ibOSTON
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK
conctKess of the united states
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 37
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
BOSTOT^
PUBLIC
UBRARY
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGEESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OP THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7. 1041, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 37
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
S^
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLET, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERB COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER P. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W, MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFB, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
William D. Mitchell, Oeneral Counsel
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel
JDLB M. Hannaford, Assistant Counsel
John B. Masten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Skth W. Richardson, Oeneral Counsel
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate Oeneral Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
Logan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Pages
Transcript
No.
pages
1
1- 399
1- 1058
2
401- 982
1059- 2586
3
983-1583
2587- 4194
4
1585-2063
4195- 5460
5
2065-2492
5461- 6646
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
7
2921-3378
7889- 9107
8
337^3927
9108-10517
9
3929-4599
10518-12277
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
11
5153-5560
13709-14765
Hearings
Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
Apr. 9 and 11, and Mav 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No.
Exhibits Nos.
12
1 through 6.
13
7 and 8.
14
9 through 43.
15
44 through 87.
16
88 through 110.
17
Ill through 128.
18
129 thj-ough 156.
19
157 tlu-ough 172.
20
173 through 179.
21
180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations,
22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings,
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 661
[See Index of Exhibits, supra pp. 2-4]
He\yitt Inqtjiey Exhibit No. 11
(This exhibit is the book entitled "BATTLE KEPORT— Pearl
Harbor to Coral Sea," by Commander WALTER KARIG, USNR,
and Lieutenant WELBOURN KELLEY, USNR. It was published
(1944) for The Council on Books in Wartime, by Farrar & Rinehart,
Inc., New York, N. Y., and is not being reproduced here.)
Hewitt Inquiey Exhibit No. 12
TOP secret
United States of Amebica,
Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D. C, August 18, 1944.
I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as
follows :
Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather messages which Major
Wesley T. Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the
Commission's monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and
to advise Colonel Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such message
was intercepted. This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approxi-
mately 2140 GMT.
Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station
JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 22 GMT, De-
cember 4, 1941, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been
unable to contact Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant
Brotherhood, 20-G, Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he
was authorized to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.
Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station
JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941,
which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7 : 50 p. m.
EST, December 5, 1941.
Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by
Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ between 0002
and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusen-
bury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at
approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains
the Romaji version of these messages,
on file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.
In Witness wheeeof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the
Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of August,
1944.
T. J. Slowie,
T. J. Slowie,
Secretarjj.
Document No. 1
GROUP ONE IS EAST WIND RAIN.
GROUP TWO IS NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND.
GROUP THREE IS WEST WIND CLEAR STOP.
GROUPS REPEATED TWICE IN MIDDLE AND AT END OF BROAD-
CAST.
The above are the weather messages Maj. Wesley T. Guest requested the
Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941.
Document No. 2
TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME
CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE
WEATHER
KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM
AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS
CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME
SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM
Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately
2200 GMT, December 4, 1941.
662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Document No. S
TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR
BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER
FROM SOUTH, (repeated 3 times)
Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 ti'ansmitted at approximately
2130 gmt December 5, 1941.
Document No. Jf
English Romaji
THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI-
NBWS BUT TODAY, SPECIALLY AT MASU GA HONJITSU WA TOKU NI
THIS POINT I WILL GIVE TEtE KOKO DE TENKI YOHO WO MOSHI-
WEATHER FORECAST : AGE MASU
WEST WIND, CLEAR NISHI NO KAZE HARE
WEST WIND, CLEAR NISHI NO KAZE HARE
THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI-
NEWS BUT TODAY, AT THIS POINT MASU GA KYO WA KOKO DE TOKU
SPECIALLY I WILL GIVE THE NI TENKI YOHO WO MOSHIAGE
WEATHER FORECAST : MASU
WEST WIND, CLEAR NISHI NO KAZE HARE
WEST WIND, CLEAR NISHI NO KAZE HARE
Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ trans-
mitted by them between 0002 GMT December 8, 1941.
Hewitt Inqxhrt Exhibit No. 13
INDEX
A — Messages relating to Japanese interest in ships 1, 2,
3, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24
B — Messages relating to "winds code" 4
C — Message advising Germany of war between Japan and Anglo-Saxon nations 5
D — Messages relating to "hidden word" code 6, 8, 11, 12, 17, 20
B — Message indicating steps to be taken as to Holland on opening of war with
Britain and America 21
TOP SECEET
The Seceetaby of the Navy,
Washington 25, D. 0., 14 May 19^5.
Op-2a-4-mp
Serial 0002020
(SC)A17-24(1)
From : The Secretary of the Navy.
To : John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant.
Subj : Testimony and documentary evidence to be presented to Admiral H. Kent
Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.
Ref : (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concern-
ing further Pearl Harbor investigation.
1. Forwarded herewith are photostatic copies of the following dispatches,
certified in jacket form NJA 24, to be used in the proceedings directed by refer-
ence (a) :
JD-1: 1842 JD-1: 7063 JD-1: 7214
JD-1: 5696 JD-1: 7111 JD-1: 7280
JD-1: 5730 JD-1: 7148 JD-1: 7294
JD-1: 6850 JD-1: 7157 JD-1: 7360
JD-1: 6943 JD-1: 7158 JD-1: 7335
JD-1: 6985 JD-1: 7178 JD-1: 7370
JD-1: 7029 JD-1: 7179 JD-1: 7511
JD-1: 7122 JD-1: 7212 JD-1: 8007
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 663
2. Your attention Is directed to the fact that these dispatches are classified
TOP Secret. When used in accordance with reference (a), the return of these
dispatches to this oflSce is directed.
James Foebestal.
From: Honolulu (Okuda).
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin).
10 March, 1941.
(J18K8)*
#043
Vessels seen in Pearl Harbor on (9th) were the following:
Four battleships (two of the New Mexico class and two of the Pennsylvania
class).
Five heavy cniisers (two of the class, one of the class, and
two of the class).
Six light cruisers (four of the class and two of the Omaha class).
Yorktown.
25 destroyers ( )
Two destroyer tenders.
Several submarines.
One submarine tender.
Several transports.
Mailed to Washington, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle.
•Note : This is first translation of J18K8, a new system effective 1 March, 1941.
JD-1: 1842 Navy Trans. 4-5-41 (S)
SECEET
From: Tokyo (Toyoda).
To : Honolulu.
September 24, 1941.
J-19.
#83.
Strictly secret.
Henceforth, we would like to have you make rejwrts concerning vessels along
the following lines insofar as possible:
1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas.
(We have no objections to your abreviating as much as you like.)
Area A. Waters between F'ord Island and the Arsenal.
Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. This
area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
Area C. East Loch.
Area D. Middle Loch
Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.
2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you
i-eport on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys
and in docks. (Designate tyi>es and classes briefly. If possible we would like
to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along
side the same wharf. )
JD-1 : 5696
From: Honolulu (Kita).
To : Washington.
29 September 1941.
Circular #041.
Honolulu to Tokyo #178. *
Re your #083.*
(Strictly secret.)
The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels :
1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (The repair basin referred to in my message to
Washington #48**) : KS.
2. Navy dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier) : KT.
3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island : FV.
4. Alongside in Ford Island : FG. ( East and west sides will be differentiated
by A and B respectively.
Relayed to Washington, San Francisco.
JD-1: 5730 23312 (D) Navy Trans. 10-10-41 (X)
•Not available.
••Available, dated 21 August.
664 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From: Tokyo.
To : Washington.
19 November 1941.
(J19).
Circular #2354.
When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the fol-
lowing at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts :
(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI."
(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA."
(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), "NISHI."
The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.
JD-1: 6850 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)
SECBET
From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin. j
November 30, 1941.
Purple. (CA).
#985. (Parti of 3.)'
Re my Circular #2387."
1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during
the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the
Imperial Government, now stand ruptured — broken. (I am sending you an out-
line of developments separately.)
In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with
determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor
HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate
to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and
the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that
they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia
and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very
secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out
between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add
that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone
dreams.
JD-1: 6943 ARMY 25552 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (MR)
" Part 2 not available.
»> Not available.
SECBET
From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin.
November 30, 1941.
Purple. (CA).
#985. (Part 3 or 3.)
4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about
our attitudes toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude
toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present
moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and
that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and
resists us with, hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might;
however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time
being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.
5. This directive is important from a strategic point of view and must under
all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without say-
ing. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how im-
portant secrecy is.
6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to
the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI
and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the
Germans and Italians, please let me know.
Will you please forward this directive to Rome, together with the separate one
following.
JI>-1:6943 ARMY 25553 SECRET Trans 12-1-41 (RIR)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 665
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
27 November 1941.
(J19)
Circular #2409 (In 4 parts, complete).
Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular #324.
(Washington sent to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Havana, Panama,
New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message).
(Part 1)
Handle as Chief of OflSce routing.
With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency
system of despatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language
telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully.
Make up a table with the left column containing the code words and the right
the corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that there is no mistake in
transcribing this.
EXAMPLE : A message meaning :
"Japan and U. S. S. R. military have clashed", will read :
"HIJIKATA and KUBOTA, clerks, have both been ordered to your em-
bassy on 15th (begin spell) STOP (end spell)."
In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word STOP will
be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word "OWARl" (end)
will not be used).
{Part 2)
Code Word Meaning
ARIMUR.A Code communications prohibited.
ASAI Communications will be by radio broadcasts.
ASAKURA Will communicate by radio broadcast. You are directed
to listen carefully. .
ASIKA.QA Reception of overseas broadcast impossible due to
interference.
AZUMA Pressure on Japan increasing continually.
EDOGUTI Prepare for evacuation.
HANABUSA Preparations for evacuation have been completed.
HANAZONO (?) Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suitable foreign
envoy (or consul) there.
HATAKEYAMA Relations between Japan and . . . (blank) . . . have
been severed.
HATTORI Relations between Japan and . . . (blank) . . . are not
in accordance with expectation.
(Part S)
HIZIKATA Japan's and . . . (blank's) . . . military forces have
clashed.
HOSINO Japan and . . . (blank) . . . are entering a full fledged
general war.
IBARAGI Communicate to us probable date of breaking off of rela-
tions between Japan and the country to which you are
&ccrpditGd
INAKAKI Have you --?-- the . . . (blank) . . . matter?
ISHIKAWA I have—? the . . . (blank) . . . matter.
KASHIWAGI- We are commencing military action? against . . . (blank)
KOBAYAKA.WA Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas to Japan, to
persons of . . . (blank) . . . nationality.
KODAMA Japan.
KOMIYAMA China.
KOYANAGI England.
KUBOTA U. S. S. R.
KURIBARA France (?).
KUSUNOKI Germany.
MATUTANI Italy.
666 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
{Part ^)
MINAMI U. S. A.
MIWATA Canada.
MIYAZAKI Mexico.
MOROKOSI Brazil.
MOTIZUKI Panama.
NAGAMINE Argentina.
NAKAZATO Thailand.
NANGO French Indo-China.
NEGI (?) Netherlands East-Indies.
OGAWA Burma (?).
OKAMOTO Malaya.
OKUMZRA Australia.
ONIZUKA Union of South Africa (?).
ONODERA Enemy country.
OTANI ? (Possibly : friendly, or allied country?)
ONISI Year.
SIMANAKA Day (?).
SAKAKIBAEA Tsuki) Month.
SIGENOI (KO) Pargraph.
SANZYO (Toki) Time.
ITIRO 1.
NISAKU 2.
SANTARO 3.
YOITI 4.
GORO 5.
MASAROKU 6.
SIMETARO 7.
TASOKITI 8.
HISAMATU 9.
ATUMI 0.
JD-l: 6985 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-2^1 (7)
From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Honolulu.
November 20, 1941.
#111. Strictly secret.
Please investigate comprehensively the fleet — bases in the neighborhood of the
Hawaiian military reservation.
ARMY 25694 JD 7029 Trans. 12-4-41 (S)
From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii).
To : Santiago.
2 December 1941.
(J19.)
Circular #329 (In 3 parts, complete).
Tokyo to Rio as Circular No. 2482, on 29 Nov.
Re my Circular No. 2409*.
The following are added this date to my Circular No. 2409*, for special use in
your area. Please use them together with the others, (after making them up in
a table).
(Translator' 8 note: Undellned values are doubtful due to garbles. Probable correct
value added below in parenthesis.)
Code Word Meaning
ASAHINA From - - (blank) - - (date), Japanese ships stopping
here will not be allowed to take on fuel.
DATE Please telegraph probable amount of - - (blank) - -
that can be imported.
BLAWAHARA I estimate we can probably import about (blank)
tons of - - (blank) - -.
•JD-l : 6985. List of code names to be used In plain language messages, with indictor
STOP at end.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 667
Code Word Meaning
NIWAGUCHI It is impossible to carry out - - blank) - -.
(Kawaguchi)
NAKAMIITA Are in the process of arranging for importation of - -
(NakamuraT (blank) - -.
SATUNAKATA Send communications via - - (blank) - - (country).
(Munakata)
KAZAMA Communications will be through office stationed in - -
(blank) - - (country).
TOKUSIMA Japanese ship should arrive in - - (blank) - - (coun-
try) on - - (blank) - - (month) - - (blank)
- - (day).
TAKENOUTI Is it possible for Japanese ships to come to - -(blank)- -
(country)?
YA — GI It is not possible to send Japanese ships to - - (blank) - -
(Yanagi) (country).
TONEGI It is possible to send Japanese ship(s) to - -(blank)- -
(country).
(Part 2)
TAKAGI Minerals.
SAWAMURA Lead.
— SUMI Mercury.
(Kasumi)
IWASAKI Petroleum.
HIROHATA Diamonds for industrial use.
ITAMI Platinum.
KADA Copper.
NAKAGAWA Carat.
MAEHATA Peru.
MASUKO Chile.
SENEDA Colombia.
TAKENAKA Paraguay or Uruguay (?).
SIMAZU Paraguay or Uruguay (?).
IMAZAWA Venezuela.
FUJIKAKE San QINY.**
HASIMOTO Cuba.
SINDO__ Havana.
TIBA__1 Rio de Janeiro.
TOZAWA Sao Paulo.
(Part S)
HASEGAWA Riberao Preto.
IRIFUNE Santos.
ENOMOTO BAURU.
BEPPU Curityba.
TIKAMATU Belem.
SUETUGU Buenos Aires.
OKIZUMI Santiago.
YAMATO Lima.
UMEGAWA Bogota.
HARA Caracas.
ISONO Montevideo (?).
PUKAMATI Asuncion.
Relay from Rio de Janeiro to TPT***, Lima, Sao Paulo, Mexico City relay to
"Washington, Panama, Havana, Caracas (?), Bogota.
••Code value is QINY, (probably Salvador or Domingo).
•••Probably "Buenos Aires and Santiago".
668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
JD— 1:7122 Secret (Y) Navy Trans, 12-5-41 (7)
SECEET
From : Tokyo (Togo).
To : Honolulu.
November 18, 1941.
J-19.
#113.
Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein : Area "H",
Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay," and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your inves-
tigation with great secrecy. )
JD-1 : 7063 ARMY 25773 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (3)
» Probably means Mamala Bay.
From Honolulu (Kita).
To : Tokyo.
November 18, 1941.
J-19.
#222.
1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my
#219 " on that day.
Area A" — A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.
Area O ' — 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.
2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise,
or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class,
one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "XB". 4 merchant vessels were
at anchor in Area D."^
3. At 10 : 00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed enter-
ing the Harbor. Their course was as follows : In a single file at a distance of
1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor.
From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to
which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30
degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers
entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.
Relay to .
JD-1: 7111. Middle Loch. SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)
• Available In WE code dated November 14. Code nnder study.
•» Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
« Bast Loch.
<i Middle Loch.
From: Tokyo.
To: (Circular telegram).
7 December 1941.
(Plain Japanese language using code names).
Circular #2494.
Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.
JD-1:7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)
From : Tokyo (Togo)
To Honolulu
November 28, 1941
J19 (Priority)
#118.
Re your #232\
To be handled in government code.
Anticipating the possibility of ordinary telegraphic communication being sev-
ered when we are about to face the worst of situations, these broadcasts are
intended to serve as a means of informing the diplomats in the country concerned
of that situation without the use of the usual telegraphic channels. Do not de-
stroy the codes without regard to the actual situation in your locality, but
retain them as long as the situation there permits and until the final stage is
entered into.
JD-1: 7157 ARMY 25859 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (5)
• Not available.
■• S. I. S. #25482 in which Tokyo sends a circular giving hidden-meaning words which
will be broadcast In the event that code communication Is cut off.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 669
From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Honolulu.
November 28, 1941.
#119 Re your message #243".
Secret outside the Department.
Intelligences of this kind which are of major importance, please transmit to us
in the following manner :
1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement but
once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the
Hawaiian Islands, but could also have travelled far. Use your own judgment in
deciding on reports covering such movements.
2, Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of time
they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the departure.
ARMY 25880 JD-7158 Trans. 12/8/41 (S)
a Available in code under study.
From: Honolulu.
To: Tokyo.
December 6, 1941.
#253 Re the last part of your #123',
1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage
balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four
or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of
these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is con-
cerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl
Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the
troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for
the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are
no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that
they have actually any. However, even tliough they have actually made prepara-
tions, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of
the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Fort and Ewa", there are
limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability
there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack
against these places.
2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are
not known. I will report the results of my investigation.
ARMY 25877 JD 7178 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)
" Not available.
" Kana spelling.
From: Honolulu.
To : Tokyo.
December 6, 1941.
#254.
1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were —
and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on
the 6th :
Nine battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in
addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy
cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.
2. It appears that no air reconnaisance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.
ARMY 25874 JD-7179 Trans. 12/8/41 (2^TT)
P'rom : Honolulu.
To : Tokyo.
November 28, 1941.
#238.
Military report :
(1) There are eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the altitude range of their
anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet ?).
(2) Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are: number of shots — 12;
670 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
interval of flight — 13 seconds ; interval between shots — 2 minutes ; direct hits —
none.
(3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in
Honolulu during December or January.
(4) There has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet ?) south
of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor,
ARMY 25928 JD-7212 Trans. 12/8/41 (7)
From : Tokyo.
To : Singapore.
December 2, 1941.
,J19-19.
Circular #2450. (5 yards complete.)
Re my Circular #2409'.
We have drawn up the following table for the particular needs of your localities
to supplement for the already given list.
Code Word Meaning
KIKUTI Shipments on the road whereby CHIANG receives assist-
ance (the Burma road ?) are now very lively.
KAGEYAMA Shipments along the road whereby CHIANG receives
assistance (the Burma road ?) have now virtually
stopped.
(DE ?)OUTI (blank (blank) has been forced backward
at (blank) —
AYAOKA The Bumese Independents movement is gradually gaining
momentum. The officers are endeavoring to quell this
with every resource, however, the movement is grad-
ually growing more fierce.
ITAOISI On the the Burma (blank) was attacked by the
Independents wing with pistols (or dynamite).
FUKUNISI On the th in the (blank) area rioting broke out.
MIYAMOTO I will continue the action I described to you until advised
by you to do otherwise, then I will end it immediately.
PART II
KITAMURA Recently (blank) American military planes arrived
at (blank)
MTJTO (blank) — and pilots numbering (blank) ar-
rived at (blank)
NAGAOKA (blank) divisions of (blank) troops arrived
at (blank) and left for (blank) on the th.
INABA (blank) divisions of (blank) troops are re-
portedly concentrated on the (blank) border.
YASIROEW The Independents movement at (blank) and nego-
tiations thwarting England are now progressing smoothly.
TUMURA At present there is a total of (blank) enemy mer-
chant men docked at (blank)
NINO < Merchant ships now docked at — (blank) — are as fol-
lows: American (blank) ; British (blank) ;
Netherlands (blank)
NAGAY .. an merchant ships left for (blank) loaded with
arms.
NIOGUTI Our means of communication witb Burma and the South
Seas is disrupted and we cannot receive.
SEGAWA Our resident Nationals have been camped.
PART III
YASUI It is reported that riots are breaking out.
MARUSE Progressing with preparations to bomb oil fields.
KUBOTA Oil fields bombed.
NIRA The residents of area are preparing to flee.
MOORI Orders issued to residents of (blank) area to fleo.
SEKYA Morale wavering.
TUKAMOTO Netherlanders.
OCHIAI Japanese Nitta Natives.
KURIBAPA Japanese.
SISIYAMA
YAMANOUTI Premier.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 671
Code Word Meaning
NOSE Specialists' Commission.
KURODA High tide (?).
NIRAI Some officers and private citizens
INOYAMA Telegraphy.
ENDOO The Yamashita Agency.
ATUKAX The Nakamura Company,
KOIZUMI India.
AER Java.
EDOGUTI Sumatra.
HIROSE Celebes.
HUKUI Borneo.
INOCYE
FUKA British India.
KASAURA Ceylon.
IKAWA
PART IV
HUJIMURA Hainan Island.
IIJIMA The Spratleys.
ARIASA Singapore.
HORUTA Pinan.
NIWA Bangkok.
KAMIYA Chien mai* Singora.
ISIDA Saigon.
NINOMIYA
HOSOKAWA
NEZU Tonkin.
YOKOTA Cambodia.
NUMATA
WATAMZAWA Manila.
NOKAKI
KERI Batavia.
SERINE Menado.
SERISAWA Makassar.
SOWE
ANDO Pankaran-Brandau*.
DOBASI Pankau Sasu*.
FUKUSIMA Mandalay.
BAKAMATSU Palembang.
PART V
ISTUMOTO Jambi.
NAKINO Tarakan.
MAKING Pa Pan.
SAKURAI Sagsirinda*.
TAKANO Sanga Sanga*.
UEDA Paura*.
YANAGIYA Banka*.
WATAGI Biriton*.
FOAWA Runda*.
AIDA Malacca.
BANDO Sumaran*.
FUNARASI Timor.
TKEDA New Guinea.
KATAGIRI Lashie.
MIXOGUYI The Periswisa* region.
NICK.\DA The Geta* region.
SAWAKARA The Keta Eharu Region.
TAKESITA East.
UTSUMONIYA West.
YAMASE Sooth.
ARAWAKI North.
DOOKY Island.
JD-1:7214 ARMY 25943 SECRET Trans. 12/9/41 (NR)
• See S. I. S. #25609 in ■which Tokyo sends out a circular containing hidden-meaning
words to be used as an emergency system for dispatches.
•Kena spelling.
672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Tokyo.
5 December 1841.
#252.
(1) During Friday morning, th,e 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my
message #239* arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.
(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.
(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:
8 battleships.
3 light cruisers.
16 destroyers.
Four ships of the Honolulu class and * * * were in dock.
26029
JD-1: 7280 (D) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)
♦Available, dated 29 November.
From: Honolulu (Kita).
To : Tokyo.
1 December 1941.
#241 (In 2 parts, complete).
Re your #119.*
Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor :
1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles
southeast of here.
Direction based on :
(1) The direction taken when the ships start out is usually southeast by south
and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction.
(2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or liead for the "KAIUI" straits
northwards.
(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and islands and is
not suitable as a ocean maneuver practice sea.
(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and official travel
routes.
Distance based on :
(1) Fuel is plentiful and long distance high speed is possible.
(2) Guns can not be heard here.
(3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my message
#231** were for the duration of four full days of 144 hours), a round trip to a
distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached (if speed is 12 knots), or 1152
nautical miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 1440 nautical miles (if speed is 20 miles)
is possible, however, figuring on 50 percent of the time being used for maneuver
technicalities, a guess that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be a
point of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor.
(2) The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: leaving
on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on
Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week.
JD-1: 7294 26053 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)
• JD-1 : 7158.
•♦Available, dated 23 November.
From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii).
To : Santiago.
2 December 1941.
(J19).
Circular #328.
Tokyo to Rio de Janeiro as Circular #2431, 29th November.
Re my Circular #2409*
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 673
Additions to the list already sent ; please use with others.
Code Word Mewning.
KASIMA Have Japanese living there been interned?
K4NO Japanese living here are all safe.
KIKUTI Japanese living here have all been interned.
KATDNO . Some of Japanese living here have been interned.
KAWASIMO The wave length of General Information broadcast will
be changed to kilocycles from (day)
(month)
KAKAO Reception of General Information broadcast bad, please
(Kayao) change wave length.
TUJIKITA Please change wave length of General Information
broadcast to a shorter wave length than the present
"^ wave length.
TABUSE Please change wave length of General Information
(Tabuti) broadcast to a longer wave length.
SAITO The time of General Information broadcast is to be
changed starting on (day) from
(time) to (time)
HAYASAKI Please change time of General Information broadcast,
starting on (day) to, from (time)
to (time)
ISEZAKI 100 (hyaku)
WANAMI 1,000 (sen)
YASUNO" 10,000 (man)
UNO 100,000 (jyii man)
ITIOTA 1,000,000 (hyaku man)
(perhaps ITIOKA)
(probably UTIOKA)
JD-1:7360 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)
*JD-1 : 6985. List of code words similar to above.
From : Tientsin (7) Peking
To: Tokyo.
5 December 1941.
(Purple).
#625, (Circular Number.)
To be handled in government code.
Re my secret military communication #262* of November 30th.
1. Concurrent with opening war on Britain and America we have considered
Holland as a semi-belligerent and have exercised strict surveillence over her
consulates and prohibited all communication between them and the enemy
countries.
2. Coincident with the beginning of the war against Britain and America we
have taken steps to prohibit the use of code messages and the use of wireless by
the Holland consulates.
3. In case war breaks out with Holland we will take the same steps toward
that country that we havei taken in the case of Britain and America.
JD-1: 7335 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (AR)
♦Not available.
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2-
674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From: Honolulu (Kita).
To : Tokyo.
3 December 1941.
#245 (In 2 pai-ts, complete).
(Military secret.)
From Ichiro Fuji to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.
1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following;
1. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows :
Meaning
Signal
Battleship divisions including scouts and screen
units.
Preparing to sortie . . -
1
Preparing to sortie
2
All departed between 1st and 3d
3
Several departed between 1st and 3d
4
6
All departed between 4th and 6th
6
Several departed between 4th and 6th
7
All departed between 4th and 6th.--
8
26145.
JD-1: 7370
(continued) (M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)
2. Signals.
I. Lanikai* Beach.
House will show lights during the night as follows:
Signal
One light between 8 and 9 p. m 1
One light between 9 and 10 p. m . 2
One light between 10 and 11 p. m 3
One light between 11 and 12 p. m 4
II.—
Two lights between 12 and 1 a. m 5
Two lights between 1 and 2 a. m 6
Two lights between 2 and 3 a. m _ 7
Two lights between 3 and 4 a. m 8
(Part 2.)
III. Lanikai* Bay, during daylight.
If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals
1, 2, 3, or 4.
If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.
IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House** will indicate the following :
Times ' Signal
1900-2000 - 3
2000-2100 4
2100-2200 5
2200-2300 6
2300-2400 7
0000-0100 8
V. K. G. M. G. *** Want Ads.
A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.
B. CHIC— CO farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.
C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.
3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from
Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium**** at
a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20°
40' N., longitude 156° 19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and south-
* Between Waimanala and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.
**A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai.
***A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.
•***At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 675
west of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your
EXEX signal is received.
Time ' Signal
From 7-8 3 or 6
From 8-9 4 or 7
From 9-10 5 or 8
JD-1:7370 (M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)
B. MESSAGES TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941
From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Tokyo.
November 24, 1941.
#231. (Part 0 of 2)
Re your #114.''
Strictly Secret.
1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts ma-
neuvers and forthwith returns.
2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted
maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaina Roads. Destroyers and submarines
are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.
3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe.
Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas.
4. The manner in which the fleet moves :
Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft.
They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of
Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas
sea plane tenders operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Air-
plane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern
extremity of the island of Kahoolawe.
ARMY 26351 (Japanese) Trans. 12-16-41 (2)
JD-7511.
« Not available.
From: Honolulu.
To: Tokyo.
November 24, 1941.
#234. (Part 2 of 2.)
The heavy cruisers in groups of six carry on their operations over a period of
two to three weeks, doubtless going to Samoa. The length of time that they
remain at anchor in Pearl Harbor or tied up at docks is roughly four or five days
at a stretch.
The light cruisers in groups of five spend one to two weeks in operations. It
would seem that they carry on their maneuvers in the vicinity of Panama.
The submarines go out on 24-hour trips Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.
The destroyers, in addition to accompanying the principal units of the fleet,
carry on personnel training activities in the waters adjacent to Hawaii.
Mine layers (old-style destroyers) in group sf , have been known to spend
more than three weeks in operations in the Manila area.
Furthermore, on the night of the 23rd, five mine layers conducted mine laying
operations outside Manila harbor.
ARMY 26352 (Japanese) Trans. 12/16/41 (2)
JD-7511.
From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Honolulu.
December 2, 1941.
J-19.
#123, (Secret outside the department)
In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane
carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your
ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there
are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications
676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are
provided with anti-mine nets.
Note : This message was received here on December 23.
JD-1:8007 ARMY 27065 SECRET (Japanese) Trans. 12/30/41 (5)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 14
(Exhibit No. 14 originally consisted of four parts: Exhibits 14A,
14B, 14C, and 14D, being photostatic copies of a Japanese submarine
chart, showing courses and locations of U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor.
These photostatic copies are reproduced as a single chart and will be
found as Item No. 106, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTKATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 15
From : Washington.
To : Tokyo.
25 July 1941.
(Purple).
#571.
Apparently Admiral Pratt had put in a good word for me to the Chief of
(Naval) Operations, for ever since I assumed this post, I have been shown
many courtesies by him. His opinions concerning U. S.-Japanese relations co-
incide with mine; he told me that the only result of a war between the two
countries would be mutual exhaustion.
Once while conversing with the Admiral (Stark) I happened to mention that
it seemed to me that the higher officials in the Navy Department here seemed
to be men of excellent character and qualifications.
To this, the Admiral replied that both the Assistant to the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Director of War Plans were exceedingly able men. The
same is true of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. As for the fleets, he
continued, both Kimmel and King were recommended by him, and both are of
the highest caliber. Although Hart had reached the age of retirement, he had
been kept on in active duty because of the critical times, he added.
Please relay this information to the Navy.
JD-1:4063 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 7-29-41 (7)
8ECBET
From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
October 14, 1941.
Purple.
#943 (Part 1 of 2)" (To be handled in Government Code).
I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told
me, it is this :
"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise.
Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a
definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be
made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament.
Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters
independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most
of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of
withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all
at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between
Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."
' For part 2 see S. I. S. # 23516.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 677
He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally.
It seems that this opinion of his has also heen given to the Secretary of State.
Army 5854 23570 SECRET Trans. 10/16/41 (2)
SECBET
From: Tokyo (Toyoda).
To: Washington.
October 16, 1941.
Purple (CA).
#671
Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambas-
sadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-Ameri-
can negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations,
been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German
attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival ?) of the
movement for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities de-
manded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government
a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the
ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly,
a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on
the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would provide the
reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agree-
ment and might lead Japan to joinn immediately the war in opposition to the
United States. We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view
of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider care-
fully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German au-
thorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are rea-
sons which do not permit this matter to be postponed.
ARMY 5901 23631 SECRET
From : Berlin.
To : Tokyo.
1 October 1941.
(Purple).
#1198.
On this the occasion of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign
Minister Ribbentrop has come to Berlin from the Imperial Headquarters
especially and I have had several visits with him. Using this opportunity I,
and the other members of the staff, have mingled with people from all classes
of society and visited with them. I am endeavoring to sum up all these experi-
ences and analyze the present state of feeling toward Japan held by Germany
In this report to you.
1. Ribbentrop said that he had absolute proof that, while reports of the
content of the Japanese-American negotiations were withheld from Am-
bassador Ott, America was in secret communication with England in regard to
the Japanese-American negotiations. Even Ribbentrop who is supposed to under-
stand Japan's position, expressed great dissatisfaction regarding Japan's
attitude.
2. That the Foreign Office staff from Weizsacker down and also everyone in
general were thoroughly disgusted with Japan was very apparent from their
attitude toward myself and other members of the staff. Everyone who feels
kindly disposed toward Japan is deeply concerned over this state of aiTairs.
Even those who do not come to the same conclusion that Ambassador Ott did
in his telegram are outspoken in their dissatisfaction and expression of pessi-
mistic views. I am trying to take the position in interviews with newspaper
correspondents and other concerned with the outside that Germany is cognizant
of the Japanese-American negotiations and that they are no indication of an
alienation between Japan and Germany.
3. Foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents of third countries show
great interest in the Japanese attitude and seem to. consider it in a certain
sense as a barometer by which the course of the European war can be judged.
However we receive the Impression that the greater number feel that Japan is
avoiding war because of the impoverishment resulting from the China incident
and Is taking a pessimistic attitude toward the course of the European war.
4. Even though It might be said that Germany is prepared for these machina-
678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tions of estrangement by third countries and that she is keeping up the pretence
that there is no change in her feeling toward Japan, the fact that the feeling
of German leaders and the people in general toward Japan is getting bad is one
that cannot be covered. Please bear this fact in mind. If Japan takes a
wishy-washy attitude and goes ahead with her negotiations without consulting
Germany there is no telling what step Germany may take without consulting
Japan.
Relayed to Rome.
JD-1: SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 10-18-41 (4)
From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
October 22, 1941.
Purple. (CA).
I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure
that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time
the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how
little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my
ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice
and who say that things will g0t better for me, but, alas, their encouragement
is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are also
some who feel the same way, but alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for
Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do
I image that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the bones of a
dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other
people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle*, but as a
man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send
me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgive-
ness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the
depth of my rudeness.
ARMY 6017 23859 SECRET Trans. 10-23^1 (7)
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
23 October 1941.
(Purple-CA).
Unnumbered.
From you message (s) I am advised of the various difficulties you are coping
with and I wish to express to you that I appreciate the efforts you are making.
As you are well aware, the outcome of those negotiations have a great bearing
upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue. As such,
it is an exceedingly important matter. We are placing all of our reliance on Your
Excellency's reports for our information on this matter.
For the above reason, we express our hope that you will see fit to sacrifice all
of your own personal wishes, and remain at your post.
JD-1: 6016 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 10-23-41 (S-TT)
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
5 November 1941.
(Purple-OA).
#736
(Of utmost secrecy).
Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrange-
ments for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.
I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an
unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of
saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so
with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.
This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.
JD-1: 6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 679
SBCBEIV
From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
November 10, 1941.
Purple (CA) (Urgent).
#1066. Part 1 of 2.
1. I sent MOORE" to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows :
"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States
will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The
Navy is prepared and ready for action."
2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discarding all
quibbling, began by saying to me:
"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then
he continued: "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable
reports that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does
not believe that ydur visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr.
KURUSU will have any effect on the general situation."
I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown
since the freezing ; how they are eager for a quick understanding ; how both
the Government and the people do not desire a Japanese- American war; and
how we will hope for peace until the end.
He replied, however:
"Well, our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the Secretary
of State."
Army 6440 24655 SECRET Trans. 11/12/41 (2)
• Frederick Moore — Legal Adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.
SECBETT
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 10, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#106a (Part 2 of 2.)
In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily News
and the Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are much more
eager for a war with Japan than they are for one with Germany. It is said
that some of the British are using this inclination for their own advantage
and that already parleys have been started for joint Anglo-American action.
Suggestions have already been made to the effect that it is necessary for
some of the British fleet to be located in the Pacific. Now even if the Presi-
dent and other statesmen do not follow this trend, who can say how it will
be? The friend I just spoke of told me that the United States cannot stop
now because if Japan moves something will have to be done since it is a
question of the United States saving its face.
3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk with
him on the basis of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very
best.
Army 6440 24656 SECRET Trans. 11/12/41 (2)
SECEET
From : Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 16, 1941.
Purple (Ca) (Urgent).
For your Honor's own information.
1. I have read your #1090," and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude
for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender
thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.
680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and
I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to
the fundamental policy laid down in my #725." Will you please try to realize
what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war
takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation
renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these
negotiations in my #786,' and there will be no change. Please try to understand
that. You see how short the time is : therefore, do not allow the United States
to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution
on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate
solution.
ARMY 24878. JD-1:6638. SECRET Trans. 11/17/41 (S).
" S I S. # 24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the
Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United
<= S. I. S. # 24378 in which TOGO says that It is absolutely necessary that all arrange-
ments for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.
SECRET
From: Tokyo.
To : Washington.
November 22, 1941.
Purple CA (Urgent).
#812.
To both you Ambassadors.
It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.'
You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed
policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution
we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to
settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or
four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans ; if the signing
can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you — twenty ninth) ; if the
pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great
Britain and the Netherlands ; and in short if everything can be finished, we have
decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline abso-
lutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.
Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever
have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassa-
dors alone.
ARMY 6710. 25138. SECRET Trans. 11/22/41 (S).
» See S. I. S. # 24373. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circum-
stances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be
completed by the 25th of this month.
SECEET
From : Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 26, 1941.
Purple.
#836. To be handled in Government Code.
The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take
too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of nego-
tiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the
« See JD 1 : 6553 In which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 8
not available.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
681
America Bureau on the telephone and make
we will use the following code :
Japanese
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai
(Three-Power Treaty
question )
Musabetsu Taiguu Mondai
(The question of non-dis-
criminatory treatment)
Shina Mondai
(The China question)
Soori
(Premier)
Gaimudaijin
(Foreign Minister)
Rikugun
(The Army)
Kaigun
(The Navy)
Nichi-bei kooshoo
(Japan-American nego-
tiations)
Daitooryoo
( President )
Haru
(Hull)
Kokunaijoosei
(Internal situation)
Jooho Suru
(To yield)
Jooho Sesu
(Not to yield)
Keisei Kyuuten Suru
(Situation taking critical
turn)
For your information, telephone addresses
as follows :
Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO :
Section Chief KASE:
The Minister's residence
The Vice-Minister's resi-
dence
ARMY 25344 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (S)
From : Tokyo.
To : Washington.
19 November 1941. i
(J19).
Circular #2354.
When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the fol-
lowing at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts :
(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI".
(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".
(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), "NISHI"
The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.
JD-1:6850 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)
your report to him. At that time
English
Nyuu Yooku
(New York)
Shikago
(Chicago)
Sanfuranshisuko
(San Francisco)
Itoo Kun
(Mr. Itoo)
Date Kun
(Mr. Date)
Tokugawa Kun
(Mr. Tokugawa)
Maeda Kun
(Mr. Maeda)
Endan
(Marriage proposal)
Kimiko San
(Miss Kimiko)
Fumako San
(Miss Fumako)
Shoobai
(Trade)
Yama Wo Uru
(To sell the mountain)
Yama Wo Urenu
(Not to sell the mountain)
Kodomo Gaumareru
(The child is born)
other than our Home Office are
Setagaya 4617
Yotsuya 4793
Ginza 3614
Ginza 1022
682 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From: Tokyo.
To: Nanking.
15 November 1941.
(Purple).
#499.
Re your #818*
To Naval authorities:
We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached
an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for
a while.
jd-1: 6848 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (6-AR)
♦Not available.
From : Tokyo.
To : Washington.
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2353.
Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and
the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be
added in the middle of the daily .Japanese language short wave news broadcast.
(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.*
(2) Japan-U. S: S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.**
(3) Japan-British relations : NISHI NO KAZE HARE***
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy
all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
Forward as urgent intelligence.
JD-1: 6875 SECRET (Y) Navy Tran.s. 11-28-41 (S-TTi.
*East wind rain.
**North wind cloudy.
***West wind clear.
From : Washington.
To : Tokyo.
November 26, 1941.
Purple. ( Extremely urgent) .
#1180. (Parti of 2.)
From NOMURA and KURUSU.
As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having
them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situa-
tion remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will
inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure
and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situa-
tion. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President
ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of iposterity he hopes that Japan and
the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of iieace in the Pacific
(just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this
sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply
with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also
gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United
States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection
through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should pro-
nose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Nether-
lands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT
proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai. )
ARMY 6891 25435 SECRET Trans. 11-28-11 (1)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 683
From: Washington.
To : Tokyo.
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (Extremely urgent).
#1180. (Part 2 of 2.)
We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily
mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we
said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England
and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them
would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel
duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would.
Again, you must remember that the Sino-Jajxanese incident would have to wait
until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.
In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have
to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it
to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him ; then we hope that you will wire us
back instantly.
ARMY 25436 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)
From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (Extremely urgent.)
#1189. (Parti of 2.)
At 4 : 45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with
Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.
HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been
getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the
nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on
the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it.
At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without
commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June
21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the follow-
ing two proposals :
A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."
B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo,
Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.
(2) Agreement between .Tapan, the United States, England, the Netherlands,
China, and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of
economic treatment in French Indo-China.
(3) The complete evauation of Japanese forces from China and all French
Indo-China.
(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime
in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.
(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.
ARMY 25441 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)
From: Washington (Momura).
To : Tokyo.
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (Extremely urgent.)
#1189. (Part 2 of 2.)
(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the
United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.
(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.
(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.
(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has
contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties
will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the
maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate
the Three-Power Pact.)
684 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we
could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Toyko. We argued
back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States
have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and
China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit
helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have
been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there
have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that" she give us complete
control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard pro-
posals, or we think so.
ARMY 25442 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)
From: Tokyo.
To : Washington.
November 28, 1941.
Purple. (CA.)
#844.
Re your #1189."
Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of
this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal.
This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government
can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of
the views of the Imperial Goveirnment on this American proposal which I will
send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured.
This is inevitable. However, 1 do not wish you to give the impression that the
negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instruc-
tions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to
you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made
just claims and has borne great sacritices for the sake of peace in the Pacific.
Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude,
but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it
impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this
pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 " and he said that under
the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on
do the best you can.
ARMY 6S98 25445 SECRET Trans. 11-28-^1 (S)
» S. I. S. # 25441, # 25442,
" S. I. S. # 25435, # 25436.
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
29 November 1941. «
(Purple-CA.)
#857.
Re my #844*
We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines :
The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial
position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims
of both sides.
However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has
now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made
the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore
actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the
Imperial Government.
With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem,
what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made
the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points
*JD-1 : 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new
U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days
giving its views on them the negotiations will be 'de facto' ruptured. However, do not
give the impression that negotiations are broken off.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 685
we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States
government.
(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead
to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)
JD-1: 6921 SECRET (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)
From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST).
Telephone Code.
Transpacific Radio Telephone.
(NOTE: Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation be-
tween Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division
Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night.)
Kurusu: "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a
short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that.
There is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see)
him about the short one." (i. e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's
reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)
Yamamoto: "Yes. I see."
Kurusu : "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."
Y. "Is there any special significance to this?"
K. "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is
having strong repercussions here."
Y. "Is that so."
K. "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried
large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of
it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the up Tspapers
are giving,"
(Pause)
"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others,
it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out
about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani."
Y. "We are being careful."
K. "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the
correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the
Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that
we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we
get this." (i. e. Premier's speech)
JD-1: 6922 SECRET (M)Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5)
(After a pause, Kurusu continues ; using voice code)
K. "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan)
Y. "No particular (one or two words faded out) "
K. "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"
Y. "Yes."
K. "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you: hut now you
want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and
the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches ! ! ! ! Do you
understand? Please all use more discretion."
Y. "When will you see them. The 2nd?"
K. "Let's see — this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten.
That will be Monday morning here."
(Pause)
"Actually the real problem we are up against is the ejffects of happenings
in the South. You understand don't you?"
Y. "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?"
K. "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:0 this
afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."
Y. "Well then— Goodbye."
JD-1: 6922 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-o)
686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From: Tokyo.
To : Washington.
1 December 1941.
(Purple-CA).
#865.
Re my #857 *.
1. The date set in my message #812 ** has come and gone, and the situation
continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States
from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others
that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United
States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information) .
2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to
Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124 ***. Please make
the necessary representations at your end only.
3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital
is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President
did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please
make investigations into this matter.
JD-1: 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)
♦JD-l : 6921.
**JD-1:6710.
•♦•Not available.
SEOBin'
From : Tokyo.
To : Berlin.
November 30, 1941.
Purple.
#986. (Strictly Secret.) (To be handled in Government Code.) (Part 1 of 2.)
Secret outside the Department.)
1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this
year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that
period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as
the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the inter-
national situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan
and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the
scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from
participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through
these negotiations.
2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of
defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a Just and equitable basis, has
continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and
ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations
rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French
Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.
Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first
came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional
idealogical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her
fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried
on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The mo-
tive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent
the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and
in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long
as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could
be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States
was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate
a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-
Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say
that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become
gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer
continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a con-
tinuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.
ARMY 6944 25554 SECRET Trans. 12/1/41 (MR)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 687
BECKETT
From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin.
November 30, 1941.
Purple.
#986. (Part 2 of 2.)
3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude
of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says
that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will
not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty,
namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the
Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European
war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance
to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others,
makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations.
What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred
with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China — they did so repeatedly.
Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those
nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as
an ememy.
ARMY 6944 25555 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (MR)
SEXJEET
From: Washington (Nomura).
To : Tokyo.
November 28, 1941.
Purple.
#1214.
To be handled in Government Code.
Re my #1190".
So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United
States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and
headlines like this are appearing in the papers: "Hull Hands Peace Plans to
Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second :\Iunich." The papers say that it is
up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles,
or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.
This we must carefully note.
ARMY 6971 25548 SECRET Trans. 12-1^1 (2)
« S. I. S. # 25444 and # 25480 in which NOMURA expresses the danger of the responsi-
bility for the rupture of negotiations being cast upon Japan should Japan enter into her
scheduled operations during the course of the negotiations. He suggests that the negotia-
tions be irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy
in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption.
From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Honolulu (Riyoji).
15 November 1941.
(J19).
#111.
As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make
your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although
you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.
.TD-1: 6991 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (8)
688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECEET
From : Wasliington.
To : Tokyo.
December 2, 1941. {Completed Translation)
Purple.
#1232. (Parti of 2)
Re my #1231 '.
Today, tlie 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-
Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying
that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he
turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233 ". * Thereupon we
said : "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning
the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations
directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that
such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November
20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand
the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of
the world." Thereupon we replied : "The United States and' other countries have
pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I
made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful ag-
gression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or
the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure,
and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this
pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. *We want you to realize this
as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of
the four-year incident in China ; the President recently expressed cognizance of
the latter situation.
■ Not available.
•Original translation incomplete from this point on.
EECBEV
From : Washington.
To : Toyko.
December 2, 1941
Purpla
#1232. (Parti of 2.)
Re my #1231 ».
Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-
Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying
that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he
turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1223'. Thereupon we
said : "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning
the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representa-
tions directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered
that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of Novem-
ber 20th." The Under-Secretary then said : "I want you to know that the stand
the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of
the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries
have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese.
(I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful
aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question
or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure
and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this
pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. Recently the President, too,
the four year incident
ARMY 7021 25659 SECRET Trans. 12-3-41 (7)
• Not available.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 689
From : Washington ( Nomura j.
To: Tokyo.
December 2, 1941.
Purple.
#1232. (Part 2 of 2.)
Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American
proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration
to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-
Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued:
"We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is
virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now
stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September
25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the pi'evious proposal, still
stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the ofling,
it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to
the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement
f>f the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from
French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident
and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settle-
ment of fimdamental questions, the question of the representations of this date
would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretai-y assiduously heard us out and
then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the
necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal
situation here." Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have
expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."
I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan
in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.
Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my
conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to
peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they
would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in
niind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American pro-
posals and to my separate wire #1233."
AR-SIY 2.")660 SECRET Trans. 12-3-41 (7)
Not available.
Fi-om : Tokyo.
To : Hsinking.
1 December 1941.
(Purple.)
#893.
In the event that Manchuria participates in the war in view
of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in
the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and
America that his country will take in case war breaks out.
A summary follows :
1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized
as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code
telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However, it is
desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be
comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries
resident in Japan.
2. The treatment accorded to British and Ani9rican public property, private
pro]ierty. and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded
by Jfipan.
3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular
offices and interests will not be recognized.
However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchuokuo shall be equitable
and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.
4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform
to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be
exercised not to antagonize Russia.
JD-1: 7002 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (.^)-AR)
690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From : Washington.
To: Tokyo.
i December 1941.
(Purple.)
#1227.
Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations
even if it is necessarj' to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles.
However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck
in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any fur-
ther developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to
conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a
conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for
example. Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the
former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser
to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some
midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany
these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reacli some agreement,
using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.
We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or
peace.
We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former
Premier liouoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation,
it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U. S. attitude on this possibility.
Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the ob-
jectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given
this matter.
We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face,
it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion
that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U. S. attitude re-
garding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this
procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then
how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and
in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the
government could make the official proposal.
Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.
JD-1:7055 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-^-41 (1)
SKCRET
From : Tokyo.
To: WasliiiigTon.
December 4, 1941.
Purple. (Urgent.)
#891.
To be handled in Government Code.
Re your #1256."
What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be
a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my #875.''
I would advise against it because unfortunate results might follow, so please
replv in accordance with my aforementioned message.
ARMY 7105 25731 SECRET Trans. 12-4^1 (S)
« Not available.
"S. I. S. #25725.
From : Tokyo.
To: Washington.
3 December 1941.
(Purple.)
#875.
Chief of Office routing.
Re your #1232.*
Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:
There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French
Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been
♦JD-l : 7021.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 691
an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-
French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts
of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of
troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the
nunors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have
in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense
agreement.
JD-1:7057 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)
SECBETT
From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
December 2, 1941.
Purple. (Urgent.)
#1234.
Strictly Secret.
Ee your #862 ».
I know that to leave that error in the publication of this speech as it now
stands would have a bad effect on negotiations, so on the morning of the 2nd
prior to my interview with WELLES I sent TERAZAKI to visit BALLANTINE
at the State Department to explain the substance of your #862. BALLANTINE
said, "At this tense psychological moment in Japanese-American negotiations,
the fact that such a strong statement as this has been circulated has given a
severe shock to the American Government and people and it is very unfortunate
and dangerous." TERAZAKI replied, "Well, as it was the American newspapers
that made such a clamor about it, I did not come to vindicate ourselves or make
any explanation. I merely wished to state the facts." He added, "At present
the newspapers of both countries ought both to be cool and calm, so will you please
advise them hereafter concerning this point."
ARlvrr 7059 25730 SECRET Trans. 12-4r41 (2)
■ Not available.
From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
3 December 1941.
(Purple.)
#1243.
If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that
the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should
be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls.
JD-1: 7050 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)
8BCBBX
From: Berlin.
To: Tokyo.
December 4, 1941.
Purple. (CA.)
#14J0.
In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like
to arrange to have. Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE
and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other
officials ( UKHARA and TUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end.
ARMY 7134 25807 SECRET Trans. 12-5-41 (W)
From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
3 December 1941.
(Purple.)
#1243.
Judging from all indications, we feel that some Joint military action between
Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is
a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.
•UD-l: 7098 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)
79716 — 46— Ex. 140, vol. 2 3
692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From : Washington.
To: Tokyo.
1 December 1941.
(Purple.)
#1225 (Part 1 of 3).
When I and Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull on the 1st, we con-
veyed to him the matter contained in your message #857*. Roughly speaking,
Hull's reply stayed within the bounds of his earlier explanations. He placed the
most emphasis on two points, namely, the tone and trend of the Japanese Gov-
ernment's expressions and movements and that of the general public opinion
organs ; and, the increase in strength of the garrisons in French Indo-China.
From the beginning of today's conference, Secretary Hull wore a deeply pained
expression. Without wasting any time, he brought up the subject of the Pre-
mier's statement, (see my message #1222**), and said that that was one of the
reasons for the President's sudden return to Washington. (Upon our arrival at
the State Department, we found not only newspaper men, but even some members
of the Departmental staff crowding the corridors. Some of these speculators
were of the opinion that the issue of war or peace was to be immediately decided
upon. In general, the scene was highly dramatic.)
We, therefore, replied that we were convinced that the Premier's statement
had been erroneously and exaggeratedly reported in the vernacular. We pointed
out that regardless of who the speaker may be if only an exerpt from his speech
is reported, without having the entire text available, it is quite possible that the
reader will get exactly the opposite meaning from that intended by the speaker.
We went on to advise the Secretary that we were at present awaiting the
delivery of the entire text.
During the course of our explanations, the Secretary showed visible signs of
relief.
He said: "Since our talks were begun recently, there has not been a single
indication of endorsement and support from Japan. I have not heard of any
steps being taken in Japan aimed at facilitating these conversations, all of which
is exceedingly regrettable."
JD-1: 7(H2 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)
•JD-l : 6921.
•♦Available, Purple dated 30 November.
From: Washlngton.
To: Tokyo.
1 December 1941.
(Purple.)
#1225 (Part 2 of 3) (Parts 1 and Snot available).
(Message having the indicator 20803* is part one of three.)
For this reason CHA has been the target of considerable attack and dissatis-
faction. It was admitted that he was in a very tight spot. As the President
recently said, it is clearly understood that the people of Japan, after over four
years of the Japanese-Chinese incident, are very tense.
Japan, too, is highly desirous of having peace on the Pacific assured by success-
fully concluding these negotiations. It is our hope that he would give his support
and encouragement to the efforts that Hull and we are making in this direction.
With regard to the matters pertaining to French Indo-China - - - - the gov-
ernment of the United States, too, cannot help but feel concern since it has been
receiving report after report during the past few days, from U. S. officials sta-
tioned in that area, of unusual movements of the Japanese army and navy ; the
landing of various types of arms ; and the movements of transport vessels. Con-
cern is felt as to the goal of all these activities (the implication was that they
feared that they were going to be used not only against Thailand but in the
southwestern Pacific area).
As to what plaps the responsible persons in the Japanese army and navy are
planning are not difficult to guess if one goes on the assumption that the Japanese
army and navy joins forces with the Germans ; even if, in actuality, that is not
what is taking place, preparations must be made for this possible eventuality, and
aU nations concerned must concentrate their fighting forces in that area.
JD-1: 7042 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (7)
•Not available, probably Is Part 1 of this message.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 693
From : Washington.
To: Tokyo.
1 December 1941.
(Purple.)
#1225. (Part 3 of 3.)
Hull : "In the final analysis, that means that Hitlerism is being given indirect
support, and for this reason please exercise the utmost of caution.
"In view of the fact that Japan is acting in the manner described above, there
is absolutely no way of bringing about a settlement of the situation,
"Disruptions in Japanese-U. S. relations is exceedingly unfortunate, not only
for our two countries, but to the world in general. There shall be nothing con-
structive about a Japanese-U. S. war. We fully realize that it can be nothing
other than destructive. For this reason, we are still highly desirous of bringing
these conversations to a successful conclusion.
"However, with the existence of the above described conditions, and because of
the nature of this country, the Secretary of State and the President are placed in
an exceedingly difficult position."
I : "It seems mutually regrettable that all of our efforts which lead to the 21
June and 25 September proposals, should have been in vain."
In general he expressed his agreement to this.
Hull: "The recent situation in Japan and the U. S. public opinion made it
necessary for us to return to the most recent proposal."
We then said that behind the problems at hand, there has always been the
China problem.
"As I have pointed out on several occasions," I said, "this has been the bitterest
experience since the Washington Conference. Peace between Japan and China
could not be attained through any such terms as were contained in your most
recent proposal. We hear your argument to the effect that you cannot stand by
and do nothing while China dies. The converse of that argument should be even
stronger. That is, that it is of the utmost importance for us to avoid standing by
and watching our own respective countries die, just because of the China problem.''
Hull indicated his agreement with this, but went on to say :
"Because the situation is as I have already described, I hope that Japan will
take steps to bring about order through her public organs."
JD-1:7042 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2).
From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
November 30, 1941.
Purple.
#1224.
Re your #857.'
I at once requested HULL for an interview ; however, I failed to be notified of
the exact time for it for the reason, among others, of the President's expected ar-
rival tomorrow morning. I am afraid I shall miss a good opportunity and so wiD
you transmit yours message at once to Ambassador GREW? (7 : 30 p. m.)
ARMY 7089 25762 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (2).
■ See S. I. S. # 25496. Tokyo Instructs Washington to make one more attempt verbally
to the eflfect that the Imperial Government i^ at a loss to understand -why the United States,
In view of the fair position it has always taken, should have changedin their front with
regard to the China problem.
From: Tokyo.
To: Honolulu.
29 November 1941.
(J19.)
#122.
We have been receiving reports from yon on ship movements, but In future will
you also report even when there are no movements.
JD-1 : 7086 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)
694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR A^FTACK
From: Tokyo (Togo.)
To: Honolulu.
November 18, 1941.
J-19.
#113.
Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein : Area "N,"
Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay," and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your inves-
tigation with great secrecy.)
ARMY 7063 25773 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (S).
* Probably means Mamala Bay.
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#901.
Re my #844".
1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th
of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United
States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).
2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts
and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situa-
tion is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it
secret for the time being.
3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I
will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to
put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the
Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.
ARMY 7149 25838 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (S)
• See S. I. S. # 25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot
accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial
Government which will be sent In two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto
ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations
are brolien ofC.
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902. (Part 1 of 14.)
Separate telegram.
MEMOBAirorrM
1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an
amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that
the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area
and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued
negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the
United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American
relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.
The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning
the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the
measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during
these eight months.
2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Gove^'nment to insure the stabil-
ity of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to
find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world.
Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China
to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for
the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent
tlie extention of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September
last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.
JI>-1:7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6^1 (S)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 695
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902. (Part 2 of 14.)
However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every
possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the estab-
lishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's
constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pres-
sure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they
have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common
prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in
accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of
French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinter-
preted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands
government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing
economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile
attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations per-
fecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which
endangers the very existence of the empire.
JD-1:7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902. (Part 3 of 14.)
Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed,
in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of
important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area.
However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that
the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached
on fundamental — (75 letters garbled) — The Japanese government submitted
a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking
fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating' Japanese
views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agree-
ment of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal,
moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of
difiiculty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settle-
ment. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original pro-
posal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The
negotiation made no progress.
JD-1:7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
Fi'om: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902. (Part 4 of 14.)
Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for
averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th
still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more
essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipu-
lated the following points :
(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dis-
patch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the
Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.
(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisi-
tion in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which
the two countries are in need.
(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations
to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.
The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity
of oil.
696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures
and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace
between Japan and China.
(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed
in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and
China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area ; and it is
prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-
China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.
JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
From: Tokyo.
To : Washington,
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902. (Part 5 of 14.)
As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness
to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of
peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an un-
dertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the resto-
ration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct
negotiations.
The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new pro-
posal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek ; and
in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President
to act as the so-caUed "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading
that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to
impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently main-
tained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese
claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.
JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902. (Part 6 of 14.)
4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government
has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its
best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in
spite of great difficulties.
As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the
negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.
As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, ad-
vocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its
desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that
along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese
Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including
China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China
economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.
Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French
Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to
carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China
as a measure of easing the situation.
JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
From : Tokyo.
To : Washington.
December 4, 1941.
Purple.
#902. (Part 7 of 14.)
It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree
by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the
Aiperican government.
On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 697
in disregard to realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical prin-
ciples, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand
this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires
to call the attention of the American government especially to the following
points :
1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those
principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the accep-
tance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering
a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation
and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores
realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the
purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.
7143 SECRET
From : Tokyo.
To : Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902. (Part 8 of 14.)
Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis
of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese govern-
ment is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions,
it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to at-
tempt to force their immediate adoption.
Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between
Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Nether-
lands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective se-
curity, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.
The American proposal contains a stipulation which states : "Both governments
will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers,
shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental pur-
pose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout
the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed
with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite
Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it
cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.
JD:1 7143 SECRET Army Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
From : Tokyo.
To : Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902. (Part 9 of 14.)
The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be
said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one
hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other
hand in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-de-
fense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order
in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon
which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific
area through peaceful means.
3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds,
objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising
in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power.
Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations
should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.
JD-1: 7143 Army Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From : Tokyo.
To : Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902. (Part 10 of 14.)
4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government
desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other
powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in
other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr (45 letters
garbled or missing) been compelled to observe the satus quo under the An-
glo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice" the es to
the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate
the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's
fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the
world.
JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
From: Tokyo.
To : Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902. (Part 11 of 14)
The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French
Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy.
That the six countries — Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Nether-
lands, China and Thailand — excepting France, should undertake among them-
selves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China
and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to
placing that territory under the joint garantee of the governments of those six
countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position
of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrange-
ment cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a
system similar to the n__(50 letters missed) sible for the present predicament
of East Asia.
JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-^1 (S)
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902. (Part 12 of 14)
5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding
China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the
principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual
conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the
stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in
demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any
regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence
of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation.
This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its
above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demon-
strates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the
restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of
peace to East Asia.
JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-&-41 (S)
From: Tokyo.
To : Washington,
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902. (Part 13 of 14)
5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such
as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement,
mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 699
Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the
other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the
four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and
disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the
Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of
negotiation.
6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the
negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-
American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other inter-
ested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government.
However, since the American government has made the proposal of November
26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The
Netherlands and Chunking, ANDND* presummably by catering to the wishes
of the Chungking regime on the questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT** be con-
cluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring
Japan's position.
JD:1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
•Probably "and as"
•♦Probably "China, can but"
From : Tokyo
To: Washington
7 December 1941
(Purple-Eng)
#902. Part 14 of 14
(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part,
appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")
7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's eiforts toward tiie estab-
lishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and espe-
cially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and
China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the
present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to
adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of
the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been
lost.
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Gov-
ernment that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but
consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.
JD-1:7143 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7Dec.l941 (S-TT)
SECRET
From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Tokyo.
November 18, 1941.
J-19.
#222.
1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my
#219' on that day.
Area A " — ^A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.
Area C ' — 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.
2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier. Enterprise,
or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class,
one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were
at anchor in Area D *.
3. At 10 : 00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed en-
tering the Harbor. Their course was as follows : In a single file at a distance
of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl
Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area
C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30
" — Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study.
•> — Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
* — East Loch.
* — Middle Loch.
700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers en-
tered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.
Relayed to .
ARMY 7111 25817 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)
SECBET
From: Tokyo,
To: Washington.
December 7, 1941.
Purple (Urgent — Very Important).
#907. To be handled in government code.
Re my #902 \
Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if pos-
sible to the Secretary of State) our x'eply to the United States at 1 : 00 p. m. on
the 7th, your time.
ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (3)
« — S. I. S. #25843 — text of Japanese reply.
From: Budapest.
To: Tokyo.
December 7, 1941.
LA.
#104.
Re my #103».
On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this
country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war
would break out on the 7th.
Relayed to Berlin.
ARMY 7184 25866 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2)
SECBET
From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
December 6, 1941.
Purple (Urgent).
#1272.
In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and
HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members hav-
ing close relations with the President and through individuals equally influ-
ential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep
this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to
report :
(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and
advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "intro-
ducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not
make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of
the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed
matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he
did so on the advise of these individuals.
(2) Tliiose carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November
20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating these sections in
the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or
advantageous to us (MESSAGE INCOMPLETE)
ARMY 7176 25846 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 2T)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 701
SECBET
From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
December 3, 1941.
Purple (Urgent).
#1256. Re your #875«.
I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply
was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States
Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially
since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among
the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be
war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but
what the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how
our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive
at a settlement, the explantion you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy
them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to — even if your reply
is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore,
in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the
President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer
impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this
question with this in mind and wire me at once.
AKMY 7128 25849 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (1)
» See S. I. S. # 25725 — Explanation of Japan's Increase of their forces in French Indo-
China.
From: Tokyo (Togo).
To : Honolulu.
December 6, 1941.
PA-KZ.
#128.
Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123* the movements of the
fleet subsequent to the fourth.
ARMY 7381 26158 (Japanese) SECRET Trans. 12/12/41 (5)
• Not available.
SECBET
From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Honolulu.
December 2, 1941.
J-19.
#123. (Secret outside the department)
In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane
carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your
ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are
any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that
they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided
with anti-mine nets.
Note : This message was received here on December 23.
ARMY 8007 27065 (Japanese) SECRET Trans. 12/30/41 (5)
702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Hewitt Inqxtiey Exhibit No. 16
SECRET
Naval message — Navy Department
Phone Extension Number: 2027
Addressees
Message precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN.
Release'l by . -
For Action:
CINCPAC.
OPNAV.
. COMFOURTEEN.
Priority
Routine
Date: 28 November 1941.
Deferred
TOR Coderoom ---
Information.
Priority
Decoded by P. R. WHITE.
Routine
Deferred
Indicated by asterislf addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
[Hand written:] Reported to ONI in Serial 26-11.
281510
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time OCT
Comment Naval attache thai Astalusha Sharda two seven zero eight three
zero X Isuzu (cl) in Formosa Straits Sunday X Subtender and four subs
probably Subron Six plus Nagoya Maru tender X Last sentence believed to be
sendai (cl) plus two desdivs XX Other items no comment XX Additional
info from CN Nitta Maru sailing Yokosuka to Takao twenty ninth with military
supplies XX Two senior construction officers and four thousand men status not
known ordered mandates XX Unidentified ship believed to be light cruiser has
apparently relieved Kashii as flagship southern expeditionary fleet X This ship
now in Camranh Bay Saigon area XX
Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art. 76 (4)
NAV REGS.
Note. — Penned notations in italics.
SECRET
Naval message — Navy Department
Phone Extension Number: 2027
Addressees
Message precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN.
Leased by _
For Action:
OPNAV.
Priority
Routine
Date: 1 December 1941.
Deferred
TOR Coderoom
Information:
CINCPAC.
COMFOURTEEN.
CINCAF.
Priority
Decoded by: WHITE.
Routine
Deferred
Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
Reported to ONI in Serial 25-41 010913
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date time OCT
[Hand written:] Reported to ONI in Serial 25-41.
'I'H'.x'r
From RI X Arrivals in Takao area past two days X Comdesron five in
Natori X Naka to join Desron four X units of number two base force and Chogei
X Last named ship considered to be tender for two divisions submarines X
All these units now under command Cine third X Cine second in Atago shifted
from Kure to Sasebo Comm Zone apparently en route South China waters
Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art. 76 (4)
Nav Regs.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
703
Classified
U. S. Naval CoMMtrNiCAXioN Service
COMMANDEE IN CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
Incoming
Reassignment all orange calls occurred midnight X Same garble cable X No
change in shore addresses XX
3(3 Nov. 41 Crypto-Group 87 CBO HMC Serial No. 12-2
Originator : Information :
COM 16 CINCAF
Action : CINPAC
OPNAV COM 14
Authenticated :
F. S. Lockard,
F. S. LocKAED, Ens. U8NR.
Hewitt iNQtriBT Exhibit No. 17
(Exhibit No. 17 is a photostat of a captured Japanese submarine
chart used for Plan V of "Battle Report". This chart will be found
reproduced as Item No. 107, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
Hewitt Inqutey Exhibit No. 18
RADIO LOG
of
BISHOP'S POINT RADIO STATION
7 December 1941
Radio Log
Section Base
Bishop's Point, Oahu, T. H.
Watch
C, E. Gibson, Supervisor
R. B. Moyle, Operator
Receiver & Controls O. K.
Freq.: 2670 KCS.
Date: 7 December 1941 R. W. H.
DN3L AR
K
DN3L AS ONE MOMENT PLEASE STAND BY
DN3L AR
COME IN
K
WHAT IS THE DISTANCE OF THE SUBMARINE K
WHAT WAS THE APPROXIMATE DISTANCE AND COURSE
OF THE SUBMARINE THAT YOU SIGHTED K
THE COURSE WAS ABOUT WHAT WE WERE STEERING AT
THE TIME 020 MAGNETIC AND ABOUT 1000 YARDS FROM
THE ENTRANCE APPARENTLY HEADING FOR THE EN-
RANCE K
R
BT DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON
THE SUB K
NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION K
WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME APPROXIMATELY THAT YOU
SAW THE SUBMARINE K
APPROXIMATE TIME 0350 AND HE WAS APPARENTLY
HEADING FOR THE ENTRANCE K
R
AR PLEASE
K
BT THANK YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION NOTIFY US IF
YOU HAVE ANY MORE INFORMATION WE WILL CON'
TINUE SEARCH K
1445
DZ5Y
DN3L
DZ5Y
DBIL
DN3L
DN3L
DZ5Y
DZ5Y
DBIL V
VDZ5Y
DBIL V
DZ5Y V
VDZ5Y
VDBIL
VDN3L
VDN3L
1450
DN3L
VDZ5Y
1451
1456
DZ5Y
DZ5Y
VDN3L
VDN3L
DN3L
DZ5Y
VDZ5Y
VDN3L
DN3L
V DZ5Y
1458
1505
VDN3L
DZ5Y
DNSL
DZ5Y
VDN3L
VDZ5Y
VDN3L
704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
RADIO LOG— Continued
Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, T, H,
-Continued
1508
V DZ5Y
R
1524
DBIL
VDZ5Y
AR
DZ5Y
VDBIL
K
V DZ5Y
WE ARE FINISHED K
1525
VDBIL
R
1535
DR7Y
VDJ8A
PM DRBR EARLY 0450 K
1538
VDJ8A
R
1539
DW2X
VDBIL
AR
DBIL
VDW2X
K
DW2X
VDBIL
CLEAR K
V DW2X
R
1555
DJ8A
VDR7Y
AR
DR6Y
VDJ8A
K
DJ8A
VDR7Y
815 FJIMALE 0525 YOU GOT THAT MESSAGE BEFORE DID YOU
DR7Y
VDJ8A
R BOTH MESSAGES R LAST TWO MESSAGES K
1557
DJ8A
VDR7Y
R
1630
DE2A
V DW2X
AR
DW2X
VDR9Q
K
DW2X
VDN3L
K
VDZ5I
K
DE2A
V DW2X
Z RIME WING 071614 (SEE FILE) K
1641
V DN3L
R
V DZ5I
R
DW2X
VDN3L
AR
DN3L
V DW2X
K
1642
DW2X
V DN3L
ZCD DZ51 R AR
1643
DN3L
V DW2X
R
1647
DW2X
VDZ5I
AR
1650
D\aF2X
VDR9Q
ZCE DZ5I K
DR9Q
VDZ5I
ZSF K
DZoI
VDR9Q
S3 K
DW2X
V DN3L
ZCE DZ5I AR
DZ5I
V DW2X
K
DW2X
V DZ5I
ZSF Ki
V DW2X
85 k:5 K
165
VDZ5I
R
1714
DR7Y
V DJ8A
HAVE YOU ANYTHING FOR ME
DJ8A
VDR7Y
YES 2307 COUNTER 0640 VA
1715
DR7Y
V DJ8A
R
6 June 1945.
I hereby certify that this is the radio log or the exact copy of the log that
was made by the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, T. H., on 7 December 1941.
Richard Wilmot Humphrey,
This copy was certified in my presence :
Walter H. Kozacko,
Walter H. Kozacko,
Lt. Comdr., VSNR.
Richard Wilmot Humphket,
S-06-6S, RMSc, V-S, U. S. N.
RADIO LOG
Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, T. H.
Watch
G/E. Gibson, Supervisor
R.^B. Moyle, Operator
R.
Receiver & Controls 0. K.
Freq. 2670 Kcs.
Date: December i943 1941 R. W. H.
1715
1721
DW2X
DN3L
DW2X
V DN3L
V DW2X
V DN3L
1723
DW2X
DNRL
DW2X
VDN3L
V DW2X
VDN3L
DW2X
V DW2X
VDN3L
V DN3L
TIME OF LAST ENTRY
AR
K
P BK WE HAVE DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES UPON SUBS
OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREA AR
STAND BY FOR MORE MESSAGES
IMl YOUR LAST PRIORITY K
WE HAVE ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DRIPPED DEPTH
CHARGES UPON SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE
SEA AREA AR
DID YOU GET THAT LAST MESSAGE K
R
STAND BY FOR FUTHER MESSAGES
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
705
RADIO LOG— Continued
Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahtj, T. H. — Continued
1727 VDW2X
1749 t)W2X
DN3L
DW2X
V DW2X
1755 DW2X
V DW2X
DW2X
1756 VDW2X
1803 DJ8A
DR9Q
AJ8A
DW2X
V DW2X
VDN3L
1805 VDW2X
VDN3L
VDJ8A
VDN3L
DN3L
1810 DR7Y
1813 DJ8A
DR7Y
1817 DEIT
1821 DN3L
DW2X
VDW2X
1826 DW2X
DR7Y
DJ8A
DR7Y
DJ8A
1830 DW2X
DJ8A
1830
R
V DN3L AR
VDW2X K
V DN3L ZMA 0 BUT STAND BY AR
R
V DN3L AR
K
V DN3L ZMA 0 BUT STAND BY FOR MESSAGE AT ANY TIME AR
R
V DN3L P P AR PLEASE
V DN3L ZCQ DJ8A AR
V DR9Q AR
V DN3L P AR
K
BT WE HAVE INTERCEPTED A SAMPAN INTO HONOLULU
PLEASE HAVE COAST GUARD SEND CUTTER TO RELIEVE
US OF SAMPAN AR
R P K
AS 1 MINUTE
K
BT WE HAVE INTERCEPTED SAMPAN AND ESCORTING
SAMPAN INTO HONOLULU PLEASE HAVE CUTTER RELIEVE
US OF SAMPAN AR
V DW2X Z DW2X 071807 DN3L P GR 11 BT HELID ARUQS QLUAN SVDER
LBVQY NEXKQ TPHQX BMMQH LBPBV ARUQS HELID K
VDJ8A IMIGRl
V DR7Y OR 1 402
V DJ8A R
MOYLE AND GIBSON OFF TO BANKS AND HUMPHREY
VDW2X AR
VDW2X AR
V DN3L K
Z DW2X 071820 DEIT Q DN3L P GR 5 BT PROCEED IMMEDIATE-
LY AND CONTACT WARD AR
V DN3L R
V DJ8A AR
V DR7Y K
V DJ8A HERE IS A MESSAGE Z DK:3K 071801 DR7Y OR 4 BT PROCEED
CONTACT HARBOR PATROL
V DN3L IMI THAT LAST MESSAGE
V DR6K ZMC ZGD DR6K DR9Q DUIP
VDN3L
RECEIVER AND TRANSMITTER HAVE GONE OUT— POWER
OFF
AIR RAID BY JAPANESE PLANES
6 June 1945.
I hereby certify that this is the radio log or the exact copy of the log that
was made by the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, T. H., on 7 December 1941.
Richard Wilmot Humphrey,
This copy was certified In my presence :
Walter H. Kozacko,
Walter H. Kozacko,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.
RicHAED Wilmot Humphrey,
438-06-63, RM3c, V-3, U. S. N.
R.
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 19
14 aiAY 1945.
Received the following secret material from Captain L. F. Safford, USN, for
ofllcial use in the Pearl Harbor Investigation:
(1) Three copies of Com 14 Daily RI Summaries (at Pearl Harbor) from
1 Nov. 1941 to 6 Dec. 1941, incl.
(2) Three photos of Station "H" Chronology, 1 Dec. 1941 to 6 Dec. 1941, incl.
(3) Photos of the following (3 copies) :
OpNav to CinCAF 242239
Com 14 to OpNav 260110
Com 16 to OpNav 261331
OpNav to Alusna Tokyo 040330
706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Com 13 031825
Com 16 to OpNav 010245
Foote's message
Com 16 to OpNav 041502
Hidden message of December 7
Bainbridge Island 051830
Com 14 052200
(2) Three photos of Station "H" Chronology, 1 Dee. 1941 to 6 Dec. 1941, Mel.
(JI>-1 No. 7148).
John L. Sonnett.
Communication Intelligence Summaey
1 NovEMBEE 1941-6 Decembek 1941
SECRET
Communication Intelligence Sum/mary — 1 November 1941
General. — ^Traffic volume a little less than normal. Receiving condition fair,
traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new calls not very great. Fleet
calls only changed, shore station calls and shore addresses not changed. It is
believed that tactical calls also remain unchanged, but not enough intercepted
traffic to so state definitely. The same garble table for calls is employed so
the change amounts to a reassignment of calls previously used. New calls have
appeared, but it is thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units
or were in reserve. All of the major Fleet calls are identified and a small
amount of individual calls were recovered today. Because the new calls are
not yet lined up save for the major Fleet Commanders and all time today was
spent in call recovery, this summary will deal only with general impressions.
Combined Fleet. — The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio
traffic. The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a bit of
traffic to addresses placed in submarine and carrier category. No indications
of movement of any of these units. COMBINED FLEET tactical circuits were
heard but little tactical traffic copied due to interference by NPM.
Carriers. — The COMMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in despatches from
Tokyo and he took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast.
Submarines. — Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well lined
up yet.
Third Fleet.— This Fleet very active as before. The SECOND and FIRST
BASE FORCES are stUl marshalling their MARUs and the CINC, is very
busy with Tokyo.
China.— The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several
messages from Saigon.
Communication Intelligence Summary — 2 November 1941
General. — Traffic volume normal for Sunday. Receiving conditions were fair,
but bulk of traffic derived from the major shore circuits. Solution of new call
system progressing satisfactorily but volume of accumulated traffic in new
system not yet large enough to permit more than casual identification of individ-
ual calls. The number of alternate calls for major commands is increased
over last system. So far there are seven alternate calls for the Combined
Fleet.
Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The combined air force traffic
is also very high with the Commander of the Combined Air Forces originating
many despatches. It appears that he is now in Taiwan. Traffic to SAMA
and BAKO is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China Fleet Intelligence
bureaus are originating many dispatches, these from Tokyo being prefixed
WIWI. There were several high precedence dispatches from Tokyo with the
major fleet commanders as addressees.
Communication Intelligence Summary — S November 1941
Oeneral. — Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for Monday. Re-
ceiving conditions good but all circuits slow. General messages continue to emln-
ate from TOYKO communications. Such an amount is unprecedented and the
import is not understood. A mere call change does not account for activities of
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 707
this nature. The impression is strong that these messages are periodic reports
to the Major Commander of a certain nature. Dummy traflBc is again being sent
on the TOKYO broadcasts. Naval Intelligence TOKYO addressed two WIWI
messages to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and to KUMI 8 (unidentified).
Combined Fiee*.— Commander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent message
to BUMIL information all Major Commanders, Combined Fleet, Naval Intelli-
gence Tokyo, the Chief of Naval General Staff, and Bureau of Personnel.
Commander in Chief Combined Fleet also was associated in traffic with offices
in the mandates, principally RNO PALAO. The Commander in Chief, Combined
continues to be associated with the Carriers and Submarines.
Third Fleet. — Third Fleet trafBc continues at a high level. A movement re-
port by It ATI G6 (unidentified) was addressed to Commander in Chief Third
Fleet for information.
Air.— J. WE address, today broke down as "ITIKOUKUU KANTAI". The
literal reading of this as "1st Air Fleet" Is correct; it indicates an entirely new
organiza»ion of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which indicated
that this may be the case. An old call (Y0ME7) while never identified seemed
to be in n high position with respect to the Carriers and the Air Coi-ps. Upon
movemeit of air units to TAIWAN the association of CarDiv 4 and CarDiv 3
with uni :s of the Combined Air Force was apparent. Their association in a com-
mand se ise between shore based air and fleet air had never occurred before, but
under the concept of an AIR FLEET can be easily accepted. Traffic in the Air
Force continues at a high level.
Communication Intelligence Summary — 4 'November 1941
General. — ^Traffic volume normal with all circuits easily readable. More tac-
tical traffic copied than for past few days. Combined Fleet and Carriers heard
on tactical circuits. TOKYO Naval Intelligence sent four messages to Major
Commanders. One of these was for information Chief of Staff China Fleet and
one other for information of Chief of Staff Second Fleet.
Air. — High traffic level of air activities continues. Most significant of the
aid dispatches were some in which various air corps were addressed and BAKO
included for information. One from Yokosuka Air was addressed to SANCHOW
Island Radio for information TAKAO Air Corps. BAKO was also noted as an
addressee in several messages ftrom SASEBO and originated two mesages to
SASEBO and TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a message to two
unidentified calls for Information of Commander Combined Air Force, Com-
mander in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDivs collective, BAKO and others. The
Commander Combined Air Force addressed a message to Commander in Chief
Third Fleet.
Mandates. — The RNO PALAO was active today, being addressed by Com-
mander in Chief, Fourth Fleet and sent several messages to TOKYO and YOKO-
SUKA. The PALAO weather station sent a long code message addressed to
nearly all the Islands of the Mandates. MARCUS island appears as an origin-
ator. No change in the location of Fourth Fleet units noted.
Submarines. — No activity noted.
Communication Intelligence Summary — 5 November 1941
General. — Traffic volume above normal. All circuits heard and receiving con-
ditions were fair to good. TOKTTO very active as an originator, sending out
many messages of general address. Two WIWI messages in Kana Code sent
by NGS to Chief of Staff Car Divs and TIYA 44 (Unidentified) respectively. The
Intelligence Offices of China Fleet and TOKYO continue active with many
dispatches passing between the two.
Third Fleet. — Two units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKIAO area.
Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RISI4 and Y0A2) it isnot known how
much of this fleet they represent. It is certain that the Commander in Chief,
Third Fleet has not yet left the Sasebo area although it is expected he will
before long. One message which may be a movement report from him was re-
ceived late on the 5th. The present state of call recovery on the Third Fleet does
not permit of an estimate of the movement involved.
A unit of the First Fleet, identified today as CARDIV 4 appeared at BAKO.
This Carrier Division was addressed as "less FUTA SHOTAI" (2nd Section?)
Whether or not these are other units at BAKO is not known. The Commander
CARDIVS has been associated with SAMA and BAKO in several dispatches today.
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2—4
708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The following were also associated, SANCHOW ISLAND TAKAO AIRCORPS,
CANTON (China) and YOKOHAMA Air. The RNO TAIHOKU originated many
dispatches to TOKYO and the French Indo China Forces. A TAIWAN origin-
ator sent one to Lieut. Comdr. SHIBA at the Embassy THAILAND for informa-
tion to HANOI and the Commander French Indo China Forces.
BAKO originated numerous dispatches to the Empire and to the Major Fleet
Comanders.
The South China Fleet was also the recipient of many despatches from TOKYO.
Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that there
is now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO area which
will comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the past month and
will be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet units to an un-
known extent
OoMmunication Intelligence Summary — 6 November 19^1
General. — Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving conditions were
fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches interferred somewhat.
Today the specific call-up on the Tokyo broadcast was eliminated. Formerly
Tokyo radio called the unit concerned when the dispatch was addressed to a
member of that unit. Beginning yesterday afternoon, all broadcast messages
are addressed to a single call without regard to the addressee of the message.
The recovery of the radio organization will be hampered by this new advance
in Communication Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this
broadcast from which the address and originator were missing. This may be the
start of complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits. Tokyo ad-
dressed a WIWI message to the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and
Submarine Force.
TaJcao-Bako Area. — It is now certain that there is a very heavy air con-
centration on Taiwan. This comprised practically the entire Combined Air
Force including the Commander and his staff plus at least one carrier division
and an unknown amount of the fleet air arm. No additional units of the Third
Fleet were located there today but it is believed that CinC Third Fleet is now
enroute BAKO from SASEBO. From traffic association it is believed that some
Second Fleet units are in Takao area but this has not yet been proven. The
South China Fleet Command has been active in dispatches to Taiwan addresses.
Combined Fleet. — A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now appearing
with secret (tactical) calls in use.
Mandates. — The Mandates traffic has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth De-
fense Force at Truk and the RNO Paloa continue to be the most active units.
Communication Intelligence Summary — 7 Novemier 19^1
General. — Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use of
the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTU for delivery to all Com-
bined Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces to which attached
is very difficult. Use of large number of alternate calls for major fleet forces,
many of which have not yet been definitely identified or associated with known
calls, renders the picture more confusing. Appearance of the prefix "JITSU"
(authenticator for bonafide traffic) in several messages indicates that a com-
munication drill is being held but without indication as to what units are par-
ticipating and therefore much of the traffic is suspected of being "drill". Jaluit
Radio is handling traffic direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to congestion
of Mandate circuits from the Marshalls caused by heavy concentration in that
area.
Air. — Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities, mainly
centered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air activities in the Mandates
included in headings of messages. Despatches originated by Fourth Fleet
Command included Air Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and all types of Man-
date activities in long headings.
Fleet. — Fourth Fleet Command remains in Truk area. There are indications
that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao area but identifica-
tions are not sufficiently certain to confirm this.
Greatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls to
facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of handling
fleet traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 709
Communication Intelligence Summary — 8 November 19^1
General. — Normal volume of intercepted traffic with no "dummies" appearing
on the UTU. All UTU traffic was broadcast to the general call only. The
Staff Communication Officer of the French Indo China Force (So. Exp. For.)
sent a dispatch action to S. C. O. Combined INFO S. C. O. Second Fleet, Com-
bined Air Force, unidentified fleet unit, Radio stations at Tokyo, Palao and
Takao. This may indicate a contemplated coordination of communications be-
tween the Indo-China-South China areas and the Palao Island-Taiwan area.
Secret calls were used very little as compared to the past few days and only
three circuits were heard using them, including the Combined Fleet Com-
manders circuit and Air Station Net. North Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet.
All mandate circuits were active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all
classes of Mandate addressees in all areas, but with continued emphasis on the
Palao area at one end and the Jaluit-Marshall area on the other. Chichi jima
Air Station was included in much of the traffic between Empire Offices and Saipan
Air with Jaluit Base Force included for information. Inclusion of Chichijima
usually presages an air movement between Mandates and Empire but the Units
involved are unidentified. Commander of unidentified shore activity (NEO 66)
previously associated with the Fifth Fleet, was addressed at Chichijima Air
which tentatively identifies him as an air activity. Previous association of the
Fifth Fleet traffic with Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka tends to confirm the belief
that Fifth Fleet operations are, or will be, in the area adjacent to Chichijima-
Marcus, supplementing the Fourth Fleet in the lower island areas.
Fleet. — Chief of Staff First Fleet originated a despatch through Kure Radio.
Batdiv Three of the First Fleet appears to be operating separately from the
main force, possibly in connection with the Cardivs TTiree and Four in the
Taiwan-Naha area. An apparent movement report from Cardiv Four was ad-
dressed to CinC Combined Fleet, First Fleet, CarDiv Commander, Combined
Air Force Commander and to movement offices at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Kure, Mai-
zuru, and Sasebo. Traffic from the Commander Indo China Force is handled
from the Japanese radio station at Saigon rather than from the KASHII, in-
dicating that the staff is based ashore at present. No identifiable submarine
activity was noted.
Air. — Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities. The
area between Chichijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit appears to be particu-
larly concerned with movement of air forces and auxiliaries, while the formation
of a force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao-Bako area appears to
be nearly completed as indicated by reports addressed to CinC, Combined Naval
Minister, Commanders of Cardivs, Combined Air Force, First Fleet and shore
addresses generally associated with movements or organization changes. This
force is believed to include CarDiv Four, and possibly CarDiv Three, with a
number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Force, also possibly some
units from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders composition of the
force highly speculative and area of operations obscure. Prior to change of
calls, much traffic was exchanged between China, South China and Indo-China
while at present most traffic includes Palao.
Communication Intelligence Summary — 9 November 1941
General. — Traffic column heavy for Sunday. Receiving conditions fair but
heavy static caused numerous garbles fragmentary messages. Navy Minister
sent several messages of general address including one to all First and Second
class Naval stations. Practically all of the general messages carried SAMA as
an information address. Carrier Division Three arrived at Takao and there are
indications that Carrier Division Four will return to Sasebo from Takao. The
Flagship of Carrier Divisions is AKAGI and is in Sasebo area. Some tactical
traffic today shows units of Combined Fleet still operating. The association of
Batdiv Three and Mandate addresses, especially Saipan may indicate operations
of that unit in the Mariannas. The JINGEI was communicating with SAMA,
HAINAN today. The Chief of Staff of the French Indo China Force is in Tokyo.
One message today addressed to CinC. Combined Fleet was routed to
MAIZURU for delivery but this is believed a communication error. The Third
Fleet appears to be still in Sasebo area, but it was noted that considerable traffic
passed between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the Third Fleet. The Fifth Fleet
is still being organized with no indications yet that it has assembled. The
Eighteenth Air Corps at Saipan originated much traffic to Yokosuka Air Corps.
710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Communication Intelligence Summary — 10 NovemT)er 19 ^1
General. — Traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There were fewer
general messages sent today than for the past few weeks. Tokyo Intelligence
still active and addressing dispatches to all Major Commanders. The Mandates
construction traffic has decreased considerably. Call recovery is progressing but
has been slowed down by the general call-up used on Fleet broadcast.
ComUned Fleet. — Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A Staff officer of BatDiv
Three was addressed there today and it is likely that this whole division is there
also. The Cine, Second Fleet was located at Kure today as well as two cruiser
divisions.
Thirci Fleet. — ^The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo area. Several
movement reports have been noted by units of this fleet but none have been noted
other than individual ships. At least two units of this fleet still at Takao. CinC
Three originated one movement report for information of CinC Fourth Fleet.
Fourth Fleet. — Little activity. CinC. Fourth remains in vicinity of Truk with
major portion of his command. The Staff Communication Officer of Submarine
Force sent a message to the CinC Fourth for information of Jaluit.
Fitth Fleet. — One unit of this fleet located at Chichijima.
Air. — The Combined Air Force Command is still talking to Sama and the
South China Fleet. From one address it appears that the Commander of Car-
rier Division Three is with the Combined Fleet. Several units of the Carrier
Divisions are in port at Kure and Sasebo. CinC Combined Air Force is still in
Takao.
Communication Intelligence Summarj/ — 12 November 1941
General. — Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving condition
about average. The general character of the traffic has been administrative with
most of it being between shore logistic and technical activities. The D. F. net was
active today with very little activity shown yesterday. Intercept operators have
commented adversely on the major shore network which comprises all of the
major naval activities, in the EMPIRE. Traffic has been moving slowly over this
circuit. The reason is the non-cooperation of the operators and the definite lack
of control exercised by TOKYO radio stations. TOKYO Intelligence is still send-
ing messages to the major commands but the remainder of TOKYO traffic has
been mostly from the technical bureaus.
Combined Fleet. — The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE area.
The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and several Mandates stations
is borne out by a D. F. position on the flagship of BATDIV 3 which places him
about halfway between CHICHIJIMA and MARCUS Island. Their position was
obtained on the 4th when this unit was not yet identified. No subsequent bear-
ings have been obtained. Also associated with the BATDIV are a Submarine
Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although the association of this CARDIV
(Lately returned from TAKAO) is not positive. The Third Fleet remains at
SASEBO with the only activity exhibited in the Base Forces.
J.ir.— CARDIV 3 returned to KURE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE.
Most of air activity confined to dispatches between carrier and shore establish-
ments.
Fifth Fleet. — The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The volume
of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The Commander Submarine Force
is still adding JALUIT and today COMSUBRON 2 addressed a message there.
AIRRON 24 sent a movement report but no indication of the direction. Com-
munication exercises were held by JALUIT and several stations in that area.
YOKOHAMA Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO.
China. — The previous activity of SAIVIA and the French Indo China Forces
and bases continues.
Communication Intelligence Summary, IS November 19 U
General. — Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several
messages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are:
1. UNIWIWI dispatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to Chief
of Staff Combined Air Force, INFO RNO TAIHOKU, BAKO Naval Station.
2. WIWI from N. G. S. to MAIZURU INRO Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.
3. NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet,
INFO Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third Fleet and
SAMA, HAINAN.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 711
4. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to Secretary First Fleet.
5. (2 Messages) WIWI to same address as 3 above.
6. At 3 part NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined
Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief French Indo China Fleet.
7. One UNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA,
INFO Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Commander in Chief Combined
Fleet.
This is the only occurrence in some time of anyone save the TOKYO Intelligence
activity using the WIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the China Fleet Intelligence
Bureau were active all day with dispatches to the Major Commanders.
The direction finder net was again active all day with CHINKAI, ORU 7
(near CHINKAI), JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending in bearing reports.
ComUned Fleet. — The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is
operating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The Commander of
BATDIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. The Division Communication Officer is
communicating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other ships in this
division remain unlocated but is assumed, lacking evidence to the contrary that
they are with the flagship. Other units of First Fleet seem inactive. One
Cruiser Division of Second Fleet is associated in traffic with PALAO and may
be in that area.
Third Fleet— ?iti\l located in SASEBO, the Commander in Chief has been
active in the traffic, being addressed by both TOKYO and Commander in Chief
Combined Fleet. The First BASE FORCE Commander originated several
messages but no indication of
Air. — Carriers remain relatively inactive. The SETTSU is still with them
and a few may be engaged in target practice near KURE. The Combined
AIRFORCE is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual high traffic level
between its component Air Corps still exists.
China. — The Commander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one of the
RNO TAIHOKU. His Chief of Staff is stUI in SHANGHAI.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 14 Noventher 194I
Oeneral. — Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor air receiving con-
ditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry originated several AlNav
dispatches. There were three WIWI messages originated today.
1. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet,
Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and YOKOSUKA.
2. WIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet,
Chief of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO.
3. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to AN1758 (Chief of Staff of an unidentified
unit). Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Chief of Staff Com-
bined Air Force.
Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bearings in addi-
tion to the others. Tactical circuits heard during day with a fair amount of
activity.
Combined Fleet. — ^Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three is still
operating but no further information on this division. Two Combined Fleet
units appear active in the traffic. They are DesRon Three (normally in First
Fleet but has been operating with Second Fleet) and CruDiv Seven of Second
Fleet. Both of these units have been associated in traffic with the South China
Fleet and the French Indo China Force. They may proceed to the South China
Area in near future.
Third Fleet. — Still in Sasebo area. The CinC. has been addressed by Tokyo
to a great extent and is still associated with South China activities in traffic.
It has been noted that the association between the Third Fleet and units of the
Combined Air Force is growing. Especially the Second Base Force has been
talking with several Air Corps among whom is the Kure Air Corps. Will air
units be embarked in ships of the Base Force?
Fourth Fleet. — No movement yet from the Truk area. It appears that the
Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various officers of the staff were ad-
dressed at Tokyo and at unidentified locations.
Submarines. — No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute PALAO
and Submarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being addressed by
Tokyo and Yokosuka originators.
712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Air. — One Air Squadron of the Combined Air Force is at HOIHOW, HAINAN.
The Commander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good representa-
tion of his command. The Carriers remain in home waters with most of them
in port.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 19^1
General. — Traffic volume normal, with a number of general address messages
originated by Communication Division, Tokyo, to Radio Officers, Ominato, U #9
(D. F. Station in Marshalls), Jaluit, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Takao and Sama
Radios Staff Communication Officers All Major Flagships, Staff Communication
Officer South Expeditionary Force and two apparent collective shore addresses.
Traffic from all stations mentioned except Sama and Ominato to D. F. Control
and Plotting Room Tokyo information to Staff Cmmunication Officer Combined
Fleet was exchanged. No Messages of the D. F. type were detected so it pre-
sumed that the interchange had to do with arrangements for drill or organization
of the net. The Minister of the Navy originated one Alnav and one to all Ma.ior
Commands and collective shore. Tokyo Personnel and Tokyo Communication Di-
vision originated several to collective fleet and shore. Significance is not deter-
mined though it is believed possible that a further partial change of shore and air
calls may be in prospect. The Empire air station net was normally active using
tactical calls. Secretary First Fleet originated one Urgent Code to unidentified
(MINI 55), Staff Communication Officer Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and
Commanding Officer of BatDiv Three flagship.
Combined Fleet. — Same as yesterday, same units (BatDiv Three, Desrons One
and Three) associated through traffic with South Expeditionary Force. CinC.
Second Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be arranging oper-
ations of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air Units.
Third Fleet. — Inactive.
Fourth Fleet. — Apparent movement of Fourth Fleet units in prospect or under-
way, with continued emphasis on the Marshalls Area. CinC. Fourth traffic still
being handled from the Truk area, with Airron Twenty-four (Kamoi) and asso-
ciated Yokohama and Chitose air units involved in some movement, direction
undetermined. All Marshall Island activities, including unidentified Army For-
ces, exchanging traffic freely.
Submarine Force. — Little activity detected. It is believed that some activity
is operating or preparing to operate in the Marshall area, from communication
arrangements underway between Staff Communication Officer Submarine Force
and same Fourth Fleet, information to Jaluit. Jaluit has been heard working
on various frequencies, using tactical calls and procedure associated with sub-
marine operations, but no identifications of calls used have been made.
Air. — Continued air traffic to and from Takao area, with unidentified Airron
(formerly YOME 7) including South Expeditionary Force and Sama addressees
in traffic. Composition of this force and purpose still speculative but believed to
be preparing to move southward to work with the South Expeditionary Force.
The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders analysis of
traffic headings very slow and difficult, but identifications and recoveries of al-
ternates are improving as a greater volume of November traffic becomes avail-
able for research.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 16, 'November 19Jfl
General. — Traffic volume approximately normal for week-end period. A new
form of despatch heading appeared in a series of dispatches broadcasted on the
regular UTSU series. Only the originator or the address of the dispatch ap-
peared ; it is assumed that the other pertinent call or address may be buried in
the text. These dispatches were with one exception (in 5 numeral text) all in
the nine-Kana period separator system and the single call in the heading fitted
In each case Line seven of the call garble table.
A dispatch was originated by the Navy Minister addressed to all Major Fleets
and general addresses to this effect :
"Today the House of Peers and House of Representatives by means of a de-
cision adopted the following resolution transmitted as follows :
1. Resolution of House of Peers — (Expressed deepest thanks and emotion
to Army and Navy for their glorious service over a long period to the Empire
and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen in battle.
2. Resolution of House of Representatives — Expressed thanks, etc., to all
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 713
officers and men of Army Navy and Air Force for their 4i^ years service (iu
China affair) and for their contribution to the establishment of a permanent
world peace. Gave prayers for well being of all hands, etc."
First and Second Fleets. — Majority of First and Second Fleet Units remain in
the general Kure area. The units of these two fleets that have been most active
from dispatch heading viewpoint in the last ten days appear to be :
Airron Seven (3 Chitose class)
Carrier Division Four
Destroyer Squadron Seven
Destroyer Squadron Three
Battleship Division Three
Cruiser Division Seven
It is rather singular that the CinO. Second Fleet has assumed an important
role in addressing for action several first fleet and other fleet recently. In
some of these dispatches the call identified as Southern Expeditionary Force (Indo
China Force) appears. Associations of addresses in several dispatches have
thrown the Second and Third Fleets with the Combined Air Force and in other
dispatches, these appear to an association between First Fleet, Carrier Divisions
and the Mandates.
It is apparent that Destroyer Squadron One has been or is operating with the
Carrier Divisions and Battleship Division Three while Cruiser Division Seven
and Destroyer Squadron Three have been operating together. Iwakuin Air
sent short priority dispatch to the ATAGO, Second Fleet cruiser and submarine
units indicating some joint minor exercises in that ax'ea.
Third Fleet. — Believed inactive in Sasebo — Kure area.
Fourth Fleet. — FUATU, a Tokyo address originated one UNI dispatch to an
unidentified fleet unit (Men 33), information to CinC. Combined Fleet, Com-
munication Officer, Fourth Fleet, Tokyo Intelligence, and NEO 66, believed to be
a shore based air activity in Chichijima-Marcus area.
Fifth Fleet. — Prior to the change of calls on 1 November, the composition of
the Fifth Fleet was very indefinite, but appeared to contain several naval auxil-
iary type vessels. Since 1 November, little has been recovered of the composition
of this mythical fleet, but is definite that some units are operating in the general
Yokosuka Chichijima-Marcus area.
Bulmarines. — Little activity. Communication OflScer, Submarine Force origi-
inated one priority dispatch to unidentified address, information to Combined
Fleet Communication Officer. Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet
Commands continues.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 11 November 1941
General. — Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. More traffic
with single call heading appeared on the broadcast circuit. These dispatches num-
bered serially and each call different, but all fitting the same line on the call
garble table. Since these messages are transmitted each hour on the hour and are
of approximately the same length it appears that they are drill messages. It is
feared that they constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a heading.
Since none of this traffic has been found going into Tokyo, it is probably originated
in the Navy Ministry. Very few messages of general address were noted. Tac-
tical circuits in the Mandates were heard during the day with radio Saipan
controlling.
Combined Fleet. — No movement from the Kure area of any major portion of
the First or Second Fleets. The CinC. Second Fleet very active as an originator
today. He continues to address units which are most normally under his com-
mand. He also addressed the CinC. Third Fleet, Palao Forces, and the Chief of
Staff Fourth Fleet.
Third Fleet.— Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Communication Officer of Third
Fleet was addressed by the R. N. O. Palao.
Fourth Fleet. — The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area centered
about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit. Both
these activities originated traffic.
Air. — The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was
addressed frequently by SAMA, HAINAN and was in two instances addressed by
the Fourth Fleet. The carriers are mostly in the Kure-Sasebo area with the
exception of a few which are operating in the Kyushu area.
China. — Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined Fleet
Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The R. N. O. Taimoku ad-
714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
dressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow Island, Sama, Bako, CinC, South
China, and Chief of StafE Combined Air Force.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 18 Novem'ber 1941
Oeneral. — Traffic volume a little under normal with receiving conditions fair
to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of general address
emanating from the Communication section. The double originator BUMIL and
N. G. S. sent one NIKAWIWI to the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet for informa-
tion to all First Class Naval Stations. BUMIL also addressed an urgent dispatch
to SAJMA, information to R. N. O. TAINOKU, Chief of StafE South China Fleet
and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Another Tokyo originator believed to be
N. G. S., sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff
French Indo China Force and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. MAIZURU Naval
Station also sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Second
Fleet, Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force and for information to
N. G. S. The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent three long dispatches
to the entire Direction Finder Net which was very active today with many bear-
ings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General Staff sent one to Chief of Staff
Carrier Divisions and Chief of Staff French Indo China Force.
Combined Fleet. — CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an originator
and addressee. Since this officer is always included in the address of every
important message, he will no longer be mentioned as an addressee unless he is
the only addressee. The association between the CinC Second Fleet and the
French Indo China Forces and Combined Air Force today in an urgent NIKA
dispatch. Several units of the Combined Air Force also addressed several dis-
patches to him. Battleship Division Three, the Carrier Divisions and two de-
stroyer squadrons have been associated in traffic. Several dispatches occurred
today, being addressed by N. G. S. and the Commander Carrier Divisions in sev-
eral instances. The CinC. Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches to him.
These form the indication that CinC. Second Fleet will be in command of a large
Task Force compromising the Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, some carrier
divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No movement from home waters has
been noted.
Third Fleet. — The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears to
be a movement report. He also sent one to R. N. O. TAIHOKU information to
CinC. Third Fleet. There were other units tentatively placed in Third Fleet who
sent dispatches in which the Tokyo movement report office was an addressee. It
is expected that the Third Fleet will move from the Sasebo area in the near
future. This Second Base Force was having quite a bit of traffic with several
Air Corps awhile ago and may be transporting air units for equipment.
Fourth Fleet. — Not much activity in tliis fleet. The amount of traffic still
interested in Jaluit.
Communication Intelligence Summary 19 November 19^1
General. — ^Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates
was noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the northern circuits also very light
Some technical traffic received from Combined Fleet units. There has been a
noticeable increase in the afloat traffic over the normal amount usually seen.
Fleet units seem to have a great deal of business with other Fleet units both
within and outside of their own organization. Staff Officers are frequently
addressed at other than their normal locations. The activity at Tokyo has sub-
sided somewhat in that there were fewer general massages tlian for the past
few days. Tokyo Intelligence sent out several messages addressed to Second
Fleet, Submarine Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAMA for
information to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet. The Navy
Minister sent out two AlNavs. The Direction Finder net is still active with all
stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting station making reports to major
commanders.
Combined Fleet. — The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears today at
Sasebo, its southern jaunt apparently having been completed. Destroyer Squad-
ron Four and Two appear associated with the Third Fleet. CinC Second Fleet
continues his activity, being still associated with Combined Air Force, French
Indo Chna Force, Third Fleet, and today with Carrier Division Three. Carrier
Division Three was in Takao and returned to the Empire a week ago and has
been associated with Third Fleet since. A Bako activity addressed the Chief of
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
715
staff Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The Chief of Staff
Second Fleet addressed an urgent dispatch to CinC. French Indo China Fleet
information to Third Fleet and Commander Cruiser Division Five.
Third Fleet. — Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and of
the Base Forces originated movement reports but no indication of direction.
CinC. Third Fleet is still in Sasebo.
Fourth Fleet. — Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base De-
fense Force at Palao. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and the Second Fleet
was considerable. One call (SITI 4) appears at Jaluit today. This call has
been identified as Carrier Division Four and if the one message is correct it
appears that this Carrier Division (ZUIKAKU) is in the Jaluit area. This is
not confirmed as no other indications have been found and its presence at Jaluit
is doubted, attributing the message to be a communication error.
Fifth Fleet — Flagship located Yokosuka. The CinC. Fifth Fleet appeared in
a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen.
Communication Intelligence Summary — 20-21 Novemier 1941
General. — Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal.
Tokyo originators active with messages addressed to all major commanders.
N. G. S. sent a UNIWIWI to Commandant BAKO for information to Chief of
Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The Personnel Bureau at Tokyo became
very active on the 21st sending out a series of long personnel messages. The
activity at Tokyo identified as R.D.F. plotting stations increased his recent high
volume of messages with a long four part message addressed to all major com-
manders. He also addressed several dispatches to the Direction Finder Net,
indicating the employment and results being obtained by this activity. The
traffic load on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 21st, so heavy
that the circuit was n duplex operation most of the mid-watch.
Combined Fleet. — Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area and
most of both fleets remain in the Kure-Sasebo area. Battleship Division Three
still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the CinC. Second Fleet continues
abnormally high. A list of units addressed by him or who sent traffic to him and
CinC. Third Fleet over the past two days follows :
MIRA 9 (Carrier Division Three) END 7 (Unidentified)
TAB 1 (Airron 7) AKU 8 (Air Unit)
KAME 5 (Airron 6) KUSU 7 (Unidentified)
YAWI 1 (Crudiv 5) SATU 88 (Unidentified)
KENU 3 (Crudiv 7) KUNI 88 (Unidentified)
EESE 4 (Desron 3) OYU 9 (Unidentified)
AKI 0 (Desron 4) KOA 0 (Unidentified)
TIYA 7 (Comdr. 1st Base For) NOTU 6 (Unidentified)
SASE 3 (Comdr. 2nd Base For) NETE 5 (Unidentified)
YOMO 9 (Desro 5) NSI 3 (Unidentified)
REA 2 (Shiogama Air Corps) SUTE 1 (Unidentified)
KUNO 9 (Erimo) YAYU 1 (Unidentifled)
MIMO 3 (Air Unit) MARE 5 (Unidentified)
TUE 7 (Unidentified) Plus 11 Marus
This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assembled by him but only
the ones occurrng in the past two days. Each one appeared not only with the
CinC. Second Fleet but with the Third Fleet and with one of the units now in
South China or a Taiwan-South China Address. A complete list is being made
up but was not finished at this writing. Assuming that the entire Second Fleet
will be included in this organization and that each unit addressed will either
participate or contribute somewhat to the Task Force it appears that it will com-
prise a good portion of the navy. One item stands out — so far there has been
practically no submarine units mentioned by the Second or Third Fleets in con-
nection with South China activities. Commander Submarine Force has not been
included in traffic. He does appear in Tokyo Fourth Fleet and Mandates traffic.
Communications Intelligence Summary — 20-21 November 1941
Mandates and Fourth Fleet. — The R. N. O. Palao and Palao radio stations have
remained active with the Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka for days. This is taken
to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include
the Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active witli
716 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the R. N. O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so
great it may be that he will assign some non-Second Fleet units to that area
but just which ones is not yet known. From information from radio sources
there is no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third Base
Force which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet units
i-outed there and the Maru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal flow to
that area. With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday reported as either a carrier
unit or submarine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron of the
Submarine Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls is far
greater than that existing at Palao.
Communication Intelligence Summary — 22 Novemler 1941
General. — Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical
circuit heard today, indicating that Combined Fleet tactical exercises are now
completed. The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs and sent two other
messages, one to CinC Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka and Commander Sub-
marine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out the usual long messages
to CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. BuMil
addressed Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan Civil Engineering Section at Peleliu and
Yokosuka. Another imidentified Tokyo originator sent a priority message to
all major flags and China Fleet, information to ANOS at Taihoku and Palao.
Sasebo addressed one to Chief of Staff French Indo China Force, information
Chief of Stafe Second Fleet, Bako, Sama, Chief of StafC South China, Chief
of StafC Third Fleet, Commander Cruiser Division Seven and Commander De-
stroyer Squadron Three. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three
to South China Area soon? While the Direction Finder Net is still active, the
station at Palao sent in more bearings than usual for that station.
ComMned Fleet. — CinC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two un-
identified calls, one a Maru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet. CinC Second
Fleet was again prolific with many messages addressed to Third Fleet and
Combined Air Force. The amount of traffic interchanged between these three
commanders was very great. One message addressed many units as follows :
CinC. Second Fleet. To: NETES (Crudiv?), K002 (SubronS) TIYU 66
(CinC. Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC. Comb. Air Force) MIRA 9 (CarDivS),
RESB 4 (Desron 3), KORE 4 (Second Fleet) (Collection), less Crudiv 8 and
unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI 2 (BatDiv 3) (at Kure and Sasebo), Airron
7 (at Kure), SUTI 1 (?) (atKure), SATU 8 (?) (atKm*e) META 0/ (AKASHI)
(at KURE) META 2 (ASHI MARU), TUFU 2 (?) NARI 33 (CinC. China
Fleet), KAKE 66 (CinC. South China Fleet), MISI 66 (CinC. Comb. Fleet).
Third Fleet. — CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from "RIKUGUN
SANBOUTEU ISIABDATI SEUZEU (at Tainoku). This is translated as "Army
Chief of Staff General MAEDATI" and indicates the linking of the Taiwan
Army Forces with Third Fleet, The CinO Third Fleet continues his association
with Combined Air Forces.
Fourth Fleet. — CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base
Force at Jaluit and AirRon 24 now in Jaluit area. Third Base Force at Palao
and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and Yokosuka. He
also received one from Commander Submarine Force.
China. — The Commander French Indo China Force sent one message to CinC.
Combined Fleet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako sent one to
Secretary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Carrier
Divisions, Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet.
Communication Intelligence Summary — 23 November 1941
General. — Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic has increased.
Some of the high precedence dispatch headings are listed :
1. MAYURU (Tokyo Address) to HORONO MUSEKU (Collective Shore
Precedence Information Chiefs of Staff Com-
NIKA-WIWI bined, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and
Southern Expeditionary Force.
2. Third Fleet Chief of StafC to Second Fleet Chief of Staff Information
VIKA Combined and Southern Expeditionary
Force Chief of Staff.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 717
3. KESANA EONO (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and Southern
WIWI Expeditionary Force. Information "SAN-
KUYUTI" at Sama Hainan.
4. SUTE 1 (Unidentified Fleet unit) to Eadio Takao, Hainan, Flagship
NIKA NWA 2, information Tadio Tokyo
and Second Fleet flagship.
6. Imakuni Air to Iwakuni Air Detachment at NAHA information
KIU Kure, Bako, and
MINO 3 in Takao.
Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to First Fleet,
Third Fleet, and others. The following WE address was followed by Sasebo
Radio in the delivery of a personnel Bureau dispatch "SAHOTI. RENGO. RI.
SI."
An unidentified fleet unit (SUITE 1) listed recently in KURE appeared on
radio circuit with Takao Radio. Also on this circuit were the following:
KENU 3— CruDiv 7 Flagship?
HOWI 2— Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
EKE 8 — Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
MUSE 4 — ^Naval Auxiliary associated with Second Fleet.
The above units received delivery of the long NIKA dispatch originated by
CinC Second Fleet on the 21st of November and which appeared to outline the
forces expected to operate in the Indo-China general area.
Combined Fleet. — CinC Combined was included, as always, in all exchange
of fleet commander trafiic, but not important messages originated by him were
intercepted. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet messages mentioned
in summaries of 22nd were still being circulated, but Third Fleet appeared as
the most active unit in today's traffic. Indications are that Third Fleet units
are underway in a movement coordinated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air
Force and French Indo China Force. Commander French Indo China Force
(So. Exp. Fr) was included in all important traffic from Second, Third and
Combined Air Commanders, Hainan addresses were included in nearly all high
precedence messages concerning these forces and may indicate a rendezvous
of forces in that area. Palao appeai'ed as an information addressee on a por-
tion of the traffic. Fourth Fleet activity involved Palao area on one end and
Marshalls on the other. With no means of substantiating the impression, it
is believed that more submarines are operating in, or from, the Marshalls than
it has been possible to definitely place from radio interceptions. It is recalled
that there was an exchange between Staff Communication Officers of the
Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet with Jaluit included as either action or
information around November 1st and that Jaluit opened a direct circuit, to
Yokosuka early this month, apparently to relieve traffic congestion from that
area. Jaluit Radio has been heard on various frequencies using and working
with units using tactical or secret type calls, while the main submarine fre-
quency of 6385/12770 has been relatively inactive.
AIR. — Combined Air Traffic remains associated with Taiwan area, while the
Mandate Air units continue high level of activity, covering the whole Mandate
area. Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet, but with Carrier Division Three
definitely associated with Second Fleet operations.
CHINA. — CinC. China and South China not included with the Second, Third
Air Force and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic were quiet. Bearings from
Cavite and Guam place CinC. South China east of Taiwan, but this is believed
questionable.
Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few
days and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent
or actually underway, at least in part, to the southward with covering forces
operating from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled
or gathering in the Palao area.
Communication Intelligence Summary — 24 November 1941
GENERAL. — Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal
Traffic analysis impressions are unchanged from yesterday's report. The diffi-
culties of identifications have prevented more definite information of vessels (and
fleets to which attached) that appear to be moving south from Kure-Sasebo area.
If the poor reception prevailing here the last two days can be disregarded and
718 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the assumption made that Radio Heeia intercepted their "Share" of the total
traffic, the following impresisons are worth something :
(a) The falling off of traffic to China addresses.
(b) The increased activity among third fleet addressees with a high
percentage of what appears to be movement reports.
(c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat
addresses.
The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary
Force continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in despatch
traffic, the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the Submarine Force
Commander with the latter.
First and Second Fleets. — "Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio call
believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven originated a dispatch
to Comamnder Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second Fleet, Commander Southern
Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. The CinC.
Second Fleet continues to appear as the Task Force Commander of a large number
of units fi'om First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Three and Combined
Air Force units.
Third Fleet. — Large number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some
of which apepar to be movement reports. The fact that CinC Third Fleet appears
as information addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet units
indicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future operations.
Yesterday, a large number of dispatches asosciating Carrier Division Three with
CinC. Third Fleet.
Fourth Fleet and Mandates. — Fourth Fleet appears to be concentrated in Truk
area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet vessels have come
from Truff. Aid Squadron Twenty-Four and perhaps a large number of sub-
marines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall Area.
Submarines — Comparatively little activity.
Comparatively quiet.
Carriers — No definite indications of location.
Combined Air Force — Commander Kanoya Air appears in the Takao area.
Otherwise no change.
Communication Intelligence Summary — 25 November 1941
General. — Traffic volume normal. Receiving conditions much unproved over
last two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with messages to various units.
Tokyo originated one UNI WIWI to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC. Second Fleet,
CinC. Third Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fleet, and CinC, French, Indo China Force
plus Yokosuka, Kure and Maizuru. The Navy Minister originated several
AlNavs. A Direction Finder Net, controlled by Tokyo radio was active with secret
calls being sent by the five stations. The entire fleet traffic level is still high
which leads to the conclusion that organizational arrangements or other prepara-
tions are not yet complete.
Combined Fleet. — Little activity by CinO. First Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet re-
mains highly active as an origination, addressing Third Fleet, Air Force and
South China units. A second Fleet unit and a submarine division or squadron
arrived in Takao communication zone today. Crudivision Seven which previously
arrived there has been associated with Destroyer Squadron Three which indicated
the presence of that unit in Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still ex-
changing messages. Two new units to be associated with CinC Second Fleet and
the Task Force now forming are the North China Fleet and Defense Division One.
Air. — Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air Corps has
been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe that other units of the Com-
bined Air Force have moved from Taiwan to the French Indo China Area al-
though this is not yet verified. One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present
in the Mandates.
Fourth Fleet — CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications
with the Commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander
Carriers. His other communications are with the Third, Fourth and Fifth
Base Forces.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 26 November 19^1
General. — Traffic volume normal. All circuits heard well except for Tokyo-
Takao circuit which faded early. Traffic jjicture about the same as for the past
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 719
week. Intra-Fleet traffic still very heavy and Tokyo Bureaus still dispatching
AlNavs. The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed
a succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC. Sec-
ond and Third Fleets in particular. The only MAM schedule was NR 15 which
was first broadcast on the twenty-fifth. Takao and Bako originated more traffic
today than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the Cine. Second
Fleet and the China Fleets came in for their share. Tokyo radio is working
the ISUZU (flagship South China) SAMA and CAMRANH Bay radio stations
directly. Takao is also working ITSUBA (Spratleys).
ComJjined Fleet. — Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic via
SAMA, indicating the arrival of that unit in HAINAN waters. While no indi-
cations were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also arrived it is probable
that this unit is still In company with Cruiser Division Seven and is also present
at Hainan. The Takao, former flagship of the Second Fleet became active in
the traffic today being associated with the Second and Third Fleets, The tanker
HAYATONO appeared In several of CinC second Fleet's dispatches today as
well as the SOYO MARU. No movement is evident yet of any of the flags of
the newly formed force. The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and
the Combined Air Force still continues at it's high level.
Fourth Fleet. — No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive communica-
tion with Hainan forces as well as Palao forces. The KATORI and Cine. Sub-
marine Fleet appear to be at or near Chichijima.
Fifth Fleet. — The CinC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the dispatches of
the Second Fleet and is associated with the new Task Force.
Submarines. — As noted above, Commander Submarine Force is in Chichijima
area. The Submarine Squadron NETE5's location is somewhat uncertain today
due to one dispatch being routed to MAIZURU. The routing of this dispatch
being doubted because of the indication of theer arrival at Takao yesterday and
her previous association with Cruiser Division Seven.
China. — Two Marus of the Third Fleet left Bako for Sama today.
Third Fleet. — ^Active as above but no indication of large scale movement from
the Sasebo area.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 27 November 1941
General. — ^Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the fre-
quencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Tako circuit unreadable on midwatch. Some
tactical traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sana, and Saigon active as orig-
inators, addressing traffic to each other and to the Chiefs of Staff of Second,
Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako addressed the Chief of Staff Third
Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second
Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence activity who
send five dispatches to the major commanders. The Direction Finder activity
was very high with all stations sending in bearings including the Marshall
Islands Stations which has been silent for the past four days.
Combined Fleet. — No further information as to whether or not Destroyer
Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to still be with Cruiser Division
Seven in that area. There is still no evidence of any further movement from the
Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several mes-
sages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator lately.
Cine. Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Air
Force, and Bako.
Third Fleet. — Still holding extensive communication with Bako, Sama, South
China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of WE addresses is increas-
ing, those occurring today were :
"DAIHATIFUTABUTAISANBOTEU" (in Taihoku)
"KOROKUKITISIKI"
"KIZUKEYAMASITABUTAI" (in cate of RYU JO)
"URIZEUBAIGUNDAIGONREUSEU"
There is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet.
Fourth Fleet.— CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to the de-
fense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the Commander
Submarine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air Corps held com-
munication with Jaluit and Cine Fourth Fleet. The Civil Engineering Units at
IMIEJI and ENIWETOK were heard from after being silent for weeks. Chitose
Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron Twenty-four is still operating in the
720 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Marshalls. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in
the Mandates,
Air. — An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYTJ and
SEOKAKU. Carriers ate still located in home waters. No information of fur-
ther movement of any combined air force units to Hainan.
/8fw&«iannes.— Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area.
Communication Intelligence Summary 28 November 19Jfl
General. — Traffic volume normal. Communications to and from South China
and between Mandates and Empire very heavy. No tactical traffic seen. As has
been previously reported the suspected Radio Intelligence net is very active and
is becoming more so. The TOKYO plotting activity addressed more messages to
the Radio net than previously and most of these sent for information to the
Major Commanders. Much traffic also was directed to WRE0 (The Tokyo
D. F Command) from all eight stations in the Mandates and OMINATO. This
Command also originated messages of high precedence to the Major Fleet Com-
manders. This activity is interpreted to indicate that the R. I. net is operating
at full strength upon U. S. Naval Communications and 18 GETTING RESULTS.
TOKYO originators were active with messages of high precedence to the Com-
mander in Chief's of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. The
Navy Minister sent two Alnavs. The Chief of the Naval General StafE sent one
to the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third
Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second fleet and RNO PALAO. The BUAERO
sent one to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet info IMIESI and 11th Air Corps at
SAIPAN.
ComMned Fleet. — No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units.
Commander in Chief Second Fleet originated his usual number of despatches to
Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid particular attention to by
the Commander in Chief Second Fleet were CARDIVS Five and Seven and
DESRONS two and Four and SUBRON Five. No traffic today from the TAKAO,
(CA).
Third Fleet. — Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander
in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present
with the bulk of the Third Fleet in SASEBO but it is not yet located elsewhere.
The Army Commander in TAIHOKU is still holding communications with the
Commander in Chief Third Fleet. Two Third Fleet units arrived at BAKO and
are apparently returning to KURE from BAKO.
Fourth Fleet.— BnYk of Fourth Fleet still at TRUK. The Commander in Chief
Fourth Fleet addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the
Fourth Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at TUOTO and WOTJE
and held communications with AIRRON Twenty-foui- and KAMOI.
South China. — SAMA sent several messages to shore addresses in the Empire.
SAMA also addressed the OMURA AIR CORPS in several messages which went
for information to SAIGON and TOKYO. TAKAO radio station addressed the
Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, and the French Indo-China and Com-
bined air force. TAKAO Air Corps addressed SUKUGAWA Air Corps and
YOKOSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a HAINAN office now at SAIGON
originated several messages to the Naval Bases at SASEBRO and KURE. The
Commander in Chief Second and Commander in Chief Third Fleets.
Submarines. — Except for the mention of Subrons Five and Six in two dis-
patches there was no submarine activity today.
Communication Intelligence Summary 29 November 1941
General. — Traffic volume above normal. The traffic to South China still very
high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Tokyo-Takao circuit but
was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of today's traffic is made
up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo Intelligence sent eleven mes-
sages during the day to Major Commander both ashore and afloat, while the radio
intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the Major Commanders.
In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, radio Yokosuka sent in
reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The
Direction Finder Net controlled directly by T'okyo was up during the night with
much activity. One message from Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station in-
cluded Commander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister originated
his usual two AJNavs and the Naval General Staff addressed Commanders Sec-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 721
ond Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force and the South China Units. The
unit which has been addressed as the "103rd Air Group" originated one dispatch
today whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls. It is apparent
that he has no Navy call list. On address was "juitikoukuukantai" 11th AIR
FLEET". Since this has appeared before it is evident that the use of KANTAI
is intentional making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its composition is
unknown.
Comhmed Fleet. — The arrival of Air-Squadron Seven in Takao area is con-
firmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not confimed nor
denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following units are under the
immediate command of Cin C. Second Fleet :
CARDIV THREE
SUBRON FIVE
SUBRON SIX
CRUDIV FIVE
CRUDIV SEVEN
DESRON TWO
DESRON FOUR
THIRD FLEET
FRENCH INDO CHINA FORCE
Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships' but their assignment is not yet
definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third Fleet, China and
South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval General Staff ; Commander
in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above. Only one
message from Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This was ad-
dressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air Force, CRUDIV Four and BUMILAFF.
The HIYEI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fleet.
Third Fleet. — Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one message to Comdesron
Five, Number Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense Division One
and Comdesron Two and Four. He held extensive communications with the
Commander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKO. Two more units of Third Fleet
made movement reports.
Fourth Fleet. — Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander in
Chief Second Fleet, Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air Force.
He is still in TRUK area.
Submarines. — Traffic for Commander Submarine Force was routed through
SAIPAN today. He was at CHICHIJIMA yesterday.
South China. — CRUDIV Seven now in SAMA made a movement report but
direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander ad-
dressed several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO. The
Commander in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South China Naval
Bases and the South China Fleets, all for information to Commander in Chief
Second Fleet.
Communication Intelligence Summary, SO November 1941
General. — Traffic volume less than for past few days. Today's traffic consisted
largely of despatches bearing old dates, some as far back as 26 November. No
reason can be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high vol-
ume of traffic for past few days has prevented the repetition of despatches. The
number of despatches originated on the 30th is very small. The only tactical cir-
cuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several MARU'S. The TOKYO
Intelligence activity originated two WIWI despatches to Major Fleet Com-
manders. One urgent despatch was sent by NGS to Chief of Staff, Combined,
Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Feets, Combined Air Force; Submarine Force
and China Fleets.
Combined Fleet. — The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet are
in KURE, In the Same message the Chief of Staff Second Fleet was not at any
location. Other traffic indications are that he is at sea. Commander in Chief
Second Fleet sent one to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined
Air Foi'ce, but also included KONGO and HIYEI, which places them as members
of his Task Force. The Commander in Chief Second Fleet is no longer adding
PALAO activities and has not for past two days. The RNO PALAO today ad-
dressed two messages to TAIWAN GUNSIREIBU (Taiwan Army Headquarters).
Third Fleet. — Commander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to
COMDESRON two, Four and Five, COMCRUDIV five; First and Second Base
Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief Second
722 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Fleet. No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief
Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway.
Fourth Fleet. — Believed to be still in TRUK area. D. F. activity in Marshalls
a little greater day than normal. JALUIT addressed Commander Submarine
Force and A IRRON 24 in one despatch. The continued association of JALUIT
and Commander Submarine Force plus his known progress from the Empire to
CHICHIJIMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the Marshalls. Since
one of his large units (SITI4) arrived in the Marshalls some time ago this unit
cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a submarine concentration in that
area. Every evidence points to a concentration of not only the small Fourth
Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet Submarines of the
Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA AIR CORPS presence in that
area points to intended air-submarine operations from the Marshalls. Also the
presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least
one carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed.
BAKO Active with despatches to Second and Third Fleets, Combined Air Force
and SAMA. Commander in Chief China Fleet becoming more and more active
as an originator with despatches to the Task Force. He made a movement report
with the South China Fleet as an information addressee. The StafCommunica-
tion Officer of the South China Fleet was addressed at Shanghai today.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 December I941
Oeneral. — All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1
December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of six 'months or
more. Calls were last changed on 1 November WJ^l. The fact that service calls
lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for
active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to
the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one
to four or five days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting more
and more security provisions. A study of traffic to deliver all dispatches using
old calls so that promptly with the change of calls, there would be a minimum
of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromises. Either
that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pay the total vol-
ume and make it apepar as if nothing unusual was pending.
First fleet. — Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside
of Empire waters. It is believed that such a large percentage of the First
Fleet is operating with the Second Fleet Task Force that this fleet has ceased
to operate in a prominent role.
Second Fleet. — This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area
in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to
play an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the assumption is made
that this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task
Force are definitely in the Indo-China area (Cruiser Division Seven and De-
stroyer Squadron Three most prominent).
Third Fleet. — Nothing to report except that the same association of Second,
Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces
continues.
Fourth fleet. — No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area.
Fifth Fleet. — Nothing to report.
Submarines. — Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the
area to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan Flagship somewhere in
this general area.
Carriers. — No change.
Combined Air Force. — No change ;
Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 December 19^1
Oeneral. — The most promenent factor in today's traffic is the apparent con-
fusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet.
There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after
it appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao Radio received the
same dispatch that it has previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and
Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao Radio was broadcasting traffic to
these fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location
report, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao,
In several instances Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 723
Summing up 0II reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made
up of Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters hut is either
not close enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course
not close to Takao. Tlie change of calls on December 1st has prevented this
office from making definite statements at this date of the units now in the South-
ern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai Radio handled a
considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined
for units in the Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South China area continues
to appear in Shanghai. Comsixteen reported nine submarines proceeding south
by Camranh Bay. This group is believed to comprise both Submarine Squadrons
five and six, which units normally operate with the First Fleet but have been
Included repeatedly in the Second Fleet Task Force for Southern operations.
There vxis a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both
by major forces afloat and Tokyo. Hainan continues a a prominent address.
Palao and Third Base Force is holding the same relative importance.
First Fleet. — Dispite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet ap-
pears relatively quiet. From inconclusive evidence it a*ppcars as if there may be
been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff that these may
be two supreme commanders toith staffs. As an example, traffic routing indicates
one Combined Fleet Call associated with Second and Third Fleets and ap-
parently in company while another Combined Fleet calls appears not associated
with the second and Third Fleets.
Second Fleet. — No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days.
This is partly due to lack of nevj identifications but contributes somewhcpt to the
belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company. Cruiser
Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unlocated and unobserved
since change of calls.
Third Fleet. — Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way in
some of the Third Fleet traffic.
Mandates. — Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues. Some
traffic for Fourth Fleet units still going through Truk.
Carriers. — Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today.
Lack of identifications has some'wha<t promoted this lack of i7iformation. Hoto-
ever, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since
the change on the first of December, and not otie carrier call is at a low ebb.
Combined Air Force. — This force continues to be associated closely with Sec-
ond, Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have
undoubtedly left the Takao area.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 December 1941
General. — Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Present
state of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained.
The extensive use of alternate calls by the Major Commands slows up identifica-
tion of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far.
The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long despatches to the
CINC COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence
originated nine despatches to the same address.
The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed
by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takao the CINC SECOND FLEET is indi-
cated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is
indicated for delivery by that Station. It is the impression that both SECOND
and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence
means.
There are some FOURTH FLEET Unites in the Marshall Island area includ-
ing some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of these units is not
known. The SIXTH BASE FORCE at Jaluit addressed several messages to
CINC FOURTH.
Some Swatow Unites were addressed at Saigon today indicating a movement
of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako originated many despatches to the
BNO Taihoku and the Task Force Commander.
No information on Submarines or Carriers.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 December 1941
General. — Traffic volimie normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio
today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 5
724 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation. So far only a few mes-
sages have been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number
of urgent messages today, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders.
Among other Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven part message to Chiefs of Staff
China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China
Force and Saka. In all. This activity sent twelve messages to the major com-
manders.
Combined Fleet. — The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of mes-
sages from the CinC. Second Fleet and Cine. Third Fleet. These previously
very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not
yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed
to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now
believed that the CinC. Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that ap-
parently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broad-
castcast which Cine. Second Fleet is still Copying. The CinC. Combined Fleet
sent one message to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force
Palao, CinC. Second Fleet and CincC. Third Fleet.
Fourth Fleet. — The CinC. Fourth Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff Com-
bined Air Force, information to Eleventh Air corps, Chitose Air, Air Squadron
Twenty-Four, Third Base Force at Palao and Fourth Base Force at Truk. No
further check could be made today on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the
Marshalls. Jaluit appeared many times in today's traffic being associated with
Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo Radio and MUSI 88 (Which is believed to
be an oil tanker).
Soiith China. — Bako continues as an active originator addressing many mes-
sages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China Commanders,
all units in that area quiet.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 5 December 1941
General. — Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broad-
cast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operation.
There were several new intercept schedules heard. OMINATO radio working
SAMA and BAKo sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handing traffic
to Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic
for these units also. It is noted that some traffic being broadcast is several
days old which indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio
organization.
There were many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused
by the jammed conditions of all circuits.
A plain language message was sent by the Captain, OKAWA from Tokyo to
Takao probably for further relay addressed to FUJIHARA, Chief of the Political
Affairs Bureau, saying that "in reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said
is considered important at this end but proceed with what you are doing, specific
orders will be issued soon".
Combined Fleet. — Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have orig-
inated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving
their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther
south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from
the Commander Carriers or Submarines Force has been seen either.
TJxird Fleet. — In one WE address a "Chief of Staff" sent a message to "Com-
mander Fourteenth Army aboard RYUJOMARU in Third Fleet."
HITOYONGUN SATI (IRO 1 REUZEU MARU). A number of MARUs
have been addressing the CinC. Third Fleet.
Fourth Fleet. — The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication Officer
of the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today strengthening the impres-
sion that the CinC. Fourth Fleet is in the Marshalls. The Commander of the
South China Fleet has been addressing the Palao radio and the RNO TAI-
HOKU and the Commander Second Fleet.
South China. — SAMA addressed much traffic to CinC. Second Fleet. BAKO
continues as an active originator with many dispatches to Second and Third
Fleet. The Commander Combined Air Force api)ears to be busy with the move-
ment of Air Corps. SHIOGAMA air and at least two unidentified corps are
moving, probably to Indo-China.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 725
Communication Intelligence Summary 6 December 19^1
Oeneral. — Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being
transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic.
This is not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level, but is the result
of confusion in traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now
•holding broadcasts are TOKYO (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts),
SAIPAN, OIMAUTO and TAKAO.
Yesterday's high level of traffic from TOKYO originators was maintained with
the Intelligence activity still sending periodic messages. Practically all of
TOKYO'S messages carry prefixes of high priority.
Combined Fleet. — Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders.
These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The
Commander in Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers,
Fourth Fleet and the Major Commanders.
Fourth Fleet. — The Conunander in Chief Fourth Fleet is again in the TRUK
area. It is doubtfull that he ever went to JALUIT although it is certain that
some members of his staff were there over the past few days. There is a definite
close association between the Third Base Force at PALAO and the forces in
South China. This unit is constantly sending messages to the Chief of Staff of
the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces and BAKO. It is being almost
entirely neglected by Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet under whose command
it normall operates. RONGELAB radio addressed the PALAO weather observer.
Fifth Fleet.— Th\& fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN sea with OMINATO
broadcasting traffic for this unit.
Submarines. — The Commander Submarine Force originated two messages to
his command. These are the first two originated since 1 December. He is
definitely in the MARSHALLS.
South China. — Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAMA and TAKAO still sending
many messages to the Task force.
SECRET
Station H, 1 December, 1941.
Chronology
South China Area : No change in location of flagships assigned to the China
area was observed. Subron 6 is at Takao and is probably going South. Airron 7
is in the vicinity of Hainan Isand. Comdr. Combined Air Force is still at Takao,
Sheet #95431. RMO Tuihoku originated a message with prefix, MIN — highest
priority, action Bako, information Sama, Takao and Chiefs of Staff of five un-
identified calls. Sheet #95451 CinC South China Fleet originated a despatch
with prefix, KIU NIELA WIWI — Urgent-special cipher, action three imidentified
calls.
Combined Fleet: CinO's Combined, First and Second Fleets are all believed
to be in the Kure area. CinC Second Fleet sent a code movement report it is
po.ssible that this Command will go to South China or Indo-China.
Very little activity was observed in the Kure or Casebo area. Most of the
activity seamed to be in South China, but this might have been caused by more
thorough coverage of South China circuits, with less coverage of Empire circuits.
Submarines : No activity noted in Subforce. Comdr. Subforce is in the Man-
dates, probably with a number of submarines. Some submarine units are still
based at Yokosuka and Kure.
Fourth Fleet : CinC Fourth Fleet is still at Truk.
No unusual activity noted in the Mandates, except that Comdr. Subforce is in
the vicinity of Saipan and will probably go to Truk to join CinC Forth Fleet.
General : Service calls for units afloat were changed on 1 December. The flrst
new calls were noticed about 1100. Old calls were used by some units until
evening. The "WE" (enciphered) addresses were also changed. The only shore
call observed to be changed was 0ASI4 (Sama, Hainan) to YUIl.
Three kana authenticators were used after the message NRs on several des-
patches but were not used on others. This was begun after the change of calls.
A large number of DF despatches, originated by MENUl (Jaluit), were sent
on the UTU broadcast, information IKAl (unidentified). These messages were
originated several days ago. Several messages, originated by Comsubforce, were
also sent on the UTU broadcast for action of Subforce. These were also several
days old.
Saipan, using the call HOKO, called FUHO (Tokyo) and NUKU (Takao) on
726 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATl.^OK
13013 Kcs during the day. On 14310A Kcs (Takao to ships) NUKU (Takao)
called RIKU once and then secured.
A considerable number of messages that had been originated several days ago
were noted in traffic intercepted. This might have been done to keep the volume
of traffic up to cover-up for a decrease in the amount of traffic originated.
Station H, 2 December, 1941.
South China Area: CinC China Fleet (aboard Idzumo) is at Shanghai; CinO
South China Fleet (aboard Isuzu) is in Canton area ; Comdr. Indo-China Force is
at Saigon ; CinC Central China Fleet is at Shanghai.
Takao continues to accept traffic for delivery to Comdr. Combined Air Force
and Commanding Officer Kanoya Air Station. Desrons 4 and 5 and Chogei (flag-
ship Subron — ) are in Takao area and are probably going South,
Several high precedence despatches were originated by South China units,
indicating increased activity in that area.
The following units normally based in Japan have gone South to Hainan or
Indo-China areas: Desrons 2, 4 and 5, Subrons 5 and 6, Airron 7 and Crudiv 7.
Combined Fleet : CinC's Combined and First Fleets are believed to have re-
mained at Kure with the First Fleet and most of the Second Fleet. CinC Second
Fleet has shifted to Sasebo and is probably going to South China to direct
operations of units sent to this area from the Empire.
No signs of movement of the Third Fleet or Carriers were given in today's
traffic. It is believed that they remain in the vicinity of Kyushu. Cardiv 4 is
believed to still be at Sasebo. Cardiv 3 has not shown any activity during the
last few days, and it is possible that this unit has gone South.
Submarines : No activity in the Subforce has been observed. Comdr. Subforce is
in the Mandates. Several submarine units are still at Yokosuka and Kure.
Several despatches originated by Mandate units were given to Comsubforce for
information.
Fourth Fleet : CinC Fourth Fleet remains at Truk.
Several high precedence despatches yrere originated by Fourth Fleet units,
indicating activity of some sort is taking place in the Mandates.
General: Takao Air Station (MER06) was heard sending traffic (broadcast),
formerly sent on the UTU broadcast, to REHES (Combined Air Force) on
11500M Kcs during the evening watch.
Addition to "WE" table : YO=A.
Station H, 3 December, 1941.
South China Area : No change in location of major flagships assigned to South
China waters was observed.
Takao was acting as radio guard for CinC Second Fleet, Comdr CAF and
Comdg. Officer Kanoya Air Corps. Bako was much more active than usual and
was probably acting as relay station for vessels going South. Bako was heard
vcorking Takao on 3705A Kcs during the evening ; this station stopped working
Tako on the hour to hold schedule with ships.
Takao, using call NUKU, was heard broadcasting traffic on 7155A Kcs (night)
and 14310A Kcs (day). This broadcast was similar to the Tokyo UTU broad-
cast. Traffic was broadcast to CinC's Combined, Second and Third Fleets,
Comdr. Combined Air Force, Comdr. Indo-hina Force and several unidentified
afloat calls.
NUKU (Takao) and MAYA were heard working each other on 6762 Kcs dur-
ing the evening.
Considerable high precedence traffic was originated by South China or Indo-
China units indicating unusual activity in this area.
Combined neet: CinC's Combined and First Fleets are believed to be in the
Kure area. CinC Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and is probably going
South.
There were no indications that CinC Third Fleet had moved South, except that
Takao was heard broadcasting traffic for that command. It is believed that the
Carriers are still based at or near Sasebo.
Very little activity was observed in the Empire.
Submarines : No activity in the Subforce was noted. Comdr. Subforce is be-
lieved to still be in the Mandates. Submarine units are believed to be in port at
Yokosuka and Kure.
Fourth Fleet : Very little activity observed in the Fourth Fleet. CinC Fourth
Fleet is still at Truk. Normal activity was indicated in traffic intercepted in this
area. Several ships were in the Truk and Jaluit areas. No activity of any kind
was noticed in the Palao area.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 727
General: Tokyo (FUHO), Takao (NUKU) and Saipan (HOKO) were heard
working each other on 13000A Kcs during the day and early evening. Takao
relayed trafBc from Saipan to Tokyo.
Station H, 4 December, 19^1.
South China Ai-ea: CinC China Fleet is at Shanghai; CinC South China
is in the vicinity of Amoy ; Comdr Indo-China Force is at Saigon.
Takao continues to broadcast traflBc on 7155A (night) and 14310A Kcs (day)
to ships in that vicinity. A regular series of UTU numbers are being used by
Takao and the broadcast is similar to Tokyo's. Takao uses the call, NUKU
and calls RIKU (All ships in my vicinity?).
NUKU (Takao), TAI (Sama) and TANU (Saigon?) were heard working
each other on 7008N Kcs during the evening. TANU sent traffic to Takao,
originated by KORU0 (Kanoya Air Corps), indicating this unit is at Saigon.
Note sheet #96819 sent by TANU (Saigon?) to TAI (Sama) for delivery
to "WE" address, (TONUSIUDANSANJIUTEU— Army?). The text of the
message consisted of 3 numeral groups. Sheet #96829 was similar, except that
the text consisted of 4 numeral groups.
Combined Fleet : CinC's Combined and First Fleets are believed to have
remained in' the Kure area. CinC's Second and Third Fleets are probably in
the vicinity of Takao and might be going South. Takao broadcasted traffic ad-
dressed to CinC's Second and Third Fleets.
Very little activity was observed in the Sasabo or Kure areas. The Carriers
are believed to have remained in the vicinity of Kyushu.
Submarines : No activity among the submarines was observed. Comdr.
Subforce is still in the Mandates. Several submarine units remain at Tokosuka
and Kure.
Fourtn Fleet: CinC Fourth Fleet is believed to have remained at Truk.
CinC Fifth Fleeth is probably at Chichijima.
Very little activity was noted in the Mandates. Several messages were ex-
changed between CinC Fourth Fleet and Commanders in South China waters.
General: KUNIWI (Tokyo Naval Intelligence) sent a 7 part SUU WIWI
despatch to Chiefs of Staff Combined, Second, Third, China, South China, Indo-
China Fleets and to Sama. A number of high precedence messages were also
sent to the above addresses, to general collective calls and to KANKA (All
ships and stations) by Naval Intelligence and Communication Division, Tokyo.
The large number of high precedence messages and general distribution might
indicate that the entire Navy is being instructed to be prepared for drastic action.
Station H, 5 December, 19Ifl.
South China Area : No change in location of major units in South China has
been observed.
Increased activity in South China and Indo-China indicates that a move of
some sort in that area is imminent.
Takao continues the use of the UTU broadcast on 7155 Kcs to units in that
area. From all indications CinC's Second and Third Fleets are in the Takao
area or have moved even farther South from Takao.
■ Tokyo Naval Intelligence and Communication Division continue sending high
precedence messages for general distribution and especially to CinC's Combined,
Second, Third, South China Fleets and Comdrs Indo-China and Combined Air
Forces. From all indications CinC Second Fleet is in command of operations
in Indo-China and South China areas.
Combined Fleet: It is believed that CinC's Combined and First Fleets remain
at Kure. Very little activity was observed in the Empire.
CinC's Second and Third Fleets are probably in the Takao area or in South
China. No indication as to location of the Carriers was noted in today's
traffic, although it is believed they remain in the vicinity of Kyushu.
Submarines: No activity in the Subforce was observed. Comdr. Subforce is
in the Mandates. It is believed that one Subron is at Yokosuka and another at
Kure.
Fourth Fleet: Very little activity was observed in the Mandated Islands.
CinC Fourth Fleet seems to have moved from Truk to the Jaluit area.
Comsubfor is probably in company with CinC Fourth Fleet.
There has been quite an exchange of messages between units in the Fourth
Fleet and in the South China or Indo-China areas. This indicates closer cooper-
ation between the Mandate and South China forces.
728 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General : Saipan, Ominato and Takao were heard broadcasting traffic to vessels
in their vicinity. Tokyo broadcasted traffic on 12330 Kcs in addition to his
regular UTU broadcast. At a430/6th Tokyo was observed using 32 Kcs for an
UTU broadcast. This frequency was used dual with 12330 Kcs. Signals were
very strong during the day. The use of this low frequency indicates traffic sent
on this broadcast is for ships at a great distance from Tokyo.
— ? — 4 (Saigon?), LU3 (Palao) and HAKU6 (Tokyo) were heard working each
other on 4746M Kcs at midnight.
Ominato, Chichijima and Tokyo were heard on 6020 and 4010 Kcs during the
evening watch. Chichijima called Yokosuka, but that station was not heard.
Kanoyu Air, Yokosuka Air and 9NUU (Plane ?) were also on this frequency.
Ominato was heard sending traffic to UFUl (5th fleet) on 4010 Kcs. This
command has probably split, with part of it at Chichijima and the rest at
Ominato.
Station E 6 December, 1941.
South China area: CinC China Fleet (aboard Idzumo) is at Shanghai. CinC
South China Fleet (aboard Isuzu) is in the vicinity of Amoy. Comdr. Indo-China
Force (aboard Kashi) is at Saigon. CinC Central China Fleet is at or near
Hankow and CinC North China Fleet is in vicinity of Tsingtao.
Considerable activity in the South China and Indo-China areas was indicated
by the large amount of high precedence traffic originated by and sent to units in
these areas. Most of the traffic sent to units in Southern waters was originated
by Tokyo.
CinC's 2nd and 3rd Fleets are still in the vicinity of Takao or farther south.
Comdr. Combined Air Force is at Takao Air. Traffic for Kanova Air Corps,
Shiogama Air Corps, Genzan Air Corps, 11th Air Corps, Takao Air Corps and other
units believed to be Air Corps or squadrons was handled by Takao, indicating
they are in the South China or Indo-China area.
Takao continues to broadcast traffic for ships in that vicinity on 7155 Kcs (A)
(night) and on 14310 Kcs (A) (day).
Combined Fleet : CinC's Combined and 1st Fleets are believed to still be in the
Kure area.
Very little activity in the Empire was observed. Most of the traffic addressed
to CinC's 2nd and 3rd Fleets and Comdrs. Combined Air Force and Indo-China
Force is also given to CinC Combined Fleet — probably to keep that command
informed of operations being carried out in Indo-China.
Submarines : No activity of importance was observed in the SubForce. Com-
SubForce originated several messages addressed to the entire Submarine force.
This command is in the Mandates, but it is not known whether he is at Jaluit
or Truk. Several indications lead to the belief that ComSubForce is at Jaluit.
At least two Subrons are believed to have remained in home waters, with one
at Yokosnka and the other at Kure.
Fourth Fleet : It has been definitely established by traffic study that CinC 4th
Fleet is in the Truk area. Several times traffic routing indicated that part of the
Staff of CinC 4th Fleet was at Jaluit. It is i>ossible that this command has been
split-up for better administration of all operations in the South Seas. The
Kamoi (with Commanding Officer, Chitose Air Corps aboard) is in the Jaluit
area.
Traffic continues to be exchanged between several 4th Fleet units and Com-
mands in the Indo-China area.
Fifth Fleet: Ominato has been heard working the flagship and at least one
other unit of the 5th Fleet for the last few days. This fleet has been based at
Chichijima for some time. It is probable that part of this force has remained at
Chichijima ; it is known that KE06 (Airron attached to 5th Fleet) is there.
General : At 0430, Tokyo was heard using 32 Kcs, dual with 12330 Kcs, for UTU
broadcast of traffic. This broadcast was discontinued at 1800, but 7285 Kcs (M)
was immediately brought up and used until 1900, when it was secured. This
broadcast was used in addition to Tokyo's regular UTU. Tokyo also broadcasted
traffic on 6665 Kcs (A) during the evening.
Saipan, Takao and Ominato were also heard broadcasting traffic to units in
their vicinities. The use of this method of delivering messages tends to keep
unknown the positions of vessels afloat, and is probably one of the first steps
toward placing the operations of the Navy on a war-time basis.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 729
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 20
top secbet
The Secretary of the Navy,
Washington 25, D. C, 2Jf May 1945.
0P-2(>-4-mp
Serial 0002720
(SC)A17-24(1)
From : The Secretary of the Navy.
To : John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant.
Subj : Testimony and documentary evidence to be presented to Admiral H.
Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor Investigation.
Ref : (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, con-
cerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.
1. Forwarded herewith are the following, certified in jacket form NJA 24, to
be used in the proceedings directed by reference (a) :
(a) Photostatic copy of station "S" intercept sheets 5651, 5652 and 5653
(Tokyo Circular # 2492, 7 December 1941) ; and
(b) Photographic print of JD-1 : 7148, Circular #2494, 7 December 1941.
2. Your attention is directed to the fact that these documents are classified
TOP SECRET. When used in accordance with reference (a), the return of
these documents to this office is directed.
James Forrestal.
James Forrestal.
SF DE JAH S 7 DEC 41
621 S TOKYO 19 7 8508 JG
KOSHI PANAMA
Urgent 92494 KOYANAGI RIJIYORI SEIRINOTUGOO ARUNITUKI HAT-
TORI MINAMI KINENBUNKO SETURITU KIKINO KYOKAINGAKU SIKYUU
DENPOO ARITASI STOP— TOGO
1208 S JP
7630
S. 387/7 850S GR23
Obese ovals RPWMO RFNMO RTJMO RWFMO gnome
SF DE JAH S 7 DEC 41
622 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG KOSHI HAVANA
623 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI HONOLULU
624 S TOKYO 19 7 850 JG RIYOJI NEW YORK
625 S TOKYO 22 7 850S JG JAPANESE CONSUL VANCOUVER
626 S TOKYO 22 7 850 JG JAPANESE MINISTER OTTAWA ONT
(Same text and sign as our NR5651)
1220 JP
7630
SF DE JAH S 7 DEC 41
627 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI S.\N FRANCISCO
628 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI PORTLAND ORE
629 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI SEATTLE
680 S TOKYO 19 7 850 S JG RIYOJI NEW ORLEANS LA
631 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI CHICAGO ILL
632 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI LOS ANGELES CAL
(Same text and sign as our NR5651)
1243 JP
7630
From: Tokyo.
To: (Circular telegram).
7 December 1941.
(Plain Japanese language using code names.)
Circular #2494.
Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.
730 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 21
PACIFIC FLEET INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN #45-41, 27 NOVEMBER 1941
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship HRK
Cincpac File No.
A8/FFl/(25) Pearl Haebor, T. H.,
Serial 01954 November 27, IHl.
Confidential
From : Commander-in-Cliief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To : PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject : Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.
Enclosure: (A) Subject Bulletin.
1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for information.
2. BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF BOTH THE SOVRCB
AND INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, IT IS OF THE HIGHEST IM-
PORTANCE THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL CHARACTER OF THIS BE
CAREFULLY PRESERVED.
3. This information obtained from Naval Intelligence sources has been re-
produced by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Any request
for additional copies of this document will be made to the Commander-in-Chief,
and not to the Division of Naval Intelligence.
4. Additional copies shall not be made. This bulletin should be retained for
study and reference (plus subsequent additions or correction) during the present
National Emergency.
P. C. Crosley,
P. C. Crosley,
By direction.
DISTRIBUTION: (7CM-41)
List I, Case 3 ; P, X.
Atlantic Fleet Al ;
Asiatic Fleet Al ;
One copy each to :
FATU, NTS, NC4, ND11-ND14,
NB49, Rdo. & Snd. Lab.
CONTENTS
(A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEETS Pages 1 to 12 inclusive.
Major Fleet Commands __. Page 1.
Combined Fleet and First Fleet " 2.
Combined Fleet and Second Fleet " 3.
Third Fleet " 4.
Fourth Fleet •' 5 and 6.
Fifth Fleet " 7.
Sixth Fleet — (Submarine Fleet) " 7.
Carrier Fleet " 8.
Combined Air Force " 9.
Train for Combined Fleet " 10.
Japanese Naval Forces in China " 11 and 12.
(B) JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN
THE MANDATED ISLANDS Pages 13 and 14.
General Situation.
Air Distribution.
Table "A" showing distribution of material and personnel forces in
Mandates (2 pages to be pasted together).
Sketh of PALAO (PELEW).
Sketch of MALAKAI Harbor, etc.
Sketch of JALUIT Harbor, etc.
PROCEEDINGS OP HEWITT INQUIRY
731
[1]
(A) Organization of the Japanese Fleet. Octobeb 30, 1941. (10574)
The following revision of Op-16-F-2, O. N. I. Serial #27-41 supersedes and
replaces the former report on this subject.
The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet coni-
mands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane
tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in
connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has
resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as shown
below.
MAJOR FLEET COMMANDS
(Battle Force) 3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2
(Scouting Force) Desrons.
(Blockade & Transport4 Crudivs, 2 Desrons, etc.
Force) Small craft.
(Mandate Defense Force) 1 Desron, 1 Subron and
many small units.
I. Combined Fleet
1. First Fleet
2. Second Fleet
3. Third Fleet
4. Fourth Fleet
5. Fifth Fleet
6. Sixth Fleet
7. Carrier Fleet
8. Combined Air
Force
II. Japanese Naval
Forces in China.
1. First China Exped.
Fleet.
2. Second China Ex-
ped. Fleet.
3. Third China Ex-
ped: Fleet.
4. Southern Exped.
Fleet.
[2] The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than
ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the
line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The
base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly in-
creased the strength of the Navy, which is on full-wartime footing.
COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET
YAMAMOTO Isoroku, CinO (Admiral)
NAGATO, Flagship
(Submarine Fleet)
(Aircraft Carriers)
(Seaplane tenders, etc.)
(Staff Headquarters)
(Central China)
(South China)
(North China)
( Saigon )
6 Subrons.
5 Cardivs.
4 Airrons, & shore based
planes.
1 PG and 3 DD's
Gunboats
1 CA, 1 CL and small
craft.
Torpedo Boats, etc.
1 . CL, transports and
mine craft.
FIRST FLEET
Batdiv One
NAGATO (F)
MUTSU
YAMASHIRO
Batdiv Tico
FUSO (F)
ISE
HYUGA
Batdiv Three
HIYEI (F)
KONGO
KIRISHIMA
*HARUNA
Crudiv Six
KAKO (F)
FURUTAKA
AOBA
KINUGASA
Desron One
ABUKUMA (F)
Desdiv 6
IKAZUCHI (F)
INAZUMA
SAZANAMI
HIBIKI
Desdiv 21
NENOHI (F)
HATSUHARU
HATSUSHIMO
WAKABA
Desdiv 21
SHIRATSUYU (F)
ARIAKE
YUGURE
SHIGURE
*NOTB
repairs.
The HARUNA has been inactive during 1941, and is probably undergoing major
732 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET— Continued
Desron Three
SENDAI (F)
Desdiv 11
FUBUKI (F)
SHIRAYUKI
HATSUYUKI
Desdiv 12
SHIRAKUMO (F)
SHINONOME
USUGOMO
MURAKUMO
Desron Three — Continued
Desdiv 19
ISONAMI (F)
SHIKINAMI
AYANAMI
URANAMI
Desdiv 20
AMAGIRI (F)
ASAGIRI
YUGIRI
SAGIRI
Total : 10 BB, 4 CA, 2CL, 27 DD.
[S]
COMBINED FLEET
SECOND FLEET
TAKAO, Flagship
Crudiv F'jur
TAKAO (F)
ATAGO
CHOKAI
MAYA
Crudiv Five*
MYOKO (F)
NACHI
HAGURO
Crudiv Seven
KUMANO (F)
MOGAMI
MIKUMA
SUZUYA
Crudiv Ei(j}it
TONE (F)
CHIKUMA
Desron Two
JINTSU (F)
Desdiv 8
ASASHIO (F)
ARASHIO
OSHIO
MICHISHIO
Desdiv 15
KUROSHIO
OYASHIO
NATSUSHIO
HAYASHIO
Desron Two (Cont'd)
Desdiv 16
HATSUKAZE
YUKIKAZE
AMATSUKAZE
TOKITSUKAZE
Desdiv 18
KASUMI
ARARE
KAGERO
SHIRANUHI
Desron Four
NAKA (F)
Desdiv 2
YUDACHI (F)
MURASAME
HARUSAME
SAMIDARE
Desdiv 9
ASAGUMO
YAMAGUMO
MINEGUMO
NATSUGUMO
Desdiv 24
KAWAKAZE (F)
YAMAKAZE
SUZUKAZE
UMIKAZE
Total: 13 CA, 2 CL, 28 DD.
♦Note : There is a possibility that a new cruiser has been added to Crudiv 5.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
733
U]
THIRD FLEET
TAKAHASHI Ibo— Vice Admiral
« NAGARA, Flagship
NORTHERN BLOCKADE FORCE Minelayer Division
- CHOGEI (F) ITSUKUSHIMA (F)
Subdiv AOTAKA
HATSUTAKA
Mine Sweeper Division 1 and 21
AM-1 AM-7
Subdiv AM-2 AM-8
AM-3 AM-9
_ AM-4 AM-10
AM-5 AM-11
2nd BLOCKADE FORCE AM-6 AM-12
Desron Five Gunboat Division 1
NATORI (F) ~ 6 Gunboats (Converted Fish-
Desdiv 5 in" Vessels)
ASAKAZE SUBCHASER SQUADRON
HAKUKAZE . (F)
MATSUKAZE Suoctiaser Division 1 and 11
HATAKAZE PC-1 PC-7
r» ^- ^o PC-2 PC-8
Desdiv 12 pp o pp Q
^TfArTrroTTCT Subcliaser Division 21 and 31
■c Uiuli-bUivl pp_4 PP in
MINATSUKI pp:t ^^-f*/
NAGATSUKI ^^_^ ^gfj^
Desdiv 34 21 AP— Names Unknoimi
HAKAZB 2nd BASE FORCE
AKIKAZE Maru, (F)
YUKAZE Minelayer Division 11
TACHIKAZB SHIRATAKA
1st BASE FORCE YAEYAMA -
Maru (F) KUNAJIRI
At least 5 other men of war, and 17
merchant ships.
Total, 1 CL, 12 DD, 1 AS, 6 SS, 6 CM,
12 AM, 6 XPG, 12 PC, 46 AP.
[5]
Crudiv Eighteen
TENRYU (F)
TATSUTA
KASHIMA
Desron Six
YUBARI (F)
Desdiv 29
01 TE
HAYATE
ASANAGI
YUNAGI
Desdiv SO
MITSUKI (F)
KISARAGI
YAYOI
MOCHITSUKI
FOURTH FLEET
HIRATA— Vice Admiral
KASHIMA, Flagship
Subron Seven
JINGEI
Subdiv 26
RO-60
RO-61
RO-62
Subdiv 21
RO-65
RO-66
RO-67
Subdiv 33
RO-63
RO-64
RO-68
Subdiv
8 XPG
734 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FOURTHTFLEET— Continued
Survey and Patrol Division
KOSHU
KATSURIKI (CM)
KOMABASHI (AS)
Repair and Salvage Division
MATSUEI ]MARU
NAGAURA (MARU)
3rd BASE FORCE
Palao, Headquarters
Maru (F)
Chiard Division S
Maru
Subdiv 6
RO-56
RO-57
RO-58
RO-59
Subchaser Division 55
Maru (F)
(?)
(?)
(?)
(?)
XPG 551
XPG 552
XPG 553
XPG 554
9 AP or AK
THIRD DEFENCE
PALAO)
Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in-
cluding Air Group #16 and TOBI
detachment of 4th Defence Force
Detach. 4th Def. Force
FORCE (HQ
[6]
(Estimate these unknown loca-
tions to be SOROL, HELEN
REEF, ULITHI, YAP and
ANGUAR).
4th BASE FORCE
Truk, Headquarters
Maru (F)
Guard Division 4
Maru (F)
4 AP or AK
FOURTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-
TRUK
Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in-
cluding Air Group #17 and
Ponape Detachment of 4th Def.
Force, Kusaie Detachment of 4th
Def. Force, Olol Detachment of
4th Def. Force, Greenwich De-
tachment of 4th Def. Force, Mort-
lock Detachment of 4th Def.
Force, Pingelap Detachment of
4th Def. Force, Puluwat Detach-
ment of 4th Def. Force, Lamotrek
Detachment of 4th Def. Force,
(Hall ?) Detachment of
4th Def. Force.
5th BASE FORCE
Saipan, Headquarters
SHOEI MARU ^)
Guard Division o
Composition unknown
Minelayer Division 19
OKINOSHIMA (F)
TOKIWA
Stihchaser Division 56
KASHI (F)
XPG 561 (?)
XPG 562 (?)
XPG 563 (?)
Gunhoat Division 8
Composition unknown
9 AP or AK
FIFTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ—
SAIPAN)
Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in-
cluding Air Group #18
T^enian Detachment, 5th Defence
Force PAGAN
6th BASE FORCE
Jaluit, Headquarters
TAKUHAN MARU (F)
Mine Siveeper Division 16
NAGATA MARU (F)
CHOKAI MARU
DAIDO MARU
IKUTA MARU
'This may
? be the
l"_"I~l'_"r_"Maru J SALVAGE
Maru 1 Unit known
Maru to be in 6th
iBase Force
SuTjcJiaser Division 5
PC-51
PC5-52
PC-53
SIXTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-
JALUIT)
KAIKEI Maru
#5 FUKU Maru
Maru
Miscellaneous Forces ashore in-
cluding AIR GROUP #19 at
IMIBJI, Jaluit Atoll and
probable Air Groups at
WOT.JE and KWAJALEIN
and RUOTTO Is. (Kwajaleiu
Atoll)— Detachment 6th De-
fence Force KWAJALEIN
Is. (Kwajalein Atoll),
TARO A Is. ( Maloelap Atoll ) ,
ENIV7ET0K Is (Eniwetok
Atoll), UJELANG Atoll,
ENYBOR Is. (Jaluit Atoll),
IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit Atoll),
WOTJE Atol— Detach, of 6th
Def. Force, UTIRIK Atoll-
Detach, of 6th Def. Force
Total : 4 CL, 9 DD, 2 AS, 16 SS, 1 Sur-
vey Ship, 3 CM, 15 XPG, 3 PC, 4 XAM,
41 AP or AK.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
735
[7]
FIFTH FLEET
CL (F)
The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown.
The Flagship has been reported at Maisuru.
SIXTH FLEET
(Subarine Fleet)
KATORL Flagship
Subron One
TAIGEI (F)
Subdiv 1
1-9
1-15
1-16
1-17
SuMiv 2
1-18
1-19
1-20
Subron Two
KITAGAMI (F)
Subdiv 7
I-l
1-2
1-3
1-7
Subdiv 8
1-4
1-5
1-6
Subron Three
NAGOYA MARU (F)
Subdiv 11
1-74
1-75
Subdiv 12
1-8
1-68
1-69
1-70
Subdiv 20
1-71
1-72
1-73
Subron Five
YURA (F)
Subdiv 28
1-59
I-€0
Subdiv 29
1-61 (Sauk 10-2-41)
1-62
1-64
Subdiv 30
1-65
1-66
Subron Six
KINU (F)
Subdiv 9
1-123
1-124
Subdiv 13
1-121
1-122
Subron Ten
KARASAKI (F) *
Subdiv 18
1-53
1-54
1-55
Subdiv 19
1-56
1-57
1-58
Subdiv 21
RO-33
RO-34
TOTAL : 3 CL, 2 AS, 1 AP, 42 SS.
•NOTE : The old sub-tender KARASAKI appears to have been recommissioned.
[8]
Cardiv 1
AKAGI
KAGA (F)
Desdiv 7
OBORO (F)
USHIO
AKEBONO
AKATSUKI
CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs)
CV KAGA, Flagship
Cardiv 2
SORYU (F)
HIRYU
Desdiv 23
UZUKI
KTKUTSUKI
MIKATSUKI
YUZUKI
736 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK
CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs)— Continued
Cardiv 3
RYUJO (F)
HOSHO
Desdiv 17
ISOKAZE
URAKAZE
HAMAKAZE
Cardiv Jf
ZUIKAKU
SHOKAJMU
TOTAL : 10 OV, 16 DD.
Cardiv 4 — Continued
Desdiv 3
HOKAZE
SHIOKAZE
KAMIKAZE
NU]VIAKAZE
Cardiv
CV KORYU
CV KASUGA (MARU)
[9]
COMBINED AIR FORCE
Kanoya Naval Air Station, Hdqtrs.
Shore-basecl land planes and seaplanes. The organization provides for great
mobility. Air units are ordered to work with other forces, and return to the
Combined Air Force pool when their mission is fulfilled. The named Air Groups
(e. g. the Takao Air Group) are not tied down to their stations, but are sent
freely wherever they are needed. Furthermore, the various air squadrons and
air groups frequently split into smaller units, and are scatered over wide areas.
Because of this extreme mobility, tlie picture is constantly changing. Accord-
ingly, the following list makes no attempt to indicate all the temporary group-
ings into which the various units may be combined.
Ship-Based Squadrons
Shoeb-Based Gkoups
Air Ron 6
8th Air Group
KAMIKAWA MARU (F)
10th Air Group
FUJIKAWA MARU
11th Air Group
KEN.TO MARU
12th Air Group
(Has been working with
the
3rd
14th Air Group
Fleet)
16th Air Group
Air Ro?i 7
17th Air Group
CHITOSE (F)
18th Air Group
CHIYODA
19th Air Group
MIZUHO
23rd Air Group
(Has been working with
the
1st
Chichijima
Fleet)
Chinkai
Air Ron 24
Genzan
KAMOI (F)
Hyakurihara (or
Moriibara)
IXAV
Iwakuni
Yokohama Air Group
Kanoya (Hdqtrs.)
Chitose Air Group
Kashima
(Has been working with
the
4th
Kasumigaura
Sasebo
Fleet)
Kisarazu
Suzuka
Patrol Squadron 2
Kure
Takao
NOTORO
Maizuru
Tateyama
(Formerly with Air Ron 6)
Oita
Ominato
Omura
Saeki
Tsukuba
Usa
Yatabe
Yokosuka
Total : 5 AV, 3 XAV, 85 Air Groups.
UO]
SHIRETOKO
SATA
TSURUMI
SHIRIYA
IRO
TRAIN FOR COMBINED FLEET
ONDO
HAYATOMO
NARUTO
MAMIYA
ASAHI
AKASHI
MUROTO
OTOMARU
SETTSU
Total : 8 AO, 1 AF, 2 AR, 1 AC, 1 Ice Breaker, 1 Target Ship.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
737
IW
JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA
KOGA, Mineichi — Vice Admiral
IZUMO, Flagship
Shanghai Base Force
ASUGA KURI
TSUGA HASU
Shanghai Hartor Affairs Section
Special Naval Landing Force, Shanghai
Nanking Base Force
Special Naval Landing Force, Nanking
TOTAL : 1 OCA, 1 PG, 3 DD.
Centeal China Fleet, or First Expedi-
tionary Fleet
•KOMATSU, Teruhisa— Vice Admiral
UJI, Flagship
Partol Division 11
ATAMI
FUTAMI
FUSHIMI
SUMIDA
HASHIDATE
(F)
ATAKA
SETA
KATADA
HIRA
HOZU
TOBA
Air Group 10
Hankow Base Force
Kiukiang Base Force
Gunboat Division t f
SHINFUKU MARU
HITONOSE
CHIKUBU
TOTAL : 4 PG, 10 PR, 1 AP.
South China Fleet, or Second Expedi-
tionary FLEErr
NIIMI, Masaichi, Vice Admiral
ISUZU, Flagship
Crudiv 15
ISUZU (F)
ASHIGARA
Patrol Division 14
SAGA
AM-17
AM-18
TOTAL: 1 OCA, IDD, 8-TB, 1 AP.
South China Fleet, or Second Expe-
ditionary Fleet — Continued
Torpedo Boat Division 1
OTORI
HAYABUSA
HIYODORI
KASASAGI
Guard Division 15
Guard Division 16
Canton Base Force
Amoy Base Force
Hainan Is. Base Force
13 Special Service Ships
TOTAL: 1 CA, 1 CL, 4 TB, 1 PG,
2 AM, 13 Misc.
[12]
North China Fleet, or Third Expedi-
tionary Fleet
SUGIYAMA, Rokozo, Vice Admiral
IWATE, Flagship
Patrol Division 12
IWATE (F)
MANRI MARU
Torpedo Boat Division 11
HATO KARI
SAGI KIJI
Torpedo Boat Division 21
CHIDORI
MANAZURU
TOMOZURU
HATSUKARI
KARUKAYA
Gunioat Division 1
Gunboat Division 2
Gunboat Division 13
Gunboat Division 14
Tsingtao Base Force
Southern Expeditionary Fleet
KASHII (F) (CL)
SHIMUSHU (CM)
AP
[13]
(B Japanese Forces and Installations in the Mandated Islads
1. FOURTH FLEET, which may be termed the MANDATE FLEET, appar-
ently administers the Naval activities, afloat and ashore and also the Army
Garrisons units in the Mandated Islands. While the forces afloat exercise ad-
ministrative jurisdiction over the Mandate area, the Yokosuka Naval District
is directly responsible for the supply of stores, material and provisions. Truk
is the headquarters for supply and munitions and has been principle Fourth Fleet
operating base.
2. Up to the present the entire Mandate Islands have been lightly garrisoned,
the majority of the garrison units being Naval Defence Foi'ces ("special Landing
Forces" corresponding to our Marine Corps) but some Army troops are believed
to be on SAIPAN, PALAO, PONAPE, TRUK and JALUIT. The total garrison
force has been estimated at fifteen thousand. In addition, there are Civil Engi-
neering Units engaged in development work on various islands. Working in
738 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
conjunction with these are naval engineering units, naval ordnance specialists,
navy yard units with civilian navy yard workers and technicians. The network
of naval radio stations has been greatly expanded, meteorological stations and
high frequency direction finders installed at strategic locations, aviation facilities
increased both in scope and number, and shore-batteries emplaced on strategic
islands of key Atolls.
3. I tis apparent that a decision to expedite the fortification, expansion of
facilities and militarization of the Mandated Islands, was made late in 1940,
probably concurrently with the signing of the Tripartite Pact. The movement
of naval auxiliaries, small and medium cargo, freight-passenger vessels (ex-
merchant marine) to the Mandates began in December, 1940, and has increased
in scope and number until some seventy odd vessels are engaged in this traffic,
the average number present in the Mandate area at any one time being some
forty odd vessels.
4. The function of supply of munitions, supplies, material and provisions to
the Mandates is under the YOKOSUKA Naval District with a Headquarters for
Civil Engineering, Munitions, Military Stores and Supplies for the Mandates
centered at Truk, although this function is normally under the jurisdiction of
Yokosuka as the Mandates are in the First (HQ— YOKOSUKA) Naval District.
5. The Commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Base Forces are subordinate
commanders under Commander-in-Chief, 4th Fleet ; they have a designated Flag-
ship and a Headquarters or Administrative Section, the latter remaining ashore
at the home base regardless of the movements of the command or the Flagship.
Each Base Force contains a DEFENCE FORCE, detachments of which are sta-
tioned on outlying islands of that general area. Four Ro Class submarines have
been reported to be attached to the PALAO BASE FORCE.
[i^] 6. Considerable air activity has been in evidence in the SAIPAN,
PALAO-PELELIU, TRUK, PONAPE and JALUIT-KWAJALEIN areas. Close
cooperation has been noted between the Defence Forces and the Aircraft activi-
ties at their home bases. Foreign steamers nearing the SAIPAN area have been
subject to aircraft observation and close scrutiny by Patrol planes, Bombers, and
Kghters. Heavy laud plane bombers and patrol planes, undoubtedly ORANGE,
have made reconnaissance flights over the Gilbert Islands (TARAWA, BUTARI-
TARI, andBERU).
7. The distribution of material, personnel, and installations in the Mandated
Islands is indicated in table "A". While this is admittedly incomplete and may
be subject to inaccuracies, it represents the latest and best intelligence on this
subject. In addition to those listed in Table A, there are a number of potential
bases, principally in the lagoons of the naturally protected atolls, which may be
used as emergency basis or may be earmarked for "priority two" development.
8. The latest information (up to 25 November 1941) indicates that the present
distribution of the Air forces (believed to be a temporary strategical disposition
rather than a permanent assignment) in the Mandates is:
Identification Location Includes
Airron 24 Marshall Area (AV) KAMOI
(AV?) Maru
ex-CHITOSE Air Group
ex- YOKOHAMA Air Group
11th Air Group PALAO Area:
16th Air Group PALAO Area
17th Air Group TRUK
18th Air Group SAIPAN
19th Air Group IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit Atoll)
Air Station (and Air Group?) WOTJE
Air Station (and Air Group?) KWAJALEIN
? AIR GROUP TRUK
The exact composition of these Air Groups is unknown and the estimates of
total plane strength in the Mandates vary widely: 62-268 planes.
(Table A, referred to in the foregoing paragraphs, consisting of
pages 1 and 2 reflecting the distribution of Japanese material, per-
sonnel, and installations in the Mandated Islands, will be found re-
produced as Items Nos. 108 and 109, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 739
Last Page of Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41
(At this point in Exhibit No. 21 there appear two sketch maps of
Palao Islands and of Malakal Harbor and approaches. These maps
will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 110 and 111, respectively,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Notes to Accompany Sketch of Jalvtt
1. Aviation Facilities — Two landing fields, each with a hangar capable of hous-
ing twenty medium sized planes. Engineering Shop (camouflaged) situated
between the two fields. Adjacent storehouses (galv. iron) camouflaged. Diesel
fuel and gasoline storage in camouflaged, above-ground tanks adjacent to air
fields. Diesel power plant (June-1940). Eighty planes reported based here
(November, 1940).
On beach opposite southern air field is Naval Air Station having small ramp
and one hangar for seaplanes (June 1940). This may be an auxiliary as present
indications jvDint to naval air Base on Imieji (EMIDJ) Is.
2. Headquarters — Two story concrete building. Large building to SE of Head-
quarters is Post Office and Telephone central. Flagstaff adjacent to Post Office
is also used as signal tower. In town are many one story concrete stores. Good
bitumen and powdered coral roads.
3. Rarlio towers — Two steel combination radio and lookout towers 40O feet
high. Diesel engine power plant near southern tower (1940).
4. Shore Batteries — Bases and trunnions along the three quarter mile water-
front street called the Marine Parade (1940) (guns not mounted in June, 1940
but are now). Also three 6" guns and a battei-y of four 4.7" field pieces. Bar-
racks for regular garrison of 500 soldiers (1940) (probably enlarged now).
Mobile Batteries — Machine guns and AA guns mounted on Diesel-tractor towed
trailers. 10" searchlights on pneumatic tired truck assemblies (1940).
5. Oovernment Pier — 600 feet long, 75 feet wide (18'-25' alongside) equipped
with two railroad tracks and three 10 ton mobile cranes. Storehouse on end of
pier (1940).
6. Mole — 1.50' concrete mole constructed parallel to shore line along NW corner
of JABOR (1933).
7. Conspicous red building (may be red-roofed building) (1936).
8. South Seas Trading Co. PIER (N. B. K. or "NAMBO") also called "SYDNEY
Pier". Two water tanks and warehouses. Coal and briquette storage (1938).
9. Two buildings (resembling hangars) with tracks leading down to water from
one of them (beaching gear? — small marine railway?). A gasoline storage
located near the two buildings (1936).
(The sketch of Jaluit, to which the foregoing notes apply, will be
found reproduced as Item No. 112, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 22
Communication Intelligence Summary, 14 October 1941
D F Bearings —
30 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.
lOsiiioTis^^
FUI 5 (M) Communication— Sama (SASI 4) to Takao (FUWI 4)
KURU 8 (M) do — Ponape (RESU 0) to Truk (YUMI 0)
WINI 5 (M) do —Sama (SASI 4) to MENU 3 (Maru)
KONA 9 (M) 34. 7 139. 5
SIKA 4 (M) 14. 1 156. 6
TEE .5 (M) 21. 2 141. 5
TEFU 0 (M) 17. 1 136. 2
MESU 4 (M) 19. 0 144. 2
YOHA 6 (M) 08. 8 165. 0
SUWI 4 (M) 11. 3 139. 3
SAYU 5 (M) 14. 3 162. 0
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 0
740 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vessels in Mandates October 14-16
October 15, 1941.
Call
Type
Location
E ME 5.-
EKO0.-.
HAKI3..
HI I 5-...
HIKO 9..
HOME 1.
FUNE9.
IKI3....
KARI3..
KA 0 7..
KEBO 8.
KENO 2.
KINI 5-...
K0NA9..
KAMA 6-
KURU8..
MESA0..
MENE 5_.
MESU4..
MENA 6..
MIN0 2_.
MITA 5...
MURU3..
MUTUl..
NAU5.-..
NINO 0.08-
NOSA 2...
NUR0 4-.
0S0 8....
O YO 8.—
RARU5.-
RASE0...
RATU5..
RIR0 5...
RISI6
RISA 2....
RIYU6...
SAYU 5_..
SIKA 4....
SEWA4..
SETO 1...
SUWI4...
S0Y0 9...
TE E 5...
TETU 7..
TETU 2..
TEFU 0..
TOHI 1...
TOWA 2__
TOYA 3..
TUHO 33-
TUYU 00.
WINI 5...
YAYI 6—
YOHA 6-
YOKU 5..
YUHO 8_.
YUMO 3..
MOTO 6-
SEWI 7...
M under CNO
SubDiv in 4th Fit.
Mara
DesRon in 4th Flt.
Maru
Maru
Maru
In 4th Fit
Maru -
Maru
KATSURIKI
KOSHU
Maru
Maru
Maru
Maru
Maru
TAMA, 4th Fit
Maru
Maru
Minesweep Div, 4th Fit.
Air Tender, 4th Fit
Maru.
DcsDivin4th Fit
Maru .
CofS., 4thFlt
Maru
JINGEI, 4th Fit/
SubRon, 4th Fit
KAMOI, 4th Fit
Maru
Maru
Maru..
Maru
Maru, Air Tender, CAF.
HAYAT0M0,4th Fit..
MUROTO, 4th Fit
Maru
Maru
Maru
Maru
Maru
4th Fit
Maru
Fit Unit, 4th Fit
Unidentified
Maru
KOMOBASHI
4th Fit Vessel
CinC 4th Fit...
Maru
Maru
Maru
SHIRETOKO-
Maru
Maru
Maru
Maru
In Mandates
In Mandates
In Mandates (Comdr MINO 2 onboard)
In Mandates
Jaluit— Chichijima area?
In Mandates
In Mandates
In Mandates
In Mandates
In Mandates
In Mandates
In radio company with RIYU 6 who contacts
RDO YOKOSUKA
Posit— 163-29, 11-34N
139-31, 34-45
In Mandates
(14th) Between Ponape (going to) Truk.
Posit— 157-47, 07-58
In Mandates
Enroute Saipan ? 144-11, 19-00
In Mandates
In Mandates
Not in Jaluit area (where generally).
Posit— 164-47, 09-40
In Mandates
In Mandates
In Truk area.
.Taluit area.
In Mandates
In Mandates
In Mandates.
In Mandates (Call doubtful)
In Mandates
In Mandates
In Mandates
In Mandates
In Mandates
In Mandates
Yokosuka to Truk or Ponape, 162-00 14-30
Saipan to .Taluit, 153-36, 1406
In isiandates
In Mandates
Near Yap, 1,39-18 11-16
In Mandates
Posit— 141-32 21-09
In Mandates.
In Truk area.
Posit— 136-13 17-05
Jaluit area.
In Mandates.
In Mandates.
In Jaluit— Chichijima area.
In Mandates.
Hainan to MENU 3 (In Mandates)?
In Mandates.
Posit— 164-58 08-47.
In Mandates.
Saipan area.
In Mandates.
Japan or outside Mandates.
In Yokosuka zone— may be going Mandates.
Communication intelligence summary, 15 Octoher lOJfl
General. — TraflSc above normal. Several more new radio calls representing
shore stations and Naval auxiliaries appeared lately. Bureau of Personnel traflBc
again reached a high peak. Many general despatches (addressed to "all hands"
or large collective addresses) appeared. It is worthy of note to list the radio
stations called by Radio TOKYO to deliver general despatches originated by
Toliio Personnel, Tokio Naval Minister, Tokio Communication and Tokio Bureau
Military Affairs.
Radio Yokosuka and Flagships S. China Fleets
Radio Kure " " 1st Fleet
Radio Sasebo " " 2ud Fleet
Radio Maizuru " " 3rd Fleet
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 741
Radio Ominato " " 4th Fleet
Radio Takao " " Subforce
Radio Shanghai " " CarDivs.
Radio Saipan " " Combined Fleet.
Radio Palao
Radio Kanoya
Radio Spratley Island
Tokyo Communications also originated a despatch addressed to "all hands"
information to a Naval auxiliary (SITU 1) indicating possible future operations
of this vessel. A large number of vessels appear to be in Saseho area. However,
the Commander First Base Force, Third Fleet at Saseho addressed units of his
command at Kure and Yokosuka. Some maneuvering traffic observed on 7024
(using 3 kano calls) and 5897 kcs.
First and Second Fleets. — 2nd Fleet units observed at Kure. A New Naval
auxiliary (NIRA 8) reported to the 1st Fleet Secretary. Relatively little activity
among 1st and 2nd Fleet vessels indicated in radio traffic. A vessel identified as
YAMASHIRO (BB) originated one dispatch to the KOMOBASHI in Jaluit Area.
Suhmarines. — Continued activity on submarine frequency (6385) by vessels
using secret calls. DF bearings indicate they are approximately in the Chichi-
jima Yokosuka-Kagoshima area.
Air Activities. — Kaga continues as flagship of Cardivs. The SHOKAKU and
Commander of the Cardiv are in the NAHA-Takao area. Also it is believed one
of the large airons in Combined Air Force (TOME 2) is also in same vicinity and
that Commander Cardiv 3 (NUYA 88) and the HOSHO are connected with these
vessels in some maneuver going on or planned as all were associated in despatch
headings. Indications are that two or three large groups of Combined Air
Force are in the Genzan-Chiukai Area. (YUMO 8, YOME 7, MOO 0?). Ashigara
originated dispatch to 11th Air Base which was forwarded to Maizuru for
delivery.
Fourth Fleet. — Traffic above normal. Many new calls observed, some of which
are undoubtedly garbled.
Fifth Fleet f — The new fleet or force which has been mentioned at various
times in the past (NARE (6) appeared in dispatch headings frequently today.
The call was associated with 4th fleet units and some Naval auxiliaries which
appear-to be new or newly commissioned. One dispatch originated by Commimi-
cation Officer 5th Fleet was addressed for action to the 5th Fleet, a new fleet
unit in parenthesis (TOYU 5) and for information to Radio Takao, Tokyo,
Saipan, Palao, Truk, Jaluit and to Communication Officers 2nd, 4th Fleets, Sub-
Force, Cardivs and Combined Air Force.
D F Bearings.— 21^ Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.
Pos/ito?!*.— NESU 5 (M) Comm-Kure #4 SLF (SIKA 8) to Shanghai
(KAMO 0)
YOKE 7 (M) 06.4 155.1
KIMO 5 (KASHI) 20.9 112.0
KENO 2 (KOSHU ?)
Communication Inteixigence Summaby, 16 October 1941
General. — Average amount of traffic intercepted, with complete absence of
"dummy" traffic for the first time since early October. All forces active in origi-
nated and addressed traffic except South China. A considerable number of WE
addresses appeared, usually associated with air activities. One broke as
"Chinkai Defense Force" indicating newly organized activity at that location.
Ominato transmitted a despatch with three WE addresses, which broke as Chief
A Area, Chief B Area and Chief C Area. Stations addressed in this despatch fit
the call table line designated tentatively as "Temporary Shore" or "Advanced
Base" stations, which were most commonly associated with the South China
activities up to and including the Indo China campaign. Stations fitting this
classification are increasing in the Chinkai-Chosen area, one unidentified unit
(TAWI 7) which was formerly connected with So China Forces, has reappeared
in the Chosen area, with line of bearing from Oahu D/F pa.ssing thru the Rashin,
Seisin area. Units of 12th Air Corps are apparently embarked on two unidenti-
fied Marus and probably proceeding to join the 12 A. C. Commander at Genzan
Air.
Combined Fleet. — CinC Combined, possibly back on NAGATO, appears to be
acting as radio guard for an increasing number of units from 1st. 2nd- CarrierSi
742 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and Subfor. The tentatively identified 5th Fleet appeared as action and infor-
mation addressee in several despatches concerning addressees in the Mandates,
Chichijima, and major force commanders. The 2nd Fleet was a heavier origi-
nator -with traflic addressed to major units of the Combined. No indication of
change of location of 1st or 2nd fleets. Third fleet continued actively originat-
ing and receiving traffic from Sasebo area. Flagship of #2 Base Force, 3rd Fleet,
with commander aboard at Sasebo.
Carriers. — Active in exchange of traffic as yesterday. No indicated change
of location. Planes from Kasanoliara Air are operating aboard or with the
HIRYU. Commander Carriers still aboard KAGA in area between Sasebo and
Taiwan. AKAGI and SORYU at Yokosuka.
Air Force. — Chitose Air enroute to Mandates, probably to Marshall area, with
Yokohama Air at or near Truk. Indications that Yokosuka Air is, or will be,
moving to the Mandates, possibly to the Palau area.
)S'm6 Force. — Same activity on Subfor frequencies as previously reported, bear-
ings remaining the same.
China. — Activity appears confined Takao, and North China areas, with
Shanghai continuing normal. A despatch addressed to China Fleet collective
exempted the North China Force from delivery, thus placing N. China Force as
part of CINC CHINA FLEET (on Idzumo) Command.
Miscellaneous. — Many new calls appearing, including MARUS, which have
been very recently taken over, as they are not equipped with call books and use
WE addresses for activities which have assigned calls. One new unit apparently
containing both Marus and Combatau vessels appeared today without indication
of which Force he is attached.
D F Bearings. — 31 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.
Positions. —
KINE 9 ( ?) Comm. KURE RETJ 3 to YOKOSUKA HOMI 3.
ERO 6 ( V) Comm. Takao FUWI 4 to Bako NOTI 7.
YUKO 9 ( •?) Comm. Canton RUYO 6 to Bako NOTI 7.
MURU 3 (M) Comm. Remain with Ponape and establish with Truk RESU
0 to YUMI 0
MISE 5 (Fleet Unit)— Comm. Sasebo KIMU 9 to KINU 7 (Maru)
KARO 9 (ERIMO)— Comm. Sasebo KIMU 9 to Kure RETI 3
NIRI 0 (M) Comm. Yokosuka HOMI 3 to Saipan OSI 0
RETI 5 (M) Comm. Remain with Shanghai (KAMO/0) establish with
SIKA 8.
KUNA 1 (M) 10.7 166.7
TEFU 0 (M) 23.0 137.4
TIWI 1 (M) 28.5 140.9
JAPANESE NAVY — OCT 16TH
1st. Fleet:
BB's believed in INLAND SEA-SASEBO area.
AIRRON 7 and a CARDIV in NAHA-TAKAO area.
KONGO and HIYE had busy traffic with SAEKI AIR.
2nd. Fleet:
Some units are definiately at KURE.
8rd. Fleet:
Concentrated with few exceptions in general SASEBO area.
ASHIGARA is mentioned in 3rd. Fleet traffic with major units of that Fleet.
CHOGEI (Flag of NORTHERN BLOCKADE FORCE) appears with NAGARA
(3rd. Fleet Flag).
4th. Fleet:
Definitely in TRUK area. Large air concentration in the MARSHALLS.
5th. Fleet:
Still in process of organizing. CHICHIJIMA RADIO, 4th FLEET and CINC
COMBINED are interested parties in traffic which includes this hypothetical
fleet.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 743
SUBMARINES:
Many units definitely in KURE area. Perhaps a dozen are operating in
exercizes in the general CHICHIJIMA-TOKOSUKA area. With a few as far
south as the MANDATES.
From one indication it appears that COMSUBFORCE is at SASEBO.
A large part of COMBINED AIR FORCE appears to be in CHINKAI-SASEBO-
GENZAN area. One section of CAF operating with a CARDIV of 1st. FLEET
in TAKAO area. CARRIER LOCATIONS: AKAGI and ZUIKAKU in YOK-
SUKA area. KORYU at KURE. KAGA at SASEBO.
Oeneral:
Several fleet auxiliaries (tankers etc.) appear to be in SASEBO area. KASHII
near SAIGON. ISUZU (Acting Flag South China) in HAINAN-SOUTH CHINA
area.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 17 October, lOJfl
General. — Traffic volume about normal. (Traffic flow now being analyzed
by statistical machinery and normals are established for all major and secondary
stations). Dummy traffic again absent from TOKYO — Fleet broadcast. Sprat-
ley Islands radio sent a message to TAKAO. This message must have been
relayed to TOKYO because TOKYO repeated the message under a priority pro-
cedure sign to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Comcardiv 4 (SUTU 7) ESARO
(believed to be their Radio Intelligence unit) BAKO, Chief of Staff South
China Fleet, Chief of Staff French Indo China Forces, RNO TAIHOKU, Com-
mander 11th Air Corps and Chief of Staff of South China Air Forces. It seems
that the Spratley report caused considerable excitement. The resignation of the
Cabinet was reported to the fleet by plain language today.
Combined Fleet. — The impressions grow that there is underway a concen-
tration of units upon the Combined Fleet Flagships. Subrons 5 and 6 appear
with him today.
The following is what is believed to be the circumstances surrounding the
relief of the Combined Fleet Flags. On September 23 the MUTSU was in Kure
Navy Yard. On September 27th or 28th she joined the Second Fleet. On
October 1 CinC 2nd Fleet relieved as CinC Combined Fleet and hoisted Flag
in MUTSU. He was active today in addressing messages to general calls. The
CinC Second Fleet also originated many dispatches. One message, originated on
the 14th of October was repeated again today. It was addressed as follows :
2nd Fleet Collective
3rd Fleet Collective
Combined Air Force
Subron 5
Subron 6
Airron 7
BatDiv 3
Information to
Comcardivs.
C in C Combined Fleet
Radio Takao
Radio Palao
Radio Tokyo.
South China. — Traffic to this area with si)ecial reference to TAKAO was
higher today than usual. The movement of the ZUIKAKU to Taiwan as reported
by Com. 16 today is only partially confirmed here. A call (SIHA 5) identified
here as the SHOKAKU of Cardiv 4 appeared today in care of the Combined
Air Force at TAKAO and was routed to that station for delivery. No indication
of any other units in her company. Direction Finder bearings place some Car-
riers together in the area east of TAIWAN and south of KYUSHU. These units
could and probably will establish radio Communication with TAKAO. While
they may move to TAKAO it is expected that they will not but will remain in
the area east of TAIWAN. Some slight indications exist that the Flagship of
the Combined Fleet is with these carriers but is not confirmed.
Suhmarines. — KATORI and submarines are still in area southward and east
of KYUSHU.
07.5 N
165 E
26
153
18
155
18
148.5
06
170.5
30.5
134.5
05.5
165
05.5
164. 5
11.5
163. 5
16.5
140
12.5
165
08.
154
11.5 N
102. 0
E
24. 7 N
142.4
E
33. 2 N
142-3
E
16. 2 N
144. 4
E
3. 5 N
160.4
E
32. 3 N
140.9
E
TRUK to SAIPAN
CZ
18.8 N
145. 1
E
22.0 N
116.0
E
26. 7 N
123.3
E
Estab. Comm. with YOKOSUKA
AMOY to TAKAO.
CZ
19. 8 N
159.4
E
Saipan to Chichijima. CZ
Jaluit to Saipan.
CZ
744 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Fourth Fleet. — Very little fourth Fleet activity.
