PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOB ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
PIEST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A C0NC5URRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
BVBNTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 36
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the InTestigatioD of the Pearl Harbor Attack
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
1--^ JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAKL HARBOK ATTACK
CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION ■
PURSUANT TO
S. Con, Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 36
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of tlie Pearl Harbor Attack
united states
government printing office
79716 Washington : io4g
;
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLBY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel
Jule M. Hannaford, Assistant Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Pages
Transcript
Hearings
No.
pages
1
1- 399
1- 1058
Nov,
. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2
401- 982
1059- 2586
Nov
. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3
983-1583
2587- 4194
Dec.
5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4
1585-2063
4195- 5460
Dec.
14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5
2065-2492
5461- 6646
Dec.
31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946,
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
Jan.
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7
2921-3378
7889- 9107
Jan.
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8
3379-3927
9108-10517
Jan.
30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9
3929-4599
10518-12277
Feb.
7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
Feb.
15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11
5153-5560
13709-14765
Apr.
9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No. Exhibits Nos.
- 12 1 through 6.
13 7 and 8.
14 9 through 43.
15 44 through 87.
16 88 through 110.
17 111 through 128.
18 129 through 156.
19 157 through 172.
20 173 through 179.
21 ISO through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
IV
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATK^N PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
PQ S
CO
O =0
CO ^
CO o
£«
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5269-5291
3814-3826
3450-3519
""6089-5122
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149 t
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
"471-510"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
InvestiEjation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
1 1 "^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r 1 1 Tf CO 1
1 ICO 1 1 1 1 1 lOCO 1
1 : : ;;;;:; 1! 1 :::;;: I : rcL !
(S 1 1 ; ! 1 1 ! 1 '1 : ; 1 : '1 ; 1 1 1 ! 1 "^ i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
Ill 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |<N
, II 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7^
^ i i i : i i ; i i i i i 1 i i i i 1 i i i i i
Joint
Committee
Exliibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
"660-688"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
3105-3120'
2479-2491"
4022-4027"
148-186
2567-2580"
3972-3988
2492-2515
1575-1643"
3720-3749"
1186-1220
1413-1442"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
Juno 15, 1944)
Pages
""391-398"
"'115-134'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJan. 23, 1942)
Pages
203-209
1127-1138
1033-1038
1719-1721'
1219-1224'
"886-951'
1382-1399
""377-389"
1224-1229
"'314-320"
1
Allen, Brooke E., Maj
Allen, Riley H
Anderson, Edward B., Maj
Anderson, Ray
Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm
Anatcy, Alice
Arnold, H. H., Gen
Asher, N. F., Ens
Ball, N. F., Ens
Ballard, Emma Jane
Barber, Bruce G
Bartlett, George Francis
Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr
Beardall, John R., Rear Adm
Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens
Beatty, JFrank E., Rear Adm
Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm
Benny, Chris J
Benson, Henry P
Berquist, Kenneth P., Col
Berry, Frank M., S 1/c
Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen
Bicknell. George W., Col
Bissell, John T., Col
INDEX OF WITNESSES
lO o
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VI
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5080-5089
""3826-3838
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
163-181
"418^423"
"451-464"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
"87'-B"
205
'B223-224"
B65-66
B229-231
49-51
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
H
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
495-510
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
4125-4151
1695-1732
2745-2785
4186-4196
3190-3201"
1928-1965
3642-3643
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
179-184
""ios-iii'
96-105
74-85
"368-378"
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
478-483,
301-310
1171-1178"
1178-1186"
1659-1663,
170-198
"812-843,"
1538-1571
504-509
2-32'
365-368
1747-1753'
1
Craige, Nelyin L., Lt. Col
Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN)
Crosley, Paul C, Comdr
Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM)
Curts, M. E., Capt., USN
Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN
Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen
Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm
Dawson, Harry L
Deane, John R., Maj. Gen
DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm
Dickens, June D., Sgt
Dillingham, Walter F
Dillon, James P
DiUon, .John H., Maj
Dingeman, Ray E., Col
Donegan, William Col
Doud, Harold,' Col
Dunlop, Robert H., Col
Dunning, Mary J
Dusenbury, CarUsle Clyde, Col
Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN
Earle, Frederick M., W/0
Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN
INDEX OF WITNESSES
VII
4<
4.
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■* o
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<£>■
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ma
VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
r5 t^oio,-, gooeo(N
1 i i ;I i i i i ; i : i i i i i il;i^7 : iS^sss
i i i I i : i i i i i i i i i i " ■ i sis
Joint
Committee
Esliibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
428^32
414-417
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
2i2-2i3
ioo-ioi
182
"ioo-ioi"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944: July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
p- ' 1 ' ' '
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
;Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
1070-1076
46i-469
"763-772"
si 6-85 i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2030-2090'
3957-3971
"24i-274"
"207-246"
2934-2942
2260-22i4
1914-1917
'"745-778"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
4 i 7-430
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II III 1 1 1 1
IIIIIITjHIIIlOllCOlll llll
iiiiiil:^iilit>iit^iii llll
«iiiiiiiOiiiicOiii*iii llll
^iiiiii,-iilli^ii| III llll
^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 lOi 1 1 1 llll
Cli 1 1 1 1 1 iJh 1 1 1 i4 1 ICO 1 1 1 llll
iiiiiil^iiiicOii-<*iii llll
1 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 III llll
Hamilton, MaxweU M., State Dept
Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen
Harrington, Cyril J
Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator
Hayes, Phihp, Maj. Gen
Heard, WiUiam A., Capt., USN
Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA
Herron Charles D., Maj. Gen
HiU, William H., Senator
Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN_..i...
Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr
Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col
Hornbeck, Stanley K
Home, Walter Wilton
Howard, Jack W., Col
HubbeU, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr
Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN
Hull, Cordell
Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c
Hunt, John A., Col
IngersoU, Royal E., Adm
Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
IX
7V777'7'777 i ok
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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
o 1 1 1 1 1 1 OS CO ^-_ro 1 1
coi oo iiiiiiS;ioit
loiiiii'ocoiiiii £2;x<Mii
^iiiiiiT}*! iiiiiiiiiii^"3icii
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toiO iiiiiiCiTjH iiilliOil
CiOiiiii-lMCO 2St^i"
0,10 1 1 1 1 I lOO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i^^-H 1 1
ic iTf< iiiiiiiiii.o^ioii
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
541-553
182-292
"'140^142
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
103
107-112
186
219-222
102
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
2 ' ' ' '
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
904^918
628^643
"734-746"
""852-885"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2665-2695"
3028-3067
1161-1185"
2787-2802"
1014-1034
1678-1694
3226-3250
2362-2374"
2-54"
T. S. 2-52,
192-226
3126-3152
1816-1913
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
214^225
363-367
.Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
iiOii-iitMLOiiiiOiiiiTfiiiiiO i(M|05
1 iiO it^ iCOOi 1 1 1 CO 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 0 iiOQOiO
» 1 1 rt 1 rH 1 1 0 1 1 1 <N 1 1 1 1 10 1 1 1 00 iCO-^O
« , 1^ ,^ ITf^ 1 , ,^ 1 , 1 , 1 , , ,,_, , 1 5^^
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1 1 Tti 110 1 Oil 1 t^ 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 C55 ICO
iii-iii-ii OiiiiMiiii iiit^ 1
1
Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN
Ivroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen
Landreth, J. L., Ens
Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0
Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col
Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC
Lawton, WUliam S., Col
Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN
Leahy, William D., Adm
Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm
Lewis, Fulton, Jr
Litell, S. H
Locey, Frank H
Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA
Lorence, Walter E., Col
Lumsden, George, Maj
Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN
Lynch, Paul J
Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr
MacArthur, Douglas, Gen
Marshall, George C, Gen
Marston, Morrill W., Col
Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen
INDEX OF WITNESSES
XI
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XII
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5210
4933-5009
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1915)
Pages
""387-3S8"
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
CO —1 1 (Mil it^li
TjHii III iioo 1 coii it^ii
IJ5 I 1 111 1 IT 1 '^11 lei 1 1
t^-*^ I 1 1 1 1 1 ig ! i i i"^ i i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Cl:irke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
"5111 III III 1 1 ' ' 1 1 1 1
►^111 111 111 1 1 I 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
1 iiO 111 III •■-j-„-(M"n."(M 1 lo 1 1 00 00
1 i05 1 Zli2i2.°'^^^ 1 '^ 1 lOO
1 1 IT III 111 ^^^2;::: 1 iT 1 1? -
1 1 li 111 111 "ic^J^cii 1 li 1 li^
ll'^ 111 111 c^io§22ll'* ll^^O
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
• July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
1107-1100,"
1240-1252
3636^3640
2375-2398,
3990-3996
3153-3165
2323-2933
3885-3915
1968^1988"
1035-1070
778-789
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
147-169
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJaa.23,1942)
II II 1 1 1 1 .. 1 1 1 1
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a
Pettigrew, Moses W., Col
Phelan, John, Ens
Phillips, Walter C, Col
Pickett, Harry K., Col
Pierson, Millard, Col
Pine, Willard B
Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov
PoweU, BoUing R., Jr., Maj
Powell, C. A., Col
Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr
Prather, Louise
Pratt, John S., Col
Pye, William S., Vice Adm
Rafter, Case B
Raley, Edward W., Col
Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN
Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
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XIV
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR j^TIACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
: ; : 1 i ;2 : 1 ; ;'i : 1 1 ! i i :|s? :
« 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 '^11
*H||lNNnNi \m\
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
1 1 1 1 1 lo ! 1 1 1 1 icococ^ lo 1 1 1 1
iiiiii— iiiiiiicciooiiciii 1
«iiiiii-^l<iiiliiC0iOCDi^iii 1
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U,llllli00lllllit^-^OSl-^lll 1
COi COiOiOi-ifiii 1
Joint
Committeo
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 19H,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
1 1 1 1 1 1 los 1 1 1 1 !cD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 100 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1
1 i i i i i i iS i i i i :3 i i i i i i i
t. 1 1 1 1 1 1 lOO 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1
Joint
Committeo
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
1 i II i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lo 1 1 1 1
llll OS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lO
<! i i i i i i i i i i ij5 i i i i i i i i i
1 00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2722-2744
3120-3124
1989^2007"
2456-2478
134.5-1381"
910-931
3663-3665
3677-3683'
3750-3773
3357-3586"
2580a-2596
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
""279-288"
379^382
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJan.23, 1942)
Pages
1311-1329
496-499
1830-1842
1334^1340"
""247-259"
1525^1538"
1683-1705
S3
Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen
West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col
Whaling, William J., Lt. Col
White, William R., Brig. Gen
Wichiser, Rea B
Wilke, Weslie T
Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm
Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen
Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen
Wilson, Erie M., Col
Wimer, Benjamin R., Col
Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm
Wong, Ahoon H
Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR
Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN.
Woolley, Ralph E
Wright, Wesley A., Comdr
Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col
York, Yee Kam
Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN
Zucca, Emil Lawrence
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 149
[TOP SECRET]
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
A Further Inquiry Into the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor
ON December 7, 1941
Conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy, in accordance
with a precept, dated 2 May 1945, from the Secretary of the Navy
INDEX OF WITNESSES
'Name and rank Page ^
Smedbekg, William R., II, Capt 4
McCoLLUii, Arthur H., Capt 10
RocHEFORT, Joseph H., Capt 43, 541
Mason, Redtield, Capt 68
Fabian, Rudolph J., Comdr 68
Kaeig, Walter, Comdr 80
Kktxey, Welbourn, Lieut 80
OxTTicRBRiDGE, William W., Capt 87
Safford, Laurance F., Capt 97,529,609
Kramer, Alwin D., Capt 128, 576
Linn, George W., Lieut. Comdr 140
BegthEi'.hood, Francis M., Lieut. Comdr 143
Peeing, Alfred V., Lieut. Comdr 148
Freeman, Frederick L., Lieut 149
Notes, Leigh, Rear Admiral (extracts of testimony) 153
Reieirstad, Leo, Lieut. Comdr 158
CoNANT, Joseph M., Lieut, (jg) 158
Delany, Walter S., Rear Admiral 163
Laytox, Edwin T., Capt 182
McMoREis, Charles H., Vice Admiral 293
Smith, William W., Vice Admiral 335
Burr, Harold S., Comdr 376
WooDRL'M, Donald, Lieut 376
Powell, Carroll A., Brig. Gen., USA 387
Wilkinson, Theodore S., Vice Admiral 389
^?TREET, George, Civilian 411
Humphrey, Richard W., RM3c 414
Dyer, Thomas H., Capt 418
FixNEGAN, Joseph, Capt 424
HuBBELL, ]Monroe H., Lieut. Comdr 428
Murray, Allan A., Lieut. Comdr 433
Weight, Wesley A., Comdr 442
Earle, John B., Capt 451
UxDERKOFLEK, Oliver H., Lieut 465
Bblunger, Patrick N. L., Vice Admiral 471
Edgers, JMrs. Dorothy, Civilian 511
Friedman, William F., Civilian 515
Laswell, Alva B., Colonel, USMC 541
Woodward, Farnsley C, Lieut, (jg) 541, 597
Boone, Gilbert E., Lieut. Comdr 554, 607
Mayfield, Irving H., Rear Admiral 558
^ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figrues enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 2
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
Exhibit
No.
Description
Page 1 of
original
exhibit
where
Introduced
1
lA
2
3
4
9
10
11
12
13
14A
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Precept convening investigation
Modification of precept, directing report of findings and
conclusions
Narrative statement by counsel of previous Navy in-
vestigations
CinCPOA Weekly Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of
8 Dec. 1944, relating to the attacking force
A translation of a captured Japanese submarine chart,
showing courses and. location of U. S. ships in Pearl
Harbor
CinCPOA Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of 20 Oct.
1944, containing description of Japanese midget
submarines
ONI document "ONI 220-J, Japanese Submarines"
Berthing plan at Pearl Harbor, 7 Dec. 1941 (Ex. 60 of
Naval Court)
Photostatic copies of Coml4 and Coml6 dispatch esti-
mates of Japanese fleet location and movements, 26
Nov. 1941
ONI Bulletin of 1 Dec. 1941, Japanese fleet locations- .
McCoUum memorandum estimating situation as of 1
Dec. 1941
"Battle Report"
FCC radio intercepts regarding "winds" code (Ex. 65
of Naval Court)
Collection of intercepted Japanese dispatches
14B, 14C, 14D: Photostatic copies of captured Japa-
nese submarine chart, showing courses and location
of U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor
Collection of intercepted Japanese dispatches (Ex. 63
of Naval Court)
Copies of dispatches sent from RI unit, Corregidor,
regarding Japanese fleet movements
Photostat of captured Japanese submarine chart used
for Plate V of "Battle Report"
Log of conversation between WARD and CONDOR
on the morning of 7 Dec. 1941
Tentative copies of Communication Intelligence Sum-
maries, for 1 Nov. 1941 to 6 Dec. 1941, at Pearl
Harbor
Message from Tokyo establishing the hidden word
code
Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin of 27 Nov. 1941 con-
cerning composition of Japanese Navy
Daily Communication Intelligence Summaries, 14 Oct.
1941 to 5 Dec. 1941, prepared by Fleet Intelligence
Officer (Captain Layton) for delivery to Admiral
Kimmel
Memorandum of 1 Dec. 1941 from Fleet Intelligence
Officer to Admiral Kimmel, estimating Japanese ship
locations
Nov. 24th dispatch from CNO to CincPac (Ex. 15 of
Naval Court)
"War Warning" (Ex. 17 of Naval Court)
Layton Intelligence Reports from 6 Oct. 1941 to 2 Dec.
1941
Paraphrased copies of dispatches from various intelli-
gence agencies delivered to CincPac
1
602
2
5
12
17
21
22
31
56
60
66
75
83
91
103
135
185
194
211
238
247
259
264
' Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original
exhibit
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
INDEX OF EXHIBITS— Continued
Description
Page 1 of
original
exhibit
where
introduced
Memorandum from Fleet Intelligence Officer to Ad-
miral Kimmel regarding proposed Army aerial recon-
naissance of Mandated Islands
Intercepted Japanese consular dispatches delivered to
Fleet Intelligence Officer about December 10th
Two Japanese panorama views of Pearl Harbor with
Japanese log on reverse side, recovered from sub-
marine (returned to Captain Layton)
Photostat of Japanese log on reverse of exhibit 30
Translations of exhibits 30 and 30A
Panomara sketch of Pearl Harbor position five miles
south of Pearl Harbor, recovered from submarine
(returned to Captain Layton)
Photostats of exhibit 31
Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from
Japanese midget submarine (returned to Captain
Layton)
Photostat of exhibit 32
Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from
Japanese submarine, showing defensive installations
(returned to Captain Layton)
Photostatic copy of exhibit 33
Staff Instructions, CincPac, 1941
U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow Five (Navy
Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46)
Letter of 9 September 1941 from CNO to CincPac, ap-
proving Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five--
Letter of 25 July 1941 from CincPac to CNO, submitting
Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five
Photostatic copy of schedules setting forth utilization of
patrol planes of Pacific Fleet from 17 Nov. to 31 Dec.
and approved 22 Nov. 1941
Transcripts of intercepted telephone calls of Japanese
Consul and Vice Consul in Honolulu from October
to 2 Dec. 1941 (Consul's marked 38A; Vice Consul's
marked 38B)
Copy of intercepted "Mori conversation"
ONI Summaries of messages sent by Japanese Consul
in Honolulu from 1 Dec. to 6 Dec. 1941
File of work sheets on Jap diplomatic traffic (incorpo-
rated in other exhibit)
Paper showing part of decryption process of Japanese
"PA" code
Duty Officer, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, information
sheets
Extract from signal log of gate vessel of 7 Dec. 1941
• Extract from quartermaster's log of gate vessel of 7
Dec. 1941
Extract from log of Signal Tower, Navy Yard, Pearl
Harbor, of 7 Dec. 1941
Collection of documents, containing Annex VII, Section
VI, Joint Agreements, to Joint Coastal Frontier De-
fense Plan
Collection of dispatches regarding submarine contacts
at Pearl Harbor in November and Dec. 1941
Bellinger "Estimate of Situation"
Letter from ComTaskFor 9 to CinC, 20 Dec. 1941, on
reconnaissance prior to attack
Dispatches cited in exhibit 50
266
272
279
279
280
280
280
281
281
290
291
29S
295
297
297
368
379
382
385
420
421
430
430
431
432
457
461
474
481
482
801
802
804
804
804
805
805
805
805
805
805
806
837
869
871
872
872
908
911
933
935
935
937
938
938
938
942
946
953
95g
• Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original
exhibit.
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
INDEX OF EXHIBITS— Continued
Exhibit
No.
Description
Page ' of
original
exhibit
■where
introduced
51
52
53
54
55
56
56A
57
57A
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69-
70
71
72
ComTaskFor 9 letter of 22 Oct. 1941, file 0026
ComTaskFor 9 letter of 16 Jan. 1941
ComPatWing 2 letter to CNO, of 11 Dec. 1940
Watch and duty schedules of Patrol Wings One and
Two prior to attack
RCA Communications, Inc., statement, listing certain
Japanese cable messages from Honolulu in Nov. and
Dec. 1941
Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at
Honolulu, via RCA, among those listed in exhibit 55,
received by Navy 5 Dec. 1941
Pages 7 to 12 of exhibit 56, containing messages not
decrypted until after the attack
Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at
Honolulu, via RCA, among those listed in exhibit 55,
received by Navy after the attack
Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at
Honolulu, via RCA, received by Navy on night of 7
Dec. and subsequently translated
Collection of dispatches from Naval Communication
files relating to Japanese fleet movements and loca-
tions during the period 27 Nov. to 7 Dec. 1941
Collection of Japanese plain language news broadcasts..
Collection of memoranda relating to messages re-
ceived at Naval Communications in various Japanese
code systems
Memorandum of Naval Communications, surveying
work sheets processed by Navy of Japanese purple
system
Report from DIO, 14th N. D., to Director of Naval
Intelligence, of 19 Apr. 1942, relating to coded dis-
patch traffic of Japanese Consul General, Honolulu..
Certified collection of documents relating to anti-
torpedo baffles for protection against torpeao plane
attacks
Copy of Itr. from Secretary of W-'ar to Secretary of
Navy, dated 7 Feb^ 1941, relating to air defenses at
Pearl Harbor
CincPac secret letter of 7 Aug. 1941 relating to the
organization of the Orange fleet
Map showing the location of ships present at Pearl
Harbor on 7 Dec. 1941
Telephone log of radio unit at Pearl Harbor, showing
calls made and received on 7 Dec. 1941 as to Jap
fleet locations
Photostatic copies of memoranda relating to qustion-
ing of captain of Japanese captured submarine
Pacific Fleet Weekly Intelligence Bulletin for 11 June
1945, containing description of midget submarines
and method of transport to Pearl Harbor
Selected collection of Pearl Harbor dispatches, mis-
cellaneous subjects, taken from CincPac Head-
quarters
Collection of dispatches relating to proposed Army
reconnaissance in November of 1941
Collection of dispatches of Dec. 7 and 8, 1941, from
CincPac
483
484
488
496
542
544
600
550
601
555
555
556
557
569
602
603
603
603
603
604'
604
604
604
605
959
961
965
973
932
982
986
996
1004
1058
1068
1081
1084
1088
1126
1129
1130
1144
1145
1147
1151
1176
1205
1206
1 Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original
exhibit.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
INDEX OF EXHIBITS— Continued
Exhibit
No.
Description
Page' of
original
exhibit
where
introduced
Page
73
CincPac secret letter of 12 Dec. 1941 reporting damage
to ships at Pearl Harbor as result of attack and other
details. . _ -_ _ _
605
605
605
606
606
611
613
613
613
1213
74
75
76
77
78
Photostatic copy of War Diary of Com 14 from 7 Dec.
1941 to 1 Jan. 1942
War Diary of USS WARD; War Diary of 0-in-C, Net
and Boom Defenses, 14th N. D.; War Diary of USS
CONDOR; excerpts from diary of 0-in-C, Net and
Boom Defenses, 14th N. D., WARD, and CONDOR..
Photostatic copy of 1st and 2nd endorsements on Com
14 letter of 30 Dec. 1941 relating to early morning
submarine contact on 7 Dec. 1941
Collection of correspondence relating to combined
operating center for Army and Navy
Typewritten translation and copy of intercepted
Japanese communication contained in exhibit 20,
and notes relating thereto.
1266
1281
1298
1299
1305
79
Photostatic copy of page 44 of volume containing trans-
lations of files of operations orders, orders, memos,
and serials dealing with Japanese Navy plans, re-
covered from Jap CA NACHI _
1306
80
81
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theatre.
Collection of photostatic copies of ONI memoranda
dealing with organization and locations of Jap fleet
as estimated during November and up to Dec. 1,
1941
1306
1314
• Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original
exhibit.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
[/] PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIEY
First Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the ofnces of the Gen-
eral Board, Nav;^ Department, at 2 p. m., Monday, 14 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy, Investigating
Officer; Mr. John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
the Navy, Counsel; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold,
U. S. Naval Reserve, Aide to Admiral Hewitt ; Lieutenant John Ford
Baecher, U. S. Naval Reserve, Assistant to Mr. Sonnett; and Ship's
Clerk Ben Harold, U. S. Naval Reserve, Official Reporter.
The precept, convening the investigation, was read and is appended
hereto as "Exhibit 1."
Admiral Hewitt made the following opening statement:
The precept of the Secretary of the Navy appointing Admiral H.
Kent Hewitt, USN, to conduct further investigation into the facts
concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941,
will be marked "Exhibit 1" in the record of this investigation.
The Secretary's precept forwarded :
(A) Report of Commission appointed by Executive Order, dated
18 December 1941, to investigate the attack made by Japanese armed
forces upon the Territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941.
(B) Copy of Examination of Witnesses, ordered by the Secretary
of the Navy, 12 February 1944.
(C) Copy of record of proceedings of Court of Inquiry, convened
by order of the Secretary of the Navy, 13 July 1944.
The Secretary's precept provides, in part :
7. You are hereby detailed to make a study of the enclosures and then to con-
duct such further investigation, including the examination of any additional
[2] persons who may have knowledge of the facts pertinent to the said Japa-
nese attack, and to re-examine any such person who has been previously examined,
as may appear to be necessary, and to record the testimony given thereby. You
are authorized to obtain such documents relating to said attack as may be
required for inclusion in the record.
A study has been made of the enclosures. In this connection, a
narrative statement of the previous Navy investigations has been pre-
pared by counsel and is designated "Exhibit 2" in these proceedings.
I find that further investigation is necessary in order :
(A) to obtain the information now available concerning the com-
position and movements of the Japanese forces which attacked Pearl
Harbor on 7 December 1941 ;
(B) to obtain the information which was available at Pearl Harbor,
at Cavite, and at Washington, during the period 14 October 1941 to
7 December 1941, concerning the location, composition and move-
ments of Japanese naval forces, including: (1) examination as to the
activities of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor and the
information obtained by it, with particular reference to the location
8 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of tlie major portion of the Japanese carriers, to the loss of radio
contact with units of the Japanese Fleet on or about 1 December 1941,
and to the apparently erroneous belief that on 7 December 1941 the
attacking force was located south of Hawaii; (2) examination as to
the preparation of ONI bulletins, such as the bulletin of 1 December
1941; (3) examination as to the information furnished by the Navy
to the Army, at Washington and at Pearl Harbor, concerning Japa-
nese naval movements and loss of radio contact with Japanese units;
(4) examination as to information of Japanese navaF units obtained
by Army reconnaissance, with particular reference to the War Depart-
ment's directions to General Short, about 26 November 1941, to con-
duct reconnaissance to Jaluit, to the action taken, and to the question
whether Admiral Kimmel was advised of this ;
(C) to determine whether or not Japanese submarines operated in
and around Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December 1941, including: (1)
wdiether a captured Japanese map, as indicated in the Army Pearl
Harbor report, establishes that such submarines were in Pearl Harbor
before that date, or, as indicated in the book entitled "Battle Report,"
that the map was [3] made on that date and erroneously fixed
the positions of United States ships in the harbor ; (2) what submarine
contacts were made in or around Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December
1941; (3) according to "Battle Report," at about 0500 on 7 December
1941, a naval radio station on Oahu intercepted and logged a conver-
sation between the WARD and CONDOR concerning the sighting
of a submarine at approximately 0350. It should be determined what
was done about this and why were the net gates allowed to remain
open from 0445 until 0800 ;
(D) to obtain the information received in Hawaii through the inter-
ception of Japanese telephone and cable messages by the office of Naval
Intelligence, or so obtained by other agencies of the United States
Government or of other governments and communicated to the Naval
Intelligence at Hawaii ;
(E) to determine who obtained the intercepted Japanese messages
concerning ship movements, sent to and from Honolulu, which are
set forth in Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court's Record, and how, when,
and where they were obtained and decoded ;
(F) to determine the basis for the statement at page 6 of "Battle
Report" that "There were two powerful task forces sent against Pearl
Harbor, the major elements of one lurking just over the horizon from
its companion force to overwhelm any American attempt to engage
the invaders. The United States, too, had two task forces at sea, and
Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo."
(G) to determine whether or not there was a "winds code" message
relating to the United States. In connection with the "winds code"
message, it should be noted that according to Captain Safford the
last time he saw the message was when it was sent to the Roberts
Commission. It should be determined whether or not the message
was there or is there now ;
(H) to interview Admiral Wilkinson generally and with particular
reference to combat intelligence and to the "winds code" ;
(I) to interview Captain McCollum generally and with particular
reference to the "winds code" ;
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 9
(J) to determine what the origmal records show concernmg: (1)
Admiral Kimmel's approval of Annex VII to the Joint Coastal De-
fense Plan and the "Bellinger" estimate; (2) Admiral Kimmel's receipt
and evaluation [4] of copies of the Secretary of the Navy's
letter of 24 January 194:1, and the Secretary of War's reply; (3) Ad-
miral Kimmel's receipt and evaluation of the second letter from the
Chief of Naval Operations concerning air torpedo attack; (4) the date
when Admiral Kimmel approved the aircraft schedules which were
submitted covering employment of planes during the period 15 No-
vember 1941 to 31 December 1941 ;
(K) to determine what were the reasons for the air reconnaissance
which Admiral Kimmel directed on or about July, 1941, toward the
Jaluits.
In accordance with the Secretary's precept, having found that such
further investigation is necessar}^, the purpose of this proceeding will
be to examine persons having knowledge of the facts in question and
to obtain such documents as may be relevant thereto.
Counsel in this investigation will be John F. Sonnett, Special As-
sistant to the Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting in the investiga-
tion are Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNIl, and
Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNK.. The reporter at this meeting
is Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, was read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you give your name and rank ?
Captain Smedberg. William R. Smedberg, III, Captain, U. S. Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. What is your present duty ?
Captain Smedberg. I am the Assistant Combat Intelligence Officer,
Staff, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Admiral Hewitp. Will you give me the information that you now
have available and can testify to concerning the Japanese forces which
attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Smedberg. A Japanese prisoner wdio was captured on
Saipan [S] during the Marianas Campaign has given a very
complete account of the preparations and movements of the Jap Fleet
in the Fall of 1941, up to and including December 7, 1941. This
prisoner was a chief yeoman in the Japanese Navy, attached to the
Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, Admiral Yama-
moto. He has reconstructed the events preceding and leading up to
the Pearl Harbor attack. Much of the information given by this
chief yeoman has been substantiated and verified by other information
which we have received, and we believe the reliability which can be
placed on this information to be very high.
The best reconstruction can be found in the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, a confidential bul-
letin dated 8 December 1944, volume 1, number 22. This gives a very
complete story of the preparations for the attack and also gives a
reconstruction of the Operation Order, as I remember it, on which the
attack was based.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you submit a copy of this as an exhibit?
Captain Smedberg. Yes, sir.
(The Weekly Intelligence Bulletin referred to was received and
marked "Exhibit 3.")
1() CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This secret Operation Order is dated 1 November 1941 and starts
off with the statement that "The Japanese Empire will declare war on
the United States, Great Britain and the I^ etherlands," that "War
will be declared on X-daj^," and that "This order will become effective
onY-Day."
It gives the composition of the striking force, which sortied from
Etorofu To in the Kuriles on or about 27 November (all times used
here are East Longitude times and dates) and headed eastward under
heavy front before turning south to the attack.
[6] The late Vice Admiral Nagumo, who was then CinC 1st Air
Fleet, was in command and his force consisted of the six carriers
KAGA, AKAGI, SORYU, HIRYU, SHOKAKU, and ZUIKAKU;
two battleships, the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA; three cruisers, the
TONE, CHIKUMA, and ABUKUMA; elements of Destroyer Squad-
ron One, and about twenty submarines.
This document tells of the plan to coordinate midget submarine
unit attacks with the Main Fleet attack and states that the Sixth
Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within Pearl Harbor. The
Sixth Fleet was the Japanese submarine fleet. The submarine fleet,
according to the chief yeoman prisoner of war, had almost its entire
strength off the mouth of Pearl Harbor, with the object of attacking
those ships which attempted to escape from the plane attacks of
carrier divisions one, two, and five.
One of the documents which the prisoner previously referred to has
reconstructed from memory was a Combined Fleet Secret Operation
Order Number 2, elated 5 November, which stated that Y-Day. will
be 23 November. He also reconstructed Combined Fleet Secret Oper-
ation Order Number 3, dated 10 November, which stated, "X-Day
will be 8 December." (It should be noted that 8 December is 7 Decem-
ber Pearl Harbor date.)
From the prisoner's reconstruction of the original Secret Operation
Order Number 1, it was his belief, and he so stated, that the striking
force (carrier task force) would depart its naval bases or operating
areas about X minus 16 days and will proceed by way of Tankan
Bay, Etorofu Island in the Kuriles for Pearl Harbor, where it would
deliver a surprise attack.
It further stated that the commander of the surprise attack force
(submarine force), having the Sixth Fleet (submarine fleet) as its
main elementj will have most of the submarines leave the western
part of the [7] Inland Sea on X minus 20 day to attack Pearl
Harbor.
It is interesting to note here that the commander of this surprise
attack force was charged with carrying out reconnaissance before
the attack and also carrying out surprise attacks on enemy warships
with midget submarines. The prisoner states that the time for such
attacks was to be after the flights of planes have attacked Oahu.
There is on page 16 of the Intelligence Bulletin which we have been
discussing a copy of a captured track chart of the Japanese carriers,
covering the period, showing, among other things, the departure of
the carriers from their home bases, departure from Etorofu Island
on November 27th, arrival to the northwest of Oahu on December
8th (East Longitude time), and a retirement initially to the north-
west and then to the southwest. This indicates that the Jap aircraft
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 11
took off from their carriers about 200 miles due north of Oahu, and
this information checks with the document recovered from a crashed
enemy plane shortly after the raid.
Admiral Hewitt. There is reference in the exhibit just introduced,
and in other publications concerning the Pearl Harbor attack, to a
map which was recovered from a Japanese midget submarine, show-
ing courses and the location of ships inside Pearl Harbor. Can you
produce the original or a copy of this map and discuss it?
Captain Smedberg. I cannot produce the original. Admiral. My
division had not been formed up to the time of Pearl Harbor, and I
have asked that the records of the Japanese Section of the Far East-
ern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence be checked to see if it
can be located — without result. I have here, however, a copy, which,
I am assured by Captain E. S. Pearce, present head of the Japanese
Section of the Far [8] Eastern Division of ONI, was made
from the English translation of the Japanese chart taken from the
captured midget submarine. This chart indicates to me the courses and
times which the submarine captain laid down beforehand and hoped to
follow. He hadn't gotten into Pearl Harbor, as he later testified
after his capture, so that the chart could not have been prepared by
him either while in Pearl Harbor or after his emergence from Pearl
Harbor.
I leave you a cop}' of this chart as exhibit 4.
(The chart referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 4.")
Admiral Hewitt. What information can you give as to the charac-
teristics of the midget submarine?
Captain Smedberg. There are several descriptions of Jap midget
subs which have been developed from captured documents and pris-
oner of war interrogations, one of the best being found in Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Confidential Intelligence Bul-
letin of 20 October 1944, volume 1, number 15, a copy of which I will
bring to you for use as an exhibit.
(The Intelligence Bulletin referred to was received and will be
marked "Exhibit 5.")
The sum of the information on the midget sub used at Pearl
Harbor is that it was carried by and launched from a mother sub-
marine. The sub at Pearl Harbor was 41 feet in length and had a
reported cruising range of 175 to 180 miles maximum at its most
economical speed of 4 to 6 knots. The full details are available in an
Office of Naval Intelligence publication known as "ONI 220-J, Japa-
nese Submarines." I will obtain this document and bring it to you
for use as an exhibit.
[9] (The publication referred to was received and will be marked
"Exhibit 6.")
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know any information about whether
these two-man midget submarines were equipped with radio?
Captain Smedberg. The best information that I can recall on this
submarine which was used at Pearl Harbor is that it had no radio.
A much larger type midget submarine which Japan used one year
later had a high frequency radio with a range of about fifty miles,
but this sub was twice as long as the type used at Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Hewitt. Exhibit 60 from the Naval Court of Inquiry
record will be marked as an exhibit in this investigation.
12 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(The document referred to was received and market "Exhibit 7.")
Admiral Hewitt. Have you anything further, Captain?
Captain Smedberg. No, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Then, that will be all. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
Admiral Hewitt. That is all for today.
(The investigation was then, at 3:15 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m.
the next day.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 13'
im PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIKY
Second Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the Gen-
eral Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Tuesday, 15 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNE; Lieutenant
John F. Baecher, USNPv; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. State your name and rank.
Captain McCollum. Arthur H. McCollum, Captain, U. S. Navy.
Admiral Hewttt. Will you state the duties to which you were as-
signed in December, 1941, and the period preceding that?
Captain McCollum. I was Ofticer-in-Charge of the Far Eastern
Section of the Division of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department,
Washington.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you please give us the details of your duties
in that connection ?
Captain McCollum. My duties consisted of evaluating all forms
of intelligence received concerning the Far East, correlating it, and
advising the Director of Naval Intelligence and through him the Chief
of Naval Operations on political developments in the Far East and
all forms of information concerning the Japanese Navy and other
countries in the Far East and their defenses and state of preparation
for war.
Admiral Hewitt. What was the relationship of your unit wdth
Op-20-G, Captain Safford's unit?
Captain McCollum. Captain Safford's unit produced a source of
intelligence. Intelligence from that source was shown to me and was
one of our most valued sources of intelligence concerning the Far East.
Briefly, the intelligence [i7] received from that source con-
sisted of decryptions of secret Japanese code despatches, inferences
drawn from the analyses of Japanese radio traffic, and inferences
drawn from changes in procedure of Japanese radio traffic. There
was from time to time intelligence of this same general nature received
from non-Japanese sources, but the bulk of it was from Japanese
sources.
Admiral Hewitt. Concerning the location, composition, and move-
ments of the Japanese forces in general, what information or estimate
was received from and sent to the Pearl Harbor unit and to Cavite?
Captain McCollum. By the end of November we were almost
wholly dependent upon radio intelligence for information concerning
the location of Japanese naval forces, except those that were sighted
by our observation posts along the China coast.
The system for serving radio intelligence consisted of a three-point
system, one serving the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; one
serving the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet ; one serving the Cliief
14 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of Naval Operations at the Navy Department in Washington. All
intelligence derived from radio intelligence means in either one of
these three centers was passed through and back to these three centers.
In order words, information from radio intelligence sources available
in Manila were also available at Pearl and also available at Washing-
ton, and vice versa. That was passed as a matter of routine back and
forth among the three radio intelligence centers serving between the
three major command centers, Asiatic, Pacific, and Washington.
Admiral Hewitt. That applies not only to the information but also
to the inferences that they drew from them ?
Captain McCollum. Definitely. I am not so denite about decodes
of diplomatic traffic. I am not certain whether items concerning the
Japanese [i^] diplomatic traffic, that is, traffic in diplomatic
cyphers, was invariably available to all three or not. The volume of
that was very great, and, if I remember correctly, the principal head-
quarters for that type of traffic was here in Washington and, to my
mind, it is doubtful that all decodes of Japanese diplomatic traffic were
ever sent back out again. I don't think it was. I don't think it
could have been with the existing radio facilities.
Admiral Hewitt. I have here a series of photostatic copies of cer-
tain dispatches, which I submit to you for your identification.
Captain McCollum. I identify these. I have seen them.
(The photostats referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 8.")
Admiral Hewitt. Will you give us your comment on the salient
points of this exhibit?
Captain McCollusi. As I have indicated before, in general radio
intelligence consists of three distinct procedures. One is an actual
translation of the enemy's code despatch ; another is inferences drawn
from the volume of enemy radio traffic and its divergence from a
norm.
Admiral Hewitt. What you call traffic analysis?
Captain McCollum. That is traffic analysis. Another is from a
study of call signs, the ships' radio call, and so on.
Before Pearl Harbor we never had very good intelligence on Japa-
nese naval type messages from decryption. With the disappear-
ance of means which we had devised for keeping Japanese naval ves-
sels and naval movements under observation, such as reports by mer-
chant ships, reports by agents located in various ports in Japan and
on the Asiatic continent, reports by our consular authorities, which
all had been set up and was functioning — these sources [13]
whereby our radio intelligence could be confirmed from time to time
by actual visual sighting had disappeared by early November due to
a number of natural causes. One was the enforcement of our em-
bargoes against Japan, which in a very short period of time swept
normal merchant traffic out of the North Pacific so that by mid-No-
vember it is hardly too much to say that there were no ship movements
of any nature to and from Japan in the North Pacific. One other
point that we watched and carefully checked, had a world-wide system
for observing, was the world-wide movement of Japanese merchant
shipping in all the ports of the world. Due again to the operation of
our embargoes, the Japanese merchant shipping in the Americas was
gone. Due to the war in Europe, the Japanese merchant shipping
lines had been disrupted; so that source of intelligence had disap-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 15
peared. One other point, the Japanese progressive closing in of secu-
rity measures made it almost impossible for agents in Japan to get
information out of Japan that would be timely in a tactical situation.
So that by the middle of November it was apparent that so far as ob-
serving and locating the Japanese fleet were concerned, our major
dependence was perforce based on radio intelligence without the bene-
fit of check by visual observations from time to time.
As a result of this situation, this dispatch of the 24th of November
was sent out. It was intended to point out to our major commanders
that our information was unsatisfactory and that every effort had to
be made by using the one remaining instrument we had to determine
the location and direction of movement of Japanese naval forces.
As a result of this dispatch, we got the benefit of estimates of the
situation as it applied to the location and possible movements of the
Japanese fleet from both ComFOUETEEN and ComSIXTEEN.
These two addresses and the code system which was sent indicates
that this estimate was made [14] by the radio intelligence
organizations which went under that cover call in both of these places.
The estimates are virtually the same. They differ only in minor
degree. You will find that you had two task forces being organized
under the over-all command of Commander Second Fleet. One was
thought to be fairly well located in the general Formosa-Southern
Japan area; another was possibly in the Mandated Islands. There
was some discussion as to whether carriers were present with this lat-
ter force or not. That was one of the points of disagreement between
these two here.
Greater reliance was placed on ComSIXTEEN's dispatch because
physically he was in a much better position to intercept a larger vol-
ume of Japanese radio traffic than ComFOURTEEN was and his
radio intelligence organization was stronger in numbers and in conti-
nuity of operation than that of ComFOURTEEN.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, then, will you read the part of the
ComFOURTEEN message which relates to the possible task force
in the Mandates and then give me SIXTEEN's comments on that ?
Captain McCollum. This is ComFOURTEEN's :
There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in
the Marshalls which comprise AIRON TWENTY FOUR at least one carrier
division unit plus probably one third of the submarine fleet.
Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in South
Eastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.
Now, ComSIXTEEN in referring to that states as follows :
Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force and are in
Mandates X our best indications are that all known first and second fleet car-
riers still in Sasebo-Kure area.
[i<5] Admiral Hewitt. What were the dates of those ?
Captain McCollum. The 26th, sir; the 24th, which was our out-
going, and ComFOURTEEN's is 260110, November, sir, and
ComSIXTEEN's is 261331.
Admiral Hewjtt. Which would be 27 our time ?
Captain McCollum. Which would be about 27 our time. These
are all GCT, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Those are all GCT ?
16 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. ComSIXTEEN added to his gen-
eral evaluation of the situation that he considered the evaluation
reliable.
Admiral Hewitt. What further information on this subject was
received in Washington during the period from November 27th to
December 7th ?
Captain McCollum. Pursuing the directive issued, there ComSIX-
TEEN from day to day issued fragmentary reports concerning the
movement of such Japanese naval units as became apparent to him.
There was never received in Washington, to my knowledge, anything
that changed the general view of fleet organization and concentration
areas as set forth in those dispatches of the 26th.
Admiral Hewitt. It appears from i^rior investigations that on or
about December 1st radio contact with the Japanese forces was either
greatly diminished or was lost. Can you tell us anything about that?
Captain McCollum. If I might presume, sir, I don't think it is
exactly accurate to say that radio contact was lost. What occurred
was a change in the call signs and frequency allocations of the fleet.
In other words, presumably the communication plan of the Jap fleet
was changed at that time, which meant that a period of time must
elapse before we could build up identifications of specific naval units
based on call signs, and so on. In other words, the actual radios were
still going out, but we [16] couldn't get anything out of them
very much.
Admiral Hewitt. Then there was no perceptible diminution of
traffic?
Captain McCollum. Not that I know of. There are other people
possibly better qualified to advise you on that score than I am, but
my impression of what had occurred was what is generally known
as a general call sign change. In other words, the old call book went
out and a new one was eifective that date. There may have been some
differences in frequencies ; there probably were some two or three new
allocations. But some time would have to elapse before a radio in-
telligence organization would be able to draw inferences from mes-
sages intercepted.
Admiral Hewitt. That was a situation which had occurred previ-
ously, was it not ?
Captain McCollum. It had occurred from time to time previously.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you remember the approximate elate of the
previous change ?
Captain McCollum. No, sir, I do not. Normally in peacetime those
things do not change often, possibly every six months or every year
or so, but we had had partial changes from time to time as new task
organizations developed presumably in Jap forces, sir. It was a
shorter period of time since the last change to this change than had
occurred normally before.
Admiral Hewitt. As far as you know, had a change of that sort
ever previously accompanied a major movement by the Japanese such
as a movement to French Indo-China ?
Captain McCollum. No, sir. There had been minor changes in
that, but a wholesale change hadn't occurred for some time previously
to that that I remember now.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 17
[i/] Admiral Hewiit. As far as you know, there was no discus-
sion or concern about apparent radio silence of any major part?
Captain McCollum. There was concern not of the radio silence
but the fact that we had lost at this particular time an exceedingly
valuable source of intelligence which for the time being was going
to be much less valuable than it had been before. It wasn't possible
to connect at the time that particular change with that specific move-
ment, except that which had been outlined. We were certain at that
time there were reorganizations and regroupings of forces going on.
We knew that the Japanese fleet was ready for action. We knew that
it had been called home, docked and extensively repaired and was look-
ing for action. Therefore, it was interpreted, along with this other
stuff, as a possible indication of action to come.
Admiral Hewitt. Am I correct in stating, then, that as the intelli-
gence unit in Hawaii would have this same information as ComFOUR-
TEEN, therefore CincPac would be as well informed as to these
changes of radio calls and frequencies, and so forth, as you were in
the Navy Department?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. The ONI Bulletin of 1 December 1941 stated as
to Japanese naval forces : "Major capital ship strength remains in
home waters as well as the greater proportion of carriers."
(The ONI Bulletin referred to was received and marked "Ex-
hibit 9.")
Was that statement correct ?
Captain McCollum. This statement is correct, based on the best
intelligence available at the time. It was based on the intelligence
then available. At this late date I can't make a specific statement
as to the [18] exact time lag, but as I remember it, this state-
ment was based on intelligence that would be at least three to four
days prior to the date of the document itself.
Admiral Hewitt. What was understood by the term "home waters"
as used in that bulletin ?
Captain McCollum. This paper developed out of a scheme for keep-
ing track of the Japanese fleet which had been followed for a number
of years in the Far East Section of ONI, and the term "home waters"
was generally understood to mean the normal cruising grounds of the
Japanese fleet. That would roughly be west of the 180th meridian of
longitude and north of the southern end of Formosa and included the
Kurile Islands but not the Aleutians.
Admiral Hewitt. In your opinion, would the recipients of this bul-
letin, such as the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, interpret the term
"home waters" in the same way ? In other words, was that definition
of "home waters" generally known ?
Captain McCollum. Admiral, this paper was originally designed
for circulation within the Department alone. At various times from
1939 on Commanders-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had visited the
Department and on two occasions had expressed a desire for this docu-
ment. The general basis on which the document was prepared, and
the charts showing the delimitation of areas, was discussed with these
officers at that time, including both Admiral Richardson and Admiral
Kimmel. Whether the term was ever formally defined and a defini-
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, voL 1 3
18 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tion issued to the fleet, I doubt. If the term was ever formally
defined and issued to the fleet, I doubt. However, it was well under-
stood here in the Department and in discussions with officers from the
fleet at various times, the term was understood to mean the normal
cruising grounds of the Jap fleet. That is, north of southern Formosa,
[19] west of the 180th meridian, and including the Kurile Islands,
Admiral Hewitt. In this particular case, the information on which
the estimate was apparently based, Exhibit number 8, was that the
forces under discussion were generally in the Sasebo-Kure area.
Captain McCollum. The major battleship and carrier strength was
in the Kure-Sasebo area.
Admiral He^witt. So that, really in this case the term apparently
meant home waters in the home islands ?
Captin McCoLLUM. That is right, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What information, if any, was sent out to the fleet
after December 1st concerning the location and movements of Japanese
fleet units ?
Captain McCollum. The fleet, as I explained to you, had informa-
tion from radio intelligence as to fleet locations, had the same informa-
tion available to them as we had here in the Department. So far as I
am aware, no dispatch was sent from the Department specifically to
the fleet, calling attention to the location and movements of the Jap-
anese fleet. Such messages as they would have received would have
been common not only to the Pacific Fleet but to the Asiatic Fleet
and to the Department, and they consisted, after the 1st of December,
of reports of our observers on the China coast and of our naval forces
which had contacted a Jap task force moving south of Formosa in
the direction of Hainan and from there on farther south towards the
Kra Peninsula.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you tell me what was the system or whether
any one was specifically charged with the duty of dissemination of
information which was necessary to the major fleet commanders?
Captain McCollum. I can't answer that question specifically, sir.
[£0] The radio intelligence organization, as I have pointed out, cer-
tain of their information was passed automatically to the three centers.
The system in the Department at the time was that the Intelligence
Division, with the information it had available to it, prepared state-
ments of intelligence which were presumed to be factual, without mak-
hig an estimate of enemy intention. This statement of fact, or pre-
sumed fact, was submitted then by the Intelligence Division to the
Plans Division and to the Chief of Naval Operations, who made the
decision as to what, if anything, was to be disseminated to the fleet
Admiral Hewitt. "Wliat would be your own action in the case of
receipt of information which you considered to be of serious import ?
Would you attempt to call special attention to it?
Captain McCollum. I would. My responsibility was definitely to
bring that to the attention of my Director of Intelligence immediately
and to recommend most strongly to him that he take such action as I
deemed necessary further up, and in almost every case we had direct
access to both Admiral Turner, Director of the Plans Division, and
to the Chief of Naval Operations himself.
I might remark in that connection that on the 1st or December I
prepared an analysis of the situation as it looked to me at that time
which I submitted to Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Naval In-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 19
telligence, on the morning of December 1st. I had actually prepared
this the day before and had slept over it overnight. He took this up
and made an appointment for us to see Admiral Stark, and about
noon on the 1st Admiral Wilkinson took me into Admiral Stark's
office and I read this statement and made verbal comments on my
views on it, and both Admiral Wilkinson and I urged that a dispatch
of "warning be sent to the fleet at [21] that time. We were
assured at that time that such a dispatch had been sent on the 27th
of November which definitely included the term, "This is a war warn-
Subsequent to this, the situation further deteriorated and I recom-
mend to Admiral Wilkinson and we did send dispatches out to our
naval attaches and various naval agencies throughout the Far East,
directing that they destroy all their codes and ciphers, and so on and so
forth, and to affirmatively report when these had been destroyed.
That dispatch was sent so that the fleet commanders on the chain going
out and coming back would have the information that that order
had been issued. Some time after the 1st, possibly around the 4th, I
prepared this
Admiral Hewitt. That is a copy of the memorandum to which you
refer ?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 10.")
Captain McCollum. I took that, coupled with additional informa-
tion, and drafted the general situation up in dispatch form, which
I presented to Admiral Wilkinson with the recommendation that it
be sent. Whether that was sent or not, I do not know.
Admiral Hewitt. What information regarding the Japanese naval
forces was furnished to the Army during the period from October
to 7 December?
Captain McCollum. The Far Eastern Section of the Military In-
telligence Division had full information on the situation. We were
in daily consultation. I saw Colonel Bratton or one of his assistants
daily. They usually came to my office in the afternoon. They had
full access to my charts showing the location and movements of ships,
and they had full [2^] access to all of the radio intelligence
information available in the Xavy Department. That was given by
me personally and verbally and the situation discussed from day to
day with officers of the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelli-
gence Division in the War Department, and that had been true for
some months past. We made no major move, for instance, such as
withdrawing our naval language officers from Japan or sending a
dispatch out to destroy all codes and ciphers, and so forth, as we did
to the naval attaches and other places, without notifying my oppo-
site number in the War Department what we intended to do.
Admiral Hewitt. That was Colonel Bratton?
Captain McCollum. That was Colonel Bratton, or his assistant,
who, I believe, at the time was Colonel Pettigrew. The people who
had access to that stuff in detail were Colonel Bratton, Colonel Petti-
grew, and Colonel Dusenberry, I believe.
Admiral Hewitt. Would the like apply to the information which
the Army received from their sources? Was that made available to
you?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir, so far as I know, sir.
20 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Hewitt. What, in general, sources of information did the
Army have?
Captain McCollum. The Army had information from their usual
attaches and observation posts such as they had in the Far East, and
the Army also had a radio intelligence organization which produced
certain information along this same line.
Admiral Hewitt. Which confirmed, in this case, your own infor-
mation ?
Captain McCollum. The Army had nothing to do with the Navy
systems. They didn't touch the Jap Navy systems. They were do-
ing work on Japanese diplomatic ciphers at that time and some minor
Japanese Army system. They [£3] weren't so well developed
or anywhere near as good as our naval radio intelligence service at
the time. But any information that they got through their services,
as far as I am aware, was made available to me through Colonel
Bratton's office in the War Department.
Admiral Hewitt. As I understand it, there was no particular
organization or system for effecting cooperation between your organi-
zation and the Army organization other than the mutual unofficial
relations you established ?
Captain McCollum. Those relations were unofficial, but they had
the official sanction and approval of both the Director of Naval Intel-
ligence and of the Director of Military Intelligence, Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, I think he is called, who were both not only glad of
that mutual confidence and trust and exchange of information, but
thoroughly encouraged it.
Admiral Hewitt. AVhat information have you concerning the
movements of Japanese submarines ? What information can you give
me concerning the movements of Japanese submarines in and around
Pearl Harbor on or prior to December 7th ?
Captain McCollum. I remember nothing specific, except we had
suspected for some time that Japanese submarines were keeping our
fleet based in Pearl Harbor under observation. At various times
through the preceding six months there had been reports of contact
by our destroyers on Japanese submarines. At one time, I think it
was in July or August, we actually suggested a search of a certain
sjDot in the ocean to the north of Midway where we believed that a
Jap provision ship and tanker might be rendezvousing with Jap sub-
marines who were observing our fleet movements. It was felt here,
and I feel that it was felt in the fleet, that our movements were
124] under Japanese submarine observation.
Admiral Hewitt. What was the nature of these contacts ? Under-
water sound by destroyers?
Captain McCollum. They would be underwater sound by de-
stroyer and sighting of a periscope and that sort of thing.
Admiral Hewitt. Sighting of a periscope ?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. Wliether it was actually a periscope
or not, I don't know.
Admiral Hewitt. Were any of them well authenticated ?
Captain McCollum. One or two seemed to us at the time to be fairly
well authenticated.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you remember the general location of those
contacts ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 21
Captain McCollum. Most of them weren't close in to Honolulu, but
one contact, if I remember correctly, was made in Molokai Channel
somewhere off Lahuna Roads — most of this is memory — in the ap-
proaches to and from the drill grounds of the fleet from Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Hew^itt. I have here two charts which have been submit-
ted as exhibits which purport to be reproductions in translated form
of a chart which was'taken from a Japanese midget submarine which
was stranded on the north side of Pearl Harbor. One is in a Pacific
Fleet Intelligence Bulletin and the other one came from another
source. They appear to be generally the same, except that as to the
captions in English, if you will notice, off Ford Island to the eastward,
one of them sajs, "Attack and sink enemy ship"; in the other one it
says, "Enemy ship sunk," and there are similar differences.
I would like to have you examine those and from your knowledge
of the Japanese lang-uage give us your ideas on that. What I have
in mind [^^5] generally is whether this is a record of an actual
trip by a submarine or whether it might have been an attack plan
with points marked at which certain actions should be taken. The
oriofinal is not available to me.
Captain McCollum. This, in the Pacific Fleet Bulletin dated 8
December 1944, I don't remember having seen before. This other
chart, marked "secret" here, is a translation of a photostat, later backed
up b}^ the original, of a Japanese chart which, to the best of my belief,
was recovered from, a Japanese midget submarine that was sunk in the
East Loch. I remember the original quite well and went over it per-
sonally, together with the best translators in the Far East Section of
the Division of Naval Intelligence, and it was my opinion at the time,
and it is my opinion now, that this was an attack plan. In other words,
this thing here was the planned scheme that the submarine commander
was going to utilize in making his entry to Pearl Harbor.
(A cop3^ of the book "Battle Report" was received and marked
"Exhibit 11.")
Captain McCollum. Take, for instance, the four Japanese ideo-
graphs appearing in the photostat in the book "Battle Report." I
point out these four ideographs here._ In the Japanese language the
tense of verbs is shown in general — there are exceptions — by append-
ing the ka7ia symbols which indicate the tense. Wliere the ideograph
alone is used it is not possible to determine the tense of the verb. Here
you have only four ideographs, which might be translated present,
past, future, or imperfect as the situation might warrant, because there
are no kmia symbols here showing the tense of the verb. It is not
possible to infer from this as to whether this is past tense or future
tense. The words "attack and sink enemy ship" [£6] in Ex-
hibit 4 are a literal translation. It is impossible to make a literal
translation in English without an English indication of tense. The
best you can do is to take each word for its value and put it down. In
this particular instance (referring to Exhibit 4), the word "and" is
interpolated.
Admiral Hev/itt. You stated that to the best of your knowledge
this came from a submarine which was sunk inside the Loch. The
other exhibit, the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin, makes the state-
ment that this was taken from a midget submarine which was stranded
on the north coast of Oahu. Could there have been two charts ?
22 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. One from one submarine and tlie other from
another ?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir, I think so, but it would have been
most unusual had they been exactly the same.
Admiral Hewitt. Unless they were attack plans.
Captain McCollum. That is true.
The stuff that is run in circles is stuff that was pencilled notations,
if I remember correctly. In other words, there was a distinction made
here (referring to Exhibit 4). In other words, what I am calling to
your attention here is you will notice certain of these things are circled,
like this (indicating). It is circled on this other chart (referring to
Exhibit 11). I think that those circles represent pencilled notations
by the submarine commander. In other words, he had his plan and
these notations were aid memoirs in assisting him in carrying out
this plan.
Admiral Hewitt. I notice here (referring to Exhibit 11) several
characters appearing in heavy black
Captain McCollum. Well, sir, that may be the way they are repro-
duced. These "are hand-written characters here (indicating), written
in by hand and [27~\ not by printing. They are both printing
and typewritten stuff. Now this stuff here (indicating) is hand-
written by the man himself.
Admiral Hev/itt. Can you tell me what this (indicating) is about?
Captain McCollum. I am not much good at this translation any
more, sir. I wouldn't venture a translation of that for you, sir. I can
get it done for you and check it, but I am not very good at this any
more. This first two is Hawaii. It is something about ships anchor-
ing off at certain times in Hawaii. I think, sir. In other words, ships
are sometimes anchored off in this general area or genferal direction
(indicating) . That is not shown on this (referring to Exhibit 4) .
Admiral Hewitt. One more question on this exhibit (referring to
Exhibit 4) . With respect to the times which are noted, the turning
point and arrival and so forth, there is a question in my mind whether
it relates to some zone time or whether it may be based on an H-Hour
for an attack, if it is an attack 'plan. Can you give me any comment
on that ? If it were a dawn attack, it wouldn't be Honolulu time.
Captain McCollum. No, sir. If it were any one of the standard
times at all, it would be Item time. All the Japanese Navy runs on
Item time, which is Tokyo time. That is standard' or has been standard
in the past. The impression that I have from this is that it is time
based on a zero hour.
Admiral Hewitt. Have you any information as to the probable
source of the other map, in the Intelligence summary, which differs ?
Captain McCollum. No, sir, I haven't.
Admiral Hewitt. Now we go back to the communication questions.
We have here Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court record, which contains
certain decrypted communications. Can you tell us how they were
obtained, decoded, evaluated, and distributed ?
[£8] Captain McCollum. These that I see here are decrypted
copies of Japanese diplomatic and consular dispatches. These dis-
patches were received in the Navy Department from the intercepting
stations in a variety of ways, some by direct transmission in the origi-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 23
nal by radio, others telegraph, and others by mail. AVhen they arrived
in the communication intelligence center, Navy Department, they were
decoded and translated. A nmnber of copies of the translations were
made, and books containing these translated dispatches were made up.
Those books were distributed by officer messenger to the Chief of
Naval Operations, Secretary of the Navy, Director of War Plans,
Director of Intelligence, Chief of Far Eastern Section of Naval In-
telligence, within the Navy Department, and the Naval Aide to the
President. A complete book was also taken by officer messenger to
the Secretary of State. Another complete books was taken over and
shown to the Far East Section of the Military Intelligence Division
of the Army and by them was distributed to the Secretary of War,
Under Secretary, and Chief of Staff, War Plans Division of the Gen-
eral Staff, and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and, I think, to the
head of what they called the Intelligence Branch of G-2, which was
the Foreign Intelligence Section. The book, in whole or in part, went
to the President, depending on what the Aide to the President thought
about it.
Admiral He^vitt. Now will you discuss the question of the "winds"
code and the messages using that code, the dispatch which previous
testimony indicates you prepared and which was allegedly not sent?
Captain McCollum. I don't quite understand your question.
Admiral Hewitt. I would like to have you discuss the subject of the
'•winds" code, what it was, the messages that were received using the
code.
[29] Captain McCollum. All right, sir. If we may lead up a
little bit, by the latter part of November it was apparent that the
Japanese were doing a great many things, that they expected that war
with the United States, Great Britain, or both might possibly break
out at any time, and that they were taking every possible step to make
sure that their intelligence organization and their diplomatic repre-
sentatives would be well advised. One of the schemes for this was
to use a Tokyo weather broadcast, which was normally with the ordi-
nary voice news broadcasts that came out from the commercial or
so-called commercial radio stations at Tokyo from time to time. There
was a message setting forth that by arrangements of using this
weather code and for having the thing repeated in certain sequence in
a broadcast, that in one instance it meant war with Russia ; in the next
instance it meant war with England, and another one was that it meant
war with the United States. Those were the three possibilities.
Admiral Hewitt. Was that war or a break in diplomatic relations ?
Captain McColluim. Well, a break in diplomatic relations. Instead
of war, the term used was, "In case relations are in danger," "danger
of cutting off our diplomatic relations." There is the verbatim trans-
lation ; in Japanese this says, "In case there is danger of cutting off
our diplomatic relations." The system followed that they used, a
term which was a smooth translation and in important cases the exact
rendition followed that in parenthesis. That was the Navy's system.
The Navy translators did that, in general.
Admiral Hewitt, Read that here (indicating), for instance.
Captain McCollum. (Referring to Document 15 of the Exhibit)
"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)
and the cutting off of international communications, the following
24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
warning will be [30] added in the middle of the Japanese lan-
guage daily short-wave news broadcast."
There is another dispatch (referring to Document 13 of the Exhibit) .
This (indicating) is circular 2353; this (indicating) is circular 2354.
It was another code. He coded it differently. It is a different message.
This says, "When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous,
we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general
intelligence broadcasts."
Admiral Hewitt. In your opinion, that is merely a different trans-
lation of the same phraseology?
Captain McCollum. No, sir, I think it is different phraseology in
the Japanese. In other words, I think that two different messages
were sent out, and possibly more, by the Japanese Foreign Office, which
may have been and probably were phrased differently in the original,
which gave differing translations on this answer.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know whether the actual message con-
taining the phrase which indicated the emergency with any particular
country was actually transmitted?
Captain McCollum. About the middle of the week 1-7 December,
the Federal Communications Commission reported the occurence of
one of the words in a Japanese news broadcast from Tokyo which
indicated war with Russia. In studying the message at the time, it
did not appear that this was a bona fide warning in the terms as set
forth. It did not appear in the proper sequence and proper number of
times in the broadcast, as I remember it, and it was thought at the
time that this was a bona fide weather report which happened to use
the code word for Russia. I know of no message receive prior to the
attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December which indicated [31]
tliat diplomatic relations with the United States would be ruptured.
After the attack on Pearl Harbor had been made, either late afternoon
of the 7th, Washington time, or some time on the 8th, a dispatch was
translated which indicated war with England. I think you have got
some exhibits on that point there.
(Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record was received and
marked "Exhibit 12.").
This is the Federal Communications Commission dispatch which I
referred to. It is Document number 2 Exhibit number 65.
Admiral Hewitt. That, in your opinion, is a bona fide weather
report ?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir, I think so. We don't have the ver-
batim Japanese of this thing about Russia here, but the translation
would indicate that it was other than as given here. For instance,
all this in here [indicating] is exact. Now, this translation indicates
that "Tokyo today, north wind slightly stronger, may become cloudy."
You see, there is too much in there. This is an abbreviated sort of
an imperative form used here. And besides, the announcer in this
thing starts out by saying, "This is in the middle of the news, but
today especially I will give a weather broadcast at this point." I
mean this is what he says in this [indicating].
The Document number 2 is from the Federal Communications
Commission, which came verbally to me and later on the thing written
out, which was from a plain language broadcast and it was our opinion
at the time, considering all of the facts, that this was probably a
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 25
bona fide weather broadcast and not the warning signal. If it were
the warning signal, it [32] would have applied to Eussia.
The Document number 4 of Exhibit 65, which was transmitted
between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, was the "winds" code
message announcing dangerous diplomatic relations with England.
The wording used in there meant Japan-British relations.
That is what is shown on Exhibit 12.
Admiral Hewitt. You have no knowledge of any message trans-
mitted which indicated the breaking of diplomatic relations with
the United States?
Captain McCollum. Not in the "winds" code, no, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you have it in any code ?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. By afternoon of Saturday, Decem-
ber 6th, a very long diplomatic dispatch was coming in to the Japanese
ambassador at Washington. On the morning of — that is Washington
time — December 7th, I was on duty in my office in the Navy Depart-
ment when the last parts of this very long diplomatic note were trans-
lated. Following this, a dispatch was translated, instructing the
Japanese ambassadors to present this note to the Secretary of State
at 1 o'clock, Washington time, December 7, 1941. The context of the
diplomatic note as contained in the dispatch which the Japanese
ambassador was directed to present to the Secretary of State indicated
a discontinuance of the negotiations between Japan and the United
States, with the strong inference that diplomatic relations would be
ruptured.
(Referring to Documents 38 and 89 of Exhibit 63 of the Naval
Court of Inquiry record). This first one doesn't make any particular
impression. There had been so many of these things along this line,
including telephone conversations backward and forward, that we
Iniew something was coming. And on the fourteen-part message, all
hands were up all night, working on it to [33] get it through.
Admiral Hewitt. That was the night of the 6th-7th ?
Captain McCollum. That was the night of the 6th-7th, yes, sir.
By late Saturday night, we had, if I remember correctly, thirteen of
the parts. They were transmitted, almost as soon as received, to the
Secretary of State, to the President, to the Chief of Naval Operations,
and to people over here in the War Department.
Early Sunday morning, when I arrived to take over the duty in my
office, where we had a special watch set since early November, the
fourteenth part was coming in ; and while Admiral Wilkinson and I
were discussing the situation about 9 o'clock Sunday morning, or
possibly earlier, nearer 8 : 30, with Admiral Stark, the instruction
which directed the delivery of the note to the Secretary of State
was brought in, shown to Admiral Stark, who immediately called
the "Wliite House on the telephone, and the draft was taken over to
the Secretary of State and to the White House. At the time, the
possible significance of the time of delivery was pointed out to all
hands.
Admiral Hewitt. You are referring to the 1 p. m. delivery time?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. In other words, it was pointed out
that 1 p. m. Washington time would mean about 8 o'clock in the
morning Honolulu time.
Admiral Hewitt. 7 : 30.
26 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain McCollum. 7 : 30, yes, sir, and very early in the morning
out in the Far East, that is, out in the Philippines and those places ;
and that we didn't know what this signified, but that if an attack
were coming, it looked like the timing was such that it was timed for
operations out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii at the time.
We had no way of knowing, but because of the fact that the exact
time for delivery of this note had [34-] been stressed to the
ambassadors, we felt that there were important things which would
move at that time, and that was pointed out not only to Admiral
Stark, but I know it was pointed out to the Secretary of State.
I was present and assisted in pointing it out to Admiral Stark and it
was taken over, with instructions to point that out, to the Secretary of
State. I was not present at that. I do not know. I would add, how-
ever, that the Secretary of State was not available at the time that the
Japanese ambassador desired to deliver their note, and it is my recol-
lection in the discussion at the time with the Chief of Naval Operations
and his admirals in there that that was a deliberate move on our part.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you remember who it was delivered the mes-
sage to tlie Secretary of State and the White House?
Captain McCollum. No, sir, I do not, but it was probably Lieutenant
Commander, now Captain, Kramer. I can't say that for sure because
some of these things Admiral Turner himself would run over to see the
Secretary, or Captain Schuirman would run over. The normal routine
would have been for Kramer to have delivered it.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall who was present when
Captain McCollum. Yes. May I elaborate a little bit ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
Captain McCollum. By mid-November the situation in the Far
East had appeared so acute that in addition to the usual duty watches
in the Division of Naval Intelligence, one of the three regular officers
assigned to the Far East Section — that is, Commander Watts, Colonel
Boone and myself — was constantly on duty in oiir offices, with adequate
office help, on a twenty-four hour basis.
I arrived at the Navy Department about 7 :30 or a quarter of eight
[SS] Sunday morning, December 7th, to take over the watch from
Commander Watts. Shortly after my arrival in the Navy Depart-
ment, Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Intelligence, arrived and
sent for me and we had a discussion concerning the situation in the Far
East. After fifteen or twenty minutes of the discussion, we received
word that Admiral Stark had arrived in the Navy Department and both
Admiral Wilkinson and myself went down to talk to Admiral Stark.
At that time he was alone. While we were in there discussing the
situation with Admiral Stark, various officers of the Division of Oper-
ations came into the office. I belicA^e Admiral Ingersoll was present.
Admiral Brainard, Admiral Noyes, Admiral Turner, and possibly Cap-
tain Schuirman. Tliere may have been others; I don't know. Cer-
tainly, Admiral Turner and Admiral Ingersoll yere present. Whether
they were present all the time, I do not know. There was considerable
going in and out at that time.
About 9 o'clock or a little earlier, I received word from the outside
room that one of my officers wished to see me urgently and I stepped
outside and received the last part of the message, concerning the final
note to be delivered on the United States by the Japanese ambassadors.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 27
Admiral Hewitt. The last part of the lon^ message ?
Captain McCollum. The long message. And the dispatch directing
its presentation on the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock Washington time.
1 held a short discussion with Lieutenant Commander Kramer as to
the significance at the time, and he it was who pointed out the times at
Honolulu as 7 :30 and in the Far East as dawn, and so on.
Admiral Hewitt. Before dawn. Wouldn't that be before dawn ?
Captain McCollum. Before dawn, yes, sir. That would be about
2 o'clock in the morning oiit there.
[36] I took that in to Admiral Stark and pointed out the possible
significance of the time in conjunction with the note, and it was also
pointed out to other officers of the Division of Operations who were
present at the time. Admiral Stark talked over the telephone, I think,
with the Chief of Staff of the Army, who presently came over with
Colonel Bratton. I was not there the whole time, and later on I came
back in and by 10 o'clock that morning we were given to understand
that a warning message had been sent to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, via Armj^ channels. In other words, the warning was to
go to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, with
instructions to transmit it to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, to go back to the "winds" code message,
there has been other testimony in prior inA'estigations that you, about
the 4th of December, prepared a long warning message to CincPac and
CincAsiatic, summarizing the significant events up to that date and
quoting the "winds" message. Can you tell us anything about that?
Captain McCollum. I did draft in dispatch form a general sum-
mary of the Far Eastern sitiiation, indicating the probability that dip-
lomatic relations might be ruptured at almost any time. I do not
remember specifically quoting any "winds" message or referring speci-
fically to a "winds" message in that dispatch. Normally I should not
have done it as that would have been passed over all radio intelligence
channels rather than the type of dispatch I had formulated, which was
in effect a cumulation of the situation, the moves made by the Japanese
and an estimate of the probable enemy reaction or probable Japanese
reaction to the situation.
Admiral Hewitt. It embodied
Captain McCollum. Yes. In effect it embodied the contents of my
[37] memorandum of the 1st of December, plus such additional
factors, such as the sighting of the Jap task force, and so on, which we
had at the time.
Admiral Hewitt. You say you submitted that draft. What hap-
pened to that ? Was the message sent ?
Captain McCollum. Well, sir, that draft, I don't know. That draft
was submitted to Admiral Wilkinson and before a thing of that sort
left the Navy Department, it had to be passed on by higher authority.
I do not believe that it was sent, but time passed and I am not certain
as to what became of it.
Admiral Hewitt. You say you submitted that to Admiral Wilkin-
son?
Captain McCollum. That is correct, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you remember what his comment or reaction
to it was ?
28 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain McCollum. I think he tried to get it out. As a matter of
fact, hindsight now, or recollection, I am quite sure that he tried to get
it out.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you have any particular conversation with
Captain Safford with respect to that ?
Captain McCollum. I don't remember having a conversation wholly
on the subject of the "winds" code. Safford and I discussed certain
aspects of radio intelligence from time to time because when I was un-
clear on the possible meaning or interpretation to be placed on some-
thing from the radio intelligence viewpoint, I made it a custom to go
down and see Safford and talk to him about it.
And as I say again, this "winds" message was a definite message, but
it was only one of various other communications we had. For instance,
we had a message directing the Japanese intelligence chief for the
Americas [38] to clear out of the country. We had another
message directing the consuls to burn all their papers. We had con-
stant messages regarding the presence of our ships in West Coast ports.
All of those we had. The Japanese had for some years, until the Divi-
sion of Naval Intelligence had been successful in breaking it up, a sys-
tem of reporting United States naval movements out of the West Coast
ports. That was done through the consuls, and starting in November
the number of messages coming in showed in effect, "For goodness sakes,
get these reports in promptly," and caused some note to be taken of
them.
(Referring to Document 40) This was a sample of a routine report
made by Japanese consuls throughout the Americas on the location
and movement of United States warships.
(Referring to Document 46) This document wasn't available be-
fore December 7th, nor, to my memory, was one couched in quite such
urgent terms transmitted to any other consulate in the United States.
However, it was evident from a study of general messages sent to
Japanese consuls, particularly in our West Coast ports, that the Japa-
nese were particularly anxious to learn the location and movements of
our naval forces on the West Coast.
Admiral Hewitt. How about Hawaii ?
Captain McCollum. Hawaii we didn't have in that detail yet. We
had some, but the general instruction covering Hawaii would cover all
the rest of it. The general instruction went out in a general circular
and Hawaii would be included.
These dispatches were to come — the one referring to ship movements
and location is under date of 18 November 1941. It is a routine war-
ship report from the Consul General at Honolulu to Tokyo, presum-
ably intercepted [39] by the radio intelligence organization
which translated it. It was translated on the 6th of December 1941.
This message must have been transmitted by the Japanese Consul
General in Honolulu and therefore originated at that station. It is
not possible to tell from the exhibit whether this dispatch was physi-
cally acquired in Honolulu or at one of the various intercept stations
located in other parts of the world.
Admiral PIewitt. What information can you give me on the in-
terception in Hawaii of Japanese telephone and cable messages by
ONI and the FBI or otherwise?
Captain McCollum. I know very little about that subject, sir. The
ONI had been making an effort to get a workable arrangement with
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 29
the telephone and cable companies, which, as I remember it, "was only
partially successful. Both the Federal Communications Commission,
so far as I am aware, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation came
much later into this field than we were, and, so far as I am aware, made
no serious effort to obtain this type of intelligence until a very brief
time before the outbreak of war with Japan.
Admiral Hewitt. Is'nt it a fact that there was a law which forbade
the commercial companies from furnishing that information?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Are there any other facts bearing on this ques-
tion that have not been previously mentioned, that you think would
be of assistance to me ?
Captain McCollum. I think. Admiral, that you have all the facts.
I would like to venture some observation of the general organiza-
tion of intelligence as it operated in the Navy before the war with
Japan and substantially as it is operated todaj' that I am not certain
in my own mind [40] are quite clear to people that might
read the records.
The ONI was not an omnipotent and over-all intelligence center
for the fleet as a whole. It operated primarily as an intelligence
center for the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy Department;
equipped to supply combat type of intelligence, which prior to out-
break of war is nearly ahvays closely related with diplomatic nego-
tiations. Each of our major commanders in the Pacific was equipped
with a staff of intelligence and with a radio intelligence staff which
served him directly. With the exception of more static types of
intelligence, such as the design of a Japanese battleship, and so on,
your combat intelligence was designed to function in the Navy De-
partment to advise the Chief of Naval Operations, at Pearl Harbor
to advise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, through his fleet
intelligence officer, and out in the Philippines
Admiral Hev/itt. May I interrupt you for a moment? You say
at Pearl Harbor to advise the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet. I
think you have mentioned before it was attached to the Commandant
of the FOURTEENTH Naval District.
Captain McCollum. It was attached to him, sir, but actually the
function was to advise CincPac. Similarly, such personnel were
administratively attached to ComSIXTEEN, but they worked opera-
tionally directly under CincAsiatic.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. Go ahead.
Captain McCollum. And in the Asiatic Fleet, which in some re-
spects, from an intelligence point of view, was our strongest organiza-
tion, to keep the CinC, Asiatic Fleet, advised.
The Division of Naval Intelligence, in addition to that, did try to
set up certain over-all intelligence agencies in foreign countries which
would [4-?] produce intelligence. In each case in the Asiatic
Theatre those intelligence agencies operating out there were made
known to the CinC, Asiatic Fleet, and their reports in every case
funneled to him and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Our
naval attaches, for instances, were under orders to submit copies
of every report that they made bdth to the Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic Fleet, and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as well
as to the Department. So, you had in effect a three point system
30 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in which combat intelligence common to any one of them was com
mon to all the others, with each Commander-in-Chief supreme in
his own area. And that is essentially the way it was functioned
throughout the war.
Admiral Hewitt. What would be the responsibility of the Asiatic
unit, for instance, to insure that intelligence wliich they received
was disseminated to the other commands ?
Captain McCollom. They would be guided in that by the policies
of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, as in turn they would be
guided by the over-all policy of the Chief of Naval Operations.
In general, that was for the Asiatic Fleet to keep CincPac and the
Department informed. In other words, they went right up the
chain of every one in the Pacific into the Department and it worked
back the other way.
Admiral Hewitt. The Office of Naval Intelligence was well or-
ganized apparently for the collection and evaluation of intelligence.
What means were used to disseminate the intelligence?
Captain McCollitm. Reports were disseminated by letter, in book
form, and by dispatch. In February, I think it was, of 1941 the Divi-
sion of Naval Intelligence, if it had ever had the authority, didn't have
it after that date of issuing estimates to the fleet of probable enemy
intentions. [4^] That was considered to be a function of the
higher echelon of command within the Department, and the Division
of Naval Intelligence was restricted to presenting what appeared to be
the facts of a situation for determination of what a prospective enemy
might do by higher authority within the Navy Department.
I might add, sir, some time prior to that, to be perfectly frank with
you, we had here from time to time issued a memorandum of just
what we thought about the situation. About February, 1941, that was
done away with and that stuff had to be cleared through Plans and,
I think, through Admiral Ingersoll.
Admiral Hewitt. 1941 ?
Captain McCollum. Yes, sir. Now, we continued from time to time
to prepare stuff, but a lot of things there, who prepared it and who
put out estimates of probable enemy intentions weren't clear to the
Division of Intelligence.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 4: 20 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m.
the next day.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 31
m PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIEY
Third Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the Gen-
eral Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Wednesday, 16 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's
Clerk Ben Harold, USNR
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. State your name and rank.
Captain Rochefort. Joseph J. Rochefort, Captain, U. S. Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. From about 15 May 1941 to about the end of
1941 you were in charge of communication intelligence, assigned to
the FOURTEENTH Naval District?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. As we understand it, there were two other com-
munication intelligence units, one in the Far East at Cavite and the
other in Washington, D. C.
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir, insofar as the Navy is concerned.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes, I am speaking of the naval communication
intelligence units.
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Who was in charge of the other units ?
Captain Rochefort. The unit in Washington was in charge of Cap-
tain E. F. SafFord, and the unit in Cavite was in charge of R. J. Fabian.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you tell me what in general was the mission
and scope of each ?
^4] Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. The mission of all three
stations was in general to exploit all cryptographic systems employed
by foreign powers and to develop what was then known as radio intel-
ligence but is now known as traffic intelligence organizations, and to
develop radio direction finder nets.
Admiral Hewitt. That was the general mission ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Wliat was the scope of each of those units ? What
was each one supposed to cover in area or in type of traffic or what ?
Captain Rochefort. During the latter part of 1941, the station at
Pearl Harbor was assigned the specific tasks of attacking personnel
code, administrative code, the code in use in the Marshalls Islands area,
and to exploit those systems. They were also directed to conduct re-
search on all Japanese naval systems except the five-numbered system.
Cavite was charged with the exploitation of information contained
in diplomatic systems and in five-numbered system.
The station in Washington was charged with the general control of
all three plus Japanese diplomatic systems and such other systems as
might have been directed by higher authority.
32 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Hewitt. As head of this unit, to %Yhom were you responsi-
ble for your work, the Navy Department, the FOURTEENTH Naval
District, or the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
Captail RocHEFOKT. My orders to that duty read to report to the
Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District. I assumed that
he was my immediate superior and I made all reports, other than
purely technical reports, to the Commandant.
Admiral Hewitt. What in general was the relation of your unit to
[4S] the District Intelligence Officer and the Fleet Intelligence
Officer?
Captain Rochefokt. The relationship with the District Intelligence
Officer was on the basis of a frank and over-all exchange of informa-
tion and views on a personal basis other than any information ob-
tained from ultra sources. The relationship with the Fleet Intelli-
gence Officer was to exchange all information available and to en-
deavor to obtain information as desired by him.
Admiral Hewitt. You have stated in your previous testimony that
your unit consisted of an interception unit, direction finder unit, and a
cryptographic research group. You will explain what each of these
are and how it functioned and who was in charge of each.
Captain Rochefort. The station at Pearl Harbor consisted in the
main of an interception unit which was stationed at Aiea radio sta-
tion in charge of Chief Radioman Langf ord ; a mid-Pacific direction
finder net with stations at Dutch Harbor, Samoa, Pearl Harbor, and
Midway. These were controlled in Pearl Harbor under the supervi-
sion of the then Lieutenant Commander Huckins. The decryption
Unit was responsible for the attack, exploitation, translation, and dis-
semination of all intercepted traffic. I was in direct charge of that
section as well as directly in charge of all sections.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, you stated in your previous testimony that
your sources of information, in addition to the work of your own unit,
were the other two combat intelligence units and other government
agencies, such as the FBI, the Army, and the FCC at Honolulu. You
also stated that the information furnished by these latter agencies was
of no value prior to December 7th, and stated before the Court of
Inquiry that the collaboration of these agencies was on a personal basis.
Will you explain what the [46] relationships were with the
FBI, the Army, the FCC, and the other intelligence agencies with
whom you dealt ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. With regard to the FBI, I met with
Mr. Shivers, the agent in charge, on frequent occasions and discussed
the general situation, particularly pertaining to Japanese in Hawaii,
but did not discuss any ultra matters. Mr. Shivers on his part kept
me informed as to what he was doing, possibly with some limitations.
The relationship with the Army dealt primarily with the G-2, Col-
onel Fielder, and was similar in nature to that carried out with the
FBI.
The relationship with the FCC was limited to technical matters,
particularly those pertaining to direction finding, location of unau-
thorized stations, and other similar matters.
Admiral Hewitt. Your relationship with the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, did that include matters concerning getting infor-
mation from commercial transmissions, telephone and cable ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 33
Captain Rochefort. No, sir. The reason for that was, sir, that the
FCC was not authorized to handle any ultra and I knew from personal
experience that all matters pertaining to the acquisition of traffic were
handled by the Washington unit.
Admiral Hewitt. You stated before Admiral Hart that any mes-
sage originating in one of the communication intelligence centers was
automatically sent to the other two, and before the Naval Court that
at Pearl Harbor they received all information of a technical nature
from Washington. I would like to ask you what information was so
received during October, November, and December, that is, from the
other combat units and from Washington.
Captain Rociiefort. I could not state in detail, sir, every message
because I do not have the files, but a typical message would be the
receii)t [47] of the so-called "winds" message from Cavite
on or about November 27th and the receipt from Washington of the
frequencies then employed by the Japanese in making voice broad-
casts. By "winds" message, I mean the message which established the
procedure for indicating war.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know of any intercept of any message
using that so-called "winds" code?
Captain Rochefort. What we referred to as the execute or the
message indicating war based on the code established in the "winds"
message has not been seen by me and I have made an exhaustive
search into all available records and can find no trace of any execute
of the "winds" message prior to the evening of 7 December Washington
time.
Admiral Hewitt. That message related to war w4th England, did
it not?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Was Pearl Harbor monitoring for that execute?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. Shortly after the receipt of the
message from Cavite previously referred to, we received a dispatch
from Washington directing us to establish a listening watch on the
most likely frequencies. I thereupon sent four language officers to
the intercept station at Aiea, where they covered on a twenty-four hour
basis one or more frequencies in addition to all the known broadcasts
from Tokyo. Results were nil.
Admiral Hewitt. With respect to your estimate of the location of
the Japanese fleet on November 26th, you stated before Admiral Hart
that it was your opinion that at least two Japanese carriers were at
that time in the Marshalls area. What was the basis of that estimate ?
Captain Rochefort. The estimate was arrived at after mature con-
sid- [4S] eration by the three or four officers best qualified
in the Pearl Harbor unit and embraced their considered opinion,
considering all tlie traffic which they had studied and including the
results of their past experiences with the Japanese in such operations
as the Hainan occupation the previous year. It was based entirely
on radio intelligence.
Admiral Hewitt. I hand you Exhibit 8. Will you identify those ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes. I don't recall this one (referring to
the first dispatch). I do not recall the receipt of this message from
OpNav to CinCAF, ComSIXTEEN, Chungking, Shanghai, Tokyo,
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 4
34 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and CincPac, 242239. I might have seen it, but I can't recall it.
This (referring to the second dispatch) I identify as the so-called
estimate by ComFOURTEEN, 260110, and I recognize the dispatch
from ComSIXTEEN, 261331.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, with respect to ComFOTIRTEEN's dis-
patch of the 26th, which was based on your estimate, you testified be-
fore Admiial Hart that the Commander-in-Chief and Commander
FOURTEENTH Naval District came to your office and discussed
the matter at great length, at least for an hour and a half, and in
answer to a question from Admiral Hart as to whether you recalled
the disagreement vrhich came to you from the other unit in the east
and was likewise communicated to the Commander-in-Chief, you
stated that you were almost positive that it was by reason of the fact
that all messages of that type were given to the Commander-in-Chief.
Wliat was said during the discussion between the Commander-in-
Chief, ComFOURTEEN, and you at that time in discussing that
situation ?
Captain Rochefort. In general terms, the Commander-in-Chief
wished to know the basis for the estimate, why we placed certain units
in certain areas, wished to know the distinction or difference between
the estimates of ComFOURTEEN and ComSIXTEEN, and what our
opinion was regarding the [49] location and direction of
movement of the "various Japanese forces. ComFOURTEEN also
inquired about the same information. Each point, as I recall, was
discussed in some detail by both admirals in my office. To the best
of my belief, that would be the 27th of November.
Admiral Hewitt. Was that before or after the war warning?
Captain Rochefort. I am quite sure it was after the receipt of the
war warning. My reason for saying that was, as I recall, the Com-
mander-in-Chief wanted to know what Washington's reaction was
and my reply was apparently the war warning or something of that
nature, but that was their reply.
Admiral Hewitt. I assume, then, you saw the war warning.
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir, I did see the war warning. That is,
the war warning of the 27th, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. How many carriers did the Japanese have at that
time ?
Captain Rochefort. They were generally considered as having
seven, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What was your estimate as to the location of the
other Japanese carriers, that is, after you placed two in the Mandates?
Captain Rochefort. We did not know, sir, where they were.
Admiral Hewitt. And that lack of knowledge was communicated
to Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What conferences. Captain, did you have with
Admiral Kimmel after November 27th and prior to December 7th and
who else was present and what was said at those conferences?
Captain Rochefort. There were several conferences in my office
[50] at which the Commander-in-Chief and the Commandant were
present to discuss what information our unit had available and to elab-
orate upon our daily summaries of location and disposition of Japanese
forces.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 35
Admiral Hewitt. Can you summarize in general terms the infor-
mation and deductions that were made as to the movements of the
Japanese fleet during the period 27 November to 6 December ?
Captain Eochefort. The communication intelligence summaries as
prepared by the ComFOURTEEN unit during the period 27 Novem-
ber to 6 December, inclusive, contained the following information :
(A) The fact that a large task force commanded by the CinC
Second Fleet and whose composition was fairly definitely established
and whose destination was likewise fairly well established.
(li) Several other items, including on 27 November the fact that
there was no further information regarding the presence of CarDiv
Five in the Mandates and that an air unit in the Takao area addressed
a dispatch to the SORYU and SHOKAKU.
It was further stated on November 27th that carriers are still located
in home waters.
On 28 November it was stated that there was no indication of move-
ments of any combined fleet units and that CinC Second Fleet was
particularly attentive in his dispatches to CarDiv Five and Seven.
On 30 November it was stated that the only tactical circuit heard
was one that the AKAGI and several Marus, and that CinC Second
Fleet sent a dispatch which included the HIYEI as an addressee,
which indicated that that vessel was a member of the Second Fleet
task force.
It was also stated on 30 November that the presence of a unit of
plane guard destroyers in the Marshalls indicated at least one carrier
in [51] the Marshalls, although this was not confirmed.
On 1 December all service radio calls were changed, and that this
indicated an additional progressive step in preparing for active opera-
tions on a large scale.
On 1 December, referring to carriers, a notation was made "no
change."
On 2 December from inconclusive evidence it appeared as if there
might have been a split or division in the normal or combined fleet
staff and that these might be two supreme commanders with
staffs; also a complete lack of information in regard to carriers, and
that despite the partial identification of 200 service calls, not one
carrier call had been located, which was a new low ebb.
On 3 December there was no information on submarines or carriers.
Also, on 5 December it was stated that there was no traffic from
the commander carriers or commander submarine force.
On 6 December it was noted that CinC combined fleet sent several
messages to the carriers, to the Fourth Fleet, and other major com-
manders. Commander submarines originated two messages, which
were his first since 1 December. He was believed to be definitely in
the Marshalls.
Admiral Hewitt. Captain, referring to Exhibit 3, which is a U. S.
Pacific Fleet Weekly Intelligence Bulletin of 8 December 1944, at page
13 you will find a statement of the composition of the Japanese forces
which attacked Pearl Harbor. Is that description of those forces
accurate, to the best of your knowledge ?
Captain Rochefort. It is accurate, to the best of my knowledge.
Admiral Hewitt. It was a fact, Captain, that the AKAGI was one
of the carriers in the force which attacked on December 7th, was
it not?
36 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Rochefort. Yes.
[S2] Admiral Hewitt. And also the SHOKAKU?
Captain Rochefort. Yes.
Admiral Hewitt. And tlie battleship HIYEI was also in that force,
was it not ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes.
Admiral Hewitt. Referring to the daily summaries of intelligence
information in your unit at Pearl Harbor during the period 27 No-
vember to 7 December 1941, Captain, what references do you find
to those three ships?
Captain Rochefort. On 27 November the communication intelli-
gence summary stated that an air unit in the Takao area addressed a
dispatch to the SORYU and SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located
in home waters.
On 30 November the statement was made in the above-mentioned
summary that the only tactical circuit heard was one that the AKAGI
and several Marus.
On 30 November it was stated that the CinC Second Fleet sent a
dispatch which included the HIYEI as an addressee and which placed
the HIYEI as a member of his task force.
Admiral Hewitt. In the light of later information, to what extent
are the statements made in that intelligence bulletin correct?
Captain Rochefort. In the light of later information, it appears
that the statements made in the answer above were correct or could
have been correct, except the one in regard to the HIYEI.
Admiral Hewitt. Caj)tain, what is the significance to be given to
the tactical dispatch which was, according to your information, sent
to the AKAGI on the 30th of November 1941 ?
Captain Rochefort. Normally whenever tactical circuits were
established within units of the fleet, it signified that an operation, such
as [o3] a fleet problem or a maneuver, was about to begin or
had already commenced.
Admiral Hewitt. What was your procedure. Captain, for dissemi-
nating this tjq^e of information between 27 November and 7 Decem-
ber and who received the information ?
Captain Rochefort. Copies were airmailed to the other communi-
cation intelligence units. Information considered to be of great im-
portance was sent by radio to the other communication intelligence
units. A copy of the communication intelligence summary was sent
to the Fleet Intelligence Officer daily during the early afternoon, ac-
companied by a trained RI officer for any discussions which the Fleet
Intelligence Officer had wish to conduct.
Admiral Hewitt. You stated before Admiral Hart that between
November 26 and December 7 very little radio information was ob-
tained by means of radio intelligence due to the lack of traffic. That
lack of traffic, as I understand it, was not over-all, but was lack of
traffic from ships at sea. Is that correct ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir, except as noted in the communication
intelligence summary, the volume of total traffic remained about the
same or increased, but the traffic which contained as an addressee or
as an originator one of the major units or major vessels was almost
non-existent.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 37
Admiral Hewitt. And some of the actual traffic, as I understand it,
consisted of repetitions of old messages which might, in the light of
later information, have been padding, is that correct?
Captain Rochefoet. Yes, sir. There was perhaps a certain amount
of padding or repeating of messages, but in our opinion at the time,
and our opinion today, of all of the trained RI personnel, there was no
attempt on the part of the Japanese to practice radio deception in
any of its forms.
Admiral Hewitt. You also stated in your previous testimony that
[54] 5^our unit did not assume that because you did not hear from
the large Japanese ships or units that they were all in port and that
it occurred to your unit that this silence definitely presaged another
offensive movement and that this was called to the attention of the
Commandant and the Fleet Intelligence Officer. That is correct?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What information was received concerning this
lack of traffic and its significance from the Far Eastern unit?
Captain Rochefort. I do not recall any specific message or messages
from the Far Eastern unit and therefore believe that any messages
they may have sent us in all probability added nothing to the picture.
Admiral Heavitt. What was the reaction of the Commandant and
the Fleet Intelligence Officer to this question of lack of traffic?
Captain Rochefort. Both officers were concerned and enjoined us
to make every effort to at least estimate or ascertain the location of
the missing units.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you recall on what date this was brought to
their attention ?
Captain Rochefort. I would say, sir, it was brought to their at-
tention almost daily. It was brought to their attention daily by means
of the communication intelligence summary and in addition to that
by telephonic conversations.
Admiral Hewitt. Did Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel or Cap-
tain Leighton know that on a prior occasion when similar traffic con-
ditions existed it preceded the advance and occupation of Hainan?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Did they make any comment to the effect that
this [55] might indicate another offensive movement?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir, I think it was generally agreed that
there was a definite offensive movement by every one connected with
the fleet or with my organization. The only error made was in the
direction.
Admiral Hewitt. In other words, they probably connected that
with the other indications of a large movement to the south?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. There was an air reconnaissance toward Jaluit
which was ordered by Admiral Kimmel in July, 1941. Have you any
information about that?
Captain Rochefort. No, sir, I have no information about any air
reconnaissance on Jaluit.
Admiral Hewitt. What was the relative period of silence prior to
the Hainan operation as compared with the period of silence which oc-
curred prior to December 7th and how was the first period of silence
evaluated by the intelligence unit?
38 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Rochefort. About the same, and the evaluation at the time
of the Hainan occupation included the statement of occupation of
Hainan.
Admiral Hewitt. The ONI Bulletin of 1 December 1941 stated that
the major portion of the Japanese carriers was in home waters. Did
you see this between December 1st and December 7th ?
Captain Rochefort. No, sir, I did not see any ONI estimate dated
1 December prior to 7 December.
Admiral Hewitt. Apart from the information of the movement
of Japanese naval forces and apart from the information from Ja-
panese telephone or cable messages, what other intelligence did you
receive during the period 1 December to 7 December 1941 ?
IS6] Captain Eochefort. Apart from telephonic, sir?
Admiral Hewitt. Excepting the Japanese telephone or cable mes-
sages.
Captain Rochefort. We received several messages from the Wash-
ington and Cavite units pertaining to the destruction of Japanese
cryptographic systems. We also received a report through the District
Intelligence Officer that the Japanese consulate in Honolulu was burn-
ing its papers and presumably cipher systems. This information was
passed on to all concerned.
Admiral Hewitt. The book "Battle Report" states that the United
States shortly before 7 December 1941 had two task forces at sea
and that Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo. What do you
know about that?
Captain Rochefort. To the best of my knowledge, Tokyo was not
informed of the presence at sea of the two task forces ?
Admiral Hewitt. Now, v/ith relation to the communications with
which the Japanese consul general at Honolulu was concerned that
you previously testified you had received about 1 December and of
which some, which you were able to decode prior to the attack, were
unimportant, and others were decoded after — how did you receive
those communications ?
Captain Rochefort. They were received from an officer messenger
from the District Intelligence Officer's office. I did not know, nor did
I inquire, as to how he had obtained them.
Admiral Hewitt. What communications were the}'? Do we have
copies of those?
Captain Rochefort. I do not have copies and do not know what
happened to the copies received from the ^DIO, FOURTEENTH
Naval District, but believe that duplicates will be in the Washington
file but unable to identify the same.
(A certified collection of dispatches supplied by Naval Commimica-
[57] tions. Navy Department, Washington, was received and
marked "Exhibit 13?')
Admiral Hewitt. There are three dispatches to which I direct your
attention. Captain, in that exhibit and request that you examine them
and explain whether or not you have ever seen them, and give us your
comments concerning them.
Captain Rochefort. I do not recall having seen Honolulu to Tokyo,
dated 6 December, number 253. I do not recall having seen Honolulu
to Tokyo, December 6, number 254. I do recall having seen Hono-
lulu to Tokyo, dated 3 December, number 245. This last message was
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 39
one of the group of messages received by the Pearl Harbor unit from
the District Intelligence Officer and due to the difficulties inherent
in the system, involving research, it was not deciphered until the night
of 10 December by the Pearl Harbor unit. It was shown to the Com-
mandant, who gave it to the Secretary of the Navy, who had just ar-
rived. At the Secretary's direction, it was shown to no one except the
Commander-in-Chief and the District Intelligence Officer, who was di-
rected verbally to take whatever action was necessary with the local
officials, including the FBI.
This message referred to above prescribed a set of signals to be
made, indicating the types of ships in the Hawaiian area, the types
of American vessels in the Hawaiian area, and their activities, and
included arrangements for various lights in houses, on beaches, signals
on boats, want ads in Honolulu radio stations, and signals on Maui
Island.
Admiral Hewitt. What was the source of that message?
Captain Rochefort. The source, sir ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes, of that message you just discussed.
Captain RociiEroRT. From Honolulu to Tokyo.
Admiral Hewitt. The source from which you received it.
[S8] Captain Eochefort. The District Intelligence Officer, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Captain, that was one of the group of messages
which, I believe, you said you received on or about December 2nd or
3rd, is that correct ?
Captain Rochefort. That is correct.
Admiral Heavitt. Do you recall the substance of any of the other
ones of that group of messages ?
Captain Rochefort. I do not.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you at any time before December 7th receive
copies of any Japanese reports concerning American ships in Pearl
Harbor or American preparations in Pearl Harbor to meet attack?
Captain Rochefort. Not to the best of my knowledge. I have here
all the messages we could dig up on the subject and it is not there.
Admiral Hewitt. In addition. Captain, to the message concerning
the signals which you have just discussed, you examined, did you not,
a message of December 6th from Honolulu to Tokyo, number 253,
and a message from Honolulu to Tokyo of December 6 bearing the
number 254? Would you read the two messages into the record and
call attention to the date of translation?
Captain Rochefort. The message number 253, dated 6 December
1941, from Honolulu to Tokyo in system PA-K2, reads as follows:
1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage
balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four
or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are eonsideriug the use
of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii
is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl
Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, [59] nor have they
selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any
training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present
time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult
to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have
actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water
and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. Hickam, Ford
and Ewa. there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine
that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage
for a surprise attack against these places.
40 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. In my opinion the battlesliips do not liave torpedo nets. Tlie details are
not known. I will report the results of my investigation.
A notation on the bottom of this dispatch indicates that it was trans-
lated on the 8th of December 1941 by the Army.
The message number 254, from Honohilu to Tokyo on December 6,
1941, also in system PA-K2, states as follows :
1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were
and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor
on the 6th :
9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in
addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy
cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).
2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air
arm.
This message was translated on the 8th of December 1941 by the
Army.
Admiral Hewitt. Do j^ou know how the Army secured those mes-
sages ?
Captain Rociiefort. No, sir, I do not know how they secured them
or [60] when. Safford can answer that question, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. There has been testimony to the effect that both
the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation tapped telephone wires of the Japanese Consul General at
Hawaii. What do you know about this ?
Captain Rochefort. I know nothing about it, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, concerning the movement of Japanese sub-
marines in and around Pearl Harbor on or prior to 7 December, what
do you know of the captured Japanese map which apparently shows
either the actual or proposed movement of a Japanese submarine?
Captain Rochefort. I have a copy of a chart in four sections.
Admiral Hewitt. Photographic copy?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir, photographic copy of a chart in four
sections, which is a copy of the chart removed from the Japanese sub-
marine which went aground off Bellows Field, Oahu, shortly after
7 December. This chart indicates courses and distances into Pearl
Harbor and around Ford Island counterclockwise and also contains
several notations written in pencil.
It is my considered opinion that the submarine from which this
chart was obtained did not transit Pearl Harbor on 7 December and
that the marks in pencil, which had been erroneously translated as
"begin firing" and "attack and sink enemy ship" or "enemy ship
sunk", were actually notations made by the submarine commander
prior to his arrival in the Hawaiian area and were merely his plan of
approach and entry into Pearl Harbor (referring to Exhibits 3
and 4).
(The four photostatic sections referred to were received and marked
respectively "Exhibit 14A," "Exhibit 14B," "Exhibit 14C," and "Ex-
hibit 14D.")
[6J] I had received a copy of the original chart from which
this photographic copy has been made shortly after its being obtained
from the submarine in question and did study the chart in its original
form on or about 8 December. It is impossible to state with regard
to the Japanese characters referring to "begin firing" and "attack and
sink enemy ship" whether they are in the past, present, or future tense.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 41
However, in view of the fact that the submarine when obtained did
have its two torpedoes aboard, it would appear that the vessel did not
at that occasion sink or fire any torpedo at American vessels in Pearl
Harbor.
Admiral Hewitt. What is your deduction as to the meaning of the
times indicated at the different points that the courses have ?
Captain RocHEroRT. My deductions as to the times at the various
turning points are that they were the submarine commander's pro-
posed times for arriving at such points, all times being minus 9 or
Tokyo time.
Admiral Hewitt. Which is how many hours different from Hono-
lulu time ?
Captain Rochefort. Which is four and one-half hours ahead of
Honolulu local time, which is plus lOi/^.
He would have been off the entrance to Pearl Harbor at 0510 Sun-
day morning Honolulu time and he would have arrived at the gate
on or about 0530 Honolulu time.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall at about what time the actual
midget submarine was sunk in Pearl Harbor and at about what part
of the harbor ?
Captain Rochefort. A midget submarine was sunk in the vicinity
of East Loch during the forenoon of 7 December. The exact time
I do not recall.
Admiral Hewitt. Was there a similar map recovered from the sub-
ma- [62] rine that was sunk inside Pearl Harbor ?
Captain Rochefort. If so, I have never seen it, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. On the original map (Exliibit 14 A) were the lo-
cations of ships plotted in pencil or in ink ?
Captain Rochefort. They were plotted in ink.
Admiral Hewitt. And what were the notations as to the
Captain Rochefort. The notations adjacent to each ship marker
were the names of the ships.
Admiral Hewitt. Were those in pencil or in ink ?
Captain Rochefort. I don't remember that. There they looked to
be in ink.
Admiral HE^VITT. And the times of the turning point are in ink?
Captain Rochefort. The times of the turning point are in ink.
Admiral Hewitt. And the remarks "prepare to fire" and "attack and
sink" are in pencil ?
Captain Rochefort. Pencil, yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. That is not the photograph of the original chart,
but it is a photograph of a copy of it (referring to Exhibit 14A) ?
Captain Rochefort. No, sir, this is a photograph of the original, I
am pretty sure about that.
In connection with the track of the submarine on course 295 between
times 0500 and 0510, both Tok3'0 time, it would appear impossible for
the submarine to have steered such a course due to the fact that at that
time United States vessels were anchored or moored in the area trav-
ersed by that course.
Admiral Hewitt. What do you know about submarine contacts that
were made prior to December 7th ?
[6o] Captain Rochefort. During my service in the fleet imme-
diately preceding my detail to the FOURTEENTH Naval District, we
42 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
had at least several submarine contact reports in the immediate vicinity
of the entrance to Pearl Harbor. None of these contacts developed into
actual submarines.
Admiral He\\t;tt. Do you mean by that that they were never actually
determined to be submarines ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. I was trying to avoid the use of the
word "negative" there because we didn't know.
Admiral Hewitt. They weren't positively determined to be sub-
marines ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Is that v/hat you mean ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. None of these contacts were positively
determined to be submarines.
Admiral Hewitt. According to this book "Battle Report," about
0500 on 7 December a naval radio station on Oahu intercepted and
logged a conversation between the WARD and CONDOR concerning
the sighting of a submarine some time earlier. What do you know
about that ?
Captain Rochefort. I haven't heard of such a conversation prior to
this, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, it appears from previous testimony that it
was believed on 7 December after the initial air attack that the attack-
ing force was located to the south of Pearl Harbor and that certain
orders were sent out to search for and intercept Japanese forces in
that direction. What information do you have on that?
Captain Rochefort. Wlien the attack commenced, the unit at Pearl
Harbor lost all communication with the direction finder stations, one
of which was located at Lualualei and the other at Aiea ; consequently,
no [64] bearings were received from the direction finders at
these two locations by the communication intelligence unit. The direc-
tion finder at Lualualei, being unable to deliver its bearings, finally
broadcast by radio a bearing obtained of one of the attacking units.
This bearing was allegedly received by the Commander-in-Chief as
being an alternate bearing, either 357 true or 178 true. The direction
finder station stated later to me that they had transmitted the bearing
as 357. If a reciprocal bearing was given to the Commander-in-Chief
by radio, it was the first instance, to my knowledge, that that particular
type of direction finder, namely, a CXK, gave a reciprocal bearing.
Admiral Hewitt. In other words, that type was capable of obtaining
a unilateral bearing?
Captain Rochefort. Yes, sir. That was the number one direction
finder that we had at that time in the Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. And that is all the information on that particular
occurrence that you have ?
Captain Rochefort. That is all that I have on that, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What was your system of communication with
Lualualei ?
Captain Rochefort. The system of communication with Lualualei
was by telephone which utilized short stretches of wire between Pearl
Harbor and Lualualei, partly Army cable and partly commercial tele-
phone lines. It was claimed at the time that the communication sys-
tems failed because of sabotage, but after considerable study and re-
search on our part, we believed it was due to actions of our own per-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 43
sonnel, that is, United States personnel, whereby in setting up new
circuits, telephone and otherwise, our circuits were discontinued.
Admiral Hewitt. That action, then, would have been by the Army?
[65] Captain Kochefgrt. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, concerning relationship with the Army in
Oahu, what information, to your knowledge, was furnished to the
Army, particularly during the critical period 27 November to 7 De-
cember ?
Captain Eochefort. The war warning was given to the Army, as
was stated in the dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief. In my sev-
eral talks with Colonel Fielder subsequent to the 27th, in which we
exchanged opinions, I gathered the impression that he was as well
informed on current affairs as we were in Pearl Harbor. I did not
give the Army G-2 any ultra information, first because the only ultra
that was available pertained to destruction of cryptographic material
and had no bearing on the local G-2 situation; secondly, because the
Army G-2 in Honolulu was being furnished such ultras as was con-
sidered necessary by the War Department. It is my recollection
that the Army received the information regarding burning of papers
in the Japanese consulate in Honolulu at the same time that we
received it.
Admiral Hewitt. Did they receive any information as to your
estimates of the location and movements of the Japanese fleet?
Captain Eochefort. Not from me, they did not, sir. If they re-
ceived such information, they would have received it from the Com-
mander-in-Chief.
Admiral Hewitt. May I ask who Colonel Fielder was?
Captain Eochefort. Colonel Fielder was G-2, sir, to General
Short, the opposite number to Layton.
Admiral Hewitt. The relationship with the Army, as I under-
stand, was entirely on a personal basis? There was no official system
set up for joint operations?
Captain Eochefort. No, sir, there was not.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know whether any reconnaissance was
conducted [66] bj^ Army planes at any time ?
Captain Eochefort. No, sir, I do not know of any air reconnais-
sance conducted by the Army, except that which was being conducted
during 1941 at the direction of the Commander-in-Chief, which was
an inshore patrol.
(Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record was received and
marked "Exhibit 15.")
Admiral Hewitt. I would like to ask you what information you
had on the messages in that exhibit prior to 7 December.
Captain Eochefort. The only ones that I have seen, sir, are these
here because these are the onlv ones transmitted by Washington to
CincPac and ComFOUETEEN (indicating those of 1 and 3 De-
cember). It tells London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to
destro}^ the purple machine, and one on 1 December about giving
plans to entice the British to invade Thailand; one on 26 November
covering the Tokyo voice; and one on 13 November which went to
ComSIXTEEN, but it doesn't say whether it went to CincPac or not,
giving the U. S. military situation in the Philippines. That is all we
got.
44 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The messages referred to above were received by the Pearl Harbor
unit from the Navy Department.
In addition, I have seen the gist of the message of November 19th
(contained in Exhibit 15) .
Other than the above, I haven't seen any, to the best of my knowl-
edge, of the messages contained in this exhibit.
Admiral Hewitt. There has been previous testimony relating to
a commercial telephone conversation between Tokyo and a Japanese
resident at Hawaii some time during this critical period between the
1st and 6th of [67] December. It has been termed the "Mori
conversation" and it was more or less unintelligible. Do you know
anything about that ?
Captain Rochefort. No, sir, I do not.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, as you know, the purpose of this investiga-
tion is to supplement previous investigations in order to obtain all
the facts. Is there any fact bearing on this matter, of which you have
Iviiowledge, which hasn't been mentioned ?
Captain Rochefort. No, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. That is all.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 4: 40 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m.
the next day.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 45
[.68] PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIRY
Fourth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the
General Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Thursday, 17 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John F. Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
Two witnesses entered, each read the precept, and each was duly
sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. Will each of you state his name and rank.
Captain Masox. Redfield Mason, Captain, U. S. Navy.
Commander Fabian. Eudolph J. Fabian, Commander, U. S. Navy.
Admiral HE^\^:TT. Captain Mason, for the benefit of the record,
will you state what your duties were during 1941 ?
Captain Mason. I was Fleet Intelligence Officer on the staff of
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, sir.
Admiral Heavitt. Will you do the same. Commander?
Commander Fabian. I had been the Officer-in-Charge of the radio
unit on Corregidor and had been relieved in September, but my
orders were, by the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to remain
there and to assist as much as I could.
Admiral He^\t;tt. That was in view of the situation existing at the
time ?
Commander Fabian. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Commander Fabian, what was the mission of
the radio intelligence unit at Corregidor ?
Commander Fabian. Our mission. Admiral, was to maintain a unit
for \69^ study of enemy fleets and communications in order,
first, to keep track of their peacetime intentions; second, to prevent
against a surprise attack, insofar as possible, or an attack without a
declaration of war ; and, third, to keep as well up as possible on the
organization, methods, and so forth, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Of the Japanese fleet ?
Commander Fabian. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What equipment did you have there ?
Commander Fabian. I had twenty-six radio receivers, ranging
from low frequency to high frequency, had a set of business machinery
and the appurtenances necessary for the interception of both high
speed and low speed enemy transmissions.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you have a direction finder?
Commander Fabian. Yes, sir. In addition to that, we had a direc-
tion finder.
Admiral Hewitt. And what about decrypting?
Commander Fabian. For the decryption of naval traffic, we had
seven officers, and nineteen men, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What, in general, were the arrangements for dis-
semination of radio intelligence information to the Asiatic Fleet,
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and to the Army out there ?
46 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander Fabian. The American Navy radio intelligence organ-
ization had a private cryptographic system which was held by
ComSIXTEEN, which was our unit, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic
Fleet, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, and OpNav, sir. Now, as for
dissemination to the Army, locally all of our information was handed
to the Fleet Intelligence Officer in Manila, who provided for liaison
with the Army. Insofar as the Army in Washington, [70] it
was all carried on by OpNav, sir.
Admiral Hewiti'. Did you have any specific tasks which were as-
signed by the Navy Department, any particular types of traffic to
watch, and so forth?
Commander Fabian. No, sir. In general, we were assigned the mis-
sion that I indicated previously, and in carrying out that mission, we
covered certain circuits from which we could get most of the informa-
tion we desired, sir, and the greatest volume of material. In addi-
tion to that, we provided for intercept of diplomatic traffic. In con-
nection with the dij)lomatic traffic, sir, certain types were immediately
enciphered and sent back to Washington as soon as it was intercepted.
Admiral Hewitt. Did that go to Pearl Harbor also, the Pearl Har-
bor unit ?
Commander Fabian. No, sir. To the best of my knowledge, they
weren't performing any cryptanalysis or reading of diplomatic system.
Admiral Hewitt. Captain Mason, have j^ou got anything to add to
that?
Captain Mason. I can add a little bit about the dissemination to
the Army locall}^ The Army was furnished daily a copy of all dip-
lomatic translations that had been made by the unit at Corregidor.
The purely naval matters, when our intelligence came from purely
naval traffic, inasmuch as there wasn't any translating going on as a
matter of fact, they weren't furnished any copies of either dispatches
that we sent to CincPac or Washington or received from them, but I
conferred quite frequently with the head of the intelligence depart-
ment in the Philippine Army Department and always provided at
least — I can't be too specific on the point of how frequently, but quite
frequently — our estimate of the locations of the Japanese fleet. A.s I
recall now, I didn't give him the source of this [7i] information
but graded it as "doubtful" or "possible" or whatever we thought of it.
Admiral Hewitt. Did the Army out there have any similar sources
of information ?
Captain Mason. No, sir. That is correct, isn't it?
Commander Fabian. They had an intercept unit, but they made no
local attack, I believe, sir.
Captain Mason. It was copying Army and diplomatic traffic.
Commander Fabian. That is right.
Admiral Hewitt. Was the exchange of information between you
and the Army complete? I mean did you receive all the information
they had as well as giving them all the information you had?
Captain Mason. So far as I know, yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. You were in close contact most of the time?
Captain Mason. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What diplomatic codes were assigned to the unit
in the Philippines for reading ?
Captain Mason. There were assigned the machine cipher known as
purple, machine cipher known as red, and the diplomatic code known
as J with the current one being 19.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 47
Admiral Hewitt. What was the relative order of importance of
those codes?
Captain Mason. You mean as we deemed it?
Admiral Hewitt. As you deemed it.
Captain Mason. Well, we considered that the information of the
greatest value would more likely be obtained from the purple. It
should be made clear, I think, in the record that the exploitation of
this traffic [7£] was for the purpose of local information
chiefly, seeing that we might be the first to intercept the message and
that the unit was not responsible for the recovery of the keys neces-
sary to read it. That was done in Washington and forwarded back
to it. And all purple traffic intercepted and certain other traffic in
the red and J-19 codes were immediately enciphered and sent to Wash-
ington. That is whether we read it later or not.
Admiral Hewitt. What, in general, was the information obtained
from the Japanese diplomatic codes during the period 27 November to
7 December ?
Captain Mason. Well, we knew from purple dispatches that nego-
tiations then being carried on in Washington between the Japanese
and ourselves were not progressing satisfactorily and would probably
be broken off. I think that is as general as I can make a statement.
Admiral Hewitt. You saw the war warning dispatch from OpNav
on November 27th ?
Captain Mason. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Did that contain any information which was new
to you or surprising?
Captain Mason. Not of a surprising nature, no, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. I have here a file of dispatches which has been
previously submitted in evidence and marked "Exhibit 15." I would
like to have both of j^ou look them over and let me know which, if
any, you saw. They are a file of diplomatic and consular dispatches.
Captain Mason. I have seen this file, Admiral, both Commander
Fabian and I. The only message which we specifically remember hav-
ing received or seen was number 15 of Exhibit 15, which we received
from the Britisli unit at Singapore and sent to OpNav, information to
ComSIXTEEN, CincPac, and [73] ComFOURTEEN, in
CinCAF dispatch 281430 of November, 1941.
Admiral Hewitt. Wliat was the gist of that ?
Captain Mason. That was the setting up of the "winds" code.
Admiral Hewitt. I have here a file of Japanese dispatches which
have been marked "Exhibit 13" which T would like to have you examine
and state what messages, if any, you had seen.
Captain Mason. I do not recall having seen any messages in tliis
exhibit.
Admiral Hewitt. Commander Fabian ?
Commander Fabian. Yes, sir. I can't specifically remember any
of these. Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall having seen any messages referring
to the ships or locations of ships at Pearl Harbor ?
Captain Mason. I do not.
Commander Fabian. Nor I, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Wliat Japanese naval codes had been broken at
Corregidor ?
48 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander Fabian. The Corregidor unit, Admiral, was working
on the naval system known as JN-25, which was the system containing
the greatest volume of Japanese dispatches.
Admiral Hewitt. To what extent were you successful in breaking
the code ?
Commander Fabian. We were in the initial stages, sir. We had an
established liaison with the British unit at Singapore. We were ex-
changing values, both code and cipher recoveries, but we had not de-
veloped either to the point where we could read enemy intercepts.
Admiral Heavitt. Is it a fac't, then, that most of your information
[74] as to the location and movements of the Japanese fleet were
obtained entirely from traffic analysis rather than decryption?
Commander Fabian. That is true, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Concerning your estimates of the location and
movements of Japanese naval forces from 26 November to 7 December
1941, are you familiar with the dispatches contained in exhibit number
8, which I submit to you ?
Commander Fabian. Yes, sir.
Captain Mason. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What difference, if any, existed between the esti-
mate of the ComFOURTEEN unit and the ComSIXTEEN unit?
Commander Fabian. The ComFOURTEEN unit indicated a strong
concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls and also
indicated that one CarDiv unit was present in the Marshalls. In the
same dispatch in which they gave their estimate, they requested our
comment, to which we rej^lied that we could not confirm their thought
that there were carriers and submarines in force in the Mandates. We
believed that all the First and Second Fleet carriers were in the Sasebo-
Kure area.
Admiral Hewitt. Then your dispatch was rather a statement that
you were unable to confirm the FOURTEENTH District estimate
rather than a f)ositive disagreement?
Commander Fabian. That is correct, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What dispatches relating to Japanese movements
were sent by ComSIXTEEN or Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, to
OpNav or CincPac after the 26th of November dispatch ?
Commander Fabian. From the standpoint of the RI unit on Corregi-
dor, sir, we initiated a dispatch around the 1st of December containing
the [7-5] movement report of the Commander-in-Chief, Second
Fleet, on his departure from the Empire area and his prospective move-
ments through the various communication zones down to the Indo-
China area, sir.
In addition to the dispatch just mentioned, ComSIXTEEN trans-
mitted to CincPac, OpNav, and ComFOURTEEN, comment on AS-
TALUSNA Shanghai 270830, regarding locations of enemy ships and
added information indicative of a shift of 4,000 men to the Mandates.
On 30 November we originated a dispatch indicating a change of
"orange" call signs, and on 1 December a message indicating enemy
fleet movements or enemj'^ ship movements, plus indication of the CinC
Second's movement from the Kure-Sasebo comnmni cation zone prob-
ably en route to South China waters.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you identify these (handing dispatches to
the witness) as the dispatches which you sent?
Commander Fabian. Yes.
(The dispatches referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 16.")
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 49
Admiral Hewitt. What other information did. you have concerning
the Japanese fleet movements from 26 November to 7 December 1941?
Captain Mason. Is that other than RI ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
Captain Mason. Information concerning Japanese fleet movements,
other than that obtained from traffic analysis, consisted of one or two
reports, the exact nature of whicli I am not certain, from the Assist-
ant Xaval Attache, Shanghai, and in addition a number of sighting
reports obtained from our reconnaissance planes. There was one on 2
December from CincAF to OpNav, information CincPac, dispatch
020315, reporting the sighting of nine [76] submarines. I
don't remember just where they were now, but it will be contained
in that dispatch. Another on 2 December at 0730, the same originator
and the same addressees, reporting the sighting of three submarines
and twent3'-one transports and the presence of enemy patrol planes
over Camranh Bay. One on 6 December, same originator, same ad-
dressees, at 1255, reporting a convoy in Camranh Bay. Those are all
the messages that have been found and to which I can positively testify.
I have a fairly clear recollection of another one or two, and one
made by the British which included the sighting of the heavy fleet
units, the battleships and the cruisers, after they had turned westward
around Poulo Condore, French Indo-China, which was probably about
twenty-four to forty-eight hours prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
I can't recall positively, but I feel certain that our own reconnaissance
planes had sighted at least the cruisers of that task force about twelve
hours or more previously, which we reported also. I don't recall any
other information that we had on movements during that period, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. During the critical period from 26 November to
7 December, did you have any information, by deduction or other-
wise, as to the location and movements of any Japanese carriers?
Commander Fabian. Our estimate summarized in ComSIX-
TEEN's 261331 indicated that v:e believed all carriers, all known car-
riers, were in the Kure-Sasebo area.
Admiral Hewitt. You mentioned the aerial reconnaissance, your
own aerial reconnaissance. Can j^ou give me an idea of the extent
of that and approximate dates?
Captain Mason. I can't give the exact dates, Admiral, except that
I know some of it was going on before we received the war warning
and that l??] it was intensified thereafter. We flew such
aerial reconnaissance so as to insure that no surface force could ap-
proach Luzon from any of what might be termed the expected direc-
tions and escape detection. Chieflj^, as I recall it now, we put most
stress on the lines from slightly eastward of the east coast of Formosa
down through Bako, where they had a naval base, and Hainan, where
they also had a naval base, and also towards Comranh Bay in the later
days after the sighting of these various units moving south. We also
had in the late days some sort of an agreement with the Dutch about
reconnaissance toward Palau, thinking that perhaps an attack on the
Mindanao and Davao area would come from that direction. I am not
prepared to try to give exact details of that because I can't recall that,
sir. The Dutch were flying, I am certain, something up from the
general Halmahera area towards Palau and, I think, we were flying
something along the general Davao-Palau line. And the British, too,
in the final days were flying reconnaissance out of Singapore towards
79716—46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 5
50 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Camranli Bay and over the Gulf of Siam. I think that is about all I
can really recall about the reconnaissance.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall receiving any information from
the British and Dutch sources?
Captain Mason. From the British, yes, sir. I have mentioned it
previously. They sighted the task force that was to eventually in-
vade Malaya somewhere in the general Poulo Condore area.
Admiral Hewitt. I have here an exhibit which is a Pacific Area
Intelligence Bulletin. It gives information obtained from a Japanese
prisoner of war as to the composition of the task force which attacked
Pearl Harbor. Will you look at that and see if you had anj^ radio
intelligence concerning any of those ships in the period 26 November
to 7 December?
Commander Fabian. No, sir. I feel sure our last definite informa-
[78] tion about carriers was summarized in the dispatch I referred
to which was originated on the 26th.
Admiral Hewitt. Concerning the "winds" code in the dispatch of
28 November which you recalled having seen, what steps were taken to
monitor for the use of this code and what were the results'?
Commander Fabian. We assigned one receiver to cover the Tokyo
voice broadcasts and each broadcast was listened to by a linquist.
In addition to that, we assigned one receiver on a twenty-four hour
basis to the Navy Morse press broadcast. The materials therefrom
were copied constantly and delivered to the linguists and no indication
of any of the phrases set up in the "winds" message appeared.
Captain Mason. The British unit at Singapore was also monitoring
the same circuits and it was agreed that anything received by either
unit would immediately be exchanged.
Admiral Hewitt. Nothing was received ?
Captain Mason. Nothing was received from that.
Admiral Hewitt. This book called "Battle Report," which I show
you, contains a statement that the United States had two task forces
at sea shortly before the Pearl Harbor attack and that the Japnese
espionage had so informed Tokyo. Have you any information as to the
basis for that statement?
Captain Mason. I have none, sir.
Commander Fabian. Nor I, sir.
Admiral Hewitt, Did you receive any information by means of in-
terception of Japanese cable or telephone messages ?
Captain Mason. None, sir.
Commander Fabian. No, sir.
Admiral Hev>^itt. Have you any information concerning the opera-
tion [79] of Japanese submarines in and around Pearl Harbor ?
Commander Fabian. None, sir.
Captain Mason, None, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. As you Icnow, the purpose of this investigation is
to supplement the previous investigations in order to obtain all the
facts. Are there any facts bearing on this matter of which you
have knowledge which have not previously been mentioned ?
Commander Fabian. None that I recall, sir.
Captain Mason. No, sir.
(The witnesses were excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 2: 50 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m.
the next day.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 51
[SO] PKOCEEDINGS OF^THE HEWITT INaUIRY
Fifth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General
Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m,, Friday, 18 May 19i5.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John F. Baecher, USNE ; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
Two witnesses entered, each read the precept, and each was duly
sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. Will each of you state his name and rank.
Connnander IL^rig. Walter Karig, Commander, IT. S. Naval Re-
serve.
Lieutenant Kelley. Welbourn Kelley, Lieutenant, U. S. Naval Re-
serve.
Admiral Hewitt. You gentlemen were the authors of "Battle Re-
port," a book published in 1944?
Commander Karig. Yes, sir.
Lieutenant Kelley. Yes, sir.
Admiral PIewitt. Turning to page 6 of that book, what was the
basis of the statement that, "There were two powerful task forces sent
against Pearl Harbor, the major elements of one lurking just over the
horizon from its companion fleet to overwhelm any American attempt
to engage the invaders," and, ''The United States, too, had two task
forces at sea, and Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo"?
Commander Karig. That question. Admiral, was in several parts.
Can we work at it backwards? Can we take the last part of that
question first?
Admiral BDewitt. Yes.
Commander Karig. "That Japanese espionage had so informed
Tokyo"?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
[81] Commander Karig. That was made in the form of a declar-
ative sentence, and is not the most cautious kind of writing. It was
based on the Robert's Report, and I would like to read two paragraphs
of that report into the record, if I may.
Admiral Hewitt. Go ahead.
Commander Karig. (reading) :
It was believed that the center of Japanese espionage in Hawaii was the
Japanese consulate at Honolulu. It has been discovered that the Japanese
consul sent to and received from Tokyo in his own and other names many
messages on commercial radio circuits. This activity greatly increased toward
December 7, 1941. The contents of these messages, if it could have been learned,
might have furnished valuable information. In view of the peaceful relations
with Japan, and the consequent restrictions on the activities of the investigating
agencies, they were unable prior to December 7 to obtain and examine messages
transmitted through commercial channels by the Japanese consul, or by persons
acting for him.
It is now apparent that through their intelligence service the Japanese had
complete information. They evidently knew that no task force of the United
52 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
States Navy was anywhere in the sector northeast, north, and northwest of the
Hawaiian Islands. They evidently knew that no distant airplane reconnaissance
was maintained in any sector. They evidently knew that up to December 6
no inshore airplane patrol was being maintained around the periphei-y of Oahu.
They knew, from maps which they had obtained, the exact location of vital air
fields, hangars, and other structures. They also gnew accourately where certain
important naval vessels would be berthed. Their flyers had the most detailed
maps, courses, and bearings, so that each could attack a given vessel or field.
Each seems to have been given a specified mission.
Lieutenant Kjekley. May I say something also, sir? In conversa-
tion [82] with Secretary Knox he gave us the background of
the Japanese attack as he knew it — how he knew it, we don t know —
and he said that his belief was there were two Japanese task forces, as
we have it here.
Admiral Hewitt. That was the basis for your statement, then?
Commander Kj^rig. Our conclusions were drawn as a deduction
from the Robert's Report although there was no specific proof that the
Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo.
Admiral Hewitt. Relative to the conversation between the WARD
and CONDOR on pages 13-14 relative to a submarine contact, will
you tell me where you obtained that information ?
Commander Karig. I will let Lieutenant Kelly answer that. Ad-
miral, please sir.
Lieutenant Kelley. Sir, from the skipper of the WARD, then Lieu-
tenant W. W. Outerbridge, USN, who went to the station on Bishop's
Point and got a transcript of that conversation as intercepted by the
naval radio station on Bishop's Point, the conversation between the
CONDOR and WARD. At approximately 0500, the following con-
versation between the USS CONDOR and the USS WARD was
intercepted by the naval radio station on Bishop's Point :
WARD. What was the approximate distance and course of the submarine you
sighted ?
CONDOR. The course was about what we were steering at the time, 020 mag-
netic and about 1,000 yards from the entrance.
WARD. Do you have any additional information on the sub?
CONDOR. No additional information.
WARD. When was the last time approximately that you saw the submarine?
CONDOR. Approximately 0350 and he was apparently heading for the entrance.
[83] Admiral He^vitt. Concerning the Japanese map, Plate V,
and this diagram. Figure 3, you take the position, I believe, that the
Japanese submarine from which this map was obtained was in Pearl
Harbor on December 7 and inaccurately charted the position of our
ships in the Harbor that day. Will you tell me on what you base
that belief?
Commander Karig. Again I'll ask Mr. Kelley to answer that be-
cause he interviewed Admiral Furlong here in Washington,
Lieutenant Kelley. Admiral, that map as contained in Plate V
was quite widely published and was released officially by the Navy
Department some time after Pearl Harbor. I don't remember the
exact date. A news story widely printed at that time was to the effect
that this chart was made by a submarine in the harbor. I discussed
this chart with Admiral Furlong on a visit to Washington. I dis-
cussed the whole Pearl Harbor attack with Admiral Furlong at great
length. I don't remember specifically saying to Admiral Furlong,
"Do you think this was made by the submarine?" I couldn't say that
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 53
he said that to me. He did describe how the chart was brought into
the submarine base and spread out on the deck. They all looked at it.
I am sure he told me that it was from a submarine. That is, I think,
pretty well known and my memory is that it came from the submarine
which was sunk by the MONAGHAN and the CURTISS inside the
harbor.
Admiral Hewitt. But you wouldn't be positive?
Lieutenant Kellet. We cannot prove that.
(A photograph of a captured Japanese chart, showing courses and
location of United States ships in Pearl Harbor, from which Plate V
in "Battle Report" was taken, was received and marked "Exhibit 17.")
Commander Karig. Shall we read into the record the official title
of the picture ?
[84] Admiral Hewitt. Will you please?
Commander Karig. "CHART OF PEARL HARBOR FOUND
IN CAPTURED JAP SUBMARINE.— This Japanese map is an ex-
cellent example of ' subversive Japanese activities mentioned by Sec-
retary Knox upon his return from Hawaii. Japanese sj^mbols drawn
on the chart indicate the anchorage of ships and details of military
establishments around the inner harbor of Pearl Harbor, U. S. Naval
Base in Hawaii. Note misspelling of 'Southeast Loch' (lower right) ."
WATCH YOUR CREDIT
No objection to reproducing or publishing
this photograph provided credit line
"OFFICIAL U. S. NAVY PHOTOGRAFE'
is used
This photograph may be used for commercial
advertising if accompanying copy and layout are
submitted, prior to publication,
to the
OFFICE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
Photographic Section
Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you see the translation with notations on
that chart ?
Lieutenant Kelley. Yes, sir.
Admiral He"\^ttt. I have here two Exhibits, 3 and 4, of reproduc-
tions of the chart with the English translations. If you will note,
the notations are different. You will notice off the position of the
TENNESSEE one says, "Attack and sink enemy ship," and the other
one says, "Sunk enemy ship." For your information, that confusion
may be because they are translations of the Japanese ideographs,
which have no tense and could mean either past or future.
Commander Karig. They don't even have a number. It could be
"enemy shij)s."
Lieutenant Kelley. We haven't seen this translation.
Admiral Hewitt. You haven't seen either?
[85] Lieutenant Kelley. Not this one, no, sir.
Commander Karig. No, sir. The translations we supplied in the
book were made by a civilian. The only translations that were made
for us anyhow were made in the so-called syllabic, and not ideograph.
Admiral Hewitt. On page 26 of "Battle Report" there is the fol-
lowing : "At one point on his chart, and as if to bolster the evidence
54 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of his own vision, he wrote in Japanese, 'I saw it with my own eyes.' "
You don't know what part of the chart that was?
Lieutenant Kelley. It was the southeast, as I remember it, along
here (indicating) about the cruisers.
Commander Karig. That is just trusting to memory— where that
was penciled into the chart from which the cut was made.
Admiral Hewitt. Concerning the times noted on the chart, what
was your opinion as to the zone time that they were in ?
Commander Karig. Honolulu time was our assumption, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you read the statement on page 23 as to the
source of the submarine map?
Commander Karig. On page 23, Chapter Two, part two :
At 0430 on the morning of December 7th a Japanese two-man submarine was
inside Pearl Harbor just off Hospital Point.
From the log of this submarine, subsequently beached outside Pearl Harbor
and recovered intact, it is not difficult to reconstruct its survey of the harbor,
leg by leg.
Admiral Hewitt. By the "log" of this submarine, do you mean the
chart which has been under discussion?
Commander Karig. Yes, sir. The only copy of the Japanese chart
from which we worked in preparing the text of chapter two was Ex-
hibit 17, supplied [86] by the Pictorial Section, Office of
Public Relations.
Lieutenant Kelley. That is not a complete chart as taken from the
submarine.
Commander Karig. Nor did it show that part of the channel
below
Lieutenant Kelley. Below the Hospital Point entrance.
Admiral Hewitt. The Army Pearl Harbor report, apparently based
on testimony of an FBI agent, states that the diiference between the
charted positions of the United States ships and the actual positions
on December Ttli shows conclusively that a submarine had been in
the Harbor prior to December 7th. Did you investigate the location
of ships in the Harbor prior to December 7th ?
Commander Karig. No, sir.
Lieutenant Kjslley. No, sir, we did not. The information was not
available to us.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know the location of the original map?
Commander Karig. No, sir.
Adniiral Hewitt. If you have anything else or any other informa-
tion or any leads that you can give that would permit me to obtain
additional information about this affair, I would be very glad to
have it.
Commander Karig. We have nothing further. That is, first-hand
information.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much.
(The witnesses were excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 2: 40 p. m., adjourned until 10: 30
a. m., Monday, 21 May 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 55
[87-] PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY
Sixth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General
Board, Navy Department, at 10 : 30 a. m., Mondaj^, 21 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's
Clerk Ben Harold, USNK.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral HEwrrr. State your name and rank.
Captain Outerbridge. William W. Outerbridge, Captain, U. S.
Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. You were the Commanding Officer of the WARD
on the morning of 7 December 1941?
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. And during the early hours of that morning, you
had several actual contacts with submarines ? Is that so ?
Captain Outerbridge. Several actual contacts ?
Admiral Hewitt. Well, reported contacts.
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir. We had one alert and one actual
contact and then later, after the attack, we had several outside.
Admii'al Hewitt. There has been reported and logged the conversa-
tion which you had with the CONDOR along about 0520 Honolulu
time and later there is in evidence the report of your actual attack on
the submarine. Will you give me your story of the events of the
morning, beginning with the report from the CONDOR about 0400 ?
Captain OuTERBRrooE. That doesn't appear on this record, but she
signalled us by flashing light that she believed she had seen an object
that looked like a submarine proceeding to the westward, and I believe
she [55] had just come out and was sweeping, magnetic sweep
out in the channel, but she said, "The submarine is standing to the
westward."
Admiral Hewitt. "Wliat was her location ?
Captain Outerbridge. She was in the channel, sweeping with her
magnetic sweeps.
Admiral Hewitt. The approach channel to Pearl Harbor ?
Captain Outerbridge. Outside of the actual channel, between the
reefs, but on the approach channel to Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Hewitt. Swept channel?
Captain Outerbridge. Swept channel, yes, and we went to General
Quarters and proceeded to her position, as close as we could get to
her without fouling her sweeping gear, and then we stood to the west-
ward, slowed to ten knots, and searched. It was a sonar search. We
couldn't see anything.
Admiral Hewitt. About what time did you get that signal ?
56 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Outerbridge. We got that signal about 0358, visual signal
about 0358, and we searched for about an hour and didn't find any-
thing; so I got in contact with her ^igain and asked her for a verifi-
tion. Then she said — this is in the record here. We asked her first,
"What was the approximate distance and course of tlie submarine that
you sighted?" and she said, "the course was about w^hat we were steer-
ing at the time 020 magnetic and about 1000 yards from the entrance
apparently heading for the entrance." Well, I knew then that we
had been searching in the wrong direction. We went to westward,
and, of course, there was still doubt as to whether she had actually
seen a submarine because there hadn't been any other conversation,
except by flashing light with us, and I wondered whether they were
sure or not; so I did ask them, "Do you have any additional informa-
tion on the sub?" and they said, "No additional information," and
I then asked them, "When was [89] the last time approxi-
mately that you saw the submarine?" and they said, "Approximate
time 0350 and he was apparently heading for the entrance." Then
we thanked them for their information and asked them to notify us
if they had any more information and then we just kept on search-
ing in our area, in the restricted area outside of the buoys. That was
the end of this incident for the first search.
Admiral Hewitt. You made no report of that to higher authority?
Captain Outerbridge. No, sir, I didn't make any report of it.
Admiral Hewitt. What was your evaluation of that?
Captain Outerbridge. Well, at the time I though perhaps it wasn't
a submarine, because they didn't report it. This conversation was
taken over another circuit entirely. This is not in either his log or
mine. They didn't report it and I thought if he didn't report it, he
must not think it is a submarine. It was his initial report and I
thought it may not be. It may have been anything ; it may have been
a buoy. Since then, I don't believe it was a buoy. I believe the Com-
manding Officer of the CONDOR saw a submarine. I don't know
where he is. I think he was killed, killed in action. But at that time
I didn't know whether or not it was a submarine.
Admiral Hewitt. You say you think the Commanding Officer of the
CONDOR was killed?
Captain Outerbridge. I believe he was killed.
Adiniral Hewitt. Do you remember his name ?
Captain Outerbridge. No, sir, I don't know, but I met some people
who told me about him.
Admiral Hewitt. Well, now about the later contact. -
Captain Outerbridge. The later contact — I turned in again and was
sleeping in the emergency cabin, as usual, and Lieutenant Goepner
[90] had the deck. He was a j. g. He called me and said, "Cap-
tain, come on the bridge." The helmsman was the first one to sight
this object and he saw this thing moving. It looked like a buoy to
him, but they watched it and after they had watched it for a while,
they decided probably it was a conning tower of a submarine, although
we didn't have anything that looked like it in our Navy, and they had
never seen anything like it. I came on the bridge as fast as I could
and took a look at it. I don't know where it appeared to them at first,
but at that time it appeared to me to be following the ANTARES in.
The ANTARES had been reported to me and at that time I thought
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 57
tlie ANTAKES had been heading into the harbor. She also had a
tow, towing a lighter, and it appeared to me the submarine was fol-
lowing astern of the tow.
Admiral Hewitt. Astern of the tow?
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir. It may or may not have been. I
think other people can testify it was standing in to Honolulu. To
me it appeared to be following the ANTARES in and I thought, "She
is going to follow the ANTARES in, whatever it is." It was going
fairly fast.. I thought she was making about twelve knots. It seemed
to be a little fast to me. I was convinced it was a submarine. I was
convinced it couldn't be anything else. It must be a submarine and
it wasn't anything that we had and we also had a message that any sub-
marine operating in the restricted area — not operating in the sub-
marine areas and not escorted — should be attacked. We had that
message ; so there was no doubt at all in my mind what to do. So, we
went to General Quarters again and attacked. That was 0740-0640.
Admiral Hewitt. And you attacked and you reported, I believe
that — —
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir, we reported.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you identify those exchanges of messages?
Will [91] you identify the messages on the racTio log ?
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir. The Executive Officer was on the
bridge at the time. We made the attack and we dropped depth charges
in front of the submarine. The first report was, "We have dropped
depth charges upon sub operating in defensive sea area." I thought,
''Well, now, maybe I had better be more definite," because we did fire
and if we said we fired, people would know it was on the surface, be-
cause saying it was a sub and dropping depth charges, they may have
said it might have been a blackfish or a whale. So I said, "We have
attacked fired upon and dropped depth charges upon submarine oper-
ating in defensive sea area," so they would feel, well, he shot at some-
thing. We sent the message at 0653, the second one.
(The radio log of the Naval Radio Station. Bishop's Point, Oahu,
containing the conversation between the WARD and CONDOR and
the ward's report of attack upon a submarine, was received and
marked "Exhibit 18.")
Admiral Hewitt. What do you feel was the effect of your attack?
Captain Outerbridge. I think we sank the submarine.
Admiral Hewitt. What do you base that on ?
Captain Outerbridge. On the gun hit, only on the gun hit.
Admiral Hewitt. There was a gun hit on it ?
Captain Outerbridge. There was a gun hit on it, and I looked these
submarines over and there is no hatch between the conning tower and
the tube of the submarine, where I believe it was hit, right at the
waterline, the base of the conning tower.
Admiral Hewitt. And the submarine disappeared after that?
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir, it disappeared.
Admiral Hewitt. That was before you made the depth charge at-
tack?
[92] Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir, we fired at the submarine
before we made the depth charge attack, and as she was going under
the stern, we dropped over the depth charges.
Admiral Hewitt. Your dej)th charges were close to her ?
58 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Definitely?
Captain Outerbridge. Definitely, they were there. I didn't claim
a kill
Admiral Hewitt. Whom were those reports addressed to ?
Captain Outerbridge. I believe it was Commander Inshore Patrol.
We were working for inshore patrol, but the interpretation is here
Admiral Hewitt. You got the calls ?
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir, we got the calls.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you remember what they mean ?
Captain Outerbridge. No, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Those were the only reports of that attack you
made ?
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir, two messages on that.
Admiral Hewitt. "\Yliat was your action after the completion of that
attack ?
Captain Outerbridge. Well, I saw one of these large white sampans
lying to out there in the defensive area.
Admiral Hewitt. Was that against regulations?
Captain Outbridge. That was against standing rules. They weren't
supposed to be in the defensive area, but he was in there. So, I turned
around and went after him and we chased him out towards Barber's
Point. He was going pretty fast.
Admiral Hewitt. He tried to get away from you ?
[93^ Captain Outerbridge. It appeared that way to me. He
could have stopped much sooner, but he appeared to be going around
Barber's Point. When we did catch up to him, he came up waving
a white flag. I thought that was funny. I thought, "We will just
send for the Coast Guard." That was what we always did when we
caught a sampan in the defensive area. We sent for the Coast Guard
and they were very prompt. They sent a cutter out to take him in.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you identify for the record those two mes-
sages you sent about the sampan, which are on the Bishop's Point
record ?
Captain Outerbridge. "We have intercepted a sampan into Hono-
lulu. Please have Coast Guard send cutter to relieve us of sampan."
And, "We have intercepted sampan and escorting sampan into Hono-
lulu. Please have cutter relieve us of sampan." We sent that.
That is a little garbled, but that looks like it.
Admiral Hewitt. lYliat was the time of it?
Captain Outerbridge. That was 0833 and 0835.
Admiral Hewitt. Well, then, I understand that several days later
you saw a midget submarine which was recovered off Bellow's Field.
Is that correct?
Captain Outerbjridge. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Admiral Hewitt. Was the appearance of the conning toAver simi-
lar to the one that you saw?
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What was the condition of that submarine off
Bellow's Field? Did it have its torpedoes?
Captain Outerbridge. Yes, sir, it was in good condition and I went
inside and there was a torpedoman — I believe he was a chief tor-
pedoman — [94-] working on the torpedoes, trying to get them
out without exploding them, and I saw the torpedoes inside.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 59
Admiral Hewitt. "Well, I think, that is all I had planned to ask
you. I am naturally interested in any information you can pro-
vide on this Pearl Harbor attack. Is there anything that you might
think would be pertinent to this investigation that you can
volunteer ?
Captain Outeebridge. Well, I suppose it would be a matter of
opinion, which probably wouldn't do you much good, but I was even
a little surprised at the attack which followed. I mean I had no
idea that the air attack was going to follow. We brought the sam-
pan in and we got another submarine attack. We dropped four
depth charges on another submarine in the area. We got depth
charges that morning and at 11 o'clock we ran out. When the at-
tack started, we were still at General Quarters. We hadn't secured
from the attack. We were still at General Quarters and we saw the
planes coming in, but not until after the bombs began to fall, be-
cause the bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor, and the Exec and I
were standing on the bridge. Lieutenant Commander Dowdy was
the Exec and he said, "They are making a lot of noise over there
this morning. Captain." I said, "Yes, I guess they are blasting the
new road from Pearl to Honolulu." He said, "Look at those planes.
They are coming straight down." I looked at them, and he said,
"Gosh, they are having an attack over there." I said, "They cer-
tainly are," and that was the time the attack actually began.
Admiral Hewitt. That was about OToO?
Captain Outeebridge. 0750, yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. That must have been about the time, judging
from this report here, that you were engaged in bringing the
sampan in.
Captain Outeebridge. Yes, sir, we were still standing in with the
sampan.
[95] Admiral Hewitt. You mentioned just then several other
submarine attacks that you had the same morning.
Captain Outeebridge. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. That was after the ones you have already dis-
cussed. What were they?
Captain Outeebridge. They were good metallic contacts, although
I was a little surprised at them at first, before things began to pop.
I didn't think we would get so many, but we did get a lot of them.
We got good metallic contacts and the only thing to do was to bomb
them. They gave us a good sharp echo. We bombed them until we
ran out of depth charges and went in and got sorne more.
Admiral Hewitt. That was in the same general area?
Captain Outerbeidge. Right in that defensive area.
Admiral Hewitt. Off the entrance to the swept channel ?
Captain Outeebeidge. Yes, sir. There was another thing we saw.
That was a lot of explosions along the reefs. I thought that they were
explosions of torpedoes fired into the reefs. I didn't see any other
submarines the whole morning. We didn't actually see any, but we
did see a lot of explosions that looked like shallow water explosions
of torpedoes.
Admiral Hewitt. What would make you think they were torpedoes
rather than bombs ?
Captain Outeebeidge. They were right along the coast, along the
reef, and I didn't see any planes overhead. They were inside the coast
60 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in Pearl Harbor, bombing Pearl Harbor, and I didn't think they would
all miss that far. I thought they would do better than that. They
did do better than that in general.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall approximately how many different
[96] contacts you bombed ?
Captain Outerbridge. I think we had three or four that morning,
sir.
Admiral Hewitt. After the one
Captain Outerbridge. In the first ten days we had eighteen con-
tacts, clay and night, but we didn't actually see any more submarines.
I heard that they were there, but we didn't actually see any more.
We don't know what the effect of the attacks were on the submarines.
There was one other one, on the 2nd of January. We were with our
division, making the attack, and the ship astern of us, after I got in
port, told us that she saw a submarine come up under our starboard
depth charge. I hadn't, up until then, claimed any hit for it. We
had a pretty good contact. It was our turn to make the run. We
made the run and kept on going, and that is what the Commanding
Officer of the ALLEN said. That was the 2nd of January. But we
didn't actually see that from the ship.
Admiral Hewitt. That is of general interest to show the probable
submarine activity out there on the first day.
I think that is about all I have, then. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
[97] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. State your name and rank.
Captain S afford. Laurance F. Safford, Captain, U. S. Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you state your duties during 1941?
Captain Safford. 1941, 1[ was the Chief of the Communications Se-
curity Section, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department.
Admiral Hfavitt. What was the mission of that activity ?
Captain Safford, Our mission was twofold: Intelligence, intelli-
gence on foreign nations, particularly Japan — in fact, almost exclu-
sively Japan ; and security, to furnish our own codes and ciphers and
to supervise the security of our own communications of the U. S. Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. What was the relation between that activity and
Commander, now Captain, McCollum's unit, which, I believe, was
lmownasOp-16-FE?-
Captain Safford. We" were furnishing intelligence or information
to Op-16-F2, who evaluated the information and combined it with
other intelligence and were responsible for its dissemination. My
section had no authority or responsibility for the dissemination of any-
thing except what we called technical information ; that is, the codes
and ciphers. Japanese frequencies, and so forth, which would aid us in
our work, which would aid the organization in its work, rather.
Admiral Hewitt. It appears from your testimony before Admiral
Hart that there were three main radio intelligence units, one in the
Navy Department, which was concerned with intelligence relating to
naval operations in the Atlantic and to the plans and intentions of
foreign governments ; the second at Pearl Harbor, with subsidiary in-
tercept stations at Oahu, Midway, Samoa, and Dutch Harbor, which
dealt with the dispositions and plans of naval forces [98] in
the Pacific and surveilland of naval Japanese communications, exclu-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 61
sive of diplomatic communications ; and the third at Corregidor, which
early in 1941 had been concerned primarily with diplomatic commimi-
cations, but which, in the fall of 1941, shifted its main attention to
Japanese naval communications.
The so-called Japanese "iDurple" code was a diplomatic code, was it
not? ^. -, 1 .
Captain Safford. It was a machine, sir, a very complicated electri-
cal machine.
Admiral Hewitt. But it was used for
Captain Safford. It was used for diplomatic purposes to the higher
embassies, or more important ones, such as Washington, London, and
they also held it at Singapore and Batavia, Tsinking, and a few other
places which I would hesitate to say from memory ; also Berlin and
Tokyo.
Admiral Hewitt. The unit at Pearl Harbor was assigned the pro-
blem of intercepting Japanese communications using the "purple"
code?
Captain Saft'ord. It never was, sir. They hadn't been assigned any
diplomatic circuits since about 1932.
Admiral Hewitt. Was the unit at Corregidor ever assigned the
problem of intercepting communications in the "purple" code?
Captain Safford. The unit at Corregidor had been intercepting
messages in the Japanese "purple" code and other diplomatic systems
for several years and continued to do that up to and including December
7, 1941. Their main attention was on the local Asiatic circuits for the
information of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, but very late
in November, 1941, they were given the additional duty of covering
the Berlin-Tokyo circuit because we couldn't get adequate coverage
from all other stations combined. [99] These were forwarded
to Washington and weren't touched locally.
Admiral Hewitt. What in general were the arrangements for the
exchange of information among the three units, that is, Corregidor,
Pearl Harbor, and Washington ?
Captain Safford. If Corregidor translated a message which they
thought important, they would encipher the translation and forward
it to Washington. Everything they intercepted on the Tokyo-Berlin
circuit was enciphered ; that is, the intercept was enciphered and for-
warded to Washington by radio. Corregidor also had liaison with the
British unit at Singapore and anything of interest or importance re-
ceived from Singapore was forwarded to Washington. In like manner,
any translations of particular importance to the Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic Fleet, were sent out from Washington. We also had a very
free and continuous exchange of technical information between the two
units, by which I mean the keys for the "purple" machine and keys
for another system which we called Jig-19, and any other information
which would help either unit in its performance of duty.
With regard to communications between the Navy Department and
our unit at Pearl Harbor, there were comparatively few. Pearl
Harbor's main mission was in attack on the Japanese flag officers
system. This particular code and cipher had been in effect since
about 1 December 1940 and remained in effect for some time after
Pearl Harbor. We were also attacking this code with another group
in the Navy Department and, I believe, the British were working on
62 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
it. We never succeeded in a solution. From about 1926 to Decem-
ber, 1940, most of our knowledge about the Japanese Navy came from
this code. We thought it the most important system the Japanese
Navy was using and we had our most skilled and most experienced
officers and men working on it. After the attack on Pearl Harbor,
about December 10th, the Hawaiian unit [100] discontinued
their attack on this code and put all their attention on to a lesser
system which used numerals and was held by all ships, or practically
all ships, of the Japanese Navy. We continued attack on the flag
officer cipher back in the Navy Department until the system went out
of use.
Will you repeat the question so I know what I am answering ?
Admiral Hewitt. I can ask another amplifying question here.
Was there free exchange of intelligence information between the
Corregidor unit and the Pearl Harbor unit?
Captain Safford. There was in so far as it pertained to the proj-
ects they were assigned. Corregidor and the Navy Department ex-
changed by radio information on the "purple" machine and on what
we called the Jig-19 system and other diplomatic systems, but Pearl
Harbor was not addressed in these messages.
Admiral Hewett. What about the information gained from break-
ing the code, information as to enemy movements and locations?
Captain Safford. The information gained from breaking enemy
messages, dissemination was a function and responsibility of Naval
Intelligence. We were bending over backwards not to try to take
over the functions of Niival Intelligence in this respect, and at the
same time we were insisting that Naval Intelligence keep out of the
communications field of activity and disband the amateur intercept
stations which various ambitious District Intelligence Officers had
set up without authority from the Navy Department. We insisted
that both parties adhere strictly to approved war plans.
Admiral Hewitt. Well, then, am I correct in stating that any
enemy intelligence, intelligence as to movements or locations of
enemy ships which was gained by the Corregidor unit would not
necessarily be passed by them to the Pearl Harbor unit ?
[101] Captain Safford. It would normally be passed to the
Commander-in-Chief, Asiastic Fleet, or to the Fleet Intelligence Of-
ficer, and they would make further dissemination.
Admiral Hewitt. Before Admiral Hart, you testified that on No-
vember 26th estimates were received from Pearl Harbor and from
ComSIXTEEN relating to the organization and disposition of the
Japanese fleet. Can you identify this exhibit number 8 as
Captain Safford. These are the messages referred to.
Admiral Hewitt. Is it correct, as Captain Layton testified, that the
principal difference between the estimate was that ComSIXTEEN's
unit couldn't confirm the supposition by ComFOURTEEN's unit that
Japanese carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandates?
Captain Safford. To my mind, the chief difference between the two
reports was that ComSIXTEEN gave a great deal of supplementary
information which was not available to ComFOURTEEN. The only
respect in which ComSIXTEEN disagreed with ComFOURTEEN
was in his statement, "Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and
submarines in force are in Mandates. Our best indications are that
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 63
all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area."
Admiral Hewitt. Is it correct that both units believed that the
major j^ortion of Japanese carriers was in home waters?
Captain Safford. It is correct for that particular date.
Admiral Hewitt. Is it also correct that, as you previously testified,
ONI sent a dispatch on November 24th to CinCAF, indicating that
the SIXTEENTH District intercepts were considered most reliable,
and requesting that future reports be submitted from ComSIXTEEN
to OpNav witli copies to CinCPac for information ?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
[102^ Admiral Hewitt. Is it also correct that ONI did not ad-
vise the FOURTEENTH Naval District that they, ONI, considered
ComSIXTEEN's report to be more accurate because of the geograph-
ical location of the ComSIXTEEN unit?
Captain Safford. That was not stated in the dispatch.
Admiral Hewitt, It has been testified previously that on or about
December 1, 1941, radio contact with the Japanese forces was either
lost or greatly diminished. Did you know about this at the time
and, if so, when did you learn it ?
Captain Safford. I do not believe that statement is correct. We
received an immediate report from one of the two stations that the
Japanese had changed their call sign system for forces afloat at mid-
night on December 1, 1941, and until they made a reasonable number
of identifications, any information on the "Orange" fleet through radio
alone would be rather limited. The Daih^ Communication Intelli-
gence Summary which was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, by our unit in Pearl Harbor contained detailed informa-
tion as to not hearing messages from various ships and particularly
the Commanders-in-Chief, Second and Third Fleet, but that an un-
usual number of messages were being broadcast or otherwise addressed
to these forces, and that they believed that these fleets had already
commenced or were about to commence their southward movement.
This information was not forwarded to the Navy Department at that
time, so far as I know, and we did not get the details until copies of
these summaries were received by air mail some time after the attack
on Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you introduce such information as you have
on those communication summaries that you mentioned ?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir. This exhibit, we have copies of Com-
munication Intelligence Summary at Pearl Harbor for the period 1
November 1941 [103] to 6 December 1941, inclusive. The
Navy Department copy could not be located in 1944, When Com-
mander Rochefort reported for duty in 20-G shortly before the Navy
Department Court of Inquiry under Admiral Murfin, he made a
thorough search personally throughout the records of 20-G and could
find no trace or record of this paper ; so he sent a dispatch out to Pearl
Harbor and had them prepare copies out there, which they forwarded
to him for use with that investigation. I signed for one of those
copies and prepared additional copies for the use of this investiga-
tion. It is obvious that there are two or three clerical errors or typo-
graphical errors in copying because some of the sentences seem to be
incomplete or else somebody used a very queer style of English. I
64 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
think they tell the story, with one or two exceptions where we have
to guess.
Admiral Hewitt. We will receive that copy and mark it as an ex-
hibit, subject to correction when the originals are obtained.
(The document referred to was received and marked, "Exhibit 19,")
Admiral Hewitt. We have here Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court's
record, which concerns a series of decoded Japanese diplomatic and
consular dispatches. Will you look at those and tell me, if you can,
how they were obtained, decoded, evaluated, and distributed i
Captain Safford. They were initially obtained from intercepts of
Japanese diplomatic messages between Tokyo and foreign points;
mostly radio intercepts and occasionally. land wire or cable. Some
were photographs of station copies as they passed through the various
commercial communication facilities, but roughly ninety-five per cent
were obtained by radio intercept of the U. S. Army and U. S. Navy
at various points. They were all decoded by means of reconstructed
Japanese sj^stems. The principal was the "purple," [^04-]
which is a complicated electrical machine solved bj^ the Army and
machines made both by the Army and the Navy and two machines, in
fact, sent to London for the use of the British. The Jig-19 at this
period was solved by cryptographic analysis. That had to be done
over again each day, and it really took more time and effort to keep
abreast of the Jig-19 than it did the "purple" once we had the ma-
chine reconstructed. In all these sj^stems, "purple," Jig-19, and the
minor systems, we had an exchange between Washington, Singapore,
Corregidor, and London. We pooled our efforts on that.
Admiral Hewitt. How were these messages evaluated as to their
importance and what distribution was made ?
Captain Safford. They were translated in the translation sections
of the Navy Department unit and the War Department unit and the
senior translator decided which were of relative unimportance, not
worth writing up smooth, mostly connected with financial matters and
visas and things like that ; and the others were all typed smooth and
turned over to Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, respec-
tively. Originally the two intelligence organizations had prepared
briefs or memorandums giving a summation or a paraphrase of the
messages and they were clistributed to the higher officials in the War
and Navy Departments and to the Secretary of State and [lOo]
to the President.
In the Navy Department the people that saw them were, specifically,
the Chief of Naval Operations and his aide usuall}^ saw them; the
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of the
War Plans Division. The Secretary of the Navy also saw them and
usually his aide saw them. The Naval Aide to the President saw them
and took them in to the President.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 65
In the War Department they went to the Military Intelligence, Chief
Signal Officer, Director of the War Plans Division, and the Chief of
Staff, War Department, aid also to the Secretary of War.
Later on, in November, when things became critical, at the request
of the President and after conference agreement between Military In-
telligence and Naval Intelligence, the system of summaries and briefs
was dropped and the original messages were prepared in folders and
each day the folder was taken through. By agreement, all dissemina-
tion to the White House was handled through the Navy Department,
and in return all dissemination to the State Department was handled
through the Army, but the two things were duplicates. Anything the
Navy was sending around, the copy was sent to the Army, and anything
the Army was sending around, a copy was sent to the Navy ; and they
put on a serial number. Ours were JD-1 and the Army's were SI-X,
with a serial ; so they were substantially duplicates unless something
went wrong.
In addition, it was the habit to put notations on the bottom as to
references, and Kramer, when he took his stuff around, everything
that was referenced to anything bearing on this subject was put on the
off side of the page, so that you had the message on one side and the
references on the other side, the left hand side, of the folder. Then,
anybody seeing them had a complete picture. And Kramer went with
them and stood in the [^06] doorway or outside and if there
was any doubt, he could be called in to explain further to anybody
who was interested in the subject. Kramer also went to the White
House, I believe twice. Normally he would explain things to the
Naval Aide to the President and the aide would depend on his memory
to answer any questions the President might want to ask. The Presi-
dent insisted on seeing the original messages because he was afraid
when they tried to condense them, some one would change the meaning.
Admiral Hewitt. If the information contained in these messages
was disseminated to naval agencies outside the Navy Department, that
was the responsibility of the Director of Naval Intelligence or the
Chief of Naval Operations himself, is that true?
Captain Safford. Yes, sir. Well, Kramer was serving under me
and had space in my section. He was officially attached to the rolls
of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence and our foreign
translators were paid from ONI funds. I think Naval Communica-
tions furnished one officer and two or three yeomen because Intelli-
gence couldn't furnish enough people to help them out. We did that
as a favor in cooperation. Kramer had to do a job. But when any
information was passed over to Kramer or Op-20-GZ, Naval Com-
munications' responsibility was finished. From that time on it was
the clear responsibility of Naval Intelligence and we were very care-
ful not to cross the line.
One thing I would like to add. There was only one copy of it
sent around. It made the rounds and everybody took a look at it.
The one exception was on the night of December 6th, when the mes-
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1-
66 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sage was so important and time so short that Kramer made individual
copies for each person who was to see it.
Admiral Hewitt. Here are some additional messages, which have
been introduced as Exhibit 13, also relating to Japanese movements
and the [107] . "winds" code.
Captain Safford. These are the same as the others, except they are
mostly, I notice, in the minor systems.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you examine the messages which are marked,
relating to ship movements, and give me your comment as to how
they were translated, how they would have been translated, apparent
reason for the delays in effecting translation ?
Captain Safford. The JD serial 7029 was an Army translation. I
believe the long delay is due to the fact that the Army forwarded
it from Honolulu by air mail, but only the Army can give the positive
answer to that. Number 7029, dated November 20, 1941, was trans-
lated on December 4, 1941, by the Army.
The next is JD serial 7179, dated 6 December 1941, translated De-
cember 8, 1941, by the Army. That message was in one of the minor
systems, which is known as PA-K2. The notation shows it inter-
cepted at Station 2, San Francisco, and forwarded by teletype. The
War Department unit at that time was observing normal office hours
and secured from work at noon on Saturday, December 6, 1941, with
intention of doing no work until 8 'clock on Monday, December 8,
1941. The Army unit received an urgent call from the Navy about
8 p. m., Saturday afternoon, December 6, 1941, and there were cer-
tain officers over there, working overtime to get back work caught
up. They telephoned and got some of the Army people back and they
assisted the Navy throughout the night of December 6th in translating
the very long and very important fourteen-part message which has
been referred to in earlier investigations. I believe that this mes-
sage, JD 7179, simply laid in the basket until they got all these urgent
messages over and then it was decrypted and translated as a matter
of routine. We had a rigid system of [108] priorities, first
by systems and second by the priorities the Japanese assigned their
own messages, and a message like this in the normal course of events
would only be looked at after the most urgent messages had been
caught up to date.
The JD serial 8007, dated December 2, 1941, and translated by the
Army on December 30, 1941, was intercepted at Station 5, which is
Honolulu. This is an Army translation and I believe the Army are
investigating this themselves to see if they can determine what was
the trouble. Superficially, it was intercepted at Station 5, which is
Fort Shafter, and I think it was forwarded by air mail and just got
delayed in the excitement. The Army gave instructions to encipher
and forward by radio Japanese diplomatic messages intercepted
at Fort Shafter, beginning December 3rd or December 4th, as I remem-
ber. This order was faithfully complied with, but the messages of
earlier date went by air mail as in the past. That is how I account
for this delay, though it is only my supposition. May I add, there
was a notation on the message which said, "This message was received
here on December 23."
Referring to Exhibit 63, JD serial 7086, message was sent from
Tokyo to Honolulu on 29 November 1941 and translated by the Navy
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 67
Department on December 5, 1941. This message was intercepted at
Station 2, San Francisco, and forwarded by air mail or ordinary mail,
because it doesn't have the "TT" which means teletype. Station 2
is an Army unit at the Presidio. Seven days is about the average
time of solution or translation of Jig-19 messages. They normally
weren't forwarded by teletype and also got second priority in transla-
tion. This delay is average and not unusual.
The next is JD serial 7063, dated November 18, 1941, translated
December 5th by the Army. Again, I can't account or give the exact
reason for the delay. It was intercepted at the Navy station at Bain-
bridge Island, [109] Station S, was not forwarded by teletype.
Part of the delay was caused in transmission ; part possibly by delay
in solving the message or solving the Jig-19 key. This was one of
the longest delays we had in the Jig-19 system, but it was by no means
unique.
The next is JD 7111, dated November 19, 1941, translated December
6, 1941, by the Army. This message was intercepted by the Army
station at San Francisco and was not forwarded by teletype. It is
my estimate that the long delay in this message was waiting for enough
messages or a long enough message in this particular system to be
received so that we could solve the cipher. Sometimes we would get
Jig-19 key in a day and sometimes we would have to wait a week
or ten days until we were able to break it.
We have one more, JD 7381, dated December 6, 1941, and translated
December 12, 1941. This was also an Army translation ; so I can only
guess at the reason for the delay. It was intercepted at Station 5,
Army station. Fort Shafter. It is in the PA-K2 system, which
probably had the last or next to the lowest priority in decipherment
and translation. The system had been in effect for several years and
there was no difficulty at all in reading messages in it. But with one
or two exceptions, the message was so unimportant they were never
typed smooth for distribution.
Incidentally, if I may look through, there was one other message
about the same time which I would like to look for, because there were
two messages — the only two messages to or from Honolulu at that time
went on the air twelve hours and eighteen hours respectively before
the attack on Pearl Harbor and there simply wasn't time enough to
get those messages into the War and Navy Departments and have
them translated and get any information out. So, though they may
have been several days late, v^e couldn't have possibly made the grade
on it. This (indicating) may be one [i^O] of the messages I
am thinking about. I am not certain of it. I looked that up way
way back. It is possible that the other message I referred to hasn't
been submitted in evidence.
An additional fact was this : As I said before, the Army were cov-
ering the even days and the Navy the odd dates; that is, the filing
date. And if the Army had been standing continuous watches, the
way the Navy had been since the 1st of February 1941, they might
have picked up these messages in time to have done something with
them, but when they came back on the Navy's call, they only handled
the messages the Navy was looking at and the other messages didn't
get looked at until Monday at best. However, I do not believe we
68 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
could have handled these messages in the minor systems within eight-
een hours of the time they were on the air.
Admiral Hewitt. Were any of the codes used by the Japanese for
reports on United States ships being read at Pearl Harbor ?
Captain S afford. They weren't, sir, and if they were, it was not
known to us.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know whether or not Pearl Harbor knew
of these Japanese reports ?
Captain Safford. I did not know at the time and I only have at
second-hand now and would prefer not to attempt to answer that
question. If I might add for my own answer, we had at Pearl Har-
bor a copy of the old keys in what we called our radio intelligence
publication on Japanese diplomatic systems. We had two or three
spares there and we sent them all out the printed changes, but we
didn't keep them up to the minute and they did not get the day to
day changes by radio which went out to ComSIXTEEN and also
went out to London, and therefore, if they got into those and were able
to read anything, it was only one some of the minor systems, such as
the [ii^] LA system which had been in effect since 1925, and
the PA-K2.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know whether or not any of these dis-
patches which indicated interest in locations of ships in Pearl Harbor
and which were translated before December 7th were ever sent to
CinCPac?
Captain Safford. To the best of my knowledge, none of them ever
were. That would have been Naval intelligence's province and they
would know better than I would, but I have no personal knewledge
of ever sending them, and I did look through the outgoing message
files once and do not recall seeing anything like that.
Admiral Hewitt. Concerning the so-called "winds" message, it
appears from your previous testimony that in all the Navy received
four reports of the establishment of that code and that two reports said
that the use of the code would signify a break in diplomatic relations
and the other two said that it would signify war; that efforts were
immediately made to monitor for a message using that code ; that the
FCC intercepted some messages, set forth in Exhibit 65, which did not
use the words relating to the United States ; that you said that at 0800
on December 4th, Lieutenant Murray or Lieutenant Commander
Kramer came in with a pencilled message which used the words relat-
ing to the United States ; that you said that you had not seen a copy
of this message since December 15, 1941 ; that at that time you checked
the various papers which were being assembled by Kramer, which
included the "winds" message relating to the United States, and then
turned the messages over to the Director of Naval Communications
for use as evidence before the Robert's Commission; that you were
certain that the "winds" message had been distributed both in the
Navy and to the Army ; that no copy could be found in the Navy's files
and that the Army had been unable to furnish a copy; that on the
afternoon of December 4th, Commander McCollum prepared a dis-
patch [i^^] summarizing the situation to date with direct
reference to that "winds" message, and which said that it was con-
sidered to be the signal to execute Japanese war plans ; that you said
that you were present when Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Noyes
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 69
discussed the advisability of sending McCollum's dispatch; that
Admiral Wilkinson wanted to send it but Admiral Noyes did not want
to send it; that you understood that Admiral Wilkinson was going to
try to get the dispatch cleared ; and that you believed, until you read the
Kobert's Report, that the dispatch had been sent. You further indi-
cated that you had conducted some investigation into this matter;
that Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood told you that he knew the
disposition of the copies of the message but did not care to tell you ;
and that you, through very second-hand and devious sources, learned
what happened to the Army copies.
What investigation into this matter did you conduct?
Captain Saffgrd. The statements there are substantially correct.
In the fall of 1943 it appeared that there was going to be a trial or
court martial of Admiral Kimmel. It was hinted in the newspapers
and various people in the Navy Department were getting testimony
ready for it. I realized I would be one of the important witnesses,
that my memory was very vague, and I began looking around to get
everything that I could to prepare a written statement which I could
follow as testimony. That was the time when I studied the Robert's
Report carefully for the first time and noted no reference to the
"winds" message or to the message which McCollum had written and
which I had seen and I thought had been sent. And then I began
talking to everybody who had been around at the time and who I knew,
had been mixed up m it to see what they could remember to straighten
me out on the thing and give me leads to follow down to where I could
put my hands on official messages and things so that it would be a
matter of fact l^i^] and not a matter of memory. I also
talked the thing over with whatever Army people were still around
at the time and had anything in this thing, and bit by bit these facts
appeared to come together. The investigation was conducted, if you
call it that, for the purpose of preparing myself to take the stand as
a witness in a prospective court martial of Admiral Kimmel.
Admiral Hewitt. When and where did you have the conversation
with Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood as to the disposition of
copies of that message ?
Captain Saffgrd. That was not a conversation. I wrote him a
letter about the thing because that was looked for throughout a period
of six months repeatedly. Various people looked for it in the Army
and finally couldn't find it, and I asked him if he knew anything about
it. He said yes, but he didn't care to tell me about it then ; but when he
came back to the States, I asked him about it and found out he hadn't
understood. We were working at cross purposes. I found out he
was referring to the false "winds" message which we had thrown in
the wastebasket. This is document number 2 of Exhibit 65, which was
telephoned from the FCC to Lieutenant Brotherhood, who was on
watch. Kramer identified that as being not what we were looking
for and threw it in the wastebasket.
Admiral Hewitt. Is that the message, then, which Lieutenant Com-
mander Brotherhood referred to when he said that he did not care
to tell you what the disposition of it was ?
Captain Saffgrd. That was the one.
Admiral Hewitt. It was the result of a misunderstanding?
70 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Safford. That was the result of a misunderstanding. We
were talking about different things. He didn't want to get — par-
ticularly [ii4] unofficially, he didn't want to get Kramer into
any trouble on the thing. He didn't mind telling me first-hand when
he got back here.
Admiral Hewitt. Then you have no information that the Army
ever got copies of the "winds" message relating to the United States
to which you testified ?
Captain Safford. I have no information which would be acceptable
as evidence before this Court. I heard the story and I believe it
true, but it is very third-hand.
Admiral Hewitt. The information that you have, even though
second- or third-hand, may be of assistance in furnishing a lead. Will
you tell us your information ?
Captain Safford. The information that I got was that written
copies of the "winds" message had been destroyed in the War Depart-
ment by then Colonel Bissell on the direct orders of General Marshall.
Admiral Hewitt. You don't recall the direct source of that in-
formation ?
Captain Safford. I would prefer not to give the direct source, but
I think it may be confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Sadler before
the Army investigation.
The investigation then, at 12 : 27 p. m., recessed for lunch until 1. 30
p. m., at which time it reconvened.
Present : The same parties as during the morning session.
Captain Laurance F. Safford, USN, resumed his seat as witness.
Admiral Hewitt. Before proceeding any further, I would like to
make sure that the message now under discussion was actually the
message relating to the breaking of diplomatic relations or war with
the United I-^-^-^] States rather than the false message which
indicated war with Russia.
Captain Safford. I am certain that Colonel Sadler did not have
them confused.
Admiral Hewitt. In order to clear this matter up and to permit
further investigation of the allusions to high officers in the Army,
I feel that you should give me the complete story of the source of
this information.
Captain Safford. That story came through Mr. W. F. Friedman,
Principal Cryptanalyst in the War Department, the man who was
responsible for the solution and reconstruction of the "purple" ma-
chine, although at the time of Pearl Harbor he was working on
German systems rather than Japanese and was not directly concerned
with anything that took place at that time, but he did have a fatherly
interest in the Japanese section.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you give me his name ?
Captain Safford. William F. Friedman, Principal Cryptanalyst,
War Department. I have only answered half that question, inciden-
tally. The other is more direct.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes. Will you go ahead ?
Captain Safford. There is another angle, which is very much older
than this destruction. When Colonel Bratton first learned of the
"winds" execute message, he was not entirely satisfied in his mind
and telephoned to Admiral Noyes, requesting to be furnished the
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 71
original intercept so that he could verify the translation. This was
customary in highly important messages because the Japanese lan-
guage was very tricky and sometimes the translations varied, in which
case both translations were sent to higher authority and they could
have their choice. Admiral Noyes refused to comply with this request,
told Colonel Bratton that the Navy translation was correct and the
Army would not be given a copy of the original message. For this
reason, [^^6] Bratton did not take very much stock in the
"winds" execute message; at least, he did not take it as seriously as
Colonel Sadler and the officers in SI-X.
Admiral Hewitt. You are speaking again of this execute
"winds"
Captain Safford. I am talking of the "winds" execute.
Admiral Hewitt. For the United States?
Captain Safford. For the United States. And that story should
appear in Colonel Bratton's testimony before the Army investigation.
1 might add, furthermore. Captain Schukraft knew that the "winds"
execute had been received and that it meant the United States, although
he may never have seen the original message or known the exact
wording.
Admiral Hewitt. Wlio was that ?
Captain Safford. Captain Robert F. Schukraft. He is now a
Colonel, U. S. Army.
Admiral Hewitt. What were the names of the four watch officers
in your section through one of whom this or any similar message
must have passed?
Captain Safford. They were Lieutenant — do jou want their then
ranks or present ranks?
Admiral Hewitt. It is immaterial as long as we can identify them.
Captain Safford. Lieutenant Commander George W. Lynn, U. S.
Navy; Lieutenant Commander Francis M. Brotherhood; Lieutenant
Commander A. V. Pering; and Lieutenant Commander Allan A.
Murray, U. S. Naval Reserve. The first three are in Washington.
Murray is with the Allied Military Government somewhere in the
Pacific.
(The witness desired to augment his testimony relating to the
question beginning on page 111 and continuing on page 112.)
[117] Captain Safford. To supplement the very long summary
in the previous question, Lieutenant Commander Kramer of Murray
or both came in with a teletype message on which was noted in pencil
the translation and meaning of the Japanese words which constituted
the war warning. Kramer has informed me within the past month
that a copy of the "winds" message and other papers relative to the
break in diplomatic relations with Japan were not turned over to the
Robert's Commission but were given to Assistant Secretary of the
Navy Forrestal about 9 December 1941 while he was Acting Secre-
tary in the absence of Mr. Knox, who had flown to Hawaii. So far
as Kramer knows, this folder was never turned over to the Robert's
Commission. I had stated it was my impression — not that it was
a fact, but it was my impression. Kramer said that he went over
this folder with Mr. Forrestal and spent about two hours explaining
the significance of the various messages. Kramer did not recall the
"winds" execute specifically.
72 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Hewitt. What did Kramer tell you about his recollection
of the "winds" message?
Captain Saftord. Kramer's recollection of the "winds" message
now is that it came in, that he and the watch officer, whom he is not
certain of, came up to my office and showed it to me, and then the
watch officer took it upstairs to deliver it to Admiral Noyes, in
accordance with instructions that the Admiral had given Kramer and
were posted in writing at the watch officer's desk at that time, though
I had forgotten that point. Kramer says that we walked down the
corridor together to his office, discussing the message. It was my
custom to talk over ultra secret matters with Kramer, walking up
and down the corridor. We were so horribly overcrowded. My
office had about five people in it and his had an equal number. We
had to go out in the corridor to get any privacy. I recall that the
message was [-?-?5] fouled up somehow and did not come in
the exact form which we expected and Kramer remarked, "You can
alwavs count on those monkeys to do something that you don't ex-
pect. That is a little off from what he told me. That is my recol-
lection getting mixed up in that. And Kramer now is not certain
whether the United States was specifically mentioned or not, but he
is certain there was a "winds" execute message which we were
expecting and that it came in the middle of the week before Pearl
Harbor. I wouldn't say exactly what date. In fact, I had to check
up some outgoing messages to make sure whether it was Thursday
or Friday and Kramer couldn't remember whether it was Wednes-
day or Thursday.
Kramer informed me that no written copy was furnished the Army
and no written copy was distributed in the Navy Department in the
customary manner because Admiral Noyes had given specific orders
not to do so and that he would handle dissemination of this message
himself.
I would like to add, McCollum's message of warning was very
long. The part referring to the "winds" message was very short,
but was the last item in the message.
That covers all the discrepancies on that I had any reason to want
to correct.
Admiral Hewitt. You testified before Admiral Hart that :
The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to
monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the "winds" message when it should be sent, and
this was done. From November 28 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo
broadcast schedules were monitored by about 12 intercept stations, as follows :
N. E. I. at Java ; British at Singapore ; U. S. Army at Hawaii and San Francisco ;
U. S. Navy at Corregidor, Hawaii, Bremerton, and four or five stations along the
Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept stations in the [119] continental
United States were directed to forward all Tokyo plain language broadcasts by
teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran up bills of sixty dollars per day for this ma-
terial alone. The "winds" message was actually broadcast during the evening of
December 3, 1941 (Washington time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time
and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propa-
gation was such that the "winds" message was heard only on the East Coast
of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations that
were listening for it.
Now the question is : What was the frequency and time of day and
condition of radio propagation which resulted in the message being
received only bv one or two of the Navy stations on the East Coast of
the United States?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 73
Captain Safford. That is a question I cannot refer to, having no
station log available. It now appears more likely that it was received
early in the morning of December 4th, Washington time, rather than
late the night before, because the watch officers who were on at that
time only recollect the false "winds" message and not the true "winds"
message. There is a possibility that it was heard by the Dutch at
Java, although such information as I had available indicated the
Dutch did not get it, and it also could have been heard by the Austral-
ians and may have been the basis of the story that was told to Senator
Ferguson by the Australian Minister to this country, who was, I be-
lieve, Minister of National Defense in Australia at the time of tlie at-
tack on Pearl Harbor.
I can illustrate some of the vagaries of high frequency radio by two
or three actual examples of about that time, if I may refresh my mem-
ory here.
Before giving these examples, I would like to state that radio com-
munications over long distances in a north-south direction is much
easier and more reliable than in an east-west direction, and our recep-
tion of the [120] Tokyo radio was always in an east-west di-
jection.
The long fourteen-part Tokyo serial number 902 or JD serial 7143
was intercepted solid at Bainbridge Island, Washington. This mess-
age, incidentally, was received by Radio San Francisco. Part 2 of
this message and the message immediately before, which was Tokyo
serial number 904 or JD serial 7144, were also copied at Cheltenham,
Maryland, were forwarded to the Navy Department by telegraph,
and were used for the actual description of those messages. This is
verified in the GY log for 6 December 1941. The other thirteen parts
of Tokyo serial number 902 were uncopyable at Cheltenham, that is,
they were either not heard or were failing so hard they couldn't make
an intelligible message. Part 2 of the very important part 3 Tokyo
to Berlin, number 985, JD serial 6943, that was dated around the 1st
of December, were missed, but the first and third parts were copied
solid. Incidentally, this came from England and not from this coun-
try.
As I have stated earlier in my testimony, we had to call on Corregi-
dor to cover the Tokyo-Berlin circuits as the combined efforts of in-
tercept stations on the East Coast, West Coast, Hawaii, and England
could not provide better than about fifty per cent coverage.
I would like to add that all hands had been very nervous about our
ability to receive this "winds" execute when it shoiild come in, because
we were not certain of the power or the frequency, of the time or any-
thing, and every day I would come in and I would ask Welker, in
charge of GX, or the watch officer, if we had it and we would call the
Army or they would call us to see if we had it, and I think on one oc-
casion Kramer came down and said that Admiral Wilkinson wanted
to know if there was any chance of our missing it and I told him then
I didn't see how we could because there were so many stations, so
widely scattered, listening for it. When the message first came
[121] in to me, my heart sank like an elevator to think that the Japs
really had the nerve to attack the United States, because as soon as I
saw it, to me it was war and nothing else. And then later, particularly
when I talked with Welker, we had a great sense of i-elief because the
74 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
thing had come in and we hadn't missed it. We had done our part
properly. We had gotten the warning to higher authority and we felt
very thankful that we had put these East Coast stations on it, though it
seemed like a wild goose chase. It was like the center fielder backing
up the second baseman. It was a wild chance, but it paid us dividends.
That was our feeling on the thing.
Admiral Hewitt. Have you any record at all of what East Coast
stations the message could have come in from or did come in ?
Captain Safford. We were intercepting foreign transmissions at
Winter Harbor, Maine, which was a main intercept station and was
always attempting to copy Tokyo; Cheltenham, Maryland, which is
also a main intercept station and guarding it regularly at that time;
Jupiter, Florida, which is primarily a direction finder station but had
an intercept unit attached ; and Amagansett, Long Island, also a direc-
tion finder, but with an intercept unit attached.
Admiral Hewitt. You have no knowledge, then, of what station
this message came in from?
Captain Safford. I have no knowledge which station it came in
from, though I would give firet guess to Cheltenham and second guess
to Winter Harbor, because they had much better facilities than the
others.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know whether the logs of these stations
iiave been searched for any record of this message ?
Captain Safford. We searched for the logs of those stations and in
the Navy Department they had been destroyed during one of the
numerous moves [1^2] and no record kept of them. They
simply couldn't be found.
Admiral Hewitt. When was that search made ?
Captain Safford. This search was made in November or December,
1943, and again in the spring of 1944 — I wouldn't place that any
closer — after we got notice that Admiral Hart would conduct his in-
vestigation. Thfe logs of Winter Harbor, Maine, were destroyed in
the spring of 1943 simply to make room; they destroyed everything
for about six months back. Cheltenham's logs were destroyed when
the intercept unit left Cheltenham and moved up to Chatham, Massa-
chusetts, which was some time earlier than that. I camiot say offhand
what happened to the logs of the other two stations, but they could
produce nothing.
Admiral Hewitt. We have here in exhibit 65 four documents which
are copies of weather messages which were intercepted by the FCC.
They indicate war with Russia rather than war with the United States.
What is your explanation of that?
Captain Safford. I never saw these documents until the day or the
day before I went on the stand before the Navy Court of Inquiry
under Admiral Murfin. The document number 1 was the information
which Major Guest gave the FCC in requesting their cooperation.
I did not know about this request or else had forgotten it completely.
Welker might know something about it. Document number 2 is
obviously a part of a true weather forecast and bears no relation to
the "winds" execute we were expecting. However, it was telephoned
in to Brotherhood and this is what he was referring to by the winds"
message. Not having a copy of the message before our eyes, we were
working at cross purposes there.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 75
Admiral Hewitt. In other words, one of you was referring to one
message and the other to the other message, the one about Russia ?
[123] Captain Safford. Yes, sir, to this one here.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
Captain Safford. Brotherhood said he called Admiral Noyes and
Admiral Noyes said, "That is a funny direction for the wind to blow
from, isn't it?" and Brotherhood said, "Yes," and the Admiral said,
"I don't think there is anything in it. Don't take any further action
until tomorrow morning," and then Kramer took one look at it and
said, "That is not what we want," and threw it in the wastebasket.
For the sake of the record, this was received — it was intercepted at
approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941, and was telephoned to
Brotherhood at 9: 05 p. m., Eastern Standard Time, from the Wash-
ington office of the Federal Communications Commission. This mes-
sage came in twelve hours or more after what I referred to as the true
"winds" execute had been intercepted and received.
Now, document number 3 was intercepted by the FCC and telephoned
to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7 : 50 p. m.. Eastern Standard
Time, December 5, 1941. That also is apparently a part of a true
weather forecast because it mentioned south and south did not come
in as part of the "winds" code. We only had the three directions:
north, east, and west. If it had been a "winds" code message, it would
have referred to Russia because it does specifically mention north.
Admiral Hewitt. But does it follow the form which was specified
for the "winds" code message in the dispatch which established that
code as to the location of the reference in the broadcast, and so forth ?
Captain Safford. In document number 3 the reference to north wind
does not follow the form or location specified in their set up, but, for
that matter, neither did the true "winds" message. The Japanese fol-
lowed that [1^4] one up, though I can t remember just how
it was. I know in discussing it afterwards, Welker and I congratu-
lated ourselves that we had required all plain language to be for-
warded to Washington to be looked over here instead of telling the
stations what to look for and relying on them to segregate true from
false.
Admiral Hewitt, What is your recollection of the wording of the
true message ?
Captain Safford. May I get into number 4 before I get into that ?
Admiral Hewitt. Oh, yes.
Captain Safford. Document number 4 is a true "winds" execute
message, the way we expected to see it, but mentions England only.
It was sent about twelve hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, what is your recollection of the wording of
the so-called true "winds" message ?
Captain Safford. My recollection was that they sent the voice
form by Morse code and made some other departure from what was ex-
pected. Murray says that in addition they sent the negative form
of "north wind cloudy."
Admiral Hewitt, That isn't quite clear to me. What do you mean
there? You say they sent the negative form of the north wind. If
that was south wind
Captain Safford. No, it wasn't south. The three winds were speci-
fically named ; that is, Kita, north, or Hussia ; Nishi, west, or England ;
76 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that included the Netherlands East Indies ; and Higashi, east, or the
United States. They had the other expressions in Japanese which
accompanied these words in the voice form of the message.
The "winds" execute message as translated gave east wind, war with
the United States; west wind, war with England, including N. E. I. ;
and the [i^5] negative form of north wind, meaning no war
with Russia, or which could have been interpreted as no war with
Russia.
Admiral Hewitt. Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court record indicates
that a "winds" code execute message relating to England was received
and transmitted to Lieutenant Commander C. C. Dusenberry, U. S.
Army Service Corps, at approximately 8 p. m.. Eastern Standard
Time, December 7, 1941. If a "winds" code execute relating to the
United States and England had been sent on December 4th, as you
previously testified, why was a "winds" code message relating to Eng-
land alone sent on December 7th ?
Captain Safford. This message was broadcast about twelve hours
after the attack on Pearl Harbor, which had been announced on all
the radios of the world. It may have been to remind the Japanese con-
sulates, and so forth, that Japan was still going to attack England or
British possessions and it may have been to amplify the hidden word
message received in Washington a little before 11 o'clock, Eastern
Standard Time, December 7, 1941, which was translated differently by
the Army and Navy but seemed to stop short of war. I am referring
to Tokyo circular number 2494 or JD serial 7148.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you describe to me what is meant by the
hidden word code ?
Captain Safford. The hidden word code was set up by Tokyo cir-
cular number 2409, dated 27 November 1941, JD serial 6985, and was
subsequently added to by three or four other messages. It provided
a means of sending out secret information in ostensibly plain lan-
guage, certain words being given as a secondary or hidden meaning,
constituting the true message. This system was designated or indi-
cated by adding the word "stop" in English as the last word of the
message, whereas the rest of the message was in Japanese. The hidden
word message of December 7th referred to had thirteen \^126'\
words of text, exclusive of the indicator "stop" and the signature
"Togo." Three of these words constituted the true message, namely,
Koyanagi^ Ration^ Minami. This message was translated in such a
hurry Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, that the third word, Min-
ami, was overlooked and the message delivered to the Chief of Naval
Operations and the President merely said, "Relations between Japan
and England aren't in accordance with expectations." The Army
translation was considerably stronger and added "America." We did
not get this information until 1944. I do not know when the Army
discovered that Minami had been omitted.
Admiral Hewitt. And the significance of Minami was United
States?
Captain Safford. United States. In fact, we didn't know it until
the Army pointed it out to us. I would like to add one thing more.
While the Japanese set up a very elaborate system for reporting mili-
tary movements, declarations of war, smuggling of critical materials,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 77
and so forth, tliis one message is the only time that I recall that they
ever used the hidden word code.
Admiral Hewitt, It was not used, then, so far as you know
Captain Safford. So far as I can recall offhand, it was never used
again. If it were, it was nothing important and it was just lost in the
maze.
Admiral Hewitt. Well, thank you very much. Captain.
Captain Safford. May I add one more thing to this hidden word ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes. Add anything that you think would be
pertinent and of value.
Captain Safford. I would like to add this : The hidden word set up
was translated by the Navy on December 2, 1941, and from that time
on we could not be certain whether the Japanese decision as to peace
or war would come in the hidden word code or in the "winds" message,
and apparently [127] they used them both. As a matter of
fact, they did use them both. .
Admiral Hewitt. That is all. Thank you very much, Captain.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 2:30 p. m., adjourned until 12:30
p. m. the next day.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 79
urn PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY
Seventh Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General
Board, Navy Department, at 12 :oO p. m., Tuesday, 22 May 1945.
Present : Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN ; Mr. John' F. Sonnett ;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's
Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. State your name and rank.
Captain Kramer. Alwin D. Kramer, Captain, U. S. Navy.
Admiral He^vitt. What was your duty or assignment in 1941 ?
Captain Krajsier. I was attached to Op-16, Far Eastern Section, but
working in Op-20-G.
Admiral Hewitt. Under Captain SafFord ?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. And you were the head of the Translation Sec-
tion ?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, Op-20-GZ.
Admiral Hewitt. And on some occasion you evaluated messages as
well as translated them, evaluated them as to their possible impor-
tance ?
Captain Kramer. For information I expressed my opinion on them,
yes, sir, which can be construed as an evaluation. The evaluation was
normally done by Commander McCollum, the head of the Far Eastern
Section, or Admiral Wilkinson, but I gave them the benefit of my opin-
ion about it, too.
Admiral Hewitt. You were in this section that was headed by Cap-
tain Safford, but you were also responsible, I believe, to Captain Mc-
Collum of ONI?
[i^P] Captain Kramer. I was primarily responsible to Captain
McCollum of ONI, yes, sir. That arrangement may seem a little
unusual, but it was one that had been in effect since the early 20's for
several reasons. One was since all the language talent available in
the Navy at that time were language officers who had been to Tokyo
in that three year language course and as a result were well known
to the Japanese and were normally in social contact with the Japa-
nese in town here, naval attaches and assistants and the embassy
people, it was felt preferable to have them attached to the office of
Naval Intelligence than to a section of Naval, Communications. That
was one reason. There were a number of others.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes. Well, that is very logical. Exhibit 63,
64, and 65 of the Naval Court's record and exhibit 13 of this record —
have you had an opportunity to examine those?
80 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Kra'mer. I looked at them briefly yesterday afternoon,
yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. I -would like to ask you if you can identify the
messages in exhibit 63 and exhibit 64 which establish or give the so-
called "winds" code.
Captain Kramer. There are two messages in 63, numbers 13 and
15. Both concern the setting up of that plain language so-called
"winds" code, one applicable to Morse code transmission, the other to
voice broadcast. In exhibit 64 there is also one that I saw in 1941,
namely, number 2. The dispatch marked number 3 from ALUSNA,
Batavia, I do not recall having seen.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you tell me what steps were taken to listen
for and monitor any message using the "winds" code ?
Captain Kramer. I was familiar only in a general way with the
[130] allocations of circuits to be monitored by our intercept sys-
tem and the Army intercept system. I do know that because of the
considerable interest in this particular "winds" code message, an un-
usually wide coverage was directed; but regarding the details of
which stations were so ordered to watch for it, I cannot give any
testimony from first-hand knowledge.
Admiral Hewitt. Are you familiar with the messages in exhibit 13
setting up the so-called hidden word code? If so, will you explain
what this code was?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, I am familiar with these messages
marked number 6 in exhibit 13. As the messages themselves indi-
cate, it was a system set up by the Japanese Foreign Office whereby
in the case of disruption of encoded traffic, they could make use of
plain language words to get across hidden meanings as set forth in
the code. We were very interested in seeing any of this traffic after
the thing was set up, which was about the end of November, but
traffic did not appear in this system until the 7th of December and
the latter part of December, '41.
Admiral Hewitt. How was the use of the hidden word code indi-
cated in a message ?
Captain Kramer. That we did not know until the first traffic ap-
peared. Based on experience, we assumed that it would be an in-
nocuous sounding Japanese Romagi message.
Admiral Hewitt. I think in one of those messages, at least, if my
recollection is correct, it says look for the hidden meaning if the Eng-
lish word "stop" is used at the end of the message instead of the
Japanese word.
Captain Kjiamer. That is correct. That refreshes my memory
now. I remember, now that you remind me of it, that these reams of
plain language traffic that we were getting in several weeks before
Pearl Harbor were searched [^-^-?] for that indicator. That,
however, I didn't recall specifically because I didn't do the searching.
It was done by the GY watch officers.
Admiral Hewitt. I believe that about the middle of the first week
of December there was a teletype message which, to the best of your
recollection, one of the watch officers had in his possession and which
was subsequently delivered to Admiral Noyes. Will you tell me
about that, to the best of 3^our recollection ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 81
Captain Kramer. I previously testified on that matter at Pearl
Harbor, Admiral. I would like to go over that previous testimony
again in the light of thinking it over since that time. I had no re-
collection of that message at the time it was first mentioned to me in
the spring of '44. However, after being given some of the details of
the circumstances surrounding it, I did recall a message some days
before 7 December '41, I believe about the middle of the week 1-7
December, and I do recall definitely being shown such a message
by the GY watch officer and walking down with him to Captain
Safford's office and being present while the GY watch officer turned
it over to him. A brief conversation ensued and Captain Safford then
took it, I assumed, to Admiral Noyes, since that message we had all
been on the qui vive about for a week or ten days. That is the last I
saw of such a message.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you recall what the general subject of the
message was ?
Captain Kramer. It was, as I recall it, a "winds" code message.
The wording of it I do not recall. It may have been, ^^Higashi no
haze ame^'' specifically referring to the United States, as I have previ-
ously testified at Pearl Harbor, but I am less positive of that now than
I believe I was at that time. The reason for revision in my view on
that is the fact that \^132'\ in thinking it over, I have a rather
sharp recollection in the latter part of that week of feeling there was
still no overt mention or specific mention of the United States in any
of this traffic, which I was seeing all of and which also was the only
source in general of my information since I did not see, as a rule, the
dispatches from the fleet commanders or going out to them from Opera-
tions.
Admiral Hewitt. Then it is still your belief, the best you can recall
in view of that, there was no indication
Captain Kra^nier. I would like to continue that statement, Admiral,
by saying : For that reason, I am now at least under the impression
that the message referred to England and possibly the Dutch rather
than the United States, although it may have referred to the United
States, too.
Admiral Hewitt. Or possibly it may have referred to Russia?
Captain Kramer. I just don't recall.
Admiral Hewitt. Reference to one or more of the messages supplied
by the FCC is in exhibit 65. Can you recall whether any of those
may have been seen by you ?
Captain Kramer. This document 1 is not a message and document 4
is the one of the 8th of December about midnight GMT. I may have
seen these specific messages. I cannot be certain, however, because we
saw a great many messages of this kind in looking for this particular
type of "winds" code message. When we started monitoring all Jap-
anese plain language some weeks before Pearl Harbor, the volume of
material coming in was simply tremendous, swamping. We had only
three linguists at the time for translation purposes, with a pretty
heavy volume of coded traffic concerning the negotiations. Conse-
quently, we felt the extra burden or having to scan all this Japanese
plain language stuff and there were many instances of \13S'\
weather occurring in that, but because of the fact that the particular
code thing we were looking for, we felt it was incumbent on us to ex-
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 7
82 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
amine it all. The reason I cannot state specifically that these par-
ticular ones were ones I had seen, but they were of the same nature
as many I did see.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall any message which arrived in the
forenoon of 7 December using the hidden word code ?
Captain Kramer. I didn't recall it until I looked over these exhibits
yesterday afternoon. I had been under the impression since the hear-
ing of last summer that it was a "winds" message.
Admiral Hewitt. The one you saw, this hidden word, you decided
that was the message
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. Now that I have reexamined the ex-
hibits, I recognize that as being a hidden word message.
Admiral Hewitt. My understanding is that when that was first
decoded, the word minami, Avhich related to the United States, was
overlooked, so that the translation merely referred to England. Is
that your recollection ?
Captain Kramer. Last summer when that question of the late
morning of 7 December had come up at Pearl Harbor, my recollection
had been that it was a "winds" message. It wasn't until I saw these
exhibits yesterday afternoon that my recollection was refreshed to the
extent that I thought it was one of these hidden word messages rather
than the "winds." I do recall on that that after my return from the
State Department near 10 : 30 the morning of 7 December, we had just
had translated a message specifying the time of delivery of the four-
teen-part note from the Japanese Government to the United States.
That item, together with several other minor messages, one thanking
the Ambassador for his services and another to the embassy staff and
another directing final destruction of codes, all added up in my
[JS4-] mind to a crisis to take place at 1 o'clock. Consequently,
I was in very much of a hurry to get the word out. The books were
made up in the course of a couple of minutes and as I was leaving the
office, I looked at another short plain language message that had just
come in, had just been brought in, and I recognized, as I recall it now,
the first word in there as being a code word in this plain language
text, a code word referring to estranged relations or breaking rela-
tions. As I recall it now, I dictated to a chief yoeman the sence of
the message, glasing through the entire message, spotting another code
word referring to England, and then two minutes after that was on
my way. It wasn't until I returned to the office approximately an
hour later and was looking over the marning's traffic again that I
again examined more closely this particular plain language message,
which was one of many in the traffic that morning, and noted the
omission referring to the United States.
Admiral Hewitt. I show yout a copy of a Tokyo dispatch dated 7
December and ask if you can identify it.
Captain Kjramer. I believe this is the one I saw that morning, yes,
sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you read it for the benefit of the record ?
Captain Kj?amer. It is a message from Tokyo to the legation in
Panama, classified urgent, serially numbered as a circular number
2494, the initial 9 in that figure group indicating circular, and reading:
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 83
Koyanagi rijiyori seirinoUigoo arunituki hattori minami kinebimko seturitu
kikino kyokaingaku sikyuu denpoo aritasi stop — Togo.
It is. to be noted that this is a "stop" message ; therefore of the
hidden word code. My recollection of the handling of this par-
ticular message that morning was as I have earlier indicated and on
seeing this message now, my recollection tends to [^35] be
confirmed in that the initial word of the mesage referred to England.
The fifth word of the message referred to estranged relations. May
I have my previous answer read.
(The former answer referring to this message was read.)
Now on seeing the message, I can see that the initial word refers
to England and the seventh word of the message, at the beginning
of the second line, refers to the estranged relations. It was on
the basis of those two words that I hastily dictated something to
go along with the folder I was already on my way out with and
did not note the omission in translation of an additional code word
appearing in this message until return to the office and reexamina-
tion of the morning's traffic an hour or more later. My recollec-
tion is not clear cut as to the time when the discrepancy was noted.
I do, however, have a rather vague recollection of making two or
more phone calls at the time the discrepancy was noted, which,
if correct, would indicate that that discrepancy was noted perhaps
a quarter of one or 1 o'clock. I do definitely recall, however, that
no retranslation of that message was made for distribution be-
cause of the fact that before it could be delivered to the recipients
of this traffic, who had left meetings respectively in the State De-
partment and Chief of Naval Operations' office for lunch, that it would
be well after the time of delivery, 1 o'clock, about which there had
been so much excitement late in the morning. I might further add
that when the attack was first learned, I recall definitely feeling that
there was no point in making the delivery at that time. That was
perhaps 1 : 30.
Admiral Hewitt. Referring back to document 11 of exhibit 13
there, can you identify that as the original translation which you
made that you dictated hurriedly?
[136] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, I do. In this connection, how-
ever, I might add that I do have a recollection of making an insertion
in, I believe, the file copy of this message of the words "United States,"
with a view to making a distribution of a corrected copy, but that no
actual corrected copy was distributed because of the attack taking
place about 1 : 30.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall, during the latter part of December,
'41, during the absence of Secretary Knox, assembling a collection of
intercepted traffic bearing on Pearl Harbor and discussing this with
Mr. Forrestal ?
Captain Kjiamer. Yes, sir, I do.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you recall whether or not this message of
7 December, this hidden word message of 7 December, was among
that group of messages ?
Captain Kramer. I cannot specifically recall. Admiral, but I am
almost certain that it was. We broke out a sizeable folder of that
84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
traffic for Mr. Forrestal, and I recall going through it rather hastily
in the course of three-quarters of an hour or so, giving him the general
tenor of the way the things shaped up from this traffic because of the
fact that Mr. Forrestal hadn't normally seen this material before that
time.
Admiral Hewitt. Referring to the so-called one p. m. message,
document 41 of exhibit 63, which you have previously mentioned, will
you tell me what you remember about delivery of that message?
Captain Kramer. I have already touched on what took place in my
office as regards the haste of getting this out to recipients on my re-
turn from the State Department about 10 : 30. Wliile the folders for
recipients were being made up, I recall drawing a navigator's time
circle to see if this one p. m. Washington time tied up at all with the
developments in the [137] Malay area, which we had been fol-
lowing in considerable detail the previous week. I recall being im-
pressed with the fact that one p. m. here was several hours before sun-
rise in the Kra Peninsula area, where we knew the Japanese had been
contemplating an attack on Kota Bharu with the connivance of the
Thaiian Chief of Staff. That further tied up with the movement of
a large Japanese convoy down the coast of China the previous three
or four days. For that reason, I felt that on the way over to the
State Department it might be well to point that out for Mr. Knox'
benefit, and when the folder for Mr. Knox was turned over to Mr.
Hull's private secretary, I did point that out and repeated that matter
to Colonel Bratton, who was also in Mr. Hull's outer office with a
similar folder for Mr. Stimson as well as Mr. Hull.
Admiral HEwm. Then you knew the fact that this particular time
was before daylight in the Far East but shortly after daylight in the
Hawaiian area was significant?
Captain Kramer. My mention of the time 7 : 30 at Pearl Harbor
was incidental in passing this explanation on for Mr. Knox' benefit.
I mentioned that point too because of the fact that I had just com-
pleted two years sea duty operating out of Pearl Harbor, was
thoroughly familiar with the IOI/2 time zone, and more or less auto-
matically inserted Hawaiian time into that time circle.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you call the attention of any one else to the
significance of this time ?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, I think that I repeated that item perhaps
to eight or ten different people, including people in my office, I believe
Commander McCollum, and I am not certain but possibly to Admiral
Wilkinson ; several people in the State Department, Colonel Bratton,
and, I think. Captain Safford. But I don't believe that I mentioned
it specifically, [138] although again I may have, on delivery
to the CNO's office.
Admiral Hewitt. I would like to refer you now to the intercepted
Japanese messages which referred to ships and the location of ships
in Pearl Harbor, in particular documents 14, 15, 22, and 24 of ex-
hibit 13. The notations on those messages indicate whether they were
intercepted by the Army or the Navy and give the times of translation.
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you explain or discuss the time lag between
the dates of the interception and the dates of translation of those
messages ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 85
Captain Kramer. Numbers 14, 15, and 24 are Army translations.
Number 22 was a Navy translation which, however, was intercepted
by an Army intercept station, station number 7. Date of origin was
3 December; date of translation 11 December. I recall seeing this
message for the first time Monday morning, the 8th of December. In
view of what had happened the previous day and further in view
of the rather badly garbled and partly unrecovered form of the mes-
sage we had, it took about two days before this translation was com-
pleted. At that time, namely, when the translation was completed,
a message giving the essential points in it was sent to Pearl Harbor
or was sent to CinCPac, suggesting that it be passed on to the District
Intelligence Officer. Even in this form here, there are several gaps
and undecipherable spots, after having worked on it for a couple of
days and comparing additional copies of this message with the one
we were working on.
Admiral Hewitf. Would some of the time lag possibly have been
due to the volume of traffic which was being intercepted arid decoded?
Captain Kramer, I will refer specifically to number 22 again, but I
think it applies to all four of those. The time lag in the case of mes-
sage number 22, the so-called "lights" message, between the date of
origin [139] and the date we got it I cannot account for
specifically, but can give this background on this type of code. The
machine systems, when the key had been recovered and was being used
again, were usually very promptly decoded, a case in point being the
previous afternoon, when between 3 o'clock in the afternoon and
about 8 : 30 in the evening thirteen parts of that f ourteen-part note
were coming in at intervals and the whole job was completed, as re-
gards decrypting, translation, and typing:, by 9 o'clock, when I com-
menced delivery after calling Admiral Wilkinson. In the case of the
codes, however, as compared with these machine ciphers, it depended
on the volume of traffic whether or not a key for that day's traffic was
broken. Sometimes, with luck, a day with a small amount of traffic
could be broken. Many days, however, never were broken. This par-
ticular exhibit 22, I can't state from first-hand knowledge whether
such factors entered into the delay or whether the delay was due to lag
between time of origin and transmission by the Japanese consulate
or lag between time of intercept and delivery here.
Admiral Hewitt. Have you any other information which has not
been brought out before which you think would be interesting or
pertinent to this investigation.
Captain Kramer. I think that I have covered my part of this thing
fairly completely. Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
[I40] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. State your name and rank.
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. George W. Linn, Lieutenant Commander,
U. S. Naval Reserve.
Admiral Hewitf. What duty were you assigned during 1941?
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. I was in OP-20GY, which was a decrypting
section of the Communications Intelligence Section, and I was as-
signed, I think it was probably about February or March — ^a watch
was started, a twenty-four hour watch started, and I was assigned to
86 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that watch and later became the senior officer of that watch. Some
time, maybe a month or so, before December 7th, I was taken off the
watch list and put on days, principally for decrypting reasons. I had
more experience than most of the others and Captain Safford wanted
to be sure we would get the keys in this machine cipher as soon as
possible during the night so that we would have them the next morn-
ing. So that took me off the watch list. Then — I am not sure about
this date — a couple of days before the Tth of December we started our
Christmas leaves and one of our watch officers started his leave and
I went on the watch list in his place, and that put me on watch from
1600 to 2400 on the 6th.
Admiral Hewitt. How many watch officers were there standing
that watch during the first week in December ?
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. Well, at the early part of the first week there
were the four watch officers, including the one that I replaced. From
about the 4th or 5tli on — I am not sure about this date — there were
three others besides myself.
Admiral Hjewitt. Can you give me their names?
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood,
[i^i] Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, and Lieutenant Com-
mander A. A. Murray, all Naval Reserve.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you know of the existence of the "winds"
code at the time ?
Lieutenant Commander ETA shrdl
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. Well, I saw the translations of the documents
that set up the "winds" code and I knew that steps were taken to get
the raw material in and the watch was assigned the task of looking
over that raw material outside of normal working hours. Lieutenant
Commander Kramer, who was in Op-20GZ at that time, handled that
himself during the day, anything that came in during normal working
hours. At night the watch looked over this raw material. It came
in mainly from the West Coast, plain language Japanese; came in by
teletype.
Admiral Hewitt. Then if anything came in on that subject, it would
have been seen by you or one of the officers that you have mentioned ?
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. Yes. If it had come in outside of normal
working hours, some one of the officers should have seen it. I myself
have no knowledge of it. I will say this, that we wouldn't of necessity
know about it
Admiral Hewitt. But one of vou
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. If it did come in. But the man who received
it would.
Admiral Hewitt. What I am trying to bring out is it must have
gone through one of the officers that you mentioned, one of those four
watch officers, outside of working hours ; is that right ?
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. That is right.
Admiral Hewitt. And Commander Kramer during the day time?
Lieut. ComdT. Linn. Yes. Well, he was in during the evenings a
lot. [^4^1 It is pretty hard to draw the line. Commander
Kramer worked sometimes as late as 9 o'clock. It is pretty hard to
draw the line at 1630.
Admiral Hewttt. What I am trying to bring out is if an execute or
any message having to do with that "winds" code had come in, it would
have been seen by at least one of those officers ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 87
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. Yes, if Commander Kramer wasn't there at
the time. We were the GY watch and we had the responsibility for
anything that came in if it came in through Naval Communications
or anything else. The only way in which they might not would be if
something came in at 8 o'clock and he just took the raw material and
handed it to Commander Kramer without looking it over.
Admiral Hewitt. Then Commander Kramer would have seen it?
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. He would would had it himself. That is right.
Admiral Hewitt. Are you able to state positively that you never saw
any intercept which used the code words indicating the breaking of
relations with the United States or war with the United States ?
Lieut. Comdr. Linn. Prior to December 7th, yes. I have seen the
one from the FCC, but that was afterward. That was a part of the
previous investigation. I didn't see anything before that I remember.
My memory in some phases of this is good and others not too good
at all. I knew nothing about the FCC being mixed up in this until
at the time of the inquiry, when I saw that copy.
Admiral Hewitt. That is all. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
[14^] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. State your name and rank.
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Francis M. Brotherhood, Lieutenant
Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve.
Admiral Hewitt. It appears from previous testimony that during
1941 you were connected with the security section of Naval Communi-
cations in Washington and that you have some knowledge of the so-
called "winds" code. What were your duties in 1941 ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Admiral, I was one of the watch offi-
cers in charge of the decryption and preparation of diplomatic dis-
patches, especially the Japanese.
Admiral Hew^itt. Will you tell us what you know about the "winds"
code and the efforts to monitor for the "winds" code ? State what your
understanding of the "winds" code is and what steps were taken to
listen for a message using that code.
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Some time in the month of November,
Admiral, we got a dispatch which we succeeded in breaking out, that
told us that the Japanese were planning to inform their consular
officials around the world by voice radio from Tokyo to the effect
that they intended to break relations with certain countries, among
them the United States, Russia, and Great Britain. I don't remember
whether any one else was included. It would be in the way of a
weather broadcast. A certain weather expression was to indicate
that Japan planned to break diplomatic relations with the United
States, and another expression meant that they planned to break
with Great Britain, and still another that they planned to break
with Russia. As one of the watch officers through whom they hoped
to have the message transmitted to the authorities at the Navy Depart-
ment, I had been [J4j] drilled as to what to watch for and
had very specific instructions as to how to handle any such dispatch
that was intercepted.
In connection with the intercept facilities, I wasn't a part of the
people that set up the intercept organization, but it was my under-
standing at the time that whatever facilities the Navy had that could
be diverted to the reception of voice signals as against conventional
88 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
radio telegraphic signals had been diverted and had been set up for
the purpose. We regarded the possible intercept of such an execute
order as being of great importance. We had been instructed further
that the FCC had been informed of what we were looking for and
that under certain circumstances we might hear from them, and the
Army, who was working this diplomatic project with us jointly,
and my understanding at the time was that they were also diverting
certain facilities in an effort to get this broadcast. That is the back-
ground, as I understand it.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall what, if any, messages were re-
ceived using this "winds" code ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. I was on duty there the evening of,
I believe it was, the Ith of December — I rightly don't remember at
this moment whether it was the 4th or the 5th — when the FCC called
and asked for some one to whom they could deliver a certain dispatch
and the officer of the FCC at the other end indicated to me some way
that I understood what he was driving at, and I said, "I am authorized
to take it," and I did so and it was an expression that just didn't quite
fit the code. In other w^ords, it was not what we were looking for.
I would say not what we were looking for. In other words, it did
not indicate that we might expect a break in relations on the part
of Japan with the United States, but it was suggestive of a break in
relations with Russia. However, as I remember the [^4^] dis-
patch in question, without refreshing my memory here, it was not
accurate in its fitting the formula insofar as Russia was concerned.
At the time, I myself was not in position to evaluate the value of that
dispatch. I had only my orders to pass it on, which I did. However,
I did so with a reservation in my own mind that it was not fitting
the formula setting up this dispatch.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you examine this exhibit number 65 of the
Naval Court of Inquiry and see if any of those fits the message which
you just described?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. This one (indicating) is somewhat
like the message that I have just described, although this is in English,
a translation of Avhat I actually received.
Admiral Hewitt, That is document number 1 ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. This is document number 1.
Admiral Hewitt. Look at the others also. What about document
number 2 ? Could that have been the message to which you referred ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. That doesn't strike me. Admiral
Hewitt, as being the one.
Admiral Hew^itt, Number 1 to which you refer is not a message,
but it might be the code ?
Lieut, Comdr. Brotherhood. Yes, sir, but that was the point I
made, Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. I will rephrase the question. Document number
2, then, as I understand it, refers to the north wind, but in referring
to the north wind, it did not follow the form which had been more
or less specified in the message that set up the "winds" code, is that
correct ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Yes, sir. That was the impression I
had at the time.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 89
[14.6] Admiral Hewitt. Will you discuss to whom this message
was delivered ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Admiral Hewitt, my instructions were
to first get in touch with the communication watch officers upstairs
and pronounce the words that I had heard from whoever sent them
to me, in this case the FCC, and I would receive further instructions.
The communication watch officer instructed me in these words : "You
want to see the Admiral." I called the Admiral on the telephone
directly and without delay got him on the other end of the wire and
told him verbally what I had received. The reaction on the part of
Admiral Noyes, who was then the Director of Naval Communications,
was that he thought the wind was blowing from a funny direction,
and he used words to that effect. As I said, when I telephoned this
thing through, 1 didn't think personally, although I was not supposed
to think in the matter — I didn't think it was in the nature of an execute.
Admiral Noyes further gave me to believe from what I heard him say
over the telephone — I can't quote his words, but the impression I got
was, however he would pass the information on for what it was worth.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall what conversation you had with
Captain Safford concerning this ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Admiral Hev/itt, I haven't had my
memory refreshed on that conversation, although Captain Safford
says that I called him that morning and told him such a dispatch had
arrived. That was in accordance with my instructions, too.
Admiral Hewitt. But you can't remember now actually whether
you did it or what was said ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. No, sir. If I hadn't seen Captain
Safford here a half hour ago, I wouldn't be able to say that I had
called him, but Captain Safford said I did and I believe I had called
him.
[IW] Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall ever seeing any message
which referred to the United States ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. No, Admiral, I do not.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you give me the names of the other officers
who stood the same watch that you did ?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Yes, sir. I relieved Lieutenant Com-
mander Linn, Lieutenant Commander George Linn, at midnight —
well, 1201, December 7th — and I was relieved in turn by Lieutenant
Commander A. V. Pering some time after 7 the same morning, and
the other officer, whom I did not see that day, was Lieutenant Com-
mander Murray. I don't remember his initials.
Admiral Hewitt. Were there any officers who stood watch earlier?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Well, sir, we had another member of
the group. There were five of us. The other member of the group
managed to get in his Christmas vacation that week — I mean his
annual leave — so he was not present, and that was Lieutenant Com-
mander Brown.
Admiral Hewitt. The only other officer besides those you have
mentioned who would have direct knowledge of such messages or
through whom such messages would pass would be Commander
Kramer, is that right?
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood. Well, Commander Kramer should
certainly be considered, yes, sir.
90 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Hewitt. As I understand it, he would have the messages
that came in during the day and one of these watch officers, one of
you watch officers, would be sure to see any messages that came in
during the night outside of working hours. Is that correct ?
Lieut Comdr. Brotherhood. Yes, sir. That would also be true of
the day time. We had a teletype set up there in which all this stuff,
if it was intercepted by any of the outside stations, was being trans-
mitted to us.
[14^] Admiral Hewitt. I think that is all then. Thank you
very much.
(The witness was excused.)
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Heavittt. State your name and rank.
Lieut. Comdr. Pering. Alfred V. Pering, Lieutenant Commander,
USNE._
Admiral Hewitt. Wliat were your duties during 1941 ?
Lieut. Comdr. Peking. I was the watch officer in Op-20G.
Admiral Hewitt. And you were carrying out that duty during the
first week in December, 1941 ?
Lieut. Comdr. Peking. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Who were the other watch officers?
Lieut. Comdr. Peking. Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood, Lieu-
tenant Commander Murray, Lieutenant Commander Linn. At the
time there was a four section watch.
Admiral Hewitt. You knew of the existence of the "winds" code?
Lieut. Comdr. Peking. Yes, sir. We had instructions to look for a
certain set of conditions in plain language Japanese which was being
intercepted.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you ever see any intercept using that code
which referred to the breaking of relations with the United States?
Lieut. Comdr. Peking. I did not, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you see any referring to breaking relations
with any other nation ?
Lieut. Comdr. Peking. No, I saw none.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
[149] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. State your name and rank.
Lieutenant Freeman. Frederick L. Freeman, Lieutenant, U. S.
Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. What were your duties during 1941, Mr. Freeman ?
Lieutenant Freeman. I was in the section that was identified as sec-
tion GI of Intelligence, which was a correlating section and dissemi-
nating section. We disseminated intelligence received by us from the
field radio intelligence units to ONI. We wrote up our own reports on
the basis of information sent to us and delivered them to ONI.
Admiral Hewitt. Did 3'ou stand a watch in connection with those
duties?
Lieutenant Freeman. We had been on a watch basis, sir, for about
a month, I would say — I don't recall exactly how long, but it was
about that long — ^before Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Hewitt. What other officers shared that watch with you
the first week of December, 1941 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 91
Lieutenant Freeman. Lieutenant M. W. Lyon, Chief Yeoman —
he is Ensign now — Nine, and Chief Yeoman Stalter.
Admiral Hewitt. You were acquainted with the so-called "winds"
code then ?
Lieutenant Freeman. Yes, sir, I was.
Admiral Hewitt. What do you know about the efforts made to
monitor, intercept, a message referring to that code or in that code?
Lieutenant Freeman. Well, I am aware that we made every effort.
We were expecting the signal to execute and I know that every effort
was made, all stations were alerted to listen for it; but from personal
knowledge I don't know that we ever actually got the signal.
[ISO] Admiral Hewitt. You never knew personally of any in-
tercept?
Lieutenant Freeman. No, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you recall what discussions you may have
had with Captain Safford concerning this?
Lieutenant Freeman. I had a discussion with Captain Safford some
time last year about it and he was requesting me as to my memory of
the circumstances, as to whether or not we had gotten such a message.
I was standing duties adjacent to the section that was responsible for
decrypting, and so forth, at that time and we worked fairly closely
with them and he thought that I might personally recall having seen
the message executing.
Admiral Hewitt. But you never did?
Lieutenant Freeman. I never did, no, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. That is all. Thank you.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 4: 10 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m.
the next day.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 93
[151^ PKOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIRY
Eighth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General
Board, Navy Department, at 2 p. m., Wednesday, 23 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin .H. Griswold, USNB.; and Ship's
Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
Admiral Hewitt. Careful consideration has been given to the evi-
dence concerning the so-called "winds" message with a view to deter-
mining whether or not Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN, formerly
Director of Naval Communications, should be called as a witness.
It appears from the testimony of Captain Safford that he thought
that a "winds" message relating to the United States was received
about 4 December 1941 and was shown to him by Captain Kramer
and a watch officer and then delivered to Admiral Noyes. It appears
from the testimony of Captain Kramer that be believes that there was
some such message at about that time, but that he cannot recall
whether or not it referred to the United States, and he is under the
impression that it referred to England and possibly to the Dutch
rather than to the United States, although it may have referred to
the United States also. Captain Kramer believed that the message
in question was delivered to Admiral Noyes. There is yet no other
evidence to the effect that a "winds" code message relating to the
United States was received.
Upon review of the sworn testimony of Admiral Noyes, given be-
fore the Naval Court of Inquiry, it appears that he recalled no such
message and that he did not believe that any such message relating
to the United States had ever been received by the Navy, although
he had some recollection of a "false alarm." Accordingly, I find that
no useful purpose would be served [1-5^] by calling Admiral
Noyes as a witness in this investigation, and direct that the portions
of his previous testimony relating to this subject be incorporated in
this record. This decision will be reconsidered should further evi-
dence be developed indicating that a useful purpose would be served
by reexamining Admiral Noyes.
(The extracts of testimony of Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN,
before the Naval Court of Inquiry, follow. )
[iJS] Extracts of Testimony of Rear Admiral, Leigh Notes Before Naval
Court of Inquiry
37.' Q. I would like to show you document 15 of Exhibit 63, which has been
familiarly termed the "winds message" and ask you to examine it and state
whether you had seen this document on or after the date of its translation, which
is noted in the right-hand corner as being 28 November 1941?
A. Yes.
38. Q. What action did you take with reference to this document when it was
brought to your attention?
94 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. We took steps to get immediate notice from our intercept stations to cover
this point.
39. Q. Subsequent to the date of your having taken these steps to get inter-
cepts from your stations, will you state whether any of the code words as set out
in document 15 were received in the Navy Department, either in Japanese or in
plain English?
A. They were not.
40. Q. I show you Exhibit 65, and refer you to Document No. 2 and Document
No. 3. These are intercepts by Federal Communications Commission. I ask you
whether you were ever acquainted with the information contained in these docu-
ments prior to the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941.
A. I have no recollection of ever having seen this document.
41. Q. Either 2 or 3 — either document?
A. No, sir.
42. Q. Had you ever been informed of the contents of either 2 or 3 prior to
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941?
A. Not to the best of my knowledge.
43. Q. Can you recall whether or not an oflBcer in your Division made any
telephone calls to you with reference to any subject matter contained in the winds
code, of document 15, that you have previously been shown?
A. No.
44. Q. Do you recall at any time prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
on 7 December 1941, having been informed by some officer in the Navy Depart-
ment that there had been received in the Navy Department certain information
about winds, and that your reply was. "The wind seems to be blowing in a strange
direction," or words to that effect? Do you have any recollection of such a con-
versation ?
A. I do not."
78. Q. At any time prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 De-
cember 1941 was there brought to your attention a dispatch that had been pre-
pared by Commander McCollum in the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Far
Eastern Division in which there was a summary or resume of intelligence infor-
mation to be transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?
[154] A. I believe that Admiral Wilkinson discussed such a message with
me which was an estimate of the situation based on purely communication intel-
ligence coming from the Director of Naval Intelligence. I told him that in my
opinion estimates of the situation should come from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions.
79. Q. Do you have any knowledge of whether or not that message was ever
transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?
A. I do not.
80. Q. Can you state what action was taken in the Navy Department with
regard to releasing this dispatch?
A. I cannot. I exercised no censorship in regard to dispatches except to see
that they were properly released.
The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, stated that he did
not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested party. Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
81. Q. At the time that you saw this McCollum dispatch that was prepared and
being considered for transmission to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet,
do you remember whether any reference was made to the winds code system?
