photostat personnel, as it appeared when brought back
from them.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence sum-
mary for December 1, 1941, Captain, was that received after the de-
livery of your memorandum of December 1, Exhibit 23, and your dis-
cussion with Admiral Kimmel, to which you have just testified?
Captain Layton. It is my recollection that the 1 December 1941
summary was delivered prior to the submission of my location sheet,
Exhibit 23.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you examine the communication intelligence
summary for 1 December 1941 and give us the highlights of that doc-
ument ?
Captain Layton. The summary, dated 1 December 1941, confirmed
previous information from ComSIXTEEN that all service radio calls
of forces afloat of the Japanese Navy had changed promptly at 0000,
1 December, minus 9 time. Previously service calls had changed after
a period of six months or more. Calls having last changed on 1 No-
vember 1941, it was noted that service calls lasting only one month
indicated progressive steps in preparing for active operations on a
large scale. The latter part of this [i^-?-^] sentence is under-
lined in red pencil and, to my best recollection, was underlined by
Admiral Kimmel at the time.
It was noted that the Japanese were adopting more and more se-
curity provisions by passing old traffic for a period of two or three days
prior to the change of calls to defeat the traffic analysis and in an
attempt to match in a previous call with a new call. This could not
be done on a series of passing old dispatches.
They had noted also that the Japanese Navy was adopting more
and more radio security provisions. It was also noted then an effort
had been made to deliver all dispatches using the old calls prior to
the change so that there would be a minimum of undelivered dis-
patches and resultant confusion and compromise of new call signs.
To clarify this, I would say that if your call sign is A and it is changed
to Q and a message addressed to you as A, which we knew to be you,
is sent to Q, we know that your new call sign is Q. Also it was ob-
served that the large volume of old messages may have been used to
pad the total volume of traffic to make it appear as if nothing unusual
was pending. This is an old Jap trick.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 129
Traffic analysis showed nothing to indicate that the First Fleet was
outside of Empire Waters. I should say that "Empire Waters" is
synonomous to "Home waters." The Second Fleet was believed to be
proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area towards South China and Indo-
China, and certain units of the Second Fleet task force were already in
the Indo-China area. Specifically prominent were Cruiser Division
7 and Destroyer Squadron 3. The Third Fleet traffic showed nothing
new in the way of associations, but its associations with South China
and Indo-China forces continued. There were no changes in the
Mandates or in the Fifth Fleet or in the Combined Air Force.
[216] It was noted that large numbers of the submarines of
the Submarine Force were believed to be to the eastward of Yokosuka-
Chichijima-Saipan line, and that the flagship of the Submarine Force
was somewhere in that general area.
Under "Carriers" it was stated there was no change. This was
presumed to mean no change since the previous report, since there
had been no report of carriers recently and the last report said in the
Empire area, with the exception of Cardiv 3, with the possibility of one
carrier in the Mandates.
Mr. SoNNETT. Before you go into the dispatches. Captain, I have
one question on this. What, if any, discussion do you recall, Captain,
with Admiral Kimmel concerning the significance of the change in
Japanese service radio calls referred to in the summary of 1 December
1941?
Captain Latton. Our discussion merely reviewed what I have pre-
viously read in testimony, that it was an unusual step, that it was an
advance in radio security, that they were doing everj^thing they could
to defeat our radio intelligence, that they were apprehensive that we
would know of the move that was underway. Unfortunately, we
didn't know the extent of the move completely. But under the con-
ditions obtaining there, we discussed radio intelligence, its faults and
its promises, its inexactities and yet the overall picture that it will
produce. Whether then or at other times, we discussed the fact that
a force can take sealed orders, proceed under radio silence and never
be detected except by visual or other sighting.
Mr. SoNNETT. Eeferring again to the communication intelligence
summary for 1 December 1941, concerning the Fifth Fleet it was
stated, "Nothing to report." I believe you testified that the Fifth
Fleet was the [216] fleet in the northern area of Japan.
Captain Latton. I don't believe I said the fleet in the northern area.
The Fifth Fleet was a new organization of which nothing was known,
but from past indications it was believed that the Fifth Fleet was a
force assembled for operations in northern waters, as had been done
in previous years. There had been a Fifth Fleet prior to that during
a maneuver, which was based in the Ominato-Hokkaido area, but, -as
I recall it at this time, there was no positive information on the Fifth
Fleet; and further. Admiral Kimmel had asked me several times to
check with the communication intelligence people to see if there wasn't
sornething that we could ascertain regarding this force, its intentions
or its composition. You go way back in here and you will find there
was considerable discussion when this first came up, but we did not
.know anything about that fleet.
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 10
130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNECT. Then, the statement "nothmg to report" concerning
the Fifth Fleet meant tliat you had no information concerning the
fleet and did not mean that you had information indicating no change?
Captain Layton. It would mean that there was no information
rather than that the information showed no change. If you will note,
he said under "Combined Air Force" "No change." It would mean
that the normal traffic pattern was followed and there were no new
associations. And also recall that this was a day of call sign changes,
when the identification of these units would be most difficult and the
analyst cannot on a flood of new call signs really make any commit-
ments; so he was satisfied with the words "no change" and satisfied
with the words '''nothing to report" as meaning we had nothing to
report.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you have any dispatches for 1 December, Cap-
tain?
Captain Layton. We had a dispatch from OpNav, dated 1 Decem-
ber, [217] addressed to CincAF, ComSIXTEJEN, information
CincPac and ComFOURTEEN. It referred to the intrigue in Thai-
land, on which conferences in progress in Bangkok — Japanese confer-
ences in Bangkok were considering plans aimed at forcing the British
to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singora as a countermove to
Japanese landing at Kota Bharu. Since Thailand intended to con-
sider the first invader as her enemy, the Japanese believed this land-
ing in Malaya would force the British to invade Thai at Padang
Bessa. Thai would then declare war and request Jap help. This
plan apparently had the approval of the Thai Chief of Staff, Bijitto.
It observed that Thai Government circles had been sharply divided
between the pro-Japanese and the pro-British factions until about
25 November, but now Wanitto ancf Shina, who favored joint mili-
tary action with Japan, had silenced the anti-Jap group and intended
to force the Premier, Pibul, to make a decision. The Japanese Am-
bassador in Bangkok expected early and favorable developments to be
P'ossible.
On l" December, ComSIXTEEN informed CinC, Asiatic Fleet,
which readdressed it for information to CincPac, ComFOURTEEN,
and OpNav, that Japanese radio station JVJ press tonight in closing
at 1700 hours (presumably minus 9 time) stated: "All listeners be
sure and listen in at 0700 tomorrow morning since there may be im-
portant news." ComSIXTEEN suggested frequencies 7327, 9430, and
12275. All times Tokyo, minus 9.
ComSIXTEEN also pent a dispatch on 1 December that radio in-
telligence had showed that among the arrivals in the Takao area dur-
ing the past two days were Comdesron 5 in the NATORI, and that
the NAKA was to join Desron 4 there; units of number Two Base
Force and CHOGEI, the latter being considered a tender for two
submarine divisions, had arrived in the Takao area, and that all these
units were under command of the CinC Third Fleet. ComSIXTEEN
noted that the CinC Second Fleet in the ATAGO had shifted from
Kure to the Sasebo [218] communication zone, apparently en
route to South China waters.
_ Referring to ComSIXTEEN dispatch in which Japanese radio sta-
tion JVJ requested all listeners to "be sure and listen in at 0700 to-
morrow morning since there may be important news," the impression
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 131
received was that the "winds" code was about to go on the air, mean-
ing by that the fake weather broadcast at the beginning and end of
news broadcasts to signal the rupture of relations between either
Japan and America or Japan and Britain or Japan and Russia. The
monitors were told of this and placed on the double alert, but nothing
came of it.
Mr, SoNNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summary
for December 2nd, Captain, will you give us the highlights of that?
Captain LATToisr. Of interest was the Japanese were having diffi-
culty in routing their traffic due to the change of calls and the probable
unf amiliaritv of operators with the new calls and the location of the
units thereof.
Also it was noted that ComSIXTEEN had reported the Second and
Third Fleets to be in the Takao area and that Takao radio was broad-
casting traffic for these fleets. The broadcast was not heard in Ha-
waii, but it was observed here in ComFOURTEEN that there was
one indication that these two fleets weren't close to Takao. For in-
stance, in several instances Takao forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these
fleets. It was summarized as the belief that a large fleet, made up of
Second, Third, and First Fleet units, had left the Empire waters and
was either not close enough to Takao for good communications or
was proceeding on a course not close to Takao.
It was noted that Radio Shanghai handled considerable amounts of
traffic which obviously were originated by and destined for units in
thp Takao area.
[£19] It was noted that the Chief of Staff, South China area,
continued to appear in Shanghai. It was observed that ComSIX-
TEEN had reported nine submarines proceeding south of Camranh
Bay. These were assessed to be Subrons 5 and 6, which units normally
operated with the First Fleet, but which had been repeatedly shown to
be included in the Second Fleet task force for southern operations.
Despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appeared
to remain relatively quiet. Inconclusive evidence suggested there may
have been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff and
that there may be two supreme commanders with staffs. Lack of
identifications was noted as precluding precise information on the
Second Fleet, but it contributed to the belief that a large part of the
Second Fleet was underway. Cruiser Division 7 and Destroyer
Squadron 3 were unlocated since the change of calls.
There was nothing to report concerning the Third Fleet, but the
association of the Submarine Force with the Mandates Fleet, that is,
the Fourth Fleet, continued. Some traffic for the Fourth Fleet was
still seen going through Truk.
Under "Carriers" it was stated :
Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of iden-
tifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since
over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the change
on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident
that carrier traflfic is at a low ebb.
It was noted that the Combined Air Force, the shore-based air force,
continued to be closely associated with the Second, Third, and Indo-
China Fleets, and that some units of the Combined Air Force, which
previously 1220] had been shown in the Takao area, had de-
132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
parted. The direction was not given, but it was inferred as south, as
their previous associations had been south.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall what, if any, discussion you had with
Admiral Kimmel concerning the lack of information concerning the
carriers?
Captain Latton. I don't believe that there was any amount of dis-
cussion at this time, because in the past when call sign changes had
been made, there was a blank
Mr. SoNNETT. Was the fact, as stated in the communication intelli-
gence summary, evide, that the failure to identify one carrier call
indicated that carrier traffic was definitely at a low ebb ?
Captain Layton. Admiral Kimmel read that. Whether he com-
mented on it, I do not recall.
Mr. SoNNETT. If so, he did no comment to you ?
Captain Layton. I do not recall that he commented, but, if so, he
would have commented to me, I presume.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was your own analysis or evaluation of that
fact. Captain?
Captain Layton. At that time, as best I can recall it, I laid it to
the fact that there was a lack of identifications and in the past there
had been many times when carrier calls didn't appear, as you will
notice on previous days carrier calls didn't appear when there was
identified traffic. There have been many times and sometimes over a
considerable period when the carriers just did not appear because they
weren't operating. When they are tied at the buoy in Yokosuka or
Kure or other naval ports that have wire communications to Kure,
they receive their traffic by land line or on the teletype. They wouldn't
use high power. They wouldn't be called on broadcasts because their
operations were all local. They would also receive and pass con-
siderable local traffic.
[2^11 Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall whether the previous Ja-
panese advance into Hainan was preceded by a similar lack of carrier
traffic?
Captain Laytoist. No. On the contrary — do you mean Hainan or
French Indo-China?
Mr. SoNNETT. French Indo-China.
Captain Layton. On the contrary, in the French Indo-China dem-
onstrations of January and July, 1941, Carrier Division 2 appeared
in the traffic, and also at this occasion of the formation of this south-
ern invasion force under CinC Second Fleet, with the amphibious
forces under CinC Third Fleet, plus the shore-based air force under
major commands, it was noted definitely that Cardiv 3 and possibly
Cardiv 4 were associated with this force, Cardiv 4 being much less
associated and some lack of close association seen. It was also noted
that prior to the apparent formation of this task force, Cardivc 4 and
3 had been in the Takao area, or Nansei Shoto area, and that they
had returned to the Empire. Having been in that area, and since
Cardiv 3 was definitely southbound and since Cardiv 4 was lightlv
suggested as possibly being associated, it was on this basis that 1
placed Cardiv 3 and Cardiv 4 in my estimate as in the Southern Task
Force. It was believed that had the carrier* been intending to operate,
they would likely have appeared in the traffic.
Mr. SoNNETT. That is, you are speaking now of December 2, 1941 ?
Captain Layton. Had other carriers, other than those I have men-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 133
tioned, other carrier divisions, intended to operate, it would have been
suggested in traffic. It is to be noted here that Commander Carriers
is not associated in any of these dispatches.
Mr. SoNNETT, Wliat I am getting at. Captain, is when you say it
was believed, do you refer to December 2, 1941 ?
[£2£] Captain Layton. Correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. And at that time you believed that were the carriers
thought to be in home waters in operation, that would have shown
up in the traffic?
Captain Layton. If the carriers had been operating in active status
in home waters, they would have been shown in traffic.
Mr. SoNNETT. That was your belief at that time ?
Captain Laytox. That was my belief at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence sum-
mary of December 2, 1941, referring to tlie Second Fleet, it stated,
"No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. This
is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to
the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in com-
pany." Was the lack of traffic concerning the Second Fleet, therefore,
a reason for believing that the fleet was underway ?
Captain Layton. There was no lack of traffic; there was lack of
identification. The amount of traffic handled in the rough on Second
Fleet circuits, the presence of the call signs on the frequencies used by
those people, indicated that they were underway. It wasn't a case
of radio silence. Certain units used certain frequencies, just as our
Navy does, and the Second Fleet, and certain of its units, was using
certain frequencies and traffic was on these frequencies. We had no
identification of calls, but the fact that the traffic was on the circuits
would suggest that the Second Fleet was underway and probably in
company since they weren't handling it by broadcast methods. I would
have to talk to the men who wrote this to know what he thought when
he wrote it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Wliat I am getting at is your evaluation of the radio
silence or complete blank of information as it was stated in the Decem-
ber 2, [22S] 1941, summary as to carriers.
Captain Layton. The difl'erence between the statement here and the
statement as it reads, "No units have stood out prominently the last two
or three days" ; this is referring to the Second and Third Fleets.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you compare this with the statement concerning
the carriers, "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers
today"?
Captain Layton. I took that to mean that he had no information
on the carriers that day.
Mr. Sonnett. In the one case did you believe that the Second Fleet
units were underway and in the other case did you believe that the
carrier units were not underway and for the same reasons?
Captain Layton. I will repeat. The Second Fleet units were using
their radios. They were using their radios on known frequencies.
They were handling a normal pattern of traffic. A normal number of
unidentified calls on these circuits appeared. It was my belief that
even though these people were not identified as names, they were units
operating normally and at sea. Under "Carriers" there was a com-
plete blank of information, meaning since there had been no identified
calls, there was a complete blank of information. The carrier circuits
134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
were definitely not up, that is, there were no calls identified on circuits
that would be called carriers. The difference between a unit operating
at sea and a unit operating in home waters under an umbrella of broad-
casts. The things on broadcast can go to shore stations and special
landing forces and air forces and carrier forces and everything else
and there is no way of identifying who they are, but if a unit is identify-
ing under its tactical circuits at sea, that is a force. If a unit is operat-
ing under a broadcast, you wouldn't hear them. [^^4] If they
are operating in local waters and using only their local circuits of low
power or voice, for instance, you cannot hear it at the intercept station.
You cannot hear it at Cavite. It is too far away. Whenever they go
into local waters, they have always gone to local maneuvering circuits,
which applies to all vessels in that area. That is the impression that
I received from reading this, as best I recall it, on 2 December.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you, on or about December 2, 1941, have the belief
that the operations of carriers or any other types of ships of Japan
might be conducted in a period of radio silence ?
Captain Layton. Radio silence is a means that can be used by any
force at any time, and that fact had been known to me for a consider-
able period. It was not particularly apparent to me on December 2nd
any more than it was on July 16th, for instance, but that fact had been
discussed. I don't believe there was any thought of radio silence in
my mind in reading this paragraph, nor do I think that the paragraph
was written to imply that there was any radio silence of carriers. We
know, in fact, now that there was, but at that time, in trying to recall
as best I can, the reaction that I obtained in reading this summary
and discussing it with Admiral Kimmel was, for one thing, this was
only the second day of a change of call signs which will run some-
where around 20,000 calls. It is beyond the capabilities of our organ-
ization at this time to be able to tabulate and fit these all in in one
day. You never could do it if you had all the men in the world, because
there isn't any way of doing it. It is only after many days of traffic
that you can lay the traffic down and identify it. Even in those days,
you see, commanders had several call signs, but the ships had only one.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, was it not the fact that on December 2, 1941,
the radio intelligence unit here had identified over 200 service calls
[225] partially since the change on December 1, 1941?
Captain Layton. They stated that they had identified partially
over 200 service calls.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it not further the fact that the radio intelli-
gence unit said that in view of that fact and the further fact that they
hadn't recovered one carrier call, it was evident that carrier traffic
was at a low ebb?
Captain Layton. That is true.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did that signify something unusual, then, to you
concerning carrier radio traffic?
Captain Layton. Not at all, because in the previous days' sum-
maries, there was no significant carrier traffic noted or no remark to
that effect. You see, the summary brings out things that are sig-
nificantly noted, new associations, or if there is undue activity or if
people are heard, they put them down, because with this I kept my
location sheet. This was the only way that anyone could try to keep
track of the Japanese Navy. We had no espionage system that could
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 135
tell us when they went in and out of Kure or Sasebo or anywhere else.
This was the only way we had of doing it ; so when they had the identi-
fication for one of the Jap ships, if he was working with Yokosuka,
they would say so, just as they had the AKAGI in there working with
MARUS, so that we could keep track of as many major ships as
possible.
The fact that they didn't appear tended to indicate that they were
in an inactive status as they had returned in late October from oDera-
tions in the Nansei Shoto. It was sometimes the custom of the Japa-
nese after operations to take their carriers into the general Inland
Sea area, put their air groups shore-based and you wouldn't hear from
the carriers for \226\ a considerable period of time.
Admiral Heavitt. Did you interpret this note on the carriers, then,
as meaning that there was lack of traffic on the carrier freqeuncies?
Captain Layton. Yes, sir, lack of traffic on the carrier frequencies
and lack of carriers' call signs appearing on any frequencies
even in administrative types of dispatches about paymasters or per-
sonnel changes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall. Captain, whether or not you had any
discussion with Admiral Kimmel concerning that fact specifically?
Captain Layton. I believe I said before that I do not have any re-
collection that it was brought up, and I have not.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you have any dispatches for December 2nd, Cap-
tain?
Captain Laytox. ComSIXTEEN on the 2nd of December reported
to OpNav, CincPac, CincAF, and ComFOURTEEN that the CinC Sec-
ond and CinC Third Fleets were in the Takao area and Commander
Southern Expeditionary Force was in the Sama area. The Com-
mander Southern Expeditionary Force, incidentally, was the Com-
mander who had taken charge at the demonstration off French Indo-
China and had remained back in that area as a Fleet Area Commander.
ComSIXTEEN noted that broadcasts to fleet units were now being
sent by Takao or Bako Radio in addition to Tokyo. ComSIXTEEN
also said in this dispatch that the Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok
had on the 30th requested permission to destroy all but a limited num-
ber of codes.
On 2 December we received a dispatch from CincAF, timed 020345,
addressed to OpNav. info CincPac, that a patrol plane had spotted
nine submarines, speed 10, course south, at 0230 Greenwich, latitude
13-10 north, longitude 110-00.
And in a dispatch at 020730 CincAF reported to OpNav, info
CincPac, that bearing 070 from Saigon, distant 180 miles, three 1-61
class \227^ submarines had been sighted in cruising forma-
tion, headed south at 15 knots; that twenty-one transports were an-
chored at Camranh Bay with six planes patrolling overhead.
At 012200 the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, reported to
Opnav. info CincPac, CincAF, ComSIXTEEN, Naval Attache,
Chungking, Naval Attache, Tokyo, as follows : that between Wednes-
day and Saturdaj^ there had arrived there (Shanghai) 14,000 troops
plus others on two special trains. He was unable to get an accurate
check on numbers. "Equipment with arrivals include field artillery
and tanks. Those (troops) sailing from Shanghai week ending 22nd
believed to have included Fourth Division,"
136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
%
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the communication intellig:ence sum-
mary for December 3, 1941, Captain, will vou give us the highlights
of it?
Captain Layton. Highlights were that the volume of traffic was
normal, with the receiving conditions good. It was observed that the
"present state of call recovery does not permit much detailed informa-
tion to be obtained." It noted the extensive use of alternate calls by
the major commands and stated that it slowed tip the identification of
these units, stating that very few units had been positively identified
so far.
It was noted that the Chief of the Naval General Staff originated
three navy dispatches to CinC Combined, CinC Second, CinC Third
Fleets. Tokyo Intelligence originated nine dispatches to the same
commanders.
It was observed that the presence of the CinC Second Fleet in For-
mosan waters was not revealed in the radio traffic, but the impression
was gained that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway, but
that was not verified by radio intelligence means.
It was noted that some of the Fourth Fleet units were in the Mar-
shall Islands area and included some of the Fourth Fleet staff. It
[3£8] stated that the identity of these units was not known.
It was noted that the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit addressed several
messages to CinC Fourth Fleet.
It was also noted that some Swatow units were addressed at Saigon,
indicating movements south of certain of the South China units to
Saigon.
It was noted that Bako Radio originated many dispatches to the
Resident Naval Officer at Taihoku, Formosa, and the Task Force Com-
mander.
It stated, "No information on submarines or carriers,"
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you have any dispatches of December 3rd ?
Captain Layton. On December 3rd, OpNav addressed CincAF and
ComSIXTEEN, information CincPac and ComFOURTEEN, that
Tokyo had ordered London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila to
destroy their purple machines. The Batavia machine had already
been sent to Tokyo. On December 2nd Washington had been directed
to destroy their purple machine and all but one copy of other systems.
It stated that the British Admiralty that date had reported that the
Japanese Embassy in London had complied with its orders to de-
stroy it.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was the purple machine. Captain ?
Captain Layton. It was an electric coding machine.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you have any discussion with Admiral Kimmel
concerning the destruction of the purple machine by the Japanese ?
Captain Layton. All I recall of it is that Admiral Kimmel sent for
me when he received this dispatch I have just mentioned, or one similar
to it, and asked what was the purple machine. I told him that I didn't
know, that I would find out. I then approached Lieutenant Coleman,
the Fleet Security Officer, who had come from Washington, and asked
him, and he told me it was the Japanese diplomatic electrical coding
machine.
[2£9] Mr. SoNNETT. Did you communicate that to- Admiral
Kimmel ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 137
Captain Layton. Which information I communicated to Admiral
Kimmeh
Mr. SoNNETT. What, if any, evaluation was made of the fact that the
Japanese were going to destroy the purple machine ?
Captain Latton. It indicated that the Japanese were preparing for
any or all eventualities and most of the addresses were in the southern
area, with the exception of Washington and London.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you know whether or not the Japanese Consul
in Hawaii had a purple machine?
Captain Laytox. I did not know, but I have subsequently discovered
that he did not.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you know at this time whether or not the Jap-
anese Consul in Hawaii was destroying or burning papers ?
Captain Layton. He was not at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. On December 3, 1941 ?
Captain Layton. I don't believe it was the 3rd. I thought it was a
little bit later. It may have been the 3rd. I don't recall which day I
was informed that he was burning his papers, and I said, "That fits the
picture that the Japanese are preparing for something, destroying
their codes."
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it brought to Admiral Kimmel's attention that
the Japanese Consul in Hawaii was burning papers ?
Captain Laytox. Yes, sir.
Mr. SoNXETT. Do you know, Captain, whether or not the Army in
Hawaii was advised of the information concerning the Japanese de-
struction of the purple machine or of the Japanese destruction of
records in Hawaii ?
[230] Captain Laytox. As I recall it. Commander Eochefort
told me that he had informed Ixis opposite number in the Army the
Japanese were destroying their secret and confidential papers not
only in Hawaii but in other places. I don't know whether he told
them that they were destroying the purple machine. As a matter of
fact, I wouldn't think that he would, I don't know. It is my best
recollection that I told Colonel Raley that the Japanese were destroy-
ing their important papers and code books and everything else not
only here but everywhere else. I didn't want to mention the purple
machine because I didn't want to explain what I meant.
Mr. SoxxETT. Do you have any other dispatches, Captain?
Captain Laytox. OpNav sent another dispatch, containing the same
information, time 031850, addressed for action to ComSIXTEEN,
CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, CincAF, and it said :
Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent in-
structions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at
Hong Kong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington X and London to
destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important
confidential and secret documents.
We received a dispatch from the Naval Attache, Singapore, time
020335, on the 3rd, which stated that CinC China had issued the
following to British and Allied merchant ships in that area : All ships
north of Hong Kong proceed south thereof. Crown Colony's and
all ocean-going ships to Singapore, proceeding to Singapore,
and bring such shipyard equipment as possible X except for coast Mal aya
and West Borneo no vessels leave near northbound without permission XX
Dutch issued orders none their ships go north their islands without authority.
138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Keferring to the intelligence summary for December
4, 1941, Captain, will you give us the high lights of that?
[231] Captain Layton. It was noted that Takao Radio instituted
a Fleet broadcast using the same prefix indicator that Radio Tokyo
used. This was rather an important move from a communications
point of view in that you had two complete broadcasts which carried
the same indicators but had different serial numbers. It also in-
dicated that Takao had now assumed the position that Tokyo had
been in two weeks before of handling major fleet traffic on high speed
circuits. It was noted, however, that only few messages had been
placed on that broadcast. Moreover, it was noted that there were a
large number of urgent messages, most of these from Tokj^o to major
commanders, and, among others, there was a Tokyo intelligence dis-
patch in seven parts addressed to the Chiefs of Staff, China Fleet, the
Combined Fleet, the Third Fleet, the South China Fleet, the French
Indo-China Force, and Sama, Hainan. In all, Tokyo radio intel-
ligence sent out twelve dispatches to the major commanders.
It was noted that the outstanding item of the day's traffic was the
lack of mesages originating from CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third
Fleet. It was noted that these were previously very talkative and
were now very quiet. While the fleet calls were not as yet well
identified, the lack of traffic from these commands could not be
ascribed to that. They are still prominent as addressees. It was
believed now that the CinC Second Fleet was in the vicinity of
Takao and that the conflicting evidence before was due to the two
broadcasts that had been brought up. CinC Combined Fleet sent
one message to an unidentified unit for action and for information
to the Third Base Force at Palao, CinC Second Fleet, and CinC
Third Fleet, thereby renewing Palao's association with the Southern
Invasion Force.
CinC Fourth Fleet sent a message to the Chief of Staff Combined
Air [232] Force, information Eleventh Air Corps, Chitose
Air, and Air Squadron Twenty-four, the Third Base Force at Palao,
and the Fourth Base Force at Truk. This undoubtedly had to do
with air movements or preparations. They couldn't find anything
further in the day's traffic to check on the present of Fourth Fleet
units in the Marshalls, as has previously been stated. Jaluit Radio
was associated with the Commander Submarine Force and with Tokyo
Radio and with an unidentified call which was believed to be an oil
tanker.
There was an impression, a definite impression, as I recall it, from
this summary that these commanders, who had previously been very
active in originating dispatches, from the dispatches which tied in
their groups, suddenly now became quiet, but they were still the
addressees of many intelligence reports; they were the addressees
of many other dispatches from Empire and shore-based originators.
Now yon do get tlie impression they are at sea and maintaining radio
silence. They are in the traffic, but they don't send the traffic them-
selves. I would like to state here that the Japanese tlien hadn't found
out the hidden little trick of putting it from no originator. We taught
them (hat in the war, which they dutifully followed thereafter, much
to our chagrin.
Mr. Son NEXT. Do you have any dispatches for December 4th,
Captain?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 139
Captain Layton. Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, dispatch, time
020704, received on 4 December, stated tliat an unidentified modern
10,000 ton cargo ship converted as a seaplane tender. It liad a flush
deck, raised forecastle, raked bow, cruiser stern, armed with one 4,7
gun on an elevated platform forward and one also on ihe poop. Also
that Japanese naval craft sighted were as follows: On the 15th off
Saigon were seven transports; on the 20th northeast of Amoy was a
10,000 ton seaplane carrier, having eight [^33] catapults.
Assistant Naval Attache's dispatch from Shanghai, 020702, received
on 4 December, in general stated that local Nazis of military age
were being sent to Japan for training and believed to be for duty on
the German vessels interned there. Eighty men, average age thirty,
were known to have de])arted the past ten days; also that the officials
in the Shanghai area were exerting pressure on the French Conces-
sion to discharge Anglo-American volunteer members of the police
reserves, who were to be replaced by Germans and Italians. He con-
firmed previous movements of the large liners KAMAKURA iMARU,
the NITTA MARU. and the ARGENTINE MARU, had been carry-
ing building material, personnel, oil, and supplies to the Caroline
Islands; that 3,000 laborers had landed at Jaluit, and that the fol-
lowing three islands were being specially developed: Katherine,
iMajuro, and Mejit.
We received from the Naval Attache, Tokyo, time 030030, received
on 4 December, a dispatch to the effect that two escort vessels had
been recently completed in the Yokohama dockyard; that one trans-
port loaded with aircraft plus another one carrying naval personnel
departed Yokohama 27 November.
iMr. SoNisTETT. Referring to the communication intelligence sum-
mary for December 5, 1941, Captain, will you give us the highlights
of that?
Captain Layton. It was noted that the traffic volume was extremely
heavy and all circuits were overloaded. There were several new
intercept schedules heard, and Ominato Radio was working with
Sama and Bako, and that the Takao broadcast was handling traffic
to the Second and Third Fleets, and that the Tokyo broadcast was
also handling traffic for those units. It was observed that some traffic
being broadcast was several days old. It was adduced that this indi-
cated uncertainty of delivery [234] existing in the radio or-
ganization. It was also seen that there were many messages of high
precedence which appeared to have caused a jammed condition on
all circuits. They quoted a plain language dispatch sent by Captain,
OKAWA, from Tokyo to Takao, probably for further relay, and
addressed to Fujihara, Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau, which
said,
In reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said Is considered important
at this end but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued
soon.
iMr. SoNNETT. Captain, what was the OKATVA? Do you know?
Captain Layton. I do not know.
It w^as noted that neither the Second Fleet Commander nor the
Third Fleet Commander originated any traffic. They were still fre-
quently addressed and are receiving their traffic over the broadcasts.
It was believed that they were undoubtedly in the Takao area or
140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
farther south since the Takao broadcast handled nearly all their
traffic.
It was stated that no traffic from the Commander Carriers of Sub-
marine Force had been seen either.
Third Fleet. It was noted that the Commander Fourteenth Army
was aboard the KYUJO MARU in the Third Fleet and that a number
of MARUS had been addressing the CinC Third Fleet.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was a MARU, Captain?
Captain Latton. A MARU is any Japanese merchant vessel.
Rather than saying merchant vessel or Japanese merchant vessel,
you say MARU, because all Japanese merchant vessels have MARU
at the ends of their names; so that is another little standardization
that we use.
The Flag Secretary of the Fourth Fleet and the Staff Communica-
tion Officer of the Fourth Fleet were addressed in Jakiit, strengthening
the 1^235] impression that the CinC Fourth Fleet was in the
Marshalls. Again we had an association between the Palao Radio, the
Resident Naval Officer at Palao, and Commander Second Fleet by
being addressed by the Commander South China Fleet.
Sama, Hainan, addressed much traffic to CinC Second Fleet, and
Bako in the Pescadores sent considerable traffic to the Second and
Third Fleets. The Commander of the Combined Air Force appeared
to be busy with the movement of his air corps. Shiogama Air and
at least two other unidentified air corps appeared to be moving, prob-
ably to Indo-China.
On December 5th we received no intelligence traffic from any source
whatsoever.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence sum-
mary for December 6, 1941, Captain, do you know whether that was
delivered to Admiral Kimmel before or after the attack on Decem-
ber 7th?
Captain Layton. It was delivered to me after the attack on De-
cember 7th and Admiral Kimmel did not see it and was too busy to
read it. It contained no positive information of anything we didn't
already know and, in fact, contained nothing of what we then
did know.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you have any dispatches received prior to the
attack on December 7th ?
Captain Layton. On 7 December there was a dispatch and I be-
lieve it was received after the attack, but I am not positive. It may
have come in in the early morning and I didn't see it until afterwards.
It was a dispatch which ComSIXTEEN sent to OpNav, information
CinCPac, CincAF, and ComFOURTEEN.^ They estimated the South
China Air Force Headquarters were now in the Saigon area ; at least
four groups of planes, strength unknown, were at that station ; that a
heavy concentration of aircraft were at Formosa and [3361
based at Takao, Taichu, and Kagi naval air stations; that eight
MARU air tenders, that is, converted ex-merchant marine, probably
freighters to seaplane tenders, were in the South China area, five of
them being in the Takao general zone, one near Saigon, and two near
Sama, Hainan; that the direction finder bearings indicated the
AKAGI was moving south from the Empire and now was in the
Nansei Shoto, Okinawa, area. "Estimates based on call recoveries
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 141
since 1 December and may be considered conservative." This esti-
imate is based on call sign recovery since 1 December and may be
considered conservative. The large volume of high precedence traffic
from air activities in the Saigon area indicates extensive air opera-
tions may be imminent.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were there any other dispatches received before the
attack ?
Captain Latton. These are dispatches I have in my file, and
whether they came in to us before, I don't know. A dispatch, time
060550, from Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, and dated 7 De-
cember 1941, reported that approximately 14,000 troops who had ar-
rived in Shanghai by rail the latter part of the week before had
embarked and departed south; that the equipment included ninety
armored cars, and that the Japanese gendarmerie force in Shanghai
had been augmented by a thousand persons brought from Nanking
and Hanchow. The Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, remarked
that there was "no apparent reason for this increase unless policing
of additional local areas is contemplated."
A dispatch received on 6 December 1941 from CinC Asiatic Fleet,
addressed to OpNav, information CinCPac, ComSIXTEEN, and
ComFOURTEEN, stated that the CinCChina reported :
25 Ship convoy with escort 6 cruisers and 10 destroyers lat 8 north 106 east
at 0316 GCT' today X Convoy 10 ships with [237] 2 cruisers and 10 de-
stroyers 7-40 north 106-20 east 2 hours later X All on course west X 3 addi-
tional ships 7-51 north 105 east at 0442 course 810 X This indicates all forces
will make for Kohtron X By scouting force sighted 30 ships and 1 large cruiser
anchored Camranh Bay X
A dispatch from the Naval Observer, Wellington, time 050600, re-
ceived on 6 December 1941, which said that the naval intelligence,
New Zealand, had informed our Naval Observer there in confidence
and not for transmission that the Jap Consul in Wellington had re-
ceived orders to destroy his codes. A reply, using the code word
set up for that, indicating compliance therewith, had been sent to
Tokyo. Also he reported that the Japanese consuls in Australia and
New Zealand had been directed to forward all possible geographical
data. He enjoined secrecy in this matter to keep the source still
available to the British.
Admiral Hewitt. We will adjourn at this time until 9 : 15, tomor-
row morning.
(The investigation was then, at 5 : 30 p. m., adjourned until 9 : 15
a. m., 30 May 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 143
[238^ PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY
Ele\t:xth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investi<ration met at the Visitinrr Flair Offi-
cer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief. U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 9 : 15 a. m.,
Wednesday 30 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt. U?N : Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. GrisAvold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR: and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, entered and, after having been
warned that his previous oath was still binding, resumed his seat as
witness.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain. T show you Exhibit 15 of the Naval Court
of Inquiry, which is a certified copy of an OPNav dispatch of Novem-
ber 24th. and ask you whether yon recall having seen that.
Captain Layton. Yes, I recall it.
Mr. Sonnett. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral, before
this investigation?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The dispatch referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 24.")
Captain Layton. I believe that is the dispatch that Admiral Kim-
mel had me take and show to General Short in person the day it was
received. I gave it to Admiral Short for his perusal shortly after
12 : 15, as he was then listening to the news, which, I believe, ran from
12 to 12 : 15, at his headquarters. He read it and asked me what naval
air strength we had at Guam \2S9'\ and I replied that as far
as I knew, we had no naval air strength unless there was a transient
patrol plane or so passing through. He asked me concerning the
former landing field at Guam and I told him that while I did not
knoAv at first hand, it was my impression that some time after 1930
and probably before 1932 the shore-based Marine observation group
that was stationed at Guam had been withdrawn and the airfield had
been allowed to revert to its original state, that is, unimproved and
not kept up. General Short then asked about the defenses of Guam.
I told him again I did not know at first hand, but when in Tokyo on
duty at the American Embassy, 1 had seen a copy of a memorandum
or aide memoire submitted to the Japanese Government, informing
them that all coast defense guns on Guam had been withdrawn and
that Guam was to be considered thereafter as an undefended island.
While I do not recall the date of this note, it is my impression it was
somewhere around 1933, possibly 1934. General Short made some
remark to the effect about appeasing Japan both in the past and in
the present and returned the note to me and tlianked me for bringing
144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
it. I returned the note to CincPac Headquarters and reported that
I had completed the mission sent on.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the sentences in exhibit 24 of this in-
vestigation, which is the OpNav dispatch of November 24th, as
follows :
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements
their naval and military forces indicate in oiir opinion that a surprise aggressive
move in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility —
will you state, Captain, what conversation you had with Admiral
Kimmel concerning your evaluation or estimate of that portion of
the dispatch?
[24-0] Captain Latton. I don't recall that Admiral Kimmel
asked me specifically for my evaluation of that special part of the
dispatch. I do recall that in general a statement was made to the
effect that that was borne out by the present information we had at
hand; an aggressive move was then under way. I believe that the
fact the Philippines and Guam were mentioned was given particular
attention, although I do not believe it was stressed in my presence.
I know that when dispatches of this nature or other important dis-
patches having to do with fleet movements or dispositions were re-
ceived, the Admiral, the Chief of Staff, War Plans Officer, Opera-
tions Officer, and the Aviation Officer were closeted with the Admiral
for sometimes hours at an end. During these conferences, I was sel-
dom, if ever, present.
Mr, SoNNETT. Did the opinion of the Chief of Naval Operations as
expressed in this dispatch, namely, that the movements of the Japa-
nese naval and military forces and statements of the government in-
dicate a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including
attack on the Philippines or Guam, coincide or agree with your own
estimate of the situation at that time?
Captain Layton. As I recall it, and it is more than three and a
half years since then, and it is very difficult to recall what you thought
after this period, and particularly when I have been engaged in fleet
intelligence work daily since then — I believe that my impression was
they have the same information we have; they note this southern
movement as we do, and they have found in their judgment that the
Japanese may not leave us on their flank either. That had been a
subject of conversation, as to whether the Japanese would proceed on
with the indicated movements, leaving us on their flank, or would they
have to take us out on the way down. It was my personal impression,
and I so stated, that Japan had never yet, with [24^] the ex-
ception of Russia, left a strong enemy on a flank.
Mr. SoNNETT. It appears from the exhibit. Captain, that an attack
on American territory, namely, the Philippines or Guam, was re-
garded as a possibility by the Chief of Naval Operations. Was that
in accord with your estimate at the time ?
Captain Layton. The possibility of a Japanese attack on the Phil-
ippines or Guam was in accord with my belief at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you express that belief to Admiral Kimmel ?
Captain Layton. I don't believe that my belief was specifically
requested as you have so stated it. I believe he asked me to the extent
that, didn't this bear out what we were thinking at the time, namely,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY " 145
would they or would they not leave us on the flank when they moved
south ? By the possibility of the Japanese leaving us on their flank,
I meant, and it was understood, I believe, that the Japanese in their
move into French Indo-China and Thailand or even across into Burma
to cut the Burma Road, as was conjectured by some observers, would
consider our position in the Philippines as a direct menace and threat
on their immediate flank; that should they leave us on their flank,
our position in the Philippines would be a threat to their line of com-
munications should we decide to take action in assistance to Great
Britain or French Indo-China or the Thai operations, as the case
might be.
Mr. SoxNETT. By that, Captain, do you mean that you expected an
attack on the Philippines or Guam in the event of Japanese war with
the United States?
Captain Layton. I did not expect the attack, but I was not unaware
of its possibilities. In other words, the whole problem was would
the Japanese leave us on their flank? If they would leave us, they
wouldn't [^4^] attack. On the other hand, if they left us
there, we would be a threat. So, since the Japanese have rarely left
a strong enemy in an immediate flank, they might attack so as to pro-
tect their own wing, their own line of communications, as a measure
of security.
Mr. SoNNETT. What directions of movement were considered in
your estimate other than Japanese movement or attack on the Philip-
pines or Guam?
Captain Layton. My estim.ate was there were two task forces under
CinC Second Fleet, one proceeding down south from the Formosa-
Hainan-Bako area into the South China Sea and aiming at the Kra
Isthmus or its vicinity, the Gulf of Siam. The other task force was
proceeding via Palao in the Western Carolines with the intention per-
haps of threatening Timor, Celebes, or other Dutch holdings in that
general zone.
Mr. SoNKETT. Did you at that time. Captain, believe or estimate
that in the event of war with Japan, an attack on Hawaii was a pos-
sibility?
Captain Laytox. I did not believe it a possibility at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you know whether or not the Commander-in-
Chief believed at that time that an attack on Hawaii was a possibility?
Captain Layton. I do not know.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I show you exhibit 8 of the Naval Court of
Inquiry, which is a Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number 2CL-41
(Revised) of October 14, 1941, and ask you whether you were familiar
with that.
Captain Layton. I had seen it.
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to paragraph 2 (b) of that letter, does it
not appear that the security of the fleet operating and based in the
Hawaiian area was predicated at that time on two assumptions and
that one of the assumptions was that a declaration of war might be
preceded by [^4^] a surprise attack upon ships in Pearl
Harbor ?
Captain Layton. That is what this letter from the Commander-in-
Chief says.
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 11
146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, was that not, Captain, an estimate, then, of
CincPac concernincj the possibility or indicating the possibility of a
surprise attack at Pearl Harbor prior to a declaration of war?
Captain Layton. I presume it was. I was not consulted on the
writing of that letter ; therefore, I cannot speak at first hand. Its face
value would say that that was true.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did your own estimate agree with that of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, on that subject?
Captain Layton. Yes. That had been discussed in the past. As a
matter of fact, that point of Japan's actions was informally discussed
with Admiral Kimmel on the occasion some months before Pearl
Harbor when I presented him with a translation of a Japanese novel
which purported to tell for the layman what would be expected during
a Japanese-American war, and in which were laid out three problems
for the American Commander-in-Chief, who, they presumed, would
proceed from the West Coast and be based in Pearl Harbor. One
problem was the possibility of a surprise task force raid on the Hawai-
ian Islands. Another possibility was an expedition or raid in the
Aleutian Islands. As I recall it, the third proposition was an am-
phibious expedition against the Hawaiian Islands. Under the first
of these, the surprise raid by a task force on the Hawaiian Islands,
they listed in this book the possible composition of such a task force,
listing fast carriers, KONGO class battleships, and NACHI class
cruisers, stating that because this force was fast and America had no
fast battleships, it could run away from any superior force ; because
the force was strong, it could close with ['^44-] any inferior force
and destroy it.
This very point was informally discussed and the Admiral asked me
what I thought concerning such a proposition. As I recall it, I stated
that that was a potentiality the Japanese always had and that I hoped
that our air search would find them before they got too close. He
then excused me and thereafter sent for other officers. Whether they
discussed this point or not, I do not know, as I was not present.
Mr. SoNNETT. It was. Captain, I tal?,e it, a part of your duties to
maintain an estimate of the situation so far as possible enemy action
was concerned, was it not?
Captain Layton. It was, to maintain the enemy forces section of
the estimate. In other words, an estimate of the situation is built up
from all material, political, economic, military, and so forth. Particu-
larly, an estimate regarding a nation is a very large and a very bulky
document; yet it is a result of considerable information and clear
thinking. My job was to keep up that part of the enemy forces, which
my 1 December memorandum purports to be.
Admiral Hewitt. Does that include possible enemy courses of
action?
Captain Layton. I don't believe so, sir. I would have to get out the
War College book. Unless it has been changed — this was written when
the old gray-covered book was in use. I would have to check to see.
Admiral Hewitt. It is not your recollection that it was your duty
to formulate possible enemy courses of action?
Captain Layton. No, sir, I don't think that was part of it. This
was only formulation of enemy forces. I think possible enemy
courses was part of the Plans Division. I furnished them with the
psychological and other things for the broad estimate of the first part.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWlTT INQUIRY 147
124s'] Admiral Hewitt. The composition and position of the
fleet?
Captain Layton. The composition and position of the fleet was my
section, too, of the estimate. It was at best, of course, the best infor-
mation that we had, but was lacking considerably in detail, particu-
larly on land forces and certain of the air forces, although our day
to day check on the intelligence, even though at times it was a little
contradictory, when the end averaged out, was we knew there was a
considerable concentration of air, for instance, in the Southern For-
mosa-French Indo-China-Hainan area, and at the same time there was
a concentration of some submarines in the Marshalls. There was a
concentration of considerable naval force — as a matter of fact, a large
naval force — in the South China Sea area which was amphibious in
nature. And my estimate showed that remaining in the Empire were
only the battleships of Batdivs 1 and 2, the cruisers of Crudiv 6,
which were put down as tentatively moved to the Mandates, which
ihey did, Desron 1, and probably or possibly Cardivs 1 and 2, plus
Cruiser Division 8 also. Of the Pearl Harbor task force, with the
exception of the first section of Batdiv 3, that is, the HIYEI and
KIRISHIMA, and the two carriers that we carried down in the
Hainan area, the Pearl Harbor task force was carried as in home
waters.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I show you exhibit 23 of the Naval Court of
Inquiry record, which is the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan,
Hawaiian Department, Annex number VII, Section VI, Joint Agree-
ments, dated 28 March 1941, and Addendum 1, Naval Base Defense
Air Force Operation Plan number A-1-41. I refer you to the sum-
mary of the situation set forth in the Addendum and to the possible
enemy action also set forth in the Addendum, and ask whether that
was in accord with your estimate during the year 1941.
[246] Captain Latton. I don't recall ever having seen this docu-
ment, as it was produced in another command. It was not submitted
to me, nor was I consulted regarding it ; therefore, anything I say now
concerning this document would be as I learn it at this instant.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know whether the summary of the situation
as expressed in that document, Addendum 1, was in accord with your
views as of October 1941 ?
Captain Layton. In general, I would say that the sub-paragraphs
listed therein had been in my mind, probably not in the same phrase-
ology but all the points listed therein had been matters that had been
previously discussed and which I was well aware of.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, does that apply. Captain, as well to the state-
ment in the Summary of the Situation contained in Addendum 1 to
the effect that, "It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an
Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no
prior warning from our intelligence services"?
Captain Layton. I did not write that sentence and I would not write
it in that way, although I would say the same thing. Since my interest
was purely intelligence, m}' statement would be, as I have said before,
any force under sealed orders can sail without any warning, unless
you have an efficient espionage and spy system which can give you all
the information, and it can arrive at any point, unless it is detected
by visual or other sighting. That is the same language being used
there, only differently phrased.
148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. I refer you to the paragraph of Addendum 1 entitled'
"Possible Enemy Action," sub-paragraph (a) , as follows :
A declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise submarine attack
on ships in the operating area : (2) a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and
[247] installations in Pearl Harbor; (3) a combination of these two.
I also refer you to sub-paragraph (b) , reading as follows:
It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would
be an air attack. It is believed that at present such qn attack would most likely
be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of
300 miles.
Do those statements accord with your estimate of possible enemy ac-
tion as of October or November, 1941 ?
Captain Laytox. Those statements are in accord with other courses
of possible enemy action which I had thought of. Paragraph (b) ,
wherein carriers would have to come within 300 miles, was not one
of my thoughts. That is, the 300 miles was a matter of air operations
and I mere]y thought that carriers would approach within launching
range, and had expressed the hope that such a task force would be found
by our air search prior to getting to within striking range.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the so-called war warning of November
27, 1941, Captain, which was exhibit 17 of the Naval Court of Inquiry
record, is that the dispatch to w^iich you referred in your testimony
yesterday ?
Captain Laytox. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit in this
case?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 25."^')
Mr. SoNNETT. Was that the dispatch, Captain, which you para-
phrased and which paraphrase you were instructed to deliver to Gen-
eral Short, about which }■ ou testified yesterday ?
[^4^] Captain Layton. This is a copy of the dispatch which
Admiral IGmmel directed me to paraphrase and deliver to Genera]
Short on the late afternoon or early evening of 27 November.
Mr, SoxNETT. Exhibit 25, the war warning. Captain, has as its first
statement the following :
This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.
What, if any, discussion of that phrase did you have with Admiral
Kimmel ?
Captain Laytox. I had no discussion with Admiral Kimmel about
that phrase. After Admiral Kimmel received this dispatch, he was
in closed conference, as I have previously testified. He sent for me
and told me to deliver this dispatch to General Short. He acquiesced
to a paraphrase being delivered to General Short and I retired to make
the paraphrase. When I brought the paraphrase back, the Chief of
Staff of the Fourteenth Naval District brought in an urgent dispatch
from General Short, which was handed to Admiral Ivimmel. During
my wait in the Admiral's cabin to receive the Admiral's approval of
my paraphrase and receive it for delivery to General Short, I was
asked no questions that I recall. I did not take part in the discussions,
I feel sure.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you. Captain, evaluate that dispatch as indicat-
ing that war with Japan was apt to break out in the near future ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 149
Captain Latton. I felt that.
Mr. SoNXETT. At that time, Captain, was it the fact that your esti-
mate of the location of the Japanese carriers, briefly, was as follows :
That one carrier was possibly in the Marshalls and that, according to
ComSIXTEEN, the First and Second Fleet carriers were in home
waters ?
Captain Layton. I believe that was a fact.
Mr. SoNNETT. Keferring to Exhibit 8 of this investigation. Captain,
and to the ComSIXTEEN dispatch of 26 November, does it appear
that ComSIXTEEN [£49] was of the opinion that Carrier
Division 3 was expected to operate in the Mandates ?
Captain Laytox. It was my opinion on reading this dispatch where
ComSIXTEEN said:
and units expected to operate in Mandates will be referred to as second section X
estimated units . . . second section Crudiv Five and Cardiv Three Ryujo and one
niaru x Desrons two and four X Subron five X Desdiv twenty-tiiree X first
base force of third fleet X third base force at Palao X fifth base force at Saipan
and lesser units unidentified XX Crudiv six and Batdiv three may be included
in first and second sections respectively but status cannot be clarified yet
referred-to units to operate from the Palao area of the Japanese Man-
dates and not the central, northern, or eastern Mandates, that is, the
Eastern Carolines, Marianas, or Marshalls.
It is to be noted that ComFOURTEEN's dispatch 260110 had stated
there is believed to be a strong* concentration of submarines and air groups in
the Marshalls which comprise Airon twenty-four x at least one carrier division
unit X plus probably one third of the submarine fleet.
I believe, and it was my interpretation at the time, that the Com-
SIXTEEN dispatch placing Cardiv 3 in the Mandates was in accord-
ance with our existing information that Cardiv 3 would operate to the
south with the Southern Invasion Fleet and possibly based out of
Palao, while the presence of one carrier unit in the Marshalls was still
a potentiality, and that while there was a disagreement on the lattei
point, there was no disagreement on the former point.
Mr. SoNNETT. The ComSIXTEEN dispatch of November 26th,
Captain, contained in Exhibit 8, states, among other things,
our best indications are that all known first and second fleet carriers still in
Sasebo-Kure area.
Wliat carriers were comprehended by the description "First and
Second Fleet [250] carriers" ?
Captain Laytox. I believe that the ComSIXTEEN dispatch,
speaking of First and Second Fleet carriers in home waters, referred
to Cardiv 1, AKAGI and KAGA, and Cardiv 2, HIRYU and SORYU,
plus their plane guards, and possibly another Cardiv consisting of two
carriers or possibly one carrier or, in other words, the one I called
Cardiv 4 on my December 1st estimate and placed with Cardiv 3 in the
Bako-Takao area.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Captain, to Exhibit 23 of this investiga-
tion, which is your December 1, 1941, estimate of the location of the
Japanese Fleet, will you state whether, having refreshed your recol-
lection, that was delivered on December 1st or on December 2, 1941?
Captain Latton. I believe, having considered this throughout the
evening, that it was on December 1st that Admiral Kimmel told me
to prepare a location sheet of the Japanese Fleet, and that it was that
evening I prepared it and so dated it in my rough draft ; that it was
150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
most likely, and I believe most probable, the 2nd of December when
the rough draft was written up into the smooth copy and the date of
the day before had been written on there; and that it was on the 2nd
of December and not the 1st of December that this delivery was made
to Admiral Kimmel. Two dispatches which I referred to in my
testimony yesterday from CinC Asiatic Fleet regarding the sighting
of submarines and transports along the French Inclo-China Coast and
in Camranh Bay, respectively, are penciled notations on this memo-
randum. Their time group indicates they were written as of the
late afternoon and early evening of 1 December, Honolulu time and
date, and, as these corrections were made the following morning after
its typing in the smooth, I am sure in my recollection that it was done
when these dispatches reached my desk and prior to its submission
to Admiral Kimmel. [3-51] So, I believe the date of the 2nd
is thereby fixed and I wish to have all previous testimony so
corrected.
Mr. SoNNETT, As of the date of the delivery of your estimate, which
is Exhibit 23, just to summarize the situation as to Japanese carriers,
Captain, you placed Carrier Divisions 3 and 4 in the Bako-Takao area
and possibly the KORYU in the Marshalls area, did you not?
Captain Layton. I placed Cardivs 3 and 4 plus their plane guard
destroyers and tlie KASUGA MAEU (XCV) in the Bako-Takao
area, and the ''KORYU ( ?)" plus plane guards in the Marshalls area.
The "KORYU ( ?)" was to indicate that»while this was a carrier or
a converted carrier, the name might be incorrect, but it was still a
carrier unit with a flight deck and planes.
Mr. SoNNETT. I note that in your December 1st estimate. Captain,
which is Exhibit 23, you start out by saying, "From best available
information units of the orange fleet are thought to be located as
listed below." "What was the significance of underscoring the word
"thought"?
Captain Layton. As I recall it, the tenseness of the situation could
not be underestimated in my mind. The fact that all of this informa-
tion, with possibly one or two exceptions of sighting of transports
and light cruisers and the submarines, was based on traffic analysis
of the enemy naval radio circuits, which by itself, by its very nature,
is inconclusive, sometimes contradictory, and very often incomplete.
On the other hand, it does depict a picture, barring planned decep-
tion, and the picture, as I saw it, was as I laid it down to you. But
I underscored the word "thought" because I had no direct evidence.
I had kept track in the best way possible of every single unit, of every
single command, and I wanted it plainly indicated that this was my
thought and that [252] somebody elese in drawing an estimate
with the same material might vary in small details but would not
vary over the big picture.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, in your December 1st estimate, Captain, in
placing Carrier Division 4, which consisted of the ZUIKAKU and
the SHOKAKU, in the Bako-Takao area, that was later discovered
and in fact was an error, was it not ?
Captain Layton. It was, but it was based on previous radio intelli-
gence indications wherein it was noted that Cardiv 4 was associated
with Cardiv 3 and had previously operated in the Takao area with
Cardiv 3, had previously operated with Commander of the Combined
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 151
Air Force in joint operations, Commander of the Combined Air Force
being the commander of the naval shore-based aircraft, and who was
then an important command in the southern invasion units. Since
this small indication existed and since this was not only one, but had
occured on two occasions, I felt that they possibly were there; and
that again is my thought with very small indications.
Mr. SoNNETT. What I am getting at. Captain, is that as to Carrier
Division 4, then, on the basis of whatever information radio intelli-
gence could provide, it was your estimate, subject to the limitations
of radio intelligence, that Carrier Division 4 was in the Bako-Takao
area ^
Captain Latton. That is true.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, subsequently it has been ascertained that they
were then on the high seas, heading for Pearl Harbor?
Captain Layton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. But radio intelligence couldn't detect that fact at
that time ?
[£■53] Captain Lattox. Nor could it detect that far in advance.
I would like to invite your attention at the present time to one
phenomenon of this whole campaign. All those units that moved
to the south, air submarines, carriers, cruisers, battleships, destroyers,
ausiliaries, plus those commands concerned thereto, appeared in
traffic, appeared in substantial traffic. They were addressed in intel-
ligence dispatches. There were no other commands so addressed so
constantly as a rule. In other words, there may be one exception.
The commander of the Carrier Fleet, who became the commander
of the Pearl Harbor task force, was not so addressed and hadn't been
so addressed and hadn't appeared in the traffic since mid-November.