D/F Bearings. — 38 Naval auxiliaries in Mandates including:
HAKI 3
KENO 2
KERO 8
MESU 4
MEMU 7
NIRI 0
NOTA 4
OYO 8
ORU 6
TEE 5
TOHI 1
KIME 3
Positions. —
NORU 6
TIWI 1
TUU 5
MAO 5
YOHA 6
SEWI 7
MURU 3
OMI MARU
SINI 2
FURI 6
KUSU 9
TIKA 9
RIRO 5
KURU 8
YOHA 6
Communication Intelligence Summary, 18 October 1941
General. — Traffic volume about normal. Traffic consisted largely of adminis-
trative traffic. There was one WIWI message from TOKYO to CinC •Combined
Fleet for information of CinC China Fleet, CinC South China Fleet and an uni-
dentified unit in the French Indo China Force. Naval Communications TOKYO
has originated several messages of general address. These may indicate a com-
ing change of call or cipher systems. The Secretary to the Navy Minister sent
out a plain language message announcing the appointment of Admiral Shimada
Shigetaro in Tojo's Cabinet. •Tfeis moosagc was give-a a ge»ei=a4 distribution as
is uaual witfe mcooagco ef ^tfeis efearactcf fe«* aise ieehided was '-'ZAIGAITAIKO^S-
IKANTUKIBUKAN". Wbiie i* is nndcrotood that- t^ie Attaehe *e Tbailftftd
we«}4 fee intGrootcd, ye* the ifteluaion el feifti as as addrcoacc e» ft» ethe-pwise
OTriC tiy litlVQjT QGQpftt'Cfi "Wirx til ft KG 1% ftOpCfti* rilftr xfiCFO "WftS 9'0'fJlG S0Ft Or ft miilL'flFy
tie-up between Japaa a»4 Thailaadr Another plain language despatch from the
Secretary China Fleet to INOUE, Head of the Military Mens Association, thanks
him for message to newly appointed Commander in Chief of the China Seas Fleet.
This is the first intelligence of the relief of the China Command.
Combined Fleet. — No information received today to check location of First Fleet
The flagship is still acting as guard for units previously reported as being in
company. One Cardiv (UYU 3) had its traffic accepted by the MUTSU today.
The CHITOSE also joined the flagship. Desron 3 is in SASEHO area. HAGURO
is in KURE area. 2nd Fleet traffic is being routed thru KURE.
Third Fleet. — Still in SASEHO area, little activity except for the Commander
2nd Base Force who addressed several MARUS of his unit.
Fourth Fleet. — Mandates traffic largely concerns air activities. The impression
is that there is a considerable amount of air movement between the Mandates
and the Empire. CHITOSE air is very active in the MARSHALS. KATSURIKI
is at JALUIT.
Subm.arine% — The Chief of Staff of SubForce is receiving his traffic via
SASEHO. There were fewer submarine calls on tactical circuits than for the
past few days. It is believed that all submarines are nearing SASEHO.
Carriers. — AKAGI and SORYU are at Yokosuka. From traffic it appears that
SORYU is finished with whatever she was doing at SASEHO and is about to
join her division which is in company with CinC Combined. Cardiv 4 is definitely
in TAKAO area.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 745
China. — Little activity save for tlie Spratley Islands Radio Station which
originated several messages today.
D/F Bearings. — None.
Pobitions. —
SIHI 2 22.0 N 115.0 E
TUYA 2 From RETI 3 to SUKA 2 C. Z.
HIRE 4 20.4 N 114.4 E
YOHA 6 15.7 N 158.4 E
TIWI 1 21.7 N 145.2 E
RUTI 2 22.8 N 146.1 E
NOSA 2 11.6 N 169.0 E
TEFU 0 Chichijima (EME 6) to Yokosuka (HOMI 3)
TIWI 1 18.7 N 145.2 E
TUU 5 29.1 N 147.1 E
Cormnunication Intelligence Summary, 19 Octoher 1941
General. — Traffic volume below normal. Less traflBc was copied at Heeia due
to poor receiving conditions but since there were numerous dummy messages
among those intercepted, the traffic volume is considered below the daily average
attained in the last two months. There has been a perceptible increase in the
use of secret (or tactical) calls and addresses with not only drill and maneuvering
traffic but in administrative despatches as well. Todays traffic included some
maneuvering type (4 kana uigori) traffic with HE one and two letter calls being
broadcasted by Tokyo Radio to presumably submarine units. Kanoya Air was
also employing tactical calls on 8915 kcs with a call 1 MIYA. Tokyo Radio in
delivering an "all hands" despatch called all Major Fleet Flagships less the call
identified as FIFTH FLEET. Tokyo Radio originated one despatch for action
to Radio Sasebo, Kure, Takao, Maizuru, Chichijima, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Jaluit,
FUMU 44 (may be new Chinkai Station), Ominato, TAU 77, KUMO 66, Indo-China
and "HOROMUSIRO Air Corps Base. This list just above covers all outlying
stations. KUMO 66 is believed to be Shanghai and TAU 77 definitely is in the
far North (Kuriles). The WE addresses included the No. 2 and No. 61 Air
Corps Commanders associated with Kanoya Air.
First d Second Fleets. — Very little activity among 1st Fleet Units as far as
traffic is concerned. Some traflic for second Fleet units was handled by Kure
Radio. Combined Fleet Flagship was guard for Suzuya, Midzuho and SUBRON 5
among others. Combined Fleet frequency (6775kcs) was active with secret calls.
Submarines. — Radio Saipan accepted a despatch for SUBDIV 29 (UFU 11).
While this one instance may represent a garble, it matches fairly well the past
reports that some of the units using secret calls on 6385 kcs lately were submarines
in the general Mandate area. Some of the Submarine service calls were associ-
ated in despatch headings with CARDIV and COMBINED AIR FORCE Units.
Air. — Continued indications that a large part of the Combined Air Force is
spread from Takao area to Genzan. Shokaku ("C" calls him Zuikaku.) definitely
associated with this concentration in the Takao area with at least one additional
unit SUYO 8 (probably DesDiv plane guards). Also RYU JO appears to be
associated with same operation but may be as far North as the Sasebo area.
Chinkai radio guard for a few additional fleet vessels associated with China Air
activities formerly. AKAGI and SORYU definitely in Yokosuka area. All other
Carriers appear to be in the general Sasebo area except for SHOKAKU.
Third Fleet.— SUsiht decrease in THIRD FLEET traffic observed.
Fourth Fleet & Mandates. — Very few 4th Fleet Units appear outside of Man-
dates. Bearings of the KOMABASHI place this unit between Ellice and Gilbert
Islands but one bearing was labeled poor so that it is believed this vessel still
in Jaluit vicinity. Thirteen new Naval auxiliaries reported by GUAM in Man-
dates ; some of these verified by C0M^14 reports.
Positions.— TVJJ 5 (M) ' 27.8 150.3
YOHA 6 (M) 18.0 155.7
Communication Intelligence Summary 20 October 1941
General. — Traffic volume far below normal. Receiving conditions good but
traffic light on all circuits. In the early evening the major circuits were quite
active but all traffic was cleared by midnight. The TOKYO broadcast carried a
good percentage of dummy traffic. Maneuvering traffic intercepted on 13560
746 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Kcs. and 8710 Kcs. That intercepted on 8710 Kcs. indicates that a tactical
problem is being worlied out. The traffic usually carries an EN in the heading,
has an additional number at the beginning of the text, and all originator numbers
are fairly close together. Numbers being in proximity indicate that all series
were started at the same time, i. e. the beginning of the exercise. The secret
calls used are mostly unidentified but MUTSU (9 HEFU), a submarine-unit
(3 TEI), and TOKYO RADIO (7 MARI) were among those heard. The type
traffic which is believed to be Direction Finder or Radio Intelligence has been
received from CHINKAI and an unidentified station in the CHOSEN or MAN-
CHUKUO area. Other identified stations sending it are TAKAO TAIWAN),
JALUIT, and three other stations in the MANDATES. JALUIT sends these
messages singly but CHINKAI combines several at a time in one transmission.
The amount of this traflic is increasing.
Combined Fleet. — Little traflic concerning the First and Second Fleets seen.
What traflic did appear was handled via KURE radio. A staff officer of the
French Indo China Force is aboard NEGATO. JALUIT addressed a message
to Commanding Officer, Batdiv 3.
Submarines. — The Staff Communication Officer of Subron 1 addressed a message
to TRUK. The nunsber of submarines operating with Combined Fleet is not
known but is believed to comprise the greater part of the Submarine Force.
Air. — Air traffic in Mandates centers about CHITOSE AIR and Airron 24.
No change in status of carriers as previously reported.
Mandates. — Except for air activities and civil engineering traffic, 4th Fleet
and Mandates very quiet.
China. — No change in dispositions. The China Fleet Intelligence Bureau
addressed one of thgir members at MACAO. The Commander of the French
Indo China Forces originated several despatches to an unidentified unit which
was addressed by TOKYO in a WIWI message two days ago.
DIF Bearings. — 27 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.
KINO 5 (KASA II) SAIGON— Base 217 .
TUU 5 (M) 24. 7 153. 5
RUTI 2 (M) 15. 3 149. 0
Communication Intelligence Summary, 21 October, 1941
General. — Traffic volume returned to about normal today. There was no
dummy messages in the TOKYO broadcast. Last night this TOKYO to Fleet
Circuit was interf erred with by station KTK (Mussel Rock, California, Globe
Wireless). This interference also botliered the Japanese for TOKYO shifted
his frequency down 10 Kcs. to avoid it. Statistical analysis of total navy traffic
for period 15-19 October shows a close agreement with the normal established
for the past 3 mouths. CinC Combined Fleet originated about 50% more traffic
than normal and CinC 1st Fleet originated far less than his normal. These
were the only variations noted. The major shore stations are not now exi)eri-
encing as many difficulties as before in the routing of traffic, the whereabouts of
all units being apparently better known. Sasebo radio today sent traffic identified
as direction finder bearings. The stations now sending this traffic are CHINKAI,
ORU 4 (in Manchuko), FUIMU 4 (in Chosen ?), JALUIT and SASEBO. The
amount of this traffic is still increasing. All High North Circuits checked but
little activity.
Combined Fleet. — Little traffic concerning these fleets. The Commander in
Chief appears as an addressee but did not originate much to his command. It is
known that Subron 5 is in company with MUTSU but the flagship of Subron 5
(YURA) is in CHINKAI area. This leaves doubt as to the location of his com-
mand. If with him there MUTSU must also be in that area. The Second Fleet
has been quiet for some time.
Third Fleet. — Apparently inactive in Sasebo area. Comairron 6 made a move-
ment report to CinC 3rd Fleet. The Commander 1st Base Force is fairly active
with his Marus.
Fourth Fleet. — Inactive in Truk area. SAIPAN was in communication with
KAGOSHIMA Air and Commander Cardivs.
Fifth Fleet. — No indication yet of any attempt to organize and concentrate
this vague unit. The Commander 5th Fleet sent a despatch to CinC Combined
today.
Submarines. — Submarines tactical circuits heard today. A Staff Officer of
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 747
Commander Submarine Force addressed a message to the SubForce collective and
for information to all major Fleet flags.
Air. — The Commander Combined Air Force addressed a message as follows :
Action to : MINISTER OF NAVY.
CHIEF OF NAVAL GENERAL STAFF.
COMBINED AIRFORCE.
CINC COMBINED FLEET.
CARDIV 4 less HOSHO and ORU 4 (unidentified).
CARDIV 3.
Information to: CINC CHINA FLEET.
CINC SOUTH CHINA FLEET.
ALL MAJOR FLEET FLAGSHIPS.
It would appear from this message that whatever the combined Air Force in-
tends to do will interest the China Fleet. It is apparent that he has all ready
located parts of his command from TAIWAN northward at least as far as
GENZAN. The fact that he has had Carriers added to his force (Carriers are
not normally part of the Combined Air Force) indicates a large scale operation
over a long distance.
D/F Bearings. — 33 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.
Positions. —
9 (M) Comm— Takao (FUWI 4) to SAMA (SASI 4)
4 (M) Comm— Palao (MISE 8) to Yap (INE 6)
8 (M) Comm— Chichijima (EME 6) to Yokosuka (HOMI 3)
4 (M) Comm— Sasebo (KIMU 9) to Bako (NOTI 7)
5 (M) Comm— Sasebo (KIMU 9) to Bako (NOTI 7)
2 (M) Comm— Establish with Sasebo (KIMU 9)
6 (M) 22.5 151.5
8 (Katsuriki) 10.0 169.0
2 (M) 12.8 150.5
6 (M) 27.5 124.2
7 (M) 22.7 149.0
7 (M) 16.3 147.5
2 (M) 19.2 159.9
6 (M) 24.3 122.1
Commuhication Intelligence Summary, 22 Octoler 19Itl
General — Larger volume of traffic intercepted than normal, with no "dummy"
traffic appearing. The traffic was dominated by exchanges between Staff Com-
munication Officers of all major forces, with highly significant increase in China
and South China activities. UNI WIWI from a Tokio originator was addressed
action to CinC Combined, info to CinC's Com. Air Force China, South China Air
Command (at Sama, Hainan) KORYU (CV) plus Yokosuka and Bako addresses.
The use of tactical (numeral two-kana) calls is increasing with despatches coming
through on regular shore channels carrying NR and SMS of identified service
calls. Air activities ,afloat and ashore, in all areas, were heavy traffic originators,
with greatest emphasis on the Whole mandate area, Takao-China-Hainan. 11
Marus yesterday and today were noted using the suffix denoting "C. O. Naval
Detachment aboard" without definite indication of affiliations, though most ap-
peared connected with the Takao-Hainan air movement.
Combined Fleet. — Most traffic from CinC Staff was fi-om Staff Comm. Officer,
V7ith suffix "Secretary" second in volume. Many general address despatches were
originated, embracing all areas in specific callups and leading to believe that a
call change may be impending or that some communication change is scheduled.
The D/F net collective appeared with most general address messages. No indi-
cation of movement of CinC from Kure-Sasebo area.
First Fleet. — ^Addressed frequently but little originated. No area change
indicated.
Second Fleet. — Same as First.
Third Fleet. — Apparently still in Sasebo area.
Fourth Fleet. — Communications to and from CinC continue through TRUK.
Originates several collectively addressed to 4th Fleet. NIKA WIWI (Special
key URGENT) from Naval Intelligence Tokio addressed for action Ch, of St. 4th
Fleet info Combined and Maizuru address. SUU UNA WIWI from MAYURU
(Tokio) to Ch. of St. 4th, info all air and base forces in the Mandates.
748 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Fifth Fleet. — This nebulous unit is very elusive. The tentatively identified
Commander was exempted in a general address message and again appeared in
the proper order between 4th Fleet and Subfor in an addi'ess. Delivery routing
and guard stations have never been determined.
Suhmariyies. — Some activity with tactical calls on Subfor frequencies as re-
ported all October. No detectable change in operating areas previously reported.
Carriers. — Cardiv 4 addressed care Takao Radio and included with China and
Hainan addresses, indicating probable operating area South of Taiwan. Cardiv 5
(UYU 3) with the Koryu and Zuikaku are operating with Yokosuka and Omura
air stations. AKAGI and SORYU appear to be preparing to leave Yokosuka and
resume operations. Carrier Comdr. still aboard KAGA in company HIRYU and
traffic still appears through Sasebo routing.
Combined Air Force. — Air Force and communications most active in todays
traffic. The reshuffling of air units which was underway in September and the
first half of October is apparently completed and large scale operations in the
Mandates, Chosen-Manchukuo, and Taiwan-Hainan-Amoy areas are in prospect
or progressing. The Special Task Force or Southern Expeditionary Force of
which the KASHII is Flagship is assuming considerable importance in despatch
headings and is connected with the Combined Air Force and CARDIV 4 in forth-
coming maneuvers or operations. A call tentatively identified as Spratley Island
(NRE 0) is addressed in several general collective despatches originated by
Tokyo Communication Division and Tokyo Plotting and DF Sections and is called
directly from Tokyo for delivery, indicating probable DF activity in that area.
With nothing definite to point to, the impression grows that a large scale
screening maneuver or operation, at least, is in progress, involving mainly air
units in the Mandates, Takao-Hainan Indo-China area, the Kuriles, and Sub-
marines Marcus and Chichijima to the Kuriles. Identification of Horomushiro
as an Air Base the otJier day places air operations up to the Northern Kuriles.
D F Bearings. — 33 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.
Positions. —
HONA 6 (M) Communication— Chinkai (SUTI 5) to Tsingtao (UYO 5).
SAHO 2 (M) Communication— sasebo (KIMU 9) to TIKU 0 (shore) .
KIMO 5 (Kashii)— Base 217— Saigon.
KENO 2 (Koshu?) 09.3 151.1.
KERO 8 (Katsuriki) 10.0 169.0.
HAO 7 (M) 13.5 149.4.
YOHA 6 (M) 25.0 148.7.
FURI 6 (M) 27.3 124.4.
SATE 0 (M) 23.1 148.3.
SEMI MARU 13.7 144.6.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 23 October 19Jfl
General. — Traffic interception about normal volume with continuing absence
of dummy traffic. The collective address communication messages continue,
either presaging a call change or correcting communication publication to conform
with organization changes. There was less exchange of traffic between Empire
and Mandate areas due to confusion on the Orange circuits but it was indicated
that the volume and character was similar to yesterday. Expansion of the China
activity into the Indo-Cliina area was indicated by increasing traffic to and from
the Southern Expeditionary Force, in the Saigon area, with information ad-
dressees including all forces attached to China waters northward to Chinkai.
Fleet. — No changes in locations previously reported except that traffic routing
places the tentative Fifth Fleet as at or near Yokosuka and traffic headings with
information addressees may indicate that this force is charged with operations
in the area from Chichijima northward. Tentatively, this would place task areas
for various forces as below :
Combined, 1st, 2nd and Subforce nucleus plus some carriers Yokosuka to
Sasebo.
3rd Fleet, Sasebo, Japan Sea, Maizuru.
4th Fleet, Marshalls to Palau to Chichijima.
5th Fleet, Chichijima to Kuriles (vague).
Southern Expeditionary Force (KASHII Flag) Indo China, South China
Sea.
South China Force (ISUZU Flag) Hainan-Taiwan.
Combined Air with Carriers, Taiwan-Naha, Chichijima.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 749
Fourth Fleet. — Cine Truk area as before.
Significant despatches included six URGENTS plus several routines as below :
UNI— Cine CombFlt to Comdr. CombAirFor INFO : Cine China, SoChina,
Ch. NavGenSt, Tokyo, plus Yokosuka, Bako and Hainan addressees.
NIKA WIWI— Tokyo origin to CinC Combined, CinO 4th.
UNI— CinC CombFlt to St. Comm. Officer Corab.AirFor infor St. Comm.
Officers China Fit., SoChinaForce, SoChAirFor, Comm. Div. Tokyo, plus
Sasebo and Bako addressees.
UNI— Chief of Staff China Fleet to Naval Intelligence Tokyo. Retrans-
mitted by Communication Division Tokyo for information to Staff Com-
munication Officer, Combined Fleet.
Routine — Chief of Staff South China Force — same as above.
WIWI— Naval Intelligence Tokyo to Chief of Staff China Fleet informa-
tion Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, South China Force.
Routine — Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet to Naval Intelligence Tokyo infor-
mation Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, and Maizuru address.
SUU WIWI— Chief Navy General Staff Tokyo to Staff Communication
Officer Fourth Fleet.
Routine— Chief of Staff Submarine Force to Collective ALL FORCES
COMBINED FLEET, Collective Submarine Force, information DF head-
quarters Tokyo and new station in South China sea area. (NRE 0)
Routine — Long 3 part despatch from DF headquarters Tokyo to Collective
ALL MAJOR FLAGSHIPS information Tokyo Tracking Section, Stations
of DF Net.
Routine SUU— Short 5 numeral despatch from joint origin Bureau Military
Affairs— Navy General Staff Tokyo to Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, First,
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Submarine Force, Carrier Divisions, Combined
Air Force, China Fleet, North China Fleet, Southern Expeditionary Force,
Sasebo, Bako, Chinkai addresses— information — unidentified addresses plus
collective shore. In this it is noted that CINC SOUTH CHINA FORCE is
omitted but the Southern Expeditionary Force is included. This is similar
to operations in Indo-China occupation vrhen the Third Fleet assumed major
Importance with CINC SOUTH CHINA FORCE apparently subordinated.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 2-'t October 19->{1
General. — Traffic volume light due to very poor receiving conditions obtaining
here. Heavy static and fading ruined reception on the night watches when most
traffic is copied. The TOKYO broadcast carried no dummy traffic. The number
of general messages emanating from Tokyo continues to be high. Most of these
today came from the Communications activities of the Ministry. There were a
few from the double originator, Navy Minister and Chief of the General Staff.
Especially prominent today was the activity of the SUTU 7 and ESARO combina-
tion, thought by this Unit to be radio intelligence and direction finding activities.
ESARO received frequent reports from Chinkai and ORU 4 (station in that area),
JALUIT, and PALAO. He in turn originated messages to the CINC COMBINED
and CINC SECOND AND was, more frequently than not, at lea.st an information
addressee in all messages between the major commanders. The interest in the
South China Activities continues. There has been much traffic directed to the
French Indo China Force, to HAINAN activities and to NRE0 (identified as
Spratley Islands but thought to be in vicinity of Camranh Bay). This particular
wave of South China interest seems to date from the 15th of October when NRE0
sent a dispatch to Takao which was then reported to all major commanders.
First Fleet. — Little activity by fleet units except as noted under Second Fleet.
CinC Combined Fleet received a KIU from C. N. G. S. and from the Commander
of Direction Finder Activities (SUTU 77). He sent one to a general collective
call, SUTU 7 and NREO (Spratley? Camranh?).
Second Fleet. — After a long period of comparative inactivity ihe CinC Second
Fleet today sent a message with the following heading :
Third Fleet (Collective) (Now in
Sasebo area)
Combined Air Force (Collective)
Second Fleet (Collective),
BatDiv Three,
Desron Three,
750 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Information :
Palao Radio French Indo China Force
NERO (Spratley ?, Camranh ?) Subron Six
SUTU 77 (D/F) Subron Five
Toliyo Radio Taliao Radio
ComsubFor CinC Combined Fleet
ComCarDiv Five
Attention is invited to the action addressees of this message. They have
appeared separately in the traflSc for weeks and are here grouped in one
message a single commander. Secondly, the units named are not normally under
the Command of the Second Fleet. The geographic area indicated is to the
south (Palao, Takao, Spratley).
Third Fleet. — Same activity by Second Base Fleet but little traffic from this
unit.
Fourth Fleet. — Comairron Tvs^enty-four addresfeed a message to 6 Tokyo
addressees and part of his unit at Yokohama Air Station, less the Chitose Air
Corps. No other activity in Fourth Fleet.
Air. — The Communication Officer CarDivs sent a message v^ith the following
heading :
Com.Off. SubFor.
" " Desron One.
" " BatDiv Three.
" " CruDiv 8.
Cardivs less Cardiv 3.
Information :
Tokyo Radio.
SUTU 749.
ComOfiE Combined Fleet.
The air activities of the Air Force and the Cardivs continues as previously
reported.
Submarines. — Comsubfor addressed a message to Jaluit, Tokyo Radio and
Communication Officer Carrier Divisions.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 25 October, 19^1
General. — Traffic volume about normal. All circuits heard well except for the
Yokosuka-Saipan circuit which was poor. At 0730 Tokyo radio began transmit-
ting traffic with tactical calls, from that time until noon these calls were of the
single and doube KANA variety. At 1200 he worked apparently the same people
but sent only the numeral kana hand variety. In aU cases these messages began
a new numbering series for each originator. The normal or administrative traffic
continued on in the old series. The conclusion is drawn that these new number
series while continuing the old indicator the beginning of tactics akin to a fleet
problem with that traffic to form separate files. Activity of the direction Finder
net was indicated by transmissions from the Chinkai and ORU 4 stations. None
was received from the mandates Stations but this was due to the poor reception
of the Saipan circuit. Tokyo Communication originated several more messages
of general address. One NIKA WIWI was originated by^okyo and sent to
Chief of StafC Carrier Divisions, Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Carrier
Division Two.
First Fleet. — Little information relative this fleet but at sea in the Kyushu area.
Practically the only traffic concerning it was in the tactical systems mentioned
above.
Second Fleet. — ^No activity.
Third Fleet. — Commander Second Base Force originated a movement report
which went for information to Maizuru. Bumil sent one to Chief of Staff Third
Fleet for information of Commander First and Second Base Forces.
Fourth Fleet. — Air Squadron Twenty-fourth is still very active with Jaluit
and Truk.
China. — Little activity. Spratley Island addressed a message to NRE0
(Camranh) for information of a First Fleet Unit, Saipan, Chichijima, Hainan
and Takao. The Chief of Staff of the French Indo China Force sent one to CinO
Combined Fleet for information of all Combined Fleet Commanders.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 751
Communication Intelligence Summary, 26 October, 19^1
General. — Large amount of tactical call traffic intercepted on frequencies used
for communication between Tokyo and Mandate Stations. Identifications of calls
showed that Tokyo, Saipan, Palau, Truk, Jaluit and two or three unplaced shore
calls handled the bulk of the traffic. Guards for all forces of the Combined Fleet
were also present, using a large number of alternate calls and addresses. Analysis
of the routing and handling of this type of traffic leads to the belief that the
activity is largely concerned with a major communication drill or test, combined
with possible maneuvers of the Fourth Fleet and air units in the Mandates.
Control of the operation appears to rest with Tokyo Radio, who transmitted
several high precedence-urgent despatches in abbreviated procedure on the UTU,
calling collective Combined Fleet for delivery. The prefix "Jitsu" appeared
occasionally, meaning that the despatch was bona fide, indicating that the bulk
of the ti-afBc was drill. This is reverse of the usual procedure of indicating the
drill trafiic by the prefix "Enshu" when normal traffic constitutes the bulk of the
load. Possible active participation of the Fourth in maneuvers is indicated by
exemption of this force in several messages under normal addresses and general
collectives. Contradictory routing to tactical addresses previously identified as
major force flagships and commanders and the lack of "jigs" and repeats tends
to confirm the primary communication nature of the exercise. This may be
preliminary to a major call change in the near future. Normal administrative
traffic intercepted indicates that there has been no movement of major units into
areas in which the tactical traffic would place them.
Combined Fleet. — Flags of Combined, First, Second and Submarine Force ap-
pear to still be located in the Kyushu area, with Air Force commander and
Carrier Division Four in Takao. Preparations for an unidentified air command
(YOME 7) to move from Taiwan to South China appear to be under way. It is
believed that Carrier Division Three (NUYA 8) is proceeding to join Carrier
Division Four to operate under Air Force Commander. One despatch heading
indicates that the HOSHO may also be rejoining Carrier Division Four. Com-
manding Officers of the SORYU and KORYU were aboard the KAGA (Com-
mander Carriers Flagship) yesterday. The AKAGI has left Yokosuka Navy Yard
and will probably rejoin the KAGA. The Fifth Fleet is assuming a slightly more
tangible form, with an additional alternate recovered and a movement report,
involving a new fleet unit with this force (?). Yokosuka continues to accept
traffic addressed to Fifth Fleet.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 27 October IBJfl
General. — Traffic volume below normal attributed to weekend and possible non
coverage. A few dispatches in tactical systems using new types of calls observed ;
these were undoubtedly late deliveries of the previous day's heavy traffic in
tactical communications. A survey of the past few days traffic and location
sheets reveals the definite association of certain naval auxiliaries with several
component parts of the Combined Fleet. Some of these naval auxiliaries are
known to be tankers. Examples (1) Commanding Officer KYOKUTO Maru that
made two or three fast tanker trips to California last spring is aboard the KAGA,
(2) the NARUTO and another new auxiliary (YUMAJ3) appeared at least twice
with those first fleet units most likely to move.
First and Second Fleets. — COM-16 reports the majority of First and Second
Fleets in the Inland Sea-Ariaki area. Also that the YAMASHIRO is in Yokosuka
while KONGO is in Maizuru. The units of the First Fleet that appear to be
involved in movements, present or immediate future, include:
SENDAI— CL.
MIDZUHO— AV.
HYUGA— BE.
1 other BB— (WAFU0) with HYUGA.
BatDiv 3— (Includes KONGO, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA, HIYEI).
Desron 1 and 3.
Submarines. — COM-16 reports ComSubForce and large part of the Submarine
Force in the Inland Sea-Ariaki area. One important Submarine Squadron
(NASU4) has appeared frequently associated with Cruiser Division 8 in the Sec-
ond Fleet and Destroyer Squadron 1 in First Fleet. There is a slight indication
that a part of Carrier Divisions and these forces will operate in the Mandates.
Several dispatches forwarded to ComSubForce and ComCarDivs have also in-
752 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
eluded JALUIT and TRUK Radio Stations. Additionally Tokio Radio originated
a despatch to Communication Officer Cruiser Division 8 information to COMOFFS
CAF, Second Fleet, BatDiv 3, CARDIVS and JALUIT Radio. While SubForce is
exempted in this last despatch, there seems to be a tie-in between these forces and
the Mandates.
Air. — The following units appear to comprise all air activities of Combined
Fleet now operating in Takao-South China Area :
MOO0— 11th Air Corps.
NTI4— CAF (Comdr., and COMOFF).
OTOfi— KANOYA Air Corps.
REA2— SHIOGAMA Air Corps.
SIHA5— ZnJIKAKU.
SUY08— Plane guards for ZUIKAKO.
T0ME2— Large AIRON in CAF.
YUHI7— KASUGA MARU (new Converted carrier)?
Also CarDiv 3, HOSHO, and RYUJO appear to be in Takao general area but
not with the above forces.
Mandates. — A considerable concentration of air activities continues in the
Mandates. One Mandate naval auxiliary YUH08 originated a dispatch to a
FUSAN (Korea) address. Fourth Fleet and Chitose Air Corps both appear at
TRUK.
China. — North and South China appear relatively quiet if Takao is placed
outside of this category.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 28 October 1941
General. — Traffic volume normal with good reception on all circuits except
Tokyo to Shanghai which was poor. The direction finder stations throughout the
Mandates were active indicating an exercise of this net. The types of tactical
traffic previously reported as being very heavy has now been reduced to very light.
It is now apparent that such traffic was in the nature of a drill embracing the
entire Communication System. A few tactical circuits heard, Carriers were
heard on 9606 kcs.. Central China Forces on 4690 kcs. and the Direction Finder
Net on 4955 kcs.
First Fleet. — No indication of movement of this fleet. Today a message ad-
'dressed to Chief of Staff Second Fleet and Battleship Division One was sent to
the Second Fleet for delivery. Another message originated by CinC. Combined
Fleet was intercepted on Jaluit radio station frequency. This last message is
discounted as being a communication error of some discription. The Chief of
Staff of the French Indo China Force, is aboard the Combined Fleet Flagship
today. It will be recalled that the Radio Officer of this force was aboard the
Flagship several days ago.
Second Fleet. — No comment.
Third Fleet. — Except for some activity among units of the First Base Force,
Third Fleet very quiet.
Fourth Fleet and Mandates. — Indications are growing stronger that the Fourth
Fleet is preparing for operations. The CinC. Fourth Fleet has been originating
considerable traffic for the past two days and this has been addressed to the
Combined Fleet, Submarine Force, Carrier Divisions and several Tokyo addres-
sees. The Base Forces at Saipan, Jaluit, Truk and Imieji have become active
in traffic. The air activity in the Marshals is increasing although there have been
no reinforcements of the air units all ready there. Truk radio has been active
in transmitting weather originated by stations at Mortlock, Ololo, Kwajalang, and
one unidentified station. His frequent communication with Commander Carrier
Divisions plus above weather may indicate coming augmentation of the air
forces there.
Submarines. — Little activity.
China. — ^Tokyo originators are still addressing much traffic to Sama, Takao,
Bako, Saigon and the South China Fleet. The latter made a movement report
today but the movement is believed to be a local one.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 29 October 19^1
General. — Less volume of intercepted traffic today. The heavy use of tactical
calls and addresses on the Tokyo-Mandate Fleet general circuit which com-
menced on 25 October and was tagged as a communication test-drill, was com-
pleted early on the 28th. Use of tactical calls with maneuvering traffic on
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 753
various Fleet frequencies, with Combined, First, Second Fleet flagships and units
of these Fleets participating continues and a revival of tactical trafhc on sub-
marine frequencies indicates that portions of these forces are at sea. Carriers
were also heard working. The Third Fleet was especially prominent as an
originator with code movement reports from Comdesron Five, Comairron Six,
Number Two Base Force, First Defense Division of Third Fleet indicating prep-
arations for some activity on the part of this force. The Fifth Fleet is daily
assuming more tangible form and it is believed that it will shortly appear as an
active unit of the Combined Fleet.
Combined Fleet. — Continued operations with First, Second Fleet Units, AKAGI,
SORYU and SHOKAKU apparently in same south Kyushu area. It is believed
the Commander Submarine Force is also operating in the same area.
Third Fleet .—Thi's, unit apparently preparing to move from Sasebo area. The
CinC Third Fleet is not aboard his usual flagship, NAGARA, today. "Various
Third Fleet units initiated movement reports as reported above under general
notes.
Fourth Fleet. — Remains Truk area, with general air activity continuing
throughout Mandate area but especially Siapau-Truk-Jaluit areas.
Stihmarine Force. — Jaluit Radio came up under tactical call on Submarine
Force frequency working three previously unheard sliips with D/F bearings
running through the Marshalls.
China. — Carrier Divisions Three and Four continue association with Com-
bined Air Force Commander in the Takao area, with HIKUl (Unidentified
Sasebo Office) apparently having cognizance over forces in Taiwan, South China
and Hainan areas, as well as the South Expeditionary Force in Indo China area.
It is still felt that the areas of operations of the various forces as outlined in
the summary of 23 October is substantially correct.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 30 October 1941
General. — Traffic volume a little above normal. TOKYO Communication is
continuing to originate messages for general distribution. This activity has
covered a considerable period now and is, I believe, unprecedential. The subject
matter is unknown because of the general address always involved. The only
conclusions are that a major change in the communication system is imminent
or that regular reports are being made to the Navy concerning communications.
Very little tactical traffic intercepted. The High North circuits continue to be
quiet. Base HO 4 heard calling HO 1 and exchanged signal strengths but no
traffic sent. Jaluit, Saipau, and Truk heard working each other. Direction
Finder activities quiet ; Jaluit did not send in any bearings, Saipan sent two
and Chinkai sent four.
Combined F/eef.— Little activity evidenced by either the 1st or 2nd Fleets.
The CINC COMBINED Fleet was prominent as an addressee but originated very
little traffic. The greater part of these Fleets appear to be in Kure area but
CINC is indicated as being in Sasebo,
Third Fleet.- — This Fleet very active in radio traffic. The Commander in Chief
originated much traffic as did the Commanders of the 1st and 2nd Base Forces.
Yesterday the despatches seemed to be of the movement report variety while
those today appear to be regarding organizations. Some typical headings are:
From: TIYA 77 (Com.dr 1st Base Force)
To : CINC COMBINED FLEET
Chief of Naval General Staff
Info: All Major Unit Commanders (less 4th Fleet, French Indo-China
Force, 1st Defense Division and COMAIRRON 6)
CINC THIRD FLEET sent one as follows :
Action : CINC COMBINED FLEET
Chief of Naval General Staff.
Info: MESA 1 (unidentified) ; All Major Commanders (less 4th Fleet) ;
AIRRON 6; NITU 7 (A Division in 3rd Fleet) ; Defense Division 1; NA-
GARA ; Comdr 2nd Base Force ; Comdr 1st Base Force.
There has been no confirmation of movement of this Fleet by other means
than traffic headings. Normal delivery of traffic via Sasebo continues. No
confirmation by DF hearings. It is therefore believed that the movement is
imminent. The directive is not evident but Cavite reports that the ASHIGARA
has departed for South. BuMil is in active touch with Bako and the UNO
Taihoku.
754 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Fourth Fleet. — One despatch today addresed the Commander in Chief of the
4th Fleet in care of Naval Intelligence at Tokyo. For the past two days all 4th
Fleet Traffic has been addressed to the Chief of StafE rather than the CINC.
Most of the activity in this F'leet still centers about the 4th, 5th and 6th Defense
Divisions. Today both Saipan and Truk sent messages to MOMU/0 (a new
Carrier identified here as KORYU). The association of the KORYU, SAIPAN,
TRUK and YOKOSUKA Air Corps leads to the belief that KORYU and
YOKOSUKA Air will move toward Saipan soon.
Subniarines. — Nothing to report.
China. — The traffic load on the South China circuits has greatly increased.
SAMA, HAINAN is quite prominent as an addressee and has originated far more
traffic recently than for the past few months.
Communication Intelligence Summary, SI Octo'ber, 19^1
General. — at 0000, 31 October, Japanese Navy service calls changed in all fleet
and air units, as expected. Shore station calls and addresses remain unchanged.
Insufficient data is at hand at time of writing to determine whether tactical
calls in the fleet were also switched ; however these shifted on 20 September and
may carry over. Traffic intercepted on 31st about normal volume with continua-
tion of general address messages from Communication Division Tokyo, Naval
Ministry and China Fleet Intelligence. Increasing traffic involving the Fifth
Fleet appeared, including communication officers of this force and of the Fourth,
probably indicating early activity of the Fifth Fleet in connection with, or in
areas adjacent to, the Fourth Fleet. Naval Ministry originated a despatch to
CinCs Fourth, Fifth, Yokosuka addressee. Information to Saipan Base Force,
Jaluit Base Force, Fifth Defense Force (at Saipan), Sixth Defense Force (at
Wotje), unidentified activity associated with Fifth Fleet organization (NEO 6),
and unidentified activity (SETA 6).
CinC Second to Second Fleet (collective SuflSx 88), Batdiv 3, Subrons Five and
Six, Desrons One and Three, Unidentified Maru, Second Fleet (Suffix 29). In-
formation to Commanders Combined Fleet, Cardivs, Subfor, and movement
offices at Tokyo, Kure, Yokosuka and Sasebo. Significance of this address is
obseure, possibly indicating organization or movement.
Combined Fleet. — Bearings place combined flagship. First fleet flag, carriers
and subfor units previous mentioned in the same general area Kure to south
and southeast of Kyushu.
First Fleet. — Inactive as traffic originator.
Second Fleet. — No indication of area from traffic, but it is believed that some
units of this force in connection BatDiv Three and units mentioned in the heading
of the despatch quoted above are preparing to operate.
Third Fl^et. — Continued movement reports from units and individual ships
as noted past three days, but no direction indicated.
Fourth Fleet. — Flagship remains in Truk area. Activity among air units and
shore based forces continues, with increasing emphasis on the Jaluit area.
Jaluit exchanged communication officer despatches with Combined and Fourth
Fleets. No D/F activity from this area was noted today.
Fifth Fleet. — As mentioned under general.
Submarine Force. — Exchange of despatches by communication officers of Com-
mander Carriers and Submarine Force indicate arrangements being made for
coordination of operations.
China. — Taiwan continues to be the center of Combined Air Force activity
with communications between Air units concentrated in that area and bases in
Palao and Truk areas in one direction and China, South China, Hainan and
Indo China Southern Expeditionary Force on the other. Commanders Eleventh
and Twelfth Air Corps, Shiogama Air, Takao area. This is a concentration of
practically the same units which were together at Hankow Air during latter July
and August. First Base Defense Force of the China Fleet (TIFU 0) is included
as an action addressee in practically all despatches originated by China force
commanders, including China Fleet, North China Foi-ce, Central China, South
China, South China Air Force, China Fleet Intelligence and South Expeditionary
Force. Carrier Divisions Three and Four traffic still goes via Takao.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 November 1941
General. — Traffic volume is a little less than normal, receiving conditions fair
but traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new calls not very great. Fleet
calls only changed, shore station calls and shore addresses not changed. It
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 755
is believed that tactical calls also remain unchanged but not enough intercepted
traffic to so state definitely. The same garble table for calls is employed so
the change amounts to a reassignment of calls previously used. New calls have
appeared but it is thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units
or were in reserve. All of the major Fleet calls are identified and a small amount
of individual calls were recovered today. Because the new calls are not yet
lined up save for the major Fleet Commanders and all time today was spent
in call recovery, this summary will deal only with general impressions.
ComUned Fleet.— The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio traf-
fic. The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a bit of traffic
to addresses placed in submarine and carrier category. No indications of
movement of any of these units. COMBINED FLEET tactical circuits were
heard but little tactical traffic copied due to interference by NPM.
Carriers.— The COMMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in despatches from
Tokyo and he took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast.
Submarines.— Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well lined
up yet.
Third Fleet.— This Fleet very active as before The SECOND and FIRST
BASE FORCES are still marshalling their MARUs and the CINC is very busy
with Tokyo.
China.— The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several
massages from Saigon.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 November, 19^1
General. — Traffic volume normal for Sunday. Receiving conditions were fair
but bulk of traffic derived from the major shore circuits. Solution of new call
system progressing satisfactorily but volume of accumulated traffic in new sys-
tem not yet large enough to permit more than casual identification of individual
calls. The number of alternate calls for major commands is increased over last
system. So far there are seven alternate calls for the Combined Fleet.
Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The combined air Force
traffic is also very high with the Commander of the Combined Air Force originat-
ing many dispatches. It appears that he is now in Taiwan. Traffic to SAMA
and BAKO is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China Fleet Intelligence
bureaus are originating periodic despatches, those from Tokyo being perfixed
WIWI. There were several high precedence dispatches from Toky» with the
major fleet commanders as addressees.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 November 1941
General. — Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for Monday.
Receiving conditions good but all circuits slow. General messages continue
to eminate from TOKYO communications. Such an amount is unprecedented
and the import is not understood. A mere call change does not account for
activities of this nature. The impression is strong that these messages are
periodic reports to the Major Commander of a certain nature. Dummy traffic
is again being sent on the TOKYO broadcasts. Naval Intelligence TOKYO
addressed two WIWI messages to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and to KUMI
8 (unidentified).
Combined Fleet. — Commander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent message
to BUMIL information all Major Commanders, Combined Fleet, Naval Intelli-
gence Tokyo, the Chief of Naval General Staff, and Bureau of Personnel. Com-
mander in Chief, Combined Fleet also was associated in traffic with offices in the
mandates, principally RNO PALAO. The Commander in Chief, Combined con-
tinues to be associated with the Carriers and Submarines.
Third Fleet. — Third Fleet traffic continues at a high level. A movement report
by RATI66 (unidentified) was addressed to Commander in Chief Third Fleet
for information.
Air.— A WE address today broke down as "ITIKOUKUU KANTAI". The
literal reading of this as "1st Air Fleet" is correct it indicates an entirely new
organization of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which indicate
that this may be the case. An old call (Y0ME7) while never identified seemed
to be in a high position with respect to the Carriers and the Air Corps. Upon
movement of air units to TAIWAN the association of CarDiv 4 and CarDiv 3
with units of the Combined Air Force was apparent. Their association in a
79716 — 46 — Ex. 1^9, vol. 2 7
756 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
command sense between shore based air and fleet air had never occured before
but under the concept of an AIR FLEET can easily be accepted. TraflSc in
the Air Force continues at a liigh level.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 November 1941
General. — Traffic volume normal vrith all circuits easily readable. More tac-
tical traffic copied than for past few days. Combined Fleet and Carriers heard
on tactical circuits. TOKYO Naval Intelligence sent four messages to Major
Commanders. One of these was for informa.tion Chief of Staff China Fleet
and one other for information of Chief of Staff Second Fleet.
Air.— High traffic level of air activities continues. Most significant of the air
despatches were some in which various air corps were addressed and BAKO
included for information. One from Yokosuka Air was addressed to SANCHOW
Island Radio for information TAKAO Air Corps. BAKO was also nated as an
addressee in several messages from SASEBO and originated two messages to
SASEBO and TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a message to two
unidentified calls for information of Commander Combined Air Force, Com-
mander in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDivs Collective, BAKO and others. The
Commander Combined Air Force addressed a message to Commander in Chief
Third Fleet.
Mandates. — -The RNO BALAO was active today, being addressed by Commander
in Chief, Fourth Fleet and sent several messages to TOKYO and YOKOSUKA.
The PALAO weather station sent a long code message addressed to nearly all
the islands of the Mandates. MARCUS Island appears as an originator. No
Change in the location of Fourth Fleet units noted.
Submarines. — No activity noted.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 5 November 19^1
General. — Traffic volume above normal. All circuits heard and receiving con-
ditions were fair to good. TOKYO very active as an originator, sending out
many messages of general address. Two WIWI messages in Kana Code sent by
NGS to Chief of Staff CarDivs and TIYA44 (unidentified) respectively. The
Intelligence Offices of China Fleet and TOKYO continue active with many des-
patches passing between the two.
Third Fleet. — Two units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKAO area.
Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RISI4 and YA02) it is not known how
much of this fleet they represent. It is fairly certain that the Commander in
Chief, Third Fleet has not yet left the Sasebo area although it is expected that
he will before long. One message which may be a movement report from him
was received late on the 5th. The present state of call recovery on the Third
Fleet does not. permit of an estimate of the movement involved.
A unit of the First Fleet, identified today as CARDIV 4 appeared today at
BAKO. This Carrier Division was addressed as "less FUTA SHOTAI" (2nd
Section?) Whether or not there are other units at BAKO is not known. The
Commander CARDIVS has been associated with SAMA and BAKO in several
dispatches today. The following were also associated, SANCHOF ISLAND,
TAKAO AIRCORPS, CANTON (China) and YOKOHAMA Air. The RNO
TAIHOKU originated many despatches to TOKYO and the French Indo China
Forces. A TAIWAN originator sent one to Lieut. Comdr. SHIBA at the Embassy
THAILAND for information to HANOI and the Commander French Indo China
Forces.
BAKO originated numerous despatches to the Empire and to the Major Fleet
Comnianders.
The South China Fleet was also the recipient of many despatches from
TOKYO.
Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that there is
now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO area which will
comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the past month and will
be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet units to an unknown
extent.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 6 November, 19'tl
General. — Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving conditions were
fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches interferred somewhat.
Today the specific call-up on -the Tokyo broadcast was eliminated. Formerly
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 757
Tokyo radio called the unit concerned when the dispatch was addressed to a
member of that unit. Beginning yesterdaj^ afternoon all broadcast messages
are addressed to a single call without regard to the addressee of the message.
The recovery of the radio organization will be hampered by this new advance in
Communication Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this
broadcast from which the address and originator were missing. This may be
the start of complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits. Tokyo
addressed a WIWI message to the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and
Submarine Force.
Takao-Bako Area. — It is now certain that there is a very heavy air concen-
tration on Taiwan. This comprises practically the entire Combined Air Force
including the Commander and his staff plus at least one carrier division and an
unknown amount of the fleet air arm. No additional units of the Third Fleet
were located there today but it is believed that CinC Third Fleet is now enroute
BAKO from SASEBO. From traffic association it is believed that some Second
Fleet units are in Takao area but this has not yet been proven. The South
China Fleet Command has been active in dispatches to Taiwan addresses.
Comhined Fleet. — A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now appearing
with secret (tactical) calls in use.
Mandates. — The Mandates trafllc has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth De-
fense Force at Truk and the RNO PALOA continue to be the most active units.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 7 November lOJfl
General. — Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use of
the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTU for delivery to all Combined
Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces to which attached is very
difficult. Use of large number of alternate calls for major fleet forces, many
of which have not yet been definitely identified or associated with known calls,
renders the picture more confusing. Appearance of tlie prefix "JITSU" (authen-
ticator for bonafide traffic) in several messages indicates that a communication
drill is being held but without indication as to what units are participating and
therefore much of the traflic is suspected of being "drill". Jaluit Radio is han-
dling traffic direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to congestion of Mandate
circuits from the Marshalls caused by heavy concentrations in that area.
Air. — Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities, mainly cen-
tered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air activities in the Mandates included
in headings of messages. Despatches originated by Fourth Fleet Command in-
cluded Air Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and all types of Mandate activities
in long headings.
Fleet. — Fourth Fleet Command remains in Truk area. There are indications
that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao area but identifica-
tions are not .sufficiently certain to confirm this.
. Greatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls to
facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of handling fleet
traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped.
_ Communication Intelligence Summary, 8 November 19^1
General. — Normal volume of intercepted traffic with no "dummies" api)earing
on the UTU. All UTU traffic was broadcast fo the general call only. The Staff
Communication Officer of the French Indo-China Force (So. Exp. For.) sent a
despatch action to S. C. O. Combined INFO. S. C. O. Second Fleet, Combined Air
Force, unidentified fleet unit. Radio stations at Tokyo, Palao and Takao. This
may indicate a contemplated coordination of communications between the Indo-
China-South China areas and the Palao Island-Taiwan area. Secret calls were
used very little as compared to the past few days and only three circuits were
heard using them, including the Combined Fleet Commanders circuit and Air
Station Net. North .Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet. All mandate circuits
were active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all classes of Mandate
addressees in all areas, but with continued emphasis on the Palao area at one
end and the Jaluit-Marshall area on the other. Chichijima Air Station was in-
cluded in much of the traffic between Empire Offices and Saipan Air with Jaluit
Base Force included for information. Inclusion of Chichijima usually presages
an air movement between Mandates and Empire but the Units involved are un-
identified. Commander of unidentified shore activity (NEO 66) previously asso-
ciated with the Fifth Fleet, was addressed at Chichijima Air which tentatively
758 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
identifies him as an air activity. Previous association of the Fifth Fleet traflBc
with Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka tends to confirm the belief that Fifth Fleet
operations are, or will be, in the area adjacent to Chichijima-Marcus, supple-
menting the Fourth Fleet in the lower island areas.
Fleet. — Chief of staff First Fleet originated a despatch through Kure Radio.
Batdiv Three of the First Fleet appears to be operating separately from the main
force, possibly in connection with Cardivs Three and Four in the Taiwan-Naha
area. An apparent movement report from Cardiv Four was addressed to CinC
Combined Fleet, First Fleet, CarDiv Commander, Combined Air Force Commander
and to movement offices at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru and Sasebo. Traffic
from the Commander Indo-China Force is handled from the Japanese radio sta-
tion at Saigon rather than from the KASHII, indicating that the staff is based
ashore at present. No identifiable submarine activity was noted.
Air. — Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities. The
area between Chichijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit appears to be par-
ticularly concerned with movement of air forces and auxiliaries, while the for-
mation of a force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao-Bako area ap-
pears to be nearly completed as indicated by reports addressed to CinO. Combined,
Naval Minister, Commanders of Cardivs, Combined Air Force, First Fleet and
shore addresses generally associated with movements or organization changes.
This force is believed to include CarDiv Four, and possibly CarDiv Three, with
a number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Force, also possibly some
units from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders composition of the
force highly speculative and area of operations obscure. Prior to change of
calls, much traffic was exchanged between China, South China and Indo-Chinn
while at present most traffic includes Palao.
Communicatioti Intelligence Summary, 9 November, 1941
Oeneral. — Traffic volume heavy for Sunday. Receiving conditions fair but
heavy static caused numerous garbles and fragmentary messages. Navy
Minister sent several messages of general address including one to all First and
Second class Naval stations. Practically all of the general messages carried
SAMA as an information address. Carrier Division Three arrived at Takao
and there are indications that Carrier Division Four will return to Sasebo
from Takao. The Flagship of Carrier Divisions is AKAGI and is in Sasebo
area. Some tactical traffic today shows units of Combined Fleet still operating.
The association of Batdiv Three and Mandate addresses, especially Saipan may
indicate operations of that unit in the Mariannas. The JINGEI was com-
municating with SAMA. HAINAN today. The Chief of Staff of the French-
Indo China Force is in Tokyo.
One message today addressed to CinC. Combined Fleet was routed to
MAIZURU for delivery but this is believed a communication error. The Third
Fleet appears to be still in Sasebo area but it was noted that considerable
traffic passed between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the Third Fleet. The
Fifth Fleet is still being organized with no indications yet that it has
assembled. The Eighteenth Air Corps at Saipan originated much traffic to
Yokosuka Air Corps.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 10 November, 19^1
Oeneral. — ^Traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There were
fewer general messages sent today than for the past few weeks. Tokyo Intel-
ligence still active and addressing dispatches to all Major Commanders. The
Mandates construction traffic has decreased considerably. Call recovery is
progressing but has been slowed down by the general call-up used on Fleet
broadcast.
Combined Fleet. — Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A staff officer of
BatDiv Three was addressed there today and it is likely that this whole divi-
sion is there also. The CinC, Second Fleet was located at Kure today as well
as two cruiser divisions.
Third Fleet. — The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo area. Several
movement reports have been noted by units of this fleet but none have been
noted other than individual ships. At least two units of this fleet still at
Takao. CinC Three originated one movement report for information of CinO
Fourth Fleet.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 759
Fourth Fleet. — Little activity. CinC. Fourth remains in vicinity of Truk
with major portion of his command. The Staff Communication Officer of Sub-
marine Force sent a message to the CinC. Fourth for information of Jaluit.
Fifth Fleet. — One unit of this fleet located- at Chichijima.
Air. — The Combined Air Force Command is still talking to Sama and the
South China Fleet. From one address it appears that the Commander of Car-
rier Division Three is with the Combined Fleet. Several units of the Carrier
Divisions are in port at Kure and Sasebo. CinC. Combined Air Force is still
in Takao.
Communication InteUigence Summarj/, 12 November, 1941
General. — Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving condition
about average. The general character of the traffic has been administrative
with most of it being between shore logistic and technical activities. The
D. F. net was active today with very little activity shown yesterday. Inter-
cept operators have commented adversely on the major shore network which
comprises all of the major naval activities in the Empire. Traffic has been
moving slowly over this circuit. The reason is the non-cooperation of the
operators and the definite lack of control exercised by TOKYO radio stations.
TOKYO Intelligence is still sending messages to the major commands but the
remainder of TOKYO traffic has been mostly from the technical bureaus.
ConiMned Fleet. — The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE area.
The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and several Mandates
stations is born out by a D. F. position on the flagship of BATDIV 3 which
places him about halfway between CHICHIJIRIA and MARCUS Island. Their
position was obtained on the 4th when this unit was not yet identified. No
subsequent bearings have been obtained. Also associated with this BATDIV
are a Submarine Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although the association of
this CARDIV (Lately returned from TAKAO) is not positive. The Third
Fleet remains at SASEBO with the only activity exhibited in the Base Forces.
4tr.— CARDIV 3 returned to KURE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE.
Most of air activity confined to dispatches between carrier and shore estab-
lishments.
Fifth Fleet. — Nothing to report.
Fourth Fleet. — The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The vol-
ume of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The Commander Sub-
marine Force is still adding JALUIT and today COMSUBRON 2 addressed a
message there. AIRRON 24 sent a movement report but no indication of the
direction. Communication exercises were held by JALUIT and several stations
in that area. YOKOHAMA Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO.
China. — The previous activity of SAMA and the French Indo China Forces
and bases continues.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 13 November 1941
General. — Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several
messages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are :
1. UNIWIWI despatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to Chief
of Staff Combined Air Force, INFO RNO TAIHOKU, BAKO Naval Station.
2. WIWI from N. G. S. to MAIZURU INFO Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.
3. NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet,
INFO Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third Fleet and
SAMA, HAINAN.
4. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to Secretary First Fleet.
5. (2 messages) WIWI to same address as 3 above.
6. A 3 part NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined
Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief French Indo China Fleet.
7. One UNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA,
INFO Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Commander in Chief Combined
Fleet.
This is the only occurence in some time of anyone save the TOKYO intelligence
activity using the WIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the China Fleet Intelligence
Bureau were active all day with despatches to the Major Commanders.
The direction finder net was again active all day with CHINKAI, ORU 7 (near
CHINKAI), JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending in bearing reports.
Combined Fleet. — The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is
operating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The Commander of
760 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
BATDIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. Ttie Division Communication Officer is
communicating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other ships in this divi-
sion remain unlocated but it is assumed, lacking evidence to the contrary, that
they are with the flagship. Other units of First Fleet seem inactive. One
Cruiser Division of Second Fleet is associated in traffic with PALAO and may
be in that area.
Third Fleet. — Still located in SASEBO, the Commander in Chief has been active
in the traffic, being addressed by botli TOKYO and Commander in Chief Com-
bined Fleet. The First BASE FORCE Commander originated several messages
but no indication of change of location.
Fourth Fleet. — The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is in communication
with the Sixth BASE FORCE JALUIT. Several messages were exchanged. He
appers to be preparing for a move from TRUK but no movement has yet occurred.
SUBRON 2 is again in communication with JALUIT and today originated a
movement report, but no indication of direction.
Air. — Carriers remain relatively inactive. The SETTSU is still with them
and a few may be engaged in target practice near KURE. The Combined AIR
FORCE is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual high traffic level between
its component Air Corps still exists.
China. — The Commander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one of the
RNO TAIHOKU. His Chief of Staff is still in SHANGHAI.
Commutiication Intelligence Summary, l.'f November 19^1
General. — Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor to fair receiving
conditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry originated several AlNav
dispatches. There were three WIWI messages originated today. i
1. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.
Information Chief of Staff" Combined Fleet and YOKOSUKA.
2. WIV/I from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief
of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO.
3. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to ANI758 (Chief of Staff of an unidentified
unit). Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Chief of Staff Com-
bined Air Force.
Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bearings in addi-
tion to the others. Tactical circuits heard during day with a fair amount of
activity.
Combined Fleet. — Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three is still
operating but no further information on this division. Two Combined Fleet units
appear active in the traffic. They are DesRon Three (normally in First Fleet
but has been operating with Second Fleet) and CruDiv Seven of Second Fleet.
Both of these units have been associated in traffic with the South China Fleet
and the French ludo China Force. They may proceed to the South China area
in near future.
Third Fleet. — Still in Sasebo area. The CinC. has been addressed by Tokyo
to a great extent and is still associated with South China activities in traffic.
It has been noted that the association betvv'een the Third Fleet and units of the
Combined Air Force is growing. Especially the Second Base Force has been
talking with several Air Corps among whom is the Kure Air Corps. Will air
units be embarked in ships of the Base Force?
Fourth Fleet. — No movement yet from the TRUK area. It appears that the
Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various officers of the staff" were
addressed at Tokyo and at unidentified locations.
Submarines. — No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute PALAO and
Submarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being addressed by Tokyo
and Yokosuka originators.
Air. — One Air Squadron of the Combined Air Force is at HOIHOW, HAINAN.
The Commander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good representation of
his command. The Carriers remain in home waters with most of them in port
Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 19^1
General. — Traffic volume normal, with a number of general address messages
originated by Commiunication Division, Tokyo, to Radio Officers, Ominato, U E
9 (D. F. Station in Marshalls), Jaluit, Palao, Truk, Saipan. Takao and Sama
Radios, Staff Communication Officers All Major Flagships, Staff Communica-
tion Officer South Expeditionary Force and two apparent collective shore ad-
dresses. Traffic from all stations mentioned except Sama and Ominato to
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 761
D. F. Control and Plotting Room Tokyo information to Staff Communication
Officer Combined Fleet was exchanged. No messages of the D. F. type were
detected so it is presumed that the interchange had to do with arrangements
for drill or organization of the net. The Minister of the Navy originated one'
Alnav and one to all Major Commands and collective shore. Tokyo Personnel
and Tokyo Communication Division originated several to collective fleet and
shore. Significance is not determined though it is believed possible that a
further partial change of shore and air calls may be in prospect. The Empire
air station net was normally active using tactical calls. Secretary First Fleet
originated one Urgent Code to unidentified (MINI 55), Staff Communication
Officer Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and Commanding Officer of Batdiv
Three flagship.
Cotnbined Fleet. — Same as yesterday, same units (Batdiv Three, Desrons One
and Three) associated through traffic with South Expeditionary Force. CinC
Second Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be arranging
operations of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air Units.
Third Fleet. — Inactive.
Fourth Fleet. — Apparent movement of Fourth Fleet units in prospect or
underway, with continued emphasis on the Marshalls Area. CinC. Fourth traf.
fie still being handled from the Truk area, with Airron Twenty-four (Kamoi)
and associated Yokohama and Chitose air units involved in some movement,
direction undetermined. All Marshall Island activities, including unidentified
A.rmy Forces, exchanging traffic freely.
Suhmarine Force. — Little activity detected. It is believed that some sub-
marine activity is operating or preparing to operate in the Marshall area, from
communication arrangements underway between Staff Communication Officer
Submarine Force and same Fourth Fleet, information to Jaluit. Jaluit has
been heard working on various frequencies, using tactical calls and procedure
associated with submarine operations, but no identifications of calls used have
been made.
Air. — Continued air traffic to and from Takao area, with unidentified Airron
(formerly YOME 7) including South Expeditionary Force and Sama addressees
in traffic. Composition of this force and purpose still speculative but believed
to be preparing to move southward to work with the South Expeditionary
Force.
The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders analysis
of traffic headings very slow and difficult, but identifications and recoveries
of alternates are improving as a greater volume of November traffic becomes
available for research.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 16 November 19Jfl
General. — Traffic volume approximately normal for week-end period. A new
form of despatch heading appeared in a series of dispatches broadcasted on
the regular UTSU series. Only the originator or the address of the dispatch
appeared ; it is assumed that the other pertinent call or address may be buried
in the text. These dispatches were with one exception (in 5 numeral text)
all in the nine-Kana period separator system and the single call in the heading
fitted in each case Line seven of the call garble table.
A dispatch was originated by the Navy Minister addressed to all Major
Fleets and general addresses to this effect :
"Today the House of Peers and House of Representatives by means of
a decision adopted the following resolution transmitted as follows :
1. Resolution of House of Peers — (Expressed deepest thanks and
emotion to Army and Navy for their glorious service over a long period
to the Empire and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen in
battle.
2. Resolution of House of Representatives — Express«>d thanks, etc.,
to all officers and men of Army, Navy and Air Force for their 4i/^ years
service (in China affair) and for their contribution to the establish-
ment of a permanent world peace. Gave prayers for well being of all
hands, etc."
First and Second Fleets. — Majority of First and Second Fleet Units remain
in the general Kura area. The units of these two fleets that have been most
active from dispatch heading viewpoint in the last ten days appear to be :
Airon Seven (3 Chitose class)
Carrier Division Four
762 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Destroyer Squadron Seven
Destroyer Squadron Three
Battleship Division Three
Cruiser Division Seven.
It is rather singular that the CinC. Second Fleet has assumed an important role
in addressing for action several first fleet and other fleet units recently. In
some of these dispatches the call identified as Southern Expeditionary Force (In-
do-China Force) appears. Associations of addresses in several dispatches have
thrown the Second and Third Fleets vi^ith the Combined Air Force and in other
dispatches, there appears to be an association between First Fleet, Carrier Di-
visions and the Mandates. It is apparent that Destroyer Squadron One has
been or is operating with the Carrier Divisions and Battleship Division Three
while Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three have been oper-
ating together. Iwakuin Air sent short priority dispatch to the ATAGO, Sec-
ond Fleet cruiser and submarine units indicating some joint minor exercises in
that area.
Third Fleet. — Believed inactive in Sasebo-Kure area.
Fourth Fleet. — FUATU, a Tokyo address originated one UNI dispatch to an
unidentified fleet unit (MEN 33), information to CinC. Combined Fleet, Com-
munication Officer, Fourth Fleet, Saipan Base Force, Kure Movement Oflicer, CinC,
Fifth Fleet, Tokyo Intelligence, and NEO 66, believed to be a shore based air activ-
ity in Chichijima-Marcus area.
Fifth Fleet.— Prior to the change of calls on 1 November, the composition of
the Fifth Fleet was very indefinite but appeared to contain several naval aux-
iliary type vessels. Since 1 November, little has been recovered of the composi-
tion of this mythical fleet but it is definite that some units are operating in the
general Yokosuka Chichijima-Marcus. ,
Submarines. — ^Little activity. Communication Oificer, Submarine Force orig-
inated one priority dispatch to unidentified address, information to Combined
Fleet Communication OflScer. Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet
commands continues.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 17 November, 1941
General. — Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. More traffic
with single call heading appeared on the broadcast circuit. These dispatches
numbered serially and each call different but all fitting the same line in the call
garble table. Since these messages are transmitted each hour on the hour and
are of approximately the same length it appears that they are drill messages.
It is feared that they constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a head-
ing. Since none of this traffic have been found going into Tokyo it is probably
originated in the Navy Ministry. Very few vessels of general address were
noted. Tactical circuits in the Mandates were heard during the day with radio
Saipan controlling.
Combined Fleet. — No movement from the Kure area of any major portion of the
First or Second Fleets. The CinC. Second Fleet very active as an originator
today. He continues to address units which are normally under his command.
He also addressed the CinC. Third Fleet, Palao Forces, and the Chief of Staff
Fourth Fleet.
Third Fleet. — Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Communication Officer of Third
Fleet Avas addressed by the R. N. O. Palao.
Fourth Fleet. — The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area centered
about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit. Both
these activities originated traffic.
Air. — The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was
addressed frequently by SAMA, HAINAN and was in two instances addressed by
the Fourth Fleet. The carriers are mostly in the Kiire-Sasebo area with the
exception of a few which ai'e operating in the Kyushu area.
China. — Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined Fleet
Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The R. N. O. Taihoku ad-
dressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow Island, Sama. Bako, CinC. South
China, and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 18 November 19^1
General. — Traffic volume a little under normal with receiving conditions fair
to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of general address
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 763
emanating from the Communication Section. The double originator BUMIL and
N. G. S. sent one NIKAWIWI to the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet for infor-
mation to all First Class Naval Stations. BUMIL also addressed an urgent
dispatch to SAMA, information to R. N. O. TAINOKU, Chief of Staff South China
Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Another Tokyo originator, believed
to be N. G. S., sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief
of Staff French Indo China Force and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. MAIZURU
Naval Station also sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet,
Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force and for informa-
tion to N. G. S. The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent three long
dispatches to the entire Direction Finder Net which was very active today with
many bearings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General Staff sent one to
Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions and Chief of Staff French Indo China Force.
Conibined Fleet. — CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an originator
and addressee. Since this officer is always included in the address of every im-
portant message, he will no longer be mentioned as an addressee unless he is
the only addressee. The association between the CinC Second Fleet and the
French Indo China Forces and Combined Air Force is very plain. He was ad-
dressed by CinC. French Indo China Force today in an urgent NIKA dispatch.
Several units of the Combined Air Force also addressed several dispatches
to him. Battleship Division Three, the Carrier Divisions and two destroyer
squadrons have been associated in traffic. Several dispatches occurred today,
being addressed by N. G. S. and the Commander Carrier Divisions in several
instances. The CinC. Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches to him.
These form the indication that CinC. Second Fleet will be in command of a
large Task Force comprising the Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, some car-
rier divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No movement from home waters
has been noted.
Third Fleet. — The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears
to be a movement report. He also sent one to R. N. O. TAIHOKU, informa-
tion to CinC. Third Fleet. There were other units tentatively placed in Third
Fleet who sent dispatches in which the Tokyo movement report office was an
addressee. It is expected that the Third Fleet will move from the Sasebo area
in the near future. This Second Base Force was having quite a bit of traffic
with several Air Corps a while ago and may be transporting air units or
equipment.
Fourth Fleet. — Not much activity in this fleet. The amount of traffic between
this fleet and Palao is noticeable with the submarines still interested in Jaluit.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 19 Novetnher 194I
General. — Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates
was noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the northern circuits also very light.
Some tactical traffic received from Combined Fleet units. There has been a
noticeable increase in the afloat traffic over the normal amount usually seen.
Fleet units seem to ha'Ve a great deal of business with other Fleet units both
within and outside of their own organization. Staff Officers are frequently
addre,ssed at other than their normal locations. The activity at Tokyo has sub-
sided somewhat in that there were fewer general messages than for the past
few days. Tokyo Intelligence sent out several messages addressed to Second
Fleet, Submarine Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAMA for
information to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet.* The Navy
Minister sent out two AlNavs. The Direction Finder net is still active with all
stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting station making reports to major
commanders.
Combined Fleet. — ^The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears today
at Sasebo, its southern jaunt apparently having been completed. Destroyer
Squadron Four and Two appear associated with the Third Fleet. Cine. Second
Fleet continues his activity, being still associated with Combined Air Force,
French Indo China Force, Third Fleet, and today with Carrier Division Three.
Carrier Division Three was in Takao and returned to the Empire a week ago
and has been associated with Third Fleet since. A Bako activity addressed the
Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The Chief
of Staff Second Fleet addressed an urgent dispatch to CinC. French Indo China
Fleet information to Third Fleet and Commander Cruiser Division Five.
Third Fleet. — ^Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and
of the Base Forces originated movement reports but no indication of direction.
CinC. Third Fleet is still in Sasebo.
764 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Fourth Fleet. — ^Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base De-
fense Force at Palao. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and the Second Fleet
was considerable. One call (SITI 4) appears at Jaluit today. This call has
been identified as Carrier Division Four and if the one message is correct it ap-
pears that this Carrier Division (ZUIKAKU) is in the Jaluit area. This is not
confirmed as no other indications have been found and its presence at Jaluit
is doubted, attributing the message to be a communication error.
Fifth Fleet. — Flagship located at Yokosuka. The CinC. Fifth Fleet appeared
in a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 20-21 November 19Jfl
General. — Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal.
Tokyo originators active with messages addressed to all major commanders.
N. G. S. sent a UNI WIWI to Commandant BAKO for information to Chief
of Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The Personnel Bureau at Tokyo become
very active on the 21st sending out a series of long personnel messages. The
activity at Tokyo identified as R. D. F. plotting stations increased his recent
high volume of messages with a long four part message addressed to all major
commanders. He also addressed several dispatches to the Direction Finder net,
indicating the employment and results being obtained by this activity. The
traffic load on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 21st, so heavy
that the circuit was in duplex operation most of the mid-watch.
Combined Fleet. — Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area
and most of both fleets remain in Eure-Sasebo area. Battleship Division Three
still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the CinC. Second Fleet continues
abnormally high. A list of units addressed by him or who sent traffic to him
and CinC. Third Fleet over the past two days follows :
MIRA 9 (Carrier Division Three)
TAE 1 (Airron 7) AKU 8 (Air Unit)
KAME 5 (Airron 6) KUSU 7 (Unidentified)
YAWI 1 (Crudiv 5) SATU 88 (Unidentified)
KENU 3 (Crudiv 7) KUNI 88 (Unidentified)
RESE 4 (Desron 3) OYU 9 (Unidentified)
AKI 0 (Desron 4) KONA 0 (Unidentified)
TIYA 7 (Comdr. 1st Base For) MOTU 6 (Unidentified)
SASE3 (Comdr. 2nd Base For) NETE 5 (Unidentified)
YOMO 9 (Desron 5) NSI 3 (Unidentified)
REA 2 (Shiogama Air Corps) SUTE 1 (Unidentified)
KUNO 9 (Erimo) YAYU 1 (Unidentified)
MIMO 3 (Air Unit?) MARES (Unidentified)
TUE 7 (Unidentified) Plus 11 Marus.
ENO 7 (Unidentified)
This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assembled by him but
only the ones occurring in the past two days. Each one appeared not only with
the CinC. Second Fleet but with the Third Fleet and with one of the units
now in South China or at Taiwan-South China Address. A complete list is being
made up but was not finished at this writing. Assuming that the entire Second
Fleet will be included in this organization and that each unit addressed will
either participate or contribute somewhat to the Task Force it appears that
it will comprise a good portion of the navy. One item stands out — so far
there has been practically no submarine units mentioned by the Second or
Third Fleets in connection with South China activities. Commander Subrnarine
Force has not been included in traffic. He does appear in Tokyo Fourth Eleet
and Mandates traffic.
Mandates and Fourth Fleet. — The R. N. O. Palao and Palao radio stations
have remained active with the Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka for days. This is
taken to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include
the Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active with
the R. N. O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so
great it may be that he will assign some non-Second Fleet units to that area
but just which ones is not yet known. From information fi'om radio sources
there is no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third
Base Force which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet
units routed there and the Maru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal
flow to that area. With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday reported as either
a carrier unit or submarine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 765
of the Submarine Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls
is far greater than that existing at Palao.
Communication Intelligence Sutnmary, 22 November I94I
General. — Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical
circuit heard today, indicating that Combined Fleet tactical exercises are
now completed. The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs and sent two
other messages, one to CinC Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka and Com-
mander Submarine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out the usual long
messages to CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet.
BuMil addressed Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan Civil Engineering Section at Peleliu
and Yokosuka. Another unidentified Tokyo originator sent a priority message to
all major flags and China Fleet, information to ANOS at Taihoku and Palao.
Sasebo addressed one to Chief of Staff French Indo China Force, information
Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Bako, Sama, Chief of Staff South China, Chief of
Staff Third Fleet, Commander Cruiser Division Seven and Commander Destroyer
Squadron Three. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three to
South China Area soon? While the Direction Finder Net is still active, the
station at Palao sent in more bearings than usual for that station.
Combined Fleet. — CinC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two uniden-
tified calls, one a Maru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet. CinC. Second
Fleet was again prolific with many messages addressed to Third Fleet and Com-
bined Air Force. The amount of traffic interchanged between these three com-
manders was very great. One message addressed many units as follows :
CinC. Second Fleet. To: NETE 5 (Crudiv ?), KOO 2 (Subron 5) TIYU 66
(CinC. Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC. Comb. Air Force), MIRA 9 (CarDiv 3),
RESE 4 (Desron 3), KORE 4 (Second Fleet) (Collective), less Crudiv 8
and unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI 2 (BatDiv 3) (at Kure and Sasebo),
Airron 7 (at Kure), SUTI 1 (?) (at Kure), SATU 8 (?) (at Kure), META 0
(AKASHI (at Kure) META 2 (ASAHI MARU), TUFU 2 (?), NARI 33
(CinC. China Fleet), KAKE 66 (CinC. South China Fleet), MISI 66 (CinC.
Comb. Fleet).
Third Fleet.— CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from "RIKUGUN SAN-
BOUTEU MAEDATI SEUZEU (at Tainoku). This is translated as "Army Chief
of Staff General MAEDATI and indicates the linking of the Taiwan Army
Forces with Third P"'leet. The CinC Third Fleet continues his association with
Combined Air Forces.
Fourth Fleet. — CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base
Force at Jaluit and AirRon 24 now in Jaluit area. The Third Base Force at
Palao and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and Yokosuka.
He also received one from Commander Submarine Force.
China. — The Commander French Indo China Force sent one message to CinC.
Combined Fleet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako sent one to Sec-
retary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Carrier Divisions,
Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 23 November, 1941
General. — Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic has increased.
Some of the high precedence dispatch headings are listed :
1. MAYURU (Tokyo address) to HORONO MUSEKU (CoUective Shore
Precedence Information Chiefs of Staff Combined, 1st,
NIKA-WIWI 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and Southern Expedition-
ary Force.
2. Third Fleet Chief of Staff to Second Fleet Chief of StaflF Information
NIKA Combined and Southern Expeditionary
Force Chief of Staff.
3. KESANA EONO (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and Southern
WIWI Expeditionary Force. Information "SAN-
KUYUTI" at Sama Hainan.
4. SUTE 1 (Unidentified Fleet unit) to Radio Takao, Hainan, Flagship
NIKA NWA 2, information Radio Tokyo and
Second Fleet flagship.
5. Imakuni Air to Iwakuni Air Detachment at NAHA Information Kure,
KIU Bako, and MING 3 in Takao.
766 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to First Fleet, Third
Fleet, and others. The following WE address was followed by Sasebo Radio in
the delivery of a personnel Bureau dispatch "SAHOTI.RENGO.RI.SI".
An unidentified fleet unit (SUTE 1) listed recently in Kure appeared on radio
circuit with Takao Radio. Also on this circuit were the following:
KENU 3— CruDiv 7 Flagship?
HOWI 2 — Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
EKE 8 — Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
MUSE 5 — Naval Auxiliary associated with Second Fleet.
The above units received delivery of the long NIKA dispatch originated by
CinC Second Fleet on the 21st of November and which appeared to outline the
forces expected to operate in the Indo-China general area.
Combined Fleet. — CinC Combined was included, as always, in all exchange of
fleet commander traffic, but no important messages originated by him were inter-
cepted. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet messages mentioned in sum-
maries of 22nd were still being circulated but Third Fleet appeared as the most
active unit in today's traffic. Indications are that Third Fleet units are under-
way in a movement coordinated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air Force and
French Indo China Force. Commander French Indo China Force (So. Exp. For)
was included in aU important traffic from Second, Third and Combined Air Com-
manders, Hainan addressees were included in nearly all high precedence messages
concerning these forces and may indicate a rendezvous of forces in that area.
Palao appeared as an information addressee on a portion of the traffic. Fourth
Fleet activity involved Palao area on one end and Marshalls on the other. With
no means of substantiating the impression, it is believed that more submarines
are operating in, or from, the Marshalls than it has been possible to definitely
place from radio interceptions. It is recalled that there was an exchange between
Staff Communication Officers of the Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet with
.Taluit included as either action or information around November 1st and that
Jaluit opened a direct circuit to Yokosuka early this month, apparently to relieve
traffic congestion from that area. Jaluit Radio Has been heard on various fre-
quencies using, and working with units using tactical or secret type calls, while
the main submarine frequency of 6385/12770 has been relatively inactive.
Aii'. — Combined Air Traffic remains associated with Taiwan area, while the
Mandate Air units continue high level of activity, covering the whole Mandate
area. Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet, but with Carrier Division Three
definitely associated with Second Fleet operations.
China. — CinC. China and South China not included with the Second, Third,
Air Force and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic and were quiet. Bearings
from Cavite and Guam place CinC. South China east of Taiwan, but this is
believed questionable.
Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few
days and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent or
actually underway, at least in part, to the southward, with covering forces operat-
ing from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled or gathering
in the Palao area.
Communication intelligence summary, 2^ November, 1941
General. — Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal. Traf-
fic analysis impressions are unchanged from yesterday's report. The difficulties
of identifications have prevented more definite information of vessels (and fleets
to which attached) that appear to be moving south from Kure-Sasebo area. If
the poor reception prevailing here the last two days can be disregarded and the
assumption made that Radio Heeia intercepted their "share" of the total traffic,
the following impressions are worth something :
( a ) The falling off of traffic to China addresses.
(b) The increased activity among third fleet addresses with a high per-
centage of what appears to be movement reports.
(c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat
addresses.
The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force
continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in despatch traffic,
the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the Submarine Force Com-
mander with the latter.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 767
First and Second Fleets. — Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio call
believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven originated a dispatch
to Commander Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second Fleet, Commander South-
ern Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. The
CinC. Second Fleet continues to appear as the Task Force Commander of a large
number of units from First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Three and
Combined Air Force units.
Third Fleet. — Large number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some
of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC. Third Fleet ap-
pears as information addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet
units indicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future
operations. Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division
Three with CinC. Third Fleet.
Fotirth Fleet and Mandates. — Fourth Fleet appears to be concentrated in Truk
area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet vessels have come
from Truk. Air Squadron Twenty-four and perhaps a large number of sub-
marines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall Area.
Submarines. — Comparatively little activity.
China. — Comparatively quiet.
Carriers. — No definite indications of location.
Combined Air Fo7-ce. — Commander Kanoya Air appears in the Takao area.
Otherwise no change.
Communication Intelliffence Summary 25 Novemher, I94I
Genera?.— Trafiic volume normal. Receiving conditions much improved over
last two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with messages to various units.
Tokyo originated one UNI WIWI to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC. Second Fleet,
CinC. Third Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fleet and CinC. French, Indo China Force plus
Yolj;osuka, Kure and Maizuru! The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs.
A Direction Finder Net, controlled by Tokyo radio was active with secret calls
being sent by the five stations. The entire fleet traffic level is still high which
leads to the conclusion that organizational arrangements or other preparations
are not yet complete.
Combined Fleet. — ^Little activity by CinC. First Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet
remains highly active as an originator, addressing Third Fleet, Air Forces and
South China units. A Second Fleet unit and a submarine division or squadron
arrived in Takao communication zone today. Crudivision Seven which previously
arrived there has been associated with Destroyer Squadron Three which indicates
the presence of that unit in Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still ex-
changing messages. Two new units to be associated with CinC Second Fleet and
the Task Force now forming are the North China Fleet and Defense Division One.
Air. — Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air Corps has
been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe that other units of the Combinetl
Air Force have moved from Taiwan to the French Indo China Area although
this is not yet verified. One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the
Mandates.
Fourth Fleet. — CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications
with the Commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander
Carriers. His other communications are with the Third, Fourth and Fifth Base
Forces.
Communication Intelligence Summanj 26 November, 19Ifl
Oeneral. — TraflBc volume normal. All circuits heard well except for Tokyo-
Takao circuit which faded early. Traffic picture about the same as for the past
week. Intra-fleet traffic still very heavy and Tokyo Bureaus still dispatching
AlNavs. The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed
a succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC. Second
and Third Fleets in particular. The only MAM schedule was NR15 which was
first broadcast on the twenty-fifth. Takao and Bako originated more traffic today
than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC. Second Fleet
and the China Fleets came in for their share. Tokyo radio is working the ISUZU
(flagship South China) SAMA and CAMRANH Bay radio stations directly.
Takao is also working ITSUBA (Spratleys).
Combined Fleet. — Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic via
SAMA, indicating the arrival of that unit in Hainan waters. While no indica-
768 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tions were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also arrived it is probable that
this unit is still in company with Cruiser Division Seven and is also present at
Hainan. The Takao, former flagship of the Second Fleet became active in the
traffic today being associated with the Second and Third Fleets. The tanker
HATATOMO appeared in several of CinC. Second Fleet's dispatches today as
well as the SOYO MARU. No movement is evident yet of any of the flags of the
newly formed force. The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the
Combined Air Force still continues at it's high level.
Fourth Fleet. — No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive communi-
cation with Saipan forces as \yell as Palao forces. The KATORI and CinC.
Submarine Fleet appear to be at or near Chichijima.
Fifth Fleet. — The CinC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the dispatches of
the Second Fleet and is associated with the new Task Force.
Suhmarines. — As noted above Commander Submarine Force is in Chichijima
area. The Submarine Squadron NETES's location is somewhat uncertain today
due to one dispatch being routed to MAIZURU. The routing of this dispatch is
doubted because of the indication of her arrival at Takao yesterday and her
previous association with Cruiser Division Seven.
China. — Two Marus of the Third Fleet left Bako for Sama today.
Third Fleet. — Active as above but no indication of large scale movement from
the Sasebo area.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 21 November 19^1
. General. — Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the fre-
quencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Takao circuit unreadable on mid-watch. Some
tactical traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama, and Saigon active as
originators, addressing traffic to each other and to the Chiefs of Stafit of Second,
Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako addressed the Chief of Staff Third
Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second
Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence activity who sent
five despatches to the major commanders. The Direction Finder activity was very
high with all stations sending in bearings including the Marshall Islands Stations
which has been silent for the past four days.
Combined Fleet. — No further information as to whether or not Destroyer
Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to be still with Cruiser Division
Seven in that area. There is still no evidence of any further movement from
the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several
messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator lately.
CinC. Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Air Force,
and Bako.
Third Fleet. — Still holding extensive communication with Baka, Sama, South
China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of WE addresses is increas-
ing, those occurring today were :
"DAIHATIEUTABUTAISANBOTEU" (in Taihoku)
"KOROKUKITISIKI"
"KIZUKEYAMASITABUTAI" (in care of RYU JO)
"HEIZEUKAIGUNDAIGONREUSEU"
These is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet.
Fourth Fleet. — CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to the de-
fense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the Commander Sub-
marine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air Corps held com-
munication with Jaluit and CinC. Fourth Fleet. The Civil Engineering Units at
IMIBJI and ENIWETOK were heard from after being silent for weeks. Chitose
Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron Twenty-four is still oijerating in the
Marshalls. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in
the Mandates.
Air. — An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and
SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of fur-
ther movement of any Combined Air Force units to Hainan.
Submarines. — Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area.
Communication Intelligence Summarif, November 28, 1941
General.— Traffic volume normal. Comnmnications to and from South China
and between Mandates and Empire very heavy. No tactical traffic seen. As has
been previously reported the suspected Radio Intelligence net is very active and is
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 769
becoming more so. The TOKYO plotting activity addressed more messages to the
Radio net than previously and most of these sent for information to the Major
Commanders. Much traffic also was directed to NRE0 (the TOKYO D. F. Com-
mand) from all eight stations in the Mandates and OMINATO. This Command
also originated messages of high precedence to the Major Fleet Commanders.
This activity is interpreted to indicate that the R. I. net is operating at full
strength upon U. S. Naval Communications and IS GETTING RESULTS.
TOKYO originators vpere active with messages of high precedence to the Com-
mander in Chief's of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. The
Navy Minister sent to Alnavs. The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent one to
the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third
Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second Fleet and RNO PALAO. The BUAERO
sent one to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet info IMIESI and 11th Air Corps at
SAIPAN.
Combined Fleet.^-No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units.
Commander in Chief Second Fleet originated his usual number of despatches to
Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid particular attention to by
the Commanded in Chief Second Fleet were CRUDIVS Five and Seven and
DESRONS Two and Four and SUBRON Five. No traffic today from the TAKAO
(CA).
Third Fleet. — Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander
in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present
with the bulk of the Third Fleet in SASEBO but it is not yet located elsewhere.
The Army Commander in TAIHOKU is still holding communications with the
Commander in Chief Third Fleet. Two Third Fleet units arrived at BAKO and
are apparently returning to KURE from BAKO.
Fourth Fleet.— Bulk of Fourth Fleet still at TRUK. The Commander in Chief
Fourth addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the Fourth
Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at RUOTTO and WOTJE and
held communications with AIRRON Twenty-Four and KAMOI.
South China. — SAMA sent several messages to shore addresses in the Empire.
SAMA also addressed the OMURA AIR CORPS in several messages which went
for information to SAIGON and TOKYO. TAKAO radio station addressed the
Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, the French Indo China Force and
Combined Air Force. TAKAO Air Corps addressed SUKUGAWA Air Corps and
YOKOSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a HAINAN office now at SAIGON
originated several messages to the Naval Bases at SASEBO and KURE. The
Commander in Chief China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and ad-
dressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief Second
and Commander in Chief Third Fleets.
Subinarinesl. — Except for the mention of SUBRONS Five and Six in two
despatches there was no submarine activity today.
Communication Intelligence Summary 29 November 1941
General. — Traffic volume above normal. The traffic to South China still
very high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Tokyo-Takao circuit
but was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of today's traffic is
made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo Intelligence sent eleven
messages during the day to Major Commanders both ashore and afloat, while the
radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the Major Com-
manders. In addition to the stations normally reiwrting to Tokyo, radio Yoko-
suka sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports.
The Direction Finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night
with much activity. One message for Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station in-
cluded Commander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister originated
his usual two AlNavs and the Naval General Staff addressed Commanders Sec-
ond Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Aid Force and the South China Units. The
unit which has been addressed as the "103rd Air Group" originated one dispatch
today whose address was composed entii'elv of enciphered calls. It is apparent
that he has no Navy call list. One address was "JUITIKOUKUUKANTAI"
"11th AIR FLEET". Since this has appeared before it is evident that the use
of KANTAI is intentional making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its com-
position is unknown.
Combined Fleet. — The arrival of Air Squadron Seven in Takao area is con-
firmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not confirmed nor
770 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following units are under the
immediate command of CinC. Second Fleet :
CARDIV THREE CF 2CV
SUBRON FIVE CL+IOSS
SUBRON SIX CL+4SM
CRUDIV FIVE 3CA
CRUDIV SEVEN 4CA
DESRON TWO-1 CI^12DD
DESRON FOUR-1 CL-12DD
THIRD FLEET
FRENCH INDO CHlNA FORCE
Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships but their assignment is not
yet definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third Fleet, China and
South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval General Staff; Com-
mander in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above.
Only one message from Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This
was addressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air Forces, CRUDIV Four and LUMIL-
AFF. The HIYEI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fli^et.
Third Fleet. — Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one iflessage to Comdes-
ron Five, Number Tivo Base Force. Number One Base Force, Defense Division
One and Comdesron Two and Four. He held extensive communications with
the Commander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKO. Two more units of Third
Fleet made movement reports.
Fourth Fleet. — Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander
in Chief Second Fleet, Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air
Force. He is still in TRUK area.
Submarines. — Traffic for Commander Submarine Force was routed through
SAIPAN today. He was at CHICHIJIMA yesterday.
South China. — CRUDIV Seven now in SAMA made a movement report but
direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander ad-
dressed several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO. The
Commander in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South China
Naval Bases and the South China Fleets, all for information to Commander in
Chief Second Fleet.
Communication Intelligence Summanj Novem'ber 30, 194i-
General. — Traffic volume less than for past few days. Today's traffic consisted
largely of despatches bearing old dates, some as far back as 26 November. No
reason can be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high
volume of traffic for past few days has prevented the repetition of despatches.
The number of despatches originated on the 30th is very small. The only tac-
tical circuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several MARXJS. The
TOKYO Intelligence activity originated two WIWI despatches to Major Fleet
Commanders. One urgent despatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff, Com-
bined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force ; Submarine
Force and China Fleets.
Combined Fleet.— The Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet
are in KURE. In the same message the Chief of Staff Second Fleet was not at
any location. Other traffic indications are that he is at sea. Commander in
Chief Second Fleet sent one to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and
Combined Air Forces but also included KONGO and HIYEI. which places them
as members of his Task Force. The Commander in Chief Second Fleet is no
longer adding PALAO activities and has not for past two days. The RNO
PALAO today addressed two messages to TAIWAN GUNSIREIBU (TAIWAN
Army Headquarters).
Third Fleet. — Commander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to
COMDESRON Two, Four and Five; COMCRUDIV Five: First and Second
Base Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief
Second Fleet. No information obtained as to the location of the Commander
in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway.
Fourth Fleet. — Believed to be still in TRUK area. D. F. activity in INIar-
shalls a little greater today than normal. JALUIT addressed Conunander Sub-
marine Force and AIRRON 24 in one despatch. The continued association of
JALUIT and Commander Submarine Force plus his known progress from the
Empire to CHICHIJIMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the Mar-
shalls. Since one of his large units (SITI 4) arrived in the Marshalls some
time ago this unit cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a submarine
concentration in that area. Every evidence points to a concentration of not only
the small Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 771
submarines of the Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA AIR CORPS
presence in tbat area points to intended air-submarine operations from the Mar-
shalls. Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence
of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this has not. been confirmed.
South China. — BAKO active with despatches to Second and Third Fleets, Com-
bined Air Force and SAMA. Commander in Chief, China Fleet becoming more
and more active as an originator with despatches to the Task Force. He made
a movement report with the South China Fleet as an information addressee. The
Stafe Communication Officer of the South China Fleet was addressed at Shanghai
today.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 December 1941
General. — All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1
December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of six months or
more. Calls were last changed on 1 November, 1941. The fact that service calls
lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for
active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the
change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four
or five days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting more and more
security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December indicates that
an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly
with the change of calls, there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches
and consequent confusion and compromises. Either that or the large number of
old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear
as if nothing unusual was pending.
First Fleet. — Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside
of Empire waters.
Second Fleet. — This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in
the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play an
important role in today's traffic ; consequently, the assumption is made that this
fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force are
definitely in the Indo-China area (Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squad-
ron Three most prominent).
Third Fleet. — Nothing to report except that the same association of Second,
Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces
continues.
Fourth Fleet. — No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area.
Fifth Fleet. — Nothing to report.
SKhmarines. — Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the area
to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan. Elagship somewhere in
this general area.
Carriers. — ^No change.
ComMned Air Force. — No change.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 December 1941
General. — The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent confusion
in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There
were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it ap-
pared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao Radio received the same
dispatch that it had previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and Third
Fleets in Takao area and that Takao Radio was broadcasting traffic to these
fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location report,
there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In
several instances Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. Sum-
ming up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of
Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not
close enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course
not close to Takao. The change of calls on December first has prevented this
office from making definite statements at this date of the imits now in the
Southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai Radio handled a
considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined
for units in the Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South China area continues to
appear in Shanghai. ComSixteen reported nine submarines proceeding south by
Camranh Bay. This group is believed to comprise both Submarine Squadrons Five
and Six, which units normally operate with the First Ileet but have been included
repeatedly in the Second Fleet Task Force for Southern operations.
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 8
772 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both
by major forces afloat and Tokyo. Hainan continues as a prominent address.
Palao and Third Base Force is holding tlie same relative importance.
Fi7'st Fleet. — Despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appears
relatively quiet. From inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have
been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff and that these may be
two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routing indicates
one Combined Fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets and appar-
ently in company while another Combined Fleet call appears not associated with
the Second and Third Fleets.
Second Fleet. — No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days.
This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the
belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company. Cruiser
Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unlocated and unobserved
since change of calls.
Communication Intelligence Smmnary, 2 December 19^1
Tlm-d Fleet. — Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way in
some of the Third Fleet traffic.
Mandates. — Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues.
Some traffic for Fourth Fleet units still going through Truk.
Carriers. — Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today. Lack
of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However,
since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the
change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it
is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.
Combined Air Force. — This force continues to be associated closely with Second,
Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have
undoubtedly left the Takao area.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 December 1941
General. — Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Present state
of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The
extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slows up identification of
even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far. The
Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long despatches to the CINC
COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence originated
nine despatches to the same addresses.
The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed
by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takao the CINC SECOND FLEET is indi-
cated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is
indicated for delivery by that Station. It is the impression that both SECOND
and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence
means.
There are some FOURTH FLEET Units in the Mar.'^hall Islands area including
some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of these units is not known.
The SIXTH BASE FORCE at Jaluit addressed several messages to CINC
FOURTH.
Some Swatow Units were addressed at Saigon today indicating a movement
of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako originated many despatches to the
RNO Taihoku and the Task Force Commander.
No information on submarines or Carriers.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 December 194 i
General. — Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio
today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so that
there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation. So far only a few messages
have been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent
messages today, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Among
others Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven part message to Chiefs of Staff
China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China
Force and Sama. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major com-
manders.
Combined Fleet.— The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of mes-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 773
sages from the CinO. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet. These previously
very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not
yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to
that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed
that the CinC. Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently
conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which
CinC. Second Fleet is still copying. The CinC. Combined Fleet sent one message
to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force Falao, CinC. Second
Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet.
Fourth Fleet.- — The CinC. Fourth Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff Com-
bined Air Force, information to Eleventh Air Corps, Chitose Air, Air Squadron
Twenty-four, Third Base Force at Palao and Fourth Base Force at Truk. No
further check could be made today on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the
Marshalls. Jaluit appeared many times in today's traffic being associated with
Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo Radio and MUSI 88 (which is believed
to be an oil tanker).
South China. — Bako continues as an active originator addressing many mes-
sages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China Com-
manders, all units in that area quiet.
Communication intelligence summanj, December 5, 1941
General. — Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broad-
cast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operation.
There were several new intercept schedules heard. OMINATO radio working
SAMA and BAKO sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic
to Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic
for these units also. It is noted that some traffic being broadcast is several
days old which indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio or-
ganization.
There were many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused by
the jammed condition of all circuits.
A plain language message was sent by the Captain, OKAWA from Tokyo
to Takao probably for further relay addressed to FUJIHARA, Chief of the
Political Affairs Burejau saying that "in reference to the Far Eastern Crisis,
what you said is considered important at this end but proceed with what you
are doing, specific orders will be issued soon".
Combined Fleet. — Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have orig-
inated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving
their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther
south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic
from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either.
Third Fleet.— In one WE address a "Chief of Staff" sent a message to "Com-
mander Fourteenth Army aboard RYUJOMARU in Third Fleet. HITOYONGUN.
SATI (IRQ 1 REUZEU MARU). A number of MARUS have been addressing
the CinC. Third Fleet.
Fourth Fleet. — The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication Officer
of the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today strengthening the impression
that the CinC. Fourth Fleet is in the Marshalls. The Commander of the South
China Fleet has been addressing Palao radio, the RNO PALAO and the Com-
mander Second Fleet.
South China. — SAMA addressed much traffic to CinC. Second Fleet. BAKO
continues as an active originator with many dispatcher to Second and Third
Fleet. The Commander Combined Air Force appears to be busy with the move-
ment of Air Corps. SHIOGAMA Air and at least two unidentified corps are
moving, probably to Indo-China.
Communication Intelligence Summary, December 6, 1941
General. — Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being
transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 Decembe/r were seen in the traffic.
This is not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level but is the result
of confusion in traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now
holding broadcasts are TOKYO (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts),
SAIPAN, OMINATO and TAKAO.
Yesterday's high level of traffic from TOKYO originators was maintained
with the Intelligence activity still sending periodic messages. Practically all
of TOKYO'S messages carry prefixes of high priority.
774 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ComUned Fleet. — Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Com-
manders. These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO
broadcasts. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet originated several mes-
sages to the Carriers, Fourth Fleet and the Major Commanders.
Fourth Fleet. — The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is again in the TRUK
area. It is doubtful that he ever went to JALUIT although it is certain that
some members of his staff were there .over the past few days. There is a
definite close association between the Third Base Force at PALAO and the forces
in South China. This unit is constantly sending messages to the Chief of Staff
of the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces and BAKO. It is being
almost entirely neglected by Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet under whose
command it normally operates. RONGELAB radio addressed the PALAO weather
observer.
Fifth Fleet. — This fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN Sea with OMI-
NATO broadcasting traffic for this unit.
Suhmarines. — The Commander Submbarine Force originated two messages
to his command. These are the first two originated since 1 December. He is
definitely in the MARSHALLS.
South Chi7ia.— Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAMA and TAKAO still sending
many messages to the Task Force.
Convmunication Intelligence Summary, 9 December W^i
Combined Fleet. — The Combined Fleet Commander-in-Chief and Staff are be-
lieved to be in Empire waters. There appeared to be a split in this command in
Mid-November which led to the belief that the operations as initiated by Second
Fleet Commander in South East Asia occasioned a supreme Commander in
Empire waters with a secondary Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet in South.
East Asia or elsewhere.
First Fleet. — First Fleet is believed to be temporarily in the background as
some first fleet units should be operating with the Second and Third Fleets and
the majority of the remainder is operating with the Carrier Dvisions. Battle
Ship Division One and Two have disappeared as far as our identifications
are concerned. Battleship Division Three is believed to be operating with
Carrier Divisions which outfit is in turn divided so that HI YE I and KIRI-
SHIMA are operating with Striking Force #1 in the Blue Pacific and HARUNA
and KONGO are probably with the or a #3 Striking Force. Destroyer Squadron
One and ABUKUMA are believed also in the #1 Striking Force. From one
dispatch in plain text and associations, it appears likelv that Striking Force #1
is still in the Oahu-Midway area (Lat. 32 N Long. 164 W).
Second Fleet. — Cruiser Division Eight of this Fleet may be operating with
Sti-iking Force #1. Other units are probably with the Commander-in-Chief,
Second in Southeast Asia. One indication is that the bulk of the Second Fleet
is operating against Malay and Singapore while the Third Fleet took care of
Luzon. The indications continue that Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined
Air Force are under one command ; also that Indo-China Force and South China
Force seem to have lost some of the close association with this combination,
probably because South China and Indo-China Force are holding the South China
Coast and Indo-China.
Third Fleet. — Together with some units of the Combined Air Force is probably
operating against the Philippines and also in Malay. The close connection of
Palao with Third Fleet addresses and Palao prior to war is the basis for this
assumption.
Fourth Fleet. — Operating in the Mandates. No recent indications of opera-
tions of this fleet outside of the Mandates. On one hand there is a close con-
nection between Fourth Fleet and Fifth Fleet in the north ; on the other hand
Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet must be working together in the defense of
the southern flank. Air Squadron Twenty-four figures prominently in the traffic
and is still in the Marshall area. Saipan Radio initiated a broadcast similar ro
Takao. Jaluit appears to have taken over some of the promary duties of a
radio intelligence unit and is as.sumed to be headquarters in the "Field".
Fifth Fleet. — Definite information that this fleet is in the northern area con-
tinues. Ominato Radio handles traffic to and from the Fifth Fleet units. This
fleet appeared to shift from Yokosuka north to Ominato area shortly before war
opened. The composition of this fleet is still somewhat obscure but is believed
to have very few so called fleet vessels. ' Probably as large percentage of fleet
auxiliaries and converted air tenders?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 775
Carriers. — #1 Striking Force, operating in Blue Pacific. Believed to comprise
Carrier Division One — AKAGI (Flagship Cardivs)
KAEA
Carrier Division Two— HIRYU
SORYU
Carrier Division
Four (or Five) — SHOKAKU
ZUIKAKU
Cruiser Division Eight
Destroyer Squadron One
KIRISHIMA— —First Section BatDiv Three.
HIYEI.
By deduction #2 Striking Force, if such an organization exists, comprises
Carrier Division Three — ^RYUJO
HOSHO
Carrier Division
Five (or four) — KORYU
and probably other combatant units. Carrier Division Three and RYUJO were
definitely associated with Second and Third Fleet prior to war.
Submarines. — A strong force of submarines believed to be operating with
Fourth Fleet and another force operating with Carrier Divisions.
China. — China Fleet Commanders in normal bases or locations.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 10 December 1941
General. — Traffic volume continues very high with proportionate amount of
high precedence traffic. The actual amount of traflic intercepted at Heeia has
not increased materially since the Eighth but this is due to the concentration
of efforts on obtaining all transmissions of Japanese vessels in the Hawaiian
area somewhat at the expense of obtaining the maximum traffic on all Imown
circuits. There were very few signals identified as emanating from the imme-
diate Hawaiian area. A great many bearings have been obtained the last two
days in the sector 295-300 true from Oahu ; since most calls involved have been
tentatively identified as vessels in the North China and Takao areas, increased
activity in that region may be the reason therefor. The Navy Minister originated
the following dispatch to the Secretary of the Combined Fleet which was broad;
casted from Takao Radio :
"164. From the Cabinet, Prime Minister and Admiral Arihama Takaza Igo
received a request for a congratulatory telegram as follows addressed to all
hands (?).
"Congratulations (upon) there having been attained manifold results (war
results) (at) the outset of the naval war. We pray for the success of the
fortunes of war for all ranks of officers and enlisted men".
Combined Fleet. — No change.
First Fleet. — No indications of any change. The calls identified as First
Fleet have practically disappeared from the traffic lately. This is submitted
as a partial strengthening of the opinion that the First Fleet has lost its identity
as such and has been split between Carrier Divisions and the large task force
operating in the Malay area. The report of United States bomber action on a
HARUNA type Battleship in the Philippine area, if true, substantiates this.
Second and Third Fleets. — Appear to be "intact" in the Southeastern Asia area.
Fourth Fleets. — Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Fleet and some of the Fourth
Fleet vessels definitely show in the Mandates. It is believed that Air Squadron
Twenty-four is still in the Marshall area and that the Commander-in-Chief,
Fourth Fleet, is in the Truk area. While complete coverage at Heeia is not
possible under present conditions, the available traffic does not indicate the
previous association between Palao and Second-Third Fleet combination.
Fifth Fleet. — No apparent change in the available information on this fleet.
Considerable activity has been noted in the High North and Ominato area shore
stations.
Submarines. — Commander Submarine Force continues to show in the routing
of traffic to and from Mandate stations, particularly the Marshall Island area.
From all the reports of submarine activity in the Hawaiian area and the well
established fact that Submarine Squadrons Five and Six went south to Malay
prior to declarations of war, it appears that practically all submarines are
away from Empire waters or that our estimates of Japanese submarine strength
were lower than actual numbers.
776 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Carriers. — Very little radio activity the past twenty-four hours. One possible
significant clue to Carrier Divisions future operations was contained in a
despatch from Tokyo Radio to the Commander of First Air Fleet flagship,
AKAGI, listing a long string of Tokyo Broadcast messages which it is assumed
provided a reminder or check on those dispatches which should have been received
for the First Air Fleet during the period 7-10 December. To this office, the
inference is that for the past three days (during radio silence in Hawaiian
waters), a check up was not practicable but now may be done without breaking
radio silence. While this may be far-fetched, it still remains a possibility.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 11 December 19-il
G'eneral. — Intercepted traffic volume lower than normal due to employment of
receivers in search watch. The amount intercepted was however, indicative that
the traffic volume for the Fleet was high, Jaluit and Saipan broadcast overloaded
and the Yokosuka to Saipan was in continuous operation.
Local Operations. — Continuous search watch was maintained on all known Air
and Submarine frequencies during the day. No air circuits heard. It was ex-
pected that after dark the submarines circuit 6385 kcs. would liven up but there
was very little activity. Two bearings of submarines in this vicinity were ob-
tained. HEHIYA was heard and a bearing of 050° True was obtained. HIMI
was heard on 1$0.2° True. Other submarine calls were faintly heard and bearings
were all to the westward.
First Fleet. — Nothing to report.
Second Fleet. — Together with Third Fleet in the Malay Area.
Fourth Fleet. — Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Fleet is in the Mandates with
most of the Fourth Fleet. He is believed to be in the Truk area but is main-
taining close liaison with the Marshalls in which is stationed Air Squadron
Twenty-four and KAMOI. Jaluit radio is handling all traffic for the Submarine
Fleet which indicates this place as the base for the submarine operating in the
Hawaiian area.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 12 December 19-ii
General. — No apparent change in traffic volume or high precedence traffic. No
material change in fleet locations has been definitely established. However, it is
apparent that several minor units have altered positions and, after combining
several British conflicting reports, many units are more definitely located than
heretofore.
Combined Fleet. — Singapore reported Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet at
Sama Bay in Hainan. Both Corregidor and Pearl Harbor report the Supreme
Commander today in the Chichijima-Mandate area. If it is assumed that there
is a split in the command, which possibility was brought up recently by this office,
then both British and our reports may be correct. Our evidence here points to
Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet very closely associated with Mandate
addresses and possibly in the general Saipan area.
First Fleet. — First fleet calls showed again after a period of obscurity. Chief
of Staff, Combined Fleet originated one despatch to Chief of Staff, First Air
Fleet (recently near Oahu) ; Chief of Staff, First Fleet; Yokosuka Air Group;
Chichi jima Air Group? Chief of Staff, Fifth Fleet ; Chief of Staff, Fourth Fleet?
and other commands.
Second and Third Fleets. — There appears to be a difference of opinion as to
locations of these forces. The only definite point of agreement between British
and United States reports is that the entire Second and Third Fleets are in the
Luzon-Singapore-Saigon triangle. The best estimate of locations is as follows:
Saigon-Malay Area In Philadelphia Area
CinC, Second Fleet (Singapore?) CinC, Third Fleet
Second Fleet (Singapore area ?) Third Fleet
First Fleet Units operating with Second Base Force of Third Fleet
Second Fleet : 2 BB of Batdiv 3 AKASHI (Repair Ship)
(less sunkship), Desron3, 3CL (flag- Possibly Air outfits from Takao area.
ship Subrons and Desron) (N. E.
coast of Malaya)
CinC. Southern Exp. Force (Saigon)
Comdr. Combined Air Force (Saigon)
CarDiv. 3— HOSHO-RYUJO (Siam)
Subrons Five and Six
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 777
Fourth Fleet. — There appears to be little change in location of Fourth Fleet
— still in Truk-Saipan-Marshall area. Fourth Fleet addresses and First Air
Fleet appeared together in several despatch headings. This is submitted as
possible clue to the present disposition of -the Striking Force against Oahu.
Air Squadron Twenty-four normally in Marshalls and unidentified Fourth
Fleet command (RATA9) also included in this same association.
Fifth, Fleet. — Little change or information.
Submarines. — During the past twelve hours, there have been four to five single
bearings of submarines in the Oahu area bearing 302 True to 49 True from Oahu
Direction Finder Stations. Bearings were equally spread. One bearing of sub-
marine unit from Dutch Harbor provided a possible fix in L. 30 N, 146 W. Ad-
ditionally six bearings of submarine units were received from West Coast sta-
tions— these were also somewhat spread over North Pacific area. Since west
coast stations are untrained to copy Japanese, no calls were given, consequently
no fixes obtained. Evidence is conclusive that majority of submarine units in
Eastern Pacific are widely sprea'd in the Dutch Harbor-Oahu-San Diego area,
perhaps several in immediate vicinity of Hawaiian Islands. Tokyo Radio came
up on 17 Kcs. with a powerful broadcast on the 11th December. This is believed
to be an additional safeguard for widespread submarine units communications as
practically all addressees have been identified as submarine units. The best
estimate from Direction Finder bearings of the of the number of submarines in
the Northeast Pacific including the immediate Hawaiian area- is 8 to 12 sub-
marines. There appears to be a split in serial numbers of Submarine Force Com-
manders despatches. The assumption is that perhaps one serial series is for
submarines in the Pacific and the other for Submarine units in the South Eastern
Asia area. Commander Submarine Force is believed to continue in the Marshall
area.
China. — Report received of part of South China Fleet in Jaluit area. This is
not believed to be correct. From inconclusive evidence, China's depleted fleet
and South China Fleets are still spread between Shanghai and Canton-Haiau
area.
The address "OKASHUDANSO.SATI" originated despatch to CinC. Second
Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force using a four numeral code. The origina-
tor appears to be the OKA army division headquarters-location, except as to asso-
ciation addresses, not evident.
Communication Intelligence Summary, 13 December 19^fl
General. — ^Traffic volume heavy with a great number of high precedence mes-
sages. Practically all traffic being handled by broadcast. Large parts of inter-
cepted traffic addressed to submarine units but this is due to our concentration
on submarine frequencies.
Combined Fleet. — Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet is still taking his traffic
from Saipan. Tokyo gives some traffic for Combined Fleet units to Chichi jlma
for delivery showing that some units are in that vicinity. In several dispatches
the Commander-in-Chief, First Fleet was associated with Commander Striking
Force, Commander First Air Fleet and Commander Submarine Fleet. Tokyo
Intelligence addressed messages to this group of commands. The Commander of
the Second and Third Fleets are still closely associated in the traffic. It is not
possible to definitely separate them in areas as yet but it is still believed that
Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet is concerned with operations in Malaya while
Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet appears to be situated a little farther north,
making him concerned in Philippine operations. Since the Second Base Force
is associated with Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet it is probable that this unit
is in the Philippine area.
Fourth Fleet. — The Commander, Fourth Fleet is indicated at Truk or Saipan.
He is not in the Marshalls. Air Squadron 24 and KAMOI in Marshalls with
Air Squadron 24 basing on the northern-most ATOLL (radio call HII5) and is
beyong a doubt the unit raiding Wake. Yokohama Air Corps has moved to a
base established in the Gilberts.
Fifth Fleet. — Commander-in-Chief, Fifth Fleet in communication with OMI-
NATO radio. He has a number of units with him as indicated by his radio ac-
tivity on 4640 kcs. These units furnished the greater part of the radio activity
last night. This force appears to be guarding the northern approach to Japan.
Suhmarines. — Little submarine activity last night. Some traffic heard on 6385
kcs. but no bearings outside of the 250-300 sector obtained. One unit (6RI) fixed
778 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
by Direction Finder bearings from Dutch Harbor and Oahu. At a position just
N. E. of wake Island. Commander Submarine Fleet at Jaluit and is continually
broadcasting.
Air. — The Commander, First Air Fleet has appeared in dispatches as mentioned
above but no other carrier traffic found.
Communication Intelligence Summary, lit December 1941
Oeneral. — High traffic volume continues. An increase in tactical traffic over
the past two days was evident in the Siam-Philippine area. Also radio activity
was on the increase in the North China Area and the Yokosuka sector. Dispatch
headings and radio activity on 5350 kcs. indicated a grouping of several Naval
auxiliaries (MARU's) with a few fleet vessels. Only bearings on this group
placed them in the Northern sector — Chinkai or Japan Sea area? To take one
case, Chinkai Radio was very active on 6345 kcs. with about 16 units. All these
indications point to reinforcements organizing or proceeding from the Japan area
to other locations. In another area, a bearing of the Fourth Base Force Detach-
ment at Greenwich Island (Y0ME6) showed 270 degrees which is 15 degrees
above Greenwich Island, and associated traffic indicated this force was probably
afloat in the Saipan area since several Naval Auxiliaries were included in the
traffic. Another significant despatch heading which was repeated several times
contained the action address "Communication Officers of Major Fleet units (or
Forces) less Fifth Fleet, Submarine Force, and First Air Fleet". These three
organizations seem to be the ones on the "loose" at the present date.
ComUned and First Fleet. — First Fleet showed a little in the dispatch headings.
Chiefs of Staff, Combined Fleet and the First Air Fleet appeared to be associated
with Yokosuka Radio and the calls believed to represent Yokosuka Air, Tateyama
Air, and Chichi jima Air.
Second, Third Fleets, Comtined Air Force. — No indications of any material
changes in locations these fleets. Tactical traffic was particularly heavy among
the major units operating the Siam-Philippine area. Commandant, Sixteenth
Naval District reported an identity of Air Corps 22 which has figured prominently
in the S. E. Asia sector. It is believed this group may be shore based in Hainan
or Siam. Several air units showed at Takao which have been inconspicuous
lately — Kanoya Air, Takao Air, Shiogama Air, and Staff Combined Air Force.
This may or may not indicate change in disiwsitions due to the fact that the traffic
routing through Takao Radio has never been clearly defined or understood.
Fourth Fleet. — The 17th Air Corps, Air Squadron 24, and possibly Kisaratsu
Air was represented at a Marshall Island Station (HII5). This group was very
busy with tactical traffic and apparently was operating, possibly in Wake area.
Commander-in-Chief Fourth Fleet remains at Truk. Palao was not prominent.
Fifth Fleet. — No indication of locations or plans.
Subma7-ines. — Traffic to submarine units particularly heavy. No bearings of
submarine units in the Hawaiian area were obtained. Traffic to some submarine
units are repeated several times indicating difficulties of communicating with
distant locations. The tactical call ITO, which from Direction Finder bearings
passed from west to east of Hawaii on the 12th, 13, appears to be a Submarine
Squadron Commander. No bearings on ITO obtained since 13th.
Carriers. — Remarks on First Air Fleet contained in above. Only indication as
to present location is the associations in traffic with three air activities in the
general Yokosuka area.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 779
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 23
PACIFIC FLEET INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM OF 1 DECEMBER 1941
Location of Japanese Fleet Units
Cincpac File No.
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Peabl Haeboe, T. H., December 1, 1941.
C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
M-E-M-0-R-A-N-D-U-M
From : Fleet Intelligence Officer.
To : Admiral.
Subject : ORANGE FLEET— Location of.
1. From best available information units of the ORANGE fleet are thought to
be located as listed below : —
Yokosuka Area
TAKAO (CA) 1 CA
3rd Fleet HQ ?
#1 Patrol Force ?
AIRGROUPof 5th Fleet (Chichi jima?) 36 planes ?
Total— 1 CA plus ? 36 planes.
Kui-e — Sasebo Area
CinC Combined Fleet
CinC First Fleet
BatDiv 1 & 2 6 BB ?
Crudiv6 — may head for Mandates (?) 4 CA ?
Desron 1 1 CL
12 DD
^me^Srdfihet m N AGAR A "i ^t
4 €t i efe
©eediv i3 f?)- i Gi,
4©©
Cruiser Division EIGHT 2 CA
Total— 6 BB— 6 CA— 1 CL— 16 DD.
Shanghai Area
CinC China Fleets in IZUMO 1-OCA
Shanghai Base Force It-PG
3-ODD
plus miscellaneous craft
#10 Air Group 36 planes (?)
Total— 1 OCA— 1 PG — 3 ODD— 36 planes, etc.
Bako — Takao Area
THIRD Fleet Submarine Squadrons 1 AS
6 SS (I)
Subron-S 1 CL
6 SS
8ubron-6 1 CL
4 SM
Desron-5 less Desdiv 22 1 CL
8 DD
#2 Base Force 3 CM
5 XPG or XPO
17 AP or AK
Desron-Jf 1 CL
12 DD
780 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Location of Japanese Fleet Units — Continued
Baeo — Takao Area — Continued
Comdr. Combined Air Force
5th Air Battalion (Army ?)
11th Air Group 36 planes
Air Squadron 6 3 XAV
30 planes
Air Squardon 7 3 AV
48 planes
23rd Air Group 36 planes
" Air Group 36 planes
" Air Group 36 planes
" Air Group 36 planes
Genzan Air Group__^ 36 planes
Shiogama Air Group 36 planes
Kanoya Air Group 36 planes
Kasuga Maru 1 XCV
36 planes
at
CinC 2nd Fleet with units enroute TAKAO
plus Crudiv-5 4 CA possibly 5 CA
Desron-2 1 CL
16 DD
Cardiv-4 2 CV & 4 DD
Cardiv-3 2 CV & 3 DD
Batdiv-3 less HARUNA 3 BE (maybe 2 BB)
Total— 3 BB— 4 CV— 7 CL^-47 DD— 4 SIM— 3 AV— 4 XAV— 4 CA-
3 CM- 17 XAP— 5 XPC— 450 planes.
Hainan — Canton Area
CinC South China (in ISUZU) 1 CL
CinC Sm Exp Force 1 CA
Crudiv-7 4 OA
Desron-3 1 CL
15 DD
1st Base Force (?) 3 CM
(part of this may be in Formosan waters) . 12 AM's
6 XPG
12 PC
27 AP
Total— 5 CA— 2 CL— 15 DD— 3 CINI- 12 AM's— 6 XPG— 12 PC—
27 AP.
French Indo China
CinC S. Exp. Fleet in CHOKAI 1 CA
1 CL
1 CM
9 Torpedo Boats
? XPG
Total — 1 CL— 1 CM — 9 Torp. Boats & Miscellaneous. -
Some of 1st & 2nd Base Force are m»y fee here ( ?)
OMURA AIR GROUP 36 planes
12 Air Group f [ 36 planes (?)
13 Air Group] Some may be on Hainan 1 36 planes (?)
14 Air Group [ I 36 planes (?)
Mojtdate Area
PALAO
16th Air Group 36 planes
Srd Base Force 10 XPG
4 SS (Ro)
Total— 36 planes— 10 XPG-^ SS. '
Truk
CinC 4th Fleet '- 1 CL
2 OCL
1 CL
8 DD
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
781
Location of Japanese Fleet Units — ContinuedJ
Mandate Area — Continued
4ih Base Force 4 XPG
4 XAP
17th Air Group 4 XAM's
36 planes
Total— 36 planes— 2 CLr-2 OCLr-8 DD— 4 XPG— 4 XAP— 4 XAM.
Saipan
CinC Submarine Force 1 CL
plus subs (?) 1 Suron (?) 1 AS
7 SS
Chitose Air Group 36 planes
IStli Air Group 36 planes
5th Base Force 2CM
8 XPG
5 XAP
Total— 78 planes— 1 CL— 1 AS— 7 SS— 2 CM— 8 XPG— 5 XAP.
Marshall Area
19th Air Group 36 planes
Yokohama Air Group 36 planes
Wotje Air Group 34 planes
Kwajalein Air Group 24 planes
Air Squadron 24 2 XAV
KORYU (?) plus plane guards 30 planes
1 CV
4 DD
Submarine Squadron 7 1 AS
9 SS (Ro)
Sudiv(?) 4 SS (I)
Submarine Squadron 3 9 SS (I)
6th Base Force 4 XAM's
8 XPG
3 PC
KATSURIKI 1 AG (survey)
Total— 140 planes— 2 XAV— 1 CV— 4 DD— 1 AS— 22 SS— 4 XAM-
8 XPG— 3 PG— 3 PC— 1 AG.
Respectfully,
E. T. Layton
Lieutenant Comm'ander, U. S. N..
Fleet Intelligence Officer.
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 24
sealed — secret
Naval message — Navy Department
'Phone Ext. No. Op-12. Br. 2992
Addressees
Message Precedence
R17R
From' Chief of Naval Operations
Action:
To CinCaf.
CinCpao
Comll.
Coml2,
Coml3.
ComlS.
Priority.
Released by: Ingersoll .. .
Routine.
Date: November 24, 1941 .
Deferred.
TOR Code Room ..
Info:
Spenavo London.
Cinclant.
Pricrlty.
Routine.
Paraphased by
Deferred.
Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
242OO5CR0443.
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with Deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for Deferred and Mail Delivery: Date Time OCT.
[Hand written]: Cincaf Cincpac, Coms Eleven Twelve, Thirteen, and Fifteen for action spenavo London
and Cinclant for infoxx.
782 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X.
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements
their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possi-
bility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action Adees
to inform senior Army Officers ,,^^![, areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order
your
not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X
Guam will be informed separately
Copy to (WPD, War Dept.) and to OP-12 but no other distribution.
[Handwritten:] plus 3 copies to sealed secret file.
Make original only. Deliver to Conununication Watch Ofiicer in person. (See Art. 76 (4), Navy Regu
lations.)
Note.— Linetype and italics denote change.
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 25
sealed — secret
Naval message — Navy Department
Phone extension number: Op-12, Ext. 2992
Addressees
Message precedence
From: Chief of Naval Operation.
Released by . . .
For action:
CINCAF.
CINCPAC.
Priority X.
Routine.
Date: November 27, 1941.
Deferred.
TOR Coderoom
Information:
CINCLANT.
SPENAVO.
Priority.
Decoded by .. .
Routine.
Paraphrased by
Deferred.
Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
GKVJL BVKLW 2723370921
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time OCT
This despatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan
looking toward Stabilization of Conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number
and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces
indicates an amphibious expedition pfobabty against either the Philippines
[Written: Thai] or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate
defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46X
Inform district and Army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War
Department X Spenavo inform British X
[Handwritten:] Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate
measures against sabotage.
Copy to WPD War Dept.
Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer ta person. See Art. 76 (4) Nav. Regs.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 783
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 26
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS BY PACIFIC FLEET INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
6 October 1941-2 December 1941
Confidential
Secret Intelligbnqe Repoet
Reliability Rating : B3. Serial No. 82. Date : October 6, 1941
Anchored in a Bay near HAKODATE on 26 September :
7 SS
2 CL
2 CA
Underway headed South in Japan Sea night of 26th : 5 CA.
29th departed YOKOHAMA: 1 CL (NAKA) Class.
29th Located South of Hong Kong (CL) ISUZI& (DM) SHUMUSHU.
26th departed Shanghai (OCA) : IZUMO.
26th departed Shanghai (PG) : TOBA.
26th arrived CHEFOO : 1 TB.
Week ending 27th : Mouth Pearl River —
12 AP upstream.
14 AP downstream.
Serial No. 83
Air Groups are reported at : Takao, Hoihow, Taichu (?) and Kagi ( ?) .
ASHIGARA is reported to have left Sasebo with probable destination South
China.
Secret Intelligence Report
Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 85. Date : 27 October 1941
Latest information of locations of units of Orange Fleet is :
Takao Area :
GVs AVs
RYUJO NOTORO
ZUIKAKU KENJO MARU
unidentified Maru Type
Maru Type
DD (Plane Guards)
DD
Takao : Commander Combined Air Force
Inland Sea & Ariake Ba^ Area : FIRST & SECOND FLEET plus SUBFORCB
except:
Yokosuka : YAMASHIRO.
Maizuru : KONGO.
Kanoya-Eastern Kyushu Area :
CVs: AKAGI HIRYU
ICAGA HOSHO
Unidentified
Unidentified
Unidentified
Sasebo Area : THIRD FLEET
(continued)
784 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Secret Intelligence Report
Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 84. Date: 4 November, 1941
The following information is from a source which has been thoroughly reliable
in the past :
From 1 Nov. the navigation through URAGA CHANNEL is restricted as
follows. Seven fixed buoys are in the channel.
(1) Lighted buoy : From ASHIKA JIMA lighted buoy 136 degrees, 6050 meters
(3.27 miles) . Lighted painted black.
(2) Lighted buoy : From ASHIKA JIMA lighted buoy 104 degrees, 6500 meters
(3.55 miles). Painted black.
(3) Lighted buoy : From ASHIKA JIMA lighted buoy 104 degrees, 6700 meters
(3.66 miles). Painted red.
(4) Flag buoy : From ASHIKA JIMA" lighted buoy 87 degrees, 6600 meters
(3.61 miles).
(5) Flag buoy: From buoy (4) 190(170?) degrees, 500 meters (.27 miles).
(6) Flag buoy: From KANNONSAKI LIGHT 88 degrees, 4900 meters (2.67
miles) .
(7) Flag buoy: From buoy (6) 170 degrees, 500 meters (.27 miles).
NAVIGATION
Sail to the east of lighted buoy (1) and between lighted buoys (2) and (3).
Sail to the east of the northern four buoys because the sea area to west of them
is dangerous. Do not enter (this area) .
When meeting (another ship) going to the entrance between buoys (2) and (3),
the ship leaving port is to wait.
There will probably be maintenance by naval patrol vessels and by the lookout
station on the northwest point of NOKOGIRI YAMA.
Take care !
Secret Intellige;nce Report
Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 85. Date : 10 November 1941
Reliable information indicates the ZUIKAKU, NOTORO and two Maru Tenders
have returned to the Sasebo-Kure Area. RYU JO is still in Taiwan. The KEN JO
MARU is in the Saigon-Camanh Bay Area.
Secret - Intelugence Report
Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 86. Date : 12 November 1941
It is reliably reported that the RYUJO has returned to Kure.
Secret Intelugence Report
Reliability Rating: (?). Serial No. 87. Date : 22 Nov. 1941 '
Dutch Authorities in the NEI have received information that a Japanese ExpCr
ditionary Force which is strong enough to constitute a threat against the NEI
or Portugese Timor has arrived in the vicinity of Palau. If this force moves past
a line through Davao-Waigea-Equator the Governor General of the NEI will
regard it as an act of hostility and will consider war to have begun.
Secret Intelligence Report
Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 88. Date : 23 Nov. 1941
CinCAF has no information confirming the Dutch report of a Japanese Expe-
ditionary Force near Palao. His information does not indicate the presence of
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 785
units other than the Fourth Fleet in the mandates and no unusual concentration
of that force. It is possible that there may be an increase in the number of
transports and marus. There has been a concentration of 30-40 marus in the
Saipau area since the middle of October. CinC Fourth is at Saipan as of the
22nd and it is possible that Airon 24 may also be present. Slight indications
are that one battleship division and two carriers are preparing to proceed to the
mandates but so far there has been no signs that the movement has begun.
Secret Intelligence Report
Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 89. Date : 23 Nov. 1941
CinC Fourth Fleet is now reported to have returned to Truk after a trip to
Saipan in the Kashima. There has been increased activity of the cruiser division
and other units of the Fourth Fleet in the Truk-Saipan area. The following
increases in Base Forces are estimated: Third (Palao), one (1) division marus;
Fourth (Truk), two divisions marus, two maru air tenders, special landing
force (?) ; Fifth (Saipan), two divisions marus; Sixth (Jaluit), three divisions
marus, three unidentified shore commands, two maru air tenders.
The activity of the Combined Air Force is increasing. The Eleventh Air Corps
is believed to be at Palao and Airon Twenty four is concentrated in the Mar-
shalls. The Fifth Fleet is apparently at Chichijima with portions possibly at
Marcus. There have been approximately seventy arrivals or departures of
marus since one November, mostly in the Truk and Jaluit areas.
Secret Intelligence Repokt
Reliability Rating : Serial No. 90. Date : 25 November 1941
The U. S. N. Shipping Adviser in Batavia reports that the Dutch report con-
cerning the Japanese Expeditionary Force near Palao originated from the Dutch
Army in Timor. Portugese Timor was named as the objective of the Expedition.
The information was classed as doubtful and no further confirmation has been
obtained.
Secret Intelligence Report
Reliability Rating : Serial No. 91. Date : 25 Nov. 1941
The' British report that Germany is obtaining rubber from Saigon in the fol-
lowing shipments. All routing is from Saigon to Bordeaux around Cape Horn.
Six thousand tons was shipped in two Japanese ships on 15 October and 14
November respectfully. Five thousand tons is to be shipped in a German ship
on about one December. The Jap ships may be German vessels under Japanese
charter. The ships have not yet been identified.
top secret
Secret
Intelligence Report
Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 12. Date ; 25 November 1941
Opnav reports that the chances of any favorable result coriiing out of the
present negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. It is his opinion that this,
.coupled with the statements of the Japanese government, and the movements
of their military and naval forces, indicates that they may make a surprise
aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines
or Guam. The Chief of Staff of the Army concurs in this opinion. Senior Army
Officers in the Far East, Pacific and West Coast areas (including Panama) have
been informed. Utmost secrecy is enjoined regarding this opinion in order to
not further complicate the present tense situation or to precipitate Japanese
action.
786 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TOP SECRET
tiecret
Intelligence Report
Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 13. Date : 25 Nov. 1941
For the past month the Commander Second Fleet has been organizing a Force
composed of the following:
Second Fleet — Third Fleet (including 1st and 2nd Base Forces and 1st
Defense Division) — Combined Air Force — Desron Three — Airron 7 —
Subron 5 — possibly units of Batdiv 3 (from First Fleet).
These units are linked vpith the South China Fleet and French Indo-China
Force as well as the Naval Stations at Sama, Takao and Bako. Thp Commander
Second Fleet has intensely been interested in operations at Palao and the Third
Base Force which is at Palao.
The Combined Air Force has assembled at Takao with some indications that
certain units have moved on to Hainan.
The Third Fleet is believed moving in the direction of Takao and Bako.
The Second Base Force appears to transporting the equipment of air forces to
Taiwan.
An unidentified Second Fleet unit and a submarine unit appears to be in the
vicinity of Takao. Crudiv 7 and Desron 3 appear to be an advance unit and
may be en route South China. A strong concentration of submarines and air-
craft is believed in the Marshalls comprising Airron 24, at least one cardiv and
one third of the submarine force.
Com 14 believes the above indicates a strong force is preparing to operate in
SoutliEastern Asia while certain units operate from Palao and the Marshalls.
top secret
Secret
Inteujgence Kepokt
Reliability Rating : A. Serial No. 94. Date : November 26. 1941
A reliable source of information evaluates the situation during the past few
days as follows. He considers it reliable:
1. He believes that various units of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th Fleets are being
directed by CinC 2nd Fit in a loosely-knit organization. He further states that
the organization appears to be subdivided into two sections. And expects :
Section I to operate in South China Area.
Section II to operate in the Mandates.
2. Forces which appear to be under CinC 2nd Fit.
«
section I
CruBiv 7 (From 2nd Fit) (4 CA's— KUMANO, MOGAMI, MIKUMA,
SUZUYA)
Airon 6 (From Combined Air Force) (3 XAV's— ICAMIKAWA MARU,
FUJIKAWA MARU, KEN JO MARU)
1st Defense Division (From 3rd Fit)
Sulron 6 (From 6th Fit) (1 CL, 2 Subdivs (4 ss) ) (note 4 SMs)
It is possible but not known for sure that Crudiv 6 may be included herein.
(From 1st Fit) (4 CA's— KAKO, FURUTAKA, KOBA, KINUGASA)
section II
Crudiv 5 (From 2nd Fit) (3 CA's (maybe 4)— MYOKO, NACHI, HAGURO)
Cardiv 3 (From Carrier Fit) (2 CV's— RYUJO?, HOSHO) RYU JO and 1
MARU
Desron 2 (From 2nd Fit) (1 CL, 3 Desdivs(12 DD's) )
Desron 2 (From 2nd Fit) (1 CL, 3 Desdivs(12 DD's) )
Subron 5 (From 6th Fit) (1 CL, 3 Subdivs (6 or 7 SS's) )
Desdiv 23 (From Carrier Pit) (4 DD's)
1st Base Force (From 3rd Fit)
3rd Base Force (At PALAO)
Sth Base Force (At SAIPAN)
Other lesser units (Names not known)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 787
It is possible but not known for sure that Batdiv S may be Included herein.
(From 1st Fit) (4 BBs— HIYEI^ KONGO, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA) (HARUNA
may be undergoing major repairs)
3. Disposition of remainder of 3rd Fit in doubt but it is assumed they will
be stationed around the BAKO-TAKAO area or further south.
4. Indications are that today (Nov. 26th) Desron S (1st Fit), Crudiv 7 (2nd
Fit) and Suiron 6 (6th Fit) are in the TAKAO area. Units of Combined Air
Forces from the Empire are at TAKAO, HOCHOW, PAKHOI, SAIGON and other
bases along the CHINA COAST and in TAIWAN.
5. He cannot confirm report there being large force of SS and CVs in the
MANDATES. Thinks all known carriers of 1st and 2nd Fits are still in the
KURE-SASEBO area.
6. He believes that:
CinC Combined Fit is in NAGATO (BB)
1st " " " EYVGA (BB)
2nd " " " AT AGO (CA) (In KURE area)
3rd " " " ASHIGARA (CA) (In SASEBO area)
. 5th " » " CHICHIJIMA area
6th " " " £:4firir/i/4 (CL) (In YOKOSUKA area but this
is unreliable)
7. CinC 2nd Fit, CinC 3rd Fit and CinC Southern Expeditionary Force ap-
parently have the major roles.
8. Units from North or Central appear to have joined the South China Fleet
(probably torpedo boats).
9. One Base Force unit apparently being used to strengthen Southern Expedi-
tionary Force.
Secret Intelligence Repobt
Reliability Rating : A. Serial No. 95. Date : November 27, 1941
A reliable agent states that there appears to be ORANGE Army activity in the
air that envolves Imperial Headquarters, Combined Army Forces and Com-
mander OPTION KING AFIRM. Commander OPTION KING AFIRM and Com-
bined Army Taiwan and Combined Army Forces Sama.
Confidential Intelligence Report
Reliability Rating : B-3. Serial No. 96. Date : 27 November 1941
Information from British Intelligence (Far East) sources states:
Japan will commence Military Operations on 1 December against the KBA
Isthmus, Thailand, with the objective of interposing between Bankok and
Singapore.
Main landing and center of effort at SINGORA (SONGKHLA).
Japanese Assault Forces to proceed direct from TAIWAN (FORMOSA)
and HAINAN Is.
TOP 8ECBET
Secret Intelligence Repokt
Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 97. Date : 28 Nov. 41
Absoutely reliable reports from Singapore are that the following procedure
will be carried out on Japanese news broadcasts in the event that diplomatic
relations are on the verge of severance :
On ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts, the following words repated five times
at the beginning and the end will have this significance :
HIGASHI HIGASHI : Japanese-American.
KITA KITA : Russia.
NISHI NISHI: England (including occupation of Thai or invasion of
Malaya and NEI).
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 9
788 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On Japanese language foreign news broadcasts, the following sentences repeated
twice in the middle and twice at the end will be used :
"HIGASHI NO KAZE AME" (America).
"KITA NO KAZE KUMORI" (Russia).
"NISHI NO KAZE HARE" (England).
The British and Com 16 are monitoring the above broadcasts.
Secret Inteixigence Report
Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 98. Date : 28 Nov. 1941
Com 16 reports location of following units :
In Formosa Straits :
ISUZU
SubTender
4 Subs (probably Subron 6)
NAGOYA aiARU
NITTA MARU sailing Yogosuka to Takao on 29th with military supplies.
Two senior construction otficers and 400O men (status unknown) order to
the Mandates.
Unidentified CL (?) has apparently relieved KASHWI as flagship of the
Southern Expeditionary Fleet and is now in the Camranh Bay Saigon Area.
Secret iNTBnxiGENCB Report
Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 99. Date : 29 Nov. 1941
Com 16 reports recent developments noted :
"COMDR FIRST PATROL FORCE" has headquarters apparently in Palao
or Yokosuka along with other forces of this nature.
"FIFTH AIR BATTALION" is at Takao.
"COMDR AIR BORNE TROOPS" (location unknown).
"FRENCH INDOCHINA BILLETING DETACHMENT" in Saigon Area.
"THIRD FLEET HEADQUARTERS" probably at Yokosuka.
CinC Third has shifted flag from ASHIGARA to NAGARA.
CinC Southern Expeditionary Force shifted flag from KASHII to CHOKAI.
New additions to the First Section (Ser. # 94) :
DESRON 4.
SUBRON (?).
AIRRON 7 (CHITOSE type).
The HIYEI and KONGO now appear to be definitely in the First Section but
no movement has been noted.
Completely reliable information indicates that CinC Combined will leave Kure
Zone at 0400 today, leave Sasebo Zone at midnight on the 1st and enter Bako
Zone at midnight on the 2nd.
Secret iNTEaxiGENCE Report
Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 100. Date : 1 Dec. 41
There have arrived in the Takao Area in the past two days : ComDesRon 5
in the NATORI : NAKA to join DesRon4 ; Units of Number Two Base Force ;
CHOGEI (believed to be tender for two subdivs). All of these units are under
command of CinC Third. CinC Second has shifted from Kure to Sasebo Area
in the ATAGO apparently en route South China Waters.
Secret Intelligence Report
Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 101. Date : 1 Dec 1941
Absolutely reliable agent in Bangkok reports that on the 29th conferences
were in progress considering plans to force the British to attack Thai at Padang
Bessa near Singora as counter move to Japanese landing at Kota Bharu. Thai,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 789
at present, intends to consider the first invader as her enemy therefore Japan
believes this landing in Malay would force the British to invade Thai at Padang
Bessa. Thai would then declare war against the British and call on Japan
for help. This plan appears to have the approval of the Thai Chief of Staff
Bijitto. Up until 25 November Thai government circles have been sharply
divided between pro-British and pro-Japanese but now those favoring Japan
seem to have silenced the anti-Japan group and intend to force Premier Pibul
to make a decision. They expect early and favorable developments.
Secret Inteujgenob Rkpoet
Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 102. Date : 2 December 1941
CinC Second Fleet [handwritten: in ATAGO] and the Cine Third Fleet have
put in their appearance in the TAKAO Area. The Commander Southern Expe-
ditionary Force in the CHOKAI has arrived at SAMA, HAINAN.
The U. S. Ambassador at Bangkok on the 30th requested permission to
destroy all but a limited number of Codes.
Three I-class submarines were sighted bearing 070 distant 180 miles from
SAIGON, course 180 speed 15.
Nine (9) ORANGE Submarines sighted at 0230 GCT 2nd Latitude 13-10,
longitude 110-00 East course 180 speed 10.
Reported at CAMRANH Bay 21 ORANGE transports with a six plane patrol
overhead.
Hevtitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 27
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIO FI>EET
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflBcer
for burning when of no further use
In ^okyo Yokohama area at present time, Kamakura and Nitta Marus X
Yokohama Dock Yard finished, not long ago, 2 escort ships X 2 transports left
Yokohama last Thursday in November one carrying aircraft, the other Navy
men
CBO HRF Date 5 December 41 Serial No. 12-129
Originator : NAVATT TOKYO
Action : OPNAV
Information :
CINCPAC
CINCAF
COM 16
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraghrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflBcer
for burning when of no further use.
Nazis from Shanghai who are of military age are being transferred to Japan
for training thought for purpose of serving on German ships which are now
in Japan. In this connection 80 have departed in last 10 days average age of
these men 30 years. A great deal of pressure is being brought to bear on French
Concession by 9 Shanghai officials to bring about the discharge of Anglo Ameri-
can civilian volunteer members of police reserves for the purpose of replacing
them with Italians and Germans. The following information from British In-
790 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
telligence who gave it a reliability classification of B2: Kamakura, Nitta and
Argentina Maru carrying personnel, oil, supplies, and building material have
visited Caroline Islands since September ; Majuro, Mejit, and Katherine Islands
are being specially developed; laborers numbering 3000 have been landed at
Jaluit.
CBO S Date 4 Dec 41 Serial No. 12-102
Originator :
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI
Action :
OPNAV
Information :
CINCPAC
CINCAF
COM 16
NAVATT CHUNGKING
U. S, Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
(Classification): Confidential. Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflBcer for
burning when of no further use.
In response to the reference (Cincpac Serial No. given below). The unidentified'
modern vessel was a 10,000 ton cargo ship which has been converted into a sea-
plane carrier. , , ,
Characteristics: Flush deck, with raised foe s'l, with raked bow and cruiser stem,
mounting 14.7" gun on elevated platiform foward. and 14.7 gun on poop deck.
RAISED FORE CASTLE A^^© *:t¥S» DECK.
Ref: No. 11-827
Subref: No. 11-759
CBO MRQ Date 4 Dec 41 Serial No. 12-103
Originator: Information:
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC
Action: CINCAF
OPNAV COM 16
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PAOIFTC FLEET
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer
for burning when of no further use.
State Department advises :
Jap troop and supply ships commenced making Saigon November 21, and have
disembarked approximately 20,000 men, using all wharves possible. From Friday
to Wednesday, 10,000 further troops came by train from the north. Present
concentration of troops in South Indo China believed about 70,000 with estimates
as high as 128,000 although latter figure discredited as being too high. Large
number of trucks landed, carrying materials and men inland, in a large movement,
of such size that it appears to point to immediate action against Siam. All above
received from Saigon, following from Hanoi, all reports on November 26 unless
otherwise noted.
On the morning of November 25, the mayor of Haiphong notified all affected
parties the Japs were going to commandeer all stores being shipped to China
and to this end ordered that they must have all keys to all bonded storehouses
prior to noon that day, despite the fact that protest was made by the French.
He advised also that those concerned should exercise their own judgment as to
compliance with the order. Report from Hanoi further stated that recently
augmented stores and military gear, landed at Haiphong, (consisting principally
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 791
of gasoline and railway equipment, including rolling stock) are being further
shipped south.
It is said Nipponese intend to buy as many as 500 native boats, and have, in
fact, acquired a great many along the coast of Tongking Province, which they
have moved south. Tuesday, the U. S. Consul at Hanoi obtained report from
dependable sources, stemming from Governor General's Office to the effect that
the latter had learned from an agent of proposed Japanese move. This movement
was said to be contemplated in the form of simultaneous Army-Navy action, sea
forces to open hostilities on Isthmus Kra, while land forces attacked Thailand.
Same information was credited with statement that the above advances would
be made without advance warning in form of ultimatum or declaration of war.
Wednesday report from Hanoi stated that there has been considerably more
activity in the way of landing and movement south of armed forces, 4000 men
having been disembarked in the last few days. A special train will carry about
1500 south on Tuesday and Wednesday of this week. Tongking is said to contain
some 25000 (estimated) Nipponese troops with 90 planes present at Gialam.
CBO HRF Date 29 November 41 Serial No. 11-891
Originator : Information :
OPNAV CINCPAC
Action : COM 16
CINCAF COM 14
U. S. Naval Communication Sebvich
COMMANDBB-IN-OHIEF, U. S. PACIFIO FLEEH-
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflScer for
burning when of no further use.
During period mentioned in your 182250 United States merchant vessels were
in the vicinity of Ellice and Gilbert.
CBO FWR Date 29 Nov '41 Serial No. 11-879
Originator : Information :
OPNAV CINCPAC
Action :
NAVOBS AT WELDINGTON
U. S. Naval Communication Skbvicb
OOMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflScer for
burning when of no further use.
Kamakura Nitta and Argentia Marus have been engaged since September in
hauling materials in the form of supplies, oil, construction supplies, as well as
personnel to the mandate islands X On one trip to the Marshall group, 3000
workmen were carried and disembarked at Jaluit X Two trips have been made
to the Caroline Islands X Awaiting transportation, seemingly, at Yokahoma
Naval pier, is approximately 8000 Wadts gasoline in drums X Development of
the Marshall group is proceeding on the following islands: Katherine (Ujae
Atoll ), Ma juro X Mejit X Watt (Ailuk)
CBO HRF Date 27 November 41 Serial No. 11-823
Originator : Information :
NAVATT TOKYO CINCPAC
Action : CINCAF
OPNAV COM 16
CINCPAC COM 14
792 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for
burning -when of no further use.
Following report received from commanding officer of a foreign merchant sMp
by the office of the Naval attache at Shanghai : Left Hongkong for Shanghai,
Sunday, November 23. While on the way, saw numerous transports. There
were approximately 3 or 4 ships sighted during each watch the first three days
of this week. They were travelling in a general southerly direction. Trans-
ports were sailing either alone or in groups of few ships.
Following is also noted by the Shanghai attache's office : There is an unusually
small amount of supplies on the military docks in Shanghai.
CBO HRF Date 27 November 41 Serial No. 11-834
Originator : Information :
AS ST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC
Action : CINCAF
OPNAV NAVATT CHUNGKING
NAVATT TOKYO
COM 16
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for
burning when of no further use.
Following Jap naval ships sighted :
Northeast Amoy 20th course southwest 10,000 ton modern ship fitted as sea-
plane carrier with catapult. On deck 8 seaplanes Navy type 95.
OfE Swatow: 19th; course South, light cruiser and destroyer Soihow 17th:
20 merchant type ships left heading for Formosa off Saigon 15th : 7 transports.
CBO WBM Date Nov. 25 Serial No. 11-759
Originator : Information :
ASST NAVATT CINCPAC
SHANGHAI NAVATT TOKYO
Action : NAVATT CHUNGKING
CINCAF OPNAV
COM 16
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for
burning when of no further use.
The following 5 ships, previously Japanese merchant motor ships, arrived here
with names blocked out and painted grey — Atutasan, Mitsui line. 1 more same
type.
Sato Nyk.
2 sister ships Tekasii Maru, Ockshima Steamship Co.
They were armed with 10 to 16 AA guns apiece. The ships with 10 guns have
mounts placed for 6 more machine guns. They had an average of 7 3-inch dual
purpose guns with the other guns being automatic and seemed to be approximate-
ly 50 caliber.
CBO WBM Date Nov. 25 Serial No. 11-751
Originator : Information :
ASST NAVATT CINCPAC
SHANGHAI CINCAF
Action : NAVATT^ TOKYO
OPNAV NAVATT CHUNGKING
COM 16
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 793
U. S. Naval Commttnication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF V. S. PACIFIC FLEET
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for
burning when of no further use.
Shipping here is now normal. No large movements seen either north or south
along coast to date. About 24,000 troops with large amount of military equip-
ment sailed from Woosung between the 15th and 23rd. Several trucks leaving
were seen to be newly camouflaged, mostly green in color. This type of camou-
flage is unusual in this locality. 184 landing boats besides others on 5 vessels
were included in the above equipment. Could not obtain exact check.
CBO WBM Date Nov. 25 41 Serial No. 11-761
Originator : Information :
ASST NAVATT CINCPAC
SHANGHAI CINCAF
Action : NAVATT CHUNGKING
OPNAV NAVATT TOKYO
U. S. Naval Communication Ser\'Ice
COMMANDEB-IN-CHIEF IT. S. PACIFIC FLEET
(Classification : ) Confidential
Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for
burning when of no further use
At 2115 November 24 about 1,000 miles east of Guam, the ANSAC clipper
sighted 4 Japanese seaplanes flying south at 10,000 feet.
CBO WBM Date Nov 25 41 Serial No. 11-766
Originator COM 14
MARDET WAKE INFORMATION :
COM 14 CINCPAC
Action :
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEP U. S. PACIFIC FLEETT
(Classification:) Confidential
Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for
burning when of no further use
Five transports departed Woosung Saturday with undetermined number of
troops and small boats X Present at Woosung on the same day were eight
other transports of from four to twelve thousand tons each.
No activity was noted between Shanghai and Darien X 2000 troops arrived
Shanghai from Nanking by rail Thursday night.
Some observers believe that the transports which left Woosung last week
were possibly going to northern Formosa avoiding shipping lanes. Upon leav-
ing Woosung these vessels did not change course until out of sight of the pilot
boat. No convoys were seen along coast and foreign vessels from Hong Kong
report only a few scattered transports south-bound with troops and landing boats.
One 10,000 ton ispecial landing craft carrier which departed Shanghai 18th
was sighted 20th off Wenchow on southwesterly course.
CBO WJE Date 24 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-725
Originator : Information :
ASST NAVAL ATTACHE^ SHANG- CINCPAC
HAI CINCAF
Action : NAV ATT CHUNGKING AND
OPNAV TOKYO
794 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
U. S. Naval Communication Service
OOMMANDEB-IN-CHIEF V. S. PACIFIC FLEET
( Classification : ) Confidential
Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflScer for
burning when of no further use
Reliable report at Singapore of monoplane with two engines and one rudder
making reconnaissance flights over Gilbert Islands on November 15th X Re-
I)eated on the 16th November by single wing silver flying boat number of engines
undetermined
CBO S Date 22 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-686
Originator : Information :
NAVATT SINGAPORE CINCPAO
Action : CINCAF
OPNAV
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF XT. S. PACIFIC FUCET
(Classification:) Confidential
Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflacer for
burning when of no further use
Transports with limited number horses troops and roughly 115 landing boats
assorted equipment trucks and anti-aircraft guns sailed from Shanghai from
14th to 17th X 7 ships of similar type are present X Hasidate sailed Canton
14th Nov X 1 minelayer transport 6 destroyers 3 torpedo boats departed Amoy
X 2 destroyers 1 troop ship and cruiser of the Natori class were anchored off
Bias Bay 15th Nov X 2 destroyers sighted on southerly course south of Hong-
kong on 16th Nov X Night of 17th Italian escort vessel Eritrea departed Shang-
hai with 190 tons Diesel oil bound Okon X 14th observed 12 transports down-
stream and 18 upstream at mouth Pearl River X From 10 to 14 Nov master
sighted 17 tran^orts southbound at intervals between Crown Colony and
Woosung
CBO S Date 21 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-626
Originator : Information :
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC
Action : OPNAV
CINCAF NAVATT TOKYO
NAVATT CHUNGKING
COM 16
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDEB-IN-CHIEP U. 8. PACIFIC FLEEH"
(Classification:) Confidential
Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for
burning when of no further use
Close to 14000 Japanese troops with about 80 tanks and 20 field pieces have
arrived here from Nanking during the past 5 days by rail believed awaiting water
transportation from this point X During the first part of November lesser num-
ber of young recruits were sent inland from Shanghai after their arrival from
Japan.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 795
CBO S Date 21 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-627
Originator : Information :
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAO
Action : CINCAF
OPNAV NAVATT TOKYO
NAVATT CHUNGKING
COM 16
U. S. Naval Communication Sebvice
COMMANDEE-IN-CHIEF IT. S. PACmo FLEETT
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflBcer for
burning when of no further use.
1000 troops left Swatow 15th Nov X Installation machine gun mounts being
completed here after arrival on several vessels vphich appear to have been only
recently taken over X 3 outbound ships Shanghai were observed to carry sec-
tions of trestles on deck sections were 60 feet long by 8 feet high by 8 feet wide
and made of creosoted heavy timbers X Woosung military base has shown intense
activity since Nov 15th X There are an unusual number of ships present which
include former merchant vessels of 10000 tons and up average X 10 transports
departed 19th 8 of these were carrying troops 32 more transports anchored
lower WhangiK)o X Landing boats still constitute part of outgoing equipment.
CBO S Date 21 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-630
Originator : Information :
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC
Action : CINCAF
OPNAV COM 16
NAVATT TOKYO
NAVATT CHUNGEaNG
U. S. Naval Communication Sebvice
COMMANDEE-IN-CHIEF U. 8. PACIFIO FLEET
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for
burning when of no further use.
On 16 and 17 November, planes, apparantly Japanese, were sighted over Gilberts.
On the 16th the plane was a twin engine monoplane and on the 17th a flying
boat. The flying boat was on a generally north and south course, speed 125.
These flights indicate a daily patrol from Jaluit, over Gilberts, to an area south
near shipping routs.
Truk and Saipan were each recently reinforced with half a squadron of bombers
and half a squadron of fighters.
Several unknown ships have been reported near EUlce and Gilbert. Also, re-
ports have been received of Japanese liners carrying either troops or laborers to
Mandates.
Note. — ^The source of the above report is the New Zealand Naval Intelligence.
CBO MRQ Date 19 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-550
Originator : Action :
ALUSNOB OPNAV
WELLINGTON Information :
CINCPAO
796 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF XT. S. PACIFIO FLEET
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflQcer for
burning when of no further use.
Strict regulations being enforced in Camranh Bay area. The following from a
responsible foreign traveler on an orange ship which anchored in Camranh Bay
last month while riding out a typhoon : Japanese building activity being rushed.
Freighters observed in harbor discharging cargo. French 75's on surrounding
hills, 4 long range rifles on hills over looking outer bays with a number if minor
caliber guns. Island inner bay has 4 small guns.
CBO 19 Nov '41 Date FWR Serial No. 11-564
Originator : Information :
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC
Action : CINCAF
OPNAV NAVATT TOKYO
NAVATT CHUNGKING
COM 16
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIO FLEET
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for
burning when of no further use.
Following obtained from supposedly accurate French military source regard-
ing military situation in Indo-China as of Nov 12 X Amassing of great amount of
gasoline, ammunition and oil X Japanese forces present reported to be as fol-
lows X Cambodia-Saigon area 31,000 X Tongking 24,700 X South part of
Annam 2,500 X It is reported by reliable traveller from that vicinity that large
amount of heavy artillery has been landed at Saigon and Haiphong during past
thirty days.
CBO HRF Date 17 November 41 Serial No. 11-498
Originator : Information :
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC
Action : CINCAF
OPNAV NAV ATT TOKYO
COM 16
NAV ATT CHUNGKING
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIO FLEET
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for
burning when of no further use.
Mouth of Pearl River 18 cargo vessels upstream 29 down Sunday to Thursday X
6 transports present at Shanghai Friday X Same day Canton minesweeper with
vice admiral's flag departed gun boat Saga X Minelayer Yaeyama class sighted
9th Canton outbound X Kuma type cruiser and 2 torpedo boats Tuesday Bias
Bay X 6 destroyers X 3 torpedo boats X 1 transport arrived at Amoy
W^ednesday X 1 Sendia class south of turnabout Island Tuesday.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 797
CBO HKF Date 16 November 41 Serial No. 11-486
Originator : Information :
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC
Action : OPNAV
CINCAF COM 16
NAVATT CHUNGKING
NAVATT TOKYO
U. S. Naval Communication Sekvicb
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF V. S. PACIFIC FLEBTT
( Classification : ) Confidential Paraphrasa
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer
for burning when of no further use.
Below Hongliong Nov 6 13 transports 2 trawlers 28 motor boats on southerly
course X Off Turnabout Island Nov 4 17 sliips ranging from 2000 tons to
10,000 tons in a convoy headed southwesterly X Departed Saturday Nov 2
fram Canton, Shimushu X Following day gunboat Saga was seen at Pearl
River X Monday Nov 4, cruiser Natori departed Amoy X In period between
1 and 4 Nov 7 transports left Shanghai X Loaded as follows X 2 with rail-
way trucks and coaches one each old locomotives X Tanks and trucks remainder
with miscellaneous military gear including 49 landing boats
CBO HRF DATE 10 November 41 Serial No. 11-245
Originator : Information :
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC
Action: NAVATT CHUNGKING
CINCAF NAVATT TOKYO
OPNAV
COM 16
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIO FLEHTr
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer
for burning when of no further use.
During the last two weeks Jap troop trains passing through Tehchow and
Shihnei from North Pingham Line enroute Tsingtao total approximately 40
or 50 trains X Movement has now been carried out X No indications of
Nip divisions being transported north China to Manchuria during the month
of October X Movement of 20 trains Taiyuanfu Shansi to Tsingtao via Shihnei
and Tehchow just commencing
CBO JMS Date 9 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-235
Originator : Information :
ASST NAVATT PIEKING ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI
Action: i NAVATT CHUNGKING
OPNAV CINCPAC
CINCAF
COM 16
798 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
U. S. Naval Communication Sebvicb
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEP U. 8. PACIFIO FLEET
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer
for burning when of no further use.
Supposedly accurate report from sources in Hongkong X Left outward bound
Monday on Pearl River, 28 trawlers and 35 transports for undetermined points X
Haiphong, today, Japanese forces to the extent of 12,000 men disembarked,
with more ready
CBO HRF Date 8 November 41 Serial No. 11-194
Originator : Information :
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAO
Action : CINCAF
OPNAV COM 16
NAVATT CHUNGKING
NAVATT TOKYO
U. S. Naval Communication Seevicb
COMMANDEB-IN-CHIEP V. S. PACIFIO FLEBTT
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer
for burning when of no further use.
Please forward brief summary by dispatch ahead of full report on information
requested below X For your information, there is now being sent you by mail
14th N D intelligence report 1027 of 30 October concerning Edward John
Coquelle, who is confined in Honolulu X He was according to his statment,
born French and is a naturalized U S citizen (1930) having taken papers in
San Francisco X Coquelle's avowed nephew, Alfred Munson, now on Midway,
is involved in confession made by the former in which he admits addressing
secret plans to Mrs. Alice Coquelle at 3229 21st Ave., San Francisco X Plans
were intercepted here, and were contained in a suitcase sent by Coquelle from
Midway in the sirius during October X U S attorney wishes C N O to have in-
vestigation of Coquelle's service record made X Also desires San Francisco
authorities study records to ascertain whether or not Mrs. Coquelle has been
naturalized and check on her personally X Coquelle avers he was a member
of Army Intelligence and was with overseas armed forces in first world war
CBO HRF Date 7 November 41 Serial No, 11-172
Originator: Action: Information:
COM 14 OPNAV COM 12
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDEE-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIO FLEIffr
(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer
for burning when of no further use.
16 destroyers and 14 other naval vessels, probably transports or auxiliaries
were observed far away, anchored in Wakasa Bay, Obama Harbor area X Above
are Japanese and were sighted on the thirtieth of October.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
799
CBO HRF Date 6 November 41 Serial No. 11-153
Originator :
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI
Action :
CINCAF
Information :
CINCPAC
NAVATT CHUNGKING
OPNAV
COM 16
U. S. Naval Communication Seevicb
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIO FLEBJT
( Classification : ) Confidential
Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflBcer
for burning when of no further use.
The following Japanese naval craft have been observed: Monday the 27th
10 transports in ballast averaging 6000 tons each anchored off Namow Island
Swatow X Tuesday 10 small transports south Hongkong course southwest
loaded with cargo X Sailed Amoy 1 destroyer and cruiser Kuma X A vessel
departed Shanghai with 600 troops X Sighted at the mouth of the Pearl River
during the past week 34 transports have passed upstream and 21 downstream.
At Shanghai the Italian escort vessel Eritrea continued to load oil in drums
small lots as obtainable X
German ship Quito left Shanghai night of 31st escorted by 2 Jap gunboats X
Its cargo included large quantity of Diesel oil and antifouling paint X Its
destination is believed to be Kobe
CBO DCG Date 5 Nov Serial No. 11-118
Originator :
ASST NAV ATT SHANGHAI
Action :
CINCAF
Information :
CINCPAC
NAV ATT CHUNGKING
NAV ATT TOKYO
OPNAV
COM 16
U. S. Naval Communication Service
C0MMANDEai-IN-CHIE3' U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
(Classification.) Confidential
Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer
for burning when of no further use.
Following information from Navatt Chungking relaying from chief of SRKO
intelligence :
Report from private agent Hongkong states that Orange Fleet has been
mobilized at Sasebo since 20 October, although he is in doubt as to the reliabil-
ity of the above information X Probable origin British X Londin notified
local attache of a general mobilization recently, and he, it is believed, repeated
information X He has been asked to check through the naval attache at
Hongkong X Original report from London did not give date or place X
Chinese claim of Japanese naval concentration at Chainan or Gulf of Siam is
without confirmation, although there is the usual local unit activity in those
places.
CBO HRF Date 27 October 41 Serial No. 10-734
Oi^iginator :
NAVATT CHUNGKING
Action :
CINCAF
Information :
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI
CINCPAC
OPNAV
COM 16
COMSOPAT
800 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
(Classification.) Confidential
Paraplirase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding ofiicer
for burning when of no further use.
Although the Chinese maintain claims that the Japanese intend to attack
Siberia in the near future, foreign observers claim this hinges upon Russian
failure in the West X Chungking Russian Attache refuses to make statement
concerning Russian strength in the East, although suggesting that severe
weather handicaps Japanese action as well as sufficient Russian strength to
give Nipponese severe punishment X Chinese also insist the Japs are sending
four unidentified divisions into Manchuria and are holding four more in read-
iness in Northern China X British Naval Attache doubts this latter since he
claims the Chinese obtained it via backdoor, information being originally
transmitted by me to the Soviet Embassy in my 62/4 Oct. for checking, and by
the British Attache to London also for cross check.
CBO HRF Date 27 October 41 Serial No. 10-736
Originator :
NAVATT CHUNGKING
Action :
CINCAF
Information :
ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI
CINCPAC
COMSOPAT
OPNAV
COM 16
NAVATT PEIPING
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
(Classification.) Confidential
Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding ofiicer
for burning when of no further use.
The following were sighted:
Thursday — 10 trawlers heading south, near turn about island.
Thursday — Orange convoy, course southwest, consisting of 11 cargo ships
and 4 tankers sighted off Amoy.
Monday — 20 trawlers proceeding southwest off Wenchow with destroyer, 1
transport.
Saturday — 2 transports loading small boats at Woosung X Yangtze entrance
2 transports outbound with landing craft and few troops on board.
Sharps Peak Jap naval garrison below Foochow for past 2 weeks abandoned
station on the morning of the 25th.
FOR25/
CBO FWR Date 27 October 41 Serial No. 10-750
Originator :
ASNAVAT SHANGHAI
Action :
CINCPAC
CINCAF
NAVAT CHUNGKING
NAVAT TOKYO
OPNAV
COM 16
Information :
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 801
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
(Classification.) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflScer
for burning when of no further use.
2300 Thursday 13 orange transports were seen off Wenchow Tuesday on a
southwest course X A hospital ship departed Shanghai from upriver with
2000 wounded X Seen off Wenchow on Wednesday afternoon 9 transport
averaging 3000 tons moderately loaded, with no troops reported.
CBO EBR Date 27 Oct. 41 Serial No. 10-703
Originator : Information :
ASST NAV AT SHANGHAI CINCPAC NAVATTS
Action: CHUNGKING, TOKYO
CINCAF OPNAV, COM 16
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
(Classification.) Confidential Paraphrase
This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer
■ for burning when of no further use.
It is reported that all Jap tankers are being armed with 2 guns.
Izumo, converted carrier, was launched at Kobe October 30th and was moved
to the dock formerly occupied by the Zuikaku.
The main Japanese Fleet departed on 28 October for the Kure area.
Master of foreign vessel order charter to Nips states that a guard ship is
now stationed at Tsucaru strait and signals all passing ships for name, nationality,
and destination.
CBO MRQ Date 5 Oct. 41 Serial No. 11-117
Originator : Information :
ASST NAV ATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC
Action : CINCAF
OPNAV NAV ATT CHUNGKING
COM 16
8-e-c-r-e-t
Hewitt Inquirt Exhibit No. 28
United States Pacific Fleett
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
PHARii EUrbor, T. H., November 28, 1941.
Memorandum for: Admiral.
Subject : Projected Reconnaissance Flight over Mandates Islands.
1. The subject was discussed with the Intelligence Section, Hawaiian Air
Force, on 27 and 28 November, 1941, and will be further discussed this afternoon
at 1430.
2. I have furnished the Intelligence Officer, Hawaiian Air Force, with Meet
Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, giving the general summary of the installations
and developments in the Mandates. The Chief of G-2, H. A. F., has promised
me that this publication will not be reproduced by them nor given any circulation
except to the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and to the commanders of the
Army squadrons to be stationed on Wake and Midway. This document will not
be carried in any aircraft.
802 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. The urgent need for as wide a reconnaissance of the Marshalls, Truk and
Ponape was stressed with particular reference to Jaluit, Eniwetok, Kwajelien,
Rongelap, Wotje and Maloelap.
4. The Fleet Aerological Officer was present at this morning's conference and
is working up meteorological data in conjunction with the proposed reconnais-
sance. From a point of view of photographic interpretation the hours of medium
shadow 9-11 a. m. and 2-4 p. m. are considered most advantageous and fog con-
ditions are expected to be best at around 10 a. m. Consequently, that hour has
been tentatively agreed upon for arrival at first objective.
5. The Army plans to fly two (2) B-24 planes fully manned with defensive
armament and photographic equipment from Wake on the selected day, de-
partures to be staggered so that arrivals over assigned initial points would be
practically simultaneous. Lacking definite information as to Radar installa-
tions in the Mandates it is proposed (tentatively) to make the first objective of
the planes Jaluit and Truk respectively. The Jaluit plane returning via Maloelap,
Wotje, Kwajelien, Rongelap and Pokaakku. The Truk plane returning via
Ujelang and Eniwetok. These return objectives being dependent upon discovery
or detection at or after first objective, and existing conditions at the time.
6. The second reconnaissance is to be conducted over Ponape enroute to Port
Moresby was assigned Ujelang, Ponape and Kapingamarangi (Greenwich Island).
7. The Hawaiian Air Force has requested that I sit in on all conferences after
the arrival here of the photographic planes and that I brief the pilots on all
matters relating to the Mandates prior to their takeoff.
[s] B. T. Latton.
HEwrrr Inquibt Exhibit No. 29
U. S. Naval Communication Sehvioh
Classified commandeb-in-ohief u. s. pacific rLEOT Incoming
From : Togo, Foreign Minister.
To: Consul Honolulu.
Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of warships
after the 4th.
Togo.
Date : 6 Dec. 41.
U. S. Naval Commttnication Service
Classified commander-in-chief tj. s. paciftc fleet Incoming
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
1. The three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning the 5th
entered port. They expect to depart port on the 8th.
2. On the same day the LEXINGTON and 5 heavy cruisers departed.
3. The following warships were anchored on the afternoon of the 5th :
8 Battleships
3 Light cruisers
16 Destroyers
Coming in were 4 cruisers of the Honolulu tyi)e and 2 destroyers.
Kita.
Date : 5 Dec. 41.
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEETT
Classified Incoming
From: Foreign Minister.
T^o : Kita, Consul, Honolulu.
Strictly Secret.
Would like you to hold on to your list of code words (also those used in connec-
tion with radio broadcast) right up until the last minute. When the break comes
burn immediately and wire us to that effect.
Togo.
Date: 3 Dec 41.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 803
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COM MANDEE-IN -CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
Classified Incoming
From: Kita.
To : Foreign Minister.
On tlie afternoon of the 3rd a Britisli man of war entered Honolulu and de-
parted early on the 4th about 1100 tons ; one stack, and had a 4 inch gun fore
and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went ashore and were re-
ceiving mail at the British consulate.
KiTA.
Date : 4 Dec. 41.
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDEB-IN-CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEBI
Classified Incoming
From: Kita.
To : Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
At 1300 on the 4th a light cruiser of the Honolulu class hastily departed.
KiTA.
Date : 4 Dec. 41.
Cincpac File No. United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Consul Kita in Honolulu sent following as #245 on 3 December, 1941.
From : Ichiro Fujii.
To : Chief of 3rd Section of General Staff.
1. I wish to change method of communication by signal to following:
Signal #
1. Battleship divisions including screen Preparing to sortie.
2. Aircraft carriers Preparing to sortie.
3. Battleship divisions including screen All dep. 1-3 Dec.
4. Aircraft carriers Several dep. 1-3 Dec.
5. Aircraft carriers All dep. 1-3 Dec.
6. Battleship divisions including screen All dep. 4-6 Dec.
7. Aircraft carriers Several dep. 4-6 Dec.
8. Aircraft carriers AH dep. 4r-6 Dec.
2. (A and B.)
Lanakai beach house will show one light before midnight and two after mid-
night during the hour number representing the signal :
Hour Signal #
2000-2100 1
2100-2200 2
2200-2300 3
2300-2400 4
2400-0100 5
0100-0200 6
0200-0300 7
0300-0400 8
(C) During daylight star bot at Lanakai showing masthead star indicates
signals 1-4. Star and roman numeral three indicates signals 5-8:
Signal
1 *
2__i *
3__^ *
4 *
5 *III
6 *III
7 *iir
8 *III
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 10
804 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(D) At the times indicated a one hour light in tlie attic window of Kalama
house indicates the corresponding signal :
Hours Signal #
1900-2000 1 3
2000-2100 4
2100-2200 5
2200-2300 6
2300-2400 7
2400-0100 8
( E ) In the KGMB Want Ads at 0945, these ads have following signal meaning :
Want Ad Signal #
Chinese rug for sale. Apply P. O. Box 1476 3 or 6
Chicken farm for sale. " " " " 4 or 7
Beauty Operator wanted. " " " " 5 or 8
2. If the above signals cannot be made from Oahu a bonfire on Maui about 6
miles north of Kula Sanatarium between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road
at point Lat. 20-40 and Long. 156-19 will be made for several days between 1900
and 2200. It can be seen from the south west or south east of Maui and the
hour at which it is shown will have the following signal meaning:
Hour Signal #
19-2000 3 or 6
20-2100 4 or 7
21-2200 5 or 8
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 80
(Exhibit No. 30 consisted of two Japanese panorama views of Pearl
Harbor with Japanese log on the reverse side recovered from a Jap-
anese submarine. These items were returned to Captain Layton.)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 30A
(This exhibit consists of a photostat of a Japanese log which ap-
peared on the reverse side of Exhibit No. 30, This photostat will be
found reproduced as Item No. 113, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. SOB
Log of Attack
1300 Completed last work on the tube (TN: midget sub?). Went aboard.
Waves fairly high.
1500 OAHU I. sighted. Radio station, red light, and surf (?) sighted. L 20°.
This ship 90°.
1615 Barbers Point Light seen operating. L 40°.
1800 Cruising submerged, depth 25 meters.
1815 According to intelligence reports, ships present in the harbor on the 5th
are as follows :
5 BB's, 3 CL's, 16 DD's docked.
4 HONOLULU Class CL's, 5 DD's.
Im
5 Lt 180 m
7 220 m
12 430 m
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 805
Hewitt Inquiby Exhibit No. 31
(Exhibit No. 31 consisted of a panorama sketch of Pearl Harbor
from positions five miles south of Pearl Harbor, -which was recovered
from a Japanese submarine. This sketch was returned to Captain
Lay ton.)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 31A
(Exhibit No. 31A consists of two photostats of Exhibit No. 31, being
a panorama sketch of Pearl Harbor from a position five miles south
of Pearl Harbor which was recovered from a Japanese submarine.
These photostats will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 114 and 115,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Hewitt Inqubt Exhibit No. 32
(Exhibit No. 32 was an original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor
recovered from a Japanese midget submarine. This chart was re-
turned to Captain Layton.)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 32A
(Exhibit No. 32 A consists of three photostatic copies of Exhibit
No. 32, as follows :
1. Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from
a Japanese midget submarine, bearing the original Jap-
anese characters.
2. Ihid, with the English translations of the Japanese
characters.
3. Photostatic copy of the reverse side of the Japanese chart
mentioned in Item No. 1 above.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 116,
117, and 118, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 33
(Exhibit No. 33 was an original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor
recovered from a Japanese submarine showing defensive installations.
This chart was returned to Captain Layton.)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 33A
(Exhibit No. 33A is a photostatic copy of Exhibit No. 33, being an
original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from a Japanese
submarine, showing defensive installations. This photostatic copy
will be found reproduced as Item No. 119, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRA-
TIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
806 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Hewitt Inquiky Exhibit No. 34
RESTRICTED
STAFF INSTRUCTIONS
Staff of the Commandeb-in-Chief United States Pacifio Flkkt, 1941
A2-12(05) United States Pacific Fleett
Serial 1525 U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Peael Haeboe, T. H., July 14, 1941.
The following Staff Instructions are published for the guidance of all persons
attached to or serving with the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States
Pacific Fleet, and also the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet,
while both commands are administered jointly.
The 1938 edition of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff Instructions are hereby
superseded and all copies should be destroyed.
W. W. Smith,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff.
Approved :
H. E. KiMMEL,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET STAFF INSTRUCTIONS, 1941
Page Nos .
Section I Composition, Organization and General Cognizance of Duty 1-3
Section II Individual Cognizance of Duties 3-15
Section III Battle Stations Ifi
Section IV Flag Office Personnel and General Instructions ..- 17-20
Section V Handling of Correspondence 21-28
Section VI Confidential and Secret Correspondence 29-30
Section VII Libraries ._ 31
Section VIII Rapid Communications t-.. ..- J2-39
Section IX Registered and other Secret and Confidential Publications 40
Section X Relationship between Flag and Ship _ 41-43
STAFF INSTRUCTIONS 1941
DISTRIBUTION LIST
COMMAND No Copies
Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet 40
Opnav 10
Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet 5
Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet 5
Commander Battle Force, Pacific Fleet 5
Commander Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet 5
Commander Base Force, Pacific Fleet (including Subordinate Command) (3 each) 6
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet 2
Commander Battleships, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet 2
Commander Cruisers, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet 2
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet 2
Commander Mineeraft, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet 1
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet , 2
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet 1
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet 2
Compatwing Two 1
Commander Mine Squadron THREE 1
Commander Transports, Base Force, Pacific Fleet 2
Commanding General, Second Mnrine Division, Fleet Marine Force 5
Commandants 11th, 12th, & 14th Naval Districts (each 2) 2
Fleet Flagship 5
Fleet Personnel Officer 1
Total 107
Spares 40
Grand total 147
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
807
STAFF INSTRUCTIONS
Section I. Composition, Organization and Geneeal Cognizance of Duty
111. The composition of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States
Pacific Fleet is as indicated in the following paragraphs.
112. The Commander-in-Chief is available to the entire Staff for consultation,
but all questions for decision or action should pass through the Chief of Staff
whenever such a procedure will not involve an undue delay.
113. The below tables indicate in general the assignment of duties to the
members of the Staff. Primary functions are indicated at the top of each
column ; the officer whose number appears first after each of the subheads
under (a), (b), (c), or (d) is the leader in the duty specified:
COMMA NDER-IN- CHIEF— 00
Chief of Staff— 01.
Assistant Chief of Staff— 02.
Personal Aides— 01, 05, 15.
Staff Duty Officer— 14.
(a) OPERATIONS
11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 90,
95.
Estimates, Plans,
Orders, Instructions.
11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 90,
95.
Communications.
20, 05, 15, 18, 21, 22,
30.
Schedules, Train-
ing.Exercises, Reports
of Exercises. 11,12,
13, 15, 16, 20, 50, 90,
95.
Tactics. 11, 12, 13,
15.
Anchorages, An-
choring, Getting
Underway, Operat-
ing Areas. 11, 12,
13, 15.
Joint Army and
Navy Operations.
11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 86.
Ship and Airplane
Movements. 11,
12, 13, 95, 15, 20, 50,
90.
Navigation. 12.
Logistics. 50, 12, 90,
95.
Intelligence. 11, 25.
Censorship. 25, 05.
Aerologies!. 96, 95.
Navy Relief Force.
U, 12, 13, 88.
Security. 21.
Propaganda. 05, 25,
26.
Damage Control.
60, 11, 90, 75.
Chemical Warfare
and Mines. 90.
Base Hospitals. 11,
75.
(b) ADMINISTRA-
TION
01, 05, 20, 21, 25, 75,
90, 95, 96.
Correspondence
Files, Records, Le-
gal Matters, Flag
Allotment and
Office, Print Shop,
Flag Personnel. 05.
Communications.
20, 05, 15, 18, 21, 22,
30.
Secret and Confi-
dential Registered
Publications. 20,
21, 33.
Guard Duty, Uni-
forms, Calls, Cele-
brations, Ceremo-
nies, Band, Boats,
Official Cars. 15.
Characteristic
Cards. 50, 18, 90,
95.
Athletics and Rec-.
reation. 15, 96.
Requisitions, Sur-
veys, Ship's Serv-
ice. 50.
Landing Force and
Parades. 86, 15, 90.
Annual Report. 05.
(Assisted by each
member of the
Staff).
Intelligence. 25, 26,
20,05.
Censorship. 25, 26,
05,20.
Navy Relief Force
11, 12, 13, 86.
Aerological and Per
sonnel. 96.
Security. 21.
Medical (Sanita
tion, etc.) and Re
ligous Activities
75.
Public Relations,
27, 25, 26, 05.
Damage Control
50, 90, 75.
Base Hospitals. 75,
Customs and Agri
cultural Inspection
Liaison. 75, 96.
(c) WAR PLANS
16, 17, 18, 19, 86.
Estimates, Plans
. Orders. 16, 17, 18,
19.
Marine Corps mat-
ters. 86.
Landing Force. 86.
Mobilization plans.
16, 17, 18, 19, 86.
Joint Army and
Navy Operations.
16, 17, 18, 86, 11.
Logistic Readiness
for War. 16, 17, 18,
19, 50, 86, 90, 95.
Radio and Sound
(Signal Equip-
ment. 18, 20, 50, 22,
16.
Navy Relief Force.
11, 12, 13, 86.
(d) MAINTENANCE
fO, 90, 95.
Overhauls, Dock-
ing. 50.
Repairs, Altera-
tions. 50, 90, 95.
Technical Services.
50, 18, 20, 90, 95.
Bureau of Ships
Activities. 50.
Navigation. 50, 12.
Bureau of Ord-
nance. 90, 95.
Aviation. 95.
Aerological. 96.
Mines, Chemical
Equipment. 90.
Base Hospitals. 71.
Notk: Detailed assignments of duties are contained in section II.
808 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COGNIZANCE AND DUTY
114. The following numbers are employed to identify the duties of the officers
attached to the Staff :
01 — Chief of Staff.
02 — Assistant Chief of Staff.
05 — Flag Secretary.
11 — Operations Officer.
12 — 1st. Assistant Operations Officer.
13 — 2nd. Assistant Operations Officer.
14 — Staff Duty Officer.
15 — Flag Lieutenant.
16 — War Plans Officer.
17 — 1st. Assistant War Plans Officer.
18 — 2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.
19 — 3rd. Assistant War Plans Officer.
20 — Communication Officer.
21 — Communication Security Officer.
22 — Radio Officer.
23 — Assistant Communication Officer.
24 — Assistant Communication Officer.
25 — Intelligence Officer.
26 — Assistant Intelligence Officer.
27 — Public Relations.
30 — Assistant Communication Officer.
31 to 43 — Communication Duty and Coding Officers.
50 — Maintenance Officer.
75 — Medical Officer.
86 — Marine Officer, (Assistant War Plans Officer).
90 — Gunnery Officer.
95 — Aviation Officer.
96 — Aerological and Personnel Officer.
115. The following table shows the reliefs for members of the Staff who ma'y
be absent for any reason :
PRIMARY DUTY
01— Chief of Staff.
05 — Flag Secretary.
11 — Operations Officer.
12— 1st. Assistant Operations Offi-
cer.
13— 2nd Assistant Operations Offi-
cer.
15— Flag Lieutenant and Athletic
Officer.
16— War Plans Officer.
17— 1st. Assistant War Plans Offi-
cer.
18— 2nd. Assistant War Plans Offi-
cer.
19— 3rd. Assistant War Plans Offi-
cer.
20— Communication Officer.
21— Communication Security Offl-
22— Radio Officer.
23 — Assistant Communication
Officer.
24 — Assistant Communication
Officer.
25— Intelligence Officer.
26 — Assistant Intelligence Officer.
27— Public Relations Officer.
30 — Assistant Communication
Officer.
31 to 43 inclusive — Communication
50— Maintenance Officer.
75— Medical Officer.
86— Marine Officer.
RELIEF
02— Assistant C*ief of Staff.
25— Intelligence Officer.
16— War Plans Officer.
13— 2nd Assistant Operations Offi-
cer.
12— 1st. Assistant Operations Offi-
cer.
26 — Assistant Intelligence Officer.
90— Gunnery Officer.
95— Aviation Officer.
96— Aerological and Personnel
Officer.
17— 1st. Assistant War Plans Offi-
cer.
18— 2nd. Assistant War Plans Offi-
cer.
19— 3rd. Assistant War Plans Offi-
cer.
18— 2nd. Assistant War Plans Offi-
22— Radio Officer.
30— Assistant Communication
Officer.
20 — Communication Officer.
24 — Assistant Communication
Officer.
23 — Assistant Communication
Officer.
26— Assistant Intelligence Officer.
25 — Intelligence Officer.
05 — Flag Secretary.
31 — Assistant Communication
Officer.
Watch Officers and Coding Board.
13— Assistant Operations Officer.
05— Flag Secretary.
05 — Flag Secretary; (and Gun-
nery Officer for Landing
Force etc.)
95 — Aviation Officer.
90 — Gunnery Officer.
95— Aviation Officer.
REMARKS
(02 is same as 11.)
16 — Relieves if available, other-
wise 12 relieves 11.
20 — Relieves for visual communi-
cations.
Senior CWO.
War Plans Section by 16, 17,
18, 19.
Assisted by 12.
Assisted by 96.
Assisted by 05 for personnel.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 809
Section II. Individual Cognizanck of Duties
200. Chief of Staff— 01— Personal Aide.
(See Navy Regulations Articles 785 — 786).
(a) Carries out policies prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.
(b) Exercises general supervision over and coordinates work by members
of the Staff.
(c) Advises the Commander-in-Chief on all matters concerning the war readi-
ness and battle efficiency of the Fleet.
(d) Supervises the preparation of campaign orders and plans, as well as
strategical and tactical problems of the Fleet.
(e) Signs correspondence as follows:
(1) Routine Matters.
(2) Minor recommendations, or minor forwarding endorsements on same,
to material Bureaus regarding repairs and alterations concerning which a
policy has been established.
(3) Orders to and requests from officers not in Command.
(4) Matters concerning which the policy is of long standing.
(5) Letters from the Navy Department noted for compliance, informa-
tion, or guidance.
(6) The Commander-in-Chief personally will sign correspondence regard-
ing questions of particular importance involving criticism, approval, or
disapproval of previous recommendations ; action on legal papers.
201. Assistant Chief of Staff— 02— See Operations Officer (11).
202. Flag Secretary — 05 — Personal Aide.
(a) Responsible for the receipt, dispatch, recording, routing, and filing of all
official written correspondence. He shall be assisted by an officer (Assistant
Communication Officer) designated to handle the SECRET mail.
(b) Authenticates and checks the distribution of operation plans, orders,
movement orders and multiple address correspondence requiring authentication.
(c) In charge of the Flag Office organization and personnel connected there-
with.
(d) Ascertains that outgoing correspondence is in agreement with current
instructions and properly distributed.
(e) Brings to the attention of the officers concerned all conflicting, incon-
sistent or overdue communications.
(f) Responsible for the general dissemination of administrative information.
(g) Supervises the handling of U. S. and Guard Mail within the Fleet,
(h) Printing.
(i) Legal and disciplinary matters.
(j) Signs correspondence "by direction" for:
(1) Papers forwarded or returned without comment.
(2) Correspondence consisting of information or appropriate minor action
only.
(3) Receipts and tracers.
(4) Transmission of registered mail, or publications.
(5) Transfers and orders for enlisted personnel,
(k) Controls Flag Office Allotment.
(1) War Diary.
203. Operations Officer— 11— {Assistant Chief of Staff 02).
(a) Assists the Chief of Staff as required, signing correspondence in bis
absence as "Assistant Chief of Staff".
(b) As head of Operations Section coordinates operations and employment
activities.
(c) Develops Fleet tactics and doctrine, and originates recommendations
for revision of same.
(d) Prepares problems and exercises.
(e) Assignments of vessels to special duties.
(f ) Prepares estimates of the situation, campaign orders, operations orders,
and plans and movement orders.
(g) Assisted by other members of Staff reviews and analyzes Fleet exercises,
(h) Acts as head of the Schedule Board for preparing the Fleet operation
plans.
810 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR. ATTACK
(i) Navy Relief Force.
(j) Fleet anchorages, bases, and operating areas.
204. First Assistant Operations Officer — 12.
(a) Acts as Fleet Navigator with corresponding cognizance of navigational
equipment, charts, etc.
(b) Assists in all the duties under the cognizance of the Operations Oflacer.
(c) Coordinates the duties of Operations Officer with those of the War Plans
Section.
(d) Acts as member of the Schedule Board.
(e) Commander-in-Chiefs Night Order Book.
205. Second, Assistant Operations Officer — 13.
(a) Assists the Operations Officer in all the duties of that office.
(b) Responsible for maintaining location plot and movement report system
for vessels of the Fleet.
(c) Edits Quarterly Fleet Organization information.
205A. Staff Duty Officer— U.
(See paragraph 226).
206. Flag Lieutenant — 15 — Personal Aide.
(a) Acts as Fleet Signal Officer; supervises the dissemination of tactical
signals, under the Fleet Communication Officer; is responsible for the efficiency
of Fleet signalling operations and material.
(b) Fleet Athletic Officer; liaison officer with Fleet Recreation and Morale
Officer based ashore.
(c) Boarding officer.
(d) Has cognizance of:
(1) Matters relating to ceremonies, salutes, honors, and official calls.
(2) Entertainments.
(3) Club privileges, invitations, etc.
(4) Uniform.
(5) Boats, boat crews, and official cars.
(6) Military and Medical Guard Dpties.
(7) Band or orchestra.
(e) When on board during working hours, attends the side.
(f) Maintains flag combat bill.
(g) Acts on requests for bands, parades, visits to ships, etc.
(h) In charge of Admiral's mess attendants.
207. War Plans Officer— 16.
(a) As head of the War Plans Section is responsible, under the Chief of Staff,
for the preparation of War Plans for the Fleet and for all matters pertaining
thereto.
(b) Has general custody of War Plans and secret letters relative thereto.
(c) Member of Schedule Board.
(d) Maintains liaison with War Plans representatives of subordinate Com-
manders.
(e) Maintains liaison with U. S. Army in War Plans matters, — via District
Commandant if appropriate.
(f) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships — general features — and
on alterations of old ships that affect military characteristics.
(g) Makes recommendations on matters pertaining to reserves of material,
particularly ammunition, mines, bombs, torpedoes, fuel, provisions, etc., and
their distribution.
(h) Maintains liaison with Commandants of Naval Districts in War Plans
matters.
(i) Is responsible for the review of War Plans of subordinate commanders
and of District Commandants and Coastal Frontier Commanders insofar as these
Plans may affect the Fleet.
208. Assistant War Plans — 17.
(a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:
(1) Fleet estimates and plans.
(2) Collaboration with Naval Coastal Frontiers and Commandants of
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 811
Naval Districts.
(3) Liaison witli Army on War Plans matters.
(4) Duties of 18 when that assignment is vacant.
209. Assistant War Plans — 18.
(a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:
(1) Review of subordinate plans, including those of Naval Coastal Fron-
tiers and Naval Districts.
(2) Prosecution of current War Plans tasks and projects.
(3) Action on administrative matters and correspondence in which War
Plans has an interest.
(4) Logistic studies and data.
210. Assistant War Plans — 19.
(a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:
(1) Office administration and correspondence.
(2) Compilation and assembly of data.
(3) Specific custody of War Plans publications and files.
Fleet Marine Officer — 86. (See paragraph 222). '
211. Fleet Communication Officer — 20.
(a) Responsible for the efficiency of Fleet communications.
(b) Supervises training in Fleet communications.
(c) Assists Operations Officers and War Plans Officers with strategic opera-
tions and with war plans.
(d) Prepares Fleet communication plans.
(e) Directs activities of flag radio and sound schools and assignments of com-
munication personnel.
(f) Collaborates with "96" concerning radio and sound schools and assign-
ments of communication personnel.
(g) Supervises activities ashore of communication stations when manned by
Fleet personnel.
(h) Supervises the assignment and utilization of Fleet radio frequencies,
(i) Coordinates with "50" on matters of communication material,
(j) Responsible for registered publications,
(k) Supervises communication watch officers.
(1) Cryptographic and radio security, with "21".
212. Communication Security Officer — 21.
(a) Assists Fleet Communication Officer.
(b) Is responsible for security of Fleet Communications and directly those of
Fleet flagship :
(1) Inspection of radio traffic handled by Fleet flagship.
(2) Inspection of communication plans and orders of subordinate com-
manders.
(3) Supervision and control of monitor watch.
(4) Preparation of Fleet Letters and orders on communication security.
(5) Recommendations for improvement of crytographic aids.
(6) Recommendations for distribution and allowances of cryptographic
aids.
(7) By personal contact and instruction improve security of communi-
cations.
(c) Is in immediate charge of Radio Intelligence Unit.
(d) Is in charge of Commander-in-Chief's registered publications library.
Signs all routine transfer and destruction reports and inventories "by direction".
(e) Is responsible for production and security of U. S. F. publications and
other classified publications and printed matter issued by the Commander-in-
Chief.
(f ) Advises concerning and ensures security of handling of secret and confiden-
tial correspondence.
(g) Is responsible for the organization and training of the Fleet Coding Board.
213. Fleet Radio Officer— 22.
(a) Assists Fleet Communication Officer.
(b) Assists "50" in regard to technical aspects of Degaussing.
(c) Recommends assignment of Radio frequencies to 20.
(d) Supervises radio, sound and landwire communications and material in-
stallations of the Fleet.
812 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(e) Initiation and conduct of radio training operations in the Fleet.
(f ) Instruction and training of radio and sound personnel.
(g) Liaison with commercial radio and cable companies.
(h) Material inspection reports of radio and sound installations in the Fleet,
(i) Recognition and identification installations in the Fleet.
234. Intelligence Officer — 25.
(a) Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluates same, disseminating
to various members of staff, indicating where action is required.
(b) Provides Operation Officer and War Plans Officer information essential for
current estimates (monograph material).
(c) Maintains Section II (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Estimate
of Situation (Enemy Forces) . Maintains location plot of Fleets of possible enemy
or allies.
(d) Directs counter espionage and counter information.
(e) Maintains Intelligence Records (See Naval Intelligence Manual).
(f ) Prepares Fleet Intelligence Bulletins.
(g) Evaluates Intelligence Information received of procedures or practices of
other navies and prepares deSnite recommendation as to any action to be taken
within own Fleet.
(h) In charge of censorship.
(i) Internal Security of ships.
(j) Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.
215. Assista7it Intelligence Officer — 26
In addition to assisting "25" in all duties of the Intelligence section, performs
the following additional assignments :
(a) Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analysis.
(b) Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination
to Fleet.
(c) Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of Eenemy information.
(d) Maintenance of Current Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces) and loca-
tion plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.
216. Pumic Relations Officer— 21.
(a) Liaison officer with the Press.
(b) Releases all Fleet publicity requiring the Commander-in-Chief's review.
(c) Maintains file of clippings from current periodicals.
(d) Maintains photographic file.
(e) Maintains biographical file of flag and commanding officers.
(f) Cognizance of Staff library.
(g) Motion Picture Officer.
(h) Assists in recruiting activities in collaboration with the Bureau of
Navigation.
( i ) In charge of Staff photographer.
(j) Assists 15 (Flag Lieutenant) in connection with press releases for visitors,
visits, social activities, athletics, and other recreational subjects.
(k) Publicity liaison with other U. S. government activities.
(1) Propaganda in time of war.
(m) When directed assist "25", and "26" with censorship and collaborates in
intelligence matters as necessary.
(n) Reviews ship's papers in the fleet.
(o) Reviews congressional records, bills, etc.
217. Assistant Communication Officer — 30.
(a) In addition to the following, assists the Fleet Communication Officer as
directed.
(m) Is in charge of internal distribution and contduct of Flag rapid com-
munications within the Flagship.
(c) Is in charge of the Flag Communications Office, including personnel, rou-
tine operations, files, forms, and publications.
(d) Coordinates the duties of the Communication Watch Officers and Coding
Watch Officers.
(e) Under Flag Secretary, has duty as officer responsible for receipt, routing,
custody, and dispatch of secret mail.
(f) Responsible for cleanliness and upkeep of the Flag Communication Office
and communication spaces.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 813
218. Communication Watch Officers — 31, 32. 33, 34.
(a) Communication Watch Officers stand communication desk watches, being
governed in the i)erformance of these duties by the provisions of the Communi-
cation Instructions and such orders and instructions as may be issued by the Fleet
Communication Officer, Fleet Radio Officer, or Assistant Communication Officer.
(b) A Communication Watch Officer is the Flag Division Officer. He is assisted
in this assignment by the communication watch officers who are designated as
Junior Division Officers for the Flag Division.
(c) Communication Watch Officers must become proficient in the use of codes
and ciphers and be familiar with Fleet Operations, routine, and staff procedure.
In addition to performing routine code and cipher duties they may be assigned
coding board duties at a battle station.
(d) One Communication Watch Officer is detailed as custodian of non-regis-
tered communication publications which he shall keep corrected.
(e) One Communication Watch Officer is detailed as custodian of the Regis-
tered Publications which he shall keep corrected.
219. Coding Board Officers— 35, 36, 37, 38, (39, 40).
(a) Coding Board Officers stand Coding Board watches, being governed in the
performance of these duties by the instructions issued by the Assistant Communi-
cation Officer.
(b) They shall familiarize themselves with all cryptographic systems in use
and become proficient in their proper use.
(c) They shall assist the Fleet Security Officer in matters of Fleet Crypto-
graphic Security.
(d) They shall familiarize themselves with the duties of Communication
Watch Officers to the end that they may stand Communication Watch Officer
watches when required.
(e) All Coding Board Officers shall assist Fleet Security Officer in the correc-
tion, custody, preparation, and care of registered and classified matter.