A. I do not.
82. Q. What special circumstances or procedures were set up in your office for
the handling of the execution signal of the winds code system if and when the
execution signal was received?
A. We had a siwcial 24-hour watch for all communication intelligence matters.
83. Q. Were there any special cards prepared giving the Japanese words that
were expected and these cards, six sets of them, delivered to persons in the Navy
Department who would be particularly interested upon the receipt of the execu-
tion of that signal?
A. I couldn't say.
84. Q. As a possible refreshing of your memory, there has been testimony given
before this court that prior to the receipt of the execution signal you had prepared
a series of six cards and these had been delivered to officials in the Navy Depart-
ment who would be particularly anxious to know of this execute signal at the
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 95
earliest moment it was received. Do you now recall that any such system was
established?
A. No, I couldn't say.
85. Q. There has been testimony before this court to the effect that the execu-
tion of the winds code system was received and that a thorough search in the
Navy Department files had failed to receive a copy of the execution signal.
Would the Director of Naval Communications files be the normal place in which
the record would be kept?
A. If it was received by naval means, yes ; if not, no.
86. Q. Will you please answer the question. Are not the files of the Director
of Naval Communications the normal repository of such messages?
[155] A. If received by naval means, yes. Otherwise, the OflBce of Naval
Intelligence.
87. Q. The testimony before this court was that it had been received by naval
intercepting means and therefore the record of this message would naturally be
kept in the files of the Director of Naval Communications, would it not?
A. Yes.
88. Q. Can you explain why this document is missing from the files of the
Director of Naval Communications?
A. I don't think that your assumption is correct. I don't think that any such
message was received by naval means.
89. Q. Then at no time did you learn from anyone of the execution of the winds
message in any form, and at no time did you tell anyone of the execution in any
form of the winds message? Is that the way you want to leave your testimony on
that subject?
A. That is right ; yes.
136. Q. Referring to this "Winds Message" and the execute of the "Winds
Message" : Have you any recollection whether Lieutenant Commander Kramer
came in with the execute of the "Winds Message" and said, "Here It is"?
A. As I remember it, we received some outside information which afterwards
turned out not to be correct. That information was taken to mean that an
execute of this "Winds Message" had been received. It turned out not to be
correct.
141. Q. In my previous examination I asked you, "At no time did you learn
from anyone of the execution of the 'Winds Message' in any form and at no
time did you tell anyone of the execution in any form." I ask you if that is the
way you wish to leave your testimony on that subject? I now invite your atten-
tion to the fact that you have just testified that you received some information.
From where did this information come?
A. I beg your pardon. I said, to the best of my recollection, that there was a
false alarm about it.
142. Q. But that was information about the "Winds Message", was it not?
The mere fact that it turned out to be false afterwards did not take it away from
that particular subject, did it?
A. I would be very glad to give you a better answer if I could.
143. Q. Then, you did hear from some source about the execution of the "Winds
Message" ; is that right?
A. I can only say that to the best of my remembrance no execution of the
so-called "Winds Message" was finally received.
Reexamined by the court :
144. Q. Did you ever discuss this "Winds Message" or the receipt of it with the
Chief of Naval Operations?
A. When the message came in, as I remember it, we considered it more impor-
tant than a later study of it indicated. The message only said that relations were
strained.
[156] 145. Q. I asked you whether you discussed it?
A. With the Chief of Naval Operations personally?
146. Q. Yes.
A. No.
147. Q. Did you give him any information?
A. He got a copy of it.
Recross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy (Ret.) :
148. Q. I show you document 3 of Exhibit 64, which is a message from Alusna
Batavia to OpNav, No. 031030, and ask you whether or not you have seen that
dispatch, or whether you recognize it, and if so, at what time did you see it?
96 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I couldn't say the time I saw it. I did see it.
149. Q. Will you read the first part of the dispatch to the court, please?
A. (Reading) "From Thorpe for Miles, War Department."
150. Q. And continue for the first three lines.
A. (Continuing) "Code intercept. Japan will inform her consuls of war de-
cision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end."
151. Q. Does that not indicate more than just strained relations?
A. It was his interpretation apparently of the same message that had already
been received.
152. Q. Was it not entirely possible that the translators in the War Depart-
ment of the Japanese code would have reached about the same conclusion, in that
they had the same words to work from?
A. This was not necessarily-
The interested party. Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, made the follow-
ing statement : I call the court's attention to the fact that this was not a trans-
lation made in the War Department. This came from Batavia that way.
The witness made the following statement : Somebody in Batavia had gained
that information.
153. Q. But the dispatch represents the translation of the same code system
which was sent out by Japan, does it not, namely, the "Winds Code" system?
A. Probably, We discussed it with the War Department. They did not have
much confidence, as I remember it, in the information from there as against the
rechecking that was done in Washington.
154. Q. Can you state from where this false report on the "Winds Message"
was received ; that is, who gave it to you?
A. No.
155. Q. But you do recollect that you did hear about the execution of this before
7 December 1941?
A. It has been stated and it has been testified to that there were six [157]
copies made of this dispatch, and also I won't trust my i-ecoUection for three years
back as against my assistants. These people who handled the details were my
subordinates, and their recollection of details is probably better than mine.
Reexamined by the judge advocate :
156. Q. Will you state, exactly as you remember having seen it, what this false
report of the execute of the "Winds Message" was?
A. I can only say that, in the phrasing of the questions, I believe there must
have been some discussion about it. I am convinced that it was not finally found
to be correct.
157. Q. What I am trying to ascertain, Admiral, is the wording of the report
which you received and which later you determined to be false?
A. I don't know.
158. Q. Do you know from whom it was received?
A. I don't.
[158] Two witnesses entered and each was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. Will each of you gentlemen state his name and
rank.
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. Leo Eeierstad, Lieutenant Commander,
USNR.
Lieutenant (jg) Conant. Jo.seph M. Conant, Lieutenant (jg),
USNR.
Admiral Hewitt. Lieutenant Commander Eeierstad, what are your
duties ?
Lieut. Comdr. Reiekstad. I am in charge of the translating unit in
Op-16FE.
Admiral Heavitt. That involves translating Japanese ?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Wliat are your qualifications in Japanese?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. Well, I am a graduate of the Navy's
School of Oriental Languages and Japanese language and then I had
nine years of residence in China, during which time I studied Chinese,
which, of course, has some relation to the Japanese language as far as
the written form is concerned.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 97
Admiral Hewitt. Lieutenant Conant, will you answer the same
questions with regard to your duties and qualifications?
Lieutenant (jg) Conant. I am a translation sub-section head under
Lieutenant Commander Reierstad and my qualifications are solely
that I graduated from the Boulder Language school.
Admiral Hewitt. Have you examined this exhibit number 14, which
I present to you ?
Lieutenant (jg) Conant. Yes, sir.
Lieut. Comclr. Reierstad. This looks like the one that we had and
actually examined.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you examine it closely enough to tell whether
this is the same one or a copy of it? This is a photographic copy.
[159] Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you state whether this is the one that you
looked over to translate ?
Lieutenant (jg) Conant. Yes, that is the one.
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. I present you with exhibit number 4 and ask you
to testify if the printed part of the exhibit, with the additional pencil
notations, is your translation of the exhibit number 14?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad, It is.
Lieutenant (jg) Conant. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. How does your translation compare in general
with this exhibit number 3 ?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. This (referring to exhibit number 3) we
haven't examined prior to this time, sir. Admiral, I point out here,
sir, that this translation, which is a possibly correct one, also might
be translated ''establish position." I should like to make clear that
the time element, whether it is past, present, or future, is not definitely
ascertainable from the characters as appearing here.
Admiral Hewitt. That would also be true where this caption is "en-
emy ship sunk" in exhibit 3 and in exhibit 14 it is "attack and sink"?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. That is also true. Simply on the basis
of the original Japanese it is not possible to say definitely whether it
is past or future action. "Attack and sink enemy battleship" could be
correct, or "enemy ship attacked and sunk" would also be correct, in
our opinion.
Admiral HEWiT-r. I call your attention to the fact that the entrance
channel is marked here by rings through a lighthouse here and through
t he Sugar Mill stack at Waihapu, that a vessel entering the channel at
these [JGO] outer buoys should be on this range (indicating).
Will you confirm my idea that possibly this notation "position estab-
lished" could be a note to get on that range at that point ?
Lieut, Comdr, Reierstad. I would say definitely. Wouldn't you,
Conant ?
Lieutenant (jg) Conant. Yes, I would say that.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you state the date on which you last looked
over exhibit 4 and added the pencil notations ?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. 22 May was the last time we handled this
chart and put our final remarks, on.
Admiral Hewitt. Are you willing to certify as to the accuracy of
this translation within the limitations of tense which you have already
expressed ?
79716— 4C— Ex. 149, vol. 1- S
98 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. And we would like to add within the
limitations of this being a photostatic copy and certain parts of it
being impossible for us to accurately discern.
Admiral Hewitt. But to the extent that there is a translation here
on exhibit 4 it is accurate ?
Lieut, Comdr. Reierstad. Yes sir.
Admiral Hewitt. In other w^ords, your translation is not complete,
but what you have translated is correct ?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. Yes, sir, with the further qualification,
of course, that the Admiral just made, that we cannot undertake to
state whether this is past or future tense.
Admiral Hewitt. In the book "Battle Report" on page 26 there is
a statement, referring to this chart or another photographic copy of
the same chart: "At one point on his chart, and as if to bolster the
evidence [^67] of his own vision, he wrote in Japanese, 'I saw it
with my own eyes'!" Could you find anything on this chart which
might be the basis for that statement, any notation on this chart?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. In this connection, sir, all we can say is
on the basis of the photo copy made available to us for examination,
there is no evidence we have been able to locate of any Japanese writ-
ing that could be so translated.
Admiral Hewitt. Calling your attention to the notations which are
in ink near the times 0115 and 0410, one is translated as "fight."
Could that possibly refer to the initiation of a general attack or a
zero hour for an attack ?
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. In my opinion, it definitely could.
Lieutenant (j. g.) Conant. Yes, sir.
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. It is very possible, but again there is no
way of saying whether that is a future action or a past action.
Admiral, there is just one idea that occurred to me, whether it might
not be worthwhile in connection with this project to get the original
and to also make from the original a study of the calligraphy which
appears here in different places to establish first of all whether it
was all written by the same man, if possible, whether some of it might
not have been written in considerably greater haste. A good deal of
information could be obtained from a study of that kind. Don't you
think so, Joe ?
Lieutenant (j. g.) Conant. Yes, sir.
Lieut. Comdr. Reierstad. The interesting thing here is. Admiral,
that all of these signals appear to have been written in pencil. If
anything had been fixed up in advance, I think that that happening
would have been written on in ink, if we assume that these other
things were also written [162] on in ink, well in advance.
Also the question of the effect of what damage on some parts of the
document as against the others which would make some of these stand
out more clearly.
Admiral Hewitt. That is all. Thank you very much.
(The witnesses were excused.)
The investigation was then, at 2 : 30 p. m., adjourned until 11 a. m.
Friday, 25 May 1945.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 99
[163] PROCEEDINCtS of THEmEWITT INQUIEY
Ninth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General
Board, Navy Department, at 11 a. m., P'riday, 25 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNE.; and Ship's
Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Admiral Hewitt. State your name and rank.
Eear Admiral DeLany. Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLany, U. S.
Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. You were Assistant Chief of Staff in the Opera-
tions Office of CinCPac?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes. sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Prior to 7 December 1941 ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. You are, of course, familiar with exhibit number 8
of the Naval Court's record. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41
on the security of Pearl Harbor. One of the assumptions is —
That a declaration of war may be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in
Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, (3)
a combination of the two.
And also at the end of the letter a statement was made that —
It must be remembered, too, that a single submarine's attack may indicate the
presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accom-
panied by a carrier. •
Is that correct ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Exhibit 52 of the Court of Inquiry's record, which
[WJ,.'] is Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, established the
task groups then in effect ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Task forces, yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. You can identify that ^
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Also we have exhibit 69A and B of the Court of
Inquiry, which purport to be memoranda gotten up for the Com-
mander-in-Chief by Captain, now Admiral, McMorris. Can you iden-
tify those from your recollection ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, that exhibit, tliose two memoranda, as I un-
derstand it, were somewhat in the nature of a check-off list of steps to
be taken
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir. They were given to the Duty
Officer.
/
100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Hewitt. — a running check-off list of steps to be taken in
case war was declared ?
Rear Admiral DeLant. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, before tlie Roberts Commission you stated
that as far as you recalled, the question of an air raid on Pearl Harbor
was not discussed between 27 November and 7 December. Is that still
in accordance with your memory?
Rear Admiral DeLany. You mean a surprise attack
Admiral Hewitt. It says :
The possibility of an air raid on Pearl Harbor was not discussed between 27
November and 7 December.
Rear Admiral DeLant. I take it that you mean a joint discussion or
as a matter within the Staff or personal discussion. "Never from the
point of view of what liappened" ; yes, sir, I confirm that statement,
[16S] Admiral Hewitt. The question was :
Had you any discussions between November 27 and December 7 as to the proba-
bility of Japanese naval action or air action?
Never from the point of view of what happened.
Then the next question was :
The possibility was not discussed, the possibility of an air raid?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir, that is still my
Admiral Hewitt. But it was not specifically discussed after the ar-
rival of the war Avarning on November 27th?
Rear Admiral DeLany. No, sir. The same answer there ; not in the
light of what happened, an attack of that nature.
Admiral Hewitt. What I was trying to bring out was whether the
possibility of what actually did happen was discussed during that criti-
cal period from November 27th to December 7th in the Staff or with
Admiral Kimmel.
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir, within the Staff, even before this
time, and when this order Avas formulated, it was stated in there that
the possibility of an air raid existed ; but with the information that
we had, it wasn't discu^ed as a matter that was actually going to
happen. There always was a possibility of it.
Admiral Hewitt. About that time was an estimate of the Pacific
situation made?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. In which various enemy courses of action were
considered ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Was that in written form or was it just a mental
estimate made by the Commander-in-Chief or some of the members
of the Staff?
[lOG] Rear Admiral DeLany. Well, Admiral, I think that the
war plans that came out of the Pacific Fleet, and I think must be on
file here, gave consideration to that.
Admiral Hewitt. The Pacific Fleet war plans.
Rear Admiral Delany. There was a Rainbow plan and shipping
raid plans.
Admiral Hewitt. Let's refer to that.
Rear Admiral DeLany. I can't give you the contents of those war
plans after all this time, but I know there was a running estimate of
the situation and plans based on those estimates.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 101
Admiral Hewitt. You expect it to appear in the assumptions to
the war phm, do you not?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Looking at this Pacific Fleet Operating Plan,
Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-l), they are general assumptions:
That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British
Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in
Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, com-
prising either :
1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.
Note: As of 22 June war exists between tiie European Axis and Russia,
and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of
the Axis but not necessarily against Japan,
b. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility
of their intervention must be taken into account —
and other general assumptions of that nature, and one special assump-
tion—
That the [167] Pacific Fleet is virtually mobilized and is based at Pearl
Harbor, but regular navy yard overhauls are in progress which would reduce
forces immediately available by about one-fifth.
Now, I might read the following into the record, I think. In Chap-
ter III, paragraph 1331, of this reference, the Estimate of Enemy
Action includes the following:
1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited
to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket
battleship or heavy cruiser.
1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows :
a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia
(including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.
b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American
and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean,
and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.
c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.
d. The principal defensive efforts to be :
1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.
2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central
and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced
bases.
3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.
1.333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action
will be toward :
a. Capture of Guam.
[168] b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea. Philippine
waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of
advanced bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval
forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.
c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas
area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval
forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.
e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval
forces.
f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying
United States positions.
1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:
a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong
concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines,
and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.
b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position
(possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the
Mandates.
102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probably main base
in Halmahera).
d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces
in that area.
[169] e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft
in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported
there.
Those are the essential ones. Take this sub-paragraph "f" here:
Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines
in the Hawaiian area.
That would seem to indicate that a raid on the Hawaiian area by
forces other than submarines was not seriously contemplated then^
Rear Admiral DeLany. That is right ; to the extent that it actually
happened, that is correct, and I think it might be pertinent to say
that I believe that that plan was submitted to the Navy Department and
approved by the Navy Department. I don't know the date because I
am not familiar enough with the thing three years from then to say
what the thing is, but I know that those things were submitted to the
Navy Department.
Admiral Hewitt. I read from the letter of distribution of this book :
From : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To : Distribution List for WPPac-46.
Subject : WPPac-46.
1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet
been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect prior
to the receipt of such approval.
You don't remember whether that
Eear Admiral DeLant. I don't know that the thing was actually
approved, but the concept of the whole thing was that it was to be
approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, because it is intimated
in that letter that approval hadn't yet been received and if the occasion
arose before the approval was forthcoming, it would be placed in effect
anyhow,
[170] Admiral Hewitt. So as to have something ready?
Rear Admiral DeLant. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Well, I gather a picture of this, from reading the
testimony and so forth, that you had a great many warnings of dif-
ferent sorts. You knew about that time that the relations were
strained — there was a good deal in the papers about it, as I recall —
and you had the messages of November 24th, particularly, and Novem-
ber 27th, The message of November 24th, with which you are un-
doubtedly familiar, was from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and the Naval Districts con-
cerned. The one of the 24th was : "Chances of favorable outcome of
negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. This situation coupled
with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval
and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam
is a possibility," This says any direction but puts emphasis on the
attack on the Philippines or Guam,
Do you recall what discussion was held of that and what other
directions besides those indicated, the Philippines or Guam, were
considered ?
Rear Admiral DeLant. Yes, sir, I think that the fact that air-
craft carriers were sent out to place planes on both Midway and Wake
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 103
and that patrol strength at Midway was increased is indicative of the
fact that we thought that the attack would not probably be limited to
the Philippines and Guam but it would extend farther to the eastward
as far as Midway and Wake.
Admiral Hewitt. What made you feel that it might not be extended
farther east or probably wouldn't be ?
Eear Admiral DeLany. Well, Admiral, I think Intelligence indi-
cated that there weren't any forces in that area.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you glance over these intelligence sum-
maries [i7i] (exhibit 19) and see if you can recall whether
those or something like that were the ones that were available to you ?
Rear Admiral DeLant. Yes, sir, these are summarized in the daily
conferences in which the Intelligence Officer of the fleet presented
the
Admiral HEW^TT. The general tenor of those was that there was
considerable movement of forces in the direction of Indo-Cliina and
the Kra Peninsula and to the south and southeastward generally but
there might be some forces in the Mandates, particularly submarines.
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. There was a question whether or not there might
be a carrier unit there, is that correct ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. And that the main body of the carriers was in
home waters ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. What did you generally understand out there by
"home waters"?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Generally to the westward and southern
of the Philippines and in the homeland itself.
Admiral Hewitt. Close to the homeland ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Now, then, you got this war warning dispatch
on November 27th which contained the words, "Thit dispatch is con-
sidered a war warning," and went on, "The negotiations have ceased
and an aggressive move by Japan is expected in the next few days,"
and went on to mention these forces to the southeast. What was the
general feeling out there as to what that dispatch meant? That was
considered a war warning. Was that [-?7~'] taken particu-
larly seriously?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Very definitely so. Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. I mean it meant more than the other warning
dispatches that they had had before ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir, and the operating forces at sea
were all put on condition watches, darken ship, required to steam
continuously in anti-submarine defense dispositions.
Admiral Hewitt. As a matter of fact, that had been the case for
almost
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir, but it had been tightened up after
this thing here.
Admiral Hewitt. Now as to the message addressed to both the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Asiatic, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, "Ex-
ecute defense deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks assigned
in WPL 46." You had at that time two carrier task forces out there
delivering planes?
104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. So that you did have some forces to the west-
ward?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. But, as I understand it, there was nothing else
done in the matter of defensive deployment which was considered
possible or necessary. Am I correct in that ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Well, so far as the relations between the
Army and Navy were concerned, there were conferences and I believe
that the same concept existed then as existed previously, that the
greatest danger in the Hawaiian area lay from submarine attacks
and sabotage in view of the intelligence information that we had.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know whether an attack of the nature
whicli [173] actually was carried out was ever investigated
carefully as a possible course of action? Was there an investigation in
which you figured out the distances and times necessary to cover the
distance of a carrier running from the home waters
Rear Admiral DeLany. As I recall, it wasn't possible, between the
time of the attack and the receipt of the war warning, in the event
that the intelligence was correct about the fleet being in home waters.
Admiral Hewitt. Well, the home waters would have been anywhere
in the home islands ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Well, the evidence indicates that that force actu-
ally left the harbor up there at Etorofu Island on the ^'7th, which
was the date of the war warning. I haven't laid this thing out myself
yet to figure out the speeds and so forth, but apparently it clemon-
strate„d that it could be done. I just wondered if they had been laid
down and thought of
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir, I am sure — well, I know that in
the Operations Section and with the plans that had been put on a
piece of paper.
Admiral Hewitt, That would have been McMorris's job, wouldn't
it? He would have known the details of that and what study was
made of it?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Speaking of the conferences and so forth between
the Army Staflf and the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, also with Com-
FOURTEEN's I suppose, as to courses of action and defensive meas-
ures, did you have a staff command post or communications center
or an operations room which was to be put into effect in case of war
or strained relations, or was there ever an exercise, joint exercise,
carried out?
[174] Rear Admiral DeLany. In all the exercises that were con-
ducted prior to this, there was a joint setup as much as was possible
with the facilities and communications and other requirements in
effect, because as required by the Commander-in-Chief out there, there
had been numerous air raid exercises and the Army's installation was
fairly well complete, as I recall it, for their own particular control
of planes, but the hookup into a central joint operational room never
had been made.
Admiral Hewitt. Was it planned?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, there were complete plans for the
installation of a complete warning net on the island and the joint ar-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 105
rangement up there in the caves in the liill was all down on paper and
the thing was definitely an acconii)lished plan.
Admiral HEwrrr. Did that include a command post, or whatever
you want to call it, for ComFOURTEEN?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. And CinCPac, too, if he was there?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, because the whole joint defense of the
island was planned in those arrangements.
Admiral HEwrrr. But it had never actually been tried out in an
exercise ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Not with that installation as existed sub-
sequent to the 7th of December, because there just weren't any mate-
rials available to establish this radar warning set hookup or anything
like that. I think all the material was ordered according to plans,
but it never had been delivered, never had been set up, by the Tth of
December.
Admiral Hewitt. .There is a lot of testimony through here in vari-
ous jilaces of efforts which w^ere made to get the various things which
were needed to improve the defenses. We have the letters which were
written about the [^75] deficiencies in defenses in the first
part of 1941, the requests for planes; of course, the supply of addi-
tional planes, except in the operations, would not have been your
function, but do 3'ou happen to know whether that was kept after,
the importance of that was realized ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir, I am positive of it. The Com-
mander-in-Chief made a trip back here in the summer of '41. The
thing was completely outlined in that, and I believe the records show
the efforts that were made by everybody to get more planes, more
anti-aircraft batteries, more communication facilities. We took pains
to get officers w^lio had been familiar with the defense of Great Brit-
ain out into the Islands to instruct and lecture and guide everybody
in their island defense installations. That had been going on for
months.
Admiral HswrrT. I recall a reply to the request for additional
planes, made by the Navy Department, which stated in effect that
the planes weren't available. Was any reason ever given for the non-
availability of these planes, why they weren't available? Was it be-
cause they did not exist or because they were distributed elsewhere ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. As I recall it, it is the latter case ; they were
being distributed elsewhere.
Admiral Hew^itt. And shortly after the attack took place, addi-
tional planes were sent very promptly, is that correct?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes. There was no question of their ability
to deliver planes to us after the Tth of December.
Admiral Hew^itt. Do you recall where those came from ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. They came from continental United States.
I don't know where they started out from initially, sir. That same
thing is true of [77^] a lot of material that wasn't available
before the Tth of December, that flowed out to us out here.
Admiral HEwrrT. Referring to Exhibit 8 of the Naval Court's rec-
ord, Assumption B, that indicates that a surprise air attack on Pearl
Harbor is possible, does it not ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes.
106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Hewtett. And that letter was issued on October 14, 1941 ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. I believe that the letter was orio;inally is-
sued in March or April, 1941, because reference (a) is PacFleet letter
2CL-41. "Reference (a) is revised herewith." This is a revision.
The original order, which was almost identical with this, was issued.
I believe, in March, 1941.
Admiral Hewitt. And this revision was issued on October 14, 1941 ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. That is what the date says; yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. So that from the date of the first letter up to and
including October 14, 1941, I take it it was an assumption that a sur-
prise air attack on Pearl Harbor was possible ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, I think it is correct to say that.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you know whether there was any written esti-
mate or assumption made after October 14, 1941, which changed or
modified that assumption in any way ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. No, because I think it was as correct in
March, 1941, or October, 1941, as it is on the 25th^of May, 1945.
Admiral Hewitt. Referring to Exhibit 19, Admiral, which contains
communication intelligence summaries, and particularly to the sum-
maries for the period November 27 to December 6, 1941, do you recall
that on or [177] about December 1, 1941, there was a change
in the radio call signs of the Japanese ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. No, I can't answer that.
Admiral Hewitt. Would it refresh your recollection if you exam-
ined the communication intelligence summary for December 1, 1941,
contained in that exhibit ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. The question now was what ?
(The question asked was read back as follows :)
Referring to Exhibit 19, Admiral, which contains communication intelligence
summaries, and particularly to the summaries for the period November 27 to
December 6, 1941, do you recall that on or about December 1, 1941, there was a
change in the radio call signs of the Japanese?
Rear Admiral DeLany. My answer is still that I do not remember
now whether I knew it then or not. I mean this doesn't refresh my
memory. I do not recall whether I knew that or not.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall that there was any noticeable dimi-
nution in radio traffic from Japanese fleet units after December 1,
1941?
Rear Admiral DeLany. I believe that the subject was mentioned
at the morning conference by the intelligence officer in the fleet out
there.
Admiral Hewitt. Can you recall the substance of that discussion
at that time ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. No, I can't. I don't recall it at all.
Admiral Hewitt. But you do recall that there was some discussion
of the change ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, I recall there was a discussion, be-
cause, as I say, this information here, particularly this one here about
the carriers [i78] are still located in the home waters, was well
covered by the intelligence officer out there on all the discussions around
that time. Whether it was the 27th of December or the 27th of No-
vember, or the 1st of December, or anything like that, I am not pre-
pared to say now.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 107
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall whether or not Admiral Elimmel
was present during the conference concerning the change in Japanese
radio traffic which you have just mentioned?
Rear Admiral DeLant. Yes, because the conferences that I men-
tioned were held in his office and included the Admiral, the Chief of
Staff, Plans, Operations, and Intelligence Officers.
Admiral Hewitt. I take it, then, that both you and Admiral Mc-
Morris as well as Admiral Kimmel were present at each of those con-
ferences ?
Rear Admiral DeLant. I would say, generally, yes. I can't answer
that I was there every morning.
Admiral Hewitt. There were daily conferences, Admiral?
Rear Admiral DeLant. Yes.
Admiral Hewitt. And were such conferences held daily, to the best
of your recollection, during the period November 27th to December 7,
1941?
Rear Admiral DeLant. I think so, yes.
Admiral Hewitt, Now, referring. Admiral, to Exhibits 69A and B
of the Naval Court record, would you examine those and give us the
dates and tell us what they are ?
Rear Admiral DeLant. As I recall these — this is dated the 30th
of November 1941, and they are the check-off lists that were prepared
to be in the possession of the duty officer out there in the event that
war would occur in the next twenty-four hours.
Admiral Hewitt. And the second one, 69B, is dated what date.
Admiral ?
[179] Rear Admiral DeLant. 5th of December.
Admiral Hewitt. Admiral, will you point out where in those ex-
hibits 69A or B any provision is made in light of Assumption B of
the October 14th letter, namely, that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
was a possibility ?
Rear Admiral DeLant. Well, If I may be frank again, you read
this the same as I can ; I don't think you will find it in that. This
daily reconnaissance of Task Force Two and Three all provides for
reconnaissance, but it is not stated any place in here that there was
going to be an attack on Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Hewitt. What reconnaissance is provided for in those
exhibits, Admiral ?
Rear Admiral DeLant. There is no reconnaissance provided in here
until
Admiral Hewitt. Until war has broken out?
Rear Admiral DeLant. Probably so, yes.
Admiral Hewitt. Was there any discussion of reconnaissance dur-
ing the period November 27th to December 7, 1941 ?
Rear Admiral DeLant. The usual reconnaissance was conducted,
yes.
Admiral Hewitt. Was there any discussion of increasing the recon-
naissance.
Rear Admiral DeLant. Yes, the planes on Midway were increased.
The planes were put on Wake.
Admiral Hewitf. What reconnaisance was being conducted during
that period, sir?
Rear Admiral DeLant. The usual reconnaissance within the area.
108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Hewiti\ That is, I take it, a reconnaissance of the fleet
operating areas to the soiitliward of Oahu and reconnaissance from
Midway and Wake ?
[180] Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir, and partially to the
northward. There was always an anti-submarine reconnaissance
around the island.
Admiral Hewitt. How far out was that?
Rear Admiral DeLany. It depended on the number of planes avail-
able and the condition of the planes. The reconnaissance to the north-
ward was usually conducted as part of the training and testing of
planes that were on the roll call.
Admiral Hewitt. That was done by the PB Y's ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Admiral, would you say that the information,
particularly from radio intelligence, wliich was available from Novem-
ber 27th to December 6, 1941, at Pearl Harbor indicated that Japanese
naval forces were on the move and that the direction of some' of those
forces could not be known or was not known ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. It is perfectly possible for them to be on
the move without our knowing anything about it.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you recall whether or not the radio intelligence
indicated that they were on the move?
Rear Admiral DeLany. I think the intelligence indicated there was
a move to the southward.
Admiral Hew^itt. Do you recall what the intelligence indicated in
the week preceding December 7, 1941, concerning the whereabouts of
the major portion of the Japanese carrier fleet ?
Rear Admiral DeLany. As I recall it, the information was that the
carriers were in the home waters and the report, that was not well
founded, that there was a possibility of some of the smaller carriers
being around [^5i] Truk or some place like that.
Admiral Hewitt, Was there any discussion during the period
November 27th to December 7th concerning the desirability of recon-
naissance from Oahu in the direction of Truk?
Rear Admiral DeLany. There was a lot of discussion about the
desirability of the reconnaissance and the reconnaissance would have
been conducted had there been planes available to do it and at the
same time maintain their material condition, which was considered
of vital importance.
Admiral Hewitt. In your opinion, as far as the plane reconnais-
sance was concerned, if you had employed all the planes for recon-
naissance, that could not have been maintained very long, and if you
were to use sufficient planes, the maximum number of planes, for daily
reconnaissance, the sectors to be covered would have been entirely
limited and just a choice?
Rear Admiral DeLany. Yes, sir. There weren't enough planes for
a complete 360° search around the island, and even in the limited
sectors in any direction that you would have chosen, the number of
planes and replacement pilots available was such that the search could
not have been kept up for a very long time because of the material
condition of the planes, the scarcity of relief crews, and the fact that
everybody there was convinced that you had to give continued thought
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 109
to maintaining the number of planes that you had in the best material
condition so that if something did break, you would have them avail-
able, and by saying "break," I mean some information commg to us
that would require the use of these planes.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The meeting was then, at 12 : 10 p. m., adjourned until a tune and
place to be set.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY HI
[182-] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIRY
Tenth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag
Officer's Office, Headquarters, Conimander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific
Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 2 p. m.,
Tuesday, 29 May 1915.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, III, USNR; Lieu-
tenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold,
USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn. '
Mr. SoxxETT. Will you please state vour name and rank.
Captain Layton. Edwin T. Layton, Captain, U. S. Navy.
Mr. Sonnett. What is your present assignment. Captain?
Captain Layton. Staff, CincPac.
Mr. Sonneti. And what is the nature of your present duties?
Captain Layton. I am assigned as Combat Intelligence Officer,
Staff, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Mr. Sonnett. On December 7, 19-11, what was your assignment?
Captain Layton. Fleet Intelligence Officer, United States Pacific
Fleet.
Mr. Sonnett. And for how long prior to December 7, 1941, were
you in that assignment ?
Captain Layton. One year to a day.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you state, Captain, the nature of your duties
as Fleet Intelligence Officer for the Pacific Fleet ?
Captain Layi^on. With your permission, I will refresh my memory
]_183'\ when appropriate.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes, do.
Captain Layton. I will read from the Staff Instructions, Com-
mander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, dated 1941 :
214. InteUigence Officer — 25.
(a) Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluates same, dissemi-
nating to various members of staff, indicating where action is required.
(b) Provides Operation Officer and War Plans Officer information essential
for current estimates (monograph material).
(c) Maintains Section II (a), (b), (c). (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Estimate
of Situation (Enemy Forces). Maintains location plot of Fleets of possible
enemy or allies.
(d) Directs counter espionage and counter information.
(e) Maintains Intelligence Records (See Naval Intelligence Manual).
(f ) Prepares Fleet Intelligence Bulletins.
(g) Evaluates Intelligence Information received of procedures or practices of
other navies and prepares definite recommendations as to any action to be taken
within own Fleet.
(h) In charge of censorship,
(i) Internal Security of ships.
112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(j) Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.
215. Assistant Intelligence Officer — 26.
In addition to assisting "25" in all duties of the Intelligence section, performs
the following additional assignments :
(a) Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analysis.
(b) Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination
to Fleet.
(c) Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of Enemy information.
(d) Maintenance of Current Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces) and loca-
tion plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.
[184-^ Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, in the discharge of the Staff In-
structions which you have just quoted, what sources of information
did you have ?
Captain Layton. Principally from the Office of Naval Intelligence,
Naval Operations, Navy Department ; also from communication intel-
ligence sources, from American Naval Attaches and observers, and
information obtained by them through foreign observers and ship
masters, plus information passed to me from British intelligence
sources in the Far East, and in some instances information from
consuls or State Department representatives in the Far East.
Mr. SoNNETT. Of those sources of information. Captain, which
would you characterize as your principal source of intelligence or
information during the months of October, November, and up to
December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Latton. Principally dispatch reports from Naval Attaches
and observers in the Far East, and daily, communication intelligence
analyses of traffic flow and delivery, and reports from ONI on Japanese
naval organizations, activity, movements, and intentions.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you a photostatic copy of a letter dated
November 27, 1941, and enclosed intelligence bulletin number 45-41,
and ask you if you can identify that.
Captain Layton. I can. I wrote it; I prepared it; I proof-read it,
and had it released by the Admiral.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state what that document is. Captain?
Captain Layton. That document shows a summation of the effort
made in the CincPac Intelligence Section to assemble all pertinent and
timely information on the Japanese naval organization and the
Japanese forces and installations in the Mandated Islands.
[185] Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark this as an exhibit. Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 21.")
Captain Layton. That is as of 27 November 1941,
Mr. SoNNETT. Eef erring to Exhibit 21, which is the document you
have just identified. Captain, will you state the highlights of the in-
formation therein contained concerning the Japanese carrier forces?
Captain Layi'on. Previous bulletins from OpNav and previous in-
telligence bulletins on the Japanese fleet organization disseminated by
CincPac had carried the Japanese carrier division attached to the
First and Second Fleets, two divisions to each fleet respectively, plus
their plane guard destroyers. Some time between April and July,
1941, as I recall it, a reorganization within the Japanese Fleet took
place in which a Commander of Number One Air Fleet was detected.
He acted as a type commander such as our ComCarrier Divisions,
Pacific, in those days.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 113
From all sources available, it was believed that the Japanese Carrier
Fleet, as we called it then, was organized as follows : KAGA, Flag-
ship ; Cardiv 1 ; AKAGI and KAGA plus Desdiv 7, plane guards of
four destroyers ; Cardiv 2, consisting of the SORYU and the HIRYU
with Desdiv 23; (4 destroyers) as plane guards; Cardiv 3: RYUJO
and HOSHO with Desdiv 17 of 3 destroyers as plane guard ; Cardiv
4 : ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU with Desdiv 3 of 4 destroyers as plane
guard ; Cardiv , consisting of the carriers KOR YU and KASUGA
(MARU) — totaling ten carriers and sixteen destroyers.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you Exhibit 3 of this investigation and ask
3^ou if you can identify the document.
[186] Captain Layton. I can.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you state what it is, Captain ?
Captain Layton. It is CinPac-CincPoa Weekly Intelligence Bul-
letin, the successor to the previous Fleet Intelligence BuUetms I prev-
iously identified. It serves the same purpose of keeping the Fleet in-
formed of all matters of general interest regarding the enemy, his
techniques, practices, and in some cases historical examples.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is the date of that bulletin, Captain?
Captain Layton. 8 December 1944. It is Volume 1, Number 22.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the contents of Exhibit 3 describing the
composition and movements of the Japanese task force which attacked
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, will you state whether or not you
are familiar with the information therein contained?
Captain Layton. I am.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you have a hand in the preparation of that
bulletin. Captain ?
Captain Layton. I did, with one exception. There is an error. It
is not "Cardiv 5 less HOSHO." The HOSHO did not belong in
Cardiv 5.
Mr. Sonnett. For the sake of the record, Captain, referring to page
13 of Exhibit 3, will you state exactly what the error is to which you
have just referred?
Captain Layton. That states, "SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (Cardiv 5
less HOSHO)." That is an error in that the words "less HOSHO"
should be omitted.
Mr. Sonnett. With that exception, Captain, I take it that the infor-
mation contained in the exhibit concerning the Japanese forces which
attacked Pearl Harbor is corrected ?
[187] Captain Layton, Again may I suggest that the last line,
stating, "elements of Desron 1 ; and about twenty subs" is incorrect,
inasmuch as I do not believe that twenty subs ever sortied from Etorofu
as was stated. I believe that a minimum of three and a maximum
of six accompanied the task force in their trip from Etorofu to a posi-
tion north of Oahu, arriving there the morning of December 7th.
Mr. Sonnett. The information contained in Exhibit 3, Captain,
was obtained from what source?
Captain Layton. This came principally from the interrogation of a
prisoner of war who had the position of secret yeoman to the Opera-
tions Officer of the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet; also from
interrogation of other prisoners of war who were a part of the task
force, and from captured documents, diaries, maps, and other infor-
mation.
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 9
114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Are you able to state, Captain, on the basis of all of
the information which you have received since the attack, whether,
with the exceptions you have just noted, the information contained in
Exhibit 3 is or is not correct ?
Captain Layton. With the exceptions I have mentioned above, the
information in Exhibit 3 referred to previously is correct. I have
since seen in the original Japanese a photostatic copy of Combined
Fleet Operation Order Number 1 from the NACHI sunk in Manila
Bay, and while it does not lay down specifically each ship by name,
it Isijs down the forces in such terms that, putting it with other task
unit designations and compositions, I am positive that this force
sortied from Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, on or about 27 November
and is composed of the ships listed herein, with the exceptions I have
named.
Mr. SoNNETT. For the sake of the record. Captain, would you re-
state [iSS] the information on page 13 of Exhibit 3 concerning
the composition of the attacking Japanese forces correctly so that we
have in the record a correct statement of the available information
that you now have?
Captain Latton. Task title. Striking Force ; Commander, Vice Ad-
miral Chuichi Nagumo ; Cardiv 1, AKAGI, KAGA ; Cardiv 2, HIRYU,
SOEYU; Cardiv 5, SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU; Batdiv 3, first section,
HIYEI, KIRISHIMA; Crudiv 8, TONE and CHIKUMA; elements
of Desron 1 headed by Desron 1 flagship, the light cruiser ABUKU-
MA, some submarines, five or six tankers.
Mr. SoNNETT. On the basis, Captain, of the information which was
available when Exhibit 3 was prepared and on the basis of other in-
formation which you have subsequently received, can you state the
movements of the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Layton. To my best recollection, about 20 or 22 November
the forces of the striking force departed Saeki Anchorage near the
Bungo Channel and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, and
there assembled and fueled, departed on or about 27 November 1941,
East Longitude date. According to the diagram on page 16 of Exhibit
3, they proceeded on an easterly course to a little east of the 180th
meridian, whence they struck southeast to a point to the north of Oahu,
arriving December 8, 1941, East Longitude date. A subsequently cap-
tured map, which was on exhibit in San Francisco, incidentally, showed
an easterly course to a position almost north of Oahu, with a subse-
quently southerly course to a position just north of Oahu.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, do you recall on or about November 27, 1941,
that a dispatch was received which has been referred to as a war
warning ?
Captain Latton. I do.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state when and how you learned of that
[J89] dispatch and what action was taken concerning it that day ?
Captain Layton. In mid-afternoon I learned that such a dispatch
had been received and was shown the tape copy in the communication
office. Subsequently, Admiral Kimmel sent for me and told me he
wanted me to take this dispatch to General Short. I asked him if he
wanted me to take this dispatch, as I had done on previous occasions,
and show it to him or should I give him a paraphrased copy thereof.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 115
He directed me to make a paraphrased copy and return that para-
phrased copy with the dispatch to him for his perusal, which I did.
This paraphrased dispatch was prepared and shown to the communica-
tion officer to obtain his concurrence that the pliraseology did not de-
stroy the import of the original dispatch nor change in any way its
import.
When this was completed, I went outside the Admiral's office and
awaited an opportmiity to enter as there was a large conference with
closed door, which meant no admittance. At the first opportunity, I
entered and asked if the Admiral desired to see the paraphrase. He ex-
amined the paraphrase and about that time, as I recall it, the Chief of
Staff of the 14th Naval District, Captain Earle, arrived in civilian
clothes and requested the Admiral's pardon for being in civilian clothes,
but stated in substance that he had a very urgent message which General
Short had delivered to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and
to be further delivered for the perusal of the Commander-in-Chief. He
presented the dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief, who showed it to
the Chief of Staff and others. Their remarks were in the general tenor
that, "This is the same dispatch in substance that we have just re-
ceived." I should add that the Chief of Staff, 14th Naval District,
stated that General Short had requested that no copies be made of
their dispatch. There was some discussion then concerning this
[IW] dispatch and the Army dispatch, their similarity, when
Admiral Kimmel turned to me, handed me the paraphrase, and said,
"Get this to General Short right away." At the same time, he deliv-
ered the dispatch from General Short to the Chief of Staff, 14th Naval
District, and we left the Admiral's cabin.
Outside was the officer who had brought General Short's dispatch.
Lieutenant Commander Burr, USNR, the Naval Liaison Officer with
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. The Chief of Staff, 14th Naval
District, urged me to give Burr the dispatch Admiral Kimmel had
given me for delivery to General Short so that they could be delivered
simultaneously and by the officially accredited liaison officer, to which
I assented. I did not immediately check on his delivery, but I subse-
quently checked and was told by Lieutenant Commander Burr that it
had been delivered.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I show you Exhibit 8 of this investigation,
which consists of photostatic copies of various dispatches, and ask you
if you can identify those as copies of dispatches which you saw.
Captain Latton. I don't have a good recollection of this, but I think
we received it.
Mr. SoNNETT. That is referring to the dispatch on November 24,
1941, from OpNav to CincAF ?
Captain Layton. Info ComSIXTEEN; ALUSNA, Chungking;
ASTALUSA, Shanghai; ALUSNA, Tokyo; CincPac.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the other two dispatches in that exhibit,
Captain, will you simply state as to those whether you can identify
them?
Captain Layton. The dispatch from COMFOURTEEN dated 26
November 1941, time date group 260110, was sent by the communica-
tion intelligence unit, 14th Naval District, at the direction of Admiral
Kimmel, transmitted through [J 91] me to Commander Roche-
fort, as a result of the daily traffic analyses, intelligence reports which
116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Admiral had seen, and of the discussions we had had concerning
the formation of these forces and their movement to the south, with
amphibious warfare being noted as paramount,
Mr. SoNNETT. How about the third one, Captain ?
Captain Layton. ComSIXTEEN's dispatch of 26 November 1941,
time date group 261331, 1 recognize as the dispatch reply by ComSIX-
TEEN to the dispatch sent by ComFOURTEEN on 260110 in which
they gave their estimate of the Japanese naval organization and move-
ments as pertaining to the time in question. We specifically noted at
that time that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the supposi-
tion by ComFOURTEEN that submarine and carriers in force were
in the Mandates, and noted their best indications were that all First
and Second Fleet carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would it be correct to state. Captain, that the dis-
patches to which you have just referred summarized the intelligence
available to ComFOURTEEN and ComSIXTEEN concerning the
Japanese naval movements during the preceding month or so?
Captain Layton. I would say that. Additionally, I would say that
summarized the information also made available to CincPac and
CincAF as of those times because those units each served the Fleet
Commander of that area and all of that information was made avail-
able to the Fleet Commanders.
Admiral Hewitt. What was understood by the term "First and
Second Fleet carriers" contained in the ComSIXTEEN dispatch?
Captain Layton. I believe that ComSIXTEEN was referring to the
naval organization as promulgated by ONI on 29 July 1941, in which,
as I have previously stated, there were two carrier divisions attached
to each of \192'] the First and Second Fleets. ONI listed
Cardiv 3, ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU, with Desdiv 34 plane guards
(four destroyers), and Cardiv 5, RYUJO and HOSHO with a four
destroyer plane guard, division number unknown, as attached to the
First Fleet. ONI listed Cardiv 1, AKAGI, KAGA, and Desdiv 3 of
four destroyers as plane guards, plus Cardiv 2, SORYU, HIRYU,
with Desdiv 23 of four destroyers as plane guards, attached to the
Second Fleet. This would be a total of eight carriers assigned to the
First and Second Fleets, with no other carriers being listed as assigned
to any other fleets.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that in substance. Captain, the ComSIXTEEN
dispatch of November 26th, in stating that all known First and Second
Fleet cariers were believed to be in the Kure-Sasebo area, was under-
stood by you to mean that they estimated that all known Japanese
carriers were in that area ?
Captain Layton. Yes, all known operating carriers.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that estimate differed with the ComFOUR-
TEEN estimate in that ComFOURTEEN was of the opinion that at
least one Japanese carrier was in the Marshalls at that time ?
Captain Layton. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Subsequent to those dispatches of November 26th,
Captain, it was the fact, was it not, that daily communication intelli-
gence summaries were delivered by the radio intelligence unit to you
and to Admiral Kimmel ?
Captain Layton. They were delivered to me for my presentation to
Admiral Kimmel.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 117
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you have copies of the daily summaries which
were so presented through you to Admiral Kimmel ?
Captain Latton. I have.
[193] Mr. SoNNETT. I note, Captain, on the photostatic docu-
ments which you have presented, commencing with October 14, 1941,
and ending with December 1941, initials in the lower right hand
corner. Can you identify those initials?
Captain Layton. Those are Admiral Kimmel's initials.
Mr. SoNNETT. And do they appear on the original ?
Captain Latton. They do.
Mr. SoNNETT. I also note that certain of these daily communication
intelligence summaries have portions underscored. Can you state
who underscored those portions?
Captain Latton. Certain of the underscoring was performed by
Admiral Kimmel as he read them. Certain other marks, including
marks by direction finder bearings and positions of ships, were made
by myself in plotting them,
Mr. SoNNETT. To the best of your knowledge. Captain, are the
photostatic copies which you have presented true copies of the original
daily communication intelligence summaries presented to Admiral
Kimmel ?
Captain Layton. This is the original copy. They only presented
one copy and this is the original. The}'- kept a copy in combat intelli-
gence, 14th Naval District, but this is the original copy as prepared.
. Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the document you have*bef ore you ?
Captain Latton. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the document or collection of documents which
I show you and which you have supplied are photostatic copies of the
original ?
Captain Latton. They are.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark them as an exhibit, Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes,
[194] (The documents referred to were received and marked
"Exhibit 22,")
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to Exhibit 22, Captain, and to the daily
communication intelligence summaries from November 27 to De-
cember 5, inclusive, 1941, will you give us in general the substance
of the movements of Japanese forces therein noted ?
Captain Layton, On 27 November 1941, there was some tactical
traffic intercepted from the carriers. There was other traffic addressed
to the commanders to play the leading roles in the days that followed
on the Southern Expedition; that is. Chiefs of Staff, Second Fleet,
Third Fleet, and Combined Air Force were addressed by Southern
Theater Commands, It is to be noted that the Commander Combined
Air Force commands all naval shore-based air and all naval tender-
based planes. He does not have any connection whatsoever with the
carriers except in inter-joint force maneuvers.
(The following was read:)
That is, Chipfs of Staff, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, and Combined Air Force
were addressed by Southern Theater Commands.
(Continuing) — Bako, Pescadores, Hainan Island, and Saigon. De-
stroyer Squadrons 4 and 5, who were earmarked for the southern move-
118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ment, were also addressed, with information to Chief of Staff, Second
Fleet.
Direction finder net was active and it was noted that the Marshall
Island stations were also sending bearings in after having been
silenced for several days.
It was noted that Destroyer Squadron 3, earmarked for the southern
move, could not be positively identified in the Hainan area but was
believed to be in company with Cruiser Division 3 there.
[195] It was noted that there was no further detected movement
from the Kure-Sasebo area.
There were four enciphered addresses noted. An enciphered ad-
dress always indicates a new command who has no position in the
call sign book, so that these then were placed in a fairly simple cipher.
From these forces one was aware of newly formed units becoming
active and generally in an operational or maneuver stage and not as
administrative or routine appearance. These were the number 82 unit
at Taihoku, Formosa; in care of the Yamashita unit addressed for
delivery via the RYUJO; Koroku (Naha. Okinawa) air base com-
mander; the military stores depot chief at Keijo, Korea.
It was also noted that there was nothing to indicate the movements
yet of the CinC, Third Fleet (corresponding to our Commander
Amphibious Force) .
It was noted that the commander of the Mandates was addressing
dispatches to his defense forces there; that Jaluit was sending mes-
sages to the Commander Submarine Force and several submarine
units ; that there was communication between Jaluit. the Saipan Air
Command, and the Commander of the Mandates Field; that work
was still in progress there was inferred by communications seen from
the civil engineering units at Imieji, Jaluit and Eniwetok.
Traffic analysis located the Chitosa Naval Air "Corps" in Saipan
and Naval Air Squadron number 24 in the Marshalls. It was noted
that there was no further information on the presence of Carrier
Division 5 in the Mandates. It was, however, noted that an air unit
in the Formosa area (Takao) addressed the carriers SHOKAKU
and KORYU. It was stated that [196] "Carriers are still
located in home waters." No information of further movement of
the shore-based air forces to Hainan.
Of signijBcance was the location of the Commander of the sub-
marine forces in the Chichijima area.
The unit at Cavite informed us that they had noted Armv type
ciphers being handled on Navy circuits for the past couple of days,
during which an Army officer named Oka was in communication on
these naval circuits with the Combined Army Forces. Imperial
Headquarters.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was that by dispatch. Captain Layton ?
Captain Latton. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you identify the dispatch ?
Captain Layton. I don't have the time-date requirement.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you supply us with a copy of each of the dis-
patches to which you make reference in your testimony ?
Captain Layton. Yes. Also that this officer, Oka. was associated
with the Combined Army, Taiwan, and the Combined Army Forces,
Sama (Hainan).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 119
On the 27th of November the Naval Attache at Shanghai in his
dispatch 270855 reported the sightings by master of a foreign vessel
which left Hong Kong en route Shanghai of many transports proceed-
ing south singly or in small groups — they averaged three or four ships
on each VN^atch Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday — and that the military
wharves at Shanghai were abnormally empty of stores.
Dispatch from OpNav, addressed to CincPac and CincAF, informa-
tion Cinclant, dispatch 272337, which was a war warning and stated
that OpNav had been informed by the Chief of Naval Operations that
negotiations between Japan and America regarding the stabilization
of conditions in 1 he Pacific had ended and an aggressive move by the
Japanese was expected within the [J97] next few days. The
number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of
Navy task forces indicated an amphibious expedition against either
the Philippines, Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.
It directed appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying
out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 and said to inform only the district
and Army authorities. It stated the War Department was sending
a similar warning, and directed continental naval districts, plus Guam
and Samoa, to take appropriate measures against sabotage.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, if I may interrupt you for just a moment, the
daily communication summary to which you have ]ust referred, that
was for 27 November 1941, was it not?
Captain Layton. That was.
Mr. SoNNEiTr. When was that delivered to you. Captain, and by you
to Admiral Kimmel ?
Captain Layton. As I recall it, it was delivered to me in the morn-
ing of the 28th of November, 1941, and, as was my custom, I presented
it to Admiral Kimmel at about 8 : 15.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was that presentation to Admiral Kimmel of avail-
able intelligence information done daily during this period ?
Captain Layton. This was done daily throughout the period of my
association with Admiral Kimmel.
Mr. SoNNETT. And in addition to the communication intelligence
summary of 27 November, to which you have referred, and to other
daily communication intelligence summaries, I take it you also would
present whatever other intelligence information you then had avail-
able?
Captain Layton. That is true.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence sum-
mary [i^S] of 27 November and to the statement that "car-
riers are still located in home waters," will you state what was com-
prehended by the term "home waters"?
Captain Layton. "Home waters" was the term used to consist of
Japanese home waters, that is, the drill grounds of the Inland Sea
and the approaches to Kyushu, the coastal offshore area, the Isei Bay
Area; in general, the waters surrounding Honshu, Shikoku, and
Kyushu.
Admiral Hewitt. Did that include Etorofu?
Captain Layton. No, sir. Locations in northern Japan, including
northern Hokkaido and the Kuriles, were referred to as the high
north area.
120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. To what point east of Japan would the scope of
"home waters" extend ?
Captain Layton. Forty, fifty, sixty miles perhaps; maybe more;
about the same distance that our fleet operations would take us west of
San Clemente or San Pedro or San Diego.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was that definition of "home waters" which you have
given, Captain, the accepted definition in the radio intelligence unit
and in CincPac headquarters ?
Captain Layton. It was. It was also understood by Admiral Kim-
mel, who had queried me on these standard phraseology terms used
in writing those traffic intelligence summaries.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence sum-
maries for 28 November and there on up to December 5th, Captain,
will you give us the highlights of those ?
Captain Layton. The highlight on 28 November was the activity
shown by what was believed to be the Tokyo intelligence broadcast
net, plus the direction finder net, and it was stated and underscored
that the Japanese radio intelligence net "is operating at full strength
upon U. S. Naval [199] Communications and IS GETTING
results:'
It was noted that Tokyo originators were sending high precedence
traffic to the Commander-in-Chief of the Second and Third Fleets and
Combined Air Force, the three commands for the south movement.
Previous indications that Palao was concerned with this southern
movement were shown by a typical dispatch where the Chief of the
Naval General Staff addressed the Chiefs of Staff (normally Chiefs
of Staffs are addressed in operational matters) of the Combined Air
Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet (Mandates Fleet), Third Fleet
(Amphibious Force), French Indo-China force, Second Fleet, and
Resident Naval Officer, Palao.
It was noted that no Combined Fleet units movements were detected ;
that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was sending his usual
dispatches to the Third Fleet and the Combined Air Force ; and that
he, Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was paying particular atten-
tion in his communications to Crudivs 5 and 7, Desrons 2 and 4, and
Cardiv 5. It is to be noted in the original it stated "attention to
Cardivs 6 and 7." This was corrected in pencil to read "Crudivs
5 and 7."
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know when that correction was made.
Captain ?
Captain Layton. I do not recall, but it was either prior to show-
ing to Admiral Kimmel or upon his noting that there was no Cardiv 7
and therefore there was something wrong. I think it was before.
The impression was gained this date that the First Base Force, that
is, the first section of the Amphibious Force, consisting of about a
minelayer division, two minesweeper divisions, one gunboat division,
one subchaser squadron of four subchaser divisions, and twenty-seven
transports, was not present at that time with the bulk of the Third
Fleet in Sasebo but could not be exactly located elsewhere.
[SOO] It was noted that the Army commander on Formosa was
holding communications with the Commander-in-Chief of the Am-
phibious Force, generally a sure sign of amphibious operations.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 121
It was noted that two Third Fleet units had arrived in the Pescadores
but were apparentlj^^ to return to Kure from Bako.
Nothing significant was noted in the Mandates on the 28th of
November summary.
It was observed that Sama, Hainan, addressed the Omura Naval Air
Corps in several messages which were for information to Saigon and
Tokyo. This would indicate the future location of the Omura Air
Corps to be Saigon in the near future.
Takao, Formosa, was addressing French Indo-China forces, the
Combined Air Force, and the Chiefs of Staff, Combined Fleet and
Second Fleet.
It was noted that the Takao Naval Air Corps was addressing the
Sukugawa Air Corps and the Yokosuka Naval Air Corps.
It was noted that a representative of the Hainan office, which had
moved to Saigon, was sending messages to the naval bases at Sasebo
and Kure.
Additionally, the Commander-in-Chief of the China Fleet was
addressing the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, and the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Third Fleet, the two prime movers in the
southern movement, indicating his assistance in some degree.
No submarine traffic of note was observed.
On the 28th of November, ComFOURTEEN addressed to OpNav,
information CincAF, and stated :
Following received by British Consul from usually reliable source X Japanese
will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on one \_201] December without
ultimatum or declaration in order get between Bangkok and Singapore X Attack-
ers will proceed direct from Hainan and Formoso X Main landing to be made at
Songkhola X (Singora).
This dispatch from CincAF, addressed to OpNav, CincPac, Com-
FOURTEEN and ComSIXTEEN for action, established the "winds"
code in two variations, one from Tokyo to the diplomatic net and the
other from Japanese language foreign broadcasts for more generalized
receipt.
ComSIXTEEN in a dispatch of the 28th addressed to CincAF,
OpNav, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, stated that an unidentified ship
believed to be a light cruiser had apparently relieved the KASHII as
flagship. Southern Expeditionary Fleet ; that this ship was now in the
Camranh Bay-Saigon area.
OpNav, in dispatch 281633, addressed CincAF, info CincPas, Com-
SIXTEEN, ComFOURTEEN, and supplied information from State
Department, from Saigon, dated November 26th, which stated that
five days previously Orange troops and supply vessels began to put
in at Saigon, taking up all available quay space; that 20,000 troops
had landed and that 10,000 had arrived from the north by rail during
the same period; that the total troops in South Indo-China totalled
70,000. It observed that there was an estimate of some 128,000, but
considered that too high. It reported that many trucks had landed
and were moving troops and supplies to the interior. It observed that
this movement is of large proportions and indicates hostilities against
Thailand may begin soon. It also forwarded information from
Hanoi, also from the State Department, dated November 26th, that
said supplies and military equipment, particularly railway, rolling
stock, gasoline, landing at "Haiphong even recently augmented and are
122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
being trans-shipped south. Among recently landed artillery are anti-
tank guns: that the Japanese had recently purchased a considerable
number of native boats along the coast of Tongking [W2]
Province. It was reported they desired to purchase 500. These boats
were being sent south. Further reports from Hanoi, dated November
25th, said that the American Consul had received reliable informa-
tion that the Governor General had ascertained from an agent that
around 1 December, without either declaration of war or ultimatum,
NijDpon Navy will attack Kra Isthmus. Simultaneously the Army
would advance on Thailand ; that great increased troop landings and
movements were noted south; that during last few days about 4,000
men have landed. On November 25th and 26th, 1,500 would go south
by special train; that in Tongking there were approximately 25,000
Jap troops and at Gillam there were approximately ninety airplanes.
Dated November 26th, Hanoi, was the report that on early November
25th the Haiphong mayor had advised all interested persons that the
Japanes intended to sequester all freight en route to China, that the
Japanese had demanded keys to all warehouses by noon November
25th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to November 29, 1941, Captain, will you
point out the highlights of the communication intelligence summary
of that day, together with any dispatches of interest received that daj^,
November 29, 1941 ?
Captain Layton. Communication intelligence summary noted again
Tokyo intelligence sending eleven messages during the day to major
commanders, both afloat and ashore, and that the radio intelligence
activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to major commanders. It
noted that the direction finder net controlled by Tokyo was active dur-
ing the night, with much activity, and that the Jaluit radio direction
finder station included Commander Submarines as an information ad-
dressee in a dispatch, indicating, as has previously been shown, that
Commander Submarines was somewhere in the approaches to or about
to enter the Mandated Islands and likely the [B03'\ Marshalls.
A new air group, the 103rd Naval Air Group, was noted as originating
a dispatch whose address was composed completely of enciphered
calls, confirming that he was new as he had no call sign book. One of
the addresses was a new organization, the 11th Air Fleet. It was
noted that this address had appeared before and therefore was not a
mistake, that the use of the word "fleet" was not a mistake. And it
was added that its composition was unknown.
The highlight from an operational point of view was the confirma-
tion of the arrival of Air Squadron Seven in the Takao area. This
unit consisted normally of three CHITOSE class seaplane tenders.
It was noted that the presence of Cruiser Division 4 in the Takao
area could not be confirmed nor denied, but dispatches and their han-
dling indicated the following units under the immediate command of
CinC Second Fleet, who, it had been shown previously, was in com-
mand of the Southern Invasion Force. The commands under this
Commander were CarDiv 3, SubRon 5, SubRon 6, CruDiv 5, CruDiv
7, Des Ron 2, DesRon 4, Third Fleet (Amphibious Force) , and French
Indo China Force.
It was further noted that associated with the Third Fleet were two
battleships. It was further noted that the Commander-in-Chief,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 123
Third Fleet, sent a message to ComDesRon 5, Number Two Base Force
(consisting of one minelayer division, with at least five other men-of-
war, and seventeen merchant ships suspected of being transports and
cargo carriers). Number One Base Force, Defense Division One, and
ComDesRons 2 and 4.
It was noted also that CinC Third Fleet held extensive communi-
cation with CinC Second Fleet and Bako.
Fourth Fleet was noted as relatively inactive, and that the Com-
mander of the Submarine Force had his traffic routed through Saipan,
noting that the previous day's traffic had been routed through Chichi-
jima, indicating [^204] a southerly or southeasterly movement.
It was noted that ComCruDiv 7 made a movement report type of
dispatch from the Sama, Hainan, area and the direction of this move-
ment was not indicated.
The communication intelligence unit a Cavite sent a dispatch on
the 29th of November which noted recent developments from radio
intelligence: encrypted addresses noted in traffic the last two days,
"Commander First Patrol Force"; headquarters this unit apparently
at either Yokosuka or Palao ; "Fifth Air Battalion" at Takoa ; "Com-
mander Airborne Troops," location undetermined; "French Indo-
China Billeting Detachment" in Saigon area; "Third Fleet Head-
quarters" probably at Yokosuka. The CinC Third Fleet shifted his
flag from the ASHIGARA to the NAGARA. The CinC Southern
Expeditionary Fleet shifted flag from KASHII to CHOKAI (tenta-
tive identification).
New arrivals in the Takao area that may be placed in the first section
of the task force he referred to in his 261331 : DesRon 4, Air Squadron
7, and one command that appears to be a submarine squadron. It
appears that the HIYEI and KONGO are definitely associated with
these units in the first section, but no movement has been noted on these.
CinC Second Fleet told the key radio stations today and also CinC
Combined Fleet that he would leave the Kure zone 0400 hours today,
that he would leave Sasebo zone midnight the 1st and enter Bako
zone midnight the 2nd.
On the 29th we received OpNav's 290110, addressed to Commander
North Pacific Naval Frontier, Commander South Pacific Naval Fron-
tier, information CincPac and Commander Panama Naval Coastal
Frontier, which stated that the Army had sent to the Western Defense
Command :
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes
with only the barest possibility [205] that the Japanese Government might
come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but
hostile action possible at any moment X if hostilities cannot be avoided the
United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X this policy should
not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize
your defense X prior or hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake
such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these meas-
ures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose
intent X report measures taken * * * should hostilities occur you will carry
out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 so far as they pertain to Japan X limit
dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers' X
WPIi 52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that
area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific sub area and Panama Naval
Coastal Frontier X undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an
overt act X be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they
apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.
124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
He referred in this dispatch to OpNav's 272337, but in error sent
it as referring to his 272338, wliich was the war warning.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the connnunication intelligence sum-
mary for 29 November 1941 and to the dispatches just mentioned by
you, Captain, is it correct that tlie only reference to carriers was the
reference in the communication intelligence summary to the elfect that
CarDiv 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander-in-
Chief, Second Fleet?
Captain Layton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was the composition of CarDiv 3 at that time?
Captain Layton. At that time we believed CarDiv 3 to be composed
of the RYUJO and HOSHO plus three plane guard destroyers.
120€] Mr. SoNNETT. So that, aside from that information, there
was, on 29 November, no other information relating to Japanese car-
riers ?
Captain Latton, There was no other information relating to Jap-
anese carriers.
Mr. SoNNEiT. Now, referring to 30 November 1941, will you give us
the highlights of the communication intelligence summaries and of
any dispatches received that day ?
Captain Laytox. In general the traffic volume was less, indicating
less circuit activity and that back-dated traffic, some as far back as
26 November, was being transmitted. This sort of practice generally
indicated a reduction in the urgency of the general over-all picture
plus the possibility of the importance of the re-transmitted dispatches.
The only tactical circuit heard was one with the carrier AKAGI and
several MARUS.
Mr, SoNNETT. Wliat was the significance of the use of the term "tac-
tical" in that connection, Captain ?
Captain Layton. The term "tactical" implies the use of radio by the
vessel itself, calling up directly other vessels and working them directly
rather than working vessels through shore stations via the broadcast
method, which is the common practice by the Japanese communications.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did it connote any operation of the carrier AKAGI ?
Captain Layton. No. If the AKAGI had been working with other
carriers, it would indicate that they were exercising or operating, but
working with MARUS would indicate more that she was making ar-
rangements for fuel or some such administrative function. A carrier
would i-arely address a MARU except an oiler or repair vessel or air-
craft tender in matters of administration and function rather than in
the tactical concept of operations,
[207] It was noted that one urgent dispatch was sent from the
Chief of the Naval General Staff to the Chiefs of Staff of the following
fleets : Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, Combined Air Force, Sub-
marine Force, China Fleet, and Fifth Fleet. The last fleet, the Fifth,
was a new fleet of which little or nothing was known, but it was in-
ferred from long practice that it most likeh^ was a minor force con-
cerned with the northern area.
Mr, SoNNETT, What was the northern area to which you referred,
Captain ?
Captain Layton. North Japan, from Ominato on Honshu north.
Mr, SoNNETT, And therefore including the Kuriles?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 125
Captain Latton. Including the Kuriles. The traffic on the 30th
located the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet at
Kure. By that same message the Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet
was not shown in any location, but other indications suggested he was
at sea .
It was noted that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, sent a
dispatch to his "usual addressees" of the Third Fleet and Combined
Air Force, but he also included therein the battleships KONGO and
HIYEI, which placed them as members of the CinC Second's task
force.
Mr, SoNNETi. Captain, if I may interrupt you for a moment at that
point, the HIYEI was one of the battleships which was part of the
force which later attacked Pearl Harbor, was it not ?
Captain Latton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. And on 30 November 1941 that battleship was at sea,
having left Etorofu Island?
Captain Latton. That is correct. I believe
Mr. SoNNETT. Therefore, is the statement contained in the communi-
cation intelligence summary correct or incorrect?
[£08] Captain Latton. I believe the statement in the connnuni-
cation intelligence summary is correct in this regard. It is verv
likely that the HIYEI is a bad identification for the HARUNA,
which, with the KONGO, took part in the southern expedition. It
is believed that this mis-identification, which frequently occurs with
ships of one type and within one organization, is an error in fact
but not an error in substance.
It is noted that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was no
longer adding the activities at Palao in his addresses and had not
done so for the past two days.
It was noted that the Resident Naval Officer at Palao was holding
traffic with Taiwan Army Headquarters.
Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet, was seen addressing two mes-
sages to ComDesRon 2, ComDesRon 4, ComDesRon 5, ComCruDiv 5,
First and Second Base Forces,, and Defense Division One, being sent
for information to CinC Second Fleet. The location of the CinC
Third Fleet was not indicated, but there was a strong impression
that he was underway.
It was noted that the Jaluit radio addressed the Commander Sub-
marine Force and Naval Air Squadron 24 in one dispatch. The con-
tinued association of Jaluit and the Commander Submarine Force,
plus his known progress from Japan through the Chichi jima area
to the Saipan zone, made his destination obviously the Marshalls.
Since one of his large units had arrived in the Marshalls some time
previously, the communication intelligence summary pointed out that
this bore out ComFOURTEEN's unit's previous contention that
there was a submarine concentration in the Marshalls, not only the
small Fourth Fleet submarines, but also a good portion of the Fleet
submarines of the Submarine Force.
It was stated that Naval Air Squadron 24 plus the Yokohama
Naval Air [^00] Corps, being in the Marshalls, pointed to-
ward air-submarine operations from the INIarshalls.
It was also noted that the presence in the Marshalls of a unit of
plane guard destroyers would indicate the presence of at least one
126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
carrier in the Mandates, although the presence of that carrier was
not confirmed.
Continued activity was observed with dispatches to the Second and
Third Fleets from the Pescadores, activities including also the Com-
bined Air Force and Hainan as addressees ; also that the Commander-
in-Chief of the China Fleet was becoming more and more an origina-
tor of dispatches to the task force, which was then believed to be
southbound. The CinC China Fleet made a movement report, with
the South China Fleet as an information addressee, indicating his
intention to proceed south.
Mr. SoNNETT. I note. Captain, that on the original of the communi-
cation intelligence summary of November 30, 1941, which you have
before you, that various portions are underlined in red and in blue
pencil. Can you state who made the underlining?
Captain Latton. I believe that I did. I am not positive.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was that made before or after the submission of
the summary to Admiral Kimmel ?
Captain Layton. I believe it was made after the submission,
although it may have been before.
Mr. SoNNETT. I note also on the November 30th commimication
intelligence summary that in the left-hand lower corner of the page
there are other initials. Would you state whose initials they are ?
Captain Laytgn. They are Admiral McMorris' initials. He was
at that time head of the War Plans Section.
[210] We received a dispatch late the 30th from ComSIX-
TEEN, addressed to OpNav, information CincAF, CincPac, and
ComFOURTEEN, to the effect that a reassignment of all Japanese
naval calls had occurred at midnight, that they followed the same
garble table pattern as before, and that the shore addressees' call
signs hadn't changed.
We received a dispatch, time 301T09, from OpNav, addressed to
CincAF, information CincPac, referring to his dispatch 300419, in
which he had directed CincAF to cover by air search the line
Manila-Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt of said
dispatch in order to ascertain the destination of the overseas expedi-
tions, based on the information that Japan was about to attack points
on the Kra Isthmus. He was told in this dispatch that if the expe-
dition was approaching Thailand, he was to inform MacArthur.
In this dispatch, 301709, he referred to the above dispatch and re-
quested priority dispatch of any contacts, and in case of no contacts
being made, to report once a day if the information was all negative.
Mr. SoNNErrr. Captain, I show you an original memorandum, dated
December 1, 1941, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer to Admiral and
ask you if you can identify it.
Captain Layton. I do.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state what that document is ?
Captain Layton. This document was prepared by me late the after-
noon of Sunday, 30 November 1941, at the direction of Admiral Kim-
mel. As my yeoman was absent, the write-up of this memorandum
was delayed until December 1st. Admiral Kimmel's directions, as I
recall them were that he wanted the following day, Monday, 1 De-
cember, a list of Japanese fleet [^-?^] locations, and eveiy
Monday thereafter. After this was written up, certain substantiating
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 127
and additional information was obtained from the officer who wrote the
daily communication intelligence summary as to any future indicated
movements and these changed movements were made in red pencil
prior to being submitted to Admiral Kimmel. There was, however,
one typographical error that was not found until Admiral Kimmel
read the paper, in which a typographical error meaning "2 OCL"
became "20 CL," which Admiral Kimmel pointed out to me and in his
handwriting wrote, "2-OCL" at the side on page 4.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, may we mark this document as an exhibit?
Admiral Hewitt, Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 23.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, referring to Exhibit 23, which is the memo-
randum you have just identified, do I understand your testimony to be
that it was delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 1, 1941?
Captain Layton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you have a discussion with Admiral Kimmel
concerning this memorandum after he had read it ?
Captain Layton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. I note on page 1 of the exhibit the word "Japan"
written in pencil opposite certain ships listed under Yokasuka area
and similarly the word "Japan" written in pencil opposite certain
ships listed under the Kure-Sasebo area. In whose handwriting are
those words ?
Captain Layton. Admiral Kimmel's.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to Exhibit 23, Captain, will you state the
information therein contained concerning the location of Japanese
carriers ?
Captain Layton. On page 3, under the Bako-Takao area, was car-
ried [£12] Cadiv 4 : 2 CV plus 4 DD ; and Cardiv 3 : 2 CV and
3 DD. On the last page the supposed carrier KORYU ( ? ) plus plane
guards, 1 CV, 4 DD, was carried under the Marshalls area. On page 2
under the Bako-Takao area was carried the KASUGA MARU,
IXCV.
Mr. SoNNETT. Summarizing the information, then, Captain, in this
exhibit concerning the whereabouts of Japanese carriers, it appeared
that there were Carrier Division 3 and Carrier Division 4 plus the
KASUGA MARU thought to be in the Bako-Takao area and the
KORYU thought to be in the Marshalls area, is that correct?
Captain Layton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. There is no reference in this memorandum, Captain,
to Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Was there any discussion between you
and Admiral Kimmel concerning the whereabouts of those carrier
divisions ?
Captain Layton. There was. Admiral Kimmel noted almost im-
mediately that neither Carrier Division 1 nor Carrier Division 2 was
listed in this memorandum, and asked me where they were. I said
that I had no recent good indications of their locations, but that if I
had to guess, I would estimate them in the general Kure zone.
Mr. Sonnett. Did he inquire whether it was possible that those
carriers weren't in that zone but were in the Hawaiian area ?
Captain Layton. Not in those words.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you state the substance of what he said and what
you said, as best you recall it?
128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Layton, As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, "What !
You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2
ajre^" and I replied, "No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home
waters, but 1 do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I
feel pretty confident of [^iJ] their location." Then Admiral
Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern
countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do
you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you
wouldn't know itT' or words to that effect. My reply was that, "I
hope they would be sighted before now," or words to that effect.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to Exhibit 23, Captain, it appears that
on each of the pages, at the bottom, there is an X mark. Can you
explain that ?
Captain Layton. That X mark was not on this memorandum this
morning prior its being photostated. I presume that it was placed on
there by the photostat personnel, as it appeared when brought back
from them.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence sum-
mary for December 1, 1941, Captain, was that received after the de-
livery of your memorandum of December 1, Exhibit 23, and your dis-
cussion with Admiral Kimmel, to which you have just testified?
Captain Layton. It is my recollection that the 1 December 1941
summary was delivered prior to the submission of my location sheet,
Exhibit 23.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you examine the communication intelligence
summary for 1 December 1941 and give us the highlights of that doc-
ument ?
Captain Layton. The summary, dated 1 December 1941, confirmed
previous information from ComSIXTEEN that all service radio calls
of forces afloat of the Japanese Navy had changed promptly at 0000,
1 December, minus 9 time. Previously service calls had changed after
a period of six months or more. Calls having last changed on 1 No-
vember 1941, it was noted that service calls lasting only one month
indicated progressive steps in preparing for active operations on a
large scale. The latter part of this [i^-?-^] sentence is under-
lined in red pencil and, to my best recollection, was underlined by
Admiral Kimmel at the time.
It was noted that the Japanese were adopting more and more se-
curity provisions by passing old traffic for a period of two or three days
prior to the change of calls to defeat the traffic analysis and in an
attempt to match in a previous call with a new call. This could not
be done on a series of passing old dispatches.
They had noted also that the Japanese Navy was adopting more
and more radio security provisions. It was also noted then an effort
had been made to deliver all dispatches using the old calls prior to
the change so that there would be a minimum of undelivered dis-
patches and resultant confusion and compromise of new call signs.
To clarify this, I would say that if your call sign is A and it is changed
to Q and a message addressed to you as A, which we knew to be you,
is sent to Q, we know that your new call sign is Q. Also it was ob-
served that the large volume of old messages may have been used to
pad the total volume of traffic to make it appear as if nothing unusual
was pending. This is an old Jap trick.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 129
Traffic analysis showed nothing to indicate that the First Fleet was
outside of Empire Waters. I should say that "Empire Waters" is
synonomous to "Home waters." The Second Fleet was believed to be
proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area towards South China and Indo-
China, and certain units of the Second Fleet task force were already in
the Indo-China area. Specifically prominent were Cruiser Division
7 and Destroyer Squadron 3. The Third Fleet traffic showed nothing
new in the way of associations, but its associations with South China
and Indo-China forces continued. There were no changes in the
Mandates or in the Fifth Fleet or in the Combined Air Force.
[216] It was noted that large numbers of the submarines of
the Submarine Force were believed to be to the eastward of Yokosuka-
Chichijima-Saipan line, and that the flagship of the Submarine Force
was somewhere in that general area.
Under "Carriers" it was stated there was no change. This was
presumed to mean no change since the previous report, since there
had been no report of carriers recently and the last report said in the
Empire area, with the exception of Cardiv 3, with the possibility of one
carrier in the Mandates.
Mr. SoNNETT. Before you go into the dispatches. Captain, I have
one question on this. What, if any, discussion do you recall, Captain,
with Admiral Kimmel concerning the significance of the change in
Japanese service radio calls referred to in the summary of 1 December
1941?
Captain Latton. Our discussion merely reviewed what I have pre-
viously read in testimony, that it was an unusual step, that it was an
advance in radio security, that they were doing everj^thing they could
to defeat our radio intelligence, that they were apprehensive that we
would know of the move that was underway. Unfortunately, we
didn't know the extent of the move completely. But under the con-
ditions obtaining there, we discussed radio intelligence, its faults and
its promises, its inexactities and yet the overall picture that it will
produce. Whether then or at other times, we discussed the fact that
a force can take sealed orders, proceed under radio silence and never
be detected except by visual or other sighting.
Mr. SoNNETT. Eeferring again to the communication intelligence
summary for 1 December 1941, concerning the Fifth Fleet it was
stated, "Nothing to report." I believe you testified that the Fifth
Fleet was the [216] fleet in the northern area of Japan.
Captain Latton. I don't believe I said the fleet in the northern area.
The Fifth Fleet was a new organization of which nothing was known,
but from past indications it was believed that the Fifth Fleet was a
force assembled for operations in northern waters, as had been done
in previous years. There had been a Fifth Fleet prior to that during
a maneuver, which was based in the Ominato-Hokkaido area, but, -as
I recall it at this time, there was no positive information on the Fifth
Fleet; and further. Admiral Kimmel had asked me several times to
check with the communication intelligence people to see if there wasn't
sornething that we could ascertain regarding this force, its intentions
or its composition. You go way back in here and you will find there
was considerable discussion when this first came up, but we did not
.know anything about that fleet.
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 10
130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNECT. Then, the statement "nothmg to report" concerning
the Fifth Fleet meant tliat you had no information concerning the
fleet and did not mean that you had information indicating no change?
Captain Layton. It would mean that there was no information
rather than that the information showed no change. If you will note,
he said under "Combined Air Force" "No change." It would mean
that the normal traffic pattern was followed and there were no new
associations. And also recall that this was a day of call sign changes,
when the identification of these units would be most difficult and the
analyst cannot on a flood of new call signs really make any commit-
ments; so he was satisfied with the words "no change" and satisfied
with the words '''nothing to report" as meaning we had nothing to
report.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you have any dispatches for 1 December, Cap-
tain?
Captain Layton. We had a dispatch from OpNav, dated 1 Decem-
ber, [217] addressed to CincAF, ComSIXTEJEN, information
CincPac and ComFOURTEEN. It referred to the intrigue in Thai-
land, on which conferences in progress in Bangkok — Japanese confer-
ences in Bangkok were considering plans aimed at forcing the British
to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singora as a countermove to
Japanese landing at Kota Bharu. Since Thailand intended to con-
sider the first invader as her enemy, the Japanese believed this land-
ing in Malaya would force the British to invade Thai at Padang
Bessa. Thai would then declare war and request Jap help. This
plan apparently had the approval of the Thai Chief of Staff, Bijitto.
It observed that Thai Government circles had been sharply divided
between the pro-Japanese and the pro-British factions until about
25 November, but now Wanitto ancf Shina, who favored joint mili-
tary action with Japan, had silenced the anti-Jap group and intended
to force the Premier, Pibul, to make a decision. The Japanese Am-
bassador in Bangkok expected early and favorable developments to be
P'ossible.
On l" December, ComSIXTEEN informed CinC, Asiatic Fleet,
which readdressed it for information to CincPac, ComFOURTEEN,
and OpNav, that Japanese radio station JVJ press tonight in closing
at 1700 hours (presumably minus 9 time) stated: "All listeners be
sure and listen in at 0700 tomorrow morning since there may be im-
portant news." ComSIXTEEN suggested frequencies 7327, 9430, and
12275. All times Tokyo, minus 9.
ComSIXTEEN also pent a dispatch on 1 December that radio in-
telligence had showed that among the arrivals in the Takao area dur-
ing the past two days were Comdesron 5 in the NATORI, and that
the NAKA was to join Desron 4 there; units of number Two Base
Force and CHOGEI, the latter being considered a tender for two
submarine divisions, had arrived in the Takao area, and that all these
units were under command of the CinC Third Fleet. ComSIXTEEN
noted that the CinC Second Fleet in the ATAGO had shifted from
Kure to the Sasebo [218] communication zone, apparently en
route to South China waters.
_ Referring to ComSIXTEEN dispatch in which Japanese radio sta-
tion JVJ requested all listeners to "be sure and listen in at 0700 to-
morrow morning since there may be important news," the impression
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 131
received was that the "winds" code was about to go on the air, mean-
ing by that the fake weather broadcast at the beginning and end of
news broadcasts to signal the rupture of relations between either
Japan and America or Japan and Britain or Japan and Russia. The
monitors were told of this and placed on the double alert, but nothing
came of it.
Mr, SoNNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence summary
for December 2nd, Captain, will you give us the highlights of that?
Captain LATToisr. Of interest was the Japanese were having diffi-
culty in routing their traffic due to the change of calls and the probable
unf amiliaritv of operators with the new calls and the location of the
units thereof.
Also it was noted that ComSIXTEEN had reported the Second and
Third Fleets to be in the Takao area and that Takao radio was broad-
casting traffic for these fleets. The broadcast was not heard in Ha-
waii, but it was observed here in ComFOURTEEN that there was
one indication that these two fleets weren't close to Takao. For in-
stance, in several instances Takao forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these
fleets. It was summarized as the belief that a large fleet, made up of
Second, Third, and First Fleet units, had left the Empire waters and
was either not close enough to Takao for good communications or
was proceeding on a course not close to Takao.
It was noted that Radio Shanghai handled considerable amounts of
traffic which obviously were originated by and destined for units in
thp Takao area.
[£19] It was noted that the Chief of Staff, South China area,
continued to appear in Shanghai. It was observed that ComSIX-
TEEN had reported nine submarines proceeding south of Camranh
Bay. These were assessed to be Subrons 5 and 6, which units normally
operated with the First Fleet, but which had been repeatedly shown to
be included in the Second Fleet task force for southern operations.
Despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appeared
to remain relatively quiet. Inconclusive evidence suggested there may
have been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff and
that there may be two supreme commanders with staffs. Lack of
identifications was noted as precluding precise information on the
Second Fleet, but it contributed to the belief that a large part of the
Second Fleet was underway. Cruiser Division 7 and Destroyer
Squadron 3 were unlocated since the change of calls.
There was nothing to report concerning the Third Fleet, but the
association of the Submarine Force with the Mandates Fleet, that is,
the Fourth Fleet, continued. Some traffic for the Fourth Fleet was
still seen going through Truk.
Under "Carriers" it was stated :
Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of iden-
tifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since
over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the change
on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident
that carrier traflfic is at a low ebb.
It was noted that the Combined Air Force, the shore-based air force,
continued to be closely associated with the Second, Third, and Indo-
China Fleets, and that some units of the Combined Air Force, which
previously 1220] had been shown in the Takao area, had de-
132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
parted. The direction was not given, but it was inferred as south, as
their previous associations had been south.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall what, if any, discussion you had with
Admiral Kimmel concerning the lack of information concerning the
carriers?
Captain Latton. I don't believe that there was any amount of dis-
cussion at this time, because in the past when call sign changes had
been made, there was a blank
Mr. SoNNETT. Was the fact, as stated in the communication intelli-
gence summary, evide, that the failure to identify one carrier call
indicated that carrier traffic was definitely at a low ebb ?
Captain Layton. Admiral Kimmel read that. Whether he com-
mented on it, I do not recall.
Mr. SoNNETT. If so, he did no comment to you ?
Captain Layton. I do not recall that he commented, but, if so, he
would have commented to me, I presume.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was your own analysis or evaluation of that
fact. Captain?
Captain Layton. At that time, as best I can recall it, I laid it to
the fact that there was a lack of identifications and in the past there
had been many times when carrier calls didn't appear, as you will
notice on previous days carrier calls didn't appear when there was
identified traffic. There have been many times and sometimes over a
considerable period when the carriers just did not appear because they
weren't operating. When they are tied at the buoy in Yokosuka or
Kure or other naval ports that have wire communications to Kure,
they receive their traffic by land line or on the teletype. They wouldn't
use high power. They wouldn't be called on broadcasts because their
operations were all local. They would also receive and pass con-
siderable local traffic.
[2^11 Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall whether the previous Ja-
panese advance into Hainan was preceded by a similar lack of carrier
traffic?
Captain Laytoist. No. On the contrary — do you mean Hainan or
French Indo-China?
Mr. SoNNETT. French Indo-China.
Captain Layton. On the contrary, in the French Indo-China dem-
onstrations of January and July, 1941, Carrier Division 2 appeared
in the traffic, and also at this occasion of the formation of this south-
ern invasion force under CinC Second Fleet, with the amphibious
forces under CinC Third Fleet, plus the shore-based air force under
major commands, it was noted definitely that Cardiv 3 and possibly
Cardiv 4 were associated with this force, Cardiv 4 being much less
associated and some lack of close association seen. It was also noted
that prior to the apparent formation of this task force, Cardivc 4 and
3 had been in the Takao area, or Nansei Shoto area, and that they
had returned to the Empire. Having been in that area, and since
Cardiv 3 was definitely southbound and since Cardiv 4 was lightlv
suggested as possibly being associated, it was on this basis that 1
placed Cardiv 3 and Cardiv 4 in my estimate as in the Southern Task
Force. It was believed that had the carrier* been intending to operate,
they would likely have appeared in the traffic.
Mr. SoNNETT. That is, you are speaking now of December 2, 1941 ?
Captain Layton. Had other carriers, other than those I have men-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 133
tioned, other carrier divisions, intended to operate, it would have been
suggested in traffic. It is to be noted here that Commander Carriers
is not associated in any of these dispatches.
Mr. SoNNETT, Wliat I am getting at. Captain, is when you say it
was believed, do you refer to December 2, 1941 ?
[£2£] Captain Layton. Correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. And at that time you believed that were the carriers
thought to be in home waters in operation, that would have shown
up in the traffic?
Captain Layton. If the carriers had been operating in active status
in home waters, they would have been shown in traffic.
Mr. SoNNETT. That was your belief at that time ?
Captain Laytox. That was my belief at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence sum-
mary of December 2, 1941, referring to tlie Second Fleet, it stated,
"No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. This
is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to
the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in com-
pany." Was the lack of traffic concerning the Second Fleet, therefore,
a reason for believing that the fleet was underway ?
Captain Layton. There was no lack of traffic; there was lack of
identification. The amount of traffic handled in the rough on Second
Fleet circuits, the presence of the call signs on the frequencies used by
those people, indicated that they were underway. It wasn't a case
of radio silence. Certain units used certain frequencies, just as our
Navy does, and the Second Fleet, and certain of its units, was using
certain frequencies and traffic was on these frequencies. We had no
identification of calls, but the fact that the traffic was on the circuits
would suggest that the Second Fleet was underway and probably in
company since they weren't handling it by broadcast methods. I would
have to talk to the men who wrote this to know what he thought when
he wrote it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Wliat I am getting at is your evaluation of the radio
silence or complete blank of information as it was stated in the Decem-
ber 2, [22S] 1941, summary as to carriers.
Captain Layton. The difl'erence between the statement here and the
statement as it reads, "No units have stood out prominently the last two
or three days" ; this is referring to the Second and Third Fleets.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you compare this with the statement concerning
the carriers, "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers
today"?
Captain Layton. I took that to mean that he had no information
on the carriers that day.
Mr. Sonnett. In the one case did you believe that the Second Fleet
units were underway and in the other case did you believe that the
carrier units were not underway and for the same reasons?
Captain Layton. I will repeat. The Second Fleet units were using
their radios. They were using their radios on known frequencies.
They were handling a normal pattern of traffic. A normal number of
unidentified calls on these circuits appeared. It was my belief that
even though these people were not identified as names, they were units
operating normally and at sea. Under "Carriers" there was a com-
plete blank of information, meaning since there had been no identified
calls, there was a complete blank of information. The carrier circuits
134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
were definitely not up, that is, there were no calls identified on circuits
that would be called carriers. The difference between a unit operating
at sea and a unit operating in home waters under an umbrella of broad-
casts. The things on broadcast can go to shore stations and special
landing forces and air forces and carrier forces and everything else
and there is no way of identifying who they are, but if a unit is identify-
ing under its tactical circuits at sea, that is a force. If a unit is operat-
ing under a broadcast, you wouldn't hear them. [^^4] If they
are operating in local waters and using only their local circuits of low
power or voice, for instance, you cannot hear it at the intercept station.
You cannot hear it at Cavite. It is too far away. Whenever they go
into local waters, they have always gone to local maneuvering circuits,
which applies to all vessels in that area. That is the impression that
I received from reading this, as best I recall it, on 2 December.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you, on or about December 2, 1941, have the belief
that the operations of carriers or any other types of ships of Japan
might be conducted in a period of radio silence ?
Captain Layton. Radio silence is a means that can be used by any
force at any time, and that fact had been known to me for a consider-
able period. It was not particularly apparent to me on December 2nd
any more than it was on July 16th, for instance, but that fact had been
discussed. I don't believe there was any thought of radio silence in
my mind in reading this paragraph, nor do I think that the paragraph
was written to imply that there was any radio silence of carriers. We
know, in fact, now that there was, but at that time, in trying to recall
as best I can, the reaction that I obtained in reading this summary
and discussing it with Admiral Kimmel was, for one thing, this was
only the second day of a change of call signs which will run some-
where around 20,000 calls. It is beyond the capabilities of our organ-
ization at this time to be able to tabulate and fit these all in in one
day. You never could do it if you had all the men in the world, because
there isn't any way of doing it. It is only after many days of traffic
that you can lay the traffic down and identify it. Even in those days,
you see, commanders had several call signs, but the ships had only one.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, was it not the fact that on December 2, 1941,
the radio intelligence unit here had identified over 200 service calls
[225] partially since the change on December 1, 1941?
Captain Layton. They stated that they had identified partially
over 200 service calls.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it not further the fact that the radio intelli-
gence unit said that in view of that fact and the further fact that they
hadn't recovered one carrier call, it was evident that carrier traffic
was at a low ebb?
Captain Layton. That is true.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did that signify something unusual, then, to you
concerning carrier radio traffic?
Captain Layton. Not at all, because in the previous days' sum-
maries, there was no significant carrier traffic noted or no remark to
that effect. You see, the summary brings out things that are sig-
nificantly noted, new associations, or if there is undue activity or if
people are heard, they put them down, because with this I kept my
location sheet. This was the only way that anyone could try to keep
track of the Japanese Navy. We had no espionage system that could
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 135
0
tell us when they went in and out of Kure or Sasebo or anywhere else.
This was the only way we had of doing it ; so when they had the identi-
fication for one of the Jap ships, if he was working with Yokosuka,
they would say so, just as they had the AKAGI in there working with
MARUS, so that we could keep track of as many major ships as
possible.
The fact that they didn't appear tended to indicate that they were
in an inactive status as they had returned in late October from oDera-
tions in the Nansei Shoto. It was sometimes the custom of the Japa-
nese after operations to take their carriers into the general Inland
Sea area, put their air groups shore-based and you wouldn't hear from
the carriers for \226\ a considerable period of time.
Admiral Heavitt. Did you interpret this note on the carriers, then,
as meaning that there was lack of traffic on the carrier freqeuncies?
Captain Layton. Yes, sir, lack of traffic on the carrier frequencies
and lack of carriers' call signs appearing on any frequencies
even in administrative types of dispatches about paymasters or per-
sonnel changes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall. Captain, whether or not you had any
discussion with Admiral Kimmel concerning that fact specifically?
Captain Layton. I believe I said before that I do not have any re-
collection that it was brought up, and I have not.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you have any dispatches for December 2nd, Cap-
tain?
Captain Laytox. ComSIXTEEN on the 2nd of December reported
to OpNav, CincPac, CincAF, and ComFOURTEEN that the CinC Sec-
ond and CinC Third Fleets were in the Takao area and Commander
Southern Expeditionary Force was in the Sama area. The Com-
mander Southern Expeditionary Force, incidentally, was the Com-
mander who had taken charge at the demonstration off French Indo-
China and had remained back in that area as a Fleet Area Commander.
ComSIXTEEN noted that broadcasts to fleet units were now being
sent by Takao or Bako Radio in addition to Tokyo. ComSIXTEEN
also said in this dispatch that the Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok
had on the 30th requested permission to destroy all but a limited num-
ber of codes.
On 2 December we received a dispatch from CincAF, timed 020345,
addressed to OpNav. info CincPac, that a patrol plane had spotted
nine submarines, speed 10, course south, at 0230 Greenwich, latitude
13-10 north, longitude 110-00.
And in a dispatch at 020730 CincAF reported to OpNav, info
CincPac, that bearing 070 from Saigon, distant 180 miles, three 1-61
class \227^ submarines had been sighted in cruising forma-
tion, headed south at 15 knots; that twenty-one transports were an-
chored at Camranh Bay with six planes patrolling overhead.
At 012200 the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, reported to
Opnav. info CincPac, CincAF, ComSIXTEEN, Naval Attache,
Chungking, Naval Attache, Tokyo, as follows : that between Wednes-
day and Saturdaj^ there had arrived there (Shanghai) 14,000 troops
plus others on two special trains. He was unable to get an accurate
check on numbers. "Equipment with arrivals include field artillery
and tanks. Those (troops) sailing from Shanghai week ending 22nd
believed to have included Fourth Division,"
136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
%
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the communication intellig:ence sum-
mary for December 3, 1941, Captain, will vou give us the highlights
of it?
Captain Layton. Highlights were that the volume of traffic was
normal, with the receiving conditions good. It was observed that the
"present state of call recovery does not permit much detailed informa-
tion to be obtained." It noted the extensive use of alternate calls by
the major commands and stated that it slowed tip the identification of
these units, stating that very few units had been positively identified
so far.
It was noted that the Chief of the Naval General Staff originated
three navy dispatches to CinC Combined, CinC Second, CinC Third
Fleets. Tokyo Intelligence originated nine dispatches to the same
commanders.
It was observed that the presence of the CinC Second Fleet in For-
mosan waters was not revealed in the radio traffic, but the impression
was gained that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway, but
that was not verified by radio intelligence means.
It was noted that some of the Fourth Fleet units were in the Mar-
shall Islands area and included some of the Fourth Fleet staff. It
[3£8] stated that the identity of these units was not known.
It was noted that the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit addressed several
messages to CinC Fourth Fleet.
It was also noted that some Swatow units were addressed at Saigon,
indicating movements south of certain of the South China units to
Saigon.
It was noted that Bako Radio originated many dispatches to the
Resident Naval Officer at Taihoku, Formosa, and the Task Force Com-
mander.
It stated, "No information on submarines or carriers,"
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you have any dispatches of December 3rd ?
Captain Layton. On December 3rd, OpNav addressed CincAF and
ComSIXTEEN, information CincPac and ComFOURTEEN, that
Tokyo had ordered London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila to
destroy their purple machines. The Batavia machine had already
been sent to Tokyo. On December 2nd Washington had been directed
to destroy their purple machine and all but one copy of other systems.
It stated that the British Admiralty that date had reported that the
Japanese Embassy in London had complied with its orders to de-
stroy it.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was the purple machine. Captain ?
Captain Layton. It was an electric coding machine.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you have any discussion with Admiral Kimmel
concerning the destruction of the purple machine by the Japanese ?
Captain Layton. All I recall of it is that Admiral Kimmel sent for
me when he received this dispatch I have just mentioned, or one similar
to it, and asked what was the purple machine. I told him that I didn't
know, that I would find out. I then approached Lieutenant Coleman,
the Fleet Security Officer, who had come from Washington, and asked
him, and he told me it was the Japanese diplomatic electrical coding
machine.
[2£9] Mr. SoNNETT. Did you communicate that to- Admiral
Kimmel ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 137
Captain Layton. Which information I communicated to Admiral
Kimmeh
Mr. SoNNETT. What, if any, evaluation was made of the fact that the
Japanese were going to destroy the purple machine ?
Captain Latton. It indicated that the Japanese were preparing for
any or all eventualities and most of the addresses were in the southern
area, with the exception of Washington and London.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you know whether or not the Japanese Consul
in Hawaii had a purple machine?
Captain Laytox. I did not know, but I have subsequently discovered
that he did not.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you know at this time whether or not the Jap-
anese Consul in Hawaii was destroying or burning papers ?
Captain Layton. He was not at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. On December 3, 1941 ?
Captain Layton. I don't believe it was the 3rd. I thought it was a
little bit later. It may have been the 3rd. I don't recall which day I
was informed that he was burning his papers, and I said, "That fits the
picture that the Japanese are preparing for something, destroying
their codes."
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it brought to Admiral Kimmel's attention that
the Japanese Consul in Hawaii was burning papers ?
Captain Laytox. Yes, sir.
Mr. SoNXETT. Do you know, Captain, whether or not the Army in
Hawaii was advised of the information concerning the Japanese de-
struction of the purple machine or of the Japanese destruction of
records in Hawaii ?
[230] Captain Laytox. As I recall it. Commander Eochefort
told me that he had informed Ixis opposite number in the Army the
Japanese were destroying their secret and confidential papers not
only in Hawaii but in other places. I don't know whether he told
them that they were destroying the purple machine. As a matter of
fact, I wouldn't think that he would, I don't know. It is my best
recollection that I told Colonel Raley that the Japanese were destroy-
ing their important papers and code books and everything else not
only here but everywhere else. I didn't want to mention the purple
machine because I didn't want to explain what I meant.
Mr. SoxxETT. Do you have any other dispatches, Captain?
Captain Laytox. OpNav sent another dispatch, containing the same
information, time 031850, addressed for action to ComSIXTEEN,
CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, CincAF, and it said :
Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent in-
structions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at
Hong Kong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington X and London to
destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important
confidential and secret documents.
We received a dispatch from the Naval Attache, Singapore, time
020335, on the 3rd, which stated that CinC China had issued the
following to British and Allied merchant ships in that area : All ships
north of Hong Kong proceed south thereof. Crown Colony's and
all ocean-going ships to Singapore, proceeding to Singapore,
and bring such shipyard equipment as possible X except for coast Malaya
and West Borneo no vessels leave near northbound without permission XX
Dutch issued orders none their ships go north their islands without authority.
138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Keferring to the intelligence summary for December
4, 1941, Captain, will you give us the high lights of that?
[231] Captain Layton. It was noted that Takao Radio instituted
a Fleet broadcast using the same prefix indicator that Radio Tokyo
used. This was rather an important move from a communications
point of view in that you had two complete broadcasts which carried
the same indicators but had different serial numbers. It also in-
dicated that Takao had now assumed the position that Tokyo had
been in two weeks before of handling major fleet traffic on high speed
circuits. It was noted, however, that only few messages had been
placed on that broadcast. Moreover, it was noted that there were a
large number of urgent messages, most of these from Tokj^o to major
commanders, and, among others, there was a Tokyo intelligence dis-
patch in seven parts addressed to the Chiefs of Staff, China Fleet, the
Combined Fleet, the Third Fleet, the South China Fleet, the French
Indo-China Force, and Sama, Hainan. In all, Tokyo radio intel-
ligence sent out twelve dispatches to the major commanders.
It was noted that the outstanding item of the day's traffic was the
lack of mesages originating from CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third
Fleet. It was noted that these were previously very talkative and
were now very quiet. While the fleet calls were not as yet well
identified, the lack of traffic from these commands could not be
ascribed to that. They are still prominent as addressees. It was
believed now that the CinC Second Fleet was in the vicinity of
Takao and that the conflicting evidence before was due to the two
broadcasts that had been brought up. CinC Combined Fleet sent
one message to an unidentified unit for action and for information
to the Third Base Force at Palao, CinC Second Fleet, and CinC
Third Fleet, thereby renewing Palao's association with the Southern
Invasion Force.
CinC Fourth Fleet sent a message to the Chief of Staff Combined
Air [232] Force, information Eleventh Air Corps, Chitose
Air, and Air Squadron Twenty-four, the Third Base Force at Palao,
and the Fourth Base Force at Truk. This undoubtedly had to do
with air movements or preparations. They couldn't find anything
further in the day's traffic to check on the present of Fourth Fleet
units in the Marshalls, as has previously been stated. Jaluit Radio
was associated with the Commander Submarine Force and with Tokyo
Radio and with an unidentified call which was believed to be an oil
tanker.
There was an impression, a definite impression, as I recall it, from
this summary that these commanders, who had previously been very
active in originating dispatches, from the dispatches which tied in
their groups, suddenly now became quiet, but they were still the
addressees of many intelligence reports; they were the addressees
of many other dispatches from Empire and shore-based originators.
Now yon do get tlie impression they are at sea and maintaining radio
silence. They are in the traffic, but they don't send the traffic them-
selves. I would like to state here that the Japanese tlien hadn't found
out the hidden little trick of putting it from no originator. We taught
them (hat in the war, which they dutifully followed thereafter, much
to our chagrin.
Mr. Son NEXT. Do you have any dispatches for December 4th,
Captain?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 139
Captain Layton. Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, dispatch, time
020704, received on 4 December, stated tliat an unidentified modern
10,000 ton cargo ship converted as a seaplane tender. It liad a flush
deck, raised forecastle, raked bow, cruiser stern, armed with one 4,7
gun on an elevated platform forward and one also on ihe poop. Also
that Japanese naval craft sighted were as follows: On the 15th off
Saigon were seven transports; on the 20th northeast of Amoy was a
10,000 ton seaplane carrier, having eight [^33] catapults.
Assistant Naval Attache's dispatch from Shanghai, 020702, received
on 4 December, in general stated that local Nazis of military age
were being sent to Japan for training and believed to be for duty on
the German vessels interned there. Eighty men, average age thirty,
were known to have de])arted the past ten days; also that the officials
in the Shanghai area were exerting pressure on the French Conces-
sion to discharge Anglo-American volunteer members of the police
reserves, who were to be replaced by Germans and Italians. He con-
firmed previous movements of the large liners KAMAKURA iMARU,
the NITTA MARU. and the ARGENTINE MARU, had been carry-
ing building material, personnel, oil, and supplies to the Caroline
Islands; that 3,000 laborers had landed at Jaluit, and that the fol-
lowing three islands were being specially developed: Katherine,
iMajuro, and Mejit.
We received from the Naval Attache, Tokyo, time 030030, received
on 4 December, a dispatch to the effect that two escort vessels had
been recently completed in the Yokohama dockyard; that one trans-
port loaded with aircraft plus another one carrying naval personnel
departed Yokohama 27 November.
iMr. SoNisTETT. Referring to the communication intelligence sum-
mary for December 5, 1941, Captain, will you give us the highlights
of that?
Captain Layton. It was noted that the traffic volume was extremely
heavy and all circuits were overloaded. There were several new
intercept schedules heard, and Ominato Radio was working with
Sama and Bako, and that the Takao broadcast was handling traffic
to the Second and Third Fleets, and that the Tokyo broadcast was
also handling traffic for those units. It was observed that some traffic
being broadcast was several days old. It was adduced that this indi-
cated uncertainty of delivery [234] existing in the radio or-
ganization. It was also seen that there were many messages of high
precedence which appeared to have caused a jammed condition on
all circuits. They quoted a plain language dispatch sent by Captain,
OKAWA, from Tokyo to Takao, probably for further relay, and
addressed to Fujihara, Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau, which
said,
In reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said Is considered important
at this end but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued
soon.
iMr. SoNNETT. Captain, what was the OKATVA? Do you know?
Captain Layton. I do not know.
It w^as noted that neither the Second Fleet Commander nor the
Third Fleet Commander originated any traffic. They were still fre-
quently addressed and are receiving their traffic over the broadcasts.
It was believed that they were undoubtedly in the Takao area or
140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
farther south since the Takao broadcast handled nearly all their
traffic.
It was stated that no traffic from the Commander Carriers of Sub-
marine Force had been seen either.
Third Fleet. It was noted that the Commander Fourteenth Army
was aboard the KYUJO MARU in the Third Fleet and that a number
of MARUS had been addressing the CinC Third Fleet.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was a MARU, Captain?
Captain Latton. A MARU is any Japanese merchant vessel.
Rather than saying merchant vessel or Japanese merchant vessel,
you say MARU, because all Japanese merchant vessels have MARU
at the ends of their names; so that is another little standardization
that we use.
The Flag Secretary of the Fourth Fleet and the Staff Communica-
tion Officer of the Fourth Fleet were addressed in Jakiit, strengthening
the 1^235] impression that the CinC Fourth Fleet was in the
Marshalls. Again we had an association between the Palao Radio, the
Resident Naval Officer at Palao, and Commander Second Fleet by
being addressed by the Commander South China Fleet.
Sama, Hainan, addressed much traffic to CinC Second Fleet, and
Bako in the Pescadores sent considerable traffic to the Second and
Third Fleets. The Commander of the Combined Air Force appeared
to be busy with the movement of his air corps. Shiogama Air and
at least two other unidentified air corps appeared to be moving, prob-
ably to Indo-China.
On December 5th we received no intelligence traffic from any source
whatsoever.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the communication intelligence sum-
mary for December 6, 1941, Captain, do you know whether that was
delivered to Admiral Kimmel before or after the attack on Decem-
ber 7th?
Captain Layton. It was delivered to me after the attack on De-
cember 7th and Admiral Kimmel did not see it and was too busy to
read it. It contained no positive information of anything we didn't
already know and, in fact, contained nothing of what we then
did know.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you have any dispatches received prior to the
attack on December 7th ?
Captain Layton. On 7 December there was a dispatch and I be-
lieve it was received after the attack, but I am not positive. It may
have come in in the early morning and I didn't see it until afterwards.
It was a dispatch which ComSIXTEEN sent to OpNav, information
CinCPac, CincAF, and ComFOURTEEN.^ They estimated the South
China Air Force Headquarters were now in the Saigon area ; at least
four groups of planes, strength unknown, were at that station ; that a
heavy concentration of aircraft were at Formosa and [3361
based at Takao, Taichu, and Kagi naval air stations; that eight
MARU air tenders, that is, converted ex-merchant marine, probably
freighters to seaplane tenders, were in the South China area, five of
them being in the Takao general zone, one near Saigon, and two near
Sama, Hainan; that the direction finder bearings indicated the
AKAGI was moving south from the Empire and now was in the
Nansei Shoto, Okinawa, area. "Estimates based on call recoveries
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 141
since 1 December and may be considered conservative." This esti-
imate is based on call sign recovery since 1 December and may be
considered conservative. The large volume of high precedence traffic
from air activities in the Saigon area indicates extensive air opera-
tions may be imminent.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were there any other dispatches received before the
attack ?
Captain Latton. These are dispatches I have in my file, and
whether they came in to us before, I don't know. A dispatch, time
060550, from Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, and dated 7 De-
cember 1941, reported that approximately 14,000 troops who had ar-
rived in Shanghai by rail the latter part of the week before had
embarked and departed south; that the equipment included ninety
armored cars, and that the Japanese gendarmerie force in Shanghai
had been augmented by a thousand persons brought from Nanking
and Hanchow. The Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, remarked
that there was "no apparent reason for this increase unless policing
of additional local areas is contemplated."
A dispatch received on 6 December 1941 from CinC Asiatic Fleet,
addressed to OpNav, information CinCPac, ComSIXTEEN, and
ComFOURTEEN, stated that the CinCChina reported :
25 Ship convoy with escort 6 cruisers and 10 destroyers lat 8 north 106 east
at 0316 GCT' today X Convoy 10 ships with [237] 2 cruisers and 10 de-
stroyers 7-40 north 106-20 east 2 hours later X All on course west X 3 addi-
tional ships 7-51 north 105 east at 0442 course 810 X This indicates all forces
will make for Kohtron X By scouting force sighted 30 ships and 1 large cruiser
anchored Camranh Bay X
A dispatch from the Naval Observer, Wellington, time 050600, re-
ceived on 6 December 1941, which said that the naval intelligence,
New Zealand, had informed our Naval Observer there in confidence
and not for transmission that the Jap Consul in Wellington had re-
ceived orders to destroy his codes. A reply, using the code word
set up for that, indicating compliance therewith, had been sent to
Tokyo. Also he reported that the Japanese consuls in Australia and
New Zealand had been directed to forward all possible geographical
data. He enjoined secrecy in this matter to keep the source still
available to the British.
Admiral Hewitt. We will adjourn at this time until 9 : 15, tomor-
row morning.
(The investigation was then, at 5 : 30 p. m., adjourned until 9 : 15
a. m., 30 May 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 143
[238^ PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIRY
Ele\t:xth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investi<ration met at the Visitinrr Flair Offi-
cer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief. U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 9 : 15 a. m.,
Wednesday 30 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt. U?N : Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. GrisAvold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR: and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, entered and, after having been
warned that his previous oath was still binding, resumed his seat as
witness.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain. T show you Exhibit 15 of the Naval Court
of Inquiry, which is a certified copy of an OPNav dispatch of Novem-
ber 24th. and ask you whether yon recall having seen that.
Captain Layton. Yes, I recall it.
Mr. Sonnett. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral, before
this investigation?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The dispatch referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 24.")
Captain Layton. I believe that is the dispatch that Admiral Kim-
mel had me take and show to General Short in person the day it was
received. I gave it to Admiral Short for his perusal shortly after
12 : 15, as he was then listening to the news, which, I believe, ran from
12 to 12 : 15, at his headquarters. He read it and asked me what naval
air strength we had at Guam \2S9'\ and I replied that as far
as I knew, we had no naval air strength unless there was a transient
patrol plane or so passing through. He asked me concerning the
former landing field at Guam and I told him that while I did not
knoAv at first hand, it was my impression that some time after 1930
and probably before 1932 the shore-based Marine observation group
that was stationed at Guam had been withdrawn and the airfield had
been allowed to revert to its original state, that is, unimproved and
not kept up. General Short then asked about the defenses of Guam.
I told him again I did not know at first hand, but when in Tokyo on
duty at the American Embassy, 1 had seen a copy of a memorandum
or aide memoire submitted to the Japanese Government, informing
them that all coast defense guns on Guam had been withdrawn and
that Guam was to be considered thereafter as an undefended island.
While I do not recall the date of this note, it is my impression it was
somewhere around 1933, possibly 1934. General Short made some
remark to the effect about appeasing Japan both in the past and in
the present and returned the note to me and tlianked me for bringing
144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
it. I returned the note to CincPac Headquarters and reported that
I had completed the mission sent on.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the sentences in exhibit 24 of this in-
vestigation, which is the OpNav dispatch of November 24th, as
follows :
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements
their naval and military forces indicate in oiir opinion that a surprise aggressive
move in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility —
will you state, Captain, what conversation you had with Admiral
Kimmel concerning your evaluation or estimate of that portion of
the dispatch?
[24-0] Captain Latton. I don't recall that Admiral Kimmel
asked me specifically for my evaluation of that special part of the
dispatch. I do recall that in general a statement was made to the
effect that that was borne out by the present information we had at
hand; an aggressive move was then under way. I believe that the
fact the Philippines and Guam were mentioned was given particular
attention, although I do not believe it was stressed in my presence.
I know that when dispatches of this nature or other important dis-
patches having to do with fleet movements or dispositions were re-
ceived, the Admiral, the Chief of Staff, War Plans Officer, Opera-
tions Officer, and the Aviation Officer were closeted with the Admiral
for sometimes hours at an end. During these conferences, I was sel-
dom, if ever, present.
Mr, SoNNETT. Did the opinion of the Chief of Naval Operations as
expressed in this dispatch, namely, that the movements of the Japa-
nese naval and military forces and statements of the government in-
dicate a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including
attack on the Philippines or Guam, coincide or agree with your own
estimate of the situation at that time?
Captain Layton. As I recall it, and it is more than three and a
half years since then, and it is very difficult to recall what you thought
after this period, and particularly when I have been engaged in fleet
intelligence work daily since then — I believe that my impression was
they have the same information we have; they note this southern
movement as we do, and they have found in their judgment that the
Japanese may not leave us on their flank either. That had been a
subject of conversation, as to whether the Japanese would proceed on
with the indicated movements, leaving us on their flank, or would they
have to take us out on the way down. It was my personal impression,
and I so stated, that Japan had never yet, with [24^] the ex-
ception of Russia, left a strong enemy on a flank.
Mr. SoNNETT. It appears from the exhibit. Captain, that an attack
on American territory, namely, the Philippines or Guam, was re-
garded as a possibility by the Chief of Naval Operations. Was that
in accord with your estimate at the time ?
Captain Layton. The possibility of a Japanese attack on the Phil-
ippines or Guam was in accord with my belief at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you express that belief to Admiral Kimmel ?
Captain Layton. I don't believe that my belief was specifically
requested as you have so stated it. I believe he asked me to the extent
that, didn't this bear out what we were thinking at the time, namely,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY " 145
would they or would they not leave us on the flank when they moved
south ? By the possibility of the Japanese leaving us on their flank,
I meant, and it was understood, I believe, that the Japanese in their
move into French Indo-China and Thailand or even across into Burma
to cut the Burma Road, as was conjectured by some observers, would
consider our position in the Philippines as a direct menace and threat
on their immediate flank; that should they leave us on their flank,
our position in the Philippines would be a threat to their line of com-
munications should we decide to take action in assistance to Great
Britain or French Indo-China or the Thai operations, as the case
might be.
Mr. SoxNETT. By that, Captain, do you mean that you expected an
attack on the Philippines or Guam in the event of Japanese war with
the United States?
Captain Layton. I did not expect the attack, but I was not unaware
of its possibilities. In other words, the whole problem was would
the Japanese leave us on their flank? If they would leave us, they
wouldn't [^4^] attack. On the other hand, if they left us
there, we would be a threat. So, since the Japanese have rarely left
a strong enemy in an immediate flank, they might attack so as to pro-
tect their own wing, their own line of communications, as a measure
of security.
Mr. SoNNETT. What directions of movement were considered in
your estimate other than Japanese movement or attack on the Philip-
pines or Guam?
Captain Layton. My estim.ate was there were two task forces under
CinC Second Fleet, one proceeding down south from the Formosa-
Hainan-Bako area into the South China Sea and aiming at the Kra
Isthmus or its vicinity, the Gulf of Siam. The other task force was
proceeding via Palao in the Western Carolines with the intention per-
haps of threatening Timor, Celebes, or other Dutch holdings in that
general zone.
Mr. SoNKETT. Did you at that time. Captain, believe or estimate
that in the event of war with Japan, an attack on Hawaii was a pos-
sibility?
Captain Laytox. I did not believe it a possibility at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you know whether or not the Commander-in-
Chief believed at that time that an attack on Hawaii was a possibility?
Captain Layton. I do not know.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I show you exhibit 8 of the Naval Court of
Inquiry, which is a Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number 2CL-41
(Revised) of October 14, 1941, and ask you whether you were familiar
with that.
Captain Layton. I had seen it.
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to paragraph 2 (b) of that letter, does it
not appear that the security of the fleet operating and based in the
Hawaiian area was predicated at that time on two assumptions and
that one of the assumptions was that a declaration of war might be
preceded by [^4^] a surprise attack upon ships in Pearl
Harbor ?
Captain Layton. That is what this letter from the Commander-in-
Chief says.
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 11
146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, was that not, Captain, an estimate, then, of
CincPac concernincj the possibility or indicating the possibility of a
surprise attack at Pearl Harbor prior to a declaration of war?
Captain Layton. I presume it was. I was not consulted on the
writing of that letter ; therefore, I cannot speak at first hand. Its face
value would say that that was true.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did your own estimate agree with that of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, on that subject?
Captain Layton. Yes. That had been discussed in the past. As a
matter of fact, that point of Japan's actions was informally discussed
with Admiral Kimmel on the occasion some months before Pearl
Harbor when I presented him with a translation of a Japanese novel
which purported to tell for the layman what would be expected during
a Japanese-American war, and in which were laid out three problems
for the American Commander-in-Chief, who, they presumed, would
proceed from the West Coast and be based in Pearl Harbor. One
problem was the possibility of a surprise task force raid on the Hawai-
ian Islands. Another possibility was an expedition or raid in the
Aleutian Islands. As I recall it, the third proposition was an am-
phibious expedition against the Hawaiian Islands. Under the first
of these, the surprise raid by a task force on the Hawaiian Islands,
they listed in this book the possible composition of such a task force,
listing fast carriers, KONGO class battleships, and NACHI class
cruisers, stating that because this force was fast and America had no
fast battleships, it could run away from any superior force ; because
the force was strong, it could close with ['^44-] any inferior force
and destroy it.
This very point was informally discussed and the Admiral asked me
what I thought concerning such a proposition. As I recall it, I stated
that that was a potentiality the Japanese always had and that I hoped
that our air search would find them before they got too close. He
then excused me and thereafter sent for other officers. Whether they
discussed this point or not, I do not know, as I was not present.
Mr. SoNNETT. It was. Captain, I tal?,e it, a part of your duties to
maintain an estimate of the situation so far as possible enemy action
was concerned, was it not?
Captain Layton. It was, to maintain the enemy forces section of
the estimate. In other words, an estimate of the situation is built up
from all material, political, economic, military, and so forth. Particu-
larly, an estimate regarding a nation is a very large and a very bulky
document; yet it is a result of considerable information and clear
thinking. My job was to keep up that part of the enemy forces, which
my 1 December memorandum purports to be.
Admiral Hewitt. Does that include possible enemy courses of
action?
Captain Layton. I don't believe so, sir. I would have to get out the
War College book. Unless it has been changed — this was written when
the old gray-covered book was in use. I would have to check to see.
Admiral Hewitt. It is not your recollection that it was your duty
to formulate possible enemy courses of action?
Captain Layton. No, sir, I don't think that was part of it. This
was only formulation of enemy forces. I think possible enemy
courses was part of the Plans Division. I furnished them with the
psychological and other things for the broad estimate of the first part.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWlTT INQUIRY 147
124s'] Admiral Hewitt. The composition and position of the
fleet?
Captain Layton. The composition and position of the fleet was my
section, too, of the estimate. It was at best, of course, the best infor-
mation that we had, but was lacking considerably in detail, particu-
larly on land forces and certain of the air forces, although our day
to day check on the intelligence, even though at times it was a little
contradictory, when the end averaged out, was we knew there was a
considerable concentration of air, for instance, in the Southern For-
mosa-French Indo-China-Hainan area, and at the same time there was
a concentration of some submarines in the Marshalls. There was a
concentration of considerable naval force — as a matter of fact, a large
naval force — in the South China Sea area which was amphibious in
nature. And my estimate showed that remaining in the Empire were
only the battleships of Batdivs 1 and 2, the cruisers of Crudiv 6,
which were put down as tentatively moved to the Mandates, which
ihey did, Desron 1, and probably or possibly Cardivs 1 and 2, plus
Cruiser Division 8 also. Of the Pearl Harbor task force, with the
exception of the first section of Batdiv 3, that is, the HIYEI and
KIRISHIMA, and the two carriers that we carried down in the
Hainan area, the Pearl Harbor task force was carried as in home
waters.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I show you exhibit 23 of the Naval Court of
Inquiry record, which is the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan,
Hawaiian Department, Annex number VII, Section VI, Joint Agree-
ments, dated 28 March 1941, and Addendum 1, Naval Base Defense
Air Force Operation Plan number A-1-41. I refer you to the sum-
mary of the situation set forth in the Addendum and to the possible
enemy action also set forth in the Addendum, and ask whether that
was in accord with your estimate during the year 1941.
[246] Captain Latton. I don't recall ever having seen this docu-
ment, as it was produced in another command. It was not submitted
to me, nor was I consulted regarding it ; therefore, anything I say now
concerning this document would be as I learn it at this instant.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know whether the summary of the situation
as expressed in that document, Addendum 1, was in accord with your
views as of October 1941 ?
Captain Layton. In general, I would say that the sub-paragraphs
listed therein had been in my mind, probably not in the same phrase-
ology but all the points listed therein had been matters that had been
previously discussed and which I was well aware of.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, does that apply. Captain, as well to the state-
ment in the Summary of the Situation contained in Addendum 1 to
the effect that, "It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an
Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no
prior warning from our intelligence services"?
Captain Layton. I did not write that sentence and I would not write
it in that way, although I would say the same thing. Since my interest
was purely intelligence, m}' statement would be, as I have said before,
any force under sealed orders can sail without any warning, unless
you have an efficient espionage and spy system which can give you all
the information, and it can arrive at any point, unless it is detected
by visual or other sighting. That is the same language being used
there, only differently phrased.
148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. I refer you to the paragraph of Addendum 1 entitled'
"Possible Enemy Action," sub-paragraph (a) , as follows :
A declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise submarine attack
on ships in the operating area : (2) a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and
[247] installations in Pearl Harbor; (3) a combination of these two.
I also refer you to sub-paragraph (b) , reading as follows:
It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would
be an air attack. It is believed that at present such qn attack would most likely
be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of
300 miles.
Do those statements accord with your estimate of possible enemy ac-
tion as of October or November, 1941 ?
Captain Laytox. Those statements are in accord with other courses
of possible enemy action which I had thought of. Paragraph (b) ,
wherein carriers would have to come within 300 miles, was not one
of my thoughts. That is, the 300 miles was a matter of air operations
and I mere]y thought that carriers would approach within launching
range, and had expressed the hope that such a task force would be found
by our air search prior to getting to within striking range.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the so-called war warning of November
27, 1941, Captain, which was exhibit 17 of the Naval Court of Inquiry
record, is that the dispatch to w^iich you referred in your testimony
yesterday ?
Captain Laytox. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit in this
case?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 25."^')
Mr. SoNNETT. Was that the dispatch, Captain, which you para-
phrased and which paraphrase you were instructed to deliver to Gen-
eral Short, about which }■ ou testified yesterday ?
[^4^] Captain Layton. This is a copy of the dispatch which
Admiral IGmmel directed me to paraphrase and deliver to Genera]
Short on the late afternoon or early evening of 27 November.
Mr, SoxNETT. Exhibit 25, the war warning. Captain, has as its first
statement the following :
This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.
What, if any, discussion of that phrase did you have with Admiral
Kimmel ?
Captain Laytox. I had no discussion with Admiral Kimmel about
that phrase. After Admiral Kimmel received this dispatch, he was
in closed conference, as I have previously testified. He sent for me
and told me to deliver this dispatch to General Short. He acquiesced
to a paraphrase being delivered to General Short and I retired to make
the paraphrase. When I brought the paraphrase back, the Chief of
Staff of the Fourteenth Naval District brought in an urgent dispatch
from General Short, which was handed to Admiral Ivimmel. During
my wait in the Admiral's cabin to receive the Admiral's approval of
my paraphrase and receive it for delivery to General Short, I was
asked no questions that I recall. I did not take part in the discussions,
I feel sure.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you. Captain, evaluate that dispatch as indicat-
ing that war with Japan was apt to break out in the near future ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 149
Captain Latton. I felt that.
Mr. SoNXETT. At that time, Captain, was it the fact that your esti-
mate of the location of the Japanese carriers, briefly, was as follows :
That one carrier was possibly in the Marshalls and that, according to
ComSIXTEEN, the First and Second Fleet carriers were in home
waters ?
Captain Layton. I believe that was a fact.
Mr. SoNNETT. Keferring to Exhibit 8 of this investigation. Captain,
and to the ComSIXTEEN dispatch of 26 November, does it appear
that ComSIXTEEN [£49] was of the opinion that Carrier
Division 3 was expected to operate in the Mandates ?
Captain Laytox. It was my opinion on reading this dispatch where
ComSIXTEEN said:
and units expected to operate in Mandates will be referred to as second section X
estimated units . . . second section Crudiv Five and Cardiv Three Ryujo and one
niaru x Desrons two and four X Subron five X Desdiv twenty-tiiree X first
base force of third fleet X third base force at Palao X fifth base force at Saipan
and lesser units unidentified XX Crudiv six and Batdiv three may be included
in first and second sections respectively but status cannot be clarified yet
referred-to units to operate from the Palao area of the Japanese Man-
dates and not the central, northern, or eastern Mandates, that is, the
Eastern Carolines, Marianas, or Marshalls.
It is to be noted that ComFOURTEEN's dispatch 260110 had stated
there is believed to be a strong* concentration of submarines and air groups in
the Marshalls which comprise Airon twenty-four x at least one carrier division
unit X plus probably one third of the submarine fleet.
I believe, and it was my interpretation at the time, that the Com-
SIXTEEN dispatch placing Cardiv 3 in the Mandates was in accord-
ance with our existing information that Cardiv 3 would operate to the
south with the Southern Invasion Fleet and possibly based out of
Palao, while the presence of one carrier unit in the Marshalls was still
a potentiality, and that while there was a disagreement on the lattei
point, there was no disagreement on the former point.
Mr. SoNNETT. The ComSIXTEEN dispatch of November 26th,
Captain, contained in Exhibit 8, states, among other things,
our best indications are that all known first and second fleet carriers still in
Sasebo-Kure area.
Wliat carriers were comprehended by the description "First and
Second Fleet [250] carriers" ?
Captain Laytox. I believe that the ComSIXTEEN dispatch,
speaking of First and Second Fleet carriers in home waters, referred
to Cardiv 1, AKAGI and KAGA, and Cardiv 2, HIRYU and SORYU,
plus their plane guards, and possibly another Cardiv consisting of two
carriers or possibly one carrier or, in other words, the one I called
Cardiv 4 on my December 1st estimate and placed with Cardiv 3 in the
Bako-Takao area.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Captain, to Exhibit 23 of this investiga-
tion, which is your December 1, 1941, estimate of the location of the
Japanese Fleet, will you state whether, having refreshed your recol-
lection, that was delivered on December 1st or on December 2, 1941?
Captain Latton. I believe, having considered this throughout the
evening, that it was on December 1st that Admiral Kimmel told me
to prepare a location sheet of the Japanese Fleet, and that it was that
evening I prepared it and so dated it in my rough draft ; that it was
150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
most likely, and I believe most probable, the 2nd of December when
the rough draft was written up into the smooth copy and the date of
the day before had been written on there; and that it was on the 2nd
of December and not the 1st of December that this delivery was made
to Admiral Kimmel. Two dispatches which I referred to in my
testimony yesterday from CinC Asiatic Fleet regarding the sighting
of submarines and transports along the French Inclo-China Coast and
in Camranh Bay, respectively, are penciled notations on this memo-
randum. Their time group indicates they were written as of the
late afternoon and early evening of 1 December, Honolulu time and
date, and, as these corrections were made the following morning after
its typing in the smooth, I am sure in my recollection that it was done
when these dispatches reached my desk and prior to its submission
to Admiral Kimmel. [3-51] So, I believe the date of the 2nd
is thereby fixed and I wish to have all previous testimony so
corrected.
Mr. SoNNETT, As of the date of the delivery of your estimate, which
is Exhibit 23, just to summarize the situation as to Japanese carriers,
Captain, you placed Carrier Divisions 3 and 4 in the Bako-Takao area
and possibly the KORYU in the Marshalls area, did you not?
Captain Layton. I placed Cardivs 3 and 4 plus their plane guard
destroyers and tlie KASUGA MAEU (XCV) in the Bako-Takao
area, and the ''KORYU ( ?)" plus plane guards in the Marshalls area.
The "KORYU ( ?)" was to indicate that»while this was a carrier or
a converted carrier, the name might be incorrect, but it was still a
carrier unit with a flight deck and planes.
Mr. SoNNETT. I note that in your December 1st estimate. Captain,
which is Exhibit 23, you start out by saying, "From best available
information units of the orange fleet are thought to be located as
listed below." "What was the significance of underscoring the word
"thought"?
Captain Layton. As I recall it, the tenseness of the situation could
not be underestimated in my mind. The fact that all of this informa-
tion, with possibly one or two exceptions of sighting of transports
and light cruisers and the submarines, was based on traffic analysis
of the enemy naval radio circuits, which by itself, by its very nature,
is inconclusive, sometimes contradictory, and very often incomplete.
On the other hand, it does depict a picture, barring planned decep-
tion, and the picture, as I saw it, was as I laid it down to you. But
I underscored the word "thought" because I had no direct evidence.
I had kept track in the best way possible of every single unit, of every
single command, and I wanted it plainly indicated that this was my
thought and that [252] somebody elese in drawing an estimate
with the same material might vary in small details but would not
vary over the big picture.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, in your December 1st estimate, Captain, in
placing Carrier Division 4, which consisted of the ZUIKAKU and
the SHOKAKU, in the Bako-Takao area, that was later discovered
and in fact was an error, was it not ?
Captain Layton. It was, but it was based on previous radio intelli-
gence indications wherein it was noted that Cardiv 4 was associated
with Cardiv 3 and had previously operated in the Takao area with
Cardiv 3, had previously operated with Commander of the Combined
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 151
Air Force in joint operations, Commander of the Combined Air Force
being the commander of the naval shore-based aircraft, and who was
then an important command in the southern invasion units. Since
this small indication existed and since this was not only one, but had
occured on two occasions, I felt that they possibly were there; and
that again is my thought with very small indications.
Mr. SoNNETT. What I am getting at. Captain, is that as to Carrier
Division 4, then, on the basis of whatever information radio intelli-
gence could provide, it was your estimate, subject to the limitations
of radio intelligence, that Carrier Division 4 was in the Bako-Takao
area ^
Captain Latton. That is true.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, subsequently it has been ascertained that they
were then on the high seas, heading for Pearl Harbor?
Captain Layton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. But radio intelligence couldn't detect that fact at
that time ?
[£■53] Captain Lattox. Nor could it detect that far in advance.
I would like to invite your attention at the present time to one
phenomenon of this whole campaign. All those units that moved
to the south, air submarines, carriers, cruisers, battleships, destroyers,
ausiliaries, plus those commands concerned thereto, appeared in
traffic, appeared in substantial traffic. They were addressed in intel-
ligence dispatches. There were no other commands so addressed so
constantly as a rule. In other words, there may be one exception.
The commander of the Carrier Fleet, who became the commander
of the Pearl Harbor task force, was not so addressed and hadn't been
so addressed and hadn't appeared in the traffic since mid-November.
I would like to point out another fact, that in the previous Japa-
nese naval activities in the Far East in connection with Thailand
and French Indo-China, we had received substantiating information
from OpNav from most secret sources which outlined exactly what
was taking place. The radio intelligence picture of the fleet activi-
ties was confirmed also from newspaper accounts later published as
the presence by name of various units there. In the time of which
we now speak, the time of this estimate of 1 December 1941, we had
what we called the framework of an intelligence picture. There are
in intelligence many pieces like a jigsaw. The intelligence officer
attempts to find the framework or border to find the scope of the intel-
ligence picture and therefore to fit pieces together and form a part
of the pattern or all of it if possible. In this, since we had no other
source of information, we had received no dispatches that would indi-
cate to us the possibility of the framework being larger than it was.
The framework fitting into this pattern neatlv, my attention u'as
focused toward the south, and I believe that will explain why I was
[254] inclined to include Cardiv 4 on the ver^^ briefest of evidence
when there was no other evidence of any kind.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, the absence of evidence, Captain, concerning
Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 was so noticeable, I take it, that you did
not include in your written estimate of December 1st any statement
as to your belief concerning their whereabouts?
Captain Layton. I would like to explain how this estimate was
made and I think you
152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATT'ACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you answer that question ?
Captain Layton. To say "yes" or "no" doesn't fit the picture. I
would like to explain how this estimate was arrived at. I had a list
of all Japanese units and commands. I went through my tickler ready
scratch file where by sightings or by radio intelligence the indication
of this unit or this command or of his whole command might be indi-
cated or located. I then filled in after each unit or each ship 'the
latest information, as it was run up day by day, of its location and
then filled in the picture, as you say, but since I did not have any
information on Cardivs 1 and 2, 1 omitted them because on all of the
units, and that includes all the Japanese Fleet, there had been state-
ments in the radio intelligence summaries as to their location or
assumed location, but there had been no statements as either assumed
location or their indicated location. Therefore, I left Cardivs 1 and
2 out of my thought because I really did not know. I presumed and
estimated they were in the Kure area on no evidence at all.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, Cardiv 1 consisted of the AKAGI and ICAGA,
which was the flagship, and Cardiv 2 of the SORYU and HIRYU,
did they not ?
Captain Laytox. That is correct.
[255] Mr. SoNNETT. And at the time of your December 1st esti-
mate, they, along with Cardiv 4, were on the high seas, headed for Pearl
Harbor, as we have later learned ?
Captain Layton. True.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, referring to your conversation with Admiral
Kimmel, which, I take it, was December 2nd, concerning your estimate
dated December 1st, you testified yesterday that Admiral Kimmel
asked you a question about the fact that Cardivs 1 and 2 weren't listed
in your written estimate.
Captain Layton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me,
arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his
eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this : Was the dis-
cussion about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2
a serious or jocular one?
Captain Layton, His question was absolutely serious, but when he
said, "Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?" and I said, "I do not know pre-
cisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in
the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they
may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half
ago," and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, "Do you
mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?" or words to that
effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete igno-
rance as to their exact location.
Mr. SoNNETT. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of infor-
mation about those carriers ?
Captain Layton, This incident has been impressed on my mind. I
do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a
[256] statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should
know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, referring to Exhibit 22, Captain, which con-
sists of the photostatic copies of communication intelligence sum-
maries, and the summary for December 2, 1941, that is the summary,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 153
is it not, which as to carriers indicates "abiiost a complete blank of
information on the carriers today"; is that correct?
Captain Layton. That is what it states.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the summary for the following day, namely,
December 3, 1941, states, "No information on submarines or carriers";
is that correct?
Captain Layton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do I accurately summarize the situation, then, Cap-
tain, by saying that at that time "you did not have information showing
you the location of the carriers, but you did have a lack of information
"concerning the location of the carriers?
Captain Layton. There was no information on the location of the
carriers.
Mr. SoNNETT. On December 4th and December 5th, Captain, is it
true that the communication intelligence summaries made no mention
of carriers ?
Captain Layton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, referring back to the war warning of No-
vember 27th, which is Exhibit 2o of this investigation, you will note
the following direction contained in the warning : "Execute an appro-
prate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks
assigned in WPL 46." Do you note this?
[^57] Captain Layton. I do note it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were you familiar, Captain, with the tasks assigned
in WPL 46?
Captain Layton. I was at that time familiar with the general tasks.
The task assigned the intelligence organization in WPL 46 was in
general to receive the intelligence afforded us by OpNav.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall the tasks assigned in Pacific Fleet Oper-
ation Plan Rainbow Five and described as Initial Tasks, namelj^ tasks
to be taken when Japan was not in the war ?
Captain Layton. I do not recall it. It was not a part of my duties
and I do not recall having been consulted regarding deployment or
operation of our forces at any time,- except that on occasions in the
past when there had been submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor, Ad-
miral Kimmel asked me if I thought it was a Japanese submarine
and I told him I thought it was and that we had had various uncon-
firmed reports from unreliable observers to the effect that there had
been submarines reconnoitering the approaches to Pearl Harbor, and
the Naval Attache, Tokyo, reported a rumor there that a submarine
had returned from a cruise of reconnaissance there of Pearl Harbor
and the Hawaiian Islands and the West Ccast.
Mr. SoNNETT. I would like to come to that submarine matter. Cap-
tain, again in a minute. I want at this moment to
Captain Layton. I merely want to point out as far as operations
or plans went, I was not frequently consulted, nor was I supposed to
be that I know of, but the Admiral would ask me once in a while about
matters concerning the Japanese, if I thought that was a Japanese
submarine or what.
Mr. SoNNETT. Then, I take it, Captain, that you do not recall
[^58] that one of the initial tasks assigned in the Pacific Fleet
War Plan was "Protect the communications and territory of the as-
sociated powers . . . and prevent the extension of enemy military
154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
power into the western hemisphere by patrolling with light forces
and patrol planes and by the action of striking groups as necesssary"?
Captain Layton. I do not recall that specific paragraph. I might
have seen it, but again that was not in my immediate province, al-
though all the tasks of all the members of a staff or command are all
interlocking in a degree, sometimes larger, sometimes much less.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I refer you to the Staff Instructions, Staff
of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 1941, paragraph 214(a), which
relates to the Intelligence Officer and which reads as follows : "Directs
assembly of Enemy Information and evaluate same, disseminating
to various members of staff, indicating where action is required," Did
you indicate at any time prior to December 7, 1941, that any aerial
reconnaissance from Oahu was ever required by reason of enemy in-
formation ?
Captain Layton. I do not recall specifically telling the Admiral
that he should conduct aerial reconnaissance as I was aware that recon-
naissance was being conducted by Pat Wing 2.
Mr. SoNNETT. What reconnaissance was being conducted by Pat-
Wing 2, Captain?
Captain Laytox. It was not my duty to check on aerial reconnais-
sance by our own forces and therefore I did not know the extent or
the degree. That was the duty of the Fleet Aviation Officer.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you ever inquire of the Fleet Aviation Officer
what reconnaissance was being conducted?
Captain Layton. I did not.
[2S91 Mr. SoNNETT. Did it occur to j^ou in the week preceding
December 7, 1941, that at any time during that week aerial reconnais-
sance might be advisable ?
Captain Laytox. Aerial reconnaissance was being conducted as far
as I knew and it would have been presumptuous of me to go and check
on another officer's performance of his duty. Furthermore, it would
not have tended toward good staff relationship, nor good command
relationships, for people to go and check on the performance of duty
of other people not in their secticJn and to whom they were not directly
or indirectly responsible up or down. The Fleet Aviation Officer was
a subordinate of the Operations Division whose duties were laid out
in the Staff Organization as conducted by operations. May I add
that the Operations Officer was shown mv periodic summaries of in-
formation received and at this time I would like to introduce in evidence
my photostatic copy of my original file thereof.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 26.")
This consists of reports commencing 6 October 1941 and it
starts with serial number 82 and ends with intelligence report dated
2 December 1941, serial number 102. I would like to describe how
this intelligence report book was handled and disseminated. From
time to time, as information was assembled or as intelligence was
evaluated from assembled information, I prepared and assigned a
reliability to various items, which I called intelligence reports,
which were typewritten on a standard form. Since this material
had already been seen by the Admiral and the Chief of Staff, the
boxes 00 and 01 were crossed out in the form when printed. The
other boxes in the form consisted of staff numbers 11, 12, and 13,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 155
being the Operations Officer and the two Assistant Operations Offi-
cers, respectively; numbers 16, 17, 18, and 86 being the War Plans
[£60] Officer and his three assistants, the latter, 86, being the
Fleet Marine Officer. Numbers 20, 21, 25, and 26—20 and 21 were
the Fleet Communications Officer and the Fleet Security Officer,
respectively; 25 was myself, the Intelligence Officer, and 26 my
assistant.
It is to be noted in this exhibit that periodically staff boxes will
not be filled. This was d\ie to the habit of certain officers of only
initialling the top page, having read those from his last initial up.
For example, certain information from the most secret sources re-
ceived at CincPac were by direction of OpNav available only to the
Admiral, his Chief of Staff, Intelligence Officer, and such other
officers as he designated. To insure that the Plans and Operations
Divisions and the Communication Officer and the Security Officer
were fully aware of information at hand and to protect sources of
information from too wide knowledge of their basic source, this
material was paraphrased by myself and its source sometimes dis-
guised, but the picture remained unchanged.
For instance, on 25 November 1941, serial number 93, reliability
rating Al, which meant communication intelligence, the following
report was written and submitted and initialed :
(Attached as page 260A).
[260A] INTELLIGENCE REPORT
SECRET
Reliability Rating, A-1. Serial No. 93. Date, 25 Nov 1941.
For the past month the Commander Second Fleet has been organizing a Force
composed of the following:
Second Fleet — Third Fleet (including 1st and 2nd Base Forces and 1st De-
fense Division) — Combined Air Force — Desron Three — Airron 7 — Subron 5 —
possibly units of Batdiv 3 (from First Fleet). These units are linked with
the South China Fleet and French Indo-China Force as well as the Naval
Stations at Sama, Takao and Bako. The Commander Second Fleet has in-
tensely been interested in operations at Palao and the Third Base Force which
is at Palao.
The Combined Air Force has assembled at Takao with some indications that
certain units have moved on to Hainan.
The Third Fleet is believed moving in the direction of Takao and Bako.
The Second Base Force appears to transporting the equipment of air forces
to Taiwan.
An unidentified Second Fleet unit and a submarine unit appears to be in the
vicinity of Takao. Crudiv 7 and Desron 3 appear to be an advance unit and
may be enroute South China. A strong concentration of submarines and air-
craft is believed in the Marshalls comprising Airron 24, at least one cardiv
and one-third of the submarine force.
Coml4 believes the above indicates a strong force is preparing to operate in
SouthEastern Asia while certain units operate from Palao and the Marshalls.
00 01 11 12 13 16 17 18 20 21 25 26 90 95 86
(initials) P
[3611 On 26 November 1941, intelligence report, serial number
94, reliability A, as follows:
(Attached as pages 261A, 261B, and 26lC.)
156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[261 A} TOP SECRET
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Secret
Reliability Rating, A. Serial No. 94. Date, November 26, 1941.
A reliable source of information evaluates the situation during the past few
days as follows. He considers it reliable :
1. He believes that various units of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th Fleets are being
directed by CiuG 2nd Fit in a loosely-knit organization. He further states that
the organization appears to be subdivided into tw« sections. And expects :
Section I to operate in South China Area.
Section II to operate in the Mandates.
2. Forces which appear to be under CinC 2nd Fit.
SGctif)'}i T
CriiDiv 7 (From 2nd Fit) 4 CA's— KURIANO, MOGAMI, MIKUIMA,
SUZUYA)
Airo7i 6 (From Combined Air Force) (3 XAV's— KAMIKAWA IMARU,
FUJIKAWA ]\L^RU, KEN JO MARU)
1st Defense Division (From 3rd Fit)
Suhron 6 (From 6th Fit) (1 CL, 2 Subdivs (4SS) ) (note 4 SMs)
It is possible but not known for sure that Cruel iv 6 may be included herein.
(From 1st Fit) (4 CA's— IvAKO, FURUTAKA, AOBA, KINUGASA)
Section II
Crudiv 5 (From 2nd Fit) (3 CA's (maybe 4)— MYOKO, NACHI,
HAGURO)
Cardiv 3 (From Carrier Fit) (2 CV's— RYUJO?, HOSHO)
RYUJO and 1 Maru 1 CV
[261B] Desron 2 (From 2nd Fit) (1 CL, 3 Desdivs(12DD's) )
Desron 4 (From 2nd Fit) (1 CL, 3 Desdivs(12DD's) )
Subron 5 (From 6th Fit) (1 CL, 3 Subdivs (6 or 7 SS's) )
Desdiv 23 (From Carrier Fit) (4 DD's)
1st Base Force (From 3rd Fit)
3rd Base Force (At PALAO)
5th Base Force (At SAIPAN)
Other lesser units (Names not known)
It is possible but not kuov.n for sure that Batdiv 3 niav be included herein.
(From 1st Fit) (4 BB's— HIYEI, KONGO, KIRISHI^NLA, HARUNA)
(HARUNA may be undergoijig major repairs)
3. Disposition of remainder of 3rd Fit in doubt but it is assumed they will be
stationed around the BAKO-TAKAO area or further south.
4. Indications are that today (nov. 26th) Desron 3 (1st Fit), Crudiv 7 (2nd
Fit) and Suhron 6 (6th Fit) are in the TAKAO area. Units of Combined Air
Force from the Empire are at TAKAO, HOIHOW, PAKHOI, SAIGON and other
bases along the CHINA COAST and in TAIWAN.
5. He cannot confirm report there being large force of SS and CV's in the
IVIANDATES. Thinks all known carriers of 1st and 2nd Fits are still in the
KURE-SASEBO area, (cont.)
[261C] 6. He believes that :
CinC Combined Fit is in NAGATO (BB)
1st " " " ETUGA (BB)
2nd " " " ATAGO (CA) (in KURE area)
3rd " " " ASHIGARA (CA (In SASEBO area)
5th " " " CHICIJIMA area
6th " " " KASHIMA (CL) (In YOKOSUKA area but this
is unreliable)
7. CinC 2nd Fit, CinC 3rd Fit and CinC Southern Expeditionary Force appar-
ently have the major roles.
S. Units from North or Central appear to have joined the South China Fleet
(probably torpedo boats).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 157
9. One Base Force unit apparently being used to strengthen Southern Ex-
peditionary Force.
00 : 01 : 11 : 12 : 13 : 16 : 17 : 18 : 86 : 20 : 21 : 25 : 26 : 86 :
(initials) P
[36^] Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, referring to serial number 94 of
Exhibit 26, which you have just read into the record, explain the con-
nection between that intelligence report and ComSIXTEEN's dis-
patch of November 26, 1941, which is contained in Exhibit 8.
Captain Latton. These intelligence reports are evaluations of re-
ports received from all sources. This specific intelligence report,
number 94, is my rewrite and reterming into standard phraseology
the language, as I understood it, from Com SIXTEEN" dispatch
261331. Also, intelligence report serial 93, which I read previously,
is mv interpretation and rewrite into standard phraseology of Com-
FOtJRTEEN's dispatch of 260110.
I would like to read intelligence report number 92, dated 25 Novem-
ber 1941, reliability Al.
(Attached as page 262A).
622A TOP SECEET
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Secret
Reliability Rating, A-1. Serial No. 92. Date, 25 Novejn'ber 19^1
Opnav reports that the chances of any favorable result coming out of the
present negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. It is his opinion that this,
coupled with the statements of the Japanese government, and the movements
of their military and naval forces, indicates that they may make a surprise
aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or
Guam. The Chief of Staff of the Army concurs in this oninion. Senior Army
officers in the Far East, Pacific and West Coast areas (includino; Panama) have
been informed. Utmost secrecy is enjoined regarding this opinion in order to
not further complicate the present tense situation or to precipitate Japanese
action.
00 : 01 : 11 : 12 : 13 : 16 : 18 : 20 : 21 : 2.^) : 26 : 90 : 95 : 88
(initials) P
s
[£631 It will be noted that these intelligence reports are in some
cases merely a paraphrased version of intelligence dispatches which
1 read into the record in connection with the 'communication in-
telligence summaries previously and are to complete the record for
the purposes of dissemination of information within the Staff, regard-
less of its dissemination by copies of communication messages.
I would like to read into the record serial number 97, of 28 November,
1941, reliability Al.
(Attached as page 263 A.)
158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[26SA1 TOP SECRET
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Reliability Rating, A-1. Serial No. 97. Date, 28 Nov. 41.
Absolutely reliable reports from Singapore are that the following procedure
will be carried out by Japanese news broadcasts in the event that diplomatic rela-
tions are on the verge of severance :
On ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts, the following words repeated five times at
the beginning and the end will have this significance :
("EAST-EAST-etc")
HIGASHI HIGASHI : Japanese-American
("North-North-etc")
KITA KITA : Russia
("WEST-WEST- WEST" )
NISHI NISHI : England (including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya
andNEI)
On Japanese language foreign news broadcasts, the following sentences repeated
twice in the middle and twice at the end will be used :
"HIGASHI NO KAZE AME" (AMERICA) "Easterly winds with rain"
"KITA NO KAZE KUMORI (Russia) "Northerly winds— cloudy"
"NISHI NO KAZE HARE" (England) "Westerly winds, clear"
The British and Com 16 are monitoring the above broadcasts.
00 : 01 : 11 : 12 : 13 : 16 : 17 : 18 : 86 : 20 : 21 : 25 : 26 : :
(initials) P C
[264^ It is noted that the last intelligence report submitted was
serial 102, dated 2 December 1941. Subsequent to 2 December 1941,
there was a hiatus of information that could be evaluated into in-
telligence other than that which tended to confirm previous indications
of the southern movement.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I believe you have a collection of para-
phrased dispatches containing other intelligence during the period
October to December, 1941, do you not ?
Captain Latton. I have.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark it as an exhibit ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 27.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state briefly, Captain, without reference to
the contents, but generally, the nature of the documents contained in
Exhibit 27?
Captain Layton. These are paraphrases of official dispatches re-
ceived from various^intelligence agencies — for instance. Naval Attache,
Singapore ; Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai ; Assistant Naval At-
tache, Pekin; Naval Attache, Chungking; Marine Detachment, Wake;
OpNav, and Naval Attache, Tokyo — in which various items of in-
telligence information were passed to CincPac and of which I kept a
paraphrased copy for reference purposes to assist in making enemy
location reports and other matters.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it. Captain, then, that these dispatches con-
tained in Exhibit 27 were among the material which you considered
in the preparation of your intelligence reports contained in Exhibit
26?
Captain Latton. That is correct.
[£65] Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall that toward the end of No-
vember, 1941, there was some discussion of a proposed army recon-
naissance flight over the Mandated Islands ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 159
Captain Latton. I do recall conferences which I attended with
then Lieutenant Colonel Raley. concerning a projected army recon-
naissance by B-25's over Japanese positions in the Marshalls and
also Truk.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will yon tell us how that discussion came to take
place and what happened with respect to that reconnaissance?
Captain Laytox. Either Admiral Kimmel directed me to establish
contact with the Hawaiian Air Force pertaining to this reconnaissance
or my opposite number, Colonel Raley, came to me and informed me
of this pending reconnaissance and requested my assistance toward
delineating the appropriate objectives for the reconnaissance and to
furnish the reconnaissance pilots and crews with intelligence ma-
terial for briefing and to assist in tlie successive projected reconnais-
sance.
Mr, SoNNETT. Will you state what happened with respect to the
reconnaissance, Captain? Did it taTie place or not?
Captain Latton. The reconnaissance unfortunately never mate-
rialized because the planes, except one, did not arrive. There was a
delay from time to time due to, as Colonel Raley explained to me,
uncompleted camera installations in the B-24's at Hamilton Field.
I was never informed that the one plane which did arrive had ar-
rived, but I learned later it was destroyed in the attack on Hickam
Field on December 7th. We were very anxious that this reconnais-
sance be made at the earliest possible date and the Admiral, upon
receipt of my memorandum stating the conferences concerning this
reconnaissance had been held, asked me how soon I though they could
hold it, and I gave him Colonel Raley's answer to [£66] me;
that is, it was being delayed due to non-installation or non-completed
installation of cameras, and that it would be made as soon as they ar-
rived here and were briefed but that the time was still not definitely
fixed.
Mr. SoNXETi". I show you a photostatic copy of a memorandum of
November 28, 1941, and ask you if you can identify that, Captain.
Captain Latton. I can. It is my memorandum to Admiral Kim-
mel, relating to him the general circumstances of the conference con-
cerning the projected aerial reconnaissance by Army planes over the
Mandated Islands, particularly those in the Marshalls, plus Truk and
Ponape.
Mr. SoxNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit. Admiral ?
Admiral Hewett. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 28.")
Mr. Sonnett. In your discussions with Admiral Kimmel wherein
you advised him that there was some delay on the part of the Army
in getting the planes ready, was there any consideration given to the
use of naval planes for such reconnaissance?
Captain Latton. It was not discussed with me. I presume it was
discussed with the Aviation Officer.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you know why such naval planes could not have
been used for that reconnaissance ?
Captain Latton. I do not know, except what I thinlf. I think
that had we used the only naval planes available, that is, PBY Cata-
linas, they would by their appearance over the Marshalls, the Japa-
nese Mandated Islands, have been the overt act that the Japanese
160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
could claim we had committeed and would be a violation of the ex-
isting directives of OpNav, while tlie Army planes were ostensibly
jflying from Wake to Port Darwin, Australia, en route [£67~\ to
the Philippines.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it also true, Captain, that the Army planes were
to have special equipment for this reconnaissance that the Navy planes
did not have?
Captain Lattox. It was my personal belief that the first PBY that
got near the Marshall Islands would be shot down by the fighters
that I felt positive were there, whereas the Army B-24 photographic
planes would have good armament, good defensive armament, and
would also be very fast and would fly very high. Its chances of a
successful reconnaissance flight were considered to be better than
three to one. As I remember it, the Army reconnaissance planes
were to be armed and thej'^ were to fire on ary plane that interfered
with them in the accomplishment of their mission.
I was particularly anxious, and I am sure Admiral Kimmel was also,
that this reconnaissance be carried out because it would check on our
other information as to the presence or absence of air strength and
carriers, also submarines, and naval concentrations, that is. Fourth
Fleet units, in the Marshalls area, including also Truk and Ponape.
It was felt that this was an ideal opportunity to establish the credulity
of existing intelligence on Japanese naval disposition and develop-
ments in the Mandated Islands to be reconnoitered.
Mr. SoNNETT. Apart from the proposed reconnaissance by the Army
which you have just discussed, Captain, what other information or
intelligence was exchanged between the Army and Navy, to your
knowledge, during the period October to December, 1941 ?
Captain Laytox. The Army-Navy liaison, as I understood it, was
established as a normal policy through the shore establishment, that
is, the Fourteenth Naval District and the Army forces there, as a
normal [£68] measure. In addition, about four or five months
before December, 1941, the G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force, then
Lieutenant Colonel Raley, Air Corps, U. S. Army, called on me
and stated that he had come to me to establish Army liaison on a
continuing basis as his superiors considered the Bomber Command of
the Hawaiian Air Force and the Navy to be the offensive w^eapons in
the execution of war plans and the Hawaiian Department as a de-
fensive garrison, and that, therefore, the liaison should be established
on the level of air force and fleet.
From that time on I furnished Colonel Raley with various items of
intelligence, particularly in the early period, stressing air field facili-
ties in the Netherlands East Indies and Australia, where the Hawaiian
Air Force was the responsible agency toward ferrying planes to the
Philippines via Australia. I furnished him with the confidential and
secret sections of the Dutch Airways Guide we had received from CinC
Asiatic. As the trend of events commenced to develop in mid-
November, I told Colonel Raley these events in general. I also told
Colonel Raley, without divulging the source and by disguising its
actual existence, of the general trend of movements of naval vessels to
the south. Since some of the material I gave Colonel Raley was of the
utmost secrecy, I cautioned him that I woud give him certain very
secret matter provided he made no written record of it and would
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 161
communicate such only to his Commanding General and on the under-
standing that he in turn would make no written record of it. I in-
formed him of the intrigue in Thailand, which I previously discussed,
in v/hich the British were to be brought in on a false pretext and then
declared the invader so that Japan could then be called upon as an ally
to eject the British troops and thus facilitate their quick entry into
that area.
[269] I feel sure that I told him that we were listening for a
special broadcast from one of our spies, as I put it, which would give
us indication through a weather report that relations between Japan
and America might be terminated, or words to that effect. I do not
recall distinctly telling him of the destruction of the purple machine.
I think that I did, but I do not distinctly recall it.
Mr. SoNNETT. You have testified, Captain, that liaison was estab-
lished with the Hawaiian Army Air Force. Was there any liaison
with the Hawaiian Department, that is, directly with General Short?
Captain Layton. I clo not know. I took messages to General Short.
General Short consulted with the Admiral, and the norml liaison with
the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department would be with the District In-
telligence Officer of the Fourteen Naval District, they being on the
same plane and echelon of command. Furthermore, the Hawaiian
Air Force was a subordinate of the Hawaiian Department in those
days and was directly under General Short. Therefore, when the
Hawaiian Air Force came to me to establish liaison on fleet level, and
I understood they were establishing the Army liaison, I presumed it
was as far on that level as was intended to go.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it from your testimony. Captain, that you were
familiar with the establishment by the Japanese of the so-called
"winds" code.
Captain Layton. I was.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you state when you learned of the establish-
ment of that code and what the code was ?
Captain Layton. A dispatch from CinC Asiatic Fleet, dated 28
November 1941, and addressed to OpNav, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN,
and ComSIXTEEN, for action, states as follows :
1270] Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore
X If diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed following words repeated
five times at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts will have sig-
nificance as follows X Higashi Hlgashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Rus-
sia X Nislii Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya
and Nei XX On Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sen-
tences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be
used XX American Higashi no Kaze Kumori XX England X Nishi no Kaze
Hare X Unquote X British and ComSIXTEEN monitoring above broadcasts.
This was made the subject of my intelligence report, serial number
92, reliability Al, dated 25 November 1941, and was shown as cus-
tomary to all staff members concerned. It is noted that on the photo-
stat of this the initials only of then Captain DeLany, then Commander
Goode, then Lieutenant Commander Collins, then Captain McCor-
mick, then Commander Murphy, and then Colonel Pfeiffer, appear.
It was the habit of certain staff officers not to initial each page but to
read up from their last initial and then initial the top page they had
read.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 12
162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. What efforts were made, Captain, to monitor for any
message employing the "winds" code ?
Captain Latton. Upon receipt of this message, I contacted Com-
mander Rochefort and asked him what measures were going to be
established. He said he had already set up a monitoring procedure
wherein all our Japanese language officers were placed on continuous
watch on several circuits and were to cover all known news broadcasts
emanating from Japan.
Mr. SoNNETT. What were the results, if any?
Captain Latton. Almost each day thereafter I would check with
[271] Commander Rochefort or he would call me and say, "Noth-
ing so far." Up to the attack on December 7, 1941, we received no such
intercept, nor did we receive any dispatch from any source stating that
such an intercept had been heard.
Mr. SoNNETT. You testified before Admiral Hart, Captain, in sub-
stance that on or about December 9, 1941, you received certain informa-
tion from Captain Rochefort which had been secured from intercepted
cables of the Japanese Consul General and that prior to December 9,
1941, you had received no such information from any source. Is that
correct ?
Captain Latton. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you recall the substance of the information which
you did receive on December 9th from Captain Rochefort?
Captain Latton. The information was decryption of the Japanese
Consul's cypher and it laid out various procedures and signals and
also reports of movements of naval vessels into and out of Pearl Har-
bor and also made reference to the presence or absence of aircraft car-
riers, as I recall it.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you document 22 of Exhibit 13, and ask you
whether that is the message to which you refer, Captain.
Captain Latton. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall. Captain, what other messages of the
Japanese Consul were shown to you by Captain Rochefort on or about
December 9, 1941 ?
Admiral Hewitt. We will recess at this time.
(The investigation then, at 11:42 a. m., recessed until 2 p. m., at
which time it reconvened.)
(Present : The same parties as during the morning session.)
[272] Captain Edwin T. Layton, U.S.N., resumed his seat as
witness.
(The last question was read.)
Captain Latton. I have here a file of dispatches which are copies
of consular dispatches which then Commander Rochefort delivered to
me by safe hand on or after December 9, 1941. It may have been
December 10th. I cannot remember exactly.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark those as an exhibit, Admiral, and sub-
stitute a photostatic copy, when a copy is made, for that exhibit so
that Captain Layton can retain his copies ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 29."-^-
Mr. SoNNETT. I note, Captain, that the exhibit 29 just marked
consists of copies of six dispatches. Were these the only intercepted
Japanese consular messages or messages to the Japanese Consul in
Hawaii that you received ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 163
Captain Latton. These were the only ones received and they were
received some time on or after 9 December 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know, Captain, what, if any, efforts were
made previously by any one to secure such messages and what were
the results of such efforts made ?
Captain Latton. I don't know at first hand, but when these mes-
sages were delivered to me, I asked then Commander Rochefort the
background of them, and, as I recall it, a prominent executive of
RCA, I believe perhaps Mr. Sarnoff himself, visited the Hawaiian
Islands sometime prior to or just about the 1st of December and that
some approach had been made — by whom I was not told — to obtain
the files of the [273] consular messages, which by law our in-
telligence service could not touch. As I understand it, this high
official, possibly Mr. Sarnoff, was sympathetic but said his hands were
tied by the law the same as ours were, but would inquire upon his
return to the States as to his receiving immunity, FYesidential or
otherwise, from prosection in order that the intelligence services
could have access to these quoted dispatches and attempt to decrypt
same. As I recall it, the story went he sent a special message to Hono-
lulu, saying in effect that this immunity had been obtained and he, the
holder of those in Honolulu, could turn them over to the appropriate
source. I do not know who obtained them, but Commander Rochefort
led me to believe that they had been worked on from the time they
were received and that they could not break the cipher but were con-
tinuing and that after December 7th efforts continued and finally the
cipher key was decrypted and the messages reduced to plain Japanese
and translated and then delivered to me.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, the previous investigations disclosed that
ONI and the FBI were tapping the telephone wires of the Japanese
Consul prior to the 7th of December, 1941. Were vou aware of that
fact?
Captain LAYxoisr. I was aware without them having definitely so in-
formed me. Wire tapping was also against the law. I knew that they
had a source of information that was what they called "inside of the
horse's mouth."
Mr. SoNNEiT. Do you know what information was secured by them
from that?
Captain Latton. Nothing of importance as far as fleet movements
went. There were certain times when the District Intelligence Officer
would inform me that the Consul General had had an urgent meeting
with the representatives of the NYK Line in connection with evacua-
tion of [274] Japanese on the TAIYO MARU. There was
considerable unrest and uneasiness on the part of the Japanese about
the measures being undertaken by the United States, particularly
those respecting inspecting mail, and that they were considerably re-
lieved when they learned that second class and third class would not
be inspected. It was presumed from my conversations with the Dis-
trict Intelligence Officer that all secret communications that they had
wanted to send first class, they would thereafter send parcel post.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you learn at any time whether or not as a result
of tapping the wires of the Japanese Consul it was learned that Jap-
anese agents were reporting on the location and movements of United
States ships in Pearl Harbor ?
164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Latton. There was no such report made to me at any
time.
Mr. SoNNETF. Did you know whether or not as a general proposition
Japanese agents were engaged in such activity ?
Captain Layton. I did not know at first hand that they were or I
would have had them arrested. It was a matter of common knowledge,
without legal foundation, that the Japanese were engaged in espio-
nage. It was suspected that the Japanese Toritsuginin, or "honorary
consuls," in fact, some hundreds, were recommended by the Com-
mandant of the Fourteenth Naval District for arrest and prosecution
under the federal statute for being the unregistered agents of a foreign
government. I was interested in this because the District Intelligence
Officer had informed me of this situation and so recommended. It
seems that this measure was also accorded support by the FBI repre-
sentative, Mr. Shivers, but it is my understanding that it was utterly
opposed and disapproved by the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department. General Short.
[275] Mr. SoNNETiT. Concerning the operation of Japanese sub-
marines in or around Pearl Harbor, Captain, what reports did you
have prior to December 7th of the operation of such submarines in
Hawaiian waters?
Captain Latton. Shortly after I joined the staff of the Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, Admiral J. O. Richardson, there was a sub-
marine reported off the Pearl Harbor entrance and the destroyer
which made the contact was known to be a very efficient anti-submarine
destroyer. That was late December, 1940. The McDOUGAL made
the contact. There had been other contacts made, both off the west
coast of the United States, and as I understand it, off Hawaiian
waters. These contacts were developed on a purely underwater search
basis and at no time was a definite submarine sighted, nor could any
actual evidence be obtained that it was in fact a Japanese submarine.
However, subsequent to this first contact, to my personal knowledge,
there were several other contacts, one of them again obtained by the
McDOUGAL's screening group and held down by the ISIcDOUGAL
for some forty-four hours. The Captain of the McDOUGAL has told
me that the first fourteen hours of this contact was a definite sub-
marine, that the remaining hours of this contact was a temperature
gradient and therefore a false contact which had permitted the sup-
'posecl Japanese submarine to escape undetected by sonar search.
However, during the early part of this contact, three destroyers
passed over the position of the alleged submarine and obtained sound-
ings of forty-six fathoms. The water there was thousands of fathoms
deep.
There were additional reports, from unreliable sources unfor-
tunately, that there had been rumors of Japanese submarines recon-
noitering Pearl Harbor and the West Coast. The Naval Attache,
Tokyo, so reported such a rumor in which, as I recall it, a Japanese
submarine was supposed [£76] to have returned from recon-
noitering duty off the "West Coast and off Pearl Harbor.
Additionally, there were reports from, I believe, the Naval Observer
in Cuba or Naval Attache in Cuba. It may have been South America,
but he reported that he had information to the effect that there were
sunken submarines which could be raised and manned by crews located
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT IXQUIRY 165
off Molokai. These submarines were supposed to have been brought
in and beached in not too deep water off Molokai, with a small hose
leading up to a buoy, which was covered with kelp, and then led off
ashore and was camouflaged, while the crews thereof Avere ashore dis-
guised as fishermen on the island of ]Molokai; that at a giveri time
thev would proceed and connect up air leads to this hose and thereby
blow the ballast of these sunken submarines and would then man
them at the appropriate time. It was inferred that these were smaller
than the normal type submarines.
By letter, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, was directed
and carried out a complete and thorough investigation of the coast
line and off-shore areas of the island of Molokai and other islaiids.
The report was negative. By direction, Commander Patrol Wing 2
was directed to make a close aerial reconnaisance of these waters
under various conditions of light to detect if there was a possibility
of this report being correct. Their report was also negative. This,
as I recall it, may have been the summer or fall of 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT, To sum it up, then, Captain, there was no actual
evidence prior to December 7, 1941, of the operation of submarines in
or around Pearl Harbor which established conclusively that they
were there?
Captain Latton. There was no positive evidence beyond any
shadow [£77] of doubt to establish that they were in "fact there,
but Admiral Kimmel, I am sure from his remarks to me and his
questions to me, felt, and I did also, that at least some of these contacts
were true contacts ; in other words, actual Japanese submarines. In
fact, at one time when the cruiser AUGUSTA returned from the
Asiatic Station, it was directed by Admiral Kimmel to pass through
a position to the north or northwest of Oahu, I believe about 600
miles, and search out an area where a Japanese naval tanker was
known to be passing at that general time and to ascertain if it was
fueling submarines. I believe, although I am not sure, that a special
aerial search was made in that area at that time. This was all very
secret operations and I did not know it until after it was completed.
Mr. SoxNETT. The previous investigations. Captain, have disclosed
that on the morning of December 7, 1941, a Japanese or midget sub-
marine was attacked and sunk in Pearl Harbor and also that another
Japanese or midget submarine was grounded off Bellows Field and
was subsequently recovered. Were you familiar with the recovery of
those two submarines ?
Captain Latton. I am. They were recovered under my direction,
but not under my personal supervision.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you state approximately how long after Decem-
ber 7, 1941, the submarine recovered off Bellows Field was examined?
Captain Layton. The submarine grounded off Bellows Field on
the morning of 9 December, as I recall it — it may have been the 8th —
at which time we dispatched the Repair Officer of the Submarine Base,
then Commander Eddy, to examine it and particularly to bring back
any documents he could obtain from this submarine. He came back
that evening and reported that it was too small a submarine for him^ —
he was a large man — to get into and that the electrician's mate, who
was rather small, too, could not get in either. He [£78'] said,
however, that he could salvage that submarine with some assistance
166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and I directed him to proceed forthwith with the salvage. With the
assistance of some Army engineers, I believe, and Oahu Land and
Railroad Company's super heavy duty, many-wheeled, trailer-type
trucks, the salvage was finally effected, but only after dismantling the
submarine into two sections, it being too heavy in one section. It
was then and throughout that time under guard and was brought to
the Pearl Harbor Submarine Base, at which time a very small enlisted
man was able to obtain all the documents and equipment remaining in
the submarine. They consisted of maps, recognition pictures, a small
note book, and various types of equipment, such as line, palm and
iceedle, morphine syringe, first aid kit, emergency rations, and mclud-
ing a small cuspidor type head.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you several documents, Captain, and ask you
whether you can identify those.
Captain Latton, I can.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state what they are ?
Captain Lation. The first one is a series of two panoramas marked
with II No. 27, entitled in Japanese, "View of Pearl Harbor from Aiea
Northeast High Ground, Number 5." The lower one states in Jap-
anese II No. 28, "View of Pearl Harbor from Aiea Northeast High
Ground, Number 6." That is a rough translation.
I also recognize these panoramas as having been sold commercially
in Honolulu, having been approved for publication by the Com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District, at some time unbeknownst to
me. I believe the Commandant at that time was Admiral Bloch.
On the reverse of this panorama view is a short log in Japanese.
[279] Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, you speak and understand Jap-
anese, do you not?
Captain Layton. I am a qualified interpreter and translator of
Japanese.
I would like to note for the record that in Japanese naval custom
all times remain Tokyo time, minus nine, and all days remain East
Longitude, Tokyo, dates, regardless of crossing the 180th meridian.
So all times in these logs and memoranda and notebooks will always
remain as minus nine, four and a half hours earlier than Pearl Harbor.
Mr. ScNNETT. May we mark this as an exhibit, Admiral, and sub-
stitute a photographic copy?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 30.")
Captain Layton. I would like to invite your attention to the fact
that there are several English words in lead pencil and in read pencil
on this so-called log. These were inserted by amateur translators in
an endeavor to decipher it shortly after its receipt.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you a photograph, Captain, and ask you
whether the photograph is a true and correct copy of Exhibit 30, which
is the so-called Japanese log.
Captain Layton. It is.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark the photogi-aph as Exhibit 30A, Ad-
miral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 30A.")
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you a document, Captain, and ask j'ou whether
[280] it is a correct translation of the Exhibits 30 and 30A.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 167
Captain Layton. It is.
Mr. SoNXETT. May we mark that as SOB, Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was receiving and marked "Exhibit
30B.")
Captain Layton. The next document is a panorama sketch, appar-
ently a copy of panorama photograph or sketch, taken from seaward,
and looking at the mouth of Honolulu Harbor from a position five
nautical miles to the south of Pearl Harbor, They have written in
red, ''Looking at the mouths of Honolulu and Pearl Harbors from a
position five miles south of the mouth of Pearl Harbor."
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark the original as Exhibit 31 and sub-
stitute a copy thereof?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 31.")
Mr. Sonxett. I show you two photographs, Captain, and ask you
whether together they constitute a true and correct copy of the pano-
rama sketch to which you have just referred?
Captain Layton. They do.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark the photograph as 31A ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The photographs were received and marked "Exhibit 31A.")
Captain Layton. May I indicate two translator's errors? Wliere
he has "Rodgers symbol symbol," which is translated "Eodgers -V
place," and "Hickam symbol symbol," translated "Hickam V place,"
the two symbols stand [281] for "airfield."
I know the third document, recovered from the midget submarine
that grounded at Bellows Field, as being a Japanese chart of Pearl
Harbor on which courses and times are noted, as well as certain ab-
breviated signals, and a course and time projected track or tracks
going around Ford Island, leaving it port hand to and returning out
Pearl Harbor entrance.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we deem this original map marked as Exhibit
32?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The map was received and marked as "Exhibit 32.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I show you a photograph and ask you
whether it is a true and correct photograph of the original map,
Exhibit 32.
Captain Layton. It is a good reproduction of that map, except for
the colors. It is to be noted that the times apparently scheduled for
inbound, starting at 0040 and proceeding up through the channel and
around Ford Island, leaving it on its port hand, up until 0515, when
he is just south of Peninsula Point, are in blue crayon; all positions
plotted thereafter are in red crayon, starting at 0520 and ending at
0600. It should be noted that the speed inbound is relatively slow
and the speed outbound is much faster.
Mr. Sonnett. May we mark this as Exhibit 32A ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 32A.")
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, can you tell by examining Exhibits 32 and
32 A whether this chart represents an attack plan of the submarine
from which it was recovered, or does it represent a log of an actual
trip of [282] the submarine from which it was recovered?
168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Latton, I give as my professional opinion as a seaman
that it is a projected track and not an actual logged track by bearings
and distances as indicated hereon. It is too exact to be an exact track
and the figures are written a little too carefully and meticulously to
have been performed by the captain of this midget submarine, who
had to control trim, use his periscope, and maneuver the submarine
without assistance. The second member of the submarine was the
machinist's mate, who closed and opened switches, cut in and out the
C02 absorbent material, and in general performed the duties of chief
engineer and auxiliary gang.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I call your attention to the Japanese symbols
appearing on the exhibit under the time 0450 and ask you if you can
translate those for us.
Captain Latton. These four symbols are Chinese characters which
translates "Enemy ship — the first two — and the work "sink." The
word "sink" can be "sink," "sank," or "sunk," or any connotation
because no verb suffixes are appended to show tense.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you examine this submarine after it was re-
covered ?
Captain Latton. I did.
Mv. SoNNETT. Did you find whether or not it had torpedoes aboard ?
Captain Latton. His torpedoes were still aboard, although he had
tried to fire them.
Mr. SoNNETT. How many were aboard, Captain ?
Captain Latton. Full allowance, two, one atop the other.
Mr. SoNNETT. Kef erring again to the symbols appearing on the chart
under the time 0450 and bearing in mind that the submarine had its
two torpedoes aboard when recovered, would you say that that symbol
could not [283] be translated as "Sunk enemy ship" if it re-
ferred to action by the submarine ?
Captain Latton. Based on my knowledge now from Japanese cap-
tured documents and material, I give as my professional opinion that
that symbol does not represent the captain of this midget submarine
recording that he himself sank an enemy ship there.
I would like further to invite your attention to this track. This
track is carefully laid out both by course and by distance, course in
degrees and distance in meters, and time in minutes and seconds. An
examination of this time in minutes and seconds will show that his
speed was varied from point to point to be able to make his arrival at
these points at a predetermined time. I point out for your attention
the time 0450, which would be 0920 Pearl Harbor Time. At 0920
Honolulu Time the attacks were still taking place, salvage ships were
being rushed into this area, a tremendous amount of activity was then
taking place, and I doubt that a midget submarine captain, as busy as
he was navigating his ship, w^ould be able to so meticulously follow
his course all the way around, keeping track of the time spent from
point to point. On the other hand, if he had been there at that time,
he would have moved out at a predetermined course at best speed and
he would not have cared what time he rounded these points but rather
that he rounded them and got away. Therefore, that is on what I
base my judgment that this is a predetermined track and not an actual
navigational track.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 169
It is to be noted that on his track there are frequently written in
Arabic numerals two different times for the same distance. The first
is generally preceded by "Bi Fu" and the second one is preceded by
"Bi," the second one being the greater number. It is believed that
these [284-] symbols and these different times represent differ-
ent pole settings of his propulsion electric motors in accordance with
the state of his battery, and while the track was designed for one, the
other was an emergency figure so that he would know when to turn
submerged were his battery lower than he had thought, due to the fact
that, going slower, his battery would last longer, and also therefore
the time was greater.
I would like to invite your attention to positions made on this chart
both on the right-hand and left-hand sides of the Pearl Harbor channel
as you enter it. Near the time 0530 position is a position 1-16. South
of that position along Waipio Peninsula is a symbol and the mark 1-20.
South of that position and still just off the Waipio Peninsula cut is a
symbol which reads 1-22. On the right-hand side of the channel just
southwest of the fuel dock and on the channel edge and just to the
north of 0410 position of the submarine track is a circular symbol which
reads 1-16. Just between the 0410 and the 0115 track positions is a
large circle and indistinctly can be read the symbol 1-24. It is my
estimation — since the 1-16, 18, 22, and 24 all carried midget submarines,
belong to the class of submarines carrying midget submarines, and
since, as I recollect it, the submarine recovered from Bellows Field
was marked 1-18 — that these were the positions for these midget
submarines to lie in wait during that period indicated as 0115 to 0410
in blue on the right-hand side of the channel and that these symbols
do not represent their mother submarine, but rather the midget sub-
marine, which apparently carried the same number as its mother.
Mr. SoNNETT. CaDtain, will you state again the date on which you
obtained Exhibits 30, 31,'and 32?
Captain Layton. I cannot give you the exact date, but it was some
[£85] time between three and ten days after the 7th of December.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you receive these exhibits before the submarine
sunk in Pearl Harbor was recovered ?
Captain Latton. Yes. The submarine sunk in Pearl Harbor was
not recovered, nor was any attempt made to recover it, for a consider-
able time after Pearl Harbor Day due to the requirements for all
salvage equipment and personnel to work on damaged and sunken
ships in an effort to extricate trapped personnel. As I recall it, the
salvage of the midget submarine to the north or west of Ford Island
was not accomplished until three weeks and possibly a month or more
after December 7th, When salvaged, an attempt was made for two
days to obtain intelligence material from this submarine, but as it was
full of silt and all material had been completely destroyed by the effect
of silt, mud, and decaying human bodies, the submarine was found
to have no further intelligence value and was disposed of by burial
into the submarine sea wall face as a fill.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that nothing by way of documents was recovered
from the submarine which had been sunk in Pearl Harbor?
Captain Layton. Nothing in the way of documents and nothing in
the way of material because even electrical leads and pipes had been
170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
completely disintegrated. The submarine had also been depth
charged and rammed, and was practically in two smashed bits.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it ascertained whether the submarine which had
been sunk in Pearl Harbor had fired its torpedoes or not?
Captain Latton. It had. It had fired both of them. Reports
reached me on the 7th of December indicated that one had been fired
and had exploded on the beach of Ford Island between the RALEIGH
and CURTIS, as I recall it. The other, I believe, was fired and landed
in the mud and [^86] silt in the vicinity of the UTAH berth
and didn't explode. Attempts have been made to recover that torpedo
as a safety measure, but no success was achieved. In the UTAH
berth area there is very, very deep mud and silt and I believe it had
buried itself completely.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, in respect of Exhibits 30, 31, and 32, which
are the original documents recovered from the submarine off Bellows
Field, I understand it is your desire to leave these documents in the
possession of CinCPac Headquarters.
Admiral Hewitt. That is true.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you desire further. Admiral, that any particular
precaution be taken to preserve them?
Admiral Hewitt. I think that attention should be called to their
condition and that special efforts should be made to preserve these
documents as being of future value.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Captain, to the 7th of December, it was
testified by Commander Wright, who was then assigned to the Com-
munication Intelligence Unit, that radio bearings were received that
day by the unit which were conflicting but that one hearing placed
the attacking force as due north and that he transmitted that informa-
tion to you. Will you tell us whether or not that was correct and, if so,
what you recall about that report ?
Captain Layton. On the morning of 7 December 1941, we received
several bearings, commencing about 10 o'clock, from the direction
finder, which gave two-way or bilateral bearings. They were in gen-
eral either 357 or 178. These came from Heeia, whose communication
to intelligence unit. Fourteenth Naval District, hadn't been completely
disrupted. Some time in the afternoon and, as I recall it, it was about
2 o'clock, I [^87] received a report to the effect that they had
gotten a bearing with the CXK, the only direction finder that can make
a unilateral or a one-way bearing and that that bearing was about 358
or 000. The CXK was at Lualualei, whose communications with Com-
bat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District, had been completely dis-
rupted, and although that bearing had been obtained about 10 o'clock,
it could not be transmitted by telephone or other means and was finally
sent by officer messenger in a car to other location to be transmitted
by telephone. It may have been brought all the way to Pearl Harbor
by messenger; I don't know, but telephones were out all over. By
that time we had received a series of bearings by the bilateral, that is,
the one from Heeia, two ways, all the way from 350 to 180. We had
received conflicting and very erroneous information that the carriers
had been sighted to the south. When the bearing came through from
the CXK as bearing north, it tended to confirm an overlay that had
been furnished me by Colonel Raley, Hawaiian Air Force. This over-
lay was made from a navigation chart of a Japanese fighter that had
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 171
been shot down at Hickam Field and indicated radial lines radiating
out from a position to the north of Oahu. This, of course, did not
prove that they were north, but indicated, along with the CXK bearing,
that they were to the north of Oahu. I communicated this informa-
tion to the Assistant Operations Officer, then Commander Goode,
who said all I had for him was bum dope. I believe that information
was used for a late afternoon search by the only remaining planes,
which, as I recall it, were two or three PBY's and one B-17. No
contact was made.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I have no further questions for Captain
Layton.
Admiral Hewiti'. I would like to mention that incorrect report of
the sighting of the carrier south of Barber's point.
[288] Captain Layton. I don't have any records on that, sir,
because that came in by — there were several incorrect sighting re-
ports that day. The Fleet Communication Officer knew that the Army
command radio system was being used for sightings and combat in-
telligence. He designated an APD, the BALLARD, I believe, that
was alongside the Sub Base dock to get on that circuit and pass to
CinCPac Headquarters radio the information received on the Army
command channel. It was soon apparent, although it didn't become
apparent for some little time, that this was the greatest collection of
erroneous, foolish, fantastic reports that was ever passed on a radio
circuit, and until these were observed to be so fantastic, so exag-
gerated, and so imaginary — until this was discovered to be so, they
were passed in plain language to our fleet at sea, and the communica-
tion log can be examined to get them in great detail. I recall they
were transmitting that some six or eight transports and destroyers
were off Barber's point and a cruiser and destroyer were sent over to
knock them off. It was fantastic that they could get in without any-
body seeing them, and they reported nothing there. They reported
two cruisers, four or five transports and destroyers unloading troops,
first wave now hitting the beach at Barber's Point, and again we sent
the RALEIGH and some destroyers over, and again they reported
nothing there, but in approaching those areas she had a torpedo fired
at her, which lead to the rumor that that had been a Japanese trap.
There were also reports that the Japanese had dropped paratroops
on the north of the island and also that these paratroops were wear-
ing blue coveralls with red insignia on the sleeves. I believe it was
on that same circuit that we had a report that two aircraft carriers
were bearing 200 degrees from Diamond Head, distant 200 and some
odd miles, and ships were sent to search that area. We also had a
report that was an [289] erroneous transmission from one of
our vessels about the fact that he had two aircraft carriers in sight
that was later corrected to have no aircraft carriers in sight.
This may have been the vessel that was sent to investigate the previ-
ous report. I am not sure.
These reports are only a few of the conflicting and fantastic and
highly imaginative reports that we received until they were evaluated
as being what they were and we ceased to broadcast these to our fleet
because it was causing them as much confusion as it was causing us.
With these sorts of reports being passed into the Operations Division
of CincPac, you can imagine that the Assistant Operations Officer
172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
could well say "All you have is bum dope" when I told him that the
bearing of the carriers was now reported as being to the north. That
was just one more report that they had.
I would like to state in this connection that I have never received
from the Army then or since as to what direction these planes were
picked up on the radar or which direction they went out on the radar
on the morning of 7 December, as I have read in the Roberts Report
that such a report was made, and had we had a radar report to con-
firm which direction they came from or went to, all of our uncertainty
as to their exact location would have been dispelled.
Admiral Hewitt. You never had any information from radar
at all?
Captain Layton. I didn't even know they had the radar until I
read the Roberts Report, Admiral. I didn't'know the Army had the
radar until I read the Roberts Report of the Pearl Harbor investi-
gation.
Mr. Sonxett. Captain, I show you an original chart and ask you
if you can identify it.
Captain Laytox. This chart of the Island of Oahu, as showing
best [£90] landing beaches and gun emplacements, with their
ranges, and having navigational or predicted navigational tracks with
times and courses thereon, was also recovered from the midget sub-
marine that beached itself or was beached on Bellows Field beach.
Mr. Sonnett. May we mark this as Exhibit 33, Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 33.")
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you a photograph, Captain, and ask you if
you can identify it as a true and correct copy of Exhibit 33.
Captain Layton. It is a true and correct copy except for the repro-
duction of colored pencil that the Japanese used. The time 0845
to the south and west of Barber's Point is in red. The time 0745
just below the course symbol 250 is in red. The position at the exten-
sion to the northeast of that line, which is in a position southeast of
Pearl Harbor entrance channel, is also in red; that position is 0620.
The position just to the left of 0620 is 0621 and is in blue. Just to
the left of that and in blue and smudged is a position that is actually
0-30, but could be 0230 in blue. It is badly smudged from oil as
these charts were all recovered from the oily bilges of the midget
sub. Just to the south of the 0745 position in red is a 2230 position
marked in blue. The translation says midget sub released at that
position. Actually, it says "tube released"; so the tube may be the
abbreviation or slang expression for the midget sub. The true trans-
lation, however, is "tube."
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the photograph, may we mark it "Ex-
hibit 33A"?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
[291] (The document was received and marked "Exhibit 33A.")
Captain Layton. Just south of Diamond Head crater is a position
0740 in blue ; also marked in blue with a circle on the map is Lualualei
radio towers, as is Hickam Field and Barber's Point li^ht. There
is a blue smudge just off Sand Island, but I do not believe it is a
position.
Mr. Sonnett. Can you verify. Captain, the translations stated on
Exhibit 33A5 which is a photograph of Exhibit 99 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 173
Captain Latton. With the exception noted of the word "tube"
being used for a midget sub— it may be the slang expression for
midget sub — the translation appears to be correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Calling your attention to the translation "got under-
way" appearing under the time 0745, can you state whether that is
correct, or could it as well be translated "get underway" ?
Captain Latton. My translation of this is "proceed" and it has
no verb suffix, so could be "proceed," "proceeding," "to proceed."
Mr. SoNNETT. That same problem of tense applies to the other
translations, does it not, Captain ?
Captain Layton. It does. Omitted near the position Kualiki is
the Japanese saying "four barracks." There is some Japanese refer-
ring to a circle of the Ewa Plantation area which is badly smudged
and does not lend itself to good translation. It is noted on this chart
that there are four course lines laid, three approaching Pearl Harbor
entrance buoys. They are 45 degrees, 40 degrees, and 331 degrees,
and the retiring course from the Pearl Harbor channel buoys is
shown as 151. The course to the east from the 0621 position in blue,
passing through the 0740 position in blue, is 107 degrees and passes
Diamond Head Peak 3,600 meters abeam.
[£92] Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I note on this Exhibit 33 that
there are some words in English, as well as on previous Exhibit 32.
Were those words on the exhibits when you received them ?
Captain Layton. They were. The English words written in lead
pencil on this exhibit are all believed to have been written by the
Japanese owner and were on there when it came in my possession.
On the translation in a position just to the southwest of Barber's
Point is the legend "midget sub?" This on the original is written in
large characters and says "tubes five" or "five tubes," which we as-
sumed to mean five midget subs. The 0845 position I referred to,
in red, is a navigational position about a mile and a half southwest
of Barber's Point light and is connected to a position near the 0745
position in red by a line in lead pencil.
Mr. SoNXETT. Admiral, may the record show that Exhibits 30, 31,
32, and 33, which are the original documents obtained from the sub-
marine, are being turned back to Captain Layton ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
Have you got anything further now?
Mr. SoNNETT. No, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much, Captain.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 3:55 p. m., adjourned until 1:30
p. m., 31 May 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 175
[293^ PKOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT maUIRY
Twelfth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag
Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 1 : 30 p. m.,
Thursday, 31 May 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR ; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you state your name and rank, sir?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Charles H. McMorris, Vice Admiral, USN.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, it appears from the previous investigations
that from February, 1941, until the end of 1941 you were the War
Plans Officer for CincPac, is that correct?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Correct.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you a pamphlet, Admiral, and ask you if 3'ou
can identify what that is, and, if so, I will ask you to read certain
portions of it into the record.
Vice Admiral McMorris. This pamphlet is entitled "Staff Instruc-
tions, Staff of CinePac, 1941."
Mr. Sonnett. Were you familiar with that, Admiral, at the time?
Vice Admiral McMorris, Presumably so.
Mr. Sonnett. May we mark it as an exhibit. Admiral?
Admiral Hewiit^. Yes.
(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 34.")
[^5j] Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I refer you to the provisions of
this exhibit, which is exhibit 34, which contain the definitions of the
duties of the War Plans Officer, and ask if you would read those into
the record. I believe it is paragraph 207.
Vice Admiral McMorris (reading) :
207. War Plans Officer— 1Q.
(a) As head of the War Plans Section is responsible, under the Chief of
Stalf, for the preparation of War Plans for the Fleet and for all matters per-
taining thereto.
(b) Has general custody of War Plans and secret letters relative thereto.
(c) Member of Schedule Board.
(d) Maintains liaison with War Plans representatives of subordinate Com-
manders.
(e) Maintains liaison with U. S. Army in War Plans matters — via District
Conimandant if appropriate.
(f) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships — general features — and
on alterations of old ships that affect military characteristics.
(g) Makes recommendations on matters pertaining to reserves of material,
particularly ammunition, mines, bombs, torpedoes, fuel, provisions, etc., and
their distribution.
176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(h) Maintains liaison with Commandants of Naval Districts in War Plans
matters.
(i) Is responsible for the review of War Plans of subordinate commanders
and of District Commandants and Coastal Frontier Commanders insofar as
these Plans may affect the Fleet.
Mr. SoNNETT. Does that accord, Admiral, with your recollection of
yuor duties as War Plans Officer for CincPac ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you a document entitled "U. S.
Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow Five, (Navy Plan 0-1, Rain-
bow Five) (WPPac-46)" and ask you if you can identify that as a
copy of the Pacific [295] Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five.
Vice Admiral McMokris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 35.")
Mr. SoNNETT, Referring, Admiral, to exhibit 35, which is the exhibit
you have just identified, it appears, does it not, that on page 24 the
tasks assigned by the Navy Basic Plan are outlined?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. And among those tasks, Admiral, is sub-paragraph
(h), which I would like to ask you to read into the record.
Vice Admiral McMorris (reading) :
h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent
the extension of enemy military power into the Western hemisphere by destroying
hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the eneiny
the use of land positions in that hemisphere.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, the phrase "territory of the associated
powers in the Pacific area" included Hawaii, did it?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to page 25 and to page 26 of this exhibit.
Admiral, it appears that the tasks formulated by the Pacific Fleet to
accomplish the assigned missions are set forth, are they not?
Vice -Admiral McMorris. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Those tasks. Admiral, of the Pacific Fleet are divided
into Phase I — Initial Tasks — Japan not in the war; and Phase lA —
Initial Tasks — Japan in the war. There is also a Phase II containing
succeeding tasks ?
[£96] Vice Admiral McMorris. Correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, would you read into the record from Phase
I of the Initial Tasks subdivisions (b) , (g) , and (m) ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. (reading) :
(b) Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
(b) Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere
by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking
groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the
equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.
(m) Guard against surprise attack by Japan.
Mr. SoNNETT. Does sub-paragraph (m), Admiral, contemplate that
a surprise attack by Japan against Hawaii should be guarded against
as a task of the Pacific Fleet?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you. Admiral, a carbon copy of a letter dated
September 9, 1911, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Com-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 177
/nancler-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and ask you whether you can
identify it.
Vice Admiral McMorrts. This is a copy of a letter which approves
Pacific Fleet Operation Plan Rainbow Five, WPPac-46,
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark the letter as an exhibit, Admiral?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 36.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you also identify, Admiral, a letter of July 25,
1941, from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the Chief
of Naval Operations on the same subject ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, I identify this as a letter submitting
[^97] Pacific Fleet Operating Plan for Eainbow Five to the Chief
of Naval Operations.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that as exhibit 36A, Admiral, and sub-
stitute a copy ? There is a carbon annexed to that.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document was received and marked "Exhibit 36 A.")
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to paragraph 5 of exhibit 36 A, Admiral, do
you know the basis for the statements made in that paragraph, and, if
so, would you state the basis for the statements?
Vice Admiral McMorris. The primary offensive operations as re-
quired by the Departmental Plan were for offensive operations in the
Marshall Islands with a vjew to causing the Japanese to withhold as
much of their force as possible from operations in the South China Sea.
That paragraph pointed out certain handicaps that would exist in
carrying out those operations. It expressed concern particularly as to
the limited number of destroyers ancl other anti-submarine vessels. It
also noted that transports weren't available to carry assault and oc-
cupying forces to the positions that might be attacked or seized, and it
also pointed out a lack of suitably trained and equipped Marine forces
for such operations. There was no doubt in my mind at that time
that the deficiencies mentioned were verv real and that while they
wouldn't prevent the operations directed, they would make their execu-
tion extremely difficult and far more hazardous than would be the case
if the deficiencies could be rectified.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I refer you to exhibit 23 of the Naval Court
of Inquiry, which consists of Annex number VII, Section VI, to the
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and
Fourteenth Naval District, 1939, dated 28 March 1941, and also con-
sists of Addendum I to [298] Naval Base Defense Air Force
Operation Plan Number A-1-41, dated March 31, 1941, and ask you
whether or not you can identify those.
Vice Admiral McMorris. I feel that these can be identified as the
papers which those headings purport them to be.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall, Admiral, whether you reviewed those
papers at or about the dates which they bear or at some subsequent
time?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Wliile I now have no specific recollection
that I reviewed these particular papers, by their very nature I enter-
tain no doubt that I did review them.
Mr. Sonnett. Particularly, Admiral. I take it, in view of the fact
that the review of such plans of subordinate commanders was one of
your regidar duties as War Plans Officer?
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 13
178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral McMorris. Those were part of my regular duties and,
recollecting very definitely the duties in that connection, I know I did
see a number of such papers and had many discussions of this and
kindred subjects. I feel it would be virtually impossible for such a
paper to have been issued without my having seen it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Admiral, to the second of those two
papers, that is, Addendum I, you will note that it contains a so-called
"Summary of the Situation." Will you examine that and state
whether your own summary of the situation at that time was in accord
with the summary contained in the exhibit?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That is substantially correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we read that into the record, Admiral, for the
sake of clarity of the record, at this point?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
[£99] Mr. SoNNETT (reading) :
1. Summary of the Situation.
(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain
and varying.
(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of
war.
(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on
OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western
Pacific for a long period.
(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas
organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force
which initiates hostile action.
(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding
force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intel-
ligence service.
Admiral, the reference to Orange in the Summary of the Situation
is to Japan, is it not ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Correct.
Mr. SoNNEETT. I refer you, Admiral, to page 3 of that Addendum,
sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) and (c) and (d) under Possible Enemy
Action and ask if you would examine that to see whether that accorded
with your own estimate of the situation at or about that time.
Vice Admiral McMorris. That section indicated possible enemy
actions. To that I subscribed in a greater or less degree. I did not
subscribe to some of those possibilities as being probable. In fact, I
personally felt they might be quite improbable.
Mr. SoNNETT. Again, Admiral, for the sake of clarity of the record,
may we read in those four?
Admiral He\vitt. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT (reading) :
///. Possible Enemy Action.
(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl
Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.
[300] (b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack
on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack
would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably
approach Inside of three hundred miles.
(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more sub-
marines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been
drawn away by the original thrust.
PROCEEDIICGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 179
(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable
undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a
carrier.
Admiral, while we are on the same subject, let me also refer to
the last sub-paragraph under Possible Enemy Action and read that
to you so that we may have your comments concerning that as well.
(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered
as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it
might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow
to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a
second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have
all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage
that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next
day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage
would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and
might be observed. Under tiie existing conditions this might not be a serious
disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take
no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete
surprise. Midday attacks have all the dl-sadvantages and none of the advantages
of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer
certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack
would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accom-
plishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air
attack.
Now, Admiral, you indicated previously that you felt that the pos-
sible enemy action as set forth in this exhibit was not probable at or
about the time of this exhibit in March of 1941?
[30 J] Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct.
Mr, SoNNETT. Did you agree with the estimate in paragraph (a) 2
to the effect that a declaration of war might be preceded by "a sur-
prise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl
Harbor"?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I agreed with the thought there expressed,
but considered such an attack more probable, much more probable,
in the approaches to Pearl Harbor rather than in Pearl Harbor itself.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I refer you to exhibit 8 of the Naval Court
of Inquiry, which purports to be Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter num-
ber 2CL-41 (Revised), dated October 14, 1941, and ask if you can
identify that.
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, I identify this as a Fleet Letter issued
at that time concerning the security of the fleet at the base and in the
operating areas.
Mr. SoNNETT, I take it. Admiral, that that would have come under
your official cognizance as War Plans Officer for review?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, I recall reviewing this. It was pre-
pared in the Operations Division, but a paper of this nature would
unquestionably have been reviewed by myself, and while I have at
this time no specific recollection of the details in preparation, I do
recall that some of the earlier drafts were modified in accordance
with suggestions made by myself.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Admiral, to the document before you,
there are two assumptions set forth, are there not, upon which the
plan was predicated ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you read, Admiral, assumption 2 (b) into the
record ?
180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[30£'\ Vice Admiral McMorris (reading) :
2. (b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by :
(1) a surprise attack on sliips in Pearl Harbor,
(2) a surprise submarine attack on sliips in operating area,
(3) a combination of these two.
Mr. SoNNETT, Did you, Admiral, at or about that time, namely,
October 14, 1941, agree with assumption 2 (b), which you have just
read ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I refer you to exhibit 15 of the Naval Court
of Inquiry, which is a dispatch of OpNav, dated November 24, 1941,
and ask whether you recall having seen that at or about that time.
Vice Admiral McMorris. I recall seeing this about that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. I refer you, Admiral, to exhibit 17 of the Naval
Court of Inquiry record, which is a dispatch of OpNav, dated Novem-
ber 27, 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that at or about
that time.
Vice Admiral McMorris. I recall seeing this dispatch about that
time.
Mr. SoNNETT. I refer you. Admiral, also to exhibit 19 of the Naval
Court of Inquiry, which is an OpNav dispatch of November 27, 1941,
and ask you whether you recall having seen that dispatch at or about
that time.
Vice Admiral McMorris. I recall seeing this dispatch about that
time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, Admiral, I believe you testified before the
Naval Court of Inquiry that no formal written estimate of the situa-
tion was maintained during this period of late November and early
December, 1941, but that a mental estimate was maintained, is that
correct ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. What w\as your estimate of the situation and of pos-
sible courses of enemy action during the period November 27 to
December 6, 1941 ?
[303] Vice Admiral McMorris. It is not possible now to give
with too great a degree of exactness the deductions and estimate made
at that time, but substantially I estimated that the Japanese were on
the point of commencing a war against Great Britain by operations
in Mala3^sia. Somewhat earlier I had estimated that they would take
&uch action with the expectation that the United States, unless at-
tacked, would not enter the war in support of Great Britain, and that
the Japanese were likely to proceed on the assumption that the Ameri-
can people would be unwilling to support a war that to them would
appear primarily for the defense of Great Britain's colonies. By the
time in question, however, I had come to the conclusion that the Japa-
nese might be unwilling to leave their line of communications abreast
the Philippines exposed to American attack in case the United States
did determine to come into the war.
I estimated that heavy attacks on the Philippines had become not
only a distinct possibility, but were even probable.
As our defenses at Guam were negligible and as the construction
work at Wake was not very far advanced, I estimated that measures
would be taken by the Japanese to seize those positions when they
PROCEEDINGS OF flEWITT INQUIRY 181
initiated the war. As the defenses of Midway were markedly stronger
than those at the other two places mentioned and as the Japanese
were probably familiar with the details thereof, I estimated that
heavy raids on that place were initially probable, but that immediate
efforts towards seizure were far less likely.
I estimated that there were likely to be heavy submarine concen-
trations in the Hawaiian area and the approaches thereto. I believed
that submarine attacks would be directed primarily at our task forces
operating at sea and that there was likelihood of attempts being made
to sink a ship in the Pearl Harbor channel. It seemed not unlikely
that the war might be [304] initiated by an attempt to torpedo
a valuable ship making ingress or egress to Pearl Harbor Channel.
I estimated that vigorous enemy submarine activity would take
place in the approaches to our important Pacific Coast ports.
Those are the highlights of the estimate at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, was it your estimate also at that time,
namely, after the receipt of the so-called war warning of November
27th, that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility but not in
your opinion a probability?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That expresses the view that I had.
Mr. SoNNETT. What action, Admiral, was taken as a result of the
war warning of November 27th and of your estimate which you have
just stated?
Vice Admiral McMorris. As I now recall, there was considerable
discussion between Admiral Kimmel and the key members of his staff
as to action to be taken and determination was reached that the naval
organizatipn was already substantially on a war footing and no
material changes would be made within the Hawaiian area. There was
considerable discussion as to continuation or modification of training
schedules, and the conclusion was reached that it was essential that
the training continue until it was necessary to move the principal
elements of the fleet for offensive operations. It had been determined
before that reconnaissance in force would be made into the Marshalls
as a preliminary towards seizure of positions therein with the utmost
celerity when war came.
The limitations in supplies and facilities at Wake and Midway, as
well as certain island outposts, had precluded stationing there requisite
defensive forces until such action became virtually mandatory. This
applied particularly to defensive aircraft. The only two carriers in
the Hawaiian [305] area were dispatched to those places, with
fighter aircraft, one going to Wake, the other to Midway. They were
accompanied by cruisers and destroyers on those expeditions.
Consideration was given to sending other additional personnel to
those places and consideration was also given to the withdrawal of
civilian personnel who were working under contractors and developing
the defenses of those two places.
It was determined, all things considered, that the best thing to do
was to consider the construction work and that existing limitations of
the two islands would not permit increase in personnel. It is my re-
collection that some small number of men and certain specialized equip-
ment were dispatched to Wake, but it is possible that the ship carrying
those elements sailed before the receipt of this dispatch.
182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. What, if any, conferences or conversations were had,
Admiral, between you and Admiral Kimmel during this period of
November 27th on concerning reconnaissance from Oahu?
Vice Admiral McMokris. I have no specific recollection in that con-
nection, but during this period, this was a matter that was discussed
between Admiral Kimmel and myself and with the two of us and the
other members of the staffs and with other senior naval officers present
in Pearl Harbor. The details I no longer remember, but I do recall
some of the considerations that were in mind and, in general, the action
determined upon. The number of patrol planes here was small. Cer-
tain of them were earmarked for advancement to Midway and at ap-
propriate time to Wake for support and assistance in the reconnais-
sance of the Marshalls at an appropriate time. My recollection is that
about this time there was some augmentation of the number of patrol
craft at Midway.
[306] In case war should start, most of the fleet shore-based
aircraft were to be moved to the island outposts, Midway, Johnston,
and Wake, but since the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier had no aircraft
of its own, some of the fleet aircraft were to remain under the opera-
tional control of the Coastal Frontier Command.
In order that the patrol craft might be ready for prompt movements
to distant service where repair and upkeep facilities were limited or
negligible, it was deemed highly important that as many as possible
be kept ready for flight on short notice and not tie up an undue number
requiring engine overhaul because of excessive use.
At this time the patrol wings in the Navy as a whole were being
increased and the operating forces were in no small measure engaged in
giving essential advanced operational training. After discussion and
consideration, the determination was reached to continue the training
as much as possible.
It was belived by myself and, I believe, generally by other officers
that entered into the discussions that it was highly important to main-
tain anti-submarine patrols in the operating areas.
Considering the requirements for anti-submarine patrols, the neces-
sity for maintaining patrol aircraft in prompt readiness for distant
service, and considering the impelling necessity for continuation of the
training program, it was determined that the arrangements that were
actually in effect were the best that we could do. This in effect accepted
a calculated risk. Subsequent events proved that the calculations
weren't good. Calculations at the time, however, did show that only
very limited sectors could be continually patrolled with the forces then
available. It may be remarked in passing that with the effectiveness
of search that could have been maintained, it is doubtful that the ap-
proach of the Japanese carriers on the morning of [307] 7 De-
cember would have been detected as the arc of their approach would
quite possibly have been unguarded.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, the various considerations concerning air
reconnaissance which you have just described were, I take it, your own
considerations at the time?
Vice Admiral McMorrts. Yes, I think so. I might say that with
the passage of time and various discussions of this matter, it is some-
times difficult to say whether those specific things were in your mind
at that time or that possibly other considerations were in mind in ad-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 183
dition. I feel safe in saying, however, that while the considerations
which I have just mentioned are my best recollection now, it is not
only possible but highly probable that they were in my mind at that
time and were voiced in discussions with the Commander-in-Chief and
with others concerned.
Mr. SoNNETT. It is the fact. Admiral, I take it, that you do not
recall any formal conference or detailed discussion with the Com-
mander-in-Chief on that subject?
Vice Admiral McMorris. It would be better to say that it was not a
practice to have formal conferences. There was not a formal confer-
ence, but there were numerous conferences and discussions, and while I
cannot say that this specific question was the subject of any one con-
ference, it undoubtedly was a matter that was discussed during this
period, and the action taken was after consideration and evaluation
of the factors involved in the light of information and circumstances
that existed at the time.
Mr. SoNNETT. What I am trying to get at, Admiral, is you have no
independent recollection of any specific discussion with Admiral Kim-
mel after November 27th on the subject, but you feel it must have been
discussed ?
[SOS] Vice Admiral McMorris. Wliile I have no specific recol-
lection as to time or date or subject matter of a conference, I can say
definitely that during this period this subject matter was discussed
between myself and others and the Commander-in-Chief.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you tell us what Admiral Kimmel said at any
such discussion. Admiral, concerning reconnaissance from Oahu ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. No, I cannot, but manifestly the conclu-
sions that he reached did not result in any distant search being main-
tained, but rather that the search at the time was against submarines
in localized areas.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, any discussion with Admiral
Kimmel after the war warning of November 27th and prior to De-
cember 7th concerning a projected reconnaissance fliglit by the Army
over the Mandated Islands?
Vice Admiral McMorris. No, I do not. I do recall that General
Martin was very loathe to have the fighter aircraft over water at all,
and while I do not recall any discussion of Army flights over the Man-
dated Islands, it doesn't mean that such discussions may not have taken
place, but certainly no action was ever taken leading to anything of
that sort; so that, if such discussion did take place, it must have been
concluded that such would be unfeasible.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 28 of this investigation,
which is a memorandum from Captain Layton to the Admiral on No-
vember 28, 1941, and ask you whether, after examining it, it refreshes
3'our recollection at all concerning the proposed Army reconnaissance.
Vice Admiral McMorris. That does refresh my recollection to some
extent because I was thinking at the time in terms of visual reconnais-
sance by a number of planes. I do now vaguely recall some discussion
with regard to photo reconnaissance, but the recollection is vague in
the extreme.
[S09] Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, do you recall the extent of the
sector from Oahu which could have been covered by the patrol planes
available'during the period November 27th to December 7, 1941 ?
184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral McMorris. That is a question that cannot be cate-
gorically answered. Various combinations of diagrams were given
consideration and had a search been determined upon, it would of
necessity finally been based on the radius of flights and how long a
period of time the searches would continue and whether or not mat-
ters of training and engine overhaul would be completely ignored.
As a practical measure, had such searches been instituted at all, they
undoubtedly would have been a compromise among the different fea-
tures involved, just as a compromise was actually reached in limiting
the searches to the fleet operating areas.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, you stated a moment ago that various dia-
grams were given consideration. When and by whom were they con-
sidered. ?
Vice Admiral McMorris, That I cannot now answer. There were
undoubtedly some drawn within the War Plans Section, some by the
Aviation Officer, possibly or even probably by the Operations Di-
vision. I do not recall whether any were brought over by the patrol
wing commander. The extent to which any were directly presented to
tlie Commander-in-Chief or which he may have noted within my office
or the Operations Office, I cannot now answer.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral Bellinger was the Air Officer at that time,
was he not. Admiral ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. He was in command of the patrol wing
of the fleet that was stationed here at that time, and the senior naval
officer in the patrol craft.
Mr. SoNNETT. He testified. Admiral, before the Naval Court of In-
quiry \_310] that during the period in question, November 27,
1941, on, continuous daily patrol could have been flown by dividing
the combat crews into three groups, using twenty planes daily and
covering 144°, which could have been continued for an undertermined
number of days. Does that accord with your recollection as to the
capabilities for reconnaissance during that period 'I
Vice Admiral McMorris. I would say that that wouldn't be far
wrong if that were the only consideration to be given, namely, to run-
ning a search, but the Commander-in-Chief had not only that consid-
eration to weigh, but also the matter of keeping planes ready for dis-
tant service and for training of personnel for new aircraft being built.
Mr. SoxNETT. How many naval aircraft were available at that time
at Oahu ? Do you recall, Admiral ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I do not.
Mr. SoxNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 22 of this investigation,
which consists of a series of photostats of a document entitled "Com-
munication Intelligence Summaries" and I direct j'our attention to
those particularly for the period 27 November 1941 to 5 December 1941
and ask you whether you recall having seen those at the time.
Vice Admiral McMorris. I recall being familiar with information
of that general nature at that time, that frequently I did not myself
read them but heard them either read or orally presented by Captain
Lay ton, and I judge that those are the principal intelligence informa-
tion that was available at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the summary for November 30, 1941,
Admiral, and to the lower left-hand corner, is that your initial?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I don't know. It may well be.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 185
Mr. SoxNETT. Do you recognize the initial in the lower right-hand
corner ?
[Sll] Vice Admiral McMorris. That appears to be Admiral
Kimmel's initial. I certainly had access to all such material at that
time.
Mr. SoxxETT. I refer you to the initial on the 23 November 1941
summary at the lower left-hand corner and ask you whether that is
your initial.
Vice Admiral McMokris. Probably.
Mr. SoxNETT. And to the one for November 22, 1941, Admiral, the
lower left-hand corner.
Vice Admiral McMorris. The same comment holds. That is prob-
ably my initial.
Mr. SoNXETT. Is that also true of the one for November 30th, Ad-
miral, that it probably is your initial, or aren't you sure about it?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, that is probably.
Mr. SoNNETT. In the November 30th sum.mary, Admiral, it is indi-
cated, is it not, that the radio intelligence unit was of the opinion
that there was a Japanese carrier in the Mandates ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. What, if any, discussion did you have with Admiral
Kimmel concerning that belief ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I do not now recall any. It is quite pos-
sible, however, that discussion did occur.
Mr. SoNNETT. "Would it be an accurate statement, Admiral, to say
that you had received during that period either these communication
intelligence summaries or the substance of them?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That would be accurate.
Mr. SoxNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 8 of this investigation,
which consists of photostats of various dispatches, and refer you par-
ticularly to the dispatch of ComFOURTEEN of 26 November and
ask whether you recall having seen that at the time.
[312] Vice Admiral McMorris. I have now no independent
recollection of that message, but would say that I probably did see it at
the time. I almost surely saw it at the time.
Mr. SoNNETT. That indicates. Admiral, does it not, that tliere was
believed to be, among other things, at least one carrier division unit
in the Marshalls ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoxxETT. I also show you. Admiral, exhibit 23 of this investi-
gation, vrhicli is a memorandum of December 1, 1941, from Lieutenant
Commander Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, to the Admiral, and ask
you whether you recall having seen that.
Vice Admiral McMorris. Again I now have no independent recol-
lection of seeing that, but would say it is improbable that I did not
see it.
Mr. SoxxETT. Do you recall. Admiral, that on or about December
1, 1941, there was a change in the service calls of the Japanese fleet?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I remember that about that time there
was a cliange in their call signs.
Mr. SoxxETT. And do you further recall that in the succeeding
days prior to the attack there was a blank of information as to the
Japanese carriers ?
186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral McMorris. My recollection now is that specific infor-
mation was lacking, but my general impression now is that we believed
at the time that we had a fairly good idea of the general location of the
major elements of the Japanese fleet.
Mr. SoNNETT. Where did you, during the period November 27th to
December 6, 1941, believe the Japanese carriers were, Admiral?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Again, it is difficult to say what the spe-
cific beliefs were at that time, but generally in home waters or towards
Formosa.
[313] Mr. SoNNETT. Now, referring to the communication in-
telligence summaries, exhibit 22, will you point out where in those
summaries is the information on which you based that belief ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Before looking, I may say that it may or
may not be specifically in here.
Mr. SoNNETT. I should add, Admiral, if it is not there, would you
state whatever the information was on which you based the belief?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Nor would I be able to answer a question
of that nature.
To answer the question now would be an attempt to take the record
here and justify the conclusion reached. The information is at best
vague. It would take a considerable number of quotations to give
them as they come.
24 November :
Large numbers of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some of which ap-
pear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC Third Fleet appears as in-
formation addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet units in-
dicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future operations.
Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division Three with
CinC Third Fleet.
25 November:
One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates.
26 November :
The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed a suc-
cession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC Second and
Third Fleets in particular. . . . Takao and Bako originated more traffic
today than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC Second
Fleet and the China Fleets came in for their share.
[314] Again on the 26th of November :
The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the Combined Air Force
still continues at its high level.
27 November :
Bako addressed the Chief of Staff, Third Fleet, information Destroyer Squad-
rons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator
today was the Intelligence activity who sent tive dispatches to the major com-
manders.
Same date :
COMBINED FLEET — There is still no evidence of any further movement from
the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several
messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator late-
ly. CinC Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Aii-
Force, and Bako.
Again :
THIRD FLEET — Still holding extensive communication with Bako, Sama.
South China Fleet and French Indo-China. . . . There is nothing to indi-
cate any movements of the Third Fleet as yet.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 187
28 November :
Tokyo ox'iginators were active with messages of high pi-ecedence to the Com-
mauders-in-Chief of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. . . .
The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent one to the Chief ot Stai'ts of Com-
bined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third Fleet, French Indo-China
Force, Second Fleet, and RNO Palao.
Again, same date :
COMBINED FLEET — No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units.
Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet originated his usual number of dispatches to
Third Fleet and Combined Air Forces. The units paid particular attention to
by the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, were Crudivs 5 and 7 and Desrons 2
and 4 and Subron 5. No traffic today from the Takao (CA).
[5i J] Again, same date :
THIRD FLEET — Little activity from Third Fleet xinits save for the Com-
mander-in-Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not
present with the bulk of the Third Fleet in Sasebo but it is not yet located
elsewhere. * * * Two Third Fleet units arived at Bako and are apparently
returning to Kure from Bako.
29 November:
Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet, sent one message to Comdesron 5, Number
Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense Division One and Comdesrons
2 and 4. He held extensive communications with the Commander-in-Chief Second
Fleet and Bako. Two more units of Third Fleet made movement reports.
30 November :
One urgent dispatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff, Combined, Second,
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force.
30 November :
No information obtained as to the location of the Commander-in-Chief Third
Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway.
1 December:
FIRST FLEET — Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside
of Empire Waters.
SECOND FLEET — This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area
in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play
an important role in today's traffic ; consequently, the assumption is made that
this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force
are definitely in the Indo-China area.
THIRD FLEET — Nothing to report except that the same association of Second,
Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China forces
continues.
[S16] 2 December :
SECOND FLEET — No units have stood out prominently the last two or three
days. This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat
to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company.
Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unl^cated and unob-
served since change of caUs.
Same date:
THIRD FLEET — Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way
in some of the Third Fleet traffic.
CARRIERS — Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today.
Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. How-
ever, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since
the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered,
it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.
188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
o December :
The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slows up identifi-
cation of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far.
The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long dispatches to the
CINC C0:MBINED, second and THIRD FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence
originated nine dispatches to the same addresses.
The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed
by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takeo the CINC SECOND FLEET is indi-
cated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is
indicated for delivery by that Station. It is the impression that both SECOND
and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence
means.
4 December :
There were a large number of urgent messages today, [3171 most of
these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Among others Tokyo Intelligence
originated a seven-part message to Chiefs of Staff China Fleet, Combined Fleet,
Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force, and Sama. In all,
this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders.
Same date :
The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the CinC
Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. These previously very talkative com-
manders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not yet well identified,
the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two
commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the CinC
Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting
evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which CinC
Second Fleet is still copying. The CinC Combined Fleet sent one message to an
unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force, Palao, CinC Second Fleet
and CinC Third Fleet.
5 December:
Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have originated any traffic
today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic over
broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the
Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander
Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen, either.
6 December :
Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. These units
are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The Com-
mander-in-Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers,
Fourth Fleet and the major commanders.
[S18] Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, as to the 6th of December sum-
mary, I would like to call your attention to a pencilled note at the
bottom which indicates that that summary was not received until
after the attack. I just wondered whether you could confirm that
or not, or whether you have any recollection of it.
Vice Admiral McMorris. I have no recollection.
Mr. SoxME'BT. I also would like to refer you, Admiral, back to
the December 3rd intelligence summary, which closes with the state-
ment, "No information on submarines or Carriers."
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, Admiral, may I show you exhibit 21 of this
investigation, a photostat of Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin num-
ber 45-41, and ask you whether you saw that on or about that date?
Vice Admiral McMorris. It is highly probable that I did during
that period.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 189
Mr. SoNNXTT. Referring, Admiral, to page 1 of the bulletin, do
you recall the following statement :
The following revision of Op-16-F-2, ONI Serial number 27-41, supersedes
and revises the former report on this subject,
The subject being the organization of the Japanese fleet.
The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet
commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and sea-
plane tenders into separate forces and from the creation of special task forces
in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China.
And then the major fleet commands are listed, the seventh being the
carrier fleet, aircraft carriers of five carrier divisions.
Vice Admiral McMorris. Item 7, just to avoid confusion, because
they give the numbers of those.
[319] Mr. SoNNETT. Right, sir; item 7 listed as the carrier
Do you recall having had that information, Admiral, at that time?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I feel sure I must have had it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, referring back to page 8, Admiral, of the
bulletin, there is set forth, is there not, the composition of the Japanese
carrier fleet?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes. It indicates here ten carriers and
sixteen destroyers.
Mr. SoNXETT. Now, is it the fact, Admiral, that after December 1,
1941, and prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, you had no intelligence
or information concerning the location or movements of those
carriers ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Of a carrier fleet as such we did not, as
I recall it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you have any information concerning the move-
ments of anv of the carriers of the Japanese carrier fleet after De-
cember 1, 1941?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Not specifically.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you have any in general? If so, what ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Without now being able to indicate any-
thing specific, the general organization as set forth in the paper in
question was to a large extent a type organization, and while there
was a lack of reference to specific carriers or to carriers as a whole,
I did not reach a conclusion that they were operating independently
of the rest of the Combined Fleet.
Mr. SoxxETT, Did you, Admiral, reach the conclusion that, as stated
in these commimicatio'n intelligence summaries, after December 1,
1941, there was no information as to the carriers?
[320] Vice Admiral McMorris. My recollection now is that
during that period there were one or two vague indications associating
theni with the Second and Third Fleets, which was logical, and some
possible associations with Palao, and at least one instance with the
Marshalls.
Mr. SoxxETT. Well, Admiral, referring to exhibit 23, which is now
Captain Layton's estimate of December 1, 1941, of the location of the
Japanese fleet, do you find any reference in that estimate to the loca-
tion of Carrier Divisions Three and Four of the Japanese fleet?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I note under "Kure-Sasebo" in red pencil
"Four CV." I note under heading "CinC 2nd Fleet with units at
190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Takao" Cardivs 3 and 4, and I note under the summation four CV
at that place. I note under "Marshall Area" one CV.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, Admiral, referring to exhibit 21, that indicates
on paire 8 Carrier Division One of the Japanese fleet consisted of the
AKAGI and the KAGA and Carrier Division Two of the SORYU
and HIRYU. Do you find in the December 1st estimate by Captain
Layton, exhibit 23, any indication as to the location of any of the
four carriers comprising Carrier Divisions One and Two ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I do not find in that paper the names
of any specific ships, carriers or otherwise.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you find on page 3, Admiral, under "Bako-Takao
area" Carrier Division Four and Carrier Division Three?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you find any place i-n the paper Carrier Division
One or Carrier Division Two?
Vice Admiral ]\IcMorris. No.
[S21] Mr. SoNNETT. Did you participate, Admiral, in any con-
ference with Admiral Kimmel concerning the December 1st estimate
of Captain Layton ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I do not recall, but if there were a dis-
cussion on that, it is improbable that I would not have been present.
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, I take it. Admiral, you recall no specific dis-
cussion of the lack of information concerning Carrier Divisions One
and Two of the Japanese fleet on or about December 1, 1941, and prior
to the attack?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I do not so recall, but I do recall that
during that general period, the information as to locations of Japanese
fleet units far from as specific as was desired, but I do not recall that
lack of information, taking into consideration the general situation
and all other information at hand, that we were extremely disturbed.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring back to exhibit 17 of the Naval Court
record, the so-called war warning dispatch of November 27, 1941, I
should like to call your attention to the following portion of that
dispatch :
Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL-46.
I should like further to call your attention to the Initial Tasks of
the Pacific Fleet and in particular items "b," "g," and "m" of the
Phase I initial tasks, to be taken vrhen Japan was not in the war,
and to ask you what was done by way of a d'eployment preparatory
to carrying out those tasks. I will read them again so that you will
have them clearly in mind. (Reading) :
b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
g. Protect tlie communications and territory of the associated powers and
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the [322] Western
Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action
of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces
south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.
m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.
The question. Admiral, is
Vice Admiral McMorris. I know the question.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the war warning, what appropriate
defensive development preparatory to carrying out those tasks was
executed ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 191
Vice Admiral McMorris. That question has in effect been answered
in my reply in this testimony to an earlier question regarding that
dispatch. In substance there was no material change in the dispo-
sition and deployment of the fleet forces at that time other than the
movements of certain aircraft to Midway and Wake and of the car-
riers, with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to those locations
to deliver aircraft.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, the language which I have quoted from
the war warning dispatch was a direction, was it not ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it, then, that it was your view that either you
had already in effect an appropriate defensive deployment or that
what you had in effect on November 27th plus the steps you mentioned
amounted to an appropriate defensive deployment. Is that correct?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct, and in addition thereto,
considering the other tasks assigned in case of war, the direction to
take defensive dispositions carried with it the implication that offen-
sive dispositions weren't to be taken. The primary offensive task of
the [322] Pacific Fleet, and one that in my view would require
very prompt action, was employment of our forces against the Mar-
shalls in order to force the Japanese to withhold a portion of their
forces from operations against Malaysia.
_ This so-called war warning order, mentioning specifically "defen-
sive" dispositions, was issued while important conversations were
going on in Washington with a view to prevention of war. It seems
clearly to indicate that our forces should not be exposed in the Mar-
shall area or close approaches thereto preparatory to an assault, as
detection there might prejudice efforts to maintain peace. Since the
fleet was in effect cautioned against offensive dispositions, by specific
directives to take defe^isive dispositions, and since the fleet had to a
large extent been already disposed in a defensive manner, it was felt
that the directive in question was being complied with.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I call your attention to the fact that the
initial tasks of the Pacific Fleet contained in Pacific Fleet Operating-
Plan Kainbow Five were divided into two phases: Phase I, Japan
not in the war, and Phase lA, Japan in the war; and that Phase I did
not provide for any raid or any offensive action toward the Marshalls
or elsewhere, but did provide for protecting the communications and
territory of the associated powers, the prevention of the extension of
enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling
with light forces and patrol planes, and also provided for guarding
against surprise attack by Japan.