I would like to point out another fact, that in the previous Japa-
nese naval activities in the Far East in connection with Thailand
and French Indo-China, we had received substantiating information
from OpNav from most secret sources which outlined exactly what
was taking place. The radio intelligence picture of the fleet activi-
ties was confirmed also from newspaper accounts later published as
the presence by name of various units there. In the time of which
we now speak, the time of this estimate of 1 December 1941, we had
what we called the framework of an intelligence picture. There are
in intelligence many pieces like a jigsaw. The intelligence officer
attempts to find the framework or border to find the scope of the intel-
ligence picture and therefore to fit pieces together and form a part
of the pattern or all of it if possible. In this, since we had no other
source of information, we had received no dispatches that would indi-
cate to us the possibility of the framework being larger than it was.
The framework fitting into this pattern neatlv, my attention u'as
focused toward the south, and I believe that will explain why I was
[254] inclined to include Cardiv 4 on the ver^^ briefest of evidence
when there was no other evidence of any kind.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, the absence of evidence, Captain, concerning
Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 was so noticeable, I take it, that you did
not include in your written estimate of December 1st any statement
as to your belief concerning their whereabouts?
Captain Layton. I would like to explain how this estimate was
made and I think you
152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATT'ACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you answer that question ?
Captain Layton. To say "yes" or "no" doesn't fit the picture. I
would like to explain how this estimate was arrived at. I had a list
of all Japanese units and commands. I went through my tickler ready
scratch file where by sightings or by radio intelligence the indication
of this unit or this command or of his whole command might be indi-
cated or located. I then filled in after each unit or each ship 'the
latest information, as it was run up day by day, of its location and
then filled in the picture, as you say, but since I did not have any
information on Cardivs 1 and 2, 1 omitted them because on all of the
units, and that includes all the Japanese Fleet, there had been state-
ments in the radio intelligence summaries as to their location or
assumed location, but there had been no statements as either assumed
location or their indicated location. Therefore, I left Cardivs 1 and
2 out of my thought because I really did not know. I presumed and
estimated they were in the Kure area on no evidence at all.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, Cardiv 1 consisted of the AKAGI and ICAGA,
which was the flagship, and Cardiv 2 of the SORYU and HIRYU,
did they not ?
Captain Laytox. That is correct.
[255] Mr. SoNNETT. And at the time of your December 1st esti-
mate, they, along with Cardiv 4, were on the high seas, headed for Pearl
Harbor, as we have later learned ?
Captain Layton. True.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, referring to your conversation with Admiral
Kimmel, which, I take it, was December 2nd, concerning your estimate
dated December 1st, you testified yesterday that Admiral Kimmel
asked you a question about the fact that Cardivs 1 and 2 weren't listed
in your written estimate.
Captain Layton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me,
arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his
eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this : Was the dis-
cussion about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2
a serious or jocular one?
Captain Layton, His question was absolutely serious, but when he
said, "Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?" and I said, "I do not know pre-
cisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in
the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they
may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half
ago," and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, "Do you
mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?" or words to that
effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete igno-
rance as to their exact location.
Mr. SoNNETT. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of infor-
mation about those carriers ?
Captain Layton, This incident has been impressed on my mind. I
do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a
[256] statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should
know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, referring to Exhibit 22, Captain, which con-
sists of the photostatic copies of communication intelligence sum-
maries, and the summary for December 2, 1941, that is the summary,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 153
is it not, which as to carriers indicates "abiiost a complete blank of
information on the carriers today"; is that correct?
Captain Layton. That is what it states.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the summary for the following day, namely,
December 3, 1941, states, "No information on submarines or carriers";
is that correct?
Captain Layton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do I accurately summarize the situation, then, Cap-
tain, by saying that at that time "you did not have information showing
you the location of the carriers, but you did have a lack of information
"concerning the location of the carriers?
Captain Layton. There was no information on the location of the
carriers.
Mr. SoNNETT. On December 4th and December 5th, Captain, is it
true that the communication intelligence summaries made no mention
of carriers ?
Captain Layton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, referring back to the war warning of No-
vember 27th, which is Exhibit 2o of this investigation, you will note
the following direction contained in the warning : "Execute an appro-
prate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks
assigned in WPL 46." Do you note this?
[^57] Captain Layton. I do note it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were you familiar, Captain, with the tasks assigned
in WPL 46?
Captain Layton. I was at that time familiar with the general tasks.
The task assigned the intelligence organization in WPL 46 was in
general to receive the intelligence afforded us by OpNav.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall the tasks assigned in Pacific Fleet Oper-
ation Plan Rainbow Five and described as Initial Tasks, namelj^ tasks
to be taken when Japan was not in the war ?
Captain Layton. I do not recall it. It was not a part of my duties
and I do not recall having been consulted regarding deployment or
operation of our forces at any time,- except that on occasions in the
past when there had been submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor, Ad-
miral Kimmel asked me if I thought it was a Japanese submarine
and I told him I thought it was and that we had had various uncon-
firmed reports from unreliable observers to the effect that there had
been submarines reconnoitering the approaches to Pearl Harbor, and
the Naval Attache, Tokyo, reported a rumor there that a submarine
had returned from a cruise of reconnaissance there of Pearl Harbor
and the Hawaiian Islands and the West Ccast.
Mr. SoNNETT. I would like to come to that submarine matter. Cap-
tain, again in a minute. I want at this moment to
Captain Layton. I merely want to point out as far as operations
or plans went, I was not frequently consulted, nor was I supposed to
be that I know of, but the Admiral would ask me once in a while about
matters concerning the Japanese, if I thought that was a Japanese
submarine or what.
Mr. SoNNETT. Then, I take it, Captain, that you do not recall
[^58] that one of the initial tasks assigned in the Pacific Fleet
War Plan was "Protect the communications and territory of the as-
sociated powers . . . and prevent the extension of enemy military
154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
power into the western hemisphere by patrolling with light forces
and patrol planes and by the action of striking groups as necesssary"?
Captain Layton. I do not recall that specific paragraph. I might
have seen it, but again that was not in my immediate province, al-
though all the tasks of all the members of a staff or command are all
interlocking in a degree, sometimes larger, sometimes much less.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I refer you to the Staff Instructions, Staff
of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 1941, paragraph 214(a), which
relates to the Intelligence Officer and which reads as follows : "Directs
assembly of Enemy Information and evaluate same, disseminating
to various members of staff, indicating where action is required," Did
you indicate at any time prior to December 7, 1941, that any aerial
reconnaissance from Oahu was ever required by reason of enemy in-
formation ?
Captain Layton. I do not recall specifically telling the Admiral
that he should conduct aerial reconnaissance as I was aware that recon-
naissance was being conducted by Pat Wing 2.
Mr. SoNNETT. What reconnaissance was being conducted by Pat-
Wing 2, Captain?
Captain Laytox. It was not my duty to check on aerial reconnais-
sance by our own forces and therefore I did not know the extent or
the degree. That was the duty of the Fleet Aviation Officer.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you ever inquire of the Fleet Aviation Officer
what reconnaissance was being conducted?
Captain Layton. I did not.
[2S91 Mr. SoNNETT. Did it occur to j^ou in the week preceding
December 7, 1941, that at any time during that week aerial reconnais-
sance might be advisable ?
Captain Laytox. Aerial reconnaissance was being conducted as far
as I knew and it would have been presumptuous of me to go and check
on another officer's performance of his duty. Furthermore, it would
not have tended toward good staff relationship, nor good command
relationships, for people to go and check on the performance of duty
of other people not in their secticJn and to whom they were not directly
or indirectly responsible up or down. The Fleet Aviation Officer was
a subordinate of the Operations Division whose duties were laid out
in the Staff Organization as conducted by operations. May I add
that the Operations Officer was shown mv periodic summaries of in-
formation received and at this time I would like to introduce in evidence
my photostatic copy of my original file thereof.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 26.")
This consists of reports commencing 6 October 1941 and it
starts with serial number 82 and ends with intelligence report dated
2 December 1941, serial number 102. I would like to describe how
this intelligence report book was handled and disseminated. From
time to time, as information was assembled or as intelligence was
evaluated from assembled information, I prepared and assigned a
reliability to various items, which I called intelligence reports,
which were typewritten on a standard form. Since this material
had already been seen by the Admiral and the Chief of Staff, the
boxes 00 and 01 were crossed out in the form when printed. The
other boxes in the form consisted of staff numbers 11, 12, and 13,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 155
being the Operations Officer and the two Assistant Operations Offi-
cers, respectively; numbers 16, 17, 18, and 86 being the War Plans
[£60] Officer and his three assistants, the latter, 86, being the
Fleet Marine Officer. Numbers 20, 21, 25, and 26—20 and 21 were
the Fleet Communications Officer and the Fleet Security Officer,
respectively; 25 was myself, the Intelligence Officer, and 26 my
assistant.
It is to be noted in this exhibit that periodically staff boxes will
not be filled. This was d\ie to the habit of certain officers of only
initialling the top page, having read those from his last initial up.
For example, certain information from the most secret sources re-
ceived at CincPac were by direction of OpNav available only to the
Admiral, his Chief of Staff, Intelligence Officer, and such other
officers as he designated. To insure that the Plans and Operations
Divisions and the Communication Officer and the Security Officer
were fully aware of information at hand and to protect sources of
information from too wide knowledge of their basic source, this
material was paraphrased by myself and its source sometimes dis-
guised, but the picture remained unchanged.
For instance, on 25 November 1941, serial number 93, reliability
rating Al, which meant communication intelligence, the following
report was written and submitted and initialed :
(Attached as page 260A).
[260A] INTELLIGENCE REPORT
SECRET
Reliability Rating, A-1. Serial No. 93. Date, 25 Nov 1941.
For the past month the Commander Second Fleet has been organizing a Force
composed of the following:
Second Fleet — Third Fleet (including 1st and 2nd Base Forces and 1st De-
fense Division) — Combined Air Force — Desron Three — Airron 7 — Subron 5 —
possibly units of Batdiv 3 (from First Fleet). These units are linked with
the South China Fleet and French Indo-China Force as well as the Naval
Stations at Sama, Takao and Bako. The Commander Second Fleet has in-
tensely been interested in operations at Palao and the Third Base Force which
is at Palao.
The Combined Air Force has assembled at Takao with some indications that
certain units have moved on to Hainan.
The Third Fleet is believed moving in the direction of Takao and Bako.
The Second Base Force appears to transporting the equipment of air forces
to Taiwan.
An unidentified Second Fleet unit and a submarine unit appears to be in the
vicinity of Takao. Crudiv 7 and Desron 3 appear to be an advance unit and
may be enroute South China. A strong concentration of submarines and air-
craft is believed in the Marshalls comprising Airron 24, at least one cardiv
and one-third of the submarine force.
Coml4 believes the above indicates a strong force is preparing to operate in
SouthEastern Asia while certain units operate from Palao and the Marshalls.
00 01 11 12 13 16 17 18 20 21 25 26 90 95 86
(initials) P
[3611 On 26 November 1941, intelligence report, serial number
94, reliability A, as follows:
(Attached as pages 261A, 261B, and 26lC.)
156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[261 A} TOP SECRET
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Secret
Reliability Rating, A. Serial No. 94. Date, November 26, 1941.
A reliable source of information evaluates the situation during the past few
days as follows. He considers it reliable :
1. He believes that various units of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th Fleets are being
directed by CiuG 2nd Fit in a loosely-knit organization. He further states that
the organization appears to be subdivided into tw« sections. And expects :
Section I to operate in South China Area.
Section II to operate in the Mandates.
2. Forces which appear to be under CinC 2nd Fit.
SGctif)'}i T
CriiDiv 7 (From 2nd Fit) 4 CA's— KURIANO, MOGAMI, MIKUIMA,
SUZUYA)
Airo7i 6 (From Combined Air Force) (3 XAV's— KAMIKAWA IMARU,
FUJIKAWA ]\L^RU, KEN JO MARU)
1st Defense Division (From 3rd Fit)
Suhron 6 (From 6th Fit) (1 CL, 2 Subdivs (4SS) ) (note 4 SMs)
It is possible but not known for sure that Cruel iv 6 may be included herein.
(From 1st Fit) (4 CA's— IvAKO, FURUTAKA, AOBA, KINUGASA)
Section II
Crudiv 5 (From 2nd Fit) (3 CA's (maybe 4)— MYOKO, NACHI,
HAGURO)
Cardiv 3 (From Carrier Fit) (2 CV's— RYUJO?, HOSHO)
RYUJO and 1 Maru 1 CV
[261B] Desron 2 (From 2nd Fit) (1 CL, 3 Desdivs(12DD's) )
Desron 4 (From 2nd Fit) (1 CL, 3 Desdivs(12DD's) )
Subron 5 (From 6th Fit) (1 CL, 3 Subdivs (6 or 7 SS's) )
Desdiv 23 (From Carrier Fit) (4 DD's)
1st Base Force (From 3rd Fit)
3rd Base Force (At PALAO)
5th Base Force (At SAIPAN)
Other lesser units (Names not known)
It is possible but not kuov.n for sure that Batdiv 3 niav be included herein.
(From 1st Fit) (4 BB's— HIYEI, KONGO, KIRISHI^NLA, HARUNA)
(HARUNA may be undergoijig major repairs)
3. Disposition of remainder of 3rd Fit in doubt but it is assumed they will be
stationed around the BAKO-TAKAO area or further south.
4. Indications are that today (nov. 26th) Desron 3 (1st Fit), Crudiv 7 (2nd
Fit) and Suhron 6 (6th Fit) are in the TAKAO area. Units of Combined Air
Force from the Empire are at TAKAO, HOIHOW, PAKHOI, SAIGON and other
bases along the CHINA COAST and in TAIWAN.
5. He cannot confirm report there being large force of SS and CV's in the
IVIANDATES. Thinks all known carriers of 1st and 2nd Fits are still in the
KURE-SASEBO area, (cont.)
[261C] 6. He believes that :
CinC Combined Fit is in NAGATO (BB)
1st " " " ETUGA (BB)
2nd " " " ATAGO (CA) (in KURE area)
3rd " " " ASHIGARA (CA (In SASEBO area)
5th " " " CHICIJIMA area
6th " " " KASHIMA (CL) (In YOKOSUKA area but this
is unreliable)
7. CinC 2nd Fit, CinC 3rd Fit and CinC Southern Expeditionary Force appar-
ently have the major roles.
S. Units from North or Central appear to have joined the South China Fleet
(probably torpedo boats).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 157
9. One Base Force unit apparently being used to strengthen Southern Ex-
peditionary Force.
00 : 01 : 11 : 12 : 13 : 16 : 17 : 18 : 86 : 20 : 21 : 25 : 26 : 86 :
(initials) P
[36^] Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, referring to serial number 94 of
Exhibit 26, which you have just read into the record, explain the con-
nection between that intelligence report and ComSIXTEEN's dis-
patch of November 26, 1941, which is contained in Exhibit 8.
Captain Latton. These intelligence reports are evaluations of re-
ports received from all sources. This specific intelligence report,
number 94, is my rewrite and reterming into standard phraseology
the language, as I understood it, from Com SIXTEEN" dispatch
261331. Also, intelligence report serial 93, which I read previously,
is mv interpretation and rewrite into standard phraseology of Com-
FOtJRTEEN's dispatch of 260110.
I would like to read intelligence report number 92, dated 25 Novem-
ber 1941, reliability Al.
(Attached as page 262A).
622A TOP SECEET
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Secret
Reliability Rating, A-1. Serial No. 92. Date, 25 Novejn'ber 19^1
Opnav reports that the chances of any favorable result coming out of the
present negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. It is his opinion that this,
coupled with the statements of the Japanese government, and the movements
of their military and naval forces, indicates that they may make a surprise
aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or
Guam. The Chief of Staff of the Army concurs in this oninion. Senior Army
officers in the Far East, Pacific and West Coast areas (includino; Panama) have
been informed. Utmost secrecy is enjoined regarding this opinion in order to
not further complicate the present tense situation or to precipitate Japanese
action.
00 : 01 : 11 : 12 : 13 : 16 : 18 : 20 : 21 : 2.^) : 26 : 90 : 95 : 88
(initials) P
s
[£631 It will be noted that these intelligence reports are in some
cases merely a paraphrased version of intelligence dispatches which
1 read into the record in connection with the 'communication in-
telligence summaries previously and are to complete the record for
the purposes of dissemination of information within the Staff, regard-
less of its dissemination by copies of communication messages.
I would like to read into the record serial number 97, of 28 November,
1941, reliability Al.
(Attached as page 263 A.)
158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[26SA1 TOP SECRET
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Reliability Rating, A-1. Serial No. 97. Date, 28 Nov. 41.
Absolutely reliable reports from Singapore are that the following procedure
will be carried out by Japanese news broadcasts in the event that diplomatic rela-
tions are on the verge of severance :
On ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts, the following words repeated five times at
the beginning and the end will have this significance :
("EAST-EAST-etc")
HIGASHI HIGASHI : Japanese-American
("North-North-etc")
KITA KITA : Russia
("WEST-WEST- WEST" )
NISHI NISHI : England (including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya
andNEI)
On Japanese language foreign news broadcasts, the following sentences repeated
twice in the middle and twice at the end will be used :
"HIGASHI NO KAZE AME" (AMERICA) "Easterly winds with rain"
"KITA NO KAZE KUMORI (Russia) "Northerly winds— cloudy"
"NISHI NO KAZE HARE" (England) "Westerly winds, clear"
The British and Com 16 are monitoring the above broadcasts.
00 : 01 : 11 : 12 : 13 : 16 : 17 : 18 : 86 : 20 : 21 : 25 : 26 : :
(initials) P C
[264^ It is noted that the last intelligence report submitted was
serial 102, dated 2 December 1941. Subsequent to 2 December 1941,
there was a hiatus of information that could be evaluated into in-
telligence other than that which tended to confirm previous indications
of the southern movement.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I believe you have a collection of para-
phrased dispatches containing other intelligence during the period
October to December, 1941, do you not ?
Captain Latton. I have.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark it as an exhibit ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 27.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state briefly, Captain, without reference to
the contents, but generally, the nature of the documents contained in
Exhibit 27?
Captain Layton. These are paraphrases of official dispatches re-
ceived from various^intelligence agencies — for instance. Naval Attache,
Singapore ; Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai ; Assistant Naval At-
tache, Pekin; Naval Attache, Chungking; Marine Detachment, Wake;
OpNav, and Naval Attache, Tokyo — in which various items of in-
telligence information were passed to CincPac and of which I kept a
paraphrased copy for reference purposes to assist in making enemy
location reports and other matters.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it. Captain, then, that these dispatches con-
tained in Exhibit 27 were among the material which you considered
in the preparation of your intelligence reports contained in Exhibit
26?
Captain Latton. That is correct.
[£65] Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall that toward the end of No-
vember, 1941, there was some discussion of a proposed army recon-
naissance flight over the Mandated Islands ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 159
Captain Latton. I do recall conferences which I attended with
then Lieutenant Colonel Raley. concerning a projected army recon-
naissance by B-25's over Japanese positions in the Marshalls and
also Truk.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will yon tell us how that discussion came to take
place and what happened with respect to that reconnaissance?
Captain Laytox. Either Admiral Kimmel directed me to establish
contact with the Hawaiian Air Force pertaining to this reconnaissance
or my opposite number, Colonel Raley, came to me and informed me
of this pending reconnaissance and requested my assistance toward
delineating the appropriate objectives for the reconnaissance and to
furnish the reconnaissance pilots and crews with intelligence ma-
terial for briefing and to assist in tlie successive projected reconnais-
sance.
Mr, SoNNETT. Will you state what happened with respect to the
reconnaissance, Captain? Did it taTie place or not?
Captain Latton. The reconnaissance unfortunately never mate-
rialized because the planes, except one, did not arrive. There was a
delay from time to time due to, as Colonel Raley explained to me,
uncompleted camera installations in the B-24's at Hamilton Field.
I was never informed that the one plane which did arrive had ar-
rived, but I learned later it was destroyed in the attack on Hickam
Field on December 7th. We were very anxious that this reconnais-
sance be made at the earliest possible date and the Admiral, upon
receipt of my memorandum stating the conferences concerning this
reconnaissance had been held, asked me how soon I though they could
hold it, and I gave him Colonel Raley's answer to [£66] me;
that is, it was being delayed due to non-installation or non-completed
installation of cameras, and that it would be made as soon as they ar-
rived here and were briefed but that the time was still not definitely
fixed.
Mr. SoNXETi". I show you a photostatic copy of a memorandum of
November 28, 1941, and ask you if you can identify that, Captain.
Captain Latton. I can. It is my memorandum to Admiral Kim-
mel, relating to him the general circumstances of the conference con-
cerning the projected aerial reconnaissance by Army planes over the
Mandated Islands, particularly those in the Marshalls, plus Truk and
Ponape.
Mr. SoxNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit. Admiral ?
Admiral Hewett. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 28.")
Mr. Sonnett. In your discussions with Admiral Kimmel wherein
you advised him that there was some delay on the part of the Army
in getting the planes ready, was there any consideration given to the
use of naval planes for such reconnaissance?
Captain Latton. It was not discussed with me. I presume it was
discussed with the Aviation Officer.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you know why such naval planes could not have
been used for that reconnaissance ?
Captain Latton. I do not know, except what I thinlf. I think
that had we used the only naval planes available, that is, PBY Cata-
linas, they would by their appearance over the Marshalls, the Japa-
nese Mandated Islands, have been the overt act that the Japanese
160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
could claim we had committeed and would be a violation of the ex-
isting directives of OpNav, while tlie Army planes were ostensibly
jflying from Wake to Port Darwin, Australia, en route [£67~\ to
the Philippines.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it also true, Captain, that the Army planes were
to have special equipment for this reconnaissance that the Navy planes
did not have?
Captain Lattox. It was my personal belief that the first PBY that
got near the Marshall Islands would be shot down by the fighters
that I felt positive were there, whereas the Army B-24 photographic
planes would have good armament, good defensive armament, and
would also be very fast and would fly very high. Its chances of a
successful reconnaissance flight were considered to be better than
three to one. As I remember it, the Army reconnaissance planes
were to be armed and thej'^ were to fire on ary plane that interfered
with them in the accomplishment of their mission.
I was particularly anxious, and I am sure Admiral Kimmel was also,
that this reconnaissance be carried out because it would check on our
other information as to the presence or absence of air strength and
carriers, also submarines, and naval concentrations, that is. Fourth
Fleet units, in the Marshalls area, including also Truk and Ponape.
It was felt that this was an ideal opportunity to establish the credulity
of existing intelligence on Japanese naval disposition and develop-
ments in the Mandated Islands to be reconnoitered.
Mr. SoNNETT. Apart from the proposed reconnaissance by the Army
which you have just discussed, Captain, what other information or
intelligence was exchanged between the Army and Navy, to your
knowledge, during the period October to December, 1941 ?
Captain Laytox. The Army-Navy liaison, as I understood it, was
established as a normal policy through the shore establishment, that
is, the Fourteenth Naval District and the Army forces there, as a
normal [£68] measure. In addition, about four or five months
before December, 1941, the G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force, then
Lieutenant Colonel Raley, Air Corps, U. S. Army, called on me
and stated that he had come to me to establish Army liaison on a
continuing basis as his superiors considered the Bomber Command of
the Hawaiian Air Force and the Navy to be the offensive w^eapons in
the execution of war plans and the Hawaiian Department as a de-
fensive garrison, and that, therefore, the liaison should be established
on the level of air force and fleet.
From that time on I furnished Colonel Raley with various items of
intelligence, particularly in the early period, stressing air field facili-
ties in the Netherlands East Indies and Australia, where the Hawaiian
Air Force was the responsible agency toward ferrying planes to the
Philippines via Australia. I furnished him with the confidential and
secret sections of the Dutch Airways Guide we had received from CinC
Asiatic. As the trend of events commenced to develop in mid-
November, I told Colonel Raley these events in general. I also told
Colonel Raley, without divulging the source and by disguising its
actual existence, of the general trend of movements of naval vessels to
the south. Since some of the material I gave Colonel Raley was of the
utmost secrecy, I cautioned him that I woud give him certain very
secret matter provided he made no written record of it and would
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 161
communicate such only to his Commanding General and on the under-
standing that he in turn would make no written record of it. I in-
formed him of the intrigue in Thailand, which I previously discussed,
in v/hich the British were to be brought in on a false pretext and then
declared the invader so that Japan could then be called upon as an ally
to eject the British troops and thus facilitate their quick entry into
that area.
[269] I feel sure that I told him that we were listening for a
special broadcast from one of our spies, as I put it, which would give
us indication through a weather report that relations between Japan
and America might be terminated, or words to that effect. I do not
recall distinctly telling him of the destruction of the purple machine.
I think that I did, but I do not distinctly recall it.
Mr. SoNNETT. You have testified, Captain, that liaison was estab-
lished with the Hawaiian Army Air Force. Was there any liaison
with the Hawaiian Department, that is, directly with General Short?
Captain Layton. I clo not know. I took messages to General Short.
General Short consulted with the Admiral, and the norml liaison with
the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department would be with the District In-
telligence Officer of the Fourteen Naval District, they being on the
same plane and echelon of command. Furthermore, the Hawaiian
Air Force was a subordinate of the Hawaiian Department in those
days and was directly under General Short. Therefore, when the
Hawaiian Air Force came to me to establish liaison on fleet level, and
I understood they were establishing the Army liaison, I presumed it
was as far on that level as was intended to go.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it from your testimony. Captain, that you were
familiar with the establishment by the Japanese of the so-called
"winds" code.
Captain Layton. I was.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you state when you learned of the establish-
ment of that code and what the code was ?
Captain Layton. A dispatch from CinC Asiatic Fleet, dated 28
November 1941, and addressed to OpNav, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN,
and ComSIXTEEN, for action, states as follows :
1270] Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore
X If diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed following words repeated
five times at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts will have sig-
nificance as follows X Higashi Hlgashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Rus-
sia X Nislii Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya
and Nei XX On Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sen-
tences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be
used XX American Higashi no Kaze Kumori XX England X Nishi no Kaze
Hare X Unquote X British and ComSIXTEEN monitoring above broadcasts.
This was made the subject of my intelligence report, serial number
92, reliability Al, dated 25 November 1941, and was shown as cus-
tomary to all staff members concerned. It is noted that on the photo-
stat of this the initials only of then Captain DeLany, then Commander
Goode, then Lieutenant Commander Collins, then Captain McCor-
mick, then Commander Murphy, and then Colonel Pfeiffer, appear.
It was the habit of certain staff officers not to initial each page but to
read up from their last initial and then initial the top page they had
read.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 12
162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. What efforts were made, Captain, to monitor for any
message employing the "winds" code ?
Captain Latton. Upon receipt of this message, I contacted Com-
mander Rochefort and asked him what measures were going to be
established. He said he had already set up a monitoring procedure
wherein all our Japanese language officers were placed on continuous
watch on several circuits and were to cover all known news broadcasts
emanating from Japan.
Mr. SoNNETT. What were the results, if any?
Captain Latton. Almost each day thereafter I would check with
[271] Commander Rochefort or he would call me and say, "Noth-
ing so far." Up to the attack on December 7, 1941, we received no such
intercept, nor did we receive any dispatch from any source stating that
such an intercept had been heard.
Mr. SoNNETT. You testified before Admiral Hart, Captain, in sub-
stance that on or about December 9, 1941, you received certain informa-
tion from Captain Rochefort which had been secured from intercepted
cables of the Japanese Consul General and that prior to December 9,
1941, you had received no such information from any source. Is that
correct ?
Captain Latton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you recall the substance of the information which
you did receive on December 9th from Captain Rochefort?
Captain Latton. The information was decryption of the Japanese
Consul's cypher and it laid out various procedures and signals and
also reports of movements of naval vessels into and out of Pearl Har-
bor and also made reference to the presence or absence of aircraft car-
riers, as I recall it.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you document 22 of Exhibit 13, and ask you
whether that is the message to which you refer, Captain.
Captain Latton. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall. Captain, what other messages of the
Japanese Consul were shown to you by Captain Rochefort on or about
December 9, 1941 ?
Admiral Hewitt. We will recess at this time.
(The investigation then, at 11:42 a. m., recessed until 2 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.)
(Present : The same parties as during the morning session.)
[272] Captain Edwin T. Layton, U.S.N., resumed his seat as
witness.
(The last question was read.)
Captain Latton. I have here a file of dispatches which are copies
of consular dispatches which then Commander Rochefort delivered to
me by safe hand on or after December 9, 1941. It may have been
December 10th. I cannot remember exactly.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark those as an exhibit, Admiral, and sub-
stitute a photostatic copy, when a copy is made, for that exhibit so
that Captain Layton can retain his copies ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 29."-^-
Mr. SoNNETT. I note, Captain, that the exhibit 29 just marked
consists of copies of six dispatches. Were these the only intercepted
Japanese consular messages or messages to the Japanese Consul in
Hawaii that you received ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 163
Captain Latton. These were the only ones received and they were
received some time on or after 9 December 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know, Captain, what, if any, efforts were
made previously by any one to secure such messages and what were
the results of such efforts made ?
Captain Latton. I don't know at first hand, but when these mes-
sages were delivered to me, I asked then Commander Rochefort the
background of them, and, as I recall it, a prominent executive of
RCA, I believe perhaps Mr. Sarnoff himself, visited the Hawaiian
Islands sometime prior to or just about the 1st of December and that
some approach had been made — by whom I was not told — to obtain
the files of the [273] consular messages, which by law our in-
telligence service could not touch. As I understand it, this high
official, possibly Mr. Sarnoff, was sympathetic but said his hands were
tied by the law the same as ours were, but would inquire upon his
return to the States as to his receiving immunity, FYesidential or
otherwise, from prosection in order that the intelligence services
could have access to these quoted dispatches and attempt to decrypt
same. As I recall it, the story went he sent a special message to Hono-
lulu, saying in effect that this immunity had been obtained and he, the
holder of those in Honolulu, could turn them over to the appropriate
source. I do not know who obtained them, but Commander Rochefort
led me to believe that they had been worked on from the time they
were received and that they could not break the cipher but were con-
tinuing and that after December 7th efforts continued and finally the
cipher key was decrypted and the messages reduced to plain Japanese
and translated and then delivered to me.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, the previous investigations disclosed that
ONI and the FBI were tapping the telephone wires of the Japanese
Consul prior to the 7th of December, 1941. Were vou aware of that
fact?
Captain LAYxoisr. I was aware without them having definitely so in-
formed me. Wire tapping was also against the law. I knew that they
had a source of information that was what they called "inside of the
horse's mouth."
Mr. SoNNEiT. Do you know what information was secured by them
from that?
Captain Latton. Nothing of importance as far as fleet movements
went. There were certain times when the District Intelligence Officer
would inform me that the Consul General had had an urgent meeting
with the representatives of the NYK Line in connection with evacua-
tion of [274] Japanese on the TAIYO MARU. There was
considerable unrest and uneasiness on the part of the Japanese about
the measures being undertaken by the United States, particularly
those respecting inspecting mail, and that they were considerably re-
lieved when they learned that second class and third class would not
be inspected. It was presumed from my conversations with the Dis-
trict Intelligence Officer that all secret communications that they had
wanted to send first class, they would thereafter send parcel post.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you learn at any time whether or not as a result
of tapping the wires of the Japanese Consul it was learned that Jap-
anese agents were reporting on the location and movements of United
States ships in Pearl Harbor ?
164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Latton. There was no such report made to me at any
time.
Mr. SoNNETF. Did you know whether or not as a general proposition
Japanese agents were engaged in such activity ?
Captain Layton. I did not know at first hand that they were or I
would have had them arrested. It was a matter of common knowledge,
without legal foundation, that the Japanese were engaged in espio-
nage. It was suspected that the Japanese Toritsuginin, or "honorary
consuls," in fact, some hundreds, were recommended by the Com-
mandant of the Fourteenth Naval District for arrest and prosecution
under the federal statute for being the unregistered agents of a foreign
government. I was interested in this because the District Intelligence
Officer had informed me of this situation and so recommended. It
seems that this measure was also accorded support by the FBI repre-
sentative, Mr. Shivers, but it is my understanding that it was utterly
opposed and disapproved by the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department. General Short.
[275] Mr. SoNNETiT. Concerning the operation of Japanese sub-
marines in or around Pearl Harbor, Captain, what reports did you
have prior to December 7th of the operation of such submarines in
Hawaiian waters?
Captain Latton. Shortly after I joined the staff of the Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, Admiral J. O. Richardson, there was a sub-
marine reported off the Pearl Harbor entrance and the destroyer
which made the contact was known to be a very efficient anti-submarine
destroyer. That was late December, 1940. The McDOUGAL made
the contact. There had been other contacts made, both off the west
coast of the United States, and as I understand it, off Hawaiian
waters. These contacts were developed on a purely underwater search
basis and at no time was a definite submarine sighted, nor could any
actual evidence be obtained that it was in fact a Japanese submarine.
However, subsequent to this first contact, to my personal knowledge,
there were several other contacts, one of them again obtained by the
McDOUGAL's screening group and held down by the ISIcDOUGAL
for some forty-four hours. The Captain of the McDOUGAL has told
me that the first fourteen hours of this contact was a definite sub-
marine, that the remaining hours of this contact was a temperature
gradient and therefore a false contact which had permitted the sup-
'posecl Japanese submarine to escape undetected by sonar search.
However, during the early part of this contact, three destroyers
passed over the position of the alleged submarine and obtained sound-
ings of forty-six fathoms. The water there was thousands of fathoms
deep.
There were additional reports, from unreliable sources unfor-
tunately, that there had been rumors of Japanese submarines recon-
noitering Pearl Harbor and the West Coast. The Naval Attache,
Tokyo, so reported such a rumor in which, as I recall it, a Japanese
submarine was supposed [£76] to have returned from recon-
noitering duty off the "West Coast and off Pearl Harbor.
Additionally, there were reports from, I believe, the Naval Observer
in Cuba or Naval Attache in Cuba. It may have been South America,
but he reported that he had information to the effect that there were
sunken submarines which could be raised and manned by crews located
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT IXQUIRY 165
off Molokai. These submarines were supposed to have been brought
in and beached in not too deep water off Molokai, with a small hose
leading up to a buoy, which was covered with kelp, and then led off
ashore and was camouflaged, while the crews thereof Avere ashore dis-
guised as fishermen on the island of ]Molokai; that at a giveri time
thev would proceed and connect up air leads to this hose and thereby
blow the ballast of these sunken submarines and would then man
them at the appropriate time. It was inferred that these were smaller
than the normal type submarines.
By letter, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, was directed
and carried out a complete and thorough investigation of the coast
line and off-shore areas of the island of Molokai and other islaiids.
The report was negative. By direction, Commander Patrol Wing 2
was directed to make a close aerial reconnaisance of these waters
under various conditions of light to detect if there was a possibility
of this report being correct. Their report was also negative. This,
as I recall it, may have been the summer or fall of 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT, To sum it up, then, Captain, there was no actual
evidence prior to December 7, 1941, of the operation of submarines in
or around Pearl Harbor which established conclusively that they
were there?
Captain Latton. There was no positive evidence beyond any
shadow [£77] of doubt to establish that they were in "fact there,
but Admiral Kimmel, I am sure from his remarks to me and his
questions to me, felt, and I did also, that at least some of these contacts
were true contacts ; in other words, actual Japanese submarines. In
fact, at one time when the cruiser AUGUSTA returned from the
Asiatic Station, it was directed by Admiral Kimmel to pass through
a position to the north or northwest of Oahu, I believe about 600
miles, and search out an area where a Japanese naval tanker was
known to be passing at that general time and to ascertain if it was
fueling submarines. I believe, although I am not sure, that a special
aerial search was made in that area at that time. This was all very
secret operations and I did not know it until after it was completed.
Mr. SoxNETT. The previous investigations. Captain, have disclosed
that on the morning of December 7, 1941, a Japanese or midget sub-
marine was attacked and sunk in Pearl Harbor and also that another
Japanese or midget submarine was grounded off Bellows Field and
was subsequently recovered. Were you familiar with the recovery of
those two submarines ?
Captain Latton. I am. They were recovered under my direction,
but not under my personal supervision.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you state approximately how long after Decem-
ber 7, 1941, the submarine recovered off Bellows Field was examined?
Captain Layton. The submarine grounded off Bellows Field on
the morning of 9 December, as I recall it — it may have been the 8th —
at which time we dispatched the Repair Officer of the Submarine Base,
then Commander Eddy, to examine it and particularly to bring back
any documents he could obtain from this submarine. He came back
that evening and reported that it was too small a submarine for him^ —
he was a large man — to get into and that the electrician's mate, who
was rather small, too, could not get in either. He [£78'] said,
however, that he could salvage that submarine with some assistance
166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and I directed him to proceed forthwith with the salvage. With the
assistance of some Army engineers, I believe, and Oahu Land and
Railroad Company's super heavy duty, many-wheeled, trailer-type
trucks, the salvage was finally effected, but only after dismantling the
submarine into two sections, it being too heavy in one section. It
was then and throughout that time under guard and was brought to
the Pearl Harbor Submarine Base, at which time a very small enlisted
man was able to obtain all the documents and equipment remaining in
the submarine. They consisted of maps, recognition pictures, a small
note book, and various types of equipment, such as line, palm and
iceedle, morphine syringe, first aid kit, emergency rations, and mclud-
ing a small cuspidor type head.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you several documents, Captain, and ask you
whether you can identify those.
Captain Latton, I can.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state what they are ?
Captain Lation. The first one is a series of two panoramas marked
with II No. 27, entitled in Japanese, "View of Pearl Harbor from Aiea
Northeast High Ground, Number 5." The lower one states in Jap-
anese II No. 28, "View of Pearl Harbor from Aiea Northeast High
Ground, Number 6." That is a rough translation.
I also recognize these panoramas as having been sold commercially
in Honolulu, having been approved for publication by the Com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District, at some time unbeknownst to
me. I believe the Commandant at that time was Admiral Bloch.
On the reverse of this panorama view is a short log in Japanese.
[279] Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, you speak and understand Jap-
anese, do you not?
Captain Layton. I am a qualified interpreter and translator of
Japanese.
I would like to note for the record that in Japanese naval custom
all times remain Tokyo time, minus nine, and all days remain East
Longitude, Tokyo, dates, regardless of crossing the 180th meridian.
So all times in these logs and memoranda and notebooks will always
remain as minus nine, four and a half hours earlier than Pearl Harbor.
Mr. ScNNETT. May we mark this as an exhibit, Admiral, and sub-
stitute a photographic copy?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 30.")
Captain Layton. I would like to invite your attention to the fact
that there are several English words in lead pencil and in read pencil
on this so-called log. These were inserted by amateur translators in
an endeavor to decipher it shortly after its receipt.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you a photograph, Captain, and ask you
whether the photograph is a true and correct copy of Exhibit 30, which
is the so-called Japanese log.
Captain Layton. It is.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark the photogi-aph as Exhibit 30A, Ad-
miral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 30A.")
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you a document, Captain, and ask j'ou whether
[280] it is a correct translation of the Exhibits 30 and 30A.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 167
Captain Layton. It is.
Mr. SoNXETT. May we mark that as SOB, Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was receiving and marked "Exhibit
30B.")
Captain Layton. The next document is a panorama sketch, appar-
ently a copy of panorama photograph or sketch, taken from seaward,
and looking at the mouth of Honolulu Harbor from a position five
nautical miles to the south of Pearl Harbor, They have written in
red, ''Looking at the mouths of Honolulu and Pearl Harbors from a
position five miles south of the mouth of Pearl Harbor."
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark the original as Exhibit 31 and sub-
stitute a copy thereof?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 31.")
Mr. Sonxett. I show you two photographs, Captain, and ask you
whether together they constitute a true and correct copy of the pano-
rama sketch to which you have just referred?
Captain Layton. They do.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark the photograph as 31A ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The photographs were received and marked "Exhibit 31A.")
Captain Layton. May I indicate two translator's errors? Wliere
he has "Rodgers symbol symbol," which is translated "Eodgers -V
place," and "Hickam symbol symbol," translated "Hickam V place,"
the two symbols stand [281] for "airfield."
I know the third document, recovered from the midget submarine
that grounded at Bellows Field, as being a Japanese chart of Pearl
Harbor on which courses and times are noted, as well as certain ab-
breviated signals, and a course and time projected track or tracks
going around Ford Island, leaving it port hand to and returning out
Pearl Harbor entrance.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we deem this original map marked as Exhibit
32?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The map was received and marked as "Exhibit 32.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I show you a photograph and ask you
whether it is a true and correct photograph of the original map,
Exhibit 32.
Captain Layton. It is a good reproduction of that map, except for
the colors. It is to be noted that the times apparently scheduled for
inbound, starting at 0040 and proceeding up through the channel and
around Ford Island, leaving it on its port hand, up until 0515, when
he is just south of Peninsula Point, are in blue crayon; all positions
plotted thereafter are in red crayon, starting at 0520 and ending at
0600. It should be noted that the speed inbound is relatively slow
and the speed outbound is much faster.
Mr. Sonnett. May we mark this as Exhibit 32A ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 32A.")
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, can you tell by examining Exhibits 32 and
32 A whether this chart represents an attack plan of the submarine
from which it was recovered, or does it represent a log of an actual
trip of [282] the submarine from which it was recovered?
168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Latton, I give as my professional opinion as a seaman
that it is a projected track and not an actual logged track by bearings
and distances as indicated hereon. It is too exact to be an exact track
and the figures are written a little too carefully and meticulously to
have been performed by the captain of this midget submarine, who
had to control trim, use his periscope, and maneuver the submarine
without assistance. The second member of the submarine was the
machinist's mate, who closed and opened switches, cut in and out the
C02 absorbent material, and in general performed the duties of chief
engineer and auxiliary gang.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I call your attention to the Japanese symbols
appearing on the exhibit under the time 0450 and ask you if you can
translate those for us.
Captain Latton. These four symbols are Chinese characters which
translates "Enemy ship — the first two — and the work "sink." The
word "sink" can be "sink," "sank," or "sunk," or any connotation
because no verb suffixes are appended to show tense.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you examine this submarine after it was re-
covered ?
Captain Latton. I did.
Mv. SoNNETT. Did you find whether or not it had torpedoes aboard ?
Captain Latton. His torpedoes were still aboard, although he had
tried to fire them.
Mr. SoNNETT. How many were aboard, Captain ?
Captain Latton. Full allowance, two, one atop the other.
Mr. SoNNETT. Kef erring again to the symbols appearing on the chart
under the time 0450 and bearing in mind that the submarine had its
two torpedoes aboard when recovered, would you say that that symbol
could not [283] be translated as "Sunk enemy ship" if it re-
ferred to action by the submarine ?
Captain Latton. Based on my knowledge now from Japanese cap-
tured documents and material, I give as my professional opinion that
that symbol does not represent the captain of this midget submarine
recording that he himself sank an enemy ship there.
I would like further to invite your attention to this track. This
track is carefully laid out both by course and by distance, course in
degrees and distance in meters, and time in minutes and seconds. An
examination of this time in minutes and seconds will show that his
speed was varied from point to point to be able to make his arrival at
these points at a predetermined time. I point out for your attention
the time 0450, which would be 0920 Pearl Harbor Time. At 0920
Honolulu Time the attacks were still taking place, salvage ships were
being rushed into this area, a tremendous amount of activity was then
taking place, and I doubt that a midget submarine captain, as busy as
he was navigating his ship, w^ould be able to so meticulously follow
his course all the way around, keeping track of the time spent from
point to point. On the other hand, if he had been there at that time,
he would have moved out at a predetermined course at best speed and
he would not have cared what time he rounded these points but rather
that he rounded them and got away. Therefore, that is on what I
base my judgment that this is a predetermined track and not an actual
navigational track.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 169
It is to be noted that on his track there are frequently written in
Arabic numerals two different times for the same distance. The first
is generally preceded by "Bi Fu" and the second one is preceded by
"Bi," the second one being the greater number. It is believed that
these [284-] symbols and these different times represent differ-
ent pole settings of his propulsion electric motors in accordance with
the state of his battery, and while the track was designed for one, the
other was an emergency figure so that he would know when to turn
submerged were his battery lower than he had thought, due to the fact
that, going slower, his battery would last longer, and also therefore
the time was greater.
I would like to invite your attention to positions made on this chart
both on the right-hand and left-hand sides of the Pearl Harbor channel
as you enter it. Near the time 0530 position is a position 1-16. South
of that position along Waipio Peninsula is a symbol and the mark 1-20.
South of that position and still just off the Waipio Peninsula cut is a
symbol which reads 1-22. On the right-hand side of the channel just
southwest of the fuel dock and on the channel edge and just to the
north of 0410 position of the submarine track is a circular symbol which
reads 1-16. Just between the 0410 and the 0115 track positions is a
large circle and indistinctly can be read the symbol 1-24. It is my
estimation — since the 1-16, 18, 22, and 24 all carried midget submarines,
belong to the class of submarines carrying midget submarines, and
since, as I recollect it, the submarine recovered from Bellows Field
was marked 1-18 — that these were the positions for these midget
submarines to lie in wait during that period indicated as 0115 to 0410
in blue on the right-hand side of the channel and that these symbols
do not represent their mother submarine, but rather the midget sub-
marine, which apparently carried the same number as its mother.
Mr. SoNNETT. CaDtain, will you state again the date on which you
obtained Exhibits 30, 31,'and 32?
Captain Layton. I cannot give you the exact date, but it was some
[£85] time between three and ten days after the 7th of December.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you receive these exhibits before the submarine
sunk in Pearl Harbor was recovered ?
Captain Latton. Yes. The submarine sunk in Pearl Harbor was
not recovered, nor was any attempt made to recover it, for a consider-
able time after Pearl Harbor Day due to the requirements for all
salvage equipment and personnel to work on damaged and sunken
ships in an effort to extricate trapped personnel. As I recall it, the
salvage of the midget submarine to the north or west of Ford Island
was not accomplished until three weeks and possibly a month or more
after December 7th, When salvaged, an attempt was made for two
days to obtain intelligence material from this submarine, but as it was
full of silt and all material had been completely destroyed by the effect
of silt, mud, and decaying human bodies, the submarine was found
to have no further intelligence value and was disposed of by burial
into the submarine sea wall face as a fill.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that nothing by way of documents was recovered
from the submarine which had been sunk in Pearl Harbor?
Captain Layton. Nothing in the way of documents and nothing in
the way of material because even electrical leads and pipes had been
170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
completely disintegrated. The submarine had also been depth
charged and rammed, and was practically in two smashed bits.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it ascertained whether the submarine which had
been sunk in Pearl Harbor had fired its torpedoes or not?
Captain Latton. It had. It had fired both of them. Reports
reached me on the 7th of December indicated that one had been fired
and had exploded on the beach of Ford Island between the RALEIGH
and CURTIS, as I recall it. The other, I believe, was fired and landed
in the mud and [^86] silt in the vicinity of the UTAH berth
and didn't explode. Attempts have been made to recover that torpedo
as a safety measure, but no success was achieved. In the UTAH
berth area there is very, very deep mud and silt and I believe it had
buried itself completely.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, in respect of Exhibits 30, 31, and 32, which
are the original documents recovered from the submarine off Bellows
Field, I understand it is your desire to leave these documents in the
possession of CinCPac Headquarters.
Admiral Hewitt. That is true.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you desire further. Admiral, that any particular
precaution be taken to preserve them?
Admiral Hewitt. I think that attention should be called to their
condition and that special efforts should be made to preserve these
documents as being of future value.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Captain, to the 7th of December, it was
testified by Commander Wright, who was then assigned to the Com-
munication Intelligence Unit, that radio bearings were received that
day by the unit which were conflicting but that one hearing placed
the attacking force as due north and that he transmitted that informa-
tion to you. Will you tell us whether or not that was correct and, if so,
what you recall about that report ?
Captain Layton. On the morning of 7 December 1941, we received
several bearings, commencing about 10 o'clock, from the direction
finder, which gave two-way or bilateral bearings. They were in gen-
eral either 357 or 178. These came from Heeia, whose communication
to intelligence unit. Fourteenth Naval District, hadn't been completely
disrupted. Some time in the afternoon and, as I recall it, it was about
2 o'clock, I [^87] received a report to the effect that they had
gotten a bearing with the CXK, the only direction finder that can make
a unilateral or a one-way bearing and that that bearing was about 358
or 000. The CXK was at Lualualei, whose communications with Com-
bat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District, had been completely dis-
rupted, and although that bearing had been obtained about 10 o'clock,
it could not be transmitted by telephone or other means and was finally
sent by officer messenger in a car to other location to be transmitted
by telephone. It may have been brought all the way to Pearl Harbor
by messenger; I don't know, but telephones were out all over. By
that time we had received a series of bearings by the bilateral, that is,
the one from Heeia, two ways, all the way from 350 to 180. We had
received conflicting and very erroneous information that the carriers
had been sighted to the south. When the bearing came through from
the CXK as bearing north, it tended to confirm an overlay that had
been furnished me by Colonel Raley, Hawaiian Air Force. This over-
lay was made from a navigation chart of a Japanese fighter that had
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 171
been shot down at Hickam Field and indicated radial lines radiating
out from a position to the north of Oahu. This, of course, did not
prove that they were north, but indicated, along with the CXK bearing,
that they were to the north of Oahu. I communicated this informa-
tion to the Assistant Operations Officer, then Commander Goode,
who said all I had for him was bum dope. I believe that information
was used for a late afternoon search by the only remaining planes,
which, as I recall it, were two or three PBY's and one B-17. No
contact was made.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I have no further questions for Captain
Layton.
Admiral Hewiti'. I would like to mention that incorrect report of
the sighting of the carrier south of Barber's point.
[288] Captain Layton. I don't have any records on that, sir,
because that came in by — there were several incorrect sighting re-
ports that day. The Fleet Communication Officer knew that the Army
command radio system was being used for sightings and combat in-
telligence. He designated an APD, the BALLARD, I believe, that
was alongside the Sub Base dock to get on that circuit and pass to
CinCPac Headquarters radio the information received on the Army
command channel. It was soon apparent, although it didn't become
apparent for some little time, that this was the greatest collection of
erroneous, foolish, fantastic reports that was ever passed on a radio
circuit, and until these were observed to be so fantastic, so exag-
gerated, and so imaginary — until this was discovered to be so, they
were passed in plain language to our fleet at sea, and the communica-
tion log can be examined to get them in great detail. I recall they
were transmitting that some six or eight transports and destroyers
were off Barber's point and a cruiser and destroyer were sent over to
knock them off. It was fantastic that they could get in without any-
body seeing them, and they reported nothing there. They reported
two cruisers, four or five transports and destroyers unloading troops,
first wave now hitting the beach at Barber's Point, and again we sent
the RALEIGH and some destroyers over, and again they reported
nothing there, but in approaching those areas she had a torpedo fired
at her, which lead to the rumor that that had been a Japanese trap.
There were also reports that the Japanese had dropped paratroops
on the north of the island and also that these paratroops were wear-
ing blue coveralls with red insignia on the sleeves. I believe it was
on that same circuit that we had a report that two aircraft carriers
were bearing 200 degrees from Diamond Head, distant 200 and some
odd miles, and ships were sent to search that area. We also had a
report that was an [289] erroneous transmission from one of
our vessels about the fact that he had two aircraft carriers in sight
that was later corrected to have no aircraft carriers in sight.
This may have been the vessel that was sent to investigate the previ-
ous report. I am not sure.
These reports are only a few of the conflicting and fantastic and
highly imaginative reports that we received until they were evaluated
as being what they were and we ceased to broadcast these to our fleet
because it was causing them as much confusion as it was causing us.
With these sorts of reports being passed into the Operations Division
of CincPac, you can imagine that the Assistant Operations Officer
172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
could well say "All you have is bum dope" when I told him that the
bearing of the carriers was now reported as being to the north. That
was just one more report that they had.
I would like to state in this connection that I have never received
from the Army then or since as to what direction these planes were
picked up on the radar or which direction they went out on the radar
on the morning of 7 December, as I have read in the Roberts Report
that such a report was made, and had we had a radar report to con-
firm which direction they came from or went to, all of our uncertainty
as to their exact location would have been dispelled.
Admiral Hewitt. You never had any information from radar
at all?
Captain Layton. I didn't even know they had the radar until I
read the Roberts Report, Admiral. I didn't'know the Army had the
radar until I read the Roberts Report of the Pearl Harbor investi-
gation.
Mr. Sonxett. Captain, I show you an original chart and ask you
if you can identify it.
Captain Laytox. This chart of the Island of Oahu, as showing
best [£90] landing beaches and gun emplacements, with their
ranges, and having navigational or predicted navigational tracks with
times and courses thereon, was also recovered from the midget sub-
marine that beached itself or was beached on Bellows Field beach.
Mr. Sonnett. May we mark this as Exhibit 33, Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 33.")
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you a photograph, Captain, and ask you if
you can identify it as a true and correct copy of Exhibit 33.
Captain Layton. It is a true and correct copy except for the repro-
duction of colored pencil that the Japanese used. The time 0845
to the south and west of Barber's Point is in red. The time 0745
just below the course symbol 250 is in red. The position at the exten-
sion to the northeast of that line, which is in a position southeast of
Pearl Harbor entrance channel, is also in red; that position is 0620.
The position just to the left of 0620 is 0621 and is in blue. Just to
the left of that and in blue and smudged is a position that is actually
0-30, but could be 0230 in blue. It is badly smudged from oil as
these charts were all recovered from the oily bilges of the midget
sub. Just to the south of the 0745 position in red is a 2230 position
marked in blue. The translation says midget sub released at that
position. Actually, it says "tube released"; so the tube may be the
abbreviation or slang expression for the midget sub. The true trans-
lation, however, is "tube."
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the photograph, may we mark it "Ex-
hibit 33A"?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
[291] (The document was received and marked "Exhibit 33A.")
Captain Layton. Just south of Diamond Head crater is a position
0740 in blue ; also marked in blue with a circle on the map is Lualualei
radio towers, as is Hickam Field and Barber's Point li^ht. There
is a blue smudge just off Sand Island, but I do not believe it is a
position.
Mr. Sonnett. Can you verify. Captain, the translations stated on
Exhibit 33A5 which is a photograph of Exhibit 99 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 173
Captain Latton. With the exception noted of the word "tube"
being used for a midget sub— it may be the slang expression for
midget sub — the translation appears to be correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Calling your attention to the translation "got under-
way" appearing under the time 0745, can you state whether that is
correct, or could it as well be translated "get underway" ?
Captain Latton. My translation of this is "proceed" and it has
no verb suffix, so could be "proceed," "proceeding," "to proceed."
Mr. SoNNETT. That same problem of tense applies to the other
translations, does it not, Captain ?
Captain Layton. It does. Omitted near the position Kualiki is
the Japanese saying "four barracks." There is some Japanese refer-
ring to a circle of the Ewa Plantation area which is badly smudged
and does not lend itself to good translation. It is noted on this chart
that there are four course lines laid, three approaching Pearl Harbor
entrance buoys. They are 45 degrees, 40 degrees, and 331 degrees,
and the retiring course from the Pearl Harbor channel buoys is
shown as 151. The course to the east from the 0621 position in blue,
passing through the 0740 position in blue, is 107 degrees and passes
Diamond Head Peak 3,600 meters abeam.
[£92] Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I note on this Exhibit 33 that
there are some words in English, as well as on previous Exhibit 32.
Were those words on the exhibits when you received them ?
Captain Layton. They were. The English words written in lead
pencil on this exhibit are all believed to have been written by the
Japanese owner and were on there when it came in my possession.
On the translation in a position just to the southwest of Barber's
Point is the legend "midget sub?" This on the original is written in
large characters and says "tubes five" or "five tubes," which we as-
sumed to mean five midget subs. The 0845 position I referred to,
in red, is a navigational position about a mile and a half southwest
of Barber's Point light and is connected to a position near the 0745
position in red by a line in lead pencil.
Mr. SoNXETT. Admiral, may the record show that Exhibits 30, 31,
32, and 33, which are the original documents obtained from the sub-
marine, are being turned back to Captain Layton ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
Have you got anything further now?
Mr. SoNNETT. No, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much, Captain.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 3:55 p. m., adjourned until 1:30
p. m., 31 May 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 175
[293^ PKOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT maUIRY
Twelfth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag
Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 1 : 30 p. m.,
Thursday, 31 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR ; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you state your name and rank, sir?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Charles H. McMorris, Vice Admiral, USN.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, it appears from the previous investigations
that from February, 1941, until the end of 1941 you were the War
Plans Officer for CincPac, is that correct?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Correct.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you a pamphlet, Admiral, and ask you if 3'ou
can identify what that is, and, if so, I will ask you to read certain
portions of it into the record.
Vice Admiral McMorris. This pamphlet is entitled "Staff Instruc-
tions, Staff of CinePac, 1941."
Mr. Sonnett. Were you familiar with that, Admiral, at the time?
Vice Admiral McMorris, Presumably so.
Mr. Sonnett. May we mark it as an exhibit. Admiral?
Admiral Hewiit^. Yes.
(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 34.")
[^5j] Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I refer you to the provisions of
this exhibit, which is exhibit 34, which contain the definitions of the
duties of the War Plans Officer, and ask if you would read those into
the record. I believe it is paragraph 207.