(f) The Coding Board of the Fleet Flagship is required to perform Flag Coding
Board functions, as directed.
220. Fleet Engineer and Maintenance Officer — 50.
(a) Docking and overhaul schedules.
(b) Engineering performances.
(c) Repairs, preservation and alterations of ships of the Fleet.
(d) Fleet repair and docking facilities.
(e) Tests and upkeep of material.
(f) Design, construction, and operation of machinery and governing in-
instructions.
(g) Orders for and reports of military and material inspections,
(h) Damage Control.
(i) Allowance lists (Bureau of Ships), requisitions and surveys,
(j) Chip's Service store activities,
(k) Training of engineering personnel.
(1) Member of Schedule Board,
(m) Fuel and provisioning schedules,
(n) Ship's characteristics cards and logistics. "
(o) Supply Department matters.
(p) Assists War Plans Officer in preparation of War Plans,
(q) Makes recommendations on design of new ships (Bureau of Ships
cognizance).
(r) Degaussing.
221. Fleet Medical Officer— 75.
(a) Keeps himself informed by inspections, and advises Commander-in-Chief of
the sanitary conditions of ships of the Fleet.
(b) Prepares a periodic F'leet Medical News Letter.
(c) Acts as liaison officer with civilian medical activities.
(d) Interests himself in making such provisions for medical services at bases
as may not be otherwise provided for.
(e) Customs and agricultural inspections.
(f ) Shall obtain for, or advise Units of the Fleet in the obtaining of Bills of
Health and the securing of pratique in accordance with local and foreign health
regulations.
(g) Holds periodic conferences with medical officers of the Fleet for the
814 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
purpose of standardizing practices not specially provided for by regulations and
for other purposes in the interest of increased efficiency of the medical department.
(h) Has cognizance of religious activities.
(i) Has cognizance of and advises upon Damage Control Activities within the
purview of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
222. Fleet Marine Officer— 86.
(a) General cognizance of matters concerning Marine Corps and Fleet Marine
Force.
(b) Data on organization, strength, equipment, etc., of Marine Divisions,
Defense Battalions, and Detachments.
(c) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with the following:
(1) Plans for amphibious operations.
(2) Seizure, establishment, and defense of advance bases.
(3) Demolition and related operations.
(4) Logistic data (Marines and Army).
(5) Review of Marine Corps subordinate plans.
223. Fleet Gunnery Officer— 90.
(a) Supervises gunnery, training, gunnery exercises, and the care and upkeep
of the armament of the Fleet.
(b) Keeps informed of the efficiency in gunnery and the condition of the
armament of the Fleet.
(c) Advises in regard to tactical maneuvers for obtaining advantageous range
bands, greatest fire effect, and dispositions for the best use of the armament.
(d) Prepares outlines of schedules of gunnery exercises for the Fleet and
advises concerning detailed schedules prepared by Force Commanders.
(e) Supervises small arms training and exercises of the Fleet.
(f ) Consults with Aviation Officer in connection with aircraft and antiaircraft
gunnery.
(g) In charge of the following matters, consulting with Operations Officer
regarding tactical aspects : " ,
(1) Mining and sweeping exercises and material.
(2) Torpedoes and torpedo practices.
(3) Smoke screens, both offensive and defensive.
(4) Chemical warfare service — Material and training of personnel. (In
collaboration with Fleet Maintenance Officer).
(h) Supervises courses of study in Ordnance and Gunnery technical schools of
the Fleet.
(i) Assists War Plans Officer in preparation of War Plans and in matters of
liaison with Army.
(j) Reviews military and material inspection reports.
(k) Consults with Fleet Maintenance Officer on Damage Control.
(1) Exercises particular supervision over recommendations for changes to
"Orders for Gunnery Exercises," "Gunnei-y Instructions" and other ordnance,
gunnery and fire control publications.
(m) Makes recommendations on designs of news ships (Bureau of Ordnance
cognizance.
(n) Member of Schedule Board.
(o) Advises on gunnery features of tactical plans and publications.
(p) With 86 has cognizance of matters involving landing forces.
(q) Handles matters affecting training, assignments, rating, and qualifications
of gunnery personnel (consults with 96).
224. Fleet Aviation Officer— 95.
(a) Advises with reference to:
(1) All aircraft operations and aviation matters including those pertaining
to policy with respect to :
(A) Material.
(B) Personnel.
(C) Gunnery arid Bombing.
(D) Radio.
(2) Aircraft Operations, and aviation shore facilities.
(3) Coordination of aviation activities of the Fleet.
(4) Employment of aircraft in tactical exercises, analysis and reports
thereon.
(5) The development of aircraft tactics, gunnery and doctrine.
(6) Naval air operating policy.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 815
(b) Assists War Plans Officer in the preparation of War Plans.
(c) Keeps informed as to the effectiveness of aircraft units of the Fleet.
(d) Assists Operation Officer in the preparation of Fleet Schedules dealing with
aircraft and aircraft services.
(e) Consults v?ith Gunnery Officer in connection with aircraft and anti-aircraft
gunnery. Handles Aircraft Gunnery Reports.
(f) Member of Schedule Board.
(g) Has cognizance of, keeps informed of aircraft material matters.
225. Fleet Aerological and Personnel Office?- — 96.
(a) In charge of the aerological office and keeps the Commander-in-Chief and
members of his staff advised of weather conditions as concerns the planning and
executions of Fleet Operations. Assists War Plans Officer.
(b) Advises with reference to the establishment of new aerological units in
matters concerning :
(1) Equipment.
(2) Personnel.
(3) Weather information required.
(c) Coordinates aerological activities in the Fleet, including:
(1) Collection and dissemination of weather reports.
(2) Weather forecasts and advisory storm warnings.
(3) Aerological research.
(d) Exercises supervision over the training and instruction of aerological
personnel.
(e) Prepares such weather summaries as are required in connection with
orders for Fleet Problems and Tactics.
(f) Consults with Gunnery Officer in connection with atmospheric ballistic
information pertaining to gunnery.
(g) Advises with reference to exchange of weather information between the
Fleet and the U. S. Weather Bureau or other activities maintaining meteorologi-
cal facilities.
(h) In charge of all matters relating to :
(1) Orders for officers and enlisted i)ersonnel.
(2) Naval Reserve Officers on active duty.
(3) Transportation in ships of the Fleet.
(4) Congressional mail regarding personnel matters.
(5) Action on leave requests for all officers and preparation of endorse-
ments for signature of Admiral, Chief of Staff and Flag Secretary, depend-
ing upon the rank of officer requesting leave.
(6) Examinations and promotions.
(7) Navy Relief and Red Cross.
(i) In charge of entertainment and welfare of enlisted personnel.
(j) Shore Patrol.
(k) Liberty for the Fleet.
226. Staff Duty Officer— IJ,.
(a) Such Officers as may be designated by the Chief of Staff shall stand a
day's duty in port and a watch on the Flag Bridge at sea when a watch is
established.
(b) The officer having the day's duty shall :
(1) Receive routine reports.
(2) Act on routine matters.
(3) Act as necessary on matters when the officer having cognizance and
his relief are absent, informing officers concerned of action taken as soon as
possible.
(4) Attend the side when the Flag Lieutenant is not available. The pro-
cedure for tending the side is laid down in Section X of these Staff instruc-
tions.
(5) Regulate movements of Admiral's Barge, Chief of Staff's Gig, and
Staff boats in absence of Mag Lieutenant or outside of working hours. The
Officer-of-the-Deck will keep the Staff Duty Officer and Flag Lieutenant
informed of the movements of the Admiral's Barge, Chief of Staff's Gig,
and Staff Duty boats.
(6) Keep informed as to Staff Officers on board or absent from the ship.
(7) In the absence of the Flag Lieutenant see that boarding calls on visit-
ing men of war are made by an officer from Fleet flagship.
816 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(8) Receive aerological forecasts from the Aerologist and when bad
weather is forecast transmit the necessary information to the ships present.
(9) Initial all dispatches, taking action if necessary when action officer is
not on board.
(10) See that the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff are kept in-
formed of all important matters, and particularly that they are informed
promptly upon their return to the sliip of all important matters that occur
during their absence ; and similarly keep the Operations Officer informed of
all ship movements observed by the signal watch.
(11) Examine all mail received during the absence of the Flag Secretary
or his regularly designated relief, and decide what action if any shall be
taken.
(c) Day's duty will begin at 0900, except Sundays and holidays when it will
begin at 1100. The sequence will be uninterrupted by the fact that the ship may
be at sea when regular watches are set. »
(d) The duties of the Staff Duty Officer assume particular importance when,
in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff, or other members of
the staff, he is called upon to make decisions in cases of emergency, or on matters
which cannot be delayed for reference to higher authority or to the officers having
cognizance. This fact makes it imperative that all officers standing duty keep
themselves informed as to existing situations, the policies of the Commander-in-
Chief and the usual and proper manner of taking action on all matters which
may arise.
(e) In important emergency cases the Staff Duty Officer will take such action
as may be necessary. lastructions should be obtained by the most expeditious
manner of communication with the Chief of Staff and, failing to locate him, with
the Commander-in-Chief. The Operations Officer should, if practicable, be fully
informed of the situation.
(f ) When civilians or officials, other than personal friends of the Commander-
in-Chief or officials whose status is a matter of doubt, come on board the flagship
to confer with the Commander-in-Chief, he shall first present them to the Chief
of Staff, Flag Lieutenant, or in their absence, to the Operations Officer.
(g) Should an emergency arise necessitating action involving the Fleet Relief
Force, the Staff Duty Officer will carry out the following :
(1) Notify the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff and Operations Officer.
(2) Send staff boats to landing, keeping one at ship as may be advisable.
(3) Land field radio and signalmen if BASRAD is out of commission.
(h) Assignment of Berths. Requests for berths are received occasionally by
the Staff Duty Officer for immediate action during the absence of the Operations
Officers. To assist the Staff Duty Officer in assigning berths, an anchorage chart
is kept in the Oi)erations Office, together with a copy of current instructions.
See also the Commander-in-Chief's current letter in regard to anchorage assign-
ments.
(i) In the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, or Chief of Staff, he shall take
steps to correct any defects in external Fleet routine which would constitute an
adverse i-eflection on the Fleet.
(j) Leave— Relief for Day's Dutij. (1) The Day's Duty list for Staff Duty
Officers is prepared on the basis that the sequence will not be interrupted by the
fact that the ship may be at sea. Nor is it to be interrupted by absence on, duty,
illness or leave.
(2) Staff Duty Officers are "Relief Officers" in inverse order of seniority. A
Relief Duty List is posted in the Staff Duty Book. When an officer stands a
relief duty watch, he will inform the senior watch officer. The next officer on
the list then becomes the "Relief Duty Officer."
(3) For extended periods of leave, greater than 10 days the Relief Duty Officer
will take the duty for the officer scheduled for the Day's Duty. For shorter
periods of leave, officers are expected to arrange for their own reliefs by agreeable
shifts with other Staff Duty Officers. In every case, inform the Senior Staff
Duty Officer of the arrangements made.
SEA WATCHES
(k) An officer of the Staff shall be on the bridge at all times when the Fleet
flagship is imderway in company with vessels of the Fleet acting as a unit.
(1) He is the representative of the Commander-in-Chief on the bridge and bears
the same relation to him that the Officer-of-the-Deck bears to the Captain of the
ship. He shall keep himself informed of the location of all units and ships in
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 817
whatever disposition or formation tlie Fleet is at tlie time ; whatever land or lights
are in sight ; \Vhether either are likely to be seen ; and of all other particulars
which may be of use to the Commander-in-Chief in keeping the ships of the forma-
tion out of danger.
(1) In case of emergency, when neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the Chief
of Staff is on the bridge, he shall make such signals as are required by the circum-
stances, reporting his action immediately to the Commander-in-Cliief, the Chief
of Staft and the Operations Officer. ACT FIRST, REPORT AFTERWARDS.
Under all other conditions the formation shall not be maneuvered without the
authority of the Commander-in-Chief or the Chief of Staff. Furthermore, under
these latter conditions, the Staff Duty Officer shall report the circumstances to
the Operations Officer. Also, he shall call the Flag Lieutenant and Operations
Officer to the bridge at once if immediate action is required — otherwise those
officers shall be informed of the time when their presence on the flag bridge will
be required and the reasons therefor.
(m) He shall promptly report to the Commander-in-Chief, through the Chief
of Staff, all land, shoals, rocks, lighthouses, beacons, buoys, discolored water, ves-
sels, or wrecks sighted ; all changes of weather or shifts of wind ; all signals
made; all changes in speed, formation, disposition, or course; in general, all
occurrences worthy of notice.
(n) He shall handle all dispatches which in port are routed to the Officer
having the day's Staff duty.
(o) When the Flag Lieutenant is on the Bridge he will handle all tactical
signals, relieving the Staff Duty Officer of this function of his usual duties.
(p) Record of events. — ^A Record of Events during the watch will be kept by
the Staff Officer on watch assisted by a duty yeoman. This record will include
items of importance, movements, major and minor contacts with the enemy, aerial
and submarine activity, weather information, etc. The Record of Events
will be typed in quadruplicate, signed by the Officer on watch and handled as
follows: Original to be placed in a file folder in Flag Plot. (This folder will be
kept in Flag Plot until the completion of the exercise, when it shall be turned over
to the file yeoman by the yeoman securing the watch) . At 0800 each day the three
copies of the Record of Ev,ents covering the watches of the preceding 24 hours
shall be turned over to the Flag Office for the following distribution : one copy
to the Admiral, one copy to the Chief of Staff, and one copy to the Operations
Officer. )
(q) When necessary to make a signal to change course or speed to avoid a vessel
or unit having the right of way, make such changes great enough, and execute
the signal soon enough to leave no doubt in the minds of the other officers of the
deck as to your intentions. Avoid crossing ahead of vessels or units having the
right of way.
(r) When fog closes in :
(1) Order bridge radios manned if not already in effect.
(2) Order fog buoys streamed.
(3) Order fog searchlights manned.
(4) Comply with Fleet Communication letter — 2RLr-41 summarized briefly
as follows :
(a) Take soundings at short intervals to ensure safety of the forma-
tion.
(b) Designate a ship to: At least half-hourly or oftener; obtain
bearings froip shore radio direction finder stations, and radio
bearings of ships in company.
(c) Plot all bearings and soundings on a chart. This ensures safety.
(d) Establish a transmitting and receiving watch, (on distress fre-
quency).
(e) Provided Radio, restrictions so permit broadcast in plain language
followed by International Code : visibility conditions, names of
ships in compai^y, position, and time of origin OCT. If other
ships reply to this safety transmission shift to 422 kcs. and ex-
change information.
227. The night order book is written by the Commander-in-Chief for guidance
of officers having night watches. Each officer having a night watch shall initial
the book after reading the orders, and before relieving the watch. The night
order book is prepared by the Fleet Navigator (12) .
228. Nothing herein is intended to contravene existing regulations or to pre-
clude taking such additional precautions as may seem desirable.
818 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Section III. Battle Stations
300. The Ctombat Organization of the Staff is covered in a separate confidential
issue of this section. It is distributed to the flagship and flag personnel only. .
Section IV. Flag Office Peesonnel and General Instructions
401. The authorized Flag Allowance of yeomen is :
Chief Yeoman 3
Yeoman 1st class , 4
Yeoman 2nd class 5
Yeoman 3rd class : 6
Total 18
Yeoman on board are assigned in general as follows:
1 Yeoman — In general charge.
1 Yeoman — ^Admiral, Chief of Staff and Flag Lieutenant.
1 Yeoman — Flag Secretary and Division Officer.
3 Yeomen — Operations and Assistant Operations Officers.
2 Yeomen — War Plans Officers.
2 Yeomen — Communication, Radio, and Comm. Security Officers.
1 Yeoman — Intelligence Officer.
1 Yeoman — Aviation Officer.
1 Yeoman — Gunnery Officer.
1 Yeoman — Engineer and Maintenance Officer.
1 Yeoman — Aerological Officer.
1 Yeoman — Files and Correspondence Classification.
1 Yeoman — Outgoing Mail Desk.
1 Yeoman — Communication Office.
These assignments will be augmented by yeoman strikers. Yeoman
strikers will also be assigned to other Flag Office details, such as incoming
mail, File Section, Tracer desk, etc.
402. Assignment of yeomen will necessarily depend largely on their individual
aptitude for certain duties, and their availability. One Pharmacist's Mate
is included in the Flag Allowance and is assigned to the Fleet Medical Officer.
One Marine Sergeant Major is assigned to the Marine Officer.
403. Whenever an officer finds that he requires additional clerical assistance,
he will apply to the Flag Secretary. Additional clerical assistance can in this
way be secured with a minimum of delay and without interfering with the
routine of the office.
404. The Chief Yeoman in charge has general supervision of the Flag Office
and personnel under the Flag Secretary, who is in direct charge of the offices
of the Commander-in-Chief. The Chief Yeoman in Charge is responsible for
the cleanliness of the offices and storerooms, for the carrying out of the office
instructions, for the conduct and proper performance of duty by the enlisted
personnel and for regulating watch lists, liberty and leave in accordance with
existing instructions and orders. He will supervise the drawing of office sup-
plies against the flag allotment, issuing of stationery, etc., and exercise care
that expenditures are kept within requirements.
405. Routine Duty, (a) Routine hours of duty in flag offices and print shop
are as follows :
Daily 0800 to 1600
Half Holidays 0800 to 1130
(b) Handling of work outside regular office hours. Routine work outside
of regular office hours will be handled by the yeoman of the officer desiring
such work done, when that yeoman is on board, otherwise by the duty section.
There is always a duty printer on board who sleeps in the print shop.
(c) No uncompleted work shall be stowed away in office desk drawers, but
shall be kept above the desks in labeled baskets or envelopes, and available
to the staff officers concerned, or to the duty section, if required.
406. Eamdling of mail upon arrival in port. The taking up and distribution
of mail upon arrival in port will, without exception, be an "all hands" job.
All yeomen will prepare routing sheets and assist in clearing up all mail re-
ceived. No liberty will be granted on arrival in port until such mail has been
received, routed and distributed to the cabinets of the officers concerned.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 819
407. Liberty and Lewve. (a) Liberty and leave for the flag ofl3ce personnel
will be regulated to conform, as closely as work will permit, to that of the
flagship. Subject to the approval of the officers for whom the yeomen work,
after routine working hours, or Saturdays after 1130, Wednesday afternoons,
Sundays and holidays, will be considered routine liberty periods. Liberty cards
are issued under the supervision of the Division Officer for all flag personnel.
(b) All requests for other than regular liberty shall first be referred to the
officer for whom the yeoman works, the Flag Division Officer and to the Chief
Yeoman in Charge for designation of relief if required, then to the Flag Secre-
tary for approval or disapproval. If the request is one for leave and is approved
by the Flag Secretary as Head of Department, it will then be sent to the Execu-
tive Officer for issuance of formal leave papers.
40S. Cleanliness of Offices, (a) The cleanliness of flag offices and storerooms
will be under the supervision of the Chief Yeoman in Charge. Each yeoman
will be required to keep his own desk neat and clean, as well as the desk
of the officer for whom he works. Offices will be cleaned daily, prior to 0800,
and a field day shall be held between 1200 and 1300 each Friday.
(b) Flag offices, shops, storerooms and other spaces will be included in the
commanding officer's inspection of adjacent ship spaces. Personnel in charge
of offices, shops, storerooms and other flag spaces shall have their spaces open
and ready and shall stand by for inspection at the times designated in the daily
schedule issued by the flagship. Yeomen shall have the drawers of their desks
neatly stowed and ready for removal should they be directed to do so by the
inspecting officers.
409. FlG}g Office Duty Section, (a) The Flag Office personnel will be divided
into duty sections of not less than three men, one of whom shall be a com-
petent stenographer. Duty changes at 0900 daily, Sundays excepted. The Duty
Section will function in the Flag Office during the following hours:
Daily 0730 to 0815
1130 to 1300
1600 to 2200
Half Holidays 0730 to 0815
1130 to 2200
Whole Holidays 0730 to 2200
(b) The duty section will handle all emergency work outside of regular work-
ing hours and if the Outgoing Mail Yeoman is not on board, will mail all signed
outgoing correspondence. The entire duty section will remain in the flag offices
during the hours specified in subparagraph (a) except:
(1) Only one rated man need remain in the flag office during mealtimes.
(2) When the press of work permits and when in the discretion of the senior
duty yeoman their services are not immediately required, members of the duty
section may be allowed to attend the evening movies on deck, subject to call ;
however, one rated member of the duty section shall remain in the flag office
during the authorized absence of the rest to attend the movies. From time
to time, if the Staff Duty Officer grants permission to do so, the offices may be
locked and keys turned over to him, during movies, smokers, etc.
(3) When the Flag is based temporarily ashore, the Duty Section will maintain
a continuous one-man security watch in the Flag Office during the following
hours :
Daily 1600 to 0800
Half-holidays 1200 to 0800
Holidays 0800 to 08GO
This watch will be armed, the primary duty of which is to prevent
unauthorized persons from entering the Fleet War Plans Offices and all
other Flag Offices of the Commander-in-Chief. This Security Watch will
normally be sufficient to remain in the Flag Office after working hours.
The entire Duty Section is available for call by the Staff Duty Officer at
any time.
(c) Handling of mail and correspondence. Before going on liberty the incom-
ing and outgoing mail yeomen will inform the senior duty yeoman of any special
instructions, who in turn will inform his section. Special instructions may be : —
To watch for special correspondence exi)ected in the incoming mail — to see that
certain U. S. or guard mail is dispatched. File numbers will not be entered on
incoming mail by the duty section unless the correspondence is of an urgent
79716 — 46 — ^Ex. 149, vol. 2 11
820 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
nature, in which case a file number will be entered on the routing sheet and
file yeoman notified when he returns from liberty. Incoming correspondence
shall be made ready for the examination of the Staff Duty Ofiicer with minimum
delay and report shall be made to him that it is ready for his examination. On
hoard ship, immediately after the end of working hours, the duty section shall
gather up all confidential and other important correspondence from the Staff
Officers' rooms and retain such correspondence in the Flag Ofiice overnight, dis-
tributing it immediately after 08(00 the following working day. In offices ashore,
immediately after the end of working hours, the duty section shall gather up all
confidential correspondence from the desks of the Staff officers and deposit it in
the locked cabinet provided for this purpose. Just prior to 0800 the next working
day, the correspondence shall be returned to the respective officers' desks.
(d) Security of Flag Offices. The duty section will stand watch in the main
flag office. The offices will be secured promptly at 2200 and keys turned over to
the Flag Secretary, if on board, otherwise to the Staff Duty Officer. If, for any
urgent reason, it is desired to keep offices open after 220O, permission should be
requested from the Staff Duty Ofiicer. Flag offices shall never be left unguarded.
Outside regular working hours a constant check should be kept on the Staff
offices, operations office, and file room to see that it is either occupied by staff
personnel, or looked. If it is necessary for everyone to leave flag offices on duty,
the last person to leave will lock offices and take keys with him, posting a note
on main flag office door as to who has keys. Offices should be reopened as soon as
possible.
(e) Visitors to flag offices. No general visitors will be permitted. Other than
flag personnel admitted by senior duty yeoman, only officers and men on duty, or-
persons accompanied by staff duty officer, will be permitted in the flag offices out-
side of working hours.
(f) Waste paper baskets in Cabins and Staterooms. Waste paper baskets in
Admiral's Cabin, Chief of Staff''s Cabin and Staff officers' staterooms will be
emptied and the contents burned, or stowed in flag office pending burning, at the
following times :
Regular working days 1500
Half and Whole Holidays 1115
410. Security of Classified Matter. All personnel of the staff of the Com-
mander-in-Chief whose duties require handling of classified matter, shall acquaint
themselves with the Navy Regulations and other instructions pertaining to the
security of classified matter.
(a) Offices, Print Shop, Mnltilith Shop, Flag Plot Officers' Staterooms. Flag
personnel are responsible that classified matter under staff routing, or in spaces
in which flag activities are paramount, is constantly attended. Attended, as
employed herein, signifies that the matter is receiving care while being used, or
that it is under surveillance with respect to possible pilferage or perusal by un-
authorized persons, or that it is under lock.
(b) Trash and waste. Will be removed from flag activities and burned at
times specified in subparagraph 409 (f). Should the incinerator be secured, or
out of commission, such rubbish will be returned to flag oflices, flag plot, print or
multilith shops for retention awaiting suitable opportunity for its burning. The
Senior Duty Yeoman will personally supervise collection and burning as set out
in 409 (f ). However, during routine hours of duty (see Article 405), this may be
done by a rated yeoman designated by the Chief Yeoman in Charge.
(c) Keys. The key to the flag storerooms, the keys to the flag offices and
mimeograph shop, and duplicate keys to the print shop and multilith shop are
in the custody of the Flag Secretary. The Chief Printer and the Duty Printer
will each retain a key to the print shop, and the Multilith Printer will retain a
key to the multilith shop. Keys to the Flag Office files will be in the custody
of the Flag Secretary, Gunnery Yeoman, File Yeoman, or Duty Yeoman. At the
end of working hours, whenever classified matter is being produced in the print
shop or multilith shop, the keys to the print shop galley racks and stowage
locker will be placed in the main flag office key locker. During office hours the
key to the flag offices will be in the main flag office. When offices are secured
for the night, the keys to confidential files will be placed in the main flag ofiice
key locker and the keys to the flag offices turned over to the Flag Secretary, if on
board, otherwise to the Staff Duty Officer. Except as herein specified, personnel
are forbidden to have duplicate keys to flag offices and print shop spaces in their
possession.
(d) Files, Lockers, Storerooms. Access to the flag storeroom by other than
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 821
regularly authorized personnel may be had upon application to the Flag Secre-
tary. In all cases when a confidential file jacket is to be removed from the flag
offices, a receipt will be required from the recipient.
(e) Nonconfidential file jackets should be obtained from the File Yeoman or
in his absence from the duty yeoman. If the file jacket is to be removed from
the flag office, a receipt will be signed by the recipient.
(f ) Classified matter may be removed from the Print Shop only at the instance
of the officer for whom the work is being done, or an officer of the Staff. Classi-
fied matter will not be allowed to remain in the multilith shop overnight, but
will be stowed under lock in the print shop stowage locker.
Section V. Handling of Coebespondence
501. (a) Incoming Mail, is delivered to the Incoming Mail Desk.
(b) Upon receipt of Registered U. S. Mail in the Main Flag Office, it shall be
taken immediately to the Secret Mail Officer or the Chief Yeoman designated as
Secret Mail Yeoman. In their absence the mail shall be taken to the Duty Com-
munication Watch Officer who shall open it and extract the envelopes marked
"SECRET". A receipt for the envelopes so retained shall, in all cases, be ob-
tained on the "Incoming Registered Guard Mail Log". The envelopes marked
"CONFIDENTIAL" .shall be returned to the Flag Duty Yeoman. All "SECRET"
mail received by the C. W. O. shall be logged in the book provided for that purpose,
and then taken to the Staff Duty Officer who shall open it in order to determine
its urgency. If the Staff Duty Officer retains any of the Secret Mail his receipt
therefor shall be obtained. All Secret Mail shall be delivered to the Secret Mail
Officer at the first opportunity.
(c) Incoming personal mail for the Commander-in-Chief will be delivered to
his orderly and placed on his desk. If Admiral is not on board, it will be placed
in the routing cabinet in the Flag Office and will be delivered upon the Admiral's
return to the ship.
(d) Incoming personal mail for other staff officers will be delivered by a Flag
Office messenger immediately upon its receipt in the Flag Office. In the absence
of any Staff Officer his personal mail will be placed in the routing cabinet in the
Flag Office and delivered to him upon his return to the ship.
502. Urgent Correspondence. When URGENT correspondence is received on
board, routing sheets shall be prepared immediately, an URGENT tag securely
attached to and visible on the routing sheet, and correspondence delivered by
hand to the Flag Secretary, or in his absence, to the Staff Duty Officer. Such
correspondence shall be shown to Action Officer and a copy delivered to him if
desired, prior to routing to other officers. If a copy is delivered to Action Officer,
a notation of this fact will be made on routing sheet. If file yeomen are not on
duty or in the office when URGENT mail is received, such mail shall be assigned
a file number by the Duty Yeoman and handled as indicated above. No corre-
spondence, or other papers, shall be kept visible as the top paper on the corre-
spondence. If correspondence or other papers are of an urgent nature and no
URGENT tag accompanies it, the officer concerned shall indicate to this yeoman
that the matter is urgent and the latter shall then attach an URGENT tag.
503. Routine Correspondence.
(a) Incoming Mail Yeoman. Opens all incoming mail immediately upon its
receipt, except U. S. registered mail, which is handled in accordance with sub-
paragraph 501 (b), above. (See Section VI for method of handling registered
U. S. mail by receiving officers.)
Logs the envelope number and descriptive data of all correspondence received
via registered guard mail and U. S. Mail.
Carefully checks all incoming mail to insure that it is complete and the listed
enclosures are attached, or in case enclosures have been forwarded under sepa-
rate cover keeps a memorandum check-off record of such enclosures so that they
can be readily identified and properly distributed upon receipt.
I'asses correspondence to File Yeoman and then, after File Yeoman has assigned
office file numbers, prepares routing slips for all matter received except certain
routine reports designated by the Flag Secretary, and MAILGRAMS. MAIL-
GJRAMS received by registered mail are logged and then sent to the Flag Com-
munication office without being taken up on routing slips.
After routing slips have been typed, detaches memorandum routing slip and
delivers mail to Chief Mail Yeoman in Charge. From data shown on the retained
memorandum routing slips, maintains the Incoming Mail Log in loose-leaf form.
822 CONGRESSIOISI AL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This log shall be a permanent record of all correspondence received and will
show:
Date of receipt.
OflBce of origin.
File and serial number of office of origin.
Date of correspondence.
Subject.
Cincus file number of jacket in which permanently filed.
Serial number of routing slip on which correspondence has been taken up.
(b) File Yeoman. Assigns file numbers. (See Article 505.)
(c) Chief Yeoman in Charge. Routes correspondence.
(d) Flag Secretary. Confirms routing of correspondence, or changes routing
where required.
(e) Tracer Yeoman. Removes routed correspondence from the outgoing bas-
ket of the Flag Secretary, detaches duplicate routing sheet, stamps date of
delivery to first ofiicer indicated in order of routing and delivers the correspond-
ence, (except URGENT — see Article 502), through routing cabinet to officers
concerned in accordance with the assigned order of routing.
Files duplicate routing sheet as a tracer against outstanding correspondence in
the office.
(f ) Yeoman Concerned. Takes cognizance of and removes all correspondence
from routing boxes of officers for whom he works and delivers to officers as
directed.
When the officer for whom he works is absent, he will return the correspond-
ence checked to that officer for Information, to the Tracer Yeoman, to be checked
to the next officer in the order of routing, and deliver Acti'bn correspondence to
the assigned relief officer.
(g) Officer Concerned. In general, papers will pass from one officer to another
via Tracer Yeoman as indicated on the routing sheet.
Correspondence requiring action will be routed first, if the Flag Secretary
deems it necessary, to the Action Officer, the latter being responsible that other
interested officers are consulted before letter or endorsement is prepared.
Correspondence routed for information should not be placed in the routing
cabinet for an officer temporarily absent until it has been noted by all other officers
checked for information.
Ordinarily, when necessary data is available, action should be completed on
correspondence within forty-eight hours after receipt.
Any officer desiring to hold correspondence, in order to compile data, reports,
etc., should return the correspondence to the files and draw it from the files when
needed.
A list will be furnished each officer on Tuesday showing all correspondence
which the records of the Flag Office indicate has been in his possession since the
preceding Tuesday. Officers indicated as being charged with the correspondence
should check this list and mark in the column provided the items which they
have in their possession.
(h) Yeoman Concerned. Prepares outgoing letter or endorsement as directed
(See Article 504).
Keeps outgoing basket of officer for whom he works empty — delivering routed
correspondence on which action is required or taken to Tracer Yeoman.
Insures that officer concerned has initialed in the space provided on the rout-
ing sheet and that notation is made when action is taken by a method other
than a letter or endorsement.
(i) Tracer Yeoman. Delivers through the routing cabinet, correspondence
on which routing is incomplete.
Scrutinizes all correspondence on which routing is complete to see that no
correspondence requiring action goes to file and that officers concerned have
initialed in the space provided on the routing sheet.
The correspondence to be finally cleared by the Tracer Yeoman falls into
three classes :
(1) Incoming letters on which no action is required, or on which dispatch
action was taken and so noted on the original routing slip.
(2) Incoming letters which were endorsed or are the basis for additional
correspondence.
(3) Letters originated by the Commander-in-Chief with no incoming corre-
Bpondence attached.
When correspondence described by (1) above has completed its routing the
!rracer Yeoman will destroy his duplicate routing slip, initial in the space pro-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 823
vided on the original routing slip under "Tracer," and pass this correspondence
to the File Yeoman, However, if there is a cross file, the duplicate routing slip
shall not be destroyed but will be attached to the correspondence for filing.
When correspondence described by (2) above has completed its routing the
Tracer Yeoman will destroy his duplicate routing slip (unless it has a cross file
number) initial in the upper right-hand corner of the file copy of the Com-
mander-in-Chief's action, and on the original routing slip, and pass this corre-
spondence to the File Yeoman.
504. Outgoing Mail.
(a) General . — ^Dates and serial numbers will be stamped by the Outgoing
Mail Yeoman after the letter is actually signed. The original sheet of corre-
spondence of a personal nature shall not bear a file or serial number. The
originator's yeoman shall address envelopes for this class of correspondence.
The use of staples in fastening correspondence should be limited to printed
or mimeographed letters of two or more pages. Staples shall then be used in
the upper left hand corner.
Letterhead paper shall be used for the original sheet and all copies of corre-
spondence.
(b) Corresiwndence for signature shall be prepared and assembled as follows:
(1) Sheets shall be arranged in numerical order from bottom to top, i. e.,
page one on the bottom, last page or endorsement on top. Enclosures to the
entire correspondence shall be in alphabetical sequence, fastened directly behind
the letter or endorsement to which it is an enclosure and securely fastened by
brass fasteners, with ends turned over the face of the sheet. When enclosures
are too bulky to be attached, then a separate slip with notation should indicate
that the enclosures have been temporarily retained by the originator.
(2) In preparing endorsements, reference should be made to the basic corre-
spondence as prescribed by Fleet Regulations.
(3) In preparing a letter, the original shall : Indicate the distribution,
acknowledgement (if desired), signature, and obtain file number from file yeo-
man or, in the case of a reply, assign same file number as has been placed on
the routing sheet of the incoming letter plus the originator's symbol number.
Ascertain that there is a :
(A) Green file copy (pinned on top of a complete copy of the Incoming
correspondence with the routing sheet on the bottom. )
(B) Yellow information copy. The day following the mailing of corre-
spondence, information copies shall be bound and routed to all oflicers.
After completion of routing, these copies shall be destroyed.
(0) Pink Copy. This is retained by the tracer yeoman until the corre-
spondence is signed, after which it is sent to the outgoing mail desk and
subsequently returned to the originator bearing the date and serial number.
(4) The original and all copies shall show in the upper right-hand corner the
initials of the yeoman typing the letter and the originator's symbol number
immediately following the file number.
(5) Correspondence shall be clipped together with paper clips in the following
order: Original and copies for information addresses; file copy (green) ; infor-
mation copy (yellow) ; pink copy. The green copy shall extend at least an inch
to the right side of the correspondence to permit the initials of the originator
(indicated by red diagonal mark) as well as other interested officers (indicated
by pencil diagonal mark).
(c) Correspondence to be printed. Four copies shall be typed, original on
green paper, copy on white bond for the printer, one yellow information copy
and one pink copy. The word ''PRINT" shall be typed on the left side of the
last page, opposite the signature, and immediately over the word "DISTRIBU-
TION." When the green copy (original) has been signed, it will pass through
the outgoing mail desk to be numbered and dated, and for the preparation of a
printing order.
(d) Correspondence to he mimeographed. In order to reduce the amount of
typing required for letters that will be mimeographed, the yeoman doing the typing
will insert a green sheet provided for this purpose under the stencil when cutting
the latter. When this impression copy has been signed by the Admiral or Chief
of Staff, the Flag Secretary affixes his authentication, using a stencil stylus,
and the stencil and impression copy are then delivered to the Outgoing Mail
Yeoman for entry of date and serial number, mimeographing, (done by the
Mimeograph Yeoman), and ultimate mailing. (Article 504 (j) (10)).
(e) Multiple Address Letters. Multiple address letters are those addressed
to more than one office. The original of the multiple address letter shall be
824 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
made on green paper, and one onion skin copy stiall be made for each addressee.
Thiese onion skin copies shall be checked off by the yeoman preparing the corre-
spondence, an arrow check being placed immediately after the office addressed.
All action copies of multiple address letters shall be authenticated by the Flag
Secretary. The original (green), arranged in the manner prescribed in Art.
504 (b) (5), will be signed by the Commander-in-Chief or Chief of Staff and is
kept as the file copy.
(f ) When a letter is required to be rewritten, the pink copy shall be removed
from the file on the tracer desk and all copies of the letter as originally pre-
pared shall be immediately destroyed except the one copy on which corrections
have been indicated. This copy shall be attached to the pink copy of the letter
as rewritten and will be returned with the pink copy to the yeoman of the officer
taking action. With the exception of recommendations on a subject made by
various staff officers, these instructions shall also apply to rough drafts of let-
ters or endorsements. Copies of letters on which corrections have been made
and rough drafts of letters or endorsements shall not be filed in the correspond-
ence files unless retention in the file is indicated.
(g) Letters that have not been signed should be returned to the tracer yeo-
man in order that the latter may inform the originator accordingly, meanwhile
returning to him the pink copy.
(h) When correspondence is signed by other than the Commander-in-Chief,
the following words shall be typed immediately below the name of the officer
signing :
Signed by Signatubh Typewritten
Chief of Staff — name
Chief of Staff
Operations Officer when Chief — name
of Staff is absent Acting Chief of Staff
Flag Secretary or Flag Lleur — name name
tenant (Authentication of Flag Secretary Flag Lieutenant
multiple address letters). (or Acting Flag Secretary)
Flog Secretary or Flag Lieu- — ■ name
tenant (for single address by direction
letters).
(i) When information addressees are directed to take action by copy of
letters or endorsements, such copy shall be authenticated by the Flag Secretary.
(j) When correspondence is ready for signature the following procedure shall
be followed:
(1) Deliver to Tracer Yeoman.
(2) Tracer Yeoman. Uses the pink copy for tracing correspondence circulat-
ing through the staff for initialing. When correspondence is initialed by all
officers except Flag Secretary and Chief of Staff, delivers to Chief Yeoman in
Charge.
(3) Chief Yeoman in Charge. Checks correspondence to see that it is com-
plete and in agreement with regulations, policies and current instructions.
(4) Flag Secretary. Checks correspondence to see that it is complete and
that it is in agreement with regulations, policies and current instructions.
Brings to the attention of officers concerned any conflicting or inconsistent
orders or instructions.
Authenticates all multiple address letters, and copies of letters or endorse-
ments directing action. Signs single address letters.
Releases printed and mimeographed letters for mailing.
(5) Tracer Yeoman. Removes correspondence from the outgoing basket of
Flag Secretary. *
Delivers correspondence signed "By direction" to the Outgoing Mail Yeoman,
attaching pink.
Places unsigned correspondence in the Chief of Staff's box in the routing
cabinet and indicates by notation on pink copy date and time that it has been
placed in Chief of Staff's box in the routing cabinet for signature or initialing.
(6) Chief of Staff's Orderly or Yeoman. Removes correspondence from Chief
of Staff's box in the routing cabinet, and delivers to Chief of Staff for initials
or signature.
Removes correspondence from outgoing basket of Chief of Staff and delivers
to Tracer Desk.
(7) Tracer Yeoman. When correspondence is initialed by Chief of Staff,
places it in Commander-in-Chief's box in the routing cabinet, indicating by
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 825
notation on pink copy date and time that it has been placed on Commander-in-
Chief's box for signature. Delivers mail signed by the Chief of Staff to the
Outgoing Mail Yeoman, attaching pinks.
(8) Flag Secretary. Removes correspondence from the Commander-in-Chief's
box in the routing cabinet. Sees that all correspondence is initialed by Chief
of Staff and delivers to the Commander-in-Chief for signature.
(9) Tracer Yeoman. When correspondence has been signed by the Com-
mander-in-Chief removes pink copies from tracer file, and attaches same to the
letters to which they belong; delivers them to Outgoing Mail Yeoman.
Makes daily check on pink copies vphere letters are outstanding.
(10) Outgoing Mail Yeoman. Insures that correspondence is complete; en-
closures, if any, attached; properly arranged (See Art. 504 (b) ) ; initialed by
Flag Secretary ; signed ; that there are sufficient copies for all action and infor-
mation addressees ; that each copy of CONFIDENTIAL correspondence is so
marked ; that information and pink copies have been prepared where necessary.
Returns correspondence which is found to be delinquent in any of the above
respects to the Chief Yeoman in Charge for corrective action.
Stamps serial number (except on personal letters) and date on original and
all copies ; stamps date of mailing on file information and pink copies, and
initials file copy.
Provides for the registry of all records of proceedings of Naval Courts and
Boards, all SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL correspondence and other corre-
spondence as directed. Maintains a record of all registry numbers and records
the serial file number or other description of the correspondence for which each
register number is used. '
Is responsible for the correct addressing of envelopes for all mail passing
over the Outgoing Mail Desk and for its being placed in the mail properly
protected to insure its delivery free from damage by normal handling. In
connection with the former, he shall keep himself informed of the location and
prospective movements of all ships and transfers of all Flags.
Requests instructions from Flag Secretary regarding mailing of multiple
addressed letters, operation orders, plans, etc., to Commanders who are absent
when several of the vessels under their command are present with the
Commander-in-Chief.
Under the direction of Flag Secretary determines the distribtuion and number
of copies necessary to be printed or mimeographed using "U. S. Fleet Mail
Distribution Lists" or such other distribution as may be assigned. Prepares
Distribution Memorandum on Printing Orders.
Prepares Printing Order and forwards with White copy of the letter to be
printed to print shop. The print shop shall send the Printing Order with each
proof to the yeoman designated to proof-read it. This yeoman shall initial in
the space provided for each proof and when correct in all respects and con-
sidered ready for printing the yeoman shall refer the final proof and the
printing order to the originating ofiicer, who shall, if he approves for printing,
initial on the Printing Order in the space "Read and found correct". The Flag
Secretary will release all letters for printing and distribution. The green (file
copy) is held by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman until the letter is printed and
mailed, when it is given to the Tracer Yeoman for necessary action. Yellow
and pink copies, are handled in the same manner as for other outgoing corre-
spondence. The date sent to the print shop, instead of the date of mailing
will appear on the file copy. When distribution is made and entered in the
outgoing mail log, a printed copy with original "Printing Order" securely
attached thereto, shall be sent to file.
Note : The Mimeograph Yeoman will mimeograph the required number of
copies shown on the Distribution Memorandum.
A copy of each mimeographed letter originating in the office of the Com-
mander-in-Chief will be marked "INFORMATION COPY", and will be handled
in the same manner as other "Information" copies.
When the Distribution Memorandum is released for mailing by the Flag Secre-
tary, the Outgoing Mail Yeoman mails the printed or mimeographed letter and
furnishes the Tracer Yeoman with the necessary copies for a Staff Distribution ;
stamps date of mailing and initials on the Distribution Memorandum ; sends file
copy to the Tracer Yeoman with the Distribution Memorandum securely attached
thereto.
Assigns and maintains a record of serial numbers, in their proper numerical
sequence, of Operation Plans, Operation Orders, U. S. and Pacific Fleet Letters,
Memoranda, Notices, etc.
826 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Insures that when required, URGENT tags are securely attached to the cor-
respondence, and to the outside envelope. (See Article 502).
Removes any SPECIAL NOTICE tags before mailing.
Handles all guard mail, incoming and outgoing, and will promptly inform Flag
Secretary of any variation from the scheduled trips called for by Fleet Regula-
tions. Logs registered number, originator and addressee of all incoming regis-
tered guard mail. Delivers incoming mail to Incoming mail Yeoman, and has
outgoing mail ready for Guard Mail Petty Officers at the designated times. When
the ship is at the Navy Yard, is responsible that necessary guard mail trips are
made to the Commandant's Office.
lAt the end of each day, checks numerical sequence and enters in the outgoing
mail log, loose leaf form, all correspondence mailed that day. This log shall be a
permanent record of correspondence mailed and will show:
(1) Serial number of letter.
( 2 ) Cincpac file number of jacket in which filed.
(3) To whom sent.
(4) Date of letter,
(5) Subject.
The above data shall also be entered for all mimeographed and printed letters
dated and serialled that day, even though they are not mailed on that day. A note
"Mailed on " shall be made in "Subject" column of log and the date of
mailing inserted on the date the mimeographed or printed letter is mailed.
Confidential and Secret correspondence will be so designated in the log and,
in the case of secret correspondence, the subject will not be entered.
When correspondence has been entered in the log, gives file copies to Tracer
Yeoman, pink copies to the yeoman of the officer taking action as indicated by the
officer's number (not the initials of the yeoman) .
Arranges yellow information copies in numerical sequence and prepares routing
sheets next morning and delivers to Chief Yeoman in Charge.
(11) Tracer Yeoman. Takes appropriate action being governed by the pre-
ceding provisions of this Article.
(12) File Yeoman. Handles correspondence as directed in Article 506-1.
505. FILE NUMBERS. The file yeoman will assign file numbers to all cor-
respondence. If the File Yeoman is not on duty or in the office when URGENT
mail is received, such mail shall be handled as directed in Article 502. In assign-
ing file numbers to correspondence, the File Yeoman shall use the U. S. Navy Filing
Manual as the basis for filing arrangement. Correct file numbers are essential
in order to locate correspondence readily. A new jacket shall be prepared for
each new number so assigned.
506. In addition to the standard file numbers assigned to outgoing correspond-
ence, the originator's symbol number and a serial number wiU be used. The
originator's symbol number shall be placed after the file number and enclosed
in parenthesis. The serial number will appear after the word "Serial" and will
not be in parenthesis. New serial numbers will be started on each January 1st,
and will run throughout the calendar year. The first figure of all CONFI-
DENTIAL serial numbers shall be a "0".
506-1. The File Yeoman shall:
Scrutinize correspondence to see that none goes to file unless complete action
has been taken; that routing sheet has been initialed by all officers and the
Tracer Yeoman and that original routing sheet is attached to correspondence.
Prepare correspondence for file, retain spare copies in the spare copy file
when action is so indicated on routing sheet.
File correspondence. CONFIDENTIAL correspondence must actually be
placed in the jackets by the File Yeoman himself. He may utilize his assistants
for filing correspondence of a lower classification.
Check off, in colored pencil, all entries in the incoming and outgoing mail
logs to see that all mail received and originated has been checked to file. Undue
delays shall be reported after check has been made with the Tracer Yeoman.
Keep an up-to-date Index of the files.
Cooperate with the Tracer Yeoman in preparing the Weekly List of Outstanding
Correspondence.
507. Where correspondence treats of more than one subject, it shall be filed
under the principal subject, and cross-index tracers prepared and filed under
the other subjects treated or referred to. Cross-index tracers shall be printed
on white paper.
508. Yeomen preparing correspondence shall type the file number appearing
on the routing sheet, the symbol number of the originator in parenthesis and
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 827
the word "Serial" below the file number after which the serial number will be
entered by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman.
509. FILING OF PRINTED MATTER. Fleet Letters, Memoranda, Notices,
etc., must be kept in an unbroken serial titled "file for ready reference" in addi-
tion to being placed in the subject file jacket. Care must be taken to make cross-
index files complete and to make sure that signed copy is filed.
None of the above matter will be removed from the files merely because it has
been cancelled or superseded, but a notation to this effect shall be made on the
file copy showing reference numbers of the dispatch or letter cancelling and
superseding it. Extra copies held for issue will, however be destroyed. When-
ever the number of spare copies of a particular publication is low, or a request
for spare copies is large, the requests will be referred to the Flag Secretary.
Normally requests from ships should be handled by Type commanders.
510. WEEKLY CHECK OF OUTSTANDING CORRESPONDENCE. On Tues-
days of each week a sight check will be made by the Tracer Yeoman of all
outstanding correspondence that records indicate has been in the possession of an
oflScer since the preceding Tuesday, and a list prepared for each such oflicer
showing correspondence thus outstanding. The duplicate routing sheet will be
used as a "tickler" tracer for checking outstanding letters in the office. A nota-
tion will be made on the outstanding correspondence sheet showing the date
the check was made and the officer who acknowledges having each piece of
correspondence in his possession on that date.
511. If, after making a thorough canvass of the offices, no trace can be found
of a letter that has not moved in its routing from one officer to another within
the past week, the outstanding correspondence sheet will be delivered to the
Flag Secretary with a report of the search.
512. Lists of outstanding correspondence checked to the Admiral and Chief of
Staff will be delivered to the Flag Secretary,
Seotion VI. — Confidential and Seobet Coreespondence
601. Confidential mail shall be handled in accordance with Article 410 and the
following :
( a ) All correspondence classified as CONFIDENTIAL wUl have the word "CON-
FIDENTIAL" stamped and typed, or printed in the upper left-hand corner, under
file number, of each sheet.
(b) All routing sheets for confidential correspondence shall be printed on blue
paper and are plainly marked "CONFIDENTIAL".
(c) All confidential correspondence will be filed in separate filing cases known
as "the CONFIDENTIAL files".
(d) All confidential correspondence placed in U. S. or Guard Mail will be placed
in double envelopes with the inner envelope stamped "CONFIDENTIAL". Con-
fidential correspondence forwarded by U. S. Mail or Guard Mail must be registered.
602. SECRET correspondence shall be handled in accordance with the following
instructions :
(a) Stoicage and Handling. (1) SECRET correspondence files shall be kept
in a safe under the immediate supervision of the Secret Mail Officer ; except corre-
spondence regarding War Plans which may be retained by the War Plans Officer,
and that concerning Communication Intelligence which may be retained by the
Fleet Security Officer.
(2) The yeomen assigned to the War Plans Officer and the Secret Mail Yeoman
are authorized to handle secret correspondence. Secret correspondence shall not
be typed or handled by any enlisted personnel other than the yeoman who have
been so authorized. Secret correspondence must not be permitted to pass out of
the personal custody of staff officers at any time.
(b) Incoming Mail. (1) The Secret Mail Officer, or in his absence, his au-
thorized relief, the duty communication officer, will receive all incoming Officer
Messenger Mail, and show same to the Flag Secretary or in the latter's absence
to the Staff Duty Officer.
(2) Incoming mail marked SECRET will be handled by the Secret Mail Officer
subject to instructions by the Flag Secretary.
(3) The Secret Mail Yeoman, under the supervision of the Secret Mail Officer,
shall log all incoming SECRET correspondence, attach secret routing slips, and
deliver to the Flag Secretary for routing.
(4) The Secret Mail Officer or the Secret Mail Yeoman shall deliver the SECRET
correspondence to the staff officers concerned. Receipts shall be obtained for all
828 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET correspondence left in the custody of officers. Officers not having au-
thorized secret stowage shall not retain correspondence overnight.
(c) Outgoing Mail. (1) An officer desiring to originate a SECRET letter
shall prepare a rough draft in long hand or dictate the letter to a yeoman au-
thorized to handle secret correspondence. The letter shall be typed and delivered
by personnel authorized to handle secret documents to staff officers concerned for
initialling and signature.
(2) The file copy of outgoing secret correspondence prepared by the War Plans
Officer may be retained in his files. In such cases a copy of the letter shall be
delivered to the Secret Mail Officer for filing in the secret correspondence files.
(3) SECRET correspondence will be forwarded in accordance with Article
76(4), U. S. Navy Regulations.
(4) Outgoing SECRET mail will be marked with an identification number of
five figures preceded by CINCPAC or CINCUS as appropriate. Franked cards
bearing a return receipt shall be enclosed with each letter and will indicate the
identity of the letter by both the serial and shipment numbers.
Section VII. Libraries
701. Every effort will be made to maintain an office library of official publica-
tions required for reference by members of the Staff. Officers are requested to
advise the Flag Secretary of publications they desire to have ordered.
The office library consists of various books and pamphlets such as : — ^Annual
Reports, Regulations, Bureau Manuals, Registers, Directories and miscellaneous
publications. The library will be added to as publications are received from time
to time. Any publications carried in the library which have become obsolete
will be submitted to the Flag Secretary, who will issue the necessary instructions
as to their disposition.
Each publication is listed and assigned a serial number, and filed according to
that number.
The File Yeoman will be responsible for the proper classification and filing of
the library.
702. The Commander-in-Chief's Library is maintained under the supervision
of the Fleet Public Relations Officer. It consists principally of non-fiction although
some works of fiction may be included. The books are kept in book cases in the
Admiral's and guest cabins and elsewhere as necessary. The Fleet Public Rela-
tions Officer will publish to the staff a list of books on hand and lists of additions
as received. All members of the staff are invited to make use of the facilities
afforded by this library. It is desired to augment and improve the Commander-
in-Chief's library. To this end suggestions as to books which should be obtained
are requested from all members of the Staff. Keys to the bookcase of the Com-
mander-in-Chief's Library will be kept in the key locker in the flag office.
Section VIII. Rapid Communications of Commander-in-Chief, United States
Paoifo Fleet
part a GENERAL
801. Drafting of Despatches, (a) In order that the Commander-in-Chief may
set an example of propriety in drafting of despatches, all officers of the Staff
will familiarize themselves with the provisions of Communication Instructions
relative to that subject. Communication watch and coding board officers should
bring to the attention of originating officers all violations of these instructions
and recommend necessary corrections. In no case will a change in a despatch
be made without the consent of the originating officer.
(b) An officer originating a non-classified or restricted despatch will have the
message typed by his own yeoman, or duty seaman. After it has been initialed
by the originating officer it will be delivered to the communication watch officer
who will obtain the initials of the information and releasing officers and super-
vise the transmission of the despatch.
(c) An officer originating a classified despatch will write or type the message
on an outgoing classified despatch blank. After initialing by the originating
officer it will be delivered to the communication watch officer who will obtain
initials of the information and releasing officers, have the despatch encrypted
and supervise its transmission.
(d) All despatches will normally be released only by the Admiral or Chief of
Staff. In case of emergencies or special circumstances, despatches may be re-
leased by other members of the Staff.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 829
(e) An officer desiring to have a message passed to supplementary addresses
for action or information will inform the communication watch officer who will
prepare the necessary despatch or procedure signal and obtain initials of
originating, information and releasing officers.
802. Security of Communications, (a) Visual methods or landline will be used
for transmission of despatches whenever practicable. The use of radio for trans-
mission of administrative despatches shall ie kept at a minimum.
(b) If a delay in the delivery of a despatch is acceptable, such message should
be sent by despatch mail (mailgram). Mail grams should be used particularly
for transmission of despatches to information addresses when it is desirable
that their radio calln do not appear in the heading of the radio despatch.
803. Distribution of Despatches, (a) Copies of all outgoing and incoming non-
classified and restricted administrative despatches are provided for the Admiral,
Chief of Staff, Operations Officer, Staff Duty Officer, Flag Secretary and Com-
munication Officer. Outgoing despatch books also contain a copy for the originat-
ing officer. Incoming despatch books also contain an action copy and two in-
formation copies which are available to any member of the Staff who may
request such copies from the communication orderly. The Communication
Officer's copies of despatches will be placed on a file in the Staff Office where
they will be available for perusal by all members of the Staff.
(b) Only one copy of outgoing and incoming classified administrative des-
patches (other than restricted despatches) will be made. Paraphrases of
secret and confidential despatches shall be kept at a minimum and will be
furnished only at the specific request of officers, and must be returned to the
coding room for burning when no longer needed. Paraphrases of secret messages
will be furnished only to the action or originating officer, and shall be receipted
for in the same manner as registered publications.
(c) Only four copies of the translations of tactical despatches will be made
for distribution to appropriate boards.
804. Routing and Delivery of Despatches. (Internal) (a) Correct and com-
plete routing of despatches is a function of the communication watch officer.
(b) The Staff Duty Officer should see all despatches when the action officer
is not on board. In such cases instructions will be requested by the orderly from
the Staff Duty Officer as to whether the latter wil accept responsibility for the
message or whether it should be held for the action officer.
(c) Whoever initials the message for the action officer and accepts the action
copy assumes full responsibility for taking the required action and for informing
the designated action officer of the action taken.
805. Movement Reports, (a) The movement report sheets and cards will be
corrected and maintained by communication personnel under the supervision
of the communication watch officer designated as Movement Report Officer.
(b) Movement reports of the flag plane will be originated by the pilot making
the flight and will be prepared and released by the flagship.
806. Fleet Coding Board, (a) The fleet coding board will consist of four
officers of the Staff and five officers detailed by the Commanding Officer of the
Fleet Flagship.
(b) The fleet coding board will be charged with encrypting and decrypting
messages sent or received by the Commander-in-Chief or the Fleet flagship, as
directed by the Fleet Communication Officer.
(c) The Communication Security Officer will be responsible for the organiza-
tion and training of the fleet coding board.
807. Shutting Down Transmitters. Except in ca«e of emergency, permission
for securing transmitters must be obtained from the Fleet Communication Officer.
PABT B — ^INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMUNICATION PERSONNEL
808. Administrative Communication Organization, (a) The following stations
will normally be manned :
(1) Main radio room ;
(2) Signal bridge;
(3) Main communication station;
(4) Flag communication office;
(5) Coding room.
(b) The communication watch will normally consist of:
(1) Communication Watch Officer
(2) Coding Board Officer
(3) Communication Supervisor
830 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(4) Communication Yeoman
(5) Communication Orderly
(6) Radio Supervisor
(7) Signal Supervisor
(8) Radio Operators
(9) Signalmen
(c) The communication watch oflicer will stand a day's duty, relieving the
watch at 0800. He will inform his relief regarding unfinished business, effective
organization, frequency plan in effect, circuits up, visual signalling conditions,
and all pertinent information necessary for the proper conduct of his duties.
(d) The coding board oflBcer will stand a day's duty, relieving the watch at
0800. He will inform his relief regarding unfinished business and all pertinent
information necessary for the proper conduct of his duties.
(e) Relief Communication Watch Officers. The first and second relief com-
munication watch officers will maintain a continuous watch in the Flag Com-
munication Office during working hours. The second relief communication
watch officer will stand watch for 0800 until after lunch. The first relief com-
munication officer will stand watch from after lunch until 1530, at which time
he will be relieved by the communication watch officer with the day's duty. Other
relief communication watch officers are available for duty when the traffic
situation requires.
(f ) The first and second relief coding board officers will maintain a continuous
watch in the Coding Room during working hours. The watches will correspond
to those stood by relief communication watch officers. Other relief coding
board officers are available for duty when the traffic situation requires.
(g) Communication Supervisor. The communication supervisor will stand a
day's duty under the administrative organization in the Main Communication
Station. He will act as an assistant to the communication watch officer. The
time of relieving and hours on watch will be the same as those prescribed for
the communication watch officer. The watches for the communication super-
visors will be arranged by the Senior Chief Radioman and will be approved by
the Assistant Communication Officer.
(h) The radio and signal supervisors shall maintain continuous watches in
the Main Radio Room ,and Signal Bridge respectively. The watches for
supervisors will be arranged by the leading radio and signal chief petty officers
and will be approved by the flagship's Radio and Signal Officers, respectively.
(i) Communication Yoeman. Communication yoemen will maintain a con-
tinuous watch in the Flag Communication Office. The watches will be arranged
by the Senior Communication Yoeman and approved by the Assistant Com-
munication Officer.
(j) The flagship will provide sufficient communication orderlies to permit a
continuous watch in the Flag Communication Office. When the flagship is
underway a continuous watch will also be maintained on the Flag Bridge.
Orders for the communication orderlies will be promulgated by the Assistant
Communication Officer.
(k) Watches prescribed In the preceding articles will not be exchanged without
permission of the officers concerned.
809. Tactical Communication Organization, (a) The following Stations will
normally be manned :
(1) Main Radio Room;
(2) Signal Bridge
(3) Main Communication Station ;
(4) Flag Communication Office
(5) Flag Bridge Radio Station;
(6) Flag Bridge Communication Office;
(7) Coding Room.
(b) The communication watch normally consists of:
(1) Communication watch officer;
(2) Coding board officer;
(3) Two communication yoemen;
(4) Two communication orderlies;
(5) Communication Supervisor;
(6) Radio Supervisor ;
(7) Signal Supervisor;
(8) Radio Operators ;
(9) Signalmen;
(10 Additional members of coding board as necessary.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 831
(c) Communication watch offices shall maintain a continuous watch in the
Flag Bridge Communication Office. Off-watch communication watch officers are
available for handling administrative traffic and coding duties as the situation
requires.
(d) Coding Board Officers shall maintain a continuous watch in the Coding
Eoom. Off-watch coding board officers are available for coding duties as the
situation requires.
(e) The Chief Radiomen assigned to the Flag Allowance shall maintain a
day's duty watch in the Main Communication Station, and a continuous watch
as radio supervisor in the Flag Bridge Radio Station. This watch list may be
augmented by qualified first class radiomen as required.
(f ) The radio and signal supervisors shall maintain a continuous watch in the
Main Radio Room and Signal Bridge.
(g) Communication yoemen shall maintain continuous watches in the Flag
Bridge Communication Office and the Flag Communication Office.
(h) The flagship will provide sufficient communication orderlies to permit
continuous watches in the Flag Communication Office and on the Flag Bridge.
810. Duties of Communication Watch Offlcer. (a) The communication watch
officer is in direct charge of the communications of the Commander-in-Chief.
(b) The communication watch officer is responsible for the efficiency of the
communication watch and will require an alert and military watch of all
communication personnel.
(c) The communication watch offlcer is responsible for complete and rapid
internal distribution of despatches and for the expeditious handling of outgoing
traffic,
(d) The communication watch offlcer is responsible for the handling of en-
crypted despatches and the efficiency of the coding watch.
(e) The communication watch officer must be fully cognizant of the effective
organization of the Fleet and is responsible for setting up and maintaining the
communication channels required by the organization.
811. Duties of Coding Board Officers, (a) The coding board offlcer is in charge
of the operation of the Commander-in-Chief's coding room.
(b) The coding board officer is responsible for expeditious, accurate and
efficient encryption and decryption of despatches.
(c) The coding board officer must be fully cognizant of the rules for crypto-
graphic security and will ensure strict observance of these rules in the handling
of the encrypted traffic of the Commander-in-Chief.
(d) The coding board officer is responsible for the custody of the cryptographic
aids, publications and devices in the coding room.
812. Qualification of Communication Watch Officers and Coding Board Officers.
Upon reporting for duty communication watch officers and coding board officers
must undergo sufficient instruction to qualify taking over a watch. To be con-
sidered qualified a communication watch officer or coding board officer must :
(a) have a working knowledge of Communication Instructions, Basic Com-
munication Plan, Frequency Plans and Tactical Instructions;
(b) have a working knowledge of the call systems, the General Signal Book
and Signal Vocabulary;
(c) have a thorough knowledge of the U. S. Fleet Staff Instructions and Staff
Organization ;
(d) have a thorough knowledge of the operation of the communication plant
of the Fleet Flagship;
(e) be proficient in the use of all cryptographic systems held by the Com-
mander-in-Chief.
(f ) have a thorough knowledge of the principles and rules of communication
and ci'yptographic security and their application.
813. Routing of Despatches, (a) Full and complete routing of despatches is a
function of the communication watch officer. A despatch must be seen by every
officer having a possible interest in it. Intelligent and complete routing requires a
thorough knowledge of the Staff organization and a careful application of this
knowledge to each despatch.
(b) Copies of dispatches concerning routine reports and requests should not be
delivered to the Admiral. Such despatches will be marked "NN" and the Ad-
miral's copy will be delivered to the Assistant Communication Officer for dis-
position.
(c) Classified despatches, other than restricted, shall be routed to the Chief of
832 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Staff, Operations Officer, Communication Officer and Communication Security
Officer in addition to action or information officers. The Chief of StafE shall be
the first to see classified despatches and shall approve the routing prior to further
delivery. When the Chief of StafE is not available despatches may be shown to
the action officer prior to final approval of the routing.
(d) The flag is responsible for delivery of messages addressed to the flagship.
Copies of such messages and copies of messages which are not addresed to, but
which are of interest to the flagship, shall be delivered to the flagship communi-
cation office for internal distribution.
814. Delivery of despatches, (a) The communication watch officer will be
responsible for requiring orderlies to deliver all messages promptly between
0800 and 2230 unless otherwise directed. Between 2230 and 0700 messages will
be delivered to action and information officers when so directed by the communi-
cation watch officer. In case of doubt, messages will be delivered regardless of
the hour. Priority despatches will always be delivered to the action officer
immediately.
(b) Delivery of all traffic accumulated during the night will be completed by
0900 daily.
(c) Speed in delivery of despatches, especially those of priority precedence, is
essential and the system must not be allowed to delay action. However, it is
also essential that despatches be accurately written up. It is the responsibility
of the communication watch officer to insure that a complete and accurate copy
of all despatches is delivered to the proper officers as soon as possible.
815. Emergencies, (a) The communication watch officer should bear in mind
that speed in the delivery of a message indicating an Emergency is the primary
consideration.
(b) Make use of the telephone as well as messengers. Above all, do not let
the system delay action.
(c) Call relief watches as necessary to assist in handling the situation and
retain them on watch as long as required.
(d) Be prepared to handle any emergency at night. Before turning in leave
clear and definite instructions to be notified immediately in the case of any
unusual occurrence.
816. Encrypted Despatches, (a) If time permits, the encryption of each out-
going encrypted despatch will be checked prior to transmission by an officer other
than the one who encrypted the despatch. If time does not permit the encryption
to be checked prior to transmission it will be checked as soon as possible there-
after,
(b) All intercepted encrypted despatches will be delivered to the coding room
where they will be decrypted for information if traffic conditions permit.
817. Intercepted Traffic. Intercepted traffic of possible interest to the Com-
mander-in-Chief will be written up and distributed for information. Each copy
will be marked "Written up for Cincpac information."
818. Radio Logs. Radio logs shall be kept in accordance with Articles 1413-
1417, Communication Instructions, 1937. The communication watch officer will
examine radio logs carefully during his watch for despatches addressed to the
Commander-in-Chief, for violations of communication instructions, for inter-
cepted despatches of possible interest to the Commander-in-Chief, and to ascer-
tain that circuit discipline in being maintained.
19. Transmitting and Receiving Data. Transmitting and receiving data will
be recorded by the radio operator or signalman as indicated below :
Radio
(1) Time of Delivery or Receipt
(2) Frequency
(3) Operator's sign.
Visual
(1) Time of Delivery or Receipt
(2) System
(3) Signalman's sign.
820. Communication Files, (a) General File. The general file includes one
copy of each message transmitted or received. Service messages (except des-
patches) shall be stapled to the message to which they refer. Procedure signals
not classified as service messages and messages not bearing time groups shall
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
833
be filed according to time of receipt or delivery. Classified mailgrams (other than
restricted) shall be filed in the classified tiles and a tickler filed in the general file.
(b) Shore station Schedule Files. A copy of each message received by I or F
method shall be filed in these files. A separate file shall be maintained for each
shore station. Messages shall be filed by shore station serial numbers.
(c) Movement Report File. A copy of each notice or modification to the Ship
Movement Report Sheets shall be placed in this file.
(d) Flag Files. The flag file includes one copy of each message originated by
the Commander-in-Chief, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, or vpritten up
for information of the Commander-in-Chief. These messages shall be filed in
chronological order of time groups under the headings incoming and outgoing.
(e) AInav File. A copy of each alnav message shall be placed in this file in
order of alnav number.
(f ) Fleet File. A copy of each fleet message shall be placed in this flle in order
of fleet number.
(g) Classifled Files. Translations of classified despatches shall be placed
in these files in order of coding room serial number. Secret despatches shall be
placed in a file separate from the regular classified files.
(h) Tactical Translation Files. The tactical translation files'contain one copy
of the exact translation of each encrypted tactical despatch and one copy of each
plain language tactical despatch. Messages will be filed in chronological order
of date time groups.
821. Composition and Standard Distribution of Message Books:
(a) Outgoing Circuit
Front Cover
First copy
Second copy
Third copy
Back copy
(b) Outgoing Administrative
Fi'ont cover
First copy
Second copy
Third copy
Fourth copy
Fifth copy
Sixth copy
Seventh copy
Eighth copy
Ninth copy
Back cover
(c) Outgoing Tactical
Front cover
First copy
Second copy
Back cover
(d) Outgoing Umpire
Front cover
First copy
Back cover
(e) Incoming Circuit
Front cover
First copy
Second copy
Back copy
(f) Incoming Administrative
Front cover
* First copy
Second copy
Third copy
Fourth copy
Fifth copy
Sixth copy
Seventh copy
Eighth copy
Back cover
General File
Station File
Flag File
Originator
Ship
General File
Flag File
Originator
Admiral
Chief of Staff
Operations Officer
Flag Secretary
Staff Duty Officer
Communication Officer
Station File
Ship
Translation File
Flag Plot
Flag Plot
Coding Board
Translation File
Umpire
Coding Board
General File
Spare copy
Advance action
Check copy
Flag File
Action
Admiral
Chief of Staff
Operations Officer
Flag Secretary
Staff Duty Officer
Information
Information
Communication Officer
834 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(g) Incoming Tactical
Front cover — Translation File
First copy — Flag Plot
Second copy — Flag Plot
Back copy — Coding Board
(h) Incoming Contact Report
Front cover — Translation File
First copy — Flag Plot
Second copy — Flag Plot
Back cover — Ship
(i) Incoming Umpire —
Front cover — Translation File
First copy — Umpire
Back cover — Coding Board
Section IX. Registeeed and Otheb Sexjeei and Confidential Publications
901. The Communication Security OfBcer is responsible to the Commander-
in-Chief and to the Department for the custody of all registered publications.
902. A Communication Watch OflScer, designated as Registered Publications
Officer, is the custodian of registered and other secret and confidential p)ubli-
cations. He shall receipt to the Fleet Communication Security Officer for all
registered publications and for other important confidential, secret or restricted
documents which must be accounted for by the Commander-in-Chief.
903. All registered and other important publications shall be catalogued to
show their receipt and the safes in which they are stowed. No registered pub-
lication shall be issued except on written receipt of an authorized individual,
which receipt shall be obtained at the time of issue. Other confidential or
secret publications and important documents shall be handled in a similar
manner,
904. In accounting for registered publications when preparing quarterly returns,
each publication actually must be sighted by the officers taking the inventory.
905. Confidential and secret publications shall be kept only in authorized
stowages.
906. The Coding Board Officer on watch shall be responsible for the publi-
cations in the communication office safes. The Registered Publications Officer
shall make a weekly inventory of the contents of the communication office safes.
907. The Registered Publications Officer shall be the only person regularly
in possession of the combinations of safes containing un-issued registered
publications, except for: (a) communication office safes: (b) War plans safe;
(c) Security Officer's safe. In order that access to any safe may be had in
the absence of the regular custodian, the Registered Publications Officer shall
maintain in sealed envelopes the combinations of all safes assigned to the
Staff. These sealed envelopes shall be kept in the communication office secret
safe. Prompt report shall be made to the regular custodian of a safe whenever
the envelope containing the combination thereto is opened for any purpose.
908. The Registered Publications Officer shall change the combination of all
safes when he first receipts for the registered publications, and from time to
time thereafter; particularly subsequent to the opening of a safe by another
officer.
909. The Registered Publications Officer shall keep a record of all "shipment
memoranda" to insure receipt of all new matter. He is responsible that all
publications in his custody are corrected to date. It is desirable that members
of the staff correct their own publications ; but even though they do so, their
work shall be checked by the Registered Publications Officer, who is responsible,
for their being corrected.
910. When not actually in use, war plans shall be stowed in the safes es-
pecially provided for them. Corrections to the war plans shall be made under
the direction of the War Plans Officer. War plans shall not remain out of the
above safes overnight. The War Plans Officer shall have custody of all War
Plans in use by the War Plans Section, receipting for them to the Registered
Publication Officer.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 835
Section X. Relationship Between Flag and Ship.
A — Station keeping and maneuvering of flagship.
1001. When in formation, the flagship will normally maneuver in obedience)
to signal in the same manner as other vessels of the formation.
1002. The Commander-in-Chief will, however, as circumstances warrant, ver-
bally direct the flagship to make changes in course, speed, or jjosition.
1003. When, for any reason, the movements of thci flagship are no longer
to be directed by the flag, the Captain of the flagship will be so informed. He
will be further informed as may be practicable, of the interval during which
he is expected to act independently.
1004. When in position, the commanding ofiicer is responsible for the station
keeping, course, and speed of the flagship as circumstances dictate.
B — Honors.
1005. Responsibility for rendering proper honors lies with the flagship except
that no gun salutes shall be fired without the authority of the Commander-in-
Chief. Advance information as to honors shall be furnished by the Flag
Lieutenant or Staff Duty Officer.
O — Personnel
1006. Officers of the Staff shall be careful to preserve the unity of command
of the flagship. To this end they shall give no orders to the officer-of-the-deck
except in an emergency. Personal requests may be made to subordinate officers
of the flagship but official requests to the ship shall always be made direct
to the Captain or Executive Officer. Such requests should be headed, "The
Admiral desires you Etc."
1007. The Flag Division Officer and the Division Officers will be the Com-
munication Watch Officers or Coding Board Officers so designated.
1008. Leaver and liberty for all men assigned special duty with the flag will
be regulated by the Flag Secretary who will regulate it to conform as closely
to that of the flagship, as flag work will permit. (See Article 407(a)). The
flagship will regulate, control, and administer the following functions pertaining
to flag personnel :
(a) Reports, inspections, records and accounts, and advancements in ratings.
(b) Personal requests (via Flag Secretary).
(c) Disciplinary matters.
(d) The division parade is assigned by the flagship. The Flag Division
Officer is in charge at division parade. He reports to the Executive Officer
at quarters, the number of unauthorized absentees.
1009. The following instructions govern the routine muster or flag personnel :
(a) All flag personnel except the marines will muster at quartcirs with the
flagship.
(b) The marines assigned as flag allowance, will muster with the ship's
marine detachment.
1010. Flag Division personnel will be stationed for abandon ship drill and
will report at quarters for this drill unless excused. At fire and collision drills
and general quarters. Flag division personnel will, when men detailed by the
ship have failed to do so, secure ports, etc., in offices and other places devoted
strictly to Flag activities. The Flag division, will not go to quarters for these
drills except that radio and visual communications will actually be manned.
1011. The Flag division officer and the junior Flag division officers will conduct
bag and bedding inspections of the Flag Division. The ship will provide berthing
and messing for all personnel of the Flag Division. Flag Division personnel under
the direction and supervision of the Flag Division Officer will clean all compart-
ments dedicated exclusively to Flag use. Boat crews, under the direction of the
Flag Lieutenant, will clean the barges and staff boats ; the signal force, under
the direction of the Flag Lieutenant, will clean the Flag Signal Bridge and Flag
Conning Tower.
1012. All members of the Staff shall be assigned battle stations which will be
manned when "General Quarters" is sounded. Enlisted men of the Flag not
required for Staff Battle Stations will be assigned to ship battle stations. En-
listed men of the Flag will stand Flag condition and cruising watches, but will
not stand ship cruising watches.
1013. The Flag Lieutenant is in direct charge of the boat crews, chauffeur,
signal force, Admiral's mess attendants, boats, and automobiles (Band and
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 12
836 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.
Orchestra is assigned), and is directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief
for their appearance, training and performance. The ship is responsible for
maintenance and upkeep. The Flag Lieutenant, and, in his absence, the Staff
Duty Officer, regulates the employment of the Staff motor boats and the Chief of
Staff's barge when it is used as the Staff duty boat. He will prepare the schedules
for all staff motor boats, prescribing the routine hours for securing and the places
of securing away from the ship and will furnish information as to liberty of
boat crews, after securing, to the Flag Secretary. The Officer-of-the-Deck will
keep the Flag Lieutenant, and in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, informed of
the movements of the barges and the staff motor boats.
1014. The Commanding Officer of the Flagship shall be responsible that all
safety precautions of the barge and staff gig be made as are required by existing
regulations and instructions.
D — Routine Reports
1015. In order that the routine reports to the Commander-in-Chief may be
complete and uniform, the Commanding Officer of the flagship is requested to
promulgate the following instructions :
(a) AT ANCHOR
(1) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall make reports to Commander-in-Chief as
follows :
(a) The hours of 0800, 1200 and 2000.
(b) Ship's Movements.
(c) All marked changes in the weather. .
(d) Display of storm signals.
(e) All occurrences worthy of notice.
(2) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall report salutes fired, exchanges of official calls,
shifting of personal flags and movements of ships to the Commander-in-Chief, the
Chief of Staff, and to the Flag Lieutenant, or in the absence of the Flag Lieu-
tenant to the Staff Duty Officer.
(3) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall announce requirements for Staff attendance
at the accommodation ladder by loud speaker: "Staff Gangway". Boat gongs
shall also be sounded in number equal to the number of side boys required In
attendance; e. g., for Admiral and Vice Admiral, eight (8) gongs; for Rear
Admiral, six (6) gongs; and for Captain, four (4) gongs. The above procedure
shall be carried out by the Officer-of-the-Deck in sufficient time for the Com-
mander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, and the Flag Lieutenant, or, in his absence,
the Staff Duty Officer, to reach the Quarter Deck and properly meet visiting
officers. When the Commander-in-Chief is leaving the ship, the Officer-of-the-
Deck will notify the Flag Lieutenant, or in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer,
and the Chief of Staff, when the barge or automobile is alongside. -
(4) The signal Bridge supervisor shall report all movements of ships getting
underway, or coming to anchor, shifting of personal flags, exchange of salutes,
and any occurrences worthy of notice to the Officer-of-the-Deck.
(5) When the Admiral has retired, the Officer-of-the-Deck shall make necessary
reports to the Staff Duty Officer who will indicate what action is to be taken.
(6) During the night the Officer-of-the-Deck shall report to the Staff Duty
Officer only such movements of ships as he deems necessary. The Signal Bridge
supervisor will report to the Flag Lieutenant or to the Staff Duty Office, prior to
0800, any movements of ships occurring during the preceding night.
(b) UNDERWAY
(1) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall report to the Commander-in-Chief via the
Staff Duty Officer on watch on the Flag Bridge :
(a) The sighting of land, rocks, shoals, lighthouses, beacons, buoys, and dis-
colored water.
(b) All vessels or wrecks discovered.
(c) All marked clianges in the weather.
( d ) All occurrences worthy of notice.
If the ship is operating independently, the Officer-of-the-Deck shall make the
above listed reports direct to the Chief of Staff and officer with the day's Staff
Duty.
(2) If the Commander-in-Chief should be on the Navigating Bridge, the Officer-
of-the-Deck will make reports direct to him, reporting thereafter to the Staff
Duty Officer on watch.
(3) When underway making passage or outside the usual operating areas the
Navigator shall report the ship's position at 0800, 1200 and 2000.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 837
Hewitt Inquiey Exhibit No. 35
My
SECRET
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Cincpac file no.
A16/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 063W
Pearl Harbor, T, H., July 25, 1941.
From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.
Subject: WPPac-46.
1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet
been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect
prior to the receipt of such approval.
2. Attention is invited to the Introduction, Chapter III, article 0301 of the
Plan concerning the preparation of supporting plans by Task Force Commanders.
At the present time it is desired that the following submit supporting plans for
approval by the Commander-in-Chief:
Commanders Task Forces Two, Three, Six, Seven and Nine. (Commander
Task Force Nine may, if he desires, delegate preparation of the plan to the
Senior Officer of that type in the Hawaiian Area.)
The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers addressed may provide for
the accomplishment of such tasks as are assigned them in this 0-1 Plan by
including suitable measures in their 0-4 or other plans, rather than to prepare
separate supporting plans for this 0-1 Plan. The Commander Southeast Pacific
Force (Commander Cruiser Division Three) is required to submit the plan for
operations of that force after its detachment from the Fleet to the Chief of Naval
Operations for approval.
3. Supporting Plans as required above will be submitted for approval of the
Commander-in-Chief prior to 20 August 1941. After approval they will be
incorporated with the Fleet Plan as annexes as prescribed by the Commander-
in-Chief.
4. Further annexes prepared by the Commander-in-Chief to cover operations
to be undertaken in later phases of the war will be distributed when completed
and approved.
5. Suitable binders for this Plan will be forwarded as soon as received by this
command.
H. E. Kimmel.
H. E. Kimmel.
[i\ SECRET
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
CinCpac File
A16/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 056W.
Pearl Harbor, T. H., July 21, 1941.
From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.
Subject: WPPac-46, promulgation of.
Enclosures:
(A) Pages for WPPac-46; Reg. No. 5Jncluding list of effective pages.
(B) Receipt form in duplicate.
1. U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Navy Plan 0-1,
Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46) is promulgated herewith. Holders of Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Secret letter A16(R-5)040W of May 27, 1941 and
the tentative Operation Plan promulgated thereby, will destroy them by burning
and make report of destruction to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
2. A receipt form is enclosed to be accomplished and forwarded to the Chief
of Naval Operations (Registered Publications Section).
3. This publication will be handled and accounted for in accordance with the
instructions contained in the Navy Regulations, the System of War Planning and
the Registered Publication Manual.
4. This volume shall not be carried in aircraft, and when not in use, shall be
kept in Class "A" storage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual.
838 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
5. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY POR-
TIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY
FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED
FOR IN CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION
MANUAL.
6. SPECIAL WARNING— the contents of this publication shall be given
the nainimum dissemination compatible with thorough preparation of the sub-
ordinate plans.
P. C. Crosley, H. E. Kimmel.
P. C. Crosley,
Flag Secretary.
InJ U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan — Rainbow Five (Navy Plan 0-1,
Rainbow Five)
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES— WPPa^jie
Subject Matter
Page Number >
Change
in Effect
Promulgating letter: C
incPacfile A16/WPPac-46(16) Serial 056W
WPPac-46
1
Original
of July 21, 1941.
List of Effective Pages
ii
Table of Corrections-
Distribution List
iv
Title Page.
1
Table of Contents
2, 2a, 2b .
Parts I to V (incl.)
3-52 incl
52a-52h incl
53-56 incl
56a-56d incl
57-74 incl
Annex I.
I-l to I-ll incl
Annex II. _.
II-l to II-9 inci
AnnexIII
III-l to III-5 inci
Annex IV •_
IV-1 to IV-3 incl
^ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
[««] TABLE OF CORRECTIONS
Change No.
Date of
entry
Signature and rank of officer entering change
[iv]
DISTRIBUTION LIST
Regis-
tered
Official to Whom Issued Nos.
Chief of Naval Operations .. 1,2,3,4,5,6
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet 7,8
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet 9
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet 10,11
Commander, Task Force One (Combatfor) 12,13
Commander, Task Force Two (Comairbatfor) 14, 15
Commander, Task Force Three (Comscofor) 16,17
Commander, Battleships Battle Force 18
Commander, Battleship Division One 19
Commander, Battleship Division Two. 20
Commander, Cruisers Battle Force 22
Commander, Cruiser Division Three 23
Commander, Carrier Division One.. ... . . ... 25
Commander, Destroyers Battle Force 26
Commander, Destroyer Flotilla One 27
Commander, Minecraft Battle Force 28
Commander, Cruisers Scouting Force. 29
Commander, Cruiser Division Five 30
Commander, Cruiser Division Six 31
Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force 32
Commander, Patrol Wing Two. _ 33
Commander, Submarines Scouting Force . . . 34
Commander, Base Force _ 35,36
Commanding General, Second Marine IDivision 37
Commandant, Naval Station, Samoa 38
Commandant, Eleventh Naval District . .. .. 39
Commandant, Twelfth Naval District . ... 40
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District. 41
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District 42
Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District 43
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet is holding registered numbers 21, 24, and 44 to 60 in
reserve.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 839
SECRET
[1] U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE)
WPPac-46
[i] TABLE OF CONTENTS
Subject Page Nos. i
Introduction:
Chapter I. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) - 3
Chapter II. Format of Fleet Plans 4
Chapter III. Subordinate Plans. 1... 6
Chapter IV. Mobilization. 8
Part I. Task Organization, Assumptions, Information:
Chapter I. Task Organization 9
Chapter II. Assumptions 15
Section 1. General Assumptions _ 15
Section 2. Special Assumption 16
Chapter III. Information 17
Section 1. General Information 17
Section 2. Enemy Information 20
Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action 21
Part II. Outline of Tasks:
Chapter I. Tasks Assigned by Navy Basic Plan, — Mission.. 24
Chapter II. Tasks Formulated to Accomplish the Assigned Missions 25
Part III. Task AssignmeiU:
Chapter I. Phase 1 28
Section 1. Task Force One 28
Section 2. Task Force Two 29
Section 3. Task Force Three 30
Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) 32
Section 5. Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) 33
Section 6. Task Force Eight (Mining Force) 34
Section 7. Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) 35
Sections. Naval Coastal Frontiers 36
Section 9. Tasks Jointly Applicable 38
\ia] Chapter II. Phase lA 39
Section 1. Task Force One. 39
Section 2. Task Force Two 40
- Section 3. Task Force Three 41
Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) 42
Section 5. Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) 45
Section 6. Task Force Eight (Mining Force) 48
Section 7. Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) 49
Section 8. Naval Coastal Frontiers 50
Section 9. Tasks Jointly Applicable 51
Chapter III. Phases Succeeding Phase lA 52
Section 1. Task Force One 52
Section 2. Task Force Two 52a
Section 3. Task Force Three 62b
Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) 52c
Section 5. Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) 52d
Section 6. Task Force Eight (Mining Force) 52e
Section 7. Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) 52f
Section 8. Naval Coastal Frontiers 52g
Section 9. Tasks Jointly Applicable 52h
Chapter IV. Execution of the Plan 53
Chapter V. Initial Transfer of Units 54
Part IV. Logistics:
Chapter I. General 56
Chapter II. Transportation 56a
Chapter III. Hospitalization and Evacuation 56b
Chapter IV. Prize Crews 56c
Chapter V. Salvage..... 56d
Part V. Special Provisions:
Chapter I. Time to be Used 57
Chapter II. Communications 58
Chapter III. Location of Commander-in-Chief 59
Chapter IV. Tentative Operations Plans— Phase land lA 60
Section 1. Phase I 61
Section 2. Phase lA 68
[Sb] Annex I. Patrol and Sweeping Plan '. I-l to I-ll
Annex II. Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan.. _. II-l to II-9
Annex III. Communication Plan _.. III-l to III-5
Annex IV. Command Relationship and Coordination of Activities at Outlying Bases_ IV-1 to IV-3
* Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
840 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[S] SECRET
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE)
Introduction
chapter i. navy basic war plan (rainbow five)
0101. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) is the directive which this U. S.
PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) is designed to implement in
so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET are concerned. As the
Basic Plan is in the possession of most of the recipients of this Fleet Plan, only
particularly pertinent parts of it will be repeated herein. These parts have to do
chiefly with assumptions, concepts of enemy action, and tasks.
[4] CHAPTER II. FORMAT OF FLEET PLANS
0201. This Plan follows the standard War Plan form of WPL-8 except for small
variations made for the purpose of facilitating ready reference and quick dissemi-
nation on the outbreak of war. These, in brief, are as follows:
a. In Part I the order of presentation is:
Chapter I — Task Organization.
Chapter II — Assumptions.
Chapter III — Information.
b. In Part II are incorporated:
Chapter I — Task assigned by Basic Plan.
Chapter II — Phases; and specific tasks, arranged by phases, for accom-
plishing the assigned mission together with (in a few in-
stances) decisions as to how they will be initially carried
out.
c. In Part III the first three chapters each cover one phase. Within each of
those chapters the tasks assigned to each task force are grouped in a separate
section, except the naval coastal frontiers, which are grouped together. Perti-
nent special information and logistic instructions are placed with the tasks given
therein or they are placed in an appropriate annex of this 0-1 Plan. Where a
task requires coordinated action with other task forces, reference is simply made
to the annex which comprises the plan for such coordinated action.
d. Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter IV, Part V are tentative fleet operation plans
which, when completed by'the assignment of forces actually available at the time,
and modified to meet any change in the conditions whi^h have been visualized
in this Fleet War Plan {tj. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan — Rainbow Five), are
considered suitable, together with the annexes, for placing into eff'ect the measures
of Phase I and Phase lA of this Plan. In other words Chapter IV, Part V could
be omitted as the material therein is completely covered in the text that precedes
{5\ them. They are included, however, for the sake of clarity and in order to
have immediately available tentative fleet operation plans in the conventional
form with which all concerned are familiar.
e. Annexes I, II, etc., are plans, special plans issued by the Commander-in-
Chief for a particular purpose. They may be made effective separately if occa-
sion requires. The forces affected are indicated in the annex itself. Some of
the annexes may ultimately be only guides for promulgation of an operation order
by despatch or letter.
f. Supporting plans of subordinate commanders, which are prescribed in the
next chapter, are to be appended as lettered annexes.
[6] CHAPTER in. SUBORDINATE PLANS
0301. Subordinate plans to support this Fleet Operating Plan will be prepared
as follows:
a. The Commanders of the forces designated in the Task Organization in
Chapter I, Part I of this Plan, will prepare supporting plans for each assigned
task, the accomplishment of which would be facilitated by further planning.
b. These supporting plans will be, as closely as practicable, in the standard
form of operation plans, and will be incorporated as annexes to this Fleet Operat-
ing Plan. Where the nature of the tasks lends itself to such procedure, the plan
for their accomplishment may be in the form of a single annex. Where such is
not the case, as where tasks are assigned in one or more of the Commander-in-
Chief's annexes, several plans may be required.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 841
c. Letter designations for annexes are assigned to each commander as listed
below. The first annex to be prepared will be designated as "Letter-1", the
second as "Letter-2", etc. It should be noted that if the nature of a task as-
signed at present does not require the preparation of a subordinate plan by a
commander, the annex assigned him below will be vacant.
Task Force One A-1, etc.
Task Force Two B-l) "
Task Force Three C-l] "
Aircraft Scouting Force D-l', "
Submarines Scouting Force E-1,' "
Minecraft Battle Force F-l' "
Base Force G-l, "
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier H-l' "
Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier ' J-l/ "
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier K-l, "
d. In the subordinate plans, forces should, in general, be listed in the task
organization by organizations and approximate numbers of types rather than
by name, unless it is known that specific units will be available.
e. If a commander considers it desirable to disseminate the considerations
which have governed his decision and task assignments, he should append a
brief and sum- [7] marized estimate of the situation as an addendum to
his plan. Auxiliary directives such as communication plans should also be ap-
pended as addenda to the task force commander's plan.
f. If the execution of the subordinate plans would be facilitated by still further
preliminary planning, task force commanders should require their group com-
manders to submit plans for the accomplishment of the tasks assigned them in
the task force commander's plans. These will be designated as addenda, but
will not be incorporated with this Fleet Plan. They need be submitted only to
the task force commander for acceptance,
g. If appropriate, each subsidiary plan will include in an addendum, the logistic
requirements for carrying out the plan in so far as they can be foreseen. Such
addenda may or may not be incorporated in the Fleet Plan, but, in every case,
copies will be supplied to Commander Base Force.
h. The plans must be predicated upon realities and must provide for maximum
possible utilization of forces presently available. Unless absolutely necessary,
plans should not be based upon either conceptions or material not reasonably
attainable. When material, equipment or personnel, not immediately available,
is necessary for the successful execution of the measures to be undertaken, this
shall be made the subject of an addendum. The commander concerned shall take
immediate action to remedy the deficiencies, forwarding necessary correspondence
through the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Thereafter the Commander-
in-Chief shall be informed of corrections of these deficiencies as the}' occur.
i. Task force commanders will employ, in subdividing their forces, the decimal
system of numbering subdivisions.
j. In numbering the pages of the plans which form annexes of this Fleet Plan,
lower case letters to correspond to the letters assigned in subparagraph c above
will be used. Thus the first page of the plan of Commander Task Force One
will be "a-1".
[8] CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION
0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually
mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl
Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can
be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization.
To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which
hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout
the Plan as W-da}'. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated
J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day.
[9] Part I. Task Organization, Assumptions, Information
CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION
1101. The forces available to the Pacific Fleet are listed in the current Appendix
II of the Basic Plan. In addition, the Commanders of the Pacific Southern,
Pacific Northern, and Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the Commandants
842 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of the Naval Stations Guam and Samoa are considered to be oflBcers of the U. S.
Pacific Fleet, and, through them, the local defense and coastal forces are subject
to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.
1102. For planning purposes, tasks are assigned to the commanders of the
current task forces in the Fleet and to certain other commanders who are to
become task force commanders as indicated in paragraph 1107 below.
1103. As of July 1, 1941, the major task forces, their commanders, and their
broad tasks for which they are training, are as follows:
Task Force One. — for covering operations — Commander Battle Force in
command.
Task Force Two. — for reconnaissance in force and raiding operations — Com-
mander Aircraft Battle Force in command.
Task Force Three. — for landing attack operations — Commander Scouting
Force in command.
1104. The subdivision of the Fleet which is made in paragraph 1107 below is
designed to provide a flexible overall task organization from which may be drawn
the task forces to accomplish the operations which can be visualized at this time.
It must be realized that, for most operations, certain units must be transferred
between task forces, some will be absent in the navy yard or for other reasons,
and, in some cases, two or more task forces will be merged under the command of
the senior oflBcer concerned. Also many of the tasks assigned to a task force in
this plan do not require the employment of the whole task force. In such cases
the task force commander will utilize such units of his force as are required to
accomplish the assigned task.
[10] CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION
1105. It is not expected that the Task Organization as shown below will be
efi"ective throughout the campaign. Rather it will be the basis for making up
particular task organizations for the various operations that may be required.
It will be the specific plans and orders in effect at any given time which will show
the task organizations at that time.
1106. Units assigned to a task force or to a task group in the normal organiza-
tion that are subsequently assigned to another task force or task group will
thereafter continue as an integral part of the last organization to which assigned
until released by the commander thereof. The commanders mentioned will
release such units as promptly as the situation at the time permits when the
period of assignment to their commands has terminated or when further reassign-
ment is made by competent authority.
[11] 1107. The Normal Task Organization for this Plan is as follows:
1. TASK FORCE ONE Commander Battle Force
Batdivs 2, 4 6 BB
SARATOGA 1 CV
Crudivs 3, 9 5 CL
Desflot 1 less Desrons 5, 9 4 OCL#
2 DL
16 DD#
2 AD
(Wncludfts Southeast Pacific Force of 2 OCL and 4 DD.)
2. TASK FORCE TWO Commander Aircraft Battle Force
Batdiv 1 3 BB
Cardiv 2 less YORKTOWN 1 CV
Crudiv 5 1 4 CA#
Desflot 2 less Desrons 4, 8 and Desdiv 50 1 OCL
8 DD
2 AD
(#lncludes Atlantic Reenforcement of 4 CA.)
3. TASK FORCE THREE Commander Scouting Force
Crudivs 4, 6 8 CA
Cardiv 1 less SARATOGA 1 CV
Desrons 4, 5 2 DL
16 DD
Minron 3, less Mindivs 5, 6 5 DM
Available Transports Base Force — AP
— APD
2d Marine Div less Defense Batt.
2d Marine Air Group.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 843
[12] 4. TASK FORCE NINE (Patrol Plane Force) Commander Aircraft
Scouting Force
All units of Aircraft Scouting Force 107 VP
2 AV
2 AVP
4 AVD
Utility Squadron from Base Force _ 10 VJR
5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (Undersea Force) Commander Submarines Scouting
Force
All units of Submarines Scouting Force except Sound School. _ 30 SS
2 OSS
1 SM
1 ODD
3 AS
2 ASR
1 AM
6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (Mining Force) Commander Minecraft Battle
Force
All units of Minecraft Battle Force 1 CM
8 DM
7. TASK FORCE SIX (Logistic & Control Force) Commander Base Force
All units of Base Force except AP, APD and Minron 3 less 8 DMS
Divs 5 and 6 and 10 VJ. 4 AF
6 AT
1 AH
13 AO
2 AR
1 ARD
2 AK
2 AE
1 AKS
10 AM
4 AG
Utility
Wing
[13] 8. TASK FORCE FOUR (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) Com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Local defense forces.
9. TASK FORCE FIVE (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) Com-
mandant, Twelfth Naval District.
Coastal and local defense forces.
10. TASK FORCE TEN (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) Com-
mandant, Thirteenth Naval District.
Local defense forces.
[14] 1108. The Southeast Pacific Force and the Atlantic Reenforcement,
composed as indicated above, will operate under the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Pacific Fleet until specifically detached by the Chief of Naval Operations. They
will not, however, be sent to* such distances from Pearl Harbor as would prevent
their arrival in the Canal Zone twenty-one days after their transfer is ordered.
[IS] Chapter II. Assumptions
Section 1. General Assumptions
1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:
a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the
British Commonwealth, (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Govern-
ments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers,
comprising either:
1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.
Note. As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia,
and the latter may be tentatively considered as an aUy against that part of
the Axis but not necessarily against Japan.
b. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility
of their intervention must be taken into account,
c. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive
844 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
elements, but will remain in a non-belligerent status unless subject to direct
attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will
be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.
d. That the principal military effort of the Associated Powers will be in the
Atlantic and European Areas, and that operations in other areas will be so con-
ducted as to facilitate that effort. Therefore, transfer of units from the Pacific
Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet is provided for in the Navy Basic Plan, and additional
transfers may become necessary.
e. That the Asiatic Fleet will not be reinforced by the Pacific Fleet, but that
eventually, if Japan enters the war, heavy British reenforcements will be made
in the Far East.
[16] Section 2. Special Assumption
1221. That the Pacific Fleet is virtually mobilized and is based at Pearl Harbor,
but regular navy yard overhauls are in progress which would reduce forces
immediately available by about one-fifth.
[17] CHAPTER III. INFORMATION
Section 1. General Information
1311. a. The Pacific Area, which is under the command of the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, is that part of the area of the Pacific Ocean:
1. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.
2. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.
3. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American
Coast and Longitude 74° West.
4. Less waters in which Canada may assume strategic direction of military
forces.
b. In addition, the United States will afford support to British Naval Forces
in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.
c. The Southeast Pacific Sub- Area, when established^ wUl be that part of the
Pacific Area south of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier and between the West
Coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West.
d. The Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone
extending from the northern boundary of California to the southern boundary of
Mexico.
e. The Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone of
the Northwestern United States north of the northern boundary of California,
and, in addition, Alaska.
f . The Pacific sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal
zone defined to be within a broken line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala
boundary to a point in Latitude 5° South, Longitude 95° West and thence to the
Peru-Ecuador border, and to include the sea routes near the southern and western
borders of that zone.
[18] g. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu, and all the
land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to
a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and
Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.
h. The Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude
30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east
to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on
the south coast, thence westward 'to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East,
thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence
north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.
i. In the Far East Area, responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval
forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the
defense of the Philippines will be assumed by the British Naval Commander-in-
Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be
responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of
the Philippines.
j. The Australia and New Zealand Area comprises the Australian and New
Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the equator.
The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, is responsible for the strategic
direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in this Area.
1312. The foregoing delineation of principal areas and the agreements as to
cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth are con-
tained in the Report of United States-British StafiF Conversations (ABC-1).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 845
Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22) is now in the process of
preparation. Similar agreements with the Netherlands East Indies are being
made.
[19] 1313. The following principles of command will obtain:
a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the United
Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsi-
bility of their own Power.
b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting
the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations
into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.
c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic
direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their
type, be emploj^ed as task forces charged with the execution of specific strategic
tasks. These task forces will operate under their own commanders and will
not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power.
Only exceptional military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension
of the normal strategic tasks.
d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised
by that oflBcer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of
time in grade.
e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate
under United States Naval command, and will remain an integral part of United
States Naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their
operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.
1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth^in ABC-1 is as foUows:
Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis
Powers, it would stiU be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their
forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does
enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defen-. [20]
sive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military
strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet
offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power,
and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese
strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its
forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Common-
wealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.
Section 2. Enemy Information
1321. Information of the enemy will be disseminated prior to and on the exe-
cution of this Plan, by means of intelligence reports.
1322. Information which is of special interest with respect to a specific task
is included with that task in Part III or in the Annexes.
[21] Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action
1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be
limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional
pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.
1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:
a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia
(including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.
b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American
and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean,
and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.
c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.
d. The principal defensive efforts to be:
1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.
2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central
and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced
bases.
3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.
1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is beUeved that Japan's initial action
wiU be toward:
a. Capture of Guam.
b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and
the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced
bases, and by the [22] destruction of United States and aUied air and
naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.
c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
846 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline- Marianas
area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light
naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.
e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval
forces.
f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying
United States positions.
1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:
a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong
concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines,
and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.
b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position
(possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the
Mandates.
c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main
base in Halmahera).
d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces
in that area.
e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the
Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.
f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and sub-
marines in the Hawaiian Area.
[S3] g. Obsolete and weaker units on patrol of coastal areas and focal areas
of lines of communication.
h. Merchant ships in neutral ports or proceeding home via detours wide of
usual routes.
[S4] Part II. Outline of Tasks
CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN — MISSION
2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks
within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:
a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting
enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture
of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications
and positions;
b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall
Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;
c. Destroy axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading
directly or indirectly with the enemy;
d. Support British naval forces in the'area south of the equator as far west as
longitude 155" east; "^"'^^ -^ p..
e. Defend Samoa in category "D"; W W^ w'-f^<^-^ *• ^ p'^'
f . Defend Guam in category " F" ; '^ b» ^ -^ -. u„ « ^ >-
g. Protect the sea communications'^of^the associated powers by escorting,
covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy
raiding forces;
h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent
the extension of enemy military power^^into the Western Hemisphere by destroying
hostile expeditions and]by supporting land and air forces Jn denying the enemy
the use of land positions in that hemisphere;
i. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces;
j. Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits^from time to time as
circumstances require;
k. Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.
[25] CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSIONS
2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based
upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks
the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption al and divides the
tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:
a. PHASE I — Initial tasks — Japan not in the war.
b. PHASE lA — Initial tasks — Japan in the war.
c. PHASE II, etc. — Succeeding tasks.
2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:
a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter main-
tain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
PEOCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 847
c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.
d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a
similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-day.
f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern
Naval Coastal Frontier on M.day.
g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by
patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups
as necessary. In so doing support the British Naval Forces south of the equator
as far west as Longitude 155° East.
h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
[S6] 2202. i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the
possible raider bases in the Japanese mandates, if authorized at the time by the
Navy Department.
j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway,
Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
k. Continue training operations as practicable.
1. Move the maximum practicable portion of second Marine Division to Hawaii
for training in landing operations.
m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.
Phase I A
2203. Phase lA tasks are as follows:
a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k. ■
b. AccompUsh such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been com-
pleted.
c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and
tenders in the northern Pacific.
d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the asso-
ciated powers, and of the naval coastal frontier forces, chiefly by covering opera-
tions.
e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.
2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids
against Japanese shipping in waters between Hansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against
Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.
g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and
outlying bases.
[27] 2203. h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, be-
tween the Hawaiian rea Aand the West Coast.
i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.
j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier
as necessary.
k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the
Second Marine Division.
1. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island Area.
Phase II and subsequent phases
2204. Tasks of Phase II and Subsequent Phases which can be formulated at
this time are:
a. Capture and establish a protected fleet anchorage in the Marshall Island
Area.
b. Capture or deny other positions in the Marshall Island Area as necessary
for further advance to the westward.
c. Raid other Japanese land objectives and sea communications.
d. Capture and establish an advanced fleet base at Truk.
6. Continue uncompleted tasks of Phase lA.
848 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[28] PA.RT III. Task Assignment
CHAPTER I. PHASE I
Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE
3111. Task Force One will perform tasks as required by the following para-
graphs of this section.
3112. When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division
to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the navy basic plan.
3113. Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
[39] Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO
3121. Task Force Two will:
Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I) .
[SO] Section 8. TASK FORCE THREE
3131. Task Force Three will perform the tasks assigned in the following para-
graphs of this section.
3132. Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
3133. a. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of
the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.
b. Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the
Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan
for capture of Eniwetok.
c. 1. Special Information.
As of July 1, 1941, the Marine defenses in Hawaii and the outlying islands are
as follows:
MIDWAY —34 officers
750 men
6 5' 751 caliber guns
12 3'750 caliber AA guns
30 0.50 caliber machine guns
30 0.30 caliber machine guns
4 searchlights.
JOHNSTON— 18 men
2 5'751 caliber guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns
PALMYRA —4 officers
101 men
4 5' 751 caliber guns '
4 3' 750 caliber A A guns
4 0.50 caliber machine guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns
[31] OAHU —32 officers
620 men
4 5' 751 caliber guns
8 3' 750 caliber A A guns
20 0.50 caliber machine guns
16 0.30 caliber machine guns
Note: The above personnel are defense battalion person-
nel only and are in addition to personnel employed in guard
duty, barracks duty, etc.
WAKE —None.
2. Task
Furnish additional -defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by the
Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-
in-Chief.
[3S] Section 4. TALK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)
3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following para-
graphs of this section.
3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the
Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue admin-
istration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.
3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 849
[S3] Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)
3151. Task Force Seven will perform tasks as required by the following para-
graphs of this section.
3152. a. Special Information.
1. There are indications that Axis raiders^^have been basing in the Marshall
area.
2. The imminence of the entry of Japan into the war requires a deploy-
ment suitable for this eventuality.
3. NARWHAL and NAUTILUS are fitted to carry 13,500 gallons of
aviation gasoline each for fueling patrol planes.
b. Task.
Maintain patrols required by the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I) .
c. Special Logistics.
Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor and to a limited degree at Midway.
3153. Assign one submarine division to Task Force Three as required for land-
ing attack training.
3154. On W-day transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaskan
sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.
[34] Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT {MINING FORCE)
3161. Task Force Eight will:
Continue operations and training under commanders Task Forces One and Two.
[35] Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)
3171. Task Force Six will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs.
3172. Provide logistic service to the fleet and cooperate with Commander
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases.
3173. Perform tasks required by The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
3174. Maintain in the office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an
officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the fleet, the
loading of base force and NTS vessels, and the routing and protection of U. S.
and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.
3175. Transfer ten VJR to Commander Task Force Nine.
[36] Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS
Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)
3181. Special Information.
The Basic Plan assigns the following tasks to the Commander, Hawaiian
Naval Coastal Frontier:
a. Defend the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in Category "D". (Category
"D" — May be subject to major attack). (N. B. The Commander-in-Chief,
U. S. Pacific Fleet, does not consider Category "D" will apply during Phase I.)
b. Protect and route shipping within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
~~ c. Support the U. S. Pacific Fleet.
d. Support the Army and Associated Forces within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal
Frontier.
3182. By this Fleet Plan, Task Force Four is assigned the tasks below.
a. Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian
Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned.
(As of the date of issue of this plan, the security plan of the Commander, Hawaiian
Naval Coastal Frontier (as Commander, Base Defense) is already in eff"ect).
b. Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston,
Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized. Assist as practicable in the
development of Samoa and Guam.
c. Make the facilities of outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in
the vicinity; and directly and through own task group commanders cooperate
with other task force and task group commanders in coordinating the military
activities at these bases. (See Annex IV.)
850 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPER ATI NGIPL AN—RAINBOW FIVE
{NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE)
PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT
CHAPTER I. PHASE I.
[37] 3182. d. Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for
the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized,
Wake and Canton.
Task Force Five {Pacific Southern) and Task Force Ten {Pacific Northern
Naval Coastal Frontier)
3183. Commanders Task Forces Five and Ten perform tasks assigned by the
Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
[38] Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE
3191. Until detached from the Fleet, all forces less those of Naval Coastal
Frontiers will perform the following tasks:
|f a. Units in the Hawaiian Area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor by the
end of four W-day; units designated for early operations complete mobilization
prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the
Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.
b. Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.
0. Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating
with commanders of naval coastal frontiers while within the limits of those
frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese forces.
d. Continue such training activities of the fleet as the commander-in-chief
may direct.
e. Reinforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.
f. Protect the territory and communications of the associated powers, the
operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other opera-
tions as directed by the commander-in-chief.
{Sd\ CHAPTER II. PHASE lA
Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE
3211. Task Force One will perform tasks as required by the following para-
graphs of this section.
3212. Perform task assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
3213. Reenforce and support operations of Task Force Two as required in the
Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).
[40] Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO
3221. Task Force Two will perform tasks as required by the following para-
graph,
3222. Conduct reconnaissance and raid in force against the Marshalls as
required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).
[41] Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE
3231. Task Force Three will perform tasks as required by the following para-
graphs of this section.
3232. Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required
in The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
3233. Reenforce Task Force Two as required by the Marshall Reconnaissance
and Raiding Plan (Annex II).
3234. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of
the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.
3235. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.
[42] Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE {PATROL PLANE FORCE)
3241. Task Force Nine will perform tasks as required in the following para-
graphs of this section.
3242. a. Special Information.
1. Patrol plane operations from Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and
Canton are feasible, the extent of such operations being dependent upon the
defenses, facilities and supplies available at the time operations commence.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 851
Those defenses, facilities and supplies are being augmented. As of July 1, 1941,
tenders cannot base at Wake or Canton, but Pan-American Airways' facilities
may be used by special arrangement or by commandeering. A project for the
improvement of Wake as a base is underway. No such project for Canton has
been approved.
2. No aircraft are assigned a-t present to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Frontier.
3. Our submarines will assist in the defense of Midway and Wake, and will
habitually operate offensively in enemy waters.
4. Land defenses exist on outlying islands, as described in paragraph 3133c,
1. Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), is charged
with the defense of these outlying islands and will make them available for patrol
plane operations.
5. It is believed that enemy action in the area subject to our patrol plane search
will comprise:
(a) Submarine raids and observation off Oahu and outlying islands and along
our lines of communication.
[45] (b) Surface raids on our lines of communications.
(c) Surface and air raids against Wake and possibly against iMidway, Johnston,
Palmyra and Canton.
(d) Possibly carrier raid against Oahu.
b. Tasks.
1. Perform patrols required by patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
2. Subject to the specific tasks prescribed elsewhere in this plan, operate patrol
planes in the Hawaiian Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest
possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only
when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of
damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on
the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.
3. Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.
4. Perform tasks assigned in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan
(Annex II).
5. Coordinate operations of patrol planes with submarines operating in same
general area.
6. Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid dis-
proportionate losses.
[44] 3242. b. 7. Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ
Squadron from base force) based on Oahu at all times. During the absence of
major portions of the fleet from the vicinity of Oahu, such squadrons, at dis-
cretion, may be temporarily transferred to commander Task Force Four (Hawai-
ian Naval Coastal Frontier).
c. Special Logistics.
Logistic support at outlying bases will be supplied by own tenders, Hawaiian
Naval Coastal Fontier, Base Force, and, if necessary, by Pan-American Airways
facilities.
[45] Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN {UNDERSEA FORCE)
3251. Task Force Seven will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph.
3252a. 1. Special Information.
1. Surface units of the Fleet will initially conduct the operations required by
the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) and the Marshall Reconnaissance and
Raiding Plan (Annex II). Thereafter operations will be conducted for the cap-
ture of the Marshalls and Carolines, with. occasional sweeps toward the Marianas
and the Japanese Homeland.
2. Our patrol planes will be operating from Midway, and possibly Wake and
Johnston Islands.
3. Japan is developing extensively the defenses of the Mandated Islands.
Land planes are known to be based at Saipan, Truk and Jaluit and have been
reported at Marcus Island. Air fields are believed to exist at Wotje and Maloe-
lap. Port Lloyd in the Bonins is a minor operating base and some aircraft
usually base there and at Hachijo Jima. Aircraft may be present on Amami
Oshima.
4. Considerable air strength is based on the Japanese Homeland but it is be-
lieved that, with many commitments elsewhere and a general lack of patrol
planes, the air patrol surrounding the Homeland will not be particularly intensive.
5. The main units of the Japanese Fleet will probably be operating from the
Inland Sea.
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 13
852 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6. All important harbors will probably be mined and netted against submarines
and are well fortified. A considerable number of small patrol craft must be
expected.
[4-6] 3252. a. 7. The southwestern and western lines of communications
from Japan may be considered vital needs and those toward the Mandates are
very important.
8. It is expected that all Japanese Merchantmen will be armed or will be
operating under naval control, and will therefore be subject to submarine attack.
Specific instructions on this subject will be issued later.
9. Arrangements will be made with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to
extend the Pacific Area sufficiently for submarines to pass through the Nansei
Shoto as far south as Latitude 28°-30' N.
10. Mining Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. The
specific authority for such mining will be issued later.
b. Tasks
1. Continue patrol of two submarines each at Wake and Midway.
2. Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese homeland and
thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating condi-
tions, giving Stations the following priority.
YOKOHAMA
BUNGO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU
3. Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces including shipping, utilizing
torpedoes and mines, and, if appropriate, gunfire.
[47] 3252. b. 4. Report important enemy movements by radio if success of
attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.
c. Special Logistics.
Utilize facilities at Midway as necessary to increase endurance on patrol.
[48] Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT {MINING FORCE)
3261. Task Force Eight will:
Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the
local defense forces during this phase.
[49] Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX {LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)
3271. Task Force Six will:
Continue tasks assigned for Phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the
patrol and sweeping plan (annex I) and the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding
plan (annex II).
[50] Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS
3281. Task Force Five (Pacific Northern) and Task Force Ten (Pacific Southern
Naval Coastal Frontier) will:
Continue tasks assigned for phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the
patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).
3282. Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) will:
Continue tasks assigned for phase I.
[51] Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE
3291. All task forces concerned:
a. Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3191.
b. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).
[52] CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE lA
Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE
3311. Task Force One will:
Cover operations of other forces as prescribed in the Eniwetok plan (annex — ),
and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.
[52a] Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO
3321. Task Force Two will:
Reenforce Task Forces One and Three as required in Eniwetok and other plans
and perform such reconnaissance and raiding as is directed.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 853
[Sm Section 8. TASK FORCE THREE
3331. Task Force Three will:
a. Continue training for landing attacks.
b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — ) and other operations
involving landing attacks.
c. Patrol as directed in subsequent plans.
d. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.
[52c] Section 4- TASK FORCE NINE {PATROL PLANE FORCE)
3341. Task Force Nine will:
a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3242 b, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7.
b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — ) and other plans for
the capture of the IMarshalls and Carolines.
[52d] Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE)
3351. Task Force Seven -will:
a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3252 b, 1,2, 3, and 4.
b. Carry out tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — ) and other plans for
the capture of the IMarshalls and Carolines.
L^ S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE)
PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT
CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE lA
[d2e] Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)
3361. Task Force Eight will:
Perform such mining tasks as may be assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — )
and other operations and continue to augment local patrols as directed.
[52f] Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC AND CONTROL
FORCE)
3371. Task Force Six will:
a. Continue tasks prescribed in paragraphs 3172 to 3174.
b. Prepare plans for the establishment of a fleet anchorage at Eniwetok and
a fleet base at Truk after the positions have been captured.
[52g] Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS
3381. Task Forces Four, Five, and Ten will:
Continue the tasks assigned in paragraphs 3182 and 3183.
[52h] Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE
3391. All task forces concerned:
Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3291.
[53] CHAPTER IV. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN
3401. The execution of this Plan may be in one or two steps depending on
whether Japan does or does not become a belligerent on the first day of execution.
a. If action against European Axis Powers only is to be taken the despatch will
be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE
PHASE ONE".
b. When action against JAPAN is to be taken the despatch for execution will
be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE
PHASE ONE AFIRM".
3402. In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power against the United
States prior to the existence of a state of war, it is the duty of the senior commander
on the spot to take such action in the defense of his command and the national
interests as the situation may require, and report the action taken to superior
authority at once.
[54] CHAPTER V. INITIAL TRANSFER OF UNITS
3501. The table below gives, for ready reference, a summary of the transfers
to be made in going from the current peace time organization to the task organ-
ization as of W-Day and as of J-Day. Those transfers for W-Day will be made
upon the placing into effect of Phase I of this Plan. Those for J-Day will be
854 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
made when the execution of Phase lA is ordered. Units concerned will report by
despatch to the commanders of the task forces to which they are transferring.
From
To
Unit transferred
Transfer eflected
Remarks
Southeastern Pa-
cific For.
Taskfor 3
f2 OCL
[when directed- -
W-Day
W-Day
When directed..
When directed..
W-Day.
U Desdiv
1 CL
For rotation on patrol
Taskfor 3
1 CA
until J-Day.
For rotation on patrol
Atlantic Reen
Taskfor 2 -.
PSNCF
4 CA
until J-Day.
If Atlantic Reen. is de-
Taskfor 3
2CA ..--
tached.
If Atlantic Reen. is de-
fl2 VPB
tached.
fAdrninistration remains.
1 Units may be rotated.
h AVD
PNNCF
tl AVP
W-Day
12 VPB -
/Administration remains.
\ Units may be rotated.
Taskfor 9 (Patrol
Plane Force).
1 AVD
PNNCF
1 AVP
}w-Day
12 SS
(■Administration remains.
\ Units may be rotated.
Taskfor 7 (Under-
\1 ASR
Taskfor 3
W-Day
sea Force).
NARWHAL or
NAUTILUS.
/I CM
Base Samoa. Released
[BS]
Hawaiian NCF...
Taskfor 3
)j-Day
on J-Day.
Until further orders.
Taskfor 8 (Minfor).
\8DM
W-Day
Taskfor 6 (Logistic
and Control For).
1 AO
Base Samoa, released on
Taskfor 2
1 AO
J-Day
J-Day.
For fueling at sea ships
2 AO
J-Day.—
in initial sweep. To
revert when released.
For fueling at sea ships
Taskfor 9
10 VJR
J-Day
in initial reconnais-
sanceofMARSHALLS.
To revert when re-
leased.
Until further orders.
All Forces
Hawaiian NCF_..
Taskfor 6 (Logistic
and Control
Force).
As directed
Any ship passing
between West
Coast and .Ha-
waii.
When directed- -
Prior to sched-
uled date of
departure.
For escort duty. To re-
vert on completion.
[56]
Part IV. Logistics
CHAPTER I. GENERAL
4101. Commander Task Force Six (I>ogistics and Control Force) is charged
with the logistic supply of the Fleet and, in cooperation with Commander Task
Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), with supplying the present out-
lying bases in the Mid Pacific. He will make requests for replacements as required
by paragraph 4322 g of the Navy Basic Plan. He will maintain a liaison officer
in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal
Frontier) and, through him, will control the quantities and times of delivery of
material and personnel requirements to the Fleet. In so far as practicable, a
reserve of consumable supplies will be established and maintained at Pearl Harbor.
After capture of bases in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES a reserve of
supplies will be maintained at these places, as permitted by storage and transporta-
tion facilities available.
4102. The supply of units of the Second Marine Division after they have left
the West Coast will be included with that of the Fleet.
4103. Special logistic instructions affecting particular tasks have been included
in the task assignments in Part III and the Annexes of this Plan.
4104. For the benefit of Commander Task Force Six, Commanders of other
task forces will include, in the plans which they prepare, their logistic require-
ments as far as they can be foreseen.
4105. The requirements of the U. S. Pacific Fleet are placed in the second highest
priority classification by paragraph 4261 of the Navy Basic Plan.
[56a] CHAPTER II. TRANSPORTATION
4201. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force), through his
liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern
Naval Coastal Frontier), will coordinate the transportation of material and per-
sonnel by Fleet transportation faciUties and the Naval Transportation Service.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY S55
4202. The Naval Transportation Service vessels assigned to assist in the sup-
ply of the Hawaiian and Alaskan areas will be shown in a revised Chapter IX,
Appendix II, of the Navy Basic Plan. If practicable, they will not be employed
for transportation farther westward than Hawaii.
4203. The employment of commercial vessels to assist in transportation from
the West Coast to Hawaii is most desirable and is acceptable to the Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
[56b] CHAPTER III. HOSPITALIZATION AND EVACUATION
4301. The facilities of the Fleet including those of hospital ships, advanced
base hospitals and mobile medical units will, as far as practicable, provide hospi-
talization for sick and wounded personnel.
4302. As necessary, such personnel will, under the coordinated supervision of
the task force commanders responsible for the personnel and for the transportation
facilities employed, be evacuated to the nearest shore establishment having hospi-
tal space available.
4303. The ships concerned will furnish hospitalization to embarked Army
forces until ineffectives can be transferred ashore.
[56c] CHAPTER IV. PRIZE CREWS
4401. The Navy Department will furnish prize crews as follows: U. S. Pacific
Fleet — 8; Southeast Pacific Force — 8. If those for the Pacific Fleet are available
they^^will be placed aboard ships assigned to make the search for enemy merchant
ships in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) .
[66d] CHAPTER v. SALVAGE
4501. All units, particularly of Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force)
and suitable units of Task Force Seven (Underseas Force) will render salvage
service, as practicable, to naval and other vessels in the Pacific Area outside of
a zone lying 500 miles from the continental United States, Alaska, and Panama.
Within the above mentioned zone, salvage service will be rendered by the shore
establishment.
[57] Part V. Special Provisions
CHAPTER I. time TO BE USED
5101. GREENWICH Civil Time wiU be used in carrying out this Plan.
[58] CHAPTER II. COMMUNICATIONS
5201. Communications will be in accordance with USF-70 as modified by
Annex III to this Plan.
[59] CHAPTER III. LOCATION OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
5301. The Fleet wiU be kept informed of the location of the Commander-in-
Chief.
[60] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS PHASES I AND lA
5401. Tentative Operation Plans Nos. 1-R5 and 1A-R5 as formulated below
are designed to facilitate the promulgation and execution of the tasks assigned for
Phases I and I A of this U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five). It
is expected that they will be modified and executed by despatch when the corre-
sponding Phase of this 0-1 Plan is placed in efi"ect as prescribed in paragraph 3401.
[61] Section 1. Phase I
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date
Operation Plan No. 1-R5
Initial Task Organization
(See paragraph 1107 of this Plan for normal organization)
(a) Task Force One — Commander Battle Force. — Normal units this task force
plus Yz minecraft less 1 cruiser in rotation to Task Force Three patrol pool.
856 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) Task Force Two — Commander Aircraft, Battle Force. — Normal units this
task force plus }i minecraft less one cruiser in rotation to Task Force Three patrol
pool.
(c) Task Force Three — Commander Scouting Force. — Normal units this task
force plus 1 cruiser each from Task Forces One and Two for cruiser patrol pool plus
1 SS from Task Force Seven, 1 AO from Task Force Six, and (on request) 1 patron
and tender from Task Force Seven for South Pacific operations.
(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) (S. O. P. Airscofor Hawaiian Area). —
Normal units this task force less 24 VP and tenders transferred to Naval Coastal
Frontiers, and (if requested by Commander Task Force Three) 1 patron and tender
to Task Force Three.
[6S] (e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) — Commander Submarines,
Scouting Force. — Normal units this task force less 2 SS and 1 ASR to Task Force
Ten and 1 SS to Task Force Three.
(f) Task Force Eight (Mining Force). — Non-operative as such; normal units
thereof being divided between Task Forces One and Two.
(g) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) — Commander Base Force. —
Normal units this task force plus any units transferred from other forces for escort
duty West Coast-Hawaii less 1 AO to Task Force Three.
(h) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) — Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District. — Normal units this task force plus units from other
fleet forces when and if the Commander-in-Chief directs transfer.
(i) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) — Commandant,
Twelfth Naval District. — Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from
Task Force Nine.
(j) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) — Commandant,
Thirteenth Naval District. — Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender
from Task Force Nine plus 2 SS and 1 ASR from Task Force Seven.
[6S] 1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II
and III of Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five.
2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territorj^ and sea communica-
tions of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south of the
equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding
against attack by Japan.
3. (a) Task Force One. — (1) When directed release two small light cruisers and
one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the
Navy Basic Plan.
(2) Perform the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
(b) Task Force Two. — (1) Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweep-
ing Plan (Annex I).
(c) Task Force Three. — (1) Maintain the patrols required by the Patrol and
Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
(2) Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the
Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.
(3) Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the
Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan
for capture of Eniwetok.
[64] (4) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested
by Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Com-
mander-in-Chief.
(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force). — (1) Transfer twelve patrol planes
and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval
Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at
discretion.
(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
(e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force). — (1) Maintain patrols required by the
Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
(2) Asi ign one submarine division to Task Force Three as required for landing
attack training.
(3) Transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific
Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaska sector. Con-
tinue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.
(f) Task Force Eight. (Mining Force) . — (1) Continue training under Commander
Task Force One.
(g) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force). — (1) Provide logistic services
to the Fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier
in providing logistic services to outlying bases.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 857
[65] (2) Perform tasks required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) .
(3) Maintain in the Office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an
officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the Fleet, the
loading of Base Force and Naval Transportation Service vessels, and the routing
and protection of United States and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison
with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.
(h) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier). — (1) Assist in pro-
viding external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal
Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned.
(2) Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston,
Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton is authorized. Assist as practicable in the
development of Samoa and Guam.
(3) Make the facilities of the outlying bases available for Fleet units operating
in the vicinity and cooperate with Commanders of Mobile Forces in coordinating
the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV) .
(4) Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose,
to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized. Wake and
Canton.
(i) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier). — (1) Perform
tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) .
[66] (j) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier). —
(1) Perform tasks assigned by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
(x) (1) Units in the Hawaiian area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor
within four days of date of execution of this Plan; units designated for early
operations complete mobilization prior to-the time designated for their operations
to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly
as possible.
(2) Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.
(3) Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating
with the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers while within the limits of those
frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese Forces.
(4) Continue such training activities of the Fleet as the Commander-in-Chief
may direct.
(5) Reenforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.
(6) Protect the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, the
operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other opera-
tions as directed by the Comrhander-in-Chief .
4. Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor, on the West Coast, and as specially
provided for in the Annexes.
5. (a) Communications in accordance with U. S. F. Seventy, as modified by
Annex III.
(b) Use Greenwich Civil Time.
(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in- Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.
[68] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS PHASES I AND lA
Section 2. Phase I A
Tentative
United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Place
Date.
Operation Plan No. 1A-R5.
Initial task organization
(See Basic Fleet Plan for normal organization.)
(a) Task Force One. Commander Battle Force. — Normal units this task force
less any cruiser absent on patrol with Task Force Three less 1 CV and all other
large CL's to Task Force Two for reconnaissance of MARSHALLS.
(b; Task Force Two. Commander Aircraft, Battle Force. — Normal units this
task force plus 1 CV and available CL's (approximately 4) from Task Force One
858 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
plus 1 CV from Task Force Three less any cruiser absent on patrol with Task
Force Three.
(c) Task Force Three. Commander Scouting Force. — Same as for Operation
Plan 1-R5 less 1 CV to Task Force Two less 1 SS and 1 AO from SAMOA returned
to their respective normal task forces plus 1 AO from Task Force Six for fueling
at sea.
(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) Senior Officer Present, Aircraft,
Scouting Force, HAWAIIAN AREA). — Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.
[69] Part V. Special Provisions
CHAPTER IV, TENTATIVE OPERATIONS PLANS PHASES I AND lA
Section 2. Phase I A
(e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) Commander Submarines, Scouting
Force.
Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5
plus 1 SS returned from Task Force Three.
(f) Task Force Eight (Mining Force)
Non-operative as such, normal units thereof being detached from Task
Forces One and Two at end of Phase I and on commencement of Phase
lA being transferred to Task Force Four.
(g) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) Commander Base Force.
Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5,
plus 1 AO returned from Task Force Three
less 2 AO transferred to Task Force Two
less 1 AO transferred to Task Force Three.
(h) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Four-
teenth Naval District.
Normal units this task force
plus all units of Minecraft, Battle Force.
(i) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant,
Twelfth Naval District.
Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.
(j) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant,
Thirteenth Naval District.
Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.
1. Information, Assumptions sa previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this
Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five.
[70] 2. This Fleet, while protecting the sea communications and territory of
the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area, and supporting the operations of the
British Navy south of the equator as far west as Longitude one hundred fifty-five
degrees East, will:
(a) Conduct an initial sweep with light forces and aircraft against enemy
merchant ships and raiders.
(b) Raid Japanese communications to westward of NANPO SHOTO with
cruisers.
(c) Patrol Japanese homeland with submarines.
(d) Conduct a reconnaissance and raid against the MARSHALLS, in order to
divert Japanese forces away from MALAYSIA, and to prepare for the capture of
the MARSHALL-CAROLINE area.
3. (a) Task Force One.
(1) Perform task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy
Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five).
(2) Reenforce and support operations of Task Force Two as required in the
MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1,
Rainbow Five).
(b) Task Force Two.
(1) Conduct Reconnaissance and Raid in force against the MARSHALLS as
required in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to
Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five).
[71] (c) Task Force Three.
(1) Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required in
the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five).
(2) Reenforce Task Force Two as required by the MARSHALL Reconnaissance
and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five).
(3) Move from SAN DIEGO to HAWAII the remaining units and equipment
of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 859
(4) Continue preparations and training for landing attacks on Japanese bases
in the MARSHALLS with particular emphasis on plan for capture of ENI-
WETOK.
(5) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by
Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) and approved
by the Commander-in-Chief.
(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
(1) Subject to the specific tasks prescribed below, operate patrol planes in the
HAWAIIAN Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible
information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other
types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the
planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective
appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.
[72] (2) Perform patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan Annex I
to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five).
(3) Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.
(4) Perform tasks assigned in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding
Plan (Ajinex II to Navy Plan O-I, Rainbow Five).
(5) Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid
disproportionate losses.
(6) Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ squadron from Base
Force) based on OAHU at all times. During the absence of major portions of
the Fleet from the vicinity of OAHU, such squadrons may, at discretion, be
temporarily transferred to Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Frontier).
(e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force).
(1) Continue patrol of two submarines each at WAKE and MIDWAY.
(2) Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese Homeland
and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating
conditions, giving stations the following priority:
YOKOHAMA
BUNCO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU
[73] (The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements for submarines to
pass through that part of the Far Eastern Area in the NANSEI SHOTO as far
south as Latitude twenty-eight degrees, thirty minutes North).
(3) Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces, including shipping, utilizing
mines and torpedoes and, if appropriate, gunfire. Mining of Japanese waters
outside the three mile limit may be planned. Specific authority for such mining
will be issued later.
(4) Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack mission
is not thereby jeopardized.
(f) Task Force Eight (Mining Force).
(1) Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the
local defense forces during this Phase.
(g) Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force).
(1) Continue general logistic support of Fleet and assistance to outlying bases.
(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy
Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five), and the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiduig
Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five).
(h) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).
(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5, with regard for the
probable increase in enemy activities.
[74] (i) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier),
(j) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).
(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5 with regard for the
probable increase in enemy activities.
(2) Perform the tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to
Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five).
4. Logistic replenishment at PEARL HARBOR, on the West Coast, and as
specially provided for in the Annexes.
860 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan 0-1,
Rainbow Five.
(b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.
(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.
Adiniral, U. S. Navxj,
Co m m ander-in - Chief,
U. S. Pacific Fleet.
[I-l] ANNEX I
United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date
Patrol and Sweeping Plan
No. .
INITIAL TASK ORGANIZATION
(a) Task Force One.
(b) Task Force Two.
(c) Task Force Three.
(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
(e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force).
(f) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force).
(g) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).
(h) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier),
(i) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) .
(Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1-R5.)
1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of
this Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions,
estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.
2. Phase I
This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communica-
tions of the Associated Powers by:
[1-2] (a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of
the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-
Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.
(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.
(c) Covering.
(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
(e) Routing shipping.
Phase I A
This Fleet will: (a) continue the operations of Phase I, except as to patrols
which will be modified or discontinued as necessary in order to carry out pre-
scribed offensive operations;
(b) attack enemy communications by making initial sweep for enemy mer-
chant ships and raiders, and by raiding Japanese sea communications westward
of Nanpo Shoto;
(c) reconnoiter and raid the Marshall Islands.
Subsequent Phases
This Fleet will: (a) continue operations of Phase I except as to patrols, for which
further directives will be issued later.
3. (a) Task Force One.
(1) Cover territory, forces and shipping of the Associated Powers as directed.
[IS] (2) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to Task Force
Three for cruiser patrol pool; and be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or
a striking force, or both.
(3) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding
Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1) conduct such sweep as information and circum-
stances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 861
(b) Task Force Two.
(1) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to Task Force Three for
cruiser patrol pool. (In case of detachment of Atlantic reenforcement this sub-
- paragraph is inapplicable) .
(2) Be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or a striking force, or both.
(3) Develop contacts made by patrol planes from Oahu if vessels of Task Force
Three are not within supporting distance of such contacts.
(4) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding
Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1) conduct such sweep as information and cir-
cumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.
(c) Task Force Three, reenforced with one cruiser each from Task Forces One
and Two (for cruiser patrol pool), NARWHAL or NAUTILUS from Task Force
Seven (Undersea Force), and one oiler from Task Force Six (Logistic and Control
Force), also further reenforced by one squadron of patrol planes and tenders from
Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) (by request on Commander Task Force
Nine) when the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilities there permit:
(1) Patrol against enemy units that may attack own and allied communication
lines, operating in general as follows:
[1-4] (a) Maintain two cruisers (one, if Atlantic Reenforcement is detached)
on patrol between Hawaii and the Pacific Coast in areas more than five hundred
miles from land. Reservice such ships either in Hawaii or on Pacific Coast.
(b) (i) Maintain two cruisers, two destroyers, one submarine and one oiler
in the South Pacific based on Samoa, normally keeping one cruiser on patrol
within one thousand miles of Samoa along routes to New Zealand.
(ii) When the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilitates there permit,
request from Commander Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) assignment of a
patrol squadron and tenders; and advance it into that area for operations.
(iii) Coordinate activities of unit operating in the South Pacific with British
naval forces as far west as longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East as the
situation at the time makes expedient; and in accordance with such directives
as may from time to time be issued.
(c) Maintain one cruiser, based on Midway, on patrol to the northward of the
Midway- Marianas line, in the vicinity of trans-Pacific trade routes.
(2) Upon commencement of Phase lA, dispatch two heavy cruisers in company
to raid Japanese communications westward of the Nanpo Shoto, and return to
base when fuel situation or other circumstances require. Arrange directly with
Commander Task Force Six for fueling such cruisers at or near Midway on out-
ward passage and on return as may be feasible. The Commander-in-Chief will
make arrangements with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, concerning the
utilization of the portion of the Far Eastern Area involved.
[7-5] (3) Upon commencement of Phase lA, discontinue patrols required
by paragraph 3 (c) (1) and sweep for enemy merchant ships, operating along the
following general lines:
(a) Samoa based cruisers and destroyers sweep northward to latitude twenty
thence to rendezvous designated by Task Force Commander for operations in
conjunction with the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to
Navy Plan 0-1). Other Samoa based units rejoin their normal commands.
(b) Cruisers on patrol between West Coast and Hawaii sweep or search for
specific enemy merchantmen, as Task Force Commander may require enroute to
rendezvous designated by him for operations in conjunction with Marshall Raid.
(c) Other available units conduct maximum practicable sweep in general area
bounded by Hawaiian Island chain, latitude forty-six North, and longitudes one
hundred sixty-seven West and one hundred eighty; such sweep to occupy about
six days, and to begin on or as soon after J-day as possible.
(d) Units operating in the foregoing northerly area originate radio traffic to
indicate an advance toward Japan via a northern route.
(4) (a) Upon completion of sweep directed in subparagraph (3) (c) above,
rendezvous with oiler supplied by Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force) in
latitude twenty-seven North, and one hundred seventy-eight West, or other
rendezvous you may have designated. Fuel and proceed to join Task Force Two
(Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan, Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1) on
twelve J-day at rendezvous Tare in latitude sixteen North, longitude one hundred
seventy -seven East or other designated time and rendezvous,
(b) If any units will be delayed in joining Task Force Two, advise the com-
mander thereof as to the extent of the delay.
[1-6] (c) If conflict of tasks exists, operations against inferior enemy forces
within striking distance take precedence over joining Task Force Two.
862 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(5) If Atlantic Reenforcement is detached, assign two heavy cruisers to Task
Force Two. (In such event the assignment of one cruiser from Task Force Two to
Task Force Three, hitherto mentioned will, of course, not be made) .
(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for
conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy
forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.
(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At
discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of
Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities
thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.
(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer one
patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South
Pacific.
(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.
(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.
(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval
Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.
(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in
sweeping during initial sweep of Phase lA.
[7-7] (8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned
in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1).
(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible
with assigned tasks, with other forces thereat. Be guided by principles of com-
mand relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan 0-1.
(e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force).
(1) Maintain two submarmes on patrol at Wake and two at Midway for gain-
ing information and for attack on enemy units approaching tliose places.
(2) Be prepared, if Commander-in-Chief directs, during Phase I to conduct
observations, by submerged submarines from outside the three-mile zone, of
probable radar bases in the Japanese Mandates.
(3) At commencement of Phase lA, or earlier if so directed, establish patrols
off the Japanese homeland as prescribed in the basic Fleet Plan.
(4) Route submarines advancing to westward for patrols so as to cover wide
front. Coordinate such routing with other patrol and sweeping operations,
including that prescribed for cruisers in the area westward of Nanpo Shoto, so as
to avoid contact of submarines with own forces.
(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief and task force commanders concerned advised
as to location and routes of own submarines.
(6) Transfer NAUTILUS or NARWHAL to Task Force Three for operations
in South Pacific during Phase I.
(f) Task Force Six (Logistio and Control Force).
(1) Through liaison with Commanders of Task Force Five (Pacific Southern)
and Task Force Four (Hawaiian [1-8] Naval Coastal Frontiers) ensure
that routing of shipping is in accordance with general directives of the Com-
mander-in-Chief and is coordinated with the protection offered by Fleet patrols
and with the routing and protective measures of the British in the South Pacific.
(2) Escort important ships or convoys by using combatant vessels en route to
or from the West Coast and Hawaii, which vessels are made available for that
purpose. If escort is found necessary and suitable vessels will be not available
by modifying schedules of escorts or convoys, make suitable representations to
the Commander-in-Chief as far in advance as possible.
(3) During Phase I maintain one oiler at Samoa to operate under Commander
Task Force Three.
(4) Provide oiler to fuel at sea units of Task Force Three on eight J-Day in
latitude twenty-seven North, Longitude one hundred seventy-eight West, or at
time and place designated by commander of that Task Force.
(5) See also oiler requirements under Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding
Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1).
(g) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).
(1) Coordinate, as practicable, patrol in coastal zone with patrols by other Fleet
forces.
(2) Through liaison with Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Coastal
Force) and Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)
coordinate routing and escort of shipping in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier
with that in the Fleet Control Zone, when and if established, and in the general
Pacific Area.
[1-9] (h) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 863
(1) Coordinate routing of shipping with the protection afforded by Fleet forces
and by British forces in accordance with current situation, and with general
directives that may be issued by the Commander-in-Chief.
(2) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable
with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of informa-
tion gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information
direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.
(3) In the initial stages of Phase lA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet
forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying rainge of the
West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable.
(i) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).
(1) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable
with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information
gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information
direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.
(2) In initial stages of Phase lA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet forces
in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the West
Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable. It
is especially desired to cover until eight J-Day UNIMAK PASS and the maximum
area to the southward of Dutch Harbor that daily flights and available planes will
permit.
(x) (1) This plan effective simultaneously with Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five.
[I-IO] (2) All task forc€f make available to Commander Task Force Six
(Logistics and Control Force) for escort duty, all ships enroute between Hawaii
and West Coast.
(3) Destroy enemy combatant ships encountered.
(4) Capture or destroy enemy merchant ships encountered.
(5) Investigate neutral merchant ships encountered; send them to port for
adjudication if investigation warrants; or if necessary and permissible under
international law, destroy them. (See "Instructions for the Navy of the United
States Governing Maritime Warfare").
(6) Seize any opportunity to inflict disproportinate damage on the enemy,
modifying or discontinuing plans in operations if necessary in order to do so.
(7) Disseminate pertinent information to other Task Force Commanders as
conditions of radio silence and other circumstances permit.
(8) Aircraft attempt, without taking undue risk, to force merchant ships to
the vicinity of supporting surface vessels or to United States* ports.
(9) This plan effective with Navy Plan 0-1.
(10) Be prepared to transfer units of Southeast Pacific Force and Atlantic
Reenforcement on short notice. So employ such units that if transferred they
can reach Canal Zone within twenty-one days. If transferred, such units proceed
along routes and conduct such sweeps as the Commander-in-Chief may prescribe.
(11) Continue such training as these and other prescribed operations permit.
[I-ll] 4. Logistics as in Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five.
5. Provisions of Part V Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five apply.
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.
[II-l] ANNEX II
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date
Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan No.
Initial Task Organization.
(a). Task Force One.
(b). Task Force Two.
(c). Task Force Three.
(d). Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force),
(e). Task Force Seven (Undersea Force),
(f). Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force).
tFnits of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1A-R5.
864 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1. (a) Information. — (1) This plan covers the initial operations in the
MARSHALLS for carrying out the basic task of diverting Japanese strength
away from the MALAY BARRIER through the denial and capture of positions
in the MARSHALLS.
2. This force will:
(a) Reconnoiter the MARSHALLS, particularly ENIWETOK, preparatory to
a raid in force and to eventual capture, in order to develop the mobile and land
defenses and material installations therein.
(b) Raid the MARSHALLS with ships and aircraft and small landing groups
in order to destroy enemy mobile forces, fixed defenses and facilities.
[1 1-2] 3. (a) Task Force One. — (1) Transfer available large Jight cruisers
and carrier to Task Force Two on J-Day.
(2) About Five J-Day, depart PEARL HARBOR with remainder of force and
proceed to rendezvous with Task Force Two at Point Tare on Eleven J-Day.
If delay in arriving at rendezvous is in prospect, advise Commander, Task Force
Two, of the probable time of arrival. Transmit any such message prior to
departing from the PEARL HARBOR area, if possible. Sweep as practicable
along the route as required by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan
0-1, Rainbow Five.
(3) If the Oommander-in-Chief is not present upon making the rendezvous,
Commander Task Force One assume general charge of all further operations in
connection with this reconnaissance and raid, and direct Commander Task Force
Two to commence the raid at a suitable time after he has reported ready.
(4) Upon making rendezvous, assume command of battleships of Task Force
Two.
(5) Cover operations of Task Force Two, as reenforced, from the area to the
northward of the MARSHALLS, furnishing such support to that force as devel-
opments require, and keeping its commander informed as to the location of Task
Force One. Detail escorts for any damaged ships of Task Force Two which it may
be necessary to return to base.
(6) Utilize-security offered by operations of patrol planes at WAKE.
[II-S] (7) After Task Force Two has completed raids and rejoined, if the
Commander-in-Chief is not present, Commander Task Force One carry out
further operations of a similar nature or conduct the combined forces to PEARL
HARBOR at discretion.
(b) Task Force Two, reenforced as provided in this plan, reconnoiter and raid
the MARSHALLS, carrying out the following approximate procedure:
(1) On One J-Day, unless otherwise directed, depart PEARL HARBOR with
reenforcements provided by this Plan and proceed toward TAONGI; battleships
and destroyer screen at fifteen knots, remainder of force at twenty knots. Sweep
along the route in accordance with Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy
Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five) and furnish security as practicable to Task Force One.
Furnish destroyer escort to oilers as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) (1).
(2) Five J-Day, fuel the advance group from oilers at Rendezvous Tare or
other designated rendezvous.
(3) Six J-Day to Nine J-Day reconnoiter the MARSHALLS as follows:
(i) Reconnoiter by air such atolls as weather conditions, forces, time and devel-
opments permit, giving particular attention to ENIWETOK, BIKINI, RONGE-
LAP, WOTJE, JALUIT, KWAJALEIN, MALOELAP and ARNO. Recon-
noiter ENIWETOK particularly with a view to an early attack for its seizure.
[II-Ji] (ii) So conduct reconnaissance as to leave the enemy in doubt as to
what further reconnaissance is about to be undertaken, or as to what particular
places may be attacked.
(iii) Supplement air reconnaissance by reconnaissance from surface units and
by landing patrols, and raid with forces immediatel}^ available if the situation
and developments at the time indicate that such supplementary action is desirable
and feasible.
(iv) Utilize both photographic and visual observations to determine as accu-
rately as practicable the opposition that may be expected to raids and landing
parties; and the targets suitable for air and surface bombardment. Of particular
interest are:
ships and aircraft;
storage tanks;
power plants and radio installations;
docks;
air fields;
storehouses and other buildings;
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 865
guns and observation posts;
mines ;
channel and beach obstructions;
other defense installations;
beaches suitable for landing operations;
extent of anchorage area;
hydrographic, topographic, and
meteorological features.
(v) Retire on own battleships or Task Force One for assistance should circum-
stances require.
(vi) Operate battleship group to furnish support as necessary.
(vii) Unless persistent bad weather or other unforeseen developments prevent,
adjust operations to complete reconnaissance in four days or less after making
initial flights over enemy territory.
[II-5\ (viii) Upon the completion of reconnaissance, withdraw to join
Task Forces One and Three. Transfer battleships to Task Force One. Task
Force Three will merge into Task Force Two at this time.
(ix) Study and analyze information gained in reconnaissance; determine upon
the atolls to be raided and the specific objectives for attack. Complete final
plans therefor, with due regard for subparagraph (4) below, and issue to those
concerned. Via destroyer, furnish the Commander, Task Force One and the
Commander-in-Chief, if present, with information and aerial photographs ob-
tained, and copy of raiding plan.
(x) Report by visual (or by destroyer if out of signal distance) to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, if he is within the general area, otherwise to the Commander,
Task Force One, the time it is desired to place the raiding plan into effect.
(4) Beginning about Thirteen J-Day, when directed, carry out the raiding
plan. In preparing and carrying out the raiding plan, be guided by the following:
(i) Make such additional air reconnaissance immediately prior to attack as best
meets the existing situation.
(ii) Attack the selected objectives with air and surface forces, the scheme of
attack being at the discretion of the Task Force Commander and designed to
provide the best economy of force. Avoid directing enemy attention in advance
to the objectives of attack.
[1 1-6] (iii) The priority of objectives is as follows:
combatant ships, tenders, and aircraft;
other ships;
fuel tanks;
power and radio installations;
troop concentrations;
storehouses ;
other installations.
(iv) Except in unusual circumstances, no vessel expend more than twenty-five
per cent of bombs or ammunition on fixed objectives.
(v) Where conditions appear favorable, land personnel to demolish installa-
tions and eliminate enemy personnel.
(vi) Do not enter lagoons with ships.
(vii) Make suitable arrangements for the protection of and withdrawal of
damaged ships, requesting escorts from Task Force One.
(viii) If sufficient weakly held positions are developed to warrant further raids,
carry them out, otherwise discontinue raids at discretion and join Task Force One.
(c) Task Force Three. — (1) If Atlantic Reenforcement has been detached,
transfer two heavy cruisers at PEARL HARBOR to Task Force Two.
(2) If carrier is available, assign it to Task Force Two for this operation begin-
ning J-Day.
[1 1-7] (3) While in the Northern Pacific carrying out the Patrol and Sweep-
ing Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five) employ radio to deceive
enemy as to intentions in the MARSHALLS.
(4) If available, assign combat unit of about one hundred fifty marines to each
cruiser which will eventually join Task Force Two.
(5) Upon completion of the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan on
about Ten J-Day, join Task Force Two with cruisers and destroyers at Point Tare
or other designated rendezvous. Thereafter operate as part of Task Force Two
until released upon completion of the raiding operation of this plan.
(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) coordinate operations of patrol planes
with those of other forces as follows:
(1) Prior to Five J-Day advance maximum practicable patrol plane strength
866 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to WAKE, MIDWAY, and JOHNSTON, leaving not less than two operating
squadrons at OAHU.
(2) JOHNSTON-based planes, during passage of units of other forces to the
westward, search along the route of advance from the vicinity of JOHNSTON
to longitude one hundred seventy-eight degrees west.
(3) MIDWAY-based planes search sectors to the southwestward of MIDWAY
to prevent surprise attack across that sector on units operating toward the
MARSHALLS.
[1 1-8] (4) WAKE-based planes make preliminary air reconnaissance of
TAONGI and BIKAR on Five J-Day, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and
acquaint Commander Task Force Two with the results. Thereafter, conduct
search, to the extent that available planes and supplies will permit, to prevent
surprise attack from the westward by enemy surface forces on own units operating
toward the MARSHALLS.
(5) On completion of the raiding operations of Task Force Two resume normal
operations as required by paragraph 3242b. of the Fleet Operating Plan.
(e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force). — No primary tasks in connection with
this plan are assigned but:
(1) Submarines which may have been in the MARSHALLS in carrying out the
Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five) report
enemy information obtained.
(2)' While en route to patrol stations to the westward:
(i) Seize opportunities to damage important enemy units.
(ii) Avoid contacts with own forces.
(iii) Force Commander keep other forces advised of location and movements of
submarines.
(f) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force). Despatch two oilers to carry
out the following:
(1) Proceed on J-Day with destroyer escort provided by Commander Task
Force Two to rendezvous with the advance group of Task Force Two on Five J-
Day at Point Tare, or as directed by Commander Task Force Two.
[II-9] (2) Thereafter conduct fueling and proceed as directed by Com-
mander Task Force Two.
(x) (1) Seize every opportunity to damage the enemy, but avoid engaging
at a disadvantage.
(2) Be alert to detect and destroy enemy mobile forces, particularly raids or
expeditions which may be directed at our outlying islands.
(3) Restrict the use of radio to a minimum.
(4) This plan effective simultaneously with the execution of PhasellA of
U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).
4. (a) Fuel from oiler as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) above.
(b) Fuel destroyers from large ships at discretion of force and group commanders.
(c) Logistic support for submarines and patrol planes as in U. S. Pacific Fleet
Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).
5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan 0-1,
Rainbow Five.
(b) Use GREENWJCH Civil Time.
(c) Rendezvous Tare: Latitude sixteen degrees North; Longitude one hundred
seventy-seven degrees East.
(d) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised as to his location.
Admiral,
Commander-in- Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.
[III-l] ANNEX III
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date
Communication Plan No. 1, Rainbow Five
USF-70 effective as modified herein. The numbered parts, sections, and
paragraphs of USF-70 listed are efi'ective in toto, or as indicated. Omitted
numbered parts, sections, or paragraphs are not effective unless specifically
made so by Task Force Commanders by supplementary communication plans.
1110. Efi^ective.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 867
1120. Effective. Unless otherwise directed this communication plan is effec-
tive coincident with the placing in effect of Navy Plan 0-1 Rainbow Five.
1170 to 1178. Effective.
1179. Effective. The above procedure shall be usedior Radar contact reports.
No receiver not supplied by Bureau of Ships shall be used for this or any other
purpose until it has been thoroughly tested to assure that it does not transmit a
carrier from its oscillating circuit.
1180. Effective.
1190. Effective.
1212. Effective.
1220. Effective.
13S0. Allied communications in Pacific Area are governed by SP 02376; in the
Eastern Theater by current Andus publications.
[1 1 1-2] 2120. Condition 19 effective.
21S1. Effective.
2200. The radio frequency plans are as set forth in Appendix B, USF-70, except
that Naval Coastal Frontier Defense Communication Plans will be governed by
Article 4005, 1(a) of WPDNC-46.
No transmission shall be made on 500 kcs. frequency without the authority of
the O. T. C. of a Task Force.
When the O. T. C. of a Task Force or component at sea considers that the risk
is justified by the importance of the traffic concerned he may transmit traffic to
the nearest shore radio station that guards the Naval Calling Frequency (355 kc)
or to Radio Washington or Honolulu on the 4235 kc series. He shall not, except
in extreme emergency and when he is sure that the situation justifies the risk,
answer calls or receive traffic on 355 kc, except by interception.
The various circuit guards required shall be so disposed as to permit the maxi-
mum number of ships to set watches on the radio direction finder, underwater
listening equipment and other intelligence equipment as directed by Task Force
Commanders.
The Senior Commander of Units from different task organizations operating
in the same area shall arrange for rapid means of inter-communications, preferably
by available shore stations. Task Organization Commander in a port or operat-
ing area shall establish an area radio frequency for use under circumstances when
visual systems will not serve. In port radio shall not be used [III-S] '■ for
inter-communication or communication with shore when a visual link or landline
exists or may be established.
Guard NPM Primary Fox regardless of geographical position.
2300. Effective.
2400. Effective.
2510. CSP-1161 effective with this communication plan and shall be used in
lieu of CSP-776 for Task Organization command traffic.
2520. Use effective Confidential Radio Call Sign lists and ciphers for adminis-
trative traffic.
25JfO. Effective.
2720. Effective.
2740. Effective.
SOOO. Effective. •
4120. Effective.
5000. Effective.
5230. Until receipt of satisfactory radio recognition device for aircraft the
following approach and recognition procedure shall govern the approach of Naval
aircraft to either units of the Fleet or Naval outlying island bases. Separate
special procedure will be prescribed for major bases and areas.
Aircraft approach from outside of gun range in simple cruising formation (if
more than one plane) on bearing 045° T. or 225° T. [III-4] on odd days
(OCT), and 135° T. or 315° T. on even days (OCT), from center of formation or
station at 1000 feet or under. (These bearings may be changed if necessary by
local authorities.) They shall never approach from the bearing on the sun when
the sun is low.
If station does not recognize plane as friendly it challenges by making "Zs" on
searchlight, or by training searchlight with red filter on plane if available; other-
wise at shore bases use a red smoke bomb during daylight and a red rocket at night.
On seeing challenge plane, or leading plane if there is a formation, replies as
follows :
(a) Daytime. — On odd day of the month (GCT), leave formation, circle to the
right and, when back on the approach course, dip right wing twice, on even days
(GCT), leave formation, circle to the left and, when back on approach course,
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 14
868 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
dip left wing twice. This must be made distinctive, dipping the wing about 30
degrees to the prescribed side and returning to horizontal after each dip.
(b) Nighttime. — Turn on running lights and proceed as for daytime replies to
challenge, except circling may be omitted; or make emergency identification
pyrotechnic signal prescribed in effective CSP.
When approaching aircraft are recognized as friendly, the recognition station
shall [III-5] train on the approaching aircraft a powerful searchlight,
make "Fs" or show green colored light. Those signals indicate to planes that they
are recognized as friendly and will not be fired on.
In a Fleet formation the recognition stations will be, unless otherwise desig-
nated, those ships on the outer circle closest to approach bearings 045° T. and
225° T. or 135° T. and 315° T. (depending on the day) from Fleet center.
0131. Effective.
6200. Effective.
6400. Effective.
6500. Effective.
6610. Effective.
7000 (less 7100). Effective.
[IV~1] ANNEX IV
Command relationships and coordination of activities ai outlying bases
1. Forces operating from outlying stations or bases, under this Plan, may
consist, broadly, of the following:
(a) Local Defense Forces, consisting of the local garrison and the local defense
forces (which may include submarines and aircraft especially designated for this
purpose), operating under the direct control of the base or station commander,
and with the primary mission of defending the base or station against hostile
attack.
(b; Fleet forces consisting of submarines, airplanes and possibly surface ships
or detachments, operating under a fleet task force commander or commanders,
whose missions, while contributing indirectly to local defense, are primarily
dictated by broader strategical and tactical considerations in connection with
other operations.
2. Command relationships, under these conditions, will be governed by the
following:
(a) The base or station commander will, normally, command and direct the
operations of local defense forces, in accordance with the directive of the Com-
mander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval
District). This base commander, a task group commander under the Commander
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, who is himself a task force commander under
the Commander-in-Chief, may, on occasion, also have functions of command in
connection with Fleet units in the vicinity.
(b) Fleet forces will, normally, be operated in accordance with directives of
their respective Fleet task organization commanders. In entrance and egress,
use of facilities, arrangements for berthing and services, etc., they will conform
to and be guided by the local regulations.
(c) In the event of contact with enemy forces which may threaten the base,
or the forces operating [lV-2] therefrom or in connection therewith, the
senior officer present in the base area will assume command of all forces and activ-
ities in the vicinity as necessary to take appropriate action against the threatening
enemy. As it is entirely possible that such procedure may temporarily divert
Fleet forces from some broader task contemplated by their task force commanders
of the Commander-in-Chief, local commanders must bear this in mind and reduce
such diversion to a minimum. They must also, within the limits of the informa-
tion available to them, and as permitted by the urgent local situation, so direct
an}' action taken by Fleet units under their temporary command, as to further
the broad operating plan in effect.
(d) To obviate to a maximum the difficulties which are inherent in the com-
mand and communication relationships at such bases, it will be necessary to
insure that all interested commanders, including the commanders of bases con-
cerned, are made information addressees of all appropriate plans, orders, and
reports of enemy forces. Commanders of all forces within the area will ensure
that the base or station commander, as well as the Senior Officer Present, is
familiar with the general nature of their orders and with their general operations
(unless specifically directed otherwise).
(e) In general, the question of command in such circumstances is covered by
articles 801 and 1486, U. S. Navy Regulations.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
869
(f) The shifting of vessels, squadrons, or other units within an area may result
in consequent changes in seniority among those actually present.
3. (a) A Base Defense Plan and a supporting Communication Plan will be
prepared under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
They must provide for the Fleet units present participating in the defense, and
for adequate communications among the various fixed and mobile forces, both
local and Fleet. Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier will furnish
copies of such plans to appropriate fleet force commanders. [IV-2] The
latter will, whenever practicable, supply copies to units of their command prior
to departure for operations at the outlying base. A unit commander arriving
in the area without receiving the plans in advance, however, will obtain them as
soon as possible after arrival.
(b) The Base Defense Plan should be analogous to the one currently in effect
for the Pearl Harbor area. The Senior Officer Present, in exercising his function
of command (paragraph 2 (c) of this Annex) should normally conform to the
Base plans.
(c) The Communication Plan should include provisions for:
(1) Inter-communication between units of the local defense forces, and between
such forces and the local defense commander.
(2) Communication between local defense commanders and fleet task organiza-
tion commanders.
(3) An area radio frequency which may be used within that area for both (1)
and (2) above and for inter-communication between the fleet task organization
commanders present.
Hewitt Inqxjiey Exhibit No. 36
Sep 9, 1941.
Oi>-12B-2-djm
(SC)A16/EF12
Serial 098912
D-33956
Secret
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: The U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow No. 5 (Navy Plan
O-l, Rainbow No. 5) WPPac-46, review and acceptance of.
Reference: (a) CinCPac Secret let. Serial 064W of 25 July, 1941.
1. The Chief of Naval Operations has reviewed subject Plan and accepts it.
2. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the
addressee in time by the next available officer coiu'ier. The originator therefore
authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the conti-
nental limits of the United States.
H. R. Stakk.
BOTJTING AND TBANSFER SUP — NA\Tr DEPT., KOOM 2055
(SC) A16/FF12 Document No. 33956
SUBJECT: U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan— Rainbow Five (WPPae-46)
Date received 8-12-41 Parcel or Postal No. Five
From—
To—
File
Serial
Date
Copy
No.
With
enclo-
sures
Without enclosure
Itr: CinCPac
CNO
Al6/WPPae-46 (16)
064W
7-25-41
1-5
A
Ends, received di-
rect by 20-P
Routed
to—
Copy
No.
With en-
closures
No. Cy.
enclo-
sures
SECRET Remarks CONFIDENTIAL
12
1-5
870 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[SH]
WHEN NO LONGER REQUIRED FOR ACTION OR IMMEDIATE REFERENCE PLEASE
RETURN ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) TO ROOM 2055, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS.
IF IT IS DESIRED TO RETAIN ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) INDEFINITELY PLEASE
REMOVE ORIGINAL OF THIS ROUTING AND TRANSFER SLIP AND RETURN SAME TO
ROOM 2055, OFFICE OF C. N. O.
Doc. No. 33956 Copy No. Doc. No. 33956 Copy No. -
With enclosures With enclosures
9 Received Received 10
(Date) (Date)
Op Op
GPO (Signature) gpo (Signature)
Doc. No. 33956 Copy No Doc. No. 33956 Copy No. - -
With enclosures With enclosures
7 Received - Received 8
(Date) (Date)
Op — Op
Op. GPO (Signature)
GPO (Signature) Doc. No. 33956 Copy No
Doc. No. 33956 Copy No With enclosures
With enclosures Received 6
5 Received (Date)
(Date) Op
Op. GPO (Signature)
GPO (Signature) Doc. No. 33956 Copy No
Doc. No. 33956 Copy No. 1-4 With enclosures
With enclosures Received. 4
3 Received 9-9-41 (Date)
(Date) Op
Op. 12 W. C. Blaine gpo (Signature)
GPO (Signature) Doc. No. 33956 Copy No. 1-4
Doe. No. 33956 Copy No. 1-5 With enclosures
With enclosures Received 9-6-^1 2
1 Received 8-12-41 (Date)
(Date) Op. IOC A. Meek
Op. 12 W. C. Blaine gpo 16-15240 (Signature)
GPO (Signature)
[S-ff] [Stamped :] Received S-C files, Room 2055. Aug 12 1941. Route to :
12. Op File No. (SC) A16/FF12. Doc. No. 33956. Copy No. 1 of 5.
UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FlagSllip
Peael Haebob, T, H., July 25, 1941.
CinC File No.
A16/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 064W
Secret
From : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan— Rainbow Five (WPPac-46).
Reference: (a) WPLr46.
Enclosure: (A) Six (6) copies of WPPac-46, registered numbers 1 to 6 inclusive.
1. As required by reference (a), the subject Plan is submitted herewith for
approval.
2. In order that the task force commanders of the U. S. Pacific Fleet might
have a basis for planning, and for action in case of an early outbreak of war, this
Plan has been distributed prior to its approval by the Chief of Naval Operations.
8. The Plan required by paragraph 8215 a.2 of reference (a) will be submitted
when completed.
4. Plans for other operations are under investigation and 'will be submitted as
they are developed.
5. This 0-1 Plan is the best that this command has been able to evolve for
carrying out the tasks assigned in the Basic Plan. Every investigation of pro-
spective operations among the Japanese Mandated Islands shows that risk of
serious damage from enemy submarines and shore-based aircraft must be in-
curred. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet finds himself severely handi-
capped for any such operations, because of the limited forces made available to
him, particularly by the small number of destroyers and other anti-submarine
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 871
vessels, and the lack of transports and a properly trained and equipped marine
force.
6. If this Plan is put into eifect in whole or in part the actual conduct of any
particular operation must be adjusted to accord with the situation actually ex-
isting and the forces actually available.
H. E. Kimmel
H. E. Kimmel.
Hewitt Inqtjiry Exhibit No. 36A"
14H] [Stamped:] Received S-C files, Room 2055. Aug. 12, 1941. Route to:
12. Op File No. (SC A16/FF12. Doc. No. 33956. Copy No. 2 of 5.
Peabl Harbor, T. H., July 25, 1941.
A16/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 064W
Secret
From : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
, To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan— Rainbow Five (WPPac-46).
Reference: (a) WPL-46.
Enclosure: (A) Six (6) copies of WPPac-46, registered numbers 1 to 6 inclusive.
1. As required by reference (a), the subject Plan is submitted herewith for
approval.
2. In order that the task force commanders of the U. S. Pacific Fleet might,
have a basis for planning, and for action in case of an early outbreak of war, this
I'lan has been distributed prior to its approval by the Chief of Naval Operations.
3. The Plan required by paragraph 3215 a.2 of reference (a) will be submitted
when completed.
4. Plans for other operations are under investigation and will be submitted as
they are developed.
5. This 0-1 Plan is the best that this command has been able to evolve for
carrying out the tasks assigned in the Basic Plan. Every investigation of pro-
spective operations among the Japanese Mandated Islands shows that risks of
serious damage from enemy submarines and shore-based aircraft must be in-
curred. The Comander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet finds himself severely handi-
capped for any such operations, because of the limited' forces made available to
him, particularly by the small number of destroyers and other anti-submarine
vessels, and the lack of transports and a propei'ly trained and equipped marine
force.
6. If this Plan is put into effect in whole or in part the actual conduct of any
particular operation must be adjusted to accord with the situation actually ex-
isting and the forces actually available.
H. E. Kimmel.
[73"] charge slip
c. n. o. files
•
File No. (SC) A16/FF12
Serial No. 09S912 D-33956
Date Sep. 9, 1941
From CNO
To. CincPac.
Subject U. S. Pac. Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-1, Rain-
bow No. 5) WPPac-46, review and acceptance of.
Enclosures Doc. 33956— CincPiic Ltr. of July 25, 1941 to CNO on same subject.
(Orig. & 3 copies.) -
Charged to Comdr. Griswold For Admiral Hewitt.
Charged by Lt. N. M. Blake
Date May 26, 1945.
Received by
872 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Date 22 November, 1941.
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 37
U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
COMMANDEE-IN-CHIEF
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
OUTGOING
From CINCPAC [U PAC]
Info To:
Classification: Plain
Originator: 12
HO
To COlVrt'ATWINQ 2
Precedence: Routine
Release: 01
System: LL
Show to: 13 95
Heading: Z F5L 220130 M9U QRS
UJ]
URSER 0780 AFFIRMATIVE
Ref : CLASSIFIED.
Sent at 0131/TT
Flag file. TS 01976
P\v #2 0131A/22
MHA
(At this point in Exhibit No. 37 there appears :
1. A copy of a routing slip bearing Cincus routing No, 10548
and date 19 November 1941.
2. A memorandum form bearing handwritten notations.
This material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 120 and 121,
respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[Endorsed :] A4-3/FF12-7 A4-3/VZ
PW2/A4-3/0780
Confidential
From :
To:
Subject :
Enclosure
Pateol Wing Two,
U. S. Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harior, T. H., 19 Nov. 1941.
The Commander Task Force NINE.
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Revised Schedule for Remainder of Second Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942.
(A) Two copies of proposed revised schedule.
1. Changed conditions have necessitated a revision of the schedule for units of
Task Force NINE for the remainder of the second quarter.
2. Approval of enclosure (A) is requested.
N. L. Bellinger
N. L. Beixingeb.
10543
(The enclosures mentioned supra, being two copies of proposed
revised schedule for November and December 1941 for the Commander
of Task Force Nine, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 122 and
123, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Hewitt Exhibit No. 38
(This exhibit consists, of two parts, viz, Exhibit Nos. 38 A and 38B.)
PEOCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 873
Hewitt Inquiby Exhibit No. 38A
INTERCEPTS, JAPANESE CONSUL GENERAL, HONOLULU, 10/1/41-12/2/41
SECEET
1-466
Wednesday, 1 October 1941
0900 o MURAOKA to TSUSHIMA.— Out— Have him call.
0912 i NJ to OG for birth date. NI.
1108 i Man to MURAOKA re sports.
1115 i MIKAMI to SAKAI. NI.
1255 0 MURAOKA asks Tamako /female name/ to come to see them next week.
/This has all the earmarks of straight social talk./
1257 o SAKAI tells wife /?/ that they won't need the car this Sunday.
1305 o Man asks HBD for thick drawing paper and a fountain pen. NI.
1310 i XX to MIKAMI ordering a car for 2.15.
1320 o SEKI to NAKAMURA of HBD re paper and maps. /No localities
indicated./
1324 o To HBD for supplies.
1-467
End
Thursday, 2 Octobee 1941
0900 0 To NISHIKAWA.— Out.— Have him call.
1028 i Universal Motors says the parts are ready at any time.
1042 i MURAOKA to NISHIKAWA /commercial ; NI/.
1055 i Man to SAKAI re XP. Routine info.
1115 o To MIKAMI asking him to call XX.
1121 o To RCA for messenger.
1121 i For closing hours.
1134 i TAKAGISHI to XX inviting him for next Monday, the 6th, at about 2 : 00.
T. also thanks XX and apologizes for keeping him up late. T. remarks
that XX was "high" at the /wedding/ party /of Sumida's son/ and j'elled
a lot and XX says he remembers having a good time, but doesn't remem-
ber yelling. T. will call for him.
1140 0 XX to Mrs. ? saying he has just learned from Mr. TAKAGISHI that he
was pretty bad the other night. He apologizes for his behavior and
seems to be sincerely remorseful. She says that the incident T. referred
to was quite late when XX entered the maid's room and got tangled
with the maid. He says he learned about it from T. She giggles and
is amused at his contrite heart. He asks what time the Incident /not
War/ took place. — About 1 : 30. /It seems that MIKAMI failed to show
up when he was supposed to and XX got beyond his depth in sake. He
forgot somethink there that night, and Mrs. ? /Sumida?/ asks when
she may return it to him. They both laugh unroariously at the "missing
link" of his evening's adventure. She asks whether he is at home and
learns that he is at the ofRce. She refers to it as "that", which leads to
more merriment, and says she will send "that" up this afternoon.
1145 o NI.
1330 o O. G. to Rev. IKEZAKI re girl that lives at Koloa, born 7 Feb. 1916.
1-468
Fbiday, 3 October 1941
0900 i NAKATSUKA to XX.— Not in.
0905 i NAKATSUKA to XX re the Advertiser spread about Senator Gillette's
remarks on the subversive activities of X. N. asks XX whether the
accusations are just. — No, they are only rumors. — Do you have any
idea how the rumor started? — ^No. I don't know at all what activities
are referred to as leading to the X in Hawaii. — Have you heard anyone
from the American Government asking you questions? According to
Senator Gillette, the FBI and Army and Navy Intelligence services
desire such an inquiry. He gives the idea that they are more or less
following the activities of X. /They both agree that very foolish state-
874 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ments often get into the papers./ .... Have you heai-d anything
about the Japanese on the Pacific Coast?— No, I don't tliink so. — You
feel they are just as loyal as the Js. in Hawaii, then? — Yes, I think so. —
They, of course, you deny all what he says.— Yes, I deny it. — Cate-
gorically deny it ? — Oh, yes. — He mentions here that some organizations
send funds to Japan or help distribute propaganda films in the U. S.
Do you feel that these allegations are true or not? — No, I've never heard
about the Army /apparently misunderstood N. to say the Army was
sending them/ sending films here. — You deny that X is taking part in
any subversive activity, of course? — Yes. /N. will let XX look over
whatever he writes on this matter./
0911 i KAWAMOTO of NJ to SAKAI re data on man named NITTA. NI.
0938 i NAKATSUKA to XX reading his story re Senator Gillette's allegations
of "unconsular" activities on the part of X. XX then asks N. to wait a
moment. — What for? — I am preparing a statement for you. — You mean
you are translating your J. statement into English? — Yes. — Are you
writing a long statement? — No. /N. then continues reading his story.
XX asks for his phone number and says he will call him back./
0949 0 SEKI TO NAKAMURA of HBD for paper.
0959 0 XX to NAKATSUKA saying he put the matter in very simple Japanese,
but believes N.'s story covers it very well. XX adds that he has heard
for the first time of the Japanese military league in the U. S. which
is accused of subversive activities on the West Coast. XX requests
N. to look at his paper of 4 and 5 January. VX called XX's attention
to the fact that Gillette made a statement on the 4th and the following
day a S-B editorial referred to him. XX approves N.'s story including
XX's denial that the J. War Office distributed films in America.
1008 o SAKAI to KAWAMOTO at NJ.— Out at a meeting.— Have him call.
1053 i /FPM/ Man tells OG he has received a letter which indicates that the
Federal Govt, is going to treat all dual citizens as aliens beginning 1
October. Can X do anything about it? — No. — Thanks.
1139 i KONISHI to SAKAI. Routine request for data.
1355 i NAWATANI to YUGE. /A very cryptic brief conversation In which
great surprise was expressed at some telegram or wireless message
received. No details given./
i-470
1-471
1-472
Sattjbday, 4 October 1941
0952 i KATSUNUMA asks OG re Nakazo FUJII. He has died in Hilo and
his friends have phoned to find out what ken he is from. They are all
embarrassed about the fimeral /i.e., they don't know which kenjin-kai
will take charge/. Call 98310.
1037 o OG to KATSUNUMA saying he is not listed, but his younger brother,
Nobuta, is given. Yamaguchi.
1045 i NAKATSUKA to XX. XX approves N.'s story re Gillette's accusa-
tions. N. asks whether XX has had any commimication re the two
NYK ships coming here. — No ; none ; I have read about them in the
paper. I wonder where they got the information. I haven't received
any letters from Japan since July. I haven't received any inforrnation
at all about this.
1050 i KONISHI to MURAOKA re XP of a Korean.— That's impossible. The
Koreans are in the same position as the British or Germans with regard
to dual citizenship. — This is a student at the University who has been
told he must XP before he can be eligible for an exchange scholar-
ship.— After a check, I find that it is impossible for a Korean to XP.
End
Sunday, 5 October 1941
Not Covered
Monday, 6 October 1941
0945 i NAKATSUKA asks XX about ships. They agree that' the rumors are
persistent, but no oflJcial confirmation has been received.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 875
0957 i NOMURA /f/ to MURAOKA re passport issued in 1889 (28 Nov.) to
Sanzuchi IWASAKI. Proof of arrival and date of marriage of parents
lacking.
1012 o KOTOSHIRODO /?/ to man. /Very brief, indistinct./
1047 0 SAKAI to MIHO.— He's at National Mortgage ; call 6221.— Have him call.
He sent a check to cover some fees. We asked him to send cash. —
Alright. /A sign of the times. Fees paid in in cash are not subject to
control or are easily kept out of reach of the controllers. X refuses all
checks now./
1053 o No answer. NR.
1102 0 NOMURA to MURAOKA again.— We find we have the record. He came
in 1887 on the 11th of December on the Wakaura Maru, ship No. 4.
1120 i Man /possibly Dr. of Maui/ to LG arranging to see her
• /at X ?/ this afternoon.
1127 0 XX to cook saying he will not require lunch. /He also went to hear
Bowles at PPU./
1137 0 /NR/ No answer.
1205 o SAHARA to Mr. BEERLT /?/.— He's busy.
1207 i Woman to MURAOKA re picnic.
1300 0 SEKI to NAKAMURA.— Out.— When will he be back?— He's gone to
McCully.— I'll call again.— Shall I have him call?— No, I'd rather call
myself for it may be evening before I call.
1303 0 OG to friend re picnic this Saturday. NC.
1316 0 ? to KOGO.— Out.— When will he be back?— Probably about 4:30.—
I'll call.
1-473
1359 0 SAKAI for ?— He's left.
140i 0 01 to his OG for ?'s number.— 6361, local 105.
1405 0 OI to Mr. AUSTIN /?/ at 6361, local 105. 01 says the secretary of X
returned here in 1940 on a diplomatic passport. Is he a blocked na-
tional?— I think he probably would be. — You do? — Sure, no doubt . . .
What's his name? — Mr. YUGE. He has over $1,000 in one of those three
banks.
1410 0 YUGE to SUZUKI at YSB saying he made deposits the 14th June and
26th July of this year. YUGE's balance at beginning of business 26th
July was $7..51 ; on 14th June, $562.87.
1420 0 MURAOKA to woman saying the letter is ready. This evening MURAO-
KA will be out till about 7 : 30 this evening. — I'll see you tomorrow.
1-m
End
TtTESDAY, 7 OCTOBEB 1941
0932 i YSB To TSUKIKAWA re balance. On 1 June of last year your balance
was $642.44. On 14 May of this year it was $730.02. On 26 July it was
zero.
0936 0 TSUKIKAWA to OI giving the data of the preceding.— If you have no
balance, it can't be frozen.
1026 i Man asks for date of his XP.
1031 o NI.
1203 o SAKAI to his wife. NI .
1-475
End
Wednesday, 8 October 1941
1147 i NAKATSUKA to XX re simplified XP procedure. N. asks whether
"Stimson's bill" seems to XX to be a good one. XX has a stock answer
to any and every question : I don't know. — N. : Do you think that will
eliminate a lot of trouble? — I don't know. — Do you think it will help us
eliminate the dual citizenship problem? — I don't know what the attitude
of the J. Govt, will be. — What is your personal opinion then? — "I can't
have my personal opinion if I do not know the attitude of our Govern-
ment."— Don't you know for youi'self whether it would help or not? —
No, I can't say. — I think it would be a good thing for both sides to know
876 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
which side of the fence the dual citizens are going to be on. — Anyway, I
will wait and see whethei- our Government has "an attitude to this law
or not". — Do you have any word on J. ships' being scheduled? — None,
except in the newspapers.
1315 ? NI.
1355 i /FPM/. Too brief.
1400 i /FPM/. Girl to SAKAI re XP applied for around New Year's. Yoshito
HIROTA. NC.
1406 i /Cont. of 1400 conversation./ SAKAI : Your XP arrived 3 July, #433.—
I had heard nothing about it. — The details aren't here yet, but I will
look them up by tomorrow.
End
1-Jtl6
Thursday, 9 October 1941
0918 o XX to woman at NATSUNOYA TEA HOUSE, saying he forgot to bring
home the syohin /could be 'trophy, prize' ; 'stolen goods' ; 'commodity,
merchandise'./ last night. Please put the smaller package of photo-
graphs in an envelope. I am sending some one to pick them up. — Alright.
1028 i Man at NATSUNOYA /?/ to SAKAI saying that he will send his KT to
X by mail.
1040 i Man re deferment of J. military service. He asks OG whether the re-
quest must be sent to the village office in Japan. — Yes. — But if the P. O.
here should "open" these requests for deferment, wouldn't there be a lot
of trouble? — Why don't you come up to the office with it? /It developed
later that was for advice only. The forms must be sent in by the indi-
vidual direct to the village office and should reach that office as soon after
1 December as practicable, especially in view of the uncertainty of mail
connections with Japan./
1130 i Brief. NI.
1140 o MURAOKA to GOTO re arrival of XP permits for several members of
the Goto family. Please come up for them and we will take the final
_ step in XP procedure.
1253 i Re XP ; NC ; NI.
1322 o To MIKAMI requesting him to come to X.
1325 0 ? to NAKAMURA of HBD asking him to come to X this afternoon.
/A thing that never fails to impress me is the fact that N. is not only
"familiar" with higher members of X staff, but he tells them he will not
come up when they ask him to or picks his own hour. No one else is so
discourteous, to X, as N. is./ — I can't make it today.
1328 1 Woman asks OG whether she can get money through to Japan. — ^We
don't know. /Later switched to SAKAI./ — Is it hard for people born
here who do not hold J. citizenship but who are now studying in Japan
to be naturalized Japanese? — They will have to follow the regular pro-
cedure and apply to the Minister of the Interior. Sometimes it takes 2
months, sometimes it takes longer. — You see, I have children in school
there and they won't pay money out to them because they are American
citizens. Aren't they Japanese? — No, they are foreigners. They will
not release funds to them. — Can they acquire J. citizenship here? — No,
they must be in Japan to be eligible for naturalization. — Where can I
take steps to have them naturalized? — Do all this in Japan. It cannot
be done here.
1435 0 SEKI to NYK. — ^We have word that a ship is coming here about the
20th. — Is it bound for Mexico? — I suppose so. — Are you free Saturday? —
Yes. — Then let's have a game. /Golf./
1-J,78
End
Friday, 10 October 1941
1305 0 OG to woman. NI.
1400 i Man to VX.— Call 5243.
1457 i Re XP of KONO. SAKAI had to send the $3.00 check back and re-
quest cash. Caller wondered why he wasn't trusted. S. explained that
it was the "freeze" that made the new plan necessary.
End
1-479
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 877
SaTXJBDAY, 11 OCTOBEB 1941
0930 i NAKATSUKA to XX, saying the J. short-wave broadcast this morning
/6 : 30-?/ reported that some ships were definitely going to be sent to
America to bring passengers from Japan and to pick up some to take
hack.
0932 o SEKI to restaurant reserving places for lunch for four : TSUKIKAWA,
YUGE, SEKI, and one other. About 1 o'clock.
0933 0 NI.
0934 o SEKI to ISHIZAKA arranging to meet in front /of X-?/ at a little
before 1 : 00. They are going to lunch together and plan to play /golf/
about 2 : 30. ISHIZAKA then tells SEKI that both AP and UP news
indicates that on the 15th the Tatuta Maru will sail, on the 22nd the
Taiyo Maru will sail for Honolulu from Kobe. From San Francisco
the Tatuta Maru will sail direct for Japan while the Taiyo Maru will
come to Honolulu and return. The Nitta Maru will proceed to Seattle.
Today is Sunday in Japan and I have had no wire from the head office.
0939 i NI.
0955 i NI.
0957 i /FPM/ To OG. Very brief.
1000 0 /FPM/ Re picnic. NC ; NI.
1012 i Girl to OG, arranging picnic. NC ; NI.
1-480
1-481
End
Sunday, 12 Octobek 1941
No activity
Monday, 13 October 1941
0900 0 MURAOKA to TSUSHIMA.— Out.— Have him call.
0930 i Woman says she wants to send parcels on the ship that is coming to
Honolulu, but supposes that is not permitted. — We can't say about that.
0932 o SEKI to MIKAMI re football and tennis tickets /apparently the police
game/.
1045 i NAKATSUKA to XX. The first edition of the H. S.— B. Saturday
reflected that X had had no word re the ships, but this was changed in
the second edition after I'eceipt of official news from Tokyo. No news
since Saturday.
1049 i Woman re request for deferment of J. military service which she wishes
to send on the steamer leaving here the 15th. He suggests that she send
it registered. Rest NI. If she sends it through X, however, he requests
her not to send it before December, for the dates are 1 December to 31
January of the following year. /Time and again I have observed that
9 out of 10 calls connected with deferment are from women. Apparently
they look after this detail of keeping their husbands or sons out of the
J. Army./
1135 0 MURAOKA to Mrs. FUKUMOTO, a language school principal, re a
questionnaire which he will send her by mail since he hasn't time to
bring it down. It may be that he had a child at her school, /Makiki
J. L. S./?/, but no real clues are given.
1144 0 MURAOKA to Mrs. KIRIHARA asking her to telephone X tomorrow
morning after 9 : 00.
1320 0 OG orders tickets in Japanese for VX as a private individual, not as VX
/to what?/.
1433 i KANEKO to YUGE asking whether it is alright to give the wording of
the cable from the F. O. to X to the press as received. — Yes, I think so.
/YUGE starts to ask a question put as K. hangs up on him./
—END—
878 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Tuesday, 14 October 1941
0910 i For? — Still at home.
0940 i KIRIHARA to MURAOKA, Mostly about arranging a social affair early
enough in the day to permit children to attend. Later M. tells K. that
Saturday is a holiday because of the great ceremony at the Yasukuni
Shrine /enshruiement of war dead/. They will get together then.
1003 i NAKATSUKA to XX saying there are 800 J. residents who are going
to leave the Pacific Coast. Have you heard how many are leaving here? —
The NYK is maldng all arrangements and I can't say what the whole
number is. — Do J. nationals have to clear any papers with you first
before leaving for Japan? — No.
1026 i HBD to NAKAMURA of HDD. — He's left here.
1307 i Castle & Cooke re pensioners. — Person in question not here yet.
1330 o SEKI re some printing jobs.
1343 o Re camphor and formalin.
1420 i "Have NAKASUJI call 91043 if he comes in."
1430 0 /FPI\I/ Man calls re passport. Matanosuke MURAKAMI. Routine
check if arrival.
1443 i MacNaughton /?/ of Castle & Cooke asks SAKAI for addresses of these
persons who are C&O pensioners now living in Japan. Under General
License No. 32, C&C are permitted to make these monthly remittances to
them, but the Bank of Hawaii has no J. funds available. Should we
approach the YSB or Sumitomo direct? — The secretary in charge will
call you back tomorrow. He has left for today.
1-483
End
Wednesday, 15 October 1941
0913 i Kiichi KUWAHARA applied for XP in August. He is expecting a new
KT on the next ship. Shall he bring it in? — Yes.
0925 i DATE to SAHARA, reporting death of SHINJIRO SHINO. He wonders
whether it has been reported.
0927 o SAHARA to DATE. Yes, it was reported on the day he died.
1152 i Re application for deferment of J. military service. Routine.
1206 i /FPM/ Sports talk. They will play Saturday afternoon. /One of the
junior members of the staff and a friend./
1-m
End
Thursday, 16 OcxoEBai 1941
0853 0 Sakai to ISHIHARA.— Out.
0858 o Sakai to OHIRA at NJ.— Out.— Have him call.
/Ichimatsu OHIRA is NJ collector./
0902 i Nakatsuka to XX.— Not in ; call back.
0913 i NAKATSUKA to XX, saying he will be up in 15 or 20 minutes to see
XX.
0915 i KUWATA to Sakai re application for deferment. Routine.
0918 i Woman asks whether she can get her /son's or husband's?/ application
for deferment off on the Taiyo Mani. OG thinks so. The woman is
worried for fear the J. Govt. wiU not grant deferment. OG thinks every-
thing will be alright.
0928 i /FPM/ Man to X, saying something is at 5 o'clock today, or something
at 9 o'clock.
1000 i Calling in to ask about the draft deferment request. — He should send
it in.
1024 i NAKATSUKA to XX, reading to him in English interview for S-B 10/16
re his ideas for the consular probe suggested by Senator Gillette. — "How
do I say about the Hawaii-born Japanese?" — No. I make little refer-
ence to the Hawaiian born Japanese. The talk is all more or less all
pertaining to the when I say the Japanese people of Hawaii, I take it
for granted that that's the older people. — Yes.^ — Because otherwise I
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 879
I would say Americans of Japanese ancestry. — Yes. And you remember,
one place I said : 'The elder Japanese also gladly send their American
born sons into the Army'. — "Oh, yes, yes" /rapidly expressing under-
standing/.— That gives the impression that all along I've been talking
about the older Japanese. — Yes, that's alright. — Because the younger
Japanaese, vpell, everybody would take it for granted that they are
loyal. /Hearty laughter by XX in which N. soon joins. XX breaks in
with :/ "Yes, yes ; quite natural." /More laughter by XX, of a polite
sort./ — N : Do you want to mention anything about your X here? I have
omitted it because I knew it is very delicate. — I think it alright just as
you say now. Thank you. Goodbye.
1039 0 To HBD for supplies. NX.
1-485
1043 o To a pharmacy for a substitute for medicine formerly gotten from
Japan. — Will send up % lb. — If OK, may get more.
1045 i Dr. ■ to XX, inviting him to dinner on the 19th at YMCA
/?/ at 6:80.
1053 1 To Sakai re request for deferment.
1055 i NC; NI.
1135 o OG to Mackay Radio /FPM/. OG: message received this morn-
ing.—What number is it?— HC 169 SN /?/— 169, one moment . . .yes,
here it is.— It's the third word.— Third word? OG: The first.— The
first?— First.— 1 uhh 00 980.— Yes.— Do you want that word checked?—
I want this tenth word checked.— Tenth?— Yes.— That's J U U G.—
The next one.— The next one, G O N A N I G O N I T E?— Yes. I wish
to have you check if it is G O N A N A.— It should be G O N A N A.
OG : So we'd like to check on that. — Yes. I'll check that up. — And who
is calling? — The Japanese Consulate /no particular person/.
1209 i From Mackay Radio : This morning you got a message from Toko by
Mackay Radio and you wanted a confirmation of the next to the last
word. That's GONANANIGOONIT E.— I see /repeating it/.
1310 i To Sakai about the draft deferment, whether he needs to report. NI.
1320 i. NI.
1434 o NI.
1440 o Lee for taxi right away to go up to X.
1-486
End
Friday, 17 October 1941
0900 i YAMASHIRO no other name given, but X understands/ to X. Y. sent
off a letter concerning the deferment for Tomimatsu SHIGETOSHI.
Received under date of August 5 from Japanese city or town hall a noisy
or vigorous letter, saying he was to return to take his physical exam for
conscription. What is the best way to reply? Native village is Takaoka
Prefecture, Hikujo Country, Kurotsuchi Village. He was born August 8,
1920. X will see. Please wait. X tells him to send off something as
soon as possible and then wait imtil January anyhow.
0905 i Girl in English : "Ah wanta inquire where to have where the Japanese
go to see about th' expatriation papers. Can you tell me?" /Apparently
someone who -wants to have her maid expatriated. Accent mainland
American, probably Southern. Calls in long distance./ — At this office.
0925 i Inquiry whether OK to forward draft deferment by mail. — OK, but to-
morrow is a holiday, so if you get stuck don't come in then.
0987 i NI.
1000 i NAKATSUKA to XX, reporting the latest news just in "that U. S.
merchant ships have been ordered from the Chinese and Japanese waters.
Of course, this isn't straight from the Navy Department, but it's what
some iwople Have you received any word to that effect?"
/No answer. Perhaps XX doesn't quite understand./ N : We have some
word even in Honolulu that ships dovra here have been ordered to stay
away from the Asiatic waters .... The only reason is that the Navy
considers the situation in the Pacific quite serious. I think that's the
only interpretation. — XX replies that he hasn't heard anything about it.
880 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
. . . wants to know when it came in /as he didn't quite get it tlie first
time, when conversation was in English/.
1017 i To Muraoka /private ; NI/.
1027 0 Muraoka to someone in connection witli private plans. NI.
1047 i Evidently a mistake.
1203 i NI.
1-Ji87
1-m
l-U
Saturday, October 18, 1941
No Activity
(Japanese Holiday)
Sunday, October 19, 1941
Out of commission
Monday, Octobeb 20, 1941
0840 o /FPM/ Muraoka /?/ to /?/ re : sports. NI
0845 0 Muraoka /?/ to Nishimoto. Is out.
0846 o Muraoka /?/ to Suzuki, re : tennis. NI
0847 0 Muraolca /?/ to /?/ who is out.
0848 o Muraoka to Fujikawa. Are you coming to the party? NI
0855 o Muraoka to Sasaki. NI.
0856 i NI
0857 o Muraoka to another Muraoka. FPM
0859 o To Mr. YOKOTA of Occidental Life. Not in yet. Have him call 2243,
Mr. MURAOKA.
0859 i To VX. Not in yet, but soon.
0904 i 01 calling re : a conscription deferment for someone.
0908 i To MURAOKA. NI /about the party and getting geishas/
0956 o To RCA for messenger.
1003 i Man asks how soon he must hand in his application for deferment.
1028 o MURAOKA to NISHIMOTO inviting him to a party at the Natsunoya
the ■26th.
1030 0 MURAOKA to TOMIKO (?) inviting him to dinner Sunday. Apparently
not private invitation for the price of $2.00 is mentioned,
10310 NC;NI
1035 i . . . . Call 5243 (Line #2)
1100 i Woman to Muraoka. NI.
1120 i YSB to TSUKIKAWA saying a draft has come for him.
1126 i KURISHIMA to Muraoka re tennis and other sporting events. Later
there was mention of 5 cases of liquor for the big event. There will be
exhibition game.
1136 0 MURAOKA to Mrs. HIROKOTO (?) re tennis next Sunday. NI
1147 i NI
1248 i re office hours.
1249 i Re XP. The man XP'ed a number of years ago and then later had his
J. citizenship restored. His father or an elder man wants to get his
status with regard to (J. ?) military service cleared up. SAIKI asks
him to come to the office to talk it over. (It seems that the boy is now
trying to dodge J. military service after becoming a Japanese citizen.
"Restoration" of J. citizenship should automatically XP from American
nationality, because "restoration" requires an act on the part of the
individual and is not on a par with the accidental citizenship acquired
by birth. This dual citizen lost his J. citizenship when he XP'ed and
then lost (or should have) his American citizenship when he had the J.
citizenship restored.)
1305 o An outsider calls out for information re a form he is filling out. NI.
1325 0 KUNIYOSHI of K. store in Moiliili to old man. He had asked for his
KT in connection with XP. Call 8323 and ask for Takazu.
1328 0 KUNIYOSHI to ? complaining that his XP has not come yet.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 881
1334 o KUNIYOSHI to 4221 re his BC (Birth Certificate). There is a dis-
crepancy in the birthdate. K. is much perturbed but J. girl at 4221
tells him not to worry. The old man was probably late in registering
K's birth with X and didn't wish a scolding or fine for late registration,
so gave a later date. The Board of Health date is here taken as the
correct one.