What specific deployment was made to accomplish those tasks ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. The disposition of the major portion of
the fleet in Hawaiian rather than in coastal waters was a major action
[S23] in that regard. The reenforcement hitherto mentioned for
Midway and Wake were elements of that disposition. The employ-
ment of the fleet units underway at sea and the Hawaiian area with
appropriate screens and with patrol of the area by patrol aircraft
were other elements of that disposition. The maintenance of a full
supply of ammunition and the requirement that all ships at all times
must have a certain minimum quantity of fuel on board (my recollec-
192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tion is that that requirement was seventy per cent, although it may
have varied somewhat with the class of the ships) was a supporting
act to make the dispositions effective.
Mr. SoNNETT. It would, Admiral, have been an appropriate move,
would it not, in order to accomplish the initial task "m," namely, guard
against surprise attack by Japan, to have established an air patrol
from Oahu?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, that would have been an appropriate
act, but no one act nor no one disposition can be examined independent
of other requirements.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring again. Admiral, to exhibit 17 of the Naval
Court's record, the so-called war warning, it started out, did it not,
by stating :
This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number
and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces
indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or Kra
Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment,
et cetera, and language that we quoted before.
[325] Now, had you received a dispatch prior to that time stat-
ing that this was a war warning or that an aggressive move was
expected, other than the dispatch of November 24th, which stated in
part, ". . . a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, in-
cluding attack on Philippines or Guam, is a possibility"?
Vice Admiral McMorkis. We had received no communication
which used the term, "This is a war warning." However, in Jan-
uary of 1941, while I was under orders to duty as War Plans Officer,
Pacific Fleet, but before I had reported as such and before Admiral
Kimmel had assumed command, I did participate in a conference
with Admiral Richardson, then the Commander-in-Chief, and his
War Plans Officer and with Admiral Kimmel and with the Chiefs of
Staff of the two admirals mentioned, concerning the probability of
war with Japan; and throughout the year until 7 December there
were various communications by letter and by dispatch and by inter-
change of personal letters between the Chief of Naval Operations
and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, regarding the probability of
war with Japan ; and the situation was tense throughout the year, so
much so that the dispatch in question occasioned no surprise, nor
did it convey any considerable amount of additional or startling
information.
Mr. SoNNETT. The conference to which you refer just before you
reported as War Plans Officer, I take it, occurred in late January or
early February of 1941, Admiral?
Vice Admiral JSIcMorris. Late January, 1941, and as a result
thereof a joint letter was sent by Admiral Richardson and Admiral
Kimmel to the Chief of Naval Operations.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you at that time see the letter of the Secretary
of the Navy, dated January 24, 1941, which was exhibit 9 before the
Naval [326] Court of Inquiry, a copy of which I now show
you ?
Vice Admiral McMorrts. I saw that letter in late January or early
Februarv, 1941.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY ' 193
Mr. SoNNETT. Did the statements of the Secretary of the Navy
in tlie letter, which I will now read in part, accord with your own
views ?
(Reading:)
If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities
would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at
Pearl Harbor. . . .
The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are con-
sidered to be :
(1) Air bombing attack.
(2) Air torpedo plane attack.
(3) Sabotage.
(4) Submarine attack.
(5) Mining.
(6) Bombardment by gun fire.
Vice Admiral McMorris I had no fault to find with the views ex-
pressed therein, although not completely in accord as to the elements
of danger as listed in importance there.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were you also in accord with the statement of the
then Secretary of the Navy, which I will quote : "The countermeas-
ures to be considered are: (a) location and engagement of enemy
carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched,"
and the further statement referring to (a) as follows: "The opera-
tions set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet, but quite
possibly might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated
without warning prior to a declaration of war"?
[327] Vice Admiral McMorris. Those views appeared to be
sound.
Mr. SoNNETT. And I take it, Admiral, from your previous testi-
mony that certainly as late as October 14, 1941, when the fleet secu-
rity letter was issued, you still thought that an air attack was pos-
sible although you were of the view that it was not probable ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. I felt that an air attack was possible but
not probable and that the fleet should not take as its sole object of
existence the defense of itself against a surprise attack, but that it
should also carry on other fundamental duties.
Mr. SoNNETT. Those duties. Admiral, were the duties we referred
to before, set forth in the Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, were they
not?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes, and with reference to that plan, I
presume that that included the training and otherwise readying of
itself for operations, but whether or not those duties are specifically
indicated there, they would be implicit in any orders or plans that
might be issued.
Mr. SoNNETT. In that connection. Admiral, I call your attention to
initial task "k" of the Phase I tasks, reading, "Continue training opera-
tions as practicable."
It is the fact, Admiral, or it was the fact, as you earlier testified, that
patrols, or aircraft reconnaissance rather, was being conducted from
Midway and other outlying bases during the so-called critical period,
November 27, 1941, on, was it not?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Only to a very limited extent. The aircraft
that were at the outlying bases other than Midway were entirely de-
fensive. The aircraft at Midway were partially defensive and par-
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 14
194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tially [328] for patrol. The amount of gas and the upkeep
facilities at Midway were extremely limited and necessitated the ut-
most conservation of the available supplies and of the aircraft them-
selves in order that engines might not be worn out before a critical
period arose. Again, it may be remarked in passing that had the
maximimi search been instituted from Midway and Pearl Harbor on
the 27th of November warning, the situation with regard to aircraft
engines by the 7th of December would have been in a highly critical
situation.
Mr. SoNNETT. By the first week in December, 1941, Admiral, you
had had, of course, the war warning and you knew that Japanese
forces were on the move, according to intelligence, and you also knew
that the Japanese were destroying codes and the like, as I recall your
previous testimony ; is that correct ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. You also knew, I take it. Admiral, and were aware
of the fact that the Japanese in the past had attacked without declara-
tion of war and indeed your security orders and war plans were based
on an assumption that they might do that, is that correct ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. The factors which you have mentioned
were constantly in the mind of myself and, I am sure, were in the mind
of the Commander-in-Chief.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it. Admiral, that one of the things tha,t you
were thinking about during that first week of December was the
proposed reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands,
which was one of the tasks set forth in Phase I A of the Pacific Fleet
Plan, is that correct ?
[329] Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct. During that
period, I daily, or at most on alternate days, furnished the Command-
er-in-Chief an informal typed memo of the action that I felt should be
taken by the important elements of the fleet if war ensued in the ensu-
ing twenty-four hours.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you. Admiral, exhibits 69A and 69B of the
Naval Court of Inquiry and ask you whether those are the memoranda
to which you referred.
Vice Admiral McMorris. These are typical, but I believe there
were additional ones.
Mr. SoNNETT. Those are dated, Admiral, November 30th and De-
cember 5, 1941, respectively, are they not?
Vice Admiral McMorris. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there any provision made in those for recon-
naissance from Oahu?
Vice Admiral McMorris. No.
Mr. SoNNETT. I call your attention. Admiral, to task "g" of Phase
lA of the initial tasks of the Pacific Fleet — that is, the Phase lA
tasks are those to be taken initially when Japan is in the war — which
reads as follows: "Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the
approaches to Oahu and outlying bases." Why was no provision
made for carrying out that task?
Vice Admiral McMorris. There was actually in effect in Oahu
patrols against enemy forces, but the patrol was against submarines,
which was regarded as the greatest element of danger. On the insti-
tution or commencement of war, certain of the patrol craft were to
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 195
pass to the [SSO] operational control of the Commander of
the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and such searches would have been
conducted by him. However, the number of such aircraft so assigned
was very small and it was expected that they would largely be used
for anti-submarine patrols as was in effect at the time. Although the
operations of that nature were under the general supervision and
direction of the Operations Division rather than the Plans Division
of the Staff, I was fully aware of what was being done and was com-
pletely in accord and had given the weight of my advice in that direc-
tion to the Commander-in-Chief.
Mr. SoNNETT. In advising the Commander-in-Chief during the
critical period of 1941, did you evaluate and consider at any length the
intelligence information showing that you had no information as to
the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers from December 1st on?
Vice Admiral McMorkis. Certainly the negative as well as the posi-
tive information available entered into the conclusions.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. In your testimony before one of the previous
investigations you stated that in your opinion the island defense was
adequate and in case of an air attack the chance to inflict damage was
small. The question arose in my mind as to what you based that
opinion on.
Vice Admiral McMorris. It might be somewhat difficult to give
the train of thought that led to those conclusions, but I felt that with
the defenses here, with the anti-aircraft power and with the fighter
strength, that a large proportion of the attacking planes would be
destroyed and that the accuracy of the bombing would be such that
no large number of [3311 hits would be obtained. Notwith-
standing the success of the British attack at Taranto (I believed
there were peculiar conditions that existed there), I did not believe
that there was a serious hazard from aerial torpedo attack in Pearl
because of the necessity for attacking planes to come very low. I be-
lieved that a considerable proportion of them would be destroyed
by AA fire, aside from the local fighter protection, and that the shal-
lowness of the water and the short distance the torpedoes would have
to run would mean that the torpedoes themselves would not inflict
great damage. Manifestly, my conclusions were entire!}^ wrong in all
those respects. They were reached, however, from reading available
information and acquaintance with the torpedo performance in our
own Navy.
Admiral Hewitt. Did you have any knowledge as to the readiness of
the Army anti-aircraft defenses, whether they were actually alerted
and occupied their positions ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. No.
Admiral Hewitt. But your assumption was that they were in
readiness?
Vice Admiral McMorris. That is correct, and perhaps I was remiss
in not acquainting myself more fully as to what they were doing. We
knew that our own establishment was fairly good. Actually the}'
proved not to be as good as I felt. We were a bit too complacent
there. I had been around all of the aircraft defenses of Hawaii; I
laiew their general location. I had witnessed a number of their anti-
aircraft practices and knew the quantity and general disposition of
196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
their aircraft. I knew that they were parked closely together as a
more ready protection against sabotage rather than dispersed. None-
theless, I was not directly acquainted or indirectly acquainted with the
actual state [332] of readiness being maintained or of the
watches being kept.
Admiral Hewitt. It was brought out in the other investigations
that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were very
cordial and they saw each other frequently and kept each other in-
formed as well as possible. I wonder whether that extended down
to elements of the staff, whether there was much interchange of in-
formation.
Vice Admiral McMorris. I think there was such interchange of in-
formation rather habitually on an informal basis. I myself not in-
frequently saw members of General Short's staff. I know that
General Martin, I believe, and Admiral Bellinger had not infrequent
meetings ; perhaps they shouldn't be characterized as conferences. I
know that there had been called for the morning of the 8th of De-
cember a meeting between a number of General Short's officers and
District officers to meet with Captain DeLany, who was the Operations
Officer at the time, at his call to see if there could be brought about
an improvement with regard to communications and arrangements for
coordination if meeting attack. I cite those things merely as illustra-
tive. There was a considerable amount of interchange of informa-
tion and discussion with one another. At that time it is certain the
two services acted semi-independently, but the local plan of defense,
which Admiral Kimmel had approved, had been drawn up by the
Commander of the Hawaiian Department's staff and by tne Com-
mander of the Sea Frontier's staff.
Before I joined Admiral Kimmel's staff, I was Operations Officer
for Admiral Andrews, who was the Commander of the Hawaiian
Detachment, and was Senior Officer Present in the Hawaiian area until
the fleet came out in 1940 some time. During that period, I frequently
visited Fort Shafter, the military establishments in Hawaii, and
discussed defensive [SSS] plans with the Planning Officer of
the District Commandant. I witnessed a number of firings by Army
elements. On more than one occasion the G-3 officer of the Department
was my guest at our own firings, and after I joined Admiral Kimmel's
staff, that association continued, and I feel that I was not exceptional
in having contact with the Army personnel on their problems.
Admiral HmviTT. When you discussed the considerations of the
principal danger being from submarines, that would apply to ships
in the operating areas and to ships entering and leaving the port, but
would not apply to the ships inside the harbor ?
Vice Admiral McMorris. No, sir, it did not apply to ships inside
the harbor. There had been considerable fear that submarines lying
outside the channel entrance might sink a ship in the entrance and
consideration was given to defensive mining and to the establishment
of listening posts a little farther offshore. The thought of defensive
mining was abandoned because the shelf was narrow and there was a
fair amount of current along there. Almost every one reached the
same conclusion that the defensive mines would be more hazardous
than the submarine menace might be. And there was grave concern
over the lack of anti-submarine craft either in numbers or in types.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 197
Nonetheless, it was felt that the chance of a submarine getting within
Pearl Harbor was very, very remote. Actually, of course, when the
time came about, we found we were unduly complacent.
Admiral Hewitt. Well, the submarines that got in Pearl Harbor
weren't sea-going submarines; they were midgets.
Vice Admiral McMorris. Correct, sir. That was our first acquaint-
ance with the midgets.
[334.] Admiral Hewitt. I think that is all I have. I want to
thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 5:20 p. m., adjourned until 9:45
a.m., 2 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 199
[sss-j PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIKY
Thirteenth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag
Officer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pa/'ific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 9 :45 a. m., 2
June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Beacher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state your name and rank, sir?
Vice Admiral Smith. William W. Smith, Vice Admiral, USN.
Mr. SoNXETT. Admiral, you were Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet
from February, 1941, to December 7, 1941, were you not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you exhibit 34 of this investigation and ask
you whether you can identify it.
Vice Admiral Smith. This is Staff Instructions, Pacific Fleet, issued
July 14, 1941, signed by me.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, that was issued by you on or about July 14,
1941, with Admiral Kimmel's approval, was it not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. And the purpose of the instructions, I take it, was to
summarize the duties of various members of the staff of CincPac ?
Vice Admiral SMrni. That is right.
Mr. Sonnett. Would you examine, Admiral, paragraph 112 on page
] and read paragraph 112 into the record?
[S36] Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
112. The Commander-in-Cliief is available to the entire Staff for consultation,
but all questions for decision or action should pass through the Chief of Staff
whenever such a procedure will not involve an undue delay.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you refer, Admiral, to paragraph 200 on page 3
and similarly read that into the record ?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
200. CHIEF OF STAFF— 01— Personal Aide.
( See Navy Regulations Articles 785 — 786. )
, (a) Carries out policies prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.
(b) Exercises general supervision over and coordinates work by members of the
Staff.
(c) Advises the Commander-in-Chief on all matters concerning the war readi-
ness and battle efficiency of the Fleet.
(d) Supervises the preparation of campaign orders and plans, as well as
strategical and tactical problems of the Fleet.
(e) Signs correspondence as follows:
(1) Routine Matters.
(2) Minor recommendations, or minor forwarding endorsements on samp
to material Bui'eaus regarding repairs and alterations concerning which a
policy has been established.
200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3) Orders to and requests from oflBcers not in Command.
(4) Matters concerning wliich the policy is of long standing.
(5) Letters from the Navy Department noted for compliance, information,
or guidance.
(6) The Commander-in-Chief personally will sign correspondence regarding
questions of particular importance involving criticism, approval, or disap-
proval of previous recommendations ; action on legal papers.
[SST] Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 35 in this investiga-
tion and ask you if you can identify it.
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state what it is, Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Smith. U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Kainbow
Five, otherwise known as WPPac-46.
Mr. SoNNETT. That was distributed to the fleet on or about July 25,
1941, was it not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, it was.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 36, Admiral, and ask you if you
can identify it.
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes. That is a letter from the Chief of Naval
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in which
the Chief of Naval Operations states that he has reviewed the subject
plan of exhibit 35 and accepts it.
Mr. Sonnett. I take it. Admiral, that in accordance with your duties
you supervised, at least generally, the preparation of the war plan,
exhibit 35, and that you were familiar with its provisions.
Vice Admiral Smith. I had very little to do with the preparation
of it, but I did supervise it and read it before it was presented to the
Commander-in-Chief for signature.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, would you examine Part 1 of the plan, at
about page 12, relating to the composition of Task Force Nine, which
was the patrol plane force, was it not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. How many patrol planes were listed as comprising
that task force ?
[338] Vice Admiral Smith. All units of Aircraft Scouting
Force, 107 VP. The rest of them are ships : Two AV, two AVP, four
AVD ; and ten utility planes, VJR.
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to page 19 of the exhibit, Admiral, you will
find stated the basic concept of war in the Pacific as set forth in the
basic plan. Will you read that into the record, sir ?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers,
it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a
manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war,
the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does
not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ
the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken
Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by
diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends
to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British
Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far
East.
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to page 22 of the exhibit, Admiral, which
concerns the initial Japanese deployment estimated in the plan, will
you read sub-paragraph "f " into the record ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 201
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
1334. . . .
f. Itaiding and observation forces widely distributed in tbe Pacific, and sub-
marines in tbe Hawaiian area.
Mr. SoNNETT. What, Admiral, was comprehended by the term
[Z3d] "raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the
Pacific"?
Vice Admiral Smith. We expected raids on Wake and Midway, pos-
sible raids on Wake and Midway, and the Philippines, but everything
tended to give us the opinion that the first strike would be down to-
wards Singapore.
Mr. SoNNETT. You are speaking now of your intelligence, Admiral,
primarily ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. What I am trying to get at at the moment is the
understanding which you had of the estimated Japanese initial deploy-
ment covered by the statement that raiding and observation forces
would be widely distributed in the Pacific and submarines in the
Hawaiian area.
Vice Admiral Smith. We were particularly guarding against their
submarine raids in the area and perhaps we were influenced by the fact
that within fifteen days after Admiral Eammel took over as Com-
mander-in-Chief, we had several alarms in the operating areas to the
south of Oahu. In one case the destroyers had sound contact with
what they believed to be a submarine for a period of more than thirty-
six hours. No bombing attack was made on it. One experienced de-
stroyer officer stated that he personally heard propeller noises. Look-
ing back on it, we doubt very much that it was a submarine ; it was
probably due to different temperatures of water, because one month
later when the moon was the same we had the same experience. But we
were always guarding against a submarine attack. We believed that
that was Japan's first attack to be made upon us and we made every
effort to guard against it.
Mr. SoNNETT. While you are on the subject of submarine contacts,
Admiral, will you state what other contacts you recall prior to Decem-
ber 7, 1941, in the general vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands?
[S4-0] Vice Admiral Smith. There were many of them, but they
were probably large fish. The first one that I recall was in the summer
of 1940 when I had the cruiser BROOKLYN and had the gunnery
school on board and I came into Pearl Harbor every two or three days,
and as I approached the entrance, I received orders to black out, that a
submarine had been detected off the entrance, and I remained outside.
Within a few hours a dispatch was received from the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District, stating the contact was false, that it had
been a fish. And those continued all during 1941 at intervals.
Whether they were real submarines, I don't know. In most cases we
decided they were not.
Mr. SoNNEiT. With particular reference, Admiral, to the months
October, November, and up to December 7, 1941, do you recall any
contacts in that period ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No, I do not.
202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Returning to the war plan, Admiral, will you examine
at page 24 paragraph 2101, which appears to contain an Outline of
Tasks, and read into the record sub-paragraph "h" ?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
h. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area aud
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by
destroying hostile exi)editions and by supporting land and air forces in denying
the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it, then, that Hawaii was one of the territories
of the Associated Powers covered by that paragraph ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you refer to page 25 and read into the record
[SP] paragraph 2201 ?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based
upon Assumption A-2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating
tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption A-1 and divides
the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows :
a. PHASE I — Initial tasks — Japan not in the war.
b. PHASE lA — Initial tasks — Japan in the war.
c. PHASE II, etc., — Succeeding tasks.
Mr. SoNNETT. Paragraph 2202 sets forth, does it not, initial tasks
to be performed by the Pacific Fleet before the Japanese got in the war ?
Will you read that?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
2202. Phase I tasks are as follows :
a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations ; thereafter main-
tain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
b. Maintain Fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.
d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and
a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-day.
f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern
Naval Coastal Frontier on M-day.
g. Protect the communications aud territory of the Associated Powers and
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by
patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking
groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the
equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.
[S^] h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider
bases in the Japanese Mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Depart-
ment.
j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway,
Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
k. Continue training operations as practicable.
1. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii
for training in landing operations.
m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to page 32 of the exhibit and paragraph
3141 to 3143, those paragraphs set forth, do they not, the initial tasks
assigned to the patrol plane force before Japan was in the war?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Would you read those into the record, sir ?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
3141. Task Force Nine will perform the task assigned in the following para-
graphs of this section.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 203
3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the
Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue ad-
ministration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.
3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to Annex I, Admiral, as to Phase I,
namely, when Japan is not in the war, would you read into the record
paragraph 2 ? Annex I, I take it, is the Patrol and Sweeping Plan ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you read into the record paragraph 2 of that
plan?
[34^] Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communi-
cations of the Associated Powers by :
(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Ha-
waiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-
Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa,
(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.
(c) Covering.
(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
(e) Routing shipping.
Mr. SoNNETT. Eeferring to paragraph 3 of the Patrol and Sweep-
ing Plan, it sets forth, does it not, specific tasks of the various task
forces ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, it does.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you read the specific tasks set forth for Task
Force Nine? I think it is on page 1-16.
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and
for conservation of i)ersonnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against
enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.
(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At
discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of
Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities
thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.
(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer
one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South
Pacific.
(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.
[344] (5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep en-
route.
(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval
Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.
(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in
sweeping during initial sweep of Phase lA.
(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Mar-
shall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1).
(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible
with assigned tasks, with other forces, thereat. Be guided by principles of com-
mand relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan O-l.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Admiral, to page 8 of the war plan, does
it appear that the plan was to become effective on W-Day ?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
At the date of Issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized,
and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base.
It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for
active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide
for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are
to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as
204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This
may or may not coincide with W-day.
Mr. SoNNETT. To attempt to summarize, Admiral, for the sake of
the record, does it appear from the plan that it might be put into execu-
tion on a day other than the date hostilities with Japan commenced
or on a day other than M, or mobilization, day?
Vice Admiral Smith. It could have been put into effect on any date
by the Navy Department.
[S4S] Mr. SoNNETT. Do you find any provision in the plan, Ad-
miral, which requires the designation of W-Day to require the ap-
proval of the Navy Department?
Vice Admiral Smith. I would have to read the entire plan to answer
that question. My recollection is that we had it in some form.
Mr. SoNNETT. Apart from that question, Admiral, and referring
specifically to the Phase I initial tasks, namely, those to be performed
when Japan was not in the war — those, you will recall, are set forth at
pages 24 and 25 of the plan — is it correct that the Phase I initial
tasks were entirely defensive in nature?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, they are entirely defensive, and train-
ing, of course, which is very important.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do any of the Phase I initial tasks, when Japan was
not yet in the war^ require, or did they require, a directive from the
Navy Department to be discharged?
Vice Admiral Smith. That is my impression, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. I refer you specifically by way of illustration to
Initial Task 1-m, which is "Guard against surprise attack by Japan."
Was that a task which the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet
was required to carry out, irrespective of any Navy Department
directive ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, that was constantly in his mind.
Mr. SoNNETT. And similarly. Admiral, referring to Initial Task
1-g, to protect the communications and territory of the Associated
Powers in the Pacific, that, too, was a task which the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, had irrespective of the 'Nslwj Department, was it
not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, it was.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you Annex VII, Section VI, to the
[34^] Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and Addendum I there-
to, which was exhibit 23 before the Naval Court of Inquiry, and ask
you whether you recall having seen that.
Vice Admiral Smith. I do not recall the details of this plan, but
I remember it as having been signed by the Commandant, Fourteenth
Naval District, and by General Short. We had it in our office.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you refer to Addendum I, which is annexed to
that document, and will you state. Admiral, what Addendum I is?
Vice Admiral Smith. It is a "joint estimate covering Joint Army
and Navy air action in the event of a sudden hostile action against
Oahu or Fleet units in the Hawaiian area."
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall having seen that at or about the date
it bears ?
Vice Admiral Smith. I can't recall when I first saw it, but I did
see it.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 205
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Admiral, to the summary of the situation
contained in Addendum I, will you read that into the record and then
state whether it was in accord with your views at the time?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain,
and varj'ing.
(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration
of war.
(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on
OAHU might prevent effective ofEensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific
for a long period.
(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas
organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force
which initiates hostile action.
[5^7] (e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange
fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from
our intelligence service.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was that in accord. Admiral, with your views at or
about that date, March of '41 ?
Vice Admiral Smith. I would say that this is an estimate of the
situation in which all possibilities were considered. I would also state
that I know of no one in this area who really believed there would
be a hostile air attack on the Hawaiian Islands, but we guarded against
it. I believe that prior to this date — I know that prior to this date,
in fact the 15th of February, we issued an order, 2CL-41, which was
later revised in the middle of October, that provided for this very
thing, for both air and submarine attack, and also that our ships were
so moored at all moorings in Pearl Harbor — in the first place, the
heavy ships had to be headed out before they were moored, and they
were so moored that it provided in all four areas there was an arc of
fire from every direction from which planes could come from a 360
degree arc. And I remember that we knew at that time the Army
plan was to throw a cordon of light anti-aircraft guns around Pearl
Harbor, but we felt that the guns of the fleet, in case of a surprise
attack, would be much more effective than anything the Army had.
It was for that reason that we moored the ships as we did.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, will you refer to exhibit 8 of the Naval
Court record and state whether or not that is the Pacific Fleet letter
on the security of the fleet at base and in the operating areas which
you just mentioned?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, that is. It is a revision of a similar letter
issued on the 15th of February, 1941.
[34s] Mr. SoNNETT. And that revision was issued on October 14,
1941, was it not, sir?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you read assumption 2 (b) of the Pacific Fleet
confidential letter into the record. Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
2. . . .
(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by :
(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.
(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area.
(3) a combination of these two.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that, I take it, Admiral, it was your view that a
surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility?
206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Smith. Oil, yes, but a remote possibility, I would say.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that was the basis for the fleet letter on security
and of the war plans ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. That possibility, also, Admiral, reflected your knowl-
edge, did it not, of the fact that historically the Japanese had attacked
without declaration of war.
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you, Admiral, refer to exhibit 15 of the Naval
Court record, which is exhibit 24 of this investigation, and state
whether or not you saw that dispatch at or about the date it bears ?
Vice Admiral Smiiti. I don't recall whether I saw it at the time.
I think I did. I am familiar with the dispatch.
Mr. SoNNETT. For the sake of the record, will you just briefly
describe what that dispatch is?
[349] Vice Admiral Smith. It is from the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations to the Commanders-in-Chief, Asiatic, Pacific, and tlie Com-
mandants of Districts 11, 12, 13, and 15, with information to Cinclant
and Spenavo, London, and it states :
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X
This situation couplejd with statements of Japanese Government and movements
their naval and military forcess indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a pos-
sibility X . . . Action adees to inform senior Army ofl5cers their areas X
Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation
or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, will you refer to exhibit 17, Admiral, of the
Naval Court record, which is exhibit 25 of this investgation, and state
whether or not you saw this dispatch at or about the date it bears ?
Vice Admiral Smith. I saw it on the date it was received, the 27th of
November.
Mr. Sonnett. Again, for the sake of the record, will you state what
that dispatch is ?
Vice Admiral Smith. It starts out by saying : "This dispatch is to
be considered a war warning," and then unfortunately it tells us where
the attack is coming from or what will be attacked.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you read that language into the record, Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Smith. "This dispatch is to be considered a war
warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization
of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by
Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equip-
ment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces
indicates an amphibious expedition [S50] against either the
Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL46 X Inform district and Army authorities X
A similar warning is being sent by War Department X Spenavo
inform British."
Mr. Sonnett. That is the so-called war warning of November 27th,
Admiral, is it not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you refer now to exhibit 18 of the Naval Court,
the following exhibit, and state whether or not you saw that dispatch
at or about the date it bears ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 207
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, I remember this very well.
Mr. SoNNETT. Again, will you state what that dispatch is?
Vice Admiral Smith. This dispatch was received by the Army from
the War Department, as well as by the Commander-in-Chief from the
Navy Department, and we were in conference for several days on it
as to how to carry it out. It required us to move to replace our planes
in the outlying islands, Midway and Wake, by Army planes, as I
remember.
It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from
Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier X Planes will be flown ofE at des-
tination and ground personnel landed in boats essential spare parts tools and
ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of Regular Navy supply
vessels X Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents X Navy
must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other
Army supplies X Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with
planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines X Additional parking areas
should be laid promptly if necessary X Can Navy bombs now at outlying posi-
tions be carried by Army bombers which may fly [351] to those positions
for supporting Navy operations X Confer with commanding general and advise
as soon as practicable.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is the date of that dispatch, Admiral?
Vice Admiral Smith. November 26, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. I believe you stated that several days were spent in
conference on that subject ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the conferences were between General Short and
Admiral Kimmel ?
Vice Admiral Smith. And their staffs.
Mr. SoNNETT. And their staffs ?
Vice Admiral Smith. And the Commanding General of the Army
Air Force.
Mr. SoNNETT. As I recall your previous testimony, Admiral, you
indicated that it was in connection with that subject that General
Short and Admiral Kimmel had the closest to a dispute that you ever
saw between them ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state just what that was?
Vice Admiral Smith. During the discussion, we informed the Army
that the planes they placed on Wake would have to remain there for
the duration of a war, if any, because it was impossible to put a ship
in there and take them out and Army planes are not equipped to
land on a carrier, although they can take off from a carrier. Admiral
Kimmel then asked, "What may I expect of Army fighters on Wake?"
and General Martin of the Army Air Force replied, "We do not allow
them to go more than fifteen miles offshore," to which Admiral
Kimmel replied, "Then they are [S52] no damn good to me,"
or words to that effect. General Short stated, not angrily at all, that,
"If I man these islands, I must command them," and Kimmel replied,
"Only over my dead body. The Army should exercise no command
over Navy bases." General Short replied, "Mind you, I do not want
these islands. I think they are better manned by Marines. But if I
must put troops and planes on them, then I must command them."
And that was the extent of the controversy.
208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Actually, Admiral, subsequently Marines were used
instead of Army personnel, were they not, to reenforce the islands?
Vice Admiral Smith. Before Pearl Harbor, Admiral Halsey was
on his way with the ENTERPRISE to land an additional squadron
of Marine planes, but the plan, as I recall it, went further than re-
placing planes; the troops were involved also, because I remember
that the Army had no guns and it was necessary for us to leave our
guns there.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it then, Admiral, that at or about the time
of the receipt of the so-called war warning of November 27th, Gen-
eral Short and Admiral Kimmel were engaged in considerable dis-
cussion about this proposal to reenforce Midway and Wake with
Army personnel ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, they were.
Mr. SoNNETT. What conferences and discussions were held, Ad-
miral, after November 27th concerning the so-called war warning
message ?
Vice Admiral Smith. A conference was held in Admiral Kimmel's
office that afternoon. Admiral Bloch was not present since he was
visiting his wife in the hospital. He was represented by Captain
Earle. The conference was held, to my recollection, about 5 p. m.
I do not recall whether General Short was present at that one, but
I know that the Intelligence [353] Officer was given a copy of
the dispatch to take over and make certain that General Short got it.
I am quite certain a conference was held the next day. In the mean-
time, on the evening of the 27th, the Army was on the march. It
manned the public utilities, reservoirs, and so on, to protect them
against possible sabotage, which apparently was what the Army feared
most in these islands. How many conferences were held later, I do
not recall, but by that time we were conferring at least every other
day. I was jDresent at most of the conferences. But one night I recall
that Admiral Kimmel at 6 o'clock called up General Short at General
Short's home and General Short said he was about to go up to the
north side of the island and Kimmel said, "Stay there ; I am coming
over to see you," which he did. What that conference was about, I
don't know, but I imagine it was on this same subject. I was not
present at that,
Mr. SoNNETT. How was the so-called war warning of November
27th evaluated by Admiral Kimmel, sir?
Vice Admiral Smith. There were several considerations. One was
negotiations had been resumed on the arrival of Kurusu. There was
a report that Admiral Hart's seaplanes had discovered large Japanese
forces moving south. The Intelligence Officer placed the position of
some Japanese forces somewhere supposedly in the Marshalls. The
Combinet Fleet, as I recollect it, was in home waters and the carriers
were supposedly in home waters also. Therefore, we felt, not know-
ing whether the United States would be in the war or not — many of the
directions we received, mostly in personal letters from Admiral Stark,
but which are on file, cautioned us not to take any action that might
foment a war. The people of the United States were diAnded in their
opinions apparently. We believed that their [3S4.] attack
would be on the Dutch and British to the south and that if they did at-
tack us, it would be in the Philippines. We had no assurance from our
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 209
government that the United States would go to war if the Dutch and
British were attacked. We were in constant training, intensive train-
ing, to prepare for war, but there was nothing in that message that led
us to believe that Pearl Harbor was threatened with an air attack.
We did expect a surprise submarine attack.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the November 24th dispatch from
OpNav, that dispatch started, did it not, as follows:
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan vei'y doubtful x This
situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their
naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive move-
ment in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility?
'Upon receipt of that dispatch was it found that the views of yourself
and Admiral Kimmel were in accord with the situation as stated in
the dispatch?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, but the words, "In any direction includ-
ing an attack on the Philippines and Guam" implies that they are not
coming any farther east than the Philippines or Guam.
Mr. SoNNETT. Of course, it was true at that time, Admiral, that it
was your estimate, as set forth in the various war plans, that a surprise
attack on Oahu by air was a possibility?
Vice Admiral Smith. Always, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And this dispatch said, did it not, that a surprise
aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines
or Guam, is a possibility?
Vice Admiral Smith. That's right.
Mr. Sonnett. Now, referring to the so-called war warning of
[SS5] November 27th that started out, did it not, sir, by stating,
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning" ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Had you ever received a dispatch before that time
in such language ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No, and as I have previously testified, if they
put a period after the words "war warning," it would have been a much
more effective message. We had received many letters from the Chief
of Naval Operations — in fact, almost weekly warnings — and Admiral
Kimmel's predecessor, Admiral Richardson, had received similar warn-
ings. Perhaps we received too many of them. But we hadn't received
one saying, "This is to be considered a war warning," not previously.
Mr. Sonnett. The second sentehce of that November 27th dis-
patch. Admiral, was as follows, was it not :
Negotiations with Japan looking towards stabilization of conditions in the
Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next
few days?
Vice Admiral Smith. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. Was that substantially in accord with your own views
at the time of receipt of the warning, namely, that within a few days
Japan would strike somewhere ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, but I have a vague recollection that on
the same date that this was received we had some other word, possibly
in the local paper, that negotiations had been resumed, and, of course,
they were resumed,
Mr. Sonnett. Of course. Admiral, I take it that you do not mean to
state that as between a newspaper account • .
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 15
210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Smith. Oh, no.
Mr. SoNNETT. And an OpNav dispatch, you would lend more cred-
ence [356] to a newspaper account?
Vice Admiral Smith. Oh, no. Something had happened — it must
have been another dispatch — by which we learned that negotiations
had been resumed.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, the receipt of dispatches dur-
ing the first week of December, 1941, advising that the Japanese were
destroying their codes ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that, I take it, confirmed the impression that
war was imminent with Japan ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, and we had directed Guam to destroy its
codes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, Admiral, what specific steps were taken be-
tween November 27th and December 7, 1941, as a result of this war
warning ?
Vice Admiral Smith. "We continued our intensive schedule for
training, having always at least one task force operating and usually
two. We notified all task force commanders of the receipt of this
message and called attention to our order 2CX«-41 of October 15th or
12th. We had our destroyers — the big ships were always protected
by destroyers against submarine attack. We carried out our air
searches in the operating area. I am quite certain we had alerts in
the harbor just for training. We prepared to carry out the war plan
if ordered to do so.
Mr. SoNNETT. Which of those actions. Admiral, was not in effect
before November 27th ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Before November 27th, on any suspicious
sighting or on sound contact with anything that could be an enemy
submarine, a signal was sent out immediately and all forces in the
operating area [357] ceased whatever training they were do-
ing ; the destroyers went at high speed to protect the carriers and bat-
tleships, carrying out the provisions of existing directives. This hap-
pened on many occasions, sometimes when the entire fleet was at sea.
Early in Admiral Kimmel's administration he reported to the Chief
of Naval Operations that he had on one occasion issued orders to
depth charge a suspicious contact in the operating area and had
changed those orders. The Chief of Naval Operations in his letter
stated, "Thank God you didn't," or words to that effect. Before the
27th of November, Admiral Kimmel, with no instructions from the
Navy Department, issued orders that any submarine within a radius
of one mile, I believe it was, possibly three miles, of the entrance to
Pearl Harbor would be depth charged by the offshore patrol. After
November 27th, it is my recollection that he issued orders to depth
charge submarines in any area in which we were operating.
Mr. SoNNETT. As to the air patrol of operating areas, Admiral, that
had been in effect, I take it, prior to November 27th ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Oh, yes, that had been in effect, I should say,
during the entire year of 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that air patrol of the operating areas was con-
tinued after November 27th ?
Vice Admiral Smitp. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 211
Mr, SoNNETT. For the sake of the record, Admiral, will you just
state generally what the operating areas were?
Vice Admiral Smith. The operating areas were to the south of
Oahu for approximately thirty miles and extending east and west.
Some ships were operating around Maui. Those were the general
operating areas. Occasionally we operated to the north of Oahu, and
shortly before Pearl Harbor we had a fleet exercise for the entire fleet
to the north of Oahu, [358] and it was very intensive, dark-
ened at night, as we had been for some time, and, of course, on occa-
sions like those the air searches were to the northward to protect the
fleet.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there any air search from Oahu to the north
after November 27th and prior to the attack?
Vice Admiral Smfth. I cannot recall.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall whether the operation to which you
just testified occurred after November 27th and before the attack?
Vice Admiral Smith. There were no operations to the north be-
tween 27 November and 7 December 1941, although I believe we would
send a destroyer at night to make a trip along the north shore, with
the possibility that the destroyer might find a submarine lurking
there or communicating with the beach. I know that that was done
early in the war and I believe that it was done after November 27th.
Mr. SoNNETT. You testified before the Naval Court that, in sub-
stance, as Chief of Staff you did not maintain a current written estimate
of the situation, but that you did maintain a current mental estimate,
and that the situation was discussed daily and that daily the War Plans
Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer presented their estimates to
Admiral Kimmel. Is that correct?
Vice Admiral Smith. Correct, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Who was the War Plans Officer ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Captain, now Vice Admiral, C. H. McMorris.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the Fleet Intelligence Officer?
Vice Admiral Smith. Was Lieutenant Commander, now Captain,
Layton.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that practice of furnishing a daily estimate was
followed from November 27th to December 7th ?
[359] Vice Admiral Smith. Followed long before that.
Mr. SoNNETT. And also during that period?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Before the Naval Court, Admiral, you stated in
answer to a question as to the adequacy of the state of readiness exist-
ing on December 7th, in substance, as follows : That in your opinion
the state of readiness was adequate to meet the emergency envisaged
in the warning messages and then you said : "You must remember that
what we were thinking about in the Pacific was not the defense of
Pearl Harbor. We were thinking about the fleet and the readiness
of the fleet. I believe that the state of readiness is indicated by the
fact that how quickly the gun crews responded to the fire AVhich was
absolutely unexpected. We exercised as much security as we could
in port. We realized that the Army defenses were not adequate, that
ships were stationed in sectors and every sector was always occupied
for anti-aircraft fire, but we also had to get that fleet in readiness to
go back to sea. It happened at a time when two task forces were in
212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
port. Usually only one was in port. Sometimes three were at sea,
depending upon the exercises that were projected by the Commander-
in-Chief. The readiness of the ships — they were ready for anything,
but they were thinking mostly of how soon they could get out and how
to get out and go into battle. They were not thinking about the de-
fense of Pearl Harbor."
Is that a correct statement of your views during the period after
November 27, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, it is.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it, then, that the primary emphasis. Admiral,
during that so-called critical period after November 27th was on
preparation for offensive action by the fleet ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, to get ready, yes.
[360] Mr. SoNNETT. And that your thinking was primarily on
that score?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoxNETT. Admiral, among the intelligence which you received
prior to the attack, do you recall any information received from inter-
cepted telephone conversations of the Japanese, or from intercepted
cable messages from the Japanese ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No. Those cable messages were brought to
me two days after the attack on Pearl Harbor. We, so far as I know,
had intercepted no important messages concerning enemy movements.
Mr. SoNNETT. Either telephonically or by cable?
Vice Admiral Smith. No.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, would you state for the record your esti-
mate of the situation and of possible enemy courses of action during
the period November 27th to December 7, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Smith. I believe I have stated before we thought
that the enemy would take his first action to the south against the
British and Dutch, possibly the Philippines. Early in 1941 I recall
an officer messenger coming through from Admiral Hart's flagship
in which he gave his estimate of the possibility that the Japanese
would go south and would bypass the Philippines and not attack them
at all ; would get Hong Kong and places to the south before that. I
don't say that we agreed with that, but it was my estimate, and I be-
lieve the estimate of the staff, that their activities would be confined to
the Far East to take everything they needed there before any action
was taken to the eastward; and always, because of their previous
history, the possibility of a very strong submarine attack to disable
our heavy ships.
Mr. SoNNETT. That is, in the Pearl Harbor area?
[S61] Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it also. Admiral, that it was your estimate after
November 27, 1941, that an air attack at Pearl Harbor was a possi-
bility?
Vice Admiral Smith. A possibility, but certainly not a probability.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 8 of this investigation,
which consists of photostatic copies of three dispatches, and ask
whether you recall having seen those.
Vice Admiral Smith. I don't recall ever having seen this dispatch,
but this intelligence is of the nature given to the Commander-in-Chief
by our Intelligence Officer, who worked very closely with the In-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 213
telligence Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District, and I recall this
particularly, that "our best indications are that all known First and
Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area."
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 21, Admiral, and ask you if you
can identify it.
Vice Admiral Smith. I don't recall ever having seen this.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, having received at or about
that date, which, I believe, is November 27th, information to the effect
substantially that the Japanese had organized their carriers into a
separate force, that they were estimated to have five carrier divisions,
consisting of a total of ten carriers?
Vice Admiral Smith. I do not recall that. We knew how many they
had, but I don't recall any special organization they had formed.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is your recollection as to the number of car-
riers that the Japanese had?
Vice Admiral Smith. Eleven, including the small ones.
Mr. SoNNETT. And they were organized into divisions, Admiral?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, as I recall it.
[362] Mr. SoNNETT. How many carriers to a division?
Vice Admiral Smith. I think two.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you. Admiral exhibit 22, photostatic copies
of communication intelligence summaries, and call your attention par-
ticularly to those during the period November 27th to December 6,
1941, and ask, first, if you can identify the initials appearing in the
lower right-hand corner of those summaries.
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, Admiral H. E. Kimmel.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you examine those, Admiral, and state whether
or not you received them during the period November 27th to De-
cember 6, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Smith. I don't remember just when this was received,
but I assume it was received on or after 27 November. I would say
that the Intelligence Officer held his stuff very, very close and, as I
have stated, I was usually present in his daily meeting with the Com-
mander-in-Chief, but there was so much administrative work going on
that frequently I was called from the office for some other purpose.
However, I was familiar with these estimates, traffic analyses.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was your estimate. Admiral, from November
27th to December 6, 1941, as to the location of the Japanese carriers?
Vice Admiral Smith, About as stated here, some in the Marshalls
and the remainder in home areas. As this states, "An air unit in the
Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KOR YU and the SHOKAKU.
Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of further
movement of any combined air force to Hainan."
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, would you examine the summaries after
November 27th and up to December 6, 1941, and point out the infor-
mation which was the basis for your belief that the carriers remained
in those [363] locations?
Vice Admiral Smith. Now, I see nothing very alarming in these
dispatches up to Pearl Harbor. On one day the traffic will be very
light, radio traffic, and on the next day it is very heavy right up to the
6th of December. The fact that you don't hear from the Second Fleet,
he doesn't originate any message, doesn't necessarily mean that he
is on the way to Pearl Harbor. Our own forces while at sea exercising
214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
maintained radio silence. We had a very large force, almost half of
the Pacific Fleet, in May, 1941, proceed to the Atlantic and no traffic
was heard from them for a period of some six weeks. So the absence
of radio traffic from the forces at sea doesn't indicate anything to me.
Mr. SoNNETT. Does it indicate that they are at sea. Admiral?
Vice Admiral Smith. It indicates the probability that they are at
sea, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And it is the fact that after December 1, 1941, there
was no information from the Japanese carriers' radio traffic ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No, except after saying there js no informa-
tion, they usually wind up with, "They are believed to be in home
waters."
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there any such statement in the summaries,
Admiral?
Vice Admiral Smith. On the 27th, "Carriers are still located in
home waters. No information of further movement of any combined
air force units to Hainan." The 29th, "The arrival of Air Squadron
Seven in the Takao area is confirmed. The presence of Cruiser Divi-
sion Four is not confirmed nor denied. The dispatches indicate today
that the following units are under the immediate command of the
Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet," That includes several sub-
marine divisions and destroyer squadrons and [364] two car-
riers, Cardiv 3. On the 1st of December, "Carriers no change."
Mr. SoNNETT. On the 1st it was noted that there was a change in
Japanese radio calls. Admiral, was it not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes. I didn't know about that before. In
fact, that impresses me more than anything I have read here, and it
is followed by great confusion because they cannot locate anybody.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you note their statement, Admiral — I think it
is on the 2nd — concerning the blank of information as to carriers and
tell us what your evaluation of that was?
Vice Admiral Smith. On the 2nd:
COMBINED AIR FORCE— This force continues to be associated closely with
Second, Third, and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force
have undoubtedly left the Takao area.
Mr. Sonnett. Just after that, Admiral, the next paragraph.
Vice Admiral Smith (reading) :
Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identi-
fication has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over
200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of
December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier
traffic is at a low ebb.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall having seen that. Admiral, at the time ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No, I do not. It is too long ago. I do not
recall.
Mr. Sonnett. And on the ord, if you will just note the reference
to carriers.
Vice Adjniral Smith. I don't see anything on the 3rd of Decem-
ber
Mr. Sonnett. On the last line, Admiral.
[S6'5] Vice Admiral Smith. "No information on submarines
or carriers." Then on the 4th
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall having noted the lack of information
on the 3rd as to carriers ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 215
Vice Admiral Smith. I don't recall it. On the 4th it gives the
information that the Second Fleet, which includes the carriers, was
in the vicinity of Takao.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was that. Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Smith. On the 4th, speaking of the Combined Fleet :
The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the Com-
mander-in-Chief Second Fleet and the Commander-in-Chief Third Fleet. . . .
These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that
the Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the
aipparently conflicting evidence is destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast, which
CinC Second Fleet is still copying. CinC Combined Fleet sent one message to an
unidentified unit for information to the Third Base Force, Palao, and CinC
Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet as information addressees.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, do you recall whether the lack of informa-
tion as to Japanese carriers which is set forth in the communication
intelligence summaries after December 1, 1941, was discussed between
you and Admiral Kimmel?
Vice Admiral Smith. No. My recollection is that he questioned
the Intelligence Officer on it, in fact, every day, but I don't know
that we discussed that or what it might possibly mean. It is more
likely that he might have done it with the War Plans Officer. He fre-
quently sent for the War Plans Officers while I was doing something
else. He may have discussed it with them.
[366] Mr. SoNNETT. In that connection, Admiral, I show you
exhibit 23, which is a December 1, 1941, memorandum from the Fleet
Intelligence Officer to the Admiral on the location of the Japanese
fleet, and ask whether you recall having seen that.
Vice Admiral Smith. I recollect that this report was called for by
the Commander-in-Chief. I probably saw it at the time. In fact, it
was submitted frequently.
Mr. SoNNETT. That, I take it, was a special report by the Fleet
Intelligence Officer at the Commander-in-Chief's request ?
Vice Admiral Smith. To the Commander-in-Chief- That was
not distributed to the staff. It may have gone through the War
Plans Section.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, do you recall whether or not you saw that
estimate at the tme, that is, about December 1 or 2, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No. It looks very familiar to me, but my
recollection is that I saw more than one of those, and this particular
one I don't recall. Undoubtedly I saw it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall. Admiral, that at that time it was
noted by the Commander-in-Chief that this estimate did not account
for the whereabouts of Japanese Carrier Divisions One and Two ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No.
Mr. Sonnett. You recall no conversation with Admiral Kimmel
on that point ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No.
Mr. Sonnett. And you did not, I take it, participate in any meet-
ings between Admiral Kimmel and Layton at which that point was
discussed ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No, I don't remember.
Mr. Sonnett. What discussion, Admiral, if any, during the period
November 27 to December 6, 1941, do you recall with Admfral Kimmel
concerning [367] aircraft reconnaissance ?
216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Smith. He had frequent conversations with Admiral
Bellinger, who is much more capable of answering that question than
I am. Just on which days those conferences were held, I don't know,
but they frequently discussed the practicability of more extensive use
of patrol planes, and it is my recollection that Bellinger outlined his
limitations to Admiral Kimmel on several occasions, that he was lim-
ited by the number of engines he had. He was trying to get leak-
proof tanks installed. It was a question of whether he should put it
all into training or wear out his planes, of which he had not too many.
Mr. SoxNETT. Do you recall any such discussion, Admiral, after
November 27, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No, I could not. I could not be certain about
that.
' Mr. SoNNETT. I show you a route sheet and correspondence to
which are annexed aircraft schedules, together with a photostatic copy
of an outgoing dispatch from CincPac to ComPatWing Two, dated
22 November 1911, and ask whether you recall those.
Vice Admiral Smith. My recollection is that the Fleet Aviator
discussed this with Kimmel. He would never prepare a dispatch of
this kind without bringing it to Admiral Kimmel s attention. And
I undoubtedly released the dispatch, but I wouldn't have done so had
Kimmel not known what was going on.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, those schedules. Admiral, set forth the utiliza-
tion of the patrol planes of the fleet from November 17, 1941, up to
and including December 31, 1911, do they not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
[368] Mr. SoNNETT. And the schedules as submitted were ap-
proved on November 22, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Sjiith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark a photostatic copy of the route sheet
and schedules together with a photostatic copy of the dispatch ap-
proving them, Admiral, as an exhibit ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And for the sake of the record, Admiral, the docu-
ment I show you is a photostatic copy of the original document you
have before you, is it not ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
(The documents referred to T\-ere received and marked "Exhibit
37.")
IVIr. SoNNETT. Admiral, these schedules do not provide for any
reconnaissance from Oahu, do they ?
Vice Admiral Smith. It is not so stated here and it probably came
under "training" because it is certain that the searches were conducted
daily in the operating area. It would appear that no particular
squadron was assigned that duty and that was probably part of their
training.
Mr. SoNXETT. These schedules. Admiral, were approved before re-
ceipt of the November 24th and the November 27th, or war warning,
dispatches, were they not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel
after November 27th concerning the necessity or desirability for
revision of these schedules ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 217
Vice Admiral Sjhith. I do not recall. So many things happened
that I cannot remember that. I think it is more likely that Admiral
Bellinger [369] or Rear Admiral A. C. Davis, the Fleet Avia-
tor, would be able to answer that question.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall any discussion during the period No-
vember 27th to December 6th of any proposed Army reconnaissance
over the Mandated Islands ?
Vice Admiral S^iith. Two planes had long been directed by the
Chief of Naval Operations to make a flight from Hawaii over the
Mandated Islands, to land, I believe, in New Caledonia, then to pro-
ceed to Australia and to Manila. The purpose of this flight was
photographic reconnaissance and the planes were ordered by the Chief
of Naval Operations not to circle the Mandated Islands but to proceed
directly over them, then furnish the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic,
and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, with copies of the photogi'aphs.
One of the planes had arrived in Pearl Harbor, but, as I recall the
conversation between Admiral Bellinger and the Commander-in-Chief,
they had failed to bring their camera with them or some item of very
important equipment. To the best of my knowledge, the second plane
never arrived and the flight was never made before Pearl Harbor.
Mr. SoNNETT. These were Army planes. Admiral, were they not?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, they were Army planes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And when you said that the reconnaissance had been
directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, did you mean the Chief of
Staff of the Army ?
Vice Admiral Smith. It probably was the Chief of Staff. I dare
say that it resulted from a conference because their orders were to
deliver the photographs to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Kimmel,
the copies ; so I imagine the Navy must have been in it.
[370] Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 28 of this investigation.
Admiral, and ask you whether you recall having seen that at or about
November 28, 1941.
Vice Admiral Smith. I don't recall having seen this paper, and I
doubt if I did see it. However, I knew about the flight as projected.
I was of the opinion — I still am of the opinion — ^that the flight was
ordered long before November 28th, but the planes weren't ready.
Mr, SoNNETT. Admiral, you testified before the Naval Court, in
substance, that you thought that the intent of the war warning
message of the 27th was to get you on your toes out here and to get you
ready to execute the war plan. Is that correct ?
Vice Admiral Smith. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. And you recall that the November 27th message di-
rected that an appropriate defensive development preparatory to
carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 be executed? Do you
recall that provision of the exhibit?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Now, will you state what discussion was had with
Admiral Kimmel concerning the steps to be taken to constitute an
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
initial tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet by the war plans ?
Vice Admiral Smith. I cannot remember in detail, but I do recall
conferences over the charts. Admiral Kimmel taking the type com-
manders personally to the War Plans Office and going over all these
218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
islands of the Marshalls and Carolines ; discussions of what might be
found there; whether they would be soft or difficult; that that had
been going on for months.
[371] Mr. SoNNETT. Keferring to exhibit 35, the Pacific Fleet
War Plan, you will recall, Admiral, that the initial tasks assigned to
the Pacific Fleet were in Phase I, namely, Japan not in the war,
and Phase la, Japan in the war; that under Phase I, one of the tasks
was: "g. To protect the communications and territory of the Asso-
ciated Powers and to prevent the extension of enemy military power
into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and
patrol planes and by the action of striking groups as necessary" ; also,
"m. To guard against surprice attack by Japan."
What, if any, consideration was given to the steps to be taken to
carry out those initial tasks which were to be taken before Japan
got into the war ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Well, the .ships had already been designated
for each task long before 27 November. All that was needed was
the word to carry out the plan.
Mr. SoNNETT. As I recall your earlier testimony. Admiral, the
Phase I initial tasks required no Navy Department direction to be
carried out?
Vice Admiral Smith. Well, certain parts of it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Specifically, the portions I just called to your atten-
tion, namely, to protect the communications and territory of the Asso-
ciated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power
into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and
patrol planes, and also to guard against surprise attack. Was there
any consideration given as to the means or methods to be employed
to carry out the directive ?
Vice Admiral Smith. Certain of those items were already being
done without the plan being in effect. For example, we had sub-
marines stationed off Midway and Wake, fighting planes out of Wake,
and patrol [37^] planes operating from Midway. Whenever
a task force moved with a carrier, they always had their planes in
the air on a search. We always, over our ships, launched our planes
for protection against submarines. We had been doing that a long
time.
Mr. SoNNETT. I note that one of the Phase I initial tasks to be
taken when Japan was not in the war, as set forth in the war plan,
was "h," namely, to establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake
and Midway.
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. That was, o;f course, done. Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Smith. That was done.
Mr. SoNNETT. Prior to the attack?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. What I would like to get at is what was done in
connection with the other similar Phase I tasks in connection with
the patrolling by light forces and patrol planes and guarding against
attack by Japan.
Vice Admiral Smith. I would say that the only thing that wasn't
done was the guarding with patrol planes in the direction of Japan
or to the northward. I have forgotten just where in the phase it comes,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 219
but remember we had to send cruisers and submarines to the north
and southeast Pacific, Samoa. That was not considered a necessary
preliminary to the mobilization.
. IVIr. SoNNETT. Would the establishment of aircraft patrol from
Oahu have been an appropriate defensive deployment to carry out
the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war plans?
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, it would.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you. Admiral, exhibits 69 A and 69B of the
Naval Court of Inquiry and ask you whether you can identify those.
[S73] Vice Admiral Smith. Yes, I do.
Mr, SoNNETT. Will you state what they are. Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Smith. This is a memorandum for the Commander-
in-Chief, prepared by the War Plans Officer, Captain McMorris, dated
30 November 1941. It is a recommendation to the Commander-in-
Chief on steps to be taken in case of an American-Japanese war within
twenty-four hours of the date of the memorandum. This is followed
by a second memorandum of the same nature, dated noon, December
5, 1941, recommending steps to be taken in case of an American-Japa-
nese war within the next forty-eight hours.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you see those at or about the dates they bear,
Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Smith. I believe so.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you find in either of those memoranda any pro-
vision made to carry out the initial tasks laid down in the war plans
concerning aircraft patrol ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No, I do not.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you participate in any discussion with Admiral
Kimmel or with Captain McMorris concerning the adequacy of the
steps recommended by him in those memoranda ?
Vice Admiral Smith. I don't recollect having done so.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel
during this period November 27th to December 7, 1941, of the lack of
information reflected in the intelligence summaries as to Japanese
carriers ?
Vice Admiral Smith. No. There were frequent discussions, but
lack of sufficient information from the Navy Department. We be-
lieved at that time that our intelligence was adequate. We received
very little from Naval Intelligence. It is possible that the Intelli-
gence Officer of the [374] Fourteenth Naval District and the
Intelligence Officer of the Commander-in-Chief received more infor-
mation than I know of. Occasionally a paper from the State Depart-
ment would pass over my desk on conditions in Japan, but I never
saw anything alarming in one of those papers. I believe they came
out monthly. There may, of course, have been other reports of the
State Department of a more secret nature that weren't issued to us at
all. If there were, they weren't shown to me. I do not recall any
discussion of the adequacy or inadequacy of our own intelligence
staff. The same two officers are continuing the same jobs; so they are
apparently considered satisfactory now.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, was it the fact that, so far as your intelli-
gence was concerned relating to the movements of Japanese naval
vessels, your reliance was on the intelligence submitted by the Fleet
Intelligence Officer primarily ?
220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Smith. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Which was most current?
Vice Admiral Smith. And based upon the analysis of radio traffic.
At that time, to the best of my knowledge, our people were unable to
decipher Japanese naval codes. They did decipher commercial codes,
the movements of commercial ships.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Admiral, to your previous testunony that
your estimate was that a surprise attack by the Japanese on the fleet
in the harbor by air was possible but not probable, will you state the
basis for that estimate ?
Vice Admiral Smith. There was a great deal of doubt in our minds
that Japan would go to war with us unless Germany did so also. Our
information from all sources, including the Navy Department, and
our [37S] intelligence did not indicate that the Japanese fleet
had any intentions or was on the way to attack Pearl Harbor. The
Japanese fleet, as located, indicated no move in this direction, and,
I believe, most important of all, we doubted whether the Japanese
would dare send a large force as far to the eastward as Hawaii. The
possibility that they might be located even by a neutral ship existed.
They might have been located several times before their arrival there,
in which case they would have been at a great disadvantage. I believe
that all of these things existed in the back of our minds and it was
for this reason that we did not fear an air attack.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation then, at 12:05 p. m., recessed until 1:30 p. m,,
at which time is reconvened.)
( Present : The same parties. )
[376] Two witnesses entered, each read the precept, and each
was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state your name and rank, Commander ?
Commander Burr. Harold S. Burr, Commander, USNE.
Mr. SoNNETT. Lieutenant?
Lieutenant Woodrum. Donald Woodrum, Lieutenant, USNR.
Mr. SoNNETT. Commander, what is your present assignment ?
Commander Burr. I am Acting District Intelligence Officer, Four-
teenth Naval District.
Mr. SoNNETT. And yours, Lieutenant?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I am attached to the District Intelligence
Office, Fourteenth Naval District.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was your assignment in 1941, Commander ?
Commander Burr. I was Naval Liaison Officer for the Commandant
at the headquarters of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, and on the complement of the District Intelligence Office.
Admiral Hewitt. Will you give us an outline of what your duties
were as Liaison Officer, generally ?
Commander Burr. Sir, it was a new job and I was sort of a handy-
man, trying to help the Army with its problems involving the Navy,
seeing that officers in the Army were placed in touch with appropriate
officers in the District in order to accomplish missions of mutual re-
sponsibility or interest. It was a very broad field.
Admiral Hewitt. I suppose also you advised them about naval af-
fairs insofar as you could ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 221
Commander Bukr. Yes, sir.
[377] Mr, SoNNETT. Did you know in 1941 then Lieutenant
Commander Layton ?
Commander Burr. I did.
Mr. SoNiNTETT. And what was his assignment at that time?
Commander Burr. I understood it to be Fleet Intelligence Officer.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall on or about November 27, 1941, receiv-
ing from Lieutenant Commander Layton a message for delivery to
General Short?
Commander Burr. I think it was received directly from Lieutenant
Commander Layton, but I am not sure. It was at CincPac and he as
well as others were there at the time. The Chief of Staff, Fourteenth
Naval District, was there, and I couldn't swear it was Commander
Layton, although I am sure he is acquainted with the message.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 17 of the Naval Court of Inquiry
and ask whether the message -which you received at that time was a
copy of this or substantially a copy of this message.
Commander Burr. I would say it appears to be substantially the
same.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state what you did with that message at
that time. Commander ?
Comn^ander Burr. I was instructed to delivery that message to Gen-
eral Short, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. It
was after hours by the time I received it, but I drove directly to Fort
Shafter and attempted to locate General Short. No one seemed to
know where he was at the time. I knew that the message was urgent ;
so I looked for the Chief of Staff, who was next senior, and I couldn't
find him. The Senior Officer Present was Colonel Donnegan, then
Lieutenant Colonel William Donnegan, head of G-3, which, I be-
lieve, is the next senior officer. So I showed the [3781 message
to him and explained my eagerness to reach General Short, and, as
nearly as I can recollect, he stated that he would see to it that General
Short saw it and that since he was apparently the action officer, he
would proceed to act on the message at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you leave the message with him ?
Commander Burr. Reluctantly.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you subsequently ascertain whether the message
had been delivered to General Short ?
Commander Burr. Yes, sir, I checked with Colonel Donnegan and
was informed that it had been delivered to General Short.
Mr. SoNNETT. When were you told by Colonel Donnegan that it had
been delivered to General Short ?
Commander Burr. On or about the 28th, the following day.
Mr. SoNNETT. I think, Admiral, that is all on that particular point.
Admiral Hewit't. I think that is all.
Mr. SoNNETT. Lieutenant, during 1941 were you familiar with the
telephone taps which were on the line of the Japanese Consulate in
Honolulu ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. After about October I was made familiar
with them.
Mr. SoxxETT. Do you have in the files of the District Intelligence
Office transcripts of the telephone conversations so intercepted ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I do. ' '
222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. In addition to taps on the line of the Japanese Consul,
were there telephone taps on the line of the Japanese Vice Consul as
well?
Lieutenant Woodrum. There was a tap on the private line of the
[S79] Japanese Vice Consul in the Consulate itself.
Mr. SoNNTiTT. In addition to the telephone taps by ONI* on the busi-
ness phones of the Japanese Consul and Vice Consul, did you for a time
have taps on their home phones ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. Yes, we did. We had a tap on the home
phone of the Consul General until about September and on the Vice
Consul until we shut down,
Mr. SoNNETT. When did you discontinue tapping the telephone
wires in question, Lieutenant?
Lieutenant Woodrum. December 2, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you state in general the nature and type of in-
formation which was acquired from the telephone taps you have
described ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. There was very little of military significance.
There was a great deal of information concerning the routine activi-
ties of the Consul and some informationconcerning the activities of
the local Japanese population.
Mr. SoNNETT. Could you prepare and submit for this investigation.
Lieutenant, copies of the transcripts of telephone conversatio'as inter-
cepted from October to December 2, 1941 ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I can.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark those as exhibits when received. Ad-
miral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received, to be marked "Exhibit
38.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state. Lieutenant, the reasons for the discon-
tinuance of the telephone taps by ONI on or about December 2, 1941 ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I have no personal knowledge of the reasons
[3801 for removing the taps on December 2nd, but this is my gen-
eral understanding of the reason that action was taken at that time :
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, with our cognizance, had placed
a tap on the private phone of one Kenzi Kimura, the general manager
of the NYK office in Honolulu. This occurred some time in Novem-
ber, 1941. Late in November, 1941, a member of the District Intelli-
gence Office learned from a contact at the telephone company that
workmen had uncovered the FBI tap on Mr. Kimura. The member
of the District Intelligence Office assumed that FBI had made this tap
without the cognizance of the telephone company inasmuch as the
NYK office was on the ground floor of the same building in which the
FBI office was located and the tap was in the basement of that building.
During a subsequent visit of an FBI agent, the representative of the
DIO informed him of this fact in a spirit of cooperation, with the
thought of warning him that his taps had been uncovered and security
violated. I was present at this meeting when the FBI agent was so
informed. It is my understanding that a representative of the FBI
thereafter approached the telephone company and demanded to Iniow
why their representatives were revealing FBI secrets to the Office of
Naval Intelligence. The result of this approach by the FBI was to
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 223
give one or more employees of the telephone company a realization
that this sort of activity was going on, whereas they previously, to our
knowledge, hadn't known of it.
When Captain Mayfield learned of the FBI action, he ordered all
taps to be removed. It was my understanding that the reason for
this was his concern at the violation of security caused by this incident
and his concern that some incident of possible international import
might result from such revelations. The telephone tapping work done
by ONI was kept extremely secret. Only a handful of persons in the
District [381] Intelligence Office, who were directly concerned
with the information gained thereby, were even aware that such work
was being done. Many persons attached to the office weren't aware
that such work was being done and great care was taken to prevent
their obtaining that knowledge. I was told that even the Com-
mandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was not aware of this ac-
tivity in order that he might be spared any possible embarrassment
arising from his knowledge thereof.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know whether after December 2, 1941, the
FBI tapped any of the Japanese telephone wires ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I don't know.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did they have access to the trans-Pacific telephone
conversations ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I have seen transcripts of taps they made on
conversations between Honolulu and Japan during the months of
November and December, 1941.
Mr. SoNNiETT. Among those conversations was the so-called Mori
conversation, was there not?
Lieutenant Woodrum. Yes, there was.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state when the Navy first received a tran-
script of that conversation?
Lieutenant Woodruhi. It is my understanding that this conversa-
tion took place on the evening of December 5, 1941, and that Captain
Mayfield was notified by FBI, either immediately or the following day,
that a suspicious conversation had taken place and that a translation
and transcription was being made by the FBI translator at that time.
It is my further understanding that a written translation of the con-
versation was received at the District Intelligence Office some time
[382] on December 6, 1941. At that time it was studied by Com-
mander Denzel Carr, who thereupon desired to hear the original re-
cording of the conversation. Arrangements were made with the FBI
to have him do this, but as it was late in the evening already by the
time this was done, it was agreed that he would go down the following
day and listen to the recording. At a time subsequent to the Japanese
attack, within a day or so. Commander Carr did go down and listen
to the recording. At that time he stated to me that it was his opinion
that Dr. Mori was not attempting to send information from the
Islands, but on the contrary was greatly surprised and mystified by
the whole tenor of the conversation. It was further Commander
Carr's opinion that Dr. Mori hedged and hesitated to give anything
in the way of specific military information. A study of the tran-
script reveals that strictly military subjects were discussed only briefly
and that Dr. Mori gave little or no specific military information.
224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. You have supplied us with a copy of the Mori con-
versation, have you not?
Lieutenant Woodrum. We have.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that, Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 39.")
Lieutenant Woodrum. The man who made this telephone call was
subsequently interned for accepting the telephone call.
Mr. SoNNETT. Lieutenant, was there any telephone tap by ONI or
FBI which came to the attention of Naval Intelligence prior to Decem-
ber 7, 1941, wherein military information was furnished by persons
here to any outside source?
[38S] Lieutenant Woodrum. You mean furnished here to the
Consulate ?
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, any way. Furnished to any Japanese repre-
sentative. Let's put it that way.
Lieutenant Woodrum. There are only two instances to my knowl-
edge in which this occurred. In one instance, in 1940 — I would have
to look up the right date — Japanese Vice Consul Okuda telephoned
a Buddhist priest at Lahaina on the Island of Maui by the name of
Vriji Hirayama and requested Hirayama to keep the Consulate in-
formed of any United States fleet movements that came to his atten-
tion. In another instance, in 1941, a woman very much agitated called
the Consulate and blurted out that the USS NEW ORLEANS had
just left the harbor. The person answering at the Consulate hung up
without reply, and it was the evaluation of the listeners that the
woman was under some sort of emotional stress and that the people
in the Consulate suspected some sort of a trick.
Mr. SoNNETT. Prior to December 7, 1941, certain cable messages sent
by the Japanese Consul over commercial cable lines were intercepted
and received by the Office of Naval Intelligence, were they not ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. They were.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you have copies of those messages available ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I can't state exactly which messages were
made available. We have now copies of messages sent by the Con-
sulate between December 1st and December 6th.
I might explain the background of that. At various times efforts
had been made to secure copies of the coded messages sent by the Con-
sulate to Japan and to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. These
efforts were unsuccessful. There are three cable companies in Ho^io-
lulu and it was known [384] that the Consulate alternated be-
tween each of the three, using each one for a period of one month.
It is my understanding that Admiral Bloch requested David Sarnoff,
who was visiting in the Islands at that time, to make available to the
naval service copies of messages handled by RCA Radio. Sarnoff
agreed and ordered the local office to do this. On December 1st, fol-
lowing their usual custom, the Consulate began using the facilities of
RCA. On the morning of 5 December the District Intelligence Office
received the first copies of these cables, and it is my understanding
that these were immediately sent out to Commander Rochefort's unit.
It is also my understanding that these were not decoded until after
the Japanese attack and that even then it was necessary to use a Japa-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 225
nese code book that had been picked up in the effects of the Consulate
after it was raided on December 7th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you have the messages which were so delivered to
the District Intelligence Office on December 5, 1941 ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. We have copies of messages sent by the Con-
sulate between December 1st and December 6th, decoded copies.
Mr. SoNNETT. Decoded copies ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. Decoded copies.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you supply us with a decoded copy of each
message sent by the Consul between December 1st and December 6th
which was in the possession of Naval Intelligence prior to the attack
on December 7th ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I can't say from my own knowledge which
was in the possession of Naval Intelligence prior to the attack.
Mr. SoNNETT. No record was kept, I take it, of the messages turned
over on December 5th ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I know of no record.
[S85] Mr. SoNNETT. Can you supply us, then, with copies of
each of the messages that you have decoded, sent by the Japanese
Consul between December 1st and December 6, 1941 ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I can, and we have supplied you with some
of those.
Mr. SoNNETT. And you will supply us with a complete set of them ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark those, Admiral, as an exhibit when
they are received ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received, to be marked "Exhibit
40.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Aside from information received through telephone
taps and from the interception of Japanese cable messages, was there
any other information received by the Office of Naval Intelligence
indicating Japanese interest in movements of United States ships or
preparations to meet attack in Pearl Harbor, or any military subject?
Lieutenant Woodrum. Over a period of years there was considerable
information gathered by the Naval Intelligence service concerning
Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor and the Island of Oahu. There
are voluminous reports available concerning the visits of Japanese
tankers, Japanese training ships, Japanese training squadrons to the
Island of Oahu and to other islands in the Hawaiian group. It was
well known that officers attached to these groups made "sightseeing
trips" of the islands, including such vantage spots as Aiea Heights.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did any of the information in the possession
of [386] Naval Intelligence prior to December 7, 1941, indi-
cate that the Japanese had a specific interest in the location or move-
ments of United States ships in Pearl Harbor ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. The only instance I know of is the one here-
tofore cited of the conversation with the Buddhist priest on Maui.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there any information showing specificall}^ that
the Japanese were interested in the anti-aircraft defenses in or around
Pearl Harbor?
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 16
226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Lieutenant Woodrum. I know of none.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there any information indicating specifically
that the Japanese were interested in the question of anti-torpedo nets
in Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th ?
Lieutenant Woodrum. I know of none prior to December 7, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT, I have nothing further, Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. I have nothing else.
(The witnesses were excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 2 : 27 p. m., adjourned until 4 p. m.,
4 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 227
[-W] PKOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIRY
Fourteenth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Of-
ficer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 4 p. m., Mon-
day, 4 June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr, SoNNETT. State your name and rank, sir.
Brig. General Powell. Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA.
Mr. SoNNETT. General, what was your assignment in November and
December, 1941?
Brig. General Powell. Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department.
Mr. SoNNETT. And you were stationed where ?
Brig. General Po^vell. Fort Shafter.
Mr. Sonnett. Did the Army operate a radio intercept unit at Fort
Shafter?
Brig. General Powell. Yes, it did.
Mr. Sonnett. What, if any, decryption of intercepted Japanese
messages was done at Fort Shafter, General ?
Brig. General Powell. None whatsoever.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you documents 14, 15, and 18 of exhibit 13,
which are dispatches or messages between Tokyo and Honolulu relat-
ing to preparations for defense of Pearl Harbor and to the Japanese
interest in [388] those preparations, and ask you whether you
recall having seen those messages or any of them before.
Brig. General Powell. I never have seen them.
Mr. Sonnett. I take it, General, that the intercepted messages of
the Japanese were sent from Fort Shafter to Washington for de-
cryption ?
Brig. General Powell. That is right.
Mr. Sonnett. And what methods were used to send the material
to Washington ?
Brig. General Powell. Messages with a certain indicator, which I
don't recall, were sent by radio, and all others were sent by air mail.
Mr. Sonnett. I think that is all, Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 4: 10 p. m., adjourned until 9: 30
a. m., 5 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 229
3S9\ PROCEEDmGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIRY
Fifteenth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Of-
ficer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 9 : 30 a. m.,
Tuesday, 5 June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETr. State your name and rank, sir.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Theodore S. Wilkinson, Vice Admiral,
USN.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, you were Director of the Office of Naval
Intelligence on December 7, 1941, were you not?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. When had you assumed that position, Admiral?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. October 15, 1941, as I recall it.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you state generally the structure of the Office
of Naval Intelligence?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. The Office of Naval Intelligence was
composed of two main branches, foreign intelligence and domestic.
The domestic had to do with internal subversion, espionage, and other
activities of foreign nationals or organizations inimical to national,
and particularly naval, welfare. It included several branch offices in
principal cities of the United States, one of which was Honolulu.
The foreign intelligence was organized under a number, approximately
eight, of regional groups of which [^390'] the Far Eastern was
one. Under the administration of ONI and directly of foreign intelli-
gence were the Naval Attaches and Naval Observers stationed
throughout the world.
Mr. Sonnett. Who was in charge, Admiral, of the foreign branch
of the Office of Naval Intelligence ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Captain Heard, I believe, at that time,
though there had been a change either just before or after.
Mr. Sonnett, Admiral, do you recall who was in charge of the Far
Eastern Section of the foreign branch ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Commander McCollum.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, would you state in general the sources of
information which the Far Eastern Section of the foreign branch
of the Office of Naval Intelligence had ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Naval Attache reports from Japan and
China, Observers' reports from various ports in the Far East, reports
from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Station, collateral items
of interest produced by the investigations of the domestic branch of
230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ONI, particularly from Honolulu, radio intelligence matters as avail-
able in Washington, and also from a center set up in Manila.
Mr. SoNNETT. And Pearl Harbor, Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. The State Department reports from
diplomatic agents and reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the
Fleet at Pearl Harbor with respect to searches and radio intelligence.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, will you state your recollection as to the
responsibility of the Far Eastern Section of the foreign branch of
ONI for the dissemination of the information in its possession ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. The responsibility of the Far Eastern
section derived from the responsibility of the office as a whole. In
general, the [391^ duties of any of the foreign sections were to
receive, collate, and analyze information obtained either by the agen-
cies of ONI or received from other sources and to disseminate that in
one of several ways. The usual means of dissemination of technical
information was transmission by mail of copies or abstracts of the
pertinent reports. There was a periodical publication, bi-weekly, as
I remember, to all flag officers, containing political and operational
intelligence, which contained a Far Eastern section, and in which latter
the Far Eastern Division of ONI would incorporate any information
of value. A third means of dissemination, although not strictly dis-
semination, was the limited distribution within the Navy Department
of highly confidential radio intelligence and all urgent or important
operational information. The radio intelligence was incorporated in
a secret book, which was passed by hand by a responsible officer to
approximately four of the Navy Department's heads and to the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State. The urgent operational information
was reported to me and either by myself in company with Commander
McCollum or by himself directly to the Chief of Naval Operations and
the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. There was also, as the situa-
tion got hot, a daily one or two paragraph summary of the Japanese
picture which was given to the Chief of Naval Operations and to the
Director of War Plans. The immediate report I have mentioned above
was also made to the Director of War Plans, These reports or analyses
usually contained some deduction as to future moves to be expected,
which we offered for such value as they might have to the Chief of
Naval Operations and to the Director of War Plans.
Mr. SoNNEiT. As to the dissemination of information. Admiral, out-
side of the Navy Department and to the Pacific Fleet, do I take it then
that it was the responsibility of ONI to disseminate information on the
Japanese situation to the Pacific Fleet?
[392] Vice Admiral Wilkinson. That point was never fully de-
termined. We issued the reports and the bi-weekly summary of the
situation, but I was told that the deductions of future movements were
the function of War Plans rather than of Intelligence, and this under-
standing was confirmed by the Assistant Chief of Operations, Ad-
miral Ingersoll, when at one time I said that I thought it was our
responsibility. He told me at that time that the Army system was
for Intelligence to prepare the analyses of enemy prospective move-
ments, but in the Navy system War Plans did that. I told him then
that I would prepare that analysis myself in my office in order that
War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations might use it as they
saw fit, and in consequence such analyses as I made weren't trans-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 231
mitted to the fleet, but were given to the Chief of Operations and to
War Plans. The same with respect to spot news of the enemy move-
ments. My miderstanding at the time was, and still is, that I would
report to War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations the latest
operational information deduced from all sources and that they would
forward to the fleet such items as they felt should be so forwarded.
Mr. SoKNETT. Would it be an accurate summary, then, Admiral, to
state that information in the possession of the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence concerning Japanese movements, for example, would be dis-
seminated by ONI, but the evaluation of Japanese plans or deductions
to be drawn from those movements would be the function of War
Plans or the Chief of Naval Operations ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. The latter part of your question, yes.
The first part, the day by day information of the Japanese movements
would not, according to my then and present understanding, be sent
out by Intelligence, but rather by Operations after their evaluation.
[3901 Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 9 of this in-
vestigation, which is a copy of the fortnightly summary of current
national situation, issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence and dated
December 1, 1941, and ask you if you can identify that as a summary
set up by you.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, that is a summary of which I was
recently speaking.
Mr. SoNNETT. Eeferring, Admiral, to page 9 of the exhibit, para-
graph C summarizes, does it not, the Japanese naval situation as seen
by the Office of Naval Intelligence at that time ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, I recall this, and, in fact, the entire
issue, as I read over the text of each issue before authorizing its publica-
tion.
Mr. SoNNETT. Who prepared, Admiral, the portion of the exhibit to
which I have called your attention, namely, relating to the Japanese
naval situation?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. The Far Eastern Section.
Mr. Sonnett. For the sake of clarity of the record. Admiral, as well
as to refresh your own recollection since it has been some time ago,
would you read the first paragraph of C into the record ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. The heading is —
The Japanese Naval Situation
Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that exten-
sive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports
and freightei-s are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China
coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports.
Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual
units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated,
will probably take sharper form in [394] the next few days. To date this
task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears
to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the
southeast Asiastic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong
striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force,
destroyer and submai-ine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also
may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as
well as the greatest portion of the carriers.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you exhibit 10 of this investigation,
a memorandum for the Director by A. H. McCollum, dated Decem-
ber 1, 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that.
232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Wilkinson, I recall it vaguely, but I presume that it
was given to me in view of its form.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 8 of this investigation,
which consists of photostatic copies of three dispatches, and ask
whether you recall having seen those or any one of them ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall having seen any. I did
not ordinarily see any of the so-called COPEKS, due perhaps to their
very limited distribution, although I believe that the Far Eastern
Section was given access to them by inspection at the office of receipt.
I do not believe that they were furnished a copy.
Mr. SoNNETT. The situation as to Japanese carriers, Admiral, set
forth in exhibit 9, the ONI fortnightly summary for December 1, 1941,
is summarized, is it not, in the statement as follows : "Although one
division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship
strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of
the carriers" ?
[395] Vice Admiral Wilkinson. That was our best knowledge
and belief at the time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, upon what information that
statement was based?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No. On the digest of all available in-
formation, radio intelligence and sighting, whatever we had.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, do you recall how this exhibit 9, the fort-
nightly summary of December 1, was sent out? By air mail?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. By air mail, I believe.
Mr. SoNNETT. And, I take it, it was sent out on or about the date
it bears, namely, December 1, 1941?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. It is my impression that it had
been received in Pearl Harbor prior to December Tth.
Mr. SoNNETT. What information, Admiral, do you recall on or
after December 1, 1941, concerning the location or movements of
Japanese carriers?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. My remote recollection at this time is
that we had little, if any, information as to the carriers. We had
fairly complete knowledge of the movement down through the South
China Sea and around Indo-China, but the movements in the Pacific
Ocean as a whole, including both battleships and carriers, were com-
pletely veiled. There may have been one or two carriers involved in
the South China Sea movement, but the carrier force as a whole was
not definitely located.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 22 of this investigation,
which consists of photostatic copies of daily communication intelli-
gence summaries at F'earl Harbor, and call your attention to those
particularly for the period December 1 to December 5, 1941, and ask
if you can recall having had any of the information contained in those
summaries during that [396'] period of time.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Not directly, but as digested through the
Far Eastern Section. I note j)articularly the fact that parts of the
Japanese fleet were apparently in radio silence, of w^ich I was aware.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, do you recall any discussion with the Chief
of Naval Operations or with the War Plans Officer concerning the lack
of information as to parts of the Japanese fleet during the first week
of December, 1941 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 233
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I think we reported daily that a
large part of the Japanese fleet was apparently at sea with its where-
abouts not known. We also reported, however, that the only indica-
tions we had been able to pick up of any movement were those toward
the south, including through the South China Sea, and our conclu-
sion that an attack on Thailand and the Malay Peninsula was im-
minent. I recall that Admiral Turner also concluded that an attack
would be made on the Philippines.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall any discussion during that period of
time, Admiral, concerning the question whether or not any aerial
reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No discussion of which I was a part.
That was in the line of operational intelligence, procured by our
own operations, which I considered was a function of the Office of
Operations proper, although, of course, I was interested in the re-
sults of such searches for their own value and for their consolidation
in the general picture.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there. Admiral, during the month or so pre-
ceding December 7, 1941, any discussion in which you participated
concerning the likelihood of a Japanese move toward Pearl Harbor ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Unfortunately, no.
[S97] Mr. SoNNEiT. At that time. Admiral, what was your
estimate as to the possibility or probability of a Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I thought it was improbable and I
thought it was impracticable in view of the air searches which I
had known were being conducted when I had last left Hawaii in
May and which I presumed, in the lack of any other knowledge,
were still being conducted.
Mr. SoNNEiT. Did you. Admiral, have the view that such an attack
on Pearl Harbor was a possibility?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. A remote possibility, but to my mind I
thought it would be detected and driven off before it could be
effective.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 63 of the Naval Court
of Inquiry record, which consists of certified copies of Japanese
diplomatic dispatches, and ask if you would examine that.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Well, not recognizing this exhibit spe-
cifically, I was familiar with the various decrypted dispatches which
were available in the Navy Department.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, will you state how such Japanese dis-
patches were obtained?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. They were obtained by radio intercep-
tor, if they were sent by cable, I believe that v»'e got copies of the
cable; I am not sure. The text was then given to a large deciypt-
ing unit under the immediate control of the Director of Communi-
cations, although ONI cooperated by assignment of certain technical
personnel. The Army had similar experts and there was a division
of labor between the two departments in connection with the de-
cryption of all foreign texts. In general, I recall that the Navy,
which had made a longer study and was more familiar with the
Japanese language and codes, took care of most of the Japanese
work, while [398] the Army looked after other nations.
234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The products of the decryption of the Japanese dispatches were
embodied in a secret book which originally was shown in full text
to the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Director of
"War Plans, myself, and the President and the Secretary of State.
At some time — I don't know precisely whether before or after De-
cember 7th — I believe only abbreviated summaries were shown the
President and Secretary of State. Also there was some arrange-
ment that the Army would look after the State Department and
that the President would be served on alternate days by the Army
and the Navy, but I am not sure of this in my recollection. At any
rate, the books contained, as I recall, the product of both the Army
and the Navy work.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I note that various of these Japanese dis-
patches are indicated to have been in the so-called purple code.
Will you state generally what the purple code was ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall, although I vaguely re-
member that it was a diplomatic code.
Mr. SoNNiyrr. Do you recall, Admiral, whether the Japanese pur-
ple code was being decrypted at any other place besides Washington ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I call your attention to a dispatch dated
19 November 1941 from Tokyo to Washington, which is indicated
to have been translated on November 28, 1941, and ask whether you
recall having seen that dispatch or having had that information.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, I recall the "east wind," et cetera.
I do not recall the specific Japanese words.
Mr. Sonnett. That dispatch. Admiral, was a dispatch setting up
the so-called "winds" code to be used by the Japanese in daily Japanese
[399] language short wave news broadcasts, was it not?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall, Admiral, what efforts were made to
monitor for any message using the "winds" code ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is that the Japanese
broadcasts were all monitored, and I do not recall any specific efforts
in connection with this, but since it was to appear in the regular news
broadcast, it presumably would be detected therein.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall whether or not any message using the
"winds" code was ever intercepted ?
Vice Admiral AVilkinson. The metliod was not to use the "winds"
code in a whole message, but simply to put in a word which of itself
was the "winds" code. I recall that at some late stage, along about
December 6th or 7th, I heard, either then or immediately after the
Pearl Harbor attack, tliat there had been such a word in one of the
broadcasts. I don't recall when.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall. Admiral, that the Japanese also had
established a code known as the hidden word code ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No, I recall no mention of it.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you document 6 and document 11
of exhibit 13 of this investigation. The first is a dispatch from Tokyo
to Washington on November 27, 1941, establishing a hidden word code,
and the second is a message of 7 December 1941 from Tokyo, and ask
whether you recall having seen either of those messages.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall either one of them.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 235
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of
Inquiry, which consists of various documents supplied by the Federal
Communications Commission, and ask jvhether you recall having seen
any of [WO^ those documents.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No, I do not recall such.
Mr. SoNXETT. Do you recall, Admiral, who it was who indicated to
you some time around December 7, 1941, that a "winds" code message
had been received ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I recall some mention of it, but not until
after the attack, but I no longer attributed importance to it since tlie
overt act had occurred. It may possibly have been the last message of
the exhibit you just showed me, which, you will note, was received
on December Stli.
Mr. SoNNETT. But you don't remember who it was that mentioned
it to you ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall, but presumably it would
have been Commander McCollum, who was in touch with the Army,
to whom the reports of that exhibit were made.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall. Admiral, during the first week in
December, 1941, that Commander McCollum prepared a long dispatch,
summarizing the situation, which he desired to have released and sent
out and which dispatch he discussed with j^ou ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. From time to time Commander McCol-
lum and I, or he after consulting me, would prepare dispatches to be
submitted to the Cliief of Naval Operations for release. I do not
specifically recall this dispatch, but if you have any evidence of it, I
could probably refresh my recollection.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, Captain Safford, who testified during this
investigation and who testified in previous investigations, stated that
on or about December 4, 1941, he was present when you and Admiral
Noyes [4^-?] conferred concerning the desirability of sending
out a dispatch which had been prepared by Commander McCollum
and that you were in favor of sending out the dispatch but Admiral
Noyes was not in favor of doing so and that you indicated you would
take it to the Chief of Naval Operations to try to get it released. Do
you recall that incident at all ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No. It is quite possible that I did take
it to Admiral Ingersoll, but I do not recall is specifically.
Mr. SoNNETT. And I take it, therefore. Admiral, that you do not
recall the contents of any dispatch which McCollum had prepared
at that time ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Not at that specific time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall, Admiral, whether in any dispatch
prepared by Commander McCollum prior to the attack there was
specific reference made to any Japanese broadcast using the "winds"
code words relating to the United States ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No. I know the "winds" code words
were discussed in Washington, but I do not remember any dispatch
sent outside. There was, of course, at that time considerable reluc-
tance to any widespread information which would indicate our opera-
tions and our success in breaking Japanese codes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you document 38 and document 39
of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record and ask whether
you recall having seen those intercepted Japanese messages.
236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, I saw this in several successive parts
as it was received, decrypted, and passed out in the secret book I
spoke of.
Mr. SoNNETT. The first. Admiral, for the sake of the record, is a
dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, December 6, 1941, advising
that the [W^] Japanese had deliberated on the American pro-
posal of the 26th of November and had drawn up a memorandum
for the United States which would be in a separate message in
fourteen parts ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And also directed that the long message to the
United States should be presented at a time to be specified in a sep-
arate message, is that correct?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the second, a dispatch from Tokyo to Washing-
ton, December 6, 1941, consists of the fourteen parts of the Japanese
reply, does it not?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. As I recall, the date is the East
Longitude date and the first thirteen parts were available to us on our
date of December 6th, and the fourteenth part not till the early
morning of December 7th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I also show you document 41 of exhibit 63
of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, a message from Tokyo to Wash-
ington, December 7, 1941, directing the Japanese Ambassador to sub-
mit to the United States Government the Japanese reply to the United
States at 1 p. m. on the 7th, Washington time. Do you recall having
seen that message ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall having seen it, but I
heard it mentioned on the 7th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall. Admiral, any discussion on December
7th concerning the significance of the time set for delivery of the
Japanese reply, namely, 1 p. m. Washington time, and the relationship
of that time to times at Pearl Harbor and in the Far East ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I recall the discussion of the relation-
ship [403] between the times, but whether that discussion was
before or after the actual attack I do not at this moment recall.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you state. Admiral, who participated in the
discussion and what was said?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Perhaps I had better mention the dis-
cussion of the fourteenth part. On arriving at the Office of Naval
Intelligence shortly after 8 o'clock on the morning of Sunday, the
7th, I saw the fourteenth part and went to the office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, where, as I recall, Admiral Stark, Admiral Inger-
soll, and Admiral Turner were present. There was a discussion that
the tone of the fourteenth part presaged, if not actually promised,
early overt acts, which still, to our best knowledge and indication,
would be directed against Thailand and the Malay Peninsula and
possibly the Philippines. As I recall, Admiral Stark said he would
confer at once with General Marshall. At that time the 1 o'clock
message may have been in hand, but I do not believe so and I don't
recall now having heard it discussed until after the actual attack, at
which time, in answer to the question, the discussion may have been
with Commander McCollum or almost any one on the basis of com-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 237
meriting upon the fact that the two times apparently had been
simultaneous.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 15 and exhibit 17 of
the Naval Court of Inquiry and ask you whether you recall having
seen those dispatches at or about the dates they bear.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall having seen either. They
were apparently prepared by the War Plans Section, Op-12. The
second I knew had been sent in substance ; the first I don't remember.
Mr. SoNNETT. The second is the so-called war warning, is it not?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
[4.04] Mr. SoNNETT. What, if any, discussion. Admiral, was
there on the morning of December 7, 1941, concerning the necessity
or advisability of informing Admiral Eammel or other fleet com-
manders of the prospective 1 p. m. delivery of the Japanese reply?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I don't remember a discussion of the
1 p. m. delivery. I remember a discussion of the immediate trans-
mission of the status of negotiations indicated by the receipt of the
fourteenth part, and my impression at the time was that Admiral
Stark was to confer immediately with General Marshall for a joint
decision as to notifying the Army and Navy forces in Hawaii and
in the Far East.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know what, if anything, was done after
Admiral Stark and General Marshall conferred on that point?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Only by hearsay.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, on December 7, 1941, what telephonic con-
nections existed between the Navy Department and the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know. It was in the province
of Communications.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you know at that time whether or not either the
Navy or the Army had a so-called scrambler telephone?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. My impression is the Army had one. I
am not sure.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was any consideration given at that time, namely,
December 7, 1941, to the necessity or advisability of telephoning to
the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet or to other fleet com-
manders concerning the delivery of the Japanese reply?
[4^S] Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know, but my recollec-
tion is that Admiral Stark was to confer immediately with General
Marshall with the view of getting the information and presumably a
warning out by the fastest means of communication that were then
available.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you document 14, document 15, and document
24 of exhibit 13 of this investigation, which are intercepted Japanese
"communications between Honolulu and Tokyo, and ask whether you
recall having seen those prior to December 7, 1941, or thereafter, and,
if so, when.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall seeing these specifically,
but I am certain that I did not see them before December 7th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, in the interest of clarity of the record, could
we have these three dispatches copied into the record at this point ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The dispatches referred to follow as pages 405A, 405B, and 405C.)
238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
l405A-\ [Copy]
A true copy. Attest :
Ben Haeold,
Ship's Clerk, USNR.
From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
PA-K2
#253 Re the last part of your #123.^
1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage
balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four
or jQve hundred baloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use
of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawai is
concei-ned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl
Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the
troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for
the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are
no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine
that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made
preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways
of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickaui, Ford and Ewa," there
are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all proba-
bality there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise
attack against these places.
2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are
not known. I will report the results of my investigation.
25877
Army 7178 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)
* — -not available.
•^ — Kana spelling.
1405B] [Copy]
From : Honolulu
To: Tokyo.
December 6, 1941
PA-K2
#254
1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port
were and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at
anchor on the 6th :
9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addi-
tion there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers
and airplane carriers have all left).
2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.
25874
Army 7179 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)
A true copy. Attest:
Ben Harold,
Ships Clerk, USNR.
U05C-\ [Copy]
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To : Honolulu
December 2, 1941
J-19
#123 (Secret outside the department)
In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane
carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your
ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are
any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 239
they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided
with anti-mine nets.
Note : This message was received here on December 23.
27055
Army 8007 (Japanese)
Trans. 12/30/41 (5)
A true copy. Attest :
Ben Harold,
Ships Clerk, USNR.
[406] Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, these three dispatches indicate
specific Japanese interest in the preparations for defense of Oahu
against air attack, do they not ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And it appears that they were translated by the Army
after the attack, although they were dated prior to the attack?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. On the fact of them the note as to the
date of translation would so indicate it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, do you know what the explanation may be
for the delay in translating these messages ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No. Possibly circuit delays in the orig-
inal coded text reaching Washington. Possibly a jam in the decoding
office, caused perhaps by the long diplomatic message which was then
being decoded about December 6th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall. Admiral, that prior to this time there
were other messages available in Washington showing that the Jap-
anese were interested specifically in the location and movements of
American ships in Pearl Harbor?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No, not prior to that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. May I call your attention, Admiral, to documents 1,
2, 3, 7, 9, and 10 of exhibit 13 and ask whether they refresh your rec-
ollection on that point ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. The first three of these I do not recall
and they were apparently dated and translated before my taking over
the office. Number 7, dated November 20th and translated December
4th, requesting an investigation of the fleet bases, I should have seen
but do not now recall. The same applies to number 9, dated Novem-
ber 18th, [407] translated December 5th, requesting data as
to vessels anchored in a certain area in Pearl Harbor and in Manila
Bay. Number 10, dated November 18th and noted as translated on
December 6th, giving specific information about movements of ships,
I am sure I did not see before December 7th and I do not recall having
seen it thereafter. The remainder were translated after the attack.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it your belief. Admiral, prior to the attack on
December 7, 1941, that the Japanese agents in or around Pearl Harbor
were interested in United States ships in the harbor ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I believe they were and I believe they
were reporting them, but my belief was that they were concerned in
the presence of the fleet with a view to its availability for distant oper-
ations rather than its susceptibility as a target.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I call your attention to document 11 of ex-
hibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry and document 14 and ask
whether you recall having seen those documents.
240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, I believe I recall them both.
Mr. SoNNETT. Those messages, Admiral, indicated that the Jap-
anese had established deadlines beyond which there would be no fur-
ther diplomatic negotiation with the United States, did they not?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And referring, Admiral, particularly to the -message
of November 22, 1941, from Tokyo to Washington, translated on the
same date, it indicated that Tokyo had fixed the 29th of November as
a deadline and that that deadline absolutely could not be changed and
after that things were automatically going to happen, did it not ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. "
_ [408] Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Admiral, to document 18 of ex-
hibit 63 of the Naval Court record, a message from Tokyo to Washing-
ton dated November 28, 1941, translated November 28, 1941, do you
recall having seen that at or about that time?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, that message indicated, did it not, that
Tokyo regarded the November 26th note of the United States as a
liumiliating proposal?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that with a report of the views of the Imperial
Government on this American proposal, the negotiations would be
de facto ruptured, but that Tokyo wanted them to be careful to avoid
giving the impression that negotiations were broken off?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, what consideration was given to the ques-
tion of the necessity or desirability of sending to Admiral Kimmel
copies of these various Japanese messages which were intercepted?
Vic Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know. That was in the province
of the Chief of Operations. As I have said, there was great reluc-
tance to disseminate the knowledge of our code-breaking activities.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, will you please state what the arrange-
ments were for the exchange of intelligence with the Army?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. There was a complete liaison between
the decrypting agencies and complete exchange of actual texts im-
mediately after their transcription into a smooth copy. The two
Far Eastern Sections of Naval Intelligence and Military Intelligence
were in daily and, in fact, hourly contact by telephone and by fre-
quent exchange of visits. The head [409] of Military Intel-
ligence, General Miles, was in constant telephonic and other contact
with me and, in fact, he was at dinner at my house when the first
thirteen parts of the diplomatic message were brought to us at ap-
proximately 11:30 the night of December 6th, at which time we
both ascertained that they had been shown to higher authorities in
our two Departments.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, what information concerning the location
or movements of the Japanese fleet was furnished by the Navy to
the Army?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. Why, I think everything we had, by
this process of interchange between the two Far Eastern Sections.
I know that we got information that they^ jHcked up with respect
to Japanese Army movements and activities and, of course, from
time to time some of our agents would report something having to
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 241
do with the Japanese Army and some of theirs something concerning
the Japanese Navy, but all information was constantly interchanged.
Mr. SoNXETT. Admiral, do you recall whether or not any infor-
mation of significance came to your attention prior to December 7,
1941, which had been obtained from either tapping the telephone
wires of the Japanese in Honolulu or from interception of their
cable messages here?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No. Shortly after the attack we got
word of the so-called "flower" telephone message, and I know that
the local intelligence representative, the District Intelligence Officer,
had endeavored to obtain copies of cable messages, but had been
denied them because of the United States law concerning the integrity
of civil communication.
Mr. SoNNBiT. You do not know, Admiral, then, whether or not, in
fact, any copies of Japanese cable messages were secured at Honolulu
prior 14^0] to December 7th ?
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I do not believe there were.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further. Admiral.
Admiral Hewiti. I don't think I have anything further. Thank
you very much.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. I don't think I have anything to add.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you have anything to add ? I would be glad
to have you do it.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Admiral HE^^^TT. That is all.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 11 : 35 a. m., adjourned until 10 a. m..
G June 1945.)
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 243
Wn PEOCEEDINGS OF THEiHEWITT INaUIRY
Sixteenth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Offi-
cer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 10 a. m.,
Wednesday, 6 June 1945.
Present : Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN ; Mr. John F. Sonnett ;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. State your name, sir.
Mr. Street. George Street.
Mr. Soxnett. What is your occupation, Mr. Street?
Mr. Street. District Manager, RCA Communications, Incorporated.
Mr. Sonnett. For how long have you been employed by RCA in
Plonolulu ?
Mr. Street. I have been with the company for over twenty-five years
and have been in my present position for almost ten years.
Mr. Sonnett. During 1941, Mr. Street, did you know the District
Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, Captain Mayfield ?
Mr. Street. I did.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall that on or about the first week of De-
cember, 1941, certain messages were, at the request of the Navy, turned
over by j^ou to Captain Mayfield ?
Mr. Street. I do recall, yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Were those messages of the Japanese Consul sent
from Um'\ Honolulu?
Mr. Street. Yes, there were several.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you have any record, Mr. Street, of the messages
which were turned over at that time to Naval Intelligence ?
Mr. Street. Not now. They were legally destroyed.
Mr. Sonnett. Does your company have at any place copies of those
messages ?
Mr. Street. To the best of my knowledge and belief, copies of all
messages transmitted to and from Honolulu will be in the files of our
company at 28 Geary Street, San Francisco.
Mr. Sonnett. I take it, Mr. Street, that when you said copies of the
messages had been destroyed, you mean they had been destroyed
locally in the Honolulu office?
Mr. Street. Locally, yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Pursuant to the authority of the Federal Com-
munications Commission?
Mr. Street. Yes, pursuant to the regulations of the Federal Com-
munications Commission. It was simply a matter of my lack of stor-
age space.
244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall, Mr. Street, whether or not, to the
best of your recollection, all messages sent by the Japanese Consul
during the first week of December, 1941, were turned over to Naval
Intelligence ?
Mr. Street. They were.
Admiral Hewitt. Do you have anything to add, Mr. Street ?
Mr. Street. Here are three copies of press messages filed from
Honolulu on December 4th and 5th which I do not recall were given
to Captain Mayfield previously.
[4i3] Mr. SoNNETT. Can you identify the senders of each of
those messages?
Mr. Street. The message of December 4th, addressed Yomiuri,
Tokyo, was filed by Mrs. M. Mori, Correspondent. The two messages
of December 5th, addressed Asahi, Tokyo, were filed by Mr. Onodera,
Correspondent.
Mr. SoNNETF. I have nothing further. Admiral, for Mr. Street.
Admiral Hewiti. I have nothing further. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 10:20 a. m., adjourned until 9:35
a. m., 7 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 245
Um PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIEY
Seventeenth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Of-
ficer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas, at 9 : 35 a. m., Thursday, 7 June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. State your name and rate.
Radioman Humphrey. Richard W. Humphrey, radioman third
class, USNR.
Mr. SoNNETT. On December 7, 1941, you were on duty at the radio
station at Bishop's Point, Oahu, were you not ?
Radioman Humphrey. I was.
Mr. Sonnett. Under whose jurisdiction did that station come?
Radioman Humphrey. At that time it came under the jurisdiction
of the Commander, Inshore Patrol.
Mr. Sonnett. Were you acquainted with one C. E. Gibson?
Radioman Humphrey. I was.
Mr. Sonnett. And also one R. B. Moyle ?
Radioman Humphrey. I was.
Mr. Sonnett. Can you state where, to the best of your knowledge,
they are now located ?
Radioman Humphrey. To the best of my knowledge, Moyle was last
known to be on a train in Florida as a shore patrolman and Gibson
was a flag radioman aboard an LST.
\_.kl5\ Mr. Sonnett. Who was the duty officer on December 7,
1941, at that station?
Radioman Humphrey. The duty officer was Lieutenant Commander
A. E. Kilhefner.
Mr. Sonnett. And do you know where he is now located ?
Radioman Humphrey. To the best of my knowledge, he is now
located at a naval air station in Brazil.
Mr. Sonnett. At what time did you come on duty on December 7,
1941 ?
Radioman Humphrey. I came on duty approximately ten minutes
until 8 o'clock.
Mr. Sonnett. In the morning?
Radioman Humphrey. In the morning, yes, sir.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you exhibit 18 of this investigation, which
is a copy of the radio log of the station for December 7, 1941, con-
sisting of two pages, and note on the reverse side of each page a
certification of that log by you, is that correct ?
246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Radioman Humphrey. That is correct. I certified that this is a
copy of the log that we kept at the Section Base.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, the log has at the left-hand side times from
1445 to 1830. Those are Greenwich times, are they not ?
Radioman Humphrey. They are. That is Greenwich Civil Time.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that would be comparable to 0415 to 0800, local
Pearl Harbor time ?
Radioman Humphrey. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the entries in the log from 1445, Green-
wich time, to 1508, Greenwich time, that would be from 0415 to 0438,
[4^6^ would it not. Pearl Harbor time ?
Radioman Humphrey. That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. And do you find there a record of a conversation
between the WARD and the CONDOR?
Radioman Humphrey. I do.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, in substance, will you state what that conversa-
tion was ?
Radioman Humphrey. In substance, it is a conversation between,
the two ships, trying to determine the position of a submarine operat-
ing in a restricted area.
Mr. SoNNETT. Is there any indication that that conversation was
addressed to your station or to the Inshore Patrol or to any one else
for action?
Radioman Humphrey. No, there is no indication of any such thing.
It is purely a conversation between the two ships.
Mr. SoNNETT. In the event that your station had taken any action
by way of reporting that conversation to the Inshore Patrol by radio,
would that have appeared subsequently in the log?
Radioman Humphrey. Had we relayed this conversation to the
Inshore Patrol by radio on this frequency, it would have appeared in
this log.
Mr. SoNNETT. And you find no record of such action in the log?
Radioman Humphrey. No such entry in the log.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to page 2 of the log, there is a report, is
there not, by the WARD of having attacked a submarine ?
Radioman Humphrey. There is.
Mr. SoNNETT. At what time, both Greenwich and local, was that
report logged ?
[4i7] Radioman Humphrey. That is 1721, Greenwich time, and
the message was transmitted again at 1723, Greenwich time, which
makes it 0653, local time.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that message was addressed by the WARD to
whom?
Radioman Humphrey. That was addressed by the WARD to Com-
mander, Inshore Patrol.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. I have nothing. Thank you very much,
(The witness was excused.)
(A brief recess was taken.)
[418] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. State your name and rank.
Captain Dyer. Thomas H. Dyer, Captain, USN.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is your present assignment. Captain?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 247
Captain Dyer. I am Officer in Charge of the Cryptanalytical and
Decrypting Section, Fleet Radio Unit, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
Mr. SoNNETT. In December, 1941, were you associated with that
unit or its predecessor ?
Captain Dyer. I have been associated with that unit and its prede-
cessor since 2 July, 1936.
Mr. Sonnett. Wlio else, Captain, besides yourself was engaged in
decryption work at that unit during December, 1941 ?
Captain Dyer. Lieutenant Commander Wesley A. Wright, USN,
was my principal assistant ; Chief Yeoman Arnold M. Conant, Chief
Radioman Woodward — I will have to look up his initials for you —
several other enlisted personnel and several Reserve officers who had
recently reported for duty and were under training, whose names I
do not now recall.
Mr. SoNNETT. Commander Wright is now at Bainbridge Island, is
he not, Captain ?
Captain Dyer. I have been so informed.
Mr. Sonnett. And I think you also told me that you had been in-
formed that Woodward is now in Washington ?
Captain Dyer. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. Washington, D. C. ?
Captain Dyer. Washington, D. C.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall where Conant is ?
Captain Dyer. He is also in Washington, D. C.
[4^9] Mr. Sonnett. Who was engaged principally in the trans-
lation of the decrypted communications in that unit in December', 1941,
Captain ?
Captain Dyer. Captain A. B. Laswell, U. S. Marine Corps, and
Lieutenant Commander R. FuUenwider were the principal translators.
Mr. SoNNi?rT. The entire unit, Captain, was under the command of
now Captain Rochef ort, was it not ?
Captain Dyer. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. There has been testimony. Captain, in previous inves-
tigations that during the first week of December, 1941, certain com-
munications of the Japanese Consul were delivered to ONI and by ONI
to your unit for decryption and translation. Were you aware of that
at the time ?
Captain Dyer. The only Japanese communications of which I am
personally aware were received subsequent to the attack on Pearl
Harbor and were decrypted and translated during the ensuing week.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you know. Captain, whether at any time prior to
December 7, 1941, cable messages to or from the Japanese Consul at
Honolulu were received by the Navy ?
Captain Dyer. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Sonnett. And I take it that the first time you ever saw a
translation of such a message was after December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Dyer. Was either the 9th or the 10th of December.
Mr. Sonnett. I show j^ou exhibit 29 of this investigation. Captain,
which consists of various translations of Japanese messages supplied
by Captain Layton, and for your information state that he testified
before Admiral Hewitt that he received those on or about December
10th from Captain Rochefort. Do you recall having seen those at or
about that time ?
248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Dyer. I can definitely recall some of the items and I am
1420] reasonably sure I saw all of them at about that time.
Mr, SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 40 of this investigation, Captain,
which consists of two investigation reports made by ONI at Honolulu,
the second of which is dated 14 February 1942, by Lieutenant Steven-
son, and which sets forth various messages in translated form, which,
according to the report, were learned in their translated form on 11
December 1941, and ask you whether you recall having seen those
messages at or about that time, namely, December 11, 1941.
Captain Dyer. I iim sure I saw some of the messages at about that
time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, do you have a file with you of decryptions
and translations of Japanese messages?
Captain Dyer. I do have a file of certain Japanese diplomatic traffic.
Here it is.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark this. Admiral, as an exhibit with the
understanding that the Captain is going to photostat today the begin-
ning of it up to the point indicated by the paper clip and let us have
that to take with us tomorrow and will photostat the oalance and send
it to you at Washington ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. The beginning of the file contains various of the
messages referred to in the ONI leport and also some of the messages
set forth in exhibit 29 which Captain Layton supplied.
Admiral Hewitt. All right.
(The file referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 41.")
Mr. Sonnett. For the sake of the record, Captain, and as illustrative,
I take it, of the other translations and decryptions, will you refer to
the 14^J] pencilled translation of a message dated 6 December
1941, bearing number 02530, and state whether that is a translation of
one of the Japanese messages to which you referred ?
Captain Dyer. It is.
Mr. Sonnett. That translation bears the symbol. Captain, PA.
Would you state what that indicates ?
Captain Dyer. That is the designation for one of the many Jap-
anese diplomatic systems and indicates the type of cipher.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, I show you a sheet of paper containing
various letters and ask you if you can state what that is.
Captain Dyer. This paper represents a portion of the decrypting
process which was applied to the message you just showed me.
Mr. SoNNETi. May we marlc that as an exhibit. Admiral?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The paper referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 42.")
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, would you similarly photostat this afternoon
exhibit 42 so that we may take a photostat and return the original as
an exhibit?
Captain Dyer. I will.
Mr. Sonnett. And would you. Captain, while we are thinking of
it, annex to both exhibit 41 and to exhibit 42 a certificate stating that
the photostats you supply are correct photostats of the original files
which you have ?
Captain Dyer. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 249
Mr. SoNNETT. The PA code then, Captain, was a code which re-
quired decryption first into plain Japanese and then translation into
English [4^2] from the Japanese?
Captain Dyek. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you state who did the decryption and translation
of this message ?
Captain Dyer. I am practically certain that the decryption was done
by Chief Radioman Woodward. I do not recognize the handwriting
and have no way of identifying the translation.
Mr. SoNNETT. The decryption in question. Captain, appears in the
file, I take it, in written out form immediately behind the translation
into English to which we have been referring?
Captain Dyer. That is true in the majority of cases.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, do you have any other file or, to your knowl-
edge, is there any other file in the unit here containing decryptions or
translations of Japanese messages which were sent prior to 7 December
1941?
Captain Dyer. I believe there is no other file in existence, to the best
(-.f my knowledge.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. I have nothing further. Thank you
very much.
[4^S] (The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 11 : 50 a. m., adjourned until 9 : 45
a. m., Friday, 8 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 251
Vm'\ PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIRY
Eighteenth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Visiting Flag Offi-
cer's Office, Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, T. H., at 9 : 45 a. m.,
Friday 8 June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNK,; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR ; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. Sonnett. State your name and rank.
Captain Finnegan. Joseph Finnegan, Captain, USN.
Mr. Sonnett. What is your present assignment. Captain ?
Captain Finnegan. Attached to the Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet.
Mr. Sonnett. When did you first become attached to the fleet radio
unit ?
Captain Finnegan. Under regular orders on the 15th of February,
'42.
Mr. Sonnett. And had you previously reported to that unit under
verbal orders?
Captain Finnegan. On either the 9th or the 10th of December, 1941,
under verbal orders of Admiral Kimmel, I reported there for tempo-
rary duty.
Mr. Sonnett. Prior to that time what was your assignment, Cap-
tain?
Captain Finnegan. Aide and Flag Lieutenant to Rear Admiral
David W. Bagley, Commander Battleship Division Two, USS TEN-
NESSEE.
Mr. Sonnett. You are a translator of Japanese, Captain, are you
not?
Captain Finnegan. Yes.
[^^5] Mr. Sonnett. Will you state what your training and
experience have been in the translation of Japanese ?
Captain Finnegan. I took the regular Japanese language course,
attached to the American Embassy in Tokyo, 1934 to 1937, followed
by fourteen months of work in radio intelligence.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, I show you exhibit 41 of this investigation,
which contains twenty-eight pages of Japanese language and work
sheets and translations supplied by Captain Dyer of the fleet radio
unit, and ask you whether you can identify any of the handwriting
in that exhibit as your own.
Captain Finnegan. Pages 7 and 8 and 22.
Mr. Sonnett. Page 22, Captain, is a translation of a message, is
it not, dated 3 December 1941 from Kita\ Would you state for the
record what your translation of that message was ?
252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Finnegan. "WYOMING and two seaplane tenders de-
parted the third."
Mr. SoNNETT. Pages 7 and 8, Captain, which you identified, consti-
tute a translation of a message from Kita to Tokyo, dated 6 December
1941, bearing number 02530, does it not?
Captain Finnegan. It does.
Mr. SoNNETT. Is it correct, Captain, that the translation of the 6th
of December message, pages 7 and 8, is a translation of the hand-
written message appearing on page 9 of the exhibit?
Captain Finnegan. It is.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, I refer you to document 14 of exhibit 13
of this investigation, which appears to be an Army translation of that
same message, does it not?
Captain Finnegan. It is a translation of the same message and it is
marked Army.
Mr. Sonnett. And it bears a translation date indicating transla-
tion by the Army on December 8, 1941 ?
Captain Finnegan. It does.
\_Ji26'\ Mr. Sonnett. I call your attention. Captain, to the last
sentence in paragraph 1 of the Army translation, which reads as fol-
lows : "I imagine that in all probability there is considerable oppor-
tunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these
places," and I refer you also to the last sentence of the first paragraph
of your translation, page 7 of exhibit 41, reading : "The whole matter
seems to have been dropped."
I further invite your attention to the Japanese language message,
page 9 of exhibit 41, and ask you to reexamine it and to state whether
your translation or the Army translation is correct as to the sentence
to which I have directed your attention.
Captain Finnegan. Without hesitation, I believe that the Army
translation is correct. The position of the sentences doesn't mean
anything. You can't compare the last sentence with the last sentence.
The last part of the rough work sheet, that is, pages 9 and 10, is fairly
garbled or missing groups, but it is quite easy and very logical to
fill in the missing groups in garbles, and I would say without hesita-
tion that the Army translation is most probable and probably correct.
Mr. Sonne-it. How long had you been away from Japanese, Cap-
lain, prior to the time when you translated this message ?
Captain Finnegan. A little more than three years.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, when did you translate this message?
Captain Finnegan. I don't remember the exact date. It was prob-
ably the 10th, but certainly not before the 9th of December, 1941.
[^7] Mr. Sonnett. Did you translate any Japanese message
at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Finnegan. No, I didn't even enter the combat intelligence
office.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you know of any translation of any of the Japa-
nese consular messages by anybody else prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Finnegan. I do not recognize any of the messages in this
file as having been made before that time and it is my distinct im-
pression that all of these were received about the same time and trans-
lated if not on one day, within two days of pages 7 and 8, within a
period of forty-eight hours, I would say.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 253
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
[4^8] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. State your name and rank.
Lieut. Comdr. Htjbbell. Monroe Harmon Hubbell, Lieutenant
Commander, UNTSR.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is your present assignment. Commander?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. At present I am Officer in Charge, Dis-
tribution Section, Officer Division, Naval Personnel Office, Pacific.
Mr. SoNNETT. What were your duties on December 7, 1941 ?
Lieut Comdr. Hubbell. I was Commanding Officer of the USS
CONDOR, AMC-14.
Mr. SoNNETT. On the morning of December 7, 1941, were you en-
gaged in sweeping off the mouth of Pearl Harbor ?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. We were.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall a blinker signal to the USS WARD
given by you that morning ?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. I do.
Mr. SoNNETT. At about what time was it?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. At approximately 0350.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was the substance of the message you sent to
the WARD at that time ?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. It was indicated to the WARD that we had
sighted what appeared to be a periscope of a submarine.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you subsequently have a radio conversation on
the TBS with the WARD ?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. I did.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 18 of this investigation and ask
if you find there recorded the radio conversation which you had
with the WARD [4^9] that morning.
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. That is the substance, to the best of my
recollection now.
Mr. SoNNETT. And will you state for the benefit of the record the
substance of your radio conversation and the time at which it took
place ?
Lieut Comdr. Hubbell. It was at approximately 0415 and it had
to do with an inquiry from the WARD as to the location and course of
the submarine that we had sighted.
Mr. SoNNETT. What did you advise the WARD as to the location
and course of the submarine?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. As I remember, it is substantially what is
stated here, that we gave them the course that we were steering at
the time and indicated that at the time the periscope was sighted,
that it was not a positive identification, but under the conditions of visi-
bility, it appeared that the course was approximately the same as
ours and that shortly thereafter the course of the submarine changed
abruptly and our own course changed rather abruptly. At the time
the periscope was sighted, it appeared to be heading directly for the
entrance buoys.
Mr, SoNNETT. Other than your report to the USS WARD, did you
make any report of this incident to the inshore patrol or any one
else?
254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. No. The indentification at that time was
not positive enough to consider making a report to other than the
Senior Officer Present Afloat there.
Mr. SoNNETT. Who was the Commanding Officer of the WARD, I
take it?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, we have a certified copy of the Pearl Har-
bor Navy Yard Duty Officers' information sheets, particularly as of
December 6, 1941. [4^0] I think this might be a good point
to receive it as an exhibit for the record if that meets with your
approval.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Ehibit 43.")
Mr. SoNNETT. May we note for the record, Admiral, that exhibit 43
provides in part : "The anti-torpedo net will be closed from sunset to
sunrise. To be opened and closed only upon orders from the Captain
of the Yard, the Assistant Captain of the Yard, or the Yard Duty
Officer"?
Commander, at my request you have endeavored to find out, have you
not, at what time sunrise occurred at Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. And what information did you receive on that ?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. The word received was that sunrise was at
approximately 0727. That is within a few minutes of the actual time.
Mr. SoNNETT. We also have, Admiral, a certified extract from the
signal log of the USS YNG-17 ?
Commander, what was the USS YNG-17?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. That was the gate vessel at the entrance to
Pearl Harbor.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we receive this. Admiral, at this point?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 44.")
Mr. SoNNETT. We also have, Admiral, a certified extract of the
quartermaster's log of the USS YNG-17 for the same dates. May
we receive that also as an exhibit ?
[4^1] Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 45.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Directing your attention to exhibit 45 and to the
entries for December 7, 1941, commencing at 0232, Commander, would
you read those into the record for the sake of clarity ? Then I want
to ask you a question about that.
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. (Reading.)
0232 Gate closed.
0447 Commenced opening gate.
0458 Gate opened. White lights.
0508 CROSSBILL stood in.
0532 CONDOR stood in.
0618 Hoisted ball.
Mr. SoNNETT. The entries in the log, I take it. Commander, or as
to your entering after the CROSSBILL at or about 0532 on December
7, 1941, are in accord with your own log and recollection substantially?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. That is correct.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 255
Mr. SoNNETT. And that is Honolulu time ?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is the meaning of the entry at 0618 after you
stood in "hoisted ball" ?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. To my present recollection, that indicated
that the gate was open.
Mr. SoNNETT. It appears that the next entry on the log is "0800
Japanese air raid." When does it appear that the gate was closed from
that log, Commander ?
[4^£] Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. The log indicates that the gate
was closed at 0846.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the entry in exhibit 45, Commander,
indicating that at 0532 on December 7, 1941, the CONDOR stood in to
Pearl Harbor, can you recall what the conditions of visibility were at
that time ?
Lieut. Comdr. Hubbell. To the best of my knowledge, they were
very good. They were approaching daylight conditions.
Mr. SoNNETT. We have one more certified extract of the log, Ad-
miral, which is an extract from the log of the signal tower at the Navy
Yard, which, if you approve, we should receive at this point.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 46.")
Mr. SoNNETT. May we note, Admiral, for the record at this point
that exhibit 46, the log of the signal tower, has an entry at 2250 on De-
cember 6, 1941, that the LITCHFIELD cleared and the gate was
closed, and that the next entry is 0600, December 7th ? There appar-
ently were no entries kept during the morning of December 7, 1941,
up to 0600.
I have nothing further. Admiral. *
Admiral Hewitt. All right. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation then, at 10:12 a. m., adjourned until 3 p. m.,
Saturday, 9 Jtine 1945, to meet at San Francisco.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 257
Uss-\ PKOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INUUIRY
Nineteenth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the Office of the Com-
mander Western Sea Frontier, Federal Building, San Francisco,
California, at 3 p. m., Saturday, 9 June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. Jolm F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNE; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and W'as duly sworn.
Mr. Sonnett. State your name and rank.
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Allan A. Murray, Lieutenant Commander,
USNR.
Mr. Sonnett. Commander, what is your present assignment?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Well, I am on the Staff of the Military
Govermnent Staging and Holding Area, Monterey, California.
Mr. Sonnett. What were your duties during December, 1941?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. I w^as one of four watch officers who stood
a twenty-four hour round-the-clock watch on the wires coming in
which brought in all of the messages, and so forth, that were handed
to us for working over.
Mr. Sonnett. In whjit section, Commander?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Op-20-G.
Mr. Sonnett. That was at Washington ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. That is right ; Navy Department.
Mr. Sonnett. Who was the commanding officer of that section?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Captain Salford.
Mr. Sonnett. And who were the other three watch officers ?
\^kSl^\ Lieut. Comdr. Murray. There was Brotherhood, Pering,
and Brown. Then there was George Linn, who was the senior officer
and normally did not stand watch, but when any one was on leave,
Linn stood watch.
Mr. Sonnett. Were you standing a watch during the first week of
December, 1941?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Part of the week, yes. You see, we worked
a certain number of watches and then we had forty-eight hours off.
Mr. Sonnett, Who else was on watch that Aveek of those you
named?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Well, Brown was on vacation, so Linn was
taking Browm's place, and otherwise the setup was the same.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you document 15 of exhibit 63 of the Naval
Court of Inquiry record and. ask you whether you have ever seen that
message before.
Lieut. Comdr. Murray, Yes, but I did not see it in English. You
see, I saw it in Japanese kana and at that time Commander Kramer
was the language officer and, of course, I don't know enough about
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1— — 18
258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the language to read the whole message, but he took out transcripts
of this, such as these words here of the four winds, and handed out
those words and told us the meaning of those and told us to watch
out for those words.
Mr. SoNNETT. That was an intercepted Japanese dispatch setting
up the so-called "winds" code, was it not. Commander?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. That is my understanding of it. Any-
thing that I say on this, gentlemen, it is more or less second hand
information because I am not a language expert and the only thing
I can say about it is what they told me and my instructions in regard
to it.
Mr. SoNXETT. Will you state what your instructions were. Com-
mander, in regard to the "winds" code ?
[^•55] Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Well, my instructions were much
the same as they had always been and that is anything of any impor-
tance that came in was to get hold of Commander Kramer and Com-
mander Kramer always left word where he was going. He was very
faithful in that respect and never moved from one place to another
without calling up and telling us where he was ; so we knew where he
was most of the time. But our orders were in addition to that, if we
couldn't get him on the phone, to go and take a car and get him by any
means possible in the event of anything of any importance ; and if any
of those had come in, that is exactly what we would have done.
Mr. SoNNETT, That translation of that message was on or about
November 28, 1941, was it not?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Approximately, yes; about a week before
Pearl Harbor.
Mr. SoNNETT. And is it the fact that efforts were made to monitor
for any Japanese message using the so-called, "winds" code?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. As far as I know, every effort was made,
using even the Coast Guard to get every possible message that they
could get in the hope that they might come through, because it was my
understanding — I don't particularly understand this English version
here — it was my understanding it would be added in in the plain text
news broadcasts that were made. Now, I guess that is essentially what
it says here. It says, "In the middle of the daily Japanese language
shortwave news broadcast." I guess that is the same, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. So far as you know, was any Japanese broadcast
or message ever intercepted by any one using the "winds" code words
relating to the United States?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Let me explain the whole situation on
that, [4^6] as I mentioned to you before. It never came in on
my watch and I was very particular about it and the staff that I had
on there, after they had gone over it, I went over it myself to be sure,
so that I don't think it is possible it could have gone through on my
watch. I was on the day watch of the 4th and the 5th ; then I went
off on forty-eight hour watch. Now, then, when I came back after
Pearl Harbor happened, it is my memory, and I am pretty clear on
it, that Linn mentioned that it had comQ in, but it had come in at a
time when they couldn't use it. Now, that is exactly as I remember
it, but it did not come in on my watch and I am absolutely certain
that up until 4 o'clock the afternoon of the 5th it hadn't come in,
because if it had come in on any one's watch other than mine, I car-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 259
tainly would have known about it because all watch officers passed
along: the log and all events of preceding watches.
Mr. SoxNETT. I show you exhibit 65, Commander, of the Naval
Court of Inquiry record, which consists of documents received from
the Federal Communications Commission, and direct your attention
particularly to documents 2, 3, and 4 and ask whether any of those
came to your attention.
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Document 4 I never did see. Document 3
I couldn't say because it is in English and I practically never saw any
of these messages in English. And Document number 2 the same.
Document number 1, I remember that, but I don't remember it from
the Army. That was our own organization that gave us that.
Mr. SoNNETT. Document innnber 1, Commander, for the sake of
clarity of the record, sets forth the Japanese language to be used for
the three signals, does it not?
Dieut. Comdr. Murray. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And you had the substance of that information, for
[4^] which you were watching?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. But we had it in Japanese and not in Eng-
lish. , ^1
Mr. SoxxETT. Li Japanese?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Yes. The first document you sliowed me
there, I remember now that those words used there in Japanese were
the words we had on a slip of paper and told to watch for, but we had
none of these in English.
Mr. SoxxETT. Commander, you said that on or about December 7th
Linn stated to 5^011 it had come in ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray, After December 7th.
Mr. SoxxETT. After December 7th ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Yes.
Mr. SoxxETT. Will you state exactly what he said, as best you recall ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Well, it was in connection with that multi-
part message that came in. You see. I was off. I was to go on again
at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of Pearl Harbor Day. I was sitting home,
listening to my radio, when I heard the flash and I jumped into a taxi-
cab and reported immediately. It appears then that the word that was
passed on to me from the preceding watch officer was that during the
night of the 6th a mfilti-part message had come in, which I under-
stood laier was the message that was handed to the Secretary of State
the follow day — the multi-part message had come in and they had all
gone to work and sweated over it and then during the course of that
conversation, Linn mentioned to me — I am quite sure of this, but I
can't swear to it — that the "winds" code message had come in, but I
don't know whether the Army got it or whether we got it or who. You
see. the Army and the Navy there were working two teams and the
\4^^8] way the set up was, that on one day — odd or even day ; I can't
remember which — ^the Navy handled it: the other day the Army han-
dled it. Now, of course, we, to be perfectly frank about it — we went
ahead on our own anyway and I think it was due to the fact that we
went ahead on your own that we got a little bit of jump on that multi-
part message. You see. actually that multi-part message came in on
the day that was supposed to be hanrlled by the Army.
Mr. SoxxETT. That is, on December 6th ?
260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Yes, but in view of the urgent circum-
stances, we went ahead on it anyway, that is, our organization did, and
I am quite sure that Linn was on that watch because Brown — the
watches got mixed up and Brown normally either preceded me or re-
lieved me and the fact that he was on vacation, I am quite sure that it
was Linn that got that multi-part message.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, when Linn said to you that this message had
come in, did he indicate when it had come in ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. No.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you understand that it had come in about the
same time as the multi-part message ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. No. My understanding was that it came
in later, because the impression I got from him was that they got it
too late to do anything about it.
Mr. SoNNETT. That would be, then, on December 7th?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Apparently that would be it.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you, Commander, document 6 and document 11
of exhibit 13 of this investigation and ask whether you have seen those
documents before.
[4S9] Lieut. Comdr. Murray. No, I don't ever remember seeing
that. That is the first one.
Mr. SoNNETT. That is document 6, is it, of the exhibit?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Yes, that is 6.
Mr. SoNNETT. For the sake of the record, Commander, can we state
what that document is? That is an intercepted Japanese dispatch
of what date ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. 27 November.
Mr. SoNNETT. And it indicates that a code is set up ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Well, yes, yes. This designation here J-19,
I recognize, too. That usually carried instructions of this kind.
Mr. SoNNETT. The dispatch stated, did it not : "With international
relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of
dispatches using ingo denpo (hidden word or misleading language
telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully"? Then
it lists a series of code words, does it not?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Yes, it gives the code word and the meaning
that the code word will have.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were you familiar with th% establishment b}'' the
Japanese of the so-called hidden word code as indicated in that
exhibit ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. No, I wasn't.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you refer to the next document, which is 11 ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. That I could have seen. You see, again
if I had seen that, gentlemen — well, it was in code
Mr. SoNNETT. For the sake of the record. Commander, would you
read that into the record, too ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. "Relations between Japan and England are
not [44^] ^n accordance with expectations."
Mr. SoNNETT. What is the date of it ?
Lieut. Comdr, Murray. 7 December.
Mr. SoNNETT. From whom and to whom ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. From Tokyo, a circular.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 261
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know whether or not, Commander, Linn was
referring to that message of December 7th when he said to you that a
message had come in employing the "winds" code ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Well, I am not sure what he was referring
to, except this, that we all had the "winds" code on our mind and we
even dreamt about it at night. "We just were on our toes and on edge,
looking and waiting for that thing, and as soon as he said it came in
but too late to use, well, there was only one thing that came to our
mind, and I will be perfectly frank about it. It was no definite speci-
fication made on it or anything further said.
Mr. SoNNETT. If a "winds" code message had come in relating to
England on December 7, 1941, would it have been translated the same
as document 11 of exhibit 13 ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Would it have been translated the same
as 11 ? You mean written up in that form ?
Mr. SoNNETT. In substance, would it have conveyed the same mean-
ing ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. I believe it would, yes, but again I have
the language difficulty to contend with and I can say it is my belief
that it would have been that way.
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, what I have in mind is. Commander, the
"winds" code established a code the use of which would signify a
break in diplomatic relations between this country, England, Russia,
and Japan.
Lieut. Comdr. MuRR^iY. Yes.
[44-^] Mr. SoNNETT. That was also true of the hidden word
code, was it not ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. As indicated?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that the message you have before you, which is
document 11 of exhibit 13, conveyed the substance of the message
which could have been sent in either the "winds" code or the hidden
word code ?
Lieut. Comdr. Murray. Right. In other words, it infers a warn-
ing that something is going to happen.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further. Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. I thinly that is all. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
[44^1 A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. State your name and rank.
Commander Wright. Wesley A. Wright, Commander, USN.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is your present assignment. Commander?
Commander Wright. I am Officer in Charge of the naval radio
activities, Bainbridge Island.
Mr. Sonnett. What was your assignment on December 7, 1941 ?
Commander Wright. Assistant Communications Officer, Staff of
the Commander-in-Chief, on temporary duty in combat intelligence
unit. Fourteenth Naval District.
Mr. Sonnett. For how long prior to December 7, 1941, had you
been on that duty ?
Commander Wright. Since March 31, '41.
262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Who was in charge of that activity, Commander?
, Commander Wright, Then Lieutenant Commander J. J. Roche-
fort.
Mr. SoNNETT. And what were your duties in that unit?
Commander Wright. Assistant Cryptanalyst.
Mr. SoNNETT. Wlio else was engaged in cryptanalysis activities in
that unit at that time ?
Commander Wright. Lieutenant Commander T. H. Dyer was the
senior cryptanalyst and myself and we had an ensign, a Reserve, who
had been there since December, '40 — I think it was Wurner. We had
ii lieutenant. Reserve, by the name of Underwood ; a chief yeoman by
the name of Woodward ; Chief Yeoman Rorie.
Mr. SoNNETT. Is this all in decrypting?
Commander Wright. All of those up to Rorie were aKuully en-
gaged in decrypting and clerical.
[4-43] Mr. SoNNETT. Woodward?
Commander Wright. No. Rorie. Woodward was entirely de-
crypting and language assistance. Chief Yeoman Conant. Lieu-
tenant Hopewick was available for decrypting work. His primary
duties were with the IBM machines. I believe that is all.
Mr. SoNNETT. Commander, you recall, I take it, that during the
early part of December, 1941, certain messages of the Japanese Consul
in Hawaii were secured and worked on by your unit ?
Commander Wright. Yes, I remember that.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you recall approximately when those messages
were received in your unit ?
Commander Wright. I am afraid I couldn't answer that definitely.
I have discussed these things so much since that I know we got them
on the 5th now, but that would be absolutely hearsay.
Mr. SoNNETT. Commander, I show you exhibit 29 of this investiga-
tion, which consists of photostatic copies of translated dispatches to
and from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu during the first week in
December, 1941, and ask you whether you recall that they were among
the dispatches received and translated at that time.
Commander Wright. Yes, I believe they were among the dispatches
that were delivered to us by the naval intelligence unit of the Four-
teenth Naval District.
Mr. SoNNETT. I also show you exhibit 40 of this investigation and
call to your attention the second ONI report contained in that exhibit,
dated 14 February 1942, and ask you whether the translated Japanese
messages set forth in that report were among those received prior to
December T, 1941.
Commander Wright. I would say that they were all received to-
gether. [444] It is my recollection that we got them all on the
5th. It would have been very difficult for us to get one that was sent
on the 6th — no, not necessarily ; if it was sent the 6th Tokyo time, we
could have got it on the 5th. I would state that I am fairly positive
on those up to and including the day of the 5th. Those that are dated
the 6th, I am not so sure about them ; but I don't remember the second
package coming in.
Mr. SoNNETT. Commander, did you work on the decryption of any
of those messages which came in up to and including December 6,
1941?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 263
Commander Wright. Not directly, no. In a supervisory capacity, I
watched Woodward's work.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it Woodward, then, who did the bulk of the de-
cryption ?
Commander Wright. Woodward, I believe, did all of the decryption
with some clerical assistance.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 41 of this investigation. Com-
mander, which consists of twenty-eight pages of photostats of hand-
written and typed decryptions and translations, and ask you whether
you can identify the handwriting on any of those pages.
Commander Wright. No, I am afraid I couldn't recognize the hand-
writing positively. I am quite sure that between Woodward and
Laswell— they are in Washington— they can all be identified. They
are both there in Washington, and Laswell was the translating unit
out there at the time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall. Commander, whether any of the mes-
sages to or from the "Japanese Consulate in Hawaii which were deliv-
ered to the Navy prior to December 7, 1941, was decrypted and trans-
lated before the attack?
Commander Wright. No, I don't know whether any were or not. I
have been under the impression that there were none delivered to
Layton previously, but if he has testified differently, he is probably
correct. I wouldn't [44^] have been involved in it myself.
Mr. SoNNETT. My question wasn't whether they were delivered to
Layton, but whether there was any decrypted and translated prior to
the attack.
Commander Wright. I don't know. Again, I think Laswell and
Woodward can give you a better answer.
Mr. SoNNETT. Commander, were you familiar with the establish-
ment of the so-called "winds" code by the Japanese on or about No-
vember 28, 1941 ?
Commander Wright. Yes, it came to my attention at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry,
document 15, and ask you whether you were familiar with that dis-
patch of the substance of it.
Commander Wright. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. That is the so-called "winds" code, is it not?
Commander Wright. That is setting up the wind warning.
Mr. SoNNETT. Are you familiar with the efforts which were made to
monitor for any Japanese message employing that code?
Commander Wright. Yes. As I remember it, immediately after the
I'eceipt of this message, we set a watch, a twenty-four hour watch, on
those broadcasts at the radio station, one language officer on for every
four hours.
Mr. Sonnett. What were the results, if any?
Commander Wright. No message of that nature was intercepted by
our unit.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you know of the receipt by any one of a "winds"
code message relating to the L^nited States prior to December 7, 1941?
Commander Wright. No, I do not know of such. That is, the exe-
cute.
Mr. Sonnett. Did any information ever come to your attention
which was received as a result of tapping the telephone wires of the
264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese [44^] Consulate, that is, prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Commander Wright. No.
Mr. SoNNETT. On December 7, 1941, Commander, you were on duty
at the unit at Pearl Harbor, were you not ?
Commander Wright. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And during the co^irse of that day, it has been indi-
cated by previous investigations, there were various radio bearings re-
ceived as to the location of the attacking force. You testified before
Admiral Hart that there was an early arbitrary assumption that the
surface forces were actually to the southward. Is that your recollec-
tion?
Commander Wright. I would say there was a general impression
that the enemy forces were to the south.
Mr. SoNNETT. There was one bearing, was there not, which was in
direct conflict with the other bearings and indicated that the attacking
force was almost due north ?
Commander Wright. Yes, but the circinnstances surrounding the
obtaining of that bearing were such that it was never given the prom-
inence that it possibly might have had.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state fully what those circumstances were,
please ?
Commander Wright. The large direction finder which we then had
had out at Lualualei, CXK, the only means of communication we had
between Lualualei and our unit there at Pearl Harbor was by an Army
mega-telephone and all those mega-telephones were put out of com-
mission and we had no communication contact with the station; so
we finally raised the station by radio from Admiral Kimmel's head-
quarters and received one bearing by radio which indicated a northern
direction.
144'^] Mr. SoNNETT. About what time of day was that? Do
you remember?
Commander Wright. No, I am afraid I don't. I would say offhand
maybe 10 : 30, 11 o'clock.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know what, if any, action was taken as a
result of having obtained that bearing ?
Commander Wright. No, I don't believe it made — it had influenced
the opinion at all that the forces were to the south.
Mr. Sonnett. Was the direction finder at Lualualei a one directional
or reciprocal —
Commander Wright. The CXK is unilateral.
Mr. Sonnett. Unilateral?
Commander Wright. Yes, it gives a true direction.
Mr. Sonnett. Were there any other CXK's being used in the area
at that time ?
Commander Wright. No, the only other one we had at that time was
in Mare Island.
Mr. Sonnett. Was there any information received from the Army
on December 7, 1941, as to the radar bearings of the attacking forces ?
Do you know whether any information was received ?
Commander Wright. To the best of my knowledge, there was none
received by our unit.
Mr. Sonnett. Commander, I call your attention to documents 1, 2,
3, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 23, and 24 of exhibit 13 of this in-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 265
vestigation, which are all copies of Japanese dispatches relating to
ships and defense preparations in the Pearl Harbor area, and ask
you whether prior to December 7, 1941, you saw any of those dispatches.
Commander Wright. No. To the best of my recollection, none of
these [44S] messages were transmitted to or received by our
unit prior to December 7th.
Mr. SoNNFTT. I call your attention, Commander, specifically to
docmnent 14 of this exhibit, which is a message from Honolulu to
Tokyo, dated December 6, 1941, in the PA-K2 system, dealing with
barrage balloons, and also call your attention to pages 7 and 8 of ex-
hibit 41, which is a pencilled translation, and ask you whether those
are translations of the same message.
Commander Wright. Yes, undoubtedly two different translations
of the same message.
Mr. SoNNETT. I call j'our attention to the last sentence of the first
paragraph of document 14, which indicates that it is an Army transla-
tion, does it not?
Commander Wright. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the last sentence reads: "I imagine that in all
probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage
for a surprise attack against these places." I call your attention to
the last sentence of the first paragraph of page 7 of exhibit 41, which
reads : "The whole matter seems to have been dropped" — which indi-
cates a different translation of that portion of the message, does it
not?
Commander Wright. It certainly indicates a different interpreta-
tion of the Japanese in that portion.
Mr. Sonnett. Have you any information about the difference in
translation, Commander ?
Commander Wright. None at all.
Mr. Sonnett. And you do not know, I take it, who made the trans-
lation contained on pages 7 and 8 of exhibit 41 ?
Commander Wright. Not offliand. I would guess it was Fullen-
wider, [449] but it is either Laswell or Fullenwider or possibly
Rochefort. I would guess from this one it was possibly Fullenwider.
Mr. Sonnett. The messages in exhibit 13 to which I have called
your attention just now, Commander, indicate that many of them were
translated by the Army, do they not?
Commander Wright. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you know how the Army received those messages
in the first place and, secondly, what their procedure was for decrypt-
ing and translating them ?
Conimander Wright, Roughly, as I remember it, we had a joint
source of obtaining all the diplomatic traffic. We had our own inter-
cept stations and they had their own intercept stations. We pooled
the intercepts. Then they had a day by day arrangement whereby
the Navy didn't necessarily work on all the traffic for that day, but the
Navy was responsible for all of the translations for that day and the
Army was responsible — if it were the odd days, then the Navy would
be the even days; but both units works on all of the messages. The
Army on there just indicates that it was the Army's date to be respon-
sible for that particular message.
266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you state from those particular exhibits what
Army intercept station intercepted them, that is, referring to the same
ship movement and defense preparation messages '^
Commander Wright. In general, I would say that the numerals in-
dicated Army and the letters indicated Navy. I am not sure of that.
You can get better information on that from the people that were in
Washington at that time. Murray, I think, would probably know it.
That is what it looks like to me, that the letters were Navy and the
numerals Army. The letter "S" would indicate that the message was
intercepted at Bainbridge Island.
[4^0] Mr. SoNNETT. Was any decryption done at Bainbridge
Island, Commander ? Do you know ?
Commander Wright. No.
Mr. SoNNETT. Where was the decryption done of the Japanese
messages which were intercepted ?
Commander Wright. In accordance with the assignment of cryp-
analytical tasks, all of the decryption of diplomatic traffic was done
either at Washington or at Cavite.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.
Commander Wright. I have nothing. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 3:52 p. m. adjourned until 2: 15
p. m., 19 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 267
\.W] PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INQUIEY
Twentieth Day
Pursuant to notice, the inA^estigation met at the offices of the Gen-
eral Board, Navy Department, at 2 : 15 p. m., Tuesday, 19 June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USX; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. CirisAvold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Beecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. Sonnett. State your name and rank, please.
Captain Earle. John B. Earle, Captain, tjSN.
]Mr. Sonnett. What was j-our assignment on December 7, 1941,
Captain?
Captain Eable. Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Xaval District.
Mr. Sonnett. And for how long had you been in that assignments
Captain Earle. Since June 9, 1941.
Mr. Sonnett. You testified previously, as I recall it, Captain, tliat
in the several months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor you had
about ten or fifteen reports of submarines sighted around Pearl Har-
bor. Can you recall what those reports were ?
Captain Earle. Verj' indefinitely. They generally came from sam-
pans— from fishing boats ; occasionally from Army lookout posts ; and
now and then from planes.
]Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall. Captain, the nature of the last report
received prior to December 7. 1941?
Captain Earle. No, I do not.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, do you recall specificalh' any report of sub-
marine sighting or contact in the months of October, November, and
up to [It52^ December 6, 1941 ?
Captain Earle. No, I do not.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall. Captain, whether prior to December 7,
1941, there Avas any report of a submarine just off the entrance to
Pearl Harbor?
Captain Earle. As I recall, there had been such a report, but wheth-
er it was official and not simply unofficial, I can't say at this time.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall whether that report was a contact or
sighting, Captain ?
Admiral Hewitt. You mean destroyer contact.
Mr. Sonnett. Destroyer contact or sighting.
Captain Earle. I can't recall.
Mr. Sonnett. Did any report of a submarine contact prior to De-
cember 7, 1941, involve a depth charge on the submarine or suspected
submarine ?
Captain Earle. My recollection is not sufficiently accurate to say
whether or not I can recall that point. I have a vague recollection of
268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
something of that kind, but not sufficiently accurate to make a definite
statement.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you recall, Captain, whether any report prior to
December 7, 1941, involved firing upon a submarine or a suspected
submarine ?
Captain Earle. I am almost certain that there was no such report.
Mr. SoNNETT. Keferring to the morning of December T, 1941, Cap-
tain, I show you exhibit 18 of this investigation and direct your atten-
tion particularly to the conversation recorded at about 0520 Pearl Har-
bor time of that date between the WARD and the CONDOK, and ask
whether that conversation or the fact of such a convereation came
to your attention prior to the attack on December 7th?
Captain Earle. It did not.
[4S3] Mr. SoNNETT. You will note on the second page of that
exhibit. Captain, a report by the WARD of its attack upon a sub-
marine. That report did come to your attention prior to the attack,
as I understand your previous testimony.
Captain Earle. That report did come to my attention but not in the
wording that it is included in the log of the section base.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you state. Captain, the report of that con-
versation which was received by you on December 7, 1941, and state
the time approximately at which you received it ?
Captain Earle. About 0710 I was informed by the Operations Duty
Officer, Lieutenant Commander Kaminski, that he had received a mes-
sage from the WARD to the effect that "We have attacked and fired on
a submarine."
Admiral Hewitt. Nothing about depth charges ?
Captain Earle. No, sir.
Mr. SoNNETT. That report. Captain, was a more specific report, was
it not, than any previous report concerning submarine contact which
had been received by you ?
Captain Earle. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. What action was taken on the report?
Captain Earle. As I recall it, I immediately told the watch officer
to inform the Commander-in-Chief's Operation Officer and to take
steps to get the relief destroyer ready to proceed out of the harbor, to
get the message checked and verified and attempt to find out what
further action was being taken by the WARD. I then called the
Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral Bloch, in-
formed him of what had been done, and talked the situation over with
him for some time with a view to deciding what other action should
be taken. Our reaction was that it was probably a mistake as we had
had numerous reports of sighting of submarines, but that if it were
not a [4^4-] mistake, the WARD could take care of the situa-
tion and the relief destroyer could lend a hand, while the Commander-
in-Chief had the necessary power to undertake any other action which
might be desired. Mainly we were trying to definitely determine
what had happened.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it. Captain, that no further action was taken
on that report prior to the air attack on December 7th?
Captain Earle. No other action was taken by me. I believe that in
addition to that, that Commander Momsen, who was the Operations
Officer, was contacted and told to take station. We were vaguely
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 269
alarmed but could see no specific threat involved except that by the
possible position of an enemy submarine in that area.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I show you exhibit 8 of the Naval Court of
Inquiry, which is Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number 2CL-41
(Kevised) , dated October 14, 1941, and ask whether you saw that and
were familiar with that prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Earle. It is my recollection that I saw this before Decem-
ber 7, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, referring to page 6 of that exhibit. Captain,
sub-paragraph (m) (3), would you read that into the record, sir?
Captain Earle. "It must be remembered too, that a single sub-
marine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface
force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The
Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as
quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be
prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air
search or other means."
Mr. SoNisTETT. Were you in agreement. Captain, there with that
statement of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of the fleet ?
[4oS] Captain Eaele. Most certainly in agreement, based upon
the belief that such an attack might take place after the declaration
of war.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, referring. Captain, to page 1 of that letter,
you will find two assumptions stated. Would you read assumption
(b) into the record? I suggest doing it that way because it has been
some lime since you have seen that exhibit, and also it will be clearer
in the record.
Captain Earle (reading) :
(a) That no responsible foreign power wil provoke war, under present exist-
ing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and mis-
guided nationals of such powers may attempt ;
(1) Sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.
(2) To black the entrance to Peai'l Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the
Channel.
(3 ) To lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.
(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by ;
(1) A surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
(3) a combination of these two.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, Captain, coming back to the previous question,
it appears, does it not, that one of the assumptions of the security
letter was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise
Japanese attack? Having that in mind and turning to the statement
that you previously read concerning the presence of a submarine, will
you state W'hy, on the morning of December 7, 1941, upon receipt of the
report from the WARD, it was not believed tliat a large Japanese
force might be in the offing and why appropriate action was not taken
on that belief ?
[4^6] Captain Earle. In the first place, we were not sure of this
supposed contact. It still seemed to have a possibility of being in
error. This was particularly strengthened by a later report received
from the WARD which said that she was proceeding to escort a
sampan toward Honolulu. We couldn't imagine that the WARD,
having actually attacked a submarine, would leave her post to proceed
to Honolulu if it were a real attack. In the second place, we had no
270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
force immediately available to resist any attack as far as the District
was concerned, except the relief destroyer, and we felt that by referring
the matter to the Commander-in-Chief, that we had done all that we
possibly could even if the attack were real.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Captain, to the previous submarine con-
tact reports, that is, prior to December 7, 1941, were any air searches
conducted as a result of those reports ?
Captain Earle. It is my recollection that there were air searches,
but we in the District had no control over these air searches and we
had no airplanes ourselves, so that we asumed that when information
was referred to the Commander-in-Chief, that all necessary action
would be taken.
Mr. SoNNETT. With respect, Captain, to the question of aircraft
reconnaissance, it appears from the previous investigations that some
time in July or August of 1941 Admiral Bloch suggested to Admiral
Kimmel that reconnaissance be conducted on a sector towards Jaluit.
Have you any information in connection with that?
Captain Earle. I have not.
Mr. SctNNETT. And you do not know what the reasons were for the
suggestions made by Admiral Bloch ?
Captain Earle. I do not recall.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, I show j'ou a certified collection of docu-
ments L-^'/] which contains Annex VII, Section VI, Joint
Agreements, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, this being
dated 28 March 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that
at or about the time it was issued.
Captain Earle. I do not recall definitely having seen this docu-
ment, but inasmuch as when I reported as Chief of Staff in June
I was shown all of the existing orders, it is very probable that T
saw this.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, this contains various other documents
which we don't presently need, but since it is certified, I wonder
whether we shouldn't take it now as an exhibit and we can refer to it
with the Captain. Some of the provisions will be of interest.
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 47.")
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to exhibit 47, Captain, which w^e have just
been discussing, it appears that it was approved April 2, 1941, and
signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short, does it not?
Captain Earle. It does.
Mr. Sonnett. Paragraph 2 of the exhibit provides for joint air
operations and paragraph 4 for joint anti-aircraft measures, includ-
ing arrival and departure procedure for aircraft, and other items.
Would you, referring to this exhibit. Captain, discuss what joint
. exercises and drills were held with the Army as a general practice
in the months preceding the attack under the joint anti-aircraft
procedure ?
Captain Earle. As I recall, definite problems were prepared for
training purposes which would serve to develop the control features
of the base anti-aircraft defense and at the same time develop the
necessary coordination between the operations of the Army and Navy
air components. Frequent [4^S] drills — I should say about
once every ten days — were held in which planes would fly over the
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 271
Pearl Harbor area both day and night and the ships in the harbor
would stimulate anti-aircraft fire on these planes. The entire Pearl
Harbor area was divided into sectors and there was a naval sector
commander on a ship who was responsible for controlling the indi-
vidual fire of that sector and make the necessary reports. In addi-
tion to the above, a problem was developed about once a month or
less in which a definite target for aircraft was placed on a certain
bearing from Pearl Harbor at a certain time and the warning was
sent in to both the Army and Navy that an enemy aircraft carrier
or unit was on such and such a bearing, distance so much. At that
time the various provisions of air control were used in that, fighter
planes were sent aloft and bombers were actually sent out to inter-
cept and attack the simulated target offshore. I am not certain
exactly how many drills of this type were had before Pearl Harbor
on December 7th. but I should say at least three.
Mr, SoNNETT. When was the latest of the three. Captain ?
Captain Earle. I am sorry, but I couldn't say exactly.
Mr. SoN>rETT. Can you recall whether any such drill was held be-
tween November 27th and December 7th, that is, roughly in the two
weeks preceding the attack ?
Captain Earle. I cannot recall.
Admiral Hewitt. What was the command staff setup for carrying
out joint operations as between the District and the Army command
in such exercises ?
Captain Earle. You mean before Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Hewitt. Any such exercise, before Pearl Harbor and what
was set up after?
Captain Earle. My recollection is colored from operations that took
[4-59] place after Pearl Harbor, but it is my belief that the entire
problem of this aircraft coordination was handled through the fleet
and the Army. In other words, after the word came through that an
enemy had been sighted on a certain bearing, this word was given to
the fleet and to the Army and that then arrangements were made
between the commander of the fleet air and the Army air to coordinate
their operations, including orders as to — detailed directions as to
direction, speed, and number of planes to be used, and so forth.
To amplify the above statement, there was no joint command post
or operations center actually set up for these drills before the war.
The Operations Office in the Headquarters of the Fourteenth Naval
District, which consisted of an operation switchboard with necessary
communication personnel and a watch officer, was set up to handle
these drills from the Fourteenth Naval District. I do not recall the
exact time, but either somewhere just before Pearl Harbor or just
after, a coast artillery liaison officer was placed in this Operations
Office. Plans had been made for a joint command post, but no definite
steps had been taken as to location or details prior to the start of the
war. It is my recollection that plans had been made for a joint com-
mand post, but this had not gone beyond the planning stage.
After the war started, a joint command post was set up immediately
in the Operations Office of the Fourteenth Naval District and operated
there for several months while the Army moved their principal com-
272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
mand center to the Crater. Shortly after their move, the Navy moved
its command center next to the Army center in the Crater-
Admiral HiwiTT. That is, Fourteenth Naval District
Captain Earle. Fourteenth
Admiral Hewitt. Or District and the Commander-in-Chief?
Captain Earle, No, District; just the District.
[4^0] Mr. SoNNETT. Prior to December 7, 1941, Captain, the
Fourteenth Naval District had a Liaison Officer with General Short's
headquarters, did you not?
Captain Earle. Yes, sir.
Mr. SoNNETT. What, in general, were his duties, Captain ?
Captain Earle. He was sent up to the Army to report to the Com-
manding General for duty as Liaison Officer and to perform such duties
in that connection as would be required.
Mr. SoNNETT. Exhibit 47, Captain, the Annex VII, Section VI, to
the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, provided in part that the
Army would expedite the installation and placing in operation of an
aircraft warning service. During the period of completion of the
AWS installation, the Navy, through use of radar and other appro-
priate means, would endeavor to give such warnings of hostile attacks
as might be practicable. What steps were taken, in general. Captain,
by the Navy to carry out that agreement ?
Captain Earle. In the first place, communications were established
with the Army over radio nets and teletype system so that any infor-
mation that came in could be sent promptly to the Army stations
interested. The communication activities were informed that prompt
reports must be made concerning any possible enemy activity. The
few destroyers assigned to the District had the necessary instruc-
tions as to reporting contacts. There were no planes attached to the
District, but it is my recollection that fleet planes were instructed to
forward immediately any information to that extent. The District
Communications Officer was thoroughly aware of the necessitj^ for
getting prompt information of enemy contacts to the Army.
Mr. SoNNETT. To what extent, Captain, were you or Admiral Bloch
kept informed concei-ning the reconnaissance being performed by the
fleet panes in the months preceding the attack ?
[4^1] Captain Earle. I can't speak for Admiral Bloch, but as
far as I am concerned, I had no information unless I came by it
casually, following some special report of a sighting.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I show you a collection of dispatches relat-
ing to submarine contacts reported in November and December, 1941.
some of which were sent for information to ComFOURTEEN, and
ask you whether these are the type of reports of submarine contacts
received prior to the attack to which you referred previously in your
testimony.
Captain Earle, They are.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit. Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes,
(The dispatches referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
48".)
Mr. SoisrisTBTT. Captain, referring again to exhibit 47, which is
Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan,
it appears that the Army was to expedite the installation and placing
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 273
in operation of an aircraft warning service. It appears from previous
investigations that some request was made of ComFOURTEEN for
Navy liaison officers to work with the Army aircraft warning service.
Do you have any knowledge or information concerning that?
Captain Earle. The only information I have is that there was a
naval officer engaged in assisting the Army to get their warning system
installed and operating, who came to me at one time and asked for
help and I told him to apply to the District Communications Officer,
who would be glad to give him every possible assistance. This officer
also mentioned that a certain number of naval liaison officers would be
necessary at this warning center, to which I replied that we had no
spare personnel in the District for that purpose as [463] we
were extremely short in every department. The officer then stated that
he would see what he could do to get liaison officers from the fleet,
and it was my impression that no further action would be taken by
the District unless the fleet found it necessary. It might be of interest
to note that after Pearl Harbor liaison officers were supplied, but they
all came from ships that had been damaged or sunk in Pearl Harbor.
Mr. SoNNETT. Wliile we are on the subject of the Army radar
system, Captain, do you recall what reports you received from the
Army relative to the bearing of planes or bearings of planes, received
on December 7th, showing in which direction they departed from
Pearl Harbor ?
Captain Earle. So far as as I know. I never saw such information.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, the District Intelligence Officer was Cap-
tain Mayfleld, was he not?
Captain Earle. Yes, sir.
Mr, SoNNETT. And the radio intelligence unit was under then
Lieutenant Commander Rochefort?
Captain Earle. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you receive the daily communication intelligence
summaries prepared by the radio intelligence unit, such as those con-
tained in exhibit 22 of this investigation (handing the exhibit to the
witness) ?
Captain Earle. No, I did not. These summaries were considered
of such secret matter that the Commandant of the District wished
as few as possible to see them.
Mr, SoNNETT. Do you know whether or not such summaries came
to Admiral Bloch's attention?
Captain Earle. I do not, but I imagine they did.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you have any information prior to December 7,
1941, [4631 concerning any telephone taps on the lines of the
Japanese Consul or Vice Consul in Honolulu ?
Captain Earle. I have no information on that subject.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you know whether or not any cables of the Japa-
nese Consul in Honolulu were intercepted prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Earle. I do not know.
Mr. Sonnett. At any time prior to Deceipber 7, 1941, did there
come to your attention. Captain, any messages of the Japanese Consid
relating to ship movements in Pearl Harbor or preparations for de-
fense in Pearl Harbor ?
Captain Earle. There did not.
79716— 4G— Ex. 149, vol. I 19
274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, with respect to the dealings of the Four-
teenth Naval District with the Army, do you recall what information,
if any, was supplied to the Army, particularly relating to movements
of Japanese naval forces ?
Captain Eari^. I do not know of any information of that character
being furnished the Army.
Mr. SoNNETT. Prior to December 7, 1941, immediately prior thereto,
and between the 1st and the Tth there were various dispatches re-
ceived at CincPac Headquarters relating to the destruction of codes
by the Japanaese. Did you have any knowledge of those dispatches ?
Captain Earle. I believe that I saw such a dispatch over at the
Commander-in-Chief's office.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know whether that information was com-
municated to the Army?
Captain Earle. I couldn't say. The Fourteenth Naval District
didn't communicate it to the Army.
Mr. Sonnett. I think that is all. Admiral.
[464] Admiral Hewitt. I have nothing further. Thank you
very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 3 : 20 p. m., adjourned until 10 : 10
a. m., Wednesday, 20 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 27i
U65] PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIRY
Twenty-First Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the Gen-
eral Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. at lU : 10 a. m.,
Wednesday, 20 June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. Sonnett. Will jou state your name and rank, please?
Lieutenant Underkofler. Oliver H. Underkofler, Lieutenant,
USNR.
Mr. Sonnett. Where were you assigned on December 7, 1941,
Lieutenant?
Lieutenant Underkofler. Communication Office, ComFOUR-
TEEN.
Mr. Sonnett. What duties were you performing on the night of
December 6th or morning of December 7, 1941?
Lieutenant Undekkofler. I' was the communication watch officer
on watch.
Mr. Sonnett. That is, of ComFOURTEEN?
Lieutenant Underkofler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sonnett. At what time did that watch commence, Lieutenant ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. The commAinication watch officer's
watch started at 0800 on the 6th and was supposed to conclude at 0800
on the 7th.
Mr. Sonnett. In addition to yourself, who else was present at that
time, during that watch ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. Ensign Kennedy, now lieutenant.
Mr. Sonnett. And his first name?
Lieutenant Underkofler. I believe it was Gordon F., but I am
not sure.
[4G0] Mr. Sonnett. On the morning of the 7th until approxi-
mately 0630 was Kennedy present with you, listening to the reports
(hat came in, and in a position to hear them?
Lieutenant Underkofler. No. sir, he was in the coding vault,
which was at the far end of the Communication Office and was sepa-
rated from the Communication Office by a bulkhead, with a port in
the bulkhead about twelve inches square; so he was in no position
to hear the radio.
Mr, Sonnett. You were standing what you termed a loudspeaker
watch, were you not, Lieutenant?
Lieutenant Underkofler. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you describe what that consisted of?
276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Lieutenant Underkofler. It was a watch on the inshore patrol
frequency, was established each evening at the time the minesweeps
went out and commenced sweeping the channel, and we stood watch
on that circuit until we received a report from the minesweeps that
the channel had been swept and was clear, at which time we secured.
Mr SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 18 of this investigation, which
consists of an extract of the radio log of the Bishop's Point Radio
Station for December 7, 1941, and call your attention to the conver-
sation between the WARD and the CONDOR, having call signs
DZ5Y and DN3L, at about 1450 Greenwich time, and ask whether
or not that conversation came to j^our attention.
Lieutenant Underkofi^er. It did not.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you explain why it did not come to your atten-
tion. Lieutenant?
Lieutenant Underkofler. On this loudspeaker watch that was set
up there was no one assigned to sit by the radio and listen to it.
Any one who has stood loudspeaker watches is aware that you listen
to it subconsciously, [4^"^1 the same as you would any other
noise in the vicinity. If your call is given, you hear it just like as
if an alarm clock had been rung and you immediately answer the
call. If we hadn't been called that morning, we would have paid,
or the man on watch would have paid, no attention to the conversa-
tion that was carried on.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you remember what your call was?
Lieutenant Underkofler. No, sir, I don't.
Mr. SoNNETT. By looking at exhibit 18, can you refresh your recollec-
tion, particularly the second page?
Lieutenant Underkofler. From the appearance of the log, it would
seem that DW2X was a call for ComFOURTEEN. Those calls were
assigned by the District and changed about once eveiy two months
and we made no attempt to memorize them.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring again to the conversation between the
WARD and CONDOR at about 1450 Greenwich time, what time would
that be. Pearl Harbor time?
Lieutenant Underkofler. Pearl Harbor time before the war was
plus ten and a half hours, which would make that 4 : 20.
Mr. SoNNETT. Is it the fact that you were not called by either the
WARD or the CONDOR and given a report of the sighting of the
submarine referred to in that conversation?
Lieutenant Underkofler. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to page 2 of exhibit 18, there appears at
1723 Greenwich time, which, I take it, is about 0653 Pearl Harbor
time, a record of the report by the WARD of an attack on a submarine.
Did that report come to your attention ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. It did.
[4^8] Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state the circumstances and what
action was taken by you?
Lieutenant Underkofler. There were two dispatches came through
to ComFOURTEEN and I was broken out of the bunk as the first
one came in and by the time the second one had come in, which came
in immediately following, I was alert and received the message and
delivered it to the duty officer at ComFOURTEEN.
Mr. Sonnett. At what time on the morning of December 7th had
you turned in, Lieutenant?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 277
Lieutenant Underkofler. At approximately 0230.
Mr. SoNNEiT. And from that time until you were awakened at about
0630 or thereabouts, I take it, you were asleep ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. That is correct. ,
Mr. SoNNETT. Who was the supervisor, if you recall, who was awake
during that period of time ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. I do not recall who was on watch. I don't
recall a single man that was on watch that morning.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do vou know whether the conversation between the
WARD and the CONDOR at about 0420 Pearl Harbor time came to
the attention of any one who was standing that watch with you ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. To my knowledge, it did not.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would the fact of such a conversation have been re-
ported to you had it come to the attention of some one standing that
watch ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. Yes, I am sure it would.
Mr. SoNNETT. It has been testified previously, Lieutenant, that ef-
forts were made to verify the WARD's report. Have you any knowl-
edge of that?
Lieutenant Underkofler. Yes, sir.
[469] Mr. Sonnett. Will you state what you know about that ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. On receipt of the dispatch from the
WARD at approximately 0653 Hawaiian time, the dispatch was de-
livered to the duty officer of ComFOURTEEN, who relayed it to the
Chief of Staff of the Fourteenth Naval District. I was directed to get
a verification from the WARD by the duty officer and presumed that
this order emanated from the Chief of Staff. I asked if it should be
encoded and was instructed that it should be. The message requesting
verification was enciphered in a strip code and was delivered over the
voice circuit, voice radio circuit, to the WAHD. A reply to the re-
quest for verification was delivered to ComFOURTEEN by radio and
was deciphered at approximately the same time as the first attack by
air.
Mr. Sonnett. You stated that you were instructed by the duty
officer to have the report of the WARD verified. Did you receive that
instruction upon delivery to him of the report by the WARD or sub-
sequent to the delivery?
Lieutenant Underkofler. It was subsequent to the delivery.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall approximately how long afterwards?
Lieutenant Underkoflfj?. That has been some time ago and the
best of my remembrance, it was between ten and fifteen minutes.
Mr. Sonnett. You kept no log at the Communication Office on the
morning of the 7th, did 3^ou ?
Lieutenant Underkofler. There are several different types of logs.
We did not keep a log of the inshore patrol frequency over which these
messages to the WARD were handled.
Mr. Sonnett. You testified. Lieutenant, that you were instructed
to request the WARD for verification and to encode your request and
that you did so in a strip code. Will you state what that means and
the amount of time required to transmit such a message in that code ?
[4W] Lieutenant Underkofler. Use of the strip code is a sub-
stitution method, a substitution of letters method, so that when that
message has been encoded, it consists of five-letter groups that are
278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
not in any particular arrangement; in other words, indiscriminate let-
ters in the five-letter groups. It is a slow system to use, that is, to en-
code or decode in, and was used because it was the only thing that the
WARD had. The transmission of such a message over a voice circuit
requires that each letter be given in its phonetic equivalent, which is a
slow process. The reply, of course, was also enciphered and was de-
livered the same way, which was a lengthy process and took consider-
able time. I can't tell you how many minutes.
Admiral Hewitt. The origial report from the WAED was de-
livered in clear, was it not?
Lieutenant Underkofler. Yes, sir.
Mr. 80NNETT. That is all.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
Admiral Hewitt. We will i-ecess at this time until 11 o'clock.
(The investigation then, at 10: 30 a. m., recessed until 11 a. m., at
tvhich time it reconvened.)
(Present: The same parties.)
[471] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state your name and rank, sir ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Patrick N. L. Bellinger, Vice Admiral,
USN.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, you have a statement, do you not, setting
forth your duties during December, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I have.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we have it copied into the record?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
(The statement referred to follows as pages 4Tla to 47lh, inclu-
sive.)
[471a] On December 6, 1941, and, for several mouths prior thereto, my duties
were as follows :
(1) Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings and O^mmander, Patrol Wing
Two. Included in the larger command were the patrol squadrons and airci'aft
tenders attached to I'atrol Wings One and Two.
(2) Commander, Task Force Nine. This comprised Patrol Wings One and Two
plus other units as assigned by Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet for the conduct
of specific operations.
(3) Commander, Fleet Air Detachment. Pearl Harbor. The responsibilities of
this function included administrative authority in local matters over all aircraft
actually based on the Naval Aair Station. Pearl Harbor.
(4) Liasion with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for aviation develop-
ment within the District, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston
Islands.
(5) Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.
In connection with the above duties, I functioned under the following seniors :
(a) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who as type commander for patrol
wings, was based at San Diego.
(b) Commander Scouting Force, the Force Command of which Patrol Wings
One and Two were a part.
(c) Directly under Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet in my capacity as Com-
mander. Task Force Nine.
['/7i?>] (d) Under Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in his capacity
as Commander. Naval Base Defense Force when performing my duties as Com-
mandei- Naval Base Defense Air Force.
(e) Commanders of Task Forces One, Two, and Three for Operation of patrol
planes assigned those forces for specific operations.
A change in my status was contemplated in the then curi-ent Navy Orange War
Plan. Under its provisions, the units of my connnand were expected to make an
early move to bases on the outlying islands Midway, Wake, Johnston and Palmyra.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 279
My own headquarters were to be shifted to Midway. That my responsibilities in
this connectiou were by uo means considered light is evidenced by the fact that,
just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, this War Plan was being played as a
chart maneuver. Further, the squadron, ■VP-22, designated for maintenance in
the highest practicable degree of readiness to expedite the initiation of the war
plan move to advance bases was, in fact, transferred to Midway in October 1941.
Keverting to my status on Oahu, the most complicated of my duties consisted
of those in connection with the air defense of Pearl Harbor. About 1 March,
1941, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet directed me to report to the Com-
mandent 14th Naval District to prepare an air defense plan in conjunction with
the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. I so reported and proceeded with
the assigned task, working directly with Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. Army,
Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force who, incidentally, was senior to me.
The operation plan for the Naval Base Defense Force included several sub-
sidiary plans. The most important of these was the operation plan of
[Jf71c] the Naval Base Defense Air P^orce. In it was outlined the proposed
employment of all units made available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force.
In so far as Naval and Marine Corps air units were concerned, it was an order
requiring definite action when applicable. Orders from Army sources covering
the functioning of their units in the Naval Base Defense Air Force were the guides
for these aircraft. Both Army and Navy orders on this subject were based upon
the estimate of the situation dated March 31, 1941, and signed by General Martin
and myself.
That estimate was based on the conditions as they existed at the time it was
drafted. Changes in the naval air situation between that date and December 7,
1941, were not of sufficient significance to warrant a reestimate and my informa-
tion of the Army Air Force indicated an analogous condition.
The estimate, I believed, — and still believe — to be sound. But the orders based
on that estimate, like a precept of international law, lacked sanction. And the
missing sanction in this case was the absence of unity of command.
Specifically, the organization was designed to function through "mutual co-
operation" between the Army and Navy for the defense of Pearl Harbor against
air attack. As such, the Naval Base Defense Air Force could function only in
the event of an actual emergency or when proper authority so directed.
The composition of the Naval Base Defense Air Force varied from day to day
with the number of aircraft made "available" to it by the various Air Commands
of both Army and Navy. The determining factor in this technical availability
was the daily employment schedule of aircraft belonging to the various air units.
Aircraft reported as [//7irf] available were subject to the operational con-
trol of the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Foi'ce or the Army Pursuit Com-
mander in the prevailing category of readiness, only when the Naval Base Defense
Air Force was in a functioning status.
The normal procedure used for vitalizing this organization for drills was for
the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as Commander Naval
Base Defense Force, to send dispatch reading, "Drill, Danger of an air raid on
Pearl Harbor exists, Drill". This placed the Search and Attack groups in a
functioning status. On receipt of this message, I, in turn, as Commander Naval
Base Defense Air Force, sent a dispatch to all air units, which made planes
available to that organization, except Army pursuit units, ordering them to place
all available aircraft in the highest degree of readiness. At this point, during
such drills, searches were immediately started by planes initially in a high
degree of readiness, and their efforts were supplemented by orders to other
aircraft as they were reported ready for flight.
The term. Command Naval Basp Defense Air Force, was actually a misnomer
due to the limited composition of that portion of the Air Forces under my opera-
tional control, which included only aircraft for scouting to locate enemy surface
units and to attack tliem when located. It did not include fighter aircraft, radar
detection devices, or anti-aircraft guns.
The term, Commander. Naval Base Defense Air Force, was even more of a
misnomer as it implied authority over operating units to a degree which did not
exist. This authority was non-existent until an emergency was apparent, or
until appropriate authority placed the Naval Base Defense [471e] Air
Force in a functioning status, and, when so called into existence, was limited in
scope, in that it consisted only of operational control over Army units based upon
mutual cooperation. In addition, my authority, limited as' it was, extended
only over the Search and Attack Groups of the Naval Base Defense Air Force
and was non-existent so far as Army Pursuit aviation and Navy Fighter aviation
280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
were concerned which were to function under Brigadier General H. C. Davidson,
U. S. Army.
To illustrate the lack of numerical strength of aircraft available to the Naval
Base Defense Air Force, attention is invited to the report of a joint Army-Navy
Board dated 31 October, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering
the allocation of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian Ai-ea. Paragraph
4 (a) of this report, which was signed by Major General Martin as senior Army
member and myself as senior Navy member read as follows :
"4. The problem confronting the board as pertains to Army Aviation was
summed up by the Army representatives as follows :
(a) The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval
Base against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the
Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out his mission is:
(1) To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action
by bombardment aviation.
(2) To detect, intercept, and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu
by pursuit aviation."
It was pointed out that, under the Army 54th Group program, 170 B-17's and
two groups of 183 pursuit planes each would be assigned to fulfill [-^^if] the
above missions.
Naval plans called for 84 patrol planes and 48 VSO planes to be directly under
the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District to supplement or function in lieu
of the 98 patrol planes of Patrol Wings ONE and TWO, which might be ordered
to advance bases on the outlying islands of Wake, Midway, Johnston aind
Palmyra.
Further, the planes actually present on Oahu were not free until ordered to
concentrate on the Naval Base Air Defense. Both Army and Navy were in
the process of receiving replacements of obsolescent planes. Army B-18's were
being replaced by the more modern B-17's and in Patrol Wings ONE and
TWO PBY-1, 2 and 3's were being replaced by PBY-5's. The new types were
subject to the usual shake-down diflSculties and maintenance problems.
In the case of the Naval PBY-5 planes, there was an almost complete absence
of spare parts and, in addition, a program of the installation of armor and leak-
proof gasoline tanks was in progress. Considerable difficulty had also been
experienced with the cracking of engine nose sections in the first planes of this
type received and the installation of modified engine nose sections was in progress.
The major effort of Patrol Wings ONE and TWO during 1941 prior to
December 7th was expansion training, operational training, security operations,
development and equipping of air facilities — all in preparation for war. Avia-
tion training facilities and output in the Navy at that time were considerably
behind the contemplated increase in the number of squadrons. Therefore,
particular stress was placed by higher authority on the need for expansion
training. This necessitated a planning [-J^if/] of operations whereby each
squadron could be required to conduct training for the qualification of additional
combat crews not only for their own aircraft, but to form nucleii for new squad-
rons being commissioned back on the mainland as well. The higliest priority
was placed upon this feature.
Despite this continuing emphasis on training, every effort was being made
to increase the readiness for war. Squadron and patrol plane commanders
were indoctrinated with the necessity of keeping their planes so equipped and
their crews so trained that at any time during a flight they could be diverted
from their peacetime objectives to combat missions.
The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization into a func-
tioning status would have necessitated the substantial cessation of training
activities in order to concentrate on defense. With the patrol planes constantly
scouting to maximum range, and the bomber aircraft standing by for attack
missions, a situation would have been soon reached wherein the Naval planes
would have been greatly reduced in material readiness and their combat crews
approaching an operational fatigue point while the Army pilots would have been
in need of refresher training. Hence, as pointed out in the Martin-Bellinger
estimate, the problem resolved itself into one of timing with respect to the current
status of our relations with Japan, and necessity for specific information as to
the probability of an air attack within rather narrow time limits.
The Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force did not have the authority to
place that organization in a functioning status, except [^Hlh] in the case
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 281
of an actual emergency. The Naval Base Defense Air Force assumed a func-
tioning status immediately after the start of the attack on December 7, 1941,
without orders from higher authority. Orders to planes in the air were sent
and received by 0805, and a message, "'Air raid Pearl Harbor X This is no drill"
was ordered broadcasted at 0758 that morning.
[4.72] Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 34 of this
investigation, which consists of Stalf Instructions, Staff of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 1941, and call your attention to para-
graph 224, dealing with the Fleet Aviation Officer. That sets forth,
does it not, the duties of the Fleet Aviation Officer ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That sets forth the duties of the Fleet
Aviation Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet. It has no bearing on my responsibilities and duties as Com-
mander Patrol Wing Two or Commander Task Force Nine or any
other duties I had in connection with my job in the forces of the
Pacific Fleet.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you, Admiral, exhibit 9 of the Na^ial Court
of Inquiry record, which is a certified copy of a letter from the Sec-
retary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941,
and ask whether that letter had ever come to your attention prior
to December 7, 1941.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I don't want to take your time up reading
it, but I have never seen it before.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 47 of this investigation,
which contains Annex number VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal
Frontier Defense Plan, dated March 28, 1941, and ask you whether
you were familiar with that.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you state the circumstances tmder which you
had connection with that document, Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. In connection with the preparing of this
document, it came about as a result of a directive from the Commander-
in-Chief. Pacific Fleet, and my relation to the Commander Naval
Base Defense Force, who was the Commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District. I functioned under him and in connection with the
working out of a plan to bring an organization into [47S'] ex-
istence, this document was one of the preliminary features. It was
not prepared by me, but some portions of it I did have a chance to
criticize and advise in connection with its preparation.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you have any discussions of that document with
Admiral Kimmel that you recall. Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Beixinger. No, not with Admiral Kimmel but with
Captain Gill, who was the Plans Officer of the Commandant, Four-
teenth Naval District, and I am sure I discussed some of the points
with Admiral Bloch, who was the Commander Naval Base Defense
Force under that setup.
INIr. Sonnett. Do you recall any discussion of that document with
any other members of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. From time to time during the setup of
this organization and even after it was in effect, I discussed general
aspects of it with Admiral Kimmel, not particularly with reference
to this paper, but with reference to subjects which had a bearing on
it such as unity of command.
282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Admiral, to exhibit 47 and to page 4, it
is stated, in part :
The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an air-
craft warning service. During the period prior to the completion of the AWS
installation, the Navy, through use of radar and other appropriate means, will
endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable.
Do yon recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel as to that fea-
ture of the Navy's obligation under this agreement ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Not prior to December 7th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you some certified copies of docu-
ments and ask you whether you can identify those.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, I identify those as having been
[4'^4-l prepared by my organization.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the next, too. Admiral, is Addendum I. Can
your similarly identify that?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, I identfy that as an estimate of the
situation which was prepared primarily by my organization with
the concurrence of the Commander, Army Air Force, in the Hawaiian
area.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you personally participate, Admiral, in the
preparation of that estimate ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I did.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and market "Exhibit 49.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, for the sake of the record and in order to
refresh your recollection of the document, would you read paragraph 1,
the Summary of the Situation, and paragraph 3, Possible Enemy
Action, into the record?
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
1. Summary of the Situation.
(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain,
and varying.
(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of
war.
(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval Installations on
OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western
Pacific for a long period.
(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in tlie operating areas
organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force
which initiates hostile action.
[//75] (e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange
fast raiding force misrht arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from
our intelligence service.
III. Possible Enemy Action.
(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by :
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations ini !Pearl
Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.
(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU
would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most
likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach
inside of three hundred miles.
(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more sub-
marines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been
drawn away by the original thrust.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 283
(d) Any single submarine attacli might indicate tlie presence of considerable
undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a
carrier.
(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered
as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it
might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to
start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a
second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have
all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage
that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the
next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage
would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and
might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious
disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no
offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise.
Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the
above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain
advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably
be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large
success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.
Mr. SoNNETT. Substantially, Admiral, a basic premise of that esti-
mate [47S] was that a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor with-
out declaration of war was a possiblity, was it not ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It was.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the second basic premise was that in the event
of such an attack, it was probable that the attack would be by air?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, Admiral, referring to the section of that joint
estimate entitled Action Open To Us, would you read sub-paragraph
(a)
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
IV. Action open to us:
(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to
reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but
can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a
very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken
unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather
narrow time limits.
Mr. Sonnett. Is there any provision, Admiral, under the section
dealing with action open to use for reconnaissance of a sector of less
than 360 degrees ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. In this estimate it is not stated that less
than 360 degrees might be used effectively, but, of course, it was taken
into consideration in all thought and ideas.
Mr. Sonnett. Well, partial reconnaissance, Admiral, was, of course,
one type of antion open to the fleet, was it not, in order to meet the
situation estimated in that joint estimate?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, in a degree.
Mr. Sonnett. And that was true, Admiral, both at the date of that
estimate — which was about March or April of 1941, was it not?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. March 31, 1941.
[477] Mr. Sonnett. And similarly remained true throughout
the rest of the year up to the time of the attack?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, because at no time were we able to
cover 360 degrees to the range that we thought was necessary^ — at any
time up to July, 1942, and even later.
284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. The point I wanted to get clear, Admiral, is although
it is not listed in your joint estimate as a possible course of action, it
nevertheless was a possible and feasible and a practical operation open
to the fleet to conduct partial reconnaissance from Oahu, covering
certain selected sectors?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes. This estimate was not to restrict
any effort to accomplish the main idea of the estimate.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, did you have any discussion of that estimate
with Admiral Kimmel at any time?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I don't remember discussing it with him
prior to issuing it, but I am certain that he saw it because he talked
to me about it, not in detail but in general, and I talked to him in
general and sometimes in detail concerning the features of it.
Mr. SoNNETT. That is, of course, prior to December 7, 1941?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Prior to December 7, 1941, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall any discussion of that estimate with
other members of Admiral Kimmel's staff?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I feel practically sure that I discussed it
many times with his aviation aide. I don't remember any details of
any of the discussions.
Mr, Sonnett. Was there at any time. Admiral, any request on the
part of Admiral Kiimnell or any member of his staff for clarification
or any disagreement [4-'^S] as to your joint estimate?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Not to my recollection. As a matter of
fact, he more or less complimented me on it and particularly so, I
remember, when he had returned to Honolulu after a trip to Washing-
ton, where some mention apparently had been made of the general
plan : not of the estimate in particular, but the general plan to attempt
coordination.
Mv. Sonnett. That is, the Naval Base Defense Air Force plan ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. And this estimate, of course, was the basis upon which
that plan was written?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you exhibit 35 of this investigation,
which is the Pacific Fleet Operating Plan distributed to the fleet in
July of 1941, and ask whether you recall having seen that prior to
December 7, 1941?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, I am familiar with this Rainbow
Five plan and we were in the midst of a chart maneuver of this plan
by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, prior to De-
cember 7th and it hadn't been completed up to December 7th.
Mr. Sonnett, Admiral, will you refer to page 24 of that exhibit
and I think j^ou will find there set forth the tasks assigned by the
Navy Basic Plan to the Pacific Fleet. I call your attention particularly
to subparagraph h and ask if you would read that into the record.
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
h. Pi'otect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and pre-
vent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by
destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying
the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.
[47P] Mr. Sonnett. And will you refer now, Admiral, to pages
25 and 26 and you will there find that the initial tasks of the Pacific
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 285
Fleet are divided into two phases, do you not, phase lA and phase I ?
Vice Admiral Bellingee. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, will you read into the record nhase I-b,
I-g, and I-m of the initial tasks of the Pacific Fleet ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
b. Maintain Fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and pre-
vent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by
patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking
groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the
Equator as far west as longitude 155° east.
m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, it was, therefore, an assigned initial task
of the Pacific Fleet to guard against a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor,
was it not ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Evidently, yes, from the point of view
that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, took upon himself to try
to bring about a coordinated organization to take care of such an attack.
However, I would like to refer you to a statement by the Commander
of the Hawaiian Air Force. I was on an Army-Navy board to en-
deavor to adjust the control of certain airfields that were in the island
of Oahu and in connection with this board's report there is a state-
ment as follows in paragraph 4 : "The problem confronting the Board
as it pertains to Army aviation was summed up by the Army represent-
atives as follows : The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the
Pearl Harbor naval base against all attacks by an enemy. The con-
tribution to be [4^0] made by the Hawaiian Air Force in
carrying out this mission is to search for and destroy enemy surface
craft within radius of action by bombardment aviation ; to detect, in-
tercept, and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit
aviation." It is therefore indicated to me that the Army also assumed
a responsibility for the air defense of the Pearl Harbor naval base.
Mr. SoNNETT. For the sake of the record, Admiral, what is the date
of that report ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. The date of that report is 31 October 1941.
The board members are listed as Major General F. L. Martin, USA,
Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, USN, Brigadier General H. C.
Davidson, USA, and Lieutenant Commander S. E. Burroughs, USN.
The report was signed by General F. L. Martin, Major General, USA,
Senior Army Member, and P. N. L. Bellinger, Rear Admiral, USN,
Senior Naval Member.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, it was true, was it not, that under the Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had the obligation to conduct
long-range reconnaissance?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that obligation, of course, remained right up to
the time of the attack ?
y~ice Admiral Bellinger. It did in the setup, although I would like
to invite attention to the fact that. How was the Navy going to do
this and carry out the war plan. Rainbow Five? — because the available
aviation couldn't be in two places at one time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Admiral, to page 12 of the war plan, I
believe you will find set forth the composition of Task Force Nine.
Would you read that into the record?
286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[4-Sl] Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
TASK FORCE NINE (Patrol Plane Force) Commander Aircraft Scouting Force
All units of Aircraft__ 107 VP
Scouting Force 2 AV
2 AVP
Utility Squadron from Base Force 4 AVD
10 VJR
Mr. SoNNETT. Could you state just in general, Admiral, what the
107 VP's were?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. The 107 VP's were supposed to be flying
boats, twin-engine. As a matter of fact, we did not have that many
planes on December 6th and our total number, as I recall, was eighty-
one, in varying degrees of readiness.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you a carbon copy of a letter dated
20 December 1941, from Commander Task Force Nine to Commander-
in-Cliief and ask you whether you can identify that as a copy of a
letter sent by you.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I do identify it as such.
Mr. Sonnett. May we mark it as an exhibit. Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and mprked "Exhibit 50.")
Mr. Sonnett. Incidentally, Admiral Bellinger, to this letter we
have annexed copies of various dispatches referred to in the final
paragraph of the letter. Would you take a look at those and see if
you can identify those, too, so we can make them part of the record?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. May we mark the dispatches. Admiral, as exhibit
50A?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
[4S3] (The documents referred to were received and marked
"Exhibit 50A.")
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to exhibit 50, Admiral, which is the letter
you have just identified, at page 2 you give a total of seventy-two
planes in the air or ready for flight in four hours or less and sub-
sequently you show that there were nine planes undergoing repairs,
making a total of eighty-one planes. Now, is that the correct figure
of the number of patrol planes which you had in Task Force Nine ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That is the correct number, to the best of
my information.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, with respect to the number of planes which
you had in Task Force Nine, which you have stated to be eighty-one
patrol planes, what efforts had been made to obtain additional planes?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. There is a letter on record, the first letter
wherein I tried to paint the picture out there. That letter was dated
January 16, 1941, and was the start. There was a lot of effort made
on my part to improve the situation out there, covering the over-all
situation. Planes are no good unless you have i)laces to operate from
and facilities to operate on and spare parts. I will give you a copy
if I have it here, but it is all in the files somewhere. It wasn't so much
numbers of planes in this case — the numbers were more or less con-
trolled by the Navy Department — as it was of getting those that
were assigned to us in a condition of readiness and operating ability
to the maximum extent. If you really want to know what I have done
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 287
on this subject, I will have to go through the records, because there
was an awful lot of letters written.
For instance, I would like to invite your attention to one letter
dated 22 October 1941, and I am asking in that letter for "180 long-
range, [4-83] high speed, landplane bombers, equal or superior
to tlie B-17-E, and 180 interceptor fighters of the best performance
available." That was in addition to any that we had, and that was in
this letter, which is file 0026 of 22 October 1941.
Air. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you a photostatic copy of a letter
with several endorsements thereon and ask you whether it is a copy
of the letter to which you have just referred.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It is.
Mr. SoNNETT. And you, I take it, can also identify the endorsements,
Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I do.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit?
Admiral Hewitt, Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 51.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, referring to exhibit 51, which is the letter
you have just identified, that letter was concerned, was it not, with the
aircraft requirements for offensive action ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Both offensive and defensive.
Mr. SoNNETT. I call your attention particularly. Admiral
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Suppose I say this: Both offensive and
defensive, primarily offensive, because the flying boat was known to
have very little offensive power unless used under special conditions.
Mr. SoNNETT. That appears particularlry from the sentence in par-
agraph 1 reading. Admiral : "It is respectfully submitted that the Fleet
is not adequately prepared for a campaign in the Pacific until, in ad-
dition to present types of aircraft, it is provided with an air strik-
ing force of high speed, long range [4^4] landplane bombers at
least equal in performance to the B-17-E" ; so that that letter was not
concerned with increasing the present types of aircraft primarily used
for reconnaissance, but rather was primarily concerned with getting
additional planes to be used primarily offensively, is that correct?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Correct. It was designed primarily to
bring about a more acceptable situation for the United States Navy in
the Pacific.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know what, if any, action was taken upon the
recommendations made by you in exhibit 51 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. There were no actual results obtained
from it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you a letter dated January 16, 1941,
and ask you whether it is a copy of a letter sent by you.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It is.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that. Admiral, as an exhibit and we
will return the exhibit to Admiral Bellinger after we have had it
copied ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 52.")
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, this exhibit 52, your letter of January 16,
1941, summarizes the situation as to the aircraft as of that time, does
it not?
288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It did.
Mr. SoNNETT. And points out various deficiencies and requirements
for the patrol wings?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It does.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it the fact, sir, that during the year 1941 and
prior to the attack, there were additional planes sent out to the Pacific
Fleet?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, there were additional planes sent out
[4^6] and also a newer type of plane, but I would like to invite
attention in this letter, which is dated January 16, 1941, in paragraph
2 (b) the following quotation, which is referring to an OpNav confi-
dential letter : "In about one year practically all Fleet aircraft except
Patrol Wing Two will have armor and fuel protection," and the
planes which were discussed in this letter actually arrived on the
following dates : VP 11, with twelve planes, arrived in the Hawaiian
area on 28 October 1941; VP 24, with six planes, arrived on 28 Oc-
tober 1941 ; VP 12, with twelve planes, arrived on 8 November 1941 ;
VP 23, with twelve planes, arrived on 23 November 19'41 ; VP 14, with
twelve planes, arrived on 23 November 1941. Most of these planes
and squadrons were replacements, and, I believe, some additions, for
the old planes which we had prior thereto. But note that they arrived
about a year after the above-quoted statement was made, as predicted.
Mr. SoNNETT. As I figure it. Admiral, that makes a total of fifty-
four new planes delivered in October and November, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Correct.
Mr. Sonnett. And those, added to the planes you had and kept,
made a total of eighty-one
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. From November to December 7, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. But remember that practically all of these
planes weren't additional groups or squadrons of planes; they were
replacement planes with the newer type of PB Y-5 type.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, after the attack on December 7, 1941, I
understand that additional planes were sent out to Pearl Harbor.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, there were.
Mr. Sonnett. Can you recall in round numbers how many addi-
tional patrol planes and where they came from, if you know?
Vice xVdmiral Bellinger. They came from the Pacific Coast and the
Atlantic Fleet and I think there were about forty-odd planes.
[4£8] Mr. Sonnett. Do you know why those forty-odd planes
could not have been sent prior to the attack ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I sent a squadron commander, Avho had
departed from Pearl Harbor with his squadron for replacement planes,
to Washington to find out what was the situation with reference to the
Pacific and why were we the last ones to be re-equipped, and the word
he gave me upon his return to Pearl Harbor was that the Atlantic
had priority.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, referring again to this period from the end
of November up to the time of the attack on December 7th, you had
a total of eighty-one patrol planes in Task Force Nine, as I under-
stand it ?
V ice Admiral Bellinger. Correct.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 289
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, do you recall the number of Army planes which
were suitable for long-range reconnaissance and which could have
ben made available during that period of time ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No, I do not know the exact number or
even an accurate approximate number because it was very difficult to
get that information from the Army. It appears that their situation
was changing quite rapidly and continually as their planes of the
long-range bomber type were being sent to the Philippines.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did they report some six or eight available during
that period of time, B-17's?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. In accordance with the operational di-
rectives prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force,
and mj^self , a report of planes that were available — that could be made
available to the other command, was sent to the appropriate command
every day. I have here a copy of a dispatch from the Headquarters,
Hawaiian Air Force, to Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force,
as of 5 December 1941, which indicates [4S7] that there were
eight B-17's, twenty-one B-18's, and six A-20's which were to be con-
sidered available when made available.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, the range of the B-17's was sufficient for
long-range reconnaissance from Oahu, was it not ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It was, in the conception of long-range
at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. About what was the range of the B-17 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Without bomb load they were supposed
to be able to cover a sector of radius about 800 miles.
Mr. Sonnett. And of the B-18's, Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. In this B-17 situation I just spoke about,
the range applied without bomb load or not more than one-half bomb
load. That meant they had to put an extra gas tank in the vacant
bomb bay.
The B-18's were supposed to have a reconnaissance radius of ap-
proximately 300 miles.
Mr. Sonnett. And the A-20's ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. About 150 miles radius.
Mr. Sonnett. Also for the sake of the record we might also get the
range of the PBY— 4 and 5, Admiral, if you will state that.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. PBY-5's and 4's had a radius of approxi-
mately 700 miles.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, it was the fact, was it not, that after the
attack on December 7th, long-range reconnaissance was conducted,
using the PBY's, the B-17's, the B-18's as well ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That is correct, except the B-18's did not
have long-range. I made a mistake some time back. I said PBY-4's
and 5's. I should have said PBY-3's and 5's. The PBY-3's had a
practical operating radius of [4^8] approximately 600 miles.
Admiral Hevv^tt. We will adjourn for lunch at this time.
(The investigation then, at 1 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m., at which
time it reconvened.)
(Present: The same parties as during the morning session.)
Vice Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellinger, USN, after having been
warned that his previous oath was still binding, resumed his seat as
witness.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 20
290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, you have produced a letter of December 11,
1940, from Commander Patrol Wing Two to Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, together with various endorsements. Are those copies of docu-
ments which were sent to the Chief of Naval Operations ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. They are.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that. Admiral, as exhibit 53 ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 53.")
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I would like to add that there are many
other letters relating to deficiencies that were sent in with the idea of
trying to increase the effectiveness of the patrol wings in the Pacific.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, referring back to the Pacific Fleet war plan,
paragraphs 3141 and 3143, at page 32, sir, set forth the initial tasks
assigned to the patrol planes. Would you read those into the record,
please. Admiral?
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following para-
graphs of this section.
[489] 3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to
each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Con-
' tinue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.
3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
Mr. Sonnett. Would you refer. Admiral, to Annex I, the Patrol
and Sweeping Plan, and read paragraph 2 into the record ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
2. Phase I
This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and- sea communica-
tions of the Associated Powers by :
(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Ha-
waiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific
westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.
(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit,
(e) Covering.
(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
(e) Routine shipping.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, will you also examine paragraph 3 (d) and
read that into the record ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
3. (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and
for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against
enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.
[490] (2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Mid-
way. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to west-
ward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the
facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.
(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander "Bask Force Three, to transfer
patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South
Pacific.
(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.
(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct vride sweep enroute.
(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval
Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.
(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweep-
ing during initial sweep of Phase lA.
(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall
Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 291
(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible
with assigned tasks, with other forces thereat. Be guided by principles of com-
mand relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan 0-1.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, the Phase I initial tasks assigned to the
patrol planes were tasks to be performed when Japan was not in the
war, were they not ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, referring to page 15 of the War Plan, will
you read into the record the general assumption on which the war plan
is based?
[4^i] Vice Admiral Bellinger. "That the Associated Powers,
comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth,
(less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile,
China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, com-
prising either :
1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thai-
land."
Mr. SoNNETT. As to the second general assumption. Admiral,
namely, thatthe United States was at war with the Axis powers,
including Japan, was it in your mind, as set forth in your estimate,
that war with Japan was apt to commence by surprise attack without
declaration of war?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, that was the estimate, the basis of
the estimate.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that the plan, then, might have become effective
as to Japan in the event of a surprise attack by Japan without declara-
tion of war ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger, Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 8 of the Naval Court of
Inquiry record,. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number '2,CL-41 (Re-
vised) , dated October 14, 1941, and ask you whether you saw that at or
about the time of its issuance.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, would you read assumption (b) of that
letter into the record ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
That a declaration of war may be preceded by ;
(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.
(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
(3) a combination of these two.
[49^] Mr. Sonnett. You will note subsequently in the letter,
Admiral, that there are provisions for air patrol. Would you refer to
provision (B) concerning air patrol and read that into the record?
Vice Admiral Bellinger (reading) :
(2) Air Patrols:
(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft, Scouting Force.
(b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will
search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel
buoys which is south of latitude 21°-20' No. The Fleet or Task Force Com-
mander concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior
to the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie
and entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol.
(c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than
292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol
mentioned therein.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, were those provisions for air patrol carried
out between October 14, 1941, and December 7, 1941.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Mr. SoNNETT. Yes.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, I am practically sure they were.
Mr. SoNNETT. And in addition to the air patrol provided for in that
security letter, patrols were run from Midway and Wake, were they
not?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. The patrols run from Midway and Wake
were for a certain period of time, as specifically directed by the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific.
[4dS] Mr. SoNNETT. Was there any discussion, Admiral, during
the months of October, November, and up to December 7, 1941, of the
necessity or advisability of a partial patrol or reconnaissance from
Oahu as a fleet security measure?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Patrols had been ordered to be run at
various periods of time during 1941 and they were carried out as
directed.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall any discussion of the question of patrols
or partial reconnaissance during the months of October, November, and
up to December 7, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Noj not other than the ones that had been
directed. by this letter.
Mr. Sonnett. That is, the fleet security letter ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. The fleet security letter.
Admiral Hewitt. Wliich were merely of the operating area.
Mr. SoNNETT. Merely of the operating area.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Wait a minute. October, November, and
December ?
Mr. Sonnett. Yes.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I don't remember the exact date that the
last patrol, other than was directed in this letter, was ordered carried
out. It may have been in October. Actually there had been opera-
tions, training operations, simulating air attack, where carriers entered
the training phase to simulate an attacking force and patrols had been
carried out in comiection with that effort, but from pure security rea-
sons, I am in doubt as to when the last one had been ordered or was
ordered.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there any reconnaissance from Oahu, other than
of the fleet operating areas, during the period November 27th to
December 7, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No, not other than the movement that took
place [4^4-] between Wake, Midway and the Hawaiian Islands.
The planes making those trips were directed to observe. However as
part of planned internal Patrol Wing Tactical Exercises covering the
period 1 to 4 Dec. 1941 and not as a part of any directed fleet recon-
naissance, to the best of my remembrance, scouting flights were con-
ducted daily covering a sector of approximately 90 degrees to a distance
of 300 miles by probably one squadron for the sector per day. Each
day there was a different sector. These scouting flights were solely for
training in connection with the Wing Tactical Exercises. Usually a
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 293
Seaplane Tender was employed as the objective of search and a sled
towed by the Tender served as a bombing target. I cannot recall the
sectors utilized in the above exercises.
Mr. SoNNETT. There has been previous testimony, Admiral, to the
effect that some time around July or August, 1941, Admiral Blocli
requested Admiral Kimmel to direct a reconnaissance on a sector to-
wards Jaluit and that this was done for several days. What do you
recall of that ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. On what ? Jaluit ?
Mr. SoNNETT. Yes, on a sector towards Jaluit.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It may have been done. I do not remem-
ber, but I did not know the originator of the idea, nor any reason con-
cerning such idea. I am not sure that it was done towards Jaluit.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I refer you to page 6 of the fleet security
letter as revised on August 14, 1941, to sub-paragraph 3, and ask if
you would read that into the record.
[494a] Vice Admiral Bellinger. "It must be remembered too,
that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a con-
siderable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied
by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble
his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions
warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that
may be located by air search or other means,"
Mr. SoNNETT. There were va,rious sujbmarine contacts reported
prior to December 7, 1941, were there not. Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No, not to my knowledge.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, do you recall whether there was any air
patrol directed prior to the attack for the purpose of attempting to
verify any alleged reports of the presence of submarines ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. There were sound contacts, as I remem-
ber, and [49S~\ the question was raised, Were they submarine
contacts? and, as I remember it, there was considerable local effort,
both with reference to patrol planes and to surface craft, to verify
those sound contacts, but to my knowledge, no submarine was ever seen.
Mr. Sonnett. Who directed the patrols in those cases ?
Vice Admiral Bjillinger. When the Commander, Scouting Force,
was the Senior Officer Present, he directed it until the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, was present ; then he directed it.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall any discussion with Admiral Kimmel
or with Admiral Bloch concerning the submarine contacts prior to
December 7, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I remember discussing it with many
people, but I don't know that I remember discussing it with Admiral
Bloch personally or Admiral Kimmel personally. It was a question,
Was it a submarine or was it not? — and that appeared to be a moot
question among those who had actually made the sound contact.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you exhibit 37 of this investigation,
which consists of a photostatic copy of a letter dated November 19,
1941, from the Commander Task Force Nine to the Commander-in-
Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and which annexes a schedule, and which
exhibit also contains a photostatic copy of a mailgram dated 22 No-
vember 1941 from CincPac to Compatwing Two, and ask you whether
you recognize those docmnents.
294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I do.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, would you state what the schedules an-
nexed to your letter of November 19, 1941, show as to aircraft patrol
from Oahu ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. They do not directly show any patrol
search operations. However, in advance base operations my policy
was, and as written down for the guidance of the patrol wings, that
when any squadron was based at [496] an advance base, that
they would carry on patrols for security reasons ; and also, in connec-
tion with this schedule, although it does not show the morning patrol
that was required in this security letter of the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific, it was an understood fact that those patrols would continue
and did continue.
Mr. SoNNETT. Those were patrols of the operating areas. Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Those were patrols of the daily assigned
operating areas.
Mr. SoNNETT. That mailgram, Admiral, from CincPac to you, was
the approval by the Commander-in-Chief of those schedules submitted
by you, is it not ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It is.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you a series of photostatic docu-
ments and ask you whether you can identify them.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, they represent the watch and duty
schedules and the general employment of Patrol "Wings One and Two
and those planes considered part of the Fleet Air Detachment.
Mr. Sonnett. May we mark those. Admiral, as an exhibit?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
SB (The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
54.")
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to exhibit 54, which you have just identi-
fied. Admiral, and to the schedules for the period November 27th to
December 7, 1941, will you discuss any provision of the schedules re-
lating to aircraft patrol from Oahu?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Where you note the nomenclature "DP,"
it refers to the dawn patrol, and each day a squadron was assigned to
that duty.
[4^7] Mr. Sonnett. And again. Admiral, for the sake of the
record, the dawn patrol was the patrol of the operating areas ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Correct.
Mr. Sonnett. As illustrative. Admiral, of the schedules in ques-
tion, would you, referring to December 7, 1941, schedule, read into
the record the assignments of the patrol squadrons ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. On December 7th, Patrol Squadron 22,
first division, was secured; Patrol Squadron 22, second division, se-
cured ; Patrol Squadron 23, first division, secured ; Patrol Squadron 23,
second division, secured ; Patrol Squadron 24, tactics with submarines
and the Pearl Harbor ready duty division ; Patrol Squadron 11, tactics
with submarines and Kaneohe ready duty division ; Patrol Squadron
12, secured ; Patrol Squadron 14, dawn patrol ; division making dawn
patrol secured upon completion, other division normal duty, 7 to 1300
except Saturdays and Sundays. Not listed in the above squadrons
was Patrol Squadron 21, which was on advance base duty at Midway.
Patrol Squadron 22 had returned from Midway on 5 December after
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 295
a tour of duty at Midway and Wake since 17 October, This squadron
had had strenuous duty at those bases and was in a state of rehabilita-
tion and maintenance.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring back, Admiral, to your letter of November
19, 1941, forwarding the schedule for the planes to the Commander-
in-Chief for approval, which letter is part of exhibit 37, the letter
reads in paragraph 1, "Changed conditions have necessitated a re-
vision of the schedule for units of Task Force Nine for the remainder
of the second quarter." Do you recall, Admiral, what the changed
conditions were that you referred to in that letter?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I can't remember positively. In may
have been because of the assignment of Patrol Squadron 22 to the
Midway-Wake area or it may have been due to a change in directive
from the Commander-in-Chief, [WS] Pacific, wherein the
task force organizations were changed. At one time patrol squadrons
were assigned to the various task force commanders. One, Two, and
Three, and their schedule of employment was more or less controlled
by those task force commanders.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 15 of the Naval Court
of Inquiry, which is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to
CincAF, CincPac, and others, dated November 24, 1941, and ask you
whether you saw that prior to December 7, 1941.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I did not.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you know that such a dispatch or some such dis-
patch had been received about that time?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Not till subsequent to December 7th.
Mr. Sonnett. I refer you, Admiral, to exhibit 17 of the Naval Court
of Inquiry, a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to CincAF,
CincPac, and others, dated November 27, 1941, which is the so-called
war warning, and ask whether you saw that prior to December 7, 1941.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I did not.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you know that such a dispatch had been received ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Not until subsequent to December 7, 1941.
Mr. Sonnett. I refer you to exhibit 19 of the Naval Court of Inquiry
a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated November 28,
1941, sent for information to CincPac, among others, and ask whether
you saw that dispatch or knew of it prior to the attack on December 7,
1941.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I did not.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you exhibit 22 of this investigation,
which consists of daily connnunication intelligence summaries, and ask
whether you saw those prior to December 7, 1941.
[499] Vice Admiral Bellinger. No, I don't remember seeing any
of these.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you exhibit 26 of this investigation, which con-
sists of photostatic copies of intelligence reports by Lieutenant Com-
mander Layton between October 6, 1941, and December 2, 1941, and
ask whether you saw any of those prior to the attack."
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you exhibit 23 of this investigation, a memo-
randum, dated December 1, 1941, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer
to the Admiral on the subject of the location of the Orange fleet, and
ask wdiether you saw that prior to the attack.
296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No, I don't remember ever seeing it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, do you recall anything concerning a pro-
posed Army reconnaissance flight over the Mandated Islands which
was discussed toward the end of November, 1941 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Towards the end of November, 1941?
Mr. SoNNETT. Yes.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No. I do not recall such proposition.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 28 of this investigation, a memo-
randum by Lieutenant Commander Layton on that subject, and ask
whether that refreshes your recollection concerning the matter.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I don't remember any specific plan or even
a proposal.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, during the last half of November and up
to December 7, 1941, what was your estimate of the location and move-
ments of Japanese ships, particularly Japanese carriers?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I didn't know where they were.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you receive any intelligence on that subject
[S00~\ Vice Admiral Bellinger. No.
Mr. Sonnett. During that period of time ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No.
Mr. Sonnett. Or have any discussion with Admiral Kimmel or
Admiral Bloch on that subject during that period of time?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No. I recall no such discussion.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you know before the attack that a direction had
been issued to CincPac on or about November 27, 1941, in substantially
the following language: "Execute an appropriate defensive deploy-
ment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46" ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall any discussion between November 27th
and December 7, 1941, concerning deployment of fleet or aircraft?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I am trying to remember the date on which
a conference took place in the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's,
office wherein several of the fleet commands, myself included, and the
Army and also the District Commandant were present, and that was in
connection with the movement of Marine planes to Wake and Midway.
Now, the reason for that — a specific dispatch or even a discussion of
the reasons for it, other than general bolstering up defenses, was not
discussed, as I remember.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you exhibit 18 of the Naval Court
of Inquiry, a dispatch of November 26, 1941, from the Chief of Naval
Operations to CincPac, and ask you whether you saw that disiDatch.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I don't remember seeing this dispatch, but
I think I attended a conference which evidently was in connection with
this dispatch, that is, in carrying out some of the details of this
dispatch.
[SOJ] Mr. Sonnett. There is one other dispatch I would like to
call to your attention, Admiral, and that is exhibit 13 of the Naval
Court of Inquiry 5 a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated
October 16, 1941, to CincPac, among others, and ask whether you recall
having seen that.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No, I don't remember ever seeing that
dispatch prior to December 7th.
Mr. Sonnett. I call your attention. Admiral, to the following por-
tion of that dispatch : "In view of these possibilities, you will take
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 297
due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not
disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against
Japan." Do you recall being consulted as to any preparatory deploy-
ments after October 16, 1941, and prior to the attack?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No. If I was called in in connection with
any deployment, the reasons for it weren't connected with this dis-
patch, that is, they weren't explained to me as having any relation to
a particular dispatch as I hadn't seen the dispatch.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to exhibit 19, which was the November 28th
dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, which you previously
testified, Admiral, you hadn't seen, that provided in part that CincPac
was directed to "Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46
in so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur." Do you
recall any conference or discussion as to the steps to be taken in order
to be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, a hypothetical question. Had you known
of these dispatches which have just been shown to you prior to the
attack and bearing in mind that the initial tasks of the Pacific Fleet
and specifically [5021 of Task Force Nine included reconnais-
sance from Oahu, would you have recommended that such reconnais-
sance or partial reconnaissance be instituted ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That question was asked me once before
and I will have to give you almost the same answer, which is that
God only knows what I would have done, but I hope I would have
recognized the situation.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, will you state for the record what recon-
naissance could have been run from Oahu with the Navy planes avail-
able during the period November 27th to December 7, 1941 ?
Admiral Hewitt. Do you mean what patrol could have been
maintained on a continuous basis?
Mr. Sonnett. Well, I think he will develop that in his answer,
Admiral. As I recall his previous testimony, he said they could have
maintained a 360 degree reconnaissance for a limited time ; they could
have maintained 144 degrees by dividing the crews in three indefinitely.
That is my recollection.
Admiral Hewitt. Of course, on 27 November they had no idea that
the attack was coming on the 7th. They had no way to time it. They
had to make plans for patrol indefinitely.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That is a very difficult question to answer.
You must remember that between 28 October and 23 November, of the
eighty-one planes available later, fifty-four of these had arrived and
they were the PBy-5 type and the spare parts for those planes weren't
available. Also, the number of plane crews available scarcely ex-
ceeded— if I remember correctly, did not quite equal the number of
planes we had available. A lot of things can be done in an emergency
and when pressure is on. That was demonstrated in the Battle of
Midway; the flying time carried on by plane crews under stress
exceeded by far what was thought the human equation could stand.
[SOS] Normally speaking, considering eighty-one planes avail-
able and considering the fact that we hoped the planes wouldn't break
down and be put out of commission from lack of spare parts, it was
practical, of course, to utilize one-third for daily patrol, covering
sectors that were estimated to be the most vital. However, you must
298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
remember that the time of starting these operations and the duration
of them would have a tremendous effect on the force that would be
available at any subsequent time for further projected operations.
But, normally speaking, I would say that a plane and a plane crew
could have been used one day in three,
Mr. SoNNETT. And how large a sector could be covered in that
fashion, Admiral ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Normally speaking, we considered eight
degrees for 800 mile radii of operations to be what one plane would
cover, and multiply that by the number of planes and you have the
number of degrees of the sector.
Admiral Hewiti\ You did testify before to 144, based on eighteen
planes, which is one-third of 144.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Did I say 800 miles ? Make that 700 miles
and the eight degrees.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, referring to your memorandum or letter of
December 20, 1941, which is exhibit 50, it appears that nine planes
were undergoing repairs on December 7, 1941, and that eleven planes
were at Midway, which, I take it, would leave approximately sixty-
one planes available at Oahu.
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Sixty-one, and that is including one
squadron that had just returned from Midway, having also served time
at Wake. They were in commission. They had just returned. They
weren't listed, as I remember, [S04-] as being in a state of over-
haul, but they were due for considerable checking.
Mr. SoNNETT. With those sixty-one planes. Admiral, and dividing
the sixty-one planes into three, I take it that reconnaissance could have
been run from Oahu, therefore, covering a sector of approximately
160 degrees?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That is possible, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, eliminating the squadron which had just re-
turned. Admiral, would have given you about fifty Navy planes avail-
able, I take it?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Forty-nine.
Mr. SoNNETT. Forty-nine. And with the forty-nine planes avail-
able, you could have had a daily reconnaissance covering about 128
degrees ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, that is possible.
Mr. Sonnett. Would that have been not only possible, Admiral, but
practical or the praticable measure and for how long could it have been
continued on that basis?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. That is a very difficult question to answer.
Even after December 7th when everything else was subjugated to
carrying on patrol for the security of Oahu, I received letters from the
Bureau of Aeronautics indicating that they couldn't support the con-
tinuous and tremendous operations of this kind, with reference to
engine changes and spare parts, and were endeavoring to inveigle me
into reducing the search operations. This was not an official letter.
This was a personal letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronau-
tics and it was the result of an official dispatch which I had sent, de-
manding spare parts.
Mr. Sonnett. Well, Admiral, assuming that on December 1, 1941,
you had received a directive from Admiral Kimmel to conduct 360
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 299
degree reconnaissance with the available Navy planes, could you have
done it and if so, for how [505] long could you have con
tinued it?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. In conducting the 360 degree search, it
would have meant that planes proceeding out on search would have
had to depend on a visibility greater than would have existed. It
would have been possible to do it perhaps four or five days.
Mr. SoNNETT. Assuming that on December 1, 1941, you had received
a directive from Admiral Kimmel to conduct the fullest possible par-
tial reconnaissance over an indefinite period of time, could you have
covered 128 degrees approximately on a daily basis and for how long?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It could have been done until the failure
of planes and lack of spare parts reduced the planes to an extent that
it would have made it impossible. Perhaps it could have been car-
ried on for two weeks, perhaps, but this estimate is, of course, very
vague and it is all based on maintaining planes in readiness for flight.
Mr. SoNNETT. If in addition to the forty-nine available Navy planes
at that time at Oahu, you had the eight available Army B-l7's and
the twenty-one available Army B-18's, could you have covered 360
degrees from December 1 on and if so, for how long?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. In the first place, the Army weren't
schooled or able to carry on these searches in the way we would have
expected them to carry them on, and that statement is made as a result
of experience which showed up that situation subsequent to Decem-
ber 7th. Later, after more experience and training of the Army per-
sonnel had been obtained, the Army did enter this search plan with
a few planes each day. The B-18's, as you remember, would only
have been capable of proceeding out 300 miles, which would have
netted very little in timely information. Certainly any assistance
from the Army in the B-l7's would have enabled more patrol and
search of greater areas.
[606] Mr. Sonnett. Would it have been feasible. Admiral, to
have used the forty-nine available Navy planes at Oahu on December
1, 1941, and thereafter entirely for search and to have relied on the
eight Army B-l7's and the twenty-one Army B-18's for an attacking
force ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Would it have been possible ?
Mr. Sonnett. Feasible. »
Vice Admiral Bellinger. The attack force was always made up of
either the Army's B-17's or whatever other types they had that might
be utilized for that purpose, such as B-18's or even A-2'O's if the ships
had come in that close. Even carrier planes were held as striking
groups. No patrol planes were ever held for striking, except in spe-
cial instances for night torpedo attack. They were used to the fullest
extent for searching.
Mr. Sonnett. So that the forty-nine available Navy patrol planes
which were available around the beginning of December 1941, could
probably have been devoted entirely to searching ?
Vice Admiral Beli^inger. They could have been as far as they were
able to be used, but the question would always have been : Is this the
time to start ?
Mr. Sonnett. It has been previously testified. Admiral, that certain
sectors were regarded as more dangerous than others. What sectors
were they ?
300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Bellinger. The northern sectors were considered to
be the most vital, primarily on account of the prevailing winds. For
instance, when the carrier launches her planes, later she has to recover
them and it is a rather good thing to be going away from trouble when
you are recovering planes.
Mr. SoNNETT. It was, in fact, from the north that the Japanese task
force attacked Pearl Harbor, was it not. Admiral?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. It was.
[S07] Mr. SoNNETT. Had you been directed on or about Decem-
ber 1, 1941, to institute a partial reconnaissance with the available
planes, would you have covered the northern sector ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. As a matter of fact, without any informa-
tion, the normal plan on December 7th was to utilize planes that we
had for the northern sector. We did later send planes to the south-
ward because of information from the Commander-in-Chief's office
which indicated a radio bearing in that direction.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you define. Admiral, what you mean by the
northern sector?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. More towards the northwest than the
northeast.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I believe you previously testified that from
December 2nd, approximately, to December 7, 1941, you were ill?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes, I had the flu.
Mr. Sonnett. And, I take it, you weren't at your office during that
period of time ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. I was not at my office, but I was in touch
with the office and with things going on.
Mr. Sonnett. Did j^ou have any conferences with Admiral Kimmel
while you were ill or with any member of his staff that you recall ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No. I had conferences with my Chief
of Staff.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain Ramsey?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you, as best you recall it, have any conference
with Admiral Kimmel in November and up to December 7, 1941, con-
cerning the question of possible reconnaissance or the desirability of
reconnaissance or any related subject ?
[oOS] Vice Admiral Bellinger. No, not with respect to Oahu.
The conference I 'attended, and I think it was the last conference I
attended, was in connection with the reenforcement of Wake and
Midway.
Mr. Sonnett: Do you recall any other conference with Admiral
Kimmel or members of his staff after that conference and prior to the
attack?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No, although I am not positive that I did
not see him between those dates.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I believe you previously testified that had
complete reconnaisance been undertaken in November or December,
1941, prior to the attack, it would have meant a cessation of the train-
ing activities being carried on by patrol wings. Would it have been
feasible to conduct reconnaissance and to have the reconnaissance as
part of the training ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 301
Vice Admiral Bellinger. In the first place, I might say that the
need for expansion training had been stressed a great deal, expansion
training meaning the development of air combat crews to augment
and to replace those crews that were then in the squadrons. When the
December 7th attack was made, all training ceased for the time being
and all effort was put on search operations by all the patrol planes.
The question came up how could we continue this expansion training
that every one realized was such a necessity? If we endeavored to
train combat air crews in planes that were on patrol, it meant an ex-
cess of personnel and extra weight. It meant also that except for
navigation and the general operation of radio and engineering, very
little else could be done. It was not actually qualifying personnel to
take over the job in the patrol plane, nor to give them the qualification
of an air crewman in a specific job. Finally we had to devote certain
planes to this training and take them out of their operating status on
their off days in order to accomplish some of this expansion training.
So I would say if all effort had been placed [S09] on searching,
why the expansion training would have suffered considerably, as it
did suffer after December 7th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, if you had been told on or about November
27, 1941, that war with Japan was expected to break out momentarily,
would you have considered that a valid reason for discontinuance of
training?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. You will have to look at it from this
angle, when you once start, then you freeze the situation and you aren't
improving it. We didn't have in the Navy a training establislnnent
that could carry on this training, which up to that time had been done
in the squadrons, and the question should be viewed from the angle :
Are you willing to freeze as is, with no question of expansion, and
take the consequences or proceed with your efforts to expand? be-
cause aviation was known to have to expand tremendously and the
training of personnel was one of the very serious problems connected
with it. The discussion of this subject had gone to considerable
lengths concerning where this training was to be accomplished,
whether it should be done by the fleet, as an operational training pro-
gram by the fleet on the Pacific Coast, or whether it was to be set up
as a shore establishment.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, referring to the four or five days prior to
the attack when you were ill and you were getting reports from Cap-
tain Ramsey, did he at any time report to you that he had had any con-
ferences on the subject of reconnaissance with Admiral Kimmel or
any member of his staff ?
Vice Admiral Bellinger. No.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. Is there any other statement that you care to
make in connection with the matter under investigation?
[SIO] Vice Admiral Bellinger. Yes. I would like to state that
in preparation for meeting an air attack such as occurred on Decem-
ber 7, 1941, at Pearl Harbor, unity of command must exist ; the organ-
ization must be in effect, manned, functioning, and operating twenty-
four hours every day. There must be reconnaissance, radar nets, and
complete information in regard to shipping and control of aircraft
302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
entering and leaving the zone. All that must be in effect and func-
tioning properly prior to the attack. No mutual cooperative organi-
zation set up on paper and developed through intermittent drills is
worth much.
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 3:48 p. m., adjourned until 9 a. m.,
Friday, 22 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 303
1511] PEOCEEDINdS OF THE HEWITT INaUIKY
Twenty-second Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General
Board, Navy Department, at 9 a. m., Friday, 22 June 1945.
Present : Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN ; Mr. John F. Sonnett ;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. Sonnett. State your name, please.
Mrs. Edgers. Mrs. Dorothy Edgers.
Mr. Sonnett. What is your occupation, Mrs. Edgers?
Mrs. Edgers. Research Analyst, Navy Department.
Mr. Sonnett. And in what section do you work?
Mrs. Edgers. In the Office of Communications right now.
Mr. Sonnett. What was your occupation in December of 1941 ?
Mrs. Edgers. Research Analyst in the ONI. That is Naval In-
telligence.
Mr. Sonnett. And that office was engaged in the decryption and
translation of intercepted Japanese communications at that time?
Mrs. Edgers. The particular branch I was working with was.
Mr. Sonnett. What are your qualifications in the Japanese lan-
guage, Mrs. Edgers ?
Mrs. Edgers. My knowledge of the Japanese language is about as
good as it can be. I have a diploma from a Japanese school to teach
Japanese to Japanese people up to high school.
Mr. Sonnett. You lived in Japan for some time ?
Mrs. Edgers. Over thirty years.
[5-?^] Mr. Sonnett. And when did you leave Japan ?
Mrs. Edgers. In the year before Pearl Harbor, which would make
it '40.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you, Mrs. Edgers, document 22 of exhibit 13
of this investigation, which is a message from Honolulu to Tokyo,
dated December 3, 1941, which bears a notation that it was translated
by the Navy on December 11, 1941, and ask you whether prior to
December 7, 1941, you had any connection with that message.
Mrs. Edgers. Yes, I did.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you state, please, fully what your connection
with that message was?
Mrs. Edgers. Well, at the time it was my work to roughly translate
any message which was put on my desk and this was among the mes-
sages that were put on my desk on December 6th, Saturday morning,
and at the time I had only been working in this section for about a
little over two weeks ; so, at first glance, this seemed to be more inter-
esting than some of the other messages I had in my basket, and so I
304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
selected it and asked one of the other men, who were also translators
working on other messages, whether or not this shouldn't be done im-
mediately and was told that I should and then I started to translate it.
Mr. SoNNETT. About what time on that day did you complete your
translation, Mrs. Edgers.
Mrs. Edgers. Well, it so happened that there was some mistake in
the message that had to be corrected and so that took some time. That
was at 12 : 30 or perhaps it was a little before or after 12 : 30 ; whatever
time it was, we were to go home. It being Saturday, we worked until
noon. I hadn't completed it, so I worked overtime and finished it and
I would say that between 1 : 30 and 2 was when I finished my rough
draft translation.
[SIS] Mr. SoNNETT. That is, on the afternoon of December 6th ?
Mrs. Edgers. Of the 6th, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. For the sake of the record, Mrs. Edgers, would you
describe briefly w^hat that message is ?
Mrs. Edgers. Well, without reading it over again now, just because
of the fact that the message did keep in mind, I would say that it was
a message saying how they were going to communicate from Honolulu
to the parties interested the information on our fleet movements from
Honolulu, and apparently it was something which they had had pre-
vious arrangements, but they had changed some of the minor details
of how to go about it. I think there was something to do with lights,
a window of a certain house, and there was also something about news-
paper advertising.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know whether that translation which you
completed in the early afternoon of December 6, 1941, was brought
to the attention of now Captain Kramer ?
Mrs. Edgers. It was brought to his attention naturally because it
was — well, in any case, he knew that I was working on it and I left
it, as a matter of fact, in the hands of the chief whose job it was to
edit messages and write them up, or ones that were more complicated
and more important like this, the officer-in-charge looked it over and
edited it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain Kramer was your superior officer in that
section, was he not?
Mrs. Edgers. My supervisor, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Wliat was the name of the chief to whom you re-
ferred ?