Vice Admiral McMorris (reading) :
207. War Plans Officer— 1Q.
(a) As head of the War Plans Section is responsible, under the Chief of
Stalf, for the preparation of War Plans for the Fleet and for all matters per-
taining thereto.
(b) Has general custody of War Plans and secret letters relative thereto.
(c) Member of Schedule Board.
(d) Maintains liaison with War Plans representatives of subordinate Com-
manders.
(e) Maintains liaison with U. S. Army in War Plans matters — via District
Conimandant if appropriate.
(f) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships — general features — and
on alterations of old ships that affect military characteristics.
(g) Makes recommendations on matters pertaining to reserves of material,
particularly ammunition, mines, bombs, torpedoes, fuel, provisions, etc., and
their distribution.
176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(h) Maintains liaison with Commandants of Naval Districts in War Plans
matters.
(i) Is responsible for the review of War Plans of subordinate commanders
and of District Commandants and Coastal Frontier Commanders insofar as
these Plans may affect the Fleet.
Mr. SoNNETT. Does that accord, Admiral, with your recollection of
yuor duties as War Plans Officer for CincPac ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you a document entitled "U. S.
Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow Five, (Navy Plan 0-1, Rain-
bow Five) (WPPac-46)" and ask you if you can identify that as a
copy of the Pacific [295] Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five.
Vice Admiral McMokris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 35.")
Mr. SoNNETT, Referring, Admiral, to exhibit 35, which is the exhibit
you have just identified, it appears, does it not, that on page 24 the
tasks assigned by the Navy Basic Plan are outlined?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. And among those tasks, Admiral, is sub-paragraph
(h), which I would like to ask you to read into the record.
Vice Admiral McMorris (reading) :
h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent
the extension of enemy military power into the Western hemisphere by destroying
hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the eneiny
the use of land positions in that hemisphere.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, the phrase "territory of the associated
powers in the Pacific area" included Hawaii, did it?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to page 25 and to page 26 of this exhibit.
Admiral, it appears that the tasks formulated by the Pacific Fleet to
accomplish the assigned missions are set forth, are they not?
Vice -Admiral McMorris. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Those tasks. Admiral, of the Pacific Fleet are divided
into Phase I — Initial Tasks — Japan not in the war; and Phase lA —
Initial Tasks — Japan in the war. There is also a Phase II containing
succeeding tasks ?
[£96] Vice Admiral McMorris. Correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, would you read into the record from Phase
I of the Initial Tasks subdivisions (b) , (g) , and (m) ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. (reading) :
(b) Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
(b) Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere
by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking
groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the
equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.
(m) Guard against surprise attack by Japan.
Mr. SoNNETT. Does sub-paragraph (m), Admiral, contemplate that
a surprise attack by Japan against Hawaii should be guarded against
as a task of the Pacific Fleet?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you. Admiral, a carbon copy of a letter dated
September 9, 1911, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Com-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 177
/nancler-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and ask you whether you can
identify it.
Vice Admiral McMorrts. This is a copy of a letter which approves
Pacific Fleet Operation Plan Rainbow Five, WPPac-46,
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark the letter as an exhibit, Admiral?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 36.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you also identify, Admiral, a letter of July 25,
1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the Chief
of Naval Operations on the same subject ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, I identify this as a letter submitting
[^97] Pacific Fleet Operating Plan for Eainbow Five to the Chief
of Naval Operations.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that as exhibit 36A, Admiral, and sub-
stitute a copy ? There is a carbon annexed to that.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 36 A.")
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to paragraph 5 of exhibit 36 A, Admiral, do
you know the basis for the statements made in that paragraph, and, if
so, would you state the basis for the statements?
Vice Admiral McMorris. The primary offensive operations as re-
quired by the Departmental Plan were for offensive operations in the
Marshall Islands with a vjew to causing the Japanese to withhold as
much of their force as possible from operations in the South China Sea.
That paragraph pointed out certain handicaps that would exist in
carrying out those operations. It expressed concern particularly as to
the limited number of destroyers ancl other anti-submarine vessels. It
also noted that transports weren't available to carry assault and oc-
cupying forces to the positions that might be attacked or seized, and it
also pointed out a lack of suitably trained and equipped Marine forces
for such operations. There was no doubt in my mind at that time
that the deficiencies mentioned were verv real and that while they
wouldn't prevent the operations directed, they would make their execu-
tion extremely difficult and far more hazardous than would be the case
if the deficiencies could be rectified.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I refer you to exhibit 23 of the Naval Court
of Inquiry, which consists of Annex number VII, Section VI, to the
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and
Fourteenth Naval District, 1939, dated 28 March 1941, and also con-
sists of Addendum I to [298] Naval Base Defense Air Force
Operation Plan Number A-1-41, dated March 31, 1941, and ask you
whether or not you can identify those.
Vice Admiral McMorris. I feel that these can be identified as the
papers which those headings purport them to be.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall, Admiral, whether you reviewed those
papers at or about the dates which they bear or at some subsequent
time?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Wliile I now have no specific recollection
that I reviewed these particular papers, by their very nature I enter-
tain no doubt that I did review them.
Mr. Sonnett. Particularly, Admiral. I take it, in view of the fact
that the review of such plans of subordinate commanders was one of
your regidar duties as War Plans Officer?
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 13
178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral McMorris. Those were part of my regular duties and,
recollecting very definitely the duties in that connection, I know I did
see a number of such papers and had many discussions of this and
kindred subjects. I feel it would be virtually impossible for such a
paper to have been issued without my having seen it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Admiral, to the second of those two
papers, that is, Addendum I, you will note that it contains a so-called
"Summary of the Situation." Will you examine that and state
whether your own summary of the situation at that time was in accord
with the summary contained in the exhibit?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That is substantially correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we read that into the record, Admiral, for the
sake of clarity of the record, at this point?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
[£99] Mr. SoNNETT (reading) :
1. Summary of the Situation.
(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain
and varying.
(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of
war.
(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on
OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western
Pacific for a long period.
(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas
organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force
which initiates hostile action.
(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding
force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intel-
ligence service.
Admiral, the reference to Orange in the Summary of the Situation
is to Japan, is it not ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Correct.
Mr. SoNNEETT. I refer you, Admiral, to page 3 of that Addendum,
sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) and (c) and (d) under Possible Enemy
Action and ask if you would examine that to see whether that accorded
with your own estimate of the situation at or about that time.
Vice Admiral McMorris. That section indicated possible enemy
actions. To that I subscribed in a greater or less degree. I did not
subscribe to some of those possibilities as being probable. In fact, I
personally felt they might be quite improbable.
Mr. SoNNETT. Again, Admiral, for the sake of clarity of the record,
may we read in those four?
Admiral He\vitt. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT (reading) :
///. Possible Enemy Action.
(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl
Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.
[300] (b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack
on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack
would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably
approach Inside of three hundred miles.
(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more sub-
marines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been
drawn away by the original thrust.
PROCEEDIICGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 179
(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable
undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a
carrier.
Admiral, while we are on the same subject, let me also refer to
the last sub-paragraph under Possible Enemy Action and read that
to you so that we may have your comments concerning that as well.
(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered
as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it
might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow
to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a
second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have
all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage
that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next
day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage
would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and
might be observed. Under tiie existing conditions this might not be a serious
disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take
no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete
surprise. Midday attacks have all the dl-sadvantages and none of the advantages
of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer
certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack
would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accom-
plishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air
attack.
Now, Admiral, you indicated previously that you felt that the pos-
sible enemy action as set forth in this exhibit was not probable at or
about the time of this exhibit in March of 1941?
[30 J] Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct.
Mr, SoNNETT. Did you agree with the estimate in paragraph (a) 2
to the effect that a declaration of war might be preceded by "a sur-
prise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl
Harbor"?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I agreed with the thought there expressed,
but considered such an attack more probable, much more probable,
in the approaches to Pearl Harbor rather than in Pearl Harbor itself.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I refer you to exhibit 8 of the Naval Court
of Inquiry, which purports to be Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter num-
ber 2CL-41 (Revised), dated October 14, 1941, and ask if you can
identify that.
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, I identify this as a Fleet Letter issued
at that time concerning the security of the fleet at the base and in the
operating areas.
Mr. SoNNETT, I take it. Admiral, that that would have come under
your official cognizance as War Plans Officer for review?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, I recall reviewing this. It was pre-
pared in the Operations Division, but a paper of this nature would
unquestionably have been reviewed by myself, and while I have at
this time no specific recollection of the details in preparation, I do
recall that some of the earlier drafts were modified in accordance
with suggestions made by myself.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Admiral, to the document before you,
there are two assumptions set forth, are there not, upon which the
plan was predicated ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you read, Admiral, assumption 2 (b) into the
record ?
180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[30£'\ Vice Admiral McMorris (reading) :
2. (b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by :
(1) a surprise attack on sliips in Pearl Harbor,
(2) a surprise submarine attack on sliips in operating area,
(3) a combination of these two.
Mr. SoNNETT, Did you, Admiral, at or about that time, namely,
October 14, 1941, agree with assumption 2 (b), which you have just
read ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I refer you to exhibit 15 of the Naval Court
of Inquiry, which is a dispatch of OpNav, dated November 24, 1941,
and ask whether you recall having seen that at or about that time.
Vice Admiral McMorris. I recall seeing this about that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. I refer you, Admiral, to exhibit 17 of the Naval
Court of Inquiry record, which is a dispatch of OpNav, dated Novem-
ber 27, 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that at or about
that time.
Vice Admiral McMorris. I recall seeing this dispatch about that
time.
Mr. SoNNETT. I refer you. Admiral, also to exhibit 19 of the Naval
Court of Inquiry, which is an OpNav dispatch of November 27, 1941,
and ask you whether you recall having seen that dispatch at or about
that time.
Vice Admiral McMorris. I recall seeing this dispatch about that
time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, Admiral, I believe you testified before the
Naval Court of Inquiry that no formal written estimate of the situa-
tion was maintained during this period of late November and early
December, 1941, but that a mental estimate was maintained, is that
correct ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. What w\as your estimate of the situation and of pos-
sible courses of enemy action during the period November 27 to
December 6, 1941 ?
[303] Vice Admiral McMorris. It is not possible now to give
with too great a degree of exactness the deductions and estimate made
at that time, but substantially I estimated that the Japanese were on
the point of commencing a war against Great Britain by operations
in Mala3^sia. Somewhat earlier I had estimated that they would take
&uch action with the expectation that the United States, unless at-
tacked, would not enter the war in support of Great Britain, and that
the Japanese were likely to proceed on the assumption that the Ameri-
can people would be unwilling to support a war that to them would
appear primarily for the defense of Great Britain's colonies. By the
time in question, however, I had come to the conclusion that the Japa-
nese might be unwilling to leave their line of communications abreast
the Philippines exposed to American attack in case the United States
did determine to come into the war.
I estimated that heavy attacks on the Philippines had become not
only a distinct possibility, but were even probable.
As our defenses at Guam were negligible and as the construction
work at Wake was not very far advanced, I estimated that measures
would be taken by the Japanese to seize those positions when they
PROCEEDINGS OF flEWITT INQUIRY 181
initiated the war. As the defenses of Midway were markedly stronger
than those at the other two places mentioned and as the Japanese
were probably familiar with the details thereof, I estimated that
heavy raids on that place were initially probable, but that immediate
efforts towards seizure were far less likely.
I estimated that there were likely to be heavy submarine concen-
trations in the Hawaiian area and the approaches thereto. I believed
that submarine attacks would be directed primarily at our task forces
operating at sea and that there was likelihood of attempts being made
to sink a ship in the Pearl Harbor channel. It seemed not unlikely
that the war might be [304] initiated by an attempt to torpedo
a valuable ship making ingress or egress to Pearl Harbor Channel.
I estimated that vigorous enemy submarine activity would take
place in the approaches to our important Pacific Coast ports.
Those are the highlights of the estimate at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, was it your estimate also at that time,
namely, after the receipt of the so-called war warning of November
27th, that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility but not in
your opinion a probability?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That expresses the view that I had.
Mr. SoNNETT. What action, Admiral, was taken as a result of the
war warning of November 27th and of your estimate which you have
just stated?
Vice Admiral McMorris. As I now recall, there was considerable
discussion between Admiral Kimmel and the key members of his staff
as to action to be taken and determination was reached that the naval
organizatipn was already substantially on a war footing and no
material changes would be made within the Hawaiian area. There was
considerable discussion as to continuation or modification of training
schedules, and the conclusion was reached that it was essential that
the training continue until it was necessary to move the principal
elements of the fleet for offensive operations. It had been determined
before that reconnaissance in force would be made into the Marshalls
as a preliminary towards seizure of positions therein with the utmost
celerity when war came.
The limitations in supplies and facilities at Wake and Midway, as
well as certain island outposts, had precluded stationing there requisite
defensive forces until such action became virtually mandatory. This
applied particularly to defensive aircraft. The only two carriers in
the Hawaiian [305] area were dispatched to those places, with
fighter aircraft, one going to Wake, the other to Midway. They were
accompanied by cruisers and destroyers on those expeditions.
Consideration was given to sending other additional personnel to
those places and consideration was also given to the withdrawal of
civilian personnel who were working under contractors and developing
the defenses of those two places.
It was determined, all things considered, that the best thing to do
was to consider the construction work and that existing limitations of
the two islands would not permit increase in personnel. It is my re-
collection that some small number of men and certain specialized equip-
ment were dispatched to Wake, but it is possible that the ship carrying
those elements sailed before the receipt of this dispatch.
182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. What, if any, conferences or conversations were had,
Admiral, between you and Admiral Kimmel during this period of
November 27th on concerning reconnaissance from Oahu?
Vice Admiral McMokris. I have no specific recollection in that con-
nection, but during this period, this was a matter that was discussed
between Admiral Kimmel and myself and with the two of us and the
other members of the staffs and with other senior naval officers present
in Pearl Harbor. The details I no longer remember, but I do recall
some of the considerations that were in mind and, in general, the action
determined upon. The number of patrol planes here was small. Cer-
tain of them were earmarked for advancement to Midway and at ap-
propriate time to Wake for support and assistance in the reconnais-
sance of the Marshalls at an appropriate time. My recollection is that
about this time there was some augmentation of the number of patrol
craft at Midway.
[306] In case war should start, most of the fleet shore-based
aircraft were to be moved to the island outposts, Midway, Johnston,
and Wake, but since the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier had no aircraft
of its own, some of the fleet aircraft were to remain under the opera-
tional control of the Coastal Frontier Command.
In order that the patrol craft might be ready for prompt movements
to distant service where repair and upkeep facilities were limited or
negligible, it was deemed highly important that as many as possible
be kept ready for flight on short notice and not tie up an undue number
requiring engine overhaul because of excessive use.
At this time the patrol wings in the Navy as a whole were being
increased and the operating forces were in no small measure engaged in
giving essential advanced operational training. After discussion and
consideration, the determination was reached to continue the training
as much as possible.
It was belived by myself and, I believe, generally by other officers
that entered into the discussions that it was highly important to main-
tain anti-submarine patrols in the operating areas.
Considering the requirements for anti-submarine patrols, the neces-
sity for maintaining patrol aircraft in prompt readiness for distant
service, and considering the impelling necessity for continuation of the
training program, it was determined that the arrangements that were
actually in effect were the best that we could do. This in effect accepted
a calculated risk. Subsequent events proved that the calculations
weren't good. Calculations at the time, however, did show that only
very limited sectors could be continually patrolled with the forces then
available. It may be remarked in passing that with the effectiveness
of search that could have been maintained, it is doubtful that the ap-
proach of the Japanese carriers on the morning of [307] 7 De-
cember would have been detected as the arc of their approach would
quite possibly have been unguarded.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, the various considerations concerning air
reconnaissance which you have just described were, I take it, your own
considerations at the time?
Vice Admiral McMorrts. Yes, I think so. I might say that with
the passage of time and various discussions of this matter, it is some-
times difficult to say whether those specific things were in your mind
at that time or that possibly other considerations were in mind in ad-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 183
dition. I feel safe in saying, however, that while the considerations
which I have just mentioned are my best recollection now, it is not
only possible but highly probable that they were in my mind at that
time and were voiced in discussions with the Commander-in-Chief and
with others concerned.
Mr. SoNNETT. It is the fact. Admiral, I take it, that you do not
recall any formal conference or detailed discussion with the Com-
mander-in-Chief on that subject?
Vice Admiral McMorris. It would be better to say that it was not a
practice to have formal conferences. There was not a formal confer-
ence, but there were numerous conferences and discussions, and while I
cannot say that this specific question was the subject of any one con-
ference, it undoubtedly was a matter that was discussed during this
period, and the action taken was after consideration and evaluation
of the factors involved in the light of information and circumstances
that existed at the time.
Mr. SoNNETT. What I am trying to get at, Admiral, is you have no
independent recollection of any specific discussion with Admiral Kim-
mel after November 27th on the subject, but you feel it must have been
discussed ?
[SOS] Vice Admiral McMorris. Wliile I have no specific recol-
lection as to time or date or subject matter of a conference, I can say
definitely that during this period this subject matter was discussed
between myself and others and the Commander-in-Chief.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you tell us what Admiral Kimmel said at any
such discussion. Admiral, concerning reconnaissance from Oahu ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. No, I cannot, but manifestly the conclu-
sions that he reached did not result in any distant search being main-
tained, but rather that the search at the time was against submarines
in localized areas.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, any discussion with Admiral
Kimmel after the war warning of November 27th and prior to De-
cember 7th concerning a projected reconnaissance fliglit by the Army
over the Mandated Islands?
Vice Admiral McMorris. No, I do not. I do recall that General
Martin was very loathe to have the fighter aircraft over water at all,
and while I do not recall any discussion of Army flights over the Man-
dated Islands, it doesn't mean that such discussions may not have taken
place, but certainly no action was ever taken leading to anything of
that sort; so that, if such discussion did take place, it must have been
concluded that such would be unfeasible.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 28 of this investigation,
which is a memorandum from Captain Layton to the Admiral on No-
vember 28, 1941, and ask you whether, after examining it, it refreshes
3'our recollection at all concerning the proposed Army reconnaissance.
Vice Admiral McMorris. That does refresh my recollection to some
extent because I was thinking at the time in terms of visual reconnais-
sance by a number of planes. I do now vaguely recall some discussion
with regard to photo reconnaissance, but the recollection is vague in
the extreme.
[S09] Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, do you recall the extent of the
sector from Oahu which could have been covered by the patrol planes
available'during the period November 27th to December 7, 1941 ?
184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral McMorris. That is a question that cannot be cate-
gorically answered. Various combinations of diagrams were given
consideration and had a search been determined upon, it would of
necessity finally been based on the radius of flights and how long a
period of time the searches would continue and whether or not mat-
ters of training and engine overhaul would be completely ignored.
As a practical measure, had such searches been instituted at all, they
undoubtedly would have been a compromise among the different fea-
tures involved, just as a compromise was actually reached in limiting
the searches to the fleet operating areas.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, you stated a moment ago that various dia-
grams were given consideration. When and by whom were they con-
sidered. ?
Vice Admiral McMorris, That I cannot now answer. There were
undoubtedly some drawn within the War Plans Section, some by the
Aviation Officer, possibly or even probably by the Operations Di-
vision. I do not recall whether any were brought over by the patrol
wing commander. The extent to which any were directly presented to
tlie Commander-in-Chief or which he may have noted within my office
or the Operations Office, I cannot now answer.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral Bellinger was the Air Officer at that time,
was he not. Admiral ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. He was in command of the patrol wing
of the fleet that was stationed here at that time, and the senior naval
officer in the patrol craft.
Mr. SoNNETT. He testified. Admiral, before the Naval Court of In-
quiry \_310] that during the period in question, November 27,
1941, on, continuous daily patrol could have been flown by dividing
the combat crews into three groups, using twenty planes daily and
covering 144°, which could have been continued for an undertermined
number of days. Does that accord with your recollection as to the
capabilities for reconnaissance during that period 'I
Vice Admiral McMorris. I would say that that wouldn't be far
wrong if that were the only consideration to be given, namely, to run-
ning a search, but the Commander-in-Chief had not only that consid-
eration to weigh, but also the matter of keeping planes ready for dis-
tant service and for training of personnel for new aircraft being built.
Mr. SoxNETT. How many naval aircraft were available at that time
at Oahu ? Do you recall, Admiral ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I do not.
Mr. SoxNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 22 of this investigation,
which consists of a series of photostats of a document entitled "Com-
munication Intelligence Summaries" and I direct j'our attention to
those particularly for the period 27 November 1941 to 5 December 1941
and ask you whether you recall having seen those at the time.
Vice Admiral McMorris. I recall being familiar with information
of that general nature at that time, that frequently I did not myself
read them but heard them either read or orally presented by Captain
Lay ton, and I judge that those are the principal intelligence informa-
tion that was available at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the summary for November 30, 1941,
Admiral, and to the lower left-hand corner, is that your initial?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I don't know. It may well be.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 185
Mr. SoxNETT. Do you recognize the initial in the lower right-hand
corner ?
[Sll] Vice Admiral McMorris. That appears to be Admiral
Kimmel's initial. I certainly had access to all such material at that
time.
Mr. SoxxETT. I refer you to the initial on the 23 November 1941
summary at the lower left-hand corner and ask you whether that is
your initial.
Vice Admiral McMokris. Probably.
Mr. SoxNETT. And to the one for November 22, 1941, Admiral, the
lower left-hand corner.
Vice Admiral McMorris. The same comment holds. That is prob-
ably my initial.
Mr. SoNXETT. Is that also true of the one for November 30th, Ad-
miral, that it probably is your initial, or aren't you sure about it?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, that is probably.
Mr. SoNNETT. In the November 30th sum.mary, Admiral, it is indi-
cated, is it not, that the radio intelligence unit was of the opinion
that there was a Japanese carrier in the Mandates ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. What, if any, discussion did you have with Admiral
Kimmel concerning that belief ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I do not now recall any. It is quite pos-
sible, however, that discussion did occur.
Mr. SoNNETT. "Would it be an accurate statement, Admiral, to say
that you had received during that period either these communication
intelligence summaries or the substance of them?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That would be accurate.
Mr. SoxNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 8 of this investigation,
which consists of photostats of various dispatches, and refer you par-
ticularly to the dispatch of ComFOURTEEN of 26 November and
ask whether you recall having seen that at the time.
[312] Vice Admiral McMorris. I have now no independent
recollection of that message, but would say that I probably did see it at
the time. I almost surely saw it at the time.
Mr. SoNNETT. That indicates. Admiral, does it not, that tliere was
believed to be, among other things, at least one carrier division unit
in the Marshalls ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoxxETT. I also show you. Admiral, exhibit 23 of this investi-
gation, vrhicli is a memorandum of December 1, 1941, from Lieutenant
Commander Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, to the Admiral, and ask
you whether you recall having seen that.
Vice Admiral McMorris. Again I now have no independent recol-
lection of seeing that, but would say it is improbable that I did not
see it.
Mr. SoxxETT. Do you recall. Admiral, that on or about December
1, 1941, there was a change in the service calls of the Japanese fleet?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I remember that about that time there
was a cliange in their call signs.
Mr. SoxxETT. And do you further recall that in the succeeding
days prior to the attack there was a blank of information as to the
Japanese carriers ?
186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral McMorris. My recollection now is that specific infor-
mation was lacking, but my general impression now is that we believed
at the time that we had a fairly good idea of the general location of the
major elements of the Japanese fleet.
Mr. SoNNETT. Where did you, during the period November 27th to
December 6, 1941, believe the Japanese carriers were, Admiral?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Again, it is difficult to say what the spe-
cific beliefs were at that time, but generally in home waters or towards
Formosa.
[313] Mr. SoNNETT. Now, referring to the communication in-
telligence summaries, exhibit 22, will you point out where in those
summaries is the information on which you based that belief ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Before looking, I may say that it may or
may not be specifically in here.
Mr. SoNNETT. I should add, Admiral, if it is not there, would you
state whatever the information was on which you based the belief?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Nor would I be able to answer a question
of that nature.
To answer the question now would be an attempt to take the record
here and justify the conclusion reached. The information is at best
vague. It would take a considerable number of quotations to give
them as they come.
24 November :
Large numbers of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some of which ap-
pear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC Third Fleet appears as in-
formation addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet units in-
dicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future operations.
Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division Three with
CinC Third Fleet.
25 November:
One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates.
26 November :
The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed a suc-
cession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC Second and
Third Fleets in particular. . . . Takao and Bako originated more traffic
today than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC Second
Fleet and the China Fleets came in for their share.
[314] Again on the 26th of November :
The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the Combined Air Force
still continues at its high level.
27 November :
Bako addressed the Chief of Staff, Third Fleet, information Destroyer Squad-
rons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator
today was the Intelligence activity who sent tive dispatches to the major com-
manders.
Same date :
COMBINED FLEET — There is still no evidence of any further movement from
the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several
messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator late-
ly. CinC Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Aii-
Force, and Bako.
Again :
THIRD FLEET — Still holding extensive communication with Bako, Sama.
South China Fleet and French Indo-China. . . . There is nothing to indi-
cate any movements of the Third Fleet as yet.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 187
28 November :
Tokyo ox'iginators were active with messages of high pi-ecedence to the Com-
mauders-in-Chief of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. . . .
The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent one to the Chief ot Stai'ts of Com-
bined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third Fleet, French Indo-China
Force, Second Fleet, and RNO Palao.
Again, same date :
COMBINED FLEET — No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units.
Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet originated his usual number of dispatches to
Third Fleet and Combined Air Forces. The units paid particular attention to
by the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, were Crudivs 5 and 7 and Desrons 2
and 4 and Subron 5. No traffic today from the Takao (CA).
[5i J] Again, same date :
THIRD FLEET — Little activity from Third Fleet xinits save for the Com-
mander-in-Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not
present with the bulk of the Third Fleet in Sasebo but it is not yet located
elsewhere. * * * Two Third Fleet units arived at Bako and are apparently
returning to Kure from Bako.
29 November:
Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet, sent one message to Comdesron 5, Number
Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense Division One and Comdesrons
2 and 4. He held extensive communications with the Commander-in-Chief Second
Fleet and Bako. Two more units of Third Fleet made movement reports.
30 November :
One urgent dispatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff, Combined, Second,
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force.
30 November :
No information obtained as to the location of the Commander-in-Chief Third
Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway.
1 December:
FIRST FLEET — Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside
of Empire Waters.
SECOND FLEET — This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area
in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play
an important role in today's traffic ; consequently, the assumption is made that
this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force
are definitely in the Indo-China area.
THIRD FLEET — Nothing to report except that the same association of Second,
Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China forces
continues.
[S16] 2 December :
SECOND FLEET — No units have stood out prominently the last two or three
days. This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat
to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company.
Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unl^cated and unob-
served since change of caUs.
Same date:
THIRD FLEET — Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way
in some of the Third Fleet traffic.
CARRIERS — Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today.
Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. How-
ever, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since
the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered,
it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.
188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
o December :
The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slows up identifi-
cation of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far.
The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long dispatches to the
CINC C0:MBINED, second and THIRD FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence
originated nine dispatches to the same addresses.
The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed
by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takeo the CINC SECOND FLEET is indi-
cated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is
indicated for delivery by that Station. It is the impression that both SECOND
and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence
means.
4 December :
There were a large number of urgent messages today, [3171 most of
these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Among others Tokyo Intelligence
originated a seven-part message to Chiefs of Staff China Fleet, Combined Fleet,
Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force, and Sama. In all,
this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders.
Same date :
The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the CinC
Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. These previously very talkative com-
manders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not yet well identified,
the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two
commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the CinC
Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting
evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which CinC
Second Fleet is still copying. The CinC Combined Fleet sent one message to an
unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force, Palao, CinC Second Fleet
and CinC Third Fleet.
5 December:
Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have originated any traffic
today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic over
broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the
Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander
Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen, either.
6 December :
Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. These units
are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The Com-
mander-in-Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers,
Fourth Fleet and the major commanders.
[S18] Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, as to the 6th of December sum-
mary, I would like to call your attention to a pencilled note at the
bottom which indicates that that summary was not received until
after the attack. I just wondered whether you could confirm that
or not, or whether you have any recollection of it.
Vice Admiral McMorris. I have no recollection.
Mr. SoxME'BT. I also would like to refer you, Admiral, back to
the December 3rd intelligence summary, which closes with the state-
ment, "No information on submarines or Carriers."
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, Admiral, may I show you exhibit 21 of this
investigation, a photostat of Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin num-
ber 45-41, and ask you whether you saw that on or about that date?
Vice Admiral McMorris. It is highly probable that I did during
that period.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 189
Mr. SoNNXTT. Referring, Admiral, to page 1 of the bulletin, do
you recall the following statement :
The following revision of Op-16-F-2, ONI Serial number 27-41, supersedes
and revises the former report on this subject,
The subject being the organization of the Japanese fleet.
The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet
commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and sea-
plane tenders into separate forces and from the creation of special task forces
in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China.
And then the major fleet commands are listed, the seventh being the
carrier fleet, aircraft carriers of five carrier divisions.
Vice Admiral McMorris. Item 7, just to avoid confusion, because
they give the numbers of those.
[319] Mr. SoNNETT. Right, sir; item 7 listed as the carrier
Do you recall having had that information, Admiral, at that time?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I feel sure I must have had it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, referring back to page 8, Admiral, of the
bulletin, there is set forth, is there not, the composition of the Japanese
carrier fleet?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes. It indicates here ten carriers and
sixteen destroyers.
Mr. SoNXETT. Now, is it the fact, Admiral, that after December 1,
1941, and prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, you had no intelligence
or information concerning the location or movements of those
carriers ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Of a carrier fleet as such we did not, as
I recall it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you have any information concerning the move-
ments of anv of the carriers of the Japanese carrier fleet after De-
cember 1, 1941?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Not specifically.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you have any in general? If so, what ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Without now being able to indicate any-
thing specific, the general organization as set forth in the paper in
question was to a large extent a type organization, and while there
was a lack of reference to specific carriers or to carriers as a whole,
I did not reach a conclusion that they were operating independently
of the rest of the Combined Fleet.
Mr. SoxxETT, Did you, Admiral, reach the conclusion that, as stated
in these commimicatio'n intelligence summaries, after December 1,
1941, there was no information as to the carriers?
[320] Vice Admiral McMorris. My recollection now is that
during that period there were one or two vague indications associating
theni with the Second and Third Fleets, which was logical, and some
possible associations with Palao, and at least one instance with the
Marshalls.
Mr. SoxxETT. Well, Admiral, referring to exhibit 23, which is now
Captain Layton's estimate of December 1, 1941, of the location of the
Japanese fleet, do you find any reference in that estimate to the loca-
tion of Carrier Divisions Three and Four of the Japanese fleet?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I note under "Kure-Sasebo" in red pencil
"Four CV." I note under heading "CinC 2nd Fleet with units at
190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Takao" Cardivs 3 and 4, and I note under the summation four CV
at that place. I note under "Marshall Area" one CV.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, Admiral, referring to exhibit 21, that indicates
on paire 8 Carrier Division One of the Japanese fleet consisted of the
AKAGI and the KAGA and Carrier Division Two of the SORYU
and HIRYU. Do you find in the December 1st estimate by Captain
Layton, exhibit 23, any indication as to the location of any of the
four carriers comprising Carrier Divisions One and Two ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I do not find in that paper the names
of any specific ships, carriers or otherwise.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you find on page 3, Admiral, under "Bako-Takao
area" Carrier Division Four and Carrier Division Three?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you find any place i-n the paper Carrier Division
One or Carrier Division Two?
Vice Admiral ]\IcMorris. No.
[S21] Mr. SoNNETT. Did you participate, Admiral, in any con-
ference with Admiral Kimmel concerning the December 1st estimate
of Captain Layton ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I do not recall, but if there were a dis-
cussion on that, it is improbable that I would not have been present.
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, I take it. Admiral, you recall no specific dis-
cussion of the lack of information concerning Carrier Divisions One
and Two of the Japanese fleet on or about December 1, 1941, and prior
to the attack?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I do not so recall, but I do recall that
during that general period, the information as to locations of Japanese
fleet units far from as specific as was desired, but I do not recall that
lack of information, taking into consideration the general situation
and all other information at hand, that we were extremely disturbed.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring back to exhibit 17 of the Naval Court
record, the so-called war warning dispatch of November 27, 1941, I
should like to call your attention to the following portion of that
dispatch :
Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL-46.
I should like further to call your attention to the Initial Tasks of
the Pacific Fleet and in particular items "b," "g," and "m" of the
Phase I initial tasks, to be taken vrhen Japan was not in the war,
and to ask you what was done by way of a d'eployment preparatory
to carrying out those tasks. I will read them again so that you will
have them clearly in mind. (Reading) :
b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
g. Protect tlie communications and territory of the associated powers and
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the [322] Western
Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action
of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces
south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.
m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.
The question. Admiral, is
Vice Admiral McMorris. I know the question.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the war warning, what appropriate
defensive development preparatory to carrying out those tasks was
executed ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 191
Vice Admiral McMorris. That question has in effect been answered
in my reply in this testimony to an earlier question regarding that
dispatch. In substance there was no material change in the dispo-
sition and deployment of the fleet forces at that time other than the
movements of certain aircraft to Midway and Wake and of the car-
riers, with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to those locations
to deliver aircraft.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, the language which I have quoted from
the war warning dispatch was a direction, was it not ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it, then, that it was your view that either you
had already in effect an appropriate defensive deployment or that
what you had in effect on November 27th plus the steps you mentioned
amounted to an appropriate defensive deployment. Is that correct?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct, and in addition thereto,
considering the other tasks assigned in case of war, the direction to
take defensive dispositions carried with it the implication that offen-
sive dispositions weren't to be taken. The primary offensive task of
the [322] Pacific Fleet, and one that in my view would require
very prompt action, was employment of our forces against the Mar-
shalls in order to force the Japanese to withhold a portion of their
forces from operations against Malaysia.
_ This so-called war warning order, mentioning specifically "defen-
sive" dispositions, was issued while important conversations were
going on in Washington with a view to prevention of war. It seems
clearly to indicate that our forces should not be exposed in the Mar-
shall area or close approaches thereto preparatory to an assault, as
detection there might prejudice efforts to maintain peace. Since the
fleet was in effect cautioned against offensive dispositions, by specific
directives to take defe^isive dispositions, and since the fleet had to a
large extent been already disposed in a defensive manner, it was felt
that the directive in question was being complied with.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I call your attention to the fact that the
initial tasks of the Pacific Fleet contained in Pacific Fleet Operating-
Plan Kainbow Five were divided into two phases: Phase I, Japan
not in the war, and Phase lA, Japan in the war; and that Phase I did
not provide for any raid or any offensive action toward the Marshalls
or elsewhere, but did provide for protecting the communications and
territory of the associated powers, the prevention of the extension of
enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling
with light forces and patrol planes, and also provided for guarding
against surprise attack by Japan.
What specific deployment was made to accomplish those tasks ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. The disposition of the major portion of
the fleet in Hawaiian rather than in coastal waters was a major action
[S23] in that regard. The reenforcement hitherto mentioned for
Midway and Wake were elements of that disposition. The employ-
ment of the fleet units underway at sea and the Hawaiian area with
appropriate screens and with patrol of the area by patrol aircraft
were other elements of that disposition. The maintenance of a full
supply of ammunition and the requirement that all ships at all times
must have a certain minimum quantity of fuel on board (my recollec-
192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tion is that that requirement was seventy per cent, although it may
have varied somewhat with the class of the ships) was a supporting
act to make the dispositions effective.
Mr. SoNNETT. It would, Admiral, have been an appropriate move,
would it not, in order to accomplish the initial task "m," namely, guard
against surprise attack by Japan, to have established an air patrol
from Oahu?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, that would have been an appropriate
act, but no one act nor no one disposition can be examined independent
of other requirements.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring again. Admiral, to exhibit 17 of the Naval
Court's record, the so-called war warning, it started out, did it not,
by stating :
This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number
and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces
indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or Kra
Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment,
et cetera, and language that we quoted before.
[325] Now, had you received a dispatch prior to that time stat-
ing that this was a war warning or that an aggressive move was
expected, other than the dispatch of November 24th, which stated in
part, ". . . a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, in-
cluding attack on Philippines or Guam, is a possibility"?
Vice Admiral McMorkis. We had received no communication
which used the term, "This is a war warning." However, in Jan-
uary of 1941, while I was under orders to duty as War Plans Officer,
Pacific Fleet, but before I had reported as such and before Admiral
Kimmel had assumed command, I did participate in a conference
with Admiral Richardson, then the Commander-in-Chief, and his
War Plans Officer and with Admiral Kimmel and with the Chiefs of
Staff of the two admirals mentioned, concerning the probability of
war with Japan; and throughout the year until 7 December there
were various communications by letter and by dispatch and by inter-
change of personal letters between the Chief of Naval Operations
and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, regarding the probability of
war with Japan ; and the situation was tense throughout the year, so
much so that the dispatch in question occasioned no surprise, nor
did it convey any considerable amount of additional or startling
information.
Mr. SoNNETT. The conference to which you refer just before you
reported as War Plans Officer, I take it, occurred in late January or
early February of 1941, Admiral?
Vice Admiral JSIcMorris. Late January, 1941, and as a result
thereof a joint letter was sent by Admiral Richardson and Admiral
Kimmel to the Chief of Naval Operations.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you at that time see the letter of the Secretary
of the Navy, dated January 24, 1941, which was exhibit 9 before the
Naval [326] Court of Inquiry, a copy of which I now show
you ?
Vice Admiral McMorrts. I saw that letter in late January or early
Februarv, 1941.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY ' 193
Mr. SoNNETT. Did the statements of the Secretary of the Navy
in tlie letter, which I will now read in part, accord with your own
views ?
(Reading:)
If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities
would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at
Pearl Harbor. . . .
The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are con-
sidered to be :
(1) Air bombing attack.
(2) Air torpedo plane attack.
(3) Sabotage.
(4) Submarine attack.
(5) Mining.
(6) Bombardment by gun fire.
Vice Admiral McMorris I had no fault to find with the views ex-
pressed therein, although not completely in accord as to the elements
of danger as listed in importance there.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were you also in accord with the statement of the
then Secretary of the Navy, which I will quote : "The countermeas-
ures to be considered are: (a) location and engagement of enemy
carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched,"
and the further statement referring to (a) as follows: "The opera-
tions set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet, but quite
possibly might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated
without warning prior to a declaration of war"?
[327] Vice Admiral McMorris. Those views appeared to be
sound.
Mr. SoNNETT. And I take it, Admiral, from your previous testi-
mony that certainly as late as October 14, 1941, when the fleet secu-
rity letter was issued, you still thought that an air attack was pos-
sible although you were of the view that it was not probable ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I felt that an air attack was possible but
not probable and that the fleet should not take as its sole object of
existence the defense of itself against a surprise attack, but that it
should also carry on other fundamental duties.
Mr. SoNNETT. Those duties. Admiral, were the duties we referred
to before, set forth in the Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, were they
not?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, and with reference to that plan, I
presume that that included the training and otherwise readying of
itself for operations, but whether or not those duties are specifically
indicated there, they would be implicit in any orders or plans that
might be issued.
Mr. SoNNETT. In that connection. Admiral, I call your attention to
initial task "k" of the Phase I tasks, reading, "Continue training opera-
tions as practicable."
It is the fact, Admiral, or it was the fact, as you earlier testified, that
patrols, or aircraft reconnaissance rather, was being conducted from
Midway and other outlying bases during the so-called critical period,
November 27, 1941, on, was it not?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Only to a very limited extent. The aircraft
that were at the outlying bases other than Midway were entirely de-
fensive. The aircraft at Midway were partially defensive and par-
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 14
194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tially [328] for patrol. The amount of gas and the upkeep
facilities at Midway were extremely limited and necessitated the ut-
most conservation of the available supplies and of the aircraft them-
selves in order that engines might not be worn out before a critical
period arose. Again, it may be remarked in passing that had the
maximimi search been instituted from Midway and Pearl Harbor on
the 27th of November warning, the situation with regard to aircraft
engines by the 7th of December would have been in a highly critical
situation.
Mr. SoNNETT. By the first week in December, 1941, Admiral, you
had had, of course, the war warning and you knew that Japanese
forces were on the move, according to intelligence, and you also knew
that the Japanese were destroying codes and the like, as I recall your
previous testimony ; is that correct ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. You also knew, I take it. Admiral, and were aware
of the fact that the Japanese in the past had attacked without declara-
tion of war and indeed your security orders and war plans were based
on an assumption that they might do that, is that correct ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. The factors which you have mentioned
were constantly in the mind of myself and, I am sure, were in the mind
of the Commander-in-Chief.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it. Admiral, that one of the things tha,t you
were thinking about during that first week of December was the
proposed reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands,
which was one of the tasks set forth in Phase I A of the Pacific Fleet
Plan, is that correct ?
[329] Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct. During that
period, I daily, or at most on alternate days, furnished the Command-
er-in-Chief an informal typed memo of the action that I felt should be
taken by the important elements of the fleet if war ensued in the ensu-
ing twenty-four hours.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you. Admiral, exhibits 69A and 69B of the
Naval Court of Inquiry and ask you whether those are the memoranda
to which you referred.
Vice Admiral McMorris. These are typical, but I believe there
were additional ones.
Mr. SoNNETT. Those are dated, Admiral, November 30th and De-
cember 5, 1941, respectively, are they not?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there any provision made in those for recon-
naissance from Oahu?
Vice Admiral McMorris. No.
Mr. SoNNETT. I call your attention. Admiral, to task "g" of Phase
lA of the initial tasks of the Pacific Fleet — that is, the Phase lA
tasks are those to be taken initially when Japan is in the war — which
reads as follows: "Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the
approaches to Oahu and outlying bases." Why was no provision
made for carrying out that task?
Vice Admiral McMorris. There was actually in effect in Oahu
patrols against enemy forces, but the patrol was against submarines,
which was regarded as the greatest element of danger. On the insti-
tution or commencement of war, certain of the patrol craft were to
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 195
pass to the [SSO] operational control of the Commander of
the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and such searches would have been
conducted by him. However, the number of such aircraft so assigned
was very small and it was expected that they would largely be used
for anti-submarine patrols as was in effect at the time. Although the
operations of that nature were under the general supervision and
direction of the Operations Division rather than the Plans Division
of the Staff, I was fully aware of what was being done and was com-
pletely in accord and had given the weight of my advice in that direc-
tion to the Commander-in-Chief.
Mr. SoNNETT. In advising the Commander-in-Chief during the
critical period of 1941, did you evaluate and consider at any length the
intelligence information showing that you had no information as to
the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers from December 1st on?
Vice Admiral McMorkis. Certainly the negative as well as the posi-
tive information available entered into the conclusions.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. In your testimony before one of the previous
investigations you stated that in your opinion the island defense was
adequate and in case of an air attack the chance to inflict damage was
small. The question arose in my mind as to what you based that
opinion on.
Vice Admiral McMorris. It might be somewhat difficult to give
the train of thought that led to those conclusions, but I felt that with
the defenses here, with the anti-aircraft power and with the fighter
strength, that a large proportion of the attacking planes would be
destroyed and that the accuracy of the bombing would be such that
no large number of [3311 hits would be obtained. Notwith-
standing the success of the British attack at Taranto (I believed
there were peculiar conditions that existed there), I did not believe
that there was a serious hazard from aerial torpedo attack in Pearl
because of the necessity for attacking planes to come very low. I be-
lieved that a considerable proportion of them would be destroyed
by AA fire, aside from the local fighter protection, and that the shal-
lowness of the water and the short distance the torpedoes would have
to run would mean that the torpedoes themselves would not inflict
great damage. Manifestly, my conclusions were entire!}^ wrong in all
those respects. They were reached, however, from reading available
information and acquaintance with the torpedo performance in our
own Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you have any knowledge as to the readiness of
the Army anti-aircraft defenses, whether they were actually alerted
and occupied their positions ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. No.
Admiral Hewitt. But your assumption was that they were in
readiness?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct, and perhaps I was remiss
in not acquainting myself more fully as to what they were doing. We
knew that our own establishment was fairly good. Actually the}'
proved not to be as good as I felt. We were a bit too complacent
there. I had been around all of the aircraft defenses of Hawaii; I
laiew their general location. I had witnessed a number of their anti-
aircraft practices and knew the quantity and general disposition of
196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
their aircraft. I knew that they were parked closely together as a
more ready protection against sabotage rather than dispersed. None-
theless, I was not directly acquainted or indirectly acquainted with the
actual state [332] of readiness being maintained or of the
watches being kept.
Admiral Hewitt. It was brought out in the other investigations
that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were very
cordial and they saw each other frequently and kept each other in-
formed as well as possible. I wonder whether that extended down
to elements of the staff, whether there was much interchange of in-
formation.
Vice Admiral McMorris. I think there was such interchange of in-
formation rather habitually on an informal basis. I myself not in-
frequently saw members of General Short's staff. I know that
General Martin, I believe, and Admiral Bellinger had not infrequent
meetings ; perhaps they shouldn't be characterized as conferences. I
know that there had been called for the morning of the 8th of De-
cember a meeting between a number of General Short's officers and
District officers to meet with Captain DeLany, who was the Operations
Officer at the time, at his call to see if there could be brought about
an improvement with regard to communications and arrangements for
coordination if meeting attack. I cite those things merely as illustra-
tive. There was a considerable amount of interchange of informa-
tion and discussion with one another. At that time it is certain the
two services acted semi-independently, but the local plan of defense,
which Admiral Kimmel had approved, had been drawn up by the
Commander of the Hawaiian Department's staff and by tne Com-
mander of the Sea Frontier's staff.
Before I joined Admiral Kimmel's staff, I was Operations Officer
for Admiral Andrews, who was the Commander of the Hawaiian
Detachment, and was Senior Officer Present in the Hawaiian area until
the fleet came out in 1940 some time. During that period, I frequently
visited Fort Shafter, the military establishments in Hawaii, and
discussed defensive [SSS] plans with the Planning Officer of
the District Commandant. I witnessed a number of firings by Army
elements. On more than one occasion the G-3 officer of the Department
was my guest at our own firings, and after I joined Admiral Kimmel's
staff, that association continued, and I feel that I was not exceptional
in having contact with the Army personnel on their problems.
Admiral HmviTT. When you discussed the considerations of the
principal danger being from submarines, that would apply to ships
in the operating areas and to ships entering and leaving the port, but
would not apply to the ships inside the harbor ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. No, sir, it did not apply to ships inside
the harbor. There had been considerable fear that submarines lying
outside the channel entrance might sink a ship in the entrance and
consideration was given to defensive mining and to the establishment
of listening posts a little farther offshore. The thought of defensive
mining was abandoned because the shelf was narrow and there was a
fair amount of current along there. Almost every one reached the
same conclusion that the defensive mines would be more hazardous
than the submarine menace might be. And there was grave concern
over the lack of anti-submarine craft either in numbers or in types.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 197
Nonetheless, it was felt that the chance of a submarine getting within
Pearl Harbor was very, very remote. Actually, of course, when the
time came about, we found we were unduly complacent.
Admiral Hewitt. Well, the submarines that got in Pearl Harbor
weren't sea-going submarines; they were midgets.
Vice Admiral McMorris. Correct, sir. That was our first acquaint-
ance with the midgets.
[334.] Admiral Hewitt. I think that is all I have. I want to
thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 5:20 p. m., adjourned until 9:45
a.m., 2 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 199
[sss-j PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIKY
Thirteenth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag
Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pa/'ific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 9 :45 a. m., 2
June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Beacher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state your name and rank, sir?
Vice Admiral Smith. William W. Smith, Vice Admiral, USN.
Mr. SoNXETT. Admiral, you were Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet
from February, 1941, to December 7, 1941, were you not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you exhibit 34 of this investigation and ask
you whether you can identify it.
Vice Admiral Smith. This is Staff Instructions, Pacific Fleet, issued
July 14, 1941, signed by me.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, that was issued by you on or about July 14,
1941, with Admiral Kimmel's approval, was it not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. And the purpose of the instructions, I take it, was to
summarize the duties of various members of the staff of CincPac ?
Vice Admiral SMrni. That is right.
Mr. Sonnett. Would you examine, Admiral, paragraph 112 on page
] and read paragraph 112 into the record?
[S36] Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
112. The Commander-in-Cliief is available to the entire Staff for consultation,
but all questions for decision or action should pass through the Chief of Staff
whenever such a procedure will not involve an undue delay.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you refer, Admiral, to paragraph 200 on page 3
and similarly read that into the record ?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
200. CHIEF OF STAFF— 01— Personal Aide.
( See Navy Regulations Articles 785 — 786. )
, (a) Carries out policies prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.
(b) Exercises general supervision over and coordinates work by members of the
Staff.
(c) Advises the Commander-in-Chief on all matters concerning the war readi-
ness and battle efficiency of the Fleet.
(d) Supervises the preparation of campaign orders and plans, as well as
strategical and tactical problems of the Fleet.
(e) Signs correspondence as follows:
(1) Routine Matters.
(2) Minor recommendations, or minor forwarding endorsements on samp
to material Bui'eaus regarding repairs and alterations concerning which a
policy has been established.
200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3) Orders to and requests from oflBcers not in Command.
(4) Matters concerning wliich the policy is of long standing.
(5) Letters from the Navy Department noted for compliance, information,
or guidance.
(6) The Commander-in-Chief personally will sign correspondence regarding
questions of particular importance involving criticism, approval, or disap-
proval of previous recommendations ; action on legal papers.
[SST] Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 35 in this investiga-
tion and ask you if you can identify it.
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state what it is, Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Smith. U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Kainbow
Five, otherwise known as WPPac-46.
Mr. SoNNETT. That was distributed to the fleet on or about July 25,
1941, was it not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, it was.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 36, Admiral, and ask you if you
can identify it.
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes. That is a letter from the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in which
the Chief of Naval Operations states that he has reviewed the subject
plan of exhibit 35 and accepts it.
Mr. Sonnett. I take it. Admiral, that in accordance with your duties
you supervised, at least generally, the preparation of the war plan,
exhibit 35, and that you were familiar with its provisions.
Vice Admiral Smith. I had very little to do with the preparation
of it, but I did supervise it and read it before it was presented to the
Commander-in-Chief for signature.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, would you examine Part 1 of the plan, at
about page 12, relating to the composition of Task Force Nine, which
was the patrol plane force, was it not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. How many patrol planes were listed as comprising
that task force ?
[338] Vice Admiral Smith. All units of Aircraft Scouting
Force, 107 VP. The rest of them are ships : Two AV, two AVP, four
AVD ; and ten utility planes, VJR.
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to page 19 of the exhibit, Admiral, you will
find stated the basic concept of war in the Pacific as set forth in the
basic plan. Will you read that into the record, sir ?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers,
it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a
manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war,
the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does
not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ
the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken
Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by
diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends
to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British
Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far
East.
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to page 22 of the exhibit, Admiral, which
concerns the initial Japanese deployment estimated in the plan, will
you read sub-paragraph "f " into the record ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 201
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
1334. . . .
f. Itaiding and observation forces widely distributed in tbe Pacific, and sub-
marines in tbe Hawaiian area.
Mr. SoNNETT. What, Admiral, was comprehended by the term
[Z3d] "raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the
Pacific"?
Vice Admiral Smith. We expected raids on Wake and Midway, pos-
sible raids on Wake and Midway, and the Philippines, but everything
tended to give us the opinion that the first strike would be down to-
wards Singapore.
Mr. SoNNETT. You are speaking now of your intelligence, Admiral,
primarily ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. What I am trying to get at at the moment is the
understanding which you had of the estimated Japanese initial deploy-
ment covered by the statement that raiding and observation forces
would be widely distributed in the Pacific and submarines in the
Hawaiian area.
Vice Admiral Smith. We were particularly guarding against their
submarine raids in the area and perhaps we were influenced by the fact
that within fifteen days after Admiral Eammel took over as Com-
mander-in-Chief, we had several alarms in the operating areas to the
south of Oahu. In one case the destroyers had sound contact with
what they believed to be a submarine for a period of more than thirty-
six hours. No bombing attack was made on it. One experienced de-
stroyer officer stated that he personally heard propeller noises. Look-
ing back on it, we doubt very much that it was a submarine ; it was
probably due to different temperatures of water, because one month
later when the moon was the same we had the same experience. But we
were always guarding against a submarine attack. We believed that
that was Japan's first attack to be made upon us and we made every
effort to guard against it.
Mr. SoNNETT. While you are on the subject of submarine contacts,
Admiral, will you state what other contacts you recall prior to Decem-
ber 7, 1941, in the general vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands?
[S4-0] Vice Admiral Smith. There were many of them, but they
were probably large fish. The first one that I recall was in the summer
of 1940 when I had the cruiser BROOKLYN and had the gunnery
school on board and I came into Pearl Harbor every two or three days,
and as I approached the entrance, I received orders to black out, that a
submarine had been detected off the entrance, and I remained outside.
Within a few hours a dispatch was received from the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District, stating the contact was false, that it had
been a fish. And those continued all during 1941 at intervals.
Whether they were real submarines, I don't know. In most cases we
decided they were not.
Mr. SoNNEiT. With particular reference, Admiral, to the months
October, November, and up to December 7, 1941, do you recall any
contacts in that period ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No, I do not.
202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Returning to the war plan, Admiral, will you examine
at page 24 paragraph 2101, which appears to contain an Outline of
Tasks, and read into the record sub-paragraph "h" ?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
h. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area aud
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by
destroying hostile exi)editions and by supporting land and air forces in denying
the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it, then, that Hawaii was one of the territories
of the Associated Powers covered by that paragraph ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you refer to page 25 and read into the record
[SP] paragraph 2201 ?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based
upon Assumption A-2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating
tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption A-1 and divides
the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows :
a. PHASE I — Initial tasks — Japan not in the war.
b. PHASE lA — Initial tasks — Japan in the war.
c. PHASE II, etc., — Succeeding tasks.
Mr. SoNNETT. Paragraph 2202 sets forth, does it not, initial tasks
to be performed by the Pacific Fleet before the Japanese got in the war ?
Will you read that?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
2202. Phase I tasks are as follows :
a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations ; thereafter main-
tain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
b. Maintain Fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.
d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and
a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-day.
f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern
Naval Coastal Frontier on M-day.
g. Protect the communications aud territory of the Associated Powers and
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by
patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking
groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the
equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.
[S^] h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider
bases in the Japanese Mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Depart-
ment.
j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway,
Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
k. Continue training operations as practicable.
1. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii
for training in landing operations.
m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to page 32 of the exhibit and paragraph
3141 to 3143, those paragraphs set forth, do they not, the initial tasks
assigned to the patrol plane force before Japan was in the war?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Would you read those into the record, sir ?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
3141. Task Force Nine will perform the task assigned in the following para-
graphs of this section.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 203
3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the
Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue ad-
ministration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.
3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to Annex I, Admiral, as to Phase I,
namely, when Japan is not in the war, would you read into the record
paragraph 2 ? Annex I, I take it, is the Patrol and Sweeping Plan ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you read into the record paragraph 2 of that
plan?
[34^] Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communi-
cations of the Associated Powers by :
(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Ha-
waiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-
Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa,
(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.
(c) Covering.
(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
(e) Routing shipping.
Mr. SoNNETT. Eeferring to paragraph 3 of the Patrol and Sweep-
ing Plan, it sets forth, does it not, specific tasks of the various task
forces ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, it does.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you read the specific tasks set forth for Task
Force Nine? I think it is on page 1-16.
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and
for conservation of i)ersonnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against
enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.
(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At
discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of
Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities
thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.
(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer
one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South
Pacific.
(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.
[344] (5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep en-
route.
(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval
Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.
(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in
sweeping during initial sweep of Phase lA.
(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Mar-
shall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1).
(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible
with assigned tasks, with other forces, thereat. Be guided by principles of com-
mand relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan O-l.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Admiral, to page 8 of the war plan, does
it appear that the plan was to become effective on W-Day ?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
At the date of Issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized,
and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base.
It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for
active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide
for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are
to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as
204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This
may or may not coincide with W-day.
Mr. SoNNETT. To attempt to summarize, Admiral, for the sake of
the record, does it appear from the plan that it might be put into execu-
tion on a day other than the date hostilities with Japan commenced
or on a day other than M, or mobilization, day?
Vice Admiral Smith. It could have been put into effect on any date
by the Navy Department.
[S4S] Mr. SoNNETT. Do you find any provision in the plan, Ad-
miral, which requires the designation of W-Day to require the ap-
proval of the Navy Department?
Vice Admiral Smith. I would have to read the entire plan to answer
that question. My recollection is that we had it in some form.
Mr. SoNNETT. Apart from that question, Admiral, and referring
specifically to the Phase I initial tasks, namely, those to be performed
when Japan was not in the war — those, you will recall, are set forth at
pages 24 and 25 of the plan — is it correct that the Phase I initial
tasks were entirely defensive in nature?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, they are entirely defensive, and train-
ing, of course, which is very important.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do any of the Phase I initial tasks, when Japan was
not yet in the war^ require, or did they require, a directive from the
Navy Department to be discharged?