1448 ? (FPM) NX
End
l-],90
Tuesday, Octobeb 21, 1941
0910 o NT (Maraoka about beer for the party!)
0915 o MURAOKA to NISHIMURA. Not in. NI.
0917 o MURAOKA to NISHIMURA. Not in. NI.
0918 o MURAOKA to NISHIMURA. In! NI. /More about the beer. 4 or
5 cases?/
0926 o MURAOKA to YOKOTA. NI. /a geisha— to arrange for THE party/
1003 o MURAOKA to FUJIKAMA. NI.
1004 o MURAOKA /?/ to SAKATA Bon Ton. Out.
1016 i NISHI of NYK to YUGE reporting that they have received a definite
telegram that the ship will be off port 10 a. m. day after tomorrow /i. e.
Thursday/
1019 i NAKATSUKA to XX — has' he had any word as to the exact arrival time
of the Tatsuta. Yes. It will arrive on the 23rd and not on the 24th.
But he doesn't know the exact time of its arrival ( !). Can't think of
anything else.
1045 o MURAOKA to Sec of Hawaii re SHIOMATSU (or CHIYOMATSU or
CHINOMATSU). Secretary's man wants "everything on the card."
"His birth September 5, 1873.
"Arrival November 2, 1906."
"Is that the only arrival?"
"I see several times he went back to Japan."
He will have to check and find out just when he first came. Continues
re wife Hina, now dead.
Also re one SUZUKI.
1059 0 Muraoka to pal. NI.
1103 o Muraoka to NI.
1121 o Muraoka to Mr. Medeiros re Yamashiro' CHIYOMATSU (Chiyomatsu
YAMASHIRO?) when he came etc.
1-^91
1145 i KANEKO to VX saying the prospective repatriates are very numerous
and the accounts connected therewith are most troublesome. Many of
them are trying to get permission from Washington to get money from
New York and so on etc. we are having an awful time with them.
VX — How about sending them up here to pay their fare?
k — That's all right, but there are immigration problems too.
VX — Let's take the whole matter up with Mr. Strench.
K — You mena with Coleman?
VX— Yes. With Coleman.
K — What about white passengers?
VX — White passengers?
K — Yes. The head office has arranged for some haole musicians to sail
with us. A Mr. Si Si
VX— Mr. SIROTA?
K — Yes. Mr. and Mrs. There is a group going first class to Slianghai.
They are Americans.
VX — People going to Shanghai must take a transport. There is no
other way.
K — These people are "foreign correspondents" of some "news service".
They must be newspapermen.
VX— The name is not NEWMAN, is it?
K— No.
End
882 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1-492
1-493
Wednesday, October 22, 1941
Out of commission
Thursday, October 23, 1941
1400 o Muraoka to tai (female). M. — "Tlie person is not a passenger."
"He didn't come back then." "No. He didn't."
1413 i inquiring "one information about my girl friend." NI
1414 i Inquiry. Hard to hear. NI.
1427 o To RCA for messenger.
1434 i fragment. NI.
1554 i F.P.M. NI
1603 i KATO to KANEKO. "How late will you be open?"
Planning details, beds etc. NI.
1618 i Dialogue between KANEKO and XX re : who is to issue the tickets and
how they will be paid for. Apparently the rates are much lower for
this trip than the usual ones. Kaneko is worried because many of the
passengers have paid in yen and the company keeps its books in dollars.
Kaneko says taking into account the discount they will get only about
$69.75 for $85.00 and suggests that the "simplify" the system ?perhaps
keep receipts in dollars or yen/ and cable to the main office for authority
to do so.
1816 i Seki to KOTOSHIRODO asking him to come over. He will.
2032 0 N.R. Man (not VX) asks for taxi.
1-494
End
Friday 24 October 1941
0900 ? (FPM) Re sailing of TATUTA.
0912 o
0934 i Re deferment. Routine.
0943 o Re deferment.
0947 i NI -
1010 i Man to MURAOKA re meeting at NATSUNOYA (Tea House) Sunday
morning early, which they wish to postpone a week.
1020 o Seki to MIKAMI asking him to come to take XX to ship in very few
minutes. He wants to be there before 1100.
1048 i Redeferment. NI
1112 i Re BC ; NC ; NI.
1105 o Seki to SAKAMOTO re cameras. Have your cameras all gone up
15%? — No, only 10% — One of my friends wants to buy but they had
sold all— we're out of those foreign made ones too. No new ones come
in, and everyone bought before the price rise on 1 Oct. We have
super DX and super-6 with meter — How much are the Super-6's? — •
$176 — Is that the best one you have? — No we also have some for $219 —
Does that include the case? — No. — I may be in soon to look them over,
1110 i FUJITA of YSB to X saying he would like passage on the TAIYO.
A letter has come from the Yokohama office ordering me home. X prom-
ises to arrange passage.
1130 o To NAKAMURA. Out.
1138 i Very noisy. NI.
1153 i Re deferment. NI.
1255 i Some sort of query. Very faint/ NI.
1-495
1845 i For xx. Mr. NEWMAN calling. N. arrived yesterday on the Tatsuta.
Mr. MAEDA said he would speak to XX re NEWMAN'S going back on
the Taiyo. XX saw Maeda — but hedges when asked if anything had
been arranged. He hasn't "approached" the NYK yet, but he will "have
a talk" with them. N. dropped around to see XX but got to his office a
little too late today, so missed him. N. is busy this afternoon having
eyes examined — is getting new glasses made here before he goes back.
N. won't be able to make it before XX goes home at 3. Could he (N.)
see him early tomorrow morning. He has a letter from Mr. KISHI of
of the Joho Kyoku. "He has a few things that he wants you to get for
him so I can take them back. Also N. has to get a reentry visa to
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 883
Tokyo. He spoke to Mr. Kishi, and also to Mr. Yokoyama and also to
some of the people in the foreign office and they said the best thing
would be first to start it thru here and the application has to be made
and it will have to go thru the regular channels but they may facilitate
it from the other side. XX thinks that in that case they will have to
refer the matter to the Foreign Office. Says that in fact "about any-
body that came thru now we have to refer it back." Laughter by XX/
Does XX think tomorrow would be all right to do that? He does. N.
says they know all about him over there and thinks approval will be
just a routine matter. He will drop around tomorrow morning ok.
1312 0 To KANEKO NYK from SEKI of X who will come to the point at once
re a long cable which KIMURA came and sent on the 8th of August to
the tune of $45.82. The cable was sent to Tokyo to NYK main office.
X would like payment please. OK.
1315 0 To XX HAKUBUNDO from X to order some small swords (or small
trees) for some of the people sailing on the boat today. OK. Appar-
ently left addresses during earlier personal call.
1330 i Some inquiry re Japanese made products or Japanese nationality /?/.
X doesn't know either. NI/
1-496
End
Satubdat, 25 October, 1941
0925 i Man discusses entering his son in a J. school. The boy is without J.
citizenship and the authorities in Japan will not admit him. Caller
wonders whether X cannot write a letter to the authorities that will
explain the situation in Hawaii and facilitate the boy's admission. S.
says the boy must go thru the regular procedure of having his J. citizenship
restored. He must apply to the foreign minister for naturalization. As
a person of J. descent, the procedure applied is different and simpler. It
is called the "restoration of citizenship" instead of "naturalization" even
in cases such as this one where the boy never was a J. citizen because
he was not registered at X (born subsequent to 1 December, 1924). XP
procedure must be instituted here, while citizenship restoration proceed-
ings must be instituted in Japan.
0929 i KAWAMOTO of NJ to Sakai saying the FBI is investigating the consular
agents and also the members of the NJ branch office (for Kauai).
They are accused of being Army or Navy officers. K. suggests the giving
the NJ men identification cards to prove they are members of Domei
News Agency.
0955 o SEKI to MIKAMI asking him to come to X.
1013 0 Sakai to Mr. Creighton at S-B. Creighton sent the money yesterday
with Mr. Newman. The amount was $20. N. has an appointment with
Mr. Kishi (error for Kita?) this morning. The secretary must have
the money before he can send the wire (for permission for Creighton
and Newman to travel on the Taiyo). S. can't send the wire without
the money, and it has been mislaid somewhere. C. promises to get it into
X's hands by noon.
End
1-497
1427 0 Yuge to IKEZAWA at YSB. /This line got deep in the rain. Very
hard to catch/. What the main trend of the conversation is I don't know,
tho the conversation sounds important. Something is "funny — strange."
Whether a man / one of the three getting off tlie Harrison?/ is from Tokyo
or Yokohama. Also mention of the "situation being bad." Some men-
tion of the Pensecola Hotel having something. The following sequence
cannot be vouched for, but the words sounded like the following :
"You're not returning."
"No."
"Keep pistol, eh." /This line in English?/
"Yes I have, because the situation is so bad." /The last sentence in a
very grave voice, and clear./
End
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 2 15
884 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1-498 Sunday 26 October 1941
no activity
Monday, Octobek 27, 1941
0855 i NI. Wrong number.
0900 i MURATA of Waialae to inquire about the notification of arrival at
military age. Is referred to book stores or newspapers, advised to mail
it on the Taiyo.
0915 o MURAOKA to YOKOTA retennis. NI
0926 i Inquiry about method of forvparding military age attainment forms.
Either thru X or personally is ok.
0943 i Inquiry about expatriation procedure. Is advised to visit X for help
1026 i Inquiry regarding first steps in expatriation procedure. Is informed
takes about 3 months.
1030 i Pan Pacific Union callion. NC. Not able to come to lunch today.
1117 o To Hakubundo from Muraoka re engraving on trophy cup. NI.
1130 o NC/ Ran out of blank cylinders at this point until 1420.
1135 0 To RCA. (NR) On 2oth of this month 33 word telegram in code was
sent. How much is cost of telegram ? $4.79.
1424 o Seki to 01 discussing some sort of "applicants" /for passage on the
Taiyo?/ until the 31st. Apparently the X doesn't want to handle them.
1437 0 To RCA. "Will you send a messenger boy?"
1443 o XX to RCA. Your message #154 /poss. 164?/ which we received today
has two pages. We received one page. She will send the other right
over. Now XX says they have received three pages already! It's all
right !
1450 i To OG. Very brief.
1458 0 NI.
End
1-500 Tuesday, Ootobeh 28, 1941
0820 o NI
0828 i To Sakai/?/ Not in.
0907 o Conversation with YANE wanted to write it, but hasn't a pen or
anything, so can't /a country woman/ NI.
0921 i NAKATSUKA to SAKAI ?Also asks if Kita is there. No./ Asking
about IIZUKA, his dates etc. SAKAI was working there but "doesn't
kOGD tr3.ck of tliG d&tGS "
0928 i NAKATSUKA for XX— Not in. "What's happened to him this morn-
ing?" Gets phone #4416.
0929 i For Muraoka. Inquiry from KONISHI re FUKUDA, Michizo of Yama-
guchi prefecture, Oshima county, Okika village. M. will phone him after
he has looked it up.
0940 0 To KANEKO from SEKI at X. Is K. returning? He is. Then he must
be busy, but S. wiU trouble him with a little business re : the forthcoming
Taiyo call. S. has received a cable that the Taiyo will be here on the 1st
instead of the 31st. Also a cable that there is on board a man Taro
TOKUNAGA who was on the Asama Maru / and of course had to go back/
who wants to get off here and take an American boat to S. F. Doesn't
know whether he is- a man of wealth or influence or not. They aren't
clear if there ate two of them or only one. If S. finds out he will call.
0956 o SEKO to KANEKO/?/ regarding 2 passengers on the Taiyo, one from
San Juan, the other from Philadelphia. American(s?) and honorary
consul (s?) Pardin is a high personage who was returned to port on
order of the government as he is going to the mainland on the Taiyo.
They have orders from the Foreign Ministry?/ to put them off and take
care of them. Doesn't know how old. They/?/ are Roman Catholics.
Then the problem arises about the money the said passengers will need.
Will arrange about it later.
lOOOo To Rosecrans for Taxi.
1004 i FPM. Very brief.
1008 0 To Secy, of Hawaii. Line is busy.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 885
1012 i KONISHI TO MURAOKA request for information on RIKIZO and his
wife — how long have they been on Kauai.
1-501
They came September 9, 1898. Re : OTAMA. M. doesn't know. Re :
SAITO, Kuislii and Fukuishi ; get their dates also.
1020 i SHIMOKURI re : filing of report on conscription attainment of military
age. Will they receive it? They will. He'll bring it.
1022 o To NAKAMURA at /YSB?/ inquiry about yesterdays rates. N. Bays
they are changing all the remittances for Japan into dollars, and they
are paid in Yokohama. The price is about $24 — 24 points. /This?/ is
to pay for a telegram so what will $5.9.3 be in yen? N. says the rate is
about $24 for ¥100 / then giggles and opines that $24 is quite a bit to
pay tho tliat is the rate they give their guests !/
1058 i NAKATSUKA reads long rebuttal by Kita denying acquaintance with
Tadaake IIZUKA /see papers for 10-28-41/ N. at one point says he
wants "to clear (Kita) from this case" by pointing out that IIZUKA
was here in 1935, long before Kita.
1110 o TUGE to 01. NI.
1131 i Family talk. NI.
1140 0 To RCA for messenger.
1141 o For time.
1150 ? (FPM) NI.
1152 i NISHI to Sakai. NI.
1200 o No answer.
1201 o MURAOKA to HIGA (girl) asking for her father. He invites him to
come to the office this afternoon about 3,30.
1415 o (FPM) The ship will be in on the 31st.
1420 0 Sakai to ITAGAKI re one cloisonne vase belonging to to the honorary J.
consul at San Juan, probably an American, but whose name we do not
know. Things could be handled infinitely better if w^e knew the other
man's (I'ecipients?) name. (It is from the present or the previous
Foreign Minister to the honorary consul at San Juan. There is no
price indicated. ) Itagaki : I think we had better wait till it arrives
and then see how to handle it.
1-502
1432 0 Sahara to YOKOYAMA /?/ Out. Have him call if he gets back by 3
o'clock.
1484 0 Seki to SATO. Out. (To MIYAMOTO) Seki wishes to talk over with
SATO the question of 4 yards of some kind of cloth.
1440 i Re various children of a man who died on Kauai.
1441 i Re oflice hours. Up to three. Caller then asks whether a child born
two months ago, but of whose birth the family had just learned, cannot
be registered immediately with X and thereby acquire Japanese citizen-
ship— No. It is absolutely impossible. — Isn't there any way it can be
done? — No. None whatever — (as a matter of fact there is a way called
"restoration" of J. citizenship, but the child would have to be in Japan
in order to have his previously non existing J. citizenship "restored".)
1445 i An eldest son wishes to return to Japan and asks what steps he must
take as an eldest son who has an eldest son born here who was not
registered at X within the prescribed period. He wants the child to
be a J. citizen — After two weeks it is impossible to give the child J.
citizenship if not registered at X. — Isn't there any way? — If you return
to Japan with the child "restoration" proceedings may be inaugurated —
You can't restore J. citizenship here? — No. there is absolutely no way
of doing it here. After two weeks have elapsed the child is an American
and nothing else. — Even if my ignorance of the child's birth until today
prevented registration at X?— That has nothing to do with it. If the
child's birth was registered with the Board of Health, take documentary
proof along with you and the whole thing can be arranged in Japan.
1447 o to UEDA. Out. Have him call tomorrow morning for a correction.
1448 o Sahara to KAWAMOTO re mistake in data. Please bring for correction.
1450 o To RCA for messenger.
1451 i Woman to OG re XP procedure. Routine.
1459 i Same woman for further details. She asks whether she has to have her
parent's consent. They are opposed ; she is 1&— You will have to have
their consent if you are under 20, for you will have to have them sign
886 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the petition (Caller is under considerable strain. Her parents want her
to return to Japan and want her to keep her J. citizenship but she wants
to cut loose from it entirely.).
End
l-SOJf
Wednesday, 29 October, 1941
0905 i (FPM) Woman asks whether it is true that all baggage must be on the
docks early — Yes (She then asks about deferment of military service.).
0945 i Inquiry as to the meaning of "Maru".
0946 i /can't hear it because of ruoise in record — something about a chokusen
— straight line/.
0947 i NISHIMURA, Mataso, asking something about enlistment.
1021 i To SAKAI re: Conscription levies. Routine.
1022 o to NYK. YUGB calling for "Take" YOSHIOKA giving information re
CHRICHTON, Colvil M. directing him to issue a ticket for him. He is
on the Taiyo. Also re: a NEWMAN /to take care of him?/.
1034 i Fragment.
1035 o To S. B. to Mr. CHRICHTON— will he come up and fill in the application
for a visa. They hear he is trying to go to Japan and /they?/ have
received a wire from Japan. C. will come in this afternoon.
1103 i Inquiry whether there is time to get an exemption claim back for the
conscription summons. This boat will be okay.
1105 i To MURAOKA. NC. Somebody too busy to play today.
1111 0 For Mrs. SMYTHE of the Senate chamber. Call 59471.
1111 0 To 59471. Mrs. Smythe speaking. Would like a copy of the M-day bill.
Doesn't know if they have any more. .Will check and mail one.
1302 i Inquiry as to hours of business.
1318 i Inquiry about conscription, deferment.
1326 i Inquiry about conscription deferment.
1333 i Inquiry about conscription deferment. X will receive them.
1341 i Inquiry about sending money to Japan. Country person. NI.
1-505
1540 0 to RCA. Will you send a M. B.
1712 i No answer
1-505
ThuBSDAT, 30 OCTOBEB 1941
0845 o Staff member to sister (or sister-in-law) about groceries. NI.
0901 i Man to Sakai. NI.
0926 i to MURAOKA re something he wishes to send to Japan by Parcel Post/
Will there be duty levied on it? — We can't say. A great deal depends
on the man inspecting the particular parcel in question. Old or new,
one or many — all these considerations enter in.
0927 0 to Mr. Hallett ABEND at RH Hotel. (Connection with Abend not made.)
0935 o OG to Nakatsuka for address of ABEND, who is supposed to be living
at the RH Hotel., OG reports he wasn't there this morning/ N. sug-
gests she try the Moana. (Then to XX) SB wants a list of the Taiyo
Maru's departing passengers. We haven't a complete list yet. There
may be further applications. We have turned the matter over to NYK.
Would you permit us to publish the list Monday? — I think it is all right.
0944 i A haole at our place wants to send some chocolate candy to Japan. Is
that permitted? — I imagine so but I don't know.
0945 o OG to Moana for ABEND— Not in. Have him call 2243.
1002 i FPM. Man re deferment. Routine.
1020 0 XX' to ABEND at Moana. Not in. Shall I page him? Tell XX called.
— I left that message for him. He will call you when he comes in. —
When do you think he will come in? — I don't have the information when
he will come back. The message is in his box and under his door and
he will receive it as soon as he comes into the hotel. I have not any
urgent need (XX interrupts for a long laugh) but I am one of his old
friends and would like to hear his voice.
1030 o KAWAMOTO of NJ re deadline for applications for passage. Saturday
noon,
1033 i SATO to Seki. NI.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
887
1-506
1100 i
1105 o
1107 o
1108 o
1114 i
1116 i
1120 i
? i
1205 i
1210 i
1252 i
1255
1315 i
1340
1355
- 1413 i
1500 o
1-507
1502 o
1-^08
0848 0
0849
0851 o
0855 i
0902 i
0913 0
0923 0
0934 i
0935 i
0940 o
0945 i
0946 i
0950 0
1108 o
1116 0
1123 0
1-509
1127 i
Man asks whether he can send 5# sugar and 2 or 3# nails to his parents.
Yes, but there may be duty to pay. NO ; NI.
Seki to merchant re bill. NI.
NI
Seki to MIKAMI. Out. Have him call.
Dr. Wickerson at Moana Hotel to XX. OG says XX is out and she can't
make out Wickerson's name. W. insists he foimd a message requesting
him to call XX. (Could Dr. Wickerson be Hallet Abend's nom d'exile?
Or was the note to Abend put in the wrong box?) Call 4416.
MIKAMI to Seki asking him to come over.
Elderly man to Sakai re XP ed deferment.
Dr. Wickerson to XX. XX wanted ABEND, not W.
Komatsuya Hotel to YUGE re the allotment (of space on the Taiyo)
according to ken. Is there any disctinction made with regard to citizen-
ship status? — ^All circumstances are taken into consideration. The funda-
mental division is into kens.
Girl to X. He's left. Re XP.
Re application for passage on the Taiyo. The usual system. (What is
the usual system? Via NYK).
KANEKO to VX. Out. Have him call 6198.
To MURAOKA re number of declarations of applications. Quite a num-
ber left.
Miss IMAMURA to Muraoka. NI.
Girl asks for YAGI, ABE, AND HORI. None of them there. (The
three lads who transferred from the Harrison to the Taiyo here last
week. )
FPM. TOGASHI mentioned, but this conversation was interrupted by
the next one. NC.
NI
NI
End
FbEOAT, 31 OCTOBEK, 1941
Muraoka to ? saying the tennis matches will start at 10 o'clock Sunday.
ABEND to XX. Out. When wUl he be in? In a few minutes— When
I got in yesterday your office was closed. I am going out this morning,
but I will call him later in the day.
Muraoka. NI.
Woman to Muraoka re deferment. Routine except that M. tells her X
will be closed Monday, a holiday.
Re deferment. Routine.
Seki to 01 of JCC. Out ; I'll have him call.
To Glabe wireless for ISHII. Out.
Re deferment.
Re deferment.
Seki to HARADA. He left a few minutes ago. Then to Mrs. H. asking
about a cool room for a (Mr?) TAKEMURA arriving the next day or so
(presumably on the Taiyo) who will be here a week before proceeding
to the states. She has already had word from XX to this effect and is
going to give him a cool room being vacated very shortly.
Re deferment. Question by woman as usual.
SHINAGAWA to Seki re deferment (First re office supplies). Seki men-
tions ABE and his prices. (ABE appliance Co.?) NI/
Muraoka to INADA ordering groceries.
XX to KIMURA re necessary supplies. Replenishment of the oil is the
main thing. (Long discussion but nothing of interest. K. seems very
cooperative. He is trying to make arrangements for cleaning a place for
the customs searches. He expects the ship to dock about 0800. He ex-
pects to be down at the dock at 0730. Both are in good spirits. )
Yuge to MIKAMI asking him to come to X.
NI
SAKAMOTO requests information as to data of his family.
888 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1145 i Query re an application for XP.
1148 0 Muraoka to friend.
1152 0 Moraoka to Tosliio (first name). Sports. NX.
1154 o Muraoka NI.
1155 o Muraoka NI.
1155 i Seki to Yuge re some financial matters and how to treat the public funds
collected /for the Taiyo/.
1238 i Query re conscription.
1239 i for SEKI. Out /?/.
1244 i Inquiry for someone — ^Not in.
1305 o Muraoka to NAKAMURA. Sports. NI.
1306 o Muraoka. NI.
1308 i Inquiring re afternoon hours.
1308 o Muraoka to KIMURA. Out. Left message. NI.
1315 o KITA to someone re Monday being a holiday, v. brief.
1320 i OTANI (woman) to SAKAI. Something about a copy of the census
register. She wants to take it home and he'll get it that evening or
something. She has to make the proper moves it seems to i*e-register
the fishing boats previously confiscated. He is explaining to her the
difference between having the boat owned by one's own son who is a
citizen and having it owned by a stranger or mere acquaintance who
acts as a dummy. /But they agree that it amounts to the same thing./
He asks her to be sure to return the papers he is lending her and she
promises to — she probably won't work at it after 9 PM this evening.
1341 0 YUGE for SEKI. His superior over there /in Japan/ says that /it/
is good. IWANAGA is /on?/ the boat. Yes. probably. So there is
only TOKUNAGA. Something about loading /chocolate?/ onto the boat.
The words hachi hachi are mentioned toward the end of the talk. One
says hachi hachi /lierally eight eight/ and the other says "I under-
stand." /The recorder doesn't !/ This expression is used for a game
of cards. Also for a squadron of 8 battleships or 8 cruisers.
1407 o X to Mr. NEWMAN. Can he come tomorrow or Tuesday since Monday
is a Japanese holiday. He'll try to come tomorrow.
1448 o to NYK for Mrs. Nishi? Asks where KANEKO is. He is phoning. Here
he comes. K. is so distorted I can't understand him at all.
1-511
End
Saturday, 1 Novembee 1941
1038 o NI.
11)10 o To Yamashiro Hotel for a children's room, (for whom?)
1128 i Man asks for correct spelling (in Japanese) of new premier's name.
1140 i NI.
1149 i to Seki. FPM. Caller went down to the ship to see if he could locate
the cosignee thru the purser's office, but no such message had been left
there at all. As a matter of fact? did come — I made enquiry thinking
one of the passengers might have brought it in his baggage, but again
the quest was unsuccessful. — Is that so? — The Embassy (probably
J. embassy in Washington) intervened with the treasury to facilitate
entry. I don't think there would have been any trouble — Is it a big
thing? — Yes. Rather. (In the part recorded no name was mentioned, no
article was specified. I have no clue as to the nature of the article.)
1241 o NR.
1306 0 Seki to Kyorakkan ) hotel) asking for one room up to the departure of
the Taiyo on the 4th. She tells him to wait. (Cut off in the rush, but
gist elsewhere in log as monitored direct.
1300 1 NR.
1309 ? FPM Re mail on Taiyo.
1310 i Kyorakkan (a hotel) (a call-back) to Seki asking how many guests
there are. — One. — When? — Right away. — What food? Probably occi-
dental.— (K. will take him. Not sure who it is, but probably one of
the diplomats or otlier leading man from the ship.)
1315 i Man wants to send a package on the Taiyo but has heard that she will
take no mail. He wonders whether this was a J. govt, decision. — ^No.
It was the American Govt's decision. — I heard that the P. O. was
turning down and returning packages already mailed. There are mobs
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 889
of Japanese at the P. O. who want to mail letters and parcels. — They
can't get anything very definite out of the P. O. The P. O. apparently
doesn't know itself what it can accept and what reject.
1-512
1317 o Seki to Mrs. Harada asking her how the matter of the room was finally
decided this morning. When they came back from the ship this morning
Mr. IWANAGA alone (of the diplomats?) came here. A little later Mr.
TOKUNAGA called in about a room and I had to report that matters
were a little hard to manage just then. FUJITA is leaving shortly and
his room will be free then! Mr. TOKUNAGA said he has a iuton of his
own and would be glad to sleep in the closet or anywhere if space could
be spared. Food can be arranged for them, but the main thing is a place
to sleep — I discussed this with Mrs. Yuge and she thought they could
stay at XX's house — But it would be not quite proper for a married
couple to stay there (Does Seki think XX would neglect to observe the
canons of diplomatic immunity as he did the night of the Sumida wedding
when he got drunk and chased the Sumida maid round and round the
bedpost?) — Fujita's room would be free on the 4th and the Tokunagas
could take it then. How long would they want a room? — Till Friday —
If they could stay somewhere till Tuesday we could take care of them—
If they were an older couple they could stay at XX's without hesitation,
but they are a newly married (or young married) couple which compli-
cates matters. (They both laugh knowingly). In full realization of the
risks involved in a young woman's staying at XX's. Mrs. H. agrees to
ask Mr. HASYIYA to move to a small room for two nights to make way
for the TOKUNAGAS if no other suitable place can be found.
1325 o Seki to Kyorakkan re the young couple. Seki tries to be sure a married
couple will be welcome there. (The hotel is often used by people less
interested in the enduring bonds of life.) She says it will.
1452 o NA. Fragment while caller was waiting for XX.
1545 o to ? for messenger boy.
1547 o NI.
1605 o To Pensecola Hotel. NR ; NA.
16-? i re ; Age for draft /American/.
1-512~A
(Addition entries missed on first log)
0907 i Inquiring re passenger on Taiyo. Haven't got list yet.
? ? To 6907. The awful nes breaks. The Taiyo will not take any mail !
The P. O. says so. Washington has sent a cable to the postmaster.
0945 0 To Mackay radio for messenger.
0950 i What time did Taiyo get in ?
1000 1 Personal call for Sakai?
1007 i Fro Sakai in good english from Alice YONENAKA. Could I come and
see you this morning. Wants to bring her copy of certified census reg-
istra rather her mothers. /Probably getting expatriated/. He tells her
to bring her sheet and he'll look it over.
1047 i Wrong number.
1050 i FPM/ Inquiry re ; report of residence abroad for deferment of J. military
conscription.
1108 i NI.
1135 o for HIROKAWA of registry department of P. O./different Hirokama no
doubt/ to check on the mail situation. H. only knows what he heard
and picked up. Refers X to P. M.
1137 0 To P.M. Not in. Asst. P. M. will be in about 1230.
1159 ? Fragment re XP.
1202 0 To NYK. Message from Minister of Communications via XX which is
referred to TAKASAMA at 2772 /?/, Gives his own number as 4416.
1213 0 XX to KUSUNOBU /?/ his cook /?/. Wants lunch for four people at
his residence. /Probably KIMURA is one.
1215 o XX to /maid at home?/ In about 10 minutes 4 guests will be coming.
But no one is there and cook is out !
1217 0 XX to /another kitchen?/ Today is a wedding day. Therefore SO
SORRY ! /Poor Kimura ?/
1218 0 He tries again. Hooray ! Success. Orders a simple meal not party style
since he planned to have them at his home originally, he says.
890 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1-512-B
0956 i 01 calling about "educational films" /?/. Afterward talking about a
Kwanto style doll /?/ /Wasn't there some question whether one could
be carried as an "award" to some American commission or something?
Apparently the verdict was negative from the tone of the voices.
— End—
1-51S
Sunday, Nov. 2, 1941
1510 i Rang a long time ; finally answered but callee not there.
End
Monday, 3 Novbmbke, 1941
1-5U
0909 i from SOGA. Recently Mr. TOKUNAGA has come from the Foreign Office
and Japan. Am inviting him for dinner, also Dr. Motokazu MORI and
VX/& others ?/6 P. M. tonight. Some possibility of another farewell at
the boat. Invitee will have to excuse himself from that if he can. At
the first part of the conversation SOGA explains, I think, that he knows,
or knows of TOKUNAGA thru Mr. Ken HARADA, his son's wife's
brother, who is in the Foreign Office, tho born in Hawaii. Not very sure
of this tho.
0934 i From OMI Shoten. When will the Hikama get to Yokohama?
0955 i NI
1004 i Conscription. Routine.
1024 i NI
1026 i NI
1221 o Routine. NI.
1224 o to HARADA /?/. If he comes in have him call X.
1355 i HARADA asking about Taiyo mail situation as concerns the notification
of attainment of conscription age reports which have to arrive by Nov.
31 in order to comply with Japanese law. Is asked to call tomorrow
since today is a Japanese holiday. They say that since the Taiyo is
out, another boat will probably be all right.
1400 i NEWMAN to XX. Would like to come up for a few minutes right away.
1508 i Inquiry. Woman with no passport is worried /lest the boat return to
Hawaii?/ She introduces herself as an ordinary woman. Probably in-
teresting but not urgent just now.
1611 i NI.
1-515
#2 log
0820 i NR. Star Bulletin calling. Call after 9 :00.
0939 i NI
1046 i NI. Re deferment. ,
1047 o 01 of JCC to Chamber of Commerce (Hamilton) asking whether there
has been word on mail situation. No word from Sam King either. The
postal inspectors expect word this afternoon.
1-516
End
Tuesday, 4 Novbmbeb, 1941
0918 i Man to Muraoka re 3 games (tennis?) tomorrow.
0927 i FPM. NAKATSUKA to XX. XX has no news from Washington re mail
situation. XX wanted the Taiyo Maru to take mail to Japan. ( See the
S-B.) XX "Mr. King knows (the character of) Mr. Haan." This in
answer to N's remark about the "fight" between the two.
0986 i /VX and YOSHIOKA/ YOSHIOKA seems furious at something. Sounds
as tho he thinks he is being cheated. Perfectly enraged. Something
about /the authorities?/ not thinking it worth while to telegraph on the
advice /or request or for the sake of/ a nikkei* or a whole boat load of
them. (*nikkei American citizen of J. ancestry.). YOSHIOKA cites
the discrimination shown towards the nikkei — the niunerous personal
questions asked etc. etc. compared with the treatment accorded other
Americans and VX /?/ replies that it is discrimination, isn't it? Perhaps
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 891
he is talking about the questions asked of the incoming Taiyo passengers.
Anyhow he is still furious and very indignant. Also something about
the mail being held up. Towards the end of this long harrangue Y.
suggests that VX intercede — just how is not clear — possibly thru the
Federal courts, for the nordsai bansho is mentioned. Probably the
effects of red tape plus extra work, worry and anxiety have added fuel to
Yoshioka's rage. He is very disturbed to say the least. They cool down
enough to laugh a bit toward the end.
1028 i TAKAYANAGI. NI.
1002 i Re deferment.
1003 i Re deferment.
1045 i From a fellow returning to Japan regarding military service there. Is
advised to explain to Japanese authorities his real address (in Japan).
and they will understand.
1053 i KANEKO to VX re baggage. Inspected yesterday at 7 and today again —
they have been trying to get cigarettes. Will VX help as they can't get
enough? He will. Discuss sailing time etc.
1126 0 SEKI to TOKUNAGA /?/ to say that DOI is waiting for him at X. /A
little other talk — can't get it easily./
1-517
1142 i VX to XX He's busy with someone in "that room" (the lowered-to-
inaudibility voice indicated that it was a conference which she had
instructions not to interrupt). Tell him when he finishes to please
wait on the matter of the (NYK?) company's telegrams.
1144 0 /to RCA?/ "Your messenger just came in here and and took 3 messages
back. We'd like you to hold them, return them, if you will please.
O. K.
1203 i To SEKI to inquire as to a reasonable price for stockings, eh ! Bought
1 dozen.
1327 i FPM. For TAKAGISHI. Out. Gone to Ala Wai.
1345 i to SEKI from TOKUNAGA. /very blurred, but something about a car,
probably asking SEKI to have him driven somewhere either by taxi
or by X car.
1350(0 To Hiberly. XX would like to come down. Make date for 2:10.
1405 o to KYORAKKAN asking if TOKUNAGA has gone out yet. No— not
yet. Well, the car is "dry", so please have him wait a little please.
1407 i for SAKAI. He's out till 3.
1407 i Wrong number for Easy Appliances.
1435 i Fragment
1450 o XX Will you send a messenger boy.
1-518
End
Wednesday, 5 November, 1941
0917 ? NO ; NI
1002 i Re deferment.
1005 i WEST of UH wants name of XX.
1007 i JARAKI of Mitsukoshi to VX.
1023 i NI; NO
1038 i Re expatriation; NI
1058 i Inquiry re mail
1005 i HARADA to IWANAGA ; wanted to invite him to dinner tonight, but
since it is an hour earlier than usual will invite him for lunch. Did.
Something about HACHIYA and Nov. 24th. Can't get last part at all.
1113 i For /VX?/ from YOSHI at NYK.
1115 o NI.
1343 o For messenger boy.
1449 i NAKATSUKA to XX re KURUSO. Is XX planning any reception?
Hasn't yet decided. XX has received a message. It will take about
5 days from Hong Kong. Foreign Ofiice message said he would arrive
by clipper, but didn't say when he would arrive here. XX doesn't
know much about KURNSO. Wife is real Caucasian. Oh ! Oh ! Oh !
Ah ! Ah ; "She's quite a Japanese lady. She eats Japanese food and
is very polite and looking very nice.
1457 i NC; NI.
1459 o NI.
892 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1636 o to (4)? YUGE to Mrs. NISHL She asks him to call and gives him
the number 67182 /that of the boat/.
1640 i KANEKO to YUGE arranging about working and the tickets etc.
tomorrow morning. /A lot of accounting still to do. Long discussion./
1711 i About sailing.
1-519
Thuesday, 6 November, 1941
1000 i NI.
1020 Seki to Nakamura of HBD. NI.
1035 i NAKAMURA to Seki. NI.
1045 o Routine data call. Very lengthy.
1055 o Sakai to George SAKAMOTO re deferment.
End
1-620
1-521
Fbidat, Saturday, Sunday, Novembee 7 to 9
Out of Commission.
Monday, 10 November, 1941
0905 0 Sakai to PAA asking about arrival of clipper. About 1700 tomorrow.
0910 i NAKATSUKA to XX re delay in arrival of KURUSU— VX and I will go
out to meet him — The N. J. says he is going to stay at the R. H. Hotel —
That's right. — Are you going to have a lunch for him? — No. I'm not
organizing any parties — Will there be a private party at X? — Yes. I
think so. — When is he leaving? — He will stay overnight.
0915 i Komatsuya Hotel to Sakai re XP. NI
0916 i Girl for VX re KURUSU. Not in yet. Please have him call to let us
know when the Ambassador is arriving.
0918 0 Muraoka to friend re cup (athletic trophy). NI. Very lengthy. Sports
chatter.
0925 o Muraoka to friend re sport. NI.
0927 i Nakatsuka to XX asking whether KURUSU will call on governor and
army and navy leaders here — I don't know. No word yet — Are any of
the leaders of the J. community going with you to meet him? — SATO
[pres. of JCC and UJS] may go. On Saturday morning he was sure
whether he would be allowed to go to the landing at Pearl City. He will
check with the authorities today. — Who is going to be at the dinner? —
Not decided yet ; we are still discussing the matter — There will be about
10 guests. XX — ^Any haoles? — No. A strictly Japanese gathering. — •
What time will it start?— About 6.30.
0930 i ITAGAKI to Seki re the possibility of sending parcels to the Embassy re
American Railway Express.
0936 i For XX ; busy ; for VX ; "You'll have to call him" "Oh shux. What's the
number." "5243".
0943 0 To tell — ? — that tho tomorrow is a holiday the stores will probably be
open. WiU he make preparations to get in touch with them and have
them stay closed.
0951 o To ONOH to Sumitomo Bank. Tell him that party is postponed till
tomorrow at 6.30 because of delay of clipper etc. Will be at oflScial
residence.
1030 i To XX from Pan Pacific telling him about Education week and that
Mr. Long is speaking. She is hoping XX and VX could come. Sorry —
today they both have to attend to "my friend's luncheon." — Yes. VX too.
- Too bad.
End
1-522
Tuesday, 11 November, 1941
Holiday; closed.
1207 o Seki to Morimura saying KURUSU has been delayed a day and as a
result XX's kitchen help has been driven crazy. Seki then asks M. to
come over with KIKAWA /?/ this evening about 1800 for dinner with
XX [to help eat up the excess food prepared.]
1208 i Seki to ? announcing delay and inviting him to XX's house.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 893
1-523
Wednesday, Novembee 12, 1941 ■
0839 0 For IMASASHIIMA. Shall she have him call? He's out, will be back
about 10. He's at the corner of Kukui and Hall where /he/ just sent
a blacksmith. Something about*No. 2 /house beyond a Chinese family's?/
She finally has X call at 10.
0845 i Wrong No.
0855 0 Yuge / ?/ calling Bob. Not in.
0915 i FPM Routine inquiry
0930 i For XX from Mr. FORE /?/ of the Airlines. Wants to come up this
morning. OG says OK. /Probably going to explain what happened to
the plane !/
0933 0 To SASAKI at YSB. Muraoka re sports.
0935 0 Muraoka re sports.
0937 o For cigarettes. NI
0939 i Re Illumination for the party. NI.
0954 i To Seki. The party is off. Much laughter about something.
0958 o To "Jimmy" from NAKATA. "You tell one of my boys come get me at
the Japanese Consul right away." NI.
1000 i Routine re J. conscription.
1015 o to ? No come down yet. NI
1035 0 From MORIOKA. NI
1048 0 to KUSANOBU /?/ re seating arrangements. 15 persons can't be divided
well. How about 16? Also about times etc.
1130 i Lt. Riddick to XX reporting clipper left Midway at 7.30 this morning.
1133 o To S/B/ to NAKATSUKA. Not in.
1145 i Inquiry on KURUSU. OG doesn't exactly know. Inquisitor gets hot at
such ignorance. 5 :10 she says.
1150 o To HBD for NAKAMURA from Seki to ask how the photographs turned
out. Be careful of them.
1-524
1325 Q To Royal Hawaiian Hotel. SEKI went down yesterday to make a reser-
vation and asked XX to tell hotel that plane is coming in this afternoon.
1345 0 Inquiry re China Clipper. 5 : 15
End
1-525
Thubsday, Novembeb 13, 1941
0925 0 To P.A.A. from X. What time is the China Clipper leaving for the
coast?" . . . "Three o'clock." X thought it was 1 or 5. Mr. KURUSU
must be there at 2.
0935 0 NI. XX asking when plane is leaving for S. F.
0942 i NAKATSUKA of S. B. to OG. XX did give KURUSU a private party
last night (according to OG).
1001 o to II airways re China Clipper.
1025 o Wrong no.
1030 i KAWAZOE to VX. He's phoning. Call on other phone.
1045 i KAWAZOE to SSKI tho he really wants VX.
1147 o NI
1155 i From a man from Royal Hawaian who has called SEKI's home and
can't make himself understood there. "The ambassador is putting up
a real fight to pay his own bill. He's not to pay it, eh?" "Yes (!) Mr.
YOUKI is to get the bill and he will pay.
End
1-526
Fbiday, No\t:iiber 14, 1941
1045 0 For someone who is out.
1048 0 For TSUSHIMA— out. For FUJIKAWA. Morioka calling.
1050 i For MORIOKA from TSUSHIMA. The cup is finished. NI.
1103 o To HBD. Fragment.
1302 o MURAOKA. NI.
End
894 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1-521
Satubday, November 15, 1941
0930 0 OflScial at X wants someone to call him.
0948 0 To Mackay radio. "Will you send a messenger boy?" XX.
1058 i To SAKAI from CLAUDUS/?/who will come tonight to his house about 6.
One asks the other if he has seen the new Shimpo /weekly/. There is a
discussion of the necessity /of having or of not having/ bonds. Asks
whether he has studied the problem in relation to the freeze. They are
worried about the future possibility of war and especially something
that ABEND has lately written /probably Shimpo has quoted from the
last "Life",/ also worried about the future of commerce.
0915 o To Mackay Radio. XX has received message #238, but has received only
page 1, not page 2. M. says last night they sent two pages at about 7
o'clock. Then, at 7.25, he sent corrected copy of page 1. Seattle made a
mistake, so they sent a corrected copy of page one. Page 2 is all right.
11151 To XX. Busy. Nakatsuka.
End
1-528
Sunday, November 16, 1941
No activity
Monday, November 17, 1941
0946 i Inquiry re expatriation.
1005 0 to KANE from SEKI. This morning they are paying bills.
1045 i TAKAHASHI /woman/ re : the fate of a 25 year old U. of H. graduate of
dual citizenship who has become a public school teacher. He has never
been registered as a Japanese citizen. First step is to get registered etc.
1316 i From KOMATSIYA about "yesterday's case" / The hotel is apparently
handling the deferment petitions of KOICHI and FUJIKAWA. NI.
1340 o SEKI to OI. Something about paying /?/ for registration. Instruc-
tions have come by cable from the minister. There is some other problem
to it tho. They were advised, after conversations with the American
government, that there might not be any necessity of registering /the
money?/. So SEKI thinks it is ok. /Some diggerel about somebody
from X rparrying a fatty /?/ Seems to be between a Miss DO and
KIMURA of the bank.
End
1-529
1-530
Tuesday, November 18, 1941
0905 i FPM. Muraoka on tennis.
0910 0 To HBD. MORIOKA to NAKAMURA whom he asks for FUJIMURA
with whom he discusses tennis at length.
0915 o MURAOKA— tennis
0917 i from a man who wants to speak to the "one who uses cables." Caller
iS'Eigo CHIROMA — a senior at U. H. who is making a sociological study
of the Okinawas in Hawaii. Would like to get statistical material about
their occupation status, distribution, numbers, how many have left for
Okinawa etc. X doesn't have those facts. C. says the Jiji Annual has
some information — he thought they had got it from X. X says they
don't keep record of how many come and go, and especially this was a
long time ago — They keep "just if they come and report — but don't keep
track of the numbers. C. asks how he'd get the materials. X says to
ask the Okinawa people "they have some sort of club you know," — but he
doesn't think they have such records. But X thinks he can get the
general idea. Refers him to immigration.
0928 i To SAKAI re hospital bill.
0954 0 To SATO Music Store saying the radio at the official residence of XX last
evening and for some time past has been so when you listen there is
freekune /?/ — something the matter with it anyway. Asks him to come
up and look at it.
1007 o For Mr. /UE?/ MASE. Out. Call 2634.
1008 0 To OYAMA. Out. Try 6311 /?/.
1120 i From Mrs. NISHI to say goodbye.
End
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 895
1-531 Wednesday, Novembek 19, 1941
1009 o Fragment
1028 o MURAOKA to girl. Someone is to bring "bron paper" (birth certificate)
in within two weeks.
1127 i to MORIMURA /?/ frag.
1415 0 YUGE to N. Y. K.'s TAKEI. NT
1437 i From ONODA of Sumitomo who supplies or is supplied some data on
addresses and names in Japan.
End
1-532 Thubsday, Novembee 20, 1941
No activity — Holiday
Friday, November 21, 1941
0930 i FPM./ Mistake in log?/ Sounds like UEMURA to maud. "They haven't
come yet, have they?" "No."
0934 i Routine. NI
0955 0 Asking YAMAMOTO about a souvenir for a deceased friend. /Has he/
TGCGivGd It *^ Ygs.
1011 o URAOKA to YAMAGUCHI. Wants to get some information re him or
his mother. Y. apologizes— he has received the letter from X but has
been too busy to answer. Will answer in 2 or 3 days. M. says Saturday
till noon, other days till three /for him to come in?/
1022 0 Something is at 6 tonight, gurobu?
1027 i to MURAOKA re club affairs.
1033 i From OAHU JUNK CO. re matter called about previously, the
YAMAMOTOT business. No one is around now. This evening /we?/
will inform /him?/ and tomorrow a. m. he will let you know how much
it is.
1347 i to SAKAI from MACHIDA. The pictures are finished. Shall she bring
them? No. He'll pick them up.
1420 i to SAKAI from KOMATSUYA with a new ? Paketto HIROSHIMA
on August 23. "I don't remember attaching and due /paper?/ on it."
Probably NI.
1-533 Monday, November 24, 1941
0050 o X for U. S. Coast Guard for Mr. Anthony, (Someone speaking for
Mr. VX.) re letter rec'd from CG. CG is preparing new passes for
everyone who has legitimate business on the waterfront and has re-
quested list of such people from X.
End
Tuesday, Novembeb 25, 1941
1008 0 FPM re the evening KURUSU was here — asks for the bill for photo-
graphs of the occasion. $27.50.
1128 i NAKATSUKA to XX telling him about a Frederich Kuh U. P. report
from London of a provisional agreement between J. and U. S. in
Washington. XX : — "Is it from London?/ !/ It is ! N. al.so reports that
the new dual citizenship bill has been approved by the House sub-com-
mittee. Provides for compulsory renunciation of foreign citizenship by
persons in U. S. Gov't, or armed forces, and voluntary renunciation of
, foreign citizenship by all others holding dual citizenship. XX heard on
the Tokyo radio about the Tatsuta, but hasn't received any official word —
he says. He doesn't know if there will be a ship to Hawaii.
1157 i From applicant for XP. "For a person in the government service it is
very inconvenient to be a Japanese citizen." Wants to hurry.
1402 o To Maekay for messenger.
1410 o To HBD. Muraoka for either NAKAMURA or FUJIWARA. Gets F. re
tennis. ,
End
896 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1-535
Wednesday, November 2G, 1941
0931 0 From SAHARA /?/ Something about Satiu-day. NI. Not regular X
call.
1025 i For SEKI from SATO SHOTEN about a bill.
1102 i To SAKAI from YAMAMOTO. Something about an order for 2,000
cases of something Friday, and about the price, and about a wire in
connection with them.
1131 0 To AKAYAMA (girl) from MURAOKA. NI
1140 o to MACKAY. X for messenger.
1258 0 for ? Out. If he returns have him call SAKAI
1317 o re Sa to Kinjiro and Saito Karoku /to a girl/ The place isn't written
in. Please drop in and sign them.
1357 o To Mackay for messenger.
End
1-536
Thursday, November 27, 1941
0924 i to SAKAI from /Seiichi/ HAYAMA /Pharmacist of Honolulu Pharmacy
Co./ Your photographs are finished. OK. I'll get them tomorrow or the
next day.
1014 i girl /INAGE?/ asking for a census registration person. She was regis-
tered /in Japan/ 24 years ago, but the receipt has been lost. What to do?
Girl explains she is calling for a girl whose /parents?/ have died and be-
cause of her job it has become inconvenient not to have it /XP/ Finally
some satisfactory arrangement is made.
1041 o MURAOKA to girl, ISHIURA giving an address and family information
in Japan. Also re some relative in Pahoa. NI
1045 i Fro SEKI from YSB re some "usual bills". YSB wants to write a letter
about it.
1342 i To SEKI from MIYAMOTO of YSB. It is $14.00. They have finished
the investigation of cash on hand ; will bring it up.
1343 i NAKATSUKA to XX. N asks him to answer Sen. GILLETTE'S charges.
XX says he has heard from the Japanese radio that the Tatuta is coming
to L. A. and Balboa. "I received no information at all from Tokyo. I
was very sorry."
1502 0 to NAKASHIMA or ? MOKIOKA? for a date. She puts him off till Tues.
of next week.
End
1-537
Friday, November 28, 1941
0900 i NAKATSUKA to XX asking for a reaction to Sen Gilette. Asks XX
if he knows that Jack Wakayama has said that the Hawaiian Japanese
Civic Association would welcome an investigation. XX asks if he is here
in Honolulu ! /XX is well uninformed on most subjects !/ XX says he
has repeated that same statement many times already and thinks that
is enough. He feels that if there were an investigation things would be
more than 100 percent OK. N. says if they do find some un-American
activity going on, the sooner the better so they /the U. S./ can get rid
of them. /Friendly agreement and polite laughter Curtain/.
0922 i About date for some dinner in past. NI
0950 0 Private call by sonieone from Star Bulletin. Everybody /at X?/ is out.
What to do? They'll be there in a few minutes.
0952 o Man to girl. NI ,
1005 i for SAKAI from man. Lunch date.
1030 i FPM Routine inquiry re nationality
1038 0 Short conversation but can't get it. Something about "three o'clock."
1052 i From ONO of Osaka Shoten re attainment of military age form.
1100 0 to RCA re message received this morning. No. 1070 want to check.
"On first page, second line, 8th word : CCFGR ; 10th word, ITLJS ; on page
two, line 2, 9th word: P(B?) MEDZ-^ last line, first word, IRWPB and
third word ZZGRO, and the ninth, FPOEN.
1125 i Is SAKAI there? This afternoon at 1.30 I'm coming to your /house/.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 897
1328 i FPM about something /someone has left?/ in a drawer.
1338 o SAKAI asking about films. They (the store?) called about them this
morning whether to send them or not. They agree that someone is to
bring them over.
1-538
1442 i to MURAOKA from MIKAMI re deferment of conscription blanks. If
born in August 6, 1905 you don't need to fill out the blank do you. No,
you don't. Or if born in 1925 you do not need to, do you. No. Thank
you.
End
1-539
Sattjbday, November 29, 1941
0905 o SAKAI to ? about doing something on a commission basis. Also wants
him to takejsome pictures of the graduation /or a member of the gradu-
ates?/ Wants 2 pictures. /Personal NI
0925 i ProVX. "Will you call his other phone?"
0936 0 FPM from VX. Sounds important, but very hard to get because of faulty
recording./ Mention of a /black?/ smith's shop of Fort St, and a few
isolated words, but no other clue.
0950 i For SAKAI from HAYASHI /can't get this message but tone sounds
legitimate and innocent./
1015 o to OKUMURA /having something to- do with/ children. His "card"
in the X is incomplete. Will he come in and finish filling it out? He
will.
1025 o for NAKASHIMA. Out. Have him call 2243. Caller not or VX. Man.
1150 o For Yoshino, a girl /from MURAOKA/ This is the same girl that put
him off before. Sample talk :
Yoshino?
Yes.
How about it?
I don't know what you're talking about.
Don't say that!
Have you some matter to talk about?
Of couse.
What is it?
etc. NI
1200 0 XX /home?/ wants to eat right away.
1-540
End
Sunday, Novembeb 30
No activity
Monday, DECEMBEit 1, 1941
1000 0 to RCA, for messenger
1045 0 to NYK TAKEI from SEKI who says he received a telegraph /to be
sent thru X?/ some time ago and wants now to settle accounts. $45.82.
They are bringing the money up today. T. asks about the situation
but SEKI doesn't tell him anything startling. TAKEI is worried for not
being able to get home, but admits he doesn't know what the situation is.
(Doubt is S does either!)
1115 i Inc. to XX, NAKATSUKA quoting an AP dispatch based on Asahi
despatch from Washington that the closing of J. consulate is imminent.
First public reference. "Have you had any information?" XX has not
had any information from TOKYO to prepare for possible closing (he
says). He saw "a few lines," in this morning's Advertiser. XX thinks
the Tatuta will leave tomorrow, but on all else he is his usual blank self.
1150 0 to HBD for NAKAMURA. Tsukikawa calling re day before yesterday.
This morning /it was set?/ at 9.S0, __ no 10. At X? Yes. /This con-
versation pretty fast. Translation a little unsure./
1305 i For someone who's not there yet. Girl calling.
898 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1326 0 YOSHIOKA to MATSU/DA?/ Won't you come out in front of the office.
/Possible taxi, because he emphasizes the words "in front of."/
1330 o for NAKASHIMA. Date with her.
1352 o to a girl. NI
1405 o to HBD for NAKAMURA. Out. When back? 3 or 4. Well then please
/have him call me? First part was missing/.
End
1-5U
Tuesday, December 2, 1941
1429 o to TANAKA. Has he sent the things. Yes. The price will be about $30
since prices are going up. Too bad. NI
14291 MURAKAMI to SAKAI re Fujino. "Is it all right or do we have to
send a letter first? The latter M. will come over. XP. NI.
Discontinued
/ ! Sic transit gloria mindi !/
RX
R. P. P.
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 3SB
INTERCEPTS, JAPANESE VICE-CONSUL, HONOLULU, 10/1/41—12/2/41
SECRET
Wednesday, 1 Octoeeh 1941
0915 0 VX to MIKAMI for a car at 3 : 45.
1143 i XX to VX. XX is going to Waikiki at about 2 : 30.
End
2-2J,8
THxmsDAY, 2 October 1941
1027 o VX to KIMURA.— He's out.— I'll call again.
End
2-2^9
Friday, 3 October 1941
1011 0 VX to KAWAZOE at NJ dictating a statement in reply to Gillette's state-
ment. /See NJ for text./ Interrupted.
1016 0 VX to KAWAZOE, continuing the statement. K. reads it back as a check.
1020 o VX to KAWAZOE /?/ of the HH with the same statement on the Gillette
question.
1030 0 VX to KAWAZOE at HH /?/ adding that the S-B carried on 4 January a
statement by Senator Gillette, followed the next day by a S-B editorial.
End
2-250
Saturday, 4 October 1941
No Activity
2-251
Sunday, 5 October 1941
Not Covered
2-252
Monday, 6 October 1941
0925 o /To #4./ VX tells wife that he will have lunch at the Pan-Pacific.
/Gilbert Bowles, Sr., spoke./
End
2-253
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 899
TtTESDAT, 7 OcrroBEB 1941
0913 i Woman to VX. — Out. /Woman speaks in English at first and then latdr
in Japanese. It was probably MORIMURA who answered./ — When will
he be back, do you know? — Very shortly. And what is your name,
please? — /She falters a little in her embarrassment and says:/ I just
wanted to talk to him personally. — I see. — I suppose that's all right,
isn't it? /M. hangs up without answering or giving her a chance to
finish./
1000 i /FPM/ /Verbatim, woman spealjing:/ It is the second street toward
the sea from King. It's just in front of this Castle Church. You
probably know it, don't you? The Makiki Church that looks like
o-shiro /Japanese for "castle"/. It's just the other side of McKinley
High. — Oh, is that so? I think I can find it quite easily. — Between
Pensacola and Piikoi. — Oh, I see. — Most anybody knows it, because
it's just this side. There are several apartments around a court. The
entrance to the court is just across the street from the entrance to
Makiki Church, this o-shiro church. — I see. — So I think you will find it
easily. 1116-A Elm Street. — Is there any indication at the gate of the
house or . . .? — Well, the number is out on the . . . /indistinct/. — You
see, 1116-A faces Palm /?/ Street and 1116-A is inside the court. —
Alright, quite right. — I'll look for your tomorrow, then. Thank you very
much. — Shall I take Mr. XX? — Ah ha, please. — And my wife? — Please..
Thank you very much. — Not at all. — Goodbye.
1121 i /Prom #4/. /Due to technical difficulties I couldn't understand any-
thing. Neither could the principals./
2-254
End
Wednesday, 8 Octobeb 1941
1405 0 VX to MIKAMI /?/ to send a car to X. Do you know Elm Street?—
No, but I'll check it.— The number is 1116-A Elm Street.
2-255
2-256
End
ThuKSDAY, 9 OCTOBEE 1941
No Activity
Friday, 10 Octobee 1941
1125 ? /FPM/ VX and woman. It is apparent that a picnic is being planned
for this weekend. Woman reports there will be 5 or 6 to a car.
1401 i MIKAMI to VX.— Send a taxi over.
1415 i /FPM/ From #4 : Mrs. VX to VX. NX.
1427 0 To #4 : VX to wife. VX will soon be home.
End
2-251
Satueday, 11 October 1941
0958 i YAMADA asks VX whether XX and VX can come to Shunchoro on
Monday evening, the 13th, at 6 : 00. — Yes.
2-258
2-259
End
Sunday, 12 October 1941
• No Activity
Monday, 13 October 1941
0925 i /FPM/ ? to VX re nature of the ships being sent. The word hikiage
/evacuation/ is to be avoided, and "temporary relief" used in connection
with these ships.
0940 o VX to Kimura. — Out.— Have him call.
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 16
900 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0947 o VX to KUCHIBA.— Not in.
0950 ? /FPM/ ? and VX. A few remarks about mail just received after a long
delay.
End
2-260
Tuesday, 14 October 1941
0952 0 VX to KAWAMURA of HH. The Nitta Maru is being replaced by the
Hikawa. /K. thinks this is "very interesting."/
1000 0 OG to "Trouble".
1000 0 OG to Repair Service, wondering why 5243 cannot be connected with
6091. — Try again, and dial slowly.
1005 0 VX to KAWAZOE, saying the Nitta Maru has been replaced by the
Hikawa Maru. /Probably this Kawazoe is at NJ./
1010 0 /To #4 :/ VX to wife saying a cable has come for him. He has talked
the matter over with the NYK. /No clue given here as to the nature
of the discussion, but it may be that VX and family will return to Japan
on the "evacuation ship"./
1020 i Mrs. HAMAMOTO to VX, who can hardly understand her at all. She
is one of the fastest chatterers ever heard here./ At 5 o'clock Saturday
she invites herself up to see him. — How about 7 Thursday evening? —
If business should make it impossible for me to see you, how may I
reach you by phone? — 8428. /She jumbles it so in pidgin English that
neither VX nor I could understand her. After long shots wide of the
mark, he finally asks her to give it in plain Japanese. It turned out
to be 8429./
1040 o VX tells ? that the Nitta Maru has been replaced by the Hikawa Maru.
1203 i Castle & Cooke to VX re three pensioners of the Waialua Ag. Co. —
The person in charge of these matters has just gone home. Will you
call 2243 after 1:00?
1430 i KANEKO to VX notifying him of the arrival of a cable re the ships being
sent. Passengers and mail ; no cargo. There are to be 1000 persons on
the Tatuta Maru and 500 or 600 on the others. There are no reductions
from the full rate. Third class is $165. There are so many uncertain-
ties that the rest of the conversation was conjecture of little interest.
2-261
2-262
End
Wednesday, 15 Octobee 1941
No activity
THtTRSDAY, 16 October 1941
0943 i xxxxsxxx VX to /Mikami?/ re the October 6th issue of Life; buy
5 copies. /Note : issue contains two articles of possible interest./
1130 o To 01 re the Women's Club /Fujin Kai/ something-or other wants
to find out if it is today or tomorrow. — It is today. /He finds this
out after a pause in which he apparently asks someone./
1148 i KANEKO to VX to speak of what they discussed before ; quotes rates :
1st Class, $205 ; 2nd Class, $105 ; 3rd Class, $58 ; Children /?/, $49. Says
if they lowered "compartments" to $165 they would be losing about $40
per person ; also, the rates are set ; says he'd like to have an order
to do that. — VX says not X's business to decide. The practical details
are up to the Company ; also, the money alloted to X is Govt, money and
the Govt. /Japanese/ is responsible for spending it. All that will have
to be decided in Japan. /Apparently K. has hinted that X might make
up the difference. K. then brings up the practical problem of provision-
ing the ship /with fuel?/. They have already applied for it, I hear.
There are about 800 /feet?/ of pier. They go on talking about prob-
lems apparently connected with the ship./ — K: Well, it (Taiyo Maru)
will get in on the 31st, won't it? One week before that / / Some-
thing about leaving the matter until the 22nd — about a week before the
ship comes in, I think./
End
2-263
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 901
Fbiday, 17 October 1941
0921 i Mrs. GADDIS to VX. Finds out that it is the same TOJO they knew.
/This was former War Minister in Japan/. Mrs. G : "Didn't he have
something to do with aviation once, sometime ago?" — VX : Well /laugh-
ing a little/ I don't know about that. /Then VX confirms that Eichi
TOJO and Hideki TOJO are one and the same person./
1101 0 VX to KAWAZOE of NJ, dictating newspaper release. See NJ.
1105 o Ditto to other KAWAZOE, of HH. /After dictation, K, asks if VX
has heard anything special about the Tatuta or the Taiyo. VX has not,
so they agree that everything probably is alright./
1126 o VX to Sumitomo Bank for Ono-san /manager/ to ask about Ilatte no ken
/?/. Ono says will tomorrow a little before 8 : 00 be alright. It is.
1348 i From HARADA to make a date for a conference about 1 : 20 tomorrow.
End
2-264
Saturday, 18 October 1941
No Activity
(Japanese Holiday)
Sunday, 19 October 1941
Out of Commission
2-266 Monday, 20 October, 1941
1018 i KANEKO to VX. VX explains that it is not true that X is deprived of
all funds. X is permitted to draw out money to provide necessary food
and shelter for the staff. VX explains to K the difference between a
diplomat and a consul. K implies that some of his staff may be trans-
ferred to China, especially Nanking.
1031 i KANEKO to VX asking whether he thinks the Taiyo and Tatsuta Maru
will get here. VX thinks so. Then K. mentions that there is someone
who wants to pay for his passage here, but VX says it cannot be sent out
of the U. S. if paid here. (The inference is that fares should be paid
at the other end to avoid the freeze. )
1035 i TAKEO of NYK to VX. T. says the accounts (connected with the spe-
cial trips of J. vessels) will be handled at X. T. will handle all the de-
tails as usual except that all expenditures and receipts from whatever
source must be entered in a separate set of books. T. will go up this after-
noon to talk it over with XX, VX, and company.
1112 0 /Technical disturbances/. VX to TAKEI (?) re difficulties in making
the arrangements.
1520 o VX to KIMURA re a dinner for the crew. XX thinks it may be possible
in the case of the Taiyo, but there will be no time in the case of the
Tatuta. XX thinks it may be all right to have the purser, the (mer-
chant marine) captain, and the Engineering officer to dinner. We could
even limit it to the (merchant) captain and the engineering officer if the
others are busy.
1525 0 VX to KANEKO, apparently a call back. K asks what the word "permit"
means (on the ticket issued by X). "This transportation ticket is issued
for THe Imperial Japanese Government." Is fo7- correct? — Yes. —
It seems to me it should be 62/ or through. — No. This is for the Cus-
toms (U. S. or Japanese?) K. continues to find fault with the ticket,
but VX defends it legally. Finally VX comes around to K's view that it
should have been hy, not for. No sooner does he make this admission
than he reverts to his old position that for stands for "in the interest of",
"for the benefit of," "on behalf of."
End
902 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2-266 A
1550 i F.F.W.M. Probably NYK.
NYK "This passage ticket is issued for and on behalf of the Imperial
Japanese Goverument."
VX— "O. K. I think."
NYK — "Consul General for Japan .... no Japanese consulate general
at Honolulu — is that wrong."
VX — All right I think /repeats/.
NYK — Then the X will do the Japanese part?"
yx "Yes."
/ Apparently the N.Y.K. is printing special tickets for the 3 forthcoming
trips to make clear that the government is in charge./
2-26y
Tuesday, 21 Ootobeb 1941
0956 i Request in pidgin about deferment. VX refers her to 2243. /W. N. ?/
0956 i Above caller. Girl at X explains that since this is a case of re-deferment
she has from Dec. 1 till Jan. 31. If it were for the first time it ought to
be gotten in quickly, this month.
1029 o VX to . Saw ( ? ) yesterday re the bond procedure. The money
will be released from the X funds in the Y. Specie Bank and the treasury
department has OKed this.
1031 o VX to YSB. Miyamoto — tells him the treasury in Washington has OKed
the money proposition the release of funds. /But I'm not clear who got
the message in the first place/.
1142 0 VX to Matsuda. He's out. This is Miyamoto. Have Matsuda call
when he comes in please.
1155 0 VX to Mrs. UYETAR for Mrs. MATSUDA, wife of YSB's MATSUDA.
Not here. I'll call her later then.
End
2-268
2-269
2-270
Wednesday, 22 Ocax>BER, 1941
Out of commission
Thursday, 23 October, 1941
No activity
Friday, 24 October, 1941
0916 i re deferment. Routine.
1135 i Woman to VX. Please call 2243 (X)
1152 i To VX— Call 2243.
1325 i Fragment,
1326 i From KANEKO to VX asks him if he (VX) sent the cable for him about
the Taiyo Maru business. VX did, for it was necessary. VX says they
are negotiating with the State Dept. about the money they have taken in.
Thinks it will be ok. Some mention of the "search" by the immigration
oflScials /?/ Apparently that is ok too.
1355 o VX to KANEKO— out; for HIRADA /?/ also out; for KIMURA— call
58234. Re the estimate of receipts from the Taiyo. They are 3rd class
417 (before from 200 to 400). First class about 23. Second class, 33.
Won't exceed $1000 /what?/.
1405 i Fragment.
End
2-271
Saturday, 25 October, 1941
0929 i NI
0935 i KAWAMOTO of NJ to VX saying the FBI is conducting an investigation
on Kauai of Consular Agents according to a letter received today from
the Branch Oflice (of the NJ) on Kauai. It seems that HAMADAYO
and FUNAGAYO (in May) and HAKAMA (?) are in question. Please
let me have names. The people are scared ; I will let you have the names
(apparently by mail or messenger, for nothing more was said).
End
2-272
2-275
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 903
Sunday, 26 Octobeb, 1941
No activity
Monday, 27 Octobeb, 1941
0916 i To VX from KANEKO /?/, Discussion of the various details of the
forthcoming Taiyo visit ; licenses, the issuance of tickets ; the collection
of fares; about someone who is a nikkei — a woman, and that there is
time to settle the thing /about her/ because there is still four days / the
Taiyo comes four days after this conversation/; how /to send?/
something that is quite heavy; about a further "conference". They
agree to take in money from the 27th on, and think they can collect it
under the special license.
1025 i FPM/ From NTK ? Still talking about special licenses, etc.
1108 i Very brief.
1420 i Mrs. VX to VX / recording extremely bad/
xxxxxxxxxx
End
2-27//
Ttjesdat, 28 October, 1941
094.5 o VX /?/ to NIO /? phon./ wants to consult with him about Re. the
X's ambition to hold an examination this month (until the 31st of Oct.).
The Minister without Portfolio, then the Minister of Education is con-
ferring an award of honor to the Commissioner (s?) for Japanese Affairs/?
not positive tliat this is right/.
0952 0 to 4. NC. NX.
1005 i YOSHIOKA to VX, No reply yet to telegram sent to Inchikau
/?/ in Washington on 22nd. Y. has heard nothing of the extent of
understanding reached by the negotiations there, and has heard that they
have broken down. VX says that there has been a reply by cable re
certain frozen funds. The Foreign office has received a reply from the
State Department which amounted to (question about the following)
"Get them (the particular funds in question?) out of the country."
Y — Is there anything especially interesting about this contract situation?
VX — /Interrupting hurriedly/ "Wait . . that is . . that is . . .
that is . . . wait a moment . . . that is right.
Y — Something has come here, hasn't it?
VX — I think so. XX has (unable to make out.)
1355 i FPM YOSHIOKA of NYK to ? re a matter that had been taken up
with the collector of Customs. The matter concerns the X clerk,
MORIMURA. (Switched to VX). Y. to VX re license for oil for the
Taiyo. When she gets in her tank will inspected and checked against
the log. That's all right.
End
2-275
Wednesday, 29 October, 1941
1055 0 VX to TOYAMA /Edt. of Jitsugyo No Hawaii/, He has just stepped out
to the barber's. VX asks about a serial text of the M-day law being
published in the English section. VX wants 5 or 6 copies since X hasn't
received and from the legislature yet.
1105 i FPM. Information wanted re /Joe Gin Gee/ phone clerk in a store
they say. Allen D. Smythe, Chief Clerk Territorial Senate.
2-276
End
Thursday, 30 Octobeb, 1941
0927 i KANEKO to VX re the method of counting passengers. Are children to
be counted as half or as full passengers? — As adults if unaccompanied —
A lot of these are dual citizens — Many of them have no passports at all
and may have trouble when they reach Japan. Then, since they have
no reentry permits they will have trouble when they attempt to come
904 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
back here later. (This is the very problem that Mrs. NISHI scolded
her husband of spilling to Sumitomo bank employees the other day).
To facilitate the landing of these passengers in Japan each child should
have an excerpt from his KT as proof of at least his parent's Japanese
citizenship. They should also have BCs along. The passengers will
be classified on the passenger list as Japanese and as American citizens.
0956 o VX to TAKEI. KANEKO answers saying T. is out. T. is sick and
took yesterday afternoon off.
1050 ? VX to KANEKO. They will meet at official residence at 6.30. K— Goro
TAKAYANAGI (Manager of Honolulu Fire Insurance Co., whom VX
does not know), TAKAGISHI, TAKAHASHI, IMAZAVi'A, Hiroshi(?)
KODAMA, SHIRAKAWA, and somebody's wife (whose name I could not
catch) were all going to Japan together on the Taiyo.
1146 o VX to wife. She hasn't got back yet.
1332 i Mrs. VX tells VX that KANEKO called him.
1414 0 VX to KANEKO re the plans for the search etc. Both seem perfectly
satisfied. Taiyo will sail at 5PM Tuesday. VX says the alien registra-
tion blanks have to be filled out if not previously registered. (NC due
to shortage of blanks.)
End
2-277
Friday, 81 October 1941
1135 i KANEKO to VX. They discuss putting the names of arrivals in the
newspapers. They think customs inspections will take quite a long
time and that many will read in the papers of their relatives and friends
before they are able to debark.
1425 0 VX says it's a civil case and he doesn't know much about it. About
something that is in the newspapers.
End
2-278
Satueday, Nov. 1, 1941
1140 o VX to KAWAZOE saying he has heard that the Taiyo is taking no mail.
Is that true? — Yes. It is. — Is there to be an inspection of the mail? —
Yes. — V7ho ordered it? — The postmaster — Has word to this effect come
from J. Embassy? — No.
End
2-279
Sunday, 2 No\'embh8 1941
1048 0 Seki to ? re : something that has come from Washington.
End
Monday, Novembeb 3, 1941
2-280
0859 i NAKATSUKA wants a complete list of passengers. Come down in person.
1044 i Routine re NYK. Something from Washington. XX is out.
1045 i VX to someone re mail situation.
1146 o VX asks for MIKAMI— out.
1218 o VX asks where HIROSHI is. Calee says didn't he go somewhere with
XX. Isn't he at X now? VX seems perplexed. Does calee know SAKAI
/name uncertain/ of X ? He does. Does he know his house? Yes. Then
please come up to X now.
1226 i /from taxi? VX asks to take him to dock at 2PM. He wants to see 1.
the immigration station. 2. The harbor master. 3. Hibberly. VX also
him to go to the P. Hotel at 1.30 / A moment later he changes this, since
apparently the P. hotel is considered too hot — and says he is to take VX
to the three places previously planned.
1655 0 To NYK. VX calling to get Hibberly's number.
1658 o To Hibberly home, but H. is down at boat. She advises him to call the
customs inspector. VX — "Thank you for my troubling you!" Mrs. H.
"Bye bye."
End
2-281
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 905
TTJESDAY, 4 NOVEMBEB, 1941
1052 0 to Hiberly's office /from XX?/. Call 2458.
1054 1 Fi'om (4). Re : Conscription notification. Routine. X says such notices
will probably go on an American boat since the P. O. is receiving mail.
1106 i From (4) . KANEKO to VX re overtime of customs. K. wanted them to
work to ten, but Hiberly thought they should work shorter hours
Rest NX.
1110 o VX to wife. NT.
1112 i Wife t© VX. NI.
1138 1 From Nippu Jiji (which calls us first and keeps them waiting) to XX.
/Not SOGA — sound like KABO but isn't/ re : the Washington tie-up of
the mail. Says Star-Bull reports that X has phoned the J. ambassador
about it and asks what their (X's) expectation is re the outcome of the
protest. XX rather thinks the outcome will be favorable. XX says it
was the Ambassador (muko wa) that called him to ask about it. /More
details but stopping here./
1534 0 For girl's older brother. Not in. From VX.
End
2-282
Wednesday, 5 November, 1941*
1009 i ONOH of Sumitomo to VX. Not in.
1037 1 Re expatriation. NI.
1500 i $26,000 /approximate receipts?/ from YOSHICKA /?/ Talking about
the accounting for the voyage.
2-283
THxmsDAY, 6 Novembee, 1941
No activity
Friday to Sunday, November 7 to 9
Out of commission
2-284
Monday, November 10, 1941
0936 i To VX from 01 of JCC. re the welcome for Ambassador KURUSU. The
plane will come tomorrow. He has his wife with him. They talk about
getting in to the field and the situation in reference to greeting the am-
bassador. 01 says he will inform SATO and ? The ambassador
will stop overnight. X is going to put out a party for him.
0944 FPM VX (probably) to someone re picture taking In connection with the
arrival tomorrow. Decide to have none because of the "big news" that
it would be. Re the party, VX wants it to be a formal affair. /Possibly
to newspaper editor or reporter ?/
.0950 o to /KOMO?/ telling him that clipper is down at Midway with motor trou-
ble and will be 22 hours late. He is very tured so the party will be
formal. Wants also to /neglect?/ the newspaper reporters interview.
Also talk about taking a picture.
0952 FPM "Value $70 for 2 cases freight prepaid,"— substance of telegram being
explained to someone. Looks like someone is sending freight to the
J. Embassy in Washington. They will go to get them Wednesday. If
it is, a thousand and ten kin /or 1000 ten-kins?/. The charge is $6. Of
course they will get it ; then take it over there to weight it. "Please
erase the address and substitute J. Embassy, Washington."
? ? Re the party being simple.
1002 o VX to KAWADA /?/ asking the president of the company or someone in
his place to come to the "pahtee" tomorrow night at X at 6.30. Callee
will tell him.
1005 0 VX inviting SOGA of NJ to the "pahtee". There will be 14 or 15 guests
in all.
906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1010 0 VX gets girl, asks for father MORI whom he invites to the simple
"pahtee". MORI is willin. Asks if KURUSU is going to stay at the
R. Hawaiian.
1015 0 VX to TSUDA /?/ asking him to "pahtee".
1041 1 VX from ? whom he has leit word to call him. "Pahtee".
2-285
2-286
End
Tuesday, November 11, 1941
Holiday; closed
Thtjbsdat, Novembee 12, 1941
0940 i To FUKUYA /?/ from MIYA/TO?/ of the YSB re payment of telegraph
charges. X will pay tomorrow.
0942 i XX telling NAKATSUKA that he hasn't heard from KURUSU for 2 days
so doesn't know. Thinks he is coming at 4 p. m. XX wants to know
"if the plane left Midway this morning." N. doesn't know — suggests Pan
American can tell. XX says no social events because XX has wired that
he is tited.
0945 i from a bank? No statement has come etc.
0947 o To NJ to KAVTAZOE from VX. A telegram has just come from
KURUSU. He will arrive this afternoon. Left Midway 7 : 25. Accord-
ing to K's wish a news reporter is not to meet him — only a representative.
1045 0 To 01 from VX. KURUSU is coming at 5 : 10 today. The seating order
is SATO, SUGIMOTO, MORIFUJI, SUMITA, MORI, MATSUDA,
KIMURA, ONOH, SOGA, MAKINO.
1105 i Inquiry re J. census registration. Reporting a death.
1320 i About the plane's arrival /to a guest/.
2-287
End
Thursday, November 13, 1941
1015 i KAWAZOE to VX inquiring re KURUSU's movements. Wants to know
the Navy's representative. Knows already the army's. X boy has for-
gotten the Navy's. Wants to know about all other movements of KU-
RUSU.
1030 i NAKATSUKA to VX. NI (See S. B. 11/13/41)
1045 i Is someone there? Girl. NI.
1445 i Hung up.
End
2-288
Friday, November 14, 1941
0955 i From Mrs. VX. Domestic business. NI.
1040 o To (4). VX to YOSHI /?/ at NYK re: receipts from the Taiyo Maru.
Does he want the cash? No. The figures. They haven't figured out the
tax bill yet. They will send it over as soon as finished.
2-289
End
Saturday, November 15, 1941
0932 i "trying very hard to get the telephone number of the Nuuanu Sotoshu
/Soto sect of Buddism — a zen sect/ (American woman speaking from the
voice). No. is 5120. "It is listed under Rev. Kumagata /?/
End
2-290
Sunday, November 16, 1941
No activity
2-291
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 907
Monday, Novembek 17, 1941
2-293
0945 i KA.WAZOE to VX re TOJO's speech, has VX heard any adverse reac-
tions? VX has not. /Laughter, especially by K/- K. says /I think/ that
previously there was talk that speeches were for overseas propaganda.
But this time no such statements have come in. No, none have. Not in
Japanese either.
1117 i FPM. Fragment
1313 ? YOSHIOKA and X about money. $10,000, $12,000 /the amount they have
on hand?/ Apparently X wants to get all the figures, for they figure the
taxes, the bond, and all.
1317 i From YSB /woman/ reporting something that she has done, and very
brief.
End
2-292
Tuesday, Novembek 18, 1941
No activity
Wednesday, November 19, 1941
No activity
Thubsday, November 20, 1941 ^
No activity — holiday
Friday, November 21, 1941
0900 0 /to maid at home?/ telling her there is a wedding for 9 or 10 giiests.
1037 o for Mr. MORI from VX replying to a communication via his wife yes-
terday. Re going to NAMIKI's. VX on discussing it with his wife
thinks it will be good /to go?/ Something about 6 volumes of books.
/Sounds like a social engagement./
1408 FPM Since other "has had no opportunity, will mail be 0. k.?" VX says
it will.
End
2-294
Monday, Novembeb 24, 1941
No activity
TxTESDAY, November 25, 1941
No activity
Wednesday, November 26, 1941
No activity
2-295
Thursday, November 27, 1941
No activity
Friday, November 28, 1941
1109 o VX /?/ coming home quick. OK.
1150 0 to YAMAMOTO from VX. Has he got some unused congratulations? Y.
says the insurance company has them. VX asks how many there were.
Y. doesn't know. They're all thru with them.
1320 0 No ans.
End
908 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2-295
Saturday, November 29, 1941
0920 o VX for YAMAMOTO of /YSB?/. Then seems to have FUJITA instead.
"The master (Y) is out." VX has something on liis mind, but apparently
decides not to tell FUJITA. He asks him to have Y. call him when
he returns.
0926 i from? (KAWA, HARA, ZAWA?) to VX who wants to see him for a
minute. ? is busy, how about next week. /Long pause/. VX — "If
/the round trip/ takes only about 20 minutes couldn't you come?" He
finally will, but it has taken a great deal of persuasion, and he is obvi-
ously reluctant for he is alone, it being Saturday.
0935 o to SATO (SAITO?) from VX who says he wants to have a conference
about the recent daitoto ogikawa's recent request /don't get it. Do
you?/
0946 0 VX to 01. VX has been talking to YAMAMOTO about there being prac-
tically no malt (or possibly yeast. Much confusion about this word.
Might also mean ostentation, display, a good thing, good news, a bait,
a tempting offer) in town. (Y. brought up the question.) Discuss the
problem of the difficulties of the J. here.
1026 i From ONODA of the Sumitomo Bank to VX inviting him to a meal or
something tomorrow. VX is busy except for lunch (There are some
others coming, XX and Harada, not many). Can VX come to his place
about 1 pm. VX can and will. /Line very noisy/.
End
2-296
Sunday, November 30, 1941
No activity
Monday, December 1, 1941
No activity
Tuesday, December 2, 1941
No activity
Discontinued
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 39
69512—10
(J) Hello, is this Mori?
(H) Hello, this is Mori.
(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.
(H) Not at all.
(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I
would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at
present. Are airplanes flying daily?
[Handwritten in margin :] Prompted. Reluctant hesitation.
(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.
(J) Are they large planes?
(H) Yes, they are quite big.
(J) Are they flying from morning till night?
(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.
(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?
(H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of
this year and the ending part of last year.
(J) Is that so?
[2] (H) I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very
few sailors here at present.
(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meeting to discuss US- Japanese
negotiations being conducted presently?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 909
(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japa- here appear calmer than
expected. They are getting along harmoniously.
(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?
(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This
fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and
we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the
people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are
some who say odd things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland,
and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel
like the rest of the people in the islands.
(J) That's fine.
(H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amazed.
(J) Has there been any increase in ...?... of late? That is, as a result
of the current tense situation.
[3] (H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war
building boom.
(J) What do j'ou mean by enjoying a war building boom?
(H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry
here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army
personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various
sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students
at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these
jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.
(J) Are there many big factories there?
(H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds
are being constructed.
(J) Is that so?
[Handwritten in margin :] Great surprise at J. end?
(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.
(J) How large is the population?
(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy
personnel and workers from the mainland.
(J) What is the population?
(H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.
(J) What about night time?
(H) There seem to be precautionary measures taken.
(J) What about searchlights?
(H) Well, not much to talk about. Strikes attention.
[-4] (J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?
(H) No.
(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?
(H) The comments by the papers are very bad. They are opposite to the
atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed
to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily.
The main articles concern the Japanese conferences.
[Handwritten in the margin:] Then they discuss the Southern advance [of
Japanese into French Indo-China] every day.
(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?
(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he
was very adept at answering queries of the press.
(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate
Hawaii?
(H) There are almost none wishing to do that.
(J) What is the climate there now?
[Handwritten in the margin:] Seemed not to understand the question about
climate.
(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a
phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a
very unusual climate recently.
[Handwritten in the margin :] Long delay.
(J) Is that so?
(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the
United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland
today. He made no statements on any problems.
(J) Did he make any statements concerning the US- Japan question?
[5] (H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan
question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war.
910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.
(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.
(H) Yes.
(J) What kind of impression did LitvinofE make?
(H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a
gentleman.
(J) Did he stop ^t the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?
(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already enplaned
for the mainland.
(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?
[Handwritten in margin:] M[ori] tries never to hear about the fleet.
(H) No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking
about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet
here seems small. I don't [know whether] all of the fleet has done this, but it
seems that the fleet has left here.
(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?
(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. How-
ever, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.
[Handwritten in margin:] Red Christmas flower with long stems [explana-
tion of poinsettia omitted in translation].
*(J) Does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.
(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation
of Japanese goods?
[6] (H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japan-
ese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are
enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year,
at any rate it is a big inconvenience.
(J) What do you lack most?
(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the
freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods
are having a hard time.
[Handwritten in margin:] (J) has a hard time understanding sake (re-
peats 4 times).
(J) Thanks very much. ^
(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells
very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago
went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors
are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a stand-
still due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor
manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese
sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.
[Handwritten in margin:] (J) is surprised that British liquor came in.
[Handwritten in margin:] Taisho jijiisho Takagishi (understood as Taka-
guchi) repeated 5 or 6 times. Sake is in style here, but there is no kazu-no-ko.
Last year there was everything.
(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-
Masamume" ; that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge
of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain
Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter ; and that said Takagishi re-
turned recently to Japan on the Taiye Maru. He adds that Japanese here and
the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J> that Japanese chrysanthemums
are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roe for this year's New
Year celebration.
[Handwritten in margin:] Who is this "he" — Ogawa? Presumably it is.
(J) How many first generation Japanese ai'e there in Hawaii according to
last surveys made?
[7] (H) About fifty thousand.
(J) How about the second generation Japanese?
(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.
(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the
United States Army?
(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,5(X) have entered the
army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are
Japanese.
(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?
(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.
(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 911
(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be
inducted in January.
(J) Thank you very much.
(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.
(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.
(H) Wait a moment please?
(J) Thank you,
(J) 0£E phone.
[Handwritten in margin:] Tried to raise Tokyo again.
Hewitt Inquiey Exhibit No. 40
TWO REPORTS, SUBJECT JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU-
ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES.
United States Naval Inteixigencb Service
investigation kepobt
Confidential
Subject : JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities
Report made at : Honolulu, T. H., 14th Naval District Date : 9 Feb., 1942
Report made by: Lt. George P. Kimball, USNR, and Lt. (jg) W. B. Stephenson,
USNR
Period covered : 5 Dec, 1941—9 Feb., 1942. Status of Case : Pending in 14ND.
Origin of Case: Receipt by DI0-14ND of variovis encrypted messages sent by
Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign Office, Tokyo, and Japanese
Ambassador, Washington.
Character of Investigation : Espionage.
Enclosures : (See first page of details)
References :
14ND (3)
Copy to: ONI
(5)
CinCPac
(1)
Coml4
(1)
FBI-Hon
(2)
MID HI >
(2)
Source File No. : 14ND #54A ONI File No. :
Synopsis. — On 3 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, trans-
mitted by encrypted despatch to Tokyo a system of signalling by lights, cloths,
fires, and radio (presumably to communicate with Japanese ships at sea, near
the Hawaiian Islands), which signals would be used to announce the departure
of U. S. Naval units from Pearl Harbor. The system was conceived, and sub-
mitted to the Consulate, by Otto KUEHN, a German subject and ex-officer of the
Germany Navy. Evidence indicates all observation and reporting of ship dis-
positions and movements at Pearl Harbor was done by Consulate attaches or
contacts (including, in at least one instance, KUEHN).
Other than suspicious lights (not conforming to the signal system) seen at night
on the island of Maui, subsequent to 7 December, 193l, no evidence has been
found that KUEHN's signal system' ever was employed.
The decoded body of the despatch of 3 December gave the sender's name as
FUJII and the addressee as Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff, Efforts
to identify FUJII have so far been unavailing.
KUEHN, who has been in custodial detention since 8 December, 1941, will be
charged with espionage and be tried by the Military Commission.
Deductions : Japanese naval espionage in Honolulu prior to 7 December, 1941,
was carried on by Consulate attaches and contacts, among whom was Otto
KUEHN, a German subject.
Approved.
I. H. Mayfieu)
Captain, U. 8. Navy
District Intelligence Officer,
912 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[1]
WBS/zw
Subject : JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities
Rcf GrGncGS "
(a) ONI Information Card, Subject MR. AND MRS. KOEHN, 2-13-39.
(b) Com 14 Conf. Ltr. to CNO (DNI) , Subject GERMAN LOTTERY, 4-21-39.
(c) 14ND Suspect List, copy to ONI, 7-29-40.
(d) 13ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA,
UN, 5-1-41.
(e) DI0-14ND Conf. Ltr. to R. L. Shivers, FBI, Honolulu (copy to ONI),
5-31^1.
(f) 12ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA,
UN, 7-17-41.
(g) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject TAKAICHI SAKAI, 2-3-42.
(h) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KANAYE SAHARA, 2-3^2.
(i) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KIMIE DOUE, 2-3^2.
(j) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTOSHI-
RODO, 2-8-42.
Enclosures :
(A) Table Showing Numbers of Battleships, Heavy Cruisers, Light Cruisers,
Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, Destroyers, and Destroyer-Type Vessels
in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800 22-30 November, 1941.
(B) Table of Number and Movement of Ships in Pearl Harbor, by Types, at
Various Times between 0600 and 180O, 28 November, 1941.
1. On the morning of 5 December, 1941, a thoroughly reliable confidential in-
formant furnished the District Intelligence Ofiicer with copies of certain com-
mercial communications sent and received by Japanese Consul General Nagao
KITA, of Honolulu, during the period, 1-4 December, 1941. These messages were
despatch traffic between Tokyo and Honolulu and Washington and Honolulu,
that is, between Consul General KITA and Ambassador Kichisaburo NOMURA,
in Washington, and Foreign Minister Shigenori TOGO, in Tokyo.
2. Preliminary evaluation of the importance of the messages was impossible
to make, inasmuch as they were in code or cipher. They were, however, the first
of such messages ever made available to this office, and for that reason deemed
very important.
[2] 3. Efforts to determine the meaning of such messages were commenced
immediately, but this task was not completed until the morning of 11 December.
When the meaning of the messages was determined, the District Intelligence
Officer, acting upon orders from Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch, USN, Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District, immediately conferred with Lieutenant Colonel
George W. Bicknell, assistant chief of staff for G-2, Hawaiian Department, in
charge of the Army Contact Office, Honolulu, and Mr. Robert L. Shivers, special
agent in charge, Honolulu field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, with
regard thereto. (Meanwhile, arrangements to secure copies of other commercial
radiograms and cablegrams to and from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu,
were effected.)
4. The following message, despatched by Consul General KITA to Foreign
Minister TOGO, on 3 December, 1941, was the basis of subsequent extensive inves-
tigation by the three intelligence agencies :
From : Kita
To : Foreign Minister, Tokyo
(Secret military message No. — by Chief of Consulate's Code)
To : Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff.
From : Fujii
Re signals I wish to simplify communications as follows :
(1) Code (following 3 section 8 line table) battle force, including scouting
force, are about to put to sea —
1. Several aircraft carriers plan to put to sea.
2. All battle force has sailed first to third dates inclusive.
3. Several aircraft carriers have sailed first to third.
4. All aircraft carriers have sailed first to third.
5. All battle force has sailed fourth to sixth dates inclusive.
6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.
7. All aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth.
8.
PROCEEDINGS OP HEWITT INQUIRY 913
(2) Signal
1. Light in Lanikai beach house at night — One light from 8 pm to 9 pm
indicates "1", from 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "2". The below signals until
midnight, in order, indicate "3" and "4". Two lights, according to the time,
indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".
— When not in accordance with (lights) above one full automobile head-
light and one half light indicate "1", "2", "3", "4". Two full lights indicate
"5", "6", "7", "8".
2. On the Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 am until noon every hour
one piece linen cloth (sheet) indicates "1", "2", "3" "4". Two pieces linen
cloth indicate "5", "6", "7", "8".
3. In Lanikai bay during daytime in front of harbor (offing) a star boat
with one star on sail indicates "1", "2", "3", "4", a star and "III" indicates
"5", "6", "7", "8".
4. Light iu dormer window of Kalama house from 7 pm to 1 am every
hour indicates "3", "4", "5". "6", "7", "8".
5. "KGMB want ads" advertisements 9 : 45 am —
(a) A Chinese rug, etc., for sale — apply P. O. Box 1476, indicates "3" or "6".
(b) A complete chicken farm, etc., apply as above, indicates "4" or "7".
(c) Beauty operator wanted — same — indicates "5" or "8".
In the event that in accordance with one of three items written above from
Oahu a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located
between the lower road six miles north of Kula sanitarium and Haleakala road
which can be watch from the sea to the southwest and southeast of Maui, until
the receipt of the signal "Exex" this (the following) will be repeated for several
days : A small fire on the high peak — 7 pm to 8 pm indicates "3" or "6" ; 8 pm to
9 pm indicates "4" or "7" ; 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "5" or "8".
[4] 5. At the aforementioned conference of representatives of the three
intelligence agencies, the following preliminary evaluation of the message of 3
December was made :
1. That no one named FUJII, was connected with the Japanese Consulate,
Honolulu ; but, that FUJII might be a code name or word employed by the
Consulate or by some member of its staff, or by some person reporting to
the Japanese Navy Ministry through the Consulate.
2. That the "Lanikai beach house" referred to was not readily identifiable,
there being many beach houses at Lanikai, Oahu.
3. That the "dormer window of Kalama house" probably referred to a
window of this type in the home of Otto KUEHN, a Class "A" German
suspect, of Kalama, Oahu, who was put in custodial detention on 8 December,
1941.
4. That the method of signalling set up in the above despatch may have
been used prior to the Japanese attack on Oahu, 7 December, and thereafter
still might be used, to indicate the movements of United States fleet units
from Pearl Harbor.
In an attempt to determine whether the signals referred to in the despatch
of 3 December were used prior to the attack, and to detect any further use of
such signals, the three intelligence agencies assumed the following tasks :
1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, was to send two or
more agents to Kalama, Oahu, to stay there and gather all possible pertinent
information regarding signalling from "dormer window of Kalama house".
(The Federal Bureau of Investigation at that time had a pending investiga-
tion on Otto KUEHN and members of this family. )
2. The Military Intelligence Division was to maintain a watch at Kalama
and Lanikai for a display of lights, display of cloths, or star boats with the
indicated markings.
[5] 3. The District Intelligence Office was to send two or more agents
to Lanikai, Oahu, to stay there and gather all pertinent information regard-
ing signalling from a "Lanikai beach house" ; and, in addition, to conduct
an appropriate investigation in the vicinity of Kula Sanitarium and
Haleakala, island of Maui.
6. In execution of part of its agreed task, this office sent Agents Joseph P.
McCarthy, Fred H. Paoa, and Albert K. Kai to Lanikai on the afternoon of 11
December. On the following morning, an officer messenger flew to Wailuku,
Maui, with full instructions for Lieutenant (jg) Morris Adelson, USNR, Branch
Intelligence Officer, Zone III, Fourteenth Naval District, to investigate the case
there.
914 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
7. At Lanikai, the agents of this office early determined that of the more than
seventy houses and cottages fronting on the ocean, only two had clothes lines
on the premises that could be used for displaying the arranged signals, and
that one of the two houses having a clothes line so usable was owned by Otto
KUEHN, whose Kalama home with the dormer window already has been men-
tioned. Under a pretext, Agents McCarthy, Paoa, and Kai interviewed all avail-
able residents of the Lanikai area who lived on lots adjacent to the beach. It
was determined that Otto KUEHN had no connection with the residents of the
Lanikai beach house he owns, other than as their landlord. All star boats in
the Lanikai area were found beached, and it was determined that none of them
answered the description of the sailboat mentioned in the despatch of 3
December.
8. Upon the return of the agents of this office from Lanikai on 19 December,
the following memorandum was submitted to the District Intelligence Officer by
Agent McCarthy:
"In compliance with instructions. Agents Paoa, Kai and the writer proceeded to
Lanikai on December 11, 1941, and remained until the evening of December 19.
"Over this period of time a complete and thorough canvass was made of all
residences on the beach at Lanikai and all others adjacent thereto that might
possibly been used by anyone sending the type [6] of signals reported.
It was immediately learned that Otto KUEHN owns a house on the beach at
Lanikai, this being the fifth house from the junction of Lanikai and Kailua.
It was determined that this house is occupied by Lieutenants Chapman and
Stuppy and their wives. Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy are attached to
Schofleld Hospital.
"Mrs. Stuppy, when interviewed, advised that they had occupied "Kuehn's
house for a month and left there to take another house in Lanikai on December 15.
Mrs. Stuppy stated that during her residence there she did not have any com-
munication with Kuehn's family nor did any members of this family put in
their appearance at Lanikai to her knowledge.
"All of the people interviewed during the course of this investigation reported
that they observed no signals nor any activity that appeared to be suspicious or
could be interpreted as signaling. This statement is made with the exception
of the information received from Mrs. R. C. Waldron whose house is the second
house from the Kailua junction, who reported that at 6 :45 A. M. on the morning
of December 7, 1941, a Japanese, carrying a fishing pole, was observed running
on the beach towards Kailua. Shortly after he left, a red flare was seen to have
been sent from the vicinity of the beach near the Waldron residence. Mr, and
Mrs. Waldron were unable to describe the Japanese referred to or to furnish
any additional information concerning his identity.
"The inquiries made generally among the people residing in Lanikai, over the
period of this investigation, were confined primarily to suspicious activity on
the part of anyone for the period from December 1 to 7, 1941. The inquiries
related generally to the possible signaling with flares or lights at night time and
the presence of sail boats off the beach during the day time. Over this period,
and for the three weeks preceding December 1, the waters off Lanikai were too
rough for sailing and it was generally stated by the persons interviewed, most
of whom are boat enthusiasts, that no star boats or other types of sailing ves-
sels were seen near this beach over this period. [7] It was pointed out
by many of the residents that, had a sail boat of any description appeared in
this rough weather, these residents, being interested in sailing vessels, would
have remarked upon the presence of a boat off shore in this type of weather
and would have remembered the presence of this boat and probably could have
recalled the name of the owner.
"l^ecause of the nature of the other signals reported that could have been
used in daylight hours questions, it was felt, could not be particularly asked
concerning these signals without endangering the source of the information.
However, in travelling about the vicinity of Lanikai, over this period, all resi-
dences were examined carefully for the purpose of attempting to determine from
what residence the other day time signals might have been given. The Kuehn
residence could have been used for all signals described except for the signalling
with automobile headlights. A residence owned and occupied since Thanks-
giving by Judson Roblee, which is back from the beach about 300 yards on a
hillside, could have been used as a location from which to give all of the signals
described. Mr. Roblee is the manager of the Edward R. Bacon Company.
Inquiry generally concerning the Roblees resulted in the information that they
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 915
are a veiy reputable family and should be held above suspicion in this case. Mr.
Roblee is well known to Lieutenant (jg) G. P. Kimball of this office.
"During the course of this investigation, the agents had access to, and the
use of, the home of Mr. Arthur Powlison. ITiis house is set on a cliff extending
over the Lanikai road and from which can be had a view of all of Lanikai.
"During the period of time consumed by this investigation, a watch was kept
for signals and for other suspicious activity from this vantage point without
results. During the interviews, generally, those persons interviewed, who were
found to be reputable, were advised to be on the alert for suspicious activity
in this vicinity and requested to report any information considered worthy of
further attention to this office."
[S] 9. In a general report of activities on the island of Maui, dated 9 Decem-
ber, 1941 (which report, due to poor mail service following the outbreak of war,
did not reach this office until 13 December), Lieutenant Adelson told of the
following incident :
"Only one incident of a number of reports received, indicated suspected espion-
age activities. The following is a resume of the reported incident.
"Mr. Earl Kraft reported that on 8 December, 1941, at about 2045, while he was
spending the night at the Kula Sanitorium, visiting Dr. Sanders, he was tele-
phoned from the hospital to investigate the cause of frequent flashing of a light
in the vicinity of the water tank, while a total blackout was in progress. Mr.
Kraft proceeded to the vicinity of the water tank, and upon his arrival the person
flashing this light disappeared in the bushes. At the approximate time this took
place a report was also received that flashes of light were coming from a room
in the hospital in the Kula Sanitorium occupied by Shigeo FURUKAWA, who is
subject of a recent confidential investigation by the DIO and this office. It will
be noted that HAIMADA and MATSUDA, who visited FURUKAWA recently at
Kulu (DIO-Z/3-#3) , have already been picked up here as enemy aliens. Colonel
Lyman and Major Cruckshank, of Maui Headquarters, have been advised of the
incident and have also been given all information available here, in regard to
FURUKAWA. This matter was referred to them for appropriate action. Follow-
ing our report to Army authorities this day, FURUKAWA subsequently has made
an attempt to commit suicide by drinking an excess amount of Listerine. While
FURUKAWA is in the isolation ward, because of his attempted suicide, no mili-
tary orders have been issued to place him in custody, as an enemy alien."
This report was considered very significant because of the fact that an inves-
tigation of Shigeo FURUKAWA was begun by this office shortly before the out-
break of war because of the latter's possible connection with Lieutenant Com-
mander Sadatomo OKADA, UN, among whose effects was found, in the summer
of [9] 1941, FURUKAWA'e name. (References (d) and (f).)
10. On 20 December, by officer messenger, the District Intelligence Officer
received from Lieutenant Adelson the following report, dated 19 December,
regarding investigation of the Haleakula and Kula Sanitarium region :
"Every night since 12 December, 1941, this area has been under surveillance
from nightfall to past midnight — actual observation of the area being conducted
personally with the assistance of Lt. Hansen, H. E. Anderson (Fish and Game
Warden), a member of Fleet Reserve, and Police Officers Albert Wong, Louis
Fernandez and Chas. Ledward.
"In addition the VJ3 Squadron and the Maui Range is keeping the designated
point and its area under surveilance from their tower stations and are keeping
this office advised.
"On the night of 14 December, 1941, the reporting officer in company with
Mr. Anderson from their observation post noted the following lights and fire
which were interpreted as signals :
"At 8 : 25 p. m. a strong blue light was seen on and off every few seconds in
the PUUNENE area. In answer, a strong blue light was seen on and off in
the MALAAEA BAY vicinity. Both lights went off and a definite lire signal
was observed on the Island of Kahoolawe. This -fire last 3 minutes. At 8 : 40
p. m. the light at Puunene came on again and in response the light at Malaaea
Bay came on again. Both then went out.
"Police Officers Wong and Ledward also observed the above but placed the fire
in the channel between Kahoolawe and Lanai instead of on Kahoolawe.
"Col. Lyman has been kept advised and particular stress laid on the Kahoolawe
fire signal seen.
"Kahoolawe as far as is known is uninhabited. On an average of once a week
a sampan — "Maisie C", owned by one of the Baldwins and captained by
an [iO] alien Japanese (Y. Yamauchi) has made a trip to the island —
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 2 17
916 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
where Baldwin keeps some horses. Since hostilities with Japan, Mr. Baldwin
has requested Col. Lyman's permission to send the "Maisie C" to Kahoolawe.
Col. Lyman advised Mr. Baldwin that he would permit the trip to be made under
armed guard. In view of the fire signal angle, Col. Lyman will notify this office
if and when the "Maisie C" is ready to go and we will make a search of the boat
and also arrange for a thorough search of the island.
"Numerous reports on lights and signals from various points on the island
have been received by Police, Provisional Police, Army, and Navy. This has
added to confusion as many of these reports when checked were found to have
been carelessly put on or to be made by patrol cars.
"However, there is one such report of interest : On the night of 11 December,
1941, (one day prior to receipt of reference (a) /referring to the District In-
telligence Officer's letter of 11 December directing Lieutenant Adelson to investi-
gate this case on Maui/, Provisional Police patrolling the Kula area investigated
a report of light signals coming from a point almost the same as the one we have
the information on. Upon investigation by Provisional Police, the person sig-
nalling was scared away and heard to scurry through the shrubbery. On 10
December, 1941, Provisional Police had received a similar report but could not
locate anyone at the point. There is a strong possibility that this incident may
have been connected with the information we have, and if such is the case, our
suspect has been scared away or else using another point."
11. On 18 January, 1942, the District Intelligence Officer received a further
report regarding FURUKAWA, from Lieutenant Adelson, which is quoted, in
part:
". , . Miss Marie Dupont, a ward girl, who observed the light was interviewed.
[ii] "Miss Dupont stated that at about 2130 on the night of 8 December
1941, she saw flashes of light in the subject's room, 401-B. The subject was
sole occupant of the room. At about the same time she also observed a strong
light flashing in the vicinity of the water tank on the Kula Sauitorium grounds.
Subject's room faces the mountain and is in line of vision with the water tank.
A check was made of the subject's room and matches were found. Subject was
questioned by Miss Dupont about the matches and he stated that he had lit them
to see what the time was. Subject does not smoke. Miss Dupont did not actually
see subject light any matches."
12. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Adelson was instructed to investigate fully the
activities of Shigeo FURUKAWA since the latter's hospitalization at Kula Sani-
tarium. Lieutenant Adelson's findings will be set forth in a separate report being
prepared on FURUKAWA.
13. On 30 December, this office received information that Morima MARUYAMA,
who lives at Kailua, Oahu, T. H. (in an area between Kalama and Lanikai, but
very proximate to the latter), was of doubtful loyalty and lived in a house high
on a hill from where signalling to a ship at sea might be facilitated. After
advising the other investigative agencies, the District Intelligence Officer, on 30
December, sent Agent Kai to Kailua with instructions to investigate MARU-
YA]\L^ to determine whether signals hud been seen emanating from his house,
and also to investigate the portion of Kailua immediately contiguous to Lanikai,
14. On 2 January, 1942, Agent Kai returned from Kailua and reported, as to
aiARUYAMA, that 'Hvhile this Subject's home is strategically situated and could
have been used as a location from which to send signals, or as an observation
point, no evidence has been secured to indicate any subversive activity on the
part of Subject or to indicate that he would engage in such activities." Agent
Kai also reported that no evidence was found to indicate that any other person in
the area covered (about twenty houses) had engaged in any signalling to ships
at sea.
15. It was learned from a highly confidential source that the full name of the
sender of the Consulate's aforementioned message of 3 December probably is
Ichio FUJII.
U2] 16. Confidential Informant J-1, who has been familiar with most of
the contacts of the Consulate over a period of several years past, advised that
the only FUJII known by him to have been close to the Consulate was Junichi
FUJII, a prominent merchant. (It should be noted that the latter sailed from
Honolulu for Japan aboard the TAIYO MARU on 5 November, 1941.) Former
clerks of the Consulate who were interviewed by representatives of the three
intelligence agencies confirmed this fact.
17. The records of the Bux'eau of Immigration and Naturalization, at Hono-
lulu, were checked and reveal that on 6 June, 1925, one Ichio FUJII arrived
at Honolulu, from Japan, board the TAIYO MARU. At a hearing of a special
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 917
board of inqury held at Honolulu, 12 June, 1925, it was found that FUJII was
born at Moiliili, Honolulu, T. H., on 1 May, 1908. FUJII stated that he was
taken to Japan at the age of seven by his parents, who remained there. FUJII
stated that he was a farm laborer. No further record of this Ichio FUJII was
found in the immigration records, nor has any clue to his present whereabouts
been discovered.
18. Appropriate examination of available indexes and directories with refer-
ence to the surname FUJII (or HUZII) and possible variants, FUJIE and FUJI,
was made, with negative results. However, investigation of this phase of the
case is continuing.
19. On 1 January, 1942, interrogation of certain of the clerks formerly employed
at the Japanese Consulate was commenced by representatives of the three in-
vestigative agencies : Special Agent F. G. Tillman, Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion ; Captain Frank O. Blake, Military Intelligence Division ; and, Lieutenant
George P. Kimball, District Intelligence Office.
20. These Consulate clerks, who are American citizens of Japanese ancestry,
all informed the agents that they considered themselves separated from em-
ployment at the Consulate on 7 December, 1941, and did not report for work
on Monday, 8 December, 1941. However, none of them had submitted a letter
of resignation or otherwise given notice to the Consulate.
[13] 21. The names of the clerks interrogated are as follows :
Miss Kimie DOUE
Takaichi SAKAI
Katsukichi MURAOKA
Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO
Kanaye SAHARA
Hiyoshi SHIGEFUJI
22. Miss DOUE, formerly employed as receptionist and typist at the Consulate,
was the first clerical employee interrogated. Details concerning her personal
history are set forth in reference (i) and will not be repeated herein. In her
position as receptionist. Miss DOUE had a better opportunity to observe visitors
to the Consulate than any of the other clerical employees. She appeared to be
slightly above the average in intelligence for a Japanese girl of her class, and
impressed the agents as being entirely frank and cooperative in answering
questions.
23. It was developed in the course of the interrogation of Miss DOUE that
Tadasi MORIMURA, one of the secretaries of the Consulate, who had arrived
from Japan on 27 March, 1941, for the ostensible purpose of taking charge of
the expatriation work at the Consulate, did little or nothing in connection with
that work after the first few days following his arrival in Honolulu. Instead,
MORIMURA was assigned a desk in the same office with Vice Consul Otojiro
OKUDA, where the nature of his work was unknown to Miss DOUE. The
expatriation work was done in a different office of the Consulate, and was under
the supervision of Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary. Most of the clerical
details of this work were handled by Takaichi SA^AI, one of the clerks above
mentioned.
24. Miss DOUE stated that MORIMURA often came to work at about 1100,
two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and seldom was at his desk in
the afternoon. There was a week in October or November, 1941, when he
did not come to work at all. Miss DOUE often saw MORIMURA leave the
Consulate in a taxi during office hours between 1000 and 1100 and would not
see him again the same day. The staff of the Consulate usually called the
proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, located at 6 South Vineyai'd Street, Hono-
lulu (telephone 3299), and it was this stand that MORIMURA customarily
called. On other occasions, Miss DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate
during [1^] business hours with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, one
of the aforementioned clerks. Sometimes they would drive away in KOTO-
SHIRODO's car, and at other times they would use the above mentioned taxi.
On several occasions, neither of them came back for the rest of the day.
25. According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of Oahu which he
used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time. Miss DOUE stated
that she had seen Japanese characters written in pencil on the map. She had no
dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk.
26. Takaichi SAKAI, whose personal history is set forth in reference (g),
also was interrogated on 1 January, 1&42. He corroborated what Miss DOUE said
about MORIMURA's lack of connection with expatriation matters and his fre-
quent departures from the Consulate during business hours.
918 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
27. It was learned from Kanaye SAHARA, whose personal history is set forth
in reference (h), that MOKIMURA had one finger, either the middle or third, cut
off at the first joint. However, SAHARA could not remember which hand it
was. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said concerning MORI-
MURA's departures from the Consulate during business hours, accompanied by
KOTOSHIRODO, who often wore an aloha (sport) shirt. On these occasions,
they would be gone for the rest of the day. SAHARA stated that he suspected
that they went to "important places", and upon being asked what he meant by
that, said, "military places". On being asked why he thought they were going to
such places, SAHARA said that it was because of the strained relations between
the United States and Japan, and also because MORIMURA and KOTOSHI-
RODO would not make any mention around the Consulate as to where they had
been on their trips. SAHARA stated that KOTOSHIRODO had a 1937 Ford
sedan which he and MORIMURA often used.
28. SAHARA further stated that he did not know much about MORlMURA's
background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Ofiice publication
containing the names and biographical data of diplomatic and consular officials.
He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years of age, and if he is a regular member
of the consuler service, he would have been listed, as he could not have just
recently been graduated from college. SAHARA believed that the other three
secretaries of the Consulate, Kyonosuke YUGE, Samon TSUKIKA"\\A, and
Kokichi SEKI, were listed in this publication.
[15] 29. SAHARA also informed the agents that MORIMURA and KOTO-
SHIRODO were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together
as they came into, or left, the ofiice. Asked if he thought this was not strange, in
view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and clerks at the
Consulate, SAHARA attempted to explain it by the fact that both were about the
same age and seemed to enjoy each other's company.
30. KOTOSHIRODO was interrogated on 3 and 4 January, 1942, and on 9
January, 1942. His personal history is set forth in reference (j), while details of
his activities with MORIMURA will be discussed in a subsequent report. In
substance, this information is that MORIMURA, often accompanied by KOTO-
SHIRODO, sometimes in a taxi driven by John Yoshie MIKAMI, subject of
.reference (k), proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, and sometimes in KOTO-
SHIRODO's car, made frequent trips for the purpose of making observations of
military installations and operations. In addition to the trips made with MORI-
MURA, KOTOSHIRODO made a number of trips for the same purpose, by
himself and with MIKAMI, at the direction of MORIMURA. The names and
addresses of certain Japanese contacted by MORIMURA were obtained from
KOTOSHIRODO, and the joint investigation of these leads al.so will be covered by
a separate report. Signed statements concerning his activities were obtained
from KOTOSHIRODO on 4 and 9 January, 1942.
31. From all the clerks interviewed an effort was made to obtain the names
of frequent visitors to the Consulate, particularly those who saw the Consul
General and the "Vice Consul in private. Seven or eight prominent Japanese
business and professional men, who have been in custodial detention since 7
December, 1941, were named, including the local managers of the Yokohama Specie
and Sumitomo Banks and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N. Y. K. Line). According
to Mis<! DOUE. these men would go directly into the office of the Consul General,
who often would summon the Vice Consul for a conference. None of the clerks
had any idea of the nature of the conversations between these men and the
consular officials.
32. Asked if any persons, other than the prominent Japanese referred to above,
visited the Consulate on what appeared to he other than routine business, Miss
DOUE stated that a man whose nationality she did not know, came and went
several times from the Consulate during November, 1941. This man she described
as a "haole" (Hawaiian for "white person") [16] and looked somewhat
Jewish. Miss DOUE did not know his name. Sometimes this man, the Consul
General, and the Vice Consul were locked in the Consul General's private office.
The last visit of this man rememiiered by Miss DOUE was about the end of
November, 1941. The man referred to usually came in the morning and sometimes
Miss DOUE would see him only when he left the Consulate.
33. On 31 December, 1941, the dav before the investigation of the former con-
sular clerks was commenced. Otto KUEHN was brought from detention quarters
at the U. S. Immigration Station, Honolulu, to the headquarters of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for questioning bv Snecial Agents J. Sterling Adams and
George E. Allen. The interrogation of KUEHN, not having been completed on
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 919
31 December, was resumed the following day. While Miss DOUE was being
questioned as described above, KUEHN also was under interrogation in a nearby
room.
34. When Miss DOUE gave the information mentioned above concerning the
unidentified white man who had visited the Consulate during the month of Novem-
ber, Special Agent in Charge R. L. Shivers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
was advised. On the theory that this person might have been KUEHN, Miss
DOUE was told by Mr. Shivers that he wanted her to observe a certain person
and state afterwards if she had ever seen this person before. Miss DOUE v\-as
taken to a stenographer's room and placed at a desk. KUEHN was brought to
the door of this room and was engaged in conversation. Miss DOUE immediately
recognized KUEHN and placed a sheet of carbon paper over her face so that she
could not be recognized by him.
35. After KUEHN was taken back to the room where he was being questioned.
Miss DOUE was brought back to the room where her interrogation was being
conducted. She was thereiipon asked whether she had ever seen the person who
had just been shown to her. She answered immediately and with assurance that
this was the "haole" she had previously mentioned as having come to the Con-
sulate several times during November. Asked how she knew it was the same
man, she stated that she knew by the shape of his head and by his Jewish appear-
ance. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen this man leave the Consulate but
had never seen him get into any automobile. However, she stated that on days
when he came to the Consulate a tan-colored roadster was seen parked in front
of the building. Miss DOUE stated that she thought his visits were peculiar
and that she thought he was a "spy".
[17] 36. A short biographical sketch of KUEHN, based upon written state-
ments obtained from him on 1 and 3 January, 1942, by Special Agents Adams and
Allen, is submitted for information :
37. KUEHN was born in Berlin, Germany, on 25 December, 1895. In April,
1913, he enlisted as a cadet in the German Navy, serving as a midshipman until
captured by the British in January, 1915, and remaining a prisoner of war until
December, 1918. In 1920, he married his present wife. From the close of the
World War until 1927, KUEHN was employed in various occupations. In 1927,
he entered the coffee business and continued in it until 1935, when he came to
the United States. However, during the period 1928-1930, he was in the secret
police of the German Navy. In 1930, he and his stepson Leopold KUEHN, who
was born 6 July, 1911, joined the National Socialist (Nazi) party, but KUEHN
claims not to have been active in the party until 1932, when he was considered
for a position high in the Gestapo under Heinrich HIMMLER, but which position
was given to Reinhold HEYDRICH. Thereafter, KUEHN was twice jailed in
Germany, but was released, he says, through the efforts of his wife.
38. In 1935, KUEHN decided to go to Japan to study the Japanese language,
and passed through the mainland United States and Honolulu eni-oute to Japan.
In 1936 KUEHN and his family returned to Honolulu where they established
permanent residence and subsequently KUEHN returned to Japan for three
months' further language studj\ Upon his return to Honolulu in September,
1936, KUEHN continued the study of the Japanese language. In Honolulu, he
engaged in the steel furniture manufacturing business. Friedel KUEHN oper-
ated a beauty shop at Kailua and the KUEHNs have owned two homes at Kalama
and one at Lanikai. KUEHN's furniture business failed in 1938, his wife's beauty
shop brought in only about $80.00 a month, and they were forced to sell the
Kalama home and mortgage the other two residences, one of which usually was
rented.
39. From time to time, KUEHN has received considerable sums of money
from Eui'opean sources. He claimed that this money came from the estate of
his father and from the liquidation of the coffee business which he had owned.
Friedel KUEHN also received raoney from inherited property in Germany.
According to KUEHN, great difficulties were encountered in getting this money
out of Germany. Certain of the transfers were said to have been made through
a friend in Japan, a Doctor HOMBERG, who is connected with a German
steel firm, ROESCHLING STEEL WORKS in Tokyo, who assertedly purchased
the [IS] German holdings of Friedel KUEHN for $40,000.00. Part of this
consideration was transported in cash by Mrs. KUEHN from Japan to Honolulu
in 1940. KUEHN said the amount so received was $6,000.00, but his wife, who
was questioned later, said it was $9,C00.0O. In September, 1940, a payment of
$10,000.00 was received from Dr. HOMBERG and was delivered by one KAI,
purser of the SS KAMAKURA MARU, an N. Y. K. liner.
920 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
40. The following additional information was obtained from KUEHN and is
contained in his written statements made on 1 and 3 January, 1942 :
41. In July, 1941, after the "freeze order", KUEHN contacted Vice Consul
OKUDA at the Japanese Consulate and requested him to send a message to
Dr. HOMBERG through a Baron KYOGOKU in Japan, whom KUEHN claims
previously to have met on a trip to Japan. According to KUEHN, the message
to HOMBERG was in a prearranged private code and the substance of it was
a request to send the balance of the $40,000.00 due Mrs. KUEHN as soon as
possible. When OKUDA was hesitant about sending the message, KUEHN in-
formed him that he was acting for the Japanese Government and had an
important message for KYOGOKU, a Government official in Tokyo. KUEHN
told OKUDA that it was imperative that he receive the money before 29 October,
1941, because of the Treasury Department's foreign funds regulations, and he
intentionally gave OKUDA the impression that the money was to come from
KYOGOKU as compensation for services rendered the Japanese Government.
OKUDA finally agreed to send the message.
42. In his statement of 1 January, 1942, KUEHN had said that he first con-
tacted the Consulate early in November, 1941, to request assistance in sending
money to his stepson, Leopold, in Germany, and was informed that the Vice
Consul would take the matter up with the Yokohama Specie Bank. However,
in his statement of 3 January, 1942, he gave the version above set forth about
the message to Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in both versions, KUEHN
admitted having made several visits to the Japanese Consulate in November,
1941, and stated that he called in the mornings.
43. It was developed that on his second or third visit, either KUEHN or
Consul General KITA suggested that KUEHN could be of assistance in obtain-
ing information concerning United States fleet movements. KUEHN agreed to
do what he could, and on or about 28 November, 1941, he drove to the vicinity
of Pearl Harbor, where he said he saw very few [19] ships in the harbor.
Later, according to KUEHN, he informed the Consulate that there were seven
battleships, six cruisers, two aircraft carriers, twenty destroyers and twenty-
seven submarines, "or some similar figure in Hawaiian waters." The infor-
mation which KUEHN stated he furnished the Consulate, as set forth above,
can be compared with the figures set forth in enclosures (A) and (B), which
were prepared by this office (for the Federal Bureau of Investigation) from
data furnished by the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. As to
the figures admittedly reported by KUEHN, he said "those figures were purely
fictitious, as far as I knew."
44. Subsequent to the visit during which information relative to fleet move-
ments was first discussed, the following occurred, as described in KUEHN's
statement of 1 January, 1942:
"At that time I made suggestions to them stating that I had a short-wave
transmitter and could send messages for them if they so desired and I also
outlined a system of signaling that could be used in order to furnish infor-
mation relative to the types of ships in Pearl Harbor and those that had left.
This system of signalling contained fifteen sets of signals. These signals were
to have been given by a light in my home at Lanikai or Kalama which could
have been seen out at sea by a submarine, as follows: One light between
6 and 7 meant battle fleet in harbor ; one light between 7 and 8 meant scouting
force in harbor ; one light between 8 and 9 meant aircraft carriers in harbor ;
one light between 9 and 10 meant battle fleet prepared to leave; one light
between 10 and 11 meant scouting force prepared to leave; one light between
11 and 12 meant aircraft carriers prepared to leave ; one light between 12 and
1 meant battle fleet left between one and two days ago ; one light between 1 and
2 meant scouting force left one to two days ago; two lights between 6 and
7 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two lights between
7 and 8 p. m. meant battle fleet left three to four days ago ; two lights between
8 and 9 p. m. meant scouting force left three to four days ago ; two lights be-
tween 9 and 10 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left three to four days ago ; two
lights between 10 and 11 p. m. meant fleet left five to six days ago ; two lights
between 11 and 12 midnight meant scouting force left five to six days ago;
two lights between 12 midnight and 1 a. m. meant aircraft carriers left five
to six days ago.
[20] "This same set of signals could have been sent by means of linen on
the clothes line at my Lanikai home, one sheet between 6 and 7 a. m. in daylight
meaning battle fleet in harbor ; one sheet between 7 and 8 a. m. meaning scouting
force in harbor; one sheet between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers in
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 921
harbor ; one sheet between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning battle fleet prepared to leave ; ■
one sheet between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning scouting force prepared to leave ; one
sheet between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning aircraft carriers prepared to leave ;
one sheet between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning battle fleet left one to two days
ago; one sheet between 1 p. m. and 2 p. m. meaning scouting force left one to
two days ago; two sheets on line between 6 a. m. and 7 a. m. meaning aircraft
carriers left one to two days ago ; two sheets on line between 7 a. m. and 8 a. m.
meaning battle fleet left three to four days ago ; two sheets on line between 8 a. m.
and 9 a. m. meaning scouting force left three to four days ago ; two sheets on line
between 9 a. m. and 10 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left three to four days
ago ; two sheets on line between 10 a. m. and 11 a. m. meaning battle fleet left
five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning
scouting force left five to six days ago ; two sheets on line between 12 noon and
1 p. m. meaning aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.
"They told me at the time that this system of communication was too com-
plicated and it would be necessary for me to simplify it. I went home. One or
two days prior to the time I submitted this first set of signals I had ridden by
Pearl Harbor and there were very few boats in the harbor at that time. About
three days later I went back to the Consulate with a simplified system of sig-
nalling, on what I think was December 2, 1941. This set of signals contained
only eight combinations, as follows : No. 1 meaning battle fleet prepared to leave ;
No. 2 meaning scouting force prepared to leave ; No. 3 meaning battle fleet left
one to three days ago ; No. 4 meaning scouting force left one to three days ago ;
No. 5 [21] meaning aircraft carriers left one to three days ago ; No. 6
meaning battle fleet left four to six days ago ; No. 7 meaning scouting force left
four to six days ago ; No. 8 meaning aircraft carriers left four to six days ago.
These signals were to be given as follows from my Lanikai home : One light be-
tween 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 1 ; one light between 8 and 9 meaning No. 2 ;
one light between 9 and 10 p. m. meaning No. 3 ; one light between 10 and 11 p. m.
meaning No. 4 ; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 5 ; two lights be-
tween 8 and 9 p. m. meaning No. 6, etc. These lights were to have been from a
window or automobile lights. The same system could have been used with one
piece of linen hung on the line at Lanikai between 8 and 9 a. m., meaning No. 1,
one between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 2 ; one between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning
No. 3 ; one between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning No. 4 ; two pieces between
8 and 9 a. m. meaning No. 5 ; two pieces between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 6,
and so forth. It was also arranged that a light in the skylight at my Kalama
home between 7 and 8 p. m. would mean No. 1 ; one between 8 and 9 p. m. would
mean No. 2 ; one between 9 and 10 p. m. would mean No. 3 and 6 ; one between
10 and 11 p. m. would mean No. 4 and 7 ; one between 11 and 12 p. m. (midnight)
would mean Nos. 5 and 8.
"It was also arranged that this same system of signalling could have been
used with a star boat just ofC the mouth of Lanikai Beach between certain
hours, a star on the sail or a star and a number on the sail meaning corre-
sponding signals as those previously given, according to the time the boat
was in that position. I do not recall the exact combinations that were to have
been used to indicate each signal.
"It was also arranged that on the KGMB Want-Ads program in the morning
the signal could be effected to indicate numbers 3 and 6 if a Chinese rug was
advertised for sale, Nos. 4 and 7 if a beauty parlor operator was advertised
for ; and a third type of advertisement which I do not recall would indicate
numbers 5 and 8. It was also arranged that if it was impossible to give this
system of signals, [22] a garbage fire on Maui in a certain locality
between certain hours would indicate the above number signals, such as a fire
between the hours of 9 and 10 p. m. would mean signals 8 and 6, and so forth.
In mentioning this latter plan I had in mind a locality previously described
to me by a friend, CARL BASLER, where a number of vacant lots are located.
I determined the exact locality of this area by reference to a map of Maui
which showed the names of the two roads which border that locality and which
names were mentioned in my recommended plan as bordering the area wherein
the fire signals were to be effected.
"It was also arranged that this same set of signals could be given by short
wave radio and arrangements were made that if the Consulate desired to contact
me they could do so by sending me a postcard signed "JIMMIE", to my Box
No. 1476 at Honolulu.
"This simplified set of signals was taken to the Consulate in an envelope
by me about 8 : 30 in the morning. At the time I went to the Consulate I was
922 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
accompanied by my wife, FRIEDEL, and wliile she remained in the car I went
to the door and handed the envelope containing this set of signals and another
envelope containing $500.00, which was to be sent to my son LEOPOLD in
Germany, to the Vice Consul whose name I do not recall. I had no conversa-
tion with him at this time but went back to my car and drove on into
Honolulu.
"I might point out that the plan outlined by me above and that submitted
to the Japanese Consulate are probably not identical in every detail with those
actually submitted, although the plans outlined above are basically the same
as those submitted. Differences will probably appear in connection with the
hours stated for the signals to be given.
"Following the submission of these latter plans to the Consulate I have had
no further contact with any representatives of the Consulate to date, neither
have I received any correspondence or telephone messages from such repre-
sentatives. Apparently [23] no effort was made by the Consulate to
carry either of the proposed plans into effect through me.
"I have never been to the Island of Maui nor have I ever seen the island
nor purchased any property there. I never had a short-wave transmitter,
and my Lanikai Beach house is rented to Army people. I might state that
CARL BASLER had no knowledge of my plans submitted to the Japanese
Consulate. As a matter of fact I have not seen him or his wife since they
departed from Honolulu about September 1941. Further, I have had no corre-
spondence with them except for one letter received from Mrs. BASLER about
October, 1941. I rented my Lanikai residence on November 1, 1941, to two
couples, one an Army doctor, age about 30, and the other an employee with the
Engineers, about the same age, both of whom had been transferred from
Schofield Barracks to Kaneohe. I cannot recall the names of these individuals
at the present time."
45. In the same statement, KUEHN said that following the arrival of the
TATUTA MARU in Honolulu in October, 1941, a Japanese attached to that
vessel called at his residence and delivered a package enclosed in cardboard
containing $14,000.00 in $100.00 bills. The person v?ho made this delivery
stated to KUEHN that the package came from Dr. ROMBERG in Japan. But,
in his statement of 3 January, 1942, KUEHN described the receipt of the money
as follows:
"I did not contact the Consulate again nor did I receive any post card
until one afternoon in the very end of October, just after the first Japanese
boat came to Honolulu, a young Japanese man came to my home in Kalama
and he told my son that he wanted to see me. I was in the back working
in my garden. My son came and advised me he was there and I went around.
He very brusquely asked me if I was OTTO KUEHN and I said "Yes." and
he said, "I have something for you from Dr. HOMBERG," so I took him back
to my little garden house where he gave me a package and a letter and I
asked him if he had any other information for me and he said no. I opened the
letter first and in the letter was a sheet of paper written in English asking if
I had a short-wave transmitter and if I would be willing [24] to make
a test at a certain stated time which was on a night several nights later, on
a certain wave length. This letter was typewritten and had no name on it.
He gave me a sheet of paper and an envelope and I wrote on the sheet of
paper that I was unable to make the test. I was quite nervous and put it in
the envelope and gave it to him. I asked him if he knew what was in the
package and he said no. I asked him if he wanted a receipt for the package
and he said no, and he then left and I opened the package and counted the
money. There were $14,000.00 in the package, mostly in new $100.00 bills,
some $20.00 bills. I think that this was a contact KYOGOKU was trying to
make with me through this letter. As soon as he left I tore up the sheet of
paper asking me to make this radio test and burned it up."
46. It was learned from KOTOSHIRODO that some time in October, 1941,
he had been requested by Vice Consul OKUDA to drive IMORIMURA and him-
self to Kailua. At the corner of Kuulei Road and Maluniu Avenue, Kailua,
KOTOSHIRODO said that OKUDA directed him to stop the car, which he did,
and there MORIMURA got out of the car and commenced walking along
Maluniu Avenue in a northwesterly direction. OKUDA directed KOTOSHI-
RODO to drive several blocks along Kuulei Road and to stop at the corner
of Kuulei Road and Kalaheo Avenue. They waited there thirty or forty
minutes before MORIMURA reappeai'ed, walking along Kalaheo Avenue from
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 923
the dii'ection in which he had disappeared. (It is noted that the places where
MORIMURA alighted and later rejoined OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO are
approximately one-half mile from the Kalama residence of Otto KUEHN.)
On 4 January, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO directed Special Agent Tillman and
Lieutenant Kimball to the places above mentioned, and identified the places.
47. Eberhard KUEHN, age 15, stepson of Otto KUEHN, was interviewed
by Special Agents Adams and Allen, and stated to them that an unidentified
Japanese had come to see his father between 1600 and 1630 on a Saturday
afternoon, on either 18 October or 25 October, 1941. The description he gave
of this person is substantially similar to that of MORIMURA. Later, a pho-
tograph of MORIMURA was shown to Eberhard KUEHN, who stated that it
was very similar to the Japanese who called to see his father in October, and
that he believed that it was very likely the same person, but he could not say
positively. The same [25] photograph also was shown to Otto KUEHN,
who stated tliat it was quite similar to the Japanese who had delivered the
money to him ; that he is positive he has seen the person represented in the
photograph before, and believed it probably was on the occasion when the
money was delivered. However, KUEHN still contended tliat he was of the
belief that the man who had come to see him had been sent by Dr. HOMBERG,
and that a Japanese steamer was in port in Honolulu on the day in question.
(It should be noted here that the only Japanese liner in port around the time
in question was the TATUTA MARU, which arrived in Honolulu from the
Orient on 23 October, 1941, and departed for San Francisco the following
day.)
48. At no time has KUEHN implicated anyone outside the Consulate, other
than himself and the Japanese who delivered the $14,000.00 to him, in any of
the activities above described. Thus far, no evidence has been developed that
anyone, other than persons connected with the Consulate, have acted in con-
junction with KUEHN.
49. In the plan of the system of signals submitted by KUEHN to the Con-
sulate, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942, and set forth
in the despatch sent by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO on
3 December, 1941, part of the signals consisted of "KGMB want ads". KGMB
are the call letters of the broadcasting station in Honolulu owned and operated
by .the Hawaiian Broadcasting Company, Limited. Tlie despatch designated
the advertisements to be: (a) for the sale of a Chinese rug; (b) for the
sale of a complete chicken farm; and, (c) for a beauty operator wanted.
Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation lias failed to disclose any
record of radio advertisements on any KGMB program of the type described,
between 24 November and 8 December, 1941. However, it was found that
Post Office Box 1476, referred to in the message of 3 December, referred to
KUEHN's box at the Honolulu postoffice,
50. Of the original $14,000.00 cash received by KUEHN, $5,000.00 in new
$100.00 Federal Reserve Bank of New York notes was found on the person of
Mrs. KUEHN, after she was taken into custody on 8 December, 1941. It also
was discovered that Mrs. KUEHN had given $2,000.00, in similar denominations,
to her daughter, Mrs. J. Carson MOORE (nee Ruth KUEHN). This money also
was recovered by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These
funds are being traced from their source, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
to determine [26] the persons or agencies throiig'h whom they were
transmitted to Honolulu. It has been established by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that these notes were not obtained from, nor cleared through,
Honolulu banks. .
51. Otto KUEHN and his wife are the subjects of reference (a), being named
therein as "Mr. and Mrs. KOEHN". Reference (b) states that KUEHN and
his wife had (before 21 April, 1939) been under observation by the District
Intelligence Office for a number of months, and that KUEHN was strongly
suspected of being an espionage agent for either Japan or Germany, or both.
52. Otto KUEHN was carried on the Fourteenth Naval District records (July,
1940) as a class "A" Nazi suspect. See reference (c). The following informa-
tion appeared on the suspect card :
"KUEHN, Otto Kailua, Oahu (Occupation) None at present
Formerly (1918) cflicer in German Navy; cultivates acquaintances among
officers in U. S. Navy ; at one time received considerable sums of money from
European source; frequent trips to Japan; Mrs. KUEHN recently (May,
1940) returned from Japan and reportedly brought back a considerable sum
of money with her ; has failed in business but owns considerable real estate."
924 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
53. The name of Mrs. KUEHN was added to the Fourteenth Naval District Nazi
list, as a class "A" suspect, on 31 May, 1941, as shown by reference (e), the
pertinent portion of which reads as follows :
"KUEHN, Friedel— Kailua, Oahu. Wife of Otto KUEHN, suspected of being
a German agent. Friedel KUEHN is known to be pro-Nazi. Mr. and Mrs.
KUEHN are suspected of being 'Mr. "and Mrs. Friedel' who are reported as
contacts of the local Japanese consulate."
54. The names of "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" were furnished to the District Intelli-
gence Officer in July, 1940, by a reliable confidential informant who stated that
the I'riedels had approached the Honolulu Japanese Consulate with the request
that certain information of theirs be transmitted to the Japanese Navy. The
same confidential informant reported [27] that the consul-general re-
quested the Foreign Office to advise concerning the reliability of the Friedels, and
that the Foreign Office replied stating that the Friedels could not be placed, but
that any information they furnished should be received and forwarded with an
indication that it came from the Friedels. The message further advised that the
Japanese Navy was prepared to compensate the Friedels for any information they
furnished according to its value.
55. All of the information received from this confidential informant concerning
"Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" was transmitted to the Honolulu Field Office of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. An investigation conducted by that agency
failed to disclose any "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" who in any way fitted the meager
description furnished by the informant. It was concluded, however, that Otto
and Friedel KUEHN might be "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel", but no evidence was
obtained prior to the present investigation, indicating that either of the KUEHNs
had contacted the Japanese Consulate.
56. The evidence obtained in the investigation, which is set forth in substance
in this report, has been given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Angus
M. Taylor, Jr., United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii, who has
pi-epared charges and specifications charging Otto KUEHN with violation of
Sections 34, 31, and 32 of Title 50, U. S. Code. These charges and specifications
will be preferred by Captain Eugene V. Slattery, Assistant Judge Advocate
General, Hawaiian Department, who will act as trial judge advocate in the
prosecution of the case before the Military Commission.
57. Charge No. 1 is based on Section 34 of Title 50, and avers that KUEHN
conspired with Consul General KITA and Vice Consul OKUDA on or about 20
November, 1941, to unlawfully communicate, in violation of Section 31, informa-
tion to the Japanese Government concerning the movements and positions of
the United States Fleet, by means of a system of signals prepared by KUEHN,
and that in the furtherance of the conspiracy, certain overt acts were committed
by KUEHN. These acts include obtaining by visual observation on or about 28
November, 1941, figures as to the number of naval vessels in Pearl Harbor and
furnishing the same to the consular officials ; and preparing and submitting to
the same officials on or about 2 December, 1941, the plan for the system of
signals previously described, which plan was transmitted by Consul General
KITA to the Japanese Government on or about 3 December, 1941.
[28] 58. Charge No. 2 is based on an alleged violation of Section 31,
Title 50, and specifies that KUEHN, on or about 28 November, 1941, for the pur-
pose of obtaining information respecting the national defense, and with intent
and reason to believe that the information to be obtained was to be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, namely,
Japan, unlawfully obtained information concerning the disposition of United
States naval vessels in Pearl Harbor.
59. Charge No. 3 is based on an alleged violation of Section 32 of Title 50,
and specifies that on or about 2 December, 1941, KUEHN unlawfully trans-
mitted the information he had obtained concerning naval vessels to the Japanese
Government, through the Consulate.
60. No evidence has thus far been discovered by any of the three investigative
agencies which have handled the various phases of this case which would estab-
lish as a fact rhat any attempt was made, either before or after 7 December,
1941, to put into actual operation the system of signals prepared by KUEHN
for the Consul General and submitted by the latter to Tokyo. However, efforts
still are being made to obtain such evidence, if it exists, and to determine what
other person or persons, if any, may have been implicated in such activities.
61. (Other messages despatched by the Consul General, both in the period,
1-4 December, 1941, and at other times, as the same have been received by this
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
925
ofl3ce and have been resolved into plain language, will be discussed in a report
supplementary to this one, and bearing the same subject title. )
Pending— 14ND.
6 February, 1942
Enclosure (A): Table showing numbers of battleships, heavy cruisers, light
cruisers, aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and destroyer-type vessels in
Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and ISOO, SS-80 November 1941
Date
Time
Types of Ships
BBS CAs CLs CVs SSs DDs DMs AVDs (#)
11/22
11/23
11/24
11/25
11/26
11/27
11/28
11/29
11/30
1800
0800
1800
0800
1800
0800
1800
0800
1800
0800
1800
0800
1800
0800
1800
0800
1800
31
32
32
28
26
27
31
37
34
34
34
39
18
33
31
33
32
33
Key: BB^battleship; C A^heavy cruiser; CL — light cruiser; C V — aircraft carrier; SS— submarine; DD —
destroyer; DM — light mine layer (destroyer type); AVD— seaplane tender (destroyer type).
(#)— Total of destroyer type craft. DMs and AVDs were built as destroyers and converted to their
present use. To the untrained eye, they would appear as destroyers.
Enolosueb (B) : Table of numier and movement of ships in Pearl Harbor, by
types, at various times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941
HEAVY CRUISERS (CAS) — Continued
0727— CHESTER cleared 0
0735— SALT LAKE CITY cleared.- 8
LIGHT CRUISERS (CLS)
0600 — Underway in harbor
(DETROIT) 1
0637— DETROIT cleared 0
1138— HELENA entered 1
1131— HONOLULU entered 2
1148— ST LOUIS entered 3
1200— PHOENIX entered 4
1212— RALEIGH entered 5
1250— HELENA moored 5
1300— HONOLULU moored 5
1300— RALEIGH moored 5
1305— PHOENIX moored— 5
1328— ST. LOUIS moored 5
1350— DETROIT entered 6
1510— DETROIT moored 6
1800 — At moorings 6
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CVS)
0600— At moorings (LEXINGTON,
ENTERPRISE) 2
0735— ENTERPRISE underway 2
(#) The UTAH was commissioned as a battleship, but later demilitarized and used as a
target ship. To the untrained observer, she might appear to be a battleship.
BATTLESHIPS (BBS)
0600— At moorings (ARIZONA,
NEVADA, OKLAHOMA) 3
0658— NEVADA underway 3
0705— ARIZONA underway 3
0748— NEVADA cleared 2
0801— ARIZONA cleared 1
1045— PENNSYLVANIA entered 2
1053— CALIFORNIA entered 8
1102— MARYLAND entered 4
1110— TENNESSEE entered 5
1123— WEST VIRGINIA entered 6
1155— PENNSYLVANIA moored 6
1210— CALIFORNIA moored 6
1232— MARYLAND moored 6
1240— TENNESSEE moored 6
1306— WEST VIRGINIA moored 6
1547— UTAH moored (#) 7
1048— UTAH moored (#) 7
1800— At moorings : 7
HEAVY CRUISERS (CAS)
0600— At moorings 11
0625— NORTHAMPTON underway _ 11
0632— CHESTER underway 11
0640— SALT LAKE CITY underway 11
0718— NORTHAMPTON cleared 10
926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Enclosure (B); Table of number and movement of ships in Pearl Harbor, by types,
at various times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, J94/— Continued
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CVS) — Continued
0838— ENTERPRISE cleared 1
1800 — At moorings 1
STJBMAEINES (SSS)
0600 — At moorings 4
1254— ARGONAUT underway 4
1300— TROUT underway 4
1340— ARGONAUT cleared 3
1350— TROUT cleared 2
1800— At moorings 2
DESTBOYEES (DOS)
0600 — At moorings or underway — 26
0602— MUGFORD cleared 25
0605— GRIDLEY cleared 24
0608— MAURY cleared 23
0612— BAGLEY cleared 22
0617— HENLEY cleared 21
0620— CRAVEN cleared 20
0621— PATTERSON cleared 19
0623— BALCH cleared 18
0625— HELM cleared 17
0628— RALPH TALBOT cleared.- 16
0630— FANNING cleared 15
0632— McCALL cleared 14
0640— DUNLAP cleared 13
0641— BENHAM cleared 12
0647— CONYNGHAM cleared 11
1205— WORDON entered 12
1221— ALYWIN entered-- 13
1228— CONYNGHAM entered 14
1232— CASSIN entered 15
1236— HULL entered 16
1243— DAT^E entered 17
1245— REID entered 18
1247— DOWNES entered 19
1254— DEWEY entered 20
DESTROYERS (dds) — Continued
1300— MONAGHAN entered 21
1308— TUCKER entered 22
1318— CONYNGHAM mored 22
1330— FARRAGUT entered 23
1333— CASE entered 24
1336— MacDONOUGH entered 25
1340— PHELPS entered 26
1345— CASSIN moored 26
1350— ALYWIN moored 26
1350— REID mored 26
1407— DOWNES moored 26
1412— TUCKER mored 26
1425— WORDON moored 26
1435— DALE moored 26
1440— CASE moored 26
1446— MONAGHAN moored 26
1446_HULL moored 26
1459--DEWEY mored 26
1459— FARRAGUT moored 26
1515— PHELPS moored 26
1530— MacDONOUGH moored 26.
1800— At moorings 26
MINESWEEPERS (DMS)
0600 — At moorings
0610— GAMBLE underway
0612— MONTGOMERY uuderway.
0615— BREESE underway
0625— RAMSAY underway
0652— GAMBLE cleared
0655— MONTGOMERY cleared—
0657— BREESE cleared
0700— RAMSAY cleared
1800 — ^At moorings
SEAPLANE TENDERS (AVDS)
0600— At moorings 3
1800— At moorings 3
Upoted States Naval iNTEixiaBNCE Service
INVESTIGATION REPORT
C^fi'h ff/tf f^'iiiifLl/
Subject : JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities.
Report made at : Honolulu, T. H., 14tli Naval District. Date : 14 Feb. 1942.
Report made by: Lieutenant (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR.
Period covered : 5 Dec, 1941 to 14 Feb., 1942. Status of Case : Pending.
Origin of Case: Receipt by DI0-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by
Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign OflSce, Tokyo, and Japanese
Ambassador, Washington.
Character of Investigation : Espionage.
Enclosures: (A) Copies of mis- Copy to: ONI (5) 14ND (3)
CinCPac (1)
Com 14 (1)
FBI-Hon (2)
MID-HD (2)
Source File No. : 14 ND #54A. ONI File No. :
Synopsis : During the period 3-6 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General.
Honolulu, reported to Tokyo, by despatch, the entry and departure of Naval
vessels at Pearl Harbor. There is no evidence at hand to show reporting of such
cellaneous despatches from Japa-
nese Consul General, Honolulu, to
Tokyo and to other Consuls, con-
cerning military and naval subjects.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 927
facts by despatch prior to 3 December, nor has aiiy message been found which
ordered the Consulate so to report starting on 3 December.
Messages furtlier reported in detail as to the numbers of Naval vessels in Pearl
Harbor on 5 and 6 December, 1941. Reports vpere accurate as to the number
of battleships and aircraft carriers, not so accurate as to cruisers, and very inac-
curate as to destroyers.
Percentage of error in reporting indicates reports probably were based on
data gathered by untrained observers stationed at some distance outside the
Navy Yard. There is no evidence to indicate that anyone inside the Navy Yard
was engaged in this espionage activity.
The despatch of 1248, 6 December, indicated knowledge that anti-torpedo nets
were not being used to protect battleships moored in Pearl Harbor.
Deductions: Despatches of 3-6 December, 1941, while relatively inaccurate in
many details, apprised Japan of the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor, ab-
sence of aircraft carriers therefrom, and the non-use of anti-torpedo nets to pro-
tect battleships in the harbor.
Approved : I. H. Mayfield,
Captain, U. 8. Navy,
District Intelligence Ofjficer.
[1] Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Ac-
tivities.
References :
(a) 14ND Investigation Report, same subject, 2-9-42.
(b) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTO-
SHIRODO, 2-8-42.
(c) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject JOHN YOSHIE MIKAJNII, 2-6^2.
1. This report is a continuation of, and an enlargement .upon, reference (a).
It is concerned chiefly with (a) the substance of certain naval intelligence trans-
mitted by despatch from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo, and
(b) the accuracy of the data transmitted.
2. Copies of some, but not all, of the encrypted despatches of the Japanese
Consulate, Honolulu, dating back to March, 1941, were made available to the
District Intelligence Office and to the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation by reliable confidential informants. Only such of those com-
munications that refer to military or naval subjects will be discussed in this
report. As stated in reference (a), copies of the despatches hereinafter dis-
cussed were received by the District Intelligence Officer, from a highly confiden-
tial source, on 5 December, 1941, but were in code or cipher and could not be
evaluated immediately. The plain meaning of the despatches was not learned
until 11 December, 1941.
3. For the sake of clarity, it is stated at the outset that evidence gathered
to date indicates that intelligence concerning United States vessels in Pearl Har-
bor, and heir entry and departure therefrom, was gained by the simple expedient
of observing ships in the harbor from points of vantage outside the Navy Yard.
From reference (a), it appears that such fact-gathering was directed either by
Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA or Tadasi MORIMURA, a secretary at the Con-
siilate; that MORIMURA personally made many trips to the vicinity of Pearl
Harbor, with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, a Consulate clerk, subject of
reference (b), and with John Yoshie MIKAMI, a trusted taxi driver, subject of
reference (c), who is at present in custodial detention; that MORIMURA per-
sonally did most of the known observing of Pearl Harbor, and contacting ob-
servers who lived in that vicinity; and, that Otto KUEHN, prominently men-
tioned in reference (a), who admitted making up a signal system for the Con-
sulate to use to convey information (presumably to Japanese ships off the shores
of the Hawaiian Islands) , at least once visited the Pearl Harbor [2] area for
the purpose of determining the number of ships there and reporting his findings
to the Consulate. The modus operandi of MORIMURA and other Consulate ob-
servers and contacts will be set forth in detail in a report to follow.
4. On 3 December, 1941, Consul General Nagao KITA sent the following
despatch to the Foreign Office, Tokyo:
Wyoming and two seaplane tenders departed third.
(It should be noted that the messages consistently refer to the WYOMING,
where obviously the UTAH was intended.) An examination of copies of the
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, ejitry and departure log for 22 November to 7 De-
cember, 1941 (hereinafter referred to as "operational data"), shows the above
928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
despatch to have been wholly in error. The UTAH cleared Pearl Harbor on
1 December, at 1208, and did not return until 1555, 5 December. The seaplane
tenders CURTISS and THORINTON also left Pearl Harbor on 1 December,
clearing at 1628 and 1712, respectively, and also returned to the harbor on
5 December, entering at 1408 and 1410, respectively. The operational data
further reveals that no battleships cleared the harbor on 3 December (so there
was no departure of a vessel that might reasonably have been mistaken for the
UTAH), and that no seaplane tenders left Pearl Harbor that day.
5. On 4 December, at 1657, the following despatch was sent to Foreign Minister
TOGO by the local Consulate :
USS Honolulu arrived 1300/4 th
From the operational data aforementioned, it was determined that the USS
HONOLULU entered Pearl Harbor at 1131, and secured at berth B-21 at 1300,
on 28 November, 1941. She did not move from that berth before the Japanese
attack of 7 December. Furthermore, no cruisers of the HONOLULU type either
eptered or cleared the harbor on 4 December. The only cruiser movements at
Pearl Harbor during the period 1-6 December, 1941, were the departure of the
CHICAGO, PORTLAND, ASTORIA, INDIANAPOLIS, and MINNEAPOLIS, be-
tween 0718, 5 December, and the arrival of the DETROIT, at 0947, 5 December.
6. Obviously in response to a request from Tokyo for the same (which re-
quest has not yet been found in the tratfic to the Consulate), the following
message was sent by [^'j Consul General KITA at 1804 on 5 December:
The three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning, the
fifth, entered port. They expect to depart port on the eighth. On the same
day the Lexington and five heavy cruisers departed. The following war-
ships were anchored on the afternoon of the fifth : 8 battleships ; 3 light
cruisers ; 16 destroyers. Coming in were 4 cruisers of the Honolulu type
and 2 destroyers.
The first sentence of the message evidently refers to Battleship Division One
(ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA), which entered Pearl Harbor between
0856 and 0931, 5 December. The District Intelligence Officer has been informed
by the Fleet Intelligence Officer that Battleship Division One was NOT scheduled
to sail on 8 December, 1941, as reported in the second sentence of the despatch
to Tokyo.
7. The foregoing message, in its third sentence, correctly set forth the facts.
The LEXINGTON cleared Pearl Harbor at 0810, 5 December, in company with
the five heavy cruisers before mentioned, which cleared between 0718 and 0735,
the same morning.
8. After the arrival of Battleship Division One on the morning of 5 December,
and up until the time of the Japanese air attacli on 7 December, there were
eight battleships moored in Pearl Harbor: PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA,
MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, WEST VIRGINIA, ARIZONA, NEVADA, and
OKLAHOMA. The information reported to Tokyo on 5 December in this regard
was, therefore, correct.
9. The statement in the foregoing message, that there were (only) three
light cruisers in the harbor on the afternoon of 5 Deee;mber reported only half
of the vessels of that type in Pearl Harbor, which were the HONOLULU,
HELENA, ST, LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT. In addition to
light cruisers, the heavy cruisers NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO were
in the harbor all that afternoon, but were not reported in the despatch.
10. As shown by the operational data, at 0800 on 5 December, 1941, there
were twenty-one destroyers in Pearl Harbor. Six more arrived, and none de-
parted, before 1200 the same day, making a total of -twenty-seven moored (or
underway ia the harbor, proceeding to moorings) at noon. [^] One de-
stroyer cleared the harbor at 1539, but re-entered at 1612. Therefore, at all
times on the afternoon of 5 December, there were at least twenty-six destroyers
in Pearl Harbor.
11. Assuming that the Consulate's observer or observers might not have been
able to distinguish between destroyers (including DLs) and ex-destroyers now
used as minelayers, mine sweepers, or seaplane tenders, the following facts
as to all destroyer-type ships are presented : At 0800, on 5 December, 1941, there
were twenty-eight destroyers and destroyer-type vessels moored in Pearl Harbor.
Between 0800 and 1200, the same day, six DDs, four DMs, and two DMSs en-
tered, and there were no departures of those types, bringing to forty the total
of destroyers and ex-destroyers in the harbor at 1200. Subsequent departures,
between 1200 and 1800, varied the number of such vessels in the harbor between a
minimum of forty and a maximum of forty-three.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 929
12. The last sentence of the above message of 5 December, to the effect that
four cruisers of the HONOLULU class and two destroyers were coming in that
afternoon, is not supported by the facts. On the afternoon of 5 December, the
four HONOLULU class cruisers already named were in the harbor, and had been
there since 28 November, 1941. No cruisers of that class did come in, or were
coming in, on the afternoon mentioned. Furthermore, after the arrival of the
DETROIT on the morning of 5 December, there were no further arrivals of
cruisers of any class until after the Japanese attack. As to destroyers, four
destroyer-type vessels entered the harbor on 5 December, at 1310, 1408, 1431,
and at 1612.
13. On 6 December, 1941, Consul General KITA received the following despatch
from Foreign Minister TOGO, which is inserted here merely as a matter of
interest :
Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of war-
ships after the fourth.
There has not yet been found in the Consulate traflSc any indication as to when
the Consulate received orders to report by despatch on United States fleet move-
ments. It is noted from the data at hand that such reporting by despatch was
not indulged in prior to 3 December, 1941.
14. At 1801 on 6 December, 1941, the Consulate [5] placed the follow-
ing message for transmission to Tokyo and Washington :
On the evening of the fifth the battleship WYOMING and one sweeper
entered port. Ships moored on the sixth are as follows : 9 battleships ; 3
light cruisers ; 17 destroyers ; 3 mine sweepers. Ships in dock : 4 light
cruisers; 2 destroyers. (CA and CV ALL ) PS — CV cannot be found
in the fleet.
The first sentence of the foregoing message is supiwrted by the following facts :
The UTAH (again mistakenly referred to as the WYOMING) entered Pearl
Harbor at 1555 on 5 December, preceded by the SUNNADIN at 1530.
15. As to the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor on 6 December, the fol-
lowing are the true facts: If the UTAH be counted as a battleship (as it should
be in this situation, where the Consul consistently referred to it as the WYO-
MING), there were nine battleships in the harbor, as reported.
16. Cruisers in the harbor at that time were two heavy cruisers, the NEW
ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO, and six light cruisers, the HONOLULU,
HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX. RALEIGH, and DETROIT.
17. In this message, as in that of 5 December regarding the number of vessels
in Pearl Harbor, there is a considerable variance between the number of
destroyers reported to be in the harbor, and the number actually there. As of
0800, 6 December, there were twenty-seven destroyers moored in Pearl Harbor.
Two more destroyers entered at 1115 and 1132, respectively, one cleared at 1300,
and there were no further destroyer movements that day. Therefore, a total
of twenty-nine destroyers were in Pearl Harbor from and after 1300 on 6 De-
cember, as compared with a total of nineteen reported in the despatch quoted
above. In addition, there were other destroyer-type craft present in the harbor
that day — four high-speed mine sweepers (DMSs), eight minelayers (DMs),
and three seaplane tenders (AVDs) — which to the untrained observer might
have appeared also to be destroyers.
18. As noted in the preceding paragraph, there were four mine sweepers in
Pearl Harbor all day on 6 December. In addition, the BOGGS (DMS) entered
at 0830, cleared at 0920, [61 entered again at 1540, and cleared again at
1625. This is to be compared with the reported three mine sweepers in the
harbor.
19. It is believed that the report to Tokyo of 6 December, where the terms
"moored" and "in dock" were used, meant to differentiate between ships at
moorings and those berthed at docks (and not to distinguish between ships in
drydock and those not in drydock). From Navy Yard operational data, it was
determined that only eight battleships (counting the UTAH as such) were at
moorings on that afternoon. The ninth battleship, the PENNSYLVANIA, was
in Drydock #1. As to cruisers, it is noted that three light cruisers were moored,
as reported In the despatch, while three other light cruisers and the two heavy
cruisers were at docks. The approximate data as to destroyers was : nineteen at
moorings, five at docks, and three in drydocks.
20. The postscript to the above despatch is thought to mean not that there were
no aircraft carriers in the fleet, but that there were none in the portion of the
fleet at Pearl Harbor at the time of last observation. Such was the fact, the
last carrier, the LEXINGTON, having sailed on 5 December.
930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
21. Another despatch of 6 December, delivered for transmission to Tokyo at
1248, was called for by a previous message from Tokyo twhich also has not yet
been found in the Consulate traffic) :
Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123 :
1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis,
N. C, on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the
practicability of their employment in the defen.se of Hawaii and Panama.
Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected
for their use or any preparations for construction moorings. No evidence of
training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their
installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they
would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field, and
Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.
2. Am continuing in detail- the investigation of the non-use of nets for
torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.
[7] Information as to the accuracy of the first paragraph of the above
despatch is not readily available to this office and, because that portion of the
message is not relevant to the general subject-matter of this report, no further
comment thereon is offered.
22. The second paragraph of the message above suggests the following facts
which, however, it has been impossible so far to verify: (a) That the local
Consulate (and through it, Tokyo) knew that anti-torpedo nets were not being
used to protect battleships in Pearl Harbor; and (b) that a prior report on
the subject had been made by the Consul General to Tokyo, or that the above
despatch was called for by a request from Tokyo (which, however, has not yet
been found in the Consulate traffic), or both.
23. That the Japanese Consulate was interested in reporting not only the
movements of United States Naval vessels, but also those of American mer-
chantmen and British men o'war, is shown by the two despatches immediately
following.
24. At 1718, 3 December, 1941, Consul General KITA despatched the following
message to Tokyo, information copy to Japanese Consul, San Francisco :
Urgent report. Military naval transport (name unknown) departed for
the mainland on second. Lurline arrived from San Francisco on third.
The part of the message relating to the arrival of the Matson liner Lurline
is correct. However, there is no record of any military or naval transport
having left either Honolulu harbor or Pearl Harbor on 2 December, 1941.
25. The Japanese Consulate on the evening of 4 December, 1941, placed the
following message for transmission to Tokyo :
On the afternoon of the third a British man of war entered Honolulu
and departed early on the fourth. About 110 tons ; one stack ; and had
a four-inch gun fore and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went
ashore and were receiving mail at the British consulate.
[8] Reference was made to the PRINCE ROBERT, a converted Canadian
merchantman, which arrived at Honolulu harbor on 3 December, at 1240, and
departed at 1220 on 4 December. The registered gross tonnage of the PRINCE
ROBERT, as a merchantman, was 6,892. Mr. Harry L. DAWSON, Vice Consul
for Great Britain, advised that the PRINCE ROBERT has two stacks, but
could give no figures as to her offensive armament. There is nothing of record
in the Fourteenth Naval District regarding the vessel's armament or number
of stacks. That part of the despatch reporting that the PRINCE ROBERT'S crew
went ashore and received mail at the British Consulate is correct.
26. The quality of reporting done by the Consulate to Tokyo on 3-6 December,
1941, is considered to have been poor, noticeably in the following particulars :
A. Complete inaccuracy of the despatch of 3 December regarding departure
of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. (See paragraph 4, above.)
B. Erroneous reference to the UTAH as the WYOMING. (Paragraphs 4,
14.)
C. Complete inaccuracy of the message regarding arrival of the HONO-
LULU. (Paragraph 5.)
D. Failure entirely to report heavy cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 14), and
reporting only half the light cruisers ( Paragraphs 6, 9. )
E. Reporting that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class were coming in
on 5 December, whereas none arrived. ( Paragraph 6. )
F. Large percentage of error in reporting number of destroyers. (Para-
graphs 6, 10, 11, 14, 17.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 931
G. Failure to report that the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock and not
at moorings. (Paragraph 14.)
27. Upon the basis of the foregoing, including references (a), (b), and (c),
it is concluded that :
A. There definitely were several observers who reported Pearl Harbor
ship movements to the Consulate. This is proved by the admisisons of
KOTOSHIRODO and MIKAMI, in references (b) and (c), respectively,
and by other evidence to be discussed more fully in the next report.
B. The observers were relatively untrained, with the possible exception
of MORIMURA, who may be a naval officer. (To date, the evidence fails
[9] to show which observers made the accurate reports, and which made
the erroneous reports.)
C. Observing was done from a considerable distance. This is concluded
chiefly from the fact that the demilitarized UTAH was mistaken for the
WYOMING (wjiereas the latest issue of Jane's Fighting Ships, readily
available in Honolulu, clearly shows the WYOMING to have guns in her
turrets and the UTAH not to have them), and from the fact that all battle-
ships were reported on 6 December to have been at moorings, whereas the
PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock.
D. Confidential data as to Naval operations was not compromised. This
is concluded from the fact that, in general, the data transmitted to Tokyo
was surprisingly inaccurate.
28. Other than the despatches above reported, none of a seasonable nature
have been found which bear directly on fleet movements. Certain messages,
reporting (from newspaper sources, in most instances) such facts as the arrival
of an American "goodwill squadron" in Australia and New Zealand, Admiral
H. E. Kimmel's trip to and return from Washington, and the passage through
Honolulu of personnel and supplies destined for the Burma Road have been
collected and are appended hereto in enclosure (A).
Pending,
[i] Enclosure (A) : Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese
consul general, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other consiils, concerning
military and naval subjects.
21 March 1941.
(To Tokyo; hy code mail to Washingto7i)
According to despatches from Auckland and Sydney the light cruisers Brook-
lyn and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cummings, Tucker arrived at
Auckland on the 17th ; and the heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland, and the de-
stroyers Clark, Cassin, Conyngham, Downs, Reid arrived at Sydney — both
groups on a friendly visit. The first group departed from Auckland on the 20th
and may return to Pearl Harbor. It is reported that the second group will also
go to Brisbane. Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under
sealed orders and that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and de-
parted there on the 11th, that the final destination was not known by "outsiders"
until they arrived. The maintenance of secrecy on this trip was a great suc-
cess, it was reported.
29 April, 1941
(To Tokyo)
The American Army transport Washington with 2,500 troops and 24,300 tons
of military supplies departed New York the 11th and arrived here early the
morning of the 26th [2]] via Panama and San Francisco. After unload-
ing 2,000 troops, 12 student pilots, and military stores, 500 troops were embarked
and she departed the 27th. It is believed this ship will be employed in trans-
porting troops and evacuating Americans from the Far East.
14 MAY, 1941
(To Tokyo)
With respect to message No. 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reenforcing
the local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieutenant General Em-
mons departed San Francisco at 1559 the 13th fiying in formation and arrived
Hickam Field at 0558 the 14th.
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 18
932 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
7 JTTNB, 1941
(To Tokyo ; by code mail to San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle)
1. On the fourth received word from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started
conservations with the Secretary of the Navy. No extraordinary significance
seems to attach to his visit.
2. According to an announcement by Navy Department officials Admiral Kim-
mel brought plans for sending units [5] of the Fleet back to the mainland
for recreation of personnel for short periods. The periods and names of vessels
to return were not announced.
13 JUNE 1941
(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco and Manila)
Reference San Francisco MSG #92 :
SS President Pierce with about 900 Army men embarked (includes some hun-
dreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the 11th and sailed the
12th.
26 JUNE 1941
(To Tokyo)
Admiral Kimmel and Captain McMorris returned by Clipper the 25th.
27 JUNE 1941
(To Tokyo)
Chungking — Burma Road — Trucks
28 JUNE 1941
(To Tokyo and Consul, Hongkong)
Danial Arnstein, Harold Davis, Manco Hellman, transportation [4] man-
agers of prominent eastern U. S. trucking companies will leave on the 28th via
clipper for Hong Kong. Their aim will be to inspect the Burma Road from the
standpoint of speeding help (to China).
8 JULY, 1941
(To Tokyo and Washington)
A report regarding the Washington report of the Latin Pact of May that
American pilots are joining the China air force : The local Chinese Consul Gen-
eral on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his consulate (largely from local air groups).
Newspapers reports indicate that the Chinese military attache in Washington
(makes arrangements?) furthermore according to English (language) news-
papers of the 5th, 200 men have already (Toppa Senn) gone (?). The Chinese
Consul General avoids a statement regarding his orders.
15 JULY 1941
(To Tokyo, San Francisco, Washington)
On the evening of the 14th a local broadcasting station broadcast to the effect
that at present more than twenty Soviet ships are concentrating on the west
coast and [5] loading for Vladivostok with machinery, parts, shoes, high
test gasoline, etc., which had previously been released for export to Russia.
26 JULY 1941
(To Washington and Tokyo)
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Forrestal accompanied by Rear Admiral
Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and his aide will leave Alameda in
a Navy plane on the 26th and arrive at Pearl Harbor for the purpose of inspect-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
933
ing the U. S. Fleet and naval and military installations. In the same plane, six
oflScials connected with the Treasury Department will arrive for the purpose of
handling afEairs concerning the freezing of Japanese and Chinese assets here.
2 SSaT^MBEB 1941
(To Washington and Tokyo )
On the 2nd an English language paper reported that on the 1st a foreign ship
(called a sister ship of the Egyptian ship Zamzam which was recently attacked
by German planes, but the name and nationality was not [6] announced)
entered port here enroute to the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and
mechanics. Although the group declined to reveal their destination, they are
an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma
road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their military duties.
23 SEPTEMBEB, 1941
(To Tokyo)
Magruder to Chungking via Manila.
18 NOVEMBEB 1941
(To Tokyo)
Capt. Richard M. Jones, etc., Burma road trucks 3000 — 2 ton trucks.
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 41
7 June 1945.
I hereby certify that the annexed pages 1-28 are true and correct photostats
of original documents on file in Frupac*
Tho. H. Dyar,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
SIS TRANSLATIONS 1200-1299
DIPLOMATIC "KO", "PA" & "LA" SYSTEMS
Date
Addressee
GR
Next to last code group
Received
Transmit-
ted
FBI has
/3 Dec
T
T
T
SF
W
T
T
SF
T
T
T
SF
Sea
T
W
T
T
W
165
188
56
59
69
18
25
27
16
41
42
45
45
43
45
138
47
49
\3 Dec
(3 Dec
!■ Same
r 1254
i 1254
[ 1255
1657
/ 1718
1 1718
1834
1833
1804
f 1136
J 1139
1 1136
I 1132
1258
f 1801
1 1801
1315
JsDec
1318
13 Dee
1318
3 Dee
1707
/3 Dec
1 Same
1726
l3 Dec
1730
4 Dec
lYJIE
1848
4 Dec
YUAHE-...
1850
5 Dec - . - -
BYJVE
1806
f5 Dec
IHSGZ
IHSGZ
IHSGZ
IHSGZ
OXAQA
> Same
1138
5 Dec
5 Dec
1139
1139
5 Dee ..
1132
6 Dec
1304
/6 Dec
UEVTA..._
UEVTA...-
1 Same
1805
\6 Dec
1807
•(Incorporated into Exhibits 56 and 57 — June 27, 1945.)
934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Secret
FOXJETEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
DISTRICT INTETXIGENCE OFFICE
Sixth Floor, Young Hotel, Honolulu, Hawaii
WBS/wbs
Memo for : The File.
Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE GENERAL, Honolulu.
Ref : (a) FBI-Hon. Inv. Rpt, dated 26 Dec. 1941, subject: Japanese Activities
Honolulu, T. H.
1. Capt. I. H. Mayfield, USN, former DI0-14ND, was interviewed regarding
reference (a) on 17 March 1944, in the presence of Capt. Peyton Harrison, USNR,
present DI0-14ND, and the undersigned. Upon reading reference (a) in full,
Capt. Mayfield made the following observations, in substance :
(a) Ref. (a), p. 2, 2nd full par. — Statement that the material was not in-
ventoried is correct.
(b) Ref. (a), p. 4, 3rd full par. — I did receive some of the enciphered Con-
sulate traffic from RCA after 1 Dec. 1941 and before 7 Dec. 1941. All was
delivered immediately by officer messenger to Comdr. J. J. Rochefort, USN,
0-in-C of the combat intelligence "unit" at NYPH. Insofar as Comdr. Rochefort
provided me with "clear" versions of portions of that traffic, I furnished FBI-
Honolulu with copies thereof.
(c) Ref. (a), p. 6, 1st full indented par. — Meeting of Mr. Shivers, Lt. Col.
Bicknell, and myself took place in the DIG office about 1100, 11 Dec. 1941, after
the Commandant directed me to get in touch with Mr. Shivers and work on the
matter immediately.
(d) Ref. (a), p. 7, top line — To my knowledge, it was never established that
anyone ever used the signaling system to communicate with the enemy:
(e) Ref. (a), last page, 2nd and 3rd lines from top — The action taken by me
was to notify the appropriate District and Fleet staff officers with whom I had
been maintaining liaison on such matters — Comdr. Rochefort, and Lt. Comdr,
E. T. Layton, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer.
W. B. Stephenson,
W. B. Stephenson,
Lieutenant, USNR.
23 January, 1942.
Copies of the within messages given to FBI and MID today by Lt. Kimball.
W. B. S.
1941 DEC 7 AM 3 20
ZL MRHU68 TOKIO JG 19 9 PM 7TH
Urgent 92494 koyanagi rijiyori seirinotu-goo arunituki hattori minami kinen
bunko seturitu kidino kyokingaru sikyuu denpoo aritasi stop
Togo.
[Ostensible meaning: Regarding the state of adjustment [of what?] from
Director KOYANAGI [stated by a thoroughly reliable soure to stand for "Eng-
land"]. An ux'gent wire is requested re the sum collected for the establishment
of the reference HATTORI [code for "relations strained"] MIANIMI [code for
"America"] Memorial Library.]
"Relations strained with U. S. & England" is purport, ace. to the same source.
(The document. from which this translation was made was not received until
after 7 December 1941.
Denzel Carb.
6 June 1945.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 935
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 42
7 June 1045.
I hereby certify that the amended page is a true and correct copy of an original
document on file in Vrupac.
Thos. H. Dyeb,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
(Exhibit No. 42 consists of a paper showing part of the decryption
process of the Japanese "PA" code. This paper will be found repro-
duced as Item No. 124, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS,- Hewitt
Inquiry.)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 43
U. S. Na\t Yard, Peael Harbok, Hawaii, U. S. A.
Office of the Captain of the Yard
I hereby certify that the attached photostats onsisting of four sheets are true
copies of part of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard Duty Officer's Information Sheets,
ch are a part of the records of the Office of the aptain of the Yard, the originals of
which records are on file in the Office of the Captain of the Yard.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the
Captain of the Yard to be affixed, this seventh day of June, 1945.
S. F. Craven,
Captain, U. S. N.,
Captain of the Yard.
U. S. Navy Yard, PEiVRi> Harbor Haw ah, U. S. A.
Office of the Captain of the Yard
Restricted
DUTY' OFFICERS' INFORMATION SHEET NOS. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
1. The following information is furnished for duty officer as of 1200, December
G, 1941 :
Prospective Arrivals
2200 Litchfield out.
Ship, ANTARES. Time, 0600. Day, 12-7. Berth, XXX K-3. Pilot, 1. Tug,
142-153. *S. F. W. D. H. L., ARGONE.
Antares will require customs and agricultural inspection.
Prospective arrivels : *PLUNGER to SB 12^7, *POLLACK to SB 12-7, *POM-
PANO to SB 12-7, 1500 Sunday. Sunday 1400, *NAVAJO towing YC-786 12-8 to
M-1 Yardcraft take tow in "Turning Basin".
*"A11 require agricultural inspection (inspector not notified) .
Prospective Departures
Ship, HENLEY. Time, 1645. Day, 12-7. Tug, XX.
Kail, 0840 12-8 Coal dock to K5.
DUTY TUG SECTION LEADER
12-6 153-Holzhaus, B. M. Ic. ; 142-Fielder, C. B. M.
Dispatchers : Kennedy, C. Q. M. & Shepard, B. M. Ic.
12-7 130-Campbell, B. M. Ic. ; 38-Lt. Comdr. Boltz ; Dispatchers, Jones CQM
Vigil, BMlc
Other Information of Interest
1930 12-6 NEOSHO Hickam Buoys to F-4, pilot 4, tugs 142^153, lines NAS.
0100 12-7 COCKATOO & REEDBIRD sweep channel.
0900 12-7 NEOSHO F-4 to M-3, pilot 1, tugs 142-153, lines NAS/CASTOR.
0100 12-8 CONDOR & CROSSBILL sweep channel.
The dredge "TURBINE" is working in the drydock channel and all tx-affic
incoming or outgoing should be directed via the North Channel.
The dredge "WEEBER" is working in the South Channel off Hospital Point.
All traffic incoming or outgoing should be directed via the North Channel. Duty
Officer can control movements of tugs and mud scows, and getting dredge cleared
by telephone 4219.
936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Anti-Torpedo Net will be closed from sunset to sunrise. To be opened and
closed only upon orders from the Captain of the Yard, the Assistant Captain of
the Yard, or the Yard Duty Oflacer. Can be reached by telephone S254 or via the
tSignal Tower.
The Assistant Captain of the Yard (Comdr. H. R. Hayes) 'phone 2141.
Pilot's home phones : Otterson Aiea 63175 ; Green Aiea 63931 ; Hannus Aiea
63827 ; Carlson 714 15th St., Hickam Housing Area.
Inshore patrol— CHEW ; Ready duty destroyer— 12-6 MONAGHAN ; 12-7
RAMSAY ; Night flying NAS none reported.
12-6
Duty Oflicers: Yard Lieut. Mcllhenny ; Security Lt. (jg) Lewis.
12-7 Lt Comdr. Welden ; Ens. Peabody.
*S. F. W. D. H. L. — Ship furnishing working detail for handling lines.
CC: Hull Superintendent, Public Works OflScer, Power Plant, Master Rigger,
Pilot, File.
H. R. Hayes
H. R. Hayes,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Assistant Captain of the Nany Yard.
(At this point in Exhibit No. 43 there appears a sketch captioned
"Berth Numbers", dated December 6, 1941, relating to Pearl Harbor.
This sketch will be found reproduced as Item No. 125, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Office of the Assistant Captain of the Yaed
LIST OF ships present AS OF 1130
RESTRICTED
December 6, 1941 1941
B-1 Cachalot
K-1
D-5
B-2 Helena Oglala
K-2
D-6
B-3
K-3
D-7 Zane Washmuth Trever
Perry
B-4 Argonne Tern
K-4
D-8
B-5
K-5
D-9
B-6 Mugford Sacramento Jarvis
C-2
T-1
B-7
C-3
T-2
B-8
C-4
T-3
B-9
C-5
T-4
B-10
C-6 Phoenix
XPl
B-11
X-1
XP2
B-12
X-2 Dobbin Wroden McDon-
ough Phelps Dewey Hull
WBl
B-13 Rigel
X-3
WB2
B-15 Cummings Tracy Preble
X-4 Solace
SUBBASE
B-16 New Orleans Ramapo
X-5 Allen Bait. Nava.
Litchfield Narwhal Pelias Gud-
geon Dolphin Tautog Sumner
Hulbert Widgeon
B-17 Sanfrancisco
X-6
PT 20-30*42
B-18 Pruitt Sicard Ontario
X-7 Blue Helm
B-20 Sccley Grebe
X-8 Reid Case Tucker Whitney
Conyngham
,
B-21 St Louis Honolulu
X-9
DDl Penna Cassin Downes
B-24 Bagley
X-10
DD2
M-1
X-11 Patterson Talbot
DD3
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
937
LIST OF SHIPS PEESENT AS OF 1130— Continued
M-2
X-12
YFD2 Shaw
M-3
X-13
MARREY Swan
M-4 Castor
X-1 Monghan Dale
Aylwin
Farragut
West Loch Pyro Henley
F-1
X-15
HONO
F-2
X-16
HONO
F-3 California
X-17
Hickam: SS Haleakala
F-4
X-18
Coal Dock Bobolink Vireo
Turkey
F-5 Maryland Oklahoma
X-19
F-6 West Va, Tennessee
X-20
Inshore Patrol Chow
F-7 Arizona Vestal
X-21
F-8 Nevada
X-22 Curtiss
Ready Duty Destroyer Mong-
ghan
F-9
X-23 Medusa
F-10 Tagier
D-1
Net Depot Reedbird CrossbDl
Condor Cockatoo Chengho
AshYN7 YNgl
F-U Utah
D-2
YP109 YN53
F-12 Raleigh
D-3 Gamble Breese
ery Ramsay
Montgom-
SOPA COMBATFOR CALI-
FORNIA
F-13 Detroit
D-4
IN:
9 : 25 : Lay out fire hoses.
9 : 30 : Fire #1 drydock. Out of hand get more men down there.
9 : 35 : Torpedo at 0£E Club wharf unexploded. Wilder notify Capt. of Yd. I no-
tified Capt. Yd.— Wood.
9 : 40 Fuel off. Lower tank. 1 tank blew up.
10 : 00 False alarm.
4208, 3224, 3287.
Ship Hughes FD— 3224
10 : 25 : Murphy called saying : boats Wolse & Miduj have truck!
10 ; 25 : 59591 — Hold trucks with in readiness. Can't get thru our lines out.
Hewitt Inquiby Exhibit No. 44
U. S. S. YNG-17
CEETIFICATE
I hereby certify that the attached six sheets are true copies of pages of the
signal log of U. S. S. YNG-17, kept aboard this ship under my custody and com-
mand.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 5 day of June, one thou-
sand nine hundred and forty-five.
J. D. Robinson,
Joe D. Robinson,
Lieutenant (jg), USNR,
Officer in Charge.
YNG-17
(Copies of pages of the signal log of the U/SS YNG-17, referred
to supra, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 126 through 131,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTKATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 45
U. S. S. YNG-17
certificate
I hereby certify that the attached seven sheets are true copies of the quarter-
master's log of U. S. S. YNG-17, kept aboard this ship under my custody and
command.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 5 day of June, one thou-
sand nine hundred and forty-five.
J. D. Robinson,
Joe D. Robinson,
Lieutenant (jg), USNR,
Officer in Charge.
YNG-17
(Copies of the quartermaster's log of USS YNG-17, referred to
supra, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 132 through 138,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 46
Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, T. H.
certificate
I hereby certify that the attached one page is a true copy of the log of the signal
tower, navy yard. Pearl Harbor, for the method stated thereon, and that the
original log is kept under my custody and command.
In witness wliereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the
Captain of the Yard to be afllxed this fifth day of June, one thousand nine hun-
dred and forty-five.
S. F. Craven,
Captain of the Yard,
Navy Yard Pearl Harhor, T. H.
(A copy of the log of the signal tower, navy yard. Pearl Harbor, for
6-7 December 1941, referred to supra, will be found reproduced as
Item No. 139, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 47
United States Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas
headquabtr.rs of the commander in chief
This is to certify that the attached documents consisting of the following:
Copy of Cincpac Routing Slip 0845 dated 4 September 1941 (inscribed
"CINCUS Routing No. 0845"), with attached copy of Hawaiian Department Itr.
AR 311.5 Rev Of HCF-41, Subject : Annex VII and Enclosure (B) to Annex VII
to 14ND-JCD-42.
Copy of Cincpac Routing Slip 05710 dated 30 June 1941 (inscribed "CINCUS
Routing No. 05710"), Subject: Annex VII to 14ND-JCD13 (Joint Security
Measures: Protection of Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base. \VP#5.
Copy of Cincpac Routing Slip 0604 dated 10 June 1041 (inscribed "CINCUS
Routing No. 0604"), with attached copy of CNO Secret Itr. file Op-30B2-BP(SO)
A7-2(2)/FFl, Serial 059230, dated 20 June 1941, Subject: Joint Security Meas-
ures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base, and Enclosure (A).
copy of Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements of the Joint Coastal
Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval Distiict.
are true and correct photographic copies of the documents in the ofiicial files of
the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
R. E. Keeton,
R. E. Keeton,
By direction of the Commander in Chief,
V. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 939
(A copy of Cincpac Kouting Slip No. 0845 dated 4 September 1941,
referred to supra, will be found reproduced as Item No. 140 EX-
HIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
office of the department commander
fort shafter, t. h.
AG 311.5— Rev of HCF-41. 20 August 1941.
Subject : Revision of HCF-41.
To : Custodiaus of HCF-41.
1. Herewith new cover sheet and Inclosure "B" Section VI, ANNEX VII HCF-
41 for insertion in Register No. 21 of document now in your possession.
2. Present cover sheet marl^cd "to be published later" will be destroyed.
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT :
O. M. McDole,
O. M. McDoLE,
lla]or, A. G. D.
Assistant Adjutant Qeneral.
Inclosure A— Annex No. VIII HFC-39 ; 14 ND-JCD-13
AIRCRAFT DEPARTUBE, APPROACH, AND RECOGNITION PROCEDURE — OAHU AREA
To be published later.
Inclosure B— Annex No. VII HCF-39 ; 14 ND-JCD-13
HARBOR CONTROL POST, HONOLULU AND PEARL HARBORS, OAHU, T. H.
(To be published later. Pending publication of this inclosure, the Harbor
Control Post will be established, as far as practicable in accordaoce with the
recommendations contained in the report (dated 17 March 1941) of the joint com-
mittee (Chairman, Commander H. B. Knowles, USN) convened to study and
report upon the establishment of a Harbor Control Post and Measures for Com-
munication, Coordination, and Liaison between the Inshore Patrol and the Harbor
Defenses. )
(Copies of Cincpac Routing Slips Nos. 0604 and 05710, dated 10 June
1911 and 30 June 1941, respectively, and referred to swpra, will be
found reproduced as Items Nos. 141 and 142, EXHIBITS -ILLUS-
TRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
(SC)A7-2(2)/FFl Serial 059230
Secret
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To : The Commandants, All Naval Districts.
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.
Subject : Joint Security Measures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl
Harbor Base.
Enclosure: (A) Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements of the Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and
Fourteenth Naval District.
1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information. Attention is invited to the
importance of the problems presented in the subject matter.
2. Transmission by registered mail within the continental limits of the United
States is authorized.
/s/ H. R. Stark.
Copy to : Op-12
940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[1] Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District
1939
28 Marcli 1941
ANNEa? No. VII Section VI Joint Agreements. Joint Security Measures,
Protection of Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base.
I. general
1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet
and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air
attacks delivered prior to a declaration of vpar and before a general mobilization
for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-
39, (14ND-JCD-13) are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once
and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their re-
nouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to in-
corporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable
and necessary.
U. JOINT AIE operations
2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval
Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that
the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such
action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to
make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the
air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint
operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans.
a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the
tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the
Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consider-
ation to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes
released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will re-
main available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion
of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.
[2] b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu
will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base
Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these
missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number
of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable.
This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or
for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical
situation ; it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant 14th
Naval District), and i-everts to Navy control.
c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search opera-
tions, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the
tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.
d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the
protection xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this
mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the
mission.
m. joint communications
3. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to friendly
and hostile aircraft, and to provide for the transmission of orders when units of
one service are placed under the tactical control of the other service. Army and
Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and operation,
within the limitations of equipment on hand or which may be procured, of the
following means of joint communication.
a. Joint Air-Antiaircraft page printer teletype circuit with the following sta-
tions :
ARMY NAVY
Hawaiian Air Force Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor
18th Bombardment Wing Naval Air Station, Kaneche
14th Pursuit Wing Ewa Landing Field
Hq. Prov. AA Brigade Waialupe Radio Station
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 941
6. Joint radio circuit on 219 kilocycles with the following stations :
ABMY NAVY
♦Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. Waialupe Radio Station
Headquarters, HSCA Brigade Senior Officer Present Afloat
Hq. Prov. AA Brigade Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor
Hq. Hawaiian Air Force Naval Air Station, Kaneohe
18th Bombardment Wing Marine Air Group, Ewa
14th Pursuit Wing
[3] c. Direct local battery telephone lines as follows :
ARMY NAVY
Hq. Haw. Dept. (G-3 Office) 14th Naval District
CP, H. S. C. A. B. 14th Naval District
CP, Pearl Harbor Gpmt (Ft. Kam) 14th Naval District
d. Radio frequencies to be employed during joint air operations both during
combat and joint eercises, for communication between airplanes in flight will be as
agreed upon by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and the Com-
mander, Base Defense Air Force.
4. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to the move-
ments of friendly and hostile naval ships and of commercial shipping, Army and
Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and operation,
within the limitations of equipment on hand, or which may be procured, of the
following means of joint communication :
a. Joint page printer teletype circuit connecting the Harbor Control Post with
the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade loop.
6. Joint radio circuit on 2550 kilocycles with the following stations :
ARMY NAVY
CP, PH Gpmt, Ft. Kamehameha Waialupe
CP, Hon. Gymt, Ft. Ruger Destroyer Patrol
Additional stations that may be deter- Mine Sweepers
mined to be necessary
c. Telephone circuits as provided in par. 3 c. above.
5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, the Army will
operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broad-
casts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly and
hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS are
such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will in
most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAAIS will be transmitted
on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or movements of hostile air-
craft off-shore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be trans-
mitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade.
6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made
for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly
aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of
Navy liaison oflScers, so that they may make their own evaluation of [4]
7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above,
the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service (after
establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods, joint
exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such periods
as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the
Naval Base Defense Officer. The temporary loan of surplus communication
equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint communi-
cation nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken by the
service receiving the borrowed equipment to obtain replacements for the borrowed
articles through their own supply channels,
♦Net Control Station.
942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
IV. JOINT ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES
8. Arrival and departure procedure, aircraft. — ^During joint exercises, alert
periods, and combat, and at such other times as the Commanding General Ha-
waiian Department and the Naval Base Defense OfBcer (Commandant, Four-
teenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy aircraft approch-
ing Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will conform to the Arrival and
Departure Procedure prescribed in Inslosure A. This procedure will not be modi-
fied except when a departure therefrom is essential due to combat (real or simu-
lated during exercises) or due to an emergency.
9. Balloon barrages. — Reports from abroad indicate the successful development
and use of balloon barrages by European belligerents both British and German.
Although detailed information is not available, the possibilities of balloon bar-
rages in the Oahu area are recognized. Further investigation and study is neces-
sary both locally and by the War and Navy Departments in order to determine
the practicability of this phase of local defense.
10. Marine Corps antiaircraft artillery. — When made available by the Naval
Base Defense Officer, (Commandant, 14th Naval District), Marine Corps units
manning antiaircraft artillery present on Oahu will be placed under the tactical
control of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.
11. Aircraft Warning Service. — The Army will expedite the installation and
placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior
to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of RADAR
and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile
attacks as may be practicable.
[5] V. MUNITIONS, JOINT USE OF
12. Army and Navy Officers charged with the storage and issue of ammunition
and bombs will exchange information concerning the types, quantities, and loca-
tions of tliese munitions which are suitable for use by the other service. Studies
will be instituted and plans prepared for the prompt transfer of ammunition
from one service to the other. No such transfer of munitions will be made with-
out specific authority granted by the commander concerned for each transfer.
VI. SMOKE SCREENS
13. Smoke screens will not be employed for screening the Pearl Harbor-Hickam
Field area from air attacks.
VII. HAEBOB CONTROL POST
14. A joint harbor control post, as described in Inclosure B, will be established
without delay. This system will be actively manned during joint exercises,
alert periods, and combat and for such other periods as may be agreed upon by
the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense
Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District).
Approved : 2 April 1941.
(Signed) C. C. Bloch (Signed) Walter C. Short
C. C. Bloch, Walter C. Short,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commandant, Commanding,
Fourteenth Naval District. Hawaiian Department.
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 48
Classified Incoming
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CinCPAC and CinCPOA
Heading MUX 031835 GR 10 BT
2 Submarines and tender longitude 159-12 latitude 21-05. Confidential.
Certified to be a true copy. R. E. Cox Ensign USNR.
Date 3 DEC 41. Crypto-Group 740. CBO MRQ. Circ. No. 12-89.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 943
Originator : Action : Information :
PLANE 3 VP 12 COMPATWING 1 SOPA
031835 COMTASKFOR 2 CINCPAC, COM 14,
COMPATWING 1 COMPATWING 2,
PEARL
Classified Incoming
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CinCPAC and CinCPOA
NPM 823 030040 Priority
Sound contact reported lat 20 30 Long 158 23 at 1000 X Desron 4 investigate X
Battleships operate east long 158 X Detroit Victor 123 during niglit. Confidential.
Certified to be a true copy. R. E. Cox Ensign USNR.
Date 3 Dec 41. Crypto-Group 132-C. CBO OCF. Circ. No. 12-73.
Originator : Action : Information :
COMTASKFOR 2 DETROIT COM 14
030040 COMDESRON 4 COMBATFOR
COMBATDIV 1 CINCPAC
Classified Incoming
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CinCPAC and CinCPOA
NPM NR 814 Confidential Priority
Gamble in lat 20-30 long 158-23 reports clear metallic echo picked up bearing
097 true distant 2800 yards X Lost echo bearing 101 at 4300 yards about 3
minutes later change of range appeared too rapid for submatine.
Certified to be a true copy. R. E. Cox Ensign USNR.
Date 3 Dec. Crypto-Group 132-C. CBO JSM. Circ. No. 12-58.
Originator : Action : Information :
NEVADA COMTASKFOR 2 SOPA PEARL
022336 CINCPAC
COM 14
COMBATDIV 1
Classified Incoming
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CinCPAC and CinCPOA
4205 1845 Priority
Searched western border and most of northern half cast 9. No contacts.
Confidential.
Certified to be a true copy. S. D. Lohmann Lt ( jg) USNR.
Date 28 Nov. Crypto-Group 816. CBO DCG. Circ. No. 11-886.
Originator: Action:- Information;
CIG 1.4 CTF 1 CTF 2 CINCPAC
1845/28
Classified Incoming
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CinCPAC and CinCPOA
1704/28 GR 33
Abandon search in time to join Task Group 1.1 by 0900. Confidential.
Certified to be a true copy. S. D. Lohmann Lt (jg) USNR.
Date 28 Nov '41. Crypto-Group 816. CBO FWR. Circ. No. 11-876.
Originator : Action : Information :
COMTASKFOR 1 COMTASKGR 1.4 TASKFOR 1
1704/28 COMTASKFOR 2
CINCPAC
944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Classified Incoming
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CinCPAC ani> CinCPOA
1133/28 GR 17
Keep clear area cast 9 at least 15 miles. Confidential.
Certified to be a true copy. S. D. Lohmann Lt ( jg) USNR.
Date 28 Nov '41. Crypto-Group 816. CBO FWR. Circ. No. 11-871.
Originator : Action : Information :
COMTASKFOR 1 BOGGS CINCPAC
1133/28 TASKFOR 1
Classified Incoming
U. S. Naval Communication Service
281050 P GR 44
CinCPAO and CinCPOA
-P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y-
Task Group 1.4 with 3 Destroyers search area cast 9 for submarine X Task
Group 1.1 and 1.5 keep 50 miles. From area cast nine (9) until daylight
approach on point option from west. Confidential.
Certified to be a true copy. S. D. Lohmann Lt ( jg) USNR.
Date 28 Nov '41. Crypto-Group 26. CBO FWR. Circ. No. 11-870.
Originator: Action: Information:
COMTASKFOR 1 COMDESDIV 6 TASK FOR 2
281050 TASK FOR 1
CINCPAC
Classified Incoming
U. S. Naval Communications Service
CiNCPAC AND CiNCPOA
Secret
280835 P GR 36
-P-R^I-0-R-I-T-Y-
Radar operator without knowledge CINCPAC 280355/6 iwsitive that a sub-
marine was in area cast 9 during Helena firing approach about 1900.
Ref #11-857 extreme vigilance against subs in operating areas especially dur-
ing sorties and entrances . . . subs conduct submerged operations only in cast 5
and cast 7 . . , depth bomb all contacts suspected to be hostile except in cast
5 and 7.
Certified to be a true copy W. C. Woods, Lt( jg) USNR.
Date 28 Nov '41. Crypto-Group 137. CBO. FWR.
ORIGINATOR : ACTION : INFORMATION :
HELENA COMTASKGR 1.5 SERIAL NUMBER
280835 COMTASKFOR 1 11-872
COMTASKGR 1.5 CINCPAC
COMTASKFOR 1 COMTASKFOR 2
Classified Incoming
U. S. Naval Communications Service
CiNCPAC AND CiNCPOA
0042
Priority
Your 2105 investigated scattered slicks character indefinite. Confidential.
Ref. — Investigate and report on oil slick sighted by patrol plane.
Certified to be a true copy R. E. Cox Ensign USNR.
Date 4 Nov. Crypto-Group 740 CBO DCG Circ. No. 11-70.
ORIGINATOR : ACTION : INFORMATION :
DALE COMTASKFOR 1 CINCPAC
0042/04
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 945
Classified Incoming
U. S. Naval Communications Seevice
CiNCPAC AND CiNCPOA
032300
Routine
Found scattered patches and streaks lub oil latitude 20-10 longitude 157-41 sound
search result negative. Confidential.