Mrs. Edgers. Chief Bryant.
Mr. SoNNETT. B-r-y-a-n-t?
Mrs. Edgers. I don't remember how he spelled his name, but he
had been [5^4] in the section for some time. He left imme-
diately after the war for sea duty. He put in a request.
Mr. SoNXETT. Did you before you left on the afternooii of Decem-
ber 6, 1941, show all or any part of your translation of this message to
Captain Kramer?
Mrs. Edgers. I am sorry. I will have to say I don't remember
whether I did or didn't show any or all of it, although I am sure he
did have occasion to see part of it, but he knew I was working on the
message and I believe that is probably the reason he came back again,
no doubt later, as I understand it, to work on it.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 305
Admiral Hewitt. Thank you very much, Mrs. Edgers.
(The witness was excused.)
[Slo] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. State your name, please, sir.
Mr. FRiEDMAisr. William F. Friedman.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is your occupation, Mr. Friedman ?
Mr. Freedmax. I am Cryptanalyst and Director of Communica-
tions Research, Signal Security Agency.
Mr. SoNNETT. War Department ?
Mr. Friedman. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. And during 1941 what was your occupation?
Mr. Friedman. I was Principal Cryptanalyst in the Signal Intelli-
gence Service.
Mr. Sonnett. How long have j^ou been in that work, Mr. Fried-
man?
Mr. Friedman. Since 1915.
Mr. Sonnett. I show you document 4 of exhibit 13 of this investi-
gation and ask you whether you can identify that dispatch, and also
show you document 15 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry
and ask whether you can identify that.
Mr. Friedman. Yes. These are translations of messages which
were processed jointly by the Army and Navy Signal Intelligence
Services.
Mr. Sonnett. Those were Japanese messages which set up the so-
called "winds" code, were they not?
Mr. Friedman. They are.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you have any knowledge or do you have any
knowledge of the efforts that were made to monitor for any Japanese
message employing the "winds" code ?
Mr. Friedman. I know that when these code messages were trans-
lated, that steps were taken to monitor all the circuits over which an
execute message [ol6] might appear, both in the Army and
the Navy and also by the Federal Communications Commission.
Mr. Sonnett. Prior to December 7, 1941, did you learn whether
or not any such execute message was intercepted by any one?
Mr. Freidman. No, sir.
Mr. Sonnett. After December 7, 1941, did you have any informa-
tion as to whether or not any such message was intercepted ?
Mr. Friedman. Indirect information in the way of statements by
Captain Safford of the Navy and Colonel Sadler of the Army to the
effect that there had been such an execute message.
Mr. Sonnett. Will j^ou state, Mr. Friedman, as best j'ou recall it,
when and where you had the conversation with Captain Safford to
which you refer and what was said by him on that subject during the
conversation ?
Mr. Friedman. I have had several conversations with him. I am
unable at the moment to indicate the dates. The first one was cer-
tainly a year and a half ago and I haven't had any conversations with
him now for some six months, I dare say. In the course of the earlier
conversations. Captain Safford indicated that there was — there had
been a "winds" execute message ; that no copies of it were to be found
in the Navy files, and that nevertheless there had been testimony to
the effect that it had been intercepted. His story was that it was iner-
79716 — 4C— Ex. 149, vol. 1 21
306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cepted by one of their East Coast stations, he believed, and was
promptly forwarded into Washington, and I don't recall now who
got it. Colonel Sadler indicated also
Mr. SoNNETT. Before you come to your conversation with Colonel
Sadler, Mr. Friedman, in his conversations with you, did Captain
Safford state the substance of the "winds" code execute which he
thought had been received prior to December 7, 1941 ?
[5i7] Mr. Friedman. Yes, he indicated that it not only had the
affirmative for break in relations between Japan and the United States,
but it also had a negative for a break in relations between Japan and
Russia.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now turning to your conversation with Colonel Sad-
ler, will you state when you had that, approximately, and what was
said at that time?
Mr. Friedman. Approximately a year and a half ago I had a con-
versation with Colonel Sadler, who came to duty in Washington about
then, and we talked about Pearl Harbor because of the fact that he had
been the head of our communications service at the time, and he
indicated that he had tried his best to urge that some specific warning
message be sent out to the Department commander. He indicated
that the "winds" code execute message had come in on the — some time
on the 4th or 5th of December. I don't think that he was clear himself
as to which of those two days it was. If I remember correctly,
he was either notified himself by somebody in the Navy, possibly
Admiral Noyes, that the message was in — "it's in," as I recall it, was
the expression used — or it may be that the Navy source called Army
G-2 and indicated that they had had word that the message was in,
and that Colonel Sadler was then called to G-2 to corroborate the
interception of the message.
At any rate, there was a question as to the exact word, the Japanese
word, that was used and when Colonel Sadler couldn't indicate the
word, because he hadn't seen the message himself, I think they tried —
I think he said that they tried to get a varification from whoever
it was — Admiral Noyes — but they weren't successful, whereupon the
G-2 authorities simply passed the matter over. There was apparently
nothing to substantiate the existence of the message.
Then, if I remember correctly, I asked Colonel Sadler whether
he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of this message, and
his answer was, if I remember correctly, that he hadn't himself seen
a copy, but that he had been [SIS] told by somebody that the
copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Mar-
shall. Of course, I regarded this as merely hearsay evidence and
nothing more than that; highly inconceivable that such a thing would
happen. And when I talked over the Pearl Harbor story with Captain
Satt'ord, I probably just jDassed that out as one of those crazy things
that get started. I shouldn't have done it. I certainly had no idea
that he would repeat it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Other than what you have already testified to, Mr.
Friedman, did you have any information from any source as to the
existence of a "winds" code message relating to the United States?
Mr. Friedman. You mean a "winds" code execute?
Mr. SoNNETT. Yes.
Mr. Friedman. Not of my own direct knowledge at the time.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 307
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, has anybody else in the Navy, other than Cap-
tain Safford, ever stated to you or indicated to you that such a message
existed ?
Mr. Friedman. I have not talked with anybody else in the Navy.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that either directly or indirectly, I take it, you
have no information from naval sources as to the existence of a
"winds" code execute relating to the United States, aside from your
conversations with Captain Safford and Colonel Sadler ?
Mr. Friedman. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry
record, which consists of a statement by the Federal Communications
Commission and has annexed to it various documents. Will you exam-
ine those and state which of those messages, in your opinion, was a
genuine execute of the "winds" code?
Mr. Friedman. I have examined these messages anterior to this
questioning and came to the conclusion that only the last, which is
labelled document number 4, gives evidence of being an authentic
"winds" code executive message. [^i^'J It conforms to the form
established in the "winds" code, except that there is no repetition of
the nishi no haze hare at the end of the message as there should have
been.
Mr. Sonnett. What was the date of the "winds" execute message to
which you have just referred, Mr. Friedman ?
Mr. Friedman. According to the statement, the date is December 8,
1941, between 0002 and 0035, GMT, which would be December 7, 1941,
Washington time.
Mr. Sonnett. And that message uses the code words, Mr. Friedman,
relating to what country ?
Mr. Friedman. A Japanese-British break.
Mr. Sonnett. Mr. Friedman, I show you documents 6 and 11 of ex-
hibit 18 of this investigation and ask whether you can identify those
documents.
Mr. Friedman. I can. The one dated 27 November 1941 from Tokyo
to Washington established a hidden word code system whereby the
Japanese hoped to be able to pass secret information to case of a closure
of communications between Tokyo and places in the Western Hemi-
sphere.
The other document, Tokyo circular telegram of December 7, 1941,
I identify as being a message in the hidden word code.
Mr. Sonnett. Would you just read the text of that message into the
record ?
Mr. Friedman. The English text is :
Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations.
Mr. Sonnett. Does it appear from the document who translated
that version of the message %
Mr. Friedman. It does. It says on the bottom "Navy translation."
Mr. Sonnett. And the date ?
{520^, Mr. Friedman. December 7, 1941.
Mr. Sonnett. Was that message translated by the Army also, to
your knowledge ?
Mr. Friedman. I do not know whether it was translated at that time
by the Army also, but I have had it translated since then.
308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr, SoNNETT. And what translation was made by the Army of that
message ?
Mr. Friedman. The one to which you refer now ?
Mr. SoNNETT. Yes.
Mr. Friedman. Well, there is quite a story about that.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you tell us that story, Mr. Friedman ?
Mr. Friedman. A few days after Pearl Harbor I saw this message
in the form, "Relations between Japan and England are not in accord-
ance with expectations," and although I was ill, I saw clearly enough
that the message on its face was absurd. Any fool would realize that
on December 7th Tokyo was not going to send a message out saying,
"Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with ex-
pectations" when the die had already been cast, and I came to the
tentative conclusion that there was something wrong with that mes-
sage and I asked Colonel Svennsson about the message and told him
that I felt that there was something wrong with it and suggested that
it be re-translated. Colonel Svennsson looked it up and told me that
it was not a good translation. When I went into the details, I un-
covered a very surprising situation. The translation of the message
conforms to the translation set up in the 27 November 19^1 code, but
the translation in that code was not good.
This is the situation. The word that was set up, hattori^ meant, ac-
cording to this translation, "relations between Japan and blank: are
not in accordance with expectations," whereas it should have read,
"Relations between Japan and blank are on the brink of catastrophe,"
or some strong expression [J^i] of that sort. Moreover, I
found that the message of 7 December 1941, which mentions only re-
lations between Japan and England, had another defect in that the
original intercept included the word niinavii, meaning the USA, as
well as the word koyanagi^ meaning England.
That double error produced a concatenation of circumstances that
I thought later was just an additional one in the series of accidents
that contrived together to prevent due warning, because had that
originally been translated accurately "on the brink of catastrophe,"
"on the verge of disaster," and so on, had that come in, it would have
got immediate attention. That was a few hours before. Also if it
had mentioned the United States, it should have.
Mr. SoNNETT, And, I take it, the error in translation in the original
hidden word code, Mr. Friedman?
Mr. Friedman. December 2, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. And by whom was it translated ?
Mr. Friedman. Navy.
Mr. Sonnett. Was that translation distributed to the Army prior
to the attack?
Mr. Friedman. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. And, I take it, the error in translation in the original
code was not detected until you detected it, as you have just testified?
Mr. Friedman. That is correct, yes.
Mr. Sonnett. When did you detect the errors of the code and in the
translation of the December 7th message ?
Mr. Friedman. I can't place it accurately. It was a few days after
Pearl Harbor.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 309
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you communicate your discoveries to the Navy as
to the errors?
Mr. Friedman". No.
[S^S] Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know whether or not the discov-
eries which you had made as to these messages were communicated to
the Navy at any time?
Mr. Friedman". No.
Mr. SoNNETT. Mr. Friedman, referring to documents 14 and 15 of
exhibit 13 of this investigation, will you examine those and state
whether or not they came to your attention at any time ?
Mr. Friedman. They were not brought to my attention at the time
of their translation, but I have seen them since.
Mr. SoNNETT. Both of those are Japanese messages from Honolulu,
relating to the status of defenses at Pearl Harbor and vicinity, are
they not?
Mr. Friedman. They are.
Mr. Sonnett. Would you read, Mr. Friedman, into the record the
last sentence of the first paragraph of document 14?
Mr. Friedman. The last sentence of the first paragraph reads : "I
imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left
to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places."
Mr. Sonnett. And that message was dated what date, sir?
Mr. Friedman. December 6, 1941.
Mr. Sonnett. Wliat was the date of translation of that, Mr. Fried-
man?
Mr. Friedman. It is stated December 8th.
Mr. Sonnett. And by whom translated?
Mr. Friedman. It doesn't state, but on the basis of the division of
labor that had been established between the Army and Navy, whereby
Army processed messages bearing in their pre-handle even dates, I
[>resume that this message was processed by the Army.
Mr. Sonnett. Is there an indication on the message as to where and
bv whom it was intercepted, Mr. Friedman ?
[5£3] Mr. Friedman. There is. Exhibit 14 bears on it an indi-
cation that it was intercepted by Station Two, which is the Army
monitor station at San Francisco.
Mr. Sonnett. And does it also indicate how it was forwarded to
Washington ?
Mr. Friedman. It is indicated as having been forwarded by tele-
type.
Mr. Sonnett. For the sake of the record, Mr. Friedman, you re-
ferred to exhibit 14, but what you meant to say was page 14 of the
exhibit before you, which is exhibit 13 ?
Mr. Friedman. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you turn to page 15 of that exhibit and state
whether or not you can identify that message?
Mr. Friedman. I identify it as being a message presumably proc-
essed by the Army since it bears the date December 6, 1941, an even
date.
Mr. Sonnett. A message from
Mr. Friedman. A message from Honolulu to Tokyo.
Mr. Sonnett. Would you read the second paragraph of that mes-
sage into the record?
310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Friedman. The second paragraph reads: "It appears that no
air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet Air Arm."
Mr. SoNNETT. And what is the date of translation of that indicated ?
Mr. Friedman. December 8, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. Does it appear where and by whom the message was
intercepted ?
Mr. Friedman. It was intercepted by Army Station Two at San
Francisco and was forwarded by teletype.
Mr. Sonnett. Now, both of those messages of December 6th, Mr.
Friedman, were in the PA-K2 code, were they not ?
Mr. Friedman. They were.
[5£4] Mr. Sonnett. Will you state briefly and generally what
that code was and its relative difficulty ?
Mr. Friedman. That code was a high grade code involving keyed
columnar transportation of code text, distributed in a form established
by the Japanese when they set up the crypotographic system. It
represents what we call a rather good form of enciphered code.
Mr. Sonnett. As of the first week of December or, more specifi-
cally, as of December 6, 1941, do you know how rapidly that code could
have been read by the Army ?
Mr. Friedman. We were in position usually to process this traffic
fairly readily in view of the fact that we had reconstructed the entire
code or practically the entire code and were able to reconstruct from
time to time as was necessary the transportation keys for the super-
encipherment.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you refer to page 24 of that exhibit, Mr. Fried-
man, and state whether you can identify that message?
Mr. Friedman. Yes, I have seen this message before.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you state the date and
Mr. Friedman. The date is December 7, 1941. The message is from
Tokyo to Honolulu.
Mr. Sonnett. What is the subject matter, briefly, of the message,
Mr. Friedman ?
Mr. Friedman. The matter directs the Japanese in Honolulu to keep
Tokyo informed day by day of the presence in port of warships and
airplane carriers and cruisers and indicates that it is of the utmost
importance to let them know.
Mr. Sonnett. Is there any reference also to barrage balloons ?
Mr. Friedman. Yes. They were to wire in each case whether or not
[5^5] there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or
if there are any indications that they will be sent up, and also whether
or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.
Mr. Sonnett. When was that translated and by whom, Mr. Fried-
man?
Mr. Friedman. This message was translated by the Army on De-
cember 30, 1941.
Mr. Sonnett. It bears a notation that the message was received on
December 23rd, does it not?
Mr. Friedman. It does.
Mr. Sonnett. Does it appear where and by whom the message was
intercepted ?
Mr. Friedman. The message was intercepted by Station Five, which
is an Army station at Honolulu.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 311
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you explain, Mr. Friendman, the delay between
the date of interception, which presumably was December 2, 1941, and
the date of translation, December 30, 1941 ?
Mr. Friedman. There were insufficient facilities and personnel to
process all of the traffic which might be processed. Naturally, that is
a situation which is beyond control of the Army because it depends
upon the funds that are provided by Congress, and so on, for this sort
of work. And in any case, to be able to process all the traffic that may
have been intercepted would have required a very large organization,
which we didn't have at the time. We set up priorities for the handling
and processing of traffic according to the best standards that we could
establish at the time. We naturally would process messages in the
purple system first because we had found from experience that that
carried the most important information, and then we would process
cryptographic systems of next importance, and so on.
Now, in the case of this particular message of December 2nd, I have
[S26^ no doubt that Honolulu intercept station had accumulated
a large amount of traffic which had to be forwarded and we didn't
have the radio circuits and facilities adequate to be able to forward
all of the intercepted material by radio. In any case, a good deal
of it, of minor importance, there is no use in forwarding by radio,
which is a relatively expensive method as compared with forwarding
by air mail, for example.
' Mr. SoNNETT. The note on that message would indicate that it was
received here on the 23rd of December, would it not?
Mr. Friedman. It does.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that it took approximately seven days between the
time of receipt of the message by the War Department in Washington
and the time of its decryption and translation?
Mr. Friedman. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. Now, would the interval between December 2nd and
December 23rd indicate that the message had been forwarded from
Fort Shafter by mail?
Mr. Friedman. It would indicate that that was the case.
Mr. Sonnett. What was the order of priority, Mr. Friedman, after
the purple code, insofar as dispatching those messages to Washington ?
Mr. Friedman. I am unable to stata from memory. That is a mat-
ter of record. I could find it.
Mr. Sonnett. Where did the J-19 code come from ? Do you recall ?
Mr. Friedman. It was below purple, definitely, below purple, and
presumably, according to my recollection now, it would be either on
the same level with the PA-K2 or slightly below it.
Mr. Sonnett. Now, this message of December 2nd was in the J-19
code, was it not ?
[527] Mr. Friedman. It was.
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to the months prior to December 7, 1941,
Mr. Friedman, did you have any personal connection with the decryp-
tion of Japanese communications ?
Mr. Friedman. Yes, I had been asked by the Chief Signal Officer
to take a hand in our attempts to solve the Japanese purple system.
Mr, Sonnett. Will you state approximately when that occurred, Mr.
Friedman ?
312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Friedman. The first time we were able to hand in a completely
deciphered text was some time in August of 1940 ; it might have been
late in August of 1940. We had been on the problem for eighteen or
twenty months, something like that.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, the purple code of the Japanese was, I take it
from your testimony, solved by the unit under your direction ?
Mr. Friedman. That is correct. As Chief Cryptanalyst, it was nat-
urally my responsibility to solve the things that superiors asked us to
solve.
Mr. Sonnett. After you worked on the purple code of the Japa-
nese, did you continue your close connection, personal connection, with
the decryption of Japanese communications and, if so, up to what
time?
Mr. Friedman. No. I regret to say that the solution of the Japa-
nese purple machine had apparently taken such a toll of my nervous
energy that I was suffering from nervous exhaustion and while I
understood quite well that things weren't well with me, nevertheless
I felt under extreme necessity of keeping going and did so until some
time in December of 1940, when I had a complete collapse. I returned
to duty some time in April of 1941, but in view of the fact that it was
going to take considerable time to recover my health, the Chief Signal
Officer indicated that I was to take it easy, and [628] one way
of doing that was to keep me more or less out of the high pressure
cryptanalytical processing and let me devote my attention to some of
the signal security matters where it was a slower pace. I wasn't too
happy about that.
Mr. Sonnett. So that, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, then,
you weren't actually working directly on the Japanese material?
Mr. Friedman, That is right.
Mr. Sonnett. I think that is all. Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. That is all. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
[62d] Captain Laurance F. Safford, USN, was recalled as a
witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was
still binding.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain Safford, I show you exhibit 13 of this inves-
tigation, which consists of a collection of intercepted Japanese dis-
patches in translated form, and call your attention to the fact that
each page of the document indicates that it was translated by the
Navy or the Army and that after the date there appear symbols in
parentheses, letters such as the letter "S" or "X" and in other cases
there appear numbers. Will you explain what they signify ?
Captain Safford. The letter "S" was the Navy intercept station
at Bainbridge Island, Washington.
Mr. Sonnett. And the letter "X"?
Captain Safford. The letter "X" was a photograph taken by the
Navy, in this particular case at Washington, D. C.
Mr. Sonnett. And the letters "NE"?
Captain Safford. "NR" merely meant Navy radio.
Mr. Sonnett. The number 7
Captain Safford. Number 7 was an Army intercept station at Fort
Hunt, Virginia, just outside of Washington.
Mr. Sonnett. Number 2?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 313
Captain Safford. Number 2 was an Army intercept station at the
Presidio in San Francisco, California.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the letters "STT" ?
Captain Safford. "S" was Station S and "TT" stood for teletype.
Any message forwarded by teletype was marked "TT" at the bottom.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did the Army follow the same practice ?
[530] Captain Safford. The Army followed the same practice
at least in one case, because it is marked.
Mr. SoNNETT. The letters "AR"?
Captain Safford. Army radio, and you also have one more, number
5, which is the Army intercept station at Fort Shafter, T. H.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the docimient bearing number 14 and
the document bearing the number 15 of that exhibit, will you state
where they were intercepted, when and by whom translated?
Captain Safford. They were both intercepted at the Army inter-
cept station in San Francisco and forwarded by teletype. They were
presumably intercepted on the 6th of December, 1941, which is their
filing date. They were both processed and translated by the Army,
and they were translated on December 8, 1941. About sixteen or sev-
enteen months ago we sighted the original work sheets for these two
messages, including the intercepted message, and found or learned
that number 14 went on the air about eighteen hours before the attack
on Pearl Harbor and number 15 went on the air about twelve hours
before the attack on Pearl Harbor, that is, to the nearest hour. The
Army have all these papers in their custody.
Mr. SoNNETT. Both of those messages were in the PA-K2 Japa-
nese code, were they not ?
Captain Safford. Both were in PA-K2 ; that is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state the difficulty of that code in terms of
the time which would have been required for the Navy to have de-
ciphered those messages after they were available to the Navy for
such purposes ?
Captain Safford. The actual time of decryption for number 14,
including typing in smooth, would have been about an hour or an
hour and a half, and number 15 about half that time. However, in
the Navy PA-K2 was given precedence [531] in processing
after all the purples and after all the J-19's and it would not have
been touched as long as there were any J-19's on hand being worked
on by the two girls, who only performed day's duties and did not
work on Sundays and handled only the PA-K2's and only the routine
decoding of J-19 after J-19 had been solved by the men who were
standing continuous watch.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you refer to page 24 of that exhibit and state
when and by whom the message was intercepted and forwarded ?
Captain Safford. The message was intercepted at Fort Shafter.
It was processed and translated by the Army on December 30, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is the date of the message. Captain?
Captain Safford. The message was dated December 2, 1941, and
was in J-19. The message bears a note : "This message was received
here on December 23."
Mr. SoNNETT. Does it appear when that message was received in
Washington ?
Captain Safford. Yes, December 23rd. That is from this notation
314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. In what code was that message?
Captain Safford. That was in J-19.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state how long it would have required for
the Navy to have decrypted and translated that message ?
Captain Safford. That would have required from twelve hours to
five days, depending upon luck and upon the volume of traffic we had
available to work on. At this particular time most of the J-IO systems
had been destroyed and the volume of J-19 traffic dropped off to a large
extent. •
Mr. SoNNETT. That is, when you say "this particular time," do you
mean early in December, '41, before the attack?
Captain Safford. Early in December, 1941, before the attack. I
would like to add that there were very few purple keys which we failed
to solve, maybe two or three per cent, and there was an appreciable per-
centage of J-19's, maybe [SS^] ten or fifteen, which we com-
pletely failed to solve due to insufficient traffic or extremely bad luck.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the afternoon of December 6, 1941, and
the morning of December 7, 1941, Captain, will you state whether the
Navy decryption unit was working and, if so, on what?
Captain Safford. A continuous watch was being maintained and
that watch gave priority to purple and did nothing else so long as there
were any purple messages to be solved. However, during the night of
6-7 December 1941, they did get caught up and they took out something
in other systems, which is a matter of record in the GY log, according
to my memory. I don't know how many messages we entered into be-
cause it showed they got caught up to date and were keeping up with
stuff regardless of the extra flow of work.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, Oie so-called fourteen-part message was inter-
cepted beginning on December 6, 1941, was it not?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr, SoNNETT. That was all in English ?
Captain Safford. That was all in English.
Mr. SoNNETT. And required, therefore, neither decryption nor trans-
lating ?
Captain Safford. Oh, it required decryption. It was in purple.
Mr. SoNNETT. But in English ?
Captain Safford. But in English, so didn't require translation.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was that decrypted promptly on the afternoon of
December 6th and the evening ?
Captain Safford. They began to work on that immediately after it
came in and they had found out by telephone conversation with the
War Department that the Army weren't going to work over that week
end. As a matter of fact, some of the parts of it were logged out in
the GY log to the Army and then recalled [533] when they
found out they were going home at 12 o'clock. It was the Army's day
of responsibility whereby the Navy took odd days and the Army took
even days.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, the fourteen-part message, which is document
39 of exhibit 63 of the Naval Court of Inquiry record, was dated Decem-
ber 6, 1941, was it not?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that under the agreement between the Army and
the Navy, the Army was responsible for the decryption of that mes-
sage?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 315
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there also received on that day a message from
Tokyo to Washington, dated December 6th. in the purple code, being
message 901, advising that the reply would be in fourteen parts and
that time of delivery would be fixed in a separate message ?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was that message decrypted by the Army ?
Captain Safford. I believe that was decrypted by the Army. It will
bear their notation on the bottom if it was.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you document 38 of exhibit 63 of the Naval
Court of Inquiry record and ask you if you can determine from that
who decrypted and translated the message.
Captain Safford. Yes, that was processed and translated by the
Army during the late afternoon and early evening of 6 December 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, will you explain, Captain, how it was that the
Army came to work upon those messages when it appears from your
earlier testimony that they had planned not to work that afternoon
and evening?
Captain Safford. About 3 o'clock, about 3 p. m., the afternoon
of \_^34-] December 6, 1941, Commander Kramer returned to
the Navy Department and saw on hand roughly twenty intercepts in
the purple machine. These turned out to be one long message and
several short ones, and realizing that he had more than we could
handle, he called up SIS in the War Department and asked for
assistance. He found an officer down there making up some back
work and this officer called Major Doud and Mr. Rowlett and they
also called two young ladies who were Civil Service employees. All
four came from their homes and got back to the War Department
about 4 p. m. One of the sirls, a Miss Ray Cave, a typist, came
over to the Navy Department and assisted in the smooth type-ups.
The others worked over in the Munitions Building. One other Army
officer who was present in the Munitions Building also assisted, but
he was under instruction, I believe, and not very much help. I don't
recall his name. He is of no importance.
Mr. SoNNETT. Which parts of the first thirteen parts of the f ourteen-
part message were worked on by the Army on the afternoon and
evening of December 6th ?
Captain Safford. I will have to see that GY log to verify this.
As I recall it, it was parts 9 and 10 they actually worked on, but the
smooth typing was done over in the I^avy Department and it was
marked as a Navy translation. There was no actual translation, of
course, because it was in English.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the balance, I take it, of the thirteen parts were
actually worked on by the Navy?
Captain Safford. The balance were actually worked on by the Navy.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to part 14 of the message
Captain Safford. May I add there were also three or four purple
messages of relative unimportance which the Army handled at the
same time.
[635] Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state generally what those mes-
sages were, if you recall them. Captain?
Captain Safford. One message said that this long one was most
secret and not to let an ordinary typist type it; it would have to bei
316 C6NGRESSI0NAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
done by the coding officer, and take great pains not to let it leak out.
Then there were two congratulatory messages and one ordering some-
body to be recalled to his post of duty if they knew where he was
and another one ordering one of their intelligence agents to skip to
Latin America.
Mr. SoxNETT. Referring to part 14 of the fourteen part message,
which was from Tokyo to Washington, dated 7 December, in the
purple code and bearing number 902, that was decrypted, I take it,
on the morning of December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Saffoud. That is part 14?
Mr. SoNNETT. Yes.
Captain Safford. That was decrypted on the morning of the 7th
some time prior to 7 a. m. It was received in the Navy Department
around 6 a. m., as well as we can determine.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to a message of December 7, 1941, from
Tokyo to Washington, bearing number 907, which directed the Am-
bassador to submit the reply to the United States at 1 p. m. on the 7th,
that, I take it, was decrypted on the 7th. Do you know at what hour ?
Captain Safford. That was decrypted on the 7th before 7 a. m. and
sent over to the Army for translation. Brotherhood, who was on
watch, translated it himself and knew what it said, but he was not
sufficiently skilled in the Japanese language at that time that we
could trust his translations, and he sent it over to the War Department
for translation as per orders.
Mr. SoNNETT. This bears the note at the bottom: "Trans.
12/7/41 (S) ." mat does that signify ?
[oM] Captain Safford. That means that was translated on De-
cember 7, 1941, and the "S" means it was intercepted at Bainbridge
Island, Washington, by the Navy radio station there, and that also
bears the notation that it was translated by the Army. It was de-
crypted by the Navy in this case, but the actual translation was done
by the Army, and it was typed smooth by the Army.
Mr. SoxKETT. That message was decrypted at about what time on
December 7, 1941 ?
Captain Safford. Before 7 a. m.
Mr. SoNNETT. And the message consisted of one sentence, did it
not?
Captain Safford. It consisted of one sentence.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were there any qualified Japanese translators on
duty in the Navy Department at that time ?
Captain Safford. There were not.
Mr. SoNNETT. But Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood, who was
on duty, attempted a translation?
Captain Safford. Attempted a translation and realized it was very
important and stayed on himself after his watch had expired until
Commander Kramer came down to the Navy Department.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, at what time was the translation received back
from the Army of this message ?
Captain Safford. I do not know for certain, except it was received
back at least by 10 : 15 a. m. and possibly shortly after 9 a. m. What
the various people say doesn't agree and we have no written record.
Mr. SoNNETT. At what time did Commander Kramer arrive at the
office on the morning of December 7, 1941 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 317
Captain Safford. He arrived some time prior to 9 o'clock; about
8 : 30 as well as I can judge.
[537] Mr. SoNNETT. Was he shown the decrypted message in
Japanese, that is, of message 907, directing the delivery of the reply
at 1 p. m. ?
Captain Safford. I do not know. Kramer said he never knew about
the existence of that message until after he had made his first trip
to the State Department.
Mr. SoNNETT. December 7, 1941, being an odd day, was the day
on which the Navy had the responsibility for the decryption and
translation of Japanese messages ?
Captain Safford. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. If that was so, why was there no Japanese translator
on duty in your section at that time ?
Captain Safford. Because Kramer had worked overtime from 4
p. m. until about 1 a. m. after putting in a normal day's work and
he was ordered to report to Admiral Stark with translations the
next morning at 9 a. m. and realized that he wouldn't be available.
Kramer normally took the Sunday duties himself. Kramer made spe-
cial arrangements with the Army whereby they would provide a trans-
lator for Sunda}^ in view of the fact we had handled their work the
day before. At that particular time one of our civilian Japanese
translators was in the hospital, where he died about two months later,
and another one was not available for some reason which I can't recall
at the moment.
Mr. SoNNETT. The other one being Mrs. Edgers ?
Captain Safford. Mrs. Edgers was not good enough to be permitted
to handle purple translations. I counted her out.
Mr. SoNNETT. You mean her ability to translate Japanese was not
adequate ?
Captain Safford. Was not adequate at that time.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you know Mrs. Edgers' history?
[538] Captain Safford. She was the sister of Mr. Woodruff,
one of our best translators here. Mr. Cate was the one who was in the
hospital and died. I don't know what the status of Woodruff was
except there was some reason he wasn't immediately available. And
Doctor Hoffman had been taking Sunday duties for a long period and
by some local arrangement Kramer had taken them over himself, par-
tially because he was a little mistrustful of the doctor's evaluations of
the importance of things, not his translations, but his ability to evalu-
ate, and since Kramer would be making the distribution, it was better
for him to come down himself.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you know Mrs. Edgers' qualifications as a Japa-
nese translator and her previous study of the language ?
Captain Safford. As I recall, she had been with us about three
months, three to six months. She was employed by ONI and ONI
was entirely responsible for translation.
Mr. SoNNETT. But did you know. Captain, that she had been licensed
to teach Japanese in Japan up to the grade of high school ?
Captain Safford. I did not know what her personal qualifications
were, but on translating this technical stuff, regardless of their educa-
tion, it took long experience in working with this particular type of
stuff before we dared trust their translations.
318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. In other words, then, your statement concerning Mrs.
Edgers' qualifications was not so much, I take it, her qualifications as
a translator but rather her experience with the work ?
Captain Safford. And her technical vocabulary. Every one we had
had to go through a probationary period of about a year before we
dared turn them loose on really important stuff.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, referring. Captain, to the question which we
have [SS9} prevously gone into, namely, the "winds" code
execute message relating to the United States, did you ever have a con-
versation with Colonel Sadler of the War Department concerning the
existence of such a message ?
Captain Safford. I never talked to Colonel Sadler about that.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall whether on or about December 4, 1941,
you received a call from Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood in
which he advised you of the receipt of a message apparently relating
to the "winds" code?
Captain Safford. I cannot recall anything distinctly about it that
1 would want to say in testimony. I have had a vague idea that there
Avas another "winds" code message and the FCC intercept seemed to
fill the bill.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry
record, which contains documents supplied by the FCC, and to specifi-
cally document 2 of that exhibit, do you recall whether or not Lieu-
tenant Commander Brotherhood advised you of that message on or
about December 4, 1941 ?
Captain Safford. I do not recall ever having seen this message or
knowing of it in this form until I saw the FCC transcript.
Mr. SoNNETT. When did you first see that. Captain ?
Captain Safford. Some time after August 19, 1944, the day before
I went on the stand.
Mr. SoNNETT. Up to that time, namely, August of 1944, had you
known that the Federal Communications Commission had intercepted
any messages which apparently employed the "winds" code?
Captain Safford. Yes, I had known of it for several months.
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, prior to 1944 had you known ?
Captain Safford. Oh, no, no, not prior to 1944, no.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral, at this time.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. I don't think of anything further.
[S40] Captain Safford. I would like to add the following in-
formation: In May, 1945, or late in May, 1945, I had a conversation
with Mr, Walter Foote, formerly American Consul General at Ba-
tavia. Java. Mr. Foote is the man who sent in a Dutch version of the
"winds" setup message. Mr. Foote said that he sent this message at the
urgent request of Mr. Lovink, who was technical adviser to the NET
government on Asiatic affairs. Mr. Foote is certain that the Dutch
did not hear the "winds" execute message and that he would have been
informed if they had heard it.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. Thank you.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 11:41 a. m., adjourned until 1:30
p. m., Tuesday, 26 June 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 319
Vnn PROCEEDlNriS OF THE HEWITT INaUIRY
T^^rENTT-THIRD Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the Gen-
eral Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, at 1 : 30 p. m.,
Tuesday, 26 June 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's
Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
Captain Joseph H. Rochefort, USN, was recalled as a witness and
was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.
Two witnesses entered, read the precept, and each was duly sworn.
Mr. Sonnett. Will each of you gentlemen state his name and rank,
please ?
Colonel Lasswell. Alva B. Laswell, Colonel, USMC.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Farnsley C. Woodward, Lieutenant
(Jg),USN.
Mr. Sonnett. Colonel, will you. state what your assignment was
in December of 1941?
Colonel Lasswell. I was a translator with the conununication in-
telligence unit — I believe we called it combat intelligence unit at that
time — Fourteenth Naval District.
Mr. Sonnett. And Lieutenant Woodward, would you state your
assignment in 1941 ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. My assignment in 1941, 1 was attached
to the same organization and I had several duties among which was
cryptanalysis.
Mr. Sonnett. During the first week of December, 1941, certain
messages were received by that unit for decryption and translation,
which were messages of the Japanese Consul, were they not %
[542] Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They were.
Mr. Sonnett. And the three of you were on duty at that time ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes.
Colonel Lasswell. Yes.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. There has been previous testimony that those mes-
sages were received on or about December 5, 1941. Is that in accord-
ance with your general and several recollections ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes.
Colonel Lasswell. I can state that certain messages were received
on the 5th, yes.
Mr, Sonnett. To the knowledge of any one of you, were such mes-
sages received by your unit prior to December 5, 1941?
Captain Rochefort. No, there were not.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. No.
320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR AllACK
Colonel Lasswell. I know of none.
Mr. SoNNETT. Lieutenant Woodward, I show you a statement on
the letterhead of RCA Communications, Inc., listing various mes-
sages, and ask whether you have examined that document and checked
the messages listed thereon.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodwabd. I have.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that, Admiral, as an exhibit ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 55.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Mr. Woodward, this document, which is exhibit 55.
sets forth messages sent by the Japanese Consul General in Decem-
ber and November, l-S^S] 1941, from Honolulu, does it not?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodwaed. It does.
• Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the file which I show you. Lieutenant,
can you identify the documents contained therein ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. I can.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state what they are ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, they are deciphered messages
of which there is a translation that were taken out by me and trans-
lated by some one else.
Mr. SoNNETT. And those are coded messages of the Japanese Con-
sul General at Honolulu ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is right, sir.
Mr. SoxNETT. Is that correct?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Those messages are among those listed on exhibit
55, which is the ECA statement?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They are.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state when copies of the coded messages
contained in that document first came to your attention ?
Lieutenant ( jg) Woodward. Around possibly 1 : 30, 2 o'clock Friday
afternoon, December 5, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. And each of the messages in the folder, according
to the best of 3'our recollection, was received by you on that date?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. At about that time ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. Subsequent to the receipt of those messages. Lieu-
tenant, did you endeavor to decrypt the messages ?
[544] Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. I did, as soon as it was de-
termined that the other messages that we had received along with
these, what they were, plain language and so forth, we immediate]}'
went to work and worked pretty far into the night on that Friday
evening.
Mr. SoxxETT. May we mark those as an exhibit. Admiral?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
Mr. Soxxett. Lieutenant, exhibit 56, which is a folder containing
photostatic copies of coded messages, also contains some plain lan-
guage and some translations. Are the translations contained in this
exhibit correct translations of the Japanese messages, to the best of
your knowledge ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 321
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. To the best of my knowledge, but I
am not a linguist.
Mr. SoNNETT. Colonel Lasswell, have you veriiBed the translations
in this exhibit 56 and can you state whether or not they are correct ?
Colonel Lasswell. I can state only that those which I made are
correct, to the best of my knowledge and ability.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you. Colonel, exhibit 56 and ask if you will
identify the translations contained therein which were made by you.
Colonel Lasswell. None of these.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know who made the translations of the mes-
sages which are set forth in exhibit 56 ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. I couldn't be positive about that, no.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were the translations taken from the files of the
Navy Department?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. The translations that are in that book
were taken from the files here, a copy of which was put in with this.
[54S'\ Mr. SoNNETT. When you say "here," j^ou are referring
to
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Washington.
Mr. SoNNETT. Washington ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. In addition to the messages contained in exhibit 56,
which you testified were received on December 5, 1941, there were
certain other messages received, were there not, at that time ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. There were.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you describe what those messages were?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, they were plain language and
they were in some less secret systems, none of which are in this book.
Mr. SoNNETT. What did the plain language messages relate to?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. I do not know. I didn't translate
them.
Mr. SoNNETT. Colonel, did you have any connection with the plain
language messages received on or about December 5, 1941 ?
Colonel Lasswell. Yes, I hastily read a number of them, many of
which dealt with the exchange of certain amounts of money as trans-
portation expenses, etcetera, of personnel connected with the consular
department, passing through Honolulu. Many of them were con-
cerning the transfers and movements of certain consular personnel.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were there any of the plain language messages
which were so received prior to the attack of December 7th which dealt
with defense preparations or movements of ships at Pearl Harbor ?
Colonel Lasswell. There was no such information, to the best of
my knowledge, contained in any messagje tljere.
Mr. SoNNETT. In addition to the plain language messages and the
coded messages contained in exhibit 56, 1 believe you said. Lieutenant,
there were some other coded messages in less difficult codes ?
[546'] Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you state what they were ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, you mean the gist of them?
Mr. SoNNETT. Both the gist of them and the code.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, the code was a simple code that
they had used for years, with which we were very familiar, but as far
79716—^6 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 22
322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
as the contents of the messages themselves are concerned, I don't
know because I went to work right on this stuff.
Mr. SoNNETT. What was the code in question ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. LA.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were you familiar, Colonel, with the mesages in the
LA code so received prior to the attack ?
Colonel Lasswell. Yes, quite a number of them I hastily read.
However, we placed, understandably, most of our attention on the
other documents in hand, but we did decrypt and read enough of them
to know the genei'al content,
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you state what generally was the content of
the messages in the LA code so received ?
Colonel Lasswell. The messages encrypted in what was known as
the LA code were almost similar or very similar to those in plain text.
The degree of secrecy of that is apparently very little above the plain
text.
]Mr. SoNNETT. I take it it was also true, then, of the LA code mes-
sages that there was no message relating to the defense preparations
at Pearl Harbor, to movements of ships, or to indicating in any way
the possibility of any attack ?
Colonel Lass^vell. None that I know of.
Mr. Sonnett. For the sake of the record, Lieutenant, referring to
exhibit 56, there are various photostatic pages followed by a transla-
tion and [5^7] then a blank white page. The white pages,
I'lank, separate the various messages, do they not?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. And the translation at the back of each group of
photostats is a translation of the coded and of the Japanese language
preceding it ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is right, sir.
Mr. Sonnett. Can you state when the messages contained in exhibit
56, or any of them, were first translated or decrypted ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodw^ard. No, except that on the morning of the
9th about 2 o'clock the first break was found ; some time between there
and the 10th they were all taken out and possibly translated.
Mr. Sonnett.' Will you explain, Lieutenant, what you mean by
saying that at that time the first break occurred?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, we were fortunate enough to
discover what they had done in enciphering, which was a breach from
the normal way of enciphering the messages.
Mr. Sonnett. In what code were those messages ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. PA-K2 system; PA base with a K2
transposition system. *
Mr. Sonnett. Between December 5th, when those messages were
received, and December 9th, when you first succeeded in breaking that
code, I take it that efforts were made to break that code and decrypt
the messages?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodw.\rd. Very much so, some fourteen to sixteen
hours a day.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you work on that project yourself or did you
have assistants?
\54B] Lieutenant ( jg) Woodward. I worked myself on them and
after getting them, I turned them over to translators for translation.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 323
Mr. SoNNETT. And the translators, in addition to Colonel Laswell,
were now Captain Finnegan and who else ?
Lientenant (jg) Woodward. That I can't be sure.
Colonel Lasswell. There were quite a number of officers there. The
ones that were used on that project, to the best of my memory, would
have been Allyn Cole, John Chivley — those were the only two I
remember employing.
Captain Rochefort. Besides yourself and Finnegan.
Colonel Lasswell. Besides myself and Finnegan.
Mr. SoNNETT. In addition to tlie PA-K2 code, the Japanese had
the so-called J-19 and the purple codes which they used, did they not ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They did.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you ever at Pearl Harbor work on any of those
codes, that is, purple or J-19 ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. I did not.
Mr. SoisTNETT. Were the Japanese code messages received on Decem-
ber 5, 1941, forwarded to Washington by your unit'^
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Copies of them were.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall whether that was done before or after
the attack ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That I do not know. I couldn't say.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you know whether or not Washington had from
other sources copies of such messages ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. I couldn't be sure about that either.
Mr. SoNNETT. Lieutenant, when, prior to December 5, 1941, had you
last engaged in attempting to break Japanese diplomatic code?
[549] Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. From the period of 1938 in
around April till June, 1940.
Mr. SoNNETT. Where was that work done ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Shanghai, China.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was any such w^ork carried on in the Pearl Harbor
unit during the period of time j^ou were there prior to December 6,
1941?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. No, sir.
Mr. SoNNETT. And when did you arrive at Pearl Harbor ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. August 13, 1940.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that, I take it, no attack was being made on Japa-
nese diplomatic codes during the latter part of 1940 and up to the time
of the attack ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Except commencing on December 5, 1941 ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you another folder of photostatic copies of
dispatches and ask if you can identify that.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Yes, I do.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state what that document is?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, this document cotains encoded
messages, which also contains the take-outs — we call them take-outs —
and translations.
Mr. SoNNETT. That is, messages of the Japanese Consul at Hono-
lulu?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward, That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. When were those coded messages first in your posses-
sion?
324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. These messages were received on the
night of 7 December 1941.
[550] Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that, Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 57.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to exhibit 57, which you have just identi-
fied, Lieutenant, I take it these messages were also in the PA-K2
code?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They were, with the exception of the
last batch at the bottom. That is not. That is in J-19 and 22.
Mr. SoNNETT. And those messages weren't deciypted and translated
at Pearl Harbor ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. No, sir.
Mr. SoNNETT. In this exhibit is it also true that the photostatic
documents relating to the one message are followed by a translation
and then a blank sheet of paper ? Is that correct ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is correct, sir.
Mr. SoNNETT. I note in exhibit 57 that the first message was one from
Honolulu, Eita to Tokyo, dated December 4, 1941, in the PA-K2 code,
bearing the number 249. Can you explain why that message was not
among the messages received on December 5, 1941, which are set forth
in exhibit 56 ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. I can't explain that.
Mr. SoNNETT. The messages received on December 5, 1941, which are
contained in exhibit 56 are those which after careful examination,
Lieutenant, of all of these messages you identify as the only ones
received prior to the attack, of the coded messages ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Of the coded messages, yes, sir, except
the LA's, the ones in the LA system.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to exhibit 55, Lieutenant, which is the RCA
[551] Communications statement, listing messages of the Japanese
Consul General in November and December, 1941, will you state as to
each message there listed whether a copy of the message is contained
in 56 or 57?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Copies of all the messages in these 56
and 57 exhibits are on this list. Do you want me to identify each one ?
Mr. SoNNETT. Would you ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, the cable radiogram numbers are
merely stamped on the blank by the company. Those numbers have
been matched with the internal secret message serial number of the
Japanese, where showing, and copies of all of these are in the folders
as such, labelled at the bottom accordingly.
Mr. SoNNETT. I note that there are more cable messages shown than
there are documents contained in exhibits 56 and 57.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, the reason for that is because
one document carrying a number, say 245, embodies two messages, or
the same message, I should say, one and two different addressees under
two separate cable numbers, and there may also be some three or four
addressees shown for some message.
Mr. SoNNETT. The messages set forth on exhibit 55, Lieutenant,
were, as you previously testified, in several of the Japanese diplomatic
systems such as the PA-K2 and the J-19 and others perhaps. I believe
you also testified that you translated after the attack
Lieutenant ( jg) Woodward. I didn't translate.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 325
Mr. SoNNETT. That you decrypted after the attack the messages in
the PA-K2 system. For the sake of the record, will you identify by
date and number the messages which were in systems other than the
PA-K2 and which you did not decrypt at Pearl Harbor ?
[SS2] Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, the cable numbers,
immber 38 was a question; I don't know what that is. The cable
numbers 156 and 160 were the same message going to two addressees,
and the secret message, serial number was 241, that was in system J-19.
Cable number 161 or radiogram number — whichever you want to call
it — was secret message serial number 242, was in system J-22, not
translated, but the gist — we didn't translate it at all. Number 362 and
363 and 411 in question. This system is not known and those, I didn't
know what they are because I can't find them. Number 362, 363, and
411 weren't worked on by me at Honolulu and I find no record of them
here.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the November messages of the Japanese
Consul set forth at page 2 of exhibit 55, will you state whether any
of those messages were in the PA-K2 system and were worked on at
Honolulu by you ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They weren't.
(Brief discussion off the record.)
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain Rochefort, I show you exhibit 23 of this
investigation, which is a December 1, 1941, estimate of Japanese fleet
location by Lieutenant Commander Layton and ask whether or not
you saw that document prior to the attack on December 7th.
Captain Rochefort. I cannot say that I saw this particular docu-
ment, but undoubtedly participated in its preparation.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall any discussion with Lieutenant Com-
mander Layton or with Admiral Kimmel or any other member of his
staff concerning the whereabouts of the Japanese Carrier Divisions
One and Two ? You will note that the exhibit contains no reference
to those carrier divisions.
Captain Rochefort. No, I do not, other than we did not know where
CarDivs One and Two were.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall in general what information your unit
had after December 1, 1941, concerning the whereabouts of the Jap-
anese carriers?
[SS3] Captain Rochefort. To the best of my belief, our estimate
did not vary after our dispatch of November 26th ; in other words, one
Cardiv somewhere in the Marshalls and the other Cardivs unlocated.
Mr. SoNNETT. You were, I take it, delivering daily to Lieutenant
Commander Layton the daily communication intelligence summaries
which you have previously identified ?
Captain Rochefort. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you exhibit 22 of this investigation and ask
you whether those are photostatic copies of the communication intelli-
gence summaries so delivered by you.
Captain Rochefort. Yes, they are.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. Thank you very much gentlemen.
(The witnesses were excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 2:08 p. m., adjourned until 2:30
p.m., 4 July 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 327
im'X PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT maUIRY
Twenty-fourth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the Gen-
eral Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, at 2 : 30 p. m., Wed-
nesday, 4 July 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's
Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. Sonnett. Please state your name and rank.
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. Gilbert E. Boone, Lieutenant Commander,
USNR.
Mr. Sonnett. What is your present duty ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. The section head of Op-20-GL.
Mr. Sonnett. And that is a sub-section of Op-20-G ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. That is right.
Mr. Sonnett. Wliat is qp-20-GL?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. It is a research and collateral section.
Mr. Sonnett. Who has custody of the records of Op-20-G ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. Op-20-G's records are divided in custody,
each sub-section or section retaining for operational purposes such
records as they require.
Mr. Sonnett. Wlien the}'^ are through with the operational use of
the records, what happens to them ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. Operational records no longer used for that
purpose are turned over to my custody in Op-20-3GL.
Mr. Sonnett. At our request. Commander, have you made a search
of the Op-20-G files to attempt to collect all messages received by
Op-20-G from \555\ November 27th to December 7, 1941, re-
lating to the location and movements of Japanese naval forces?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. I directed a search from such cognizant
sources.
Mr. Sonnett, And have you with you. Commander, a collection of
the dispatches wliich you succeeded in locating on that subject?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. I have, right here.
Mr. SoNNETP. May we mark that as an exhibit. Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
58.")
Mr. Sonnett. I show you a collection of photostatic copies of docu-
ments, Commander, and ask if you can identify what they are.
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. They are photographic copies of Japanese
plain language dispatches interceptecl at Station S.
Mr. Sonnett. And forwarded to Op-20-G ?
Liet. Comdr. Boone. Forwarded to Op-20-G. They are of De-
cember 3 and 4, 1941.
328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. And those are news broadcasts from what source,
Commander ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. Jap press. That would probably be Tokyo ;
Domei, wherever Domei might originate. This one (indicating) is
Domei from Tokyo.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that as an exhibit, Admiral ?
Admiral HEwrrr. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
59.")
Mr. SoNNETT. I sliow you a collection of carbon copies of memoranda.
Commander, and ask if you can identify them.
[SS6] Lieut. Comdr. Boone. CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 June 28) is a
survey relating to Japanese diplomatic traffic of 1941. CT.FJPZ-2
( 1944 September 28) is a rough count of the work sheets held in GL-6,
sub-section of GL, of various Japanese diplomatic systems.
CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 September 23) is a survey of messages received by
Op-20-G from 1 to 8 December 1941 by stations and listing time lag.
Mr. SoNNETT. And you have indicated in pencil the location of each
station listed on that ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. Over here, giving the identity, right. You
will note one in here, Army, where Army is printed out, it may have
been Army teletype; it may have been delivered — the message may
have been delivered, just a copy or it may have been some other meth-
od, but Army was the source. There is one other where we have photo
and X, they are two practically synonomous uses. The Army used
one; we used the other. We may have used both simultaneously.
Mr. SoNNETT. That symbolizes that the message was obtained by
])hotographing at the cable office in Washington ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. That is right. Well, that may not have been
necessarily Washington. It may have been any place we could get.
CT. FJPZ-2 (1944 January 19, enclosure F) is a memorandum
which was made in response to an attempt to locate odd groups of
files.
Mr. SoNNETT. And those are correct copies of memorandum in your
files in Op-20-G, are they not ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. They are.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we receive that, Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
60.")
[SST] Mr. Sonnett. I show you a memorandum dated 29 June
1945 and ask if you can identify that and state who prepared it, Com-
mander.
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. The number is CT.FJPZ-2 (1945 June 29)
and it was prepared by a sub-section head under my cognizance. Its
purpose was a survey of the work sheets processed by the Navy of the
Japanese purple system.
Mr. Sonnett. May we receive this. Admiral, as an exhibit?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 61.")
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to exhibit 58, Commander, which is a col-
lection of dispatches produced by you from the Op-20-G files, have
you examined every source known to you wherein you might find dis-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 329
patches relating to Japanese fleet movements after November 27th
and prior to December 7, 1941 ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. I have examined all possible cognizant
sources, to my knowledge.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
[S68] A witness entered, read the precept, and was duly sworn.
Mr. SoNNETT. State your name and rank, please, sir.
Eear Admiral Matfield. Irving H. Mayfield, Rear Admiral, USN.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, what was your duty in December of 1941 ?
Rear Admiral Mayfleld. I was District Intelligence Officer, Four-
teenth Naval District.
Mr. SoNNETT. And for how long had you been District Intelligence
Officer?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. Since March 15, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. What, in general, Admiral, was the mission of the
District Intelligence Office of the Fourteenth Naval District?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. The mission, in general, was that of gen-
eral intelligence matters in cooperation with the other federal and
local intelligence organizations, particularly with respect to espionage
and counter-espionage and such other intelligence matters as might be
directed by the Chief of Naval Operations or District Commandant.
Mr. SoNNETT. What were the other local intelligence agencies.
Admiral ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. There were two other local federal intel-
ligence agencies, namely. Military Intelligence and Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Mr. SoNNETT. Who was in charge of the Military Intelligence?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. To the best of my recollection, it was
Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, who was not the G-2 on the Department
Commander's staff, but was the assistant who had charge locally of
matters pertaining to local intelligence. The FBI was Mr. Robert L.
Shivers, who was later relieved — the exact date I do not remember —
by a Mr. Thornton of FBI.
Mr. SoNNETT. That was subsequent to the attack of December 7
1941 ?
l5o9] Rear Admiral Mayfield. Subsequent to the attack.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state, in general, Admiral, what were the ar-
rangements for the exchange of intelligence among the three local fed-
eral intelligence agencies ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. The general directive from the Chief of
Naval Operations, as I understood it, was complete cooperation be-
tween the three federal investigative agencies in accordance with the
delimitation agreement and modifications thereto signed in Washing-
ton. There was, to the best of my knowledge and belief, complete,
whole-hearted, unreserved cooperation between Naval Intelligence and
the other two federal investigative organizations.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it as a matter of general practice, Admiral, that
the information in the possession of the District Office of Naval Intelli-
gence was communicated to the other agencies, that is, the FBI and
G-2 of the Army ?
330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Rear Admiral Matfield. Every bit of the information received by
my organization was available to the other two organizations and if, on
scrutiny of the information, it appeared of interest to either or both,
they were given copies.
Mr. SoNNETT. There was. Admiral, a unit known as the radio intelli-
gence unit of Com 14, headed by Lieutenant Commander Rochefort,
was there not ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. Commander.
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, Commander Rochefort.
Rear Admiral Matfield. There was.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state. Admiral, what the relations were be-
tween your office and that unit ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. I received from and gave to Commander
Rochefort's unit all possible assistance. However, his unit operated
entirely separate [660] and distinct from my organization and
I had no authority whatever over his unit.
Mr. Sonnett. To whom did his unit report, Admiral ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. I believe directly to the Chief of Naval Op-
erations, though perhaps through the District Commandant.
Mr. Sonnett. What, in general. Admiral, was the mission of the unit
headed by Commander Rochefort ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. It was my understanding that this was a
highly specialized unit operating. under the Chief of Naval Operations,
and I am unable to give definite information as to its mission or work
performed by it.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, did you know to whom the unit headed by
Commander Rochefort reported the results of its activities?
Rear Admiral Matfield. I believe to the Chief of Naval Operations
or to such other officers and officials as might be directed by the CJiief
of Naval Operations.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you know whether the unit reported to the Fleet
Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. I do not know what reports were made by
Commander Rochefort to the Fleet Intelligence Officer, but I do know
that personal cooperation and relations between Commander Rochefort
and Commander Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, appeared to me
to be cordial, thorough, and cooperative.
Mr. Sonnett. What were the relations. Admiral, between the Dis-
trict Intelligence Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer?
Rear Admiral Matfield. The relations between the District Intelli-
gence Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer were, to the best of my
knowledge, cordial close, and cooperative. I was in more or less
constant communication by telephone and by personal visit with Com-
mander Layton and [SOI] it was my endeavor to supply him
with every bit of information reaching me which I believed would be of
interest or value to him.
Mr. Sonnett. I take it, Admiral, from your testimony that you did
not receive, directly or indirectly, reports as to the location or move
ments of Japanese fleet units made by the intelligence unit under Com-
mander Rochefort?
Rear Admiral Matfield. I did not.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, there has been previous testimony to the
eflfect that during the first week of December, 1941, certain cable mes-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 331
sages sent by the Japanese Consul were secured from the local office
of the RCA Communications Company at Honolulu. Do you have
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding that ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I do.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state, Admiral, fully your knowledge of those
circumstances, including the efforts which had been made previously
to secure such messages '(
Rear Admiral Mayfield. Shortly after taking over the duty of
District Intelligence Officer, I discussed with the representative of
Military Intelligence and the Special Agent in Charge of FBI meth-
ods of obtaining from the cable and radio communication companies
access to their tiles for the purpose of obtaining copies of dispatches
which might have intelligence value. We had endeavored to approach
the managers of these companies or some of their employees, seeking a
method whereby we could obtain copies of such dispatches. We had
had no success.
By agreement with the other two organizations, I had concentrated
particularly on RCA. It was not until the visit of Mr. Sarnoff that
I was able to secure access to RCA files. The Japanese Consulate
General alternated among the different companies on a monthly basis
in sending its traffic. [562] RCA did not handle the traffic
during the month of November, but did handle the traffic of the Japa-
nese Consulate General beginning on the 1st of December. I, there-
fore, was able to secure the traffic sent and received by the Japanese
Consulate General from and after 1 December 1941.
Since the turning over of this traffic to me was considered an un-
usual and perhaps an illegal matter, the detailed arrangement, to the
best of my recollection, was as follows: The manager of RCA daily
would have copies made on a blank piece of paper, giving little in-
formation as to origin or addressee of this traffic. This was a measure
of protection for him which I considered justifiable. I did not con-
sider that written records of receipt and delivery of these copies of
messages should be kept. I called personally at the office of RCA at
the beginning in the forenoon, late forenoon, and received from the
manager a blank envelope containig copies of these messages. To the
best of my recollection my first visit was about the 3rd of December.
The envelope I received contained plain sheets of paper with the
messages written thereon. I immediately forwarded these messages
by officer messenger to Commander Rochefort. As I did not keep a
written record of receipt and delivery of these messages, I am unable
to give exact dates of receipts and deliveries to Commander Roche-
fort.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was there more than one delivery of messages to him
prior to the attack ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. That I cannot state definitely, but I be-
lieve there was.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the day before the attack, Admiral,
that is, December 6, 1941, have you any recollection whether or not
messages were obtained that day from RCA and sent to Commander
Rochefort?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I have no definite recollection as to that
date.
332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
IS'6S] Mr. SoNNETT. Can you recall at what time of the day
these messages were picked up at the RCA office?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. Usually in the late forenoon, around 10
or 11 o'clock.
Mr. SoNNETT. Prior to the attack on December 7, 1941, Admiral, did
you receive from Commander Rochefort any translations of the mes-
sages which you so obtained and delivered to him?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. To the best of my recollection, I did not,
or if I did receive any such translations, they did not appear to have
any military or intelligence value.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 56 of this investigation,
which has previously been identified by members of Captain Roche-
fort's unit as containing messages which were received on December
5, 1941, by that unit, and ask if you can identify those or any of those
as messages which you so prior to the attack?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I have no recollection and do not believe
that I ever saw the translations of any of these messages prior to
December 7th.
Mr. SoNNETT. I also show you, Admiral, exhibit 57 of this in-
vestigation, which has heretofore been identified as messages and
translations of messages, wliich messages were received after the at-
tack, on the night of December 7th, by Commander Rochefort's unit,
and ask whether you recall having seen the translations of any of
these messages prior to the attack.
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I have no recollection of ever having seen
the translations of any of these messages prior to December 7, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it, Admiral, that it is not possible for you to
recall any of the actual messages themselves which were received on
December 5th or prior to the attack in code?
[564.] Rear Admiral Mayfield. No. When these dispatches
came to me from RCA, I would simply look at them and see that they
were code dispatches which had been sent to me by RCA; so I just
simply sent them on out to Rochefort without any attempt to recognize
code groups or addressees or anything else, because supposedly it was
nothing but traffic from and to the Japanese Consulate General.
Mr, SoNNETT. Admiral, I show you exhibit 40 of this investigation,
which contains two Office of Naval Intelligence reports made at the
Fourteenth Naval District, and ask whether those reports were sub-
mitted to and approved by you.
Rear Admiral Mayfield. They were submitted to me, approved by
me. and bore my signature when they left my office.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state the substance. Admiral, of the first
report, which is dated February 9, 1942 ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. The first report reports on a message sent
by the Japanese Consul General, transmitting to Tokyo a proposed
system of signalling by lights and other methods, which signals would
be available for use to report departures of naval units from Pearl
Harbor. This system was conceived and submitted to the Japanese
Consul General by Otto Kuhn, a German subject resident on the Island
of Oahu. Til is message presTmiably was sent on the ord of December
1941 and I believe to have been one of the messages delivered by me to
Commander Rochefort on the 4th or 5th of December. The transla-
tion of this message was given to me at the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 333
by Admiral Bloch, District Commandant, on the morning of 11 De-
cember, at which time I received certain instructions from him, the
action on which is set forth in the report.
Mr. SoNNETT. In substance, Admiral, was there any evidence ob-
tained to indicate that that system of signaling had been used?
[56S] Rear Admiral Matfield. Although my office made every
effort, as did the Federal Bureau of Investigation, we were unable to
find any definite information that any part of the proposed system of
signals had ever been used.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, will you state what action was taken with
respect to Kuhn, who conceived this system of signalling ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. Mr. Kuhn was tried and convicted. I be-
lieve his sentence was commuted to a long term of imprisonment.
Mr. Sonnett. Referring, Admiral, to the second of the ONI reports
in exhibit 40, which is dated February 14, 1942, will you state whether
that report was submitted to and approved by you, and the substance
of it?
Rear Admiral Maytield. This report was submitted to me, approved
by me, and bore my signature when it left my office.
Mr. Sonnett. It appears in that. Admiral, does it not, that various
of the messages sent by the Japanese Consul on December 3rd and sub-
sequently are translated and digested in the report ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. It does.
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to the report. Admiral, willyou state briefly
what messages of the Japanese Consul are set forth prior to December
5,1941?
Rear Admiral Matfield. There appears in the report a statement
that the Japanese Consul General sent a dispatch on 3 December re-
porting departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. On
the 4th of December, another dispatch, reporting the arrival of the
HONOLULU. And another, on the 5th of December, which reported
the arrival of three battleships, their expected date of departure, the
depaiture of the LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers, and a state-
ment as to vessels of certain classes of U. S. men of war in Pearl Harbor
on the afternoon of the 5th, presumably December 5th.
[S66] Mr. Sonnett. Now, Admiral, referring to the first page
of the report, does it appear when the messages referred to subse-
quently in the report were received by your organization from RCA ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. It appears in the report that my office re-
ceived on the morning of December 5th certain communications sent
and received by the Japanese Consul General during the period 1 to 4
December.
Mr. Sonnett. Now, the communications set forth in the report,
however, are only those of the 3rd and 4th of December, are they not,
Admiral, that is, prior to the morning of the 5th ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. Correct.
Mr. Sonnett. Does it appear in the report when the Japanese
Consul's messages of the evening of December 5, 1941, was received by
your organization ?
Rear Admiral Matfield. It does not appear in the report as to
when my office received a copy of the message sent by the Japanese
Consul General in the late afternoon of 5 December.
334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Similarly, Admiral, as to the message of December
6th referred to in the report, does it appear when that message was
received by your office ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. It does not appear in the report when
a copy of this dispatch was received by my office.
Mr. SoNNETT. The message of the 6th, Admiral, was in substance
what ?
Rear Admiral IVIaytield. "Please inform us immediately of any
rumors of the movements of warships after the 4th."
Mr. SoNNETT. Is there another message also set forth for Decem-
ber 6th in the report ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. There is.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that in substance is what, sir ?
[S67] Rear Admiral Mayfield. It relates to arrival of the
WYOMING and the number of various types of U. S. men of war in
Pearl Harbor.
Mr. SoNNETT. Does it appear at what time that message was filed
by the Japanese Consul ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. It is stated in the report that this message
was filed at 6 : 01 p. m. on December 6th.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you recall whether after 6 : 01 p. m. on the night
preceding the attack your office received any messages from RCA of
the Japanese Consul ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I do not remember that any were re-
ceived and am of the opinion that none were received since it was my
agreement with the manager of RCA that these messages would be
delivered to me or my authorized representative during the late fore-
noon of each day. This arrangement was at the desire of the manager
of RCA and was for his own security inasmuch as he was violating
instructions and desired to have these messages copied and delivered
to me or my representative only in such manner as would best safe-
guard and protect him as well as me.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that under your arrangement with the RCA man-
ager, you would have received the messages filed on the afternoon or
evening of the 6th the following day, that is, on the 7th ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you find. Admiral, a message filed on the 6th
translated and set forth in the report, relating to the use of balloons ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. There appears in the report a dispatch
relating to the Army's use of balloons and the report states that the
dispatch was delivered for transmission to Tokyo at 12 : 48 on Decem-
ber 6th.
Mr. SoNNETT. And, I take it, therefore, that under the arrange-
ments which you have described, you would not have received that
message until the 7th ?
[568] Rear Admiral Mayfield. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. And you have no recollection of having received that
message at any time before the attack ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I have none, no recollection, and do not
believe that I did receive it before the attack.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you an original report from the
District Intelligence Officer, dated April 19, 1942, to the Director of
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 335
Naval Intelligence, and ask whether you can recognize that as a re-
port forwarded by you.
Read Admiral Mayfield. I recognize this report as having been
raade from my office by one of my assistants, approved and signed
by me.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state, sir, generally what the report deals
with?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. In general, the report deals with coded
dispatch traffic of the Japanese Consulate General, Honolulu, Terri-
tory of Hawaii.
Mr. SoNNETT. As set forth in the incoming and outgoing logs of
the Japanese Consul, sir ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. This report encloses copies of translations
of the incoming and outgoing message log books of the Japanese Con-
sulate. General.
Mr. SoNNETT. They were recovered, Admiral, were they not, after
the attack and reconstructed ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. To the best of my knowledge, they were
recovered after the attack by either the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation or Military Intelligence. The report states that both of these
organizations sent to me copies of the outgoing log book, but that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation was the only organization sending
me a copy of the incoming log book.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, this is the original report, which has been
[569] provided to us by the Director of Naval Intelligence. I
wonder if we could have it marked as an exhibit with the understand-
ing that we will have it photostated and we will substitute a photo-
static copy, so that we can return this to the Director of Naval
Intelligence.
Admiral Hewitt. All right ; yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 62.")
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, it appears from prior testimony that for
some months prior to the attack of December 7, 1941, the telephone
lines of the Japanese Consulate General were tapped at Honolulu. I
show you exhibits 38A and 38B of this investigation, which have been
identified as transcripts of the conversations recorded by ONI repre-
sentatives and obtained via the lines of the Japanese Consul General
and Vice Consul during the period October 1, 1941, to December 2,
1941. For how long prior to December 7, 1941, were the telephone
lines in question tapped. Admiral ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I have no personal recollection of the
date on which these interceptions began. That should be shown in
the records of the DIO, Fourteenth Naval District.
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, Admiral, it is clear from the exhibits, is it not,
that certainly by October 1, 1941, these telephone lines were being
tapped ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. It is.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, sir, was it true that the information obtained
from the telephone taps on the Consulate's lines was brought to your
attention as a matter of regular routine while the taps were in effect ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. My consent had to be obtained before the
interceptions were started. Thereafter, copies of the interceptions
were [S70] only brought to my attention when they appeared
336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to contain items of particular interest. All bits of information ob-
tained from these interceptions were used to supplement information
already on file in my office concerning people or locations on which
we had dossiers or for use in starting new dossiers. Copies of these
transcripts were delivered to FBI daily.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, did any information come to you prior to
December 7, 1941, of military significance which had been obtained
from tapping a telephone line to the Japanese Consul ?
Rear Admiral Maytield. None that I recollect and I do not believe
that any information received by this method was considered of
military or naval importance by me or my assistants.
Mr. SoNNETT. You haA^e, Admiral, examined at my request, have
you not, exhibits 38A and 38B, the transcripts from October 1, 1941,
to December 2, 1941 ? Can you state whether, having examined those
transcripts, there appears to be anything of military or naval sig-
nificance contained therein?
Rear Admiral Mattield. I do not believe there is anything of
military or naval significance contained therein.
Mr. SoNNETT. Will you state, Admiral, whv there are no tran-
scripts after December 2, 1941, and up to December 7, 1941 ?
Rear Admiral Mattield. On or about December 2nd, it was re-
ported to me by one of my assistants that employees of the tele-
phone company had discovered a jum.per put across the connections
in a junction box by a member of the FBI organization and that
an employee of the telephone company had reported this discovery
to one of my assistants. It was further reported to me that one of
my assistants reported this matter to one of the agents of the FBI.
It was further reported to me that a member of the FBI organiza-
tion, name unknown to me, had taken the matter up with the tele-
phone company. What [■571] representative of the telephone
company I do not know. To the best of my recollection, I discussed
the matter with Mr. Shivers and the reports made to me did not
agree with the reports made to him by his assistants. My organiza-
tion long before my arrival had worked up a contact with an em-
ployee of the telephone company and through this contact was able
to obtain any telephone interception desired by my office. Because
of the highly explosive nature of such practice, I did not desire to
enter into an argument or controversy as to the merits or demerits
of the case since I was afraid that by so doing, the fact that such
interceptions were being made miglit be discovered and thereby
jeopardize the future of any further interceptions. Furthermore,
since the interceptions to that date had revealed nothing of particu-
lar value, I considered the wisest thing to do was to cease all inter-
ceptions of whatever kind and so instructed my assistants.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you exhibit 39 of this investi-
gation-
Rear Admiral Matfield. I would like to add that later along —
the exact date I do not remember, but I believe after December
7th — the whole matter was satisfactorily straightened out and we
were again able to resume interceptions.
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you exhibit 39 of this investiga-
tion, which has been previously identified as a transcript of the so-
called Mori conversation. Will you state whether that conversation
and transcript came to your attention and fully the circumstances
surrounding that?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 337
Rear Admiral Mattield. To the best of my recollection, a tran-
script of this exhibit was brought to me by Mr. Shivers on the morn-
ing of December 6th. I believe it was very late in the forenoon. We
discussed the transcript and were unable to determine that it did
have any definite or particular significance. It was thought desirable
to have Lieutenant Commander Carr [572] listen to the
recording and give us his further opinion as to the value of the con-
tents of the transcription before decision was arrived at as to whether
or not it should be reported to the Commandant of the District.
Mr. SoNNETT. Was it brought to the attention of the Commandant
or to any other superior officer prior to the attack ?
Rear Admiral Mattield. To the best of my recollection, it was not.
Mr. SoxNETT. Do you know whether or not it was brought to the
attention of General Short prior to the attack?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I have no knowledge of that.
Mr. SoNNEiT. Referring, Admiral, to the transcript of the tele-
phone conversation between Mori and a person in Japan which you
have before you, it appears, does it not, that after a question from
Japan concerning the United States fleet and the number of ships
present, the person in Japan inquired what flowers or whether the
flowers were in bloom and that that question was answered by Mori,
who pointed out that poinsettias and some other flowers were in bloom ?
Rear Admiral Mattield. It does. The question from Japan asks,
"What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?" The
reply from Honolulu was to the effect that flowers in bloom were the
fewest out of the whole year, but that hibiscus and poinsettias were
in bloom.
Mr. Sonnett. When you studied that transcript on December 6,
1941, Admiral, did that particular portion of it come to your attention ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. It did.
Mr. Sonnett. What were your thoughts concerning it at the time?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. Our thoughts at the time were that it
was somewhat curious but that it was a disconnected conversation in
which Mori seemed to be somewhat at a loss, and, according to my
recollection, that was [673] the reason for our desire to study
it further and have Doctor Carr listen to the recording itself.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you have any knowledge at that time, or have
you now any knowledge, as to the establishment by the Japanese of
a code in which by the broadcast or trans-Pacific radio telephone
conversation references to flowers would signify movements of United
States ships from Pearl Harbor?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I think that is rather a complicated ques-
tion to answer, did I have then or do I have now.
Mr. Sonnett. Would the answer be different?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Let's make it did you have then ? Then we will ask
you the other.
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I did not have knowledge of any such
code at that time.
Mr. Sonnett. Have you knowledge of any such code at this time?
Rear Admiral Mayfield, Of my own personal knowledge of the
existence of such code, I have none. I mean I have heard or read
something about it, but then
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 23
338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, I think you might just state that.
Rear Admiral Matfield. I have heard or read something to the
effect that such a code may have been in existence. I have no per-
sonal knowledge of the existence of such a code.
Mr. SoNNETT. As to those portions of the transcription of the Mori
conversation, Admiral, which referred to the flying of airplanes daily,
what evaluation did you make of that inquiry at the time ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. My evaluation at that time was that such
information as to the number of planes or approximate number of
planes flying was a matter of common knowledge. They could be
seen and heard by any one.
[S74^ Mr. SoNNETT. Did you attach. Admiral, any particular
significance to the fact that the inquiry was made by a person then in
Japan ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. Not particularly, except that the whole
message seemed a bit queer and I desired to have a further study
of it made before making any report.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, there has been previous testimony to the
effect that some time during the summer of 1941 Admiral Bloch, on
the basis of some intelligence or information which he received, asked
Admiral Kimmel to establish an air reconnaissance on a sector towards
Jaluit. Do you have any information as to that reconnaissance or
the reasons for it?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I do not. Such matters were not di-
rectly in my sphere of activity.
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, did you have any knowledge prior to the
attack of the establishment by the Japanese of a so-called "winds" code
and of any message which may have been received using that code ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I had not.
Mr. Sonnett. What, if any, conversations did you have. Admiral,
with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, Captain Layton, or Com-
mander Rochefort during the period November 27th to December 7,
1941, concerning the likelihood of war between Japan and the United
States?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. I do not remember, nor do I believe, that
I had any conversations on this subject with Admiral Kimmel. I did
have conversations with Admiral Bloch and Commander Layton on
intelligence matters, with particular relation to counter-espionage
work, but I have no recollection of any statement to me that war was
imminent. I do recollect that we discussed the increasing tension,
particularly with relation to counter-espionage measures.
[5751 Mr. Sonnett. Were you advised of the receipt on Novem-
ber 27, 1941, of the so-called war warning?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. To the best of my recollection, I was not.
Mr. Sonnett. Did you have any conversation with any of the four
officers mentioned concerning the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor
by the Japanese ?
Rear Admiral Mayfield. To the best of my recollection, I did not.
Mr. Sonnett. I have nothing further. Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. That is all. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
(The investigation was then, at 4: 15 p. m., adjourned until 2: 15
p. m., 6 July 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 339
[S76] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INOUIRY
TwENTY-nrTH Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the Gen-
eral Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, at 2:15 p. m.,
Friday, 6 July 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; ISIr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR ; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNE.
Captain Alwin D. Kramer, USN, was recalled as a witness and
was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, there has been testimony before this in-
vestigation that during the first week of December, 1941, you ex-
amined an intercepted Japanese broadcast which apparently used
the "winds" code words relating to Russia and that after your
examination of that, you stated that the broadcast was not a "winds"
code message, and that you threw the message into the wastepaper
basket. Do you recall any such incident?
Captain Kramer. I dont recall any specific incident of that kind,
but during that week and some days before that week, there were
literally hundreds of such so-called weather messages which were
actually simply weather broadcasts. We were getting thorough cov-
erage on Japanese plain language broadcasts, both kana and Roman
letter news broadcasts. They were coming in from various stations
by the hour, every hour. It threw a considerable extra burden on
our limited number of translators to scan those things, but neverthe-
less it was done religiously, looking for one of these "stop" messages
or an actual war warning message. Of those hundreds that we saw
during that week or ten days, those that were not applicable, of
course, we destroyed.
[677] Mr. Sonnett. I show you document number 2 of ex-
hibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, Captain, and ask you whether
that refreshes your recollection as to the receipt on the night of
December 4, 1941, of a message apparently using the words relating
to Russia.
Captain Kramer. I don't recall specifically having seen this,
though I well may have. It appears to be one in that category of
simple weather broadcasts.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, referring to the previous testimony con-
cerning the receipt of a "winds" code message relating to the United
States during the first week of December, 1941, since your last
testimony in this investigation^ have you obtained any additional
information concerning the receipt or non-receipt of such a message?
Captain Kramer. No first-hand information. Simply I do have
some more specific recollection of it than I did when the matter was
first broached to me at Pearl Harbor during Admiral Murfin's
340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
inquiry. That refreshing goes to the extent that I have already
testified about, namely, a positive recollection of having accompanied
the GY watch officer with a "winds" message to Commander Saf-
ford's office, at which point he carried the ball, taking it, as I un-
derstood, directly to Admiral Noyes, who was handling it by special
setup that he had for that type of message.
Mr. SoNNETT. And you have now no clear recollection, Captain,
as to which country the message referred to?
Captain Kramee. No positive recollection. It may have been any
one or all three of the nations covered by that Japanese code setup.
The fact that we jumped on the ball on that message, liowever,
would appear to me to have been applicable to at least England and
probably the United States as well, but I have no first-hand recol-
lection of it.
[S78] Mr. SoNNETT. Do you mean to imply, Captain, if you
found a message in that code relating to Russia during that period,
you wouldn't have given it as speedy treatment as you would if it
related to England and the United States ?
Captain Kramee. Of course, we would have, but there isn't the
slightest indication that the Japanese had any intention of attacking
Russia.
Mr. SoNNETT. Other than, of course, the FCC intercept telephoned
to Liuetenant Brotherhood on the night of December 4th, which ap-
parently related to Russia ?
Captain Kramer. That, however, was simply another weather
broadcast.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, after the attack on December 7, 1941, Captain,
and up to the time of your testimony before the Naval Court of In-
quiry, did you have any occasion to refresh your recollection as to the
existence of a "winds" code message?
Captain Kramer. None whatsoever. I did not testify before the
Roberts' hearing or before Admiral Hart. In other words, I was not
called on to t-estify regarding anything concerning Pearl Harbor until
the court of Admiral Murfin's.
Mr. Sonnett. Prior to your testimony before the Naval Court of
Inquiry, was vour recollection refreshed by any communication from
Captain Safford?
Captain Kramer. In the late fall of '43, he wrote me a personal let-
ter under classified mail, asking certain questions covering the events
leading up to Pearl Harbor in connection with what he stated was a
study he was making of the subject. I answered those specific
questions.
Mr. Sonnett. Prior to the receipt of that communication from
[S79] Captain Safford, had you any recollection of the circum-
stances surrounding the receipt of any "winds" code message during
the first week of December, 1941 ?
Captain Kramer. I had no occasion to recall such message. His
letter, however, did refresh my memory on that one of the middle of
the week.
Mr. Sonnett. And as of now, since you have testified previously
in the Naval Court of Inquiry and this and have refreshed your
recollection, I take it, to the fullest extent possible, your best recollec-
tion is that there was a "winds" message, but you cannot say with
certainty what the contents were?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 341
Captain Kramer. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring, Captain, to the so-called hidden -word
code, I show you exhibit 20 of this investigation, which contains a
certified photostatic copy of a Japanese message and a translation
of that message, and ask whether you recall having seen those.
Captain Kramer. Yes. on the morning of 7 December.
Mr. SoNNETT. The translation indicates that relations between
Japan and England are not in accord with expectations, does it not?
Captain Kramer. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. What is the Japanese word of code contained in the
exhibit which signified that relations were not in accord with ex-
pectations ?
Captain Kramer. I don't recall the exact Japanese nomenclature
used, but the phrase "not in accordance with expectations" is a literal
translation of the Japanese. It is typical of their way of talking in
certain locution.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you document 6 of exhibit 13 of this [680]
investigation, Captain, at page 2, and ask whether the Japanese word
in question is not there indicated to be hattorif
Captain Kramer. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. There has been, Captain, other testimony before this
investigation to the effect that the word hattoH correctly translated
meant that relations were on the verge of a crisis or perhaps that hostil-
ities were imminent. Would you say that translation is a correct
translation of the word?
Captain Kjramer. It is not a literal translation, which is the point
I just made. It can be inferred, however, and I have testified to that
effect previously, both here and before Admiral Murfin, that such
phraseology could have the implication of our words "relations are
reaching a crisis," with all its implications, that is, either a minor
crisis or a major crisis. In this case it referred simply to the fact that
negotiations concerning an understanding with the United States were
at an end or that relations were to be broken or it could even mean
that the crisis was so severe that war was imminent. But those were
all simply implications to be drawn as a matter of interpretation from
the Japanese text.
Mr. SoxNETT. The code in question, Captain, that is, the hidden
word code, was established by Tokyo, was it not, on November 27, 1941 ?
Captain Kramer. That is the date of this message, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. And as of that time, of course, war with Japan was
expected by those in Naval Intelligence, including yourself, was it
not?
Captain Kramer. I wouldn't say that it was expected, no. There
was a definite crisis in the ofling, however. There was no indication
from this source, which is the source with which I mainly had to
deal — in other wards, I didn't see our other secret dispatches. There
was no 1581] slightest indication in this source that Japan
intended any overt act against the United States. There were positive
indications of a break with England in this traffic.
Mr. SoNXETT. Do you recall the receipt prior to November 27, 1941,
of intercepted Japanese communications indicating that the Japanese
Government had established a deadline for the completion of diplo-
matic negotiations and that unless successfully completed by the time
342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of the deadline, that things were going to happen automatically there-
after?
Captain Kramer. The deadlines were set for the latter part of No-
vember, initially around the 20th, and later delayed at the request and
insistence of Kurusu and Nomura until around the 25th or 26th of
November. A few days after that deadline there was a message from
Tokyo which directed their Washington envoys to continue the ap-
pearance of negotiation, which added up to the fact that from the
Japanese point of view the negotiations were de facto terminated.
There was a further positive indication at the end of November in a
message Tokyo sent to Berlin in which for the first time during 1941
they outlined the course of the negotiations with the United States
and used the phrase in that message which means, "Sooner than any
one imagines Japan will be at war Avith the Anglo-Saxons." That is
the closest there is in this traffic to anything indicating likelihood of
war with the United States, with, of course, the possible exception,
which I am unable to testify from first-hand recollection on, of the
"winds" message of the first week of December.
Mr. SoNNETT. Captain, I show you documents 10 and 11 of exhibit
63 of the Naval Court, which are two deadline messages, and call your
attention to the following appearing in the second message: "This
time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed.
After \58ii\ that things are automatically going to happen."
I call your attention further to the fact that that message was trans-
lated on November 22, 1941. What did you understand by the sen-
tence, "After that things are automatically going to happen"?
Captain Kramer. This is the first time I have seen this one since the
date of dissemination, the 22nd of November, '41. My recollection is
a little vague on our interpretation at the time, but that it was intended
to mean — well, it intended to mean — that Japan was going to war
with us would be a little far fetched. It appears to be now.
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, would you say. Captain, that they intended to
mean
Captain Kra:mer. I might continue this. Undoubtedly it intended
to mean that a course of action or policy by the Japanese already
decided upon Avas intended to be carried out. Just what that con-
sisted of is a matter of interpretation or guessing.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were you familiar with any of the messages sent out
during November to the Pacific Fleet and elsewhere, indicating that
an attack by Japan on United States possessions was regarded as
likely?
Captain Kramer. I do have some slight recollection of being told of
such a message. That, however, was the type of message normally
originated by the War Plans Division or CNO and which I did not
see and had no hand in drafting.
Mr. SoisTNETT. Coming back. Captain, to the second deadline mes-
sage, to which we just made reference, would you say that the Japanese
intended to mean more merely than that relations between the United
States and Japan were not in accordance with expectations ?
Captain Kramer. That phrase "not in accordance with expecta-
tions" \583A^ should not be interpreted as mildly as the English
appears to indicate. It is simply a literal translation of the Japanese
phraseology, which can have more dire implications than the simple
English terminology.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 343
Mr. SoNNETT. Eef erring to document 6 of exhibit 13, which is the
message from Tokyo establishing the hidden word code, it appears
that it was translated by the Navy. Did you translate the message,
Captain?
Captain Kramer. One of my profossional translators did it, yes.
Mr SoNNETT "Was the translation reviewed by you ?
Captain Kramer. Normally all translations were reviewed by me to
a greater or lesser degree, depending upon who translated them as
well as the importance.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, referring to exhibit
Captain Kramer. As well as depending on the shape in which the
message arrived. Sometimes a badly garbled message would call for
more careful editing than one that was in good, clear text.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to exhibit 20 of this investigation. Cap-
tain, which contains the photostatic copy of the Japanese message
employing certain of the hidden code words, and to the translation
annexed thereto, reading, "7 December 1941. Relations between
Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations," I be-
lieve you testified previously that in the hurry of the morning of 7
December 1941, you saw the Japanaese message and while you were
about to leave to deliver other urgent messages, you hurriedly trans-
lated the Japanese message in the form in which it appears in this
exhibit, namely, that relations between Japan and England were not
in accordance with expectations, but that you did not note the word
minami which also related to the United States. Is that a correct
summary of your testimony ?
[S84^] " Captain Kramer. That is correct. I might amplify that
by stating that when the oversight was noted in reviewing the mes-
sages after returning from the State Department and Wliite House,
namely, about 12 : 30, I made some phone calls in that regard and
planned, as occasionally we had done in the past, sending around a
corrected translation. That procedure was not unusual, particularly
in the case of garbled messages of importance, of sending around a
first version. If a later better copy of a message was intercepted or
if in later editing a revised version of the translation was warranted,
a corrected translation would be sent around. Sometimes such cor-
rection was phoned to recipients if it involved negotiations coming
up before such dissemination could be made. That was the pro-
cedure intended in the case of this message and carried out to the
extent of making a couple of phone calls, with the intention of dis-
seminating a corrected translation early in the afternoon.
Mr. SoNNETT. I refer you, Captain, to the photostat of the Japa-
nese message, which indicates that the first word of the message.
koyanagi, is underscored. That word referred to England, did it
not?
Captain Kramer. Yes, it did.
Mr. SoNNETT. I refer you further to the fact that the fifth word,
hattori, is underscored, and that word meant either that relations
weren't in accordance with expectations or that there was some sort of
crisis, depending on the translator?
Captain Kramer. Correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. And to the sixth word, Tninami, which is also under-
scored, and which referred to the United States, did it not?
Captain Kramer. That is right.
344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, was the underscoring of that message, of those
three words, made by you ?
[685] Captain Kramer. My understanding of this particular
photostat you have is that it is from the log of station S, which was
received some time subsequent to Pearl Harbor. Consequently, this
was not the one from which we worked. As I recall it, it was a tele-
type version that was handled on the morning of the 7th of December.
Mr. SoNNETT. Does anything on that photostatic copy. Captain, in-
dicate where that message was intercepted by the Navy ?
Captain Kramer. Simply the station indication "S." I believe
that was Cheltenham, but I am not certain offhand without refresh-
ing my memory.
Mr. SoNNETi. And it would have been sent in by Cheltenham to the
Navy Department by teletype ?
Captain Kramer. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you have any recollection whether or not you
underscored the code words of the message with which you worked?
Captain Kramer. I did no underscoring or writing at all in connec-
tion with that. I dictated on my feet while the book concerning the
1 o'clock delivery and other late urgent messages was being made up
and added this to the folder as I was about to leave the office.
Mr. SoNNETT. I refer you to the translation annexed
Captain Kramer. I might amplify that further as, a point I haven't
mentioned before, feeling that despite the urgency of that 1 o'clock
delivery message, that delay to get this one into that folder was war-
ranted; otherwise delivery probably wouldn't have been made until
after noon since the meetings then in progress at the State Department
and in CNO's office would probably have been adjourned and the recip-
ients not accessible, out to lunch or one thing and another.
[SS6] Mr. SoNNETT. Does it appear from the photostatic copy
of the message. Captain, in exhibit 20 the time at which the message
was intercepted on December Tth?
Captain Kramer. This time group and the frequency (indicating).
Mr. SoNNETT. Indicating what time, sir ?
Captain Kramer. Greenwich time, I believe.
Mr. Sonnett. What time, Greenwich time?
Captain Kramer. Presumably this would be 0708, Washington civil
time, converted into 0808 by daylighting saving hour if it was inter-
cepted at Cheltenham, on frequency 7630.
Mr. SoNNETT. I take it there is no indication of the time when the
message was received in the Navy Department and came to your
attention?
Captain Kramer. I see no indications on here, no.
Mr. Sonnett. At approximately what time do you recall seeing
and translating the message. Captain?
Captain Kramer. It was about 10 : 30.
Mr. Sonnett. On December 7th?
Captain Kramer. Between 10:30 and twenty minutes of 11.
Mr. Sonnett. On December 7, '41 ?
Captain Kramer. On December 7th, yes, as I was about to leave for
the State Department on the second trip.
Mr. Sonnett. Now, referring to the translation contained in the
exhibit, which is a certified copy of the translation as contained in
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 345
the Op-20-G files, you will note that there is no pencilled correction
inserted concerning the United States.
Captain Kramer. Yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. You will recall in answer to a previous question,
[587] Captain, you said that on discovering the error after your
return from the State Department on December 7th, you made a
pencilled correction in the copy. Can you explain why the photostat
of the file does not show the correction ?
Captain Kramer, I cannot explain why that corrected copy is not
currently in the files, other than that the explanation may be due to
the following: The fact that sixteen, I believe, copies of this traffic
were prepared, eight of which went to Army ; eight retained by Navy.
The originals, ribbon copy, normally went to the Secretary of the
Navy ; five other copies to other recipients ; and two copies normally
retained in section GZ, one a serially numbered numerical file which
was our basic file, second copy filed by subject. That second copy
was occasionally used for special dissemination to counter-intelligence
people, for example. Wlien the ribbon copy and the other dissemi-
nated copies were returned to GZ, as all papers were, the ribbon copy
normally then became the primary file copy for permanent record.
It could well be that since those other seven copies, six or seven copies
after return in the course of a few days or a week or two to GZ,
were destroyed and not more than two copies normally retained in
GZ files, that the copy with the correction on it, which I have referred
to, could have been destroyed with the other surplus copies. Since
I have been back in Washington, since March of this year, 1 recall
having seen a photostat of such a corrected copy with inserted pencil
correction in it in the hands of Captain Safford.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did Captain Safford indicate to you whether the
corrected copy in his possesion was a copy which had been corrected
before the attack, or was it a copy which he had since corrected?
Captain Kramer. I am not certain of that point.
[5S8] Mr. SoNNETT. Turning, Captain, to document 22 of ex-
hibit 13 of this investigation, which is a certified copy of the message
from Honolulu to Tokyo, December 3rd, establishing the signal sys-
tem to be used from Oahu, that document indicates, does it not, that it
was translated on December 11, 1941?
Captain Kramer. Right.
Mr. SoNNETT. There has been previous testimony in this investiga-
tion to the effect that on December 6, 1941, that message was translated
in rough form by Mrs. Edgers, a civilian translator in Op-20-G at
the time, and that it came to your attention on the afternoon of
December 6, 1941. Will you state what you recall of that incident?
Captain Kramer. It is possible that it was put on my desk on the
afternoon of 6 December '41. I do not recall, however, having ex-
amined it in detail until Monday morning, the 8th of December,
at which time it was in a highly garbled state still, and, in fact, it
wasn't until another copy of the intercept came through and charts
of Oahu and Maui were broken out and another day or two of study
had been made that we were able to get out a translation that was
quite legible. Even this copy still has a few garbles in it, namely,
under paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 5(b). If that were finished on
Saturady afternoon, as you state it was, the reason that it was not
346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
further examined in detail was undoubtedly due to the fact that
starting around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, we began getting this series
of important machine messages from Tokyo and turned to all hands
on completing that and calling the Army for help on some of those
parts. I might state in passing that we were working our profes-
sionals overtime as it was on that Saturday afternoon. Normally
working hours called for Saturday afternoon off, securing at 1 o'clock,
but I had held several [SS9] of the translators on through the
early part of the afternoon, completing a number of things that were
being worked on and keeping them also as a stand-by in case some-
thing more important came in that afternoon. Despite the fact that
it was working overtime, we normally kept one translator on into
Saturday evening, using for Sunday coverage, which was also a
holiday in those days, the fifth linguist we had, a Seventh Day Ad-
ventist, who normally did not work Saturday and was used therefore
on Sunday.
Mr. SoNNETT. You stated, Captain, in your testimony that this
message did not come to your attention in detail until Monday, De-
comber 8, 1941. Can you recall whether or not it came to your atten-
tion at all on the afternoon of December 6, 1941 ?
Captain Kramer. I do not recall it, no. The reason I am pretty
certain of that is the fact that when I did see it on Monday morning,
we immediately turned full energies on to getting it completed in the
complete form.
Mr. SoNXETT. During the afternoon and evening of December 6,
1941, Captain, the important message on which your unit was work-
ing was the first thirteen parts of the Japanese fourteen-part reply,
was it not ?
Captain Kraimer. That was the principal one, yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Now, that was a message in the purple code, was
it not?
Captain Kramer. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. SoNisrETT. But was in English, not Japanese?
Captain Kramer. That is also correct, but there are many Japanese
procedure abbreviations and introductory phrases used at the be-
ginnings and ends of messages, which called for some linguistic work
on it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Is it your testimony, Captain, that the first thirteen
parts required translation as well as decryption ?
[690] Captain Kramer. Not so much translation as clearing of
garbles. In the hurried version that we disseminated that Saturday
evening, there were still many garbled spots; one place where there
was as much as ten or a dozen lines missing.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, the purple code was a machine code, was it not ?
Captain Kjramer. Correct.
Mr, SoNNETT. And was the decryption of the message in the purple
code also a machine operation?
Captain Kramer. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Would you state just generally what that consisted
of?
Captain KRAivrER. It is closely analagous to running a message
through our ECM. It requires initially the setting up of the machine
to handle that day's key. If the key hadn't previously been re-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 347
covered, it would involve research work by a cryptanalyst to recover
that day's key.
Mr. SoNNETT. Once the key was recovered, was the decryption of
a message an automatic process ?
Captain Kramer. Yes.
Mr. SoNNBiT. And then the resulting product of the machine de-
cryption, which as to the thirteen parts was in English, would require
examination and writing out, I take it, by your unit ?
Captain Kramer. That is correct. Another limiting factor was the
number of machines we had to work on that traffic. At that time, my
recollection is that the Navy had only one purple machine, while the
Army had two, and it was for that reason that we sent some of those
parts to the Army that evening to run through.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were you working at your section on the afternoon
[S91] and evening of December 6, 1941 ?
Captain Kramer. Yes, as I have just indicated.
Mr. SoNNETT, And certain of the portions of the thirteen part re-
ply, that is, parts eight and nine, were translated or decrypted by the
Ai-m}^, were they not ?
Captain Kramer. That would be indicated from this copy of that
message, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. So that the Army unit was working on the afternoon
or evening of December 6, 1941, as well as the Navy, is that correct?
Captain Kramer. Yes.
Mr. SoNNEiT. Referring to the morning of December 7, 1941, and
to the message which directed that the Ambassador submit to the
United States Government the Japanese reply at 1 p. m., when did
you first see that message ?
Captain Kramer. On my return from the State Department at about
10 : 30 on Sunday morning, 7 December.
Mr. Sonnett. That message indicates that it was translated by the
Army, does it not ?
Captain Kramer. Yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you know at what time that message was avail-
able in decrypted form in the Navy Department prior to your seeing it ?
Captain Kramer. So far as 1 am aware, it was not available in the
Navy Department.
Mr. Sonnett. Does it appear from the exhibit who intercepted the
message ?
Captain Kramer. Navy intercept station "S" intercepted it, from
this copy,
Mr. Sonnett. And that station "S" was what station ?
[SO^] Captain Kramer. Cheltenham, as I recall it.
Mr. Sonnett. And messages intercepted by the Cheltenham Navy
station were forwarded to the Navy Department, were they not ?
Captain Kramer. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. So that the message was available in the Navy De-
partment for decryption some time on the morning of December 7,
1941, before you saw it ?
Captain Kramer. However, the fact that the Navy intercept station
intercepted it did not necessarily mean that the Navy unit would
handle it. The division of effort between Signal Corps and the Navy
unit was on the basis of odd and even day keys in which the traffic
was sent.
348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. That division of effort. Captain, was not being ad-
hered to rigidly, was it, on the 6th and 7th of December, 1941?
Captain Kramer. In general it was adhered to completely, except
when one unit or the other called on their opposite numbers for assist-
ance due either to volume of traffic or for other reasons.
Mr. SoNNETT. On December 6, 1941, the Navy decrypt-ed eleven out
of the thirteen parts of the Japanese reply intercepted that day, did
it not ?
Captain Kramer. Yes; thirteen, as I recall it.
Mr. SoNNETT. Two were decrypted by the Army, were they not?
Captain Kramer. As I recall, they all came in on the Navy in-
tercept.
Mr. Sonnett. But two were decrypted by the Army ?
Captain Kramer. All station "S" intercepts were thereafter received
by the Navy Department direct from station "S." The fact that
Army decrypted them would indicate that we had sent them over
there, those particular parts over to Army, to run through their
machines.
[S9S] Mr. Sonnett. So that on the 6th of December, 1941, both
the Navy and the Army were decrypting the thirteen parts of the
Japanese reply, is that correct ?
Captain Kramer. That is correct, yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Now, do you recall whether it was the Navy's obliga-
tion to decrypt that message that day or the Army's obligation ?
Captain Kramer. The fact that our Navy unit was going ahead with
the decryption would indicate to me that it was a message for which
the Navy was responsible, being in the key that the Navy was handling
that day.
Mr. Sonnett. On the morning of December 7th the 1 p. m. delivery
message was received in the Navy Department, as you previously tes-
tified. Do you know whether or not it was decrypted in the Navy De-
partment that morning ?
Captain Kramer. I do not.
Mr. Sonnett. Was there a translator on duty at the Navy Depart-
ment on the morning of December 7, 1941, prior to your arrival?
Captain Kramer. There was none actually in the Navy Department,
but there was one available on telephone call who could be down here
within ten or fifteen minutes after being called by the GY watch
officer.
Mr. Sonnett. And who was that, Captain ?
Captain Kramer. Myself. That was a standard arrangement that
had been in effect for over a year. Probably six or eight times in the
course of the year I had been called down at various times in the early
morning to examine something apparently hot that had come in.
Mr. Sonnett. On the night of December 6th and the morning of
December 7th it was realized by you and others in the section that a
very [<594] critical message was coming in, was it not ?
Captain Kjiamer. If you are referring to the fourteenth part
Mr. Sonnett. I am referring to the entire message. On the night
of December 6th it was realized by you and others in the section that
a very critical message was coming in, was it not ?
Captain Kramer. If you are referring to the fourteenth part, of
which we had already received the first thirteen parts
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 349
Mr. SoNNETT. During the afternoon and evening of December 6,
1941, a very critical message had been received, had it not ?
Captain Kramer. That is correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. Did you expect at that time that further critical mes-
sages would be received?
Captain Kjiamer. The fourteenth part of that Japanese reply we
were expecting momentarily, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. You knew that the time of delivery of the fourteen-
part reply was to be fixed in a separate message, did you not?
Captain Kramer. Correct.
Mr. SoNNETT. And, I take it, all hands were on the lookout for the
time of delivery ?
Captain Kramer. That is right.
Mr. Sonnett. Now, in view of that situation, why was there no
translator on duty in the Navy Department during such times as you
could not be present ?
Captain Kramer, There was in effect a translator on duty in the
Navy Department, as I have indicated. The time between the receipt
of a message by teletype and its decryption by machine would nor-
mally be more [595] than the time it would take me, on being
notified, to get down here ; so, in effect there was a twenty-four hour
coverage.
Mr. Sonnett. When you left the office on the night of December 6,
1941, did you issue instructions that you were to be called immediately
upon the receipt of any Japanese message?
Captain Kramer. I did, as I had normally done frequently before.
That was about 1 o'clock Sunday morning.
Mr. Sonnett. Who was on watch at that time?
Captain Kramer. I don't recall who specifically at the moment.
There were three or four watch officers so familiar to me that I am
not certain which one was on duty.
Mr. Sonnett. The message directing delivery of the Japanese reply
at 1 p. m. on December 7, 1941, was a one sentence Japanese message,
was it not, in the purple code?
Captain Kramer. Directing delivery, yes. A short message, yes.
Mr. Sonnett. Will you examine the message, Captain, and state
how long it would have taken for you to translate that message once
it was decrypted and available in Japanese ?
Captain Kramer. Probably about two minutes.
Mr. Sonnett. Referring to the morning of December 7, 1941, Cap-
tain, when you discovered the necessity for correction of the transla-
tion of the hidden word code message, you testified that before 1 o'clock
you made several phone calls. Who did you call and what did you say
to them?
Captain Ivramer. As I recall, I phoned all the recipients but con-
tacted only two due to the absence of the others, and indicated that
the United States was to be inserted in GZ file nmnber such and such.
Mr. Sonnett. Who was it that you called, Captain ?
[596] Captain Kramer. Just which ones I did contact I am
not certain, but I believe one was Captain McCollum and the other was
Colonel Bratton.
Mr. Sonnett. Do you recall about how long prior to 1 p. m. those
calls were made ?
350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Krameb, I am not certain. It was about 12:30, though.
Mr. SoNNEiT. I have nothing further, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. I have nothing further either. Thank
you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
[597] Lieutenant (jg) Farnsley C. Woodward, USN, was re-
called as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by
him was still binding.
Mr. SoNNETT. Lieutenant, for the sake of the record, I would like
to review with vou the various exhibits relating to the messages to
and from the Japanese Consul in the first week of December, 1941,
which were received at your unit both before and after the attack.
I show you exhibit 56 of this investigation and ask you to state
what that exhibit contains.
Lieutenant ( jg) Woodward. It contains four coded messages, num-
bers 245, 46, 47, and 48, and some additional coded messages that are
in a system, in the LA system.
Mr. SoNXETT, When were those messages received by your unit at
Pearl Harbor?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. About, I would say, around noon or
1 o'clock on the 5th of December, 1941.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were efforts made to decrypt and translate the mes-
sages received at that time?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. There were.
Mr. SoNNETT. And those efforts were made by you with the assist-
ance of others in the unit, were they not ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They were.
Mr. SoNNETT. Which of the messages in that exhibit did you suc-
ceed in decrypting and translating prior to the attack on December
7th?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Well, I myself did not decrypt any-
thing prior to the attack on December 7th, but this was taken out and
decrypted [698] and translated after it was determined what
it was in the LA system, which was seen to be junk, and I immediately
went to work on the other.
Mr. SoNNETT. Well, various of the messages in that exhibit were
decrypted and translated prior to the attack, were they not?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They were.
Mr. SoNNETT. Can you identify which messages they were ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. I can. They were all in the LA sys-
tem. Number 125; and there is one which there is no original for,
no message itself, just the decryption with the translation here; that
is number 362 ; and also number 321 ; and also 852 and 124, which is
the same as 852. It looks to be an answer to and request to re-send or
something of that sort.
Mr. SoNNETT. Re-transmission?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodavard. A re-transmission. It is the same
text, more or less.
Mr. SoNNETT. To each of the copies of those messages contained in
exhibit 56 you have affixed, have you not, a note stating when it was
received and that it was decrypted and translated prior to the attack ^.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Yes, I have.
Mr. SoNNETT. And those messages are bound into the exhibit on
the left hand side of the exhibit, are they not ?
L
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 351
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They are.
Mr. SoNNETT. You testified that you yourself did not do the decryp-
'tion of those messages in the LA system, but that after it was dis-
covered what system they were in, some one else did the decryption?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. Who was it that did the decryption ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That I can't say because we were
located [699] in different parts of the building and the nature
of my work at the time kept me at one end, where they just turned
this stuff over to me and let me go to work on it where I was.
Mr. SoNNETT. Now, referring to the balance of the messages in the
exhibit, which are affixed to the right-hand side of the exhibit, they
were among the group which was received on the 5th of December,
1941, also, were they not?
Lieutenant (jg) WooDWAiiD. They were.
Mr. SoNNETT. And were efforts made to decrypt those?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They were.
Mr. SoNNETT. Who made the efforts ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. I did.
Mr. SoNNETT, With what results ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Negative.
Mr. SoNNETT. In what code has it since been discovered were those
messages ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They were discovered to be in the
PA-K2 system.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were any of those decrypted and translated prior to
the attack ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They weren't.
Mr. SoNNETT. About when were they decrypted and translated?
Lieutenant ( jg) Woodward. The night of the 8th and 9th of Decem-
ber. Well, there is only one here that shows it and it was taken off
on the 10th. All of these messages were decrypted by the 10th that
could be. There is a couple in there that can't be.
Mr. SoNNETT. But none of those on the right-hand side of the
exhibit, in the PA-K2 code, were decrypted prior to the attack ?
[600'] Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. No, sir.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you photostatic copies of documents and call
your attention particularly to pages 7 to 12 and ask whether you can
identify those.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. These are merely copies of the mes-
sages that are in exhibit 56 on the right-hand side of the page.
Mr. SoNNETT. That is, messages which were received on the 5th of
December but weren't decrypted until after the attack ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. That is right.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were there any other messages, to the best of your
knowledge and recollection, received prior to the attack of December
7, 1941?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Not that I know of. If there were,
they weren't turned over to me.
Mr. SoNNETT. The balance of the messages contained in the folder
which I have just shown you were received at what time, Lieutenant?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. These were all after the attack.
352 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. You have noted in red crayon, have you not, the
time of receipt of the various messages ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. The date of the receipt, yes.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark this as exhibit 56A, Admiral?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
56A.")
Mr. SoNNETT. I refer you to exhibit 57 of this investigation, which
contains a series of messages which I believe you previously identi-
fied, and ask whether you can state when they were received first by
your [601] unit.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. None of these messages were received
prior to 7 December. All subsequent to the attack.
Mr. SoNNETT. Were they subsequently decrypted and translated ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They were.
Mr. SoNNETT. And translations are set forth in the exhibit, are
they not?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. They are.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you a folder of photostatic copies of docu-
ments containing translations of Japanese messages and ask whether
you can identify the documents contained therein.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. This document contains messages that
were received subsequent to the 7 December attack, received on the
night of the 7th of December.
Mr. SoNNETT. And were decrypted after the attack ?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Yes, some of them taken as long as
the 23rd of January.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark that. Admiral, as exhibit 57A?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
57A.»)
Mr. Sonnett. I also show you a similar folder of photostatic copies
of documents, consisting of messages and translations, and ask whether
you can identify those.
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. These messages were received after the
attack on Pearl Harbor. Sources, of course — one source was the Army
out there. I just don't know who they are. I really don't know who
had it. But they were messages that were more or less all diplomatic
circuits.
[602] Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, may we mark that as exhibit
57B?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
57B.")
Mr. Sonnett. The messages contained in exhibit 56 and at pages
7 to 12 of exhibit 56A were received by your unit from what source?
Do you know ?
Lieutenant ( jg) Woodward. I do not.
Mr. Sonnett. Who delivered these messages to you?
Lieutenant (jg) Woodward. Commander Rochefort.
Mr. Sonnett. I have nothing further. Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 353
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, may we mark as an exhibit the precept of
the Secretary of the Navy dated 6 July 1945 which amends the prior
precept so as to require a statement of findings and conclusions by you ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit
lA.")
Mr. SoNNETT. We have some further documents, Admiral, which
we should like to have marked as exhibits at this time.
The first is a certified collection of documents obtained from
CincPac Headquarters, relating to the subject of anti-torpedo baffles
for protection against torpedo plane attacks. May we mark that as
exhibit 63?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
63.")
[603] Mr. Sonnett. We also have, Admiral, certified copies of
other documents from CincPac Headquarters, including a copy of the
Secretary of War's letter to the Secretary of the Navy, dated February
7, 1941, dealing with air defense at Pearl Harbor. May we mark
that as exhibit 64?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
64.")
Mr. SoNNETT. We also have, Admiral, a certified copy of CincPac
secret letter, dated 7 August 1941, on the organization of the Orange
fleet. May we mark that as exhibit 65 ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 65.")
Mr. SoNNETT. We also have. Admiral, a certified map, showing the
location of the ships present at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and
annexed overlay. May we mark that as exhibit 66 ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 66.")
Mr. Sonnett. Also, Admiral, a certified copy of the telephone log of
the radio unit at Pearl Harbor, showing the calls made and received on
December 7, 1941, as to Japanese fleet locations.
Admiral Hewitt. All right.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 67.")
Mr. Sonnett. We also have, Admiral, photostatic copies of memo-
randa relating to the interview or interviews of the Japanese captain
of the captured submarine, which photostats were supplied by Captain
Layton. May [604-] we mark that as exhibit 68 ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
68.'^
Mr. Sonnett. We also have a copy of Pacific Fleet Weekly Intelli-
genpe Bulletin for 11 June 1945, which contains, at page 28, a descrip-
tion of the midget submarines and how they were carried to Pearl
Harbor. May we mark that as exhibit 69 ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 69.")
Mr. Sonnett. We also have. Admiral, copy number 5 of a selected
collection of Pearl Harbor dispatches which were received from
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 24
354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CincPac Headquarters, relating to miscellaneous subjects. May we
mark that as exhibit 70 ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
70.")
Mr. SoNNETT. We also have a similar collection of dispatches, re-
lating to the proposed Army reconnaissance in November of 1941, also
supplied by CincPac Headquarters.
Admiral Hewitt. All right.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
71.")
Mr. Sonnett. We have a collection of dispatches of December 7 and
8, 1941, from CincPac, also supplied by CincPac Headquarters.
Admiral Hewitt. All right.
[605] ' (The documents referred to were received and marked
"Exhibit 72.")
Mr. Sonnett. We have further a certified copy of CincPac secret
letter, dated 12 December 1941, and reporting on the damage to ships
at Pearl Harbor as a result of the attack and giving other details in
connection with the attack. May we mark that as exhibit 73 ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 73.")
Mr. Sonnett. We also have, Admiral, a photostatic copy of the War
Diary for the period 7 December to January 1, 1942, of the Com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District. May we mark that as exhibit 74 ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 74.")
Mr. Sonnett, We also have the photostatic copy of the War Diary
of the USS WARD, the War Diary of the Officer-in-Charge, Net and
Boom Defenses, Fourteenth Naval District, the War Dairy of the USS
CONDOR, and a certified collection of excerpts from the diary of the
Officer-in-Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict, and fi'om the WARD and from the CONDOR. May we mark the
latter all as one exhibit. Admiral ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit 75.")
Mr. Sonnett. We have a photostatic copy of a first endorsement and
second endorsement on Com 14 letter of December 30, 1941, relating
to the early morning submarine attack or contact of 7 December 1941.
May we mark that exhibit 76, Admiral ?
[606] Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 76.")
Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, a final exhibit we would like to mark is a
collection of correspondence, the basic letter of which is from Com-
FOURTEEN to CNO, and endorsements, relating to combined operat-
ing center for the Army and Navy. May we mark that as exhibit 77
and substitute a photostatic copy ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 77.")
Mr. Sonnett. That is all, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. All right.
(The investigation was then, at 3:57 p. in., adjourned until 11:15
a.m., 11 July 1945.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 355
U^07] PKOCEEDINGS OF THE HEWITT INaUIKY
Twenty-sixth Day
Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the Gen-
eral Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, at 11 : 15 a. m.,
Wednesday, 11 July 1945.
Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett;
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNE; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.
Lieutenant Commander Gilbert E. Boone, USNR, was recalled as a
witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was
still binding.
Mr. Sonnett. Commander, I show you exhibit 20 oX this investiga-
tion, which includes a translation of a message from Tokyo, dated
7 December 1941, translated by the Navy 7 December 1941, and bear-
ing number JD-1 : 7148, and ask whether pursuant to our request you
have searched the files of Op-20-G for copies of that message.
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. I have searched the files under my cognizance.
Mr. Sonnett. And those files include all files which, to the best of
3"our knowledge, would contain a copy of that message ?
Lieut Comdr. Boone. That is correct.
Mr. Sonnett. How many copies of the message did you find in your
search ?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. I found three.
Mr. Sonnett. The message is translated, is it not, "Relations be-
tween Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations"?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. Correct.
[^608'\ Mr. Sonnett. Did you find any copy of that message
during your search which contained a correction in pencil or other-
wise, indicating the insertion of the word "United States" after the
word "England"?
Lieut. Comdr. Boone. I did not. I found no pencilled corrections
of the text.
Mr. Sonnett. " I have nothing further. Admiral.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
\609'\ Captain Laurance F. SafFord, USN, was recalled as a wit-
ness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still
binding.
Mr. Sonnett. Captain, I show you exhibit 20 of this investigation,
which contains a photostatic copy of an intercepted Japanese message
dated 7 December 1941 and another document which purports to be
an English decryption and translation of that message. Are you
familiar with those?
Captain Safford. I am.
356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the translation of that message con-
tained in the exhibit, Captain, do you know whether on or prior to
7 December 1941 that translation was corrected so as to indicate that
relations were strained not only with England but with the United
States as well ?
Captain Safford. I only know what Kramer told me two or three
months ago after his return from the South Pacific waters. I pointed
out to him an apparent error in the translation which had been turned
in to higher authority and Kramer informed me that he had caught
the error himself prior to delivery and had added in in pencil a cor-
rection, nidded "United States." 1 have a vague recollection of seeing
scribbled in pencil "& U. S." after "England" on one of the original
flimsies on file in 20-G, but I thought that had been added after 7
December and disregarded it completely.
Mr. SoNNETT. I show you a typewritten translation similar to the
one contained in exhibit 20, containing various notes, together with
a copy of the intercepted Japanese communication contained in exhibit
20, and ask you whether these documents were produced by you.
Captain Safford. These documents were produced by me. One is a
photographic copy of the Station "S" log, which is on file in 20-Gi
[610] The other is a copy of JD-1 serial number 7148 with notes
added by me in 1944 to explain as well as I could in Kramer's absence
the reason for an apparent oversight in omitting "United States."
Kramer at that time was in the South Pacific and nobodj else knew
anything about the circumstances. Lieutenant Commander Linn
checked over the original intercepted message with the hidden word
code, as contained in JD-1 serial number 6985, and discovered that
"United States" should have been in the original translation. The
first word of the hidden word message, ^^koyanagi,''^ means "England."
This can be verified from the original thing. The fifth word, '"'■hattori^
means "relations between Japan and the following countries are not
in accordance with expectations," according to the Navy translation,
or "relations between Japan and blank are approaching a crisis (on
the verge of danger," according to the Army translation. The sixth
word, ^^Minanii,''^ means "America." The last word, "stop," in English,
means "This is a hidden word message." The other Japanese words
of the message are mere padding to make it appear superficially as a
normal plain language Japanese message.
Mr. SoNNETT. Do 3^ou know, Captam, when Linn discovered the
omission of the United States from the translation of that hidden
word code message ?
Captain Safford. Some time in January, 1944.
Mr. SoNNETT. And that discovery, I take it, was the basis of your
note
Captain Safford. That was the basis of the notes on this paper, and
noted the time so it wouldn't be forgotten.
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark the papers produced by Captain Safford
as an exhibit. Admiral ?
[611] Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
8.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Do you have in your possession, Captain, or did you
ever have, to the best of your recollection, a translation oi the hidden
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 357
word code message referred to in exhibit 78 and in exhibit 20 which
contained a pencilled correction adding the United States to the
translation ?
Captain Saftord. To the best of my recollection, I did, in the spring
of 1944, but I thought that had been added subsequent to the attack
on Pearl Harbor and therefore it was disregarded. I recommended
that both of the flimsy copies bearing this translation, which should
be in Op-20-G's custody, be examined to see if my memory in this
respect could be verified.
Mr. SoNNETT. Where was the copy which you examined in the
spring of 1944 and which contained the correction ?
Captain Safford. I had borrowed all the files from 20-G cover-
ing this period of time. I cannot say whether it was in the file in which
messages were arranged by serial order or JD number or whether
it was the one in which they were arranged strictly chronologicallj
by dates.
Mr. SoNNETT. There has been testimony before this investigation,
Captain, that no copy of the message can be found in the Op-20-G
files which bears such a correction. Do you know what might have
happened to such copy ?
Captain Safford. It is possible that it might have been erased before
returning to 20-G in an attempt to remove what was considered an
addition after the attack on Pearl Harbor. I do not recall making
any such erasure, but it is still possible that it was done. I would
like to add that it looked bad for the section and I was not trying
to do anything to make it look better for us.
[612] Mr. SoNNETT. Did you recognize the handwriting in which
the correction was made?
Captain Safford. I did not.
Mr. SoNNETT. Referring to the copies of the Japanese message con-
tained in exhibit 20 and in exhibit 78, can you state who underscored
the word "rm'Tiami" and the other words there underscored, and when ?
Captain Safford. These three words were underscored by Lieu-
tenant Commander Linn or myself in January, 1944, so as to distin-
guish or designate the hidden words in this particular message. The
actual translation was made from the teletype copy and I believe that
this teletype copy could not be located among the work sheets. I
won't even say that for certain.
Mr. SoNNETT. I have nothing further, sir.
Admiral Hewitt. All right. Thank you very much.
( The witness was excused. )
[613] (The investigation was then, at 11:32 a. m., recessed
until 7 : 45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.)
(Present: Same parties.)
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, may we mark as exhibit 79 in this investi-
gation a photostatic copy of page 44 of a volume containing transla-
tions of the files of operations orders, orders, memoranda, and serials
dealing with Navy operations plans, recovered from the Japanese
cruiser NACHI?
Admiral Hewitt, Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 79.")
358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. SoNNETT. May we mark as exhibit 80, Admiral, copy number
3 of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theatre, and
after marking it, return it to the files from which we received it ?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The document referred to was received and marked "Exhibit 80.")
Mr. SoNNETT. And may we also mark. Admiral, a certified collec-
tion of photostatic copies of ONI memoranda dealing with the organ-
ization of the Japanese Fleet and Japanese Fleet locations as estimated
during November and up to December 1, 1941?
Admiral Hewitt. Yes.
(The documents referred to were received and marked "Exhibit
'81.")
Mr. SoNNETT. Admiral, after review of the questions for further
investigation which you proj^osed to the Secretary of the Navy antl
which were approved by him, I believe that we have covered all the
points [614^ required for further investigation and accordingly
recommend that the investigation be now closed.
Admiral Hewitt. The investigation may now be considered closed.
(The investigation was then, at 7: 50 p. m., closed.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 359
EXHIBITS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
[See Index of Exhibits, supra, pp. 2-4]
Hewitt iNQunjY Exhibit No. 1
Department of the Navy,
Washington 25, D. C, 2 May, 19J,5.
Confidential
From : Tlie Secretary of the Navy.
To: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN.
Subject : Further investigation of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941.
Enclosure :
(A) Report of Commission appointed by Executive Order dated 18 Decem-
ber 1941, to investigate the attack made by Japanese armed forces
upon the Territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941.
(B) Copy of Examination of Witnesses, ordered by the Secretary of the
Navy, 12 February 1944.
(C) Copy of record of proceedings of Court of Inquiry, convened by order
of the Secretary of the Navy, 13 July 1944.
1. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forth-
with with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catas-
trophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts
might justify. Prior to the enactment of said law, the attack made by Jap-
anese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941 had
been investigated by a Commission appointed by Executive Order, dated 18
December 1941, and by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), pursuant to
precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 12 February 1944. The report of
the Commission is Enclosure (A). The record of Admiral Hart's examination
of witnesses is Enclosure (B).
2. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN (Retired),
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus
Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, USN, as judge
Advocate, was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944. The
Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1941, or as soon thereafter as practi-
cable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the
attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7
December 1941 ; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its
findings, a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The
Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were
commited or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or i)ersons in
the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been com-
mitted or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further pro-
ceedings should be had. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on
31 July 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944.
Enclosure (C) is the record of proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, which con-
tains the Court's findings and opinion.
3. Upon the evidence before the Court of Inquiry and all the other proceedings
in the matter to date, the Secretary has found that there were errors of judgment
on the part of certain oflBcers in the Naval Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at
Washington.
4. The Secretary has further found that the previous investigations have not
exhausted all possible evidence. , Accordingly, he has decided that the investi-
gation directed by Pitblic Law No. 339 of the 78th Congress should be further
continued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts
Can be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted.
5. The Secretary's present decision will be reviewed when the investigation
has been finally completed, in the light of all the evidence then at band.
360 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6. Yon are hereby detailed to make a study of the enclosures and then to
conduct such further investigation, including the examination of any additional
persons who may have knowledge of the facts pertinent to the said Japanese
attack, and to re-examine any such person who has been previously examined, as
may appear to be necessary, and to record the testimony given thereby. You
are authorized to obtain such documents relating to said attack as may be
required for inclusion in the record.
7. Under the authority of Title 5, Section 93, of the U. S. Code, you are author-
ized and directed to administer an oath to any witness called by you to testify
or depose in the course of this examination into the subject-named matter.
Except that the testimony you take should be taken under oath so as to be on
equal status in this respect with the testimony previously taken, you will con-
duct your examination in an informal manner and without regard to legal or
formal requiremenf-s. Upon completion of your examination you will submit
the record direct to the Secretary of the Navy.
8. You are being oi*dered to report to the Secretary of the Navy for temporary
duty for this purpose, and will request such additional orders from him as you
find necessary.
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 1A
Office of the Secretary
Department of the Navy
washington 25, d. c.
Confidential
From : The Secretary of the Navy
To : Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN
Subject: Further investigation of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941.
Enclosure :
(A) Report of Commission appointed by Executive Order dated 18 Decem-
ber 1941, to investigate the attack made by Japanese armed forces
upon the Territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941.
(B) Copy of Examination of Witnesses, ordered by the Secretary of the
Navy, 12 February 1944.
(C) Copy of record of proceedings of Court of Inquiry, convened by order
of the Secretary of the Navy, 13 July 1944.
1. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith
with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe,
and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might
justify. Prior to the enactment of said law, the attack made by Japanese
armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941 had been
investigated by a Commission appointed by Executive Order, dated 18 December
1941, and by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), pursuant to precept of
the Secretary of the Navy, dated 12 February 1944. The report of the Com-
mission is Enclosure (A). The i-ecord of Admiral Hart's examination of wit-
nesses is Enclosure (B).
2. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN (Retired),
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus An-
drews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, USN, as Judge
Advocate, was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944. The
Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as prac-
ticable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the
attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7
December 1941 ; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its
findings, a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The
Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were
committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in
the Naval service, and, in case its opinion wqs that offenses had been com-
mitted or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further
proceedings should be had. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings
on 3 July 1944. and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 361
Enclosure (C) is the record of proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, which
contains the Court's findings and opinion.
3. After examination of the record of proceedings and the findings of fact
and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge
Advocate General of the Navy, and by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and
Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy has found that the evidence
obtained by the Court does not warrant and will not support the trial by general
court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.
4. Upon the evidence before the Court of Inquiry and all the other proceedings
in the matter to date, the Secretary has found that there were errors of judgment
on the part of certain oflBcers in the Naval Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at
Washington.
5. The Secretary has further found that the previous investigations have not
exhausted all possible evidence. Accordingly, he has decided that the investiga-
tion directed by Public Law No. 339 of the 78th Congress should be further con-
tinued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be
obtained and all possible evidence exhausted.
6. The Secretary's present decision will be reviewed when the investigation
has been finally completed, in the light of all the evidence then at hand.
7. You are hereby detailed to make a study of the enclosures and then to con-
duct such further investigation, including the examination of any additional
persons who may have knowledge of the facts pertinent to the said Japanese at-
tack, and to re-examine any such person who has been px-eviously examined, as
may appear to be necessary, and to record the testimony given thereby. You are
required for inclusion in the record.
8. Under the authority of Title 5, Section 93, of the U. S. Code, you are author-
ized and directed to administer an oath to any witness called by you to testify or
depose in the course of this examination into the subject-named matter. Except
that the testimony you take should be taken under oath so as to be on equal
status in this respect with the testimony previously taken, you will conduct your
examination in an informal manner and without regard to legal or formal re-
quirements. Upon completion of your examination you will submit th^ record
direct to the Secretary of the Navy.
9r You ftfe being ordered %© ropoi4 4« tbe Scorctary in Chief, United States
Fleet; fef temporary duty fe? -tfeis purpoaci a«^ "ff^ request ouoh additionai
Hewitt Inquiky Exhibit No. 2
NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF RECORD OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF
INQUIRY
With Cross-References to Admiral Hart's Investigation Together With Adden-
dum Thereto (Admiral Hewitt's Findings and Conclusions)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword.. ..- .._ 363
Chapter:
I. A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Pacific Fleet 3fi5
B. Basing of Fleet at Hawaii Se.")
C. Air Patrol from Hawaii in 1940 367
D. The International Situation; Likelihood of Attack and the Status of Defenses Prior
to Admiral Kimmel's Command ___ 368
E. Joint Estimate of Richardson and Kimmel as to Situation and Defenses 369
F. The Grew Report of Rumored Japanese Attack and ONI Evaluation 370
II. Assumption of Command by Admiral Kimmel— His Reorganization of the Pacific Fleet
and His Staff:
A. Assumption of Command 370
B. Reorganization of the Pacific Fleet 371
C. Admiral Kimmel's Staff __ 371
D. General Orders Xos. 142 and 143 374
III. The Chief of Xaval Operations— His Staff and Duties:
A. The Chief of Naval Operations 374
B. Admiral Stark's Staff 374
C. The Duties of the Chief of Naval Operations _. 377
362 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Chapter. Page
IV. The Commanding General Hawaiian Department— His Major Mission:
A. The Commanding General _._ ___ _»_. 375
B. General Short's Major Mission __ 379
V. Relations in General Between Navy and Army Commanders:
A. In Washington 379
B. In Hawaii 379
VI. The War Plans Relating to Hawaii and the Adequacy of the Pacific Fleet:
A. The Plans for Defense of Hawaii . 381
B. Testimony Concerning the War Plans in General 395
C. Adequacy of Fleet Generally to Carry Out its Tasks 400
VII. The Possibility of Aerial Torpedo Attack at Pearl Harbor:
A. Knowledge and Evaluation of Secretary's Letter 402
B. Correspondence on Anti-torpedo BaflSes in Pearl Harbor 403
VIII. The Situation Prior to the Freezing of Japanese Assets:
A. The Inadequacy of Local Defense Forces and Necessity for Reliance on the Fleet... 405
B. Admiral Kimmel's View Concerning the Possibility of a Surprise Attack.. ._ 405
C. Admiral Kimmel's Desire for Information as to Developments 406
D. Information Sent to Admiral Kimmel Concerning the International Situation 406
IX. Admiral Kimmel's Visit in June and Annual Report:
A. Admiral Kimmel's Visit... -. 407
B. Kimmel's Annual Report— Year Ending June 30, 1941 407
X. Reconnaissance Toward Jaluit 407
XI. The Freezing of Japanese Assets — Deterioration of Situation and Fleet Security Order:
A. The Freezing Order 408
B. Further Deterioration of Situation _ -. 409
C. Inadequacy of Equipment and Efforts to Rectify 411
D. Admiral Kimmel's Letter on Security of the Fleet _.. 411
XII. Intelligence in Washington — The Interception and Decoding of Secret Japanese Communi-
cations:
A. ONI Distribution and Acquisition of Intelligence in General 413
B. The Interception and Decoding of Secret Japanese Communications 416
C. Failure to Send this Secret Information to Admiral Kimmel. 418
XIII. Resignation of Japanese Cabinet— Arrival of Kurusu— The Possibility of a Surprise Aggres-
sive Movement:
A. The Dispatch of October 16, 1941... 418
B. Admiral Stark's Letter of October 17, 1941 - 420
C. Japanese Messages Concerning German Attitude; Nomura's Desire to Resign 42o
D. Admiral Bloch's Letter on Inadequacy of Local Defense 421
E. Admiral Kimmel's Estimate and Action 421
P. The First Japanese "Deadline" Message... 422
Q. Admiral Stark's Letter of November 7, 1941 422
H. Japanese Interest in Ships at the Philippines and Seattle - - - 423
I. Arrival of Kurusu; Stark and Marshall Recommendation as to Ultimatum 423
J. Further and Final Japanese "Deadline" Messages 424
K. The Possibility of a Surprise Aggressive Movement 425
XIV. Dispatches Concerning Reinforcement of Wake and Midway 426
XV. Intercepted Japanese Communications of November 26th and 27th 427
XVI. The State Department Note of November 26th... 427
XVII. The War Warning of November 27th:
A. The Warning 430
B. Preparation of the Warning. 431
C. The Failure to Mention Hawaii 432
D. The Direction to "Execute an Appropriate Defensive Deployment" 433
XVIII. Repetition of Army Dispatch on November 28th:
A. General Marshall 435
XIX. Reinforcement of Midway and Wake. 435
XX. Pearl Harbor— Estimates of the Situation:
A. Admiral Kimmel 437
B. Admiral Bloch 438
C. Admiral Pye.. 438
D. Admiral Smith 441
E. Admiral McMorris . - 443
F. Admiral Delaney ._. 446
0. Admiral Calhoun 447
H. Captain Layton _ 447
1. Admiral Bellinger 447
J. Admiral Kitts-. _.. 448
K. Admiral Withers 448
L. Colonel Phillips 448
M. General Short 448
XXI. Conferences Between Admiral Kimmel and General Short after November 27th 449
XXII. Action Taken by Admiral Kimmel- Extent of Reconnaissance:
A. In General 450
B. Responsibility for Long Range Reconnaissance 453
C. Readiness of Aircraft and Drills 456
D. Extent of Reconnaissance 457
E. Extent of Reconnaissance Which Could Have Been Taken 457
XXIII. Action Taken by General Short. 462
XXIV. Japanese Espionage and United States Intelligence at Pearl Harbor— Japanese Military
and Fleet Move nents:
A. Japanese Espionage .- 463
B. United States Intelligence at Pearl Harbor 466
C. Japanese Military and Fleet Movements 478
XXV. Intercepted Japanese Communications After the "War Warning" and up to December 6,
1941:
A. Failure to Transmit to Admiral Kimmel 490
B. Concerning the Diplomatic Negotiations and Situtation 491
C. Concerning United States Ships and Planes... 496
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 363
Chapter: Page
XXVI. The "Winds" Code and Messages:
A. The Winds Code..-- .- 501
B. Monitoring for the Code Words _ 502
C. Admiral KLmmel's Knowledge of Winds Code 502
D. "Winds" Messages Using the Code Words for Russia . 502
E. Was There a "Winds Code" Message Relating to the United States? 503
XXVII. Information Sent to Admiral Kimmel After the "War Warning;" _ . 510
XXVIII. The "Mori" Conversation: Japanese Burning Papers.. 523
XXIX. The Likelihood of a Japanese Attack at Hawaii as Estimated in Washington, December 6,
1941:
A. Navy Estimates ., 525
B. Army Estimates ■. _ 527
C. State Department Estimates . . 527
XXX. Japanese Message Advising of Fourteen Part Reply and First Thirteen Parts:
A. Message advising of Fourteen Part Reply 527
B. The First Thirteen Parts of the Reply 627
C. Delivery of the Translations of the Above Messages. 528
XXXI. December 7, 1941, in Washington:
A. Intercepted Communications Other Than Part Fourteen and the "1 p. m. Mes-
sage" -. 529
B. Part Fourteen and the "1 p. m. Message" 530
C. Delivery of Part Fourteen and the "1 p. m. Message" and Action Taken 531
XXXII. Conditions at Pearl Harbor Prior to Attack:
A. The Ships in Port 536
B. The Anti-aircraft Guns 538
C. Army and Navy Conditions of Readiness 539
D. Number and Condition of the Men 541
E. The Aircraft Warning Service 542
F. Ships' Radar 549
G. Steps Taken by Commander Local Naval Defense Force 550
H. Army Aircraft 551
I. The Submarines 652
J. Reconnaissance Airplanes and Air Reconnaissance 652
XXXIII. The Japane.se Attack on Pearl Harbor:
A. Japanese Submarines 556
B. Detection of Planes by the Army Radar System ._ 561
C. The Air Attack 562
D. The Arrival of the Army's Message 565
E. The Failure to Telephone on December 7th 566
F. What Could Have Been Done if There Had Been Advance Notice 566
O. The Casualties and Damage. .568
Appendix: List of witness before Court of Inquiry... 571
List of witnesses before Admiral Hart 573
Foreword
Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved June 13, 1944, directed the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith
with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe,
and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify.
A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. N. (Retired),
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. N. (Retired) and Vice Admiral Adolphus
Andrews, U. S. N., (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. N., as
Judge Advocate, was appointed on July 13, 1944. The Court was directed to
convene on July 17, 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of
inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese
forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on December 7, 1941; to inquire
thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings a full statement of the
facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state
its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred
on the part of any person or persons in the Naval Service, and, in case its opinion
was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend
specifically what further proceedings should be had.
The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on July 31, 1944, and sub-
mitted the record of its proceedings on October 20, 1944. During its investiga-
tion, the Court took the testimony of thirty-nine witnesses, and received seventy-
seven exhibits. Certain portions of the record of proceedings before the Court,
including the findings and opinion of the Court, have been classied "TOP
SECRET," and the balance "SECRET."
By letter dated October 21, 1944, the Secretary of the Navy requested the
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations to advise as to
how much of the records of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry bear such a rela-
tion to present military operations as to require high security classification.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations advised,
in a letter dated November 3, 1944, that a substantial part of the records of
Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry bears such a relation to the national security and
to current military operations as to make it essential that that information not
be revealed publicly.
364 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
After thorough review of the record of proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Court
of Inquiry, the Secretary concurred with the views of the Commander in Chief,
U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, as expressed in his letter of Novem-
ber 3, 1944, and accordingly has directed that in the best interests of the present
and future military operations of the United States, the existing "TOP SECRET"
and "SECRET" classifications of the record must be continued. The Navy
Department has stated that the record of the Court will not be made public
while the war is in progress.
The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval
Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and by the
Secretary of the Navy is that the evidence now available does not warrant and
will not support the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the
Naval Service.
The Secretary in his findings upon the evidence before the Court of Inquiry and
all the other proceedings in the matter to date, has found that there were errors
of judgment on the part of certain officers in the Naval Service, both at Pearl
Harbor and at Washington.
The Secretary is not satisfied that the investigation has gone to the point of
exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, he has decided that his own
investigation should be further continued until the testimony of every witness in
possession of material facts can be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted.
Some of the testimony will be much delayed because certain witnesses who are
actively engaged in combat against the enemy are not available and will not be
available within the predictable future. The present decision of the Secretary
will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed in the light of
the evidence then at hand.
The Secretary made this personal statement to the press on December 1, 1944:
"In reaching the above conclusions and decisions I am fully mindful of the wide
and legitimate public interest in the Pearl Harbor attack. However, there is
one consideration which is paramount to all others, and that is: What will best
serve the continued successful prosecution of the war? The actions I have taken
in my judgment, are taken in the light of that consideration, and I accept full and
complete responsibility for them."
In connection with the Secretary's further investigation, the following statement
has been prepared, narrating the evidence obtained by the Court of Inquiry.
It is believed that all significant evidence so obtained has been included. Because
reference is made to "TOP SECRET" material, this statement has been classified
"TOP SECRET."
On June 15, 1944, two days after the enactment of Public Law No. 339 of the
78th Congress, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), completed an examin-
ation of witnesses and the taking of testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harobr, which had been directed by the Secretary of the Navy in a pre-
cept to Admiral Hart, dated February 12, 1944. In the course of his examination.
Admiral Hart took the testimony of forty witnesses, some of whom also testified
later before the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, and received forty-two
exhibits. Various of the witnesses before Admiral Hart furnished information
which does not appear in the Record of Proceedings of the Naval Pearl Harbor
Court of Inquiry. The evidence obtained by Admiral Hart has been digested.
The following narrative statement of the evidence obtained hy the Naval Pearl
Harbor Court of Inquiry has been cross-referenced to the evidence obtained by
Admiral Hart. The left-hand "pink" pages refer to the record of the examination
of witnesses conducted by Admiral Hart. It should be noted that the record of
proceedings before Admiral Hart has been reclassified as "TOP SECRET."
John F. Sonnett.
Addendum to Foreword
After reviewing the evidence obtained in the prior investigations and examining
the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the Secretary of the Navy having
determined in his Third Endorsement dated 1 December 1944, that it was neces
sary, by precept, dated 2 May 1945, appointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S.
Navy, as investigating officer, with John F. Sonnett as counsel, and Lieutenant
John Ford Baecher, USNR, as assistant counsel, to examine such witnesses and
to obtam such other evidence as might be necessary in order to fully develop the
facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The further
investigation by Admiral Hewitt was completed on 12 July 1945.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 365
A digest of t^e evidence obtained in the further investigation by Admiral
Hewitt has been prepared, and keyed into the following Narrative Statement in
the manner in which the evidence adduced before Admiral Hart was treated.
The left-hand yellow page, under the left-hand pink pages, contain the evidence
adduced before Admiral Hewitt, keyed on the white pages at the points indicated
by the yellow crayon.
The findings and conclusions of Admiral Hewitt are attached to the following
Narrative Statement as Addendum I.
John Ford Baecher,
Lieutenant, USNR.
TOP-SECRET
NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF RECORD OF NAVAL PEARL
HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY
[The digest of testimony from the Hart Inquiry will be found set forth in bold face type at the pertinent
point. The digest of testimony from the Hewitt inquiry will be found similarly indicated in italic type]
I. Background
A. COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. FLEET AND PACIFIC FLEET
At the time of the Pearl Harbor catastrophe the Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was Admiral Husband E.
' Kimmel, USN (page 273). Admiral Kimmel's predecessor was Admiral J. O.
Richardson, USN. He had occupied that post from January 1940, when he had
relieved Admiral Bloch, until February 1, 1941 (page 1053).
B. BASING OF FLEET AT HAWAII
According to Admiral Richardson, in May 1940, while the Fleet was in Hawaii
as part of the Fleet exercises, he received directions to announce to the press that
"at his request" the Fleet would stay in Hawaii to carry out further exercises.
He did not think that Hawaii was a proper base for the Fleet and so advised the
Chief of Naval Operations (page 1057). The reason for basing the Fleet at
Hawaii, as he understood it, was so that it would act as a restraining influence on
the Japanese (page 1058). (See also Exhibits 26 and 27.)
Admiral Stark testified that the Fleet, which was normally based on the Pacific
Coast, was kept at Pearl Harbor in 1941 as a deterrent to Japan, and for training
for its task, which included the security of the Fleet when at anchor; Admiral
Richardson had advised basing the Fleet on the Pacific Coast and did not agree
that the Fleet should be based at Pearl Harbor (pages 21, 22, 91). The President
he said, made the decision as to the base of the Fleet (page 91). The ships,
however, were allocated or based, prior to December 7, 1941, in accordance with
Admiral Stark's views and recommendations (page 189).
Admiral Turner said that CincPac recommended several times that the Fleet
be returned to the West Coast; Admiral Stark discussed this with the President,
but made no recommendation to the President, who would not approve the
change (page 1020).
Admiral Turner said that the matter of withdrawing the Fleet from Pearl
Harbor had been discussed a number of times and each time the decision was
reached to leave the Fleet there (p. 261).
It appears that there were some differences of opinion on the part of various
other Naval witnesses as to the advisability of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor.
Admiral McMorris, for example, said that he personally felt that Hawaii was a
proper base for the Pacific Fleet (page 896).
Admiral McMorris said that he had always held the view that he would
have based the Fleet at Pearl Harbor rather than on the Pacific coast, al-
though, he said, there was considerable difference of opinion about that (p.
248).
Admiral Pye said that he had expressed the opinion that it was unwise to base
the battleships there (page 439).
Concerning the basing of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Pye said
that there were several reactions, first, that it might incite Japan and second,
that it was a poor time to make such a move because we were not prepared
366 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to move to the westward in time of war due to poor logisticsr support. There
was, however, one great advantage which was that the expenditure of money
on the ships for repair and overhaul in Pearl Harbor permitted expansion of
the Navy Yard at a greater rate (p. 151).
And Admiral DeLany testified that he personally saw no reason for keeping the
Fleet at Pearl Harbor (page 496).
Admiral DeLany thought that it was inconsistent to place the Fleet at
Pearl Harbor with the idea of having it as a threat to Japan and at the same
time being advised whenever they asked for material that the war was in
the Atlantic and also to get units of the Pacific Fleet moved to the Atlantic.
He thought that Admiral Kimmel discussed this very thing during his trip to
Washington in the summer of 1941. He thought that there was some ef-
fect on morale because of the indecisiveness about whether the Fleet was
going to stay at Pearl Harbor or be returned to the West Coast but there was
no efifect on the material condition of the Fleet. The fact ihat the Fleet was
based there resulted in the development of a number of wartime practices
which were beneficial to the Fleet when war came (p. 82).
Admiral Smith testified that during 1940 the Fleet was told to remain at Pearl
Harbor and everyone thought this meant a probability of war in the Pacific, but
he knew of no military reason for keeping the Fleet there. In his opinion neither
the development of the Navy Yard nor fleet logistics was a sufficient reason for
keeping the Fleet at Pearl Harbor (page 528). The objections in 1940 were:
(1) no protected anchorage, (2) no air cover, (3) single channel entrance to Pearl
Harbor.
Admiral Smith said that the lack of premonition as to a carrier raid was
not due to administrative difiiculties facing the Fleet which resulted from
the fact that the Fleet had been based at Pearl Harbor for a long time
(p. 64).
Admiral Smith said that the fact that the Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor
rather than on the mainland did not affect the materiel conditions or readi-
ness of the Fleet for war; he said that Admiral Kimmel often discussed the
question of the conditions of the Fleet and that they felt that it was better
out there than when it had been based on San Pedro; he said there might
have been a question In the minds of some of the officers as to why the Fleet
was being kept out there; a great many felt that the Administration was
keeping them out there unnecessarily since there was no danger of war in
the Pacific; the movement of a part of the Fleet undoubtedly had some
effect upon the minds of the personnel of the Fleet (p. 39).
Admiral Smith said that to his absolute knowledge. Admiral Kimmel
never made a recommendation during 1941 that the Fleet should be re-
turned to the California coast either by letter or dispatch. Admiral Smith
never heard him say that the Fleet should return to the coast although
Admiral Kimmel knew that his predecessor had recommended it. Admiral
Smith said that if Admiral Kimmel ever made any such recommendation
it might have been in July 1941 when he made a trip to Washington ac-
companied only by Captain McMorris, but that Admiral Smith thought he
would have heard about it (p. 40).
Admiral Smith said that the transfer of certain units to the Atlantic
affected the mental attitude of some officers in that the danger of immediate
outbreak of war might have been more evident to them if the units had not
been transferred (p. 40).
Admiral Smith said that in his opinion the general warmindedness of
the personnel of the Fleet was improved by its retention in Hawaii (p. 40).
Captain Murphy indicated that previously he had been War Plans Officer
for Admiral Richardson; that at that time he had advocated basing the
Fleet on the Pacific coast instead of Pearl Harbor.
Captain Glover's view was that the Fleet was kept in Hawaiian waters
for the purpose of assisting in the protection of the United States east of
the 180th Meridian and also to be in a position from which raiding operations
could be projected (p. 176).
Admiral Halsey said that he thought that the closer the Fleet was to the
Japanese, the better off they were and therefore, he thought that Manila
was the first best base, then Pearl Harbor the second, (p. 295)
It may be noted that according to Mr. Grew no official representations were
made to him by Japan with respect to the United States keeping the Fleet in
Pearl Harbor (page 1065).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 367
Admiral Schuirmann said that so far as he knew, there was no open dis-
agreement beyween the State and Navy Departments as to the disposition
of the Fleet. He said that the State Department generally favored the re-
tention in the Pacific of the greater portion of the United States Fleet (p. 407).
Admiral Ingersoll said that he recalled during the winter 1940-1941 that
the question was raised about continuing to base the Fleet at Hawaii and that
it was considered that that was the most advantageous point and that the
Fleet should be kept there. He recalled no discussion of the particular
point of the Fleet's security at Hawaii in that connection and recalled no
protest by Admiral Kimmel and no pressure by the State Department to
keep the Fleet there (p. 418).
C. AIR PATROL FROM HAWAII IN 1940
Admiral Bloch testified that in June, 1940, General Herron, then Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department, came to Admiral Bloch and stated that he
had received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to the efiFect that he
must be on the alert against a raid from the west by a hostile nation (page 1139).
Bloch told him that he had no patrol planes for the purpose and suggested that
they go to the Senior Officer Present, who was Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews,
then Commander of the Hawaiian Detachment. They did so and Admiral
Andrews instituted a dawn-to-dusk patrol, informing the Commander-in-Chief,
Admiral Richardson, who -was then at sea. Admiral Richardson flew in to discuss
the matter and finally sent a dispatch to the Navy Department, asking for infor-
mation about the situation, to which the Navy Department never replied. Ad-
miral Bloch did not recall for how long they continued that reconnaissance. To
the best of Admiral Bloch's recollection, the long distance reconnaissance estab-
lished by Admiral Andrews in 1940 was for three days and then was discontinued
by Admiral Richardson (page 1149).
Admiral Bloch said: "Sometime in the summer of 1940, the date I cannot
recall, General Herron, the Commanding General, came to my office and
stated that he had just received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff of the
Army to the effect that an overseas raid was impending and that he was to
go on the full alert at once. He told me that he had received this dispatch,
that it was a bolt from the blue, that he knew nothing about it, but he had
gone on the alert and came down to see me and wanted to know if I had
received a similar dispatch. I told him, no; I knew nothing about it. He
then said that he was very much disturbed about this, he didn't know the
nature of the raid, didn't know when it was going to be, what it was about,
.but he wanted my advice. And I said, 'Well, I'm not the senior officer
present in the Fleet. While I am an officer of the Fleet, there is a superior
officer here. Vice Admiral Andrews, and I think you had better show him
the dispatch.' We went aboard the Flagship and told Admiral Andrews
about this, and after conference, it was decided by Admiral Andrews that
we would have morning and dusk reconnaissance patrols, and patrols were
then ordered to be sent out. The Commander-in-Chief was Admiral Rich-
ardson, but he was not present. Admiral Andrews sent him a dispatch
telling him of the condition. Admiral Richardson flew in and as he had
never heard of the warning, he sent a dispatch to the Chief of Operations
and it was my recollection that he never received a reply to it. Now this
alert continued for some two or three weeks. When the Army_ had this
alert, had been warned of an overseas raid, they were not told it was an
exercise or drill, they were told it was an overseas raid that was expected.
The Navy was in a position of knowing nothing about it. I think, subse-
quently, the Commander-in-Chief got information about it here in Wash-
ington, but so far as I know, we got nothing there." (p. 13-4)
Admiral Richardson said that in June, 1940, he received a warning from the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to the effect that there was
a possibility of war, and as a result of this he increased the air patrols which he
had established. He reported, he said, this warning to the Navy Department
and asked for information, but received no reply (page 1056). He asked the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department whether this was a real warn-
ing, but was informed that the Commanding General had no idea, and he acted
as though it were such a warning. It appears that in personal letters he had also
received warnings of the possibility of war which, he said, were not definite or
clear cut (page 1055). In view of these warnings, and his beUef that when war
came it would come as a surprise, which was based on 20 years' study of the
368 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese, he felt that he had to maintain as adequate a patrol as he could with
the available means (pages 1053, 1060).
The air patrol directed by Admiral Richardson during 1940 was a patrol of
particular sectors which was daily rotated. As Admiral Richardson recalled it,
this patrol covered 170° to 350° to a distance of 300 miles. A dawn and dusk
patrol was also established. He regarded the Southwest sector as the sector
from which an attack most probably would come (pages 1053, 1055).
Admiral Richardson did not recall the number of patrol planes which were
available to him. He stated that toward the end of his command it was planned
to restrict the air patrol to adequate searches of operating areas, and that it was
Admiral Kimmel's intention to continue this same patrol in effect when hef as-
sumed command (pages 1055,' 1053).
Admiral Bellinger's recollection was that under special conditions and orders
there had been a dawn patrol of 6 to 12 planes flying to 300 miles (page 682).
This patrol was discontinued after the time that Admiral Kimmel took command
as CincPac. It had covered a constantly changing sector (page 683).
D. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION; LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK AND THE STATUS OF
DEFENSES PRIOR TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL's COMMAND
Shortly before Admiral Kimmel assumed command, as appears from a dispatch
of January 21, 1941 (Exhibit 76) from the Chief of Naval Operations to CincUS
and others, it was thought that the international situation was continuing to
deteriorate and that the Pacific Fleet should be in a waiting attitude or execute
the tasks assigned to it in the area eastward of 160°, depending on the action
which might be taken by the Japanese.
At this time Admiral Bloch, as ComFOURTEEN, complained of inadequate
local defense forces and pointed out that he had no planes for distant reconnais-
sance and that for such reconnaissance requisition would have to be made on the
forces afloat. This was set forth in a letter of December 30, 1940, by Admiral
Bloch.
According to Admiral Bloch, in the fall of 1940, he became convinced that
the Army's defenses against aircraft attack were insufficient. He discussed
this matter with the then Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson. As a
result of that conversation, Admiral Richardson asked the then Commanding
General, General Herron, to go around with him and to interview first hand
the officers and find out what equipment the Army had. At the conclusion
of this tour around the Army posts, Admiral Richardson gave Admiral Bloch
a memorandum informing him of the numbers of aircraft, guns and planes
which were at Oahu. As the result of this information and of his conversa-
tion with Admiral Richardson, Admiral Bloch wrote a letter to the Navy
Department concerning the inadequacy of the defenses. This letter was
forwarded with a strong endorsement by Admiral Richardson. (The letter
is Exhibit 23.) That correspondence was the basis of the letter written by
the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 4, 1941
(p. 3). (That letter and the reply of the Secretary of the Navy constitute
Exhibit 40.)
Admiral Richardson's endorsement on this letter (January 7, 1941, Exhibit 28)
stated that the Army's equipment was inadequate to meet a surprise attack; that
the defense of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor would have to be augmented by that
portion of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor; that plans for cooperation with local defense
forces were being made; that constant readiness of fighter squadrons was not
contemplated ; that there did not appear to be any practical way of placing
torpedo baffles or nets within the harbor; and considering this and the improba-
bility of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of the enemy
being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of fleet
operations, it was not regarded as necessary to lay such nets. This endorsement
urgently recommended that local defense forces be provided ComFOURTEEN.
On January 24, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy wrote to the Secretary of War
(Exhibit 9) and discussed in some detail the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor
and the adequacy of the local defense forces. The Secretary of the Navy's letter
stated that the security of the Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl
Harbor Naval Base, hart been reexamined because of the increased gravity of the
situation with respect to Japan, and because of reports from abroad of successful
bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. The letter stated:
"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities
would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 369
Harbor * * *. The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and
probabilities are considered to be: (1) air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane
attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by
gunfire."
The letter continued that defense against all but the first two of the dangers
appeared to have been provided for satisfactorily. As to an air bombing attack
or an air torpedo plane attack, it was stated tha^t both types were possible and
might be carried out successfully simultaneously or in combination with any
of the other possible operations. Attacks, it was said, would be launched from
a striking force of carriers and other supporting vessels. The counter-measures
to be considered were the location and engagement of enemy carriers before the
attack could be launched: the location and engagement of enemy aircraft before
they reached their objectives; the repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft
fire, the concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke; and the protection
of vital installations by balloon barrages. The letter pointed out that the location
and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before an air attack
could be launched were largely functions of the fleet, but quite possibly might not
be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning and prior ta
a declaration of war; and, then discussed the status of the Army's preparations,
such as pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft information service, and anti-aircraft
batteries.
Various proposals were made in this letter, including proposals that the Army
assign the liighest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery,
and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii, and that local joint plans
be drawn for effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and
ship and shore anti-aircraft gunfire, against surprise aircraft raids; that the Army
and Xavy forces agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate
action in defense against surprise aircraft raids on Pearl Harbor; and, that joint
exercises designed to prepare Army and Xavy forces in Oahu for defense against
surprise aircraft raids be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertain-
ty continued to exist.*
E. JOINT ESTIMATE OF RICHARDSON AND KIMMEL AS TO SITUATION AND DEFENSES
The views of both Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel, at that time, were
set forth in a letter which they prepared and sent to the Chief of Naval Operations
on January 25, 1941 (Exhibit 70). This stated that if Japan entered the war or
committed an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in
the Pacific would be primarily defensive. Certain assumptions were then outlined,
upon which the action of the Pacific Fleet would be predicated. These included:
(a) United States is at war with Germany and Italy,
(b) War with Japan is imminent,
(c) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any f^rm —
even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines,
under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or Italian.
(f) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying positions or
naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel
are possible.
Their letter continued, that the tasks to be undertaken by the Fleet in connection
with such assumptions included the taking of full security measures for the
protection of Fleet units, at sea and in port. The letter pointed out that the
Fleet was handicapped by deficiencies in the existing local defense forces and
stated that, among other things, it would be necessary to expand patrol plane
search to the maximum, reinforcing Patrol \^ ing Two with units from Patrol \V ing
One; that it would be necessary to establish an inner air patrol; to arrange for
alertness of a striking force of planes; and to augment Army anti-aircraft defenses
with batteries of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor; also that it would be necessary to
assist in local defenses of the Fourteenth Naval District, which task would require
the increase of district forces by the assignment of Fleet units until suitable
vessels would become available to the Commandant. Various other measures
were discus.sed, including tho.se to be taken if Japan entered the war, among which
was reconnaissance of the Marshalls.
The letter then discu.ssed in some detail the existing deficiencies in the defenses
of Oahu among which were the inadequacy of anti-aircraft guns, the small number
and condition of land-based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking
* The Secretary of War's reply to this will be found at page 402.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 25
370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
groups of Fleet planes and the use of Fleet planes for local patrols, the lack of
patrol vessels for ComFOURTEEN, and the lack of aircraft detection devices
ashore. It stated that it was considered imperative that immediate measures be
undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies.
Admiral Smith said that about a week before Admiral Eimmel assumed
command, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Richardson, Captain McMorris, and
Admiral Smith were together on the PENNSYLVANIA in a conference with
Commander McCrea, who was returning from a mission to CincAF. At
that time, Comdr. McCrea furnished Admiral Hart's estimate of each one
of the Japanese naval leaders, which was the best estimate that had ever
been received; this included information concerning the Japanese Admiral
Yamamoto to the effect that he was efficient and bold, a poker player, and
dangerous; Comdr. McCrea's information was copied down and put in the
secret file (p. 45-46).
F. THE GREW REPORT OF RUMORED JAPANESE ATTACK AND ONI EVALUATION
• On the day when Admiral Kimmel assumed command, Naval Intelligence wrote
to him concerning the rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (See letter of
February 1, 1941, Exhibit 67). The letter referred to the report from Ambassador
Grew, based on information from the Peruvian Minister, that in the event that
trouble broke out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese would make
a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor. This information the Peruvian Minister
had transmitted, although he considered it fantastic. The letter of Naval Intel-
ligence stated that no credence was placed in these rumors and that based on
known data regarding the disposition and employment of Japanese forces, no
move against Pearl Harbor appeared imminent or planned for in the foreseeable
future.
Admiral Schuirmann said that a low evaluation had been given to Ambas-
sador Grew's report (referring to page 113 "PEACE AND WAR") that in
case of trouble the Japanese planned a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. He
recalled no discussion of that report with the State Department. He said
that he did not think that a particularly high evaluation had been placed upon
that information by the Ambassador or his staff and could not explain the
prominence given to this report in "PEACE AND WAR" (p. 411).
Ambassador Grew said that the information of Japanese intention to open war
by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor that he transmitted to the State Department
on January 27, 1941, was a rumor from reliable sources (the Peruvian Minister —
page 1066). This was only such report of this rumor (page 1062). He also said
that in making his later reports during 1941, including a report of November 3rd,
he advised that the Japanese might strike with dramatic suddenness.
Admiral Turner said that he usually attended the State Department conferences.
He never heard of Ambassador Grew's statement that Hawaii might be attacked
suddenly, until it came out in the newspapers (page 1019).
Captain Smith-Hutton, Naval Attach^ at Tokyo, said that since there was so
much secrecy of Japanese movements, it was highly improbable that the plan, if
real, would have been known in diplomatic circles (page 1080).
II, Assumption of Command by Admiral Kimmel — His Reorganization of
THE Pacific Fleet and His Staff
A. assumption of command
Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN, assumed duty as Commander-in-
Chief, United States Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, on February 1,
1941. He served as such until December 17, 1941, when he was retired on his
own application (page 273) .
It may be noted that Admiral Stark had recommended Admiral Kimmel for
this assignment. In the fitness report on Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 25), which
Admiral Stark prepared after the issuance of the Robert's Report, and in which
he stated that an adverse report had been made on Admiral Kimmel, he also stated
that he had always considered Admiral Kimmel to be an outstanding officer and
still did (page 86).
It may also be noted that in his statement to the Court, Admiral Pye volun-
teered that he thought that the appointment of Admiral Kimmel as CincPac was
excellent, and that he performed his duties as such in an excellent manner (page
446).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 371
B. THE REORGANIZATION OF THE PACIFIC FLEET
Admiral Kimmel testified that he reorganized the Pacific Fleet (page 274),
The organization established by him existed, he testified, throughout the entire
period of his command in substantially the same form as is set forth in Pacific
Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41 of October 31, 1941 (Exhibit 52) as follows:
(a) Task Force One (Commander Battle Force) consisting of six battleships,
Carrier Division One— less the LEXINGTON. Cruiser Division Nine, and part
of Destroyer Flotilla One, etc;
(b) Task Force Two (Commander Aircraft, Battle Force) consisting of three
battleships, Carrier Division Two, Cruiser Division Five, Destroyer Flotilla Two,
etc:
(c) Task Force Three (Commander Scouting Force) consisting of Cruiser Divi-
sion Four and Six, the LEXINGTON plus Marine Air Group Twenty-one, and
Destroyer Squadrons, etc;
(d) Task Force Four (Commandant 14th Naval District) which comprised that
part of the 14th Naval District activities which involved the island bases, and
Admiral Bloch, who was ComFOURTEEN, was also designated in other directives
as Naval Base Defense Officer;
(e) Task Force Seven (Commander Submarine Scouting Force) ;
(f) Task Force Nine (Commander Patrol Wing Two) ; consisting of Pat Wings
One and Two.
(g) Task Force Fifteen (Commander Base Force).
It may be noted at this point that this directive also provided that current
employment schedules for the task forces would remain in effect; that the Com-
manders of Task Forces Seven and Nine were to submit revised schedules for the
period November 15th to December 31, 1941, at the earliest practicable date.
It was indicated that those schedules were to contemplate various arrangements
for further training.
C. ADMIRAL KIMMEl's STAFF
Vice Admiral Pye was Admiral Kimmel's next senior in command, and was
Commander of Task Force One;
Admiral Herbert F. Leary during 1941 was in command of Cruisers,
Battle Force, and under the command of Admiral Pye. (p. 363)
During 1941, Admiral Walter S. Anderson was Commander Battleships,
Battle Force, Pacific Fleet. His superior was Admiral Pye. He was
Admiral Pye's most important subordinate commander, (p. 390)
During 1941, Admiral Joel William Bunkley was Commanding Officer of
the USS CALIFORNIA which was attached to the Pacific Fleet. Admiral
Buckley's ship was Admiral Pye's Flagship, (p. 413)
Vice Admiral Halsey was Commander of Task Force Two; Vice Admiral
Brown of Task Force Three;
Admiral John Henry Newton, during 1941, was in command of Cruisers
Scouting Force. His superior was Admiral Brown, (p. 314)
Admiral Bloch of Task Force Four; Rear Admiral Withers of Task Force Seven;
Rear Admiral Bellinger of Task Force Nine; and. Rear Admiral Calhoun of
Task Force Fifteen.
Admiral Bloch testified that during 1941 he was ComFOURTEEN,
From March 15, 1941 until the end of the year, Captain Irving H. Mayfield
was District Intelligence Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District. He had
had no previous experience in Intelligence work except two weeks temporary
duty in Washington and two years as a Naval attache in Chile.
After July 1, 1941, Lieutenant William B. Stephenson, USNR, was desig-
nated as head of the Counter-Espionage Desk of the District Intelligence
Office of the Fourteenth Naval District (p. 323).
Until June 9, 1941, Captain J. B. Earle was in command of Destroyer
Squadron Five, thereafter he was Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District
(p. 368).
Commander Wesley A. Wright was Assistant Communication Officer on
Admiral Kimmel's staff and was on temporary duty with the Fourteenth
Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit. He had had no experience
in traffic analysis, which includes the location of forces by instruments, but
had had about nine years' experience in other closely related branches of
communication intelligence work (p. 379).
372 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander Local Defense Forces, Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier, Com-
mandant Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, Commander Task Force Four, as Naval Base
Defense Officer. He performed his duties in cooperation with the Army.
Admiral Bloch stated that ' he and Admiral Kimmel worked harmoniously
together and conferred four to five times weekly. Admiral Kimmel, he said, made
an honest effort to' keep him fully Informed. He was conscious that in 1941
Japanese-United States relations were strained. He did not disagree with deci-
sions made by the High Command of the Fleet. He was not called upon to make
any independent decision (page 393).
According to Vice Admiral Bellinger his duties, in general, were as:
(a) Commander Task Force Nine. This comprised Patrol Wings One and Two,
plus other units as assigned by CincPac for specific operations. His senior ofiicer
was CincPac.
(b) Commander Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings and Commander Patrol Wing
Two. The larger command included the patrol squadrons, aircraft tenders,
attached to Patrol Wrings One and Two. His senior officer was Commander
Aircraft Scouting Force based at San Diego.
(c) Commander Fleet Air Detachment Pearl Harbor. Administrative authority
in local matters over all aircraft actually based on Naval Air Station.
(d) Liaison with ComFOURTEEN for aviation development with the district,
including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnstown Island.
(e) Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, and when performing such
duties, his senior officer was Admiral Bloch (pages 660-61).
Captain Logan C. Ramsey, who also testified, was Operations Officer to Admiral
Bellinger between November 1 and December 7, 1941 (page 574).
Vice Admiral W^ L. Calhoun said that he was Commander Base Force, United
States Fleet, during 1941. His duties included logistic support of the Pacific Fleet,
assisting ComFOURTEEN with services in Pearl Harbor, command of fleet
securitj' measure until August or September when relieved by Admiral Bloch,
and he was Senior Patrol Officer in charge of all naval shore patrol (page 931).
Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, during 1941, was Chief of Staff to CincPac
Vice Admiral Smith testified that he was Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet
■ from February, 1941 to 7 December 1941 {page 335), and that his duties, as
prescribed by Staff Instructions, Pacific Fleet (Exhibit 34), issued 14 July 1941,
which he himself signed and issued with the approval of Admiral Kimmel, were:
"112. The Commander-in-Chief is available to the entire Staff for consulta-
tion, but all questions for decision or action should pass through the Chief of
Staff whenever such a procedure will not involve an undue delay."
"200. CHIEF OF STAFF— 01~Personal Aide.
{See Navy Regulations Articles 785-786.)
(a) Carries out policies prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.
(b) Exercises general supervision over and coordinates work by members of
the Staff.
(c) Advises the Commander-in-Chief on all matters concerning the war readi-
ness and battle efficiency of the Fleet.
{d) Supervises the preparation of catnpaign orders and plans, as well as
strategical and tactical problems of the Fleet,
{e) Signs correspondence as follows:
(1) Routine Matters.
(2) Minor recommendations, or minor forwarding endorsements on same, to
material Bureaus regarding repairs and alterations concerning which a policy
has been established.
{3) Orders to and requests from officers not in Command.
(4) Matters concerning which the policy is of long standing.
(5) Letters from the Navy Department noted for compliance., information, or
guidance.
{6) The Commander-in-Chief personally will sign correspondence regarding
questions of particular importance involving criticism, approval, or disapproval
of previous recommendations; action on legal papers" {NCI Rec. p. 336).
(page 528).
Admiral Smith, on December 7, 1941, was Chief of Staff of the Pacific
Fleet which position he assumed on February 1, 1941. Previously, he
served a year and a half as Captain of one of Admiral Kimmel's cruisers
while Admiral Kimmel was Commander Cruisers Pacific Fleet. As Chief
of Staff, Admiral Smith supervised all divisions of the Staff (p. 32) and
everything which transpired between the Staff members and the Com-
mander-in-Chief was brought to Admiral Smith's attention, (p. 33)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 373
Admiral Smith said that he felt that entirely too much of his time was
taken up with administrative matters; when the Commander-in-Chief and
Staff moved ashore, Admiral Smith found it difficult to keep a day-by-day
routine going; possibly he was to blame himself for this situation, but he
attempted to reduce the paper work. However, the Commander-in-Chief
kept him too long in the Commander-in-Chief's office, and he knew that
because Admiral Smith told him so; Admiral Smith believes that they spent
entirely too much time on staff discussions, (p. 60) Admiral Smith stated
that because of his preoccupation with day-to-day matters he was not as
free as the Commander in Chief to think of future events.
Rear Admiral DeLany was Chief of Staff for Operations for Admiral Kimmel
from February 1 to December 7, 1941 (page 496). Rear Admiral C. H. McMorris
was "War Plans Officer during the last half of 1941 (page 887).
On December 7, Captain Vincent R. Murphy was on the staff of Admiral
Kimmel as Assistant to the War Plans Officer, and on that day was Staff
Duty Officer (p. 195).
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he was War Plans Officer for CincPac
from February, 1941 until the end of 1941 (page 29S). He stated that his duties,
as prescribed by "Staff Instructions, Staff of CincPac, 1941" {Exhibit 34) were:
"207. War Plans Officer— 16.
"(a) As head of the War Plans Section is responsible, under the Chief of Staff ,
for the preparation of War Plans for the Fleet and for all matters pertaining
thereto.
"(b) Has general custody of War Plans and secret letters relative thereto.
"(c) Member of Schedule Board.
"(d) Maintains liaison with War Plans representatives of subordinate Com-
manders.
"(e) Maintains liaison with U. S. Army in War Plans matters — via District
Commandant if appropriate.
"(f) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships — general features — and
on alterations of old ships that affect military characteristics.
"(g) Makes recommendations on matters pertaining to reserves of material,
particularly ammunition, mines, bombs, torpedoes, fuel, provisions, etc., and
their distribution.
"(h) Maintains liaison with Commandants of Naval Districts in War Plans
matters.
"(i) 7s responsible for the review of War Plans of subordinate commanders
and of District Commandants and Coastal Frontier Commanders insofar as
these Plans may affect the Fleet." (page 294)
2 Captain E. T. Layton testified that between October and December 7th, he
was Fleet Intelligence Officer for CincPac (page 904) .
Captain Layton testified that for one year prior to 7 December 1941, and
subsequently, he had been Fleet Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, (page
182) and that his duties, as prescribed by "Staff Instructions, Commander in
Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 1941" {Exhibit 34) were:
"214. Intelligence Officer— 25.
"(a) Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluates same, disseminat-
ing to various members of staff, indicating where action is required.
"(6) Provides Operation Officer and War Plans Officer information essential
for current estimates {monograph material).
"(c) Maintains Section II (a), (6), (c), {d), {e), (/), and {g) of Estimate of
Situation {Enemy Forces). Maintains location plot of Fleets of possible enemy
or allies.
"{d) Directs counter espionage and counter information.
"(e) Maintains Intelligence Records {See Naval Intelligence Manual.).
"(f) Prepares Fleet Intelligence Bulletins.
" {g) Evaluates Intelligence Information received of procedures or practices of
other navies and prepares definite recommendations as to any action to be taken
within own Fleet.
"{h) In charge of censorship.
"(i) Internal Security of ships.
"(J) Supervises reconnaissance photographic -activities.
"215. Assistant Intelligence Officer — 26.
In addition to assisting "25" in all duties of the Intelligence section, performs
the following additional assignments:
(o) Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analysis.
374 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
" (6) Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination
to Fleet.
"(c) Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of Enemy information.
"(d) Maintenance of Current Estimate of Situation {Enemy Forces) and loca-
tion plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies" {page 183).
Rear Admiral Kitts was Fleet Gunnery Officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff and
was in charge of training (pages 511-12). (3)
On December 7, 1941, Admiral Arthur C. Davis was Fleet Aviation Officer
of the Pacific Fleet. He had been performing these duties for about a
year and a half (p. 96). His duties primarily were concerned with technical
training and logistics matters (p. 97).
On December 7^1941, M. E. Curts, Captain, U. S. N., was Pacific Fleet
Communication Officer and had served in that capacity for about two years.
D. GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 142 AND 143
General Order No. 142, dated January 10, 1941, of which the Court took
judicial notice, assigned a dual status to the Commandants of various Naval
districts, including the Fourteenth, in that as Commandants they were to operate
under orders of the Navy Department, and as officers of one of the fleets they
were to operate under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief thereof, (1) with
duties corresponding to those of the Senior Officer Present Afloat, when their
relative rank made them such, and (2) in command of task groups of the fleet in
question when and as directed by its Commander-in-Chief. It was further pro-
vided that as Commandants they were to be governed by all instructions relating
to the duties of Commandants of Naval districts and the units under their com-
mand would be those prescribed in existing regulations and instructions, and
would include the local naval defense forces. Their duties as officers of a fleet
were to be guided by such instructions as the Commander-in-Chief of that fleet
might consider desirable.
General Order No. 143, dated February 3, 1941, which the Court also judicially
noticed, provided for the organization of naval forces of the United States, which
included the United States Fleet, composed of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic
Fleets. These were described as administrative and task organizations normally
operating under the instructions of the Navy Department. The United States
Fleet was said to be an administrative organization for training purposes only
and a task organization when two or more fleets were concentrated or operating
in conjunction with each other. Under the Chief of Naval Operations, the
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, was to prescribe standards and
methods of training. It was also stated that the Commandants of Naval districts
had administrative responsibility direct to the Navy Department for naval local
defense forces.
III. The Chief of Naval Operations — His Staff and Duties
A. THE chief of NAVAL OPERATIONS
Admiral H. E,. Stark, USN, was Chief of Naval Operations through the period
when Admiral Kimmel was Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.
B. ADMIRAL STARK's STAFF
Admiral Stark's principal advisers during this period, he said, were Admiral
R. E. Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Admiral R. K.
Turner, head of War Plans.
Captain Robert O. Glover was in the plans division of the office of the Chief
of Naval Operations and was assigned various planning duties, (p. 171)
Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, head of Central Division, Admiral Wilkinson,
Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence.
From May until October, 1941, Admiral Howard F. Kingman was head of
the Domestic Intelligence Branch of ONI, and from October on was Assistant
Director of Naval Intelligence. As head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch,
he had general supervision of the activities of the several districts' intelli-
gence organizations, (p. 335-6)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 375
Captain L. F. Safford was in charge of the Communications Security Section
of Naval Communications during 1941. (p. 355)
the heads of the Divisions of Ship Movements,
(3) During 1941, Admiral Roland Munroe Brainard was Director of the Ship
Movements Division, OflSce of Chief of Naval Operations, (p. 399)
The duties of the Ship Movements Division were summarized by Admiral
Brainard as follows:
"The general functions of the Ship Movements Division involved prepara-
tion of the publications "Operating Force Plan," "Assignment of Vessels
to Fleets and Forces," "Assignment of Vessels to Districts," assignment
of home ports; and collaboration and coordination with the Fleet Mainte-
nance Division of overhauls, schedules of Fleet activities as submitted by
the Commanders of the forces afloat, these tentative schedules being sub-
mitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and circulated for the
approval or modification by the divisions under the CNO, and final approval;
then returned to the forces afloat by the Chief of Naval Operations; sched-
uling and itinerarying of NTS ships, the recording and accountability of ship
locations in rather detailed form as the result of position reports and location
reports from the ships operating individually and from Fleet units, as reported
by Fleet Commanders. During the period of my incumbency, a War Infor-
mation Room was started under the late Rear Admiral F. T. Leighton for
the purpose of plotting and keeping track of all combatant ships of the navies
of the world. Also a section of Convoy and Routing, as now called, whose
duties were the plotting and as close an accountability as possible to keep
track of the merchant shipping of the world. Positions of our own naval
vessels also was obtained through a movement report system. Information
on merchant shipping and foreign shipping and men-of-war was obtained
through the various sources of ONI, naval observers at ports of the world.
Naval Attaches, Maritime Commission, and other such sources. The ac-
quisition of small craft was accomplished by the NTS Section which, later,
grew into a sizeable division, and the assignments to Districts and Sea Fron-
tiers was determined by the Chief of Naval Operations as set forth in the
publication previously mentioned as prepared and distributed by this
Division." (p. 399-400)
Admiral Brainard said that the assignment of important naval units was
determined by echelons higher than his division, (p. 400)
Admiral Brainard said that the Ship Movements Division was primarily
a record keeping division and something of an information bureau, available
to proper authorities, as regards the location of shipping and that he and his
division did not participate in questions of broad general policy, (p. 402)
Ship Maintenance, Fleet Training, and his Flag Secretary (pages 2, 18).
During 1941, Captain John L. McCrea was an aide to Admiral Stark. He
was assigned special duties by Admiral Stark.
During 1941, Captain Charles Wellborn, Jr. was Administrative Aide to
the Chief of Naval Operations (p. 383).
Admiral Royal Ingersoll said that he was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
in 1941, and as such generally acted for the Chief of Naval Operations in matters
where policy had been established, and in an advisory capacity. He knew
generally what was going on in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (page
816).
During 1941, Admiral Ingersoll was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.
He described his duties as follows:
"As Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, I had no duties that pertained
solely to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; that is, I did not have
original cognizance of any matters. All matters for the consideration of
Chief of Naval Operations were taken up with me before presenting to the
Chief of Naval Operations. All matters of policy, of course, were referred
to the Chief of Naval Operations. Once he had decided upon a policy, I
then endeavored to carry out the details without further reference to him
unless it was a question of which I thought he should know. I signed most
of the correspondence except letters going to heads of other government
departments or letters to Commanders-in-Chief which embodied orders to
them. I frequently released many dispatches that had previously been
376 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
considered by the Chief of Naval Operations after I knew they were in the
form in which he wished them sent." (p. 417)
Concerning Admiral Ingersoll's familiarity with matters coming before
Admiral Stark, he said:
"Generally speaking, I now feel that Admiral Stark kept me fully informed
of all matters of which I should have had knowledge. I was usually present
when conferences were held with other officers of the Navy Department or
officers of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I was not always
present when Admiral Stark conferred with officials of the State Department
or with officials of the War Department. Frequently these conferences
took place in the State Department or in the War Department and I usually
did not accompany Admiral Stark for such conferences. I felt, however,
that when these were over that Admiral Stark told me everything that I
should know. I do not recall now anything that transpired of which I was
not told and of which I thought I should have been told. There may have
been conferences between Admiral Stark and the President and the Secre-
tary of State of which he did not tell me all the details." (p. 417)
Vice Admiral R. K. Turner said that between July and December 7, 1941, he
was Director of War Plans in the office of CNO. He was a professional adviser
to CNO in the preparation of plans for war (page 988).
Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was Director of the Central Division
during 1941 and was the liaison with the State Department.
The liaison between the Chief of Naval Operations and the State Depart-
ment was summarized by Admiral Turner as follows:
"The Chief of Naval Operations had a close personal association with the
Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State. He consulted them fre-
quently and they consulted him, I might say invariably, before making any
particular diplomatic move. In the Office of Naval Operations, the Chief of
the Central Division was appointed as liaison officer with the State Depart-
ment. He visited the State Department and discussed problems with them
practically every day. There was a weekly meeting in the State Department
conducted by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, usually attended
by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of
the War Plans of the Army, Chief of War Plans of the Navy, the Chief of
the Central Division of the Office of Naval Operations, an officer of the
General Staff not in the War Plans Division, and two or three representatives
of the State Department. The matters discussed at these meetings usually
related to events in Western Hemisphere countries. The Army was build-
inga lot of air fields in the Caribbean and South America. The Navy and
the Army, both, had sent missions to those countries, and at the meetings
with the Under Secretary it was chiefly American affairs that were discussed.
Occasionally, possibly once a month, the Secretary of State would hold a
conference with representatives of the War and Navy Departments, and at
these meetings events outside of the Americas were discussed. From time
to time, the Secretary of State would call individuals from the War and Navy
Department to discuss particular aspects of world events. There were other
unscheduled conferences between the State and War and Navy Depart-
ments. I participated in a great many such conferences. From time to
time, informal memoranda were exchanged between individuals of the State
and Navy Departments or exchanged between the Secretary of State and
the Chief of Naval Operations. I would say that relations between the
State and War and State and Navy Departments were very close and were
characterized by good feeling." (p. 257)
Admiral Turner summarized the situation in regard to the State Depart-
ment by stating that on the whole, he was satisfied and had no complaint
or criticism on the attitude of the State Department, (p. 258)
Captain Wellborn discussed the general exchange of information with the
State Department, (p. 385)
The records kept of the meetings with the State Department officers were
described by Admiral Schuirmann as follows:
"A 'Liaison Committee' consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, the
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, and the Under Secretary of State was set up while
Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations. This Committee was mainly
occupied with questions other than the Far East, but occasionally questions
relating to the Far East were discussed. About the middle of May, 1941,
the practice of having a stenographer present to record the discussion was
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 377
commenced; prior to that time I would make notes of the meetings in order to
be able to follow up such matters as required action, and I believe one of
Mr. Welles' assistants made a precis of the meetings. At times there were
'oflF the record* discussions at these liaison committee meetings. I made
notes of some of these 'off the record' discussions. Aside from the meet-
ings of the Liaison Committee, Secretary Hull held meetings with various
officials of the Navy Department, and I maintained liaison with Dr. Hornbeck
and Mr. Hamilton of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department by
visit and by telephone. I know of no official record of these meetings and
discussions. Fragmentary notes of some are in the files of the Central
Division as are such records of the Liaison Committee as are in the possession
of the Navy Department. It is possible that the State Department representa-
tives may have made notes of some of these meetings and discussions with
Secretary Hull and other State Department officials." (p. 405)
"Memo: The examining officer has identified the records mentioned by
the witness as being contained in file titled 'Record of Liaison Meetings and
some other special papers,' now on file in the Central Division (Op 13) of
the Chief of Naval Operations' Office, Navy Department." (p. 405 and 406)
Admiral Schuirmann said that he had some informal memorandums which
would be in the files of the Central Division, (p. 406)
Liaison was made by personal visits, conferences, and by telephone. He dealt
with Dr. Hornbeck, Maxwell Hamilton, Joseph Ballantine, Under Secretary
Welles, and Secretary Hull. Incomplete minutes were kept by the Central
Division of State Department meetings. ONI kept him informed, he said,
but there was no established sj'stem for getting information to hira. He also
received information, for some time prior to the attack, during daily morning
conferences conducted by the Secretary of the Navy, at which the War Plans
Officer, who kept a current estimate, was present (pages 195-198).
C. THE DUTIES OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
The duties of Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations, are set forth in
Article 392 and Article 433, Navy Regulations, of which the Court took judicial
notice at pages 74-77, as follows:
Article 392:
"(1) The Chief of Naval Operations is appointed by the President by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate from among officers of the Line of the
Navy, not below the grade of captain, for a period of four j'ears. He is charged,
under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, with the operations of the fleet,
with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war, and with the co-
ordination of the functions of the Naval Establishment afloat, together with the
determination of priorities relating to repair and overhaul of ships in commission
or about to be commissioned. (Act of 3 ]\Iar. 1915.)
"(2) The Chief of Naval Operations, while so serving, has the rank and title
of admiral, takes rank next after the Admiral of the Navy, and receives pay and
allowances as specifically provided in the Act of 10 June 1922. All orders issued
by the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties assigned him are per-
formed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and his orders are
considered as emanating from the Secretary and have full force and effect as such.
To assist the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties of his office
there are authorized by law for this exclusive duty not less than fifteen officers
of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the
Marine Corps. Should an officer, while serving as Chief of Naval Operations, be
retired from active service, he may, in the discretion of the President, be retired
with the rank, pay, and allowances authorized by law for the highest grade or
rank held by him as such Chief of Naval Operations.
"(3) During the temporary absence of the Secretary, the Under Secretary
when serving, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, the Chief of Naval
Operations is next in succession to act as Secretary of the Navj'."
Article 433:
"1. The Chief of Naval Operations shall, under the direction of the Secretary
of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation
and readiness of plans for its use in war. (Act of 3 Mar. 1915.)
"2. The duties of the Chief of Naval Operations shall include the direction of
the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Division of Fleet Training; the opera-
tion of the Communication Service, of naval districts, of vessels assigned to the
378 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Naval Reserve, and of mines and mining;Tthe operations of the Marine Corps,
except when operating with the Army or on other detached duty by order of the
President; and the operations of Coast Guard vessels when operating with the
Navy; and the direction of all strategic and tactical matters, organization of the
fleet, maneuvers, gunnery exercises, drills and exercises, and training of the fleet
for war; ocean and lake surveys; with the collection of foreign surveys; with the
publication and supply of charts, sailing directions, and nautical rules; dissemi-
nation of all nautical, hydrographic, and meteorological information to ships and
aircraft, and with the upkeep, repair, and operation of the Naval [Observatory
and Hydrographic Office.
"3. He shall so coordinate all repairs and alterations to vessels and the supply
of personnel and material thereto so as to insure at all times the maximum readi-
ness of the fleet for war.
"4. He shall keep all bureaus and offices of the Navy Department informed in
regard to action within their cognizance that is at any time necessary or desirable
to improve the war efficiency of the fleet, and shall arrange for the coordination
of eff'ort of his office and of the bureaus and other oflBces of the Navy Department
in relation thereto.
"5. He shall under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy direct the move-
ments and operations of vessels of the Navy, including the time of their assign-
ment for docking, repairs, and alterations, and shall prepare schedules and issue
orders in regard thereto.
He shall keep records of service of fleets, squadrons and ships.
"6. He shall advise the Secretary in regard to the military features and design
of all new ships and as to any alterations of a ship which may affect her militarj'
value; as to the location, capacity, and protection of navy j^ards and naval sta-
tions, including all features which affect their military value; also, as to matters
pertaining to fuel reservations and depots, the location of radio stations, visual
signal stations, reserves of ordnance and ammunitions, fuel, stores, and other
supplies of whatsoever nature, with a view to meeting effectively the demands
of the fleet.
"7. He shall advise the Secretary of the Navy on all business of the depart-
ment in regard to insular governments and foreign relations, and all correspond-
ence in regard to these matters shall be presented for the Secretary's action
through his office.
"8. He is charged with the preparation, revisions, and record of regulations
for the government of the Navy, general orders, tactical instructions, drill books
(except such as are issued by the Bureau of Naval Personnel for the individual
instruction of officers and enlisted men) , signal codes, and cipher codes.
"9. In preparing and maintaining in readiness plans for the use of the fleet in
war, he shall freely consvilt with and have the advice and assistance of the various
bureaus, boards, and offices of the Department and the Marine Corps Headquar-
ters, in matters coming under their cognizance. After the approval of any given
war plans by the Secretary it shall be the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations
to assign to the bureaus, boards, and offices, such parts thereof as may be needed
for the intelligent carrying out of their respective duties in regard to such plans
and their maintenance in constant readiness.
"10. In carrying out his duties he shall utilize the facilities of the appropriate
bureaus and offices of the Navy Department.
"11. The Chief of Naval Operations shaU from time to time witness the opera-
tions of the fleet as an observer."
The Court of Inquiry also took judicial notice of General Order No. 170, dated
March 23, 1942, which provided that the duties of the Commander-in-Chief,
United States Fleet, and the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations were com-
bined and placed under one officer with the title "Commander-in-Chief, United
States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations."
IV. The Comma^jding General Hawaiian Department — His Major Mission
A. THE COMMANDING GENERAL
Major General W. G. Short, USA, became Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department in February, 1941, and was relieved December 16, 1941
(page 220). General Marshall testified that he considered General Short a very
superior officer (page 853).
Colonel W. C. Phillips, USA, became General Short's Chief of Staff on Novem-
ber 5, 1941, prior to wHch he had worked through the various staff sections. He
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 379
stated that General Short discussed all important communications with him.
He was relieved December 18, 1941 (page 477, 493).
B. GSiNEBAL SHORT's MAJOR MISSION
General Marshall said that he wrote to General Short on February 7, 1941,
when General Short took command. The reason for the letter was a conference
he had had with Admiral Stark on the inadequacj' of Army equipment for the
protection of Pearl Harbor (pages 865-6). His letter stated that Kimmel had
written Stark about it but did not realize that the Army was tragically lacking
in AA material, and that Hawaii was on a better basis than other places. The
fullest protection for the fleet, he stated, is "The rather than a major consideration
for us."
Captain Wellborn said that generally it was the Navy's view that there
was no more important commitment that the Army might have than the
defense of Pearl Harbor, but that this view appeared not to be completely
concurred in by the War Department, (p. 386)
Tlie Navj' itself, he said, made demands for other places that made it difficult
to meet their demands for Hawaii. He was doing every thi:ig to build up the
defenses but could uot perform a miracle; Short was to make this clear to Kim-
mel; he was sending planes, some of which were not up to Jap speed, et cetera; he
was trying to augment the machine guns. The Navy had approached the Army
for barrage balloons and probably the first test would be in June in Hawaii.
General Marshall's letter also stated (page 867), "The risk of sabotage and the
risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real peril
in the Hawaiian Islands."
In this letter he also said that Short should keep clearly in mind, "that our
mission is to nrotect the base and the Naval concentration, and that purpose
should be maae clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel." (Page 867.)
V. Relations in General Between Navy and Army Commanders
A. IN WASHINGTON
General Marshall said that he held frequent consultations with Admiral Stark
and that their relations were excellent (page 856).
B. IN HAWAII
The Navy and Army witnesses were unanimously of the opinion that relations
between the Navy and Army commanders in Hawaii were satisfactory.
Admiral Pye stated that the cooperation between General Short and Admiral
Kimmel was greater than had ever existed previously between such commanding
officers (page 441).
Admiral Delaney stated that there was complete cooperation between the
higher echelon of the Army and the Navy at Pearl Harbor (page 507) .
Admiral Smith testified that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General
Short were very close and that there was a free exchange of military information
(page 536) .
Admiral Smith said that "Admiral Kimmel assumed command only a
week or two before General Short arrived. Before General Short had taken
over as Commanding General, Admiral Kimmel went around to see him;
both were in civilian clothing, and discussed all the problems of the Pacific
as Kimmel saw them. The relations between General Short and Admiral
Kimmel were better than those I had ever seen between a commanding
general and an admiral, either there or in other places. They were together,
I should say, at least twice a week, very frequently with their Staffs, and
sometimes more frequently than that. We always invited the Army to take
part in our exercises, and then developed a relation such that Army planes
would use Navy fields and Navy planes would use Army fields. It was
found that the bombs of one would not fit the racks of the other, and that
was remedied. The relations between the Army and the Navy out there
were excellent." (p. 35)
Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel never felt that Admiral Bloch
was General Short's opposite number, rather Admiral Kimmel felt that he
was General Short's opposite; he felt that when he was present he was the
380 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
man who should deal with the Army and with everything himself; he took
that responsibility although that might not have been indicated on the offi-
cial documents. However, Admiral Smith did not recall that this left
Admiral Bloch in any state of uncertainty; Admiral Kimmel had a great
deal of respect for Admiral Bloch. (p. 36)
Admiral Smith said that the method of command In effect in Hawaii as
between the Army and Navy was the method of mutual cooperation, but
that CincPac had the predominate interest which General Short recognized
and that the Navy was not very much impressed with the Army's provision
for defense of Pearl Harbor and realized that any defense of Pearl Harbor
would have to be by the Fleet itself, "which it was." (p. 36)
Admiral Smith said that "Kimmel's attitude was that Bloch was under
his command and that when he was in port, he had the responsibility and
he dealt directly with Short. Probably one reason was that he had a force
that Admiral Bloch did not have, but he felt that Bloch was his subordinate
while in port, and he dealt directly with the Army. Usually, however, he
would call in Admiral Bloch if he had anything important to say." (p. 36)
Admiral Smith said that the primary reason why the Army and Navy
business was conducted by Admiral Kimmel and not by Admiral Bloch
was that after Admiral Kimmel moved ashore in the summer of 1941 and
was there all the time practically, he just assumed that responsibility of a
permanent nature. That responsibility included the responsibility for the
safety of the Fleet for it was realized that the only defense would be by the
Fleet and that there was no defense ashore except the net or the gate.
(p. 37)
However, Admiral Smith thought that it was Admiral Kimmel's intention
in issuing his security order that the tasks therein prescribed for the Com-
mandant of the Fourteenth Naval District involving coordination with the
Army, should be performed directly by Admiral Bloch. (p. 37)
Admiral Calhoun said that Kimmel and Short were on excellent terms and
cooperated fully (pages 936-937).
Admiral Kitts said that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short
were cordial and cooperative (page 523.)
According to Admiral Me Morris, the relations of Kimmel and Short were
cordial and cooperative, as to the development of plans for local defense and for
utilization of fleet units in port for local defense, there may, from time to time,
have been difi'erences of opinion, but relations were habitually pleasant (page 901).
Admiral DeLany said that the relationship between the Army and the
Navy out there was one of complete understanding and was very close.
(p. 78)
Vice Admiral McMorris testified with respect to whether the cordiality in rela-
tions as they existed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short extended down
to elements of the staffs, that there was much interchange of information on a
habitual informal basis; that he himself not infrequently saw members of General
Short's staff. He stated that he knew that General Martin and Admiral Bellinger
had meetings not infrequently.
He stated further that prior to joining Admiral Kimmel's staff, he was Opera-
tions Officer for Admiral Andrews, who was Commarider of the Hawaiian De-
tachment and Senior Officer Present in Hawaii until the Fleet came out sometime
during 1940; that during that period he frequently visited Fort Shafter and dis-
cussed defensive plans with the Army officers, and that after joining Admiral
Kimmel's staff, his association at Fort Shafter with the Army continued. He
stated that he felt he was not exceptional in that respect {p. 332-333).
Captain Ramsey said that he did not usually attend Army-Navy conferences
but sometimes went with Admiral Bellinger. In general, cooperation between the
Army and the Navy was very good (page 587).
Commander Rochefort, in charge of combat intelligence at 14ND, testified
that relations between the Army and Navy were satisfactory and they worked
closely together (page 476).
Admiral Bloch testified that his personal relations with General Short Avere
friendly and his official relations were good. Thej^ had no serious disagreements
and cooperated fully (page 408) .
Admiral Bloch said that Admiral Kimmel moved his offices ashore in
February 1941, almost immediately after he assumed command and with the
exception of possibly a couple of trips as sea and one trip to Washington, he
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 381
was there the entire time although his intention, in the event of hostilities,
was that he would go to sea. (p. 7) Admiral Bloch said that jAdmiral Kim-
mel's presence ashore did not make him either unhappy or embarrassed.
His relations with Admiral Kimmel were extremely good and his relations
with the Commanding General were cordial and their cooperation, he thought,
was good. But the Commanding General had a right to go to Admiral Kim-
mel directly and he also had a right to discuss matters with Admiral Bloch
and on one or two occasions Admiral Bloch didn't know whether General
Short had discussed particular matters with Admiral Kimmel or whether he
was coming to Admiral Bloch in the first instance. This, however, did not
cause any disagreement because Admiral Bloch talked everything over fully
with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch did not think that there had been
any doubt in his mind as to where he stood in the picture, (p. 7)
Admiral Bloch had subordinates who dealt with the Army constantly
concerning the matters in connection with the Joint Coastal Defense Plan.
Among these were Captain J. B. Earle, Chief of Staff and Commander C. B.
Momsen, the War Plans Officer and Captain Graham, the District Commu-
nications Officer. They had no serious differences of opinion with the
Army. Some matters were referred to Washington but they were always
settled. Admiral Bloch thought that their preparations were being prose-
cuted very vigorously, (p. 8)
General Marshall was informed that relations between Short and Kimmel and
Bloch were excellent (page 856).
According to Admiral Kimmel his relations with General Short were "O. K."
in all respects (pages 367-8).
General Short testified that in matters of cooperation with the Navy he dealt
with Admiral Bloch on routine matters and with Admiral Kimmel on matters of
importance. He frequently conferred with both. There were no regular con-
ferences, but conferences were held from time to time. He and Admiral Kimmel
were friendly personally and officially (pages 220-21).
Colonel Phillips said that relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel
were very good, and that General Short, Admiral Kimmel, and Admiral Bloch
conferred frequently, and that relations between them were cordial and coopera-
tive (pages 482, 493).*
VI. The War Plans Relating to Hawaii and the Adequacy of the Pacific
Fleet
a. the plans for defense of HAWAII
In the Hewitt investigation, the war plans were fully examined. They were:
1. U.S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainboio Five:
On 26 July 1941, U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainhoiv Five {Exhibit
35) was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This plan was
designed to implement the Navy basic war plan {Rainbow Five) in so far as the
tasks assigned the U. S. Pacific Fleet were concerned. It was approved 9 Sep-
tember 1941 by the Chief of Naval Operations {Exhibit 36). *
According to this plan the day of execution was to be designated as W-Day, and
the day upon which hostilities opened with Japan would be J-Day, which might
or might not coincide with W-Day. The plan {Exhibit 35) provided in part:
"INTRODUCTION
"Chapter IV. Mobilization
"O4OI. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually
mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl
Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be
ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization.
To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the dale on which hos-
tilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the
Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-
day. This may or may not coincide with W-day." {Exhibit 35)
*In connection with the relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, it will appear subse-
quently that there may be questions raised concerning the extent of their knowledge of action taken by one
another, particularly after November 27, 1941, their exchange of information, and the degree of cooperation
which exfeted in connection with the Army radar system at Oahu.
382 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"Chapter II. Assumptions
"1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:
"a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the
British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments
in Exile, China, and the 'Free French' are at war against the Axis powers, com-
prising either:
"1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
"2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.
"Note. — As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia,
and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis
but not necessarily against Japan." . . . {Ex. 35)
"Chapter III. Information
"1S14- The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as
follows:
"Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis
Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces
in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the
war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States
does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will
employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to
weaken Japanese economic, power, and to support the defense of the Malay
barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States
intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the
British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for
the Far East." (Exhibit 35)
"Chapter III. Information
I
SECTION S. ESTIMATE OF ENEMY ACTION
"1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be
limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional
pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.
"1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:
"a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia
(including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.
"b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American
and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian
Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.
"c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.
"d. The principal defensive efforts to be:
"1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.
"2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central
and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced
"3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.
"1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action
will be toward:
"a. Capture of Guam.
"b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters,
and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of ad-
vanced bases, and by the destruction of United- States and allied air and naval
forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.
"c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
"d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline- Marianas
area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light
naval forces to reduce the strength of Ihe United States Fleet.
"e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval
forces.
f. Possibly raids on stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying
United States positions.
"1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as
follows:
"a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with
strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 383
Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the
Marshalls.
"b. Main fieet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position
{possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the
Mandates.
"c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanoa-Celebes area (probably main
base in Halmahera).
"d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval
forces in that area.
"e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the
Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.
"f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and sub-
marines in the Hawaiian area." . . . (Exhibit 35)
"PART II. ObTLINE OF TASKS
Chapter I. Tasks Assigned by Navy Basic Plan — Mission
"2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following
tasks within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:
"a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting
enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture
of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications
and positions;
"b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall
Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;
"c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels
trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;
"d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west
as Longitude 155° East;
"e. Defend Samoa in category 'D';
"f. Defend Guam in category 'F';
"g. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting,
covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy
raiding forces;
"h. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and pre-
vent the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by
destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying
the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;" . . . (Ex. 35)
. "Chapter II. Tasks Formulated to Accomplish the Assigned
Missions
"2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are
based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formu-
lating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption al and
divides the tasks to be accortiplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:
"a. PHASE I — Initial tasks — Japan not in the war.
"b. PHASE I A — Initial tasks — Japan in the war.
"c. PHASE II, etc., — Succeeding tasks.
"2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:
"a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter
maintain all types in constant readiness for 'distant service.
"b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
"c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.
"d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
"e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern
and a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-Day.
"/. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern
N'aval Coastal Frontier on M-Day.
"g. Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by
patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by tEe action of striking
groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the
Equator as far west as longitude 155° East.
"h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider
bases in the Japanese Mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Depart-
ment.
"j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway,
Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
"k. Continue training operations as practicable.
"I. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to
Hawaii for training in landing operations.
"m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan." {Exhibit 35)
"Phase I A
"2203. Phase I A tasks are as follows:
"a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.
"b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been
completed.
"c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders
and tenders in the Northern Pacific.
"d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the Asso-
ciated Powers, and of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, chiefly by covering
operations.
"e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.
"2. If available cruisers and other circumstances perimt, make cruiser raids
against Japanese shipping in waters between Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
"f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against
Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.
"g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and
outlying bases.
"h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the
Hawaiian area and the West Coast.
"i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.
"j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier
as necessary.
" k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of
the Second Marine Division.
"I. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island area."
(Exhibit 35)
"PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT
Chapter I. Phase I
"section It. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE) '
"3141- Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following
paragraphs of this section.
"3142. On W-Day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the
Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue
administration of these forces and rotate .detail at discretion.
"3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex
I)." . . . (Exhibit 35)
"PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS
Chapter IV. Tentative Operation Plans Phases I and IA
SECTION 1. PHASE I
Vnited States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date
"Operation Plan
"No. 1-R5"
"1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and
III of Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five.
"2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communi-
cations of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 385
of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and
guarding against attack by Japan." . . . {Exhibit 35)
"ANNEX I
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date
"Patrol and Sweeping Plan." . . .
"1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and
III of this Navy Plan 0—1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dis-
positions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be fur-
nished by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.
"2. Phase I.
"This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communi-
cations of the Associated Powers by:
"(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the
Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, {2) Trans-
Pacific westward of Midway, and (S) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.
"(6) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.
"(c) Covering.
"(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
"(e) Routing shipping." . . . {Ex. 35)
"3. {d) Task Force Nine {Patrol Plane Force).
"{1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and
for conservation of personnel, maiiitain maximum patrol plane search against
enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.
"{2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway.
At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of
Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities
thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.
"{3) Be prepared, on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer
one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South
Pacific.
"{4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.
"{5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.
"{6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval
Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.
"{7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in
sweeping during initial sweep of Phase I A.
"(5) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in
Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan {Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1)."
.... {Exhibit 35)
2. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Orange I4ND-JCD-42.
The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaian Coastal Frontier,
Hawaiian Department and FOURTEENTH Naval District {I4ND-JCD-42),
was signed and placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval Dis-
trict {Ex. 80). The plan was based on the joint Army and Navy basic war plans,
and was to constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects,
joint operating plans, and mobilization plans would be based. The method of
coordination under the plan was by mutual cooperation which was to apply to all
activities wherein the Army and the Navy would operate in coordination until
and if the method of unity of command were invoked. {Ex. 80)
It will be seen that under this Plan the Army task was to hold Oahu against
attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; and to
support the Naval forces; and, that the Navy task was to patrol the coastal zone
and control and protect shipping therein; and to support the Army forces; and,
that the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance.
The tasks assigned were as follows:
"14. Tasks.
"a. JOINT TASK. To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to
control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
"b. ARMY TASK. To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air
forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 26
386 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
f
"c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect
shipping therein; to support the Army forces." {Ex. 80)
The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone was defined as "The Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" (Oahu
and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu) .
{Ex. 80)
"17. ARMY. The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
shall provide for:
"a. The beach and land, seacoast and anti-aircraft defense of OAHU with
particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval
forces persent thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and
the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area.
The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.
"b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.
"c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands
consistent with available forces.
"d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to
the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage,
except within naval establishments.
"e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except
within naval shore establishments.
"f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU
D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol {see par. 18. a.), and an
aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service
for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
"g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea con-
ducted within range of Army bombers.
"h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor
control post provided for in paragraph 18.e.
"i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications {coor-
dinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed
joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intel-
ligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed
by 'Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940'.
"j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will
gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information
of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS.
"k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
"I. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS.
"m. Any measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship
over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army
and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.
"n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
"o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS.
' 'p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and
of supplies for the civil population.
"18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, shall
provide for:
"a. An inshore patrol.
"b. An offshore patrol.
"c. An escort force.
"d. An attack force.
' 'e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL
and HONOLULU HARBORS.
"f. Installation and operation of an under, water defense for PEARL and
HONOLULU HARBORS. {Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and
installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)
"g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D. C. A. and installation of sub-
marine mine fields in the defense of the OAHU-D. C. A. as may be deemed
necessary and practicable.
"h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.
"i. Distant reconnaissance.
"j. Attacking enemy naval forces.
"k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all
naval shore establishments.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 387
"/. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 i., a local
communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intel-
ligence.
"m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship
over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army
and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.
"n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage,
for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.
"o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.
"p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities per-
taining thereto." (Exhibit 80)
3. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.
Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian
Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated 28 March 194-1, and approved
by Admiral Bloch and General Short 2 April 1941 (Exhibit 47), dealt with joint
security measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base.
This provided for joint defensive measures for defense against hostile raids
or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war (including joint air operations
and for the use of Army aircraft by the Navy for long distance patrol when Navy
forces were insufficient), and was to become effective when the Commanding
General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack
was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action.
It stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security
of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids
or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and before a general mobiliza-
tion for war, there were adopted the following agreements:
Paragraph II, in respect of joint air operations, provided that when the Com-
manding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid
or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander
would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without
delay to the other commander stich proportion of the air forces at his disposal
as circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted
in accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface
vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive air
operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the
tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long
distant patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available,
these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval coynmander directing
the search operations. (Ex. 47)
Paragraph III provided for joint communications, and, among other things,
that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from
Oahu secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Com-
mand Post of the Army Provisional Anti-Aircraft Brigade and the Aircraft
Warning Service Information Center; that subsequently, when the Army aircraft
warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of
information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and special
wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers
so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and
transmit it to their respective organizations. (Ex. 47)
Paragraph IV related to joint anti-aircraft measures, the arrival and departure
procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages. Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery,
and Army Aircraft Warning Service. It provided that the latter service was to be
expedited in its installation and operation by the Army and, "during the period
prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar
and other appropriate means will endeavor to give such warning of hostile
attacks as may be practicable (Ex. ^7)
4. Joint Estimate Covering Army and Navy Air Action in the Event of Sudden
Hostile Action Against Oahu.
On 31 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bellinger, Commander Naval Base Defense
Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two), and Major General F. L. Martin,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a joint estimate covering joint
Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or
Fleet units in the Hawaiian area (Exhibit 49).
Paragraph I of the estimate included a "Summary of the Situation," which
indicated that relations between the United States and Orange were strained, un-
certain, and varying, that in the past Orange had never preceded Kdstil'e action by
388 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a declaration of war; that a successful sudden raid against our ships and naval
installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the
western Pacific for a long period; that a strong part of our fleet was constantly at
sea in the operating areas, organized to take prompt offensive action; and, that it
appeared possible that Orange submarines andjcr Orange fast raiding force might
arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence Service
{Exhibit 49).
Paragraph II of the estimate embraced a "Survey of Opposing Strengths,"
indicating, among other things, that Orange might send into the Hawaiian area
one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers
supported by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet would be when
several of the above elements were present and closely coordinating their actions;
and that the aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any
extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure that an
air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete sur-
prise (Exhibit 49).
Paragraph III of the estimate dealt with "Possible Enemy Action." It
stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine
attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships
and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two; that it appeared
the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack,
most likely launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach
inside of 300 miles. It was further pointed out that a single attack might or might
not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to attack
after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust; that:
"(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable
undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by
a carrier;" and that in a dawn air attack there was a high possibility that it
could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be
using. (Exhibit 49).
Paragraph IV of the estimate considered "Action Open to Us." It was
stated that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward
through 360° , but this could only be effectively maintained with present personnel
and material for a very short period, and, as a practicable measure, could not
therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a surface raid was
probable within rather narrow limits of time. Reference was made to other types
of action open in the event of a surprise attack on ships in the operating area or
on the islands, and pointed out that none of the outlined courses of action could
be initiated by our forces until an attack was known to be imminevt or had
occurred. (Exhibit 49)
Paragraph V contained "Decisions." The primary decision was that the
Naval Base Defense Air Force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile
action against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our
forces from a surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base
coordinated retaliatory measures. A number of subsidiary decisions were made,
including decisions for the establishment of a search and attack group, an air
combat group, the assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions, of
conditions of readiness. The search and attack group was to be under the Com-
mander Naval Base Defense Air Force-Commander Patrol Wing Two, and,
in accordance with current conditions of readiness, included patrol squadrons and
Army bombardment and reconnaissance squadrons. (Exhibit 49)
5. Pacific Fleet Letter on Security of the Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.
Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-4I, from the Commander in Chief,
Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the Fleet at base and
in operating areas, was issued in February, 1941 and reissued in revised form
on 14 October 1941.
This order provided that the Security of the Fleet was predicated on two
assumptions:
(a) That no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present exist-
ing conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided
nationals of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl
Harbor from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an
obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches
to Pearl Harbor;
(&) That a declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on
ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating
areas, (3) a combination of the tu>o.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 389
Security measures were prescribed covering:
A. Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor.
B. Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air
patrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the
entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet
or Task Force, (c) one destroyer {READY DUTY) for screening heavy ships,
other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice.
The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas, as directed by
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, an air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a
Fleet or Task Force, an air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at
other times. There also was to be a daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.
C. Sortie and entry.
D. Operating areas.
E. Ships at sea.
F. Ships in port.
The security provisions covering defense against air attack (G), described the
principal Army anti-aircraft gun defenses of Pearl Harbor, and directed that
Marine defense battalions would assist the Army in manning them; and pro-
vided that in the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus
all Fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; it
prescribed air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor. It further
provided that the senior officer embarked, exclusive of CincPac, should insure
berthing so as to develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire; and that Com-
FOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army
joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and take other action,
including supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft, arranging through
the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort
between the Army and the Navy, and coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the
base defense by advising the Senior Officer Embarked (exclusive of CincPac) of
the condition of readiness to maintain, and by holding drills, etc.
Three conditions of naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition
III read as follows:
"Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship
in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each
sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."
The procedure to be followed by the task forces in the event of an air attack
was also set forth: The Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency
sortie order, sending destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships
and submarines for sortie; the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch
a striking unit, etc.; and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm
indicating that an attack was in progress or ijnminent, inform the Task Force
Commander at sea of the attack and type of attacking aircraft, launch air search
for enemy ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available.
The action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set
forth. It was provided that the ship attacked was, among other things, to origi-
nate a plain language dispatch containing the essential details; various actions were
to be taken by other ships; and the Patrol Wings were to assume readiness for
search and for offensive action, to carry out search as directed by Task Force
Commander, and to prepare to establish station patrol at a 220 mile radius
from the scene of attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding day-
light period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes
over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which case the
instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have priority. It
was further provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack may or
may not indicate the presence of more subinarines waiting to attack," that "(S)
it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the
presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accom-
panied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble
his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant
in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by
air search or other means." (Exhibit 8, Naval Court of Inquiry).
The war and defense plans relating to Hawaii were contained in Navy Basic
War Plan Rainbow No. 5, U. S. Navv-WPL^46 (Exhibit 4) ; in United States
Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow No. 5, WP-PAC-46 (Exhibit 5) ; in "Joint
Action of Army and Navy, 1935" (Exhibit 6); and, particularlv, in Joint Coastal
Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Theatre, Orange 14ND-JCD-42 (Exhibit 7);
and in Operation Plan No. 1-41, issued by Admiral Bloch as Naval Base Defense
Officer (Exhibit 53).
390 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In accordance with the Basic War Plans, United States Pacific Fleet
Operating Plan Rainbow 5 was approved by Admiral Kimmel and issued
about July 1, 1941. It was offered in evidence as Exhibit 16. Admiral Smith
said that these plans contemplated that the Pacific Fleet was to deny to the
enemy the Marshalls and Carolines, and to capture a fleet base in Truk.
With the available equipment and personnel, he said, the Marshalls could
have been raided, but could not have possibly been captured.
Admiral Pye said that in his opinion, war plan Rainbow 5 was not yet up
to date and that he considered that the whole basic war plans had really not
been operations plans but development plans and had been used as a lever
to get more men, ships and naval shore establishment development, (p. 160)
Admiral Pye said that under the provisions of the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan, the responsibility for carrying out distance reconnaissance
ofif Hawaii was apparently the Navy's under the direction of the Commandant
of the Fourteenth Naval District, (p. 163)
" The record submitted by the Naval Court refers to, but does not include,
copies of Exhibits 4 to 7, inclusive. There was, however, considerable testimony
concerning the local plans for the Hawaiian area.
Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian
Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated March 28, 1941 (Exhibit 23).
dealt with joint securitj^ measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor
base. It stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the
security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against
hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a
general mobilization for war, the following agreements were adopted.
Paragraph II provided for joint air operations. It stated that when the Com-
manding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid
oT attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander
would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without
delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as
circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in
accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface
vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive
air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under
the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for
long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available
these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander direct-
ing the search operations. . . .
Paragraph III provided for joint communications and, among other things,
stated that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft off-
shore from Oahu which was secured through Navy channels would be transmitted
promptly to the Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti-Aircraft Brigade.
It also stated that subsequently, when the Army aircraft warning service was
established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the loca-
tion or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and that special wire or radio
circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they
might make their own evaluation of the available information and transmit it
to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or move-
ments of hostile aircraft offshore which would be secured through Navy channels
was to be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information
Center.
Paragraph IV related to joint anti-aircraft measures, dealt with arrival and
departure procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages, and Marine Corps anti-aircraft
artillery, and the Armj^ Aircraft Warning Service. This stated that that service
was to be expedited in its installation and operation by the Army and, "during
the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through
use of Radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning
of hostile attacks as may be practicable."
Admiral Brown said that he would have expected the Army to depend on
Navy planes to discover the approach of the enemy, (p. 144)
Admiral Bellinger said that the Commanding General of the Army's Air
Force at Hawaii apparently expected the Navy would have early information
and seemed surprised when Admiral Bellinger told him that they should not
expect such information, (p. 131)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 391
ADMIRAL HEWITT'S EXAMINATION
Captain John B. Earle, USN, Chief of Staff of ihe Hth Naval District in
December, 1941, was shown Annex VI T, Section VI, Joint Agreements, of the
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, dated 28 March 1941 (Exhibit 47), which
deals with joint Army and Navy measures for the protection of Pearl Harbor
and the Fleet. Regarding joint anti-aircraft exerc'ses and drills in the months
preceding December, 1941, Captain Earle staled that definite problems were
developed for training purposes, which would serve to develop the control fea-
tures of anti-aircraft defense and also develop ihe necessary coordination between
Army and Navy operations. In addition, about once in every ten days a drill
was held in which planes flew over Pearl Harbor during either day or night
and ships in the harbor simulated anti-aircraft fire. The Pearl Harbor area
was divided into sectors, with a naval sector commander aboard ship responsible
for controlling the fire from that sector and making required reports (p. 457-458).
Captain Earle stated that about once a month a drill ^ras held which entailed
locaiing an aircraft target at a certain bearing from Pearl Harbor, with warn-
ings being sent to both Army and Navy that an enemy aircraft carrier or iinit
was located at a certain distance and bearing. Fighters planes would then be
sent up and bombers dispatched to attack the simulated target. Captain Earle
believed that at least three of these drills were held prior lo 7 December 1941,
but could not recall the date of the last drill or whether any was held between 27
November and 7 December (p. 4-58).
Questioned regarding the command set-up for the joint exercises. Captain
Earle said (p. 458-459):
"My recollection is colored from operations that took place after Pearl Harbor,
but it is my belief that the entire problem of this aircraft coordination was han-
dled through the fleet and the Army. In other words, after the word came through
that an enemy had been signed on a certain bearing, this word was given to the
fleet and to the Army and that then arrangements were made between the com-
mander of the fleet air and the Army air to coordinate their operations, includ-
ing order as to — detailed directions as to direction, speed, and number of planes
to be used, and so forth.
"To amplify the above statement, there was no joint command post or opera-
tions center actually set up for these drills before the war. The Operations
Office in the Headquarters of the Fourteenth Naval District, which consisted
of an operation switchboard with necessary communication personnel and a
watch officer, was set up to handle these drills from the Fourteenth Naval District.
I do not recall the exact time, but either somewhere just before Pearl Harbor or
just after, a coast artillery liaison officer was placed in this Operations Office.
Plans had been made for a joint command post, but no definite steps had been
taken as to location or details prior to the start of the war. It is my recollection
that plans had been made for a joint command post, but this had not gone beyond
the planning stage."
Exhibit 47 provided in part that pending completion by the Army of an aircraft
warning service, the Navy would by radar and other appropriate means attempt
to give such warnings of hostile attacks as might be practicable. Captain Earle
said that to implement this agreement, the Navy had established communications
with the Army over radio nets and the teletype system, so that any information
received could be promptly disseminated; had ordered the communications
activities to make prompt report of enemy movements; had directed the few
destroyers assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District to promptly report contacts;
and since there were no planes attached to the District, had instructed fleet planes
to forward immediately to the Army any pertinent information (p. 4^0).
Captain Earle said that prior to 7 December 1941 the Fourteenth Naval
District assigned a liaison officer to heneral Short's headquarters for general
liaison duties (p. 4^0). Captain Earle stated further that there had been a
naval officer engaged in assisting the Army to get their aircraft warning system
installed and that at one time this officer came to him and asked for assistance.
This officer also stated that several naval liaison officers would be required at the
warning center. Captain Earle told him that the District Communications
Officer would be glad to give him all possible assistance, but that there were no
spare personnel in the District who could be used for naval liaison officers at
the center (p. 461).
392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The above agreement was approved April 2, 1941, by Admiral Bloch and
General Short.
Exhibit 22 is a letter forwarding the joint agreement between General
Short and Admiral Bloch and the Joint Estimate, which was sent to the Chief
of Naval Operations on May 1, 1941. (p. 86)
The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that the Chief of Staff,
Fourteenth Naval District would be a member of the Joint Planning Com-
mittee established by that plan. Captain Earle, however, did not act formally
^ as a member of that Committee, but said that the Chiefs of Staff acted
informally with sub-committees appointed for the majority of the detailed
work, (p: 368)
Captain Earle said that when he first had his assignment as Chief of Staff
it took some time to get the plans approved by the Army, but as time went
on and various warnings were received, it became easier to accomplish joint
action, (p. 369)
Captain Earle said that the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was not
effective during the period preceding the attack, except as to the portion
relating to planning, (p. 369)
Concerning annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan,
which required the Army to expedite the warning service and the Navy to
endeavor to give warning of hostile attack until such time as the Army
system was in operation. Captain Earle had no recollection of discussion of
this requirement. Neither did he have any definite recollection of the
provision for liaison officers in connection with the dissemination of informa-
tion, but vaguely recalled some talk with a fleet radar officer on the question
of assignment of Navy personnel, and recalled that he told the fleet radar
officer that as soon as they could get somebody who was qualified they
would be glad to turn him over to the Army. (p. 369)
Captain Earle 's recollection was vague as to other provisions of the Joint
Plan such as procedure for recognition of aircraft and the use of barrage
balloons, etc. (p. 370) Captain Earle could recall no plan for the coordination
of Fleet anti-aircraft fire with Army anti-aircraft fire in the Pearl Harbor
area. Captain Earle discussed generally his recollection of the Harbor
Control Post. (p. 372-3)
To the agreement was annexed Addendum One, dated March 31, 1941. Adden-
dum One was a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy action in the event of
sudden hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in the Hawaiian area.
Concerning the estimate in Admiral Bellinger's air plan that the most
likely and dangerous form of attack would be an air attack. Admiral Pye said
that the estimate did not mean that the enemy was more apt to do that than
to do something else. (p. 160)
In paragraph I of the addendum there was a "Summary of the Situation."
The summary indicated that relations between the United States and Orange
were strained, uncertain, and varying; that in the past Orange had never preceded
hostile action by a declaration of war; that a successful sudden raid against our
ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by
our forces in the western Pacific for a long period; that a strong part of our fleet
was constantly at sea in the operating areas, organized to take prompt offensive
action against any surface or submarine force which Initiated hostile action; and,
that it appeared possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding
force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with nor prior warning from our Intelligence
service.
Paragraph II of the addendum was a "Survey of Opposing Strengths." This
indicated, among other things, that Orange might send into the area one or more
submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by
fast cruisers. Also that the most difficult situation for us to meet would be when
several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions.
The aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any extended
period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack
from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise.
Paragraph III of the addendum dealt with "Possible Enemy Action." This
stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine
attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships
and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two. Further, that
it appeared that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 393
an air attack, which would most likely be launched from one or naore carriers,
which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. That a single attack might
or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to
attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust. It
was also stated that: "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence
of considerable undiscovered surface force, probabl}' composed of fast ships ac-
companied by a carrier." It was further stated that in a dawn air attack there
was a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite
of any patrol that we might be using.
Paragraph IV of the addendum dealt with "Action Open to Us." This stated
that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through
360°, but this could only be effectively maintained with present personnel and
material for a very short period and as a practicable measure could not therefore
be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable
within rather narrow limits of time. It contained other types of action open in
the event of a surprise attack on ships in the operating area or on the Island, and
stated that none of the outlined courses of action could be initiated by our forces
until an attack was known to be imminent or had occurred.
Paragraph V contained the "Decisions." The primary decision was that this
force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against Oahu or
fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise
attack, and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory
measures. There were a number of subsidiary decisions, including decisions for
the establishment of a search and attack group, an air combat group, assignment
of missions to the groups, and definitions of conditions of readiness. The search
and attack group was to be under the Commander Naval Base Defense Air
Force-Commander Patrol Wing Two, and was to include various units in accord-
ance with current conditions of readiness. These units included patrol squadrons
and Army bombardment and reconnaissance squadrons, among others.
Admiral Bloch, as Naval Base Defense Officer, issued his Operation Plan No.
1-41, on February 27, 1941 (Exhibit 53). The Task Organization prescribed
was (a) Destroyer Patrol (Commander Inshore Patrol) consisting of two destroy-
ers, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, an A/B boom and minesweepers, (b) Base
Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two) in conjunction with the
Army, (c) Antiaircraft Defense (District Marine Officer) in conjunction with the
Army, (d) Harbor Control Post (District Operations Officer) in conjunction with
the Army. This plan directed attention to, among other things, the Hawaiian
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and stated:
"By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be
established as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL Harbor Base in order
to safeguard the Fleet.
"In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the
Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) will
arrange to coordinate joint effort; to set conditions of readiness; to hold required
drills; to make "alarm" and "all clear" signals.
"assumptions *
"(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing condi-
tions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided na-
tions of such powers may attempt:
"(1) Sabotage from small craft on shijDs based in PEARL HARBOR.
"(2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruc-
tion in the channel.
"(3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.
"(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:
"(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area — probable.
"(2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR — possible.
"(3) A combination of these two — possible."
A detailed Inshore Patrol Plan was Annex "A" to Operation Plan 1-41, a de-
tailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was Annex "Baker," a detailed Anti-
Aircraft Defense Plan was Annex "C", a detailed Harbor Control Post Plan was
Annex "D", and a detailed Communications Plan was Annex "Easy."
Annex "Baker", the detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, was dated
April 9, 1941, prepared by Admiral BeUinger and approved by Admiral Bloch.
According to Admiral Bloch, after Admiral Eimmel assumed command
and before information was received about the correspondence between the
394- CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War dealing with the Pearl
Harbor defenses, Admiral Kimmel reviewed certain information that had
been left by Admiral Richardson and decided that since the ships had anti-
aircraft batteries, they should be used to the fullest extent to increase the
volume of fire and protection that the Fleet would have in the harbor. He
also decided that since the Navy also had a number of planes on shore many
of which were carrier planes that had been sent ashore while the carriers
were alongside, they also should be used. Admiral Kimmel loaned Admiral
Halsey and Admiral Ballinger to Admiral Bloch to talk over with the Army
the coordination of action of the airplanes. Conferences were held with the
Army authorities and an agreement reached vdth the Army under which
all fighter planes, including Navy fighter planes on shore at the time of an
attack, would be placed under the Army's command and that all bombers
would be turned over to the Navy. (p. 4)
Admiral Bloch said that generally speaking, he took no exception to the
Air Defense Plan which had been worked out by Admiral Ballinger and
General Martin, (p. 89)
Admiral Bloch said that Admiral Kimmel had a copy of the Joint Air Operat-
ing Plan; that it was fair to assume that he must have known about the
plan; and that General Short also must have known about the plan. (p. 89)
Admiral Smith said that the Commander-in-Chief was apprised of all of
the plans made by the Army and by Admiral Bloch. However, Admiral
Smith did not recall the Joint Defense Plan, Exhibit 5. (p. 37)
It divided the Task Organization into (a) Search and Attack Group, consisting
of patrol squadrons and other planes, including Army reconnaissance squadrons,
and (b) an air combat group. This plan was made in accordance with, among
other things, the Joint Estimate, dated March 31, 1941, which is digested above.
The Naval Base Defense Air Force was, according to this plan, to locate and
destroy hostile forces raiding against Oahu or Fleet units in the operating areas.
The plan was effective upon receipt and would become operative without signal
in the event of a surprise attack on Oahu. It might be made operative by des-
patch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness, prescribed in Addendum Two
to this plan, would be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian
Department for Army units, and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Com-
FOURTEEN) for Navy units. The condition of material readiness was to be
signified by a letter, such as "E", signifying that all aircraft were conducting
routine operations and none were read}^ for the purposes of this plan, and the
condition of operational readiness by a number, such as "5", signifying that all
types of available planes would be ready in four hours. It was also required that
a dispatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day, be made by each unit assigned
to a task group by this plan stating the number of planes and readiness.
General Short testified that the local joint defense plan was in effect prior to
the attack, but was not in operation because, he said, it was predicated on the
Rainbow Plan which had not been execvited, and, therefore, the action taken
under it prior to the attack was only drills (pages 259-260).
Admiral Bellinger testified that about March 1, 1941, CincPac directed him to
report to ComFOURTEEN to prepare an air defense plan in conjunction with the
Commanding General, Hawaiian Force. He did so and worked with Major
General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. The operations plan
for the Naval Base Defense Force included several subsidiary plans, the most im-
portant of which was the plan for the Naval Base Defense Air Force, which out-
lined the proposed employment of all units made available to that force (page
661).