Vice Admiral Smith. That is my impression, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. I refer you specifically by way of illustration to
Initial Task 1-m, which is "Guard against surprise attack by Japan."
Was that a task which the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet
was required to carry out, irrespective of any Navy Department
directive ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, that was constantly in his mind.
Mr. SoNNETT. And similarly. Admiral, referring to Initial Task
1-g, to protect the communications and territory of the Associated
Powers in the Pacific, that, too, was a task which the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, had irrespective of the 'Nslwj Department, was it
not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, it was.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you Annex VII, Section VI, to the
[34^] Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and Addendum I there-
to, which was exhibit 23 before the Naval Court of Inquiry, and ask
you whether you recall having seen that.
Vice Admiral Smith. I do not recall the details of this plan, but
I remember it as having been signed by the Commandant, Fourteenth
Naval District, and by General Short. We had it in our office.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you refer to Addendum I, which is annexed to
that document, and will you state. Admiral, what Addendum I is?
Vice Admiral Smith. It is a "joint estimate covering Joint Army
and Navy air action in the event of a sudden hostile action against
Oahu or Fleet units in the Hawaiian area."
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall having seen that at or about the date
it bears ?
Vice Admiral Smith. I can't recall when I first saw it, but I did
see it.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 205
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Admiral, to the summary of the situation
contained in Addendum I, will you read that into the record and then
state whether it was in accord with your views at the time?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain,
and varj'ing.
(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration
of war.
(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on
OAHU might prevent effective ofEensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific
for a long period.
(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas
organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force
which initiates hostile action.
[5^7] (e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange
fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from
our intelligence service.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was that in accord. Admiral, with your views at or
about that date, March of '41 ?
Vice Admiral Smith. I would say that this is an estimate of the
situation in which all possibilities were considered. I would also state
that I know of no one in this area who really believed there would
be a hostile air attack on the Hawaiian Islands, but we guarded against
it. I believe that prior to this date — I know that prior to this date,
in fact the 15th of February, we issued an order, 2CL-41, which was
later revised in the middle of October, that provided for this very
thing, for both air and submarine attack, and also that our ships were
so moored at all moorings in Pearl Harbor — in the first place, the
heavy ships had to be headed out before they were moored, and they
were so moored that it provided in all four areas there was an arc of
fire from every direction from which planes could come from a 360
degree arc. And I remember that we knew at that time the Army
plan was to throw a cordon of light anti-aircraft guns around Pearl
Harbor, but we felt that the guns of the fleet, in case of a surprise
attack, would be much more effective than anything the Army had.
It was for that reason that we moored the ships as we did.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, will you refer to exhibit 8 of the Naval
Court record and state whether or not that is the Pacific Fleet letter
on the security of the fleet at base and in the operating areas which
you just mentioned?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, that is. It is a revision of a similar letter
issued on the 15th of February, 1941.
[34s] Mr. SoNNETT. And that revision was issued on October 14,
1941, was it not, sir?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you read assumption 2 (b) of the Pacific Fleet
confidential letter into the record. Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
2. . . .
(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by :
(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.
(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area.
(3) a combination of these two.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that, I take it, Admiral, it was your view that a
surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility?
206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Smith. Oil, yes, but a remote possibility, I would say.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that was the basis for the fleet letter on security
and of the war plans ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. That possibility, also, Admiral, reflected your knowl-
edge, did it not, of the fact that historically the Japanese had attacked
without declaration of war.
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you, Admiral, refer to exhibit 15 of the Naval
Court record, which is exhibit 24 of this investigation, and state
whether or not you saw that dispatch at or about the date it bears ?
Vice Admiral Smiiti. I don't recall whether I saw it at the time.
I think I did. I am familiar with the dispatch.
Mr. SoNNETT. For the sake of the record, will you just briefly
describe what that dispatch is?
[349] Vice Admiral Smith. It is from the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations to the Commanders-in-Chief, Asiatic, Pacific, and tlie Com-
mandants of Districts 11, 12, 13, and 15, with information to Cinclant
and Spenavo, London, and it states :
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X
This situation couplejd with statements of Japanese Government and movements
their naval and military forcess indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a pos-
sibility X . . . Action adees to inform senior Army ofl5cers their areas X
Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation
or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, will you refer to exhibit 17, Admiral, of the
Naval Court record, which is exhibit 25 of this investgation, and state
whether or not you saw this dispatch at or about the date it bears ?
Vice Admiral Smith. I saw it on the date it was received, the 27th of
November.
Mr. Sonnett. Again, for the sake of the record, will you state what
that dispatch is ?
Vice Admiral Smith. It starts out by saying : "This dispatch is to
be considered a war warning," and then unfortunately it tells us where
the attack is coming from or what will be attacked.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you read that language into the record, Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Smith. "This dispatch is to be considered a war
warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization
of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by
Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equip-
ment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces
indicates an amphibious expedition [S50] against either the
Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL46 X Inform district and Army authorities X
A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo
inform British."
Mr. Sonnett. That is the so-called war warning of November 27th,
Admiral, is it not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you refer now to exhibit 18 of the Naval Court,
the following exhibit, and state whether or not you saw that dispatch
at or about the date it bears ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 207
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, I remember this very well.
Mr. SoNNETT. Again, will you state what that dispatch is?
Vice Admiral Smith. This dispatch was received by the Army from
the War Department, as well as by the Commander-in-Chief from the
Navy Department, and we were in conference for several days on it
as to how to carry it out. It required us to move to replace our planes
in the outlying islands, Midway and Wake, by Army planes, as I
remember.
It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from
Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier X Planes will be flown ofE at des-
tination and ground personnel landed in boats essential spare parts tools and
ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of Regular Navy supply
vessels X Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents X Navy
must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other
Army supplies X Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with
planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines X Additional parking areas
should be laid promptly if necessary X Can Navy bombs now at outlying posi-
tions be carried by Army bombers which may fly [351] to those positions
for supporting Navy operations X Confer with commanding general and advise
as soon as practicable.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is the date of that dispatch, Admiral?
Vice Admiral Smith. November 26, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. I believe you stated that several days were spent in
conference on that subject ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the conferences were between General Short and
Admiral Kimmel ?
Vice Admiral Smith. And their staffs.
Mr. SoNNETT. And their staffs ?
Vice Admiral Smith. And the Commanding General of the Army
Air Force.
Mr. SoNNETT. As I recall your previous testimony, Admiral, you
indicated that it was in connection with that subject that General
Short and Admiral Kimmel had the closest to a dispute that you ever
saw between them ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state just what that was?
Vice Admiral Smith. During the discussion, we informed the Army
that the planes they placed on Wake would have to remain there for
the duration of a war, if any, because it was impossible to put a ship
in there and take them out and Army planes are not equipped to
land on a carrier, although they can take off from a carrier. Admiral
Kimmel then asked, "What may I expect of Army fighters on Wake?"
and General Martin of the Army Air Force replied, "We do not allow
them to go more than fifteen miles offshore," to which Admiral
Kimmel replied, "Then they are [S52] no damn good to me,"
or words to that effect. General Short stated, not angrily at all, that,
"If I man these islands, I must command them," and Kimmel replied,
"Only over my dead body. The Army should exercise no command
over Navy bases." General Short replied, "Mind you, I do not want
these islands. I think they are better manned by Marines. But if I
must put troops and planes on them, then I must command them."
And that was the extent of the controversy.
208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Actually, Admiral, subsequently Marines were used
instead of Army personnel, were they not, to reenforce the islands?
Vice Admiral Smith. Before Pearl Harbor, Admiral Halsey was
on his way with the ENTERPRISE to land an additional squadron
of Marine planes, but the plan, as I recall it, went further than re-
placing planes; the troops were involved also, because I remember
that the Army had no guns and it was necessary for us to leave our
guns there.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it then, Admiral, that at or about the time
of the receipt of the so-called war warning of November 27th, Gen-
eral Short and Admiral Kimmel were engaged in considerable dis-
cussion about this proposal to reenforce Midway and Wake with
Army personnel ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, they were.
Mr. SoNNETT. What conferences and discussions were held, Ad-
miral, after November 27th concerning the so-called war warning
message ?
Vice Admiral Smith. A conference was held in Admiral Kimmel's
office that afternoon. Admiral Bloch was not present since he was
visiting his wife in the hospital. He was represented by Captain
Earle. The conference was held, to my recollection, about 5 p. m.
I do not recall whether General Short was present at that one, but
I know that the Intelligence [353] Officer was given a copy of
the dispatch to take over and make certain that General Short got it.
I am quite certain a conference was held the next day. In the mean-
time, on the evening of the 27th, the Army was on the march. It
manned the public utilities, reservoirs, and so on, to protect them
against possible sabotage, which apparently was what the Army feared
most in these islands. How many conferences were held later, I do
not recall, but by that time we were conferring at least every other
day. I was jDresent at most of the conferences. But one night I recall
that Admiral Kimmel at 6 o'clock called up General Short at General
Short's home and General Short said he was about to go up to the
north side of the island and Kimmel said, "Stay there ; I am coming
over to see you," which he did. What that conference was about, I
don't know, but I imagine it was on this same subject. I was not
present at that,
Mr. SoNNETT. How was the so-called war warning of November
27th evaluated by Admiral Kimmel, sir?
Vice Admiral Smith. There were several considerations. One was
negotiations had been resumed on the arrival of Kurusu. There was
a report that Admiral Hart's seaplanes had discovered large Japanese
forces moving south. The Intelligence Officer placed the position of
some Japanese forces somewhere supposedly in the Marshalls. The
Combinet Fleet, as I recollect it, was in home waters and the carriers
were supposedly in home waters also. Therefore, we felt, not know-
ing whether the United States would be in the war or not — many of the
directions we received, mostly in personal letters from Admiral Stark,
but which are on file, cautioned us not to take any action that might
foment a war. The people of the United States were diAnded in their
opinions apparently. We believed that their [3S4.] attack
would be on the Dutch and British to the south and that if they did at-
tack us, it would be in the Philippines. We had no assurance from our
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 209
government that the United States would go to war if the Dutch and
British were attacked. We were in constant training, intensive train-
ing, to prepare for war, but there was nothing in that message that led
us to believe that Pearl Harbor was threatened with an air attack.
We did expect a surprise submarine attack.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the November 24th dispatch from
OpNav, that dispatch started, did it not, as follows:
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan vei'y doubtful x This
situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their
naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive move-
ment in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility?
'Upon receipt of that dispatch was it found that the views of yourself
and Admiral Kimmel were in accord with the situation as stated in
the dispatch?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, but the words, "In any direction includ-
ing an attack on the Philippines and Guam" implies that they are not
coming any farther east than the Philippines or Guam.
Mr. SoNNETT. Of course, it was true at that time, Admiral, that it
was your estimate, as set forth in the various war plans, that a surprise
attack on Oahu by air was a possibility?
Vice Admiral Smith. Always, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And this dispatch said, did it not, that a surprise
aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines
or Guam, is a possibility?
Vice Admiral Smith. That's right.
Mr. Sonnett. Now, referring to the so-called war warning of
[SS5] November 27th that started out, did it not, sir, by stating,
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning" ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Had you ever received a dispatch before that time
in such language ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No, and as I have previously testified, if they
put a period after the words "war warning," it would have been a much
more effective message. We had received many letters from the Chief
of Naval Operations — in fact, almost weekly warnings — and Admiral
Kimmel's predecessor, Admiral Richardson, had received similar warn-
ings. Perhaps we received too many of them. But we hadn't received
one saying, "This is to be considered a war warning," not previously.
Mr. Sonnett. The second sentehce of that November 27th dis-
patch. Admiral, was as follows, was it not :
Negotiations with Japan looking towards stabilization of conditions in the
Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next
few days?
Vice Admiral Smith. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. Was that substantially in accord with your own views
at the time of receipt of the warning, namely, that within a few days
Japan would strike somewhere ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, but I have a vague recollection that on
the same date that this was received we had some other word, possibly
in the local paper, that negotiations had been resumed, and, of course,
they were resumed,
Mr. Sonnett. Of course. Admiral, I take it that you do not mean to
state that as between a newspaper account • .
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 15
210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Smith. Oh, no.
Mr. SoNNETT. And an OpNav dispatch, you would lend more cred-
ence [356] to a newspaper account?
Vice Admiral Smith. Oh, no. Something had happened — it must
have been another dispatch — by which we learned that negotiations
had been resumed.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, the receipt of dispatches dur-
ing the first week of December, 1941, advising that the Japanese were
destroying their codes ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that, I take it, confirmed the impression that
war was imminent with Japan ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, and we had directed Guam to destroy its
codes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, Admiral, what specific steps were taken be-
tween November 27th and December 7, 1941, as a result of this war
warning ?
Vice Admiral Smith. "We continued our intensive schedule for
training, having always at least one task force operating and usually
two. We notified all task force commanders of the receipt of this
message and called attention to our order 2CX«-41 of October 15th or
12th. We had our destroyers — the big ships were always protected
by destroyers against submarine attack. We carried out our air
searches in the operating area. I am quite certain we had alerts in
the harbor just for training. We prepared to carry out the war plan
if ordered to do so.
Mr. SoNNETT. Which of those actions. Admiral, was not in effect
before November 27th ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Before November 27th, on any suspicious
sighting or on sound contact with anything that could be an enemy
submarine, a signal was sent out immediately and all forces in the
operating area [357] ceased whatever training they were do-
ing ; the destroyers went at high speed to protect the carriers and bat-
tleships, carrying out the provisions of existing directives. This hap-
pened on many occasions, sometimes when the entire fleet was at sea.
Early in Admiral Kimmel's administration he reported to the Chief
of Naval Operations that he had on one occasion issued orders to
depth charge a suspicious contact in the operating area and had
changed those orders. The Chief of Naval Operations in his letter
stated, "Thank God you didn't," or words to that effect. Before the
27th of November, Admiral Kimmel, with no instructions from the
Navy Department, issued orders that any submarine within a radius
of one mile, I believe it was, possibly three miles, of the entrance to
Pearl Harbor would be depth charged by the offshore patrol. After
November 27th, it is my recollection that he issued orders to depth
charge submarines in any area in which we were operating.
Mr. SoNNETT. As to the air patrol of operating areas, Admiral, that
had been in effect, I take it, prior to November 27th ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Oh, yes, that had been in effect, I should say,
during the entire year of 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that air patrol of the operating areas was con-
tinued after November 27th ?
Vice Admiral Smitp. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 211
Mr, SoNNETT. For the sake of the record, Admiral, will you just
state generally what the operating areas were?
Vice Admiral Smith. The operating areas were to the south of
Oahu for approximately thirty miles and extending east and west.
Some ships were operating around Maui. Those were the general
operating areas. Occasionally we operated to the north of Oahu, and
shortly before Pearl Harbor we had a fleet exercise for the entire fleet
to the north of Oahu, [358] and it was very intensive, dark-
ened at night, as we had been for some time, and, of course, on occa-
sions like those the air searches were to the northward to protect the
fleet.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there any air search from Oahu to the north
after November 27th and prior to the attack?
Vice Admiral Smfth. I cannot recall.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall whether the operation to which you
just testified occurred after November 27th and before the attack?
Vice Admiral Smith. There were no operations to the north be-
tween 27 November and 7 December 1941, although I believe we would
send a destroyer at night to make a trip along the north shore, with
the possibility that the destroyer might find a submarine lurking
there or communicating with the beach. I know that that was done
early in the war and I believe that it was done after November 27th.
Mr. SoNNETT. You testified before the Naval Court that, in sub-
stance, as Chief of Staff you did not maintain a current written estimate
of the situation, but that you did maintain a current mental estimate,
and that the situation was discussed daily and that daily the War Plans
Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer presented their estimates to
Admiral Kimmel. Is that correct?
Vice Admiral Smith. Correct, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Who was the War Plans Officer ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Captain, now Vice Admiral, C. H. McMorris.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the Fleet Intelligence Officer?
Vice Admiral Smith. Was Lieutenant Commander, now Captain,
Layton.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that practice of furnishing a daily estimate was
followed from November 27th to December 7th ?
[359] Vice Admiral Smith. Followed long before that.
Mr. SoNNETT. And also during that period?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Before the Naval Court, Admiral, you stated in
answer to a question as to the adequacy of the state of readiness exist-
ing on December 7th, in substance, as follows : That in your opinion
the state of readiness was adequate to meet the emergency envisaged
in the warning messages and then you said : "You must remember that
what we were thinking about in the Pacific was not the defense of
Pearl Harbor. We were thinking about the fleet and the readiness
of the fleet. I believe that the state of readiness is indicated by the
fact that how quickly the gun crews responded to the fire AVhich was
absolutely unexpected. We exercised as much security as we could
in port. We realized that the Army defenses were not adequate, that
ships were stationed in sectors and every sector was always occupied
for anti-aircraft fire, but we also had to get that fleet in readiness to
go back to sea. It happened at a time when two task forces were in
212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
port. Usually only one was in port. Sometimes three were at sea,
depending upon the exercises that were projected by the Commander-
in-Chief. The readiness of the ships — they were ready for anything,
but they were thinking mostly of how soon they could get out and how
to get out and go into battle. They were not thinking about the de-
fense of Pearl Harbor."
Is that a correct statement of your views during the period after
November 27, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, it is.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it, then, that the primary emphasis. Admiral,
during that so-called critical period after November 27th was on
preparation for offensive action by the fleet ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, to get ready, yes.
[360] Mr. SoNNETT. And that your thinking was primarily on
that score?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoxNETT. Admiral, among the intelligence which you received
prior to the attack, do you recall any information received from inter-
cepted telephone conversations of the Japanese, or from intercepted
cable messages from the Japanese ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No. Those cable messages were brought to
me two days after the attack on Pearl Harbor. We, so far as I know,
had intercepted no important messages concerning enemy movements.
Mr. SoNNETT. Either telephonically or by cable?
Vice Admiral Smith. No.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, would you state for the record your esti-
mate of the situation and of possible enemy courses of action during
the period November 27th to December 7, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Smith. I believe I have stated before we thought
that the enemy would take his first action to the south against the
British and Dutch, possibly the Philippines. Early in 1941 I recall
an officer messenger coming through from Admiral Hart's flagship
in which he gave his estimate of the possibility that the Japanese
would go south and would bypass the Philippines and not attack them
at all ; would get Hong Kong and places to the south before that. I
don't say that we agreed with that, but it was my estimate, and I be-
lieve the estimate of the staff, that their activities would be confined to
the Far East to take everything they needed there before any action
was taken to the eastward; and always, because of their previous
history, the possibility of a very strong submarine attack to disable
our heavy ships.
Mr. SoNNETT. That is, in the Pearl Harbor area?
[S61] Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it also. Admiral, that it was your estimate after
November 27, 1941, that an air attack at Pearl Harbor was a possi-
bility?
Vice Admiral Smith. A possibility, but certainly not a probability.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 8 of this investigation,
which consists of photostatic copies of three dispatches, and ask
whether you recall having seen those.
Vice Admiral Smith. I don't recall ever having seen this dispatch,
but this intelligence is of the nature given to the Commander-in-Chief
by our Intelligence Officer, who worked very closely with the In-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 213
telligence Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District, and I recall this
particularly, that "our best indications are that all known First and
Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area."
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 21, Admiral, and ask you if you
can identify it.
Vice Admiral Smith. I don't recall ever having seen this.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, having received at or about
that date, which, I believe, is November 27th, information to the effect
substantially that the Japanese had organized their carriers into a
separate force, that they were estimated to have five carrier divisions,
consisting of a total of ten carriers?
Vice Admiral Smith. I do not recall that. We knew how many they
had, but I don't recall any special organization they had formed.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is your recollection as to the number of car-
riers that the Japanese had?
Vice Admiral Smith. Eleven, including the small ones.
Mr. SoNNETT. And they were organized into divisions, Admiral?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, as I recall it.
[362] Mr. SoNNETT. How many carriers to a division?
Vice Admiral Smith. I think two.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you. Admiral exhibit 22, photostatic copies
of communication intelligence summaries, and call your attention par-
ticularly to those during the period November 27th to December 6,
1941, and ask, first, if you can identify the initials appearing in the
lower right-hand corner of those summaries.
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, Admiral H. E. Kimmel.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you examine those, Admiral, and state whether
or not you received them during the period November 27th to De-
cember 6, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Smith. I don't remember just when this was received,
but I assume it was received on or after 27 November. I would say
that the Intelligence Officer held his stuff very, very close and, as I
have stated, I was usually present in his daily meeting with the Com-
mander-in-Chief, but there was so much administrative work going on
that frequently I was called from the office for some other purpose.
However, I was familiar with these estimates, traffic analyses.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was your estimate. Admiral, from November
27th to December 6, 1941, as to the location of the Japanese carriers?
Vice Admiral Smith, About as stated here, some in the Marshalls
and the remainder in home areas. As this states, "An air unit in the
Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KOR YU and the SHOKAKU.
Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of further
movement of any combined air force to Hainan."
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, would you examine the summaries after
November 27th and up to December 6, 1941, and point out the infor-
mation which was the basis for your belief that the carriers remained
in those [363] locations?
Vice Admiral Smith. Now, I see nothing very alarming in these
dispatches up to Pearl Harbor. On one day the traffic will be very
light, radio traffic, and on the next day it is very heavy right up to the
6th of December. The fact that you don't hear from the Second Fleet,
he doesn't originate any message, doesn't necessarily mean that he
is on the way to Pearl Harbor. Our own forces while at sea exercising
214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
maintained radio silence. We had a very large force, almost half of
the Pacific Fleet, in May, 1941, proceed to the Atlantic and no traffic
was heard from them for a period of some six weeks. So the absence
of radio traffic from the forces at sea doesn't indicate anything to me.
Mr. SoNNETT. Does it indicate that they are at sea. Admiral?
Vice Admiral Smith. It indicates the probability that they are at
sea, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And it is the fact that after December 1, 1941, there
was no information from the Japanese carriers' radio traffic ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No, except after saying there js no informa-
tion, they usually wind up with, "They are believed to be in home
waters."
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there any such statement in the summaries,
Admiral?
Vice Admiral Smith. On the 27th, "Carriers are still located in
home waters. No information of further movement of any combined
air force units to Hainan." The 29th, "The arrival of Air Squadron
Seven in the Takao area is confirmed. The presence of Cruiser Divi-
sion Four is not confirmed nor denied. The dispatches indicate today
that the following units are under the immediate command of the
Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet," That includes several sub-
marine divisions and destroyer squadrons and [364] two car-
riers, Cardiv 3. On the 1st of December, "Carriers no change."
Mr. SoNNETT. On the 1st it was noted that there was a change in
Japanese radio calls. Admiral, was it not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes. I didn't know about that before. In
fact, that impresses me more than anything I have read here, and it
is followed by great confusion because they cannot locate anybody.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you note their statement, Admiral — I think it
is on the 2nd — concerning the blank of information as to carriers and
tell us what your evaluation of that was?
Vice Admiral Smith. On the 2nd:
COMBINED AIR FORCE— This force continues to be associated closely with
Second, Third, and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force
have undoubtedly left the Takao area.
Mr. Sonnett. Just after that, Admiral, the next paragraph.
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identi-
fication has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over
200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of
December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier
traffic is at a low ebb.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall having seen that. Admiral, at the time ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No, I do not. It is too long ago. I do not
recall.
Mr. Sonnett. And on the ord, if you will just note the reference
to carriers.
Vice Adjniral Smith. I don't see anything on the 3rd of Decem-
ber
Mr. Sonnett. On the last line, Admiral.
[S6'5] Vice Admiral Smith. "No information on submarines
or carriers." Then on the 4th
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall having noted the lack of information
on the 3rd as to carriers ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 215
Vice Admiral Smith. I don't recall it. On the 4th it gives the
information that the Second Fleet, which includes the carriers, was
in the vicinity of Takao.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was that. Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Smith. On the 4th, speaking of the Combined Fleet :
The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the Com-
mander-in-Chief Second Fleet and the Commander-in-Chief Third Fleet. . . .
These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that
the Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the
aipparently conflicting evidence is destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast, which
CinC Second Fleet is still copying. CinC Combined Fleet sent one message to an
unidentified unit for information to the Third Base Force, Palao, and CinC
Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet as information addressees.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, do you recall whether the lack of informa-
tion as to Japanese carriers which is set forth in the communication
intelligence summaries after December 1, 1941, was discussed between
you and Admiral Kimmel?
Vice Admiral Smith. No. My recollection is that he questioned
the Intelligence Officer on it, in fact, every day, but I don't know
that we discussed that or what it might possibly mean. It is more
likely that he might have done it with the War Plans Officer. He fre-
quently sent for the War Plans Officers while I was doing something
else. He may have discussed it with them.
[366] Mr. SoNNETT. In that connection, Admiral, I show you
exhibit 23, which is a December 1, 1941, memorandum from the Fleet
Intelligence Officer to the Admiral on the location of the Japanese
fleet, and ask whether you recall having seen that.
Vice Admiral Smith. I recollect that this report was called for by
the Commander-in-Chief. I probably saw it at the time. In fact, it
was submitted frequently.
Mr. SoNNETT. That, I take it, was a special report by the Fleet
Intelligence Officer at the Commander-in-Chief's request ?
Vice Admiral Smith. To the Commander-in-Chief- That was
not distributed to the staff. It may have gone through the War
Plans Section.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, do you recall whether or not you saw that
estimate at the tme, that is, about December 1 or 2, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No. It looks very familiar to me, but my
recollection is that I saw more than one of those, and this particular
one I don't recall. Undoubtedly I saw it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall. Admiral, that at that time it was
noted by the Commander-in-Chief that this estimate did not account
for the whereabouts of Japanese Carrier Divisions One and Two ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No.
Mr. Sonnett. You recall no conversation with Admiral Kimmel
on that point ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No.
Mr. Sonnett. And you did not, I take it, participate in any meet-
ings between Admiral Kimmel and Layton at which that point was
discussed ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No, I don't remember.
Mr. Sonnett. What discussion, Admiral, if any, during the period
November 27 to December 6, 1941, do you recall with Admfral Kimmel
concerning [367] aircraft reconnaissance ?
216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Smith. He had frequent conversations with Admiral
Bellinger, who is much more capable of answering that question than
I am. Just on which days those conferences were held, I don't know,
but they frequently discussed the practicability of more extensive use
of patrol planes, and it is my recollection that Bellinger outlined his
limitations to Admiral Kimmel on several occasions, that he was lim-
ited by the number of engines he had. He was trying to get leak-
proof tanks installed. It was a question of whether he should put it
all into training or wear out his planes, of which he had not too many.
Mr. SoxNETT. Do you recall any such discussion, Admiral, after
November 27, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No, I could not. I could not be certain about
that.
' Mr. SoNNETT. I show you a route sheet and correspondence to
which are annexed aircraft schedules, together with a photostatic copy
of an outgoing dispatch from CincPac to ComPatWing Two, dated
22 November 1911, and ask whether you recall those.
Vice Admiral Smith. My recollection is that the Fleet Aviator
discussed this with Kimmel. He would never prepare a dispatch of
this kind without bringing it to Admiral Kimmel s attention. And
I undoubtedly released the dispatch, but I wouldn't have done so had
Kimmel not known what was going on.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, those schedules. Admiral, set forth the utiliza-
tion of the patrol planes of the fleet from November 17, 1941, up to
and including December 31, 1911, do they not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
[368] Mr. SoNNETT. And the schedules as submitted were ap-
proved on November 22, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Sjiith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark a photostatic copy of the route sheet
and schedules together with a photostatic copy of the dispatch ap-
proving them, Admiral, as an exhibit ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And for the sake of the record, Admiral, the docu-
ment I show you is a photostatic copy of the original document you
have before you, is it not ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
(The documents referred to T\-ere received and marked "Exhibit
37.")
IVIr. SoNNETT. Admiral, these schedules do not provide for any
reconnaissance from Oahu, do they ?
Vice Admiral Smith. It is not so stated here and it probably came
under "training" because it is certain that the searches were conducted
daily in the operating area. It would appear that no particular
squadron was assigned that duty and that was probably part of their
training.
Mr. SoNXETT. These schedules. Admiral, were approved before re-
ceipt of the November 24th and the November 27th, or war warning,
dispatches, were they not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel
after November 27th concerning the necessity or desirability for
revision of these schedules ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 217
Vice Admiral Sjhith. I do not recall. So many things happened
that I cannot remember that. I think it is more likely that Admiral
Bellinger [369] or Rear Admiral A. C. Davis, the Fleet Avia-
tor, would be able to answer that question.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall any discussion during the period No-
vember 27th to December 6th of any proposed Army reconnaissance
over the Mandated Islands ?
Vice Admiral S^iith. Two planes had long been directed by the
Chief of Naval Operations to make a flight from Hawaii over the
Mandated Islands, to land, I believe, in New Caledonia, then to pro-
ceed to Australia and to Manila. The purpose of this flight was
photographic reconnaissance and the planes were ordered by the Chief
of Naval Operations not to circle the Mandated Islands but to proceed
directly over them, then furnish the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic,
and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, with copies of the photogi'aphs.
One of the planes had arrived in Pearl Harbor, but, as I recall the
conversation between Admiral Bellinger and the Commander-in-Chief,
they had failed to bring their camera with them or some item of very
important equipment. To the best of my knowledge, the second plane
never arrived and the flight was never made before Pearl Harbor.
Mr. SoNNETT. These were Army planes. Admiral, were they not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, they were Army planes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And when you said that the reconnaissance had been
directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, did you mean the Chief of
Staff of the Army ?
Vice Admiral Smith. It probably was the Chief of Staff. I dare
say that it resulted from a conference because their orders were to
deliver the photographs to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Kimmel,
the copies ; so I imagine the Navy must have been in it.
[370] Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 28 of this investigation.
Admiral, and ask you whether you recall having seen that at or about
November 28, 1941.
Vice Admiral Smith. I don't recall having seen this paper, and I
doubt if I did see it. However, I knew about the flight as projected.
I was of the opinion — I still am of the opinion — ^that the flight was
ordered long before November 28th, but the planes weren't ready.
Mr, SoNNETT. Admiral, you testified before the Naval Court, in
substance, that you thought that the intent of the war warning
message of the 27th was to get you on your toes out here and to get you
ready to execute the war plan. Is that correct ?
Vice Admiral Smith. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. And you recall that the November 27th message di-
rected that an appropriate defensive development preparatory to
carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 be executed? Do you
recall that provision of the exhibit?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Now, will you state what discussion was had with
Admiral Kimmel concerning the steps to be taken to constitute an
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
initial tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet by the war plans ?
Vice Admiral Smith. I cannot remember in detail, but I do recall
conferences over the charts. Admiral Kimmel taking the type com-
manders personally to the War Plans Office and going over all these
218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
islands of the Marshalls and Carolines ; discussions of what might be
found there; whether they would be soft or difficult; that that had
been going on for months.
[371] Mr. SoNNETT. Keferring to exhibit 35, the Pacific Fleet
War Plan, you will recall, Admiral, that the initial tasks assigned to
the Pacific Fleet were in Phase I, namely, Japan not in the war,
and Phase la, Japan in the war; that under Phase I, one of the tasks
was: "g. To protect the communications and territory of the Asso-
ciated Powers and to prevent the extension of enemy military power
into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and
patrol planes and by the action of striking groups as necessary" ; also,
"m. To guard against surprice attack by Japan."
What, if any, consideration was given to the steps to be taken to
carry out those initial tasks which were to be taken before Japan
got into the war ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Well, the .ships had already been designated
for each task long before 27 November. All that was needed was
the word to carry out the plan.
Mr. SoNNETT. As I recall your earlier testimony. Admiral, the
Phase I initial tasks required no Navy Department direction to be
carried out?
Vice Admiral Smith. Well, certain parts of it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Specifically, the portions I just called to your atten-
tion, namely, to protect the communications and territory of the Asso-
ciated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power
into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and
patrol planes, and also to guard against surprise attack. Was there
any consideration given as to the means or methods to be employed
to carry out the directive ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Certain of those items were already being
done without the plan being in effect. For example, we had sub-
marines stationed off Midway and Wake, fighting planes out of Wake,
and patrol [37^] planes operating from Midway. Whenever
a task force moved with a carrier, they always had their planes in
the air on a search. We always, over our ships, launched our planes
for protection against submarines. We had been doing that a long
time.
Mr. SoNNETT. I note that one of the Phase I initial tasks to be
taken when Japan was not in the war, as set forth in the war plan,
was "h," namely, to establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake
and Midway.
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. That was, o;f course, done. Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Smith. That was done.
Mr. SoNNETT. Prior to the attack?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. What I would like to get at is what was done in
connection with the other similar Phase I tasks in connection with
the patrolling by light forces and patrol planes and guarding against
attack by Japan.
Vice Admiral Smith. I would say that the only thing that wasn't
done was the guarding with patrol planes in the direction of Japan
or to the northward. I have forgotten just where in the phase it comes,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 219
but remember we had to send cruisers and submarines to the north
and southeast Pacific, Samoa. That was not considered a necessary
preliminary to the mobilization.
. IVIr. SoNNETT. Would the establishment of aircraft patrol from
Oahu have been an appropriate defensive deployment to carry out
the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war plans?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, it would.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you. Admiral, exhibits 69 A and 69B of the
Naval Court of Inquiry and ask you whether you can identify those.
[S73] Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, I do.
Mr, SoNNETT. Will you state what they are. Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Smith. This is a memorandum for the Commander-
in-Chief, prepared by the War Plans Officer, Captain McMorris, dated
30 November 1941. It is a recommendation to the Commander-in-
Chief on steps to be taken in case of an American-Japanese war within
twenty-four hours of the date of the memorandum. This is followed
by a second memorandum of the same nature, dated noon, December
5, 1941, recommending steps to be taken in case of an American-Japa-
nese war within the next forty-eight hours.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you see those at or about the dates they bear,
Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Smith. I believe so.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you find in either of those memoranda any pro-
vision made to carry out the initial tasks laid down in the war plans
concerning aircraft patrol ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No, I do not.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you participate in any discussion with Admiral
Kimmel or with Captain McMorris concerning the adequacy of the
steps recommended by him in those memoranda ?
Vice Admiral Smith. I don't recollect having done so.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel
during this period November 27th to December 7, 1941, of the lack of
information reflected in the intelligence summaries as to Japanese
carriers ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No. There were frequent discussions, but
lack of sufficient information from the Navy Department. We be-
lieved at that time that our intelligence was adequate. We received
very little from Naval Intelligence. It is possible that the Intelli-
gence Officer of the [374] Fourteenth Naval District and the
Intelligence Officer of the Commander-in-Chief received more infor-
mation than I know of. Occasionally a paper from the State Depart-
ment would pass over my desk on conditions in Japan, but I never
saw anything alarming in one of those papers. I believe they came
out monthly. There may, of course, have been other reports of the
State Department of a more secret nature that weren't issued to us at
all. If there were, they weren't shown to me. I do not recall any
discussion of the adequacy or inadequacy of our own intelligence
staff. The same two officers are continuing the same jobs; so they are
apparently considered satisfactory now.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, was it the fact that, so far as your intelli-
gence was concerned relating to the movements of Japanese naval
vessels, your reliance was on the intelligence submitted by the Fleet
Intelligence Officer primarily ?
220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Which was most current?
Vice Admiral Smith. And based upon the analysis of radio traffic.
At that time, to the best of my knowledge, our people were unable to
decipher Japanese naval codes. They did decipher commercial codes,
the movements of commercial ships.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Admiral, to your previous testunony that
your estimate was that a surprise attack by the Japanese on the fleet
in the harbor by air was possible but not probable, will you state the
basis for that estimate ?
Vice Admiral Smith. There was a great deal of doubt in our minds
that Japan would go to war with us unless Germany did so also. Our
information from all sources, including the Navy Department, and
our [37S] intelligence did not indicate that the Japanese fleet
had any intentions or was on the way to attack Pearl Harbor. The
Japanese fleet, as located, indicated no move in this direction, and,
I believe, most important of all, we doubted whether the Japanese
would dare send a large force as far to the eastward as Hawaii. The
possibility that they might be located even by a neutral ship existed.
They might have been located several times before their arrival there,
in which case they would have been at a great disadvantage. I believe
that all of these things existed in the back of our minds and it was
for this reason that we did not fear an air attack.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation then, at 12:05 p. m., recessed until 1:30 p. m,,
at which time is reconvened.)
( Present : The same parties. )
[376] Two witnesses entered, each read the precept, and each
was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state your name and rank, Commander ?
Commander Burr. Harold S. Burr, Commander, USNE.
Mr. SoNNETT. Lieutenant?
Lieutenant Woodrum. Donald Woodrum, Lieutenant, USNR.
Mr. SoNNETT. Commander, what is your present assignment ?
Commander Burr. I am Acting District Intelligence Officer, Four-
teenth Naval District.
Mr. SoNNETT. And yours, Lieutenant?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I am attached to the District Intelligence
Office, Fourteenth Naval District.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was your assignment in 1941, Commander ?
Commander Burr. I was Naval Liaison Officer for the Commandant
at the headquarters of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, and on the complement of the District Intelligence Office.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you give us an outline of what your duties
were as Liaison Officer, generally ?
Commander Burr. Sir, it was a new job and I was sort of a handy-
man, trying to help the Army with its problems involving the Navy,
seeing that officers in the Army were placed in touch with appropriate
officers in the District in order to accomplish missions of mutual re-
sponsibility or interest. It was a very broad field.
Admiral Hewitt. I suppose also you advised them about naval af-
fairs insofar as you could ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 221
Commander Bukr. Yes, sir.
[377] Mr, SoNNETT. Did you know in 1941 then Lieutenant
Commander Layton ?
Commander Burr. I did.
Mr. SoNiNTETT. And what was his assignment at that time?
Commander Burr. I understood it to be Fleet Intelligence Officer.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall on or about November 27, 1941, receiv-
ing from Lieutenant Commander Layton a message for delivery to
General Short?
Commander Burr. I think it was received directly from Lieutenant
Commander Layton, but I am not sure. It was at CincPac and he as
well as others were there at the time. The Chief of Staff, Fourteenth
Naval District, was there, and I couldn't swear it was Commander
Layton, although I am sure he is acquainted with the message.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 17 of the Naval Court of Inquiry
and ask whether the message -which you received at that time was a
copy of this or substantially a copy of this message.
Commander Burr. I would say it appears to be substantially the
same.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state what you did with that message at
that time. Commander ?
Comn^ander Burr. I was instructed to delivery that message to Gen-
eral Short, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. It
was after hours by the time I received it, but I drove directly to Fort
Shafter and attempted to locate General Short. No one seemed to
know where he was at the time. I knew that the message was urgent ;
so I looked for the Chief of Staff, who was next senior, and I couldn't
find him. The Senior Officer Present was Colonel Donnegan, then
Lieutenant Colonel William Donnegan, head of G-3, which, I be-
lieve, is the next senior officer. So I showed the [3781 message
to him and explained my eagerness to reach General Short, and, as
nearly as I can recollect, he stated that he would see to it that General
Short saw it and that since he was apparently the action officer, he
would proceed to act on the message at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you leave the message with him ?
Commander Burr. Reluctantly.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you subsequently ascertain whether the message
had been delivered to General Short ?
Commander Burr. Yes, sir, I checked with Colonel Donnegan and
was informed that it had been delivered to General Short.
Mr. SoNNETT. When were you told by Colonel Donnegan that it had
been delivered to General Short ?
Commander Burr. On or about the 28th, the following day.
Mr. SoNNETT. I think, Admiral, that is all on that particular point.
Admiral Hewit't. I think that is all.
Mr. SoNNETT. Lieutenant, during 1941 were you familiar with the
telephone taps which were on the line of the Japanese Consulate in
Honolulu ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. After about October I was made familiar
with them.
Mr. SoxxETT. Do you have in the files of the District Intelligence
Office transcripts of the telephone conversations so intercepted ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I do. ' '
222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. In addition to taps on the line of the Japanese Consul,
were there telephone taps on the line of the Japanese Vice Consul as
well?
Lieutenant Woodrum. There was a tap on the private line of the
[S79] Japanese Vice Consul in the Consulate itself.
Mr. SoNNTiTT. In addition to the telephone taps by ONI* on the busi-
ness phones of the Japanese Consul and Vice Consul, did you for a time
have taps on their home phones ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. Yes, we did. We had a tap on the home
phone of the Consul General until about September and on the Vice
Consul until we shut down,
Mr. SoNNETT. When did you discontinue tapping the telephone
wires in question, Lieutenant?
Lieutenant Woodrum. December 2, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you state in general the nature and type of in-
formation which was acquired from the telephone taps you have
described ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. There was very little of military significance.
There was a great deal of information concerning the routine activi-
ties of the Consul and some informationconcerning the activities of
the local Japanese population.
Mr. SoNNETT. Could you prepare and submit for this investigation.
Lieutenant, copies of the transcripts of telephone conversatio'as inter-
cepted from October to December 2, 1941 ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I can.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark those as exhibits when received. Ad-
miral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received, to be marked "Exhibit
38.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state. Lieutenant, the reasons for the discon-
tinuance of the telephone taps by ONI on or about December 2, 1941 ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I have no personal knowledge of the reasons
[3801 for removing the taps on December 2nd, but this is my gen-
eral understanding of the reason that action was taken at that time :
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, with our cognizance, had placed
a tap on the private phone of one Kenzi Kimura, the general manager
of the NYK office in Honolulu. This occurred some time in Novem-
ber, 1941. Late in November, 1941, a member of the District Intelli-
gence Office learned from a contact at the telephone company that
workmen had uncovered the FBI tap on Mr. Kimura. The member
of the District Intelligence Office assumed that FBI had made this tap
without the cognizance of the telephone company inasmuch as the
NYK office was on the ground floor of the same building in which the
FBI office was located and the tap was in the basement of that building.
During a subsequent visit of an FBI agent, the representative of the
DIO informed him of this fact in a spirit of cooperation, with the
thought of warning him that his taps had been uncovered and security
violated. I was present at this meeting when the FBI agent was so
informed. It is my understanding that a representative of the FBI
thereafter approached the telephone company and demanded to Iniow
why their representatives were revealing FBI secrets to the Office of
Naval Intelligence. The result of this approach by the FBI was to
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 223
give one or more employees of the telephone company a realization
that this sort of activity was going on, whereas they previously, to our
knowledge, hadn't known of it.
When Captain Mayfield learned of the FBI action, he ordered all
taps to be removed. It was my understanding that the reason for
this was his concern at the violation of security caused by this incident
and his concern that some incident of possible international import
might result from such revelations. The telephone tapping work done
by ONI was kept extremely secret. Only a handful of persons in the
District [381] Intelligence Office, who were directly concerned
with the information gained thereby, were even aware that such work
was being done. Many persons attached to the office weren't aware
that such work was being done and great care was taken to prevent
their obtaining that knowledge. I was told that even the Com-
mandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was not aware of this ac-
tivity in order that he might be spared any possible embarrassment
arising from his knowledge thereof.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know whether after December 2, 1941, the
FBI tapped any of the Japanese telephone wires ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I don't know.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did they have access to the trans-Pacific telephone
conversations ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I have seen transcripts of taps they made on
conversations between Honolulu and Japan during the months of
November and December, 1941.
Mr. SoNNiETT. Among those conversations was the so-called Mori
conversation, was there not?
Lieutenant Woodrum. Yes, there was.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state when the Navy first received a tran-
script of that conversation?
Lieutenant Woodruhi. It is my understanding that this conversa-
tion took place on the evening of December 5, 1941, and that Captain
Mayfield was notified by FBI, either immediately or the following day,
that a suspicious conversation had taken place and that a translation
and transcription was being made by the FBI translator at that time.
It is my further understanding that a written translation of the con-
versation was received at the District Intelligence Office some time
[382] on December 6, 1941. At that time it was studied by Com-
mander Denzel Carr, who thereupon desired to hear the original re-
cording of the conversation. Arrangements were made with the FBI
to have him do this, but as it was late in the evening already by the
time this was done, it was agreed that he would go down the following
day and listen to the recording. At a time subsequent to the Japanese
attack, within a day or so. Commander Carr did go down and listen
to the recording. At that time he stated to me that it was his opinion
that Dr. Mori was not attempting to send information from the
Islands, but on the contrary was greatly surprised and mystified by
the whole tenor of the conversation. It was further Commander
Carr's opinion that Dr. Mori hedged and hesitated to give anything
in the way of specific military information. A study of the tran-
script reveals that strictly military subjects were discussed only briefly
and that Dr. Mori gave little or no specific military information.
224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. You have supplied us with a copy of the Mori con-
versation, have you not?
Lieutenant Woodrum. We have.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that, Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 39.")
Lieutenant Woodrum. The man who made this telephone call was
subsequently interned for accepting the telephone call.
Mr. SoNNETT. Lieutenant, was there any telephone tap by ONI or
FBI which came to the attention of Naval Intelligence prior to Decem-
ber 7, 1941, wherein military information was furnished by persons
here to any outside source?
[38S] Lieutenant Woodrum. You mean furnished here to the
Consulate ?
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, any way. Furnished to any Japanese repre-
sentative. Let's put it that way.
Lieutenant Woodrum. There are only two instances to my knowl-
edge in which this occurred. In one instance, in 1940 — I would have
to look up the right date — Japanese Vice Consul Okuda telephoned
a Buddhist priest at Lahaina on the Island of Maui by the name of
Vriji Hirayama and requested Hirayama to keep the Consulate in-
formed of any United States fleet movements that came to his atten-
tion. In another instance, in 1941, a woman very much agitated called
the Consulate and blurted out that the USS NEW ORLEANS had
just left the harbor. The person answering at the Consulate hung up
without reply, and it was the evaluation of the listeners that the
woman was under some sort of emotional stress and that the people
in the Consulate suspected some sort of a trick.
Mr. SoNNETT. Prior to December 7, 1941, certain cable messages sent
by the Japanese Consul over commercial cable lines were intercepted
and received by the Office of Naval Intelligence, were they not ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. They were.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you have copies of those messages available ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I can't state exactly which messages were
made available. We have now copies of messages sent by the Con-
sulate between December 1st and December 6th.
I might explain the background of that. At various times efforts
had been made to secure copies of the coded messages sent by the Con-
sulate to Japan and to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. These
efforts were unsuccessful. There are three cable companies in Ho^io-
lulu and it was known [384] that the Consulate alternated be-
tween each of the three, using each one for a period of one month.
It is my understanding that Admiral Bloch requested David Sarnoff,
who was visiting in the Islands at that time, to make available to the
naval service copies of messages handled by RCA Radio. Sarnoff
agreed and ordered the local office to do this. On December 1st, fol-
lowing their usual custom, the Consulate began using the facilities of
RCA. On the morning of 5 December the District Intelligence Office
received the first copies of these cables, and it is my understanding
that these were immediately sent out to Commander Rochefort's unit.
It is also my understanding that these were not decoded until after
the Japanese attack and that even then it was necessary to use a Japa-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 225
nese code book that had been picked up in the effects of the Consulate
after it was raided on December 7th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you have the messages which were so delivered to
the District Intelligence Office on December 5, 1941 ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. We have copies of messages sent by the Con-
sulate between December 1st and December 6th, decoded copies.
Mr. SoNNETT. Decoded copies ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. Decoded copies.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you supply us with a decoded copy of each
message sent by the Consul between December 1st and December 6th
which was in the possession of Naval Intelligence prior to the attack
on December 7th ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I can't say from my own knowledge which
was in the possession of Naval Intelligence prior to the attack.
Mr. SoNNETT. No record was kept, I take it, of the messages turned
over on December 5th ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I know of no record.
[S85] Mr. SoNNETT. Can you supply us, then, with copies of
each of the messages that you have decoded, sent by the Japanese
Consul between December 1st and December 6, 1941 ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I can, and we have supplied you with some
of those.
Mr. SoNNETT. And you will supply us with a complete set of them ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark those, Admiral, as an exhibit when
they are received ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received, to be marked "Exhibit
40.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Aside from information received through telephone
taps and from the interception of Japanese cable messages, was there
any other information received by the Office of Naval Intelligence
indicating Japanese interest in movements of United States ships or
preparations to meet attack in Pearl Harbor, or any military subject?
Lieutenant Woodrum. Over a period of years there was considerable
information gathered by the Naval Intelligence service concerning
Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor and the Island of Oahu. There
are voluminous reports available concerning the visits of Japanese
tankers, Japanese training ships, Japanese training squadrons to the
Island of Oahu and to other islands in the Hawaiian group. It was
well known that officers attached to these groups made "sightseeing
trips" of the islands, including such vantage spots as Aiea Heights.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did any of the information in the possession
of [386] Naval Intelligence prior to December 7, 1941, indi-
cate that the Japanese had a specific interest in the location or move-
ments of United States ships in Pearl Harbor ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. The only instance I know of is the one here-
tofore cited of the conversation with the Buddhist priest on Maui.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there any information showing specificall}^ that
the Japanese were interested in the anti-aircraft defenses in or around
Pearl Harbor?
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 16
226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Lieutenant Woodrum. I know of none.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there any information indicating specifically
that the Japanese were interested in the question of anti-torpedo nets
in Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I know of none prior to December 7, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT, I have nothing further, Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. I have nothing else.
(The witnesses were excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 2 : 27 p. m., adjourned until 4 p. m.,
4 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 227
[-W] PKOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIRY
Fourteenth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Of-
ficer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 4 p. m., Mon-
day, 4 June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr, SoNNETT. State your name and rank, sir.
Brig. General Powell. Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA.
Mr. SoNNETT. General, what was your assignment in November and
December, 1941?
Brig. General Powell. Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department.
Mr. SoNNETT. And you were stationed where ?
Brig. General Po^vell. Fort Shafter.
Mr. Sonnett. Did the Army operate a radio intercept unit at Fort
Shafter?
Brig. General Powell. Yes, it did.
Mr. Sonnett. What, if any, decryption of intercepted Japanese
messages was done at Fort Shafter, General ?
Brig. General Powell. None whatsoever.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you documents 14, 15, and 18 of exhibit 13,
which are dispatches or messages between Tokyo and Honolulu relat-
ing to preparations for defense of Pearl Harbor and to the Japanese
interest in [388] those preparations, and ask you whether you
recall having seen those messages or any of them before.
Brig. General Powell. I never have seen them.
Mr. Sonnett. I take it, General, that the intercepted messages of
the Japanese were sent from Fort Shafter to Washington for de-
cryption ?
Brig. General Powell. That is right.
Mr. Sonnett. And what methods were used to send the material
to Washington ?
Brig. General Powell. Messages with a certain indicator, which I
don't recall, were sent by radio, and all others were sent by air mail.
Mr. Sonnett. I think that is all, Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 4: 10 p. m., adjourned until 9: 30
a. m., 5 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 229
3S9\ PROCEEDmGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIRY
Fifteenth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Of-
ficer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 9 : 30 a. m.,
Tuesday, 5 June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETr. State your name and rank, sir.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Theodore S. Wilkinson, Vice Admiral,
USN.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, you were Director of the Office of Naval
Intelligence on December 7, 1941, were you not?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. When had you assumed that position, Admiral?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. October 15, 1941, as I recall it.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you state generally the structure of the Office
of Naval Intelligence?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. The Office of Naval Intelligence was
composed of two main branches, foreign intelligence and domestic.
The domestic had to do with internal subversion, espionage, and other
activities of foreign nationals or organizations inimical to national,
and particularly naval, welfare. It included several branch offices in
principal cities of the United States, one of which was Honolulu.
The foreign intelligence was organized under a number, approximately
eight, of regional groups of which [^390'] the Far Eastern was
one. Under the administration of ONI and directly of foreign intelli-
gence were the Naval Attaches and Naval Observers stationed
throughout the world.
Mr. Sonnett. Who was in charge, Admiral, of the foreign branch
of the Office of Naval Intelligence ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Captain Heard, I believe, at that time,
though there had been a change either just before or after.
Mr. Sonnett, Admiral, do you recall who was in charge of the Far
Eastern Section of the foreign branch ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Commander McCollum.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, would you state in general the sources of
information which the Far Eastern Section of the foreign branch
of the Office of Naval Intelligence had ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Naval Attache reports from Japan and
China, Observers' reports from various ports in the Far East, reports
from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Station, collateral items
of interest produced by the investigations of the domestic branch of
230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ONI, particularly from Honolulu, radio intelligence matters as avail-
able in Washington, and also from a center set up in Manila.
Mr. SoNNETT. And Pearl Harbor, Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. The State Department reports from
diplomatic agents and reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the
Fleet at Pearl Harbor with respect to searches and radio intelligence.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, will you state your recollection as to the
responsibility of the Far Eastern Section of the foreign branch of
ONI for the dissemination of the information in its possession ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. The responsibility of the Far Eastern
section derived from the responsibility of the office as a whole. In
general, the [391^ duties of any of the foreign sections were to
receive, collate, and analyze information obtained either by the agen-
cies of ONI or received from other sources and to disseminate that in
one of several ways. The usual means of dissemination of technical
information was transmission by mail of copies or abstracts of the
pertinent reports. There was a periodical publication, bi-weekly, as
I remember, to all flag officers, containing political and operational
intelligence, which contained a Far Eastern section, and in which latter
the Far Eastern Division of ONI would incorporate any information
of value. A third means of dissemination, although not strictly dis-
semination, was the limited distribution within the Navy Department
of highly confidential radio intelligence and all urgent or important
operational information. The radio intelligence was incorporated in
a secret book, which was passed by hand by a responsible officer to
approximately four of the Navy Department's heads and to the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State. The urgent operational information
was reported to me and either by myself in company with Commander
McCollum or by himself directly to the Chief of Naval Operations and
the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. There was also, as the situa-
tion got hot, a daily one or two paragraph summary of the Japanese
picture which was given to the Chief of Naval Operations and to the
Director of War Plans. The immediate report I have mentioned above
was also made to the Director of War Plans, These reports or analyses
usually contained some deduction as to future moves to be expected,
which we offered for such value as they might have to the Chief of
Naval Operations and to the Director of War Plans.
Mr. SoNNEiT. As to the dissemination of information. Admiral, out-
side of the Navy Department and to the Pacific Fleet, do I take it then
that it was the responsibility of ONI to disseminate information on the
Japanese situation to the Pacific Fleet?
[392] Vice Admiral Wilkinson. That point was never fully de-
termined. We issued the reports and the bi-weekly summary of the
situation, but I was told that the deductions of future movements were
the function of War Plans rather than of Intelligence, and this under-
standing was confirmed by the Assistant Chief of Operations, Ad-
miral Ingersoll, when at one time I said that I thought it was our
responsibility. He told me at that time that the Army system was
for Intelligence to prepare the analyses of enemy prospective move-
ments, but in the Navy system War Plans did that. I told him then
that I would prepare that analysis myself in my office in order that
War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations might use it as they
saw fit, and in consequence such analyses as I made weren't trans-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 231
mitted to the fleet, but were given to the Chief of Operations and to
War Plans. The same with respect to spot news of the enemy move-
ments. My miderstanding at the time was, and still is, that I would
report to War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations the latest
operational information deduced from all sources and that they would
forward to the fleet such items as they felt should be so forwarded.
Mr. SoKNETT. Would it be an accurate summary, then, Admiral, to
state that information in the possession of the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence concerning Japanese movements, for example, would be dis-
seminated by ONI, but the evaluation of Japanese plans or deductions
to be drawn from those movements would be the function of War
Plans or the Chief of Naval Operations ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. The latter part of your question, yes.
The first part, the day by day information of the Japanese movements
would not, according to my then and present understanding, be sent
out by Intelligence, but rather by Operations after their evaluation.
[3901 Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 9 of this in-
vestigation, which is a copy of the fortnightly summary of current
national situation, issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence and dated
December 1, 1941, and ask you if you can identify that as a summary
set up by you.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, that is a summary of which I was
recently speaking.
Mr. SoNNETT. Eeferring, Admiral, to page 9 of the exhibit, para-
graph C summarizes, does it not, the Japanese naval situation as seen
by the Office of Naval Intelligence at that time ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, I recall this, and, in fact, the entire
issue, as I read over the text of each issue before authorizing its publica-
tion.
Mr. SoNNETT. Who prepared, Admiral, the portion of the exhibit to
which I have called your attention, namely, relating to the Japanese
naval situation?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. The Far Eastern Section.
Mr. Sonnett. For the sake of clarity of the record. Admiral, as well
as to refresh your own recollection since it has been some time ago,
would you read the first paragraph of C into the record ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. The heading is —
The Japanese Naval Situation
Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that exten-
sive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports
and freightei-s are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China
coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports.
Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual
units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated,
will probably take sharper form in [394] the next few days. To date this
task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears
to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the
southeast Asiastic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong
striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force,
destroyer and submai-ine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also
may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as
well as the greatest portion of the carriers.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you exhibit 10 of this investigation,
a memorandum for the Director by A. H. McCollum, dated Decem-
ber 1, 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that.
232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Wilkinson, I recall it vaguely, but I presume that it
was given to me in view of its form.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 8 of this investigation,
which consists of photostatic copies of three dispatches, and ask
whether you recall having seen those or any one of them ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall having seen any. I did
not ordinarily see any of the so-called COPEKS, due perhaps to their
very limited distribution, although I believe that the Far Eastern
Section was given access to them by inspection at the office of receipt.