Certified to be a true copy R. E. Cox Ensign USNR
Date Nov 4 41 Crypto-Group 740. CBO WBM. Circ. No. 11-66.
ORIGINATOR : ACTION : INFORMATION :
WORDEN COMTASKFOR 1 CINCPAC
032300
COMTASKFOR 1
Classified Incoming
U. S. Naval Communications Service
CiNCPAc and Cincpoa
4205/Z 032133 P GR 30 BT Priority
CONFIDENTIAL
Task Force One about twelve hours ago crossed area of oil slick reported by
patrol plane number five. Light airs prevailed all night.
Certified to be a true copy R. E. Cox Ens. USNR.
Date 11/3/41, Crypto-Group 132-C. CBO LJO. Circ. No. 11-63.
ORIGINATOR : ACTION : INFORMATION :
COMBATSHIPS CINCPAC
032133
Classified Incoming
U. S. Naval Communications Service
MUX
CiNCPAc AND Cincpoa
032035
Searched area 15 mile no result. Priority. Confidential.
Certified to be a true copy W. M. Klepper Lt(jg) USNR.
Date 3 Nov, Crypto-Group 740. CBO DCC. Circ. No. 11-59.
ORIGINATOR : ACTION : INFORMATION :
PLANE 5 VP-11 COMTASKFORCE 18 CINCPAC
COM 14
SOP AT PEARL
COMPATWING 2
Classified Incoming
U. S. Naval Communications Service
CiNCPAc AND Cincpoa
MUX
031920
Confidential
Investigating suspicious oil slick position 20-15 157-40, Priority.
Certified to be a true copy A. S. Gordon Lt ( ig) USNR.
Date 3 Nov. Crypto-Group 740. CBO, DCC, Circ, No. 11-58.
ORIGINATOR : ACTION : INFORMATION :
PLANE 5 COMTASKFORCE 1 CINCPAC
VP-11 COM 14
031920 SOP AT PEARL
COMPATWING 2
CofS X. F Sec X. Fl Lt X. Oper X. Avia. X. Gun X. AOO X. FCO X.
FSO X. AOO X.
946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Classified Incoming
D. S. Naval Communications Service
CiNCPAC AND CiNCPOA
Z 1230 1932 0G1 Q MIC WING TORY 0F2 BT PRIORITY
Investigating suspicious vessels lat 21-05 long 159. Confidential.
Certified to be a true copy W. C. Woods, Lt ( jg) USNR.
Date Oct 16 1941. Crypto-Group 740. CBOWBM.
ORIGINATOR : ACTION : INFORIVIATION :
PLANE 3 VP-23 COMTASKFORCE 1 SERIAL NO. 10-331
1923/16 SOPA PEARL
CINCPAC
Hewitt Inquiky Exhibit No. 49
This is to certify that the attached documents consisting of the following :
Copy of Cincpac Routing Slip 03210 dated 14 April 1941 (inscribed "CINCUS
Routing No. 03210"), with attached copy of ComPatWing Two Confidential Itr.
file C A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14, Serial 0348 of 9 April 1941, and copy of Com 14
Mailgram DTG 120001 of April 1941, Subject : Annex Baker to Commander Naval
Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 dated 27 February 1941.
are true and correct photographic copies of the documents in the official files of
the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
[SEAL]
R. E. Keeton,
By direction of the Commander in CJiief,
V. 8. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
(A copy of Cincpac Routing slip 03210 dated 14 April 1941, referred
to supra, will be found reproduced as Item No. 143, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[Mailgram]
From: Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District)
Mailed at: Pearl Harbor, T. H.
120001 April 1941
Action To : CincPac, Pacific Fleet Force
Commanders & Type Commanders
ComPatWing 2, Dist. Mar. Officer,
Capt. Yard, C. O.'S Dist. Activities
& Units as per Distribution List
of N.B.D.O. Operation Plan No.
1-41 with Annexes A,B,C,D, & E.
Information : CincPac
Comdg. Gen. Hawaiian Dept.
confidential
In accordance with paragraph (X) of Naval Base Defense Officer Operation
Plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941, revision of Annex Baker (Naval Base Defense
Air Force Operational Plan No. A-1-41 dated 9 April 1941) is issued in replace-
ment of Annex Baker dated 28 February 1941 and the latter will be destroyed.
C. C. Bloch,
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.,
Commander Naval Base Defense Force
{Commandant Fourteenth Naval Dist.)
Authenticated :
J. W. Bays,
Lieutenant, U. 8. Navy.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 947
[i] Navai Aai Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H. April 9, 1941.
ANNEX BAKEE TO COMMANDER NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 1-41
DATED FEBRUARY 2 7, 1941
Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-l-^l. — Task Organisation
(a) Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO)). The following units in accordance with
current conditions of readiness :
Patrol Squadtons.
Shore-based VO— VS units.
Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
Army bombardment squadrons.
Army reconnaissance squadrons.
Navy Utility squadrons.
(b) Air Combat Group (Senior VF Squadron Commandei'. The following
units in accordance with current conditions of readiness :
Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
One division of shore-based carrier type VS planes.
1. Information: This plan is made in accordance with: The Joint Air Opera-
tions agreement approved, and promulgated on 21 March 1941 ; Joint Estimate
covering joint Army and Navy air action, addendum I to this plan ; and Pacific
fleet confidential letter No. 2CLr-41 dated 15 February 1941. An air combat
group under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Air Force will : Intercept
and destroy hostile aircraft; Identify and report type of attacking aircraft;
Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander
search and attack group ; and as a secondary mission support search and attack
group upon request.
[2] Assumptions: As in Addendum I of this plan. Antiaircraft gun control
in the PEARL HARBOR area will be coordinated with operations under this
plan. Air traffic lanes and recognition signals will be prescribed as found
necessary.
2. This force will locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against OAHU or
Fleet Units in the Operating Ai'eas.
3. (a) Search and Attack Group, (a) Locate, report, and track all hostile
surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile
ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting
ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to : (1) carrier
involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.
(b) Air Combat Group, (b) Operate as directed by the Commanding Gen-
eral Hawaiian Air Force.
(x) This plan is effective upon receipt. It is operative without signal in
the event of a surprise attack on OAHU. It might be made operative by despatch.
In the meanwhile condition of readiness prescribed in Addendum II will be taken
as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units
and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District)
for Navy units. This plan supersedes and replaces Annex Baker of Naval Base
Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941. Units assigned
to task groups of this plan shall make readiness reports in accordance with
Addendum II of this plan.
4. The senior carrier commander based ashore at Fleet Air Detachment,
PEARL HARBOR, shall at all times see that one division of VS planes is
detailed to the Air Combat Group. When all carrier planes are to embark the
Group Commander shall so inform the Commander Second IMarine Aircraft
Group who will make the detail required by this paragraph.
5. Communications in accordance with Annex Easy to Naval [3] Base
Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1^0 of 27 February 1941. Use zone plus
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 2 19
948 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ten and one half time. Operation orders for the search and attack group will
be separately distributed.
Addendum I — Joint Estimate.
Addendum II — Aircraft Readiness.
P. N. L. Bellinger,
Rear Admiral, V. 8. N(wy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
{Commander Patrol Wing TWO).
Approved :
C. C. Bloch,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Force.
Authenticated :
J. W. Bays,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.
[1] Commander Patrol Wing Two,
Naval Air Station, Pearl Hartor, T. H.
Hawaiian Air Force,
Fort Shatter, T. H.
Addendum I to naval "base defense Air Force operation plan No. A-l-Jfl
Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden
hostile action against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.
I. Sum<mary of the Situation.
(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain,
and varjlng.
(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of
war.
(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval Installations on
OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western
Pacific for a long period.
(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas
organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine
force which initiates hostile action.
(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding
force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelli-
gence service.
II. Survey of Opposing Strengths.
(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or
more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For
such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to
be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better.
Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10-8"
guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small
(7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and
characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However
the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate
from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones [2] about 60. Probably the best
assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided be-
tween fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and
armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our
similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch guns and least 12 six
inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting
Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection
into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from
their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces
operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.
(b) The most diflicult situation for us to meet would be when several of the
above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-
based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being
periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also
varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of
the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for
flight.. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for
any extended period, from bases on OAHU, a patrol extensive enough to insure
that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over OAHU as a com-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 949
plete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support
sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range
scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this
work. If present plans are used to bomb well defended ship objectives, the num-
ber available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the
continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of
those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting.
Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work,
can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other
types of aircraft, in [3] general, can perform functions that accord with
their type.
III. Possible Enemy Action.
(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by :
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. : A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl
Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.
(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU
would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most
likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach
inside of three hundred miles.
(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more sub-
marines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been
drawn away by the original thrust.
(d) A single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable
undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a
carrier.
(c) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered
as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might
find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start,
also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second
attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day
to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that
the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day
near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be
that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be
observed. Under the existing condi- [4] tions this might not be a serious
disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no
offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise.
IMidday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the
above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain
advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably
be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large
success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.
IV. Action open to us:
(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to
reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but
can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very
short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless
other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow
time limits.
(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating
areas or on the islands :
1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of
hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.
2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force
and its despatch for attack when information is available.
(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above:
1. The immediate despatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept
the attackers.
2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range
shore based aircraft.
3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to
their carrier.
[5] IV. (d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating
area in addition to (b) above:
950 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to
counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.
2. Despatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over
the attack area.
3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes tvs^o hundred twenty mile radius
from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight
period.
(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is
known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack
develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum
of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions
assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that
coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one
of the visualized emei-gencies arises. To provide most effectively for the neces-
sary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required :
1. Search Unit.
2. Attack Unit.
3. Air Combat Unit.
Carrier scouts,, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with
very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying
conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be
desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordi-
nated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group
commander,
V. Decisions:
1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against
OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from
a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated
retaliatory measures.
2. [6] Subsidiary decisions. In order to be in all respects prepared to
promptly execute the above decision :
(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air opera-
tion plan :
1. Search and Attack Group {Comnmnder Naval Base Defense Air Force
{Commander Patrol Wing TWO) ). The following units in accordance with
current conditions of readiness :
Patrol squadrons.
Shore-based VO-VS units.
Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
Army bombardment squadrons.
Army reconnaissance squadrons.
Navy Utility squadrons.
2. Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force). The follow-
ing units in accordance with current conditions of readiness :
Army pursuit squadrons.
Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
One division of shore-based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing
aircraft)
(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows :
1. Search and Attack Group. Locate, report and track all hostile surface
units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships
by air attack. Priority of targets : (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships.
If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier
involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of out surface vessel intercep-
tion.
2. Air Combat Group. Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify
and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail [7] attacking carrier
type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack
group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon
request.
(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan
when:
(a) An air attack occurs on OAHU.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 951
(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is
probable.
(c) Information is received that an attacli has been made on fleet units.
(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows: Condi-
tions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number
from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condi-
tion of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the
degree of readiness prescribed for that part.
Material readiness
A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a
task.
C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available
and ready for a task.
D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available
and ready for a task.
E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes
of this plan.
Degree of readiness
1. For pursuit and VF types — four minutes.
Types other than fighters — fifteen minutes.
2. All types — 30 minutes.
3. All types — One hour.
4. All types — two hours.
5. All types — four hours.
The armament and fuel load for each type under the [8] above condi-
tions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory planes
and orders and will be prescribed therein.
(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be main-
tained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior Officers Present of
the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them.
In using the above conditions it should be noted that : CONDITION A-1 requires
a preparation i)eriod of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a
short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2 require
watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will
decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any Condition 1, 2, or 3
will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can
be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.
(f ) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that
prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately
available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency,
provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying
from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to
state :
(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter,
etc.
(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness
as deflned above.
(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above
has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare
detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situa-
tions requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an
emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work
the following tempoi-ary details will be made :
[9] (a) By commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander
Patrol Wing TWO) : an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and
planning to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group.
952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an oflBcer experienced in
Army bombardment and x'econnaissance operations and planning to assist
the Commander of the Search and Attacli Group.
F. L. Mabtin,
P. N. L. Beixingee, Major General, U. S. Army,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commanding Patrol Wi7ig TWO)
Authenticated :
J. W. Bays,
Lieutenant, U. 8. Navy.
in
C-A16-3/A4-3 ( 5 ) /ND14 ( 0348 )
Confidetitial
Base Defense Am Foece, Pateol Wing Two,
Fleet Aib Detachment, Naval Aie Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, 1941.
Addendum II to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan
No. A-l-U
Conditions of readiness and readiness reports
1. Conditions of readiness will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and
a number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a
condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating
the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.
Material Readiness
A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for
a task.
C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type avail-
able and ready for a task.
^ D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type avail-
able and ready for a task.
E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes
of this plan.
Degree of operational readiness
All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane
of a unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with the assigned task.
1. For pursuit and VF types — four minutes. Types other than fighters,
fifteen minutes.
2. All types — 30 minutes.
3. All types — one hour.
4. All types — two hours.
5. All types — four hours.
2. The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of
readiness are dependent upon the task assigned in contributory plans and orders
and will be prescribed in these.
[2] 3. Readiness Reports:
(a) A despatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day shall be made by each
unit assigned to a task group by this plan as follows :
(1) Units of "Search and Attack Group" to the Commander Naval Base
Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO) .
(2) Units of the "Air Combat Group" to the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Air Force via Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.
(b) These reports shall state :
(1) The number of operating planes in the unit by functional types as
bomber, fighter, etc.
(2) The number of each type in material readiness for flight and their
degree of operational readiness as defined above.
(c) The officer detailing VS planes to the Air Combat Unit (paragraph 4 of
N. B. D. A. F. plan No. A-1-41) shall inform the Commander Naval Base Defense
Air Force and Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force by despatch of the
detail and any changes therein.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 953
Hewitt Inqxjiry Exhibit No. 50
Patroi- Wing Two,
U. S. Navai, Air Station,
Pearl Harior, T. U., 20 December 1941.
PW2/A16-3/0850
Gonfldential
From: The Commander Task Force NINE (Commander Patrol Wing TWO).
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
Subject : Operations on December 7, 1941.
1. On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, forces under my command were
disposed as follows : Patrol Squadron TWENTY-ONE at Midway, Patrol Squad-
rons ELEVEN, TWELVE, FOURTEEN at Kaneohe, TWENTY-ONE, TWENTY-
THREE AND TWENTY-FOUR at Pearl Harbor, all tenders except WRIGHT
at Pearl Harbor; WRIGHT enroute to Pearl Harbor from Midway.
2. The condition of readiness in force was Baker 5 (50% of assigned aircraft
on 4 hours notice) with machine guns and ammunition in all planes not under-
going maintenance work. In addition to the above, three squadrons (VP-21 at
Midway, VP-23 at Pearl, and VP-11 at Kaneohe) were in condition Afirm 5
(100% of assigned aircraft on 4 hours notice). This was augmented by specific
duty assignments on December 7 which required six planes from Patrol Squadrons
FOURTEEN, TWENTY-FOUR and TWELVE to be ready for flight on 30 minutes
notice.
The general orders listed above were modified by circumstances and planes
actually ready for flight were as follows :
VP-21 7 planes — in the air conducting search 120° to 170° to 450 miles from
Midway,
4 planes — on the surface at Midway armed each with 2 five hundred
pound bombs and on 10 minutes notice.
VP-11 12 planes — ready for flight on 4 hours notice.
VP-12 6 planes ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.
5 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice.
VP-14 3 planes in the air on morning security patrol armed with depth charges.
3 planes ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.
4 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice.
VP-22 12 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice.
VP-23 11 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice.
VP-24 4 planes in the air conducting inter-type tactics with submarines.
1 plane ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.
Total 72 in the air or ready for flight in 4 hours or less.
In this connection it may be stated that the 4 hours notice was primarily set
to permit rest and recreation of personnel and was in no wise, a criterion of
material readiness. For example, one plane of VP-23, theoretically on 4 hours
notice, was actually in the air 45 minutes after the first bomb dropped.
To summarize the foregoing, at the moment the first bomb dropped, aircraft
of this command were in the following condition :
14 — in the air (7 on a search from Midway).
58 — on the surface ready for flight in four hours or less.
9 — undergoing repairs.
81— Total.
Illustrative of the efforts made by personnel, one of the nine planes undergoing
repairs took off for a search at 1335, local time, loaded with 4 one thousand
pound bombs.
3. A narrative of events of the day follows :
Time (LOT)
0700 14-P-l sank enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance.
0715 Message coded and transmitted to base.
0735 Message decoded and information received by Staff Duty OflBcer.
0737 IMessage relayed to Operations OflBcer.
0740 Relayed by telephone to Staff Duty Officer of Commander in Chief.
0750 Search plan drafted by Operations Officer.
0757 First bomb dropped near VP-22 hangar.
954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0758 Message ordered broadcasted to all ships present quote "AIR RAIU
PEARL HARBOR X THIS IS NO DRILL" unquote (An identical
message was sent by Cincpac).
0800 Search plan transmitted by radio and telephone (Received by some of
the planes in the air at 0805),
From this time on an accurate chronological account is impracticable.
The Commander Patrol Wing TWO arrived at the Operations Office during the
first attack and approved the orders that had been issued. Telephonic commu-
nication with the various squadrons at Pearl Harbor was established in order
to supplement and possibly accelerate the radio transmissions. As was usually
the case, it was difficult to communicate with Kaneohe. The page printer had
gone out of commission and it was quite difficult to obtain a telephonic con-
nection. Immediately upon termination of the first attack, an endeavor was
made to determine the sectors of the search actually being covered. It was
determined, with some difficulty that, of all planes at the bases of Kaneohe and
Pearl Harbor, only 3 were still in commission. These were dispatched to fill
holidays in what appeared to be the most promising sectors for search. In addi-
tion, available planes from the Utility Wing were ordered out. The 2 planes
still available for duty at Kaneohe were ordered by telephone to cover the sector
between 280 and 300 degrees. The one plane still available at Pearl Harbor
had some difficulty in being launched due to the wreckage and fires of other
planes in the way. About this time the second attack came in. Fire was opened
by tenders of this command and from machine guns mounted in planes on the
ground or removed from the planes to extemporized mountings with greater
arcs of fire. As a result of this second attack, all communications, radio, tele-
phone and page printer were knocked out of commission. Immediate steps to
restore communications were taken while the second attack was still underway
and communications personnel, who unfortunately have not yet been identified,
proceeded to repair the radio antenna during the height of the attack. Before
the end of the second attack, radio communications were established by utilizing
all the facilities available, including some of that unin.iured on the tenders of
this command. Shortly thereafter, telephonic communication was reestablished
and information was received that the 2 planes at Kaneohe previously reported
as ready for service had been destroyed. Accordingly, orders were issued for
the 1 plane at Pearl Harbor, which had somehow escai)ed unin.iured during the
second attack, to cover the sector from 280 to 300 degrees. The Commander
Patrol Wing ONE at Kaneohe felt that the orders to cover the sector 280 to 300,
which had been transmitted to him by telephone for the 2 planes on the ground,
required his taking action and he accordingly diverted 14-P-l and 14-P-3 from
the sector's that they had been searching, information of this action was not
received by me.
The Fleet Aviation Officer, Captain A. C. Davis, U. S. N., kept in constant
touch by telephone and made many valuable suggestions. Various members of
my staff maintained communications with Army information centers and re-
quested that attempts be made to track the retiring Japanese planes by RADAR.
Unfortunately, the CURTISS RADAR was placed out of commission by the
damage sustained by that vessel. During the mid-afternoon, 14-P-2 reported
being attacked by enemy planes and was thereafter not heard from for 2 or
3 hours. As it was felt that this plane had been shot down and a hole thus
left in what appeared to be the most promising sector of the search, every
effort was made, as additional planes from whatever sovirce became available,
to plug the gap.
All hands exerted their utmost efforts to get more planes ready for flight
and to arm them for offensive action. Three more patrol planes were reported
ready at Pearl Harbor and dispatched, each carrying 4 one thousand pound
bombs. Thirteen SED planes, loaded with 500 pound bombs, came in from
LEXINGTON and were pressed into service. Nine were dispatched to search
a sector to the north, while the remaining 4 were ordered to attack 4 .Japanese
troop ships reported off Barbers Point. This report proved to be unfounded.
The accompanying charts indicate the search as actually conducted. The
urgent necessity for conducting daily searches since December 7 and for putting
all planes possible back in commission, together with urgency for inimediate
operations, have precluded an exhaustive analysis of the events of the day.
Certain highlights however may be of interest :
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 955
All planes in commission had guns on board together with full allowances
of service ammunition. During the first attack, fire was opened from the guns
as mounted in the planes, and when it was discovered that these were not
effective for fire from the ground due to structural interference, many personnel
removed these guns from the planes and set them up on benches in vises and
opened up an effective fire against the second attack. As nearly as can be
determined, a total of 4 Japanese planes were shot down by personnel of
patrol plane squadrons by this method.
Two planes of Utility Squadron One conducted an extensive search although
these planes being of a noncombatant type were not equipped with machine
guns. Despite the lack of defense against attacks by hostile aircraft, the pilots
of these planes persisted in their search until the threatened exhaustion of
their fuel forced their return to Pearl Harbor. The devotion to duty of these
pilots will be made the subject of a special report.
These and numerous other instances of distinguished conduct occurred which
Commander Task Force NINE has not yet had time to investigate.
4. Attention is invited to the following dispatches and mailgrams indicating
the extensive searches conducted by units of this command during the period
30 November to 7 December 1941, from Wake and Midway :
Ci^^Pa^ 280450| ^, November.
040237 of December.
ComTaskForce NINE 2911241
QQ'^l 01
292103 of December.
302359 J
050328 of November.
P. N. L. Bellinger.
Copy to:
Comairscofor.
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 50 (A)
Classified outgoing
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CiNCPAC AND CINCPOA
From . Info To :
CINCPAC COMPATWING 2
To : COMBATFOR
COMTASKFOR2 COMBASEFOR
COM 14
Twelve planes marine fightrom two eleven are to base Wake accordance Myser
101825 of 10 November X Enterprise provide transportation X After departure
Pearl on 28 Nov form Task Force Eight consisting of Enterprise Chester North-
hampton SaltlakeCity and Desron six and pass command task force two to Real
Admiral Draemel with orders task force two carry out normal operations in
Hawaiian area X proceed to arrive 200 miles 070 degrees from Wake at
0700 on 3 Dec X ply off marine planes that vicinity and upon receiving info
that planes have arrived Wake return Pearl X enroute to and from Wake pass
through point afirm four hundred miles south of Midway X Patrol planes from
Midway and Wake will cover your route and provide security while at Wake X
communications radio condition nineteen guard NPM primary Fox continuously
X comfourteen inform Wake that planes expected arrive there 0830 on 3 Dec
and direct Wake report comfourteen by coded dispatch when planes arrive there
X comfourteen furnish this final arrival information to comtaskfor eight X
Wake submarine patrol tambor triton will be advised X Narwhal and Dolphin
are enroute Pearl at 1200 get on 27 Nov they were about 300 miles east of Wake
956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
280447 Nov 41 11-860
Classified outgoing
U. S. Naval Communication Sekvice
CiNCPAC AND CiNCPOA
From : Info To :
CINCPAC COMSCOFOR
To : COMBATFOR
COMPATWING 2 COM 14
COMBASBFOR
COMAERBATFOR
Direct 12 patrol planes now at Midway proceed Wake on 1 Dec search enroute X
provide one squadron relieve Midway planes on 30 November X after arrival both
squadrons direct them comply my 280447 X present intention return Wake
squadron Pearl about 5 December
Classified U. S. Naval Communication Service Incoming
CiNCPAC AND CiNCPOA
Secret Mailgram 292103
ORIGINATOR :
CTF 9
292103
ACTION :
COMPATRONS 21, 22
COMTASKGROUP
9.2
INFORMATION :
CINCPAC
COM 14
COMSUBSCOFOR
CO NAS MIDWAY
CO NAS WAKE
Operation order 981 x Information Cincpac 280447 and 280450 x Task Force 8
Enterprise Chester Northampton Salt Lake City 6 DD transporting Marine Figron
which will base on Wake x Planes will be launched 200 miles bearing 070 from
Wake at 2000 GCT on December 3 x Enroute and returning Task Force 8 will pass
point 400 miles south of Midway x Departed Pearl forenoon 28 Nov. x Wright
expected arrive Midway from Wake 3 December x Mission cover route and provide
security for TF 8 while in vicinity of Wake in order to obtain information possible
enemy forces in threatening position and provide readily available aerial slinking
power during period carrier will be launching marine planes x Tasks Patron 21
search as (?) indicated ; Nov. 30 depart Pearl daylight search sector 260-
280 degrees to longitude 165 degrees thence on track 270 to long 172-30 thence to
Midway ; Dec 1 sector 170 dash 224 to 500 miles using 8 planes ; Dec 2 sector 209-
237 to 525 miles using four planes ; Dec 3 sector 206-248 to 525 miles using 6 planes ;
Dec 4 sector 170-224 to 500 miles using 8 planes ; Dec 5 sector 126-168 to 525 miles
using 6 planes x Patron 22 search as indicated ; Dec 1 depart Midway daylight
using 2 plane sections sector 226-249 to 525 miles thence on track 238 to far perim-
eter of 120 mile circle from Wake thence to Wake ; Dec 2 sector 060-102 to 525
miles using 6 planes; Dec 3 take off at 1800 GCT sector 048-092 to 500 miles
(?) using six planes: one plane be 200 miles bearing 070 from Wake at 2000
GCT remain with Task Force 8 until 2400 GCT unless otherwise directed by visual :
remaining 5 planes each load with 2 500 pound bombs ; imless otherwise directed
unload bombs at 0230 GCT December 4 x On December four x On Dec 4 take off
daylight for Midway x On December 5 take off at daylight for Pearl xray critical
I)eriod entire operation forenoon 3 Dec. x Logistics fuel as required x Special
provisions use zone 0 times x Task Force 9 basic communications and aerological
plans X Frequency plan fox Comtaskforce 9 with fairdet at nas Pearl x Maintain
radio silence except for contact ( ?) reports and emergencies x Arrange for
bases to broadcast Mo's on schedule without request x.
Date 11/30/41. Crypto-Group Mail. Grp. Ct. 100. Circ. No. 11-97*
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 957
Classified U. S. Naval Communication Sekvice Incoming
CiNCPAC AND CiNCPOA
■ Mailgram 292101 Mailgram
Operation Order 982 special provisions use zone plus 12 time x Task force nine
basic communication and aerological plans
Frequency plan fox information Cincpac 170429 of October x Comtask force 9
in fairdet at nas Pearl x Mission conduct daily
Patrols from outlying bases in order to locate jwssible enemy forces threaten-
ing their security x Tasks search area within *
lOO miles of Midway daily using sector search plan number 2 x Be prepared to
shift base to Wake x Take offensive action only
If planes or bases are actually attacked or on further orders from Cincpac x
Report all contacts except United States naval
Vessels x Coordinate activities with subs operation from Midway x This order
effective upon completion of opord 981 x
Date, 11/30/41. Grp. Ct. 100. Circ. No. 11-973.
Originator, CTF 9, 292101. Action. COM PATRON 21. Information, CINC-
PAC, COM 14, NAS MIDWAY (VIA VP 21), COMSUBSCOFOR.
U. S. Naval Communication Service
Classified
Outgoing
Cincpac and Cincpoa
Date Grp. Ct.
From CINCPAC. Mailgram to COMTASKFOR 3, COMFOURTEEN, COM-
PATWING 2.
Info Mailgram to: COMBATFOR, COMBASEFOR, COMAIRDATFOR,
LEXINGTON.
Originator 11. Release 00. 20 2101. Show to 12.95.
Myser 01825 of 10 Nov Marine scoron two three one will base eighteen planes
Midway X Lexington provide transportation X on 5 Dec after sortie Pearl form
Task Force 12 under Comcruscofor consisting of Lexington Chicago Astoria
Portland desron five less desdiv ten X task force twelve proceed by direct route
to arrive four hundred miles ISO degrees from Midway at 2230 Oct oh 7 Dec X
From that vicinity fly off Marine planes to Midway X return operating area and
resume normal operations after planes have arrived Midway X Comtaskfor
nine direct patrol planes from Midway cover Lexington flying off position
provide security while that area and guard Marine plane fisht X communica-
tions radio condition 19 guard continuously npm primary fox X Com 14
inform Midway planes expected arrive about 0200 GCT on 8 Dec and require
Midway report arrival to Com 14 by coded dispatch X Com 14 pass this report
to Comtaskfor 12 X Midway submarine patrol will be advised
Classified Incoming
U. S. Naval Communication Seem:ce
Cincpac and Cincpoa
Copy
Secret AMGM
Deliver to Compatron.21 operation order 983 information Marine scoron 231
will base Midway 18 planes X Taskforce 12 Lexington 3 CA 5 DD will launch
400 miles 130 degrees from Midway on December 7 at GCT 2230 X mission cover
launching position provide security while that area and guard Marine plane
flight December 7 X logistics fuel as required tasks 5 planes search section 120
to 170 degrees to distance 450 miles arriving outer limit at 2230 GCT X 2 planes
arrive launching position by 2230 and escort Marscoron 231 to Midway X remain-
ing 5 planes each load with 2 500 pound bombs and await orders at Midway unless
otherwise directed unload bombs at 0200 GCT December 8 X special provisions
Date 6 December '41 ; Crypto-group pl/MG ; CBO HRF/H JG.
Originator Comtaskfor 9, Page 1 of 2 pages 050323. Action, NAS Midway.
Information, Cincpac, Lexington, CO Maraigr 21, Commarscoron 231. Serial
No. 12-206.
958 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Naval Commtjnitation Serv
CiNCPAC AND CiNCPOA
Classified . Incoming
Copy
Secret AMGM
Use zone 0 time X Comtaskfor 9 with fairdet at nas Pearl radio silence except
for contact reports and emergencies use task force 9 basic communication and
aerological plans frequency plan fox
Copy and return to Adm. Bellinger
Mailgbam
U. S. Naval Communication Service
A. S. F. stand, form No. 13
U. S. S. Wright
Deliver this mailgram to communication system immediately upon receipt for
distribution an handling as a regular dispatch
From : Comtaskfor 9
To: NAS Midway
Mailed at: PH TH 1124
To: Compatron 21 (Mail)
291124
Your squadron departs for Wake daylight December first X Detailed orders
via Patron 21 X Mission cover Route Taskforce 8 including carrier proceed-
ing westward X Task on thirty November using six planes search sector
153-195 degrees to 500 miles X Patron 21 enroute Midway will search adjacent
sector to eastward X For Patron 22 X Present intention return your
squadron about 5 December to Pearl X Arrange schedule for base broadcast
MO's without request on 364 Kilocycles to cover return your squadron and
arrival Patron 21 X Maintain radio silence except for contact reports and
emergencies.
Authenticated :
Signature, name and rank.
Copy and return to Admr. Bellinger
A. S. P. Stand. Form No. 13
U. S. S. Wright
Mailgeam
u. s. naval communication service
Deliver this mailgram to communication system immediately upon receipt for
distribution and handling as a regular dispatch
From : COMTASKFOR 9
To: NAS Midway
Date: November 30, 1941
Mailed at : NAS, PH, TH, 2359
To: NAS Johnston
302359
Detailed plans and orders arriving via Patron 21 planes prior sunrise tomor-
row minday X First day operations require quote December 1 depart Midway
daylight using two plane sections search sector 226-249 degrees to 525 miles
thence on track 238 to far perimeter of 120 mile circle from Wake thence to
Wake unquote if necessary leave one pair planes Midway with orders depart
directly for Wake upon receipt of pai)ers from Patron 21 X INFO ADEE
deliver to Compatron 21 X Action ADEE to Compatron 22.
Authenticated :
Signature, name and rank.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 959
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 51
Patrol Wing Two,
U. S. Naval Axb Station,
Pearl Earlor, Hawaii, V. S. A., 21 Oct. WJfi-
Secret
PW2/A16-30027
From : The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
Subject : Types of Combatant Aircraft for a Pacific Campaign.
Reference: (a) Compatwing TWO SECRET Itr. A16-3 serial 0026 of Oct. 22,
1941, with Comairscofor SECRET 1st end. A1&-3 of Oct.
23, 1941.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).
1. In view of the urgent nature of the subject matter of reference (a), and,
in view of the fact that the Commander Scouting Force is now at sea, a copy
of reference (a), is being forwarded herewith direct.
P. N. L. Bellinger,
P. N. L. Bellinger.
Copy to: Comscofor.
A16-3
United States Pacific Fleet
aircraft scouting force
Fleet Air Detachment,
U. S. Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., October 23, 194 J.
Secret
First endorsement to Compatwing two secret
Letter PW2/A16-3/0026 dated October 22, 1941.
From : The Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
Via : The Commander Scouting Force.
Subject : Types of Combatant Aircraft for a Pacific Campaign.
1. Forwarded, concurring in the recommendations of the Commander Patrol
Wing TWO. This concurrence is emphatic with respect to the employment of
carriers of present design.
2. The recommendation for change in Naval Policy to permit inclusion within
the Naval Aeronautical Organization of Air Striliing Groups of high perform-
ance landplane- bombers and landplane interceptor fighters, for the protection
of advanced Fleet Air Bases, meets with the hearty endorsement of the Com-
mander Aircraft, Scouting Force. Landplane bombers and fighters with the
characteristics as described are definitely tools that Naval Aviation requires
today in its varied missions. Upon enlargement of the scope of Navy Policy,
the corresponding procurement and training programs should be prosecuted.
3. The inherent delays in accomplishing tlie change of policy with its attend-
ant modifications in training and procurement plans, seriously influence the fac-
tor of time, which is now not one of our superiorities to be exploited. Accord-
ingly as a stop-gap measure, if not already provided for, the Commander Air-
craft, Scouting Force, considers that the westward movement of the Pacific
Fleet must be accorded the full support of an Army Air Striliing Force in joint
effort under the unified command of the Commander-in-Chief, United States
Pacific Fleet.
J. S. McCain.
Copy to : Compatwing TWO.
Ln
960 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Patbol Wing Two,
U. S. Naval Aie Station, •
Pearl Harbor, T. H., October 22, 1941.
PW2/A16-3/0026
Secret
From : The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET.
Via: (1) The Commander Aircraft, SCOUTING FORCE.
(2) The Commander Scouting Force.
Subject : Types of Combatant Aircraft for a Pacific Campaign.
1. In examining the types of aircraft that are listed in the scheme of procure-
ment of the 15,001) plane program, it is noted that, except for those planes based
on carriers, there are no types that are considered really valuable as combatant
units capable of carrying out offensive action against enemy units afloat, or
ashore in the face of efficient enemy opposition. The strategical background of
the Pacific indicates that in a war in the Pacific there will be many occasions
where Fleet aircraft will have to take offensive action against objectives at
islands which are strongly defended by anti-aircraft batteries and by shore-
based aircraft. The utilization of carrier aircraft for this purpose involves
placing the carriers within range of hostile shore-based aircraft. Carriers of
present design are very vulnerable to bomb hits and the value and chances of
success of their employment against bases defended by shore-based aircraft
must be weighed against the chances and consequences of failure. Patrol
Planes, which have the requisite range, are relatively slow and vulnerable to
fighter and anti-aircraft opposition. It is respectfully submitted that the Fleet
is not adequately prepared for a campaign in the Pacific until, in addition to
present types of aircraft, it is provided with an air striking force of high-speed
long-range landplane bombers, at least equal in performance to the B-17-E. It
is my opinion that such bombers should be available in sufficient numbers to
permit continuous effective bombing attacks to be made against shore objectives
from Wake, and from such other suitable island bases as are available. In
addition, for the protection of bases from which this air striking force would
operate, there are needed high performance interceptor fighters In adequate
numbers to provide for interception, under RADAR direction, of approaching
hostile air attacks.
2. If we are provided with a suitable Air Striking Force of long-range shore-
based landplane bombers, it is possible that carriers need not approach within
range of hostile shore-based aircraft until hostile air bases have been destroyed
or, by sustained attacks, have been made untenable. By such means, and it is
believed, only by such means, can a rapid successful Pacific campaign be accom-
plished without disproportionate losses to our own forces. It is undoubtedly
the intention of ORANGE initially to fight a war of attrition, utilizing shore-based
aircraft, shore batteries, mines, and submarines to inflict maximum damage to our
surface forces, while his own fleet is maintained intact in the hope of attaining
equality or superiority to our fleet. It is my considered opinion that our present
plan of action gives him a fair chance of succeeding in the attainment of this
objective. He will undoubtedly throw his most modern aircraft into the campaign,
sending them to the theatre of operations from the homeland via the chain of
island airports in existence, in a steady flow of fresh replacements. It is there-
fore essential that the fields in the immediate theatre of operations be made
untenable at the outbreak of war, and also, successively, bis most advanced air-
ports as the campaign progresses.
3. The following courses of action are strongly recommended for accomplish-
ment under unexcelled priority as of the most vital importance to national
security :
(a) Obtain the immediate initial assignment of an Army Air Corps Air Striking
Force to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. It is believed
that the composition of this force should be approximately as follows :
(1) Three groups, each of sixty (60) long-range high-speed landplane
bombers equal or superior to the B-17-E.
(2) Three groups, each of sixty (60) interceptor fighters of the best i>er-
formance available.
(b) Develop Wake and Midway air fields under highest priority so that each
may accommodate not less than one-third of the bombers and fighters simul-
taneously.
(c) Expedite and expand, the RADAR installations at Midway and Wake.
(d) Expedite and expand anti-aircraft defenses at Wake.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 961
(e) As soon as possible, station one group of interceptor fighters at Wake, and
one group at Midway. Provide Johnston and Palmyra with smaller detachments
of interceptor fighters. Station one group of bombers At Midway. Station two
bomber groups and remainder of interceptor fighters in reserve in the Hawaiian
Area. This disposition will provide for defense of Wake and Midway, while
the bombers at Midway are beyond range of attack from hostile shore-based aii*-
craft, but are in position to proceed immediately to Wake to start offensive
operations.
(f) Initiate action to modify Naval Policy to augment the mission of the
Navy Aeronautical Organization to provide Air Striking Forces of long-range
high-speed landplane bombers to the Fleets, and landplane interceptor fighters for
protection of advanced air bases used by Fleet Aircraft.
(g) Initiate action to include in the Navy aircraft procurement program the
requisite quantities of long-range high-speed landplane bombers and interceptor
fighters.
4. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to
phrase this document in such a manner as will i)ermit a classification other tlicm
SECRET.
P. N. L. Beixingeb.
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 52
[/]
PW2/A16-3/(022) Je.
Patrol Wing Two,
Confidential January 16, 1941.
From : The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: (1) The Commander Scouting Force. (2) The Commander in Chief,
U. S. FLEET.
Subject : Patrol Wing TWO — Readiness of.
References: (a) OpNav Conf. serial 095323 to the Commander in Chief, U. S.
Fleet — "Protection of Fleet Aircraft".
1. I arrived here on October 30, 1940, with the point of view that the Inter-
national situation was critical, especially in the Pacific, and I was impressed with
the need of being ready today ratlier than tomorrow for any eventuality that
might arise. After taking over command of Patrol Wing TWO and looking over
the situation, I was surprised to find that here in tlie Hawaiian Islands, an
important naval advanced outpost, we were operating on a shoestring and the
more I looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be.
2. (a) War readiness of Patrol Plane Squadrons is dependent not only on
the planes and equipment that comprise these squadrons, but also on many
operating needs and requirements at Air Stations and outlying bases over which
the Patrol Wing Commander lias no direct control. Needs and requirements for
War Readiness include : spare planes, spare engines, hangar and beach equip-
ment, squadron equipment, spare parts, stores, material, bombs, ammunition, base
operating facilities, overhaul and repair facilities, qualified personnel to man
all base facilities and shops, all in sufiicient adequacy to insure continuous operat-
ing readiness. These cannot be provided overnight. The isolation of this lo-
cality from the source of supply, the distance, and time involved, make careful
and comprehensive long distance planning mandatory. I am informed that in
the past, the average interval between the normal request and receipt of ma-
terial has been nine months.
(b) Reference (a) reads, in part, as follows: "In about one year practically
all fleet aircraft except Patrol Wing TWO will have armor and fuel protection".
As there are no plans to modernize the present patrol planes comprising Patrol
Wing TWO, this evidently means that there is no intention to replace the
present obsolescent type of patrol planes in Patrol Wing TWO prior to one
year and that Patrol Wing TWO will practically be the last Wing to be furnished
new planes. This, together with the many existing deficiencies, indicates to
me that the Navy Department as a whole does not view the situation in the
Pacific with alarm or else is not taking steps in keeping with their view.
3. (a) Presumably, the offices and bureaus concerned are familiar with the
situation in the Hawaiian Area over which they have particular cognizance;
certainly enough correspondence has already been written concerning patrol
plane needs to enable bureaus and offices to take the necessax-y steps to provide
and to anticii)ate such needs.
962 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[2] (b) If war should break in the Pacific, there is much work cut out for
patrol planes and undovibtedly much will be expected of them. Considerably
more attention will have to be paid to anticipating their needs and action taken to
provide deficiencies by all the bureaus and oflices concerned if patrol planes are
to perform according to expectations.
4. It is therefor urgently recommended that these concerned with War Plans
and those in the Planning and Procurement Divisions of all bureaus and oflices
view the patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian Area in the light of the Inter-
national situation in the Pacific ; that each bureau and office check and recheck
their planning and procurement lists for present requirements and future needs
and that immediate steps be taken to furnish the personnel, material, facilities
and equipment required and under their cognizance, to meet the present emergency
and probable eventualities. The tremendous and all consuming work of those
in the Navy Department is fully appreciated and there is no intent to criticize
or to shift responsibility. This letter is written merely in an effort to insure
thatwe may not be "too late".
5. The following are some of the deficiencies and requirements referred to
above :
(a) For Patrol Wing TWO.
1. Replace present obsolescent type patrol planes with high performance
modern types having latest approved armor and armament features and in
such numbers as the readiness of base operating facilities will permit.
2. Provide squadron spares and squadron equipment in excess so as to
have available a sufficiency to provide for shift of operations to outlying
bases.
3. Provide bomb handling equipment of latest design in sufficient amounts
as to reduce to minimum the time element involved in rearming both at
normal base and outlying bases.
4. Provide ordnance material to fill and maintain full squadron allow-
ances.
5. Provide increased number of aircraft torpedoes when additional stor-
age is available. Twenty-four aircraft tori)edoes are now stored at the
Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
[3] 6. Expedite completion and assignment of patrol plane tenders. At
present the tenders for Patrol Wing TWO consists of the USS WRIGHT and the
USS SWAN. The WRIGHT now is not available due to Navy Yard overhaul
until March 17, 1941.
(b) P'or Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
1. Increase capacity for overhaul and repair of patrol planes, engines,
instruments, radio and ordnance material, and provide manufacture and
stowage of breathing oxygen, to anticipate operating needs both now and as
estimated for the future, through addition of shop space, additional shops,
additional personnel, additional equipment, additional supply of spare parts
and stock.
2. Increase and improve bomb stowage and ammunition storage through
enlargement and preparation of present storage and installation of bomb
handling equipment.
3. Construction of squadron's ready ammunition storage.
4. Additional bombs in Hawaiian Area.
5. Additional ferries or other suitable means for transporting bombs from
ammunition depot across water surrounding Ford Island to Navfil Air
Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
6. Increase supply facilities through additional stowage, additional supply
personnel (Officer and enlisted, additional facilities for handling supplies,
assistance in obtaining and increasing the amount of spares and supplies
on hand, and simplification of requisitioning spare parts and supplies.
7. Increase machine gun and rifle range facilities in Pearl Harbor Area
to provide for more effective ground training for personnel of Patrol squad-
rons based on Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
[4] 8. Provide for torpedo war head stowage at some suitable location
readily accessible to the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T, H.
9. Increase barrack space to provide for increased personnel at Naval Air
Station and for personnel of additional patrol squadrons as may be assigned.
(c) For Naval Air Station, Kaneohe.
1. Expedite completion ; providing the operating facilities necessary to
permit basing and efficiently operating the number of patrol squadrons
intended to base thereon, including dredging the patrol plane operating area
to the extent recommended, dredging ship channel, housing of the necessary
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 963
personnel, supplying necessary boats and supplying adequate station person-
nel. Anticipate engine and plane overhaul facilities to meet War Require-
ments.
(d) For Keehi Lagoon.
1. Take necessary steps to expedite the development of Keehi Lagoon for
a patrol plane base.
(e) For Outlying Bases; Wake, Johnston, Palmyra.
1. Expedite completion of operating facilities with particular regard to
dredging ship channels; dredging landing and take-off areas; providing
gasoline and oil reserves and issue facilities ; bomb and ammunition supply
and stowage ; concrete ramps and parking area.
(f) For Midway.
1. Expedite completion and establishment of Midway as an outlying operat-
ing base with the asignment of necessary personnel and with facilities and
equipment to provide for the basing thereon of two patrol plane squadrons.
(g) General.
1. Stop the normal shifting and rotating between sea and shore and be-
tween other activites of personnel, officer and enlisted, in Patrol Wing TWO,
Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor and Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, until all
personnel complements have been brought up to the requirements necessary
for war-time operations.
2. Provide two sets additional beaching gear and two boats fitted with
gasoline bowser tanks for use at each of the following outlying bases : Wake,
Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Guam and Canton.
P. N. L Beixingek.
Copy to : Comairscofor
Com. 14
NAS P. H. TH
Prosp. C. O., NAS Kaneohe.
[1] Je.
Pateol Wing Two,
January 16, 191ft.
PW2/A16-3/(022)
Confidential
From : The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: (1) The Commander Scouting Force. (2) The Commander in Chief, U. S.
FLEET.
Subject : Patrol Wing TWO-Readiness of.
References: (a) OpNav Conf. serial 095323 to the Commander in Chief, U. S.
Fleet-"Protection of Fleet Aircraft."
1. I arrived here on October 30, 1940, with the point of view that the Inter-
national situation was critical, especially in the Pacific, and I was impressed with
the need of being ready today rather than tomorrow for any eventuality that
might arise. After taking over command of Patrol Wing TWO and looking over
the situation, I was surprised to find that here in the Hawaiian Islands, an im-
portant naval advanced outpost, we were operating on a shoestring and the
more I looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be.
2. (a) War readiness of Patrol Plane Squadrons is dependent not only on the
planes and equipment that comprise these squadrons, but also on many operating
needs and requirements at Air Stations and outlying bases over which the Patrol
Wing Commander has no direct control. Needs and requirements for War Readi-
ness include : spare planes, spare engines, hangar and beach equipment, squadron
equipment, spare parts, stores, material, bombs, ammunition, base operating fa-
cilities, overhaul and repair facilities, qualified personnel to man all base facili-
ties and shops, all in sufficient adequacy to insure continuous operating readiness.
These cannot be provided overnight. The isolation of this locality from the
source of supply, the distance, and time involved, make careful and comprehensive
long distance planning mandatory. I am informed that in the past, the average
interval between the normal request and receipt of material has been nine months.
(b) Reference (a) reads, in part, as follows: "In about one year practically
all fleet aircraft except Patrol Wing TWO will have armor and fuel protection".
As there are no plans to modernize the present patrol planes comprising Patrol
Wing TWO, this evidently means that there is no intention to replace the present
obsolescent type of patrol planes in Patrol Wing TWO prior to one year and that
Patrol Wing TWO will practically be the last Wing to be furnished new planes.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 2 20
964 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This, together with the many existing deficiencies, indicates to me that the Navy
Department as a whole does not view the situation in the Pacific with alarm or
else is not taking steps in keeping with their view.
3. (a) Presumably, the offices and bureaus concerned are familiar with the
situation in the Hawaiian Area over which they have particular cognizance ;
certainly enough correspondence has already been written concerning patrol
plane needs to enable bureaus and oflSces to take the necessary steps to provide
and to anticipate such needs.
[2] (b) If war should break in the Pacific, there is much work cut out
for patrol planes and undoubtedly much will be expected of them. Consider-
ably more attention will have to be paid to anticipating their needs and action
taken to provide deficiencies by all the bureaus and offices concerned if patrol
planes are to perform according to exiiectations.
4. It is therefor urgently recommended that those concerned with War Plans
and those in the Planning and Procurement Divisions of all bureaus and offices
view the patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian Area in the light of the Inter-
national situation in the Pacific ; that each bureau and office check and recheck
their planning and procurement lists for present requirements and future needs
and that immediate steps be taken to furnish the personnel, material, facilities
and equipment required and under their cognizance, to meet the present emer-
gency and probable eventualities. The tremendous and all consuming work of
those in the Navy Department is fully appreciated and there is no intent to
criticize or to shift responsibility. This letter is written merely in an effort
to insure that we may not be "too late".
5. The following are some of the deficiencies and requirements referred to
above :
(a) For Patrol Wing TWO
1. Replace present obsolescent type patrol planes with high i)erformance
modern types having latest approved armor and armament features and
in such numbers as the readiness of base operating facilities will permit.
2. Provide squadron spares and squadron equipment in excess so as to
have available a sufficiency to provide for shift of operations to outlying
bases.
3. Provide bomb handling equipment of latest design in sufficient amounts
as to reduce to minimum the time element involved in rearming both at
normal base and outlying bases.
4. Provide ordnance material to fill and maintain full squadron allow-
ances.
5. Provide increased number of aircraft torpedoes when additional stor-
age is available. Twenty-four aircraft torpedoes are now stored at the
Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
[5] 6. Expedite completion and assignment of patrol plane tenders.
At present the tenders for Patrol Wing TWO consists of the USS WRIGHT
and the USS SWAN. The WRIGHT now is not available due to Navy Yard
overhaul until March 17, 1941.
(b) For Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
1. Increase capacity for overhaul and repair of patrol planes, engines,
instruments, radio and ordnance material, and provide manufacture and
stowage of breathing oxygen, to anticipate operating needs both now and
as estimated for the future, through addition to shop space, additional shops,
additional personnel, additional equipment, additional supply of spare parts
and stock.
2. Increase and improve bomb stowage and ammunition storage through
enlargement and preparation of present storage and installation of bomb
handling equipment.
3. Construction of squadron's ready ammunition storage.
4. Additional bombs in Hawaiian Area.
5. Additional ferries or other suitable means for transporting bombs from
ammunition depot across water surrounding Ford Island to Naval Air
. Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
6. Increase supply facilities through additional stowage, additional sup-
ply personnel (Officer and enlisted), additional facilities for handling sup-
plies, assistance in obtaining and increasing the amount of spares and
supplies on hand, and simplification of requisitioning spare parts and
supplies.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 965
7. Increase machine gun and rifle range facilities in Pearl Harbor Area
to provide for more effective ground training for personnel of Patrol squad-
rons based on Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
[4] 8. Provide for torpedo war head stowage at some suitable location
readily accessible to the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
9. Increase barrack space to provide for increased personnel at Naval Air
Station and for personnel of additional patrol squadrons as may be assigned,
(c) For Naval Air Station, Kaneohe.
1. Expedite completion ; providing the operating facilities necessary to
permit basing and eflBciently operating the number of patrol squadrons in-
tended to base thereon, including dredging the patrol plane operating area
to the extent recommended, dredging ship channel, housing of the necessary
personnel, supplying necessary boats and supplying adequate station per-
sonnel. Anticipate engine and plane overhaul facilities to meet War Re-
quirements,
(d) For Keehi Lagoon.
1. Take necessary steps to expedite the development of Keehi Lagoon for
a patrol plane base,
(e) For Outlying^Bases ; Wake, Johnston, Palmyra.
1. Expedite completion of operating facilities with particular regard to
dredging ship channels ; dredging landing and take-off areas ; providing gaso-
line and oil reserves and issue facilities ; bomb and ammunition supply and
stowage ; concrete ramps and parking area.
(f ) For Midway.
1. Expedite completion and establishment of Midway as an outlying
operating base with the assignment of necessary personnel and with facilities
and equipment to provide for the basing thereon of two patrol plane
squadrons.
(g) General.
[5] 1. Stop the normal shifting and rotating between sea and shore and
between other activities of personnel, officer and enlisted, in Patrol Wing
TWO, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor and Naval Air Station, Kaneohe,
until all personnel complements have been brought up to the requirements
necessary for war-time operations.
2. Provide two sets additional beaching gear and two boats fitted with
gasoline bowser tanks for use at each of the following outlying bases:
Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Guam and Canton.
P. N. L. Beixingee.
Copy to : Comairscofor
Com. 14
NAS P. H. TH
Prosp. C. O. NAS Kaneohe.
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 53
Chg. from SECRET to
CONFIDENTIAL by Op Nav
(015723)
PW2/A16-3/
(0003)
Pathoi, Wing Two,
U. S. Naval Aib Station,
Pearl Earlor, T. H., December 11, 1940.
Confidential
From : The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: (1) The Commander Aircraft, SCOUTING FORCE.
(2) The Commander SCOUTING FORCE.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Subject : Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.
1. On November 15, 1940, Commander Patrol Wing TWO ordered a Bomb Load-
ing and Arming Exercise for the five squadrons of this Wing. The Naval Air
Station, Pearl Harbor, was made cognizent of this Exercise in adcanse and a
detailed plan prepared to arm the planes with the service bombs and ammunition
now stored at the Naval Air Station.
966 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. Utilizing all of the available facilities and using the Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, as a source of supply for the bombs used in this Exercise, the time
element was revealed to be excessively high. Below is a summary of the times
involved in delivering and arming with forty-eight each of the 1000 and 500
pound type bombs :
Event Time required
First bomb delivered to squadrons 50 minutes
Last bomb delivered to squadrons 2 hours
Fuses delivered to squadrons 1 hour 05 minutes
Tail vanes delivered to squadrons 1 hour 40 minutes
Time required to arm a twelve plane squadron with four
bombs on each plane 6 to 7 hours
Time required to belt a complete machine gun ammunition
allowance in each squadron 4 to 6 hours
3. As a result of this exercise, numerous glaring deficiencies were apparent
which adversely affect the condition of readiness for War of this Wing. Such
corrective action that is within the capabilities of this Wing, to remedy these
deficiencies and to decrease the time element involved, has beeii taken. However,
some of these deficiencies are beyond the control of the wing to correct and
should be remedied immediately. These items are discussed in details as
follows:
(a) The supply of service bombs of the 1000 pound and 500 pound type avail-
able in this area is considered entirely inadequate. The current transfer of one
hundred 1000 pound, two hundred 500 pound, and two hundred 100 pound bombs
to the Asiatic Station from the ammunition depot, Oahu, in connection with
the transfer of the Wm. B. PRESTON and Patrol Squadron TWENTY-SIX,
leaves available at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, Lualualei ammunition
depot, and on board the U.S.S. WRIGHT a total number of the heavier type
bombs sufficient for just 10.2 complete bomb loads for the four squadrons now
comprising this Wing. These are distributed as follows and represents all
naval bombs within the Hawaiian Area :
NAS PH
Lualualei
Wright
Totals
1000 lb
48
48
48
573
1151
2446
61
81
314
682
5001b
1280
1001b .
2808
The above quantities of bombs are not considered sufficient for use in the Pearl
Harbor Area alone, and certainly they are woefully inadequate as a source of
supply when considering the wide separations of outlying bases from which squad-
rons now assigned, or scheduled for assignment to this Wing will be required
to operate from, and the fact that an adequate supply of bombs should be avail-
able at each such base.
(b)' The present bomb stowage at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, is in-
adequate both as to capacity and handling facilities. At present it is necessary
to handle the bombs within the magazine entirely by hand. It is urgently rec-
ommended that a suitable bomb stowage be provided on the Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, to accommodate enough bombs of each type to provide at least one
complete bomb load for the number of the squadrons to be based thereon.
In view of the fact that the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor Is located on an
Island (Ford Island) any bombs required by Patrol Wing TWO from the am-
munition depot at Lualualei must be transported at some stage of the transporta-
tion by water.
Trucks via ferry seems to be far the most practical method of transportation.
At present there is only one ferry available for such use. This is not considered
sufficient. A total of three ferries is considered desirable in order to make sure
that two will be continuously available.
(c) Stowage for ready service machine gun ammunition and pyrotechnics
should be provided each squadron such stowage to be constructed in the immedi-
ate vicinity of the squadron and with a capacity sufficient to store at least one
complete load of belted ammunition for each plane of the squadron and a com-
plete allowance of pyrotechnics.
[ PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 967
(d) The Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, has insuflScient bomb handling equip-
ment, the following being urgently required: (1) Two electric finger lift cranes
(2) additional traveling cranes, preferable of gasoline type, to expedite the un-
loading of bombs from trucks at the point of delivery. Two such traveling cranes
for each squadron is considered a minimum. The above has not been requested
by the Naval Air Station. The necessary funds and authorization -to purchase
these items should be given high priority.
(e) There is a marked shortage of MK IIX Bomb Hoists in this Wing. It is
recommended that the supply of Bomb Hoists be immediately increased and that
the allowance of Hoists be increased to twenty-eight per twelve plane squadron.
At least two additional squadron allowances should be provided for each Wing
to provide equipment for use when operating from widely separated bases.
(f) The number of Bomb Skids allowed each squadron is considered inade-
quate. It is recommended that each squadron be supplied with twelve of the
MK X Mod. I Bomb Skids. It is also recommended that each Patrol Squadron
equipped for carrying torpedoes be supplied with twelve MK XXXI Torpedo
Skids.
(g) The present allowance and supply of machine gun ammunition belting
machines is inadequate. It is recommended that this allowance be increased to
twelve each of the .30 and .50 calibre type for each squadron and each tender.
(h) It is recommended that the hoisting bands be installed on all service 500
pound bombs are now on hand and that in the future all such bombs be designed
with a lifting lug as on integral part of the bomb. It is further recommended
that the specification for all bomb crates, tail vane crates, and ordnance equip-
ment, specify standard size AN belts and threads.
4. All of the above mentioned items are considered of the utmost importance
as regards Patrol Wing TWO readiness for War and it is urgently recommended
that their correction be given the highest degree of priority.
5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to
phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other
than SECRET.
P ^I ti BtTT T TNOFRi
Copy to : (direct) Comdt. 14th N. D. NAS, PH, TH CincUS Com'sco'for
United States Fleet
A16 AiKCBAFT Scouting Foece
U. S. S. HuiaERT, Flagship,
(SI) Naval Air Station,
San Diego, California.
Confidential
First endorsement to
PW-2 Secret Itr. A16-2/
(0003) of 11 Dec, 1940.
From : The Commander Aircraft Scouting Force.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: (1) Commander Scouting Force.
(2) Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Subject : Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.
1. Forwarded.
2. With reference to paragraph 3 (b), present plans call for the expeditious
development of the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, into a primary base for operating
and arming patrol planes. Maximum effort should be made to equip that base
with every possible facility for large scale arming operations. The supply of
ammunition at Ford Island should be limited to one allowance of "ready" ammu-
nition per plane, to be used only when it is impracticable to arm at other bases,
or to augment facilities at Kaneohe in an emergency. It should be possible to
maintain this comparatively small supply by utilizing only one ferry or in the
event of casualty to it, by using small boat or barge transx)ortation. Adequate
stowage and handling facilities for the above mentioned ready supply of bombs at
Ford Island must be provided.
3. With reference to paragraph 3 (d), it is recommended that all air stations
basing patrol planes be adequately equipped to handle ammunition in and at the
magazines, to transport it to the operating lines, and to handle it there. When
practicable, this equipment should be standardized in order to economize on time
968 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and cost of procurement. The Commanding OflScer of the Naval Air Station, San
Diego, after extensive study of the problem, has recommended to the Chief of the
Bureau of Ordnance for use at that station, special rolling equipment consisting
of units made up of three, low, six-ton trailers pulled by a small tractor, to trans-
port ammunition from the magazines to the operating lines. This type of equip-
ment should be highly satisfactory for use at air stations, including Ford Island,
where roads are surfaced and hauling distances are not great. For transportation
over longer distances such as from the ammunition depot at Lualualei to Kaneohe,
heavy, high-powered trucks are recommended. Recommendations from command-
ing officers of air stations basing patrol planes, as to the type of equipment
required to meet special local conditions should be given careful consideration.
4. Referring to paragraph 3 (e), it is requested that the regular allowance of
Mk. Ill bomb hoists be supplied without delay. An increase in allowance to two
per plane with adequate spares is also recommended in order to permit simul-
taneous loading on both wings.
5. Subject to the remarks in the preceding paragraphs of this endorsement,
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, concurs in the comment and recommenda-
tions contained in the basic letter. The inadequacy of facilities at air stations
basing patrol planes for the stowage, handling, transport and delivery to squadrons
of bombs, torpedoes, machine gun ammunition, fuses and pyrotechnics necessary to
equip i)atrol planes for service operations is a matter of grave concern. The need
for remedial action by responsible activities is considered to be of the utmost
importance.
6. It is hereby certified that the originator of this endorsement considers it to
be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a
classification other than SECRET.
A. L. Bbistol.
Copy to: COMPATWING 2.
[1] A16/0054/
(0202)
(Chg. from SECRET to
CONFIDENTIAL By OpNav
015723
United States Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship,
Confidential Pearl Harlor, T. H.,
Feb. 5, 1941.
Third Endorsement to
CPW-2 Secret Ltr. A16-3
(0003) of 11 Dec. 1940.
From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.
Reference :
(a) Cincus Secret 2nd end. to Compatwing TWO Secret ltr. PW2/A5/F41
(0002) of Oct. 22, 1940.
(b) Cincus Conf. 2nd end. to CPW-2 conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of
1/16/41.
1. Forwarded, requesting that rectification of conditions set forth in the basic
correspondence be undertaken as a matter of utmost urgency.
2. Attention is particularly invited to reference (a) in which the Commander-
in-Chief "stressed the necessity for decided augmentation of the bomb supply in
the Hawaiian Area, and to reference (b) in which he strongly recommended in-
creased ready storage for bombs and torpedoes at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor,
together with adequate handling and loading equipment.
3. It is absolutely essential that the aircraft of Patrol Wing TWO and one-
shore-based carrier group, operating from Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, be
able to meet the purpose for which they have been built. The arming and re-
arming conditions described in the basic letter are wholly unacceptable. There
should be utmost effectiveness of aviation in this area as k vital feature of Fleet
readiness. This is alarmingly far from the case now. The situation demands
Immediate and direct action.
4. The comments of Commander Aircraft Scouting Force in the first endorse-
ment are, in general, sound and are recommended for consideration in connection
with the general problem of provigion for arming and re-arming at various places.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 969
It is definitely recommended, however, that nothing therein be permitted to mini-
mize or delay the needed action at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, on the recom-
mendations of the basic letter and of the second endorsement by Commander
Scouting Force, with which the Commander-in-Chief fully concurs.
5. Prospective developments at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe should be per
mitted to have no weight toward postponement or reduction of requirements that
exist now at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor. As has been pointed out frequently
in previous correspondence, no development within reason will be in eventual
excess in view of the planned great expansion of naval aviation in this area.
6. Earliest practicable information as to Departmental action is requested.
7. By copy of this endorsement, Commander Patrol Wing TWO and Commander
Aircraft Battle Force are directed to take immediate steps to develop the best
arming and re-arming procedure for Patrol Wing TWO and one aircraft carrier
group at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor that can be improvised with facilities
and conditions as they now exist, and prior to the full corrective action requested
herein. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is requested to cooperate
in this directive.
8. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the
addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator, therefore,
authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the conti-
nental limits of the United States.
H. E. KiMMEL.
Copy to :
Comscofor
Comairscofor
Comairbatfor
Compatwing TWO
Com-14
NAS P. H.
[1] PW2/A16-3/ Chg. from SECRET to
(0003) CONFIDENTIAL by OpNav
(015723)
Pateol Wing Two,
U. S. Naval Air Station,
Peael Habbok, T. H.,
December 11, 19^0.
Confidential
From : The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via:
(1) The Commander Aircraft, SCOUTING FORCE.
(2) The Commander SCOUTING FORCE.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Subject: Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.
1. On November 15, 1940, Commander Patrol Wing TWO ordered a Bomb
Loading and Arming Exercise for the five squadrons of this Wing. The Naval
Air Station, Pearl Harbor, was made cognizant of this Exercise in advance and
a detailed plan prepared to arm the planes with the service bombs and ammuni-
tion now stored at the Naval Air Station.
2. Utilizing all of the available facilities and using the Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, as a source of supply for the bombs used in this Exercise, the
time element was revealed to be excessively high. Below is a summary of the
times involved in delivering and arming with forty-eight each of the 1000 and 500
pound type bombs :
Event Time Required
PHrst bomb delivered to squadrons 50 minutes
Last bomb delivered to squadrons 2 hours
Fuses delivered to squadrons 1 hour 05 minutes
Tail vanes delivered to squadrons 1 hour 40 minutes
Time required to arm a twelve plane squadron
with four bombs on each plans 6 to 7 hours
Time required to belt a complete machine gun
ammunition allowance in each squadron 4 to 6 hours
970 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. As a result of this exercise, numerous glaring deficiencies were apparent
which adversely affect the condition of readiness for War of this Wing. Such
corrective action that is within the capabilities of this Wing, to remedy these
deficiencies and to decrease the time element involved, has been taken. How-
ever, some of these deficiencies are beyond the control of the wing to correct
and should be remedied immediately. These items are discussed in details as
follows :
[2] (a) The supply of service bombs of the 1000 pound and 50O pound
type available in this area is considered entirely inadequate. The current
transfer of one hundred 1000 pound, two hundred 500 pound, and two hundred
100 pound bombs to the Asiatic Station from the ammunition depot, Oahu, in
connection with the transfer of the Wm. B. PRESTON and Patrol Squadron
TWTNTY-SIX, leaves available at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor,
Lualualei ammunition depot, and on board the U. S. S. WRIGHT a total
number of the heavier type bombs sufficient for just 10.2 complete bomb loads
for the four squadrons now comprising this Wing. These are distributed as
follows and represents all naval bombs within the Hawaiian Area :
NAS PH
Lualualei
Wright
Totals
1,0001b
43
48
48
573
1,151
2,446
61
81
314
682
5001b
1,280
1001b
2,808
The above quantities of bombs are not considered sufiicient for use in the
Pearl Harbor Area alone, and certainly they are woefully inadequate as a
source of supply when considering the wide separations of outlying bases
from which squadrons now assigned, or scheduled for assignment to this.
Wing will be required to operate from, and the fact that an adequate supply
of bombs should be available at each such base.
(b) The present bomb stowage at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor,
is inadequate both as to capacity and handling facilities. At present it is
necessary to handle the bombs within the magazine entirely by hand. It
is urgently recommended that a suitable bomb stowage be provided on the
Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, to accommodate enough bombs of each
type to provide at least one complete bomb load for the number of the
squadrons to be based thereon.
In view of the fact that the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor is located
on an island (Ford Island) any bombs required by Patrol Wing TWO fown
the ammunition depot at Lualualei must be transported at some stage of
the transportation by water.
[3] Trucks via ferry seems to be by far the most practical method of
transportation. At present there is only one ferry available for such use.
This is not considered sufficient. A total of three ferries is considered desir-
able in order to make sure that two will be continuously available.
(c) Stowage for ready service machine gun ammunition and pyrotechnics
should be provided each squadron such stowage to be constructed in the
immediate vicinity of the squadron and with a capacity sufiicient to store
at least one complete load of belted ammunition for each plane of the
squadron and a complete allowance of pyrotechnics.
(d) The Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, has insufficient bomb handling
equipment, the following being urgently required: (1) Two electric finger
lift cranes (2) additional traveling cranes, preferable of gasoline type, to
expedite the unloading of bombs from trucks at the point of delivery. Two
such traveling cranes for each squadron is considered a minimum. The
above has not been requested by the Naval Air Station. The necessary funds
and authorization to purchase these items should be given high priority.
(e) There is a marked shortage of MK IIX Bomb Hoists in this Wing.
It is recommended that the supply of Bomb Hoists be immediately increased
and that the allowance of Hoists be increased to twenty-eight per twelve
plane squadron. At least two additional squadron allowances should be
provided for each Wing to provide equipment for use when operating from
widely separated bases.
(f) The number of Bomb Skids allowed each squadron is considered
inadequate. It is recommended that each squadron be supplied withtwelve
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
971
of the MK X Mod. I Bomb Skids. It is also recommended that each Patrol
Squadron equipped for carrying torpedoes be supplies with twelve MK XXXI
Torpedo SkidS.
(g) The present allowance and supply of machine gun ammunition belt-
ing machines is inadequate. It is recommended that this allowance be
increased to twelve each of the .30 and .50 calibre type for each squadron
and each tender.
(h) It is recommended that the hoisting bands be installed on all service
500 pound bombs are now on hand and that in the future all such bombs
be designed with a lifting lug as on integral part of the bomb. It is fur-
ther recommended that the specification for all bomb crates, tail vane crates,
and ordnance equipment, specify standard size AN belts and threads.
4. All of the above mentioned items are considered of the utmost importance
as regards Patrol Wing TWO readiness for War and it is urgently recommended
that their correction be given the highest degree of priority.
5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable
to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other
than SECRET.
P. N. L. BELLINGER.
Copy to: (direct)
Comdt. 14th N. D.
NAS, PH. TH
CincUS
C'omscofor
United States Fleet
Aircraft Scouting Force
A16 U. S. S. HULBEBT, Flagship,
(SI) NAVAii Air Station,
Confidential San Diego, California.
First Endorsement to
PW-2 SECRET Itr. A16-2/
(0003) of 11 Dec, 1940.
From : The Commander Aircraft Scouting Force.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via:
(1) Commander Scouting Force.
(2) Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Subject : Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.
1. Forwarded.
2. With reference to paragraph 3 (b). present plans call for the expeditious
development of the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, into a primary base for operating
and arming patrol planes. Maximum effort should be made to equip that base
with every possible facility for large scale arming operations. The supply of
ammunition at Ford Island should be limited to one allowance of "ready"
ammunition per plane, to be used only when it is impracticable to arm at other
bases, or to augment facilities at Kaneohe in an emergency. It should be pos-
sible to maintain this comparatively small supply by utilizing only one ferry or
in the event of casualty to it, by using small boat or barge transportation. Ade-
quate stowage and handling facilities for the above mentioned ready supply of
bombs at Ford Island must be provided. ^
3. With reference to paragraph 3 (d), it is recommended that all air stations
basing patrol planes be adequately equipped to handle ammunition in and at the
magazines, to transport it to the operating lines, and to handle it there. When
practicable, this equipment should be standardized in order to economize on time
and cost of procurement. The Commanding OflScer of the Naval Air Station.
San Diego, after extensive study of the problem, has recommended to the Chief
of the Bureau of Ordnance for use at that station, special rolling equipment
consisting of units made up of three, low, six-ton trailers pulled by a small tractor,
to transport ammunition from the magazines to the operating lines. This type
of equipment should be highly satisfactory for use at air stations, including Ford
Island, where roads are surfaced and hauling distances are not great. For trans-
portation over longer distances such as from the ammunition depot at Lualualei
972 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to Kaneohe, heavy, high-powered trucks are recommended. Recommendations
from commanding officers of air stations basing patrol planes, as to the type of
equipment required to meet special local conditions should be given careful
consideration.
4. Referring to paragraph 3 (e), it is requested that the regular allowance of
Mk. Ill bomb hoists be supplied without delay. An increase in allowance to two
per plane with adequate spares is also recommended in order to permit simul-
taneous loading on both wings.
5. Subject to the remarks in the preceding paragraphs of this endorsement,
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, concurs in the comment and recommenda-
tions contained in the basic letter. The inadequacy of facilities at air stations
basing patrol planes for the stowage, handling, transport and delivery to squad-
rons of bombs, torpedoes, machine gun ammunition, fuses and pyrotechnics neces-
sary to equip patrol planes for service operations is a matter of grave concern.
The need for remedial action by responsible activities is considered to be of the
utmost importance.
6. It is hereby certified that the originator of this endorsement considers it
to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a
classification other than SECRET.
A. L. Bristol.
Copy to : COMPATWING 2.
[1] A16/0054/ United States Pleett
(0202) U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship,
(Chg. from SECRET to
CONFIDENTIAL by OpNav
015723
Confidential Pearl Harbor. T. H.,
Feb. 5, 19Jtl.
Third Endorsement to
CPW-2 Secret Ltr. A16-3
(0003) of 11 Dec. 1940.
From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Readiness for War Deficiencies, Patrol Wing TWO.
Reference :
(a) Cincus Secret 2nd end. to Compatwing TWO Secret ltr. PW2/A5/F41
(0002) of Oct. 22, 1940.
(b) Cincus Conf. 2nd end. to CPW-2 conf. ltr. PW2/A16-3/(022) of 1/16/41.
1. Forwarded, requesting that rectification of conditions set forth in the basic
correspondence be undertaken as a matter of utmost urgency.
2. Attention is particularly invited to reference (a) in which the Commander-
in-Chief stressed the necessity for decided augmentation of the bomb supply in
the Hawaiian Area, and to reference (b) in which he strongly recommended
increased ready storage for bombs and torpedoes at Naval Air Station Pearl
Harbor, together with adequate handling and loading equipment.
3. It is absolutely essential that the aircraft of Patrol Wing TWO and one-
shore-based carrier group, operating from Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, be
able to meet the purpose for which they have been built. The arming and re-
arming conditions described in the basic letter are wholly unacceptable. There
should be utmost effectiveness of aviation in this area as a vital feature of Fleet
readiness. This is alarmingly far from the case now. The situation demands
immediate and direct action.
4. The comments of Commander Aircraft Scouting Force in the first endorse-
ment are, in general, sound and are recommended for consideration in connection
with the general problem of provision for arming and re-arming at various places.
It is definitely recommended, however, that nothing therein be permitted to mini-
mize or delay the needed action at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, on the recom-
mendations of the basic letter and of the second endorsement by Commander
Scouting Force, with which the Commander-in-Chief fully concurs.
5. Prospective developments at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe should be per-
mitted to have no weight toward postponement or reduction of requirements
that exist now at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor. As has been pointed out
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 973
frequently in previous correspondence, no development within reason will be
in eventual excess in view of the planned great expansion of naval aviation in
this area.
6. Earliest practicable information as to Departmental action is requested.
7. By copy of this endorsement, Commander Patrol Wing TWO and Commander
Aircraft Battle Force are directed to take immediate steps to develop the best
arming and re-arming procedure for Patrol Wing TWO and one aircraft carrier
group at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor that can be improvised with facilities
and conditions as they now exist, and prior to the full corrective action requested
herein. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is requested to cooperate
in this directive.
8. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the
addressee in time by the next available oflScer courier. The originator, therefore,
authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the
continental limits of the United States.
H. E. KiMMEL.
Copy to:
Comscofor
Comairscofor
Comairbatfor
Compatwing TWO
Com-14
NAS P. H.
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 54
Pateol Wing Two
U. S. Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.,
25 Nov. 1941.
PW2/A4-4/
(3298)
From : The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
To:
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO.
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-THREE.
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWENTY-FOUR.
The Commander Patrol Squadron ELEVEN.
The Commander Patrol Squadron TWELVE.
The Commander Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN.
Subject : Watch and Duty Schedule for December 1, 1941, to January 1, 1942.
Enclosure : (A) Watch and Duty Schedule.
1. Enclosure (A) will be followed as the Watch and Duty Schedule for the
period December 1, 1941, to January 1, 1942.
L. C. Ramsey,
L. C. Ramset,
By direction.
Copy to :
Compatwing ONE.
Compatron 21.
974 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
975
PW2/A4-3(4)/
(3288)
Restricted
Wn
Patrol Wing Two,
U. S. Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 25, 1941.
Operation Schedule No. 45-^1 {Week of Nov. 26-Dec. 2, 1941)
26
Wed
27
Thurs
28
29
30
Dec. 1
Fri
Sat
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SPH
DP
G4 V8
SHW
SHW
Fl V8
G2 Ll
UK
SHW
Fl V7
UK
RD
DP
El
RD G2 Fl
G2 Fl
L2 VC9
DP
SHW
Ll VC9
ABE
ABE
ABE
ABE
El
SHW
RD
El
Fl G3
Gl V4
PI
SHW
V4
2
Tues
Curtiss
Tangier
Wright
McFarland-
Hulbert
Swan
A voce t
Patron 11.
Patron 12.
Patron 14.
Patron 21.
Patron 22.
Patron 23.
Patron 24.
SPH
UK
ABE
UK
SPH
PG
SPH
G4 V8
RD
G2 Ll L2
UK
DP 02F1
V4 VC9
ABE
-. El
Fl G3
Yl VCIO
SPH
UK
ABE
UK
SPH
PG
SPH
RD
G4 V8
DP
G2 Ll
UK
G2 Fl
L2 VC9
ABE
El
Fl G3
VCIO
Tl
UK
ABE
SPH
SPH
SPH
SPH
Fl V8
Fl V7
El
G2 Fl
Ll VC9
ABE
El
Fl G3
V4
El Familiarization.
Fl Free or Fi.xed Machine Guns.
ABE Advance Base Operations.
G2 High Altitude Horizontal Bombing.
Gl Master Horizontal Bombers, Qualification Practice.
G3 Anti-Submarine Bombing.
Q4 Bombing Maneuvering Target.
PG Plane Guard.
PI Inspection.
RD Ready Duty.
SHW Holiday Routine.
SPH Services Pearl Harbor.
Tl Tactics.
UK Upkeep.
Yl Night Flying.
DP Dawn Patrol.
Readj' Duty Tender; HULBERT.
Distribution
Squadrons (each) 10
Tenders (each) 10
NAS PH TH 20
NAS Kaneohe Bay 20
NAS Maui 20
FAD 00 D 3
Pat Wing TWO Photo. Unit 2
L. C. RAMSEY,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing TWO.
Wn
PW2/A4-3/VZ/ Patkol WIxNG Two,
(3287) U. S. Naval Air Station,
RESTRICTED Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 25, 1941.
Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying Schedule ( Week Nov. 26-Dec. 2, 1941)
Wednesday, Nov. 26. # Patron 24 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate
in area VU3 above 2000 feet. VJ-1 (3 landplanes) practice landings 1800-1900.
2 (JRS planes) will operate without lights in areas C-7 and C-11 altitude 10,000
feet towline 7000 feet. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and
air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VSl above 2000 feet.
976 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Thursday, Nov. 27. Can*ier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and
air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VSl above 2000 feet.
VO-2 and VO-4 (9 planes) will return to Pearl Harbor from operating areas
at sea.
Friday, Nov. 28. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and
air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VSl above 2000 feet.
2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4 2130-2230.
Saturday, Nov. 29. VJ-1 (1 PBY) takeoff 1800. Will operate without lights in
areas 08, C9, CIO altitude 10,000 feet towline 7000 feet.
Sunday, Nov. 30. NONE.
Monday, Dec. 1. #VCS-9 (8 planes) landings and air tactics. For tactics
operate in area VU3 above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4 2130-2230.
Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics
operate in areas V2, V3, V4 and VSl above 2000 feet.
Tuesday, Dec. 2. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and
air tactics. Navigation flights to Maui and return. For tactics operate in areas
V2, V3, V4 and VSl above 2000 feet.
#Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI
of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941),
L. C. Ramsey,
L. C. Ramsey,
Commander, U. 8. Navy,
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.
(At this point in Exhibit No. 54 there appear two schedules of
Patrol Wing Two, U. S. Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, being
"Aircraft Gunnery Area Assignment Distribution" and "Fleet Air
Detachment Night Flying Schedule Distribution". These schedules
will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 144 and 145, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Wn
PW2/A4-3/VZ/ Patrol Wing Two,
(3231) U. S. Naval Aib Station,
Restricted Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 18, Idlfl.
Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying Schedule (Week of Nov. 19-25, 1941)
Wednesday, Nov. 19. # Patron 21 night bombing 2030-2200 area VS2. Carrier
Air Groups landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas VI, V2, V3,
V4, VSl above 2000 feet.
Thursday, Nov. 20. NONE.
Friday, Nov. 2t. Carrier Air Groups landings and air tactics. For tactics
operate in areas VI, V2, V3, V4, VSl above 2000 feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise
AA-4 2130-2230.
Saturday, Nov. 22. NONE.
Sunday, Nov. 28. NONE.
Monday, Nov. 24- Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and
air tactics. For tactics operate in areas VI, V2, V3, V4, and VSl above 2000
feet, 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4 2130-2230.
Tuesday, Nov. 25. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and
air tactics. For tactics operate in areas VI, V2, V3, V4, and VSl above 2000
areas VI, V2, V3, V4, and VSl above 20C0 feet.
#Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI
of Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).
Note : Drydock channel will be closed to seaplane traffic during this period
except on permission of the Tower Duty Officer.
L. C. Ramsey,
L. C. Ramsey,
Commander, U. S. Navy.
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO:
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
977
PW2/A4-3(4)/
(3230)
Restricted
Pateol Wing Two,
U. S. Naval Aie Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Novemler 18, 1941.
Operation Schedule No. 4i-41 ( Week of November 19-25, 1941 )
19 Wed
20Thurs
21Fri
22 Sat
23 Sun
24Mon
25Tues
Curtiss -
UK
UK
ABE
SPH
PG
UK
PQ
UK
DP
/ RD Fl
\ V5V6
ABE
fG2 Fl.Yl
t Ll VCIO
ABE
ABE
El
UK
UK
ABE
SPH
PQ
UK
PQ
UK
SHW
DP Fl "1
V5V6 /
ABE
RD G2F1
Ll VCIO
ABE
ABE
SHW
UK
UK
ABE
SPH
PG
UK
PG
UK
RD El
PI
ABE
DPG2F1\
Ll VCIOJ
ABE
ABE
El
UK
Tl
ABE
UK
PQ
UK
PQ
UK
DP
UK
ABE
SHW
ABE
ABE
RD
UK
Tl
ABE
UK
PG
UK
PG
UK
SHW
Tl
ABE
fRD G2F1
\ Ll V4
ABE
ABE
DP
SPH
Tl
ABE
UK
PG
UK
PQ
UK
RDG4V4
Tl
UK
DP G2F1
Ll VCIO
ABE
UK
El
SPH
Tangier -
Tl
Wright
ABE
McFarland
UK
Thornton
PG
Hulbert -
UK
Swan
PG
UK
Patron 11
DP G4 V4
Patron 12
Tl
Patron 14 -
UK
Patron 21 .. --.
RD Q2F1
Ll VCIO
ABE
Patron 22
Patron 23
UK
Patron 24
El
El
Familiarization.
RD
Ready Duty.
Fl
Free or Fixed Machine Guns.
SHW
Holiday Routine.
ABE
Advance Base Operations.
SPH
Services Pearl Harbor
G2
High Altitude Horizontal Bombing.
Tl
Tactics.
G4
Bombing Maneuvering Target.
UK
Upkeep.
PG
Plane Guard.
Yl
Night Flying.
PI
Inspection.
DP
Dawn Patrol.
DISTRIBUTION
Squadrons (each) 10
Tenders (each) ! 10
NAS PH TH 20
NAS Kaneohe Bay 20
NAS Maui 20
FAD COD Pearl Harbor 3
L. C. Ramsey,
L. C. Ramsey,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing Two.
Wn
PW2/A4-S(2)/
(3229)
Restricted
Patrol Wing Two
U. S. Naval Ant Station
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 18, 1941-
Aircraft Gunnery Area Assignment (Week of November 19-25, 1941)
Patrol Wing Two V4, VCIO, Ll, L2.
Carrier Air Groups VI, V2, V3, VSl, L3. Illio Point target, Kahuku
Marine Air Group 21. Point Target (except 25 & 26 Nov.)
VO Wing V7, V8.
CA Wing VU3.
CL Wing VA9, VC9.
VCS-5 Kahuku Point Target 25 and 26 November.
L. C. Ramsey,
L. C. Ramsey,
Commander, U. S. Navy
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.
Wn
978 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
PW2/A4-3(2)/
Restricted
Aircraft Gunnery Area Assignment
Distribution:
CinCPac 5
Comairbatfor 5
Comsco^for 5
Combatships 5
Combatdiv ONE 5
Combatdiv FOUR 5
Comcrubatfor 5
Comcruscofor 5
Comcrudiv THREE 5
Comcrudiv FOUR 5
Comcrudiv FIVE 5
Comcrudiv SIX 5
Comcrudiv NINE 5
PatWing ONE Units (each)__ 5
Patwing TWO Units (each)— 5
Lexington Air Group H
Enterprise Air Group 11
Saratoga Air Group 11
Marine Air Group 21 20
C. O., U. S. S. LEXINGTON— 10
C. O., U. S. S. ENTERPRISE., 10
C. O., U. S. S. SARATOGA 10
C. O., N. A. S., Pearl Harbor__ 20
C. O., N. A. S., Kaneohe Bay— 20
Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp.
Unit 5
C. G., 18th Wing Air Corp,
Hickam Field 27
Headquarters, 14th Wing,
Wheeler Field 27
Commander Haw^aiian Air
Force 5
Combatfor 4
Comsubscofor 4
Comdt. 14 N. D 8
Combasefor 2
Cominbatfor 2
Comutwing, Basefor 5
Subron FOUR 5
CG ; KSC, B, Fort DeRussy 5
Comdesbatfor 5
C. O., Harbor Defense, Pearl
Harbor 2
C. O., Harbor Defense, Fort
Ruger 2
C. O., U. S. S. PENNSYLVA-
NIA 5
FAD OOD PH TH 3
PW2/A4-3/VZ
Patkol Wing Tvto
U. S. Naval Ajb Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying
Schedule Distribution:
CinCPac 5
Comairbatfor 5
Comscofor 5
Combatships 5
Combatdiv ONE 5
Combatdiv FOUR 5
Comcrubatfor 5
Comcruscofor 5
Comcrudiv THREE 5
Comcrudiv FOUR 5
Comcrudiv FIVE 5
Comcrudiv SIX 5
Comcrudiv NINE 5
Compatwing ONE 5
Patrol Wing ONE (All units-
each) 5
Patrol Wing TWO (All units-
each) 5
Lexington Air Group 2
Enterprise Air Group 2
Saratoga Air Group 2
Marine Air Group 21 4
C. O., USS LEXINGTON 2
c. o., USS ente:rprise 2
C. O., USS SARATOGA 2
C. O., NAS Pearl Harbor i;
C. O., NAS Kaneohe Bay G
Kingfisher -Medusa Av. Rp.
Unit 4
CG, 18th Wing Air Corp, Hick-
am Field 27
Headquarters, 14th Wing,
Wheeler Field 27
CG, Hawaiian Air Force 5
Combatfor 3
F. D. COD PH TH 3
VJ-,1 5
VJ-2 5
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
979
PW2/A4-3(4)/
(3176)
Restricted
Pateol Wing Two, Wn
U. S. Navai- AiE Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 11, 19U.
Operation Schedule No. 43-41 (Week of November 12-18, 1941)
Wed
12
Thurs
13
Fri
14
Sat
15
Sun
16
Mon
17
Tue
18
Curtiss-.. - . .
UK
SPH
UK
ABE
SPH
ABE
SPH
UK
RD VI
El
ABE
/DP Gl
\ LI L2
ABE
ABE
ABE
UK
SPH
UK
ABE
SPH
ABE
SPH
UK
DPG2LI
RD
ABE
Fl VI
VCIO
ABE
ABE
ABE
UK
SPH
SPH
ABE
SPH
ABE
SPH
UK
G2 LI
DP
ABE
RD Fl\
VCIO /
ABE
ABE
ABE
UK
SPH
SPH
ABE
SPH
ABE
UK
UK
RD
UK
ABE
DP
ABE
ABE
ABE
UK
SPH
SPH
ABE
SPH
ABE
UK
UK
DP
RD
ABE
SHW
ABE
ABE
SHW
UK
SPH
SPH
ABE
SPH
ABE
UK
UK
El
El
ABE
f Gl \
\ LI L2 /
ABE
ABE
UK
UK
Tangier
SPH
Wright—
SPH
McFarland
ABE
Thornton
SPH
Hulbert
ABE
Swan
UK
Avocet
UK
Patron 11
02L1
Patron 12
El
Patron 14
ABE
Patron 21
G2 L2
Patron 22
ABE
Patron 23
ABE
Patron 24
UK
Fl
Free or Fixed Machine Guns.
El
Familarization.
ABE
Advance Base Operations.
Gl
Master Horizontal Bombers,
Qualification Practice.
G2
High Altitude Horizontal Bombing
RD
Ready Duty.
SHW
Holiday Routine.
SPH
Services Pearl Harbor.
UK
Upkeep.
Yl
Night Flying.
DP
Dawn Patrol.
Ready Duty Tender: THORNTON.
Distribution
Squadrons (each) 10
Tenders (each) 10
NAS PH TH 20
NAS Kaneohe Bay 20
NAS Maui 20
FAD OOD 3
L. C. Ramsey,
L. C. Ramsey,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.
PW2/A4-3(2)
(3175)
Restricted
Wn
Patbol Wing Two
U. S. Naval Am Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 11, 194I.
Aircraft Gunnery Area Assignment (Week of November 12-18, I94I) .
Patrol Wing Two V4, VCIO, LI, L2.
Carrier Air Groups, Marine Air
Group 21 V6, V8, V9, VIO, VSl, L3, L5, L6, Kahuku Point and lUio
Point targets.
VO Wing VI, V2, V3.
CA Wing A7, A8. All.
CL Wing VU3, VA3.
L. O. Ramsey
L. C. Ramsey,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, voL 2-
-21
980 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIpN PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Wn
PW2/A4-3/VZ/(3174)
Restricted
Patkol Wing Two
U. S. Naval Aie Station
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Novemher 10, 19^1.
Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying Schedule (Week of Nov. 12-18, 19^1)
Wednesday, Nov. 12. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings
and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VSl above 2000 feet.
Patron ELEVEN (Kaneohe) night bombing 1830-2000 in area VS2.
Thursday, Nov. 13. #Patron TWENTY-ONE night bombing 1830-2000. Area
VS2. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For
tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VSl above 2000 feet.
Friday, Nov. 14. VJ-2 (6 landplanes) practice landings 1830-2100. 2 VO-VS
planes exercise AA-4.
Saturday, Nov. 15. NONE.
Sunday, Nov. 16. NONE.
Monday, Nov. 17. #VCS-9 (10 planes) landings and air tactics. For tactics
operate in area VU3 above 200O feet. 2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-4. Carrier
Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate
in areas V7, V8, V9, VSl above 2000 feet.
Tuesday, Nov. IS. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and
air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VSl above 2000 feet.
#Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI of
Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).
Note: Drydock channel will be closed to seaplane traffic during this period
except on permission of the Tower Duty Officer.
L. C. Ramsey
L. C. Ramsey,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer, Patrol Witig TWO.
PW2/A4-3/VZ/
RESTRICTED
Fleet Air Detachment Night Flying Schedule
CinCPac 5
Comairbatfor 5
Comscofor i 5
Combatships : 5
Combatdiv ONE 5
Combatdiv FOUR 5
Comcrubatfor 5
Comcruscofor 5
Comcrudiv THREE 5
Comcrudiv FOUR 5
Comcrudiv FIVE 5
Comcrudiv SIX 5
Comcrudiv NINE 5
Compatwing ONE 5
Patrol Wing ONE (all units-
each) 5
Patrol Wing TWO (all units-
each) 5
Wn
Patkol Wing Two,
U. S. Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
Distribution
Lexington Air Group 2
Enterprise Air Group 2
Saratoga Air Group 2
Marine Air Group 21 4
C. O., U. S. S. LEXINGT0N__ 2
C. O., U. S. S. ENTERPRISE— 2
C. O., U. S. S. SARATOGA 2
C. O., N. A. S., Pearl Harbor 6
C. O., N. A. S., Kaneohe Bay— 6
Kingfisher-Medusa Av. Rp.
Unit 4
C. G., 18th Wing Air Corp,
Hickam Field 27
Headquarters, 14th Wing,
Wheeler Field 27
C. G., Hawaiian Air Force 5
Combatfor 3
F. A. D., C. O. D., P. H., T. H— 3
(At this point in Exhibit No. 54 there appears a schedule of Patrol
Wing Two, U. S. Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, being "Aircraft
Gunnery Area Assignment Distribution." This schedule will be
found reproduced as Item No. 146, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
PW2/A4-3(4)/
(3110)
Restricted
981
Wn
Patrol Wing Two,
U. S. Naval Aib Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 4, 194I.
Operation Schedule No. 42-4i (Week of November 5-11, 1941)
5
Wed
Thurs
7
Fri
8
Sat
Sun
10
Mon
11
Tuea
CURTISS
TANGIER
WRIGHT
McFARLAND
THORNTON..
HULBERT..-.
SWAN
AVOCET
PATRON 11...
PATRON 14...
PATRON 21...
PATRON 22...
PATRON 23...
PATRON 24...
ABE
SPH
UK
ABE
PG
SPH
SPH
PO
RD 03
yi V4
UK
n
VCIO
ABE
UK
DP
ABE
SPH
UK
ABE
PG
SPH
SPH
PG
DP G3
Yl V4
UK
Fl
VCIO
ABE
UK
RD
ABE
SPH
UK
ABE
PG
SPH
SPH
PG
G3 V4
UK
RD Fl
VCIO
ABE
UK
DP
ABE
SPH
UK
ABE
PG
SPH
SPH
PG
RD UK
ABE
DP
ABE
ABE
UK
ABE
SPH
UK
ABE
PG
SPH
SPH
PG
DP
ABE
RD
ABE
ABE
SHW
SPH
SPH
UK
ABE
PG
ABE
SPH
PG
RD 03
L2
ABE
DP Ql
LI
ABE
ABE
ABE
SPH
SPH
UK
ABE
PG
ABE
SPH
PG
DP 02
L2
ABE
RD G2 03
Lll VCIO
ABE
ABE
ABE
El Familiarization.
Fl Free or Fixed Machine Guns.
ABE Advance Base Operations.
Gl Master Horizontal Bombers, Qualification Practice.
G2 High Altitude Horizontal Bombing.
G3 Anti-Submarine Bombing.
PG Plane Guard.
RD Ready Duty.
SHW Holiday Routine.
SPH Services Pearl Harbor.
UK Upkeep.
Yl Right Flying.
DP Dawn Patrol.
Ready Duty Tender:
HULBERT 5-8 Nov.
SWAN 9-11 Nov.
Distribution:
Squadrons (each) 10
Tenders (each) 10
NAS PH TH 20
NAS Kancohe Bay 20
NAS Maui 20
FAD OOD 3
L. C. Ramsey
L. C. Ramsey,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing Two.
Wn
PW2/A4-3/VZ Patkol Wing Two
(3109) U. S. Naval Aib Station
Restricted Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 4, 194I.
Fleet Aid Detachment Night Flying Schedule (Week November 5-11, 1941)
Wednesday, Nov. 5. *Patron 11 landings (Kaneohe) and air tactics. For
tactics operate in area V4 above 2000 feet. Carrier Air Groups and Marine
Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9,
VSl above 2000 feet.
Thursday Nov. 6. *Patron 11 landings (Kaneohe) and air tactics. For tac-
tics operate in area V4 above 2000 feet. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air
Group 21 landings and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VSl
above 2000 feet.
Friday; Nov. 7. *V0-1 (9 planes) landings and air tactics. For tactics
operate in area VU3 above 2000 feet. VO-2 and VO-4 (12 planes total) will
return to Pearl Harbor from operations at sea with Fleet at about 2130.
982 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings and air tactics. For
tactics operate in areas V7, VS, V9, VSl above 2000 feet.
Saturday, Nov. 8. None.
Sunday, Nov. 9. None.
Monday, Nov. 10. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings
and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VSl above 2000 feet.
2 VO-VS planes exercise AA-1.
Tuesday, Nov. 11. Carrier Air Groups and Marine Air Group 21 landings
and air tactics. For tactics operate in areas V7, V8, V9, VSl above 2000 feet.
♦Units so designated furnish night flying details as required by Section VI of
Air Operations Manual, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).
Note: Drydock channel will be closed to seaplane traffic during this period
except on permission of the Tower Duty Officer.
L. C. Ramsey,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing, TWO.
PW2/A4-3(2) Patrol Wing Two, Wn
(3108) . U. S. Naval Aik Station
Restricted Pearl Hardor, T. H. November 4, 1941.
Aircraft gunnery area assignment {Week of November 5-11, 19Jfl).
Patrol Wing TWO V4, VCIO, LI, L2
Carrier Air Groups 1 V6, V8, V9, VIO, L5, L6. Kahuku
Marine Air Group 21 / Point and Illio Point targets.
VO Wing VI, V2, V3.
CA Wing VU3, VAS.
CL Wing A7, A8, All.
L. C. Ramsey,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO.
(At this point in Exhibit No. 54 there appear two schedules of
Patrol Wing Two, IT. S. Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, being
"Aircraft Gunnery Area Assignment Distribution" and "Fleet Air
Detachment Night Flying Schedule Distribution." These schedules
will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 147 and 148, respectively,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 55
All maps checked in "Blue" pencil are in "PA-K2" transposition system
and were taken out, read and translated.
All maps checked in "Red" were thought to be in more complex systems
(probably machine) as there were no indicators Ijy which they could be readily
identified. No machines held at Honolulu.
Copies of all messages were forwarded to Washington.
(Exhibit No. 55 is a statement of RCA Communications, Inc.,
Honolulu, T. H. listing certain Japanese cable messages from Honolulu
in November and December, 1941. This statement will be found re-
produced as Items Nos. 149, 150, 151 and 152, EXHIBITS-ILLUS-
TRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 56
(A copy of a coded message, appearing at this pomt in the Exhibit,
from Togo to the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, dated 4 December
1941, will be found reproduced as Item No. 153, EXHIBITS-ILLUS-
TRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 983
Dec. 4, mi.
#01250 "La" system.
From : Togo, Jap foreign minister.
To: Jap Consul Honolulu, T. H.
Ki kan ko in tai pi su to nitai (shi) ru ru hon nen do nen ma tsu sho
yo si kyu ga ku sanstori ke tsu tei se ri
Ha i fu ga ku nite so ben arita . . . ku na ho yo nin nitai (shi) te wa kyu
ryo no yii wo ri o sai ko kyo yu seipi to shi kaku jin hi go ro no kin tai o
shin sha ku none kikan sai ryo niyo (ri) te ki to ga ku ha i fu ga ku ni te si
kyu aritashi
sa ha ra 80 dollars. 93 dollars, mu ra o ka 83 dollars, ji dai do 44 dollars,
i zu re nix> kan pipi ji tsu pi shi ben
Togo.
The following has been authorized as the annual year-end bonus for employee
typist of your office. It is desired that you stay within the allowances. For
key personnel ten percent is considered the top amount. You may pay a suitable
amount at your own discretion after deducting indebtedness.
Sahara, $80. $93.
Muraoka, $83.
Jidaido, $44.
All above chargeable to government expenses.
#125 "LA" System. 4 Dec. 1941.
From : Jap. Foreign Minister — Togo.
To: Jap. Consul, Honolulu, T. H.
[Rec'd on 5 Dec. '41, trans — before 7th]
(A copy of a coded message, appearing at this point in the Exhibit,
from the Japanese Consul at San Francisco, to the Consul at Hono-
lulu, dated 3 December 1941 ; and a coded message, with translation,
from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to the Foreign Minister, Tokyo,
and the Consul at San Francisco, dated 3 December 1941, will be found
reproduced as Items Nos. 154 and 155, respectively, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
3 Dec. 1941.
Urgent #321 "LA" System
From : Japanese Consul Muto, San Francisco, Calif.
To : Japanese Consul, Honolulu, T. H.
Sen si tsu no wa ri a te tsu go a ru nitsuki ta tu ta ma ru jo sen ki bo
no kan in ka zo ku jii sha su kaku to be tsu ni shi kyu go kai den ko.
MUTO.
Due to the necessity of arranging accommodations, desire you report by dis-
patch the number of members of the families of officials, by rank, desiring
accommodations on the TATSUTA MARU.
(Two coded messages, with translations, dated 3 December 1941,
from Tokyo to the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, bearing Nos. 852
and 1240, appear at this point in the Exhibit, They will be found
reproduced as Items Nos. 156 and 157, respectively, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Rec'd these on afternoon of 5 Dec. '41 along with a few plain language and
some misgs in less secret systems.
Read plain and less secret systems and was nothing but junk.
Immediately set to work making tests against all systems on hand, working
backwards from current system in use.
Nothing coming to light so it was decided to reverse the process of deciphering,
allowing for the encoding party to have either purposely encrypted the msgs in
this manner or possibly to have made an error in using the system employed due
to confusion. This netted results. Ref. Exhibit # 57.
984 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(At this point in the Exhibit the following coded messages appear :
1. No. 2451 from Japanese Consul in Honolulu to Tokyo, dated
3 December 1941.
2. Ihid, showing handwritten decipherment, page 1.
3. Ihid^ showing handwritten decipherment, page 2.
4. No. 2452 from Japanese Consul in Honolulu to Tokyo, dated
3 December 1941.
5. Ihid^ showing handwritten decipherment, page 3
6. Ihid^ showing handwritten decipherment, page 4.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 158
through 163, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
(Military secret).
From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Tokyo.
3 December 1941
(PA-K2)
#245 (In 2 parts, complete)
From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.
1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following :
I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows :
Meaning
Signal
Battleship divisions including scouts
Preparing to sortie
1
and screen units.
A number of carriers
Preparing to sortie
2
Battleship divisions
All departed between 1st and 3rd
3
Carriers
Several departed between 1st and 3rd
4
Carriers .*..
All departed between 1st and 3rd
5
Battleship divisions . ..
All departed between 4th and 6th
6
Carriers ..
Several departed between 4th and 6th. . .. . ..
7
Carriers
All departed between 4th and 6th
8
2. Signals.
Lanikai ' Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows :
Signal
One light between 8 and 9 p. m 1
One light between 9 and 10 p. m 2
One light between 10 and 11 p. m 3
One light between 11 and 12 p. m 4
II
Two lights between 12 and 1 a. m 5
Two lights between 1 and 2 a. m 6
Two lights between 2 and 3 a. m 7
Two lights between 3 and 4 a. m 8
III
Lanikai ^ Bay, during daylight :
If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals
1, 2, 3, or 4.
If there is a "star" and a Roman numerial III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.
^ Between Waimanalo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Gabu.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 985
IV
Lights in tlie attic window of Kalama House ' will indicate the following:
Times Signal
1900-2000 3
2000-2100 4
2100-2200 5
2200-2300 6
2300-2400 7
0000-0100 8
V
K. G. M. B." Want Ads.
A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.
B. CHIC. .CO farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.
C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.
3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu,
then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium* at a
point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20°40' N.,
longitude 156° 19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of
Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX
signal is received:
Time Signal
From 7-8 3 or 6
From 8-9 4 or 7
From 9-10 5 or 8
(At this point in the Exhibit the following coded radiograms on
forms of RCA appear :
1. No. 246 from Kita, Japanese Consul in Honolulu, to Tokyo,
dated 3 December 1941, with handwritten notations.
2. Another copy of No. 246 without handwritten notations.
3. Ihkl, being the message sent the San Francisco Consul.
4. Ibid, being the message sent the Washington Embassy.
5. No. 247 from Kita in Honolulu to Tokyo dated 3 December
1941.
6. Ibid, being the message sent the San Francisco Consul.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 164
throiigh 169, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
From: Honolulu (Kita).
To : Tokyo.
3 December 1941 (PA-K2).
#247
Ship report.
2nd. Military transport (Name unknown) sailed out toward mainland.
3rd. RARIN came into port from San Francisco.
(A copy of the coded radiogi-am from Kita to Tokyo, No. 248, on
form of RCA, dated 3 December 1941, will be found reproduced as
Item No. 170, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
02480 3rd [WA I 00 MIN GU] Paragraph SU I ZYOO KI BO KAN 2 SE KI
SYUTU KOO. SONO TA I.
" A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai.
2 A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.
* At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W.
986 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From: Honolulu (Kita).
To : Tokyo.
3 December 1941 (PA-K2).
#248
Ship report. December 3rd. Wyoming and 2 seaplane tenders left port. No
other movements.
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 56A
SECBET
Registered Mail —
Return Receipt Requested
Secret DW/wps
FOITKTEENTH NaVAI. DiSTEICT
DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE
Sixth, Floor, Young Hotel
Honolulu, Hawaii
14ND/A17
Serial No. 217
15 June 1945
From : District Intelligence Officer, 14ND
To : Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN,
Office of the Secretary of the Navy
Subj : Pearl Harbor Disaster Investigation.
1. The enclosed copies of material from the files of this office are forwarded
herewith as requested by Mr. John Sonnett, Counsel for subject investigation.
2. The urgency of delivery of these documents is such that they will not reach
the addressee in time by the next available officer messenger. Authority is
hereby granted to transmit these documents by registered air mail within tlie
jurisdiction of the United States Mail and Naval Postal Service.
H. S. Burr,
Acting.
Ends.: Sixty-six (66) photostats of miscellaneous material dealing with the
decoding and translation of cable messages sent by the Japanese Consulate,
Honolulu, prior to 7 December 1941.
"KO" SYSTEM
"PA" SYSTEM
SENT FILE
Completed— Tfc. Taken Off
RCA Radiogram Filed at SF REC Here 1941 Dec 6 PM 4 39 [HST]
1494 30 SAN FRANCISCO CALIF 6 628P
L C Shokin Honolulu
Takakuwanoken tesuuryoo beisisuno shookimo keiyeinite shookankyoosei
konnanto omowaru, American Trust Nitsuki naimitsuni torishirabe tarutokoro
dooninwa dookookeiyu oimatsuate suusendoru attosaitobiru torikumi koshoo-
naku shiharaware orumoyoo tookoonimotsu kawarikin ryuuyoono keiseki-
nakiya.
Shokin.
[Suppressed; undelivered in Honolulu.]
(At this point in the Exhibit the following coded messages appear :
1. No. 252, dated 5 December 1941, from Kita, Japanese Con-
sul in Honolulu, to Tokyo.
2. No. 250, dated 4 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.
3. No. 249, dated 4 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.
4. Ibid, showing decipherment and English translation.
5. No. 248, dated 3 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.
6. Ibid, showing decipherment and English translation.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 987
7. No. 247, dated 3 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.
8. Ihid, showing decipherment and English translation.
9. No. 246, dated 3 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.
10. Ihid^ showing decipherment and English translation.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as It^ms Nos. 171
through 180, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
"KO" SYSTEM
"PA" SYSTEM
EECHUVED FILE
Completed— TFC Taken Off
(At this point in the Exhibit the following coded messages from
Tokyo to the Japanese Consul at Honolulu appear :
1. No. 128, dated 6 December 1941.
2. No. 126, dated 4 December 1941.
3. No. 92466, dated 4 December 1941.
4. No. 92461, dated 3 December 1941.
5. No. 90094, dated 3 December 1941.
6. No. 278, dated 22 November 1941.
7. No. 360, dated 22 November 1941.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 181
through 187, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
"L A." SYSTEM
RECEIVED FILB
Completed— TFC Taken Off
(At this point in the Exhibit there appear copies of the following
coded messages :
1. No. 384, Part 1, dated 27 November 1941, from Nomura in
Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu.
2. No. 384, Part 2, dated 27 November 1941, from Nomura in
"Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu.
Parts 1 and 2 of this message will be found reproduced as Items Nos.
188 and 189, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
#384
27 November 1941.
From : Ambassador Nomura, Washington, D. C.
To : Japanese Consul, Honolulu.
Detailed regulations re the proclamation mentioned in my #1042 and 1124
to Tokyo were announced by the State Department on the 19th. They are
roughly as follows :
1. The procedure for requesting a permit to depart the country must be at
least within 30 days of the day of departing. Exceptions to the above are
as follows :
(a) Regular embassy personnel: Consular personnel, other officials and fam-
ilies and their servants, and important personages may get an "exit visa" by
going to the State Department.
(b) Persons who can show proof that they are a part of the crew of foreign
men of war.
(c) No permit will be required of a wife or child under 4 accompanying the
spouse & father.
[2] 2. In the following categories, permits will not be issued for any
person, whose departure the U. S. considers would be harmful :
988 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(a) Any person possessing secret information regarding national defense plans,
preparations, equipment, or organization.
(b) Any person who might directly or indirectly communicate the information
concerning the above to a foreign power.
(c) Any persons who have been engaged in obstructing national plans of
the U. S. for the benefit of defense of any third power or U. S. KEIBO.
(d) Any person who has been attempting to interfere with or delay the
defense plans or military of any nation of the Western Hemisphere working
for the defense of the Hemisphere.
(e) Any persons who have been attempting to incite revolution, [3]
bring about a war, or who has been attempting to interfere with U. S. defense
plans, or plans for the defense of any third power.
3. Inspecting oflScials may revoke the departure permit of any person who
refuses to permit an examination.
4. In regard to permits for entering the country, the Secretary of State may
grant such after inquiring of the Army, Navy, Police, and immigration authori-
ties regarding the person concerned.
5. There is no stipulation which would exempt consular oflBcials if they came
under any of the above list of exceptions, and oflScial will when entering or leaving
the country be required to produce proof that they are not engaged in any
subversive activities.
The full text is being sent air mail.
(Part 1 of 2 Parts)
"LA" 27 Novemher 19^1.
From : Nomura— Wash. D. C. # 384
To : Jap. Com — Honolulu
Re my Msf 1042 & ll24 to Tokio.
Migi fu Koku Nimo tozu (Ki) Ku sai so ku wa 19th zu Ke o Motte Koku mu syo
yori ha tu pi yoo sera reta . . . . ru ga souo gai ryaku sano goto ... si
1. Syu tu Koku Kyo Ka sin sei tetuzuki wa (begun special code) sukunakutomo
OLBY (end sp. cde.) syu tu Koku yo tei hi no 30th i zen ni na subeku Migi no rei
gai ta ru be Ki mo no wa
(A) sei si Ki ni Mito (me) ra re ta ru taisikan in. Ryozi Kan in no ta no
gaikoku seifu Kan ri oyobi sono Ka zo Ku zu i in. Zyn sya Yo nin wa tan ni
Koku mu syo sa syo Kyo Ku yori syu to Koku sa syo zi ( (begin Eng. sp.) EXIT
VISA (end Eng. sp.) ) o to ru tu Ku ru on hi tu yo to su ru no mi
(B) Gaikoku seifu syo yu no gun Kan no ri Ku mi in tosite syo Mei sa re ta
ru Mo No
(C) o tu to Ni si ta go tu Ma. O ya kon OC si ta bo zyu 4 sai i Ka No Ko wa
Kyo Ka o hi tu yo to sun zu
2. I Ka Ni Ka Ka qu ru zi rei wa United States no ri e Ki o gai su ru Mo No
tosite syu tu KoKu Kyo Ka o a ta e zu
(A) United States seifu No Kyo Ka Na Ku si te United States KoKu bo no
Ki KaKu. Zyu n bi. Se tu bi. Se tu ri tu bu tu NiKan (si) su ru hi mi tu
zyo ho o yu su ru mo no
(B) Migi NiKan (si) su ru hi Mi tu tu sin o ho ho no tyo Ku se tu ta ru to Kan
se tu ta ru to o to wa zu gaiKoKu seifu e un Ka ten to su ru mo no
(C) United States Kei bo ma ta tva dai 3 KoKu no K6 e Ki ma ta wa 6o ei no
ta me ni United States ga sai yo se ru sei sa Ku no Ko Ka o so gai si ti en
subeKi Ka tu do Ni zyu zi subeKi mo no
"LA" (Part 2 of 2 parts) 27 Novemler, 1941.
From : Nomura — Washington, D. C. #384
To : Jap Consul — Honolulu, T. H.
(D) Sei ban Kyu bo ei no ta me sei han ei nai no koku ka ga to ri ta ru kei
kaku ma ta wa hei dan o so gai sen en se si men to su ru mo no.
(E) United States nitai (si) bo do. Sen so o zyaku ki si United States koku
bo ma ta wa dai 3 koku bo ei no ta me no United States no sei sa ku ni hi tu
yo na ru si gen o ha kai sen to su ru mo no.
3. Syu tu koku kan ri kan wa syn tu koku sya ga hi tu yo na m ken sa o
kyo hi su ru to ki wa syu tu koku o tei si su ru ko to o u.
4. Nyu koku nikan (si) te wa 1 tei no syo si ki niyo (ri) ru syu tu gan o
na si ta ru no ti kaku syu yori no wa hyo sya 1 mei a te. Ri ku kaigun syo.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 989
Ren po kei sa tu kyo ku, i min kyu ku no kan ri o Motte k. sei su ru Kaku syo
iinkai no i ken o ki ki ta ru no ti koku mu tyo kan wa kyo ka ha tu kyu kan ni si
rei su
5. Ryo kan no ri e ki o gai su to Mito (me) mu ru zi rei sono ta nikan (si)
te wa tai yo syu tu koku no baai to do yo na ru mo nyu koku no sai ni wa
gaiko kan ryozi kan o zyo gai su ru ki tei na ku. Ryo ko ko zin te ki zi mu yu
ran ma ta wa tii ka no mo ku te ki o Motte 1 zi et te ki ni nyu koku sen te su ru
gaikoku seifu kan ri wa kyo ka sin sei i gai ni kan ri tosite no ti i o syo
mei si ka to ko te ki ka tu do ni zyii. zi sezaru ko to o a ki ra ka ni su ru
o lii tu yo to su
Migi ki so ku [te ki su to] wa o tu te ku <— so su on
(A copy of the coded message No. 767, dated 26 November 1941,
from Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honoluhi will
be found reproduced as Item No. 190, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTKA-
TIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[Received on night of 7 December 1941]
#767 "LA" 26 November, 1941.
From : Nomura — Washington, D. O.
To : Jap Consul — Honolulu.
Betuden (#....) Yokohama December 2nd syo go Los Angeles tyaku do
14th Do ha tu do 16th Ba ru bo a tyaku do 24th.
Expects depart Yokohama noon 2nd arrive Los Angeles 14th, depart 16th and
arrive Balboa 24th.
(A copy of the coded message No. 638, dated 26 November 1941, from
Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be
found reproduced as Item No. 191, EXHIBITS -ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
#638 "LA" 26 November, 194I.
From: Nomura — Washington, D. C. #381.
To : Jap Consul — Honolulu.
No. 6 Nikan (si) Koku mu syo ka ka ri kan yori ta tu ta Ma ru zyo sen syn tu
koku ho zin nikan (si) te wa to ku be tu no toriha karan o motte syn tu pan zen
sai syo gen do 10th zen no 00 sei a jm ko to mito (me) mo ru ko to ni toriha karan
SHU SHU
to ru nituki migi ni ma ni o yo sudeni hei tu koku kyo ka sin ei o tei hei tu sesime
ra re ta ki mu ne mosu ko se ri.
I have just learned from an official of the state department that a special
procedure will be applied to Japanese who desire to depart via the Tatsuta Maru.
Departure permits must be acquired within a period of ten days prior to sailing.
Those wishing to make that ship would best put in their request for permits.
(A copy of the coded message No. 302, dated 25 November 1941 from
Consul General Muto in San Francisco to the Japanese Consul in
Honolulu will be found reproduced as Item No. 192, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
25 Nov. I94I'
From : Consul General Muto, San Francisco #302,
To: Japanese Consul, Honolulu.
Upon the expiration of the Anti-Commitern pact on the 24th of November,
it has been decided to renew the pact for a i)eriod of 5 years. Today the 25th
it is planned that the emissaries of Japan, Germany, Italy, Manchukoku, Ko, and
Spain will affix their names to a 5 year renewal. Furthermore those who will
participate in this agreement have been in increased by the seven countries of
China, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Denmark, Slovakia, and KURENATIA.
990 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
<«LA» 25 Tfovember, 19^1.
From : Muto— San Francisco, #302.
To : Jap Consul — Honolulu.
Bo kyo kyo tei wa CH nen November 24tli o motte ki kan man ryo su ru o
motte sen pan rai kan kei koku kan nisi (te) zi go no kyo ryo ku tai yo
nituki kvo gi son ru ke tu ka sa ra ni ko re o 5 ka nen en tyo su ru ko to
to na ri hon 25th Berlin nioi (te) hi . Doku . i . man . ko . sei 6 ka koku zen
ken niyu (ri) en tyo gi tei syo no tyo in o ko na wa ru ru yo tei na o sin
gi tei syo ni a ra ta ni ki tei sera reta . . . . ru san ka tetzuki nisi taga (1)
sa ra ni tyu ka min koku . Rumania , [Bu ru ga ri ya] . Finland . Denmark .
[Su ro bu a ki a] oyobi [Ku ren a ti a] no 7 ka koku wa hon 25th bo kyo
kyo tei ni san ka su ru ko to to narita ri.
(At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear:
1. Copy of coded message No. 345, dated 25 November 1941,
from Kita, Japanese Consul in Honolulu, to Washington
showing decipherment.
2. Copy of Part 1 of coded message No. 375, dated 18 Novem-
ber 1941, two pages, from Nomura in Washington to the
Japanese Consul in Honolulu.
3. Ihid.'Psivt^
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 193
through 196, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Received
18 Nov. 1941.
"L A"
From: "Washington
To: Jap. Con. Honohilu— Cir. #375 (Part 1).
(Sent to Tokio as #1127)
November 14th zu ke o mette Dai to ryo wa 1918 neu May 22nd ko fu. 1941
nen June 21st shu sei ho ri tsu dai 114 go nimotozu (ki) yo shi sa nogoto ki shu
tsu nyii gu sei gen oyobi kin shi nikan (shi) su ru 1 so ku no sei tei ji tsu shi ka
to o mei ze ri
(1) How ki so ku no ji tsu shi i go nioi (te) wa United States shi miu wa
United States (Panama un ga chi tai . hi tsu oyobi zeu ryo i ki ryo su i o
fukumi mu) ni shu tsu nyii su ru ni sai shi koku mu cho kan sono ta kan kei
kan kan ha tsu ku (ko) no ryo ken o hi tsu yo to su sen in mo ma ta a na ji
(2) Gaikokujin no shu tsu koku ni sai shi te wa koku mu cho kan ma ta wa
sono shi tei su ru kan ri no ha tsu ko se ru kyo ka o hi tsu yo to si ka tsu
taisho 1 — neu cho kan . i miu kan sono no shi tei su ru mi na to ni kagi
(ri) ru tadashi koku mu cho kan ga United States no ri e ki o gai su ru to
mito (me) ru to ki wa shu tsu koku wa kyo ka sa re ga ru be shi
(3) Hon ki so ku no ji tsu shi i go nioi(te) wa gaikoku jin no nyu koku ni
sai shi te wa (2) to do yo no kyo ka o hi tsu yo to shi United States no ri e ki
o gai su ru to mito (me) ra ru ru to ki wa kyo ka serare yu (new Para)
(4) shu tsu koku ma ta wa nyii koku sen to su ru mo no wa hi tsu yo to mito (me)
ra ru ru to ki wa su be te sono sho ji su ru bun sho, bu tsu pin sono ta o ken sa
sa ru be shi.
(5) Gaikoku no mi na to yori United States no mi na to ni nyu ko su ru sen
pa ku no gaikokujin ta ru sen in nitai(shi) ha tsu ku serarota ru nyii koku kyo
ka wa jo ken zu ki nishite ka tsu go ri te ki hi tsu yo no baai ni kagi(ri) ka tsu
i min kan ga sono nyu koku ga United States no ri e ki ni ban se zu to mito (me)
ta ru to ki nyii koku no shi kaku o a ta e ra i*u be shi tadashi migi wa sen in no
sho ko sho ru i tei kyo nikan (shi) su ru 1940 neu June 5th no dai t5 ryo rei dai 84
kei 9 go o hen ko su ru mo no ni a ra zu
(6) Gaikokujin ni ha tsu ko serareta ru shu tsu koku oyobi nyu koku kyo ka
no yu ko ki kan wa ahu tsu koku oyobi nyu koku kyo ka ha tsu Jiyu kan ma ta wa
koku nu cho kan niyo(ri) sono shu tsu nyii koku ga ga tsu shil koku no rl e ki
ni ban su ru to mito (me) ra ru ru to ki wa i tSu ni te mo ko re o shu ryS seshimu
ru koto o u
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 991
(7) Hon fu koku no kaku ki tei wa to ku be tsu ni ki tei su ru baai monozo(ki)
ki ki son no ho rei no tsu i ka ta ru mo nun mishite hen ko shu sei su ru mo no
ni a ra zu bei jo
IslOMr!BA.
(Part 2)
(8) kaku kan cho wa hon fu koku oyohi kou go ha tsu pu seraru be ki fu koku
ki so ku mei rei nimotozu (ki) ku koku mu cho kau no ken gen shi tsu ko nikan(shi)
koku mu cho kan ni kyo ryo ku su ru ko to o yo shi koku mu cho kan no yo kyu
a ra ba migi mo ku te ki no ta me to gai kan ri ka ka ri nin no kin mu o tei kyo
subeshi (New Para)
Hon po shi tsu ko o tau to su ru zen kau ri wa 1918 nen May 22nd no
ho ri tsu oyobi 1941 neu June 21st no shu sei ho no i ho bo shi oyobi i hau sha no
torishirabe narabini sho ba tsu ni sai ze o tsu ku su ko to o mei zu (New Para)
(9) 1941 nen June Srd no dai to ryo dai to ryo rei dai 8766 go dai 6 [pa ra gu ra
fu] dai 1 bu wa ko re o ha i shi su (nen Para)
Na o hon ken ki so ku wa imada ha tsu pi yo ko ho o mi za ru mo jo ho niyoreba
kokn mu cho kan wa ken ji so cho to kyo ryo ku shi te dai to ryo fu koku
nishitaga (i) 1918 nen May 22ud ho ri tsu oyohi 1941 nen June 21st no do shu sei
ho niyo (ri) dai to ryo yori fu yu serareta ru ken gen nimotozu (ki) Gaikokujm
no shu tsu nyu kokn nikan (shi) su ru ki so ku o sudemi sei tei shi ahi kaku kan
p6 ni ha tsu pi yo serau be ki omonmki nishite migi niyoreba shu tsu koku sen
to su ru gaikokujin wa koku mu sho no shu tsu koku kyo ka o hi tsu yo to shi
ka tsu shu tsu kokn liyo ka shin sei wa su ku na kn to mo shu tsu koku sen to
su ru hi yori 3ju hi i zo ni sho na su ko to o yo su ru omomuki na ri,
NOMTTRA
On November 14 the President ordered the enforcement of the law #114 of
May 22, 1918, as Amended June 21, 1941 regarding the prohibition and restric-
tion of leaving and entering the country. Main points follow :
1. After this law is put in to effect, when American citizen enter or leave the
U. S. (including the Canal Zone, all territories, and territorial waters) a pass-
port issued by the Secretary of State and other interested authorities. This
applies to ship's crews.
2. Foreigners when leaving the country must obtain permission from the Sec.
State or his designated official, and are limited to harbors designated by the
Sec. State, the immigration authorities in Taisho I-neu. However, the Sec.
State is to refuse permission when he believes it to be against the interests of
the U. S.
3. After this law is put into effect, the same sort of permission is required for
foreigners entering the country, and when it is considered to be agains the in-
terests of the U. S. permission is not granted.
4. When it is considered necessary to enter or leave the country all documents,
goods, etc. must be inspected.
5. Foreign crew members of ships entering U. S. ports from foreign ports in
cases of reasonable necessity, provided that they have permits to enter and it
is not against the interests of the U. S. may enter the country (in the opinion
of immigration officials), are entitled to entry. However, the above does not
change Presidential order (84 kei 9go) of June 5, 1940 concerning offering of
documentary proof of crew members?
6. The validity of permits for entering or leaving the country received by
foreigners may be terminated at any time the Sec. State or (other officials) con-
sider that entry or departure is against interests of U. S.
7. Provisions of this law except in the case of special provisions shall not be
changed or ammended. (Part not clear — looks like additions to damage law.)
Part II
8. It is necessary for all government officials to cooperate in the enforcement
of the Sec. State's authority under this ordinance and all future ordinances,
rules and orders. For the purpose of the above aim, if it is requested of the
Sec. State he shall offer the services of a competent official.
Former Officials charged with enforcement of (this law Honpo?) are ordered
to investigate and punnish violaters and prevent violation of the law of May 22,
1918, and ammendments of June 21, 1941.
9. Presidential order #8766 #6 paragraph first part is abolished.
992 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Although this law has not been publicly proclaimed, according to Intelligence
reports, the Sec. State in cooperation with the Attorney General under author-
its delegated by the Presidential ordinance based on the law of May 22, 1918, and
Amendments of June 21, 1941 are about to publish the rules for entering and
leaving the Country in all official publications. According to the above (in-
formation?) foreigners desiring to leave the County will need permission from
the State Dept. and, although applications for leaving are few, it is believed
that it will take more than 30 days.
(A copy of coded message No. 367, dated 17 November 1941, from
Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honohilu will be
found reproduced as Item No. 197, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
Received
"LA"
11 Nov, 1941
From : Washington,
To: Jap. Con.— Honolulu. Cir. #367.
(Have delivered to: San Francisco; and (Note: 6 other addresses not
decoded)
Dai 2313 go nikan (shi) (new Para)
Zai Bei tei koru ryoji kan ni zo ku su ru fu do san . bihim . ki ro ku bun
syo wa to ro ku no yo na ki nitsuki sa yo go sho cho ai na ri ta shi —
NOMUKA.
Re: #2313. Wish to advise you that registration of real property, furni-
ture, and documents belonging to Consulates in the U. S. not necessary.
(A copy of coded message No. 029, dated 15 November 1941, from
Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be
found reproduced as Item No. 198, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
Received
"LA" 15 Nov. mi.
From: Washington
To : Jap. Con. Honolulu— # 029.
(Sent following to Tokio as #1101.)
SHUTU Puerto Rico
Kon pan jo in ni tei WOFIJ serareta ru Hawaii [pu e ru to ri ko]
bo ei do an nai yo gai ryaku sanotori (new Para)
Dai to ryo wa sono sai ryo niyo (ri) bo do. shin ryaku to no yo bo ma ta wa
Hawaii
chin a ku to no ta me ni Nagasaki [pu e ru to ri ko] ryo nai, no United States ri
ku kaigun, o, shi su ru ko to, o u, ka tsui ku an, no, ta me, ni, jin, shin, ho go,
rei, o, tei shi, shi kai gen rei, 0 ha tsu su ru ko to o u
Nomura
A digest of a bill for the defense of Hawaii and Puerto Rico submitted in the
Senate today —
(Last part not clear but general meaning seems to be) That the President may
at his discretion for the prevention and suppression of invasion and rioting declare
martial law in Hawaii and Puerto Rio.
(A copy of coded message No. 110, dated 14 November 1941, from
Tokyo to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced
as Item No. 199, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 993
Received
•LA"
14 Nchvemler 19ftl.
From: Tokio.
To : Jap. Con. Honolulu #110.
(Re ys mag. #215 of 11 November)
Hon tsuki 11th to chi sho kin ha tsu den sho se ri —
Togo.
Money was sent from here by cable on the 11th of this month.
? Densho-telegraphie inquiring
(A copy of coded message No. 217, dated 13 November 1941, from
Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be
found reproduced as Item No. 200, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
13 Nov. mi.
Received
"LA"
From : Washington.
To : Jap. Con. Honolulu.
(Following rec'd from Tokio as #217 on 13th)
nth United States taishikaus nitai (shi) zai honpo United States taishi ki
kan oyobi sono sho ku in wa taishikau oyobi sono sho ku in kei yx honpo to ke
tsu rei nimotozu (ki) zai san ho koku o na subeki mu ne tsu ho se ri mottomo
ryoji daifikan nitsuki te wa United States do yo fu do san. bi hin oyobi ki ro ku
bun sho nikan (shi) su ru ho koku o men jo se ri — ■
Togo.
NOMXJBA.
nth. We were informed that, based on the .Japanese freezing regulations, the
Japanese Ambassador to the U. S. and his stafe must make a property report.
However, according to a consular representative reports on real property, fur-
niture, and documents belonging to the Embassy are not required.
(A copy of coded message No. 356, dated 10 November 1941, from
Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be
found reproduced as Item No. 201, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
[Received on night of 7 December 1941]
10 Nov. 1941.
Received
"LA"
From: Washington.
To : Jap. Con. Honolulu ( #356 Circular) .
Ei ga kaisha yori Ku ru su taishi no [ka me ra in ta bi yu] o ki bo shi ki
ta re ru to ko ro do taishi, ko go i ko, o tashikame, none.
Beg End
EX IDBO QU
orikaishi kaideri Anita shi.
Nomura.
A picture company desires a "camera interview" with Ambassador Kurusu.
Find out his wishes and reply by telegraph.
(A copy of coded message No. 088, dated 8 November 1941, from
Morishima in New York to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be
found reproduced as Item No. 202, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
[Received on night of 7 December 1941]
994 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Received
"LA"
8 Nov. 1941.
From — ^New York.
To — Jap. Con. Honolulu. Circular #088.
(Sent to Tokio as #496 on 5 Nov.)
Gaikoku . . . jin houpo sliu tsu koku tatsuzuki no wa zu ra wa sa o un
nun se ru [to ri pyu n] ki ji o sai hau ba ku shi ta ki nitsuki sa ki orika' reshi go
kai den ko (new para)
1. Gaikoku ... jin honpo sliu tsu koku ni sai shi nai mu. Okura t5 no kan
ken yori WA to ku no hi tsu y5 a ru kyo ka nai shi sho mei sho (shu tsu pan
shin rin ma de no mo no zen bu a fuku (mi) mu) no shu ru i oyobi migi shu no
ku ni yo su ru hi su < long (new para)
JIN
2. kou ji to ku be tsu ha i sen ni bin jo ka ta mosu i de ta ru United States MC
nishite migi kyo ka sho to no shu to ku ta ni a wa za ri shi ta me jo sen de ki
za ri shi mo no a ri
MORISHIMA.
Request information to refute "Tribune" article complaining about troublesome
procedure for foreigners leaving Japan by return telegraph —
1. Foreigners at the time of leaving Japan must obtain permission or identifica-
tion cards from officials of the Home office and the Finance Ministry (includes
everything up until sailing ??) this requires days. (Not very clear) .
2. Americans who applied as passengers on the special evacuation ship because
they had not obtained permission [or, because their permits were not in order]
could not go on board —
(At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear :
1. Handwritten decipherment of coded message No. 026, dated
7 November 1941, from Kita to the Japanese Consul in San
Francisco; and No. 004, dated 5 November 1941, from
Kita to the Japanese Consul in New York.
2. Copy of coded message No. 027, dated 5 November 1941, from
Nomura in Washington to the Japanese Consul in
Honolulu.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 203
and 204, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTKATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[Received on night of 7 December 1941]
Received
"LA" 5 Nov. 1941.
From — Washington
To— Jap. Con. Honolulu #027
Zen mei yo ryoji nitai (shi) su ru ki nen hin mu ze i tsu kan ka ta te ha i
fu ni no mu ne 3rd koku mu sho yori kai to arita ri
NOMUBA
The State Department has replied to the effect that arrangements have been
made to pass commemorative articles of previous honorary consuls duty free.
(A copy of coded message No. 364, dated 5 November 1941, from
Tokyo to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu will be found reproduced
as Item No. 205, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Received
"LA" 5 NOVEMBEE 1941.
From — Tokio
To— Jap. Con. Honolulu #364
Kon pan hi Bei ko sho uikan (shi) Nomura taishi o ho sa se shi mu ru ta me
Ku ru su taishi o kyo ha su ru ko to to na re ru to ko ro do taishi wa United
States Seifu ko i te ki a tsu sen niyo (ri) 7th Hongkong ha tsu [ku ri tsu
pa <] ni te to Bei subeku yu ki shokika taido 5th to chi o shu tsu pa tsu se ri.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 995
tsuitena do taishi ki chl to cha ku no sai wa shikaru be ku ben gi kyo
yo aritashi —
Togo.
Ambassador Kurusu is being rushed to the U. S. to assist Ambassador Nomura
in the present conferences. The Ambassador through the good offices of the
U. S. Government will go to the U. S. on the Clipper leaving Hongkong on the
7th, and departed from here with his stafE on the 5th. Give him all facilities
possible when he arrives there (Honolulu).
Togo.
5 Nov. 1941.
From— Morishima #002 "LA"
To— Jap. Con. Hono. T. H. Ref yr msg. #003
To Chi chaku ha tsn hi zu ke sai den aritashi
Request you repeat telegram date of arrival and departure this place
(At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear :
1. Copy of coded message No. 302, dated 4 November 1941 from
Kita to the Japanese Consul in New York, showing hand-
written decipherment.
2. Copy of coded message No. 273, dated Q, November 1941,
from the Japanese Consul in San Francisco to the Hono-
lulu Consul.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 206
and 207, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
2 November 1941.
Received
"LA" Urgent—
From — San Francisco
To— Tokio #269 Honolulu Cir. #273
Ta tsu ta ma ru kon 2nd gogo . .^ . ji bu ji shu tsu n5 se ri jyo kyaku 1 to
164.2 to 63.3 to 635 mei na ri u chi doku jin 2. Italy jin 1. France jin 1 mei
MUTO
The Tatutu Maru departed today at 2 P. M. without incident. Passengers:
1st Class, 164; 2nd Class, 63; 3rd Class, 635; including 2 Germans, 1 Italian,
and 1 Frenchman.
[seceet]
MISCELLANEOUS
SENT AND EECEIVED
(At this point in the Exhibit there appear seventeen coded Jap-
anese messages covering the period 19 November 1941 to 2 December
1941. These messages will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 208
through 224, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt lMU"y-)
[Received on night of 7 December 1941]
The following are special usages for the "WA" and "WO" (PA) codes : —
1. "WA" Code :—
This usage is primarily for use in encoding messages classified as "strictly
secret", is the same as some that have been in use in the past, and is effected
by the transposition of letters. There are the following five methods:
(a) Using units of 5 letters: Chose two key words (such as KANDA and
KUDAN). Transpose according to these words. From the list chose one of
the three letters (C-G-Q) and place this letter in the 2nd and 4th position of
your 5-letter indicator. Choose at will a vowel (Y included) to fill in the 1st,
3rd and 5th position and put them together. Examples: ICICI — ^AGAGA —
UQUQU. Since this type of transportation is common in these codes we will
not go into detail re the transposition.
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 22
996 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) Like (a), this method is by using units of 5 letters. Talje two words from
the key word list (this is SANSO and SUISO) and transpose the text in accordance
with the numerical arrangement of the letters. Make up the indicator of the
letters "Z", "J", and "X" with a vowel chosen at random. That is: — IZIZI —
EJEJE— 0X0X0.
(c) As above, 5 letters form a unit. Take three key words from the list (such
as TOKYO — KYOTO — OSAKA) and transpose groups in accordance with the
numerical position of the letters in the separate key words. The indicator is
formed by choosing one of the two letters "T" or "D" and adding a vowel at
random. Thus :— ATATA— UDUDU.
(d) In this method 7 letters will be considered a unit. One key word is taken
from the list (such as OTOHIME) and the letters transposed by means of the
numerical position of the letters of the key word. To form the indicator group
take one of the following ("B" — "V" — "P") and add a random vowel. Thus;
ABABA— IVIVI—OPOPO.
(e) Seven letters will be considered as a unit. Take two key words from the
list (such as KUMAGAI — NAOZANE) and transpose accordingly. For an indi-
cator choose one of the two ("M" or "N") and add a vowel of choice. Thus:
IMIMI— ENENE.
2. Special usage for the "WO" code: This is supplementary to the usages given
in above section. These are like paragraph 1, but are used in telegraphic
messages only.
(a) Nine letters will be considered as a unit. Take a key word such as
(TAGONOURA) and transpose accordingly. For the indicator take one of the
two consonants "L" and "R" and put them in positions 1, 3, and 5. Add vowels
of choice in positions 2 and 4. Thus : LOLOT.— RURUR.
(b) Choose a key word of 11 letters (such as ODANOBUNAGA) and transpose
accordingly. For and indicator put one of the following two consonants (T or D)
in 1, 3, and 5 positions, add a vowel of choice, thus : TOTOT— DIDID.
(c) Choose a key word of 13 letters such as HANAYORIDANGO and transpose
accordingly. For a key word place either H or F in positions 1, 3, and 5 and
add a vowel of choice in positions 2 and 4. Thus : HAHAH — FIFIF.
(d) Choose a key word of 19 letters such as (KINOKUNIYABUNZAEMON)
and transpose accordingly. For a key word use (K or G) as above.
(General) Be careful not to use a "WA" indicator on a "WO" message.
3. INtethod of encoding remainder or supplementary group: — The following
method will be in case of both "WA" and "WO" codes.
(a) It is based on 5 letters. On the days listed on the left use the key to its
right : —
1st and 6th— 54321
2nd and 7th— 43215
3rd and 8th— 32154
4th and 9th— 21543
5th and 10th— 15432
(more but too abbreviated)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 57
Rec'd the attached on night of 7 Dec. 41. Page 19 attached furnished break by
which all were read by 11 Dec. '41. (Process of enciphering was reversed by en-
coding person)
(A copy of the coded message No. 02490, dated 4 December 1941,
from Kita to Tokyo will be found reproduced as Item No. 225, EX-
HIBITS-ILLUStEATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
#02490 Gaimudaijin Tokio from Kita.
4 Dec. 41
3rd Go Go England Gun kan I Se Ki Honolulu Koo Nyuu Koo 4th
soo tyoo syutu koo. Ton suu 1100 ton nai gai. En to tu 1 po n. 4 [in ti] Hoo
zen go kaku 1 Mon. Tan kai syoku paragraph Nao Nyuu koo tyoku go zyoo
riku su I hei wa ei ryoozi (ryoozi dairi) kan ni te yuu bin bu tu wo u ke to ri.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 997
From: Kita #02490. 12/4.
To : Foreign Minister.
3rd. gogo Eikoliu gun kan 1 se ki houoruru ko nyu ko 4th so cho shutsu ko.
ton su 1100 ton nai gai. en to tsu 1 po n. 4 (in chi) ho zen go kaku 1 mon.
tan kai slioku.
nao nyQ ko choku go jo riku su i hei wa ei ryoji kan ni te yu bin bu, tsu wo u
ke to ri itaru
On the afternoon of the Srd a British Man-of-war entered Honolulu, and de-
parted early on the 4th. About 1100 tons ; one stack, and had a 4 inch gun fore
and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went ashore and were re-
ceiving mail at the British consulate.
KiTA.
From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokio
December 4, 1941
PA-K2
#249
On the afternoon of the Srd one British gunboat entered Honolulu harbor.
She left port early on the morning of the 4th. She was roughly of the 1,100 ton
class. She had but one funnel and carried one 4 inch gun fore and aft.
Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port a sailor took some
mail to the British Consular OflBce and received some mail in return.
(A copy of coded message No. 02500, dated 4 December 1941, from
Kita to Tokyo will be found reproduced as Item No. 226, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
#02500 Secret "PA" (#365) 4 Dec. 41.
From: Kita.
To : Foreign Min, Tokyo.
4th gogo . . . . gi 1 kei zyun [ho no ru om] niokorn to JJ migi ko.
From: Kita #02500 12/4.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
4th gogo 1 kei jun (ho no ru ru) Kata hyaku shutsu ko.
At 1300 on the 4th a light cruiser of the Honolulu class hastily departed.
Kita
No translation to match this one — Rec'd on night of 7th Dec. '41. 4 copies
same way, to 4 different address. Gist : regarding funds
(At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear :
1. Copy of coded message No. 02510, dated 5 December 1941,
from Kita to the Japanese Consul in San Francisco.
2. Ibid, to the Japanese Consul in Seattle.
3. Ibid, to Tokyo.
4. Ibid, to the Japanese Embassy in "Washington.
5. Copy of coded message No. 02520, dated 5 December 1941,
from Kita to Tokyo.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 227
through 231, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
From: Kita.
To : Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
#02520 Urgent.
1. 5 nichi kin yo bi a sa oden 239 no sen kau 8 nyu ko se ri shutsu
do Mkan 8th paragraph.
998 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. do jitsu [RE KI SIN TON] oyobi ju jun 5 shutsu ko.
3. Migi niyori 5 nichi gogo zai ha ku kan sen sanotOri.
Sen Kan 8 kei jun 3 ku chi ku Kan 16.
Nyfu kyo chu no mono Honolulu ka ta 4 oyobi ku me shi son 2
chi ku kan 2
5 December 1941.
From: Honolul (Kita).
To: Tokyo.
(PA-K2)
"252
(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned In my
message "239* arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.
(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.
(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:
8 battleships.
3 light cruisers.
16 destroyers.
Four ships of the Honolulu class and - - - - were in dock.
♦Available, .T19 dated 29 29 November.
JD-1: 7280 (D) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)
(A copy of coded message No. 02530, infra, dated 6 December 1941,
from Kita to Tokyo will be found reproduced as Item No. 232, EX-
HIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
# 368
From : Kita
To : F. M. Tokyo
6 Dec. 41.
Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123
1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis NC
on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability
of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the
vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any prepara-
tions for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations
were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if
they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby
Hickam Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been
dropped.
2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo
defense of battleships and will report further.
Delivered 1248
Transmitted 1304
#02530 Secret "P. A." (#368) 6 Dec. 41.
From: Kita.
To : Gaimudaijin Tokio.
Kiden (dai .... go) 123 matsudan nikanshi (Para).
1 Bel how do ni a ri te wa October ko . riku gun wa Beg. Eng KE [c] LA [am]
EK [p] ZI [— ] DI [da] YC [vi] IW [s] ZI [— ] VY [N] AA [.] KE [c] AA [,]
10 [End spell] ni oite so sai ki kyii u hei no yo sei ni ehaku shu si six hyaku no
ki kyu wo chu mow se shi nominarazu ki kyii ni yoro ha wa i . Panama po [Bo]
et wo mo ko ryo shi wo ru omomu (ki) na ru to koro to chi ni 9 [KAN] shi te
wa shin zyu wan fu kin wo tan sa se ru mo so re to wo mo wa ru ru ba sho no
sen tei oyobi kei ryu shi se tsu to na shi wo ra zu ma ta ki kyu fu yo kun ren mo
mi za ru wo niotte i ma no tokoro so sai ki kyu se tsu chi no cho ko su ra mito
(me) zu ka tsu so kyu ni wa ji tsu geu seraru (ru) mono to wa mito (me) gata
(ku) shi shikashite mo shi ji tsu geu surin to mo shin ju wau ni kin se ku se ru
[hi tsu ka mu] [fu 5 do] [e wa] hi ko jo no ri chaku riku su i ni tai suru so ra
no kai gu wo OU — D — K za — Y beikara (zu) yuc (mi) shiu ju wau ki kyu po
ei — Ei — F geu Y — a ri kore wo A — ze ki suru ki kai wa s5 to ta buw mi mo ko
sa raru (ru) mono to — N dau seram (ru) (para) (2) kan 1— ku se ru tokoro
sen kan wa gyo rai po zyo mo wo yu se zu sho sai hikitsuku (ki) cho sa ho — G
ran koto to su.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 999
(#368)
#02530 Secret "P.A."
6 Dec. 41.
From: Kita
To : Gaimudaijin Tokio
Kilden (dai .... go) 123 matsndan nikanshi (Para)
Bei hou do ni a ri to wa October ko. riku gun wa Beg. Eng
c am p — da vi s — N . c . end spell
KE la EK ZI DI YC IW ZI VY AA KE AA 10 ni oite so sai ki kyn u hei no yo
sei ni chaku shu si su hyaku no ki kyii wo chu mou se shi nominarazu
Bo
ki kyu ni yoru ha wa i. Panama po ei wo mo ko ryo shi wo ru omomu (ki)
KAN
na ru tokaro to chi ni 9 shi te wa shin zyu wan fu kin wo tan sa se ru mo so
re to wo mo wa ru ru ba sho no sen tei oyobi kei ryu shi se tsu to na shi wo
ra zu ma ta ki kyu fu yo kun ren mo mi za ru wo wotte i ma no tokoro so sai
ki kyu se tsu no cho ko su ra mito (me) zu ka tsu so kyu no wa ji tsu
gen seraru (ru) mono to wa mito (me) gata (ku) shi shikashite mo shi ji tsu
gen surm to mo shin ju wau ni kin se ten se ru [hi tsu ka mu] [fu 6 do]
[e wa] hi ko yo no ri shaku riku su i ni tai suru so ra no kai gu wo OU — D — K za
— y beikara (zu) que(m) shin ju wan hi kyii po ei -E -F gen y- a ri kore wo A-
ze ki suru ki kai wa so to ta bun ni no ko sa raru(ru) moiso to — N dan serau(ru)
(Para)
(2) kau 1-ku se ru tokoro sen kan wa gyo rai po gyo mo wo yii se zu sho sai
hikitsuku (ki) cho sa ho — G ran koto to su
From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941.
PA-K2
#253 Re the last part of your #123'.
1. In the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage
balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered
four or five hundred balloons, but it is tinderstood that they are considering the
us of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii
is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of
Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected
the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training
for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there
are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is diflBcult to imagine
that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made
preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways
of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa ", there are
limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability
there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack
against these places.
2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are
not known. I will report the results of my investigation.
» Not available.
" Kana spelling.
(Copies of two coded messages No. 02540, dated 6 December 1941,
one from Kita to Washington and the other from Kita to Tokyo will
be found reproduced as Items Nos. 233 and 234, respectively, EXHIB-
ITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[Received on night of 7 December 1941]
(369)
#02540 Urgent "PA"
6 Dec. 41.
From: Kita
To : Koshi Wash— Foreign Min. Tokyo
(1) 5tth yu koku sen kan [wa i 6 min] oyobi su i po 1 nyu ko shi 6th
zai ha ku kan sen Sane tori (Para)
1000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
San kan 9 kei jun 3 su i po 3 ku chi ku kan 17 oyobi nyu kyo chii no kei
jun 4 ku chi ku kan 2 (ju jun ku po wa zen bu jutsu do slii a ri). (Para)
(2) kan tai nl i jo no ku ki wo mito (me) zu. (Para)
Zai . . . taishi sano tori u gi te se tan.
December 6, I941.
From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
PA-K2
#254
1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port
were and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed
at anchor on the 6th:
9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in
addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroj'ers lying at docks (the heavy
cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.
2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.
4 Dec. 1941.
From: Togo (Foreign Min. Tokio) #01260 "PA."
To: Jap. Com. Honolulu.
Kan cho fu go a tsu ka i (Para)
1. i rai shi wo ke rn bu tsu ken ryo ho mo sunniyakani wa ta so re ta shi
2. 6 ku ma a te mu su me U3m gaku su chi chi
From: Tokyo.
To: Honolulu.
(Date not given. Approx. Dec. 4, 1941)
PA-K2.
6.
#125.
Restricted distribution.
1. Please turn over immediately both items which I requested.
2.
(Japanese)
ARMY 7379 Trans. 12/12/41 (5)
No msg to match this translation.
"PA" 4 Dec. 1941.
From : Togo — Foreign Min. — Tokio #92466 Urgent.
To: Jap. Con. — Honolulu.
20
Ki kan in ka do ku ki cho nikaushi te wa to ho ni oite mo se tsu kaku ko ryao
shi wo ru nitsui (tewa) wo tsu te nanibun no gi denpo (dai ... go) su ru ma de
ma ta re to shi (para)
Hon den a te sa ki zai jo ku wo oyohl DOXO kaku koo XPJVEU
womotte mi
We are now giving consideration to the question of the return home of the
families of members of your department. Until you hear further, please hold it
up.
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu.
December 4, 1941.
PA-K2.
Circular 2466.
We here are giving a great deal of thought to the question of the return to
Japan of your staff and their families. Therefore, wait where yau are until
I wire you at a later date. This message addressed to .
(Japanese)
ARMY 7380 Trans. 12/12/41 (5)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1001
(At this point in the Exhibit tliere is a paper on which appears de-
cipherment and plain hmguage Japanese. The numeral notation
"851" also appears thereon. This paper will be found reproduced as
Item No. 235, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTKATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[Received on night of 7 December 1941]
From : Foreign Minister 92461
To: Kita, Consul, Honolulu 12/3
Strictly secret #92461
Would like you to hold on to your list of code words (also those used in con-
nection with radio broadcast) right up until the last minute. When the break
comes burn immediately and wire us to tliat effect.
Togo.
This msg was an extra, picked up on night of 7th Dec '41. Not dated or
numbered.
From : The Foreign Minister 000 See A
To : All Hands No date.
Well known to you all is the fact that the empire is at this instant con-
fronted with the gravest crisis in its history, and the problem of reducing that
crisis is exclusively one of diplomacy. Those within and without the govern-
ment expect big things of the Foreign Office and indeed I have a deep respect
for the activities of the members of this department. The fact that I am so
frankly giving you my opinion from the envoy to the head of an office is that
I wish to encourage you one and all. Even tho we would rather be at home
and even tho conditions are bad at this time we are diplomats and if our conduct
is such as to disrupt our unity we may not only obstruct the course of diplomatic
aims, but may stand in the way of our presenting a solid front ; and by so doing
place ourselves in a position of having no excuse to give. So at this time
especially let us put our best foot forward and present a solid front to the world.
"PA"
Tei koku ga | i ma | ya | cho koku | i rai I mi zo I no koku nan | ni | so gu | shi | wo
ru I koto 1 go sho chi no tori | na ru | ga | ko no ( {nan koyoku) do kai ni wa | mo
tsu pa ra | gai ko | ni yoru | no | hoka | na ku | cho ya kyo | wo | gai mu
sho I ni I taishi | ta dai | no | ki tai | vyo ka ke | to sho in | (The personnel of the
said) no ko do ni | taishi | shin jin | na ru | kan shin | wo | mo chi 1 wo ru | gen
jo I na ru | ni | tsui (te 1 wa) te | wa | zai gai j shi (Ambas. ; envoy, mints.)
shin I ha ji me | kaku | ko | kan cho | ni oite ki tan | na ki | i ken | wo | gu
shin I seraru (ru) ru wa Nihon | yo ro ko bu | tokoro | na ru | mo | konosai i ya
gyakua (NA) ku | mo | gai sei | shoku in | ni | shite | sho zen tai no dan | ke
tsu I wo I mi da rw | ga | goto (ki) kyo so
ni i i zu ru I koto | a ra ba | gai ko | shi sa ku | no | shin ko ] wo | sa ma ta
gu ru I nominarayu | kyo koku 1 chi sho pan | no I mokutaki | ni | ma i shin | LW
wo ru I sai cho ya no | ki tai | ni | taishi te j mo | mo (shi) wa ke na ki | shi dai
nitsui (tewa) go jo sai | na ki | to | na ga ra | konosai | tokuni sho | nai gai| wo | a
ge te I 1 gan to shi | gai ko | no | ki | no | wo | ju bun | ni | ha tsu ki | suru | su
tokushu to mo 1 so | kan in | wo to ku | rei | seraru (ru) yo itaskitashi.
(At this point in the Exhibit there appears on a radiogram form of
RCA with the following : 'Japanese Consulate General November-De-
cember 1941 Messages" appearing in handwriting. This form will be
found reproduced as Item No. 236, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
This message dated 6 Dec. 41 was rec'd on night of 7th and furnished break
by which others were read. Break found on night of 8/9 at 0200 9th Dec. '41.
No copy of code msg. to match this one.
1002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK:
From : Tojo, Foreign Min,
To: Consul Honolulu
01280.
Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of warships
after the 4th.
KE 12/6
(At this point in the Exhibit there appears a paper with decipher-
ment in handwriting and also what appears to be some plain Japanese
text. This paper will be found reproduced as Item No. 237, EXHIB-
ITS- ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Received attached on night of 7 Dec. '41.
•Could not immediately identity or decrypt.
Copies sent to Wash, D. C.
Unable to do anything with this one.
(At this point in the Exhibit the following coded messages appear
on radiogram forms of RCA :
1. Message dated 1 November 1941 from Kita to Tokyo.
2. Ihid., to the Japanese Consul in San Francisco.
3. Ihid^ to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.
4. Message dated 12 November 1941 from Kita to the Japanese
Consul in San Francisco.
5. Ihid, to the Japanese Embassy in Washington,
The foregoing quoted messages will be found reproduced as Items Nos.
238 through 242, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
12 Nov. 1941.
#078 "LA" (581-582)
From : Kita To : Jap Consul San Francisco and Minister at Washington,
D. C.
Ku ru su taishi yori.
Honshi tishite wa i zon na ki mo sho han no ji jyo sha hon ken ka hi no ketsu tei
wa ki taishi ni o ma ka se — Ku na o honshi no no bu be ki ten to o ki zu ki no ten
San Francisco a te shikyudenjo aritashi.
From : Ambassador Kurusu
I have no objections and will leave the divisions on the various items to your
Excellency. Furthermxjre if you think of any items that I should include in my
statement please wire me at San Francisco.
(At this point in the Exhibit there appear two items, as follow :
1. A receipt form for radiograms of RCA.
2. A coded message dated 1 December 1941 from Kita to the
Japanese Embassy in Washington.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 243 and
244, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
1 Dbc. 1941.
#082 J-19 (K-10) transposition (38)
(Enciphered with 30 Nov key)
From: Kita
To : Minister at Washington, D. C.
Gakuki (?) 26th
1 nitsuki G 25th nashi 2 nitsuki zal Bel taishi ate go jig 29th 2403 no tori ri
24th taki "L" 13th nari CH Beg. Sp. Mochi
Regarding references to items in circular #2403.
Note : Circular #2403 not available.
(Copies of two coded messages, each dated 1 December 1941, from
Kita to Tokyo, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 245 and 246,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
J
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1003
From: Honolulu (Kita).
To : Tokyo.
1 December 1941 (J19)
#241 (In 2 parts, complete).
Re your #119*
Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor :
1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles
southeast of here.
Direction based on ;
(1) The dii-ection taken when the ships start out is usually southeast by
south and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction.
(2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or head for the "KAIUI" straits
northwards.
(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and islands and
is not suitable as an ocean maneuver practice sea.
(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and official
travel routes.
Distance based on ;
( 1 ) Fuel is plentyf ull and long distance high speed is possible.
(2) Guns cannot be heard here.
(3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my mes-
sage #231** were for the duration of four full days of 144 hours), a round
trip to a distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached (if speed is 12 knots),
or 1152 nautical miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 1440 nautical miles (if speed
is 20 miles) is possible, however, figuring to 50% of the time being
used for maneuver technicalities, a guess that the point at which the maneu-
vers are held would be a point of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor.
2. The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is : leaving
on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Sat-
urday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week.
(T) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)
* JD-1 : 7158.
JD-1 : 7294.
**Available, MEIZI dated 23 November
(A copy of coded message No. 2420, dated 1 December 1941, from
Kita to Tokyo will be found reproduced as Item No. 247, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTKATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Unable to do anything with this one.
(Copies of two coded messages, each dated 2 December 1941, from
Kita to Tokyo will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 248 and 249,
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[Received on night of 7 December 1941]
2 Dec. 1941.
#244. J-19 (KIO) transportation (362)
From : Kita
To : Foreign Minister Tokyo
(Gai N nth P 2Qth) kida go jig 29th 2437 M 23rd 2 inkanshi H zai shoku nen
su wa hon nen G Gth Beg. date 10th End date zuke o shin jig 2dth 69 oyohi
oden 152 no tori.
Regarding reference to items in circular #2437 (m)
Note: Circular #2437 (m) not available.
(At this point in the Exhibit the following items appear :
1. Message dated 2 December 1941 from Kita to Tokyo bearing
the one word "Haruna."
2. Copy of a "Skeleton" form for accounting purposes em-
ployed by RCA and relating to a message dated 3 Decem-
ber 1941 from the Japanese Consul, Honolulu, to Tokyo.
1004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. Ihid, with respect to another message dated 3 December 1941.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 250,
251, and 252, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
Hewitt Inquibt Exhibit No. 57A
"LA" system.
Received by Kita.
Prior to 7 Dec. '41.
Rec'd night of 7 Dec. '41 — by us.
To : GAIMUDAI JIN. Tokio.
From: KITA.
#180 "LA" 30 Sept. 41.
April 28th zu ke ki sin dai 69 Go nikan (si) paragraph May 29th Yokohama
ha tu ni tu ta ma ru tu mi to kan a te ni mo tu 2 ko no u ti 1 ko wa o ku
ri zyo (1460 Go) ni begin englisli spelling 5 ri na ma] ri ma ga kaku ai tei ma
to ma bei] Ryo 9 - to a ru to ko ro ze i kan tetuzulii ni hi tu yo na ru nituki
migi nai yo syo sai sikyii go kai den aritasi.
Trace baggage.
To : GAIMUDAI JIN. Tokio.
From : KITA.
#174 "LA" 23 Sept. 41.
United States yori Chungking ha ken no gun zi si ^e tu [ma gu ru da long
sound] dai (dairi no dai) syo. [Ma ku mo ran] repeat indicator Tyu sa 1st
Repeater. [Su gi ne long sound] 1st Repeater. [Su sa long sound ran do] 1st
Repeater No 1 ko wa 22nd repeat indicator [ku ri tu pa long sound] ni te
2nd repeater to ti tyaku. Su long sound hi go 2nd repeater Manila kei yu to
si no ha zu.
Magruder to Chungking via Manila.
To : KOSHI. Washington.
From : KITA.
(ReyiCir#278) #055 "LA" 18 Sept. 41.
1. (1 Ka 3 Dan No Nyo) So Ryozi ki ta na ga o 417 $ 56 paragraph.
Fu ku ryozi o ku da o to zi ro 277 $ 65 paragraph
Syokiica . . . Sei yu ge kyo no su ke 252 $ 45 paragraph
Syokiica ... Sei yu ge kyo no su ke 252 $ 45 paragraph
Syokiica Sei se ki ko ki ti 209 $ 61 paragraph
Syokiica Se mo ri mu ra ta da si 133 $ 00 paragraph
2. Migi i zu re mo ko gi tu te kan zyo (ta dasi mo ri mu ra wonozo (ki)
ku) paragraph. Yokohama syo kin ginko Honolulu si ten paragraph.
4 period to kan ka ni sono ta no self u ki kan na si.
Finance.
To : BIYOJI Shanghai
From: KITA.
17 Sept. 41.
KA TU YA MA KEN ZI E KI YO HA RA SYOKIKA YORI paragraph [PU
RE SI DEN TO. TEI RA long sound] Go NI TE OCTOBER 1st KI TI TU KU
PA.
Arrival of Katsyamo here from Shanghai Oct. 1 via Pres. Tyler.
To : GAIMUDA IN TOKIO
RIYOJI Shanghai
(HPPAF QRXM)
#245-LA. 17 Sept. 41.
From : Kita
GAIMU. . . . SYO DEN SYO SI 3 MEI (KU GA MI TI SA DA. WA TA NA
BE MA KO TO. TA TI MA SA YO SI) [PU RE SI DEN TO. TEI RA long
sound] GO NI TE 16th TO TI HA TU OCTOBER 1st KI TI TYAKU NO YO TEI
NITKUI SIKARU BE KU GO TE HA I KO PA
Kugam, Watanobe, Tajima, sailing on Tyler for Shanghai. Welcome them.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1005
#216
To : GAIMUDAIJI TOKIO
From: KITA
#214 "LA"
KIDEN (dai . . . . Goo) GOO 1781 NIKANSI paragraph 1. KOKU POO
KEN KIN BEI KA 483 Dollars (TOO KE TU REI ZI TU SI GO SYUU NO SE
RU MONO) paragraph NAO SYOO KIN KA RI I RE KIN NIKANSI TE WA
OODEN (DAI GOO) 133 WO MOITE GO SYOO NIN KA TA RIN SEI
$483 for defense fund
#208
"LA" system.
To: Shanghai?
Bakl zeki ju ge ki shi ta to 1 tsu te o ru za Japan ko ku bu tai wa hyo shij
ki a ru ko re ra no hei wa shi se tsu o ba ku ge ki su ru ho do gi ryo se tsu
re tsu de nai ko to wa Japan ko ku bu tai no i ma ma de no sen ka yori mi
te a ki ra ka de a ru.
Togo.
It is being said that Japan has bombed and strafed (non military establish-
ments) but one has only to think of the war results scored to date by the
Japanese air force to realize that our air force is not so unskilful! as to bomb
these establishments marked as non-military,
Togo.
#140
To : Gaimudaijin Tokio
From : Kita
#193-LA 30 July 41.
Japan ho so kyo kai e sanotori paragraph sin ha tyo niyo (ri) ru Hawaii
mu ke ho so tyo syu set se ki kiwamete fu ryo na ri 19 meters 25 meters 31
meters niyo (ri) ru do syu mo ku no [te su to] ho so o o ko nai sei se ki
sai ryo na ru mo no 1 o e ra bu ko to to si te wa i kan.
To Japan Broadcasting Co. : Your new frequencies are lousy for Hawaii.
Please go back to 19-25-31 meters.
#121
To : Gaimudaijin Tokio
From: Kita
#169-LA 11 July 41.
Sin nin syo khi ki ko mon (ki van 6 ka tuki) [ra tl mo a] wa Chungking
ni ita (ri) ru to 9th [ku ri tu pa long sound] ni te to ti ki ko Begin English
spelling tetnzuki tai man tei — syu sai ban san kai se ki zyo China ga [de mo
ku ra si long sound] no ta me zen sen se ru o syo yo si ta ru u e Japan wa gun zi
zyo sa te tu o ki ta si tu tu a ru nomi narazu sono bu ryo ku niyo(ri) ru sin
ti tu zyo ken se tu wa ta koku no ken ri o ki son si zi ko no syo gai to na ru
ku ni ni ku tu zyo o a to ru mu no nisite zen zen si tu pa i ni ki si tu tu a
gi kaette mon zi yu oyobi ryo do syu ken no ta me ta ta kai tu tu a ru China
o mei syu to su ru sin no sin ti tu zyo ko ko ni ken se tu o min to si tu tu a
ru mu ne en ze tu si ta ru omomuki na ri.
Movements and opinions of Chiang Kai Shek new adviser, Latimore.
#120
To: Gaimudawin Tokio
From : Kita
#16&-LA 11 JvisY 41.
Ta ki den syo si yori paragraph go sin ei . yo se ki yaku ta te 2 sya ku. yo
ko 1 sya ku 5 Sun. A tu sa 1 Sun
#112 Night of #028
To : Koshi Washington
Gaimudaijin Tokyo
From : Kita
#155— LA 30 June 41.
To ti Germany mei yo ryozi yori ko bun o motte 30th i ko do ryozi daipikan
o hei sa su ru mu ne tu ti arita ri pa
Memo from German Consul. He closes shop for the 30th.
1006 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
#109
To : Gaimudaijin Tokyo
From : Kita
#151 28 June 41.
To kan ka si da si kin na si (kan Tyo fu go a tu kai)
#107
To : Gaimudaijin Tokyo
From : Kita
#149 "LiA" 26 June 41.
[Kin me ru] tai syo wa [ma ku mo ri su] tal sa tai do 25th [ku ri tu pa
long sound] na te to ti ni ki kan se ri pa
Admiral Kimmel and Capt McMorrie returned by clipper the 25th.
#105
To: Gaimudaijin Tokio
From : Kita
#147— LA 27 June 1941.
Chungking sei ken gi zyu tu go mon Begin English spelling so dan ge ma ru
man za doku pe 9 — wa Washington yu ki no to 22nd [ku ri tu da long sound]
ni te to ti ni ki ko si ta ru ga ei zi si syo ho niyoreba do nin wa [hi ru ma] do
ro niyo (ri) ru syo ku ryo un pan yo [to ra tu ku] su long sound sen dai ko nyu
no y5 mu o o bi o ru omomuki na ri kyii sun so ya
Chungking — Burma Rd — Trucks.
"KO" system.
Sent by Kita.
Prior to 7 Dec. '41.
Rec'd night of 7 Dec. '41 — by us.
#310 "KO"
7 Nov. 41.
From : Kita.
To : Foreign Min. — Tokio.
Nyii man nite ni sasho wo atae tarutokoro sonogo donin yari how sha no shi
rei niyori (ru) wo motte taiyo maru yo sen wo tori ya ninru muno moshiide
mokka tochi taizai kyu
After granting Newman's visa, he informed us that he has cancelled his
passage on the Taiyo Maru and will remain here for the present.
#287 "KO"
25 Oct. 41.
From : Kita.
To : Foreign Min. Tokyo.
Kiden (dai96z6) nikanski (Para)
"Nyu man" fu November 4th tochi hatsu no Tai nite ki nin itashitashi
omonur (ki) notokoro donin nitai (shi) (suru) honpo nyuksku sasho wo hakyu
shi (zo) sashitsuka (e) naki ya shi ka cho tomo (o) uchiawa (sei) no ne ori-
kaeshi (go) kaiden ko (irai ho).
Be : Your #9G. Newman wislies to return to Japan on the Taiyo Maru leaving
here Nov. 4th. After conferring with with the head of the department concerned,
please let me know if you have any objections.
From: Kita (Secret).
To : Foreign Min. Tokio.
"in ta ■< na sho naru. nyu su. sa ■< bi su" ki sha Beikoku jin Beg Eng. Sp.
CRICHTON — COLVIN End Sp. yori honpo nyiikoku sasho hakkyu kata negaiide
aritaru takaro honnin fu honuen July made Tokyo ni wo (o) ri taru omomu (ki)
nite kei shi so kan hakkyu no tai ho (taizai no tai. honpo no ho) kyoka
sho (May 19th zu ke Beg. Sp. A End Sp dai . . . 476 zo) wo sho ji su (para)
Donin fu November 4th tochi hatsu no Taiyo maru ni jo sen hibo naru omomu
(ki) nikuki (tewa) migi sasho hakkyu no ka hi shikyu (go) sengi no
ne denpo (dai go) nite (go) kaikun ko (irai ho)
Mr. Crichton Colvin an American of the International News Service has
requested a visa for a stop-over in Japan. He expects to leave here on the
Tatuta Maru sailing Nov. 4th. Instructions requested.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1007
#209 "KO"
7 Aug. 41.
From: Kita.
To : Foreign Min — Tokio.
Ryo mei tomo sasho tori ya me kata moshiicle taru nikuki go ryo chi
ainaritaski. —
Visas were refused in both case. Tour indulgence is requested.
#189 "KO"
28 July 41.
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Min — Tokio.
Nanibun no gi shi kyQ go kaiden ko bu. —
Some sort of answer requested.
#181 (2nd) "KO"
22 July 41. System
From: Kita.
To : Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
This office has a request from a Mr. W. R. B. McBain, manager of the Shanghai
firm of George-McBain, and his wife Mrs. V. W. K. McBain for a visa to visit
Japan. These people spend a good deal of their time in Shanghai, and have
been residing heire for the past six weeks. They wish to stop over between ships
in Japan, and state that they have visited there many times before. They both
have on two previous occasions (19 July 1939 and 25 Aug. 1939) obtained visas in
Shanghai. They returned to their home country in 1940. Have you any objec-
tions to these visas? Answer to that question requested.
# 181 "KO" # 130-22wd
From : Kita.
• To : Foreign Min. Tokio.
zai Shanghai Sp. Eng GDORGE-McBAIN-CO. End 8p. (1 Sp. Eng. THE-BUND
End Sp. sho zai) shi hai nin England jin Sp. Eng. W. R. B. McBain End Sp. oyo
(bi) donin tsuma Sp. Eng. V. W. K. McBAIN End. Sp. no ryo nin yori honpo tsu
ka sasho hakkyii kata negaiide aritaru tokoro migi ryo mei wa 2 jo 1 nen kan
Shanghai ni zai jo seru mono ni shite 6 shu kan zen kjii ka kyu yo notame to fu
tochi ni taizai shi konpan ki nin no to ki sen no ri ka e to no tsugo niyori (ru) 1
jin honpo ni jo riku itashitashi omomu (ki) nite nao ryo nin tomo jural Nippon e
wa sfi ji tolvo sern koto aru mune shiu (mosu) ta te wo(o)ri sono ryoken niyoreba
saikin nioite sho wa jQ 4 nen July 19th oyo(bi) do August 25th tsu ju ke nite so
re zo ri Shanghai soryoji no sasho wo e te do ju 5 nen honpo myokoku no mune
ki myu ari (Para).
Migi nitai (shi) (suru) tsu ka sasho wo tae (go) sashitsuka(e) naki ya
orikaeshi (go) kaiden ko (i rai ho).
#165 "KO"
10 July 41.
From : Kita. #119 of 10th.
To : Foreign Min. Tokio.
Ref : your circular 1381 —
9th
Gokuhi (Para) April kyu German jin 1 mei Beikoku jin 1 met Beikoku jin 1 mei
(Para)
Migi izure no shuppatsu seru hayu
Strictly secret : 9th. One American and one German should have departed by
now.
"KO" #76
29 Maech 1941.
From : Kita
To : Gaimudaijin Tokyo —
Sp. Eng. HOLCOMBB End Eng. fu imada tokan ni shutsu to seyn nao
WA
1008 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"ha ri son" go fu honpo nika ki ko seza (ru) nitsuki (tewa) donin fu "ma ni ra"
in tyoku ko seru mono to shi ryo seraru (ru).
Chokko,
From : Kita.
To : Foreign Minister Tokyo.
Holcomb has not arrived in the past ten days. Furthermore as the Harrison
(steamship) will not return to our country the subject person is the one who is
going direct to Manila.
"PA-K2" system
Received by Kita
Prior to 7 Dec. 41
Rec'd night of 7 Dec. '41 — by us 24a
United States Pacific Fleet
eadio unit
Commandant, Navy 128 % Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif., 15 June 19 -i5.
Top Secret.
From : Captain T. H. Dyer, U. S. Navy.
To : Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, Office of the Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Exhibit 41, Forwarding of.
Enclosure: (a) Photostatic Copies, Pages 29 to 286 of Exhibit 41.
1. Enclosure (a) is forwarded at the request of Mr. Sonnett.
T. H. Dyer,
T. H. Dyeb,
Captain U. S. Navy. •
Top Secret.
CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that the attached Pages 29 to 286, inclusive, are photostats
of original documents contained in the files of FRUPAC.
T. H. Dyer,
T. H. Dteb,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
(Note — See record page 420)
WB
909S on 22 November 19^1.
From : Togo— Foreign Min—Tokio. #278 (PA)
To : Jap. Con. Honolulu.
(su i to kan ri wa jo sei kyu ten no sai sa ki ji ko denpo (dai go) arita
(shi) shi (Para)
1. sai nyu kin oyobi sai shutsu kin wa sono to ji ni okei'u ti ka mo ku he tsu no
cho Shu ma ta wa shi shutsu zu mi no ru i kej kin gaku (Para)
2. ho dan kin no shu ru i be tsu kin gaku (Para)
3. ta te ka e kin no cho shaku (Para)
4. ko kin no ho yii zan gaku oyobi sho rai sM to mi ko mi gai yo (Para)
5. kin kyu sho bun kiden (dai go) yo en WT ko no.
GONPWIO
Note : the above msg. was also received here from Ninto — San Francisco with
his number #360 on it, at 456 P on 22 November 1941.
Not translated.
13 Nov. 1941.
From: Consul General Muto, San Francisco, #285
To: Japanese Consul, Honolulu (PA)
1. Even tho the Imperial Government has urged strongly that the U. S. recon-
sider its shipments of aviation gasoline to Vladivostock, it has been of no avail.
Recently we called to the attention of the Soviets the fact that one of our ships
PROCEEDINGS OP HEWITT INQUIRY 1009
was sunk off the Japanese coast by a mine of Soviet manufacture, but the affair
is still unsettled. Her main forces are now tighting the Germans and she is
trying to follow a policy of procrastination elsewhere. We have since September
controlled our military and followed a policy of non-aggravation witli the Soviets
while there is information to the effect that the Soviet's Far Eastern and Mon
golian armies are appearing on her Moscow front. Although she is controlling
any activity on the Soviet-Manchukoku border tliat would give rise to trouble,
she also appeart; to have plans up her sleeve for use in case worse come to worst.
2. Since the establishment of the mutual defense agreement between us and
French Indo Cliina we have been progressing with plans to turn the south of
French Indo China into a military base. The authorities there have since tht-^
middle of September been holding up import and export authorizations and are
afraid that we are about to regiment the Annimites through the Greater East Asia
policy and pressure is increasing against our rapproachment, and are obstruct-
ing many pending measures through a policy of delay. Our policy against this
is fast taking form. Ambassador Yosizawa and party had arrived there by the
end of October and plans starting several investigations using Hanoi as his
lieadquarters. (Sumita the former official there is assisting).
3. England is hoping for active cooperation from Tailang whom she considers
necessary for the defense of Malay, P. Ruma, and Singapore, but Thai appears
to be maintain ng a strict neutrality as between England and ourselves
The Dutch East Indies stoutly maintains her stand that we have occupied
French Indo China as a base from which to attack them and will not furnish
us supplies, and also they have refused to even exchange products ship by ship
on the barter sjstem.
The Malay-Singapore areas are hastily strengthening defenses and reports say
are nearing completion. On the other hand the Russo-German war will prob-
ably draw-out the war between Germany and England and in the end looks like
a British victory, while we're stuck in the China incident and as a result of
economic pressure from the U. S. will be impoverished, if their plans are real-
ized. So apparent has their Anti-Japan attitude become of late that their
attitude toward our ships and our evacuating citizens and our remaining citizens
has been greatly stiffened.
13 November 1941.
"PA"
From — Muto — San Francisco #285
To — Jap. Con. — Honolulu
(Parti of 2 parts)
(Gakuhi) dai 5 ho (Para)
1. Teikoku Seifu wa U.S.S.R. nitaishi Beikoku yori no ko ku ki yo [ga so rin] no
"Vladivostock yu so nikanshi shin jin no han sei wo u na ga shi ta ru mo ra chi a
ka zu m,a ta ho ku sen Nihon kai gan no U.S.S.R. sei no fu ryii su i rai (ki ken su
i i ki se tsu tei ni to mo nai fu se tsu se ru tsu MJ) nikanshi U.S.S.R. ga wa no
chu i wo kan ki se ru mo mi taiketsu ri ni ho chi suru to ji koku no zen gun ji
ryoku to Germany ni taisnru tei ko ryoku to wo ta no mi sen en shu gi to ri ki ta re
ru ga sai kin ni ita(ri) Nihon wa tai so ko ge ki wo wo ko na wa za ru be shi to
no mi to shi no mo to ni September i rai gun tai wo sei so shi Moscow zen men ni
kyokute gun oyohi Mongolia gun a ra wa re wo ru omonu(ki) no jo ho a ri mau so
koku kyo no kin cho ya ya kau wa shi so ga wa mo nichi mau wo shi ge ki suru
gagoto(ki) ho do wa yo ku sei shi wo ru mo mau 1 no baai no himitsu jun
ho ko sa ku wa kore wo kei jo ku shi wo ru mono nogoto(ki) shi (Para)
2. nichi futsu in kyo do po ei sei ritsu go wagaho wa nau bu futsu in wo gun
ji ki chi toshite sei pi shi tsu a ru tokoro futsu in to kyoku wa September
chu jesu i ko tai nichi yu shutsu nyii kyo ka wo shi bu ru to sho kyoku te ki tei
ko wo na shi aruiwa wagaho ga ka kyo wo tsu ji te tai an nau jiu ko sa ku wo na
sau ko to wo wo so re ka kyo no tai datsu se tsu kiu ni taisuru a tsu pa ku wo kyo
ka shi ma ta kaku shu keu au taiketsu no sen en sa ku wo ko ji wo ru mo
tai sei toshite wa wagaho no futsu in ni tisuru ha a ku ryoku wa chaku chaku
to su su mi tsu tsu a ru EYMJ to yu be ku yo shi za wa taishi 1 ko mo October
ma tsu shuppatsu fu nin no to ni tsu ke ru ga [Ha no i] wo hou kyo toshite
kaku hau no ko sa ku ni no ri da su yo tei na ri ( ju rai no su mi ta kikau wa kai
sho se ri ) tsu zu ku sho un.
#285 Part 2 of 2 parts
Malay
3. England wa [ma re <— ] [pi ru ma] oyohi Singapore po ei jo no yo chi ta ru
[tia] koku ga wa ga jin ei ni to zu du no ki ken wo no shi sen to se tsu kvoku
1010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
te ki se ku do wo ko ko ro mi [tai] wa ko no kan nichi ei no kan ni a ri te chu
ritsu i ji ni kyu kyu ta ru a ri sa ma wo ri (Para)
Ran in wa wa ga ku ni ga futsu in wo ki chi toshite ran in wo ko ge ki sum
gagoto (ki) ko to na ki mu ne wo gen ji tsu no ko do (tatoeba futsu in yori no
te tsu pe i) niyori te shi me sa za ru kagi (ri) wagaho no gun ji ryoku wo ma
su gagoto (ki) ran in bu tsu shi wo 1 sai kore wo kyo kyu suru a ta wa zu to no
tatemae wo ken ji shi wagaho yori no 1 fu ne go to no [ba <— ta <— ] sei no tei
an mo kyo hi shi wo re ri (Para)
Malay
[ma re <— ] Singapore ho men ni oite wa kou shun rai chaku chaku toshite
po pi wo kyo ka shi kan sei nichi ka zu ki tsu tsu a ri to no ho a ri ta ho doku
so sen so no ke tsu ka ei doku sen cho ki ka shi ke tsu kyoku ei ga wa no sho ri
to narube (ku) shutsu wo mo shin shi Nihon wa China ji hau ni yoru koku zu
sho mo. Beikoku yori no kei zai a tsu pa ku no ke tsu ka hi hei no 1 to wo ri
do ru mono to kau dau se ru mono Iva ei to kyoku no gen do sai kin to mi ni
tsu yo go shi to na ri ro ko tsu na ru tai nichi te ki sei wo shi me shi liou po sen
pa ku. hikia (gu) ho jin. zai ryu min to ni taisuru tai do i chi ji ru shi ku
koka se ri (ko).
12 Nov.
From: Consul General Muto (San Francisco)
To : Japanese Consul, Honolulu
To te handled, with greatest secrecy
1. This latest big campaign of the Germans which started on October 2nd is
aimed at the control of European Russia through the occupation of Moscow and
later the annihilation of all the remaining field forces of Soviet Russia. This
objective has already to a great degree been realized, for the main strength of
the Russians has been broken and the occupation of Moscow is merely a matter
of time, it would seem.
Along with the defeat of the Russian Army unrest is growing among the
people ; and with this it would appear that the collapse of the Spanish Govern-
ment is no longer a matter for worry. (Plans are under way for cutting off
British and American supplies for Portugal). It appears that from now on
Soviet Russia will hardly be an aggressive competitor.
The order of these events to the conclusion will be to secure the line Leningrad-
Moscow-Halikov (?) -Rostov; then to reorganize their mobile units and even
tho they are weary occupy the Caucasus.
This tracking down of the Soviet Army should not only deal a heavy blow
to the British, but should throw some doubt into the business of bribing the
Spanish Government with which is being carried out through the cooperation of
the U. S.
Even tho there is the possibility of a quick settlement of the Russo-German
conflict, looking at it from a standpoint of the ability of the Russians to resist
(as I explained in a previous article), they have already turned down peace
through surrender, and the Germans are not likely to take the role of appeasers.
2. England has not been resting since the outbreak of the Russo-German
War, but has taken advantage of the respite to concentrate her force, and even
tho the Russo-German war has come to the close of one phase already the
plans for an invasion of England has been abandoned and it seems that Ger-
many plans to continue her air warfare and blockade and at the same time start
operation to occupy certain areas in the Near East and Mediterranean Sea.
Even Britain can guess this, and is taking measures to strengthen her positions
in the Near East. Because, as before, sea power in the Medit. Sea rests in the
hands of the British, she threatens the supply lines of the Axis in North Africa,
and it can be guessed that the German Medit. Sea campaign will be aimed at
breaking that(?)
After the outbreak of the Russo-German "War, sabotage has broken out in the
occupied countries of Norway, France, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Chechoslovakia
fostered by the Communist party, but the German policy of pressure has reduced
this pretty much until we believe it will hardly affect the future course of the war.
The U. S. has progressed toward abandoning her neutrality to the extent of
patrolling the waters of certain areas and has issued orders to shoot at German
boats within that area. Also she has occupied Iceland and Greenland, and sent
troop to certain bases in South America and is approaching a state of partici-
pation in the war, and the fact that she is hesitating is due to public opinion
at home.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1011
12 Nov. 1941.
"Pa System" ("k-2 transp. reversed")
From— Mu to— San Francisco— #287 (23)
To— Jap. Con.— Honolulu, T. H.
(Part 1 of 2 parts)
Gokuhi (Para) o hei jo ho dai 5 ho (Para)
1. October 2nd kai shi no how nen do sai go no doku gun dai sa ku sen wa
Moscow ko ryaku wo shu gan toshiti a wa se te so ren zan zon ya sen bu
tai wo ge chl me tsu shi motte gen t5 ki zen ni o ro kaku ho wo mokutaki
to sux'u mono na ru tokoro migi mokutaki wa BJPF tai han ta tu sei sevare
0 ro no so gun shu ryoku wa kai me tsu shi Moscow no ho i kan ra ku mo pa
tai ji kan no mon dai to mi ra re wo re ri (Para).
U. S. S. R. min shin wa ji koku gun ha i sen totomoni fu an ta ka ma ri
tsu tsu a ru mo migi mo motte tadachini [su] sei ken no ho kai wa ki shi
gata (ku) [po ru ga] i to no shi 0DH8 narabi (ni). Ei Bei yori no bu tsu
shi ni ta yori shun ki son e jun jun pi ni sen shin subeku kaku te U. S. S. R.
no sho kyoku te ki tei gyo wa ken go to mo kei jo ku seraru (ru) mono to
mi raru (ru) (Para).
Hin sa ku sen shu ryo ren doku koto wa [re min gu ra <— do] Moscow [ha
ri ko fu] [ro su to fu] no sen wo kaku ho shi jaku CJ [kan] but tai wo no
ko si MD ta ru u e riku ku gun no dai ku wa UYPT gu be ki mo [ko ■<— ka sa su]
ko ryaku wa hikitsuyu (ki) wo kona wa ru be shi (Para).
Kei no mo shu ni so gun mo tsu i en to suru ni a ta ri Ei no ro ba i o u be
ku mo na ku Bei to no (go) kyoroku ni yoru bu tsu shi en go wo motte [su]
sei ken wo ju bu shi tsu tsu a ru mo sono ko ka utaga (i) wa shi (Para).
Nao 1 bu ni doku so kyu sen se tsu a ru mo zen ki U. S. S. R. no tei ko kei
gaku yori mi te U. S. S. R. wa tadachimi ku tsu WEDC te ki ko wa wo na
sa za ru be ku ma ta doku toshite mo da to [po ru shi e pi zu mu] no tachiba
yori migi no kyo sen wa ni okeru de za ru be shi (i ka u me ze.)
Part 2 of 2 parts, #287 ("PA" (K2 transp.)
2. Ei wa June doku so sen po tsu pa tsu i rai kyii yo wo na shi u hon do po
wa
Ei ryoku wo ma shi te ji shin wo e ta ru tokoro doku mo tai so sen 1 dan ra ku
to na ru mo tadachim. tai ei jo riku sen wa na sa za ru be ku tai Ei ku sliu. to
fu sa wo kyo ka suru totomoni chi chu kai kin to ko ryaku wo kai shi subeshi to
mi raru(ru) ei toshite mo kore wo yo so shi Iran Iraq [shi ri a] chaku tsu
ra nu ru kin to ho men no hei ryoku jo taishi totomoni do no da ki ko mi ni
kyo hon shi wo re ri 1 po chi chu kai no sei kai ken wa i zen toshite ei no te ni
a ri ta me ni doku i ho ku a en sei gun wa ho kyu ro wo wo pi ya ka sa re ren
kyo ni a ru mono nogoto(ki) ku doku no chi chii kai sa ku sen mo ma zu ko
no jo tai kai han na mokuteki to subeshi to so zo O/NC (Para)
3. Doku so sen kai shi go doku sen ryo chi no 1 bu (Norway . futsu . [yii go]
Bulgario to) oyobi [chi e ko] ho go ryo ni wa kyo san to no an ya ku re zin
min no [sa no ta<— ju] to no tame 1 ji so jo wo ko ri ta ru mo doku no kyo a tsu ho
oso(ke)
shin to BOKZ ryoku nayori migi wa dai tai yo ku a tsu serare doku no kou go
no sen so su i ko no -go gai to na ru gagoto(ki) koto na ki mono to mito(me)
raru(ru) (Para)
4. Beikoku wa sho kai ku e ki no se tsu tei . do chi e ki nai no dol^u i kati tei
ko ge ki mei rei no ha tsu shutsu [gu ri<— n ran do] [a i su ran do] no sen
ryo to yori sarani 1 po wo su su me chu ritsu BB no ha i ki . sho sen bu so
to no kyo ni i den to hei wo ri ta ho hei nanbei sho koku ni oite gun ji ki chi
kaku to ku . su zi ku sei ryoku ku chi ku ni do ryoku shi san sen ka mi 1 e no
gen jo ni oite nao shun jun hei wo ru wa gun pi to koku nai yo ran to ga kore
wo yu ru sa za ru ta me na ru gagoto(ki) shi (ko) nitaishi shoku (wo wa ri).
QA=(
QE=)
*'La" System Sent by Kita
Prior to 7 Dec. '41. Rec'd night of 7 Dec. '41 by us 44a.
5 Dec. '41.
Ooden (Dai . . .Goo 221 nikansi (paragraph (Ba n ka Long sound)
Dai kin kan zyoo tyuu seifu kan kei no hi yoo no mi si ha rai mi sai na ru
ga migi si ha rai zu mi nove wa zan gaku 16224 dollar (s) 13 cent(s) to na ri
poo too ooden (dai . . . goo) dai 1 koo no gaku to ga tu si too kan hon ken
tokubetu kan zyoo tyoo zi ri wa 2610.
79716 — i6 — Ex. 149, vol. 2 -23
1012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From Kita FM Tokyo
5 Dec. U-
In reply to #221 (Banker)
Auditing accounts with government expenditures only not completed. Upon
settlement of above will have balance of $16,224.13.
Special students expenses $2610??
From : Kita, Jap C. G. Honolulu
To: Jap. Consul, Seattle
( Name) (Japanese) formerly a resident of your place,
original residence Hiroshima, Ken. As a gun (county) Nakara (village))
Azauebara (ward), says he landed in your city 1898-9 with the manager of
the Sakamoto Hotel in your place. Question him as to year, month, and date
of arrival and name of steamer and inform me.
Kita.
#346 "LA"
26 Nov. 1941.
From: Kita #001.
To : Jap. Con. Seattle, Wash.
Mo to ki chi zai ryii honpo . . . zin i tsu kan da i chi so ku (i ka ho jo se,
FLB TGZ CCV pu or fu a man) (to 5 zyu 6 sai. Gen se ki begin sp. code
Hiros'hima ken DA HY QU a sa gun na ka ha ra nu ra a za u e ba ra) w(a
1898.9 nen go ro ki chi sa ka mo to [ho te ru] a tsu kai ni te ki chi ni zyo ri ku
se ru omomuki no to ko $o zo nin no to rai nen tsuiki hi oyobi sono zyo sen mei
0 torishirabe no ue go hai den kou (i rai bo) .
Kita.
Kenseki, permanent abode.
#233 "LA"
To : Gaimudin Tokio. 24 Nov. 41.
From : Kita.
September 16th to ti ki ko no ko ga den syo si ni bei ka 2 hyaku $ (ko kin ni
a ra zu) to te ka e oki ta ru to ko ro sei ri no tu go zyo migi to tu to ma ru
bin o motte hen kin sesime gin (se) ra re to si.
Spent $200.
#224
18 NOVEMBEE 41.
To: Gaimudaiyn, Toki.
From : Kita.
United States ha ken repeat indicator [ bi ru ma ro do ] 1st repeater [ to ra tu
ku ] un yu si do gi zyu tu sya no sen pa tu tai tosite [ ri tya long sou^d do . E
mu. Zyo n zu | tai i ni in so tu seraru ru 4 zyii 6 mei wa 16th to ti ni ki !k)5
se ri na o 1st repeater ni si yo tyu no [ to ra tu ku ] wa mo tu ka 3 zen 5 hyaku
dai dai bu bun 2 ton ban zu mi sin ga ta sya na ru yo si.
Capt. Kichaed M. Jones.
Etc. — Burma Road-Truck,
3500—2 Ton Truck.
#331-LA
18 NOVEMBEE 41.
223
From: Kita.
To : Ryoji'S. F., Koshi Wash. #069.
Gaimudaiyn in Tokio. #223.
[Kuritupa-] oyobi [Hawaii kaku to ken syu ko sen paku wo not(ki) ku]
to tisyutunyu ko sen paku no hatu tyaku wa kongo 1 sai ha tu pi yo serare taru
mune 17th to ti yumukensakan yori hatu pi yo aritari (?)
Local postal inspectors (Yiimukensakan) announced on the 17th that from now
on arrivals and departures of Clippers and ships (except for Hawaiian (local)
mail ships?) will not be published.
#321— LA
12 Nov. 41.
078 (1)
From: Kita.
To: Kashi— Wash. #078.
Kyoji— S. F.— #027 (Re yr Cir #356).
Kurusu taisi yori H Honsi tosite wa izon naki mo syohan no zi zyo yori honken
kahi no ketutei wa ki taisi ni omakase itasitaku | nao honsi no nobubeki tento
okizukinoten San Francisco ate slkyii denpo aritasi.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1013
Following from Ambassador Kurusu :
Although I have no objections, for various reasons, I would like you to take
care of Washington's decision in this affair.
Wants same thing forwarded immediately to San Francisco. (Maybe the
results of above.)
#316-LA
11 Nov. 41.
From: Kita.
To : Koshi, Washington. #075
Gaimudaijin, Tokyo. #213
[Su tin son] rikugun tyo kan wa 3rd gi kai nitaishi Hawaii ni gaikokujin
wa zen | zin ko | no | wa ri ni | ta tu si | tai gyo ma ta wa ha kai te ki | ko i | no |
ki ken | sei dai | na ru | ten o si te | ki si | hi zyo zi | zy6 tai 1 son zai si ma
ta wa I sin ryaku | no kyo i J a ru baai Hawaii oyobi [po ru to ri ko] no ki kai gen
rei I fu koku | no ken gen | OK o | dai to ryo | ni fu yo | ka ta | yo sei | se ru
omomuki na ru ga 4th Washington | ha tu | tu sin | niyoriba [kin gu] dai gi si |
wa migi wa | kan min | no tyii zi tu | to | ai koku sin | nitaishi | su ru | ba zyo
ku I na ri to no ko gi te ki [su tei to meu to] o | ha tu pi yo | si ma ta | to ken ti
zi I mo sudeni 1st R wa do ti zi ni | fu yo serare o ru o motte | ka ka ru | ri tu
p6 I no hi tu yo | na ki mu ne | ka ta ri ta ru | omomuki na ri.
Yo su ru ni kon pan rikugun, | ga wa | no | tei an | wa | dai to ryo | yori | tyo
ku se tu I to ti I rikugun so rei kan | ni | si rei [ su ru | to nlyori kai gen rei o
si ko I seshime N to suru ni ori.
#316-LA'
11 Nov 41.
Secy of War Stimson on the 3rd pointed out to Congress that the aliens in
Hawaii amount to one tenth of the total population and emphasizing the danger of
strikes and sabotage destructive activity he demanded that in case of the existence
of an emergency or an attack, the President should be granted the right to declare
martial law in Hawaii and also Porto Rico. According to information from
Washington on the 4th, Delegate King issued a protesting statement to the effect
that the above was an insult to the loyalty and patriotism the [local] govern-
ment and people. The territorial governor also retorted that since the power
to declare martial law was already vested in the governor of the territory there
was no necessity for such legislation.
In short, the recent army proposal was to permit the President to directly order
the local military commander to put martial law into effect.
#305-LA
6 Nov. 41.
From : Kita.
To : Ryoji, Seattle, Wash, #060
Gaimudaijin, Tokyo, #206
Tai yo ma ru 5th go go 7 zi 40 fun bu zi syu tu pan se ri na o dai 3 syu yu
bin bu tu 2 zyii 3 tai tu mi ko mi ta ri.