Army and Navy orders, he said, were based on the estimate of the situation
dated March 31, 1941. He believed this estimate was sound, but that unity of
command was missing (page 662). The plan was to function through mutual
cooperation of the Army and Navy, and the Naval Base Defense Air Force could
function only in an emergency or when proper authority directed. The composi-
tion varied with the planes made available bj' the various Army and Navy
commanders; the determining factor of availability was the daily employment
schedule of planes belonging to various units. Available planes were subject to
operational control only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force was in a function-
ing status.
The normal procedure for vitalizing this organization for drill was an "air raid"
dispatch from ComFourteen, as Base Defense Force Commander; then Bellinger,
as Base Defense Air Commander, would send a dispatch to all units which made
planes available to that organization, except Army pursuits, ordering them to
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 395
place all available planes in highest readiness; searches would immediately be
started then, and an attack on enemy surface forces when located (page 662).
The authority of "Commander Naval Base Defense Air Officer" was non-
existent until an emergency was apparent or appropriate authority placed that
force in a functioning status, and when called into existence covered not pursuit,
but only the search and attack groups of that force (page 663). The planes ac-
tually present on Oahu were not free until ordered to concentrate on naval base
defense (page 663).
Admiral Kimmel, he said, made final approval for naval aircraft operation.
He or ComFourteen could vitalize the NBDA Force. ComFourteen worked
under CincPac. NBDA Force was not composed of all aircraft but only of
aircraft reported available (page 665).
Their estimate, he said, that "it appears possible that Orange submarines and/or
an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning
from our Intelligence service" was an estimate of hostile action and not of Japa-
nese war plans (page 666) .
In summary, the NBDA Force would come into being in the event of: (a) a
drill, (b) an actual emergency, (c) orders from higher authority based on infor-
mation as to the imminence of attack (page 678) .
Admiral Bloch said that the agreement with the Army concerning the use
of aircraft was efTective from the date of signature and would be put in exe-
cution in the same manner as the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan,
(p. 7)
B. TESTIMONY CONCEKNING THE WAR PLANS IN GENREAL
Admiral Bellinger stated that unity of command is essential to the preparation
for meeting such an air attack as that on Pearl Harbor; the organization, operat-
ing twenty-four hours a day, must he fully manned and functioning. Recon-
naissance, radar nets, complete information regarding shipping, and control of
all aircraft in the zone of operations are essential. Such an organization must
be in effect and functioning smoothly before the attack. Not much can be
expected from a mutual cooperative organization existing only on paper, developed
only through intermittent drills (p. 510).
It appears from the testimony of various of the witnesses that (1) the decisive
theater, as laid down in the war plans, was the Atlantic, and that the military
strategy in the Pacific was to be defensive; (2) that the primary responsibility for
the defense of Pearl Harbor was the Army's, and that the Navy was to assist the
Army in that task; (3) that the method of command at Pearl Harbor was one of
joint cooperation between the Army and Navy and not unity of command; (4)
that the principal mission which had been assigned to the Pacific Fleet was to train
for war with Japan ; and (5) that the war plans were not technically executed prior
to the attack, nor was the fleet technically mobilized.
(1) The decisive theatre the Atlantic; defensive strateg}'^ in the Pacific.
Admiral Bloch said that "Rainbow I" contemplated the United States at
war with the Axis Powers, including Japan, without any assistance except
perhaps some of the South American Republics; JCD was based on that plan;
"Rainbow 3" was based on the assumption that the United States would be
alliedMth Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies against the Axis nations,
including Japan; he believed that the provisions of "Rainbow 5" were about
the same as in the earlier plans insofar as they related to the Fourteenth
Naval District. No. 1 was a purely defensive plan. No. 3 had certain
offensive tasks in it, and he did not recall the tasks assigned by "Rainbow 5."
(p. 23)
Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, on December 7, 1941, was assistant
War Plans Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and was under
then Captain McMorris. He was responsible for the preparation of the
written war plans for the Pacific Fleet which were required to implement the
basic Navy war plans then in effect. He had reported for that duty on
February 1, 1941. (p. 66)
Admiral McCormick said that the commitments of the Pacific Fleet for the
first phase of the war, such as contemplated by Rainbow 5 Plan, in general
were to defend the United States and its possessions, some of which were in
special categories such as Guam, which was regarded as more or less in-
defensible ; to divert the Japanese strength away from the Malay Barrier by
396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
raids, and the capture of positions in the Marshall Islands; to protect our sea
communications; and to raid or interrupt Japanese communicat'ons east of
longitude 180. This provided, therefore, for the use of task forces composed
of combatant ships for offensive operations consisting of raids, and if the use
of a covering force were taken into account it might be said that the whole of
the Fleet would thus be engaged in offensive operations during this first
phase, (p. 66-7) In his opinion, had the three carriers which were attached
to the Fleet been available, they could have raided an island in the fringes
of the Marshalls without undue risk. There were only two carriers available
around December 7th, but it is Admiral McCormick's belief that Admiral
Kimmel intended to carry out the plan even with the two carriers which were
then available. The operating schedules were more or less built around
the war plans insofar as the operations of the task forces were concerned,
(p. 67)
Captain Glover worked on portions of Rainbow 5, which was completed in
May. The plan contemplated, he said, the dispatch of certain forces from the
Pacific to the Atlantic, (p. 161) According to Captail Glover, the plan gave
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, an offensive task to prepare for the
capture of positions in the Caroline area. Also, to divert the enemy strength
from the Malay Barrier, through the denial or capture of positions in the
Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.
Captain Glover's concept of the plan was that initially, the attitude of the
Pacific Fleet was to be defensive and that it did not have the means available
to assume an outright offensive. The movements which he had mentioned
were to be classed as raids rather than movement of total force and he
considered that the logistic support provided the Pacific Fleet was sufficient
for such raids, (p. 173)
Captain Glover said that he thought that WPL-46 represented a realistic
appreciation of the situation existing at that time and a calculated risk in the
Pacific and that the plan was elastic.
Captain Glover referred to a memo, dated August 21, 1941, to the Plans
Section of the War Plans Division re: "Cognizance of Navy Basic War Plan — ■
Rainbow No. 5." This indicated that the Plans Section was charged with
preparation of directives placing the whole or any part of the plan in effect
and continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so that advice might be
given in regard to matters relating to the execution of the plan.
No change was made in Rainbow 5 prior to December, according to Captain
Glover, (p. 174)
Admiral Turner discussed the background and form of WPL-46, known as
Rainbow 5. (p. 251-2) Admiral Turner said that the contributory plan of
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was approved by the Navy Depart-
ment in about September, 1941. Concerning the offensive tasks of the war
plan. Admiral Turner said, "So far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned, his
part in the plan was not defensive. It required a limited offensive through
the Central Pacific islands. It was realized that Admiral Kimmel did not
have at hand all the material and men and organizations to proceed immedi-
ately with a strong offensive to the Gilberts or the Marshalls. The Navy
Department was making every effort to try to set up base materiel and or-
ganizations that would permit Admiral Kimmel, in the course of a compara-
tively short time, to initiate such an offensive. Admiral Kimmel, whether in
writing or orally, I don't recall, expressed the view that he did not have the
forces suitable for conducting an offensive in the immediate future. There
was no disagreement in the Department with such a view. We felt that the
first part of the war in the Central Pacific would be largely naval and air, and
that some time would elapse before we could seize and hold island territory.
But it would be a grave error for anyone to get the idea that the war in the
Central Pacific was to be purely defensive. Far from it. While the Navy
Department believed that our major military effort, considered as a whole,
should initially be against Germany^ — that view, I may add, was also held by
the War Department — we were all in agreement that the principal naval
effort should be in the Pacific." (p. 252)
Captain Wellborn said that his recollection was that generally the officers
concerned with the preparation of the war plans were of the view that the
initial major effort must be in the Atlantic, (p. 383-4)
Concerning the concept that Germany was ihe principal enemy to be first
disposed of, Admiral Ingersoll said: "Naturally, there was a discussion of
the situation that was developing and, of course, it was realized that if Japan
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 397
entered the war against us that she would be a very strong foe. Never-
theless, the United States, at that time, was too weak to engage in offensive
warfare in both oceans and a decision had to be made whether a major effort
would be made in one ocean or the other. It was felt that Germany was the
principal enemy to be disposed of first, except to eliminate the soft member,
Italy, and that after Germany was defeated all the allied Nations could con-
centrate on Japan. I do not recall that there was any formal representation
made to the Chief of Naval Operations that his plan was not sound. At
some time during 1941, the general features of WPL-46 were explained at
a conference in the Navy Department at which I seem to recall that Secretary
Hull, and I believe the Chairman of the Senate and House Naval Affairs
Committees were present. I'm quite sure that the general consensus of
opinion was that Germany should be eliminated first, after Italy, and then
Japan." (p. 422)
Admiral Stark testified that the over-all military strategy which regarded the
Atlantic as the decisive theatre had been established by the President, the Secre-
tary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy (pages 8Q-1). Despite this, however,
he said, the Atlantic did not have exactly priority over the Pacific, and he did
not believe that men had been transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic (page
794).
Admiral Smith testified that he thought the CNO considered the Atlantic more
important than the Pacific since in May, 1941, the best BB's, four CL's, and two
squadrons of DD's were secretly transferred to the Atlantic (pages 529-30).
Admiral Smith said that in May, 1941, the YORKTOWN, Battleship
Division Three Cruiser Division Eight, and two squadrons of destroyers
were detached and sent to the Atlantic; these he said were equipped with
all of the modern devices that they had tried to get for them while they
were attached to the Pacific Fleet, (p. 38)
(2) Testimony concerning the primary responsibility for defense.
Both Admiral Stark (page 193) and Admiral Kimmel (page 294) testified
that the basic responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was the Army's.
The Army, Admiral Kimmel said, had the duty of locating and engaging enemy
aircraft before they reached their objectives; the Navy was to support the Army.
The Army had the duty of repulsing air attack by artillery, the Navy to assist.
Under the joint plan, the Army operated all pursuit planes and the Navy all
bombers and patrol planes (page 295).
Admiral Pye stated that the Army was responsible for the defense of Pearl
Harbor, assisted by the Navy in such manner as possible (page 438).
Admiral Bloch stated that the method of command was joint cooperation and
that the Army's task under JCD-42 was to hold Oahu against attack and sup-
port the naval forces (page 385, Exhibit 7) ; the Navy's task was to patrol and
control the coastal zone and to support the Army (page 386).
Admiral Bloch said that it might be stated that the Navy had no respon-
sibility because there was nothing said in the Joint Coastal Defense Plan
to the effect that the Navy had any responsibility for protecting Pearl Harbor
against air attack, but yet, by 2CL the Commander-in-Chief felt the necessity
to help out on account of the fact that he had means that he could use. (p.
11)
Admirals Ingersoll, Delaney, and Smith testified that under JCD-42 the Army
was responsible for the defense of Hawaii (pages 848, 505, 551).
Admiral Kitts testified that the Army was responsible for the defense of Pearl
Harbor (page 521). The Navy's function was to support the Army. When
ships were in port, the guns of the Fleet were made available to Army command
through the Base Defense Officer (page 521).
Admiral Mc Morris said that the Fleet was not charged with its own defense
while in Pearl Harbor.
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the phrase "territory of the associated
poiuers in the Pacific area," as used in sub-paragraph (h), page 24, of the
"Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, {WPPac~46)", {Exhibit 35),
included Hawaii, and that the duty prescribed in sub-paragraph (m) of Phase I
of the Initial Tasks which was to "guard against a surprise attack by Japan,"
contemplated that it was a task of the Pacific Fleet to guard Hawaii against
the surprise attack by Japan. (Page 295-296).
398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral McMorris fiinher testified, with reference to the siatements in
the "Summary of the Situation" appearing in Addendum, I to the Naval Base
Defense Air Force Operation Plan Number A-I-4I, dated March SI, 1941,
to the effect that a declaration of war might be preceded by "a surprise attack
on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor," that he agreed
with the thought there expressed but had considered such an attack much more
probable in the approaches to Pearl Harbor than in Pearl Harbor itself. (Page
299-301).
Vice Admiral McMorris also testified that at or about the time of the issuance
of the Pacific Fleet Confidendal Letter number SCL-41 (Revised), dated Oc-
tober 14, 1941, he agreed with the assumption therein stated that a declaration
of war might be preceded by either a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
or a surpnse submarine attack on ships in the operating area, or by a combi-
nation cf both of those two for772s of attack. (Page 301-302).
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he had no specific recollection yet he
entertained no doubt that he had reviewed, Annex VIII, Section VI to the Joint
Coastal Frontier or Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and also that he had
reviewed Addendum I of Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan Num-
ber A-l-41, dated March 31, 1941. (Page 297-298).
but CinPac was concerned over the safety of the Fleet and felt a responsibility
for urging the strengthening of the defenses (page 899).
Admiral McMorris said that Admiral Kimmel had felt an overall respon-
sibility for safeguarding the Fleet, although he did look to ComFOURTEEN
and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to protect Hawaii,
(p. 239)
General Marshall said that the Army was responsible for protecting Pearl
Harbor against air attack; the Xavy was to do long distance patrol and to search
for and to attack hostile surface ships (page 855). The mission of the Hawaiian
Air Force was to defend Oahu against air attack in cooperation with fleet aircraft
and to attack hostile vessels (page 863).
Colonel Phillips testified that the Army's mission was the defense of the island,
but that the Navy was jointly responsible (page 479).
(3) Command by joint cooperation, not unity of command.
Admiral Bellinger said that one of the main impediments of the air agree-
ment and of the air organizations was the provision requiring agreement
between the Commanding General and the Navy Base Defense Officer that
a hostile raid was sufficiently imminent to warrant action; the set-up that
existed was a paper organization which could not really function to prevent
or take action in an air attack; it was not the primary objective of either the
Army of the Navy; there was no unity of command or control, (p. 119-120)
He said that if the Commanding General or he had seen an emergency
situation, he felt that the Commanding General would have cooperated in
any specific instance. Drills had been arranged previously by special
arrangement with the Army. (p. 120)
Admiral Bellinger said that he did not talk over with Admiral Kimmel the
possibility of a carrier raid by the Japanese nor was the wording of his esti-
mate discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and that Admiral Kimmel knew, of
course, that Admiral Bellinger was not satisfied with the organization's set-
up because it was based on too much cooperation and on the assumption
that it would go into efi"ect when an emergency arose, and that no such
organization is any good unless it functions on a 24-hour basis. There
were, he said, insufficient personnel to have an organization functioning on
that basis, (p. 122-3)
Admiral Bellinger said that when the situation in the Pacific grew more
tense, those portions of his estimate dealing with a carrier raid came back
to his mind; he remembered discussing the subject matter with a high
Navy Department official during his visit to Oahu, wherein he complimented
Admiral Bellinger on the organization that had been set up, and Admiral
Bellinger told him that that was all right but it would not work in case of war
and indicated that there must be unity of command to make it work and also
additional facilities and equipment, (p. 123)
Admiral Bellinger said that he did not think that any joint plan based on
cooperation alone would or could function properly in an emergency and he
mentioned his more or less dissatisfaction with the general set-up of this air
defense, both personally in conversation with Admiral Kimmel and also at
one time to Mr. Forrestal, the Under Secretary of the Navy. (p. 124)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 399
Admiral Bellinger ended his testimony with a statement which in part
was as follows:
"Although it was realized that facilities, personnel, and equipment were
inadequate for proper and continuous air defense, the main idea was to evolve
a plan and organization that would make the most of the tools that were
available and conditions that were existing. It is foolish to think that such
a skeletonized organization functioning on the basis of cooperation by the
Navy and Army Air Forces and set up to be put in motion by special orders or
by an emergency occurring, remaining practically non-existent except during
periodic drills, could go into action and function effectively at the occurrence
of an actual emergency. An organization of this nature to be effective must
function twenty-four hours every day, and prior to an air raid not subsequent
thereto. However, considering shortages, and deficiencies, other necessary
employment of forces, such as expansion training and development of
facilities, and lacking unity of command, little, if any more, in the way of
readiness could be expected. It is believed that Admiral Kimmel saw this
picture very realistically and I know of no man who, under the circumstances,
could have done more. I know this, that the existing deficiencies, the varied
duties and schedules of employment, the lack of authority due to lack of
unity of command, placed the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force
in a very embarrassing position." (p. 134)
Captain Glover said that unity of command for Hawaii had been discussed
but never came anywhere near following through to any action.
Admiral Pye said that for at least ten years before the attack, he felt that
there was need for unity of command at Pearl Harbor; for more than a year
before the attack, he had advised several Commanders-in-Chief that coor-
dination was not adequate and that they should get some Army oflScers on
their staff so that it would be better arranged at least, (p. 168)
Concerning the absence of unity of command, Admiral Stark testified that
thought had been given to unity of command for the whole area, but that no
satisfactory solution had been reached (page 29). He said that the President or
Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War could have put unity of command
in effect. Admiral Stark and General Marshall could have, subject to approval,
he said, of the Secretaries. Local Army and Navy commanders could have done
so by agreement. Admiral Bloch probably could not have acted independently
of Admiral Kimmel (page 39). He occupied, under directive, a dual status when
directed by OPNAV or on "M" day (page 41).
Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not discuss with the Army the desirability
of invoking unity of command. Unity of command would have made operations
easier. ComFOURTEEN could not," he said, have invoked unity of command
without reference to him, and he would have referred the matter to the Navy
Department (page 296).
Admiral Ingersoll said that unity of command at Hawaii was not discussed at
the Secretary's and CNO's conferences when he was present (page 848).
Admiral Turner and General Marshall both said that there had been discussion
of unity of command, but that no decision had been reached (pages 858, 1009).
Admiral Turner said, "That had been discussed at great length with the
Army and, to some extent, with the British. We never could find, and there
has not yet been found, a general formula for unity of command applicable to
all cases. We struggled with the problem and solved it in certain cases in
WPL-46, as that document provides for a virtual unity of command between
the British and our Army and Navy in certain cases, but we had never been
able to get a satisfactory formula with regard to the Fleet and troops on
shore." (p. 271)
(4) The principal mission which had been assigned was training for war.
Admiral IngersoU said that he was familiar with the problems of the Pacific
Fleet in 1941. The Pacific Fleet was assigned its missions in the War Plans, and
until war broke out its major mission was to prepare for war (page 820) .
Admiral Smith testified that the principal mission of the Pacific Fleet during
1941 was training for war with .Japan (page 529). And this was not changed
prior to December 7th (page 539) .
(5) The plans were not technically executed prior to the attack, nor was the Fleet
technically mobilized.
Admiral Stark admittedly sent out no order to mobilize under WPL-46 (page
102).
Admiral Pye discussed the various phases of mobilization at page 440.
400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Smith's testimony concerning WPL-46 and the assigned tasks of the
Pacific Fleet appears at pages 541-2. He said that the War Plan was not executed
by the Navy Department before the attack (page 561).
Admiral Delaney said that no "M" day was set prior to December 7, 1941 (page
505) . He did not consider the Fleet mobilized because of deficiencies in men and
material.
Admiral McMorris said that the War Plans, which were not executed provided
that the greater part of the patrol planes of the Fleet were to be advanced to Mid-
way and Wake and a minimum number to be left under control of the sea frontier,
based on Pearl Harbor (pages 901-2).
Admiral Bloch also said that no parts of JCD-42 (Exhibit 7) were executed prior
to December 7th ; parts of appendix VII thereof were in effect in regard to agree-
ments for tactical control of aircraft in case of attack (page 386) .
Admiral Turner, on page 1011, discussed the Rainbow War Plans and their
development; WPL-46 was a realistic plan. Mobilization without war, he said,
is not practical in a democracy as the authority of Congerss to mobilize is tanta-
mount to a declaration of war. The Fleet was, however, so mobilized that the
only thing left to be done by mobilization was the taking over of merchant shipping
which can only be taken after war is declared. Execution of a part of WPL-46
would have been an act of war. Provision for the execution of a part of the plan
was put in to provide for war with Germanv without war with Japan (page 1012).
Admiral Ingersoll (page 844), read Articles 3721 and 3722 of WPL-46 (Exhibit
4). Mobilization of the Fleet, he said, was not ordered because the Fleet was in
effect already mobilized. In this connection, the Government did not want to
take any action that could be considered an overt act, and mobilization is always
an act preliminary to war (page 845).
Admiral McMorris said that no technical execution of WPL-46 was necessary,
he thought, to put the Fleet on a war footing; it was on a Vv^ar footing (page 895).
It may be noted that Admiral Kimmel was aware, at the end of November and
early in December, that WPL-46 was not yet in effect and that one of the first
steps which his War Plans Officer recommended be taken, in the event of American-
Japanese war, was to send dispatches to Task Force Commanders advising that
WPL-46 was effective (Exhibits 69A and 69B).
C. ADEQUACY OF FLEET GENERALLY TO CARRY OUT ITS TASKS
Admiral Stark testified that certain units were detached from the Pacific Fleet
during 1941 for an amphibious operation in the Atlantic. The units transferred
in June were three BB's, four CA's, one CV, and one DesRon, which amounted to
about 25 per cent of the Pacific Fleet (pages 100-101).
He stated that from October to December, 1941, the Pacific Fleet was con-
sidered adequate to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 (pages 23, 25) ;
and later testified that in 1941 the United States did not have sufficient men and
material to meet an attack on one ocean, much less in both (page 800).
Admiral Ingersoll said that the Pacific Fleet~was regarded as adequate to
carry out the initial tasks prescribed for it in the War Plans, which were
primarily defensive with the exception of diversionary raids against the
Carolines and the Marshalls. (p. 421-2) Admiral Ingersoll discussed the
transfer of ships of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic which he said was in
accordance with the basic concept of the War Plans which indicated that
Germany was the predominant member of the Axis powers. These contem-
plated that the British would release certain forces for the Far East but
Admiral Ingersoll did not know why it took until November, 1941, for a small
detachment of British capital ships to arrive in the Indian Ocean, (p. 419)
Admiral Turner considered that the Pacific Fleet was fully prepared on Novem-
ber 26th to carry out missions assigned to it in the War Plans. These missions
were defensive, except for possible raids (page 1017).
Admiral Turner said that forces were withdrawn from the Pacific Fleet
to support an occupation of the Azores but that project was abandoned and
the occupation of Iceland was substituted and some of the forces which
had been withdrawn were then retured to the Pacific.
Admiral Turner said that he did not recall any official protest by Admiral
Kimmel concerning the detachment of units to the Pacific Fleet, but that
Admiral Kimmel did not approve the matter, (p. 253)
Admiral Turner discussed the Rainbow Plan No. 3, the practice of keeping
the war plans up to date and the movement of forces in accordance with the
commitments of the war plans. Concerning the adequacy of the Fleet,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 401
Admiral Turner said, "We were not at all satisfied with the defensive cover
that was being afforded Hawaii, and continued every effort to set up de-
fenses in outlying islands, such as Midway, Wake, Palmyra, Johnston
Island, and Samoa. These places were all strengthened, air fields were
built or in process of building, and we were distributing forces to those
positions. The principal reason for building the defenses there was to
detect and ward off enemy attacks against Hawaii, and to afford defensive
cover for the sea operations of our Fleet. It was not possible, of course,
to provide such a cover to the northward, and that was always recognized
as a weak spot in our defense. I may say that I, personally, was not in
favor of setting up defenses in Wake. It was too far removed for proper
support, and was certain to fall at an early date after the war broke out
unless we could have an early successful engagement with the Japanese
Fleet, which seemed unlikely. The other positions were considered of
great value and work was pushed on all of them to the limit of our available
resources. As regards the strength of the Pacific Fleet, we felt that it was
adequate for the tasks assigned to it, although we would have been happy
to have had greater strength." (p. 256)
Admiral Turner said that the Fleet logistics were believed to be adequate
for initial Fleet operations, (p. 257)
According to Admiral McMorris, while there were deficiencies in the Pacific
Fleet, he felt that it would be effective to carry out the missions of WPL-46.
WPLf-46 was based on the Japanese starting war (page 893). The Fleet would
have been alerted by dispatch and was advised for sometime that the situation
was tense (page 894).
Admiral McMorris was of the view that the Pacific Fleet was adequate to
carry out the missions assigned to it in the War Plans, although there were
many marked deficiencies in the Fleet, particularly in anti-submarine craft.
He said that he thought that Admiral Kimmel considered that the Pacific
Fleet did consist of strong naval forces which could be effectively employed
notwithstanding some handicaps, (p. 234)
Admiral McMorris said that he was not happy over the logistics situation,
but certainly not discouraged over it. (p. 235)
Admiral McMorris thought the intention of Admiral Kimmel with respect
to the carrying out of the War Plans in the event of war was to sweep for
Japanese merchant ships, to make immediate reconnaissance of the Mar-
shalls, to carry out as expeditiously as possible operations to establish our
forces in the Marshalls, and to inaugurate patrol plane searches in the
approaches to Hawaii, (p. 235)
Admiral Pye testified that the Pacific Fleet could have operated as far as the
Marshall Islands, but no farther (page 431). It would have been difficult to
operate long there because of the scarcity of tankers. Fuel was also short (page
432), but there was sufficient to operate up to 7 December. The fleet would have
been more effective if the detachment had not been sent to the Atlantic (page 432) .
Concerning the detachment of three battleships, four cruisers and a squad-
ron of destroyers in June of 1941, Admiral Pye said that this materially re-
duced the power of the Pacific Fleet, but that it did not make much difference
in what the Pacific Fleet could have accomplished because the situation
with regard to logistics was such that the Fleet could not have operated more
than 2,500 miles from Honolulu no matter what its strength. Admiral Pye
said that the greatest deficiency was in tankers. Another deficiency was the
inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as a base. He said that he thought all of the
officers agreed that the Fleet could not operate to the westward of the
Marshall Islands and that even with plenty of tankers, he doubted that the
Fleet could have operated much farther west than that because of the lack
of adequate repair facilities or bases, (p. 151) Admiral Pye said that during
the training periods previous to December 7, fuel was being used at a greater
rate than the rate at which fuel was being delivered so that the reserve was
being reduced, (p. 152)
Admiral Delaney testified that he was familiar with the naval war plans in 1941
(page 500). He stated that WPL-46 could not have been executed with the forces
then available to CincPac, but some of the tasks might have been carried out (page
501).
Admiral Calhoun was famihar with WPL-46 and the preparation for carrying
out the tasks of the Pacific Fleet (page 931). He said that their tankers were
adequate to maintain the fuel supply at Pearl Harbor (the fuel tanks there were
7e716 — 16— Ex. 149, vol. 1 27
402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
filled to capacity on December 7, 1941), but not sufficient to do this and also to
supply the fleet while operating any considerable distance to the westward of
Pearl Harbor and at high speeds (pages 932-3). The number of provision ships
was hopelessly inadequate to supply fresh provisions to the fleet if operating to ^
the westward (page 933). The logistic support of the fleet, however, was adequate '
to carry out the initial tasks of WPL-46, which were of a limited nature (page 938).
There were, he said, personnel shortages in the Pacific Fleet in 1941 (page 943).
Admiral C. W. Nimitz testified that he was Chief of BuNav during 1941 (page
947). Because of the expansion of the fleets and new construction, it was neces-
sary to draw on the fleets for trained personnel to man new ships. About Decern- •
ber, 1941, the ships were fully manned as to officers and about 90 per cent manned
as to men. There was a large proportion of Reserve officers, and a large propor-
tion of the men were untrained (page 948).
VII. The Possibility of Aerial Torpeijo Attack At Pearl Harbor
A. knowledge and evaluation of secretary's letter:
Shortly after he assumed command, Admiral Kimmel saw the letter of the
Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941, which
discussed the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor and set forth the types of attack
regarded as most likely (page 286).
In that letter, it will be recalled, the Secretary said that:
"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would
be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor . . .
The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered
to be: (1) air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4)
submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire."
Apparently, Admiral Kimmel also received a copy of the reply of the Secretary
of War to that letter. It may be noted that the Secretary of War in his reply of
February 1941 (Exhibit 24), expressed complete concurrence as to the importance
of the questions raised by the Secretary of the Navy, and as to the urgency of
making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. In his letter, the
Secretary of War stated that the Hawaiian Department was the best equipped
of the overseas departments and continued to hold a high priority for the comple-
tion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection
to the Fleet. The letter discussed the Army's pursuit planes at Hawaii and those
to be sent to Hawaii, the present and prospective anti-aircraft guns, the fact that
the aircraft warning service equipment would be delivered in June, advised
that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department was being directed to give
consideration to the question of employment of balloon barrages and the use
of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Also, it stated with reference
to the other proposals for joint defense that a copy of the Secretary of the Navy's
letter and of the reply were being forwarded to the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department with instructions that he cooperate with the local naval authorities in
making those measures effective. It appears from the copies of the endorsements
annexed to this letter that a copy of the letter was sent to CincPac and to
ComFOURTEEN.
Admiral Kimmel's testimony showed some confusion as to his agreement
with, and his evaluation of, this correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy
and the Secretary of War. He testified that he felt that the most probable form
of attack on Pearl Harbor was by submarine and that a bombing attack was
the second most probable form of attack, and that the danger of an air torpedo
attack was nil because the water was too shallow (page 286). He then corrected
his testimony and stated that his previous testimony was erroneous and that he
had regarded an air attack as no more than a possibility (page 287).
Captain McCrea described his conferences which he had had with the
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
• Fleet, early in 1941. He recalled that Admiral Kimmel, who was shortly to
relieve Admiral Richardson, specifically discussed the short-comings of the
air defenses of Pearl Harbor, (p. 275)
Admiral Stark testified that the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the
Secretary of War had been prepared by Admiral Stark and his assistants (page 24).
Admiral Ingersoll was familiar with the correspondence between the
Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War concerning the inadequacy
of defenses at Pearl Harbor. He recalled that there was some subsequent
discussion of the question of balloon barrages and that the Fleet did not want
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 403
them at Pearl Harbor because of interference with aircraft operations. He
recalled no further formal representations being made to the War Depart-
ment on the subject of the deficiencies, (p. 418-9)
General Marshall was familiar with the Secretary of War's reply to the Secre-
tary of the Navy's letter of January 24, 1941 (page 853). In this connection he
said that he personally took steps to meet the deficiencies discussed therein;
that Hawaii for years held first priority on material and was by far the best
equipped Army installation; that additional planes were sent to Hawaii, seriously
handicapping the training program in the United States, and special efforts
were made to expedite production. The problem of expansion was very serious
in terms of limited equipment and personnel needed both for Hawaii and else-
where, and also needed here for training essential to expansion (page 854).
Admiral Bloch said that after the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January
24, 1941, a large number of fighters and some bombers were sent to Hawaii,
but that so far as he knew, no additional anti-aircraft guns were sent. He
said that they knew nothing about the defenses of the coast artillery and
as to the adequacy of Army personnel, but that he Was definitely of the opinion
that the personnel of the Army was being increased all the time and was
considered by the Army generally adequate for its task. Admiral Bloch
knew that the Army had a deficiency in numbers and types of planes capable
of performing inshore patrol, (p. 8)
General Short testified that he saw both the Secretary of the Navy's letter and
the War Department's reply. He agreed with the Navy's recommendations
except as to smoke and balloon barrages (page 237) .
Admiral Schuirmann testified that the Secretary of the Navy's letter had not
been shown to him, and that the State Department had not been apprised of it.
He said, however, that the State Department was kept informed of the Navy's
estimate of United States-Japanese relations (page 199).
Admiral Schuirmann said that he was sure that the State Department had
not seen the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24, and the Secretary
of War's answer concerning the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. He
believed, however, that they were fairly well informed of the lack of certain
equipment and of personnel shortages in the Army and Navy generally,
(p. 408)
In his voluntary statement. Admiral Anderson said that the Robert's report
indicated that nothing was done about the Secretary of the Navy's letter of
January 27, 1941 by the top commanders or any of the junior flag officers.
He said that so far as he was concerned, he never knew about the Secretary
of the Navy's letter, (p. 398)
B. CORRESPONDENCE ON ANTI-TORPEDO BAFFLES IN PEARL HARBOR
On February 15, 1941 (Exhibit 49), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to
CincPac regarding anti-torpedo baffles for protection against attacks on Pearl
Harbor. This stated that the shallow depth of water limited the need for anti-
torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor and the congestion and the necessity for maneuver-
ing room limited the practicability of the present type of baffles. The letter
indicated that a minimum depth of water of 75 feet might be assumed necessary
successfully to drop torpedoes from planes and that the desirable height for
dropping is 60 feet or less. There were various other considerations stated.
The recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief were especially
desired. A similar letter was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the
Commandants of various Naval Districts, including the Fourteenth, on Feb-
ruary 17, 1941 (Exhibit 54).
The reply to the request for recommendations and comments was made on
March 20, 1941, in a letter by Admiral Bloch, stating that the depth of water
at Pearl Harbor was 45 feet, and for that and other reasons, he did not recom-
mend anti-torpedo baffles. CincPac agreed, until such time as a light efficient
net were developed (page 293).
In June, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent another letter to the Com-
mandants of Naval Districts, copy to CincPac and others, referring to recent
developments, and to experience at Taranto, which stated that no minimum
depth of water could be assumed safe as regards torpedo attack if there were
sufficient water around a ship to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient
run to arm the torpedo, but that such attack in 10 fathoms or more was
more likely than in shallow water (Exhibit 55). The torpedoes at Taranto,
404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
it was said, were launched in thirteen to fifteen fathoms although some may
have been in eleven.
Admiral Kimmel testified that on this correspondence he based his opinion that
there was no chance of an air torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor — and that even after
the June letter, he did not think torpedoes would run in such shallow water.
He pointed out that the Navy made no effort to place such nets in Pearl Harbor
(page 293). He later stated that he did not think an aerial torpedo attack
would be made because he did not think svich torpedoes would run in Pearl
Harbor and did not give this a great deal of consideration for that reason (page
331).
Admiral Smith recalled the first letter from the Chief of Naval Operations con-
cerning anti-torpedo nets, but not the June letter. He said they did not think
the Japanese would attack with torpedo planes (page 536).
Admiral Smith said that he was familiar with the earlier correspondence
on the subject of the need for anti-torpedo nets, and that they concluded
that because of the shallow water at Pearl Harbor no such nets were neces-
sary; he did not recall ever having seen the second letter. Exhibits 17, 18
and 19 are copies of the letters in question, (p. 60-1) Admiral Smith said
that the decision of the Commander-in-Chief, as set forth in his letter of
March 12, 1941, that anti-torpedo nets were not necessary, was never recon-
sidered. Admiral Smith complained that the Navy's torpedo information
was kept too secret so far as the Fleet was concerned, other than the sub-
marines, (p. 62)
Admiral Bloch testified that he believed that air torpedoes could not be launched
profitably in Pearl Harbor (page 394).
Admiral Bloch said that he was familiar with the discussions concerning
the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor; that he was familiar with
the earlier correspondence but he never saw the later correspondence
modifying the earlier views, (p. 26)
Admiral Halsey said that he had felt, prior to December 7, that the Fleet
should have been protected at Pearl Harbor by anti-torpedo baffles and was
strongly in favor of having them. (p. 306)
Admiral Bloch pointed out that such nets in Pearl Harbor might interfere
with the take-oflf of seaplanes and with the sortie and entry of ships. Ad-
miral Kimmel, he said, reached the conclusion and, insofar as Admiral
Bloch was concerned, that settled the matter. Moreover, he said they
had no nets available at the time except some makeshift nets used at harbor
entrances which they had manufactured themselves, (p. 27)
It may be noted, incidentally, that on February 11, 1941, Admiral Stark
wrote to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance stating that experimental and
development work should be undertaken on nets and booms; that there appeared
to be an urgent need for an anti-torpedo net which could be laid and removed
in certain harbors in a short time for temporary use; and that efforts should be
made to reduce the weights of the present Admiralty nets and booms (Exhibit 56) .
VIII. The Situation Prior to the Freezing of Japanese Assets
During the five months of Admiral Kimmel's command which preceded the
freezing of Japanese assets. Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark exchanged, in
addition to official correspondence, "personal correspondence," which referred to
official matters. This, Admiral Stark testified, was a "Navy custom," but
these personal letters never changed official orders (pages 41-2).
Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel showed him every letter which
he wrote to or received from the Chief of Naval Operations; that these were
personal letters, but had to be considered as official documents, (p. 33)
Admiral McMorris said that he thought he had read every one of the
"personal" letters between Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark, (p. 242)
The highlights of this correspondence concerned
(a) The inadequacy of the local defense forces at Hawaii and the necessity for
reliance on the Fleet,
(b) Admiral Kimmel's view concerning the possibility of a surprise attack,
(c) Admiral Kimmel's desire for information as to developments,
(d) the international situation.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 405
A. THE INADEQUACY OF LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES AND NECESSITY FOR RELIANCE ON
THE FLEET
Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel on February 10, 1941 (Exhibit 29),
and said, among other things, that he wished they could send Admiral Bloch more
local defense forces but they simply did not have them. He said: "If more are
needed I see no other immediate solution than for you to supply them. I am
moving heaven and earth to speed a considerable program we have for small craft
and patrol vessels for the district, but hke everything else, it takes time and
'dollars cannot buy yesterday.' "
In a letter from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark on February 18, 1941
(Exhibit 30), it was stated, among other things, that as many Army bombers and
supplies as the Army could send to Oahu should be sent, together with Army
aircraft guns; that active and immediate steps were being taken to coordinate
Army and Navy effort as well as the ground crew defenses of Pearl Harbor; that
Admiral Kimmel had a couple of interviews •with General Short and found him
fully alive to the .situation and highly cooperative, and Admiral Kimmel recom-
mended that Admiral Stark keep continuous pressure on this question of Army
reinforcement of Oahu; that the detail of local defense forces for the Fourteenth
Naval District would have to be made from the Fleet, which was a further strain
on the Fleet's small craft. He adverted to the possibility of a surprise attack and
then discussed a question of the "highest importance," the supply of modern type
planes throughout the Fleet and the need for such planes.
Admiral Stark replied on March 22, 1941 (Exhibit 32) to Admiral Kimmel's
letter of February 18, 1941, and, among other things, pointed out that the highest
prioritv had been given to Naval planes including patrol planes.
On May 7, 1941 (Exhibit 41) and on May 20, 1941 (Exhibit 42), there were
letters from Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel concerning the vessels and planes
needed for defense, particularly against submarine attacks. Admiral Bloch's
letter stated that he had no aircraft and complete reliance had to be placed
("exclusive of the Fleet") on Army planes. The letter of Admiral Kimmel
referred to previous correspondence on the subject and discussed in some detail
the additional vessels needed. A memorandum was sent by Admiral Kimmel
discussing various matters of interest and various inadequacies of Pacific Fleet.
In connection with aviation it was stated, among other things: "Modernized patrol
planes are not yet available in quantity. There are none in the Hawaiian area
and there is no early possibility for replacement of those of the older type now in
the Hawaiian area."
The memorandum_ also stated that the defense of the fleet base at PearlHarbor
was a matter of considerable concern and that "we" should continue to bring pres-
sure to bear on the Army to get more anti-aircraft guns, airplanes, and radar
equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this continental and expanding
Army needs. The Naval forces available to the Commandant, it was said, were
meager to the point of non-existence.
Admiral Stark replied to Admiral Kimmel's letter dealing with the inadequacy
of the local defense force of the Fourteenth Naval District on June 23, 1941
(Exhibit 43). He stated that he realized the necessity of increasing the strength
of the Naval Local Defense Forces, but advised that "until the unsatisfactory
situation pointed out by the Commander-in-Chief can be remedied, the light
forces and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet will have to be employed in the local defense
of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier,"
Admiral DeLany discussed in general the forces available to CincPac and
the organization thereof; the general nature of the tasks assigned in the war
plans to the Fleet; methods of training the Fleet prior to the attack, which
also involved training with the Army in exercises. He said, among other
things, "I think everybody realized that the defense of the island did depend
on the Navy_ there because certainly the Army didn't have any ground
forces, anti-aircraft installations, radar, or anything else that would make
Pearl Harbor a well-defended operating base." (p. 75-6)
B. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S VIEW CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF A SURPRISE ATTACK
In his letter of February 18, 1941, to Admiral Stark, concerning inadequacy of
the local defense, Admiral Kimmel stated: "I feel that a surprise attack (sub-
naarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We are taking imme-
diate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to insure that the
attacking force will pay. We need antisubmarine forces — DDs and patrol
craft. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when they arrive."
406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C. ADMIRAL KIMMEL's DESIRE FOR INFORMATION AS TO DEVELOPMENTS
In a postscript to his letter of February 18th, Admiral Kimmel stated that he
had been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considered it the
function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with infoimation of
a secret nature, and that he had also heard that Operations considered that the
responsibihty for furnishing the same type of information was that of ONI.
Admiral Kimmel said he did not know that he had missed anything but if there
were any doubt as to whose responsibility it was to keep the Commander-in-
Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest
to the Fleet, would Admiral Kimmel kindly fix that responsibihty so that there
would be no misunderstanding.
In his reply Admiral Stark stated that ONI was fully aware of its responsibility
to keep Admiral Kimmel adequately informed concerning foreign nations,
activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States; and
that information concerning the location of Japanese Merchant Vessels was for-
warded by air mail weekly and if desired could be issued more frequently.
In a memorandum dated May 26, 1941, surveying conditions in the Pacific
Fleet as to personnel, aviation, material, communications, operations, national
policy, and information. Admiral Kimmel stated that it should be a cardinal
principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, should be immediately
informed of all important developments as they occured and by the quickest
secure means available.
D. INFORMATION BENT TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL
SITUATION
On February 25, 1941 (Exhibit 31), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel,
forwarding a copy of a memorandum for the President, dated February 11, 1941,
discussing the possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines via the
Southern route. Also enclosed was a copy of another memorandum for the
President, of February 5, 1941, consisting of an analysis of the situation in Indo-
Cbina, which had been prepared by Admiral Stark. This stated Admiral Stark's
views that Japan had some fear that the British and the United States would
intervene if Japan moved into southern Indo-China and Thailand; that the size
of Japanese land forces in Formosa and Hainan was insufficient for occupying
Indo-China and Thailand, for attacking Singapore, and for keeping an expedi-
tionary force ready to use against the Philippines, and so far as Admiral Stark
could "tell, an insufficient number of transports was assembled for a major move;
and, that as Admiral Stark saw the situation, Japan desired to move against the
British, the Dutch, and the United States in succession, and not to take on more
than one at a time, and at present she desired not to go to war with the United
States at all.
Admiral Newton discussed a trip which he had made around March,
1941, under secret orders, with a force consisting of cruisers and destroyers.
He never learned the purpose of this trip.' (p. 315)
Admiral Stark's observations on the international situation were also set forth
in a letter of April 3, 1941 (Exhibit 73) to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
Asiatic Fleet, and Atlantic Fleet, which incidentally also discussed the prepara-
tion of Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5. The basic idea of this plan, he said,
was that the United States would draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reenforce
the Atlantic Fleet, that the British, if necessary, would transfer naval forces to
the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the Malay Barrier, and
that the U. S. Asiatic Fleet would be supported by off"ensive operation of the
United States Pacific Fleet.
He then discussed the British proposals and the dangers facing Britain. He
stated that the Japanese attitude would continue to have an extremely important
bearing on the future of the war in the Atlantic; that for some time past, Japan
had shown less and less inclination to attack the British, Dutch and ourselves in
the Far East; and, he advised the addressees to watch this situation keenly.
Unquestionably, he said, the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had a stabiliz-
ing effect in the Far East. The question, he said, was when and not whether we
would enter the war. Admiral Stark's personal view was that we might be in 'the
war against. Germany and Italy within about two months, but that there was a
reasonable possibility that Japan might remain out altogether. However, he
added, we could not act on that possibility. In the meantime, he advised that
as much time as available be devoted to training.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 407
IX. Admiral Kimmel's Visit in June and Annual Report
A. ADMIRAL KIMMEL's VISIT
Admiral Kimmel visited "Washington in June 1941 and, according to Admiral
Stark, they reviewed matters of policy (page 113). According to Admiral Turner,
in the fall of 1941, Admiral Kimmel came to Washington and they discussed the
proper methods of conducting the initial phases of war (page 1019).
Admiral Kimmel said that in June, 1941 he told Admiral Stark and the
President of the dangers to the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, i. e. air attack, blocking of
harbor, etc. He told the President that the only real answer to an air attack was
not to have the Fleet in port when an attack came; that it took two tp four hours
to sortie and that once an attack was started it would be completed before tbey
could change the disposition of the Fleet (page 867). In general, he said, he
felt that the Fleet should not stay in Pearl Harbor; but he made no protest and
made no recommendation for withdrawal of any of the battleships or cairiers.
On June 4, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote a memorandum for Admiral Stark
(Exhibit 10) with copies to General Marshall, Admiral King and Admiral Towers,
in which he stated:
"The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanaing General, Hawaiian
Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in regard to joint action
of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides:
"(a) That in activilies in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against
enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps
assisted by Navy fighters which may be available.
"(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command
shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge ot the Base. Briefly, when
an alarm is sounded the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy ships
and when located the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy bombers in
the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships.
"The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory
and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are held.
These drills have developed many weaknesses but the conditions are steadily
improving and it is felt they are in much better shape now than they were a few
months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatisfactory until certain equip-
ment has been supplied and the personnel drilled in its use.
"There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters and light bombers) and 21
heavy bombing Arm}^ planes now in the Islands. These in addition to some
obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army
bombers in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have
there now and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable
to do so.
"There are not now a sufiicient number of Army pilots to man all the Army
planes in the Islands."
B. ADMIRAL KIMMEl's ANNUAL REPORT YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1941
This ofiicial report, dated August 15, 1941 (Exhibit 44), was in five parts (1)
Organization, (2) Operations and Training, (3) Material, (4) Personnel, and (5)
Inspections. The report stated, among other things, that the Fleet had been
organized into three Task Forces; that the Fleet was adequate for only limited
offensive operations; and, that there were many deficiencies of ships, planes,
equipment and men. The deficiencies included "inadequate local defense forces
to provide for the safety of the Fleet in harbor . , ." and it was said, there were
insufficient patrol craft, and district patrol and observation aircraft, though
allocated in the aircraft expansion program, were not yet available.
X. Reconnaissance Toward Jaluit
Captain Layton testified that in the latter -part oj November, 1941, either
Admiral Kimmel directed him to establish contact with the Hawaiian Air
Force pertaining to this reconnaissance or else his opposite number, Colonel
Raley, came to him with the information of the pending reconnaisi^ance and re-
quested his assistance towards delineating the appropriate objectives and to
furnish the pilots and crews with intelligence material for briefing. The recon-
naissance never materialized, he stated, because only one plane arrived, and there
were delays due to uncompleted camera installations. He was never informed
that one plane had arrived, but later learned that it was destroyed in the attack
on Hicham Field. The Navy was extremely anxious that the reconnaissance
408 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
be made at the earliest possible date and Admiral Kimrnel, u-pon receipt of
Captain Layton's memorandum concerning information he had obtained at
the conference, asked him how soon the reconnaissance might be expected. Captain
Layton advised the Admiral to the effect that the delay was due to non-installation
or non-completion of installation of cameras and that the time was still not defi-
nitely fixed. There is in evidence a photostatic copy of a memorandum of November
28th from Captain Layton to Admiral Kimmel concerning this reconnaissance
{Exhibit 28). Captain Layton stated that the question of using Navy planes for
this reconnaissance was not discussed with him, but he thought that PBY "Cata-
linas" could not be used because their appearance over the Alarshalls would
have been an overt act, while the Army planes, on the other hand, would have
been ostensibly flying from Wake to Port Darwin en route to the Philippines.
Captain Layton was particularly anxious that this reconnaissance be carried
out to check on his information as to the presence or absence of air strength, and
carriers, submarines and naval concentrations in the Marshalls area, including
Truk {p. 265-267).
Admiral Bellinger recalled nothing concerning the proposed Army reconnais-
sance flight over the Mandated Islands (p. 4-99) .
Admiral Bloch stated that long range reconnaissance was instituted in the
summer of 1941 when he received some Intelligence information, and thought
that it would be advisable to make long distance reconnaissance on a sector toward
Jaluit (page 1139). Admiral Bloch went to Admiral Kimmel and recommended
that he put in this service. He thought it was to 500 miles out (page 1140).
Admiral Bloch said: "In 1941, possibly July or August, some tense situa-
tion arose and I cannot recall how we received information of it, whether it
was by letter to the Commander-in-Chief or the radio. At any rate. Admiral
Kimmel had a conference on the subject and I suggested to him the advis-
ability of sending out reconnaissance patrol planes with the median line of
the sector pointing to Jaluit. I think the sector was 15 to 20 degrees. And we
sent planes out every morning to 500 miles. He adopted the suggestion and
sent planes out a few days and it was discontinued." (p. 14)
Admiral Bloch said that somewhere about the summer of 1941, after the
President by Executive Order designated Midway, Walie, Palmyra and
Johnston as defensive sea areas. Admiral Bloch gave the commanding officers
instructions that planes which came in and were not identified as friendly
were to be fired on. (p. 14)
XI. The Freezing of Japanese Assets — Deterioration of Situation and
Fleet Security Order
a. the freezing order
On July 24, 1941 (Exhibit 71), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Hart and sent
a copy of the letter to Admiral Kimmel which, among other things, referred to a
two-hour conversation between Admiral Stark and Nomura. Admiral Stark said
that he thought that Nomura was sincere in his desire that the United States and
Japan avoid an open rupture; they had a very plain talk; that Admiral Stark
liked him, and that he had many friends in the Navy; that he had dwelt at length
on Japan's need for the rice and minerals of Indo-China; that Admiral Stark's
guess was that with the establishment of bases in Indo-China, Japan would stop
for the time bemg, consolidate her positions and await woild reaction; that no
doubt the Japanese would use their Indo-China bases from which to take early
action against the Burma Road; of course, there was the possibility that they
would strike at Borneo, but Admiral Stark doubted this in the near future unless
we were to embargo oil shipments to them. Admiral Stark also said that he had
talked with the President and hoped no open rupture would come but conditions
were not getting better.
Admiral Schuirmann did not recall the extent to which the office of the
Chief of Naval Operations participated in the decisions to establish "moral
embargoes" to prevent the export to Japan of various strategic commodities.
(p. 406) He did remember that there was a discussion of the question of
Japanese reaction particularly to the oil embargo and that Admiral Stark
expressed the view that a total embargo on oil would of necessity force the
Japanese to move south or to collapse, (p. 407)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 409
In connection with Admiral Stark's conversations with Nomura, it may be
noted that on July 25, 1941, Nomura reported (Document 1, Exhibit 63) to Tokyo
that:
"Apparently Admiral Pratt had put in a good word for me to the Chief of
(Naval) Operations, for ever since I assumed this post, I have been shown many
courtesies by him. His opinions concerning U. S.-Japanese relations coincide witla
mine; he once told me that the only result of a war between the two countries
would be mutal exhaustion.
"Once while conversing with the Admiral (Stark) I happened to mention
that it seemed to me that the higher officials in the Navy Department here
seemed to be men of excellent character and qualifications.
"To this, the Admiral repHed that both the Assistant to the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Director of War Plans were exceedingly able men. The same
is true of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. As for the fleets, he continued,
both Kimmel and King were recommended by him, and both are of the highest
caliber. Although Hart had reached the age of retirement, he had been kept on
in active duty because of the critical times, he added.
"Please relay this information to the Navy."
Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark on July 26th (Exhibit 34), requesting
information as to steps to be taken in the event of Russian participation in the
war, and making various requests for equipment.
According to Admiral Stark, the Navy Department knew of the proposal to
freeze Japanese assets but was not consulted prior to the issuance of the Executive
Order.
Admiral Turner said that he did not participate in any discussion prior to
the freezing order, but was informed of it after the decision was made.
(p. 258)
Admiral Schuirmann believed that the Executive Order freezing Japanese
credits was taken up by the State Department with the Navy Department.
He did not recall any reports by the Navy to the State Department concerning
the Navy's readiness in the Pacific as balanced against the risks of the
freezing order. Admiral Schuirmann said that his own state of mind was
that the Japanese would go their own way in China, Indo-China and perhaps
Malaya and put the onus of using force to stop them on the United States^ in
hopes that the division of opinion in the United States would delay effective
measures by the United States, (p. 408)
Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not recall whether or not the State
Department consulted the Navy Department before issuing the order in
July freezing Japanese credits, (p. 422)
He stated that he advised the State Department that if the United States em-
bargoed oil shipments to Japan, Japan would go to war but "not necessarily with
the United States," and that such an embargo should not be made effective unless
this country were prepared to accept the risk of war (pages 43-45).
Admiral Turner said that the freezing order was issued without any particular
advance knowledge on his part, although he had heard it mentioned previously.
He thought this meant a war between Japan and the United States (page 989) .
Admiral Turner said that the Navy and War Departments both felt that
the freezing of Japanese credits would almost surely result in war with Japan
within a comparatively short period of time. (p. 254)
As a result of the freezing order the Japanese, according to Admiral Schuirmann,
conducted a bitter press campaign against the United States (page 198). And,
General Short testified, relations became strained and he noticed uneasiness in the
local Japanese population (page 247). Admiral Kimmel stated that this worsened
Japanese-United States relations (page 296).
B. FURTHER DETERIORATION OF SITUATION
The correspondence between Admirals Stark and Kimmel indicated that the
situation in the Far East continued to deteriorate, and that the conversations
with Nomura were not improving the situation. Thus, in a letter dated July 31,
1941 (Exhibit 72), he discussed the over-all situation, and stated that "after the
Russian situation broke" he proposed to the President that they should start
escorting immediately and that we should consider, along with the British, a joint
protectorate over the Dutch East Indies; that he thought it fairly safe to say that
opinion here in general held that Japan would not go into the N. E.fl.; but'that
Turner thought Japan would go into the Maritime Provinces in Augustjand^that
410 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Turner might be right and usually was; Admiral Stark's thought had been that
while Japan could ultimately go into Siberia she would delay going until she had
the Indo-China-Thailand situation more or less to her liking and until there was
some clarification of the Russian-German clash. He also said that we would give
aid to Russia and that he hoped that Russia and Germany would exhaust them-
selves; that a Europe dominated by Russia was no more, and in fact, less attractive
picture than a Europe dominated by the Nazis. A postscript to this letter stated,
among other things, that "obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to
deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual."
In a letter of August 28, 1941 (Exhibit 11), Admiral Stark, among other things,
discussed the status of the Japanese situation and said that the Japanese seemed
to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods; that some very Strong
messages had been sent to them, but just what they were going to do Admiral
Stark did not know; that he had told one of their statesmen that another move,
such as the one into Thailand, would go a long ways toward destroying before the
American public what good will still remained; that Admiral Stark bad had some
extremely frank talks with them; that Admiral Stark had not given up hope of
continuing peace in the Pacific, but he could wish the thread by which it con-
tinued to hang were not so slender.
Admiral Kimmel raised specific questions in a letter of September 12, 1941
(Exhibit 36), such as whether he should not change his orders'and issue orders to
shoot to the escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. Admiral Kimmel also
raised the question of what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and
the vicinity. He said, "As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts,
but not to bomb unless they are in the defensive sea areas. Should we now bomb
contacts, without waiting to be attacked?"
Admiral Stark answered on September 23, 1941 (Exhibit 12, 37), and stated,
among other things, that at the time the President had issued shooting orders
only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific submarine area; that the longer they
could keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned.
He said that no orders should be given to shoot, at that time, other than those
set forth in Article 723 of the Navy Regulations, which Article was quoted. The
Article provides for the use of force in self-preservation, in the sound judgment of
responsible officers, as a last resort.
The letter also stated, in conn'ection with the question of submarine contacts
that they had no definite information that Japanese submarines had ever operated
in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, or our Pacific coast; that existing
orders, i. e. not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas,
were appropriate, and continued: "If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence
is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States terri-
tory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines
would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed."
Admiral Stark also stated that the British planned to send various battleships
to the East Indian station by late December, and that these, with other British
ships, should make the task of the Japanese in moving forward considerably more
difficult. "It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she has taken
no action by that time."
Admiral Stark said that he might be mistaken, but he did not believe that the
major portion of the Japanese Fleet was likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the
Caroline Islands under the circumstances that then seemed possible; and that in
all probability the Pacific Fleet could operate successfully and effectively even
though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly could
be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty.
In this letter. Admiral Stark asked ". . . would it not be possible for your
force to 'carefully' get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?"
A postscript to this letter stated that Secretary Hull had informed Admiral
Stark that the conversations with the Japanese bad practically reached an impasse.
He said that, as he saw it, we could get nowhere toward a settlement and peace
in the Far East until there was some agreement between Japan and China, which
seemed to be remote. Whether their inability to come to any sort of an under-
standing at the time was or was not a good thing, he hesitated to say.
A second postscript to the letter referred to a conversation between Admiral
Stark and Nomura. Admiral Stark said that Admiral Nomura usually came in
when he began to feel near the end of his rope, and that there was not much to
spare at that end then. Admiral Stark stated that conversations without results
could not last forever and that if the conversations fell through, which looked
likely, the situation could only grow more tense. Admiral Stark had again talked
to Hull and thought Hull would make one more try; Hull kept Admiral Stark
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 411
pretty fully informed, and if there was anything of moment, Stark would of course
hasten to let Kimmel know.
This letter also enclosed a copy of a memorandum from General Marshall to
Admiral Stark setting forth what was being done to strengthen the Philippines,
which indicated, among other things, that on September 30th, twenty-six Flying
Fortresses would leave San Francrsco for Hawaii enroute to the Philippines.
C. INADEQUACY OF EQUIPMENT AND EFFORTS TO RECTIFY
There was during this period further correspondence on the inadequacy of
equipment in the Hawaiian area. Thus on July 26, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote
to Admiral Stark and stated that when the proposed visit of Mr. Forrestal had
been announced, a list of topics for discussion had been prepared by Admiral
Kimmel's staff. Admiral Kimmel said that not knowing the purpose of Mr.
Forrestal's visit, or whether Mr. Forrestal was informed of the war plans and of
Admiral Kimmel's problems, that he decided it was better to combine the notes
into a letter for Admiral Stark. The principal items were then listed in the letter.
These were the importance of keeping CincPac advised of the Department's
policies and decisions, and changes to meet changes in the international situation;
questions of priorities in connection with a Pacific war, such as the need for trans-
ports and for guns and ammunition for Marines, for new construction to complete
ammunition facilities, for building up the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor, for more
personnel, for small craft for patrol in the Naval District, etc; the necessity of
improvement as to communications, including identification, friend or foe, equip-
ment for aircraft; and, various aviation requirements.
On August 22, 1941 (Exhibit 35), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (in
answer to Exhibit 34) and discussed the efforts made in connection with the
development of radar equipment, and the other requests made by Admiral Kimmel.
Again in August (Exhibit 45), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to CincPac
stating that he was fully aware of the seriousness of the situation in the Four-
teenth Naval District, and related his efforts to secure additional patrol vessels.
D. ADMIRAL KIMMEL's LETTER ON SECURITY OF THE FLEET
Admiral Mc Morris testified that no formal written estimate of the situation was
maintained by him, but that a mental estimate was maintained (page 887).
His estimate of the situation on October 1st was that United States-Japanese
relations were strained and that the Japanese might go to war with Britain and
the United States, or possibly with Russia, in which case the United States might
not be involved (page 887) ; also, that war between the Japanese and Dutch and
British was possible without the United States being initially involved.
Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CLr-41 (Revised) from the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet concerning the security of the Fleet
at base and in operating areas, was issued on October 14, 194i (Exhibit 8).
This was Admiral Kimmel's security order for the Fleet and the only general
order for this purpose (page 278). This order. Admiral Kimmel testified, was
not primarily an estimate but was a basis for training in order to meet contingen-
cies (page 283). The possibilities of attack set forth therein, he said, were not
necessarily in order of importance as to probability of attack (page 287).
Admiral Bloch said that almost immediately after Admiral Kimmel as-
sumed command of the U. S. Fleet, he issued a "Base Defense Order"
known as "2CL." As Admiral Bloch understood it, the object of this was
to assure the security of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet insofar as the Com-
mander-in-Chief could augment the forces of the Army which really had the
responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor. This order was revised in
October, 1941. (p. 3)
This order provided that the security of the Fleet was predicated on two assump-
tions:
(a) that no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present existing
conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided
nationals of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl
Harbor from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking
an obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches
to Pearl Harbor;
412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) that a declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on
ships in Pearl Harbor,* (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating
areas, (3) a combination of the two.
Admiral Smith said that the October 14th directive on Fleet security contemplated air attack on
Pearl Harbor, but that in the minds of the people out there such an attack was not expected. Un-
fortunately, he said, he believed that the attitude of most of the officers there was that they did not
believe that the Japanese had the "guts" to try such an attack, and if they had they would not get
away with it. He said that the estimate of the situation contained in the Pacific Fleet Contributory
War Plan issued around July 1. 1941, had contemplated Japanese attack upon the outlying islands and
against Malay and the Philippines, but did not consider an air attack against Pearl Harbor itself.
(p. 57)
Security measures were prescribed covering:
A. Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor.
B. Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air
patrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the
entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet
or Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) to screen heavy ships, other
than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice.
The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas as directed by
Aircraft, Scouting Force; an air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task
Force; air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than
described in the preceding. There was also to be a daily sweep for magnetic
and anchored mines.
Security provisions were also prescribed for:
C. Sortie and entry.
Concerning Pacific Fleet Confidential letter 2CL-41 dealing with the
security of the Fleet, Admiral Anderson said that prior to December 7 on
more than one occasion he had proposed changes to the effect that whenever
ships entered or sortied, depth charges should be dropped by the destroyers.
This would be for the purpose of training and also for the purpose of having
any Japanese submarines in the area assume defensive rather than ofi'ensive
attitudes, (p. 395)
D. Operating areas.
E. Ships at sea.
F. Ships in port.
The security provisions covering defense against air attack (G) referred to the
anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor, and directed that Marine defense
battalions would assist; that any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all fleet aviation
shore based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; that air defense sectors
and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor were prescribed;
Admiral Pye said that in regard to the Commander-in-Chief's instructions
for the security of ships at port, the only thing that was questionable in his
mind was the part about the sector fire control; he never felt that ships
could or should be confined to one sector; he had written a modification of the
order which he said was not in effect but simply to eliminate the responsi-
bility which he did not feel could be carried out by any Sector Commander.
(p. 167)
that the senior officer embarked, exclusive of CincPac, should insure berthing
so as to develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire; that ComFOURTEEN as
Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory
control over the defense against air attack, and take other action including super-
visory control over naval shore based aircraft and arranging through the
Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort between
the Army and the Navy, and coordinating Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base
defense by advising the Senior Officer Present (exclusive of CincPac) of the con-
dition of readiness to maintain,
Admiral Smith interprets the directive in 2CL-41 concerning the condition
of readiness as granting authority to ComFOURTEEN to order conditions
of readiness, (p. 55)
and by holding drills, etc.
•This, Admiral Kimmel testified, contemplated a surprise air attack. However, it was merely an
assumption on which to base training— there being sufficient probability of such an attack to justify training.
He thought it more probable that the Japanese would attack while the Fleet was away from, rather than at.
Pearl Harbor. But it was never considered more than a possibility which ordinary prudence would make
him guard against (page 287).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 413
Three conditions of naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition
III read as follows:
"Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship
in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each
sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."
The procedure to be followed in the event of an air attack was also set forth,
under which the Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency sortie
orders sending destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and sub-
marines for sortie, the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a striking
unit, etc., and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm indicating
that an attack was in progress or imminent, should inform the Task Force Com-
mander at sea of the attack and type of attacking aircraft, should launch air search
for enemy ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available.
The action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set
forth. This provided, among other things, that in such event the ship attacked
was, among other things, to originate a plain language dispatch containing the
essential details, various actions were to be taken by other ships, and the Patrol
Wings to assume readiness for search and for offensive action, carry out search
as directed by Task Force Commander, and prepare to establish station patrol at
a 220 mile radius from the scene of attack at one hour before daylight of the next
succeeding daylight period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to
relieve planes over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in
which case the instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have
priority. This also provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack
may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack."
It also stated that "(3) it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack
may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of
fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefor,
assembly his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions
warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be
located by air search or other means."
It may be noted that Admiral Kitts stated that he continued as Fleet Gunnery
Officer until September, 1942, and that the plans made by Admiral Kimmel were
not essentially changed after the attack. The plans were generally sound, he said,
but after Pearl Harbor, the Fleet got guns and men to make the plans effective.
Nets and balloons were subsequently installed, but the balloons were later re-
moved, as they interfered with operations (page 527).
Admiral McMorris said that they were not entirely satisfied with the
arrangements for coordinating air warnings, air operations from the different
services, and anti-aircraft from ships and shore, and there were discussions
and conferences to improve the same. On the whole, however, he felt that
his view was that the security arrangements set forth in the Fleet Security
letter was satisfactory or else he would have recommended a change,
(p. 239)
Exhibit 58 — Pacific Fleet Letter 23CL-42, prescribing battle organization
and conditions of readiness watches at sea, as issued by Admiral Nimitz on May 6,
1942, it was said, amounts to a reissue of Admiral Kimmel's instructions (page
503) . It may be noted that Condition III, as defined in this letter, provided that
all anti-aircraft batteries were to be manned on BB's, CA's and CL's, and one-
half on CV's. Also it may be noted that in this letter, Admiral Nimitz stated
that he believed that with efficient radar and the security afforded by air and
surface screening. Condition III would normally meet security requirements
when not in contact with the enemy. These provisions differ somewhat from
Admiral Kimmel's letter on the same subject, dated February 21, 1941, a copy
of which is annexed to Exhibit 58.
XII. Intelliqence in Washington — The Interception and Decodino
OF Secret Japanese Communications
A. ONI DISTRIBUTION AND ACQUISITION OF INTELLIGENCE IN GENERAL
Captain McCollum, officer-in-charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Office
of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, said that his
duties consisted of evaluating all forms of intelligence concerning the Far East,
correlating it, and informing the Director of Naval Intelligence and through him.
the Chief of Naval Operations, (p. 10) In case information of serious import
414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was received, it was his responsibility to immediately bring it to the attention
of the Director of Naval Intelligence and recommend necessary action. Usually
direct access was available to Admiral Turner, Director of the Plans Division,
and to the Chief of Naval Operations himself, (p. 20)
Speaking of the dissemination of information to the fleet commanders. Captain
McCollum said that the Office of Naval Intelligence was responsible for preparing
from the information available to it factual statements, which did not make an
estimate of enemy intention. These statements were then submitted by the Intel-
ligence Division to the Plans Division and to CNO, who made the decision as
to what, if anything, was to be disseminated to the fleet, (p. 20) He said that
prior to about February, 1941, the Division of Naval Intelligence had occasionally
submitted estimates of probable enemy intentions, but that at about that date its
authority to do so was removed. Thereafter, ONI was restricted to presenting
the facts of the situation, and higher echelons made and disseminated the esti-
mates as to enemy intentions, (p. 41'-4^)
Captain McCollum made the following general statement as to the organization
of the office of Naval Intelligence: (p. 40-41)
"The ONI was not an omnipotent and over-all intelligence center for the fleet
as a whole. It operated primarily as an intelligence center for the Chief of Naval
Operations in the Navy Department; equipped to supply combat type of intel-
ligence, ivhich prior to outbreak of war is nearly always closely related with
diplomatic negotiations. Each of our major commanders in the Pacific was
equipped with a staff of intelligence and with a radio intelligence staff which
served him directly. With the exception of more static types of intelligence, such
as the design of a Japanese battleship, and so on, your coinbat intelligence was
designed to function in the Navy Department to advise the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, at Pearl Harbor to advise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, through
his fleet intelligence officer, . . . and in the Asiatic Fleet, which in some
respects, from an intelligence point of view, was our strongest organization, to
keep the CinC. Asiatic Fleet, advised.
"The Division of Naval Intelligence, in addition to that, did try to make
[available] certain over-all intelligence agencies in foreign countries which would
produce intelligence. In each case in the Asiatic Theatre those intelligence
agencies operating out there were made known to the CinC, Asiatic Fleet, and
their reports in every case funneled to him and to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet. Our naval attaches, for instance, were under orders to submit
copies of every report that they made both to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic
Fleet, and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as well as to the Department.
So, you had in effect a three point system in which combat intelligence coynmon
to any one of them was common to all the others, with each Commander-in-Chief
supreme in his own area. And that is essentially the way it has functioned
throughout the war."
Captain McCollum said that there was close cooperation between the Far
Eastern Section of ONI and the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence
Division (Army). He stated {p. 20-21):
"The Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division had full
information of the situation, ^e were in daily consultation. I saw Colonel
Bratton or one of his assistants daily. They usually came to my office in the
afternoon. They had full access to my charts showing the location and move-
ments of ships, and they had full access to all of the radio intelligence information
available in the Navy Department. That was given by me personally and
verbally and the situation discussed from day to day with officers of the Far
Eastern Section of MIS in the PV ar Department, and that had been true for some
months past. \\ e made no major move, for instance, such as withdrawing our
naval language officers from Japan or sending a dispatch out to destroy all codes
and ciphers . . . without notifying my opposite number in the TT' ar Department
what we intended to do."
Captain McCollum said that so far as he knew all Army information was
made available to his section in ONI. He said, however, that the Army radio
intelligence organizations did not furnish information of value regarding the
Jap Fleet, since "they didn't touch the Jap Navy systems." Any radio intelli-
gence organizations were working on Jap diplomatic ciphers and on certain
minor Japanese Army systems, {p. 22-23)
The cooperation between the Far Eastern Section of ONI and the Far Eastern
section of the Military Intelligence service was "unofficial," but had the sanction
and approval of both the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of
Military Intelligence, Assistarit Chief of Staff, G-2.. {p. 23)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 415
Vice Admiral Wilkinson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence on 7
December, 1941, and for about 2 months prior to that date, named the following
as, in general, the sources of information available to the Far Eastern Section of
the foreign branch of ONI: Naval Attache reports from Japan and China, ob-
servers reports from various ports in the Far East, reports from the Commander-
in-Chief of the Asiatic Section, collateral items of interest produced by the inves-
tigations of the domestic branch of ONI, particularly from Honolulu, radio
intelligence. State Department reports from diplomatic agents and reports from
the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor with respect to searches
and radio intelligence (p. 390).
Admiral Wilkinson stated that it was his xirder standing, confirmed by Admiral
Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Operations, that final evaluation of information
received from the Office of Naval Intelligence was the function of War Plans or
the Chief of Natal Operations. Dissemination of inforrnation outside of the
Navy Department and to the Pacific Fleet was, likewise, understood to be the
responsibility of War Plans or the Chief of Naval Operations following their
evaluation and selection of those items which they believed should be forwarded,
(p. 892)
Admiral Wilkinson said that such analyses as were made in the office of
Naval Intelligence were submitted to War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations
to use as they saw fit. (p. 392)
Questioned regarding the exchange of intelligence in Washington between the
Army and the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson replied that ONI and G-2 were in
constant communication with each other and that in fact General Miles, Head
of Military Intelligence was dining with him on the night of 6 December, (p.
4O8-4O9) Admiral Wilkinson stated that through this steady and effective
liaison, all the information the Navy had regarding movements of the Japanese
fleet was furnished the Army. (p. 409)
The organization of the OfBce of Naval Intelligence had been revised on August
11, 1941. It consisted of a Director, Assistant Director, Domestic Branch,
Foreign Branch, Administrative Branch, and field offices (page 461). Captain
Heard was in charge of the Foreign Branch of ONI from October 9, 1941 to June
30, 1942 (page 461).
He stated that Intelligence was distributed as follows: Urgent, by oral report;
usually a daily Japanese summary to the Director of Naval Intelligence by the
head of the Far East Section, which was relayed to CNO; a daily summary of
State Department dispatches; weekly reports of dispositions of foreign fleets;
a daily bulletin for the Naval Aide to the President; fortnightly summaries of
current international situations and sometimes special summaries; and dispatches
to foreign posts and naval attaches. Generally, the information was evaluated
as to credibility and to a less degree as to the conclusions to be drawn. War Plans
made the final evaluation of enemy intentions. Copies of all reports and oral
reports were directed to the Chief of Naval Operations. A daily report of political
information was made to CNO (page 462). MiUtary information was promptly
passed to CNO (page 463). (1)
Admiral Ingersoll recalled receiving frequent visits from a Naval Communi-
cations Officer who had Japanese messages, but whether he saw all of the
messages or not he did not know. (p. 417-8)
In the exchange of information as to United States-Japanese relations, there
was close cooperation between the State Department and the Navy, according
to Maxwell M. Hamilton, who during the latter part of 1941 was Chief of Division
of Far Eastern Affairs in State Department. He stated that he had frequent
contact with Admiral Schuirmann (page 1070) which involved questions which
came up for decision involving foreign policy and naval policy (page 1071).
The methods of furnishing information to the Navy on matters of United States-
Japanese relations were: (1) the liaison office forwarded copies of paraphrases
of telegrams or mail reports of interest to the Navy; (2) the Division of Far
Eastern Affairs transmitted paraphrases of telegrams and mail reports from the
Far East of interest to the Navy Department; (3) Conferences between Navy
and State Department officials and meetings of the war council and Cabinet
(page 1071). In general, he said, diplomatic information was transmitted to
the Navy (page 1073),
One of the sources of Japanese military and naval information was Captain
Smith-Hutton, who in 1941 was naval attache in Tokyo and who, as part of his
416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOB ATTACK
duties, was part of ONI. Ambassador Grew, he said, expected him to keep
advised as to the Japanese Navy and they exchanged information (page 1079).
He had great difficulty in obtaining Japanese military and naval information
(page 1077). He had informed the Navy Department by implication in a report
that they could not depend on him to keep them informed concerning the Jap-
anese Navy. He had to report to the Japanese Navy whenever he left Tokyo
and his movements were restricted (page 1080).
He transmitted information by Japanese cable to the 4th Marine Radio in
Shanghai and thence to the United States; and also by reports to Ambassador
Grew and to the Navy Department by diplomatic pouch (page 1078).
By far the most important source of information in Washington as to the
Japanese, however, was communications intelligence, which is discussed in the
following paragraph.
B. THE INTERCEPTION AND DECODING OF SECRET JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS
Captain Safford made the following statements regarding the methods of
obtaining and decoding Japanese diplomatic and consular dispatches during
1941. (p. 103-104):
"They were initially ohtain°A from intercepts of Japanese diplomatic mes-
sages between Tokyo and foreign points; mostly radio intercepts and occasionally
land wire or cable. Some were photographs of station copies as they passed
through the various commercial communication facilities, but roughly ninety-
five per cent were obtained by radio intercept of the U. S. Army and U. S. Navy
at various points. They were all decoded by means of reconstructed Japanese
systerns. The principal was the ^purple,' which is a complicated electrical
machine solved by the Army and machines made both by the Army and the Navy
and two machines, in fact, sent to London for the use of the British. The Jig—
19 at this period was solved by cryptographic analysis. That had to be done
over again each day, and it really took more time and effort to keep abreast of
the Jig-19 than it did the 'purple' once we had the machine reconstructed. In
all these systems, 'purple,'iJig-19,^andJhe minorlsy stems, we had an exchange
between Washington, Singapore, Corregidor, and London. We pooled our
efforts on that.
Captain Safford said that after Japanese messages were decoded they were
evaluated and distributed as follows (p. 104-106):
"They were translated in the translation sections of the Navy Department unit
and the War Department unit and the senior translator decided which were of
relative unimportance, not worth writing up smooth, mostly connected with
financial matters and visas and things like that; and the others were all typed
smooth and turned over to Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, re-
spectively. Originally the two intelligence organizations had prepared briefs
or memorandums giving a summation or a paraphrase of the messages and they
were distributed to the higher officials in the War and Navy Departments and to
the Secretary of State and to the President.
"In the Navy Department the people that saw them were, specifically, the
Chief of Naval Operations and his aide usually saw them; the Assistant Chief of
Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Director of Naval
Communications, and the Director of the War Plans Division. The Secretary
of the Navy also saw them and usually his aide saw them. The Naval Aide
to the President saw them and took them in to the President.
"In the War Department they went to the Military Intelligence, Chief Signal
Officer, Director of the War Plans Division, and the Chief of Staff, War Depart-
ment, and also to the Secretary of War.
"Later on, in November, when things became critical, at the request of the
President and after conference agreement between Military Intelligence and Naval
Intelligence, the system of summaries and briefs was dropped and the original
messages were prepared in folders and each day the folder was taken through.
By agreement, all dissemination to the White House was handled through the
Navy Department, and in return all dissemination to the State Department was
handled through the Army, but the two things were duplicates. Anything the
Navy was sending around, the copy was sent to the Army, and anything the
Army was sending around, a copy was sent to the Navy; and they put on a
serial number. Ours were JD-1 and the Army's were SI-X, with a serial; so
they were substantially duplicates unless something went wrong.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 417
"/n addition, it was the habit to put notations on the bottom as to references,
and Kramer, when he took his stuff around, everything that was referenced to
anything bearing on this subject was put on the off side of the page, so that you
had the message on one side and the references on the other side, the left hand
side, of the folder. Then, anybody seeing them had a complete picture. And
Kramer went with them and stood in the doorway or outside and if there was
any doubt, he could be called in to explain further to anybody who was interested
in the subject. Kramer also went to the White House, I believe twice. Normally
he would explain things to the Naval Aide to the President and the aide would
depend on his memory to answer any questions the President might want to
ask. The President insisted on seeing the original messages because he was
afraid when they tried to condense them, some one would change the meaning."
Admiral Wilkinson stated that with regard to the exchange of ratio intelligence
with the Army, that complete liaison existed between the decrypting agencies and
complete exchange of actual texts immediately after their translation {p. 408).
A vitally important Japanese code had been broken. This source of intelligence
was handled jointly by Naval Communications and the Office of Naval Intelligence.
Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, who was Director of Naval Communications, said
that Communications handled the interception and crypto-analysis of Japanese
code messages and the information derived was turned over to ONI. This was a
special procedure followed because this information was most secret, and would be
useless if any inkling reached the enemy that we could read his communications
(page 1026).
According to Admirals Redman and Ingersoll, it was the function of the Office
of Naval Intelligence to evaluate and to distribute this information (pages 1102,
818).
Admiral Ingersoll stated that there was no set routine for the distribution of this
information. It was distributed by Commander Kramer when there was anything
important involved. The Director of War Plans kept a current estimate of the
military-political situation and conferred frequently with the Chief of Naval
Operations (page 819). He said that Commander Kramer almost daily brought
quite a number of intercepts to him (page 824). These were given to Admiral
Stark's Aide and were also shown to the Secretary of the Navy and possibly to the
Assistant SecNav, the President, the Secretary of State, the Director of War
Plans, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and to Captain Schuirmann.
Commander A. D. Kramer testified that between October 1 and December 7,
1941, he was attached to ONI and loaned to Op-20-G, Naval Communications.
He was head of a translation section of communication security. This consisted
of translating decrypted intercepts and dehvering them to ONI or to any persons
named by DONI or CNO. Fourteen copies were made and seven went to the
Army. The other seven copies were for delivery to officers in the Navy Depart-
ment and also to the White House or State Department. He had the responsibility
for delivery to the White House and Army for delivery to the State Department.
Addressees in the Navy Department who normallj^ got copies were the Aide to
SecNav, CNO, DONI, Head of Far East Section of ONI, Director Naval Com-
munications, and Head of War Plans Division (page 950). The seventh copy was a
file copy. A complete copy went to each addressee, delivery being made daily or
oftener if urgent. Earlier in 1941 he had attached a summarj- with asterisks to
indicate important documents as the daily volume was so heavy (sometimes 130
messages a dajO that the addressees would not have time to read all the mes-
sages. He marked and delivered the messages and it was up to the addressees
as to what they would read. All decrypted Japanese traffic was passed to his
section. He knows the Japanese language (page 951).
The decision as to whether translated messages 'should be passed to higher
authority was made by ONI and he acted for DONI. As a rule an attempt was
made to show the messages to AlcCoUum and DONI before distributing -them.
Nothing was eliminated from the books of messages, but occasionally DONI would
indicate something as being of greater or lesser interest to CNO or SecNav (page
953-4). During the latter part of the year he discontinued making summaries
(page 954). As Japanese-United States relations were then strained, he used
clips to indicate the important matter so as to get the information to those con-
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 28
418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cerned as swiftly as possible. He left the folder of messages for CNO with CNO's
aide customarily. On "hot" messages, he often gave it to CNO personally
(page 955).
C. FAILURE TO SEND THIS SECRET INFORMATION TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL
The information obtained from the interception and decoding of secret Japanese
communications was not sent, as such, to Admiral Kimmel. It will be recalled
that he had earlier requested that he be kept promptly advised of developments
and that the responsibility for furnishing secret information to him be fixed
by Admiral Stark; and, that he had been advised that ONI was aware of its
responsibility in this connection.
Information of the greatest importance, as will later appear, was obtained
from secret Japanese communications, particularly after the resignation of the
Japanese Cabinet and the arrival of the special Japanese emissary, Kurusu.
In his testimony, Admiral Kimmel asserted that he had not been adequately
informed of this information; Admiral Stark asserted that Admiral Kimmel had
been kept adequately informed by the various dispatches sent to him.
Admiral Redman said that although none of the intercepted messages were
sent to Admiral Kimmel, as intercepted and decoded, they were used as the
basis of the dispatches sent to him. He said that it was beyond the capabilities
of his organization to encode and transmit all this traffic to CincPac. This
information could not be sent by air mail. Its security was important as the source
of intelligence would be jeopardized if the enemy knew of our success in inter-
preting it. The secrecy of this material has been vital to war effort since December
7, 1941 (page 1102). His section could have handled sending briefs of these
messages to CincPac (page 1105). Admiral Noyes said that it would have been a
physical impossibility to keep CincPac informed of the contents of all "purple"
messages (page 1045) and, according to Admiral IngersoU, it would have been
too much of a burden on naval communications to repeat all the intercepts to
CincPac, although selections therefrom might have been sent (page 839).
Admiral Turner said that Admiral Kimmel was kept adequately informed and
that the information not sent to him would have been of no help to him (page
1014). Moreover, he had thought that CincPac had the same intelligence that
CNO did, including the "super-secret" class of information (page 1018).
It may be noted that General Marshall said that he did not see all of the
intercepts, nor was the decision as what should be passed on to the field coin-
manders always instituted by him (pages 874-7) .
XIII. Resignation of Japanese Cabinet — Arrival of Kurusu — The Pos-
sibility OF A Surprise Aggressive Movement
a. the dispatch of OCTOBER 16, 1941
Following the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet, Admiral Turner drafted
a dispatch to CincPac and others, which the Joint Board approved (page 989).
Admiral Turner said that he prepared the dispatch of October 16 which
had been discussed with the Army and modified by the Joint Board, (p. 263)
Admiral Ingersoll said that the dispatch of October 16 concerning the
change in the Japanese cabinet was based on an estimate by Admiral Stark
and Captain Turner and he had no recollection of any correspondence from
the State Department which would have formed the basis for that dispatch.
(p. 423)
Admiral Turner said that at this time he was convinced that if the Japanese
attacked England in the Far East, the United States would go to war to aid
England, and that the Japanese had decided to drive Britain out of the Far
East. Some Japanese, he said, wanted to keep the United States out of this
war, but the United States during 1940 and 1941 had made movements contrary
to Japan's interest, and the whole political situation and Japanese interest in
the Philippines convinced him that war was not far off. He considered that
Japan would take the initiative (page 990).
He estimated where such an attack might be made, and had issued Rainbow
War Plan No. 3 in January, which envisaged an attack by Japan against the
Philippines, Borneo, and Malaya, and called attention to the fact that the Sec-
retary of the Navy had written to the Secretary of War in January, 1941, stating
that such an attack would be accompanied by an attack on Hawaii and on the
Fleet by air, submarine or surface vessels (page 990).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 419
On October 16th, when the dispatch was sent, he still considered that the
same considerations set forth in the Secretary of the Navy's January letter con-
tinued in effect. These matters, he said, were constantly discussed with Ad-
mirals Stark and Ingersoll (page 991).
The dispatch of October 16, 1941 (Exhibit 13), stated that the resignation of
the Japanese Cabinet had created a grave situation; if a new cabinet were formed,
it would probably be strongly nationalistic and anti- American ; if the Konoye
Cabinet remained, it would operate under a new mandate which would not
include rapproachment with the United States; in either case, hostilities between
Japan and Russia were a strong possibility; since the United States and Britain
were held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation, there was a
possibility that Japan might attack these two powers. In view of these possi-
bilities, the addressees were directed to take due precautions, including such
"preparatory deployments" as would not disclose strategic intention nor con-
stitute provocative action against Japan. CincPac and CincAF were directed
to inform appropriate Army and Navy District authorities.
Exhibit 6 is the October 16, 1941 dispatch from CNO to CincPac. (p. 30)
Admiral Leary said that he thought there was complete and free inter-
change of information among the higher naval command. He, however,
did not recall having seen or having heard discussed the October 16 dis-
patch or the war warning, (p. 364-5)
Concerning the change in the Japanese Cabinet in October, 1941, Admiral
Schuirmann said that the State Department had not taken as serious a view
of this Cabinet shift as had the Navy Department, (p. 408)
General Short stated that he had been advised of this dispatch through Admiral
Kimmel (page 247). Apparently the Navy Department did not advise the State
Department of the dispatch (Schuirmann, page 200).
According to Admiral Turner, the "preparatory deployments" conteniplated
by the dispatch were the sending of submarines to the Marshalls and sending the
Fleet to sea westward of Hawaii and in supporting and covering positions for
Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands (page 991).
Admiral Smith said concerning the directive to take "preparatory deploy-
ment" that an alert was sent to the forces in the operating areas, the training
exercises were halted, the ships assembled with their destroyer screens and
placed until further orders as a fleet and kept at sea, and directed to advise
of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area; the ships in
port, however, were not moved out although conditions of readiness were
prescribed; this was not done for the protection of the base. (p. 49-50)
Admiral Halsey said that the "preparatory deployments" effected after
the October 16 dispatch included readiness of the ships to take action and
the dispatch of submarines to Midway and Wake, and also sending addi-
tional guns and ammunition there, (p. 296)
Concerning "preparatory deployments" directed in the October 16 dis-
patch, Admiral Ingersoll said:
"I think the prepatory deployments that would not constitute provocative
action and disclose strategic intention against Japan referred more to the
withdrawal of certain units of the Asiatic Fleet from the China Sea area
toward the southern Philippines, rather than to any particular deployment of
the Pacific Fleet, with the possible exception of sending out submarines for
observation. It will be noted that the dispatch is addressed to both the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic
Fleet. I wish to state here, in connection with this dispatch and others which
followed, that they were released by me. In all cases, such dispatches were
drafted in the War Plans Division and were presented to Admiral Stark for
consideration before being sent. In many cases, I am quite certain that he
may have notified both the State Department and the President of his
intention to send dispatches of this character. The fact that it bears my
release simply means that after the original draft was presented and corrected
by Admiral Stark, in order to save time and not bother him further, I released
the dispatch in the form which he had approved." (p. 423)
Admiral Ingersoll said further he did not recall that they expected the
Pacific Fleet, as distinguished from the Asiatic Fleet, to make any important
new dispositions, (p. 423)
The direction not to take provocative action against Japan was inserted by him
because the State and Navy Departments were agreed that the United States
should get as much time as possible to prepare, and there were conversations with
420 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Japanese which appeared on the surface to be a possible solution so there
would be no war, and this government did not desire war with the Japanese at
that time. Therefore, they did not want the Fleet to assume a threatening
position by cruising near the Marshalls or sending submarines near the Japanese
islands. Nor did they want to arrest disloyal people in Hawaii. They wanted to
retain peace as long as possible and to make sure that when war came, it would be
Japan and not the United States which started it (page 992). The question of
shifting the Fleet back to the West Coast had been continuously discussed, he
said. This was put up to the President and each time it was decided to keep the
Fleet out there, except that about one-third or one-quarter of the Fleet would
come to the West Coast for repairs and recreation. But, by October 16th, every
one believed that the Fleet should stay at Pearl Harbor (page 992).
It is of interest to note that at about this time Admiral Turner had a conference
with Nomura, at which, according to Nomura, Admiral Turner said to him that
what the United States wanted was not just a pretense, but a definite promise;
that should a conference be held between the leaders of the two governments
without a definite preliminary agreement, and should an advance be made into
Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament; that Japan
spoke of peace in the Pacific as if she could decide matters independently, and
so it would seem to Admiral Turner that Japan could set aside most of her obliga-
tions toward the Three-Power Alliance (Doc. 2 — Exhibit 63) .
B. ADMIRAL STARK's LETTER OF OCTOBER 17, 1941
On October 17, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (exhibit 38).
In this letter. Admiral Stark advised that things had been popping here for the
last twenty-four hours, but from the dispatches Admiral Kimmel knew about all
that they did. He said, "Personally, I do not believe the Japanese are going to
sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the 'possibility;' in fact, I
tempered the message handed me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope
not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we
should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend."
Admiral Stark continued that Admiral Kimmel would recall that in an earlier
letter, when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in August,
Admiral Stark had said that his own judgment was that they would make no
move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite trend. In
this letter he said that he thought this whole thing worked up together. He
stated that efforts would be made to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How
long it could be kept going, he did not know, but the President and Mr. Hull were
working on it. To this letter was annexed a postscript, stating in part, "General
Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of reconnaissance
so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack
may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against
any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we
keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of
these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are
on guard to the best of our abilitj", and my advice to him was not to worry."
Also annexed was a memorandum of October 17, 1941, by Rear Admiral
Schuirmann, estimating the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet. The
substance of this analysis was that the military would determine Japanese action
whether to attack Russia or move southward, and would make that decision on the
basis of opportunity and what they could get away with, and that it would not be
determined by the cabinet in power.
C. JAPANESE MESSAGES CONCERNING GERMAN ATTITUDE: NOMURA's DESIRE TO
RESIGN
On October 18, 1941, the Navy translated an intercepted Japanese communica-
tion from Berlin to Tokyo, dated October 1, 1941, which stated that the Germans
were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Japan's position, particularly because
Japan was not advising Germany of the negotiations with the United States,
although the United States was advising England (Document 4, Exhibit 63).
A Japanese message from Tokyo to Washington, dated October 16, 1941, was
ntercepted and translated on October 17, 1941. In this Toyoda advised Nomura
that although he had been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors
in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-United States
negotiations, he had, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been de-
clining to do so. However, early in October, following the German attacks on
American merchant ships and the consequent revival of the movement for revision
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 421
of the neutrality act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Govern-
ment submit to the American Government a message that if the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration continued to attack the Axis powers, a belligerent situation would
inevitably arise between German}-, Italy and the United States, which, under the
Three-Power Agreement, might lead Japan to join immediately the war against
the United States. It was indicated that such a message was being considered
and there were reasons which would not permit of postponement (Document 3,
Exhibit 63).
On October 22, 1941, Nomura sent a message to Tokyo which was intercepted
and translated on October 23, 1941, in which he said that he was sure that he, too,
should go out with the former cabinet; that he knew that the Secretary of State
realized how sincere he was and yet how little influence he had in Japan; that there
were some Americans who trusted him and who said that things would get better
for him, but that their encouragement was not enough; that among his confreres
in the United States there were some who felt the same way, that they were all
poor deluded souls; that the instructions could be carried out by Wakasugi; that
Nomura did not want to be the bones of a dead horse; that he did not want to con-
tinue "this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people"; that he was not trying
to flee froin the field of battle, but as a man of honor, that was the only way open
for him to tread; and that he sought permission to return to Japan (Document 5,
Exhibit 63).
On October 23, 1941, a message from Tokyo to Washington of the same date was
intercepted and translated, which stated that the efforts Nomura was making were
appreciated; that, as he was well aware, the outcome of those negotiations had a
great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government would
proceed; that as such it was an exceedingly important matter; that they were
placing all of their reliance on Nomura's reports for information on this matter;
that for these reasons they hoped that he would see fit to sacrifice his personal
wishes and remain at his post (Document 6, Exhibit 63) .
D. ADMIRAL BLOCH's LETTER ON INADEQUACY OF LOCAL DEFENSE
On October 17, 1941, Admiral Bloch wrote a letter dealing with the local
defense forces and their inadequacy (Exhibit 46). In this letter. Admiral Bloch
stated that he recently had tried to obtain, without much success, the assign-
ment from the Commander-m-Chief of certain planes which could be used in
connection with anti-submarine patrol; the only planes available for the purpose
were Army planes, the types and numbers of which were inadequate for the
purpose. Admiral Kimmel's endorsement pointed out that any assumption
that forces could be diverted from the Fleet for this purpose were false; that a
Fleet tied to its base by diversion of light forces necessary for its security at
sea is no Fleet at all, and that the Fleet was assigned, in the event of war, certain
tasks which would require aU of its units and men,
E. ADMIRAL KIMMEl's ESTIMATE AND ACTION
Admiral Kimmel stated that after receiving the October 16th dispatch, he
did not consider war imminent. He tried to find out, he said, what the United
States would do if Japan attacked the maritime provinces, but received no an-
swer; he learned, after December 7th, that the United States had made a com-
mitment to England to the effect that, even if not attacked, she would aid England
in the Far East (page 297).
Admiral Turner said, "That detachment went to Australia for the purpose
of indicating to Japan solidarity between the United States and the British
Commonwealth, and to indicate to Japan that if British interests were
attacked that the United States would enter the war on the side of the
British. Admiral Stark kept the Commanders-in-Chief informed, to the best
of his ability, as to the international political situation and the probabilities
of the future. While the Government could not guarantee that we would
enter the war if Japan attacked Great Britain, they fully believed that we
would do so. In our conversations with the British, we never could make
a firm commitment that at any particular time the United States would enter
the war, for the reason that unless we were attacked first, the Executive
Department did not have the power to put the Country into war. Conversa-
tions were held in the Far East with the Dutch and the British authorities, and
joint plans, not too definite in nature, were drawn up but we never could
be sure that if the Netherlands East Indies or the British were attacked the
United States would surely come into the war. (p. 254)
422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
He took the action described in his letter of October 22nd (Exhibit 14), which
was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations (page 297). In his letter, Ad-
miral Kimmel advised that the action taken included maintaining two submarines
for patrol at Midway, dispatching twelve patrol planes to Midway, preparing to
send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, and to replace the six at Midway
from Pearl Harbor, sending two submarines to Wake, and sending additional
Marines and stores there, dispatching additional Marines to Palmyra, placing
Admiral Pye and his ships on twelve hours notice, getting six submarines ready
to depart for Japan on short notice, putting some additional security measures in
effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor.
It may be noted that in connection with his need for cruisers, Admiral Kimmel
stated in this letter that, "I can easily keep three or four more divisions profitably
occupied when war breaks." The letter also stated, among other things, that
Admiral Kimmel was. forwarding an exhaustive study on the installations and
defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra.
Admiral Stark testified that Admiral Kimmel's action, as set forth in his letter,
was considered satisfactory.
Admiral Kimmel's War Plans Officer, Admiral Mc Morris, testified that the
October 16th dispatch had indicated to him that there was a greater chance that
the United States would be involved in war with Japan (page 887). Admiral
Pye stated that he had not seen the October 16th dispatch, nor did he have any
knowledge of it. He was on the Pacific Coast and about that time received a
dispatch from CincPac to be prepared to return to Oahu, whereupon he recalled
his officers and men and put his force on twelve hours sailing notice (page 423).
Admiral Bloch recalled that after the dispatch advising of the change in the
Japanese Cabinet there was a conference with Admiral Kimmel, whom he
saw practically every day. He does not recall who else was present, (p. 14)
Concerning the October 16, 1941 dispatch, Admiral Smith said that to the
best of his recollection no specific change of plans was made because they
had received warnings constantly for a period of more than a year; he did not
recall that anything was done particularly about that dispatch; he believed
that everyone of the dispatches of that nature were discussed by General
Short, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, and usually with members of the
staff, (p. 48)
F. THE FIRST JAPANESE "DEADLINE" MESSAGE
It will be recalled that throughout this period the Navy Department was
receiving information from intercepted Japanese communications. Some of
these indicated that the Japanese Government had established "deadlines" for
the completion of diplomatic negotiations. The first was a Navy translation
on November 5, 1941 (Exhibit 63, Document 7), of an intercepted Japanese mes-
sage from Tokyo to Washington), dated November 5, 1941, the substance of which
was: This message is of "utmost secrecy." It is absolutely necessary that all
arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of the
month*. ... I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances
it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the
problem of saving Japanese-United States relations from falling into a chaotic
condition. . . .
G. ADMIRAL STARK's LETTER OF NOVEMBER 7, 1941
On November 7, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel in reply to
Admiral Kimmel's letter of October 22nd (Exhibit 74). He stated, among other
things, "O. K. on the dispositions which you made in connection with recent
change in the Japanese cabinet. The big question is — what next?!" Also,
"Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when
it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I
have written you before; it continually gets 'worser and worser'I A month may
see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever —
particularly if one party cannot live with the setup. It doesn't look good."
Admiral Kitts said that he was in Washington on temporary duty between
October 6 and November 8, and that when he returned to Hawaii he carried
a message from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel to be delivered orally,
that Admiral Stark outlined the courses of action which the Japanese might
follow, and that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was in no way indicated
by the message which he carried, (p. 187)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 423
H. JAPANESE INTEREST IN SHIPS AT THE PHILIPPINES AND SEATTLE
During the first half of November, there were translated in Washington various
intercepted Japanese communications concerning ships and planes at Manila and
Seattle (Documents 1-8, Exhibit 68). According to one of these messages, which
was dated November 5, 1941, the Navy General Staff wanted investigation done
at Manila as to the conditions of airports, types of planes and numbers of planes
there, warships there, machinery belonging to land forces, and the state of progress
being made on all equipment and establishments.
I. ARRIVAL OF KURUSU; STARK AND MARSHALL RECOMMENDATION AS TO
ULTIMATUM
The special Japanese emissary Kurusu arrived in Washington at this time.
Admiral Smith said that when Kurusu was en route to the United States,
his plane broke down at Midway. Admiral Bellinger called up at night and
asked permission to fly him on in a PBY, and Admiral Smith told him not to
do this for it might be that the plane had been told by the administration to
break down; that they knew more about what was going on than Admirals
Bellinger and Smith knew and that Kurusu should be permitted to stay there.
Captain Wellborn discussed the general reaction to Kurusu's visit.
(p. 386).
The situation then existing was summarized by Nomura, in a report to Tokyo,
dated November 10, 1941, intercepted on November 12th (Document 8, Exhibit
63) by reference to a report from the legal adviser to the Japanese Embassy, who
had conferred with Senator Thomas and Secretary Hvill, that the United States
was not bluffing, that if Japan invaded again, the United States would fight with
Japan, that psychologically the American people were ready, that the Navy was
ready and prepared for action. Nomura also reported that he had a conversation
with "a, certain Cabinet member" who had said that Nomura was indeed a dear
friend, that he would tell him alone this: that the American government was
receiving reports that Japan would be on the move again and did not believe that
Nomura's visit to the President or the coming of Kurusu would have any effect
on the general situation. Nomura said that he had explained how impatient
the Japanese had become since the freezing, how eager they were for a quick
understanding, how they did not desire a Japanese-American war, and how they
hoped for peace until the end. The Cabinet member replied, however, that the
President and Secretary of State believed "those reports." Nomura also said
that his friend had stated that the United States could not stop because if Japan
moved, something would have to be done to save the "face" of the United States.
Admiral Stark was not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding
between the United States and Japan would come from Kurusu's visit. His
opinion was that it would be impossible to reconcile the Japanese and American
views. Admiral Stark so advised Admiral Kimmel by letter dated November 14,
1941 (Exhibit 39).
Concerning the withdrawal of Marines and gunboats from the Chinese
territory and waters. Admiral Schuirmann said: "I remember this proposal
but the United States and British armed forces from China were withdrawn
principally because they were in jeopardy and not because of a desire to
withdraw our forces as an example to the Japanese. Naturally, the sugges-
tion to the Japanese that they undertake to withdraw all their military, naval,
air, and police forces from China and from Indo-China was probably based
on desire to capitalize on this action in diplomatic course. The question of
withdrawal of our gunboats and Marines from China had been under dis-
cussion for since sometime during 1940. Various recommendations were
received from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and the question was
taken up with the State Department at various times during the year 1941.
The difficulty in reaching a decision was because of a number of factors,
such as the effect on the Chinese of our withdrawal, i. e., would it appear to
them that we were abandoning China to its fate; the question of the effect
on the Japanese, principally whether the Japanese would regard it as with-
drawing from China in fear of the Japanese or whether they would regard
it as a step preparatory to clearing the decks for action. As the situation
became more tense and upon receipt of Admiral Hart's letter of August 28,
1941, which was transmitted to the State Department on October 3, 1941,
the question was discussed many times with the State Department. Failing
to reach an agreement with the State Department, I prepared a memoran-
424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
dum, dated November 4, 1941, which Secretary Knox approved, suggesting
a plan for withdrawing from Shanghai, and on 8 November, the Chief
of Naval Operations sent a confidential message to the Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic, stating that the President had approved the withdrawal of Marines
from China except those required for communication and custodial duties,
and subject to State and Navy making a plan for orderly that civilians,
nationals, and others might have prior notice. November 14, the President
announced the decision to withdraw the Marines from Shanghai, and that
withdrawal would begin shortly." (p. 409-410)
Admiral Schuirmann said that the delay in taking the foregoing action
was due to a lack of agreement as to the eifect on the Japanese and the
Chinese and a certain lack of agreement as to the urgency of withdrawing
the Marines. The State Department was of the view that sufficient time
should be allowed to withdraw civilians in China before completely evacuating
the Marines. The State Department generally was in opposition to the
removal at least to the extent that the Navy was unable to get a definite
answer as to whether or not prior to November 4 the State Department
would agree, (p. 410)
With this letter, Admiral Stark also sent to Admiral Kimmel a copy of a memo-
randum, dated November 5, 1941, by Admiral Stark and General Marshall, for
the President. This was concerned with the belief of Chiang-Kai-Shek that a
Japanese attack on Kunming was imminent and that outside military support
was the sole hope for the defeat of that threat. The memorandum considered
whether the United States would be justified in undertaking offensive operations
against the Japanese to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. The memo-
randum stated that the Fleet in the Pacific was inferior to the Japanese Fleet
and could not undertake an unlimited strategic off"ensive in the Western Pacific.
It pointed out that b}' the middle of December 1941, United States air and sub-
marine strength in the Phillippines would become a positive threat to any Japan-
ese operations south of Formosa. The recommendations were in genera.! that all
aid short of war be given to China and that no ultimatum be given to Japan.
According to General Marshall, during 1941 he felt that war with Japan was
imminent and both he and Admiral Stark exerted their efforts to delay a break
with Japan as long as possible in order to be better prepared (page 860).
J. FURTHER AND FINAL JAPANESE "DEADLINE MESSAGES"
At this time, information was received in Washington that the Japanese
Government had established a further and final deadline for the completion of
diplomatic negotiations. This consisted of two messages from Tokyo to Wash-
ington, which were intercepted and tran&lated by the Army, as follows:
(a) A translation on November 1.7, 1941 (Document 10, Exhibit 63), of a dis-
patch, dated November 16th, the highUghts of which were:
. . . The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so
please fight harder than you ever did before.
What you say is of course so ... but I have only to refer j^ou to the fundamen-
tal policy laid down in my #725 (in which Togo says that conditions within and
without Japan will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with
the United States) . . . try to realize what that means. In your opinion we
ought to wait and see vrhat turn the war takes and remain patient . . . the
situation renders this out of the question. "I set the deadline for the solution of
these negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change. Please trj' to under-
stand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not ailow the United
States to side-track us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for
a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an
immediate solution."
(b) On November 22, 1941 (Document 11, Exhibit 63), a translation of a dis-
patch of the same date, reading in substance:
"To both you Ambassadors.
"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.
You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our
fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the
solution we desire. There are reasons bej'ond your ability to guess why we wanted
to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three
or four da3^s you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing
can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you — twenty ninth); if the
pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 425
Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have
decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline abso-
lutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.
Please take this into j^our careful consideration and work harder than you ever
have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors
alone."
General Marshall had no definite recollection but thought that he had been
informed of the various intercepts concerning the course of diplomatic conversa-
tions prior to December 6, 1941, such as the preceding "deadline" message
(page 871).
Admiral Turner was familiar with the second message establishing November
29th as the final "deadline" date. He interpreted this as meaning that Japan
was going to attack England, the United States, or both, and that forces were
already under way which could not be recalled. He knew such movements were
under way from sightings and dispatches from China and he thought that troops
were moving south and into Indo-China (page 904).
K. THE POSSIBILITY OF A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT
Mr. Grew said that on or about November 17, 1941, he telegraphed the State
Department and emphasized the need to guard against sudden Japanese action,
naval or military, in areas not involved in the Chinese theatre. He was taking
into account the probability that the Japanese would exploit the advantage of
surprise (page 1063). He had no idea of the definite date Japan would attack,
though he knew they had been preparing for any eventuality (page 1065).
Admiral Stark testified that he had received intelligence early in November that
the Japanese situation was so bad that the Japanese government had concluded
that a war or a diplomatic victory was necessary to distract popular attention, and
that a deadline had been fixed and then changed (page 159) He probably saw
the "deadline message."
On November 24, 1941 (Exhibit 15), a dispatch (which Admiral Stark said was
based in part on the "deadline" intercept — page 775), was sent by the Chief of
Naval Operations to CincAF, CincPac, ComELEVEN, ComTWELVE,
ComTHIRTEEN, and ComFIFTEEN for action, reading:
"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful x This
situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their
naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive move-
ment in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility x
Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to
inform senior Army officers their areas x Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to
complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action x Guam
will be informed separately"
Exhibit 7 is the November 24 dispatch from CNO to CincPac. (p. 30)
Admiral McMorris said that the dispatch of November 24th did not indi-
cate to him any new information, (p. 244)
Admiral Stark testified that he personally was responsible for the statement
that "... asurprise aggressive movement in any direction ..." was a possibility.
He stated that he had thought at the time that it might be on Hawaii and had
said so when he wrote these words in (page 49-50). The Philippines and Guam
were mentioned specifically, he said, because Japanese movements indicated an
attack to the south; this dispatch was intended to give a condensed picture of
the situation and left up to Admiral Kimmel the question of any additional
measures to be taken. No specific instructions were sent; they did not wish to
go "all-out" at the time (pages 50-53). Admiral Stark said that he always con-
sidered Japanese hostile action without declaration of war possible, and that
Hawaii was a possible place of attack, but that the information which he had
did not indicate that it was a probable place of attack (page 792) .
Admiral Turner said that the dispatch of November 24th was discussed in the
Joint Board and that at this time Admiral Stark and General Marshall were
conferring daily. Admiral Turner prepared this dispatch and it was referred to
General Marshall. It was changed in order to keep it from being too specific.
The Navy Department and War Department were not specific as they did not
want Admiral Kimmel not to be on guard as to other matters under his cog-
nizance. At this time. Admiral Turner was convinced that the Japanese were
going into Siam, Malaya, and attack the Philippines (page 996). He pointed
out that late in October 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations was convinced that
426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
war was coming and had diverted merchant shipping from the Central Pacific
to the south so that the ships would not be captured (page 1013).
Admiral Kunmel testified (page 298) that he felt that the dispatch of November
24th required no action other than the action which he had already taken; that he
considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a remote possibility; that he expected
a submarine attack at Pearl Harbor if the Philippines were attacked; that he
considered the words "in any direction," as used in the November 24th dispatch,
included Pearl Harbor only as regards submarine attack, and that any other
attack, other than on the Philippines or Guam, would be on foreign territorv
(page 299).
Admiral Smith stated that the words of this dispatch "in any direction including
Philippines or Guam" implied that the Japanese were not going any farther
eastward (page 534).
On November 25, 1941 (Exhibit 47), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel
in response to his letter of October. 17, 1941, on the inadequacy of local defense
forces in Hawaii (Exhibit 46). Admiral Stark stated that CincPac had taken
cognizance of his responsibilities in connection with tasks pertaining to the Ha-
waiian Coastal Frontier and that the forces available in the Hawaiian area, both
Fleet and local defense forces, and the actual operations of our own and hostile
forces would indicate the numbers of Fleet vessels or aircraft required to be
assigned to local defense tasks. Admiral Stark's letter continued by summarizing
the situation in regard to increasing the local defense forces and, among other
things, pointed out that the Department had no additional airplanes available
for assignment to the FOURTEENTH Naval District. A Marginal note on a
copy of this letter, ^.pparently written in Hawaii, stated, "In other words, look
to the Fleet. They seem to forget that the Fleet has offensive work to do."
On November 25, 1941 (Exhibit 16), Admiral Stark also wrote a personal letter
to Admiral Kimmel stating, among other things, that Admiral Stark agreed with
Admiral Kimmel that, for example, to cruise in Japanese home waters, Admiral
Kimmel should have a substantial increase in the strength of his fleet, but pointed
out that neither ABC-1 nor Rainbow-5 contemplated this as a general policy;
after the British strengthened Singa,pore, and under certain auspicious occasions,
opportunity for raids in Japanese waters might present themselves, but this
would be the exception rather than the rule. A postscript to this letter stated
that both Mr. Hull and the President confirmed the gravity of the situation
indicated by the message which Admiral Stark sent a day or two before. It
stated further that neither the President nor Mr. Hull would be surprised over a
Japanese surprise attack; that from many angles an attack on the Philippines would
be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us; and there were some who
thought it likely to occur. Admiral Stark further stated: "I do not give it the
weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some
people. You know I have generally held that it was not the time for the Japanese
to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into
Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely. ... I won't go into
the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know.
I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and
that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing— I think
it is more likely to be anything."
XIV. Dispatches CoNCimNiNG Reinforc£.ment of Wake and Midway
On November 26, 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 40) was sent by the Chief of Naval
Operations to CincPac stating that the Army had offered to make available some
units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on station, if Admiral
Kimmel considered that desirable: also, that the Army proposed to prepare,
in Hawaii, garrison troops for advance bases which Admiral Kimmel might
occupy, but was unable to provide any antiaircraft units. Admiral Kimmel
was instructed to take this into consideration and advise when practicable the
number of troops desired and recommended armament.
Also on November 26, 1941, another dispatch (Exhibit 18) was sent to CincPac,
which stated that in order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft
Wing available for expeditionary use, OPNAV had requested the Army, and the
Army had agreed, to station twenty-five Army pursuits at Midway and a similar
number at W'ake, provided CincPac considered this feasible and desirable;
that it would be necessary for CincPac to transport these planes and ground crews
from Oahu to these stations on aircraft carriers, and that the planes would be
flown off at destination; that ground personnel would be landed in boats and essen-
tial spare parts, tools and ammunition would be taken in the carrier or on later
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 427
trips of regular Navy supply vessels; that the Army understood that these forces
must be quartered in tents; that the Navy must be responsible for supplying
water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies; that the stationing
of these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of
Army bombers to the Philippines; and, that additional parking areas should be
laid promptly if necessary. A question was raised as to whether or not Navy
bombs at outlying positions could be carried by Army bombers which might
fly to those positions in order to support Navy operations. CincPac was directed
to confer with the Commanding General and advise as soon as practicable.
XV. Intercepted Japanese Communications of November 26th and 27th
On November 26th and 27th, there were available in Washington additional
intercepted Japanese messages, all of which had been sent from Tokyo, as follows:
(1) A Navy translation on November 27, 1941 (Document 14, Exhibit 63) of a
message to Nanking, dated 15 November 1941, in the so-called "Purple" code,
addressed to "Naval authorities" which stated:
"We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an
agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a while."
(2) A Navy translation on November 26, 1941 (Document 13, Exhibit 63) of a
message to Washington, dated 19 November 1941, stating that:
"When oiir diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the follow-
ing at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:
"(1) if it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI",
"(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA",
"(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.),
"NISHT."
"The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico Citj^ San Francisco."
(3) An Army translation on November 26, 1941 (Document 9, Exhibit 68)
of a message to Manila, dated November 20, 1941, in the "Purple" code, marked
"Strictly Secret" and stating:
"Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the type of
draft — presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay. (Near Manila,
P.I.)
"Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as to
Tokyo."
(4) An Army translation on November 26, 1941 (Document 12, Exhibit 63)
of a message to Washington, dated November 26, 1941, in the " Purple" code,
which stated:
"To be handled in Government Code.
"The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too
long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations
to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American
Bureau on the telephone and make your request to him. At that time we will use
the following code: (Codes were then set forth.)"
XVI. The State Department Note of November 26th
Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, of the State Department, testified that by the end
of October it was evident that Japan and the United States could not agree.
Early in November, the Secretary of State came to the conclusion that the question
could not be solved by diplomacy (page 764). On November 20th, the Japanese
submitted the things they wanted, which it was impossible to agree to. On
November 26th, the Secretary of State gave Nomura and Kurusu a note setting
forth the United States position. The following day the Secretary of State again
said that he could not settle this by diplomacy, but that he still hoped that the
Japanese might come forward with some reply. Between November 26th and
December 7th, the President sent a note to the Emperor of Japa^n (page 764).
While it was evident that no agreement could be reached, this did not necessarily
mean that Japan and the United States could not get along without an agreement
(page 765).
Dr. Hornbeck had no recollection of discussing the note of November 26th
with Admiral Stark or the Secretary of the Navy (page 765). He did not consider
this note as an ultimatum to Japan (page 766). The text of the note of November
26th was not released until after December 7th. The Secretary of State had a
press conference at which he announced that a note had been sent and the press
discussed a variety of possibiUties (page 772).
428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Hamilton, also of the State Department, said that on November 21st,
there was a conference which the Secretary of State, Admiral Stark, General
Gerow, and Mr. Hombeck, Ballantine and he were present, and at which the
general military and diplomatic situation in the Pacific was discussed (page 1073).
There were later meetings at which he was not present, including one of the War
Council on November 2oth and also on November 28th (page 1074). Mr. Hamil-
ton could not be sure whether the note of November 26th or the substance thereof
was given to the Navy Department (page 1073).
Admiral Turner remembered the Japanese dispatch concerning the note to
Japan of November 26th and he saw it on November 28th. He believed that
Admiral Schuirmann had brought it over from Secretary Hull to show it to Admiral
Stark, and that Admiral Stark had stated that there was no possibility of Japan
accepting this note (page 995).
Admiral Stark stated that he did not recall the November 26th note to the
Japanese (page 108) but that on November 27th, Secretary of State Hull had
advised him that negotiations were terminated (page 109). Admiral Stark later
testified that when first asked about this note he had not remembered it, but after
reading it his recollection was refreshed, and that Admiral Schuirm-ann may have
discussed this note with him at the time (page 809).
Admiral Schuirmann stated that to the best of his recollection he did not
deliver a copy of the November 26th note to the Navy Department, nor did he
specifically inform Admiral Stark of this note (page 217). He characterized this
note as an "ultimatum" in the sense that no one expected the Japanese to accept
its terms (page 716).
Admiral Turner said that negotiations with Japan had been conducted so as
to delay war as long as possible in order to give the Army and Navy time to
prepare for war (page 1013). He knew that the Army and Navy had recom-
mended that no ultimatum be given to Japan (Exhibit 39 A). He did not con-
sider that the note of November 26th was an ultimatum, although he did not
expect Japan to accept its terms (page 1015). He did not know whether Admiral
Stark saw a draft of the November 26th note before it was sent, but Admiral
Turner did see it. He said that no note given by one government to another is
ever entirely acceptable (page 1016). He did not regard the note as important
(page 1023), nor think it hastened the time of war because Japan was then already
on the move (page 1024).
General Short testified that prior to December 7th, he had no knowledge of the
State Department note of November 26th (page 263).
The court took judicial notice of the note of November 26th (page 147). A
Japanese summary of the diplomatic situation and of the American proposal,
and the reaction of the Japanese to that proposal, were contained in communi-
cations intercepted, decoded and translated on November 28th. These were:
(1) An Army translation (Document 16, Exhibit 63) of a message from Wash-
ington to Tokyo, dated November 26, 1941, in the "Purple" code and marked
"Extremelv urgent," Message #1180, reading:
"From NOMURA and KURUSU.
"As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having
them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situ-
ation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will
inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure
and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situa-
tion. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that Presi-
dent ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan
and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific
(just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this
sort of an arrangement with all we have in us) , and that you in return reply with
a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a
little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are
scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through mili-
tary occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the estab-
lishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India
and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed
the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)
"We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily
mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off', as we
said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England
and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would
be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty
bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. W^e doubt if she would.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 429
Again, youtmust remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait
until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.
"In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to
express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the
Minister of the Navj-, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire back in-
stantly."
Admiral Schuirmann testified that be was familiar with this message, but bad
not delivered it to Admiral Stark (page 696).
(2) An Army translation (Document 17, Exhibit 63) of a message from Wash-
ington (Nomura) to Tokyo, dated November 26, 1941, in the "Purple" code and
marked "Extremely urgent", which stated:
"At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with
Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.
"HULL said, 'For the last several days the American Government has been
getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations
concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th
of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length,
however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment
reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours
of September 25th.' So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:
"A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called 'four principles.'
"B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggressive treaty between Tokj'o,
Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.
"(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands,
China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of
economic treatment in French Indo-China.
"(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French
Indo-China.
"(4) Japan and the United States both defiintely promise to support no
regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.
"(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.
"(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United
States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.
"(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.
"(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.
"(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has
contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties
will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the mainte-
nance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the
Three-Power Pact.)"
In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said
we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We
argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United
States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands
and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to
quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches
have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover,
there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thia that she give us complete
control over her national defense. AU that is reflected in these two hard pro-
posals, or we think so.
Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall having seen this message, but
that it may have been discussed (pages 776-777). Admiral Schuirman said he
was familiar with it, but had not delivered it to Admiral Stark, although he
probably told Admiral Stark that such a note had been sent (page 697).
(3) An Army translation (Document 18, Exhibit 63) of a message from
Tokyo to Washington, dated November 28, 1941, in the "Purple" code, reading:
"Re your #1189.
"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of
this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal.
This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Govern-
ment can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report
of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I
will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured.
This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the
negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instruc-
tions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to
you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just
claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say
430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude,
but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it
impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this
pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #11 80 and he said that under the
present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do
the best you can." (Note. — The man is the Navy Minister.)
Admiral Stark testified that he may have seen this message (pages 775-6).
Admiral Schuirmann was familiar with this, but did not deliver it to Admiral
Stark (page 698) . Admiral Ingersoll did not remember this (page 826) .
Captain Layton said that neither he nor Admiral Kimmel had been advised
of the note of November 26th. He thought that Admiral Kimmel could have
been better informed, and that if he had had a full picture he would have had a
clearer conception of Japanese-United States affairs (page 914).
Admiral Kimmel stated that he was not advised of the contents of the United
States' note of November 26th, which was given to the Japanese, until after his
return to the United States (page 301). And, he and Admiral Smith stressed,
the press and radio indicated that negotiations between the Japanese and the
United States continued after November 27th. But, Admiral McMorris, his
War Plans Officer, said that the press may have indicated that Japanese-United
States negotiations were continuing after November 27th; he did not recall (page
893).
Admiral Stark testified that he had no recollection of press and radio state-
ments between November 27th and December 7th which indicated that negotia-
tions with the Japanese were resumed. He pointed out that, according to "War
and Peace" on November 25th and November 28th, Secretary of State Hull had
said that there was practically no possibility of an agreement, that the Japanese
might break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force, that thje matter
of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy,
and that the plans for military defense should include the assumption that the
Japanese might use the element of surprise and attack at various points (page
149). There was, Admiral Stark said, a further conversation with the Japanese
on December 1st (page 149).
Dr. Hornbeck stated that between November 26th and December 7th, there
were some further conversations with the Japanese representatives (page 767).
Mr. Hamilton stated that there were some meetings with the Japanese Am-
bassadors between November 26th and December 7th. He, however, considered
that negotiations with the Japanese ceased on November 26th. There was a
bare possibility that diplomatic conversations might continue, but they had
virtually reached a conclusion, and the matter, therefore, was one for the armed
services. He considered that there was no chance of getting a favorable reply
from the Japanese (page 1074).
Ambassador Grew, on the other hand, did not think that negotiations with
Japan had definitely ceased until Tojo saw him on December 7, 1941, after the
attack (page 1046).
XVII. The War Warning of November S7th
A. THE WARNING
Captain Layton testified thai he learned of the receipt by CinCPac, of the war
warning message of 27 November 1941, in the mid-afternoon of that day on
being shown a tape copy in the communications office. He stated that subse-
quently, at the direction of Admiral Kimmel, he prepared a paraphrase copy of
the dispatch which was shown to and approved by Admiral Kimmel, therefore,
thereafter, he {Layton) gave to Lieutenant Commander Burr, USNR, for delivery
to General Short; that subsequently he checked with Lieutenant Commander
Burr and ascertained that the dispatch had been delivered to General Short.
(Page 189-190).
Captain Layton also testified that at the time he showed Admiral Kimmel his
paraphrase copy of the war warning message a large conference in the Admiral's
office had just been terminated, and that, while Admiral Kimmel was examining
the paraphrase. Captain Earle, Chief of Staff to the Commandant, Fourteenth
Naval District, entered Admiral KimmeVs office stating he had a very urgent
message which General Short had delivered to the Commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District and which was further to be delivered to the Commander-in-Chief.
Captain Layton stated that Captain Earle delivered the message to which he
referred to Admiral Kimmel, and that both of them remarked to the effect that it
was the same dispatch in substance that they had just received. (Page 189).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 431
On November 27th, after delivery of the State Department note of the 26th,
but before receipt of the intercepted communications showing the reaction of the
Japanese Government, the ''war warning" was sent by the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to CincPac and CincAF. It read:
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning x negotiations with Japan
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggres-
sive move by Japan is expected within the next few days x The number and equip-
ment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an
amphibious expedition against either the Philippines (printed in ink, "Thai") or
Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo x Execute an appropriate defensive deployment
preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 x Inform district and
Army authorities x A similar warning is being sent by War Department x Spenavo
inform British x Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate
measures against sabotage"
Exhibit 8 is the November 27 dispatch by CNO to CincPac and CincAF.
(p. 30)
B. PREPARATION OF THE WARNING
Admiral Turner said that he prepared the "war warning" after talking to Admiral
Stark and that it meant just what it said. Admiral IngersoU assisted in the
drafting of this message (page 839). Admiral Stark testified that the working
of the "war warning" dispatch had been carefully considered by him and by his
advisers, and also by the Secretary of the Navy (page 54),
Concerning "M" Day, Captain Glover said, "M" Day is commonly under-
stood as the day of execution of a war plan. In the case of WPL-46, "M"
Day, unless otherwise designated, was to be the date of an Alnav dispatch
worded as follows: "Execute Navy basic war plan Rainbow No. 5." Upon
receipt of this Alnav, the Naval establishment was to proceed with the
execution of WPL-46, including acts of war. WPL-46 stated that all parts
of the plan might be executed at once, or in part by dispatch indicating the
enemy, tasks to be executed or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be
taken, (p. 177) Captain Glover said that possibly declaring "M" Day
west of the Pacific Coastal Frontier would have been more effective in alerting
our forces than the method actually used by the Navy Department. He
said, however, that the plan did not lend itself very easily to being put into
effect as a means of warning only but was based on war activities, (p. 177)
Captain Glover said that Rainbow 5 contemplated the commencement of
hostilities after a declaration of war. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan, he said, might have become effective on "M" Day or certain features
of it might have been placed in effect before "M" Day and that plan stated
that "M" Day might precede a declaration of war. This plan, therefore,
could have been made effective on about November 27 if desirable, (p. 178)
Admiral Turner thought that the war warning was the proper way to advise
the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet of the situation and that the war plans
could not be partially executed because it would have been an involved
situation and not as clear as the warning given. Moreover, it would not
have been practicable to have declared a mobilization, in certain areas prior
to the existence of the state of war. (p. 270)
Admiral Turner said that the preparation of the dispatches of November
24 and of November 27 was similar to that of the October 16 dispatch. He
discussed the situation at the time of the preparation of the November 27
dispatch as follows:
"As I recall, we were informed by the Secretary of State, at a small
meeting at which I was present, that the State Department has no further
hopes of composing matters with the Japanese. The Secretary of State
requested advice from the Military Services as to any further steps that
his Department might make. It was apparent, from the talks that were
going on between the State Department and Mr. Kurusu, as well as from
information received from Intelligence sources, that the Japanese were
killing time preparatory to an attack. We could not estimate the exact
time that the attack would be made, but we knew of troop movements and
naval movements in the Far East toward the South. It was at about this
time that our search planes first picked up some of the Japanese ships
moving along the coast of Indo-China. I think it may have been after the date
of this dispatch that we instituted plane search of the China Sea, but we
were conscious of definite amphibious movements being made before the
432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
dispatch we are discussing was sent. The radio traffic, during the first
half and middle of November, had been very heavy on the part of the Jap-
anese, and suddenly it almost stopped some time between the 20th and
25th of November, as I recall it. Very little traffic was then sent out. That
convinced us that the Japanese Fleet had put to sea. I was concerned, and
had been through this entire period, over whether or not Japanese traffic
analyses were being made by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and I
brought the subject up several times with the Director of Naval Communi-
cations and with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. I was assured,
each time, that the Commander-in-Chief was getting everything that we were
getting in Washington, and was making proper traffic analyses. Japanese
radio traffic analyses were under the cognizance of the Director of Naval
Communications, and I am not very familiar with the exact methods em-
ployed, nor of the distribution which was made of their deductions. The
Director kept War Plans fully informed as to these deductions." p. 265).
Admiral Turner said that Secretary Hull had told Admiral Stark that to all
intents and purposes the negotiations were over on November 27th, though he
(Hull) was not going to close them. Mr. Hull, he stated, kept Admiral Stark
well informed (page 995). This was the basis of the statement in the "warning"
that negotiations had ceased.
Admiral Ingersoll believed that the "warning" was sent because the Secretary
of State had delivered the note of November 26th to the Japanese (page 851).
Admiral Ingersoll said that the reason for sending the war warning of
November 27 was indicated in the dispatch, referring to the number and
equipment and organization of Japanese naval forces. He said that the
reason why the dispatch referred to an aggressive move in the Western
Pacific was that the character of the landing craft referred to in the dispatch
were such that they could not have been used in any area other than in the
far eastern area. (p. 425)
Admiral Brainard did not recall having had any part in the drafting of the
October 16 dispatch or the November 24 dispatch or the war warning. He
did not know definitely that a set of war warning dispatches were prepared
and held in readiness for dispatch to merchant shipping and that for a period
of two or three weeks prior to December 7, they were restraining entry of
merchant vessels and vessels of the NTS service into the Western Pacific
so as to avoid their being trapped, (p. 402)
C. THE FAILT7RE.TO MENTION HAWAII
Admiral Stark said that he did not mention Hawaii in the "war warning"
because he indicated, from the best intelligence which he had, where the blow was
most likely to fall (page 793). It was agreed in the office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, he testified, that an attack on Hawaii was a possibility but that the
information available indicated that the Philippines, Guam and the Kra Peninsula
would be attacked (page 797). Generally speaking, he and his advisers did not
expect a raid on Hawaii (page 798).
At the time of drafting the "war warning," Admiral Turner said, he expected
that the Japanese would make some kind of an attack on Hawaii (page 995). He
did not mention Hawaii in the "war warning," he said, because the places named
were the strategic objectives and he did not believe that the Japanese would launch
an amphibious attack on Hawaii (page 1020). He invited attention to the differ-
ence between the dispatch of November 24th, which had warned of the possibility
of a "surprise aggressive movement," and this dispatch, which warned of "an
amphibious expedition." The earlier dispatch, he said, was the result of deduction
and covered any type of action by the Japanese. On November 27th, however,
they knew that, as a fact, the Japanese were on the move (page 997) .
Admiral Ingersoll said that he had made the insertion of "Thai" and "Con-
tinental districts" in the "war warning" (page 839). The breaking of diplomatic
relations did not necessarily mean war, he said. But, the information as to
Japanese movements indicated action at Siam or Kra Peninsula and it was quite
evident that if the Japanese made war on the United States, the Philippines were
a probable objective and Guam would fall like a ripe plum. In the dispatch they
mentioned southeast Asia as a probable Japanese objective because they had no
information of an aggressive movement in any other direction. The intention of
the war message was to state that war was imminent — on the other hand, there
was the wish not to take any step which could provoke war with Japan (page
842). And, Admiral Kimmel never asked for any clarification of the "war warn-
ing," (page 842).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 433
D. THE DIRECTION TO "EXECUTE AN APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT"
Vice Admiral AlcMorris directed his attention to:
(a) the provisions of the Rainbow Five War Plan in respect of the
initial task of the Pacific Fleet at times ivhen Japanese were not in the
war, including the maintaining of Fleet security and protecting the territory
of the associated powers (which included Hawaii), and preventing the
extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrol-
ling with patrol planes and light forces and by the action of striking groups,
and guarding "against a surprise attack by Japan."
and
(b) the direction in the war warning message of November 27, 1941, to
CinCPac, to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to
carrying out the tasks assigned in \^' PL-46,"
and testified in the respect of what appropriate defensive deployment was executed,
that, "there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the
fleet forces at that time other than the movements of certain aircraft to Midway
and ^ ake and of the carriers, with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to
those locations to deliver aircraft." {Page 321-322).
Vice Admiral AlcMorris testified that the language in the war warning of 27
November 1941, with reference to the defensive deployment preparatory to carry-
out the tasks assigned in W PL-46, "was a direction." {Page 322).
He stated further that he considered that the action taken constituted an appro-
priate defensive deployment, {page 322), that it was a major action in line with
the measure to execute an appropriate defensive deployment, that the major portion
of the fleet was disposed in Hawaiian waters and that reinforcements were sent
to Midway and ^\ake; that it was likewise in accordance with the directive that
the ships were maintained with a full supply of ammunition and a minimum
quantity of fuel. {Page 323-324).
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the establishing of an air patrol from Oahu
to guard against a surprise attack by Japan would have been an appropriate act,
"but no one act nor no one disposition can be examined independent of other
requirements." {Page 324).
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the establishment of long distance air
patrol from Oahu would have been an appropriate defensive deployment prepara-
tory to carrying out the tasks assigned in Tl PL-46. {Page 324).
The "war warning" directed the addressees to "execute an appropriate defensive
deploj'ment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.
Admiral Bloch recalled a discussion between Admiral Kimmel and some-
one else in his presence discussing the directive to carry out a "defensive
deployment." So far as Admiral Bloch knew, he had never encountered
that terminology before. He doesn't recall what it meant to him at the time
nor does he know whether or not Admiral Kimmel regarded the submarines
at Midway and Wake as a "defensive deployment." (p. 22)
Admiral Turner said that the things they expected CincPac to do were not
communicated to CincPac in detail because the Navj^ Department's plan was
to give broad discretion to commanders. They expected CincPac to take ap-
propriate action on the "War Warning" dispatch (page 998).
The expectation in the Navy Department as to the "Defensive Deploy-
ment" that would be taken was summarized by Admiral Turner as follows:
"It will be noted that the dispatch orders a defensive deployment. We
expected all war scouting measures to be undertaken, submarines to be
sent out to protect our Fleet and territory against enemy naval forces; we
expected the carriers with their protective vessels to put to sea and stand in
readiness for war; we expected, in the Asiatic, the movement of ships to be
made to the South in accordance with the plan agreed on. We expected a
high degree of readiness on board ships against attack of any form; and on
shore, we expected a high degree of readiness of defensive troops, including
anti-aircraft. The dispatch was prepared jointly with the Army. We
expected a deployment of the Army on shore appropriate with a defensive
state of readiness, such as manning the coastal guns, and moving troops out
to their deployment for defense of territory." (p. 265)
Admiral Stark said that he had anticipated that full security measures would
be taken, that the Army would set a condition of readiness for aircraft and the
aircraft warning service, that Admiral Kimmel would invoke full readiness
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 29
434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
measures, distant reconnaissance and A/S measures, and that the measures
previously agreed on with the Army would be implemented. He did not require
a report of the actions taken pursuant to this message (pages 54-62, 84). He
considered that after this message Admiral Kimmel had a "free hand" (page 801).
Admiral IngersoU said that he considered that the "war warning" put additional
tasks on the Pacific Fleet of security of itself and readiness for any eventuality,
but that the message was not to completely interrupt training (page 849) . Train-
ing, however, should have been secondary after this message (page 821). The
October 16th dispatch had directed CincPac to make certain dispositions; he
had informed the Chief of Naval Operations and those had been considered satis-
factory (page 849). After November 27th, any measures that were necessary to
guard the security of a fleet were necessary in all fleets.
Admiral Pye said that as to the directives in the November 27 dispatch
concerning deployment, it would have been necessary to recall the Task
Forces which were at that time absent, in order to prepare them from a
logistic point of view and consequently, there was no deployment that could
be made immediately which would have better prepared Task Force One;
Task Force Two was on its way to ferry some fighting planes and was not
expected to return for over a week; there appeared to be no action to be
taken by the Fleet that would have better prepared it against an indefinite
date of beginning operations, than that which was then in progress. Admiral
Pye said that no change was made in the scheduled deployment of his task
force after the November 27 dispatch, (p. 1.55)
Concerning the deployment referred to in the War Warning, Admiral
IngersoU said, "Again, this dispatch is addressed to both the Commander-
in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The
deployment referred more to the movements which were contemplated in the
Asiatic Fleet regarding the withdrawal of forces from the Manila Bay area
for operations contemplated elsewhere, and the movements in the Hawaiian
area were those regarding observation, the establishment of patrols, and the
reenforcement of outlying positions in our own islands. It will be remem-
bered that an earlier dispatch in October had warned both Comm.anders-
in-Chief against taking action which would provoke war." (p. 426)
The reason why Admiral Kimmel was not called upon to report what he
was doing after the War Warning was Admiral IngersoU said, because they
knew that submarines were out on observation missions, that reenforcement
of Wake and Midway was contemplated and they believed that the routine
air patrols around Oahu and search patrols which had been in effect for some
time were being continued. They believed at that particular time that the
air patrol was by no means as complete as it should have been. (p. 426 and
p. 427).
XVIII. Repetition of Army Dispatch on November 28th
On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a dispatch to
CincPac for information (Exhibit 19) which repeated a dispatch which had been
sent by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:
"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with
only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and
offer to continue x Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible
at any moment x If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States
desires that Japan commit tlie first overt act x This policy should not repeat not
be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your
defense x Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such
reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures
should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose
intent x Report measures taken x a separate message is being sent to G— 2 Ninth
Corps Area re subversive activities in the United States x Should hostilities occur
you wiU carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to
Japan x Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential
officers"
The Navy dispatch continued that WPL-52 was not applicable to the Pacific
area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as then in force in South-
east Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It stated further: "Undertake
no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act x be prepared to
carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apph' to Japan in T^ase hostilities
occur"
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 435
Exhibit 9 is the November 28 dispatch from CNO to CincPac.
A. GENERAL MARSHALL
General Marshall thought that he had seen the Army dispatch which was
repeated in the Navy dispatch of November 28th (page 864). However, General
Gerow did not think that Marshall had seen it. The language made Marshall
believe that he had seen it particularly because the instruction that Japan must
commit the first overt act came from the President. Pie had no recollection that
the warning not to alarm the civilian population came from the same source
(page 865).
XIX. Reinforcement of Midway and Wake
It will be recalled that on November 26th dispatches had been sent to CincPac
by the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the proposed reinforcement of Mid-
way and Wake with Army planes and personnel, and requesting that Admiral
Kimmel confer with General Short about this and advise the Chief of Naval
Operations as soon as practicable (supra, page 56).
Captain Wellborn said that he thought that the background of the Navy's
desire to have the Army take over the defense at Midway and Wake was
that the Navy felt that the defense of the islands was an Army responsibility
and that the small amount of Marine personnel and aviation available should
be reserved for amphibious work. One method of reducing overhead
requirements of the Marines was to relieve the Marine Corps Units of their
static defensive duties, (p. 386)
On November 28th, dispatch 280627 (Exhibit 76) was sent by CincPac to
OPNAV. This advised that ground crews and material to operate one squadron
of Marine planes were being discharged at Wake.
Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor with Task Force Two on November
28. (p. 291-293)
Admiral Halsey said that he recalled clearly one conference on Novem-
ber 27 when it was decided to send fighting planes to Wake. He said
that he was with Admiral Kimmel that day until about six in the evening.
The discussion of the defense of Wake and the dispatch of fighter planes
was participated in by General Short, General Martin and some other
Army officers and Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Brown, Admiral Bellinger and
Admiral Halsey. He said Marine planes were selected because the Army
could not fly their fighters more than 15 miles from the coast, (p. 297)
Admiral Halsey said that he recalled that there was some prior discussion
of sending Army units to outlying bases and that Admiral Kimmel had
looked upon those bases as part of the Fleet and for that reason he wished
to confine the forces ashore to Marine and Naval personnel. It soon be-
came evident that such a process could not be carried out and certain bases
were picked, he said, to be garrisoned by Army forces.
Admiral Halsey said that when he left to go to Wake Island, he asked
Admiral Kimmel how far Admiral Kimmel wanted him to go and Admiral
Kimmel said, "Use your common sense." (p. 298)
Admiral Smith said that before Admiral Halsey left in the ENTERPRISE
to deliver Marine fighters to Wake, he asked Admiral Kimmel what he
should do in case he met Japanese forces. Admiral Kimmel said that in
that case he was to use his own discretion. And, Admiral Halsey replied,
that those were the best orders he had received, to keep his movements
secret and that if he found even a Japanese sampan he would sink it. (p.
43)
that similar items would be landed at Midway.
Admiral Newton said that he was at Pearl Harbor from November 27
until the morning of December 5 and was temporarily in command of a task
force because Admiral Brown departed around December 4 for a cruise to
Johnston and Palmyra Islands to investigate landing craft conditions. He
received no particular information concerning the international situation.
(p. 316)
Although Admiral Newton was commander of the most powerful unit
under the Commander Scouting Force, he never saw the October 16 dispatch
nor was he ever informed of the contents of it and recalled no warnings or
instructions mentioning preparatory deployments which were given to him
thereafter. (p. 317) Admiral Newton said that he never saw or heard of
436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the November 24, November 27 and December 3 dispatches. Except for what
he read in the press. Admiral Newton during the period November 26 to
December 5 did not learn anything indicating the increased danger of the
situation with Japan, (p. 317)
When Admiral Newton left on December 5, he was directed to proceed to
Midway to fly off a squadron of planes. He had the LEXINGTON, CHI-
CAGO, PORTLAND and five destroyers on that mission. He considered
the mission solely one to reinforce Midway and attached no special signifi-
cance to the mission. He considered that there might be more danger
from submarines than in the past and zig-zagged his course and had scouring
planes cover his advance. He gave no special orders regarding arming of
planes or making preparation for war other than ordinary routine, (p. 318)
About November 26 or 27, Admiral Brown and his Task Force Three had
returned to Pearl Harbor. They left Pearl Harbor on December 5.
Admiral Brown was of the view that the movement of the two task forces
to the outlying islands after November 27, may have been in pursuance of
the instructions contained in the dispatch regarding defensive deployment,
(p. 141)
and that about December 1st ground material for temporary operation of twelve
Army bombers would be sent, but that only six of such planes on Oahu were in
operating condition. The dispatch also discussed the use of Army pursuit planes
for insular defense and the need for additional, anti-aircraft guns; the fact that
Army troop reinforcements were being made on outlying bases but that such use
was considered not advisable as Marines were available; that twelve Marine
fighters would leave November 28th in a carrier for Wake; that other Marine
planes would be sent to Midway later; and that on December 1st, twelve patrol
planes would be sent from Midway to Wake, and those at Midway would be re-
placed by planes from Pearl Harbor.
The Chief of Naval Operations replied on November 28th (Exhibit 75) in a
dispatch stating that the steps described in CincPac's 280627 appeared to be the
best that could be done under the circumstances. This also stated that the War
Department would instruct the Commanding General to cooperate with the Navy
in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and troops in support of Marines, and
would endeavor to expedite plans for increase of anti-aircraft defenses, but that
it was doubtful if much improvement was possible soon. An immediate report
on the effective defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in the im-
mediate future was requested.
Admiral Brainard said that a dispatch recently examined by him showed
that it was contemplated that a group of vessels under Admiral Halsey's
command would leave around December 1, 1941, to land reinforcements on
Wake but he found no indication of his having seen the dispatch at the time.
The daily movement sheets, he said, from 21 November to 10 December
showed movements of the WRIGHT, but no carrier movements between
Pearl Harbor, Wake and Midway, (p. 401)
Admiral IngersoU said that they received reports of ship movements which
were plotted and that he thought that the movements to Wake and Midway
in early December were known at the time in Washington but he is not
certain. He said that in keeping track of the dispositions of Admiral Kim-
mel's ships they relied on the ship movements reports and in the quarterly
schedules of employment, (p. 424)
In letters of December 2nd to Admiral Stark (post, pages 113-114), Admiral
Kimmel further stated his views as to the desirability of using Army planes and
personnel at Midway and Wake and his concern that the replacement of Marines
would weaken the defense, would raise the question of unity of command, and
that the increase in Army and Navy stations requiring Fleet support would inter-
fere with offensive operations. (5)
Admiral Bloch discussed the various construction projects at Pearl Harbor
and at the outlying islands, (p. 91-92)
Admiral Bloch said that the security of the outlying islands, such as Wake,
Midway, Johnston and Palmyra, was a matter of some concern in November
1941 ; that the water capacity of the islands was small and that as a result of
having civilian construction workers present there, the garrisons were small;
he was more apprehensive about an attack on Guam, Wake and Midway
than on Oahu. (p. 94)
According to Admiral Delany, during the tense period preceding December
7, the outlying islands such as Midway, Guam and Wake were a matter ^f
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 437
great concern to the Commander in Chief's staff, (p. 81) The proposal to
change from Marine to Army garrisons caused additional worry and concern
and was a subject of many conferences out there, (p. 81)
Admiral Smith stated that he did not believe that the dispatch concerning
the reinforcement of outlying islands by the Army was considered related to
the war warning of November 27. He said that the discussions concerning
the outlying islands lasted several days and, as a result, there was a decided
mental preoccupation with this on the part of the highest Army and Navy
officers in Hawaii, (p. 63)
Captain Glover said that the decision to reinforce Wake had been made
by the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and that Captaii^ Glover and
Captain Moore did not share the view that it should be done. They did
believe that Midway should be fortified, (p. 176)
XX. Pearl Harbor — Estimates op the Situation
A. ADMIRAL KIMMEL
Admiral Kimmel testified that after receiving the "war warning" dispatch of
November 27th, his estimate was that the Japanese would move within the next
few days by amphibious expedition against the Philippines or Kra, or possibly
Borneo, and that there was a good chance of a mass submarine attack at Oahu.
He did not expect an air attack at Pearl Harbor, although an air attack was still
a "remote possibility" because, he said, of the tenor of the dispatches sent to him,
the other information which he had, the difficulties of making such an attack, and
information received from the Navy Department and from other sources indicat-
ing that the greater portion of the Japanese carrier forces was in home waters.
He thought that a primary cause for the "war warning" dispatch was the fact
that diplomatic negotiations had ceased, and when the newspapers indicated that
the negotiations were resumed, the warning lost much of its force. He further
assumed that no ultimatum had been given to the Japanese because the Chiefs
of Staff had recommended to the President that no ultimatum be given to them
(page 301). He testified that the phrasing of the "war warning" dispatch and
the phrasing of the dispatch of November 28th led him to believe that anything
other than a submarine attack on Pearl Harbor was most improbable (page 302).
In his testimony concerning the November 28th message. Admiral Kimmel stated
that it furnished no new information and that it stf^sed that Japan should be
permitted to commit the first overt act (page 325).
The "war warning," was discussed with ComFOURTEEN. A dawn fighter
flight patrol was considered, but was not regarded as practical because of the
limitations of the Army planes (page 303).
He considered that the action of the Navy Department in failing to make any
change in his plans to send carriers to Midway and Wake indicated that the Navy
Department expected no immediate activity in either the outlying areas (page
307) or in the Hawaiian area (page 309).
He further testified that the day after receipt of the "war warning" of Novem-
ber 27th, he had a conference with General Short, attended by members of their
staffs.
Admiral Smith said that there was no set hour for a Staff conference, that
Admiral Kimmel had a conference practically every day and would send for
the people that he wanted; he would usually have over officers from the
Fleet and very frequently would have Admiral Bloch and Admiral Pye,
especially Admiral Pye, at such conferences (p. 34).
He said that while he presently did not recall the incident that General Short
testified to a statement made by ^^c Morris at that conference, in response to a
question by General Short, to the effect that there was no chance of a Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor.
Finally, he testified that the message of November 27th followed a pattern
that he had been continuing for some time, and that he felt that before hostilities
commenced he would receive additional information which would be more definite.
When the attack came without this information, he was inclined to blame him-
self for not having been smarter, but when he found some time later that the
information was in fact available in the Navy Department which would have
changed the action taken by him had he known it, he felt differently about the
matter. If he had had that information, he said, he would have thoroughly
alerted all shore going activities, including the Army, and in all probability
would have had the Fleet put to sea in an intercepting position, and would have
instituted reconnaissance to the best of their ability.
438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Kimmel admitted, however, that during the entire period when he
was CincPac, he maintained the same estimate as was set froth in his letter of
February 18th (Exhibit 30), which stated that "a surprise attack (submarine,
air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility . . ."
B. ADMIRAL BLOCH
Admiral Bloch testified that he had estimated that if the Japanese did attack
Pearl Harbor, it would be by (1) submarine attack, (2) blocking the channel,
(3) laying mines, (4) sabotage. He believed that an aerial torpedo attack could
not be successful and if there were an air attack it would be by bombs (page 409) .
He considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a remote possibility (page 394) .
He saw the "war warning" dispatch, conferred with Admiral Kimmel and did
not disagree with his conclusions.
On November 27, after the receipt of the "War Warning", the Chief of
StaflF brought over a paraphrase of the dispatch. Admiral Bloch saw Ad-
miral Kimmel the next morning. There were others present but he does
not recall who they were. There was a term in the dispatch concerning
defense deployment. Just what Admiral Kimmel's opinion was Admiral
Bloch did not know, but they had at that time two submarines at Midway
and two at Wake. (p. 14)
The dispatch concerning the sending of planes to Midway and Wake (Exhibit
18) did not change his estimate (page 394). The part of the November 28th
dispatch which impressed him was the desire that Japan should be allowed to
commit the first overt act and that the public should not be alarmed (page 395)
Admiral Bloch said that after the War Warning of November 27, negotia-
tions between Japan and the United States were resumed and that this had
a very definite effect on his mind. Also, he said he had no feeling of impend-
ing hostilities in the Hawaiian area around the 7th of December, (pp. 15
and 16)
Admiral Bloch volunteered at the end of his testimony a statement that the
Navy Department had more information than they had in Hawaii; that a
number of warnings were sent to them; that the Navy Department had in the
War Plans a means of putting into effect all of the plans prior to "M" day;
that such action woulWiave been more effective than the warnings sent out;
and in this connection^e referred to the State Department note of November
26 concerning which he had no knowledge until after December 7.
Admiral Bloch said that he had not seriously considered nor had he heard
anybody else talk about the influence on public opinion in the United States
which an attack on Pearl Harbor would produce, (p. 88)
Prior to December 7, Admiral Bloch was of the opinion that a carrier attack
against Hawaii prior to a declaration of war was remote; one important con-
sideration was his belief that a large body of surface vessels could not cross
such a large expanse of water without the Navy having some knowledge.
(p. 89)
Admiral Bloch said that although he could not recall that any officer had
ever expressed the opinion that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was improbable,
yet he was definitely of the opinion that such an attack was remote although
he is unable to analyze that opinion and to determine the various factors which
had caused him to reach that opinion, (pp. 89 and SO)
Captain Earle said that they had considered the estimate indicating that
the most likely form of attack would be by air, but somehow or other they
always felt that it couldn't happen here and that the Japanese would not take
that chance, (p. 377)
C. ADMIRAL PYE
Admiral Pye testified that he saw the November 24th dispatch (warning of an
aggressive move in any direction) on November 29th. He recalled no decisions
made as a result of it (page 424)
Admiral Pye said that on November 29, he had a conference with Admiral
Kimmel during which Admiral Kimmel showed him the November 24 message
and called in his Intelligence Officer who explained the locations of the enemy
forces, indicating no unusual activity in the Naval forces of the Japanese
navy. They discussed possible action to be taken by Task Force 1 which
was the only Task Force in port aside from the battleships of Task Force 3
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 439
and decided that there was no action that could be taken by that Task Force
which would better prepare them for the possible action that might come.
(p. 153)
Admiral Pye said that he was not present at any conferences between
Admiral Kimmel and his staff or other senior officers. In his own discussions
with Admiral Kimmel, there was no mention of the possibility that Oahu
might be attacked by air. For some months there had been a feeling that a
surprise attack by submarines might be possible. His feeling in this con-
nection was based on the belief that a submarine attack could be made without
definite proof that it was enemy action but an air attack could not. In
the absence of any protection by carriers it was felt that the Fleet in port with
the presumed effectiveness of the Army air forces would be in a better posi-
tion for defense than they would be at sea. Admiral Pye also saw the war
warning message on the same day, i. e., on November 29. (p. 154)
Admiral Anderson said that the war warning was shown to a group of Flag
officers including Admiral Anderson in the office of the Commander in Chief.
Under the war plans in force, Admiral Anderson had no specific duties to
perform. He said that he knew that there were two task forces at sea and
knew that there was an excellent plan in existence for long distance daily
air reconnaissance. He assumed that whatever was considered necessary
to be done was being taken care of. (p. 393)
Admiral Anderson said that his ideas during early December were that
he expected the Japanese would not attack farther east than the Philippines.
He was influenced in all his thoughts as to security by the knowledge or what
he thought was the knowledge that a long distance daily reconnaissance by
air was being maintained. He assumed that such distant air reconnaissance
was being maintained and said that he had read a very complete plan for
such daily reconnaissance and knew that it had been placed into effect but
did not know that it had been discontinued prior to December 7. (p. 394)
He felt that this dispatch indicated an attack on the Philippines or Guam. He
saw the "War Warning" at the same time and discussed it with CincPac. It was
sent to several addressees. The "War Warning" to him was nothing more than
the}' had been receiving for some time (page 425). He did not see the November
28th message until after December 7th (page 427).
Admiral Pye testified first that he had not made any estimate of the situation
during the period November 27th to December 7th (page 429). In response to
the Court's questions he then stated that the maneuvers which he was on had nof
prevented him from making an estimate, but that he had made no written esti-
mate (page 434). He kept a running mental estimate. He considered a Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor as a possibility but not a probability (page 435). He
thought it a bad move because it was the one thing to unite the United States
people in an all-out effort, and therefore that it was unlikely to be undertaken
(page 435). He considered a submarine attack the most likely act in advance of
war (page 436). Before the attack he felt the defense measures taken were con-
sistent with the situation; they thought torpedoes could not be launched from
the air in waters less than 75 feet deep (page 436) ; and a bombing attack alone
would not have been profitable (page 437).
He thought an air attack on Pearl Harbor was remotely possible and did not
consider that such an attack would be made before diplomatic relations were
broken off (page 438).
Admiral Pye stated that WPL-46 required the Fleet to leave Pearl Harbor,
but there were no carriers in port and the Fleet at sea without carriers would be
more vulnerable than in port ; moreover. Intelligence had indicated that all major
units of the Japanese fleet were in home ports. No additional security measures
were taken in his command. So far as the Pacific Fleet was concerned, the phrase
"Execute an appropriate defensive deployment prior to carrying out tasks assigned
in WPL-46" was meaningless, according to Admiral Pye (page 426).
He did not know if CincPac had made a direct estimate as to air attack (page
426).
Concerning his estimate of the probability of a surprise attack at Pearl
Harbor, Admiral Pye said that a primary feature was that he felt that Japan
could gain more by delaying our entry into the war than they could possibly
gain by any damage that they could do at Pearl Harbor. He said further
that the Secretary of the Navy when he came to Pearl Harbor after the 7th
of December said that no one in Washington had stated to him that there
was any possibility of an air attack at Pearl Harbor, even Kelly Turner who
440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was the most aggressive minded of all. Admiral Pye thought that the feeling
in Honolulu was influenced by the attitude of the Department in the preced-
ing months in taking forces from the Pacific and indicating that they con-
sidered the German situation more serious than the Japanese situation.
He also said that they had not been adequately advised of the development
of conditions as known in Washington.
Admiral Pye said that although an attack against the United States was
not expected, they did expect the Japanese to proceed against the Dutch
and British. Admiral Pye said that he thought that the general impression
then had been that the Japanese naval air pilots were fairly good but that
they did not think that these pilots were as good as they appeared to be im-
mediately after Pearl Harbor, (p. 158) Admiral Pye said that they had
had no information as to the torpedoes which had actually been developed
by other nations, (p. 158)
Admiral Pye said that he did not think that any of them had felt that an
attack would be made before a declaration of war, if ever. (p. 151)
Admiral Brown was not familiar with the security measures such as air
search and other matters relating to the internal defense of Oahu except
in a most general way. (p. 137)
Admiral Brown's Task Force had assigned to it the task of developing the
technique and examining the materials for amphibious warfare and during
the six months preceding the attack, his energies and the energies of his
staff were devoted to that subject, The primary task was training. During
the year preceding Pearl Harbor, it was his impression that there must
have been at least half a dozen alarms when it appeared that war would
break out with the Japanese and each time the question was discussed
whether or not defensive measures should be taken or training continued.
His feeling was that training should be continued until the moment that
war developed. This is what happened to the Fleet, (p. 137)
During the last days of November, Admiral Brown participated in con-
ferences with the Commander in Chief. His recollection was that the greatest
concern had been as to the security of the outlying islands. They had all
believed that Japanese submarines would be in Hawaiian waters when war
came and had discussed the possibility of an air raid. His belief was that
an air raid was possible but highly improbable; that dispositions should be
made for the defense of the outlying islands and he believed that the great-
est threat to Pearl Harbor was local sabotage, (p. 137) Admiral Brown be-
lieves that during the week preceding December 7, he was in almost daily
conference with the Commander in Chief. Admiral Brown said he did not
remember whether or not he saw the November 27 dispatch. It was his rec-
ollection that there was a prolonged discussion of that dispatch, (p. 139)
Admiral Brown said that during the last few days prior to December 7,
he felt that the chance of an air attack was extremely remote because of his
misunderstanding of Japanese air ability. He did not consider the air a
menace and was not concerned about the security of the ships in Pearl Harbor.
His own estimate in December was that the Japanese wo'uld avoid an open
break with the United States and confine their first attack to one against the
Dutch or the British. He probably banked too much on that estimate of
the situation, (p. 145)
Admiral Brown's recollection of the conferences which were attended by
Army representatives was vague. He believed that the conferences pri-
marily were in connection with internal security on the island and with
shortages in defense weapons and various forms of air craft. He recalled
that in about November, somebody suggested that there might be a surprise
air attack at Hawaii, that at the time Admiral Halsey was present that Ad-
miral Brown expressed the opinion that Japanese fliers were not capable
of executing such a mission successfully and that if they did, we should
certainly be able to follow their planes back to their carriers and destroy
the carriers so that it would be a very expensive experiment, (p. 142)
Admiral Brown said that his erroneous belief at that time was that all
Japanese fliers were distinctly inferior to American fliers, (p. 142)
Admiral Halsey said that the war warning dispatch affected him very
seriously. He thought that there was going to be a fight before he got back
to Pearl Harbor. He said that when he left Pearl Harbor, he diverted the
battleships, cruisers and destroyers and told them to carry out exercises
in a certain area and then headed West with the remainder of his task force.
He then issued orders to put in war heads in all torpedoes, to regard any
submarine as hostile and to sink it, to arm the planes with bombs and to
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 441
shoot down any plane that was not identified. When they neared Wake,
they went from Condition 3 to Condition 2. He tried to make full prepara-
tion for combat and he carried out morning and afternoon searches to 300
miles. Admiral Halsey said that he felt he might be attacked before he
returned to Pearl Harbor and thought it might precipitate war. (p. 299)
Admiral Halsey said that he did not feel that they were informed on what
the Japs were doing and felt that they were operating in the dark. He
thought that a good deal more was known in Washington than was known in
Pearl Harbor, (p. 300)
Admiral Halsey said that they thought the Japanese attack would take
place in the Far East except by submarine and that they underestimated the
Japanese ability to operate carriers or did not give it enough consideration.
(p. 301)
Admiral Halsey said that the question of an air attack on Pearl Harbor
had been on everyone's mind but that he personally did not expect an air
attack. He pointed out that anti-aircraft drills had been had on many occa-
sions, (p. 302)
Admiral Halsey said his personal and official relations with Admiral
Kimmel were very close and that they conferred every time he returned to
port. He said that Admiral Kimmel was principally worried about materiel
conditions, the very heavy turnover in personnel and the question of balancing
training against security, (p. 294)
Admiral Halsey said that there was a continuous flow of messages crying
"wolf" and consequently the senses tended to be dull but the possibility of
the international situation was constantly before their minds, (p. 296)
Admiral Newton said that for several months preceding December 7, all
hands had felt a tautening up of the situation and he believed that the major-
ity were of the view that submarines were their greatest menace, (p. 332)
Admiral Leary said that after their return to port on November 28, 1941,
the security conditions existing on the ship were the same as on the previous
stay in port which had ended about November 21. Admiral Leary said that
the question of training is always a paramount one and that it was not possible
to carry out the required training and maintain entirely satisfactory security
measures, (p. 365) Admiral Leary said that in the few weeks prior to
December 7, he had thought in a general way of the possibility of a surprise
attack, and that they all felt that the contingency was remote and that the
Intelligence Services would give adequate warning, (p. 365) He said that
his estimate was that a surprise attack would be an air attack, (p. 366) He
recalls no specific discussion along that line.
Admiral Bunkley said that on October 15, the CALIFORNIA was at Long
Beach and received orders to be ready to sail at 24 hours' notice. He re-
ceived the drastic change of orders without being taken into the confidence
of Admiral Pye as to any messages received which caused such a change in
plans, (p. 415)
Admiral Bunkley had no idea of any warnings having been sent in No-
vember and December indicating that the situation was dangerous. His
opinion at the time was that there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl
Harbor. He did think that an attack would come in the Philippines, (p.
415)
D, ADMIRAL SMITH
Admiral Smith testified that Admiral Kimmel kept him informed of every-
thing (page 530). He saw the "War Warning," but though the press or radio
learned that negotiations were resumed (page 531). Each day the War Plans
Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer gave CincPac an estimate of what was
happening. He remembered the November 28th message mainly because of the
emphasis therein not to alarm the civilian population (page 531); but this did
not affect his estimate.
It seemed odd to him to take Navy and Marine planes off Midway and Wake
in accordance with the November 26th dispatch and to put Army planes there.
The Army planes had to be transported by carrier (page 532). It would take
two weeks to deliver these planes, and this meant the absence of carriers in the
direction of Japan, and while not fully prepared for war (page 533). Admiral
Smith testified that he considered this dispatch a directive, despite its language
(page 543).
He said that the inference from Exhibits 15 and 17 was plain that the warning
was directed against an attack on the Philippines or Guam (page 545). The
442 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"in any direction" dispatch of November 24th may have intensified the action
they were taking, but did not at all change their general estimate (page 546).
The "war warning" message, he said, would have been more effective if it
had stopped with the word "warning" (page 534).
Admiral Smith stated that in the Pacific Fleet they were not thinking of the
defense of Pearl Harbor, but about the Fleet and readiness of the Fleet. The
ships were ready for anything, but they were thinking mostly of how soon they
could get out into battle, not the defense of Pearl Harbor (page 548).
He stated that the Roberts' Report was correct in stating they were aware of
the possibility of hostile action without declaration of war (page 556), but they
expected that the Japanese might hit the Philippines, Midway, or Guam, but not
Pearl Harbor,
Admiral Smith said that the basis for his estimate that a surprise air attack
by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor was possible but not probable was as follows
(p. S74-S76):
"There was a great deal of doubt in our minds that Japan would go to war with
us unless Germany did so also. Our information from all sources, including the
Navy Department, and our intelligence did not indicate that the Japanese fleet
had any intentions or was on the way to attack Pearl Harbor. The Japanese
fleet, as located, indicated no move in this direction, and, I believe, most important
of all, we doubted whether the Japanese would dare send a large force as far to
the eastward as Hawaii. The possibility that they might be located even by
a neutral ship existed. They might have been located several times before their
arrival there, in which case they would have been at a great disadvantage. I
believe that all of these things existed in the back of our minds and it was for this
reason that we did not fear an air attack."
They did regard a submarine attack in the Hawaiian area as a sure thing
(page 557).
Admiral Smith said that they were very submarine conscious, and one
reason for that was that they had had several sound contacts; perhaps all of
them were false. On one occasion, in the month of February 1941, they had
a contact by two destroyers south of Diamond Head which occurred again
a month later. They never found out exactly what it was, but after investiga-
tion came to the conclusion that the contact was due to two different levels
of water temperature although the destroyers had claimed that they had
heard propeller noises. At one time, Admiral Kimmel, about six o'clock in
the morning, told him to issue orders to bomb this contact. Before the
order went out, however, he canceled it and reported the fact to CNO saying
that he had no authority to do this except within the three-mile limit around
Pearl Harbor; a reply of the CNO was to the effect that it was a good thing
that such orders had not been issued. So, Admiral Smith said, probably all
of the contacts were false, but they were submarine conscious more than air
conscious and everyone in the Fleet believed that if an attack came it would
be by submarine rather than by aircraft. Admiral Smith believed that the
officers of the Fleet felt that there was little danger of an air attack, (p. 42)
Admiral Smith said that the warnings sent to them mentioned attacks in
the Far East, and this probably resulted in a state of mind where they did
not believe that they would be subjected to an air attack on Pearl Harbor,
although they did expect submarine attack, (p. 64)
Admiral Smith said that he thought there had been too much "crying
wolf" and that such warnings had been received not only during Admiral
Kimmel's administration but also previously by Admiral Richardson, (p. 64)
Admiral Smith said that his thought was at the time, and still was, that
they spent too much time in worrying about the outlying islands. They had
large forces of civilians working on Wake and Midway, and the Commander-
in-Chief spent a great deal of time, more than he should have spent, in
efforts to complete the defenses of the outlying islands. He even went to
the extent of personally auditing the records of the number of rounds of
ammunition of all sorts on each island. He was much more concerned about
the outlying islands than about Oahu, as the estimate shown in the Pacific
War Plan would indicate. Looking back on it. Admiral Smith thinks that
they probably gave too much thought to these islands and not enough to
the larger things, (p. 64)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 443
E. ADMIRAL m'mORRIS
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the "war warning" dispatch of 27
November 1941 occasioned no surprise and did not convey any considerable
amount of additional or startling information, because the situation with refer-
ence to Japan had been tense throughout the year of 1941 (p. 325).
Admiral McMorris said that he had thought that sabotage or a submarine
attack was a distinct possibility (page 887). Up to the time of the attack he
considered the possibility of an air torpedo attack very remote (page 888) and
gave as reasons therefor: (a) increasing evidence of Japanese movements toward
Kra Peninsula; (b) concentration of troops in South China Area; (c) movement
of combatant ships from the Empire to the South; (d) Navy warnings indicated
the possibility of hostilities in that area, attack on Philippines, or movement of
Japanese forces in Halmahera; (e) distance involved and logistic problem; (f) de-
spite British attack on Italian Fleet in southern Italy — here the depth of water
and short distance for run of torpedo was important; (g) confidence in anti-
aircraft defenses against torpedo planes.
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he considered sound the views expressed
by the Secretary of the Navy in his letter of 24 January 1941 {Naval Court
Exhibit 9), though he had not been completely in accord as to the elements of
danger as listed in importance by the Secretary (p. 325-327) .*
Vice Admiral McMorris further testified that he had considered an air attack
possible but not probable and further than he considered the Fleet should not
take as its sole object of existence the defending of itself against a surprise at-
tack and that it should carry on other fundamental duties, including training
and readying itself for operations (p. 327).
He felt that the attack would be on the Philippines with a possible raid on
Wake and Midway, and Guam would be seriously endangered (page 889). He
felt that a submarine attack on Hawaii was probable.
Vice Admiral McMorris testified, with reference to his estimate of the situation
and possible courses of enemy action during the period of 27 November to 6
December 1941, that substantially he estimated the Japanese were on the point
of commencing a war against Great Britain by operations in Malaysia. His
early estimate was that the Japanese would act with the expectation that the
United States would not enter the war with Great Britain unless it was itself
attacked, but later he came to the conclusion that the Japanese might be unwilling
to leave the line of communications abreast the Philippines exposed to attack
in which case the United States would come into the war, and therefore, he esti-
mated that heavy attacks on the Philippines had become not only a distinct
possibility but were probable.
He further estimated that the Japanese would seize Guam when they initiated
the war, because of the negligible defenses there, and that, because the defense of
Midway was stronger, with which the Japanese were probably familiar, it was
initially a probability that Midway would be subjected to heavy raids but that
it was less likely that there would be any Japanese effort towards seizing Midway.
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he further estimated that there were
likely to be heavy Japanese submarine concentrations in the Hawaiian area
and the approaches thereto; that submarine attacks would be directed primarily
at our task forces operating at sea, and that there was a likelihood of attempts
being made to sink a ship in the Pearl Harbor channel, in order to block ingress
and egress. He also expected that there would be enemy submarine activity
along the Pacific Coast. (Page 303-304.)
After receipt of the message of November 27th, a discussion was had as to
whether or not any general message should be sent to the Fleet, particularly those
in training and operating areas, and it was felt that the situation was already well
in hand and it would, in effect, be a message to continue what they were doing:
The only message was an injunction to be particularly alert for submarines (part
895).
•Note. — This was the letter in wtiicti the Secretary envisioned the initiation of a Japanese war by a surprise
attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and listed the dangers in order of importance as air bombing attack, air tor-
pedo plane attack, sabotage, submarine attack, mining, and bombardment by gunfire. The Secretary further
stated that the countermeasures to be considered, in order of importance, were the location and engagement of
enemy carriers, and supporting vessels before an air attack could be launched, pointing out that these were largely
functions of the Fleet, though perhaps not possible of being carried out in the event of an air attack initiated
without warning prior to a declaration of war (p. 3^6).
444 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral McMorris said that the dispatch of November 26th from the Chief of
Naval Operations regarding the transfer of planes to Wake, of which CincPac was
an addressee, probably influenced whatever ideas or views resulted from the
series of dispatches, but the question of moving Army planes there was given
extensive consideration and the determination was made to send defensive planes
to Midway and Wake, preferably Marine, and they felt it imperative to have
protective fighters there because they anticipated operating a number of patrol
planes from Wake if war should start (page 891).
A squadron of patrol planes searched in advance of the carrier and was with-
drawn after she had discharged the planes at Wake (page 892). When Halsey
and "Newton" moved to Wake and Midway for delivery of Marine aircraft, they
were well aware of the fact that hostilities might commence before they again
entered port (page 894).
As Admiral McMorris recalled it, orders to depth bomb submarine con-
tacts were issued after the war warning and orders given to Admirals Newton
and Halsey to repel hostile planes, (p . 246)
The proposal to send Army troops and planes to Midway and W^ake did not, so
far as he was concerned, weaken the "war warning." He thought those places
would be weakened in defense by such a change; that they were important; and
might be subject to attack so that the time was inauspicious (page 896).
Admiral McMorris recalled that at not a great while before the com-
mencement of war, there was a suggestion to replace the marines at outlying
islands with Army forces and that this was discussed with General Short.
It was concluded not to send them. They felt that the Washington proposal
was badly timed. He did not feel that it vitiated the war warning dispatch,
(p. 247)
Those dispatches (Exhibits 18, 40) weie proposals and not directives and the
recommendation was against the proposals and recommendation was accepted
(page 896).
He believed from the limited knowledge he had that the danger from enemy
aircraft was not great (page 896). He did not consider that the Japanese would
make a surprise air attack; he felt that the only serious danger was sabotage or
submarines (page 900).
With reference to testimony given by him in previous investigations to the effect
that in his opinion the island defense was adequate and that the chances of an air
attack inflicting damage were small. Vice Admiral McMorris testified geiierally
that the bases of that opinion were as follows:
(a) That the anti-aircraft guns and the fighters would destroy a large propor-
tion of attacking planes;
(b) That bombing by enemy planes would not be sufficiently accurate to obtain
a large number of hits;
(c) That notwithstanding the success of the British air torpedo attack at
Taranto, which he believed was attributable to peculiar conditions that existed at
Taranto, he did not believe there was any serious hazard in an air torpedo attack
at Pearl, because: (1) the attacking planes woidd have to fly very low, thereby
exposing themselves to anti-aircraft fire and fighter interception, and {2) the
shallowness of the water and the short distance available for torpedo runs would
operate to reduce the effectiveness of this type of attack. He stated that mani-
festly his conclusions were entirely wrong, but that they had been reached by
reading available information as to torpedo performance in oxir own Navy;
(d) He admitted that he did not have any knowledge as to whether the Army
anti-aircraft defenses were actually alerted no^ as to their condition of readiness,
but he assumed that they were in a state of readiness. ". . . Perhaps I was
remiss in not acquainting myself more fully as to what they were doing. We
knew that our own establishment was fairly good. Actually they proved not to
be as good as I felt. We loere a bit too complacent there. . . . Nonetheless,
I was not directly acquainted or indirectly acquainted with the actual state of
readiness being maintained or the watches being kept" with respect to the aircraft
defenses of Hawaii {p. 330-332).
Admiral McMorris said that he saw the November 28th dispatch and con-
sidered the directive for reconnaissance to mean search by aircraft for submarines
or a raiding cruiser.
Admiral McMorris said that he did not believe that a surprise air attack
was likely in the Hawaiian area although he did consider such an attack
I
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 445
possible in the Philippines and even against Midway or Wake. Probably
he said, some discussions along those lines may have taken place but he had
no specific recollection of such a discussion, (p. 236) He personally never
considered an air attack as more than a remote possibility and he is certain
that Admiral Kimmel was not anticipating such an attack.
Admiral McMorris said that the characteristics of the leaders of the
Japanese Navy had been discussed from time to time between Admiral
Kimmel, Admiral McMorris, and others, and the general impression was that
they were rather capable and aggressive leaders, (p. 236)
The reasons why Admiral McMorris thought a surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor was a remote possibility were as follows:
"For us to make an attack on Japan would have required steaming long
distance with probability of detection and then attack in the face of shore-
based aircraft where damage to ships would be likely and difficulties of
returning to our own base would be so marked that the damaged ships
might not regain their base. We felt that the Japanese would find the same
considerations would deter them from making such an effort against us.
It also seemed hightly probable that more attractive targets could be found
to the southward of Japan and that their naval units could be more profitably
employed there. We felt that even should such an attack be launched,
that the Island defenses would be sufficient to make the damage inflicted
small and that the attacking forces would suffer heavy casualties quite
disproportionate to the damage they might inflict." (p. 237)
Admiral McMorris said that they did anticipate that mass submarine
attacks in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor were quite possible, (p. 238)
Admiral McCormick who at the time was under McMorris, said that the
courses open to the enemy, as the War Plans Officer saw them, were in the
nature of raids on our positions and communications by means of air and
submarine attacks and the seizure of all of our possessions in the western
Pacific; it was considered most improbable that they would venture out of
the western Pacific; an air attack on Pearl Harbor was listed as a possible
course of Japanese action. Predominant attention was focused on the prep-
aration for offensive movement, the countering of Japanese action against
Wake and Midway, and protection of the Fleet against submarine attack.
A very low degree of probability was assigned to air attack at Pearl Harbor.
(p. 68) He said that he did not think that any of Admiral Kimmel's advisers
had any real conception of how far the Japanese had come in their training
and preparations for such an attack as they made.
Admiral McCormick said that in formulating estimates of the situation,
the personal characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders were not, so far
as he knew, taken into consideration, (p. 70)
Admiral McCormick said that the term "defensive deployment" use in
the war warning puzzled them. The further strengthening of the islands
to the westward and defensive submarine patrols were the only changes
that Admiral Kimmel and his staff could derive from this directive.
Admiral McCormick said that he knew of not one person at Pearl Harbor
who was not completely surprised by the Japanese air attack, (p. 71)
Admiral McCormick, at the end of his statement, said that Admiral Kimmel
was whole-heartedly and self-sacrificingly devoted to getting the Fleet
ready for war; that "There is no doubt about the fact that we, at Pearl Harbor,
did, for various reasons, have what you might call a blind spot in connection
with any real probability of the carrier raid on Pearl Harbor. I think that
with the means at hand, and with the known difficulty of detecting such an
approach, as has been proved many times by our carrier task forces in this
war, that we would have suffered almost as greatly, if this blind spot that I
mentioned had not existed." (p. 72)
Captain Murphy said that he did not think that an attack, such as the
attack that was made, would be made. He thought that it would be stupid
for the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor and that they might have gone into
Thailand, Malay and the Dutch East Indies without involving the United
States. _ He thought they might attack the Philippines.
Captain Murphy said that he thought the presence of heavy ships in Pearl
Harbor amounted to a defensive deployment for the tasks involved in Rain-
bow 5. (p. 199) He was not sure whether the words defensive deployment
in any way signified security measures, but interpreted the words as leaving
the matter open to those in Pearl Harbor, (p. 200)
446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
F. ADMIRAL DELANT
Admiral DeLany stated that he saw all of the messages from the Navy Depart-
ment. He did not consider that CincPac had been furnished complete information
on relations between the United States and Japan, because full information of the
negotiations and discussions were not forwarded to CincPac (page 506).
The "War Warning" dispatch meant to him that Japan was on the move, but he
did not interpret it as showing an immediate Japanese attack on the United States.
Admiral DeLany said that between November 27th and December 7th, he
knew that Japan was on the move, but he thought they would go into the Malays
or Thailand. He did not know what we would have done if this had included an
overt act against the United States. The Pacific Fleet had not been given any
clear-cut view of the attitude which the United States Government was assuming
toward Japan. He had not thought that the Japanese would initiate a war by
attacking the Pacific Fleet as such an attack would wake up the United States
more than anything; also because they had reports that the Japanese fleet was
primarily based in the Empire (page 497).
In his opinion, if there were an attack, it would be by submarine. He did not
envisage an attack by air or surface ships (page 498) .
Rear Admiral DeLany reaffirmed his belief, previously stated to the Roberts
Comm,ission, that there was no discussion between 27 November and 7 December
by the staff as to the probability of an air attack of the nature of that which
occurred, (p. 165)
Asked what consideration was given to possible directions of aggressive move-
ments, warned against in the 24 November message from OpNav to CinCPac and
Commander-in-Chief Asiatic, he replied that aircraft carriers were sent to deliver
planes to Midway and Tl ake but that an attack farther to the eastward was not
contemplated, (p. 170)
Following the "war warning" dispatch of 27 November conferences between the
Army and Navy retained the concept previously held that the greatest danger to
the Hawaiian area lay in the possibility of submarine attacks and sabotage,
(p. 172)
Admiral DeLany stated that joint Army and Navy exercises relating to defense
of the islands were handicapped by lack of equipment necessary to provide a
Central air warning control post. This equipment, together with anti-aircraft
weapons, communication facilities and planes, was declared not available
although following the Pearl Harbor attack they were received almost immediately,
(p. 174-176)
Adequate air reconnaissance was impossible, in his opinion, due to the small
number of planes and crews, condition of the planes and the necessity for main-
taining them in readiness for an emergency, (p. 181)
From the information which he had in November 1941, he' did not think a tor-
pedo plane attack in Pearl Harbor could be launched because of the depth of the
water. This information had been sent in letters by the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions.
Concerning the possibility of a surprise attack on the ships and installa-
tions at Pearl Harbor, Admiral DeLany said that he did not and never would
have expected that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor as they did;
that everyone was of the opinion that the danger lay in the fact that sub-
marines might operate in the area; and that there might be sabotage on the
island. The general concept of the defense of the island and the security of
the base there was based on that idea. (p. 77)
Admiral DeLany said that nothing in the dispatches received by them
indicated that hostilities would be started in the way in which they did in
fact start, (p. 78)
Admiral DeLany said that the reasons why they regarded a surprise air
attack at Pearl Harbor as improbable were that the last information which
they had placed the Japanese Fleet in home waters; there was inherent danger
for the Japanese in bringing their Fleet in for such an attack; and it was felt
that the one single thing which would inflame Americans would be an attack
upon their home territory, (p. 80)
Admiral DeLany thought that in formulating the opinion that an air attack
was unlikely, consideration was given to the characteristics of Admiral
Yamamoto, an air expert, (p. 81)
I
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 447
G. ADMIRAL CALHOUN
Admiral Calhoun said that he had been present at Admiral Kimmel's confer-
ences every morning and heard all the information that Admiral Kimmel dis-
cussed. He knew of the "war warning" dispatch and interpreted it to mean that
war would start in the Philippines (page 935) . Nobody had expected war imme-
diately, he said, and Admiral Kimmel did not indicate any contrary view (page
938). When the "War Warning" was read, he had tnought, and believed the
others also had thought that it did not necessarily mean that war was imminent
and that the Fleet should go on a war footing (page 939).
In his voluntary statement at the end of his testimony. Admiral Calhoun
discussed the fact that he attended all of Admiral Kimmel's conferences and
that neither he nor anyone else expected any immediate sneak attack by the
Japanese at the time when it came. (p. 228)
H. CAPTAIN LAYTON
Captain Layton stated that he had seen the "War Warning" and had considered
that it fitted into the picture that the Japanese were going to strike in Southeast
Asia (page 911). He had no apprehension of an air attack on Hawaii. He at
one time translated a Japanese novel which academically discussed an attack on
Pearl Harbor. He showed this to Admiral Kimmel about three or four months
prior to December 7, 1941 (page 911). From the "War Warning" message and
other information he had at the time, he expected the Japanese to attack Thailand,
and possibly the Philippines (page 912) and after our search planes from Manila
had reported Japanese forces off Cameron Bay and in the Gulf of Siam, he reported
this estimate to CincPac. This was in agreement with the "War Warning"
(pages 912-3). Air attack on Pearl Harbor was a capability of the Japanese but
he had considered it a remote possibility. Surprise attack was a Japanese
characteristic (page 913).
Captain Layton knew Admiral Yamamoto personally and was familiar
with his characteristics. He did not specifically warn Admiral Kimmel that
in view of Admiral Yamamoto 's characteristics a surprise air raid on Pearl
Harbor was likely (page 223). He said that on one occasion when he did
discuss with Admiral Kimmel a book wherein a carrier raid on Oahu was
mentioned and Admiral Kimmel asked him what he thought of the chances.
He said "I only hope we can intercept them and I hope that the air search
will find them in plenty of time." He also said that in the discussion in
general regarding Japan's strength, he thought that the subject of Japan's
carriers was mentioned, and that Japan could not afford to gamble too much
in the first battle, (p. 224)
Captain Layton said that he saw the war warning of November 27th and
thought that it fitted in with the picture up to date as he saw it, namely, that
the Japanese were moving to the South. His estimate was unclear as to
whether or not the Japanese would attack the Philippines or would leave
their flank unguarded and attempt to work some compromise deal through
Kurusu and Nomura, (p. 224)
Captain Layton said that there was no discussion from November 27th to
December 7th in his presence, "in higher authority" as to the importance of
guarding against internal sabotage (page 914).
I. ADMIRAL BELLINGER
Admiral Bellinger stated that he neither saw, nor was aware of the receipt at
Pearl Harbor, of the so-called war warning of 27 November until after 7 December
1941. Neither did he see or know of the CNO despatch of 28 November regarding
possible hostile action by the Japanese. (P. 498-499)
Admiral Bellinger referred to Addendum I of Exhibit 53, which stated that an
air attack from carriers at 300 miles was the most likely form of attack on Pearl
Harbor. He anvisaged air attack as the most logical form for the greatest success
(page 668). He expected a bombing, not a torpedo attack (page 669).
Admiral Bellinger said that he had not thought it probable that an attack would
be made on Oahu as the opening event of the Japanese-United States war (page
688), and his estimate contained in the plans was in order to work out a defense
of Pearl Harbor and not an estimate of the war plans of the Japanese (page 687) .
448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
During the five days preceding December 7, Admiral Bellinger was in bed
with the "flu," His assistant. Captain Ramsey, conferred with him.
(p. 122)
Admiral Bellinger said that late in November, 1941, he thought the most
probable form of Japanese attack would be by submarine or by means of
sabotage, (p. 123-124)
J. ADMIRAL KITTS
Admiral Kitts testified that he had thought an air torpedo attack was possible
in Pearl Harbor, and antiaircraft measures such as nets and balloons had been
considered (page 516).
Admiral Kitts did not attend staff conferences generally. He was not
shown any warning dispatch but knew the general tenor of some of the
warnings, (p. 185) Admiral Kitts said that he had considered an air attack
on Pearl Harbor as a serious possibility and also a submarine attack or a
combination of the two. (p. 186) Admiral Kitts said that he helped draft
the Fleet Circular letter in February or March known as 2CL-41 which
indicated that a surprise air attack was a definite possibility, (p. 186)
His feeling in this regard was minimized by two letters from the Chief of Naval
Operations, stating that the water in Pearl Harbor was too shallow for a successful
torpedo run. Nets had not been put in because they were a hindrance to ships'
movements and because it was felt that the danger of torpedo attack was slight.
Balloon barrages had not been put in because of interference with normal opera-
tions of our own aircraft (page 516). Nets had been placed at the entrance to
Pearl Harbor (page 517).
The deepest water in Pearl Harbor was 42 feet, or 7 fathoms, and he recalled
that the Navy Department had estimated that torioedoes could not be successfully
launched in less than 10 fathoms (page 519).
K. ADMIRAL WITHERS
Admiral Withers said that he had seen the "War Warning" and had been present
at a conference held on November 28, 1941. He said that he told Admiral Kimmel
that he thought the dispatch meant war and that he wovild sink Japanese ships if
they came within 500 miles of Hawaii and didn't turn back (page 1085). General
Short was not at this conference (page 1086) . He had no orders to take offensive
action against enemy ships within the 500 mile area from Pearl Harbor (page 1086).
He had thought there would be an attack on Hawaii, but did not consider what
kind of attack (page 1086). The "War Warning" message did mention the
Philippines and he had felt that an attack might come anywhere but had thought
that the chances were that it would be on the Philippines (page 1087).
Captain Curts said that he had been apprehensive for a long time prior to
December 7 about the danger of the Japanese starting a war without a formal
declaration and he feared particularly sabotage, (p. 108)
L. COLONEL PHILLIPS
Colonel Phillips testified that General Short received an Army dispatch, corre-
sponding to Exhibit 19, on November 27th or November 28th, and that a con-
ference was held with Admiral Kimmel (page 483). He said that at the time of
receipt of the dispatch an estimate of the situation was made which resulted in the
sabotage alert. He estimated that an attack on Pearl Harbor was possible but
not probable, and that if there were an attack, it would be by air. He did not
recall receiving any information additional to that message until the afternoon of
December 7, 1941 (page 485). He did not recall having seen the Navy "War
Warning" message (page 486).
He stated that his opinion that the enemy might attack by air had been his
own personal opinion (page 493).
M. GENERAL SHORT
General Short said that at this time he considered sabotage the main danger at
Pearl Harbor since the information they had indicated that the Japanese would
move southward (page 239). He said that during a conference with Admiral
Kimmel, Mc Morris had stated that there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl
Harbor, and that there had been no disagreement by those present. He also knew
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 449
that Admiral Kimmel would have moved the ships out if he had thought an air
attack likely.
XXI. Conferences Between Admiral Kimmel and General Short After
November 27th
Admiral Smith said that the Roberts' Report was incorrect; Admiral Kimmel
and General Short, he "estimates," conferred every day between November 27th
and December 7th (page 546"). He present at some of the staff conferences (page
547).
He said that the Roberts' Report was incorrect in stating that Admiral Kimmel
did not inform himself of measures taken by Greneral Short; Admiral Smith was
present at, most of the conferences, and had been early directed by Admiral
Kimmel to cooperate with the Army (page 550); also, Short informed himself
of Kimmel's actions (page 551).
He stated that within twenty-four hours of the receipt of the "war warning,"
Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred. General Short had been promptly
advised of this message (page 561).
Comviander Harold S. Burr, then Naval Liaison Officer for the Commandant
at the headquarters, Commanding General Hawaiian Department, while at
CincPac Headquarters in the presence of Capt. Earle received from Lt. Com-
mander Layton a copy of the "war warning^' dispatch of 27 November {Ex-
hibit 17, Naval Court of Inquiry) with instructions to deliver it to General
Short. Commander Burr could not locate General Short or the Chief of Staff
and left the dispatch with the Senior Officer Present, Lt. Col. William Donnegan,
G-S, explaining its urgent nature. Commander Burr stated that on the following
day Col. Donnegan told him that the dispatch had been delivered to General
Short, {pages S77-8)
He did not recall "the details" of that conference. He thought that the message
was intended to put them on their toes and to get them readv to carrv out the
War Plan.
Admiral Kimmel, according to Admiral Smith, had a shock in the week
preceding Pearl Harbor when orders were received from the Navy Depart-
ment to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all of the Marines off of
the outlying islands and Marine and Navy planes and replacing them with
soldiers and with Army planes. As Admiral Smith remembered it, practi-
cally the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent with the two staffs
together. He said "the Army was undecided whether to put P-39's or
P-40's on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake
would remain there for the duration, in case of war, because they would
have to take off from a carrier and could not come back, and we had no
means of putting a ship in there to bring them off, and during the discussion
of this, with General Short and his staff, the Commanding General of the
Army Air Force (General Martin) and Admiral Pye were present, and also
Admiral Wilson Brown, the War Plans Officer, the Operations Officers,
and I believe Admiral Bloch. Admiral Kimmel said, "What can I expect
of Army fighters on Wake?" And General Martin replied, "We do not
allow them to go more than fifteen miles off shore." That was a shock
to all of us, and Admiral Kimmel's reply was, "Then, they will be no damn
good to me." The exchange was never made because the war broke
before-hand. The only dispute between the Army and Navy over that
exchange was that General Short said, "If I have to man these islands,
I shall have to command them." Admiral Kimmel replied, "No, that
won't do. If the Army commanded one of the islands, I wouldn't be able
to get a ship into one of the ports." or words to that effect, and General
Short said, "Mind you, I do not want to man these islands, I think they are
better manned by Marines, but if I man them, I must command them." That
was as near to a dispute between General Short and Admiral Kimmel as
I ever saw, but the plan was made and submitted but never carried out."
(p. 40-41)
Concerning the "war warning". Admiral Smith said that it was received
somewhere in the midafternoon on the 27th of November. General Short
was immediately sent for and a conference was held. By six o'clock that
evening, the Army was on the march, unfortunately what they did was to
station men at the public utilities, the reservoirs, and the bridges. In other
words, they alerted against sabotage because it was the consensus of opinion
79716—46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 30
450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
from this dispatch that attaclts would be against the Philippines, Thailand,
the Kra Peninsula, and possibly Borneo. What was considered most likely
by the Navy was a submarine attack on our forces at sea and by the others
sabotage on the Japanese population. The war warning, he said, was care-
fully considered by the assembled Army and Navy officers so as to determine
its exact meaning. He thought that the question of the defense of Pearl
Harbor, in the light of that warning, was never raised except as to the danger
of sabotage. The question of possible attack by air did not arise. Admiral
Smith was not apprised of the contemplated action of the Army and did not
believe that Admiral Kimmel had been advised. Admiral Bloch was at the
conference, but Admiral Smith recalled no discussion of measures to be taken
by Admiral Bloch's task force in light of the warning. Admiral Smith did
not recall what condition of readiness was set for ships in port. He said
the ships at sea were apprised of this warning.
Admiral Smith said that the operating schedule for ships which had been
previously issued was not departed from except that the ENTERPRISE was
sent to deliver planes to Wake. He said that as a result, at the time of the
war warning, two of the three task forces were at sea; Admiral Pye's task
force returned about the 5th of December, he thought, and also part of
Admiral Halsey's task force; Admiral Brown's task force departed on the
4th of December, he had the LEXINGTON and some cruisers and destroyers,
but no battleships; the net result of the adherence to the operating schedules
previously issued was that there was a movement of ships inward to port
rather than the deployment involving movement outward. Admiral Smith
said that it might very well be that these plans had been known to the Japanese
and that they chose their time to attack when two task forces were scheduled
to be in port.
The war warning. Admiral Smith said, did not indicate to him that there
would be an attack on Pearl Harbor. He knew that a greater part of the
approaches to Pearl Harbor were not covered by any reconnaissance, but
recalled no discussion at the conferences concerning this fact. (p. 50-53)
General Short stated that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel he placed
his anti-sabotage alert into eflfect. According to Admiral Smith and Colonel
Phillips, the Army went on the anti-sabotage alert on November 27th (pages 537,
479). General Short stated that he also conferred with Admiral Kimmel on
December 1st, 2nd and 3rd (page 251), they talked over every phase of what they
were doing (page 242).
Admiral McMorris recalled that at about this time a conference was held
between Admiral Kimmel and Greneral Short regarding utilization of Army air-
craft to strengthen defenses at Midway and Wake (page 889).
Admiral Brown said that he had overheard Admiral Kimmel frequently
question General Short as to the Army's adequacy to defend Pearl Harbor
against enemy air attack and that General Short had replied that his equip-
ment was wholly inadequate and that he had done everything possible to try
to have it increased.
Admiral Pye said that he personally attended no conferences in which the
situation was discussed by the Army High command; his conferences with
Admiral Kimmel were concerned with Fleet operations, (p. 149)
Captain Murphy said that after the receipt of the war warning he. Captain
Smith, Captain McMorris, Captain DeLany, and Captain Layton, were called
into Admiral Kimmel's office, and he read the dispatch and asked for their
opinion. Admiral Kimmel said that he would have a further conference
that afternoon. Captain Murphy said that he thought that at that conference
the decision was mde to reinforce Wake and to send some planes to Midway.
(p. 197)
Admiral Bellinger did not see the warning dispatches (Exhibits 15 and 17)
before December 7th, and between November 27th and December 7th did not
confer with the Army Air Force Commander regarding long range reconnaissance
(page 672).
Admiral Bloch recalled no discussions concerning unity of command (page 395).
XXII. Action Taken by Admiral Kimmel — Extent of Reconnaissance
A. IN GENERAL
Vice Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet from February, 1941,
through 7 December 1941, testified that all Pacific Fleet task force commanders
were notified of the receipt of the so-called war warning (p. 356) .
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 451
In this connection it should be noted that Vice Admiral Bellinger, who on 7
December 1941 was commanding officer of Task Force 9, comprising the patrol
planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified that he was unaware of the war warning until
after the attack on Pearl Harbor (p. 498).
Admiral Smith said that following the 27 November war warning the estab-
lishment of aircraft patrols from Oahu tvould have been an appropriate defensive
deployment to carry out the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war plans
(p. 372). However, he did not reynember any discussions with Admiral Kimmel
or Captain McMorris regarding the failure to direct such measures {p. 373).
The direction contained in the war warning to "execute an appropriate defensive
deployment preparatory to carry out the task assigned in WPL-46" was a new
phrase, Admiral Kimmel testified. He thought it referred to measures of the
type already taken by him (page 305).
As a result of the "war warning," he said, he continued the security measures
already in effect (page 299). On November 27th, he issued orders to bomb
unidentified submarines found in the operating areas around Oahu. He informed
the Chief of Naval Operations of this. Full security measures were invoked for
ships at sea, which were ordered to bomb submarine contacts (pages 299-300).
Admiral Bloch testified that no change was made in the condition of readiness,
except that a Coast Guard patrol was started off Pearl Harbor and they began
sweeping the Honolulu harbor channel and approaches (page 395).
Admiral Bloch said, "I knew that the Army had been alerted and I thought
they were in a general alert. I believe that General Short told me they were
alert and I thought it was a general alert. Either on the 7th or 8th of Decem-
ber, I asked General Short about it and he told me. No, it was only a partial
alert, what they call alert No. 1. He might have told me they were alert
No. 1 and I confused it with our condition 1. Our highest form is 1 and
their lowest form is 1. So far as the Navy is concerned, I know of nothing
particular, except the Commander of the Inshore Patrol at Pearl Harbor had
called in the Commanding Officers of Destroyer Division No. 80 — they
were the only four ships that I had for the inshore patrol and only one of
those was equipped with listening gear — and had given them a pep talk.
Admiral Kimmel had issued an order about the 27th of November to the
efTect that any submarines found running submerged in the defensive sea
area should be depth charged, and at this pep talk these young men were
told to be on their toes. It was my own thought that any action taken by
Japan prior to a declaration of war, or after a declaration of war, would be
in the form of concentrated submarine attack on the ships of the Fleet, in
the operating areas, and they might make an effort to get in the Harbor.
That was the reason for the pep talk. I know no other action was taken as
a consequence of the warning of the 27th of November." (p. 16)
Admiral Bloch said, "So far as I know, I advised no condition of readiness.
I might say that I felt that I could not independently advise a condition of
readiness without the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief; I believe the
order has a parenthetical expression in it that says I shall advise, exclusive
of the Commander-in-Chief, the state of readiness that shall be kept, which
indicates that the Commander-in-Chief would already know; I felt any action
that I might take should be consistent with the other things in the Fleet,
the conditions of employment, that they had been in or were in and the
future movements. This belief of mine was borne out subsequent to the
7th of December when I advised the condition of readiness, and I was in-
formed by the acting Commander-in-Chief that he wanted a different con-
dition of readiness." (p. 16)
After the War Warning, Admiral Bloch knew of no additional aerial recon-
naissance. Admiral Bloch did take one other step, namely, he directed the
District Coast Guard Officer, who was the Port Commander of Honolulu,
to put an inshore patrol in effect from Honolulu with three Coast Guard
cutters, the same as Admiral Bloch conducted from Pearl Harbor with
Destroyer Division 80. (p. 17)
Admiral McMorris said that on receipt of the "war warning," CincPac
had a discussion with his staff. A determination was made that its directions
were largely in effect already (page 888). Instructions were given to the forces
at sea to be particularly alert and to bomb submarine contacts believed hostile
(page 888). The practice was started of giving CincPac daily or every other day
recommendations as to what was to be done if war broke out within twenty-
452 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
four hours. Consideration was given to getting combatant ships out of Pearl
Harbor if war broke out, he said, but not to getting them out as a defensive
measure.
Concerning the direction to take defensive deployment. Admiral McMorris
said that they understood that Washington wanted to avoid any overt acts
and that they were not so uncertain about this as to ask the Department
for a clarification.
Admiral McMorris outlined his understanding of the action taken as
"preparatory deployment" at page 243.
Concerning the direction in the war warning to take "defensive deploy-
ment," Admiral McMorris said that they concluded that they should keep
their forces in close proximity to Hawaii where they could be kept fully
fueled and ready to move toward the Marshalls, and this was in agreement
with the directive, (p. 245)
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that as a result of the war warning on
November 27th, there occurred considerable discussion between Admiral Kimmel
and the key members of his staff, and the following determinations or conchisions
were reached:
(a) no material changes would be made within the Hawaiian area because the
naval organization was already substantially on a war footing;
(b) it was essential that training continue until it became necessary to move
the principal elements of the Fleet into offensive operations, and therefore, that
there should be a continuation and no modification of the training schedules;
(c) that li7nitations in supplies and facilities, particularly defensive aircraft,
had precluded stationing requisite defensive forces at Wake or Midway and
other island outposts until it became virtually mandatory, and, accordingly, the
only two aircraft carriers, accompanied by cruisers and destroyers were dis-
patched, one to Wake, the other to Midway, with fighter aircraft;
(d) that Midway and Wake, considering the personnel engaged in the prepara-
tion of defense, were not able to accommodate an increase in personnel, though
possibly a small number of men and some specialized equipment were dispatched
to Wake. {Page 304-305).
Admiral DeLany said that training conditions were maintained in the subor-
dinate commands, and tliat no additional security measures were invoked upon
receipt of the "war warning" (page 499).
Admiral DeLany said that he believed that everything possible was done,
with the available forces, to secure early information of possible attack,
within their concept that enemy activity within the area would be confined
to submarine and sabotage, (p. 78-9)
Concerning the instruction in the war warning to take "defensive deploy-
ment," Admiral DeLany said that as he recalled the island was alerted,
the Commander-in-Chief put certain aspects of his security letter in effect
with the forces afloat, and he pointed out, the actual deployment of the Fleet,
in view of its organization into task forces for the accomplishment of oflFensive
missions, existed.
Admiral DeLany also stated that the' Commanding Officer of the aircraft
had been given orders to accelerate the refitting of the planes which had
come to them without self-sealing tanks and other offensive war equipment.
(p. 79) _
Admiral DeLany recalls that about this time, submarines were sent out
on patrol at Midway and at Wake. (p. 79)
Admiral Calhoun said that he did not know of any additional security measures
which Admiral Kimmel could have taken (page 943) ; he considered the existing
ComFOURTEEN security orders adequate (page 944).
Admiral Smith said that because, as the Court inquired, an attack on Pearl
Harbor was held only a remote possibility, that additional precautions against
such a possibility were unnecessary and unjustified (page 560).
Admiral Smith said that the intended raid to the Westward called for by
the Pacific Fleet Operating Plan on the outbreak of hostilities was very much
in the minds of Admirals Kimmel and Halsey. The question of the security
of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was not seriously considered; the Fleet was
ready to carry out its tasks at the outbreak of war; and the question of an
attack before negotiations were completed was not, in Admiral Smith's
opinion, seriously considered, (p. 58)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 453
Admiral Smith said that the lack of premonition as to a carrier raid was not
due to preoccupation concerning offensive movements, (p. 63)
Admiral McCormick said that consideration had been given to using Fleet
units to augment the Army and local defense forces, and that the Fleet would
constitute the backbone of any defense of its own security; the necessity for
training for offensive missions naturally makes it impossible to keep the
forces wholly employed in routine security measures, (pp. 69)
Admiral McCormick said that he did not think that it was true, to the state
of imbalance, that the foremost thought in their minds was the offensive
movements rather than the security angle, although they intended to make
the maidmum offensive use of the Fleet which its comparatively small size
would permit, (p. 70)
B. RESPONSIBILITY FOR LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE
Vice Admiral McMorris testified, vnth reference to the question of whether or
not there had been any discussion by Admiral Kimmel concerning reconnaissance
from Oahu during the period November 27 to December 7, 1941, that it was not a
practice to have formal conferences though there were numerous conferences and
discussions, and that undoubtedly such question of reconnaissance was a matter
that was discussed during that period, {p. 307); that "definitely" was subject
matter discussed during that period between himself and others and Admiral
Kimmel. {p. 308).
Vice Admiral McMorris stated that he was not able to state what Admiral
Kimmel had to say concerning the discussion of reconnaissance from Oahu,
"but", he continued to testify, "the conclusions that he (Admiral Kimmel) reached
did not result in any distant search being maintained, but rather that the search
at the time was against submarines in localized areas." (p. 308).
Admiral Kimmel stated that under the provisions of Exhibit 52, Task Force
Nine (Commander Patrol Wing TWO) was to provide a long range scouting force,
conduct patrols into areas, and at times, ordered by CincPac to improve the secur-
ity of the Fleet units and bases, and was to issue orders for and supervise the con-
duct of prescribed patrols. There were insufficient planes for complete recon-
naissance. The schedules of employment of the planes were submitted to and
approved by Admiral Kimmel, pursuant to Exhibit 52. Although Admiral
Bloch had nothing suitable for reconnaissance, he could, Admiral Kimmel said,
have asked for such planes.
Admiral Kimmel stated that the Navy patrol planes were under his direct
operation (page 1125), and he assumed the direct responsibility of employing them
but that Admiral Bloch was charged with the execution of that part of the plan
which required the search, and he always had the right to request those planes
for that purpose and did so on several occasions. However, Admiral Kimmel
gave the orders to the planes (page 1125) . He said that he was directly responsible
for whether a distant reconnaissance with planes should be taken and that no
subordinate had recommended such reconnaissance (page 374).
Admiral Kimmel said that he did not know that daily patrols were permanently
flown prior to his command, as indicated by a question, over a certain arc from
Honolulu. He did know that certain searches had been conducted but thought
them ineffective (page 373). He had considered usting part of the planes to search
a probable area of enemy advance. Such search had been done previously for a
few days on Admiral Bloch's suggestion, but had been discontinued after finding
nothing (page 373).
To the best of Admiral Kimmel's recollection, reconnaissance patrol in certain
areas was not in effect when he took command. A patrol covering the operating
area was in effect, and he continued that patrol (page 1125). In any event, he
thoroughly considered the question of running patrols and had to make a decision
between training and running patrols. He was told by the commander of the
patrol planes and by the Army of their training difficulties. In addition, they did
not have a sufficient number to maintain an adequate patrol over a long period of
time, and a patrol out to 300 miles is almost useless as a guard against an air raid.
That was and is his opinion, although any patrol run has some value as far as
surface ships are concerned.
Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion that any air attack on Oahu would come at
dawn and considered at some time the placing of all available planes in the air
each morning, but did not think the time had arrived to take any measures such
as that (page 1131). The "emergencies" were continuing all the time and he did
not have the personnel and material (page 1132). If he had put the Navy PBY's
454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in the air at all, he would have had them out on patrol (page 1132). Had he put
all the planes in the air each morning at daylight, he said, it would have alarmed
the civilian population (page 1134).
Admiral Mc Morris said that long range reconnaissance was considered at this
time and earlier, but had to be considered along with the availability of patrol
planes, the status of training of these planes, employments they might be called
on to carry out, the offensive operation laid down in war plans, and the necessity
of covering operating areas, and supplying personnel for new squadrons (page 890).
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he had no specific recollection of any
conference or conversation between him and Admiral Kimmel concerning recon-
naissance from Oahu between the period of November 27 and December 7, 1941,
but that such was "a matter" that was discussed between him and Admiral
Kimmel and between the two of them with other members of the staffs and with
other senior naval officers present in Pearl Harbor.
He stated that he no longer remembered the details but did recall the consideration
that was in mind, in general, and the action determined upon. He stated that
the situation as to equipment was that the number of patrol planes was small and
certain of them were earmarked for Midway and }\ ake, and for reconnaissance
of the Marshalls at an appropriate time.
He stated that the following matters were considered:
(a) that it was believed to be highly important to maintain anti-submarine
patrols in the operating areas;
{b) that it was contemplated, in case war should start, that most of the fleet
shore-based aircraft were to be moved to the Island outposts (Midway, Johnston,
and Wake) but that some were to remain under the operational control of the
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Command since that command had no aircraft of
its own;
(c) that, in order to have the patrol craft ready for prompt movement to Island
outposts where the repair and upkeep facilities were negligible, it was considered
highly important thai there be no excessive use of such craft which would require
engine overhaul and interfere with readiness for flight on short notice;
(d) that, because the Navy patrol wings as a whole were being increased, and
the operating forces were in no small measure engaged in giving essential ad-
vanced operational training, that it was determined that such training should
be continued as much as possible.
Considering these matters, that is, the requirements for antisubmarine patrols,
readiness of patrol aircraft for distant service, and continuation of the training
program, "it was determined that the arrangements that were actually in effect
were the best that we could do. This in effect accepted a calculated risk. Subse-
quent events proved that the calculations weren't good." (page 305-306).
Admiral McMorris stated further in this connection that calculations made at
this time showed that "only varied limited sectors could be continually patroled
with the forces then available." {page 306).
He further stated "it may be remarked in passing that with the effectiveness of
search that could have been maintained, it is doubtful that the approach of the
Japanese carriers on the morning of 7 December would have been detected as the
arc of their approach would quite possibly have been unguarded."
With reference to the extent of the sectors which could have been covered in a
reconnaissance from Oahu by the patrol planes available during the period
November 27 to December 7, 1941, Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the
testimony of Admiral Bellinger, before the Naval Court of Inquiry, that con-
tinuous daily patrols for an undetermined number of days wotild have been flown
during the period in question by dividing the combat crews into three groups and
using twenty planes daily, which would have covered 144°, "wouldn't be far
wrong." {page 309-310).
However, he testified, that the only consideration given in that statement is to the
question of running a search, "but_the Commander-in-Chief had not only that
consideration to weigh, but also the matter of keeping planes ready for distant
service and for training of personnel for new aircraft being built." {page 310).
Vice Admiral McMorris stated that he could not state categorically the extent
of the sector from Oahu which could have been covered by the patrol planes during
the period in question. He stated that various combinations of diagrams, some
drawn within the War Plans Section, some by the aviation officer, and some
probably drawn by the Operations Division, were given consideration, though he
was not able to testify as to the extent the diagrams were presented to Admiral
Kimmel, neither was he able to state when and by whom any such diagrams were
considered.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 455
He testified that if any long distant searches were instituted, they undoubtedly
would have been a compromise among the different features involved, "just as a
compromise was actually reached in limiting the searches to the fleet operating
areas." {page 309).
Previously searches of rotating narrow sectors had been made daily (page 890).
After due consideration, it was decided not to make long range air reconnaissance
as it would be of limited effectiveness and training would suffer heavily and the
material readiness of the planes would be reduced. He recalled no formal con-
ference on this matter with Admiral Kimmel, but it was probably discussed
(pages 890-1).
His war plans group and he were of the opinion that a raid on Hawaii was
unlikely and wanted to have the patrol planes ready to go to Midway and Wake
to cover offensive operations (page 890) .
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the patrol or aircraft reconnaissance
being conducted from Midway and other outlying bases during the so-called
critical period from 27 November 1941 onwards, were very limited. He stated
that the aircraft at all outlying bases excepting Midway were entirely defensive,
while those at Midway were partially defensive and partially for patrol. He
stated that the patrols from Midway loere limited because of the limitations there
in the amount of gas and upkeep facilities, which required conservation in order
that the engines might not be worn out "before a critical period arose" {p. 327-328).
He also testified that if a maximum search had been instituted from Pearl
Harbor and from Midway after the warning of November 27th, there would have
been a highly critical situation with regard to aircraft engines by the 7th of
December (p. 328).
Exhibit 19 (repeat of Army dispatch) directing that operations be conducted
so as not to alarm the civilian population, had no bearing on the action taken by
him regarding reconnaissance or other war preparations (page 891).
Admiral Bloch stated that his sole connection with long range reconnaissance
was that as ComFOURTEEN, he made a joint agreement with the Commanding
General which would be placed in execution on "M" day or by order of the War
and Navy Departments, or upon mutual agreement of the two local commanders
of the Army and Navy; that then it would be the responsibility of the Navy to
provide reconnaissance planes, the delivery of which was indefinite. Commander
Patrol Wing Two was Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force and under
Admiral Bloch's control to the extent that Admiral Bloch exercised control over
naval shore based aircraft, and through him Admiral Bloch arranged to coordinate
joint air effort. Admiral Bellinger was ComPatWing Two, ComTaskFor Nine,
ComAir Scouting Force and ComNavBase Defense Air Force. The Naval Base
Defense Air Force was like a voluntere fire department. When you sounded the
air raid, they came; otherwise they were doing something else (page 398). Under
2CL-41, Admiral Bloch was not responsible for long distance reconnaissance
(page 399). Admiral Bellinger was to do this, subject to orders from CincPac
(page 400).
On November 27, CincPac decided to make no change in schedules; that in-
cluded the long range reconnaissance (page 400) .
Admiral Bloch stated that he could recall no request which he made for long
distance reconnaissance other than the request in June 1940, and in the summer
of 1941. He felt that while he could recommend such reconnaissance, the Com-
mander-in-Chief did not depend on him to make such a recommendation before
he ordered reconnaissance (page 1140). Admiral Bloch was Naval Base Defense
Officer and Admiral Bellinger was Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force
(page 1141). Admiral Bloch had supervisory control and both he and the Com-
mander-in-Chief could give Admiral Bellinger orders (page 1142). The planes
were under Admiral Bellinger as Naval Base Defense Air Officer only when they
were activated, and they were only activated while Admiral Bloch was there for
drill (page 1143). The arrangement was a makeshift one, arising out of the fact
that Admiral Bloch had no patrol planes with which to make reconnaissance; so
Admiral Kimmel had a makeshift arrangement to furnish patrol planes to the
Base Defense Air Force for reconnaissance in case of an air attack in order to
locate carriers, and to supplement the deficiencies in Army fighters (page 1144),
Admiral Bloch probably could have gotten planes temporarily by a request to
Admiral Kimmel, but could not order a protracted daily reconnaissance without
Admiral Kimmel's authority because of Admiral Kimmel's decision of November
27th that he would not make any distant reconnaissance (pages 1144-45).
456 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Bloch said that he had discussed with Admiral Eimmel the fact
that he had no planes for distant reconnaissance and had asked Admiral
Kimmel if he would supply the planes for such reconnaissance; Admiral
Kimmel said that he could not commit himself to that duty except insofar as
it might be possible on any occasion and that he, Admiral Eimmel, might
have to go away from the locality and take his own forces with him, and that
the District should really have its own forces. It was Admiral Bloch's very
definite understanding that in the absence of any planes of his own, any
missions of reconnaissance to be performed would have to be performed by
the Fleet planes and that Admiral Kimmel reserved to himself or to his
echelon of command, the handling of patrol planes for overseas work.
Actually, he said. Admiral Bellinger was the officer who, as Commander of
the Patrol Squadrons of the Fleet and as Commander of the Base
Defense Air Force, did this. It was obvious that the Commandant of
the District could not use patrol planes without the permission of the Fleet
because the patrol planes were employed by the Fleet on other missions.
It had to be done by the Fleet, there was no confusion of thought as to this,
and it was well understood that Admiral Kimmel actually would be the officer,
or somebody delegated by him would be the officer to designate what recon-
naissance was to be made. (p. 9)
Admiral Bloch said that on the occasions when he had asked Admiral
Kimmel for patrol planes that Admiral Kimmel said that he would do what
he could but could not make any commitments because in the event of
hostilities parts of the Fleet would have to leave Pearl Harbor. But Admiral
Bloch recalled no statement by Admiral Kimmel to the effect that he could
not take any particular security measures because of his commitments for
oflFensive movements, (p. 23-4)
Admiral Bellinger stated that CincPac made the final approval for naval
aircraft operation. CincPac or ComFOURTEEN could vitalize Naval Base
Defense Air Force. ComFOURTEEN worked under CincPac. Naval Base
Defense Air Force was not composed of all aircraft, but of aircrqft reported
available (page 665). Admiral Bellinger said that he would have looked to
ComFOURTEEN or CincPac to direct reconnaissance (page 683).
Admiral Bellinger said that in the absence of definite information as to
the probability of an attack, it was the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel
to order long-range reconnaissance, (p. 125)
Captain Ramsey said that Admiral Bellinger was not a naval base defense
officer insofar as planes were concerned, except in a drill or emergency, and he
did not control fighting planes, radar, or anti-aircraft guns (page 593).
Captain Ramsey said that during the period November 27th to December
7th, there were approximately 83 Army and Navy planes available for patrol.
Twelve of these were B-17's; the Army only reported six available to Navy
Base Defense. The Navy patrol planes were either in Task Force Nine or
associated with other task forces (page 599). All were operating on schedules
approved by CincPac (page 600).
Admiral Bellinger, he said, had nothing to do with the daily employment
schedules of planes and did not have authority to order them to discontinue
training and institute long range reconnaissance on his own authority in absence
of an immediate emergency (page 600).
Admiral Pye stated that it w'as not his job to advise as to patrols (page 439).
Colonel Phillips testified that distant reconnaissance was discussed but was
not undertaken. The Navy, he said, was responsible for such reconnaissance
(page 483).
C. READINESS OP AIRCRAFT AND DRILLS
Admiral Bloch said that in addtion to the 250 fighters that the Army
had of their own, the Navy usually had quite a large number of fighters
ashore and available to the Army. Each morning at 8 o'clock. Admiral
Bellinger would give the Army a list of the planes which were available to
the Army and the Army was supposed to send to him at the same time a
list of the Army bombers that were available to the Navy. (p. 10)
Admiral Bloch said that in the beginning they had an air raid and black-
out drill once a week, and later on they could not have it that often. The
Army did not always come in on the drills. There were some inteferences
because the time that Admiral Bloch would choose for the drill was not
always agreeable to the other forces. It interfered with the work of the
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 457
force commanders at sea and some of them complained. It was then
decided, at about the time that 2CL was issued, to set the date two or three
months ahead so that everyone would know that drills were going to happen
on that date. (p. 10)
According to Admiral Bellinger, the condition of the planes as to readiness
between November 27th and December 7th was the "normal" condition B-5
(50% on four hours notice) which was the normal condition of readiness (page
669) ; the Army was in Condition E-5 (in routine operation and could be made
ready in four hours).
Captain Ramsey said that during the period prior to December 7, diills were
held under the plans developed for the Naval Base Defense Air Force and defects
were noted and corrected (page 593).
Colonel Phillips could not remember whether any reconnaissance drills were
held by the Army and Navy from October 15th to December 7th (page 488).
Admiral Kimmel stated that air-raid drills had been held weekly, and later
bi-weekly, for several months prior to December 7th (page 296).
D. EXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCE
Admiral Kimmel stated (page 299) that he ordered one patrol squadron to
Wake, and that the patrol squadron at Midway be replaced by a squadron from
Pearl Harbor, and that the squadrons were to conduct reconnaissance en route.
Daily searches were made by the squadron at Midway on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th,
and 6th of December, and were to be made daily until further notice.
The ENTERPRISE was sent to Wake on November 28th, and landed planes
at Wake on December 3rd. The ENTERPRISE conducted daily reconnaissance
flights. The patrol squadron at Wake was withdrawn and conducted a recon-
naissance sweep from Mdiway to Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Halsey said that there was a plan which came out daily prior to
December 7 showing the reconnaissance for that day. He recalled that the
Fleet operating areas were searched daily and he thought that prior to
December 7 there regular searches in certain sectors believed to be most
dangerous, (p. 304)
The LEXINGTON was sent to Midway with a VMF squadron on December 5th
and conducted reconnaissance en route. She was 400 miles southeast of Midway
when war broke out.
Daily reconnaissance of operating areas was conducted with PBY planes
based at Pearl Harbor. Two submarines were operating at Wake and two at
Midway on patrol.
Admiral Delaney stated that all reconnaissance was conducted in conneciion
with training flights (page 499).
Admiral Bellinger said thai from 1 to 4 December 1941 scouting flights were
conducted daily, covering an approximate 90 degree sector, to a distance of 300
miles, by one squadron psr day for the sector. He emphasized that these flights
were flown as part of Patrol Wing Tactical Exercises only; they were training
flights and not directed fleet reconnaissance. He was unable to recall the sectors
utilized (p. 494)-
The operating areas were under constant patrol. No additional security measures
were invoked upon receipt of Exhibit 17 (War Warning), primarily because of lack
of sufiicient planes and pilots, and for getting planes in operating condition so far
as guns and bullet-proof tanks were concerned (page 499).
E. EXTENT OP RECONNAISSANCE WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN:
Vice Admiral Bellinger said that although aircraft were lacking to enable
a S60 degree search from Oahu, a partial aerial reconnaissance, covering certain
selected sectors, loas a possible and feasible operation (p. 477).
Any regular reconnaissance must, Adtniral Bellinger said, have been adopted
at the exense of the expansion training program then in effect. Had he received
clear warning to search for an enemy force, all his planes would, of course,
have been utilized, but no thorough 360 degree search was possible with the equip-
ment at his disposal {p. 508-509).
If a limited search had been planned, it would have been of the northern ap-
proaches to Oahu, since these were considered the most dangerous. But no limited
search was contemplated, according to Admiral Bellinger, who recalled no dis-
458 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cussion of aerial reconnaissance with Admiral Kimmel in the days up to 7
December {p. 506-508).
Admiral Stark testified that the Navy did not have sufficient patrol planes and
distribution was made of what he had. He was constantly trying to get more.
Other obligations of the Navy under JAAN-35 generally were taken care of
(pages 34-37). There were not sufficient forces for coastal work in Hawaii;
forces for this purpose had to be drawn from the Pacific Fleet (page 37). Hawaii
was, and Oahu was, on December 7th, in category "D", "subject to major
attack," and under the agreement a stronger offshore patrol was required than
under "C", and "long range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made
for use of GHQ air force." He was uncertain what "GHQ" air force meant, but
believed it to be a mobile force subject to direct orders from the War Department,
to be used to augment a local force (page 38) . Admiral Stark also testified that
the trip of the carrier to Wake did not impair CincPac's ability to carry out
reconnaissance (page 803).
General Marshall stated that the status of "GHQ Air Force" mentioned in
"Joint Action Army-Navy, 1935" as to long range reconnaissance planes was
that there were no planes in that Air Force available for transfer to Hawaii in
case of emergency. It was the air force in the continental United States, he said,
and was being made available in pieces for overseas use all the time (page 859) .
Admiral Kimmel testified that under the joint plan, the Army was to operate
all pursuits and the Navy all bomfciers and patrol planes and that there were daily
reports as to the availability of planes (page 296). He said that long range
reconnaissance to be effective should cover a radius of 800 miles (page 304) and
that it would take 84 patrol planes for one flight of 360° and two and a half to
three times that number for continuous daily search. All sectors around Oahu
are ones from which an attack could be expected, even though he had testified
before the Robert's Commission that he thought North the most probable sector
(page 305). If restricted, he would search the western 180° sector first (page 305).
He further stated that his firm conviction was that long range reconnaissance
over a period of time would have put his planes out of commission. Thirty days
of long range reconnaissance would have reduced his planes by 25%. Incidentally,
if he had sent the planes out, and when he did so, he would have armed them,
and did arm them (page 329) .
Admiral Bellinger made reference to a report of a Joint Army and Navy Board,
dated October 31, 1941, signed by Admiral Bellinger and his Army opposite;
paragraph 4 indicated that as pertained to Army aviation, the problem confront-
ing the Board, as stated by the Army, was that the Armj-'s mission was to defend
the naval base against all attacks by an enemy ; that the Hawaiian Air Force was
to search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action by bombard-
ment, aviation; and to detect, intercept and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity
of Oahu by pursuit aviation (page 663). This report pointed out that 170 B-17's
and two groups of 163 pursuit planes each would be assigned to fulfill that mission.
There would be needed 84 naval patrol planes and 48 VSO planes to be directly
under ComFOURTEEN, and to supplement or to replace the 98 patrol planes of
Patrol Wings One and Two which might be ordered to advance bases on outlying
islands.'
He stated that both the Army and the Navy were in the process of receiving
replacement of obsolescent planes (page 663) , and there were the usual shakedown
and maintenance problems. There was an absence of spare parts for PBY-5
planes, and the installation of leak-proof gasoline tanks was in progress. Also
there was difficulty with cracking of engine nose sections and installation of modi-
fied sections was in progress (page 663).
The major effort of Patrol Wings One and Two, he said, was training in prepara-
tion for war (page 663). The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force on a
functioning basis would have necessitated substantial cessation of training (page
664). Continued operation of all planes for scouting would have soon reduced
their material readiness and fatigued the crews. Therefore, as stated in their
estimate of the situation, advance intelligence of a possible attack within narrow
limits was a prerequisite for starting long distance patrol (page 664).
Admiral Bellinger said that fifty planes per day would be required to cover
360° for 700 miles (page 672). Counting eight available Army bombers and
about 54 Navy planes, there were 62 planes available for patrol. These Navy
planes were in Pat Wing Two and Pat Wing One, which also included a squadron
at Midway and a squadron which returned to Pearl Harbor on December 5th and
needed maintenance work (page 676). There was scarcely more than one crew
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 459
per plane. Continuous daily patrol could be flown only by dividing combat
crews into three groups, which means twenty planes daily which could cover 144°.
This would be for an undetermined number of days, but would not be permanent.
Spare parts were critically short (page 673) . The 54 Navy planes were PB Y-5's
sent to replace obsolescent planes and had arrived, one squadron of 12, Oct. 28th;
one squadron of 6, Oct. 28th; one squadron of 12, Nov. 23rd; one squadron of
12, Nov. 23rd. They were new and there were shakedown difficulties (page 673)
and absence of spare parts. They had received some earlier vintage PBY-5's
and had had trouble with cracking of engine nose sections. The practical range
of PBY-5 was radius of 700 miles, of PBY-3's 600 miles (page 670).
Exhibit 59 (letter from CincPac to CNO of January 7, 1942. enclosing Bellinger's
letter) contains data on planes needed for 360° patrol to 700 miles (page 675).
He commanded Pat Wing Two and had control of Pat Wing One (page 677).
Task Force Nine included everything he had, so it included these planes. The
general policy or plan as to employment schedules was set out by CincPac. Other
than planes being overhauled and repaired, the balance of those planes were
occupied each day in carrying out the routine schedule of operations (page 677) ,
which schedules were matters between plane commanders and CincPac through
regular channel of command.
All-out reconnaissance after November 27th would have completely disrupted
training, he (Bellinger) said (page 679) , and if all training had been stopped and
a daily patrol commenced on October 17th, it would have affected the efficiency
of the air force on December 7th; many planes would not have been in flight
condition (page 680).
Admiral Bellinger testified that after October 28th, while there were 107 VP
assigned to all units of Aircraft Scouting Force, only eighty-one were available
Of these, fifty-four had just arrived and were the PPY-5 type, with limited avail-
able spare parts. The number of plane crews did not quite equal the number of
planes available. If one could consider eighty-one planes available, and assum-
ing that there would have been none lost because of breakdowns requiring spare
parts, it would have been practicable to use one-third, about twenty-seven planes,
for daily patrol. Each plane could cover a sector of eight degrees with a ladius
of 700 miles, , totalling approximately 216 degrees daily. This, however, would
have been the absolute maximum because of the lack of sufficient crews and spare
parts. 144 degrees could have been covered daily based on the use of eighteen
planes daily of the fifty-four new PPY-5's. Actually, on 7 December 1941
there were in all only sixty-one planes available at Oahu, one squadron of which
had just returned from Midway and Wake and required overhaul. This left
forty-nine planes actually available, one-third of which would have been able to
cover 128 degrees {pages 480-483, 485~487, 502-504).