I do not believe that they were furnished a copy.
Mr. SoNNETT. The situation as to Japanese carriers, Admiral, set
forth in exhibit 9, the ONI fortnightly summary for December 1, 1941,
is summarized, is it not, in the statement as follows : "Although one
division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship
strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of
the carriers" ?
[395] Vice Admiral Wilkinson. That was our best knowledge
and belief at the time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, upon what information that
statement was based?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No. On the digest of all available in-
formation, radio intelligence and sighting, whatever we had.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, do you recall how this exhibit 9, the fort-
nightly summary of December 1, was sent out? By air mail?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. By air mail, I believe.
Mr. SoNNETT. And, I take it, it was sent out on or about the date
it bears, namely, December 1, 1941?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. It is my impression that it had
been received in Pearl Harbor prior to December Tth.
Mr. SoNNETT. What information, Admiral, do you recall on or
after December 1, 1941, concerning the location or movements of
Japanese carriers?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. My remote recollection at this time is
that we had little, if any, information as to the carriers. We had
fairly complete knowledge of the movement down through the South
China Sea and around Indo-China, but the movements in the Pacific
Ocean as a whole, including both battleships and carriers, were com-
pletely veiled. There may have been one or two carriers involved in
the South China Sea movement, but the carrier force as a whole was
not definitely located.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 22 of this investigation,
which consists of photostatic copies of daily communication intelli-
gence summaries at F'earl Harbor, and call your attention to those
particularly for the period December 1 to December 5, 1941, and ask
if you can recall having had any of the information contained in those
summaries during that [396'] period of time.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Not directly, but as digested through the
Far Eastern Section. I note j)articularly the fact that parts of the
Japanese fleet were apparently in radio silence, of w^ich I was aware.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, do you recall any discussion with the Chief
of Naval Operations or with the War Plans Officer concerning the lack
of information as to parts of the Japanese fleet during the first week
of December, 1941 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 233
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I think we reported daily that a
large part of the Japanese fleet was apparently at sea with its where-
abouts not known. We also reported, however, that the only indica-
tions we had been able to pick up of any movement were those toward
the south, including through the South China Sea, and our conclu-
sion that an attack on Thailand and the Malay Peninsula was im-
minent. I recall that Admiral Turner also concluded that an attack
would be made on the Philippines.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall any discussion during that period of
time, Admiral, concerning the question whether or not any aerial
reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No discussion of which I was a part.
That was in the line of operational intelligence, procured by our
own operations, which I considered was a function of the Office of
Operations proper, although, of course, I was interested in the re-
sults of such searches for their own value and for their consolidation
in the general picture.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there. Admiral, during the month or so pre-
ceding December 7, 1941, any discussion in which you participated
concerning the likelihood of a Japanese move toward Pearl Harbor ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Unfortunately, no.
[S97] Mr. SoNNEiT. At that time. Admiral, what was your
estimate as to the possibility or probability of a Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I thought it was improbable and I
thought it was impracticable in view of the air searches which I
had known were being conducted when I had last left Hawaii in
May and which I presumed, in the lack of any other knowledge,
were still being conducted.
Mr. SoNNEiT. Did you. Admiral, have the view that such an attack
on Pearl Harbor was a possibility?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. A remote possibility, but to my mind I
thought it would be detected and driven off before it could be
effective.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 63 of the Naval Court
of Inquiry record, which consists of certified copies of Japanese
diplomatic dispatches, and ask if you would examine that.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Well, not recognizing this exhibit spe-
cifically, I was familiar with the various decrypted dispatches which
were available in the Navy Department.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, will you state how such Japanese dis-
patches were obtained?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. They were obtained by radio intercep-
tor, if they were sent by cable, I believe that v»'e got copies of the
cable; I am not sure. The text was then given to a large deciypt-
ing unit under the immediate control of the Director of Communi-
cations, although ONI cooperated by assignment of certain technical
personnel. The Army had similar experts and there was a division
of labor between the two departments in connection with the de-
cryption of all foreign texts. In general, I recall that the Navy,
which had made a longer study and was more familiar with the
Japanese language and codes, took care of most of the Japanese
work, while [398] the Army looked after other nations.
234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The products of the decryption of the Japanese dispatches were
embodied in a secret book which originally was shown in full text
to the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Director of
"War Plans, myself, and the President and the Secretary of State.
At some time — I don't know precisely whether before or after De-
cember 7th — I believe only abbreviated summaries were shown the
President and Secretary of State. Also there was some arrange-
ment that the Army would look after the State Department and
that the President would be served on alternate days by the Army
and the Navy, but I am not sure of this in my recollection. At any
rate, the books contained, as I recall, the product of both the Army
and the Navy work.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I note that various of these Japanese dis-
patches are indicated to have been in the so-called purple code.
Will you state generally what the purple code was ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall, although I vaguely re-
member that it was a diplomatic code.
Mr. SoNNiyrr. Do you recall, Admiral, whether the Japanese pur-
ple code was being decrypted at any other place besides Washington ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I call your attention to a dispatch dated
19 November 1941 from Tokyo to Washington, which is indicated
to have been translated on November 28, 1941, and ask whether you
recall having seen that dispatch or having had that information.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, I recall the "east wind," et cetera.
I do not recall the specific Japanese words.
Mr. Sonnett. That dispatch. Admiral, was a dispatch setting up
the so-called "winds" code to be used by the Japanese in daily Japanese
[399] language short wave news broadcasts, was it not?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall, Admiral, what efforts were made to
monitor for any message using the "winds" code ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is that the Japanese
broadcasts were all monitored, and I do not recall any specific efforts
in connection with this, but since it was to appear in the regular news
broadcast, it presumably would be detected therein.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall whether or not any message using the
"winds" code was ever intercepted ?
Vice Admiral AVilkinson. The metliod was not to use the "winds"
code in a whole message, but simply to put in a word which of itself
was the "winds" code. I recall that at some late stage, along about
December 6th or 7th, I heard, either then or immediately after the
Pearl Harbor attack, tliat there had been such a word in one of the
broadcasts. I don't recall when.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall. Admiral, that the Japanese also had
established a code known as the hidden word code ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No, I recall no mention of it.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you document 6 and document 11
of exhibit 13 of this investigation. The first is a dispatch from Tokyo
to Washington on November 27, 1941, establishing a hidden word code,
and the second is a message of 7 December 1941 from Tokyo, and ask
whether you recall having seen either of those messages.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall either one of them.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 235
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of
Inquiry, which consists of various documents supplied by the Federal
Communications Commission, and ask jvhether you recall having seen
any of [WO^ those documents.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No, I do not recall such.
Mr. SoNXETT. Do you recall, Admiral, who it was who indicated to
you some time around December 7, 1941, that a "winds" code message
had been received ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I recall some mention of it, but not until
after the attack, but I no longer attributed importance to it since tlie
overt act had occurred. It may possibly have been the last message of
the exhibit you just showed me, which, you will note, was received
on December Stli.
Mr. SoNNETT. But you don't remember who it was that mentioned
it to you ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall, but presumably it would
have been Commander McCollum, who was in touch with the Army,
to whom the reports of that exhibit were made.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall. Admiral, during the first week in
December, 1941, that Commander McCollum prepared a long dispatch,
summarizing the situation, which he desired to have released and sent
out and which dispatch he discussed with j^ou ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. From time to time Commander McCol-
lum and I, or he after consulting me, would prepare dispatches to be
submitted to the Cliief of Naval Operations for release. I do not
specifically recall this dispatch, but if you have any evidence of it, I
could probably refresh my recollection.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, Captain Safford, who testified during this
investigation and who testified in previous investigations, stated that
on or about December 4, 1941, he was present when you and Admiral
Noyes [4^-?] conferred concerning the desirability of sending
out a dispatch which had been prepared by Commander McCollum
and that you were in favor of sending out the dispatch but Admiral
Noyes was not in favor of doing so and that you indicated you would
take it to the Chief of Naval Operations to try to get it released. Do
you recall that incident at all ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No. It is quite possible that I did take
it to Admiral Ingersoll, but I do not recall is specifically.
Mr. SoNNETT. And I take it, therefore. Admiral, that you do not
recall the contents of any dispatch which McCollum had prepared
at that time ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Not at that specific time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, whether in any dispatch
prepared by Commander McCollum prior to the attack there was
specific reference made to any Japanese broadcast using the "winds"
code words relating to the United States ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No. I know the "winds" code words
were discussed in Washington, but I do not remember any dispatch
sent outside. There was, of course, at that time considerable reluc-
tance to any widespread information which would indicate our opera-
tions and our success in breaking Japanese codes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you document 38 and document 39
of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record and ask whether
you recall having seen those intercepted Japanese messages.
236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, I saw this in several successive parts
as it was received, decrypted, and passed out in the secret book I
spoke of.
Mr. SoNNETT. The first. Admiral, for the sake of the record, is a
dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, December 6, 1941, advising
that the [W^] Japanese had deliberated on the American pro-
posal of the 26th of November and had drawn up a memorandum
for the United States which would be in a separate message in
fourteen parts ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And also directed that the long message to the
United States should be presented at a time to be specified in a sep-
arate message, is that correct?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the second, a dispatch from Tokyo to Washing-
ton, December 6, 1941, consists of the fourteen parts of the Japanese
reply, does it not?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. As I recall, the date is the East
Longitude date and the first thirteen parts were available to us on our
date of December 6th, and the fourteenth part not till the early
morning of December 7th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I also show you document 41 of exhibit 63
of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, a message from Tokyo to Wash-
ington, December 7, 1941, directing the Japanese Ambassador to sub-
mit to the United States Government the Japanese reply to the United
States at 1 p. m. on the 7th, Washington time. Do you recall having
seen that message ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall having seen it, but I
heard it mentioned on the 7th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall. Admiral, any discussion on December
7th concerning the significance of the time set for delivery of the
Japanese reply, namely, 1 p. m. Washington time, and the relationship
of that time to times at Pearl Harbor and in the Far East ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I recall the discussion of the relation-
ship [403] between the times, but whether that discussion was
before or after the actual attack I do not at this moment recall.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you state. Admiral, who participated in the
discussion and what was said?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Perhaps I had better mention the dis-
cussion of the fourteenth part. On arriving at the Office of Naval
Intelligence shortly after 8 o'clock on the morning of Sunday, the
7th, I saw the fourteenth part and went to the office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, where, as I recall, Admiral Stark, Admiral Inger-
soll, and Admiral Turner were present. There was a discussion that
the tone of the fourteenth part presaged, if not actually promised,
early overt acts, which still, to our best knowledge and indication,
would be directed against Thailand and the Malay Peninsula and
possibly the Philippines. As I recall, Admiral Stark said he would
confer at once with General Marshall. At that time the 1 o'clock
message may have been in hand, but I do not believe so and I don't
recall now having heard it discussed until after the actual attack, at
which time, in answer to the question, the discussion may have been
with Commander McCollum or almost any one on the basis of com-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 237
meriting upon the fact that the two times apparently had been
simultaneous.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 15 and exhibit 17 of
the Naval Court of Inquiry and ask you whether you recall having
seen those dispatches at or about the dates they bear.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall having seen either. They
were apparently prepared by the War Plans Section, Op-12. The
second I knew had been sent in substance ; the first I don't remember.
Mr. SoNNETT. The second is the so-called war warning, is it not?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
[4.04] Mr. SoNNETT. What, if any, discussion. Admiral, was
there on the morning of December 7, 1941, concerning the necessity
or advisability of informing Admiral Eammel or other fleet com-
manders of the prospective 1 p. m. delivery of the Japanese reply?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I don't remember a discussion of the
1 p. m. delivery. I remember a discussion of the immediate trans-
mission of the status of negotiations indicated by the receipt of the
fourteenth part, and my impression at the time was that Admiral
Stark was to confer immediately with General Marshall for a joint
decision as to notifying the Army and Navy forces in Hawaii and
in the Far East.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know what, if anything, was done after
Admiral Stark and General Marshall conferred on that point?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Only by hearsay.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, on December 7, 1941, what telephonic con-
nections existed between the Navy Department and the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know. It was in the province
of Communications.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you know at that time whether or not either the
Navy or the Army had a so-called scrambler telephone?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. My impression is the Army had one. I
am not sure.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was any consideration given at that time, namely,
December 7, 1941, to the necessity or advisability of telephoning to
the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet or to other fleet com-
manders concerning the delivery of the Japanese reply?
[4^S] Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know, but my recollec-
tion is that Admiral Stark was to confer immediately with General
Marshall with the view of getting the information and presumably a
warning out by the fastest means of communication that were then
available.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you document 14, document 15, and document
24 of exhibit 13 of this investigation, which are intercepted Japanese
"communications between Honolulu and Tokyo, and ask whether you
recall having seen those prior to December 7, 1941, or thereafter, and,
if so, when.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall seeing these specifically,
but I am certain that I did not see them before December 7th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, in the interest of clarity of the record, could
we have these three dispatches copied into the record at this point ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The dispatches referred to follow as pages 405A, 405B, and 405C.)
238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
l405A-\ [Copy]
A true copy. Attest :
Ben Haeold,
Ship's Clerk, USNR.
From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
PA-K2
#253 Re the last part of your #123.^
1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage
balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four
or jQve hundred baloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use
of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawai is
concei-ned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl
Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the
troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for
the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are
no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine
that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made
preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways
of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickaui, Ford and Ewa," there
are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all proba-
bality there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise
attack against these places.
2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are
not known. I will report the results of my investigation.
25877
Army 7178 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)
* — -not available.
•^ — Kana spelling.
1405B] [Copy]
From : Honolulu
To: Tokyo.
December 6, 1941
PA-K2
#254
1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port
were and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at
anchor on the 6th :
9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addi-
tion there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers
and airplane carriers have all left).
2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.
25874
Army 7179 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)
A true copy. Attest:
Ben Harold,
Ships Clerk, USNR.
U05C-\ [Copy]
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To : Honolulu
December 2, 1941
J-19
#123 (Secret outside the department)
In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane
carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your
ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are
any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 239
they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided
with anti-mine nets.
Note : This message was received here on December 23.
27055
Army 8007 (Japanese)
Trans. 12/30/41 (5)
A true copy. Attest :
Ben Harold,
Ships Clerk, USNR.
[406] Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, these three dispatches indicate
specific Japanese interest in the preparations for defense of Oahu
against air attack, do they not ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And it appears that they were translated by the Army
after the attack, although they were dated prior to the attack?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. On the fact of them the note as to the
date of translation would so indicate it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, do you know what the explanation may be
for the delay in translating these messages ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No. Possibly circuit delays in the orig-
inal coded text reaching Washington. Possibly a jam in the decoding
office, caused perhaps by the long diplomatic message which was then
being decoded about December 6th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall. Admiral, that prior to this time there
were other messages available in Washington showing that the Jap-
anese were interested specifically in the location and movements of
American ships in Pearl Harbor?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No, not prior to that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. May I call your attention, Admiral, to documents 1,
2, 3, 7, 9, and 10 of exhibit 13 and ask whether they refresh your rec-
ollection on that point ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. The first three of these I do not recall
and they were apparently dated and translated before my taking over
the office. Number 7, dated November 20th and translated December
4th, requesting an investigation of the fleet bases, I should have seen
but do not now recall. The same applies to number 9, dated Novem-
ber 18th, [407] translated December 5th, requesting data as
to vessels anchored in a certain area in Pearl Harbor and in Manila
Bay. Number 10, dated November 18th and noted as translated on
December 6th, giving specific information about movements of ships,
I am sure I did not see before December 7th and I do not recall having
seen it thereafter. The remainder were translated after the attack.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it your belief. Admiral, prior to the attack on
December 7, 1941, that the Japanese agents in or around Pearl Harbor
were interested in United States ships in the harbor ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I believe they were and I believe they
were reporting them, but my belief was that they were concerned in
the presence of the fleet with a view to its availability for distant oper-
ations rather than its susceptibility as a target.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I call your attention to document 11 of ex-
hibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry and document 14 and ask
whether you recall having seen those documents.
240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, I believe I recall them both.
Mr. SoNNETT. Those messages, Admiral, indicated that the Jap-
anese had established deadlines beyond which there would be no fur-
ther diplomatic negotiation with the United States, did they not?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And referring, Admiral, particularly to the -message
of November 22, 1941, from Tokyo to Washington, translated on the
same date, it indicated that Tokyo had fixed the 29th of November as
a deadline and that that deadline absolutely could not be changed and
after that things were automatically going to happen, did it not ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. "
_ [408] Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Admiral, to document 18 of ex-
hibit 63 of the Naval Court record, a message from Tokyo to Washing-
ton dated November 28, 1941, translated November 28, 1941, do you
recall having seen that at or about that time?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, that message indicated, did it not, that
Tokyo regarded the November 26th note of the United States as a
liumiliating proposal?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that with a report of the views of the Imperial
Government on this American proposal, the negotiations would be
de facto ruptured, but that Tokyo wanted them to be careful to avoid
giving the impression that negotiations were broken off?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, what consideration was given to the ques-
tion of the necessity or desirability of sending to Admiral Kimmel
copies of these various Japanese messages which were intercepted?
Vic Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know. That was in the province
of the Chief of Operations. As I have said, there was great reluc-
tance to disseminate the knowledge of our code-breaking activities.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, will you please state what the arrange-
ments were for the exchange of intelligence with the Army?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. There was a complete liaison between
the decrypting agencies and complete exchange of actual texts im-
mediately after their transcription into a smooth copy. The two
Far Eastern Sections of Naval Intelligence and Military Intelligence
were in daily and, in fact, hourly contact by telephone and by fre-
quent exchange of visits. The head [409] of Military Intel-
ligence, General Miles, was in constant telephonic and other contact
with me and, in fact, he was at dinner at my house when the first
thirteen parts of the diplomatic message were brought to us at ap-
proximately 11:30 the night of December 6th, at which time we
both ascertained that they had been shown to higher authorities in
our two Departments.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, what information concerning the location
or movements of the Japanese fleet was furnished by the Navy to
the Army?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Why, I think everything we had, by
this process of interchange between the two Far Eastern Sections.
I know that we got information that they^ jHcked up with respect
to Japanese Army movements and activities and, of course, from
time to time some of our agents would report something having to
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 241
do with the Japanese Army and some of theirs something concerning
the Japanese Navy, but all information was constantly interchanged.
Mr. SoNXETT. Admiral, do you recall whether or not any infor-
mation of significance came to your attention prior to December 7,
1941, which had been obtained from either tapping the telephone
wires of the Japanese in Honolulu or from interception of their
cable messages here?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No. Shortly after the attack we got
word of the so-called "flower" telephone message, and I know that
the local intelligence representative, the District Intelligence Officer,
had endeavored to obtain copies of cable messages, but had been
denied them because of the United States law concerning the integrity
of civil communication.
Mr. SoNNBiT. You do not know, Admiral, then, whether or not, in
fact, any copies of Japanese cable messages were secured at Honolulu
prior 14^0] to December 7th ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I do not believe there were.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further. Admiral.
Admiral Hewiti. I don't think I have anything further. Thank
you very much.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I don't think I have anything to add.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you have anything to add ? I would be glad
to have you do it.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Admiral HE^^^TT. That is all.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 11 : 35 a. m., adjourned until 10 a. m..
G June 1945.)
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 243
Wn PEOCEEDINGS OF THEiHEWITT INaUIRY
Sixteenth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Offi-
cer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 10 a. m.,
Wednesday, 6 June 1945.
Present : Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN ; Mr. John F. Sonnett ;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. State your name, sir.
Mr. Street. George Street.
Mr. Soxnett. What is your occupation, Mr. Street?
Mr. Street. District Manager, RCA Communications, Incorporated.
Mr. Sonnett. For how long have you been employed by RCA in
Plonolulu ?
Mr. Street. I have been with the company for over twenty-five years
and have been in my present position for almost ten years.
Mr. Sonnett. During 1941, Mr. Street, did you know the District
Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, Captain Mayfield ?
Mr. Street. I did.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall that on or about the first week of De-
cember, 1941, certain messages were, at the request of the Navy, turned
over by j^ou to Captain Mayfield ?
Mr. Street. I do recall, yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Were those messages of the Japanese Consul sent
from Um'\ Honolulu?
Mr. Street. Yes, there were several.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you have any record, Mr. Street, of the messages
which were turned over at that time to Naval Intelligence ?
Mr. Street. Not now. They were legally destroyed.
Mr. Sonnett. Does your company have at any place copies of those
messages ?
Mr. Street. To the best of my knowledge and belief, copies of all
messages transmitted to and from Honolulu will be in the files of our
company at 28 Geary Street, San Francisco.
Mr. Sonnett. I take it, Mr. Street, that when you said copies of the
messages had been destroyed, you mean they had been destroyed
locally in the Honolulu office?
Mr. Street. Locally, yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Pursuant to the authority of the Federal Com-
munications Commission?
Mr. Street. Yes, pursuant to the regulations of the Federal Com-
munications Commission. It was simply a matter of my lack of stor-
age space.
244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall, Mr. Street, whether or not, to the
best of your recollection, all messages sent by the Japanese Consul
during the first week of December, 1941, were turned over to Naval
Intelligence ?
Mr. Street. They were.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you have anything to add, Mr. Street ?
Mr. Street. Here are three copies of press messages filed from
Honolulu on December 4th and 5th which I do not recall were given
to Captain Mayfield previously.
[4i3] Mr. SoNNETT. Can you identify the senders of each of
those messages?
Mr. Street. The message of December 4th, addressed Yomiuri,
Tokyo, was filed by Mrs. M. Mori, Correspondent. The two messages
of December 5th, addressed Asahi, Tokyo, were filed by Mr. Onodera,
Correspondent.
Mr. SoNNETF. I have nothing further. Admiral, for Mr. Street.
Admiral Hewiti. I have nothing further. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 10:20 a. m., adjourned until 9:35
a. m., 7 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 245
Um PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIEY
Seventeenth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Of-
ficer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas, at 9 : 35 a. m., Thursday, 7 June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. State your name and rate.
Radioman Humphrey. Richard W. Humphrey, radioman third
class, USNR.
Mr. SoNNETT. On December 7, 1941, you were on duty at the radio
station at Bishop's Point, Oahu, were you not ?
Radioman Humphrey. I was.
Mr. Sonnett. Under whose jurisdiction did that station come?
Radioman Humphrey. At that time it came under the jurisdiction
of the Commander, Inshore Patrol.
Mr. Sonnett. Were you acquainted with one C. E. Gibson?
Radioman Humphrey. I was.
Mr. Sonnett. And also one R. B. Moyle ?
Radioman Humphrey. I was.
Mr. Sonnett. Can you state where, to the best of your knowledge,
they are now located ?
Radioman Humphrey. To the best of my knowledge, Moyle was last
known to be on a train in Florida as a shore patrolman and Gibson
was a flag radioman aboard an LST.
\_.kl5\ Mr. Sonnett. Who was the duty officer on December 7,
1941, at that station?
Radioman Humphrey. The duty officer was Lieutenant Commander
A. E. Kilhefner.
Mr. Sonnett. And do you know where he is now located ?
Radioman Humphrey. To the best of my knowledge, he is now
located at a naval air station in Brazil.
Mr. Sonnett. At what time did you come on duty on December 7,
1941 ?
Radioman Humphrey. I came on duty approximately ten minutes
until 8 o'clock.
Mr. Sonnett. In the morning?
Radioman Humphrey. In the morning, yes, sir.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you exhibit 18 of this investigation, which
is a copy of the radio log of the station for December 7, 1941, con-
sisting of two pages, and note on the reverse side of each page a
certification of that log by you, is that correct ?
246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Radioman Humphrey. That is correct. I certified that this is a
copy of the log that we kept at the Section Base.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, the log has at the left-hand side times from
1445 to 1830. Those are Greenwich times, are they not ?
Radioman Humphrey. They are. That is Greenwich Civil Time.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that would be comparable to 0415 to 0800, local
Pearl Harbor time ?
Radioman Humphrey. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the entries in the log from 1445, Green-
wich time, to 1508, Greenwich time, that would be from 0415 to 0438,
[4^6^ would it not. Pearl Harbor time ?
Radioman Humphrey. That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. And do you find there a record of a conversation
between the WARD and the CONDOR?
Radioman Humphrey. I do.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, in substance, will you state what that conversa-
tion was ?
Radioman Humphrey. In substance, it is a conversation between,
the two ships, trying to determine the position of a submarine operat-
ing in a restricted area.
Mr. SoNNETT. Is there any indication that that conversation was
addressed to your station or to the Inshore Patrol or to any one else
for action?
Radioman Humphrey. No, there is no indication of any such thing.
It is purely a conversation between the two ships.
Mr. SoNNETT. In the event that your station had taken any action
by way of reporting that conversation to the Inshore Patrol by radio,
would that have appeared subsequently in the log?
Radioman Humphrey. Had we relayed this conversation to the
Inshore Patrol by radio on this frequency, it would have appeared in
this log.
Mr. SoNNETT. And you find no record of such action in the log?
Radioman Humphrey. No such entry in the log.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to page 2 of the log, there is a report, is
there not, by the WARD of having attacked a submarine ?
Radioman Humphrey. There is.
Mr. SoNNETT. At what time, both Greenwich and local, was that
report logged ?
[4i7] Radioman Humphrey. That is 1721, Greenwich time, and
the message was transmitted again at 1723, Greenwich time, which
makes it 0653, local time.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that message was addressed by the WARD to
whom?
Radioman Humphrey. That was addressed by the WARD to Com-
mander, Inshore Patrol.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. I have nothing. Thank you very much,
(The witness was excused.)
(A brief recess was taken.)
[418] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. State your name and rank.
Captain Dyer. Thomas H. Dyer, Captain, USN.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is your present assignment. Captain?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 247
Captain Dyer. I am Officer in Charge of the Cryptanalytical and
Decrypting Section, Fleet Radio Unit, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Mr. SoNNETT. In December, 1941, were you associated with that
unit or its predecessor ?
Captain Dyer. I have been associated with that unit and its prede-
cessor since 2 July, 1936.
Mr. Sonnett. Wlio else, Captain, besides yourself was engaged in
decryption work at that unit during December, 1941 ?
Captain Dyer. Lieutenant Commander Wesley A. Wright, USN,
was my principal assistant ; Chief Yeoman Arnold M. Conant, Chief
Radioman Woodward — I will have to look up his initials for you —
several other enlisted personnel and several Reserve officers who had
recently reported for duty and were under training, whose names I
do not now recall.
Mr. SoNNETT. Commander Wright is now at Bainbridge Island, is
he not, Captain ?
Captain Dyer. I have been so informed.
Mr. Sonnett. And I think you also told me that you had been in-
formed that Woodward is now in Washington ?
Captain Dyer. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. Washington, D. C. ?
Captain Dyer. Washington, D. C.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall where Conant is ?
Captain Dyer. He is also in Washington, D. C.
[4^9] Mr. Sonnett. Who was engaged principally in the trans-
lation of the decrypted communications in that unit in December', 1941,
Captain ?
Captain Dyer. Captain A. B. Laswell, U. S. Marine Corps, and
Lieutenant Commander R. FuUenwider were the principal translators.
Mr. SoNNi?rT. The entire unit, Captain, was under the command of
now Captain Rochef ort, was it not ?
Captain Dyer. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. There has been testimony. Captain, in previous inves-
tigations that during the first week of December, 1941, certain com-
munications of the Japanese Consul were delivered to ONI and by ONI
to your unit for decryption and translation. Were you aware of that
at the time ?
Captain Dyer. The only Japanese communications of which I am
personally aware were received subsequent to the attack on Pearl
Harbor and were decrypted and translated during the ensuing week.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you know. Captain, whether at any time prior to
December 7, 1941, cable messages to or from the Japanese Consul at
Honolulu were received by the Navy ?
Captain Dyer. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Sonnett. And I take it that the first time you ever saw a
translation of such a message was after December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Dyer. Was either the 9th or the 10th of December.
Mr. Sonnett. I show j^ou exhibit 29 of this investigation. Captain,
which consists of various translations of Japanese messages supplied
by Captain Layton, and for your information state that he testified
before Admiral Hewitt that he received those on or about December
10th from Captain Rochefort. Do you recall having seen those at or
about that time ?
248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Dyer. I can definitely recall some of the items and I am
1420] reasonably sure I saw all of them at about that time.
Mr, SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 40 of this investigation, Captain,
which consists of two investigation reports made by ONI at Honolulu,
the second of which is dated 14 February 1942, by Lieutenant Steven-
son, and which sets forth various messages in translated form, which,
according to the report, were learned in their translated form on 11
December 1941, and ask you whether you recall having seen those
messages at or about that time, namely, December 11, 1941.
Captain Dyer. I iim sure I saw some of the messages at about that
time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, do you have a file with you of decryptions
and translations of Japanese messages?
Captain Dyer. I do have a file of certain Japanese diplomatic traffic.
Here it is.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark this. Admiral, as an exhibit with the
understanding that the Captain is going to photostat today the begin-
ning of it up to the point indicated by the paper clip and let us have
that to take with us tomorrow and will photostat the oalance and send
it to you at Washington ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. The beginning of the file contains various of the
messages referred to in the ONI leport and also some of the messages
set forth in exhibit 29 which Captain Layton supplied.
Admiral Hewitt. All right.
(The file referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 41.")
Mr. Sonnett. For the sake of the record, Captain, and as illustrative,
I take it, of the other translations and decryptions, will you refer to
the 14^J] pencilled translation of a message dated 6 December
1941, bearing number 02530, and state whether that is a translation of
one of the Japanese messages to which you referred ?
Captain Dyer. It is.
Mr. Sonnett. That translation bears the symbol. Captain, PA.
Would you state what that indicates ?
Captain Dyer. That is the designation for one of the many Jap-
anese diplomatic systems and indicates the type of cipher.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, I show you a sheet of paper containing
various letters and ask you if you can state what that is.
Captain Dyer. This paper represents a portion of the decrypting
process which was applied to the message you just showed me.
Mr. SoNNETi. May we marlc that as an exhibit. Admiral?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The paper referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 42.")
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, would you similarly photostat this afternoon
exhibit 42 so that we may take a photostat and return the original as
an exhibit?
Captain Dyer. I will.
Mr. Sonnett. And would you. Captain, while we are thinking of
it, annex to both exhibit 41 and to exhibit 42 a certificate stating that
the photostats you supply are correct photostats of the original files
which you have ?
Captain Dyer. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 249
Mr. SoNNETT. The PA code then, Captain, was a code which re-
quired decryption first into plain Japanese and then translation into
English [4^2] from the Japanese?
Captain Dyek. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you state who did the decryption and translation
of this message ?
Captain Dyer. I am practically certain that the decryption was done
by Chief Radioman Woodward. I do not recognize the handwriting
and have no way of identifying the translation.
Mr. SoNNETT. The decryption in question. Captain, appears in the
file, I take it, in written out form immediately behind the translation
into English to which we have been referring?
Captain Dyer. That is true in the majority of cases.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, do you have any other file or, to your knowl-
edge, is there any other file in the unit here containing decryptions or
translations of Japanese messages which were sent prior to 7 December
1941?
Captain Dyer. I believe there is no other file in existence, to the best
(-.f my knowledge.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. I have nothing further. Thank you
very much.
[4^S] (The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 11 : 50 a. m., adjourned until 9 : 45
a. m., Friday, 8 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 251
Vm'\ PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIRY
Eighteenth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Offi-
cer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 9 : 45 a. m.,
Friday 8 June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNK,; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR ; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. Sonnett. State your name and rank.
Captain Finnegan. Joseph Finnegan, Captain, USN.
Mr. Sonnett. What is your present assignment. Captain ?
Captain Finnegan. Attached to the Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet.
Mr. Sonnett. When did you first become attached to the fleet radio
unit ?
Captain Finnegan. Under regular orders on the 15th of February,
'42.
Mr. Sonnett. And had you previously reported to that unit under
verbal orders?
Captain Finnegan. On either the 9th or the 10th of December, 1941,
under verbal orders of Admiral Kimmel, I reported there for tempo-
rary duty.
Mr. Sonnett. Prior to that time what was your assignment, Cap-
tain?
Captain Finnegan. Aide and Flag Lieutenant to Rear Admiral
David W. Bagley, Commander Battleship Division Two, USS TEN-
NESSEE.
Mr. Sonnett. You are a translator of Japanese, Captain, are you
not?
Captain Finnegan. Yes.
[^^5] Mr. Sonnett. Will you state what your training and
experience have been in the translation of Japanese ?
Captain Finnegan. I took the regular Japanese language course,
attached to the American Embassy in Tokyo, 1934 to 1937, followed
by fourteen months of work in radio intelligence.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, I show you exhibit 41 of this investigation,
which contains twenty-eight pages of Japanese language and work
sheets and translations supplied by Captain Dyer of the fleet radio
unit, and ask you whether you can identify any of the handwriting
in that exhibit as your own.
Captain Finnegan. Pages 7 and 8 and 22.
Mr. Sonnett. Page 22, Captain, is a translation of a message, is
it not, dated 3 December 1941 from Kita\ Would you state for the
record what your translation of that message was ?
252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Finnegan. "WYOMING and two seaplane tenders de-
parted the third."
Mr. SoNNETT. Pages 7 and 8, Captain, which you identified, consti-
tute a translation of a message from Kita to Tokyo, dated 6 December
1941, bearing number 02530, does it not?
Captain Finnegan. It does.
Mr. SoNNETT. Is it correct, Captain, that the translation of the 6th
of December message, pages 7 and 8, is a translation of the hand-
written message appearing on page 9 of the exhibit?
Captain Finnegan. It is.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, I refer you to document 14 of exhibit 13
of this investigation, which appears to be an Army translation of that
same message, does it not?
Captain Finnegan. It is a translation of the same message and it is
marked Army.
Mr. Sonnett. And it bears a translation date indicating transla-
tion by the Army on December 8, 1941 ?
Captain Finnegan. It does.
\_Ji26'\ Mr. Sonnett. I call your attention. Captain, to the last
sentence in paragraph 1 of the Army translation, which reads as fol-
lows : "I imagine that in all probability there is considerable oppor-
tunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these
places," and I refer you also to the last sentence of the first paragraph
of your translation, page 7 of exhibit 41, reading : "The whole matter
seems to have been dropped."
I further invite your attention to the Japanese language message,
page 9 of exhibit 41, and ask you to reexamine it and to state whether
your translation or the Army translation is correct as to the sentence
to which I have directed your attention.
Captain Finnegan. Without hesitation, I believe that the Army
translation is correct. The position of the sentences doesn't mean
anything. You can't compare the last sentence with the last sentence.
The last part of the rough work sheet, that is, pages 9 and 10, is fairly
garbled or missing groups, but it is quite easy and very logical to
fill in the missing groups in garbles, and I would say without hesita-
tion that the Army translation is most probable and probably correct.
Mr. Sonne-it. How long had you been away from Japanese, Cap-
lain, prior to the time when you translated this message ?
Captain Finnegan. A little more than three years.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, when did you translate this message?
Captain Finnegan. I don't remember the exact date. It was prob-
ably the 10th, but certainly not before the 9th of December, 1941.
[^7] Mr. Sonnett. Did you translate any Japanese message
at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Finnegan. No, I didn't even enter the combat intelligence
office.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you know of any translation of any of the Japa-
nese consular messages by anybody else prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Finnegan. I do not recognize any of the messages in this
file as having been made before that time and it is my distinct im-
pression that all of these were received about the same time and trans-
lated if not on one day, within two days of pages 7 and 8, within a
period of forty-eight hours, I would say.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 253
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
[4^8] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. State your name and rank.
Lieut. Comdr. Htjbbell. Monroe Harmon Hubbell, Lieutenant
Commander, UNTSR.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is your present assignment. Commander?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. At present I am Officer in Charge, Dis-
tribution Section, Officer Division, Naval Personnel Office, Pacific.
Mr. SoNNETT. What were your duties on December 7, 1941 ?
Lieut Comdr. Hubbell. I was Commanding Officer of the USS
CONDOR, AMC-14.
Mr. SoNNETT. On the morning of December 7, 1941, were you en-
gaged in sweeping off the mouth of Pearl Harbor ?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. We were.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall a blinker signal to the USS WARD
given by you that morning ?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. I do.
Mr. SoNNETT. At about what time was it?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. At approximately 0350.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was the substance of the message you sent to
the WARD at that time ?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. It was indicated to the WARD that we had
sighted what appeared to be a periscope of a submarine.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you subsequently have a radio conversation on
the TBS with the WARD ?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. I did.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 18 of this investigation and ask
if you find there recorded the radio conversation which you had
with the WARD [4^9] that morning.
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. That is the substance, to the best of my
recollection now.
Mr. SoNNETT. And will you state for the benefit of the record the
substance of your radio conversation and the time at which it took
place ?
Lieut Comdr. Hubbell. It was at approximately 0415 and it had
to do with an inquiry from the WARD as to the location and course of
the submarine that we had sighted.
Mr. SoNNETT. What did you advise the WARD as to the location
and course of the submarine?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. As I remember, it is substantially what is
stated here, that we gave them the course that we were steering at
the time and indicated that at the time the periscope was sighted,
that it was not a positive identification, but under the conditions of visi-
bility, it appeared that the course was approximately the same as
ours and that shortly thereafter the course of the submarine changed
abruptly and our own course changed rather abruptly. At the time
the periscope was sighted, it appeared to be heading directly for the
entrance buoys.
Mr, SoNNETT. Other than your report to the USS WARD, did you
make any report of this incident to the inshore patrol or any one
else?
254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. No. The indentification at that time was
not positive enough to consider making a report to other than the
Senior Officer Present Afloat there.
Mr. SoNNETT. Who was the Commanding Officer of the WARD, I
take it?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, we have a certified copy of the Pearl Har-
bor Navy Yard Duty Officers' information sheets, particularly as of
December 6, 1941. [4^0] I think this might be a good point
to receive it as an exhibit for the record if that meets with your
approval.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Ehibit 43.")
Mr. SoNNETT. May we note for the record, Admiral, that exhibit 43
provides in part : "The anti-torpedo net will be closed from sunset to
sunrise. To be opened and closed only upon orders from the Captain
of the Yard, the Assistant Captain of the Yard, or the Yard Duty
Officer"?
Commander, at my request you have endeavored to find out, have you
not, at what time sunrise occurred at Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. And what information did you receive on that ?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. The word received was that sunrise was at
approximately 0727. That is within a few minutes of the actual time.
Mr. SoNNETT. We also have, Admiral, a certified extract from the
signal log of the USS YNG-17 ?
Commander, what was the USS YNG-17?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. That was the gate vessel at the entrance to
Pearl Harbor.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we receive this. Admiral, at this point?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 44.")
Mr. SoNNETT. We also have, Admiral, a certified extract of the
quartermaster's log of the USS YNG-17 for the same dates. May
we receive that also as an exhibit ?
[4^1] Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 45.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Directing your attention to exhibit 45 and to the
entries for December 7, 1941, commencing at 0232, Commander, would
you read those into the record for the sake of clarity ? Then I want
to ask you a question about that.
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. (Reading.)
0232 Gate closed.
0447 Commenced opening gate.
0458 Gate opened. White lights.
0508 CROSSBILL stood in.
0532 CONDOR stood in.
0618 Hoisted ball.
Mr. SoNNETT. The entries in the log, I take it. Commander, or as
to your entering after the CROSSBILL at or about 0532 on December
7, 1941, are in accord with your own log and recollection substantially?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. That is correct.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 255
Mr. SoNNETT. And that is Honolulu time ?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is the meaning of the entry at 0618 after you
stood in "hoisted ball" ?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. To my present recollection, that indicated
that the gate was open.
Mr. SoNNETT. It appears that the next entry on the log is "0800
Japanese air raid." When does it appear that the gate was closed from
that log, Commander ?
[4^£] Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. The log indicates that the gate
was closed at 0846.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the entry in exhibit 45, Commander,
indicating that at 0532 on December 7, 1941, the CONDOR stood in to
Pearl Harbor, can you recall what the conditions of visibility were at
that time ?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. To the best of my knowledge, they were
very good. They were approaching daylight conditions.
Mr. SoNNETT. We have one more certified extract of the log, Ad-
miral, which is an extract from the log of the signal tower at the Navy
Yard, which, if you approve, we should receive at this point.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 46.")
Mr. SoNNETT. May we note, Admiral, for the record at this point
that exhibit 46, the log of the signal tower, has an entry at 2250 on De-
cember 6, 1941, that the LITCHFIELD cleared and the gate was
closed, and that the next entry is 0600, December 7th ? There appar-
ently were no entries kept during the morning of December 7, 1941,
up to 0600.
I have nothing further. Admiral. *
Admiral Hewitt. All right. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation then, at 10:12 a. m., adjourned until 3 p. m.,
Saturday, 9 Jtine 1945, to meet at San Francisco.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 257
Uss-\ PKOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INUUIRY
Nineteenth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Office of the Com-
mander Western Sea Frontier, Federal Building, San Francisco,
California, at 3 p. m., Saturday, 9 June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. Jolm F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNE; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and W'as duly sworn.
Mr. Sonnett. State your name and rank.
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Allan A. Murray, Lieutenant Commander,
USNR.
Mr. Sonnett. Commander, what is your present assignment?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Well, I am on the Staff of the Military
Govermnent Staging and Holding Area, Monterey, California.
Mr. Sonnett. What were your duties during December, 1941?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. I w^as one of four watch officers who stood
a twenty-four hour round-the-clock watch on the wires coming in
which brought in all of the messages, and so forth, that were handed
to us for working over.
Mr. Sonnett. In whjit section, Commander?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Op-20-G.
Mr. Sonnett. That was at Washington ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. That is right ; Navy Department.
Mr. Sonnett. Who was the commanding officer of that section?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Captain Salford.
Mr. Sonnett. And who were the other three watch officers ?
\^kSl^\ Lieut. Comdr. Murray. There was Brotherhood, Pering,
and Brown. Then there was George Linn, who was the senior officer
and normally did not stand watch, but when any one was on leave,
Linn stood watch.
Mr. Sonnett. Were you standing a watch during the first week of
December, 1941?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Part of the week, yes. You see, we worked
a certain number of watches and then we had forty-eight hours off.
Mr. Sonnett, Who else was on watch that Aveek of those you
named?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Well, Brown was on vacation, so Linn was
taking Browm's place, and otherwise the setup was the same.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you document 15 of exhibit 63 of the Naval
Court of Inquiry record and. ask you whether you have ever seen that
message before.
Lieut. Comdr. Murray, Yes, but I did not see it in English. You
see, I saw it in Japanese kana and at that time Commander Kramer
was the language officer and, of course, I don't know enough about
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1— — 18
258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the language to read the whole message, but he took out transcripts
of this, such as these words here of the four winds, and handed out
those words and told us the meaning of those and told us to watch
out for those words.
Mr. SoNNETT. That was an intercepted Japanese dispatch setting
up the so-called "winds" code, was it not. Commander?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. That is my understanding of it. Any-
thing that I say on this, gentlemen, it is more or less second hand
information because I am not a language expert and the only thing
I can say about it is what they told me and my instructions in regard
to it.
Mr. SoNXETT. Will you state what your instructions were. Com-
mander, in regard to the "winds" code ?
[^•55] Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Well, my instructions were much
the same as they had always been and that is anything of any impor-
tance that came in was to get hold of Commander Kramer and Com-
mander Kramer always left word where he was going. He was very
faithful in that respect and never moved from one place to another
without calling up and telling us where he was ; so we knew where he
was most of the time. But our orders were in addition to that, if we
couldn't get him on the phone, to go and take a car and get him by any
means possible in the event of anything of any importance ; and if any
of those had come in, that is exactly what we would have done.
Mr. SoNNETT, That translation of that message was on or about
November 28, 1941, was it not?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Approximately, yes; about a week before
Pearl Harbor.
Mr. SoNNETT. And is it the fact that efforts were made to monitor
for any Japanese message using the so-called, "winds" code?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. As far as I know, every effort was made,
using even the Coast Guard to get every possible message that they
could get in the hope that they might come through, because it was my
understanding — I don't particularly understand this English version
here — it was my understanding it would be added in in the plain text
news broadcasts that were made. Now, I guess that is essentially what
it says here. It says, "In the middle of the daily Japanese language
shortwave news broadcast." I guess that is the same, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. So far as you know, was any Japanese broadcast
or message ever intercepted by any one using the "winds" code words
relating to the United States?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Let me explain the whole situation on
that, [4^6] as I mentioned to you before. It never came in on
my watch and I was very particular about it and the staff that I had
on there, after they had gone over it, I went over it myself to be sure,
so that I don't think it is possible it could have gone through on my
watch. I was on the day watch of the 4th and the 5th ; then I went
off on forty-eight hour watch. Now, then, when I came back after
Pearl Harbor happened, it is my memory, and I am pretty clear on
it, that Linn mentioned that it had comQ in, but it had come in at a
time when they couldn't use it. Now, that is exactly as I remember
it, but it did not come in on my watch and I am absolutely certain
that up until 4 o'clock the afternoon of the 5th it hadn't come in,
because if it had come in on any one's watch other than mine, I car-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 259
tainly would have known about it because all watch officers passed
along: the log and all events of preceding watches.
Mr. SoxNETT. I show you exhibit 65, Commander, of the Naval
Court of Inquiry record, which consists of documents received from
the Federal Communications Commission, and direct your attention
particularly to documents 2, 3, and 4 and ask whether any of those
came to your attention.
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Document 4 I never did see. Document 3
I couldn't say because it is in English and I practically never saw any
of these messages in English. And Document number 2 the same.
Document number 1, I remember that, but I don't remember it from
the Army. That was our own organization that gave us that.
Mr. SoNNETT. Document innnber 1, Commander, for the sake of
clarity of the record, sets forth the Japanese language to be used for
the three signals, does it not?
Dieut. Comdr. Murray. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And you had the substance of that information, for
[4^] which you were watching?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. But we had it in Japanese and not in Eng-
lish. , ^1
Mr. SoxxETT. Li Japanese?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Yes. The first document you sliowed me
there, I remember now that those words used there in Japanese were
the words we had on a slip of paper and told to watch for, but we had
none of these in English.
Mr. SoxxETT. Commander, you said that on or about December 7th
Linn stated to 5^011 it had come in ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray, After December 7th.
Mr. SoxxETT. After December 7th ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Yes.
Mr. SoxxETT. Will you state exactly what he said, as best you recall ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Well, it was in connection with that multi-
part message that came in. You see. I was off. I was to go on again
at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of Pearl Harbor Day. I was sitting home,
listening to my radio, when I heard the flash and I jumped into a taxi-
cab and reported immediately. It appears then that the word that was
passed on to me from the preceding watch officer was that during the
night of the 6th a mfilti-part message had come in, which I under-
stood laier was the message that was handed to the Secretary of State
the follow day — the multi-part message had come in and they had all
gone to work and sweated over it and then during the course of that
conversation, Linn mentioned to me — I am quite sure of this, but I
can't swear to it — that the "winds" code message had come in, but I
don't know whether the Army got it or whether we got it or who. You
see. the Army and the Navy there were working two teams and the
\4^^8] way the set up was, that on one day — odd or even day ; I can't
remember which — ^the Navy handled it: the other day the Army han-
dled it. Now, of course, we, to be perfectly frank about it — we went
ahead on our own anyway and I think it was due to the fact that we
went ahead on your own that we got a little bit of jump on that multi-
part message. You see. actually that multi-part message came in on
the day that was supposed to be hanrlled by the Army.
Mr. SoxxETT. That is, on December 6th ?
260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Yes, but in view of the urgent circum-
stances, we went ahead on it anyway, that is, our organization did, and
I am quite sure that Linn was on that watch because Brown — the
watches got mixed up and Brown normally either preceded me or re-
lieved me and the fact that he was on vacation, I am quite sure that it
was Linn that got that multi-part message.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, when Linn said to you that this message had
come in, did he indicate when it had come in ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. No.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you understand that it had come in about the
same time as the multi-part message ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. No. My understanding was that it came
in later, because the impression I got from him was that they got it
too late to do anything about it.
Mr. SoNNETT. That would be, then, on December 7th?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Apparently that would be it.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you, Commander, document 6 and document 11
of exhibit 13 of this investigation and ask whether you have seen those
documents before.
[4S9] Lieut. Comdr. Murray. No, I don't ever remember seeing
that. That is the first one.
Mr. SoNNETT. That is document 6, is it, of the exhibit?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Yes, that is 6.
Mr. SoNNETT. For the sake of the record, Commander, can we state
what that document is? That is an intercepted Japanese dispatch
of what date ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. 27 November.
Mr. SoNNETT. And it indicates that a code is set up ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Well, yes, yes. This designation here J-19,
I recognize, too. That usually carried instructions of this kind.
Mr. SoNNETT. The dispatch stated, did it not : "With international
relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of
dispatches using ingo denpo (hidden word or misleading language
telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully"? Then
it lists a series of code words, does it not?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Yes, it gives the code word and the meaning
that the code word will have.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were you familiar with th% establishment b}'' the
Japanese of the so-called hidden word code as indicated in that
exhibit ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. No, I wasn't.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you refer to the next document, which is 11 ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. That I could have seen. You see, again
if I had seen that, gentlemen — well, it was in code
Mr. SoNNETT. For the sake of the record. Commander, would you
read that into the record, too ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. "Relations between Japan and England are
not [44^] ^n accordance with expectations."
Mr. SoNNETT. What is the date of it ?
Lieut. Comdr, Murray. 7 December.
Mr. SoNNETT. From whom and to whom ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. From Tokyo, a circular.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 261
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know whether or not, Commander, Linn was
referring to that message of December 7th when he said to you that a
message had come in employing the "winds" code ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Well, I am not sure what he was referring
to, except this, that we all had the "winds" code on our mind and we
even dreamt about it at night. "We just were on our toes and on edge,
looking and waiting for that thing, and as soon as he said it came in
but too late to use, well, there was only one thing that came to our
mind, and I will be perfectly frank about it. It was no definite speci-
fication made on it or anything further said.
Mr. SoNNETT. If a "winds" code message had come in relating to
England on December 7, 1941, would it have been translated the same
as document 11 of exhibit 13 ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Would it have been translated the same
as 11 ? You mean written up in that form ?
Mr. SoNNETT. In substance, would it have conveyed the same mean-
ing ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. I believe it would, yes, but again I have
the language difficulty to contend with and I can say it is my belief
that it would have been that way.
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, what I have in mind is. Commander, the
"winds" code established a code the use of which would signify a
break in diplomatic relations between this country, England, Russia,
and Japan.
Lieut. Comdr. MuRR^iY. Yes.
[44-^] Mr. SoNNETT. That was also true of the hidden word
code, was it not ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. As indicated?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that the message you have before you, which is
document 11 of exhibit 13, conveyed the substance of the message
which could have been sent in either the "winds" code or the hidden
word code ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Right. In other words, it infers a warn-
ing that something is going to happen.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further. Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. I thinly that is all. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
[44^1 A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. State your name and rank.
Commander Wright. Wesley A. Wright, Commander, USN.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is your present assignment. Commander?
Commander Wright. I am Officer in Charge of the naval radio
activities, Bainbridge Island.
Mr. Sonnett. What was your assignment on December 7, 1941 ?
Commander Wright. Assistant Communications Officer, Staff of
the Commander-in-Chief, on temporary duty in combat intelligence
unit. Fourteenth Naval District.
Mr. Sonnett. For how long prior to December 7, 1941, had you
been on that duty ?
Commander Wright. Since March 31, '41.
262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Who was in charge of that activity, Commander?
, Commander Wright, Then Lieutenant Commander J. J. Roche-
fort.
Mr. SoNNETT. And what were your duties in that unit?
Commander Wright. Assistant Cryptanalyst.
Mr. SoNNETT. Wlio else was engaged in cryptanalysis activities in
that unit at that time ?
Commander Wright. Lieutenant Commander T. H. Dyer was the
senior cryptanalyst and myself and we had an ensign, a Reserve, who
had been there since December, '40 — I think it was Wurner. We had
ii lieutenant. Reserve, by the name of Underwood ; a chief yeoman by
the name of Woodward ; Chief Yeoman Rorie.
Mr. SoNNETT. Is this all in decrypting?
Commander Wright. All of those up to Rorie were aKuully en-
gaged in decrypting and clerical.
[4-43] Mr. SoNNETT. Woodward?
Commander Wright. No. Rorie. Woodward was entirely de-
crypting and language assistance. Chief Yeoman Conant. Lieu-
tenant Hopewick was available for decrypting work. His primary
duties were with the IBM machines. I believe that is all.
Mr. SoNNETT. Commander, you recall, I take it, that during the
early part of December, 1941, certain messages of the Japanese Consul
in Hawaii were secured and worked on by your unit ?
Commander Wright. Yes, I remember that.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you recall approximately when those messages
were received in your unit ?
Commander Wright. I am afraid I couldn't answer that definitely.
I have discussed these things so much since that I know we got them
on the 5th now, but that would be absolutely hearsay.
Mr. SoNNETT. Commander, I show you exhibit 29 of this investiga-
tion, which consists of photostatic copies of translated dispatches to
and from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu during the first week in
December, 1941, and ask you whether you recall that they were among
the dispatches received and translated at that time.
Commander Wright. Yes, I believe they were among the dispatches
that were delivered to us by the naval intelligence unit of the Four-
teenth Naval District.
Mr. SoNNETT. I also show you exhibit 40 of this investigation and
call to your attention the second ONI report contained in that exhibit,
dated 14 February 1942, and ask you whether the translated Japanese
messages set forth in that report were among those received prior to
December T, 1941.
Commander Wright. I would say that they were all received to-
gether. [444] It is my recollection that we got them all on the
5th. It would have been very difficult for us to get one that was sent
on the 6th — no, not necessarily ; if it was sent the 6th Tokyo time, we
could have got it on the 5th. I would state that I am fairly positive
on those up to and including the day of the 5th. Those that are dated
the 6th, I am not so sure about them ; but I don't remember the second
package coming in.
Mr. SoNNETT. Commander, did you work on the decryption of any
of those messages which came in up to and including December 6,
1941?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 263
Commander Wright. Not directly, no. In a supervisory capacity, I
watched Woodward's work.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it Woodward, then, who did the bulk of the de-
cryption ?
Commander Wright. Woodward, I believe, did all of the decryption
with some clerical assistance.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 41 of this investigation. Com-
mander, which consists of twenty-eight pages of photostats of hand-
written and typed decryptions and translations, and ask you whether
you can identify the handwriting on any of those pages.
Commander Wright. No, I am afraid I couldn't recognize the hand-
writing positively. I am quite sure that between Woodward and
Laswell— they are in Washington— they can all be identified. They
are both there in Washington, and Laswell was the translating unit
out there at the time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall. Commander, whether any of the mes-
sages to or from the "Japanese Consulate in Hawaii which were deliv-
ered to the Navy prior to December 7, 1941, was decrypted and trans-
lated before the attack?
Commander Wright. No, I don't know whether any were or not. I
have been under the impression that there were none delivered to
Layton previously, but if he has testified differently, he is probably
correct. I wouldn't [44^] have been involved in it myself.
Mr. SoNNETT. My question wasn't whether they were delivered to
Layton, but whether there was any decrypted and translated prior to
the attack.
Commander Wright. I don't know. Again, I think Laswell and
Woodward can give you a better answer.
Mr. SoNNETT. Commander, were you familiar with the establish-
ment of the so-called "winds" code by the Japanese on or about No-
vember 28, 1941 ?
Commander Wright. Yes, it came to my attention at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry,
document 15, and ask you whether you were familiar with that dis-
patch of the substance of it.
Commander Wright. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. That is the so-called "winds" code, is it not?
Commander Wright. That is setting up the wind warning.
Mr. SoNNETT. Are you familiar with the efforts which were made to
monitor for any Japanese message employing that code?
Commander Wright. Yes. As I remember it, immediately after the
I'eceipt of this message, we set a watch, a twenty-four hour watch, on
those broadcasts at the radio station, one language officer on for every
four hours.
Mr. Sonnett. What were the results, if any?
Commander Wright. No message of that nature was intercepted by
our unit.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you know of the receipt by any one of a "winds"
code message relating to the L^nited States prior to December 7, 1941?
Commander Wright. No, I do not know of such. That is, the exe-
cute.
Mr. Sonnett. Did any information ever come to your attention
which was received as a result of tapping the telephone wires of the
264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese [44^] Consulate, that is, prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Commander Wright. No.
Mr. SoNNETT. On December 7, 1941, Commander, you were on duty
at the unit at Pearl Harbor, were you not ?
Commander Wright. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And during the co^irse of that day, it has been indi-
cated by previous investigations, there were various radio bearings re-
ceived as to the location of the attacking force. You testified before
Admiral Hart that there was an early arbitrary assumption that the
surface forces were actually to the southward. Is that your recollec-
tion?
Commander Wright. I would say there was a general impression
that the enemy forces were to the south.
Mr. SoNNETT. There was one bearing, was there not, which was in
direct conflict with the other bearings and indicated that the attacking
force was almost due north ?