Do i kan to ku kan yori kan sen kyo ku tyo ni mo migi no syu si dentatsu
ka ta i rai arita ri.
The taiyo Maru departed safely at 7 : 40 pm on the fifth carrying 23 bags of 3rd
class mail.
The above information has been received from both Manager Doi and the chief
of the Marine Bureau (Harbormaster?)
#299-LA
1 Nov. 44
From : Kita
To: Koshi, Washington. #072
Gaimudaijin, Toklo. #203
Tai yo ma ru 1st bu zi nyu ko se ri bei ga wa toriatsukan bu ri dai tai Tatsuta
Maru nitaisi su ru to do yo na ri. Na o do i zimushokan yori kan sen kyo ku
tyo ni mo migi no syn si dentatu ka ta i rai arita ri.
The Taiyo Maru arrived safely on the 1st. It is being handled by the Americans
in the same manner as was the Tatsuta Maru.
The above information was received from both Doi, an official in the office, and
from the Chief of the Shipping Bureau.
1014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
#285-LA
25 Oct. 41
From: Kita
To : Koshi, Washington. #065
Gaimndaijin, Tokyo. #196
Ho koku ki gen se tu pa ku se ru to ko ro to kan oyobi kan in no ho koku wa
ko re o na subeki ya ho koku zyo no honkan ko ko ro e to tomoni sikyu g|o
kai den aritashi.
Since the time limit for reporting is near, shall this office and its staff report?
Please telegraph immediately instructions and items of the report.
#279-A
24 Oct. 41
From: Kita
To: Koshi, Washington #101
Ka han zi niu no [fu i ra de ru fu i a] oyobi [san, zyu a n] tyii zai tei koku
mei yo ryozi nitaisi hon daizin yori ki neu hin (7 ho ya ki ka bin 1 ko zu tu) o |
so re zo re | zo tei su ko to to na ri mizi wa zai bei taisikan a te | ki ba ko 2
ko to si 22nd syu tu pan no tai yo sen | i wa na ga | yozi ni | ta ku so f5e ru
nitsuki tii kan oyobi ten so ka ta o torihakarai aritashi.
The Foreign Minister is presenting a commemorating gift to the recently de-
signed honorary consuls at Philadelphia and San Juan (cloissoun^ flower vase
each). These are being sent in two wooden bo^es addressed to the Embassy
(Wash.) in the case of Consul Iwanaga who is a passenger on the Tanyo Mam
sailing from here on the 22nd. It is requested that arrangements be made for
their clearance through customs and ultimate delivery.
22 OCT. 41
From : Kita
To : Koshi, Washington #100
Ryozi, San Francisco #053
Tei koku seifu | tyo yo sen i tai yo ma ru | hon 22nd | gogo 3 zi Yokohoma a
syu tu pan | si ri | na o | do sen ni wa kan to ku | no ta me | i wa na ga | hi ra
ku I (ho zyo B M B) ryoji oyobi do it to mo yo si (ho zyo zen on ( ) j tie sin
syo I zimusyoku (do i wa | kai un | kan to ku kan | no | si kaku 1 ni te) o zyo
sen I sesime ta ri.
The Taiyo maru, requisitioned by the Imperial government, sailed from
Yokohama today the 22nd. Consul Iwanaga Hiraku ( ) and Doi Tomo-
yoshi ( ) an official in the Communications Department were given pas-
sage by the Kantoku. (Doi is qualified as a shipping Kantoku) .
#275-LA
From: Kita
To: Koshi, Washington #099
Ryozi, San Francisco #052
22 Oct. 41
Tai yo ma ru zyo kyaku sano
tori :
(I ka 5 dan 6 gyo no hyo) :
Koku se ki
lt5
2 to
3t5
G5 kei.
Japan zln - -
5
1
2
1
20
28
11
Nashi
124
150
Nasi
Naslii
149
Hi kei bei zin
179
XYYE zin .-
13
England zin - -.- - --
1
Q5ke! -
9
59
274
342
The passengers on the Taiyo Maru are as follows (Table below of columns and
6 rows) :
Nationality
1st class
2nd class
3rd class
Total
Japanese - - - --
5
1
2
1
20
28
11
None
124
150
None
None
149
Americans of Jap. extraction
179
Americans (7) .
13
English -
1
Total... -
9
59
274
342
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY '1015
#274-LA 22 Oct. 41
From: Kita
To : Koshi, Washington #051
Gaimudaijin, Toklo
Ryoji, Sanfrancisco #028
Tai yo ma ru ni 1 to 5 zyu mei 2 to 8 zyu mei gu rai no yo jru a ru nituki
0 mi ko mi niyori ta tu ta ma ru no brin o ben gi to ti ni ti tai yo ma ru
zyo sen ui fu ri mu ke ra re ta si / na o kaidenaritashi.
Since there is room for 50 first class and 80 second class passengers on the
Taiyo Marn, it is suggested that the Tatsuta Marn allotment be made use of
and transfered to the Talyo Marn here. Please reply by telegraph.
#272-LA 20 Oct. 41
From: Kita
To : Ryoji, San Francisco from Tokio #094
#022
Koku mu sho wa ma e da jimmushokau no Honolulu oyobi San Francisco
zyo riku / sasitukae na ko re ga tetsuzuki o ryo se ru mu ne 20th zai kyo bei
taishikan yori tii ti ko se ru nituki migi ta tu ta ma ru/nyii ko/no sai do zimusha-
kan e den ta tu aritasi.
The State Department has no objection to the landing of Maeda (jimushokan)
at either Honolulu or San Francisco and will omit formalities, according to
information received from the American Embassy in Tokyo on the 20th. Please
transmit the above information to Maeda upon the arrival of the Tatuta Marn.
#266-LA _ 10 Oct. 41.
From: Kita.
To : Koshi, Washington #058.
Gaimudayin, Tokyo #187.
Sinbun ho do niyoubo mo tu ka | to ti ni a ru [kin gu] dai gi si wa hon kau koku
se ki ho | kai sei ho an wa United States ga | po te ki ni 2 zj^ koku se ki mondai
0 kai ke tu sen to su ru mo no ni te sono kau zen na ru kai ke tu wa | kan kei
koku ! to no I ko syo | noyo(ri) ra za ru kagiri ki tai si e zu | yottee do dai gi
si wa Washington | ki kan go | rikugun syo | ga wa | to ron kyo gi noue kan kei
koku nitaisi su ru kou se ki | ri da tu kan i ka | yo sei no | ke tu gi an | o | gi kai ni
1 tei syu tu | su ru | i ko | na ru | mu ne ka ta ri ta ru omomuki na ri.
According to information in the newspaper. Delegate King who is here at present
says that as for the plan for a revision of the territorial nationality law, the
United States wants to settle the problem of dual citizenship, but a complete
settlement without negotiating with the interested countries cannot be expected.
Consequently after the Delegate return to Washington, and has conferred with
the War Department, it is his intention to introduce into Congress a resolution
requesting provisions for the breaking off of nationality from the countries con-
cerned.
#264r-LA 4 Oct. 41.
From : Kita
To : Koshi, Washington, #058.
Gaimudaijin, Tokyo. #185.
Sen zi so ti ho an ( [e mu de. bi ru] ) sin gi no ta me September 15th yori hi
ra ka re ta ru Hawaii ken rin zi ken kai wa do ho an o tu ka si 3rd ken ti zi wa
ko, re ni syo mei o ryo se ri do ho wa sen zi nioite ke ru so ti tosite | to ku be
tu I kei sa tu tai. syo bo tai. i ryo han to no so si ki. bo ku se tu bi. ko kyo si | se tii
oyobi do ro no ri yo. syo ku ryo oyobi bu tu ka no to sei. ryu gen torisim,'e
to nikansi omomuki su ru ko han | na ru | ken gen o | ken ti zi ri | fu yo
se ru mo no nisite | migi so ti | ji tu si | no ta me no yo san hyaku 5 zyU man $ o
I kei zyo | se ru mo no na ri | several Jap characters su.
The Special Session of the Legislative of Hawaii which opened from September
15th for the purpose of considering legislation for war time action "M-Day Bill",
passed the aforesaid bill and the Territorial Governor affixed his signature
to it on the 3rd. This bill invests far-reaching authority in the Territorial
Governor in case of war, chief provisions of which are : the organizatijon of special
police and fire fighting forces and medical squads, etc., anti-air preparations, the
utilization of community installations and highways, the regulation of food
supplies and commodity prices, the control of rumors, etc. In order to put the
above measures into effect a budget of $500,000 is being appropriated. Details by
mail.
1016 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
#262-LA
From : Kita. 2 Oct. 41.
To : Koshi, Washington.
Ryoji, San Francisco #044,
Gaimudaijin, Toljyo #183.
Sept^ber 30th sa ra ni ta no 2 se ki mo | bo to | oden do yo ] ko re | o Hawaii
kan zu me | kaisya ni ba i hyaku si | sai ban syo no tetsuzuki o ryo se ri.
Once more on September 30 two other boats were sold, in the same way as ex-
plained in my previous telegram, to the Hawaii Canning Co., court procedures
being followed.
#256-LA
From : Kita 29 Sept. 41.
To : Koshi, Washington.
Ryoji San Francisco #040
Gaimidaijin, Tokyo #177
Re my #156
Zyo ken | tu ki | sya ku ho | no mu ne | ke ru tei | o mi to ru 7 se ki no u ti 2
se ki wa 26th hyo ka ga ku ni | so to | su ru | ka haku | o motte ko re o | gyo
seu I to mi tu se tu ma ru | kan kei | a ru | bei zin | kei ei | no Hawaii | kan zu
me I kaisya ni | ba i kyaku | si sai ban syo | no tetsuzuki o ryo se ri.
Migi niyori gyo | sen kyu syo yii sya wa bo to | oden notori | ba | kyaku | ka
kaku tyii yori hyo ka ga ku no 2 wa ri (1 se ki wa $2,110 ta wa $1,017) oyobi
sai ban hi yo (1 se ki wa ($178.86) sen to. Ta wa 185$80 sen to) o | sai ban syo |
ni I no nyu | no ha zu.
Na o I ta no 5 se ki mo dai migi ni na ra u Ko to to na rU mi ko mi na ri.
Na o ma ta migi wa min zi zi ken tosite wa kai ke tu [ o mi ta ru si dai ni te |
kei zi I mondai wa na o no ko sa re o ru mo ko no ho mo dai tai kandai ni | so
ti I seraru ru | mi ko mi.
released
appraised value
value, price
29 Sept. 41.
Two of the seven fishing boats reported released according to stipulations were
sold on the 26th at prices comparable to their appraised values to the Hawaii
Canning Company which has a very close connection with the boats, and court
proceedings were dispensed with.
In connection with the above, the former owners, at the beginning, as in my
telegram, must pay to the court out of the selling price 20% of the appraised value
($2,110 for one boat and $1,017 for the other) and also court costs ($178.86 for
one and $185.80 for the other) .
It is expected that the same procedure will be followed in the cases of the
other five boats.
However, the above being a civil case, a decision is expected, but criminal
procedure still remains, but this also is expected to be disposed of with leniency.
15 Sept. 41.
#232-LA
From: Kita
To: Riyoji, San Francisco.
Gaimudaijin, Tokyo.
Honpo kan ri | ha ya ka wa ki yo si | na ru mo no hon non April ki ti nl | nyu
ko I si ta ru omonuki na ru | to ko ro | hon nin imada ki ti | tai zai tyu | na ra ba |
gaikoku seifu kan ri | koku mu syo | to ro ku | o na sa si te ra re ta si | sudeni | ki
ti |o ha na re ta ru | nioite (te) wa sono | syu tu ko | nen tuki hi | oyobi | sen mei |
sono ta san ko | to narube ki | zi ko | go kai den aritaski.
Hayakawa Kiyoshi, a gov't official of this country, intends to enter your port
in April of this year' If he is still in your city, please register bim with the
State Department as a foreign gov't official. If he has already left your city
please investigate and reply by cable giving the year, month, and day of departure
and as many other details as possible.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1017
#229-LA 2 Sept. 41.
From : Kita
To: Koshi, Washington #050
Gaimudaijin Tokyo #159
2nd ei zi si wa 1st to yo mu ke to ti ki ko no gaikoku sen (sa ki ni doku ki
ni I syu ge ki | serareta ru Egypt sen [za mu za mu] go no si ma
I i sen to syo si koku se ki oyobi sen mei o ha tu pi yo se zu) ni yaku 5 zyu
mei no bei zin hi ko ki so zyu sya oyobi gi si bin zyo si o ru to ko ro | ko wa
sono yu ki | sa ki | o hi si o ru mo scno sen pa tu tai wa sudeni [hi ru ma]
koku kyo oyobi [hi ru ma . ro do] no kei kai hi ko ni a ta ri o ri ma ta migi |
ko wa kyo | ka o e te gun syo ku o si ri zo ki ta ru mo no na ru mu ne ho do
si o re ri
2 Sept. 41.
On the 2nd an English language paper reported that on the 1st a foreign
ship (called a sister ship of the Egyptian ship Zamzan which was recently
attacked by German planes, but this name and nationality was not announced)
entered port here enroute to the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators
and mechanics. Although this group declined to reveal their destination,
they are an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and
the Burma road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their
military duties.
#226-LA
28 Aug. 41.
From: Kita.
To : Koshi Washington #027
Ryoji San Francisco
Gainudoijin, Tokyo #156
Sono go sa ra ni | se ki nitaisi RI bo tu syu | ban ke tu 1st R (kei 9 se ki) ta no
1 se ki nitaisi sya ku ho | no | ban ke tu | arita ru to ko ro bo to oden | ken ti ji
to I no I un do so ko se ru mo no no 1 ko ko hu | 26th Washington ha tu | tu sin
niyoreba | si ho ho syo | nioite wa migi 1st R arita ni | mo no | ro | u ti 7 se hi
nitaishi na ra ta me te | do syo | no mau zo ku | subiki United States si min ral | ba
i kyaku su ru | ko to o | zyo keu ni | i zu re mo | hyo ka ga ku | no 2 wa ri
oyobi sai ban hi yo narabini sin pa ku | zi tai | no | fu sai ga ku | o motten ko re
o I kyii I syo yii sya | ni hon kyaku | su ru | mu ne | ke tu tei | o mi ta ru omomuki
na ri.
28 Aug. 41.
Subsequently, still another boat was adjudged confiscated (total 9 boats) and
one other boat was released, as in my earlier telegram, and after the effective
intervention of the Territorial Governor and others, according to information
from Washington on the 26th, the Justice Department has decided that seven of
the aforementioned boats be sold to United States citizens to satisfy the stipula-
tions of the Department, and that the former owners should pay back 20% of the
appraised value plus court costs together with the indebtedness on the boats
themselves.
2 Aug. 4a.
#199 LA
From: Kita.
To: Riyozi, San Francisco #020.
fm Tokio #065.
Ta tu ta I ma ru I Honolulu | ki ko | ka ta | August 1st yu sen 1 yori | si rei
zu mi.
The Tatsuta Maru will arrive in Honolulu August 1, loaded according to
instructions from the NYK.
31 Jtjly 41.
#195-LA
From: Kita.
To: Koshi, Washington. #019
Riyozi, San Francisco. #018
Gaimudaizui, Tokyo.
Ta tu ta ma ru wa San Franciso yori Japan mu ke | Tyo ku ko I subeki
omomuki na ru tokaro, hon 31st nyu ko no f a sa ma | ma ru wa nyu syn tu
ko to mo I hei zyo to | ko to na ru to ko ro ni | ki sen rei mo a ri ka tu 1 ta tu
1018 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ta ma ru no to ti ki ko ni wa tu mi mondai na ku kitagata Japan mu ki zyo
kyaku | 2 hyiku su zyu mei tai ki si o ri ha ta ma ta to ti ze i kan moite wa
do sen no syu tu nyii ko ni wa nan ra si syo nakarube ki mu ne gen mei si o ru |
moite wa do sen no to ti ki ko ka ta ko | lia i i | aritasi.
Since the Tatsuta Maru will sail directly from San Francisco to Japan, the
arrival and departure of the Asama Maru entering this 31st will be different from
usual. Moreover when the Tatsuta Maru enters this port there will be no loading
problem. Two hundred and some persons will board, and it has been announced,
that the local customs authorities will not obstruct the arrival and departure of
the ship.
#194-LA
From : Kita 30 Jui-T 41.
To: Koshi, Washington #044
Gaimudaijin, Tokyo #141
30th ei zi si | ha tu pi yo niyoreba to ti China soryozi wa tyii bei taisi yori China
gaiko kau oyobiryozi kan wa | to ke tu rei | no ti ki yo o men zyo | sa re ta no | kau
ri I nituki te wa ko ryo tyu | na ru mu ne no denpo ni se tu si | o ru omomviki na ri.
According to a report in an English language paper on the 30th a telegram has
been received by the local Chinese Consul General from a Central American
Ambassador to the effect that steps are being considered to exempt Chinese diplo-
matic and consular officials from the application of the freezing order.
#912— LA
From : Kita. 30 July 41,
To : Koshi, Washington, #143.
Gaimudaymi Tokyo #139.
Zai bei honj^o si kin to ke tu rei no zi tu si wa hi sa si ki i zen youmoyo ki
serare i ta tu to ko ro ni te to kan oyobi ho zi simbun nioite sono zi to si
no baai | pam Ki zai ryu min 1st R ni a to bi si ei kyo wa kei bi ni te yu ryo no
vo na si mu ne si do s ki ta ri ta ru ta me 26th Ri hon rei no zi, tu si o 2d B
mi ru ni oyobi mo 1st R wa sa si ta ru do ta ru do yo o mi se zu tu i de | hon rei
no te si yo bu ri | ha tu pi yo | saki 1st R no ei gyo Japan, mu ki so kin Japan
bin yu niyu nitaisi te mo | zi tu sai te ki | sei gen kiwamste kan dai na ru o mi
to zen zen hoi sei mi ta ti ka e re ri.
Na o 2nd R yo ki se ry Japan mu ke so kin oyobi bei ka ho sai no so fu wa so
to ga ku ni no bo ri o re ri.
Na 0 ma ta to ti United States ga wa wa hi bei sai a ku no zi tai ni ta ti, itari
ru mo 1st R ga United States ho o | zyu N syu su ru kagin nan ra yu ryo no yo
na ki mu ne kyo tyo si o re ri.
#192-LA
Since the enforcement of the law freezing Japanese credits in America hag
been anticipated for a long time, at this office and through the Japanese language
newspapers all the residents were warned of the effects upon them in case it was
put into force, and even with the enforcement of the law on the 26th, the residents
did not show any particular disquietude. The methods of application of the law
were announced and since the actual restrictions on the residents' businesses,
remittances to Japan, and importation of Japanese goods were considered quite
lenient, they were accepted calmly. The remittances to Japan in anticipation
of the freezing order and also the hoarding of U. S. currency has amounted to
a considerable sum. Furthermore the United States authorities here have
emphasized that although in the midsts of the worst anti American circumstances
the residents have nothing to fear so long as they obey U. S. laws.
#187-LA
From : Kita. 26 July 41.
To: Koshi, Washington, #042.
Gaimudaijin, Tokyo, #134.
[Fu o re su ta ru] Kaigun zi kan wa ko ku kyo ku tyo [Ta wa zu] syo syo oyobi
fu ku kan tai do. Bei kan tai oyobi kaigun gun zi si se tu si sa tu no ta me 26th
[a ra me do] yori kaigun ki nivorisin zyu wa N to tya ku no ha zu, na o do, ki ni ti
to ti nioite ki ru hompo oyobi China no | si san | to ke tu | zi mu syo ri | no ta me |
okura syo ka ka ri kan 6 mei rai tyaku no ha zu na ri pi Assistant Sec'y of the
Navy Forrestal accompanied by Rear Admiral Towers, Chief of the Bureau of
Aeronautics, and his aide, will leave Alameda in a navy plane on the 26th and
arrive at Pearl Harbor for the purpose of inspecting the U. S. Fleet and naval and
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1019
military installations. In the same plane 6 oflScials connected with the Treasury
Department will arrive for the purpose of handling affairs concerning the freezing
of Japanese and Chinese assets here.
#174-LA
From : Kita. 15 Jult 41.
To: Koshi, Washington.
Riyoji, San Francisco, #014.
Gaimudaijin, Tokyo, #125.
14th yo I to ti I ho so | kyo ku | wa | mo tu ka [So] ren ki sen | 2 zyti su | se ki
sei gan ] ni syu tyu | si kanete [So] ren mu ke | yu syu tu | kyo ka arita ru ki
kai ru i. Bu bun hin. Ku tu. Ko kyu [ga so rin] to Vladivostok mu ke | tu
mi I da si I no ha zu na ru mu ne ho so | se ri.
On the evening of the 14th a local broadcasting station broadcast to the effect
that at present more than twenty Soviet ships are concentrating on the West
Coast and loading for Vladivostok with machinery, parts, shoes, high test gasoline,
etc. which had previously been released for export to Russia.
#173-LA
From: Kita. 15 Jtjly 41.
To: Koshi, Washington #037.
Gaimudaijin, Tokyo #124.
Italy ryojidairikau wa 10th ko re o hei sa se ri | na o do ryozi wa honkan nitaisi
do kan ko kin no | bu oyobi kan in si yii kin zen bu wa sal kin ni itari yo yaku
hi ki da si kyo ka o e ta ru mu ne oyobi do ryozi oyobi shokikansei | mei wa to mo
ni zai bunkan zai kin o mei zei ra re do ryozi wa New York zai zyu no ha ha ho
mon noue 31st San Francisco ha tu Tatsutu Maru (shokikansei wa 18th to ti
ha tu ya wa ta ma ru) ni te fu nin no ha zu na ru mu ne ka ta ri ko bun syo | sono
ta I to kan i ta ku no mosu i de na si.
The Italian Consulate was closed on the 10th. The Consul has at last obtained
permission to withdraw a portion of the government funds and all of the private
funds of its staff members. The Consul and one secretary have ordered the
resident civil official to take over the post and after the Consul has visited his
mother who resides in New York he will proceed to his new post on the Tatsuta
Maru sailing from San Francisco the 31st (the secretary will proceed on the
Yawata Maru sailing here the 18th).
No agreement was made to entrust official or other documents to that office.
#117
#033 8 July 41.
A report regarding the Washington report of the later part of May that Ameri-
can pilots are joining the China Air Force. The local China Consul General on
10 June enrolled 100 men at his consulate (largely from local air groups). News-
paper reports indicate that the China military attache in Washington (makes
arrangements?). Furthermore according to English (language) newspapers
of the 5th 200 men have already (Toppa sever) gone (?). The Chinese Consul
General avoids a statement regarding his orders.
8 July 1941.
#163-"LA"
From : Kita #117 of 8th Re your Msg 539
To : Foreign Min. Tokio — Minister Washington #033
May ma tsu Washington ha tsu tsu wa Bu ku <— gun hi ko shi no China
ku <— gun san ka nikau(shi) ho do se ru to ko ro June 10th to chi China
soryoji wa migi san ka ka ta do soryojikan no shu tsu gan se ru mo no hyaku
mei in ta tsu shi (dai bu bun to chi hi ko tai zu ki) Washington China rikugun
bu kan ni migi mitai (shi) su ru so chi ka ta shi ji o mo to te tsu tsu a ru mu
ne shinbun shi ni ha tsu pi yo se ru ga sa ra ni 5th no ei ji shi niyoreba migi
wa sudeni 2 hyaku mei o to tsu pa se ru mo o naru to koro china soryozi wa
meirei ni yo(ri) ru omomuici o motte migi nikan(si) su ru genmei o sake taru
omomuki nari.-
3 July 41.
Con't. It has been decided to confiscate 7 ships (total 8 ships), [no koi-izyu
1 seki no uti?] 3 vessels have been released under bond and 2 have already
gone fishing.
1020 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This matter of seizing fisliing vessels is of a diflSeult nature: it is fishing'
season (?) and as it has a large influence on local food supplies, the authorities
concerned are observing it. (?) [Part not clear — seems to be something
about outrage against Japanese.] There is a movement to buy the confiscated
ships (by U. S. Gov't?) and to release them under bond. At the same time
Delegate King is making endeavors and those in Washington should make
representations.
3 July 41
#159-LA
From : Kita
Gaimudaijin — Tokyo #114
Koshi— Washington #031
114 (1) 3rd Re My May 084 [Regn Mog (?) 529 (5) ]
Sono go sara ni 7 seki_ni taishi botusyu no hanketu ari (kei 8 seki) no korizyu ?
1 seki no uti 3 seki wa RI \_Bon(lo'\ syakuho Rl o yuru sareuti 2 seki wa sude ni
syutu gyo seri.__
Nao Honken RI Cfyosen R2 yoku ryii wa yo ya ku sei gyo kini iri no ku ka mondai
ni serare oru toti syoku ryo mondai ni zyti dai eikyo ari to site kankei to kyo ku no
tyu mo ku su ru tokoro to nari honpozin kankei sya ga wa kyo bo to o den. . . .
No botu syu han ketu aritaru R2 Oyosen no harai sage oyobi yoku ryu R2 Gyosen
no Rl [Bondo) skalmlw kata undo tyil naru to tomo ni [kingu] daigisi ni oi y (te)
honken do ryoka tyu naru hoka tokentizimoti kaku Washington ni oi (te) toku ni
setu syo no hazu nari.
28 June 41
# 152-LA
From: kita
To : Ryoji Hongkong # ( ?)
Gaimudaijin — Tokyo # 110
110 (1) 8th Re. yr. msg 459 (Zyoko)
United States to bu ni oite jairyoku naru [toratuku] kotuzigyo o keiei saru,
yosi naru Daniel — Arnstein, Harold — Davis, Marco — Hellman no, 3 me i wa 28th
[kuritupa — ) nite Hongkong ni mukai taru ga do nin ra wa mazu konmei ni
itaritaisi enzyo butu si yu so so ku sin no kenti yori [biruma O ro — do] kotu
zyo tai tyo sano hazu naru omomuki nari —
Daniel Arnstein, Harold Davis & Maco Hellman, transportation managers of
prominent eastern U. S. trucking companies will leave on the 28th via clipper for
Honkong. Their aim will be to inspect the Burma Road from the standpoint of
speeding help (to China) #114-LA 17 June 41
From : Kita
To : action Min. Wash. D. C. #025
Info : Foreign Min. Tokio #103
Mei dai ya kyu bu 1 ko 2 ju mei wa Hawaii ya kyu reu mei | no sho hei ni 6 ji ya
kyu si ai no ta me 21st Yokohama ha tsu | ya wa ta ma ru ni te | to chi rai ko no yo
tei na ri shi to ko ro United States ga wa wa 1 ko no sa sho o kyo ze tsa shi ta ru
omomuki ni te | tii chi sho shu sha ga wa yori how kew wa hotondo ma i new
honpo oyobi Hawaii so go ni o ko na wa re o ri sudeui jer n. bi o to to no e o ru shi
dai ni te mo a ki ka tsu kai neu July kei o ya kyu bu rai ko no sai mo sa shu 1 o kyo
ze tsu serareta ru nitai (shi) to gi sho hei sha to ri shi hi pu ji ji yori cho ku se
tsu zen taishi no a tsu sew o i rai shi sa sho o to ri tsu ke e ta ru zew rei a ri kow
kai mo do go a tsu sew o e taki mu ne ne gai i de arita .... nitsuki migi sa sho
ka ta nikaw (shi) koku mu sho ni mosu i re ka ta shikaru be ku go ha i ryo aritashi
(i rai ho)
Group is Visas were refused for a Me U. baseball team. Kita is requesting
that Jap. Ambassador use his influence to get the visas authorized.
16 June 41.
#143-LA
From : Kita
To: (action) Foreign Min. Tokio #102
Info : Minister— Wash. D. C. #024
Zai dai Germany ryoji Dairikan sei sa mikan (shi) (para) 16th to chi Germany
imei yo ryozi [ran ge] (Germany kei United States shi min nishite bo e ki sho)
ni tashikame ta ru to ko ro hon ken wa Washington German taishiknn yori tsu
chi ni se tsu shi ta ru to ko kon go no so chi nikan (shi) te wa 1 ni do
taishikan no shi ji ni ma tsu omomuki na ri
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1021
Because of return of honorary German consul have been requested by German
Embassy in Washington to handle German affairs here.
#140-"LA"
13 JlTNE 41
From: Kita
To: (action) Foreign Min. Tokio #49
(Have forwarded by mail to San Francisco & Manila.)
San Francisco ha tsu ki daiziu a te denpo dai 92 go ohu dan nikan (shi) (Para)
[Pu re shi den to pun pi a su] go vea hi to mu ke ri ku hei yaku 9 hyaku mei
(ko ku <— in oyobi shu hjm shi kan sa <— hyaku mei o fukumi mu) o to sal shi
11th to chi chaku 12th hi chi mu ke shu tsu pan se ri —
Ref. San Francisco msg #92.
S S Pres. Pierce with about 900 army men embarked (including some hundreds
of aviation personnel and junior oflScers) arrived the 11th and sailed the 12th.
7 June 41
#134-"LA"
From: Kita
To: (action) Foreign Min. Tokio. #074
Info : Ambassador Wash. D. C. # 201
(Have forwarded by mail to San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle).
1. 4th Washington ha tsu tsu shiu wa [Rpt End] Kimmel [kiu me ru] tai sho
Kimmel wa do hi Washington nioi (te) Kaigun cho kaw to no kai daw o kai shi shi
ta ru mu ne oyoai do tai sho no Washington hii mow wa tei rei te ki no mo no na
ru mu ne ho do se ri (Para.)
2. 6th to chi Kaigun to kyo ku ha tsu pi yo niyoroba Kimmel no kei kaku nimo
tozu (ki) to chi ho men ni a ru kaw tai wa ko re o su — ku mi ni wa ka chi ko ri ku
mi in kyu yo no ta me chi ku ji tai ri ku mi 1 ji kai ko seshimu ru ko to to na ri ta
ru to ko ro sono shu tsu pa tsu ki oyobi kaw mei wa ha tsu pi yo shi e za ra
omomuki na ri
1. On the fourth received word from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started
conversations with the Secretary of the Navy. No extraordinary significance
seems to attach to his visit.
2. According to an announcement by Navy Dept. oflScials Admiral Kimmel
brought plans for sending units of the Fleet back to the mainland for recreation
of personnel for short periods. The periods and names of vessels to return were
not announced.
#133 "LA" 6 June 41.
From : Kita
To: Forein Min. Tokio #093
10th to chi ha tsu ta tsu ta ma ru mi te nai sen jin. kei 8 mei (mi tsu ko
sha 2 mei. ho go so kau sha 6 mei) to chi i min kyo ku no te niyo (ri) Yokohama
oyohi Kobe mu ke (Yokohama nai chi jin 3 mei. Kobe ju che jin 3 mei cho sen
jin 2 mei) so kan seraru ru ha ju na ri (spectable) wei hai wei
8. Jap nationals sailed the 10th on the Tatsuta (2 stowaways and 6 deportees)
having been deported by the immigration authorities bound for Kobe and
Yokohama.
Yokohama, 3 Japs.
Kobe, 3 Japs ; 2 Koreans.
# 129 "LA" 3 June 41.
From: Kita
To : Foreign Min. Tokio — #090
Punghou school
To chi [ pu na ho . su ku — ru] yori tai wa n sei to kaisha ju yaku to ke chi ta
da mi chi nitai (shi) 22nd yori kyo ko seraru ru do ko hyaku new sai ni shu tsu se
ki ka ta sho tai jo o ha tsu shi ta ru omomuki na ru to ko ro d5 nin no shu tsu se ki
ni wa to kan toshite wa nan ra i zon na ki nitsu ki ryo ken ha tsu kyu ne gai i de
ta ru sai war shikaru be ku aritashi —
100th celebration of anniversary of Punahou
The Punahou School is extending an invitation to Mr. Tadamichi Taketi,
director of the Taiwan Pottery Co. to attend the 100 year birthday celebration. I
have no objection to bis attending and request you issue necessary passport.
1022 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
#126 "LA" ^ 29 May 41.
From : Kita —
To : Foreign Min. Tokio — #089.
Info: Hongkong— #001.
[ku re fu en su] gai sho no 1 ko wa ran in go shu oyobi (spec, table) New Zeland
[QU] ho mon o o e Washington yu ki no to 26th [ku ri tsu pa <— ] ni te to Chi ni ki
ko se ri
Cravens of the Foreign Office after visiting N. E. I., Australia, and New Zealand
put in here on the clipper en route to Washington, D. C.
#123 "LA" 27 May 1941.
From: Kita (#087) 7th
To: Foreign Min. Tokio.
(Regarding your msg. to Wash. D. C. #186 of 8th).
(Have forwarded by mail in code to Wash., D. C.) .
Reg. Eng. Sp. T RA DE — WI N D [QU] 26th shu tsu ko se ri June ma tsu
Yokohama chaku no yo tei
The Trade Wind left port on the 26th and should arrive Yokohama the end of
June,
#121-LA 24 MAY 1941.
From: Kita (#014)
To: Min. San Francisco.
ta ki (ka ju o) den sho sbi ta tsu ta ma ru ni te kichi ni mu ka e ri en sho shi
toshite no kaw i tsu kaw ka ta go ha i i o ki ko
Code clerk Taki is heading for your office via the Tatwta Maru. Your good
offices are requested in helping him through customs.
#120 "LA" 23 May 1941.
From: Kita (#085) 3rd
To: Foreign Min. Tokio (Re. your msg. #281)
Info : Wash., D. C.
(Spec, table) New Zealand End. sp. table Sp. Eng. mi ni ster — of — la nd s,
f ra n k — la n g stone End Eng oyohi zen shu sho Sp. Eng. J. go r do n — coat es
End Eng to 8 mei wa 21st Washington yu ni no to ji [ku ri tsu pa <— ] ni te to chi
ni ki ko se ru to ko ro 1 ko wa Washington nioi (te) England kai gai ryo do oyobi
United States kaku dai hyo to kai go. bu ki tai yo ho nimotozu (ki) ku kai gai ryo
do en jo mondai kyo gi no ha zu na ru omonuki na ri
The New Zealands Minister of Lands Frank Langstone, former premier G.
Gordon Coates and party of 8 put in here on the 21st by clipper enroute to Wash-
ington. They plan to discuss problems concerning the protection of British and
U. S. territory.
# 115-LA ' 14 TslAY 41.
January 8th Futu 10 Oshin Nikanshi
To ti ku gun zo kyo no tame B17 gata bakugeki ki 2 zyu 1 dai wa [e mon su] tyu
zyo si ki no moto ni 13th go go 3 zi 5 zyu 9 fun San Francisco hatu hentai hi ko o
motte 14th gozen 5 zi zyu 8 fun to ti [hitu kamu] hiko zyo nitotyaku seri sei
migi — si
From : kita
To : Gaimudianjin — Tokyo
With respect to message #10 of January 8th. For the purpose of reenforcing
of the local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieut. General
(Emonsu)
Emmonds, departed San Francisco at 1559 the thirteenth flying in formation and
arrived Hickham field at 0558 the 14th.
#114-A 14 May 41.
079 (1) 0400
From : kita
To: Gaimudaijin — Tokio
When there is a request for a passport to Hawaii from Kusuda Kakushin mis-
sionary bishop (?) of the HikashsiHonganji (a temple) (home address : Niigata,
go?
Nishibori Dori 7 Banti, 7 Banko), if there is no objection from the investigation
of his record, please forward passport at once. He has applied (Tofu Suru?) as a
successor to Okiji {^ j.^) who returned home every November. (Request
message) '^ X(P
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1023
14 May 41.
079(1) 0400
From : Kita
To : Gaimudaijiu Tokyo —
Higa si hon gan zi ha kan to ku fu kyo si ku su da kaku sin (hon se ki ni —
ga ta si ni si bo ri do ri 2 ban ti 7 ban ko) yori Hawaii kuki ryo ken ka fu ka ta
ne gai ide aritaru baai hon nin no mimoto otorishirabe no ue sasitukai naki ni
oite wa do ryo ken hatu kyii ka ta sikyu Tonhakanai ainamtashi — {ex'xaby'qn}
do nin wa kaku nen November kikoku se ru oki zi (fu ku ko no ko O toti noti)
fukyo so no ketu in hozyu to site to fu su ru mo no na ri (i rai ho) .
074 (1) 0100
1 May 1941.
From: Kita.
To : Foreign Minister Tokyo #074.
(ga u su) shin niu beikoku Chu shi taishi wa fu nin no to 30th (pu re shi den
to ga — fu i — ru do) go ni te. do chi ni ki ko se ru ga do taishi wa cho ku se tSu
Chungking ni O mo mu ku yo kei na ru omomuki na ri.
Gauss, the newly appointed American Ambassador to China, en route to his
new duty put in here on the 30th on the President Garfield. He plans going direct
to Chungking.
0721
From : Kita 30 April 41.
To : Foreign Minister, Tokyo #072
Infor : Minila #004
Za tsu shi (tai mu) (rai fu) (fu 5 chu n) shu hi tsu narabini ha tsu ko nin
(hen ri . ru su) wa do nin tsu ma (ku re a . bu su) [(pen . ne
mu)] do ban 30th (ku ri tsu pa ) ni te Manila ni mu kai ta ru ga
do nin to wa Hongkong kei yu Chunking ni itari Yaku 2 ka getsu kan to
yo ryo ko no we ki bei kaku chi ko en ryo ko O O ko no ha zu na ru omomuki
Shinbuu ni ho ze ra ru
Mr. Henry Buse (Luce) Managing editor and publisher of Time, Fortune and
Life and Claire Booth (pen name) took the Clipper for Manila on the 3,0th. They
plan to go to Chungking by way of Hongkong. After a trip of about two months
they plan, upon returning to the states, to conduct a series of lectures at various
places. This information from the news papers.
#104-LH 29 Apbil 41.
071(1)2100
From: Kita.
To : Gaimudaijin — Tokyo.
The American Army Transport Washington with 2,500 troops and 24,300 tons
of military supplies departed New York the 11th and arrived here early the
morning of the 26th via Panama and San Francisco. After unloading 2,000 troops,
12 student pilots, and military stores, 500 troops were embarked and she departed
the 27th
It is believed that this ship will be employed in transporting troops and
evacuating Americans from the Far East,
#071 29 Apeil 41.
From : kita.
To: Gai
Bei rikugun yusosen [Washington] go wa riku hei z O 500 gunyo kamotu 24,
300 ton otosai 11th New York Hatu Panama San Francisco kei yu 26th sotyo toti
tyaku rikuhei 2,000 koku gaku sei 12 mei oyori gunyo kamotu oriku age sita
runoti no korino hi toyu kiriku hei 500 o no se 27th syutu patu seri.
Nao dosen wa kowro taiseiyo homen ni syu ko siguntai narabini zaito yohikiage
beizin noyu so ni zyii fi su ru omomuki nami (kyu).
26 April 41.
1024 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
#101-LA
From : Kita.
To : #011 Consul General, San Francisco.
#004 Infor. Consul, Los Angeles.
Shi mi zu narahini ya ma ji ryo tai gi shi 25th (ra — rin) go ni ti Los Angeles
mu ki shu tsu pa tsu se ri Los Angeles yori ki chi ni o mo nui ku ha zu go san ko
ma di
For your information Shimiju and Yarnaji, members of the diet, departed here
the 25th on the Lurline for Los Angeles. From Los Angeles they plan to proceed
to your city.
#96-6A
067 ( 1 ) 0100 21 APEIL 41.
From : Kita.
To : Gaimudaisin — Tokyo.
President Roosevelt's eldest son, Captain (USMC) James Roosevelt, together
vpith Major General Thomas arrived here on the 20th via Clipper and departed
for Manila on the 21st. The local nevespapers said that both men said that any
statement as to destination or mission must first come from Washington. Per-
haps it is Chungking —
21 April 41.
[Ro Daitoyo tyonan [marin] tail [zieimusu rozuberuto] wa [tomasu[ syo syo
totomoni 20th [kuritupa — ] nite toti tyaku 21st Manila muke syutupatu sitaruga
toti sinbun wa sono yuki saki simei nitsuki ryonin tomo geumei o sake o riotu
te Washington yori hatu piyo aru hazu naru motabun Chungking Naru mune
hozl o re ri sei migi de si
#»4-LA 19 April 41.
010
From: Kita.
To : Consul, San Francisco.
f u kn da deu sho sM, 18th to chi ha tsu ya wa ta ma ru ni te ki chi ni mu ka e ri
deu sho shi, toshite no kau i tsu kau ka ta go ha i ryo ko
Radio Industry employee (?) Fukuda departed here the 18th for your city.
Because of his position please use your influence in getting him through Customs.
From: Kita #84.
To : Foreign Minister.
Later seizure proceeding have been instituted against the other 18 of the 19 ships
mentioned in my previous dispatch. After considerable deliberation a court
judgment was obtained under which the 1st of the ships was confiscated by the
U. S. Government. Even tho it was to be put up at auction, judging from exam-
ples on the mainland, by the time the price is so reduced by sale at auction the
owner gets nothing.
Furthermore the parties concerned get quite a blow from the customs as a result
of this seizure. Already steps are being take to claim loss of a standpoint of
damage to the boats, and in one case authoritz has been gained for a release
from bond. Later on such steps will be taken in all cases.
0841 (1400) Re My MSG 062X .
From: Kita #84.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
Sono go ju 9 se ki chu no ju 8 se ki nitaihi te mo bo to Qden do yo no bo tsu
shu (so) sho tei ki sa re ta ru to ko ro taishi ta no ko ran nioite sai sho no 1 se ki
nitaishi do sen wo ga tsu shu koku seifu ni bo tsu shu no me ne han ke tsu arita ri
ha
do sen wa tsu i de kyo ba i ni fu seraru be ki wa zu na ru mo dai tai tai ri ku
nioite ke ru sen rei do ri kau kei sha no shin sei niyori sono tsii sen ka ga ku kei
gen none sho yu sha ni wa rai sa ge ra ru ru ko to to na ru mi ko mi na ri.
No 0 ze i kau no gyo sen yo ku ryu niyori kau kei sha wa ei gyo jo ta tai no da
ge ki 0 u ke gyo sen ni mo son sho o sho zu ru to ko ro yori kanete shin sei chu no to
ko ro sono u chi 1 se ki nitaishi (bond do) sha ku h5 kyo ka sa re ta ru ga o tsu
te ta sen mo do yo kyo ka sa ru ru mi ko mi
[Have forwarded by mail by code to : Ambass. in U. S. ; S. F. ; L. A. ; Seattle ;]
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1025
#82-"LA"
From: Kita (re yr 019).
To : Foreign Minister — Tokio. 5 April 41.
Sono go hi Kuku tyii 2 zyu 6 mei wa repeat indicator kyo Co zai tosite no koku
ha tu 1st repeater nitai (si) yu zai o syo fu ku si . ta wa ko ben mosikuwa mu
zai o mosu ta te ta ru to ko ro ga tu syu koku ho tei ken zi wa ko sya nitai (si)
sa ki no Kyo Co zai tosite no koku ha tu tu o korike (si) (rpt ind koku ha tu 2nd
rpt ri yu ni fu bi no ten a ri si ta me) a ra ta me te gi sjo zai oyobi kyo Co zai tosite
koku ha tu i zu re mo mo tu ka sin ri tyu na ri hon ken sai ban no ke tu ka wa
ma tu ta ku yo so o yu ru sa za ru mo (koto ni ba i sin in no dai ta su «— wa
bei zin ni te so to fu ri o ma nu ka re zu) koku, ha tu sono mo no wa ko re ma
de no kei ka ni tyo si kanarazu si mo honpo zin gyo gyo o ku ti ku sen to su
ru sei zi te ki ha i kei nimo tozu (ki) ku mo no to wa mito (me) ra re zu
Na 0 i sai wa March 4th zu ke futu (# ) ko 68. do hi zu ke Kimitu
(# ) ko 75 oyobi April 2nd zu ke futu (# ) ko 103 nituki go syo to ai
na ri ta ku kon go no sin ten bu ri zu i zi deupo su.
Re charges against the owners of the confiscated fishing boats.
#81-LA' 3 Apeil 41. .
059 (1) 1500
I'rom: Kitu.
To: Foreign Minister — ^Tokyo.
Consulate — Manila.
Holand's Foreign Minister, his wife, and the Colonial Minister (Tokumu
Gaimuken dai.iin) arrived here from San Francisco on the 2nd via clipper and
departed for Batavia via Manila on the 3rd. Local newspapers stated that this
inspection of the Netherlands Indies at this time is noteworthy.
#059. 3 April 41.
Holland foreign minister [fu on. Kure fuensu] wa fuzin oyobi takumu Gaimu-
ken ex puewou [Tya-rusu. Ueruta — ] do han 2nd.
San Francisco yori raityaku 8rd [Kuritupa — ] nite Manila keiyu Batavia ni
mukai taru ga toti sinbun wa sono ranin sisatu wa zisetu ga ratyu moku o yo
su ru mune hodo sioreri migi desu.
#78-LA 1 Apbh. 41.
March 7th Zuke bei 1 Futu 29 kisin nikansi.
Irainin yori ne gai ide aritaru nituki Jci sori no ki go wa go murito wa zon zu ru
mo April 10th Yokohama Syutupan Yawata Maru bin nite goso fuai nari uru
yo kaku betu no go hairyoaiogitasi (Iraiho).
#78
058 (1) 1st.
From: Kita.
To : Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
Ref : #29 of March 7.
With respect to the request of the client (Irainin) although I realize that
is unreasonable, please forward by mail on the ya Wata Maru which
departs from Yokohama on the lOth of April. I appreciate your special efforts.
#77-"LA". 29 Mabch 41.
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister — Tokyo.
To ti ki ko no honpo sen no ri ku imi in tyu kaku Nen October 26th zu ke tu 2
futu (#. . . .) 144 ki sin go tii da tu niyo (ri) ru si mon syo mei o honpo syu |
tu pa tu ko nioi (te) u ke zu si te rai ko migi syo mei ka ta ne gai i zu ru mo no
a ri migi nitai (si (to kan nioi (te) wa kaku nen ki daizin ha tu San Francisco
a te denpo dai 99 go go kun da tu niyo (ri) syo mei ryo tosite bei ka kin 1 $ o
tyo syu si ki ta ri ta ru to ko ro fu ne ga wa no se tu mei niyoreba honpo kan
kai kan tyo nioi (te) wa hon ken syo mei o mu ryo ni te a tu kai o ru omomuki
na ru ga | do syo mei ryo wa bo to ki sin no syu si ni mi ru mo kan kai kan tyo
zi mu tosite o toriatukan u be ki mo no na ru ya ni kai serare katagata zen ki
1 $ no syo mei ryo wa hon ken toriatukau bu ri kaku tei zen no go ke tu tei na ru
ten ni mo ka e ri mi hon syo mei ryo wa honpo do yo mu ryo to su ru ko to da to
na ru ya ni si ryo seraru ru nituki te wa hon ken i ma 1 o go sen gi none migi ni
toriatukau sikaru . . . be ki ya.
1026 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Answer requested by the return despatch.
re passports for sailors on Japanese ships calling at the Port of Honolulu and
other U. S. Ports.
#72-"LA" 27 Mabch 41.
From: Kita
To : Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
mo ri mu ra siyokika — sei 27th tyaku nin se ri
Moumura rejwrted for duty on the 27th.
#66-LA 21 March 41.
From: Kita (forwarded by mailing code to Washington).
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
According to dispatches from Aukland and Sydney. The light cruisers Brook-
lyn and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cummings, Tucker arrived at
Aukland on the 17th ; and the heavy cruisers Chicago and Portland, the destroyers
Clark, Cassin, Cunningham, Dotcns, Reid arrived at Sydney — both groups on a
friendly visit. The first group departed from Aukland on the 20th and may return
to Pearl Harbor. It is reported that the second group will also go to Brisbane.
Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under sealed orders and
that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and departed from there on the
11th, that the final destination was not known by "outsiders" (gaibu) until they
arrived. The maintainance of secrecy on this trip was a great success it was
reported.
#66-"LA" 21 MABCH 41.
From: Kita
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
(have forwarded by mail in "code to Washington)
[o ku ran do] oyobi Sydney ha tu tii sin niyoreba kei zyu n [bu ru tsu ku rin]
oyobi [sa ba na] ku ti ku kan [kei su] [syo] [ka min gu su] [ta tsu Ka<— ] wa
nth \6 ku ran do] ni. Ma ta zyu kyu n Chicago oyobi Portland ku to ku kan
[ku ra<— ku] [ka sin] [ka ni gu ha mu] [da un zu] [rei do] wa 20th Sydney ni i zu
re mo sin zen ho mon no ta me nyu ko. Zen sya wa 20th [o ku ran do] ha to ta
bun sin zyn wa n mu ke' ki kan no to ni tu ki ko sya wa sa ra ni [bu ri su ben]
ni mu ko be ki mu ne ho zi o ru to ko ro to ti sinbun wa migi kan tai wa sjai tu
ko no sai fu<— syo i ri no mei rei o a ta e ra re ta ru ga to hyn March 9th [pa
go — pa go] tyaku 11th yo ru syu tu ko se ru mo m,o ku te ki' ti to tyaku ma de
zen zen gai bu ni si ra re zu yo ku sono ko do no hi mi tu o ho go si e ta ru wa
dai sei ko na ri to ho zi o re ri
#64-LA
From: Kita. 18 Mar. 41.
To : Foreign Minister — Tokyo.
When the two Honganji missionaries : Asakawato Mitanigiin ( ?) home address :
Shimane kin, jti gun, kamata muna and okamoto taiyu, home address : Tokyo,
Suginami ku, kamiogi ku bo (?) #730 request passports from there to Hawaii
(from Washington (?)), if there is no objection after an examination of their
records, please expedite the forwarding of the passports. Both men are coming
to fill vacancies.
From: Kita.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
Hon gan zi ha fu kyo si gen se ki shimane ken o ti gun ka wa to mu ra a sa ka
ica to. mi ta ni gi in oyolei gen se ki Tokyo si su gi na mi ku ka mi o gi ku bo
730 o ka mo to tai yix no ryo migi yori Hawaii yu ki ryo ken ka fu ne gai i de
ai-ita . . . ru baai so re zo re mi mo to o torisirabi none sasi tukae na ki nioi
(te) wa do ryo ken ha tu kyu ka ta ontorihakarai aritashi migi ryo mei to mo
ke tu in ho zyu no ta me to rai su ru mo no na ri (i rai ho) .
15 MAE. 41.
Tomii taisi yori sono tori.
Honsi oyobi Ikegawa Siyokika. Sei December Tatu ta INIaru nite ki to to
tyaku no hazu. Dohi gogo 11 ji kiti hatu [san taufue<— ] sen [nauba«— ] 24
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1027
oyobi [spell eng.] chief ni Chicago made [konda — to mento] mata wa [Daburu.
Betudo. Ilu«— mu] 1 oyobi [R6wa«— Ba<— su] 1 ryu ho aritashi.
Nao 23rd (hiyo) Chicago hatu liberty kankaku ltd ni Washington made doyo
no [atukomode — syon] go ryii ho kose |
The following from Ambassador Tomii :
I and Ikegawa, 1st secretary to embassy, expect to arrive your place (San
Francisco) on the December Tatura Maru. Will depart [San Francisco] the
same day at 2300 — by Santa Fe Chief #24 request that you reserve 1 double,
bed room compartment and 1 lovper berth.
Also please reserve same accommodations on the Liberty Limited departing
Chicago on the 28rd for Washington.
From : Kita #062.
To : Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
Ga tsu Shu koku ho rai ken ji wa 4th ze i kan no kan ri ni u tsu sa re a ru
kan kei gyo sen ju 9 se ki chii no 1 si ki nitaishi 1 sei to 2 sei to ji sha kan ni o ko
na wa re ta ru u ri ra ta shi wa do sen nitaishi su ru kau sa tsu o shu to
ku sen ga tame fu sei shu dan o motte ra o ko na. Wa re ta ri to no ri ju so
sho o rai ki se ri. O tsu te ta no jxi 8 se ki mo do yo tetsuzuki to ra ru ru mo
no to su i so ku sa ru.
Suit has been instituted to confiscate. One of the 19 fishing boats taken into
custody. Other suits in the 18 other boats will probably follow.
Gaimudaijin Tokyo.
Koshi Washington 90072.
Riyoji San Francisco 60072.
Daiate #58-"LA".
Kiden (dai .... goo) 124 nikansi paragraph. Ryo hi tyuu fu na tin wa
too ti ni te si ha rai no baai wa too kan ta tu ta ma ru tai yoo ma ru tokubetu kan
zyoo ni ku ri i re kekkyoku wa too ke tu seraru (ru) koto to a i na ru nitui (tewa)
Migi ryo hi mi soo fu na ra ba kiden (dai .... go) goo dai 2437 goo matudan
no syu si ni zyun zi fu na tin wo nai ti ba rai to si migi wo koo zyo se ru gai san
gaku no mi go soo kin arita (si) paragraph. Zai .... taisi bei San Francisco
ni ten den se ri. (Wo wo)
Steamer Pares eyerded.
6 Dexj. 41.
From : Shokun,
In the Takakuwa case it seems diflacult to force payment of the fee, the business
being conducted with American capital. The American Trust is secretly conduct-
ing an investigation. It appears that the same person through a partner paid
several thousand dollars addressed to Oimatsu, drawing on an "at sight bill."
Is there no evidence of misappropriation of the funds held at that (your?) bank?
To : Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
Ambassador Kurusu delayed two days by clipper engine trouble left Midway
and arrived here safety 1700/12.
Kita.
#320
Hewitt Inqutey Exhibit No. 57B
MESSAGES ENCODED AND RECEIVED SUBSEQUENT TO 7 DEO. 1941
"PA" 27 Jan. 42
From: Chengoai Thia #010
To : Foreign Minister — Tokyo.
OB
Ho ku hei kohu kyo [ \VH an fu an ] hon shun no tai gun wa ka shu hei ka wo
tokoro Nishite
tai keisateu tai zoo a in se ya ku 1 man su FITJM 1 bu wa 21st St [ pi ru ma ] ga wa
e shiu shi tsu se ru ga te pan no han ge ki YV a hi Icoku kyo sen ni hi ki ka he
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 24
1028 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Shi tai ji tsu. Ma ta sei bu kolcu Tcyo [ mei sa ta ya ] do i pi 8 wa 22nd te ki no
IK AU M/ J^ NI YO RJ.
ku ba ku wo u ke shoku on zei kun 1 i kei gi.
Habada
(in bad shape)
KIERU
The Tai army now on the northern frontier, including police amounts to over
100. On the 21st a portion of them were sent to PIRUMA. At
ME - SATAYA they were bombed by the enemy.
«'LA" 15 Jan 1942
From : Foreign Minister #001
To: Ryoji Hanoi
Kaku new ki shi shu 1475 nikan(shi) (new Para) Kin 3 sen 3 hyaku ju en-/ na
ri / kan pi / wa ta shi / ki ri / hi / yori zo ga ku den so su
Togo.
Note
(No copy of coded msg. on hand — obtained from Army).
?
Re your (claim) of last year 1475
I am telegraphing increased amt of 3310 yen gov't expenses from private fund.
Togo
"PA" (Army) #012
From : Harada
To : Foreign Minister, Tokyo
1. The lower classes who were rounded up in the recent drive were leaders
of the subversive party, and it is only natural that Tailand, at a time when
rumors have been rife and in spite of the fact that it looked like the work of
spies, should put the blame on the Japanese.
2. The problem goes deeper than just tbe dual-nationality question, and enemy
sympathizers of whatever nationality have had to be controlled. All the more
so when you consider the Tailanders who have become Japanese, and it would
set a bad precedent if these were treated like the cases of those who made a trip
some time ago for Mitsubishi. Since there remains the smirch of the Mitsubishi
incident, I plan to carry out a thorough investigation,
28 Jan. 1942
"PA" (Army)
From : Harada # 012 (Re your Msg. # 431) .
To : Foreign Minister — Tokio —
1. kon kai | ken kyo | no | ka kyu | wa | en sho | ha | no I kyo to | ni | shite | sa
ku I kow I shikirini | ryu gen hi go | wo | ru fu | shi | su pa i | ko i | no |
ko I na ru | kakawara (zu) | tai ga wa wa | ho nin | shi zen | ta ini | mono | na
ri I (new para)
2. fu ryo | ka kyo [ no ni ju | koku se ki | na | mon dai | to ni | ta ra zu |
ni
nyo I te ki | ko i sha | wa | na pi to ta ri to mo gen zen ] torishima (ri) | wo |
tsu
yo su I i wan ya [ ko nichi ka ni mi VT koku | se ru tai jin (zen chi en ma i shi
ho wo
FULW I (mi tsu pi shi) shutsu | cho in | son po n) | No | goto (ki) | wo | ko ma ma
ni sum wa | a ku | rei | wo | no ko su | mono | ma ini | I miyori shu kai I ei tai ko
(sei ma i gyo mi A — | mi | tsu pi | shi | to to | tokoro | hi ki | a ri) no | rei | ba |
byo
I ku I wo I ou tsu te | tsu i kyu | suru | yo tei | na ri | on riu pyo tei i
Harada
28 Jan. '42
From : Foreign Minister, Tokyo #038 (Re yr msg. #061)
To : Minister Saigon
Re the victory celebration to be carried out upon the fall of Singapore including
to be presented to the throne, decided upon in the special diet on 19
January I desire (these) details carried out in a suitable manner.
1. The celebrations will be completed by sunset on the day of the triumphal
entry into Singapore (This day will be published by the information bureau)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1029
2. From the day of the fall until the day of the celebration the national flag
will be flown at every door.
On the day of the ceremony
(a) Before noon get all the citizens out doors and commemoi'ate the day
with stories of the imperial army and spirits of the departed. After the
Prime ministers' broadcast #43) tell stories to the children.
(b) Have Shinto & Budhist temples conduct "reporting the fall" cere-
monies and fan, water sprinkling and prayer ceremonies.
(c) Carry out primary school sightseeing (trips) celebration ceremonies
by junior organizations. Have military doctors comfort families; worship
at shx'ines, drinking contests, athletic meets, military contests, military
music. (Emphasize) the savings and other national policies.
Furthermore there are no objections in carrying out these ceremonies, if in
addition to cooperating with affiliated organizations which celebrate according
to local circumstances in China and Manchuria, as long as they do not result in
confusion, if you take any suitable measures avoiding such things as impairing
industrial output, wasting funds, injuring air defense and carrying on lantern
. and flag parades.
Togo
"LA" (Army) 28 Jan. 1942.
From: Foreign Minister Tokio. 038.0 (Re yr msg. 061) (Re My Circular 590 (f).
To : Koshi Saigon
January 19th ji kan kai gi | ni te | Singapore | kan ra ku no sai | nioi(te)
ke shu sen sho | gun ku ga I gyo I ji J ji tsu shi yo ko ke tsu tei se ru | to ko ro I
sono SF D I PB \ f7 L gu no | tori | ni [ tsuki | | o | fukumi | o ki no | ne | hi tsu yo |
ko sai wa shlkaru be ku shi do serarota shi (new para)
1. gyo ji no ji tsu shi | wa | Singapore nyu jo su ki Koshi hi ni kagi (ri)
(ki hi wa jo ho | kyo ku | yori ha tsu pi yo | su) hi bo tsu MA de ni shu ryo |
seshimu ru ko to (new para)
2. kan ra ku | no | hi | yori | nun | jo | shi ki to hi MA de knku ko ni koku ki |
0 I kei yo I su ru | ko to ( new para )
Nyu jo 1 shi ki | to hi wa (i) sho go o ki shi zen koku min wa zai sho nu te
ei rei narabim | ko gun ko ta HE ki nen o | sa sa ge | sori — daijin | no
kan I wa ho so go no ban 43 sho ni sho wa shi (ro) jin ja ji in to wo | kan ra ku |
ho koku sai (ta te ma tsu ru . tsu ge ru) Ozobi sen su kan su i ki gan sai 1 o | o ko
nai (ha) kan ko sho ga ku ko . sho dan tai to \ nioi(te) wa | shu ku ga | shi
ki I 0 I o ko no I ho ka ko gun i | ka zo ku no i mon. jin ja | san pa. bu do i. | tai 1 i
ku I tai kai . ko en kai . bu so . on ga ku ko shin . cho chi ku sono ta koku sa ku kyo
ryo ku | no ji tsu sen o te ki | gi i ji tsu shi | su ru ko to
Na o I shu ku ga gyo | ji ji tsu | shi ni a ta ri | te wa zo sau o so gai shi . shi
zai I o I ran pi | shi ] b5 ku ni kyo ge ke | o | sho seshimu ru ko to | o | sa ku ru |
shu shi yori | nai chi | mi oi (te) wa | cho chin | gyo re tsu . ha ta | gyo re tsu |
to wa I o ko na wa a ru | ko to | to | na ru o ru | to ko ro | China i man shii
1 no oi (te) | wa | chi ho to ku shu | ji jo | ni o ji | o | ma tsu ri | sa wa gi | ni | o chi
i ra za ru gen do | nioi(te) ] kan kei [ ki kan | to | kyo gi | no | ne | te ki gi | so
chi I serare | sashitsukae | na shi —
Togo.
009 26 Jan 42
Report on difficulty in getting good materials for bridge building and the pub-
lising of severe laws in papers.
Methods of handling problems of Eurasians of American parent based on
previous residence.
009— Jan 26, p. m. (Army) "Pa"
Gaimudaijin Tokyo
Too ti ka kyoo no fu ryoo bun si so syuu kei hoo soo u ke u ri no a si tu
no de ma kiden (dai goo) to ba si si min wo sa wa ga se wo ru tokoro zyuu rai
too ha no ei. Bei zin kon ke tu ka zo ku wa tai zin tosite i zen zyuu ni ki kyo si wo
nyoo. Na ka ni mo zen ki ka kyoo to renraku dan mo — nt __ mono a ru mo yoo
ni te poo tyoo zyoo hakarigata(si) za nitui(tewa) tai ga wa ni tyuu i si ke ri on
zei syu tei i kei gi pe?
Harada
Chiengoai
1030 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From: Tokyo
To: Shaghai #710
Net #1947
In relation to your despatch numbered 842 There is no objection to handling
the Belgium Embassy's despatch in the same fashion as an enemy coun-
try's despatch. In Japan no special disposition is being made for Belgians nor Bel-
gian intrests also in China in the cases when the necessity of taking special
methods in order to preserve of your secret message there is no objec-
tion to using same type of handling as for an enemy covmtry.
In relation to
22 Dec. 1941.
"PA" (Army)
From: Tokio.
To : Shanghai 710
Net 1947
842
kiden (dai go) nikanshi (new Para)
fu
Belguim tai shi ji gyo 940 tei deupo (da....g6VAFAVGING0K
wal ta ki koku ni taisung nichi to do yo no tariatsuka(i) mo na shi G I J O (go)
sashitsukae na shi Belgium jin oyoki Belgium ken e ki nitaishi te wa iiai chi
oite wa tokubetsu no so chi mo to ri mo ra za ru mo China gen chi mi oite
kimtsu (dai .... go) ho ji ma ta wa ken e ki ho zon no ken chi yori tokuni
nan ra ka no so chi wo to ru no ki tsu yo a ru baai ni oite wa to ki koku mi okom
jun ji teriatsuka(i) wa re (go) sashitsuka(e) na shi.
(New para) Naw dai Shanghai zai ho toshite shi ko kan cho cho ka ko e ten
den se ri ni tsui ( tewa )
CKIO Q
method handling banking :
gold silver deposits etc.
31 Dec. 1941.
"PA" (Army)
From: Peiping
To: (no heading #759
Kon a kai sen mi to mo nai China ni oite te ki koku gin ko. ju kei kei gin ko to
nitsui (tewo) sa shi wo sa e ta ru kin gin ozohi gin koo ken ho jo ka narabi (ni mi
ha tsu ko ken wo ie)- fuku (mi mu) wa kaku chi BYYM Tsinan) no to ku
shu ji jo tsu mi miyori te sho bun sum koto na ku kon go ni okeru tei koku
no zen pan te ki shi sa shuku to no kan ren ni oite so go te ki kewchi ni ta
chi te kore wo wo hi no ha i i ni mo to ni FIGL Manchukuo miyori sho nyO surn
mono to su
(New para) ki (Para)
1. sa shi mo sa e a ru kin gin ozobi gin ko kew wa sashiatari gun no kan ri ka
ni wo ki Nihon go wa gin ko (sho kin wo you tei su) ni you nyo suru koto za
2. Migi 1. # no kin gin oyobi gin den ken wa gen so ku toshite you nyii sa ki
gin ko wo shite wagaho ni yu ri mi un yo she shi mu ru mono to suru mo hitsuyo
mi 5 ji ki mo yo nyu wo mi kai ri toshite sa shi GC sa e gin ho mitaishi ka shi
tsu ke wo na su koto ma ta wa kan ri wo kai jo sum ta me yo nyti no ha rai to
do shi doku jo su koto wo mito (me) su bu ru koto # (new para.)
o ku ra sho wa yo su re ba yo nyu sa ki gin ko nitaishu ryu ga new sho
(new) no ta me no nen kaku wo ko fu suru koto # (new para)
3. gun wa kyaku kan ri to wo gen chi ko a in kikan no cho mi i nin surn koto
# (new para)
Migil ji mu nikanshi jii yo na ru mono wa chu 6 no shi zu wo ma chi te kore
rei wo ko no koto to shi nai yo sureba gen chi ni oite sho ri iin kai wo so shi ki
pan koto # (new para)
— H ko ho ku shi gen gin no sho ben nitsui (tewa) te wa hon ken to wa
shutsu tsu ko RZ. so chi wo to ru oyohi wo mito (me) wo shite ru mono to su
gyaku ka u BN AMRI
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1031
l.Enemy diplomatic officials in China (Consular officials included) and per-
sons of influence will not be employed in our service. In relation to the payment
of living expenses by enemy peoples, si>ecial budget appropriations will be made
by the Japanese government.
2. All deposits will be frozen, but enemy national will be allowed to with-
draw one months wages, and future matters will be handled by law.
3. It is desired that a system will be developed for exchange of unminted
silver between the Chung-King Bank and the Japanese Silver bank.
"PA" (Army)
22 Dec. 1941.
From : Tokio
To : Net #1950
China ni okern te ki koku gai ko kan (ryoji kan wo (e) fuku (fiai) mu | ) oyobi
wagaho ni oite ei gyo nai shi shu shoku wo yu ru sa zu | sono shu nyu no mi
chi w-o to ze tsu se shi me ta ka | te ki koku jin no sei ka tsu hi shi ben nikanshi
te wa shu ju kan kei cho to kyo gi no kekka | izure baai niyori te wa Nihon
seifu ni oite yo san wo kei jo suru yo a ru koto to narube (fei) ki mo sashiatari
no sochi toshite wa betsuden (dai 2651go) ni yoru koto to se ru nitsui (tewa)
migi niyori so chi serareta(shi) (para)
2. yo kin zen bu wo 1 ka tsu [ bu<— hyo ] shi yo kin na ki shun MJ ni mo
kore niyori shi ben shi ya ru an mo ko I'yo shi ta ru ga wagaho ga shi yii zai
san wo sho bun shi ta ru | ka ta chi | wa kore wo sa ku ru yo a pa wo motte
te be koku jin kan ni nin i ni so go fu jo se shi mu ru yo go shi doku arita (shi) #
(new para)
3. Wagaho su sa shi wo sa e ra re ta ru te ki koku no jii kei kei gin ko no na ma
gin oyobi gin ko ken to wa sa QI ni ko a in YY se tsu iin kai no (go) kettei su
kore wo gun kan ri ka ni wo ki Nihon ga gin gin ko ni yo nyu suru koto to na
ha wo ru tokoro mi ka e ri ka wo u ku be ki te ki san yo nyu gin ko na ki chi ni
oite wa migi son zai suru ko kan to renraku none sho LD serareta(shi) CURB go
Rest garbled
RECEIVED FROM U. S. ARMY — HONO — SUBSEQUENT TO 7 DEC. 1941 COPIES OF THEIB
TRANSLATION
From: CHEFOO
To: TOKIO
Sano Tori.
(KYU BA) 10 CHINA 10 SB. PERU O GERMANY ITO SE
SE BELGIUM TO HAND. BELGIUM OHEHA BEGIN ENGLISH SPELL. S
END ENGLISH O EN NI TONA. EGYPT KANKA HA MAN
SYU KOKU KAI NI. MAN SYU KOKU NA I. RO TYO KA HA
ENGLAND NI. FUTU KOKU ISEI ONAHE. CHINA KATOHA.
ARGENTINA GORU UN (NYU NEA) NI IHA. NE NYU
KYO 1 NIIHA 1 (NYU ZI DO) NO 2 NI IHA. (NYU ZI RAN DO)
NO 3 I ( KA GU A) I HENI. (RO SUTARI KAN) IHENI
I (KO RON BIA) IHENI RE (HON DE YU RASU) KA SENA. URUGUAY NI
IKA. NORWAY KANUGE RE NORWAY FU ZO KU KAN 1 HYO KANA RE.
(ARA SUKA) KARU EN.
#663 A
Jan 19
From: Tokio
To: Shanghai
KIN HYAKU EN KIKAN ATE DENSO SU HARADA . . . SEI ESYU KO
ARITASI
#634 A
Jan 19
From : Tokio
To: Shanghai
JANUARY 20th GEN ZAI NIOI (TE) KE RUKI KAN HO KAN NO DENSIN
FUGO SYO WA ZYU 4 NEN YU GO DAI 5 GO KUN REl NIYO (RI) DENPO
ARITASI PA
#635 A
1032 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Jan 21 1942
From : ?
To: Tokio
E^X5LAND NINITO
KEI. NASEKA.
GERMANY NAOK NA HE.
bp:lgium INI SO iha. roito. oihe mo
NANAHA ANA NARU RO K HESETO. POLAND KA HA
GEN SEL. KAKA SEI SA KA HENAS RU KUN KE
HE OHENA KORUKA.
///0
CHINA HERU. RU SENUN YU HETO SEAKA TOKA
HOLLAND KANA OHE. ORU. 10 SE.
TAI KOKU NAO.
CANADA ISE SEI ISE Nl.
BAI SESEMI SENIZI S NIRUNL
MEXICO RU.
PERU NANA NARU HEO HEHE ARU I, KAONI IKA
BOLIVIA TONI.
EGYPT NISE
MAN SYU KOKU I O S INA.
SPECIAL CODE .... TIHA OK lOI
(NIKARA GA) IHAO INOI
KOSUTA RIKA) IHA OA lOI
SPEC. CODE ... -0 (C SI ZIGO HYO KA. ZEN YO O)
(NYU 1 NE 4) I NA HE I IHE HA.
SPEC. CODE .... I NAHE Kl HEHA PUN SPEC. CODE . . O TO
PARAGUY O TO
URUGUY I HENI MI HBNA
PANAMA KATO S KANA HA (TOKU SIN BAN GO RON HASU
ZI (SON DAI 1 KA NASA SU HYO DAI 2 KA TO OK
KANAHA)
DENMARK RU SE (SONO TAFU ZOKU ISI 5 SATU)
NORWAY KAKA HANA KA HA HE FU ZO KU KANZI HYO
KAHANA. KAHAHE.
(ARA SUKA) RUNL
KASI IKA. ORU. TOE. TONI.
HI ZOKU NIKA. NINA
TUBAKI HETO. HENA.
KA DE RO HETO. HE NA
YANA GI HARU
Rest of msg lost due to station interference. -^
From : Kalgan
To: Tokio 1-20-42
CANADA KARU HE
(KYU BA) KARU HE
PERU ISEO
HOLLAND O O
ENGLAND REPEAT INDICATOR NIKA NA ANIKA HE LST
REPEATER
FRANCE KAKA HA
BELGIUM OHE IKO HENI
HUNGARY HATO
EGYPT HERU) I IRU
TURKEY HA IHA UHA 10
CHINA KASEI
PORTUGAL KANASE
MAN SYU KOKU HEO
ARGENTINA Nil
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1033
SIAM NINA
(KORON BIA) REPEAT INDICATOR INA NAKI NAHE 2ND REPEATER
(NIKA RAG A) 2ND REPEATER
(KOSU TARIKA) 2ND REPEATER
(NYU GI NEA 1ST REPEATER
NYU ZI ZE RAN DO) 1ST REPEATER
(HON ZYU RAsu) KASEHA
(ARA SUKA) KAKA SB (IZYO KOKU MEI NO SITAWA ZEN BU
KANAMO ZI)
#643
From: Chefoo Jan 20.
To : Tokyo
As follows: (KYU BA) May mean emergency, emergency code? or
may be the first in the list of names of countries appearing in this message.
The message is impossible to translate as it is. However, it should be taken
in connection with # 641 A, which shows a similar list of names of countries
with varying we letter groups after them. We may have here a new code in use,
or possibly the suggestion of new code groups to be used for the countries in
future the latter, however, seems pretty crude.
In connection with the former suggestion, should we not consider # 635 A,
which seems to call for a new code to be put in use on January 20th, the date
of this message?
RSS
# 663 A
From : Kalgan to Tokyo Jan 20
(Kindly refer #635, #663, #674. Letter groups after names of countries
seem to indicate that message is in connection with code.)
Groups in Parenthesis in this message are as follows:
Line 2. Cuba
Last line. Colombia
Second page:
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
New Guinea
New Zealand
Honduras
Alaska KAKASE (In the above, that which follows names of countries
are all in Kana)
1/23/42
#643 A
FUNADA
Canada— KARN HE
Cuba— KARN HE
Peru— ISEO
Holland— 00
England— NIKA NA ANIKA HE
France— KAKA HA
Belgium— OHE IKO HENI
Hungary— HATO
Egypt— I IRU
Turkey— HA IHA UHA 10
China— KASEI
Portugal— KANASE
Manchukuo— S¥^ KOKJ HEO
Argentina — Nil
Siam— NINA
Columbia— INA NAKI NAHE
Nicaragua— INA NAKI NAHE
Costa Rica— INA NAKI NAHE
New Guinea— NIKA NA ANIKA HE
New Zealand— NIKA NA ANIKA HE
Honduras— KASEHA
Alaska— E:AKA SE (IZYU KOKN MEINO SITAWA ZEN BU KANAMO ZI)
1034 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Maech 9
From Peiping #227 to Tokyo (Urgent)
Your v?ire No. 160 says, "Official Yoshihara of Kalgan has been ordered as
from the 6th to take a post at DAIYA. Please have him leave immediately". Is
this not a mistake? Please investigate and i-eply immediately.
1254 A
Maech 9
From Tokyo (Urgent) #174 to Peiping
With regard to our wire #718 of last year.
1. Regarding the elevation of the status of Settlements, those who have MOSU
SEX KOSHI (Note: Might not SEI, which follows MOSU in other parts of this
message also, be something else, such as IDE e? S^S^^Mi? The only transla-
tion which would fit the context in any way would be "Voice" so that MOSU SEI
KOSHI would be "sent in their voice" i. e., "reported") are as follows. If the
arrangements of all the offices are completed, we expect to put the establishment
(of elevation of status) into effect on the 1st of April. Although we have re-
ceived reports direct from the chiefs of the branch offices of Paotao and
KAISHUU, we should receive reports from KOOWA and JYONI, so please ar-
range to have these reports in first.
2. With regard to governmental orders ; in the case of colonies only, it will be
alright to put into effect the completion of organization, in line with previous
experience, and after sufficient leadership.
3. With regard to the desires of making the Settlement Chief's position an
honorary one, especially bear in mind the relationship with Article 69 of the
Regulations of Establishment. SPECIAL CODE by way of assurance.
1. HOTEI (Settlement Chief System; howevei*, honorary position).
2. KAISHUU (Council System) No report from JOSHUU Consul.
3. TAAKUU (Council system) DENPOO Consul General has sent report.
However, no report regarding governmental order.
4. TYOOTEN (Council system) Report received from Tsinan Consul
General.
5. KOOWA (Settlement Chief System, Salaried) No report concerning
governmental order.
'6. Paotao ( Settlement Chief System. However, honorai-y) No report from
KOOWA Consul General, therefore, also no report x x x x regarding gov-
ernmental order.
1255 A funada
Mabch 9
From Peiping
#229 to Tokyo
Regai-ding your message #157.
Because of the phenomenal rise in price of building materials, an additional
amount of approximately Yen 10,113.70 (for building materials) and Yen
805.30 ; making a total appropriation* of Yen 35,919.00 which will be necessary or
else the work cannot be completed, we are informed by the workmen. This sit-
uation here makes the (increase) unavoidable. Wherefore, we request that the
difference amounting to Yen 8,212.50 may be sent as a supplementary appropria-
tion. In case this seems, upon consideration, difficult, we will have no recourse
(here) but to reduce the amount (of the building) SPECIAL CODE.
#1260 A
*There seems to be something lack, or in error, in the figures, as they do not
work out properly. The message does, however, indicate something of the diffi-
culties being encountered by the New Order in a rapidly rising cost price.
RSS
From Peiping #220 to Tokyo Mabch 9
Circ #170 to Nanking. Shanghai.
With regard to our wire Extra No. 56
The various offices concerned with the establishment of Settlements have car-
ried out temporary enactment, and there being considerations to make in con-
i
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY « 1035
nection with this, it is desired that arrangements be made to MAI BIRO ( ?) the
rules and regulations. Further the newly established Settlements are Paoting,
Shanhaikwan, Tanshan, KOOWA, Paotao, Haiehow, TYOTEN, Tangku, SINGOO,
Chefoo and Kaifeng, totalling 11.
Further, the matters in the rules, which are short of those necessary towards
putting the matter into effect, (which must be known with regard to putting the
matter into effect) are 1. To put into effect on April First. 2. The book of names
which is to be built up for the first (election) will be built up by the 15th of that
month in accordance with the rules of February 1st, 1943. (In Article 83 of tax
regulations : the first period levy, 6 months from the end of July, of the business
tax ; those having paid income taxes for this period will have votes by virtue of
their having paid a business tax. Therefore, elections are not to be
held will be alright. 3. In respect to the establishment of colonies,
the directors of the colonies will be appointed by the consuls and their i)eriod of
service will be until there is an election which will take place in accordance with
regulations. The question of whether or not these three points are necessary is
being considered.
(Note: It is believed that SHOWA ZYUU 8 NEN, 1943 in above message might
be a mistake for some previous year)
1261 A
FUNADA
Mabch 10
From Peiping #136 to Tokyo
Circ. #181 Tientsin
There being also a strong desire on the part of the military in this area, it
has been decided that following the conference of the heads of legations and
consulates (?), on the 18th. (only one day) at 9 a. m. a conference of consuls
having charge of military affairs (Note: HBIJI which has been translated
"military affairs" might also be translated "everyday affairs") will take place.
Above for your information SPECIAL CODE. Further, Consuls, heads of branch
offices and heads of dispatched offices (might be instead "Higher officials of
consulates, branch offices and dispatched offices") will remain as they are.
From oflBce (s) it will be alright to dispatch consul (s) or Vice Consul
(s) so kindly include this SPECIAL CODE.
1262 A
MA£CH 11
From Shanghai to Hankow
Extra
there has been no order as yet and (we) do not know when the
order will be issued. Details will be sent by mail,
1263 A
Fttnada
March 11
From Tokyo (Urgent)
Circ. #45.5 to Tientsin. Taiyuan. Tatung. Hankow. Canton.
With regard to No. 1, our wire. A 3 GOKUHI (?)
Send in immediately SPECIAL CODE. Further, SPECIAL. CODE.
1265 A
March 11
From Tokyo (Urgent) #019 to Shanghai Minister
Re: my message No. 017
Temporary enactment documents from Hangchow and xxx KAKOO
are at hand. However, no requests as to governmental orders have arrived.
1266 A
Mabch 11
From Tokyo (Urgent) #159 to Canton. Shanghai Minister
Re your wire No. 169.
Concerning the enforcement of the Settlement Chief System, this is approved
as of March 10th. Further, by way of assurance it is advised that there is a
need for revision of the details of regulations for the enforcement of govern-
mental orders.
1267 A
TUNADA
1036 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mabch 11
From Tokyo (Urgent) #032 to Peiping
#183 to ?
Re ; your wire No. 90
With respect to the system of (forming a) treasury examination committee,
please avoid this. With regard to the others, for this time, please follow the
instructions of the Peking (Ambassador), establish in accordance with previous
experience and put in effect. (It will be alright to follow instructions of the
Peking ambassador, establish in accordance with previous experience and put in
effect.)
1268 A
Mabch 11
From Tokyo to Peiping
Extra
Repeat wire with regard to your wire Extra as follows.
Regarding your wire No. 175.
From Yosano to Harada.
The Spanish Legation in Tokyo has at last, recently, received in
Swiss Francs. So far, the arrangements, (red tape) necessary have been com-
plicated and (they) are fed up (disgusted), so that they no longer desire
to as has been done thus far.
1269 A
Fun ADA
March 11
From Taiyuan Urgent
#028 to Tokyo, Kalgan.
Your Circular #612, Paragraph 9.
Hashimoto is at present caring for the writing (secretarial work?) at the
Settlement School, and the telegraphic work alone, and in April the new organi-
zation of the colouy, official business, and the putting into operation of the new
tax for the colony, are all pressing duties If (in addition) this man is
expected to DAIKOO (teach for another; become a substitute teacher?), we
expect that troubles not a few will arise concerning the completion of the
oflScial business. Further, this man's wife j^ at present pregnant and the doctor
has forbidden travel before the end of May, which situation — RU FUTU GAN
this interpreter (Hashimoto) will complete business connected with the Colony
(organization) by the end of May, and completing that stage will be sent on
to his new post in Kalgan early in June regarding which, after an
examination of the situation, we ask that special consideration be given, and
permission be given that the removal to his new post of this interpreter be
postpond until the end of May
#1270 A
RSS
March 12
Urgent
From: Tokyo
To : Peiping Consul General
Regarding your message #221 (1259 A)
1 — The Department Orders at present in force base the power of control in
the settlements under enforcement regulation paragraph 5 (Paragraph 19 of the
Law I'egarding the Duties of a Consul, applicable to occasions when decisions
shall be made by a special order). But this section does not apply to subordi-
nate consular offices and sub-stations.
2 — Having said which, however, in colonies under the authority of a sub-
ordinate consular office or sub-station, there arise not a few circumstances in
which unreasonable situations with regard to the resident head. In
such situations there is no other way but to act in the name of the head
(consul) of the main consulate; so after consultation with the head (or heads)
of the department, we wish to send you a further message regarding the prac-
tical method of handling such situations.
#1274 A
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1037
March 12
From: Peiping
#028 to Nanking MINISTER,
Upon the visit of your excellency, the Ambassador, to this place, the total of
all expenses paid out was Yen 24,898.67, and the sum receivd was YEN 15,000.
The balance of Yen 9,898.67 has been advanced and paid by this office, for
which we request reimbursement by wire. Further, the receipted bills will go
forward to you by air.
#1275 A RSS
Mabch 12.
From: Tokyo #191
To: Peking.
#021 to Shanghai Ambassador.
With regard to Settlement Chief, Settlement System, and the selection of
people (officers?) of the settlement and their treatment (salary, housing, etc.),
please bear in mind the following and instruct appropriately SPECIAL CODE
by way of assurance.
1. The Settlement Chief system will be applicable only when an appropriate
person is being obtained for the settlement. Therefore, the settlement chief
will be thought of as a principle, and to hurry the selection of people for the
settlement will be considered wrong.
2. The settlement chief, without regard for whether he is salaried or honorary,
in connection with the business of the Settlement, (based on the
restrictions of Article 69) will take full responsibility with respect to the failure
of business. Therefore, a spare time settlement chief is wrong.
3. With respect to the Chief of the Settlement and the other leaders, the
character, the insight, etc., will be considered seriously before selection; the
treatment (same as above) also, it is considered, should not be considered merely
from the budget but should be arranged from considerations of the status, (rank)
of the settlement (set by the government) and the candidate himself (it is under-
stood of course that the amount of payment made must not be too mjich).
(Because of these considerations), the chief of the settlement, his assistants and
directors and the treatment of these should be, it is considered, arranged
after your approval is given.
4. Further, with regard to Settlement Chiefs, their assistants, and directors,
consideration is made of the future changes in personnel, and it is desired that
arrangements be made in such a way that people will serve the settlements for
long periods.
1276 A
FUNADA.
Mabch 12.
From : Tokyo
#163 to Canton
Travel and other expenses to the amount of Yen 3,4 0.89 and being sent by
wire to your excellency as agent.
Items
Travel expense for bring out the family of Consul Oozeki, Yen 171.50 ; Return
expense to Japan of the family of Consul Kobayashi, Yen 145.30; Travel ex-
pense of Vice-Consul Uyeda to Nanking and Shanghai, Yen 1,051.00 ; Sato, going
to his post. Yen 111,70; Expense of transferring Shiroto, Yen 167.00.
#1277 A
In the humble judgment of the translator, the balance of the message is not
worth bothering about.
Mabch 12.
From: Peiping
#002 Nanking Minister,
Circ. #185 Hankow, Tientsin, Tsingtao.
Regarding your circular #020.
In our area we are continuing under the organization of the Women's Defense
Association, and have not set up a New Women's Organization as yet. The
1038 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SHUU (Masses, popular) Women's Defense Association is a specialty of the
Army, which is directing it, and goes on the principle that the president (of
the association) should be the leading woman of the region, (here) the wife
of the head of the Settlement being the president, and the wife of the Consul
advisor.
#1278 A RSS
From: Shanghai Maech 12.
# 49S cut in to Nanking, Peiping.
Following the recent suddea drop in emergency messages, the postal receipts
from the sale of stamps etc., and from all other sources up to the 10th (having
fallen) a plan to limit (expenditures?) in the interests of thrift (economy)
has been announced and will be put into effect immediately. (This information
is given out after a conference with the Chief of the TAX KOO Communications
Department, who is in the city on a trip).
# 12©?79 A
From : Manchuli.
# 023 to TOKYO Hsingking.
Although we fully understand that the matter of the arrangement for a train
on the Soviet side for Ambassador Satoo and his entourage, who is to arrive
here on the 19th and that same day enter the Soviet, is in the hands of the Home
Office, we would appreciate a wire about the matter merely that we may have
the information, in this office.
# 12SU A
From : Tokyo Mabch 12,
# 036 to Harbin
Although the matter raised in your ordinary wire of # 84 should be approved,
should not the completion of the work be done according to the estimate for
the building submitted last year? We desire to have the amount NOOJI (?)
(definitely settled?)
# 1281 A RSS
From: Tokyo Makch 12.
# 053 to HANKOW
Regarding your message HI number 154 of February 17th., the announcement
of the regulations regarding promotion (or, advance in salary) was completed
in our Out-bound message # 18 of last December 31st.
# 1282 A
From: Tokyo Mabch 12.
# 182 to Hsingking Minister.
Regarding your message # 169.
As travel for Government Officials appointed abroad FOREIGN
MO KU Yen 8.2(X) special supplementation has been made, and will be
sent in advance by wire. Kindly transfer Mutankiang's share (to that office).
# 1283 A RSS
Makch 18
From: Tokyo
To : Hsingking Minister
Extra-numeral message.
To Communications Official Ogawa, from Nomura.
Replying to your extra-numeral message, both of the gentlemen are going along
^vith the Ambassador on his journey, and are expected to start today, the 13th,
in the evening. After they have started we will communicate with you again.
#1286 q A
March 13
From: Shanghai
¥e #065 To: Canton
To : Consul Kimura, in Hongkong, from Sone
With regard to your humble servant's message of the lOth. Ryuu Suu Ketsu
(parenthesis is probably an explanation of how to write the name in Chinese
characters) sends information that Ryuu Saku Min and others are to sail from
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1039
Hongkong on the boat of the 15th. The Ryuu family have again and
again asked that you would take the trouble to arrange it so that they could
travel along on the same boat, so if that is possible, I beg you to take the trouble
to make the arrangements.
#1287 A RSS
March 13
From : Nanking
#002 to Peiping.
Circ. #021 to Kalgan, Canton.
Regarding your Circ. #186 ( A)
At present they are engaged in urging the organization of a real
Women's Defense Association in Naichi (Japan proper), but here, in general
(we are proceeding) under the direction of this OflBce, the Chief of the Depart-
ment of Military Affairs, The Defense Command, the Chief of Staff, the Com-
mandant of Guards of the Navy, and the Chief of the Military iwlice being
advisors. Matters having to do with defense, and related to military matters,
are first taken up by our office, with the military department involved, and then
we proceed to guide them ; this is the plan under which we are working.
#1288 A
Mabch 8.
From: Tokyo
To: Hankow
We desire that you send a message to Daiya.
#1289 A ■ RSS
Mabch 9.
From CANTON
To # 195 to Tokyo
Circ. # 069 to Peiping, Nanking, Shanghai
Regarding my message # 182.
In view of the fact that the Army authorities here report having recently
received from headquarters (Tokyo), we have been pressing the study of a def-
inite plan for caring for enemy aliens living, and causing them to do their cooking
for themselves jointly, in order to reduce the cost of living, and we have been
making preparations as far as was possible to carry this out in accordance with
your message of December last, 4th and following columns (or lines), and espe-
cially in accordance with column (or, line) 1 and the upper (or, former) part
of column 4 (or, line 4). However, the Army's proposition is something approxi-
mating internment, which we feel is unfortunate (literally, not interesting).
In general, we have expressed our opinion that enemy aliens (with the excep-
tion of those subject to exchange) shoiild be encouraged of their own accord to
form groups, and thus to bring down the expense of living for each individual.
This is sent to keep you informed.
# 1256 A
The above message seems to be connected with # 1214 A.
Mabch 10.
From : Nanking Minister
# 266 to TOKYO
Cir. # 146 to Hsingking, Canton, Hankow and 1 other.
Chungking Broadcast (8th).
1. The United States is dispatching a commission to New Delhi to offer en-
couragement in the matter of the protection of India and the construction of
a route for transportation of supplies to China. This information comes from
a source with direct contact with the White House.
2. The Chungking government has dispatched their Ambaaoade? Minister to
Turkey, Choo I Shun (instructions how to write in Chinese characters) to
Iran to conclude a treaty of commerce, and also to arrange for the exchange of
ministers.
1040 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. According to a dispatch from Angora, the former United States Ambassador
to Moscow, Steinhart, called upon the Turkish Foreign Minister on the 7th,,
and the call lasted for more than an hour; moreover, TAI MI, German
Ambasador, is reported to be returning to his country for consultation with his
government.
4. ^Ffee Chiang Kaishek held a long conference with the British Ambassador
on the 7th.
5. After the arrival, of the visiting commission, Chiang Kaishek will organize
through the Burmese Cultural Society for the observance of a Burma Bay, on
the 8th., when the British Ambassador, Go Tetsu Jo. (Wu Tieh-cheng),
O Bun K6 (Weng Wen-hao), and TIN KA FU (Chen Kuo-fu), are to broadcast
to the Burmese people.
# 1257 A RSS
March 9.
From: Peiping Minister
# 037 to Tokyo
Peter Hansen, a citizen of Germany, resident here, (at present 62 years of
age) in charge of the Yale students abroad of the Peking TOO SOO FU KO
DOO HEI 6 ZYUU GOO (believed to be the name of an institution. Possible,
P(eking) Ms U(niversity) M(edical) C(ollege) "with an average of about sixty
students ?) has expressed the request that we confer with the Home Office
fegarding and secure a vise that he may attendieg a meeting of the Yale
Students Abroad, to be held in the building of the K. K. Laygold Company,
Kyoobashi Ku, Tokyo City. We request that you will send us instructions
in reply by wire.
# # 1258 A
March (
From: Peiping
# 221 to Tokyo
Regarding my message # 220
In the case of the new organization of a settlement in any Consular area or
sub-consular area, tlie head of the mindan ehftHj has formcrly7 according to the
fifth article of the rules, met with the consul and (carried out) the GAITOO
JIKOO (literally, applicable items) appropriate items of the detailed regulations,
and has been accustomed to appoint the members of the settlement governing
body on their first meeting. There is some doubt here, however, as to whether
this method of handling is acceptable, and so we request your wired instructions
in reply.
# 1259 A RSS .
March 11.
From: Nanking
#276 to Peiping,
Circ. #2450 to Tokyo, Hsinking, Canton.
Chunking Broadcast (10th)
1. Chiang Kai Shek spoke, in general, as follows at the gathering of CHU
SUU KI NEN (CHU is probably for CHUGOKU to mean China, but it is not
known what the SUU might be. KINEN denotes anniversary or memorial,
but contact with several Chinese in Honolulu failed to produce any knowledge
of an anniversary on the 9th.) on the 9th.
"During my visit of half a month in India, I received a hearty welcome
from the Indian government and the Indian people. China and India are in
agreement with each other (?) and are great countries. With the nobility and
the leaders of India, I had meetings at which our hearts were opened and the
people have been inspired into cooperating with each other mutually and
without regard for party or faction. The Indian government too, has now
decided to fight. I hope that England will give political freedom to India and
that the power of anti-aggression might be thus strengthened. The idea that
India should be proud of China's 5 year fight has been conveyed to the Indian
people and a recognition of our country has been brought to them sufficiently.
I believe firmly that should Japan invade India, India will have the ability
to destroy Japan.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1041
2. On the afternoon of the 8th, Chiang Kai Shek met the Minister from
Holland and a (military) Attache (under said minister) and also the Aus-
tralian Minister (Igston).
1264 A
FUNADA.
From : Tokyo (Urgent) Makch 11.
#032 to Peiping
#183 to ?
Re ; your wire No. 90.
With respect to the system of (forming a) treasury examination committee,
please avoid this. With regard to the others, for this time, please follow the
instructions of the Peking (Ambassador), establish in accordance with previous
experience and put in effect. (It will be alright to follow instructions of the
Peking ambassador, establish in accordance with previous experience and put
in effect).
1268 A
From: Tokyo Maech 11.
To: Peiping
Extra
Repeat wire with regard to your wire Extra as follows.
Regarding your wire No. 175.
From Yosano to Harada,
The Spanish Legation in Tokyo ah sat least, recently, received in Swiss
Francs. So far, the arrangements, (red tape) necessary have been com-
plicated and (they) are fed up (disgusted), so that they no longer desire down to
as has been done thus far.
1269 A
Funada.
From: Tokyo March 12.
To : Hsingking Minister.
Regarding your extra-numeral message:
The wire forwarded [Handwritten:] (forwarding will be completed) by the
night of the 11th.
#1271 A
From: Tokyo Maech 12.
To: Harbin
Regarding your extra-numeral message of the 7th :
Although we have made investigations here, as per your wire, there is no
evidence of larceny.
#1272 A
Mabch L".
From : Peiping
#186 Cir. to Nanking, Hankow, Shanghai, Canton, Kalgan
Recently, in Japan proper, a union of all the women's organizations was car-
ried out, and in every place a Women's Defense Organization have been set up,
so that one imagines that the form of the new women's organization can be seen
appearing. For the information of this office, we beg to trouble you to inform us
by wire as to the system of controlling the new Women's Organization in your
area.
#1273 A RSS
Frona: Canton March 12.
#210 to TOKYO
Cir. #077 to Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping.
Regarding your circular #181
At noon today the resident Japanese of every class gathered at the Canton
Jinja (shrine), and under the organization of the Resident Japanese Colony, rev-
erence to the flag, bowing to the direction of the Imperial Palace, and prayer
1042 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
before the flag was followed by the reading of the Imperial Rescript by the
Minister, a message of congratulation from the head of the advisory body of the
Colony, greetings from a representative of the Army, and holy voices joined in
the Banzai were had. Thus solemnly and splendidly was the second affair in
celebration of victory carried out. China is involved in the celebration of the
Old New Year through the 15th (of March), but (after that) a mass meeting
of every class (of people) is planned to celebrate the second occasion of victory
in the war.
#1284 A
Maech 13.
From : Tokyo
To: Peiping
Extra-numeral.
To Telegraphic official, Kato, from Nomura.
Your telegram and your volume have been respectfully read, but here we have
been so upset by the events following the death of Onishi, and now the departure
of Mr. Akiyama for the Soviet that I have been unable to carry out your wish.
Please grant a little more time, much as I regret to ask for it.
#1285 A RSS
22 Decembeb 1941.
From: Tokio.
To: Net #1950.
1. Enemy diplomatic officials in China (Consular officials included) and per-
sons of influence will not be employed in our service. In relation to the pay-
ment of living expenses by enemy peoples, special budget appropriations will
be made by the Japanese government.
2. All deposits will be frozen, but enemy national will be allowed to withdraw
one months wages. And future matter will be handled by law.
3. It is desired that a system will be developed for exchange of unminted
silver between the Chung-King Bank and the Japanese Silver bank.
(rest garbled)
Decripted traffic.
31 Decembee 1941.
From : Peiping
To : (no heading) #759.
Method handling banking ; gold silver deposits, etc.
Decrypted traffic.
22 Decembee 1942.
From : Tokio.
To : Shanghai #710
Net #1947.
In relation to your despatch numbered 842 there is no objection to handling
the Belgian Embassy's despatch # in the same fashion as an enemy
countries despatch. In Japan no special disposition is being made for Belgians
nor Belgian interests also in China in the cases when the necessity of taking
special methods in order to preserve of you secret message there
is no objection to using same type of handling as for an enemy country.
In relation to
Decrypted traffic.
Januaey 26— PM— 9
Gaimuaijin Tokyo
Report on difficulty in getting good materials for bridge building and the
publishing of severe laws in papers.
Methods of handling problems of Eurasions of American parent based on
previous residence.
Habada.
Decrypted traffic.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1043
28 January 1942.
From : Foreign Minister Tokyo #038 (re your m-s-g #061)
To : Minister Saigon
Re the victory celebration to be carried out upon the fall of Singapore includ-
ing to be presented to the throne, decided upon in the special diet on
19 January I desire these details carried out in a suitable manner.
1. The celebrations will be completed by sunset on the day of the triumphal
entry into Singapore (this day will be published by the Information Bureau).
2. From the day of the fall until the day of the celebration the national flag
will be Uown at every door.
On the day of the ceremony —
(a) Before noon get all the citizens out doors and commemorate the day with
stories of imperial army and spirits of the departed. After the Prime Min-
ister's broadcast #43 tell stories to the children.
(b) Have shinto and Bud-d-hist temples conduct "reporting the fall" cere-
monies and fan, water sprinkling and prayer ceremonies.
(c) Carry out primary school sightseeing (trips), celebration ceremonies by
junior organizations. Have military doctors comfort families ; worship at shrines,
drinking contests, athletic meets, military contests, military nuisic, (emphasize)
the savings and other national policies.
Furthermore there are no objections in carrying out these ceremonies, if in
addition to cooperating with aftiliated organizations which celebrate according
to local circumstances in China and Manchuria, as long as they do not result
in confusion, if you take any suitable measures avoiding such things as impairing
industrial output, wasting funds, injuring air defense and carrying on lantern
and flag parades.
Togo.
27 Jan. 1942.
From : Chengoai Thia #010
To : P^ireign Minister, Tokyo
(-garbled)
The Tai army now on the northern frontier, including police amounts to over
10,000. On the' 21st a portion of them were sent to Piruma at me
Sataya they were bombed by the enemy.
Harada.
28 Jan. 1942.
From Harada #012 (Re your msg #431).
To : Foreign ^linister, Tokio.
1. The lower classes who were rounded up in the recent drive were
leaders of the subersive party, and it is only natural that Tailand, at a time
when rumors have been rife and in spite of the fact that it looked like the work
of spies, should put the blame on the Japanese.
2. The problem goes deeper than just the dual-nationality (luestion, and
enemy sympathizers of whatever nationality have had to be controlled. All the
more so when you consider the Tailanders who have become Japanized, and
it would set a bad precedent if these were treated like the cases of those who
made a trip some time ago for Mitsubishi. Since there remains the smirch of
the Mitsubishi incident, I plan to carry out a thorough investigation.
Jan. 21.
681 A
From : Canton
To : Naking, Peking. Shanghai
Since the investment of Hongkong, our army has lost no time in using trans-
ports, and opening up transportation, although the permits were limited (at flrst)
onlv to those who were actuallv engaged in carrying on the flghting, but from
the' 15th of this month, the SHIROGANE MARU, GUYO MARY and 6 other
bottoms, scrapped ships of the NAI KA Transport Co., have been put into
operation from the controlled territory, and the general populace and freights
are being carried.
However, between this place (Canton) and Makao and between Hongkong and
Makao, traffic has not yet been opened up.
7971G— 4G— Ex. 149, vol. 2 25
1044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
17 Jan. 1942.
603A
From : Tok.vo
To: Hsingking
When we had an interview with the diplomatic representative (of
Rnssia, the context shows,) on the 13th., (we said that) from the news which
came to this office from a certain daily news agency, it was stated on the
authority of a Chinese telegram in November that an American vessel had
been sunk as the result of striking a mine. The United States, after some
difficulties, had ignored this matter, it was reported, but (we inquired) if he
did not think this was an American tanker : also, we asked if there were
absolutely no case of Russian vessels sinking after striking a mine. The
diplomatic representative denied absolutely that there was any truth in the
former statement; regai'ding the latter statement he said that last year
government a Soviet vessel struck a mine in Pita (Peter) Bay and re-
ceived injuries, but was able to make port safely. Aside from this, there
had been no cases of Soviet vessels striking mines, and this he wished received
as his reply.
604 A
From : Tokyo 17 Jan. 1942.
To : Hsingking
The Soviet new.spapers are reporting on the 15th, under the caption
"From the Progress of the Greater Asia Struggle" under dateline of the 12th the
public announcenient of the United States that since the opening of iiostilities
that country has sunk 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, .5 destroyers, 1 gunboat, 1 mine-
sweeper, 10 transports, 4 freight ships, total 29 ships. The losses of the
American Navy are reported to be 1 battleship, 3 destroyers, 1 minelayer, 1 tar-
get ship, total (All lost in the attack on Hawaii.)
131 A
From : Peking 19 Dec. 1941.
To : Nanking
Shanghai
Canton
Hsingking
News from Yenan-Fu (Communist Headquarters)
Chungking broadcast (says that) taking example from the Axis strategy
of attack, the Allies received the suggestion that an immediate attack upon
Japan should be attempted. The Yenan-Fu Kaiho Nippo (writes) already in
point of fact we are allies with Great Britain and the United States. The war
against Japan is nothing more than a screen, this war merely offering an oppor-
tunity for the Anglo American front to develop another attack upon the Axis
Powers, which is something we should find it important to realize at this time.
Among the Axis Powers, the most important is Germany, and the harming of
Germany is the main purpose of the world-wide strategems. That is to say,
taking advantage of the crisis in Germany is, as a craft (strategem) the expan-
sion of the line of operations on the Continent is most important. The impor-
tance of the war in the Pacific to the British and Americans is clear, and the Im-
perial command for China in this connection is the pressing of war against ag-
gressor nations regardless of consumption (of materials) and the overthrow of
Hitler will be victory for China (?) so at the present time cooperation with the
Allies plus the greater and greater extension of the policy of long-time resistance,
is the method of hastening the total victory of those opposed to the Axis Powers
This is the attitude which the paper (Kaiho Nippo) explains.
130A
From : Peking 19 Deo. 1941.
To : Nanking
Shanghai
Hankow
Yenan-fu report
The official newspai>er of the Chinese communist party Kai Ho Niti To (Kaiho
Jih Pao) in the editorial on the 13th said that Japan's purposes in the present
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1045
war are to incite peoples of all of the south sea areas in order to secure the
resources (of that area), expel British and American Interests — act in union
Germany and Italy to increase her power. Japan's southward
advance is, at the same time, the strengthening of the policy of encircling
southwestern China, and also of grabbing the Pacific, and is truly inseparable
from the China Japanese war.
On this critical occasion you (?) must calmly build up a battle line of all anti-
Japanese parties of the Pacific countries. All of China military forces must at-
tack actively; together with this the 8th Route Army, and the new Fourth
Army must open up Rokoho opposition, begin a counter action against border
friction, stirring up the Chinese people of the South Seas against the Japanese.
Make most important duty of stirring an anti-war feeling among the people
of Formosa, and strengthening the plans toward carrying this out.
(Funada)
XI
100 A
Dec 18 0443
From : Buenos Aires
To: Tokyo
Today the seventeenth all local papers carried the speech of the Navy Minister
before the Diet in Tokyo, showing great respect. (In the report of American
losses) 3 battleships, a mine layer, transport, (one each?) but in addition the
loss of 1 aircraft carrier, which is in the present report, seems not to have been
reported, so I ask your honorable inquiry into the matter.
/S/ HOBIKIEI,
Japanese Ambassador.
77 A
Dec 16.
From : Nanking
To : Tsingtao, Amoy, Hsingking, Peking, Kalgan, Tientsin.
Regarding the rejection by the British military in Hongkong of the well inten-
tioned advice (to surrender) on the 16th the special propaganda chief made the
announcement ; the rejection by British of the humane advice tendered by Japan
lays upon the barbarous British the entire responsibility of the exposure of a
million several hundred thousand compatriots to the horrors of war. Our com-
patriots ( ?) in Hongkong, Yotai, notice of subjugation compatriots in line
with the national policy we are pushing the plans in connection with the
greater Asia war in a positive manner, and at this time we appeal to you i)eople
to strive from the protection of your Asiatic country and drive out (expungel)
the humiliation of your country which has been practised by the English for a
hundred years. I earnestly desire that you will work for the revival of EJast
Asia along this line he gave out his interview.
From : Tsinan Dec 16 81 A.
To: Tientsin
Peking
Nanking
In the tactics employed against the harming of the road (railroad) by the
local maintainence guild, all of the Chinese living within your area (our area?)
have been commandeered, materials and domestic animals have as far as possible
been confiscated, and everything possible has been carried out to prevent (coiling
up — the word used of snakes coiling to spring). About a month and a half have
passed since the beginning of these tactics and the eflScacy carrying out
was becoming evident, then the Japan Anglo-American war began and again
there are evidences that the enemy in this area are beginning to crawl about
again.
The army lines of communication and the regular communication sys-
tems are constantly sabotaged (it is attempted). On the night of the 9th, 10 ri
(25 miles, if Japanese "ri" ; 39.30 kilometeres. If Chinese "li" is intended, then
the distance would be 6.54 kilometers). South of Daimon station, on the Shimpo
line, and attempt was made upon the roadbed (no harm was wrought) ; on the
Kosai line, in the neighborhood of Senshu village a freight train was
1046 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
wrecked : and the like. This chief in charge of the line, and the guard have been
vi-tirned that in case of trouble due to carelessness, they cannot esca];>e punish-
ment. According to Okai Sen, in that section after the local police had
applied appropriate encouragement (or pressure) the conduct of the Chinese,
while not showing anything which could be definitely defined, has, nevertheless,
steadily shown a tendency to trust more than formerly, with the arrival of the
news of Japanese victories. This information is sent for your inform'atioa.
March 2.
From Tokyo to Manchuli
Ambassador Sato and entourage (Minister Morishima, secretaries Takeuchi
and Yuhashi and 5 other people) are expected to arrive at your city at noon on
the 19th and then enter Soviet Territory on the same day. Please arrange.
1200 A
Maech 2.
From Shanghai to Tientsin. Peiping ?
The smallpox cases in this area during February (new cases) numbered 21 of
which 11 were Japanese and the total of cases since the beginning of the year
has come up to 50 of which Japanese are 27.
1201 A
March 2.
From Tokyo to ?
The trend (or "indications") in 1 of your wire (* ) approved (or "under-
stood"). However, (perhaps, "the wording of the wire leads to misunder-
standing" and so please explain to that the is not higher
than the starting point.
1202 A
FUNADA.
March 2.
From ? to Canton
Official Ogawa, who is in Tokyo has been Siiecial Code as from 2nd (first name
"Seiichiro"). If possible, have OflScial Ishikawa leave (perhaps for a new post)
without waiting for arrival of Ogawa.
1203 A
March 2.
From Tokyo to Shanghai
Please send Special Employee Fukada (first name "Ippei") to Tokyo on a
temporary schedule of about a ten day stay in Tokyo for the purpose of consulta-
tion on business.
1201 A
March 2.
From Tokyo to ?
Special Code with regard to hiring on the spot
(Perhaps, "Please arrange for) additional employment of No. 20 Shi-
nichi Matsuo and No. 24, Hideo Takahashi. ' With above, have been
decided.
1205 A
Funada.
March 2.
From ? to Canton
Official Ogawa, who is in Tokyo has been SPECIAL CODE as from 2nd (first
name "Seiichiro"). If possible, have Official Ishikawa leave (perhaps for a new
post) without waiting for arrival of Ogawa.
1203 A
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1047
March 2.
From Tokyo to Shanghai
Please send Special Employee Fukurta (first name "Ippei") to Tokyo on a
temporary schedule of about a ten day stay in Tokyo for the purpose of consulta-
tion on business.
1204 A
March 2.
From Tokyo to ?
Special Code with regard to hiring on the spot
(Perhaps, "Please arrange for) additional employment of No. 20 Shinichi
Matsuo and No. 24, Hideo Takahashi. With above, have been decided.
1205 A
FUNADA.
March 2.
From Shanghai to Tokyo
With regard to the case of the employment of Noboru Nakano to take the place
of Hosokawa as temporarily enacted by means of Confidential Wire No. 170 of
January 22nd, this year, please wire all related information immediately.
1206 A
March 2.
E'rom Tokyo to Paotao
Although, because (he) is an assistant, (he) has been considered on the the
same basis as a special employee if it is difficult to hire him at 110 Yen,
please wait until a personal history has been submitted and then select.
1207
March 2.
From Tokyo to Peiping
Former Special Code, Konji Hasegawa has been Special Code as from February
28th ; he has been appointed to take post at your office temporarily and will be
ordered to leave by himself about the middle of March.
Please wire (convey to) cotincillor.
1208 A
FuNADA.
From Shanghai to Tokyo March 2.
With regard to the case of the employment of Noboru Nakano to take the
place of Hosokawa as temporarily enacted by means of Confidential Wire No.
170 of Janttary 22nd, this year, please wire all related information immediately.
1206 A
From Tokyo to Paotao Makch 2.
Although, becau.se (he) is an assistant, (he) has been considered on the
same basis as a .special employee if it is different to hire him at 110 Yen,
please wait until a ijersonal history has been submitted and then select.
1207
From Tokyo to Peiping March 2.
Former Special Code, Kanjl Hawegawa has been Special Code as from Febru-
ary 28tli ; he has been appointed to take post at your office temporarily and will
be ordered to leave by himself about the middle of March.
Please wire (convey to) cotmcillor.
1208 A
Fun ADA.
1048 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From Shanghai to Tokyo March 2.
With regard to the case of the employment of Noboru Nakano to take the place
of Hosokawa as temporarily enacted by means of Contidentlal Wire No. 170 of
January 22nd, this year, please wire all related information immediately.
1206 A
From Tokyo to Paotao March 2.
Although, because (he) is an assistant, (he) has been considered on the same
basis as a special emplo.vee if it is diflScult to hire him at 110 Yen, please
wait until a personal history has been submitted and then select.
1207
From Tokyo to Peiping Maech 2.
Former Special Code, Kanji Hawegawa has been Special Code as from Febru-
ary 28th; he has been appointed to take post at your office temporarily and will
be ordered to leave by himself about the middle of March.
Please wire (convey to) councillor.
1208 A
FUNADA.
From Tokio to Hsinking March 2.
Because we find, after consultation with the War Department, that there is a
necessity of reinvestigating Si Mei (perhaps names), please send back report
on your examination along with papers relating to this affair.
•1209 A
3-5-42 Yamashieo.
BECBET
Signal Office,
Hawaiian Department,
March 4, J9i2.
Memorandum to G-2:
Herewith messages #1210-1224 for your information.
For the Department Signal Officer :
G. A. BiCHEB,
Lt. Col. Signwl Corps.
From Canton to Tokyo March 3.
Extra
With regard to your wire (extra) (# — ) of the 3rd.
Wire No. 71 from NAN DAI (perhaps "Southern Platform" i. e., "Southern
Station") to this office should have been replied to" in General Wire No. 48
of February 20th, but we are sending again by way of assurance.
1210 A
From Shanghai to Tokyo Maech 3.
Extra
From Takahashi to Telegraph Officer Akiyama : How is the (previous) ques-
tion coming? Please reply as to progress made.
1211 A
From Canton to Nanking, Shanghai, Peiping, Tokyo Maech 4.
With regard to taxation in China as assessed at the present time, it is thought
that studies are being made in the central office. In this area, it has been de-
cided, in view of the special situation here, that an agency for the purpose
of studying this question, the China Tax Rates research committee would be
formed through the advice of the SANSHOO (may be "Three Leaders?") meet-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1049
ing, with the local Chamber of Commerce and the league of Commodity Im-
porters and Distributors as a center, and that this agency would be made an
agency of inquiry (perhaps "on tax matters").
1212 A
Fun ADA.
From Amoy to Tokyo Makch 4.
And with regard to your wire 1212 of last June.
Police Chief TIN KAN. Policemen, Tadashi Harada, Eichi Taniguchi,
Ankichi (?) Nakamura, SI JUN SEI (?) above are higher investigators. Police
Chief RIN KEI (perhaps "position held concurrently") with that of Policeman.
RYUU TEN SIN ( ?) (above ) Chief of Police, Zempei Yamashita, Takashi
Asakura, Ryuzoo Fukumoto (above Special Duties).
1213 A
Funada.
From Canton to Tokyo, Hankow, Nanking, Shanghai, Swatow and Hoihow
Makch 4.
With regard to your wires Nos. 133 and 400.
Although the fact of our wire No. 173 is present (Although the information set
forth in our wire No. 173 are true) and although we should (eventually) have
to carry on in accordance with above (information), if a request (or "petition")
has to be submitted every month with respect to facility in obtaining loans as
dealt with in this question, it would mean an unending series of repetitions.
Thus, it is thought that one application (or "petition") should cover at least a
period of about 6 months, in order that control and business may be facilitated.
Also with respect to the beginning of your wire No. 400 : the proclamation on
this question has been considered in this city since quite eax'ly The
leadership and organization has been towards cutting down the living expenses
of enemy citizens as much as possible, but if these enemy citizens are to con-
tinue as at present, to live separately and to live under conditions no different
than previous to the war, we cannot hope to limit the living expenses of these
people merely by means of leadership (encouragement). In our area, (there-
fore) a study is being made with regard to the advisability of housing all of the
enemy nationals in a definite area, of having them live jointly and of them letting
them cook and eat jointly. If this is possible, the living expenses of these
people will fall 100 yen per head, or 500 yen for 5 people, as reported in our wire
as aforementioned (" ).
1214 A
Ftjnada.
Mae. 4.
From : Canton
To: Shanghai, Peiping, Tokio, Nanking
The transition (or changes) as is now taking place is a matter of concern to
us for the preservation of peace and Therefore, measures e to
meet this should be immediately effected. Due to the disruption of trading on
the authorized (legal) lists as well as wttb the under-cover transactions, it is
necessary to strengthen control of the market as much as iwssible. Also to
effect reforms in currency ■( ( ?), and to contrive measures of Concrete
measures will be effected in Davao in the near future.
Of course, it is doubtful whether the above remedial measures are more urgent
than those concerning mobilization ; however, locally measures will be taken to
counteract violent economic changes from the tenth.
1215 A
Mar. 4.
From : Nanking
To: Tokyo
Please remit by cable the sum of 36,703.48 yen to cover costs of the following :
31,164.65 yen for steel fencing (including 65 yen for changes in construction) as
per agreement ; 5,538 yen 3 sen for young persimmon plants ; and 80 son to cover
shortage for trees already paid for and transplanted.
1216
1050 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From: Tokyo March 4.
To : Hankow
The proclamation (Number 7) announcing (taking FUTUROO as an error for
FUKOKU, announcing, proclaiming; which modifies the noun kokuji, proclama-
tion— a not unusual tautology in Japanese), the setting up of a Branch office of
the Greater Asia Bureau (in Hankow?) and the official opening of that branch
office on the 28th., as well as the order Number 4 regarding the superin-
tendent of this branch office, and the area of his authority (this area of authority
being that suggested in your telegraphic message number 12), were officially
published in the Government Gazette of March 4th. UN (no meaning can be
assigned) __It is desired that you send a wire (in confirmation of this, or recogni-
tion of this ?) to the Greater Asia Bureau.
#1217 A
From: Tokyo March 4.
To : Shanghai
Regarding your telegram number 4 :
Yen 7,811 are being advanced from the Incidental Actual Cost Fund for the
price of impliments and garments for Japanese fencing, including the hakama
(a pleated skirt-like garment). Yen 2,627 will be sent forward by wire from the
WA TASHIKIRI (which we interpret to be a fund from which payments can
be made without voucher) for MEN SOMO (Men = cotton ; some kind of a
cotton garment), Chinese clothing, and accessories. FUN (Is the character to
divide, Chinese reading, used for STOP ?) (Cf. UN in previous message).
Further, we desire a wired message giving detailed estimates on the basis of
the various commodities, (in explanation) of your appended statement in your
telegrams giving a total for the loan fund of Yen 3,342.
#1218 A
From: Canton March 4.
To : Tokyo
WA , of this office, has never traveled to Sansootoo (which we presume
to be a place name) . Since the situation in that place is not clear to us, we desire
to send En Kido. the official entrusted with such matters, at this time, on a
two weeks trip (The exegencies of travel make such a time allowance necessary)
to investigate the situation of the Japanese resident there, and of the schools
and for this trip we ask your approval (REN RA E; not clear; possibly, "con-
tact" (renraku) something.)?
#1219 A
From : Peiping March 4.
To: Tokyo
(We have found this message practically undecipherable)
Line 1 1 your wire number 57 and the .same number 38.5 SOO (School RAI
SA YOO KOKU subject) In regard to __ RA Kai __ being, original document
BOO number in N GO PYU have do not have GI RYOO
SERARURU TO KO next (or succeeding) message number 87
GOO TYOO and regular report regarding the residences, regarding
FUN Within this month should be sent in.
#1220 A
March 4.
From : Tokyo
To: Shanghai
Special employee and radio expert Uchida, who is employed in the fifth depart-
ment of the Investigation Bureau, being about to depart by air route on the 4th,
we desire to advance temporarily (or jperhaps, he desires us to advance tem-
porarily) the expenses for his stay here and the TIN HOO (?) of the purchase
cost of supplies.
#1221 A RSS
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1051
From Tokyo to Nanking March 4.
With regard to your wire No. 190.
Please v.-lre contents of No. 1100 as that wire has been lost through fire. Fur-
ther, NO. 99 has already been approved by means of Return Regular (wire)
No. 3800.
1222 A
From : Tokyo to Shanghai March 4.
18S bundles (rolls, or batches) of BKIN ZAI, (perhaps TEKKIN ZAI for "steel
rods" or "steel building materials"), 10 tons and 298 kilograms have been shipped
on Taiei Maru which left Moji on Feb. 27th. KOO SIN
1223 A
From : Shanghai to Tokyo March 4.
your wire No. 1329 of last year.
As yet please after
1224 A
FUNADA.
sexjrets
Signal Office,
Hawaiian Department,
March 6, 19J,2.
Memorandum to G-2 :
Herewith messages #1225-1239 for your information.
For the Department Signal Officer :
G. A. BlCHEK,
Lt. Col. Siffiial Corps.
From Tokyo to Hoihow March 5.
With regard to your wire No. 19.
Will send upon issuance of permits, 2 thousand 7 Yen each from Real Govern-
ment Expenditure and 1655 Yen (each) from Special relief and control fund,
Miscellaneous, as follows :
Vice Consul Hirata, Kikuchi, Kaneko (officials) (for 3 persons from Real Gov-
ernment Expenditure).
Thi-ee sets of equipment, their number and use as follows :
Reception room hat racks, 3.
Reception room long chair, 2. Out of three, one will be one used at present.
Inside Chair, 4, out of 6, 2 will be ones used at present.
Round table, 3.
Tea Table, 3.
Dining table for dining room, 3.
Side board for Dining room, 3.
Chairs for dining room, 18.
Business desk for library, 3.
Chair for Library, 3.
Bookshelves for Library, 3.
Miscellaneous shelf for living room, 3.
Inspector Fujii, Assistant inspector Imai, and Omura (for three people)
from Miscellaneous Special Relief and Control Fund.
Following are three sets of equipment, their numbers and use.
Hat rack for reception room, 1, used by Inspector Fujii.
Long chair for reception room, 1. the one presently in use.
Inside chair, 2, same as above.
Round table for reception room, 1, same as above.
Tea table for reception room, 1, same as above.
Dining tables for dining room, 3.
Sideboards for dining room, 3.
Chairs for dining room, 18.
Business desks for library, 3. Those being used presently.
1052 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Chairs for library, 3.
Bookshelves for library, 3.
Miscellaneous shelves for living; room, 3.
1225 A
Fun ADA.
MARCH 5.
From : Shanghai
To : Canton, Tokyo
Regarding the outgoing telegram from Consul Katagiri of Kiukiang to his
excellency.
Umeda, Chief police, was enroute to Shanghai, changing his post of duty,
when he received a telegram indicating an emergency (or sudden change) (in
the condition of) his wife, and immediately turning back is now enroute again
to Kiukiang. The lady, however, is not yet out of the critical state and requires
nursing, so this oflSce has received a telegram (requesting) the postponement of
his shift of post for tlie present. The above circumstances seem unavoidable to us,
so we request that you will take the necessary steps to secure especial per-
mission.
#1126A
March 5.
From : Tokyo
To : Kalgan
Referring to your message number 127.
While (normally) the total cost of the repairing of the straw mats in the
Consul's residence HAMA (MA=room, and this may refer to some special room
in the residence) and also in the unoccupied residences should be paid (from
headquarters), in other government offices (it is the custom) for the resident in
the official residence to pay one quarter of the cost of the repairs and this we
desire to have assessed. SPECIAL CODE Yen 506.62 and from the Police Out-
right Expenditure Fund Yen 2,209.21 SPECIAL CODE. Further, as regards the
portion for the unoccupied residences, it will be made an especial grant this once
only. Hereafter when a resident is assigned, tlie necessary repairs expense
shall be defrayed from the appropriations for that purpose.
#1227 A RSS
March 5.
From : Tokyo
To : Swatow
March salary and special allowance; His Excellency Yen 893.69; MAEJIMA
SPECIAL CODE (is this not proliably Vice-Consul, as in following message?)
Yen 581.21; (including balance of February salary plus removal and family al-
lowance) ; Yoshida, Yen 280.49; Kawasaki Yen 242.74; Total, Yen 1,998.13 w'hicli
will be sent (by wire=the probable meaning of SPEC CODE) to your excellency
as agent.
#1128A
March 5.
From : Tokyo
To : Amoy
March salaries and special allowances to a total of Yen 3,582.06, will be sent
by wire to your excellency as agent.
Items :
Your Excellency, Yen 1,220.38; Consul Mizumoto, Yen 772.49; Vice-Consul
Imashiro, Yen 518.44; Gi 285.09; Tadashi, and Aoki, each Yen 212.49;
Sugihara, Yen 112.98 (Yen 28.68 and his special allowance are earmarked for
repayment) ; Morii, Yen 247.70. The end.
#1229A RSS
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1053
From : Tokyo March 5.
To : Hsingking
This message, number #1230 A, is so full of lacunae that any translation
seems impossible. It is one of several such messages from Tokyo to the Hsing-
king Consulate, apprizing them of the news that is appearing in Russian papers.
There also seems to be some report of an article in the Rome Times (if there is
such a paper) regarding Soviet-Japanese relations, and something about the
Soviet (Consulate and staff in Japan. Unless the lacunae can be filled in some-
what, re-grouping would probably accomplish nothing.
#1230 A
From : Tokyo March 6.
To : Canton
Extra numeral message.
Your messages number 44, number 53, and numbers 141 and 151 being missing,
we desire a clear cut answer regarding them. (Or possibly an "explanatory
answer").
#1231 A
From Shanghai to Peiping, Tientsin, Tokyo, Nanking March 6.
Collection of taxes at Shanghai KAI KAN (would probably mean "Association
Hall" but it is thought that SHANGHAI KAI KAN is the name of an official
building in Shanghai) for the month of February as follows, totalling 9363 Yuan,
and amounting to 40 percent of amount for same i)eriod last year, (details will
be sent by mail).
Tax collections 8169
Sur-taxes (assessments and SUISAI (probably, "collections of delinquent
taxes"). 443
Special Sur-taxes (Imports and transfers) 731.
Tonnage taxes, 20
Total 9S63 (Please do not publish for outside purposes)
1232 A
From Peiping to Tokyo March 6.
Although we have rented the Sanitation (or "Sanitary") KONSU (might be
abbreviation of "KONSUTORAKUSHION" for "Construction" or "Construc-
tions"), the repairs necessary throught the houses in order to make them usable
will take a long time, and therefore, although we have (or "there are") quite a
few people who are being transferred here and are arriving with their families,
the situation' is such that there are no houses in which to place these people.
Therefore, as a temiwrary measure (or "a measure to meet the immediate situa-
tion") the houses (mentioned) in temporary enactment of our wire No. 182,
are necessary, and we ask that you send us the necessary amount for rentals
after arranging for permission to rent said houses.
1233 A
Fun ADA.
March 6.
From Manchuli to cut in Tokyo, Hsinking
ROZOHATUKII (the name of the German in question) a 48 (?) year old
German National, who arrived in Manchuria from Berlin in December of 1939
and has been head of the . a German transportation firm, here, wishes to
evacuate to Dairen together with his family (wife and 1 daughter or nine daugh-
ters). We find that the situation (political) is alright, and that (this person's
records (?) are authentic, but would like to know if we may issue a visa (would
like to know if you have any objections) to issuing) to him, (to them). Please
reply immediately.
1234 A
March 6.
From Shanghai to Canton
From Nakane to Vice Consul Ueda.
Matsumoto is at present holding an important (a necessary) post with the
I\inds Chief (chief of the department of capital) that gets at the present time
1054 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a salary (a treatment) of about 700 yen per month. If he is to be raised to an
assistantship in the near future, but cannot obtain more than he presently gets,
it will be difficult to keep him on (prevail on him). So, in that case, will you
search for another suitable man.
1235 A
Fun ADA.
March 6.
From Tokyo to Canton
We have already sent your wire No. IGo by means of our wire No. 139.
Regarding No. 167 we are now (probably "carrying on consultation
with ")
Regarding No. 171, although there has been no (maybe "objections")
from all the (maybe "department heads''), it is believed that the message
has been wired to the assistants, (secretaries) of these (people).
1236 A
March 6.
From Tokyo to Nanking
There is a supply of 58 thousand yen to cover expenses of buying land for
your office The ^Minister (of cabinet) that plans be made within
the year and a part of tlie land (for office buildings) be surveyed, and
that enactment be carried out temporarily after proper investigation. Also, in
this case the training room (or "area") the plan is desired.
1237 A
Fun ADA.
March 6.
From Tokyo to Nanking
Regarding your wire No. 36, will send after obtaining permit, (probably
"1140 Yen") out of the fund for police offices under Consulates in China,
as being the amount of expenses to the end of the year
1238 A
March 6.
From Tokyo to Shanghai
With regard to your wire Regular No. 463
The BAN NOO. — ("Bannoo" means omnipotent, Bannooyaku, a cureall) ac-
cording to our experience is not very efficient and goes out of commission very
often, and so w^e have not been giving permits on it. It is difficult therefore
to approve of it and ask that the 825 Yen be sent back.
1239 A
FUNADA.
SECRET
Signal Office,
Hawahan Department,
March 7, 19^2.
Memorandum to G— 2 :
Herewith messages #1240^1253 for your information.
For the Department Signal Officer :
G. A. BiCHER,
TA. Col. Signal Corps.
From : Tokyo March 6.
To : Nanking
March allowances for Shiotaki and Takemitsu, both special employees, is being
sent by wire to your excellency as follows :
(1) Shiotaki's share, including the special allowance, Yen 1,062.50; (2) Take-
mitsu, DOKU KIN (the statement of a sum of money, in Japanese, usually
begins with the character KIN) Yen 544.36. Total Yen 1,606.86.
#1240A
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1055
From : Tokyo March 6.
To : Shanghai
The plan is for Asakura to leave Kobe by the Taiyo Maru on the 17th, and
everything connected with his landing, place to stay and the like is the respon-
sibility of the Contact Department of your ofBce.
#1241 A
From: Tokyo March 6.
To : Nanking
To Councilor Nakamura from Minister Nichidaka.
Mr. Yasuoka will be busy throughout the entire year and will have no leisure
until early next year, so he desires to resign from the position as a formality.
#1242A RSS
March 6.
From : Tokyo
To : Kalgan
KI SU FUTU (possibly, KIDEN or KISIN FUKU=Your reply wire) Ke-
garding (your reply wire) #124:
SA __ POO SPECIAL CODE. (Can't do anything with it)
Yen 6,000 Special Code. (KIN comes before and NARI after a statement of
a sum of money, in Japanese).
Yen 6,000 from the Special Police Outright Expenditure Fund.
Yen 2.000 From the Outright Expenditure Fund of the Expense budget of
the City Police (dep't ?) resident in the Consulate.
(KAN=officiul, KOO=public ; indicate the general classifications in the Japa-
nese governmental budget, we believe. MO KU we do not understand).
#1243 A
From: Tokyo - March 6.
To : Shanghai #2.57
We desire to have Secretary Shimoda, who is at present traveling in your
area, return to duty in Shanghai immediately. Please wire us as to his date
of sailing.
(The above does not sound right. We suspect that either the telegram was
to be forwarded to auvother point under the Shanghai Consulate, and was sent
fiom Tokyo at the request of the Shanghai Consul to adjust a difficult matter,
or else "Shanghai is in the wrong place and should modify "area", the purpose
of the message being to have Shimoda return to duty in Tokyo).
#1244 A
From: Kalgan March G.
To: Tokyo
Regarding your message #72 of last year :
As we have rented house and land for the diplomatic officials resident abroad,
we ask that you send one half year's rental. Yen 1,200, bv wire.
#12.54 A ' RSS
From Kalgan to Tokyo March 0.
And with regard to No. 33
Please send 3, AT BOO YEN (V) (3,000 Yen) Special Code XXXXXXXX
the amount of expected shortage to the end of the year in SHUYOO HI (might
be "housing", "expropriation" as in "land expropriation", "training").
1246 A
From Tokyo to Nanking March 7.
Extra
As it is suspected that your wire No. 137 has not yet arrived, please send
again.
(Note : happens to be UTAGAI)
1247 A
1056 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From Shanghai to Tokyo March 7.
With regard to your wire ( ) Extra.
Please make of our wire No. 244 KETSUGO (could be either "a missing
number"" or "a combination"). No. 3 from the Minister has not been sent
because of a mistake here it feae feee« was sent on 7th of this
month, (today).
1248 A
FUNADA.
March 7.
From Peiping to Tokyo
Extra
From Kato to Telegraph Officer Homura
I believe that you have KOOHAI (probably "seen", or "your attention has
been 'drawn to' ") our wire No. 216 (1) (2) (or "sections 1 and 2 of our wire
No. 216") and the wire addressed you (2). It is especially requested that (the
action mentioned) be carried out immediately.
1249 A
FuNADA.
March 7.
From Tokyo to Hsinking
At the time of the (meeting) mentioned in our wire No. 89 (RUNOFU, name
of a Russian representative) said that he had learned of the change of the
Japanese Ambassador to Russia through a newspaper article (Red Party Organ
dated 4th) and that Ambassador Sato (the newly appointed Ambassador),
thi-ough having been Foreign Minister in the Hayashi (General Senjuro Hayashi,
Premier Feb. to May 19.37) cabinet, is well known to the Soviet Side. To this,
I (this officer) said, that Ambassador Tatekawa (the previous Ambassador)
had, because of ill health, been desirous of returning to Japan, that the Soviet
Union knows that all of the Japanese Ambassadors to the Soviet Union in the
past have been first class men of excellence (this clause is somewhat indefinite),
that we beUeve that the Soviet Union well understands just where the purpose
of the Japanese government lies, in having especially picked this new Ambassador
who is a former Foreign Minister, a senior (old timer) in the diplomatic field,
and who has a thorough knowledge of Soviet affairs, that we here, on this
occasion, should calmly solve the various problems under discussion such as
regular shipping schedules, TAIKA (might be "exchange", "freight accumula-
tion" or "comi)ensation" ) , petitions between Japan and Russia (?), Visas, and
fl.oating docks, and that another forward step would thus be taken in the
friendship between the two countries. To this RUNOFU replied that he under-
stood, and that everything will be done towards the solving of the problems
as (his) ideas concerning them were the same as (I) had mentioned.
1250 A
Funada.
From Tientsin to Nanking, Shanghai, Tokyo, Peiping, Thingtao, and Tsinan.
Mabch 7.
According to the Economic Weekly for the first week in March, the general
situation, all commodities have a tendency of falling because of the effect
on business of the doubt (distrust) of the rural (inland) areas. Cotton yarn
and cloth opened with a tendency of being supported to some extent by the
lural areas (pi'obably "business inland") because of rapid and secret tendencies
of speculators ( ?).
Rates falling; Dry goods, 44.60 Yen. Cotton Yarn (8 UMA 20 TE) 1.460 Yen.
MEN FUN (perhaps "cotton waste" but from context, it is thought that this
might be a mistake for MUGI FUN or MUGI KO, flour) the import of Shanghai
powder (flour) is progressing smoothly, and as the CHUZAI KA (perhaps
"stock here") settles down, and the movement of material stops because of
low rates in the interior, the rates weaken 25.903 Yen IJIRUSHI (?)
24.85 Yen. Sugar, a fall was seen because of the appearance of controlled com-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1057
modities in the city towards the end of the previous week and the tendency
of 1 JUN in the buying rate in the interior, Refined sugar, 235.80. Raw Sugar,
188.40. Peanuts, rates falling on both nuts and oil because of fall in Shanghai
through lull in the year's exports, Nuts, 53.50 (highest on 6th) Oil, 104.90 (also
highest on 6th).
1251 A
Fun ADA,
March 7.
Tokyo to Kalgau
With. regard to the application for a permit to establish the Association (per-
haps "Corporation") of MU KYOO (perhaps a mistake for MOO KYOO, Mon-
golia) Engineering and Building Industries; this has been carried out tem-
porarily in accordance with your wire, Regular No. 97 of the 5th of last month.
Please reply on following points :
1. Is it necessary, in accordance with Article 34 of the Civil Law, to espe-
cially make of said corporation a Juridical Corporate Person?
2. Is it impossible to attain the objectives (of said corporation) under the
rules and regulations presently followed by the League of Industries (mentioned
above) (Note: Last probably means "League of Engineering and Industrial
workers" Also, it might be more correct to say, in above first three lines,
•'the Inner Mongolia Engineering and Building Corporation") ?
3. What were the characteristics of the League (s) of Mongolian Engineering
and Construction companies in the past?
4. Will the League of this industry be abolished upon formation of above
corporation?
5. It has been reported that the head of said corporation Fujishima arrived
there and that the establishment of said corporation took place under the
direction of your office; is this true? (Note: The last might be a confirmation
rather than a question.)
1252 A
Fun ADA.
March 7.
From : Tokyo
To: Hankow
To Business Representative Takano, resident in Daiya.
The expense appropriations for your oflBce for the current year are as follows
below. These will be sent by wire to Consul General Tanaka (at Hankow ?)
and you are to receive them as delivered from that office. Within the Organ-
ization (or. Foundation) Fund of Yen 8,000 you are to pay immediately for
repairs and equipment (it being understood that expenditure for desks and desk
chairs shall be according to the plan), this grant to be completely repaid within
the current year.
Government Expense, Actual Expense, Yen 60.
Ditto, Outright Expense, Yen 250.
Telegraphic Expenses for a diplomatic office abroad. Yen 25.
Expense for the Foundation of a diplomatic office abroad, Hankow office, Daiya
branch ofl5ce, and equipment fund, Yen 8,000.
Further, employees daily (wage) GEN 0 Yen. (Gen is probably an error for
some figure) Typists within Yen 70, 11 may be employed. When appropriate
people have been found, proceed on the basis of temporary action.
# 1258 A RSS
1058 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 58
TOP SECRET
Op-2(>-4-nip
Serial 0003520
(SC)A17-24(1)
The Secretary of the Navy,
Washington 25, D. C, 28 Jim 1945.
From : The Secretary of the Navy,
To : John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant,
Subj : Testimony and documentary evidence to he presented to Admiral H. Kent
Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.
Ref : (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concern-
ing further Pearl Harbor investigation.
1. Forwarded herewith are copies of the following dispatches, certified in
jacket form NJA 24, to be used in the proceedings directed by reference (a) :
COJkl 14
COM 16
COM 16
COM 14 280240
CINCAF 281430
260110
261331
270355
COM 16 291028
COM 16 021100
COM 16 30 Nov 41 Ser 12-2 COM 16 041502
COM 16 010245
COM 16 010913
COM 16 011422
COM 16 281510 COM 16 020355
COM 16 051402
CINCAF 060006
COM 14 060114
COM 16 071025
ASTNAYATTACHE SHANGHAI 270830
2. Your attention is directed to the fact that these dispatches are classified
TOP Secret. When used in accordance with reference (a), the return of these
dispatches to this office is directed.
James Forrestal.
TOP secret-ultra
In reply refer to Initials
and No.
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Navai. Operations,
Washington 25, D. C, 21 Jun 19Ji5.
Op-20-G-mg
Serial 000751520
(SC) A6-l(10)
Memorandum
From : Assistant Director of Naval Communications (Oi3-20-G).
To : Mr. John F. Sonnett, Rm. 1083-A, Navy Bldg.
Via: Capt. F. O. Willenbucher (Op-20-4).
Subj : Dispatches — Forwarding of.
Ref : Secret Letter, no serial, to Op-20-G, dated 23 June 1945, signed by H. Kent
Hewitt/John F. Sonnett.
End : Duplicates of dispatches requested in subject reference.
1. In compliance with subject reference, the files of this office were searched
and duplicates, copies of which are enclosed, made of the following list of
dispatches :
COM 14*
260110
COM 16*
010913
COM 16*
261331
COM 16
011422
COM 16
270355 .
COM 16
020355
COM 14*
280240
COM 16*
021100
CINCAF
281430
COM 16
041502
COM 16*
281510
COM 16
051402
COM 16*
291029
CINCAF
060006
COM 16
Certified typed copy
COM 14
060114
COM 16
010245
COM 16
071025
2. Asterisked items contain information requested in subject reference. Un-
asterisked items are included as considered of interest by you in conversation
with Lt. Comdr. G. E. Boone this morning.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1059
3. It is requested that Op-20-4 place the enclosures in proper legal form for
presentation to Mr. Sonnett, and make delivery to Mr. Sonnett.
4. In accordance witli current practice, these materials have been upgraded in
classification.
J. N. Wenger
J. N. Wengeb.
Captain, U. S. Navy.
U. S. Naval Communication SEB\^CE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, V. S. PACTFIC FLEET
Classified
Reassignment all orange calls occurred midnight X.
Same garble table X no change In shore addresses XX.
Date 30 Nov 41 Crypto group 87
Originator : Com 16 Action : Opnav.
CBO HMC Serial No. 12-2
Information :
Cincaf
Cincpac
Com 14
Authenticated :
Certified to be a true copy to the original.
Incoming
/S/
Naval Message-
F. S. LOCKARD,
Ens., VSNR.
P. W. Cann,
P. W. Cann,
Commander; TJSN.
Navy Department
Drafter Extension number
Addressees
Precedence
From: COM 14.
Asterisk (*) mailgram addressee
For action:
OPNAV.
Priority. X
Routine.
Deferred.
Released by
Date: 26 NOVEMBER 1941
TOR Coderoom
Decoded by A. V. PERIXG.
Paraphrased by
Routed by
Information:
CINCPAC.
CINCAF.
COM 16.
Priority.
Routine.
Deferred.
Unless otherwise indicated this despatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
If operational check below.
Original held by GI 260110
Originator fill in date and time:
TEXT
For past month commander second fieet has been organizing a task force
which comprises following units : Second fleet, third fleet including first and
second base forces and first defense divisions, combined air force, desron three
airron seven, subron five and possible units of batdiv three from first fleet
In message concerning these units South China fieet and French Indochina
force have appeared as well as the naval station at Sama, Bako and Takao
Third base force at Palao and Rno Palao have also been engaged in extensive
communications with second fleet commander
Combined air force has been assembled in Takao with indications that some
components have moved to Hainan
Third fleet units believed to be moving in direction of Takao and Bako
Second base force appears transporting equipment of air forces to Taiwan
Takao radio today accepted trafiic for unidentified second fleet unit and
submarine division or squadron
Crudiv seven and desron three appear as an advance unit and may be en
route South China
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 2-
-26
1060 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups
in the Marshalls which comprise alrron twenty four at least one carrier division
unit plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet
Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in
southeastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls
SEXIKET
Naval Message— Navy Department
Phone Extension Number: 2027
Addressees
Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN.
Released by
Date: 26 November 1941.
For Action:
CINCPAC.
OPNAV.
COMFOURTEEN.
CINCAF.
Priority
Routine
Deferred
TOR Coderoom
Decoded by: P. R. White.
Paraphrased by:
Information:
Priority
Routine
Deferred
Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
Reported by ONI by
Serial 23-41 261331
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time OCT
Morning comment comfourteen two one ten of twentysixth X traffic analysis
past few days indicate cine second directing units of First Second Third Fleets
and Subforce in a loose knit task force organization that apparently will be
divided into two sections X for purposes of clarity units expected to operate in
South China area will be referred to as first section and units expected to operate
in mandates will be referred to as Second Section X estimated units in first sec-
tion are crudiv seven X airron six defense division one X desron three and subron
six XX second section crudiv five X cardiv three Ryujo and one Maru X desrons
two and four X subron five X desdiv twentythree X first base force of Third Fleet
X third base force at Palao X fifth base force at Saipan and lesser units uniden-
tified XX Crudiv Six and Batdiv Three may be included in first and second sec-
tions respectively but status cannot be clarified yet XX balance Third Fleet units
in doubt but may be assumed that these vessels including desron five will take
station in Formosa Straits or further south X there are slight indications today
that desron three crudiv seven and subron six are in Takao area X combined
airforce units from empire are at Pakhoi Hoihow Saigon Takao and other bases
on Taiwan and China coast X cannot confirm supposition that carriers and sub-
marines in force are in mandates X our best indications are that all known First
and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure Area X our lists indicate cine
combined in Nagato X cine first in Hyuga and cine second in Atago in Kure area
X cine third in Ashigara in Sasebo area X cine fifth in Chichi jima area X comdr
subforce in Kashima in Yokosuka area but this considered unreliable XX South
China Fleet appears to have been strengthened by units from central or north
China probably torpedo boats XX Southern Expeditionary Fleet apparently being
reinforced by one base force unit XX directives to the above task forces if such
are directed to individual units and not to complete groups X special calls usually
precede formation of task force used in area operations X cine second X Third
and cine Southern Expeditionary Fleet appear to have major roles X traffic from
navminister and cngs to cincs of fleet appear normal X evaluation is considered
reliable.
Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Oflacer in person. See Art 76 (4)
NAV REGS.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1061
SBXJBBTT
Naval Message — Navy Department
Phone extension number
Addresses
Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN.
Released by
Date: 27 November 1941.
For action:
CINC AF.
CINC PAC.
OPNAV.
COM 14.
Priority. X
Routine.
Deferred.
TOR Coderoom
Decoded by A. V. PERING.
Paraphrased by
Information:
Priority.
Routine.
Deferred.
Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
27/0355
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GOT.
Last two days several despatches in four numeral Army cipher handled on
Navy circuit involving Commander Oka combined Army Forces Imperial
Headquarters.
Commander Oka combined Army Taiwan.
Vice commander combined Army forces Sama.
Make original only, deliver to Communications Watch Officer in person.
NAVREGS.)
(See Art 76 (4)
SECEET
Naval Message — Navy Department
Phone Extension Number
Addresses
Message Precedence
From COM 14.
Released by.
Date; November 28, 1941.
For action:
OPNAV.
Priority X.
Routine.
Deferred.
TOR Coderoom
Decoded by A. L. BRAUN.
Paraphrased by
Information:
CINCPAC.
Priority.
Routine.
Deferred.
Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
280240
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail dehvery: Date Time OCT.
Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See art. 76 (4) Nav Regs.
Following received by British consul from usually reliable source X Japanese
will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on one December without ultimatum or
declaration in order get between Bangkok and Singapore X Attackers will proceed
direct from Hainan and Formosa X Main landing to be made at Songkhala XX,
( Singora )
Passed to Code Room for routing. LWP
Only incorrect detail was date.
Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer In person.
NAV. REGS.
See Art 76 (4)
1062 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
Naval message — Navy Department
Phone Extension Number 2027.
Addressees
Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN.
Released by
Date: 28 November 1942.
For Action:
CINPAC.
OPNAV.
COMFOURTEEN.
Priority
Routine
Deferred
TOR Coderoom
Decoded by P. R. WHITE.
Paraphrased by
Information:
Priority
Routine
Deferred
Indicated by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and maU delivery: Date Time OCT.
[Hand written:] Reported to ONI in Serial 26-41 281510
Comment artolii.soa Shanghai two seven zero eight three zero x Isuzu(cl) in
Formosa Straits Sunday x subtender and four subs probably subron six plus
Magoya Maru tender x last sentence believed to be sendai(cl) plus two desdivs xx
other items no comment xx additional info from CI Nitta Maru sailing Yokosuka
to Takao twenty ninth with military supplies xx two senior construction offi-
cers and four thousand men status not known ordered mandates xx unidentified
ship believed to be light cruiser has apparently relieved Kashii as flagship
southern expeditionary fleet x this ship now in Caniranh Bay Saigon area xx
Make orisinal only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer In person. See Art 76 (4)
NAV REGS.
Naval message in Navy Department
Phone Extension Number
Addressees
Message Precedence
From: ASTNAV ATTACHE SHANGHAI.
Released by
Date: 28 Nov. 41.
For action :
COM 16.
Priority
Routine
Deferred
TOR Coderoom
De/coded by
Paraphrased by
Information:
N A V A T T A C H E
CHUNGKING.
Priority
Routine
Deferred
Indicate by asterisk addresees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
[Hand written:] Reported to ONI in
Serial 26-41
270830CR0554
Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time: Date Time GCT
C orange naval craft sighted by master foreign vessels X Saturday Canton de-
parted Hasidate and one torpedo boat Otori class X Chinwang Tao arrived two
armed trawlers with depth charges on decks one auxiliary three thousand ton fitted
for mine laying X Sunday Amoy sailed cruiser Natori class X Monday afternoon
off Turnabout Island four submarines and large sub tender course south XO
Tuesday position twenty one north and one hundred fifteen east unstated number
transports with troops course southwest X Many transports this week between
Hongkong and Shanghai heading south number with troops X Wednesday
observed by passenger from Shanghai Maru one hour before entering Nagasaki
Harbor 8 warships believed lead by cruiser Naka proceeding south good speed.
Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Article 76
(4) NAV Regs.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1063
SECRET
Naval message — Navy Department
Phone Extension Number: 2027.
Addressees
Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN.
Released by
Date: 29 November 1941.
For Action:
CINCPAC.
CINCAF.
COMFOURTEEN.
OPNAV.
Priority
Routine
Deferred
TOR Coderoom
Decoded by WHITE.
Paraphrased by
Information:
Priority
Routine
Deferred
Indicate bv asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
[Handwritten:] Reported to ONI by Serial 24-41. 291029
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill iu date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time OCT
Recent developments from RI X Encrypted addresses noted in traffic past two
days quote "Comdr First Patrol Force" unquote X This force headquarters ap-
parently in Yokosuka or Palao X Other addresses of same nature X Quote
"Fifth Air Battalion" unquote at Takao X Quote "Comdr Airborne Troops"
unquote X [handwritten: (probably Takao — FN)] Location undetermined X
Quote "French Indochina billeting detachment" unquote in Saigon Area X Quote
"Third Fleet headquarters" unquote probably at Yokosuka X cine Third shifted
flag from Ashigara to Nagara X cine Southern Expeditionary shifted flag from
Kashii to Chokai X tentative indentification X New arrivals Takao Area that
may be placed in first section my Two Six One Three Three One X Desron
Four X Airron Seven Chitose type and one command that appears to be a
Subron XX Hiyei and Kongo now appear definitely associated with these units
in First Section but no movement noted on these XX Following from CI trans-
lation today from Cine Second Fleet to key radio stations and Cine Combined
indicates he will leave Kure Zone four hundred today leave Sasebo Zone mid-
night first and enter Bako Zone midnight second X Remainder message not
clear.
Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4)
NAV REGS.
SECRET
Naval message — Navy Department
Phone Extension Number: 2027
Addressees
Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN.
Released by
Date: 1 December 1941.
For Action:
OPNAV.
Priority XX
Routine
Deferred
FOR Coderoom
Decoded by A. L. BRAUN.
Paraphrased by
Information:
CINCAF.
CINCPAC.
COMFOURTEEN.
Priority
Routine
Deferred
Indicate by asterisk Addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
[Handwritten:] Reported to ONI by Serial 25-41.
010245.
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GOT
TEXT
Please cancel my One Fifty today XX Reassignment all orange calls occurred
midnight X Same Garble Table X No change in Shore addresses
Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Oflacer in person. See Art 76 (4)
NAV REGS.
1064 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
Naval message — Navy Department
Phone Extension Number .2027.
Addressees
Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN.
Released by
Date: 1 December 1941.
For action:
OPNAV.
Priority
Routine
Deferred
TOR Coderoom
Decoded by WHITE.
Paraphrased by
Information:
CINCPAC.
COMFOURTEEN.
CINCAF.
Priority
Routine
Deferred
Indicate by asterisk addre.sFees for which mail delivery is satisfactory,
[Hand written:] Reported to ONI in. Serial 25-41.
010913
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time OCT
From Ri X Arrivals in Takao area past two days X Comdesron Five in
Natori X Naka to join Desron Four X Units of number two base force and
Chogei X Last named ship considered to be tender for two divisions sub-
marines X All tliese units now under command Cine third X Cine second in
atago shifted from Kure to Sasebo comm zone apparently en route South China
waters
•Make original only.
NAV REGS.
Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4)
SECRET
Naval message — Navy Department
NAVY DEPARTMENT
"^^WS^
Phone Extension Number
Addressees
Message Precedence
From: COM SIXTEEN.
Released by
Date: 2 December 1941.
For action:
OPNAV.
Priority
Routine XXXXX
Deferred
FOR Coderoom
Decoded by A. A. MURRAY.
Paraphrased by
Information:
Priority
Routine
Deferred
Indicate by asterisk addresses for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
020955
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time OCT
TEXT
Need sequences for Twentynine Thirty November pui*ple
[Handwritten :] Have been sent: 29 Nov. at 2129 on 29 Nov. 30 Nov. at 2200
on 1 Dec.
Make origina' only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (141
NAV REGS.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITl' INQUIRY
1065
SECRET
Naval message — Navy Department
Phone Extension Number: 2027.
Addressees
Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN.
Released by
Date: 2 December 1941.
For action:
OPNAV:
Priority XX
Routine
Deferred
To: Coderoom
Decoded by WHITE.
Paraphrased by
Information:
CINCPAC.
CINCAF.
COMFOURTEEN.
Priority XX
Routine
Deferred
Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
021100
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and lime for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time OCT
Cine Second and Third in Takao Area X Comdr Southern Expeditionary Force
in same Area X Broadcasts to fleet units now being sent by Takao or Bako
Kadio in addition Tokio XX Alusna Tokio Six hundred and Shanghai Twenty
three hundred botli of the first no comment XX Ambassador Bankok Thirtieth
requested permission destroy all but limited number codes
L Handwritten :] Reported to oni by gy 27-41
Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Ofllcer in person. See Art 70 (4)
NAV REGS.
SECRET
Naval message — Navy Department
Phone Extension Number: 2027.
Addressees
Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN.
Released by
Date: 4 December 1941.
For action:
OPNAV.
COMFOURTEEN.
Priority: XXXXX.
Routine.
Deferred.
FOR Coderoom
Decoded by
Paraphrased by
Information:
Priority.
Routine.
Deferred.
Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
041502
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time SCT
Five numeral intercepts subsequent to Zero Six Hundred today indicate change
of cipher system including complete change differentials and indicator sub-
tractors X All intercepts received since time indicated checked against all
differentials three previous systems X No dupes
Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Ofllcer in person. See Art 76 (4)
NAV REGS.
1066 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
Naval message — Navy Department
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Phone Extension Number 2027.
Addressees
Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN.
Released by
Date: 5 December 1641.
For Action:
OPNAV.
Priority
Routine
Deferred
TOR Coderoom
Decoded by WHITE.
Paraphrased by
Information:
Priority
Routine
Deferred
Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
051402
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GOT
Fuji key for twentynine November indicator Baker Yoke King Dog
inter Tliree Fifteen Nineteen Twenty Sixteen Five Twentyone Seven Seventeen
Eighteen Six Two Four One Twelve Eigiit Tliirteen Eleven Nine Fourteen Ten X
Form third period November two atirm Baker Cast Dog easy six afirm George
hypo inter Seven afirm Eight afirm Nine aflrm Baker Cast Ten Baker Thirteen
afirm Dog easy Fox George fourteen afirm Baker Cast Dog Seventeen afirm Baker
Cast Eighteen Baker Twenty Dog Twentyone Cast Twentytwo Cast Twentythree
Cast XX Tokyo circular Twntyfour Thirtythree requires additional blanks
in four love and five love X Key for Two December Baker Yoke Netat George
Prep Fourteen Six One Twentytwo Eleven Thirteen four Twenty Twelve Five
Nineteen Twentyone Seventeen Nine Three Sixteen Eighteen Eight Two Fifteen
Ten Seven X Following form correct for Tokyo circular Twentyfour Fifty
only One Baker Dog easy Two Baker Three Baker Four Baker Dog easy Fox
(Jeorge hypo Five Baker Six Baker Seven Baker Cast Eight Cast 'Nine Cast Ten
Cast George Dog easy Eleven Cast Twelve Cast Fifteen Cast Sixteen Cast George
hypo inter Seventeen Cast Dog Twentytwo afirm X Note SGPT repeat SGST is
Maru Maru X Advise if you want circular Twentyfour Fifty Singapore attaches
great importance to two messages mentioned above XX Tokyo circular Twenty-
four Thirtythree of Twentyninth apparently in purple machine X Again request
you furnisii twentyninth .sequence
[Handwritten:] sent in 29/2129
Make original only, deliver to Comuliication Watch officer in person.
NAV REGS.
See Art 76 (4)
SECRET
Naval message — Navy Department
Extension number
Addressees
Precedence
From: CINCAF.
Released by
Date: 6 Dec. 1941.
For action:
OPNAV.
Priority
Routine
Deferred
TOR Coderoom: 1311.
Decoded by CANNING.
Paraphrased by PURDY.
Information:
Priority
Routine
Deferred
Indicate bv asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
060006 CR0I32
Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time: Date Time GOT
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1067
TEXT
To differentiate C I traffic from others recommend yon assign additional exter-
nal Indicator this use with RIP 66. This is necessary in order that decoding be
done by proper personnel.
2nd Copy to 20G
Distribution : 20G Action.
Record copy : 20P 20T
Files : General CNO 20 20A
Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4)
NAV REGS.
SECRET
Naval message — Navy Department
Phone Extension Number -2027.
Addressees
Message Precedence
From: COMSIXTEEN.
Released by
Date: 7 December 1941.
For Action:
OPNAV.
Priority
Routine XX
Deferred
TOR Coderoom
Decoded by WATCH OFFICER.
Paraphrased by
Information:
Priority
Routine
Deferred
Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
071025
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time GCT
TEXT
New code for emergency use given in Tokyo serials Twentyfonr Zero Nine X
Two Four Twenty Three Question X and Twentyfonr Fifty X ilessages in p'ain
language will contain one or more code words sutiicient to communicate secret
message X Example XX Quote "Japanese and blank troops clashed" end quote
represented by code word Hijikata comma and Russia by Kubota XX A message
similar to following would be sent X On fifteenth Secretaries Hijikata and
Kubota have been appointed to duty in your office Stop XX All messages in
this system to have word Stop Repeat Stop at the end instead of Owari X
Forwarding you first two above despatches third sent this morning QX Key for
Twentyseventh indicator Baker Yoke Hypo Baker Dog X Twelve Fourteen Seven
Thirteen Nine One Nineteen Six Eiglit Seventeen Two Sixteen Eleven Three
Fifteen Eighteen Four Ten Five total Nineteen X Where Singapore referenced
Tokyo circular Twentyfonr Thirtythree they apparently meant above Twentyfonr
Twentythree
Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art 76 (4)
NAV REGS.
top secret ultra
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington 25, D. C, 4 Jul ]9J,5.
Op-20-G-mg
Serial 000761820
(SC)A6-1(10)
MEMORANDUM
From: Assistant Director of Naval Communications (Op-20-G).
To : Adm. H. Kent Hewitt— Rm. 2750, Navv Bldg.
Via: Capt. F. O. Willenbucher (Op-20-4).
Subj : Dispatches — Forwarding of.
Ref: Secret letter, no serial, to Op-20-G, dated 3 July 1945, signed by H.
Kent Hewitt.
End : Duplicates of dispatches requested in the reference.
1. In compliance with the reference, the following dispatches are forwarded ;
CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 June 28)
1068 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Sep. 28)
CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Sep. 23)
CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Jan. 19, end. F)
CT.FJPZ-2 (1945 Jun. 29)
Japanese Plain Language Press Dispatches Intercepted Station S
2. It is requested that Op-20-4 place the enclosures in proper legal form for
presentation to Mr. Sonnett, and make delivery to Mr. Sonnett.
J. N. Wenger
J. N. Wenger,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
The Secretary of the Navy,
Washington 25, D. C, 6 Jul. 1945.
Op-20-4-mp
Serial 0003720
(SC)A17-24(1)
From : The Secretary of the Navy
To : John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant
Subj : Testimony and documentary evidence to be presented to Admiral H.
Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.
Ref: (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN,
concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.
End: (A) Jacket Form NJA 24, containing Japanese Plain Language Press
Dispatches (Nos. 5077 to 5085, inclusive; Nos. 5257 to 5267,
inclusive).
(B) Jacket Form NJA 24, containing documents, CT.FJPZ-2 (1944
June 28) ; CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Sep. 28) ; CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Sep.
23) ; and CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Jan. 19, end. F).
(C) Jacket Form NJA 24, containing document, CT.FJPZ-2 (1945
Jun 29).
1. Enclosures (A), (B) and (C), containing the following documents, certi-
fied in jacket forms NJA 24, are forwarded herewith for use in the proceedings
directed by reference (a) :
Enclosure (A)
Japanese Plain Language Press Dispatches (Nos. 5077 to 5085, inclusive;
Nos. 5257 to 5267, inclusive).
Enclosure (B)
CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 June 28) ; CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Sep. 28) ; CT.FJPZ-2 (1944
Sep. 23) ; and CT.FJPZ-2 (1944 Jan. 19, end. F).
Enclosure (C)
CT.FJr2^2 (1945 Jun 29).
2. Your attention is directed to the fact that enclosures (B) and (C) are
classified TOP SECRET. When used in accordance with reference (a), the
return of these documents to this office is directed.
James Forrestal.
Hewitt Inqxhry Exhibit No. 59
CQ DE JVJ JUD
PRESS DE JVJ/JUD HR NW
BC AT 0800 DEC 3RD
(The first part is missing)
KYOOSANGUN KOOGEKIO MEIZESIJIJITU IJOONOGTOKU GENTI-
NIOKERU
SHOOKYOONO SOOKOKUWA IZENSINKOKUO KIWAME JIMII JUUDA-
IKA SITUTUARUMO BIMYOONARU KOKUSAIKANKYOONI SIHAISARE
KAROOJITE KEISIKIJOONO SHOOKYOO GASSAKUNO HATANWO
BIHOOSITUTUARU JOOKYOODEARU TUGINI JUITIMATUCHUU WA-
GAHOONO JISSISERU SHUYOOAKUSENJO MIRUNI MOTTOMO DAI-
KIBIBONARUWA SANTOONANBUNI BANJC^OSURU KYOOSANGUN
SANTOOJU OYOBI DAISYAKUJI^GOSI (YAKUNIMAN) NITAISURU
MONONISITE GOHIMIMEIYORI KAKANNARU SOOTQOSENWO
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1069
KYOOKOOSI SUDENI SONOSHUIIYOKUO HOTTONDOYAKUSI SALANI
KONKYOTI FUKUME SIKISHOKU TIKASOSIKINO EKIKETUNADO
MOKKA SAKUSENWO KIZOKUCHUU DE JUGATUGEJUNYO JlSr
SIOHUUNO SADSEISHOO NA UNIARJ CHUUOO DAIKYUUJUGUN
OYOBI DAIITISINI TAISURU FUNSE SAKNAWA SONOGOCHAKU-
CHAKU HNKAO KAKUDAICHUUDB ATTAGA WAGAGUNWA JUITI-
GATUJUHI UMONKOONO DOOKUTUJINTINI YOTTE KESSITEKI
TEKOOWO TUZUKERU TEKINII KOOSI TEKISI SENGOHYAKU-
GOJU HORYO NISENNIHYAKA SANJOUHATINO DAISENKAOAGETA
IPPCOWAGA KUUGUNWA KYOZETUSANAJU HI IRAIRENHI CHUUN
OKERU OKUTIBAKUZEINI KOWOOSI HEAN > SOOKEI RE O
(TAMASITTAOARA) BUKOO (BUSITEGARA) KANYOO (ME
YOOSHOOWO KAN NX WAGAHOOYOKUK ANI SESTUSTUTUARU
MATA HOKUSINOKEWU DAISNJI TIANKYOOKA UNDOOWA JUITI-
GATUIT I YOAI N WASTALI TENKAI ALITUTU DAITJI DA
MINSHUUNO JIEIAYOKUNO KYOOKUTO SOOKYOO SISOOSENNO
JUNBIKAN O OOKUHYOOTO SERUNITAISI SALANI TABKI KEI-
ZAISENJO FUKASS KANMI STINOJITUO A OUNI SASUME-
RARE TUTUARI HOKUSSNO TIANNO KAKURITUTO KESZAIK-
■ ETUNO TAMENI HONWUDOC U IKAKUNARU JIKKOOWO MSAM
KIKOTO KITISARRU RA AN JU TUUKWASOREZKRE CEN-
CHONA BOOKHOOJOSIMESI NITTBNKENWO GUKUMETE JUUITI-
TUKI MATUNOENKEI TUUKANZAKKOO SOOGAKUWA GUSAN JU
ENWOSANSURUNI SOATTASU NAJA SEGINKENWA ROKUWOKUISSEN
GOHYAKLUMANEN (HAKUNENMATU GOWOKUHASSEN M NDEN)
TOKYUUZOKSETAIGIKENWA NIWOKUSSEN NADHYUJOUNE (SAKU-
NENMATU ITIWOKUKYUUSNETTUUSYAKUMANEN) WOSEMESEMENTA
MANSHUU CHUUGINKENWA JUUITIKUI NIJUUHIGENZAI JUUJO-
UINANSEN GOHTAKUMANEN ( SAKUNENMATU KYUUOKU NANASE-
NYONHYAKUMANTMEN) NIGEKIZOOSI CHUGOKURUGO JUNBI JUNBI-
GINKOKENWA NUT GOHI GENZAI KYUOKUNISEN MANYENNI
NODORI SAKUNENMATUNO NANAOKU ISSENMANWO HARUKANI
UWAMAWATTA MYOOGI KENWA NIJUHIENZAI IMOKU GOHYA-
KUMAN (HAKUNENMATU KYUSENSANBYAKUKAN TONNA) KONOHO-
KANI CHUUSINI OKERU GUMPYONO RYUTUDANAGA SOOTONI
NOBORUTO MURLAREWUNODE JUITIGANA MATUNO ENKEITUUKA
RYUTUDAKA HATIJUOKU TOPPAWA UGOKANUTOKORODEARI HON-
NENMATUNO HAKKODAKAWA NAITEIDI OOKEIHYAKUOKUYENNI
NOBORUNO DEWANAIKAA CHOMKUSAETEIRU AR DE JVJ
Bad echo and interference causing bad copy.
2338 P RD
12275 KC
CQ DE JVJ
PRESS DE JVJ HR NW BC AT 0S30 DEC 3RD.
DOMEI GAIKEI MUGI 164 217 224 746 782 794 WATAMI 285 294
294 KAWARAZU PARA KAWARAZU BEIMENSIKYOO NITIBEI KAIDANNO
KEJZOKUWO KOOKANSITE BOOSEKISUJI NYUUORURINZU SUOIKABU-
SIKI SUJINOKAINI JOOSINSITA RONDONHATU KABUITIBAWA KYOKU-
TOJOSEI NITAISITE YAYARAKKAN TEKITONARI KIHAIWA SIKKARITO
NATTAGA JITUKADUHUSOKU NITORIKIKIWA IZENSHOORYOO KINBUTI
SHOOKENRUI -WA KENCHOO KOOGYOOKABU KYOOCHOO KOKUNAI
TETUDOOKABU UWAMUKI SEKIYUKABUWA SIKKARI NANAKINKOO
KABUWA GAIEITEKENCHOO. KOOJOOGINKO KABUWANIPOINTO HAN-
GATAJOOKSIN GAIKOKUSAINO NAKADEWA NIHONSAITO SINASAIGA
SANPOINTO NAIGAIKOOTOO SITANOGA MEDATTEA MATAI SA TOLA
KIHAI RUPEE NAMARI KABU KOOSAI DORU TIRIKU KOMUGIKABU
SIKYOMICHAKU DORU SANJIGENZAI 40324 534 IMI 40324 534 ATTOTA-
TAZU AR NM TU DE JVJ VA VA
2350 G RD
12275
Bad echo and interference plus weak sig.
1070 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SKED
HR BC AT 1000 3 DEC. 1941
DOMEI HAIMAITOMAEYORI 1500 NASI NASI 1538 1544 PARA
GAIKEI ASA 5900 5900 URITES MATAI 3612 4008 3608 2404 NAMA-
RI 5700 TOLA KIHAI RUPEE KABU MICHAKU DORU 40324 534 ATOTAT
AZU TAIRIKU KAWARAZU PARA
004 WASINTOKNI KAWAKAMIHATU NOMURAKURUSU RYOOTAISIWA
UERUZO KOKUMUJIKANNO YOOSEINIYORI NIHIGOZENJUJI NIJUPPUN
(NIHONJIKAN SANHIGOZENREIJI NIJUGOFUN) KOKUMUSHOOWO
HOOMON DOOJIKANTO SANJUGOFUNNI WATATTE KAIDANWOTOGETA
MIGIKAIDANWA RtUZUVERUTO DAITOORYOONO MUNEOUKE UERU-
ZUJIKANGA SHOMONDAINI TUKI NIHONSEIFUNO SETUMEIOMOTO-
META MONOTOMIRARERU UERUZUJIKA TONO KAIDANWOOETxV NO-
MURA KURUSU RYOOTAISIWA KISHADANNI TORIKAKOMARE NAGARA
TAKUMINI YOOTENWO HAZUSITE TUGINOGOTOKU NOBETA KAIDAN
NO NAIYOONI TUITEWA NANIMO MOOSIAGERU WAKENIWAIKANAl
WAREWAREWA TADA UERUZUJIKANNO GOWOKEICHOOSITANI SUGIN-
AINODA
005 WASINTON NIHI KAWAKAMIHATU KOKUMUSHOO TOOKYOKUWA
UERUZU JIKAN NOMURAKURUSU RYOOTAISI KAIDAN KATATT-
UERUZUJIKANWA DAITOORYOONO MEINIYORI NOMURAKURUSU
RYOOTAISIA NO RAIHOOWOMOTOME DAITOORYOONI HOOKOKUSURU-
TAME NIHONSEIFUNI TAISI ARUSHUNO SHOOGOOWO NASITAMONOD-
EARU
006 WASHINTONNIHI KAW KIHATU NOMURAKURUSO RYOOTAI-
HI OYOBI UERUZUJIKANNO KAIDANWA NIHUNOZEN .TUJIGO.IUGOFUN
SHUURYOO KORENITUZUITE RUUZUVERUTO DAITOORYOOWA SHOOGO
SUTUMUSON RIKUGUNCHOOKAN NOKKUSU KAIGUNCHOOKAN OYOBI
KAZEDE HIKIKOMORICHUUNO HARU KOKUMUCHOOKANNO DAIRITO-
SITE URERUZU KOKUMUJIKANNI HOWAITOHAUSUNI SANSHUUO MOTO-
META jNIIGINIKANSI HOWAITOHAUSI TOOKYOKUWA (KAIGOOWA
TANNI SHOHANNO UTIAWASE NARABINI KYOKUTOO JOOSEINO KEN-
TOOWO OKONAUTAMEDE ARU) TOHAPPYOOSITA
007 SINGAPOORUNIHI SINGAPOORU SEICHOOWA NIHI EIKAIGT^NWA
ARATANI KYOKUTOO KANTAIOHENSEI KOREOMOTTE KATTENO SI-
NAKANTAIOMO HOOGANISHUNIE EIHONGOKU KANTAIOYOBI EITI-
CHUUKAI KANTAITO DOOYOONOTIIO FUYOSITAMUNE HAPPYOOSITA
NAO KONOKANTAIWA EISINAKANTAI HARABINI HIGASIINDO KAN-
TAINIKAWATTE KYOKUTOO HOOMENBOOBINI ATARUBEKI MONO-
DEARI JIJITU.TOO GOOSYUTT NARABINI NYUUJIIRANDO KANTAIMOK-
ORENI HENNYUU SERARERUUONOTO KAISERARERU
008 NYUUYOOKUNIHI EEPII SINGAPOORU DENNICOREBA SINNINNO
EIKYOKUTOO KANTAI SIREICHOOKAN TOMASU FUIRIPPUSU TOMASU
FITIRIPPUSU TAISHOOWO NOSETA SINYEISENTOOKAN PURINSU OBU
UERUSUGOOWA SIREICHOOKANKIO KAKAGE JAKKANSEKINO YUURY-
OKUNARU GUNKANTOTOMONI NIHI STNGAPOORUNI NYUUKOOSITA
EIKOKUGA SENSOOJUNBINO TAME SHURYOKUKANWO KYIKUTOONI
HAKENSITANOWA PURINSU OBU UERT^SUGOOGA SAISHODEARU IPPOO
SINGAPOORU TOOKYOKUWA HOKANIGUNKAN SUUSEKIGATIKAKU
NYUUKOOSURU YOTEIDEARUTO HAPPYOOSITA
NAI TU DE JVJ/JUD.
0126 G TR
15880
MANUAL
PRESS DE JVJ HR NW BC AT 1030 DEC 3 RD
NOIMEI 009 WASINTONNIHI NOMURA KURUHU RYOOTAISIWA
UERVZU.TIKA KAIKENNOTAME IHIGOZENJU.TI NIJUPPTTN KOKOMUSH-
OONI TOOCHAKUSI TAGA MATIKAMAETA KISHADANNO SITUMONNI
TAISITEWA AKUMADE KOOSHOONI HAIZENWO TUKUSUMUNE SINSI-
NATAIDODE OOSHUUSTA MAZU NOMURATAISWA IWAKU NIHONSEI-
FUWA HARU KOKUMUCHOOKANNO TUE ARAYURTT CAKUDOKARA
SINCHOONI JUKURYOSITERU NIHONNOTAIDOWA DEKIREBA SBNSO-
OWO SAKERUKOTONIARU SENSOOWA KESSITE NANIGOTOWOMO KAT-
KETUSINAISI NANIBITOMO SENSOOWO NOZOMUMONOWANAI ) TUEDE
KISHADANKARA KURUSUTAISINI IMADA DORYOKUSITE KAIDANWO
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1071
SEIKOONI MITIBIKIURU KIBOOGA ARUTOWO OUMA TONOSITUMONGA
BETANONITAISI TAISIWA MOTIRONTMOWAL
(Interference local)
RIKUGUNCHOOKAN NOKKUSU KAIGUNCHOOKANOO SANSHUSU RUUZU
ERUTO DAITOORYOOWO CHUUSINNI ITIJIKAN JUGOFUNNIWATARI
SEV USHUNOOB U KAIGIGA OKONAWARETA MIGIKAIGINO NAIYOONI
TUITWA KANZENNI TINMOKUGA MAMORARETERUGA TAINIISEISAKU
KYOOGITO SINZERARET RU NAO HARU KOKUMUCHOOKANWA KAZE-
NOT-\ME KOKUMUSHOO HOWAITOHA USU IZURE IMO KAOWODASA-
NAKAT 011 RONBONMNIHI EIKAIZUNSHOOWA GOOSHUUKANTAI SHO-
ZOKA OUNYOOKAN SIDONI ZOOGA (6730 TON) TKOUKISHUUKAN SHU-
TAIERUMARUKl'GOO (&400 TON) TOGOOSHUU SUITKIDE KOOSENif;iTA
KIEATOMONI TINBOTUSITAAIUNE HAPPYOOSI TA SENTOONO JIJITUWA
HAPPYOOSARENAIGA JUITIGATU NIJUROKUHI IZENNOBOOHITO
IWARE SIDONI GOO JOOINWAZENBU IKUEFUMEIDAGA SHUTAIERU-
MARUKUGOO NORIKUMIINWA ITIBU KYUUJOIARETATO IWA RERU
012 KANFERANIHI GOOSHUUS NIHIYORU JUNYOOKAN PARAMA-
TOA GOONO GEKITINNITUKI TUGINOGOTOKU HAPPYOOSITA GOO
SURUUPU GATA KEIJUNYOOKAN PARAMATTAG(JOWA ( 1060 TON )
SUIRAINO KO GEKIOUKE GEKITINSARBTA SHOOSAIWA IMADAFUMEI
013 NYUUYOOKUNIHI NIHIYUUPII GABOOJUSI TA EIKOKUR lONI YO-
REBA HORENWA URAJIOSUTOKKU FUKINSUISKIO KOOKOOKINSI
KUIKI I SITEISITA MUNEHAPPYOOSITA 014 RONDONNIHI EISEIFUWA
SANHIYIGO KYOKUTOONIMUKE TUMIDASARERU EISHOOHINNI TAI-
SITEWA SUBETEYUSHUTU KYOKAHEIO JISIURUMUNE NIHI HAP-
PYOO STA
0152 P AN
15880
MANUAL
PRESS DE JVJ HR BC AT 1100 DO
DOME! 014 WASHINGTON WAGA RYOOTAISINO UERUZUJIKAN
HOOMONA TOKUNI RUUZUVERUTi^ DAITOORYOONO Y OKYUUGA KISONI
NATYMONODE BEIKOKU DAITOORYOOGA KANSHAIANO KYUUKAO TO-
TUJO TORIYAMETE UOOMUHUPURINGUSUYORI KIKANSURUTOYUU
KEUNO KOTOGQRADEaiO SOOZOOTUKUTOORI DAITOORYOOGA NITI-
BEIKAII3ANN0 SUISIN.TOO NANRAKA JUUYOOJITAINO SENMEIONOTE
HISSUYOOKENTO SITAKOTOGA UKAGAWARERU SHOOSOKUSUJIMO
KAKU DAITOORYOO MIZUKARA MOND ANOSHORINI NORIDASITA
KOTOWA KAIDANNOSEIHINI KIWAMET JUUY OOSEIGA ARUTOSI NIHI
TUGIN KNYAIO HYOOMEISITA DAITOORYOO MIZUKARA KAIBANNI
KAINYUUSITE SAIKINNOJITAI SENNEIO MOTOMETA KOTOWA SONOIZI
SUKOBURU JUTTYOODEARU 016 WASHINTONNIHI RUDAITOORYOOWA
NIHINO NITIBEI KAIDANNITUKI UERUZU KOKUMUJIKANNI TAISITO-
KUNI SITASIKUSHU.IU IS.IIOOKONATTA O TUTAERARERU DAKENI NI-
HINO DAITOORYOO SINUUNKISHA KAIKENWA KONOTENNI SITI':\IONGA
SHUUCHUUSARE KONNITINO KAIDANDE TEISHUTU SARETA TAINITI
SHOOKAIWA SAIGOTUT^CHUUNO KEISIKIO TOTOAMONO KS MATAWA
KIGENTUKIDE KAITOOWOYOOKYUU SITAMONOKATONO KISH ADEAGA-
WANO SITUMONNITAIHI DAITOORYOOWA SOREWAMOTOOMO BAKA
ETA SITUMONDA BEIKOKUGAWANO TAINITI SHOOKAIWA MATOAKI^
TANNA RU TEICHOONART^ SHOOKAINI SUGINAITO KARUKUKOREO IS-
SHUUSITA 017 SHANHAI KAWASEYORITUKI TAIEI TAIBEI KAWARAZU
GAUNPYOO NIJUHATIEN NINOITIURI NIJUKYUEN CHOODOKAI PARA
AKEI INONOOS ONO TAKUSOOKENXINWA SENJI KASHOKURYOO SEISA-
KUNO JUUYOOSHNI KANGAMI NAIGAITIAVO TTTUJITE IKYANSERU
SHOKURYOO SEISAKUWO KAKURITU SENTOSURUMONDE KONGO-
NOOONDAI TOSITETU(HNO GOTOKUKITAI SARETIRU HITOTU NAIGAITI
SHOKURYOO KOORYUUNO KAKURITU JUURAINO SHOKURYOO KOORYI'-
UGAYAYAMO SUREBAKAKKYO SHUGI WAZAAVAI SAREKEIKAKU DOORI-
NOUNYOOGA YINAKATA JIJITITNIKANGAME KONGOAVA SHOKURYO-
ONO HAIDUNWAMOTIRON SEISAN NTUITEAIO KOORYUUSENTO SURU-
INIONODEARU SIKASITE SEISANKEIKA NAI AN JUUIKKANEN
KEIKAKUWO KIJUNTOSI GAITI MANSHUUKOKUWO TUUJIYAKU NIS-
KNROPPYAKU MANKOKUZOOSAN KEIK AKUWO JISHISI MOTESHOKU-
1072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
RYOO JIKYUURITUNO KYOOKAWO HAKARU MONODEARU FUTATU
IMINKOKUSAKUNO SUISIN NIJUKKANEN HYAKUMANKO NO TAIMANI-
MIN KEIKAKUWA MYOONENDOKARA DAINIKI KEIKAKUNI DU
(GOKANEN) NIJUUNIMANKONO NAITINOOMINWO SOOSITUSUBEKU
IKIKONDEIRU MITTU NAIGAITI RINSEINOTOOGOO RINSEIGA (HAYA-
SISEIJI) NOORINSHOO NOMINARAZU NAIMITOKUMU SONOTANIBUN-
KATU SARETEIRUMONO^VO ITIGE^'KA SURUKOTO YOTOU HIRYOOSI-
GENNO TANKYUU CHOO'^ENPENA OYOBIKYOOEI KENNAINOHIR YOO
SINKYOOGENNO KAITAKU SURUKOTO NADODEARUGA KORENIYORI
WAGANOO IN TAKUMURYOO GYOOSEIWA SOOGOOTEKINI SONOKOKU-
SAKU WO JITUGENSIURU KOTOTONAROO PARA TOKYOMAEHIKE 1077
771 661 NASI 640 526 TAKANE 1093 771 YASUNE 10,87 766 578 794 NASI NASI
807 869 TAKANE 279 798 517 659 811 873 KASUNE 576 793 517 659 807 867
HAMAITOGENBUTU 1500 PARA
0126 F AN
15880
MANUAL
PRESS DE JVJ/JUF/JUD HR BC AT 1130 DEC 3RD
UOMEI TOKYO WITUBUTUSOO A 141 151 481 200 555 590 310 758 745 576
PARA 017 HANOISANHI NITIBEI KOOSHOOGA KIWAMETE KINPAKUSITA
KOTOWA FUTUINCHOOYANO KANSINWOTAKAIME TOOTI FURNSUGO
SINBUNWA NITIBEI KOOSHOOWOJIEGURU NYUUSUO RENJ U TOPPUNI
KAYAGETERUGA IPPANNONINKIWA KIWAMETE REISEIBE OSI NITI-
BEIKANYEGA JUUDAIKASI TAIHEIYOONI SAIAKUWITAIGA TOPPATU-
SITEMO FUTUINNAIBUNIWA NANNO DOOYOOMONAKU MUSIRO NITI
FUTUIN KYOODOODOOEI KYOOTEIWA SARANIITIDANTO SONOTIKA-
RAO HAKKISURUMONOTO HINERARITERU SUNAWATI ITIBUNIWA
MADA HIYORI MITEKI TAIDOWO SUTEKIRINU MONOARUGA ZENTAI-
TEKINI MITE NITIFU TUIN KYOODOOBOOEI KYOOTEINO SEISINWO
NINHIKISI JITAINO JUU AIKANI TOMONATE KYOOTEINO HINKAGA
HAKKISARU BEIKIMONOTOSITE FUTUINKANPENMO HAKENGUN
SHUNOODUMO EIBEINO BOORYAKUNI SINCHOONARU CHUUIOSARAI-
RBISEINI JITAINITAISHO SENTOSITERU YOMDEARU SIKAHITE WAG-
AENTIGUN OYOBI TOKUHATAISIFUWA KIWAMETE KINMITUNI RENA-
KUSI KYOKUMENNO SUHNISOKUOO BANPANNOSOTINI IKANNAKIO
KIHITERUGA FUTUINNOITIGA IWAYURU EIISI RAINNO T0KKAK:U TIKE-
INIARI GUNJIJOO SEIPIJOO TOMINI JUUY OOSEIO KAYUFAISITERUN-
ODE KONGONO JOOSEINITAIBOSI KYOODOOBOOE KYOOTEIWA JISHI-
TUTEKINI KYOOKASARERU MONOTO KITAISARERU (IKA) OOYAKU)
SINGAPOORUNI SINGAPOORU SICHOOWA NIHI EII^ I GUNWA ARATANI
KYOKUTOO KANAIOHENSEISI KORENIKATUTENO EIK OKU SINAKAN-
TAIOMO HOOGANSESIME EIHONGOKUKANTAI OYOBI TICHUUKAI KAN-
TAITO DOOYOONOTIIO FUYOSITAMUNE HAPPYOOSITA NAO SINNIN
EIKYOKUTOO KANTAI SIREICHOOKAN TOMASU FIRIP PUSU SHOOSH-
OOWO NOSETA SINCEISENTOOKAN PURINSUOBU UBRUSUGOO GA
JAKKANNO YUURYOKU GUNKANWOHIKIITE NIHI SINGAPOORUNI
NYUUKOOSITA WUSINTONNIHI NOMURAKURUSU RYOOTAISIWA NIHI-
GOZEN JUJINIJUGOFUN KOKUMUSHOONI UERUZUJIKANWO HOOMON
SANJUGOFU I NATATTE KAIDANSITA KOKUMU TOOKYOKUWA MIGI-
KAIDAN SHUURYOOGO (UERUZUJIKANWA) DAITOORYOONO MEINI-
CORI NOMURAKURUSU RYO OTAISINO RAIHOOWOMOTOME DAITOORY-
OONI PIOOKOKUSURTAME NIHON SIFUNI TAISI ARUSUUNO SHOOK-
AIONASITA MONODEARU) TOHAPPYOO WAGA RYOOTAISIMO KISHA-
DANNO SITUMONNI TAISITE) WAREWAREWA TABA UERUZUJIKANNO
HANASIO KEICHOOSITANI SUGINAI) TOKOTAETA
RUDAITOORYOOWA NIHISHOOGO SUTIMUSON RIKUGUNCHOOKA
N NOKKUSU KAinUNCHOOKAN UERU U KOKUMUJIKANWO HOWAIT-
OHAUSU INSHOMTISI ITIJIKANYONI WATARI TAINITISAKUO CHUU-
SINNI KY OOGISITA RONBONNIHI EIKAIGUNHIOOWA GOOSHUUKAN-
TAI SHOZOKU JUNYOOKAN SIDONIGOOGA (6730) FOKUKISHUUKAN
SHUTAIERUMARUKU GOOTO (9400) GOOSHUU SUHKIDE KOOSENSI-
TAKEKKA SOOHOM TINBOTU SITAMUNE HAPPYOOSITA SENTOONO
JIJITUWA HAPPYOO SARETENAIGA JUITIGATU NLTUROKUHI IZENNO
BOOHITOIWARERU NYUUYOOKUNI YUUPIECA BOOJUSITA EIKOKU
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1073
RAJIONIYOREBA SORENWA URAJI0SUTOK FUKINSUIEKIO KOOKOO
KINSIKUIKINI SITEISITA MUNESAPPYOOSITA
0254 F AN
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DOMEI GAI IS KA S U 521 275 118 BUENOSAIRE TOOTIEIKOKU
TAISIKANWA HARUNIJUUKUHI ITOOCHUUSHOOJI BURAKKURISUTO
NIKUWABRUMUNJl HAPPY OSITA CHUUNANBE TUU.TITESOO.IIN
KAIHSNO KOKUHYOOWA SAIHHODEARU KONOKEKKA ITOCHUUTONO
IDANIKOROBNIA UKETUMINIO KEIYAKUSEARU JONSON SHOOKA-
IWA HUTUKA KEIYAKUHAKIO MOOSIIRETEKITA PARA
019 RONDONNIHI CHAAIRU SHUSHOOWA NIHINOKAINNI JINTEK-
IHIGEN CHOOYOOREIO TEIANHI JUHATISAIKAK
SUBETENODANSIO HEIEKINI CHOOCOOHIURU KENCENWO YOOKY-
UUSIKATU JIJOONIYOTEWA ROKU.TUSHAINO DANHIOMO SHOOSHU-
USIRU KOTOARUBEKI UNE FUGENSITA MICIHOOASWA DANHINO-
MINARAZU NIUUSHAIKARA S AN.TUSHAIHADENO MIKONNOJOSINO
CHOOYOOWOMOKITEISITERUGASENTOMWOYOBISEIMEINIKIKENARU
NINMU IWA MIZUKARA SIGANSITA FUJINNOMIO ATBRUKOTOTO
RUSAZUDEARU SIKASITE CHAATIRUWA CHOMBOSANYI KAUUDAI
TEIANRIYUUTOSITE SANOGOTOKU SETUMEISITA HITOTU SINSETU
KOOJOONO JUUGYOOSHA DOSHUUGA KINKYUUMO HITUY OONI SEM-
ARARETERU KOTO HITOTU TOOYOONIOKERU GUNTAIOIJISI DOOH-
OOMENNI OKERU DAIKINONO SENTOOKEIZOKUNO JUN lOSITEOKU
HITUYOOARUKOTO HITOTU INDONIOITE SHOOSHUUSI KUNRENSITU-
TU ARUTASUUNO GUN AINITAISI SINSIKISOOBIO ATAEMA MARANUK-
OTO HITOTU EIKOKUNO ENSOSUSHI SEISANWIO KEIZOKUSESIMERU
ITUYOOAR UKOTO HITOTU KUUGUNNARABINI KAIGUNZOOKYOO
KEIKAKUO KANSUISSE HITUYOOARUKOTO HITOTU DOKUGfUNNO TAlEI
JOORIKUSAKUSEN OYOBI KUUSAKUNITAISI TAEZU BOODIOTUZUKIRU
SITUYOOARUKO 020 BERURINNIMI DOKUGUNSIREIBU HAPPYOO
(TOOBUSENSEN) HITOTU ROSUTOFUTIKUNO SENTOOWA HIKITU-
ZUKI KIEZOKUSANETRU HITOTU MOSUKUWA FUKINDEWA DOKUGU-
BUTAIWA SARANI TEKIJINFUKAKU KOOGEH 10 KIWAET A
RENINGURAADO FUKINDEWA MOONOOGEKIO KOOATTANOTI MATA
O DASHHUTUO KITOSITI
OYOSI HYOOKETUSERU RAWOCAKOWOOWO YUKUTEKI YUSOOBUTAIO
BA KUGEKISI SENTOOKI BAKUGEKISI
MARABINI SEOK
SANVBYIKA ROKAKU HAKA
(Fading Bad)
1539 1544 PARA NM TU JVJ VA
0321 P AN
15880
MANUAL
S , Dec. 1941.
Hr Domei press
01 Tokyo 2/12 officially announced Yoshiaki Hatta former Minister Commerce
Industry appointed new Minister Railways assuming post hitherto held con-
currently by Viceadmiral Ken Terajima Cornmuuications Minister stop Also
announced position Minister Overseas Affairs will be transferred to Hiroya Ino
Minister Agriculture Forestry stop Latter hitherto concurrently held by
Shigenori Togo Foreign Minister
02 Manilas 2/12 Manila bulletin reports high military authority close United
States Far eastern forces emphatically declared quote there's been no general alert
unquote in connection with reports United States forces Philippines been ordered
standby for action.
03 Hsinkings 2/12 five Soviet soldiers crossed border into Manchoukuo territory
1000 yesterday at point forty — South Tungning eastern Manchoukuo twas re-
ported stop Said Japanese garrison troops shot dead two trespassers drove
back three into Soviet territory.
04 Bangkoks 2/12 Japanese Ambassador Teiji Tsubokami after meeting Thai-
premier Luang Pabul Songgram this morning told press Thai premier told him
1074 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
he regretted quote malicious propaganda spreading rumors Thailand Ha —
unfriendly feelings toward Japan unquote
05 Berlins 2/12 high command communiques Nazi forces driven deep Moscow de-
fenses at more points however no details revealed sametime claimed more than
nine thousand Britisli prisoners including three generals taken in Libya added
eight one four British tanks one two seven planes destroyed.
06 Londons 2/12 Admiralty announced six eight three zero ton Australian cruiser
Sydney sunk in clash with German raider Seeiermark which also sunk added
action occurred sometime before 26/11
07 Washington 2/12 Japanese Ambassadors Nomura Korusu conferred with Un-
dersecretary State Summer Welles more thau thirty-five minutes this morniug
stop All declined reveal nature todays discussion however learned United
States made certain inquiries to Japanese government regarding situation in
South seas stop After conference Willes immediately called on President Roose-
velt and held lengthy conference.
08 Londons 2/12 Britain Deci — Faded out completely
0353 G TR
13840
Tape.
S 3 Dec. 41.
CK DE JUP/JAP
DOMEI COPYRIGHT
13 Tokyo 3/12 United States probably believes she effectively restraining Japan
by concentrating her naval force in Pacific but as irony fate would have it result
is 80 percent United States Fleet quote immobilized unquote in Pacific while
(iermany been blessed with golden opportunity to give full play her naval activity
in Atlantic writes naval editor Yomiurishimbun in front page today stop.
Yoniuri editor thinks .some eighty percent United States Navy now concentrated
in Pacific consists seven or eight battleships three aircraft carriers some dozen
out of fifteen heavy cruisers over fifty destroyers more than thirty submarines
and large number auxiliary ves.sels all which now standing by Hawaii in addition
two or three battleships and other units standing by west coast bases stop.
Reviewing Japanese American negotiations Yomiuri editor opines United States
apparently means to maintain peace in Pacific until 1946 when her two ocean
fleet completed stop. Tightening ABCD encirclement against Japan as they do
United States and Great Britain now throwing covetous eyes at Soviet fleet
Far East which they wait to drag into ABCD camp stop. Yomiuirushimbun
however asserts quote its problematical whether Soviet Union play into Anglo
American hands Soviet naval forces Far East consists more than Imndred vessels
including one cruiser five destroyers some ninety submarines two submarine
bases and several river gimboats torpedo boats and minelayers and special
service vessels in estimated Yomiuirushimbun editor who outpoints Great Britain
and United States paying special attention Soviet underwatercraft and air force
stop. Y'omiuirushimbun declares quote survey Pacific situation clearly shows
Japan seriously menaced by ABCD encirclement which United States tightening
in order to realize lier unholy design stop. But Japanese nation calmly watching
situation with implicit confidence reposed in imperial navy and army especially
since both Prime ^Minister and concurrently War Minister General Tojo and
Navy Minister Admiral Shimada assured nation before recent Diet session that
full preparations been completed unquote Para.