Admiral Pellinger further testified that if he had received a directive from Ad-
miral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941, to conduct 360 degrees
reconnaissance with the available Navy planes, it would have been possible to
maintain such reconnaissance for not more than four or five days. His estimate
of the duration of the daily 128-degree search was that it could have been flown
until the failure of planes and the lack of spare parts reduced the planes to such
an extent that further reconnaissance was impossible. It appears that such
reconnaissance could have been carried on for an indefinite period and Admiral
Bellinger' s "vague" estimate was that it could have been carried on for several
weeks {pages 504-505).
Admiral Bellinger testified that he considered the northern sectors as the most
dangerous sectors primarily because of the prevailing winds which would facilitate
carrier-based plane operations in that sector. He stated that had the normal
plan been carried out after the attack, on December 7th patrol planes would have
searched the not them sector, and that some few planes did search that sector.
But there had been searches made to the south because of information received
from CincPac to the effect that a radio bearing indicated that the attacking force
was to the south, {p. 506-07).
Admiral Bellinger said that when he arrived in Hawaii on October 30, 1940, he
found they were operating on a shoestring (page 667), and he tried to point out
to the Navy Department, via CincPac and Commander Scouting Force, the impor-
tance of remedying the existing deficiencies, but the emphasis seemed not to be
on the Pacific. He was not satisfied with the supply of planes and the develop-
ment of plane facilities in Hawaii up to December 1941, though there had been
considerable improvement over the time he first reported (page 674) in 1940
460 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Bellinger discussed the main effort during several months pre-
ceding the attack which consisted of training, maintenance difficulties, etc.
(p. 116)
Admiral Bellinger said that prior to December 7, they were short of the
allocated number of crews for patrol planes and the main training was expan-
sion training so as to increase the number of crews, (p. 117)
Admiral Bellinger discussed the reasons why a 360° circumference could
not have been maintained. He said that there was no hard and fixed deci-
sion as to the direction in which an attack might be launched although the
wind direction indicated that the northern sector might be more desirable.
The location of bases from which such an attack might come were in the
southwesterly direction, (p. 118) Admiral Bellinger said that the 300
miles estimated as an enemy launching radius was a high estimate but had
been selected as giving the enemy the advantage in the estimate.
Captain Ramsey stated that he behaved a patrol of 800 miles was necessary for
distant reconnaissance. One squadron of PBY-3 planes attached to Pat Wings
One and Two could only fly a radius of 700 miles. Around November 27th it was
decided to reenforce Wake with Marine fighter squadron, and one of the patrol
squadrons, VP-21, which had been at Midway since October was transferred to
Wake with orders to scout and cover the advance of Admiral Halsey's task force.
A second patrol squadron was sent out from Pearl Harbor to Midway to scout
and similarly cover Admiral Halsey's advance and retirement. VP-22 left Wake
on December 3rd or 4th and arrived at Pearl Harbor on December 5th, which
left just the one squadron, VP-21, at Midway (page 583). That squadron was
of old, obsolete planes, PBY-3's, which were due for overhaul and to be replaced
with PBY-5's.
With nine planes undergoing repair or out of commission for other reasons, they
had 12 naval planes at Midway and about 60 at Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe which
could have been used for reconnaissance to the 700 mile point (page 583). There
were also six Army B-17's which were available and which could go beyond 300
miles; they could go to 800 miles.
He, Capt. Ramsey, was asked whether, with these planes available from No-
vember 27th to December 7th, he could have complied with a directive to conduct
long range reconnaissance through 360° (page 583). He stated: No. A single
plane going to 700 miles could cover a s/ector of only 8°; only 50% of the 66 planes
could be used continuously and therefore only 264° could be covered daily (page
583); 360° could be covered only one, or possibly two, days in an emergency but
could not be maintained. Three weeks of intensive daily searches would have
seen about a 75% reduction in material readiness of the entire outfit, placing planes
out of commission and robbing them for spare parts to keep other going. The
pilots could have kept going about six weeks but then would need a protracted
rest (page 584). Daily long range reconnaissance could have been maintained
indefinitely by using 30 planes each day until the exhaustion period was reached,
provided they were permitted by higher authority to operate that many for search
alone, because that would have left them entirely without a striking group except
as remaining 36 were available (page 583). Without exhausting planes or per-
sonnel, and assuming the supply of critical parts, they could have safely and
indefinitely operated a daily reconnaissance to 700 miles with 18 planes and could
have covered 144° (pages 584-5).
He further stated that a 700 mile radius of search with 18 planes was based upon
a 25-mile visibility. Such visibility did not ordinarily prevail in the Hawaiian
Area for a distance of 700 miles; it was either very good or so bad that scouting
was impracticable (page 590). Except in a case of a wide-spread weather front,
a patrol to 700 miles in a 144° sector had a good chance of detecting any large
number of vessels on any given day (page 590).
For the PBY-5's, which m the case of several squadrons had during October
and November just replaced the PBY-1, 2, and 3 planes, there were substantially
no spare parts. There was the usual shakedown difficulty with a new type plane;
engine sections cracked and replacement program in effect; material for installing
armor and leak-proof tanks in the PBY-5's just being received, and first planes
were finished December 7th (page 591).
He, Capt. Ramsey, said that once at Pearl Harbor he saw forty PBY-5's going
through to Australia, New Zealand, or Dutch East Indies. This was at a time
when such planes were needed at Pearl Harbor (page 602).
He agreed with the Roberts' Report to the extent that the means for distant
reconnaissance at their disposal would have provided a certain degree of security,
but were oot adequate for absolute security (page 595) .
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 461
He said that there had been discussions of the most probable sector for an
enemy attack and the northwest sector was considered the most Hkely line of
approach (page 597). In drills for readiness the squadron in the highest degree
of readiness was ordered to take up the sector from 315° to 00°, and for any single
day he would have sent the planes to cover this sector. On a continental control,
the sector would have to be varied, as if a single sector were flown every day the
enemy would learn of this and easily avoid it (page 597).
Admiral Davis said that the entire 360° circumference was not of equal
importance; that a considerable arc to the north and west and another arc
to the south and west were the most important. He estimated that if there
had been a coverage of 180° so divided established after receipt of the dis-
patch of November 27, the chances would have been fairly good, perhaps
two out of three that the patrol would have intercepted the Japanese carriers;
based on knowledge since acquired, he would be inclined to put the chances
as no better than one out of two. The chances, he said, have always been
good enough so that defensive search is more than justified. However,
he felt that the Japanese had launched their attack at Pearl Harbor from a
long distance in order to avoid detection and therefore, that the chances of
sighting the Japanese by a previous day's search were less than one out of
two.
Admiral Davis said that it was the Commander-in-Chief's belief that it
was vitally necessary to continue as long as possible with training and
other Fleet improvements and that going into a defensive status would
interfere with this work. Concerning the possibility of attack and pre-
cautions to be taken. Admiral Davis indicated that he only occasionally saw
or heard of warnings given to the Commander in Chief; that he had stated
that comprehensive air searchs were practicable and would very definitely
interfere with progress in general in aviation training in the Fleet; he naturally
expressed the opinion that a surprise air attack was possible and could only
be prevented by the most extensive searches but he did not realize to what
a high degree of proficiency Japanese naval aviation had been developed.
He is sure that Naval Intelligence did its best but is convinced that informa-
tion on the subject was lacking.
Admiral Davis said that he did not believe that the Commander in Chief
regarded the damage possibility that might result from a Japanese air raid
as very great; that it was apparent that he felt that training and improve-
ments of our own Fleet still had priority, particularly because he believed
that there would not be at that time any overt action. Precautions to a
certain degree had been taken. As December 7 approached, he was con-
cerned about the general situation with respect to the outlying islands and
stressed the necessity for providing some form of air protection there, (p.
98-99)
Admiral Davis said that although there were not enough planes and pilots
to have established and maintained a long-range 360° search indefinitely,
there were enough to have made searches using relatively short-range
planes in the least dangerous sectors and by obtaining some assistance from
available Army aircraft. It could have been undertaken had it been con-
sidered essential but unless reinforcements arrived it could not have been
maintained.
Admiral McMorris said that, in general, it was a Navy responsibility to
obtain early information of the approach of any possible enemy and that
forces available for such detection were in general the Fleet patrol planes
of PatWingTwo and that the extent of any search that they might carry on
was determined by the Commander in Chief. It was as a practical matter,
impossible to maintain an effective patrol for anything but a brief period,
(p. 240)
Admiral McMorris said that it was not contemplated to use ships for
picket duty in the approaches to Hawaii, (p. 240)
Admiral McMorris said that he thought that as of the time in question,
the provisions made for obtaining early information of the approach of an
enemy were the best that could reasonably be made consistent with the
training and other demands on the part of the Fleet, although from hind-
sight the answer would be otherwise, (p. 241)
Admiral Calhoun said that after the warning of November 27th, CincPac
ordered air patrol to the limit of endurance of planes and pilots (page 941).
Admiral Smith testified that patrols were flown over operating areas, but there
were not sufficient planes for a 360° search (page 538) .
462 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Smith said that Admiral Bellinger maintained an air patrol of
the operating areas only because he had insufficient planes for a more ex-
tensive patrol; however Admiral Bellinger based his position entirely on
the shortages of planes and not on personnel fatigue, (p. 43)
Admiral Smith said that if CincPac had interpreted Exhibit 17 (War Warning)
to mean an attack on Pearl Harbor, he could have put out a search with available
aircraft, including Army and carrier-based planes, moved the Fleet westward,
and advanced carriers to intercept the Japanese (page 557). Without Fleet
movement, he could have searched, with the available planes, a radius of perhaps
600 miles, but not through 360° (pages 557-8). The destroyers were required to
protect heavj' ships in case of the expected submarine attack and could not be
used for patrol.
Exhibit 59, a letter by Admiral Nimitz, dated January 7, 1942, was an urgent
request for more patrol planes so as to conduct an effective daily search to about
800 miles, which would require about fifty planes daily — there being at the time
of this letter a total of 109 (Army and Navy) long range planes available. It was
said that this was inadequate for search, a striking force and special missions;
a minimum of three times the number needed for one day was necessary. He
described the extent of the search being made: 25 patrol planes and 12 B-17's
were used daily for a 700-mile search, covering 290°; and relatively ineffectual
planes, such as available VSO, VJ, and B-18's were used to cover the remaining
sectors to about 200-300 miles. To this were annexed supporting and detailed
memoranda, including a letter by Admiral Bellinger, dated December 30, 1941.
Until August, 1941, Captain George Vanduers was an assistant to Admiral
Bellinger particularly in connection with arrangements for joint Army-Navy
air command, (p. 290). He prepared the estimate of the situation dated
March 31, 1941, which indicated that a surprise carrier raid appeared to be
the most probable course of action for the enemy, (p. 290). Captain
Vanduers stated that, in his opinion, search with 80 planes over a two-week
period of the most probable sectors would have been about 40% effective.
Admiral Fitch, who preceded Admiral Bellinger and was Commander of
Patrol Wing Two from June, 1940, until October, 1940, said that during the
time when he was in command of Patrol Wing Two it was recognized that
they had insufficient planes and efforts were made to increase the effective-
ness of those they did have, to develop Western island bases and to increase
the number of planes. Off-shore patrol plane searches were instituted as a
routine from Pearl Harbor and varied as to the amount of searches conducted,
(p. 228-9). Admiral Fitch said that assuming 80 planes, long range, available
and employed over a two-week period and searching only the most probable
sectors, a search plan could be evolved which could be expected reasonably
to be 50% effective in detecting an enemy attack, (p. 289)
Admiral Ivimmel said that if he had had a reconnaissance in effect at 700 miles,
and it had met a strange force, he had no way of stopping that force from delivering
an attack except by the means already mentioned (page 1126). The court said
that as they understood it, he did not have a surface striking force available which
could have gone to the location and supported a carrier attack (page 1126).
Admiral Kimmel said, however, that he had two carriers where they could have
been very useful — one, 400 miles southeast of Midway, and the other 200 miles
west of Pearl Harbor; and had he known the location of the enemy, they probably
could have delivered a very effective attack. The court stated, and Admiral
Kimmel agreed, that it was a military fact that in order to detect a carrier raid one
must know in advance that the carrier is on its way (page 1126), and within
narrow limits of its time of arrival and sector.
XXIII. Action Taken by General Short
General Short testified that Alert No. 1 against sabotage was put in effect.
General Short considered sabotage as the main danger since the information
received was that the Japanese would move Southward (page 239) . He said that
in a conference, in response to Admiral Kimmel's question. Captain McMorris,
his War Plans Officer, had said there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl
Harbor, and that there was no disagreement. Also, he knew that Admiral
Kimmel did not think an air attack likely or he would have moved the ships out.
The dispatch which General Short had received put emphasis on not alarming the
civilian population and there had been no indication as to what form hostilities
might take. He pointed out that the Army sent in B-24's on photo mission
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 463
unarmed, and also on December 6th sent out twelve B-17's not in combat con-
dition (page 240).
He said that although he had had conferences with Admiral Kimmel during this
period, no request was made of him for planes for long distance reconnaissance
(page 249).
He did not recall having seen the dispatch of November 24th, but did see the
dispatch of November 28th, which had repeated the Army dispatch to him.
Captain Curts discussed the general procedure for delivering copies of
Navy messages to the Army and the procedure handled in connection with
the November 27 dispatch as follows:
"Our ordinary system in Pearl Harbor was to make a paraphrase of such a
dispatch, send an officer with the original and with a paraphrase to the ad-
dressee's communication office, and have them ask the Commanding
General whether he was satisfied with the paraphrase and then to sign the
dispatch, the original, as having received the same. This particular dispatch
wasn't handled in that manner. This dispatch was delivered to Admiral
Kimmel who kept it in his desk drawer with all copies thereof, and, upon my
telling him that I had to deliver it to the Army, he informed me that he would
take care of it by sending his Intelligence officer to deliver this dispatch to
the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to General Short. I
tried to get him to let me get their signatures but Admiral Kimmel refused,
saying that Commander Layton had taken care of it. I questioned Layton as
to whether he delivered it and he stated that he had delivered it to the
Fourteenth Naval District and, in the presence of Captain Earle, the Chief
of Staff", had delivered a copy to General Shorts G-2 officer for delivery
to General Short, and later Layton informed me that this officer, this G-2
officer, told him that he had given the dispatch to General Short personally
in his bedroom that night. I was quite concerned, persohally, about up-
setting the system of receipts, but, in my own mind, I am satisfied that this
dispatch was delivered to both the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval
District and to General Short, although I held no receipt." (p. 112)
In response to the direction contained in the Army dispatch. General Short
advised the War Department of the action taken by him. The War Department
did not reply. He received another telegram on November 28th which con-
firmed him in his belief that sabotage wap considered the main danger (page 244).
He replied on that day telling what he had done (page 245). He did not report
on long range reconnaissance for that was the Navy's responsibility (page 246).
He received no further information from the War Department and did not change
his alert (page 243).
General Marshall said that after the Army dispatch of November 27th, no
further warnings were sent by the Chief of Staff to General Short until December
7th (page 869). Two other messages warning against sabotage were sent by
other parts of the War Department on November 28th, but General ^Marshall
was not familiar with these until after December 7th (page 869).
General Marshall stated, concerning the dispatch in which General Short in-
formed the War Department of the measures taken pursuant to the warning of
November 27th, that so far as they could determine the reply from the Philippines
and the reply from Hawaii came in together and were stapled together. General
Marshall initialed the one from the Philippines, which was on top, but not the one
from Hawaii (pages 880-1). He had no recollection one way or the other as to
whether he had seen the one from Hawaii. He was away from November 26th-
28th (page 880), and at other times up to December 7th, and had no recollection
whether or not he knew of the precautions which General Short had taken
(page 881).
Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall having been advised of General
Short's reply until after December 7th (pages 151, 802).
Admiral Ivimmel testified that he did not know what kind of alert the Army
had effective at this time, but he knew that they had some alert in effect (page 326) .
XXIV. Japanese Espionage and United States Intelligence at Pearl
Harbor — Japanese Military and Fleet Movements
a. japanese espionage
Admiral Bloch said that he had been advised by the District Intelligence
Officer of the existence of about 200 representatives of the Japanese Consu-
late who were spread over Oahu and who were not registered agents of the
464 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese Government. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had definite
information to convict these men of being unregistered agents. Admiral
Bloch wrote a Itter to the Chief of Naval Operations on this matter dated
November 10, 1941, file S-A8-5/EF37/ND14, Serial 01216. The reply
thereto is identified as letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to Com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District, classified Secret, dated 6 December
1941, file (SC) A8-5/EF37, Serial 01348816. Both of the above-mentioned
letters are now on file in the Chief of Naval Operations Secret and Confi-
dential File Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. The Army would
not agree to the indictment of these Japanese and the matter was referred
to Washington where the War and Navy Departments agreed that they
would not be brought to trial, (p. 15)
Captain Murphy said that there was a general impression that the Japanese
could know anything that they wanted to know about the Pacific Fleet,
(p. 200)
Admiral Brown said that he thought it quite probable that the Japanese had
a copy of the employment schedule setting forth the Fleet Movements.
(p. 145)
Captain Mayfield pointed out that the topography of Pearl Harbor permitted
easy observation of the ships there. Captain Mayfield was of the belief that
there were about 350 Japanese societies which were active. He said that
there were also 250 consular agents which he believed were used by the
Japanese consulate for the purpose of getting information, (p. 311)
Admiral Wilkinson discussed the organization of the domestic branch of
ONI and the activities of the Counter-Espionage Section and conference
with the F. B. I. and the Army set-up. (p. 284) Admiral Wilkinson also
discussed the Navy's desire to have the Department of Justice prosecute
various Japanese in Hawaii for being non-registered agents of a foreign
government and said that the Commanding General had urged that prose-
cution be withheld in order not to disturb cordial relations between the
Japanese and the Americans.
Captain Mayfield said that he had participated in conferences at Hawaii
concerning the possible prosecution of the Japanese consular agents but that
the Army had indicated that they did not want these men prosecuted, (p.
311-312)
Concerning the use of Japanese fishing boats and Intelligence work.
Captain Mayfield said there never was definite proof of espionage in all of
these boats but he believed that they were used for that purpose, (p. 312)
Captain Mayfield said that he had no exact information indicating that
amateur radio transmitters were used for Intelligence work or regular com-
mercial braodcasts from Hawaii, (p. 312)
Lt. Stephenson discussed the Japanese consular agents of which there
were about 240 and the fact that one of them in June 1940 had been proved
to have been engaged in espionage. He discussed the correspondence re-
lating to the prosecution of these consular agents which was resisted by
General Short.
Lt. Stephenson discussed the sources of Japanese espionage information
and the limitations on counter Intelligence due to limited personnel in ONI
and to other reasons, (p. 326)
Lt. Stephenson discussed the measures taken to prevent the acquisition
of information by visiting Japanese merchant crewmen, etc. (p. 327)
Lt. Stephenson discussed at some length the various sources of informa-
tion open to Japanese and the inability of the Intelligence Section to prevent
the acquisition and transmission of such information.
Lt. Stephenson referred to reports which he had written concerning the
espionage problem in Hawaii dated February 9 and February 14, 1942 in the
Kuehn case and a report dated April 20, 1943 in the Counter-intelligence file
of ONI. He said that it was known on the basis of information after the war
that the consulate head used commercial communication facilities for the
transmitting of vital Intelligence from and after December 3. (p. 331)
Lt. Stephenson said that no evidence had ever been found establishing that
Japanese sampans had been used for espionage purposes but it was recog-
nized that they were so used. (p. 332)
Concerning Japanese espionage. Admiral Smith said:
"I remember an incident a few months before the war where an American
came from San Francisco; he had communicated with the Fleet Intelligence
OflBcer before doing so. He was in the employ^of the, Japanese and was sent
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 465
out by the Japanese by plane. The Intelligence officer made contact with
him by placing an officer in yeoman's clothes, and we removed from the files
two or three papers, mostly on the results of target practice, and gave them
to this American who flew back to the West Coast, and, as the result of all
this, a Japanese Lieutenant Commander and a Japanese servant, I believe
of Charles Chaplin, were arrested. No action was taken. The State Depart-
ment intervened and the Japanese Lieutenant Commander was returned to
Japan. What happened to the Japanese servant, I don't recall, but we knew
that the money had come from the Japanese Embassy. We did not know
of the activities of Japanese agents in Hawaii, although it had been developed
years before that some of the priests were ex-Army officers. I was informed
by Captain Kilpatrick, who had been a previous Intelligence officer, that an
effort was made to deport one of these priests, but it was found nothing
could be done because of an old agreement between the United States and
Japan, based upon our missionary activities of the past, that once a man in
the religious status arrived in the country, if he chose to undertake other
activities, nothing could be done about it. I know that Admiral Bloch knew
of that case. In the summer of 1940, when Admiral Richardson had the
Fleet, we were ordered to rendezvous the entire Fleet one afternoon well
off shore and a course was set toward San Pedro. I believe that no one
beyond the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief knew why we were out. We
changed course after and engaged in no real tactical operations. What this
was all about, I have never learned. But on our return to port, I learned,
through Admiral Bloch, that there had been a great deal of activity on the
part of Japanese communications between Oahu and the Island of Hawaii,
trying to learn the whereabouts of our Fleet. We knew there were Japanese
agents working, but, to the best of my knowledge, the Fleet Intelligence
Officer and the Commander-in-Chief did not know who these Japanese
agents were. We suspected all of them."
Captain McCollum said that it had been suspected for some time prior to
Dece7nber 7, 1941, that Japanese submarines were keeping our fleet based in
Pearl Harbor under observation. He said that at various times during the last
6 months of 1941 L. S. destroyers had reported contacts with enemy subs in and
around the Hawaiian group: Several of these contacts were considered well
authenticated. Although most of the contacts were not in the immediate vicinity
of Honolulu, he believed that one had been made in Molokai Channel — the
approach to the drill grounds of the fleet. In July or August, 1941, it had
actually been suggested that a search be made of a certain point to the north of
Midway, where it was believed that a Jap provision ship and tanker might he
rendezvousing with some of the Japanese reconnaissance subs (p. 23-24).
Vice Admiral Smith stated that there had been many reported submarine
contacts prior to 7 December 1941 in the general vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands,
but that in most cases these contacts had not been considered authentic. He did
not recall any submarine contacts during the period October-December, 1941
(p. 340).
Captain John B. Earle, USN, in December, 1941, Chief of Staff of the 14th
Naval District, testified that in the several months preceding the Pearl Harbor
attack there were ten to fifteen reports of submarines sighted around Pearl Harbor,
most of the reports coming from sampans, occasionally from Army lookout
posts, and now and then from planes {p. 451)- Captain Earle recalled few of
the details of these reports; he remembered none in the months of October and
November, 1941, or in December prior to the 6th of that month (p. 451).
A search of the files of CinCPac by Admiral Hewitt's investigation resulted
in locating dispatches that refer to three suspicious contacts during the five
weeks preceding Pearl Harbor:
(1) On 3 November 1941 an oil slick area in latitude 20-10, longitude 157-41
was observed by a patrol plane and crossed by Task Force One. An air search
of a fifteen mile area by the patrol plane, a sound search of an unspecified area
by the bSS WORDEN and an investigation by the USS DALE produced
negative results (Exhibit 48; dispatches 031920, 032035, 032133, 032300,
040042).
(2) On 28 November 1941, after the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
had issued an order requiring extreme vigilance against possible hostile sub-
marines, restricting submerged submarine operations to certain areas, and
providing that all submarine contacts in other areas suspected to be hostile were
to be depth bombed, the USS HELENA reported that a radar operator, with-
out knowledge of the CinCPac alert, was positive that a submarine was in a
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 31
466 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
restricted area {Exhibit 48; dispatch 2808S5). A search of part of the area by a
task group of three destroyers was pursued from 1050 to 1845 on the 28th but
produced no contacts {Exhibit 48; dispatches 281050, 281133,281704, 281845).
(5) During the night of 2 December 1941, the USS GAMBLE reported a
clear metallic echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158-23, which was lost in a
change of range; it was evaluated as probably not indicating the presence of a
submarine {Exhibit 48; dispatch 022336). An investigation, ordered to be made
by DesRon 4 {Exhibit 48; dispatch 030040), apparently was negative.
Lieutenant Woodrum said that over a period of years considerable information
had been gathered by the Naval Intelligence Service concerning Japanese interest
in Pearl Harbor and the Island of Oahu. He said, "There are voluminous re-
ports available concerning the visits of Japanese tankers, Japanese training
ships, Japanese training squadrons to the Island of Oahu and to other islands
in the Hawaiian group. It is well known that officers attached to these groups
made 'sightseeing trips' of the islands, including such vantage points as Aiea
Heights." {P. 385.)
Admiral Pye stated that the Japanese had practically unlimited means of
obtaining and transmitting information concerning United States ships at Oahu
(page 429). Charts recovered after the attack, he said, indicated that the Japanese
had planned to attack certain berths, expecting the ships to be in the position
in which they had been berthed three weeks earlier (page 430) .
Admiral DeLany stated that the enemy had unlimited opportunity for observa-
tion and for getting information out of Pearl Harbor. The operating schedule
for the Fleet provided a varying length of time for ships to be in port and at sea
(page 499) . But, he had no specific information that the Japanese were endeavor-
ing to keep currently informed of the location and movements of Units of the
Fleet immediately preceding December 7, 1941 (page 500).
Commander Rochefort said that Japanese opportunities for espionage and for
transmission of information were ample (page 473). And, according to Captain
Layton, there were no restrictions on the Japanese getting information out of
Hawaii, but the FBI was restricted by law from getting Japanese cables (pages
909-910).
B. UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AT PEARL HARBOR
Captain Rochefort, officer-in-charge of the communications intelligence unit
at Pearl Harbor, siad that his immediate superior was the Commandant of the
14th Naval District. In his relations with the District Intelligence Officer, he
freely exchanged iyiformation and views, except for "ultra" information. The
relationship with the Fleet Intelligence Officer was to "exchange all information
available and to endeavor to obtain information as desired by him." A copy of
the communication intelligence summary was sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer
every morning, \^'ith regard to the FBI, Captain Rochefort met the agent-in-
charge frequently and discussed the general situation, but did not discuss ultra
matters. In turn, the FBI agent kept Captain Rochefort informed of what he
was doing, "possibly with some limitation." Captain Rochefort' s relationship
with the Army was similar to that with the FBI. He said that between 27 Novem-
ber and 7 December 1941 he had several talks and exchanged opinions with
Colonel Fielder, G-2 to General Short. However, he gave the Army no ultra
information. He said that his relationship with the Army was entirely on a
personal basis — i. e., there was no official system set up for joint operations.
Captain Rochefort' s relations with the Federal Communications Commission
were limited to technical matters, such as direction finding and the location of
unauthorized stations {p. 44~46, 65).
Captain Rochefort said that during the latter part of 1941 the communication
intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor was assigned the tasks of attacking and exploit-
ing Jap personnel code, administrative code, and the code in use in the Marshalls
area. It was also to conduct research on all Japanese naval systems, except the
"five-numbered system." The W ashington center was charged with general
control of all three units and in addition worked on Jap diplomatic systems and
such others as were directed {p. 44)-
Admiral Hewitt's examination brought out information not previously devel-
oped regarding the intelligence sources and activities of Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic Fleet.
In this connection. Commander Fabian said that he had been attached in
November and December, 1941, to the radio intelligence unit at Corregidor.
This unit had a number of personnel detailed to the decryption of Japanese radio
traffic and operated a direction finder, twenty-six radio receivers, and other equip-
ment necessary to intercept enemy transmissions. Its general mission was to
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 467
study Japanese communications with a view to keeping track of the Jap fleet,
and in this connection the unit was attempting to break the eneyny naval system
J]SI~25 {p. 68-69, 73). The unit also intercepted Jap diplomatic codes and of
these was assigned the task of reading the machine cipher "purple," machine
cipher "red" and the code J-19. However, the exploitation of these codes was
primarily for the purpose of obtaining local information: all purple traffic inter-
cepted and certain other traffic in the red and J-19 codes were sent to Washington
for complete analysis. The latter messages were not sent to the Pearl Harbor
unit, since this unit was not performing any cryptanalysis of the diplomatic
codes {p. 70-72). Commander Fabian said that from breaking the "purple"
dispatches during the period 27 Aovember to 7 December they knew that American-
Japanese negotiations in Washington were not proceeding satisfactorily and
would probalby he broken off (p. 72).
Captain Mason, Fleet Intelligence Officer on the staff of Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic Fleet, during 1941, said that a copy of all Jap diplomatic messages
decrypted by the Corregidor radio intelligence unit was furnished daily to the
Army. The Army ivas not given copies of dispatches sent out by CinCAF to
CinCPac or to Washington dealing with purely naval matters. Captain IMason
said, however, that he conferred quite frequently with the head of intelligence in
the Philippine Army Department and quite often provided estimates as to the
locations of the Jap fleet. Speaking generally. Captain Mason said that he was
in close contact with the Army most of the time and that information ivas freely
exchanged. He said that the Army did not have a radio intelligence unit in the
Philippines, although they did have an intercept station which merely copied
Japanese Army and diplomatic traffic (p. 70-71).
Captain Safford, chief of the Communications Security Section, Office of A aval
Communications, Aavy Department, during 1941, said that the Corregidor radio
intelligence unit had been intercepting messages in the Japanese "purple" code
and other diplomatic systems for several years, up to and including 7 December
1941. Main interest of this unit was on the local Asiatic circuits for the infor-
mation of CinCAF, but late in Aiovember, 1941, they were given the additional
duty of covering the Berlin-Tokyo circuit. These latter intercepts were forwarded
to Washington and weren't touched locally (p. 98-99).
With respect to the exchange of information among the Corregidor, Pearl
Harbor and Washington radio intelligence units. Captain Safford made the
following statement (p. 99) :
"If Corregidor translated a message which they thought important, they
would encipher the translation and forward it to Washington. Everything
they intercepted on the Tokyo-Berlin circuit was enciphered; that is, the inter-
cept was enciphered and forwarded to Washington by radio. Corregidor also
had liaison with the British unit at Singapore and anything of interest or im-
portance received from Singapore was forwarded to Washington. In like
manner, any translations of particular importance to the Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic Fleet, were sent out from WashingtoJi. We also had a very free and
continuous exchange of technical information between the two units, by which I
mean the keys for the 'purple' machine and keys for another system which we
called Jig-19, and any other information which would help either unit in its
performance of duty.
"With regard to communications between the Navy Department and our unit
at Pearl Harbor, there were comparatively few."
Captain Safford said fxirther that there was a free exchange of intelligence
information between the Corregidor and Pearl Harbor units "so far as it per-
tained to the projects they were assigned." However, since the dissemination of
intelligence was considered a function of Naval Intelligence rather than Naval
Communications, Captain Safford indicated that information regarding the
Japanese fleet obtained by the Corregidor unit would not necessarily be passed
to the Pearl Harbor unit. He said that such information would normally be
passed to CinCAF or his Fleet Intelligence Officer, and further dissemination
would be made by them {p. 100-101).
Rear Admiral Irving H. Mayfield, LSN, was District Intelligence Officer,
14th Naval District, in December, 1941- The mission of his office comprised
general intelligence matters in cooperation with other federal and local intelli-
gence organizations, especially with respect to espionage and counter-espionage
and any other intelligence functions as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations
or the District Commandant. Lt. Col. Bicknell was the Army officer charged
with local intelligence. The FBI official was Mr. Robert L. Shivers (p. 558).
468 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Mayfield testified that his directive from the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations prescribed complete cooperation between the District Intelligence Office
and G-2 of the Army and the FBI. Admiral Mayfieldlstated that cooperation
was full and whole-hearted, that all information possessed by his office was
readily available to G-2 and the FBI, which were given copies of any material
of interest {p. 559) .
Admiral Mayfield stressed that despite free interchange of assistance between
his office and the radio intelligence unit of the 14th Naval District, headed by
Commander Rochefort, that unit was a separate organization and in no sense
subordinate to the District Intelligence Office. Commander Rochefort's unit
reported directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, in the opinion of Admiral
Mayfield. As to the general nature of the work of Commander Rochefort's unit,
Admiral Mayfield was unable to give definite information (p. 560).
Repoits by Commander Rochefort's unit, concerning the location or movements
of Japanese fleet units, were not routed to the District Intelligence Office, and
Admiral Mayfield said he had no knowledge of them {p. 561).
Relations between the District Intelligence Office and the Fleet Intelligence
Office were, according to Admiral Mayfield, cordial, close and cooperative. He
was in "more or less constant" personal communication with Captain Layton
{the Fleet Intelligence Officer) , to whom he endeavored to furnish all information
of interest {p. 560-561).
Admiral Mayfield recalled no conversations with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral
Bloch, Captain Layton, or Commander Rochefort froyn November 27th to Decem-
ber 7, 1941, concerning the prospects of war between Japan and the United
States. Admiral Mayfield said the only intelligence matters he discussed with
Admiral Bloch and Captain Layton concerned counter-espionage measures.
Admiral Mayfield added he was net advised of the receipt on November 27, 1941,
of the so-called war warning (p. 574—575) .
Admiral Bellinger stated that he neither saw, nor was aware of the receipt at
Pearl Harbor of the so-called war warning of 27 November until after 7 December
1941. Admiral Bellinger added that not until after 7 December 1941 did he see
or know of the CNO dispatch of 2S Noveinber stating that hostile action by the
Japanese was possible. Nor, said Admiral Bellinger, did he see any of the
daily communication intelligence summaries, 14 October to 5 December 1941,
prepared by the Fleet Intelligence Officer {Captain Layton) for delivery to Admiral
Kimmel {p. 498-499).
Admiral Bellinger did not remember having seen a memorandum of 1 December
1941 from Captain Layton to Admiral Kimmel on the subject of the location of
the Japanese fleet {p. 499).
(1) Sources and distribution:
Admiral Kingman said that the details of administration of the investi-
gative activities within the Fourteenth Naval District were left more to the
direct control and supervision of the Commandant than was the case in
those cases more closely connected with Washington. He recalled that the
District Commandant was somewhat concerned about the investigative
activities in the Fourteenth Naval District which were carried on by some
of the inexperienced personnel on duty thereat, and thinks that this was
mentioned in a personal letter from the Commandant to the Chief of Naval
Operations which, however, the Examining Officer was unable subsequently
to locate, (p. 336) Admiral Kingman could recall nothing relating to the
activities of the so-called consular agents at Hawaii, (p. 336)
The facilities for obtaining intelligence of possible enemies were, accord-
ing to Admiral Bloch, as follows: When Admiral Bloch arrived at Pearl
Harbor, there were two units at Pearl Harbor composed of communicators
and Intelligence people, Japanese language students. The information they
secured by radio intelligence and such other information as they secured
was transmitted to Cavite and to the Navy Department. That was Admiral
Bloch 's principal source of Japanese intelligence. They also received the
intelligence that was collected at Cavite.
When Admiral Bloch arrived, he was dissatisfied with this organization
and he organized it into one unit known as "Combat Intelligence," where
they were under one hand. This unit consisted of radio direction finders,
radio interceptors and all the other things they had, with one officer in
charge. In the middle of July, 1941, this unit was placed in a secure place,
one big room in the basement of the office building, with their own channels
of communications to the radio stations and radio direction finders. Admiral
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 469
Bloch always did his best to augment this force by getting more and better
men. In addition to that unit, they had the District Intelligence Officer who
was in close touch with Army Intelligence and the FBI and they also had
such reports as were sent to them by the Office of Naval Intelligence in
Washington. They kept in touch with the Commander-in-Chief as best they
could and Admiral Bloch believed that they were getting everything that
was pertinent although the Commander-in-Chief had many sources of
information that Admiral Bloch did not have. Admiral Bloch felt, however,
that Admiral Kimmel conscientiously endeavored to give to him everything
that Admiral Kimmel thought he should have. Admiral Bloch believed that
the Navy Department had more knowledge about actual conditions than
they did. (p. 12) All of the information received by the Combat Intelligence
unit, he said, was always delivered to the Commander-in-Chief, (p. 13)
Admiral Smith said that they got very little Intelligence on Oahu except
Fleet Intelligence which was more on the possibility of sabotage than on
the war, but that they had radio intelligence and every time that one or more
of the three Task Force Commanders were in port or the Type Commanders
were in port, Admiral Kimmel would have them over and have the Intelli-
gence Officer point out on his chart his estimate, by radio intelligence, of
the location of all units of the Japanese Fleet. Admiral Smith was present
at all of such conferences. The War Plans Officer (then Captain now Rear
Admiral McMorris), the Operations Officer then Captain now Rear Admiral
De Lany), the Fleet Intelligence Officer (Comdr. Layton) and the Fleet
Communications Officer, were always fully informed of all intelligence in
this manner, (p. 33)
Captain Edwin T. Layton was Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
during 1941. He had studied in Japan and qualified as a Japanese inter-
preter and translator, (p. 214)
The sources from which he obtained information concerning the Japanese
Navy in 1941 were:
"The principal source was Office of Naval Intelligence, in various intelli-
gence reports, estimates of fleet organizations position and Fleet Com-
manders, also from dispatches from Naval Attache, Tokyo, Naval Attache,
Chungking, and his assistants, also from the Communication Intelligence
Organization, which had sections at Cavite, Guam, Pearl Harbor, and
Washington, D. C; also from Consular and State Department reports for-
warded through ONI to the Commander-in-Chief; also liaison with British
intelligence agencies, both through ONI and direct through a representative
attached to the British Consulate in Honolulu." (p. 215)
Captain Layton said that he thought that our intelligence coverage was
good, although always incomplete.
Captain Layton said that he felt that the State Department undoubtedly
had information which was not supplied to the Commander in Chief and which
would have been of value, (p. 215)
Captain Layton said that he intimately concerned himself with the results
obtained by the Combat Intelligence Organizations. He said that the
information obtained and made available to the Commander in Chief was
principally from the unit at Cavite and the local unit in Pearl Harbor, that
almost nothing came from Washington, and that he felt that the principal
unit in Washington might have contributed more toward the intelligence
picture, (p. 216)
Captain Layton said that he communicated the available intelligence
concerning Japanese naval forces daily at about 8:15 in the morning, and if
subsequent to that time important information was received, he would report
it to Admiral Kimmel at the First opportunity. When he reported to Admiral
Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel's Chief of Staff was most always present. On
important occasions the War Plans Officer and senior Operations Officer
were called in. When task force commanders would return to port. Admiral
Kimmel would send for Layton and have him review the situation, (p. 216)
The discussions which he had with Admiral Kimmel were summarized
generally as follows:
"The discussions were very general, generally starting with the Japanese
situation, both political and military, the disposition of the Fleet, and their
apparent intentions from the knowledge we had at hand. The Admiral was
particularly interested in the Mandates and their development, both as air
and other bases, and these matters were discussed in general with the task
force commanders and other officers present, such as whether or not the
470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese had radar, whether it had been received from the Germans via
the trip of the ASAKA MARU which went hurriedly to Europe by the Pan-
ama Canal, the extent of the air search in the Marshalls the estimated air
strength in the area the question as to whether sound contacts obtained
off Pearl were true contacts or false contacts, that is, fish and so forth, a
discussion of whether or not it would be proper to start a depth charge
practice on one of these contacts, whether the reported presence of baby
submarines — they were called 'submerged submarines'— off Molakai, were
submarines or whether the report was true or false, or things of that nature.
The importance of certain Japanese diplomatic moves and its reflection on
military policy were also discussed. The future movements of the Pacific
Fleet or its Task Forces in compliance with the Rainbow War Plan were
the subject of conversations and discussions." (p. 217)
Commander Rochefort had studied Japanese in Japan for three years
from about September, 1929 until September, 1932, and qualified as a
Japanese interpreter and translater. Commander Rochefort 's source of
information in addition to the work of his own Combat Intelligence Unit
were the Washington headquarters, a unit similar to his attached to CincAF,
and other government agencies such as the FBI, the Army and F. C. C. in
Honolulu. The information furnished by these latter agencies, he said,
was of no value prior to December 7, 1941. (p. 208) Commander Roche-
fort said that any message originating in one of the combat intelligence
units was automatically sent to the other two units, (p. 208) Commander
Rochefort reported the intelligence which came into his hands to Com-
FOURTEEN personally and to the Commander-in-Chief, via the Fleet
Intelligence Officer.
Captain Mayfield said that the organization of the District Intelligence
Office when he reported for duty consisted of about thirteen persons. He
sought and obtained additional personnel but his opinion was that that
organization did not reach a satisfactory degree of efficiency until some
months after December 7. (p. 309) Captain Mayfield said that the cooper-
ation between the FBI and the Army and Navy Intelligence at Hawaii was
very good. (p. 309)
Captain Layton said that the Army's liaison with the Fleet was through
Colonel Edward Railey and that he saw Colonel Railey almost every day.
He did not receive from any Army source any information available, (p. 218)
In his statement at the end of his examination Lt. Stephenson said that
there was a general feeling in the District Intelligence organization that
Admiral Bloch was not sufficiently security conscious and not sufficiently
mindful of the enemy espionage potential at Hawaii. This, however, he
said could make him cite no casual connection between the Commandant's
apparent attitude and the success of the Japanese attack.
Captain Earle said that he was generally familiar with the activities of
the District Intelligence Office in the Fourteenth Naval District, and so
far as he knew both he and Admiral Bloch were satisfied with the activities
of that office. He could recall nothing of the results obtained by Commander
Rochefort 's unit. (p. 373-5)
Admiral McCormick remembered no instance where the War Plans
Section received any intelligence derived from local sources, except one or
two cases dealing with counter-espionage, (p. 70) Admiral McCormick said
that he had no knowledge of any Japanese movements until they saw the
dispatches, in the days just before the war, in which the Asiatic Fleet had
seen large movements on the way south, oflT Indo-China. He said that the
War Plans Section, as a whole, was not furnished with daily or periodic
reports by the Staff Intelligence or Fleet Intelligence, (p. 70)
Admiral Delany believed that the information furnished by Intelligence
was the best that those sources could assemble but was aware that the
sources were inadequate and believed that there was a general feeling that
they were more or less operating in the dark not only from the information
that they were able to collect in Pearl Harbor but also as to information
furnished from other sources. This applied to information both as to the
location of Japanese units and as to the probability of war. (p. 84)
Admiral Brown said that all senior officers received the Naval Intelligence
bulletins, (p. 138)
Admiral Pye said that Admiral Kimmel in effect turned over to him the
training program and in connection with that his consultations with Admiral
Kimmel were frequent. Also, Admiral Kimmel customarily called in the
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 471
Intelligence Officer and had him explain the situation on the Japanese Fleet
insofar as it was known, (p. 148)
Concerning the intelligence available from the middle of October until the
time of the attack, Admiral McMorris said that they felt that they would like
to have known lots more than they did and that on the whole, they felt it was
somewhat insufficient but did not see any probability of achieving improve-
ment, (p. 241)
Admiral Kimmel testified that his Fleet Intelligence worked with ComFOUR-
TEEN's Intelligence. He depended largely on units of the Fourteenth Naval
District Intelligence for information. The Intelligence units were satisfactory
(page 280). Also he received intelligence from ComFOURTEEN, Navy Depart-
ment, and forces afloat (page 280). Summaries of information were furnished
him (page 281). The number of w'ar plans officers were increased by him. Serv-
ing as such were McMorris, McCormick, Murphy, Colonel Pfeiffer, and a Lieu-
tenant. All enemy intelligence went to w'ar plans and estimates were drawn
from day to day (page 281). Information was furnished to him, to his War
Plans head, to his Chief of Staff, and to Captain DeLany (Operations). The
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and he interexchanged intelligence
(page 282). Prior to December 7th, the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, was informed of intelligence affecting Hawaii and other places
where he had forces. He was not informed regarding plans for places distant
from Hawaii (page 282). The Commanding General, Admiral Kimmel said,
gave him all the information which he had (page 283).
Captain Layton said that, as Fleet Intelligence Officer, his main sources of
information were from CNO and DONI, who forwarded reports from naval
diplomatic sources, reports from observers, from the State Department, from the
local intelligence officers, and liaison with the British secret intelligence, and re-
ports from ComTWELVE, ComSIXTEEN, and ComTHIRTEEN (page 904).
He was kept informed of FBI and Army Intelligence at the time (page 909). He
passed information to CincPac by hand in its original form. If the information
was a long report, he made a brief of it (page 904) . He thought that local Army
Intelligence was not getting the "highly secret" information from the Army; he
informed them in general (page 908) .
Admiral Bloch said that the intelligence unit of the Fourteenth Naval District
was efficient, although not adequate in space and personnel, and kept him and
CincPac informed (page 391). Intelligence was received from CincPac, the
District Intelligence Officer, Military Intelligence, and the FBI. He did not
receive the intelligence bulletins from the Navy Department, his ONI probably
did (page 392).
Commander Rochefort testified that he was in charge of combat intelligence of
the Fourteenth Naval District from June through December, 1941 (page 471).
Combat intelligence consisted of an interceptor unit, a direction finder unit, and
a cryptographic or research group. Collaboration with the FBI, Army, and
Federal Communications Commission was on a personal basis. They received,
normally, reports from ONI at Washington, and the letters and dispatches in
their own system, which were of a more technical nature. They would get all
information of a technical nature from Washington, but all information available
at ONI in Washington was not sent them as a matter of course (page 471). Only
one or two bits of political or diplomatic information were sent to him (page 472).
Military information would be sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer. Rochefort
handled intelligence of Japanese ship movements. The information received
was automatically passed to CNO. CincAsiatic, and to CincPac. Written
summaries were sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer (page 472).
The following information was contained in the ComFourteen Radio Intelli-
gence Summaries and was made available to Admiral Kimmel (p. 193):
1. The November 27th Com Fourteen radio intelligence suinrnary, delivered
on November 28th, stated thai in general traffic volume was a little below normal
due to poor signals on certain frequencies and that the Tokyo-Takao circuit was
unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic was heard, intercepted from car-
riers. Bako, Samo and Saigon were active as originators. The main Tokyo
originator was the intelligence activity which sent five dispatches to the major
commanders. The direction finder activity was very high. As to the Combined
Fleet, it was said that there was still no evidence of any further movement from
the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet oiiginated
several messages of general address; he had been fairly inactive as an originator.
The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, originated many messages to the Third
472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Fleet and other units. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated that there was nothing
to indicate any movement. As to the Fourth Fleet Commander, it was said that
he frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates, and
also that there was no further information on the presence of Carrier Division
Five in the Mandates. The Commander Submarine Force, it was stated, was
still in the Chichijima area. Concerning airforces in general, it was indicated
that an air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and
SHOKAKU and that "Carriers are still located in home waters." This sum-
mary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).
2. The Com Fourteen radio intelligence summary of the 28th, delivered No-
vember 29th, stated generally that traffic volume was normal, communications to
and from South China and betioeen the Mandates and the Empire were heavy.
No tactical traffic was seen. The suspected radio intelligence net was very active
and was becoming more so. Much traffic was directed to the Tokyo direction
finder command from various stations and this command also originated mes-
sages of high precedence to the major fleet commanders. It was said that ' ' This
activity is interpreted to indicate that the radio intelligence net is operating at
full strength upon U. S. naval communications and IS GETTING RESULTS."
As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that there was no indication of movement
of any of its units. As to the Third Fleet, there was little activity from its units
save for the Commander in Chief. The bulk of the Fourth Fleet was said to be
still at Truk. The Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet originated
more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the
Commander in Chief, Second, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleets. There
was little indication of submarine activity. This summary was initialed by
Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).
3. The communication intelligence summary of the 29th of November, delivered
the SOth, stated generally that traffic volume was above normal, and that the traffic
to South China was still very high. A good share of the traffic was made up of
messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo intelligence sent eleven messages
during the day to major commanders, both ashore and afloat, while the radio
intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the major commanders.
In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, Radio Yokusuka (near
Tokyo) sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit
reports. The direction finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during
the night with much activity. The Navy Minister originated his usual AlNev,
and the naval general staff addressed Commanders, Second Fleet, Third Fleet,
Combined Air Force, and the South China Unit. A unit which had been ad-
dressed as the lOSrd air group originated one dispatch whose address was
composed entirely of enciphered calls and it was apparent that he had no navy
call list. One address was "Eleventh Air Fleet." Since this had appeared
before, it was evidence that the use of Kantai was intentional in making positively
known the existence of an air fleet. Its composition was unknown. The dis-
patches indicated that various units were under the immediate command of the
Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, including CarDiv 3, and the Third Fleet.
Associated with the Third Fleet were two battleships, but their assignment was
not yet definite. Various messages were sent by the Commander in Chief, Third
Fleet, and he held extensive communication with the Commander in Chief,
Second Fleet, and Bako. The CinC Fourth Fleet was relatively inactive. He
ivas still in the Truk area. There was some traffic for Commander Submarine
Force, who was at Chichijima the previous day, and also some traffic from the
Commander in Chief, China Fleet (Hew. Exhibit 22) .
4. The communication intelligence summary for November SOth, delivered on
December 1st, stated generally that traffic volume was less than for the past few
days, and that the traffic consisted largely of dispatches bearing old dates. No
reason could be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high
volume of traffic for the past few days had prevented the repetition of dispatches.
The number of dispatches originated on the 30th was very small. The only
tactical circuit heard was one with the carrier AKAGI and several MARU's
As to the Combined Fleet and First Fleet, it was stated the Chiefs of Staff of those
Fleets were in Kure. In the same message the Chief of Staff, Second Fleet, was not
listed in any location. Other traffic indications were that he was at sea. The
Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, sent one dispatch to his usual addressees of
the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force, but also included the KONGO and
HIYEI, which it was said placed them as members of his task force. (The
HIYEI was actually en route to Pearl Harbor.) As to the Third Fleet, it was
said, "No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 473
Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway." The
Fourth Fleet was believed to be still in the Truk area. It was said that the
continued association of Jaluit and Commander Submarine Force, plus the
tatter's known progress from the Empire to Chichijiam and Saipan made his
destination obviously the Marshalls; that various facts indicated a submarine
concentration in the Marshalls. "Every evidence points to a concentration, not
only of the small Fourth Fleet submarines there, but also a good proprotion of the
Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force." It was also said that "the presence
of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier
in the Mandates, although this has not been confirmed." This communication
summary was initialled by Admiral Kimmel and Admiral McMorris, the War
Plans Officer {Hew. Exhibit 22).
5. The communication intelligence summary for December 1st, delivered on
December 2nd, stated generally that all service radio calls of forces afloat changed
promptly at 0000, 1 December. Previously service calls had been changed after
a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 Noveynber 1941.
The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicated an additional^ pro-
gressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of
two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted
of dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appeared that the Japanese
Navy tvas adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic
prior to 0000, 1 December, indicated than an effort was made to deliver all dis-
patches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls there would be
a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromise.
Either that or the targe number of ola messages may have been used to pad the
total volume and make it apppar as if nothing unusual was pending. It should
be noted that the sentence in the above summary reading, "The fact that service
calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing
for active operations on a large scale" loas understood in red pencil commencing
with the words "service calls." Captain Layton testified that to the best of his rec-
ollection this was underlined by Admiral Kimmel at the time.
The summary further stated, as to the First Fleet, "Nothing to indicate that
this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters." As to the Second
Fleet, it was stated, "This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area
in the direction of South China and Indo-China" ; Takao did not appear to play
an important role in the traffic; consequently, the assumption was made that this
fleet was passing up Takao. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated there was
"nothing to report except that the same associations of Second, Third Fleets and
Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China forces continued. As
to Fourth Fleet, "No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area." As to
Fifth Fleet, "Nothing to report." As to submarines, it was stated a large
number of the Submarine Force was believed to be in the area eastward of
Yokosuka — Chichijima and Saipan. As to Combined Air Force, it was stated,
"No change." As to carriers, it was said, "No change." This summary
was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).
6. The communication intelligence summary delivered on December 3rd,
covering the 2nd, stated generally that the most prominent factor in the traffic
was the apparent confusion in tha routing of traffic for certain parts of the Jap-
anese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several
times after it had appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao radio
received the same dispatch that it had previously sent. It was stated that Com-
SIXTEEN had reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area, and that Takao
radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. The broadcast, it was said, was
not uncovered at ComFO UR TEEN and contrary to the location report, there was
one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances,
Takao radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. It was said that "Sum-
ming up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up
of Second, Third and First Fleet units, has left Empire waters, but is either not
close enough to Takao for good communications or is proceeding on a course
not close to Takao." It was further stated, "The change of calls on December
1st has prevented this office from making definite statement as of this date of the
units now in the southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai
radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated
by and destined for units in the Takao area." Also it was pointed out generally
that "There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated
both by major forces afloat and Tokyo." As to the First Fleet, it was stated
474 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appeared relatively
quiet and that "from inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have
been a split in the original or normal combined fleet staff and that these may be
two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routine indicates
one combined fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets, and appar-
ently in company while another combined fleet call appears not associated with
the Second and Third Fleets." As to the Second Fleet, it was stated, "No units
have stood out prominently in the last two or three days. This is probably due
to lack of new identifications, but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large
part of the Second Fleet is underway in company." As to the Third Fleet,
it said there was nothing to report. As to the Mandates, it was said that the asso-
ciation of submarine force and Fourth Fleet continued.
Concerning carriers, this summary stated, "Almost a complete blank of infor-
mation on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this
lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially
identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has
been recovered, it is evidence that carrier traffic is at a low ebb." This summary
was initialed by Admiral Kimmel {Hew. Exhibit 22).
7. The communication intelligence summary of December Srd, delivered on the
4th, under the heading "General," stated that traffic volume was normal with
receiving conditions good. The present state of call recovery did not permit much
detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the
major commands slowed up identification of even these units. Very few units
had been positively identified so far. The Chief of the A^aval General Staff
originated three long dispatches to the Commanders in Chief, Combined, Second,
and Third Fleets. Tokyo intelligence originated nine dispatches to the same
addresses. It was stated that the presence of tfie Commander in Chief, Second
Fleet, in Taiwan waters was not revealed by radio traffic. It was stated that it
was the impression that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway, but
that this was not verified by radio intelligence means. It ivas also stated that
there were some Fourth Fleet units in the Marshall Islands but their identity was
not known. It was stated also that there was "no information on submarines or
carriers." This summary ivas initialed by Admiral Kimmel {Hew Exhibit 22).
8. The communication intelligence summary of December 4th, delivered on
the 5th, stated that in general traffic volume xvas normal with fair receiving con-
ditions. Takao radio institided a fieet broadcast system, using the prefix UTU
in heading so that there were two fleet broadcasts now in operation. So far only
a few messages had been placed on the Takao broadcast. There ipere a large
number of urgent messages, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders.
Tokyo intelligence originated messages to the Chiefs of Staff, China Fleet, Com-
bined Fleet, Third Fleet, Soidh China Fleet, French Indo-China Force, and
same. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders. As
to the Combined Fleet, it was stated, "The outstanding item of today's traffic is
the lack of messages from the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Commander
in Chief, Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now
very quiet. While the fieet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from
these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still promi-
nent as addressees. It is now believed that the Commander in Chief, Second
Fleet, is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is
due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast, which CinC Second Fleet
is still copying." As to the Fourth Fleet, it was stated that the Commander in
Chief sent a message to various units and that no further check could be made on
the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls and that Jaluit appeared
many times in the day's traffic, being associated with Commander Submarine
Force, Tokyo radio and an oil tanker. As to South China, it was stated that
Bako continued as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and
Saigon. Except for traffic between South China commanders, all units in that
area were quiet. This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel {Hew.
Exhibit 22) .
9. The radio intelligence summary for December 5th, which was delivered on
the 6th, was the last summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel before the attack. It
stated in general that traffic volume was heavy. All circxiits were overloaded
with Tokyo broadcasts going over full 24 hours. Tokyo- Mandates circuit in
duplex operations. There were several new intercept schedides heard. It was
noted that some traffic being broadcast was several days old, which indicated the
uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization. There were many
messages of high precedence which appeared to be caused by the jammed condition
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 475
of all circuits. A plain language message was sent by the captain of the OKA WA
from Tokyo to Takao, probably for further relay, addressed to the Chief of the
Political Affairs Bureau, saying, "In reference to the Far Eastern crisis what
you have said is considered important at this end, but proceed with what you are
doing, specific orders will be issued soon."
As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that neither the Second nor Third
Fleet Commanders had originated any traffic. They were still frequently ad-
dressed but were receiving their traffic over broadcasts. It was stated that "They
are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles
nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine
Force had been seen either."
There was no traffic from the Third Fleet, but some traffic to that fleet. There
was also some traffic to the Fourth Fleet, addressed at Jaluit, strengthening the
impression that the Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet, was in the Marshalls.
As to South China, there was much traffic addressed to the Commander in Chief,
Second Fleet, by Soma. Bako continued as an active originator with many
dispatches to the Second and Third Fleets. The Commander Combined Air
Force appeared to be busy with the movement of air corps, several of which were
moving probably to Indo-China {Hew. Exhibit 22).
Any time important information was received, he said, CincPac and ComFOUR-
TEEN would come and discuss it.
General Marshall said that prior to December 7th, he thought that all pertinent
Army intelligence was given to the Navy, but the Army did not then receive, as
regular routine, intelligence from the Navy as to Japanese ship movements (page
864).
(2) Interception of Japanese communications:
Captain Rochefort said that certain communications with which the Japanese
consul general in Honolulu was concerned {Exhibit 13) were received by him
from the District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, about 2 or 3 December
1941. He identified one of these as Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 3 December,
number 245, and said that due to the difficulties inherent in the code it had not
been deciphered until the night of 10 December. The message prescribed a set
of signals indicating the types of American vessels in the Hawaiian area and their
activities, and included arrangements for lights in houses, on beaches, from
boats, want ads over Honolulu radio stations, and signals on Maui Island
{p. 57). Captain Rochefort said that aside from this communication he did not
receive prior to December 7, 1941, any other Japanese reports regarding Amer-
ican ships in Pearl Harbor or preparations in Pearl Harbor to meet attack
{p. 58).
Captain Rochefort also read into the record two communications {part of
Exhibit 13) which he did not recollect having s?en before {p. 57-59). One of
these referred to a "surprise attack" against Hawaiian objectives, the other to
the lack of reconnaissance by the "fleet air arm" at Haioaii.
Admiral May field said that the District Intelligence Office of the 14th Naval
District had sent to the Chief of Naval Operations on February 9, 1942, a report
{part of Exhibit 4O) regarding a message sent by the Japanese consulate to
Tokyo on 3 December 1941- A copy of this message had been delivered by
Admiral May field to Commander Rochefort' s radio intelligence unit for decryp-
tion on 4 or 5 December, but Admiral Mayfield did not learn its contents until
1 1 December. The message transmitted to Tokyo a proposed system of signalling
by lights and other methods for the purpose of reporting departures of U. S.
naval units from Pearl Harbor. This system had been conceived and submitted
to the Japanese Consulate by one Otto Kuehn, a German resident on Oahu, who
was later tried, convicted, and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. Ad-
miral Mayfield stated that neither his office nor the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation found definite information that any part of the proposed signals had ever
been used {p. 564-565).
Mr. William F. Friedman, Cryptanalyst and Director of Communications,
Signal Security Agency, War Departmen* , identified two Japanese messages
from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 6 December 1941, {Exhibit 13) as having been
intercepted by the Army. They had been decoded by the Army on 8 December
1941. One of these messages referred to a "surprise attack" against Hawaiian
objectives and the other pointed out the lack of reconnaissance being conducted
by "the fleet air arm" at Hawaii {p. 522-523).
Captain Safford stated that the two messages referred to in the preceding
paragraph {Exhibit 13) were in the Japanese PA-K2 code and could have been
476 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
decrypted by the Navy in one and a half to two hours. Hoioever, the Navy gave
precedence to the processing of all "purple'" and J-19 messages and would not
have touched the PA-K2 communications as long as there were any J~19's on
hand {p. 530-531).
Lt. Donald Woodrum, District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth N^aval District,
produced transcripts of telephone conversations obtained by tapping the lines of
the Japanese Consul and Vice-Consul for the period 1 October 1941 to 2 De-
cember 1941, when the taps were removed by order of Capt. Mayfield. The
transcripts {marked E.xhibit 38) contain little, if any, information of military
significance, being concerned largely with routine consular activities and those
of the local Japanese population, (p. 379)
To Lt. Woodrum's knowledge, there were only 2 local telephone intercepts
which may have had military significance. The first was in 1940 from Vice
Consul Okuda to a Buddhist priest on the island of Maui advising the latter to
keep the Consulate informed on any United States fleet movements that came to
his attention. In 1941, the exact date not stated, a woman very much agitated
called the Consulate to say the the USS NEW ORLEANS had just left the
harbor, to which the person at the Consulate made no reply, (p. 383)
Wire tapping tvas discontinued on 2 December because, in the opinion of Lt.
Woodrum, the secrecy of the activity was jeopardized by the accidental discovery
of similar activity on the part of the FBI by employees of the telephone company,
{p. 379-81)
With regard to his instruction of 2 December 1941 , that tapping of the tele-
phone wires of the Japanese Consul and Vice Consul by officers of the District
Intelligence Office cease, Admiral Mayfield gave as his reasons: (a) that the
telephone company had discovered the FBI ivas also tapping these loires and
he feared that the residting disclosure of this tapping v^ould jeopardize the security
of the tapping by the District Intelligence Office, and (b) the interceptions up
through 2 December had revealed nothing of intelligence value, (p. 571)
Lt. Woodrum stated that prior to 1 December 1941, efforts to obtain copies of
coded, messages sent from the Jap Consulate to Japan and to the Japanese
Embassy in Washington via commercial cable companies ivere unsuccessful.
As of 1 December, however, in accordance with an agreement between Mr. David
Sarnoff, of RCA, and Admiral Bloch. copies of all messages sent via RCA
were available to the naval service and the first of these were received at the Dis-
trict Intelligence Office on the morning of 5 December. It is Lt. Woodrum's
understanding that these were sent immediately to Commander Rochefort's
unit and, further, that they were not decoded until after the attack, it being neces-
sary even then to use a Japanese code book that ivas found during a search of the
Consulate on the 7th. Su7nmaries of decoded copies of messages sent from 1
Deceynber to 6 December has been marked "Exhibit 40." {p. 383-5)
Admiral Mayfield said that Exhibit 40 contained the translation and digest
of several 7)iessages se7it by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu to Tokyo via
commercial cable companies on and after 3 December 1941 ■ One of these messages,
dated 3 December, reported the departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane
tenders. A message, dated 4 December, reported the arrival of the HONOLULU.
{p. 565) Copies of these two messages were received in the District Intelligence
Office on the morning of 5 December (p. 566) and forwarded to Commander
Rochefort's unit. Another Japanese consulate message, dated 5 December,
reported the arrival of 3 battleships, their expected date of departure, the departure
of the LEXINGTON, the departure of five heavy cruisers and other information,
{p. 565) Admiral Mayfield did not know ivhen this message had been received in
his office. On 6 December, the Jap consulate filed two messages regarding
U. S. ship movements and one regarding U. S. Army use of balloons. Admiral
Mayfield believed that these probably did not reach his office until 7 December,
(p. 566-567)
Vice Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet in December 1941,
testified that none of the intelligence material he received prior to the attack on
Pearl Harbor included any information received from intercepted telephone
conversation of the Japanese or from intercepted cable messages. None of these
cable messages was seen by Admiral Smith until two days after the attack, {p. 360)
Mr. George Street, Honolulu District Manager for RCA CoTumWnications,
Incorporated, testified that during the first week in December 1941, copies
of all cable messages sent to Japan by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu tvere
turned over to the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer, {Admiral Mayfield) at
his request. Mr. Street added that all the RCA copies of those messages had been
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 477
destroyed under authority of the Federal Communications Commission, because
of lack of storage space, (p. 4^1-413)
Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA, Signal Officer in the Hawaiian
Department in November and December 1941, testified that the Army radio
intercepted unit at Fort Shafter made no decryption whatever of intercepted
Japanese messages. The intercepted messages were sent to Washington for
decryption, (p. 387-388)
Commander Rochefort said that the United States was handicapped because
it could not censor Japanese communications (page 473). And, according to
Captain Laj'ton, the FBI was restricted by law from getting Japanese cables, but
efforts were made to get those messages. However, they had no information
concerning the messages which the Japanese consul was sending out (pages 909-
910).
Admiral Wilkinson said that the District Intelligence Officer of Hawaii had
endeavored to obtain copies of dispatches sent by Japanese diplomatic agents
from the local cable companies but had been advised that the law did not
permit interference of such messages, (p. 285) He said that despite the
limitations on obtaining copies of cable messages, the District Intelligence
Officer had arranged to tap the long distance telephone and kept a record of
the telephone conversations with Japan. This, he said, was done only in
the last few days before December 7. The conversations in general appeared
to be innocuous. There was one suspicious telephone conversation on the
afternoon of December 6. ConcerWug this, Admiral Wilkinson said, "This
conversation and the probable contents of the cable dispatches which we had
not been allowed to intercept constituted, as I recall, the only important
information of any Japanese intelligence activities in Hawaii. Undoubtedly,
much was contained in the mails, to which we had no access. There were
rumors of unexplained flashing lights and illicit radio stations, but prior to
December 7, investigation of most of these reports had disproved them,
although of course some may have been correct." (p. 286)
Captain Mayfield said that messages transmitted by the Japanese Con-
sulate General by cable or radio were not made available to him until after
the visit of Mr. Sarnoflf of RCA. He said that the Japanese Consulate Gen-
eral sent its traffic using the various communication companies alternately.
The Mackay Radio Company handled the traffic during the month of Novem-
ber. Traffic was switched to RCA as of December 1 and thereafter Captain
Mayfield was able to obtain all of his traffic from RCA. Since it was in code
and he had no reading organization, it was necessary to submit it to another
organization to be read. He learned the content of a various number of these
messages after the attack and there was considerable information about
movements of the Fleet and other military forces which he said was not
entirely accurate, (p. 311) Captain Mayfield said that so far as he was
aware, the telephone conversations of the Japanese were not recorded or
censored, (p. 313)
Admiral Bloch said that they were not able to get any information based
on dispatches being transmitted by the Japanese. The various communi-
cation companies did not and would not give them such dispatches. They
all went by cable and so far as Admiral Bloch knew, none went by radio.
(p. 15)
Admiral Smith said that they did not have access to the files in the Cable
Office; that the Fleet Intelligence Officer had made some eflfort to get these
files; that it was taken to Mr. MacKey of Postal Telegraph, being contrary
to the United States law to divulge a telegraph cable message; at that time
there were certain Japanese codes which they could break and the Intelli-
gence Officer thought if he could get those messages, he might learn what
was going on; that they did not get them until three days after the attack
and never received any information from this source before the war. (p. 46)
Commander Rochefort said that he received from the Intelligence Officer,
14th Naval District, directly or otherwise copies of such communications in
which the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu was concerned — about
December 1, 1941. These were about ten to fifteen messages and Com-
mander Rochefort was asked to examine them, which he did. He succeeded
in extracting some information from them within 12 hours, with the exception
of two or three messages which he finished on the evening of December 10th.
He said that the first messages did not contain any important information,
but the latter two or three did contain important information. He said that
478 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
he had been unable to obtain that information at an earlier date because of
the inherent difficulties in the task, and that the task had been made a matter
of paramount importance and about 12 to 16 hours daily were devoted to
that work alone, (p. 208-9)
Commander Rochefort said that the F. C. C. was monitoring radio traffic
in the so-called "amateur" status, but that he never heard of their appre-
hending any communications from Japanese spies to Japan, (p. 209)
Commander Rochefort said that the Consulate General at Hawaii com-
municated with his superiors in Japan primarily by cable and occasionally
by radio. (P. 209)
Commander Rochefort said that he had not been informed of any telephone
communication between the Consulate General at Hawaii and Japan.
(p. 209)
Concerning the receipt of communications of the Japanese Consulate
General, Captain Layton said:
"26.Q. Do you recall the receipt from the Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth
Naval District, of copies of certain communications, which the Japanese
Consular General at Honolulu was concerned with, at any time around
1 December or after?
"A. I recall receipt of material received from Commander Rochefort on
or about 9 December, but definitely after the attack.
"27. Q. Then you got nothing from him concerning those prior to the
attack?
"A. Nothing from him, nor nothing from OpNav, or from any other
source." (p. 218)
Captain Layton said that the District Intelligence Officer maintained cer-
tain monitoring of Japanese radio broadcasts as a service toward apprecia-
tion of Japanese news from the Japanese point of view, but that he did not
recall the details of this. (p. 218)
Admiral Turner said that he did not know what type of decrypting Pearl Harbor
was doing, but that Naval Communications had told him that CincPac was getting
as much of the Japanese communications as they were, and sooner (page 1001).
He said that the Director of Naval Communications had informed him that Cinc-
Pac had the decrypted Japanese messages, and that was why no information of
this nature was sent to CincPac. He was similarly assured by Admiral Noyes, he
said.
Admiral Noyes denied telling Admiral Turner that Pearl Harbor was intercept-
ing the same Japanese traffic as Washington (page 1036). He said that Pearl
Harbor had an intercept station specializing in certain codes but was not inter-
cepting Japanese cable messages, and the so-called "purple" messages were
usually sent by cable (pages 1037-38).
Admiral Redman said that CincPac did not have facilities for decoding "purple"
intercepts; the problem was not assigned to him and all translations were accom-
plished in Washington (page 1106).
(3) Surveillance of consulate
Admiral Bloch stated that after the receipt of certain dispatches relating to the
destruction of codes, which are later discussed, he had Intelligence arrange for a
close surveillance of the Japanese Consulate. What, if any, surveillance was in
effect before this does not appear.
C. INFORMATION CONCERNING JAPANESE MILITARY AND FLEET MOVEMENTS
Captain McCollum, who was Officer-in-Charge of the Far Eastern Section of
the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, during
December, 1941, said that his duties consisted of evaluating and passing to the
Director of Naval Intelligence all intelligence received concerning the Far East,
including all information on the Jap Navy. (p. 10) Sources of intelligence
available to his Section regarding the Jap Fleet were reports by our consular
authorities and agents in Japan and on the Asiatic continent, reports by our
merchant ships, reports on movements of Japanese merchant shipping, and radio
intelligence supplied by Captain Safford's unit, Op~20-G. However, by the end
of November, 1941, the Far Eastern Section had become almost wholly dependent
upon radio intelligence for information concerning the location of Jap naval
forces. This was due to the fact thai U. S. embargoes against Japan had swept
U. S. merchant shipping out of the north Pacific and. also discouraged Japanese
shipping to the Americas. In addition, increasingly strict Japanese security
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 479
measures made it almost impossible for agents in Japan to get timely information
out of the country. {p. 10, 12, 13) As a result of this situation, a dispatch was
sent out by Opnav on 24 November {GCT) to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
pointing out that information on the Jap fleet was unsatisfactory and requesting
that every effort be made by use of radio intelligence methods to locate the Japanese
naval forces. (Exhibits) Following this dispatch, estiinates were received from
ComFourteen and ComSixteen, dated 26 November {GCT). {Exhibit 8) These
evaluations were virtually the same and estimated that two Jap task forces were
being organized, one fairly well located in the Formosa-southern Japan area,
another possibly located in the Mandated Islands. However, ComFourteen
estimated that there was a strong concentration of submarines and at least one
carrier division with the force in the Mandates, while ComSixteen could not con-
firm this. Greater reliance was placed on ComSixteen' s dispatch becau6e his
radio organization was in a better position to intercept Japanese radio traffic and
was stronger in numbers and continuity of operation, {p. 13-14)
Captain McCollum said that radio intelligence consisted of three distinct
procedures: translations of the enemy's code dispatches, inferences drawn from
the volume of enemy radio traffic, and a study of the call signs of enemy ships,
(p. '12) He said that on about 1 December 1941 intelligence obtained from a
study of the call signs of Japanese ships became considerably less valuable
because there was a change in the call signs and frequency allocations of the Jap
fleet: "In other words, presumably the communication plan of the Jap fleet was
changed at that time, which meant that a period of tiine elapsed before we could
build up identiflcations of speciflc naval units based on call signs, and so on
the actual radios were still going out, but we couldn't get anTjthing out
of them very much." (p. 16-16) Captain McCollum did not know of any
general call sign change which had accompanied previous major movements of
the Japanese, (p. 16) However, he said that taken in connection with the
known regroupings of Jap naval forces and the fact that the Japanese fleet was
believed ready for action the call sign change was interpreted as a "possible indi-
cation of action to come." He said that CincPac was as well informed as the
Office of Naval Intelligence as to these changes in the call signs of the Jap fleet,
(p. 17)
Other than the ONI bulletin of 1 December 1941, Captain, McCollum was
aware of no information sent out to the fleet from the Navy Department between
1 December and 7 December 1941 regarding the location and movements of the
Jap fleet, (p. 19)
Captain Mason, Fleet Intelligence Officer for CinCAF, and Commander
Fabian, who was attached to the Corregidor radio intelligence unit, said that most
of their information regarding the location and movements of the Jap fleet was
obtained from the analysis of enemy radio traffic, rather than from the decryption
of Jap messages, (p. 73-74) Other sources of information during the period
26 November to 7 December 1941 were reports from the Naval Attache, Shanghai,
and a number of sighting reports obtained by reconnaissance planes. On 2
December a despatch was sent from CinCAF to OpNav reporting the sighting of
nine subynarines. On the same date, another despatch to OpNav reported 3
submarines, 21 transports and enemy patrol planes in the Camranh Bay area.
On 6 December, a despatch reported a convoy in Camranh Bay. Twenty-four
to forty-eight hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor, a British report was
received to the effect that heavy Japanese units were rounding Poulo Condore,
French Indo China. During this period, it was believed that all known Jap
carriers were in the Kure-Sasebo area. (p. 75-76)
Captain Rochefort stated that between 26 November and 7 December 1941 very
little information was obtained regarding the location of the Jap fleet by radio
intelligence means. The reason for this was that while the total volume of Jap
radio traffic remained about the same or increased the traffic which contained as
an addressee or originator one of the major vessels was almost non-existent. He
said that the Japanese radio traffic which was received contained a certain amount
of "padding or rejecting of messages," but that in his opinion there had been no
attempt on the part of the Japanese to practice radio deception in any of its
forms, (p. 53)
Admiral Wilkinson stated that the ONI summary of 1 December 1941 (Ex-
hibit 9) represented the best of the knowledge and belief of the Office of Naval
Intelligence at that time, and was based on the digest of all available information,
radio intelligence, and sightings. He believed, but could not be certain, that a
copy of the summary had been sent air mail to Pearl Harbor on or about the date
of issue, 1 December 1941. (p. 395)
480 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Wilkinson recalled seeing a digest, prepared by the Far Eastern
Section of ONI of daily Communication Intelligence summaries issued at
Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 22) . He recalled noting in particular those for the period
1 December to 5 December, 1941, and being aware that a large part of the Japanese
fleet appeared to have gone into radio silence. The Admiral believed that this
fact appeared daily in reports issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and these
reports drew the conclusion that an attack on Thailand and the Malay Peninsula
was imminent, since the only moveynents picked up were in that direction (p. 396)
Admiral Smith said that based on the coynmunication intelligence summaries
during the period 27 November to 6 December 1941, he had estimated that the
Japanese carriers during that period were "some in the Marshalls and the re-
mainder in home areas." (p. 362) Referring further to the summaries, he said:
{p. 363)
"Vice Admiral SMITH: Now, I see nothing very alarming in these dis-
patches up to Pearl Harbor. On one day the traffic will be very light, radio
traffic, and on the next day it is very heavy right up to the 6th of December. The
fact that you don't hear from the Second Fleet, he doesn't originate any message,
doesn't necessarily mean that he is on the way to Pearl Harbor. Our own forces
ivhile at sea exercising maintained radio silence. We had a very large force,
almost half of the Pacific Fleet, in May, 1941, proceed to the Atlantic and no
traffic was heard from them for a period of some six weeks. So the absence of
radio traffic from the forces at sea doesn't indicate anything to me.
"Mr. SONNETT. Does it indicate that they are at sea, Admiral?
"Vice Admiral SMITH. It indicates the probability that they are at sea, yes.
"Mr. SONNETT. And it is the fact that after December 1, 1941, there was
no information from the Japanese carriers' radio traffic?
"Vice Admiral SMITH. No, except after saying there is no information, they
usually wind up with, 'They are believed to be in home waters.' "
Admiral Smith said that he had not known about the change in call signs of the
Jap Fleet which occurred on 1 December, (p. 364) He did not recall having
discussed with Admiral Kimmel the lack of information on Japanese carriers
indicated by the communication intelligence summaries after 1 December,
(p. 365)
A fortnightly summary, issued by ONI on -December 1, 1941 (Exhibit 57)
stated concerning the Japanese military situation, that Japanese troops, supplies,
and equipment were pouring into Indo-China during the past fifteen days. Units
landed at Haiphong were sent south by rail to Saigon. Troops were moved
quickly through Saigon towards the interior and the Thailand border. The
arrival of reinforcements continued. Japanese army strength in Indo-China
was believed to be about 25,000 in Tongking Province and between 70,000 and
100,000 in south Indo-China. Naval aircraft and craft also moved south. It
was estimated that there were about 200 Japanese planes in Indo-China, and
roughly the same number on Hainan Island.
Concerning the Japanese naval situation, the report stated that deployment
of naval forces to the southward had indicated clearly that extensive preparations
were under way for hostilities. At the same time, troop transports and freighters
were pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports
headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Move-
ments to the south appeared to be carried out by small individual units, but the
organization of an extensive task force, then definitely indicated, would probably
take sharper form in the following few days. To that date, this task force, under
the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, appeared to be sub-
divided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast
Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constituted a strong striking
force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and
submarine squadrons; it asserted that although one division of battleships might
be assigned, the major capital ship strength remained in home waters, as well as
the greatest portion of the carriers. It also stated that the equipment being
carried south was a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable
numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consisted not only of
large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions, but also of construction
material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.
The record does not contain other ONI summaries. Admiral Stark, however,
testified that the estimates as to the positions of Japanese carriers and battleships
were conflicting and that the easternmost position estimated was the Mandates
(pages 72-3).
> PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 481
Admiral Turner said that there had been a great deal of naval radio traffic
which suddenly ceased, which meant that the Japanese fleet had put to sea (page
994). Admiral Turner also said that they did not know where the Japanese fleet
was. Deductions were that there was to be a covering force in the Marshalls'
area and that some forces would carry on missions in the China Sea. Available
information as to the location of the Japanese fleet, although considerable, was
incomplete (page 1002).
Admiral lugersoU stated that it was difficult to get information on Japanese
ships. Units in Cavite and Pearl Harbor for radio intelligence were practically
the only sources (page 818). When there was a significant move reported, he
knew about it.
Captain Smith-Hutton said that in November, 1941, he could obtain no infor-
mation of Japanese military movements except one to Southeast Asia. Japanese
military movements did not appear in the press (page 1077). No information
reached him indicating an attack on Pearl Harbor. In the latter part of 1941,
he felt sure that Japanese would make an aggressive move to relieve economic
pressure exerted by the United States embargo, but he was not sure this would
involve the United States in war. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise to
him (page 1079).
Ambassador Grew had no information as to movement of a Japanese carrier
force towards Pearl Harbor (page 1064).
Admiral Redman did not think that the December 1st ONI Bulletin was sent
to CincPac by dispatch (pages 1107-8).
Captain Layton
Captain Layton testified with respect to the photostatic copies of the various
dispatches in exhibit 8 that he thought CinCPac received the dispatch of S4 No-
vember 1941, from OpNav to CinCAF, information CinCPac and others, that
the dispatch from Coml4 dated 26 November 1941, time date group 260110, had
been sent by the Fourteenth Naval District Cotnmunication Intelligence Unit
at the direction of Admiral Kimmel, and that Coml6's dispatch of 26 November
1941, time date group 261331, was a reply to the Coml4 dispatch 260110. {Page
190-191)
Captain Layton testified that the three dispatches referred to above {exhibit 8)
summarized the intelligence available to Corns 1 4, 16, CinCAF and CinCPac,
concerning Japanese naval movements during the month preceding 26 November.
{Page 191)
Captain Layton testified that he noted that the Cornl6 unit stated in the dis-
patch 261331, that it could not confirm the supposition: by Coml4 that sub-
mariyies and carriers in force were in the Mandates, and that Coml6's best indi-
cations were that all First and Second Japanese Fleets were still in the Sasebo-
Kure area. {Page 191)
Captain Layton considered that Coml6's reference to First and Second Fleet
carriers was made in relation to the Japanese naval organization as promulgated
29 July 1941 ; that the Japanese naval organization as stated by ONI at that
time included information that there were attached to each of the First and Second
Fleets, two carrier division, that is, CarDivs Three {ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU)
■ and Five {RYU JO, HOSHO) with destroyer plane guards, were attached to the
First Fleet; and that CarDiv One {AKAGI, KAGA) and CarDiv Two {SORYU,
HI RYU) with destroyer plane guards, were attached to the Second Fleet; thus,
Captain Layton explained, the ONI bulletin of July, 1941, stated that there were
eight carriers assigned by the Japanese to the First and Second Fleets, with no
other carriers listed as assigned to any other fleets.
Therefore, Captain Lai/ton testified the Coml6 dispatch 261331 stating that
its best indications were that all known operating Japanese carriers ivere be-
lieved to be in the Kure-Sasebo area was understood by him to mean that all
known operating Japanese carriers were in that area, and that Coml4's esti-
mate at that time differed from that of Coml6, in that Coml4 was of the opinion
that there was at least one Japanese carrier in the Marshalls at that time.
{Page 191-192) {also see Page 248-250)
said that in the latter part of November, he received information of two or more
Japanese carriers in the Marshalls. He had reported to CincPac Japanese car-
riers at Truk and the Marshalls, in June, 1941 (page 912). On December 1, 1941,
he submitted to Admiral Kimmel, on request, his estimate of the locations of all
major units of the Japanese Navy (page 913). After this was typed, more recent
information caused it to be changed, in red; it showed available in the Empire "4
aircraft carriers, 6 battleships, with a question mark after them, 4 heavy cruisers,
with a question mark after them, and 12 destroyers — available for use in the home
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 32
482 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
area." This was a portion of the entire Japanese Navy, the majority of which
was shown as disposed to the south and implicated in the impending moves, from
their sources of information. The witness referred to his translation of a book
("a novel published in Tokyo to inflame public opinion toward larger armament
money" — page 911), which stated that it would be very dangerous for Japan to
launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor using carriers, battleships and cruisers;
Math Japan staking its existence on the move to the south it could not aS'ord to
gamble its defenses by sending some of this force on a raid which would denude
the Empire of vessels. That was generally his reasoning (page 913). He knows
now that there were certain decrypted messages in the Navy Department which
by themselves might not mean much, but taken together would have warned of an
attack against Hawaii more than the messages they received. This refers to ship
movement messages later discussed. Some other messages in Exhibit 63 indicated
war, he said, but did not specifically refer to Pearl Harbor (page 916).
Commander Rochefort said that no Japanese ships were reported closer than
the Marshalls during the latter part of November, up until December 7th (page
472) . No information was received which indicated a Japanese attack other than
at Guam or the Philippines, of the United States possessions. Nothing east of
Guam was indicated.
Admiral DeLany stated that CincPac had no information contrary to the ONI
Bulletin of December 1, 1941 (page 503). He recalled information that there was
a small carrier force, prior to December 7th, to the southward of the Philippines,
but that the main Japanese strength was at Japan (page 87) .
Admiral Mc Morris stated that he had had no information that Japanese carriers
were in the Marshalls (page 899).
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he was familiar with the FOUR-
TEENTH Naval District Communication Intelligence Summaries, particu-
larly those for the period 27 Novembers December 1941 {Exhibit 22); that he-
recalled being familiar with the information contained in them and though he
frequently did not himself read them, he either heard them read or orally presented
by Captain Layton; that he certainly had access to all the material contained
in those summaries (pages SI 0-3 11).
He, in many cases, identified his own and the initials of Admiral Kimmel
appearing either on the Communication Intelligence Summaries {Exhibit 22)
or on the Intelligence reports prepared and submitted by Captain Layton {p.
310-311).
He further testified that he had no independent recollection of having seen the
ComFOURTEEN dispatch of 26 November 1941, and other dispatches at-
tached thereto in Exhibit 8, nor the memorandujn dated 1 December 1941 pre-
pared by Lt. Comdr. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer. He considered it im-
probable, however, that he did not see the Layton memorandum of 1 December
1941 {p. 311-312).
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that so far as he could recollect, he had
believed the major elements of the Jap Fleet to be fairly well located on and after
1 December 1941- He remembered that on or about 1 December 1941 there was a
change in the call signs of the Japanese fieet, and stated, with reference to the
believed location of the Japanese carriers, that they were thought to be in home
waters or towards Formosa {p. 312).
Vice Admiral McMorris stated that offhand he could not recall the informa-
tion on which his estimate as to the location of the Jap carriers was based, and
that it would require a considerable number of quotations from Communication
Intelligence Summaries {Ex. 22) to point out the source of such belief {p. 313).
Following this. Vice Admiral McMorris did refer to the Communication
Intelligence Summaries, in an effort to show the basis for his belief that the
carriers were in home waters or towards Formosa:
24 November: A statement that on the 23rd there were a large number of
dispatches associating Carrier Division 3 with CinC Third Fleet.
25 November: A statement that one or more of the carrier divisions were
present in the Mandates.
26 November: Reference was made to general traffic intelligence involving
CinCs Second and Third Fleets, the China Fleet, the Fourth Fleet, and the
Combined Air Force, indicating a heavy traffic condition, but no reference was
made to any part of the Summary which said anything about carriers.
27 November: Reference was made to information in the Summary concerning
various Japanese fleets but not to information specifically referring to carriers
or to the carrier fleet.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 483
S8 November: Vice Admiral McMorris referred to information in the Commu-
nication Intelligence Summary of this date to the effect that there were many
high precedence messages involving the Combined Fleet and to information con-
cerning the Third Fleet, but he did not point out any information concerning
carriers {p. 314)-
29 November: Reference was made to various items of information in this
Intelligence Summary , but not to any involving the carriers.
30 November: Reference was made to information to the effect that there was a
strong impression that the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, was underway,
and to the fact that one urgent dispatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff of
Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, and to the Combined Air
Force.
1 December: No reference was made to any information concerning carriers
(p. 315).
2 December: Reference was made to the paragraph in the Summary that there
was almost a complete blank of information on carriers and that carrier traffic
was at a low ebb.
3 December: Reference was made to various items of information but none
concerning carriers (p. 316).
4 December: Reference was made to the large number of urgent messages from
Tokyo, to the lack of messages from CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet,
and to the fact that the former was believed to be in the vicinity of Takao {p.
316-317).
6 December: Reference was made to the radio silence of the Second and Third
Fleet Commanders, and that there was no traffic from the Commander of the
carriers or from the Commander of the Submarine Force {p. 317).
6 December: Reference was made to the radio silence of the Second and Third
Fleet Commanders and to the fact that the Commander in Chief of the Combined
Fleet had originated several messages to the carriers (p. 317).
After reviewing the above Summaries, Vice Admiral McMorris admitted
that between December 1st and the time of the Japanese attack there was no
Intelligence or information concerning the location or movements of a carrier
fleet as such {p. 319). He stated, however, that it was his recollection that there
had been one or two vague indications associating carriers with the Second and
Third Fleets, and some possible associations with Patau and in at least one
instance an association with the Marshalls {p. 320). Upon examination of
the Fleet Intelligence Officer's memorandum, of December 1st, Vice Admiral
McMorris stated he could not find on it any reference to Carrier Divisions 1 or
2 (p. 320). He could not recall if there had been any conference between Ad-
miral Kimmel and himself concerning the 1 December estimate of Captain
Layton (p. 321).
He stated that he did not reach any conclusion that the carriers were operating
independently of the rest of the Combined Fleet (p. 319).
Vice Admiral McMorris stated that during the period in question, the infor-
mation available as to the locations of the Japanese Fleet units was not as specific
as was desirable; that he did not recall the lack of information as to the car-
riers, and "taking into consideration the general situation and all other infor-
mation at hand . . . we were extremely disturbed" (p. 321).
General Short testified that he had received no information indicating Japanese
movements east of Guam (p. 265).
Admiral Kimmel testified that the information from his own Fleet Intelligence
was principally as to the movements of ships and, he said, it gave no indication of
a Japanese attack (p. 327).
Admiral Wilkinson discussed the organization of ONI and pointed out that
there was no established or effective method for the dissemination of infor-
mation of Combat Intelligence, (p. 280) Admiral Wilkinson said that for
some time the Japanese section of the foreign branch of ONI had been pre-
paring daily an analysis of the situation as to Japanese Fleet locations and as
to Japanese-American relations, (p. 281) Admiral Wilkinson referred to
the fortnight summary issued on December 1 and said that it had been
discussed with Admirals Stark and Turner and had been sent out air mail on
December 1.
According to Captain Safford, there were three main radio intelligence
units — one in the Navy Department with subsidiary direction finder stations
and intercept stations along the Atlantic seaboard and in the Atlantic Ocean;
the second at Pearl Harbor with subsidiary intercept stations at Oahu, Mid-
484 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
way, Samoa, and Dutch Harbor; the third at Corregidor, There were also
intercept stations from the West Coast of the United States which fed their
traffic directly to Washington. The main station in Washington was con-
cerned particularly with that branch of intelligence relating to naval opera-
tions in the Atlantic and to the plans and intentions of foreign governments.
It was also used for training personnel. The station at Pearl Harbor was
confined to that branch of intelligence dealing with the dispositions and plans
of naval forces in the Pacific and surveillance over Japanese naval communi-
cations. These duties did not include .surveillance over any diplomatic
communications. The Asiatic unit at Corregidor was at the disposal of
CinCAF to use as he saw fit. Up to early 1941, it was mostly concerned with
diplomatic communications, but in October or November shifted its main
attention to Japanese naval communications, (p. 356)
Captain Safford said that the unit at Pearl Harbor was kept fully informed
only of results obtained by the Washington unit as to operations of the
Japanese Navy in the Pacific with one important exception, namely that on
December 1, 1941, CinCPac and ComFOURTEEN were sent a copy of a
dispatch to CinCAF indicating that the Japanese were planning a landing in
Malaya, (p. 356)
Captain Safford said that on November 26, 1941, estimates were received
from Pearl Harbor and from ComSIXTEEN relating to the organization and
distribution of the Japanese Fleet, and that the estimates differed. Com-
SIXTEEN'S report place one carrier division as operating in the South China
Sea and the remaining carriers in Japanese home waters, and further added
that the evaluation was considered reliable. He said that in Washington
they believed that the report from ComSIXTEEN was correct, but did not so
advise the Fourteenth Naval District. He said that on November 24 ONI
had sent a dispatch to CinCAF indicating that Sixteenth District's intercepts
were considered most reliable and requesting that other reports be sub-
mitted from ComSIXTEEN to OpNav with copies to CinCPac for information.
The basis for the belief that ComSIXTEEN 's reports were better was the
geographical location of ComSIXTEEN. (p. 357)
Captain Safford said, "Further information as to Pearl Harbor's estimates
of locations of Japanese forces in early December 1941, may be found in the
monthly report of Station 'H'- — in the 'Chronology' which was prepared
daily and forwarded weekly by air mail. This information was, of course,
prepared by and currently available to the Pearl Harbor C. I. Unit but was
not received in the Navy Department until a delay of about two weeks."
(p. 360-2)
"Note: The examining officer has identified the documents mentioned by
witness as being C. I. Station 'H' 'Chronology' for December 1— Decem-
ber 6, 1941, inclusive, now on file in Communication Intelligence Section
(Op 20G), Office of Director, Naval Communications, Communications
Annex, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, to which is attached a summary
of more important extracts, made by the witness under examination."
Admiral Brainard said that the "War Information Room" received
information from sources such as O. N. I., Naval observers and what was
made known to them through the communications system and plotted the
movements of Naval units including Japanese. To the best of his knowledge,
they were receiving all Japanese information available in the department.
(p. 402).
Admiral Smith said that around the beginning of December 1941, the
information he received from the Fleet Intelligence Officer was to the effect
that one Japanese force was supposed to be at Truk and to the best of his
recollection the main part of the Japanese Fleet was supposed to be in Empire
waters; that they had no knowledge as to the Japanese carriers; that the
Fleet Intelligence Officer had said that he did not know where the carriers
were; and that Admiral Smith recalled no difference of opinion between the
radio intelligence units of the Fourteenth District and Cavite concerning
the location of enemy carriers, (p. 47)
Admiral Smith said that the Pacific Fleet staff believed that the Japanese
Navy was very efficient although they had little knowledge or information
concerning the Japanese Navy; all of the information on the Japanese Fleet
was by Radio Intelligence only, that is, as to the location of the Fleet, (p. 59)
Admiral Pye said that a rather high evaluation was placed upon the report
of the Intelligence Officer concerning the Japanese Fleet inasmuch as no
contrary or other information had been received. At the time, Admiral Pye
\
\
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 485
knew the sources upon which the Intelligence Officer was relying for his
information.
Concerning information from October ,on as to the movements of units
of the Japanese Fleet, Captain Layton said:
"Commencing in late October, many reports were received from China,
from pilots in the Chinese Custom service, from our Assistant Attaches in
South China, and through Chinese intelligence sources, of the movements
of considerable number of Japanese transports and troops to the South from
Shanghai, from Foochow, from the Canton estuary, and the movements of
troops southward from northern China through the Shanghai port of embarka-
tion. The Naval Attache at Tokyo inform.ed us, on about 1 November, that
elaborate plans for the joint Army-Navy occupation of Thailand by the
Japanese were complete and that the combined Fleet was then in the Kure-
Saeki area; that the invasion was to follow the line of the German blitskreig
of Holland and Belgium and that considerable air forces were being assem-
bled in the Taiwan-Hainan area, and that the Indo-China forces were being
strengthened to a total of 100,000. The withdrawal of the Japanese merchant
ships from Western Hemisphere waters was noted locally as well as our being
informed by OpNav. The movements of men and materiel to the Mandates
was also observed in the early part of November. Recurring reports of
movements of Japanese transports, escorted by destroyers, to the South
along the China Coast, and their arrival in the French Indo-China area and
Haiphong and Saigon were received from time to time. The loadings of
some of these transports — that is, landing craft, tanks, troops, railroad
equipment, motorboats — led to a belief that amphibious operations were
being contemplated, the area of operations to be in the South, exact location
as yet undetermined. In mid-November, our best intelligence sources
detected the beginning of the formation of the Japanese surface-force task
forces; concerned and associated with southern destinations, as well as the
movements of naval aircraft to the Hainan Islands — Southern Formosa
region. These were more or less confirmed by reports from the North
China area by Army and Navy observers, and somewhat substantiated by
one report from the American Consulate at Tsingtao. These groupings and
activation of units of the Combined Fleet with southern destinations was
noted and commented on by Admiral Kimmel, and the Combat Intelligence
Unit, Fourteenth Naval District, specifically noted this activity as the fore-
runner of operations, judging from past experience, and Admiral Kimmel
asked what we had received from other units. I replied, 'Nothing yet.'
He then directed me to tell Commander Rochefort that he desired them to
initiate a special message concerning the developments noted to OpNav and
Cavite, Guam then being inactive. This resulted in a dispatch sent by the
Com 14 Combat Intelligen.ce Unit in which a task force organization was
laid out in the general tenor as follows: That a task force under the Com-
mander in Chief, Second Fleet, has been organized, comprised of the Second
Fleet, the Third Fleet (which includes the First and Second Base Forces and
Defense Divisions, which corresponds, generally to our amphibious forces),
the combined Air Force of the Shore-based Air Command, the Destroyer
Squadrons of the Second and Third Fleets, plus one squadron from the First
Fleet, plus two Subrons and one Battleship Division. These were estimated
to be forming up for movement to the South China area and associated with
the French Indo-China, Sama (Hainan Island), and Taihoku and Takao,
Formosa. It was noted, also, that the naval units at Palau were somewhat
connected with this Second Fleet Commander's activity, and that perhaps
certain of these units might even proceed in that direction. It was noted,
also that there was a concentration of submarines and air groups in the
Marshalls, and estimated that at least one Carrier Division, plus about a
third of the submarine fleet, were in the Marshalls area. It was estimated
that these forces would operate in the southern Asia area, with component
part possibly operating from Palau and the Marshalls. Almost coincident
with this time was an inquiry from the Dutch Naval Command as to the
possibility of a Japanese seizure of Portuguese Timor and expressed the
determination of the Dutch High Command that should Japanese forces
carry out such an indicated thrust, that the Dutch would consider it an
invasion and act accordingly. We were asked to comment on this develop-
ment, but could find nothing positive to substantiate the Dutch report. After
receipt of the Combat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District, estimate of
Japanese formation of the task forces and its indicated direction of move-
486 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ment, the Cavite unit, under Com 16, confirmed the indications noted here
and estimated that this task force of the First, Second, and Third Fleets and
Submarine Force were comprised into a loose-linit organization, apparently
divided into two major sections. The majority of the strength of cruisers
being in the first section and destined for the South China area. Minor
strengths being probably destined for the Palau area, and that carriers of
CarDiv 3 and possibly CarDiv 4 were concerned with the South China area
movement of the No. 1 Force. The First and Second Fleet carriers were also
estimated to be in the Sasebo-Kure area. Com 16's unit, however, could
not confirm the supposition by 14 's unit that carriers and submarines, in
force, were in the Mandates. Prior to this, specifically on the 25th of Novem-
ber, the Commander-in-Chief received a dispatch from OpNav which stated,
in substance, that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations then
pending in Washington were very doubtful, and expressed the opinion that a
surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the
Philippines or Guam, to be a possibility, and cautioned against anything that
would complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action.
On the 27th, as I recall it, a war warning was received from OpNav. I
believe that it was aided by the two dispatches I referred to from the Com 14
unit and the Com 16 unit. It stated that the negotiations in Washington
had ended and that an aggressive move by the Japanese within the next few
days was expected, that an amphibious expedition was probably imminent
against either the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly
Borneo. We were told the War Department was sending a similar warning.
This message was passed in paraphrase form, which I wrote myself, to the
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, through the liaison officer
with the Hawaiian Department. That same evening, incidentally, the liaison
officer with the Hawaiian Department brought over from the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, the Army's warning they had received
separately, and showed this copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff,
and other high ranking officers present. I did not see the Army dispatch,
but from the discussion that came up, I could conclude only that it was almost
a duplicate as those words were used. This Navy Liaison Officer reported
to me, subsequently, that he had returned the Army dispatch to the senior
oflScer of the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, in the absence of both
General Short and his Chief of Staff, and, at the same time, delivered the
Navy's paraphrased war warning to the same officer, after trying to deliver
it in person to General Short or his Chief of Staff. When unable to deliver
it in person, he gave it to the Senior Staff Officer on duty in G-3 with the
statement that this was a very secret dispatch sent over from Admiral
Kimmel for General Short. On the 28th, information was received by the
British Consul, locally, from a source usually reliable, stating that the Japa-
nese would attack the Kra Isthmus from sea on 1 December without ultima-
tum or declaration of war. The main landing was to be at Singora. At this
time, the message regarding the false weather broadcast to indicate a condi-
tion of war was also received; and from the State Department were reports
of movements of troops and ships in the Saigon and French Indo-China
general area, substantiating previous estimates and reports of increased
forces being rushed to that area. On 1 December, there was received a
dispatch from OpNav, I previously referred to regarding the intrigue in
Thailand to get the British to attack, and in this Singora was again men-
tioned and seemed to fit in with previous dispatches regarding future Japanese
activity in that area. On 2 December, reports received from CincAF of
Japanese submarines and transports off Saigon and in Camranh Bay, which
checked previously indicated movements and previous information. On 3
December, there was received a dispatch I was previously shown as Exhibit
11, which tends to confirm the general picture presented to that time, that is,
active military operations were about to commence with the "Southern
Expansion Program" of the Japanese Navy to be put into effect. On 6
December, a report from CincAF received stated CincChina had reported
a twenty-five ship convoy, six cruisers, and ten destroyers, in a position in
the Gulf of Siam, as well as another convoy of ten ships, ten destroyers, and
two cruisers in a different position, all on course West. Also that CincAF
forces sighted thirty ships and one large cruiser in Camranh Bay. On 1
December, the Commander-in-Chief requested that I present to him a paper
showing the approximate location of the Japanese naval units, which I pre-
pared and submitted. It showed, briefly, that except for Battleships Divi-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 487
sions One and Two, DesRon One, CarDivs One and Two, and Cruiser
Division Eight, and possibly CruDiv Six — the latter was marked "May head
for the Mandates?" — that all other important Japanese naval forces were
South of Shanghai, the majority of which were in the Bako and Takao area,
that a considerable concentration of shore-based aircraft, probably 250,
under Commander, Combined Air Force, were in the Hainan-Takao area,
and that the Cine Second Fleet, in command of the Task Force, cruisers,
destroyers, and submarines, was at Takao; that in the Mandates was the
usual Fourth Fleet, consisting of three cruisers, two old cruisers, eight
destroyers, one submarine tender, seven submarines, two minelayers, twelv e
auxiliary minelayers, patrol boats, etc., and thirteen auxiliary transports,
and 140 planes, Admiral Kimmel asked me how well identified and how Avell
placed in Japan were the battleships and carrier divisions that I referred to
previously. I told him that they were not positively identified in Japanese
ports but were believed to be in Japanese waters, due to their past activity
and lack of, or negative information.
"34. Q. How many carriers did the Japanese organize in one division?
"A. Normally two carriers plus two destroyer plane guards to one division.
"35. Q. And how many divisions would that mean, total?
"A. That would mean that they had approximately five divisions. At the
time in question, there was positively identified: Carrier Division One of
the AKAGI and KAGA; Carrier Division Two of the SORYU and NIRYU;
Carrier Division Three of the RYUJO and one unknown carrier; Carrier
Division Four of the KASUGA and it was believed another carrier that we
didn't know, nor do I know to this date; Carrier Division Five of the new
SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU were just completing training and had not been
particularly active with the Fleet. These were the two newest and latest
carriers.
"36. Q. As regards what type of ship was the main disagreement between
those units of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts?
"A. The only disagreement noted was the Fourteenth unit believed that
a carrier division and one-third of the Japanese submarine force was in the
Marshalls. The Sixteenth District unit said, in substance, that they could
not confirm the supposition that the above forces were in the Marshalls.
"37. Q. Did the two units generally agree as regards the number of
carriers in home waters?
"A. I don't believe it was ever a matter of disagreement or agreement,
as, at that time, all units forwarded their reports to OpNav and any dis-
agreement in these matters would be not so much errors in judgment, as
the matter of available material, due to distance and other factors. OpNav
made no attempt at this, or other times prior to the war, to reconcile or
evaluate the opinions expressed or clarify the general picture from the
reports produced. There may have been messages passed between Four-
teen and Sixteen, of which I had no knowledge.
"38. Q. At about the time in question, say from 27 November onward,
did you, personally, make anything which constituted an estimate of the
situation on the possibility of an organization containing carriers striking at
Hawaii?
"A. I do not believe that such an estimate was made after 27 November,
but the possibilities of this occurring had been discussed at some time
previous. This occurred in a discussion wherein Japanese potentialities
and capabilities was being discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and I told him
of their books, written for their own propaganda purposes and increased
armaments; that in this book the author stated that the American Com-
mander-in-Chief, when his Fleet was concentrated in Hawaii, would be
concerned with three possible Japanese measures of attack: (1) Attack on
Pearl Harbor using carriers, cruisers, and fast battleships; (2) An attack
on the Aleutians, including an occupation force; and (3) An attack on the
American Mainland. The discussion was in a broad sense but I do not
recall any of the details thereof.
"39. Q. Did you ever advise Admiral Kimmel that with the set-up of
forces as placed by your Intelligence toward the end of November, the Jap-
anese would be unable to supply cruisers and destroyers sufficient to form
a carrier task force which could strike at Hawaii?
"A. I do not believe that point was made specifically. That, however,
was my personal estimate; that with the allocation of forces to the southern
movement, the remaining forces were weak, particularly in destroyers and
488 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cruisers, although potentially powerful in offense; that is, the carriers. I
expressed that as an opinion before the Roberts' Commission and not as an
estimate of the situation that I had expressed formally or informally, to
Admiral Kimmel. I do not recall having expressed that as a formal or
informal estimate.
"40. Q. Do you recall any personal concern which you had because of the
lack of information from Washington, based on intelligence sources of the
nature which you have just been discussing?
"A. I recall that at the time, particularly over the week-end of the first
of December, that I couldn't understand why Washington didn't give us
more information, but presumed that perhaps they didn't have it. It was a
source of considerable concern both to Commander Rochefort and me and
we remained at our telephones throughout that week-end, although I was
back at the office on the Sunday to confer with Admiral Kimmel.
"41. Q. Was it reported to you, during the week or ten days prior to 7
December, '41, that the lack of radio traffic on the part of the Japanese Navy
was, in itself, an ominous sign?
"A. That is a difficult question because the Japanese changed their call
signs on 1 December, which, in itself, was considered rather ominous in
view of the other information. The lack of identifiable traffic could be antic-
ipated under those circumstances. The lack of great volumes of traffic
does not always indicate an imminent move but it fitted very well with the
picture of the southern movement discussed previously." (p. 219-223)
Captain Lay ton said:
"I frequently took messages of secret, ultra-secret, and confidential nature
to these Commanders on their Flagships on specific occasions as there was
on Saturady morning, 6 December, when the report I have mentioned from
CinC Asiatic Fleet, giving the sightings of the Japanese naval and auxiliaries
units in the Gulf of Siam and Camranh Bay by CincAF forces. I took that
to Admiral Pye on his Flagship, the CALIFORNIA, and there again a com-
plete and free discussion took place as to what all this meant, not only this
message, but others they had seen and discussed. That was the only place
that I recall as having said positively that the movement into the Gulf of Siam
was, I considered, very significant and that the only problem remaining was
whether or not they would leave us on their flank as a menace or take us out
on the way down. Admiral Pye and his Chief of Staff told me their opinion
was that the Japanese would not attack us. When I returned the message
to the files. Admiral Kimmel asked me what they said. I repeated their
conversation, in abbreviated form. On other occasions, other Admirals
expressed apprehension as to the status of the Asiatic Fleet and our forces in
the Asiatic waters, and were very anxious regarding the situation, indicating
that they were not convinced that Japan could by-pass our Philippine flank.
It was my personal opinion that the thought of attack on Pearl Harbor at
that time was very far from most people's minds. I want to say this: I had
all the information of intelligence sources, and I had spent all of my time
trying to evaluate these jig-saw puzzle pieces to make the true picture of
events to come, and I think I was as surprised as anyone when the Japanese
attacked the following morning." (p. 225)
In view of its importance, the following is quoted directly from the exam-
ination of Commander Rochefort:
"32. Q. Now, Commander, I will ask you to state, chronologically, as
nearly as possible, the results which your unit obtained in keeping track of
the movement of units of the Japanese Fleet, beginning on or about 1 Oc-
tober 1941.
"A. On 1 October, the general mission of the unit at Pearl was to endeavor
to obtain information from the specific types of traffic as assigned by Wash-
ington. Secondly, to obtain information, by a study of radio traffic origi-
nated by the Japanese stations. And, thirdly, to obtain information by
radio direction finder bearings. As of 1 October, the first mission men-
tioned was being only partially carried out due to inability on the part of the
personnel concerned. The second and third missions were, with a reason-
able degree of accuracy, being carried out. Late in October and during the
month of November, some minor successes were obtained in the field covered
by the first mission. However, the information thus obtained was not in
any sense vital. Beginning in early November, it became apparent that
certain moves were afoot, and after about three weeks constant study an
estimate was drawn up which was submitted to the Commandant, who
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 489
released a dispatch to Washington, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. To the best of my knowledge, this dis-
patch was sent out on 26 November. Between that date and the 7th of
December, very little information was obtained by means of radio intelligence,
due to the lack of traffic. During the latter part of November and the first
week in December, information previously unavailable, due to legal restric-
tions, was made available from the files of the communication companies in
Honolulu. This traffic contained the incoming and outgoing files of the
personnel attached to the Consulate General in Honolulu.
"33. Q. On broad lines, what was the substance of that estimate which
you made about 26 November?
"A. The estimate submitted on 26 November consisted, in the main, of
the opinion that the Japanese were concentrating to the south of Japan, one
force proceeding toward Indochina; the direction of advance of the other
force was not known. An additional force of some strength and containing
at least one carrier division was placed definitely in the Marshalls area.
"34. Q. How many carriers did the Japs organize in one division?
"A. Two, sir.
"35. Q. At about the time of this aforesaid estimate, what were you
getting along similar lines from the other two units?
"A. Nothing definite except that the Far East Unit had stated, on many
occasions, that an offensive move was apparent. To the best of my knowl-
edge, no direction or composition of forces was given prior to the dispatch
of the estimate from Pearl.
"36. Q. Narrowing this testimony down to Japanese carriers — do I
understand you to say that you thought you had located two in the Marshall
Islands or proceeding in that direction?
"A. In our opinion, at that time, at least two Japanese carriers were in
the Marshalls area.
"37. Q. Did you estimate other Japanese carriers to be to the southward
of, say, Formosa?
"A. I do not recall whether the task forces which we included in our
estimate contained carriers south of Formosa, or not.
"38. Q. On this subject of location of carriers, of which it is well under-
stood the Japanese possessed ten, was the unit in the Far East in agreement
with your estimate?
"A. No, sir.
"39. Q. In what respect?
"A. The estimate mentioned previously was not replied to by Washington.
The following day, the Far Eastern Unit, commented on the dispatch and I
believe the Far Eastern Unit was in general agreement except for the direc-
tion of movement and particularly the placing of at least one carrier division
in the Marshalls.
"40. Q. Did the Far Eastern Unit suggest that more was known about the
location of Japanese carriers than was shown in your estimate?
"A. I do not recall.
"41. Q. Do you know if the aforesaid estimate and the dispatch from
Com 14, which was based thereon, were communicated to the Commander-
in-Chief?
"A. Yes, sir; the following morning the Commander-in-Chief, accom-
panied by Com 14, came to my offices and discussed the matter at great
length, at least an hour and a half, I would say.
"42. Q. Do you recall if that disagreement which came to you from the
other unit in the East was likewise communicated to the Commander-in-
Chief?
"A. I am almost positive that it was by reason of the fact that all messages
of that type were given to the Commander-in-Chief.
"43. Q. Were you, at that time, aware of the very tense situation that
existed between us and the Japanese, particularly insofar as diplomatic
negotiations were concerned?
"A. Yes, sir, I believe I was.
"44. Q. You did not, however, obtain anything in the nature of a similar
estimate from Washington, is that correct?
"A. No, sir, we did not. I might amend that slightly by stating that
several days after the dispatch of our estimate and the dispatch of the Far
Eastern Unit's estimate a warning dispatch was received from Washington.
That was on the 27th. They, obviously, tied together but there was no
direct answer.
490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"45. Q. Did it occur to you, at the time, in view of the importance of this
subject, that you had a right to expect something from Washington?
"A. No, sir. We had submitted our estimate to our superior officers in
Washington. Whether or not they replied, I considered a matter within
their purview.
"46. Q. Did you look upon Japanese battleships and carriers as the most
important units?
"A. Yes, sir.
"47. Q. Do you recall any uneasiness of mind because you did not have
a greater number of those ships located?
"A. There was great unease in all of our minds because of the lack of
traffic. The inability to locate more battleships and carriers was not con-
sidered, in itself, as a bad sign by reason of the fact that up until that time
we had generally been unsuccessful in locating the majority of the larger
ships.
"48. Q. What particular type of Japanese man-o-war did you feel you
were well in touch with and what importance did you put upon their move-
ments?
"A. We maintained close touch with all of the vessels engaged in building
up bases in the Mandates and, generally, with seaplane tenders, and occa-
sional cruiser divisions.
"49. Q. Did your unit assume that because they did not hear the large
Japanese ships talking that they were all in port?
"A. No, sir.
"50. Q. From, say, the 27th of November onward, do I understand you
to say that Japanese naval radio traffic was unusually light?
"A. Yes, sir.
"51. Q. Did you recall any previous occasion when it was as sparse as
during that period?
"A. Yes, sir. During the advance and occupation of Hainan.
"52. Q. Did it occur to the minds in your unit that this silence might be
presaging another offensive movement?
"A. Yes, sir, we considered that it did definitely presage another offensive
movement.
"53. Q. Were you emphatic in calling the attention of your seniors to the
importance of this lack of traffic?
"A. Yes, sir.
"54. Q. To whom did you represent that?
"A. To the Commandant and to my opposite number on the Commander-
in-Chief's Staff, namely, the Fleet Intelligence Officer. However, the ob-
jectives, insofar as my unit was concerned, did not include areas to the east-
ward of the Mandate islands." (p. 210-212)
Commander Wright discussed the equipment which was available at the
Fourteenth Naval District unit for the detection and location of enemy ships.
(p. 379-80)
XXV. Intercepted Japanese Communications After the "War Warning"
AND Up to December 6, 1941
A. FAILURE TO TRANSMIT TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL
After November 27, 1941, when the "war warning" was sent to Admiral Kimmel,
and prior to the Japanese attack, there were a number of highly significant
Japanese coded communications intercepted, decoded and translated by the Navy
and the Army in Washington. Both the State Department and the Navy Depart-
ment believed, according to Admiral Schuirmann, that from November 27th to
December 6th relations with the Japanese were constantly deteriorating (page 204).
It wUl be recalled that on November 28th, there were available in Washington
the intercepted Japanese communications showing the reaction of the Japanese to
the State Department note of November 26th; that it was regarded as a "humiliat-
ing proposal;" that with a report of the views of the Imperial Government to be
sent in two or three days the negotiations would be de facto ruptured; but, that
the Japanese emissaries were not to give the impression that the negotiations were
broken off (supra, pages 60-63).
Except to the extent set forth in the following chapter, Admiral Kimmel was
not advised of any of this information. The reasons for this action have been
previously mentioned (supra, page 44). As Admiral Stark explained it, in part,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 491
CincPac was not sent all of the information that was available in Washington; it
was the job of the Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate that information; they
tried to give CincPac the most useful information; and, they left it to him as to
what to do after they gave him the picture as they saw it (page 800) .
Admiral Stark testified that the procedure by which he received classified
information was through his Flag Secretary or delivery to him personally by ONI.
Comdr. Kramer normally brought information from Intelligence. Sometimes
the information was evaluated and sometimes dispatches were brought in direct
before evaluation. Intelligence and War Plans did the evaluations which were
usually gone over by Admiral Ingersoll. A watch officer and duty officer in
Operations received information after oflSce hours and decided whether it should be
sent to him at once. During the critical period from November 27th to December
7th, he felt that he was receiving all of the important information regarding
Japanese-United States relations (page 774) .
Admiral Ingersoll said that he was not sure that he had seen every document
received through interception (page 833).
B. CONCERNING THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS AND SITUATION
On November 30, 1941, there was a Navy translation of a message from Tokyo
to the Japanese emissaries in Washington, dated November 29, 1941 (Document
19, Exhibit 63), requesting that they make one more attempt to discuss the
situation with the United States, and to state that the United States had always
taken a fair position in the past; that the Imperial Government could not under-
stand why the United States was taking the attitude that the new Japanese
proposals could not be the basis of discussion, but instead had made new proposals
which ignored actual conditions in East Asia and which would greatly injure the
prestige of the Imperial Government; that the United States should be asked
what had become of the basic objectives that the United States had made as the
basis for negotiations for seven months; and that the United States should be
asked to reflect on the matter. The emissaries were directed in carrying out this
instruction to be careful that this did not lead to anything like a breaking off of
negotiations.
Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was aware of this message but did not
deliver it to Admiral Stark.
Also on November 30, 1941, there was a Navy translation of a trans-Pacific
radio telephone conversation from Kurusu in Washington to Yamamoto in Tokyo,
in which a telephone code was used (Document 20, Exhibit 63). This indicated
that Kurusu expected a long message ("probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's
proposals") ; that the President was returning apparently because of the speech of
the Japanese Premier which Kurusu said was having strong repercussions here;
that Kurusu said that unless the Premier and others used greater caution in
speeches, it would put the Japanese emissaries here in a very difficult position;
that care should be exercised, that Yamamoto said that they were being careful;
that Kurusu wanted the Foreign Minister told that the emissaries here had ex-
pected to hear something different — some good word — but instead got this (the
Premier's speech) ; that the | Japanese- American negotiations were to continue;
that Yamamoto wanted them to be stretched out; that Kurusu needed Yama-
moto's help to do this, and that both the Premier and the Foreign Minister would
need to change the tone of their speeches and that all would have to use some
discretion; that Yamamoto said the real problem that the Japanese were up
against was the effect of happenings in the South.
There were four significant Japanese communications intercepted on December
1, 1941, as follows:
1. Navy translation — (Document 21, Exhibit 63)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"1 December 1941
"(Purple CA)
"#865 Re my #857
"1. The date set in my message #812 has come and gone, and the situation con-
tinues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from
becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that
though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the
negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)
"2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador
to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124. Please make the
necessary representations at your end only.
492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an
effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so
because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make
investigations into this matter."
Admiral Stark testified that -he did not recall this, but it may have been dis-
cussed (page 778). He did not advise CincPac of this message since he did not
consider that it added anything (page 779). Admiral Schuirmann said that he
was aware of this message and the following one, but had not delivered them to
Admiral Stark (pages 702-3). Admiral Ingersoll did not remember this (page
828).
2. Army translation — (Document 22, Exhibit 63)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Berlin
"November 30, 1941
"Purple
"#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code)
(Part 1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department)
"1. Japan- American negotiations were commenced the middle of April this
year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period
the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the
cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international
situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the
United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope
of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from partici-
pating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these
negotiations.
"2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view
of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis,
has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and
ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations
rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French
Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.
"Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first
came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional
idealogical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fun-
damental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on
between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of
the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establish-
ment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far
East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire
of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance
of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they
took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand
the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This
was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the
negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more
clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the
United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would
inevitably be detrimental to our cause.
[Part 2 of 2]
"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this atti-
tude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting claiise which says
that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will
not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty,
namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the
Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European
war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to
Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others,
makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations.
What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred
with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China — they did so repeatedly.
Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations
and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."
3. The Navy report states that "on 1 December, 1941, the Navy Department
intercepted a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin as follows:
" 'The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY „- ,,; .^ 493
Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that
war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan, and
this war may come quicker than anybody dreams. We will not relax our pressure
on the Soviet, but for the time being would prefer to refrain from any direct
moves on the north. Impress on the Germans and Italians how important
secrecy is.' "
Commander Kramer said that the President was so interested "in the dispatch"
to Berlin that Kramer was directed to prepare a special paraphrase for the Presi-
dent's retention; otherwise neither the State Department or White House were
permitted to retain copies of the "super secret" dispatches (page 983).
4. Army translation — (Document 23, Exhibit 63)
"From: Washington (Nomura)
"To: Tokyo
"November 28, 1941
"Purple
"#1214 To be handled in Government Code.
"Re my #1190.
"So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United
States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines
like this are appearing in the papers: "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese,"
and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that it is up to Japan
either to accept the American proposal with its four principals, or face war, in
which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.
"This we must carefully note."
In connection with the diplomatic situation,
Admiral Schuirmann said that the Navy Department had been kept fully
informed of the progress of negotiations with Nomura and Kurusu. (p. 411)
Reference was made to page 138 in "PEACE AND WAR" concerning
which Admiral Schuirmann said that he did not recall the particular meetings
mentioned on November 25 and November 28. Admiral Schuirmann did
recall that on Wednesday or Thursday before Pearl Harbor, Secretary Hull
telephoned him and said that he wanted Admiral Schuirmann to know that
he didn't seem to be able to do anything more with the Japanese and that
they were liable to run loose like a mad dog and bite anyone. Admiral
Schuirmann assured Secretary Hull that a war warning had been sent out
and reported the conversation to Admiral Stark, (p. 412 Admiral Schuir-
mann said that the general attitude of Admiral Stark and General Marshall
was that any time that could be gained in the outbreak of hostilities was
to the benefit of the United States, (p. 412)
it may be here noted that on December 2nd, Under Secretary of State Welles
had a conversation with Nomura and Kurusu (page 311), which was summarized
by Welles as follows:
"I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop
movements to southern Indochina. These reports indicate a very rapid and
material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indochina. It
was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement — and there is
no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement — between Japan and
the French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces per-
mitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was very
considerably less than the total amount of forces already there. The stationing
of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to imply the utili-
zation of these forces by Japan for the purpose of further aggression, since no
such number of forces could possible be required for the policing of that region.
Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the
many islands of the East Indies; against Burma; against Alalaya or either through
coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of undertaking the
occupation of Thailand. Such new aggression would, of course, be additional
to the acts of agression already undertaken against China, our attitude towards
which is well known, and has been repeatedly stated to the Japanese Government.
Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador
Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual reasons
may be for the steps already taken, and what I am to consider is the policy of
the Japanese Government as demonstrated by this recent and rapid concentra-
tion of troops in Indochina. This Government has seen in the last few years in
Europe a policy on the part of the German Government which has involved a
constant and steady encroachment upon the territory and rights of free and
494 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
independent peoples through the utilization of military steps of the same char-
acter. It is for that reason and because of the broad problem of American
defense that I should like to know the intention of the Japanese Government.
"The Japanese Ambassador said that he was not informed by the Japanese
Government of its intentions and could not speak authoritatively on the matter
but that of course he would communicate the statement immediately to his
Government." »
Admiral Schuirmann could not recall that information as to this note was
given to Admiral Stark.
On December 3, 1941, there was available the Army translation of a report
by Kurusu and Nomura to Tokyo, dated December 2, 1941 (Document 25,
Exhibit 63) which stated:
"Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-
Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying
that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he
turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233. Thereupon we said:
"Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops
in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly
to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a
thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th."
The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United
States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world."
Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided
economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the state-
ment that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We
haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights or
wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you
to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or
breaking the chains that it invokes. We want you to realize this as well as the
situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year
incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situa-
tion. Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent Ameri-
can proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration
to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-
Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We
cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually
impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our
proposals prof erred on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th,
representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand-
in spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come
to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new
proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the
negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-
China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the estab-
lishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of funda-
mental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally
dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The
American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify
the position of the United States because of the internal situation here." Then
he continued: "In regard to the opinion that you have expressed, I will make it a
point immediately to confer with the Secretary." I got the impression from the
manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the (American
proposals of the 26th would leave this much room. Judging by my interview
with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is
clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current
difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy
settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations
of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233."
It may be noted that about December 3rd, according to Admiral Schuirmann,
the State Department felt that although there might be some further discussions
with the Japanese, it was inevitable that they would be unsuccessful. The Chief
of Naval Operations, he said, was kept informed (page 203).
There were various intercepted Japanese communications of interest available
on December 4, 1941, as follows:
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 495
1. Navy translation — (Document 26, Exhibit 63)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Hainking
"1 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#893
". . . In the event that Manchuria participates in the war ... in view of
various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war
in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America
that this country will take in case war breaks out.
"A summary follows:
"1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized
as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code
telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However, it is
desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be
comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries
resident in Japan.
"2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private
property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded
by Japan.
"3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular
offices and interests will not be recognized.
"However, the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be
equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.
"4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform
to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be
exercised not to antagonize Russia."
2. Navy translation— (Document 27, Exhibit 63)
"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"1 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#1227
"(This raised the question of the possibility of a conference between persons in
whom the leaders have confidence to have them make one final effort to reach
some agreement. The meeting to be held at some midway point, such as Hono-
lulu ... It was said that this last effort might facilitate the final decision as to
war or peace.)"
3. Navy translation — (Document 29, Exhibit 63)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"3 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#875 Chief of Office routing.
"Re your #1232
"Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:
"There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French
Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an
unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-
French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts
of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of
troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of
the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we
have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint
defense agreement."
4. Navy translation — (Document 31, Exhibit 63)
"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"3 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#1243
"If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that
the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be
given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the consuls."
496 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On December 5, 1941, there were available translations of additional inter-
cepted Japanese communications dealing with the diplomatic negotiations,
as follows:
1. Army translation — (Document 33, Exhibit 63)
"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"3 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#1243
"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between
Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is
a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand."
2. Navy translation — (Document 34, Exhibit 63)
"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"1 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#1225
"(This is a report of conversations held by Japanese representatives with
Secretary Hull on December 1st. which referred to the Japanese Premier's speech,
the President's return, Japanese troop movements, and apparent agreement as
to the impossibility of reaching an agreement.)"
C. CONCERNING UNITED STATES SHIPS AND PLANES
On 4 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted communication
from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 20 November 1941, serial 7029, which stated:
(Exhibit IS)
"Please investigate comprehensively the fleet — bases in the neighborhood of
the Haivaiian military reservation."
Captain Safford said that to the best of his knowledge none of the Jap inter-
, cepts which were translated in the period immediately prior to 7 December 1941
and tvhich shoired interest in U. S. ships at Pearl Harbor were sent to CinCPac.
(p. Ill) He added that so far as he knew the codes used by the Japanese for
reports on U. S. ships at Pearl Harbor were not being read by the radio intelli-
gence unit there, (p. 116)
"In addition to the Japanese intercepts ivhich were translated prior to 7 December
1941, o. number of Jap messages regarding h. S. ships at Pearl Harbor were
intercepted before that date but not translated until after the attack. {Exhibit 13)
"From: Tokyo {Togo)
"To: Honolulu
"November 28, 1941
"J19-K9
"Intelligence of this kind which are of major importance, please transm,it to
us in the following manner.
"1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement but
once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the
Hawaiian Islands, but could also have travelled far. Use your own judgment in
deciding on reports covering such movements.
"2. R eport upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of time
they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the departure."
{Translated by the Army, 12/8141.)
"From: Honolulu
"To: Tokyo
"December 6, 1941
"U5S
1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage
balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered for
or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the tise of
these balloons in the defense of Haivaii and, Panama. Insofar as Hawaii is
concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl
Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops
to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the
maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no
signs of barrage balloon equipme^nt. In addition, it is difficult to imagitie tha
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 497
they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made prepara-
tions, because they must control the air over the ivater and land runways of the
airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hicham, Ford and Ewa, there are limits
to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I image that in all probability there is
considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack, against
these places.
"2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are
not known. I will report the results of my investigation." (Translated by the
Army 1218141.)
"From: Honolulu
"To: Tokyo
"December 6, 1941
"PA-K2
"1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were —
and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on
the 6th:
"9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in
addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers
and airplane carriers have all left.)
"2. H appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air
arm." {Translated by the Army 12/8/41.)
"From Honolulu
"To: Tokyo
"November 28, 1941.
"J-19.
"Military report:
"(1) There are eight "B~l?" planes at Midway and the altitude range of
their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet ?).
"(2) Our observations at the Sand Island v}aneuvers are: — number of shots —
12; interval of flight — 13 seconds: interval between shots — 2 minutes; direct
hits — none.
"(3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in
Honolulu during December or January.
"(4) There has usually been one cruiser in the v)aters about (15,000 feet ?)
soutJi of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor."
(Translated by the Army, 12/8/ 41-)
"From: Honolulu (Kita).
"To: Tokyo
"6 December 1941
"(PA-K2)
"(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my
message #239 arrived here.
"(2) The LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day,
"(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:
"8 battleships.
"3 light cruisers.
"16 destroyers.
"Four ships of the Honolulu class and .... were in dock." (Translated
by the Navy, 12-10-41.)
(6) "From: Honolulu (Kita).
"To: Tokyo.
"1 December 1941
"(J19) Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:
"1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles
southeast of here.
*******
"2. The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: leaving
on Tuesday and returning on Frdday, or leaving on Friday and returning on
Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one
week." (Translated by the Navy 12/10/41.)
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 33
498 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(7) "From: Honolulu (Kita).
"To: Tokyo.
"3 December 1941
"{PA-K2)
"From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of §3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.
"1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:
"I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:
"Meaning
Signal
Preparing to sortie
1
and screen units.
Preparing to sortie
2
All departed between 1st and 3rd
3
Carriers
Several departed between 1st and 3rd
4
All departed between 1st and 3rd
5
Battleship division
All departed between 4th and 6th
6
Carriers - -
Several departed between 4th and 6th
7
All departed between 4th and 6th
8"
";?. Signals.
"I. Lanikai* Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:
SigtuU
"One light between 8 and 9 p. m 1
" " " 9 and 10 p. m S
" " " lOandllp.m S
" " " 11 and 12 p. m 4
:W "II.
P "Two lights " 12 and 1 a. m. 6
^ " " " land2a.m 6
" " " 2andSa.m 7
" " " Sand4a.m 8
[Part 2]
"III. Lanikai* Bay, during daylight.
"If there is a 'star' on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals,
1, 2, 3, or 4.
"If there is a 'star' and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.
"IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House** will indicate the follow-
ing:
Times Signal
"1900-2000 3
. 2000-2100 4
2100-2200 5
2200-2300 6
2300-2400 7.
0000-0100 S"
"V. K.G.M.B. *** Want ads.
"A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P.O. Box 1476 indicates signal
3 or 6.
"B. CHIC . . CO farm etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal
4 or 7.
"C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal
6 or 8.
"3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from
Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium
**** at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road
{latitude 20° 40' N., longitude 156° 19' W., visible from, seaward to the south-
east and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made
daily until your signal is received:
Time ' Signal
From 7-8 S or 6
From 8-9 4 or 7
From 9-10 5 or 8
'Between Waimanalo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.
**A beach village on east coasc of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai.
*"A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.
****At latitude SO-iS-iS N., longitude iSS-SO-SO W."
■ (Translated by the Navy 12/11/41)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 499
"From: Honolulu (Kita)
"To: Tokyo
"November 34, 1941.
"J-19.
"1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts
maneuvers and forthwith returns.
"2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted
maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaiana Roads. Destroyers and submarines
are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.
"3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe.
Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas.
"4- The manner in which the fleet moves:
"Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft.
They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui
or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas sea plane
tenders operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Airplane firing
and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity
of th island of Kahoolawe." (Translated by the Army 12/16/41.)
Vice Admiral Wilkinson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, did not
recall seeing translations of intercepted Japanese messages prior to the attack,
relating to the presence of ships in Pearl Harbor. (Exhibit 13) (p. 406-7)
Asked whether it was his belief, prior to the attack on 7 December, 1941, that
Japanese agents at Pearl Harbor were reporting United States ships there.
Admiral Wilkinson replied that he believed such reports were being made; how-
ever, it was his belief that the Japanese were concerned about the presence of the
fleet "with a view to its availability for distant operations rather than its suscepti-
bility as a target." (p. 407)
On November 29th, there was an Army translation of a message from Manila
to Tokyo, dated November 22, 1941 (Document 10, Exhibit 68), which reported
on British and American ships at Mamila.
On December 3rd, the Navy translated an intercepted communication from
Tokyo to Honolulu, dated November 15, 1941 (Doc. 24, Exhibit 63), which
stated:
"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make
your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although
you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."
Admiral Stark testified that he did not specifically recall this message, but
may have seen it, as the Japanese were reporting a great mass of ship movement
information, and he assumed they knew every move we made (page 781). He
stated that it was routine for the Japanese to report ship movements and the
fact that they reported such movements from Honolulu was not unusual (page
790).
To have gone the limit, he said, in tightening up on espionage and on Japanese
facilities for getting information out might have precipitated the war which they
were trying to delay. He pointed out that they did stop Japanese ships from
using the Panama Canal and did reroute safely United States ships (page 795).
On December 4th the following intercepts were available:
1. Navy translation — (Document 12, Exhibit 68)
"From: Manila (Nihro)
"To: Tokyo
"25 November 1941
"(Purple)
"#790
"1. On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland (5 or 6 thousand
tons, apparently a comouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port. (Probably the
U. S. HOLLAND of 8000 tons.)
"2. On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown,
"3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left port, destination unknown."
2. Navy translation— (Document 14, Exhibit 68)
"From: Tokyo
"To: San Francisco
"29 November 1941
"(J19)
"Circular #2431
"Make full report beginning December 1st on the following:
"Ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed (or at which it
arrived), and port of destination (or from where it started), date of departure,
etc., in detail, of all foreign commercial and war ships now in the Pacific, Indian
Ocean, on South China aeas."
500 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On December 5th the following translations of intercepted communications
were available:
1. Army translation — (Document 37, Exhibit 63)
"From: Tokyo (Togo)
"To: Honolulu
"November 18, 1941
"J-19
"#113
"Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N",
Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, (Probably means Mamala Bay), and the areas adjacent
thereto. Make your investigation with great secrecy."
2. Navy translation — -(Document 36, Exhibit 63)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Honolulu
"29 November 1941
"(J19)
"#122
"We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future
will you also report even when there are no movements."
Admiral Stark testified that he may have seen these two messages, but that they
did not change the situations as to which he had advised CincPac (page 781).
Admiral Schuirmann did not remember seeing these (page 720) .
3. Army translation — (Document 13, Exhibit 68)
"From Manila (Nihro)
"To: Tokyo
"November 28, 1941
"Purple
"#799
"Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and
another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from
four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the city
independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear and
windless, squalls come once a day."
On December 6, 1941, there was available in Washington an Army translation
of an intercepted Japanese communication from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated
November 18, 1941 (Document 40, Exhibit 63), reading as follows:
"1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my
#219* (a — Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study.) on that
day.
"Area A'' — (b — Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.) A battle-
ship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.
"Area C" — (c — East Loch) 3 warships of the heavy cruiser classes were at
anchor.
"2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, ENTER-
PRISE, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago
class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks 'KS.' 4 merchant vessels
were at anchor in Area D<^ — (d — Middle Loch).
"3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed enter-
ing the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000
meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From
the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they
were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The
elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after
passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side."
Admiral Stark testified that he did not see this message (pages 781-2). Ad-
miral Schuirmann similarly testified (page 719).
"It is of interest to note that a Japanese message from Tokyo to Honolulu,
dated December 2, 1941, was intercepted, apparently on December 23rd, and
translated by the Army on December 30th (Document 46, Exhibit 63), which read:
"(Secret outside the department)
"In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane
carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your
ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are
any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that
they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided
with anti-mine nets."
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 501
Note: This message was received here on December 23.
Also of interest is a similar message, dated December 6, 1941, translated by the
Army, December 12, 1941 (Document 45, Exhibit 63), which directed that Hono-
lulu wire immediately the movements of the fleet subsequent to December 4th.
Admiral J. R. Redman during the latter part of 1941 was Assistant Director
of Naval Communications (page 1091) . He said that the general tenor of Japanese
traffic was a searching expedition all over the world, as to ship movement. This
had been going on for a long time, but was intensified during the several months
preceding December, 1941. There were about 700 dispatches in November 1941.
In the last month prior to December 7th, diplomatic intercepts averaged 25 a
day. September and October were heavy but there was an increase in November
(page 1101).
Document 40 of Exhibit 63 (the location of ships in areas in Pearl Harbor)
was more specific than the other ship movement dispatches (page 1104).
Admiral Turner did not specifically remember seeing the ships movements
dispatches; they had been going on for a long time (page 1004).
Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not remember Documents 24, 36, and 37
of Exhibit 63 (ship movements reports). He would not have attached any sig-
nificance to them as he presumed such reports were being made as a matter of
routine; same as to Document 40 of Exhibit 63 (page 836). No record was kept
of persons to whom these documents were shown at the time.
Commander Kramer said that he was generally familiar with Documents 24
and 36 in Exhibit 63 and stated that these would have been in daily folders sub-
mitted to the regular recipients of this class of information. As to ships move-
ments, the Japanese were always reporting them, so that those were not unusual
messages, but somewhat more emphatic (page 961).
Commander Kramer said that he saw Document 36 of Exhibit 63 (concerning
reports even when there are no ship movements) on December 5th; Document 37
(requesting reports on certain areas at Pearl Harbor) on December 5th; Docu-
ment 40 (giving the locations of ships at Pearl Harbor (about December 6th).
Previously during the year similar intercepts were received, but Document 40
of Exhibit 63 was the first of the ship movement messages which had gone into
detail as to the location of ships at Pearl Harbor at a specific time. It was re-
ceived December 6, 1941 (page 974) (also page 976).
The inference he gathers from these is that the Japanese were concerned
about the location of United States ships but they had also been concerned sim-
ilarly about planes in the Philippines and all aspects of military establishments
in the Netherlands East Indies (page 974). Moreover the inference was that
since we were working with the British and Dutch, the Japanese were concerned
about the action we were taking, and there was no indication from this material
of overt intentions against the United States (page 975). This was, however, the
first time the Japanese had asked for such detail (page 975).
XXVI. The "Winds" Code and Messages
A. THE WINDS COD^
On November 28th, there was translated another intercepted Japanese com-
munication establishing the "winds. code," in addition to the previous message of
November 26th, which in substance was as follows:
Navy translation — November 28, 1941 (Document 15, Exhibit 63):
"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"19 November 1941
"(J19)
"Circular #2353
"Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomtic relations), and the
cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in
the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.
"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME
(East wind rain).
"(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (North wind
cloudy) .
"(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE (West wind clear).
"This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all
code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
502 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"Forward as urgent intelligence."
On December 5tb, Alusna at Batavia advised OPNAV of a message "from
Thorpe for Miles War Department" of a code intercept to the effect that Japan
would notify her consuls of "war decision," by using the "winds code" words in
Japanese weather broadcasts (See Documents 2 and 3, Exhibit 64) .
B. MONITORING FOR THE CODE WORDS
Captain L. F. Saflford testified that in 1941 he was in charge of the Security
Section of Naval Communications, which collected information through inter-
cepts (page 744). Document 15 of Exhibit 63 is the so-called "Winds Code,"
which was available to the Navy on November 28th. This was repeated by
Documents 2 and 3 of Exhibit 64. There is no material difference in these mes-
sages (page 745). After receipt of these messages special effort was made to
monitor for these messages. C. I. units at Pearl Harbor and Cairte were also
monitoring (page 746).
Admiral Turner said that at the time when he saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63
he discussed it briefly with the Chief of Naval Operations and instructions were
given to watch for the code words.
Commander Kramer said that he saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 (Winds
message) on November 28, 1941 (page 956). Arrangements were made to watch
for any use of the Winds Code by the Japanese and to promptly notify senior
officers who had cards showing the message.
C. ADMIRAL KIMMEl's KNOWLEDGE OF WINDS CODE
Admiral Kimmel was advised by a copy of a dispatch dated November 28th
from CincAF to OPNAV (Exhibit 64), that according to an intercepted communi-
cation, if diplomatic relations were on the verge of being severed, certain words
would be used in the Tokyo news broadcasts.
Captain Layton testified that he had not seen Document 15 of Exhibit 63, but
had received the same information. Upon receipt of it special watches were set
to intercept the execute of the winds code, but no execute was ever received
(pages 905-6) .
D. "winds" messages using the code words for RUSSIA
On December 4, 1941, the Federal Communications Commission reported a
Japanese radio broadcast apparently using the "winds code" words relating to
Russia (Document 2, Exhibit 65), as follows:
TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME
CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE
WEATHER
"KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM
AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS' *^' ^
"CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME
SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM"
Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately
2200 GMT, December 4, 1941
On December 5, 1941, the FCC reported another Japanese broadcast again
apparently employing the "winds code" relating to Russia. The report (Docu-
ment 3, Exhibit 65) was, in substance:
"TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR
BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER
FROM SOUTH
(repeated 3 times)
"Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately
2130 gmt December 5, 1941"
Lt. Comdr. F. M. Brotherhood stated that he was watch officer in OP-20-G,
Naval Communications (page 919A). He first saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63
(intercept establishing the Winds Code) about November 30, 1941 (page 920).
On the evening of December 4, 1941, the FCC phoned an intercept to him. He
did not remember the exact text, but it did not contain the words that he was
looking for, which were the Japanese phrase: "Higashi No Kazeame." These to
him would have indicated the severance of relations with the United States, and
war.
The watch officers in Op-20-G had been instructed to telephone Admiral
Noyes when an execute message was received (page 920) , He telephoned Admiral
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 503
Noyes and thought that he again called the FCC (page 921). Admiral Noyes
said to him, on receipt of the message, that "he thought the wind was blowing
from a funny direction." He identified Document 2 of Exhibit 65 as apparently
the message received from the FCC (page 921). This meant to him that there
would be a break in diplomatic relations, not with the United States, but with
Russia (page 921). He thinks that's why Admiral Noyes said to him that "the
wind was blowing from a funny direction."
A pencil memo was the only written record of the above-described intercept.
He did not know the disposition of this memo. He turned it over to the succeed-
ing watch officer (page 922). He had no recollection of any confirmation of
this message from the FCC (page 921). He did not know of any other intercept
of an execute message of the Winds Code (page 923). He can account for the
inability of the Navy to produce the message as recorded by him, or a confirma-
tion of it, only from his own viewpoint: He had instructions to transmit the
message orally, in view of its urgency. He, therefore, had to call Admiral Noyes
at once. He did not think that they had been ordered to make any record of
the message (page 925) .
E. WAS THERE A "wiNDS CODE" MESSAGE RELATING TO THE UNITED STATES?
In a statement before Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, Captain Safford testified
concerning the "winds message" as follows:
He testified that in the Fall of 1943 it appeared that there was going to be a
trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel. He realized that he would be one of
the important witnesses and that his memory was vague. Accordingly, he
began looking around to get information in order to prepare a written statement
which he could use in his testimony. He noticed that in the Roberts report
there was no reference to the "Winds Message" or to the dispatch which McCollum
had drafted. Safford then began talking to everyone who had been around at the
time to see what they could remember, and to see if they could give him leads so
that it would be a matter of fact and not a matter of memory. He talked the
thing over with various of the Army people, (pages 112-114)
Captain Safford testified that he had written to Brotherhood and that Brother-
hood had written back saying that he didn't care to tell Safford about the disposi-
tion of the copies of the "Winds Message," but when Brotherhood returned to
the United States, Safford asked him about it and found out that there had been
a misunderstanding. Brotherhood had been referring to the false "Winds
Message" (Document 2 of Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court), which apparently
related to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast (page 115).
Safford stated that he had information "third hand" concerning the Army's
copies of the "Winds Message," and that he thought it might be confirmed in
the testimony of Colonel Sadler before the Army investigation. He stated that
his information from the Army came through W. F. Friedman, a cryptanalyst
in the War Department, and that the information was that the copies of the
"Winds Message" had been destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel
Bissell on the direct orders of General Marshall. Safford also stated that
Colonel Bratton of the War Department had had some question about the message
and had asked Admiral Noyes by telephone for a copy of the original of the
"Winds Message," but that Admiral Noyes had refused to comply on the grounds
that the Navy translation was correct. This, he said, should appear in Colonel
Braiton's testimony before the Army investigation. He also stated that a
Captain Shukraft of the Army knew that the "Winds Message" had been received
(pages 114-115).
Safford testified that he had talked with Kramer shortly before his testimony
during this investigation, and that contrary to his earlier impression, Kramer
told him that the "Winds Message" and various other intercepts relating to
Japan had not been turned over to the Roberts Commission, but about 9 December
1941 had been collected and shown to Under Secretary Forrestal, during the
absence of Secretary Knox. He also said that Kramer told him that he did not
recall the "Winds Message" specifically. Safford also stated that the reference
in McCollum' s message to the "Winds Message" was very short and was the
last item in McCollum' s draft dispatch, (pages 117-118)
Safford testified that it now appears more likely that the "Winds Message"
was received early in the morning of December 4ih, Washington time, rather
than the night before, because the watch officers who were on duty recollected only
the false "Winds Message," and not the "True 'Winds Message'." The
vagaries of high frequency radio, he said, resulted in the message being inter-
504 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cepted only on the East Coast of the United States, and that such conditions were
not unusual. He pointed out that they had to call on Corrigedor to cover the
Tokyo-Pe^ lin circuits because the combined efforts of intercept stations on the
East Coubt, West Coast, Hawaii and England could not provide better than about
fifty per cent coverage. Although he had no knowledge as to which Naval station
allegedly intercepted the message, his first griess was the station at Cheltenham,
Maryland, and his second guess was Winter Harbor, Maine. He stated that
the logs of these stations and of the Navy Department had been destroyed during
one of the numerous moves and no record had been kept, {pages 119-122)
Referring to the message telephoned by the FCC to Lieutenant Commander
Brotherhood at 9:05 p. m. on December 4ih (Exhibit 65, Naval Court), he said
that this was the "false" message which appeared on the surface to use the "winds"
code words relating to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast.
This message, he said, Brotherhood telephoned to Admiral Noyes and later
Kramer took one look at it and said it was not what was wanted and threw it
into the waste basket. He said that that message was received twelve hours or
more after what he referred to as the "true winds message." (page 123)
Safford identified Document 4, Exhibit 65, as a true "winds" message relating
to England, which was intercepted on 7 December 1941 after the attack on Pearl
Harbor (page 124)-
Safford testified that he had been advised that the Dutch had been monotoring
for a "winds" execute message, but that prior to the attack they had intercepted no
such message (page 540).
On being recalled for examination, Captain Safford testified that he never
had a conversation with Colonel Sadler concerning the existence of a "winds"
message. He stated that he could not recall distinctly whether or not he received
a call from Brotherhood about December 4th in which Brotherhood advised of
the receipt of a message apparently using the Russian "winds" code words.
He had had a vague idea that there was another "winds" message, and, he said,
the FCC intercept seemed to fill the bill. He said further, however, that until
1944 he did not recall having seen, or knowing of the FCC intercept in which the
words relating to Russia were used (pages 538-539).
Captain Kramer said that he had testified previously conerning the "winds"
message but wanted to go over that previous testimony in the light of thinking it
over since that time. He said that he had had no recollection of a "winds"
message at the time it was first mentioned to him, the spring of 1944, but after
receiving from Safford some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it,
he did recall a message some days before 7 December 1941, about the middle of
the week, and did recall being shown such a message by the watch officer and walk-
ing with him to Captain Safford's office and being present while he turned it
over to Captain Safford. Captain Kramer thought that that message had been
a "winds" message, but did not recall the wording of it. He said it might have
been one using the code words referring to the United States, as he previously
testified, but he was less positive of that now than he had been at the time of his
previous testimony. The reason for this revision of his view was that on think-
ing it over, he had a rather sharp recollection that in the latter part of the week
preceding the attack there was still no specific mention of the United States in
any of the Japanese traffic. For that reason he was under the impression when
he testified during this investigation that the message referred to England and
possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States, although it may have
referred to the United States, too. He just didn't recall (pages 131-132).
Captain Kramer testified that on the morning of December 7th, a Japanese
^'hidden word" code message rvas received and was hurriedly translated by him
as he was about to leave the Navy Department to deliver other messages. The
message as translated by Kramer was, "Relations between Great Britain and
Japan are not in accordance with expectations" (Exhibit 20). In his haste,
Kramer overlooked the word "MINAMP' which was contained in the Japanese
message and which referred to the United States. He testified that after he re-
turned to the Navy Department and shortly before 1 p. m. on December 7th, he
discovered his mistake and made a penciled correction on the file copy of the
translation. He testified further that he believed that he made several telephone
calls about fifteen minutes before the attack and advised the officer in charge of
the Far Eastern Section of ONI and an officer of G-2 of the War Department,
The copies of the translation in the Navy Department' s files do not disclose any
correction of the translation (Exhibit 20). Kramer testified concerning this
that a number of copies of the translation were made at the time, and that
undoubtedly his correction was made on another copy which has since been dis-
carded (pages 133-135).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 505
Captain Kramer also stated that he had been under the impression until he
testified before this investigation that the "hidden word message" of 7 December
1941 had been a "Winds Message," but now recognized it as a "hidden word
message." He stated that he thought that the "hidden word message," which
he identified as having been received on 7 December, was among the group of
messages shown to Mr. Forrestal about 9 December 1941, when he hastily reviewed
a folder of that traffic for Mr. Forrestal. This ivas done, he said, because of
the fact that previously Mr. Forrestal had not seen such material {pages 133-136).
Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood testified that he was one of the four watch officers
who were on watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week of December,
1941. He said that he had never received or seen an intercept or message wherein
the "Winds Code" words relating to the United States were used. He said that
about December 4th, he received a telephone message from the FCC in which the
words apparently relating to Russia loere used; that he called Admiral Noyes,
who commented that the wind was bloiving from a "funny" direction, and that he,
Brotherhood, did not think at the time that it tvas an actual "Winds Message."
Brotherhood stated that shortly before he testified in this investigation, he had had
a conversation with Safford ivho stated that Brotherhood had called him. about
December 4th or 5th and had told him that such a message had arrived. Brother-
hood said he did not recall the telephone conversation, but that as Captain Safford
said he did make sxich a call, he {Brotherhood) believed, therefore, that he had
called Captain Safford at that time {pages 144^14'^) ■
Lieut. Comdr. Linn testified that a 24-hour watch was maintained in Captain
Safford's section; that he was senior officer of that watch, and was one of the four
officers who stood that watch during the first week in December, 1941- Any
intercept ivhich had come into that section, he said, ivould have had to come through
one of the four watch officers. He was familiar with the "Winds Code" and
he never saw any intercept prior to 7 December 1941 in which the "winds" code
words relating to the United States were useed {pages I4O-I42).
Lieut. Comdr. Bering's testimony was that he was one of the four watch officers
standing watch during the first week of December, 1941, in Captain Safford's
section. He knew of the existence of the "winds" code and he never saw any
intercept using the code words relating to the United States or to any other nation
{page I48).
Lieut. Comdr. Murray testified that he was one of the four watch officers
standing a 34-hour watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week in
December, 1941- He testified that no "winds" code execute relating to the United
States ever came to his attention during that week. He said that after the attack,
Linn had told him that a "ivinds" message had come in on 7 December I94I
{pages 433-441).
Lieut. Freeman testified that he ivas in a section which disseminated to ON^I
intelligence received from the field radio intelligence units; that his unit worked
very closely with Captain Safford's unit, and that every effort was made to moni-
tor for a "winds" message. Freeman was one of the officers mentioned by
Captain Safford, in his testimony before Admiral Hart, as having personal
knowledge of the receipt of a "ivinds" message relating to the United States. He
testified that he never knew of or saw any intercept of a "winds" message relating
to the United States {pages 149-150).
Captain McCoUuni testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code;
that he had no knowledge of any message transmitted which contained the words
relating to the United States: that the message which contained the words appar-
ently 1 elating to Russia had been received during the first week of December,
1941, but that in his opinion that was a bona fide weather report. He said
further that during the first week of December, 1941, he drafted a dispatch sum-
marizing the situation ivhich he wanted to have sent out; that he remembered no
reference to any "winds" message in that dispatch; and, that the dispatch was
based on a memorandum of his dated 1 December 1941 which did not refer to a
"winds" message {Exhibit 10). He did not know whether or not his draft
dispatch had been sent out. It had been submitted to Admiral Wilkinson {pages
28-32).
Admiral Wilkinson testified that his only recollection of the "winds" code
was that some time after the attack, some one, possibly Commander McCollum,
had mentioned to him that a message usiyig a "winds" code had been received.
Possibly he said, it was the message received on the 7th using the words relating
to England. He did not recall anything about the long dispatch which McCollum
had drafted and which Captain Safford had testified Admiral Wilkinson had
endeavored to have sent out {pages 398-401).
506 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Mason, who was Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet, and Com-
mander Fabian, who was in the Radio Intelligence Unit at Corregidor, both
testified that intensive efforts had been made there to monitor for any Japanese
broadcasts using the "winds" code, and that nothing was received wherein the
words relating to the United States were used. In this connection, it should be
noted that it was the view of the Navy Department that the unit at Corregidor
because of its geographical location, was in a much better position to intercept
Japanese radio broadcasts than were the units at Pearl Harbor or Washington
{see Exhibit 8).
They also testified that close liaison was maintained loith British Intelligence
services in the Philippines, thai the British had been monitoring for a "winds"
message also, and that had such a message been received by the British, they
most certainly would have been advised of its receipt, but that they received no
information from the British as to the receipt of a "winds" message prior to the
attack, (pages 73, 78)
Captain Layton, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified that he had been
familiar with the "winds" code; that efforts were made to monitor for the use of
thai code; and all available Japanese language officers were placed on continuous
watch on several circuits and were to cover all known news broadcasts emanating
from Japan; that he checked up each day with Commander Rochefort and that
no "winds intercept was received prior to 7 December 1941, nor did they receive
any dispatch from any source stati?ig that such an intercept had been heard.
%Ir. Friedman, a cryptanalyst of the War Department, stated that prior to
7 December 1941 he had no information as to whether or not a "winds" message
had been intercepted. He said that he had had several conversations with Captain
Safford concerning the subject, the first one about a year and a half ago, and none
later than six months prior to his testimony in this investigation. He said that
Safford had indicated in the course of the early conversations that there had been a
"winds" message, but that no copies could be found in the Navy's files, and that
his theory was that it had been intercepted by a Navy East Coast station. Mr.
Friedman also testified that about a year and a half ago he had a conversation
with Colonel Sadler, who had indicated that a "winds" message had come in on
the 4th or 6th of December; that he had been notified either directly or by somebody
in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes, that the message was in; that there had been
some question about the exact Japanese words which had been used, and that
Sadler had not seen the message himself, and Mr. Friedman thought that Colonel
Sadler also told him that they had tried to get a verification from Admiral Noyes
but had not been successful, whereupon the G-2 authorities siiyiply passed the
matter over since there was apparently nothing to substantiate the existence of the
message. Mr. Friedman said that he had asked Sadler whether he had ever seen
a copy of that message, and Colonel Sadler said that he had not, but that he had
been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed
by General Marshall. Mr. Friedman testified that he regarded this as highly
inconceivable, but that in conversation with Captain Safford he probably just
passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started, and that he had no idea
that Safford would repeat that statement. Mr. Friedman had no knoioledge,
directly or indirectly, concerning the existence of a "winds" message relating to
the United States, apart from his conversations with Captain Safford and
Colonel Sadler (pages 515-520).
Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl
Harbor, testified that they monitored for any "winds" code message, covering all
known broadcasts from Tokyo on a 24-hour basis, and that results were nil. He
testified further that he had made an exhaustive search into all available Navy
records and could find no trace of any "winds" message prior to 7 December 1941-
(Pages 46-7.)
There was a sharp conflict in the testimony as to whether or not there had been
any Japanese message using the "winds code" words relating to the United States:
(1) Witnesses who said that there was no such message or that they recalled no
such message
Admiral Stark stated that he knew of no execute of the "winds message" (page
783).
Captain Wellborn said he knew of no "winds message" indicating that
the Japanese were going to attack the United States, (p. 389)
General Marshall thought that he had been aware of the "Winds Code" (Docu-
ment 15, Exhibit 63), but did not recall any execute message (page 872),
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 507
Admiral Noyes said no intercept of such an execute of the Winds Code was
ever received in the Navy Department (page 1033. See pages 1047-8). The
explanation of why such a "winds" message is missing from the Communications
files is that no such message was ever received by naval means (page 1040).
Admiral IngersoU said that he remembered the "winds" code (Document 15
of Exhibit 63), and probably saw it on November 29th. He recalled that there
was some difiference of opinion as to what it or the execution message meant.
He did not know whether this was discussed with Admiral Stark, and did not
remember what the doubt of the message was, but remembered that some mes-
sage was received prior to December 7th (page 825). He did not know where
the document, if any, showing a "winds" execute, was (page 826).
Admiral IngersoU said that he knew of the "winds code" and that he
recalled seeing on or about December 4th the Japanese broadcast directive
indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the
United States. He said that he did not know why this information had
not been sent to Admiral Kimmel except that probably it had been supposed
that the Hawaiian intercept station had also received that broadcast. He
said it may have been because of this that a message in regard to the destruc-
tion of Japanese codes was sent. (p. 429)
Admiral Redman saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 (winds code), but never saw
any execute of it; he heard about it in discussions around December 6th or 7th, but
doesn't remember where. He heard about it from Admiral Noyes and from
Commander Kramer (page 1103).
Admiral Schuirmann testified that he recalled that some broadcast had been
intercepted, but that there was lack of agreement as to whether or not it constituted
the "winds" message (page 723).
Lt. Comdr. Lynn and Lt. Comdr. Pering testified that they did not see any
execute of the "winds" message (pages 740, 813).
Captain Layton said that the messages establishing the "winds code" signified
that if the code word were sent it meant that diplomatic relations would be severed
and anything could happen (page 907).
He did not know of the receipt by any unit of the Navy of any execute of the
"winds" message (page 908). He asserted that if an execute of the "winds"
message had been received, it would have been rapidly and aggressively acted
upon (page 917); he believed that all personnel would have been recalled to their
siiips, an anti-submarine and distance patrol would have been started, and that
a task force would have sortied (page 917). He did not think that the "war
warning" message meant the same as the "winds code" for it concerned the
cessation of negotiations but that did not necessarily mean the cessation of
diplomatic relations or war (page 918).
(2) Witnesses who said that there was such a message, or some such message
Captain Safford stated that at 0800 on December 4, 1941, Lt. Murray, possibly
Kramer, came in with a yellow teletype sheet and said, "Here it is." He thought
that the message translated read: "War with America; War with England;
Peace with Russia." He has not seen a copy of this since December 15, 1941. It
came in from an East Coast station (page 746), but he can't determine what
station. There was no confirmation of this intercept from other sources. He had
a vague recollection of a second "winds" message, but was unable to find any trace
until he testified before Admiral Hart. Since then he learned that the FCC
had intercepted a "winds" message at Portland. He saw that message for the
first time at the hearing and did not recognize it (page 747) . He did not recall any
of the messages in Exhibit 65 (FCC intercepts). They do not indicate a break
with the United States.
He asserted that the "winds" message he saw on December 4th is not on file
and cannot be found despite repeated search since November, 1943; that Lt.
Comdr. Brotherhood had told him that he knew the disposition of them but
did not care to tell him. The witness said he also knew what happened to the
Army copies, through very "second-hand and devious sources" (pages 747-8).
He said that Document 15 of Exhibit 63 indicated that a "winds" message
would be "a break of diplomatic relations;" the Dutch translation said it would
mean "war." It was interpreted by DONI as meaning war and a signal for
execution of Japanese war plans (page 748) . Two sources said it meant a break in
diplomatic relations; two said it meant war (page 748). The breaking of diplo-
matic relations and war were regarded by them, he eaid, as synonymous in
Japanese-United States relations (page 754).
508 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
He was certain that an immediate distri))ution was made on December 4th
of the "winds" message to CNO, DONI, Director of War Plans, Assistant CNO,
State Department, Wliite House, and War Department, and that Commander
Kramer could tell about this (page 749). This information was not passed to
CincPac, though McCullom wrote a long dispatch estimating the situation,
and including this information, which dispatch was not sent. This draft dispatch
had been given to Admiral Wilkinson, who wanted to sent it; Admiral Noyes
said it was an "insult to intelligence of CincPac" (page 749). Admiral Wilkinson
disagreed and went to the "front office" to try to get it released. He knew of no
copy of this draft message now in existence (page 750).
In another lengthy statement at the close of the examination Captain
SaflFord reviewed the McCollum dispatch and the "Winds" message as
follows:
"On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long
warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific
Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the 'Winds
Message', and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent.
Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with Admiral
Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral
Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p. m., Washington time, on December
4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, 'What do you think of the message?'
Admiral Noyes replied, 'I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the
Commander-in-Chief.' Admiral Wilkinson stated, 'I do not agree with you.
Admiral fommel is a v6ry busy man, with a lot of things on his mind, and
he may not see the picture as clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair
to the Commander-in-Chief that he be given this warning and I intend to
send it if I can get it released by the front office.' Admiral Wilkinson then
left and I left a few minutes later. At the time of the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor, I thought that this message of warning had been sent, and
did not realize until two years later, when I studied the Roberts report very
carefully, that McCollum's message had not been sent. In order to clarify
the above statement and my answer to a previous question, it is necessary to
explain what is meant by the 'Winds Message'. The 'Winds Message'
was a name given by Army and Navy personnel performing radio intelligence
duties to identify a plain-language Japanese news broadcast in which a
fictitious weather report gave warning of the intentions of the Japanese
Government with respect to war against the United States, Britain (including
the N. E. I.), and Russia. We received a tip-off from the British in Singapore
in late November, 1941, which was immediately forwarded to the Navy
Department by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, with an infor-
mation copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. We also received a
tip-off" from the Dutch in Java through the American Consul General and
through the Senior Military Observer. The Dutch tip-off" was handled in
routine fashion by the coding rooms of the State Department, War Depart-
ment, and Navy Department. The Director of Naval Intelligence requested
that special effort be made to monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the 'Winds
Message' when it should be sent, and this was done. From November 28
until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo broadcast schedules were monitored
by about 12 intercept stations, as follows: N. E. I. at Java; British at Singa-
pore; U. S. Army at Hawaii and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corrigedor,
Hawaii, Bremerton, and four or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard.
All Navy intercept stations in the continental United States were directed to
forward all Tokyo plain-language broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbridge
Island ran up bills of sixty dollars per day for this material alone. The
'Winds Message' was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3,
1941 (Washington time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time and
Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propaga-
tion was such that the 'Winds Message' was heard only on the East Coast of
the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations
that were listening for it. The other nations and other Navy C. I. Units,
not hearing the 'Winds Message' themselves and not receiving any word
from the Navy Department, naturally presumed that the 'Winds Message'
had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese Government was still deferring
the initiation of hostilities. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the
British at Singapore, the Dutch at Java, and the Americans at Manila were
just as surprised and astonished as the Pacific Fleet and Army posts in
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 509
Hawaii. It is apparent that the War Department, like the Navy Department,
failed to send out information that the 'Winds Message' had been sent by
Tokyo. The 'Winds Message' was received in the Navy Department
during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M.
Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch. There was some question in
Brotherhood's mind as to what this message really meant because it came
in a different form from what had been anticipated. Brotherhood called in
Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who came down that evening and identified
that message as the 'Winds Message' we had been looking for. The signifi-
cant part of the 'Winds Message' read: 'HIGASHI NO KAZE AME.
NISHI NO KAZE HARE. The negative form of KITA NO KAZE KUMORI'.
The literal translation of these phrases is: 'EAST WIND RAIN. WEST
WIND CLEAR. NEITHER NORTH WIND NOR CLOUDY'. The mean-
ing of this message from the previously mentioned tip-off was: 'War with
the United States. War with Britain, including the N. E. I., etc. Peace
with Russia.' I first saw the 'Winds Message' about 8:00 a. m. on Thursday,
December 4, 1941. Lieutenant A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., came into my
office with a big smile on his face and piece of paper in his hand and said,
'Here it is!' as he handed me the 'Winds Message.' As I remember, it was
the original yellow teletype sheet with the significant 'Winds' underscored
and the meaning in Kramer's handwriting at the bottom. Smooth copies of
the translation were immediately prepared and distributed to Naval Intelli-
gence and to S. I. S. in the War Department. As the direct result of the
'Winds Message.' I prepared a total of five messages, which were released
between 1200 and 1600 that date, ordering the destruction of cryptographic
systems and secret and confidential papers by certain activities on the Asiatic
Station. As a direct result of the 'Winds Message', McCoUum drafted the
long warning message, previously referred to, which was disapproved by
higher authority, but which the Navy Department C. I. Unit believed had
been sent. Both Naval Intelligence and the Navy Department C. I. Unit
regarded the 'Winds Message' as definitely committing the Japanese
Government to war with the United States and Britain, whereas the informa-
tion of earlier dates had been merely statements of intent. We believed
that the Japanese would attack by Saturday (December 6), or by Sunday
(December 7) at the latest. The following officers recall having seen and
having read the 'Winds Message': Captain L. F. SafTord, U. S. N., Lieutenant
Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., Lieutenant Commander A. A.
Murray, U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant (jg) F. L. Freeman, U. S. N. The
following officers knew by hearsay that the 'Winds Message' had been inter-
cepted but did not actually see it themselves: Commander L. W. Parke,
U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R., Ensign Wilmer
Fox, U. S. N., and Major F. B. Rowlett, Signal Corps Reserve. The following
officers should have some recollection of the 'Winds Message': U. S. Navy — -
Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Captain A. H. McCollum, Colonel R. A. Boone
(U. S. Marine Corps), Commander G. W. Welker, Commander A. D. Kramer,
Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, and Ship's Clerk H. L. Bryant. U. S.
Army—Brigadier General T. J. Betts, Colonel O. K. Sadtler, Colonel R. S,
Bratton, Colonel Rex Minckler, Colonel Moses Pettigrew, Colonel Harold
Doud, and Lieutenant Colonel R. E. Shukraft. The 'Winds Message' was
last seen by myself about December 14, 1941, when the papers which had
been distributed in early December were assembled by Kramer, checked
by myself, and then turned over to the Director of Naval Communications
for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission, according to my
understanding at the time." (p. 360-361)
Because his section knew the Japanese, he said, they considered them tricky
and underhanded, and Japanese history showed that they began war without a
declaration or the breaking of diplomatic relations (page 755).
Comander Kramer said that on December 3rd or 4th, he was shown a "winds"
message by CY ivatch officer and took it immediately to Captain Saff ord, and Cap-
tain SafTord took it to Admiral Noyes. Kramer did not handle this as it was a
plain language message (page 956). The message received and shown him was
"Higashi No Kazeame," translated as "East Wind Rain." This meant strained
relations or a break in relations and possibly war with the United States. That
message was on teletype paper when he saw it, which indicated that it had come
through a USN Intercept Station. He has not seen this message since (page
957).
510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The different meanings he gave of the "winds" message are inherent in the
nature of the Japanese language. He could not definitely interpret a message
executing the code as meaning war (page 969) .
The "winds" message did not necessarily mean war (page 987).
He has seen the messages in Exhibit 65, but he did not handle these (page
957). There is no question that the "important" documents in Exhibit 63 were
in the folder delivered regularly to CNO (page 980). He was sure that the
"winds" message was sent to the office of CNO (page 981).
Admiral Turner said that to his knowledge none of the code words were re-
ceived prior to December 7, 1941. He changed his testimony and said that
Admiral Noyes had called him on the telephone — the date he could not recall;
he thought it was December 6th — and had said "the winds message has come in"
(page 1004). He understood that Admiral Noyes had told CNO. He assumed
that CincPac had the "winds" message. The "winds" message meant at least a
break in diplomatic relations and probably war (page 1005).
(3) Testimony concerning the "McCollum Dispatch"
It will be recalled that Captain Safford testified that McCollum had drafted a
long dispatch estimating the situation, and including information as to the
"winds" message, which he and Admiral Wilkinson desired to send to Admiral
Kimmel, and which Admiral Noyes opposed.
Admiral Noyes testified that he had discussed McCoUum's dispatch with
Admiral Wilkinson, and had thought that such estimates should come from
CNO (page 1039).
Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall a draft dispatch prepared by
Coradr. McCollum during this period which was not sent out (pages 154A, 780).
Nor did he recall any conversations about this time concerning the sending of
additional messages to Admiral Kimmel (page 165).
Admiral Turner said that he had known about the dispatch prepared by
McCollum and had discussed it with McCollum. He did not know what hap-
pened to the dispatch, or whether it was transmitted. He thought he initialled
it and gave it back to McCollum (page 998), but he "is not sure of it" (page
1004).
Commander Kramer heard, after December 7th, of a long draft dispatch which
had been prepared by McCollum. He did not know how it had been handled
(page 960).
Admirals IngersoU and Redman did not recall the draft dispatch to CincPac
which had been prepared by McCollum (pages 830, 1106).
XXVII. Infokmation Sent to Admiral Kimmel After the "War Warning"
As of this time there was available to CincPac information of the organization
of the Japanese fleets as follows:
(1) On 29 July 1941 the Office of Naval Intelligence issued a revised report,
which had been prepared by Commander McCollum, dealing with the organiza-
tion of the Japanese Navy. This report stated that as a result of information
which had been received, it was possible to give a much more complete picture of
the organization of the Japanese Navy. It stated that the Japanese naval forces
afloat were organized into two main commands — the Combined Fleet and the
Japanese Naval Forces in China. The Combined Fleet included:
(a) First Fleet, or Battle Force.
(b) Second Fleet, or Scouting Force.
(c) Third Fleet, or Blockade and Shipping Control Force.
(d) Fourth Fleet, or Mandated Islands Defensive Force.
(e) Submarine Force {also called the Sixth Fleet).
The Combined Fleet and First Fleet, under the command of Admiral Yama-
moto, consisted of various BatDivs, a CruDiv, three CarDivs and two destroyer
squadrons. BatDiv 3 (KONGO, HIYEI, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA) was
included. The carrier divisions were CarDiv 3 (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU);
CarDiv 5 {RYU JO, HOSHO); and CarDiv 7 {CHITOSE, CHIYODA,
MIZUHO).
The Second Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Koga, included various
cruiser divisions, two carrier divisions and txoo destroyer squadrons. CruDiv
8 {CHIKUMA and TONE) was included. The carrier divisions were: CarDiv
1 {AKAGI and KAGA); and CarDiv 2 (SORYU and HI RYU).
The Third Fleet included CarDiv 6 (NOTORO and KAMI K AW A MARU)
and various minelayer and minesweeper divisions, a base force, and sub-chaser
squadrons.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 511
The composition of the Fourth Fleet or Mandates Fleet, and of the Submarine
Fleet, and of the Japanese Naval Forces in China was also given (Hew. Exhibit
81; Hew. page 613).
{2) On 27 November 1941 (when the "war warning" was received) the Com-
mander. in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, distributed Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin
Number 4-^-41 (Exhibit 21). This bulletin dealt with the organization of the
Japanese Navj/ and with Japanese forces and installations in the Mandated
Islands. It was a revision of the ONI Bulletin above summarized and replaced
that bulletin on the subject of the Japanese Fleet. This stated:
"The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet
commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and sea-
plane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in
connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has
resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as shown
below:
Major fleet commands
"I. Combined Fleet
1. First Fleet {Battle Force) S Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, t Desrons
2. Second Fleet (Scouting Force) 4 Crudivs, 2 Desrons, etc.
5. Third Fleet (Blockade & Transport Force) Small Craft.
4. Fourth Fleet (Mandate Defense Force) 1 Desron, 1 Subron and many
small units.
6. Fifth Fleet
6. Sixth Fleet (Submarine Fleet) 6 Subrons
7. Carrier Fleet (Aircraft Carriers) 6 Cardivs
8. Combined Air Force (Seaplane tenders, etc.) 4 Airrons, & shore based
planes.
"II. Japanese Naval Forces in (Staff Hdqrtrs.) 1 PG and 3 DD's
China.
1. First China Exped. Fleet (Central China) Gunboats
£. Second China Exped. Fleet (SotUh China) 1 CA, 1 CL and small craft
g. Third China Exped. Fleet (North China) Torpedo Boats, etc.
4. Southern Exped. Fleet (Saigon) 1 CL, transports and mine
craft.
"The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever
before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line
between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The base
forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly increased
the strength of the Navy, which is on full war-time footing."
The Combined Fleet and First Fleet as listed in this bulletin included three
BatDivs, among which was BatDiv 3 (HIYEI, KONGO, KIRISHIMA and
HARUNA — as to the latter it was stated that it had been inactive during 1941 and
was probably undergoing major repairs). Also included was a cruiser division
and two destroyer squadrons.
The Second Fleet included four CruDivs and two destroyer squadrons. One of
the CruDivs was CruDiv 8 {TONE, CHIKUMA).
The composition of the Third, Fourth, and Sixth (Submarine) Fleets was given
in some detail in this bulletin. As to a Fifth Fleet, it stated, "The composition
of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown. The flagship has been reported at
Maizuru." {Exhibit 21; p. 185.)
Admiral McMorris stated that he did not know whether Washington kept
CincPac fully informed but, he said, the information which was received was taken
at its face value (page 899) .
The "war warning," it will be recalled, had been sent to Admiral Kimmel on
November 27th. On November 28th, the Army dispatch had been repeated to
Admiral Kimmel, advising, among other things, that Japanese future action was
unpredictable but that hostile action was possible at any moment. Also on
November 28th, there had been sent to Admiral Kimmel a copy of CincAF's
dispatch advising of the "winds code" to be used if diplomatic relations were on
the verge of being severed. And, on the same daj% he had been in communication
with OPNAV concerning his plan for the reinforcement of Midway and Wake,
and, in that connection there had been mention made of the shortage of anti-
aircraft guns.
On November 30th, Admiral Kimmel sent a dispatch (Exhibit 77) urgently
recommending the shipment of 37 mm. anti-aircraft guns and ammunition for
familiarization and training.
On November 30, 1941, OPNAV sent a dispatch to CincAF for action and to
CincPac for information (Exhibit 76), which advised in part:
512 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"Indications that Japan about to attack points on KRA by overseas expedition
X. Disire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days commenc-
ing upon receipt of this dispatch X.
A second similar dispatch was also sent on the same day (Exhibit 77) requesting
a daily report from CincAF, even if there were no contacts and the information
were all negative.
Exhibit 10 is a dispatch of November 30 from CNO to CinCAF, information
CincPac.
Also on November 30th Admiral McMorris prepared, at the direction of
Admiral Kimmel, a memorandum setting forth the steps w^hich he recommended
to be taken in the event of American-Japanese war within the ensuing twenty-
four hours (Exhibit 69 A). This was revised on December 5th and set forth the
steps to be taken in the event of war within forty-eight hours (Exhibit 69B).
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that during the first week of December, 1941,
he, and he was sure Admiral Kimmel, had in mind constantly the "war warning,"
the fact that the Japaese forces were, according to Intelligence, on the move, the
fact that the Japanese were destroying codes, and that the Japanese in the past
had attacked without declaration of war (p. 328) .
He stated further that during that time he was also considering the tasks set
forth in Phase I A of the Pacific Fleet Plan, and that daily or on alternate days
he furnished Admiral Kimmel with an informal memorandum as to the actiori
that should be taken by important elements of the Fleet if war were initiated
within twenty-four hours. He stated that typical of such memoranda were
Naval Court of Inquiry Exhibits 69 A and 69B, which were dated 30 November
and 5 December 1941, respectively (p. 328-329).
With reference to the Phase I A task of maintaining air patrols against enemy
forces in the approaches to Oahu and the fact that no provision was made for
carrying out that task. Vice Admiral McMorris testified that submarines were
considered to be the greatest element of danger. He said that anti-submarine
patrols had been placed in effect {p. 329).
At about this time, it will be recalled. Admiral Kimmel also received information
concerning the estimated position of the Japanese Fleet. As Captain Layton
expressed it:
Captain Layton testified that in accordance with the request of Admiral Kim-
mel, he prepared a memorandum for the Admiral, dealing with the location of
the Japanese Fleet. This was prepared, according to Layton, on the evening of
December 1st and was submitted by him to Admiral Kimmel on 2 December
1941. The original memorandum bears certain notations in red pencil which,
Layton testified, were inserted by him on December 2nd prior to submission of
the memorandum to Admiral Kimmel and which refiected the later information
received after preparation of the memorandum on the night of December lst-2nd.
It also bears certain lead pencil notations which Layton identified as the hand-
writing of Admiral Kimmel. This memorandum, according to Layton, sum-
marized his best estimate of the location of the Japanese Fleet, based on all
information available to him and to Admiral Kimmel up to and including 1
December 1941-
Layton' s estimate stated that from the best available information, units of the
Orange {Japanese) fleet were "thought" to be located as listed in the memorandum.
In the Kure-Sasebo area he listed the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet
and Commander in Chief, First Fleet, with six battleships, "{?)" and other units.
He listed the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, at Nagara initially and then
corrected it in red to indicate that it was at Takao. Also in the Kure-Sasebo area
he located Cruiser Division 8.
In the Shanghai area, Layton's estimate located the Commander in Chief,
China Fleet, the Shanghai Base Force, and an air group.
In the Bako-Takao area, Layton listed Third Fleet submarine squadrons and
various destroyers and the Commander of the Combined Air Force, with numerous
air groups, and the KASUGA MARU {thought to be a converted carrier with 36
planes): He estimated that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, had been en
route to Takao {this he corrected in red pencil to indicate that he teas at Takao)
with a cruiser division, destroyers, and with "Csrdiv 4 — tivo CV and four DD;
Cardiv 3— two CV and 3 DD; Batdiv 3 less HARUNA—S BB {maybe 2 BB)"
and, he added in red pencil, certain cruisers and Destroyer Division 2.
In the Hainan-Canton area, Layton located the Commander in Chief of the
South China Fleet and various cruisers and destroyers and transports. In the
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 513
French Indo-China Area, he located the Commander in Chief of an Expedi-
tionary Fleet with various ships, including 21 transports and some base forces,
among others. In the Mandates area, he located at Palao an air group and base
force; at Truk, the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet with cruisers and
destroyers, and a base force and an air group. At Saipan he located the Com-
mander in Chief of the Submarine Force with possibly submarines and various
air groups and a base force. In the Marshalls area, he located various air groups
and the carrier "KORYU? plus plane guards," and several submarine squadrons
and base force (Hew. Es. 23).
Layton's viemorandmti did not make any reference to the location of Carrier Di-
visions 1 and 2 of the Japanese Fleet {which in fact were en route to attack Pearl
Harbor). According to Layton, on 2 December 1941, during his conference with
Admiral Kimmel, the Admiral noticed and commented on the absence of informa-
tion concerning Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. In his testimony, he
described the conversation on this point as follows:
"Mr. SONNETT: Will you state the substance of what he said and what you
said, as best you recall it?
"Captain LAYTON: As best I recall it. Admiral Kimmel said, 'What!
You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 areV and I
replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know
where they are. The rest of those units, I feel pretty confident of their location.'
Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat
a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you
mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't
know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted
before now,' or words to that effect. ... (P. 212-218)
"Mr. SONNETT: Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me,
arising out of your description of Admiral KimmeVs twinkle in his eye when
he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the
absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious jocular one?
"Captain LAYTON: His question was absolutely serious, but when he said,
'Where are Cardive 1 and 2V and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I
must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we
haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished
operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle
in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?
or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete
ignorance as to their exact location.
"Mr. SONNETT: He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information
about those ^carriers?
"Captain LAY TO N^: This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do
do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do knoiv that he made such a statement to
me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so
indicated their location" (P. 255-S ~ '
On December 1, 1941, he submitted to Admiral Kimmel, on request, his esti-
mate of the locations of all major units of the Japanese Navy (page 913). After
this was typed, more recent information caused it to be changed, in red; it
showed available in the Empire — 4 aircraft carriers, 6 battleships, with a question
mark after them, 4 heavy cruisers, with a question mark after them, and 12
destroyers — available for use in the home area. This was a portion of the entire
Japanese Navy, the majority of which was shown as dispsed to the south and
implicated in the impending moves, from their sources of information. The
witness referred to his translation of a book ("a novel published in Tokj'o to
inflame public opinion toward larger armament money" — page 911), which stated
that it would be very dangerous for Japan to launch a surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor using carriers, battleships, and cruisers; with Japan staking its existence
on the move to the south it could not afford to gamble its defenses by sending
some of this force on a raid which would denude the Empire of vessels. That was
generally his reasoning (page 913).
Captain Layton further testified that there were delivered to him, for presenta-
tion to Admiral Kimmel, daily communication intelligence summaries, during
the period of time subsequent to the sending and receipt of the dispatches of 26
November. {Page 192). Captain Layton identified such summaries for the
period 14 October to 14 December 1941, {Exhibit 22), and pointed out that the
initials appearing in the lower right hand corner of these documents reading
HEK, appeared on the orioinal and were the initials of Admiral Kimmel (Page
193-194).
79716— 16— Ex. 149, vol. 1 34
514 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Layton stated further that on certain of the originals of the commu-
nication intelligence summaries there appeared underscoring of certain portions,
and that certain of the underscores were performed by Admiral Kiminel while
certain other marks appearing on the summaries, including marks as to direction
finder hearings and positions of ships were made by he, himself {Captain Layton).
(Page 193).
Captain Layion summarized and made reference in his testimony to what he
considered to be the significant parts of the Communications Intelligence Sum-
maries dated from 27 November to 6 December 1941, and of the dispatches re-
ceived and sent during the same period, (Pages 194, ^37, 244, ^45), including
his 1 December 1941 estimate as to the location of the Japanese Fleet Units,
(pages 244, 245, 252, 253), and to the comments made on 2 December 1941 by
Admiral Kimmel when, in discussing the 1 December 1941 Layton estimate,
Admiral Kimmel noted and commented on the absence of the information con-
cerning the location of two Japanese carrier divisions. (Pages 212, 213, 255,
256). This intelligence, as summarized by him, particularly concerning the
locations of Japanese carriers, but not entirely confined to them, was briefly, as
follows:
A. 27 November 1941:
(a) (1) The Communication Intelligence Summary Information of 27 No-
vember, delivered 28 November, was: Some tactical traffic from carriers. Four
enciphered addressees were noted, indicating a new command and a newly formed
unit became active in an operational or maneuverable stage and not in an ad-
ministrative or routine role. No further information on the presence of Carrier
Division Five in the Mandates; it was stated that carriers were still located in
home waters. The commander of the submarine forces was located in the
Chichijima area and this was of significance. (Page 194-196).
(2) The term, "home waters" as used in the summary, with reference to the
location of the carriers, meant Japanese home waters, that is, the drill grounds of
the Inland Sea and the approaches to Kyushu, the coastal offshore area, the Isei
Bay area, and, in general, the waters surrounding Honshxi, Shikoku, and
Kyushu. The term, "home waters'" did not include Etorofu, since places in
northern Japan, including Hokkaido and the Kuriles, were referred to as the
high north area. The area east of Japan that would be included in the term,
"home waters", woxdd embrace perhaps 40 to 60 miles or more; it would be about
the same distance that the United States Fleet operations would take us west of
San Clemente, San Pedro or San Diego. The definition of the term, "home
waters" , as indicated above, was understood by Admiral Kimmel. (Page 198).
(b) (1) The Naval Attache at Shanghai in dispatch nmnber 270855, reported
sightings between Hong Kong and Shanghai, of many transports that were
proceeding south, and that military wharves at Shanghai were abnormally
empty. (Page 196).
(2) OpNav dispatch to CinCPac and CinCAF, information CinCLant,
number 272337, was received. This was the war warning message. It directed
an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks as-
signed in WPL-46. (Page 196-197).
B. 28 November 1941:
(a) (1) In the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 28
November, delivered 29 November, it was noted that Tokyo originators were
sending a considerably high precedence traffic to the Commander-in-Chief,
Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. It was further noted that
no movements of Combined Fleet Units were detected. Communications noted
between the Army Commander on Formosa and the Commander, Amphibious
Force, were considered a sure sign of amphibious operations. No submarine
traffic was observed. (Page 198-200).
(b) (1) The following dispatch traffic occurred:
a. Coml4 to OpNav, information CinCAF, stating the British consul advised
the Japanese would attack Krakow Isthmus on 1 December without an ultimatum.
(Page 200-201).
b. CinCAF to OpNav, CinCPac, Coml4, Coml6, establishing the winds code
in two variations, one from Tokyo to the diplomatic net, the other from Japanese
language foreign broadcasts. (Page 201).
c. Coml6 to CinCAF, OpNav, CinCPac and Coml4, advising that an unidenti-
fied ship had relieved the KASHII and was in the Camranh Bay-Saigon area.
(Page 201).
d. OpNav to CinCAF, information CinCPac, Coml6 and Coml4, dispatch
number 281633, advising of information received from the State Department of
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 515
various reports from sources in Asia concerning the movement of Japanese forces
southward. (Page 201-202) .
C. 29 November 1941:
(a) (1) In the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 29
November, delivered SO November, it teas noted that eleven messages from Tokyo
intelligence, and four long 7nessages from Tokyo radio intelligence were sent to
major commanders. The Jaluit radio dirction finder station included the Com-
mander, Submarines as an information addressee, which indicated that he was in
the approaches to, or about to enter the Mandated Islands, likely the Marshalls.
It was noted that there was tinder the immediate command of the Commander-
in-Chief, Second Fleet, who was in charge of the south invasion forces. Carrier
Division 3, along with 2 cruiser divisions, 2 destroyer squadrons, 2 submarine
squadrons, the Third Fleet or Amphibious Forces, and the French- 1 ndo-China
Forces. The Commander of the Submarine Forces had his traffic routed through
Saipan, though on the previous day, it had been routed through Chichijima,
indicating a southerly or southeastern movement. (Page 202-204).
(2) The only reference to carriers appearing in the Communications Intelli-
gence Summary of this date was that CarDiv 3 was tinder the immediate command
of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet; and there was no other information on
that date relating to Japanese carriers. (Page 205-206).
(3) It was believed that CarDiv 3 was composed of the RYU JO and Hosho.
(Page 205).
(b) (1) The Communications Intelligence Unit at Cavite sent a dispatch
noting general radio intelligence obtained by it on the previous two days. It
referred, in dispatch number 261331, to new Japanese ship arrivals in the Takao
area. (Page 204).
(2) There was received OpNav dispatch number 290110, addressed to Com-
mander Northern Pacific Naval Frontier, Commander South Pacific Naval
Frontier, information CinCPac and Commander Panama Naval Coastal
Frontier, advising that the Army had sent a war warning dispatch to the Western
Defense Command, and quoting that dispatch, which advised of the termination
of the negotiations with the Japanese, stated hostile action possible at any moment,
directed the undertaking of reconnaissance and preparations to carry out WPL-A6.
(Page 204-205).
D. SO November 1941:
(a) (1) In the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 30
November, delivered 1 December, it was noted that general radio traffic was less
than usual, and that the only tactical circuit was between the AKAGI and several
MARU's. The significance of the term, "tactical circuit" is that the vessel itself,
that is, the AKAGI, was using its own radio to call up and ivork directly the other
vessels rather than work them through shore stations via the broadcast method
which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The working of
the AKAGI with the Mar us, indicated that she was making arrangements for
fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address a Maru.
(Page 206).
(2) It was noted further that the battleships KONGO and HIYEI were placed
as units in the CinC, Second's task force. Captain Layton explained that while
it was a mistake to place the HI YEI as a member of the second fleet's task force,
as it is now known that the HI YEI was one of the battleships that attacked Pearl
Harbor, and that it was, on 30 November 1941, on the high seas enroute to Pearl
Harbor. This mistake was an error in fact but not an error in substance and
arose from a bad identification of a ship similar to the HIYEI, that is, the
HARUNA, which, in fact, did take part in the second expedition under the
CinC, Second Fleet. (Page 207-208).
(3) It was further noted that there was a strong impression that the CinC,
Third Fleet was on its way, and that there was a continued association of the
Commander, Submarine Forces with Jaluit, which, along with his known progress
through the Chichijima area to the Sapian zone, made his destination obviously
the Marshalls. Consequently, the communication intelligence summary pointed
out that this bore out Coml4's previous contention that there was a submarine
concentration in the Marshalls, not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines, but
also a good portion of the submarines of the Submarine Force. (Page 208).
(4) It was also noted that there was in the Marshalls, a unit of plane guard
destroyers, indicating the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, al-
though that fact was not confirmed. (Page 209).
516 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(5) There were other indicalions of air-submarine operations from the Mar-
shalls, following from the fact that Naval Air Squadron 24 plus the Yokohama
Naval Air Corps were located there. (Page 208-209).
(6) The Communication Intelligence Siimmary of this date was initialed by
Admiral (then Captain) McMorris, War Plans Officer. {Page 209).
(6) {1) CinCPac received from ComlG a dispatch addressed to OpNav,
information CinCAF, CinCPac and Coml4, to the effect that a reassignment
of all Japanese naval calls had occurred at midnight, that they followed the same
garble pattern as before, and that the shore addressees' call signs had not been
changed. (Page 210).
(2) OpNav dispatch number 301709, addressed to CinCAF, information
CinCPac, was received. It requested CinCAF to report daily as to whether any
contacts were made in the air search being conducted between Manila and Camranh
Bay, and that such reports should be made even though the results were negative.
This search was being made by CinCAF in pursuant of the directive by OpNav
in its dispatch number 300419. (Page 210).
E. 1 December 1941:
(a) (1) In the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 1 Decem-
ber, delivered 2 December, it was confirmed that all service radio calls of the
Japanese naval forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 1 December, minus
nine time. (Page 213).
(2) This change in service calls was of particular significance since it was
the Japanese custom ordinarily not to change their radio calls until after the same
had been in use for a period of six months or more. The last change in calls
had occurred on 1 November 1941, so that the discontinued service calls had been
used for only one month. This indicated a progressive step toward preparing
for active operations on a large scale. (P. 213).
(3) Captain Layton testified that the underlining in red on the original of the
communication intelligence summary of the words that the change in calls
indicated a progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale
was, to the best of his recollection, made by Admiral Kimmel. (Page 213-214)-
(4) It was further noted in the communication intelligence summary that the
Japanese were adopting more and more security provisions in handling their
radio traffic. (Page 213-214).
(5) No change was noted as to the location of the Submarine Force, which was
believed to be eastward of the line between Yokosuka-Chichijima-Saipan, and
under "carriers", it was stated that there was no change. This, Capt. Layton
explained, meant that there was no change in the previous report as to the location
of carriers. The last report as to carriers, he stated, tvas that they were in the
Empire area with the exception of Car-Div 3, and with the further exception that
there was possibly 1 carrier in the Mandates. (Page 215).
(6) The Communications Intelligence Summary noted further that there was
nothing to report concerning the Fifth Fleet. (Page 215).
(7) Captain Layton explained that the Fifth Fleet was on organization of
which little or nothing was known but there that were indications in the past that
it was a force assembled for operations in the Northern ivaters. (Page 216).
(b) The following dispatches were handled:
(1) OpNav to CinCAF and ComlG, information CinCPac and Coml4,
referring to an intrigue in Thailand, intended to draw the British and Japanese
into war over that country. (Page 217).
(2) Com 16 to CinCAF, information CinCPac, Coml4 and OpNav, advising
that Japanese station JVJ in closing at 1700 hours, presumably minus nine time,
stated that all listeners should be sure to tune in at 0700 tomorrow morning since
there may be important news. Coml6 suggested several radio frequencies that
might be used. (Page 217).
(3) ComlG advised of the results of its radio intelligence activity which included
the obtaining of information of Jap ship arrivals in the Takao area, which were
under the command of the CinC, Third Fleet, and that the AT AGO had shifted
from the Kure to the Sasebo communication zone and was apparently enroute to
South China waters. (Page 217-218).
It also advised that there was an impression that the broadcast scheduled by the
Japanese radio station JVJ, indicated above, would be an execute winds code
message. Captain Layton testified that as a result of receiving this dispatch, the
monitors were put on a double alert but nothing came of it. (Page 218).
F. 2 December 1941:
(a) (1) On this day there was presented by Captain (then Lieutenant
Commander) Layton to Admiral Kimmel, the 1 December 1941 Layton estimate
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 517
of the location of the Japanese Fleet Lnit. Admiral Kimmel directed Layton
to prepare the estimate late on the afternoon of Sunday, SO November 1941,
directing that it he prepared as of 1 December. {Page 210).
{2) The memorandum was prepared by Layton and dated 1 December, and,
afterwards, Layton obtained certain substantiating and additional information
from the officer who prepared the daily communication intelligence summaries.
When the 1 Decernber estimate was shown by Layton to Admiral Kimmel, the
Admiral noted that it contained a typographical error on page 4, which he cor-
rected in his handwriting. (The error consis'ed of a reference to "20 CL",
which should have read, and. was corrected by Admiral Kimmel to read "2 OCL".
The 1 December Layton estimate is exhibit 23. {Page 211).
{3) Admiral Kimmel discused this estimate with Layton and noted that it
did not contain any information as to the locations of the Japanese Carrier
Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers, though it did list Carrier Divisions
3 and 4, and the KASUGA MARU, 1 XCV, as being located in the Bako-
Takao area, and the KORYU, 1 CV, in the Marshalls. It was in connection
with the absence of reliable information on which to base an estimate as to the
locations of CarDivs 1 and 2 that Admiral Kijnmel addressed to Layton the
question whether they might be rounding Diamond Head at that moment or words
to that effect, to which Layton replied that he hoped that in such case they would
be sighted before now. {Page 211-212-213).
{b) {1) It ivas noted in the Communication Intelligence Summary of 2 December,
delivered 3 December, that the Japanese were having difficulty in routing their
radio traffic, which arose from their change tn call signs, which was probably
due to the unfamiliarity of the operators with the new calls and with the location
of the units affected. The summary noted that Coml6 reported the Second and
Third Fleets to be in the Takao area, but the Communication Intelligence Unit
in Ilaioaii noted that there was one indication that the two fleets were not close
to Takao and it expressed a belief that a large fleet, made up of First, Second
Third Fleet Units, had left Empire waters and was proceeding on a course that
was not close to Takao. {Page 218).
{2) The First Fleet appeared to remain relatively quiet. The association of
the Submarine Force with the Mandates Fleet continued. Under "carriers"
it was stated, "almost a complete blank on information of the carriers today."
It was stated further that though over 200 service calls had been partially identi-
fied since the 1st of December, yet not one carrier call had been recovered since
that date, causing it to be evident that carrier traffic was at a low ebb. {Page 219).
{3) Captain Layton stated that Admiral Kimmel read the statement in the
Communication Intelligence Summary with reference to carriers, and the failure
to identify carrier call signs, as well as the information that carrier traffic was
at a low ebb. {Page 220).
{4) Captain Layton explained the difference between the reference in the
Communication Intelligence Summary that there was almost a complete blank
of information on the carriers, and the reference in this summary in connection
with the Second Fleet that a lack of neiv identification contributed to the belief that
a large part of the Second Fleet was underway in company, as follows:
a. There was no radio silence insofar as the Second Fleet was concerned.
b. The Second Fleet was using its radio and was on the air on known frequen-
cies;
c. That Fleet was handling a normal pattern of traffic; there was a normal
number of calls in its circtiits though a number of them were not identified.
The lack of identification was due to the change in call signs. However, the
normal amount of the traffic, associated with the lack of identification, caused it
to be believed that the Second Fleet was at sea. However, with reference to car-
riers, there was a complete blank of information, meaning that the carrier circuits
were definitely not up to normal use. This would have meant either that the car-
riers were under radio silence wherever located or operating, or else that they were
operating so close to home that they were using a broadcast frequency which could
not be heard far away. {Page 220-225) .
{5) Captain Layton in his testimony, however, insisted that the statement in
the Communication Intelligence Summary that carrier traffic was at a low ebb
did not signify anything unusual to him at that time, {page 225), since it was
sometiynes the custom of the Japanese to take their carriers into the Inland Sea
area where they would not be heard from for a considerable period of time. {Page
225-226).
{6) He stated that he could not recall whether he had any discussions with
Admiral Kimmel concerning the lack of carrier traffic. {Page 226).
518 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(c) (/) Coml6 advised OpNav, CinCPac, CinCAF and Coml4 that the
CinC, Second and Third Fleets were in the Takao area, and stated further that
the Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok has requested permission to destroy all but
a limited number of codes. (Page 226).
(2) CinCAF dispatch number 020S45 to OpNav, Information CinCPac
advised that a patrol plane had spotted nine submarines on a southerly course.
{Page 226).
(3) CinCAF dispatch number 020730 to OpNav, information CinCPac,
reported further sightings of Japanese submarines and some ships in Comranh
Bay. (Page 226-227) .
(4) Assistant Naval Attache in Shanghai to OpNav, information CinCPac,
advised of Japanese troop movements in the vicinity of Shanghai. {Page 227) .
G. 8 December 1941:
{a) {1) It was noted in the Communication Intelligence Summary informa
tion of 3 December, delivered 4 December, that though the volume of traffic was
normal, the state of call recovery did not permit much detailed information to be
obtained. It was noted that there was an extensive use of alternate calls by major
commands which slowed up identification. It was stated "no information on
Japanese submarines or carriers." {Page 227—228).
(b) {1) On this day, OpNav addressed a dispatch to CinCAF and Coml6,
information CinCPac and Coml4 that Tokyo had ordered its embassies to de-
stroy its purple machine. {Page 228). Captain Layton obtained information
as to what the purple machine was and at Admiral KimmeVs request, advised
him of that information. {Page 228-229) . Admiral Kimmel was also advised
that the Japanese consul in Hawaii was burning papers. {Page 229) .
{2) OpNav in dispatch number 031850 advised that Japanese diplomatic and
consular posts were destroying their codes and important papers. {Page 230).
{3) The Naval Attache in Singapore in dispatch number 020335 stated that
the Cine, China Fleet had restricted the movement of Allied ships in China waters.
{Page 230).
H. 4 December 1941:
(a) {1) It was noted in the Communication Intelligence Summary information
of 4 December, delivered 5 December, that an important moje had been inade by
the Takao radio in inaugurating a Fleet broadcast using the same prefix indicator
that was used by the Tokyo radio, showing that Takao had now assumed the
position of handling major fieet traffic on high speed circuits. Many urgent
messages were also noted, being addressed by Tokyo to major commanders and
among these was a seven part Tokyo intelligence dispatch. The outstanding item
of the day was the lack of messages originating from the CinC, Second and Third
Fleets, who previously had been very talkative and now very quiet. {Page 230—
231).
{2) There was no traffic which enabled any check to be made on the presence of
the Fourth Fleet Units in the Marshalls. The impression obtained from the fact
that the previously talkative commanders were silent, though still prominent as
addressees, especially of intelligence dispatches, was that they were at sea and
maintaining radio silence though still receiving. Captain Layton explained
that as of that time the Japanese had not learned how to use the American trick of
putting out messages without indicating who was the originator. {Page 232).
{b) {1) The dispatches handled on this day referred to Japanese troop and ship
movements of China and Indo-China, and other general information, obtained
from the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, dispatch numbers 020704, and
020702, and Naval Attache, Tokyo, dispatch number 030630. {Page 232-233).
I. 5 December 1941:
(a) {1) The Communication Intelligence Summary of 5 December, delivered
6 December, noted that the traffic volume was extremely heavy and that all circuits
were overloaded. There were many messages of high precedence which appeared
to cause a jammed condition on all circuits. Neither the CinC, Third or Second
Fleets originated any traffic although they were still frequently addressed, and it is
believed that they were undoubtedly in the Takao area or further south. {Page
233-234).
{2) It was noted that a number of Marus had addressed the CinC, Third Fleet,
and there was traffic strengthening the impression that the CinC, Fourth Fleet,
was in the Marshalls. There was no traffic from the Commanders of the Carrier
or Submarine Forces. {Page 233-235).
J. 6 December 1941:
(a) {1) The Communication Intelligence Summary of 6 December was not
delivered until after the attack on 7 December. {Page 235).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 519
(b) (1) Certain dispatches were also received on the 7th, which Captain
Layton thought were received after the attack. (Page 235-237).
The information sent to Admiral Kimmel.
{ii) Vice Admiral McMorris testified that in advising Admiral Kimmel
during the critical period of 1941, he considered the negative as well as the positive
information available concerning the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers, and
that such negative information included the Intelligence that there was no in-
formation as to the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers (page 330).
during this period, as previously noted, included the fortnightly summary of
current national situations, prepared by ONI and issued on December 1, 1941
(Exhibit 57). In addition to the military and naval information furnished, this
stated, concerning the Japanese diplomatic situation, that unless the Japanese
requested a continuance of the conversations, the Japanese-American negotia-
tions would have virtually broken down ; the Japanese government and press were
proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the work of building
the greater East Asia sphere; the press was also criticising Thailand severely;
strong indications pointed to an early Japanese advance against Thailand; and,
relations between Japan and Russia remained strained.
On December 2, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark (Exhibit 50)
and advised that Admiral Halsey's advance in the ENTERPRISE to Wake had
been covered by two patrol squadrons operating from Johnston, Midway, and
Wake, and that upon completion of the movement. Admiral Kimmel planned to
return one squadron to Pearl Harbor and leave the other at Midway and awaiting
developments. The letter discussed the difficulty of supply and defense of the out-
lying islands. The letter also stated that consideration was being given to the
dispatches concerning the use of Army personnel in outlying islands; and, that
Admiral Kimmel had frequently called Admiral Stark's attention to the inade-
quacy of Army anti-aircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor area, with particular
reference to the shortage of anti-aircraft guns. So far, he said, very little had
been done to improve this situation. It was pointed out that because of the
Army's lack of equipment, Admiral Kimmel was unable to understand the dis-
patches directing that the Army be utilized in the defense of the outlying islands.
A postscript to this letter stated, "You will note that I have issued orders to
the Pacific Fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating
area." It will be recalled that Admiral Stark testified that he took no exception
to this (page 153).
In connection with the Army's development of airfields in Fiji and New Cale-
donia, Admiral Kimmel stated in a further postscript to his letter that the Navy
was bound to be involved in the protection of shipping and of the fields. He said,
"I fear we may become so much concerned with defensive roles, that we may
become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion of effort for defense
will leave us an inadequate force with which to take the offensive."
Also on December 2nd, Admiral Kimmel sent an official letter to the Chief of
Naval Operations concerning the defense of outlying islands and referring, among
other things, to the November 28th dispatches in this connection. After some
discussion, this letter concluded that Marine armament could be withdrawn from
outlying islands to a very limited extent; that, if the Marines were replaced, the
personnel relieved, lacking equipment, would be valueless as a defense battalion;
that replacing the Marines would very materially weaken the defense because of
less proficient personnel; and, that considering all aspects. Marine planes were
more valuable in the Advance Bases than Army pursuit planes.
It was also stated that the presence of Army forces on outlying bases would
inevitably bring up the question of command; that Midway, Wake, Johnston and
Palmyra were Navy bases; that unity of command would be necessary; and, that
command would have to be vested in the Navy's commanding officer at each
station.
This letter also said that Admiral Kimmel had conferred with General Short
on the matter and that arrangements were in progress looking toward the organi-
zation of three Army defense battalions, the training of such units with available
equipment, the obtaining by the Army of requisite equipment, the Army organi-
zation of three pursuit plane squadrons to be kept in expeditionary status, and
bringing said units to a satisfactory state of readiness and keeping them available
to support or replace Marines or for use on other islands not manned by Marines.
Admiral Kimmel stated also that the major point was that the Advanced
Bases were "going concerns;" that "the international situation is such that active
520 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
defense against hostile forces may be required on extremely short notice;" and,
that any radical change in the defense arrangements should be made only if there
were compelling necessity therefor.
In his letter Admiral Kimmel also expressed "growing concern" over the in-
crease in the Army and Navy stations that might require support from the Fleet;
that such involvement "may seriously interfere with offensive operations of the
Fleet;" that this should be curtailed; and, that the Fleet in a series of defensive
positions in the Central and South Pacific could not contribute very much toward
victory over a power thousands of miles to the westward.
Admiral Kimmel's letter closed with various recommendations consistent with
the views expressed in his letter.
Admiral Smith, during recross examination by Admiral Stark, said that Admiral
Kimmel had regularly reported to Admiral Stark the action he took, but not after
the "war warning" message (page 552). On recross by Admiral Kimmel, he
stated that Exhibit 50, the December 2nd letter, did report what Admiral Kimmel
was doing. Admiral Stark's lawyer contended this was not a reply to that mes-
sage but to the earlier one about plane movements; the witness finally character-
ized the letter as a "routine weekly report" (pages 533-534). He remembered
no dispatch which reported the action taken by Admiral Kimmel after the "war
warning" (page 554), but said "probably there was" (page 555).
In addition to the December 2nd letter, it will be recalled. Admiral Kimmel
had sent a dispatch on November 28th, concerning the same subject.
On December 3, 1941, OPNAV sent two dispatches advising of Japanese in-
structions to destroy codes, as follows:
1. A dispatch from OPNAV to CincAF, ComSIXTEEN for action, and to
CinPac and ComFOURTEEN for information which advised that Tokyo
ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy Purple machine
and the Batavia machine already had been sent to Tokyo; Washington also had
been directed to destroy the Purple and all but one copy of other systems, and
all secret documents; also, that the British Admiralty had reported that the
Embassy at London had complied (Exhibit 66).
Captain SaflFord referred to OpNav secret dispatch 031855 which he said
he prepared on December 3, and to a similar dispatch released by Admiral
Wilkinson. He then said:
"Before drafting my message, I called Commander McCollum on the
telephone and asked him, 'Are you people in Naval Intelligence doing any-
thing to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet?' McCollum emphasized
both 'we's' • . . McCollum replied, 'We are doing everything we can to
get the news out to the Fleet.' In sending this information, I was overstep-
ping the bounds as established by approved war plans and joint agreement
between Naval Communications and Naval Intelligence, but I did it because
I thought McCollum had been unable to get his message released. OpNav
031855 was addressed to CinCAF and Com 16 for action, but was routed to
CinCPac and Com 14 for information. It was written in highly technical
language and only one officer present at Pearl Harbor, the late Lieutenant
H. M. Coleman, U. S. N., on CinCPac's Staff, could have explained its sig-
nificance.'' (p. 359-360)
Captain Safford said that the unit in the Fourteenth Naval District did not
have any material from which they could have gained this information
through their own eff'orts. (p. 360)
2. A dispatch from OPNAV to CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, Com-
SIXTEEN, for action:
"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent in-
structions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at
Hong Kong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington and London
to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important
and confidential and secret documents" (Exhibit 20)
Admiral Pye said that he saw the December 3 dispatch concerning the
destruction of codes and discussed it with the Commander in Chief, that it
seemed perfectly evident that such action could precede war by many days
and it did not indicate immediate action. They were unaware of the source
of this information and as it had appeared in the newspapers it probably did
not mean as much as it would have meant had they known the source.
Admiral Pye felt that at Oahu they were pretty much operating in the dark
so far as the international situation was concerned, (p. 157)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 521
Exhibit 11 is the December 3 dispatch by CNO to CinCAF, CinCPac and
others.
Concerning the code destruction messages, Admiral Turner said that it
was impossible for him to understand how anyone could believe that because
of the messages the war was coming in the Western Pacific and would not
involve Oahu. He pointed out that both Washington and Manila had been
included in the dispatch.
Admiral McMorris said that the December 3rd dispatch concerning codes
was the best indication, in his opinion, that the United States would be
involved in war with Japan. He did not recall Admiral Kimmel's view,
(p. 247)
Admiral Anderson said that he had not precise knowledge but he thought
that there had been a proper dissemination of information among the officers
of the higher command. He saw the Commander in Chief at least weekly.
Admiral Anderson did not think that he had seen nor had he been told about
the October 16 dispatch, (p. 392). Admiral Anderson could not recall the
November 24 dispatch or the November 30 dispatch to CinCAF with copy to
CinCPac for information. He did remember having seen the war warning
and believed that he had seen the December 3 dispatch.
As a matter of interest, it may be noted that a sentence appearing at the end
of this copy of the dispatch, which was released by T. S. Wilkinson, was stricken
out in pencil. That sentence read: "From foregoing infer that Orange plans
early action in Southeast Asia."
On December 4, 1941, OPNAV sent a dispatch (Exhibit 21) to NavStaGuam for
action, and to CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, and ComSIXTEEN for
information stating:
"Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified mat
matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retaining
minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with
CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN, and OpNav X Be prepared
to destroy instantly in eyent of emergency all classified matter you retain X
Report crypto channels retained"
On December 6, 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 22) bearing time-date stamp 061743
was sent by OPNAV to CincPac for action, and to CincAF for information.
This stated:
"In view of the international situatioji and the exposed position of our outlying
Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confi-
dential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency X Means
of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence
should of course be maintained until the last moment"
Commander Kramer drafted Exhibit 66, the December 3rd dispatch concerning
Japanese destruction of the "purple" machine. This was sent on the "Kopek"
Channel, which was a channel for technical traffic between the Navy Department,
Pearl Harbor and the Asiatic Station (page 971). It indicated, he said, a break
in diplomatic relations. Exhibit 20, sent out by OPNAV on the same day as
Exhibit 66, was the interpretive dispatch of Exhibit 66 (page 960).
Admiral Noyes said that Exhibit 21 (dispatch to Guam of December 4th,
directing the destruction of codes) was prepared by him and motivated by the
growing feeling that war in the Pacific was imminent (page 1031). It was released
by Admiral IngersoU.
Admiral Noyes said that Exhibit 22 (authorizing destruction of codes on out-
lying islands, dated December 6, 1941) was prepared by him and treated as pri-
ority dispatch, Respite the lack of priority shown on its face (pages 1040, 1042).
Admiral Stark testified that the code destruction message was sent to Guam
because he felt that Guam was in the most danger; he did not similarly advise
ComFOURTEEN because he did not think Hawaii was in as much danger as
was Guam (page 69) . At this time, Admiral Stark testified, he believed that war
was imminent. Of particular significance, he felt, was the information relating
the destruction of codes (pages 165-6). He also knew that the Japanese consuls
were advising the evacuation of Japanese nationals from Malay, the Philippines,
Hawaii, the United States, etc. (page 157). Admiral IngersoU stated that the
dispatch concerning Japanese destruction of codes strengthened the "war warn-
ing" (page 835).
Admiral Turner said that on Friday, December 5, 1941, there was a discussion
between Admiral Stark, Admiral IngersoU and himself concerning the general
situation, and they all felt that all necessary orders had been issued to all echelons
of command preparatory to war and that nothing further was necessary (page
522 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1006). They did send some other messages about destruction of codes, both
Japanese and our own (page 1007).
Admiral Kimmel testified that he regarded the dispatches concerning Japanese
destruction of codes as indicating that the Japanese were going to take steps to
prevent the seizure of their codes upon the breaking off of diplomatic negotiations,
and regarded the dispatch directing Guam to destroy classified matter as a
general precautionary measure (page 327). He "presumed" that he received
the December 6th dispatch prior to the attack (page 327).
Admiral Smith testified that he saw the dispatches relating to the destruction
of codes but that this meant little to him as CincPac was prepared to destroy
codes (page 533). At this time, he said, war was inevitable (page 534).
About December 3rd, Admiral Smith said, after receipt of the dispatch
of that date, and information from the Asiatic Fleet to the effect that heavy
Japanese movements were on the way to the Southward, he believed that
the Japanese were going to attack Malay Peninsula and possibly the Philip-
pines; he thinks that the reaction of others at Admiral Kimmel's headquarters
was the same.
Admiral Pye testified that he saw Exhibit 20 (Japanese destroying codes) on
December 4th, but that this information was published in the newspapers (page
427). Admiral Pye testified that he had not seen Exhibits 21 and 22 (Page 428).
Commander Roehefort, who was in charge of combat intelligence of the Four-
teenth Naval District, stated that during this period the Japanese Consulate was
burning or destroying various papers (page 474) .
Captain Layton said that the messages concerning Japanese code destruction
meant to him only that the Japanese were destroying a cipher machine; he knew
"purple" designated it as a diplomatic code (pages 904-5) and that the "purple"
cipher was a high class cipher (page 908).
On December 5, 1941, he said, they received word from the Naval Observer at
Wellington that the Japanese were destroying codes. This was given to CincPac
and was considered along with other information received at that time (page 906).
At that time, they received messages from the British and from Washington stat-
ing that highly secret and reliable information indicated a Japanese attack on the
Kra Peninsula; this seemed to dovetail with the other information which they
had (page 906).
There was a discussion concerning the significance of the code destruction mes-
sages; they seemed to indicate to Layton that Japan was preparing for all even-
tualities. He presumed that when it was discussed by Admiral Kimmel with the
War Plans Officer and others, it was a matter of discussion (page 906).
Admiral McMorris said that he felt that Exhibit 20 (Japanese destroying
codes) indicated strongly that there would be war with Japan. He did not recall
whether this opinion was prevalent on CincPac's staff", but believed it was thought
by CincPac that war was then extremely possible (page 895).
" It may be noted that although Admiral Kimmel stated that he had kept Gen-
eral Short informed, he did not personally direct that General Short be given the
dispatches concerning codes destruction (Exhibits 20, 21, 22) and did not know
whether they were given to him (page 327).
The only action that Admiral Bloch recalled as a result of the December 3
dispatch concerning the destruction of codes was the security measures
already prescribed, the additional inshore patrol in Honolulu, a warning that
was given to the Destroyer captains, and his belief the Army was on a full
alert, (p. 18)
Admiral Bloch did not believe that the Army had been informed of these
warning (code) messages. The messages, he said, were secret and they
had been admonished to keep them secret to prevent alarming people, and
one thing and another. Admiral Bloch's War Plans Officer would know about
them. Admiral Bloch said that since General Short and he saw one another
very frequently and Admiral Kimmel and he saw one another practically
every day, it is hard to believe that anything of importance could take place
or that anything could be received of even small importance that was not
discussed because it is only fair to assume that they discussed everything.
(P- 18)
General Short, he said, had an Army Colonel as a liaison officer in Admiral
Bloch's office and Admiral Bloch had in the General's office a Lieutenant of
the Naval Reserve as a liaison officer and these men were supposed to be
kept informed. Admiral Bloch's liaison officer did not know of the dis-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 523
patches that had been received because Admiral Bloch did not consider
that it was proper to tell him; he was quite inexperienced. Nor was Admiral
Bloch sure that the Army's liaison officer knew of the messages, but he said
they were in close touch through these liaison officers and felt that they knew
what was going on. He said that it was indicated that there were some things
which they were not correctly informed about, (p. 18)
Neither General Short nor his Chief of Staff recalled having seen these messages
prior to the attack (pages 255, 486).
XXVIII. The "Mori" Conversation; Japanese Burning Papers
General Short testified that about December 5th or 6th, he received intelligence
reports to the effect that the Japanese Consulate was burning papers.
Admiral Bloch said that after the receipt of information to the effect that
the Japanese were burning papers, he didn't know whether or not that was
something that was really filled with meaning; he believed that so long as
there were negotiations going on in Washington, there was a possibility of
the period of waiting being extended; he had a very definite feeling that
we were going to have war sometime in the future but just how far in the
future he was unable to predict, (p. 17)
Lt. Stephenson discussed in some detail the Mori telephone conversation
intercepted on December 6, 1941 and stated his conclusion that he believed
it unlikely that this was a calculated transmission of information from
Honolulu to Japan.
On December 6th, he received a report of a long telephone conversation between
a person named "Mori" and someone in Japan, in which references were made to
the weather, ships at Pearl Harbor, and the local attitude toward the Japanese
(page 233).
The Mori conversation was as follows:
(Exhibit 39)
IC (J) Hello, is this Mori?
(H) Hello, this is Mori.
(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.
(H) Not at all.
(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I
would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at
present.
Are airplanes flying daily?
(H) Yes, lots oj them fly around.
(J) Are they large planes?
(H) Yes, they are quite big.
(J) Are they flying from morning till night?
(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were qtiite active in the air.
(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?
(H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of
this year and the ending part of last year.
(J) Is that so?
(H) I do not know why this is so, but appears that there are very few sailors
here at present.
(J) Are any Japanese people thel^e holding meetings to discuss US-Japanese
negotiations being conducted presently?
{H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japanese here appear calmer
than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.
(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese? ■
(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This
fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here
and we get along very well. Alll races are living in harmony. It appears that
the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There
are some who say odd things, but these are limitedltoJnewco7ners from the main-
land, and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think
and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.
(J) That's fine.
(H) Yes, it's fine, but tve feel a bit amazed.
524 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(J) Has there been any increase in . . ? . . of latef That is, as a result of
the current tense situation.
{H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building
boom.
(J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?
(H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry
here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army
personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various
sorts. Inhere are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students
at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these
jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.
(J) Are there many big factories there?
(H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds
are being constructed.
(J) Is that so?
(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.
(J) Hoiv large is the popidation?
(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy
personnel and workers from the mainland.
(J) What is the population?
(H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.
(J) What about night time?
(H) There seem to be precautionary measures taken.
(J) What about searchlights?
(H) Well, not much to talk about.
(J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?
(H) No.
(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?
(H) The comments by the papers are pretty bad They are ovvonife to the
atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the ncAvspaper is supposed,
to lead the community or not, bvt they carry headlines pertaining to Japan
daily. The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.
(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?
(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and
he was very adept at answering queries of the press.
(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?
(H) There are almost none wishing to do that.
(J) What is the climate there now?
(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a phe-
nomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly a very
unusual climate.
(J) Is that so?
(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to
the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the main-
land today. He made no statements on any problems.
(J) Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?
(li) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US- Japan question,
he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It
appears he ivas ordered by his government not to make any statement.
(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.
(H) Yes.
(J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?
(H) a very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and
a gentleman.
(J) Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?
(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already enplaned
for the mainland.
(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?
(H) N^o, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking
about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet
here seems small. I don't know whether all of the fleet has done this, but it seems
that the fleet has left here.
(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?
(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However,
the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom noiv.
*(J) does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.
(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation
of Japanese goods?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 525
(H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy,
and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough
foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any
rate it is a big inconvenience.
(J) What do you lack most?
(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze
order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are
having a hard time.
(J) Thanks very much.
(H) By the way, here is something interesting aboxit Hawaii. Liquor sells
very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went
under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are
also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill
due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manu-
facture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here,
and the sake is exported back to the mainland.
*(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called
" Takara-Masamuno" ; that a person named Takogiski was the technical
expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of
Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter' s daughter; and
that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiyo Maru. He
adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs
(J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there
are no herring-roe for this year's New Year's celebration.
(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to
last surveys made?
(H) About fifty thousand.
(j) How about the second generation Japanese?
(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.
(j) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the
United States Army?
(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the
army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are
Japanese.
(J) Any first generation Japanese in the Army?
(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.
(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?
(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be
inducted in January.
(J) Thank you very much.
(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.
(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.
(H) Wait a moment please?
(J) Thank you.
(</) Off phone.
XXIX. The Likelihood of a Japanese Attack at Hawaii as Estimated
Washington December 6, 1941
a. navy estimates
Admiral Stark testified that as of December 6, 1941, he considered that a United
States and Japanese war was imminent and that there was a strong probability
that Japan would strike. He thought that the Philippines and Guam were the
most likely targets, of United States territory. He considered that an air attack
on Pearl Harbor was possible but, he said, he thought that there was a good chance
that any attack there would be detected in time to intercept it or to reduce its
effectiveness (pages 73, 165). However, he had no information indicating that
such an attack on Pearl Harbor was probable (pages 105, 792). Generally
speaking, he said, he and his advisors did not expect a raid on Hawaii (page 798).
Captain Wellborn said that there were various individuals in the Navy
Department who felt that an attack on Pearl Harbor was probable — such as
Admiral Turner, and there were others who felt that it was less probable,
although possible, such as Admirals Ingersoll and Stark.
Admiral Turner, on the other hand, testified that he had expected a landing in
Southeast xA.sia, attacks on the Philippines and some form of attack on Hawaii
526 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(page 1002). He had thought that an aerial torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor was
not only possible (page 997) but that it was a probability, and he was not surprised
when it was made (page 1021).
Captain Glover said that a daily short strategic summary of the interna-
tional military and political situation had been prepared by Commander
Ansel in collaboration with Captain Wright and submitted to Admiral Turner.
These are contained in a notebook entitled "Daily Information Summary —
Opl2" filed with the Combat Intelligence Section. Captain Glover said
that he did not believe that it had generally been felt by officers in the Plans
Division that the Japanese would strike as they did. (p. 176)
Admiral Turner said that he had always been of the view that a torpedo
plane attack on ships in Pearl Harbor was possible and pointed out that the
Bureau of Ordnance had modified its earlier letters indicating that still 75"
depth was necessary.
Admiral Turner said that the Chief of Naval Operations shared his view
as to the possibility of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor and that they
felt that Admiral Kimmel also had the same views, (p. 261)
Admiral Turner said that generally he thought our Intelligence regarding
Japanese intentions and activities was quite good. He said that he had
anticipated that the Japanese would attack the United States, Great Britain
and the Netherlands East Indies at the end of November 1941. The attack
of December 7 came as no surprise to him whatsoever nor, he said, was it a
surprise to the Chief of Naval Operations. He was not surprised by the
Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor and pointed out that he had originated
the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 1941, pointing out that just
such an attack was the most probable form that the initiation of war by Japan
would take. (p. 259)
Admiral Wilkinson recalled no specific evaluation as to the capability of
the Japanese to launch an attack such as the attack which was made. (p.
287) Admiral Wilkinson said that he was not surprised by the fact that the
Japanese did venture a carrier raid, but was surprised by the force of the
raid, and by the fact that the attack had come in without detection.
(p. 287-8)
Admiral Ingersoll stated that he had considered that a surprise attack on
Pearl Harbor was a possibility (page 821) but he had not thought that an air
attack on Oahu was probable. He had thought that when war came there would
be numerous Japanese submarines around Pearl Harbor and he expected raids
against outlying islands in the Fourteenth Naval District and that any attack
on Hawaii would be by submarines or surface forces (page 847). (3)
Admiral Ingersoll said that he thought the dispatches concerning the
reenforcement of Midway and Wake should have accentuated the idea that
there was a danger of raids in the area rather than allay suspicion as to the
probability of attack in the Hawaiian area. (p. 427)
Admiral Ingersoll said that the December 3 dispatch indicated that war
was imminent and a matter of a few days or hours and that it was believed
in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations that such war would include
the United States as indicated by the reference to Washington in that
dispatch, (p. 428)
Admiral Ingersoll said that he recalled no discussion in late November
or early December regarding the probability of an air attack on Hawaii.
They did anticipate possible attacks by submarines and possible raids either
by light forces or by submarines at Wake, Midway and Johnston, (p. 426)
Admiral Ingersoll said that he expected that the Japanese attack against
the United States would be on the Philippines and Guam with possible
raiding attacks on our outlying islands to the westward of Hawaii and sub-
marine attacks against shipping around Hawaii and generally between the
west coast and the United States. He said that he did not recall anyone
in operations reporting to Admiral Stark that the war would be precipitated
by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, (p. 430)
Captain Heard testified that they had no information which indicated or
would lead to an obvious conclusion that there was an impending attack on Hawaii.
He was quite convinced that war would start in Southeast Asia (page 468).
Admiral Wilkinson said that for a month preceding 7 December 1941 there
loere no discussions in which he participated regarding the likelihood of a Jap-
anese move on Pearl Harbor. He stated further that during the first week in
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 527
December, 194i, he remembered no discussions concerning the qriestion of
whether or not aerial reconnaissance rcas being conducted from Oahu (p. 396).
According to Commander Kramer, from the information he saw there was not
the slightest indication of Japanese overt intention to attack the United States.
The information of this type was known to be incomplete and CNO knew this
(page 985).