Commander Wright. Yes, but the circinnstances surrounding the
obtaining of that bearing were such that it was never given the prom-
inence that it possibly might have had.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state fully what those circumstances were,
please ?
Commander Wright. The large direction finder which we then had
had out at Lualualei, CXK, the only means of communication we had
between Lualualei and our unit there at Pearl Harbor was by an Army
mega-telephone and all those mega-telephones were put out of com-
mission and we had no communication contact with the station; so
we finally raised the station by radio from Admiral Kimmel's head-
quarters and received one bearing by radio which indicated a northern
direction.
144'^] Mr. SoNNETT. About what time of day was that? Do
you remember?
Commander Wright. No, I am afraid I don't. I would say offhand
maybe 10 : 30, 11 o'clock.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know what, if any, action was taken as a
result of having obtained that bearing ?
Commander Wright. No, I don't believe it made — it had influenced
the opinion at all that the forces were to the south.
Mr. Sonnett. Was the direction finder at Lualualei a one directional
or reciprocal —
Commander Wright. The CXK is unilateral.
Mr. Sonnett. Unilateral?
Commander Wright. Yes, it gives a true direction.
Mr. Sonnett. Were there any other CXK's being used in the area
at that time ?
Commander Wright. No, the only other one we had at that time was
in Mare Island.
Mr. Sonnett. Was there any information received from the Army
on December 7, 1941, as to the radar bearings of the attacking forces ?
Do you know whether any information was received ?
Commander Wright. To the best of my knowledge, there was none
received by our unit.
Mr. Sonnett. Commander, I call your attention to documents 1, 2,
3, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 23, and 24 of exhibit 13 of this in-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 265
vestigation, which are all copies of Japanese dispatches relating to
ships and defense preparations in the Pearl Harbor area, and ask
you whether prior to December 7, 1941, you saw any of those dispatches.
Commander Wright. No. To the best of my recollection, none of
these [44S] messages were transmitted to or received by our
unit prior to December 7th.
Mr. SoNNFTT. I call your attention, Commander, specifically to
docmnent 14 of this exhibit, which is a message from Honolulu to
Tokyo, dated December 6, 1941, in the PA-K2 system, dealing with
barrage balloons, and also call your attention to pages 7 and 8 of ex-
hibit 41, which is a pencilled translation, and ask you whether those
are translations of the same message.
Commander Wright. Yes, undoubtedly two different translations
of the same message.
Mr. SoNNETT. I call j'our attention to the last sentence of the first
paragraph of document 14, which indicates that it is an Army transla-
tion, does it not?
Commander Wright. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the last sentence reads: "I imagine that in all
probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage
for a surprise attack against these places." I call your attention to
the last sentence of the first paragraph of page 7 of exhibit 41, which
reads : "The whole matter seems to have been dropped" — which indi-
cates a different translation of that portion of the message, does it
not?
Commander Wright. It certainly indicates a different interpreta-
tion of the Japanese in that portion.
Mr. Sonnett. Have you any information about the difference in
translation, Commander ?
Commander Wright. None at all.
Mr. Sonnett. And you do not know, I take it, who made the trans-
lation contained on pages 7 and 8 of exhibit 41 ?
Commander Wright. Not offliand. I would guess it was Fullen-
wider, [449] but it is either Laswell or Fullenwider or possibly
Rochefort. I would guess from this one it was possibly Fullenwider.
Mr. Sonnett. The messages in exhibit 13 to which I have called
your attention just now, Commander, indicate that many of them were
translated by the Army, do they not?
Commander Wright. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you know how the Army received those messages
in the first place and, secondly, what their procedure was for decrypt-
ing and translating them ?
Conimander Wright, Roughly, as I remember it, we had a joint
source of obtaining all the diplomatic traffic. We had our own inter-
cept stations and they had their own intercept stations. We pooled
the intercepts. Then they had a day by day arrangement whereby
the Navy didn't necessarily work on all the traffic for that day, but the
Navy was responsible for all of the translations for that day and the
Army was responsible — if it were the odd days, then the Navy would
be the even days; but both units works on all of the messages. The
Army on there just indicates that it was the Army's date to be respon-
sible for that particular message.
266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you state from those particular exhibits what
Army intercept station intercepted them, that is, referring to the same
ship movement and defense preparation messages '^
Commander Wright. In general, I would say that the numerals in-
dicated Army and the letters indicated Navy. I am not sure of that.
You can get better information on that from the people that were in
Washington at that time. Murray, I think, would probably know it.
That is what it looks like to me, that the letters were Navy and the
numerals Army. The letter "S" would indicate that the message was
intercepted at Bainbridge Island.
[4^0] Mr. SoNNETT. Was any decryption done at Bainbridge
Island, Commander ? Do you know ?
Commander Wright. No.
Mr. SoNNETT. Where was the decryption done of the Japanese
messages which were intercepted ?
Commander Wright. In accordance with the assignment of cryp-
analytical tasks, all of the decryption of diplomatic traffic was done
either at Washington or at Cavite.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.
Commander Wright. I have nothing. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 3:52 p. m. adjourned until 2: 15
p. m., 19 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 267
\.W] PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIEY
Twentieth Day
Pursuant to notice, the inA^estigation met at the offices of the Gen-
eral Board, Navy Department, at 2 : 15 p. m., Tuesday, 19 June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USX; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. CirisAvold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Beecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. Sonnett. State your name and rank, please.
Captain Earle. John B. Earle, Captain, tjSN.
]Mr. Sonnett. What was j-our assignment on December 7, 1941,
Captain?
Captain Eable. Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Xaval District.
Mr. Sonnett. And for how long had you been in that assignments
Captain Earle. Since June 9, 1941.
Mr. Sonnett. You testified previously, as I recall it, Captain, tliat
in the several months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor you had
about ten or fifteen reports of submarines sighted around Pearl Har-
bor. Can you recall what those reports were ?
Captain Earle. Verj' indefinitely. They generally came from sam-
pans — from fishing boats ; occasionally from Army lookout posts ; and
now and then from planes.
]Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall. Captain, the nature of the last report
received prior to December 7. 1941?
Captain Earle. No, I do not.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, do you recall specificalh' any report of sub-
marine sighting or contact in the months of October, November, and
up to [It52^ December 6, 1941 ?
Captain Earle. No, I do not.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall. Captain, whether prior to December 7,
1941, there Avas any report of a submarine just off the entrance to
Pearl Harbor?
Captain Earle. As I recall, there had been such a report, but wheth-
er it was official and not simply unofficial, I can't say at this time.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall whether that report was a contact or
sighting, Captain ?
Admiral Hewitt. You mean destroyer contact.
Mr. Sonnett. Destroyer contact or sighting.
Captain Earle. I can't recall.
Mr. Sonnett. Did any report of a submarine contact prior to De-
cember 7, 1941, involve a depth charge on the submarine or suspected
submarine ?
Captain Earle. My recollection is not sufficiently accurate to say
whether or not I can recall that point. I have a vague recollection of
268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
something of that kind, but not sufficiently accurate to make a definite
statement.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you recall, Captain, whether any report prior to
December 7, 1941, involved firing upon a submarine or a suspected
submarine ?
Captain Earle. I am almost certain that there was no such report.
Mr. SoNNETT. Keferring to the morning of December T, 1941, Cap-
tain, I show you exhibit 18 of this investigation and direct your atten-
tion particularly to the conversation recorded at about 0520 Pearl Har-
bor time of that date between the WARD and the CONDOK, and ask
whether that conversation or the fact of such a convereation came
to your attention prior to the attack on December 7th?
Captain Earle. It did not.
[4S3] Mr. SoNNETT. You will note on the second page of that
exhibit. Captain, a report by the WARD of its attack upon a sub-
marine. That report did come to your attention prior to the attack,
as I understand your previous testimony.
Captain Earle. That report did come to my attention but not in the
wording that it is included in the log of the section base.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you state. Captain, the report of that con-
versation which was received by you on December 7, 1941, and state
the time approximately at which you received it ?
Captain Earle. About 0710 I was informed by the Operations Duty
Officer, Lieutenant Commander Kaminski, that he had received a mes-
sage from the WARD to the effect that "We have attacked and fired on
a submarine."
Admiral Hewitt. Nothing about depth charges ?
Captain Earle. No, sir.
Mr. SoNNETT. That report. Captain, was a more specific report, was
it not, than any previous report concerning submarine contact which
had been received by you ?
Captain Earle. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. What action was taken on the report?
Captain Earle. As I recall it, I immediately told the watch officer
to inform the Commander-in-Chief's Operation Officer and to take
steps to get the relief destroyer ready to proceed out of the harbor, to
get the message checked and verified and attempt to find out what
further action was being taken by the WARD. I then called the
Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral Bloch, in-
formed him of what had been done, and talked the situation over with
him for some time with a view to deciding what other action should
be taken. Our reaction was that it was probably a mistake as we had
had numerous reports of sighting of submarines, but that if it were
not a [4^4-] mistake, the WARD could take care of the situa-
tion and the relief destroyer could lend a hand, while the Commander-
in-Chief had the necessary power to undertake any other action which
might be desired. Mainly we were trying to definitely determine
what had happened.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it. Captain, that no further action was taken
on that report prior to the air attack on December 7th?
Captain Earle. No other action was taken by me. I believe that in
addition to that, that Commander Momsen, who was the Operations
Officer, was contacted and told to take station. We were vaguely
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 269
alarmed but could see no specific threat involved except that by the
possible position of an enemy submarine in that area.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I show you exhibit 8 of the Naval Court of
Inquiry, which is Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number 2CL-41
(Kevised) , dated October 14, 1941, and ask whether you saw that and
were familiar with that prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Earle. It is my recollection that I saw this before Decem-
ber 7, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, referring to page 6 of that exhibit. Captain,
sub-paragraph (m) (3), would you read that into the record, sir?
Captain Earle. "It must be remembered too, that a single sub-
marine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface
force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The
Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as
quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be
prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air
search or other means."
Mr. SoNisTETT. Were you in agreement. Captain, there with that
statement of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of the fleet ?
[4oS] Captain Eaele. Most certainly in agreement, based upon
the belief that such an attack might take place after the declaration
of war.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, referring. Captain, to page 1 of that letter,
you will find two assumptions stated. Would you read assumption
(b) into the record? I suggest doing it that way because it has been
some lime since you have seen that exhibit, and also it will be clearer
in the record.
Captain Earle (reading) :
(a) That no responsible foreign power wil provoke war, under present exist-
ing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and mis-
guided nationals of such powers may attempt ;
(1) Sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.
(2) To black the entrance to Peai'l Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the
Channel.
(3 ) To lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.
(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by ;
(1) A surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
(3) a combination of these two.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, Captain, coming back to the previous question,
it appears, does it not, that one of the assumptions of the security
letter was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise
Japanese attack? Having that in mind and turning to the statement
that you previously read concerning the presence of a submarine, will
you state W'hy, on the morning of December 7, 1941, upon receipt of the
report from the WARD, it was not believed tliat a large Japanese
force might be in the offing and why appropriate action was not taken
on that belief ?
[4^6] Captain Earle. In the first place, we were not sure of this
supposed contact. It still seemed to have a possibility of being in
error. This was particularly strengthened by a later report received
from the WARD which said that she was proceeding to escort a
sampan toward Honolulu. We couldn't imagine that the WARD,
having actually attacked a submarine, would leave her post to proceed
to Honolulu if it were a real attack. In the second place, we had no
270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
force immediately available to resist any attack as far as the District
was concerned, except the relief destroyer, and we felt that by referring
the matter to the Commander-in-Chief, that we had done all that we
possibly could even if the attack were real.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Captain, to the previous submarine con-
tact reports, that is, prior to December 7, 1941, were any air searches
conducted as a result of those reports ?
Captain Earle. It is my recollection that there were air searches,
but we in the District had no control over these air searches and we
had no airplanes ourselves, so that we asumed that when information
was referred to the Commander-in-Chief, that all necessary action
would be taken.
Mr. SoNNETT. With respect, Captain, to the question of aircraft
reconnaissance, it appears from the previous investigations that some
time in July or August of 1941 Admiral Bloch suggested to Admiral
Kimmel that reconnaissance be conducted on a sector towards Jaluit.
Have you any information in connection with that?
Captain Earle. I have not.
Mr. SctNNETT. And you do not know what the reasons were for the
suggestions made by Admiral Bloch ?
Captain Earle. I do not recall.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, I show j'ou a certified collection of docu-
ments L-^'/] which contains Annex VII, Section VI, Joint
Agreements, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, this being
dated 28 March 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that
at or about the time it was issued.
Captain Earle. I do not recall definitely having seen this docu-
ment, but inasmuch as when I reported as Chief of Staff in June
I was shown all of the existing orders, it is very probable that T
saw this.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, this contains various other documents
which we don't presently need, but since it is certified, I wonder
whether we shouldn't take it now as an exhibit and we can refer to it
with the Captain. Some of the provisions will be of interest.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 47.")
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to exhibit 47, Captain, which w^e have just
been discussing, it appears that it was approved April 2, 1941, and
signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short, does it not?
Captain Earle. It does.
Mr. Sonnett. Paragraph 2 of the exhibit provides for joint air
operations and paragraph 4 for joint anti-aircraft measures, includ-
ing arrival and departure procedure for aircraft, and other items.
Would you, referring to this exhibit. Captain, discuss what joint
. exercises and drills were held with the Army as a general practice
in the months preceding the attack under the joint anti-aircraft
procedure ?
Captain Earle. As I recall, definite problems were prepared for
training purposes which would serve to develop the control features
of the base anti-aircraft defense and at the same time develop the
necessary coordination between the operations of the Army and Navy
air components. Frequent [4^S] drills — I should say about
once every ten days — were held in which planes would fly over the
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 271
Pearl Harbor area both day and night and the ships in the harbor
would stimulate anti-aircraft fire on these planes. The entire Pearl
Harbor area was divided into sectors and there was a naval sector
commander on a ship who was responsible for controlling the indi-
vidual fire of that sector and make the necessary reports. In addi-
tion to the above, a problem was developed about once a month or
less in which a definite target for aircraft was placed on a certain
bearing from Pearl Harbor at a certain time and the warning was
sent in to both the Army and Navy that an enemy aircraft carrier
or unit was on such and such a bearing, distance so much. At that
time the various provisions of air control were used in that, fighter
planes were sent aloft and bombers were actually sent out to inter-
cept and attack the simulated target offshore. I am not certain
exactly how many drills of this type were had before Pearl Harbor
on December 7th. but I should say at least three.
Mr, SoNNETT. When was the latest of the three. Captain ?
Captain Earle. I am sorry, but I couldn't say exactly.
Mr. SoN>rETT. Can you recall whether any such drill was held be-
tween November 27th and December 7th, that is, roughly in the two
weeks preceding the attack ?
Captain Earle. I cannot recall.
Admiral Hewitt. What was the command staff setup for carrying
out joint operations as between the District and the Army command
in such exercises ?
Captain Earle. You mean before Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Hewitt. Any such exercise, before Pearl Harbor and what
was set up after?
Captain Earle. My recollection is colored from operations that took
[4-59] place after Pearl Harbor, but it is my belief that the entire
problem of this aircraft coordination was handled through the fleet
and the Army. In other words, after the word came through that an
enemy had been sighted on a certain bearing, this word was given to
the fleet and to the Army and that then arrangements were made
between the commander of the fleet air and the Army air to coordinate
their operations, including orders as to — detailed directions as to
direction, speed, and number of planes to be used, and so forth.
To amplify the above statement, there was no joint command post
or operations center actually set up for these drills before the war.
The Operations Office in the Headquarters of the Fourteenth Naval
District, which consisted of an operation switchboard with necessary
communication personnel and a watch officer, was set up to handle
these drills from the Fourteenth Naval District. I do not recall the
exact time, but either somewhere just before Pearl Harbor or just
after, a coast artillery liaison officer was placed in this Operations
Office. Plans had been made for a joint command post, but no definite
steps had been taken as to location or details prior to the start of the
war. It is my recollection that plans had been made for a joint com-
mand post, but this had not gone beyond the planning stage.
After the war started, a joint command post was set up immediately
in the Operations Office of the Fourteenth Naval District and operated
there for several months while the Army moved their principal com-
272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
mand center to the Crater. Shortly after their move, the Navy moved
its command center next to the Army center in the Crater-
Admiral HiwiTT. That is, Fourteenth Naval District
Captain Earle. Fourteenth
Admiral Hewitt. Or District and the Commander-in-Chief?
Captain Earle, No, District; just the District.
[4^0] Mr. SoNNETT. Prior to December 7, 1941, Captain, the
Fourteenth Naval District had a Liaison Officer with General Short's
headquarters, did you not?
Captain Earle. Yes, sir.
Mr. SoNNETT. What, in general, were his duties, Captain ?
Captain Earle. He was sent up to the Army to report to the Com-
manding General for duty as Liaison Officer and to perform such duties
in that connection as would be required.
Mr. SoNNETT. Exhibit 47, Captain, the Annex VII, Section VI, to
the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, provided in part that the
Army would expedite the installation and placing in operation of an
aircraft warning service. During the period of completion of the
AWS installation, the Navy, through use of radar and other appro-
priate means, would endeavor to give such warnings of hostile attacks
as might be practicable. What steps were taken, in general. Captain,
by the Navy to carry out that agreement ?
Captain Earle. In the first place, communications were established
with the Army over radio nets and teletype system so that any infor-
mation that came in could be sent promptly to the Army stations
interested. The communication activities were informed that prompt
reports must be made concerning any possible enemy activity. The
few destroyers assigned to the District had the necessary instruc-
tions as to reporting contacts. There were no planes attached to the
District, but it is my recollection that fleet planes were instructed to
forward immediately any information to that extent. The District
Communications Officer was thoroughly aware of the necessitj^ for
getting prompt information of enemy contacts to the Army.
Mr. SoNNETT. To what extent, Captain, were you or Admiral Bloch
kept informed concei-ning the reconnaissance being performed by the
fleet panes in the months preceding the attack ?
[4^1] Captain Earle. I can't speak for Admiral Bloch, but as
far as I am concerned, I had no information unless I came by it
casually, following some special report of a sighting.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I show you a collection of dispatches relat-
ing to submarine contacts reported in November and December, 1941.
some of which were sent for information to ComFOURTEEN, and
ask you whether these are the type of reports of submarine contacts
received prior to the attack to which you referred previously in your
testimony.
Captain Earle, They are.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit. Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes,
(The dispatches referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
48".)
Mr. SoisrisTBTT. Captain, referring again to exhibit 47, which is
Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan,
it appears that the Army was to expedite the installation and placing
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 273
in operation of an aircraft warning service. It appears from previous
investigations that some request was made of ComFOURTEEN for
Navy liaison officers to work with the Army aircraft warning service.
Do you have any knowledge or information concerning that?
Captain Earle. The only information I have is that there was a
naval officer engaged in assisting the Army to get their warning system
installed and operating, who came to me at one time and asked for
help and I told him to apply to the District Communications Officer,
who would be glad to give him every possible assistance. This officer
also mentioned that a certain number of naval liaison officers would be
necessary at this warning center, to which I replied that we had no
spare personnel in the District for that purpose as [463] we
were extremely short in every department. The officer then stated that
he would see what he could do to get liaison officers from the fleet,
and it was my impression that no further action would be taken by
the District unless the fleet found it necessary. It might be of interest
to note that after Pearl Harbor liaison officers were supplied, but they
all came from ships that had been damaged or sunk in Pearl Harbor.
Mr. SoNNETT. Wliile we are on the subject of the Army radar
system, Captain, do you recall what reports you received from the
Army relative to the bearing of planes or bearings of planes, received
on December 7th, showing in which direction they departed from
Pearl Harbor ?
Captain Earle. So far as as I know. I never saw such information.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, the District Intelligence Officer was Cap-
tain Mayfleld, was he not?
Captain Earle. Yes, sir.
Mr, SoNNETT. And the radio intelligence unit was under then
Lieutenant Commander Rochefort?
Captain Earle. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you receive the daily communication intelligence
summaries prepared by the radio intelligence unit, such as those con-
tained in exhibit 22 of this investigation (handing the exhibit to the
witness) ?
Captain Earle. No, I did not. These summaries were considered
of such secret matter that the Commandant of the District wished
as few as possible to see them.
Mr, SoNNETT. Do you know whether or not such summaries came
to Admiral Bloch's attention?
Captain Earle. I do not, but I imagine they did.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you have any information prior to December 7,
1941, [4631 concerning any telephone taps on the lines of the
Japanese Consul or Vice Consul in Honolulu ?
Captain Earle. I have no information on that subject.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you know whether or not any cables of the Japa-
nese Consul in Honolulu were intercepted prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Earle. I do not know.
Mr. Sonnett. At any time prior to Deceipber 7, 1941, did there
come to your attention. Captain, any messages of the Japanese Consid
relating to ship movements in Pearl Harbor or preparations for de-
fense in Pearl Harbor ?
Captain Earle. There did not.
79716— 4G— Ex. 149, vol. I 19
274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, with respect to the dealings of the Four-
teenth Naval District with the Army, do you recall what information,
if any, was supplied to the Army, particularly relating to movements
of Japanese naval forces ?
Captain Eari^. I do not know of any information of that character
being furnished the Army.
Mr. SoNNETT. Prior to December 7, 1941, immediately prior thereto,
and between the 1st and the Tth there were various dispatches re-
ceived at CincPac Headquarters relating to the destruction of codes
by the Japanaese. Did you have any knowledge of those dispatches ?
Captain Earle. I believe that I saw such a dispatch over at the
Commander-in-Chief's office.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know whether that information was com-
municated to the Army?
Captain Earle. I couldn't say. The Fourteenth Naval District
didn't communicate it to the Army.
Mr. Sonnett. I think that is all. Admiral.
[464] Admiral Hewitt. I have nothing further. Thank you
very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 3 : 20 p. m., adjourned until 10 : 10
a. m., Wednesday, 20 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 27i
U65] PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIRY
Twenty-First Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the Gen-
eral Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. at lU : 10 a. m.,
Wednesday, 20 June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. Sonnett. Will jou state your name and rank, please?
Lieutenant Underkofler. Oliver H. Underkofler, Lieutenant,
USNR.
Mr. Sonnett. Where were you assigned on December 7, 1941,
Lieutenant?
Lieutenant Underkofler. Communication Office, ComFOUR-
TEEN.
Mr. Sonnett. What duties were you performing on the night of
December 6th or morning of December 7, 1941?
Lieutenant Undekkofler. I' was the communication watch officer
on watch.
Mr. Sonnett. That is, of ComFOURTEEN?
Lieutenant Underkofler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sonnett. At what time did that watch commence, Lieutenant ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. The commAinication watch officer's
watch started at 0800 on the 6th and was supposed to conclude at 0800
on the 7th.
Mr. Sonnett. In addition to yourself, who else was present at that
time, during that watch ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. Ensign Kennedy, now lieutenant.
Mr. Sonnett. And his first name?
Lieutenant Underkofler. I believe it was Gordon F., but I am
not sure.
[4G0] Mr. Sonnett. On the morning of the 7th until approxi-
mately 0630 was Kennedy present with you, listening to the reports
(hat came in, and in a position to hear them?
Lieutenant Underkofler. No. sir, he was in the coding vault,
which was at the far end of the Communication Office and was sepa-
rated from the Communication Office by a bulkhead, with a port in
the bulkhead about twelve inches square; so he was in no position
to hear the radio.
Mr, Sonnett. You were standing what you termed a loudspeaker
watch, were you not, Lieutenant?
Lieutenant Underkofler. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you describe what that consisted of?
276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Lieutenant Underkofler. It was a watch on the inshore patrol
frequency, was established each evening at the time the minesweeps
went out and commenced sweeping the channel, and we stood watch
on that circuit until we received a report from the minesweeps that
the channel had been swept and was clear, at which time we secured.
Mr SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 18 of this investigation, which
consists of an extract of the radio log of the Bishop's Point Radio
Station for December 7, 1941, and call your attention to the conver-
sation between the WARD and the CONDOR, having call signs
DZ5Y and DN3L, at about 1450 Greenwich time, and ask whether
or not that conversation came to j^our attention.
Lieutenant Underkofi^er. It did not.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you explain why it did not come to your atten-
tion. Lieutenant?
Lieutenant Underkofler. On this loudspeaker watch that was set
up there was no one assigned to sit by the radio and listen to it.
Any one who has stood loudspeaker watches is aware that you listen
to it subconsciously, [4^"^1 the same as you would any other
noise in the vicinity. If your call is given, you hear it just like as
if an alarm clock had been rung and you immediately answer the
call. If we hadn't been called that morning, we would have paid,
or the man on watch would have paid, no attention to the conversa-
tion that was carried on.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you remember what your call was?
Lieutenant Underkofler. No, sir, I don't.
Mr. SoNNETT. By looking at exhibit 18, can you refresh your recollec-
tion, particularly the second page?
Lieutenant Underkofler. From the appearance of the log, it would
seem that DW2X was a call for ComFOURTEEN. Those calls were
assigned by the District and changed about once eveiy two months
and we made no attempt to memorize them.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring again to the conversation between the
WARD and CONDOR at about 1450 Greenwich time, what time would
that be. Pearl Harbor time?
Lieutenant Underkofler. Pearl Harbor time before the war was
plus ten and a half hours, which would make that 4 : 20.
Mr. SoNNETT. Is it the fact that you were not called by either the
WARD or the CONDOR and given a report of the sighting of the
submarine referred to in that conversation?
Lieutenant Underkofler. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to page 2 of exhibit 18, there appears at
1723 Greenwich time, which, I take it, is about 0653 Pearl Harbor
time, a record of the report by the WARD of an attack on a submarine.
Did that report come to your attention ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. It did.
[4^8] Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state the circumstances and what
action was taken by you?
Lieutenant Underkofler. There were two dispatches came through
to ComFOURTEEN and I was broken out of the bunk as the first
one came in and by the time the second one had come in, which came
in immediately following, I was alert and received the message and
delivered it to the duty officer at ComFOURTEEN.
Mr. Sonnett. At what time on the morning of December 7th had
you turned in, Lieutenant?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 277
Lieutenant Underkofler. At approximately 0230.
Mr. SoNNEiT. And from that time until you were awakened at about
0630 or thereabouts, I take it, you were asleep ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. That is correct. ,
Mr. SoNNETT. Who was the supervisor, if you recall, who was awake
during that period of time ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. I do not recall who was on watch. I don't
recall a single man that was on watch that morning.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do vou know whether the conversation between the
WARD and the CONDOR at about 0420 Pearl Harbor time came to
the attention of any one who was standing that watch with you ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. To my knowledge, it did not.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would the fact of such a conversation have been re-
ported to you had it come to the attention of some one standing that
watch ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. Yes, I am sure it would.
Mr. SoNNETT. It has been testified previously, Lieutenant, that ef-
forts were made to verify the WARD's report. Have you any knowl-
edge of that?
Lieutenant Underkofler. Yes, sir.
[469] Mr. Sonnett. Will you state what you know about that ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. On receipt of the dispatch from the
WARD at approximately 0653 Hawaiian time, the dispatch was de-
livered to the duty officer of ComFOURTEEN, who relayed it to the
Chief of Staff of the Fourteenth Naval District. I was directed to get
a verification from the WARD by the duty officer and presumed that
this order emanated from the Chief of Staff. I asked if it should be
encoded and was instructed that it should be. The message requesting
verification was enciphered in a strip code and was delivered over the
voice circuit, voice radio circuit, to the WAHD. A reply to the re-
quest for verification was delivered to ComFOURTEEN by radio and
was deciphered at approximately the same time as the first attack by
air.
Mr. Sonnett. You stated that you were instructed by the duty
officer to have the report of the WARD verified. Did you receive that
instruction upon delivery to him of the report by the WARD or sub-
sequent to the delivery?
Lieutenant Underkofler. It was subsequent to the delivery.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall approximately how long afterwards?
Lieutenant Underkoflfj?. That has been some time ago and the
best of my remembrance, it was between ten and fifteen minutes.
Mr. Sonnett. You kept no log at the Communication Office on the
morning of the 7th, did 3^ou ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. There are several different types of logs.
We did not keep a log of the inshore patrol frequency over which these
messages to the WARD were handled.
Mr. Sonnett. You testified. Lieutenant, that you were instructed
to request the WARD for verification and to encode your request and
that you did so in a strip code. Will you state what that means and
the amount of time required to transmit such a message in that code ?
[4W] Lieutenant Underkofler. Use of the strip code is a sub-
stitution method, a substitution of letters method, so that when that
message has been encoded, it consists of five-letter groups that are
278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
not in any particular arrangement; in other words, indiscriminate let-
ters in the five-letter groups. It is a slow system to use, that is, to en-
code or decode in, and was used because it was the only thing that the
WARD had. The transmission of such a message over a voice circuit
requires that each letter be given in its phonetic equivalent, which is a
slow process. The reply, of course, was also enciphered and was de-
livered the same way, which was a lengthy process and took consider-
able time. I can't tell you how many minutes.
Admiral Hewitt. The origial report from the WAED was de-
livered in clear, was it not?
Lieutenant Underkofler. Yes, sir.
Mr. 80NNETT. That is all.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
Admiral Hewitt. We will i-ecess at this time until 11 o'clock.
(The investigation then, at 10: 30 a. m., recessed until 11 a. m., at
tvhich time it reconvened.)
(Present: The same parties.)
[471] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state your name and rank, sir ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Patrick N. L. Bellinger, Vice Admiral,
USN.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, you have a statement, do you not, setting
forth your duties during December, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I have.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we have it copied into the record?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
(The statement referred to follows as pages 4Tla to 47lh, inclu-
sive.)
[471a] On December 6, 1941, and, for several mouths prior thereto, my duties
were as follows :
(1) Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings and O^mmander, Patrol Wing
Two. Included in the larger command were the patrol squadrons and airci'aft
tenders attached to I'atrol Wings One and Two.
(2) Commander, Task Force Nine. This comprised Patrol Wings One and Two
plus other units as assigned by Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet for the conduct
of specific operations.
(3) Commander, Fleet Air Detachment. Pearl Harbor. The responsibilities of
this function included administrative authority in local matters over all aircraft
actually based on the Naval Aair Station. Pearl Harbor.
(4) Liasion with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for aviation develop-
ment within the District, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston
Islands.
(5) Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.
In connection with the above duties, I functioned under the following seniors :
(a) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who as type commander for patrol
wings, was based at San Diego.
(b) Commander Scouting Force, the Force Command of which Patrol Wings
One and Two were a part.
(c) Directly under Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet in my capacity as Com-
mander. Task Force Nine.
['/7i?>] (d) Under Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in his capacity
as Commander. Naval Base Defense Force when performing my duties as Com-
mandei- Naval Base Defense Air Force.
(e) Commanders of Task Forces One, Two, and Three for Operation of patrol
planes assigned those forces for specific operations.
A change in my status was contemplated in the then curi-ent Navy Orange War
Plan. Under its provisions, the units of my connnand were expected to make an
early move to bases on the outlying islands Midway, Wake, Johnston and Palmyra.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 279
My own headquarters were to be shifted to Midway. That my responsibilities in
this connectiou were by uo means considered light is evidenced by the fact that,
just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, this War Plan was being played as a
chart maneuver. Further, the squadron, ■VP-22, designated for maintenance in
the highest practicable degree of readiness to expedite the initiation of the war
plan move to advance bases was, in fact, transferred to Midway in October 1941.
Keverting to my status on Oahu, the most complicated of my duties consisted
of those in connection with the air defense of Pearl Harbor. About 1 March,
1941, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet directed me to report to the Com-
mandent 14th Naval District to prepare an air defense plan in conjunction with
the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. I so reported and proceeded with
the assigned task, working directly with Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. Army,
Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force who, incidentally, was senior to me.
The operation plan for the Naval Base Defense Force included several sub-
sidiary plans. The most important of these was the operation plan of
[Jf71c] the Naval Base Defense Air P^orce. In it was outlined the proposed
employment of all units made available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force.
In so far as Naval and Marine Corps air units were concerned, it was an order
requiring definite action when applicable. Orders from Army sources covering
the functioning of their units in the Naval Base Defense Air Force were the guides
for these aircraft. Both Army and Navy orders on this subject were based upon
the estimate of the situation dated March 31, 1941, and signed by General Martin
and myself.
That estimate was based on the conditions as they existed at the time it was
drafted. Changes in the naval air situation between that date and December 7,
1941, were not of sufficient significance to warrant a reestimate and my informa-
tion of the Army Air Force indicated an analogous condition.
The estimate, I believed, — and still believe — to be sound. But the orders based
on that estimate, like a precept of international law, lacked sanction. And the
missing sanction in this case was the absence of unity of command.
Specifically, the organization was designed to function through "mutual co-
operation" between the Army and Navy for the defense of Pearl Harbor against
air attack. As such, the Naval Base Defense Air Force could function only in
the event of an actual emergency or when proper authority so directed.
The composition of the Naval Base Defense Air Force varied from day to day
with the number of aircraft made "available" to it by the various Air Commands
of both Army and Navy. The determining factor in this technical availability
was the daily employment schedule of aircraft belonging to the various air units.
Aircraft reported as [//7irf] available were subject to the operational con-
trol of the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Foi'ce or the Army Pursuit Com-
mander in the prevailing category of readiness, only when the Naval Base Defense
Air Force was in a functioning status.
The normal procedure used for vitalizing this organization for drills was for
the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as Commander Naval
Base Defense Force, to send dispatch reading, "Drill, Danger of an air raid on
Pearl Harbor exists, Drill". This placed the Search and Attack groups in a
functioning status. On receipt of this message, I, in turn, as Commander Naval
Base Defense Air Force, sent a dispatch to all air units, which made planes
available to that organization, except Army pursuit units, ordering them to place
all available aircraft in the highest degree of readiness. At this point, during
such drills, searches were immediately started by planes initially in a high
degree of readiness, and their efforts were supplemented by orders to other
aircraft as they were reported ready for flight.
The term. Command Naval Basp Defense Air Force, was actually a misnomer
due to the limited composition of that portion of the Air Forces under my opera-
tional control, which included only aircraft for scouting to locate enemy surface
units and to attack tliem when located. It did not include fighter aircraft, radar
detection devices, or anti-aircraft guns.
The term, Commander. Naval Base Defense Air Force, was even more of a
misnomer as it implied authority over operating units to a degree which did not
exist. This authority was non-existent until an emergency was apparent, or
until appropriate authority placed the Naval Base Defense [471e] Air
Force in a functioning status, and, when so called into existence, was limited in
scope, in that it consisted only of operational control over Army units based upon
mutual cooperation. In addition, my authority, limited as' it was, extended
only over the Search and Attack Groups of the Naval Base Defense Air Force
and was non-existent so far as Army Pursuit aviation and Navy Fighter aviation
280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
were concerned which were to function under Brigadier General H. C. Davidson,
U. S. Army.
To illustrate the lack of numerical strength of aircraft available to the Naval
Base Defense Air Force, attention is invited to the report of a joint Army-Navy
Board dated 31 October, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering
the allocation of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian Ai-ea. Paragraph
4 (a) of this report, which was signed by Major General Martin as senior Army
member and myself as senior Navy member read as follows :
"4. The problem confronting the board as pertains to Army Aviation was
summed up by the Army representatives as follows :
(a) The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval
Base against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the
Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out his mission is:
(1) To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action
by bombardment aviation.
(2) To detect, intercept, and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu
by pursuit aviation."
It was pointed out that, under the Army 54th Group program, 170 B-17's and
two groups of 183 pursuit planes each would be assigned to fulfill [-^^if] the
above missions.
Naval plans called for 84 patrol planes and 48 VSO planes to be directly under
the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District to supplement or function in lieu
of the 98 patrol planes of Patrol Wings ONE and TWO, which might be ordered
to advance bases on the outlying islands of Wake, Midway, Johnston aind
Palmyra.
Further, the planes actually present on Oahu were not free until ordered to
concentrate on the Naval Base Air Defense. Both Army and Navy were in
the process of receiving replacements of obsolescent planes. Army B-18's were
being replaced by the more modern B-17's and in Patrol Wings ONE and
TWO PBY-1, 2 and 3's were being replaced by PBY-5's. The new types were
subject to the usual shake-down diflSculties and maintenance problems.
In the case of the Naval PBY-5 planes, there was an almost complete absence
of spare parts and, in addition, a program of the installation of armor and leak-
proof gasoline tanks was in progress. Considerable difficulty had also been
experienced with the cracking of engine nose sections in the first planes of this
type received and the installation of modified engine nose sections was in progress.
The major effort of Patrol Wings ONE and TWO during 1941 prior to
December 7th was expansion training, operational training, security operations,
development and equipping of air facilities — all in preparation for war. Avia-
tion training facilities and output in the Navy at that time were considerably
behind the contemplated increase in the number of squadrons. Therefore,
particular stress was placed by higher authority on the need for expansion
training. This necessitated a planning [-J^if/] of operations whereby each
squadron could be required to conduct training for the qualification of additional
combat crews not only for their own aircraft, but to form nucleii for new squad-
rons being commissioned back on the mainland as well. The higliest priority
was placed upon this feature.
Despite this continuing emphasis on training, every effort was being made
to increase the readiness for war. Squadron and patrol plane commanders
were indoctrinated with the necessity of keeping their planes so equipped and
their crews so trained that at any time during a flight they could be diverted
from their peacetime objectives to combat missions.
The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization into a func-
tioning status would have necessitated the substantial cessation of training
activities in order to concentrate on defense. With the patrol planes constantly
scouting to maximum range, and the bomber aircraft standing by for attack
missions, a situation would have been soon reached wherein the Naval planes
would have been greatly reduced in material readiness and their combat crews
approaching an operational fatigue point while the Army pilots would have been
in need of refresher training. Hence, as pointed out in the Martin-Bellinger
estimate, the problem resolved itself into one of timing with respect to the current
status of our relations with Japan, and necessity for specific information as to
the probability of an air attack within rather narrow time limits.
The Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force did not have the authority to
place that organization in a functioning status, except [^Hlh] in the case
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 281
of an actual emergency. The Naval Base Defense Air Force assumed a func-
tioning status immediately after the start of the attack on December 7, 1941,
without orders from higher authority. Orders to planes in the air were sent
and received by 0805, and a message, "'Air raid Pearl Harbor X This is no drill"
was ordered broadcasted at 0758 that morning.
[4.72] Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 34 of this
investigation, which consists of Stalf Instructions, Staff of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 1941, and call your attention to para-
graph 224, dealing with the Fleet Aviation Officer. That sets forth,
does it not, the duties of the Fleet Aviation Officer ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That sets forth the duties of the Fleet
Aviation Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet. It has no bearing on my responsibilities and duties as Com-
mander Patrol Wing Two or Commander Task Force Nine or any
other duties I had in connection with my job in the forces of the
Pacific Fleet.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you, Admiral, exhibit 9 of the Na^ial Court
of Inquiry record, which is a certified copy of a letter from the Sec-
retary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941,
and ask whether that letter had ever come to your attention prior
to December 7, 1941.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I don't want to take your time up reading
it, but I have never seen it before.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 47 of this investigation,
which contains Annex number VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal
Frontier Defense Plan, dated March 28, 1941, and ask you whether
you were familiar with that.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you state the circumstances tmder which you
had connection with that document, Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. In connection with the preparing of this
document, it came about as a result of a directive from the Commander-
in-Chief. Pacific Fleet, and my relation to the Commander Naval
Base Defense Force, who was the Commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District. I functioned under him and in connection with the
working out of a plan to bring an organization into [47S'] ex-
istence, this document was one of the preliminary features. It was
not prepared by me, but some portions of it I did have a chance to
criticize and advise in connection with its preparation.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you have any discussions of that document with
Admiral Kimmel that you recall. Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Beixinger. No, not with Admiral Kimmel but with
Captain Gill, who was the Plans Officer of the Commandant, Four-
teenth Naval District, and I am sure I discussed some of the points
with Admiral Bloch, who was the Commander Naval Base Defense
Force under that setup.
INIr. Sonnett. Do you recall any discussion of that document with
any other members of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. From time to time during the setup of
this organization and even after it was in effect, I discussed general
aspects of it with Admiral Kimmel, not particularly with reference
to this paper, but with reference to subjects which had a bearing on
it such as unity of command.
282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Admiral, to exhibit 47 and to page 4, it
is stated, in part :
The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an air-
craft warning service. During the period prior to the completion of the AWS
installation, the Navy, through use of radar and other appropriate means, will
endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.
Do yon recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel as to that fea-
ture of the Navy's obligation under this agreement ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Not prior to December 7th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you some certified copies of docu-
ments and ask you whether you can identify those.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, I identify those as having been
[4'^4-l prepared by my organization.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the next, too. Admiral, is Addendum I. Can
your similarly identify that?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, I identfy that as an estimate of the
situation which was prepared primarily by my organization with
the concurrence of the Commander, Army Air Force, in the Hawaiian
area.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you personally participate, Admiral, in the
preparation of that estimate ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I did.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and market "Exhibit 49.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, for the sake of the record and in order to
refresh your recollection of the document, would you read paragraph 1,
the Summary of the Situation, and paragraph 3, Possible Enemy
Action, into the record?
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
1. Summary of the Situation.
(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain,
and varying.
(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of
war.
(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval Installations on
OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western
Pacific for a long period.
(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in tlie operating areas
organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force
which initiates hostile action.
[//75] (e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange
fast raiding force misrht arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from
our intelligence service.
III. Possible Enemy Action.
(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by :
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations ini !Pearl
Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.
(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU
would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most
likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach
inside of three hundred miles.
(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more sub-
marines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been
drawn away by the original thrust.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 283
(d) Any single submarine attacli might indicate tlie presence of considerable
undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a
carrier.
(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered
as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it
might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to
start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a
second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have
all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage
that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the
next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage
would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and
might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious
disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no
offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise.
Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the
above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain
advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably
be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large
success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.
Mr. SoNNETT. Substantially, Admiral, a basic premise of that esti-
mate [47S] was that a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor with-
out declaration of war was a possiblity, was it not ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It was.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the second basic premise was that in the event
of such an attack, it was probable that the attack would be by air?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, Admiral, referring to the section of that joint
estimate entitled Action Open To Us, would you read sub-paragraph
(a)
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
IV. Action open to us:
(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to
reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but
can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a
very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken
unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather
narrow time limits.
Mr. Sonnett. Is there any provision, Admiral, under the section
dealing with action open to use for reconnaissance of a sector of less
than 360 degrees ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. In this estimate it is not stated that less
than 360 degrees might be used effectively, but, of course, it was taken
into consideration in all thought and ideas.
Mr. Sonnett. Well, partial reconnaissance, Admiral, was, of course,
one type of antion open to the fleet, was it not, in order to meet the
situation estimated in that joint estimate?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, in a degree.
Mr. Sonnett. And that was true, Admiral, both at the date of that
estimate — which was about March or April of 1941, was it not?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. March 31, 1941.
[477] Mr. Sonnett. And similarly remained true throughout
the rest of the year up to the time of the attack?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, because at no time were we able to
cover 360 degrees to the range that we thought was necessary^ — at any
time up to July, 1942, and even later.
284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. The point I wanted to get clear, Admiral, is although
it is not listed in your joint estimate as a possible course of action, it
nevertheless was a possible and feasible and a practical operation open
to the fleet to conduct partial reconnaissance from Oahu, covering
certain selected sectors?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes. This estimate was not to restrict
any effort to accomplish the main idea of the estimate.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, did you have any discussion of that estimate
with Admiral Kimmel at any time?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I don't remember discussing it with him
prior to issuing it, but I am certain that he saw it because he talked
to me about it, not in detail but in general, and I talked to him in
general and sometimes in detail concerning the features of it.
Mr. SoNNETT. That is, of course, prior to December 7, 1941?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Prior to December 7, 1941, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall any discussion of that estimate with
other members of Admiral Kimmel's staff?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I feel practically sure that I discussed it
many times with his aviation aide. I don't remember any details of
any of the discussions.
Mr, Sonnett. Was there at any time. Admiral, any request on the
part of Admiral Kiimnell or any member of his staff for clarification
or any disagreement [4-'^S] as to your joint estimate?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Not to my recollection. As a matter of
fact, he more or less complimented me on it and particularly so, I
remember, when he had returned to Honolulu after a trip to Washing-
ton, where some mention apparently had been made of the general
plan : not of the estimate in particular, but the general plan to attempt
coordination.
Mv. Sonnett. That is, the Naval Base Defense Air Force plan ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. And this estimate, of course, was the basis upon which
that plan was written?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you exhibit 35 of this investigation,
which is the Pacific Fleet Operating Plan distributed to the fleet in
July of 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that prior to
December 7, 1941?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, I am familiar with this Rainbow
Five plan and we were in the midst of a chart maneuver of this plan
by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, prior to De-
cember 7th and it hadn't been completed up to December 7th.
Mr. Sonnett, Admiral, will you refer to page 24 of that exhibit
and I think j^ou will find there set forth the tasks assigned by the
Navy Basic Plan to the Pacific Fleet. I call your attention particularly
to subparagraph h and ask if you would read that into the record.
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
h. Pi'otect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and pre-
vent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by
destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying
the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.
[47P] Mr. Sonnett. And will you refer now, Admiral, to pages
25 and 26 and you will there find that the initial tasks of the Pacific
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 285
Fleet are divided into two phases, do you not, phase lA and phase I ?
Vice Admiral Bellingee. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, will you read into the record nhase I-b,
I-g, and I-m of the initial tasks of the Pacific Fleet ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
b. Maintain Fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and pre-
vent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by
patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking
groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the
Equator as far west as longitude 155° east.
m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, it was, therefore, an assigned initial task
of the Pacific Fleet to guard against a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor,
was it not ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Evidently, yes, from the point of view
that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, took upon himself to try
to bring about a coordinated organization to take care of such an attack.
However, I would like to refer you to a statement by the Commander
of the Hawaiian Air Force. I was on an Army-Navy board to en-
deavor to adjust the control of certain airfields that were in the island
of Oahu and in connection with this board's report there is a state-
ment as follows in paragraph 4 : "The problem confronting the Board
as it pertains to Army aviation was summed up by the Army represent-
atives as follows : The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the
Pearl Harbor naval base against all attacks by an enemy. The con-
tribution to be [4^0] made by the Hawaiian Air Force in
carrying out this mission is to search for and destroy enemy surface
craft within radius of action by bombardment aviation ; to detect, in-
tercept, and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit
aviation." It is therefore indicated to me that the Army also assumed
a responsibility for the air defense of the Pearl Harbor naval base.
Mr. SoNNETT. For the sake of the record, Admiral, what is the date
of that report ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. The date of that report is 31 October 1941.
The board members are listed as Major General F. L. Martin, USA,
Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, USN, Brigadier General H. C.
Davidson, USA, and Lieutenant Commander S. E. Burroughs, USN.
The report was signed by General F. L. Martin, Major General, USA,
Senior Army Member, and P. N. L. Bellinger, Rear Admiral, USN,
Senior Naval Member.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, it was true, was it not, that under the Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had the obligation to conduct
long-range reconnaissance?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that obligation, of course, remained right up to
the time of the attack ?
y~ice Admiral Bellinger. It did in the setup, although I would like
to invite attention to the fact that. How was the Navy going to do
this and carry out the war plan. Rainbow Five? — because the available
aviation couldn't be in two places at one time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Admiral, to page 12 of the war plan, I
believe you will find set forth the composition of Task Force Nine.
Would you read that into the record?
286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[4-Sl] Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
TASK FORCE NINE (Patrol Plane Force) Commander Aircraft Scouting Force
All units of Aircraft__ 107 VP
Scouting Force 2 AV
2 AVP
Utility Squadron from Base Force 4 AVD
10 VJR
Mr. SoNNETT. Could you state just in general, Admiral, what the
107 VP's were?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. The 107 VP's were supposed to be flying
boats, twin-engine. As a matter of fact, we did not have that many
planes on December 6th and our total number, as I recall, was eighty-
one, in varying degrees of readiness.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you a carbon copy of a letter dated
20 December 1941, from Commander Task Force Nine to Commander-
in-Cliief and ask you whether you can identify that as a copy of a
letter sent by you.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I do identify it as such.
Mr. Sonnett. May we mark it as an exhibit. Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and mprked "Exhibit 50.")
Mr. Sonnett. Incidentally, Admiral Bellinger, to this letter we
have annexed copies of various dispatches referred to in the final
paragraph of the letter. Would you take a look at those and see if
you can identify those, too, so we can make them part of the record?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. May we mark the dispatches. Admiral, as exhibit
50A?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
[4S3] (The documents referred to were received and marked
"Exhibit 50A.")
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to exhibit 50, Admiral, which is the letter
you have just identified, at page 2 you give a total of seventy-two
planes in the air or ready for flight in four hours or less and sub-
sequently you show that there were nine planes undergoing repairs,
making a total of eighty-one planes. Now, is that the correct figure
of the number of patrol planes which you had in Task Force Nine ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That is the correct number, to the best of
my information.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, with respect to the number of planes which
you had in Task Force Nine, which you have stated to be eighty-one
patrol planes, what efforts had been made to obtain additional planes?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. There is a letter on record, the first letter
wherein I tried to paint the picture out there. That letter was dated
January 16, 1941, and was the start. There was a lot of effort made
on my part to improve the situation out there, covering the over-all
situation. Planes are no good unless you have i)laces to operate from
and facilities to operate on and spare parts. I will give you a copy
if I have it here, but it is all in the files somewhere. It wasn't so much
numbers of planes in this case — the numbers were more or less con-
trolled by the Navy Department — as it was of getting those that
were assigned to us in a condition of readiness and operating ability
to the maximum extent. If you really want to know what I have done
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 287
on this subject, I will have to go through the records, because there
was an awful lot of letters written.
For instance, I would like to invite your attention to one letter
dated 22 October 1941, and I am asking in that letter for "180 long-
range, [4-83] high speed, landplane bombers, equal or superior
to tlie B-17-E, and 180 interceptor fighters of the best performance
available." That was in addition to any that we had, and that was in
this letter, which is file 0026 of 22 October 1941.
Air. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you a photostatic copy of a letter
with several endorsements thereon and ask you whether it is a copy
of the letter to which you have just referred.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It is.
Mr. SoNNETT. And you, I take it, can also identify the endorsements,
Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I do.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit?
Admiral Hewitt, Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 51.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, referring to exhibit 51, which is the letter
you have just identified, that letter was concerned, was it not, with the
aircraft requirements for offensive action ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Both offensive and defensive.
Mr. SoNNETT. I call your attention particularly. Admiral
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Suppose I say this: Both offensive and
defensive, primarily offensive, because the flying boat was known to
have very little offensive power unless used under special conditions.
Mr. SoNNETT. That appears particularlry from the sentence in par-
agraph 1 reading. Admiral : "It is respectfully submitted that the Fleet
is not adequately prepared for a campaign in the Pacific until, in ad-
dition to present types of aircraft, it is provided with an air strik-
ing force of high speed, long range [4^4] landplane bombers at
least equal in performance to the B-17-E" ; so that that letter was not
concerned with increasing the present types of aircraft primarily used
for reconnaissance, but rather was primarily concerned with getting
additional planes to be used primarily offensively, is that correct?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Correct. It was designed primarily to
bring about a more acceptable situation for the United States Navy in
the Pacific.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know what, if any, action was taken upon the
recommendations made by you in exhibit 51 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. There were no actual results obtained
from it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you a letter dated January 16, 1941,
and ask you whether it is a copy of a letter sent by you.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It is.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that. Admiral, as an exhibit and we
will return the exhibit to Admiral Bellinger after we have had it
copied ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 52.")
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, this exhibit 52, your letter of January 16,
1941, summarizes the situation as to the aircraft as of that time, does
it not?
288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It did.
Mr. SoNNETT. And points out various deficiencies and requirements
for the patrol wings?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It does.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it the fact, sir, that during the year 1941 and
prior to the attack, there were additional planes sent out to the Pacific
Fleet?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, there were additional planes sent out
[4^6] and also a newer type of plane, but I would like to invite
attention in this letter, which is dated January 16, 1941, in paragraph
2 (b) the following quotation, which is referring to an OpNav confi-
dential letter : "In about one year practically all Fleet aircraft except
Patrol Wing Two will have armor and fuel protection," and the
planes which were discussed in this letter actually arrived on the
following dates : VP 11, with twelve planes, arrived in the Hawaiian
area on 28 October 1941; VP 24, with six planes, arrived on 28 Oc-
tober 1941 ; VP 12, with twelve planes, arrived on 8 November 1941 ;
VP 23, with twelve planes, arrived on 23 November 19'41 ; VP 14, with
twelve planes, arrived on 23 November 1941. Most of these planes
and squadrons were replacements, and, I believe, some additions, for
the old planes which we had prior thereto. But note that they arrived
about a year after the above-quoted statement was made, as predicted.
Mr. SoNNETT. As I figure it. Admiral, that makes a total of fifty-
four new planes delivered in October and November, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Correct.
Mr. Sonnett. And those, added to the planes you had and kept,
made a total of eighty-one
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. From November to December 7, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. But remember that practically all of these
planes weren't additional groups or squadrons of planes; they were
replacement planes with the newer type of PB Y-5 type.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, after the attack on December 7, 1941, I
understand that additional planes were sent out to Pearl Harbor.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, there were.
Mr. Sonnett. Can you recall in round numbers how many addi-
tional patrol planes and where they came from, if you know?
Vice xVdmiral Bellinger. They came from the Pacific Coast and the
Atlantic Fleet and I think there were about forty-odd planes.
[4£8] Mr. Sonnett. Do you know why those forty-odd planes
could not have been sent prior to the attack ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I sent a squadron commander, Avho had
departed from Pearl Harbor with his squadron for replacement planes,
to Washington to find out what was the situation with reference to the
Pacific and why were we the last ones to be re-equipped, and the word
he gave me upon his return to Pearl Harbor was that the Atlantic
had priority.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, referring again to this period from the end
of November up to the time of the attack on December 7th, you had
a total of eighty-one patrol planes in Task Force Nine, as I under-
stand it ?
V ice Admiral Bellinger. Correct.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 289
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, do you recall the number of Army planes which
were suitable for long-range reconnaissance and which could have
ben made available during that period of time ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No, I do not know the exact number or
even an accurate approximate number because it was very difficult to
get that information from the Army. It appears that their situation
was changing quite rapidly and continually as their planes of the
long-range bomber type were being sent to the Philippines.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did they report some six or eight available during
that period of time, B-17's?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. In accordance with the operational di-
rectives prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force,
and mj^self , a report of planes that were available — that could be made
available to the other command, was sent to the appropriate command
every day. I have here a copy of a dispatch from the Headquarters,
Hawaiian Air Force, to Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force,
as of 5 December 1941, which indicates [4S7] that there were
eight B-17's, twenty-one B-18's, and six A-20's which were to be con-
sidered available when made available.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, the range of the B-17's was sufficient for
long-range reconnaissance from Oahu, was it not ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It was, in the conception of long-range
at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. About what was the range of the B-17 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Without bomb load they were supposed
to be able to cover a sector of radius about 800 miles.
Mr. Sonnett. And of the B-18's, Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. In this B-17 situation I just spoke about,
the range applied without bomb load or not more than one-half bomb
load. That meant they had to put an extra gas tank in the vacant
bomb bay.
The B-18's were supposed to have a reconnaissance radius of ap-
proximately 300 miles.
Mr. Sonnett. And the A-20's ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. About 150 miles radius.
Mr. Sonnett. Also for the sake of the record we might also get the
range of the PBY— 4 and 5, Admiral, if you will state that.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. PBY-5's and 4's had a radius of approxi-
mately 700 miles.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, it was the fact, was it not, that after the
attack on December 7th, long-range reconnaissance was conducted,
using the PBY's, the B-17's, the B-18's as well ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That is correct, except the B-18's did not
have long-range. I made a mistake some time back. I said PBY-4's
and 5's. I should have said PBY-3's and 5's. The PBY-3's had a
practical operating radius of [4^8] approximately 600 miles.
Admiral Hevv^tt. We will adjourn for lunch at this time.
(The investigation then, at 1 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m., at which
time it reconvened.)
(Present: The same parties as during the morning session.)
Vice Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellinger, USN, after having been
warned that his previous oath was still binding, resumed his seat as
witness.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 20
290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, you have produced a letter of December 11,
1940, from Commander Patrol Wing Two to Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, together with various endorsements. Are those copies of docu-
ments which were sent to the Chief of Naval Operations ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. They are.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that. Admiral, as exhibit 53 ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 53.")
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I would like to add that there are many
other letters relating to deficiencies that were sent in with the idea of
trying to increase the effectiveness of the patrol wings in the Pacific.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, referring back to the Pacific Fleet war plan,
paragraphs 3141 and 3143, at page 32, sir, set forth the initial tasks
assigned to the patrol planes. Would you read those into the record,
please. Admiral?
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following para-
graphs of this section.
[489] 3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to
each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Con-
' tinue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.
3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
Mr. Sonnett. Would you refer. Admiral, to Annex I, the Patrol
and Sweeping Plan, and read paragraph 2 into the record ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
2. Phase I
This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and- sea communica-
tions of the Associated Powers by :
(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Ha-
waiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific
westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.