14 Tokyo 3/12 Understood Vice Admiral Seizo Sakonji former minister air
force ministry be apijointed President semiofiicia] Imperial Oil Company suc-
ceeding Y'oshiaki Hatta who appointed minister railways yesterday Para.
15 TOKYO 3/12 Financial experts expect total value yen linked currencies
at end this year will top yen ten billiard mark inclusive Yen six billiard worth
Bank of Japan notes yen seven hundred fifty million Bank of Korea notes yen
two hundred fifty million Bank of Osaka notes yen billiard three hundred million
notes Bank of Alanchoukuo yen billiard notes Federal Reserve Bank China and
yen hundred twenty million Bank of IMongolia notes stop. Incidentally its re-
vealed circulation yen linked currency Japan controlled area East Asia at end of
November exceeded yen eight billiard.
0430 R
11980K
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1075
CQ DE JVJ/ JUD
J/JUD JVJ/JUD
PRESS JDE JVJ/JUD HR ]S\V BY AT 0900 DE C 2 BT DOMEI 0002 IMI
002 SHUUGIINGIINO NINKIVVA IKKANENKAN ENCHOONO HOORITUNI-
YORI MYOONENSANGAT SAISJUITISO MOTE MANRYOOSURU KOTONI
NATTERUNODE JIKYDU KUSERU ORIKARA YOTEINOORI SOOINKY-
OWO SIXOOESRUKA INAKI UITEWA GI:M0NW0 UGA SEIFUTOO-
KYOKUTO SITEWA CCHOOYUUJINO BAYWNOITWO SHUUGIINGIINXO
SOOSEXKYOWO OKONAUHOOSINDE XOZOXDERUKOTO WA CHUUMOKU-
SARERU SUXAW XITROSEXYEKIO SAIMO SEIN KOKUXO NOTIXIOIT
SOOSEKYOWO SIKOOSITA REIGARUNODE SEIFT T OKYOKUTQ SITWA
HIJOO JIKYOKU XOITE KOKUMIN SEKATURYOKUO HATUYOOSURU
KOTOWA HITUYOONA KOTODEARUTO YUU TATEM :M0T0ZUKI
KAKUBETUTXO SISHOONAKI KAGIRI SOOSENKYOWO OKOSAUHOO-
SINDE XOZOXDERU TADASI SONOIZENNI SOUUG G E SEXKY-
OHOOXO KAISEOOKONAUKA INAKANIUITWA MOKKAXOTOKORO ZER
OXGONOJOOSEIXE OOJIN RUIKOONOYOOBEAU PARA
0015 COMMIXG AS
HR NW
KOXGOXOJOOSEXI OOJITE TADOWO KETIESUR IKOONOYOODEARU
PARA TOKTO YORI 1109 770 NAS 777 744 726 IMI 1109 770 NASI 777 744 526
OOSAKA YORI H 803 519 661 819 872 IMI 585 803 519 661 819 872 PARA AR
NW TU DE JVJ / JUD VA
12275 FAIR
0021 WF
CQ DE JVJ/JUD/JAU2
PRESS PRESS PRESS DE JVJ/JUD/JAU2
JVJ/JUD/JAU2 JVJ/JUD/JAU2 HR NR BC AT 0980
DE C 4 BT DOMEI SARUJUGATU SHOJUX KAISISARAT SAOOSHOO-
NANBU KYOOSANGUN GEKIMIE WA CHAKUCHAKU SUSUMERARE
IMAYA DAINEDAXKA HAI UGA JUITIGATU MATUJIXUMADENI HAN-
xMESSRU SOOGOOSEX KWA TEKISE 2446 IMI 2446 n^-JRYO BS IMI 685
ROKUJUKEIX JUUXI YOOHOO 1116 IMI 1116 WOKAZOETERU ROXDOX-
NIHI IMKKGUXSHOO HAPPYOO EI KES'UIJOO KAXTEIWAS TIKHU-
UKAIDE IGOSOOSEXDANWO KOOGEKI SIXYEIKUTIKUKAN ISSH
ISOOSEN NIDS GEKITIO ROOMANIIII IGU BU HAPPYOO IRAIGEKI
TOBURUKU OKIDE EIJUNYOOKAX ISSEKIO GEKITOSIA SHAXHAISANHI
SHANHAI ZAI YUUIJIN YAKUYONHYAKU GOJUMEIWA SAXII OOTJ
HAYAGG KOXKE YE GxVJPOORUXI AI HIKIAGEXO DAI-
BUBUNWA FUJOSIDE IMADA STO UHYAKU MEINO ZAXRYUU-
SINERU SHAXHAI HI HOO HIKIAGEXO MEIOUKETA ZAIS KAKO
MOKKA SOXOJUXBEIXO EISGA SIXYORI ZERO ROM BA
RAXYIN PAXAMASEXMO KOREXITUIZUI SUBU KOXOKEK A SHAX-
HAIJW TU YOKU YORI KAXZENX'I KAKU USARERU KOTOXIXRA
ZAIXI AXT OOWA SIXKOKUXA MOXOGAAROO XOOFOOKKUXIHI
RARUFU BAADO IMI RAA BAADO JI HOWA XIHITOOTIDE
EXZETUTOOKOXA HYOOXO KIKIO KYOOCHOOSEIA XOTI SAXOGOTOKU
XOBETA BEIKEIGUXWA TAI YOO XI FUSHOOJIGA OKOREBA SOREWA
SHOOKIBOXA MOXODE WAXAI KOTOWORIKAISI BAX'ZEXXO JUX-
BIOXASSIERU BEKAGUXWA KESSITTEXOXXO JITURYOKUO KAS-
HOOHY OOKA SITEW MATA EKX AT TAIESYOOXI OITWA MUTJKIO
KGUXDEWAXKU KOXOTAME BEIKOKUWA SONOKAIUXWO TAIHEYO-
OXI S'HUUCH UU AZEXKAWO ER KUXATA XYUUYOOKUSAN
SAXHIXO NYUUYOOKU TAIMUSUWA FGOOSHUU XYUUWIRAXDEOGA
BEIKOKUNI KUUGUXYI XARABIX KYUUKYUIE KYOOYOSURU KEX-
XIUKI TOOJISHAKANXI RYOOKUAGA SERIUS HOOJITERU AR
XM TU DE JVJ/JUD/JAU2 VA
12275 POOR 0053 WP
Poor copy clue to interference (ignition noise).
000 CQ DE JVJ/JUD
PRESS PRESS PRESS DE JVJ/JUD
HR XW BC AT 1000 DEC 40 DOMEI HAMAITOMEAEYORI 1507 1520 1530
1543 1547 ? 1507 1520 1530 1543 1547 PARA 003 MARUMARUKITIYON WAGA-
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 27
1076 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ARAWASI MARUMARUKIWA SANHIGOGOMO KAISEIORISITE TAIKYO-
SHUTUDOO KANSUIJOORYUU SBNSEISHOO ANKOO (HAUSAKA EYA-
SUNOYASU) HI OOJOOWO KUSSHUUSI HIKOOJOO HOKUTANNO
SANROKUNI KOOTIKUHARETA TIKAN ROOOKOTO DANYAKUKONI
KYUUKMOKA ,,,,,,, KYUUKMOKA BAKUGEKIO HANPUKU OBITA-
DASII KOKUENNO TATINOBORUNOWO KAKUNIN SARANI HIKOOJOONO
FUZOKUSEB FUZOKUSETUBIO KANPUNAKIMADE BAKUSAISITE ZEN-
KIYUUYUU KIKANSITA KONOHIGOZENNO HOOKEI BAKUGEKINIMO
GOGONO ANKOO BAKUGEKINIMO TEKIKUUGUNWA HENYEISAEMISEZU
WAGAARAWASINO RAISHUUNI OSOREONASI IZUREMO SEITOHOOMEN
OKUTIHIKOOJOONI TONSOOSITA MOYOODEARU 004 OOKURASHO-
ODEWA KONKAI HONNENDO KOKUMIN CHOTIKU MOKUHYOOGAKUO
KAITEI CHOTIKUNO SHOOREINO KYOOKATETTEINI TUTOMETERUGA
KORENITOMONAI HOOKOKUSAIKEN NARABINI CHOTIKUSAICENNO
GENKOO HAKKOOGENDONO KAKUCHOOWO KOORYOSI HOOKOKUSAI-
KEN NITUITEWA GENTKOO GOWOKUENNO GENDOWO BAIGANKUNO
JUUOKUENNI HIKIAGERU KOTOTOSI MIGINITOMONAI RINJISIKIN
CHOOSEIHOO KAISINIKANSURU HOORITUANWO KITARUBEKI KITA-
RUBEKI TUUJOOGIKAINI TEISHUTUSURU KOTONI NAITEISITA SUNA-
WATI RINJISIKIN CHOOSEIHOONI MOTOZUITE SAKUNIEHARUYORI
HAKKOOSARETERU HOOKOKUSAIKENNO HAKKOAGAKUWA HONNEN-
JUITIGATU MATUNIOITE SANWOKUISSEN NANAHYAKUMANYEN NITA-
SHI HAKKOOYORYOKURA ITEMOKUHASSEN SANBYAKU MANYENTO
NATTERUGA KOKUMINCHOTIKU MOKUHYOOGAKUNO ZOODAINITOMO-
NAI HOOKOKUSAIKENNO HAKKOO ZOOKAGA YOSOOSARERUNODE KON-
KAI HAKKOOGENDONO BAIGAKU KAKUCHOOWO DANKOOSURU KOTONI
HOOSINWO NAITEISITA MONODEARU SIKASITE CHOTIKUSAIKENNI
TUITEWA DAINANAJUROKU TUUJOOGIKAINI OITE HAKKOOGENDOWO
GOWOKUENYORI GENKOONO JUUOKUENNI HIKIAGE SONOHAKKOOGA-
KUWA JUITIGATUMATUNI OITE GOWOKUGOSEN HAPPYAKUMANYEN
TONATTEORI HAKKOOYORYOKUWA GENZAINAO YONWOKUYONSEN
NIHYAKUMANYEN WONOKOSITERUGA RAINENDONIOKERU CHOTIKU
MOKUHYOOGAKUWA HONNENDONO HYAKUNANAJU OKUENYORI SA-
RANIBOOCHOO SURUMONOTO YOSOOSARERUNODE HOOKOKUSAIKENNO
HAKKOOGENDO KAKUCHOOTO HEIKOOSITE CHOTIKUSAIKENNO
HAKKOOGENDONI TUITEMO GENZAINO JUUOKUENYORI GOQWOKUEN-
TIDOWO KAKUCHOOSURU KOTOGA KOORYOSARETERU AR NM
TU DE JVU/JUD
4 DEC 1941
0130 CQ CQ CQ DE JVJ JVJ
PRESS PRESS PRESS DE JVJ JVJ JVJ
HR BC AT 1030 DEC 4 TH
DOMEI 005 SUANHAIYONHI KAWAHIYORITUK TAIEITAIVEI WARAZU
GUNPYOO NIJUKYUEN CHOODOURI ?iIJUKYUEN YONNOITIURI 006 BE-
RURINSANHI DOKUGUNSIREIBU HAPPYOO (TOOBUSENSEN) HITOTU
MOSUKUWA SENSENDEWA DOKUHOHIE OYOBI SENSHABUTAIWA
KYOORYOKUNARU BAKUGEKIKI NARABINI KYUUKOOKA BAKUGE-
KIKITAITO AIKOWOOSITE SEKIGUNNO GANKYOONARU TEIKOO
OYOBI BUNSANTEKI HANGEKIO HAIJOSITUTU SARANIGENSINNI
SEIKOOSITA HITOTU MIGISENTOODE DOKUGUNWA SEKIGUNSEN-
SHA NIJUDAIO GEKIHASITA HITOTU SOREN OOGATAYUSOOS'EN
ISSEKIWA FINARANDOWANDE DOKUFINRANDO RYOOKOKUNO KIRA-
INIFURETE TIMBOTUSITA (TAIISEN) HITOTU DOKUKUUGUNWA
EIHONDO SHUUHENNO SUIKIDE EIOOGATASHOOSEN ISSEKIOS'HU-
UGEKI DAISONSHOOWO ATAETA HITOTU DOKUKUUGUNWA NIHI-
YORUYORI SANHI MIMEINIKAIvETE EIKOKU NANSEIKAIGAN'NO
KOOWANSTSETUNI MOOBAKUOKUWA ETA 007 MOSUKUWASANHI
MOSTJKUWA HOOSOOWA TOKUBETUSENKYOO HAPPYOODE NANBUSEN.
SEN SENKYOONITUKI SANHI TUGINOGOTOKU HOOJITERU ROSUTOFUT-
IKU NITE DAIHANGEKISENNI DETA SEKIGUNWA TAGANAROOU
TAGANROGUNI TOTOMONI FUKIN YONJUKKASONWO DAKKAN-
SITA KAKUTE SEKIGUNNO KOOGEKIO SOSISENTOSURU DOKUGUNNO-
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1077
KITOWA KOTOGOTOKU FUNSAISARE DOKUGUNAWA SARANI SEIHOO
. MARIUPORINI ? MARIUBORITIN MUKATTB KAISOOCHUUDEARU KO-
NOSENTOODE DOKUGUNWA SI&HOOHA ROKUMANYI JOOWO DASITA
008 BERURINSHANHI DOKUOUSIREIBU SANHI HAPPTOONIYOREBA
RIBIA SENSENNO SUUJIKUGUNWA TOBURKUTOONANDE NYUUJIIRAN-
DOGUN IKKOSIDANWO HOOISENMETUSI HORYOTASUUOETEA NAO DO-
KUSIWA RIBIASENKYOONI TUKI MANMANTARU JISINWO HYOOMEISI
SUUJIKUGUNWA GANKYOONARU KOOSENNOKEKKA EIGUNNO KOUGE-
KISAKUSENWO FUNSAISITATO NOBETERU PARA AKEI SHOKOSHOOD*-
EWA SENYISEIHINNO HAIKYUUKIKOO SEIBIO CHAKUCHAKU SUSUME-
TEIRUGA KONOUTI MOOSEISEIHIN BUMONNITUITEWA TUGINOGOTOKU
TEAMIITO MOOFUKATAKAKE KEORIMONO KEORIKISEIFUKU (SUDEN-
INARU YOOFUKU) NOYONSHUNO CHUOHAIKYU TOSEIKAISHAO SE-
TURITUSURU KOTONIKETTI REMO KINJITOCHUNI HOKKININKAIWO
HIRAITE HONGETUCHUNI SORITUSOKATO KAISAISURU YOTEIKEARU
HITOTU NIHON TEAMSITO CHUOHAIKYU TOSEIKAISHA SIHONKIN
SANBYAKUMANYEN ZENGAKU HARAIKOMI JUNKEITO JINKENGI-
KEITO SUFUGIKEITOWO TORIATUKAU HITOTU MOOFUKATAKAKE
CHUOHAIKYU TOSEIKAISHA SIHONKIN HYAKUMANYEN ZENGAKU
HARAIKOMI HITOTU KEORIMONO CHUOHAIKYU TOSEIKAISHA
SIHONYISSENMANYEN ZENGAKU HARAIKOMI IPPAN KEORIMONONO
HAIKYUO TKIATUKAU HITOTU KEORIMONO KISEIFIKU SEIZOHAIK-
YU TOSEIKAISHA GIHOKIN GOYAKUMANYEN ZENGAKU HARAIKOMI
KISEIFUKUNO SEIZOTO HAIKYUNIATARU AR NM TU DE JVJ VA
12275 KC 6062 VS
4 Dec 1941
0200 CQ CQ DE JVJ
PRESS PRESS PRESS DE JVJ JVJ JVJ HR NW BC AT 1100 DEC 4TH
DOMEI fGAIKET) NAMARI 5712 .5712 KOMUGISIKYOO HAJIME KABUITI-
BANO KENCHOO KATAGATA GAIKOKUSIKIN TOODBINO KANWANO-
UWASA KAKOOGYOOSHANO KOOJUOYOBI SEINANGENBUTU GYOO-
SHAGA KIROKUTEKINA TAKANEDE KAITUKETERU TONOHOIRKTE
KAIKIIPPAN TEKINIMINAOSI TAGAHIKEGTWA RIGUIURTNI MIMA-
WARETE ISSAIHANRAKU PARA 009 WASINTONSANHT BEIKATN YOSA-
NYIINKAIWA SANHI RIKTtKATGUNHI BUKITAIYOHOO KANKEIGYO-
OSEIHI KOKUBOO KANKEIJUUTAKU KOORO (OOYAKE MITI) NARA-
bini dooryokusisetu kensetuhinado issaino koogt kokuboo-
yosanwo fukumu hatijuokudoruno tuikagunji yosananwo
KAKETUSITA DOOYLLSAAN SEIRITT^NO AKATT^KINIWA 1940 .1940
NEN rokugatuirai SEIFUN'O KOKUBOOKANKEI GENKIN sishu-
TUKEIYAKU KENGENAWA JITUNI ROPPYAKUHATIJU OKUDORUNO
KYOGAKUNI TASSTTRT^ SINKOKUROO TUTKAYOSAN T^TIWAKE SANO-
TOORI (TANYI HYAKUMANDORU) HITOTU RIKUGUNSHOOYOSAN
5127 ? .5127 HITOTU KAIGTTNSHOOYOSAN 1129 ? 1129 TTATU BUKITAI-
YOYOSAN 1555 ? 1556 HITOTU PANAMAUNGA DAISANKOOMON KENSE-
TITHI 104 ? 104 HITOTU KOKUROOKOORO KRNSETT^HT 129 ? 129 HITOTU
HTKOOJOO SINSETUHI m ? 50 HITOTU KOKUBOOKANNEI JUUTAKU
KENSETUHI 10 ? 10 HITOTU GUNJT^KOOGYOOYOO DOORYOKUSETUBTHI
NARABINI TISUIKOOJTHT S7 ? 87 HITOTU SONOTA 72 ? 72 KEI 8264
? 8264 010 MOSUKUWANIHI SAKINI KUIVISHIAFTTNT TOOCHAKUSITA
SIKORTTSUKTI BOOMEI POORANDO DAITOORYOOWA NTHT KUURO
MOSUKUWANI TOOCHAKUSITA DOODAITOORYOO MOSUKUWA HOLL
NO MOKUTEKIWA AS COMMING AS , . 0215 GCT.
0220 HR NW MOSTTKUWANI TOOCHAKUSITA DOOKAITOORYOO MO-
SUKUWA HOOMONNO MOKUTEKIWA SUTAARIN GICHOOTO KAIDANWO
TOGERUTAMETO MIRARITERU PARA HAMAITOGENBUTU 1500 ? 1500
OOSAKAMAEHIKE 587 801 516 661 820 874 ? 587 801 516 661 820 874
TAKANE 590 804 519 661 821 874 ? 590 804 519 661 821 874 YASUNE
584 798 516 661 812 870 ? 584 798 516 661 812 870 PARA TOKYO
1113 773 663 767 644 526 ? 1113 773 663 767 644 526 TAKANE 1115
775 ? 1115 775 YASUNE 1105 770 ? 1105 770 PARA AR NM TU DE JVJ
0225 12275 GOOD VS
1078 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4 DEC 1941 5262
SOOSAWA AKUTENKOOWO OKASI TUZUKERARETETAGA YONHIASANII-
TARI KANTONNO SOOSAHONBUNI (KANTONSHOONANBU TANSUI TOO-
HOKUHOO SANJUKKIROXO SANSOKUNI KATAYOKUNO SOONANKIRA-
SIKI MONO WO HAKKENSITA) TOKYUUDENARI GOOUOOKAHITE YUUR-
YOKUNA SOOSATAIGA SITUDOOSITA) KAIKEI) KABUSIKISIKYOO
SAKUHIKOOTOO ATOUKETE HAJIMEZITUYONA RIGUIURIGA ARISES-
KOOKABU TETUDOOKABU HITTOONI SITAOSITINKI ITIJIHUANTEI
NEUGOKIWAKYOOAI KUGUTONATTA KOREWAIPPOOKE TEUDOOHIG-
YOONO KAIKETUNARABINI TUYOKITEKINA SENKYOKUJOOHOO TOYU-
UTUYO ZAIRYOOGAATTA NIMOKAKAWARAZU TAHOOTETUDOO HIGY.
( )OKAIKETU NITOMONAU TINGINZOOGAKUO MAKANAU TAMENOKAKY-
AKU UNTINHIKIAGE GAKYOKASARERU JIKINARABINI SONOTEIDOGA
IMADAGIMONDEARI MATASEIHUNO TOOSEIKYOOKA ZOOZEIMONDA-
INO NARIYUKIGA HAUNSISARETA TAMEDEARU MOTTOMOSIKYOO
SONOGONZENJI KYOOCHOOTONARI IPPARNl ITIDORUMIMAN GATA-
HIKIMODOSI NAKAMWAITINAISI SANDORUGATA KOOTOOSITA MONO-
MOATTA NAONIHON KOOSHASAIWA TOOKYOOSI GOBUHANNO ITIDO-
RUYASUNO HOKAMEDATTA UGOKINAKATTA PARA HAINIAITOMAEHIKE
1510 1524 1535 1544 1549 PARA AR
NM TU DE JVJ/JUD
12275 GOOD 0322 VS
0245
J JC DE JYD
HR
DOMEIPRESS DOMEIPRESS DOMEIPRESS
07 TOKYOS 4/12 01 TOKYOS 3/12 TO JO GOVERNMENT INTENDS HOLD
GENERAL ELECTION- NEXTSPRING WITH EXPIRANTION OF EXTENDED
TERURE OF NIMBERS OF HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES 3/31 ?3/31 ASAS 3
CP CP CP DE JJC/JYD
DOMEIPRESS 01 TOKYOS 3/12 TOJO GOVERNMENT INTENDS HOLD
GENERAL ELECTION NEXTSPRING WITH EXPIRATION OF EXTENDED
TENURE OF IMEMBERS OF HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES 3/31 ? 3/31 UN-
LESS UNFORESEEN SITUATION ARRISES TWAS AUTHORITATIVELY
LEARNED PARA 02 WASHINGTON'S 3/12 IN FIRST LEX'GTHY STATE-
MENT REGARDING JAPANESE AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS S'ECRETARY
STATE HULL IN PRESSS'CONFERENCE REVEALED PURPOSE DOCUMENT
HANDED JAPANESE ENVOYS LAST WEEK WAS TO CLARIFY BASIC
ISSUS INVOLVED IN TALKS AS WELLS END COUFUSION ARISING FROM
ACTIONS UTTERNCES OTHER GOVERNMENTS STOP ANSWERING FUR-
THER QUERIES HULL SAID HAD NO INFORMATION WHEN JAPANESE
REPLY BE FORTHCOMING STOP ALSO TOLD REPORTERS HE UNABLE
GO INTO DETAILS WHEN ASKED IF JAPANESE ANSWER ROOSEVELT
INQUIRIES HAVE MAJOR BEARING ON WHETHER TALKS CONTINUE
PARA 03 XEWYORKS 3/12 COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM INTER-
CEPTED NAZIRADIO CLAI]M GERMAN TROOPS WITHIN TWENTY SEVEN
MILES MOSCOW HOWEVER ADMITTED QUOTE STRUGGLING AGAINST
COLD INDESCRIBABLBY BAD ROADS AS WELLS DESPERATELY FIGHT-
ING ENEMY UNQUOTE PARA
04 TOKYOS 3/12 ALL JAPANESE RESIDENTS IN HONGKONG DECIDED
EVACUATE AND RETURN JAPAN WITHIN FEWDAYS ASAHIS HONGKONG
CORRESPONDENT REPORTED PARA 05 WASHINGTONS 2/12
DAVY DEPT BRITISH ADMIRALTY ANNOUNCED APPROACH-
ES SINGAPORE MINED NAVY DEPARTMENT SAID MINED AREA EX-
TENDS OFF SOUTHCOAST TOHORE AND VESSELS MUST ENTER THAT
AREA OWN RISK PARA 06 BLTIMORE 2/12
DAVID LAW^RENCE WELLKNOWN COMM WITHN BALTIMORE SUN
ASSETS ALTHOUGH CHANCES JAPANESE AMERICAN TALKS COLLAPS-
ING ANY MOMENT CANNOT DISMISSED NEVERTHELESS LONG AS
THERE DIPLO:\IATIC TALKSNG THERE WILL REMAIN HOPE PECE AND
AFTER FURTHER XXXXX EXCANGES DOCUMENTS MEMORANDUMS
SOME FORMULA MAY FOUND AND AT END CONVERSATION SOME OTHER
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1079
STEP INTERPOSED MAY SUCCEED MAINTAINING PEACEFULL RELA-
TIONS ON DAY TO DAY OR WEEK TO WEEK BASIS PARA
07 TOKYOS 3/12 THAIMBASHY DENIED FOREIGN REPORTS ALLEGING
THA MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES CONFERRED WITH MALAY MILI-
TARY AUTHORITIES STOP EMBASSY DECLARED QUOTE THER IS NO
TAUTH ABOUT THEALAND SENDING MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE
WITH BRITISH MALAYSTATES COMMAND UNQUOTE END
DOMEI AR.
13640 BOOR
0310 VS
4 Dec 1941.
CQ CQ CQ DE JUP/JAP
0400 TP/ JAP
0407
PRESS PRESS DE JUP/JAP
HR NW BC AT 1300 DEC 4TH
COPYRIGHT DOMEI 09 TOKYO 4/12
KOKUMINSHIMBUN DISCERNS IN AMERICAN MOVES INCRUDEING
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT QUOTE INQUIRIES UNQUOTE MADE JAPANESE
GOVERNMENT QUOTE AMERICAN MOTIVES PLAYING FOR TIME TO
TIGHTEN ABCD ENCIRCLEMENT AGAINST JAPAN ON ONE HAND ON
OTHER TO SHIFT BLAME FOR BREAKDOWN WASHINGTON TALKS TO
JAPAN STOP KOKUMINSNIMBUN ASSERTS THERES NO NECESSITY TO
MAKE ANY REPLY ROOSEVELTS INQUIRES OUTPOINTING QUOTE
THREPOINTS BASIC PRINCIPLE JAPANS FOREIGN POLICY ENUNCIATED
BY PRIMEMINISTER TOJO BEFORE RECEIST EXTRAORDINARY SESSION
DIET AND ALSO SUBMITTED BY AMBASSADOR FO KURUSU TO
WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT DOES NOT FORM CALCULATING EX-
PEDIENCY WORKED OUT OVERNIGHT BUT CONTRARIWISE REPRE-
SENTS WARNING SERVED ON UNITEDSTATES ON BASIS JAPANS LOFTY
AIPERATIONS AND FIRM DETERMINATION STOP WHILE JAPANESE
AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS GOING ON WASHINGTON KOKUMINSHIM-
BUN DECLARES JAPAN CANNOT LET GO UNCHALLENGED MOVES
FRANTICALLY PURSUED BY ANGLOAMERICA STOP PAPER ASKS QUOTE
WHAT MEANS PRINCEWALES ARRIVAL SINGAPORE QUERY WHAT
MEANS MILITARY ARRANGEMENT MADE BETWEEN CHUNGKING AND
UNITEDSTATES WITH REGARD T WESTERN CHINA QUERY WHAT
MEANS AMERICAN LEASE THREE BRITISH ISLANDS INDIAN OCEAN
QUERY WHAT MEANS TIGHTENING OF WARPREPARATIONS AUSTRALIA
PHILIPPINES OTHER ANDLAOAMERICAN POSSESSIONS PACIFIC QUERY
UNQUOTE KOKU^MINSHIMBUN CONCLUDES QUOTE ITS NECESSARY
THAT JAPAN KEEP UP STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO DISPEL AMERICAN
MISUNDERSTANDING HER INTENTIONS GAT NOLESS NECES-
SARE IS ON PART JAPAN UNQUOTE STOP ARGUING SIMILAR
VEIN HOCHISHIMBUN CON TENSE SITUATION PACIFIC MUST AST-
CRIBED ANGLOAMERICAN PREPARATIONS FOR UGORESSIVE WAR
THEREFORE ANGLOAMERICAN MUST ASSUME RESPONSIBLETY FOR
PACIFIC CRINIS IF ONE EVER COMES TOKYO 4/12
ARBNTINE GEOVERNlVIENT NOT REP JAPANESE WROPOSALS FOR
RESEWARL TRADE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN TWO RTCHEISCLOSED
UPON RECEIPT OFFICER REPORTSTOP JFFFICIALSSAIDINFORMATION
FOR DUENO DESCRIBED PRESS PORTS THAT ARGENTINE DE-
CISED TRADE RELATIONS WITH JAPAN RESULT CONTRACT
AUTHORIZEING UNITEDSTATES ARRINTINGS ENTIRE SUPPORT
PRODUCTS AS QUOTE GAOUNDALES UNQUOTE SINCE QUOTE NEGO-
TIATIONS FOR RESEPARL STILL JAPENSES ARRIVAL 4/12 FOR-
MATIONS JAPANESE NAVALBOMBERS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON DIVE-
BOMBED CHINESE AIRFILEDS ANKANGRN SH PROVIDCE STOP
ADDED AN JAPANESE
CQ DE JAU2/JUO
PRESS PRESS PRESS DE JAU2/ JUO JAU2/JUO
HR NW BC AT 2100 DEC 4TH BT COPYRIGHT DOWN W TOKYO 4/12
AUTHORITATVES COMMANTNG ON SECRET CORDELL HULL RE CO
1080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
NFERENCE 3/12 IMI 3/12 FRANKL Y HULLS SAJNIE ONE JA AMERICAN
TALKS ASSERIGN ABRUPT ANNOUNCEMENT OF CONTEN OF
TALKS BBTWENN TOKYO WAS EX EE LY UNTIMELY AT TH I CAL. OF
JAPANESE AMERICAN NEGOTIAONAS SOP HULLS REPIE OF PUR-
POSE OF DOCUMENT HANDEL W SE E VOYS THE SE THEURCES WAS
INCOMPRECHENSIBLE ADDED ATHE WHE U
DERSS OUTCOME OF CURRENT TALKS STOP ADEN REVEDATON OF
PARLEYS WGECH CONDUDD W UNDESTAD MUURL CONFIDENCE
FURTHER THAT D A FUTURE PROSPECT OF TALKS STOP THEY
SAD THAT DESSPPOIDTD OVER UNSSANES QUOTE SUPPORT TIMS
DOCTR TOACTUALITISE FARST ADDIED MAIT INCRESSID WITH
GREATEST CAUTION PARA
17T0KY0 4/12 PRIEMIER EXPRESSED SHOCKED SURPRISE THAT
EXPRESSIONS REGARDS FUTURE NEGOTIONS AS RESULT HULLS
TALK 3/12 STRESSING UNSTATES CONCERNING BASIC ISSUES AND
CRITIZE GERMANY WARASS ACTIONS STOP ONE PROMINEANCE
WASHINGTON DISPATCHES TOGETHER OPENED THREE WAY EAST-
ERN ECONOMY CONFERENCE STOP NEWS PAPERS SAW UNSTATES
WOULD DROP QUOTE UNRELISTIC PRINCIPLES UNQUOTE DEEP
DIFERENCES EXISTING BETWEEN UNSTATES JAPAN ARES OUT OF
FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE AN POLILIES PHILOSOPHICAL UNQUOTE
STOP PARA TOKYO 4/12 PACIFIC WAS FAST BECOMING INCREASING
SERIOUS FOREIGN MINISTE R TOJO DECLARED IN BRIEF SPEECH
OPENED THREE DAY INIEETING STOP QUOTE ANGLO AMERICAN AND
OTHER SO NTRIES STILL PREFER TO STAND JAPANS APEALS AND
FAREAST HAMPERING JAPANS EFFORTS TO CREATE A NEW OR-
DER AI MS ATTAINING PERMENANT PEACE AND PROSPERITY
FOR ALL TOJO SAID ADDED QUOTE AT TIMES LIKE THIS TIS MORE
SIGNIFICANTE THAT REPRESENTIVES OF JAPAN MANCHUCKO AND
CHINA GET TOGETHER TO DISCUSS AND DECIDE MATTERS 4/12
DETAILS LATTER DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS SURROUNDS
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE JAPANESE AMERICAN RELATIONS EX-
PLAINED BY PREMIER TOJO BT TOJO TO GO AT REGULAR SESSION
PRIVYCOUNCIL 1000 1230 WHEREXXXX ACTIVE OPINIONS EX-
CHANGE BY PRIVYCOUNCILORS PREMIER FORMIMIAS W 20 TOKYO
4/12 LOCAL STOCK MARKET
7320 FAIR 1230 WF
CQ DE JAU2/JU0
HR NW BC AT 2100 DEC 4
26/12 SINOCOMMUNIST LEADER LISTGNERAL CHUCHANKWEI TO-
GETHER HIS TWENTYEIGHTSTAFF FFICERS BY JAS FORCES
STOP SAID CPTURES DE WHEN JAPANESE FORSE ROUTED THEM
SI OCOMMU AT JPINT SOUTH OAOTINOG CENTAL HOPE I PROVINCE
PARA 21T0 KYOS 4/12 IMI 4/12 DE AIALS LATTS DEVELOPMENTS
SURROUNDS JAPAN AW AMERICANRE JAPANESE AMERICAN TALKS
EXPLAINED BY PERIER TOJO FORMNINISA TOGO FOREIGN PRIVY-
COUNCIL 1000 1230 IMI 1000 1230 WHERE ACTIVE OPININS EXCHANGED
BY PRIVY COUNCILORS PREMIER FORMMINISA PAR A 22 TOKYO 4/12
IMI 4/12 LOCAL STOCK MARKET KOMPLENTMETN
AND CRITCIZB GERMANY JAPANESSE STOP OMEPAPERS WASHING-
TON DISPATCHES TOGETHER OPEN THREE XXXXXXXXX WAY ECO-
MONIC CONFERENCE STOP NO FURTHER DOMES AR NM TU DE
JAU2/JU0 VA
7320 KG. FAIR
1333 WF
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1081
Hetwitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 60
Memobandum fob Lieut. Comde. Boone
28 .Tune 1944
Subject : Japanese Diplomatic Traffic dated 1941.
End: (A) Analysis of Japanese Diplomatic messages on the Tokyo to Washing-
ton and Washington to Tokyo circuits from 1 January 1941 through 7
December 1941 which were missing or not translated.
1. At the request of Lieut, (jg) Connorton an inquiry has been made as to
the sources from which intercepted Japanese Diplomatic traffic was received
during 1941.
2. Mr. C. E. Fleming of GW recalls that during 1941 most of the Japanese
Diplomatic traffic on the Washington-Tokyo and Tokyo-Washington circuits was
intercepted by Station S. Some messages were missed due to static, atmospheric
disturbances and incomplete coverage of all frequencies.
3. Other stations intercepting Diplomatic traffic were Stations A, W, S and
H. These stations were assigned certain frequencies to cover. GX would have
records of which frequencies were assigned to these stations.
4. Until the United States entered the war, little material was received directly
from Western Union. Mackay Radio & Telegraph and other commercial con-
cerns. Messages sent via these companies were often intercepted by RCA and
forwarded to OP-20-G. After the outbreak of war, solid files were sent from
these companies as well as from the All-America Cables & Radio Co. to OP-20-G.
5. It might be possible to trace some of the missing messages to the files
held by the Army. During 1941 the Army and the Navy alternated days in
processing Diplomatic traffic. It seems logical that the Army would have had a
comparable number of unreadable and badly garbled messages as the Navy.
6. Any logs which dealt with the disposition of intercepted traffic and were
originally held by GW have since been turned_over to Lieut. Comdr. Murray, and
Lieut. Comdr. Raven.
Sally T. Lightle,
Lieut, (jg), USNR.
Certified a true copy of a document on file In Op-20-G.
G. E. Boone,
Lt. Comdr., U. 8. N. R.
28 June 1944.
[/I
Enclosure (A).
Analysis of Japanese Diplomatic Messages on the Tokyo-Washington Circuit,
1 Januury-1 Decemter 19^1
Month
Total
msgs
sent
Msgs un-
account-
ed for
Msgs not
trans-
lated
Total
msgs not
available
Total
msgs
available
January -
45
62
45
35
77
56
116
82
96
103
140
55
15
18
29
11
27
18
42
29
33
27
37
12
8
15
6
10
14
12
21
22
18
26
15
11
23
33
35
21
41
30
63
43
51
53
52
23
22
29
March .
10
14
36
June - -
26
July
53
August . -
39
45
October - . - - - --
50
88
December (1-7) - - -
32
Total. .-
912
290
178
468
444
1082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Analysis of Japanese diplomatic messages on the Washington-Tokyo circuit,
1 Jamuiry-l December 191fl
Month
Total
msgs
sent
Msgs un-
account-
ed for
Msgs not
trans-
lated
Total
msgs not
available
Total
msgs
available
62
65
65
67
103
90
176
133
121
140
200
59
21
22
21
26
35
33
53
44
36
57
42
17
15
14
13
10
19
18
41
32
23
30
37
15
36
36
34
36
54
51
94
76
59
87
79
32
26
29
31
April - --
31
49
39
July
82
August
57
62
53
121
27
Total
1281
407
267
674
607
28 Septembeir 1944
Following is a rough count of tlie number of worksheets held by GL-G in
CA, J-19, J-22, LA, PA-K2 and PURPLE diplomatic systems for the period
from 1 November 1941 through 8 December 1941.
System
Total # of
msgs.
# of msgs
translated
# not trans-
lated
# partially
broken
CA
7
472
192
650
52
628
1
75
6
12
13
417
6
394
146
481
23
211
J-19
3
J-22 ...
40
LA .
157
PA-K2 . -
16
PURPLE
Total
2,001
524
1,261
216
Most of the worlvsheets have a teletype or station intercept sheet attached.
Some have both the original and carbon of the teletype message attached.
Certified a true copy of a document on file in OP-20-G.
G. E. Boone,
Lt. Comdr., U. S. N. R.
Following is a survey of messages received by OP-20^G from 1-8 December
1941 showing tlie number received from each Station and the approximate time-
lag involved. The information for this survey was taken from the GY Section
Log for 1941 December.
Station
# Msgs.
Time Lag
9
5
4
1
1
1
2
2
10
1
6
2
1
3
7
11
8
1
17
3
2
2 days
Sta. 2 San Fran . . .
3 "
3 days
Sta. 3 Fort Sam Houston .... . . . .
4 "
2 days
Sta. 5 Fort Shaffer
3 "
4 "
1 day
Sta. 6 Fort Mills .
2 days
3 "
4 "
same day
Sta. 7 Fort Hunt
1 day
3 days
6 days
7 "
8 "
Sta. 9 Rio De Janeiro
1 day
2 days
11 days
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1083
station
# Msgs. Time Lag
ALUSNA N. A.
Army.
CA_
COM 16 122 SRI (Fort Dix?).
G Amagansett_.
M Cheltenham .
Photo.
S Bainbridge.
SISIS Army.
W Winter Harbor..
X Photo
1 day
2 days
4 "
6 "
11 days
12 "
1 day
6 days
7 "
same day
4 days
same day
1 day
2 days
3 days
5 "
9 "
same day
same day
1 day
2 days
7 days
8 "
same day
1 day
6 days
1 day
2 days
7 "
8 "
same day
1 day
3 days
2 days
7 "
Certified a true copy of a document on flile in Op-20-G.
G. E. Boone,
Lt. ComdT. U. S. N. R.
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Washingtoji, 6 January 194^.
Memorandum to GY:
1. Lieutenant Commauder A. A. Murray and Lieutenant A. L. Braun were
Watch Otiicers on tlie "Security" or "Purple" watcli during tlie last lialf of 1941
and the first Iialf of 1942. Lieutenant Commander Lafore was in charge of the
watch (later known as GY-2) from about February 1942, (relieving Lieutenant
Commander Linn).
2. The security watch worked Purple trafiic on alternate days, the Army work-
ing the other days.
3. The trafiic, besides that received from the Army, was received by teletype.
If dated an Army date, it was sent to the Army ; if dated our date, we worked
it and sent the work sheet with the original message attached to GZ. Therefore,
in general, we kept no original teletype traffic. We, however, maintained a file
for each originator and into these files we put garbled messages, confirming
copies of messages from our intercept stations and duplicate messages. These
files also contained messages for earlier periods (1939—10), which had never been
worked. It is possible that at intervals the files were reduced by the burning of
the older dupes. (Our recollections on this are not clear.)
4. GZ had access to our files and frequently used material from them.
5. All plain text messages which came in were given to GZ. We kept no file
of them.
6. When the Army took over the diplomatic system (about June, 1942), these
files were turned over to them along with the machine, pertinent aids, forms, etc.
R. W. Lafore,
R. W. Lafore,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.
A. A. Murray,
A. A. Murray,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.
A. L. Braun,
A. L. Braun,
Lt., USNR.
1084 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[1]
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 61
29 June 1945.
Japanese PuiiPLE Worksheets Processed by Navy
A survey has been made of the file of purple worksheets held by OP-20-3GL-6
aud GY section log for 1941 December in an attempt to determine the complete-
ness of files of worksheets aud translations and to account for any messages
entered in the GY section log for which there are no worksheets on hand.
19.41 DEC 7
Circuit
MEXICO-TOKYO
MEXICO-TOKYO
MEXICO-TOKYO
TOKYO:
NET ----
HSINKING
TOKYO CIRCULAR
TOKYO CIRCULAR
TOKYO CIRCULAR
TOKYO:
CIRCULAR.- -
NANKING
TOKYO CIRCULAR
TOKYO CIRCULAR
TOKYO-BANGKOK
TOKYO-BANGKOK
TOKYO-BANGKOK
TOKYO-BERLIN.
TOKYO-HSINKING
TOKYO-NANKING
m
TOKYO-VICHY
TOKYO:
VICHY
BANGKOK
HANOI
TOKYO:
VICHY
BANGKOK
HANOI
TOKYO-WASHINGTON
TOKYO-WASHINGTON
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.
Sms#
474
475
476
787
916
2492
2493/l#
2493/2#
2495
1496
531
2498
2499/1
/2
/3
854
855
856
1004
115?
532
582
129
129
583
130
130
911
902/1"
/2**
/3
/4
/5
/6
/7
/8
/9"
/10*''
/ll
/12
/13
/14
1277
1278
Gy Log #
6842
6841
6707
6687
6701
6696
6688
6694
6682
6695
6681
6685
6733
6732
6702
6683
6697
6981
6693
6716
6715
6692
6658
6624
6619
6623
6620
6633
6635
6631
6634
6625
6626
6636
6632
6637
6649
6672
6718
Rec'd from
PHOTO-
PHOTO.
PHOTO.
COM 16.
COM 16.
COM 16-
COM 16.
COM 16.
COM 16.
ARMY..
STA. #6.
STA. #5.
STA. #6.
COM 16.
STA. #6-
STA. #6-
COM 16.
COM 16.
SISIS....
ALUSNA.
SISIS....
COM 16.
COM 16.
STA. #5..
STA. S..
STA. S..
STA. M.
STA. S..
STA. S..
STA. S-.
STA. S..
STA. S..
STA. S..
STA. S..
STA. S..
STA. S..
STA.S..
STA. S..
STA.S..
STA.S..
STA.S..
Date
rec'd
12-13-41
12-13-41
12-13-41
12- 8-41
12- 8-41
12- 8-41
12- 8-41
12- 8-41
12- 8-41
12- 8-41
12- 7-41
12- 8-41
12- 7-41
12- 8-41
12-10-41
12-10-41
12- 8-41
12- 8-41
12- 8-41
12-18-41
12- 8-41
12- 8-41
12- 8-41
12- 8-41
12- 7-41
12- 6-41
12- 6-41
12- 6-41
12- 6-41
12- 6-41
12- 6-41
12- 6-41
12- 6-41
12- 6-41
12- 6-41
12- 6-41
12- 6-41
12- 6-41
12- 7-41
12- 7-41
12- 9-41
JD-1#
GIST
GIST
7501
GIST
7229
72J1
7772
GIST
GIST
7210
?7211?
7281
7282
7232
7265
7237
GIST
7230
7205
7143
N. T.
7299
Messages received by Navy, sent to OP-20-GZ, but issued as Army trranslations (no worksheets in
GL-6 files):
TOKYO-WASHINGTON
TOKYO-WASHINGTON
TOKYO-WASHINGTON
TOKYO-WASHINGTON
TOKYO-WASHINGTON
TOKYO-WASHINGTON
905
6644
906
6641
907
6648
908
6652
909
6651
910
6650
STA.S
STA.S
STA.S
STA.S
STA.S
STA.S
12- 7-41
12- 7-41
12- 7-41
12- 7-41
12- 7^1
12- 7^1
7150
7183
7145
7146
7151
7147
•♦ In GY section log listed as sent to Army, but issued as Navy translation and worksheet in OL-6 files
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1085
1941 DEC 7
[S] Messages received by Navy, sent to OP-20-QZ, but no worksheets in GL-6 flies:
Circuit
TOKYO-CIRCULAR-
TOKYO- WASHINGTON.
Sms#
GOOAI
GC
Gy Log #
6698
6647
Rec'd from
STA. #6.
STA.S..
Date
rec'd
12- 8-41
12- 7-41
JD-li
(Disposition of this message in GY section log given as follows: "Army/GZ")
1941 DEC 6
TOKYO-BERLIN.
1002
6654 COM 16 12- 7-41
(Message received by Navy, sent to OP-20-GZ, but issued as Army translation— No worksheet in QL-6
flies)
1941 DEC 5
BANGKOK-TOKYO.
BANOKOK-TOKYO-
BANGKOK-TOKYO.
BERLIN-TOKYO.. __
BERLIN-TOKYO.-..
BERLIN-TOKYO
BERLIN-TOKYO
BERLIN-TOKYO 1425.
BERLIN-TOKYO 1427.
BERLIN-TOKYO
BERLIN-TOKYO
B.AIRES-TOKYO
B.AIRES-TOKYO
-RIO
B.AIRES-TOKYO
-RIO ....
HSINKING-PEKING.
U]
HSINKING-TOKYO
HSINKING-TOKYO
MEXICO-TOKYO
NANKING-TOKYO
PEKING-TOKYO CIRC
PEKING-SHAI CIRC
-TOKYO
PEKING-NANKING
ROME-TOKYO
ROME-TOKYO
ROME-TOKYO
ROME-TOKYO
SHANGHAI-TOKYO
TOKYO-ANKARA
TOKYO-ANKARA
TOKYO-HSINKING
TOKYO-HSINKING.
TOKYO-HSINKING
TOKYO-NANKING
TOKYO-PEKING
TOKYO-SHANGHAI
TOKYO-VICHY
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.
TOKYO-WASHINGTON.
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.
[6]
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.
WASHINGTON-
W^ASHINGTON-
WASHINGTON-
WASHINGTON-
WASHINGTON-
WASHINOTON-
WASHINGTON-
TOKYO.
TOKYO.
TOYKO.
TOYKO.
TOKYO.
TOYKO.
TOYKO.
909
6712
910
6714
911
6713
1416
6934
1417/1
6936
.12
6935
1421
6569
1422
6570
1425
6939
1427
6938
1428
6616
GOGAI
6608
515
6614
516
6615
117
517
6617
118
31
6600
805
6595
GOGAI
6592
471
6709
855
6601
625
6749
626
6746
770
GOGAI
6599
782
6937
784
6710
785
6565
6589
6603
2224
110
6593
111
6602
910
6747
913
6590
GOGAI
6594
525
6598
671
6597
1234
6596
579
6607
893
6560-41
894
6555
896
6558
1260
6585
1261/1
6586
/2
6587
1262
6584
1264
6582
1265
6591
1266
6588
1268
6581
1269
6711
GOGAI
6583
STA. #6
12- 8-41
STA. #6
12- 8^1
STA. #6
12- 8-41
ALUSNA
12-16-41
ALUSNA
12-16-41
ALUSNA.....
12-16-41
STA. W
12- 5-41
STA. W
12- 5-41
STA. #4
12-16-41
STA. #4
12-16-41
STA. #7
12- 6-41
COM 16
12- 6-41
STA. #7
12- 6-41
STA. #7
12- 6-41
STA. #7.
12- 6-41
COM 16
12- 6-41
COM 16
12- 6-41
COM 16
12- 6-41
STA. #2
12- 8-41
COM 16
12- 6-41
STA. #5
12-10-41
STA. #5.
12-10-41
COM 16
12- 6-41
ALUSNA
12-16-41
STA. #5
12- 8-41
STA. G
12- 5-41
STA. M
12- 6-41
COM 16
12- 6-41
COM 16
12- 6-41
COM 16
12- 6^1
STA. #5
12-10^1
COM 16
12- 6-41
COM 16
12-6-41
COM 16
12- 6-41
COM 16
12- 6-41
COM 16
12- 6-41
COM 16
12- 6-41
STA.S
12- 5-41
STA.S
12- 5-41
STA.S
12- 5-41
STA.S..
12- 6-41
STA.S
12-6-41
STA.S
12-6-41
STA.S
12-6-41
STA.S
12-6-41
STA. S
12-6-41
STA. S
12-6-41
STA. S
12-6-41
STA. #1
12-8-41
STA.S
12-6-41
7314
GIST
GIST
7765
N. T.
N. T.
7137
GIST
7836
7770
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
GIST
7264
7266
7263
7312
GIST
7335
7334
GIST
7771
7228
7169
GIST
7236
GIST
GIST
7333
GIST
GIST
7262
GIST
GIST
7298
GIST
7235
7140
GIST
7139
7141
7166
7167
7198
7136
GIST
7168
1086 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1941 DEC 5
Messages received by Navy with no record of disposition made (no worksheets in GL-6 files):
Circuit
Sms#
Gy Log #
Rec'd from
Date
rec'd
•JD-1 #
TOKYO-NEW YORK
6552
6557
6556
6566
STA. S
STA. S. _.,.._
STA. S
STA. M
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5^1
TOKYO-MEXICO
TOKYO-PANAMA
TOKYO-WASHINGTON
SUMMER
1941 DEC 3
BANGKOK-TOKYO
892
894
1407
1408
232
121
115
616/1
/2
/3
763
10
490
491
34
774
985
2208
1048
827
996
899
322
1224
874
875
876
877
878/1
/2
879
109
8
8
1241
1243
1243
1244
1245
1247
1250
1251
1255
6495
6720
6496
6522
6536
6470
6512
6513
6514
6642
6520
6521
6571
6467
6516
6639
6509
6722
6515
6646
6472
6508
6471
6478
6475
6477
6474
6476
6473
6894
6492
6567
6577
6493
6527
6523
6491
6502
6578
6490
6494
6519
STA. S
STA. #6
STA. S
STA. #7
STA. #7 _.
COM 16
COM 16
COM 16
COM 16
STA. #3
STA. #7
STA. #7
PHOTO
STA. M
STA. W
ALUSNA
COM 16
ARMY
COM 16
STA. #5
STA. S
COM 16
STA. S
STA. S
STA. S _,
STA. S
STA. S _.
STA. S
STA. S
ALUSNA
STA. S
STA. M
STA.#1
STA. S _.
STA. #7
STA. #7
STA. S
STA. S
STA. #1
STA. S
STA. S
STA. #7
12-3-41
12-9-41
12-3-41
12-4-41
12-4-41
12-3-41
12-4-41
12-4-41
12^-41
12-7-41
12-4-41
12^-41
12-5-41
12-3-41
12^^1
12-6-41
12^-41
12-9-41
12-4-41
12-7-41
12-3-41
12^-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-15-41
12- 3-41
12- 5-41
12- 5-41
12- 3-41
12- 4-41
12- 4-41
12- 3H11
12- 4-41
12- 5-41
12- 3-41
12- 3-41
12- 4-41
7053
BANGKOK-TOKYO
GIST
BERLIN-TOKYO
7132
BERLIN-TOKYO 1408
7138
CANTON:
NANKING
N. T.
SHANGHAI
TOKYO.
PEKING CIRCULAR
7848
TOKYO
RIO-MEXICO
7196
[6]
RIO-TOKYO
GIST
RIO-TOKYO
7129
RIO-WASHIXGTON
7131
ROME-TOKV'O
7016
ROME-TOKYO
7133
SHANGHAI-TOKYO
7133
N. T.
TOKYO-BANGKOK
GIST
TOKYO-BERLIN
GIST
TOKYO-HSINKINQ .
7260
TOKYO-ROME ..
7097
TOKYO-SH.\NGH.\I .
GIST
TOKYO-WASHINGTON
7048
TOKYO-WASHIXGTON
7057
TOKYO-WASHIXrjTON
7018
TOKYO-WASHIXGTON
TOKYO-WASIIIN(JTON
7019
7049
TOKYO-WASHINGTON
7049
7020
VICHY-TOKYO
GIST
WASHINGTOX-B. AIRES
WASHIXGTOX-B. .\IRES
7100
GIST
WASHINGTON-TOKYO _
7261
WASHINGTON-TOKYO . .. .
7050
WASHIXOTOX-TOKYO
7098
WASHINGTON-TOKYO
7099
[7]
WASHINGTON-TOKYO
•
7051
WASHINGTON-TOKYO
GIST
WASHINGTON-TOKYO
GIST
WASHINGTON-TOKYO
7052
WASHINGTON-TOKYO .
GIST
Messages entered in GY section log for which no worksheets in GL-6 files:
HSINKING-TOKYO
797
6510 COM 16_
12- 4-41
7263
(Not on trnaslation: "Original transmission, dated 3rd available, too badly garbled to read
as JD-1: 7263 under date of 5 Dec 1941)
." Issued
WASHINGTON-TOKYO
1253
6579
STA. #1-
12- 5-41
7126
^ (Per GY log sent to GZ, but issued as Army translation)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1941 DEC 3— Continued
1087
Circuit
Sms#
OyLog#
Rec'd from
Date
rec'd
JD-1#
WASHINGTON-TOKYO
1256
6576
STA. #1
12- 5-11
7128
(Per GY log sent to GZ, but issued as Army translation)
1941 DEC 1
BANGKOK-TOKYO . ..
815
888
1395
1396
1396
No#
161
6673
6678
6676
6251
6675
6468
6573
6458
6574
6671
6M5
6754
6755
6455
6453
6454
6572
6457
6425
6456
6.561
6677
6432
6797
6792
6699
6511
6580
6498
6674
6424
6721
6796
6575
6479
6427
6426
6431
6428
6488
6546
6452
6.547
6497
6489
6487
6480
6544
ARMY
STA. #6
STA. #6
STA. #7
STA. #6
STA. M
STA. #5
COM 16
STA. #5
STA. #6
STA. #2
W;UI .-
W. U
COM 16
STA.#7._-__..
STA. #7
STA. #5
COM 16
STA. S
COM 16
ALU SNA
STA. #6
ST.\. S
STA. #6
STA. #6
ARMY
COM 16
STA. #5
STA. #5
STA. #6
STA.S
STA. #5
STA. #6
STA. #5
STA. #5
STA.S
STA. S
STA.S
STA.S
STA.#1
STA. #2
STA. #7
STA. #2
STA.#1
STA.#1
STA.#1
STA.#1
STA.#1
12- 7-41
12- 7-41
12- 7-41
12- 2-41
12- 7-41
12- 3-41
12- 5-41
12- 2-41
12- 541
12- 7-41
12- 4-41
12-10-41
12-10-41
12- 1-41
12- 2-41
12- 2-41
12- 5-41
12- 2-41
12- 1-41
12- 1^1
12- 5-41
12- 7-41
12- 1-41
12-11-41
12-11-41
12- 8-41
12- 4^1
12- 5-41
12- 3^1
12- 7-41
12- 1-41
12- 9-11
12-11-41
12- 5-41
12- 3^1
12- 1-41
12- 1-41
12- 1-41
12- 1-41
12-3-41
12-4-11
12-2-41
12-4-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12^3-41
12-1-41
GIST
BANGKOK-TOKYO
GIST
BERLIN-TOKYO
GIST
BERLIN-TOKYO
7012
BERLIN-TOKYO
GIST
BERNE-HANOI
7044
HARBIN:
TOKYO
GIST
HSINKING ...
"
HSINKINO-TOKYO
790
812
461
GIST
MANIL.\-TOKYO .
7208
MEXICO-TOKYO
GIST
"
MEXICO-WASHINGTON
069
849
334
486
2191
2192
2436
2439
2443
2444
814
824
GOGAI
990
892
893
380
240
367
369
572
573
858
860
861
865
1223
1225/1
/2
/3
1226
1227
1228
1230
1231
7329
18]
NANKING-TOKYO
7013
RIO-WASHINGTON CIRC
7043
TOKYO
SHANGn.M-TOKYO_
7234
SHANGHAI-TOKYO
7045
TOKYO CIRCULAR . .
6939
TOKYO CIRCUL.\R
GIST
TOKYO CIRCULAR
TOKYO CIRCULAR
7091
6984
TOKYO-BANGKOK..
7374
TOKYO-BANGKOK
GIST
TOKYO-BANGKOK
GIST
TOKYO-BERLIN
GIST
TOKYO-HSINKING..
GIST
TOKYO-HSINKING
7092
TOKYO-M.A.NILA
GIST
TOKYO-MEXICO
GIST
TOKYO-SING.A.PORE
GIST
TOKYO-SINGAPORE
GIST
TOKYO- VICHY
GIST
TOKYO-VICHY .
7040
TOKYO-WASHINGTON
6940
TOKYO-WASHINGTON
6941
TOKYO-W.\SHINGTON
GIST
TOKYO-WASHI.NGTON .
6983
19]
WASHINGTON-TOKYO..
7041
WASHINGTON-TOKYO
70-<2
WASHINGTON-TOKYO.. . . .
7042
7042
7054
WASHINGTON-TOKYO
7055
WASHINGTON-TOKYO..
GIST
WASHINGTON-TOKYO
7056
WASHINGTON-TOKYO..
7093
Message received by Navy, entered in GY section log, but no record of disposition made (no worksheet
inGL-6files)j
TOKYO-BATAVIA*
6499
6700
SISIS
ARMY
12-3^1
12-8-41
(Dupes of same message.)
1088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL SARBOR ATTACK
Hewitt Inquibt Exhibit No. 62
TOP SECRET
Serial 0001391916
The Seceetabt of the Navy,
Washington, 9 Jul 1945.
From : The Secretary of the Navy.
To : Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. N.
Subject: Testimony and Documentary Evidence to be Presented Concerning
Further Pearl Harbor Investigation.
Reference: (a) Top Secret Ltr. from Admiral Hewitt to DNI, dated 5 July 1945,
Subj : Files, request for.
Enclosure: (A) Photostatic copy of Top Secret Ltr. from DI0-14ND to DNI
dated 19 April 1942, Subj : Encrypted Despatch Traffic of Japanese Consulate
General, Honolulu, T. H., File 14ND/A8-5/OJ : EF37(I-95), with Enclosures
(A) and (B).
1. Pursuant to Reference (a), Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.
James Fobrestal.
FoxmTBENTH Naval Disteict
District Intelligence Office, Sixth Floor, Young Hotel
WBS/wbs
Honolulu, Hawaii, April 19, 1942.
14ND/A8-5/0J
EF37 (1-95)
Secret
From : The District Intelligence Officer.
To: The Director of Naval Intelligence (Head of Domestic Intelligence Branch).
Subject : ENCRYPTED DESPATCH TRAFFICS OF JAPANESE CONSULATE
GENERAL, HONOLULU, T. H.
Enclosures :
(A) One copy of translation of Japanese Consulate General (Honolulu) Out-
going Message Log Book, classified as SECRET.
(B) One copy of translation of Japanese Consulate General (Honolulu)
Incoming Message Log Book, classified as SECRET.
1. Enclosure (A), which was furnished this office by the Military Intelligence
Division, Hawaiian Department, is forvparded for information. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, also supplied this office with two copies of
the same enclosure, one of which has been sent to the "Unit" at the Navy Yard,
Pearl Harbor, and the other retained in the files of the District Intelligence
Office.
2. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, recently furnished this
office with three copies of the incoming despatch log of the Japanese Consulate
General, Honolulu, one copy of which is transmitted herewith as enclosure (B),
one copy of which has been sent to the Pearl Harbor "Unit", and one copy of
which is retained tin the files of the District Intelligence Office.
3. Before leaving Honolulu, the Japanese Consul General was given three
alternatives in the matter of disposing of papers in his possession: (a) to take
them with him; (b) to pack, seal, and store them here; or, (c) to throw them
away. He elected to throw away a great deal of written matter, most of which
was first torn into pieces. The material from which enclosures (A) and (B)
were taken was found among the papers so thrown away and pieced together
by translators attached to the Military Intelligence Division, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, and the District Intelligence Office.
4. The urgency of delivery of this letter and enclosures (A) and (B) is such
that they will not reach the addressee in time by the nest available officer courier.
The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this letter and enclosures
(A) and (B) by registered mail to the continnental limits of the United States and
by registered airmail within the continental limits of the United States.
I. H. Mayfield,
I. H. Mayfield.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1089
TOP SECBET
Enclosure (A)
Fe3>ebal Bttbeaxj of Investigation,
Honolulu, T. H., March 2, 1942.
The following is a translation of a form, printed in Japanese, on which radio
messages transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu, T. H.,
were recorded :
OUTGOING MESSAGES
Telegrams, official
Secret Ordinary
No
File No.
Dispatched month day
From
To
Attached to
Subject: (gist of contents)
Disposal and development:
From To
month
day
" The Archives and Documents sec-
tion
The Telegram Section
month day
Person in charge
Remarks :
Entries were not made in all of the spaces provided on the above form. The
symbols, A N (cryptogram?), R Y A K U (code), and H E I (ordinary mes-
sage), were written over the printed characters for "Official Dispatches" and
are represented in the translation by A, B and C, respectively. There were
also used in this manner the Japanese characters Y U (pertaining to postal?)
and M U (a negative term).
DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER
(Code ? No.)
FUe No.
Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
1-B
1-
4
5
6
7.
9
10
11
12
13
14
16
17
18
19
20
22
24
27
28
32
34
36
37
38
1-4
l-«
1-7
1-9..
1-9
1-11
1-11
1-13
1-13
1-15
1-16
1-18
1-20
1-21
1-22
1-23
1-24
1-28
1-29.
1-29
1-30
2-1
2-1
2-3
2-6
Matter re dispatching of representatives of Patriotic Women's
2-A
3-A
4-B
Society.
Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.
Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.
Matter re Greek Ship heading toward Japan.
5-A
Matter re movements of U. S. Fleet.
&-B
7-B
Conversation on meeting with newly appointed Commander
8-A
KIMMEL.
^B
10-B
11-A .
12-A . . .-
Matter re Greek ship heading toward Japan.
13-B
14-A _...
Matter re movement of U. S. Fleet.
15-A
Matter re visit to Japan by American citizens of Japanese an-
16-A .
cestry without passports.
Matter re movement of U. S. warships.
[g] 17-B
18-A
Matter re movement of U. S. Fleet.
19-A
Matter re simplifying clearance of documents carried by
20-B
Consul General NAKAMURA.
Matter re proposal of Admiral RICHARDSON to welcome
21-B
Ambassador NOMUR.\.
22-B-
Report of arrival here of .Embassador NOMUR.\.
23-B
Matter re reporting to Rear Admiral KIMMEL about
24-B
appointment (NOMURA'S).
25-A
Re movements of U. S. Fleet,
1090 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER-Continued
(Code ? No.)
File No.
Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
26-A
27-A _
28-B
39
40
42
43
44
45
46
48
49
50
51
52
54
55
56
57.-
58
59
60
62
64
65
66
67
69
70
71
72
73
75..
76 .-
77
78
81
82
84
85
86
90
92
93
96
97
98
99
102
103
104-
105
107-
108
109
110
111
113
114 ...
115
116
117
118
119
120
122
123
124
126
129
130
132
133
134
2-7
2-15
2-20
2-21
2-21
2-24
2-25
2-26
2-27
3-1
3-1
3-3
3-4
3-4
3-5
3-6
3-6*
3-10
3-10
3-14
3-18*
3-21
3-21*
3-24
3-24
3-25
3-26
3-27*
3-27
3-28
3-29*
3-29*
4-1*
4-3*
4-5*
4-7*(?)--
4-8
4-9
4-14
4-15
4-17
4-21*
4-21
4-23
4-23
4-28
4-28
4-29*
4-30*
4-30
5-1*
5-1
5-6
5-8
5-12
5-14*
5-14*
5-16
5-20
5-21
5-22
5-23'
5-26
5-27*
5-27
5-29*
6-3*
6-3
6-6-
6-6*
6-7*
Re Greek ship heading toward Japan.
Re sending telegram regarding information to the Military
Command.
Re designation of naval defense area in "Kaneohe" Bay.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet.
29-A.
30-B
31-A ...
32-B-...
Re explanation of Minister (Foreign?) in the Diet.
Re report of names of persons accompanying Consul-General
KITA.
33-B -
34-A
[3] 35-B -
Re Consul-General KITA'S cook accompanying him.
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.
Re recrossing (of ocean) by CHINEI KANESHIRO.
Movement of U. S. Fleet.
36-B -
37-B - - . . -
38-A
39-A
40-B
Re granting of passport to KENJO KOHARA (or OB ARA),
missionary of the Hongwanji Sect.
Re Greek ship heading towards Japan.
Re correction of telegram.
41-B
42-B
43-A-
44-A
4.5-B.-.
Re report of arrival in office of Consul-General KITA.
Re issuing of passports for traveling to Hawaii to GIEN
MITANI and TAIYU OKAMOTO, missionaries of the
Hongwanji Sect.
46-B -
47- A...
48-B. - -
Visit to New Zealand of U. S. warships.
Re information of Consul-General's cook going on board ship.
Re movement of U. S. warships.
Re wireless messages and secret documents carried by Courier
MORI.
Re expenses for development of intelligence for year 1941.
Re report of arrival in office of secretary MORIMURA.
49-C
50-A .
U] 51-A ..
52-A .
53-B.
54-A
55-A
Re visit to U. S. by Representatives YAMAJIand SHIMIZU
56-A
Re passport visa for WILLIAM PINRY HOLCOMBE
57-B
Re verification expenses of Seamen's registration.
Re request to Prince KONOYE and Minister MATSUOKA
for articles to be printed in publication commemorating the
completion of the extension to the Japanese Hospital.
Re arrival in port of Foreign Minister of the Netherlands.
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.
Re arrival in port of Japan Christian Federation.
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.
Re movement of U S Fleet
58-B
59-B..
60-B. .
61-A
62-B -
63-A. . . .
64-A
[5] 65-A..- --
66-A
Re movement of U. S. Fleet.
67-B
68- A.
Re movement of U. S. warships.
Re receipt of decoding book for use on request telegrams.
Re receipt of wireless code T A
(MU)-B
(MU)-B .
69- A.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
70-A.... . - -...
71-B...
Re transport "WASHINGTON."
72-B.
Re trip of "HENRY LUCE" to Chungking.
73-A.
Re seizure of crew members of the "COLUMBIA" by British
74-B.
warship.
Re taking of office by Ambassador GAUSS.
75-A.
Re seizure of German subjects by British warship.
76-A.
77-A. ..
The local general emergency situation.
78- A.
79-B
[5] 80-B ---
Re granting of passport to travel to Hawaii to KAKUSHIN
KUSUD A, priest of the Higashi Hongwanji Sect.
Re arrival of B-17 Bombers.
81-A
82-A
83-A
84-B
Re aid fund to "Pan-Pacific Union".
General situation.
85-B
Re arrival in port of Labor Minister and party of New Zealand.
86-A
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
87-B
Re departure of "TRADEWIND".
88-B
Arrival in port of Foreign Minister KLEFFENS of Holland.
89-B
90-B
Re passing through of MANUEL FOX.
91-A
tennial celebration of "PUNAHOU SCHOOL".
92-A
Re boarding of German subject on TATUTA MARU (Dis-
93-B
patch #15 to San Francisco).
94-B. .
Re visit to Washington of Admiral KIMMEL and the U. S.
Fleet's visit to the mainland.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRE 1091
DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER— Continued
(Code ? No.)
File No.
Date, 1941
[7] 95-A
96-A
97-A
98-A
99-B
136
137
138
139
140
141
143
144
146_
147
148
149
150-
151
152
153
154
155
156
159
161
162
163
164
165
166
169
170
171
173
174
176
177
179
180
181
182
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
196
197
200
201
202
203
204
206
207
209
211
212
213
214
216
217
220
221
225
226
227
228
229
—Ex. 14S
6-9
6-12
6-13
6-13
6-14
6-16*
6-17*
6-20
6-23*
6-23
«
6-27
6-28
6-28*
6-28
6-30
6-30*
7-1
7-3*
7-7
7-8
7-8*
7-8
7-10*
7-11
7-11*
7-14
7-14
7-15*
7-15*
7-17
7-18
7-19
7-21
7-22*
7-22
7-26
7-26
7-26*
7-28
7-28*
7-29
7-29
7-30*
7-30*
7-30
8-1
8-1 _
8-2
8-2
8-2
8-2
8-2
8-4
8-5*
8-7
8-8
8-11
8-13
8-12*
8-13
8-15
a-18.
8-19
8-27
8-28*
8-30
9-2
9-2*
100-A
102-B
103-B -.-... .
104-A
105-B.
106-A
107-B
108-A
109-B
[8] 110-B
111-A.
-C
112-B
113-A
114-B
115-A
1]6-B. .
117-B
118-A- . .
U9-A.
120-B
121-B
122-A
123-A. . .
124-B
[S] 125-B
126-A . -
127-A
128-A
129-A
130-A
131-A
132-A .
133-A
134-B
135-A
136-A
137-B -
138-B
139
140-B
141-B
[10] 142-A
143-A
-C
-C .
-C
-C... ._
144-A
145-A
146-A
147-A
148-A
149-A
150-A
ISl-A
[11] 152-A
-A
153-A
154-A
155-A
1.56-B
157-A
158-B
159-B .
79716—46
, vol. 2 — -
Re request of German subject MEHNERT KLAUS to board
Japanese liner.
Re arrival in port of British converted cruiser.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
Local general emergency situation.
Re arrival in port of U. S. transport "PRESIDENT
PIERCE".
Re arrival in port of British converted cruiser.
Re arrival in port of British cruiser.
Re closing of German Consulate General in the U. S.
Re visit here by the baseball team of MEIJI UNIVERSITY
(to the Minister #25).
Conversation of Italian Consul.
Re arrival in port of DANIEL F. MEYERS.
Movements of U. S. warships and ships.
Re return of Admiral KIMMEL.
Re arrival in port of Commander TACHIBANA (to the
Minister #27).
Re money loaned out by this Consulate.
Re arrival in port of Americans on inspection tour of Burma
Road.
Re plot for disorder (riot) on "PENNSYLVANIA".
Re correction in usage of code type TSU.
Re closure of German Consulate.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.
Re movement of U. S. warships.
Re re-telegraphing of telegrams.
Re participation of U. S. flyers in the Chinese Air Force.
Telegram by request of Nippon Yusen Kaisha.
Re number of foreigners with visas to pass through Japan.
Re size of Imperial Portrait.
Re report of speech by LATTIMORE, advisor to CHIANG
KAI SHEK.
Re request for instructions regarding returning of the Imperial
Portrait.
Re movement of U. S. warships and ships.
Re closure of Italian Consulate, etc.
Re commencing of export to Vladivostok by ships of the Soviet
Union.
Re status of employees, (to the minister #38).
Re wavelength of KGMB
Re return of Imperial Portrait.
Movement of U. S. Fleet.
Re issuing of visa for passing through to McBAIN.
Re investigation of passeneers on board YAW ATA MARU.
Re arrival in port of ASAMA MARU.
Re loan from Yokohama Specie Bank.
Re arrival of the Under-Secretary of the Navy and Freeze
Administrators.
Re arrival of Japanese liner.
Re visa for Mr. and Mrs. McDAIN (McBAIN ?).
Re movements of U. S. Fleet.
Re entry into American ports by Japanese liners.
Effect on residence here of enforcement of the Freeze order.
Re broadcast to Hawaii.
Re exception of appHcation of Freeze order to Chinese diplo-
mats and Consulate, (to the Minister #44).
Re itinery of Courier OSIIIO (to San Francisco #19).
Re departure and arrival of ASAMA MARU.
Re receipt of Naval Code Book type S-HE and related charts
Re receipt of Telegraphic Code type YA, etc.
Re receipt of Common Code Book for the three Ministries,
the Foreign, the War, and the Foreign (Navy ?).
Re receipt of Telegraphic Code type HEI.
Telegram by request of Yokohama Specie Bank.
Re movement of U. S. warships and ships.
Re placing of the Coast Guard under the Navy.
Re visa for passing through to the Britisher McBAIN.
Movements of V . S. warships and ships.
Re loan from Yokohama Specie Bank.
Re bank "balance" of official funds, (to the Minister #47.)
Re cash in hand of this Consulate.
Re employees of this Consulate.
Telegram by request of Branch Office of the Yokohama Specie
Bank dated August 15.
Movements of U. S. warships.
Condition of Japanese people here.
Re treatment of Japanese Subjects in the U. S. by the Ameri-
cans.
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.
Re survey regarding DOMEI broadcast.
Re unreceived telegram.
Re passing through of American pilots.
-28
1092 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER— Continued
(Code 7 No.)
File No.
Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
160-A
230
234
235
23S
237_
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
249
250
251
252
253
254
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
171
273
278
283.
284
285
286
287
289
291
292
295
299
301
303
305_
306
307
308
310
311
312_
313
314
315
316*
9-2
9-4
9-5
9-5.
9-6 -.
9-9
9-13
9-13
9-13
9-15
9-15
9-17*
9-19
9-22-
9-22
9-23*
8-24
9-25
9-29*
9-29
9-29.
9-30*
1^1
10-2
10-2*
10-2
10-4
10-6
10-10*..--
10-13
10-15
10-16
10-17
10-20
10-23
10-24
10-2.5*-..-
10-25*..-.
10-25
10-25*....
10-28
10-28
10-29
10-29
11-1*
11-4
11-4.
11-6*
11-6
11-6
11-7
11-7*
11-8
11-8
11-8
11-8
11-10
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
161-A
162-A _
To OQAWA.
Plan for construction of "dock" at Pago-Pago.
-A
Telegram by request of the Yokohama Specie Bank.
163-A
Re movement of U. S. warships and ships.
164-A
Re mail to Japan.
165-A
166-A
Re arrival in port of French warship.
[12] 167-A
168-A-- -
169-A .._
Re propaganda "pamphlets" of 5th columnists against Japan.
Re transfer of official telegrams to this Consulate.
Movements of U. S. warships and ships.
170-A
Re arrival in port of Courier (to Shanghai #1).
171-A . .
Information concerning the military.
172-A
Movements of U. S. warships and ships.
173- A .
Re departure of French warship.
174-B -
Re arrival in port of military mission to Chungking.
17&-A
Re problem of U. S. and Japanese ship transportation.
176-A - -
Re questions pertaining to financial report.
177-B
Re problem of Japanese-owned fishing boats.
178-A
Movement of U. S. Fleet.
179- A
" " " " "
180-B
Re contents of baggages sent to this Consulate.
181-A
Re question of the Japanese Language Schools.
[IS] 182-A _-_
183-B
Re YORITOSHI FUJIWARA.
Re problem of Japanese owned fishing boats.
184-A
Re transportation of British soldiers by American ships.
185-B.
Re measures for time of war.
186-A
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
187-B
Re talks by Delegate KING.
188-A. .- .
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
189-A
Re going to the U. S. of Chinese airmen.
190-A
Re training of Chinese airmen by the United States.
191-A
Re payment of boat fare (shipping charges) in Japan.
192- A
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.
193- A.
Re LEO SIROTA.
194-A
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.
195-A _-
Re granting of visa to the .American, CRICHTO.N COLVIN.
196-.\
Re report of assets of this Consulate and Consulate StafI (to
[14] 197-A.._
198-A....
the Ambassador #65).
Re cancellation of freeze order on allowance for members of
this Consulate (to the Ambassador #66).
Re granting of visa for entry into country to NEWMAN.
199-A .
Re movements of U. S. warships.
200-A
?
201-A -
Re transmission (of message) to ?
202-Al.-.
Re LEO SIROTA.
203-B
Re arrival of TAIYO MARU.
204-A. ..
Re delay in departure of TAIYO MARU.
205-
Re mail matter to be loaded on TAIYO MARU.
206-B
Re departure of TAIYO MARU.
207-A
Retransmission (of message) to 7
208- A.
Survey of passengers on board the TAIYO MARU.
209-A
Re request for easy clearance for Consul IWANAGA.
210-A
Re cancellation of trip to Japan of NEWMAN.
MU-C
Re distribution of JIGO telegraphic code and attached decod-
MU-C ....
ing book.
Re sending of TAGO telegraphic code and attached decoding
[15] MU-C
211-A.. .. .
book.
Re second receipt of common indicator words and key book.
Re according of convenience for clearance to passengers on
212-A...
TAIYO MARU and two other ships.
Re movement of U. S. Fleet.
213-B.
Re bounds of application of martial law in Hawaii.
214-A.
317_
318
320*
322
324
325
326
327
329
330
331*
332*
333
334
335
336
11-11
11-11
11-12
11-13
11-13
11-14
11-14
11-15
11-18
11-18
11-18
11-18
11-19
11-19
11-22
11-22
Re number of passengers boarding the TAIYO MARU.
215-A
Re easing of freeze applying to Japanese governmental agencies
216-C...
in the United States.
Re arrival of Ambassador KURUSU.
217 .
From Ambassador KURUSU.
218-A
From Ambassador KURSU.
219-A
Re movements of U. S. warships.
220 .-
Re conversation between Ambassador KURUSU and NEW-
221-A ...
MAN.
Telegram by request of Vice-Consul OKUDA.
Revenues in connection with TAIYO MARU and TATUTA
222-A...
MARU.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
223-B...,
224-B. . .
Re suspension of announcement of ship sailings.
Re stopping in port of technicians being sent to the Burma
[16] 22&-A
226-A
Road,
To
Re movements of U. S. warships.
227-A
To...
228-A
Departure of American convoy for Singapore.
i
PROCEEDINGS OP HEWITT INQUIRY 1093
DISPATCHES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER— Continued
(Code ? No.)
File No.
Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
229-A
337
338
339
240(340)"
341*
342
343
344
347
348
350
352
353
355
356
357
358
359 .
11-22
11-22
11-23...-.
11-23
11-24
11-24
11-25
11-25
11-26
11-26
11-28
11-29
11-291-...
12-1
12-1
12-3
12-2
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
230-A.
231-A...
Re movements of warships and ships.
Re disposition of telegraphic code.
232-A
233-A
234-A
235-A
236-A
To
-A-
Telegram by request of the Specie Bank.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships.
237-A
238-A
239- A. ..
BK(?) (In Roman letters)
240-A
BK(?) " " "
241-A
BK(?) "
[17] 242-A
243-A
Re report of number of Consular staff and their families.
244-A
Re personnel of Consulate
C
Re burning of codes.
245-A
360
361
362*
363*
362*
365*
366*?....
367
368*
369*
12-3
12-3
12-3
12-3
12-4
12-4
12-5
12-5
12-6
12-6
To ?
246-A
247-A...
248-A
B. K. (?) (Message reports movements warships).
249-A...
250-A
B. K. (?) (Message reports movements warships).
251-A
252-A
253-A
254-A
and TATUTA MARU.
Movements of U. S. warships and ships.
B. K. (?)
Ditto.
TO SEATTLE
Re investigation of date of crossing to United States by
ICHISAKU ICHINUKIDA (request Telegram).
TO LOS ANGELES
1-B
15
18.
20
101'
175
1-17
1-21
1-23
4-26
7-16
Re trip to Hawaii of SUMIKO SUZUKI and troupe, (request
telegram)
Re movements of U. S. warships (to the Minister #14)
2-A - -
3-A
4-B -
Departure of Representatives SHIMIZU and YAMAJI (to
5-A--
San Francisco #11)
Re re-sending of telegram.
TO SAN FRANCISCO
2
3
1
9
19
35
63*
83
84*?
89
94*
101*
107
109
121*
132
137
168
182
195*
1-6
I
1-6
-B
1-4 dupli-
cation)
1-11-
1-22
2-1
i
5-B
3-15.
4-7
4-7
i)
B
4-19
B
\.
4-26
4-30
A
B
A
5-1..
5-24
6-6
-A-YU .
6-12
C
7-11
A
B
7-22
7-31
Re detaining of Minister SUMA's ship, (to New York #1)
Re date of arrival in and departure from San Francisco of
Minister SUMA.
Re dispatching of representatives of Patriotic Women's
Society, (to the Minister #1)
Report of gist of conversation with ABEND, (to the Minister
#6)
Re trip to Japan without passports by American citizens of
Japanese parentage, (to the Minister #15)
Re names of Ambassador NOMURA'S party, (to the Minis-
ter #5).
Re journey of Ambassador TOMII.
Re resending of telegram.
Re stopping in port of the Japan Christian Federation, (to th
Minister #61).
Re shifting of telegram (s) .
Re departure of courier FUKUDA.
Re departure of Representatives SHIMIZU and YAM.^JI.
Re the seizure of crew members of the COLUMBIA- by
British warship, (to the Muiister #73) .
Re seizure of German (s) by British warship, (to the Minister
#75).
Re request for easy clearance of courier TAGI (or TANOGI or
TAKI).
Re German boarding the TATUTA MARU.
Re entry into port of British converted cruiser, (to the Minis-
ter #96).
Telegram of thanks of Ambassador SHIGEMITSU.
Reinvestigationof passengers of the YAWATA MARU.
Re stopping in port of the TATUTA MARU.
1094 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TO SAN FRANCISCO— Continued
(Code ? No.)
File No.
Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
19-A
[go] '"io^B'y.y."'.
21-A
196
199*
224_
272*
274*
288
293
309*
321*
323
328
362*
21
27
26 _
29_
30
31
68
8-1
8-2
8-25
10-20
10-22
10-27
10-29
11-7
11-12
11-13
11-17
12-3
1-24
1-26
1-28
1-29.
1-29.
1-30
Re jouniev of courier OSHIO.
Re stopping in port of Honolulu of the TATUTA MARU.
(re transfer of telegram #65 received from the Minister).
Re non-receipt of telegram.
22-B
23-B
Re landing of Secretary MAEDA.
Re passengers on board the TAIYO I^ARU.
Re delivery to Secretary MAEDA.
24r-A
25-A
Re phvsical examination of the passengers on board the
26-B
TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #68)
Re departure of Secretary and Mrs. TOKUNAGA.
27-B
28-C.
29-A
30-A
m -(C)
-(C)
Re "camera interview" of Ambassador KURUSU? (to the
Minister #78).
Re resending of telegram.
B. S. (to the Minister #247)
Re reception program for Ambassador NOMURA, (to Am-
bassador NOMURA on KAMAKURA MARU). ^_
-(C).
Re programme for Ambassador NOMURA's sojourn, (to
-C.
Ambassador NOMURA on KAMAKURA MARU).
Re programme for Ambassador NOMURA's sojourn, (to
-C
Secretary OKUMURA).
Re sending of aide-de-camp by Commander-in-Chief RICH-
-c . . .
ARDSON, (to Ambassador NOMURA on KAMAKURA
MARU).
Re programme for Ambassador NOMURA's sojourn, (to
-c...
Secretary OKUMURA on KAMAKURA MARU).
Re meeting the boat by Vice-Consul OKUDA. (to Secretary
-(C)..-..
-(C)...
74
80..
91.
127
128
135
145
198
219
1
270
294
3-27
4-2
4-15
6-2
6-2
6-7
6-20
8-2
8-16
9-8
10-17
10-29
MORIMURA on NITTA MARU).
Private telegram of Consul General, (to FUMIKO TAKAO
from OSAKA).
To Ambassador KURUSU. (from TATUTA MARU).
-(C)
Private request telegram of Consul General, (to HARUNO
-c
\ OSISE, Tokyo).
Condolatory telegiam. (Private telegram of Consul General
to the QAKUYODO in Canton).
Condolatory telegram. (Private telegram of Consul General
to Mrs. MAKI, Tokvo)
Re declaration of residence of MAS.AO KADOFUJI. (to
-c
Villagemaster ENBUCHI, Otomari branch office, Kara-
futo).
Condolatory telegram, (to wife of Councillor AKAGI in
-c
Shanghai^
Re son of Consul NAKAUCHI. (to Consul Nakauchi, Los
-(C)
Angeles).
Request telegram of Consul General, (to translator MAZAKI
1-A.
from Shaoghai).
Re export of pineapple seedlings, (to Head of Section of For-
-c.
eign Affairs, Formosa).
Re inquiry on condition of fuel oil supply, (to Secretary
MAEDA on TATUTA MARU).
Re connection of Secretary naga to American liner, etc.
(to Consul IWANAGA on TAIYO MARU).
MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS
[IS] (l)-A-YU
(2)-A-YU
1-B :.
(3)-YU-A
(4)-B-YU
(5)-A-YU
2-B...
3-B
4.
7-
8.
14
15
24
28
32.
1-6-
1-9.
1-10
1-16
1-17
1-28
1-29
1-30
Re movement of U. S. Navy, (to the Minister #2)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, Los Angeles, and Seattle.
Re movement of U. S. Navy, (to the Minister #5)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and Manila.
Re enquiry on advisability of trip to United States by the
SUBARU SHOW.
Dispatched to: San Francisco and Los Angeles.
Re movement of U. S. Navy, (to the Minister #11)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
Seattle.
Re trip to Hawaii of SUMIKO SUZUKI'S troupe, (to Los
Angeles #1)
Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco.
Re movements of U. S. warships, (to the Minister #18)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
Seattle.
Re proposal of Commander-in-chief RICHARDSON for
reception of Ambassador NOMURA, (to the Minister
#20)
Dispatched to: Ambassador in U. S., and San Francisco.
Re offer of Commander-in-Chief RICHARDSON to send
aide-de-camp to meet the Ambassador (NOMURA?), (to
the Minister #21).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, and San Francisco.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1095
MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS— Continued
(Code ? No.)
5-A-
6- A.
(ll)-A-YU
[S5] (12)-B-YU.
(13)-A-YU --
(14)-A-YU
(15)-A-YU
(16)-A-YU
(17)-A-YU
-A
(18)-B-YU.
[S6] (19)-A-YU.
(20)-A-YU
(21)-A-YU
(22)-A-YU.
8-B
(23)-A-YU ---
9-A
(24)-A-YU.
(25)-B-YU
[«71 (26)-A-YU..
(27)-A-YU.
(28)-A-YU.
(29)-B-YU.
File No.
34
7-1
38
2-6
43
2-21
45
2-24
49
63*?_
90- _.
92...
93...
100-
180-
104*.
109..
110..
113--
115*.
Date, 1941
3-1-
3-3.
3-4-
3-4-.
3-6..
3-10-
3-10.
.3-21.
3-24.
3-27.
3-28-
4-8-.
4-9-.
4-14.
4-15-
4-17.
4-21-
4-21.
4-24-
4-28-
4-29-
5-1.-
5-6..
5-12-
5-14.
Synopsis of message
Conditions of Ambassador NOMURA'S stopping in port here
(to the Minister #22)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re movement of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #25)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #29)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #31)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #34)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
Seattle.
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners, (to the Min-
ister #36)
Dispatched to: San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet.
Dispatched to: Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. warships, (to the Minister #38)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle
Re movements of U. S. warships, (to the Minister #39)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re correction of telegram, (to the Minister #42)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #43).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #44).
Dispatched to: Ambaseador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #47)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco and Seattle and
Los Angeles.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #50).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #53).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re trip to U. S. by Representatives YAMAJI and SHIMIZU.
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners.
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle. „ ,
Re Movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #63)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
Seattle. ^ ,
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #64).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #65).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #65).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los .\ngeles and
Seattle
Re stopping in port of eldest son of President ROOSEVELT.
(to the ^Minister #67).
Dispatched to: Ambassador and ManUa.
RemovementsofU. S. warships, (to the Minister #68).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle. • .. ^tt c^ -ci «.
Re transferring of telegram regarding movements of U . S. 1< leet.
Dispatched to: San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. warships, (to the Minister #69).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle.
Re transport WASHINGTON.
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco. _
Re seizure of German(s) by British warship, (to the Minister
#75)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Seattle
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
Re arrival of B-17 bombers, (to the Minister #80) .
1096 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS— Continued
(Code ? No.)
FUe No.
Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
(30)-A-YU.
(31)-B-YU.
(32)-A-YU.
lO-A
(33)-YU-A.
(34)-B-YU.
(35)-A-YU.
\S8] (36)-B-YU
(37)-A-YU -
11-A.... --
12-A
13-A --
14-B._
15-A....
16-A
17-A_-
18-C...- -
[?5] 19-C ._
20-A
21-A
22-A
23-A
24-A
25-A -.
26-A
27-B_ .-
28-A
[SO] 29-A
30-B..
31-A
32-A
33-A
34-A.
35-A
3&-A.,..„.„,.„.
116.
119.
122.
125.
130.
1.34'
138.
140"
148
157.
160
171.
174'
180
188.
190
191.
195'
197
206
208
211
220
221
222
226'
230
231
232'
237.
239.
241,
242
243
244
5-16.
5-22.
5-26.
5-29.
6-3..
6-7_.
6-13.
6-13
6-23
7-1-
7-5.
7-14
7-15
7-21
7-28
7-29
7-29
7-31
8-1-
8-4-
8-6.
8-8.
8-18
8-19
8-21
8-28
9-2-
9-3.
9-3.
9-6.
9-9.
9-13
9-13
9-15,
9-15.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#81).
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners, (to the Minis-
ter #84).
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#86).
Re check-up and reporting of names of U. S. warships.
Dispatched to: Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister •
#91).
Dispatched to: Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle.
Re trip to Washington by Admiral KIM MEL and visit to the
mainland by the Fleet, (to the Minister #94) .
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#97).
Dispatched to: Ambassador, San Francisco and Seattle.
Re arrival in port of U. S. Army transport PRESIDENT
PIERCE, (to the Minister #99)
Dispatched to: San Francisco and Manila.
Movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#106)
Dispatched to: Ambassador, Los Angeles, San Francisco and
Seattle.
Re stoppage of sending of code(s).
Dispatched to: San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle.
Re survey of assets of Japanese residing within the United
States.
Movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#123)
Disptached to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re commencement of export to Vladivostok by ships of the
Soviet Union, (to the Minister #125)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #129)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re entry into port of Japanese vessel, (to the Minister #135)
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #137)
Dispatched to: Ambas.sador, and San Francisco.
Re entry into U. S. port of Japanese vessel(s). (to the Min-
ister #138)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re stopping in port of the T.VTUTA MARU. (to San
Francisco #18)
Re entry into and embarkation from port of the ASAMA
M.\RU. (to the Minister #143)
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#145)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re transferring of telegram(s). (telegram from the Minister
#66)
Movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#148)
Re movements of U. S. warships, (to the Minister #153)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Local Japanese situation, (to the Minister #154)
Dispatched to: .Embassador and San Francisco.
Re movements of U. S. warships, (to the .Embassador #48)
Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco.
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners, (to the
Minister #156)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#160)
Dispatched to: .Embassador and San Francisco.
Re HAY.EKA WA. (to the .Embassador #51)
Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco.
Re HAYAKAWA. (from the Ambassador #29)
Dispatched to: Minister and San Francisco.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#163)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Fransico.
Re mail matter to Japan, (to the Minister #164)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re stopping in port of French warship, (to the Minister
#166)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re propaganda pamphlets of fifth columnists against Japan.
(to the Minister #167)
Dispatched to: .Embassador and San Francisco.
Re transfer of official telegrams sent to this (Jonsulate. (to the
Minister #168)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#169)
Dispatched to Ambassador and San Francisco.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
MATCHING OF TELEGRAMS— Continued
1097
(Code ? No.)
FUe No.
Date, 194!
Synopsis of message
37-A
250
251
253_
256*
257
258
260
262*
263 _
265
267
268
271
273 .
274*
275*
276*
283
289_
298
300.
301
303
305*
314
315
320*
323
324
325
329
330
331*
334
353
361
366*
9-22
9-22_
9-24
9-29
&-29
9-26
10-1
10-2
10-2
10-6
10-13
10-15
10-17
10-20
10-22
10-22
10-22
10-24
10-2S
11-1
11-1
11^
11-4
11-6
11-8
11-10
11-12
11-13
11-13
11-14
11-18
11-18
11-18
11-19
11-29
12-3
12-5
Movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
Dispatched to; Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re departure of French cessel. (to the Minister #173)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re problem of shipping communication. Japan-United
States, (to the Minister #175)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re question of fishing boats owned by Japanese, (to the
Minister #177)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #178)
Movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #179)
Re problem of Japanese Language Schools, (to the Minister
#181)
Re problem of Japanese-owned fishing boats, (to the Min-
ister #183)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re transportation of British soldiers by American vessels.
(to the Minister #184)
Dispatched to: Ambassador. San Francisco and Vancouver.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#186)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#188)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re going to the United States of Chinese airmen, (to the
Minister #189)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re payment of boat fare in Japan, (to the Minister #191)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re Japan-U. S. ship communication, (to the Minister #192)
Re passengers of the TAIYO MARU. (to San Francisco #23)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and Minister.
Re number of passengers on TAIYO M.\RU. Telegram
transferred, (from the Minister #99)
[31] 38- A
39-A ...
40-B
41-A
42-A
43-A
44-B - .
45-A
46-A .-__-
47-A
[Sg] 48-A
49-A
50-A...
51-B
52
53
54-A
MARU. (from the Minister #100;
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication, (to the
Minister #194)
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #199)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
55-A
56-A . ' -
57-A
(to the Ambassador #71)
Dispatched to: Minister, Sail Francisco and Seattle.
Re appointment of Consul IWANAG.A. as courier, (to the
Ambassador #73)
Dispatched to: Minister, San Francisco and Seattle.
Re delay in sailing of TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #204)
Re mail matter to be loaded on TAIYO MARU (to the Min-
ister #205)
Re departure of TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #206)
Dispatched to: San Francisco and Seattle.
[33] 58-A.—
59- A.
60-B
61-Al
62- A.
and two other ships, (to the Miaister #211)
Re movements of U. S. Fleet, (to the Minister #212)
Dispatched to: U. S., and San Francisco.
Re arrival of Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister #216)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Re departure of Ambassador KURUSU. (to San Francisco #28)
Dispatched to: Minister and Ambassador.
From Ambassador KURUSU (to the Minister #218)
63-(C)
64-C.
65-A
6&-A.
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#219)
Dispatched to: Ambassador and San Francisco.
Revenues connected with TAIYO MARU and NITTA
67 -A-
68-A.
MARU. (to the Minister #221)
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#222)
Re suspension of announcement of arrival and departure of
ships, (to the Minister #223)
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
#226)
BK. (?) (to the Minister #240)
Re sending of traveling expenses of family (families), (to the
Minister #246)
Revenues and expenditures connected with TAIYO MARU
[34] 69-A
70-A
71-A
72-A...
73-A.,
and NITTA MARU. (to the Minister #251)
End of matching of telegrams.
1098 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TO NEW YORK
(Code? No.)
FUe No.
Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
[S5] 1-(B)
2-A
2
210
302*
302*
304
1-6
8-7_
11-4
11-4
11-5
Re detaining of Minister SUMA's ship.
Re telegarm to the Specie Bank.
3-B.
Re reservation of stateroom for Secretary and Mrs.
3-B . - --
TOKUNAQA.
Re reservation of stateroom for Secretary and Mrs.
4-B
TOKUNAGA.
Re reservation of stateroom for Secretary and Mrs.
TOKUNAGA.
TO THE AMBASSADOR
[36] (l)-YU-B...
1-B -
5
10
11
22
25
33
35
36
41..
42
46
47
51
58*.
01
62*?
66*
79
87
88
103
111
118
120*
123*
130
131
134*
139
141
142.
143*
144*
146
147*
149*
150
155*
156
158
159*
161
163*
167
170
172
173
1 176.
1-7
1-11
1-13
1-24
1-28
2-1.
2-1
2-1
2-18
2-20
2-26
2-26..:...
3-1.......
3-6
3-11
3-14
3-21
4-2
4-10
4-10
4-28
5-7
5-21
5-23.
5-27
6-3
6-4
6-7
6-13
6-14
6-16
6-16
6-17
6-20
6-23
6-26
6-27
6-30
7-1
7-2
7-3
V-7
7-8
7-11.....".
7-14
7-15
7-15
7-17
Movements of the U. S. Navy, (to the Minister #3)
Interview with Rear Admiral KIMMEL, newly-appointed
(2)-YU-B
2-B - ---
Commander-in-Chief, (to the Minister #7)
Movements of the U. S. Navy, (to the Minister #8)
? (To Minister #17)
3-B
Re registration of families and servants of officials of foreign
4-B --
government with the State Department.
Re expected time (date) of arrival in office of Ambassador
5-B
NOMURA.
Re names of Ambassador NOMURA'S staff.
6-B
Re reporting to Commander-in-Chief KIMMEL of new ap-
7-B
pointment.
Re measure for freezing of foreign assets in the United States.
(3) B-YU
Re designation of naval defense area in Kaneohe Bay. (to the
(4)-YU-B
Minister #28)
Re explanations of the Minister in the Diet.
8-B
Re date when Consul-General KITA will start for his new
[37] 9-B
Post, (from the Minister #10— telegram relayed).
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners, (to the
10-B
Minister #36)
Re correction of telegram, (to the Minister #42)
11-B -..
Re request for refundment of advances.
12-B
Re report of arrival at post of Consul-General KITA. (to the
(5)-B-YU
Minister #45)
Re visit to New Zealand of U. S. warship(s).
13-A .-
Re inquiry of name of Consulate to which telegraphic code
14-B - ..
was transferred.
Re investigation of code type KETSU telegram(s).
15-A . ._
Re easy clearance of courier MORI.
16-A
Re entry into port of British warship, (to the Minister #70)
17-A
Local general situation, (to the Minister #77)
(6)-A-YU.._
General situation, (to the Minister #83)
18-B
7-B-YU
Re stopping in port of Minister of Land of New Zealand.
(to the Minister #85)
Re departure of the TRADE WIND, (to the Minister #87)
19-A
Re movements of the U. S. warships and ships, (to the
[38] 20-A
21-B
Minister #91)
Re reply to date of sending of official message (s).
Re visit to Washington of Admiral KIMMEL and the visit
f8)-A-YU
of the Fleet to the Mainland, (to the M inister #94)
Local ceneral situation, (to the Minister #£8)
22-A
Re entrv into port of British converted cruiser, (to the
23-A
Minister #100)
Re entrv into port of British converted cruiser, (to the
24-B
Minister #101)
Re closure of German Consulates m the United States, (to
25-B
the AT inister #102)
Re coming here of the MEIJI University baseball team, (on
26-A
request of N. Y. K.)
Talks with Italian Consul, (to the Minister #104)
(9)-B-YU
Re stoppmg in port of DANIEL F. MEYERS, (to the
(lO)-B-YU .
Minister #105)
Re return of Admiral KIMMEL.
27-A. . - - .
Re arrival in port of Commander TATIBANA.
28-B
29- A.
Re closure of German Consulate (s). (to the Minister #112)
Re movements of U. S. warships and ships, (to the Minister
[39] 30-A
#113)
Re regular foreign text publications for oversea propaganda
(31)-B
use.
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat owners, (to the
32-A
33-B
Minister #114)
Re movements of U. S. warships, (to the Minister #115)
Re participation of American flyers in the Chinese Air Force.
34-C :
(to the Minister #117)
Telegram of thanks for Ambassador SHIGEMITSU.
35-A
Re instructions for returning the Imperial Portrait, (to the
36-A
Minister #122)
37-B .
Re closure of Italian Consulate, etc. (to the Minister #124)
38-A..
Re status of employees.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
TO THE AMBASSADOR— Continued
1099
(Code ? No.)
File No.
Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
39-(A)
178
183
184
187*
192»
194*
205
207*?....
213
222
225
229*
230
233
235
247
248*?_-.-
249
255
264*
266*
277
279*
280
281 -
282
285*
286
290
293
296
297
298
299*
300
307
316*
317
7-18
7-24
7-24
7-26
7-30
7-30
8-2
8-5
8-12
8-21
8-27......
9-2
9-3
9-3
9-5
9-17
9-18.
9-19
9-27
10-4
10-10
10-22
10-24
10-24
10-24
10-24
10-25
10-25
10-28
10-29
10-30
11-1
11-1
11-1
11-1
11-6
11-10
Re request for transfer of telegrams.
40-C
Re registration of offlfials and employees of foreign Govern-
41-A
ments.
Re returning of the Imperial Portrait.
42-B
Re arrival of Under-secretarv of the Navy and Freeze -Ad-
43-B
ministrator, (to the Minister #134)
Effect of the enforcement of the Freeze Order on the resident
UO] 44-B _ -
Japanese, (to the Minister #139)
Re exemption of Chinese diplomats and Consulates from
45- A
application of Freeze Order.
Re re-sending of telegram.
46-A
Re incorporation of the Coast Guard within the Navy, (to
47-A
the M mister #146)
Re bank "balance" of official funds, etc.
48-A
Re movements of U. S. warships.
49-A.
Re treatment of the Japanese residents in the U. S. by Ameri-
50-B
cans, (to the Minister #155)
Re passing through of American airplane "pilots", (to the
51- A
Minister #159)
Re HAYAKAWA
52-A
Re H.\YAKA\VA
53-A
Plan for construction of "dock" at Pago-Pago, (to the Minis-
54-A
ter #162)
Re reporting of names of Consulate staff members in regard to
55-B __
56-A -_-_
lil] 57-A
58-B
59-B
60-A
61-B
the Freeze Order.
Re drawmg up a name-list under arrangement for the easing
of the credit freeze order.
Military information, (to the Minister #171)
Re correction of telegram numbers.
Re measure for time of war. (to Minister #185)
Re conversation of Delegate KINO, (to the Minister #187).
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.
Re clearance of goods entrusted in care of Consul IWANAGA.
62-A.-_.
63-A
64-A
(from the Minister #101— telegram relayed.)
Re clearance of goods entrusted in care of Consul IWANAGA.
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship communication.
65-A
66-Al
67-A
68-A
69-A
Re report on assets of this Consulate and Consulate Staff.
Re cancellation of freeze order on allowance of Consulate
members.
Re correction of telegram numbers.
Re physical examination of passengers boarding the TAIYO
MARU.
70-A
UB] 71-A
72 B
73-A
courier KUGA.)
Re allowance for this Consulate members.
Re suspension of loading of mail matter on board the TAIYO
MARU.
Re arrival of the TAIYO MARU. (to the Minister #203)
Re appointment of Consul IWANAGA as courier.
74-A
Re investigation of people boarding the TAIYO MARU.
75-B
(to the Minister #208)
Re bounds of application of the Martial Law in Hawaii.
76
(to the Minister #213)
Re number of passengers on the TAIYO MARU. (to the
77-A
319
321*
322
326
343
345*
354
369*
11-11
11-12
11-13
11-14
11-25
11-25
12-1
12-6.
Minister #214)
78-B
the U. S.
Re "camera interview" of Ambassador KURUSU.
79-A
80-A
81-A
From Ambassador KURUSU. (to the Minister #217)
Ambassador KURUSU's talk with NEWMAN.
Re representation of interests, (to the Minister #235.)
82-B.
Re report of names of families of this Consulate's members.
83-A
Re representation of interests.
84-A.-..
BK (to the Minister #254)
TO FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC REPLENISHMENTS
[iS] 1-A
76
Re passport visa of WILLIAM PINRY HOLCOMBE. (to
1-B
2-A
81
95_
104
105_
4-3
1
1
4-19
4-29_
4-30
the Minister #56)
Dispatched to: New Orleans.
Re stopping in port of the Foreign Minister of the Nether-
lands, (to the Minister #59).
Dispatched to: Manila.
3-B
Dispatched to: Manila.
Re transport WASHINGTON, (to the Minister #71)
4-B
Dispatched to: Manila.
Re going to Chungking of HENRY LUCE, (to the Minister
#72)
Dispatched to: Manila.
1100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TO FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC REPLENISHMENTS— Continued
(Code 7 No.)
File No.
Date, 1941
Synopsis of message
2-C._.
112
126
152
215
218
223
245_
246
5-12
5-29
6-28
8-13
8-16
8-22_
9-17
9-17
Re mourning on death of Representative YAMAJI.
1-B
2-B
Dispatched to: New Orleans.
Re passing through of MANUEL FOX. (to the Minister
#89)
Dispatched to: Hongkong^
MU-(C)...
Burma Road, (to the Minister #110)
Dispatched to: Hongkong.
MU-A
SO).
Dispatched to: Canton.
MU-A .
Dispatched to: Canton.
Code (sign ?) for head of Consulate.
Ui] 1-B
Dispatched to: Canton.
2-B
Dispatched to: Shanghai.
From Secretary KIYOHARA.
Dispatched to: Shanghai.
day
day
TOP SEORETT
Enclosure (B)
[i] Translation of form in which were recorded the incoming telegrams to
the Consulate.
INCOMING TELEGRAMS
Telegrams, Official Messages
Secret Ordinary
No
File No.
Dated month
Received month
From
To
Attached to:
Received month
Subject: (gist of contents)
Channel of Disposition
To month
From
To
From
To
From
To
From
To
From
To : The Archives and Documents Section
Telegram Section (X)
Person in Charge:
Remarks :
day
day
EXPLANATIONS
[2]
Types of Codes:
A AN(GO)
B RYAKU(GO)
C HEX (ordinary)
Abbreviations :
CG CONSUL CENERAL
ADS ARCHIVES AND DOCUMENTS SECTION
TS TELEGRAM SECTION
1. [2a] The letter GO is very similar to another letter, namely, REI, which
may mean ORDER (in the sense of issued order), but since the letter — GO or
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1101
REI — may also be a designation of a certain type of code, this explanation is
being attached for reference. This letter appears under columns entitled
TELEGRAM No. d CODE TYPE and CONTENTS.
2. The word GOGAI is presumably a designation to the effect that the radio-
gram does not belong to any one type of code for the word literally means "out-
side of number." However, the word may also be a designation of a certain
type of code.
3. The word MU literally means nil or none, but this many also be a designa-
nation of a certain type of code.
[.?]
TOP SECRET
FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
19
1/17
20
1/17
26
1/24
27
1/24
28
1/26
31
1/27
32
1/27
33
1/27
69
2/15
78
2/25
80
2/26
82
2/27
83
3/1
91
3/8
90
94
3/10
111
3/18
116
3/20
117
3/22
119
3/25
120
3/25
127
3/27
139
4/5
145
4/7
144
4/7
148
4/10
152
4/11
Contents
Disposition
1-B. _:....
2-(A)
3-B
4-B
5-B
6-B.
7-B
177-B
8-A
9-B
10-B
U] 11-B
12-B
13-B
14-B
5S4-A
15-B
16-A
619-A
17-A
18-C
7-Yuao..
19-B
20-B
[5] 21-B
814-ANOO
SI9-RYAKUaO-
Re granting of social allowances.
Re Greek ship heading towards Japan.
Re remittance of development (of in-
telligence) expenses.
Re crew members connected with
Japan-Russian (?) fishing industry,
(to the Ainbassador #37)
Ditto.
(to the Ambassador #38)
Re invitation of Ambassador Nomura
and his party.
Re delivery of telegram to Ambassador
Nomura.
Re expression of views by the Minister
on the speech by Secretary "Hull"
against Japan,
(to the Ambassador #39)
Re collecting of information.
Re crew members connected with
Russo-Japanese (?) fishing.
Re date when Consul General Kita
will start for his new post.
Re invitation to participate in the
special festival of the Yasukuni
Shrine to MASA NAKAMURA.
Re Consul General Kita's companion.
Re reerossing by CHINEI KANE-
SHIRO.
Re appointment of Secretary (TA-
DASHI) MORIMURA to service
in this Consulate.
Re disposition of secret documents
(dated 3/10)
Re starting for new post of Secretary
Morimura.
Re granting of visa for transit to
"WILLIAM PINRY HOL-
COMBE".
Re Greek vessel heading towards
Japan.
Re radiograms and secret documents
to this Consulate carried by courier
Mori.
Re inquiry on boarding of ship by the
Consul General's "cook."
Re distribution of code type TSU and
AN.
(type GO #1 type 9)
(dated 3/12)
Re indictment of Japanese fishing boat
owners.
Re verification expense of crewmen's
registration.
Re request for contribution of article
from Premier Konoye and Foreign
Minister Matsuoka to the magazine
commemorating the completion of
the Memorial Hall of the Japanese
Hospital of Honolulu.
Re departure of Panamanian vessel
towards Japan,
(to Britain #123)
Re stopping in port of courier Secre-
tary FUKUDA and bis party.
To the CG 1/17, to
the TS 1/18.
To the CG 1/17, to
the TS 1/18.
To the CG 1/24, to
the TS 1/24.
To the CG 1/24, to
the TS 1/24.
To the CG 1/27, to
the TS 1/27.
To the CG 1/27, to
the TS 1/27.
To the CG 1/27, to
the TS 1/28.
To the CG 1/27, to
the TS 1/28.
To the CG 2/15, to
the TS 2/14.
To the CG 2/25, to
the TS 2/25.
To the CG 2/26, to
the TS 2/26.
To the CG 2/27, to
the TS 2/27.
To the CG 3/1, to
the TS 3/1.
To the CG 3/8, to
the TS 3/8.
To the CG 3/8, to
the TS 3/8.
To the CG 3/10, to
the TS 3/11.
To the CG 3/18, to
the TS 3/18.
To the CG 3/20, to
the TS 3/21.
To the CG 3/22, to
the TS 3/22.
To the CG 3/25, to
the TS 3/25.
To the CG 3/25, to
the TS 3/25.
To the CG 3/31, to
the TS 4/1.
To the CG 4/5, to
the TS 4/5.
To the CG 4/7, to
the TS 4/8.
To the CG 4/7, to
the TS 4/8.
To the CG 4/10, to
the TS 4/10.
To the CG 4/11, to
the TS 4/12.
1102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
22-A___ ----
23-B
24-C
11-B-YUG0_._.
25-B
26-B
963-ANGO
-C
[6] 28-C
29-C -
30-A
(17)-AN-YUG0
1058-ANGO
31-C
32-B
33-C
34-B
35-C -
36-A
37-C -
38-C..._ _..
39-C
40-C
[71 41-A
1211-ANGO
42-C
43-C
44-B
45-(C)
46-A
47-B -
1399-ANGO
48-C
49-A
50-B
51-C -
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
151 (12)
4/11
162
4/18
163
9/18
164
4/18
179
180
dated
4/28
4/30
181
dated
4/30
19
5/3
194
5/7
199
5/12
200
5/12
198
5/10
201
5/14
208
5/21
211
5/22
213
5/24
226
5/29
225
5/29
227
5/30
228
5/31
230
6/2
238
6/5
243
6/7
246
6/9
247
6/9
250
6/11
254
6/13
266
6/21
282
6/25
284
6/27
289
6/28
300
7/3
301
7/4
302
7/4
312
7/10
313
7/10
Re simplifying precedure for expatria-
tion from Japanese nationality.
Re remittance of allowances for rent--.
Re expatriation notices in official
gazette.
Re supplementary addition of
RYAKUGO (code?) to transferred
telegram no. E.
Re notice of expatriation of HISAO
NAKAZA WA in the official gazette.
Re crew members connected with
Russo-Japanese (?) fishing,
(to the Ambassador #186)
(dated 4/30)
Re change of indicator words in request
telegram.
(Secret)
Re notice of expatriation of
in the official gazette.
Re expatriation notice in official ga-
zette.
Ditto
Re purchase of OKUMA's house (or
purchase of house by OKUMA).
Re method for use of telegraphic code
tvpe TSU.
(dated 4/12)
Re abstinence from speeches disadvan-
tageous to the Axis.
Re expatriation notice in the official
gazette.
Re transmission of lodging expenses for
TSUKIK'AWA by wire.
Re expatriation notice in official ga-
zette.
Re trip to Hawaii by the Meiji Univer-
sity baseball team.
Re expatriation notice in official ga-
zette.
Re transmission by wire of this Con-
sulate's expenses for the develop-
ment of intelligence for this year.
Re expatriation notice in official ga-
zette.
Ditto
Re expatriation notice in official ga-
zette.
Ditto
Re subsidy to the "Pan-Pacific
Union",
(dated 6/9)
Re establishment of propaganda organ
of the League of Nations
(from Hankow #186)
Re expatriation notice in official ga-
zette
Ditto
Ditto ._.__._
Re expatriation
Re investigation of the true facts sur-
rounding discovery of the mutiny
plot of the crew on the battleship
"Pennsylvania."
Re expatriation notice in official ga-
zette.
Re putting into force the telegraphic
code type "TA".
Notice of expatriation
Message from the NYK
Re resending of radiogram :
Notice of expatriation
Disposition
to
to
To the CG 4/11, to
the TS 4/12.
To the CG 4/28, to
the TS 4/19.
To the CG 4/18
the TS 4/19.
To the CG 4/18
the TS 4/19.
To the CG 4/28, to
the TS 4/28.
To the CG 4/30, to
the TS 5/1.
To the CG 4/30, to
the TS 5/1.
To the CG 5/3, to
the TS 5/3.
To the CG 5/7, to the
TS 5/3.
To the CG 5/12, to
the TS 5/13.
To the CG 5/12, to
the TS 5/13.
To the CG 5/13, to
theTS
To the CG 5/14, to
the TS 5/14.
To the CG 5/21, to
the TS 5/22.
To the CG 5/22, to
the TS 5/22.
To the CG 5/24 to
the TS 5/24.
To the CG 5/29, to
the TS 5/29.
To the CG 5/29. to
the TS 5/29.
To the CG 5/30, to
the TS 5/31.
To the CG 5/31, to
the TS 5/31.
To the CG 6/2, to the
TS 6/2.
To the CG 6/5, to the
TS 6/5.
To the CG 6/7, to the
TS 6/7.
To the CG 6/9, to
the TS 7/9.
To the CG 6/9, to
the TS 6/10. •
To the CO 6/12, to
the TS 6/12.
To the CG 6/13, to
the TS 6/13.
To the CO 6/21, to
the TS 6/21.
To the CG 6/25, to
the TS 6/26.
To the CG 6/27, to
the TS 6/27.
To the CG 6/28, to
the TS 6/30.
To the CG 7/3, to
the TS 7/3.
To the CO 7/4, to
the TS 7/6.
To the CO 7/5, to
the TS 7/5.
To the CO 7/10, to
the TS 7/10.
To the CG 7/10, to
the TS 7/10.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)— Continued
1103
Telegram No. & Code
Type
52-C
\8] S3-B-
54-C
55-A
56-A
57-B
58-C
59-C
163f-ANGO.
60-A
61-A
62-C
63-A
64-C
65
[91 66-A--.
67-C
68-A
69-C
-A
70-C
71-A.--
1836-ANGO-
72-B
73-A -
74-C
75-A
76-A
1906-ANGO.
77-A...
[10] 78- A.
79-A
80-C
81-A
82-A
83-A
84-(C)
85-(C)
86-A
87-B
88-C
File
No.
321
322
325
329
331-330
336
344
352
395
394
404
409
419
420
432
450
451
457
459
460
469
470
477
486
492
496
498
497
499
502
507
516
524
534
558
559
561
578
579
582
586
Date
Rec'd
7/12
7/12
7/15
7/16
7/16
7/17
7/21
7/24
7/2S
7/28
7/29
7/30
7/31
7/31
8/2
8/6
8/6
8/13
8/13
8/16
8/22
8/26
8/28
8/29
8/30
9/1
9/5
9/10
9/12
9/24
9/24
9/25
9/30
10/1
10/2
10/3
Contents
N otice of expatriation
Re transmission by wire of salaries(?)
for foreign diplomatic establish-
ments.
Re expatriation notice
Re return of the Imperial portrait
Re report of gathering of local informa-
tion.
Re arrival in port of courier OSHIO.-.
Re expatriation notice in offlcial
gazette.
Ditto
Re issuing of instructions on entry
into port of Japanese vessels.
Re returning of the portraits of the
three Imperial Majesties.
Re the secret #2 type UNNUN_
Notice of expatriation
Re courier OSHIO
Expatriation notice in offlcial gazette-
Re calling at "Honolulu" of Tatuta
Maru.
Re sailing of the Tatuta Maru directly
to Japan.
Re expatriation notice
Re visa for passing through to the
Britisher, McBain.
Expatriation notice
Request telegram from the Yokohama
Speci*^ Bank dated Aug. 9.
Expatriation notice
Re loan from the Specie Bank
Re movements of foreign warships
Re request for permission for inspec-
tion tour within the jurisdiction.
Request telegram from Specie Bank__,
Re expatriation notice
Re telegraphic code
(Special telegram type GO, no. 1907;
Re loans from Specie Bank to this
Consulate.
Re survey pertaining to Domei broad-
casts.
Re telegraphic code
Re movements and whereabouts of
the U. S. Fleet.
Request telegram from Specie Bank
Expatriation notice in the official
gazette.
From OGAWA
Disposition
Re YORITOSHI FUJIWARA
Re report of movements of U. S. Fleets.
Re expatriation notice in official
gazette.
Ditto
Re financial report
Re contents of baggage directed to this
Consulate.
Re expatriation notice in official
gazette.
To the CG 7/12,
the TS 7/14.
To the CG 7/12,
the TS 7/14.
To the CG 7/15,
the TS 7/15.
To the CG 7/16
the TS 7/16.
To the CG 7/17
the TS 7/17.
To the CG 7/18
the TS 7/18.
To the CG 7/21
the TS 7/21.
To the CG 7/24
the TS 7/26.
To the CG 7/2S
the TS 7/26 (28'
To the CG 7/28
the TS 7/29.
To the CG 7/29
the TS 7/29.
To the CG 7/30
the TS 7/30.
To the CG 7/31
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 7/31
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 8/2
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/6
the TS 8/8.
To the CG 8/6
the TS 8/8.
To the CG 8/8
the TS 8/8.
To the CG 8/9
the TS 8/9.
To the CG 8/9
the TS 8/9.
To the CG 8/13
the TS 8/13.
To the CG 8/13
the TS 8/13.
To the CG 8/16
the TS 8/19.
To the CG 8/22
the TS 8/22.
To the CO 8/26
the TS 8/27.
To the CG 8/28
the TS 8/28.
To the CG 8/29
the TS 9/5.
To the CG 8/29
the TS 8/29.
To the CG 8/29
the TS 8/29. "
To the CG 8/30
the TS 8/30.
To the CG 9/1
the TS 9/2.
To the CG 9/5
the TS 9/5.
To the CO 9/10.
the TS 9/11.
To the CG 9/12
the TS 9/13.
To the CG 9/24
the TS 9/25.
To the CG 9/25
the TS 9/26.
To the CG 9/25
the TS 9/26.
To the CG 9/30
the TS 9/30.
To the CO 10/1
the TS 10/2.
To the CG 10/2
the TS 10/2.
To the CG 10/4
the TS 10/6.
1104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREIGN)— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
600
10/9
604
10/11
612
10/14
613
10/14
622
10/15
625
10/16
654
10/20
656
10/20
660
10/21
661
10/21
671
10/22
672
10/22
673
10/22
680
10/24
690
10/15
691
10/25
693
10/27
694
10/27
698
10/28
702
10/29
708
10/31
707
10/31
724
11/5
761
11/12
762
11/12
765
11/14
771
11/15
778
11/17
783
11/18
789
11/20
800
11/22
801
804
11/24
807
11/26
827
11/28
828
11/28
434
11/29
835
11/29
836
11/29
843
Contents
Disposition
89-C
90-C
91-B..
92-C
2179-RYAKUGO._--
[//] 93-C
94-B -
95-A --
96-A_ ---.
97-A
98-B
99-B..- — .
10&-B
101-B...
102-B ---
103-?-
2231-RYAKUQO...-
104-AN-RYO-.^
105-AN-RYO
106-C
[IB] 107-C
018-A
2264-RYAKUGO....
109-C
2318-A
110-B... --.
lU-A --.
112-A
113-A
114-A
115-C
2378-ANGO
116-C
117-(C)
118-A
119-A
US] 2420-1-ANOO
120-C
2422-ANGO
121-A
Re expatriation notice in official
gazette.
Ditto
Re return to Japan of TSUYOKO
AYUZAWA.
Expatriation notice
Re advance of expenses for sojourn to
Secretary MAEDA.
Expatriation notice in official gazette..
Re landing of Secretary MAEDA
Re relaying (of message) to Secretary
MAEDA.
Re surveillance of movements of
"NEWMAN".
Re reports of forcible detention of
"LEO SIROTA".
Re reservation of stateroom for Secre-
tary TOKUNAGA.
Re number of passengers on the Taiyo
Maru.
Re departure of Taiyo Maru from
Yokohama.
Re clearance of baggage entrusted in
care of Consul Iwanaga.
Re expatriation notice
Re investigation of whether the air-
craft carrier "Yorktown" is there or
not.
Re delay in arrival of Taiyo Maru
Re issuing of entry visa to "NEW-
MAN".
Re issuing of visa to the American
"CRICHTOX COLVIN".
Expatriation notice
Re expatriation notice in official
gazette.
Re transmission of (message?) to
REISAN (RET #3).
Re according of conveniences to Am-
bassador KURUSU.
Expatriation notice
Re according of conveniences to the
"Argentine" Ambassador.
Re easing of the Freeze Order
Re reports pertaining to warships and
ships.
Re ietter(s) sent through Consul
IWANAGA.
Re reports on movements of U. S.
warships and ships.
Re location of Fleet Training Base
Expatriation notice in official gazette..
Re reports on matters pertaining to
finance.
Expatriation notice in official gazette.
Ditto
Re disposal of ANGO (code).
Re reports of movements of U. S. war-
ships and ships.
Re reply telegram as to names of em-
ployes and number in their families.
Expatriation notice
Re reports of entrance and exit and
other movements of warships and
ships.
Re representation of interests
To the CG 10/9, to
the TS 10/9.
To the CG 10/11, to
the TS 10/13.
To the CG 10/14, to
theTS 10/14.
To the CG 10/14, to
the TS 10/14.
To the CG 10/15, to
the TS 10/15.
To the CO 10/16, to
the TS 10/17.
To the CG 10/20, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CO 10/21, to
theTS 10/21.
To the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/2] .
To the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/22, to
the TS 10/22.
To the CG 10/22, to
the TS 10/22.
To the CG 10/22, to
the TS 10/22.
To the CG 10/24, to
the TS 10/25.
To the CG 10/25, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 10/25, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CO 10/27, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 10/27, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 10/28, to
the TS 10/28.
To the CG 10/29, to
the TS 10/29.
To the CG 10/31, to
theTS 10/31.
To the CG 10/31, to
theTS 10/31.
To the CG 11/5, to
the TS 11/5.
To the CG 11/12, to
theTS 11/14.
To the CG 11/12, to
the TS 11/14.
To the 11/14, to the
TS 11/14.
To the 11/15, to the
TS 11/19.
To the CG 11/17, to
the TS 11/17.
To the CG 11/19 to
the TS 11/19.
To the CG 11/21, to
the TS 11/21.
To the CG 11/22, to
theTS 11/24.
To the CG 11/22, to
the TS 11/24.
To the CG 11/24, to
the TS 11/24.
To the CG 11/26, to
the TS 11/26.
To the CG 11/28, to
the TS 11/28.
To the CG 11/28, to
the TS 11/28.
To the CG 11/29, to
theTS 12/1.
To the CG 11/29, to
theTS 12/1.
To the CG 11/29, to
the TS.12/1.
To the CO 11/30, to
the.TS.12/1.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
FROM: THE MINISTER (FOREION)— Continued
1105
Telegram No. & Code
Type
122-C
2422-GOAN
2437-ANGO
2445-ANGO.
123-A
2461-ANGO
124-B_
1.25-B
126-A..
2466-ANGO
128-A
127-C-
in]
File
No.
844
845
846
848
849
85l"
852
S.'iS
857
856
863
862
Date
Rec'd
12/1
12/1
12/1
12/2
12/2
12/3
12/3
12/4
12/4
12/4
12/7
Contents
Expatriation notice
Re entrance and exit and movement of
warships and ships.
Re personal affairs of Consular staff
Re destruction by fire of code books...
Re movements of U. S. Fleet
Re ANGO FUGO (Ango code or
crj-ptographic code).
Re sending of families' travelling ex-
penses.
Re payment of year-end bonuses to
employes.
Request telegram _
Re return to Japan of families (of Con-
sulate staff?).
Re reports of movements, etc., of war-
ships and ships.
Expatriation
FROM: THE AMBASSADOR
Disposition
To the CO
the TS 12/1
To the CO
the TS 12/1.
To the CO
the TS 12/2.
To the CO
the TS 12/2,
To the CO
the TS 12/3
To the CO
the TS 12/3
To the CO
the TS 12/3.
To the CO
the TS 12/4.
To the CG
the TS 12/4.
To the CO
the TS 12/4
To the CO
the TS 12/6
To the CG
the TS 12/6
12/1, to
12/1, to
12/1, to
12/2, to
12/2, to
12/3, to
12/3, to
12/4, to
12/4, to
12/4, to
12/6, to
12/6, to
315-YUANGO
2-ANGO
1-B..
2-B
fr-RYAKUGO
7-RYAKUGO
22-RYAKUGO.
3-A
6-ANYUGO....
8-ANYUQO
[16] 25-HEIGO..
26-RYAKUGO
27-ANOO
28-ANGO
29-ANGO __..
20-YU-QO-RYAKU
4-B..
30-RYAKU-YUGO_
1
1/6
27
1/18
38
1/29
46
2/1
51
1/4
52
2/4
70
2/14
79
2/25
95
3/10
96
3/10
102
3/11
104
3/12
105
3/13
106
3/13
109
3/14
108
3/14
110
3/15
114
3/19
Re exchange visas between Japanese
and Russians,
(dated 12/20)
Re method of exit (from Japan?) of
American citizeiLS fo Japanese de-
scent,
(from the Minister #25)
Re entry of nationality of dual citizens.
Re inquiry of names of Ambassador
NOMURA'S party.
Newspaper reports concerning forcible
detention of Greek vessel,
(from Los Angeles to the Minister
#18)
Re denial of rumors of forcible deten-
tion of Greek vessel,
(from the Minister #53)
Re arrival at post of Ambassador
NOMURA.
Re bill for freezing foreign credits in
the United States.
Re gathering of military information
in U. S. and Canada,
(from the Minister #73)
(dated 2/18)
Re handling of visas for foreigners
coming to Japan,
(to the Minister #109)
(dated 2/25)
Re visit of Minister MATSUOKA to
Germany and Italy,
(from the Minister GO-#599)
Re official tour of Europe by Minister
MATSUOKA and the assumption
of superintending of foreign Min-
ister's duties bv KONOYE.
(from the Minister GO-#629)
Re telegraphic code
(from the Minister GO-#633)
Re visas of Netherlander(s)
(from the Minister GO-#643)
Re movements of U. S. Fleet
(to the Minister #34)
Tenor of arguments concerning the
Far Eastern problem,
(to the Minister #29)
(dated 3/6)
Re transmission by wire of advances..
Tenor of press comments on Minister
Matsuoka's visit to Europe,
(to the Minister #36)
(dated 3/14)
To the CG 1/7, to
the TS 1/7.
To the CG 1/18, to
the TS 1/18.
To the CG 129, to
the TS 1/30.
To the CG 2/1, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CG 2/4, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CG 2/4, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CG 2/15, to
the TS 2/17.
To the CG 2/26, to
the TS 2/26.
To the CO 3/11, to
the TS 3/13.
To the CG 3/12, to
the TS 3/13.
To the CG 3/11, to
the TS 3/12.
To the CG 3/12, to
the TS 3/13.
To the CG 3/13, to
the TS 3/13.
To the CO 3/13, to
the TS 3/13.
To the CG 3/14, to
the TS 3/17.
To the CO 3/14, to
the TS 3/17.
To the CG 3/15, to
the TS 3/17.
To the CG 3/19, to
the TS 3/19.
1106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: THE AMBASSADOR— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
31-RYAKU-YUGO
33-RYAKU-yU
24-YUGO
[16] 33-ANGO
25-ANGO-YU
35-RYAKUGO
32-ANGO --.
36-ANGO_
37-ANGO
38-ANGO
GOGAI-A (outside of
eode-A).
41/RYAKUQO
42-ANGO
52(5?)-B
24-A
44-RYAKUGO
[17] 30-RYAKU-YU
GO.
KETSU-
RYAKU-
YUGO
46-RYAKUGO_
45-ANGO
37-RYAKU-YU-GO.
48-ANGO
49-ANGO
52-ANGO
File
No.
118
121
129
130
133
136
137
138
140, 141
142, 143
146
155
161
165
166
171
176
177
178
Date
Rec'd
59-RYAKU-YU-GO.
[18] 42-RYAKU-YU-
GO.
56-RYAKUGO
43-AN-YU-GO.
183, 184
(215)
3/24
3/26
4/2
4/2
4/3
4/4
4/4
4/4
4/5
4/5
4/7
4/14
4/16
4/18
4/9
4/22
4/21
4/21
4/26
4/26
4/27
4/30
185, 186
187, 188
4/30
193
5/5
202
5/19
204
5/19
205
5/19
203
5/19
Re regulations for survey of Japanese
assets abroad.
(from the Minister GO-#702)
Comments on the President's speech,
(to the Minister #39)
(dated 3/19)
Re text of report of "LOW REY"
(to the Minister #41)
(dated 3/24)
Re movements of the U. S. Fleet
(to the Minister #46)
Re reporting of limits of aid to Britain. _
(dated 3/28)
Re change of Minister : 1
(from the Minister #786)
Re informative telegrams
(from the Minister #758)
Re method of new use of TSUGO
(HAGI).
(from the Minister GO-#779)
(*TSUGO means code type TSU)
Greater East Asia reports
(from the Minister GO-#759)
Information on Europe and America..
(from the Minister OO-#760)
Re indicator words and number of
words of telegram(s).
Re signing of the neutrality pact be-
tween Russia and Japan,
(from the Minister GO-#833)
Re continuation of voyage of Panama-
nian vessel to Japan,
(to the Minister #60)
Re granting of holiday on Grand Fes-
tival of Yasukuni Shrine,
(from the Ambassador GO-#72).
Movements of U. S. Fleet-
(to the Minister #61)
Re return to Japan of Foreign Minister
Matsuoka, etc.
(from the Minister GO-#927)
Tenor of the press .
(to the ]\Ti)iister #55)
(dated 4/12)
Tenor of press concerning conclusion
of Russo-Japanese neutrality pact.
(to the I\Tinister #57)
(dated 4/15)
Re completion of ratification of Russo-
Japanese neutrality pact.
Re intelligence strategy versus the
V. S.
(from the Ambassador GO-#82)
(from the :\'inistor #180)
Tenor of press in regard to conclusion
of Russo-Japanese neutrality pact,
(dated 4/21)
Greater East Asia reports
NI-(l);NI-(2)
(from the Minister GO-#9eO)
Second reports from Europe and
America,
(from the Minister GO-#959)
Re seizure of German(s) on board
An-erican ship by British warship,
(to the Minister #69)
(dated 5/2)
Tenor of press concerning U. S. aid to
Britain and American-Japanese
relatiojis.
(to the Afinistcr #70)
(dated 5/0)
Re strikes in raimitions factories.
(dated 5/13).
Re enforcement of trade control regu-
lations,
(from the Ambassador — Minis-
ter?—GO-#1064).
Re introduction of bill to control for-
eign language schools,
(to the Minister #74)
(dated 5/14)
Disposition
To the CG 3/24, to
the TS 3/24.
To the CG 3/26, to
the TS 3/27.
To the CG 4/2, to
the TS 4/3.
To the CG 4/2, to the
TS 4/3.
To the CG 4/3, to the
TS 4/4.
To the CG 4/4, to the
TS 4/5.
To the CG 4/4, to the'
TS 4/5.
To the CG 4/5, to the
TS 4/5.
To the CG 4/7, to the
TS 4/8.
To the CG 4/7, to the
TS 4/8.
To the CG 4/8, to the
TS 4/8.
To the CG 4/14, to
the TS 4/15.
To the CG 4/17, to
the TS 4/19.
To the CG 4/18, to
the TS 4/19.
To the CO 4/19, to
the TS 4/21.
To the CO 4/22, to
the TS 4/22.
To the CG 4/22, to
the TS 4/23.
To the CG 4/22, to
the TS 4/23.
To the CG 4/26, to
the TS 4/26.
To the CG 4/26, to
the TS 4/28.
To the CO 4/27, to
the TS 4/28.
To the CG 5/1, to
the TS 5/2.
To the CG 5/2, to
the TS 5/3.
To the CG 5/6, to
the TS 5/7.
To the CG 5/19, to
the TS 5/19.
To the CG 5/19, to
the TS 5/19.
To the CG 5/19, to
the TS 9/20.
To the CG 5/21, to
the TS 5/22.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
FROM: THE AMBASSADOR— Continued
1107
Telegram No. & Code
Type
fil-ANQO 215,217
221, 216
File
No.
Date
Eec'd
60-ANGO
62-ANGO
07-ANGO
44-RYAKU-yU-GO-
fiS-ANGO
51-R YAKU-YU-G O.
19] 69-ANGO...-
70-ANGO
6.3-ryak:u-yu-go.
72-ANGO
74-ANGO
79-RYAKUGO
77-ANGO
Sl-ANGC.
83-RYAKUQO
76-RYAKUGO
[SO] 78-ANGO
84-ANGO -.
80-ANOO
82-ANGO
55-RYAKU-YU-G0_
SS-RYAKUGO
89-ryae:uqo
qo-ryakugo
(■iK-AN(iO
218,219
220.
222
239, 240
236
241
248
251, 252.
253
255
257(8)
260
2G8
269
271
274
275
273
2S1
276
272
283
285
286
287
5/27
5/27
5/27
6/4
6/4
6/4
6/4
6/10
6/11
6/12
6/16
6/17
6/23
6/23
6/23
6/23
6/23
6/21
6/25
6/23
6/23
6/26
Contents
6/27
6/27
6/28
79716 --4«- Ex. 140, vol. 2-
Third reports from Europe
(from the Minister GO-#1125)
(dated 5/26)
Greater East Asia reports
(from the Minister #1124)
(dated 5/26) •
Movements of U. S. warships and
ships,
(to the Minister ?S!84)
Re introduction of bill to regulate for-
eign language schools,
(to the Minister #90)
Re function of the export control
bureau,
(to the Minister #78)
(dated 5/20)
Re receipt transit, degree of reliability
of intelligence telegrams,
(from the Ambassador G0-#116)
(from the Minister #1480)
Tenor of the press in regard to the
President's speech.
(to the Minister #88)
(dated'5/29)
Re mutual exemption of passport visa
fees between Japan and Italy,
(from the ]Minister GO-#1302)
Re suspension of use of temporary
terms in naval code book S, and
formulation of temporary termi-
nology #0.
(from the Minister GO-#1217)
Re requisitioning of U. S. ships
(to the Minister #92)
(dated 6/5)
Re enrollment of class #2 of the HEI-
SHIKAN (a school?)
(from the Minister #65)
Re prohibition of Germans from
leaving the country,
(to the Ambassador #24)
Re outbreak of V7ar between Germany
and Russia.
(from the Minister GO-#1293)
Re transmitted telegram #28
(freezing of foreign capital)
(Ambassador #29)
Re press guidance policy in regard to
the Russo-German War.
(from the Minister GO-#1293)
Re regulations relative to the applica-
tion of the foreign capital freeze order,
(to the Ambassador #30)
Ditto
(to the Ambassador #28)
Re inspection of mail matter
(to the Minister #104)
Re form of coded radiogram of direc-
tor (?).
(from the Minister GO-#1308)
Re change of ANGO code
(cryptic code)
(from the Minister GO-#1295)
Ditto...
(from the Minister CP-#1305)
Re tenor of press in reeard to the inci-
dent of the "ROBIN MOOR",
(to the Minister #100)
Re strikes of machinists in ship-
building industries in San Fran-
cisco,
(to the ^Minister #108)
Re reply telegram concerning total
amount of uncollected loans,
(from the Minister GO-#1329)
Re according of conveniences to
HARUJI TAHARA, director of
the Overseas Japanese Central
Society,
(from the Minister #71)
Re handling of visa for the Britisli .
(■from the TVlinister GO #1161)
(dated fi/22)
-29
Disposition
To the CG 5/27, to
the TS 5/28.
To the CG 5/27, to
the TS 5/28.
To the CG 5/28, to
the TS 5/28.
To the CG 6/5, to the
TS 6/7.
To the CG 6/5, to the
TS 6/6.
To the CG 6/6, to the
TS 6/6.
To the CG 6/6, to the
TS 6/6.
To the CG 6/10, to
the TS 6/10.
To the CG 6/1' to
the TS 6/13.
To the CG 6/13, to
the TS 6/13.
To the CG 6/16, to
the TS 6/17.
To the CG 6/17, to
the TS 6/18.
To the CG 6/23, to
the TS 6/23.
To the CG 6/23, to
the TS 6/23.
To the CG 6/23, to
the TS 6/23.
To the CG 6/24, to
the TS 6/24.
To the CG 6/24, to
the TS 6/24.
To the CG 6/25, to
the TS 6/26.
To the CG 6/25, to
the TS 6/26.
To the CG 6/25. to
the TS 6/26.
To the CG 6/25, to
the TS 6/26.
To the CO 6/26, to
the TS 6/27.
To the CG 6/27, to
the TS 6/27.
To the CO 6/27, to
the TS 6/27.
To the CO 6/27, to
the TS 6/30.
To the CO 6/30, (r
the TS t>/3n.
1108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: THE AMBASSADOR— Conttnued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
292, 293
294
295
6/28
6/30
303
7/3
304
7/5
308
7/9
307
7/8
310
7/9
316
7/10
317
7/10
323
7/12
318
7/11
319
7/11
328
7/14
333
7/16
337
7/18
338
7/18
340
7/19
341
7/19
342
7/19
243
7/19
339
7/19
345
7/21
354
7/24
361
7/25
365
7/25
362
7/24
370
7/25
390
7/29
375
7/26
397
7/26
407, 4()S
7/29
Contents
Disposition
91-ANGO
8G-EYAKU-YU-G0
im 94-ANGO...
6-C - ..-
7-B
95-ANOtO
8-A
9-A
97-ANGO --..
lOO-ANGO
98-ANGO
99-ANGO
101-ANGO.-
102-HEIGO.-..
[SH] 103-HEIGO..
104-ANGO .-
107-HEIGO
108-HEIGO
109-ANGO
110-ANGO_.
57-YUQO
111-RYAKUGO
113-ANGO....
]15-ANG0
118-ANGO
114-ANGO
116-ANGO
[2S] 121-ANGO...
120-AKGO
122-ANGO
121-ANGO
Re ANGO code (cryptic code)
(from the Minister #1166)
Outbrealc of the Russo-German war
and the tenor of the press.
Cto the Minister #105')
Re survey of number of visa granted
for transit through Japan,
(from the Minister GO-#1381)
Re arrival in port of Ambassador
SHIQEMITSU.
Re giving a mess^e to courier TAKI
(orTAGI).
Greater East Asia reports (re visit to
Japan by Wang Chin-wei and
party).
(from the Minister GO-#1406)
Re survev of assets of Japanese residing
in U. S.
Re transferring of telegram pertaining
to movements of U. S. Fleet.
U. S. Navy
(to the Minister #122)
Re freezing of Japanese credits in the
U.S.
Re steps for preparation for emergency
situation,
(from the Minister GO-#1366)
Re before and after measures on finan-
cial matters to be taken in case of
emergency.
(from the Minister GO-#1367)
Re movements of U. S. Fleet
(to the minister #123)
Re resienation en bloc of the KO-
NOYE Cabinet. .
(from the Minister GO-#1526)
Re issuance of Imperial command to
Premier KONOYE to form another
cabinet,
(from the Minister GO-#1539)
Re rigidifying of supervision of tele-
graph and telephone,
(from the Minister GO-#1525)
Re appointment of Foreign Minister
TOYOTA,
(from the Minister GO-#1550)
Re installation of new cabinet with
ceremony,
(from the Minister GO-#1551)
Ee Cabinet shift and Japanese foreign
policy,
(from the Minister GO-#1560)
Re correction in telegram...
(from the Minister GOGAI)
Tenor of press..
(to the Minister #119)
Political change in Japan and the tenor
of the press.
Re Tatuta Maru
(to the Minister #133)
Re controlling of Japanese shipping
(from the Minister #93)
Re wiring instructions to Japanese
vessel (s) .
(to the"Minister?-#138)
ReTAKIZO MATSUMOTO
(from the Minister?-#92)
Re situation of entrance into and de-
parture from port of Japanese ships,
(to the Minister #135)
Re entrance of Japanese vessels into
American ports,
(to the Minister #140)
Re arrival in Hawaii of Undersecretary
of the Navv "FORREST AL."
(to the Minister #139)
Re developments up to conclusion of
arrangements foj' mutual defense of
French Indo-China.
(from the Minister GO-#l.';98)
■Re war situation.
(from the Minister GO-#1642)
To the CG 6/30, to
the TS 6/30.
To the CG 6/30, to
the TS 7/2.
To the CG 7/4, to the
TS 7/3.
To the CG 7/5, to the
TS 7/7.
To the CG 7/9, to the
TS 7/10.
To the CG 7/9, to the
TS 7/10.
to
to
To the CG 7/ia
the TS 7/10.
To the CG 7/10,
the TS 7/10.
To the CG 7A0, to
the TS 7/14.
To the CG 7/12, to
the TS 7/14.
To the CG 7/12, to
the TS 7/15.
To the CO 7/12, to
the TS 7/15.
To the CG 7/14, to
the TS 7/16.
To the CG 7/17, to
the TS.7/17.
To the CG 7/18, to
the TS 7/18.
To the CG 7/18, to
the TS 7/21.
To the CG 7/19, to
the TS 7/21.
To the CG 7/19, to
the TS 7/21.
To the CG 7/19, to
the TS 7/21.
To the CG 7/19, to
the TS 7/21.
To thiB CG 7/19, to
the TS 7/21.
To the CG 7/21, to
the TS 7/22.
To the CG 7/24, to
the TS 7/25.
To the CG 7/25, to
the TS 7/25.
To the CO 7/25, to
the TS 7/25.
TotheCG 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the CG 7/29, to
the TS 7/30.
To the CO 7/29, to
tlie TS 7/30.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
FSOM: THE AMBASSADOR— Continued
1109
128-HEIGO
127-HEiaO
131-ANQO
135-RYAKUaO
136-ANGO
138-RYAKUQO _.
137-HEIGO
m] 132-GO-RYAKU.
14(>-ANG0 __..
143-ANGO
146-ANGO..
144-ANGO..
H8-ANG0 .
153-ANGO..
154-ANGO..
lo8-HEIGO_
159-ANGG..
412
413
433
434
441
442
443
439
59-RYAKU-YU-GO.
[i6] 164-ANQO...
60-YU-aO-RYAKU.
174-RYAKUGO
Ift-A
bl-AN-YU-GO
62-AN-YU-QO
KETSU-A !
191-ANGO
10-G (U)
Id4-ANG0 _.
12-B..
7/30
7/30
8/1
8/2
8/3
8/4
8/4
8/4
445
8/4
447
8/4
452
8/5
453,454
S/6
458
8/8
464
8/9
465
8/9
472
8/15
473
8/11
478
8/15
479,480
8/18
489
8/23
493
8/25
5U
9/2
514
9/4
615
9/4
517
9/5
518
9/6
522
9/8
523
9/8
526
9/10
Summary of the regulations control-
ling trade with foreigners.
(Minister GO-#1657)
Re enactment of regulations control-
ling trade connected with foreigners,
(from the Minister 00-#1656)
Re postponement of arrival in port of
Asama Maru.
(to the Minister #148)
Re seizure of goods on TATUTA
MARU.
Re the third KOKURA MARU
(to the Minister #152)
Re departure from San Francisco of
the TATUTA MARU.
(to the Minister #153)
Re enactment of regulations control-
ling trade connected with foreigners,
(from the Minister GO-#1732)
Re manner of enforcement of the freeze
order,
(to the Minister #151)
Re TATUTA MARU
(to the Minister #154)
Re method of investigation of bank
examiner,
(to the Minister #157)
Re movements of U. S. warships
(to the Minister #159)
Re naval code book_.-
(from the Minister GO-#1738)
Re decrease of telegraphic matter and
shortening of the contents.
(from the Minister GO-#1766)
Re British battleship "WARSPITE".
(from the Minister #108)
Re cash held in this Consulate,..
(from the Minister GO-#1781)
Re enactment of regulations control-
ling trade connected with foreigners,
(from the Minister GO-#1818)
Re amendment of regulations pertain-
ing to entry into and sojourn in
country by foreigners,
(from the Minister GO-#1819)
Drift of argument regarding Japan-
U. S. relations,
(to the Minister #164)
(dated 8/12)
Re condition of the Japanese residents
in San Francisco.
Tenor of press in regard to joint decla-
ration by Britain and the U. S.
(to the Minister #168)
(dated 8/15)
Re revision of passport visas and pas-
sage certification regulations,
(from the Minister GO-#1820)
Re arrival at post of newly-appointed
"Bishop SWEENEY" of the
"Catholic" parish.
Re method of enforcement of the freeze
order,
(to the Minister #181)
(dated 8/25)
Re treatment of Japanese residing in
U. S. bv America,
(to the Minister #182)
(dated 8/25)
Movements of U. S. warships.
(to the Minister #195)
Re applicants for class #2 of the
HEISHIKAN (a school?)
Re enactment of regulations control-
ling trade connected with foreigners,
(from the Minister GO-#1656)
Re applicants for class #2 of HEISHI-
KAN (a school?)
(to the Minister #200)
Re stopping in port of courier KUGA..
To the CG 7/30, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 7/30, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 8/2, to
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/2, to
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/4, to
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/4, to
the TS 8/6.
To the CG 8/4, to
the TS 8/6.
To the CG 8/4, to the
TS 8/6.
To the CG 8/4, to the
TS 8/6.
To the CG 8/4, to the
TS 8/6.
To the CG 8/5, to the
TS 8/8
To the c'g 8/7, to the
TS 8/8
To the CG 8/8, to the
TS 8/9.
To the CG 8/9, to the
TS8/11.
To the CG 8/9, to the
TS 8/11.
To the CG 8/15, to:
the TS 8/20.
To the CG 8/16, to
the TS 8/18.
To the CG 8/1 G, to
the TS 8/20.
To the CG 8/18.
To the CG 8/23, to
the TS 8/27.
To the CO 8/26, to
the TS 8/27.
To the CG 9/2, to
the TS 9/5.
To the CG 9/4, to
the TS 9/5.
To the CO 9/4, to
the TS 9/5.
To the CG 9/5, to
the TS 9/8.
To the CG 9/6, to
the TS 9/8.
To tlie CG 9/8, to
the TS 9/9.
To the CG 9/9, to
the TS 9/9.
To the CG 9/10, to
the TS 9/10.
1110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: THE AMBASSADOR— Continued
Telegram TSTo. & Code
Type
[561 195-ANGO
20(>-ANGO - ■
C3-YU-G0-RYAKU._..
202-ANaO
218-ANGO
20&-ANGO
211-ANGO
295-ANGO
216-ANGO
66-RYAKU-YU-GO-_.
m] 220-AN-TOKU-
GO.
222-ANGO
214-GO-AN
225-RYAKUGO.
22&-HEIGO-
228-ANGO..
File
No.
230-ANGO
232-RYAKUQO.
234-ANGO.
237-ANGO
238-ANGO
239-ANGO
[28] (7)-A12.
241-HEIGO---.
242-HEIGO
243-RYAKUGO.
245-HEIQO
24&-RYAKUGO.
527
537
538
545
549
550
555, 556
566
570
577
581
584
585
589
590
592
593, 594
595, 596
603
614, 620
621
623
624
627, 626
633
634
637
638
Date
Rec'd
9/13
9/15
9/17
9/20
9/20
9/22
9/26
9/26
9/29
10/1
10/2
10/9
10/4
10/7
lC/7
10/8
10/10
10/13
10/14
10/15
10/15
10/16
10/16
10/16
10/16
10/17
10/17
Contents
Re forwarding of mail matter between
Japan and IJ. S.
(to the Minister #205)
Movements of U. S. warships and
ships,
(to the Minister #211)
Tenor of press in regard to the "mes-
sage" to the President from Premier
Konoye.
(to the Minister #190)
(dated 8/30)
Re transmission of letters (documents,
records, or notes),
(to the Minister #214)
Japan-U. S. ship communication
problem,
(from the Minister #126)
Re revision in handling of urgent tele-
grams,
(from the Minister GO-#2040)
Japan-U. S. ship communication
problem.
(to the Minister #220)
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(from the Minister #127)
Re carrying out of diplomatic policy.-.
(from the Minister GO-#2077)
Re expansion of Far Eastern aerial
route by Pan-American Airways,
(to the Minister #224)
Re inspection of baggage, etc., when
leaving country,
(from the Minister #406)
Re movements of U. S. warships
(to the Minister #230)
Re movements of U. S. warships
(to the Minister #231)
Re official announcement of tempor-
arv postal control order,
(from the Minister GO-#2121)
Re special festival of the Yasukrmi
Shrine,
(from the Minister GO-#2129)
Re distribution of propaganda "pam-
phlets" with aim to alienate Japan
from Germany.
(to the Minister #234)
Greater East Asia reports
(from the Minister GO-#2130)
Presidential message regarding amend-
ment of the neutrality act, and
tenor of press regarding Japan-U.
A. negotiations,
(to the Minister #235)
Re problem of Japan-America ship
communication,
(from the Minister #136)
Ditto
(to the Minister #237)
Re sailing of the TATUTA MARU..
(from the Minister #139)
Re problem of Japan-American ship
communication.
Problem of Japan-America ship com-
munication,
(from the Minister, to vaiious
Consulates, GO-#237)
Re resignation en masse of KONOYE
Cabinet,
(from the Minister GO-#2190)
Ditto
(from the Minister GO-#2191)
Re number of passengers on TATUTA
MARU.
(from the Minister #142)
Re issuance of Imperial command (for
formation of Cabinet?) to War Min-
ister TOJO.
(from the Minister (GO-#2195)
Re withdrawal of Ambassador(s) to
the Soviet Union from Moscow,
(from the Minister QO-#2149)
Disi)osition
To the CG 9/12, to
the TS 9/15.
To the CG 9/13, to
the TS 9/15.
To the CO 9/15, to
the TS 9/16.
To the CO 9/18, to
the TS 9/18.
To the CO 9/21, to
the TS 9/23.
To the CG 9/22, to
the TS 9/24.
To the CG 9/23, to
the TS 9/24.
To the CG 9/26, to
the TS 9/30.
To the CG 9/28, to
the TS 9/30.
To the CG 9/29, to
the TS 10/2.
To the CG 10/1, to
the TS 10/2.
To the CG 10/2, to
the TS 10/4.
To the CO 10/3, to
the TS 10/4.
To the CG 10/6, to
the TS 10/6.
To the CG 10/7, to
the TS 10/8.
To the CG 10/8, to
the TS 10/8.
To the CG 10/8, to
the TS 10/9.
To the CG 10/11, to
the TS 10/13.
To the CG 10/14, to
the TS 10/15.
To the CG 10/15, to
the TS 10/15.
To the CG 10/15, to
the TS 10/15.
To the CO 10/16, to
the TS 10/17.
To the CO 10/16, to
the TS 10/17.
To the CG 10/17, to
the TS 10/17.
To the CG 10/17, to
the TS 10/17.
To the CG 10/17, to
the TS 10/16.
To the CG 10/17, to
the TS 10/17.
To the CG 10/17, to
the TS 10/19.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
FROM: THE AMBASSADOR— Continued
1111
Telegram No. & Code
Type
252-nEIGO
253-HEIGO
249-ANGO
245-ANGO
247-ANGO
[23] 2.')5-ANGO
258-ANGO
259-ANGO
261-ANGO
25--ANGO
260-ANGO
262-ANGO
13-B
264-ANGO
265-ANGO
2G&-ANG0
267-ANGO
[SO] 268-AN-(l)-aO
68-RYAKU-YU-GO...
273-RYAKUGO
275-ANGO
274-ANGO-
278-AMGO.
280-ANGO-
281-ANGO_
69-RYAKU-YU-GO.
283-ANGO
U-A
28i-ANGO---
[5/] 285-ANQO.
287-ANGO
292-ANGO
File
No.
640
fi47
661
652
649-650
658
603. 664
665
668
670
6C6
669
670
677
678
684
687
095
697
701
716
717, 718
719
729
732
738
743
740
752
755
707, 7G8
769, 766
773
Date
Rec'd
10/18
10/17
10/17
10/17
10/20
10/21
10/21
10/21
10/22
10/21
10/22
10/23
10/24
10/24
10/26
10/27
10/29
11/2
11/2
11/2
11/5
11/7
11/8
11/10
11/10
11/12
11/12
11/12
11/12
11/14
Contents
Re installation of Minister TOGO...
(from the Minister GO-#2196)
Re completed selection of members of
the TOJO Cabinet.
(from the Minister QO-#2197)
Japan-America ship communication
problem.
Ditto -
(to the Minister #245)
Japan-America ship communication
problem,
(from the Minister #145)
Ditto
(from the Minister #146)
Ditto
(from the Minister #150)
Ditto
(to the Minister #252)
Re method of interpreting telegrams..
(to the Ambassador #335)
Japan-America ship communication
problem,
(to the Ambassador #72)
Re carrying of American dollar bills...
(from the Ambassador GO-#310)
Re problem of ship communication
between Japan and U. S.
(to the Minister #254)
Re passengers boarding TAIYO
MARU.
Japan-America ship communication
problem,
(to the Minister #255)
Re going to the U. S. of members of
the Chungking air force,
(to the Minister #258)
Re problem of ship communication
between Japan and U. S.
(from the Minister #154)
Re progress of warship construction,
(to the Minister #260)
Re problem of ship communication
between Japan and U. S.
(from the Minister #159)
Tenor of press on change of Cabinet...
(to the Minister #249)
Re departure of TATUTA MARU...
(to the Minister #269)
Re mail matter to be loaded on
TATUTA MARU.
(to the Minister #201).
Problem of ship communication be-
tween Japan and U. S.
(to the Minister #200)
Re departure of British cruiser
(to the Minister #278)
Re simplifying of expatriation
(to the" Minister #280)
Re problem of ship communication
between Japan and U. S.
(to the Minister #282)
Tenor of press on trip to U. S. by
Ambassador KURUSU.
(to the Minister #280)
Problem of ship communication be-
tween Japan and U. S.
(to the Minister #287)
Re transmission of message to Am-
bassador KURUSU.
(from the Minister #168)
Re problem of ship communication
between Japan and U.S.
(from the Minister #109)
Greater East Asia report #5
(from tlio Minister GO-#2292)
European'and American reports #5 —
(from' the Minister GO-#2291)
Problem of ship communication be-
tween Japan and U. S.
(to the Minister #292)
Disposition
To tho CG 10/18, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CO 10/18, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/18, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/18, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CO 10/18, to
the TS 10/21.
to the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/22.
To tho CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/22.
To the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/22, to
the TS 10/22.
To the CG 10/22, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/22, to
the TS 10/24.
To the CO 10/23, to
the TS 10/24.
To the CG 10/23, to
the TS 10/24.
To the CG 10/25, to
the TS 10y27.
To the CO 10/25, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 10/27, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 10/27, to
the TS 10/28.
To the CG 10/29, to
the TS 10/30.
To the CG 11/2, to
the TS 11/4.
To the CG 11/2, to
the TS 11/4.
To the CG 11/2, to
the TS 11/4.
To the CG 11/5, to
the TS 11/7.
To the CO 11/7, to
the TS 11/10.
To the CG 11/S. to
the TS 11/11.
To the CG 11/10, to
the TS 11/12.
To the CO 11/10, to
the TS 11/10.
To the CO 11/10, to
the TS 11/12.
To the CO 11/14, to
theTS 11/15.
To the CG 11/12, to
theTSn/17.
To the CO 11/12, to
the TS 11/15.
To the CG 11/15, to
the TS 11/17.
1112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: THE AMBASSADOR— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
290-ANaO -.
291-ANGO
GOOAI-A
297-ANaO
298-ANGO ....
302-RYAK:UGO-...
305-HEIGO .-
[.?«] 303-ANGO..
71-RYAKU-YU-GO
307-ANGO
SIO-ANGO
315-ANGO
313-ANGO
318-ANQO_
321-RYAKUGO
70-RYAKU-YU-GO
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
774, 776
11/13
772
11/13
780
11/17
791
11/19
794
11/19
805
11/25
811
11/26
812
11/25
813
11/26
818-821
11/27
829
11/28
837
11/29
833
11/28
847
12/1
855
12/3
860
12/5
Contents
Condition of progress of warship con-
struction and national defense plans,
(to tlie Minister #289)
Re decision on basic plans for adjust-
ment of relations between Japan and
U.S.
(from the Minister QO-#2313)
Re interpretation of telegram(s).
Re overseas broadcast in case of crisis
in Japan's foreign policy,
(from the Minister GO-#2353)
Re movements of British warships
(to the Minister #300)
Re extension of time of anti-Comintern
pact,
(from the Minister QO-#2389)
Re demise of Princess YOSHIKO,
wife of the deceased Prince KAYA.
(from the Minister aO-#2406)
Re Japanese employed locally and
second generation employes not on
regular staff,
(to the Minister #304)
Re severance of diplomatic relations
with Japan by "IRAQ."
(from the Ambassador #1181)
(dated 11/24)
Re method of telegraphing in connec-
tion with the situation,
(from the Minister GO-#2409)
Re Japan-America negotiations.
(from the Minister 00-#2416)
Re reply telegram in regard to foreign
merchantmen and warships,
(from the Minister QO-#2431)
Re vessels requisitioned by the U. S.
Army and the Navy.
(to the Minister #317)
Re arrival and departure and move-
ments of warships,
(to the Minister #316)
Re number of attendants of families of
members of the Consulate wishing
to board the TATUTA MARU.
Tenor of press
(dated 11/19)
Disposition
To the CO 11/15, to
the TS 11/17.
To the CG 11/13, to
the TS 11/19.
To the CO 11/17, to
the TS 11/19.
To the CG 11/20, to
the TS 11/21.
To the CG 11/20, to
the TS 11/24.
To the CG 11/25, to
the TS 11/25.
To the CG 11/26, to
the TS 11/26.
To the CO 11/25, to
the TS 11/25.
To the CG 11/26, to
the TS 11/28.
To the CG 11/27, to
the TS 11/28.
To the CO 11/28, to
the TS 11/28.
To the CG 11/29, to
the TS 12/1.
To the CO 11/28, to
the TS 12/1.
To the CG 12/2, to
the TS 12/2.
To the CO 12/3, to
the TS 12/4.
To the CG 12/5, to
the TS 12/6.
ISS]
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO
218-yu-go-ryaku.
2-yu-go-ryak:u...
1-B .
4-RYAKUGO
5-AN-YU-GO
2-A
2-ryak:u-yu-go...
3-C
4-.RYAKU-YU-G0...
2
1/6
11
1/13
14
1/14
15
1/15
16
1/16
22
1/22
43
1/30
44
1/31
47
2A
Tenor of American press
(to the Minister #312)
(dated 12/20)
Re alien registration.
(to the Ambassador #1)
(dated 1/7)
Re tour of the country by the "Subaru
Show" troupe,
(dated 1/16)
Re settling on wearing of every day
clothes for various fimctions.
(from the Ambassador G0-#1)
(from the Minister G0-#68)
Re IJ. S. warships
(to the Minister #3)
(dated 1/6)
Re method of leaving country of Amer-
ican citizens of Japanese parentage,
(to the Muiister #11)
Re refusal of American freighters to be
chartered by Russia,
(to the Minister #10)
(dated 1/21)
Re holding of reception for Ambassa-
dor NOMURA m San Francisco.
Tenor of press in regard to the Minis-
ter's speech in the Diet,
(to the Mmister #13)
(dated 1/24)
To the CG 1/8, to the
TS 1/9.
To the CO 1/13, to
the TS 1/14.
To the CG 1/14, to
the TS 1/15.
To the CG 1/15, to
the TS 1/15.
To the CO 1/16, to
the TS 1/17.
To the CG 1/22, to
the TS 1/23.
To the CG 1/30, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CG 1/31, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CG 2/3, to the
TS 2/4,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
FjaOM: BAN FRANCISCO— Continued
1113
Telegram No. & Code
Type
\S4] 7-ANQO.
-HEI-YU-QO..
-RYAKU-YU-
lO-ANQO
9-ANG0_
10-AN-YU-aO_
ll-AN-YU-OO.
File
No.
53
13-ANOO.
[36] 14-RYAKU-YU-
GO
14-ANQO
le-ANQO
17-A
1&-RYAKU-YU-O0....
IS-ANQO...
19-RYAKUaO
19-RYAKU-YU-GO....
20-RYAKU-YU-QO
2-fRYAKU-YU-GO
2J-A.
[30] 24
4-B
n-AN-YU-QO
55-ANQO
64
Date
Ree'd
2/6
2/7
2/10
65
2/10
71
2/15
72
2/17
74
2/20
75,76
2/21
77
2/21
81
2/26
88
3/6
87
3/6
97
3/10
98
3/10
103
3/12
115
3/19
3/27
Contents
Re request for expenses for develop-
ment of intelligence,
(from the Ambassador G0-#15)
(from the Minister #45)
Re mediation in border controversy
between Thailand and French Indo-
Cbina.
(from the Minister GO-#155)
(dated 1/25)
Ditto ,
(from the Minister GO-#154)
(dated 1/25)
Re policy of intelligence work against
the U. S.
(from the Ambassador G0-#13)
(from the Minister #43)
Main points concerning establishment
of intelligence organ against the
U.S.
(from the Ambassador G0-#14)
(from the Minister #44)
Re careful selection of matters to be
telegraphed and making concise the
wording of the telegrams,
(from the Ambassador KETSU)
(from the Minister aO-#185)
(dated 1/30)
Re sending by wire of expenses for the
development of intelligence.
(from the Minister QO-#138)
(dated 1/23)
Re alteration of method for using
temporary terminology in naval
code book S.
(from the Minister GO -#242)
Tenor of press in regard to Minister's
speech in the Diet,
(to the Minister #16)
Re guiding of resident Japanese
(from the Minister #19)
Press accounts regarding the Far
Eastern situation,
(from the Minister GO-jjiSlO)
Re handling of visa for foreigners visit-
ing Japan.
(from the Minister QO-#300)
Tenor of press on arrival of Ambassa-
dor NOMURA at his post,
(to the Minister #22)
(dated 2/10)
Re telegraphic code
(from the Minister GO-#367)
Re refraining from making official tours
within the year,
(from the Ambassador KET-
SUGO)
(from the Minister GO-#365)
Re movements of U. S. Fleet
(to the Minister #24)
(dated 2/15)
Tenor of press in regard to Japan's
southward move question,
(to the Minister #27)
(dated 2/21)
Re the "embargo" problem
(dated 2/24)
Re disposition of secret documents
(from the Minister GO-#584)
Re passport visa fees
(from the Ambassador GO-#30)
(from the Minister QO-#555)
Re returning of advances
(to San Francisco #4)
Re investigation of the trend of the
U.S.
(from the Minister #112)
(dated 3/8)
Re reporting of bounds of aid to
Britain,
(from the Minister #111)
Disposition
To the CG 2/4, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CO 2/5, to
the TS 2/6.
To the CG 2/5, to
the TS 2/6.
To the CO 2/5, to
the TS 2/6.
To the CG 2/5, to
the TS 2/6.
To the CO 2/6, to
the TS 2/7.
To the CO 2/6, to
the TS 2/7.
To the CG 2/7, to
the TS 2/10.
To the CG 2/10, to
the TS 2/12.
To the CO 2/10, to
the TS 2/12.
To the CG 2/15, to
the TS 2/17.
To the CG 2/17, to
the TS 2/18.
To the CG 2/20 to
the TS 2/24.
To the CG 2/21, to
the TS 2/24.
To the CO 2/21, to
the TS 2/24.
To the CG 2/26, to
the TS 2/27.
To the CG 3/6, to
the TS 3/7.
To the CG 3/6, to
the TS 3/7.
To the CG 3/10, to
the TS 3/11.
To the CG 3/10, to
the TS 3/11.
To the CG 3/12, to
the TS 3/13.
To the CG 3/19, to
the TS 3/21.
To the CG 3/27, to
the TS 3/28.
1114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
FUe
No.
Date
Rec'd
Contents
Disposition
5-A. .--
128
147
157
175
207, 206
209
212
214
224
229
234
235
2^
245
256
261
262
265
280
277
278,279
288
290
297
298
3/29
4/9
4/16
4/24
5/20
5/20
5/22
5/26
5/28
5/31
6/3
6/4
6/7
6/7
6/13
6/18
6/19
6/20
6/23
6/23
6/23
6/27
6/28
6/30
7/2
Re telegraphic code kept in the Con-
sulate General in "Chicago."
(from Chicago Q0^3)
(to the Minister #8)
Re easy clearance of courier MORI —
Re number of Japanese registered and
number enlisted.
(to the Minister #195)
(dated 4/1)
Re easy clearance of courier MORI
Re issuing of visa for direct transit to
Russian (s).
(from the Minister GO-#2337)
(to Vladivostok and New ^ork
GO-#1086)
Re enforcement of system of sanction-
ing transit export (?) via America,
(to the Minister #275)
(dated 5/7)
Re issuing of visa for direct transit to
Russian (s)
(from the Minister #246)
(to New York and Vladivostock,
GO-#1103)
Re situation in the U. S. as regards the
European war.
(GO-#88)
(dated 5/12)
Re movements of the U. S. Fleet
(to Panama #15)
Re notification of Japanese shipping
in regard to suspension of use of tem-
porary terminology #S.
(dated 5/31)
Re reference to date official messages
were dispatched.
Re enforcement of system of sanction-
ing transit export (?) via U. S.
(to the Minister #288)
(dated 5/20)
Re method of seizure of foreign mer-
chantmen,
(to the Minister #373)
(dated 6/7)
Ditto -
To the CG 3/29,
6-A
To the CG 4/9, to
15-AN-YU-GO
the TS 4/10.
To the CG 4/16, to
7-A
the TS 4/18.
To the CG 4/24, to
96-ANQO -
the TS 4/20.
To the CG 5/20, to
2i-ryak:u-yu-go
[S7] 103-ANGO
22-RYAKU-YU-GO
106-ANGO -
the TS 5/20.
To the CG 5/21, to
the TS 5/22.
To the CG 5/22, to
the TS 5/22.
To the CG 5/26, to
the TS 5/28.
To the CG 5/28, to
114-ANQO
the TS 5/29.
To the CG 6/2, to
8-A -
the TS 6/6.
To the CG 6/3, to the
21-RYAKU-YU-GO
117-RYAKUGO.
TS 6/4.
To the CG 6/4, to the
TS 6/5.
To the CG 6/7, to the
118-RYAKUGO
TS 6/7.
To the CG 6/7, to the
125-ANGO -
(to the Minister #374)
(special telegram)
Re arrival in Japan of Wang Chin-Wei.
(from the Minister #1251)
Re giving strict warning for observance
of secrecy of this Consulate and re-
lated agencies.
Re promulgation of detailed regula-
tions, item 402, pertaining to expa-
triation,
(to the Minister #411)
Re refusal of visa for Meiji University
baseball team,
(to the Minister #413)
Re delivering of message to Com-
mander TATIBANA on Nitta
Maru.
Re Commander TATIBANA
TS 6/9.
To the CG 6/13, to
128-ANQO
TS 6/16.
To the CG 6/18, to
[SS] 132— RYAKUQO.
2-B....
lO-(A) -
the TS 6/18.
To the CG 6/19, to
the TS 6/20.
To the CG 6/20, to
the TS 6/21.
To the CG 6/23, to
11-A
the TS 6/24.
To the CG 6/24, to
12- A
Ditto -
the TS 6/24.
To the CG 6/24, to
144-ANGO
Re regular publications for use in de-
velopment (of intelligence?) and
propaganda.
Re question of closing Japanese Con-
sulates in the U. S.
(to the Minister #437)
Re concentration of sale of British
goods and British-controlled cur-
rency,
(from the Minister GO-#1198)
(dated 6/26)
Re stopping in port of Li. Commander
(or Major) OKADA and Engineer
First Lieuteuant YAM AD A.
the TS 6/26.
To the CG 6/27, to
148-ANGO
the TS 6/30.
To the CG 6/28, to
149-RYAKUGO
the TS 6/30.
To the CG 6/.30, to
142-RYAKUaO-(l)
the TS 7/2.
To the CO 7/2, to
the TS 7/3.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO— Continued
1115
Telegram No. & Code
Type
153-RYAKUaO-(l).
159-ANGO
[39] 158-ANGO,..
26-RYAKU-YU-aO.
165-ANaO ----
ICS-RYAKUGO
I3-A
177-HEIGO. -
178-ANGO --
179-ANGO... ..-
180-aO-RYAKU
183-ANGO.. -.-.
182-RYAK;UG0
UO] 183-HEIGO_
184-HEIGO .-
187-ANGO
189-HEIGO_—
192-(HEI)-GO_
190-(HEI)-GO-
191-(HEI)-G0.
1S5-ANG0
lOfr-RYAKUGO-
188-ANGO
File
No.
193-ANQO
141] 186-GO..
195-RYAKUGO
186-ANGO (2)..
-HEIGO
194-ANGO
299
311
314
309
324
326
335
346
347-349
350
351
355 (359)
356
357, 358
360
363
369
371
372
373
364
376
368
376
366
377
367
378-389
391,392
Date
Rec'd
7/1
7/9
7/9
7/9
7/14
7/15
7/17
7/22
7/22
7/23
7/24
7/24
7/24
7/25
7/25
7/25
7/25
7/25
7/25
7/26
7/25
7/26
7/26
7/26
7/25
Contpnts
7/26
Re gathering of telephone directories
and name directories.
Re returning the Imperial portrait
(from the Minister #481)
Re report of assets of Japanese na-
tionals and commercial firms in the
U. S.
(to the Minister #487)
Re concentration of sale of foreign
goods,
(from the Minister GO-#1276)
Re extension of time limit for report-
ing foreign assets.
Re resending of telegram(s)
Re registration of foreign government
officials and employees.
U. S. attitude towards Japan.,
(to the Minister #548)
Re Consulates on West Coast
(to the Minister #549)
Steps to be taken by U. S. government
in cavse of occupation of French
Indo-China bv Japanese troops,
(to the Minister #551)
Re problem of closure of Consulates. . .
(1) (2)
(to the Minister KETSUGO)
Tenor of press in regard to the French
Indo-China problem,
(to the Minister #561)
Re official announcement of procedure
for overruling assumption(?) of ex-
patriation,
(to the Minister #562)
...?... in regard to public an-
nouncement of retaliatory measures
against Japan by the President,
(to the Minister #568)
Re date of announcement of freeze
order against Japan,
(to the Minister #573)
Re announcement of freeze order
against Japan.
(Minister #576)
Amendment to regulations
(Minister #579)
Writ.
Re freeze order
(Minister #577)
Ditto. Revised Presidential order
(Minister #578)
'Re surveillance of U. S. warships pass-
ing through the Panama Canal,
(to Panama #22)
Re exemption provisions of the freeze
order.
(to the Minister #586)
Re holding of assets of the various
Consulates (and other Japanese
governmental agencies?) in the Em-
bassy,
(to the Minister #575)
Re telegraphic code - _
Re application of the Freeze Order to
Germany and German nationals,
(to the Minister #569)
Gist of the Presidential "statement"
on promulgation of the Freeze Order,
(to the Minister #585)
Re application of the Freeze Order to
German citizens in general,
(to the Minister #569)
General license No. 11
(to the Minister #588)
(Special telegram #11?)
Home policy of Finance Commissioner
NISHIYAMA in regard to freezing
of Japanese credit,
(to the Minister #583)
Disposition
To the CG 7/2, to
the TS 7/3.
To the CO 7/10, to
the TS 7/10.
To the CO 7/10, to
the TS 7/10.
To the CG 7/10, to
the TS 7/10.
To the CG 7/15, to
the TS 7/15.
To the CG 7/15, to
the TS 7/16.
To the CG 7/18, to
the TS 7/18.
To the CG 7/23, to
the TS 7/22.
To the CG 7/23, to
the TS 7/23.
To the CG 7/23, to
the TS 7/24.
To the CG 7/23, to
the TS 7/23.
To the CG 7/24, to
the TS 7/24.
To the CG 7/24, to
the TS 7/25.
To the CG 7/25, to
the TS 7/25.
To the CG 7/25, to
the TS 7/25.
To the CG 7/25, to
the TS 7/25.
To the CG 7/26, to
the TS 7/26.
To the CG 7/25, to
the TS 7/25.
To the CG 7/25, to
the TS 7/26.
To the CG 7/25, to
the TS 7/25.
To the CG 7/25, to
the TS 7/20 (29?).
To the CO 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the CG 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the CG 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the CG 7/26, to
the TS 7/26.
To the CG 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the CG 7/26. to
the TS 7/29.
To the CO 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the CG 7/26. to
the TS 7/29
1116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
Contents
Disposition
198-ANaO.
197-ANGO.
201-ANGO.
200-ANQO-
202-ANGO
US] 205-ANGO.
206-RYAKUGO...
204-ANOO
207-ANGO -.
KETSU-B
201-ANGO.
209-ANGO.
208-ANGO.
214-ANGO
218-ANGO
219-ANGO
KETSU-ANGO.
US] 220-ANGO...
2i2-ANGO
2I5-ANGO-
KETSU-ANGO.
224-ANGO-
233-ANGO
H-A - .
KETSU-A.
-ANGO.
15-C
245-ANGO-.
lU] 16-A.
250-ANGO..
393, 388
399, 400
401, 403
405, 406
410
411
416
418
421
423
255- A NO O.
7/26
7/26
7/28
7/28
7/30
7/30
7/30
7/31
7/31
7/31
426, 427
428
7/31
431
8/1
44?
8/?
437
8/2
430
8/2
436
8/2
435
8/2
438
8/4
444, 446
8/4
448
8/4
461
8/8
462
463
8/9
471
8/13
475, 476
8/16
481
8/18
483
8/18
484
8/19
487,488
8/22
490
8/2.5
Re evacuation oT resident Japanese
(to the Minister #587)
Re moving into French Indo-China
and propagandizing Japan's foreign
policy,
(from the Minister #1587)
Be exit from and entry into port of
shipping,
(to the Minister #593)
Be public opinion in the U. S. asso-
ciated with the Freeze Order,
(to the Minister #590)
Be reply concerning "balance" in
bank of government funds.
Re entry into port of Japanese vessel.,
(to the Minister #613)
Re shipment ,
(to the Minister #616)
Re shipment on Japanese vessels
(to the Minister #661)
Ditto
(to the Minister #619)
Re si)eci{ication of main licensed list
of articles,
(from the Minister #431)
Re counter-measure against the Freeze
Order,
(to the Minister #621)
Re American currency bonds held by
Japanese residing in U. S.
(to the Minister #619)
Re counter-move towards U. S.-Japan
relations
(to the Minister #618)
Re baggage on TATUTA MARU
(to the Minister #630)
Re shipment on Japanese vessels
(to the Alinister #637)
Re oil embargo act
(to the Minister #638)
Re exit from and entry into port of
Japanese shipping,
(to the Minister #632)
ReASAMA MARU
(to the Minister #639)
Re problem of shipment on TATUTA
MARU and HEIAN MARU.
(to the Minister #636)
Re effect of the Freeze Order on
finances of foreign diplomatic estab-
lishments,
(to the Minister #631)
Re problem of shipment on TATUTA
MARU.
(from the Minister #442)
Re oil embargo act
(to the M mister #647)
Re application of the Freeze Order to
diplomatic and consular officials,
(to the Minister #670)
Re evacuation of resident Japanese
(from the Minister #453)
Re reply telegram in regard "balance"
in bank of government funds.
Talks (?) of "MOORE" concerning
observations on the U. S.-Japan
situation.
Re counter-measures towards U. S.-
Japan relations.
(from the M inister #475)
Re forwarding of exequatur from U. S.
President to Cousul-General KITA.
Re allotment of "rumiing expenses"
(to the Minister #712)
Re movements of U. S. warships
Pe U. S. treatment of Japanese nation-
als residing in the U. S.
(from the Minister #489)
Re problem of evacuation of resident
Japanese,
(to the Mioisfpr #742;
To the CG 7/26, to
the TS 7/29.
To the CO 7/26, to
the TS 7/30.
To the CG 7/29, to
the TS 7/30.
To the CG 7/29, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 7/30, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 7/30, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 7/30, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 7/30, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 7/31, to
the TS S/2.
To the CG 7/31, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CG 7/31, to
the TS 7/31.
To the CG 7/31, to
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 7/31, to
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/1, to
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/2, to
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/2, to
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/2, to
the TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/2, to the
TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/2, to the
TS 8/4.
To the CG 8/4, to the
TS 8/6.
To the CO 8/4, to the
TS 8/6.
To the CG 8/4, to the
TS 8/6.
To the CG 8/8, to the
TS 8/9.
To the 8/8, to the
TS 8/11.
To the CG 8/9, to the
TS 8/11.
To the CG 8/13, to
the TS 8/14.
To the CO 6/16, to
the TS 8/18.
To the CG 8/18, to
the TS 8/20.
To the CG 8/19, to
the TS 8/20.
To the CG 8/19, to
the TS 8/21.
To the CO 8/22, to
the TS 8/28.
To the CO 8/26, to
the TS 8/27.
PROCEEDINGS 01'' HEWITT INQUIRY
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO— Continued
1117
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
Contents
Disposition
254-ANGO...
491, 494
495
500
501
504, 505
506, 508
509
510
519
520
521
528
529-533
635
536
543
642
544
546
547
548
552
553
557
560
562, 563
564, 567,
568
565
571
569, 572
573, 574
575
8/26
8/26
8/29
8/29
8/30
8/30
9/1
9/2
9/6
9/6
9/11
9/10
9/13
9/13
9/16
9/16
9/17
9/17
9/17
9/19
9/19
9/23
9/22
9/24
9/25
9/26
9/26
9/27
9/26
9/27
Re enforcement of the Freeze Order
(to the Minister #741)
Re drawing on allowances
(to the Minister #743)
Re KIYOSHI MAYAKAWA, Japa-
nese government official.
Re method of disposal of mail matter
to U. S. in Japan.
(to the Minister #755)
Re evacuation of resident Japanese
(from the Minister #516)
Re writing of Representative KASAI
concerning U. S. -Japan relations.
(to the Minister #760)
Re correction of telegram
To the CO 8/26, to
the TS 8/27.
To the CO 8/27, to
the TS 8/27.
To the CO 8/29, to
the TS 8/29.
To the CO 8/30, to
the TS 8/30.
To the CO 8/30, to
the TS 9/2.
To the CO 8/30, to
the TS 9/2.
To the CO 9/1. to
the TS 9/2.
To the CO 9/3, to
the TS 9/5.
To the CO 9/6, to
the TS 9/9.
To the C0 9/8, to the
256-ANOO.
29-B
257-RYAKUOO.
-A .
258-ANOO
GOOAI-A..-
Ig-A
(to the Minister #G0OAI)
(re writing of articles by Repre-
sentative KASAI)
Re stopping in port of courier
262-ANOO
Re registration of wealth by Japanese
nationals and commercial firms in
the U. S.
(to the Minister #787)
Re mail matter to Japan
[46] KETSU-B
KETSU-ANOO
KATSU-ANOO
272-ANGO.
(from Mexico GO-#86)
Re method of forwarding mail matter
to the U. S. followed in Japan,
(from the Minister #541)
Re evacuation of resident Japanese
(from the Minister #555)
Re mutual cancellation of frozen credit
towards computation of goverrmaent
funds.
Re transmission of radiograms ad-
dressed to this Consulate,
(from the Minister #552)
Re fleliVei-y of rlofninAiits
TS 9/9.
To the CO 9/8, to the
TS 9/9.
To the CO 9/12, to
the TS 9/13.
To the CO 9/12, to
KETSU-A
the TS 9/15.
To the CO 9/13, to
19-A
the TS 9/15.
To the CO 9/13, to
KETSU-B
(to San Francisco #41)
Re arrangement for alleviation of
Freeze Order between Japan and
the U. S.
(from the Minister #566)
Ditto
the TS 9/19.
To the CO 9/16, to
the TS 9/18.
To the CO 9/16, to
KETSU-A
278-BYAKUOO
(from the Minister #567)
Re drawing up of name-list based on
arrangement for alleviation of the
Freeze Order.
Re arrangement for alleviation of the
Freeze Order,
(to the Minister #820)
Re President Roosevelt's speech
(to the Minister #816, gist (?))
Re method for replenishment govern-
ment funds (estimate?) following
arrangement for alleviation of the
freezing of credit.
(from the Minister #575)
Re extension of time limit for reporting
foreign assets
(to the Minister #833)
Re arrangement for easing of the
credit freeze
(from the Minister #578)
Re alleviation of the credit freeze.
(to the Minister #840)
Ditto .
the TS 9/18.
To the CO 9/17, to
277-ANGO
the TS 9/18.
To the Cg 9/17, to the
279-ANGO.—
TS 9/18.
To the CO 9/18, to
KETSU-ANOO
U6] 283-(AN)-GO....
METSU-A
the TS 9/18.
To the CO 9/19, to
the TS 9/23.
To the CO 9/22, to
the TS 9/23.
To the CO 9/23, to
285-ANQO
the TS 9/23.
To the CO 9/23, to
287-ANGO
the TS 9/25.
To the CO 9/25, to
288-ANGO
(to the Minister #7)
Ditto
the TS 9/26.
To the CO 9/25, to
KETSU-ANOO
291-ANGO
(to the Minister #848)
Re evacuation of the resident Japanese.
(from the Minister #596)
Ditto
the TS 9/26.
To the CO 9/26, to
the TS 9/27.
To the CO 9/26, to
(20)-A
(to the Minister #854)
Re inquiry in regard to receipt of tele-
gram.
Re arrangement for alleviation of the
credit freeze,
(to the Minister #855)
Japan-U. S. ' ship communication
problem
(to the Minister #864)
Ditto .
the TS 9/27.
To the CG 9/27, to
292-ANaO
the TS 9/30.
To the CO 9/27, to
293-ANOO
the TS 9/30.
To the CO 9/27, to
-ANOO
the TS 9/30.
To the CO 9/30. to
(from the Minister #610)
the TS 9/30.
1118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
v:rROM: SAN FEAK CISCO— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
5S0
9/30
583
10/2
587,588
10/3
591
10/7
599
10/8
597, 598
10/8
601
10/9
602
10/10
605
606
10/11
607
10/11
608,609
10/11
617
10/14
615, 616
10/14
618,619
10/13
629
10/16
631
10/16
628
10/16
635
10/17
636
10/17
640
10/17
641
10/17
642,643
10/18
644
10/17
645
10/18
653
10/16
657
10/20
655
10/20
667
10/21
674, 675
10/22
679
10/23
681
10/24
683
10/24
689
10/24
Contents
Disposition
29&-ANGO
297-RYAKUGO-
[47] KETSU-ANGO..
300-RYAKUQO
KETSU-ANGO.
KETSU-HEIQO..
303-HEIGO
309-ANGO... -..
KETSU-HEIGO.-..
KETSU-B.. -.
KETSU-ANGO
305-ANGO
KETSU-R YAKUG O
KETSU
[i8] ANGO
ANGO..-
323-RYAKUGO
310-ANGO...
322-A
325-(HEI)-GO
326-GO
328-RYAKUGO
327-ANGO
325-ANGO
381-ANGO..
330-ANGO
332-ANGO—
KETSU-ANGO
149] KETSU-ANGO.....
336- ANGO
21-A .
340-ANGO
341-ANGO....
342-ANGO
Ditto
(to the Minister #875)
Re fees of freeze-aflected nationals to
banks of deposits
(to the Minister #888)
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication.
(from the Minister #531).
Re amendment of nationality laws
with object of nullifying dual citi-
zenship.
(to the Minister #905).
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication.
(to the Minister #910).
Ditto
(to the Minister #911).
Re amendment of nationality laws
with object of nullifying dual citi-
zenship.
(to the Minister #913).
Re entry permit
(to the Minister #922).
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication.
(from the Minister #653).
Ditto
(from the Minister #652) .
Ditto..
(from the Minister #351).
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication.
(to the Minister #926).
Ditto
(from the Minister #660?) .
Ditto
(from the Minister #661).
Ditto.
(to the Minister #938)
Ditto..
(to the Minister #951)
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship commu-
nication.
Re carrying of American dollar bills..
(from the Minister #670)
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship commu-
nication.
(to the Minister #953)
Ditto. -.
(to the Minister #956)
(separate telegram)
Ditto .
(to the Minister #963)
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship commu-
nication.
(from the Minister #684)
Ditto
(from the Minister #683)
Ditto
(from the Minister #685)
Ditto
(to the Minister #969)
Ditto
(from the Minister #687)
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship commu-
nication.
(to the Minister #971)
Ditto
(from the Minister #688)
Ditto
(from the Minister #695)
Ditto
(to the Minister #982)
Ditto..
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship
communication,
(from the Minister #705)
Ditto
Ditto.
(to the Minister #990)
To the CG 9/30, to
the TS 10/2.
To the CG 10/2, to
the TS 10/2.
To the CG 10/4, to
the TS 10/6. f
To the CG 10/8, to
the TS 10/8.
To the CG 10/9, to
the TS 10/9.
To the CG 10/9, to
the TS 10/9.
To the CG 10/10. to
the TS 10/10.
To the CG 10/10, to
the TS 10/11.
To the CG 10/11, to
the TS 10/13.
To the CG 10/11, to
theTS 10/13.
To the CCf 10/11, to
theTS 10/13.
To the CG 10/13, to
theTS 10/13.
To the CG 10/14, to
theTS 10/14.
To the CG 10/14, to
the TS 10/14.
To the CG 10/14, to
the TS 10/14.
To the CG 10/17, to
the TS 10/17.
To the CO 10/17, to
the TS 10/17.
To the CO 10/17, to
the TS 10/17.
To the CG 10/17, to
the TS 10/20.
To the CO 10/17, to
the TS 10/20.
To the CG 10/17, to
the TS 10/20.
To the CG 10/17, to
the TS 10/20.
To the CG 10/18, to
the TS 10/20.
To the CG 10/18, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/20, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/20, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/22.
To the CGO/20 12, t
the TS 10/22.
To the CG 10/22, to
the TS 10/23.
To the CG 10/23, to
the TS 10/25.
To the CG 10/24, to
the TS 10/25.
To the CG 10/24, to
the TS 10/25.
To' the CG 10/25, to
the TS 10/27.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO-Continued
1119
Telegram No. & Code
Type
KETSU-A
22-A.._
(23)-B
(24)-A
347-ANGO
348-ANGO
KETSU-ANOO
[50] 349- AN GO.
355-ANGO
(25)-A
(26)-A
(27)-B
352-ANGO
KETSU-ANGO
328-ANGO
(2S)-B
KETSU-ANGO
356-RYAKUGO.,_.
355-ANGO
358-ANGO
[51] GOGAI-A,.,
359-ANaO
KETSU-(C)....
KETSU-A
(28)-A_..
357-ANGO
362-ANGO
KETSU-n
29-B
384-ANGO
367-RYAKUGO
3fi8-ANGO
KETSU-ANOO.
[5S\ 369-HEIGO..
KETSU-A
File
No.
Date
Ree'd
686
10/24
G96
10/27
608
10/27
703
10/30
704, 705
10/29
700
10/30
709
10/31
710
712
11/1
"14,713
11/2
720
11/4
727
11/5
721
11/4
722
11/4
728
11/5
730
11/6
737
11/8
744
11/10
745
11/10
753
11/12
754
11/12
756
11/12
758
11/12
759
11/12
757
11/12
•46-749
11/11
763
11/13
764
11/13
776
11/15
777
11/15
779
11/17
781
11/17
782
11/17
784
11/18
785
Contents
Re results of the Japanese overseas
broadcasts,
(from the Minister QO-#2222)
Re inquiry concerning receipt of
telegram.
Re credit report of this Consulate
and Consulate staff.
Re inquiry as to whether articles
were entrusted to courier KUGA
or not.
Re problem of Xapan-U. S. ship com-
munication.
(to the Minister #1011)
Re report of foreign assets
(to the Minister #1015)
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication.
(from the Minister #715)
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(to the Minister #1018)
Re alleviation of freeze affecting our
governmental agencies in the U. S.
Re mail matter to be loaded on TAI-
YO MARU, and Consul IWAN-
AOA.
Ditto
Re tax exemntion and clearance of
souvenir gifts presented to former
honorary Consul.
Re disapproval of loading of mail
matter,
(to the Minister #1033)
Ditto 1
(from the Minister #728)
Re report of foreign assets
Re allowance for members of this Con-
sulate.
Re alleviation of freeze affecting our
governmental agencies in the U. S.
(Minister #749)
Re "camera interview" of Ambassa-
dor KURUSU.
Re alleviation of credit freeze
(to the Minister #1067)
Re delivery of message to Ambassa-
dor KURUSU.
Re interpretation of telegrams
Re easing of the Freeze Order
Ditto
(from the Minister #761)
Ditto
(to the Minister #1081)
Re alleviation of the Freeze Order
(from the Minister #744)
Re present situation in the U. S
Re alleviation of the Freeze Order
Ditto
Re resume of contents of bill for de-
fense of Hawaii and "PUERTO
RICO."
(to the Minister #1101)
Re alleviation of the Freeze Order
Re registration of real property be-
longing to Consulates in the U. S.
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(to the Minister #1120)
Ditto
(from the Minister #786)
Telegram of thanks from Ambassador
KURUSU.
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communi-
cation.
(from the Minister #791)
Disposition
To the CG 10/25, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 10/27, to
the TS 10/28.
To the CG 10/27, to
the TS 10/28.
To the CG 10/30, to
the TS 10/29.
To the CG 10/30, to
the TS 10/30.
To the CO 10/30, to
the TS 10/31.
To the CG 10/31, to
the TS 10/31.
To the CG 10/31, to
the TS 10/31.
To the CT 11/1, to
the TS 11/4.
To the CG 11/2, to
the TS 11/2.
To the CO 11/4, to
the TS 11/4.
To the CO 11/5, to
the TS 11/6.
To the CG 11/5, to
the TS 11/6.
to the TS 11/6.
To the CG 11/5, to
the TS 11/7.
To the CG 11/6, to
the TS 11/7.
To the CG 11/10, to
the TS 11/11.
To the CG 11/10, to
the TS 11/12.
To the CG 11/10, to
the TS 11/12.
To the CO 11/12, to
the TS 11/12.
To the CG 11/12, to
the TS 11/15.
To the CO 11/12, to
theTS 11/15.
To the CG 11/12, to
the TS 11/15.
To the CG 11/12, to
the TS 11/15.
To the CO H/12, to
theTS 11/15.
To the CO 11/14, to
the TS 11/15.
To the CG 11/14, to
the TS 11/15.
To the CO 11/14, to
theTS 11/15.
To the CG 11/15, to
the TS 11/15.
To the CG 11/17, to
the TS 11/17.
To the CO 11/17, to
theTS 11/19.
To the CO 11/18, to
theTS 11/19.
To the CO 11/18, to
the TS 11/19.
To the CG 11/19, to
the TS 11/19.
To the CO 11/19, to
the TS 11/19.
1120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: SAN FRANCISCO-Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
786, 787
11/18
790
11/19
792, 793
11/19
795
../21
802
803
11/23
797,798
799
11/23
806
11/25
809
11/25
810
11/25
808
11/25
815
11/26
814
11/26
817
11/26
822, 823
11/27
824, 825
11/27
826
8/4
830
11/28
831, 832
11/26
839
11/28
840, 841
11/29
842
11/26
850
12/2
854
12/3
Contents
Disposition
370-RYAK:UGO
372-17-ANGO.