B. Army Estimate
General Marshall said that he had felt that a Japanese attack would come in
the Western Pacific, also possibly against the Panama Canal, which was then
closed to the Japanese (page 861). The Japanese movements pointed to a move
into Thailand, action to cut off the Burma Road, and a threat to the Malay-Kra
Peninsula. They had no indications of Japanese plans for assault on Hawaii
(page 860-1). He always was in fear of a surprise attack on United States
territory but the probabilities pointed to the Panama Canal and the Philippines
before Hawaii; there were no specific indications in the possession of the Army
and no reports from the Navy showing a threat against Hawaii (page 863) . The
attack on Pearl Harbor came as a surprise to General Marshall (page 882). It
had appeared to him, as set forth in his letter in February 1941, that the pos-
sibility in Hawaii in the way of attack was combined air and sabotage. There
was a strong probability — really a certainty — that there was an evil intent in the
Far East. The question was when it would explode and to what extent it would
be on an infiltration basis. As to probability, Siam, the Malaya Peninsula,
and the Panama Canal took priority, in his opinion, to Hawaii.
C. State Department Estimates
Ambassador Grew said that he had received no report from the Korean under-
ground that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor and Mr, Hamilton said
that he had felt that the Japanese would move to the southward, but that he had
not excluded from his estimates an attack on United States possessions (page
1075).
XXX. Japanese Message Advising of Fourteen Part Reply and First
Thirteen Parts
A. message advising of fourteen part reply
On December 6, 1941, the Army translated an intercepted Japanese communica-
tion (document 38, Exhibit 63), as follows:
"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"December 6, 1941
"Purple
"#909 Re my #644 (").
"1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the
26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the
United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).
"2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts
and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The
situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep
it secret for the time being.
"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States,
I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to
put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the
Americans just as soon as you receive instructions,."
B. the first thirteen parts of the reply
Also on December 6, 1941, the Navy translated the first thirteen parts of the
Japanese reply (Document 39, Exhibit 63), which had been sent from Tokyo
to Washington in the Japanese diplomatic code. It may be noted that the
translations of parts 8 and 9 of the reply which were originally indicated as Navy
(») See S. I. S. #25445 in which Tokyo wires Washuigton the Imperial Government caimot accept the
United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will
be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured, Until then, however, Washington
is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken ofl.)
528 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
translations were corrected so as to indicate that they were translated by the
Army. These 13 parts which are not set forth here, but particularly part 13
disclosed that the Japanese were of the view that the American proposal, viewed
in its entirety, could not be accepted by the Japanese as a basis of negotiations.
C. DELIVERY OF THE TRANSLATIONS OF THE ABOVE MESSAGES
Captain Heard testified that he did not know what information was available
on the evening of 6 December 1941, but that a 24-hour watch, headed by a
senior officer, had been maintained in ONI since 27 May 1941 (page 467). Also
a 24-hour watch in the Far Eastern Section had been commenced on 4 December
1941 (page 467), and ONI had a direct wire to Secretary Hull (page 468).
Lieutenant Commander George W. Lynn in December, 1941, was Senior
Watch Officer in Op20-G, which handled the decoding of Japanese diplomatic
cryptographs (page 734). He was familiar in general with Exhibit 63, the file
of intercepts. The Army and Navy cooperated to get this material; each main-
tained interception stations (page 734). The Army intercepts were cleared
through the Navy and vice versa. The division made on the basis of dates; the
Army was responsible for even dates; the Navy odd (page 735). Documents were
noted as to time of translation; the dates at the top were the dates of inter-
ception (page 735).
He said that Document 39 (14 part dispatch) was received in the Navy De-
partment from station as follows: (all times Washington time)
Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 received 1149, 12-6-41:
Parts 9, 10 received between 1149 and 1451, 12-6-41
Parts 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 and 13 received at 1451, 12-6-41.
These first 13 paits were processed and given to Commander Kramer between
2100 and 2200, 12-6-41.
Commander Kramer said that the fourteen part message was received by
him (Document 39, Exhibit 63) and he got the first 13 parts broken down and
translated by 2105, December 6th. He called Admiral ^^ ilkinson, who confirmed
his plan of distribution. He went to the White House and gave a folder to one
of Admiral Beardall's assistants, which contained the 13 parts of the Japanese
reply, with instructions to get it to the President right away. The President
was entertaining. He then went to Secretary Knox's house and waited while the
Secretary' read the message, and had a brief discussion of it. When he delivered
the messages to Secretary Knox, Secretary Knox did not comment as his wife and
a business associate were present (page 972). Later Kramer and the Secretary
privately discussed some of the points of the 13 parts of the reply. Secretary
Knox called Secretaries Stimson and Hull, and these calls indicated a meeting
of the three Secretaries at 1000, December 7th. Kramer was instructed to be
there with this and any other material which came in. He then took the transla-
tions to Admiral Wilkinson, in his quarters. He thought that Admiral Wilkinson
called Admirals Turner and Stark, but is not certain (page 982). He arrived
back in the Navy Department at 0030. He then secured and went home, but
could be reached by telephone at any time.
Document 38 of Exhibit 63, advising that the time of delivery of the 14 part
reply would be directed by a separate dispatch, was received and delivered by
Kramer on December 6th along with the 13 parts (page 971).
Captain Safford said that on the week-end of December 6, 1941, his unit
handled three times the normal traffic for a busy day (page 756). Thirteen
parts of the 14-part message came in and were distributed by Kramer between
2100 and 2400 on December 6th. The Army advised that it had informed Secre-
tary Hull by 2230.
Apparently based on conversations with Kramer, Captain Safford stated that
Kramer distributed the messages to the White House and to Admiral Wilkinson;
that he believed that Admiral Wilkinson telephoned Admiral Stark; and that
Kramer returned to Navy Department at 1 a. m., then went home, and left
instructions for a call when part 14 came in, as he had instructions to deliver all
of the message to Admiral Stark at 0900, December 7, 1941.
According to Admiral Ingersoll, he saw the first thirteen parts of the Japanese
reply on the night of December 6th-7th. This, he said, indicated that the
situation was very tense (page 828). He did not remember the other message
(Document 38).
Admiral Turner remembered Document 38, but he did not remember when he
saw it (page 999).
Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall the above translations or any
information delivered to him at his home by office messenger on the evening of
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 529
December 6th nor any conversation with Secretary Knox or Admiral Wilkinson
(pages 780, 166).*
XXXI. December 7, 1941, in Washington
A. INTERCEPTED COMMUNICATIONS OTHER THAN PART FOURTEEN AND THE
"1 P. M. MESSAGE"
Captain Safford said that an intercepted Japanese message in the shape of a
circular telegram from Tokyo, rising the "hidden word" code, dated 7 December
1941, (Exhibit 20), was received in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington,
shortly before 11 o'clock in the morning of 7 December. Three of the words in
this message had a secondary or hidden meaning, constituting the actual message.
Captain Safford said that this message was translated in such a hurry on Sun-
day morning, 7 December, that only two of the three key words were given their
hidden value. As a result, the message was translated (p. 125-126):
"Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expec-
tation."
Captain Safford said that if the third and omitted key word had been given its
hidden meaning, the message would have read (p. 126, 609-610):
"Relations between Japan and England and United States are not in accord-
ance with expectation."
Captain Kramer made the following statement with regard to his translation
of the "hidden word" message of 7 December 1941, referred to in the preceding
paragraphs (p. 133-135):
"I do recall on that that after my return from the State Department near 10:30
the morning of 7 December, we had just had translated a message specifying the
time of delivery of the fourteen-part note from the Japanese Government to the
United States. That item, together with several other minor messages, one
thanking the Ambassador for his services and another to the embassy staff and
another directing final destruction of codes, all added up in my mind to a crisis
to take place at 1 o'clock. Consequently, I was in very much of a hurry to get
the word out. The books were made up in the course of a couple of minutes and
as I was leaving the office, I looked at another short plain language message that
had just come in, had just been brought in, and I recognized, as I recall it now,
the first word in there as being a code word in this plain language text, a code
word referring to estranged relations or breaking relations. As I recall it now,
I dictated to a chief yeoman the sense of the message, glancing through the entire
message, spotting another code word referring to England, and then two minutes
after that was on my way. It wasn't until I returned to the office approximately
an hour later and was looking over the morning's traffic again that I again
examined more closely this particular plain language message, which was one
of many in the traffic that morning, and noted the omission referring to the
United States. . . .
". . . My recollection is not clear cut as to the time when the discrepancy was
noted. I do, however, have a rather vague recollection of making two or more
phone calls at the time the discrepancy was noted, which, if correct, would indi-
cate that that discrepancy was noted perhaps a quarter of one or 1 o'clock. I do
definitely recall, however, that no retranslation of that message was made for
distribution because of the fact that before it could be delivered to the recipients of
this traffic, who had left meetings respectively in the State Department and Chief
of Naval Operations' office for lunch, that it would be well after the time of de-
livery, 1 o'clock, about which there had been so tnuch excitement late in the
morning. I might further add that when the attack was first learned, I recall
definitely feeling that there was no point in making the delivery at that time.
That was perhaps 1:30."
Captain Kramer further stated that when he returned to his office at around
noon on 7 December and noted the omission in the "hidden word" message of
reference to the United States, he attempted to telephone all persons who had
received the translation. However, he was able to contact only two of them, he
thought these two were Captain McCollum and Colonel Bratton. Captain
Kramer believed that he had made the telephone calls at about 12:30 (p. 595-596).
• It will be recalled that on December 6th there was also available in Washington an intercepted Japanese
communication from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated November 18th, describing ships, and the courses of ships
in Pearl Harbor (Document 40, Exhibit 63).
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 35
530 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On December 7, 1941, there were three Japanese communications intercepted
and translated by the Army in addition to part fourteen of the Japanese reply
and the "1 p. m. message." These were:
1.
"From: Washington (Nomura)
"To: Tokyo
"December 3, 1941
"Purple (Urgent)
"#1256. Re your #875 ».
"I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply
was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States
Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially
since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the
journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or
peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the
United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply
is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement,
the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent
them taking the bold step referred to — even if your reply is made for the mere
purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been
elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th,
I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful inten-
tions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and wire
me at once."
2.
"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"December 6, 1941
"Purple (Urgent)
"#1272
"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL,
we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close
relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because
of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly
secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:
(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised
him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "introducing" at
once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known
what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is
his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS
and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of these
individuals.
(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th
into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United
States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous
to us . . . (Message incomplete).
3.
"From: Budapest
"To: Tokyo
"December 7, 1941
"LA
"#104 Re my #103.
"On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this
country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would
break out on the 7th.
"Relayed to Berlin."
B. PART FOURTEEN AND THE "l P. M. MESSAGE"
Also on December 7, 1941, the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply, and the
Japanese instruction to the emissaries in Washington to deliver the reply at
one p. m. on the 7th of December were translated, as follows':
1. Navy translation — (Document 39, Exhibit 63)
" See S. I. S. #25725— Explanation of Japan's increase of their forces in French Indo-China.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 531
"From: Tokj'o
"To: Washington
"7 December 1941
"(Purple-Eng)
"#902 Part 14 of 14
(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English
phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")
"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire
with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the
estabhshment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and
especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan
and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course
of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government
to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace
of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally
been lost.
"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot
but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further nego-
tiations."
2. Army translation (Document 41, Exhibit 63)
"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"December 7,^1941
"Purple (Urgent — Very Important)
"#907 To be handled in government code.
"Re my #902('';.
"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if
possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m.
on the 7th, your time."
C. DELIVERY OF PART FOURTEEN AND THE "l P. M. MESSAGE" AND ACTION TAKEN
Captain McCollum said that he arrived in the Navy Department at about
0730 on Sunday morning, December 7, 194i, to assume a special watch in the
Far Eastern Section of ONI. Shortly after his arrival Admiral Wilkinson,
Director of Naval Intelligence, sent for him and a discussion was had concerning
the situation in the Far East. A little before 8:30 both Admiral Wilkinson
and Captain McCollum went down to talk to Admiral Stark. At about 9 o'clock
Captain McCollum received word that one of his officers wished to see him
urgently. He stepped outside and Lieutenant Commander Kramer delivered
to him the last part of the Japanese "Fourteen Part Reply," together with the
instructions directing its presentation to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock,
Washington time {p. 34-35). At that time Captain McCollum had a short
talk with Lieutenant Commander Kramer as to the signijiance of the instructions
and the latter pointed out that 1 p. m. Washington time would mean about
7:30 in the morning, Honolulu time, and about 2 o'clock in the morning out
in the Philippines; that the exact significance of this was not known, but that
if an attack were coming it looked as if it were timed for operations out in the
Far East and possibly on Hawaii {p. 33, 36). Captain McCollum said that
he took the message and instructions in to Admiral Stark and pointed out to
him the possible significance of the time in conjunction with the note {p. 36).
Captain McCollum stated: "We had no way of knowing, but because of the fact
that the exact time for delivery of this note had been stressed to the ambassadors,
we felt there were important things which would move at that time, and that was
pointed out . . . to Admiral Stark. . . ." {p. 33-34).
Referring to the Japanese instructions to deliver the "Fourteen Part Reply"
to the U. S. Secretary of State at 1 p. m., Washington time, on 7 December,
Captain Kramer said that he had been impressed by the fact that 1 o'clock in
Washington was several hours before sunrise in the Kra Peninsula area, where
he knew that the Japanese had been contemplating an attack on Kota Baru
with the connivance of the Thai Chief of Staff. Consequently, when he delivered
the "1 p. m. message" to Mr. Hull's private secretary, he pointed this fact out
to the latter and to Colonel Bratton, who ivas also in Mr. Hull's outer office.
He also mentioned the fact that 1 p. m. in Washington was 7:30 at Pearl Harbor
(p. 137).
(•— S. I. S. #25843— text of Japanese reply.)
532 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Kramer said that in all he had pointed out the significance of the
delivery time of the "Fourteen Part Reply" to perhaps eight or ten different
people, including Commander McCollum, several people in the State Department,
Colonel Bratton, possibly Admiral Wilkinson, and probably Captain Safford.
He did not remember whether he had mentioned the matter when delivering the
"1 p. m. message" to CNO's office (p. 137-138).
Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood said that the fourteenth part of the
Japanese reply was received while he was on watch between midnight and 7 a. m.,
December 7, 1941 (page 925). Also a further dispatch was received during the
watch, concerning the time of delivery of the long diplomatic message. The first
dispatch, the long diplomatic message, was in English (part 14 of Exhibit 63). He
thinks he delivered this to the Army. The second was in Japanese (page 926) , and
required translation which he thinks was done by an Army translator (part 41 of
Exhibit 63). He left the dispatches for Kramer and left around seven before
Kramer came in. He can't remember whether the translated message was back
before he left the office at 7 a. m. (page 926).
Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering testified that on 7 December 1941 he was
on duty in Op20-G of Naval Communications, beginning at 0700 (page 812). He
said that Part 14 of the Japanese reply was processed and ready for delivery at
0700 and was delivered to Kramer on his arrival between 0900 and 1000; the
"1 p. m. message" was received from an Army translator at about 0715 and was
held until Kramer arrived and then was delivered to him (p. 813).
Lieutenant Commander Lynn testified that Part 14 of the Japanese reply did
not require translation into English; it was received between 0305 and 0700 on
December 7th, and, he thought, it was handed to Kramer at about 0900-1000.
He said that the "1 p. m. message" arrived between 0305 and 0700, 12-7-41 and
was processed and in the Arnxy's hands for translation at 0700, 12-7-41.
According to Captain Safford Part 14 came in and was decoded and ready at
0700, 12-7-41 (page 757). The "1 p. m. message" came in and was sent to the
Army for translation from the Japanese, and came back about 1000, December 7
(page 758) .
Kramer, he said, ■went to Admiral Stark's office, gave it to him personally or to an
aide, then to Admiral Beardall at the White House, and then to the State Depart-
ment with the 14th part at about 1000, where Secretary Hull, Secretary Knox and
Secretary Stimson were (page 758). (The Court here refused to sustain the
Judge Advocate's objection to testimony by the witness as to what was told to
him' (page 748)).
Captain Safford continued, stating that Kramer came back and found the
translation of the message instructing deliverj^ at one p. m. There also was a
message "in the hidden-word code" which had been translated hurriedly and said,
"relations in England not in accordance with expectation." In Kramer's haste
they left out a word and the message should have read — (the witness was here
interrupted). He then said that Kramer immediately redistributed the two
messages; went to CNO and gave them to an aide. Admiral Stark being in con-
ference; to the White House, there to an aide; to the State Department about 11
and gave copies to the Secretaries of War, State and Navy. He then said that to
the copy which Kramer gave to the Secretary of the Navy was a note saying that
this was sunrise at Honolulu and midnight at Manila and undoubtedly meant a
surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor in a few hours. (On Admiral Stark's motion
this was stricken out by the court since the witness had no personal knowledge.)
Captain Saiford summarized the information which he said indicated the
objectives which the Japanese were preparing to attack, as follows:
"Going back to the late Spring of 1941, on May 22, we received positive
proof of Japanese plans for the conquest of Southeastern Asia and the
Southwest Pacific. On July 24, a high authority in Japan directed the
withdrawal of merchant shipping from the Northeast Pacific, Southwest
Pacific, and Indian Ocean. On September 4, we received information
indicating Japan's determination to carry out her program of southward
expansion and to expell the United States and England from China, Southeast
Asia, and the Southwest Pacific. On October 15, we received unexpected
confirmation of Japan's plans and intentions of the conquest of Southeastern
Asia. In October, 1941, the Japanese Consuls were directing and advising
the evacuation of Japanese Nationalists from the Netherlands East Indies,
Malaya, Philippines, Hawaii, America, and Europe. By October 28, this
was in full progress. On November 4, we received important information
that the internal situation in Japan, both political and economic, since the
American embargo, had become so desperate that the Japanese Government
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 533
had to distract popular attention by a foreign war or else by bloodless diplo-
matic victory. On November 12, we received important information that
the Japanese Government regarded November 25 as the dead-line for
negotiations then being conducted between the Japanese and American
Governments to end. November 17, we received information from a very
reliable source that Japan had no intention of attacking Russia in Siberia
or she had changed her plans, if such intention ever existed. At one time,
when it looked as if Moscow would fall, there were indications from several
sources that Japan would invade Siberia. On November 24, 1941, we
learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing
date for offensive military operations of some nature. We interpreted this
to mean that large scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and
the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that time,
Hawaii was out of our minds. On November 26, we received specific evi-
dence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and
the United States. On December 1, we had definite information from three in-
dependent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States,
and, from two of them, that Japan would maintain peace with Russia. On
December 4, 1941, we received definite information from two more independ-
ent sources that Japan would attack the United States and Britain, but
would maintain peace with Russia. At 9:00 p. m. (Washington time),
December 6, 1941, we received positive information that Japan would declare
war against the IJnited States, at a time to be specified thereafter. This
information was positive and unmistakable, and was made available to
Military Intelligence at this same time. Finally, at 10:15 a. m. (Washington
time), December 7, 1941, we received positive information from the Signal
Intelligence Service (War Department) that the Japanese declaration of war
would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1 :00 p. m. (Washington time)
that date. 1 :00 p. m. Washington time was sunrise in Hawaii and approxi-
mately midnight in the Philippines, and this indicated a surprise air raid on
Pearl Harbor in about three hours. Kramer appended a note to this effect
to the paper sent over from S. I. S. before presenting it to the Secretary of
the Navy. I do not know whether or not a copy of this note was appended
to the paper given to Admiral Stark. At this same time, information was
also received indicating that Japan was about to commence hostilities against
the British Empire. This information was sent over to S. I. S. immediately."
(p. 357-8)
Captain Safford then discussed the distribution of information within the
Navy Department and to the President and State Department, etc. His
statement of the distribution by Commander Kramer from December 1 on
was based, he said, on what Commander Kramer told him verbally.
Commander Kramer said that he received no phone call on the night of Decem-
ber 6th-7th and came in at 0900 on December 7th. received the 14th part of the
reply and took it and the first 13 parts to Admiral Stark's office about 0900 where
there apparently was a meeting. He was not certain who was in Admiral Stark's
office. He was in a hurry. Admiral Wilkinson was there (page 973). He then
left the Navy Department at 0930 to make delivery to the White House, and
was at the State Department at 0950 waiting for Secretary' Knox in order to
deliver this additional material.
This delivery did not include the message setting 1 p. m. as the time for delivery
of the reply. He did not get that until he returned to the Navy Department
at about 1020. He then found that a message had been received which directed
delivery of the replj' to the Secretary of State at 1300, and also other messages
which directed destruction of Japanese codes still on hand, and one which thanked
the Ambassador for his services. This material was delivered to Admiral Stark
at about 1030. He handed the "1 p. m. message" to Admiral Stark's aide at
10:30 or 10:45 and saw him take it in to Admiral Stark's desk. Document 41 of
Exhibit 63 is the "1 p. m. message", which had been translated by Army. He
then left to deliver this new material to the White House and the State Depart-
ment. He handed the material to a State Department official, who customarily
received such material for the Secretary of State, and who was to deliver it to
Secretary Knox.
He invited attention, verbally, to the time involved (page 965) ; that is, that
this was 7:30 in Honolulu and a few hours before sunrise at Koto Bharu. He
did not tell the naval officers this as he figured they would know it. The remarks
he made were not to Secretary Knox himself but to the State Department official
who handled this material for Secretary Hull and who was to deliver it to Secretary
534 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Knox. He did not advise the official in the State Department to tell the Secretary
of the Navy that 1300 Washington time meant dawn m Pearl Harbor and that it
might mean an attack on Pearl Harbor (page 985). And, he said, Captain
Safford never stated to him or in his presence that the message concerning the
delivery of the note indicated a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor (page 986).
Captain Heard, who was in charge of the Foreign Branch of ONI, stated that
information about the Japanese reply was available in the Navy Department at
0900, 7 December 1941 (page 464). Sometime between 0900 and 1000 DONI
took the Chief of the Far East Section, Commander McCoUum, with him to CNO
to present this information. This statement, he said, was based on official
records, a report from McCollum, and an official statement of DONI made very
shortlv after the event (page 465). Lieutenant Commander Watts relieved
McCollum at 0800, 7 December (page 466).
Admiral Schuirmann testified that on the morning of December 7, 1941, he
knew that the Japanese Ambassadors would present a note to the Secretary of
State at 1 p. m. He knew the general tenor of the note that would be presented
(page 204). The note was in the nature of an ultimatum. He was in Admiral
Stark's office in the morning of December 7th, and Admiral Stark had the informa-
tion which he had. Admiral Stark talked to General Marshall on the telephone.
The Japanese askmg for an appointment at 1 p. m. on a Sunday was quite unusual
and out of the known routine of the foreign service (page 205). Admiral Stark
concurred in a dispatch to be sent by General Marshall. The State Department
was not advised of this dispatch (page 205).
He also testified that information concerning delivery of the Japanese note at
1 p. m. was available to him between 0900 and 0930 on the morning of December
7th. He does not know when it got to the Navy Department (page 213).
Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was aware of the contents of the Japanese
message stating that a fourteen-part reply would be sent, of the fourteen-part
reply, and of the "1 p. m. message." As to the "1 p. m. message," he repeated
that he had this information at 0930 on December 7th, and believed ,that Admiral
Stark received this information about that time (page 715). He talked to Admiral
Stark about 1000 (page 214). General Marshall telephoned about 1030 (page
216).
Admiral Schuirmann testified that Commander Kramer delivered this type of
material and that no record M^as kept of time of delivery. He discussed the
situation with Admiral Stark but not specific messages. When he went to
Admiral Stark's office on December 7th, he recalled, he waited a while for Stark
to come in at about 0930 (page 729). He then knew of the prospective 1 o'clock
delivery of the "sharply worded" Japanese note and that it was a reply to the
United States note of November 26th, and so informed Admiral Stark. Admiral
Stark knew of this when General Marshall telephoned. He believes that Stark
had delivered to him that morning "the book" containing the messages received
the previous night. He is positive that the Army had the same information the
Navy had (page 730) . He personally did not think Japan was going to attack us
(page 732).
Admiral Stark testified that the outstanding thing in his mind concerning the
evening of December 6th and the morning of December 7th was the "one p. m.
message", which he learned about on the morning of December 7th. He did not
remember the "14 part message" in reply to the State Department note of Novem-
ber 26th. Admiral Schuirmann, he said, may have given him a full picture on the
morning of December 7th, and it is reasonable to assume that he did so (pages
789-790).
He stated that he had no information about the "14 part" reply or the "1
p. m. message" until he arrived at his office on December 7th (pages 790-791).
He said that on the forenoon of December 7, 1941, he received information that
the Japanese Ambassador would deliver a message to Secretary Hull at exactly
1300. He was talking to Admiral Schuirmann when General Marshall called
and asked if he had this information. He first told General Marshall he did not
think this information should be sent out, but instantly changed his mind and
called General Marshall back, asking him to have the Army authorities inform
the Navy. He asked General Marshall if he could get the message out quickly
and off"ered to send it via Navy communications. General Marshall said he could
get it out quickly.
Admiral Stark recalled discussing with Admiral Schuirmann "the time ele-
ment" in connection with the "one p. m. message" (page 170), but recalled no
suggestion made to him that this looked like a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor.
He did not recall what information he had about the Japanese message to be
delivered at 1300, December 7, 1941, except the hour of delivery (page 172).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 535
Admiral Stark stated that he had not called Admiral Kimmel on the Trans-
Pacific telephone before December 7th (page 190). He stated that he may have
been derelict in not advising Admiral Kimmel of the prospective delivery of the
Japanese reply and regretted not having telephoned to Admiral Kimmel on
December 7th concerning this (pages 113, 793), and also regretted not having
paralleled the Army message on the Navy radio (page 799).
General Marshall said that he first saw the "14 part message" and the "1 p. m.
message" sometime Sunday morning, December 7, 1941 (page 873). He 'phoned
Admiral Stark, and at first Admiral Stark did not think that any message to
Hawaii was necessary because the recipients might be confused by too many
messages. Admiral Stark 'phoned back in a few minutes, asking that the naval
authorities be advised.
General Marshall was informed, after sending some of his men back two and
three times to the message center, that his message would be received within 30
minutes after dispatch. It was in the message center at 1150 and sent by radio
to all points except Hawaii; they were unable to raise the Hawaiian station and
therefore sent it by wire. General Marshall did not know this until afterwards
(pages 873-4) .
General Marshall estimated that he arrived at 10:30 a. m., Sunday morning,
December 7, 1941, and first saw the "14 part message" and "1 p. m. message"
shortly thereafter (pages 878-9).
He said that Admiral Stark did not inquire as to the rapidity of War Depart-
ment communications in connection with dispatching the Army message of
December 7, 1941 (page 879).
Admiral IngersoU said that he arrived at the office about 0900, December 7th.
He did not recall any discussion with Admiral Stark about the fourteen part
message or delivery thereof until Admiral Stark told him of his conversation with
General Marshall (page 837). He stated that on the morning of December 7th,
he knew that the Japanese Ambassador had requested an interview with Secretary
Hull in the afternoon. At the same time, Admiral Stark told him that this had
been discussed with General Marshall (page 831). Admiral IngersoU said that
there was no discussion on the morning of December 7th of the fact that 1 o'clock
in Washington was sunrise at Pearl Harbor and midnight in Manila.
Admiral IngersoU said that he did not recall when he saw the thirteen or
fourteen part Japanese reply, (p. 429)
Admiral Turner said that he came to the Navy Department about 1030 or 1100
on December 7th. Admiral Stark called him and showed him a decrypted Japanese
dispatch which required the Japanese Ambassador to present the Japanese
reply on the 7th. Admiral Stark said he had talked to General Marshall, who
said he had sent a dispatch on the matter to Hawaii. Admiral Stark said that he
thought Admiral Kimmel already had intercepted and decrypted the Japanese
message; they thought that he had the 14 part reply and "1 p. m. message"
(page 1000).
He first recalled the time of delivery as 10:30 and corrected this to 1 p. m. He
said that Secretary Hull had told Admiral Stark that he could not give the Jap-
anese an appointment until 2:30 p. m. Admiral Turner thought from this dis-
patch that an attack on the United States or Britain was coming that day or the
next (page 1000). They had been warned, he said, that the scrambler telephone
was not secure and so the Navy Department did not use it for secret matters
(page 1001).
Admiral Noyes said he did not see the 14-part message or delivery instruction
prior to 7 December 1941 (page 1035, 1036) ; that there was no direct or convenient
telephone circuit between CincPac and CNO on 7 December 1941 (page 1038)
and that a Navy message from CNO, which had been designated for the fastest
possible transmission, would be in CincPac's hands in a maximum of an hour
(page 1044).
According to Admiral Smith, CincPac was not kept well informed of develop-
ments by the Navy Department (page 565). He testified regarding Secretary
Knox's visit to Pearl Harbor, after the attack, and statements made by him there
(page 556-57). He said that at lunch he joined Secretary Knox, Kimmel, Pye,
Bloch, Short, Beatty (Aide to Secretary), and that the Secretary said: "Did you
not get a warning on the 6th of December?" They said, "No," and the Secretary
then continued: "We learned surreptitiously on the 6th of December that Nomura
and Kurusu had orders to hold their last conference with Secretary Hull at 1 p. m.
on Sundaj', the 7th. I know that information was sent to Admiral Hart, and I
thought, of course, it was sent to you." They never got that information (page
536 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
566) . The Secretary also said, "Frankly, I know of no one in the War Department
or in the Navy Department, not even Kelly Turner, who expected an air attack on
Pearl Harbor" (page 567). Admiral Smith said that it is easy to deduce from the
1 o'clock delivery dispatch, which they received after the attack, that Pearl
Harbor was a logical place of attack as the time indicated was sunrise there.
XXXII. Conditions at Pearl Harbor Prior to Attack
A. THE SHIPS IN PORT
Admiral Hewitt's investigation developed that at the time of the attack, the
forces of the Pacific Fleet were, according to Admiral Kimmel {Exhibit 73),
disposed partly in port and partly at sea as follows:
(1) In Pearl Harbor:
(a) Task Force One, Vice Admiral Pye commanding (less one battleship, one
light cruiser and one destroyer) comprising five battleships, four light cruisers,
seventeen destroyers, two light cruisers, and four mine layers.
(6) Task Force Two {under the cojnmand of Vice Admiral Halsey, who was
at sea with units thereof constituting a separate task force — Task Force Eight)
comprising three battleships, eight destroyers, one light cruiser, and four mine
layers.
(c) Task Force Three {less detached units under command of Vice Admiral
Brown at sea, and less a separate task force — Task Force Twelve — which was at
sea under Rear Admiral Newton's command) comprising two heavy cruisers, and
four mine layers which were under overhaul.
{d) Five submarines and the submarine tender PELIAS of Task Force Seven.
(e) The TANGIER, HULBERT, CURTIS, and THORNTON, and Patrol
Squadrons {VP 11, 12, 14, 22, 23, and 24 — a total of about sixty planes) of Task
Force Nine.
(/) Marine Air Squadrons VMSB 232 and VMJ 252 {a total of twenty
planes) at Ewa, Oahu.
{g) Two destroyer tenders and the Base Force, consisting of the ARGONNE,
plus axixiliaries and repair vessels, and planes of Base Force Aircraft Squadrons
VJ-1, VJ-2, and VJ-3, as follotos: 19 J2F, 9 JRS, 2 PBY-1 , 1 J2V.
{2) At sea:
(a) Task Force Eight {Vice Admiral Halsey cojnmanding) consisting of one
aircraft carrier {ENTERPRISE), three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers,
located 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, standing to eastward, was returning to
Pearl Harbor after landing a Marine Air Squadron at Wake Island.
{b) Task Force Three {Vice Admiral Brown commanding), less units in
port, consisting of one heavy cruiser and one mine laying squadron, less two of
its divisions, was exercising with landing boats at Johnston Island.
(c) Task Force Twelve {Rear Admiral Newton commanding), ordinarily a
component of Task Force Three, consisting of one aircraft carrier {LEXING-
TON), three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, located about 425 miles south-
east of Midway, was proceeding on a westerly course to land a Marine Air
Squadron on Midway Island.
{d) One heavy cruiser and one mine laying division, ordinarily a part of
Task Force Three, were engaged in "normal operations" at sea southwest of
Oahu.
{e) Four submarines of Task Force Seven, somewhere at sea en route to
Pearl Harbor.
(3) At other places:
(a) At Midicay Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and Patrol
Squadron VP-21 {consisting of twelve planes) of Task Force Twelve.
{b) At Wake Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and a Marine Air
Squadron.
(c) At Johnston Island {in addition to Task Force Three, undergoing exercise),
two Base Force PBY-1 planes.
{d) At Mare Island, five submarines of Task Force Seven.
{e) At San Diego, four submarines of Task Force Seven.
To sum up: At Pearl Harbor, there were eight battleships, two heavy cruisers,
four light cruisers, two old light cruisers, one old cruiser mine layer, eight destroy-
ers, five submarines, twelve mine layers, two destroyer tenders, one subinarine
tender, four aircraft tenders, various auxiliary and repair ships, and 111 air-
craft of various types, of which nine were under overhaul. At sea, there were
two aircraft carriers, eight heavy cruisers, fourteen destroyers, four submarines.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 537
and one mine layer squadron less one division. At other places, there were
thirteen subtnarines, fourteen Navy patrol planes and one Marine Air Squadron.
Except as to Task Forces Eight and Tv)elve, which loere on special missions
to reenforce Wake and Midivay Islands, the dispositions of Pacific Fleet Units
as noted above were in accordance with a previously worked out fleet employment
schedide (Ex. To; Hew. page 605).
Admiral DeLany stated that the ships were in Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1941, in accordance with the operating schedule of the Fleet; the principal mission
in late 1941 was training, and they had no orders from Washington to discon-
tinue (page 507).
Admiral Smith said that after the reorganization of the Pacific Fleet to
three task forces, one task force was always at sea and very often two, and
they held exercises against one another; sometimes all three task forces would
be at sea at the same time. (p. 35)
As Operations Officer, one of Admiral DeLany's duties was the prepara-
tion of "Schedules of Employment." These were originally prepared on a
quarterly basis about six weeks before the end of the quarter, and a con-
siderable number of these were printed and widely distributed, (p. 83) The
schedules provided for patrol of the operating areas and for air patrol cov-
erage, entrances and sorties, primarily because they felt that the possibility
of a submarine attack in the operating areas was something that they had
to guard against and also to prevent any blocking of the channel in and out
of Pearl Harbor (p. 84).
On December 7, Commander Paul C. Crosley was Flag Secretary on the
Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. He produced a copy of the
Pacific Fleet employment schedule, dated August 13, 1941, which was incom-
plete since Enclosure A was missing. Enclosure A was a photostatic copy
of a diagrammatic layout of the schedule as written in the letter, (p. 179)
Commander Crosley also produced a proposed employment schedule dated
November 10, 1941. (p. 180). Commander Crosley produced copies of the
employment schedules for Task Forces 1, 2 and 3 for the second quarter
of the fiscal year 1942, and discussed the method of printing and distributing
same. (p. 181).
Admiral Brainard did not recall any changes which had been made in the
employment schedules for the last quarter of 1941 which had been submitted
by the Pacific Fleet. He said that a rather general freedom of action was
given to the Fleet Commanders as to changes in the operating schedules.
He recalled that about the middle of 1941, the schedules were changed from
type schedules to task force schedules after the Commander-in-Chief had
established a task force organization, (p. 401)
Admiral Pye stated that the task forces rotated days at sea and in port; the
days and dates varied. A task force could be figured to stay in port for nine to
fourteen days (page 430). His task force, Task Force One, was in Pearl Harbor
from November 27th until December 7th (page 418).
Admiral Pye said that it did not occur to him at any time between November
27 and December 7 to take the ships to sea because of the Army's inadequacy
since it was his confirmed opinion that the greatest danger was from sub-
marines (p. 169)
On December 7, 1941, Task Force One was in port, except for the SARATOGA,
which was on the West Coast. Task Force Two was at sea; the ENTERPRISE
was delivering planes to Wake; Bat. Div. One of Admiral Halsey's Task Force
Two was in port. Task Force Three was conducting operations at sea, and
Task Force Three's carrier, the LEXINGTON, had gone to Midwav to deliver
planes (page 539). The COLORADO was on the West Coast, and the PENN-
SYLVANIA was in drydock at Pearl Harbor (page 540).
Admiral Mc Morris said that one of the considerations that prompted leaving
the battleships of Task Force Two when the ENTERPRISE was sent to Wake
with Marine planes, was the possibility of a clash with some Japanese ships and
they did not want to handicap the carrier and its light forces with the slower
battleships (pages 891-2). The Fleet, he said, was operating under a schedule,
but no directive had been received to keep the Fleet in Pearl Harbor at that
particular time (page 893).
Admiral Kimmel testified that about two-thirds of the Pacific Fleet were in
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, because Task Force One and Task Force
Two overlapped in schedule for a few days (page 369).
538 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The location of the various ships in Pearl Harbor on December 7th was set
forth on a map, which is Exhibit 60. From the summary annexed to that map,
it appears that there were in port 8 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers,
29 destroyers, 8 destroyer minelayers, 4 destroyer minesweepers, 5 submarines,
1 floating drydock, 1 hospital ship, and 21 auxiliaries. It also appears that the
MARYLAND and OKLAHOMA were double berthed near Ford Island, as were
the TENNESSEE and WEST VIRGINIA, and the ARIZONA and VESTAL.
Admiral Bloch said that the berthing of ships so as to develop maximum anti-
aircraft fire was the responsibility of the senior officer embarked; the double
battleships were unavoidable (page 400).
(3) Admiral Bloch said that on December 7 all of the available battleships
were in Pearl Harbor — 8 battleships — and that those most severely damaged
were the double-berthed battleships in the outer positions at the moorings;
however, he did not think that the double berthing could have been avoided
since there were no other berths available, (p. 28)
Admiral Anderson said that air torpedo attack was the most damaging to
his battleships. The planes, he said, came from an easterly direction. As
the ships were berthed, there was a considerable number of the ship's guns
so placed that they could have borne upon the attacking torpedo planes.
Admiral Anderson said that assuming that at least one-fourth of the anti-
aircraft guns had been ready for opening fire and free to fire at will upon the
approaching planes, his estimate would be that those guns could not have
defeated nor seriously diminished the attack, (p. 397) Admiral Anderson
said that there wasn't any choice as to what the Commander Battleships
could do in assigning specific ships to specific berths. There were just about
as many berths designated available to him as there were ships, (p. 398)
Admiral Smith said that the ships were anchored in four sections because the
Army did not have enough anti-aircraft guns and it was necessary to locate the
ships so that the fire from the ships' guns would be effective. "We" knew that
the only guns that cold be fired in defense of Pearl Harbor probably were the
Navy guns (page 552).
Admiral Smith said that they had thought at the time that the Army and
Navy operating through the local defense forces were capable of furnishing
complete defense of the Pearl Harbor base against air attack but that he
now realized that they were not. (p. 42)
Admiral Brown said that knowing that the Army defenses were wholly
inadequate, he thought that the whole Fleet felt that the ships would have
to depend upon their own anti-aircraft for their own defense both at Pearl
Harbor and at sea. (p. 144)
B. THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS
Admiral Turner discussed the knowledge in the Navy Department of the
Army's condition of readiness as to anti-aircraft equipment, radar and the
like at page 260.
Admiral Kimmel testified that there were no naval guns ashore except a Marine
battery (page 283) . Admiral Kitts said that the statement in the Roberts' Report
about Navy shore batteries, at page 20, is inaccurate although there may have
been a Marine battery (pages 518, 521).
Admiral Bloch said that at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, there
was one Marine battalion which had some anti-aircraft weapons, (p. 88)
Admiral Halsey said that during the months preceding December 7, he
had been of the view that the Army did not have enough equipment or the
proper equipment to defend Pearl Harbor, particularly as to anti-aircraft
guns and fighting planes, (p. 303)
Admiral Kitts stated that the Army had charge of the shore-based anti-aircraft
batteries. In the area immediately around Pearl Harbor, the only anti-aircraft
fire on December 7th was from the ships and the fleet marine school at Palua.
The greatest strength of Army anti-aircraft guns was in mobile batteries of 3"
caliber, which had not been emplaced on December 7th and did not get in position
until after noon on December 7th. He estimated that the Army had 32 to 48
3" guns and one battery of 90 mm. guns (page 516).
He said that the Army anti-aircraft guns at Kamehameha were in action in
about 25 minutes after the attack. These were fixed position guns (page 522).
The main Army anti-aircraft guns were mobile batteries which were not in place
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 539
except one battery. He was informed that the Army's mobile anti-aircraft was
first in place at noon (page 522). The fixed guns may have been in operation
earlier.
Admiral Kitts discussed the readiness of personnel and ammunition on
shipboard and anti-aircraft batteries, (p. 191) Admiral Kitts said that the
Fleet had its full allowance of ammunition and in general its mobilization
allowance aboard at the time of the attack, (p. 192) Admiral Kitts dis-
cussed the gunnery training which had been given prior to Pearl Harbor,
(p. 193) Admiral Kitts discussed the anti-aircraft guns at Pearl Harbor,
(p. 189) and the anti-aircraft armament on ships in the Harbor, (p. 190)
The number and location of the Army's guns were, according to Admiral Bloch
(page 413) as follows:
"To my best belief and knowledge, the Army had about 80 3-inch anti-aircraft
guns, about 20 37-millimeter guns, and about 100 50-calibre machine guns — all of
these for anti-aircraft use. Of the 3-inch guns, it is my recollection that about 30
were in fixed emplacements, always mounted, and about one-half or two-thirds of
this 30 were located at forts in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. All of the other
3-inch guns, I believe, were mobile 3-inch guns; all of the 37-millimeter guns and
50-calibre guns were mobile. I cannot state with any great degree of accuracy
that none of the mobile guns were in place, but I think it is a fair statement to
make that most of them were not in place, in their designated locations. In addi-
tion to the Army guns, there were some marine guns, which were to be used in
conjunction with the Army guns. I believe that there were in the neighborhood
of 12 in Pearl Harbor on December 7. They were not mounted and not on their
sites, because they had not received their orders from the Army."
Admiral Bloch stated that the Army planned the mounting of the anti-aircraft
guns; he did not consider mounting anti-aircraft or machine guns on buildings in
Pearl Harbor, nor did he ask the Army to install guns in such places (page 416).
The Army, he said, had insufficient guns to carry out its assigned tasks under
JCD-42 (page 387).
According to Admiral DeLany, Admiral Kimmel was familiar with the
terribly weak defenses of Pearl Harbor and realized that the main defense
of the place from an air attack lay in the anti-aircraft guns of the Fleet, (p. 78)
Admiral McMorris said that although he personally felt the Army's prepara-
tions for the defense of Oahu were adequate that he thought Admiral Kimmel
had been concerned over the anti-aircraft defenses and had talked with the
Commanding General on the subject.
Colonel Phillips testified that he did not consider the material condition of
readiness of the Army adequate to defend Pearl Harbor (page 494). There was,
he said, a shortage of anti-aircraft guns (page 479).
General Marshall said that for Hawaii — 110 30-mm., 144 37-mm., and 516 50-
calibre AA guns had been ordered; on December 7, 1941, four-fifths of the 30-mm
were complete, and one-fifth of the lesser calibres (page 855).
Admiral Pye testified that there was no system of coordinating the fire between
ship and shore batteries; Sector Commanders took command of fire control and
so notified ships in their sectors (page 418).
Colonel Phillips could not recall whether there had been any plan for coordinat-
ing the Army gunfire with the Navy gunfire (page 481). The Local Joint Army-
Navy Committee made various plans, but he did not recall when they had met
last prior to December 7th (page 481).
General Short testified that no plans had been made for coordinating the gunfire
from the ships in the harbor with the Army's fire (page 228).
Admiral Kimmel testified that ComFOURTEEN had had many drills for co-
ordinating the fire of the ships in harbor with the shore fire (page 365).
C. ARMY AND NAVY CONDITIONS OF READINESS
General Short testified that the Army had three alerts — the first against sabo-
tage; the second the additional threat of submarine, surface or aircraft attack;
and the third an "all-out" alert. The alert in effect on December 7, 1941 was
Army Alert No. 1 — the anti-sabotage alert (page 228).
Admiral Bloch said that with the exception of one or two isolated cases,
there was never any sabotage at Pearl Harbor. Those cases involved dis-
gruntled sailors. There was no sabotage on the 7th of December, (p. 88)
540 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know what kind of an Army alert
was in effect although he did know that they had some kind of an alert effective
(page 326). He did not make specific inquiries of General Short as to the nature
of the alert which the Army was maintaining (page 343).
Admiral Kimmel testified that the Navy condition of readiness in effect was
condition No. 3 as set forth in 2CL-41 and an order requiring two 5-inch guns
and two 50-caliber guns on each battleship, which amounted to one-fourth of their
anti-aircraft to be manned at all times (page 278). He said that he considered
condition 3 and the measures which he had in force sufficient under the circum-
stances (page 279).
Admiral Kimmel stated that on December 7, 1941, Vice Admiral Pye was the
Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel's headquarters were
at the submarine base, and the PENNSYLVANIA was his Flagship to which
he could move on short notice (page 278). He testified that ComFOURTEEN
was to advise the Senior Officer Present Afloat of the condition of readiness to
maintain and that the Senior Officer Present Afloat was charged with the duty of
setting the condition of readiness for ships (page 365). He did not know whether
Admiral Bloch advised Admiral Pye of the condition of readiness to maintain
(page 279).
The condition of readiness of the Fleet, Admiral Kimmel testified, was not
changed after November 27th because full security measures for ships at sea
were already in effect (page 303).
The court wanted to know whether if Admiral Kimmel had increased the alert
would it have done any more than man a few anti-aircraft guns (page 1124).
He said, at best, it might have done so and it might have enabled the intercepting
fighters to come into action a little better.
Admiral Bloch stated that Condition 3 was, and for several months bad been,
in effect for the Fleet; the condition of readiness for Navy shore establishments
and aircraft was determined by each commanding officer, but there was none in
effect on December 7th, except normal day to day routine for training (page 390).
Admiral Pye stated that there was no condition of readiness set for ships in
port. His testimony before Admiral Hart that condition 3 was in effect and that
he so informed Admiral Kimmel was erroneous (page 419).
Admiral Pye said that the defenses of the Fleet were largely in the hands
of the Army and the condition of readiness was not set by the Fleet itself,
but was set by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, (p. 158)
Admiral Pye said that Condition 3 was in effect for the ships in the Harbor
on December 7, and had been prescribed previous to the last entry on the
understanding that that condition would be in effect uliless other notice
was given. He did not receive any advice from the Commandant of the
Fourteenth Naval District as to the necessity for a higher condition of readi-
ness, (p. 164-5).
However, each battleship had two 5" anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine
guns manned in addition to the anti-aircraft control (page 419). This condition
was in excess of that required by condition 3. Gun crews for manned guns were
required to be on deck near their guns with communications, including anti-
aircraft control, manned (page 422). The anti-aircraft control (director room)
was the only battle lookout. The officers and men required to remain aboard
were sufficient to man all anti-aircraft guns.
Admiral Anderson said that none of the three specific conditions of readi-
ness set forth in sub-heading G of 2CL-41 were maintained by the Fleet
while it was in Pearl Harbor during November and December. He said
that he was very clear that none of these conditions was in effect at the
time of the attack because be gave close personal attention to matters of
gun and ammunition readiness and on his own initiative he had increased
the degree of gun and ammunition readiness in the battleships. He had
established 24-hour watches on two of the eight .50 calibre guns on each
battleship, and two of the 5" anti-aircraft guns on each ship were to be
told off each day as ready guns. (p. 396) Admiral Anderson said that the
anti-aircraft batteries aboard the battleships were, generally speaking,
eight 5" anti-aircraft guns .25 calibre, and eight .50 calibre machine guns.
Also most of the ships had either four guns of three inch .50 calibre or
four quads of 1"1. (p. 397)
Admiral Bunkley said that in October, 1941, while his ship was in port,
they were not under any condition of readiness, i. e., under conditions one,
two or three. They had two machine guns manned at all times and am-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 541
munition ready for two 5" guns with the crews of those guns standing by.
They were operating under the Fleet security letter issued prior to October
and a security order for the CALIFORNIA which was designated to pre-
vent sabotage by requiring a security patrol. There were no changes
ordered prior to December 7 that he could remember, (p. 413-4)
While at sea. Admiral Bunkley said the battleships did maintain con-
ditions of readiness and it was his opinion that these precautions were
carried out both for training and because of the danger of a submarine
attack, (p. 415)
Admiral Pye said that: He was at sea on November 24th and received a dis-
patch from Admiral Kimmel and from then on until the task force entered Pearl
Harbor, all possible measures against submarine and aircraft attack were taken
(page 433). He said that Admiral Bloch only had the duty to inform him as
Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor of the necessity for a condition of readi-
ness (page 420). He did not do so (page 420).
Admiral Kitts testified that Condition 3 was in effect at sea and its equivalent
in effect in port (page 513). He said that, the condition of readiness at Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941 was equal to or better than that laid down in 2CL-41,
dealing with Port Security (page 523).
Admiral Smith said that despite the Robert's Report, the state of readiness
was adequate to meet the emergency (page '548) .
Admiral Delaney said that the condition of readiness was as set forth in 2CL-41
(page 498). He felt that this was satisfactory.
D. NUMBER AND CONDITION OF THE MEN
Admiral Bloch stated that the Army had insufficient and "green" personnel
(page 387). According to General Short, on December 7, 1941, he had 57,000
troops. He had asked for 71,500 (page 257).
. As to Navy personnel. Admiral Smith said that in his opinion (which the
Court did not seem to share), the withdiawal of men from the Fleet for the pur-
pose of filling complements and new construction had not materially decreased
the efficiency of the Fleet (page 560). The ship did have the crews that they ,
had normally held, "say a year before Pearl Harbor" (page 560) on the 85 pei cent
basis. He commented that several days after Pearl Harbor they received a
letter written shortly before Pearl Harbor from the Bureau of Personnel, refusing
to give them further men, and stating that the war was in the Atlantic.
Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel had constantly asked for addi-
tional equipment of men for the Pacific Fleet, but he adverted to a letter
received shortly after Pearl Harbor from the Chief of the Bureau of Navi-
gation, dated November 25, 1941, File No. FF12/MM.(55), (Secret-Confi-
dential File Room Bureau of Personnel) advising that the war was in the
Atlantic, (p. 38)
Admiral Smith said that the personnel and materiel shortages did not
lower the efficiency of the Pacific Fleet; he had always felt that the comple-
ments were unnecessarily large; the Fleet was adequately manned; he
considered the ships very efficient; the efficiency of the Fleet was not harmed
by the shortages; but the Commander-in-Chief was looking into the future
when he would have to send these men home for new construction, (p. 38)
Admiral Smith said that the materiel conditions of the Fleet was all right
and was satisfactory to the Commander-in-Chief, (p. 39)
Admiral Smith said that the program of alterations, as laid down by the
Materiel Bureaus of the Navy Department, did not interfere with the oper-
ations and training of the Fleet, (p. 39)
Admiral Smith said that the morale and health of the Fleet was excellent,
(p. 39)
Admiral Smith said that, in his opinion, the efficiency of the Fleet did not
suffer from too frequent changes of personnel, (p. 63)
Admiral Halsey said that one of his most vivid recollections of the period
prior to the attack was the constant effort on the part of Admiral Kimmel
and his subordinate commanders to get additional personnel and materiel.
(p. 307)
Admiral Kimmel testified that regular liberty was granted the night of December
6th-7th, i. e. three-fourths of the officers and one-half of the men had liberty.
The ones who remained were required to be trained and capable of manning anti-
aircraft guns. At the time of the attack there were 90 per cent of the men and
70 per cent of the officers aboard. There was no evidence of consequential in-
dulgence in liquor (page 330).
542 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Short testified that he knew of no unusual intoxication on the night of
December 6th, and that no effects of overindulgence v/ere apparent on the morning
of the 7th (page 269).
Admiral Delaney testified that morale in the fleet was high. The fleet had been
intensively trained under warlike conditions. Joint training with Army had been
conducted (page 496).
Admiral Kitts, who was in charge of training, stated that in his opinion the
efficiency of the ships and gunnery on December 7, 1941, was in the highest
state ever reached in time of peace (page 512). He stated that a shortage of 50-
calibre ammunition had affected the target practice of the ships. (In this con-
nection, the Court took judicial notice of the Robert's Report.) (page 518).
He said, however, that the Fleet's training and efficiency were of the highest;
subject to manpower and some ammunition shortages (page 525).
Admiral Kitts said that he was ashore on the night of December 6th- 7th, and
saw nothing out of line as to behavior or sobriety. The officers and men of the
ships were fit for duty on December 7, 1941. The high state of readiness of per-
sonnel for combat was the result of intensive training during 1941 (page 526).
Admiral Pye testified that from the viewpoint of sobriety the conduct of the
men and officers on the 6th and 7th of December was satisfactory (page 443).
Their behavior during the attack was superb (page 445). He considered that the
state of training was the highest he ever saw in the Fleet, despite shortages of
material (page 444).
Admiral Pye said that in his opinion on December 7, the Fleet was in the
highest state of efficiency that it had ever attained, (p. 149)
Admiral Calhoun said that there was no unusual or excessive drinking
on the night of December 6th, and no evidence of drunkenness on the morn-
ing of December 7th. (p. 226) Admiral Calhoun discussed the liberty
provisions over the week-end. (p. 226)
No instances of men being unfit for duty came to the attention of Admiral
Bloch (page 411). Admiral DeLany stated that in his opinion the men were
fit for duty and they performed their duty well (page 508) . According to Captain
Ramsey, all men were fit for duty and were efficient (page 607). Commander
Rochefort testified that the deportment of the officers and men was excellent
(page 476). Colonel Phillips stated that the condition of officers and men as
to sobriety was normal on December 6th-7th. All the men he came in contact
with on December 7th were fit for duty and on the job (pages 494-5).
E. THE AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE
General Short testified that the aircraft warning service was in the course of
preparation and was being operated for training which had started in October,
1941. The system was not completely installed and the personnel were not
expert. In October, 1941, he had sent fifteen men to sea with the Navy for train-
ing and the system could be counted on to do a fairly satisfactory job (pages
223-225). In addition to the radar system, they maintained 100 coast artillery
stations as lookout stations. These were not continuously manned, and were
not manned on December 7th because of the alert then in effect (page 225).
No civilian lookouts were maintained because the distances at Oahu were so
small as to make them valueless (page 227) .
General Short said that the radar stations were supposed to be effective at
ranges of from 75 to 100 miles, and that they might have been more effective if
higher station locations had been completed (page 227). On December 7th, the
aircraft warning service was being operated from 0400 to 0700 daily (page 228).
The system was operated after 0700 for training, if the personnel wished to do so
(page 263). The radar system was operated from 0400 to 0700 because he esti-
mated that that was the best time for the enemy to attack, if the enemy were
going to attack (page 265). The Interceptor Command was functioning after
November 27th on a 4:00 a. m. to 7:00 a. m. basis daily, although the Interceptor
Command was not established by written order until December 17th.
General Short testified that a request had been made for a Navy liaison officer
in the Information Center of the Aircraft warning system in August, and on
November 24th the Navy took steps to set up liaison officers. He does not recall
whether they were actually there on December 7th (page 226). He said that
Admiral Kimmel assigned Commander Curtis as Liaison Officer the day after
the request was made, but General Short felt that Admiral Kimmel did not under-
stand that he wanted a liaison oflScer actually working in the Information Center
and not a general liaison officer. Lt. Comdr. Taylor was sent to help with the
aircraft warning system (pages 261-2).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 543
Colonel Phillips said that the Interceptor Command was barely in the first
stage of organization on December 7th; there were no permanent stations, but
a mobile station was operating (page 487). Ultimately this command included
an information center, but he isn't sure whether it was set up on December 7th.
The Aircraft Warning System was operating for training from November 27th
until December 7th. He did not remember the hours they were working (page
487) , but it was in the morning.
General Marshall said that in connection with the installation of the aircraft
warning service, the plans were for six fixed and six mobile stations (page 857) .
Admiral Kimmel testified that he did everything he could to assist the Army
on the radar set-up. He sent officers to work with the Army. Army personnel
had been taken to sea for radar training. He knew that the Army radar system
was in operation and that it was far from perfect (pages 289-290). He said that
he did not know that the radar system was not to be operated after 0700 (page
290). He did not know the details of the progress of construction on the radar
system but knew that the Navy had continued pressure on the Army to get
something done on this line (page 294). The Army's radar crews, he said, were
green and untrained; the equipment was not adequate; and the warning net
needed poUshing in order to make it effective (page 304) .
Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel knew that the Army radar
station had not been functioning; it had just been completed; it had been
operating on the morning of December 7, but Admiral Kimmel hadn't known
it. (p. 41)
Admiral Smith said that he knew the Army radar could not be depended
upon to give warning of a Japanese carrier raid. (p. 44)
Admiral Kimmel testified that he was quite certain that in many conversations
which he had with General Short, he stressed the necessity for an aircraft warning
system as well as for other elements of defense (page 1128); General Short never
requested him to supply any naval operators to be used in the operation of Army
radar on Oahu,'and so far as Kimmel is concerned, he made no request of the Com-
mandant (page 1129). General Short did ask for a liaison officer in July, who
was furnished. Admiral Kimmel was informed that General Short did not in
fact request the Commandant for "watch officers;" they would have been sup-
plied, had he asked (page 1129). Admiral Kimmel did send Commander Taylor
to assist the Army (page 1130). Admiral Bloch was the proper person to handle
radar matters with the Army.
Admiral Bloch stated that the Navy liason officer who was supposed to be
supplied to the Army Interceptor Command was only one of a number to be
supplied as well by the Army (page 1146). A Navy liason officer was not there on
December 7th beause the Army had not even sent watch officers, nor had they
asked the Navy to send a watch officer. The Army Warning Service was not
actually established until December 7th (page 1147). A Navy Haison officer for
the Armj^ Interceptor Command, for the evaluation and relay of information,
was not sent until after December 7th, as the system was not set up before then,
although the agreement had required this.
Admiral Bloch said that when General Short arrived in February, he and
Admiral Bloch talked about the Army's radar system and as the net pro-
gressed to completion General Short, about September or October, told
Admiral Bloch that he had no operators, that he wanted to begin to train
operators and he wanted to know if there was anything Admiral Bloch could
do to help him. Admiral Bloch requested the Commander-in-Chief to
permit General Short to send a number of his men to sea for training which
was done. As of December, Admiral Bloch thought that the net was still
in the condition where all the kinks were not yet all out of it and they were
still training operators and could not be depended upon, but Admiral Bloch
had no knowledge as to whether they were standing any regular watches
and early in December there was no means developed for controlling aircraft
so as to differentiate by means of radar between friendly and other planes.
(p. 11-12)
As to communications, Admiral Bloch said the communication plan gotten
out in connection with 2CL called for a broadcast frequency from the Base
Defense Commander to all ships and points. All ships and stations were
required to listen at all times on that frequency. There were teletypes
between the Army Headquarters and Admiral Bloch's Headquarters with a
branch in Admiral Kimmel's office. There was telephonic communication
544 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
between Admiral Bloch's Headquarters and General Short's "Message
Center". Admiral Bloch also had such communication from the Harbor
Control and Command Posts, both at Honolulu and Pearl Harbor to the
the gates. There was also telephonic communication between the Harbor
Control and the Artillery Headquarters. There were, Admiral Bloch said,
means for rapid communication including communication from the "Inter-
ceptor Command" to Admiral Bloch's Headquarters, (p. 19)
Admiral Bloch said that there was no naval officer specifically detailed at
the Army Interceptor Command. After December 7, that Command was
staffed by calling in a lot of young women from Honolulu and training them
at that time, the Army asked for watch officers to communicate with the
Navy, although Admiral Bloch said it had been his plan that the communi-
cations would be sent by Army people to the Navy. Nevertheless, Navy
people were sent there on December 7. (p. 20)
Admiral Bloch said he did not recall that the Army radar net had ever
been used in any tactical operation, (p. 20)
Admiral Bloch said that the Army was having a great deal of trouble
getting the radar system to work; there was trouble with the electronics
and the Army came to Admiral Bloch for assistance; the Army was referred
to the Commander in Chief and an officer by the name of Taylor was sent to
help the Army in an effort on the part of the Navy to get the Army's net
going; he was not sent there with any orders as liaison and Admiral Bloch
thought that he was there only in the capacity as an expert to assist the
Army with their electrical and mechanical difficulties, (p. 20)
Admiral Bloch had no confidence in the Army radar system because he
knew that it was not completely set up; the operators were not completely
trained; and there was no way so that friendly or hostile planes could be
identified there being no IFF equipment. Admiral Bloch said that there was
a standard procedure for aircraft approach to and departure from Oahu for
Army and Navy planes and that in addition to Army and Navy planes, there
were various commercial companies operating aircraft there, (p. 20)
Admiral Bloch said that the Army had a number of observation posts on
Oahu and adjacent islands, but that these were not manned unless there
was a full alert and that not all of such posts had means of rapid communi-
cations with headquarters, (p. 20)
Admiral Bloch said that the only arrangement the Navy had for obtaining
information with respect to approaching aircraft or ships by visual observa-
tion was the signal tower, (p. 21)
Captain Ramsey stated that about a week or ten days before December 7th,
General Davidson asked Admiral Bellinger whether the Navy could furnish
officer personnel to help man the radar system for 24-hour operation and said
that if the Navy did not supply the men, he could operate only in the critical hours
of the morning and evening. The final decision was that the Navy could not supply
the officers required at that time on a permanent basis. He did not know the
reason (page 601).
Admiral Bellinger stated that he was only slightly informed as to the Army
radar sj^stera (page 686) .
Admiral Bellinger said that the Army Interceptor Command was not ready
to perform its part in the protection of Pearl Harbor from the viewpoint of the
radar installations and of their ability to control their fighter groups, the
number of planes they had, and the general quality of their pilots, (p. 131)
Commander W. G. Taylor testified that between October 1st and December
7th, he was assigned to temporarj^ duty, Commander Airforce, Pacific Fleet
(page 609). He was loaned to the Army Interceptor Command in an advisory
capacity to aid in setting up the air warning system. (3)
Admiral Halsey said that he had sent his communication officer to work
with the Army on the Army's radar system and that that officer had reported
to him that the radar system was very backward as to its state of readiness,
(p. 302)
He had had experience with the British air warning system and was familiar
with radar development at the time. In working with the Army, he worked
mainly on liaison between the air warning systems and the commands; he worked
in an advisory capacity (page 611). He had been detailed to the job at the direc-
tion of Admiral Kimmel around the middle of November, at the request of the
Army (page 622).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 545
He first reported to the Array as an advisor about the second week in November
and called a conference at which he submitted a memorandum which was pre-
pared because of the difficulty in getting the Information Center set up. (4)
Commander William E. G. Taylor completed a naval flight course and was
commissioned an Ensign in 1926; after a year's service, he resigned his
commission and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps
Reserve. He served as an instructor specializing in fighter aircraft, and was
placed on inactive duty as a Captain in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1934.
He then had various jobs as a pilot, and was commissioned a Sub-Lieutenant
in the British Naval Reserve Force in September, 1939, and thereafter
engaged in various combat operations with the British, (p. 338-340) He
said that the British fighter operations were very effectively directed while
the planes were in the air. The general assumption was that the direction
was employing a system of advanced electronics for interception of enemy
aircraft, (p. 341)
Commander Taylor, while serving with the British, made reports to
United States Naval representatives and endeavored to get as much in-
formation as he could on the methods of fire control used by the British.
(p. 342) Commander Taylor returned to the United States in an effort to
get from the British faster fighter craft which could be used by the Fleet
and the Fleet air arm. (p. 342) Commander Taylor was next transferred
to the British Royal Air Force on October 2, 1940, and was assigned to an
R. A. F. squadron known as 242 in order to get operational experience
before taking over his own squadron. He said that it was generally accepted
that the major reason for the success of the R. A. F. fighter during the so-
called Battle of Britain was the magnificent fighter direction control which
the British had. (p. 343)
During this period of service with the Royal Air Force, Commander Taylor
became more interested in the patrol system used by the British and con-
tinued to make reports to the American Naval Attache. Commander Tay-
lor said that both the American Army and the American Navy had a large
number of observers who were studying the Royal Air Force system, and
that his impression that all of the information was made available to them,
but that it did not appear that these observers brought back the full import-
ance of the method used by the British, (p. 343-4) Commander Taylor
said that he had made a full report to various officers in the Bureau of
Aeronautics and particularly sought out the officer who was at that time in
charge of radar development. Commander Taylor could arouse no interest
in the use of this radar for fighter direction, (p. 344)
In July, 1941, after having had his own squadron for six months, Com-
mander Taylor was advised by the British that because of his age they were
going to make him a Wing Commander in charge of a fighter operational
unit. He asked to be allowed to go back either to the British Navy or to be
returned to the American Navy. He was commissioned in the American
Navy in July, 1941, given a special assignment to visit several radar stations,
and reported to the Bureau of Aeronautics in August of 1941. (p. 345)
Commander Taylor was given various lecturing assignments to ships in
the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and he arrived at Pearl Harbor in October,
1941, where he spoke to Admirals Halsey and Kimmel, among others.
He lectured to the Army fighter squadrons at Wheeler Field and lectured
to the pilots of the SARATOGA and ENTERPRISE. He found that the
ENTERPRISE' fighter direction was considerably behind the British methods
but had progressed much further than any other ship. He found that the
ENTERPRISE had had their radar equipment for some time, the SARA-
TOGA had no radar, and the LEXINGTON had recently acquired radar.
In all ships equipped with radar, all hands were going through a training
period. Commander Taylor was recalled by a dispatch from Admiral
Kimmel which stated that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force,
desired Commander Taylor's assistance for technical purposes, (p. 347)
The conditions found by Commander Taylor about November 1, 1941,
as to the Army warning system, which he reported to both the Army and
the Navy prior to November 15, 1941, were as follows:
"During the first week in November, we inspected all of the installations
and plans for the air warning system and I found these facts to be true;
(1) Construction and maintenance of the air warning system was a Signal
Corps function directly under the cognizance of the Chief Signal Officer,
Staff of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. This Command
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 36
m.
" - ^ HHe Wttftiwi mi iiie waet ^mtHam mi the air waraiag
jImI Tcrr fide h^tmreaft m frptdaiag its mniilliiiM At
>^aikcr 7, IMl, dU tUs CsHaand finnh citker Oe
-aiMly Mced^l to gt* the wrk «r <rgMirrti— friyrtT
. %! '^yeraii— «f the ar vanng sf stemt — Oat is, the
.9 •I'la^ar iatev^iMi aad the c^dnl tf letter
»reeptar C<MWJsd. The laterc^tar Camaaad
'>f Ihe air wandi^ sjsteai. Akh— gh the
..if iafiKMed mi its cemyficafed ft^tions,
- fike adHce mad lead all aawHtaiice in
dialieas. They seemed relativelT im-
■; aet:4ed freat the CommaafiB* Gen-
'.ir Carps aad aoe Captain of the
'.Varmag Scheol at Mitchell Field.
- i*. I worked. Both were capa-
■.een hotiTs a day, seven days
>, V n of the air warning sjstem.
'-4 ieattoas system were largely
f '■ -1^ wgK temporary. However,
•^{round radio equipment,
- later proved. 5 There
w<rr«r f*ni7 b'- .liirnhftih in tiife Hawaiian area. These
•r«(f/i;jr'«-.':»?; - ,,.t ihre*; months. The five sets were
ifty.'; -<;li .-.itfcd as terrain would permit and were
iht 'I t'ttHT the entire seaward search for the
J^l;; ■ ' ',.i;jr ' . it>.*:jf wa% inferior to any I had seen before.
'fh' th<: «:qoipni<rnt, howevfcr, was due to crude mechanical
t.ot..;. . — ■ /■ than to any elf:clronic fault. This made the operation
of th<r t-nniprninl diffjr.uJl and sslow, with the result that the reported azi-
muth rtzAfiinna vnt-rc fr<:quently very inaccurate and the reports were slow
)n eofoing Jo. 'JJi«: ftquipm<-nl had a reliable range of eighty to one hundred
miUr«. A "d<rad" area eiinted through a fifteen miles radius from the
(equipment. It wa*. tberrfore, impossible to pick up aircraft plots within
tb«t firi:l fifteen mileit off shore. At each radar station, there was at least
one officer or nergeant well trained to operate and maintain the equipment.
In addition, there were heven or eight other enlisted operators under in-
titrrjr.lion at each s-.tation. All stations were under-manned for twenty-four
op<-ration. At the time of my inspection, either commercial or Signal Corps
field t<-l«:phone linesj had been installed between the radar .stations and
the Information Center. 'ftj The Information ''.enter itself had been
planned on an Area Command scale similar to the lioston ar .New York
Information < enters and was loo large in scope to efTeclively handle raids
on the umall Island of Oahu. 'Ihe building was a temporary, wooden
building and bad been just be<-n completed at the time of my inspection.
I b<- rom;riuriiralioris <(jijipmenl was mostly field tebtphone «;quipment of
Ihr type develop«d during the last war. Positions had beegn provided for
controllers ntnl liaison olficers, but liaison command lines had not been
inelnlbd. 'Ih<-se wire not installed, primarily, because the activities at
which the liaison command lines were to terminate were uninformed as
(o Ibe purpose concerning the air warning system and because the Com-
mnnding <<eneral had not taken the steps to coordinate these activities
with the siir warning system. The Sigfial Corps had furnished sufiicient
plollers to man two walrbes only. These were just starling Iheir training
at Ihe time <»f my i/iiiperlinn. '1 ln-re were no controllers or liaison olFicers
available at this lime and no provisions had been made to provide them.
<7) The anti-aircraft batteries bad installed a command post but no liaison
had been etilablislied between the anti-aircraft command and the Infor-
mation Center. (H) .No atleinpl had bec^n mad(! to secure control of Ihe
untUaircrufl gunn of nhips in harbor. I'J) No liaison had been established
belwiiii the RearclillghlH and the Information (enter. (10) No attempt
bad been made Iri dinperse the light<r Hi|uadrons at Wheeler I'ield. (II) No
niiloniiilic aircraft rerognilion system wjih installed which would identify
nil types of aircraft. (12; .No aircrjift iipjiroacii bine syslcm had been
planne<l. fl.'S; No Kyste.rn for identifying aircraft approaching Oahu by
reporln from parent aviation aclivilleH bad been organi/.ed. (Hj No viHual
oboerverM reporting syMlem bad been organi/.ed. . ."
"Ity llecember 7, I'Jil , all telephone lommuniration lines had Iteen in stalled
with Ihe exception of the ( ivillan Air Kitid Precaution Command lines, and
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT IXQUIBT .547
the command lines from the Information Center to five fielder sfHadroB
dispersal points at Wheeler Field. Direct command lines were nstaOed
from Liaison positions in the Information Center to the varions Army and
Navy commands and activities. The civilian line had not be«n completed
due to the fact no air raid center had been set up in Honolulu. The comjnand
lines to the fighter dispersal points were not completed, due to switchboard
complications at Wheeler Field. Two fighter squadrons were dispersed, one
at Bellows Field and one at Haliena Field. The dispersal of the remabuni
fighter squadrons was awaiting installation of command Lines. An exceCent
liaison had been established between the .\rmy anti-aircraft batteries three
and five inch and searchlights. About 15 November. I was instructed by
CinCPac s Staff to request control of anti-aircraft guns of ships in harbor
from Com 14. This request was refused by Com 14 on the grotmds that
'No Army organization would control guns on any naval vessel. If anythisg
comes over, we will shoot it down. However, this control was voluntarily
ttirned over to the Information Center on December 9. after ships' guns had
shot down USS ENTERPRISE aircraft. At the same time. I was also
instructed by CinCPac to request naval liaison officers for the Lnformatiom
Center from Com 14. His Chief of Staff informed me that these liaison
officers should come from the Fleet. I was referred to Commander. Patrol
Wing Two. I was told by Commander. Patrol Wing Two. that no liaison
officers were available in that Command. I returned to CinCPac and re-
ported my failure to obtain naval liaison officers. CinCPacs Operations
Officer informed me that he would take steps to find some. These officers
did not report to the Information Center untU December S. I was further
instructed by CinCPac to confer with Commander. Patrol Wing Two. in order
to establish an aircraft identification system and aircraft approach lanes to
Oahu. A conference was held at the Information Center, between November
15 and 29. at which officers from all flying activities were present to discnss
these matters. It was decided by the aviation activities concerned that these
systems would not be put into effect until war was declared, because it was
felt that activating these systems prior to that time would complicate crowded
flying conditions and hinder flying training. The .\rmy stated that move-
ments of aircraft from the United States to the Southwest Pacific were secret,
and it was. therefore, not desirable to report those movements at that lime.
It should be noted that without an aircraft movement reporting system to the
Information Center, it was impossible for the Information Center to determine
whether radar reports were of friendly or of hostile aircraft. CinCPac s
Operations Officer stated, however, that their Operations Office was prepared
to report the movements of aircraft under their cognizance at any time this
information was requested. Some doubt existed as to whether the Signal
Corps I Hawaiian Department or Interceptor Command should furnish
controllers. As no controllers seemed to be forthcoming from the Hawaiian
Department. Interceptor Command decided to use Squadron Commanders
as controllers at the Information Center. These officers were heavily occu-
pied with training their squadrons and were seldom available for controller
training. However, no other soun-e of controllers seemed to exist. Bomber
Command. G. H. Q., and G-2 liaison officers were not made available until
several days after December 7, when their importance at the Information
Center was finally realized. Interceptor Command had taken the initiatJTe
in the training of Information Center plotters. This training was prvgressug
satisfactorily when, during the last week in November, the Comrauidaif
General. Hawaiian Department, ordered that the radar stations would operate
only between 0400 and 0700. 1 was informed that the decision to limit the
operating hours was made to prevent breakdown of the radar equipment
from prolonged operation. Training which had been conducted from Oi^OO
to 1700 daily only, duo to the shortaiie o( radar operators and plotters, was
necessarily limited to the hours of 041HV-O70O by the order. The Informatioa
Center, therefore, virtually ceased to function except during those hours- I
informed CinCPacs Operations Othcer of the situaiion as it existed on about
1 December and was told that in view of the failure of the responsible com-
mnnders to take action to provide necessary personnel and to aciivato the
Information Center on a twenty-four basis, he would initiate a letter rt^quest-
ing the Commanding (leneral. Hawaii.in Department, to take action imme-
diately. 1 do not know whether this letter was ever written, or not. How-
ever, no action was taken up to Docotuber 7. " ^1^- oo0-o5l^
548 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander Taylor said that there was a 15-mile dead area around Oahu
in which the Army radar would not function. Prior to December 7 there
was no visual system to supplement that weakness, (p. 351)
Commander Taylor said that the Army's radar operators and maintenance
men at radar stations were insufficient in number and were not fully trained
even up to December 7. (p. 352)
Commander Taylor said that he had asked the Navy for six liaison officers
for the Information Center, and on December 8 he received ten who were
survivors from the CALIFORNIA. He had also asked ComFOURTEEN
to whom he was directed by the Commander in Chief's Staff, that control of
the anti-aircraft guns on naval vessels in the harbor should be held by the
Information Center; also that some action be taken to identify aircraft
approaching Oahu; and that a letter be sent to the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, to expedite putting the Information Center on a 24-
hour basis, (p. 352)
Commander Taylor said he made full reports to the Staff of the Commander
in Chief as to the inadequacy of the Army Air warning system, (p. 352)
He was quite sure that the Commander in Chief's Staff fully realized the
situation.
His recommendation in regard to the Army air warning sj^stem was made on
November 24, 1941. The memorandum containing his recommendation was
introduced in evidence, marked Exhibit 62, and read to the Court. This covered
a meeting held for the purpose of determining how quickly tlie Information
Center could be made fully operative on a wartime basis; attended by Army
and Navy officers who agreed as to the importance of the Center and as to the
necessity for liaison watch officers from each activity to transmit information;
information was to be drawn from various sources including naval aircraft; the
system was being operated 0700 to 1130 but should be on a full-time basis;
ComFOURTEEN should be approached with a view of obtaining naval liaison
officers; confusion during exercises due to the number of planes could be controlled
(1) by haA'ing all flights reported by parent units; (2) by enforcing aircraft ap-
proach procedure; (3) by requiring approaching planes to report at least 60 miles
l)efore coming in (CincUS had ordered radio silence of all aircraft during joint
exercises, this was to be discussed for a decision as to its value) ; IFF was not
available; the question of gun control of ships in port was to be discussed with
CincUS; also it was decided to investigate the possibihty of using naval radar
to supplement land radar in an emergency.
Very little was done as a result of this memorandum, he said, because they
were unable to get more personnel. It was the Army's duty to supply personnel,
with the exception of the Navv liaison officers (page 619). He personally re-
quested CincPac's, ComFOURTEEN's Chief of Staff and Admiral BeUinger to
supply liaison officers and was told that they were not available, but would be
ordered to report to the Information Center as soon as possible. Liaison officers
were essential to the proper dissemination of information (page 620). Tlieir
absence here, however, actually made little difference so far as the Navy liaison
was concerned.
Commander Taylor said that the air warning system could have been made
operative sooner if there had been some impetus behind it with enougli power to
get the things needed (page 621). This impetus should have come from the
Hawaiian Department, U. S. Army. He ramained with the Army for one month
after December 7th, and at the end of seven days the Information Center was
running smoothly. The war made it easier to get liaison officers (page 621).
Even if information from the radar were properly plotted, it would have been
impossible to tell if planes were Japanese or whether they were United States
planes; without some method of identification, radar cannot tell friend from foe.
The Information Center is for the purpose of determining what friendly planes
are in the air so that if a radar track is picked up that does not correspond to
the course of the friendly planes it is presumed that it is the track of enemy planes.
The radar equipment of the Armj', he said, was adequate to do a fair job in
the morning. Communication between the air warning sj'stem and the other
organizations was in, except for some of fighter dispersal areas and the lines to
the civilian air warning. Communications between fighter director officers and
fighter aircraft were inadequate to control fighters more than five miles off shore.
The Army radar operators vv^ere well trained. For some time prior to December
7th, the radar had been operated from 0800 to 1630 in the afternoon, but shortly
before December 7th, General Short gave orders to close down the radar stations
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 549
except between the hours of 4:00 a. m. and 7:00 a. m. (page 611). He understood
the change was made to save the equipment.
On December 7th, there were no permanent radar installations on Oahu; there
were five mobile sets (page 624). The permanent equipment was there, but it
would take some time to put it in (page 624).
He stated that the Information Center of the air warning system was not ade-
quately set up prior to December 7th, and they were in the process of teaching
controllers (page 612).
At no time were there sufficient numbers of well-trained personnel to operate the
radar station even partially (page 625). The Robert's Report is incorrect in
stating that there were sufficient partially trained personnel on November 27th
to operate the system twenty-four hours a day (page 626). There were insufficient
well-trained personnel to operate even partially at any time. They could get
fairly good 360° coverage, and he believed that in no case could a large raid come
in undetected (page 626) .
The Chief Signal Officer, U. S. Army, was in charge of the radar, and the Navy
assisted in setting up an air warning system, except that they had not furnished
liaison officers (page 615). The radar was entirely under the control of the Army;
his duties were advisory (page 616). At the time he came in contact with the
Army, the Information Center was being organized by two junior Army officers
who worked hard to get the system into operation but did not have enough force
to get what they needed from various commands to get the station operating
(page 627).
There was not sufficient personnel to operate the radars twenty-four hours a
day, although he felt that the station should be operated twenty-four hours a day,
fully manned. There were just enough sets to cover the area of Oahu. If any
one set had gone out, it would have meant the loss of that coverage, (page 617)
Concerning the Army radar system, Admiral DeLany said that they did
not rely upon it for any information because the radar itself had just been
installed and was being used for training operators, (p. 80)
Captain Curts discussed his connection with the development of radar from
1936 to 1938 and the disclosure of the Navy's developments to the Army in
about 1937. (p. 110) Captain Curts discussed the status of the Army radar in
November 1941 at Pearl Harbor. He did not know what delayed the Army
generally in securing radar. The Army's problem in connection with radar
was much simpler than the Navy's; he informed Admiral Kimmel that the
Army radar was not in an operational but was merely in an instruction status
prior to December 7. (p. Ill)
Admiral Anderson said that it was the Army's mission primarily to defend
Pearl Harbor and that he had no exact knowledge as to the readiness to
repel air attack; he was not familiar with the state of readiness of the air
warning net.
F. ships' radar
Admiral Kimmel testified that some of the ships in Pearl Harbor on December
7th were equipped with radar, but it was not manned because it was ineffective
due to the surrounding hills (page 331).
Admiral Pye said that the PENNSYLVANIA and CALIFORNIA were equip-
ped with radar (page 422). The efficiency of this radar was good. The ships'
radar could not be used in port because of the surrounding hills and buildings.
Admiral Pye said that after the beginning of the war, the PENNSYL-
VANIA Avhile at sea had picked up planes with radar and tracked them for a
distance of 85 miles, (p. 168)
Admiral Smith said that the ships' radar was of no use in port (page 559).
He stated that two carriers which were outside had radar, but picked up nothing,
and that Admiral Halsey on his trip to Midway and return had an air search to a
radius of 300 miles and picked up nothing (page 559). To have stationed a ship
clear of Pearl Harbor with radar would have been ineffective due to the 65-mile
range of the radar, and to station a cordon for that purpose would have been
ineffective and very dangerous because of the risk of attack on the ships (page
559). However, he did not recall consideration of this at the time.
Captain Ramsey stated that the CURTIS, from her berth in Pearl Harbor,
could cover the 150°-160° arc to southward with her radar for a distance depend-
ing on the altitude of the target (page 603) .
Commander Taylor said that the radar equipment in the Navy was excellent
prior to December 7, 1941, but the operators of radar were, in general, inex-
550 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
perienced (page 610). In a land-locked harbor with mountains around it, per-
formance of radar equipment aboard ship was not good (page 614). In Pearl
Harbor, the ships' radar might work, and again — it might not. It would be
affected by mountains to the north as to performance to the south (page 614).
G. STEPS TAKEN BY COMMANDER LOCAL NAVAL DEFENSE FORCE
Admiral Kimmel testified that Admiral Bloch's performance of duty as Naval
Base Defense Officer was satisfactory (page 285). He was to advise of the condi-
tion of readiness, but this did not reheve the Senior Officer Present Afloat from
fixing the condition of readiness (page 286) .
Admiral Bloch, he said, was designated as Naval Base Defense Officer and was
to command the Naval forces in the event of an attack, and also for necessary
drills (page 289). Admiral Kimmel testified that Admiral Bloch had nothing
suitable for reconnaissance (page 356), and that planes were available to Admiral
Bloch only for drill or in an emergency (page 354), but that he should have asked
for planes if he considered them necessary for long range reconnaissance, and
could have asked for submarines or surface ships for such use (pages 354-5). He
said that Admiral Bloch had available four old destroyers, four small minesweepers,
three coast guard cutters, and the SACRAMENTO (page 361).
Admiral Bloch testified that the forces assigned to him as a local defense force
were four old destroyers, four small minesweepers, three Coast Guard cutters,
the SACRAMENTO, one net vessel, one gate vessel, two self-propelled oil lighters,
and a few small tugs and small craft. This force was not adequate to perform
the Navy's task under JCD-42 (page 386). He had no surface or aircraft for
offshore patrol and had no attack force.
Admiral Bloch said that CincPac was his immediate superior in command
(page 388). He stated his responsibility under 2CL-41 and what steps had
been taken so as to discharge this responsibility. These were an agreement
which had been made with the Army regarding the use of planes, and drills held
pursuant thereto, marine anti-aircraft had been made available to the Army,
arrangements had been made at Navy installations to emplace Army guns (which
were not emplaced prior to the attack) and to take care of those gun crews; about
twenty-six 3" anti-aircraft guns had been emplaced by the Army near Pearl
Harbor; air control had been arranged for through Commander Patrol Wing Two;
in drills the Senior Officer Present Afloat had been advised of what condition of
readiness to maintain and this was Admiral Bloch's responsibilitj' ; bi-weekly drills
had been held with the Army during the Autumn and up to December 7th; a
Communications plan, including air raid alarm signal, had been planned and exe-
cuted in drills (page 390).
On the 7th of December, 1941, certain features of the Joint Coastal
Frontier Defense Plan for the Hawaiian Department plan were in effect,
Admiral Bloch said:
"Actually, on the 7th of December, certain features of that plan were in
effect. For instance, by the plan, the Navy in paragraph 18 (a) was required
to furnish inshore patrol. We had an inshore patrol working on 7 December.
By (b), we were required to have offshore patrol. An offshore patrol of an
intermittent character, forces being furnished by the Commander-in-Chief
of the U. S. Fleet, was in effect at that time, usually at the time of sortie.
(c) and (d) were not in effect, except (d) was partially in effect by this joint
air agreement we held, as we usually had a lot of wheeled fighting planes on
shore which, at the time of attack, would be turned over to the Army, (e),
which is the harbor control post, was effective and in active operation, (f),
which was installation and operation of an underwater defense, was effective.
We had some buoys, sono-buoys. I'm not sure whether the magnetic loops
had been laid, or not. I think they had been and were in operation. Nets,
torpedo nets, at the entrance to both Honolulu and Pearl Harbor were in
operation, (h), sweeping channels and mine fields: they were swept every
day. ^ (i) distant reconnaissance: the district had no forces capable of per-
forming that task, as the Commander-in-Chief and the Navy Department
knew. We had been informed that 108 patrol planes would be furnished
us at the earliest possible date but none had come to Pearl Harbor, and I
believe, on that particular point, that I had asked Admiral Kimmel about the
distant reconnaissance and asked him if he would furnish me patrol planes,
and he told me he would do what he could, but he couldn't make any promises
of furnishing a force because there was a possibility of the Fleet leaving and
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 551
taking its forces with it. (k) maintenance of guard against sabotage: that
was effective. (1) : with regard to supplying local communication service
for prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence, that was being worked
on and largely effective, (m) : all preparations had been made to assume
censorship of the part that the Navy was to assume censorship of and was
put into effect immediately after the attack, (o) : supply and hospitalization
provisions had been made for that."
Captain Curts said in substance that the communications between Head-
quarters and the ships were the same as they would have been if Head-
quarters had been maintained aboard the PENNSYLVANIA. Captain Curts
discussed communications arrangements with the Army and with aircraft
and with the air station at Kaneohe Bay. (pp. 105-107)
General Short testified that he thought the Navy was operating an inshore
patrol and was sending out task forces on offshore patrol during the period from
October 16th to December 7th, and that harbor patrol posts were established
and the channel was being swept (page 234) . (2)
Admiral Bloch said that he gave General Short no reason for believing
that the Navy forces at sea would give adequate warning against a hostile
attack, (p. 21)
Admiral Bloch stated that there was no inner air patrol on the morning of
December 7, 1941. He had asked the Navy Department for four observation sea
planes for this purpose (page 407) . He had no planes under his direct command.
¥ H. ARMY AIRCRAFT
General Short testified that his aircraft defenses were verj' inadequate and that
he had on December 7th, twelve B-17's, only six of which were in commission. In
addition to the six available B-17's, he had ten A-20's, and 50 B-18's, which he
characterized as death traps against a modern plane, only twenty-four of which
were in commission. He had asked the War Department for more planes (pages
223,224,231).
On December 7th, General Short testified, the Army pursuit planes were in a
state of routine training except for the alert against sabotage (page 228). Not
being alerted for combat, it required 55 minutes for the Army aircraft to get into
action on December 7th (page 229). General Short testified that on December
7th, the Army maintained no inshore patrol except as incidental to training. One
squadron of planes, he said, did have ammunition right next to the planes (page
229). The long range bombers which he had were available for cooperation with
the Navy. The B-17's were good for a 1200 mile radius if they carried bomb
loads.
Colonel Phillips testified that on December 7th, the Army had about twelve
planes sendable for distant reconnaissance (page 484), and a squadron of small
reconnaissance planes (page 485). He said that there was a shortage of Army
planes (page 479).
General Marshall said that for the Hawaiian project 148 pursuit planes were
scheduled: there were 99 P-40's and 46 P-36's there on December 7th. The
commander had asked for 180 long range bombers but shortages prevented reaching
this figure. There were 12 B-17's there on December 7th (page 855).
Admiral Kimmel testified that during his tour of duty, the effective Army pur-
suit planes had been increased from none to 100 and that only six Armj' B-17's
were available on December 7th (page 289). He said that in November, 1941, the
War Department had ordered the transfer of certain B-17's from Oahu to the
Philippines, which left only twelve at Oahu, six of which were available for use
(page 290).
Admiral Kimmel stated that the best defense the Army had against an attack
such as the attack which in fact was made, was pursuit planes, and that the Army
did not have sufficient planes or crews (page 331). He estimated that on De-
cember 7th the Army needed three times the number of pursuit planes they had
at Oahu (page 371).
Admiral Bloch said that in his opinion the Army did not have an adequate
number of fields to disperse their fighters on; their main fighter field was
Wheeler Field; they had another at Bellows Field and an improvised field
in the neighborhood of Haleiwa; and Admiral Bloch had recommended that
the Navy release a field at Kahuku Point, (p. 21)
Admiral Bloch believed that on December 7 the LEXINGTON, the EN-
TERPRISE, the SARATOGA and the YORKTOWN were away from Pearl
552 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Harbor and had their planes with them so that there were only about 70
Marine fighting planes at Pearl Harbor at the time. How many were avail-
able that morning, he did not know. (p. 25)
Admiral Bloch said that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air
Force, General Martin, had told him that he only had three planes available
for inshore air patrol; he could not use the Army bombers because they could
not see, and he could not use the fighters because they couldn't carry bombs
and could not see very well either; Admiral Bloch believed that one of the
three planes cracked up before December 7. (p. 25)
Admiral Bloch's recollection of the number of Army bombers available on
December is set forth on page 25.
Admiral Smith said that they did not have a very high regard for the ability
of the Army fighter and bomber pilots; that they considered, apart from anti-
aircraft gunfire, that the most efficacious defense against air attack would
be from the Navy's own carrier planes; since the carriers were away with
their planes, he said, he would have sensed, if he had realized the danger of
an air raid, that there was no security for Pearl Harbor aside from the anti-
aircraft gunfire, (p. 44)
The Army aircraft. Admiral McCormick said, were insufficient in number
and limited in usefulness because they lacked some navigational equipment
and had some weakness in radio. The comparative efficiency of personnel,
was not in his mind at the time. (p. 72)
During his discussion of the Army aircraft. Admiral Davis said that pro-
visions for command in the air were still only of a general nature and there
had been no real development along that line by drills, although drills had
been held. There were two reasons for this : first, that the air warning net and
radar system had not been actually placed in operation and secondly, that
the Hawaiian area had not been placed on the basis of unity of command so
that, human nature being what it is, progress along the lines of mutual drills
was slower that it might have been. (p. 100)
Admiral Pye said that it was definitely known that the air forces available
to the Army and the aircraft installations were below those which were con-
sidered necessary for proper defense, (p. 163)
Commander Taylor said that, in his opinion, there were sufficient numbers
of fighter aircraft at Oahu to repel a number of aircraft that actually attacked
Pearl Harbor on December 7, and that the quality of the fighter aircraft
was such as not to outperform the Japanese fighters, but the performance
was sufficient, he believed, to have been able to break up, to a large extent,
a raid of the sort which came in. Commander Taylor said that about 50
percent of the fighter pilots of the Interceptor Command were well trained:
the other percent were green, (p. 353)
I. THE SUBMARINES
Rear Admiral Withers, Commander Submarines, stated that the submarines
were engaged in training for war. They were assigned to task forces for training
and trained with other ships.
He considered his force mobilized on December 7th, and the condition of the
personnel was exceUent (page 1087). The submarines were ready for war but
there was no particular condition of readiness in effect.
He generally kept about one-third of the submarines at Pearl Harbor (page
1085). The total number of submarines which he had was 32, 18 of which were
based at Hawaii. Some of these were on the West Coast for overhaul (page 108).
Twelve submarines had gone to Manila early in November, 1941 for observation,
and to be in position should war come (page 1084). On December 7th two
submarines were off Midway and two off Wake. There was no line of submarines
out to cover the area surrounding Hawaii (page 1084). Only five submarines were
at Pearl Harbor (pages 1088-9). Five submarines were inadequate to throw a
scouting force around Hawaii (page 1089).
J. RECONNAISSANCE AIRPLANES AND AIR RECONNAISSANCE
The responsibility for long range reconnaissance, the readiness of aircraft and
drills, the extent of the actual reconnaissance and the extent of reconnaissance
which could have been undertaken during the period November 27th to December
7th have been discussed at pages 77-85, supra.
The court inquired whetlier Admiral Kimmel's reason for not using planes for
distant reconnaissance was not that the presence of foreign carriers was neither
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 553
known nor suspected. He agreed (page 380). There were no inner air patrol
flown on December 7, 1941, stated Admiral Kimmel (page 375). As to distant
reconnaissance, he said that the planes available to the Army and Navy had been
lumped for defense but there were not enough to perform distant reconnaissance
effectively. A total of 81 patrol planes and twelve B-17's were in the area. Of
this number, 61 patrol planes and six B-17's were available on Oahu immediately
prior to the attack. There were twelve patrol planes operating from Midway.
The number was not sufficient "on a requirement of 84 planes" for 360° patrol
based on 15 mile visibility. The inadequacy had been reported and more planes
asked for; they did the best they could. He thought that there were a number
of planes searching on December 7th in the operating areas and some engaged in
maneuvers with our own submarines — he was told that there were about a dozen
in the air (page 374). Midway was running a reconnaissance, as much as they
could with 12 planes. He estimated that not more than 50 patrol planes on Oahu
were in flying condition on December 7th.
Admiral Bellinger said that on December 7, 1941, the actual situation of the
planes was as follows: There were 7 planes in the air conducting search between
120°-170° to a distance of 450 miles from Midway; there were four planes on the
surface of Midway armed with two 500-pound bombs, and on ten-minute notice; at
Oahu, there were 12 planes of Vp-11 ready for flight on four hours notice; VP-12
had six planes ready for flight in 30 minutes notice, and 5 ready for flight on 4
hours notice; VP-14 had 3 in the air on security patrol, 3 ready for flight on 30
minutes notice, and 4 ready on 4 hours notice; VP-22 had 12 ready for flight on
4 hours notice; VP-23 had 11 ready for flight on 4 hours notice; VP-24 had 4
planes in the air conducting tactics with submarines, and 1 ready for flight on
30 minutes notice (page 684).
Admiral Bellinger described his duties on December 7, Planes normally
under his command consisted of a total of 81 planes on December 7. (p, 115).
On December 7, he said, there were 36 planes at Kaneohe Air Station,
33 planes at Pearl and 12 at Midway. Twelve of the planes at Pearl had
returned on December 5 from an extensive tour of duty at Midway and
Wake. They had been sent there about October 17. He did not believe that
any of the patrol planes were dispatched to the outlying islands after Novem-
ber 27 except in connection with sending Marine planes by carrier to Wake
where one squadron was sent. (p. 116).
Admiral Bellinger said that on December 7, 58 of the 81 planes were in
commission, nine were under repair and fourteen were in the air. (p. 117).
Admiral Bellinger discussed the conditions of readiness of the airplanes
and the report of availability of Army and Navy planes on December 5 and
6. (pp. 125 and 126).
Admiral Bellinger said that after the attack, the Army communicated with
the Army planes and the Navy communicated with the Navy planes. He
also discussed the communication difficulties between Pearl Harbor and the
Naval Air Station at Kaneohe. (p. 123).
There was no inner patrol around the entrances of Pearl Harbor on the morning
of December 7th (page 685), and there were no planes available to him, either
Army or Navy for that purpose (page 685).
Captain Ramsey said that units of the Army bombardment d,ivision and of
Marine bombardment aviation reported daily planes available to Naval Base
Defense Air Force, when functioning. The Base Defense Air Force only came
into existence in an emergency or for drill purposes. ComFOURTEEN or
CincPac could vitalize this Base Defense Air Force (pages 574-6). Some order
by oflficer senior to Admiral Bellinger was necessary (page 576). Pat Wings One
and Two were under Admiral Bellinger's command, of course.
Exhibit 53 was the basic operations plan of Naval Base Defense Force and was
in effect on December 7th (page 576). Annex B to Operations Plan No. 1-41
was issued pursuant to this plan, and Addendum 1 to Operating Plan No. lA-41
was an estimate of the situation prepared by Admiral Bellinger and General
Martin, covering the situation at the end of March, 1941 (page 577). (Para-
graph 3(b) of this addendum stated that an air attack was the most likely and
dangerous form of attack on Oahu, etc.). He considered this estimate sound,
and that if any attack came on Oahu, it would come by air, which would be the
only effective way to attack (pages 578-9).
The general condition of readiness of aircraft was "Baker 5," 50% available
on four hours notice, between November 27th and December 7th, but many
units were in a higher condition and some airplanes were actually in the air (page
579).
554 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
He had no records from which he could refresh his memory as to the condition
of readiness but gave isolated examples (page 580) ; Pat Wing Fourteen was in
the air, conducting search of the operating area on December 7th, he did not
remember whether there were three or four; there were about six planes of Pat-
Wing Two in the air, conducting tactics with the submarines in the "sanctuary
over that island." (page 585). There was a ready squadron, planes lined up
and presumably ready to take the air in 30 minutes, which was to be relieved at
8 o'clock by another from Kaneohe (page 580) .
The readiness question was one in fact decided by higher authority (page 581).
He could not say whether directly by CincPac or Commander Naval Base Defense
Force. In ordinary drill practice the drill message placing the organization on an
activated status came from the latter; then they would send a dispatch to all
units making aircraft available to Naval Base Defense Air Force, and start
issuing drill orders. Planes in the air were to be sent immediately to search
sectors. At the end they would send a message, "Resume normal condition
of readiness." At least once in a while he was on that job (it appears he was there
at least as early as November 1, 1941, but may have been there earlier, see page
575) the condition of readiness was changed to a higher degree. He could not
recall who sent the message, but it was some higher authority and the change was
from "Cast" to "Baker" (page 581).
Under normal operating conditions the planes available for the Naval Base
Defense Air Forces were under different commanders.
The Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force never had planes assembled
under his command except for drill or emergency and, theiefore, except in these
cases, he had no opportunity to set the condition of readiness (page 582).
He also said that aside from the ready squadron at Ford Island, the other
patrol craft there were in various position: some were ready for launching, some
being repaired, some in hangers for long repair or modification (page 585) .
On the morning of December 7th, six planes at Midway were scouting to cover
task forces there and six on the water fully manned and loaded with live bombs
(page 585).
He stated that dispersal of patrol planes was impracticable on land or in harbor
(page 585).
According to Captain Hamsey, on the morning of the 7th, patrol planes cover-
ing operating areas were under orders to depth bomb submerged submarines
outside the sanctuary without a close escort. He said that for several months
prior to December 7th, the planes of Pat Wing Two flew armed. All planes on
search of operating areas, by order of CincPac, carried live depth charges (page
604). The Army planes were usually armed (page 604).
He said that before December 7th, he had only one officer assistant; after, he
had 42 officer assistants (page 608). They were available later because their
ships had been sunk.
General Short testified that one of the most important, things the Navy was
supposed to do was long range reconnaissance (page 228). He said that from
October 16th to December 7th, he thought the Navy was operating an inshore
patrol and was sending out task forces on offshore patrol, harbor patrol, posts
were established and channels were being swept. There was a plan for Navy
long distance reconnaissance and drills were held once a week (page 234). He
said the joint air plan was effective March 1941 (page 234).
General Short testified that he did not know what Admiral Bloch did with
respect to distant reconnaissance. Under the agreement, if the Navy planes
were insufficient for such reconnaissance, the Navy could have asked the Army
for planes (page 237). The Navy made no request of General Short for planes
for distant reconnaissance, although General Short conferred with the Navy on
December 1st, 2nd and 3rd (page 251).
General Marshall said that heavy Army bombers had been delayed because of
delay at the manufacturing plants and, after delivery, unexpectedly strong winds,
adverse to Hawaii, kept the planes at the West Coast for three weeks. The
initial squadron arrived in the middle of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
(pages 681-2).
XXXIII. The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor
This investigatioru developed the following evidence regarding the sighting of Jap
submarines in and around Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 {Exhibits 18, 75,
76):
At 0342, 7 December 1941, the USS CONDOR, a minesweeper, sighted a sub-
marine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. This was in a defensive
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 555
sea area where American submarines had been restricted from operating submerged.
When sighted, the submarine was proceeding toward the entrance buoys. It was
about 100 feet from arid on a collision course with the CONDOR, but turned
sharply to port. The CONDOR simultaneously turned to starboard.
The CONDOR reported the incident by blinker to the USS WARD between 0350
and 0358. The WARD was a destroyer of the Inshore Patrol then engaged in
patrol duty off the entrance to the harbor. The CONDOR then continued on its
assigned mission. The message to the WARD read:
"Sighted submerged submarine on westerly course speed 9 knots"
After receiving this visual, signal, the WARD made a sonar search for about an
hour and a half, without result. It then communicated by radio with the CON-
DOR, asking:
"What was the approximate distance and course of the submarine that you
sighted!"
At 0520 the CONDOR replied:
"The course was about what ive were steering at the time 020 magnetic and
about 1000 yards from the entrance apparently heading for the entrance"
In response to further inquiries made by the WARD between 0521 and 0536, the
CONDOR advised again that the last time it had sighted the submarine it was at
about 0350 and that it was apparently headed for the entrance. On receiving the
message giving the submarine's course as about 020 magnetic, the captain of the
WARD realized that his search had been in the wrong direction. He then con-
tinued searching, but again without result.
The CONDOR made no report of the incident, except to the WARD. The cap-
tain considered that the identification at that time was not positive enough to make
a report to other than the Senior Officer Present Afloat. The Senior Officer Present
Afloat, Lieutenant Commander Outerbridge, who commanded the WARD, made
no report to higher authority. The captain of the WARD thought that the COA-
DOR might have been mistaken in concluding that he had seen a submarine (p.
87-92,428-429).
The radio conversation between the WARD and CONDOR was overheard
and transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, a radio
station then under the jurisdiction of the Commander, Inshore Patrol, 14th
N. D. (Ex. 18.) Since the conversation was solely between the ships and was
not addressed to the Section Base and no request was made that it be relayed,
the Bishop's Point Radio Station did not relay or report it to higher aut'nority.
The loudspeaker watch on the same frequency, which ivas maintained in the
Communications Office, 14th N. D., did not overhear or intercept the WARD-
CONDOR conversation.
At the entrance to Pearl Harbor there was stationed a gate vessel charged with
opening and closing the net at the entrance. The instructions of the Captain
of the Yard were that the net should be kept closed from sunset to sunrise and
opened only on orders from him, from the Assistant Captain of the Yard, or
from the Yard Duty Officer, who could be reached via the signal tower (Exhibit
43). The log of the gate vessel indicates that the net was opened and closed
a number of times during the night of December 6-7. At 0458 on the 7th the
gate was opened and the CROSSBILL and the CONDOR stood in. It was not
until 0846 that the gate was closed. The Commanding Officer of the CONDOR,
now Lieutenant Commander M. H. Hubbell, testified that at 0532, when the
CONDOR came in, conditions of visibility were very good and were "approaching
daylight conditions" (Exhibits 44, 45).
The log of the signal tower for December 6-7, 1941, records the closing of the
gate at 2250 on 6 December, which was followed by an entry at 0600 that the
ANT ARES was reported off the harbor (Ex. 46).
The USS ANTARES, with a 500-ton steel barge in tow, arrived off Pearl
Harbor from Canton and Palmyra at about 0605, when it exchanged calls with
the WARD. At 0630 the ANTARES sighted a suspicious object, which ap-
peared to be a small subjyiarine, about 1500 yards on its starboard quarter.
The ANTARES notified the WARD and asked it to investigate, and several
minutes later, at about 0633, observed a Navy patrol plane circle and drop two
smoke pots near the object (Exhibit 73).
The WARD complied and at O64O sighted an unidentified submarine one
point off its starboard bow, apparently following the ANTARES into Pearl
Harbor. General Ouarters were sounded and all engines ordered full ahead, in-
creasing the ward's speed from five to twenty-five knots. At 0645 she opened
556 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fire with guns 1 and 3, firing o^te shot from each gun. The attack lasted only one
or two minutes. The first shot, at a range of approximately 100 yards, passed
directly over the conning tower; the second, from N^o. 3 gun, at fifty yards or less,
hit the submarine at the waterline junctioai of the hull and conning tower. At
about this time, the ANTARES, observing the fire of the WARD, also noted
that the Navy patrol plane appeared to drop bombs or depth charges at the sub-
marine. The submarine keeled over to starboard and started to sink. The WARD
ceased firing and then dropped depth charges. A large amount of oil appeared
on the surface. The submarine went down in 1,200 feet of water (Exhibit 74).
At 0651 the WARD sent a radio message to the Commandant, FOUR-
TEENTH Naval District [Exhibit 18):
"We have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in defensive sea
area."
The captain of the WARD, after reflecting that this message might not be inter-
preted as showing a surface submarine contact, at 0653 sent the following sup-
plementary message:
"We have attacked fired upon and dropped depth charges upon submarine
operating in defensive sea area (Exhibit 18)."
This message was received by the Bishop's Point Radio Station, relayed to the
Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Inshore Patrol, and delivered by the
Communications Watch Officer, FOURTEENTH Naval District, to the Com-
FOURTEEN Duty Officer. The Duty Officer notified the ComFOURTEEN
Chief of Staff at 0712 and, at the latter' s direction, the Duty Officer of the Com-
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, at 0715.
The ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff informed Admiral Bloch. Because of
numerous previous reports of submarine contacts, their reaction was that the
WARD had probably been mistaken, but that if it were not a mistake, the WARD
and the relief ready duty destroyer MONAGHAN, which was dispatched, could
take care of the situation, while the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to whom
they had referred the information, had the power to take any other action which
might be desired (pages 414--41S, 452-469).
A. JAPANESE SUBMARINES
Captain Smedberg said that the sum of the information on the midget subs
used by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor was that they were carried and launched
from mother submarines, were about 41 f^^t w length, and had a maximum
cruising range of 175-180 miles at the most economical cruising speed of 4-6
knots. They were probably not equipped with radio (p. 8-9). Complete infor-
mation on Jap midget subs is available in Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean
Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, dated 20 October 1944, Volume 1, number
15 (Exhibit 5), and Office of Naval Intelligence Publication "ONI 220- J,
Japanese Submarines" (Exhibit 6).
NOTE: The latest Office of Naval Intelligence publication referring to Jap
midget submarines ("ONI 222-J, The Japanese Navy") establishes that the
Japanese midget submarines used at Pearl Harbor were actually about 80 feet
long, rather than 41 .feet long as stated by Captain Smedberg. They carried two
18-inch torpedoes, had a top speed of 12 knots, and could dive to a depth of 100
feet.
Captain Ramsey said that at 0730 on December 7, 1941, he received a call from
the Staff Duty Officer to the efiect that they had sunk a submarine one mile off
the Pearl Harber entrance (page 586).
Captain Earle said that at about 0710 on December 7, he learned of the
submarine attack off Pearl Harbor; that this did not indicate to him that an
air attack might be imminent; that his reactic«i was that the enemy had
decided to be a little more active with his submarine campaign of war; that
the WARD was making another mistake. He pointed out that they had
had on the average of ten or fifteen reports of submarine sighted in that
area in the several months preceding the attack. When he received word of
this attack, he told the Watch Officer to be sure and get the dispatch verified,
to notify the Commander in Chief's Watch Officer immediately, to advise
ComFOURTEEN's Operations Officer, and then he called Admiral Bloch
and discussed the matter with him. As the matter had been referred to the
Commander in Chief, they decided that they would wait for further develop-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 557
ments. They did not discuss the fact that the presence of the submarine
might indicate an air attack, (p. 376)
Admiral Bellinger read an excerpt from a report prepared by him as follows:
"0700 Patrol Plane 14P(1) sighted and attacked enemy submarine one
mile oflf Pearl Harbor entrance. 0715 Message coded and transmitted to
Base. 0735 Message decoded and information received by Staff Duty
Officer. 0737 Message relayed to Operations Officer. 0740 Message
relayed by telephone to Staff Duty Officer of Commander-in-Chief. 0750
Search plan drafted by Operations Officer. 0757 First bomb dropped near
VP-22 hangar. 0758 Message broadcast to all ships present 'AIR RAID
PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL.' 0800 Search plan transmitted
by radio and telephone and received by some of the planes in the air at 0805."
(p. 129)
Admiral Bellinger knew of no attempt at his command headquarters to
relay the information of the attack on the submarine to Army headquarters.
He requested authentication; reported it to the Staff Dut}- Officer of CincPac,
and drew up a search dispatch (page 586).
Concerning the submarine attack on the morning of December 7th,
Admiral Smith said that he had received no report of that attack, the report
was received by the Staff Duty Officer, who was Commander V. R. Murphy,
who delivered the message to Admiral Bellinger, and he believed to Admiral
Kimmel. He said:
"My recollection is that Admiral Bloch informed the Secretary of the
Navy a few days after Pearl Harbor that he had received this message at
7:15. Talking to Captain Maddox, who was on board the ANTARES, the
ANTARES had been about to enter Pearl Harbor, and as she turned, the
conning tower of the midget submarine broke the surface. He called this
to the attention of the destroyer WARD who sank the submarine, and the
WARD informed the singal tower, unfortunately by signal, that he had
attacked a submarine at the entrance to Pearl Harbor. As Captain Maddox
said at the time, he regretted that he had not put the thing out by radio in
plain language telling everybody that it actually was a submarine and it
actually had been sunk. You see, we had received so many false submarine
reports before that time. I do not remember the exact wording of the signal
sent through the signal tower, but I gathered from what Admiral Bloch told
us later that he did not consider it as serious as it actually was. J'm quoting
from a conversation between Admiral Bloch and the Secretary of the Navy,
a few days after Pearl Harbor, in the presence of Admiral Kimmel and
Admiral Pye and General Short and myself. But the first message I got
was that Pearl Harbor was under attack. I received no message before
that about the submarine. You must also realize the communications
between Pearl Harbor and Honolulu were very poor. Efforts had been made
for months to get more trunk lines through but it was sometimes very
difficult to communicate between the two places. It was particularly difficult
to communicate with the Army. It had to go through several stations."
Captain Murphy said that no specific information was furnished to him
concerning the international situation when he went on watch as Staff Duty
Officer; he had a memorandum from Captain McMorris giving him the dis-
positions of the ships and forces of the Fleet and instructions as to action
to be taken in the event of war. (p. 196)
Captain Murphy said that he was not familiar with the Army's condition
of readiness on December 7th. (p. 198) He did not know whether or not
the Army radar system was operating that day.
Captain Murphy said that as Staff Duty Officer if anything unusual
occurred during his tour of duty, he would have advised ComFOURTEEN,
who in turn would have advised the Army since ComFOURTEEN was charged
with dealings with the Army. (p. 201)
Captain Murphy said that about 7:20 or 7:25 in the morning of December
7th, he received a report to the effect that a submarine had been sunk by
the WARD. He described his actions as follows:
"At that time, I was in the process of getting dressed in my quarters.
Lieutenant Commander Black gave me the report. He was Assistant Duty
Officer. And I said, 'Did he say what he was doing about it? Did he say
whether Admiral Bloch knew about it, or not?' And he said, 'No.' I said,
'While I'm finishing dressing, call him and see what he's doing about it
and whether or not he's called Admiral Bloch.' I finished dressing. Black
558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
came back and said he had dialed and dialed and the line was busy. I then
dialed the operator — it was a local dial system — and told him to tell the
Duty Officer to call me immediately and to break in on any conversation he
might be holding unless it was of supreme importance. I went to the
office and as I walked in the office, the phone was ringing. I answered the
phone and it was Ramsey — now Captain, L. C. Ramsey, from PatWingTwo.
He said he had a report from a patrol plane to the effect that a submarine
had been sunk in the Defensive Sea Area. I said, 'I have just had a report
that I have not been able to get any more details on,' and told him what the
report was. At that time, the phone rang from the Fourteenth Naval
District and the Duty Officer was on the phone. He said that Admiral
Bloch had been informed, that he had ordered the ready-duty destroyer
out to assist the WARD and to investigate, and had ordered the stand-by
destroyer to get up steam. I said, 'Had you any previous details or any
more details of this attack?' He said, 'The message came out of a clear
sky. There was no word of preliminary search or chase of any kind.'
I then called Admiral Kimmel and gave him both messages and told him
that Admiral Bloch knew it and of the ready-destroyer being ordered out
and of the stand-by destroyer getting up steam. He said, 'I will be right
down.' About that time, and I'm not sure of the sequence, Ramsey called
again and said that he had nothing further and did I have anything further.
I said, 'No,' but I thought it might be wise for him to make his search planes
available in case the Admiral wanted them. About that time, the phone
rang again; it was the Duty Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District. He
said that he had another message from the WARD saying that she was
towing a sampan into Honolulu Harbor and requesting a Coast Guard tug
be sent to his assistance. I called Admiral Kimmel and gave him that
message. Before I finished that message, the yeoman came in, said,
'There's a message from the signal tower saying the Japanese are attacking
Pearl Harbor and this is no drill.' I gave that message to Admiral Kimmel,
either directly on that one call or a call immediately thereafter. I do not
recall exactly whether it was the same call or thereafter. I then told the
Communications Officer to send a dispatch to Chief of Naval Operations,
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, with priority of the Commander-in-Chief,
Asiatic Fleet, over the Chief of Naval Operations, and to our forces at sea:
'JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL.'
I then called Ramsey and said, 'How many planes have you got available' —
no, I'll correct that: I told the yeoman to call the signal tower and ask if
the Pearl Harbor Defense Plan had been executed, and he said it had been
by Admiral Bloch. I called Ramsey and said, 'How many planes have you
got available?' He said, 'I don't think I have any, but I'm scraping to-
gether what I can for search.' I then called all the Staff of the Commander-
in-Chief; some I called myself and some the yeoman called, using every
phone we had in the office. I distinctly remember talking to Captain Smith
myself. By that time. Captain McMorris came in, either just preceded or
followed by the Admiral, I don't recall, and we drafted a more formal dis-
patch to the forces at sea, giving them instructions and information. From
then on, the duties were largely taken over by the regular Staff and the
War Plans Division helped in advising the other people who had the immedi-
ate direction of events."
Captain Murphy said that that contact was about the third or fourth of a
series of such contacts; that all previous ones had, insofar as actual proof
was concerned, turned out to be negative. This one, he thought, might be
the real thing but he wanted some further information as to why the WARD
thought that it sunk a submarine so that he could formulate an opinion
whether or not there was a submarine sunk. In the previous contacts, they
had never been able to establish definitely that there had been a submarine
involved. He had less doubt about the authenticity of this than he had had
about some of the others. He did not interpret this submarine as possibly
being accompanied by an air attack (p. 202) .
Admiral Bloch stated that at 0715 on December 7, 194i, he received a telephone
message from the Chief of Staff that the WARD had attacked a submarine off
Pearl Harbor and was escorting a sampan in.
Commander Granville C. Briant was Aviation Aide to ComFourteen in
1941. (p. 229). During November and December, 1941, Commander
Briant was one of the District Watch Officers. There were about eight to
ten of such officers. Commander Briant discussed the instructions given to
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 559
Watch Officers and qualifications of those on the Watch Officers list. (p. 230).
He also discussed the functions of the Harbor Control Post. (p. 232).
Commander Briant said that to his mind the Watch Officers had not been
advised of the seriousness of the situation and specifically they were not
advised of the war warning, (p. 233)
Admiral Bloch said that, "on the morning of December 7, the only contact
that was made prior to the air raid was with an enemy submarine. This
submarine was sighted by USS WARD, which was inshore patrol, and the
USS ANTARES, I believe. I received no report from the ANTARES. I
did receive at 7:12 a. m. a telephone message from the Chief of Staff telling
me that he had received a dispatch from the WARD that was somewhat diffi-
cult to understand, that he had been attacked and was counter-attacking a
submarine at the entrance to the channel at Pearl Harbor. He further
stated that he was then engaged in escorting a sampan toward Honolulu.
The Chief of Staff gave me this message. I asked him what it was; is it a
real submarine or is it a report? We had had a number of false reports in
the past and he said he didn't know, and I couldn't understand from the
nature of the dispatch whether it was bona fide or sound contact or sight
contact, whether he had been fired upon or had fired, and I asked him to
get it cleared up immediately. Captain Momsen was sent immediately to
headquarters; dispatched another destroyer and tried to get information
from the WARD. Before we got the information straightened out, the air
attack was on. Admiral Kimmel was informed — ^at least his operations
Watch Officer was informed about the entire matter just at the same time
we were." (pp. 21 and 22)
Admiral Bloch did not think that the Army had been advised on the morn-
ing of December 7 of the dispatch from the WARD concerning the submarine
attack, (p. 22)
The Staff Duty Officer at CincPac was given the same information. They were
not sure whether this was a true report. The ready duty destroyer was ordered
out. Before the report was clarified, the air attack had started. The first sub-
marine contacted was one mile outside the entrance buoy (page 401). He learned
after December 7th that a patrol plane had also seen this submarine or another,
attacked it with depth bombs and sunk it. This was a midget (page 403).
A midget submarine was later sunk inside the harbor. When it was later
recovered, it was found that both its torpedoes were missing (page 403). It had
fired at the CURTISS and missed.
No anti-submarine nets had been installed, but anti-torpedo nets had been
installed to keep a submarine outside from firing torpedoes into the harbor. If
the anti-torpedo net had been closed, a midget submarine would probably have
become fouled in the net. Practice required the net gates to be open all day and
closed all night except when ships were passing them. At 0445, December 7,
1941, some minesweepers came in and the gate was not closed until after 0800
when it was ordered closed by Headquarters (page 404). The deepest part of
the channel was 72 feet; the depth of the net was 45 feet (page 405). From keel
to conning tower the submarine was about 20 feet.
Also, a midget submarine ran aground on a reef off Bellows Field and was
recovered by the Army (page 406).
Admiral Kimmel testified that on December 7th bis headquarters were at the
submarine base at Pearl Harbor, his Flagship, the PENNSYLVANIA, was
nearby and he could move to it on short notice. By moving his headquarters to
shore, he djd not intend to supplant Admiral Bloch (page 278). There was
nothing irregular in his establishing his headquarters ashore since this in no way
changed his responsibilities (pages 363-4).
Between 0730 and 0740, Admiral Kimmel had a report of a submarine attack
off Pearl Harbor and he Vv'as waiting for an amplification of this report. Between
November 27th and that time, he had had about a half-dozen such reports.
While waiting for amplification, the air attack started (page 332). He said that
the officer reporting the sinking of the submarine should, under 2CL-41, have
broadcast in plain language, but sent it in code which resulted in delay.
Admiral Kimmel said that the one submarine which did attempt to attack in
Pearl Harbor was stopped before accomplishing anything (page 373).
He also said that he had reason to believe that there were a great many sub-
marines in the area at the time of the attack (page 1124).
Admiral Calhoun said that on December 7, 1941 he had no warning that a
submarine was in Pearl Harbor until the MEDUSA and CURTISS informed
560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
him that they had sunk a midget submarine on the other side of Ford Island
(page 945).
Captain Layton testified that a submarine entered Pearl Harbor and fired both
of its torpedoes, one passing between the RALEIGH and CURTISS, the other
burying itself in the mud near the berth of the UTAH. This submarine was sunk
and was so thoroughly destroyed that no intelligence material was obtained from
it. {Page 285-286)
Another Japanese midget submarine which was beached off Bellows Field,
Oahu, was captured on December 8th along with its commanding officer. This
submarine contained various documents which were captured, including a chart
of Pearl Harbor on which was laid a course into the harbor, around Ford Island,
and out of the harbor, as well as indications of positions of various ships in the
harbor. (Exhibit 32A, 38A)
Captain Layton also testified that the midget submarine beached off Bellows
Field bore the designation 1-18 which was the apparent designation of its "mother
submarine.'^ He pointed out that the chart of Pearl Harbor ivhich was recovered
from the "1-18" contained notations in pencil along both sides of the entrance
'channel to Pear IHarbor, reading "1-16", "1-20", "1-22", "1-18", and "1-24".
He testified that from intelligence subsequently received it was known that such were
the designations of the Japanese mother submarines that carried the five midget
stihmarines believed to have been present outside Pearl Harbor on 7 December.
{Page 284).
Captain Layton further testified that the times shown on the track map of
Pearl Harbor that was recovered from the Japanese submarine off Belloics Field
was, in accordance with Japanese naval custom, Tokyo time, minus nine, and
that all dotes indicated were east longitude or Tokyo dates, regardless of the fact
that the 180th meridian may have been crossed. Therefore, 'he said, that the
"times in these logs and memoranda and notebooks will always remain as minus
nine, four and a half hours earlier than Pearl Harbor." {Page 279).
Captain Layton examined the original Japanese map which contained the
track around Pearl Harbor {Exhibit 32 A), and stated it to be his professional
opinion as a seaman that the track shown on the map was a projected track and
not an actual logged track by bearings and distances indicated thereon. He stated
that "it is too exact to be an exact track and the figures are written a little too
carefully and meticulously to have been performed by the captain of this midget
submarine, who had to control trim, use his periscope, and maneuver the sub-
marine without assistance. The second member of the submarine was the
machinist's mate, xvho closed and opened switches, cut in and out the CO2 absorb-
ent material, and in general performed the duties of chief engineer and auxiliary
gang." {Page 281-282).
Captain Layton also testified that the notations on the chart under the time
0450 did not indicate that the captain of the midget submarine recorded that he,
himself, had sunk an enemy ship. Captain Layton pointed out that the sub-
marine still had both of its torpedoes aboard, which was its full complement.
He pointed out also that the track in question ivas carcfidly laid out both by course
and distance, vnth the course in degrees and distance in meters, and the time in
minutes and seconds; and that the latter indicated that the speed of the submarine
was to be varied from point to point so as to make its arrival at the several points
at a predetermined time. He pointed out that the time indicated, 0450, which
was Tokyo time, would be 0920 Pearl Harbor time, and that at 0920 Honolulu
time, the attack was still taking place and there was a tremendous amount of
activity in the area indicated on the map. Accordingly , Captain Layton gave it
as his opinion that he doubted if the captain of the midget submarine would have
been able to so meticulously follow his course all around the harbor and at the
same time make notations from point to point. {Page 283).
The notations on the Japanese chart indicated also that the submarine com-
mander had received intelligence reports as late as December 5th. {Exhibit
32-32 A).
The Japanese submarine commander who was captured, upon being inter-
rogated, admitted that he had failed in his mission. {Page 16).
With reference to the language appearing on the Japanese map, which is
variously interpreted as "sink tnemy ship," and "enemy ship sunk," Captain
McCollum testified that it was not possible to infer whether the past tense or the
future tense was in the mind of the person who made the notations, because there
were no kana symbols attached showing the tense of the verb. {Page 25-26)
NOTE: It is to be noted that the conclusion reached by the Army Pearl
Harbor Board that Japanese midget submarines must have been in the harbor
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 561
a few days before the attack and evidently moved in and out of the harbor at will
{'RAPHE' , Page 155) is based wholly on the captured Japanese maps and on
the testimony of Robert L. Shivers. FBI agent in charge at Honolulu, 7 December
1941, which in turn is based solely on those maps. In this connection, it is
pointed out that Admiral Hewitt made a thorough study of the question (Hewitt
Report, Page I46-I48) which caused him to conclude that there was no evi-
dence warranting the belief that any Japanese submarine ertered Pearl Harbor
prior to December 7th. (Hewitt Report, Page 157).
B. DETECTION OF PLANES BY THE ARMY RADAR* SYSTEM
J. L. Locard, First Lieutenant, IJ. S. Army, and Sergeant George E. Elliott,
U. S. Army, who were privates on December 7, 1941, testified that they were on'
duty that morning from 0400 to 0700 on a mobile radar unit on the northern part
of Oahu at a site called Opana (page 628) .
There were supposed to be three men on the shift, but the men arranged, and
Sergeant Murphy approved, only two, it being a Sunday morning (pages 637-8).
The station had been set up in November, about Thanksgiving (page 639).
Locard stated (page 641) that his station worked 0400 to 0700 on Sundays and
holidays and 0700 to 1700 on weekdays. The Robert's Report states that on
November 27, 1941, the Army ordered the radar system operated each day from
0400 to 0700, but Locard had no knowledge of such order (page 643), and his
station operated those hours on Sunday.
Elliott understood that the station had been operated from 0400 to 0700 before
December 7th according to schedules (page 652).
The radar set which they were operating could cover 180° from northeast to
west. They were instructed to track for flights, intercept them and report them
to the Information Center (page 629). Locard was in charge of the station. They
had telephonic communication with the Information Center.
Locard had been operating these radar sets since August, when they were put in
operation (page 630) . The set was of rather crude construction at that time. It
would pick up one plane at 100 miles and sometimes not pick up three or four
(page 631).
They had no information prior to 0800 of the movement of friendly aircraft.
Radar could not distinguish friend from foe.
On the morning of December 7th, they continued to operate after 0700 as the
truck had not come for them, in order to give Elliott training in radar operation
(page 631). He was not regarded by Locard as a qualified operator (page 633).
At aboyt 0702 they discovered an unusually large response in a northerly
direction at 136 miles. Locard checked the equipment to make sure, and when
the planes came in to 132 miles they decided to call the Information Center
(page 633). Elliott first talked to the switchboard operator at the Information
Center (page 633).
Elliott testified that he had wanted to send the information in right away, but
that Locard had laughed at him and finally told him to send it in if he liked.
After a short time, they did (page 648).
Locard then got the switchboard operator to call the Army officer on duty and
then he reported the information to him. The officer thanked him. They con-
tinued to track the planes in to 20 miles, when they lost them because of distortion.
They left the unit and became aware of the attack at 0830 and went back on
duty at their unit at 0910. Their equipment meanwhile was being operated by
others who had relieved them (page 636).
Elliott had no information concerning an expected flight of B-17's (page 646).
This, incidentally, was the first time Elliott had this 0400 to 0700 duty; pre-
viously he had worked in the late mornings or afternoons (page 646). He thought
that other units had also picked up the flight and reported it, but had no knowledge
to that eff'ect (page 657).
Lt. Col. K. A. Tyler, U. S. Army, who was then a first lieutenant, was at the
Army Information Center on the morning of December 7, 1941. He was there
for training as an assistant controller. He was the only officer present and had
been on duty there only once before (pages 446-7). Five or six plotters were on
duty, who plotted radar reports (page 448). In all, five radar stations were in
operation.
He received no information or instructions before going on watch, nor did he
relieve any one. Watch was 0400 to 0800 (page 449). He understood the
mechanics of radar, but he had never seen one in operation.
On the morning of December 7, 1941, at 0715, he received a call from the radar
station at Opana, stating that the operator had a report of a large number of
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 37
562 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
planes at 130 miles. Private Lockard was the operator he talked to (page 457).
He thought about the report for a minute, thanked the operator, and did nothing
about it.
He was looking for a flight of B-17's, but had no official notice that they were
coming in. A bomber pilot friend had told him that when there was a flight of
B-17's en route, the radio stations played Hawaiian music all night. That
night and morning they did. He thought IB-17's were coming in because Hawaiian
music was playing on the radio, which was an arrangement made for homing planes
(page 458). He did .not suspect enemy planes and made no effort to contact his
superiors (page 459).
There was no means of distinguishing friend from foe. He thought the planes
■ were either B-17's, due from San Francisco on a northeast course, or some Navy
carrier planes. He thinks now that the large plot report at 0715 were the Jap-
anese planes (page 460).
The only information he had of Japanese-United States relations was what
he had read in newspapers.
He learned of the attack by phone call at 0800. He called all forces back.
Major Berquist and Major Tindall came and took over (page 452). A naval
officer reported to the Information Center shortly after the attack began (page
453).
Commander Taylor said that on the morning of December 7th, he got to the
Information Center between 0830 and 0900 (page 612). Upon his arrival,
the Information Center was in great confusion. Plots were made of everj'thing
reported, but there was no way of determining what planes were Japanese or
American (page 613).
Captain Ramsay said that during the day, they called Army radar and re-
quested that thej^ track the Japanese planes in retiring and advise, but got no
information (page 601).
It is not clear whether the Navy had been advised of the expected arrival of
the Army planes on December 7th. Admiral McMorris stated that several
senior members of CincPac's staff certainly were aware that some large bombers
were flying from California to Oabu at that time, December 6th (page 900).
Admiral Smith thought that they did not know of the prospective arrival of
Army planes on December 7th (page 563). He said, incidentally, that the Army
B-17's arrived that morning without ammunition (pages 569-72). Captain
Ramsey stated that prior to 0755 on December 7th, he had no information as
to the scheduled arrival of Army planes (page 587).
C. THE AIR ATTACK
Captain Smedberg said that a Chief Yeoman in the Japanese Navy who had
formerly been attached to the staff of Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief
of the Jap Combined Fleet, and who had been captured during the Marianas
campaign, had furnished what is believed to be an accurate account of the com-
position and movements of the enemy forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941. This information is presented in summarized form in
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, dated
8 December 1944, vol. 2, number 22 (Exhibit 3; p. 4-5).
The high points of the prisoner's account were as follows: The secret operation
order upon which the Pearl Harbor attack was based was dated 1 November
1941 and specified that: (1) "War will be declared on X-Day," and (2) "This
order will become effective on Y-Day." A second operation order, dated 5 No-
vember, fixed Y-Day as 23 November 1941 (22 November, Pearl Harbor time),
and a third operation order, dated 10 November, set X-Day as 8 December I94I
(7 December, Pearl Harbor time) (p. 5-6).
The Japanese plan called for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by a carrier
"Striking Force," with a "Surprise Attack Force" of submarines delivering a
coordinated blow. The submarine force was to carry out reconnaissance in ad-
vance of the attack by the Jap carrier planes and was to attack U. S. warships
which escaped from Pearl Harbor. If the opportunity became available, it was
also to launch attacks with midget stibs after the plane attacks (p. 6-7).
The striking force, commanded by Vice Admiral Nagumo, consisted of three
of Japan's five carrier divisions: The KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1); HI RYU
and SORYU (CarDiv 2); SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU (sometimes referred
to as CarDiv 3, sometimes as CarDiv 4 and sometimes as CarDiv 5); the HIYEI
and KIRISHIMA (two of the battleships of BatDiv 3); the TONE and CHI-
KUMA (CruDiv 8), plus ABUKUMA, and destroyers, including elements of
DesRon 1 (Exhibit 3; p. 6).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 563
The "Surprise Attack Force" included about twenty fleet-type submarines,
some of which carried midget subs. This constituted a large part of the Jap-
anese Sixth (Submarine) Fleet.
The Japanese operation order specified that the carrier force was to leave
Japan about X minus 16 Day (21 November 1941, Pearl Harbor time) and
proceed by way of Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles, for Pearl
Harbor. Most of the submarines of the "Surprise Attack Force" wereto leave the
Inland Sea on X minus 20 Day (17 November 194-1, Pearl Harbor time) (p. 6-7).
The Japanese striking force actually left Saiki Anchorage near the Bongo
Channel some time between November 19 and November 21, 1941, Pearl Harbor
Time, and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, where it assembled and
fueled. Departure was taken on or about 27 N'ovember 1941, under cover of
a heavy front. The force proceeded in an easterly direction, heading on course
about 085° to a point in longitude about 170° W; then turned southesat on course
about 135° and proceeded to a point due north of, and approximately 200 miles
from, the island of Oahu, where it arrived early in the morning of 7 December
1941, Pearl Harbor Time. From that position the Pearl Harbor attack wqs
launched. Following the attack, the striking force retired initially to the north-
west on a heading of about 300° to a point about longitude 170° E, thence to
the southwest, irregularly on varying headings to a point near 140° E, and
thence northwest to Kyushu (Exhibit 3, page 16).
General Short testified that he heard the first bomb of the attack; the Chief of
Staff told him it was the "real thing." He immediately ordered an all-out alert
(Xo. 3). His narrative of the attack appears at pages 254-255 of the Record.
He had no notice of a submarine having been sunk near Pearl Harbor prior to
the attack.
Admiral Kimmd testified that he became avcare of the attack by a telephone
message from the Staff Duty Officer (pages 332-333). He reached his head-
quarters at 0805.
Admiral Bloch said that he knew of the attack at 0755; he heard bombs and saw
a Japanese plane; he went to headquarters, sent dispatches to Washington,
Philippines, Guam and to ships at sea advising that Oahu had been attacked;
called all Xavy Yard workers and Xaval personnel to duty, flooded dry docks and
took other local measures (page 400). He said that ample personnel reported
(page 401). When the Japanese attacked, a visual signal was given and the air
raid alarm was given. Insofar as other measures planned, including air search
for the enemy, were possible after the attack, they were carried out.
Admiral Pj'e testified that on the morning of December 7th, he was in the
Halikulani Hotel (page 418). He learned of the attack at 0755 and proceeded to
Pearl Harbor in an automobile with Admiral Leary (page 423). His Chief of
Staff took action to carry out 2CL— 41 as he was not aboard at the time of the
attack (page 421).
Concerning the sortie of ships on December 7, Admiral Pye said:
"I was on shore at the time the attack occurred and returned to the
CALIFORNIA at approximately twenty minutes of nine, about forty minutes
after the original attack. Upon my arrival on board, my Chief of Staff in-
formed me that this provision had been carried out and that the order for
emergency sortie had been given by him. That was when the attack had
first been made. By the time I arrived, about forty minutes after the first
shots, some of the destroyers were underway; one or two cruisers were
underway then or immediately afterwards; none of the battleships were in
condition to proceed to sea with the exception of the NEVADA which started
out in accordance with the order. About the time she passed the Flagship,
.executing this maneuver, we came to the conclusion that one ship outside
would be no better off than inside and would probably be in more danger of
submarines, and as she passed us, we directed her to anchor. She had not
gone more than a quarter of a mile beyond that when she was bombed and
was unable to maneuver to an anchorage and was actually beached in the
channel. About this time, we received an order from the Commander-in-
Chief that no other ships would sortie. That order was passed around by
visual, I believe, but I think it had little effect, because all of the ships that
could move by that time were out. That's with regard to the sortie. Most
of the destroyers did get out. There were several of the cruisers, among
them the DETROIT, the Flagship of destroyers, got out. There were no
carriers present; no heavy ships could go out. That was the condition after
the attack. Several light cruisers had been damaged. No heavy cruisers
were in port except alongside the dock under overhaul." (p. 166)
564 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Bellinger said that, on December 7, 1941, the Naval Base Defense
Force immediately assumed a functioning status without orders from higher
authority (page 664).
Captain Ramsey saw the bombing on Ford Island; had a radio message broad-
cast of the raid; ordered planes in the air to search 315° to 360° from Pearl Harbor
to the maximum distance, and assigned searches of other sectors (page 587).
After the attack he ordered the planes in the air to search 315° to 360° because
they always thought that the likely direction of approach (page 597). To the
best of his belief, the Japanese attack came from the northwest and subsequent
information indicated that the planes had been launched from carriers about 325
miles from Oahu bearing 325° (page 598).
Shortly after December 7, Admiral Davis saw a chart recovered from a
Japanese plane which indicated that the planes had been launched from a
point about 250 miles north of Oahu. (p. 103-104)
Captain Ramsey reviewed what he did on the morning of December 7th (page
605). After he issued search orders and Admiral Bellinger approve, there were
a stream of requests for information; the first order he received was from CincPiac
to "locate and destroy enemy," but all possible action was already taken; com-
munications were disrupted by the raid and smoke; all planes available were told
to take off immediately; various orders were received during the day, including
some from CincPac to search specific sectors (page 606).
Captain Ramsey said that they received some information during the morning
concerning a chart from a shot-down plane in which the purported rendezvous
was to the southwest of Hawaii (page 602).
Various Army planes did go northward that day— they went out to 150 miles
but had to return because B-17's could go no further without protection of A-20's,
which had no longer range (page 602).
Admiral Smith stated that he did not get information as to the probable loca-
tion from which the Japanese carriers launched the attack — for some two days.
There was a great deal of confusion; false reports from civilians of troop and
parachute landings; a false report from one of our planes of an enemy carrier to
the south; a squadron of our seaplanes returning from Midway to Pearl Harbor
on that afternoon dropped two bombs on what the pilot said was a camouflaged
Japanese carrier south of Pearl Harbor, but seems to have been the PORTLAND.
A chart showing the position of Japanese carriers was taken from a Japanese
plane by the Army on December 7th, but was not shown to the Navy until the
afternoon (page 564). Planes left to the north, but this was not known by the
Navy until two days after the attack. Visibility was good at Oahu on December
7th, but fog could usually be found to the north.
Admiral Kitts said that about 175 to 250 Japanese planes came in from carriers
to attack from west-northwest, a distance of some 200 miles (page 524).
Admiral Kitts said that no orders in regard to fire control were issued on
December 7 other than by the ships' commanding officers and one by the
Commander in Chief were issued to stop firing on friendly planes, (p. 191)
Admiral Kitts said that, as he recalled it, 28 planes were shot down by the
Fleet, (p. 193)
He testified that on December 8th, after the attack, he was in conference with
General Davidson and was shown a radar plot showing planes coming in from about
150 miles and going out again. The plot coming in might have been interpreted
as friendly planes, but after a two-hour attack on Pearl Harbor, the outgoing plot
must have been the enemy. This plot was not reported to the Navy until he saw
it on December 8th (page t)20).
Colonel Phillips said that on December 7, 1941 he received a telephone message
of the attack and ordered the all-out alert. Some Army pursuit planes took off
but he did not know when or how many (page 389). He did not know whether
any bombers took off. He said that there was on December 7th, a radar track of
planes which turned out to be Japanese, but he cannot remember whether it was
incoming or outgoing or either (page 488). He saw this track after December 7,
1941, but did not remember where or what it showed (page 489).
Admiral Smith was not familiar with the Army radar system (page 558). He
stated that after the attack, Colonel Davidson told him the radar track had been
reconstructed from the bearings, but on Sunday that they were not convinced
that that was the direction from which the attack came (page 558). This is
"obviously correct, because we searched to the south rather than to the north"
(page 588).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 565
Commander Taylor described the confusion which existed on December 7
at the Information Center. He said, among other things, that there were a
number of plots prepared of the course of aircraft that morning which were
studied in an attempt to determine exactly where the raids had come from
and what direction they had returnied; that about 48 hours after the raids
they completed the construction of an estimated plot, and that it was his
understanding that during the subsequent visit of the Secretary of the Navy,
this plot was shown to him as evidence that all information received by the
Information Center had been received in an orderly manjier. (p. 351)
At the time of the attack. Commander Wright was having breakfast with
Commander Williams, who, he said, had been handling the traffic analyses
end of the job. He directed Williams to go over to the Communication
Intelligence Unit, find out as much as he could about the composition and
location of the attacking forces and telephone the information. He said
that, in general, the information coming over indicated that there were at
least four carriers, including the two by identified radio calls. The bearings
obtained on this force seemed to indicate that they were nearly due South
at an estimated distance of 250 to 300 miles. Conflicting reports were com-
ing in from other sources. One bearing which was obtained from Lualualei,
was in direct conflict with the other bearings, and indicated that the attacking
force was almost exactly due North, (p. 380-1). Commander Wright said
that he believed that an early arbitrary assumption that the surface forces
were actually to the Southward aflFected all of the subsequent reports. He
said that the report from Lualualei was transmitted by him to the Fleet
Intelligence Officer, then Lt. Comdr. Layton, and he assumed that he passed
it on to higher authority, (p. 381)
Captain Rochefort said that when the attack commenced, the communications
unit at Pearl Harbor lost all contact with the direction finder stations, one of
which was located at Lualualei and the other at Aiea and that consequently no
bearings on the attacking Jap force were received by his unit. He added that
the failure of communications was not due to sabotage but loas an accident caused
by Army personnel setting up certain new circuits. He said that the Lualualei
direction finder, being unable to deliver its bearings, finally broadcast by radio
a bearing obtained on one of the attacking units. He had heard that this bearing
tvas received by CinCPac as an alternate bearing, either 357 true or 178 true,
but was subsequently informed by the direction finder station that it had actu-
ally transmitted the beraing as 357. He said that the Lualualei direction finder
ivas capable of obtaining a unilateral bearing, (p. 63-64)
D. THE ARRIVAL OF THE ARMy's MESSAGE
It will be recalled that on the morning of December 7th, General Marshall
sent a message which indicated that the Japanese were presenting a note at 1
p. m., Washington time, which corresponds to dawn at Hawaii.
General Short testified that the December 7th dispatch from the Chief of
Staff (Exhibit 48) was received by the Signal Officer at 1145. and decoded by
1428, well after the Japanese attack (page 251).
That dispatch, as set forth in Exhibit 48, was as follows:
"Memorandum for the Adjutant General (Through Secretary, General Staff)
"Subject: Far East Situation.
"The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram
be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East: Com-
manding General, Carribean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army:
"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine
immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know
but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."
Admiral Kimmel testified that a copy of the December 7th disptach of the
Chief of Staff to Short was received by him on the afternoon of December 7th,
too late. He considered this information as news of a Japanese ultimatum and,
as it stated that a note was to be delivered at 1 p. m. Washington time which
was sunrise in Hawaii and midnight in Manila, he felt that it would have indicated
a Japanese attack at Oahu (page 328).
566 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
E. THE FAILURE TO TELEPHONE ON DECEMBER 7TH
Colonel Phillips said that at about 0822 Hawaiian time on December 7th, he
telephoned General Marshall, that it took about five minutes to get the call
through, and the connection was excellent. General Marshall asked if he had got
the message. He replied, "What message?" General Marshall said, "The
message I sent yesterday" or "last night." He replied, "No." (page 490). He
got the dispatch from General Marshall at 1530, December 7, 1941. He did not
know the time at which it had been sent or when it got to RCA in Honolulu.
Admiral Smith said that communications on December 7, 1941 could be estab-
lished with Washington in thirty minutes by radio; they had no telephone (page
549).
Admiral Bloch stated that the only telephone connection he had with Washing-
ton was the regular commercial, not scrambler, phone (page 410).
Admiral Ingersoll said that the Navy Department had no scrambler telephone
connection to Pearl Harbor; the Army had one; that the scrambler telephone is
not secure against an expert and that the Navy Department did not use the
scrambler phone until 1942 (page 843).
It will be recalled that Admiral Stark testified that he may have been derelict
in not advising Admiral Kimmel of the prospective delivery of the Japanese reply ;
that he regretted not having telephoned to Admiral Kimmel about this, and also
regretted not having paralleled the Armv message on the Navv radio (pages 113,
793, 797).
F. WHAT COTJLD HAVE BEEN DONE IP THERE HAD BEEN ADVANCE NOTICE
General Short testified that if he had had two hours notice on December 7th,
he could have been completely ready for an air attack. He thought that he
would have alerted against an air attack if he had the information contained in
the Chief of Staff's December 7th dispatch two hours before the attack (page 256) .
He stated, however, that he could not have prevented a torpedo attack on the
battleships even with two hours warning since any aircraft attack once launched
can be driven in (pages 265-6).
Admiral Kimmel testified that if he had received Exhibit 48 prior to the attack
he would have assumed the highest condition of readiness (page 329). He also
testified that in the event of an attack together with submarines, and he had
reason to believe that there were a great many submarines in the area at the time
of the attack, it is well within the realm of possibility that had he taken the Fleet
to sea, the losses would have been greater (page 1124). However, that presup-
poses that they would have found the Fleet and would have been able to deliver
an attack. Had the Fleet gone to sea, the Japanese might not have attacked at
that time at all. However, he thought that he would have taken the Fleet to sea.
In his closing testimony, Admiral Brown made a statement to the effect
that no matter what our state of alert or deployment at Pearl Harbor on
December 7 might have been, we were bound to suffer great damage even
though a more effective alert would have destroyed more Japanese planes.
Even if we had known the Japanese intention to attack Pearl Harbor, we
could not have kept our ships at sea indefinitely waiting for the blow to fall.
Japanese agents in Honolulu were almost free to pick the date and hour of
attack. On December 7, the Japanese risked an attack only because they
had complete information about our dispositions; their agents ashore were
able to observe and report the state of our defenses and their so-called
diplomatic agents were able to direct the moment of attack. Admiral Brown
then said: "I wish to go on record as being of the opinion that the major
lesson for the nation to learn from the attack on Pearl Harbor is that we
should never again allow enemy aliens within sighting distance of a major
operating base from which considerable portions of our naval and air forces
can be observed."
Admiral Bloch said that had the Fleet left Pearl Harbor on December 7,
there was a serious question in his mind as to whether or not the entire
Fleet would have been destroyed in view of the powerful forces that the
Japanese had in the area. Also, he said, had the Japanese attacked the oil
supply at Oahu, the drydocks, repair shops, barracks and other facilities
instead of the airfields and the ships of the Fleet, the United States would
have been hurt more so far as the prosecution of the *far was concerned
even though we did have a terrific loss of life. He pointed out that the oil
storage was in tanks above the ground or visible from the air. (p. 94)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 567
Admiral Kimmel said that if he had a reconnaissance in effect at 700 miles, and
had it met a strange force, he had no way of stopping that force from delivering
an attack except by means already mentioned (page 1126). The court said that
as they understood it, he did not have a surface striking force available which
could have gone to the location and supported a carrier attack (page 1126).
Admiral Kimmel said, however, that he had two carriers where they could have
been very useful — one, 400 miles southeast of Midway, and the other 200 miles
west of Pearl Harbor; and bad he known the location of the enemy, they probably
could have delivered a very effective attack.
Admiral Halsey said that at (he time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, they
were 150 to 175 miles from the entrance to Pearl Harbor. He had flown off
some of his planes, and some of them on arrival at Pearl Harbor shot down
Japanese planes and some were shot down. A number of his planes were
shot down by anti-aircraft fire. (p. 305)
On the morning of December 7, Admiral Newton was about 300 odd miles
from Midway when he learned of the attack. He thought that he would
receive orders to intercept the enemy which he felt must be to the Northward
of Oahu and signaled the LEXINGTON that the flight to Midway was can-
celled because presumably Midway had also been attacked. He reported
his position to the Commander in Chief and told him that he had cancelled
the Midway flight. Sometime during that morning, he received a dispatch
from the Commander in Chief to report to Admiral Halsey but he did not
know where Admiral Halsey's task force was or where it had been. He
sent a dispatch advising Admiral Halsey of his position and Admiral Halsey
directed him to join him in the vicinity of Oahu. He set a course for Oahu
and about ten or eleven that morning received a message from Admiral
Halsey that he was to assume enemy carriers about 200 miles south of Oahu
and was to intercept and destroy those carriers. He changed course and
sent search planes. The search for the enemy was called off in that vicinity
as the authorities at Pearl had received information indicating that the attack
had been from carriers located to the north, not to the south. They returned
to Pearl Harbor around the 13th or 14th, meanwhile continuing air patrol.
The PORTLAND was bombed by one of our own planes, (p. 319)
Admiral Newton said that he had assumed that the Japanese carriers
attacked from the north because they had a better chance for coming in from
that direction without being observed and because of the fact all shipping
had been diverted to the southward and the training grounds of the Fleet
were also to the southward. He felt sure that the Japanese were cognizant
of this and consequently was greatly surprised when he was told that the
Japanese carriers were to be assumed to be south of Oahu.
The court stated, and Admiral Kimmel agreed, that it was a military fact that
in order to detect a carrier raid one must know in advance that the carrier is on
its way (page 1126), and within narrow limits of its time of arrival and sector.
If he had detected an attack by the Japanese naval force 700 miles from Oahu,
he would have violated his orders just as he did when he gave the orders to bomb
the submarines; he does not know what he would have done, but thinks he would
have found some way to handle the situation (page 1127).
Admiral McMorris said that if he had known a few days before that an attacking
force was coming, he would have had the Fleet out, regardless of defense, so they
could attack the enemy forces (page 897). His action (getting the Fleet out if
lie knew that a hostile force was approaching) would have been the same if a state
of war had or had not existed (page 898). He would have informed the Navy
Department if we had not been at war. To have deferred action would certainly
have been unwise, even under our Constitution (page 898). Even if long range
reconnaissance to 700 miles had been in effect, the attack could not have been
prevented. He might have sent ships out to intercept the enemy and diverted
carriers for this purpose. However, he thought the losses might have been greater
if this had been done (page 898). However, the Army planes would have been
alerted too and undoubtedly would have done some damage, principally to enemy
planes. He doubted that the enemy carriers would have suffered very seriously
(page 899).
Admiral McMorris said that had they foreseen the Japanese carrier raid,
they would not have had the American battleships in port. He said, however,
that actually the most profitable target for the Japanese would have been the
oil tankers at Pe^rl Harbor. If they had destroyed them and the shops and
dry docks, our capabilities would have been nullified for a very long time,
(p. 248)
568 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Bellinger agreed with the Court's view that it is a historical fact that
carrier borne planes must be caught before they are launched in order to success-
fully repel a carrier attack. He stated that he doubted very seriously that even
with advance warning of this attack, he could have taken steps to save a great
many planes which might have been destroyed otherwise, because of the difficulty
of dispersion of patrol planes (page 686).
Admiral Turner thought that the Fleet could have been kept at sea after the
orders for defensive deployment (page 1021). Admiral Stark knew that CincPac
had his fleet divided in three parts and that an operating schedule provided for
the time each part was to be in Pearl Harbor (page 1022). This seemed satis-
factory.
He did not think that the Japanese attack could have been averted. Its de-
structive effect could have been lessened and more Japanese planes destroyed.
If some ships had been deployed to northward, there would have been a better
chance of detecting the enemy and bringing out shore based planes and carriers
to attack them (page 1024). It was well recognized by people who concerned
themselves with the defense of Oahu that the northern flank is a very weak place
(page 1024).
Admiral Smith said that if Exhibit 48 (the Army dispatch of 1 p. m. meeting,
had reached them between 0500 and 0600 Hawaiian time, effective measures
could have been taken against the Japanese (pages 549-50), and perhaps we
would not have been damaged so much and the Japanese more. The destroyers
could have gotten out and probably the cruisers; Army and Navy aircraft alerted,
and oil tankers sent out to the carriers; but, the battleships probably could not
have gotten out, and, if they did, would have been sunk outside (page 550).
The Robert's Report, he said, is incorrect in saying that prompt receipt of that
message would still have been too late to be of any substantial use (pages 549-50).
Admiral Smith later said that if they had known, they would have given
Condition I, sent the Fleet to sea, alerted all aircraft and sent carriers to the north
to try to locate the enemy (page 569). It was true, he said, that if the Fleet
had sortied from Pearl Harbor shortly before the attack and were within enemy
range, they would have been sunk, but had they been two or three hundred miles
to the west, it is very unlikely that the heavy ships would have been attacked.
The battleships, therefore, could have been used as a support force since their
speed was about 15 knots (page 568). Getting the Army planes aloft before
sunrise would not, in Admiral Smith's opinion, have diverted the attack but would
have decreased our damage and increased the damage to the Japanese. "There
is no question but that the Fleet in Pearl Harbor would have been damaged
even if we had been alert" (page 568). He agreed with the court that the only
method by which the attack could have been completely diverted would have
been to locate the carriers before they got within launching range.
G. THE CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE
The personnel casualties were summarized bv Lt. Comdr. Robert D. Powers,
Jr., USNR, as follows:
"These report?, examined by me in the office of the Bureau of Personnel, give
in detail the names of ships and stations of the killed and wounded as a result of
the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. These reports are very voluminous. From
this examination, I obtained a calculation of the total of the killed and wounded.
This calculation shows that the total killed, including those who died of wounds
and those missing and declared dead, was 3067, and those wounded, 896."
The damage to ships, as described by CinPac on February 16, 1942 (Exhibit
61), was as follows:
"(a) Battleships:
"ARIZONA sank at her berth as a result of one or more aircraft torpedoes and
about eight heavy bomb hits. One of the bomb hits (estimated as 2,000 pounds)
exploded the forward magazines. The ship is considered to be a total wreck
except for material which can be salvaged and reassigned. A considerable
amount of ordnance material has already been removed, and work is underway
in removing the 12-inch guns from turrets three and four.
"CALIFORNIA sank at her berth as a result of hits by two aircraft torpedoes
and one or more near bomb misses. Also received one large bomb hit on star-
board upper deck abreast of foremast, which caused a serious 5-inch powder fire.
It sank gradually for about three or four days and is now resting rather solidly on
a mud bottom. The quarterdeck is under about twelve feet of water, and the
port side of forecastle is under about three feet of water.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 569
"NEVADA struck by one or more aircraft torpedoes and by at least five bombs
and two near misses. Each of the near misses caused rupturing of the hull on
the port and starboard bows, respectively. One bomb hit in way of foremast
caused explosion and fire damage which wrecked the vertical area extending from
the second deck to the bridge. Several bomb hits wrecked the forecastle from
side to side forward of No. 1 turret, and this damage extended down to the second
deck. Fragments from a bomb hit amidships caused considerable local damage
to the mainmast, stack, and other structure, and caused many casualties to 5-inch
gun crews.
"OKLAHOMA capsized at her berth within eight to eleven minutes after
receiving three or more hits by aircraft torpedoes. The hull is 20° to 30° to
being up-side down, with a considerable portion of the bottom and starboard side
above water.
"PENNSYLVANIA one bomb hit in way of after 5-inch gun starboard side.
The vessel was in drydock No. 1. The damage from bomb explosion was consider-
able but not of a vital nature, although there were a large number of casualties
and one gun was put out of commission. The damage did not extend below the
second deck.
"MARYLAND two bomb hits on forecastle. One small bomb (probably 100
poimds) passed through the forecastle deck forward of the chain pipes and
exploded on the maindeck causing only a small amount of damage. The second
bomb (probably 500 pounds) passed through port side of the ship about twelve
feet under water and exploded in the C&R storeroom. This explosion wrecked
flats and bulkheads in that area, and fragments caused numerous leaks through
the sides and bottom. These leaks were temporarily patched without going into
drvdock.
"TENNESSEE two bomb hits (probably 15-inch shell type). One of the
bombs struck the center gun of No. 2 turret causing a large crack which neces-
sitated replacement of the gun. This bomb exploded and did considerable local
fragment damage. Another similar bomb struck the top of No. 3 turret and
penetrated same in way of a riveted joint. This bomb was a dud and did no
serious damage except for putting one rammer out of commission. The TEN-
NESSEE suffered serious damage aft in officers' quarters due to fire resulting
from the great heat caused by the oil fire starting from the ARIZONA. The
shell plates around the stern were somewhat buckled and joints broken.
"WEST VIRGINIA sank at her berth as a result of four or five ''aircraft
torpedo hits and at least two bomb hits. The vessel rests on a hard bottom
with all spaces flooded up to two or three feet below the main deck. Most of the
damage from torpedoes is in the midship area, which is badly wrecked both below
water and above water. A large bomb passed through the foretop and the boat
deck and apparently exploded near the port side of the main or second deck.
This explosion caused considerable wreckage and a terrific powder and oil fire,
which burned out the whole area and extended to the foremast structure up to and
including the bridge. A second bomb hit hit the top of turret III and passed
tlirough the 6-inch top. The nature of the penetration indicated defective ma-
terial. This bomb did not explode but caused damage to the slide of the left
gun. Recently another torpedo hole, and parts of the torpedo, have been located
aft under the counter. The steering engine room appears to be wrecked and the
rudder is lying on the bottom.
"(b) Cruisers:
"HELENA hit at frame 80 starboard side by aircraft torpedo causing the
flooding of No. 1 and 2 firerooms and the forward engineroom. The starboard
engine was found to be seriously damaged. Temporary repairs to hull were com-
pleted at Pearl Harbor, T. H., and the vessel has proceeded to Mare Island under
two shafts to await permanent repairs.
"HONOLULU damaged by near miss of large bomb (probably 500 pounds)
which passed through dock and exploded fifteen or twenty feet from the port side
at frame 40. This explosion caused considerable damage to the hull and resulted
in the flooding of storerooms and magazines in that area, and also drowned out
the electiic power cables of turret II. Most of the flooding resulted from rupture
of a magazine flood seachest; the hull of the ship was not opened up but leaked
some due to pulled joints and rivets. Permanent repairs were completed at
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
"RALEIGH hit by one aircraft torpedo amidships on port side which flooded
out the forward half of the machinery plant. The ship was also hit by one bomb
(probably 500 pounds) which passed through three decks and out the ship's
side, and finally exploded about fifty feet away. The damage from the explosion
was not extensive, but together with the hole made in the side, caused si:rious
570 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
flooding on the port side aft. This flooding was out of all proportion to the extent
of damage and resulted from inability to close armored hatches tightly against
the water head. The bomb struck only a few feet abaft the gasoline stowage.
Permanent repairs to the hull are being completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H. The
vessel will return to Mare Island about the middle of February for permanent
repairs to machinery and power leads, this being necessitated primarily by re-
placement of one boiler and the cast iron turbine casings of engine No. 4.
"(c) Destroyers:
"SHAW hit by one bomb while docked on floating drydock; also hit by many
fragments from another bomb which struck the drydock. The serious fire follow-
ing bomb hits resulted in blowing up of forward magazine and heat damage to
shell plating in the forward areas. The after part of the ship was not seriously
damaged. The SHAW was re-docked on the same drydock on January 26, 1942,
for installation of a false bow at about frame 50. The vessel will be ready to
proceed to Mare Island under her own power between 10 and 15 February.
"CASSIN and DOWNES: CASSIN was struck by one bomb and DOWNES
by two (probably 500 pounds). These vessels were in drydock No. 1 ahead of
the PENNSYLVANIA. One bomb explosion aft between the two vessels
apparently knocked the CASSIN partly off the drydock blocking and caused her
to fall over on the DOWNES when the dock was being flooded during the raid.
This caused a serious structural failure amidships and considerable local damage
in way of the bridge. The torpedo warheads in the starboard tube of the
DOWNES were set-off and blew out the maindeck and starboard side of the
vessel in that area. This caused some damage to boilers and engines. A serious
oil fire followed the explosion and caused extensive damage to the hull of both
vessels. Fragments and explosions have caused over 200 holes in the hull of the
CASSIN and probably well over 400 in the hull of the DOWNES.
"Most of the machinery of both ships has been removed for examination and
re-conditioning, and it now appears that the machinery of the CASSIN is 98%
good and the DOWNES about 95% good. Permanent and temporary repairs
have been made on the hull of the CASSIN to permit her re-floating about Feb-
ruary 5, and similar work is proceeding on the DOWNES.
"At present it appears inadvisable to count on the recommissioning of these two
vessels as first-line destroyers, but it is likely that repairs can be effected within
two to four months which will make the vessels entirely suitable for escort vessels,
thus releasing two first-line destroyers for this duty. The Navy Yard, Pearl
Harbor, T. H., is working up sketch plans covering suitable arrangements for deck
houses, bridge, armament, etc., adequate for an escort vessel. It is generally
believed that although the hull of the vessels have been considerably weakened,
they will be entirely adequate to carry the considerable reduced load in armament
and other topside weights required for an escort vessel.
"(d) Auxiliary vessels:
"OGLALA sunk by one aircraft torpedo which passed under the ship from the
starboard side and exploded against the starboard side of the HELENA. Vessel
sank slowly at ten-ten dock, capsized against the dock about l}i hours after being
struck. This vessel is probably not worth salvaging but plans are being made to
remove her from the berth that she now occupies.
"CURTISS struck on kingpost starboard crane by Japanese airplane out of
control. This resulted in some wreckage and damage due to fire. Machinery of
the crane was seriously damaged and the radio antennae were put out of commis-
sion. One bomb (probably 500 pounds) struck the forward end of the hangar on
the port side off the center line, exploding on the second deck. The explosion
and resulting fire caused a great amount of wreckage and loss of material. Tem-
porary repairs have been completed and permanent repairs await availability of
the ship at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.
"VESTAL struck by two bombs (probably 500 pounds). One bomb hit for-
ward and exploded in the steel shape storage, which stopped a large part of the
fragments and minimized damage considerably. The other bomb struck aft and
exploded in the hold, causing a large number of fragment holes through the shell.
Flooding aft caused the after part of the vessel to submerge almost to the main
deck. The vessel was alongside the ARIZONA when the raid commenced and
was beached at Aeia to prevent further sinkage. Temporary repairs have been
completed during a short stay in drydock, and permanent work will be completed
when a dock is available.
"UTAH struck by two, and possibly three, aerial torpedoes capsized at berth.
Ship is within a few degrees of being exactly upside down."
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 571
The damage to airplanes, as reported on February 15, 1942 (Exhibit 61) was:
'Extracts from Columns.
Type
Number
present Dec.
7
Number on
hand after
raid
Number us-
able after
raid
Patrol planes
Inshore patrol planes
Fighters
Scout bombers
Torpedo bombers. -
Battleship and cruiser planes
UtOity and transport planes (non-combatant)
Total
52"
List of Witnesses
Witness Title
Admiral H. R. Stark Chief of Naval Operations.
Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann Director Central Division; Liaison with
State Dept. for CNO.
Major General W. C. Short Commanding General Hawaiian Dept.
Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel CincPac and CincUS.
Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch Coml4; Comdr. Local Defense Forces;
Comdr. Hawaiian Sea Frontier;
Comdt. Navy Yard Pearl Harbor;
Naval Base Defense Officer under
201^41 Comdr. Task Force Four.
Vice Admiral W. S. Pye Comdr. Battle Force; Comdr. Task
Force One; Senior Officer embarked in
Pearl Harbor.
Lt. Colonel K. A. Tyler Army radar.
Captain W. A. Heard In charge of Foreign Branch, ONL
Commander J. J. Rochefort In charge of combat intelligence 14th
Naval District.
Colonel W. C. Phillips Chief of Staff (for General Short).
Rear Admiral W. S. Delaney Chief of Staff for Operations (for
Admiral Kimmel).
Rear Admiral W. A. Kitts, III Fleet Gunnery Officer (on Admiral
Kimmel's staff).
Rear Admiral W. W. Smith Chief of Staff to CincPac.
Captain L. C. Ramsey Operations officer to Adm. Bellinger
(Adm. Bellinger in command of
Pat Wing 2 and Pat Wing's Hawaiian
Area); Comdr. Task Force Nine;
aviation liaison officer to cooperate
with Coml4; Comdr. Naval Base
Defense Air Force.
Commander W. G. Taylor Advisor to Army on radar.
Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger Commander Hawaiian Based Patrol
Wings and Comdr. Patrol Wing Two;
Comdr. Task Force Nine; Comdr.
Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor;
Liaison with Coml4; Comdr. Naval
Base Defense Air Force.
1st Lieut. J. L. Locard, USA Army radar.
Sergeant G. E. Elliott, USA Army radar.
Lt. Commander G. W. Lynn Senior Watch Officer, Op20-G decoding
Japanese diplomatic cryptographs.
Captain L. F. SaflFord Charge of Security Section of Naval
Communications, intercepts.
Dr. Stanlej' K. Hornbeck Special Assistant to Secretary of State.
Lt. Commander A. V. Pering On duty in Op20-G of Naval Communi-
cations.
Admiral R. E. IngersoU Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.
General George C. Marshall Chief of Staff, Army.
Rear Admiral C. H. McMorris War Plans Officer for CincPac.
572 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
List of Witnesses — Continued
Witness Ti'le
Lt. Comdr. F. M. Brotherhood Watch Officer hi Op20-G, Naval Com-
munications.
Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun Commander Base Force, U. S. Fleet.
Admiral C. W. Nimitz Chief of Bureau of Navigation.
Commander A. D. Kramer Head of translation section of communi-
cation security in Op20-G Naval
Communications.
Vice Admiral R. K. Turner Director of War Plans in office of CNO.
Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes Director of Naval Communications.
Admiral J. O. Richardson Cine US prior to Admiral Kimniel.
Joseph C. Grew Ambassador to Japan.
Maxwell M. Hamilton Chief of Division of Far Eastern Affairs
in State Department.
Captain H. H. Smith-Hutton Naval Attache in Tokyo.
Rear Admiral Thomas Withers Commander Submarines, Pacific.
Admiral J. R. Redman Assistant Director of Naval Communi-
cations.
List of Witnesses Before Admiral Hart
Witness Title
1. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, USN, Commandant 14th Naval District;
(Retired). Commandant Navy Yard at Pearl
Harbor; Commander Hawaiian Sea
Frontier.
2. Commander Benjamin Katz, USN. Charge of Code Room, Navy Depart-
ment.
3. Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, USN.. Chief of Staff of Pacific Fleet.
4. Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick Assistant War Plans Officer to CincPac.
5. Rear Admiral W. S. DeLany, USN. Assistant Chief of Staff and Operations
Officer for CincPac.
6. Rear Admiral A. C. Davis, USN Fleet Aviation Officer for Pacific Fleet.
7. Captain M. F. Curts, USN Pacific Fleet Communication Officer.
8. Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, Commander Pat Wing Two; also con-
USN. trolled Pat Wing One; Commander,
Fleet Air Detachment on Ford Island;
Commander, Task Force Nine; Liai-
son with Commandant 14th Naval
District in connection with aviation
facilities at outlying islands; Com-
mander, Naval Base Defense Air
Force.
9. Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, LTSN_ In command of Task Force Three.
10. Rear Admiral W. S. Pye, USN Commander, Task Force One.
11. Captain R. 0. Glover, USN Assigned to Plans Division of Office of
Chief of Naval Operations.
12. Commander P. C. Crosley, USN Flag Secretary on Staff of CincPac.
13. Rear Admiral W. A. Kitts, III, Fleet Gunnery Officer.
USN.
14. Captain V. R. Murphy, USN Assistant to War Plans Officer.
15. Commander J. J. Rociiefort, USN.. Assistant Operations Officer; Force In-
telligence Officer for Scouting Force
Commander; Officer in Charge of
Combat Intelligence attached to Com-
FOURTEEN.
16. Captain E. T. Layton, USN Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
17. Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun, USN. Commander Base Force, U. S. Fleet.
18. Commander G. C. Briant, A-(V)G, Aviation Aide to ComFOURTEEN.
USNR.
19. Rear Admiral C. H. McMorris, Operations Officer on staff of Com-
USN. mander Scouting Force; War Plans
Officer for Adm. Kimmel.
20. Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, USN.. War Plans Officer for Chief of Naval
Operations.
21. Captain J. L. McCrea, USN Aide to Admiral Stark.
22. Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Command of the MISSISSIPPI; Di-
USN. rector of Naval Intelligence.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
573
List or Witnesses Before Admiral Hart — Continued
Witness
23. Vice Admiral A. W. Fitch, USN__.
24. Captain George Vandeurs, USN
25. Admiral Wm. F. Halsey, USN_
26. Captain I. H. Mayfield, USN_-
27. Vice Admiral J. H. Newton, USN.
28. Lieut. W. B. Stephenson, USNR..
29. Rear Admiral H. F. Kingman, USN_
30. Commander W. E. G. Tavlor,
A-V(T), USNR.
31. Captain L. F. Safford, USN
32. Vice Admiral H. F. Learv, USN...
33. Captain J. B. Earle, USN
34. Commander W. A. Wright, USN...
35. Captain C. Wellborn, Jr., USN
36. Rear Admiral W. S. Anderson,
USN.
37. Vice Admiral R. M. Brainard, USN.
38. Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann,
USN.
39. Rear Admiral J. W. Bunkley, USN
(Retired).
40. Admiral R. E. Inger.soU. USN
Preceded Adm. Bellinger as Com-
mander, Pat\Mng Two.
Assistant to Adm. Bellinger in connec-
tion with joint Army-Navy air
command.
Conmiander Aircraft Patrol Force;
Conimander, Task Force Two.
District Intelligence Officer of 14th
Naval District.
Command of Cruisers Scouting Force.
Head of Counter-espionage Desk of
District Intelligence Office of 14th
Naval District.
Head of Domestic Intelligence Branch
of ONI; Assistant Director of Naval
Intelligence.
Special assignments on radar.
Charge of Communications Security
Section of Naval Communications.
Commander, Cruisers Battle Force.
Commander, Destrover Squadron Five;
Chief of Staff 14th Naval District.
Assistant Communications Officer on
Adm. Kimmel's staff.
Administrative Aide to Chief of Naval
Operations.
Commander Battleships, Battle Force,
Pacific Fleet.
Director of Ship Movements Division,
Office of Chief of Naval Operations.
Director of Central Division of Chief of
Naval Operations Office.
Commanding Officer of U. S. S. CALI-
FORNIA (Admiral Pye's Flagship).
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.
List of Witnesses Before Admiral Hewitt
A. at pearl harbor in 1941
Witness Title
1. Captain Edwin T. Lavton, USN Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet.
(R. 182).
2. Captain Joesph J. Rochefort, USN In charge of Communications In-
telligence L'nit, Fourteenth Naval
District. (R. 43; R. 541).
3. Vice Admiral William W. Smith, USN.. Chief of Staff, CincPac. (R. 335).
4. Vice Admiral Charles H. McMorris, War Plans Officer, CincPac. (R.
USN. 293).
5. Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLanv, USN_ _ Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations,
CincPac. (R. 163).
6. Vice Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellinger, Commander, Hawaiian Based Pa-
USN. trol Wings; Commander, Patrol
Wing Two; Commander, Task
Force Nine; Commander, Fleet
Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor.
(R. 471).
7. Captain John B. Earle, USN Chief of Staff, 14th N. D. (R.451).
8. Mr. George Street Manager, RCA, Honolulu. (R.
41 ly.
9. Rear Admiral Irving H. Mavfield, USN _ District Intelligence Officer, 14th
N. D. (R. 554).
10. Captain Thomas H. Dyer, USN Cryptanalytical and Decrypting
Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet.
(R. 418).
574 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
List of Witnesses Before Admiral Hewitt — Continued
A. at pearl harbor in 1941 — Continued
Witness Title
11. Captain Joseph Finnegan, US N Translator, Fleet Radio Unit, Pa-
cific Fleet. (R. 424).
12. Commander Wesley A. Wright, USN Assistant Communications Officer,
CincPac, on temporary duty with
Com 14 Communications Intelli-
gence Unit. (R. 442).
13. Lieutenant (jg) Farnslev C. Woodward, Cryptanalvst, Communications In-
USN. ' telligence Unit, 14th N. D. (R.
541).
14. Colonel Alva B. Laswell, USMC Translator, Communications Intel-
ligence Unit, 14th N. D. (R.541).
15. Captain William W. Outerbridge, USN. Commanding Officer, USS WARD.
(R. 87).
16. Lieutenant Commander Monroe H. Commanding Officer, USS CON-
Hubbell, USNR. DOR. (R. 428).
17. Richard W. Humphrey, RM3c, USNR.. Bishop's Point Radio Station.
18. Lieutenant Oliver H. Underkofler, Communications Office, 14th N.
USNR. D. (R. 465).
19. Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, USNR_. District Intelligence Office, 14th
N. D. (R. 376).
20. Commander Harold S. Burr, USNR Com 14 Liaison Officer at General
Short's Headquarters. (R. 376).
21. Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Depart-
USA. ment. (R. 387).
B. AT THE PHILIPPINES IN 1941
22. Captain Redfield Mason, USN Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic
Fleet. (R. 68).
23. Commander Rudolph J. Fabian, USN Officer in Charge, Radio Intelli-
gence Unit, Corregidor. (R. 68).
C. AT WASHINGTON, D. C. IN 1941
24. Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, Director of the Office of Naval
USN. Intelligence. (R. 389).
25. Captain Arthur H. McCoUum, USN In charge of Far Eastern Section,
Foreign Branch, ONI. (R. 10).
26. Captain Laurence F. Safford, USN Communications Security Section.
(R. 97; R. 529).
27. Captain Alwin D. Kramer, USN ONI and Communications Security
Section. (R. 128).
28. Mrs. Dorothy Edgers Research Analyst, ONI. (R. 51P
29. Lieutenant Commander Francis M. Communications Securitv Section,
Brotherhood, USNR. (R. 143).
30. Lieutenant Frederick L. Freeman, USN. Communications Security Section.
(R. 149).
31. Lieutenant Commander Allan A. Mur- Communications Security Section.
ray, USNR. (R. 433).
32. Lieutenant Commander George W. Communications Security Section.
Linn, USNR. (R. 140).
33. Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Per- Communications Security Section.
ing, USNR, (R. 148).
C. OTHER WITNESSES
34. Captain William R. Smedberg, III, Now Assistant Combat Intelligence
USN. Officer, Staff, Cominch. (R. 4).
35. Lieutenant Commander Leo Reierstad, Now in charge of a translating unit
USNR. in Op-16-FE. (R. 158).
36. Lieutenant (jg) Joseph M. Conant, Translation sub-section head in
USNR. Op-16-FE. (R. 158).
37. Commander Walter Karig, USNR \Authors of "Battle Report." (R.
38. Lieutenant Welbourn Kelley, USNR.../ 80).
39. Lieutenant Commander Gilbert E. Head of Op-20-GL. (R. 554;
Boone, USNR. R. 607).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 575
ADDENDUM ONE— FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Conclusions
1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were designed
to meet, with the available means, various types of attack, including an attack
such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local air
defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainbow Five
war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war. The local air defense plans
presupposed agreement between the local commanders that an attack was immi-
nent. Neither of these was the case prior to the attack.
2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of mutual
cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the local Army
and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of attack, which
presupposed the possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese
intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.
3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint
Command. While there was a considerable exchange of information between
various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no organized system to
ensure such exchange.
4. Current and detailed information which was obtained by the Japanese as to
the location and movements of American naval forces and as to the preparations
being made for defense against an attack on Pearl Harbor contributed to the
success of their attack.
5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States
Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Jap-
anese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations and its inten-
tion to wage war, by means of interception, decryption, and translation of Japanese
diplomatic messages.
6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy
Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully exchanged. The
information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval
movements was available to intelligence officers of the War Department in
Washington. The War Department had information which led that Department
to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941.
This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General
Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic recon-
naissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among
other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance
WAS not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.
7. Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic messages
a code, known as the "winds" code, to be used in radio broadcasts in order to
convey information to its representatives as to the status of relations between
Japan and other countries, no message was intercepted prior to the attack which
used the code words relating to the United States.
8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from intercepted
Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated within the Navy
Department.
9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he
be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all important
developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him im-
portant information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating
the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State
Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other ex-
peditious means, information of the "1 p. m." message and its possible import,
were unfortunate.
10. Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his
possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important
developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included
the "war warning" message and similar important messages which were sent by
the Chief of Naval Operations.
11. The available information in the possession of the Commander in Chief,
Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war warning" message,
was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate commanders whose
cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the
patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units,
were not informed of this and other important messages.
576 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
12. Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese
Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages
were secured at Honolulu, no information was obtained prior to December 7th
which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which
denied access to such cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence
agencies in the Hawaiian area.
13. Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu,
which indicated Japane.se interest in specific locations of ships in Pearl Harbor,
were intercepted by radio intercept stations of the Army and Navy and decrypted
prior to the attack, this information was not transmitted by the Navy Department
to Admiral Kimmel. Certain other messages which were intercepted by the Army
prior to 7 December 1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but
were not decrj'pted or brought to the attention of the Xavy prior to the attack,
apparently because the Army did not have sufficient personnel for such work.
14. The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have
secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the approach of
the attg,cking force, were the aircraft warning service, traffic analyses of Japanese
naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu.
15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by the Army during certain
periods of the day primarily for training purposes, and, although not fully
developed, could have served to give some warning of the approach of Japanese
aircraft.
16. The principal basis for estimates of the location of Japanese naval forces
was the intelligence obtained by the Navy from traffic analysis of Japanese naval
communications.
17. A carrier attack could not, with certainty, have been prevented, for the
following reasons:
(a) Certain prevention of such an attack requires interception and destruction
of the carriers before attack planes can be launched.
(b) The forces necessary to insure such interception and destruction, anywhere
in the vast area which would have had to be covered, were not available, and
could not have been expected to be available.
(c) If the Japanese task force had been detected at nightfall, the probabilitj'
of its successful interception and destruction prior to the following dawn would
have been small.
18. Prior warning of an impending air attack, even as little as one half hour,
would have served considerably to reduce the effectiveness of the attack, for the
following reasons:
(a) Ships' anti-aircraft batteries would have been fully manned and ready.
It is to be noted that the anti-aircraft fire was more effective against the sub-
sequent attacks than the initial air attack.
(b) Enemy character of the approaching planes would have been immediately
appreciated and they would have been engaged at once.
(c) The maximum condition of damage control readiness would have been set,
thus facilitating the isolation of damage received.
(d) Many planes could nave been in the air, in readiness.
(e) Ground dispersal of planes could have been improved.
19. The only adequate means of assuring detection of an approaching carrier
attack was by 360 degree distant air search from Oahu. Sufficient planes were
not available to carry out an all-round distant air reconnaissance daily for more
than a few days.
20. A thorough appreciation of the danger, the capabilities of the available
planes, and the importance of the defense of Pearl Harbor might have justified
the allotment by the Chief of Naval Operations of additional patrol planes to the
Pacific Fleet. Although the additional planes, if assigned, would not have been
sufficient for a 360 degree daily search, they would have increased the area which
could have been effectively covered and might have acted as an inducement to
such employment. Admittedly, in making over-all plane assignments, it was
necessary for the Chief of Naval Operation to weigh the prospective needs of the
Pacific and the Atlantic, where hostihties with Axis submarines were already in
progress.
21. Partial air reconnaissance, covering a sector of some 120 degrees, could
have been maintained daily from Oahu for a considerable period of time with the
Fleet patrol planes controlled bj' Admiral Kimmel and could have been designed
to cover the most probable approach bearings from which an attack might have
been expected. Such reconnaissance would have had a reasonable chance of
success.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 577
22. Neither the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet, nor tlie key members of the latter's staff, seem to have given serious con-
sideration after 27 November 1941 to the possibility or probability of an air
attack on Pearl Harbor or of its possible effect.
23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the
southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese
attacks on tlie Philippines and Malaysia. The information which was received
by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941 indicated, however,
that on December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs;
that, on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate
could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there
was no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive
information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement
which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas
of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should
have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the
effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open to
him were:
(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most
probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent
basis, with available planes and crews.
(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at least
during the dangerous dawn hours.
(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by ships in
port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.
(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.
(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible
attack forces.
(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry into
port at irregular intervals.
(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and aircraft
warning installations.
24. Admiral Kunmel's estimate as to the probability of submarine attack in
the Hawaiian area was justified.
25. Throughout his incumbency as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral
Kimmel was energetic, indefatigable, resourceful, and positive in his efforts to
prepare the Fleet for war. In considering the action which he could have taken,
it should be noted that:
(a) Establishment of the maximum plane reconnaissance would have meant
the stoppage of aircraft training which was of great importance to the naval
expansion program, and might have resulted in wear and tear on planes and crews
which would have reduced their later effectiveness.
(b) Higher conditions of readiness would have interfered with the rest and
relaxation desirable in port for the mamtenance of personnel efficiency.
(c) Failure to mstall anti-torpedo nets was influenced (i) by information from
CNO which made it appear that effective drops of aircraft torpedoes with the
depths of water and length of run available in Pearl Harbor were not probable;
(ii) the interference such nets would have caused in harbor operations due to
crowded conditions.
(d) The presence of two carrier task forces at sea at the time on necessary ferry
trips did, in a way, provide striking forces and some reconnaissance.
(e) In view of the submarine menace and the concentration of anti-aircraft
batteries, it was questionable whether ships were safer in port or at sea.
26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarme attack off
Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language.
Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer. This infor-
mation was of no immediate interest to the Army unless it in fact indicated im-
minency of an air attack, an assumption which was not necessarily logical. In
any event, confirmation was not received until the air attack had commenced.
27. More effective action would have been taken both before and after the
attack on Pearl Harbor had there been in existence in the Hawaiian area a suita-
ble operating agency for the adequate exercise of joint command functions.
This omission was the fault of no one person, but of the existing system.
28. War experience has shown that:
(a) The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person;
that is, there must be "unity of command."
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 38
578 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) In planning and executing joint operations, responsible commanders of the
different services, who are to act jointly, and the principal members of their staffs,
must be in close physical touch, and not entirely dependent on telephonic, radio,
or similar communications. In no other way can a full exchange of information
and ideas be assured nor the possibility of misunderstanding be prevented.
(c) Command organizations which are to function effective!}' in an emergency
must be in active operation prior to such emergency.
29. Based on the foregoing, military command of outlying stations, such as
Hawaii, should, even in peacetime, be established under the principle of "Unity of
Command." The commander exercising such joint command should be assisted
by a joint staff, capable of advising him in the functions of both services concerned.
Findings
1. The basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the United
States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers, either including or
excluding Japan.
2. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various offensive tasks
to the Pacific Fleet, including the capture of positions in the Marshalls and raids
on enemy sea communications and positions, and various defensive tasks, includ-
ing the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific
area and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern
Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions.
3. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned to the Fleet
various initial tasks, including the maintenance of fleet security at the bases, at
anchorages, and at sea, the protection of the communications and territory of
the Associated Powers by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, the
establishment of defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway, and guarding
against surprise attack by Japan.
4. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) and annexes included
among the initial tasks to be performed by the patrol planes the maintenance of the
maximum patrol plane search practicable in the approaches to the Hawaiian
area.
5. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan was to be put into effect on W-day, which,
it was stated, might or might not coincide with the day that hositlities opened
with Japan. W-day was not fixed prior to the attack.
6. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, was based
on the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans. It constituted the basis of sub-
sidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans.
The method of coordination under the plan was to be bj' mutual cooperation
until and unless unity of command were invoked.
7. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Army's task was to hold
Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers,
and to support the naval forces. The Navy's task was to patrol the coastal zone
(which included Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for
the defense of Oahu), and to patrol and protect shipping therein, and to support
the Army forces.
8. One of the specific tasks assigned to the Navv in the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan was that the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District,
should provide for distant reconnaissance.
9. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was placed in effect on 11 April
1941 bv the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Comman-
dant, FOURTEENTH Naval District.
10. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was an
agreement between the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, ^nd the
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as to joint defensive measures for
the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against hostile raids
or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war.
11. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided,
among other things, for joint air operations and provided that when naval forces
were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft
were made available, the latter would be under the tactical control of the naval
commander directing search operations.
12. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan also
provided that the Army was to expedite the installation of its aircraft warning
service, and that prior to the completion of that service, the Navy, through the
use of radar and other appropriate means, would endeavor to give such warning
of hostile attacks as might be practicable.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 579
13. Annex VII, Section VI, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided
that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat
of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each
commander would take steps to make available to the other the air forces at his
disposal, in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with
the plan.
14. The Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN did not effect any agree-
ment prior to the attack that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently
imminent to warrant placing Annex VII, Section VI, in operation.
15. The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan provided, among other
things, for a Base Defense Air Force in conjunction with the Army. One of the
assumptions was that it. was possible that a declaration of war might be preceded
by a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, that it was probable that there
might be a surprise submarine attack on ships in the base area, and that a com-
bination of both forms of attack was possible.
16. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin stated, among
other things, that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would
be an air attack that would most likely be launched from carriers which would
probably approach inside of three hundred miles. The estimate also stated that
any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undis-
covered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.
This Estimate came to the attention of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.
17. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was prepared by Admiral Bellinger
and approved by Admiral Bloch. This plan, which was designated Annex
"Baker" to the Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, made specific provi-
sion for joint air operations by the Army and Navy. The plan was effective upon
receipt. It was to become operative without signal in the event of a surprise
attack, or might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime, conditions of
readiness for aircraft were to be as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaii-
an Department, for Army units, and by ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense
Officer, for Navy units.
18. The Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating
areas, which was reissued by Admiral Kimmel in revised form on 14 October
1941, provided that the Fleet's security was predicated on several assumptions,
one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack
on ships in Pearl Harbor, a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating
areas, or a combination of the two. This letter also stated that single submarine
attack might indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably com-
posed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.
19. The Pacific Fleet security letter prescribed security measures, including
provisions for defense against air attack. It provided, among other things,
that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with
the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack and that
he should take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore-based
aircraft, and arrange through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordina-
tion of the joint air effort by the Army and the Navy.
20. Under the Pacific Fleet security letter, the security measures were to
include intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol, and an air
patrol. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of fleet operating areas as
directed by Aircraft Scouting Force, one covering the entry or sortie of a fleet or
task force, and one during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.
21. The only local defense plans in effect and operative prior to the attack of 7
December 1941 were the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, under which the
Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance, and the Pacific Fleet security
letter, under which the only aircraft patrol from Oahu was a daily search of fleet
operating areas, a search during entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and during
the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.
22. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five), approved by the Chief
of Naval Operations, in estimating probable enemy (Japanese) action, visualized
that one of the enemy defensive efforts would be "destruction of threatening
naval forces"; that initial action would include "possible raids or stronger attacks
on Wake, Midway, and other outlying United States positions"; and that the initial
Japanese deployment would include "raiding and observation forces widely
distributed in the Pacific, and that submarines in the Hawaiian area * * * _"
(Italics supplied.) The possibility of an attack on Hawaii was, therefore,
included but in no way emphasized.
580 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
23. Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion, throughout his tenure of command
of the Pacific Fleet, that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a pos.nb7lity.
Neither he nor the key members of his staff appear to have considered it as a
serious probability.
24. The method of command established in the local plans was that of "mutual
cooperation." The relations between the responsible commanders were cordial.
However, there was not in existence, prior to the attack, any permanent operating
setup which could insure the constant and timely exchange of information,
decisions, and intended courses of action so essential to the efficient conduct of
joint operations, particularly in an emergency. A recent proposal looking to the
establishment of a Joint Command Center had been the subject of adverse recom-
mendations by the responsible local commanders, both Army and. Navy.
25. In accordance with "Joint Action," unity of command for the "defense of
Oahu could have been placed, in effect bv local agieement between the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the FOUR-
TEENTH Naval District. The latter, however, would naturally not make such
an agreement without the approval of his immediate superior, the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Fleet. The question of unity of command for outlying islands was
discussed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in connection with a
proposal for reenforcement of ^^ ake and Midway by Army planes. Geneial
Short's position was that if Army forces were involved, the command must be
his. Admiral Kimmel maintained that the command of naval bases must remain
with the Navy. The islands were reenforced with Maiine planes.
26. Japanese espionage at Pearl Harbor was effective and, particularly during
the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941, resulted in the frecjuent
transinission to Japan of information of great importance concerning the Pacific
Fleet, the movements and locations of ships, and defense preparations.
27. Certain reports sent by the Japanese Consul General via a commercial
communications company at Honolulu in the week preceding the attack indicated
the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.
28. It will appear subsequently that various coded messages sent by the
Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which did not indicate the likelihood of an
air attack on Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by Army and Navy radio intercept
stations and were decoded in "V^ashington, D. C. prior to the attack; that others
which were obtained at Honolulu by Naval Intelligence prior to the attack were,
with the exception of a few unimportant messages, in a code which could not be
decrypted there before December 7th; and, that three messages intercepted by
Army radio intercept stations at Hawaii and. at San Francisco, which indicated
the likelihood of an air attack, were forwarded to the \\ ar Department for de-
cryption but were either not received there prior to the attack or were not de-
crypted prior to the attack. If the United States intelligence services had been
able to obtain and to decode and translate promptly all of the espionage reports
sent by the Japanese Consul General during the period 27 November to 7 Decem-
ber 1941, the information so obtained would have been of inestimable value.
29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire information from
coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese Government and its repre-
sentatives. Through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages and
their aecryption ana translation in Washington, D. C, prior to the attack, knowl-
edge was obtained of the Japanese Government's actual views concerning the
diplomatic situation, of the Japanese Government's intention to wage war, and
of the fact that hostilities were iiBpending and imminent.
30. The information acquired in Washington through the interception of
Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly disseminated at
Washington by Naval and Military Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State Department, and to the President.
31. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely upon the Chief of
Naval Operations for information as to the status of the diplomatic negotiations
with the Japanese, and had requested to be kept fully informed on this subject.
32. The Japanese diplomatic messages acquired by Naval Intelligence at
Washington were not transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, as
such. Reasons advanced for this course of action were that the Japanese might
intercept the naval messages and learn of the Navy's success in decrypting Japa-
nese codes; that the volume of intercepted messages was so great that the trans-
mission of them, particularly during the critical period, would have overtaxed
the Navy's communications facilities; and, that it was the duty of the Chief of
Naval Operations to evaluate such information a,nd to advise CinCPac of th.P)
important facts learned,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 581
33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to
the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based on the information obtained
from intercepted Japanese messages.
34. The warnings sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, during No-
vember (particularly the "war warning" of the 27th) and early December, 1941,
indicated in unmistakable language that the diplomatic negotiations had ceased,
that war with Japan was imminent, and that Japanese attacks might occur at
any moment.
35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander in Chief,
Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indicating interest in the
location of ships in Pearl Harbor. These were more specific than other inter-'
cepted messages indicating Japanese interest in the movements of ships to or
from other ports.
36. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not fully advised of certain
other information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages after the No-
vember 27th "war warning," which made further evident the termination in
fact of the diplomatic negotiations and the Japanese intention to wage war.
37. On the morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the attention
of the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message in which the Japanese
Government instructed its representatives to present to the State Department at
1 p. m. the Japanese Government's final reply terminating the diplomatic negotia-
t ions. Mention was made of the fact that 1 p. m. Washington time was about dawn
at Honolulu and about the middle of the night in the Far East. No one stated
that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor.
38. This so-called "1 p. m. delivery message," which consisted of one sentence,
had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station at Bainbridge Island in
the State of Washington and forwarded to the Navy Department by teletype. It
was decrypted and available in the Navy Department at about 0700 on December
7th. It was sent to the Army for translation because there was no Japanese
translator on duty in the Navy Department at that time. The translation, which
could have been done by a qualified translator in a few minutes, was not received
from the Army until after 0900.
39. Although he was in possession of this highly significant information several
hours before the attack, and there were available means whereby the information
could have been transmitted to Admiral Kimmel immediately, including a
"scrambler" telephone maintained by the Army, Admiral Stark initially was not
disposed to, and did not, send any message to Admiral Kimmel. Instead he relied
on the transmission of a message by the War Department to General Short, which
was to be furnished also to Admiral Kimmel.
40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not consider it necessary
to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning of 7 December and that he had
not telephoned at any time previous to the attack, but that one regret which he
had was that he had not telephoned a message that morning to Admiral Kimmel or
paralleled the Army message on the naval radio system.
41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941, which was
received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were presenting an ultimatum
at 1 p. m., that they were under orders to destroy their code machine, that it was
not known just what significance the hour set might have but that the addressees
were to be on the alert accordingly, and that the naval authorities were to be
informed.
42. The warnings which were sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet,
indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack, on November 24th, that a
"surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philip-
pines or Guam, is a possibility," and, on November 27th, that "an agressive
movement by the Japanese is e.xpected within the next few days. The number
and equipment of Japanese troops and organization of naval task forces indicate
an amphibious expedition against either the Philippnes, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or
possibly Borneo."
43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations
to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention to probable Japanese
objectives to the southward and southeastward of Japan, and did not specifically
mention Pearl Harbor, both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander
in Chief, Pacific Fleet, were aware of the possibility of a Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor. They did not regard such an attack as probable.
44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1941, which were to
be used in radio transmissions to convey to their representatives information
concerning the status of relations between Japan and the United States, and
582 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
other countries. These were known as the "winds" code and the "hidden word"
code. The "winds" code was designed to indicate a break in diplomatic rela-
tions, or possibly war, with England or the United States or Russia by the use
in weather broadcasts of certain Japanese words signifying wind directions.
45. The interception of a "winds" message relating to the United States during
the first week of December, 1941, would not have comveyed any information
of significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not already have.
46. No message in the "winds" code relating to the United States was received
by any of the watch officers in the Navy Department to whom such a message
would have come had it been received in the Navy Department. No such
message was intercepted by the radio intelligence units at Pearl Harbor or in the
Philippines, although intensive efforts were made by those organizations to in-
tercept such a message. The evidence indicates further that no such message
was intercepted by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept
such a message. Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet nor
the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Intelligence Officer of
the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such
message. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Communica-
tions, and the Director of Naval Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony
to the effect that a "winds" code message was received prior to the attack was
given by Captain SafTord, in charge of Op-20-G, a communications security
section at the Navy Department, who stated that such a message was received
on December 3rd or 4th, that it related to the United States, and that no copy
could be found in the Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral
Hart, Captain Safford named, in addition to himself, three other officers who,
he stated, recalled having seen and read the "winds" message. Each of those
officers testified that he had never seen such a message. The only other testi-
mony to the effect that a "winds" message was received was by Captain Kramer,
an intelligence officer assigned to Op-20-G, who said that he recalled that there
was a message but that he could not recall whether or not it related to the United
States or England or Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this
investigation, Captain Kramer erroneously thought that a "hidden word" mes-
sage intercepted on the morning of December 7th had been a "winds" message.
47. On the morning of December 7th, the intercepted "hidden word" code
message was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the necessity of delivering
other messages, including the "1 p. m. delivery message," he overlooked a code
word relating to the United States and translated the message as meaning only
that "relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expecta-
tions." He testified that he later discovered the error and a few minutes before
1 p. m. on December 7th, he telephoned the correction to his superior officer in the
Office of Naval Intelligence and to an officer of Army Military Intelligence.
48. Except for the omission of the United States, the "hidden word" code
message was literally translated and did not sufficiently reflect previous diplo-
matic interceptions which indicated that the message was to convey the idea of a
crisis involving the countries in question.
49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Fleet, had prior to the attack included, in addition to the Chief of
Naval Operations, the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval
District, and the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.
50. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOUR-
TEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General and
the Japanese Vice Consul at Honolulu were tapped for some months prior to the
attack. These were discontinued on 2 December 1941 because the District Intel-
ligence Office feared that the existence of such taps might be discovered, resulting
in undesirable complications. No information of military or naval significance
was obtained by means of the telephone taps.
51. On 6 December 1941 the local representatives of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelligence Officer a trariscript
of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation between a person in Honolulu
named "Mori" and a person in Japan. This was examined by the District Intel-
ligence Officer. It was decided that the conversation should be studied further
by a Japanese linguist of the District Intelligence Office, who was to listen to the
recording of the conversation. This was not done until after the attack. The
transcript furnished on December 6th indicated that the person in Japan was
interested, among other things, in the daily flights of airplanes from Honolulu
and in the number of ships present. During the conversation, references were
made to flowers, which, it now appears, may have been code words signifying the
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 583
presence or absence of ships, and a method of conveying information to the
approaching Jajaanese ships, which presumably would have been listening in on
the conversation. Prior investigations indicate that the "Mori conversation" was
also brought to the attention of General Short on 6 December 1941.
52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOUR-
TEENTH Naval District, copies of various cable messages from and to the Japa-
nese Consul General at Honolulu, via a commercial communications company,
were obtained during the first week of December, 1941. This was the first time
that such messages had been obtained. The messages were in code and efforts
were made immediately to decrypt and translate them. Some messages were
decrypted before the attack. These contained no information of particular
significance.
53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by means of the tele-
phone taps or through the interception of messages of the Japanese Consul General
indicated the likelihood of war or of an attack on Pearl Harbor.
54. One of the Japanese Consul General's messages, which was obtained by the
District Intelligence Officer and turned over on 5 December 1941 to the Radio
Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation, was a message dated December
3rd. This message was in a Japanese code known as the "PA-K2." It was
decrypted and translated by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor after
the attack. The message was one in which the Japanese Consul General advised
of a change in a method which had been established for communication by visual
signals from Oahu, whereby lights in houses on the beach, the use of a sailboat,
certain want ads to be broadcast over a local radio station, and bonfires, would
convey information as to the presence or absence of various types of warships of
the Pacific Fleet. Although the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor was
unable to decrypt this message prior to the attack, the message was decrypted and
translated in rough form on 6 December 1941 by a civilian translator in Op-20-G
of the Navy Department in Washington. That section had received the message
from an Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Virginia. Captain Kramer
testified he had no specific recollection of having seen this translation prior to the
attack, but the evidence indicates that the rough translation was shown to him
on the afternoon of December 6th and that due to the pressure of work on other
important Japanese diplomatic messages, no action was taken on the translation
until 8 December 1941.
55. On 2 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu received a
coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the existing situation, the
presence of ships in port was of utmost importance, that daily reports were to be
submitted, that the reports should advise whether or not there were observation
balloons at Pearl Harbor, and whether or not the warships were provided with
anti-torpedo nets. This message was intercepted by an Army radio intercept
station at Fort Shaffer, Hawaii, and apparently was forwarded by mail to the
War Department for decryption and translation. The translation supplied by the
Army indicates that the message was translated on 30 December 1941.
56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at
Honolulu sent two messages in the "PA-K2" code which indicated the likelihood
of an air attack. The first reported that there were no signs of barrage balloon
equipment at Pearl Harbor, that in all probability there was considerable oppor-
tunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam,
Ford, and Ewa, and that the battleships did not have torpedo nets. The second
message reported on the ships at anchor on December 6th, and stated that it
appeared that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet Air arm.
These messages were not obtained by Naval Intelligence at Honolulu prior to
the attack. They were, however, both intercepted by an Army intercept station
at San Francisco and were forwarded by teletype to the Army. The translations
of these messages furnished by the Army indicate that they were translated on
December 8th. They could have been decrypted and translated in the Navy
Department in about an hour and a half.
57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to
the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval forces.
Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at Washington had
access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval
Intelligence showing such information, and had access to radio intelligence informa-
tion available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed with
them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force re-
ceived some general information concerning Japanese movements from the Fleet
Intelligence Officer.
584 COXGRESSIOXAL IXVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
58. The War Department had information which led that Department to be-
lieve that Japanese naval forces were in the ^larshalls in November, 1941. This
appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General
Short, information to Admiral Kimmel. concerning a special photographic recon-
naissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit. in order to obtain information, among
other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance
was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.
59. On 27 November 1941. a Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin was distributed
by the Commander in Chief. Pacific Fleet, to his command. This bulletin set
forth the available information concerning the composition of the Japanese Navy.
It revised an earlier bulletin on the same subject and pointed out that the principal
change was a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This arose from
the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces.
The bulletin stated, among other things, that the Japanese Carrier Fleet consisted
of ten carriers which were organized into five divisions, each having two carriers.
60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning the location
and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained by the Commander in
Chief. Pacific Fleet, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer, who received it primarily
from the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. Stith information also was
contained in dispatches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and
from the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington. D. C.
61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of Naval Intel-
ligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others. These included summaries
cf the information concerning Japanese naval forces which had been received from
the Radio Intelligence Units at Pearl Harbor and at the Philippines.
62. On November 26th. ComFOURTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav. informa-
tion to CincPac, CincAF. and ComSINTEEN. which stimmarized the information
as to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl
Harbor during the preceding month. The dispatch indicated that the Commander
Second Fleet had been organizing a task force comprising units of various fleets.
This dispatch stated that there was believed to be a strong concentration of sub-
marines and air groups in the Marshalls. which included at least one carrier divi-
sion unit (not necessarily a carrier), plus probably one-third of the submarine
fleet. The estimate was that a strong force might be preparing to operate in
southeastern Asia while component parts might operate from Paleo and the
Marshalls.
63. The radio intercepts b}- the radio intelligence tmit located in the Philippines
were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable because of the location of the
unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, in a
dispatch to CincPac, OpNav and others, commented on the above dispatch of
ComFOURTEEN and stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had in-
dicated that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, was directing various fleet
units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into two sec-
tions. The first section was expected to operate in the South China area. The
second section was expected to operate in the Mandates. It was estimated t'^at
the second section included "CarDiv 3, RYUJO, and one MARU." This dis-
patch also stated that the ComSINTEEN unit could not confirm the supposition
that carriers and submarines in force were in the Mndates, and th-at their best
indications were that all known earners were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. It
was stated that this evakiation was considered to be reliable.
64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting reports fiom
the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which were received by Admiral
Kimmel, which confirmed the movement of important Japanese naval forces
to the southward of Japan. These, however, did not leport the movement of
carriers.
65. After November 27t.h, the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor con-
tinued the practice of prepaiing daily summaries of the information received
through their traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications, which were
submitted to Layton, the Fleet IntelUgence Officer, for transmittal to Admiral
Kimmel on the following morning. Admiral Kimmel received and initialed these
summaiies daily on and after 27 November. On December 6th., he initialed t.he
summary dated December oth, which was the last one he received prior to the
attack.
66. On November 28th, Admiral Kimmel received a commtmication intelligence
summary dated November 27th., which stated, among other things, that there
was no further information on the presence of a carrier division in the Mandates
and that "carriers were still located in home waters." The next day, he received
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 585
the November 28th siiinmary which indicated, among other things, the view
that the Japanese radio intelligence net was operating at full strength upon
U. S. Xaval communications and "IS GETTING RESULTS." There was no
information set forth in the summary as to carriers. On the following day,
Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated November 29th., which, among
other things, indicated that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate com-
mand of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet. On December 1st, Admiral
Kimmel received the previous day's summary which stated as to carriers that
the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicated the presence of at least
one carrier in the Mandates, although this had not been confirmed.
67. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received, states that
all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 on
1 December; that previously service calls had been changed after a period of six
months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941. This
summary- stated, and was underscoied by Admiral Kimmel, that "The fact that
service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in
preparing for operations on a large scale." It also stated, among other things,
t^at a large number of submarines were believed to be east of Yokosuka-Chichijima
and Saipan, and as to carriers that there was "no change."
68. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which
Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request. This contained La.vton's
estimate, on the basis of all available information, of the location of Japanese
naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako-Takao area Carrier Division 4
and Carrier Division 3, which included fovir carriers, and the "KASUGA MARU"
(believed to have been a converted carrier"). The estimate placed one carrier
"KORYU (?) plus plane guards" in the Marshalls area.
69. Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divisions
1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate. The reason
was that La^'ton considered that the information as to the location of those car-
riers was not sufficient to warrant a reliable estimate of their whereabouts.
70. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Laj'ton had the following
conversation:
"Captain Layton. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You
don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied,
'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in h.ome waters, but I do not know wheie
they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then
Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern
countenance and yet partially with, a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean
to say t.hat they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?'
or words to that effect. My reply was that, *I hope they would be sighted before
now,' or words to that effect." * * *
"Captain Layton. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said,
'W here are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know piecLsely, but if I must
estimate, I would say that thej' aie probably in the Kure area since we haven't
heard frohi them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished opera-
tions only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in
his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or
words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete
ignorance as to their exact location." * * *
"Captain Laytox. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not
say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to
me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't
so indicated their location."
71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summaiy, which was delivered to
Admiral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carrieis:
"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers toda}'. Lack of
identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since
over 200 service calls have been partialh' identified since the change on the 1st
of December and not one carriet call has been recovered, it is evident that cairier
traffic is at a low ebb."
72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December
4th stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The summary
delivered on December oth made no mention of carriers. The summary delivered
on December 6th stated, in part, "No traffic from the Commander Cairiers or
Submarine Force has been seen either."
73. Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources, the
only practicable way b)^ which the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, could have
586 CONGRESSIOXAL IXVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
obtained information as to the location or movements of Japanese naval forces
from 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by long distance air reconnaissance.
74. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Xavy had the obliga-
tion, through ComFOURTEEX, to conduct distant reconnaissance, and under
Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, naval forces
were to be supplemented by available Army aircraft if the naval aircraft were
insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations. As previously pointed
out, the latter plan was not in operation because an agreement between the
Commanding General and ComFOURTEEX that threat of a hostile attack was
imminent was a prerequisite and no such agreement had been made prior to the
attack. The Xaval Base Defense Air Force Plan, which implemented the agree-
ments for joint Aimy-X'avy air action, similarly was not operative prior to the
attack.
75. X'o patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The onh'
Xavy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol
planes.
76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel,
and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after
22 Xovember 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time,
which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training
operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.
77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the X'aval Court of Inquiry that lie decided
on Xovember 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.
78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel
and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the
advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War
Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall
no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not
been informed of any of the ^significant warning messages, testified that Admiral
Kimmel had no such discussion with him.
79. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger, Commander, Fleet Patrol Planes,
and General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, which was
used as a basis for the joint Army-Xavy agreements, was prophetic in its estimate
that in the event of attack on Hawaii, the most fikeh* and dangerous form of
attack would be an air attack to be launched at dawn from carriers about 200
miles from Oahu. This estimate stated that the action open as a counter-measure
included daily patrols as far as jjossible from Oahu, to sectors through 360 degrees,
to reduce the possibilities of surface or air surprise. It further stated that such
patrols could be effectively maintained with the personnel and materiel available
at the time (March, 1941) for a very short period and that such patrols were not
practicable unless other intelligence indicated that surface raid was probable
within narrow limits of time. According to Admiral Belhnger, it was realized by
the responsible officers of the Pacific Fleet that another course of action which
was always open was to fly a patrol of less than 360 degrees, with the available
aircraft, covering the more dangerous sectors.
80. A daily search of the Fleet operating areas to the southward of Oahu was
being carried out prior to the attack, in accordance with the provisions of the
Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas.
81. X'o distant reconnaissance was flown from Oahu during the critical period
27 Xovember to 7 December 1941. The last previous distant reconnaissance
flown from Oahu appears to have been for several days during the summer of
1 941 on a sector toward Jaluit. This reconnaissance had been directed by Admiral
Kimmel at Admiral Bloch's request.
82. Late in X'ovember, 1941, the Army planned to conduct a reconnaissance
flight from Oahu to Jaltiit and Truk, with the Xavy assisting by providing intelfi-
gence. The reconnaissance was not flown because the Army planes were not
made ready prior to the attack.
83. The Xavy Basic War Plan assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task of protect-
ing the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by destroying hostile
expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use
of land positions in that hemisphere. Under the provisions of Pacific Fleet
Operating Plan Rainbow Five, when that plan became effective, the Pacific Fleet
patrol planes were to maintain maximimi patrol plane search against enemy
forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area, having due regard for time required
for overhaul and repair of planes and for conservation of personnel.
84. In the war warning of Xovember 27th, which advised that negotiations
with Japan had ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan was expected
PROCEEDIXGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 587
within a few days, the Chief of Xaval Operations directed that Admiral Kimmel
"execute an appropriate defensive deploj-ment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL-46."
85. The dispatch of November 28tb repeated an Army dispatch, which, among
other things, advised General Short that Japanese future action was unpredict-
able but that hostile action was possible at any moment. The Xavj- dispatch
directed that Admiral Kimmel was to undertake no offensive action until Japan
had committed an overt act and that he was to "be prepared to carry out tasks
assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in ca^e hostilities occur."
86. The establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from Oahu would
have been an "appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL-46."
87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack
were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more
than a few days.
88. Piior to the attack, requests had been made by the Pacific Fleet to the
Navy Department to increase the number of patrol planes assigned to the Fleet.
Some new replacement planes had been sent to the Fleet during October and
November, 1941. Additional planes, as evidenced by the prompt arrival of
reenforcements after December 7th, could have been made available by the Navy
Department, but at the expense of defenses in other areas. The Navy Depart-
ment presumably knew that the number of planes available at Oahu were not
sufficient to conduct 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.
The evidence in prior investigations indicates that after November 27th, responsi-
ble officers in the Navv Department thought that reconnaissance was being con-
ducted from Oahu to the extent practicable with the planes available there.
89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at
Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several
weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700
miles.
90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most
Ukely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to
attack Pearl Harbor.
91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 No-
vember 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably
would have been searched.
92. On the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly before the air attack on Pearl
Harbor, there were reports of suspected and actual hostile submarine activity.
The second advised of a surface and depth charge attack on a submarine. Only
the latter report reached responsible officers. Due to reports on previous days of
sound contacts with submarines, confirmation was sought. The action initiated
by ComFOL'RTEEN, in dispatching the ready duty destroj-er, was in accord
with the provisions of the Fleet security letter.
93. Confirmation of the report of the sinking of a submarine was not received
by Admiral Kimmel or by Admital Bloch prior to the air attack.
94. There is no evidence warranting the conclusion that a Japanese submarine
entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. The one midget submarine known
to have been in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th was sunk after
making an ineffectual attack.
95. Evidence of the approach of a large flight of planes from the northward,
obtained by Army enlisted men operating a radar installation for instruction
purposes, was not communicated either to the Navy or to responsible Army
commanders.
96. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and ComFOURTEEN had no
previous warning of the air attack, which was initiated by the enemy at 0755.
The attack was skillfully executed, and resulted in serious losses of life and
damage.
97. The battleships each had two 5" anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine
guns manned, which was in excess of the requirements of Condition III as pre-
scribed in the Fleet Security Letter. As to Fleet aircraft based at Oahu, seven
were in the air (3 on morning security patrol armed with depth charges and 4
engaged in tactics with submarine.s) ; ten were on 30 minutes notice; and the
balance of forth-four on four hours notice.
98. As a result of adherence to Fleet schedules which had been issued in Sep-
tember, 1941, the Pacific Fleet battleships, -with one exception, were all in port
and were either sunk or damaged. Due to the forturiate coincidence which
resulted in the aircraft carriers being at sea, they were uninjured.
588 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
99. It has been learned, since 7 December 1941, that the Japanese task force
which attacked Pearl Harbor left Saiki Anchorage, near the Bongo Channel,
sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and pro-
ceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles. The force then assem-
bled and fueled. It departed on or about 28 November 1941, East Longitude
Time, and proceeded in an easterly direction to about 170° West Longitude,
then southeast to a point about 200 miles from Oahu.
100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions, among
which were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the attack, the Fleet
Intelligence Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel that he could not reliably esti-
mate the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2.
101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles
due north of Oahu.
Hewitt Inquiky Exhibit No. 3
Vol. I, No. 22
8 Dee. 1944
United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocel\.n Areas
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
U. S. S. Nevada Aeire on 7 December 1941
(See story of PEARL HARBOR on page 1)
Any material appearing in "Weekly Intelligence" may be reproduced with or
without credit, so long as proper classification is observed.
"Weekly Intelligence" receives wide distribution among fleet units and key
Navy, Marine and Army Commands. Any requests for additional distribution
may be addressed to Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area.
Note: Starting with the next issue, the regular publication date of CINC-
PAC-CINCPOA '-Weekly Intelligence" will be Monday rather than Friday.
Therefore, Vol. 1, No. 23 will be issued on IS December.
CONTENTS
Page
PEARL HARBOR : The Planning Stage 1-22
Sub Situation 23
Jap Sliips Sunk in MANILA Harbor 24-25
MANILA Strike Results 26-27
Probable Conversion of Jap Hospital Ship 28
Increased AA Armament on Jap Freighter-Transport 29
MANILA PHILIPPINE Islands 30-31
KUMA-NATORI Class CL 32-33
Long Delay Bomb Fuse 32
Floating Mines in JAPAN Sea 34-35
New Jap Rifle Grenade 34
GENYO Class Tanker Victim of PB4Y 36
Jap Aerial Anti-Sub Doctrine 37-43
Long-Shafted Engine Used on JACK 44-45
New Army Air Division 45
Jap Airfield Camouflage 46-47
Thumbnail Biography of HELEN 48
Provisional Sketch of George : 49
Sidelight on Suicides 50
Japs Develop INDO-CHINA 51-54
Jap Ordnance vs. Allied Aircraft 55-56
Jap Anti-Sub Bomb 56
Weekly Photo Coverage 57-58
LUZON Airfields 59-62
Enclosures :
"Japanese Infantry Weapons"
Revised Drawing of YAMATO Class BB
12 02121 Confidential
[1] ■ Pearl Harbor: The Planning Stage
When Jap planes struck clustered U. S. warships and aircraft nt PEARL
HARBOR on 7 December 1941, the enemy was carryinsr into effpct nin-pninted
plans conceived months in advance and long cloaked in secrecv. Until recently,
little has been known of the planning stage prior to the sneak raid on HAWAII.
The first concrete Intimations of early enemy intentions are revealed in the
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
589
interrogation of a Japanese Chief Yeoman wlio worked closely with top-ranking
Jap Navy personnel during critical months in mid-1941. The prisoner, who was
captured on SAIPAN, had access to highly confidential documents as well as
behlnd-the-secenes rumors while plans for PEARL HARBOR were being per-
fected.
The prisoner appears both exceptionally intelligent and cooperative. Testi-
mony capable of confirmation from other sources checked closely. Tactical
information (as contained in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, Nos. 2 and 3)
proved reliable.
Most remarkable of the POW's assets is his memory of details, as indicated
in his reconstruction of the historic Combined Fleet Secret OpOrder #1, of
1 November 1941. This document, reproduced entirely by memory, is believed
to be fairly accurately transcribed, and will be printed in full later in this
article.
As a yeoman attached to the Staff of CinC Combined Fleet (Admiral YAMA-
MOTO) , the prisoner became familiar with Jap war games. Staffs of the various
Japanese Fleets worked these out on a large game board. Games were held
frequently, sometimes as often as twice a month.
Prior to late August (1941). war games were held at such anchorages as
SUKUMO, SAEKI, KAGOSHIMA, and KANOYA. Close attention was devoted
to current experimental data, which was incorporated in tactics employed.
Although the prisoner insists that enemy countries were not specifically desig-
nated during these games, the identity of possible Jap foes could scarcely have
been obscure.
During this period, the prisoner added, there was a constant interchange of
personnel between CiuC Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff. Men
<m these staffs were reportedly "definitely much keener" than members of other
Fleet staffs.
Final planning stages were presaged late in August, when ClnC Combined
Fleet ordered all Fleet Commanders and their key Staff members to TOKYO
for further war games. Offices at the Naval General Staff at JAPAN'S capital
were found inadequate, and the games were thei-eafter held in the Naval War
College. The POW claimed that security measures at the AVar College were
woefully inadequate. Classes at the College continued as usual ; "any man with
a half-official air could easily have walked in".
On 2 September the final all-important "games" got under way, with an intro-
ductory speech to all officers taking part. Rooms were assigned to the "N"
Team, the "A" Team, and the "E" Team (Nippon, America, and England) and
to the umpires. The teams, composed of virtually every top-notch Jap Naval
oflBcer, were made up [2] as follows :
Official duties
UMPIRES:
NAv AL GENERAL STAFF
NAG.\NO, Osami
FUKUTOME, Shigeru....
UOZUMI, .Tisaku
YAMAMOTO, Chitao__..
MAYUZUMI, Hame
TAMURA, Saburo...
SANAGI, Tsuvoshi
UOZUMI, Yoriichi
NAVY MINISTRY:
TAKATA, Toshitane
SHIKI. Tsuneo
TOIBATA, Kurie
FUJII, Shigeru
r<^-TEAM.
COMBINED FLEET:
YAMAMOTO. Isoroku....
ITO, Seiichi
KUROJIMA, Plameto
GOTO, Shigeru
ISOBE, Taro
SUGI. Toma
SASAKI, Akira
WADA, Yushiro
NAGATA, Shigeru
WATANABE, Yasuji
ARIMA, Takavasu
SEIMI, Ichivoshi
OTA, Kanai __.
Admiral
Rear Admiral
Captain
Captain
Commander. .
Commander..
Commander..
Commander.
Captain
Commander.
Commander.
Commander.
Admiral
Rear Admiral.
Captain
Commander. .
Commander..
Commander. .
Commander. .
Commander..
Commander. .
Commander. .
Commander. .
Commander..
Commander. -
Head of First Section (War Planes and
Operations).
Member First Section.
Head of Sub-Section, First Sect.
Member " " " "
Member of Military .\ffairs Bureau.
" " Office of Military Supply
Private Secretary to Navy Minister
(Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetaro).
CinC Combined Fleet.
Chief of Staff.
Deputy Chief of Staff.
StatT Adjutant.
Staff Engineering Officer.
Staff Gunnery Officer.
Staff Air Officer.
Staff Communication Officer.
Staff Navigation Officer.
Staff Operations and Plans Officer
Staff Torpedo Officer.
Staff Supply Officer.
Meteorologist attached to Stall.
590 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Rank
OflScial duties
N- TEA j\f— Continued
1st COMBINED COMMUNICA-
TIONS UNIT (RADIO INTELLI-
GENCE):
KAKIMOTO, Gonichiro
ARISAWA, Naosada
E-TEAM:
SECOND FLEET:
KONDO, Nobutake
Rear Admiral--.
Commander
Admiral
Captain
Commander
Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral
Vice Admiral
Rear Admiral...
Vice Admiral -.-
Captain
Vice Admiral- --
Captain .
Commander.
Deputy Chief of Staff.
Commander.
[S[ YANAGIZAWA,
OISHI, Tamotsu--
Kuranosuke-
Deputy Chief of Staff.
Staff Navigation Officer.
FOURTH FLEET:
INOUE, Semi
Commander.
FIFTH FLEET:
HOSOGAYA, Boshiro
ELEVENTH AIR FLEET:
TSUKAHARA, Nishizo
KUSAKA, Jinichi
A- TEAM:
THIRD FLEET (Amphibious Forces for
Southern invasions) :
TAKAHASHI, Ibo
ISHIHARA.Hajime
Commander.
Commander.
Chief of Staflf.
Commander.
Deputy Chief of Staff.
SIXTH FLEET:
SHIMIZU, Mitsumi
Commander.
KANOAKA, Tomojiro
r Fle'eY)":
Deputy Chief of Staff.
FIRST AIR FLEET (Carrie
NAOUMO, Chuichi
Vice Admiral
Rear Admiral...
Commander
Commander.
Chief of Staflf.
GENDA, Minoru
Deputy Chief of Staff.
On 3 September, officers involved studied classified material. POW vs^as as-
signed to "N" Team (CinC Combined Fleet). The afternoon, Commander
WATANABE— Admiral YAMAMOTO's hard-working, fact-finding Plans and Op-
erations Ofiicer — handed the POW an outline of conditions under which the
games were to be held, and requested fifty copies. Tliese terms, which set forth
a working basis for the games, contained the heart of the forthcoming 1 No-
vember OpOrder #1. Extensive preliminary ijlanning was indicated. The pris-
oner believed that these plans must have been under development for several
months. This was the first time that the POAV realized that something of
unusual significance was in the air.
On 5 September, the POW was attached directly to Commander SASAKI, CinC
Combined Fleet's Staff Air Officer. When he entered the smoked-filled room at
about 1000, he found PEARL HARBOR plans under discussion. The Japs
apparently expiected to catch all major U. S. Fleet units in the Pacific in PEARL
HARBOR as well as units believed recently transferred from the Atlantic. Tlie
prisoner was surprised to overhear that "N" Team expected to lose one-third of
the units participating in the attack on HAWAII ; one AKAGI Class CV and
one SORYU Class CV were estimated as ['/] sunk.
On 6 ior 7 September, the conference of "N" Team debated the best means
of assaulting PEARL HARBOR. (The POW, who was adept at the abacus-
calculating l)oard — was often used during these sessions to estimate fuel used
by Fleet units at varying si>eeds). It was during this stage of planning that
Captain KUROJIMA (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral ITO (Chief
of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an amphibious assault
on HAWAII. The cool and preci.se ITO was (surprisingly) in favor of an early
landing, and YAMAMOTO was inclined to agree, but the intuitive, tempermental
KUROJIMA won the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistics problems.
The POW believes that ITO's plan was a last-minute, improvised idea, and that—
when KUROJIMA's argument succeeded — the basic plan continued as originally
intended.
These early sessions, the POW said, seemed confined primarily to two general
problems: first, the details for a successful surprise raid on PEARL HARBOR;
and second, a carefully worked-out schedule for occupying MALAYA, BURMA,
D. E. I., the PHILIPPINES, the SOLOMONS, and Central Pacific Islands-
including (ultimately) HAWAII. Neither AUSTRALIA nor NEW ZEALAND
was apparently considered as immediate military objectives; the Japs intended
simply to cut them off from outside help. Tlie POW heard INDIA mentioned
only once, when some senior officer remarked "that's where friction with GER-
MANY will begin".
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 591
The conferences (and "games") were ended about 13 September. The prisoner
helped carry the notes to KURE, and thence by launch to the NAGATO,
YAIMAMOTO's Flagship, which was anchored at HASHIRAJIMA. About half
of the Staff were already on board.
On 15 September, all the Staff with four yoemen (not including POW) jour-
neyed to the IWAKUNI Air Group to confer with the Army. The POW re-
members TERAUCHI mentioned, but cannot recall other names. He insists,
however, that TOJO — then still War Minister — was not present. It was widely
rumored (but never confirmed by other evidence) that the Army conferees at
this meeting had not previously learned of plans to attack PEARL HARBOR.
The NAGATO remained at HASHIRAJIMA for about six more days. At
the end of September, the main body of the Jap Fleet moved to SAEKI. There
were four revisions of Combined Fleet OpOrder #1 while the Flagship was at
SAEKI, though no major changes were made.
On 1 November, the final printing of the order was started, requiring almost
three days to complete. Two copies were sent to the Array. Staff officers of
other Fleet units at SAEKI called for copies hi person. In all, 300 copies were
distributed. Op Orders #2 and #3, designating Y-Day and X-Day, were issued
on 5 and 10 November, respectively.
(Comment: The enemy naturally uses East Longitude Time in his OpOrder —
i. e., the date of 8 December for the PEARL HARBOR attack is correct ELT.)
[51 The prisoner once knew the OpOrder intimately. Over a period of
weeks, he has labored to reproduce on paper as nmch of the Order as he could
remember. This version is obviously incomplete and not to be compared with
the original document, but in main outline is believed to be substantially as
printed. Notes in parentheses were added by the editor.
Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI WAN
1 November 1941
Combined Fleet Seceet OPORD #1
The Japanese Empire will declare war on t.lie UNITED STATES, GREAT
BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS.
War will be declared on X-Day.
This order will become effective on Y-Day.
General Situation
(a) Policy toward the UNITED STATES.
In spite of the fact that the Empire has always maintained a friendly atti-
tude toward the UNITED STATES, the UNITED STATES has interfered in
all the measures which we have taken in self protection for tlie preservation
of our interests in East ASIA. Recently, she has blocked our speedy settlement
of the CHINA Incident by aiding the government of CHIANG Kai-shek and has
even resorted to the final outrage of breaking off economic relations. While
senselessly prolonging Japanese-American negotiations, she has continued to
strengthen her military preparations. She offers a threat to us in the form
of a "concentration of her Fleet in the PACIFIC OCEAN, thus attempting to
exert on us both economic and military pressure.
(b) Policy toward GREAT BRITAIN.
BRITAIN is aiding the government of CHIANG Kai-shek and, acting in con-
cert with her Allies and the UNITED STATES, in interfering with our pro-
gram of construction in East ASIA. Recently she has been steadily building
up the defen.ses of her bases in East ASIA in an attempt to threaten us.
(c) Policy toward the NETHERLANDS INDIES.
Although economic negotiations of a peaceful nature have been underway
with us for a number of months, the NETHERLANDS INDIES has been led
by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES to reject flatly the continuance of
mutually beneficial economic relations. Recently she has threatened the fortunes
of Japanese which have been built up as a result of persevering work through
long years.