(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit,
(e) Covering.
(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
(e) Routine shipping.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, will you also examine paragraph 3 (d) and
read that into the record ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
3. (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and
for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against
enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.
[490] (2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Mid-
way. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to west-
ward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the
facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.
(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander "Bask Force Three, to transfer
patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South
Pacific.
(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.
(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct vride sweep enroute.
(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval
Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.
(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweep-
ing during initial sweep of Phase lA.
(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall
Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 291
(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible
with assigned tasks, with other forces thereat. Be guided by principles of com-
mand relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan 0-1.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, the Phase I initial tasks assigned to the
patrol planes were tasks to be performed when Japan was not in the
war, were they not ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, referring to page 15 of the War Plan, will
you read into the record the general assumption on which the war plan
is based?
[4^i] Vice Admiral Bellinger. "That the Associated Powers,
comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth,
(less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile,
China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, com-
prising either :
1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thai-
land."
Mr. SoNNETT. As to the second general assumption. Admiral,
namely, thatthe United States was at war with the Axis powers,
including Japan, was it in your mind, as set forth in your estimate,
that war with Japan was apt to commence by surprise attack without
declaration of war?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, that was the estimate, the basis of
the estimate.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that the plan, then, might have become effective
as to Japan in the event of a surprise attack by Japan without declara-
tion of war ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger, Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 8 of the Naval Court of
Inquiry record,. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number '2,CL-41 (Re-
vised) , dated October 14, 1941, and ask you whether you saw that at or
about the time of its issuance.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, would you read assumption (b) of that
letter into the record ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
That a declaration of war may be preceded by ;
(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.
(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
(3) a combination of these two.
[49^] Mr. Sonnett. You will note subsequently in the letter,
Admiral, that there are provisions for air patrol. Would you refer to
provision (B) concerning air patrol and read that into the record?
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
(2) Air Patrols:
(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft, Scouting Force.
(b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will
search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel
buoys which is south of latitude 21°-20' No. The Fleet or Task Force Com-
mander concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior
to the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie
and entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol.
(c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than
292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol
mentioned therein.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, were those provisions for air patrol carried
out between October 14, 1941, and December 7, 1941.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Mr. SoNNETT. Yes.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, I am practically sure they were.
Mr. SoNNETT. And in addition to the air patrol provided for in that
security letter, patrols were run from Midway and Wake, were they
not?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. The patrols run from Midway and Wake
were for a certain period of time, as specifically directed by the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific.
[4dS] Mr. SoNNETT. Was there any discussion, Admiral, during
the months of October, November, and up to December 7, 1941, of the
necessity or advisability of a partial patrol or reconnaissance from
Oahu as a fleet security measure?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Patrols had been ordered to be run at
various periods of time during 1941 and they were carried out as
directed.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall any discussion of the question of patrols
or partial reconnaissance during the months of October, November, and
up to December 7, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Noj not other than the ones that had been
directed. by this letter.
Mr. Sonnett. That is, the fleet security letter ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. The fleet security letter.
Admiral Hewitt. Wliich were merely of the operating area.
Mr. SoNNETT. Merely of the operating area.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Wait a minute. October, November, and
December ?
Mr. Sonnett. Yes.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I don't remember the exact date that the
last patrol, other than was directed in this letter, was ordered carried
out. It may have been in October. Actually there had been opera-
tions, training operations, simulating air attack, where carriers entered
the training phase to simulate an attacking force and patrols had been
carried out in comiection with that effort, but from pure security rea-
sons, I am in doubt as to when the last one had been ordered or was
ordered.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there any reconnaissance from Oahu, other than
of the fleet operating areas, during the period November 27th to
December 7, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No, not other than the movement that took
place [4^4-] between Wake, Midway and the Hawaiian Islands.
The planes making those trips were directed to observe. However as
part of planned internal Patrol Wing Tactical Exercises covering the
period 1 to 4 Dec. 1941 and not as a part of any directed fleet recon-
naissance, to the best of my remembrance, scouting flights were con-
ducted daily covering a sector of approximately 90 degrees to a distance
of 300 miles by probably one squadron for the sector per day. Each
day there was a different sector. These scouting flights were solely for
training in connection with the Wing Tactical Exercises. Usually a
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 293
Seaplane Tender was employed as the objective of search and a sled
towed by the Tender served as a bombing target. I cannot recall the
sectors utilized in the above exercises.
Mr. SoNNETT. There has been previous testimony, Admiral, to the
effect that some time around July or August, 1941, Admiral Blocli
requested Admiral Kimmel to direct a reconnaissance on a sector to-
wards Jaluit and that this was done for several days. What do you
recall of that ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. On what ? Jaluit ?
Mr. SoNNETT. Yes, on a sector towards Jaluit.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It may have been done. I do not remem-
ber, but I did not know the originator of the idea, nor any reason con-
cerning such idea. I am not sure that it was done towards Jaluit.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I refer you to page 6 of the fleet security
letter as revised on August 14, 1941, to sub-paragraph 3, and ask if
you would read that into the record.
[494a] Vice Admiral Bellinger. "It must be remembered too,
that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a con-
siderable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied
by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble
his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions
warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that
may be located by air search or other means,"
Mr. SoNNETT. There were va,rious sujbmarine contacts reported
prior to December 7, 1941, were there not. Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No, not to my knowledge.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, do you recall whether there was any air
patrol directed prior to the attack for the purpose of attempting to
verify any alleged reports of the presence of submarines ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. There were sound contacts, as I remem-
ber, and [49S~\ the question was raised, Were they submarine
contacts? and, as I remember it, there was considerable local effort,
both with reference to patrol planes and to surface craft, to verify
those sound contacts, but to my knowledge, no submarine was ever seen.
Mr. Sonnett. Who directed the patrols in those cases ?
Vice Admiral Bjillinger. When the Commander, Scouting Force,
was the Senior Officer Present, he directed it until the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, was present ; then he directed it.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel
or with Admiral Bloch concerning the submarine contacts prior to
December 7, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I remember discussing it with many
people, but I don't know that I remember discussing it with Admiral
Bloch personally or Admiral Kimmel personally. It was a question,
Was it a submarine or was it not? — and that appeared to be a moot
question among those who had actually made the sound contact.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you exhibit 37 of this investigation,
which consists of a photostatic copy of a letter dated November 19,
1941, from the Commander Task Force Nine to the Commander-in-
Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and which annexes a schedule, and which
exhibit also contains a photostatic copy of a mailgram dated 22 No-
vember 1941 from CincPac to Compatwing Two, and ask you whether
you recognize those docmnents.
294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I do.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, would you state what the schedules an-
nexed to your letter of November 19, 1941, show as to aircraft patrol
from Oahu ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. They do not directly show any patrol
search operations. However, in advance base operations my policy
was, and as written down for the guidance of the patrol wings, that
when any squadron was based at [496] an advance base, that
they would carry on patrols for security reasons ; and also, in connec-
tion with this schedule, although it does not show the morning patrol
that was required in this security letter of the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific, it was an understood fact that those patrols would continue
and did continue.
Mr. SoNNETT. Those were patrols of the operating areas. Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Those were patrols of the daily assigned
operating areas.
Mr. SoNNETT. That mailgram, Admiral, from CincPac to you, was
the approval by the Commander-in-Chief of those schedules submitted
by you, is it not ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It is.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you a series of photostatic docu-
ments and ask you whether you can identify them.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, they represent the watch and duty
schedules and the general employment of Patrol "Wings One and Two
and those planes considered part of the Fleet Air Detachment.
Mr. Sonnett. May we mark those. Admiral, as an exhibit?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
SB (The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
54.")
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to exhibit 54, which you have just identi-
fied. Admiral, and to the schedules for the period November 27th to
December 7, 1941, will you discuss any provision of the schedules re-
lating to aircraft patrol from Oahu?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Where you note the nomenclature "DP,"
it refers to the dawn patrol, and each day a squadron was assigned to
that duty.
[4^7] Mr. Sonnett. And again. Admiral, for the sake of the
record, the dawn patrol was the patrol of the operating areas ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Correct.
Mr. Sonnett. As illustrative. Admiral, of the schedules in ques-
tion, would you, referring to December 7, 1941, schedule, read into
the record the assignments of the patrol squadrons ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. On December 7th, Patrol Squadron 22,
first division, was secured; Patrol Squadron 22, second division, se-
cured ; Patrol Squadron 23, first division, secured ; Patrol Squadron 23,
second division, secured ; Patrol Squadron 24, tactics with submarines
and the Pearl Harbor ready duty division ; Patrol Squadron 11, tactics
with submarines and Kaneohe ready duty division ; Patrol Squadron
12, secured ; Patrol Squadron 14, dawn patrol ; division making dawn
patrol secured upon completion, other division normal duty, 7 to 1300
except Saturdays and Sundays. Not listed in the above squadrons
was Patrol Squadron 21, which was on advance base duty at Midway.
Patrol Squadron 22 had returned from Midway on 5 December after
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 295
a tour of duty at Midway and Wake since 17 October, This squadron
had had strenuous duty at those bases and was in a state of rehabilita-
tion and maintenance.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring back, Admiral, to your letter of November
19, 1941, forwarding the schedule for the planes to the Commander-
in-Chief for approval, which letter is part of exhibit 37, the letter
reads in paragraph 1, "Changed conditions have necessitated a re-
vision of the schedule for units of Task Force Nine for the remainder
of the second quarter." Do you recall, Admiral, what the changed
conditions were that you referred to in that letter?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I can't remember positively. In may
have been because of the assignment of Patrol Squadron 22 to the
Midway-Wake area or it may have been due to a change in directive
from the Commander-in-Chief, [WS] Pacific, wherein the
task force organizations were changed. At one time patrol squadrons
were assigned to the various task force commanders. One, Two, and
Three, and their schedule of employment was more or less controlled
by those task force commanders.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 15 of the Naval Court
of Inquiry, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to
CincAF, CincPac, and others, dated November 24, 1941, and ask you
whether you saw that prior to December 7, 1941.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I did not.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you know that such a dispatch or some such dis-
patch had been received about that time?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Not till subsequent to December 7th.
Mr. Sonnett. I refer you, Admiral, to exhibit 17 of the Naval Court
of Inquiry, a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CincAF,
CincPac, and others, dated November 27, 1941, which is the so-called
war warning, and ask whether you saw that prior to December 7, 1941.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I did not.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you know that such a dispatch had been received ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Not until subsequent to December 7, 1941.
Mr. Sonnett. I refer you to exhibit 19 of the Naval Court of Inquiry
a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated November 28,
1941, sent for information to CincPac, among others, and ask whether
you saw that dispatch or knew of it prior to the attack on December 7,
1941.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I did not.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you exhibit 22 of this investigation,
which consists of daily connnunication intelligence summaries, and ask
whether you saw those prior to December 7, 1941.
[499] Vice Admiral Bellinger. No, I don't remember seeing any
of these.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you exhibit 26 of this investigation, which con-
sists of photostatic copies of intelligence reports by Lieutenant Com-
mander Layton between October 6, 1941, and December 2, 1941, and
ask whether you saw any of those prior to the attack."
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you exhibit 23 of this investigation, a memo-
randum, dated December 1, 1941, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer
to the Admiral on the subject of the location of the Orange fleet, and
ask wdiether you saw that prior to the attack.
296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No, I don't remember ever seeing it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, do you recall anything concerning a pro-
posed Army reconnaissance flight over the Mandated Islands which
was discussed toward the end of November, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Towards the end of November, 1941?
Mr. SoNNETT. Yes.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No. I do not recall such proposition.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 28 of this investigation, a memo-
randum by Lieutenant Commander Layton on that subject, and ask
whether that refreshes your recollection concerning the matter.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I don't remember any specific plan or even
a proposal.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, during the last half of November and up
to December 7, 1941, what was your estimate of the location and move-
ments of Japanese ships, particularly Japanese carriers?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I didn't know where they were.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you receive any intelligence on that subject
[S00~\ Vice Admiral Bellinger. No.
Mr. Sonnett. During that period of time ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No.
Mr. Sonnett. Or have any discussion with Admiral Kimmel or
Admiral Bloch on that subject during that period of time?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No. I recall no such discussion.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you know before the attack that a direction had
been issued to CincPac on or about November 27, 1941, in substantially
the following language: "Execute an appropriate defensive deploy-
ment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46" ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall any discussion between November 27th
and December 7, 1941, concerning deployment of fleet or aircraft?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I am trying to remember the date on which
a conference took place in the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's,
office wherein several of the fleet commands, myself included, and the
Army and also the District Commandant were present, and that was in
connection with the movement of Marine planes to Wake and Midway.
Now, the reason for that — a specific dispatch or even a discussion of
the reasons for it, other than general bolstering up defenses, was not
discussed, as I remember.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you exhibit 18 of the Naval Court
of Inquiry, a dispatch of November 26, 1941, from the Chief of Naval
Operations to CincPac, and ask you whether you saw that disiDatch.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I don't remember seeing this dispatch, but
I think I attended a conference which evidently was in connection with
this dispatch, that is, in carrying out some of the details of this
dispatch.
[SOJ] Mr. Sonnett. There is one other dispatch I would like to
call to your attention, Admiral, and that is exhibit 13 of the Naval
Court of Inquiry 5 a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated
October 16, 1941, to CincPac, among others, and ask whether you recall
having seen that.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No, I don't remember ever seeing that
dispatch prior to December 7th.
Mr. Sonnett. I call your attention. Admiral, to the following por-
tion of that dispatch : "In view of these possibilities, you will take
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 297
due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not
disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against
Japan." Do you recall being consulted as to any preparatory deploy-
ments after October 16, 1941, and prior to the attack?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No. If I was called in in connection with
any deployment, the reasons for it weren't connected with this dis-
patch, that is, they weren't explained to me as having any relation to
a particular dispatch as I hadn't seen the dispatch.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to exhibit 19, which was the November 28th
dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, which you previously
testified, Admiral, you hadn't seen, that provided in part that CincPac
was directed to "Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46
in so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur." Do you
recall any conference or discussion as to the steps to be taken in order
to be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, a hypothetical question. Had you known
of these dispatches which have just been shown to you prior to the
attack and bearing in mind that the initial tasks of the Pacific Fleet
and specifically [5021 of Task Force Nine included reconnais-
sance from Oahu, would you have recommended that such reconnais-
sance or partial reconnaissance be instituted ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That question was asked me once before
and I will have to give you almost the same answer, which is that
God only knows what I would have done, but I hope I would have
recognized the situation.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, will you state for the record what recon-
naissance could have been run from Oahu with the Navy planes avail-
able during the period November 27th to December 7, 1941 ?
Admiral Hewitt. Do you mean what patrol could have been
maintained on a continuous basis?
Mr. Sonnett. Well, I think he will develop that in his answer,
Admiral. As I recall his previous testimony, he said they could have
maintained a 360 degree reconnaissance for a limited time ; they could
have maintained 144 degrees by dividing the crews in three indefinitely.
That is my recollection.
Admiral Hewitt. Of course, on 27 November they had no idea that
the attack was coming on the 7th. They had no way to time it. They
had to make plans for patrol indefinitely.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That is a very difficult question to answer.
You must remember that between 28 October and 23 November, of the
eighty-one planes available later, fifty-four of these had arrived and
they were the PBy-5 type and the spare parts for those planes weren't
available. Also, the number of plane crews available scarcely ex-
ceeded — if I remember correctly, did not quite equal the number of
planes we had available. A lot of things can be done in an emergency
and when pressure is on. That was demonstrated in the Battle of
Midway; the flying time carried on by plane crews under stress
exceeded by far what was thought the human equation could stand.
[SOS] Normally speaking, considering eighty-one planes avail-
able and considering the fact that we hoped the planes wouldn't break
down and be put out of commission from lack of spare parts, it was
practical, of course, to utilize one-third for daily patrol, covering
sectors that were estimated to be the most vital. However, you must
298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
remember that the time of starting these operations and the duration
of them would have a tremendous effect on the force that would be
available at any subsequent time for further projected operations.
But, normally speaking, I would say that a plane and a plane crew
could have been used one day in three,
Mr. SoNNETT. And how large a sector could be covered in that
fashion, Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Normally speaking, we considered eight
degrees for 800 mile radii of operations to be what one plane would
cover, and multiply that by the number of planes and you have the
number of degrees of the sector.
Admiral Hewiti\ You did testify before to 144, based on eighteen
planes, which is one-third of 144.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Did I say 800 miles ? Make that 700 miles
and the eight degrees.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, referring to your memorandum or letter of
December 20, 1941, which is exhibit 50, it appears that nine planes
were undergoing repairs on December 7, 1941, and that eleven planes
were at Midway, which, I take it, would leave approximately sixty-
one planes available at Oahu.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Sixty-one, and that is including one
squadron that had just returned from Midway, having also served time
at Wake. They were in commission. They had just returned. They
weren't listed, as I remember, [S04-] as being in a state of over-
haul, but they were due for considerable checking.
Mr. SoNNETT. With those sixty-one planes. Admiral, and dividing
the sixty-one planes into three, I take it that reconnaissance could have
been run from Oahu, therefore, covering a sector of approximately
160 degrees?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That is possible, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, eliminating the squadron which had just re-
turned. Admiral, would have given you about fifty Navy planes avail-
able, I take it?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Forty-nine.
Mr. SoNNETT. Forty-nine. And with the forty-nine planes avail-
able, you could have had a daily reconnaissance covering about 128
degrees ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, that is possible.
Mr. Sonnett. Would that have been not only possible, Admiral, but
practical or the praticable measure and for how long could it have been
continued on that basis?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That is a very difficult question to answer.
Even after December 7th when everything else was subjugated to
carrying on patrol for the security of Oahu, I received letters from the
Bureau of Aeronautics indicating that they couldn't support the con-
tinuous and tremendous operations of this kind, with reference to
engine changes and spare parts, and were endeavoring to inveigle me
into reducing the search operations. This was not an official letter.
This was a personal letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronau-
tics and it was the result of an official dispatch which I had sent, de-
manding spare parts.
Mr. Sonnett. Well, Admiral, assuming that on December 1, 1941,
you had received a directive from Admiral Kimmel to conduct 360
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 299
degree reconnaissance with the available Navy planes, could you have
done it and if so, for how [505] long could you have con
tinued it?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. In conducting the 360 degree search, it
would have meant that planes proceeding out on search would have
had to depend on a visibility greater than would have existed. It
would have been possible to do it perhaps four or five days.
Mr. SoNNETT. Assuming that on December 1, 1941, you had received
a directive from Admiral Kimmel to conduct the fullest possible par-
tial reconnaissance over an indefinite period of time, could you have
covered 128 degrees approximately on a daily basis and for how long?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It could have been done until the failure
of planes and lack of spare parts reduced the planes to an extent that
it would have made it impossible. Perhaps it could have been car-
ried on for two weeks, perhaps, but this estimate is, of course, very
vague and it is all based on maintaining planes in readiness for flight.
Mr. SoNNETT. If in addition to the forty-nine available Navy planes
at that time at Oahu, you had the eight available Army B-l7's and
the twenty-one available Army B-18's, could you have covered 360
degrees from December 1 on and if so, for how long?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. In the first place, the Army weren't
schooled or able to carry on these searches in the way we would have
expected them to carry them on, and that statement is made as a result
of experience which showed up that situation subsequent to Decem-
ber 7th. Later, after more experience and training of the Army per-
sonnel had been obtained, the Army did enter this search plan with
a few planes each day. The B-18's, as you remember, would only
have been capable of proceeding out 300 miles, which would have
netted very little in timely information. Certainly any assistance
from the Army in the B-l7's would have enabled more patrol and
search of greater areas.
[606] Mr. Sonnett. Would it have been feasible. Admiral, to
have used the forty-nine available Navy planes at Oahu on December
1, 1941, and thereafter entirely for search and to have relied on the
eight Army B-l7's and the twenty-one Army B-18's for an attacking
force ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Would it have been possible ?
Mr. Sonnett. Feasible. »
Vice Admiral Bellinger. The attack force was always made up of
either the Army's B-17's or whatever other types they had that might
be utilized for that purpose, such as B-18's or even A-2'O's if the ships
had come in that close. Even carrier planes were held as striking
groups. No patrol planes were ever held for striking, except in spe-
cial instances for night torpedo attack. They were used to the fullest
extent for searching.
Mr. Sonnett. So that the forty-nine available Navy patrol planes
which were available around the beginning of December 1941, could
probably have been devoted entirely to searching ?
Vice Admiral Beli^inger. They could have been as far as they were
able to be used, but the question would always have been : Is this the
time to start ?
Mr. Sonnett. It has been previously testified. Admiral, that certain
sectors were regarded as more dangerous than others. What sectors
were they ?
300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Bellinger. The northern sectors were considered to
be the most vital, primarily on account of the prevailing winds. For
instance, when the carrier launches her planes, later she has to recover
them and it is a rather good thing to be going away from trouble when
you are recovering planes.
Mr. SoNNETT. It was, in fact, from the north that the Japanese task
force attacked Pearl Harbor, was it not. Admiral?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It was.
[S07] Mr. SoNNETT. Had you been directed on or about Decem-
ber 1, 1941, to institute a partial reconnaissance with the available
planes, would you have covered the northern sector ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. As a matter of fact, without any informa-
tion, the normal plan on December 7th was to utilize planes that we
had for the northern sector. We did later send planes to the south-
ward because of information from the Commander-in-Chief's office
which indicated a radio bearing in that direction.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you define. Admiral, what you mean by the
northern sector?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. More towards the northwest than the
northeast.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I believe you previously testified that from
December 2nd, approximately, to December 7, 1941, you were ill?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, I had the flu.
Mr. Sonnett. And, I take it, you weren't at your office during that
period of time ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I was not at my office, but I was in touch
with the office and with things going on.
Mr. Sonnett. Did j^ou have any conferences with Admiral Kimmel
while you were ill or with any member of his staff that you recall ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No. I had conferences with my Chief
of Staff.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain Ramsey?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you, as best you recall it, have any conference
with Admiral Kimmel in November and up to December 7, 1941, con-
cerning the question of possible reconnaissance or the desirability of
reconnaissance or any related subject ?
[oOS] Vice Admiral Bellinger. No, not with respect to Oahu.
The conference I 'attended, and I think it was the last conference I
attended, was in connection with the reenforcement of Wake and
Midway.
Mr. Sonnett: Do you recall any other conference with Admiral
Kimmel or members of his staff after that conference and prior to the
attack?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No, although I am not positive that I did
not see him between those dates.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I believe you previously testified that had
complete reconnaisance been undertaken in November or December,
1941, prior to the attack, it would have meant a cessation of the train-
ing activities being carried on by patrol wings. Would it have been
feasible to conduct reconnaissance and to have the reconnaissance as
part of the training ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 301
Vice Admiral Bellinger. In the first place, I might say that the
need for expansion training had been stressed a great deal, expansion
training meaning the development of air combat crews to augment
and to replace those crews that were then in the squadrons. When the
December 7th attack was made, all training ceased for the time being
and all effort was put on search operations by all the patrol planes.
The question came up how could we continue this expansion training
that every one realized was such a necessity? If we endeavored to
train combat air crews in planes that were on patrol, it meant an ex-
cess of personnel and extra weight. It meant also that except for
navigation and the general operation of radio and engineering, very
little else could be done. It was not actually qualifying personnel to
take over the job in the patrol plane, nor to give them the qualification
of an air crewman in a specific job. Finally we had to devote certain
planes to this training and take them out of their operating status on
their off days in order to accomplish some of this expansion training.
So I would say if all effort had been placed [S09] on searching,
why the expansion training would have suffered considerably, as it
did suffer after December 7th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, if you had been told on or about November
27, 1941, that war with Japan was expected to break out momentarily,
would you have considered that a valid reason for discontinuance of
training?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. You will have to look at it from this
angle, when you once start, then you freeze the situation and you aren't
improving it. We didn't have in the Navy a training establislnnent
that could carry on this training, which up to that time had been done
in the squadrons, and the question should be viewed from the angle :
Are you willing to freeze as is, with no question of expansion, and
take the consequences or proceed with your efforts to expand? be-
cause aviation was known to have to expand tremendously and the
training of personnel was one of the very serious problems connected
with it. The discussion of this subject had gone to considerable
lengths concerning where this training was to be accomplished,
whether it should be done by the fleet, as an operational training pro-
gram by the fleet on the Pacific Coast, or whether it was to be set up
as a shore establishment.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, referring to the four or five days prior to
the attack when you were ill and you were getting reports from Cap-
tain Ramsey, did he at any time report to you that he had had any con-
ferences on the subject of reconnaissance with Admiral Kimmel or
any member of his staff ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Is there any other statement that you care to
make in connection with the matter under investigation?
[SIO] Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes. I would like to state that
in preparation for meeting an air attack such as occurred on Decem-
ber 7, 1941, at Pearl Harbor, unity of command must exist ; the organ-
ization must be in effect, manned, functioning, and operating twenty-
four hours every day. There must be reconnaissance, radar nets, and
complete information in regard to shipping and control of aircraft
302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
entering and leaving the zone. All that must be in effect and func-
tioning properly prior to the attack. No mutual cooperative organi-
zation set up on paper and developed through intermittent drills is
worth much.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 3:48 p. m., adjourned until 9 a. m.,
Friday, 22 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 303
1511] PEOCEEDINdS OF THE HEWITT INaUIKY
Twenty-second Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General
Board, Navy Department, at 9 a. m., Friday, 22 June 1945.
Present : Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN ; Mr. John F. Sonnett ;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. Sonnett. State your name, please.
Mrs. Edgers. Mrs. Dorothy Edgers.
Mr. Sonnett. What is your occupation, Mrs. Edgers?
Mrs. Edgers. Research Analyst, Navy Department.
Mr. Sonnett. And in what section do you work?
Mrs. Edgers. In the Office of Communications right now.
Mr. Sonnett. What was your occupation in December of 1941 ?
Mrs. Edgers. Research Analyst in the ONI. That is Naval In-
telligence.
Mr. Sonnett. And that office was engaged in the decryption and
translation of intercepted Japanese communications at that time?
Mrs. Edgers. The particular branch I was working with was.
Mr. Sonnett. What are your qualifications in the Japanese lan-
guage, Mrs. Edgers ?
Mrs. Edgers. My knowledge of the Japanese language is about as
good as it can be. I have a diploma from a Japanese school to teach
Japanese to Japanese people up to high school.
Mr. Sonnett. You lived in Japan for some time ?
Mrs. Edgers. Over thirty years.
[5-?^] Mr. Sonnett. And when did you leave Japan ?
Mrs. Edgers. In the year before Pearl Harbor, which would make
it '40.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you, Mrs. Edgers, document 22 of exhibit 13
of this investigation, which is a message from Honolulu to Tokyo,
dated December 3, 1941, which bears a notation that it was translated
by the Navy on December 11, 1941, and ask you whether prior to
December 7, 1941, you had any connection with that message.
Mrs. Edgers. Yes, I did.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you state, please, fully what your connection
with that message was?
Mrs. Edgers. Well, at the time it was my work to roughly translate
any message which was put on my desk and this was among the mes-
sages that were put on my desk on December 6th, Saturday morning,
and at the time I had only been working in this section for about a
little over two weeks ; so, at first glance, this seemed to be more inter-
esting than some of the other messages I had in my basket, and so I
304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
selected it and asked one of the other men, who were also translators
working on other messages, whether or not this shouldn't be done im-
mediately and was told that I should and then I started to translate it.
Mr. SoNNETT. About what time on that day did you complete your
translation, Mrs. Edgers.
Mrs. Edgers. Well, it so happened that there was some mistake in
the message that had to be corrected and so that took some time. That
was at 12 : 30 or perhaps it was a little before or after 12 : 30 ; whatever
time it was, we were to go home. It being Saturday, we worked until
noon. I hadn't completed it, so I worked overtime and finished it and
I would say that between 1 : 30 and 2 was when I finished my rough
draft translation.
[SIS] Mr. SoNNETT. That is, on the afternoon of December 6th ?
Mrs. Edgers. Of the 6th, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. For the sake of the record, Mrs. Edgers, would you
describe briefly w^hat that message is ?
Mrs. Edgers. Well, without reading it over again now, just because
of the fact that the message did keep in mind, I would say that it was
a message saying how they were going to communicate from Honolulu
to the parties interested the information on our fleet movements from
Honolulu, and apparently it was something which they had had pre-
vious arrangements, but they had changed some of the minor details
of how to go about it. I think there was something to do with lights,
a window of a certain house, and there was also something about news-
paper advertising.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know whether that translation which you
completed in the early afternoon of December 6, 1941, was brought
to the attention of now Captain Kramer ?
Mrs. Edgers. It was brought to his attention naturally because it
was — well, in any case, he knew that I was working on it and I left
it, as a matter of fact, in the hands of the chief whose job it was to
edit messages and write them up, or ones that were more complicated
and more important like this, the officer-in-charge looked it over and
edited it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain Kramer was your superior officer in that
section, was he not?
Mrs. Edgers. My supervisor, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Wliat was the name of the chief to whom you re-
ferred ?
Mrs. Edgers. Chief Bryant.
Mr. SoNNETT. B-r-y-a-n-t?
Mrs. Edgers. I don't remember how he spelled his name, but he
had been [5^4] in the section for some time. He left imme-
diately after the war for sea duty. He put in a request.
Mr. SoNXETT. Did you before you left on the afternooii of Decem-
ber 6, 1941, show all or any part of your translation of this message to
Captain Kramer?
Mrs. Edgers. I am sorry. I will have to say I don't remember
whether I did or didn't show any or all of it, although I am sure he
did have occasion to see part of it, but he knew I was working on the
message and I believe that is probably the reason he came back again,
no doubt later, as I understand it, to work on it.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 305
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much, Mrs. Edgers.
(The witness was excused.)
[Slo] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. State your name, please, sir.
Mr. FRiEDMAisr. William F. Friedman.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is your occupation, Mr. Friedman ?
Mr. Freedmax. I am Cryptanalyst and Director of Communica-
tions Research, Signal Security Agency.
Mr. SoNNETT. War Department ?
Mr. Friedman. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. And during 1941 what was your occupation?
Mr. Friedman. I was Principal Cryptanalyst in the Signal Intelli-
gence Service.
Mr. Sonnett. How long have j^ou been in that work, Mr. Fried-
man?
Mr. Friedman. Since 1915.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you document 4 of exhibit 13 of this investi-
gation and ask you whether you can identify that dispatch, and also
show you document 15 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry
and ask whether you can identify that.
Mr. Friedman. Yes. These are translations of messages which
were processed jointly by the Army and Navy Signal Intelligence
Services.
Mr. Sonnett. Those were Japanese messages which set up the so-
called "winds" code, were they not?
Mr. Friedman. They are.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you have any knowledge or do you have any
knowledge of the efforts that were made to monitor for any Japanese
message employing the "winds" code ?
Mr. Friedman. I know that when these code messages were trans-
lated, that steps were taken to monitor all the circuits over which an
execute message [ol6] might appear, both in the Army and
the Navy and also by the Federal Communications Commission.
Mr. Sonnett. Prior to December 7, 1941, did you learn whether
or not any such execute message was intercepted by any one?
Mr. Freidman. No, sir.
Mr. Sonnett. After December 7, 1941, did you have any informa-
tion as to whether or not any such message was intercepted ?
Mr. Friedman. Indirect information in the way of statements by
Captain Safford of the Navy and Colonel Sadler of the Army to the
effect that there had been such an execute message.
Mr. Sonnett. Will j^ou state, Mr. Friedman, as best j'ou recall it,
when and where you had the conversation with Captain Safford to
which you refer and what was said by him on that subject during the
conversation ?
Mr. Friedman. I have had several conversations with him. I am
unable at the moment to indicate the dates. The first one was cer-
tainly a year and a half ago and I haven't had any conversations with
him now for some six months, I dare say. In the course of the earlier
conversations. Captain Safford indicated that there was — there had
been a "winds" execute message ; that no copies of it were to be found
in the Navy files, and that nevertheless there had been testimony to
the effect that it had been intercepted. His story was that it was iner-
79716 — 4C— Ex. 149, vol. 1 21
306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cepted by one of their East Coast stations, he believed, and was
promptly forwarded into Washington, and I don't recall now who
got it. Colonel Sadler indicated also
Mr. SoNNETT. Before you come to your conversation with Colonel
Sadler, Mr. Friedman, in his conversations with you, did Captain
Safford state the substance of the "winds" code execute which he
thought had been received prior to December 7, 1941 ?
[5i7] Mr. Friedman. Yes, he indicated that it not only had the
affirmative for break in relations between Japan and the United States,
but it also had a negative for a break in relations between Japan and
Russia.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now turning to your conversation with Colonel Sad-
ler, will you state when you had that, approximately, and what was
said at that time?
Mr. Friedman. Approximately a year and a half ago I had a con-
versation with Colonel Sadler, who came to duty in Washington about
then, and we talked about Pearl Harbor because of the fact that he had
been the head of our communications service at the time, and he
indicated that he had tried his best to urge that some specific warning
message be sent out to the Department commander. He indicated
that the "winds" code execute message had come in on the — some time
on the 4th or 5th of December. I don't think that he was clear himself
as to which of those two days it was. If I remember correctly,
he was either notified himself by somebody in the Navy, possibly
Admiral Noyes, that the message was in — "it's in," as I recall it, was
the expression used — or it may be that the Navy source called Army
G-2 and indicated that they had had word that the message was in,
and that Colonel Sadler was then called to G-2 to corroborate the
interception of the message.
At any rate, there was a question as to the exact word, the Japanese
word, that was used and when Colonel Sadler couldn't indicate the
word, because he hadn't seen the message himself, I think they tried —
I think he said that they tried to get a varification from whoever
it was — Admiral Noyes — but they weren't successful, whereupon the
G-2 authorities simply passed the matter over. There was apparently
nothing to substantiate the existence of the message.
Then, if I remember correctly, I asked Colonel Sadler whether
he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of this message, and
his answer was, if I remember correctly, that he hadn't himself seen
a copy, but that he had been [SIS] told by somebody that the
copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Mar-
shall. Of course, I regarded this as merely hearsay evidence and
nothing more than that; highly inconceivable that such a thing would
happen. And when I talked over the Pearl Harbor story with Captain
Satt'ord, I probably just jDassed that out as one of those crazy things
that get started. I shouldn't have done it. I certainly had no idea
that he would repeat it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Other than what you have already testified to, Mr.
Friedman, did you have any information from any source as to the
existence of a "winds" code message relating to the United States?
Mr. Friedman. You mean a "winds" code execute?
Mr. SoNNETT. Yes.
Mr. Friedman. Not of my own direct knowledge at the time.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 307
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, has anybody else in the Navy, other than Cap-
tain Safford, ever stated to you or indicated to you that such a message
existed ?
Mr. Friedman. I have not talked with anybody else in the Navy.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that either directly or indirectly, I take it, you
have no information from naval sources as to the existence of a
"winds" code execute relating to the United States, aside from your
conversations with Captain Safford and Colonel Sadler ?
Mr. Friedman. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry
record, which consists of a statement by the Federal Communications
Commission and has annexed to it various documents. Will you exam-
ine those and state which of those messages, in your opinion, was a
genuine execute of the "winds" code?
Mr. Friedman. I have examined these messages anterior to this
questioning and came to the conclusion that only the last, which is
labelled document number 4, gives evidence of being an authentic
"winds" code executive message. [^i^'J It conforms to the form
established in the "winds" code, except that there is no repetition of
the nishi no haze hare at the end of the message as there should have
been.
Mr. Sonnett. What was the date of the "winds" execute message to
which you have just referred, Mr. Friedman ?
Mr. Friedman. According to the statement, the date is December 8,
1941, between 0002 and 0035, GMT, which would be December 7, 1941,
Washington time.
Mr. Sonnett. And that message uses the code words, Mr. Friedman,
relating to what country ?
Mr. Friedman. A Japanese-British break.
Mr. Sonnett. Mr. Friedman, I show you documents 6 and 11 of ex-
hibit 18 of this investigation and ask whether you can identify those
documents.
Mr. Friedman. I can. The one dated 27 November 1941 from Tokyo
to Washington established a hidden word code system whereby the
Japanese hoped to be able to pass secret information to case of a closure
of communications between Tokyo and places in the Western Hemi-
sphere.
The other document, Tokyo circular telegram of December 7, 1941,
I identify as being a message in the hidden word code.
Mr. Sonnett. Would you just read the text of that message into the
record ?
Mr. Friedman. The English text is :
Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations.
Mr. Sonnett. Does it appear from the document who translated
that version of the message %
Mr. Friedman. It does. It says on the bottom "Navy translation."
Mr. Sonnett. And the date ?
{520^, Mr. Friedman. December 7, 1941.
Mr. Sonnett. Was that message translated by the Army also, to
your knowledge ?
Mr. Friedman. I do not know whether it was translated at that time
by the Army also, but I have had it translated since then.
308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr, SoNNETT. And what translation was made by the Army of that
message ?
Mr. Friedman. The one to which you refer now ?
Mr. SoNNETT. Yes.
Mr. Friedman. Well, there is quite a story about that.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you tell us that story, Mr. Friedman ?
Mr. Friedman. A few days after Pearl Harbor I saw this message
in the form, "Relations between Japan and England are not in accord-
ance with expectations," and although I was ill, I saw clearly enough
that the message on its face was absurd. Any fool would realize that
on December 7th Tokyo was not going to send a message out saying,
"Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with ex-
pectations" when the die had already been cast, and I came to the
tentative conclusion that there was something wrong with that mes-
sage and I asked Colonel Svennsson about the message and told him
that I felt that there was something wrong with it and suggested that
it be re-translated. Colonel Svennsson looked it up and told me that
it was not a good translation. When I went into the details, I un-
covered a very surprising situation. The translation of the message
conforms to the translation set up in the 27 November 19^1 code, but
the translation in that code was not good.
This is the situation. The word that was set up, hattori^ meant, ac-
cording to this translation, "relations between Japan and blank: are
not in accordance with expectations," whereas it should have read,
"Relations between Japan and blank are on the brink of catastrophe,"
or some strong expression [J^i] of that sort. Moreover, I
found that the message of 7 December 1941, which mentions only re-
lations between Japan and England, had another defect in that the
original intercept included the word niinavii, meaning the USA, as
well as the word koyanagi^ meaning England.
That double error produced a concatenation of circumstances that
I thought later was just an additional one in the series of accidents
that contrived together to prevent due warning, because had that
originally been translated accurately "on the brink of catastrophe,"
"on the verge of disaster," and so on, had that come in, it would have
got immediate attention. That was a few hours before. Also if it
had mentioned the United States, it should have.
Mr. SoNNETT, And, I take it, the error in translation in the original
hidden word code, Mr. Friedman?
Mr. Friedman. December 2, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. And by whom was it translated ?
Mr. Friedman. Navy.
Mr. Sonnett. Was that translation distributed to the Army prior
to the attack?
Mr. Friedman. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. And, I take it, the error in translation in the original
code was not detected until you detected it, as you have just testified?
Mr. Friedman. That is correct, yes.
Mr. Sonnett. When did you detect the errors of the code and in the
translation of the December 7th message ?
Mr. Friedman. I can't place it accurately. It was a few days after
Pearl Harbor.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 309
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you communicate your discoveries to the Navy as
to the errors?
Mr. Friedman". No.
[S^S] Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know whether or not the discov-
eries which you had made as to these messages were communicated to
the Navy at any time?
Mr. Friedman". No.
Mr. SoNNETT. Mr. Friedman, referring to documents 14 and 15 of
exhibit 13 of this investigation, will you examine those and state
whether or not they came to your attention at any time ?
Mr. Friedman. They were not brought to my attention at the time
of their translation, but I have seen them since.
Mr. SoNNETT. Both of those are Japanese messages from Honolulu,
relating to the status of defenses at Pearl Harbor and vicinity, are
they not?
Mr. Friedman. They are.
Mr. Sonnett. Would you read, Mr. Friedman, into the record the
last sentence of the first paragraph of document 14?
Mr. Friedman. The last sentence of the first paragraph reads : "I
imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left
to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places."
Mr. Sonnett. And that message was dated what date, sir?
Mr. Friedman. December 6, 1941.
Mr. Sonnett. Wliat was the date of translation of that, Mr. Fried-
man?
Mr. Friedman. It is stated December 8th.
Mr. Sonnett. And by whom translated?
Mr. Friedman. It doesn't state, but on the basis of the division of
labor that had been established between the Army and Navy, whereby
Army processed messages bearing in their pre-handle even dates, I
[>resume that this message was processed by the Army.
Mr. Sonnett. Is there an indication on the message as to where and
bv whom it was intercepted, Mr. Friedman ?
[5£3] Mr. Friedman. There is. Exhibit 14 bears on it an indi-
cation that it was intercepted by Station Two, which is the Army
monitor station at San Francisco.
Mr. Sonnett. And does it also indicate how it was forwarded to
Washington ?
Mr. Friedman. It is indicated as having been forwarded by tele-
type.
Mr. Sonnett. For the sake of the record, Mr. Friedman, you re-
ferred to exhibit 14, but what you meant to say was page 14 of the
exhibit before you, which is exhibit 13 ?
Mr. Friedman. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you turn to page 15 of that exhibit and state
whether or not you can identify that message?
Mr. Friedman. I identify it as being a message presumably proc-
essed by the Army since it bears the date December 6, 1941, an even
date.
Mr. Sonnett. A message from
Mr. Friedman. A message from Honolulu to Tokyo.
Mr. Sonnett. Would you read the second paragraph of that mes-
sage into the record?
310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Friedman. The second paragraph reads: "It appears that no
air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet Air Arm."
Mr. SoNNETT. And what is the date of translation of that indicated ?
Mr. Friedman. December 8, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. Does it appear where and by whom the message was
intercepted ?
Mr. Friedman. It was intercepted by Army Station Two at San
Francisco and was forwarded by teletype.
Mr. Sonnett. Now, both of those messages of December 6th, Mr.
Friedman, were in the PA-K2 code, were they not ?
Mr. Friedman. They were.
[5£4] Mr. Sonnett. Will you state briefly and generally what
that code was and its relative difficulty ?
Mr. Friedman. That code was a high grade code involving keyed
columnar transportation of code text, distributed in a form established
by the Japanese when they set up the crypotographic system. It
represents what we call a rather good form of enciphered code.
Mr. Sonnett. As of the first week of December or, more specifi-
cally, as of December 6, 1941, do you know how rapidly that code could
have been read by the Army ?
Mr. Friedman. We were in position usually to process this traffic
fairly readily in view of the fact that we had reconstructed the entire
code or practically the entire code and were able to reconstruct from
time to time as was necessary the transportation keys for the super-
encipherment.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you refer to page 24 of that exhibit, Mr. Fried-
man, and state whether you can identify that message?
Mr. Friedman. Yes, I have seen this message before.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you state the date and
Mr. Friedman. The date is December 7, 1941. The message is from
Tokyo to Honolulu.
Mr. Sonnett. What is the subject matter, briefly, of the message,
Mr. Friedman ?
Mr. Friedman. The matter directs the Japanese in Honolulu to keep
Tokyo informed day by day of the presence in port of warships and
airplane carriers and cruisers and indicates that it is of the utmost
importance to let them know.
Mr. Sonnett. Is there any reference also to barrage balloons ?
Mr. Friedman. Yes. They were to wire in each case whether or not
[5^5] there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or
if there are any indications that they will be sent up, and also whether
or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.
Mr. Sonnett. When was that translated and by whom, Mr. Fried-
man?
Mr. Friedman. This message was translated by the Army on De-
cember 30, 1941.
Mr. Sonnett. It bears a notation that the message was received on
December 23rd, does it not?
Mr. Friedman. It does.
Mr. Sonnett. Does it appear where and by whom the message was
intercepted ?
Mr. Friedman. The message was intercepted by Station Five, which
is an Army station at Honolulu.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 311
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you explain, Mr. Friendman, the delay between
the date of interception, which presumably was December 2, 1941, and
the date of translation, December 30, 1941 ?
Mr. Friedman. There were insufficient facilities and personnel to
process all of the traffic which might be processed. Naturally, that is
a situation which is beyond control of the Army because it depends
upon the funds that are provided by Congress, and so on, for this sort
of work. And in any case, to be able to process all the traffic that may
have been intercepted would have required a very large organization,
which we didn't have at the time. We set up priorities for the handling
and processing of traffic according to the best standards that we could
establish at the time. We naturally would process messages in the
purple system first because we had found from experience that that
carried the most important information, and then we would process
cryptographic systems of next importance, and so on.
Now, in the case of this particular message of December 2nd, I have
[S26^ no doubt that Honolulu intercept station had accumulated
a large amount of traffic which had to be forwarded and we didn't
have the radio circuits and facilities adequate to be able to forward
all of the intercepted material by radio. In any case, a good deal
of it, of minor importance, there is no use in forwarding by radio,
which is a relatively expensive method as compared with forwarding
by air mail, for example.
' Mr. SoNNETT. The note on that message would indicate that it was
received here on the 23rd of December, would it not?
Mr. Friedman. It does.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that it took approximately seven days between the
time of receipt of the message by the War Department in Washington
and the time of its decryption and translation?
Mr. Friedman. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. Now, would the interval between December 2nd and
December 23rd indicate that the message had been forwarded from
Fort Shafter by mail?
Mr. Friedman. It would indicate that that was the case.
Mr. Sonnett. What was the order of priority, Mr. Friedman, after
the purple code, insofar as dispatching those messages to Washington ?
Mr. Friedman. I am unable to stata from memory. That is a mat-
ter of record. I could find it.
Mr. Sonnett. Where did the J-19 code come from ? Do you recall ?
Mr. Friedman. It was below purple, definitely, below purple, and
presumably, according to my recollection now, it would be either on
the same level with the PA-K2 or slightly below it.
Mr. Sonnett. Now, this message of December 2nd was in the J-19
code, was it not ?
[527] Mr. Friedman. It was.
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to the months prior to December 7, 1941,
Mr. Friedman, did you have any personal connection with the decryp-
tion of Japanese communications ?
Mr. Friedman. Yes, I had been asked by the Chief Signal Officer
to take a hand in our attempts to solve the Japanese purple system.
Mr, Sonnett. Will you state approximately when that occurred, Mr.
Friedman ?
312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Friedman. The first time we were able to hand in a completely
deciphered text was some time in August of 1940 ; it might have been
late in August of 1940. We had been on the problem for eighteen or
twenty months, something like that.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, the purple code of the Japanese was, I take it
from your testimony, solved by the unit under your direction ?
Mr. Friedman. That is correct. As Chief Cryptanalyst, it was nat-
urally my responsibility to solve the things that superiors asked us to
solve.
Mr. Sonnett. After you worked on the purple code of the Japa-
nese, did you continue your close connection, personal connection, with
the decryption of Japanese communications and, if so, up to what
time?
Mr. Friedman. No. I regret to say that the solution of the Japa-
nese purple machine had apparently taken such a toll of my nervous
energy that I was suffering from nervous exhaustion and while I
understood quite well that things weren't well with me, nevertheless
I felt under extreme necessity of keeping going and did so until some
time in December of 1940, when I had a complete collapse. I returned
to duty some time in April of 1941, but in view of the fact that it was
going to take considerable time to recover my health, the Chief Signal
Officer indicated that I was to take it easy, and [628] one way
of doing that was to keep me more or less out of the high pressure
cryptanalytical processing and let me devote my attention to some of
the signal security matters where it was a slower pace. I wasn't too
happy about that.
Mr. Sonnett. So that, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, then,
you weren't actually working directly on the Japanese material?
Mr. Friedman, That is right.
Mr. Sonnett. I think that is all. Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. That is all. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
[62d] Captain Laurance F. Safford, USN, was recalled as a
witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was
still binding.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain Safford, I show you exhibit 13 of this inves-
tigation, which consists of a collection of intercepted Japanese dis-
patches in translated form, and call your attention to the fact that
each page of the document indicates that it was translated by the
Navy or the Army and that after the date there appear symbols in
parentheses, letters such as the letter "S" or "X" and in other cases
there appear numbers. Will you explain what they signify ?
Captain Safford. The letter "S" was the Navy intercept station
at Bainbridge Island, Washington.
Mr. Sonnett. And the letter "X"?
Captain Safford. The letter "X" was a photograph taken by the
Navy, in this particular case at Washington, D. C.
Mr. Sonnett. And the letters "NE"?
Captain Safford. "NR" merely meant Navy radio.
Mr. Sonnett. The number 7
Captain Safford. Number 7 was an Army intercept station at Fort
Hunt, Virginia, just outside of Washington.
Mr. Sonnett. Number 2?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 313
Captain Safford. Number 2 was an Army intercept station at the
Presidio in San Francisco, California.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the letters "STT" ?
Captain Safford. "S" was Station S and "TT" stood for teletype.
Any message forwarded by teletype was marked "TT" at the bottom.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did the Army follow the same practice ?
[530] Captain Safford. The Army followed the same practice
at least in one case, because it is marked.
Mr. SoNNETT. The letters "AR"?
Captain Safford. Army radio, and you also have one more, number
5, which is the Army intercept station at Fort Shafter, T. H.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the docimient bearing number 14 and
the document bearing the number 15 of that exhibit, will you state
where they were intercepted, when and by whom translated?
Captain Safford. They were both intercepted at the Army inter-
cept station in San Francisco and forwarded by teletype. They were
presumably intercepted on the 6th of December, 1941, which is their
filing date. They were both processed and translated by the Army,
and they were translated on December 8, 1941. About sixteen or sev-
enteen months ago we sighted the original work sheets for these two
messages, including the intercepted message, and found or learned
that number 14 went on the air about eighteen hours before the attack
on Pearl Harbor and number 15 went on the air about twelve hours
before the attack on Pearl Harbor, that is, to the nearest hour. The
Army have all these papers in their custody.
Mr. SoNNETT. Both of those messages were in the PA-K2 Japa-
nese code, were they not ?
Captain Safford. Both were in PA-K2 ; that is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state the difficulty of that code in terms of
the time which would have been required for the Navy to have de-
ciphered those messages after they were available to the Navy for
such purposes ?
Captain Safford. The actual time of decryption for number 14,
including typing in smooth, would have been about an hour or an
hour and a half, and number 15 about half that time. However, in
the Navy PA-K2 was given precedence [531] in processing
after all the purples and after all the J-19's and it would not have
been touched as long as there were any J-19's on hand being worked
on by the two girls, who only performed day's duties and did not
work on Sundays and handled only the PA-K2's and only the routine
decoding of J-19 after J-19 had been solved by the men who were
standing continuous watch.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you refer to page 24 of that exhibit and state
when and by whom the message was intercepted and forwarded ?
Captain Safford. The message was intercepted at Fort Shafter.
It was processed and translated by the Army on December 30, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is the date of the message. Captain?
Captain Safford. The message was dated December 2, 1941, and
was in J-19. The message bears a note : "This message was received
here on December 23."
Mr. SoNNETT. Does it appear when that message was received in
Washington ?
Captain Safford. Yes, December 23rd. That is from this notation
314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. In what code was that message?
Captain Safford. That was in J-19.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state how long it would have required for
the Navy to have decrypted and translated that message ?
Captain Safford. That would have required from twelve hours to
five days, depending upon luck and upon the volume of traffic we had
available to work on. At this particular time most of the J-IO systems
had been destroyed and the volume of J-19 traffic dropped off to a large
extent. •
Mr. SoNNETT. That is, when you say "this particular time," do you
mean early in December, '41, before the attack?
Captain Safford. Early in December, 1941, before the attack. I
would like to add that there were very few purple keys which we failed
to solve, maybe two or three per cent, and there was an appreciable per-
centage of J-19's, maybe [SS^] ten or fifteen, which we com-
pletely failed to solve due to insufficient traffic or extremely bad luck.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the afternoon of December 6, 1941, and
the morning of December 7, 1941, Captain, will you state whether the
Navy decryption unit was working and, if so, on what?
Captain Safford. A continuous watch was being maintained and
that watch gave priority to purple and did nothing else so long as there
were any purple messages to be solved. However, during the night of
6-7 December 1941, they did get caught up and they took out something
in other systems, which is a matter of record in the GY log, according
to my memory. I don't know how many messages we entered into be-
cause it showed they got caught up to date and were keeping up with
stuff regardless of the extra flow of work.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, Oie so-called fourteen-part message was inter-
cepted beginning on December 6, 1941, was it not?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr, SoNNETT. That was all in English ?
Captain Safford. That was all in English.
Mr. SoNNETT. And required, therefore, neither decryption nor trans-
lating ?
Captain Safford. Oh, it required decryption. It was in purple.
Mr. SoNNETT. But in English ?
Captain Safford. But in English, so didn't require translation.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was that decrypted promptly on the afternoon of
December 6th and the evening ?
Captain Safford. They began to work on that immediately after it
came in and they had found out by telephone conversation with the
War Department that the Army weren't going to work over that week
end. As a matter of fact, some of the parts of it were logged out in
the GY log to the Army and then recalled [533] when they
found out they were going home at 12 o'clock. It was the Army's day
of responsibility whereby the Navy took odd days and the Army took
even days.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, the fourteen-part message, which is document
39 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, was dated Decem-
ber 6, 1941, was it not?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that under the agreement between the Army and
the Navy, the Army was responsible for the decryption of that mes-
sage?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 315
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there also received on that day a message from
Tokyo to Washington, dated December 6th. in the purple code, being
message 901, advising that the reply would be in fourteen parts and
that time of delivery would be fixed in a separate message ?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was that message decrypted by the Army ?
Captain Safford. I believe that was decrypted by the Army. It will
bear their notation on the bottom if it was.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you document 38 of exhibit 63 of the Naval
Court of Inquiry record and ask you if you can determine from that
who decrypted and translated the message.
Captain Safford. Yes, that was processed and translated by the
Army during the late afternoon and early evening of 6 December 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, will you explain, Captain, how it was that the
Army came to work upon those messages when it appears from your
earlier testimony that they had planned not to work that afternoon
and evening?
Captain Safford. About 3 o'clock, about 3 p. m., the afternoon
of \_^34-] December 6, 1941, Commander Kramer returned to
the Navy Department and saw on hand roughly twenty intercepts in
the purple machine. These turned out to be one long message and
several short ones, and realizing that he had more than we could
handle, he called up SIS in the War Department and asked for
assistance. He found an officer down there making up some back
work and this officer called Major Doud and Mr. Rowlett and they
also called two young ladies who were Civil Service employees. All
four came from their homes and got back to the War Department
about 4 p. m. One of the sirls, a Miss Ray Cave, a typist, came
over to the Navy Department and assisted in the smooth type-ups.
The others worked over in the Munitions Building. One other Army
officer who was present in the Munitions Building also assisted, but
he was under instruction, I believe, and not very much help. I don't
recall his name. He is of no importance.
Mr. SoNNETT. Which parts of the first thirteen parts of the f ourteen-
part message were worked on by the Army on the afternoon and
evening of December 6th ?
Captain Safford. I will have to see that GY log to verify this.
As I recall it, it was parts 9 and 10 they actually worked on, but the
smooth typing was done over in the I^avy Department and it was
marked as a Navy translation. There was no actual translation, of
course, because it was in English.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the balance, I take it, of the thirteen parts were
actually worked on by the Navy?
Captain Safford. The balance were actually worked on by the Navy.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to part 14 of the message
Captain Safford. May I add there were also three or four purple
messages of relative unimportance which the Army handled at the
same time.
[635] Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state generally what those mes-
sages were, if you recall them. Captain?
Captain Safford. One message said that this long one was most
secret and not to let an ordinary typist type it; it would have to bei
316 C6NGRESSI0NAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
done by the coding officer, and take great pains not to let it leak out.
Then there were two congratulatory messages and one ordering some-
body to be recalled to his post of duty if they knew where he was
and another one ordering one of their intelligence agents to skip to
Latin America.
Mr. SoxNETT. Referring to part 14 of the fourteen part message,
which was from Tokyo to Washington, dated 7 December, in the
purple code and bearing number 902, that was decrypted, I take it,
on the morning of December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Saffoud. That is part 14?
Mr. SoNNETT. Yes.
Captain Safford. That was decrypted on the morning of the 7th
some time prior to 7 a. m. It was received in the Navy Department
around 6 a. m., as well as we can determine.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to a message of December 7, 1941, from
Tokyo to Washington, bearing number 907, which directed the Am-
bassador to submit the reply to the United States at 1 p. m. on the 7th,
that, I take it, was decrypted on the 7th. Do you know at what hour ?
Captain Safford. That was decrypted on the 7th before 7 a. m. and
sent over to the Army for translation. Brotherhood, who was on
watch, translated it himself and knew what it said, but he was not
sufficiently skilled in the Japanese language at that time that we
could trust his translations, and he sent it over to the War Department
for translation as per orders.
Mr. SoNNETT. This bears the note at the bottom: "Trans.
12/7/41 (S) ." mat does that signify ?
[oM] Captain Safford. That means that was translated on De-
cember 7, 1941, and the "S" means it was intercepted at Bainbridge
Island, Washington, by the Navy radio station there, and that also
bears the notation that it was translated by the Army. It was de-
crypted by the Navy in this case, but the actual translation was done
by the Army, and it was typed smooth by the Army.
Mr. SoxKETT. That message was decrypted at about what time on
December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Safford. Before 7 a. m.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the message consisted of one sentence, did it
not?
Captain Safford. It consisted of one sentence.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were there any qualified Japanese translators on
duty in the Navy Department at that time ?
Captain Safford. There were not.
Mr. SoNNETT. But Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood, who was
on duty, attempted a translation?
Captain Safford. Attempted a translation and realized it was very
important and stayed on himself after his watch had expired until
Commander Kramer came down to the Navy Department.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, at what time was the translation received back
from the Army of this message ?
Captain Safford. I do not know for certain, except it was received
back at least by 10 : 15 a. m. and possibly shortly after 9 a. m. What
the various people say doesn't agree and we have no written record.
Mr. SoNNETT. At what time did Commander Kramer arrive at the
office on the morning of December 7, 1941 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 317
Captain Safford. He arrived some time prior to 9 o'clock; about
8 : 30 as well as I can judge.
[537] Mr. SoNNETT. Was he shown the decrypted message in
Japanese, that is, of message 907, directing the delivery of the reply
at 1 p. m. ?
Captain Safford. I do not know. Kramer said he never knew about
the existence of that message until after he had made his first trip
to the State Department.
Mr. SoNNETT. December 7, 1941, being an odd day, was the day
on which the Navy had the responsibility for the decryption and
translation of Japanese messages ?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. If that was so, why was there no Japanese translator
on duty in your section at that time ?
Captain Safford. Because Kramer had worked overtime from 4
p. m. until about 1 a. m. after putting in a normal day's work and
he was ordered to report to Admiral Stark with translations the
next morning at 9 a. m. and realized that he wouldn't be available.
Kramer normally took the Sunday duties himself. Kramer made spe-
cial arrangements with the Army whereby they would provide a trans-
lator for Sunda}^ in view of the fact we had handled their work the
day before. At that particular time one of our civilian Japanese
translators was in the hospital, where he died about two months later,
and another one was not available for some reason which I can't recall
at the moment.
Mr. SoNNETT. The other one being Mrs. Edgers ?
Captain Safford. Mrs. Edgers was not good enough to be permitted
to handle purple translations. I counted her out.
Mr. SoNNETT. You mean her ability to translate Japanese was not
adequate ?
Captain Safford. Was not adequate at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you know Mrs. Edgers' history?
[538] Captain Safford. She was the sister of Mr. Woodruff,
one of our best translators here. Mr. Cate was the one who was in the
hospital and died. I don't know what the status of Woodruff was
except there was some reason he wasn't immediately available. And
Doctor Hoffman had been taking Sunday duties for a long period and
by some local arrangement Kramer had taken them over himself, par-
tially because he was a little mistrustful of the doctor's evaluations of
the importance of things, not his translations, but his ability to evalu-
ate, and since Kramer would be making the distribution, it was better
for him to come down himself.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you know Mrs. Edgers' qualifications as a Japa-
nese translator and her previous study of the language ?
Captain Safford. As I recall, she had been with us about three
months, three to six months. She was employed by ONI and ONI
was entirely responsible for translation.
Mr. SoNNETT. But did you know. Captain, that she had been licensed
to teach Japanese in Japan up to the grade of high school ?
Captain Safford. I did not know what her personal qualifications
were, but on translating this technical stuff, regardless of their educa-
tion, it took long experience in working with this particular type of
stuff before we dared trust their translations.
318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. In other words, then, your statement concerning Mrs.
Edgers' qualifications was not so much, I take it, her qualifications as
a translator but rather her experience with the work ?
Captain Safford. And her technical vocabulary. Every one we had
had to go through a probationary period of about a year before we
dared turn them loose on really important stuff.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, referring. Captain, to the question which we
have [SS9} prevously gone into, namely, the "winds" code
execute message relating to the United States, did you ever have a con-
versation with Colonel Sadler of the War Department concerning the
existence of such a message ?
Captain Safford. I never talked to Colonel Sadler about that.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall whether on or about December 4, 1941,
you received a call from Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood in
which he advised you of the receipt of a message apparently relating
to the "winds" code?
Captain Safford. I cannot recall anything distinctly about it that
1 would want to say in testimony. I have had a vague idea that there
Avas another "winds" code message and the FCC intercept seemed to
fill the bill.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry
record, which contains documents supplied by the FCC, and to specifi-
cally document 2 of that exhibit, do you recall whether or not Lieu-
tenant Commander Brotherhood advised you of that message on or
about December 4, 1941 ?
Captain Safford. I do not recall ever having seen this message or
knowing of it in this form until I saw the FCC transcript.
Mr. SoNNETT. When did you first see that. Captain ?
Captain Safford. Some time after August 19, 1944, the day before
I went on the stand.
Mr. SoNNETT. Up to that time, namely, August of 1944, had you
known that the Federal Communications Commission had intercepted
any messages which apparently employed the "winds" code?
Captain Safford. Yes, I had known of it for several months.
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, prior to 1944 had you known ?
Captain Safford. Oh, no, no, not prior to 1944, no.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral, at this time.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. I don't think of anything further.
[S40] Captain Safford. I would like to add the following in-
formation: In May, 1945, or late in May, 1945, I had a conversation
with Mr, Walter Foote, formerly American Consul General at Ba-
tavia. Java. Mr. Foote is the man who sent in a Dutch version of the
"winds" setup message. Mr. Foote said that he sent this message at the
urgent request of Mr. Lovink, who was technical adviser to the NET
government on Asiatic affairs. Mr. Foote is certain that the Dutch
did not hear the "winds" execute message and that he would have been
informed if they had heard it.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. Thank you.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 11:41 a. m., adjourned until 1:30
p. m., Tuesday, 26 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 319
Vnn PROCEEDlNriS OF THE HEWITT INaUIRY
T^^rENTT-THIRD Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the Gen-
eral Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, at 1 : 30 p. m.,
Tuesday, 26 June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's
Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
Captain Joseph H. Rochefort, USN, was recalled as a witness and
was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.
Two witnesses entered, read the precept, and each was duly sworn.
Mr. Sonnett. Will each of you gentlemen state his name and rank,
please ?
Colonel Lasswell. Alva B. Laswell, Colonel, USMC.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Farnsley C. Woodward, Lieutenant
(Jg),USN.
Mr. Sonnett. Colonel, will you. state what your assignment was
in December of 1941?
Colonel Lasswell. I was a translator with the conununication in-
telligence unit — I believe we called it combat intelligence unit at that
time — Fourteenth Naval District.
Mr. Sonnett. And Lieutenant Woodward, would you state your
assignment in 1941 ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. My assignment in 1941, 1 was attached
to the same organization and I had several duties among which was
cryptanalysis.
Mr. Sonnett. During the first week of December, 1941, certain
messages were received by that unit for decryption and translation,
which were messages of the Japanese Consul, were they not %
[542] Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They were.
Mr. Sonnett. And the three of you were on duty at that time ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes.
Colonel Lasswell. Yes.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. There has been previous testimony that those mes-
sages were received on or about December 5, 1941. Is that in accord-
ance with your general and several recollections ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes.
Colonel Lasswell. I can state that certain messages were received
on the 5th, yes.
Mr, Sonnett. To the knowledge of any one of you, were such mes-
sages received by your unit prior to December 5, 1941?
Captain Rochefort. No, there were not.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. No.
320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR AllACK
Colonel Lasswell. I know of none.
Mr. SoNNETT. Lieutenant Woodward, I show you a statement on
the letterhead of RCA Communications, Inc., listing various mes-
sages, and ask whether you have examined that document and checked
the messages listed thereon.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodwabd. I have.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 55.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Mr. Woodward, this document, which is exhibit 55.
sets forth messages sent by the Japanese Consul General in Decem-
ber and November, l-S^S] 1941, from Honolulu, does it not?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodwaed. It does.
• Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the file which I show you. Lieutenant,
can you identify the documents contained therein ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. I can.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state what they are ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, they are deciphered messages
of which there is a translation that were taken out by me and trans-
lated by some one else.
Mr. SoNNETT. And those are coded messages of the Japanese Con-
sul General at Honolulu ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is right, sir.
Mr. SoxNETT. Is that correct?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Those messages are among those listed on exhibit
55, which is the ECA statement?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They are.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state when copies of the coded messages
contained in that document first came to your attention ?
Lieutenant ( jg) Woodward. Around possibly 1 : 30, 2 o'clock Friday
afternoon, December 5, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. And each of the messages in the folder, according
to the best of 3'our recollection, was received by you on that date?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. At about that time ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Subsequent to the receipt of those messages. Lieu-
tenant, did you endeavor to decrypt the messages ?
[544] Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. I did, as soon as it was de-
termined that the other messages that we had received along with
these, what they were, plain language and so forth, we immediate]}'
went to work and worked pretty far into the night on that Friday
evening.
Mr. SoxxETT. May we mark those as an exhibit. Admiral?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
Mr. Soxxett. Lieutenant, exhibit 56, which is a folder containing
photostatic copies of coded messages, also contains some plain lan-
guage and some translations. Are the translations contained in this
exhibit correct translations of the Japanese messages, to the best of
your knowledge ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 321
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. To the best of my knowledge, but I
am not a linguist.
Mr. SoNNETT. Colonel Lasswell, have you veriiBed the translations
in this exhibit 56 and can you state whether or not they are correct ?
Colonel Lasswell. I can state only that those which I made are
correct, to the best of my knowledge and ability.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you. Colonel, exhibit 56 and ask if you will
identify the translations contained therein which were made by you.
Colonel Lasswell. None of these.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know who made the translations of the mes-
sages which are set forth in exhibit 56 ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. I couldn't be positive about that, no.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were the translations taken from the files of the
Navy Department?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. The translations that are in that book
were taken from the files here, a copy of which was put in with this.
[54S'\ Mr. SoNNETT. When you say "here," j^ou are referring
to
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Washington.
Mr. SoNNETT. Washington ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. In addition to the messages contained in exhibit 56,
which you testified were received on December 5, 1941, there were
certain other messages received, were there not, at that time ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. There were.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you describe what those messages were?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, they were plain language and
they were in some less secret systems, none of which are in this book.
Mr. SoNNETT. What did the plain language messages relate to?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. I do not know. I didn't translate
them.
Mr. SoNNETT. Colonel, did you have any connection with the plain
language messages received on or about December 5, 1941 ?
Colonel Lasswell. Yes, I hastily read a number of them, many of
which dealt with the exchange of certain amounts of money as trans-
portation expenses, etcetera, of personnel connected with the consular
department, passing through Honolulu. Many of them were con-
cerning the transfers and movements of certain consular personnel.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were there any of the plain language messages
which were so received prior to the attack of December 7th which dealt
with defense preparations or movements of ships at Pearl Harbor ?
Colonel Lasswell. There was no such information, to the best of
my knowledge, contained in any messagje tljere.
Mr. SoNNETT. In addition to the plain language messages and the
coded messages contained in exhibit 56, 1 believe you said. Lieutenant,
there were some other coded messages in less difficult codes ?
[546'] Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you state what they were ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, you mean the gist of them?
Mr. SoNNETT. Both the gist of them and the code.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, the code was a simple code that
they had used for years, with which we were very familiar, but as far
79716—^6 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 22
322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
as the contents of the messages themselves are concerned, I don't
know because I went to work right on this stuff.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was the code in question ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. LA.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were you familiar, Colonel, with the mesages in the
LA code so received prior to the attack ?
Colonel Lasswell. Yes, quite a number of them I hastily read.
However, we placed, understandably, most of our attention on the
other documents in hand, but we did decrypt and read enough of them
to know the genei'al content,
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you state what generally was the content of
the messages in the LA code so received ?
Colonel Lasswell. The messages encrypted in what was known as
the LA code were almost similar or very similar to those in plain text.
The degree of secrecy of that is apparently very little above the plain
text.
]Mr. SoNNETT. I take it it was also true, then, of the LA code mes-
sages that there was no message relating to the defense preparations
at Pearl Harbor, to movements of ships, or to indicating in any way
the possibility of any attack ?
Colonel Lass^vell. None that I know of.
Mr. Sonnett. For the sake of the record, Lieutenant, referring to
exhibit 56, there are various photostatic pages followed by a transla-
tion and [5^7] then a blank white page. The white pages,
I'lank, separate the various messages, do they not?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. And the translation at the back of each group of
photostats is a translation of the coded and of the Japanese language
preceding it ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is right, sir.
Mr. Sonnett. Can you state when the messages contained in exhibit
56, or any of them, were first translated or decrypted ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodw^ard. No, except that on the morning of the
9th about 2 o'clock the first break was found ; some time between there
and the 10th they were all taken out and possibly translated.
Mr. Sonnett.' Will you explain, Lieutenant, what you mean by
saying that at that time the first break occurred?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, we were fortunate enough to
discover what they had done in enciphering, which was a breach from
the normal way of enciphering the messages.
Mr. Sonnett. In what code were those messages ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. PA-K2 system; PA base with a K2
transposition system. *
Mr. Sonnett. Between December 5th, when those messages were
received, and December 9th, when you first succeeded in breaking that
code, I take it that efforts were made to break that code and decrypt
the messages?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodw.\rd. Very much so, some fourteen to sixteen
hours a day.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you work on that project yourself or did you
have assistants?
\54B] Lieutenant ( jg) Woodward. I worked myself on them and
after getting them, I turned them over to translators for translation.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 323
Mr. SoNNETT. And the translators, in addition to Colonel Laswell,
were now Captain Finnegan and who else ?
Lientenant (jg) Woodward. That I can't be sure.
Colonel Lasswell. There were quite a number of officers there. The
ones that were used on that project, to the best of my memory, would
have been Allyn Cole, John Chivley — those were the only two I
remember employing.
Captain Rochefort. Besides yourself and Finnegan.
Colonel Lasswell. Besides myself and Finnegan.
Mr. SoNNETT. In addition to tlie PA-K2 code, the Japanese had
the so-called J-19 and the purple codes which they used, did they not ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They did.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you ever at Pearl Harbor work on any of those
codes, that is, purple or J-19 ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. I did not.
Mr. SoisTNETT. Were the Japanese code messages received on Decem-
ber 5, 1941, forwarded to Washington by your unit'^
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Copies of them were.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall whether that was done before or after
the attack ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That I do not know. I couldn't say.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know whether or not Washington had from
other sources copies of such messages ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. I couldn't be sure about that either.
Mr. SoNNETT. Lieutenant, when, prior to December 5, 1941, had you
last engaged in attempting to break Japanese diplomatic code?
[549] Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. From the period of 1938 in
around April till June, 1940.
Mr. SoNNETT. Where was that work done ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Shanghai, China.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was any such w^ork carried on in the Pearl Harbor
unit during the period of time j^ou were there prior to December 6,
1941?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. No, sir.
Mr. SoNNETT. And when did you arrive at Pearl Harbor ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. August 13, 1940.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that, I take it, no attack was being made on Japa-
nese diplomatic codes during the latter part of 1940 and up to the time
of the attack ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Except commencing on December 5, 1941 ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you another folder of photostatic copies of
dispatches and ask if you can identify that.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Yes, I do.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state what that document is?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, this document cotains encoded
messages, which also contains the take-outs — we call them take-outs —
and translations.
Mr. SoNNETT. That is, messages of the Japanese Consul at Hono-
lulu?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward, That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. When were those coded messages first in your posses-
sion?
324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. These messages were received on the
night of 7 December 1941.
[550] Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that, Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 57.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to exhibit 57, which you have just identi-
fied, Lieutenant, I take it these messages were also in the PA-K2
code?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They were, with the exception of the
last batch at the bottom. That is not. That is in J-19 and 22.
Mr. SoNNETT. And those messages weren't deciypted and translated
at Pearl Harbor ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. No, sir.
Mr. SoNNETT. In this exhibit is it also true that the photostatic
documents relating to the one message are followed by a translation
and then a blank sheet of paper ? Is that correct ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is correct, sir.
Mr. SoNNETT. I note in exhibit 57 that the first message was one from
Honolulu, Eita to Tokyo, dated December 4, 1941, in the PA-K2 code,
bearing the number 249. Can you explain why that message was not
among the messages received on December 5, 1941, which are set forth
in exhibit 56 ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. I can't explain that.
Mr. SoNNETT. The messages received on December 5, 1941, which are
contained in exhibit 56 are those which after careful examination,
Lieutenant, of all of these messages you identify as the only ones
received prior to the attack, of the coded messages ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Of the coded messages, yes, sir, except
the LA's, the ones in the LA system.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to exhibit 55, Lieutenant, which is the RCA
[551] Communications statement, listing messages of the Japanese
Consul General in November and December, 1941, will you state as to
each message there listed whether a copy of the message is contained
in 56 or 57?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Copies of all the messages in these 56
and 57 exhibits are on this list. Do you want me to identify each one ?
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, the cable radiogram numbers are
merely stamped on the blank by the company. Those numbers have
been matched with the internal secret message serial number of the
Japanese, where showing, and copies of all of these are in the folders
as such, labelled at the bottom accordingly.
Mr. SoNNETT. I note that there are more cable messages shown than
there are documents contained in exhibits 56 and 57.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, the reason for that is because
one document carrying a number, say 245, embodies two messages, or
the same message, I should say, one and two different addressees under
two separate cable numbers, and there may also be some three or four
addressees shown for some message.
Mr. SoNNETT. The messages set forth on exhibit 55, Lieutenant,
were, as you previously testified, in several of the Japanese diplomatic
systems such as the PA-K2 and the J-19 and others perhaps. I believe
you also testified that you translated after the attack
Lieutenant ( jg) Woodward. I didn't translate.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 325
Mr. SoNNETT. That you decrypted after the attack the messages in
the PA-K2 system. For the sake of the record, will you identify by
date and number the messages which were in systems other than the
PA-K2 and which you did not decrypt at Pearl Harbor ?
[SS2] Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, the cable numbers,
immber 38 was a question; I don't know what that is. The cable
numbers 156 and 160 were the same message going to two addressees,
and the secret message, serial number was 241, that was in system J-19.
Cable number 161 or radiogram number — whichever you want to call
it — was secret message serial number 242, was in system J-22, not
translated, but the gist — we didn't translate it at all. Number 362 and
363 and 411 in question. This system is not known and those, I didn't
know what they are because I can't find them. Number 362, 363, and
411 weren't worked on by me at Honolulu and I find no record of them
here.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the November messages of the Japanese
Consul set forth at page 2 of exhibit 55, will you state whether any
of those messages were in the PA-K2 system and were worked on at
Honolulu by you ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They weren't.
(Brief discussion off the record.)
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain Rochefort, I show you exhibit 23 of this
investigation, which is a December 1, 1941, estimate of Japanese fleet
location by Lieutenant Commander Layton and ask whether or not
you saw that document prior to the attack on December 7th.
Captain Rochefort. I cannot say that I saw this particular docu-
ment, but undoubtedly participated in its preparation.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall any discussion with Lieutenant Com-
mander Layton or with Admiral Kimmel or any other member of his
staff concerning the whereabouts of the Japanese Carrier Divisions
One and Two ? You will note that the exhibit contains no reference
to those carrier divisions.
Captain Rochefort. No, I do not, other than we did not know where
CarDivs One and Two were.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall in general what information your unit
had after December 1, 1941, concerning the whereabouts of the Jap-
anese carriers?
[SS3] Captain Rochefort. To the best of my belief, our estimate
did not vary after our dispatch of November 26th ; in other words, one
Cardiv somewhere in the Marshalls and the other Cardivs unlocated.
Mr. SoNNETT. You were, I take it, delivering daily to Lieutenant
Commander Layton the daily communication intelligence summaries
which you have previously identified ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 22 of this investigation and ask
you whether those are photostatic copies of the communication intelli-
gence summaries so delivered by you.
Captain Rochefort. Yes, they are.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. Thank you very much gentlemen.
(The witnesses were excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 2:08 p. m., adjourned until 2:30
p.m., 4 July 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 327
im'X PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT maUIRY
Twenty-fourth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the Gen-
eral Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, at 2 : 30 p. m., Wed-
nesday, 4 July 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's
Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. Sonnett. Please state your name and rank.
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. Gilbert E. Boone, Lieutenant Commander,
USNR.
Mr. Sonnett. What is your present duty ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. The section head of Op-20-GL.
Mr. Sonnett. And that is a sub-section of Op-20-G ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. That is right.
Mr. Sonnett. Wliat is qp-20-GL?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. It is a research and collateral section.
Mr. Sonnett. Who has custody of the records of Op-20-G ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. Op-20-G's records are divided in custody,
each sub-section or section retaining for operational purposes such
records as they require.
Mr. Sonnett. Wlien the}'^ are through with the operational use of
the records, what happens to them ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. Operational records no longer used for that
purpose are turned over to my custody in Op-20-3GL.
Mr. Sonnett. At our request. Commander, have you made a search
of the Op-20-G files to attempt to collect all messages received by
Op-20-G from \555\ November 27th to December 7, 1941, re-
lating to the location and movements of Japanese naval forces?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. I directed a search from such cognizant
sources.
Mr. Sonnett, And have you with you. Commander, a collection of
the dispatches wliich you succeeded in locating on that subject?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. I have, right here.
Mr. SoNNETP. May we mark that as an exhibit. Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
58.")
Mr. Sonnett. I show you a collection of photostatic copies of docu-
ments, Commander, and ask if you can identify what they are.
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. They are photographic copies of Japanese
plain language dispatches interceptecl at Station S.
Mr. Sonnett. And forwarded to Op-20-G ?
Liet. Comdr. Boone. Forwarded to Op-20-G. They are of De-
cember 3 and 4, 1941.
328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. And those are news broadcasts from what source,
Commander ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. Jap press. That would probably be Tokyo ;
Domei, wherever Domei might originate. This one (indicating) is
Domei from Tokyo.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral ?
Admiral HEwrrr. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
59.")
Mr. SoNNETT. I sliow you a collection of carbon copies of memoranda.
Commander, and ask if you can identify them.
[SS6] Lieut. Comdr. Boone. CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 June 28) is a
survey relating to Japanese diplomatic traffic of 1941. CT.FJPZ-2
( 1944 September 28) is a rough count of the work sheets held in GL-6,
sub-section of GL, of various Japanese diplomatic systems.
CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 September 23) is a survey of messages received by
Op-20-G from 1 to 8 December 1941 by stations and listing time lag.
Mr. SoNNETT. And you have indicated in pencil the location of each
station listed on that ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. Over here, giving the identity, right. You
will note one in here, Army, where Army is printed out, it may have
been Army teletype; it may have been delivered — the message may
have been delivered, just a copy or it may have been some other meth-
od, but Army was the source. There is one other where we have photo
and X, they are two practically synonomous uses. The Army used
one; we used the other. We may have used both simultaneously.
Mr. SoNNETT. That symbolizes that the message was obtained by
])hotographing at the cable office in Washington ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. That is right. Well, that may not have been
necessarily Washington. It may have been any place we could get.
CT. FJPZ-2 (1944 January 19, enclosure F) is a memorandum
which was made in response to an attempt to locate odd groups of
files.
Mr. SoNNETT. And those are correct copies of memorandum in your
files in Op-20-G, are they not ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. They are.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we receive that, Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
60.")
[SST] Mr. Sonnett. I show you a memorandum dated 29 June
1945 and ask if you can identify that and state who prepared it, Com-
mander.
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. The number is CT.FJPZ-2 (1945 June 29)
and it was prepared by a sub-section head under my cognizance. Its
purpose was a survey of the work sheets processed by the Navy of the
Japanese purple system.
Mr. Sonnett. May we receive this. Admiral, as an exhibit?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 61.")
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to exhibit 58, Commander, which is a col-
lection of dispatches produced by you from the Op-20-G files, have
you examined every source known to you wherein you might find dis-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 329
patches relating to Japanese fleet movements after November 27th
and prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. I have examined all possible cognizant
sources, to my knowledge.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
[S68] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. State your name and rank, please, sir.
Eear Admiral Matfield. Irving H. Mayfield, Rear Admiral, USN.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, what was your duty in December of 1941 ?
Rear Admiral Mayfleld. I was District Intelligence Officer, Four-
teenth Naval District.
Mr. SoNNETT. And for how long had you been District Intelligence
Officer?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. Since March 15, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. What, in general, Admiral, was the mission of the
District Intelligence Office of the Fourteenth Naval District?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. The mission, in general, was that of gen-
eral intelligence matters in cooperation with the other federal and
local intelligence organizations, particularly with respect to espionage
and counter-espionage and such other intelligence matters as might be
directed by the Chief of Naval Operations or District Commandant.
Mr. SoNNETT. What were the other local intelligence agencies.
Admiral ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. There were two other local federal intel-
ligence agencies, namely. Military Intelligence and Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Mr. SoNNETT. Who was in charge of the Military Intelligence?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. To the best of my recollection, it was
Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, who was not the G-2 on the Department
Commander's staff, but was the assistant who had charge locally of
matters pertaining to local intelligence. The FBI was Mr. Robert L.
Shivers, who was later relieved — the exact date I do not remember —
by a Mr. Thornton of FBI.
Mr. SoNNETT. That was subsequent to the attack of December 7
1941 ?
l5o9] Rear Admiral Mayfield. Subsequent to the attack.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state, in general, Admiral, what were the ar-
rangements for the exchange of intelligence among the three local fed-
eral intelligence agencies ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. The general directive from the Chief of
Naval Operations, as I understood it, was complete cooperation be-
tween the three federal investigative agencies in accordance with the
delimitation agreement and modifications thereto signed in Washing-
ton. There was, to the best of my knowledge and belief, complete,
whole-hearted, unreserved cooperation between Naval Intelligence and
the other two federal investigative organizations.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it as a matter of general practice, Admiral, that
the information in the possession of the District Office of Naval Intelli-
gence was communicated to the other agencies, that is, the FBI and
G-2 of the Army ?
330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Rear Admiral Matfield. Every bit of the information received by
my organization was available to the other two organizations and if, on
scrutiny of the information, it appeared of interest to either or both,
they were given copies.
Mr. SoNNETT. There was. Admiral, a unit known as the radio intelli-
gence unit of Com 14, headed by Lieutenant Commander Rochefort,
was there not ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. Commander.
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, Commander Rochefort.
Rear Admiral Matfield. There was.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state. Admiral, what the relations were be-
tween your office and that unit ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. I received from and gave to Commander
Rochefort's unit all possible assistance. However, his unit operated
entirely separate [660] and distinct from my organization and
I had no authority whatever over his unit.
Mr. Sonnett. To whom did his unit report, Admiral ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. I believe directly to the Chief of Naval Op-
erations, though perhaps through the District Commandant.
Mr. Sonnett. What, in general. Admiral, was the mission of the unit
headed by Commander Rochefort ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. It was my understanding that this was a
highly specialized unit operating. under the Chief of Naval Operations,
and I am unable to give definite information as to its mission or work
performed by it.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, did you know to whom the unit headed by
Commander Rochefort reported the results of its activities?
Rear Admiral Matfield. I believe to the Chief of Naval Operations
or to such other officers and officials as might be directed by the CJiief
of Naval Operations.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you know whether the unit reported to the Fleet
Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. I do not know what reports were made by
Commander Rochefort to the Fleet Intelligence Officer, but I do know
that personal cooperation and relations between Commander Rochefort
and Commander Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, appeared to me
to be cordial, thorough, and cooperative.
Mr. Sonnett. What were the relations. Admiral, between the Dis-
trict Intelligence Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer?
Rear Admiral Matfield. The relations between the District Intelli-
gence Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer were, to the best of my
knowledge, cordial close, and cooperative. I was in more or less
constant communication by telephone and by personal visit with Com-
mander Layton and [SOI] it was my endeavor to supply him
with every bit of information reaching me which I believed would be of
interest or value to him.
Mr. Sonnett. I take it, Admiral, from your testimony that you did
not receive, directly or indirectly, reports as to the location or move
ments of Japanese fleet units made by the intelligence unit under Com-
mander Rochefort?
Rear Admiral Matfield. I did not.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, there has been previous testimony to the
eflfect that during the first week of December, 1941, certain cable mes-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 331
sages sent by the Japanese Consul were secured from the local office
of the RCA Communications Company at Honolulu. Do you have
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding that ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I do.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state, Admiral, fully your knowledge of those
circumstances, including the efforts which had been made previously
to secure such messages '(
Rear Admiral Mayfield. Shortly after taking over the duty of
District Intelligence Officer, I discussed with the representative of
Military Intelligence and the Special Agent in Charge of FBI meth-
ods of obtaining from the cable and radio communication companies
access to their tiles for the purpose of obtaining copies of dispatches
which might have intelligence value. We had endeavored to approach
the managers of these companies or some of their employees, seeking a
method whereby we could obtain copies of such dispatches. We had
had no success.
By agreement with the other two organizations, I had concentrated
particularly on RCA. It was not until the visit of Mr. Sarnoff that
I was able to secure access to RCA files. The Japanese Consulate
General alternated among the different companies on a monthly basis
in sending its traffic. [562] RCA did not handle the traffic
during the month of November, but did handle the traffic of the Japa-
nese Consulate General beginning on the 1st of December. I, there-
fore, was able to secure the traffic sent and received by the Japanese
Consulate General from and after 1 December 1941.
Since the turning over of this traffic to me was considered an un-
usual and perhaps an illegal matter, the detailed arrangement, to the
best of my recollection, was as follows: The manager of RCA daily
would have copies made on a blank piece of paper, giving little in-
formation as to origin or addressee of this traffic. This was a measure
of protection for him which I considered justifiable. I did not con-
sider that written records of receipt and delivery of these copies of
messages should be kept. I called personally at the office of RCA at
the beginning in the forenoon, late forenoon, and received from the
manager a blank envelope containig copies of these messages. To the
best of my recollection my first visit was about the 3rd of December.
The envelope I received contained plain sheets of paper with the
messages written thereon. I immediately forwarded these messages
by officer messenger to Commander Rochefort. As I did not keep a
written record of receipt and delivery of these messages, I am unable
to give exact dates of receipts and deliveries to Commander Roche-
fort.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there more than one delivery of messages to him
prior to the attack ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. That I cannot state definitely, but I be-
lieve there was.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the day before the attack, Admiral,
that is, December 6, 1941, have you any recollection whether or not
messages were obtained that day from RCA and sent to Commander
Rochefort?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I have no definite recollection as to that
date.
332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
IS'6S] Mr. SoNNETT. Can you recall at what time of the day
these messages were picked up at the RCA office?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. Usually in the late forenoon, around 10
or 11 o'clock.
Mr. SoNNETT. Prior to the attack on December 7, 1941, Admiral, did
you receive from Commander Rochefort any translations of the mes-
sages which you so obtained and delivered to him?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. To the best of my recollection, I did not,
or if I did receive any such translations, they did not appear to have
any military or intelligence value.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 56 of this investigation,
which has previously been identified by members of Captain Roche-
fort's unit as containing messages which were received on December
5, 1941, by that unit, and ask if you can identify those or any of those
as messages which you so prior to the attack?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I have no recollection and do not believe
that I ever saw the translations of any of these messages prior to
December 7th.
Mr. SoNNETT. I also show you, Admiral, exhibit 57 of this in-
vestigation, which has heretofore been identified as messages and
translations of messages, wliich messages were received after the at-
tack, on the night of December 7th, by Commander Rochefort's unit,
and ask whether you recall having seen the translations of any of
these messages prior to the attack.
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I have no recollection of ever having seen
the translations of any of these messages prior to December 7, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it, Admiral, that it is not possible for you to
recall any of the actual messages themselves which were received on
December 5th or prior to the attack in code?
[564.] Rear Admiral Mayfield. No. When these dispatches
came to me from RCA, I would simply look at them and see that they
were code dispatches which had been sent to me by RCA; so I just
simply sent them on out to Rochefort without any attempt to recognize
code groups or addressees or anything else, because supposedly it was
nothing but traffic from and to the Japanese Consulate General.
Mr, SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 40 of this investigation,
which contains two Office of Naval Intelligence reports made at the
Fourteenth Naval District, and ask whether those reports were sub-
mitted to and approved by you.
Rear Admiral Mayfield. They were submitted to me, approved by
me. and bore my signature when they left my office.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state the substance. Admiral, of the first
report, which is dated February 9, 1942 ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. The first report reports on a message sent
by the Japanese Consul General, transmitting to Tokyo a proposed
system of signalling by lights and other methods, which signals would
be available for use to report departures of naval units from Pearl
Harbor. This system was conceived and submitted to the Japanese
Consul General by Otto Kuhn, a German subject resident on the Island
of Oahu. Til is message presTmiably was sent on the ord of December
1941 and I believe to have been one of the messages delivered by me to
Commander Rochefort on the 4th or 5th of December. The transla-
tion of this message was given to me at the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 333
by Admiral Bloch, District Commandant, on the morning of 11 De-
cember, at which time I received certain instructions from him, the
action on which is set forth in the report.
Mr. SoNNETT. In substance, Admiral, was there any evidence ob-
tained to indicate that that system of signaling had been used?
[56S] Rear Admiral Matfield. Although my office made every
effort, as did the Federal Bureau of Investigation, we were unable to
find any definite information that any part of the proposed system of
signals had ever been used.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, will you state what action was taken with
respect to Kuhn, who conceived this system of signalling ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. Mr. Kuhn was tried and convicted. I be-
lieve his sentence was commuted to a long term of imprisonment.
Mr. Sonnett. Referring, Admiral, to the second of the ONI reports
in exhibit 40, which is dated February 14, 1942, will you state whether
that report was submitted to and approved by you, and the substance
of it?
Rear Admiral Maytield. This report was submitted to me, approved
by me, and bore my signature when it left my office.
Mr. Sonnett. It appears in that. Admiral, does it not, that various
of the messages sent by the Japanese Consul on December 3rd and sub-
sequently are translated and digested in the report ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. It does.
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to the report. Admiral, willyou state briefly
what messages of the Japanese Consul are set forth prior to December
5,1941?
Rear Admiral Matfield. There appears in the report a statement
that the Japanese Consul General sent a dispatch on 3 December re-
porting departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. On
the 4th of December, another dispatch, reporting the arrival of the
HONOLULU. And another, on the 5th of December, which reported
the arrival of three battleships, their expected date of departure, the
depaiture of the LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers, and a state-
ment as to vessels of certain classes of U. S. men of war in Pearl Harbor
on the afternoon of the 5th, presumably December 5th.
[S66] Mr. Sonnett. Now, Admiral, referring to the first page
of the report, does it appear when the messages referred to subse-
quently in the report were received by your organization from RCA ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. It appears in the report that my office re-
ceived on the morning of December 5th certain communications sent
and received by the Japanese Consul General during the period 1 to 4
December.
Mr. Sonnett. Now, the communications set forth in the report,
however, are only those of the 3rd and 4th of December, are they not,
Admiral, that is, prior to the morning of the 5th ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. Correct.
Mr. Sonnett. Does it appear in the report when the Japanese
Consul's messages of the evening of December 5, 1941, was received by
your organization ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. It does not appear in the report as to
when my office received a copy of the message sent by the Japanese
Consul General in the late afternoon of 5 December.
334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Similarly, Admiral, as to the message of December
6th referred to in the report, does it appear when that message was
received by your office ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. It does not appear in the report when
a copy of this dispatch was received by my office.
Mr. SoNNETT. The message of the 6th, Admiral, was in substance
what ?
Rear Admiral IVIaytield. "Please inform us immediately of any
rumors of the movements of warships after the 4th."
Mr. SoNNETT. Is there another message also set forth for Decem-
ber 6th in the report ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. There is.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that in substance is what, sir ?
[S67] Rear Admiral Mayfield. It relates to arrival of the
WYOMING and the number of various types of U. S. men of war in
Pearl Harbor.
Mr. SoNNETT. Does it appear at what time that message was filed
by the Japanese Consul ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. It is stated in the report that this message
was filed at 6 : 01 p. m. on December 6th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall whether after 6 : 01 p. m. on the night
preceding the attack your office received any messages from RCA of
the Japanese Consul ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I do not remember that any were re-
ceived and am of the opinion that none were received since it was my
agreement with the manager of RCA that these messages would be
delivered to me or my authorized representative during the late fore-
noon of each day. This arrangement was at the desire of the manager
of RCA and was for his own security inasmuch as he was violating
instructions and desired to have these messages copied and delivered
to me or my representative only in such manner as would best safe-
guard and protect him as well as me.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that under your arrangement with the RCA man-
ager, you would have received the messages filed on the afternoon or
evening of the 6th the following day, that is, on the 7th ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you find. Admiral, a message filed on the 6th
translated and set forth in the report, relating to the use of balloons ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. There appears in the report a dispatch
relating to the Army's use of balloons and the report states that the
dispatch was delivered for transmission to Tokyo at 12 : 48 on Decem-
ber 6th.
Mr. SoNNETT. And, I take it, therefore, that under the arrange-
ments which you have described, you would not have received that
message until the 7th ?
[568] Rear Admiral Mayfield. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. And you have no recollection of having received that
message at any time before the attack ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I have none, no recollection, and do not
believe that I did receive it before the attack.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you an original report from the
District Intelligence Officer, dated April 19, 1942, to the Director of
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 335
Naval Intelligence, and ask whether you can recognize that as a re-
port forwarded by you.
Read Admiral Mayfield. I recognize this report as having been
raade from my office by one of my assistants, approved and signed
by me.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state, sir, generally what the report deals
with?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. In general, the report deals with coded
dispatch traffic of the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, Terri-
tory of Hawaii.
Mr. SoNNETT. As set forth in the incoming and outgoing logs of
the Japanese Consul, sir ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. This report encloses copies of translations
of the incoming and outgoing message log books of the Japanese Con-
sulate. General.
Mr. SoNNETT. They were recovered, Admiral, were they not, after
the attack and reconstructed ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. To the best of my knowledge, they were
recovered after the attack by either the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation or Military Intelligence. The report states that both of these
organizations sent to me copies of the outgoing log book, but that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation was the only organization sending
me a copy of the incoming log book.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, this is the original report, which has been
[569] provided to us by the Director of Naval Intelligence. I
wonder if we could have it marked as an exhibit with the understand-
ing that we will have it photostated and we will substitute a photo-
static copy, so that we can return this to the Director of Naval
Intelligence.
Admiral Hewitt. All right ; yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 62.")
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, it appears from prior testimony that for
some months prior to the attack of December 7, 1941, the telephone
lines of the Japanese Consulate General were tapped at Honolulu. I
show you exhibits 38A and 38B of this investigation, which have been
identified as transcripts of the conversations recorded by ONI repre-
sentatives and obtained via the lines of the Japanese Consul General
and Vice Consul during the period October 1, 1941, to December 2,
1941. For how long prior to December 7, 1941, were the telephone
lines in question tapped. Admiral ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I have no personal recollection of the
date on which these interceptions began. That should be shown in
the records of the DIO, Fourteenth Naval District.
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, Admiral, it is clear from the exhibits, is it not,
that certainly by October 1, 1941, these telephone lines were being
tapped ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. It is.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, sir, was it true that the information obtained
from the telephone taps on the Consulate's lines was brought to your
attention as a matter of regular routine while the taps were in effect ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. My consent had to be obtained before the
interceptions were started. Thereafter, copies of the interceptions
were [S70] only brought to my attention when they appeared
336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to contain items of particular interest. All bits of information ob-
tained from these interceptions were used to supplement information
already on file in my office concerning people or locations on which
we had dossiers or for use in starting new dossiers. Copies of these
transcripts were delivered to FBI daily.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, did any information come to you prior to
December 7, 1941, of military significance which had been obtained
from tapping a telephone line to the Japanese Consul ?
Rear Admiral Maytield. None that I recollect and I do not believe
that any information received by this method was considered of
military or naval importance by me or my assistants.
Mr. SoNNETT. You haA^e, Admiral, examined at my request, have
you not, exhibits 38A and 38B, the transcripts from October 1, 1941,
to December 2, 1941 ? Can you state whether, having examined those
transcripts, there appears to be anything of military or naval sig-
nificance contained therein?
Rear Admiral Mattield. I do not believe there is anything of
military or naval significance contained therein.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state, Admiral, whv there are no tran-
scripts after December 2, 1941, and up to December 7, 1941 ?
Rear Admiral Mattield. On or about December 2nd, it was re-
ported to me by one of my assistants that employees of the tele-
phone company had discovered a jum.per put across the connections
in a junction box by a member of the FBI organization and that
an employee of the telephone company had reported this discovery
to one of my assistants. It was further reported to me that one of
my assistants reported this matter to one of the agents of the FBI.
It was further reported to me that a member of the FBI organiza-
tion, name unknown to me, had taken the matter up with the tele-
phone company. What [■571] representative of the telephone
company I do not know. To the best of my recollection, I discussed
the matter with Mr. Shivers and the reports made to me did not
agree with the reports made to him by his assistants. My organiza-
tion long before my arrival had worked up a contact with an em-
ployee of the telephone company and through this contact was able
to obtain any telephone interception desired by my office. Because
of the highly explosive nature of such practice, I did not desire to
enter into an argument or controversy as to the merits or demerits
of the case since I was afraid that by so doing, the fact that such
interceptions were being made miglit be discovered and thereby
jeopardize the future of any further interceptions. Furthermore,
since the interceptions to that date had revealed nothing of particu-
lar value, I considered the wisest thing to do was to cease all inter-
ceptions of whatever kind and so instructed my assistants.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you exhibit 39 of this investi-
gation-
Rear Admiral Matfield. I would like to add that later along —
the exact date I do not remember, but I believe after December
7th — the whole matter was satisfactorily straightened out and we
were again able to resume interceptions.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you exhibit 39 of this investiga-
tion, which has been previously identified as a transcript of the so-
called Mori conversation. Will you state whether that conversation
and transcript came to your attention and fully the circumstances
surrounding that?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 337
Rear Admiral Mattield. To the best of my recollection, a tran-
script of this exhibit was brought to me by Mr. Shivers on the morn-
ing of December 6th. I believe it was very late in the forenoon. We
discussed the transcript and were unable to determine that it did
have any definite or particular significance. It was thought desirable
to have Lieutenant Commander Carr [572] listen to the
recording and give us his further opinion as to the value of the con-
tents of the transcription before decision was arrived at as to whether
or not it should be reported to the Commandant of the District.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it brought to the attention of the Commandant
or to any other superior officer prior to the attack ?
Rear Admiral Mattield. To the best of my recollection, it was not.
Mr. SoxNETT. Do you know whether or not it was brought to the
attention of General Short prior to the attack?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I have no knowledge of that.
Mr. SoNNEiT. Referring, Admiral, to the transcript of the tele-
phone conversation between Mori and a person in Japan which you
have before you, it appears, does it not, that after a question from
Japan concerning the United States fleet and the number of ships
present, the person in Japan inquired what flowers or whether the
flowers were in bloom and that that question was answered by Mori,
who pointed out that poinsettias and some other flowers were in bloom ?
Rear Admiral Mattield. It does. The question from Japan asks,
"What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?" The
reply from Honolulu was to the effect that flowers in bloom were the
fewest out of the whole year, but that hibiscus and poinsettias were
in bloom.
Mr. Sonnett. When you studied that transcript on December 6,
1941, Admiral, did that particular portion of it come to your attention ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. It did.
Mr. Sonnett. What were your thoughts concerning it at the time?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. Our thoughts at the time were that it
was somewhat curious but that it was a disconnected conversation in
which Mori seemed to be somewhat at a loss, and, according to my
recollection, that was [673] the reason for our desire to study
it further and have Doctor Carr listen to the recording itself.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you have any knowledge at that time, or have
you now any knowledge, as to the establishment by the Japanese of
a code in which by the broadcast or trans-Pacific radio telephone
conversation references to flowers would signify movements of United
States ships from Pearl Harbor?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I think that is rather a complicated ques-
tion to answer, did I have then or do I have now.
Mr. Sonnett. Would the answer be different?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Let's make it did you have then ? Then we will ask
you the other.
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I did not have knowledge of any such
code at that time.
Mr. Sonnett. Have you knowledge of any such code at this time?
Rear Admiral Mayfield, Of my own personal knowledge of the
existence of such code, I have none. I mean I have heard or read
something about it, but then
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 23
338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, I think you might just state that.
Rear Admiral Matfield. I have heard or read something to the
effect that such a code may have been in existence. I have no per-
sonal knowledge of the existence of such a code.
Mr. SoNNETT. As to those portions of the transcription of the Mori
conversation, Admiral, which referred to the flying of airplanes daily,
what evaluation did you make of that inquiry at the time ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. My evaluation at that time was that such
information as to the number of planes or approximate number of
planes flying was a matter of common knowledge. They could be
seen and heard by any one.
[S74^ Mr. SoNNETT. Did you attach. Admiral, any particular
significance to the fact that the inquiry was made by a person then in
Japan ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. Not particularly, except that the whole
message seemed a bit queer and I desired to have a further study
of it made before making any report.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, there has been previous testimony to the
effect that some time during the summer of 1941 Admiral Bloch, on
the basis of some intelligence or information which he received, asked
Admiral Kimmel to establish an air reconnaissance on a sector towards
Jaluit. Do you have any information as to that reconnaissance or
the reasons for it?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I do not. Such matters were not di-
rectly in my sphere of activity.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, did you have any knowledge prior to the
attack of the establishment by the Japanese of a so-called "winds" code
and of any message which may have been received using that code ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I had not.
Mr. Sonnett. What, if any, conversations did you have. Admiral,
with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, Captain Layton, or Com-
mander Rochefort during the period November 27th to December 7,
1941, concerning the likelihood of war between Japan and the United
States?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I do not remember, nor do I believe, that
I had any conversations on this subject with Admiral Kimmel. I did
have conversations with Admiral Bloch and Commander Layton on
intelligence matters, with particular relation to counter-espionage
work, but I have no recollection of any statement to me that war was
imminent. I do recollect that we discussed the increasing tension,
particularly with relation to counter-espionage measures.
[5751 Mr. Sonnett. Were you advised of the receipt on Novem-
ber 27, 1941, of the so-called war warning?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. To the best of my recollection, I was not.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you have any conversation with any of the four
officers mentioned concerning the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor
by the Japanese ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. To the best of my recollection, I did not.
Mr. Sonnett. I have nothing further. Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. That is all. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 4: 15 p. m., adjourned until 2: 15
p. m., 6 July 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 339
[S76] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INOUIRY
TwENTY-nrTH Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the Gen-
eral Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, at 2:15 p. m.,
Friday, 6 July 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; ISIr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR ; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNE.
Captain Alwin D. Kramer, USN, was recalled as a witness and
was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, there has been testimony before this in-
vestigation that during the first week of December, 1941, you ex-
amined an intercepted Japanese broadcast which apparently used
the "winds" code words relating to Russia and that after your
examination of that, you stated that the broadcast was not a "winds"
code message, and that you threw the message into the wastepaper
basket. Do you recall any such incident?
Captain Kramer. I dont recall any specific incident of that kind,
but during that week and some days before that week, there were
literally hundreds of such so-called weather messages which were
actually simply weather broadcasts. We were getting thorough cov-
erage on Japanese plain language broadcasts, both kana and Roman
letter news broadcasts. They were coming in from various stations
by the hour, every hour. It threw a considerable extra burden on
our limited number of translators to scan those things, but neverthe-
less it was done religiously, looking for one of these "stop" messages
or an actual war warning message. Of those hundreds that we saw
during that week or ten days, those that were not applicable, of
course, we destroyed.
[677] Mr. Sonnett. I show you document number 2 of ex-
hibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, Captain, and ask you whether
that refreshes your recollection as to the receipt on the night of
December 4, 1941, of a message apparently using the words relating
to Russia.
Captain Kramer. I don't recall specifically having seen this,
though I well may have. It appears to be one in that category of
simple weather broadcasts.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, referring to the previous testimony con-
cerning the receipt of a "winds" code message relating to the United
States during the first week of December, 1941, since your last
testimony in this investigation^ have you obtained any additional
information concerning the receipt or non-receipt of such a message?
Captain Kramer. No first-hand information. Simply I do have
some more specific recollection of it than I did when the matter was
first broached to me at Pearl Harbor during Admiral Murfin's
340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
inquiry. That refreshing goes to the extent that I have already
testified about, namely, a positive recollection of having accompanied
the GY watch officer with a "winds" message to Commander Saf-
ford's office, at which point he carried the ball, taking it, as I un-
derstood, directly to Admiral Noyes, who was handling it by special
setup that he had for that type of message.
Mr. SoNNETT. And you have now no clear recollection, Captain,
as to which country the message referred to?
Captain Kramee. No positive recollection. It may have been any
one or all three of the nations covered by that Japanese code setup.
The fact that we jumped on the ball on that message, liowever,
would appear to me to have been applicable to at least England and
probably the United States as well, but I have no first-hand recol-
lection of it.
[S78] Mr. SoNNETT. Do you mean to imply, Captain, if you
found a message in that code relating to Russia during that period,
you wouldn't have given it as speedy treatment as you would if it
related to England and the United States ?
Captain Kramee. Of course, we would have, but there isn't the
slightest indication that the Japanese had any intention of attacking
Russia.
Mr. SoNNETT. Other than, of course, the FCC intercept telephoned
to Liuetenant Brotherhood on the night of December 4th, which ap-
parently related to Russia ?
Captain Kramer. That, however, was simply another weather
broadcast.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, after the attack on December 7, 1941, Captain,
and up to the time of your testimony before the Naval Court of In-
quiry, did you have any occasion to refresh your recollection as to the
existence of a "winds" code message?
Captain Kramer. None whatsoever. I did not testify before the
Roberts' hearing or before Admiral Hart. In other words, I was not
called on to t-estify regarding anything concerning Pearl Harbor until
the court of Admiral Murfin's.
Mr. Sonnett. Prior to your testimony before the Naval Court of
Inquiry, was vour recollection refreshed by any communication from
Captain Safford?
Captain Kramer. In the late fall of '43, he wrote me a personal let-
ter under classified mail, asking certain questions covering the events
leading up to Pearl Harbor in connection with what he stated was a
study he was making of the subject. I answered those specific
questions.
Mr. Sonnett. Prior to the receipt of that communication from
[S79] Captain Safford, had you any recollection of the circum-
stances surrounding the receipt of any "winds" code message during
the first week of December, 1941 ?
Captain Kramer. I had no occasion to recall such message. His
letter, however, did refresh my memory on that one of the middle of
the week.
Mr. Sonnett. And as of now, since you have testified previously
in the Naval Court of Inquiry and this and have refreshed your
recollection, I take it, to the fullest extent possible, your best recollec-
tion is that there was a "winds" message, but you cannot say with
certainty what the contents were?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 341
Captain Kramer. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Captain, to the so-called hidden -word
code, I show you exhibit 20 of this investigation, which contains a
certified photostatic copy of a Japanese message and a translation
of that message, and ask whether you recall having seen those.
Captain Kramer. Yes. on the morning of 7 December.
Mr. SoNNETT. The translation indicates that relations between
Japan and England are not in accord with expectations, does it not?
Captain Kramer. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is the Japanese word of code contained in the
exhibit which signified that relations were not in accord with ex-
pectations ?
Captain Kramer. I don't recall the exact Japanese nomenclature
used, but the phrase "not in accordance with expectations" is a literal
translation of the Japanese. It is typical of their way of talking in
certain locution.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you document 6 of exhibit 13 of this [680]
investigation, Captain, at page 2, and ask whether the Japanese word
in question is not there indicated to be hattorif
Captain Kramer. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. There has been, Captain, other testimony before this
investigation to the effect that the word hattoH correctly translated
meant that relations were on the verge of a crisis or perhaps that hostil-
ities were imminent. Would you say that translation is a correct
translation of the word?
Captain Kjramer. It is not a literal translation, which is the point
I just made. It can be inferred, however, and I have testified to that
effect previously, both here and before Admiral Murfin, that such
phraseology could have the implication of our words "relations are
reaching a crisis," with all its implications, that is, either a minor
crisis or a major crisis. In this case it referred simply to the fact that
negotiations concerning an understanding with the United States were
at an end or that relations were to be broken or it could even mean
that the crisis was so severe that war was imminent. But those were
all simply implications to be drawn as a matter of interpretation from
the Japanese text.
Mr. SoxNETT. The code in question, Captain, that is, the hidden
word code, was established by Tokyo, was it not, on November 27, 1941 ?
Captain Kramer. That is the date of this message, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And as of that time, of course, war with Japan was
expected by those in Naval Intelligence, including yourself, was it
not?
Captain Kramer. I wouldn't say that it was expected, no. There
was a definite crisis in the ofling, however. There was no indication
from this source, which is the source with which I mainly had to
deal — in other wards, I didn't see our other secret dispatches. There
was no 1581] slightest indication in this source that Japan
intended any overt act against the United States. There were positive
indications of a break with England in this traffic.
Mr. SoNXETT. Do you recall the receipt prior to November 27, 1941,
of intercepted Japanese communications indicating that the Japanese
Government had established a deadline for the completion of diplo-
matic negotiations and that unless successfully completed by the time
342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of the deadline, that things were going to happen automatically there-
after?
Captain Kramer. The deadlines were set for the latter part of No-
vember, initially around the 20th, and later delayed at the request and
insistence of Kurusu and Nomura until around the 25th or 26th of
November. A few days after that deadline there was a message from
Tokyo which directed their Washington envoys to continue the ap-
pearance of negotiation, which added up to the fact that from the
Japanese point of view the negotiations were de facto terminated.
There was a further positive indication at the end of November in a
message Tokyo sent to Berlin in which for the first time during 1941
they outlined the course of the negotiations with the United States
and used the phrase in that message which means, "Sooner than any
one imagines Japan will be at war Avith the Anglo-Saxons." That is
the closest there is in this traffic to anything indicating likelihood of
war with the United States, with, of course, the possible exception,
which I am unable to testify from first-hand recollection on, of the
"winds" message of the first week of December.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I show you documents 10 and 11 of exhibit
63 of the Naval Court, which are two deadline messages, and call your
attention to the following appearing in the second message: "This
time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed.
After \58ii\ that things are automatically going to happen."
I call your attention further to the fact that that message was trans-
lated on November 22, 1941. What did you understand by the sen-
tence, "After that things are automatically going to happen"?
Captain Kramer. This is the first time I have seen this one since the
date of dissemination, the 22nd of November, '41. My recollection is
a little vague on our interpretation at the time, but that it was intended
to mean — well, it intended to mean — that Japan was going to war
with us would be a little far fetched. It appears to be now.
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, would you say. Captain, that they intended to
mean
Captain Kra:mer. I might continue this. Undoubtedly it intended
to mean that a course of action or policy by the Japanese already
decided upon Avas intended to be carried out. Just what that con-
sisted of is a matter of interpretation or guessing.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were you familiar with any of the messages sent out
during November to the Pacific Fleet and elsewhere, indicating that
an attack by Japan on United States possessions was regarded as
likely?
Captain Kramer. I do have some slight recollection of being told of
such a message. That, however, was the type of message normally
originated by the War Plans Division or CNO and which I did not
see and had no hand in drafting.
Mr. SoisTNETT. Coming back. Captain, to the second deadline mes-
sage, to which we just made reference, would you say that the Japanese
intended to mean more merely than that relations between the United
States and Japan were not in accordance with expectations ?
Captain Kramer. That phrase "not in accordance with expecta-
tions" \583A^ should not be interpreted as mildly as the English
appears to indicate. It is simply a literal translation of the Japanese
phraseology, which can have more dire implications than the simple
English terminology.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 343
Mr. SoNNETT. Eef erring to document 6 of exhibit 13, which is the
message from Tokyo establishing the hidden word code, it appears
that it was translated by the Navy. Did you translate the message,
Captain?
Captain Kramer. One of my profossional translators did it, yes.
Mr SoNNETT "Was the translation reviewed by you ?
Captain Kramer. Normally all translations were reviewed by me to
a greater or lesser degree, depending upon who translated them as
well as the importance.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, referring to exhibit
Captain Kramer. As well as depending on the shape in which the
message arrived. Sometimes a badly garbled message would call for
more careful editing than one that was in good, clear text.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to exhibit 20 of this investigation. Cap-
tain, which contains the photostatic copy of the Japanese message
employing certain of the hidden code words, and to the translation
annexed thereto, reading, "7 December 1941. Relations between
Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations," I be-
lieve you testified previously that in the hurry of the morning of 7
December 1941, you saw the Japanaese message and while you were
about to leave to deliver other urgent messages, you hurriedly trans-
lated the Japanese message in the form in which it appears in this
exhibit, namely, that relations between Japan and England were not
in accordance with expectations, but that you did not note the word
minami which also related to the United States. Is that a correct
summary of your testimony ?
[S84^] " Captain Kramer. That is correct. I might amplify that
by stating that when the oversight was noted in reviewing the mes-
sages after returning from the State Department and Wliite House,
namely, about 12 : 30, I made some phone calls in that regard and
planned, as occasionally we had done in the past, sending around a
corrected translation. That procedure was not unusual, particularly
in the case of garbled messages of importance, of sending around a
first version. If a later better copy of a message was intercepted or
if in later editing a revised version of the translation was warranted,
a corrected trans 
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