(d) The ports and the vast fertile regions of the coast of CHINA have been
occupied by us and most of her great cities captured. CHINA, however, [6]
supported by BRITAIN and the United States, has not yet awakened from the
deluding dream of "Fight the War and Save the Country" and is attempting total
resistance to Japan in the form of a "scorched earth" policy for all CHINA.
592 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
While organized resistance is gradually becoming weaker, the prevalence of
guerilla warfare has obliged us to commit large numbers of troops to permanent
garrison duty there. If we are to secure decisive victory, BRITAIN and the
UNITED STATES, the powers behind CHINA, must be destroyed.
(e) Policy toward the SOVIET UNION.
The strength of Soviet forces on the Soviet-Manchukuoan border is formidable.
The USSR is maintaining a vigilant alert, awaiting developments. However,
if the Empire does not attack the SOVIET UNION, it is believed that the SOVIET
UNION will not commence hostilities.
Ou7' situation
The Fourth Fleet has largely completed preparation in the Mandated Islands,
as has the Eleventh Air Fleet (Naval shore-based air) at essential bases in
CHINA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND. The state of repair of our
ships and planes is generally excellent and the efficiency of their personnel has
markedly improved.
Strategic objectives
To drive BRITAIN and AMERICA from Greater East ASIA, and to hasten
the settlement of the CHINA Incident. In addition, it is expected that when
BRITAIN and AMERICA have been driven from the NETHERLANDS INDIES
and the PHILIPPINES, an independent self-supporting economic entity may be
firmly established. The vast and far-reaching fundamental principle, the spirit-
ual guide of our nation, (the "Eight Corners jof the World Under One Roof —
HAKKO ICHIU), may be demonstrated to the world. To this end we will use
all the military strength necessary.
Strategy
The strategy to be adopted against BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and the
NETHERLANDS will be as directed in the Annexed Volume. X-Day and Y-Day
will be announced later.
If before Y-Day the enemy is believed to have been able to ascertain our
plans, the execution of X-Day will be made the subject of a special order.
If before X-Day we should be attacked by the enemy, his attack will be
crushed with all available strength. All commanding officers will act in con-
foi'mance with "Strategy to be Adopted in the Case of an Enemy Attack".
In the case of the SOVIET UNION, every effort will be made to avoid provok-
ing hostilities. At the same time, every effort will be made to insure the
secrecy [7] of our plans. If the enemy should ascertain our plans, mili-
tary operations will immediately be begun in accordance with "Measures to be
Taken in'the Case of an Attack by the SOVIET UNION".
Circulation of this order is limited to Fleet and Force Commanders. These
Commanders will take every possible measure to prevent leakage of these plans
prior to their being carried out.
Precaution : Disposal of this order.
This order must be burned when no longer of use. If there is any danger of
its falling into enemy hands as the result of a ship sinking or some other
untoward occurrence, the responsible Commander shall personally make im-
mediate disposal of it.
Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1
ANNEXED VOLUME
1. Joint Army-Navy operations will be carried out in accordance with the
"Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement".
2. A Striking Force (Carrier Task Force), having the 1st Air Fleet (Carriers
and Escorts) as its main element, will depart its naval bases or operating
areas about X-16 Day, and will set course, bv way of TANKAN BAY (HITO-
KAPPU BAY, ETOROFU ISLAND, KURILES) for PEARL HARBOR, the base
of the American PACIFIC Fleet, where it will deliver a surprise attack.
X-Day is expected to be during the early or middle part of December.
3. Targets for attack are airfields, aircraft carriers; battleships, cruisers and
other warships; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land installations, in
that order.
4. From the time set by the Force Commander for the Striking Force to leave
port in JAPAN, strict radio silence will be observed. Communications will be
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 593
via ordinary broadcast system. The code book to be used will be "(not certain)".
The following communications abbreviations will be in effect :
"Many warships in PEARL HARBOR. "The fate of the Empire".
"No warships in PEARL HARBOR "The cherry-blossoms are in all their
glory".
"The weather is clear and visibility "Climb IMT FUJI".
good in the region. Suitable for an
attack".
"The time to commence the attack is "The depth of the moat of HONNOJI
0520. Temple is 0.".20 '.
"All forces attack" "Climb MT NIITAKA !".
etc.
[8] 5. The course and the disposition of the attacking units will be de-
termined by the Striking Force conunander.
The Commander of the Striking Force will inform the proper authorities as
soon as he determines on the course and disposition of the attacking units. Care
must be taken to avoid ordinary merchant shipping routes and to keep the plans
from disclosure under any circumstances whatever.
6. Procedure to be followed in case of discovery before the attack either by a
ship of the nation against which war is to be declared, or by a sliip of a neutral
nation (including the SOVIET UNION).
(a) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a nation
against which war is to be declared, make immediate preparation to attack and
sink it.
(b) In case of discovery within GOO miles of the objective by a ship of a
neutral nation, the ship should immediately be detained until it can do us no
actual harm ; strict surveillance should be kept of its radio transmission. In
case it should make any transmissions which might prove harmful to us or give
us reason to fear that our plans might be revealed, the ship will be seized by a
destroyer which will make immediate attack preparations.
(c) In case of discovery by a foreign ship more than 600 miles from the objec-
tive, the ship will be detained and radio transmission forbidden. However, if
it seems highly probable that our general intentions have been guessed, an attack
should be made immediately, if between X — 5 Day and X-Day. If before X — 5
Day, the Striking Force commander will decide the disposition of the ship, de-
pending on the circumstances. In the case of detention rf an enemy ship,
"R" method will be followed.
7. The Conunander of the Surprise Attack Force (Submarine Force), having
the 6th Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main element, will have most of the
submarines leave the western part of the INLAND SEA on X— 20 Day to attack
PEARL HARBOR. Its entire strength will be disposed so as to command the
harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warship which may have escaped from
the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance before the attack, and if the
opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships
with midget submarines. Tlie time for such attacks will be after the flights of
planes have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for recovery of midget
submarines should be considered.
8. Joint Army-Navy operations should be carried out in accordance with the
provisions of the Central Headquarters Agreement. The disposition of forces
will be determined by the Commander of the Advance Force (principally Second
Fleet cruisers and destroyers). The Commander of the Advance Force will
inform the proper authorities as soon as he decides on the course and disposi-
tion of the attacking units.
The point of departure for the ships of the MALAY and FRENCH INDO-
CHINA Forces will he BAKO and the point of departure for the PHILIPPINES
Occupa- [9] tion Forces will probably be PALAU.
9. The capture of Engli-sh and American troops and ships in CHINA will be
arranged by the (\unmander-in-Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet. The occupa-
tion of HONG KONG will conform to the provisions of the Army-Navy Central
Headquarters Agreement and the responsibility of the Commander, 2nd CHINA
Expeditionary Fleet.
10. English and American merchant ships which are in ports under Japanese
sovereignty at the time of the outbreak of the war or which are in ports which
may be taken are to be captured if possible.
SOVIET shipping is to be kept under surveillance after undergoing a rigid
inspection.
70716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 39
594 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It should be so planned that none of our shipping will be in foreign ports when
the war breaks out.
11. Beginning on Y-Day the Commander of the 1st Combined Communication
Unit will send false messages to give the impression that the main strength of
the fleet is in the western part of the INLAND SEA.
After Y-Day has been determined, the NYK passenger vessel TATSUTA MARU,
which is scheduled to proceed to the west coast of AMERICA, will sail ; ar-
rangements will be made to have her return while en route. (This was done,
and Allied passengers were interned; the same procedure would have been fol-
lowed with any trans-Pacific liner scheduled to sail in this period).
When Y-Day has been determined, the Commandant of the YOKOSLTKA Naval
District will allow as many men of his command as possible to go ashore so that
the number of men on liberty in TOKYO and YOKOHAMA will give a false
impression. (Another POW confirms this).
12. The Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Fleet (Mandates Fleet) will expedite
the attack and occupation of British, American and Dutch bases in the North
and South PACIFIC, acting in close cooperation with forces of the 11 Air Fleet
in the South PACIFIC. Enemy air power within our sphere of opera^^ions will
be checked and communication between AUSTRALIA and the mainland of the
UNITED STATES will finally be cut.
It is expected that in this manner AUSTRALIA will be isolated and d(miinated
completely. The natural resources of all kinds which the vast continent of
AUSTRALIA boasts will then fall to us.
(The dates for execution of assault and occupation of various Brici.sh, U. S.,
Netherlands bases were then listed in this paragraph — a few of which follow:)
(1) GUAM
(2) WAKE
about X plus 2.
about X plus 7.
[10] (3) (The dates for the invasions of RABAUL and the islands
from the SOLOMONS to the FlJIS, SAMO, and SANTA CRUZ
groups were all entered.)
13. The date for the seizure of MIDWAY is set as late Spring of 1942. The
date for the occupation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS is scheduled for October
1942.
Herewith are two of the above referenced documents
The Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement
The object of Imperial Headquarters, Army Department and Imperial Head-
quarters, Navy Department in setting forth clearly the division of duties and
command in joint operations was to promote a maximum display of efllciency.
(According to POW, it was issued at the end of October 1941. A resume of the
contents follows :)
1. The highest ranking Army officer for SUMATRA, BORNEO, the MALAY
Peninsula, CELIJBES. and the PHILLIPINES (including FRENCH INDO-
CHINA and THAILAND) will be Field Marshal TERAUCHI, Hisaichi. His
conmiand will be called the Southern Army and its headquarters will be in
SAIGON.
2. Plans for escorting large Army convoys and the place, time and date for
landings.
3. Agreements on Aerial Warfare Agreements on the places to be attacked by
both Army and Navy planes and on the places, dates and times of attacks by
Army or Navy planes acting independently. Agreements on the airfields to be
used, such as 'XX Airfield will be used primarily by the Army and secondarily
by the Navy."
4. Supply Plans.
Plans for the supply of Army landing forces to be effected by Army shipping
and for the Navy's support of same.
6. Connnunications Plans.
6. Agreement on occupied territories, cities, and resources such as, "The
BANDJERMASIN Oil Refinery will be controlled by the Navy'".
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 595
Measures To Be Taken in Case of a Soviet Attack
(POW does not remember the date exactly, but it was the end of October —
and stated in effect :)
"It is believed likely that we shall not be attacked by the SOVIET UNION
unless we attack tirst, but in case JAPAN is attacked first, the 5th Fleet
(Northern Force) will counterattack with all its strength and maintain local
supremacy."
YAMAMOTO, Isoroku,
Commnnding, Combined Fleet.
[11] Flagship AKAGI, SAEKI WAN
10 November 1941
Striking Force OPORD #1
1. All ships will complete battle preparations by 20 November.
2. The tleet will rendezvous at TANKAN WAN. (HITOKAPPU BAY, ETO-
PvOFU Is. KURILES).
3. Inasmuch as the plans for the coming operation must be kept absolutely
secret, strict security will be maintained in regard to them, up to the time they
are explained to the crew after port of departure in JAPAN has been cleared.
4. Break-down of attack plane units.
The AKAGI 1st Attack Plane Unit
Unit Commander : Lt. Comdr XX
1st Carrier Attack Unit
Etc. (details not recalled by POW).
5. Fleet cruising formation
(Including retiring formations)
6. All transmission of messages is strictly forbidden.
Transmission and reception will both use the TOKYO #1 broadcast commu-
nications svstem.
NAGUMO Chuichi,
Commanding Striking Force.
Verbal explanation by the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet of ambiguities in
Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1.
(Printed version of an explanation of details not covered in the order de-
livered to the High Commanders in an informal talk.)
1. The the coming declaration of war against ENGLAND and the UNITED
STATES will usher in a great war survival with the two leading naval powers of
the world.
That this war is really one in which our existence is in question, one in which
we have no choice but to strike with our military power.
2. That our Navy, in engaging a worthy enemy, is about to realize an ambition
which dates back to the foundation of the Imperial Navy many years ago.
[12] 3. That the alliance with GERMANY was not desired by the Navy,
but was a project favored by the Army which thought it would hold the SOVIET
UNION in check. ( !)
4. That the campaigns in the NETHERLAND INDIES and in the PHILIP-
PINES will be preceded by the securing of advanced bases in THAILAND and
French INDO-CHINA. It is believed that these operations will come off in
extremely smooth order.
The Navy will be able to secure sources of oil supply swiftly by means of these
campaigns.
5. In connection with the attack on PEARL HARBOR, reports indicate that a
gigantic fleet, which includes the ATLANTIC Fleet, has massed in PEARL HAR-
BOR.
This Fleet will be utterly crushed with one blow at the very beginning of
hostilities. It is planned to shift the balance of power and thereby confuse the
enemy at the outset and deprive him of his fighting spirit.
Our objective, however, lies more than three thousand miles away. In at-
tacking this large fleet concentration it is to be expected that countless difficulties
will be encountered in preserving the absolute security of the plans. If these
plans should fail at any stage, our Navy will suffer the wretched fate of never
596 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
being able to rise again. The success of our surprise attacli on PEARL HARBOR
will prove to be the "WATERLOO" of the war to follow. For this reason the
Imperial Navy is massing the cream of its strength in ships and planes to
assure success.
All of the planes of CarDiv 1, CarDiv 2, and CarDiv 5 will be concentrated in
the attack on OAHU. If there are any ships which escape, almost the entire
submarine strength of the 6th Fleet will be in command of the harbor mouth and
will concentrate torpedo attacks on them. In addition to these, the destroyer
strength of (DesRon 1) will be deployed in a screen (mainly for night attacks)
and the fast battleships of BatDiv 3 deployed in a fourth echelon. If the main
force of the enemy fleet should escape from PEARL HARBOR and make for
the open sea, it will be waylaid by the Main Body of our fleet.
6. The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the KURE
Navy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is still too much
to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew mem-
bers are supremely confident. The Gth Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks
within the harbor.
7. It is clear that even if AMERICA'S enormous heavy industry productive
power is immediately converted to the manufacture of ships, planes and other
war materials, it will take at least several months [13] for her man-
power to be mobilized against us. If we insure our strategic supremacy at the
very outset of the conflict by attacking and seizing all key points at one blow
while AMERICA is still unprepared, we can swing the scales of later operations
in our favor.
8. Heaven will bear witness to the righteousness of our struggle. It is hoped
that every man will exert his full efforts toward the realization of the ob.1ec-
tives of this holy war by determinedly carrying out our original pui"pose, in the
full realization of the unparalleled opportunity which this war offers.
Communications Plans. (POW does not know about these; no details.)
Supplv Plans, (outline)
The Naval bases of YOKOSUKA, KURE and SASEBO will be rear supply
bases. BAKO. PALAU, TRUK and OMINATO will be forward supply bases.
In addition to these, supply ships will be attached to each fleet.
5 November
Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #2
Y-Day will be 23 November.
10 November
Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #3
X-Day will be 8 December.
During the actual attack on PEARL HARBOR, the prisoner remained aboard
the NAGATO in the Empire with the Flag of CinC Combined Fleet. Detailed of
the Carrier Task Force which conducted the raid are known from other prisoners
and from documents. See, for example, the chart of 1st Air Fleet movements
as reproduced elsewhere in this issue.
The TF sortied from ETOROFU TO, in the KURILES, on or about 27 No-
vember (ELT), and headed eastward under a heavy front before turning south
to the attack. The composition of the Force, which was commanded by the
late Vice Admiral NAGUMO (CinC 1st Air Fleet) is fairly well established.
The enemy had six carriers: KAGA, AKAGI (CarDiv 1) SORYU, HIRYU
(CarDiv 2) SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (CarDiv 5 lei^s HOSHO) ; two BBs : HIYEI,
KIRISHIMA (BatDiv 3, less KONGO and HARUNA) ; three cruisers: TONE,
CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8), plus AKUKUMA ; elements of DesRon 1; and about
twenty subs.
[IJf] (Comment: It is of interest to note that all six carriers and both
battleships participating are now identified as sunk, plus the CA CHIKUMA;
the ma.1ority of other units involved are also believed sunk or severely damaged,
although definite identification is not yet possible.)
One of the Japs' chief headaches during the sorties was the fueling problem.
One well informed prisoner who was a CPO on fueling detail described emer-
gency measures required to keep the speedy SORYU and HIRYU in fuel.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 597
These two ships were fueled daily, and drums carried as supercargo were un-
loaded by bucket-brigade when the fast dash to the plane-launching point was
begun. At that, the SORYU arrived back at KURE with only 95 tons of oil in
her tanks. AOs coming alongside the TF to fuel units had considerable
trouble, and visibility was so bad that "towing spars" for position keeping were
almost constantly in use.
At the time of the raid, considerable information was derived from documents
taken from crashed planes and a beached midget sub.
Reproduced on the following page is a proposed track chart of a midget sub
which had planned to transit PEARL HARBOR but apparently failed. This
sub beached itself the following day on the opposite side of OAHU, and one
of the two crew members was taken prisoner. Little was learned from the
POW, but it is believed that the sub was damaged on a reef near the entrance
of PEARL HARBOR, putting sound gear out of commission and forcing retire-
ment. Subsequent examination of this sub's torpedo tubes indicated that an
attempt had been made to fire torpedoes, but launching gear fouled.
The original chart, too frayed for reproduction, was evidently a U. S. Navy
H. O. chart, with detailed navigational data carefully tran.slated into Japanese.
Rough notes were scribbled < n the chart, in some cases too illegible to translate.
On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The sub also carried
a rough profile of the PEARL HARBOR skyline. The mission of the sub was
both attack and reconnaissance. The KANA code as shown on the chart is
similar to codes recovered from aircraft.
At least three Jap midget subs were lost by our counter-actions at this time.
One sub actually entered the harbor ; it suffered a direct five-inch phell hit, and
was thereafter rammed and depth charged beyond recognition. The Japs ad-
mitted the loss of five of these undersize subs.
(At this point in Exhibit No. '3 there appear eleven item.s, as follow :
1. Photograph of a Midget Submarine beached on Oahu.
2. Track Chart of Midget Submarine for Transit of Pearl
Harbor.
3. Captured Track Chart of Japanese Carriers, covering the
period from Pearl Harbor to Midway.
4. Chart reflecting translation of code tables carried by Japa-
nese planes.
5. Photostatic copy of a document from a crashed Japanese
plane obtained after the Pearl Harbor raid.
6. Captured chart [fragmentary] employed by Japanese Pearl
Harbor raiders giving name, frequency, time of transmis-
sion and signal strength of two Honolulu radio stations.
7. Chart of torpedo runs, received from crashed Japanese
plane.
8. Captured Japanese photograph of Ford Island under at-
tack on 7 December 1941.
9. Photograph of vessels in the harbor bearing caption in
Japanese "the pitiful American Capital Fleet".
10. Photograph showing Wheeler Field during the raid.
11. Chart captioned "Submarine Situation, Xov. 28-Dec. 4".
The foregoing materials will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 1
through 11, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[24] Jap Ships Sunk in Manila Harbor, Through 14 November 1944
(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appears a sketch showing the
approximate location of Japanese ships sunk in Manila Harbor
through 14 November 1944. This sketch will be found reproduced as
Item No. 12, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
598 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It is estimated that more than 160,000 gross tons of Japanese merchant ship-
ping have been sunli in MANILA Harbor as a result of air attacks by the Third
Fleet. This estimated tonnage; refers only to MANILA Harbor proper and does
not include tonnage sunk in adjacent areas.
The 31 merchant ships noted to have been sunk consisted of two tankers, four
of the new 6500 gross ton engine-aft cargo ships (see "Weekly Intelligence", "Vol.
1, No. 21), and 25 freighters or freighter-transports ranging from 2000 to 9000
gross tons. Ships of less than 1800 gross tons were not considered in the above
estimate.
In addition to the above merchant ships, two warships were sunk in MANILA
Harbor and have been identified as a light cruiser of the KUMA class and a
destroyer of either the TAKANAMI or new KIYOSHIMA Classes.
The sketch on the opposite page shows the approximate locations of the sunken
ships, the names if identified, the tonnage and type. The symbol used to mark
the location of each sunken ship also indicates the date of the photograph in which
the ship was first observed to have been sunk.
Of particular interest in MANILA Harbor is a ship of the HOEISAN Maru
Class, indicated by an arrow. The ship has a minimum of 10 gun positions and
extra deck houses. The excessive AA plus the fact that the ship has remained
in the same position throughout all photographic coverages suggest that it may
be a flak ship.
(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appear three items, as follow :
1. Photograph of Manila Harbor.
2. Photographs showing [a] results of Third Fleet Aircraft
strike on Manila Harbor 11-14 Xovember and [b] two
freighters on the bottom near the breakwater, Manila
Harbor.
3. Photographs showing [a] burning ships and shore installa-
tions at Manila Harbor and [b] Pier Seven and other
installations. Manila Harbor, showing damage from Third
Fleet Bombs, 11-14 Xovember 1944.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Xos. 13, 14,
and 15, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS. Hewitt Inquiry.)
[28] Probable C0N^'EBSI0^' of Jap Hospital Ship
Photographed below in MANILA on 21 September is a ship apparently identical
to BAIKAL MARU, an AH. Still officially listed as a hospital ship, this vessel
has no known sister ship. It was not painted with the prescribed markings for
hospital ships and has apparently been reconverted to a merchantman to ease the
current severe Jap shipping shortage. Two gun platforms are noted forward
and one aft.
Although positive identification of this vessel as the BAIKAL MARU must
await further confirmation, it is logical to expect the enemy to reconvert his AHs
for more practical if less hiunane purposes. ^lore than 20 sizeable Japanese
vessels are still officially on the books as hospital ships — a disproportionate
allotment in view of his general shipping situation.
(The photograph mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs, being of
ships at Manila with arrow pointing to a ship apparently identical with
Baikal Mam, will be found reproduced as Item No. 16, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTSATIOXS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[29] Increased AA Armament on Jap Frehghter-Tbansport
(The photograph mentioned in the following paragraph, being of a
Japanese freighter-transport in ORMOC Bay. will be found repro-
duced as Item No. IT, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 599
Photographed by planes of the 13th Bomber Command on 11 November in
ORMOC Bay, the Japanese freighter-transport seen above is more heavily armed
with AA than any other ship of this type previously observed.
Th^ unusually large AA platform in the bow mounts four three-inch AA guns.
In addition, there is one 25-mm in the gun tub forward, and six additional light
AA — probably single-mount 25-mm mounted three on each end of the bridge.
This armament is in sliarp contrast to the standard one or two AA guns usually
observed on such vessels.
The enemy may be expected to bolster his AA defense aboard all types of
merchantmen when armament is available, in a further move to counter in-
creasingly heavy Allied shipping strikes.
(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appears a photograph of
Manihx Harbor and environs taken from the USS Hancock. This
photograph will be found reproduced as Item No. 18, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTEATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[32] Kuma-Natori Class CL
(The sketch showing the drawings mentioned in the following
paragraphs and bearing caption "KUMA-NATORI CL; Estimate of
Revised Armament'" will be found reproduced as Item No. 19, EX-
HIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Effectiveness of Allied aircraft against Jap warships has prompted a continu-
ous increase in AA armament. Recent photographs of KUMA-NATORI Class
light cruisers offer added dociimentation of this trend.
On the facing page are reproduced revised measured drawings. The refitted
cruisers are now believed armed as follows :
Two 5-inch AA in twin shielded mounts (these replace the No. 7 5.5-inch
guns of the original armament).
Five 5.5-inch guns of the original armaments.
Four 25-mm single mount guns.
Ten 25-mm in dual mounts
Three 25-mm in a triple mount.
Two 13-mm in a dual mount.
Available photographs do not offer a clear view of the well aft of the bridge,
and it is not possible to determine whether the two twin torpedo tubes mounted
there have been removed to make room for additional AA. Although possible,
this change is believed unlikely.
The catapult and the crane on the mainmast have been removed. A raised AA
platform now occupying the former catapult base is believed to contain a triple-
mount AA gun.
The old 5.5-inch No. 5 gun has been removed, and twin 25-mm added on each
side of its former location.
A launch and whaleboat are now carried athwarthship of the No. 1 and 2 stacks.
Long Delay Bomb Fuse
A captured document, (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 8309) disclosed that the
Japanese have developed a new long delay bonib fuse. It is designated as Ex-
perimental Type 1 Special Nose Fuse, and is to be used in the Model 3 No. 6 Mark
23 bomb. Model 1. This bomb is the Japanese 132-lb. delay-type generally used
against airfields.
Nothing is known of the time delay incorporated in this new fuse, but the only
other Japanese time delay fuse known has three settings, 5, 30 or 72 hours. In
construction this new fuse is an improvement over the old one.
600 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ERRATUM : In "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 17, it was erroneously
stated both in the text and on the charts of the Second Battle of the
PHILIPPINES Sea that Third Fleet BBs sank a crippled cruiser on the
afternoon of 25 October. Actually, U. S. light cruisers sank this Jap
warship.
[SJi] Floating Mines in the Japan Sea
Data on the chart on the opposite page was taken from a recently recovered en-
emy document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,410). Although dated well
over a year ago, the information plotted offers a revealing glimpse of the exten-
sive Japanese mining activity in the strategic waters of the JAPAN Sea. Float-
ing mines reported to Jap hydrographers along the southwest coast of HONSHU
were very possibly brought north by ocean currents from the heavily-mined
CHOSEN .Strait. The cluster of mines reported south of VLADIVOSTOK re-
flects the use of mines by RUSSIA to protect her greatest Pacific port area. The
total number of mines reported during the brief two-month period indicates one
of the strongest threats to U. S. subs operating in these Jap-controlled waters.
(The chart mentioned in the foregoino; paragraph, being of floating
mines in Japan Sea Area, March 1943 to May 1943, will be found repro-
duced as Item No. 20, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
New Jap Rifle Grenade
(A photograph of the new Japanese rifle grenade, mentioned in the
following paragraph, will be found reproduced as Item No. 21, EX-
HIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
A new type of Japanese High explosive rifle grenade, embodying several fea-
tures not previously encountered, was captured during a i-ecent operation. This
grenade is designed to be fired by a wooden bullet from the Type 38 and Type
99 riflles. Since these riflles are standard combat issue, it is believed this grenade
was produced for. universal use.
Carrying a main charge of three ounces of cast TNT and an instantaneous fuse
this grenade has four fins of light metal attached to the stabilizer to guide it in
flight.
Upon impact, an inertia block is forced into the fuse body, breaking a brass
shear wire and driving the steel striker into the percussion cap. Tlie cap ig-
nites a black powder relay which sets off a eyclonite primer. Then, in succes-
sion, the tetryl booster and the main TNT charge are ignited.
The heavy construction of the inertia weight shear pin indicates, that contact
with a soft object might not be sufficient to fire the fuse. However, a notation
attached to the captured grenade warns against dropping or striking the nose
of the projectile. A safety fork, which must be removed before firing, supposedly
prevents accidental detonation.
A complete round of this new grenade has been examined by Mobile Explosives
Investigation Unit #4, but its effectiveness has not been determined. The ex-
plosive charge was reported comparable to the KISKA-type hand grenade.
(At this point in Exhibit No. 3 there appear photographs of a
Genyo Class Tanker, the victim of a PB4Y. These photographs will
be found reproduced as Item No. 22, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRA-
TIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 601
[SJ] Jap Aerial Anti-Sub Doctkine
A detailed explanation of the Japanese Navy's aerial anti-submarine doctrine
is contained in an unusually lucid 'and analytical captured document.
This document was somewhat mutilated and its date of publication and issu-
ing authority are missing. Its relatively recent origin, however, is established
by the fact that episodes as late as February 1944 are mentioned, and the general
tone indicates that it may be one of the series of tactical research studies pub-
lished by the authoritative YOKOSUKA Naval Air Group.
Of special interest are notations i-eferring to the use of radar and magnetic
detectors. The tactical doctrine for these devices appears to be still in a state of
development, but their use may he expected to grow. Previous documentary
evidence has established the installation of magnetic det^'ctors on JAKEs early
last summer and it is probable that other planes may be so equipped now.
The document, which will be published in full as (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item
No. 9979), shows a full appreciation of the alertness and perseverance necessary
in effective aerial anti-submarine warfare. It contains many combat examples
which are not reproduced in this article.
Aerial anti-sub tactics, says the document in its introduction, must be based
on the rapid employment of large numbers of aircraft, even if it is necessary to
make some sacrifice in quality.
"The commanding oflicer nuist stand at the head of his troops", it states.
"The present combat conditions, if compared to I'and warfare, represent not
a battle of confrontation with the commander back of the center, but a final
charge led by the commander. In forces having detachments, the commander
should shift frequently to the various detachments, and direct activities on the
spot.
"Patrol duty requires especial attention to promotion of morale because of
the tediousness of the toiwgraphy. A patrol which has been lacking in alertness
is nothing but throwing away fuel."
Aggressiveness is stressed.
"It is necessary to attach importance to persistent and thorough sweep attacks.
If we concentrate on defense alone in combat, the enemy gradu'ally counters
with increased threats. When we strike a strong blow against them, they imme-
diately cease their pressure. This is shown by the fact that after the CAMRANH
Bay Force (BUTAI), KUSHIMOTO Force (BUTAI), and TATEYAMA Air
Group YAMADA Detachment had achieved considerable success in comb'at, the
enemy subs in that area lay low for a while."
Patience and imagination are essential.
"Even though our efforts are not rewarded and success in battle is not at-
tained, [3S] we must not become impatient and do anything rash.
"Such things as new tactics should be tried out as much as conditions permit.
In anti-submarine patrol nothing as yet exists which can be called fixed rules.
This is especially true under conditions where definite superiority cannot be
determined."
In regard to night operations.
"Night training in many cases is not carried out due to the pressure of work
or liberty or the like. However, there is great need for an increase of ability
in night operations, and it is essential to carry this out strictly because of its
special need in reference to the use of radar."
Lack of proper preparation may spoil an attack.
"In the fall of 1943 the CHUYO. about 300 nautical miles southeast of
SUNOSAKI was hit by a torpedo and sank, but a medium attack plane of the
TATEYAMA Air Group patrolling in the area immediately after this sighted a
surfaced enemy submarine and headed for it. The plane was shortly picked up
by the radar and when it reached the spot, only the wake was to be seen. A
bombing attack was made and the first bomb fellwith a right-left deviation of 0,
seventy meters ahead of the target, but the second bomb of the run did not drop
becau.se of failure of the release. Although they attacked again after repairing
this, the bomb fell short and no results were obtained. If the second bomb had
dropped on the first run, success would have been assured, but because of poor
preparations the opportunity was missed and they could get no revenge."
602 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Planes must be ready for instant operations.
"It is necessary to send out attack units immediately after receiving warning
reports. The sea area requiring patrol increases proportionately to the square
of the time elapsed from the sighting of the enemy to the arrival on the scene
of the attack units. However, since the arrival on the spot of attacking vessels
is usually markedly late, it is essential that the air forces consider this matter
so as to remedy the deficiency."
Bad weather must be turned to account.
"At such times there are chances for catching the enemy. When the visibility
on the surface is bad, it is generally the plane that makes the sighting befoi*e
the submarine does. Instrument flying training should be carried out so that
it is at least possible to fly with safety in bad weather. If necessary it should
be carried out while on patrol at times when vigilance may be relaxed, even if it
means sacrificing observation by the pilot. However, assigning unreasonable
operations to untrained personnel and suffering useless losses is condemned.
Hence, in weather in which the ability of the flying crew is not to be trusted, it is
best to return to base without loss of time."
U. 8. submarine tactics.
"By always carefully observing the condition of the enemy and knowing his
[39] present tactics, strike the first blow, and realizing that the tactics in
present use will finally become historical old tactics, prepare for future combat."
"At present the enemy makes the utmost use of radar and sonar to catch his
prey, and then carries out accurate firing by exposing the periscope. However,
a shift to completely submerged firing is being planned for the near future.
Counter-measures must be studied.
"Surface submarines sometimes use camouflage and deceptive measures. When
a strange boat has been sighted, she must be reconnoitered in detail. These
subs change their appearance to that of a fishing boat by the use of sails or
nets, or put up false smokestacks, and the like, and disguise themselves as boats
of other types.
Tactics for anti-sub patrol.
"When there are large and small planes at the same base, the large planes
will chiefly carry out day and night long range patrols around convoy routes
and make it impossible for enemy submarines to operate on the surface. In
addition to making it diflicult for them to approach our strategic places and
convoys, these planes will carry out surprise attacks, taking advantage of the
relaxing of the enemy's guard. The small type planes will have as their chief
duty the thorough patrolling of areas near strategic points and direct escort
of convoys. The large type planes, even though slow of movement, can still
obtain favorable combat results.
"Patrol must be maintained day and night with as many planes as possible.
"Continuous neutralizing sweeps only show results when there is no let-up
during the night. No matter how severely subs may be suppressed during the
day, if there are weak points at night it is very easy for enemy subs to flee on
the surface."
Tactics for planes directly escorting convoys.
"When direct escort planes sight torpedoes, they will bomb the spot from which
the torpedo tracks originate and strafe the torpedoes. Depending on conditions
(distance from the ships, number of bombs carried, etc.), the torpedoes may be
bombed and a report of this made to the unit under direct escort (escorting
vessels).
Patrol altitudes and security.
"Determine the altitude, considering foremost ease in sighting, and secondarily
the ease of carrying out bomb and/the possibility of/complications.
"(1) When primarily for vLsual contact.
"a. Usually 400-800 meters will be suitable,
"b. In darkness it is best/to fly at/about 200 meters.
"c. For confirming/sightings, etc/it is best to fly at about 300 meters.
"(2) When using magnetic detector.
"Daytime — under 80 meters is best.
[40] "Night time— 80— 100 meters is best.
"When an important escort convoy is passing it is necessary to report its
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 603
movements to the forces responsible for the next sector and make sure that
there are no gaps in the escort protection.
"In carrying this out, care must be taken that the enemy is not informed of
the movements of the convoy.
The lookout.
"The first step which determines the success or failure of attacks on enemy
subs is the lookout.
"It is necessary that before boarding/the plane/the sectors of responsibility
be determined, and that there be the will to sight the enemy without fail within
the field of visibility by an alert lookout at all times.
"Enemy submarines do not give up just because of the presence of a plam^e
overhead. If there is neglect in the lookout, aimless flying or the like, serious
result will certainly follow. In all the combat examples relating to the sight-
ing of enemy submarines, one cannot but wonder whether the flight crews put
forth serious efforts.
"It is necessary to maintain a strict visual lookout even when using radar,
magnetic detectors and the like.
"The magnetic detector is employed especially in cases when the potential sub-
marine area is small, as in the early stages after a sighting, and the like, and
the radar is employed especially at night in search of surface enemy submarines.
"When it is feared that an enemy submarine has gotten away, it is necessary
to intensify direct escort in the area in which it is most probable that the sub
Is operating or lying submerged, and the area must also be swept. Generally
when patrol, direct escort, and attack are incompatible, put emphasis on the
attack ; and when afraid the enemy has been lost, the emphasis must be shifted
to direct escort without loss of time.
Principles of the attack.
"When an enemy sub has been sighted, take care that it is not bombed inac-
curately in confusion, and make it a principle not to have to make a second try.
When the aim is found correct, all bombs must be dropped in one pass. If they
are not, the second attack generally has lost its target due to the sub's diving
or there may be no results on single dropping due to fuse failure. When it is
clearly recognized that there has been no result, a second attack must be planned.
"However, if circumstances warrant, it may be all right to drop single bombs
as signals.
"The results of submarine attacks, even when the bomb lands well, being uncer-
tain [4-/] due to frequently having a bad underwater trajectory or ex-
ploding at the wrong depth, it is necessary to attack with as many bombs as
possible. The underwater trajectory of a bomb is generally uniform to a depth
of about 20 meters, but beyond that varies greatly. When there is any suspicion
of an enemy sub, unless there is fear of attacking friendly forces, attack and do
not spare the bombs.
"Intimidation attacks should be made when the positional error of the enemy
sub is within 6000 meters and there is necessity for preventing its raising its
periscope and making another attack.
Guiding other planes to to the attack.
"The plane which has sighted an enemy submarine will drop target marker
bombs so that it does not lo.se track of it, and guiding other planes by radio, it
points the direction of the enemy sub with a small blue flag after bringing them
to the position of the enemy sub. IMoreover, if necessary, it drops more target
marker bombs and carries out bombing operations. It flies, banking toward the
true bearing of the enemy sub's position from the bombing splashes and target
markers, or reports the bearing and distance by radio.
"The planes being guided will focus their attention on the direction indicated.
When the position of enemy sighting or the point of the said direction and distance
is an unknown distance, they will bomb a point 50 metei'S in that direction. If the
planes being led do know the position of the enemy sub, when necessary they
will approach the guide plane, show a small blue flag and bank.
"When two or more planes have gone into bombing runs at the same time, the
one having the higher altitude will give way and begin over again. When the
altitude is the same, the one having the companion plane on its right will break
off and make a second run.
604 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Cooperation of magnetic detector planes.
"To cooperate with magnetic detector planes, tlie bomber should follow the vec-
toring bombless plane — but at the same time, the bomber should keep a close visual
lookout. (Comment : sic !)
(The sketch appearing at this point in Exhibit No, 3, being a "Method
of dropping target bombs," will be found reproduced as Item No. 23,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[.'{2] "When the position of an enemy sub is deduced, drop a smoke bomb
as near as possible to that point. Especially are these always to be used when
guiding surface craft.
"The attacking planes will watch the above conditions, infer the movements of
the enemy, and attack.
Cooperation with surface craft.
"The secret of cooperation is based on mutual understanding. Therefore, we
must work for perfection of communications, both visual and wireless, since they
are a most important means of establishing understanding.
"In establishing a thorough-going, unobstructed understanding, radio com-
munications must by all means be put to practical use. Even under present
conditions, this is never impossible; and, as the actual experience of the
YOKOSUKA Air Group clearly shows, if both parties have the proper determina-
tion, the desired understanding can be realized.
"Still, when the nature of the present surface craft anti-submarine staff is
considered, present development primarily is awaiting vigorous leadership from
the aircraft section.
"In directing surface craft, remember that they are often not furnished with
sonic gear, that their sighting level is restrictive, and that they are slow. Treat
them as if blind.
Ordnance atid equipment.
"New weapons should be quickly mastered. Before new equipment is received,
as much research as possible should be carried out beforehand. Radar, in par-
ticular, has revolutionized warfare, and as it is said of oW, 'Without a rifle, no
infantry', so without radar, no war planes. In this our country, since it is in
the unfortunate position of having started late in this field, requires the utmost
endeavor.
"The No. 6 (132 lb.) bomb has little power, and so if it does not hit directly, it
can not cause great damage to the enemy. It is best to use the No. 25 (050 lb.)
bomb as much as possible.
"The fuse must be set properly. The depth of explosion of anti-submarine
bombs is better deeper, ratlier than shallower than the enemy's depth. Depend-
ing on transparency of the water in the patrol area, the type bomb used, and so on,
a suitable fuse timing must be used. Usually the first bomb will be set shallow,
and the second and succeeding ones should be set for a deep depth to cope with
evasive tactics."
(Comment: The Japanese use time rather than hydrostatic fuses for anti-sub
bombs. )
"Aggressive use of machine guns must be planned, fitting it to the conditions
at the time. Although the results of strafing submarines cannot be expected to
be [^3] outstanding, by casualties to the oflScers and other annoyances it
can make diving impossible. And it can make the submarine show its position
by oil leakage, so the aggressive use of strafing must be kept in mind.
Maintenance.
"The maintenance of aircraft, due to the inadequacies in the supply of
materiel, dei>ends in great part on the efforts of the Air Group maintenance
crews. For this reason the diligent endeavors of maintenance squad leaders
are required.
Confirmation evidence.
"The confirmation of combat I'esults is extremely important for the planning
of future attacks.
"P'urthermore, since it is not easy because of the peculiar characteristics of
submarine and additionally because enemy subs are pulling various sorts of
deceptive tricks/confirmation/is becoming more and more difficult.
"Usually, either becau.se the pilot is personally satisfied of the results or
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 605
dislikes the trouble of continuing, the attack is broken off prematurely. It is
easy to let the enemy slip away in the last five minutes so care is necessary.
"When the following plienomena liave been noted, consider the sinking
confirmed.
"1. Large amounts of oil leakage and leakage of air bubbles for over 10
minutes, or, although the period of leakage of air is short, when a large
amount of air is released due to the damage to the inner shell of the hull.
"2. When oil leakage continues over a fortnight.
"3. When parts which are inside the inner shell of the enemy sub which
has been destroyed, come to the surface."
[4-'/] Long-Shafted Engine Used On Jack
The smoothly streamlined cowling of the new Jap Navy interceptor, JACK, is
made possible by the installation of an unusuallv constructed engine, the long-
shafted Kasei 23.
Information on the appearance of this new powerplant is gained from a re-
cently recovered document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,608). Data on its
performance has appeared in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 4 and in other
publications. Maximum horsepower is 1820 at takeoff.
The extended, Farman-type reduction gearing permits the installation of a
highly streamlined cowling and results in a relatively small frontal area. The
cooling problem is overcome by the addition of an auxiliary fan, geared to the
propeller shaft and turning in the same direction at an increase ratio of 3.18
to 1.
The Kasei 23 engine is the 20-series parallel of the older Kasei 13, which also
has a Farman transmission and is similar in appearance but lacking the fan.
The 13 does not appear on any currently operational plane, but served its purpose
as an experimental fore-runner of the 23.
The Kasei 23 displays several features of German design influence. The cooling
fan is similar to that employed on the FW190; in place of a carburetor, it has
a wobble-plate fuel injection system with individual injectors for each of
(The photograph appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being of
the Japanese Kasei 23 engine, will be found reproduced as Item No.
24, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
its [-'/5] 14 cylinders, a development similar to that used on the German
BMW801. The same device is used on the Ha 112, Model 2 engine installed in
DINAH 3.
This type of fuel system plus the fact that the engine uses 91 octane aviation
gas as well as water methanol makes its performance different from that of the
Kasei 21. The dry weight of tlie engine, fully equipped, is 1895.95 lbs.
Of special interest is the duraluminum cooling fan which is mounted on a
splined sleeve on the propeller shaft. The fan gearing consists of a set of planets
mounted on a plate which is splined to the propeller shaft. These planets mesh
with a fixed internal spur gear and rotate the sun gear which turns the cooling
fan in the same direction as the propeller.
The sun gear rotates on a sleeve around the propeller shaft in a lead-bronze
bearing. It is lubricated by oil under pressure from the propeller shaft. This
oil is thrown out from the sun gear and lubricates the entire assembly. The
propeller shaft has been lengthened 13.78 inches and the extended reduction
gear housing is constructed of a lightweight magnesium alloy.
NEW AKMY AIR DIVISION
The existence of an 11th Army Air Division is revealed in a Jap address book
taken from an Army twin-engined bomber SALLY shot down over SAIPAN on 3
November (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,300). The location of this unit is
given as OSAKA, which is also the headquarters of the Central District Army.
This association might indicate that the llth Air Division has been established to
control the air defense of the industrial KOBE-OS AKA-NAGOYA area. The date
of organization of the llth Air Division is not given, although the 10th is known
from transfer lists to have been organized in JAPAN last March.
606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
An Air Division in the Japanese Army Air Force is a high tactical and admin-
istrative command, subordinate only to an Air Army. The 11th Air Division
therefore is presumably subordinate to the 1st Air Army at TOKYO, which is the
top Army Air Command for the Empire. An Air Division theoretically com-
mands at least two Air Brigades of three Air Regiments each, or about 2CK) air-
planes. However, in practice the strength of Air Divisions has varied widely.
[46] JAP AIRFIELD CAMOUFLAGE
Jap use of trees and shrubbery to camouflage planes on the ground is illustrated
by photographs of LIPA WEST FIELD on LUZON. Methods used are regarded
as fairly successful, since planes are not easily visible from medium altitudes.
Note that, contrary to usual Jap practice, netting is not used.
(The photograph appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being of
Lipa West Field on Luzon, will be found reproduced as Item No. 25,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
LIPA WEST FIELD'S paved runway and trunk taxiways are not successfully
toned down and stand out clearly. Smaller loop taxiways, extending 650 yards
from the runway, are dirt surfaced and do not stand out as sharply. Revetments,
also made of earth, have shrubs growing on them and some have trees within their
walls. This prevents sharp contrasts in color or tone in the dispersal areas.
(The photograph appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being also
of Lipa West Field on Luzon, will be found reproduced as Ttem No.
26, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[^7] Planes in this and the preceding photo are camouflaged by hiding under
trees and by tying palm fronds and other foliage to the wings and fuselage. In
most instances the tail assembly of the plane has been placed between two palms
and the plane has been pushed under as far as possible. Protruding engines and
noses are well covered with foliage. In a few cases one or two palms have been
removed, leaving enough space to push the plane clear under cover. Even when
this is done, foliage has been thrown over the plane to prevent its disclosure by
outline or I'eflection.
Planes camouflaged in this way are necessarily located within one plane-
length of the edge of the taxiway. In some cases, the best indication of a hidden
plane is the shadow of revetment walls showing between the trees.
There are no dummy planes on the field, but dud planes are left in plain view
even where they partially block taxiways. No damaged planes appear to be
camouflaged, but several apparently operational planes are left in treeless areas,
both with and without foliage covering.
(Photographs and interpretation by Second Carrier Task Force).
[Jf8] Thumbnail Biographies of Japanese Aircraft
HELEN
(Fourteenth in a series outlining the background of important Japanese Aircraft)
HELEN, the Japanese Army's Type 100 Bomber, has failed to prove in com-
bat the extravagant claims which were made for it at the time of its introduc-
tion, but new developments may make it much more formidable.
This aircraft, made by Nakajima, is known to the Japanese as "The Dragon",
and was hailed at one time as the plane which would bring the Pacific war to a
quick end. However, it has not appeared in substantial quantities and its per-
formance to date has not been outstanding, even though it is among the most
heavily armed and armored of Jap bombers.
The original HELEN, Model 1, was powered with 1250 h. p. engines. It was
replaced in mid-1943 by a Model 2, with engine^ of 1450 h. p. Both models are
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 607
similar ia appearjince, being distiDguislied by a built-up wing section between
fuselage and nacelles similar to tbat of the British Mosquito.
There are indications that a Model 3, equipped with engines of more than
2000 h. p. and with greatly improved performance, is under development, but this
version has not been definitely identified.
(The photograph appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being of
a heavily camouflaged ''Helen," the Japanese Army's Type 100 Bomber,
will be found reproduced as Item No. 27, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRA-
TIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[^9] Provisional Sketch of George
Reproduced below are provisionsal sketches of GEORGE, new Jap Navy inter-
ceptor.
This drawing has been synthesized from documentary evidence, POW state-
ments and sketches, and two rough and incomplete drawings found in a captured
mimeographed manual.
No i^ositively identifiable pictures of GEORGE are available, and no specimen
has been examined in the field. The accompanying sketch is provisional and will
be superseded when better information is at hand.
Characteristics on which available information agrees and which are believed
quite reliable include the squarish wing and tail tips, blister canopy, airscoop
at five o'clock and large spinner.
Both reported variations of armament and wing position are shown.
(The sketch appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 3, being of
George", a new type Japanese Navy interceptor plane, w411 be found
reproduced as Item No. 28, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry. )
[50] Sidelight on Suicides
A JUDY pilot interrogated by Third Fleet after being shot down in an attack
off the PHILIPPINES provides a sidelight on the nature of the so-called
"KAMIKAZE Special Assault Force" of suicide divers.
This pilot was a member of 502 Naval Air Group, which he said had been
joined with several other groups for operations in the PHILIPPINES. His
information is open to question, but he appeared reliable on matters which could
be checked.
Quoting the interrogation report :
"POW stated that his unit had become a 'suicide' squadron on the 27th of
October. The designation as a suicide squad came as a result of the group's
commanding officer's request for such designation having been granted by higher
authority. The prisoner stated that pilots and other personnel of the group
were not questioned as to their desire to become members of a suicide squad.
"He felt that the order to dive on carriers to one's self-destruction was absurd
(Bakarashii), but since it was an order he fully intended to carry it out. He
did feel that there had been a needless expenditure of life with very little visible
success to date. The pilot claimed that he had been given no instruction on the
best way to carry out suicidal attacks on carriei's; however, he did feel that he
would attempt to hit an elevator in that elevators on a carrier were 'weak points'.
At the time he left MABALACAT (his base) there were still 50 members of the
suicide squadron alive but very few flyable aircraft were available. (Subsequent
strikes on LUZON by our carriers may have cut down this number).
"POW was of the opinion that his unit was the only dive-bomber squadron in the
Japanese Navy that had l)een designated as a suicide squadron ; however, he felt
that in the event of carrier attacks being launched on .TAPAN proper, suicidal
attacks in large numbers should be anticipated. POW did not believe green
and yellow silk flight clothing reiwrted as having been recovered from the body
of a Jap pilot who had made a suicide attack on a U. S. carrier had any special
significance.
"POW stated that the lack of aviation gasoline had caused the Japs to cut
608 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
down on the extent of training, but he had heard of no instances in which offensive
missions could not be flown as a result of a lack of AvGas."
POW's belief that his unit was the only one designated as a whole for suicide
work coincides with other available evidence. From recent Japanese propaganda
broadcasts, it appears that most of the so-called "KAMIKAZE" units are made
up more or less extemporaneously of volunteers from various groups acting inde-
pendently. The "KAMIKAZE" designation appears to be a special mark of
distinction applied to any such volunteers, rather than the name of a formal
organization.
If true, however, the designation of an entire air group as a suicide unit may
mark a significant change in the development of this tactic.
[51] Japs Develop Indo-China
The strategic importance of INDO-CHINA to JAPAN has increased as the
position of JAPAN in the PHILIPPINES and her supply line to the EAST INDIES
have become more precarious. The limited railroad facilities of the counti-y are
being utilized to their fullest extent in an endeavor to tind safe supply lines.
Her ports, particularly SAIGON and CAM RANH BAY are used for the protection
of convoys and as staging points for military operations. As JAPAN'S sources
of supply on the periphery of her empire are cut off it is to be anticipated that
the resources of INDO CHINA will be increasingly developed.
It is estimated that there are at present no more than 35,000 ground troops
permanently stationed in the country, plus approximately 2,000 special Navy
Landing Force troops.
There are 64 airlields, ranging from emergency fighter strips to major airports
capable of handling Jap boml)ers. The larger fields, such as those at SAIGON,
CAPE ST. JACQUES, TOURANE, CAT BAI and HAIPHONG, function not only
as combat and transport plane bases, but also as training centers.
Of the ten seaplane anchorages, the best equipped ones are in the HAIPHONG-
HON BAY area, at TOURANE, CAM RANH BAY, and CAPE ST. JACQUES.
The air force in INDO-CHINA is believed to consist mainly of float planes and
flying boats for convoy coverage and anti-submarine patrol.
(At this point in Exhibit No. 3, the following items appear:
1. Outline map of Thailand and French Indo-China.
2. Aerial photograph of Cat Bai Airfield.
8. Aerial photograph of Hon Gay, the chief coaling port of
French Indo-China.
4. Aerial photograph of Cam Kanh Bay.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 29,
30, 31, and 32, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[55] Jap Ordnance vs Allied Aircraft
Improvisation in Japjinese ordnance to combat strafing Allied planes con-
tinues. The latest development — the use of implanted bombs — is described in a
report from the Central Pacific dated 23 September 1944 and forwarded by
BuOrd.
Selecting the logical paths of approach of low-flying Allied planes on strafing
missions, the Japanese had buried the bombs in definite patterns on all sides
of the air strip. Particular attention was given to the approaches of revetments
and the main parking areas on the field.
Examinat'on of the bombs revealed they were rigged in the following manner.
a). The nose cavity of each bomb was filled with either Comiwsition C or
dynamite. About one fourth of the bomb noses were filled with the
plastic explosive and tlie remaining three fourths were filled with
dynamite.
b). The explosive was tamped into the nose cavity and electric blasting caps
inserted into the explosive,
c). The electric blasting caps were wired in series and had 2 leads running
to a dugout. The observer, hidden in the dugout, could detonate the
bombs when the strafing planes were immediately over the mined
area. Each of the five areas had lead wires running to a separate
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
609
dugout. The bombs were buried and well concealed with either sod
or coconut leaves and would not be visible from the air.
It is interesting to note that the Japs employed no particular type or size
bomb for this purpose. Over ].">0 bombs rigged with electrical detonators and
ranging in size from 82 kg. to 250 kg. were rendered safe.
Other instances of Japanese ingenuity in organizing and planning defenses
against low-flying aircraft are reported in Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 40,
Air Command, Southeast Asia. A brief resume of unorthodox and impromptu
defenses encountered by airmen in this theatre includes small arms fire by
ground troops, multi-barrelled MG's mounted on trucks and anti-aircraft guns
mounted on freight cars.
Among the more ingenious devices employed in the Southwestern Pacific area,
was a BETTY (medium bomber) conveniently parked at the end of a runway
offering an unusually easy target. Unfortunately machine gun pits containing
20 mm guns had been dug in the shadow of the wings. The attacking fighters
received a very warm reception. In other cases of this type, trucks, tanks, huts
and barges have been substituted for the BETTY as bait.
Another type of defense against strating is the use of wires, strung across
narrow valleys, between large trees and between small hills on either side of the
river. Bridges, railroads and landing strips have been reported as having pos-
sible trip-wires either over them or guarding the oi)en approaches.
[56] Other areas have reported the use of a tyiie of 70-mm mortar. The
projectile is reported to burst betv^•een 1500 and 2000 feet, ejecting 7 canisters
which in turn release parachute-suspended bomb tubes. These take two or three
minutes to float to the ground and constitute a definite hazard as they are diffi-
cult to see. If contiict is made with one of the suspending cords, it causes the
bomb to explode with a detonation described as about twice that of a 20-mm
shell.
Jap Anti-Stjbmarine Bomb
The enemy is having trouble because his anti-submarine bombs ricochet. In
the case of their 300-kg. bomb (Type 1, No. 25 bomb, Mark 2, Model 1, Modifi-
cation 1) the Japs have attempted to correct this with an anti-ricochet nose
attachment. Photographs of an altered bomb captured on GUAM and examined
by MEIU No. 4 show the steel cylinder which is secured to the nose of the bomb
by welding. This type of alteration should prove reasonably effective.
(A photograph referred to in the foregoing paragraph, being of
an altered Japanese bomb captured on Guam, will be found reproduced
as Item No. 33, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[5]
Weekly Coveeage Report
Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to
and including 1 Decemher 1944
•Prints only received; **Sorties distributed]
JAPAN
Kyushu: Good vertical partial coverage of Sasebo and Nagasaki
v/o
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No.
Jicpoa §
Date taken
V
154.9 mm-
32,500'
M10/258-21P
9225-41
10/31**
CHINA: Good split-vertical and vertical coverage of areas indicated
v..
V
V.
V
SpUt Vert...
v....
Split Vert...
152.6 mm..
6"
24"
6".
24"
24"
32,000'.
32,600'.
25,600'.
50,450'.
22,450'.
29,300'.
20,000'.
MR7-14PL
M13/5C-21PS (Amoy A/D).
M13/5C-21PS (Amoy A/D).
M11/6C-21PS (Amoy Is.)...
M11/6C-21PS (Amoy Is.)...
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1-
M7/2-9PS-A1 (Shanghai)
4MA3-24CM (Amoy Vic. to (W. of
Chelin).
—40
9240-153.
9230-222.
9231-223-
9232-224.
9233-225.
9234-225.
9237-226.
9241-227.
9242-227.
9/29
1/23
1/23
11/7
11/7
7/12
610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Photos received at CinCPac.CinCPOA during period from 2U November 19^4 to
and including 1 December 1944 — Continued
CHINA: Good split-vertical and vertical converge of areas indicated— Continued
V/0
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No.
Jicpoa #
Date taken
Split Vert...
24"
20,000'
4MA3-24CM (Linyeung to Shalung).
9249-228
(9250-228
8/8*'
Split Vert.. .
24"
20,000'
4MA3-24CM (Chinkanchi to San-
lui Vic).
9251-229
9252-229
9253-229....
9254-229
8/8»*
Split Vert.- -
24"
20,000'
4MA3-24CM (Chungtung to S. of
Paotai).
9255-230
9256-230
9257-230
9258-230
8/8"
Split Vert...
24"
20,000'
4MA3-24CM (Swatow to Amoy
Vic).
9259-231
9260-231.. _
9261-231
9262-231
8/8**
V
24"
7,300'
21PR-4MB201 (Sanchiosze-Hwei-
lung Kiao Area).
9265-232.--
9/21 •♦
V
24"
24"
24"
9,000'
14,000'
20,000'
21PR-4MB201 (Tanganhsien)
21PR-41\IB201 (Chiting)
9266-233..
9267-234...
9314-235-..
9315-235..-
9/21"
v
9/21"
Split Vert...
24CM-4MA1 (Nanya to Saikiao)__-
7/27/"
Split Vert...
24"
20,000'
24CM-4MA1 (Yentien to Kwany-
inting).
9316-236
9317-236..-
7/27"
Split Vert...
24"
20,000'
24CM-4MA1 (NW Nanshan N
Pingtan).
9318-237
9319-237....
7/28"
Split Vert...
24"
20,000'
24CM-4MAI (N Pingtan to SE
Santu to Liutu).
9320-238.-
9321-238..-
7/28"
Split Vert...
24"
20,000'
24CM-4MA1 (Liutu to S of Foo-
chow.
9422-239..
9323-239
7/28"
Split Vert...
24"
20,000'
24CM-4MA1 (SFoochowtoNHing-
wa).
9324-240 .
9325-240
7/28**
Split Vert...
24"
20,000'
24CM-4MA1 (N Hingwa to Mel-
chowcheng).
9326-241.--.
9327-241
7/28** ■
Split Vert...
24"
20,000'
24CM-4MA1 (Liuchow to Kweilin).
9328-242.-
9329-242
7/25**
Split Vert...
24"
18,500'
24CM-4MA2 (Kitung to 8 Mi W
Sungki).
9347-243
9348-243
8/7**
Split Vert...
24"
18,500'
24CM-4MA2 (8 Mi W Sungki to
Kuaotow).
9349-244
9350-244
9351-244
9352-244
8/7**
Split Vert...
24"
18,500'
24CM-4MA2 (Linyang to Paishih).
9353-245
9354-245
9355-245
9356-245
8/7**
Split Vert...
24".
18,500'
24CM-4MA2 (6 Mi S Siaoma to 10
Mi SE Kuaotow— 10 Mi W Kuao-
tow to Haoscasha).
9357-246
9358-246
8/7**
Split Vert...
24"
18,500'
24CM-4MA2 (8 Mi NW Juian to
Changyang)
9359-247
9360-247
8/7**
Split Vert...
24"
18,500'
24CM-4MA2 (Fengwei to Amoy).-
9361-248
9362-248
8/7**
V
24"
24"
18,500'-
20,000'
24CM-4MA2 (Amoy to Paishui-
ying).
24CMS-4M9-62A (26° 50' N, 117°
9363-249
9395-250-..
8/7**
Split Vert...
9/16**
57' E to 26° 50' N, 119° 24' E).
9396-250
Split Vert...
24"
20,000'
24CMS-4M9-21A (24° 50' N, 118°
10' E to 25° 42- N, 118° 53' E).
9397-251
9398-251
9/17**
Split Vert...
24"
20,000'
24CMS-4M9-21B (25° 48' N, 118° 59'
E to 26° 20' N, 119° 29' E).
9399-252
9400-252
9/17**
V
24"
30,000'
21PR-4MB21 (Canton, White Cloud
& Tienho A/Ds).
9493-277
3/13**
V
24"
24"
30,000'
30,000'
21PR-4MB21 (Whampoa Docks). _.
21PR-4MB21 (Kowloon and Hong-
kong).
9494-278
9495-279
3/13"
V
3/13**
BONIN GROUP: Nanpo Shoto
Chichi Jima: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage
V
V
24"
24"
12"
24"
24"
20"
6%"
eVi"
6?i"
17,000'
17,000'
17,000'
18,500'
18,500'
19,450'
200'
C-840-26BS-4-11-65
B-933-26BS-4-11-65
A-002-26BS-4-11-65
A-974-38BS-4M30-71-...
9401-184
9402-185
9403-186
9404-187
9405-188
9406-189
9407-190
9408-191
9409-192
11/23**
11/23**
V
11/23*'
V
11/24**
V
B-973-38BS-4M 30-71
C-617-38BS-4M30-71
A-682-42BS
11/24'*
v..
11/24"
0
11/17**
0
200'
B-662-42BS.
11/17**
0
200
G-327-42BS...
11/17
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
611
Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPO A during period from 2J+ November 1944 to
and including 1 December 1944 — Continued
BONIN GROUP: Nanpo Shoto— Continued
V/0
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No.
Jicpoa #
Date taken
V
24"
24"
12"
24"
12"
24"_ _
12"
40"
40"
40".
24"
24"
24"
18,900'
17,500'
17,500'. _
16,000'
17,000'
17,000'
200'
20,000'
20,000'
20,000'
20,000'
20,000'
20,000'
A-526-819B S-4M30-71 . -
9454-193
9455-194
9456-195 _...
9457-196. _-.
9458-197... _
9459-198...-
9474-199
9475-200... .
9476-201
9477-202
9478-203
9479-204
9430-205
11/24"
11/24
11/24**
11/23**
11/23**
11/23*'
V
C-674-819BS-4M30-71
D-527-819BS-4M30-71 -
V
V
A-873-98BS-11-65-7BC
V
B-876-98B S-1 1-65-7B C
V
C-951-98BS-11-65-7BC
0
A-016-431BS-4-11-64
VD5-1A-- - .
11/23**
11/25**
11/25**
V
v_.
VD5-1C._
V
VD5-1D
VD5-1E._
11/25**
11/25**
11/25**
11/25**
V
v._.
VD5-10
VD5-1H
V
Haha Jima:
Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage
V
12"
12"
24"
12"
24"
6H"
11,720'
12,725'
12,750'
13,000'
16,500'
A-948-38BS-4M30-55 ..
9193-71
9194-72
9195-73
9196-74
9197-75
9198-76
9471-77
9472-78
9473-79
9470-80
9481-81
9482-82
11/8**
0
A-491-98BS-7BC
11/9**
O -
B-951-98BS-7BC
A-153-431BS-47
11/9**
V
11/9**
V .- ..
A-661-819BS-4M30-53
11/6
0
No data ...
0
12"
24"
12"
12"
40"
24"
200'
14,500'
11,400'
14,000'.
20,000'
20,000'.
A-016-431BS-4-11-64
11/23**
V
B-223-431BS-4-11-61
11/21**
V ....
B-683-819BS-4M30-71
11/24**
V-
A-016-431BS-4-11-64
11/23**
V
VD5-2A
11/25**
V.
VD5-2H
11/25*'
Nishino Shima: Distant oblique partial coverage
Var VB102-18
9216-6.
11/7*
KAZAN GROUP: Nanpo Shoto
Iwo Jima: Good vertical partial coverage of island in color
V .. ..
24"..
24"
24"
24"
20,000'
20,000'
20,000'
20,000'
VD4-97
9219-261
9220-262 ....
9221-263
9222-264
11/19
V
VD4-97
11/19
V
VD4-97
VD4-97
11/19
V
11/19
MARCUS: Nanpo Shoto — Good complete vertical coverage
V
24"
12"
24"
17,000'
13,300'
18,000'
A-880-26BS
9199-36
9200-37
9201-38
11/7"
V
A-998-392BS-4M 30-55
11/9"
V . ::
A-846-98BS-7BC.
11/7
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Cebu: Good trimetrogon partial coverage
13, 500' .
Essex-131 (V)
Essex-131 (P)
Essex-131 (S)
9213-83
9214-83
9215-83
9/13"
Negros: Good trimetrogon partial coverage
13, 500' .
Essex-131 (V)
Essex-131 (P)
Essex-131 (S) .
9210-65
9211-€5
9212-65
9/13**
612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 2Ii. November 1944 to
and including 1 December t944 — Continued
PHILIPPIOE ISLANDS
Luzon: Good split-vertical and oblique coverage of areas indicated
V/0
r. L.
Alt.
Split Vert...
0
24"..
63/i"
(>%"-
(,%"
6^g"
6J^"
6J^"-
6J^" -
6K"
m"
6^"
6?^" -
8J4"
6^" -
63^"
6^"
65^"-
6^"
%%"
^Vi" -
6^".
65^".-
(,%"
6J^"
f>Vi"
6^"
6^"
6'/i"
^H"
6^"
6^"
Wi"
6H"— — -
Var
0
Var
0
Var
0.
Var.
0...
Var...
Var .
0
0
Var
Var
0
0
Var
0 .
Var
Var
0
0
Var
[5S\ 0....
0
Var
Var .-
0
Var
0
0
Var
Var...
Var
Var
0
0
0
0
Var
Var.
Var
Var
0
0 .
0
Var
Var
0
0
Var
Var.
Var
Var
Var
Var
Var -
0
0 -. .
0
0
0..
0...
Sortie No.
Jicpoa #
Date taken
CV16-2652 (Manila)
CV16-2653
Tico-5 (Manila).
Tico-6 (Manila)
Tico-7 (Manila)
Tico-8 (Manila)
Tico-9 (Manila)
Tico-10 (Manila)
Tico-11 (Manila)
Tico-12 (Manila)
Tico-14 (Manila)
Tico-15 (Manila)
Tico-16 (Manila)
Tico-17 (Manila)
CVll-125 (North Tip)...
CVll-111 (North Tip),.
CVll-1 (North Tip)..
CVll-lH (North Tip)...
CVll-126 (North Tip)...
CVll-113 (North Tip)..,
CVll-107 (North Tip)...
CVll-112 (North Tip)...
Frank-149 (Manila Bay)
CV127-201 (Manila Bay)
CV127-196 (Manila Bay)
CV127-198 (Manila Bay)
CV127-202 (Manila Bay)
CV127-197 (Manila Bay)
CV127-199 (Manila Bay)
CVl6-2fi49 (Manila Bay)
CV16-2651 (Manila Bay)
BKHIy-366 -
BKHL-367....
BKHL-368
9263-132
9264-132
9268-133
9269-134
9270-135
9271-136
9272-137
9273-138
9274-139
9275-140
9276-141.
9277-142
9278-143
9279-144
9280-145
9281-146
9282-147
9283-148.
92S4-149
9285-150
9286-151
9287-152
9288-153
9289-154
9290-155
9291-156
9292-157
9293-158
9294-159
9295. 160
9296-161
9297-162
9298-163
9299-164
11/5"
11/5"
11/5"
11/5"
11/5"
11/5"
11/5"
11/5"
11/5"
11/5**
11/5'*
11/5**
11/6**
10/18**
10/18**
10/18**
10/18**
10/18**
10/18**
10/18**
10/18**
10/18**
11/6**
11/5**
11/5**
11/6**
11/5'*
11/5**
11/5**
11/5**
10/18**
10/18**
10/18**
FORMOSA: Good split-vertical coverage of areas indicated
Split Vert.. -
Split Vert...
Split Vert.. -
24"
24"
24"
30,000'
29,800'
29,500'
21PH-4MB163 (Takao A/D &
Docks) .
21PR-4MB163 (Sikano A/F)
21PR-4MB163 (Taito A/D).
9243-339
9244-339
9245-340
9246-340
9247-341
9248-341
9/12**
9/12**
9/12**
MALAY STATES: Good vertical coverage of Singapore
V
V
V
V
V.
V
V.
V
V
24'
6"
12'
12'
24'
24'
24'
24'
24'
22,070'
21,500'
22,900'
21,000'
22,000'
22,300'
22,300'
21,300'
21,300'
(444BG) (4MB15) (444-AC352)
(462BG) (4MB15) (462-AC475)
(444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC492)
(444BC) f4MB15) (444-AC411)
(444 BO (4MB 15) (444-.\C584)
(444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC485)
(444BC) (4MB15) (444-AC419)
(462BO) (4MB 15) (462-AC382)
(462BG) (4MB15) (462-AC581)
9340-2.
9341-3.
9342-4.
9343-5.
9344-6.
9345-7.
9346-8.
9364-9.
9365-10
11/5**
11/5**
11/5**
11/5**
11/5**
11/5**
11/5**
11/5**
11/5**
BURMA: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated
V.
24"..
24,000'
(Rangoon)
(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC-581)
(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AG329)
(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC479)
(462BC) (4MB15) (462-AC479)
(462BC) (4MB13) (462-AC444)
(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC475)
(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC463)
(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC461)
(462BC) (4MB14) (462-AC506)
(444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC485)
(444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC419)
9366-3
9367-4
9368-5.
9369-6
9370-7
9364-8
9371-9..
9372-10
9373-11
9374-12
9375-13
11/3**
V
11/3**
v..
11/3**
v_
12"
40"
21,400' -
23,500.
11/5**
V
V.
11/3**
11/3**
V
24"
24"
24"
23,500'
22,000'
11/3**
V
V
11/3**
11/3**
V
24"
24"
22,00C'..
22,000'
11/3**
V .
ll/3*»
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
613
Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 io
and including 1 December JS44" -Continued
BURMA: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated — Continued
V/0
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No.
Jiepoa #
Date taken
V
V
V
24"
40"
22,000'
22,000'
22,000'
21,000'
21,400'
21,500'
21,200'
21,000'
20,500'
21,000'
20,800'
16,500'
(444BG^ (4MB14) (444-AC580)
(444BU) (4MB14) (444-AC524)
(444BO) (4MB14) (444-AC411)
(14PL) (4MB14) (468-AC525)
(14PL) (4MB14) (468-AC494)
(14PL) (4MB14) (468-AC546)
f]4PL) (4MB14) (468-AC469)
(IIPL) (4MB14) (40-AC508)
(IIPL) (4MB14) (40-AC452)
(IIPL) (4MB14) (40-AC574)
(IIPL) (4MB14) (40-AC541)
(Taungup)
(444BG) (4MB14) (444-AC202)
9376-14
9377-15
9378-16
9379-17
9380-18
9381-19
9382-20
9383-21
9384-22
9385-23
9386-24
9387-25
11/3**
11/3'*
11/3**
V
V
v.-
V
V
V
V
24"
24"
12"
40"
24"
12"
12" _
12"
12"
11/3**
11/3**
11/3**
11/3'*
11/3**
11/3**
11/3**
V
V
11/3**
11/3**
SUMATRA: Good vertical coverage of area indicated
24"
21,300'.
(444BG) (4MB15) (444-AC580)
(Pangalan Brandan)
9388-4.
11/5**
CAROLINE ISLANDS
Patau: Good vertical and oblique coverage of areas indicated
14,800'
14.000'
13,000'
12,000'
2,500'-
15,000'
14,000'
10.000'
50C' -.
14,000'
16,000'
15,000'.
50'
28PR4MB77-1 (Babelthuap A/F)...
28PR4MB90-1 (Babelthuap A/F)...
28PR4MB94-1 (Babelthuap A/F)...
28PR4MB82-1 (Central Harbor
Area)
28PR4MCB97-1 (Ngeregon Is)
28PR4MB95-1 (Urukthapel Is)
28PR4MB88-1
28PR4MB118-1 (Urukthapel Is)
28PR4MCB97-2 (Ngeregong Is)
28PR4MB99-1 (Koror Is).
28PR4MB8.V1 (Koror Is)
28PR4MCB104-1 (Eylmalk Is)
28PR4MB81-1 (Ngargol Is)
VPB117
9421-475
9422-476
9423-477
9424-478
9425-479
9426-480
9427-481
9428-482
9429-483
9430-484
9431-485,
9432-486
9433-487
9434-488
11/1
11/5
11/9
11/3
11/10
11/9
11/5
11/15
11/in
11/Q
11/.3
11/10
11/2
11/17
Ponape: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage
0
evs"
evs"
eVs"
20"
1,200'
1,000'
15,000'
10.000'
MAC22-VMF-422-8
9311-596
9312-597
9313-598
9444-599
11/22
0
MAC22-H4-68
11/22
0
MAC22-VMF-113-8 .
11/22
V
M.\C22-7
11/12
Pulo Anna: Good vertical partial coverage
5,000'.
28PR4MB70-1.
10/30
Sonsorol: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage
5,000'.
50'.-.
28PB4MB70-1.
28PR4MB70-3.
9228-3.
9229-4-
10/30*
10/30*
Truk: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage in airfield areas
V ..
12"
12"
12"
eVs"
6^"
24"
24"
12"
6Ji"
19,300'
19,400'
18,200'
18,800'
17,000'..
18,000'.
18,200'
17,600'
17,600'
A-236-27BS^M30-70
B-151-27BS-4M30-70
9445-596
9446-597
9447-598
9448-599
9449-600
9450-fiOl
9451-602
9452-603
9453-604
11/22
V
11/22
v....
C-935-27BS-4M30-70 .
11/22
0
D-633-27BS-4M30-70
11/22
0 .
E-810-27BS-4M30-70
A-425-392BS-4IVI30-70..
B-838-392BS-4M3O-70
C-358-392BS-4M30-70
D-358-392BS-4M30-70_
11/22
v....
11/22
v.... . ..
11/22
V.
11/22
0-...
11/22
614 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 24 November 1944 to
and including 1 December 1944 — Continued
MARIANAS
Aguijan: Good oblique partial coverage
V/0
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No.
Jicpoa #
Date taken
0
GVs"
Var
VB117-23 ._-
9218-30
11/15**
Farallon De Medinills: Good complete vertical coverage
13,000'.
B-832-26BS-__ 9469-6_
11/23*
Guguan: Good complete vertical coverage
10,000'_
2SPR4MC168-1.
11/14*
Pagan: Good oblique partial coverage
6%"
Var_
11/14
Rota: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage
V ..
12"
12"
12"
3,000'
50'
75'
28PR4MC167-1
28PR4MC 169-1
28PR4MC170-1
9236-185
9238-186
9496-187
11/14**
0— .
11/16**
0
11/16**
Sarigan: Good oblique partial coverage
Var.
VB117-22.
9224-8.
11/14
Zealandria Park: Good oblique shot
Var VB117-22B
9226-1.
11/14
(At this point in Exhibit No. 3, the following appear :
1. Aerial photograph of Luzon airfields, being an example of
the concentration of Japanese airfields in the vicinity of
Manila.
2. Aerial photograph of Grace Park Airfield, located in the
northern part of Manila.
3. Aerial photograph of Legaspi Airfield.
4. Aerial photograph of Fort Stotsenburg, thought to be a
Japanese Garrison Headquarters.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos, 34, 35,
36, and 3C)-A, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 4
(Exhibit No. 4 is a captured Japanese submarine chart, translated,
showing courses and location of tJ. S. ships in Pearl Harbor. This
chart will be found reproduced as Item No. 37, EXHIBITS-ILLUS-
TRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 615
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 5
CONFIDENTIAL
Vol. 1 No. 15
20 Oct. 1944
United States Pacific Fleet, and Pacific Ocean Areas
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
Any material appearing in "Weekly Intelligence" may be reproduced with or
without credit, so long as proper classirtcatiou is observed.
"Weekly Intelligence" receives wide distribution among fleet units and key
Navy, Marine and Army commands — includiug divisions. Any requests for addi-
tional distribution may be addressed to Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean
Area.
CONTENTS
Pages
Damaged Jap Auxiliary in MANILA Drydock 1
Jap Midget Subs 2-4
Fighter Planes Strafe Enemy Ships 5
YAMATO Class BB 6-7
JAP Influence Ground Mines 8-9
JAP PC 9-10
Submarine Situation 11
Thumbnail Biography of OSCAR 12-13
Crashed FRANK Believed Found 13
Japs Work on New Four-Engine Bomber 14-15
GEORGE — Fire Pattern and Specifications 16-18
Captured Photo of DAVE 18
IRVING Versions Clarified 19-20
New Jap Air-To-Air Bombing Devices 21-25
Weekly Photo Coverage 26-28
Recent Publications 28
Jap Armv Headquarters 29-33
Jap 5 CM Gun 33
Japanese Type 3 Land Mine 34-36
ANGAUR 37-42
YAP 43-45
D. S. Tanks at PELELIU 46
.\DDENDUM : "Japanese Aerial Tactics Against Ship Targets''
[/] Damaged Jap Auxiijary in Manila Drydock
When carrier planes from the USS ESSEX (CV-9) joined Third Fleet strikes
on MANILA Bay on 22 September, they photographed a damaged Jap ship with
stern awash in a floating drydock just outside the breakwater. This vessel was
possibly the ship first believed to be a cruiser or even a battleship, although sub-
sequent photo interpretation indicates that it is an engine-aft Naval auxiliary,
probably a repair ship or tender. Based on measurements of the Dewey Dock,
the only floating drydock known to be In MANILA, the damaged ship has an
overall length of 350 feet and a beam of 48 feet. In lines but not in size it re-
sembles the former AS TSURABASAKI (before conversion to the CV SHOHO)
and the AR AKASHI, which was sunk at PALAU.
The deck is flush and rounded, with a cruiser stern. The bridge is forward,
similar to that of the AKASHI. A single shielded gun, probably 5-inch, is for-
ward of the bridge. Two AA mounts are on each side of the bridge, and two
more are on the after superstructure. The amidships section is free of super-
structure. The large single stack is aft. A four-sided pylon-type foremast is
immediately aft the bridge superstructure, with two of the mast booms built
into the bridge itself. Two heavy kingposts are aft of the stack. Aft of the
kingposts appears a long rectaTigular open hatch : a gun may have been removed
from this location. There is a probable crane amidships immediately aft of the
foremast.
The Dewey floating drydock (YFD-1) was built in the U. S. in 1905 and towed
to MANILA, and can handle ships up to cruiser size. The inside (floor) measure-
ments of this dock are 500 feet by 99 feet, with a .30 foot clearance above the
keel blocks. In the photograph, the dock appears to have been submerged for
protection. Reports have not yet been received indicating damage to the drydock.
although aviators from the HORNET claim at least three effective hits in the
area.
(The photograph referred to in the foregoing paragra])h, being of
a Dewey floating drydock which was bniU in the U. S. in 1905 and
616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
towed to Manila, will be found reproduced as Item No. 38, EX-
HIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[2] Jap Midget Subs
Japanese midget subs may be expected in number as Allied forces push west-
ward into the restricted waters adjacent to the PHILIPPINES, NANSEI SHOTO,
and FORMOSA. Evidence that the enemy continues to operate these widely-
publicized units was obtained when a hastily-scuttled boat was discovered and
salvaged at SAIPAN. Another harbinger of midget subs to be encountered was
early dispatch information from Third Fleet carrier planes, which claim to have
sunk four such subs during the recent OKINAWA strike.
The tactical situation has restricted JAPAN'S use of the midget sub during the
past two years. (The use of the midget sub in the European theater is well
known.) There is no concrete evidence that JAPAN has had units in combat
zones since 7 December 1942, when a large U. S. cargo vessel was damaged and
beached by a midget sub near GUADALCANAL. Aviators have reported pos-
sible midget subs in the South Pacific, but there sightings have never been
confirmed.
In the early months of the war, midget boats were reported in almost every
theater— KISKA, HAWAII, GUADALCANAL, AUSTRALIA, and INIADAGAS-
CAR. While the box.score of ships damaged or sunk by these subs is not im-
pressive, it includes a battleship damaged and a tanker sunk (in addition to the
AK in the SOLOMONS) ; and one very narrow escape of a cruiser in SYDNEY
Harbor in May 1942. Six of the two-man subs are known to have been sunk.
The PHILIPPINES area offers the midget sub far more favorable operating
conditions than has hitherto been the case. The restricted waters will reduce
the maneuverability of his targets, and hamper the effectiveness of our ASW
vessels. The indentations of the coast offer adequate concealment. At the same
time, the distance from base is greatly reduced.
One type of midget sub is designed to be launched from a "mother ship",
another is carried as special equipment aboard a mother sub.
The sub-borne midgets are carried on the deck of the parent sub. secured by
four heavy clamps and one supplementary clamp. An access hatch in the midget
is designed to make a watertight fit into the deck hatch of the mother. The two
are linked by telephone wires and battery-charging leads. In casting off, the
mother sub releases the four main clamps while the supplementary clamp is
released by the midget.
Ship-borne midget subs have been carried in the holds of certain seaplane
carriers specially equipped for this purpose. This equipment includes a large
hold, equipped with four sets of 6-ft. 8-in. tracks running lengthwise through
the hold, and two cranes capable of lifting the 44-ton midget.
Midget subs vary in size from the 41-foot Pearl Harbor type to the 82-foot KO
HYOTEKI type. This sub has a theoretical maximum surface speed of 24
knots for a brief time, and has a reported cruising range of 175-180 miles at
4 to 6 knots. Two 18-inch torpedoes are carried. For full details see ONI 220-J
"Japanese Submarines".
[3] In at least one case a Jap cargo tube was mistaken for a midget sub.
This tube, which was probably used to deliver supplies to beleagered garrisons
("Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1., No. 7) was similar in size and shape to the sub-
marine, but had less taper forward and had a raised hatch forward and one
amidships, rather than the single streamlined conning tower of the sub.
The doctrine for use of Jap midget subs is indicated in a translation of the or-
ders found in the midget salvaged at GUADALCANAL on 7 May 1943 (SOPAC
Item No. 607). Excerpts from this document follow:
Plan of attack against anchored Enemy Warships for the KO HYOTEKI (2
man sub) TAI based at GUADALCANAL.
The Time for Resolute Attack !
If a powerful ship or transport should enter and anchor, the resolute attack
will be executed immediately. In view of the present enemy situation, there
will be more daytime attacks. However, even at night, aggressive attacks will
be executed against the powerful enemy if the condition of the moon and the
weather permits.
Select a time for attack on an enemy ship when its defense is most awkward,
such as while it is in the midst of unloading cargo.
Upon receiving a report that the enemy has been discovered, the attack will
be carried out with the least possible delay. Do not lose your opportunity (to
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 617
attack) because you vainly delayed and thereby allowed the enemy to escape
into a strongly defended harbor.
Two HYOTEKI's (midget subs) will customarily be used against a powerful
enemy ship. Four or more will not ordinarily be used simultaneously at one
spot. When completely submerged, it is essential that a maximum depth be
maintained.
Take the shortest course (to the point of attack). After completion of attack,
HYOTEKI's must take a suitable circuitous route, while avoiding the enemy,
and executing deceptive maneuvers.
It is essential that the attack be carried out from a firing position which is
sufficiently close to ensure a direct hit. The basic firing position is from 70°-110°
at 500 meters.
It is essential to pick out the most powerful ship or transport. However, if
in order to do this you vainly delay your fire, you may lose the (chance to)
attack due to enemy counter-measures, or impede the attack of the other
HYOTEKI's.
When you receive interference from any enemy anchorage patrol boat, it is
pei-missible to use some torpedoes, depending upon the situation. After having
fired, submerge quickly to a deep depth and follow the action outlined in (3) of
Article III.
[41 When it becomes impossible to return to the Base, return to, and land
at territory occupied by friendly troops. Then tow the HYOTEKI quickly to
the Base when possible. Otherwise, take quick and proper measures so that the
HYOTEKI will not fall into the hands of the enemy.
After the HYOTEKI's depart, the Base will always stand by to receive (mes-
sages). It is essential that HYOTEKI's select the proper opportunity to send
messages depending upon the situation of the enemy.
Evasive Action ii/ Midget Suh while on Attack Mission.
( Comment : The translation of the next few paragraphs is not clear, but appar-
ently refers to evasive action to be taken by the midget sub after it has been
launched from the base on an attack mission. The document goes on to state
that the sub will flood all taidis at once under this circumstance, and submerge
to 50 meters or deeper, "utilizing the manual steering gear". It will then allegedly
evade by turning to right angles from its original course. The midget sub is
then to return to its base, taking precautions to avoid discovery. )
Measures for the Prevention of Damage while Waititig at the Base
When it is probable that there will be an enemy attack while moored at the
Base, HYOTEKI's will submerge to the bottom immediately. They will surface
when there is no further danger of attack, if it is easy to form an estimate of the
outside situation from the inside of the submarine ; if not, they will receive
instructions for surfacing one hour after submerging.
Depending upon the enemy situation, it may have to remain submerged at the
bottom daily from 30 minutes before sunrise until dusk.
Whatever enemy interference you encounter after leaving the Base, carry out
your attack. After it is finished, do not uselessly throw away your lives but do
your utmost to seek a means of escape and endeavor to return. Such as these are
truly brave men and are faithful to the cause of their country.
Radio Eqtiipment on the HYOTEKI's.
(The HYOTEKI's) are equipped with one type 97 Experimental Short Wave
Radio Set (range approximately 50 nautical miles). Frequency Band, 8,000 kc.
to 10,000 kc.
Crystal Sizes — 8590 ck., 8905 kc, 9365 kc. (there is a separate set (of crystals)
for sending and receiving on each of the above (frequencies).).
(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 tliere appear two photographs show-
ing strafing by phmes of the USS Ljidepeiulence of an enemy AK and
an Enemy JPatrol Craft. These photographs will be found reproduced
as Item No. 39, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[6] Yamato Class Batti^ship
The YAMATO and MUSASHI, newest battlewagons in the Jap Navy, have long
been mystery ships, even to Jap Naval personnel. For security reasons, even
official Jap NAIREI appear to have been published with incorrect figures on
characteristics and capabilities of these ships. Rumors have been rife on
618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tonnage, armament, and equipment aboard both BBs. The sketch on the facing
page represents the impressions of an intelligent prisoner who is believed to be
fairly reliable. It was drawn after close collaboration between the POW and
draftsman. Pending further photographic or documentary evidence^ the sketch
must be evaluated as unverified information from an enemy source.
(The sketch of a Ymnato class battleship, referred to in the fore-
going paragraph, will be found reproduced as Item No. 40, EX-
HIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
The prisoner, who served aboard the YAMATO and MUSASHI for a total
period of 13 months, claims that the ships are almost identical. The flag of CinC
Combined was reportedly on board first the former and then the latter, prior to
the recent move to the new CL OYODO.
On the controversial subject of main batteries, the POW confirmed the reported
triple mounts, but insisted that the guns were 45 cm (IT.T") rather than 40 cm
(15.7"). The size and calibre of these guns has long been subject to speculation.
The POW claimed that projectiles for these guns stand six feet high, as compared
with the NAGATO's projectiles, which stand 5'6". Ammunition ordered for the
YAMATO and MUSASHI is assertedly "40 cm, Type 2" rather than "40 cm,
Type 1". According to the POW, this indicates 45 cm ammunition. The prisoner
added that a standing joke among CPOs aboard the YAMATO concerned the
remark to boots that these guns "are the largest 40 cm guns in the Jap Navy".
The secondary battery consists of twelve 15.5 cm (6") in triple mounts, as
shown in the sketch. Heavy AA armament is made up of six duel-mounted 12.7
(5") DP guns, three on each side. There are "many" 25 and 40 mm mounts.
Some of the 40 mm guns are in triple mounts. The prisoner insisted that the
40 mm AA on the main deck were (as shown) without added protection.
Another controversial subject discussed by the prisoner was the reported pair
of tunnel-shaped compartments on either side of the stern, which have variously
been reported as housing subs and PT boats. The POW stated that each tunnel
was designed for two midget subs. He said that he had never heard of these
subs actually being carried, and that he had no idea how they would be launched.
(It will be seen that the funnels are well above water-line). While the prisoner
was aboard both new BBs, the compartments were used for storage space — includ-
ing CinC Combined beer.
Two elevators are allegedly installed on each side of the foremast tower, capable
of carrying three or four men. All ships' boats are carried aft in the passageway
space directly under the catapults. The space in the hangar is large enough
(the POW said) for eight planes with wings folded, but he had seen no more than
three carried. At full speed, the POW stated, the YAMATO was capable of 26.5
knots. He added the following details :
Length— 886 ft; Beam— 114.8 ft; Tonnage— 55,000 ; Speed— 26.5 kts; Draft—
30.2 ft ; Main battery— 9 x 45 cm (17.7") ; Secondary battery— 12 x 15.5 cm (6") ;
AA Battery— 12 x 12.7 cm (5") ; Horsepower— 90,000.
Jap Influence Ground Mines
A new type of mine threat to U. S. ships is indicated in the photograph of a
Jap minelayer seen on the opposite page. Three influence ground mines are
identifiable on the starboard track and three others inboard. Although no such
mines have as yet been encountered by our forces, the photograph — coupled with
documentary evidence — proves that the standard type of Japanese influence
ground mine (known as Type 3) is in the forward areas.
(A photograph of a Toshima class Japanese Minelayer with In-
fluence Ground Mines, referred to in the foregoing paragraph, will be
found reproduced as Item No. 41, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
The photograph and a preliminary report of this mine were included in Intel-
ligence Bulletin 14-44, distributed on 6 October by the Seventh Fleet Intelligence
Center. The minelayer was identified by SEFIC as of the TOSHIMA Class. The
photograph was taken on 22 August off NGARUANL Reef (PALAU) by a PB4Y
of TF 73.
Characteristics of a Type 3 ground mine were contained in a captured Japanese
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 619
notebook which is believed fairly reliable : Overall length — 11 ft., 2 inches ;
Diameter — 21 inches ; Total weight — 2398 pounds ; Weight of charge — 1950
pounds ; Maximum depth of water for laying — 100 feet ; Minimum counter-mining
The notebook has been translated as CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 10368-B.
This document has not yet been published, but data on the mine was disseminated
by the Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit #4 as Intelligence Report No. 10.
Altliough smaller, dimensions of the mine photographed here appear roughly
similar to those of the mine described in the document. The mines photographed
may be a smaller model of the prototype, or the disparity in length may be caused
by the fact that the mines are being shipped without the parachute bousing
attached.
By virtue of its large charge, a ground mine need not fire on contact with the
skin of a ship, but — being fired on the bottom by the magnetic or acoustic field
of a target — will tend to break the ship's back or at least shatter all castings and
pipes. Mines of this type are usually laid with parachute by aircraft at minimum
altitude, but may be laid equally well by submarines or surface craft.
Development of a sure sweeping technique for such mines requires laboratory
analysis of the firing mechanism to determine its selection of targets and possibil-
ities of laying dormant over an extended period. Mine Disposal Units in-forward
areas are equipped to recover and disassemble new mines for return to technicians.
JAP PC On the following page is a profile and plan view of a 170-foot Jap PC
photographed at CHICHI JIMA by ENTERPRISE planes on 1 September. This
vessel very closely resembles the 200-foot PC-13 Class as described in ONI 222-J,
although there is a length differential of 80 feet and the PC shown in the sketch
has added AA and depth-charge equipment. Reports from the South Pacific of
patrol craft, described as of the PC-13 Class, cite lengths varying from 160 to more
than 200 feet.
(The profile and plan view of a 170-foot Jap PC, referred to in the
foregoing paragraph, will be found reproduced as Item No. 42,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTKATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
(At this point in Exhibit No. 5, there appears a sketch map cap-
tioned "Submarine Situation, Oct. 9-Oct. 15" and bearing notation
"Sightings in the Western NEW GUINEA-MOLUCCAS areas indi-
cate the submarine concentration in the PALAU-MINDANAO region
has moved southward". This map will be found reproduced as Item
No. 43, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[12] Thumbnail Biographies of Japanese AniCEArT
OSCAB
(Seventh in a series reviewing the background of important Japanese aircraft)
The stubborn persistence of a poorly conceived airplane design is well illus-
trated by OSCAR, the Japanese Army's Type 1 fighter.
(A photograph referring to the foregoing paragraph, being of an
"OSCAR" Model 1, the Japanese Army Type 1 fiahter, will be found
reproduced as Item No. 44 EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
This plane, development of which has closely paralleled that of the Navy
2iEKE, is a product of the Japanese pre-war idea that planes and pilots were
completely expendable. Carrying only two machine guns, OSCAR is the most
lightly armed of any active fighter in use by a major power. It is highly vulner-
able, despite the addition of some armor plate and gas tank leak-proofing.
But for all of that, it is still the most numerous of Army fighters and is standard
equipment for combatant units in every theater. Because of its relative ease
of manufacture, the Japanese have been forced to continue making it while
striving for quantity production of more effective types. They are aware of the
620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
plane's armament deficiency, but, up to now, have been unable to remedy it
because of design limitations.
TONY and TO.TO have not yet succeeded in replacing OSOAR. There are in-
dications [IS] that FRANK (see page — ) was intended as a successor,
but it is only beginning to come into the combat picture and may not live up to
expectations.
OSCAR was active in some quantity at the time of PEARL HARBOR, in a
Model 1 version powered by a Tjpe 99 950 h. p. engine and carrying two 7.7 mm
synchronized machine guns. A Model 2 made its combat appearance early in
1943. It had a Type 2 1150 h. p. engine and standard armament of two 12.7 mm
machine guns. Early planes of the Model 2 series closely resembled the Model 1,
but later versions appeared with blunt wing tips. There have been reports of
a Model 3, of which no details are known.
OSCAR'S strongest point in combat is its extreme maneuverability at medium
speeds and altitudes. This factor has made it troublesome to our fliers, but
has failed to compensate for its weaknesses.
Crashed Frank: Believed Found
Fragmentary information from CHINA reports recovery of the wreckage of
a new type fighter, believed to be the Japanese Army's "Ki 84", or FRANK.
This plane was powered by an 18-cylinder engine and armed with two syn-
chronized 12.7 mm machine-guns and two 20 mm wing cannon.
The plane was equipped with a four-blade paddle-type electric propeller.
Gas tanks were self -sealing and two pieces of half-inch armor plate, 18" x 2D"
and 10" X 8" were installed behind the pilot's back and head. The empennage
was reported as similar to that of TOJO, and hydraulically actuated landing
gear retracted rearward. It had split flaps.
H4] Japs Work on New 4-Engine Bomber
Japanese development of a new heavy bomber, strongly armed and powered
by four Homare engines, is disclosed in a document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item
No. 11,939) captured on PELELIU.
This plane, a Navy design still in the experimental stage, bears the Japanese
designations of "Renzan" (Distant Mountain) or 18 Experimental Land Attack.
It is the Japanese Navy's second attempt to produce a foure-engine land plane,
LIZ having proved to be a combat failure. Tliere is little possibility that
"Renzan" will be ready for service use until late 1945 at the earliest.
The document containing data on "Renzan" is another in the series of tables
which have been recovered after recent invasions. It must be viewed as ten-
tative, because it is mimeographed and bears no date or issuing authority, but
it does appear to be of semi-official nature and recent origin.
"renzan"
The given given data for this plane is as follows :
Crew: 7.
Engines : 4 x Homare (Modified) .
HP.: 18.50 at 26.240 ft.
Maximum speed : 315 Kts. at 26,240 ft.
Rate of climb : 12 mins., 45 sees, to 26,240 ft.
Cruising speed : 200 kts. at 26,240 ft.
Hypothetical ranges : Normal — 2080 naut. mi. ; attack overload 3520 naut. mi. :
Recce overload — 4070 naut. mi.
Armament : 2 x 20 mm each in dorsal, ventral and tail turrets ; 2 x 13 mm in
nose turret, and 1 x 13 mm each in right and left waist batches. (Total
6 x 20 mm and 4 x 13 mm) .
Bomb Load : 3 x 1760 lb. bombs or torpedoes, or 2 x 4400 lb. bombs, or 2 x
3300 lb. bombs, or 8 x 550 lb. bombs, or 18 x 132 lb. bombs.
Because of the recent development of this plane — it was ordered in 1943 —
it is probable that the performance figures given above are specified rather than
actual. However, they are, at least theoretically, possible of attainment by a
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 621
plane with engines of the horsepower given. The high output listed for 26,240
feet — a rated altitude higher than that of currently operational Japanese air-
craft— indicates a possibility that the Homare engines specified may be Model
51 or 52, both listed by oflBcial sources as designed for high altitude performance.
The twin-gun turrets also are new in Japanese design.
TAIZAN
The same document supplies a new set of specifications for the two-engine
bomber "Taizan", first information on whicli was outlined in "Weekly Intelli-
gence", Vol. 1, No. 11. The new material significantly differs from previous
data, [15] possibly indicating error in one or both of the sources. How-
ever, it is not necessarily contradictory or inconsistent inasmuch as the plane is
still in an experimented status and variations in design, equipment, and per-
formance are to be expected.
The new information follows :
Crew : 5.
Engines : 2 x MKIOA.
H. P. : 1950 at 26,240 ft.
Maximum speed : 303 kts. at 26,240 ft.
Rate of climb : 10 mins. to 13,124 ft.
Hypothetical range: Normal — 1200 naut. mi.; attack overload — 2000 naut.
mi. ; Recce overload — 2400 naut. mi.
Armament : 2 x 20 mm in dorsal turret ; 2 x 13 mm in tail turret ; 2 x 13 mm
in nose turret, and 1 x 13 mm each in right and left waist hatches.
Bomb load : 2 x 1760 lb. bombs, or 2 x 1100 lb., or 6 x 550 lb., or 12 x 132 lb.
The foregoing differs from prior information in listing a crew of five, rather
than four ; considerably increased armament, and a maximum bomb load of two,
rather than one, 1760 lb. bombs.
The greatest difference, however, lies in the listed engine installation and
consequent performance variations. Previous data indicated "Taizan" to be
powered by two souped-up engines of the MK6 series, each delivering a takeoff
maximum of 2700 h.p., and 2000 h.p. at 20,240 feet. Little is known of the
MKIOA engine, a new development, except that it is shown in official documents
to be an IS-cylinder twin-row radial having a "Vulcan type" (presumably turbo)
supercharger. This would account for the high rated output listed for 26,240 feet.
Another unresolved question is how five gun stations could be manned by a
total crew of five, unless one man were responsible for both waist positions or a
remote control apparatus were used. Previous information indicated total
armament of only 2 x 20 mm and 2 x 7.7 mm, positions not given.
[16} George — Fire P.\ttebn and Specifications
New translations add to the growing body of information on GEORGE
(SHIDEN), Kawanishi's interceptor-fighter powered by a Homare 21 engine
developing 2,000 h. p. at takeoff.
Although GEORGE has been in service for nearly a year, there have been no
definite identifications of it in combat and no crash examinations in the field.
It is believed that most of these planes have been assigned to Empire defense.
Reproduced as Figure 1 is a diagram showing the harmonization plan for
GEORGE'S four 20 mm fixed cannon and two 7.7 mm synchronized machine-
guns. It was taken from a mimeographed Japanese copy of an armament manual
published by YOKOSUKA Air Group in February, 1944 (CINCPAC-CINCPOA
Item No. 9720). The same document furnished rough line drawings of GEORGE
which were published in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 5.
(Figure 1, referred to in the preccdinir paragraph, is a diagram
showing the Harmonization Pattern for "GEORGE", Kawanishi's
interceptor-fighter powered by a Homare 21 engine developing 2,000
h.p. at takeoff. This diagram will be found reproduced as Item No.
45, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[17] Two of GEORGE'S four 20 mm cannons are mounted conventionally,
one in each wing. The other two are installed in faired housings on the under-
622 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
side of the wings. Of the conventionally mounted 20's these weapons may be
either the Type 99 Mk. I (low velocity) or Mk. II (high velocity). They are
hydraulically charged and electrically fired.
The harmonization pattern illustrated is an experimental one and may have
been revised, but it is of interest in showing the Japanese approach to the
problem.
Another document (CINCPAC-CINSPOA Item No. 11,805) supplies new in-
formation on the specifications of GEORGE. This document is a pilot's note-
book and should be evaluated with reserve but probably is reliable in the main.
The given span of 39.37 feet agrees with previous information, but the length,
29.35 feet, is greater than the 26.25 feet given in an earlier notebook. It is
believed that 29.35 feet is the more nearly correct figure. Weights given in the
current notebook also exceed those noted in prior documents and quite possibly
indicate the installation of additional equipment.
Item No. 9720 shows provisions for mounting a small (66 or 132 lb.) bomb
under each wing. This loading had been presumed, but not established, pre-
viously. Available data on performance of GEORGE appeared in "Weekly
Intelligence". Vol. 1, Nos. 9 and 12.
Specifications extracted from the notebook (Item No. 11,805) follow :
Principal Measurements :
Overall Span 12.000 meters (39.37')
Overall Length 8.9445 meters (29.35')
Overall Height 4.038 meters (13.25')
Landing Angle 13.0°
Wheel Base Length 4.450 meters (14.6^)
Main Wing:
Area 23.5-m' (252.8 sq. ft.)
Chord Length :
At wing root 2.700 meters (8.86')
At wing tip 1.250 meters (4-10')
Mean Chm-d Length 2.070 meters (6.79')
Angle of Setting 4.0°
Aspect Ratio 6.13
Taper Ratio 1/2.16
Aileron Area 1.23-m= x 2 (13.23 sq. ft. x 2)
Tail Assembly :
Horizontal Tail Assembly Area 4.4-m^ (47.34 sq. ft.)
Elevator Area 0.55-m= (5.92 sq. ft.)
Vertical Tail Assembly Area 2.00-m' (21.52 sq. ft.)
[18] Rudder Area 0.66-m' (7.10 sq. ft.)
Weight :
Net Weight 2.710-kg (5.962 lbs.)
Normal Load 3.750-kg (8,250 lbs.)
1st Overload 3.891-kg (8,560 lbs.)
2nd Overload 4.246-kg (9,341 lbs.)
( At this point in Exhibit No, 5 there appears a captured photograph
showing cruiser or battleship recover}' of an old Jap float recce plane,
''DAVE". This photograph will be found reproduced as Item No. 46,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
119] Irving Versions Clarified
A recently captured document, combined with field observations, sheds con-
siderable light on the several versions of IRVING and their nomenclature.
This document, a mimeographed reference pamphlet (CINCPAC-CINCPOA
Item No. 11,907), lists five separate variations of IRVING — all of them bearing
the common Model-Typfe^ symbol "JINI". They are : Type 2 Land Reece Plane ;
Type 2 Land Recce Plane, converted as bomber ; Tvpe 2 Land llecce Plane con-
verted as Type 2 night fighter; GEKKO, IModel 11, and GEKKO, Model 11,
Modified.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
623
The following table condenses salient points of difference among the five
versions :
Designation
Crew
Normal
weight
Fuel carried
in normal
cond. (in
U. S. gallons)
Armament
Type 2 Land Recce
3
3
2
2
2
15,950 lbs....
15,940 lbs....
15,063 lbs....
15,246 lbs....
15,048 lbs.-..
475 gals
264 gals
475 gals
475 gals -
475 gals
1x20 mm and 1x7.7 mm fixed, and
Type 2 Land Recce (con-
verted as bomber).
Type 2 Land Recce (con-
verted as night fighter) .
GEKKO, Model 11
4 X 7.7 mm in remotely controlled
dorsal turrets.
Same as above, plus 2 x 550 lb. or
4 X 132 lb. bombs.
1 x 20 mm and 1 x 7.7 mm fixed and
1 X 20 mm in power turret.
2 X 20 mm dorsal inclined and 2 x 20
GEKKO, Model 11 (Modi-
fied).
mm ventral inclined.
Same as above, except 1 x 20 mm
ventral.
[20] The foregoing information makes it possible to trace the history of
IRVING, which has gone through more mutations than any other Japanese
combat plane. The original version apparently saw little service, although one
of them was recovered on TINIAN. The second variation required only the
installation of external bomb racks, but also apparently was used very little.
Collaterial information indicates that the third version made its appeai'ance
late in the summer of 1943, but it seems to have met with little success and was
succeeded in the autumn of that year by the one mounting inclined, fixed 20mm
cannon. This latter was dignified by an official Japanese Navy acceptance order,
which changed the plane's designation from Type 2 to GEKKO. It is believed
that all IRVINGs made since late 1943 have been the GEKKO variety.
The third variation, with a 20mm cannon in power turrent, was illustrated in
"Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 11. According to the document, the second
member of the two-man crew normally occupies the rear cockpit section, but
operates the turret during combat. Varying armament of GEKKO has been
discussed in several past issues. The modified GEKKO, noted in CINCAP-
CINCPO Item No. 11,907, may be the one for which a triple fixed 20ram dorsal
mount ("Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 13) was designed. Although the
document does not specifically say so, it would be logical to add a dorsal gun
when one of the ventral guns was removed.
However useful the document may be in clarifying nomenclature and develop-
ment, still other minor variations of IRVING have been found in the field. Some
specimens have mounted both nose cannon and inclined cannon, and most of
them, whatever their armament, have been equipped with bomb racks.
There is also good evidence that a re-engined Model 12, or J1N2 IRVING is
in existence, and IRVINGs equipped with radar have been examined in the field.
(A photogi-aph of the GEKKO, Model 11, version of "IRVING",
referred to sirpra, will be found reproduced as Item Xo. 47, EX-
HIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[21]
New Jap Air-To-Air Bombing Devices
The Japane.se, vigorously experimenting with methods to halt our bombing
strikes, have developed a variety of new weapons based on the principle of
air-to-air bombing. Most of these still fall into the category of interesting
gadgets, but all present a tlireat which may become serious if techniques are
improved.
The standai'd air-to-air weapon appears to be the 75 lb. aerial burst phosphonis
bomb with a 3 or 3.5 second delay, which was discussed in "Weekly Intelligence",
Vol. I. Nos. 4 and 13. Continuing use of this bomb is indicated.
More recent evidence shows experiments with at least three types of cable
bomb and indicates the possibility of cable-training balloons, released from
aircraft. Action reports have noted several new types of ai-eal explosive bursts,
under circumstances indicating that they were caused by aii--to-air bombardment,
but the nature of these has not been fully determined. The Japs also have used
several types of aerial grenade discharger for some time, with little reported
success.
624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
An intriguing device of the cable variety is illustrated and described in a hand-
written document ( CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 11,006), captured on PELELIU.
This document is rough, incomplete and partly self contradictory. In view of
its nature and lack of date or source, it must be accepted with considerable
reserve, but it is presented as an interesting and possibly significant bit of
evidence.
The document, entitled "Notes on the 10 Kg. (22 lb.) Towed Bomb", remarks that
the weapon is for use against "enemy large model planes". Exact tracings from
the attached sketches, together with translations of the original notations, are
reproduced as Figures 1 and 2.
(Figures 1 and 2, suprci^ are sketches showing :
1. Tracing of Japanese sketch purporting to show method of
releasing towed cable bomb against Allied bomber.
2. Detail of towed cable bomb, from captured sketch.
These sketches will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 48 and 49,
respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[23] "The towed bomb", says the document, "is fired from a point 200 meters
(656 ft.) above the enemy plane by driving directly from above, in accordance
with the method for attacking enemy planes. A tow cable is attached to the
towed bomb. The initial speed of the bomb is about 200 meters per second, and
since its head resistance is strong, it should he made to travel not more than
500 meters before striking the enemy plane. At the time of firing, the position
of the bomb will form an angle of about 30° to the plane from which it is fired,
and an angle of 45° to the enemy plane".
(Comment : The last sentence appears anomalous under conditions of a vertical
dive. To achieve such a combination of angles, assuming level flight by the plane
under attack, the attacking plane would have to be gliding at an angle of 15°
from the horizontal, or diving 15° past the vertical.)
The document continues : "The bomb will pass, in falling, close to the enemy
plane. Since the bomb is pulled by a fighter plane by means of a fixed length of
tow cable and assumes a position similar to that of a sleeve target, the tow cable
is piilled taut upon coming in contact with the enemy plane. The bomb, which
is at the very end of the cable, is equipped with horns (to detonate it). Since
there is an instantaneous detonation when the horns touch the enemy plane, it is
fully possible to bring down a plane with one bomb.
"Nomenclature of the parts :
"a. Bomb body,
"b. Firing cylinder.
"c. Firing mechanism,
"d. Firing safety cylinder,
"e. Tow cable housing tube,
"f. Tow cable disengaging mechanism.
"Operation :
"When, in diving, the handle of the opening mechanism of the firing cylinder
is pulled, the firing cylinder forms an angle of 30 to 45 degrees, depending on the
air pressure, with the under surface of the wing. The bomb is fired by an elec-
trical firing mechanism".
Piecing together the text and the illustrations, it appears that the bomb con-
tainer tube is carried flush against the under surface of the fuselage, or within
it, during flight, with the tow cable extending back along the fuselage to a reel
near the tail. On entering the dive, the pilot operates a lever which permits
the container tube to swing outward on its hinge, at an angle apparently conti'olled
b.v inter-action of air pressure and a resistance spring. At the proper instant, the
expulsion charge is detonated, throwing the boml) our, while the cable unreels
and the protective cover falls away.
There have been no reports of such a device being used in combat, and it has
not been examined in the field.
It has been established that the Japanese have developed another t.vpe of cable
[2^] air-to-air bomb, consisting of an explosive unit attached to a cable which,
in turn, is suspended by a parachute. There is, also, a fragmentary documentary
indication of a device made up of two small bombs at either end of a cable.
An air crew of Seventh Bomber Command has reported being attacked by Jap
planes whicli released an aerial burst bomb estimated at six feet in length and a
foot and a half in diameter, thought possibly to be a 550 lb. version. From the
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
625
Asiatic theater come reports of balloons, possibly trailing cables and released
by aircraft, and of mysterious aerial explosions far out over the ocean.
(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appears a photograph of a
B-29 over Yawata, which will be found reproduced as Item No. 50,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
The supposed aerial-release balloons were noted over YAWATA by B-29s at
an altitude of about 24,000 feet under circumstances which made it unlikely
they [351 could have been either fugitive or captive. Such a device,
equipped with trailing cables and explosive charges might be developed into an
effective anti-bomber weapon if released in quantity.
Information on Japanese aerial-burst bomb tactics as carried out in actual
combat is contained in Intelligence Memorandum No. 19 of Commander Shore-
based Air, Forward Area, quoting the report of a veteran B-24 navigator. It
follows :
"After being sulijected to repeated attacks by Jap fighters over TRUK and
IWO JIMA, dropping phosphorus bombs, it can be stated that certain definitely
recurrent maneuvers are used. The attacking ZEKEs will fly parallel to our
formation, usually at 3 or 9 o'clock for one to five minutes, possibly gauging
our altitude. They then accelerate, pass the head of the formation and go into
a steep chandelle, cutting in towards the center of the formation. They then
roll oi-er on their backs, begin to descend and flip otit the phosphoi'us bombs.
Were our squadrons to lose altitude at the beginning of the enemy chandelle,
this might be good evasive action.
"These passes were used almost exclusively at IWO JIMA when the sun was
to the back of our formation. When the sun was high and from 10 to 2 o'clock,
the Japs at both TRUK and IWO JIMA would drop their bombs on their first
surprise run, directly out of the sun. The only evasive action we can take to
avoid this is to plan our missions at times when the sun will be at our back".
The tactics described appear to follow written Jap doctrine ("Weekly Intel-
ligence", Vol. I, No. 13) to the extent that, in each case, the bombs are released
ahead of the bomber formation and while the attacking fighter is flying towards
it. The report that the bombs sometimes are "flipped out" while the fighter is
on its back does not fit the normal wing-rack loading of aerial burst bombs,
and may indicate some type of ejection device which has not yet been examined
in the field.
On the parallel approach from the rear a chandelle or Immelman, following
acceleration, would permit the attacking plane to gain proper distance and
altitude increment with a minimum of exposure to opposing fire and in a
minimum of time.
(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appear photographs showing
Liberators under attack over Iavo Jima, which will be found repro-
duced as Item No. 51, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
[26]
Weekly CJovebage Report
Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to and
including 13 October 1944
[*Negs. received; **Prints only received]
JAPAN
Kyushu: Good trimetrogon split and oblique coverage of areas indicated
v/o
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No.
Jicpoa #
Date taken
Split Vert _..
24"
24"
24"
24"
24"
24"
6".
30,000'
25,000'
20,000'
30,000'
26,000'
30,000'
30,000'. ..
Omura M 7-40-25- AC 288
7213-16
7214-17
7215-18
7216-19
7220-20
7222-12
7223-13
7225-14
7226-15
8/21*
V
Yawata-M7-468-265
Yawata-M7-40-44-AC503
8/20*
8/20*
Split Vert...
V
Split Vert...
Split Vert...
Yawata-M 7-40-45-452
Taka Shima M7-40-25-AC288
Yawata-M 6-462- 769
Nagasaki M7-40-25-AC288 (Taka
Shima).
M7-40-25-AC-288
8/20*
8/20*
8/20*
9/21*
8/21*
Tri Met
30,000'
M7-40-25-AC-288_
8/21*
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1-
626 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to and
including 13 October 1944 — Continued
JAPAN^ — Continued
Kyushu: Good trlmetrogon split and oblique coverage of area indicated — Continued
V/0
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No.
Jicpoa #
Date taken
V
v_._ _..
V
12H"
12"
6"
6"
26,000'
25,000'
26,300'
30,000'
30,000'
Yawata (Bomb Run) "Wing M6-
462-769- 13 PL.
Yawata A/F ■M7-468-442-14PL
Yawat a-^ 1 19-444-262
7262-25
7261-24
7260-23
7258-21
7259-22
7263-26
7264-27
7265-28
8/20*
8/20*
8/20*
Tri Met
Nagasaki-M7-40-25-AC288
8/21*
TriMet
0
6"_
Omura M 7-40 -25-AC 288 .^
Yawata Area-468-217-20A AF
Yawata-468-3.53-20AAF
Yawata^68-370-20AAF
8/21*
8/20*
8/20*
8/20* •
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
CEBU-LEYTE-BOHOL: Trimetrogon and vertical coverage of portions of islands indicated
TriMet
152.2 mm..
6"
Var
Var.
6"
Var
V -
m"-
Var.
CVL23-33 (p) CEBU, LEYTE.
CVL23-33 (v) CEBU, VIC MAC-
TAN IS, LEYTE.
CVL23-33 (s) CEBU, BOHOL.
LEYTE.
ESSEX-124 (CEBU)
7098-42
7099-42
7100-42 ..
7124-43...
9/13*
9/13*
9/13*
9/12*
Bohol: Good Partial vertical and oblique coverage of island
V
V
V
24"
12"
8V4"
8H"
6"
8H"
6"
Var
Var
8,000'
Var
9,500'...
Var
9,500'
CV16-2478
CV16-2479
CV16-2457
7009-4
7016-6
7005-1
7006-2
7007-3
7011-5
7008-3
9/14*
9/14*
9/12*
V
V...
v/0
0
CV16-2480
CV16-2455(V)
CV12-353
CV16-2456(P)
9/14*
9/12*
9/13*
9/12*
Cebu: Good vertical, oblique and trimetrogon coverage of areas indicated
Tri Met
V
O
V/0..-..
V
o
Tri Met
V
o
V
o
o._
o._
0..
v/o
o..
6"..
m"
24".
12".
6?i"
6"..
6"..
6"..
24"
6?6
24"
6,000'.
6,000'.
6,000'.
Var..
Var..
Var..
Var..
Var._
10,000'
10,000'
10,000'
1,000.
1,000'.
Var..
Var..
Var..
Var..
2,000'.
2,500'.
Var..
Var..
1,000'.
Var..
Var..
Var..
Var_.
Var..
Var..
Var..
Var..
5,000'.
8,000'.
3,500'.
CV16-2448(V)
CV16-2449(P)
CV16-2450(S).
CV16-2451
CV16-2452
CV16-2453
CV16-2454
CV16-2458
CV16-2459
CV16-2460
CV16-2461
CV16-2462(V)(MACTAN)(CEBU)
CV16-2463(P) (MACTAN) (CEBU)
CV16-2464 (S) (MACTAN)
CV16-2467 (N. E. COAST) (CEBU)
CV16-2468 (N. E. COAST) (CEBU)
CV16-2469.-
CV16-2472
CV16-2473
CV12-240 -
CV12-341
CV12-342
CV12-343
CV12-346 (N. CEBU)
CV12-347 (SHIPPING)
CV12-348 (CEBU HARBOR)
CV12-349 (CEBU TOWN)
CV12-353
CV12-354 (CEBU TOWN)
CVL27-159
CVL27-160
CVL27-161
CVL27-163
WASP-107 (SHIPPING CEBU
HARBOR).
WASP-168 (SARA VIA & MAN-
APLA).
WASP-170 (EAST COAST)
7079-19
7080-19
7081-19
7082-5.
7083-6.
7084-7.
7085-8.
7086-9.
7087-10
7088-11
7089-12
7090-13
7091-13
7092-13
7093-14
7094-15
7095-16
7096-17
7097-18
7101-20
7102-21
7103-22
7104-23
7105-24
7106-25
7107-26
7108-27
7109-28
7110-29
7111-30.
7112-31.
7113-32
7114-33.
7115-34.
7116-35.
7117-36.
9/12'
9/12
9/12
9/12
9/12
9/12
9/12
9/12'
9/12
9/12
9/13
9/13
9/13
9/13
9/13
9/13
9/13
9/13'
9/13'
9/12'
9/12'
9/12'
9/13
9/12'
9/12'
9/12'
9/13
9/13
9/13
9/12
9/12'
9/12'
9/12'
9/12
9/12'
9/12
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
627
Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to and
including IS October 1944 — Continued
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS— Continued
Cebu: Good vertical, oblique and trimetrogon coverage of areas indicated — Continued
V/0
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No.
Jicpoa #
Date taken
0___ _.
m"
6^"
6"
6"
8M"
Var
BKHL-302 .
7077-4
7118-37
7119-38
7120-39
7121-39
7122-40
7123-41
9/13*
9/13*
9/13*
0 -. .
Var
BKHL-298
Var.-
BKHL-303
V
800'
ESSEX-123(V)
ESSEX-123 (P)
9/12*
9/12*
0
800'
Var._ _
0
ESSEX-139 (SHIPPING)
9/12*
9/14*
Var
ESSEX-147
Dinagat: Good complete vertical and oblique coverage of northern portion of island
Tri Met---
6"
8K"
Var
Var
Var
Var
CV1&-2476 (S) - - _
7073-3
7074-3
7075-3
7076-4
9/14*
CV-16-2474 (V)
CV-16-2475 (P)
9/14*
9/14*
V
CV12-353 __
9/13*
Leyte: Good vertical, oblique and trimetrogon coverage of areas and airfields indicated
Tri Met
V
O
o
V
V
o
o
6"__
20".
24".
evg"
m"
20".
12".
24".
Var..
Var..
Var..
7,000'
Var..
Var..
Var..
Var..
Var..
Var-.
CV16-2476(S)
CV16-2474(V)
CV16-2475(P)
CV16-2477 (BURA¥EN & N. W
LEYTE).
ESSEX-148 (LEYTE-SAMAR)..
BKHL-289 (LEYTE-SAMAR)...
CV12-351 _
BKHL-284
CVL 27-165 (TACLOBAN)..
CV12-346 (DULAG A/F)
6996-19
7010-19
6897-19
6998-21
6999-22
7003-24
7047-20
7126-26
7024-23
7125-25
9/14*
9/14*
9/14*
9/14*
9/14*
9/12*
9/13*
9/12*
9/14*
9/12*
Mindanao: Good vertical, oblique and trimetrogon coverage of areas and airfields indicated
O
V
o
V
V
o
v._
o
V
o
V
o
o
o
Split vert
V
V.
V.
V
Tri Met..
V
Wi'
6^'
20"
m'
6^8'
12"
12"'
12".
12"
m'
24"
6^'
24".
24".
12".
24".
12".
6"-.
12".
Var-.
Var..
Var..
1,100'.
Var..
8,200'.
Var..
Var..
Var..
8,500'.
Var.-
Var..
Var--
Var--
Var..
Var-.
3,000'.
2,500'.
8,000'.
8,000'.
15,000'
10,000'
8,500'.
Var-.
6,500'.
6,500'.
6,500'.
Var. -
CV125-80 (CAGAYAN AREA)....
CV125-80A (CAGAYAN AREA)..
CV125-80B (CAGAYAN AREA)..
CVL25-83(SAN AGUSTIN)
CVL25-84 (C. SAN AGUSTIN).-.
CVL27-150 (VALENCLA.)
CVL27-151 (VALENCIA)
CVL27-152 (VALENCIA)
CVL27-153 (VALENCIA)
CVL27-154 (MACAJALAR BAY).
CVL27-155 (MACAJALAR BAY).
CVL27-156
CVL27-157 (SURIGAO)
CV12-351
CV12-355(JAP DD DAVAO)
CV12-356 (DAVAO)
CV12-357 (DAVAO)
CV12-358 (SASSA A/D)
CV23-32P (MALABANG)
CVL23-32S (MALABANG)
\VASP-195 (AIRSTRIPS N. OF
DIQOS).
WASP-196 (DAVAO TOWN AND
AIRSTRIP).
WASP-197 (AIRFIELD S. OF
DAVAO).
WASP-198 (AIRFIELD S. OF
DAVAO).
(DIGOS PT. AREA & PADADA
A/D).
WASP-138(P)..
WASP-139(V)
WASP-140(S).
(SARAGANI BAY AREA)
\VASP-142
(BUAYAN TO MT. TANGLI)..
(BUAYAN TO BEE HIVE)
(SUMBANG PT. TO TINAGA
PT.)
(CAPE AGUSTIN)...
7048-32.
7049-33.
7050-34-
7051-35-
7052-36-
7053-37-
7054-38.
7055-39.
7056-40-
7057-41-
7058-42-
7059-43.
7060-44-
7061-45-
7062-46-
7063-47.
7064-48.
7065-49.
7066-50-
7067-50-
7068-51.
7069-52-
7070-53-
7071-54-
7247-68.
7248-68.
7249-68.
7250-69.
9/9*
9/9*
9/14*
9/14*
9/9*
9/9*
9/9*
9/9*
9/9*
9/9*
9/9*
9/9*
9/13*
9/14*
9/14*
9/14*
9/U*
9/10*
9/10*
9/14*
9/14*
9/14*
9/14*
628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to and
including 13 October 1944 — Continued
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS— Continued
Mindanao: Good vertical, oblique and trimetrogon coverage of areas and airfields indicated— Con.
V/0
Tri Met-.
V
o
o
Split Vert
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No.
Jicpoa #
Date taken
6". -
12"
152.8mm
154. Omm
24"
10,000'
10,000'
10,000'
15,000'
10,000'
1,000'-
3,000'-
Var...
Var...
WASP-144(V)
WASP-145 (P)
WASP-146 (S)
(SARANGANI BAY AREA).
WASP-147
CVL24-86 (COTABATO)
CVL24-88 (COTABATO)
CVL24-87 (COTABATO)
ESSEX-120 (P)
ESSEX-120 (S)
7251-70-
7252-70.
7253-70.
7254-71.
7255-72.
7257-74.
7256-73.
7207-55.
7208-55-
9/9***.
9/9***.
9/10***.
9/10***.
9/10***.
9/12*.
9/12*.
Negros: Good vertical and oblique coverage of areas and airfields indicated
0
20"
24"-
152.3mm..
152.3mm..
24"
12"
12"
12"
12"
24"
6"...
Var _..
BHKL-307 (BACOLOD & TALI-
SAY A/F).
CV16-2465 (MANALPA, ALI-
CANTE SARAVIA AND
TALISAY A/F's).
CV12-344KV)
7004-4
7012-5
7013-6
7014-6
7015-7
7017-8
7018-9
7019-10
7028-11
7029-12
7030-13......
7031-14
7032-15
7033-15
7034-16
7035-17
7037-19
7036-18
7038-20
7039-21
7040-22
7041-23
7042-24
7043-25
7044-26
7045-27 -
7046-28
7072-29
7141-30
7142-31
7209-33
7210-34
9/14*.
V
8,000'-
Var
9/13*.
V
9/12*.
0
Var
CV12-344 (S) _
9/12*.
o
8,000'
Var
CV12-352
9/13*.
CV12-349
9/13*.
o
Var ....
CVL27-162 (DUMAGUETTE)-..-
CVL27-171
9/12*.
[S7] v....
0
5,000'
Var
9/14*
CVL27-172
9/14*
V
Var
CV16-2466 (FABRIC A)---
9/13*
V
7,000'
8,000'
Var-
ESSEX-140 (AIRFIELDS)
■\VASP-169 (SARAVIA TN &
MANAPLA TN).
WASP-179 (V) (BACOLOD A/F,
ALICANTE A/F).
WASP-180 (P) (BACOLOD &
ALICANTE A/F).
CV12-359
9/14*
V
9/12*
9/13*
o
6"
Var...
9/13*
0
6W
4,000'
Var
9/13*
0
CV12-351 (DUMAGUETTE &
SOQUIJOR).
BKHL-297
9/13*
0
6?^"
8H"
6?i".
m"
12"
Var
9/13*
o
Var .
ESSEX-133 (SARAVIA) (P)
BKHL-300
9/13"
0
Var
9/13*
Var. .
BKHL-304
9/14*
Var
BKHL-305
9/14*
Var
BKHL-309
9/14*
Var
BKHL-310
9/14*
Var
Var
CVL27-173..
9/14*
CV16-2470
9/13*
Var
CV16-2471. -
9/13*
Var...
Var
Var
4,000'
1,000'
Var . .
CV16-2481
9/13*
CV16-2482
9/14*
CV12-343
9/13*
CV12-345
9/12"
0
ESSEX-129 - -
9/12"
0
ESSEX-130
9/12*
Palmas:
Good Partial oblique coverage of island
0
24"
6?i"
Var
2,500'
CV12-356
7077-1-.
7078-2
9/14*
0
CV12-358
9/14*
Panay: Good vertical and oblique coverage of ILOILO
v..
24"
12"
8H"
12"
m"
6?i"
f>W-
8,700'-
3,000'...
Var
ESSEX-141 (ILOILO)
7020-3
7021-4
7022-5
7023-6
7025-8
7026-9
7027-10
9/14*
v....
ESSEX-142 (ILOILO) . .
9/14*
0..
ESSEX-144 (ILOILO)
9/14*
0
Var
CVL27-164 (ILOILO)
9/14*
0
Var - . .
CVL27-168 (ILOILO)
9/14*
V
Var
CVL27-169 (ILOILO)
9/14*
0
Var
CVL27-170 (ILOILO)
9/14*
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
629
Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to and
including 13 October 1944 — Continued
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS— Continued
Samar: Good vertical and oblique coverage of areas indicated
V/0
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No.
Jicpoa #
Date taken
0 —
20"
152. Omm_
SH"
5,000'
Var
CVll-34 (TUGNUO PT. TO
CABLAGNA PT.).
CVn-36 (TIP SAMAR IS.)
BKHL-302 .
7001-4
7002-5
7000-6
9/13*
9/13*
9/13*
V
0
Var....
FORMOSA: Good vertical coverage of areas and airfields indicated
PESCADORES
Mako Island: Good complete vertical coverage of Make Island
V
24"
30,300'
4MB137-21PR TAKAO HARBOR
7127-98
8/25*-**
8/25*-**
30,400'
4MB137-21PR TAKAO A/D_
7128-99
30,500'
4MB137-21PR HEITO A/D
7129-100
8/25*-**
30,200'
4MB137-21PR OKAYAMA A/D...
7130-101
8/25*-**
29,800'..
4MB137-21PR TOSHIEN HAR-
BOR.
7131-102
8/25*-**
30,500'
4MB137-21PR TAINAN A/D
AND SAT. L/S.
7132-103
8/25*-**
29,900'
4MB139-21PR KATO SEA-
PLANE BASE.
7133-104
8/26*-**
29,900'_
4MB139-21PR TAKAO A/D_
7134-105
8/26*-**
29,300'
4MB139-21PR TAKAO HARBOR
7135-106
8/26*-**
29,700'
4MB139-21PR TOSHIEN HAR-
BOR.
7136-107
8/26*-**
31,500'
4MB143-21PR TAKAO HARBOR.
7137-108
8/29*-**
Split vert
24"
30,000'
30,000'.
30,300'.
4MB151-21PR TAKAO
7138-109
7138-109
7139-110
9/7*-**
4MB151-21PR TAKAO.
9/7*-**
4MB151-21PR TOSHIEN HAR-
9/7*-**
BOR.
30,300'_.
4MB151-21PR TOSHIEN HAR-
BOR.
7139-110
9/7*-**
30,000'
4MB151-21PR RUN FROM TAN-
SUI RIVER TOKO TO N. OF
HEITO.
7140-111
9/7*-**
30,000'
4MB151-21PR RUN FROM TAN-
SUI RIVER TOKO TO N. OF
HEITO.
7140-111
9/7*-**
V
24"
30,100'
4MC7-21PR TAKAO HARBOR..
7192-112
1/24*-**
30,100'
4MC7-21PR HOZAN RADIO
STATION & A/D.
7193-113
1/24*-**
V __
6".._.
30,100'
4MC7-21PR HEITO A/D
6888-91
1/24*-**
V
24"
30,100'
4MC7-21PR HEITO A/D
6888-91
1/24*-**
V
6"
30,300'
4MC7-21PR OKAYAMA A/D
6889-92 . .
1/24*-**
V
24"
30,300'-.
4MC7-21PR 0KAY.4MA A/D...
6889-92
1/24*-**
V .... ..
6"
30,200'
4MC7-21PR TAINAN & A/D
6890-93
1/24*-**
V
24"
6"
30,200"
29,400
4MC7-21PR TAINAN & A/D"
4MC7-21PR-KAOI A/D
6890-93
6891-94
1/24*-**
V
1/24*-**
V.
24"
29,400'
4MC7-21PR KAGI A/D ...
6891-94
1/24*-**
V
24"
30,400'
4MC7-21PR JITUCETUTAN
6892-95
1/24*-**
LAKE.
V
24"
30,500'
4MC7-21PR TAICHU AND
TOYOHARA A/D.
6893-96
1/24*-**
V
6".
30,500'
4MC7-21PR TAICHU AND
TOYOHARA A/D.
6893-96
1/24*-**
V
6"
29,800'
4MC7-21PR JITUGETUTAN
6894-97
1/24*-* *
LAKE.
V
24".
29,800'
4MC7-21PR JITUGETUTAN
6894-97
1/24*-**
LAKE.
24" 24,300' M4/5-9PS 7176-8
4/24*-**/43
630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to «»"^
including 13 October 1944 — Continued
KURILES
Onekotan: Good partial vertical and oblique coverage of island
V/0
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie Xo.
Jicpoa #
Date taken
V
24"
12"-
6"
14,500'
14,000'
13,800'
13,800'
14,000'
14,000'
14,000'
14,000'
14,500'
11AAF4M1143-1.
7199-10
7200-11
7203-14
7204-15
7205-16
7206-17
7201-12
7202-13
7199-10
8/26**
V
11AAF4M1143-2
8/26"
11AAF4M1143-5
8/26**
11AAF4M1143-6
8/26**
11AAF4M1143-7
8/26**
11AAF4M1143-8 .
8/26**
V
11AAF4M1143-3
8/26**
24"
11AAF4M1143-4
8/26**
0
11AAF4M1143-1
8/26**
Paramushiru: Good partial vertical and oblique coverage of island
V
12"
FAW4-S425
7198-45
7197-44
7196-43
9/2**
o
20"
FAW4-S425_
9/2**
0
6?^"
FAW4-S425
9/2**
BONINS
Chichi Jirna: Good partial vertical coverage showing bomb damage to Omura seaplane base
V
24"
20"
12"
19,400'
17,000'
11,500' _.
11,500'
11,700'
18,100'
A-973-38BS-H337-7BC....
D-708-819BS-H337-7BC
B-5.56-H346-38BS-7BC
B-809-819BS-H346-7BC
A-282-H346-38BS-7BC
C-674-819BS-H337-7BC
6991-118
6992-119
6989-116
6990-117
6993-120
6994-121
9/22*
V
V
9/22*
9/24*
9/24*
9/24*
9/22*
Haha Jima
; Partial vertical coverage of island
V
12"
15,000'
C-674-819BS-H337-7BC
6995-44
9/22*
KAZAN GROUP
Iwo Jima Rhetto: Good selected oblique shots of Kita Two Jima and enemy ship
0
61^"
Var VB116-31_- 6966-158
9/23*
Iwo Jima:
Good partial vertical coverage showing bomb damage to airfields
V
40"
24"
19,000'
17,800'
17,800'
17,800'
19,000'
B-838-392BS-H343-7BC
B-236-27BS-H343-7BC
A-473-27BS-H343-7BC
493-27BS-H343-7BC
A-870-392B S-H343-7B C
6987-162
6984-159
6985-160
6986-161
6988-163
9/25*
V
9/25*
9/25*
9/25*
9/25*
MARIANAS
Maug: Selected distant obliques of island
o:.:...:
6?i"..
Var
VB116-30
6968-14
9/23*
Pagan: Good partial vertical and oblique coverage of Island
V
24"
20"
12"
11,000'
11,500'
10.000'
2,000'
28PR4MC133
6970-105
6971-106
6972-107
6969-104
9/29*
0
A-994-27BS-7BC
A-556-38BS-7BC.- ..
9/21*
9/23*
0
28PR4MC131-1
9/29*
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
631
Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 1944 to «wd
including 13 October 1944 — Continued
CAROLINES
Povape: Three selected oblique shots shewing bomb damage to old and new airfields
V/0
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No.
Jicpoa #
Date taken
0
m"
9,000'
1,000' -..
5,500'
A-296-MAG'22(48BS-M356-7BC)__.
B-503-MAG;'2(48BS-M356-7BC) . .
C-614-MAGi^(48BS-M356-7BC)...
7173-581
7174-582
7175-583
9/24»
9/24*
9/24*
Truk: Selected oblique and vertical shots showing damage to airfield on Eton and seaplane base on Dublo
19,500'
19,500'
20,000'
20,000'
20,500'
19,400'
19,500'
19,700'
B-840 (26B S-H33^7B C )
C-833(26B S-H339-7B C)
D-832(26BS-H339-7BC)
E-993(26BS-H3.39-7BC)
A-873(98BS-H339-7BC)
B-876C98BS-H339-7BC)
A-025(26BS-H339-7BC)
C-362(98B S-H339-7B C )
7150-523
9/19*
7151-524
9/19*
7152-525
9/19*
7153-526
9/19*
7154-527
9/19*
715.5-528
9/19*
7149-522
9/19*
7156-529
9/19*
MARCUS: Good complete vertical coverage of island
18,500' A-708-819BS-7BC 7158-21
9/24*
NAURU: Selected distant oblique shots showing bomb damage to phosphate plant and airfields
9,500'
8,500'
6,300'
7,500'
9,500'
6,500'
B-295-396BS-M355-7BC
D-294-396BS-M355-7BC
A-e07-820 B S-M353-7B C
B-825-820B S-M353-7B C
A-615-396BS-M355-7BC
051-820B S-M353-7B C . . .
7178-272
717&-273
7181-275
7182-276,
7177-271.
7180-274
9/22'
9/22*
9/20*
9/20*
9/22*
9/20*
[28] MARSHALLS
Jaluit: Selected vertical and oblique shots showing bomb damage to government station on Emidj
V
V
O
O
20"
8H
19,000'
19,000'
19,000'
19,^00'
20,000'
5,000'..
5,000'..
3,000'..
2,500'..
1,000'..
2,000'..
1,500'..
1,000'..
1,000'..
Var...
1,000'..
A-002(26BS-TM:-SPEC-7BC)
B-947(26BS-TM-SPEC-7BC)
A-168(98BS-SP. MIS-7BC)...
B951(98BS-SP. MIS-7BCJ_.
A-673(431BS-SPEC-7BC)-..-
MAG31 (VB-133)58
MAG31 (VB-133)59.'V
VM0155-76..-
VM0155-78
MAG-57
VM0155-76..
VM0155-78
M.\G31-60
MAG31-59
MAG31-56
MAG31-61
7143-454
9/20*
7144-455
9/20*
7145-456
9/20*
7146^57
9/20*
7147-458
9/21*
7188-464
10/4*
7189-465
10/5*
7185-461
9/30*
7186-462
10/4*
7148-459 ....
10/3*
7184-460
9/30*
7187-463
10/4*
7190-466
10/5*
7191-467
10/5*
7194-468
9/30*
7195-469
10/6»
Maloelap: Selected distant oblique shots showing bomb damage to airfield on Taroa.
1,500'
1,400'
2,000'
1,500'
VMSB331-72
VM0155-75...
VM0155-70...
VM0155-77...
6981-415
6982-416
6983-417
7183-418
9/27*
9/30*
9/27*
10/3*
Mitte: Selected vertical and oblique shots showing bomb damage to airfield on MUle.
VM0155-69.
VM0155-73
VM0155-74
VM0155-68.
VM0155-69
6976-277
6973-274
6974-275
6975-276
6977-278
9/26*
9/29*
9/29*
9/26*
9/26*
632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 6 October 19^4 to and
including 13 October 1944 — Continued
MARSH ALLS— Continued
Wotje: Selected vertical and oblique shots showing bomb damage to A/F on Wotje.
V/0
F. L. Alt.
Sortie No.
Jiepoa #
Date taken
V -
12"...
6?i" -
16,800' .-
1,000'
1,000'
A-287(431BS-S. B.-7BC)
MAG31-54
MAG31-55....
6980-483
6978-481
6979-482
9/24*
9/27*
9/28*
0
RECENT PUBLICATIONS
(Important CINCPAC-CINCPOA translations of captured documents and
POW interrogation reports issued during the past week).
Preliminary POW Interrogation Report No. 75 (6 October 1944). Interro-
gation of an infantry private captured on GUAM. Principally concerned with
POW's opinions about morale in JAPAN and methods of inducing surrender of
Japanese troops. Sketch-map of barracks area in HAICHENG, near ANSHAN,
MANCHURIA. 8 pp.
Preliminary POW Interrogation Report No. 76 (7 October 1944). Interroga-
tion of member of a Navy Construction Battalian, captured on SAIPAN. Brief
information on training and functions of such units. Sketch-maps of FUJI-
SAMA Naval Airfield near YOKOHAMA. 4 pp.
Preliminary POW Interrogation Report No. 77 (7 October 1944). Interro-
gation of an infantry 1st lieutenant captured on SAIPAN. Detailed history of
9tli Expeditionary Unit ; brief order-of-battle information on other infantry
units. Detailed opinions of POW on Japanase military morale. 8 pp.
Item #9589 (7 October 1944). Plan for Naval Air Arsenal Organization in
tlie PHILIPPINES; including excerpt from Naval Air Hq Secret #17497, dated
20 December 1943. 8 pp.
Item #11,072 (7 October 1944) . Air Strength of the 1st Air Fleet and status of
supply of ordnance, fuel and vehicles, at such bases as YAP, AMBON, DAVAO,
PALAU, MARIANAS, HAIMAHERRA. etc., as of May 1944. 11 pp.
Item #9384 (7 October 1944). Northern MARIANAS Group OpOrd A #10
& #14 (CHARAN KAMOA, 26 29 May 1944) : giving T/0 of Group Fortification
Dept. 3 pp.
Item #9783 (7 October 1944). Extract resiune of a Naval Air Technical Ar-
senal Secret Report on the Results of Research and Testing of the IKIB Engine;
dated August 1942. 10 pp.
Item #10,801 B (7 October 1944). Two tables giving data on Japanese air-
craft and specifications and performance of experimental planes; undated. 3 pp.
Item #11,114 (7 October 1944). A list of Naval Air Groups and their loca-
tions; undated (presumably 1943). 3 pp.
Item #11,403 (7 October 1944). 1st Air Fleet (61st Air Flot) : proposed
schedule of transfer of Air Groups to the PHILIPPINES ; undated. 5 pp.
Item #10,804 (7 October 1944). Japanese Navy Administrative Orders (for
1942, 1943, 1944) dealing with Naval Guard Units and Specially Established
Guard Units. This publication is a compilation of all available Navy AdOrders
regarding these two classes of KEIBITAL, extracted from NAIREI TEIYO, Vol.
I, with corrections and deletions. 60 pp.
Item #10,390 (9 October 1944). A Sketch of harbor installations at HAKATA
KOWAN ; undated. 1 p.
Item #10,415 (9 October 1944). A Sketch of MOJI Port Facilities; undated.
3 pp.
Item #10.959 (9 October 1944). A brief description of the sinking of the
HIYORI MARU on 17 May 1944 ; and a T/0 of the 3rd Co, 28th Ind Car Inf Bn.
4 pp.
Item #11,112 (9 October 1944). Notes on Japanese shipping (minerals pro-
duction in Japanese colonies, fuel, etc.) taken from a notebook; undated; frag-
mentary. 2 pp.
Item #11,405 (9 October 1944). Excerpts taken from the diary of a member
of the Medical Admin Unit. Mt Arty Bn, 50th Inf Regt ; TINIAN ; entries : 23
February through 29 July 1944. 8 pp.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 633
Item #9882 (10 October 1944). A very full name list of officers assigned to
units under the command of the 31st Army ; dated I\Iay 1944. 105 pp.
Item #9883 (10 October 1944). A file of shipping Hq Orders; dated March
through May 1944 : showing troop movements for that period. 27 pp.
Item #10.103 (10 October 1944). Sketches of airfields in JAPAN, taken from a
notebook : dated variously 1934 to 1943. 12 pp.
Item #10,130 and #10,130 A (10 October 1944). North Pacific Weather Sum-
mary Maps and text — translation of a Japanese Hydrographic Office publication.
24 charts.
Item #10,188 (10 October 1944). Communications Net for ROTA; undated.
Ip.
Item #10,015 (11 October 1944). Hq, 14th Div : Reported on Conditions:
dated 5 April 1944. 13 pp.
Item #10,090 A&B (11 October 1944) . Two standing orders of the 528rd Naval
Air Group (February & April 1944) giving the organization of the air group.
11 pp.
Item #9961 A (11 October 1944). A table of specifications for important
Japanese planes; imdated. 8 pp.
Item #9660 (11 October 1944). Reports on supplies, ordnance and personnel
for Central Pacific forces; dated February throush April 1944. 23 pp.
Item #10,452 A (11 October 1944). 13th Div OpOrd A #4. giving T/O's and
ordnance issues for subordinate units. Dated 22 October 1943. 13 pp.
Item #11,823 (12 October 1944). Sketch map of KOROR, MALAKAL, and
ARAKABESAN Islands. PALAU, showing location of supply depots. 1 p.
Item #9945 (12 October 1944). Naval Technical Research Laboratories re-
port on tests with an underground sound detector, dated 10 June 1943. 15 pp.
Item #10,127 (12 October 1944). Naval Air Technical Arsenal report on the
Model 10 Rocket Launcher for the Type 97#6 Land Bomb; dated February 1944.
15 pp.
Item #8635 (13 October 1944). Tables of symbols used by Japanese ordnance
plants and ordnance depots. 4 pp.
Preliminary POW Interrogation Report No. 78 (13 October 1944). Interroga-
tion of an artillery private captured on SAIPAN. Description of POW's reac-
tion to surrender inducements. Information on food supply and ra.Moning in
JAPAN. Considerable new information on airfields and factories in vicinity of
NAGOYA; sketch-maps. 16 pp.
In "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. I, No. 14, article entitled "The Jap Naval Air
Force, a Synopsis", second paragraph on page 21 should be corrected to read "It
moved to the MARIANAS following our February, 1944 (not September) suc-
cesses, and until May, etc.".
CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 10,987, pages 1 and 2, for "CV RYtJJO" read
"CVL RYtJHO" (entry for 27 March 1944).
[29] JAP ARMY HQ
(Note: The following article was prepared by the War Department. Much
of the information is included in the new edition of TM 30—48.)
The Emperor. — The Japanese Constitution provides that the Emperor is Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, that he determines their organization,
and that he declares war, makes peace and concludes treaties. He is advised
by two military councils, namely, the Board of Marshals and Admirals and the
Supreme Military Council.
Imperial General Headquarters. — In wartime or in case of grave emergency
an Imperial Headquarters is established under the supervision of the Emperor
to assist in the exercise of supreme command. It consists of the Chiefs of the
Army and Navy General Staffs, the Ministers of War and of Navy and a staff of
specially selected officers.
Army Heads (Corresponds to U. S. War Dept.). — Subordinate to the Emperor
and Imperial Headquarters the direction of the Army is in the hands of four
principal agencies. These are :
The General Staff (SAMBO HOMBU)
The Ministry of War
The Inspectorate General of Military Training
The Inspectorate General of Aviation
634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The General Staff.— The General Staff comprises five bureaus : General Affairs,
Operations, Intelligence, Transport and Historical. It is charged with the prepa-
ration of war plans, the training and employment of combined arms, the direction
of large maneuvers, the movement of troops, the compilation of field service
regulations, maps and military histories, and with supervision of the General
Staff College, Land Survey Department and probably the Fortress Headquarters.
The Chief of the General Staff is appointed by the Empeior. The General Staff
is organized as shown in Figure 2. Sources available to the War Department
prior to 1941 indicated that the five Bureaus of the General Staff were further
subdivided into numbered Sections. However, recent sources, such as the 1942
Army List and recent Transfer Lists do not confirm the numbering of tlie Sections.
The Sections apparently are still in existence, but it is not known how many there
are, nor are their functions known.
The Ministry of War. — The Ministry of "War is the administrative, supply, and
mobilization agency of the Ai-my. Its chief, the Minister of War, is a member
of the Cabinet and provides liaison between the Army and the Diet. He must
be a general or lieutenant general on the active list and he is directly responsible
to the Emperor. The Ministry of War is subdivided into the Secretariat and
eight bureaus.
[30] The Inspectorate General of Military Training. — The Inspectorate
General of Military Training consists of a general affairs bureau, a so-called
2nd Bureau (DAI NI BU), and several inspectorates, and is responsible for
technical and tactical ti-aining of the separate arms, except the Air Corps, and
of services not under the War Ministry.
The Inspectorate General of Aviation.^-This agency was created by an ordinance
issued 7 December 1938 to supervise Air Corps training. It comprises a General
Affairs Department and a Training Department and is headed by a general or
lieutenant general. In aviation training matters only is it directly responsible
to the Emperor; in other respects, the Inspector General of Aviation is sub-
ordinate to the "Big Three" (Chief of General Staff, War Minister, and Inspector
General of Military Training.) The Inspector General of Aviation may be said
to rank with but after the "Big Three".
(Figures 1 and 2, appearing at this point in Exhibit No. 5, are tables
of organization of the Japanese High Command and the Japanese
Army General Staff Headquarters, respectively. These tables will be
found reproduced as Items'Nos. 52 and 53, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTKA-
TIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
The Air Headquarters and the Army General Staff.
The relationship of the Army General Staff and the Air Headquarters has come
to be very close. Nominally the Army Air Force Headquarters (RIKUGUN
KOKU HOMBU), as the highest tactical command, comes far down the chain
of subordination from the Army High Command and under the Inspector-General
of Aviation rather than under the Chief of the Army General Staff. But during
the TOJO regime one and the same general, Jun USHIROKU, occupied the posts
of Vice-Chief of Staff. Inspector-General of Aviation, and Chief of the Air Head-
quarters. It is not clear, however, that so close a relationship, bringing tactical
command of air operations directly into the office of the Vice-Chief of Staff, is to
continue. In the shuffle of commands after TO-TO's fall. General USIIIROKI
was relieved of his aviation posts. For the first time an Air Officer, Lt. Gen.
Michio SUGAWARA, was placed in command of the Inspectorate-General of Avia-
tion. He was made commander of Air Headquarters simultaneously, thus con-
tinuing the now customary combination of the posts. But he had not at anj
time been a General Staff Officer, and his appointment may mean the reversal
of the trend away from Air Force autonomy which USHIROKU's position had
climaxed.
Nominally, of course, the Inspectorate-General of Aviation is one of the [32]
four agencies of the Army High Command, along with the War Ministry, the
General Staff, and the Inspectorate-General of Military Education. Like the
other thi'ee, it is responsible only to the Empei'or.
The Supreme War Council and the Army General Staff.
The new Koiso cabinet has introduced a new element into the picture of the
Japanese High Command in the formation of a Supreme Council for the Direction
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 635
of the War. Domei transmitted a rush bulletin 5 August announcing the Supreme
Council (SAIKO SENSO SHIDO KAIGI) as follows:
"Having received Imperial Sanction, and in order to formulate a fundamental
policy for directing war and in order to adjust the harmonization of the com-
bined strategy of politics and war, a Supreme Council for the Direction of War
has been hereby established."
More recently a 14 September broadcast ascribed more specific functions to the
Council. It was created, according to the announcement, to "harmonize and
adjust state affairs and the High Command." Its function is "to unify the
administration and the strategy of carrying out the task of modern warfare, but
also extends to deciding the basic policies of administration, foreign affairs, and
economy." Broad as such powers seem, the procedure outlines for the Council
seems to place it high enough to carry them out. "The procedure of the Council,"
the announcement went on, "is to hand down to the Cabinet supreme policies de-
cided by the Council which * * * h^q Cabinet and the various Ministries
will * * * put into force.'
The new Council, then, be(:omes the supreme power in the Empire, relegating
the Cabinet to the position of an administrative body. The announcement of 14
September in fact called it "a powerful combined strength of the Army and
Navy * * * the fountainhead from which the measures to be enacted by
the KOISO-YONAI joint cabinet will originate."
As the only source of information on the new Council is the official announce-
ments of the Japanese, one must turn to inference for furthei" explanation of
its creation and function. Much light can be drawn from the composition of
the Council. While no persons were named, the Japanese did announce its
membership to include the War and Navy Ministers, the Chief of the Army
General Staff, thel Chief of the Navy General Staff, and the Board of Fleet
Admirals and Field Marshals.
The Council's membership, thus, represents a broadening of the basis from
which Army and Navy influence upon JAPAN'S war decisions can be drawn.
It is to be observed that the Council's members are the members of the Imperial
General Headquarters, plus senior officers of Army and Navy. The Board
of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals already exists as a body, made up of
elder statesmen in the two military branches, advisory to the Emperor on matters
of military policy. To include them in the new Council is an obvious means of
calling upon a wider circle of Army and Navy opinion and healing' the rift so
evident between Army and Navy [33] in the last months of TOJO's regime.
Significantly, too, the Japanese have reverted to the practice of setting up a head-
less group in supreme place, combining in the new Supreme Council nearly all
the reins of command over Cabinet and Armed Forces alike which TOJO had
gathered into his own hands. Significantly, too, the same officers who ran JA-
PAN'S war effort as the Imperial General Headquarters, still do so, as the nucleus
of the Council.
The evidence is thus that the General Staff of the Army still functions behind
the scenes as one of the chief ruling bodies of JAPAN. The new KOISO cabinet
has brought it still closer, perhaps, to the Navy, but it has not changed its role and
its influence.
5 CM Geound-Mounted Naval Gun
Information concerning this weapon is incomplete in view of the fact that
plates were missing when the weapon was captured. However, examination has
revetaled several points not covered in a preliminary report published in "Weekly
Intelligence," Vol. I, No. 5.
This weapon is a naval gun adapted to a ground mount, apparently designed
from a British piece. Principle data on the gun includes :
Overall weight: 500 lbs. (approx. ) Elevation: — 11° to — 21°
Length of tube : 4'8" Traverse: None.
Recoil: 6"
It is equipped with a box-type single trail with a lunette through which a
stake is driven to prevent the gun from moving to the rear when fired. There
are no spades. The trunnions are attached to the one-piece, cold-worked steel
tube at the center of gravity and mounted on the extension of the trail directly
above the axle.
636 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The breech cannot be| opened when the maximum elevation is approached
because of interference of the trail.
The photo below shows the captured gun.
(The photograph referred to supra^ being of a Japanese 5 CM
Ground-Mounted Naval Gun, will be found reproduced as Item No.
54, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Japanese Type 3 Land Mine
A Japanese document captured in the MARIANAS presents an explanation
of a new type land mine. This is the first data available to Allied forces. It
is important to note that data on this mine is derived from an enemy document
and is not yet verified by contact in combat. The mine, known as the T.vpe 3
Land Mine, has no exposed parts made of metal, and its presence would be
extremely difficult to detect by use of standard mine detecting equipment. The
case is made of terra-cotta, is circular in shape and has an earthen collar. The
outer surface is unglazed. The fuze body, cover, plunger and striker support
are made of bakelite. The fuze seat is of hard rubber. The springs, pins and
striker, all contained inside the fuze, are the only metal parts in the mine.
The mine is manufactured in two sizes. The larger mine is 27 cm (lO^^ in.)
in diameter and 9 cm (3^; in.) thick. It contains approximately 3 kg. (Qy-2
lbs.) of explosive and is assertedly effective against personnel at a radius of
10 meters (33 feet). The smaller mine is 22 cm (SVo inches) in diameter and
9 cm thick, contains 2 kg. (4% lbs.) of high explosive and has an effective
anti-personnel radius reported to be about 8 meters (26 feet). Both mines are
considered to be effective against the tracks of a heavy tank. The bursting
charges may be of any of the following composition: Ammonium nitrate (50%)
TNT (50%) ; Ammonium nitrate (90%) Dinitro naphthalene (10%) ; Am-
monium perchlorate (75%) Ferro- silicon (16%) Sawdust (6%) crude oil
(3%).
The most interesting development in the new mine is the fuze. It may be det-
onated by pressure of pull after the safety pin has been removed, and, accord-
ing to the document, will function satisfactorily even after being buried in the
ground for long periods of time. A percussion hammer located within the fuze
is held in position by a release fork to which a trip wire may be attached.
When the wire is pulled, the fork releases the hammer which is forced down-
ward by the percussion hammer spring. The hammer comes in contact with
the striker forcing it against the percussion cap. W^hen pressure is applied di-
rectly on the head of the fuze, the plunger spring is compressed, and the entire
plunger group, moving as a unit, is forced downward. The hammer comes in
contact with the head of the striker and again forces it against the percussion
cap. A pressure of approximately 2 kg. (4M> lbs.) or a pull of about 10 kg.
(22 lbs.) is stated to be required to cause detonation.
(The sketch referred to, infra, being of a section of a Tyi^e 3 Land
Mine Fuze, will be found reproduced as Item No. 55, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
The fuze is threaded so as to be interchangeable with the standard type 88
instantaneous impact and type 100 dual action artillery fuzes. By substituting
it for one of the standard fuzes, any common mortar or howitzer shell may be
converted into a very effective land mine or booby trap. It may also be in-
serted into a block of picric acid, TNT or other explosive and used similarly.
The mine's sensitivity to detonation by a normal fall is stated to be negli-
gible. Dropped from a height of 0.5 meter (liA feet) onto a concrete floor,
the mine will assertedly not explode, and it can safely be dropped on ordinary
ground from a height of 4 meters (13 feet).
Because of its color and unfinished surface, the mine may be easily camou-
flaged in almost any terrain. It is considered to be greatly superior to previ-
ously reported mines designed for the same purposes.
The preceding sketch and following photos are captured photographs showing
details of this Type 3 Land Mine. Most of the information presented herein was
derived from CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 11,431 which will not be published in
uny other form.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 637
(The photographs referred to supra, being two in number and hav-
ing several items on each photograph, are as follows:
1. [a] Sketch of a Type 3 Land Mine ; [b] photograph of Type
3 Land Mine ancl Fuze ; [c] photograph showing packing
of Type 3 Land Mine; and [d] photograph of fragments
from Type 3 Land Mine.
2. [a] Photograph of Type 3 Land Mine with trip wures tied
to sticks of wood; [b] photograph showing explosion of
Type 3 Mine; and [c] photograph showing component
parts of Type 3 Lancl Mine Fuze.
These photographs will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 56 and 57,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appear six separate items with
several photographs on each item as follows :
1. Three views of a wrecked phosphate plant at Angaur.
2. [a] PhotogTaph of small boat basin north of Angaur: [b]
photograph of phosphate loading pier, Angaur; and [c]
photograph of destroyed warehouses in Angaur.
3. [a] Photograph of a Jap 37 mm anti-tank gun in covered
emplacement on Saipan; [b] photograph of Jap pillbox
defending western side of Angaur ; and [c] photograph of
a personnel shelter.
4. [a] Photograph of a Jap 75 mm. gmi emplacement near
Middle Village, Angaur; and [b] two views of a Jap 75
mm anti-aircraft gun at Angaur.
5. [a] Photograph showing manner in which Japanese at
Angaur strung heavy rope between trees on the beach: and
[b] two photographs showing two types of anti-boat ob-
stacles encountered at Angaur.
6. [a] Photograph of remains of Jap lighthouse demolished by
naval gunfire prior to U. S. landings at Angaur; and
[b] photograph of an anti-tank trench along beach near a
Saipan town.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 58,
59, 60, 61, 62, and 63, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
Yap
U3] Outflanked YAP, Jap island outpost between new U. S. bases at
PELELIU and GUAM, was an important secondary target during landings in
southern PALAU. YAP's military installations were extensively worked over by
Allied surface units and aircraft, with results indicated in the photographs
reproduced here.
In pre-war days, YAP — a compact group of four large and ten small islands,
with a land area of only 83 square miles — was known chiefly as an important
cable station and as the home of curiously primitive natives. YAP was linked
by cable with PALAU, MENADO, the PHILIPPINES, and the Empire, as well as
GUAM and the UNITED STATES. Anthropologists and ethnologists were in-
trigued by the natives, whose superstitions have persisted despite the efforts of
missionaries.
Sensing impending U. S. moves in the CAROLINES, the Japs in early 1944,
began an airfleld on RULL Island. A prisoner claims the field was completed in
April. According to this POW, elements of the 343rd, 523rd and 261st Air Groups
were based here. Maximum A/C strength prior to our strikes was estimated by
the prisoner as 40 bombers and 60 fighters, although photo reconnaissance never
showed more than 45 planes.
638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Military installations on YAP include one airfield, three radio stations, radar
and RDF installations, and a small seaplane base. These are protected by
strong coast defense and AA gun positions as well as anti-invasion defenses.
Beach defenses were strengthened recently and many new boat barriers con-
structed. It is difficult to assess the admitted heavy damage suffered by YAP;
the airtield has however, definitely been neutralized.
The Jap garrison strength of YAP is estimated as about 8,000. Of this figure,
5000 are reported attached to the 49th Independent Mixed Brigade, 800 to the
46th Guard Force, plus 1200 air base personnel and about 1000 construction per-
sonnel. Women and children, said a POW, were evacuated to PALAU sometime
ago.
(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appear four photographs as
follows :
1. Photogi'aph of Yap town under attack by carrier planes.
2. Photograph showing burning aircraft at Yap's soggy airfield.
3. Photograph showing the bomb-scarred and shell-pocked re-
vetment area of Yap's airfield.
4. Photograph showing a marine rifleman leading the way for
a General Sherman tank at Horseshoe Valley, Peleliu.
The foregoing paragraphs will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 64,
65, 66, and 67, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry. )
Confidential
20 Oct. 1944
Japanese Aebial Tactics Against Ship Targets
"KNOW YOUR ENEMY!"
(Addendum to CinCPac-CinCPOA--"Weekly Intelligence" Vol 1, No. 15)
CONTENTS
Page
Search and Reconnaissance 1
Tracking 8
Homing the Attack Unit 14
Illumination 17
The Attack 19
(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appears a sketch caricaturing
a Japanese aviator throwing a bomb bv hand. This sketch will be
found reprocluced as Item No. 68, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
[i] Inteoductoey
This study brings together an assortment of documentary evidence bearing on
Japanese tactical doctrine for aerial operations against ship targets. No attempt
has been made here to collate available information on other phases of Jap aerial
warfare.
Although most of the material contained in this study is drawn from official
Japanese documents, this has been supplemented by such unofficial documentary
and POW information as appears to be logical and consistent.
It is important to note that the tactics outlined represent Japanese theoretical
doctrine, and may not be followed in combat.
Exact evaluation of such tactical information is difficult, because: (1) battle
experience postdating available evidence may have changed enemy concepts ;
(2) operating units in any given case may not rigidly adhere to official doctrine;
(3) it is not clear whether some documents reflect the tactical thinking of a
particular Air Group or that of the Naval Air Force.
One final word of caution must be added. Study of this article will quickly
reveal that the enemy has given much thought to the problem of tracking fleet
units and guiding the attack group into the position for a run. Fairly elaborate
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 639
tracking and liaison methods have been developed. These may well become out-
moded and of scant importance as Jap airborne railar improves.
Despite the limitations indicated above, however, the material presented here
is believed significant. It forms a fairly comprehensive background for the
study of Jap tactics as well as a basis on which future tactics may be assessed.
Si:akch and Reconnaissance
The doctrine for the Southeast Area Fleet succinctly points out that the function
of a recce unit is reconnaissance, and warns the unit to avoid combat if this would
interfere with the primary mission.
The normal search radius for a medium bomber (BETTY) is 600-660 nautical
miles, or, in the event of anticipated action, 700 miles. Recce seaplanes (JAKE)
may be expected to search a radius of 250 to 300 nautical miles, and carrier attack
planes (JILL) 350 nautical miles. Flying boats (EMILY) may fly a radius of
1000 to 1200 nautical miles.
A captui'ed chart, reproduced as'Figure 12, in the center spread of this adden-
dum, sets forth a comprehensive search plan for TRUK, PALAU, WOLEAI, and
SAIPAN. The date of the document is not given, but appears to refer to pro-
jected enemy searches in April (1944). All the sectors shown were not to be
covered each day. Sectors to be flown were to be selected either by the day or
according to a general plan. In some cases, it is known that the odd-numbered
sectors were covered on even-numbered days, and vice-versa. Of course, if there
was any indication of an Allied amphibious operation from a given direction, or
if Allied ships or subs were sighted, searches were to be concentrated in this
area.
[^j The following search plans, designed to meet particular tactical situ-
ations, have been taken from captured documents :
(A sketch relating to the "Patrol Search Method'' mentioned in the
succeeding paragraph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 1, Item
No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
This is designated as the "patrol search method'", and is recommended for
night searches.
Each plane flies in an angular figure eight, dropping a flare each time it crosses
its base point. After a given patrol line has been covered the planes advanre
to a new patrol line in the direction of the enemy force.
(A sketch relating to the "Search Sector Method" mentioned in the
succeeding paragraph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 2, Item
No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
This is designated the "search sector method". It is specified for use when
the coui-se of the enemy is not known and when it is necessary to carry out an
abbreviated search with a small number of planes.
In this method target lights are dropped at the four corners of a square and
the aircraft flies back and forth in parallel lines within the marked area.
(A sketch relating to the "Sweep Search Method" mentioned in the
succeeding paragraph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 3, Item
No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
This is designated as tlie "sweep search method'". This method is used on
moonlit nights when the visibility is particularly^ good, or when the object of
the search is a large force.
In this method a number of planes fly out from a common base and advance
in parallel lines.
(A sketch referring to a "Night Search Method'" mentioned in the
succeeding paragraph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 4, Item
No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[3] This is a ''night search method" for use by a radar-equipped plane.
The "a" on the diagram varies with the altitude. If radar conditions are
favorable, it will be determined according to Table 1, (which follows the next
640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
searcli plan). If radar conditions are unfavorable, the value for "a" will be
decreased to correspond with the decreased efficiency of the radar.
(A sketch relating to a method used for "Night Search'' mentioned
in the succeeding paragraph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 5,
Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
This method is used for ''night search" employing two planes equipi^ed with
radar. Distance "d" is set by the commander of the unit and is based on the
degree of certainty of the general position of the enemy and the lapse of time
between the time of the discovery of the enemy and the beginnng of the search.
The value for "a" is determined by the following table. The search is planned
so that a rectangle with sides of 2 "d", which has as its center the presumed loca-
tion of the enemy, will be thoroughly searched.
Altitude, meters - .
feet
Over 1500
5000
750-1000 -
2500-3300
500-750
1650-2500
200-500
600-1650
. Flying Boat
Recce Seaplane..
60 nautical mUes..
40 nautical miles. -
45 nautical miles..
35 nautical miles..
40 nautical miles..
30 nautical miles..
30 nautical miles.
20 nautical miles.
Table No. 1
(Comment: This chart probably reflects a fairly realistic Japanese conception
of the ranges of their own radar installed in EMILYs and JAKEs at the altitudes
shown. )
(A sketch relating to ''Search Plan for Use When the Distance
Involved Is More Than oOU Miles" mentioned in the succeeding para-
graph will be found reproduced as Figure No. 6a, Item No. 69,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[4] This is a "search plan for use when the distance involved is more than
500 miles". The various factors, such as distance of the sally "R", the deploy-
ment angle (c) (45 degrees in the absence of special orders), the intervals be-
tween search lines (b), the lateral distance to be covered (e) and the number
of planes to be used, are determined in advance. The interval "b" is less than
twice the range of visibility.
This method is used when the course of the enemy is not known or it is thought
that it may intersect the search base line at a large angle.
(A sketch referring to the next succeeding paragraph, being a plan
used when it is thought the angle of intersection of the course of the
enemy and the search base line will be small, will be found reproduced
as Figure No. 6b, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
This plan is used when it is thought that the angle of intersection of the
course of the enemy and the search base line will be small.
(A sketch showing a seardi plan "for daily patrol on long distances
of over 500 miles" will be round reproduced as Figure No. 7a, Item
No. 69, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
This method is used principally "for daily patrol on long distances of over 500
miles". The interval "b" is less than twice the range of visibility. The lateral
distance (1) will be %o of the total width of the search out made by planes
turning in the same direction. The return angle (E) will be from 0 to 15 degrees
depending on the anticipated angle of intersection between the coui'se of the
enemy and the base line of the search.
This plan is used when the number of planes available is large.
(A sketch showing a search plan for daily patrol on long distances
of over 500 miles where the number of planes available is small will
be found reproduced as Figure No. 7b, Item No. 69, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 641
[o] This method is used under the same circumstances as 7a where the
number of planes available is small. The symbols have the same meaning here
as in 7a.
(A sketch relating to a search method "when it is possible to predict
the enemy's approximate course", mentioned in the next succeeding
paragraph, will be found reproduced as Figure No. 8, Item No. 69,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
This method is used "xchen it is possible to predict the enemy's approximate
course" and when there is a small number of planes available.
(b) interval between the search lines will be less than four times the I'ange
of visibility.
(1) lateral distance will be one half of (b).
The search base line must be parallel to the expected course of the enemy.
(A sketch relating to a search method "when an attempt is made
to search an area of broad frontage with a few planes" will be found
reproduced as Figure No. 10a, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEA-
TIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[6] This method is used 'Hvhen an attempt is made to search an area of
broad frontuye with a feio planes" or, when a rough estimate can be made of the
general jwsition, course, and speed of the enemy as in the case of enemy supply
routes.
This plan is used when search is to be made in a direction opposite to that of
the enemy's course.
Distances 1 and 1' are figured as follows :
_2dVf_ "Vf equals plane speed
^~Vf+Ve ^G equals speed of enemy
d equals visibility
l>^2d-^^^+^^ ^"
1 /a ^^
No method for determining L is given.
(A sketch relating to a search plan "when a search is to be made in
close pursuit of an enemy" will be found reproduced as Figure No. 10b,
Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
This plan is used lohen a search is to be made in close pursuit of an enemy.
The distances 1 and 1' are determined as follows:
2dVf
Vf— Ve
Symbols have the same meaning as in 10a.
(A sketch relating to a search plan "for use of the night, or when
visibility is poor" will be found reproduced as Figure No. 11a, Item
No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[7] A plan for use of night, or when visibility is poor. Starting points are
selected to the rear of the enemy. The base lines of the search should coincide
with the expected course of the enemy.
L — length of search — no method for determining is given.
1 — lateral distance — twice the range of visibility plus the length of the enemy
force.
A — angle of change of course. Will the 20 degrees except where change indi-
cated.
(A sketch showing an alternate plan of search for use at night or
when visibility is poor will be fomid reproduced as Figure No. lib,
Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
79716—46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 42
642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
An alternate to 11a using three planes.
(A slcetch showing still another alternate plan of search at night
or wheii' visibility is poor, using four planes, will be found reproduced
as FigLire No. lie, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
An altcirnate to 11a using four planes.
Distance between starting points will be more than twice the lateral distance (1) .
(A sketch showing a plan of search to be used on moonlight nights
when the visibilitv is good will be found reproduced as Figure No. lid,
Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[S] This plan is to be used on moonlight nights when the visibility is good.
The symbols have the same meaning as in 11a. In this plan the base line may
be at right angles to the enemy's course. This illustration shows the plan as it
operates with three planes.
Tracking
After a target has been located, it is followed by one or more planes until
such time as the Japanese attack unit is in a position to attack.
Flying boats (EMILYs) and recce seaplanes (JAKEs) are used in night track-
ing, (i. e., from about two hours after sunset until about an hour and a half
before dawn ) . During the daytime less vulnerable planes are used.
According to one source, night tracking operations should be carried out at
altitudes of 2500 to 5000 feet, while in the daytime, dependent largely on the
visibility, higher altitudes are flown.
The following series of rather rough tracking plans are taken from a captured
notebook, with the comments. These plans are designed for use at night.
(A sketch showing an elliptical maneuver in tracking the enemy
will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 1, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Elliptical maneuver. To be used during good visibility when the pilot can
track the enemy while keeping him in sight by contact flying.
In this maneuver the pilot flies "d" distance away from the target, which is
said to be about 8200 feet.
(A sketch showing a maneuver used to track more than one ship
will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 2, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[9] This is a maneuver used to track more than one ship, and "d" again
represents the limit of visibility (about 8200 feet), while the distance fore and
aft from the target is 3300 feet. This short distance is flown in order to make
a close reconnaissance of the target.
(A sketch showing a tracking maneuver used for the purpose of
making a close reconnaissance on one ship will be found reproduced
as Sketch No. 3, Item No. 70, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
This maneuver is used for the purpose of making a close reconnaissance on
one ship. Three sides of the box are flown at the limit of visibility, while the
fourth side is flown at 3300 feet.
(A sketch showing a tracking maneuver when the wind is of high
velocity will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 4, Item No. 70,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
This maneuver is flown at approximately right angles to the course of the
sip at times when the wind is of high velocity. The probable purpose is to keep
the plane in sight of the target without running quickly down wind and then
being forced to buck back against it
(A sketch showing a tracking maneuver when the wind velocity is
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 643
small will be found reproduced as Sketch No, 5, Item No. 70,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTHATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
This maneuver is likewise flown at riglit angles to ttie course of the enemy.
It is stated to be effective for use when the tvind velocity is small.
(At this point in Exhibit No. 5 there appears a chart of Japanese air
searches out of Truk, Woleai, Palau and Saipan. This chart will be
found reproduced as Item No. 71, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
(A sketch referring to a tracking maneuver when the enemy force
is great and there is no danger of losing it will be found reproduced
as Sketch No. 1, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
[12] This figure eight should be flown only when the enemy force is great
and there is no danger of losing it if the plane temporarily loses contact.
(A sketch showing a tracking maneuver when the target can be
kept against the moon will be fomid reproduced as Sketch No. 2, Item
No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
This maneuver is to be flown ichen the target can be kept against the moon.
The following tracking plans, all but one of which contemplate the use of
radar, were taken from an operation order of the 11th Recce Unit.
(A sketch showing a flying boat tracking method designed for night
work will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 3, Item No. 72,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
This is a flying boat method designed for night work. As indicated in the
diagram, the plane flies out of radar range on each leg. The altitude should be
as high as possible. The plane employs a lateral beam. (This probably refers
to the beam created by the radar antenna mounted on the side of the fuselage,
which has been found in some Jap planes. )
(A sketch showing a tracking maneuver designed for seaplanes will
be found reproduced as Sketch No. 4, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[13] This is the same basic method as the one previously shown but is
designed for recce seaplanes. Forty-five rather than seventy degree turns are
employed.
(A sketch showing a tracking method designed for use where there
is interference by enemy fighter planes will be found reproduced as
Sketch No. 5, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
This method is designed for use where there is interference by enemy fighter
planes. It may take any pattern and simply consists of getting a radar contact,
flying out of radar range and returning from a different direction until another
radar contact is obtained.
(A sketch showing a tracking method to be used after the target is
located by radar will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 6, Item No.
72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
This method is used after the target is located by radar. It is used by flying
boats and recce planes. It is designed for two planes. (Apparently one plane
describes a rectangle ahead of the target and another in back of the target.)
(A sketch showing a tracing method without the use of radar will
be found reproduced as Sketch No. 7, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[IJt] This is a method for tracking without the use of radar. It employs
target markers.
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 1 43
644 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Homing the Attack Unit
Action reports from the early days of the war report the activities of Japanese
snooper planes. Their function is not only to locate and track the target, but
to get the attack unit over the target in a position for an attack. In some cases
the guide plane may be simply a bellwether, equipped with superior communi-
cations and navigational equipment and manned by competent personnel. More
frequently, however, the guide plane is the snooper, i. e. ; a plane in actual
contact with the target.
It is clear from documents that the attack unit, or a relief tracking plane,
may be brought in on the radar of the snooper or by the use of RDF equip-
ment. The tracking plane is advised to keep the radar and communication trans-
mission at a minimum during the tracking operation. However, when the time
coming in for the attack. A sudden increase in communications, or the com-
mencement of the transmission of RDF, is a reasonable indication that an
attack group or a relief plane is being homed in to the target. The following
table, which was an annex to an oflScial order (source and date unknown), gives
the communication between the attack unit and the tracking plane. The
general authenticity of the pattern set forth is corroborated by fragmentary
references found in other documents.
(Note: Those marked * to be used only when necessary)
Attack Unit
Tracking Unit
Notes
Expected time of arrival
over battle area.
Direction of approach.
•Method of Attack
Method No.
Discovery of enemy:
Strength, positions,
base course, speed.
[/5] Weather in
enemy area.
Standard altitude
for tracking position.
Commerce transmitting
RDF guide Beam! (MU-
SEN YUDO).
*Drop parachute flares!
(Continue to drop para-
chute flares!)
*We recognize the track-
ing unit's parachute flares.
[1(1] 'Indicate enemy
position!
We are transmitting
RDF guide beam.
We are dropping
parachute flares.
•Commence
tion?!
Peel off!
illumina-
Enemy speed.
Report of enemy
course.
For dive bombing report accurately the wind di-
rection and velocity at 1600 feet. For low altitude
bombing (TN: below 3300 feet) report the wind di-
retcion and velocity at 650 feet.
Direction of approach.
Direction of approach is that of course at time of
of approach.
Unless under special order, direction of approach
is from direction of moon or of twilight.
Method of Attack.
(1) Unilluminated torpedo attack.
(2) Illuminated torpedo attack.
(3) Unilluminated dive bombing.
(4) Illuminated dive bombing.
(5) Unilluminated low altitude bombing.
(6) Illuminated low altitude bombing.
Unless under special order, commence transmitting
RDF guide beam 45 minutes before attack unit
reaches battle area.
The RDF guide beam plane, ten minutes before
attack imit reaches battle area, will put out Aldis
signalling light in direction of attack unit and will
attempt to guide it.
"Drop parachute flares!" Each time one white
flare is dropped over the enemy.
Continue to "drop parachute flares!" Flares are
dropped at about two minute intervals.
About three course target lights, (KHOHMOKU
HYOTEI) or flare landing lights (SHOMEI
TODAN CHAKUSUI SHOMEITEI) are dropped
near the enemy. They are dropped ahead with
regard to the speed of the enemy. On this occasion,
if the situation warrants it, low altitude bombing
(TN: below 3300 feet) may be carried out.
Reported without fail if it is to be a torepdo attack.
If the situation warrants it, pyrotechnics may be
used as well as radio.
Parachute flares GREEN: Enemy changing
course to starboard.
GREEN-GREEN:
sharply to starboard.
RED: Enemy changing course to port.
RED-RED: Enemy changing course sharply to
port.
Parachute flares. Model 2, dropped so as to form
a continuous illuminated background.
In the event that the attack unit is to illuminate
by itself, if necessary, it will maintain constant
illumination (HOSOKU SHOMEI WO NASU).
Enemy changing course
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 645
A captured notebook states that the RDF should be transmitted thirty minutes
before the estimated time of arrival of the attacli unit.
When the RDF system of homing is used, it is apparently intended that the
tracking plane shall guide the attack unit over the target and not to the guide
plane. In two separate sources, diagrams illustrating the method of guiding the
attack unit in seem to emphasize this point. One of the diagrams is as follows :
(The diagram referred to in the foregoing paragraph illustrating
a method of guiding an attack unit in will be found reproduced as
Sketch No. 1, Item No. 73, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
[i7] (Comment : If this scheme is followed, the target, by intercepting the
RDF signal, should be able to determine the line upon which the attack unit is
approaching.)
The tracking plane is instructed to fly at a low altitude while transmitting
RDF and it is stated that where the distances are short and the altitudes high
there is likely to be great inaccuracy in the directions indicated. It is further
stated that the method is practically useless at altitudes of greater than 6500
feet.
Illumination
Japanese doctrine states that targets should be illuminated only when there
is not sufficient natural light. The following table gives the periods when it is
considered that illumination should be used.
Moon Age
10-20 days-
5-10
20-25
1-5
26-28
Visibility
Visibility good but with some mist and cirrus clouds.
■Visibility good but with light mist -
•Regardless
Illumi-
nation
No.
No.
Yes.
(Comment : Despite the above, it is noted that throughout discussions of illumi-
nated attack, continual reference is made to the method of approach in which
there is an assumption of some moonlight. )
Approaches should always be made so that the target is between the attack
unit and the moon. (This piece of advice constantly recurs in documents.) The
attack should be timed to take advantage of the greater visibility of the target
when the moon is above 10 degrees and below 50 degrees above the horizon. It
is more difficult to see the target when the moon is high.
[iS] The actual illumination of the target may be accomplished by the
tracking plane or by a couple of planes from the attack unit especially designated
for the job. In either event, the technique is the same. When the attack unit is
20 nautical miles from the target, the tracking plane drops course lights in the
rear of the target. As soon as the attack unit is able to see the course lights, it
maneuvers to approach from the proper position with respect to the moon. When
in proper position, the attack unit gives the signal for the illumination at which
time para-flares are dropped on the side of the target away from the attack unit.
One prisoner of war has stated that the flares are dropped to form a Vee, with
the i)oint indicating the direction from which the attack should be made, and
it is noted that the following illustration seems to confirm that statement.
(A sketch referring to the foregoing paragraph and showing a
method of dropping flares to form a Vee, will be found reproduced as
Sketch No. 8, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry. )
One source claims that planes of the attack unit are supposed to drop flares at
intervals of five to seven minutes when they are within 50 nautical miles of the
target. This is so basically unsound from a tactical stand-point that the Japanese
would probably do so only if the other methods of homing were proving completely
inadequate.
Some sources indicate, as does the communication table in Section III, that
flares should be dropped directly over the target. This, it is thought, would be
646 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
done when it was otherwise difficult to inform the attaclf unit of the position of
tlie target prior to the actual illumination.
After each plane has made its run or dive it is directed to drop a flare in order
to illuminate the target for the succeeding planes of the attack unit.
[19] The Attack
The Japanese have long recognized the value of a coordinated attack by dive
bombers, torpedo bombers and horizontal bombers. In the early days of the
war there are examples of such attacks. More recent action reports are more
difficult to analyze because they do not show any vei-y clear pattern ; this may
be due to the relative efficiency of the pilots and to the fact that, in the face of
the modem task force, what started out to be well-planned attacks simply break
up in the face of the opposition encountered.
In any event, the coordinated attack is planned for the particular occasion
and may employ the various aircraft in an almost infinite variety of patterns.
Other than statements generally recognizing the value of such an attack, no
statements of doctrine relative to the coordinated attack have been found.
Hence these notes are concerned largely with dive, glide and torpedo tactics
which have been given some attention in documents recovered.
A. DIVE BOMBING
Dive bombers should approach to within 50 nautical miles of the target in
normal flight formation. Aircraft should be in close formation in order to main-
tain their defensive firepower and at the same time simplify communications
and receive more eif ective support from the fighter escort.
Two examples of a normal flight formation are as follows :
(Two examples of a normal dive bomber flight formation, referred
to in the foregoing paragraph, will be found reproduced as Sketch
No. 2, Item No. 73, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
[20] At about fifty nautical miles from the target, a screening formation
is taken. (Some documents omit this intermediate step.) A diagram of the
screening formation is as follows :
(The diagram referred to in the foregoing paragraph showing a
screening formation at about 50 nautical miles from the target will
be found reproduced as Sketch No. 3, Item No. 73, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
A high altitude approach is favored if visibility and cloud conditions permit.
Approach altitudes of from 13,000 to 33,000 feet are given in various docu-
ments, with approaches at 16,000 to 20,000 feet being favored. Observation from
the field tends to confirm the later altitudes as reasonably standard.
For night approaches, the following altitudes are given. Full moon (10 to
20 days old) fine weatlier and good visibility: 10,000 to 13,000 feet. With full
moon, light clouds and good visibility, or with full moon, fine weather and a
certain amount of mist in the air: 6,500 to 10,000 feet. With new moon (5-10
or 20-25 days) fine weather, and good visibility: 8,000 to 11,500 feet. With new
moon, fine weather and misty air : 5,000 to 8,000 feet. It is said that while the
above is standard, the succeeding planes may come in at higher altitudes by
being stepped up.
At a distance of from 33,000 to 65,000 feet from the target, the attack for-
mation is taken. It consists generally of a column, or, where the attack is to be
made from two or more directions, two or more columns. An altitude of 13,000
feet is preferred at this time and is maintained until the order for attack is
given, at which time the formation flies to an altitude of about 6,500 feet at
an air speed of more than 140 knots.
The planes push over and dive at 60° to an altitude of 1600 to 1800 feet, at
which altitude bombs are released. The No. 1 plane peels off first, followed at
short intervals by the succeeding planes. It is stated that a smoothly coordinated
attack by 36 planes can be accomplished in three minutes, and some reports of
attacks in the early days of the war indicate that this is a reasonable estimate.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 647
[21] Normally, the approach is made directly to the target, but it Is recom-
mended that:
a. When the sun is high, fly out of it ;
b. At dawn and dusk, fly out of the dark ;
c. Fly against the blue of the sky rather than the white of the clouds ;
d. Make use of scattered clouds.
When the wind is negligible (below 50 feet per second), it is recommended
that the dive be from the bow or stern. If the wind is greater than 50 feet per
second, the dive should be made with the wind at the tail of the plane.
There seems to be no particular preference with respect to dives from the
bow or stern, although a majority of the diagrams show the dives as being made
bow to stern.
Tlie "multiple formation" attack in ichich different elements come in from
different directions is stressed in documents. A typical sketch is as follows:
( The sketch referred to in the foregoing paragraph showing "mul-
tiple formation" attack in which dilferent elements come in from
different directions, will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 4, Item
No. 73, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Other similar diagrams show the second and third sections attacking at angles
of 20° on the bow. Where there are only two sections, the bow to stern dive from
dead ahead is omitted.
The preferred evasive tactic is a high speed, low altitude retirement along a
predetermined course.
The No. 1 plane performs an important function in that it indicates the target,
its course and speed ; the wind direction and speed ; the point of aim ; bomb re-
lease altitude ; direction of retirement ; and rendezvous point The planes follow-
ing No. 1 observe its bomb drops and correct on them.
It is estimated that to make five or six direct hits 18 planes are required, of
which eight will be shot down.
[22] B.. GLIDE BOMBING
The general doctrine applicable to dive bombing is applicable to glide bombing.
Glide bombing is prescribed when, because of visibility, sufficient altitude cannot
be gained for dive bombing. It seems to be standard for night attacks.
The push-over into the glide is at 3300 feet. The angle of the glide is 40° to 45°.
The bombs are released at 1000 feet during the day and at 1300 feet at night.
C. TOBPEDO ATTACKS
There is relatively little documentary evidence on Jap torpedo doctrine. In-
formation available indicates that the approach formations are very similar to
those employed in dive bombing.
Standard approach altitude is stated to be 6500 to 10,000 feet. Observations
in recent encounters indicate that when within radar range an altitude of 160
feet or less is used. One prisoner of war stated that the approach until near
the formation was at 3300 to 5000 feet after which the planes dropped to about
160 feet.
When the attack has started, the aircraft fly in a loose string, although in the
face of heavy AA they may come in line abreast on a broad front. Diagrams of
torpedo attacks follow :
(The diagrams of torpedo attacks mentioned in the foregoing para-
graphs will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 5, Item No, 73, and
Sketch No. 9, Item No. 72, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
[2S] There are documentary references to an individual method of approach,
in wtiich the torpedo plane approaches on a course parallel to that of the target
and then turns in toward the target for the drop.
One source states that the torpedo should be dropped from altitudes of 160
feet at an air speed of 160 knots ; according to other sources, from 330 feet at an air
speed of 140 to 160 knots. Reports indicate that torpedoes have been released
at altitudes varying from 50 to 500 feet.
The release point is uniformly stated to be 2600 to 4000 feet depending on the
course of the target. (Horizontal distance.)
648 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(A sketch showing three release points with respect to the target
will be found reproduced as Sketch No. 6, Item No. 73, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Hewitt Inqufry Exhibit No. 6
(Exhibit No. 6 consists of ONI Document "ONI 220- J, Japanese
Submarines", being a compilation of photographs and descriptive data
relating to Japanese submarines. This document will be found re-
produced, in its entirety, as Items Nos. 74 through 104, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 7
Exhibit No. 7 is a Bertliing Plan at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941,
which will be found reproduced as Item No. 105, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 8
SECRET
Naval message — Navy Department
Drafter Extension Number.
Addressees
Precedence
From: COM 14.
Released by
Date: 26 November 1941.
TOR Coderoom
Asterisk (*) mailgram ad-
dressee:
For action:
OPNAV.
Priority PPPPPPPP
Routinp
Deferred
Decoded by A. V. PERING.
Paraphrased by
Routed by
Information:
CINCPAC.
CINCAF.
COM 16.
Priority
Routine
Deferred
Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence If Operational
and as administrative. Check below
260110 D
Originator fill in date and time: Date Time GOT
On outgoing dispatches please leave about one inch clear space before beginning text.
COPEK
For past month Commander Second Fleet has been organizing a task force
which comprises following units :
Second Fleet, Third Fleet including First and Second Base Forces and
First Defense Division, combined Air Force, Desron three, Airron seven,
Subron Five and possible units of Batdiv Three from First Fleet.
In messages concerning these units South China Fleet and French Indo China
force have appeared as well as the Naval Station at Sama, Bako and Takao.
Third Base Force at Palao and Rno Palao have also been engaged in extensive
communications with Second Fleet Commander.
Combined Air Force has assembled in Takao with indications that some com-
ponents have moved on to Hainan.
Third Fleet units believed to be moving in direction of Takao and Bako.
Second Base Force appears transporting equipment of Air Forces to Taiwan.
Takao radio today accepted traffic for unidentified Second Fleet unit and
submarine division or squadron.
Crudiv Seven and Desron Three appear as an advance unit and may be en route
South China.
There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in
the Marshalls which comprise Airron Twenty-four at least one carrier division
unit plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
649
Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in South
Eastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.
Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person,
NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-15
(See Art. 76 (4)
SECRET
Naval message — Navy Department
Drafter Extension Number 2027
Addressees
Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN.
Released by
Date: 26 November 1941.
TOR Coderoom
Decoded: P. R. WHITE
Paraphrased by..
Routed by
Asterisk (*) mailgram ad-
dressee:
For action:
CINCPAC.
OPNAV.
COMFOURTEEN.
CINCAF
Priority
Routine
Deferred.
Information:
Priority
Routine
Deferred
Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administra-
tive.
If operational
cheek below
261331 D
Originator fill in date and time: Date Time OCT
On outaoini; dispatches please leave about one inch clear space before beginning text
Morning comment ComFourteen Two One Ten of Twentysisth X Traffic an-
alysis past few days indicate Cine Second directing units of First Second Third
Fleets and Subforce in a Loose knit Tasli Force organization that apparently
will be divided into two sections X For purposes of clarity units exjjected
to operate in South China area will be referred to as First Section and units
expected to operate in Mandates will be referred to as Second Section X
Estimated units in First Section are Crudiv Seven X Airi'on Six Defense Di-
vision One X Desron Three and Subron Six XX Second Section Crudiv Five
X Cardiv Three Ryujo and One Maru X Desrons Two and Four X Subron
Five X Desdiv Twentythree X First Base Force of Third Fleet X Third Base
Force at Palao X Fifth Base Force at Saipan and lesser units unidentified XX
Crudiv Six and Batdiv Three may be included in First and Second Sections
respectively but status cannot be clarified yet XX Balance Third Fleet units
In doubt but may be Assumed that these vessels including Desron Five will
take station in Formosa Straits or further South X There are slight indi-
cations today that Desron Three Crudiv Seven and Subronsix are in Takao
area X Combined Air Force units from Empire are at Pakhoi Hoihow Saigon
Takao and other bases on Taiwan and China Coast X Cannot confirm sup-
position that carriers and submarines in foi'ce are in mandates X Our best
indications are that all knov.-n First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sase-
Bo-Kure area X Our lists indicate Cinv combined in Nagato X Cine First in
Hyuga and Cine Second in Atago in Kure area X Cine Third in Ashigara in
Sase-Bo areaX: Cine Fifth in Chichijima area X Comdr subforce in Kashima
in Yokosuka area but this considered unreliable XX South China Fleet appears
to have been Strengthened by units from Central or North China probably
torpedo boats XX Southern Expeditionary Fleet apparently being reinforced
by one Base Force Unit XX Directives to the above Task Forces if such are
directed to individual units and not to complete groups X Special calls usu-
ally precede formation of Task Force used in area operations X Cine Second X
Third and Cine Southern Expeditionary Fleet appear to have major roles X
Traffic from Nav minister and Cngs to Cincs of Fleet appear normal X Evalu-
ation is considered Reliable.
Make original only.
NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NOR-1 5
Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4>
650 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECEET
Naval message — Navy Department
Dr^ter Extension Number Br. 3598
Addressees
Message precedence
From: OPNAV.
Released by T. S. Wilkinson.
Date: November 24, 1941.
For Action.
CINCAF.
Priority
Routine X
Deferred
TOR Coderoom
Information.
C0M16.
ALUSNA, CHUNKING.
ASTALUSNA, SHANG-
HAI.
ALUSNA, TOKYO.
CINCPAC.
Priority
Routine X
Paraphrased by
Deferred
Indicate by asterisk addressees for which maD delivery is satisfactory.
24O2239CR0465
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time OCT
TEXT
Orange naval movements as reported from individual information addressees
are often conflicting because of necessarily fragmentary nature X since com 16
intercepts are considered most reliable suggest other reports carefully evaluated
be sent to com 16 for action OpNav for information X after combined all incom-
ing reports com 16 direct dispatches to OpNav info CincPac based on all in-
formation received indicating own evaluation and providing best possible conti-
nuity X request CincPac issue directive as necessary to fulfill original objective.
Make original only deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See
Art 76(4) av. Regs.
Confidential
Hewitt Inqxhry Exhibit No. 9
Navy Department,
Office of Chief of Naval Ope2iations,
Office of Naval Intelligence.
Washmffton, December 1, 19Jfl.
Copy No. 33
Serial No. 25
Fortnightly Summary of Cubeent National Situations
(Information concerning Anti-Axis Belligerents is omitted from this publica-
tion due to its wide dissemination by mail.)
Because of the CONFIDENTIAL nature of the sources from which some of
the information embodied in the text of this publication issues, and because of
the CONFIDENTIAIi channels through which it is transmitted to the Division
of Naval Intelligence, it is appropriate to invite particular attention to the
CONFIDENTIAL character of this publication.
/s/ T. S. Wilkinson,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Director of Naval Intelligence.
[1] Confidential
Serial No. 25
December 1, 1941
Fortnightly Summary of Cuekent National Situation
A. The Diplomatic Situation
1. Japan.
Unless the Japanese request continuance of the conversations, the Japanese-
American negotiations have virtually broken down. The Japanese Government
and press are proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 651
work of building the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The press also
is criticising Thailand severely. Strong indications point to an early Japanese
against Thailand.
Relations between Japan and Russia remained strained. Japan signed a five-
year extension of the anti-comitern pack with Germany and other Axis nations
on November 25.
2. Germany.
Members of the Grerman Armament Commission in Casablanca are now au-
thorized to wear uniforms and make arrests. General Schultheiss of the Air
Force, Head of the Commission, is reported to favor a German military occupa-
tion of Morocco.
There is evidence that Germany, now virtually in control of the governments of
Spain and Portugal, has impressed upon these governments the necessity of
maintaining friendly relations with the United States and with Britain. It is
Germany's expectation that such a policy will increase the resources of these
two countries with materials which evidently can be turned against those who
have supplied them.
Turkey still is being subjected to diplomatic pressure to join the Axis or "take
the consequence." Germany's representations have had no apparent effect.
According to a press report from Berlin, seven more nations have signed the
anti-comitern pact. The new signatories are Finland, Denmark, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Slovakia, Rumania, and the Nanking Government in China. This pact
should not be confused with the Tri-Power Accord of which Germany, Japan
and Italy were the original signatories and to which Rumania, Hungai'y, Bulgaria
and Yugoslavia subsequently adhered.
[2] 3. Italy.
The repurchase of war materiel sold to Italy by the French is now the subject
of conversations being held by a French delegation which arrived recently in
Rome. These conversations were initiated by Italy and were based on Italy's
urgent need for foreign exchange. These negotiations are not expected to meet
with particular success.
The visit of the German Minister of Economics (Dr. Funk) to Rome on October
apparently was motivated by the serious concern felt by Germany over the steady
climb in Italian prices of exports to Germany. Dr. Funk threatened to raise
the price of coal shipments to Italy, but it was agreed finally that Italy would
not raise prices, and that Germany would increase the yearly exports of coal
to Italy from the twelve million tons previously agi-eed upon to eighteen million
tons. Previous shipments of coal from Germany barely reached two-thirds of
the Italian national requirements. This was demonstrated by the recent laws
restricting heating this winter.
4. France.
France moved a step closer to the "new order" in Euroi)e on November 18 when
Marshal Petain, under continued pressure from Berlin and the pro-collaboration-
ist elements within the Vichy government, announced the "retirement" of General
Maxime Weygand as delegate-general and military commander of French North
Africa. That strategic area henceforth is to be administered from Vichy under
the direct control of Vice Premier Darlan. Lieutenant General Alfonse Juin,
until June of this year a prisoner of war of Germany and later commander of
French troops in Morocco, succeeds Weygand as military commander in North
Africa. The military command of French West Africa goes to General Jean
Barrau, formerly in command of troops at Dakar. Vice Admiral Fenard was
named permanent Secretary General of French Africa, and Yves Chatel is the
new Governor General of Algeria. Additional concessions to the Germans may
be announced following the meeting of Petain and Darlan with Reichmarshal
Goering which is scheduled for the near future. There are indications that this
meeting may be followed by a conference with Adolph Hitler, with the possible
attendance of Premier Mussolini.
[3] The Reich is said to be attempting to persuade Vichy to provide naval
convoys for Italian supply vessels and to have requested that French Army
divisions replace Nazi troops between Nantes and Irun. Germany, meanwhile,
Is renorted to have cut the occupation cost levied against France from $8,000,000
to $6^000,000 a day, retroactive to May 10, 1941.
France's concern over the situation in Africa is manifested by the sudden de-
parture from Vichy of Admiral Platon (Minister of Colonies), General Bergeret
(Air Secretary) and Admiral Auphan ((IJhief of the Naval General Staff) to
inspect the defenses of North and West Africa. During the absence of Platon
and Bergeret, Admiral Darlan will act as interim Secretary of Colonies and Air
652 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "
Additional powers have been granted Darlan by placing under his National De-
fense Ministry all services under the 'Franco-German armistice formerly admin-
istered by the War and Foreign Ministries.
Following the dismissal of General Weygand, the United States Department
of State announced that trade with North Africa would be suspended and that
Franco-American relations were to be studied in the light of the new develop-
ments. At the same time American lend-lease aid was extended to the Free
French of General Charles de Gaulle.
On November 26, General Catroux (Free French Commander in Syria) pro-
claimed the independence of Ijebanon and the termination of the mandate in the
name of France. The new government will be jjeaded by President Alfred
Macache.
France is understood to have protested to the Japanese government over the
size of the mission, numbering 350 political and economic experts, accompanying
Kenkichi Yoshizawa, new Japanese Ambassador to French Indo-China.
Despite rumors of capitulation, the situation in French Somaliland remains
unchanged. The Paris radio announced on November 21 that the colony could not
hold out longer than four to six weeks under the continued British blockade.
[4] 5. Latin America.
Mexico.
President Roosevelt has nominated the present Ambassador to Cuba, George
S. Messersmith, to succeed Josephus Daniels as Ambassador to Mexico. The
new British Ambassador to Mexico, Charles Bateman, is expected to arrive in
mid-December, which is about the same time that Messersmith probably will
tsike up his new duties.
The State Department announced an agreement has been reached with
Mexico providing: (1) The settling of a final fair price for American properties
taken over in 1933, through experts or through further diplomatic negotiations.
Mexico tendered $9,000,000 in advance as a token payment. (2) General and
agrarian claims comprised, Mexico to pay $40,000,000 in full settlement. Mexico
has already paid $3,000,000 on these claims and will pay $8,000,000 upon ex-
change of ratifications of the conventions covering them. The remaining
$34,000,000 is payable at the rate of $2,500,000 annually. (3) A reciprocal
trade agreement to be negotiated at once. (4) The United States will provide
a $40,000,000 stabilization fimd to maintain the peso at its present rate. (5)
The United States will purchase up to 6,000,000 ounces of newly-mined Mexican
silver monthly.
The Export-Import Bank has established a $30,000,000 credit for the develop-
ment of i-oads and highways. The credit will be available in yearly incre-
ments up to $10,000,000 over a three-year period. The Mexican Government
guarantees payment unconditionally; and additional security is provided, in
the form of highway bonds, payable from the Federal gasoline tax.
Costa Rica.
President Calderon has repeated his offer of landing fields, air and naval
bases to the United States, as free measures of hemispheric defense.
El Salvador.
Pro-Axis Chief of Police Colonel Merino has been replaced by pro-Ally Colonel
Monterrosa.
[5] Panama.
Little progress is noted in the new government of Panama towards con-
solidation of its gains. The second designate to the presidency is named
Minister to Washington ; the third designate, Anibal Rios, is in Colombia, and
will be arrested if he returns to Panama, where a number of his supporters
have been jailed. Key positions still are occupied by Ariaristas, although
there is a cordial disposition to cooperate with the United States. The extreme
nationalistic laws passed bv Arias are not repealed, but already their applica-
tion is lapsing. The government is unlikely to do anything that will frighten
off U. S. tourist or business dollars.
Argentina.
There are many indications that a secret understanding as to the joint defense
of the Straits of Magellan has been established between Argentina and Chile.
The recent death of the President of Chile probably will reopen discussions
on defense in that area. There have been expressions of annoyance on the
part of high Argentine officials over staff discussions between the United States
and countries adjacent to the Argentine, and over the U. S. lend-lease aid
promised to Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil. The view is held that the Argen-
*"ine is an interested party to all such discussions and dispositions.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 653
A new political party, of Fascist character, called Patria has been launched
in Buenos Aires by the pro-Axis Manuel Frisco. Observers note a new stu-
dent's party, or "Young Argentine" party, in process of formation. It is a
coalition of radical nationalist groups.
German influence in the Argentine is very low, the Russian war having
alienated many former supporters. There is demand for a more vigorous
attitude toward the Axis than that exhibited by Vice-President Castillo, and
an intensification of the Baborda Committee activities may be expected.
While there are no immediate signs of trouble in the Argentine, the next few
weeks will be critical. The conscripts are finishing their military service and
returning home. Justo, always a dubious factor in [6] politics, seems
firmly in control of the Army. In the Senate, the nationalists and the Demo-
cratic factions have reached an impasse. A coalition of nationalist — or total-
itarian— factions, under a strong leader probably would mean the overthrow
of the present government.
Brazil.
During the period under review there have been some alarming reports from
various sources in Brazil, forecasting trouble between Vargas and the explosive
elements in his government. To date, however, nothing serious has occurred.
Brazil i,s meeting, with some hesitation, her commitments in hemisphere de-
fense, and cooperating in the movement of U. S. troops to Surinam by sending
a military mission to Paramaribo, and strengthening her border forces in that
area. Currently, General Goes is denouncing TJ. S. aims as imperialistic in
South America, and his good faith in istaff discussions should be accepted wth
grave reservations.
Chile.
The sudden death of President Aguirre Gorda, from a bronchial affection, has
caused considerable unrest in Chile, and responsive uneasiness in that coun-
try's neighbors. Don Tinto, as he was affectionately called, because of the red
wine for which his vineyards were famous, headed the only popular front gov-
ernment, but was generally regarded as a friend to Democracy. He has pre-
served for some years an uneasy equilibrium between highly antagnostic and
immoderate factions. His successor pro tempore is a noted conciliator. Most
observers believe that the government will remain stable during the sixty-day
period before the election of a new President.
Colombia.
The Colombian Senate has rejected the U. S. Black List of Axis firms in the
Western Hemisphere, on the grounds that, in a matter of such mutual interest
to the American Republics, all their governments should have been consulted.
The Colombian press condemns articles on the country by Benjamin Welles
and John Gunther, terming them "Ambassadors of Ill-Will." It is not realized
[7] in the United States to what a high degree the Latin-American press
is sensitive to criticism of national custom and usage. The sum total of U. S.
literary comment on the Latin Americas is undoubtedly harmful to Pan American
accord.
Bolivia.
A U. S. Army Air Mission has been established in La Pas.
Ecuador.
The notorious and able Dr. Kuhne, suspected Nazi-agent in Quito, has been
banished to a small town on the Ecuador-Colombian border, because of attention
focused on him by the writer John G. Gunther.
Perti.
Early in the period observers in Peru reported widespread popular resent-
ment over Peru's failure to receive certain airplanes and material, embargoed
by the U. S. Department of State pending settlement of the Ecuador-Peru border
dispute. Concessions have been made in the procurement of non-combatant
types, and the excitement is subsiding. Affairs on the border are quiescent.
In Lima, the Aprista Party announce the possibility of the resignation of
President Prado, because of popular dissatisfaction with the border situation.
General Ureta, the hero of the Ecuadorean war, is a sti'ong Presidential possi-
bility, but he is said to have no desire to gain the oflSce by unconstitutional
means. Ureta is pro-U. S. and anti-Axis.
General.
The ABC countries at large are showing signs of disillusionment and exhausted
patience in the matter of lend-lease material. Much has been promised ; almost
literally nothing has been sent. Some deliveries, even token deliveries, would
have a happy effect at this time.
654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[8] Trends.
Military and Naval.
Mexico. — GDhe naval budget for 1942 has been set at 35,000,000 pesos, or about
$8,000,000. This is twice the 1941 budget.
South America. — Nothing to add to summary of November 15.
Economic.
The period under reviev7 has been characterized by numerous complaints in
the press of the American Republics, and in reports from various local sources,
over the growing dearth of materials essential to the support of industries. De-
prived of European export markets, the American Republics look to the United
States for a variety of heavy materials, neither produced nor manufactured
south of the Rio Grande. Immediate obstacles are : The matter of priorities, and
the availability of shipping. Here, as in the lend-lease military and naval ma-
terial, the patience of the Latin-Americas is about exhausted, and their con-
fidence in U. S. good faith is deteriorating. Few Latin Americans appreciate
the magnitude now of the demands upon U. S. industry. Aids to Britain, to
Russia, and to China, and confusion in U. S. production, are widely advertised.
Opponents to U. S. and to Pan American policies are alert to take advantage
of current circumstances. As a measure for the future, no less than for im-
mediate benefit, the allotment to Latin American trade of certain priorities, how-
ever limited, and of shipping, appears urgently desirable.
[5] B. The Japanese Military Situation
Japanese troops, supplies and equipment were pouring into Indo-China during
the past fifteen days. Units landed at Haiphong were sent south by rail to
Saigon. Troops were moved quickly through Saigon towards the interior and
the Thailand border. The arrival of reinforcements continues. Japanese army
strengtli now in Indo-China is believed to be about 25,000 in Tongking province,
and between 70,000 and 1W),000 in south Indo-China.
Naval craft and aircraft also moved south. It is estimated that there are
about 200 Japanese planes in Indo-China and roughly the same number on
Hainan Island.
C. The Japanese Naval Situation
Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that exten-
sive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop trans-
ports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern
China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan
ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small indi-
vidual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indi-
cated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task
force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears
to be subdivided into two ma.ior task groups, one gradually concentrating off the
Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong
striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force,
destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also
may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well
as the greatest portion of the carriers.
The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing
boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control,
consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but
also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.
D. The Chinese Military Situation
The Chinese are concentrating troops to defend the Burma Road. In posi-
tion, or moving up for this duty, are about 185,000 men, including China's only
mechanized units. Skirmishing was reported during the period in north Honan,
south Hopei, Shantung, south Anhwei, near Shanghai and near Canton.
[W] E. The German Military, Naval and Air Situations.
1. Military
Strength.
It has been estimated that Germany now may have 300 divisions. Of these, 28
divisions are unidentified. Of the identified divisions 72 are probably unfitted
and not yet ready for field duty. Tliis would leave 200 divisions ready for active
service at the present time.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 655
Distribution
The 272 identified divisions are distributed as follows :
Location Numier of Divisions
Russian Front Total 168 (including 20
Northern Group 31 motorized, 19
Central Group 86 armored, 2
Southern Group 51 cavalry, and 2
mountain divs. )
Italy and Libya 3 (including 2 armored)
Balkans and Hungary 14 (including 1 mountain)
Poland and East Prussia 10
Finland 7 (including 1 motorized
and 3 mountain)
Germany and Austria 33
Holland, Belgium and France 27
Norway 8
Denmark 2
Operations
(Note: Eastern Front only; see ITALY for Libyan Campaign.)
[ii] Following the freezing of the ground, German offensive operations have
been resumed.
Finnish sector. — There is evidence of renewed pressure towards Murmansk,
Kandalaksha and the White Sea. None of these objectives has been reached to
date. The situation along the Svir River and in the southern Karelian front
remains unchanged. There has been a resumption of artillery action at Hangoe.
North-Central Sectoi: — The siege of Leningrad continues with no apparent
change in the situation. The Kronstadt batteries are reported to be still active
against the Finnish right flank on the Isthmus and against the German left flank
engaged in the siege of Leningrad.
Russian counter-attacks have prevented German forces at Tichvin, just east
of the Volkhov River, from effecting a junction with Finnish-German units in
the Svir River section. This leaves the Russian route to Leningrad via Lake
Ladoga still open.
The Russians claim to have carried out counter-attacks in the vicinity of
Novgorod. These attacks have had no visible results to date.
Central Sector — German assault against Moscow has been resumed during the
past 6-10 days. Despite bitter Russian resistance and incessant counter-attacks,
the Germans have made some headway north and south of the city. At Kalinin
no appreciable shift in the lines has been apparent. Southeast of Kalinin the
Russians have admitted fighting near Klin, and the Germans have officially
claimed the capture of Solnechnogorsk, indicating considerable German penetra-
tion northwest of Moscow. The Russians admit being forced back in the Moz-
haisk sector. Another threat is developing at Tula, where the Russians report
great German pressure.
South-Central Sector. — Gradual German advances along the Orel-Kursk front,
which have been hinted at for some time but not substantiated, are confirmed in
the reports that Yefremov (on the Moscow-Yelets railroad) has been captured
and that advance units, progressing toward the important center of Voronezh,
have reached Tim, 40 miles east of Kursk.
[12} Donetz Basin Sector. — The Russians claim deep advances in a coun-
ter-attack on the "Donetz Plateau", but fail to mention the recapture of any im-
portant industrial centers. Axis reports have emphasized gradual progress along
a broad front, but have been vague as to details.
Rostov apparently has been captured, although the Soviets insist street
fighting is still in progress. A crossing of the lower Don River and the pursuit
of retiring Red forces towards the Caucasus is reported from Berlin.
Crimean Sector. — According to reports, all of the Crimea except Sevastopol
is now in German hands. The defeat of Russian forces in the central Crimea, the
breaking of strong defense positions across the Kerch Peninsula, the capture of
Kerch and of the western shore of Kerchinski Straits have opened up another
avenue for the invasion of the Caucasus.
Sevastopol is isolated and under siege, and apparently has lost its value as a
base for the Red Black Sea Fleet.
656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Personalities.
General Kurt von Briesen was killed in action on the eastern front on Novem-
ber 20, 1941,
2. Naval.
Distribution.
Ship
Date
Location
Name
Type
TIRPITZ.
BB
BB
BB
OBB
OBB
CV
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CL
CL
CL
CL
DD
DD
DD
DD
DD
DD
SS
November 9.
Kiel
SCHARNHORST
November 21 .
Brest
GNEISENAU
Brest
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN. ..
November 9
Hamburg
SCHLESIEN
October 7 . ..
Central Baltic
US] GRAF ZEPPELIN
Prior Nov. 16
Departed Stettin
ADMIRAL SCHEER . . ..
November 19
Swinemuende
LUETZOW
November 9
Kiel
SEYDLITZ
October 12
Bremen
PRINZ EUGEN
November 21
Brest
ADMIRAL HIPPER
November 5
Off Sassnitz
NUERNBERG
^November 5
September 29
KOELN
Gdynia
EMDEN
November 9..
Kiel
4 Units -.-
September 24
Northern Norway
5-7 Units
September 24
In the Baltic
1 Unit
September 24..
September 24
Bergen
3 Units
North Sea ports
2 Units -
October 24
Cherbourg
Remaining Units
Unknown
1 50 Units (estimated)
Operating out of German, Norwegian
and French Atlantic ports
Operations
A smaller number than usual of German submarines were encountered during
the period November 6 to November 13. Two forces were operating: one ofC
the Portuguese coast, and one off the southern coast of Greenland.
British October shipping tonnage Losses were less than 75% of the September,
1941, losses.
[14] HMS ARK ROYAL was attacked and sunk by two or more German
submarines just east of Gibraltar on November 13, 1941. It is not certain
whether these submarines were operating out of the usual French West Coast
bases, or from newly established bases in the Meriterranean.
In the light of available information, it appears practically certain that all
Rumanian and Bulgarian Black Sea ports are being prepared by the Germans
for use as bases for offensive operations. The naval forces at Axis disposal in
this sea are still very inferior to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Axis Black Sea
naval operations on any extensive scale are not to be expected until such time
as the Red Black Sea Fleet either will have been destroyed or otherwise neu-
tralized.
It is reported that Axis Black Sea forces have been reenforced by five small
submarines brought down the Danube. A sixth small U-boat is to follow.
A shortage in available Axis Black Sea shipping may be indicated by the
recent sinking of a 1200-ton Hungarian river motor vessel. This ship was
reported to have been carrying munitions for Axis land forces and was sunk by a
mine in the Black Sea.
H. M. S. DEVONSHIRE (CA) encountered and sank a converted German
commerce raider on November 22 in the South Atlantic. The Axis raider,
believed to have been the TAMESIS, was blown up by a magazine explosion
thirteen minutes following the commencement of the engagement.
According to belated evidence, it is not fairly certain that the German 6,000-ton
light cruiser KOELN was engaged in operations leading to the capture of the
Baltic (Oesel) Islands six weeks or so ago.
Personalities
Lt. Reschke and Lt. Guggenberger were in command of the two German sub-
marines credited with the sinking of the ARK ROYAL. Reschke entered the
Navy in 1929 and Guggenberger in 1934. Neither officer had been previously
mentioned in connection with submarine operations.
[15] Captain Bernhard Rogge was in command of the raider reported
sunk by H. M. S. DEVONSHIRE. Captain Rogge entered the Navy in 1915
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
657
and was advanced to his present rank in 1940. He has been awarded the Knight's
Cross of the Iron Cross.
3. Air
Strength and Disposition
According to a recent reliable report, the disposition of the German Air Force
in Russia is as follows :
Leningrad
Moscow
South of
Kharkov-
Kiev
Finland
& North
Norway
Long range bombers
Bomber reconnaissance
90
30
0
30
30
200
30
90
180
35
240
45
60-75
130
0
40
10
30
Single-engine fighters :
Two-engine fighters
30
10
Totals
180
535
475-490
120
Grand Total. 1310-1325.
A previous report from the same source estimated that, as of October 1, 1941,
the Germans had almost exactly twice the above number of planes on the Russian
front. This reduction in air strength may be due to some, or all, of the follow-
ing factors: (a) reported withdrawal of some 560 bombers and 150 single-engine
fighters from the Russian front to Central Germany for refitting; (b) losses;
(c) shift of air strength to the Mediterranean, which has recently been reported
from several sources.
In the Mediterranean, prior to the beginning of the recent British offensive
in Cyrennica, German Air Force distribution was reliably reported as follows:
[16]
Bombers
Dive
Bombers
Fighters
Reconnais- Coastal
C yrenaica - . .
30
10
70
75
5
Sicily
Crete
20
10
South Greece . -
60
20
25
Total— 325 - -
This represented a slight decrease in German air strength in the Mediterranean
from the last previously reported figures.
Operations
West. — Reconnaissance continues to be the chief German aerial activity in
this theater, operations being carried out over the British Isles and over the
sea approaches. A small number of bombers were regularly in action, and
activity of mine-laying planes was reported occasionally.
Rtissian Front. — According to German claims, the German Air Force has been
very active on the Eastern Front. Leningrad and Moscow were bombed regularly
during the past two weeks. The northern part of the city of Leningrad is now
in ruins, the Germans report. German bombers also are said to have paid par-
ticular attention to railroad communications ; namely, the yards near Moscow
and the Murmansk railroad at and north of Vologda.
The Luftwaffe also claims many successes in pounding the Russians in the
Crimea at Sevastopol and at Kerch.
Up to November 1, German sources claim that 83,000,000 pounds of supplies
in 30,000 flights had been carried to the front by German air transport.
On November 21, the Germans claimed further that, to that date, 15,877 Rus-
sian planes had been destroyed.
[i7] Mediterranean. — German activity in this theater has been limited
largely to defensive operations. It has been reported that German air units in
Libya have recently vainly requested reenforcements of troop-carrying planes.
Persoyialities
During the last fortnight, the German Air Force has lost its greatest technical
expert and its leading ace. Col. Gen. Udet was killed while testing a new secret
658 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
weapon. Lt. Col. Moelders was killed when a transport plane in which he was
a passenger crashed near Breslau on November 22. Moelders was returning to
the front after attending Udet's funeral.
[18] F. The Italian Military, Naval and Air Situations
1. Military
Libya
At dawn, Tuesday, November IS, the Britisii launched their long-awaited
offensive against the Italian and German forces in the Libyan Desert. The
British have been preparing for this drive for many months, and a steady stream
of material has been flowing to the Middle East. For the first time British
forces are meeting the Germans with ample equipment and air superiority.
The main spearhead of the attack began south of Sidi Omar, fifteen miles from
the coast at Solium, and branched northward to Bir el Gobi and Sidi el Rezegh.
At Bir el Gobi, the Italian 132nd Ariete Armored Division apparently was badly
mauled by the British. At El Rezegh, Imperial forces captured the airfield, in-
cluding planes and personnel. Further south an Imperial Motorized Force, start-
ing from Giarabub, raced across the desert to Gialo Oasis and captured the
Italian outpost of El Augila.
Since the initial thrust a tank battle, between German and British armored
forces, ensued at El Rezegh where both sides lost heavily in mechanized equip-
ment. To date the fighting is still fluid, and no decision has been reached.
However, the British are now in possession of Rezegh ; Gambut and Sidi Omar
Nuovo (the main supply bases of the German armored forces) have been cap-
tured, and the Tobruk garrison has made a juncture with the main Imperial
forces at Ed Duda.
East Africa
Gondar, the last stronghold of the Italians in Ethiopia, is expected to capitulate
within the next few weeks. The beleaguered Italian forces are entrenched on
a mountain top north of Lake Tana where they have been cut off from supplies
for the past seven months. British forces are c]x)sing in now and are only seven
miles from Gondar.
(Note: Since the preparation of this report, the fall of Gondar has been
announced.
[19] Russian Front.
Italian ground lines of communication are being obstructed on the Russian
Front and air transport is being used to supply the troops. Italian difl3culties
are due to mined and mired roads, lack of transportation facilities and the re-
fusal of the Germans to repair the railroads in that sector. As a result, Italian
forces in the Stalino area have been directed to exploit whatever local resources
are available.
2. Naval.
The Italian Navy is demonstrating its inability to protect convoys to Africa.
In the attack on an Italian convoy November 8 by the British, the two Italian
8-inch gun cruisers stayed beyond the range of the British 6-inch gun cruisers
during the entire action. Seven of the ten ships sunk in this convoy contained
German troops. Again on November 21/22 a British submarine attacked another
Italian convoy escorted by three cruisers and three destroyers in the Straits of
Messina. One cruiser and a destroyer were hit. On the night of November 22
the convoy was again attacked by British aircraft off Cape Spartivento in which
hits were claimed on another cruiser and several merchant ships.
German submarines are basing now in the Mediterranean. Reports indicate
that the principal German submarine base in the Mediterranean is located at
Capri. Permits to visit Capri are almost unobtainable, even for persons of
Italian nationality. A German submarine base also is being established on the
West Coast of Sardinia which will accommodate seven submarines.
3. AiK
On November 15 a serious shake-up occurred in the Italian Air Force when
General Rino Corso Fougier succeeded General Francisco Pricolo as Under-Sec-
retary for Air. First reports of the ousting of General Pricolo indicated that
he had failed to protect Italian cities from British air attacks because his in-
terest lay in bomber and torpedo planes. It was believed that General Fougier,
who is a specialist in pursuit aviation, would relegate bombers to second place
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 659
in favor of the manufacture and use of pursuit planes. However, subsequent
reports state that the Germans have taken over complete control and command
of the Italian Air Force because of [20] the sinking of the big convoy on
November 8 when many German soldiers were drowned. Mussolini was said to
have acquiesced to the German demand and, rather than submit, General Pricolo
resigned.
General Fougier is only a figure-head, and it is reported that he is not re-
spected by the Air Force. He was a protege and satellite of the late General
Balbo and commanded the 3rd Italian Air Fleet.
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 10
In reply refer to No. Op-16 — 2
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Office of Naval Intelligence,
Washington December 1, 19)1.
Memorandum for the Director
1. Attached hereto is a resume of the outstanding military, naval and political
moves made by Japan during the past two months. No effort is made to draw
conclusions in each instance but a view of the general situation would indicate
that the principal preparatory effort has been directed by the Japanese looking
towards, first : an eventual control or occupation of Thailand followed almost
immediately by an attack against British possessions, possibly Burma and Sing-
apore.
A. H. McCOLLUM.
Distribution :
Copy No. 1— CNO.
Copy No. 2— DNI.
Copy No. 3— Asst. CNO.
Copy No. 4 — F
Copy No. 5— Op-12
Copy 6 and 7— File
memobandijm for the dibectob
December 1, 1941.
Ai'my preparations
Starting about 1 October and continuing until about the middle of November
the Japanese shipped out of the port of Shanghai alone a large quantity of mili-
tary supplies. Vessels carrying this equipment were seen headed South or South-
west. The equipment consisted of all sorts of military stores and equipment, a
large number of landing boats being particularly noted. Other especially note-
worthy items consisted of a considerable number of tanks and trucks, quite a few
of which were camouflaged green ; considerable railroad equipment, particularly
locomotives and rolling stock. While a few troops were taken out at this time
these ships principally carried equipment. Starting about 15 November the
character of the shipments underwent a marked change. From 1.5 to 21 Novem-
ber large transports took out of Shanghai alone some 24,000 fully equipped vet-
eran troops, while an additional 30,000 were reported as being withdrawn from
North China reputedly destined for Formosa. From 21 to 26 November 20,000
troops were landed at Saigon and 4,000 at Haiphong which with 6,000 troops al-
ready there were sent South to Saigon and Cambodia by rail. All wharves and
docks at Naiphong and Saigon are reported crowded with Japanese transports
unloading supplies and men. It is estimated that the following Japanese troops
are now in French Indo-China ready and equipped for action.
(a) South and Central Indo-China 70,000
(b) Northern Indo-China 25,000
The landing of reinforcements continues and additional troops and supplies are
undoubtedly available on nearby Hainan Island and more distant Formosa.
Naval preparations
Starting about 1 October and continuing through November extensive naval
660 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
preparations have been made. The following are the high points of this prep-
aration :
(a) All possible ships have been recalled to Japan for a quick docking and re-
pair check up that has now been completed.
(b) Some additional naval aircraft strength has been sent to the Japanese
Mandate Island area.
(c) An air and surface patrol was established on a line between the Mar-
shall Islands and the Gilberts. Guam was placed under air and submarine
observation.
(d) The CinC 2nd Fleet organized two task groups, both rather loosely
knit organizations; group No. 1 to operate in the South China Area and group
No. 2 to operate in the Mandate Islands area. This organization is about
finished and the CinC of the 2nd Fleet expects to be in Southern Formosa by 3
or 4 December.
(e) The CinC of the Combined Air Force has just completed an inspection
of all outlying naval air groups, particularly those in the Mandates, South
China and Formosa.
(f) Many merchant vessels have recently been taken over by the Navy
and at least three of these have been equipped as antiaircraft ships.
Political preparations — 1 October-30 Nov.
Japanese residents particularly women and children have been evacuated
from
(a) British India and Singapore
(b) Netherlands East Indies
(c) Philippines Islands
(d) Hongkong
(e) Australia *
(f) Many Japanese residents have recently withdrawn from the United
States, Canada and South America.
Preparations have been made to shift the center of the War Intelligence and
Espionage net covering the Americas from Washington to Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil. Japanese Embassy at Rio de Janeiro has been equipped with short wave
radio transmitter.
Great stress has been laid on establishment of espionage net in Thailand
and Singapore as follows:
(a) Japanese consulate at Singora is manned by 4 Army Intelligence Officers.
(b) A consulate has been established at the northern railhead of Chiengmai.
(c) Army communication personnel and equipment is present at Singora,
Bangkok and Chiengmai.
(d) Four Army and Navy officers under assumed names have been sent to
the Embassy at Bangkok. The Ambassador has received instructions not to
interfere in the work of these men.
(e) A chain of drug stores manned by intelligence agents is in process of
establishment.
(f) Japanese Army doctors under assumed names are in the hospital at
Bangkok.
(g) At the end of November 60,000 Bahts were sent in gold to the Ambas-
sador at Bangkok with instructions to hold it for emergency intelligence use.
(h) At least two sabotage agents nave been sent into Singapore.
In French Indo-China the Japanese military has taken over many police
functions. Many Chinese and Annamese are being summarily arrested. At
the end of November Japanese Ambassador Yoshizawa queried his government
as to whether he and his staff should take over the governmental functions of
French Indo-China or continue to function through the front of the French
Government General.
The Consul General at Shanghai has informed his government that all prepara-
tions are complete for taking over all physical property in China belonging to
Britain, Americans and other enemy nationals.
The Army General Staff sent urgent requests for information for U. S. and
Dutch troop and plane strengths and dispositions in the Philipines and Nether-
lands East Indies.
Special Ambassador Kurusu sent to the United States to conduct negotiations
with the United States.
X
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