371-17-ANGO
KF,TSU-ANGO...-
375-ANGO ----
376-ANGO
374-ANGO
399-ANGO
380-ANGO
388-ANGO
f55] 377-ANOO.
KETSU-RY A.
KUGO.
383-RYAKUGO
KETSU-A
384-ANGO
KETSU-ANGO....
223-GO-AN
387-\NGO
KETSIJ-A
KETSU-A
KETSU-A
KETSU-A
[5i] KETSU-A
KETSU-B
Re enforcement of regulations pertain-
ing to restriction and ban of leaving
and entering country,
(to the Minister #1127)
Re alleviation of the Freeze Order
Ditto
(to the Minister #1151)
Re reporting of developments of Japan-
U. S. negotiations.
(10 the Minister #1145)
Re reply on names and competence of
members of Consfllate, etc.
Re personal affairs of members of the
Consulate,
(to the Minister #1162)
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(to the Minister #1152)
Ditto
(to San Francisco #66)
Ditto
(to the Minister #1168)
Re application for permit to leave
country,
(to the Minister #1182)
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(from the Minister #819, #820)
Re TATUTA MARU's schedule
(from the Minister #838)
Separate telegram.
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication.
(to the Minister #1181)
Re boarding of TATUTA MARU....
(from the Minister #837)
Re U. S. regulations permitting leav-
ing and entering of country,
(to the Minister? #1201)
Present condition of Japan-U. S. nego-
tiations,
(from the Minister GO-#2416)
Re investigation and reporting of
movements of warships.
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication.
(Minister #1211)
Ditto ....
(from the Minister #839)
Ditto
(from the Minister #846)
Re disposition of American currency
bonds,
(from the Minister #850)
Re entrusting of rights and interests in
the U. S.
(from the Minister GO-#2403)
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication,
(from the Minister #870)
Re transmission by wire of secret ex-
penses for third period and tem-
porarily increased amount.
To the CG 11/19, to
the TS 11/19.
To the CG 11/19, to
the TS 11/21.
To the CG U/21, to
the TS 11/21.
To the CG 11/21, to
the TS 11/21.
To the CG 11/24, to
the TS 11/24.
To the CG 11/24, to
the TS 11/24.
To the CG 11/24, to
the TS 11/24.
To the CG 11/26, to
the TS 11/26.
To the CG 11/26, to
theTS 11/26.
To the CG 11/26, to
the TS 11/26.
To the CG 11/26, to
the TS 12/1.
To the CG 11/27, to
the TS 12/1.
To the CG 11/27, to
the TS 12/1.
To the CG 11/27, to
the TS 11/28.
To the CG 11/27, to
the TS 11/28.
To the CG 11/27, to
the TS 11/28.
To the CG 11/28, to
theTS 11/28.
To the CG 11/29, to
the TS 12/1.
To the 11/29, to the
TS 12/1.
To the 11/29, to the
TS 12/1.
To the CG 11/29, to
the TS 12/1.
To the CG 11/29, to
the TS 12/1.
To the CG 12/2, to
the TS 12/3.
To the CO 12/3, to
the TS 12/4.
FROM: SEATTLE
[55] 161-AN-YU-GO..
1-AN-YU-GO.
2-AN-YU-GO
3-AN-YU-GO
4
1/8
10
1/13
12
1/14
17
1/16
Re movements of U. S. warships
(to the Minister #198)
(dated 12/24)
Ditto
(to the Minister #1)
(dated 1/3)
Ditto. .-.
(to the Minister #2)
(dated 1/8)
Ditto
(to the Minister #3)
(dated 1/8)
To the CG 1/8, to
the TS 1/9.
To the CG 1/14, to
the TS 1/15.
To the CG 1/14, to
the TS 1/15.
To the CG 1/17, to
the TS 1/18.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
FROM: SEATTLE— Continued
1121
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Reo'd
Contents
Disposition
4-AN-YU-GO.---
5-AN-yU-QO
7-AN-YU-QO ---
9-AN-YU-aO
12-AN-YU-aO. ..-.-..
13-AN-YU-GO
[56] 14-AN-YU-CO.
1-A
15-AN-YU-GO ._.
16-AN-YU-GO
19-AN-YU-GO
18-AN-YU-GO
21-AN-YU-GO
22-RYAKU-YU-GO_
23-AN-YU-aO _
24-AN-YU-GO _
2-A
[57] 3-A
37-AN-YU-GO.
42-AN-YU-GO_.
66-RYAKUGO.
70-ANGO
73-ANGO.
75-ANGO.
78-ANGO.
79-ANGO_
81-ANGO.
83-ANGO.
85-ANaO.
25
41
49
50
68
73
84
89
92
100
122
124
149
150
172
174
182
231
249
296
662
692
715
725
738
739
750
770
1/23
1/31
2/7
2/5
2/12
2/19
3/5
3/6
3/8
3/10
3/20
3/27
4/10
4/10
4/23
4/23
4/30
6/2
6/30
6/30
10/28
10/24
11/2
11/5
11/8
11/8
11/10
11/14
11/20
Ditto
(to the Minister #4)
(dated 1/16)
Ditto
(to the Minister #5)
(dated 1/21)
Ditto
(to the Minister #7)
(dated 1/24)
Ditto
(to the Minister #9)
(dated 1/25)
Ditto
(to the Minister #11)
(dated 1/25)
Ditto
(to the Minister #13)
(dated 2/10)
Ditto
(to the Minister #14)
(dated 2/24)
Ditto
Ditto
(to the Minister #15)
(dated 2/28)
Ditto_
(to the Minister #16)
(dated 3/4)
Ditto
(to the Minister #20)
(dated ?/20 )
Ditto
(to the Minister #18)
(dated 3/17)
Ditto
(to the Minister #23)
(dated 4/1)
Re calling attention to enforcement of
Nationality Laws.
(to the Minister #24)
(dated 4/2)
Re movement of U. S. warships,.
(to the Minister #26)
(dated 4/10)
Ditto
(to the Minister #29)
(dated 4/16)
ReU. S. Navy
(to the Minister #36)
Re U. S. Navy
(to the Minister #36)
Ditto -
(to the Minister #51)
(dated 5/28)
Ditto
(to the Minister #56)
(dated 6/23)
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication.
(from the Minister GO #2205)
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication.
(to the Ambassador #34)
Re registration of property
(to the Ambassador #39)
Re sailing of the HIKAWA MARU. .
(to the Minister #158)
Re Japan shipping communication
(to the Minister #162)
Ditto
(to the Minister #166)
Re problem of Japan-U. S. ship com-
munication.
(to the Minister #166)
Re adoption of the message associated
with the situation by the Council of
the League of Organizations of
"Seattle."
Re problem of Japan-U. S. shipping
communication.
(to the Minister #175)
To the CG 1/24, to
the TS 1/24.
To the CG 2/3, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CG 2/4, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CO 2/6, to
the TS 2/7. .
To the CG 2/13, to
the TS 2/13.
To the CG 2/19, to
the TS 2/19.
To the CG 3/5, to
the TS 3/6.
To the CG 3/6, to
the TS 3/6.
To the CG 3/8, to
the TS 3/8.
To the CG 3/12, to
the TS 3/13.
To the CG 3/26, to
the TS 3/27.
To the CG 3/28, to
the TS 3/28.
To the CG 4/15, to
the TS 4/15.
To the CG 4/15, to
the TS 4/15.
To the CG 4/23, to
the TS 4/24.
To the CG 4/23, to
the TS 4/24.
To the CG 5/1, to
the TS 5/1.
To the CG 6/2, to
the TS 6/3.
To the CG 6/10, to
the TS 6/12.
To the CG 7/2, to
the TS 7/3.
To the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/22.
To the CG 10/25, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 11/2, to
the TS 11/4.
To the CG 11/5, to
the TS 11/5.
To the CG 11/8, to
the TS 11/11.
To the CG 11/10, to
the TS 11/11.
To the CG 11/12, to
theTS 11/14.
To the CG 11/14, to
tlieTS 11/17.
To the CG 11/20, to
theTS 11/24.
1122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[68]
FROM: NEW YORK
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
Contents
Disposition
2-RAKUQO
35
40
154
414. 415
417
449
455, 546
466, 467
468
485
512, 513
685
711
726
733
734, 735
816
838
853
861
1/27
1/30
4/12
7/30
8/5
8/8
8/13
8/20
9/4
10/24
10/31
11/5
11/8
11/8
11/26
12/3
12/5
Re restrictions of parcel post to Japan-
Ditto
To the CG 1/27, to
3-RAKUGO
the TS 1/28.
To the CG 1/30, to
1-A
Re verbal message to Secretary FU-
KUSHIMA.
Re counter-measures against the
Freeze Order,
(to the Minister #372)
Re withholding of the ci-yptograph of
the Yokohama Specie Bank branch.
Re manner of evacuation of the resi-
dent Japanese.
(to the Minister #391)
Re maimer of evacuation of the resi-
dent Japanese.
(to the Minister #401)
Re counter-measures against the
Freeze Order,
(to the Minister #414)
Re cryptographic code
the TS 1/30.
To the CG 4/12, to
52-ANGO
the TS 4/15.
To the CO 7/30, to
54-ANGO
the TS 8/2.
To the CO 8/5. to
57-ANaO
the TS 8/6.
To the 8/8, to
60-ANGO- -
the TS 8/8.
To the CG 8/13, to
67-ANGO
the TS 8/13.
To the 8/20, to
18-ANGO
the TS 8/20.
To the 9/4, to
83-ANaO
(from the Minister GO-#1907)
Re steps for payment of boat fare for
passengers on requisitioned ships in
Japan.
(to the Minister #487)
Re report of foreign assets
the TS 9/5.
To the CG 10/25, to
96-ANGO
the TS 10/27.
To the CG 11/2, to
[59] 2-B_
(to the Minister #88)
Re resending of telegram advising of
dates of arrival and departure of
Secretary TOKUNAGA and wife.
Re procedure for foreigners to depart
from Japan,
(to the Minister #496)
Ditto
the TS 11/4.
To the CG 11/5, to
88-ANGO
the TS 11/5.
To the CG 11/10, to
89-ANaO
the TS 11/11.
To the CG 11/10, to
90-ANGO .
(from the Minister #234)
Re evacuation of Japanese commercial
firms and employes of branch banks
in the U. S.
(from the Minister #242)
Re cancellation of portion of Freeze
Order.
Ditto
theTS 11/11.
TotheCG 11/27.
91-ANGO
To the CG 11/29, to
94-ANGO
the TS 12/1.
To the CG 12/3, to
96-ANOO
(from the Minister #271)
Ditto
the TS 12/4.
To the CG 12/5, to
(to the Minister #535)
the TS 12/6.
[60]
FROM: FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS
29-AN-YU-GO
48-AN-YU-GO.
28-AN-YU-GO
1-B
2-ANGO
4-AN-YU-GO.
1-HEI-YU-QO.
6
1/V
8
1/10
9
1/10
50
2/1
66
2/12
101
3/10
112
3/19
Re movements of U, S. warships.
(to the Minister #474)
(dated 12/23)
(from Manila)
Re naval planes of the U. S
(to the Minister #406)
(dated 12/14)
Ditto.- -
(to the Mmister #470)
(dated 12/16)
Re Greek ship, "ELENE S. EN-
BILICOS".
Re method of leaving country for
American citizens of Japanese
parentaae.
(to the Minister #2)
(dated l/3l)
(from New Orleans)
Re telegraphic code in possession of
the sub-Consulate at "HOUSTON.'
(to the Minister #4)
(dated 3/4)
(from New Orleans)
Re opening of the sub-Consulate at
"HOUSTON."
(to the Minister #1)
(dated 3/7)
(from Houston)
To the CO 1/8, to
the TS 1/9.
To the CG 1/14, to
the TS 1/15.
To the CO 1/14, to
the TS 1/15.
To the CG 2/3, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CG 2/12, to
the TS 2/12.
To the CG 3/12, to
the TS 3/13.
To the CG 3/19, to
the TS 3/19.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
FROM; FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS— Continued
1123
Telegram No. & Code
Type
2-HEI-YU-GO
[61] 1
MU-B
11-ANGO
1-ANOO
4-HEI-YU-GO
1-B
No number- A.
-A.
-A,
9-AN-YU-GO.
GOGAI-C.
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
113
3/19
153
4/11
156
4/15
167
4/19
168
4/20
195
5/8
305
7/7
306
7/7
474
8/15
482
8/15
539
9/15
731
11/7
Contents
Re district under jurisdiction of the
sub-Consulate at "HOUSTON."
(from the Minister #1)
(dated 3/8)
(from Houston)
Re sending of hard "tennis balls"
(from Peking)
Re departure of the Panamanian ship
to Japan.
(from Britain)
Re stopping in port of the American,
"BOB COOK."
(to the Minister #222)
(from Manila)
Reresending of telegram
(from Manila)
Re new "Address" of the sub-Consu-
late at "HOUSTON."
(dated 4/25)
(from Houston)
Re interpretation of telegram (s)
(from Ambassador to Britain)
Deliverying message to Ambassador
SHIGEMITSU.
(separate telegram)
Symbol for the Consulate head
(from Canton)
Symbol for the Consulate head
(from Canton)
Re applicants for class #2 of HEISHI-
KAN (a school?).
(to the Minister #36)
(dated 9/10)
(from Vancouver)
Re departure of Ambassador
KURUSU.
(to the Minister QOGAI)
(from Manila)
Disposition
To the CG 3/19, to
the TS 3/19.
To the CG 4/12, to
the TS 4/12.
To the CG 4/15, to
the TS 4/17.
To the CO 4/19, to
the TS 4/21.
To the CG 4/21, to
the TS 4/21.
To the CG 5/8, to
the TS 5/9.
To the CG 7/8, to
the TS 7/10.
To the CG 7/9, to
the TS 7/10.
To the CG 8/15.
To the CG 8/19.
To the CG 9/15, to
the TS 9/16.
To the CG 11/7, to
the TS 11/8.
m
FROM: LOS ANGELES
105-AN-YU-GO
106-AN-YU-GO
107-RYAKU-YU-GO.
1-AN-YU-GO
1-(C)
4-AN-YU-GO.
5-AN-YU-GO
10-RYAKU-YU-GO-.
11-AN-YU-QO
2-AN-YU-QO
[63] 13-AN-YU-GO
2-A
15-AN-YU-GO
16-AN-YU-GO
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2-
3
1/6
5
1/6
7
1/7
13
1/14
18
1/16
24
1/23
42
1/30
59
2/6
60
2/6
23
1/23
67
2/12
85
3/5
125
3/27
132
4/3
Re movements of U. S. warships
(to the Minister #220)
(dated 12/23)
Ditto
(to the Minister #221)
(dated 12/27)
Re sending of representatives of the
Patriotic Women's Society.
(to the Minister #222)
Movements of U. S. warships
(dated 1/6)
Re visit to the U. S. by the "Subaru
Show" troupe.
Re movements of the U. S. warships.
(to the Minister #7)
(dated 1/13)
Ditto
(to the Minister #9)
(dated 1/21)
Re parcel post to Japan
(to the Minister #14)
(dated 1/26)
Re movements of the U. S. Navy
(to the Minister #15)
(dated 1/27)
Re problem of evacuation of the Jap-
anese residents in the U. S.
(to the Minister #4)
(dated 1/10)
Movements of U. S. Navy
(to the Minister #17)
(dated 2/1)
Ditto
Ditto
(to the Mmister #33)
Re visit to the U. S. by the Represent-
atives, YAMAJI and SHIMIZU.
(from the Minister #25)
(dated 3/26)
30
To the CO 1/8, to the
TS 1/9.
To the CG 1/8, to the
TS 1/9.
To the CO 1/9, to the
TS 1/10.
To the CG 1/14, to
theTS 1/15.
To the CO 1/16, to
the TS 1/17.
To the CG 1/23, to
the TS 1/24.
To the CG 2/3, to
the TS 2/4.
To the CG 2/6, to the
TS 2/7.
To the CO 2/6, to the
TS 2/7.
To the CO 1/24, to
the TS 1/25.
To the CG 2/12, to
the TS 2/13.
To the CG 3/5, to the
TS 3/0.
To the CO 3/28, to
the TS 3/28.
To the CG 4/3, to the
TS 4/4.
1124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM: LOS ANGELES— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
File
No.
Date
Rec'd
Contents
Disposition
17-RYAKU-YU-GO
18-AN-YU-GO
20-AN-YU-GO
13.3
159
173
190
196
4/3
4/15
4/23
6/1
5/8
Re visit to the U. S. by delegates of
the Japan Christian Federation.
(to the Minister #34)
(dated 3/26)
Movements of the U. S. Navy..
(to the Minister #38)
(dated 4/5)
Ditto - - -
To the CG 4/3 to the
TS 4/4.
To the CG 4/15, to
the TS 4/18.
To the CG 4/23, to
9-\
(to the Minister #44)
(dated 4/12)
Ditto .... - - --
the TS 4/24.
To the CG 5/1, to the
23-AN-YU-GO _
(to the Minister #59)
(dated 5/1)
Re participation of delegates of the
Japan Christian Federation at the
special conference of the American
Christian Federation.
(to the Minister #53)
(dated 4/26)
TS 5/3.
To the CO 5/8, to the
TS 5/9.
FROM: PORTLAND
2-ANaO
4-A
7-ANGO— -.-
5-B
32-RYAKU-YU-GO.
33-RYAKU-YU-GO-
34-RYAKU-YU-GO.
C-A
11-ANGO
7-A
36-ANGO
[651 44-ANGO--
47-ANGO.— -_.
49-RYAKUGO
50-ANGO
62-ANGO
65-ANQO:
67-ANGO
60-ANGO
313-ANGO
71-RYAKUGO
197
6/28
232
6/2
233
6/2
259
6/17
263
6/19
264
6/15
270
6/23
315
7/9
327
7/15
334
7/17
529
9/10
554
9/20
610
10/13
630
10/16
632
10/17
059
10/20
684
10/24
700
10/28
723
11/4
833
11/29
859
12/4
Re movements of the U. S. Navy
(to the Minister #66)
Ditto
Ditto
(to the Minister #83)
Re greeting courier YAMAZAKI at
pier.
Re strike by the employees of the
"NORTH AMERICAN" Airplane
Company,
(to the Minister #87)
(dated 6/6)
Re strike by the employees of the
"NORTH AMERICAN" Airplane
Company,
(to the ]M mister #92)
(dated 6/9)
Ditto
(to the Minister #95)
(dated 6/11)
Re survey of assets of Japanese people
living on the mainland U. S.
Re movements of U. S. Warships
(to the Minister #112)
Re resending of telegram (s)
Re movements of U. S. warships and
ships,
(to the Minister #176)
Ditto ..-
(to the Minister #190)
Problem of Japan-U. S. ship communi-
cation.
(to the Minister #201)
Re notices of attainment of military
age for year 1942.
(to the Minister #200)
Ditto
(Minister #94)
Movements of U. S. warships and
ships.
(to the Minister #205)
Re investigation of Japanese associa-
tions by the F. B. I.
(to the Minister #207)
Ditto
(to the Minister #209)
Re simplifying of procedure for expa-
triation.
(to the Minister #214)
Re ships requisitioned by the U. S.
Army and the Navy,
(to the Minister #317)
Re procedure for expatriation
(from the Minister #110)
To the CG 5/8, to
the TS 5/9.
To the CG 6/3, to
the TS 6/3.
To the CO 6/3, to
the TS 6/3.
To the CG 6/17, to
the TS 6/17.
To the CO 6/20, to
the TS 6/21.
To the CG 6/19, to
the TS 6/21.
To the CG 6/23, to
the TS 6/24. -
To the CG 7/10, to
the TS 7/10.
To the CG 7/15, to
the TS 7/18.
To the CG 7/17, to
the TS 7/18.
To the CG 9/10, to
the TS 9/10.
To the CG 9/22, to
the TS 9/24.
To the CG 10/13, to
the TS 10/13.
To the CG 10/17, to
the TS 10/17.
To the CG 10/17, to
the TS 10/20.
To the CG 10/21, to
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/25, to
the TS 10/27.
To the CO 10/28, to
the TS 10/29.
To the CG 11/4, to
the TS 11/7.
To the CG 11/29.
To the CG 12/4, to
the TS 12/6.
166]
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
FROM: MISCELLANEOUS PLACES
1125
Telegram No. & Code
Type
-(C).
File
No.
-(C).
-C.
-c...
-(C).
-(C)....
[67] -(C)
-(C).-.
-c
-c
-(C)...
-(C) _
-c...
-c...
-c...
[68] -C
-A
-C
Date
Rec'd
107
123
135
160
189
210
223
242
267
320
332
503
1/26
1/27
1/28
1/29
1/29
2/1
3/6
3/8
3/13
3/26
4/3
4/3
4/17
5/1
5/20
5/27
6/6
6/21
7/12
7/17
7/31
8/30
Contents
Re reception dinner for Ambassador
NOMURA,
(from Ambassador NOMURA,
KAMAKURA MARU)
Re delivery of message from Ambas-
sador NOMURA,
(from Ambassador NOMURA on
Kamakura Maru)
Ditto.
(from Ambassador NOMURA on
Kamakura Maru)
Re inquiry on functions for Ambas-
sador NOMURA,
(from Secretary OKUMURA)
Re reply as to fimctious for Ambas-
sador NOMURA.
Telegram of thanks from Ambassador
NOMURA,
(from Ambassador NOMURA on
Kamakura Maru)
Telegram of thanks.
(from Secretary MIYAZAKI on
Yawata Maru)
Re printing of English name-cards for
Consul General KITA.
(from Consul General KITA on
TATUTA MARU)
(dated 3/9)
Re stopping in port of Ambassador
TOMIL
(from Consul General KITA on
Tatuta Maru)
Re reporting on time of arrival at post
of Secretary MORIMURA.
(from Secretary MORIMURA
on Nitta Maru)
Reply telegiam from Ambassador
KURUSU.
(from Ambassador KURUSU on
Tatuta Maru)
Re arrival in port of MASABUMI
NAKAMURA.
(from MASABUMI NAKAMU-
RA on Kamakura Maru)
Re arrival in port of SHIMIZU and
YAMAOI.
(from SHIMIZU and YAMAGI
on Yawata Maru)
Re boarding of ship by HANA KU-
SANOBU.
(from the Kamakura Maru)
Re calling at port of Representative
SHIMIZU.
(from Representative SHIMIZU
on Asama Mai-u)
Telegram of greeting
(from Minister YAMAGATA on
Tatuta Maru)
Re inquiry on completion of draft
deferment procedure.
Re stopping in port of Representative
TAKAMI.
(from Representative TAKAMI
on Kamakura Maru)
Telegram of thanks from Ambassador
SHIGEMITSU.
(from Ambassador SHIGEMIT-
SU on Kamakura Maru)
Re stopping in port of Major (or Lt.
Commander) YANO.
(from Major YANO on Tatuta
Maru)
Re purchase of superior grade seed and
shoots of "pineapple."
(from Head of the Foreign Affairs
Section, Formosa)
Re changing of broadcasting wave
length to Hawaii,
(from Japan Broadcasting Com-
pany)
Disposition
To the CG 1/27, to
the TS 1/27.
To the CG 1/27, to
the TS 1/27.
To the CG 1/28, to
the TS 1/28.
To the CG 1/29, to
the TS 1/30.
To the CG 1/29, to
the TS 1/30.
To the 2/1, to theTS
2/4.
To the 3/6, to theTS
3/6.
To the CG 3/10, to
the TS 3/10.
To the CG 3/13, to
the TS 3/14.
To the CG 3/26, to
the TS 3/27.
To the CG 4/3, to the
TS 4/3.
To the CG 4/3, to the
TS 4/3.
To the CG 4/17, to
the TR 4/18.
To the CG 5/1, to the
TS 5/1.
To the CG 5/21, to
the TS 5/22.
To the CG 5/27, to
the TS 5/28.
To the CG 6/6, to the
TS 6/7.
To the CO 6/21, to
the TS 6/23.
To the CG 7/11, to
theTS 7/14.
To the CG 7/17, to
the TS 7/17.
To the CG 7/31, to
the TS 8/2.
To the CO 8/30, to
the TS 8/30.
1126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FROM:'MISCELLANEOUS— Continued
Telegram No. & Code
Type
'File
No.
Date
Rec'd
Contents
Disposition
-(C)...
576
611
648
688
731
741
742
751
9/29
10/12
10/19
10/25
11/7
11/9
11/10
11/12
Re request in regard to departure of
Professor Leo Sireta.
(from Professor NORISUGI of
the Tokyo Music Academy)
Re sendin;; of divorce papers _-.
To the CO 9/30, to
-(C)
the TS 9/30.
To the CG 10/12, to
-X
(from YASUKO KANDA, Tokyo)
Re replenishment of fuel oil of
TATUTA MARU.
Re changing of broadcasting cycle
(from Tokyo Japanese Broadcast-
ing)
Re departure of Ambassador KURUSU
(from Manila)
■Re stopping in port of Ambassador
KURUSU.
(from Secretary YUKI at Midway)
Re stopping in port of Ambassador
KURUSU.
(from Ambassador KURUSU at
Midway)
Ditto
the TS 10/18.
To the CG 10/19, to
OOGAI
-C
the TS 10/21.
To the CG 10/25.
To the CG 11/7.
To the CG 11/10, to
-C -
the TS 11/10.
To the CG 11/10, to
-(C)
thoTS 11/10.
to the TS n/12.
(dated 11/11)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. G3
In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-30Cl-AJ (SO) N20-12.
Serial 09330.
Navy Depaetment,
Office of the Chikf of Naval Opeuations,
Washington, Feb. 15, 1941.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations
To: The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
Subject : Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl
Ha r box*.
1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl
Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the
relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl
Harbor. In addition the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room
limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.
2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in
planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which
the following may be considered :
(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary
to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and fifty feet of water
is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes
is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height
for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is
necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.
(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approach-
ing and leaving berths.
(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.
(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and
harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.
(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by
shipping.
(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the
vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.
(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane
attack from the land side most difficult.
(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking
PKOCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1127
planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can
range their torpedoes.
(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon barrages,
and aircraft protection.
(j) Availability of naturally vpell protected anchorages within a harbor from
torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a
fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baflles will be difficult because of
the congestion.
3. As a matter of interest the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very
low launching heights at reported ranges by the individual aviators of 400 to
1300 yards from the battleships, but the depths of icater in which the torpedoes
were launched were hettveeu 14 and 15 fathoms. Tlie attacks were made in the
face of intensive and apparently erratic anti-aircraft fire. The eastern shore
line of the anchorage and moorings were protected by numerous balloon barrages,
but there was no trawler borne balloon barrage to the west. The torpedoes were
apparently dropped inside of the nets, probably A/T nets.
4. It is considered that certain large bays and harbors, where a fleet or large
force of heavy ships may be anchored and exposed with a large body of water
on an entire flank, should have that flank protected by a series of baffles if the
water is deep enough for launching torpedoes. The main fleet anchorage at
Scapa Flow, for instance, has an A/T net extending slightly to the north of a
line between Calf of Flotta and Cava Island protecting the main fleet anchorage.
The depth of water where this net is laid in approximately 17 fathoms. On the
other hand constricted harbors, in which practically all available space is taken
up by anchorages, and which is relatively deep probably must depend upon other
defense measures. It might be possible and practicable to provide in some places,
which are not protected by i-elatively shallow water, anti-toriiedo baflles prac-
tically surrounding a limited number of berths for large ships, such as battle-
ships or carriers. An extreme example of this is furnished at the present time
by the French at Dakar, where double nets surround the Richelieu ; she is placed
similarly as in a dry dock, and evidently would have to open a section of the net
to be hauled clear. The depth of water at Dakar, however, is very shallow.
5. The present A/T nets are very expensive, extremely heavy, their heavy
anchors and moorings take up about 20O yards of space perpendicular to the line
of the net, take a long time to lay, and are designed to stand up under heavy
weather conditions. There is apparently a great need for the development of a
light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within
protected harbors and which can be readily removed. It is hoped that some
such net can be developed in the near future.
6. Recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief are especially
desired.
H. R. Staek.
Copy to : CinC Atlantic Fleet
CinC Asiatic Fleet
CinC File No.
381-5/039S
United States Fueet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
At Sea, Haicaiian Area, Mareh 12, 191/1.
Confidential
From : Command-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl
Harbor.
Reference: (a) CNC Conf. Itr. file Op-30C1-A.T (SC) N20-12 Serial 09330 of
15 Feb. 1941.
1. In view of the contents of reference (a), the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Pacific Fleet, recommends that until a light eflScient net. that can be laid tem-
porarily and quickly is developed, no A/T nets be supplied this area.
H. E. KlMMKL.
1128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C-N20-12/ND14
20 March 1941
From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.
Reference: (a CNO Classified Itr serial 010230 of February 17, 1941.
1. In reply to reference (a) the following comment and recommendation on
anti-torpedo baffles for vessels moored in Pearl Harbor is submitted.
(a) The depth of water in and alongside available berths in Pearl Harbor
does not exceed forty-five (45) feet.
(b) There is limited maneuvering area in Pearl Harbor for vessels approaching
and leaving berths which prevents the departure of a large group of vessels
on short notice.
(c) Most of the available berths are located close aboard the main ship
channels, which are crossed by cable and pipe lines as well as ferry routes.
The installation of baffles for the fleet moorings would have to be so extensive
that most of the entire channel area would be restricted.
2. Other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District have a water depth limi-
tation similar to Pearl Harbor.
3. In view of the foregoing the Commandant does not recommend the installa-
tion of baffles for moorings In Pearl Harbor or other harbors in the Fourteenth
Naval District.
C. C. Bloch.
cc: to
CINCPACIFIC
BUORD
Office of The Chief of Naval Opekations
Washington, June 13, 1945.
Op-SOCl-AJ
(SC)N20-12
Serial 055730
Confidential
From : The Chief of Naval Operations
To : The Commandant, First Naval District
The Commandant, Third Naval District
The Commandant, Fourth Naval District
The Commandant, Fifth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixth Naval District
The Commandant, Seventh Naval District
The Commandant, Eighth Naval District
The Commandant, Tenth Naval District
The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District
The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District
The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District
Subject : Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.
Reference: (a) CNO conf. Itr. Op-30C1 Serial 010230 of Feb. 17, 1941.
1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employ-
ment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-toi^pedo baffles especially
for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective har-
bors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain
limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was
stated :
"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully
drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary
before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."
2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes
may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in
some cases make initial dives of considei'ably less than 75 feet, and make excellent
runs. Hence, it may be stated that it can not be assumed that any capital ship
or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if sur-
rounded by water at a suflicient distance to permit an attack to be developed an<J
a sufiicient run to arm the torpedo.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1129
3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored
can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may
be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any
attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or
more) is much more likely.
4, As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto
were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes
may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms.
R. E. INGEESOLL.
Copy to: CinCpac
CinClant
CinCaf
C. O. Naval Net Depot, Tiburon
C. O. Naval Net Depot, Newport
Comdt. NavSta, Guantanamo
Comdt. NavSta, Samoa
BuOrd
Op-12
A16/NDW(16) Pearl Habbor, T. H.
Serial 086W
Secret
From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. ^
To : Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Subject: Blocking Pearl Harbor Channel.
Reference: (a) Com-14 Conf. Itr. C-A16/H3/ND14(0800) of August 16, 1941.
1. In view of anti-submarine defenses approved for and now in process of
installation at Honolulu and Pearl Harbor, the Commander-in-Chief does not
desire to reopen the question of anti-submarine nets thereat.
2. With reference to laying defensive mine fields off those harbors, it is
believed there is insufficient prospect of commensurate return for the restricted
maneuverability and risks involved to our own ships.
3. The Commander-in-Chief has noted with approval the action initiated
toward obtaining suitable radar for protection of channel entrance. He would
like to see this matter vigorously prosecuted. Please keep him informed as to
progress.
4. WPL-46 assigns salvage in these waters as a task for the forces afloat,
assisted by such facilities as the shore establishment may be able to provide.
Organization and assembly of equipment is now in process under Commander
Base Force. It is requested that the results of the study and inventory re-
ferred to in paragraph (3) of reference (a) be made available to Commander
Base Force and that, if and when necessity arises, appropriate local facilities
and technical facilities be furnished him.
H. E. KlMMEL.
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 64
SECRET
War Department
Washington, Feb. 7, JQ^t.
Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of sur-
prise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express
complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of
our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The
Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and
continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses
because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.
2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit
planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes ; nineteen of these
are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to liave
<hirty-one P-36 pur.suit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii
witliin thp next ten days, as agi"*>Pd to with tho Navy Departmpnt. Tliis will bring
1130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen
of a somewhat less eflScient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit
planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled
at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.
3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns,
twenty 37-mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA
machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-incli AA guns, one
hundred and twenty 37-mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA
machine guns.
4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has
been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for
installation will haye been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry
develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be
made at an earlier date.
5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give
immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages
and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons
are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made avail-
able prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-
four being manufactured — forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder
by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thou-
sand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital
areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric
and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke imprac-
ticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General
will look into this matter again.
6. W^ith reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding
a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
partment, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities
in making those measures effective.
[s] Henky L. Stimson,
Secretarj/ of War.
mkaroranuum endoksejient
Navy Department
Febbuaet 13, 1941.
C)p-30B3-AJ
(SC)A7-2(2)/FFI
D-27446
Secret
From : Director, Naval Districts Division
To: Director, War Plans Division
Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. (SecWar Itr. of Feb. 7, 1941, to
SecNav. )
1. Returned. It is recommended that a copy of the subject letter be sent to the
Commander-in-Chief, TJ. S. Fleet and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.
[s] Alex Sharp
Alex Shakp
(Pencil Notation : Done 015712 of 11 Feb. M.)
Hev-'Itt Inquiky Exhibit No. 65
United States Pacific Fleet
AND Pacieic Ocean Areas
headquarters of the commander in chief
This is to certify that the attached documents consisting of the following :
Copy of Cincpac Secret Itr. dated 7 August 1941, Serial 069W, Subject: Organ-
ization of ORANGE Fleet and ORANGE Activities in the Mandated Islands,
and copy of Enclosure (A) thereto.
are true and correct photographic copies of the documents in the official files
of (he Coniniand«^r in Cliief, IT. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
R. E. Keeton
R. E. Keeton
Ry direction of the Commander in CMcf.
U. S. Pacific Fleet, and Parifie Qfenn Arrn-i.
PROC'LJi'JDINGS OV HEWITT INQLilKY
1131
Cincpac File No.
Serial 060W
Secret
Unitfd States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Pearl JJarhor, T. JL, Anrjust 7, ]0J,1.
From: Commander-iu-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To : Commander Battle Force.
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.
Commander Miuecraft, Battle Force.
Commander Cruisers, Battle Force.
Commander Battleships, Battle Foi'ce.
Com^mander Battleship Divisions One and Two.
Commander Carrier Division One.
Commander Destroyer Flotilla One.
Commander Scouting Force.
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force.
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force.
Commander Cruiser Divisions Three, Five and Six.
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.
Conanander Base Force.
Commander Patrol Wing Two.
Commanding General, Second Marine Division.
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval Disti'ict.
Subject: Organization of ORANGE Fleet and ORANGE Activities in the JNian-
dated Islands.
Reference: (a) Cincpac Secret Itr. A16/ (021W) of April 4, 1941.
Enclosiire : (A) Information on subject matters as of August 4, 1941.
1. Information furnished herewith is the best available, but by virtue of its
very nature is subject to omissions and other inaccuracies.
2. This letter supersedes reference (a), which together with its enclosure is
to be destroyed by burning. No report of destruction is required.
H. E. KiMMEL.
P. C. Crosley,
P. C. Ceoslet,
Flag Secretary.
Enclosure A
\n
MEMORANDUM :
(A) ORANGE Naval Organization— FLEETS.
(B) Material Installations in MANDATES.
(C) Probable Forces, Naval and others, in MANDATES.
(0) Summary of Activities in MANDATES.
(A) ORANGE NAVAL ORGANIZATION— FLEETS
COMBINED FLEET
BB MUTSU (F)
FIRST FLEET
August 4, 1941.
BB MUTSU (F)
BATDIV 1
(BB) MUTSU (F)
(BB) NAGATO
DESDir 6
IKAZUCHI
INAZUMA
SAZANAMI
AKEBONO
9-21
(1700-36-6-5"
9-21") 3
3
BATDIV 2
(BB) ISE (F)
(BB) HYUGA
(BB) FUSO
BATDIV 3
(BB) HIBI (F)
^BB) KIRISHIMA
(BB) KONGO
(BB) HARUNA
DE8DIV 7
AKATSUKI
OBORO
USHIO
HIBIKI
(Same' as
DesJiv 6)
DESRON ONE
(CL) ABUKUMA (F)
DE8DIV 21
HATSUHARU
NENOHI
HATSUSHIMO
WAKABA
(1368-36-5-5"
9-21") a'
3
GRUDIV 6
(CA) AOBA (F)
(CA) KAKO
(CA) FURUTAKA
(CA) KINUGASA
DESDIV SS
ARIAKE
YTTGURE
SniRATSUYU
SHIGURE
(1368-36-5-5"
8-21") 3'
1132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[2]
DE8DIV 11
FUBUKI
SHIRAYUKI
HATSUYUKI
(Same as
Desdiv 6)
CARDIV S
(CV) HOSHO
(CV) RYUJO
(CV) SHOKAKU
DE8R0N S
(CL) SENDAI (F)
DESDIV n DESDIV 19
ISO NAMI
URANAMI
SHIKINAMI
AYANAMI
(Same as
Desdiv 6)
CRUDIV J,
(CA) TAKAO
(CA) ATAGO
(CA) CHOKAI
(CA) MAYA
MURAKUMO
SHINONOME
SHIRAKUMO
(Same as
Divdiv 6)
DESDIV i
HAKAZB
AKIKAZE
TACHIKAZE
HOKAZE
(1270-34-4-^.7-6-21")
4 3
SECOND FLEET
(CA) TAKAO (F)
CRUDIV 5 CRUDIV 7 #
DESDIV 20
AMAGIRI
ASAGIRI
YUGIRI
SAGIRI
(Same as
Desdiv 6)
AIRRON 7
(AV) CHIYODA
(AV) MIZUHO
(AV) CHITOSE
(CA) MACHI
(CA) HAGURO
(CA) MYOKO
(CA) KUMANO (F)
(CA) SUZUYA
(CA) MIKUMA
(CA) MOGAMI
CRUDIV 8
(CA) TONE
(CA) CHIKUMA
DESRON 2
(CL) JINTSU (F)
DESDIV 8
DESDIV 15
DESDIV 16
DESDIV 18
ASASHIO
OSHIO
MICHISHIO
ARASHIO
OYASHIO
HAYASHIO
NATSUSHIO
KUROSHIO
HATSDKAZE
YUKIKAZE
AMATSUKAZE
ISOKAZE
KASUMI
ARARE
KAGERO
SHIRANUI
(1500-36-6-5"
8-21"
3
2
13]
(Same as
Desdiv 8)
(Same as
Desdiv 8)
(Same as
Desdiv 8)
DESRON i
(CL)
NAKA (P)
DESDIV 3
DESDIV i
DESDIV 9
DESDIV 2i
MURASAME
YUDACHI
HARUSAME
SAMIDARE
(Cardiv 3—
Plane Guard-
First Fleet)
-
ASAGUMO
NATSUGUMO
YAMAGUMO
MINEGUMO
UMIKAZE
KAWAKAZE
SUZUKAZE
YAJSIAKAKE
(1368-36-5-5"
8-21") 3
(1500-36-6-5"
8-21") 3
(Same as
Desdiv 2)
COMMANDER CARDIVS
(CV) AKAGI (F)
CARDIV 1 CARDIV 2 # @
(CV) KAGA
(SHOKAKU?)
DESDIV 3
SHIOKAZE
HOKAZE
(1270-34-4-4.7
6-21") 4
3
(CV) SORYU
(CV) HIRYU
DESDIV 23 # @
KIKUTSUKI
MIKAZUKI
MOCHIZUKI
YUZUKI
(1315-34-4-4.7"
6-21") 4
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1133
DEFENSE DIVI-
SION 1
(CM) SHIRATAKA
(CM) HATSDTAKA
(CM) AOTAKA
1st BASE FORCE SQUADRON #
MINESWEEP
DIV. 1
Mine Sweep #1
Mine Sweep #2
MINE SWEEP
DIV. 21
Mine Sweep #7
Mine Sweep #12
GUN BOAT DIVI-
SION 1
6 Special gunboats
(Converted Mer-
chantmen?)
S. C. DIV. 1
Special Transports
S. C. DIV 11
8. C. DIV. 21
KATSURIKI (F)
-S. G. DIV. 3 1
#Now formed into Third Fleet (operating with South China Fleet in Hainan — Indo-
China area).
@ Expected to rejoin SECOND Fl.EET about 10 August 1941.
[U THIRD FLEET
(Formed from units of 2ud Fleet and South China Fleet — became active in June-July,
1940 evidently specially organized for SOUTHWARD EXPANSION operations —
INDOCHINA — etc. )
(CL) NAGARA (F) (ex-So. China Fleet)
(CL) or (CM) KUNASHIRI (?)
CRUDIV 7 (ex-2nd Fleet)
(CA) KUMANO
(CA) SUZDYA
(CA) MIKUMA
(CA) MOGAMI
DESRON 5
(CL) NATORI (F) (ex-So. China Fleet)
DE8DIV 5 DESDIV Jf2 ( ?)
ASAKAZE SATSUKI
HARUKAZE MINATSUKI
MATSUKAZE FUMITSUKI
HATAKAZB (Same as Desdiv 4) NAGATSUKI
(1315-34-4-4.7-6-21")
4 2
CARDIV 2 (ex-2nd Fleet)
(CV) SORYU
(CV) HIRYU
DESRON 2.?
KIKUTSUKI
MIKATSUKI
MOCHITSUKI
YUZUKI (Same as Desdiv 12)
let BASE FORGE SQUADRON (ex-2nd Fleet)
Defence Div. 1 Mine Sweep Div. 1 Mine Sweep Div. 21
(CM) SHIRATAKA M. S. #1 M. S. #7
(CM) HATSUTAKA M. S. #2 M. S. #12
(CM) AOTAKA
Siihchaser Div. 1
Subchaser Div. 11
Siihchaser Div. 21
Gunhoat Div. 1
6 Special gunboats
(ex-merchant ma-
rine?)
Siihchaser Div. HI
Special Transports
AIRRON SIX
(AV) NOTORO
(XAV) KAMIKAWA MARU
(XAV) MARU
plus shore based aircraft ex-TAKAO, ex-OITA, ex-GBNZAN, ex-TAIHOKU and South China
Air Forces.
1134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[5]
CRUDir iS
(CL) KASHIIMA
TENRYU
TATSUTA
FOURTH (MANDATE) FLEET
(CL) KASHIMA (F)
AIRRON Z'f
(AVS) KAMOI (F)
(XAVS) MARU
4th AIR CORPS
5th AIR CORPS
11th AIR CORPS
16th AIR CORPS
DESRON 6
(CL) TDBARI (F)
MINE LAYER DIV. 10
(CM) OKINOSHIMA
(CM) TOKIWA
DESDIV 29
OITE
HAYATB
AS AN AG I
YUNAGI (same as Desdiv 4)
DESDIV 30
:>IUTSDKI
KISARAGI
YAYOI -
UZUKI (Snmo as? Desdiv 4)
8UDR0N 7
(AS) JINGEI (F>
SUBDir 26 SUBDIV 27 SVBDIV S-l
Ro 60 Ro 65 Ro 63
Ro 61 Ro 66 Ro 64
Ro 62 Ro 67 Ro 68
Srd BASE FORCE (UQ-PALAO) ',th DEFENCE FORCE
MARU (F) (Tiuk and ontlvina Islands)
5th DEFENCE DIV.
Srd DEFENCE DIVISION 5th DEFENCE FORCE
15 Special gunboats operating with Sub- (SAIPAN area)
marine Division (four submarines at- 8th GUNBOAT DIVISION
tached) Sfh AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
Included in above is: S. C. Div. 55 7th BASE FORCE (HO-.TALUIT)
MARU TAKUNAN MARU (F)
MARU
:___ MARU Jr,th MINE SWEEP DIV.
. MARU NAGATA MARU
7th AIR SQUADRON (PALAO?) IKUTA MARU
Srd DEFENSE FORCE (PALAO) CHOKAI MARU
DAIDO :\IARTI
5th BASE FORCE (HQ-SAIPAN) (!th DEFENCE DIVISION
SHOEI MARU (F) (o64-4-1937) 6th DEFENCE FORCE
(.T.VTjUIT and outlvina Islands)
S. C. Div. 56 AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
(ODD) KASHI (F)
/,th DEFENCE DIV.
[6] SIXTH FLEET
17th MINE LAYER DIVISION (may be now assigned THIRD FLEET)
(CM) ITUKUSHIMA
(CM) YAEYAMA
SUBRON 1 SUBRON 2
SUBDIV 1 SUBDIV 2 (AS) CHOGBI (F)
(CL) KATORI (F)(AS) TAIGBI (F) SUBDIV 7 SUBDIV S
1-9 1-18 I-l 1-4
1-15 1-19 1-2 1-5
1-16 1-20 1-3 1-6
1-17 1-7
SUBDIV 11
1-74
1-75
C^^L)
ISUZU (F)
SUBDIV 12
I-S
I-IO
1-69
1-70
SUBRON S
SUBDIV 20
1-71
1-72
1-73
8UBR02^ G
(CL) KINU (F)
SUBDIV 9 SUBDIV l-t
(SM) 1-123 (SM) 1-121
(SM) 1-124 (SM) 1-122
SUBRON 5
(CL) YURA
SUBDIV 2S SUBDIV 29
1-59 1-61
1-60 1-62
1-64
(F)
SUBDIV 30
1-05
1-66
1-67 (rep. lost)
(maj' be I-6S)
(AS)
SUBDIV It
1-53
1-54
1-55
SUBRON 10
KARASAKI
SUBDIV 19
1-56
1-57
1-58
(F)
SUBDIV 21
1-23
1-24
1>R0CEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1135
[7]
COMMANDER COMBINED AIR FORCES
NOTE : For characteristics of ORANGE planes, armameut, etc., see Tables in FATU-
Report of Air Operations, Summary #12-41 (S) dated 2 June 1941.)
AIRRON ,?.}
(Now with 4th Fleet)
(AV) KAMOI
(XAV) MARU
1st COMBINED AIR FORCE
(Hdqtrs. TAKAO)
TAKAO AIR GROUP
TOKO AIR GROUP
TAICHU AIR STATION
KAGI AIR STATION
NAHA AIR GROUP (Loochoo.s)
OITA AIR GROUP (Kyushu)
KANOYA AIR GROUP ( " )
plus other Shore Groups
Misc. "Tenders"
(DD) MINEKAZE (comm. guard)
(FORMOSA)
( " )
( " )
( " )
[8]
6th AIRCRAFT WING
AIRRON 6
(Now assigned 3rd Fleet)
(AV) NOTORO
(XAV) KAMIKAWA MARU
(XAV) MARU
Snd COMBINED AIR FORCE
^Hdqtrs. SHANGHAI)
12th AIR CORPS
(Mixed groups— 5 squadrons VP
(15/Sq.) and 2 (lightj Bomber
squadrons (12/Sq.)).
13th AIR CORPS
(3 squadrons Heavy Bombard-
ment (12/Sq.) plus reserve of
3/Sa. plus 2 Sq. VF.
SHANGHAI-HANKOW-ICHANG
(DD) OKIKAZE (comm. guard)
3rd COMBINED AIR FORGE
(Hdqtrs. SANCHAU Is. (S. China))
16th AIR CORPS (Same as 13th)
Part of 14th at HOIHOW, HAINAN-
SANCHAU IS. AND HANOI (F.I.C.)
Part of IGth at SANl'A, HAINAN
and HAIPHONG (F.I.C.)
JAPANESE FLEET IN CHINA WATERS
FIRST (CHINA) FLEET
(OCA) IZUMO (F)
11th Squadron
PG ATAKA PR ATAMI
PR SETA PR FUTAMI
PR KATADA PR FUSHIMI
PR HIRA PR SUMIDA
PR HOZU PR HASHIDATE
PR ? PR UJI
10th AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
HANKOW BASE FORCE
KIUKIANG BASE FORCE
SECOND (CHINA) FLEET
1st Squadron
(CA) ASHIGARA (F)
(CL) NAGARA (now assigned THIRD FLEET)
Uth Squadron
(PG) SAGA Mine Sweeper #17
V Mine Sweeper #18
DESRON 5 (now assigned THIRD FLEET)
(CL) NATORI (F)
DESRON 5 DESRON 12
ASAKAZE SATSUKI
HARUKAZE MINATSUKI
MATSUKAZB FUMITSUKI
HATAKAZE NAGATSUKI
1st TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRON
OTORI
HAYABUSA
HITODORI
KASASAGI
1 9]
15th DEFENCE DIVISION
AMOY BASE FORCE
16th DEFENCE DIVISION CANTON BASE FORCE
HAINAN ISLAND BASE FORCE
Special Service Ships :
Four from YOKOSUKA
Eight from SASEBO
One from MAIZURU
THIRD (CHINA) FLEET
12th DIVISION
(OCA) IWATE'
nth TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRON
KIJI
KARI
SAGI
HATO
Ist GUNBOAT DIVISION
ISth GUNBOAT DIVISION
SHANGHAI BASE FORCE
(ODD) KURI
TSUGA
HASU
SHANGHAI HARBOR DEPT.
SPECIAL LANDING FORCES
MANRI (?) MARU
21st TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRON
CHIDORI
MANAZURU
HATSUKARI
TOMOZURU
Snd GUNBOAT DIVISION
NIHONKAI MARU (F)
nth GUNBOAT DIVISION
TSINOTAO BASE FORCE
NANKING BASE FORCE
AIR CORPS
1136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HIQH NORTH FLEET
There are at least eight to ten men-of-war and three or four naval auxiliaries in the
High North Fleet. This Force operates in the KURILES-KAMCHATKA, HOKKAIDO-
SAGHALIEN, and Northern HONSHU areas. It is apparent that the Headquarters for
this Force is at OMINATO. There has been some air activity in connection with the
operations of this Fleet, probably by shore-based seaplane squadrons in the above areas.
[101
Summation
Total
No.
1st
Fit
2nd
Fit
3rd
Fit
4th
Fit
fith
Fit
1st
China
Fleet
2nd
China
Fleet
3rd
China
Fleet
Total
Attached
to Naval
Districts,
inactive
or at
NavyYards
BB
10
18
19
96
47
9
4
2
34
9
18
14
84
43
9
7
5
4
9
4
1
CA
9
2
30
4
2
12
1
0
CL#
DD#
SS#
4
8
4
5
12
43
4
ss#
25
9
16
cv
8
5
3
3
2
2
1
2
4
1
AV
1
2
2
1
0
XAV
?
CM
g
2
3
0
AS
6
2
# Numbers mclude some OCL, ODD, OSS and oss.
[ii] The above organization is believed to be quite accurate but atten-
tion is invited to the fact that ORANGE may (and probably will) regroup
Fleets or units of Fleets into special Task Forces (or new Fleets) for special
operations or to meet given conditions; for example: when ORANGE wanted
to make a show of force in connection with its benevolent mediation in the
THAILAND— FRENCH INDO-CHINA Dispute during the latter part of Janu-
ary 1941, a special reeuforcement unit was sent from the FIRST and SECOND
FLEETS to the SOUTH CHINA FLEET. This unit consisted of CRUDIV 7
(4 CA), DESRON 1 (1 CI^16 DD). CARDIV 2 (2 CV-1 DESRON), 1 AV
and 1 or more XAV. The THIRD FLEET was actually organized in April
1941, but did not operate as such until the political situation permitted the
FRENCH INDO-CHINA Base question to be forced in .Tune-July 1941. It is of
interest to note that the reeuforcement of the SOUTH CHINA FLEET in
January was a "Rehearsal Run" for the organization of the THIRD FLEET.
Although the submarines were organized and operated in a separate Fleet
(6th), they have also been split to operate with the 1st and 2nd FLEETS as
well. The inclusion of the 3 COMBINED AIR FORCES into the 6th FLEET
substantiates past reports of Joint Maneuvers of Submarines and Air Force
with stress on their cooperation in Fleet Problems and Exercises.
m]
(B) MATERLVL INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATES
For many years Japan has effectively prevented observation of activities in
the MANDATED ISLANDS. However, it is known that as a result of ex-
tensive hydrographic and meteorological surveys, considerable expansion and
improvements have been completed in harbor development, "commercial" air
facilities, communications and meteoi'ological establishments in the principal
islands (JALUIT, PONAPE, KUSAIE, TRUK, PALAO, and SAIPAN). Since
late in 1940 ORANGE Naval and Air Operations in this area have increased
and some forty to forty -five naval auxiliaries (cargo, transport, supply, and
tankers ex-merchant marine) now make continuous shuttle trips to
the MANDATES with personnel, material, equipment and supplies. (Places
marked # below have been destination for these vessels). The "Material
Installations" are listed below to bring up to date the information reported in
ONI-49, "Extracts from the Japanese Monograph 1939", pages 127.01 to 127.24
inclusive.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1137
Marshall Islands
JALVIT # (Installations on JARBOR IS., IMIEJI IS. (EMIDJ IS.) and
ENYBOR IS.)
{JARBOR IS.)
Naval Radio Station.
High Frequency R. D. F.
Meteorological Station.
Natal Inspector Jaluit.
6th Defence Force Headquarters ("Jaluit Detached Force").
6th Defence Division (Base Force) Headquarters.
Bases and trunnions for 6" guns are mounted along the Marino Parade (prol)-
ably3).
A battery of 4.7 inch field pieces.
Several mobile (pneumatic tired trucks) Searchlights, 10 inch (projector)
diameter, 1500 candle power.
Machine guns and A. A. guns. Latter moufited on trailers, towed by Diesel
tractors.
Barracks for garrison of 5(X) men (1940).
Estimate 1000 Army troops arrived in Februai'y, 1941.
Lookout towers.
Civil Engineering Section.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.
Gasoline and oil tanks above ground (camouflaged)^ — 1 mile South of JARBOR
on reef formerly called "American Town".
Coal Briquette Stowage.
Deep water wharf and smaller jetties.
Branch Office 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.
Branch Office 4th Supply Department.
#3 Branch Military Post Office.
[i3] Two landing fields each with hanger capable of handling medium sized
planes; adjacent buildings camouflaged. (Jaluit based Fighters and/or carrier
planes).
Mitsubishi Machine Shop situated between two air fields.
Power plant (Diesel) for shop and airfields.
Detachment of 6th Defence Force.
JALVIT
{IMIEJI IS. {EMIDJ 18.))
Naval Radio Station.
Seaplane base at East Point (reference to IMIEJI BASE).
Air Corps here^
Civil Engineering Section.
Ordnance Officer (s) attached.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
Detachment of Yokusuka Civil Engineers.
Detachment from Kure Navy Yard.
Detachment of 6th Defence Force.
WOTJE #
Naval Radio station.
Meteorological station.
Detachment of 6th Defence Force ("WOTJE Detached Force").
Fortified (reported).
Lookout towers.
Landing Field (completed 1937-ONI 49). (Air Corps here; June 1941).
Civil Engineer Section.
Ordnance Officers attached.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.
Detachment from Yokosuka Navy Yard.
Detachment from Kure Navy Yard.
"Oil tanks".
Deep water wharf.
Branch Office — 4th Supply Departuienf.
Branch 4th Military Storps (Munitions) Dpparfmpnt.
1138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MALOELAP #— (TAROA IS.)
Naval radio station.
Detachment of 6th Defence Force ('"J'AROA Del ached Force").
"TAROA BASE".
Lookout towers.
Landing field under construction (19-10).
Civil Engineering Section.
Ordnance Officers attached.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
"Storage plant".
Sanitary Corps in charge of Medical Officer.
[14] KWAJELIN # (establishment on both KWA.7ELTN and RUOTTO
(ROUS.))
Naval Radio Stations (on KWA.JELIN and RUOTTO).
"RUOTTO BASE". Air activity— June 1941.
Detachments of 0th Defence Force (on KWAJELIN and RUOTTO).
Shore Batteries of Olh Defence Force on KWAJELIN.
Shore Batteries of 0th Defence Force on RUOTTO.
Civil Engineering Section (RUOTTO).
Ordnance Officers attached (four or more).
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers (KWAJELIN and RUOTTO).
Detachments from YOKOSUKA Civil Engiugers (KWAJELIN and RUOTTO)
ENIWETOK #
Naval Radio Station.
Meteorological Station.
Detachment of 0th Defence Force ("ENIWETOK Detached Force").
Fortified (reported).
1935 — "Building in progress — submarine base?".
Landing Field here (?).
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers. (One also on MERIREN IS. (PARRY IS.) ) .
Detachment from Kure Navy Yard.
POKAAEKU (TAONGI IS.)
Naval Radio Station.
BIKINI
Fortifications?
Earmarked for ORANGE Base?
RONGELAP #
Naval Radio Station.
"Earmarked for ORANGE Base".
Actually used by ORANGE during maneuvers in past.
RONOERIK
Naval Radio Station (reported).
VTIRIK
Naval Radio Station.
Meteorological Station.
Naval personnel reported here.
WOTTO
Naval Radio Station (reported).
[15] UJAE
Naval Radio Station.
MAJURO (Used by Von Spee in iSHt
Naval Radio ( ?)
Naval per.sonnel hero.
Detachment <>t 4th Civil Engineer.s.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1 139
EBON #
Naval Radio (?)
Naval personnel reported here.
"BASE- (?)
MILLE
Naval Eadio Station.
Naval personnel reported here.
ORANGE considers. MILLE extremely inipctrtant.
Cai-oJines
UJELANG #
Naval Radio Station.
iMeteorologlcal Station.
KUSAIE #
Naval Radio Station.
It. D. F. (reported).
Meteorological Station.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force.
Submarine Base (?) (reported).
Fortified (at least two giin emplacements reported).
Lookout towers (day and night sentry watch).
Land Plane field (reported).
Seaplane operating base (reported).
Mine and torpedo storage (reported).
At least two Ordnance officers connected with work xmderway at KUSAIE.
PINGELAP #
Naval Eadio Station.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force.
[16] SATAWAN
Used by ORANGE SS in 1932.
MORTLOCK
Naval Radio Station.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force.
I'ONAPE #
Naval Radio Station.
R. D. F. reported.
3Ieteorological Station.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force ("PONAPE Detaclied Force").
Army troops reported arrived here in Fel)ruary, 1941— estimated IWO divided
between PONAPE and TRUK.
Fortified.
"Air Field % mile South of the tov.'n . . . anotlier base reported on tip of JOKAJ
Island.
Seaplane Facilities . . . "Air Base".
11th Air Corps.
Mine and Torpedo Storage (reported).
Civil Engineering Section.
At least two ordnance officers attached.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers. (Active on LANGAR Is.).
Detachment of YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers.
Oil storage (reported).
Branch Office, Military Stores (Munitions) Department.
Branch Office, 4th Supply Department.
•Kh r.ranch ISIilitary Post OtliPe.
7:i71G- -40 Ex. 149, vol. 2 31
1140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TRUK #
Naval Radio Station.
R. D. F. reported.
Meteorological Station.
Headquarters 4th Defence Force.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force (TRUK Detached Force").
"#70 BASE" (probably Air Base).
Army troops arrived here February, 1941— estimated 1000 divided between TRUK
and PONAPE.
Fortified.
Land plane field on TOL Is . . . another at South end of DUBLON IS.
Air Corps arrived TRUK (June 1941).
Seaplane facilities.
Mine and Torpedo storage reported.
"Prepared for mine defence".
Mandate Headquarters 4th Civil Engineers.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
[17] Civil Engineer Section.
Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.
Detachment from Kure Navy Yai'd.
Oil storage (reported).
Mandate Headquarters 4th Military Stores (Munitums) Dept.
Branch Office 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Dept.
Mandate Headquarters 4th Supply Dept.
Branch Office 4th Supply Dept.
Mandate Headquarters of Military Post Offices.
PULUWAT # (POLOOT) (ENDERBY)
Naval Radio Station.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force.
OLOL #
Naval Radio Station.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force.
LAMOTREK # (SWEDE)
Naval Radio.
Detachment of 4th Defence Force.
(Naval) "AIR BASE".
WOLEAI #
Naval Radio Station.
Reported earmarked for Seaplane base.
ULITHI #
Naval Radio Station.
Advance Fleet anchorage.
FAIS
"Commercial" Radio Station (JPF).
SOROL
Naval Radio Station.
"Landing field in operation" reported.
[18] YAP #
Naval Radio Station.
Meteorological Station.
Naval personnel reported here.
Reported fortified.
Land plane field near GAGIL, (reported).
Has been estensivelv used as seaplane operatitig base.
Ex- YOKOHAMA Air Corps (?).
Civil Engineering Section.
Branch of the 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.
PALAO # (includes PALAO— PELELIU— etc. ) .
Naval Radio Stations (at least three).
H. F R. D. F.
Combined Radio and Signal Section.
Meteorological Station.
Headquarters .3rd Defence Division (Base Force).
Headquarters 3rd Defence Force.
Detachment of 3rd Defence Force.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1141
Resident Naval OflScer (Mandate Naval Headquarters).
Estimated 5000 Army troops arrived PALAO in February, 1941.
Army resident officers — liaison with Navy.
Observation tower or Battery Control station and artillery emplacements under
construction on west side of BABELTHUAP Island (several 6" guns unloaded
from transports).
All lighthouses believed used as Observation Posts or Battery Control stations.
Batteries believed emplaced near each lighthouse.
"Aircraft Detecting Device mounted on high hill at East end of KOROR Island.
Ammunition Stoi-age to South of high hill on KOROR Island.
Barracks and Battery emplacements on PgLELIU Island.
Barracks on West end of KOROR Island and at Southeast corner of BABEL-
THUAP Island.
Seaplane facilities and Landing Field on ARAKABESANi Island.
Seaplane facilities and Landing Field on PELELIU Island.
Naval Base on PELELIU Island.
"Fighting Plane Wing— PELELIU".
4th Air Corps 16th Seaplane Squadron.
4th Aircraft Technical Section.
Ex-CHITOSE Air Corps. ( The 4th Air Corps ? ) .
Mine and Torpedo storages (reported).
Civil Engineer Section.
At least four Ordnance Officers attached.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
Detachment of Yokosuka Civil Engineers.
Detachment from KURE Navy Yard.
[19] Branch 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.
Branch of 4th Supply Department.
Oil storage ("considerable") on S. W. side of MALAKAL Island.
Advance Fleet Anchorage at KOSSOL Passage.
Submarine Base (?) reported under construction on NGAJANGEL Is.
Branch Hydrographic Office
#2 Branch Military Post Office.
HELEN REEF #
Naval Radio Station.
Meteorological Station.
"Helen Reef Seaplane Base".
Construction activity obserAed.
TOBI # (LORD NORTH)
Naval Radio.
Five oil tanks observed.
GREENWICH # (KAPINGAMARANGI)
Naval Radio Station.
Detachment of 4th Defense Force.
Bonin Island XOgasawara Oroup) {not in Mandates).
CHICHIGIMA #
Naval Radio Station.
HF— R. D. F. Station.
Army Garrison.
Fortied.
Naval Air Station (seaplane operating base).
Mine Storage (reported).
Civil Engineer Section.
Marcus Island # {MinnmUorisliimn) (not in Mandates)
Naval Radio Station.
R. D. F. Station (?).
Meteorological Station.
"Marcus Island Detached Force".
"Marcus Island Base".
Land plane field (?) . . . (!)
1142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[20] Marianas Islands
URACAS
Land plane field (?) (reported).
MAUG
Seaplane (?) and Submarine Base (?) (reported).
Has been used for seaplane and submarine operations.
Fortified (reported).
Oil Storage (reported).
PAGAN #
Naval Radio Station.
A temporary air field here has been used by carrier planes.
Civil Engineering Section.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
Detachment of YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers.
SAIPAN #
Naval Radio Station.
H. F.— R. D. F. Station.
Meteorological Station.
Fortified — heavy guns — AA guns — searchlights — (reported).
Combined Lookout Stations and Shore Battery (control) Establishments, (at
GARAPAN, NAFUTAN, LAULAU, FINA SUSU, MANIAGAHA (Is.) and
others) .
Army garrison — ^barracks — storehouses.
Fifth Defence Division (Base Force) Headquarters.
Fifth Defence Force Headquarters.
Detachment of Fifth Defence Force.
Saipan Naval Air Station — landplane field at ASLITO.
Seaplane facilities.
Fifth Air Corps (ex-KISARAZU Landplane Squadron(s) included?).
Fifth Aircraft Technical Department.
Mine and Torpedo Storage (reported).
Civil Engineering Section.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
Detachment of YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers.
Detachment from KURE Navy Y^'ard.
Oil Storage reported.
Deep water wharf.
Branch of 4th Military Stores (Munitions) Department.
SAIPAN SUPPLY DEPARTMENT.
Branch of 4th Supply Department.
#1 Branch Military Post Office.
[21] TENIAN #
Naval Radio Station.
"Combined Lookout and Shore Battery (control) Stations".
Fortified.
Detachment of 5th Defence Force.
Civil Engineering Section.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
Ordnance Officer (s) attached.
Detachment of 4th Civil Engineers.
Detachment of YOKOSUKA Civil Engineers.
ROTA
Naval Radio Station.
Fortified (reported).
Defence works underway (reported).
Submarine Base (?) (reported).
[22] C. PROBABLE FOKCES, NAVAL AND OTHERS IN MANDATES
(a) FOURTH ("Mandate") FLEET. (See Section A).
(b) Naval Forces Ashore:
3rd Defence Force (Headquarters PALAO).
5th Defence Force (Headquarters SAIPAN).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1143
Detachment of 5th Defence Force on TENIAN and probably other Islands
of MARIANAS (See Section B).
4th Defence Force (Headquarters TRUK).
Detachments of 4th Defence Force on outlying islands of Eastern and
Central CAROLINES (See Section B).
6th Defence Force (Headquarters JALUIT).
Detachments of 6th Defence Force on outlying islands of MARSHALLS
(See Section B).
(c) Army Forces Ashore:
On PALAO, SAIPAN, TRUK, PONAPE, JALUIT (See Section B).
(d) Navy Yard Detachments (labor and production (See Section B).
Civil Engineer Detachments " " " (See Section B).
(e) Naval Air Forces:
» Considerable activity. Exact composition and numbers not definite. The
following table is constructed as a result of an analysis of fragmentary
reports of varying degrees of reliability :
Air r on 24
Kamoi
(AV)
Mara
(XAV)
4th-16th
Air
(Palao)
5th-8th
Air
(Saipan)
11th Air
(Ponape)
— th Air
(Trak?)
— th Air
(Jaiuit)
Total
Sq.
No.
Sq.
No.
Sq.
No.
Sq.
No.
Sq.
No.
Sq.
No.
Sq.
No.
Sq.
No.
VF . .-
2
1
24
12
1
1
12
12
1
12
VOS
1
10
1
12
1
12
VSB
1
12
1
12
VTB
1
1
2
7
12
12
16
76
1
12
VB (hy.)
1
1
4
12
12
48
1
1
3
12
8
32
1
2
5
12
16
52
VPB
1
3
8
32
Total--..
1
10
1
12
24
262
AVhen present work on expansion and construction of land plane bases is
completed it is believed that ORANGE will use these for Type 96/97 twin engine
land-plane, long range bombers and for fighters. These will be flown out to
these bases in such numbers as to cope with a given situation.
[23] D. ACTIVITIES IN PROGRESS IN THE MANDATES
When BLUE held Fleet XXI, the ORANGE FOURTH FLEET took up stations
in the Eastern Mandates and intensified its radio intercept activities in con-
junction with ORANGE trans-Pacific naval tankers. In late August — early
September, 1940, ORANGE held maneuvers in the Mandated areas using the Air
arm (carrier and shore-based planes) and Submarine Force to search for, locate,
and attack a hypothetical enemy Force (represented by the FOURTH FLEET)
advancing to the West from the vicinity of the Northern Gilberts. The general
defence line seemed to be PONAPE — TRUK but details or conclusions of the
exercises are not known. It may be significant that on the next Fleet reorgani-
zation, December, 1940, a separate SUBMARINE (SIXTH) FLEET was formed
(See Section A).
ORANGE'S decision to speed up the militarization was apparently reached con-
currently with the signing of the Tri-Parte Pact, as movements of naval reserve
auxiliaries (taken over from the Merchant Marine) to the Mandates became
apparent thereafter. Since late in nineteen forty this movement of personnel,
materials and supplies has progressively increased until in July, 1941, there were
approximately forty to forty-five ships constantly engaged in round trips between
ORANGE mainland and the Mandates. An analysis shows about sixty-five per-
cent of this shipping is destined for the Eastern CAROLINES and INIARSHALLS.
Considerable air activity has been in evidence at S.\IPAN, PALAO, TRUK,
PONAPE and in the JALUIT area. Foreign steamers nearing these areas have
I)een subjected to aircraft observations and close scrutiny by Patrol Planes,
Bombers and Fighters. Heavv landplane bombers have made reconnaissance
flights over the GILBERT ISLANDS (TARAWA, BUTARITARI, and BERU).
1144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DISCUSSION OF SHORE ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVITIKS
During the early months of 1941, evidence has shown that an Administrative
Organization has been set up for control and expansion of the military develop-
ments of the Mandates. This Mandate Organization is taking the line parallel
to but separate from the parent organization, YOKOSUKA Administration chain,
previously in control. While PALAO has always been the MANDATE Admin-
istrative center (and may continue to be) the focus of SUPPLY, CIVIL EN-
GINEERING and MUNITIONS Administration in the Mandates is now centered
at TRUK.
An increase in the number of CIVIL ENGINEER Detachments on the various
Islands has been very noticeable and while some are distinctly Detachments of
the YOKOSUKA Civil Engineering Section, others are separately and distinctly
Detachments of the FOURTH Civil Engineering Section which almost invariably
has detachments on the same islands as the YOKOSUKA Branch Detachments.
The Headquarters of the FOURTH CIVIL ENGINEERS was formed at KURK
in November 1940 and moved to YOKOSUKA the latter part of January 1941, and
thence to the Mandates about 20 February. Accompanying it were the 4th MIL-
ITARY STORES (MUNITIONS) and the 4th SUPPLY ADMINISTRATION
which also have branch offices on the principal islandes of the MANDATES.
The Commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th DEFENCE DIVISIONS (BASE
FORCES) have a Flagship and a Headquarters or Administrative Section, the
latter remains ashore at the home base regardless of the movements of the Com-
mand or of the Flagship. Each DEFENCE DIVISION contains a DEFENCE
FORCE which in the case of the 4th and 6th is divided into DETACHED
FORCES on the islarfds in the vicinity of the Command's Headquarters. Close
cooperation has been noted between the DEFENCE FORCES and the Aircraft
activities at their home bases.
The 3rd DEFENCE DIVISION has four submarines attached, possibly old
boats of the "Ro" type. It may be ORANGE intention to similarly organize the
other DEFENCE DIVISIONS.
During late May 1941 ORANGE held maneuvers in the INIandates in connec-
tion with the dispatch of a part of the COMBINED AIR FORCE to that area
(indoctrinal training?). The RYUJO (and possibly the HIRYU) and about half
of the SUBMARINE FLEET also tooli part in this exercise. It is believed that
the FOURTH FLEET acted as an "Enemy Fleet" attempting to penetrate into
the MARSHALLS, with the AIR FORCES plus the SUBMARINE FLEET at-
tempting to intercept them. It was reported that tlie ORANGE strategic high
frequency Direction Finder net was active in this Phase, funnelling information
to the AIR and SUBARINB FORCES on a common chain via SAIPAN and there
is some evidence tliat these Forces were under a unified command. After visits
at WOTJE, KWAJELIN, and JALUIT the additional forces returned to their
normal operating units at the end of June.
Hewitt Inqtjirt Exhibit No. 6C>
United States Pacific Fleet
AND Pacibto Ocean Arenas
HEADQUARTERS OP THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
This is to certify that the attached document consisting of the following:
Copy of Map of Pearl Harbor, showing the "Ships Moored 0755, 7
December 1941"
is a true and correct photographic copy of the documjent in the official files of the
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
TsEAL] R. B. Keeton,
R. E. Keetton,
By direction of the
Commander in Chief, U. S. PacifiG Fleet,
and Pacific Ocean Areas.
(Two copies of the majD referred to supra, showing "Ships Moored
0755, 7 December 1941," at Pearl Harbor will be found reproduced as
Items Nos. 253 and 254, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1145
Hewitt In(juirt Exhibit No. 67
United States PAcanc Fleet Radio Unit
COMMANDANT, NAVT 12S
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.
6 June 1945.
of the following:
'In and Out" dated
This is to certify that the attached documents consisting
Copy of the record of telephone communications
December 7, 1941
are true and correct typewritten copies of the documents in the official files of
the United States Pacific Fleet Radio Unit.
This organizatiou has no official seal.
J. S. Harper,
J. S. Habpeb, .
Captain, U. 8. Navy.
Record Telephone Communications In and Out
December 7, 1941.
From
HEEIA YUNE 8 at 3.'i7 (Rec. of 178) at 1040. YUNE 8 is
C0MCARDIV3.
CINCPAC 2 CARRIERS. 8 ESCORTS. AND 3 TROOP SHIPS 40
MILES SOUTH OP BARBERS POINT. (Time 1050).
Arrangements being made to get direct telephone connection
to Radio Heeia.
HEEIA informed that RMO truck is on its way out and for
them not to send their truck in. ( 1245 ) .
HEEIA MU" HE SARA // HAHO on 4780 ERG 186 (1240— Time)
(Believed Sub)
HEEIA MU" HE SARA // HAHO on 4580 BRG 181 (Time 1240)
(Believed Sub)
CINCPAC MEN BLUE OVERHAULS RED MARKING LANDING
AROUND BARBERS (1255) PARACHUTE TROOPS
LANDING. SHIP 4 MILES OFF BARBERS.
CINCPAC ENEMY SHIP FOUR MILES SOUTH BARBERS POINT.
ENEMY LANDING ON NORTH SHORE ALSO PARA-
CHUTE TROOPS LANDING NORTH SHORE— BLUE
OVERHAUL, RED EMBLEMS.
HEEIA Intercepted msg to RERIS (P5L from C8Q PART ENEMY
TRANSPORTS 4 MILES OFF BARBERS POINT
ATTACK
HEEIA KANURE (Appears to O. T. C.) on 6581— BRG 183 (time
1200)
HEEIA SI SO on 7033— BRG 1671/2 (time 1200)
HEEIA UNKNOWN on 458— low frequency channel.
HEEIA VOICE on 44.50 (time 1200)
RDOLAB REPORTS HAS SEVERAL RECEIVERS READY FOR
USE (time 1310)
KANEOHE REPORTS (UNAUTHENTICATED) CAPTURED CHART
SHOWS POINT 223°— 90 MILES FROM FORD ISLAND,
(time abt 1130)
CINCPAC ENEMY SAMPAN ABOUT LAND AT AMMUNITION
DEPOT. ENEMY LANDING PARTY LANDING AT
NANAKOULI. FRIENDLY PLANE FIRING ON THEM
(time 1330)
BAYS ADMIRAL THEOBALD HAS REPORTED TO AID C6M-14
(time 1410)
BAYS DOBBIN HAS JAPANESE PRISONERS ABOARD. MEN
APPROACHED DOBBIN BY BOAT. PRISONER BE-
LIEVED OFF SUBMARINE, (time 1410)
114G CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEEIA
KASO seems to be TASK FORCE COMMANDER
KANURE is probably Commander in the Air
KANURE sez at 1235 (Local Time) "I HAVE FUEL FOR
10 MINUTES)."
KANURE sez at 1240 "I WILL FLY AS LONG AS I HAVE
FUEL".
SOMEONE ON 7033 AT 1217 SAID "HAVE NOT BE
OPPOSED".
SAME FREQUENCY BELIEVE SINIRE FROM SISO AT
1250 "WHAT IS YOUR COURSE""
RUSI8 AND YUNE8 believed to be COMMANDER
CARRIERS.
SUTI2 believed to be a CARRIER.
SISORE is either another COMDR IN THE AIR or COMDR
TRANSPORT GROUP.
SISO is BOSS OF SISORE. '
December 7, 1911.
Recokd of Information in and Out
DISPATCH 072330 SENT C0M14 TO DUTCH HARBOR,
SAMOA AND MIDWAY (YKBZY). GIVING DOPE UP
TO 1200.
OPNS JAPANESE VOICE ON 15425 KG. Time 1510
U. S. S. MAKUA Departed for Honnapo Dec. 6th due day-
light 8th. Then to Hilo and San Francisco.
HEEIA NAT17 (RF7) Bearing 240-080 (This morning at 0537 on
5995 kcs 9HK DE RF7 RF7 RF7 SOS SOS SOS SOS
JAPS ATTACKED OAHU
WAILUPE ON 5560 MASE0 Bearing 300.
On 5370 at 0709 REYA7 bearing 303 (2020 Zone 10%)
COMMOFFICE Relay to HEEIA— From : COM4-To : ALL DISTRICT
ACTIVITIES BE PREPARED FOR AIR RAID AT
DAWN .... (Delivered 2110).
" 5370 at 0715 TIFU0 Bearing 300. (2045 Zone 101/2).
" 5370 at 0721 MI S09 Bearing 300. (2051 Zone lOVo).
Mr. Lagle measured crystal — 3820.
COMMOFFICE Coast Guard sez— Strong CW sending MO's on 500 Kcs and
using calls NPS and M9U. . . .
On 4330 at 0750 SEFU Bearing 255 (2120 Zone lOVo ) .
Lt. Slonim— Nothing on 9500—2230 . . . Keep listening.
Tokio Broadcast — from Lt. Slonim . . . Attacked Shanghai
and Singapore.
Landing at Ma-
laya.
Great damage at
Philippines.
Attacked Hong-
kong Twice.
Destroyed back-
bone of Amer-
ican Fleet.
Do damage to
themselves.
WAILUPE TO: C0M14 From Capt. Mayfield Naval Intelligence via
Thru Comm Commercial Pacific Cable ...MIDWAY BEING
Office. BOMBED.
COMM OFFICE On 4900 at 0938 RISU8 Bearing 305. (2308 Zone lOV-).
Very Strong Signal . . .
COMMOFFICE On 5370 at 0945 TIFU0 Bearing 301. (2315 Zone lOy^).
THESE BEARINGS COMING FROM LUALUALEI
THROUGH WAILUPE.
Decembek 7, 1941.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1147
COMM OFFICE
HEEIA
COM. OF.
COM. OF.
HEEIA
CXK
CXK
Record of Information In and Out
On 5290 at 0950 RAYU4 Bearing 301 (2320 Zone lOM-).
SIEHI on 6385 (Sub. Freq.) at 125/305 at (1020 GCT)
(1150 LOCAL)
MSG FROM COMDESDIV SO TO ALL SHIPS AND STA-
TIONS "SHIP PREVIOUSLY HEADING NW IS AN
UNIDENTIFIED CRUISER" ALSO "CRUISER PRE-
VIOUSLY REPORTED IS ON COURSE 330" "UN-
KNOWN SHIP CHANGED COURSE TO EAST".
"IDENTIFIED AS FRIENDLY". (101/2-1045) (1215
HST).
MSG FROM MIDWAY TO WAILUPE (READDRESSED
BY WAILUPE TO ALL STATIONS ON THIS CIRCUIT
"HANGER TO GO. THIS MAY BE NNE OF NQM
4627 KENBRAYOHATU— weak signals Time 1240 HST)
6400 FUNI0 BEARING 300 Time 1035 GCT)
6400 HEME3 BEARING 298 Time 1038 GCT)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 68
Cincpac File No.
United States Pacifio Fleet, U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
December S, 19Jfl.
Report of Prisoner Number One
Detailed information concerning this report will be submitted today. Pre-
liminary report indicates the prisoner a Japanese Sub-Lieutenant, aged twenty-
four years. Was pulled out of the water ofE Bellows Field this morning. Was
talien prisoner by the Army and is held at Fort Shafter by Colonel Fielder,
The officer refused to talk concerning the enemy's composition or disposition
and at the present time the only information present is as follows :
1. He swam ashore from a reef one mile off Bellows Field.
2. He and another officer were the only members of a two-man submarine.
The reason for his capture was that he was sneaking up on what he thought
to be a capital ship and in order to navigate he had to open the hatch
of the submarine — whereupon water came into the hatch and swamped the
motor. He thereupon drifted upon the reef. This officer v\-as Captain and
Navigator. The other officer has not been recovered. Information indi-
cates that there are more of these small submarines in the vicinity and that
they were brought here from some type of a mother ship. The prisoner did
state that he had to navigate a distance of a hundred miles before running
aground upon the reef. At the time of his capture the officer wore a stop
watch around his neck which stopped running at 0210. It is not known
whether this is GCT or LCT. Although he did not give the enemy's forces
or disposition he stated that so far as he knew the attack was a disappoint-
ment in that they expected a paralyzing blow to our fleet.
3. In accordance with the saniuri code this prisoner has requested that
he only be allowed to commit suicide.
It is evident that the officer appreciated the treatment afforded him by the
naval questioners to that of the Army, and it is felt that with proper handling,
further information might be derived from this officer.
Respectfully,
E. T. Layton.
1148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Fourteenth Naval District
District Intelligence Office
Sixth Floor, Young Hotel
Honolulu, Havaii, Deccmhcr 8, 19//!.
CHC/MB
Memorandum for : Fleet Intelligence Officer.
1. Young, adult Japanese male — muscular build. cropi>ed black hair — ap-
parently in perfect health. Gave his age as 24, sub-Lieutenant in the Japanese
Navy and a graduate of the imperial Naval Academy.
2. He was without clothing of any kind, and seated in a chair wrapped in
an army blanket. Before questioning was started it was learned that this prisoner
was taken on the beach at Bellows Field. That he had swum ashore and had
around his neck, on a lanyard, a stop watch which had salt water inside of it.
The watch was stopped at 0210. The watch was inscribed on the reverse in
Japanese characters — translated as follows : "Watch 2ND clock, Type 1, Navy
#296. Movement No. 3346171." This man stated that he was an officer of the
Japanese Navy and gave his name as KAZUO SAKAMAKI of Okayama Pre-
fecture. He had been one of a crew of two in a submarine which had run
ashore on a reef approximately one mile off Bellows Field. He stated that
he was the Commanding Officer of the submarine and the navigator and that
his shipmate was the engineer — entire crew consisted of himself and one ship-
mate. He admitted that the submarine was of a small type which operated
from a mother ship but refused to give the name or tonnage of the mother ship
or the distance at sea of his disembarkation from the mother ship. When ques-
tioned as to whether the submarine was deisel or electric propelled he refused
to answer. He stated that he had navigated "more than a hundred miles'' when
asked if the distance were as much as one hundred miles. Too much credence
should not be placed in this answer as he obviously realized he was being
pumped. He stated that he wished to commit suicide and had not done so at
the time of landing on shore because of the possibility which remained of making
his escape and rejoining the Japanese Navy. He stated that he had now been
disgraced and did not want his name or his ship information sent back to Japan.
When complimented on the success of which his Naval comrades had made their
attack, he stated that it had been much less successful than they had anticipated.
We expressed surprise at this and he was asked what they originally expected
to accomplish, he replied, in effect, a knock-out blow to your Navy.
3. He stated that off Bellows Field this morning he had been approaching a
capital ship but that the darkness was so complete that he was forced to open
Ins conning tower and stand in in the open hatch while running half submerged to-
wards his target. As a result of the maneuver in the choppy sea, he shipped a
great deal of water down the hatch which crippled his motor and this motor
failure resulted, of course, in the loss of control of tlie submarine and his being
dashed into a reef over one mile from Bellows Field. He and his fellow officer
stripped, dived into the ocean jind attempted to swim ashore. He stated that
he last saw his shipmate in the heavy surf. He admitted the possibility that the
Navy might examine the submarine, which had run on the reef (because he was
not aware that Naval planes had subsequently boml)ed and sunk his submariFie).
He stated that there were no papers in the submarine and admitted that this
t.vpe of submarine represented essentially a sort of enlarged variation of a one
man torpedo. He stated "My greatest mistake was being captured. This is the
first time I have failed. Please do not advise Japan ab(»ut this. Please kill me."
During the course of this questioning, which was begun by the aid of two com-
petent interpreters, it developed that this young officer had some knowledge of
English, which he at first did not disclose. Later on he explained his inexpert-
ness in this language by saying that, while in the middle school, he had stiidied
English, but in the Academy, in expectation of duty in the China Seas, he had
selected Chinese.
4. A drawing of a petty officer's Navy Pilot's insignia was made by him and
he explained the significance of the various details of this device.
f». There remains the possibility, if the Naval aiithorities so desire, that this
submarine may yet be located and raised for examination of mechanical details,
etc.
C. H. C.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1149
#
In Reply
Refer To :
Submarine Squadron Four
V. s. s. ARGONAUT, Flagship
Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
December 8. 19.',1.
CONFIDENTIAL
Memorandum : Fleet Intelligence Officer.
Subject : Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay.
1. The submarine when first sighted was about six hundred yards from the
beach, off the end of the ruu-way at Bellows Field. At the time of my arrival
at the Field, three Navy Utility planes were engaged in dropping what appeared
to be either twenty-five or fifty pound bombs, the bombs being dropped in pairs.
No direct hits were made and out of about twelve bombs dropped six appeared
to land within fifty feet of the submarine. After the bombing the submarine did
not appear to have been damaged or to have altered its position.
2. The pilot who first sighted the suT)marine was interviewed and stated tliat
when he picked it up there was a large oil slick around its stern, also its position
had not changed any since the first sighting of it.
3. The operations officer at Bellows Field sent me up in a plane to get a clear
view of the submarine and I was able to come within one hundred feet of it.
The color was dull black with no distinguishing marks, between thirty and forty
feet in length, and about four feet in breadth. There was a small periscope
projecting about three feet from what appeared to be periscope shears. The
contour followed the general line of all submarines and there was a basket like
projection on the bow. At the time, the submarine was down by the stern with
the bow and periscope shears coming out of water from time to time due to the
action of the waves. Judging from the location of the bomb hits on the coral
bottom, which could be seen from the plane, the submarine appeared to be drifting
in towards the beach.
4. It is believed that with the minimum amount of effort, the submarine can
be towed in and beached.
R. L. RUTTER,
TAeutenant, U. S. Naiy.
To a Commanding Officer :
From Japanese Naval Officer
KAZUO SAKAMAKI
I thank you for the kindly visit of yesterday. Now I will write down your
requests of yesterday in Japanese. Please pardon my poor writing and
composition.
1. BRIEF PERSONAL HISTORY
In August 1940 I was graduated from the Naval Academy and became a mid-
shipman. In April of this year I was commissioned a sub-lieutenant in the
navy, my present rank.
2. RECORD OF BATTLE
Your honorable "have" country instituted an economic blockade of Japan, a
"have not" country, refusing to sell us oil. cotton and the like, until we had no
choice but natural collap.se. Becau.se of this we began diplomatic negotiations
with your country, but these ended in failure. Therefore, with a friend, I
set out for Pearl Harbor with the purpose of sinking a battleship, but due
lo accident, although we were nble to reach the mouth of the harbor
by creeping underneath your bombs falling like rain, since the
accident was fatal to the submarine, we determined to proceed without hesi-
tation on the surface of the water, and dashing into the harbor, and climbing
the gang-way ladder, hoped to leap onto the deck and die simultaneously with
blowing up the enem.y warship just as in olden times, during the Mongol invasion,
our Tsuyu Kawano lowered the mast and boarded the enemy ship with it. How-
ever, because of the accident suffered at the harbor mouth, we
struck a reef which given ten seconds we would have safely cleared. My first
stratagem had failed. With this difference of ten seconds the fate was decided
and one of the warships of your country was saved.
Seeing the success of our sister submarines and the splendid achievements of
our air force, I left the mouth of the harbor, compelled to do so due to my sub-
marine being disabled. Later, finally being unable to do anything with the
submarine, I swam through the ocean and reached an enemy airport. Due to
1150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
my exhaustion, I was captured without having time to even fight. And thus
n>y sad fate began.
Due entirely to my inexpert navigation and strategy, my honor as a soldier
has fallen to the ground. Thus I betrayed the expectations of our 100,000,000
(people) and became a sad prisoner of war disloyal to my country.
5. The talk I had with an understanding naval oflQcer in the home of an army
man in "Honolulu" was very pleasant. Because I thought about the trouble I
would cause your country later on, and because I was unable to endure my
shame, committing suicide or being shot to death became impossible, and thus
began my sad life as a prisoner of war. Now that things have come to such
a pass, I have started the life of a peaceful Japanese naval officer abiding by the
rules of international law.
In olden times, Hakui and Shukusei of China, refusing to eat millet of a
foreign land, went into the mountains and ate grass (?) until they starved,
but I, since I began eating your country's bread, have thought what a cause
for shame and soitow it is.
Although I have caused you much annoyance, I have done things right along
according to righteousness. However, such incidents as that which happened
yesterday which is from the standpoint of your country a sad thing has been
continued. My righteousness has made scores of men of your country withdraw
all day long with their guns pointed at me and made them afraid, but as a result
of this, I must face a death which to me is not too pleasing.
My willingness to die need not be mentioned; to be killed by one of yoiu?
bullets of your country shall make me very happy. I pray for your country's
lasting military success.
An uprighteous pistol has been aimed at me. This is my end. Good-bye.
4. To the Japanese people, especially to officers like ourselves, becoming a
prisoner of war is inexcusable. Of course, whether or not there is a record
of the incident or not, I will commit suicide upon my return to my native land.
Kven though we are unarmed, to bite with teeth and fight to the last is the
Japanese spirit.
I pray that my death will forgive me for all my failures and I pray that my
spirit will be enshrined at the Yasukuni (Shrine).
Please forward the following to the Japanese Navy Department.
Last Will and Testament
Although I plunged into the mouth of the harbor, and although I struck
terror in the hearts (of the people of the islands?) I arrived at a situation,
wherein I could do nothing. For this I have no excuse to make. I do not desire
to grasp this opportunity of being a prisoner of war. I am about to die after
fighting for righteousness till the very end as an officer of the Japanese Navy.
Banzai for his Imperial Majesty.
Showa 16th year (1941), 14th day (Month omitted)
Kazxjo Sakamaki,
Naval Sui-Heutenant
Poem Composed Among the Enemy (On the Unfortunate Day That I Became
A Pkisoner of War)
When cherry blossoms fall.
Let them fall !
Drenched are the its branches and leaves
With the sorrow of today !
5. I like best "DOWN THE TORPEDO" and "AMONG THE SHOTS THROUGH
THE MARGARET". I experienced all these things in this current battle which
is the goal of all naval men's ambition, and I manifested the Yamato Damashii
(Japanese spirit). Last night, again scores of bayonets and muzzles were pointed
at me from the front door and from the window and from above my head. How-
ever, righteousness won. And although as a result of this a regretable situa-
tion came about, I hope that all would be forgiven with my death. On the eve
of my "fairly death" lamenting the many sacrifices of your country due to my
"call of righteousness", I earnestly hope that this will be clearly understood,
that supreme desire and joy in dying as a soldier by your country's bullets.
I appreciate your many kindness shown me up to now, and I pray for your
success in the war.
Respectfully,
Kazuo Sakamaki.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1151
Hewitt Inquikt Exhibit No. 69
Confidential
Vol. 1, No. 48
11 June 1945
United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Akeas
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
Any material appearing In "Weekly Intelligence" may be reproduced -with or without
credit, so long as proper classification is observed. "Weekly Intelligence" receives -wide
distrihutiou among Fleet units and key Navy, Marine and Army Commands. Any requests
for additional distribution may be addressed to Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean
Areas.
CONTENTS
Page'
Uneasiness In Japan 1
Tokyo 2
Osaka 3
Unidentified Aircraft 4-5
New Air Commands Identified 5
Japanese Fighter Direction 6
GRACE II— Fighter (Interim Model) 7-8
Demolition Squads In SALLYs 9-11
Destruction At Kanoya 12
Dummy Aircraft 13-19
Target Analysis Of BAKA's Performance 20-21
Airfield Damage Repair 22
Oxygen Generating Apparatus 23-24
Japanese Electric Torpedo 25
Variation In SCS 26
Merchant Ship Photos 27
1-24, Midget Sub Carrier 28
Camouflage vs. Photo Interpretation On Iwo Jima 29-31
Okinawa Defense Doctrine 32-34
Strong Point Positions 35
Enemy Criticism Of Own Artillery Maneuvers : 36-37
Open Siglit For 47 mm AT Gun 37
Weekly Photo Coverage 38-41
New Note In Camouflage 41
Flak Over Japan 42
AA Firing By Heavy Naval Guns 43-44
Air Combat Notes 44
11th Year Type 12 cm CD Gun 45-46
Rifle Grenade Launcher 47
Improvised Armored Car 47
Production Of Intelligence Material 48-49
Fire Bombs For Yokohama 50
Cover Page : Two Coronados of VPB-13. operating from the USS KENNETH
WHITING, downed this MAVIS on 10 May in a 17-mile running battle near
Fukue Shima, west of Kyushu.
p]nclo^ures : Data Table — Japanese Combat Aircraft.
Count of Operational Aircraft.
Known Your Enemy: Japanese Antitank Warfare.
Two Maps : Japanese Defense Installations on Iwo Jima as plotted
from P. I. reports and ground study.
[1] UNF^VSINESS IN JAPAN
With Okinawa about to be written off, Japan took stock of the situation last
week and found the outlook grim. There was a tinge of desperation in various
Tokyo announcements as spokesmen sought to condition the public for an expected
invasion of the homeland. Like the nervous sleeper in the flat below, Japan sits
up nights waiting for the other shoe to drop.
Tiio Japanese public has been told by no less than Premier Suzuki that Okinawa
was to be the decisive battle, that Japan itself might rise or fall on the outcome
1 Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and refer to
pages of original exhibit.
1152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of the battle in the Ryukyiis. Newspapers and commentators were quick to echo
the spirit of his fright talk. When the Naha-Shuri defense line was broken, the
Japanese public must have known that a decisive phase was at hand. There was
Okinawa all but lost ; there was the ubiquitous Third Fleet hammering at Kyushu ;
there was the 11th Army Air Force raiding the northern Kurile Islands, and over
all were the B-29s with the power to pick a city and obliterate it.
Tension mounted in Tokyo, or what was left of it. There was the publicly-aired
conviction that the next Allied operation would be against the home islands.
While the Tokyo Radio talked of elaborate underground structures for "a long
war", the Japanese military took the wraps off "the home defense team" of pilots
and aircraft. Carrier pilots of the Third Fleet suddenly found they had to beat off
"a sky full of Japanese planes", manned by crack pilots who apparently had been
.«aved up for some such final showing. Moreover, U. S. airmen reported the expert
Jap flyers were coming up with new fighters which outperformed American Cor-
sairs. (Identity of this new Japanese fighter plane has not been established, but
elsewhere in this issue is a discussion of a possible new enemy plane recently shot
down over Okinawa.)
Tokyo talked, too, of converting remnants of the Imperial Fleet into a suicide
fleet or suicide units. English language broadcasts were beamed to North America
pointing out that the recent shakeup in the Japanese Navy was calculated to put
that arm on a suicide basis under new commanders who had originated and were
versed in suicide tactics. There was even talk of converting the free balloon
experiment into a direful threat to the U. S. mainland by means of suicide pilots.
Propagandists said the pilotless balloons had demonstrated that such bags could
get to the West Coast in 100 hours, so now the Japanese would send them over
with pilots to spot targets for bombs in the balloons. Still other propagandists
broadcast elaborate descriptions of vast underground fortifications and supply
areas in the homeland which, they said, would introduce "a new kind of under-
ground warfare."
It was all reminiscent of Germany's promises to her people of unlimited "secret
weapons" before the end of the war in Europe.
Meanwhile, B-29s poured relentless destruction on Japan's principal cities in
a terrible, methodical order. Tokyo, Yokohoma, Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe —
down the Tokaido line with train-like regularity and then back again, went
the Sui>erfort8. On 5 June they were over Kobe, the end of the line, and two
days later they were back at Osaka for the second time in a week. The Kobe
raid was the loth incendiai-y raid on the Empire. In the subsequent raid on Osaka
HE bombs were mixed with 2,500 tons of incendiaries. The HE was aimed
at Osaka Arsenal. Japan's largest. Before the Osaka raid, it was computed
that a total area of nearly 90 square miles has been burned out or blasted to rubble
in Japan's six major cities.
(At this point in the Exhibit the folhnving items appear:
1. Aerial view of Tokyo show ing damage effected through in-
cendiary raids.
2. Aerial view of Osaka showing damage effected through in-
cendiary^ raids.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 255,
and 256, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt In-
quiry.)
[2] Unidentified Aircr^vft
From Air Group 9 come gun camera photographs of a possible new Japanese
fighter which was shot down on 5 May over Okinawa. This aircraft was first
reported to be a GEORGE but an examination of the photos shows that its only
GEORGE-like features are general wing shape and twin gun installations.
Features not characteristic of GEORGE 11 are :
Long nose.
Low wing and excessively long fillets.
Narrow but tall fuselage aft of fillets.
Full length rudder similar to TONY's.
Notched out tail plane with fairly short chord.
While it is reported that the new version of GEORGE has a low wing, there
has been no indication that the fuselage and empennage would be redesigned or
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWFrr INQUIRY 1153
that the engine would be set farther forward. GEORGE 11 presents a very
stubby, heavy appearance. The aircraft pictured here gives that impression
only in side view because of the depth of fuselage; its narrowness from above,
if fillets are discounted, is almost like OSCAR. The tail wheel appears to be
non-retractable since no cover plates are visible.
Two conclusions may be drawn: (1) that the aircraft is the new GEORGE
21 which seems unlikely for the reasons stated, and (2) that it is a new type
Navy fighter hitherto unphotographed — perhaps SAM 11.
(Two photographs, each showing two separate views, of an un-
identified Japanese phme over Okinawa, referred to s^pra^ will be
found reproduced as Items Nos. 257 and 258, respectively, EX-
HIBITS-ILLUS IDEATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[5] New Aie Commands Idkntified
Identification of two iuiportant new Japanese air commands, the 6th Air Army
and the 1st Mobile Base Air Force, has been made through recently captured
documents.
Priov to the Okinawa campaign, only five air armies were known to exist.
Several items recovered on Okinawa, however, mentioned the 6th Air Army. A
"Very Secret" order, dated 6 February 194.5, issued by the 19th Air Sector Com-
mand gave the jurisdiction of the new Army. (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No.
B-1 8,287.) The order states:
"Imperial headquarters will plan the execution of Ten Air Operation in the
East China Sea area as a joint Army-Navy function. The 6th Air Army, chiefly,
will carry out aerial operations north of Okinawa (including Okinawa) and the
8th Air Division, generally, will carry out operations south of Okinawa (Okinawa
included)."
Since it is known that an air army is a high echelon of command with a
tactical and administrative re.sponsibility over a large area, it is presumed that
the jurisdiction of the new army also includes Kyushu. Tlie 8th Air Division
is based on Formosa. The Ten ("Sky" ) operation is apparently the name applied
to the air defense of Okinawa and the Ryukyii area.
Japanese air armies previously identified Include the 1st in the Empire, 2nd
in Manchuria, 3rd in Southeast Asia, 4th in Southwest Pacific, and .5th in China.
Mention of the 1st Mobile Base Air Force (Kido Kichi Kokubutai) and its
number designation, IKFGB was found in a notebook on Okinawa. (CINCPAC-
CINCPOA Item No. B-18,066.) A Base Air Force is the tactical equivalent of
a Navy Air Fleet and operates under the CinC, Combined Fleet. The area
covered by the 1st Mobile Base Air Force and its equivalent administrative air
fleet is not known, but it is presumed to be an important sector of the Japanese
homeland defense.
[6] Japanese Fighteb Direction
A description of Japanese fighter director methods, as they existed in April
1944, was captured on Luzon ( ADVATIS Translation No. 74, ATIS Current Trans-
lations No. 1.56, 21 March 194.5) . Particularly interesting is the dependence of the
Japanese on reconnaissance planes — which should make good targets — and on a
constant speed and course of the attacking planes.
The physical system is not unlike our own shore-based system in basic respects.
Various radars reports to a control station which we would call a filter center. At
tliis location plots are displayed and evaluated and action is taken. (Apparently
each radar reports bearing and range from itself and does not convert to a com-
mon reference point; nor does it appear to use any sort of "grid" system.) The
Japanese have an organization designated an "intelligence squad" which would
compare to our intercept team. One sketch indicates that D/P equipment is used
in some manner for tracking their own intercepting aircraft.
Numerous references in the document indicate that Japanese radar bearing
and range discrimination are not reliable. Furthermore, the enemy does not seem
to have any search radar which is dependable for altitude determination on in-
coming raids.
To compensate for shortcomings in bearing, range and altitude from their radar,
scouting planes are sent out initially to contact our raids. These scouts shadow
1154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK
and report position, type, strength, altitude, etc., as an aid to directing the in-
tercepting group. This would suggest the conclusion that our raids frequently will
be spotted by Japanese reconnaissance planes, which will act as shadows and not
as attacking luiits. The reconnaissance planes represent an important cog in the
intercept system.
Due to the time element requirefl in the filter center, the method of radio relay,
and the fact that mechanical methods are utilized for computation of vectors,
much time is wasted ; time lag in plot is an obvious conclusion. All computation
is on the premise that the "enemy raids" will remain on almost constant course
and speed. This suggests that a few diversionary raids with marked clianges in
course and speed might create confusion in Japanese intercepts.
After their intercepting aircraft are given the initial ''vector" and "range" on
the "point of encounter" (intercept position), the subsequent changes in vector
seem to be given in a manner similar to our clock-code method ; e. g., "03.10" equals
"right front ten kilometers."
(Copies of two photographs, each reflecting six views, of a Japanese
"George" 11-Fighter, Interim Model, will be found reproduced as
Items Nos. 259 and 260, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRA-
TIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[11] Demolition Squads in Sallys
On 24 May six SALLYs carried Japanese "commandos" to Yontan airfield,
Okinawa, in attempts to destroy U. S. aircraft and installations. The planes
attempted wheels-up, power-off landings, but all except one which landed on the
airfield, crashed and burned killing their occupants before any damage could
be done. All planes were SALLY 2s, fitted with Type 100 14-50 hp engines, the
Army counterpart of the Kasei 11.
None of the six aircraft carried guns or armor plate or, as far asi co'uld
be determined, radio gear. Tlie top turrets had been removed and pieces of
corrugated roofing, beaten flat, were nailed to boards 1 by G inches and tied
over the turret hole with rope to inside structural members. Such aircraft
maintenance as could be observed was extremely poor. Screws were cross-
threaded or not screwed completely into place or were left out altogether. Ill-
fitting pieces of fairing, apparently from other planes of the same model, had
been forced into place. Much patciiwork was noted and tires were considerably
worn. In two of the planes were found small pieces of carboard, 2 by 10
inches. Around the cardboard were wound five sizes of plain soldering wire,
small pieces of which could be cut off and used as substitutes for burned-out
fuses. Fuse boxes had some regidar fuses installed and some short pieces of
wire as substitutes, a possible indication of a shortage of fuses. Flare release
I'acks were found on two aircraft, the flares doubtless being intended for use
in the landings. One light smoke bomb was found, probably to.be used to hide the
raiders, once they were landed.
Extra bomb bay fuel tanks of approximately 130-gallon capacity were found in
all the crashed aircraft. It is not clear why these would be needed, since SALLY's
(Photographs appearing at this point in the Exhibit include :
1. Two views of the Japanese plane, "Sally 2", one showing
a tail section after attempted landing on Yontan airfield,
Okinawa, and the other showing a plan after "wheels-up"
landing on Yontan airfield.
2. View of a Japanese "Sally 2" plane after "Avheels-up" land-
ing on Yontan airfield.
3. Two views showing wreckage of two more "Sally 2s" near
Yontan airfield.
The foregoing photographs will be found reproduced as Items Nos.
261, 262, and 263, respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
normal range (at 75 per (;ent Vmax) without them is approximately 1200 miles,
and from the nature of the operation it would not .seem that a return trip for
PROCEEDINGS 01-' HEWITT INQUIRY 1155
the planes was anticipated. Oil tanks on one aircraft were only one-quarter
full, indicating that the engines were badly worn or that the tanks were inten-
tionally not filled in order to save oil.
The pilot of the one SALLY that landed most nearly intact is believed to hav«'
been inexperienced for these reasons : The automatic pilot was in operation and
had never been turned off; controls were operational and functioned satis-
factorily at the time of inspection, but the pilot had made a poor attempt
at leveling off before landing, thereby striking the runway hard and injuring
some of his passengers; main line switches and magneto switches were still on
at the time of inspection.
The entire operation against Yontan airfield was in the familiar suicide tradi-
tion, a move of desperation,, neither well-planned nor well-executed. It was not
successful even if measured objectively in terms of physical damage done for
losses taken.
(An aerial view of destruction wrought by American carrier based
planes on Kanova airfield will be found reproduced as Item No. 264.
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Dummy Aircraft
Increased use of dummy aircraft on Japanese homeland fields is evident in
many recent reconnaissance photographs. Photographs of three fields are re-
produced here to illustrate the trend and to show some of the more obvious
differences between the dummies and the real aircraft.
In spite of the painstaking care the Japanese have taken, the dummies look
flimsy at best. They seem to warp and twist out of shape, either because of our
gunfire or the elements. They are irregular and not precise enough to fool the
eye when studied in photographs. Their very construction defeats their purpose,
since the three-dimensional effect of solidity and strong shadow is weak. On
the other hand, when these dummies are covered with camouflage netting the
general effect can be attained and is more convincing.
To give a good idea of the lengths to which the Japanese have gone in the
construction of dummy aircraft, a selection of typical drawings is published
here. The original drawings were a part of two complete sets of blueprints
'"aptured on Okinawa (see "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1. No. 43). The dummies
depicted are probably intended to represent NATE, SONIA and SALLY. How
many other types of planes have been drawn or constructed is not now known.
Several mediocre imitations of FRANK were spotted around Yontan Field on
Okinawa (photos in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 43).
Construction of dummies follows a pattern, not unlike stage scenery. The
main members are of cedar and are comparable in size to our structural lumber.
The lighter bracing and stiffeners are of common pine. All are nailed and
spiked in place in a designated order. Structurally, the designs are only fair,
as evidenced by their disintegration. Over this rough framework platform is
woven the finish "basket". The coarseness of this weave allows the sun to
penetrate and thereby to soften shadows cast on the ground. This is par-
ticularly noticeable in the Kanoya photograph. The "undercarriage", while
elaborate for the SALLY and SONIA types, even including wooden wheels, con-
sists generally of simple posts. Sometimes gasoline drums are used as supports,
in much the same manner as they are beneath wrecked aircraft used as decoys.
(The followino; photographs appear at this point in the Exhibit :
1. Aerial photograph of Kanoya airfield.
2. Aerial photograph of Kikuchi airfield, Kyushu.
3. Aerial photograph of a Japanese airfielct showing camou-
flaged dummy planes.
The foregoing material w^ill be found reproduced as Items Nos. 265,
266, and 267, re.spectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
Three rendered sketches have been prepared from these Japanese drawings.
Conventional shadows have been cast in an effort to show how these dummies
would appear from the air. Gasoline drums have been drawn into each sketch
to give scale. The shapes of the "aircraft" are true to the types imitated, but
dummies seen to date have fallen far .short of the shapes intended in the drawings.
Certain observations are pertinent. Though dummies to date have been flimsy,
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 32
1156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
are not faithful copies of the drawings, do not cast strong shadows and dis-
integrate under gunfire, they nevertheless look enough like the real thing from
altitude under combat conditions. When covered with camouflage netting they
are particularly hard to distinguish from operational aircraft. A recent report
based on reconnaissance for mid-May (Report No. 659, InterpRon Two of 28 May
194o) shows that a total of 139 dummies are present on ten fields in Kyushu
and Honshu, not including the large number shown in the Kanoya photograph.
While these aircraft may be easy to distinguish on a photograph with a high
power glass, they present a diflScult spotting problem to pilots under combat
conditions. For that reason, effort will be made in the future to publish any
information on the subject which may be helpful in exposing to air personnel
the Japanese use of dummy aircraft.
At this point in the Exhibit the folhnving items appear:
1. Sketch of dummy Japanese phme, a "Sally."
2. Two sketches of (himmy Japanese planes, a ''Nate" and a
"Sally." ■ .
3. Sketches showing captured drawings for construction of
"Sally" dummies.
4. Sketches showing captured drawings for construction of
"Nate" and "Sonia" dummies.
5. TAIC model photos of a "Baka," primarily a Japanese
glider and secondarily a poAvered plane, being released
from a Japanese "Betty" and of a "Baka" in flight.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 268
through 272, respectively, EXHBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt
Inquir}^)
Further Analysis of Baka's Perfoumance
Detailed analysis by TAIC of the aerodynan>ic characteristics of BAKA has
led to a revision of the theoretical range, speed and glide angle estimates.
BAKA is primarily a glider and secondarily a powered plane. The rockets
greatly Increase its speed for a short time, but cause only a slight range increase
over its maximum glide range. Maximum horizontal range when released at
27,000 feet is 55 miles. Fifty-two of these miles would be travelled at a glide
speed of 229 mph and at a glide angle of 5°35' ; during the other three miles,
the use of rockets w^ould accelerate the speed to 535 mph in level flight. At a
50° or greater diving angle, maximuiii speed would be 618 mph. Whether the
rockets were used at the beginning or the end of the run, or, whether they were
used to climb would not appreciably affect the maximum range.
Against ships protected by heavy armor, presumably the rockets would be
used at the end of the run in a torpedo approach, the pilot attempting to score
a hit close to the water line. If launched from a distance, however, BAKA
would be vulnerable to attack by flghters before reaching a position to complete
effectively its own attack. Lacking maneuverability, BAKA could take but
little evasive action in its unpowered glide and its only method of escape would
be to fire one or more of its rockets. In this event, the increased velocitc^
secured from the rocket would dissipate before BAKA could reach its target
and its final terniinal velocity would be substantially decreased.
Destruction of the parent aircraft is extremely important inasmuch as special
fu.selage modifications are necessary, and the available supply of adaptable
parent aircraft controls the number of BAKAs that can be launched.
The accompanying range graph can be used to ascertain the estimated theore-
tical range of BAKA when launched from any determined altitude. It is not
believed practical that release of BAKA will be made at altitudes in excess of
20,000 feet, so that the maximum practical range remains approximately 35
nales.
(A graph showing an estimation of the range of "Baka" will be
found reproduced as Item No. 273, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1157
Airfield Damage Rsa'AiR
Extensive damage inflicted upon Japanese airtields by U. S. bombers has led
the enemy to issue special orders for the repair and camouflage of the damage.
In addition, signals have been arrauged to indicate to returning enemy pilots
which of the damaged portions have actually been repaired and which have
been merely camouflaged.
A Staff Order of the Fourth Air Division, dated 8 September 1944 and
recently captured on Okinawa (ClNCPAC-CINCPOA Item B-17564-F) states
that every effort must be made to repair bomb dam'age but, if it cannot be
repaired before morning, it should be camouflaged. An accompanying diagram,
reproduced below, illustrates the use of signal panels to indicate camouflaged
damage and the location of repaired portions of a typical strip.
A complete translation of the document follows :
"1. All bomb damage to runways by air raids should be repaired if at all
possible, overnight.
"2. When the above is impossible, at least a part of the runway should be
repaired by the next morning and iDade serviceable.
"3. Unrepaired bomb damage on runways should he camouflaged by dawn,
using camouflage nets and other available materials. Camouflage should con-
vince enemy aerial reconnaissance that the previous day's damage has been
completely repaired. Speedy repair should then be undertaken. However,
damage repair should not be delayed for purposes of camouflage.
"4. Partial repair described in Item 2 and 3 above should be marked off
according to tlie attached diagram. Red signal panels are ijiaced next to
cauMuflaged bomb damage and facing the repaired runway area. Panels are
placed so that the sides of one will be parallel to those of the others."
(A diagTam illustrating the use of signal panels to indicate camou-
flaged damage and the location of repaired portions of a typical
strip, referred to supra,^ will be found reproduced as Item No. 274,
EXHBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Oxygen Generating Apparatus
The oxygen generating apparatus now used in FRANK, NICK and other Jap-
anese Army aircraft delivers an unusually large amount of oxygen for its low
weight and will not explode if struck by shrapnel or bullets. In these respects
it is much superior to conventional oxygen storage installations.
An examination of the equipment discloses that its main components are three
generator tubes with individual filter attachments, the enclosing container and
the immediate tubing and the necessary electrical connections.
The generator tube is of thin sheet iron or steel construction, plated with
rust-proof metal, with soldered side and end plate seams. A socket and suitable
electrical contact is provided at its lower end, while the smaller but similarly
constructed filter cylinder is soldered in its insert recess at the opposite end.
Overall dimensions are : generator length 1 foot 6% inches ; overall length includ-
ing filter 2 feet 3% inches; generator diameter '^2 inches; filter diameter 2%
inches.
The oxygen-producing material is a mixture of potassium chlorate (KCLOs),
iron, iron oxide and asbestos fiber. The action of the generator is initiated
by an electric current heating a chrome-iron resistance wire, about which is
wrapped a paper fuze. The fuze in turn ignites a fuze train which finally ignites
the main compound. The mixture of constituents in contact with the fuze is
richer in iron and iron oxide than is the remainder of the compound. Oxygen
is produced by the heat-decomposition of the KCLO3. The iron oxide is a catalyst
which allows the reaction to occur at a lower temperature, and the iron metal
may act both as a heat source in reaction with the oxygen produced and as a
catalyst.
(A front view of an oxygen generating apparatus with one cylin-
der missing will be found reproduced as Item No. 275, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
The enclosing container for the generator components is constructed of what
seems to be aluminum alloy. The components of the case (back panel, doors
and base) are apparently formed by a die-stamping process. At the time of
the stamping, cooling perforations of about %-inch diameter are formed, spaced
1158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
at about VA inches between centers. Overall dimensions are : length 1 foot 8%
inches; wicfth 1 foot % inch; depth S^/s inches. Assembly consists of a back
panel to which is riveted a base or socket holding section.
Two outward-swinging doors are hinged on each side of the back plate above
the base, and are fitted with two bar-and-lever type latches. Other construc-
tional details may be ascertained from photographs. An instruction plate with
wiring and tubing diagram is secured to the front of the base.
The gross weight of the equipment (three generator-filter tubes, the container,
and part of the tubing) is 25 pounds 4^2 ounces. Each tube has a duration of
75 minutes, according to the attached nameplate. No volumetric computations
have yet been made but it is believed that the generator delivers ample oxygen
for any altitude the airplane may operate. An idea of duration per unit weight
mav be gained from the results of the quotient of time of delivery over weight,
which shows that the equipment delivers 8.95 minutes of O2 per pound of ap-
paratus. Two disadvantages of the unit are that the generator reaction, once
started, cannot be stopped. This, in turn, often necessitates by-passing a large
amount of oxygen at lower altitudes. The long duration of oxygen production
is apparently intended to counteract this.
(At this point in the Exhibit there appear two views on a plate
captioned "Shades of Darius Green," including :
1. View of an oxygen generating apparatus.
2. View of a Japanese aircraft, a photograph of which was
capture on Okinawa.
The foregoing will be found reproduced as Item No. 276, EX-
HIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Japanese Electbic Tokpedo
A Japanese electric "wakeless" torpedo, with a possible range greater than
any other electrically-driven type known, has been recovered on Saipan.
Only incomplete information is available on the weapon, designated as Type
92, Mod. 1. On the example recovered and examined by MEIU No. 4, the war-
head was missing and numerous parts which would have given additional indica-
tions of the torpedo's operation and capabilities had been removed, possibly
by souvenir hunters.
(A photograph of a Tvpe 92, Model I Japanese Torpedo will be
found reproduced as Item' No. 277, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Hewitt Inquiry.)
The range dial on the weapon is calibrated from 0 to 14000. Although the
unit of measurement is not given, it is presumed to be meters, inasmuch as that
unit of measurement has always been used by the Japanese to indicate range.
If that is the case on this weapon, the maximum setting would give the torpedo
a range almost twice as great as any other electric torpedo extant. This maxi-
mum range can probably be achieved only at a much reduced speed, however.
At the estimated maximum speed of 28 knots, it is believed the torpedo would
have an effective range of approximately oOOO yards.
The weapon is apparently modeled after the German GTE electric torpedo.
Without the warhead, it is 19 feet, lYs inches long, and 21 inches in diameter.
It has two batteries of 52 cells each and each cell has a voltage of 2.05. The
batteries are 62 inches long, 14% inches wide, and 10 inches high. The motor is
driven by direct current. Twin i^ropellers, turning in opposite directions stabilize
(he torpedo during its run. Four tail vanes with horizontal and vertical rudders
are mounted on the trailing end. No information is available on the type of
warhead or explosive device used, or on the type of submarine capable of carry-
ing the torpedo. As far as is known, the torpedo has not yet been used in
combat by the Japanese.
(A photograph showing (avo views of a Japanese torpedo, one being
of the tail and after body, and the other of the interior of the bat-
tery compartment will be found reproduced as Item No. 278, EX-
HIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1159
Variation in SCS
(Various views of the Japanese Type E Model Vessel referred to
as "Sugar Charlie Sugar" and mentioned infra, -will be found repro-
duced as Item No. 279, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRxiTIONS, Hewitt
Inquiry.)
Photographs above are among the first received showing details of the stand-
ard economy Type E (mod) Sugar Charlie Sugar vrith foremast centered on
the foredeck and a thin mainmast on the afterdeck. Shown below is a recent
good photograph of the Type E (mod) with masts at forecastle and bridge. The
two mast arrangements constitute the major variations found on this economy-
type. In other respects details of the two ships illustrated are very similar
but among minor variations which may be observed in the future are place-
ment of lifeboats and size of stack.
The foremast-centered variation of SCS can be distinguished from the larger
(2300-ton) three-hatch Sugar Charlie Love by the position of the foremast with
respect to hatches. At most, a mast can serve two hatches. If centered, it
can serve the entire foredeck, which can have but two hatches — as on a Sugar
Charlie Sugar. If the mast is forward of center it can serve only a part of the
foredeck and a third hatch must be present — as on a Sugar Charlie Love.
(See opposite page.)
(The following photographs appear at this point in the Exhibit :
1. View of a Japanese vessel referred to as "Sugar Charlie
Sugar" with foremast at forecastle.
2. Photographs of two types of Japanese cargo vessels referred
to as "Sugar Charlie Love" and "Fox Tare Dog."
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 280
and 281, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
1-24, MiDGETT Sub Cabeiee
The sketch below, reproduced from a drawing by a prisoner who served
aboard the Japanese submarine 1-24, illustrates how a midget submarine was
transported to Pearl Harbor for the sneak attack of 7 December 1941. Other
midgets were transported similarly for attacks on Sidney, Au.stralia, and in
the Solomons area. In the two years the POW was aboard, from April 1941
to May 1943, seven midget submarines were launched from the 1-24. The
prisoner's disclosures are contained in ONI Digest of Information from Prisoner
of War Sources.
The smaller craft was carried on the main deck abaft the conning tower and
was secured to the pressure hull by means of heavy clamps, the POW said. One
of the clamps was released from within the midget, the rest from within the
mother sub. No unusual difficulty was experienced in maintaining trim when
diving with the small craft aboard.
Due to the limited range of the small subs, i-eturn to the "mother" ship was
not planned, and was not accomplished in any of the seven instances. Crews
of the midgets were expected to scuttle their boats after accomplishing their
missions, and save themselves if possible.
(A sketch showing a Japanese submarine 1-24 carrying a midget
submarine will be found reproduced as Item No. 282, EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Camoubxage vs Photo Inte^pketation on Two Jima
Pre-invasion photo interpretation of installations on Iwo Jima compared
favorably with later ground studies of the island in areas where vegetation was
sparse. In wooded areas, among pandanus trees and in heavy scrub growth,
installations frequently were impossible to see and many which were not sheltered
by natural growth were so well camouflaged it was impossible to determine
whether an object was a military installation or a natural ground formation.
Along the barren beaches of the southern isthmus, interpretation of aerial
photographs was comparatively easy, although dummy positions, revealed after-
1160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ward by ground study, were so well constructed they were diflScult to dis-
tinguish from the authentic.
Near the airfields, 500 to 800 yards from the beaches, blockhouses, covered
artillery and large pillboxes, were observed and correctly interrupted. Smaller
pillboxes and mortar emplacement, often as effective against our forces as
the larger Installations, could not be observed in photographs. Even on the ground
frequently they could not be spotted from more than 15 yards' distance. Many
of the smaller pillboxes used an effective camouflage of wire netting covered
with brush over the fire lanes.
Interpretation of antiaircraft defense was more tlian 95 per cent accurate
even though all these positions were well camouflaged. One of the few errors
was the classification of a six-gun heavy AA battery as automatic AA. The
average diameter of revetments for this heavy gun battery was slightly less
than 16 feet. The revetment of a nearby twin-mount automatic AA battery was
slightly more than 15 feet. Nets and brush across the revetments obscured
characteristics so that positive identification of either battery was impossible.
Approximately 30 percent of the casemated coast artillery and field artillery
positions were observed in aerial photographs before heavy gunfire blasted away
(At this point in the Exhibit two items appear, as follows :
1. Photograph shoAving Japanese camouflage of a pillbox and
a spigot mortar position.
2. Five views showing various types of Japanese camouflage
technique.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 283
and 284, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
vegetation concealing other positions which allowed for a greater percentage
of correct interpretation. Natural vegetation was used extensively on all posi-
tions. Camoufiage discipline as evaluated from photographs was excellent during
construction of positions. Materials used for covering blended into the surround-
ing terrain and vegetation, while earth from excavations was planted with
grass to obliterate traces of military activity. Heavy coast defense guns and
field artillery were well concealed under trees.
Emplacements for machine guns and 150-mm mortars have similar characteris-
tics. Consequently, a few of the latter were interpreted as machine gun posi-
tions. Small mortar or rocket emplacements were unobserved in photographs.
CINCPAC-CINPOA Bulletin No. 136-45, concerning a ground study of the
defense installations of Iwo Jima, points out the limitations of excellent vertical
photographs. The two maps enclosed with this issue of "Weekly Intelligence"
.show (1) a plot of defense installations on Iwo as determined from photo inter-
pretation on D-15, and (2) positions plotted from a ground study of the island.
A review of aerial photographs, supplemented by a ground study knowledge
of the island, disclosed most of the larger installations, such as the CD guns
at the East Boat Basin. These casemates were discovered by comparing changes
in the ground noted in successive sorties dated from 15 .Tune 1944 to 4 February
1945. listed in Supplement to Defense Installations of Iwo Jima, CINCPAC-
CINCPOA Bulletin No. 137-45.
Despite excellent camouflage and camouflage discipline, stereo pairs revealed
the height of the concrete position in which the CD gun was emplaced. The
photographs taught photo interpreters not to rely solely on the best sortie of a
strategic area, but to study thoroiighly all differences in terrain as revealed at
different dates. It is of utmost importance that aerial photographs of strategic
areas be obtained at an early date and at frequent intervals thereafter for com-
parative studies. Low stereo obliques of beach areas were excellent in uncover-
ing camouflaged beach positions.
Operational maps, including contours and terrain features, were made from
aerial photographs where there were discrepancies occasioned by absence of
ground control. The extremely rugged terrain was not portrayed on the con-
tours of the situation map. Depth of draws and ravines was hidden by tall
trees, and stereo comparagraphs could not determine heights beneath this
vegetation. This resulted in little more than a general picture of the terrain
for unit commanders. These limitations serve to point out the need for vecto-
graphs or some type of three-dimensional picture covering the area assigned
to each tactical commander,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1161
(At this point in the Exhibit two photographs appear, as follows:
1. Photograph showing Casemated CD Guns over East Boat
Basin, two Jima.
2. Photograph showing U. S. Marines blowing up a cave har-
boring Japanese snipers on Okinawa.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 285
and 286, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[33] Okinawa Defense Doctbine
The situation facing U. S. troops poised for assault against Okinawa appeared
to be a formidable one. From seven to eight possible centers of resistance were
believed disposed within the imiuiediate area of the proiwsed zone of action.
Photographs revealed prepared defenses around Katchin Hanto on the east
side of the island sufficient to indicate a regimental position.
But an agx'eeable surprise was in store for us. B.v the evening of the initial
landing day our forces were approximately two days ahead of schedule. Forti-
fications overlooking the Hagushi beaches had been abandoned. Yontan air-
field, reputed to be one of the best in the Pacific, had been left practically intact.
Antiaircraft emplacements either had dummy guns or were empty. In a sense,
the enemy handed U. S. troops their primary objective on a silver platter.
This new "tactical reasoning" on the part of the .Japanese could not be ex-
plained immediately. However, a recent report from the III Phib Corps clarifies
the enemy's failure to oppose our landing.
In previous operations, it is pointed out; the enemy defended his important
beach areas and airfields with the utmost tenacity, withdrawing to a final
defensive line only when he was driven from his forward positions. On Okinawa
the Japanese were forced to deviate from such a course because they had insuf-
ficient troops available for defense of the island. Consequently, the enemy
chose the more important military installations to defend, leaving the others to
be destroyed by his retreating forces.
"It is definitely known," the report asserts, "that the Japanese high command
issued orders to the forces in the Yontan-Katena area to destroy the airfields
should we initiate a landing in that sector. The force was then to join the
62nd Division for a defense of southern Okinawa.
"This indicates that the enemy did not intend to make a concerted stand in
the Yontan-Katena area. Instead, he chose the narrow approaches to southern
Okinawa where he could concentrate all his defenses in depth and employ the
minimum force necessary to halt a further advance. The extensive network
of dumu>y and unoccupied positions in the area further substantiates such
plans."
A captured document .sheds attditional light on the Japanese tactical plan
for the defense of other islands in the Nansei Shoto. The document refers to
the "Okinawan Type of Defense" as the plan to be followed.
"From an analysis of this document," the report points out, "it would appear
that the so called 'Okinawan Type of Defense' is a definite tactical plan or
scheme of defense approved by the Japanese High Command. Its primary pur-
pose is the conservation of manpower. Important beach areas and even air-
fields are temporarily abandoned while the main defense line is held in force.
"This main defense line is organized in depth and makes n>aximnm use of
terrain consistent with the size of the f(n-ce and frontage to be held. It is so
designed to enable the defenders to fight a long 'war of attrition', denying
the invader use of [.?'/] captured installations."
The enemy's appreciation of terrain and tactical use of weapons on Okinawa
was excellent, the report states. First line defenses were prepared on forward
slopes where automatic weapons were emplaced. Flat trajectory fire was
utilized to its maximum extent. During bombardment the Japanese moved
back to prepared defenses on the reverse slope, reoccupying forward positions
when the bombardment lifted.
When foi'ced from forward positions, the enemy withdrew to the crest of
ridges, frons which plunging fire was delivered on advancing troops. Once dis-
lodged from the ridges, he continued his defense in fortified positions on reverse
slopes.
1162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Other Japanese tactics, it is pointed out, differed little from those encoun-
tered on previous operations. They included night infiltrations, raiding parties,
wire cutting and miscellaneous harassing actions.
"The term 'organization' is complimentary to enemy units encountered by
the III Corps," the report states. "Miscellaneous air and ground units were
thrown together in last-minute confusion and in practically no instance did
they carry out the duties assigned them. The lone exception to this was the
organized resistance on Motobu Peninsula."
According to the report, Japanese equipment was lacking in quantity. This
is substantiated by a 32nd Army order of 23 ISIarch 1945 to the 1st Special;
Infantry Regiment which read : "In view of the limited amount of equipment
available, each unit will vitilize what it already possesses and devise irj3thods
to increase its supply of equipment."
Consistent with the order were various POW statements referring to bamboo
spears and hand grenades as the only weapons issued many of the labor troops.
These poorly equipped labor units, according to POWs, were nicknamed the
Bimbo Butai, or "Poor Unit."
The Japanese made extensive use of Okinawa natives in various branches
of the service, and it is assumed that all able-bodied Okinawans vrere subject
to service as reservists.
A captured dispatch dated September 19-14, written by the commanding officer
of the 24th Division, states : "Reservists can be employed as army troops and
with their main strength carry on diversionary (raiding) warfare. They also
can be emiployed to work in rear areas as replacements for front line troops, or
in such duties as collecting intelligence, security, guarding and liaison. Care
should be taken that the execution of these (training) plans will not seriously
interfere with making a livelihood; Such things as arms and uniforms are
not specially provided Guard Units (reservists). Therefore, the commanders
will use available equipment."
(Two sketches made from a document captured on Okinawa, re-
vealino; the organization of "fire points" will be found reproduced as
Item No. 287, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[36] Enemy Criticisjis of Own Artii^leey Maneuvers
Weakness in their own artillery training were described in a Japanese critique
of maneuvers held on Iwo Jima before the Allied landings. Details were set
forth in a document captured on the island and translated as CINCPAC-CINCPOA
Item No. 4r>69.
Colonel Kaido, wlio commanded the island's artillery group which was made
up of several units of various organizations, presided at the critique, and out-
lined shortcomings in training as revealed in the maneuvers.
Principal criticism was directed at gun crews who were satisfied to drop shells
or barrages merely In an enemy area, and did not score direct hits on the target.
Crews were warned that the ammunition supply for the defense of the island was
small and there was little hope for replenishment; therefore, they must perfect
their work so that they hit every target.
Faulty firing pi-eparations were responsible for their inability to hit desired
targets, the critique stated. In many cases calculation of firing data was in-
correct and corrections were inaccurate, obstructions to aiming instruments were
not cleared away, sighting and aligning points were impropei'ly chosen, and guns
wliich should have fired in battery frequently missed the signal and fired singly.
Furtljermore, mortar base plates were not firmly embedded, it was said.
Another weakness mentioned in the document was the poor discipline shown
officers and men alike during maneuvers. Incidents were brought to light in
which gun crews received orders from battery commanders and then acted in-
dependently in cai-rying them out. Liaison suffered because subordinates re-
fused to obey orders from superiors, and many of the officers "lacked spiritual
power and bravery, and were unsatisfactoi-y in dress, physical bearing and
command."
Several gun squad leaders were unsatisfactory, failing to exhibit proper leader-
ship. Others were said to have stood around their guns like spectators while
firing was in progress.
In other instance;?, squad leaders made errors in firing because they bad failed
to establish liaison with the platoon commanders. Some squad leaders failed
completely to give firing orders, did not understand the melhod of handling the
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1163
gun 01" how to change from direct to indirect sighting, nor could they direct the
tire of the gun or properly designate targets to be brought under fire.
In the Japanese Army, a noncommissioned officer in charge of artillery ob-
.servation lias many duties. Primarily, he must be able to take over the duties
of the fire control platoon commander, or even the company commander. He
must roconnoiter the enemy situation, calculate some of tlu; firing data, and
sjwt artillery bursts.
Personnel performing this function during the Iwo maneuvers lacked experience
and most of them were unaware of their duties. Observation suffered. During
actual firing of problems, reports were sent in from observers concerning enemy
fai'gets and spotting of bursts without any previous check by noncoms in charge.
[37] Signal NCOs received their share of blame in the critique: "Most of
them just stood around as onlookers, leaving liaison to subordinates. They were
inexperienced, deficient in their sense of responsibilities, and did not understand
their duties."
If a hitch occurs in Japanese artillery liaison, it is the duty of the Signal
NCO to go to the scene and take charge. In event of a complete breakdown,
he must re-establish contact by previously-arranged methods.
Attached NCOs without specific duties must be given work such as forwarding
reports and acting as messengers. They should not, says the report, be allowed
just to "sit around putting logs on the fire."
Apparently platoon leaders spent considerable time in dugouts receiving orders
from company commanders by telephone or messenger and transmitting the
orders to subordinates in a like manner. It was noted that too many of them
failed to acquaint themselves with the targets, reconnoiter objectives and de-
teimiine methods of fire. They delegated these responsibilities to the noncoms.
They lacked knowledge of the various duties of the NCOs and many of them
knew little of the equipment they were using.
Additional drill on command and technique of fire, was threatened for those
officers who "do not call out the sensing of bursts, wlio deliberate over what to
call the sensing, who issue commands slowly, make mistakes in commands, bury
themselves in handbooks and firing tables, or busy themselves looking through
. telescopes".
(A photograph of an open site for a Type I 47 mm. Antitank
Gun recovered on Iwo Jima will be found reproduced as Item No.
288, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[38]
Weekxy Coverage Repobt
Photos received at CinCPac-CinCPOA during period from 25 May 19^5 to and
including 1 June 1945
Sorties herein listed will be screened for duplicating coverage before distribu-
tion is alfected.
*Prints only received.
JAPAN
Goto Beta
• Good vertical and trimetrogon coverage of areas indicated
v/o
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No.
Jicpoa #
Date
taken
Tri Met
153.1 mm..
153.7 mm..
20,700'
Terrain Shoreline
1PKS-5MF48-1TV
17806-4....
17807-4
5/27
1PRS-5MF48-1RO
154.5 mm..
1PRS-5MF48-1LO .
17808-4
TriMet
153.1 mm..
153.7 mm..
25,000'
Fukue
1PRS-5MF51-TV.. .
17809-5....
17810-5
4/1
1PRS-5MF51-R0
154.5 mm..
1PRS-5MF51-L0.
1781-1-5
V
24".
25,000'
1PRS-5MF51-1V.-. .. .
17852-6....
4/1
1164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
JA PAN— Continued
Honshu: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split- vertical coverage of areas indicated
V/0
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No.
Jicpoa #
Date
taken
Tri Met
154.2 mm..
152.0 mm
31,000'
Nagoya
3PR-5M216-1V-21BC
3PR-5M216-1R-21BC
17473-809. .
17474-809..
5/17
152.0 mm
3PR-5M216-1L-21BC
17475-809..
V
24"..
40"
154.3 mm..
152 7 mm
31,000'
31,000'
32,000'
3PR-5M21f.-2-21BC
3PR-5M216-3R-21BC . . .
17476-810..
17477-811..
17478-811
5/17
Split Vert
5/17
3PR-5M21(>-3L-21BC
Tri Met
Shoda Shima; Osaka
3PR-5M217-1V-21BC
17479-812..
17480-812.
5/17
3PR-5M217-1R-21BC
153.1 mm
3PR-5M217-1L-21BC
17481-812..
V
24"
40"
154.2 mm..
153 1 mm
32,000'
32,000'
32,000'
Kobe; Osaka
3PR-5M217-2-21BC
17482-813..
17483-814..
17484-814 -
5/17
Split Vert
3PR-5M217-3R-21-BC..
5/17
3PR-5M217-3L-21BC
Tri Met
Numazu; Tokyo
3PR-5M219-1V-21BC
17503-815..
17504-815
5/17
3PR-5M219-1R-21BC
154.6 mm
3PR-5M219-1L-21BC __
17505-815..
V
24"
152.3 mml.
1 52 6 mm
32,000'
31,000'
3PR-5M219-2-21BC
17506-816..
17507-817..
17508-817.
5/17
Tri Met
Kushimoto Tomo
3PR-5M220-1V-21BC
5/17
3PR-5M 220-1 R-21BC
153.1 mm
3PR-5M220-1L-21BC
17509-817..
V
24"
40"..
151.9 mm..
31,000'
31,000'
31,600'
3PR-5M220-2-21BC .
17510-818..
17511-819..
17512-819..
17532-826..
17533-826..
5/17
Split Vert
3PR-5M220-3R-21BC
5/17
3PR-5M220-3Iv-21BC
Tri Met
Yokkaichi; Nagoya
3PR-5M223-1V-21BC
5/18
3PR-5M223-1R-21BC
154 0 mm
3PR-5M223-lLr-21BC.
17534-826
V
24"
40" _.
153.0 mm..
153.9 mm
si.eoc
31,600'
32,500'
Yokuska; Nagoya
3PR-5M223-2-21BC _
17535-827..
17536-828..
17537-828..
5/18
Split Vert
3PR-5M223-3R-21BC_
5/18
3PR-5M223-3L-21BC
Tri Met
Hiratsuka; Chigasaki
3PR-5M221-1V-21BC
17513-820..
17514-820..
5/18
3PR-5M221-1R-21BC :
153.0 mm
3PR-5M221-1L-21BC
17515-820.-
V
24".
40"
153.0 mm..
154.8 mm..
32.500'
32,500'
30,000'
3PR-5M 221-2-21 BC
17516-821..
17517-822.-
17518-822
5/18
Split Vert _...,
3PR-5M221-3R-21BC
5/18
3PR-5M221 3L-21BC
Tri Met
Kuwana; Nagoya
3PR-5M222-IV-21BC
17519-823..
17520-823.-
5/18
3PR-5M222-1R-21BC
3PR-5M222-1I^21BC
153.6 mm
17521-823..
V
24". _
40"
12".
24"..
12"
12"
12"
12"
24"
12"
12".-
12"
12"
12"
6" -
30,000'
30,000'
12,000'
12,000'
11,500'
11,330'
12.100'
10,900'
10.500'
10,500'
12.500'
12.500'
13.000'
12.000'
11.500'
14.000'
14.000'
13.500'
13,500'
13,500'
13,500'
13,500'
13,500'
13,500'
14.000'
13,450'
13,500'
13,500'
13,300'
13,000'
13,500'
13,400'
3PR-5M222-3-21BC
17522-824..
17523-825..
17524-825
5/18
Split Vert
3PR-5M222-3R-21BC
3PR-5M222-3L-21BC
5/18
V
Hitachi
5M96-76V-21BC
17663-829..
17664-830..
17666-832- .
17667-833..
17668-834..
17669-835..
17670-836..
17671-837..
17672-838..
17673-839..
17674-840..
17675-841..
17676-842. .
17677-843..
17679-845..
17680-846..
17681-847..
17689-849..
17690-850..
17691-851..
17692-852..
17694-854- .
17695-855..
17696-856..
17697-857..
17698-858..
17699-859..
17700-860..
17701-861..
17702-862..
4/2
V
5M96-78V-21BC
4/2
V
5M96-51V-21BC (Shisuoka)..
4/2
V
5M96-27V-21BC (Hitachi A/C)
4/2
V
5M96-26V-21BC (Shisuoka)
4/2
V .
Hitachi (A/C)
5M96-1V-21BC
5M96-2V-21BC
4/2
V
4/2
V
5M96-4V-21BC
4/2
V
5M96-201V-21BC
4/2
V
5M96-202V-21BC
4/2
V
5M96-203V-21BC
4/2
V
5M96-204V-21BC
4/2
V
5M96-28V-21BC
4/2
V
24"
12"
24"
12"
12"
12"
12"
6"
5M96-101V-21BC
4/2
V
5M96-104V-21BC
4/2
V
5M96-105V-21BC
5M96-106V-21BC
5M96-108V-21BC.._
4/2
V ..._
4/2
V
4/2
V
5M96-112V-21BC
4/2
V
5M96-113V-21BC
5M96-114V-21BC .
4/2
V
4/2
V
12"
12"
12"
12"
12"
12"
12"
12"
12"
5M96-117V-21BC
4/2
V
5M96-119V-21BC.
4/2
V .
5M96-120V-21BC
4/2
V
5M96-214V-21BC
4/2
V
5M96-213V-21BC.
4/2
V
5M96-212V-21BC
4/2
V
5M96-211V-21BC
4/2
V
5M96-210V-21BC
5M96-208V-21BC
4/2
V
4/2
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1165
JAPAN— Continued
Homha: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated— Continued
V/0
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No.
Jicpoa #
Date
taken
V
12"
12"
12"
12"
24"
12"
12"
24"
12"
12"
12"
12"...
12"
6". .
13,000'
13,000'
12,300'
22,000'
22,000'
22,000'
21,000'
21,000'
21,000'
21,000'
21,000'
21,000'
20,000'
20,000'
20,000'
21,000'
21,000'
21,000'
22,000'
22,000'
19,700'
20,600'
20,600'
19,000'
19,000'...-
18,200'
17,500'
18,000'...'--
17,500'
18,300'
18,050'
18,200'
Hitachi (A/C)
5M96-207V-21BC
17703-863- .
17704-864..
17705-865.-
17920-866- -
17921-867..
17922-868.-
17923-869- -
17924-870..
17925-871..
17926-872- -
17927-873- .
17928-874- -
17929-875--
17930-876- .
17931-877.-
17932-878..
17933-879..
17934-880- -
17935-881..
17936-882..
17938-884..
17940-886..
17941-887..
17942-888..
17943-889..
17945-891- .
17946-892- -
17947-893.-
17948-894-
17949-895- .
17950-896..
17951-897.-
4/24
4/24
4/24
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/30
5/1
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/.30
4/30
V .
5M96-206V-21BC
V
5M96-205V-21BC
V
A/C Prop. Plant
5M 126-1 10 V-21BC
V
5M126-111V-21BC
V
5M126-112V-21BC (Toyahaski)
V
A/C Prop. Plant
5M126-113V-21BC
V
5M126-114V-21BC .
V
5M126-116V-2IBC . .
V .
5M126-115V-21BC
V
5M 126-1 18V-21BC (Hanamatsu)
V
A/C Prop. Plant
5M126-U7V-21BC.
V
Tachikawa
5M126-101V-21BC
V
5M126-102V-21BC . .
V
12"
12"..
24"
24"
12"
12"
24"
12"
24"
24"
24"
12"
12"
12"
12"
24"
24"
24"
5M126-103V-21BC
V _
A/C Prop. Plant
5M126-104V-21BC
V. .
5M126-105V-21BC .
V
5M 126-107 V-21BC..
V
5M126-108V-21BC
v.. . . ..
5M126-109V-21BC
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/.30
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/30
4/30
v..
Hamamatsu
5M126-51V-21BC
V
5M 126-26 V-21BC
V
5M126-27V-21BC
V
V
5M126-1V-21BC
5M 126-2 V-21BC
V
V
V
5M 126-80 V-21BC
5M 126-81 V-21BC
5M 126-82 V-21BC
V
5M 126-79 V-21BC
V
5M126-76V-21BC
4/30
4/30
4/30
V
V
5M126-78V-21BC
5M126-77V-21BC
Isu Shkhiio: Good vertical and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated
153.0 mm-
32,500'
32,500'
32,500'
Torishima
3PR-5M221-1V-21BC
0-Shima; Sumisu-Jima
3PR-5M221-2-21BC
Sumisu-Jima; Torishima; 0-Shima
3PR-5M221-3R-21BC
3PR-5M221-3L-21BC
17528-20-.
17529-21.-
17530-22-
17531-22.
5/18
5/18
5/18
Koshiki Retto: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage
24"
24"
24"
153.3 mm
24"
20,000'
20,000'
20,000'
20,000'
20,000'
VD5-149A.--
VD5-149B (1)
VD5-149B (2)
VD5-149D-.-
VD5-149E...
17602-1-..
17603-2A.
17603-2B-
17604-3---
17605-4---
5/13
5/13
5/13
5/13
5/13
Kyushu: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated
152
.3mra_.
31,000'.—
152
.6mm--
1W
.imm .
24'
31,000'
40'
31,000'
12'
16,000'.—
12'
16,000'
12'
16,000'
24'
16,500'
12'
17,000'
24'
16,000'
24'
16,000'
Jaeki
3PR-5M220-1V-21BC.
3PR-5M220-1R-21BC.
3P R-5M 220-1 L-21 B C -
3PR-5M220-2-21BC. . .
3PR-5M220-3R-21BC.
3PR-5M220-3L-21BC.
Kokubu .\/F
5M80-21BC-101V
5M80-21BC-102V
5M80-21BC-103V
5M8O-21BC-104V
5M8O-21BC-105V
5M80-21BC-106V
5M80-21BC-108V
5M80-21BC-109V
17497-499.
17498-499.
17499-499-
17500-500.
17501-501-
17502-501.
17538-502-
17539-503-
17540-504.
17541-506-
17542-506-
17543-507-
17545-509.
17546-510-
5/17
5/17
5/17
4/18
4/18
4/18
4/18
4/18
4/18
4/18
4/18
1166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
JAPAN— Continued
Kyushu: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated— Continued
V/0
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No.
Jicpoa #
Date
taken
[591
V
24"...
12"
12"
24"
24" ..
12"
18,000'
18,000'
18,000'
18,000'
18,000'
18,000'
Nittagahara-A/F
5M81-21BC-207V
1-7547-511 _.
17548-512..
17549-513..
17550-514.-
17551-515- -
17552-516..
17553-517- -
17554-518--
17555-519..
17556-520..
17557-521..
17558-522- .
17559-523..
17560-524..
17561-525- .
17562-526- -
17563-527..
17564-528..
17565-529..
17567-531..
17568-532..
17570-534..
17571-535..
17572-536.-
17573-537..
17574-538..
17575-539..
17576-540-
17577-541..
17578-542..
17579-543..
17580-544..
17581-545- .
17582-546..
17583-547..
17584-548..
17585-549..
17586-550- .
17587-551..
17589-553..
17590-554..
17591-555-
17593-557..
17594-558..
17595-559..
17596-560..
17597-561..
17598-562..
17599-563-
17600-564..
17601-565- .
17634-566..
17635-567..
17636-568..
17638-570..
17639-571-
17640-572..
17643-575- .
17644-576..
17645-577..
17646-578..
17710-579..
17711-580.-
17712-581.-
17713-582
17714-583-
17715-584- -
17716-585
17717-586- -
17718-587-
17719-588- -
17720-589-
4/18
4/18
4/18
4/18
4/18
4/18
V
5M81-21BC-206V
V
5M81-21BC-205V
V
5M81-21BC-204V . .
V .
5M81-21BC-203V.
V ..
5M81-21BC-202V
V
5M81-21BC-201V
Oita
5M82-77V-21BC ..
4/18
4/20
4/20
V
24"
24"
12"
12"
12"
12"
12"..
12"
12"
24"
12"
24"
24"
24"
12"
12"
12"
24"
12"
12"
12"
12"
24"........
12"
12"
12"-. _
12"
12"
12"
24"
12"
12"
24"
12"
12"
24"
24"
24"
12"
12"
12"
24"...
12"..
12"
12"
12"
24"
12"
24"
12"_.
12"
12"
12"
12"
12"
12"
12"
12"
12"
6"
15,500'
15,500'
15,275'
14,200'
14,490'
14,300'
15,000'
14,990'
16,700'
17,000'
17,000'
17,000'
16,550'
16,000'
16,500'
17,000'
16,500'
17,000'
16,500'
16,500'
16,500'
16,000'
16,000'
16,400'
16,050'
17,000'
17,350'
17,100'
15,800'
15,000'
15,800'
14,000'
14,500'
15,300'
14,500'
14,500'
17,000'
17,000'
16,000'
17,000'
17,000'
16,000'
16,800'
15,200'
15,200'
15,000'
15,000'
15,400'
15,500'
15,300'
16,000'
16,000'
16,000'
16,000'
16,000'
16,000'
6,500'
16,000'
24,300'
10,500'
25,000'
16,500'
16,800'
16,000'
V
5M82-76V-21BC .
V
5M82-78V-21BC . .
4/20
V
5M82-54V-21BC
4/21
4/21
V
5M82-53V-21BC
V
5M82-52V-21BC
4/21
V
5M82-51V-21BC
4/21
V
5M82-79V-21BC .
4/20
4/21
4/21
V -.
5M82-55V-21BC
V
Kanoya
5M83-113V-21BC
V
5M83-112V-21BC...
4/21
V
5M83-111V-21BC
•4/21
V
5M83-108V-21BC
4/21
V
5M83-107V-21BC
4/21
V
5M83-105V-21BC
4/21
V
5M83-104V-21BC
4/21
V
5M83-102V-21BC
4/21
V
5M83-101V-21BC
4/21
V
5M84-211V-21BC
4/21
V
5M84-210V-21BC.
4/21
V
5M84-209V-21BC
4/21
V
5M84-208V-21BC
4/21
V
5M84-207V-21BC.
4/21
V
5M84-206V-21BC ....
4/21
V
5M84-205V-21BC
4/21
v....
5M84-204V-21BC.
4/21
V
5M84-203V-21BC.
4/21
V.
5M84-202V-21BC
4/21
V...
5M84-201V-21BC
4/21
V
USA A/F
5M85-77V-21BC ..
4/20
V
5M85-78V-21BC
4/20
V......
5M85-76-V-21BC
4/20
V
5M85-1V-21BC
4/21
V
5M85-2V-21BC
4/21
V
5M85-4V-21BC
4/21
V
SM85-6V-21BC
4/21
V
5M85-5V-21BC
4/21
V
Kushire
5M87-201V-21BC
4/21
V
5M87-202V-21BC
4/21
V
5M87-203V-21BC
4/21
V
5M87-204V-21BC
4/21
V
5M87-205V-21BC. :
4/21
V
5M87-206V-21BC
4'21
V
5M87-207V-21BC
4/21
V .. .
Kanoya A/F
5M95-101V-21BC
4/22
V
5M95-102V-21BC
4/22
V
5M95-103V-21BC
4/22
V . ..
5M95-105V-21BC
4/22
V
5M95-106V-21BC
4/22
v..
5M95-108V-21BC
4/22
v....
5M95-112V-21BC
4/22
V
5M95-114V-21BC
4/22
V.
5M95-115V-21BC
4/22
v....
5M95-116V-21BC
4/22
V
5M 105-201 V-21BC (Kushira)
4/26
V
Kanoya
5M104-202V-21BC
4/26
V
5M1 04-201 V-21BC
4/26
V
5M104-204V-21BC.
4/26
V ,...
5M104-203V-21BC.
4/26
V
Kokuba
5M10G-201V-2IBC
4/26
V. . .
5M106-202V-21BC
4/26
V
12"
12"
12"
12"_
5M 10(5-203 V-21BC
4/26
V
5M10&-204V-21BC
4/2G
V
5M106-205V-21BC
4/26
v..
5M106-206V-21BC
4/26
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
11G7
JAPAN— Continued
Kyushu: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-verticle coverage of areas indicated— Continued
v/o
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No.
Jicpoa #
Date
taken
V
12"
6"
16,120'
16,000'
16,000'
17,000'
16,700'
10,000'
11,000' ---
11,000'
11,000'
11,000'
11,000'
11,000'
10,000'
22,000'
22,200'
17,000'
25,200'
11,000'
11,000'
11,000'
11,000'
14,500'
14,000'
16,500'
17,200'
17,020'
16,000'
16,000'
17,300'
16,000'
14,360'
16,500'
15,000'
15,000'
15,000'
16,200'
17,100'
16,400'
17,400'
17,200'
16,390'
17,200'
12,000'
12,000'
12,700'
12,500'
12,000'
12,000'
12,000'
12,000'
12,000'
13,000'
12,800'
12,790'
12,000'
12,000'
12,000'
13,000'
15,800'
11,500'
11,000'
11,000'
17,000'
16,500'
15,300'
17,00^
17,000'
17,000'
Isumi A/F
5M1 08-52 V-21BC
17721-590-
17722-591 -.
17723-592- .
17725-594..
17726-595..
17727-596- .
17728-597.-
17729-598-
17731-600- -
17732-601.-
17734-603..
17735-604- -
17736-605..
17737-606- .
177.38-607--
17739-608- -
17740-609..
17741-610- .
17742-611-.
17743-612- -
17744-613--
17746-615- .
17747-616- -
17748-^17-.
17749-618..
17750-619..
17751-620- .
17752-621..
17753-622..
17754-623..
17755-624.-
17756-625-
17757-626..
17758-627..
17759-628..
17760-629- .
17761-630..
17762-631.-
17763-632- -
177&1-633..
17765-634-
17766-635..
17773-638..
17774-639- .
17775-640..
17776-641..
17778-643- .
17779-644.-
17780-645..
17781-646..
17782-647..
17783-648..
17784-649..
17785-650.-
17786-651.-
17787-652- .
17789-654..
17790-655..
17791-656- .
17792-657- .
17798-663..
17799-664- -
17800-665- .
17801-666- -
17802-667..
17867-668.-
17868-069.-
17869-670- .
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/26
4/26
4/26
4/26
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/26
4/26
4/26
4/26
4/27
4/27
4/26
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/28
4/28
4/28
4/28
4/28
4/28
4/28
4/28
4/28
4/28
4/28
4/28
4/28
4/28
4/28
4/28
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
4/27
V
5M108-51V-21BC .. ....
V - ■--
24"
24"
12" .
12"
24"
12"
12"
6"-.
5M108-53V-21BC .
V
5M 108-80 V-21BC .-
V
5M10S-77V-21BC
V
Kokubu
5M110-111V-21BC
V
5M110-109V-21BC .- --. .
V -
5M110-108V-21BC...
V
5M110-106V-21BC
V
5M110-105V-21BC ..
V
12"
24" .-
24"
12"
12"
12"- -
6"-
5M110-103V-21BC
V
5M110-102V-21BC
V
5M110-101V-21BC
V
USA A/F
5M97-6V-21BC- . -. ....
V
5M97-7V-21BC
V
5M97-5V-21BC
V
5M97-2V-21BC
V
12"
12"
12"
12"
12"
12"-.
12"
12"-.^-.--
12"
12"
12"...
12"
12"
12"
12"
12".
12"
12"
12"
24"
24"
12"
12"
24"..
24".
12"
12"
12"
24"
24"
12"
12"
12"
24"
12"
12"
24"
12"
24"
12"..
6"
5M111-107V-21BC (Kokubu)
V .
Miyakonojo
5M111-104V-21BC .
V
5M 11 1-103 V-21BC .
V
5M111-101V-21BC .. .
V
5M103-101V-21BC (Miyasaki)..
V
5M 102-105 V-21 EC (Nittagahara)
V
Kanoya A/F
5M112-201V-21BC
V
5M;i12-202V-21BC.
V
5M112-204V-21BC . . .
V -.
5M112-206V-21BC
V
5M112-205V-21BC
V .
5M 112-203 V-21 BC
V
Kushira A/F
5M113-201V-21BC
V .
5M113-202V-21BC
V ..
5M113-203V-21BC ..
V
5M113-204V-21BC... ..
V
5M113-206V-21BC...
V
5M113-205V-21BC
V
Isumi A/F
5M114-82V-21BC-..
V ..
5M114-78V-21BC
v..
5M 114-81 V-21 BC
V.
5M 114-79 V-21 BC
V— .
5M114-76V-21BC
V
5M114-80V-21BC
V -
5M114-77V-21BC.
V
Miyasaki A/F
5M 1 15-53 V-21 BC
V
5M115-52V-21BC.
V
5M115-51V-21BC
V
Kokubu
5M116-105V-21BC
V
5M116-104V-21BC...
V
5M116-103V-21BC.
V
5M116-102V-21BC
V
5M116-101V-21BC
V
5M116-106V-21BC
V ....
Miyasaki A/F
5M 109-28 V-21 BC
V
5M109-30V-21BC.
V...
5M109-26V-21BC
V ...
5M10&-4V-21BC
V
5M 109-3 V-21 BC.
V
5M109-1V-21BC
V
5PPM109-27V-21BC.
V-
24"
12"
12".. -
12"
12"
12"
12"
12"
12"
12"
5M109-29V-21BC.
4/27
4/28
4/28
4/28
4/2.8
4/28
4/28
4/28
4/28
4/28
V
Mivakanojo.
5M117-110V-21BC ..
V
5M117-102V-21BC.
V
5M117-101V-21BC
V
Kanoya
5M1 18-208 V-21BC-
V
5M118-207V-21BC-.
V- .-
5M118-206V-21BC
V
5M118-205V-21BC
v..
5M118-204V-21BC.
V-
5M118-203V-21BC.....
1168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
JAPAN— Continued
Kyushu: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated— Continued
V -.
V...
V—
v._.
v..
V.-.
V--.
(40J
v..
V.-.
V...
V—
V/0
V— .
v.—
v.—
v.—
V— .
v.—
v.—
v....
v....
v.—
V-_-
o._..
v....
V- —
v/0.
v....
O.- .
V— .
v/0.
F. L.
12".
12".
12'_.
12".
12"_
12"_
12".
12".
6"__
12".
24".
24".
6"!.
12".
24".
24".
24".
24".
12".
12".
12".
12".
12".
24"
12".
12".
12".
12".
12".
12".
12".
12".
12".
12".
12".
12".
6"..
12"
24"
153.4 mm.
24".
24"
152.3 mm.
24"
24"..
24"
24"
8W"
152.3 mm.
152.6 mm.
24"
24".
24"
12"
152.3 mm.
12"
Alt.
16,500'.
17,000'.
17,000'.
17,000'-
16,500'.
16,500'.
16,580'.
17,000'.
15,000'.
15,000'.
15,000'.
15,500'-
15,000'-
15,500'-
16,200'.
15,000'.
15,775'.
12,000'.
12,000'.
12,000'.
12,000'-
12,C00'-
12,000'-
12,000'.
12,000'.
18,000'-
18,600'.
18,000'.
18,500'-
18,000'.
17,000'.
17,400'.
18,100'.
17,000'.
14,000'.
14,000'-
14,000'-
14,000'.
14,000'.
15,000'.
13,000'.
12,000'.
15,000'.
15,000'.
13,000'.
13,000'.
11,400'.
Var...
15,tK)0'.
15,000'.
13,000'.
11,000'.
1,000'-.
10,000'.
10,000'.
10,000'.
Var....
900'...
1,000'.-
1,000'..
11,800'.
Sortie No.
Kanoya
5M118-202V-21BC....
5M118-201V-21BC
5M118-209V-21BC
Kushira
5M119-205V-21BC
5M119-201V-21BC..
5M119-203V-21BC
5M119-202V-21BC
5M 1 19-204 V- 21 BC
Miyazaki
5M120-5V-21BC
5M120-4V-21BC
5M120-3V-21BC
5M120-2V-21BC-.
5M1 21-30 V-21BC
5M121-31V-21BC
5M121-28V-21BC
5M121-27V-21BC
Miyakonojo
5M 1 21-26-21 BC
5M121-29V-21BC
Kokubu
5M122-101V-21BC
5M122-102V-21BC
5M122-103V-21BC-
5M122-104V-21BC
5M122-105V-21BC
5M122-106V-21BC
5M1 22-107 V-21BC
5M122-108V-21BC
Kanoyo
5M1 24-204 V-21BC
5M1 24-203 V-21BC
5M124-202V-21BC —
5M124-201V-21BC
Kusliira
5M125-204V-21BC
5M125-203V-21BC
5M125-202V-21BC
5M 125-205 V-21BC
5M1 25-201 V-21BC
Kanoya
5M123-107V-21BC
5M123-105V-21BC
5M123-104V-21BC
5M123-103V-21BC
5M123-102V-21BC
5M 123-101 V-21BC
CV12-785 (SW Kyushu)...
CV12-788 (Kanoya)...
CV12-783 (Isuni).
CV12-788V (SW Kyushu)..
CV12-800 (Kanoya A/F)...
CV12-811 (Kumanoto)
CV12-812 (Tachiari)
CV12-81fi (Kumanoto)
CVJ 2-781 (Kanoya A/F)...
CV12-790V (SW Kyushu)..
CV12-790P (SW Kyushu)-.
CV12-793 (Kanoya)
CV12-795 (Saeki S/P Base).
SW Kyushu
CV12-805
CV12-807
CV12-813
CV12-820
CVL2&-74
Ariake Wan
CVL26-97A
CVL26-98A
Tozau to Tomitak
CVL26-988
Nakatsu-Nobeoka.
CV15-66
Jicpoa #
17870-671.
17871-672.
17872-673.
17873-674.
17874-«75.
17875-676.
17876-677.
17877-678.
17878-679.
17879-680.
17880-681.
17881-682.
17883-684.
17884-685.
17885-686.
17886-687.
17887-688.
17888-689.
17889-690.
17890-«91.
17891-692.
17892-693.
17893-694.
17894-695.
17895-696.
17896-697.
17898-699.
17899-700-
17900-701.
17901-702.
17902-703.
17903-704.
17905-706.
17906-707.
17919-708.
17952-709.
17954-711.
17955-712.
17956-713.
17957-714.
17958-715.
17937-716.
17966-717.
17967-718.
17968-719.
17969-720.
17970-721.
17971-722.
17972-723.
17987-731.
17988-732.
17989-732.
17990-733.
17991-734.
17992-735.
17993-736..
17994-737..
17995-738..
17996-739..
17997-740..
17998-741..
17999-742- .
18000-743- .
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1169
JA PAN— Continued
Shikoku: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split- vertical coverage of areas indicated
V/0
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No.
Jicpoa #
Date
taken
TriMct
152.3 mm_.
152.6 mm__
31,000'
Matsuyama; Muya
3PR-5M220-1V-21BC
17491-75-..
17942 75
5/17
3PR-5M220-1R-21BC
15.3.1 mm..
3PR-5M220-1L-21BC
17493 75
V _
24"
40"
153.0 mm..
154.8 mm
31,000'
31,000'
30,000'
3PR-5M220-2-21BC
17494-76...
17495-77...
17496-77
5/17
5/17
Split Vert
3PR-5M220-3R-21BC
3PR-5M220-3Lr-21BC
Tri Met
Murto; Kokutu
3PR-5M222-1V-21BC
17525-78...
17526-78.
17527-78
5/18
3PR-5M222-1R-21BC
3PR-5M222-1L-21BC.,..
153.6 mm..
V
V
24"
24"
13,000'
13,000'
CV20-lfi6A (Matsuyama A/F)
CV12-819 (Kochi A/F)
18003-79...
18004-80...
5/14
5/14
Txu Shima: Good vertical, trimetrogon and split-vertical coverage of areas indicated
24"
24"
153.0 mm..
152.6 mm..
15,000'
23,800' .
ri Met
23,800'
153.0 mm.-
40"
153.1 mm..
153.7 mm..
"23,800'".".".';
26,700'....
riMet
154.5 mm
riMet
153.1 mm..
153.7 mm..
26,700'
154.5 mm
24"
40"
25,000'
25,000'
piit Vert
1PRS-5MF45-2V (Cape Ko1._.
1PRS-5MF46-V (Shimond Is.)
Tsushima Island
1PRS-5MF46-1TV
1PRS-5MF46-1RO
1PRS-5MF46-1LO
1PRS-5MF46-LV.
Tsushima
1PRS-5MF48-1TV
1PRS-5MF48-1RO
1PRS-5MF48-1LO ..
1PRS-5MF51-TV..-
1PRS-5MF51-RO...-.
1PRS-5MF51-LO
Shipping— Tsushima Island
1PRS-5MF51-2V
Tsushima Island
1PRS-5MF51-RV
1PRS-5MF51-LV
17817-13...
17818-14...
17819-15...
17820-15...
3/24
3/26
3/20
17821-15 ..
17822-16...
17823-17...
17824-17
3/26
3/27
17825-17...
17826-18...
17827-18 ..
4/1
17828-18...
17849-19...
17850-20...
17851-20...
4/1
4/1
CHINA: Good trimetrogon coverage of areas indicated
.0 mm..
.2 mm..
16,500'
.0 mm
.1 mm..
.7 mm
21,000'
.5 mm.
.2 mm..
.8 mm .
31,000'
.8 mm..
.0 mm..
21,200'
.0 mm..
.2 mm..
21,000'
.0 mm
.0 mm..
21,000'
.0 mm.
.0 mm..
2 mm
27,200'
0 mm..
0 mm..
2 mm.
27,500'
0 mm..
0 mm..
2 mm
13,500'
0 mm..
0 nin).-
2 mm
15.000'
0 mill..
Halikiang to Faichuanchc
468BO-5MF28-TV
468BO-5MF28-RO
468BG-5MF28-LO
Miuchiatun to Lintsaicheng
1PRS-5MF33-2TV
1PRS-5MF33-2RO
lPRS-5Mr33-2LO
Tsingtao; Hotse; Hajyang
1PRS-5MF40-TV
1PRS-5MF40-RO
1PRS-5MF40-LO
Tangshan; Chinghsien
1PRS-5MF41-1TV
1PRS-5MF41-1RO
1PRS-5MF41-1LO
Suning; Shupu; Linghsien
1PRS-5MF41-2TV .
1PRS-5MF41-2RO
1PRS-5MF41-2LO.
Chiyang; Taokowchen
1PRS-5MF41-3TV
lPRS~5MF41-3RO
1PRS-5MF41-3LO
Liushuchwang; Yuanping
1PRS-5MF43-1TV
1PRS-5MF43-1RO
1PRS-5MF43-1LO
Hslen; Nampotsum
1PRS-5MF43-2TV
1PRS-5MF43-2RO
1PRS-5MF43-2LO
Yencheng to Shangtang
1PRS-5MF44-TV
1PRS-5MF44-RO
1PRS-5MF44-LO..
Taivuan; Paoting; Fcnyang
1PRS-5MF47-TV
1PRS-.5MF47-RO
IPRS 5MF47-LO
17613-922..
17614-922..
2/14
1761.5-922- .
17616-923..
17617-923
2/22
17618-923..
17619-924
17620-924
17621-924
3/9
17622-925
17623-925
17624-925
3/9
17625-926
17626-926
17627-926
3/9
17628-927
17629-927
17630-927
3/9
17647-928
17648-928
17649-928
3/16
17650-929
17651-929
17652-929
3/10
17653-930
17654-930
17655-930
3/22
17829-931
17S:i0-9:il
17656-931
3/27
1170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHINA: Good trimetrogen coverage of area indicated — Continued
V/0
7>i Met.
Tri Met.
Tri Met.
Tri Met.
F. L.
153.1
153.7 1
154.8 1
153.1 :
153.7 1
154.5 ]
153.0:
154.2 ]
154.0 ]
1.53.0]
1.54.2]
154.0 1
Alt.
mm.,
mm
15.000'
mm..
mm..
mm..
16,000'
ram
mm..
14,500'
mm
mm.,
mm .
14,.500'
mm.-
Sortie No.
Tai San; Shsinvang
1PRS-5MF48-1TV
1PRS-5MF48-1BO
1PRS-5MF48-1LO _.
Hsu-I to Taitsu Mt.
1PRS-5MF48-2TV
1PRS-5MF48-2RO
1PRS-5MF48-2LO.-..
Shen-Mcn-Kou to Sna Liu Chi
1PRS-5MF50-1TV
1PRS-5MF50-1RO
1PRS-5MF50-1LO
Ku Sliih to Taiipoc
1 P R S-5M F50-2T V
1PRS-5MF5(>-2R0
1PRS-5MF50-2LO
Jicpoa i
17057-932
17658-932
17659-932
17660-933
17661-933
17602-933
17682-934
17083-934
17084-934
17085-935
17686-935
17687-935
KOREA: Good vertical coverage of Kwan-Ni
V
40"
25,000'
1PRS-5MF-RV
17848-49
4/1
MALAY STATES: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated
V
24"........
26.000'
Singapore; Bakum
444BG-5MR60-V
17812-137
4/13
NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES
Lingga Archipelago: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated
24".
21,500'.
Selat Boeja; Tcmpah Strait
468BQ-5MR62-V
Thailand: Good vertical coverage of areas indicated
V .
154.0 mm..
154.0 mm..
152.7 mm..
152.7 mm-.
25,000'
25,000'
25,000'
25,000'
Ban Hland Khao; Ban Luk Jang
402BG-5MR45A-1V
17706-146..
17707-147..
17708-148..
17709-149..
4/10
V
O. Phiphi
402BG-5MR45.i-2V
Dba Rong Jang; Ban Vang Ban
462BG-5MR45.\-3V
Banna G Muk;
402BG-5MR45A-4V .
4/10
V
4/10
V...
4/10
MANSEI SHOTO
Amami 0 Shima: Good vertical partial coverage
v....
24"
24"
24"
24"
24".
12"
154.0mm..
24"
24"
12"
24"
24"
155.0 mm. .
15,000'
12,000'
9,700' -
7,000'
9,000'
6,500'
10,000'
10.000'
Var
Var
Var
CV9-396A
17853-90...
17854-91...
1785.5-92...
17856-93...
17857-94...
17858-95...
17859-90...
17800-97...
17861-98...
17862-99...
17863-100.-
17864-101..
17962-102..
5/17
V .
CV9-396G
5/17
v.... . .
CV9-399.'\....
5/18
V
CV9-399F (Nazeko)
5/18
V ..
CV9-401 (Kakeroma Shima)
5/18
V
CV9-402
5/18
V
OV17-675A (Kakeroma) ....
5/7
v.... . . .
CV17-676P
5/7
V
100 CVL26-1 (Honiva)
5/18
V
100 CVL20-2 (Koniva) .
5/18
V
CVL27-78V
5/18
0...
CVL27-780 .
5/18
Hi] v/o...
CV2(}-S21 (Seso Ko)
3/27
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1171
MANSEI SHOTO— Continued
Ishigaki: Good vertical partial coverage
V/0
F. L.
Alt.
Sortie No"
Jicpoa #
Daie
V
24"
10,000'
CVE28-57A-_ ___.
18737-59.-.
4/29
CORRECTION: Previously reported under Miyako as Jiopoa No. 16737-102 in Bulletin No. 4fi, dated 28
May 1945. This number is hereby cancelled
Kikaiga: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage
V
24"
24"
24"
24"
24"
24"
9,500'
2,500'
7,000'
12,000'
13,000'
12,000'
CV9-398A
17803-68
17804-69
17959-70
17960-71
17961-72
18001-73
5/17
5/10
4/20
0
CV10-458(Wan A/F..
V
CV12-769 (Wan A/F)
CV12-771 (Wan A/F)
CV12-775
v..__
4/20
V
4/20
5/18
V- ..
CV9-399E (Wan A/F)
Koshiki Retto: Good vertical partial coverage
V
153.4 mm.. 20,000'
VD5-149C
17805-5
5/13
Minami Daito: Good vertical partial coverage
V
24"
153.4 mm..
154.1 mm..
12"
7,000'
5.000'
10,000'
CV12-766 .
17814-23
17815-23
17963-25
17964-26
4/17
4/17
4/21
4/17
V
CV12-767
V
V
CV124-174 (Minami Jima)
CV12-764 (Minami Jima)
Osumi Gunto: Good vertical and oblique coverage of Kuchinoyera
bu
v/0
155.0 mm..
4,300'
CV20-106
17973-35
4/2
Tokara Gunto: Good vertical coverage" of areas indicated
V
24"
12"
24"
24"
24"
12"
14,500'
6,500'
6,300'
9,000'
11,000'
6,300'
Takara Shima
CV9-396B
17974-4
17975-5
17976-6
17977-7
17978-8
17979-9
5/17
5/17
5/18
5/18
5/18
5/18
V
CV9-397A
V
CV9-399B (Yokoate Shima)
V
CV9-399C (Takara Shima)
V
CV9-399D (Ko-Takara)
V
CV9-400 (Takara) ..
Tokuno: Good vertical and oblique partial coverage
0
24"
24"
m"
15"
2,000'
10,000'
2,400'
Tokuno A/F
CVlO-455
17767-81
17768-82
17769-83
17770-84
5/10
5/17
4/20
V
CV9-398B
V
CV20-129. --
0
CV20-138
79716 — 46— E.^. 149, vol. 2-
-33
1172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Weekly Photo Distribution
Following sorties were liven general distribution during week of 28 May to 3 June 1945 and have been
previously listed in "Weekly Coverage Report":
Locality
Sortie No.
Jicpos No.
JAPAN — Honshu
3PR-5M 113-2-21 BC
14597-519
3PR-5M78-3L-21BC
13767-341
3PR-5M78-3R-21BC . _
13766-341
3PR-5M78-2-21BC
13765-340
3PR-5M78-1V-21BC
13762-339
— KjTishu
3PR-5M147-3
15615-282
3PR-5M147-3
15616-282
3PR-5M147-2
15614-281
3PR-5M117-3R-21BC
14682-190
3PR-5M117-2-21BC_
14681-189
3PR-5M121-3R-21BC
14885-204
3PR-5M121-3L-21BC
14886-204
40BG-4MR7
12008-68 (V)
14517-173
3PR-5M103-3L-21BC
3PR-5M103-3R-21BC
14516-173
3PR-5M103-2-21BC
14515-172
KOHEA . . -
462BQ-5MF21-TV1
13553-6
MANSEI SHOTO
462BG-5MF21-RO
462BG-5MF21-LO
VD5-102A-.
13554-e
13555-6
16304-36
VD5-102B . .
16305-37
CV38-18
17172-70
(A pliotograpli showing the use by Japanese of assorted materials
to camouflage a landing ci-aft will be found reproduced as Item No.
289, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
[m
Flak Ovee Japan
During the first ten months of sustained air operations over Japan antiaircraft
fire, while considerable, did not prove as extensive as had been anticipated. As
a result of greater concentration of fire power and increasing experience, how-
ever, the enemy AA is already improving in both accuracy and intensity.
An analysis of operations extending into May 1945 reports that over cities and
industrial areas the fire seemed to come principally from heavy AA guns. De-
fenses in those areas apparently were designed to combat heavy bombers operat-
ing at high altitudes. Airfield defenses, however, in anticipation of low-flying
attacks by lighter aircraft, have been characterized by a preponderance of
medium and light AA weapons.
Search and fire control radar have been employed with varying success. Ac-
curate tracking by searclilights has been reported in several instances by B-29s.
On some occasions, however, after picking up targets and passing them for several
seconds successfully from light to light, the searchlight defenses seem to become
confused. In other instances, pick-ups were made only after searching, probably
indicating the use of sound locators rather than radar. Most accurate of the
searchlights were those aboard ships in Tokyo Bay.
Planes illuminated by searchlights were fired upon ; those which were not
illuminated usually escaped attack. Apparently AA batteries at night are
restricted to firing at lighted targets, although it is known that gun-laying
radar sometimes is used. Such I'adar is generally employed with heavy batteries
in industrial or other built-up areas. Comparatively poor results with such
fire indicate either inferior performance of equipment or effective radar counter
measures on the part of attacking aircraft.
The Japanese early warning system is based on the ubiquitous picket boat,
land-based radar and visual observation station. Detection by boat crews ap-
parently is either visual or aural, with the warning to the home islands being
CW (continuous wave) or by voice, if urgent. Picket boats ai'e generally well
equipped with AA medium and light weapons.
In addition to the normal land-based defenses, Japanese are employing various
tyijes of supplementary weapons. In harbor cities, ship-based AA usually con-
tributes to the defense of the area. In such cases, the volume, and generally
the accuracy and range of AA fire is increased greatly. Vari-oolored bursts
are generally indications of naval AA fire. Rockets, "balls of fire", phosphorous
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1173
projectiles, balloons towed by aircraft, and other novel devices have been used, but
none of these has resulted in any appreciable damage to attacking planes.
More complete analysis of Japanese AA defenses and the operational signifi-
cance of such defenses have been published in Flak Intelligence Memorandum
No. 6, entitled "Flak Over Japan". (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin No. 127-45).
143] AA Firing By Heavy Naval Guns
Additional evidence that the Japanese are employing the heavy guns of battle-
ships and cruisers as antiaircraft weapons is contained in a notebook captured
and translated as CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,170. The use of such guns
for A^\ purposes has been reported previously by naval aviators who have
encountered major units of the Japanese fleet.
In late December operations one of our patrol bombers picked up the enemy
task force which had shelled Mindoro the day before. With radar control, the
bomber let down through the overcast to within eight miles of the Japanese force
and broke out on its starboard beam. The task force showed little concern
until the plane got within six miles, when each enemy unit started evasive action
and began to circle. At this time, two of the larger ships favored the aircraft
with one-half broadside each from their main batteries. No purely antiaircraft
guns were fired from the force, just these tremendous broadsides of service
ammunition. The search plane went off about 75 miles and returned, this time
getting to witliin five miles before the ships broke formation and started evasive
circling. Once again, the ships fired a broadside at the one aircraft in the
distance. Although the air crew kept a sharp lookout, they could see no bursts,
possibly because of the low visibility.
Naval fliers who attacked and sauk the Japanese battleship YAMATO in April
reported that antiaircraft salvos were fired at them by the main batteries of that
vessel. Although the U. S. pilots reported heavy explosions nearby they suffered
no damage.
The notebook captured on Saipan reflects the content of a lecture delivered
by a Warrant Officer at the Mie Naval Air Group. According to the student who
penned the notes : "Each and every type of naval gun is used for antiaircraft
firing, including the heaviest weapons on our battleships." Initially, percussion-
fuzed projectiles were used in an effort to bring down hostile aircraft, but the
obvious ineffectivene&s of such shells prompted the development of a special
time-fuzed projectile. The uotes mention the "Komochi Dan" shell as an example
of this type round.
The student made no claims as to the actual ranges at which the heavy guns
conduct AA fire, but listed the following classes of ships, showing calibers and
ranges :
36 cm (14.1 in.) ISE Class (BB-XCV) 35,000 meters
20 cm ( 7.8 in.) NACHI Class (CA) 27,800 meters
Of these ships, two of the ISE Class, the ISE and the HYUGA, and two NACHI
Class cruisers remain.
The student had little to say about methods of fire control except for a vague
reference that "the first step in firing is to set the sight for a range of 10,000
meters." This is thought to refer to local control sighting apparatus. The
notes add that "four rounds per gun are available for firing at an airplane flying
in to bomb and since the NACHI has ten guns, forty rounds can be fired. How-
ever, since this will not bring the plane down, we use a method of fii-ing now to
bring the planes [44] within a barrage." Just how this is accomplished
is not indicated, but in the absence of AA directors, barrage fire is the only feasible
type of fire control to be employed by such guns.
In the case of the patrol bomber the ships may have been attempting to "bring
the planes within a barrage," as discussed in the notes, either with service am-
munition or perhaps with shrapnel rounds which burst far beyond the target
aircraft.
The employment of main batteries, particularly of cruisers and destroyers,
against aircraft is certainly practicable provided proper time-fuzed high ex-
plosive or shrapnel projectiles are developed. So far, this Japanese unorthodox
use of main batteries has not proved very effective against our aircraft. It has
startled air crews who suddenly find themselves among fiak bursts while still
miles from the nearest source of AA fire.
1174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Air. Combat Notes
In a recent night interc€i:)tion, a BETTY was observed without exhaust pat-
terns, indicating that the Japanese may have developed an effective exhaust
flame damper. Another BETTY vectored by two F6Fs demonstrated excellent
evasive action by spiraling in dives, changing air speed radically, changing
course and using cloud cover. At the same time, the enemy confused the radar
scope by effectively dispensing "window". The armor and dam'age control were
good, judging from the plane's ability to evade fighters, even after taking
damaging hits.
Jettisoning of burning objects by Japanese night fighters, presumably to
creater the illusion of a "plane destroyed", has been reported. By the use of
such tactics, the Japanese apparently hope to escape or maneuver for a more
favorable attack position. Such deception is not new with the Japanese. As
early as 1943. it was reported that enemy pilots, under attack by U. S. inter-
ceptors would dive and, at the same time, release black smoke from the nacelle
to create the illusion of a fatal hit.
A ZEKE hit several times in a recent action continued straight ahead on the
water, without taking evasive action. An F-IU following saw the ZEKE strike
the water four or five times, each time bouncing up and regaining flying speed.
Finally the F4TT scored hits and exploded the ZEKE.
An Avenger pilot on a night patrol over Okinawa spotted a bogie, and diving,
expended all his amn>unition without success. Not wishing to lose his prey,
the Avenger pilot turned, engaged the enemy with rockets, and shot the wing
off the Jap plane. Two of three rockets fired scored.
[f5] 11th Ykiar Type 12cm CD Gun
Eleventh Year Type 12 cm coast defense guns encountei-ed on Luzon and Two
Jima are believed similar to other types of 12 cm dual purpose and coast defense
guns used by the .Japanese. Many of the.se have been naval guns converted for
use on land.
The bore characteristics of the 11th year t.vpe are identical to those of the
3rd year type 12 cm 4^^ caliber coast defense gun. Both have a maximum range
of approximately 13,000 yards and a maximum muzzle a velocity of about
2,090 feet per second when fired with a full propellant charge. Sensi-fixed am-
munition is used. Besides the HE projectiles with time fuzes recovered, docu-
ments mention a "Star" and practice projectile. Fuzes prescribed include the
5th year type nose fuze modification 1, a Type 92 fuze, and another 30 second
time fuze.
The recoil tubes, two above and one below the barrel in contrast to the usual
three above, simplify identification of the weapon. The breech block, although
of the familiar hand-operated horizontal sliding type, does not pass all the way
across the breech ring. The slot in the rear of the breech ring is cut in keyhole
shape. This saves weight but increases the difficulty of loading.
The gun is of the built-up type with uniform right-hand rifling. It is mounted
on a 7-estangular upper carriage. Its conical base sometimes may be imbedded
in a rock foundation. Elevation control is on the left of the piece and traverse
on the right with appropriate scales on the sides of the gun. Both the eleva-
tion and traverse operators were provided with 15 power. 4-degree sights and
had speaking tubes for comm'unication. Besides the normal range scale, a
range correction scale is at the left of the piece. It is believed an operator is
employed for each, with the elevation handwheel operator normally firing the
gun. Firing also ma.v be accomplished by a lanyard attached to the right side
of the breech block.
(At this point in the Exhibit, there appears a photograph of a
front view of a Japanese 45-caliber Post Defense Gun on Luzon.
This photograph will be found repr<xluced as Item No. 290, EX-
HIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
The guns recovered on Luzon were manufactured in March 1944 by the Sasebo
Naval Ordnance Depot, and it is possible that these 11th Year Type weapons
were made to replace the well-known 3rd Year Type 12 cm CD guns.
Both on Iwo Jima and on Luzon, the guns were found in casemated positions
and could not be elevated above 25 or 30 degrees. The fields of fire were limited
by the firing slits to about 60°. On Luzon the emplacements were oval-shaped,
15 feet wide and 30 feet long, and constructed of coconut logs covered by earth.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1175
On Iwo the emplacements were concrete casemates. Information on this weapon
has been collated from reports of Iwo Jima observers, from the 5250th TIC
Company and from Item B-3833 which appeared in CINGPAC-CINCPOA Trans-
lations and Interrogations No. 25.
Condensed data on the gun follows :
Bore diameter 120 mm.
Overall length of gun IS ft. 3Vi in.
Length of tube 17 ft. 3% in.
Length of rifling 14 ft. 8V2 in.
Number of lauds 36
Length of upper recoil cylinders 4 ft. 7 in.
Length of lower recoil cylinder 2 ft. 5% in.
Max. elevation (scale reading) 50 degrees
Max. depression (scale reading) . 10 degrees
Transerse' 350 degrees
Diameter of lower carriage 4 ft. 2 In.
Height of gun 6 ft. 11 in.
Maximum muzzle velocity 2^.090 ft. sec.
Maximum range 13, 000 yds.
(Two views showing the mechanism of a Japanese 11th Year Type
12 cm. Gun located on Iwo Jima will be found reproduced as Item
No. 291, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Rifij: Grenade Launcher
(A photograph of a large Spigot-type Grenade Launcher will be
found reproduced as Item No. 292, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRA-
TIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
A new, spigot-type rifle grenade launcher which is slightly larger (27 mm. in
diameter) than the previously encountered type has been recovered in the
Philippines.
This launcher may be used with both 6.5 mm. and 7.7 mm. rifles. From its
measurements it was found by the 5250th TIC Company that Type 3 high explosive
and incendiary rifle grenades might be fired from this launcher. It is likely
that the smoke rifle grenade and Type 91 grenade with spigot attachment also
may be fired. (For description of grenades see CINCPAC-CINCPOA Bulletin,
135-45, Japanese Grenades).
The new launcher differs also in method of attachment to the rifle. To attach,
the knurled sleeve is unscrewed to allow the two prongs of the adapter to slide
and catch on the rear of the front sight mount. The sleeve is then tightened,
locking the prongs in position behind the sight mount. Two smaller projec-
tions fit around the bayonet lug to increase stability.
(A photograph of a Japanese Improvised Armored Car captured
in the Philippines will be found reproduced as Item No. 293, EX-
HIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Peoduciion of Intelligence Material
Production of intelligence material in support of an operation invariably
strains available printing and reproduction resources. An intelligence activity
cannot be judged solely on the quantity of output, nor are there any figures
that would represent tlie total efforts of all hands. The figures here presented
are only for the maps produced by Army Engineers and distril)uted through
JICPOA, and the .TICPOA production of photographic prints and printed intelli-
gence material. When it is realized that in tlie periods considered, much more
material was originated and distributed by other agencies, the magnitude of the
task can be appreciated.
Assault maps, bombardment charts and air support maps produced in the
Central Pacific Area since the Gilbert Islands operation in November 1943
totaled 8,375,776 sheets weighing 354.2 tons. Tlie volume for each operation has
risen steadily, from 8.7 tons of material for the Gilberts to 121 tons for the
Okinawa campaign. Tonnages prepared in this area alone for each major
Pacific operation are shown in an accompanying graph. It should be borne in
1176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
mind that much additional material in this category, such as air target and
shore bombardment cliarts, was prepared elsewhere.
Printed and mimeographed material in the year begiiming 1 June 1944 amounted
to 72,909,000 sheets weighing 729 tons. (Tlie standard printed sheet such as
that used in "Weekly Intelligence" carries a total of eight pages — four on each
side; mimeographed sheets carry two pages). Peak printing load for the year
was during the week of 27 January, when 5,200,000 sheets were printed.
The greatest production increase was in the photographic field. The number
of contact print turned out jumped from 59,565 in the first quarter of 1943 to an
estimated 3,000,000 (weighing 78.75 tons) for the second quarter of 1945. The
principal increase occurred after inauguration of aerial reconnaissance flights
over Japan and nearby areas, with resultant preparation of mosaics.
(At this point in the Exhibit, three items appear as follows :
1. Two graphs, one illustrating quarterly production of con-
tact print photographs and the other ilhistrating pro-
duction of maps and charts for major Pacific operations.
2. A graph illustrating the monthly production of printed
and mimeographed intelligence material for the Central
Pacific area, 1 June 19'44 to 31 May 1945.
3. A photograph showing fire bombs being dropped from
B-29's on Yokohama.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 294,
295, and 296, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 70
Mess.\ges Encoded and Received StrBSEQUENT to 7 Dec. 1941
"PA." 27 Jan. 42.
From: Chengoai Thia #010.
To : Foreign Minister — Tokyo.
Ho ku hei [OB] koku kyo [WH an fu an] how shun [BY] no tai gun wa ka shu
tokoro ui shite
hei ka wo tai keisatsu tai wo a in se ya ku 1 man su FIUM 1 bu wa 21st [pi ru
ma] ga wa e shin shi tsu se ru ga te pan no han ge ki VV a hi koku kyo sen ni
hi ki ka he shi tai ji tsu. Ma ta set bu koku kyo [inei sa ta ya] do i pi 8 wa 22nd
IE AU MI JE NI YO RJ
te ki no ku ba ku wo u ke shoku on zei kun 1 i kei gi.
Harada.
(in bad shape) Kieru
The Tai army now on the northern frontier, including police amounts to over
10,000. On the 21st a portion of them were sent to PIRUMA. At
ME-SATAYA they were bombed by the enemy.
"LA." 15 Jan. 1942.
From: Foreign Minister #001.
To : Ryoji Hanoi.
Kaku nen ki shi shu 1475 nikan(chi) (new para)
Kin 3 sen 3 hyaku ju en | na ri | kan pi | wa ta shi | ki ri | hi | yori zo ga ku
den so su
Togo.
Note: (No copy of coded mes. on hand. Obtained from Army).
Re your (claim?) of last year 1475 I am telegraphing increased amt of 3310
yen gov't expenses from private fund.
Togo.
From : Harada
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
1. The lower classes who were rounded-up in the recent drive were leaders
of the^ subversive party, and it is only natural that Tailand, at a time when
rumors have been rife and in spite of the fact that it looked like the work of
spies, should put the blame on the Japanese.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1177
2. The problem goes deeper than just the dual-nationality question, and enemy
sympathizers of whatever nationality have had to be controlled. All the more
so wlien you consider the Tailanders who have become Japanized, and it would
set a bad precedent if these were treated like the cases of those who made a trip
some time ago for Mitsubishi. Since there remains the smirch of the Mitsubishi
incident, I plan to carry out a thorough investigation.
28 Jan. 1942.
"PA" (Army)
From : Harada #012 (Re your msg. #431) .
To: Foreign Minister — Tokio.
1. kon kai | ken kyo | no 1 ka kyu | wa | en sho ] ha | no | kyo to ni | shite
sa ku I kon | shikirimi | ryu gen hi go | wo | ru fu | shi | su pa i | ko i
I no I ko I na ru kakawara(zu) | tai ga wa wa | ho nin | shi zen | ta ru
I mono I na ri | (new Para)
2. fu ryo I ka kyo | no | ni ju | koku se ki | na | mon dai | to ni | ta ra zu |
I nyo I te ki 1 ko i sha | wa | na pi to ta ri to mo gen zen | torishima(ri) | wo | yo
su I i wan ya | ko nichi ka ni mi VT koku | se ru tai jin (zen chi en ma i shi
FULW I (mi tsu pi shi | shutsu | cho in | son po n) | no | goto (ki) | wo | ko
ma ma ni sum wa. | a ku | rei | wo j no ko su | mono | na ru | niyori shu kai |
ei tai ko (sei ma i gyo mi A — | mi | tsu pi | shi | to to | tokoro | hi ki | a ri)
no I rei | ba | ku | wo | on tsu te | tsu i kyii | surn | yo tei \ na ri | on rin pyo tei i.
Harada.
28 Jan. '42.
From : Foreign -Minister, Tokyo #038 (Re yr msg. #061).
To : Minister, Saigon.
Re the victory celebration to be carried out upon the fall of Singapore includ-
ing * * * to be presented to the throne, decided upon in the special diet on
19 January I desire (these) details carried out in a suitable manner.
1. The celebrations will be completed by sunset on the day of the triumphal
entry into Singapore (This day will be published by the information bureau).
2. From the day of the fall until the day of the celebration the national flag
will be flown at every door.
On the day of the ceremony
(a) Before noon get all the citizens out doors and commemorate the day
with stories of the imperial army and spirits of the departed. After the
Priiue minister's broadcast ( #43) tell stories to the children.
(b) Have Shinto & Budhist temples conduct "reporting the fall" cere-
monies and fan, water sprinkling and prayer ceremonies.
(c) Carry out primary school sightseeing (trips) celebration ceremonies
by junior organization. Have military doctors comfort families ; worship
at shrines, drinking contests, athletic meets military contests, military music.
(Emphasize) the savings and other national policies.
Furthermore there are no objections in carrying out these ceremonies, if in
addition to cooperating with affiliated organizations which celebrate according to
local circumstances in China and Manchuria, as long as they do not result in
confusion, if you take any suitable measures avoiding such things as impairing
industrial output, wasting funds, injuring air defense and carrying on lantern
and flag parades.
Togo.
"LA" (Army) 28 Jan. 1942.
From : Foreign Minister Tokio. #038 (Re yr msg. #061.)
To : Koshi Saigon. (Re My Circular #590 (f ) .)
January 19th ji kan kai gi | ni te | Singapore | kan ra ku no sai | nioi(te)
ke shu sen sho | shu ku ga | gyo | ji | ji tsu shi yo ko ke tsu tei se rue | to ko ro |
sono ST D \ I B \ t/L gu no | tori | ni | tsuki | o | f uku,mi | o ki no I ue | hi tsu yo | ko
sai wa shikaru be ku shi do sera rota shi (new para)
1. gyo ji no ji tsu slii wa | Singapore nyu jo su ki koshi hi ni kagi(ri) (ki hi
wa jo ho I kyo ku | yori ha tsu pi yo | su) hi bo tsu da de ni shii i-vo i seshimu
ru ko to (new para)
1178 CONGliESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. kan ra ku | no hi yori | nyti jo | shi ki to hi da de kaku ko ui koku ki ] o |
kei yo | su ru | ko to (new pai-a)
Nyti jo I shu ki | to hi wa (i) sho go o ki shi zen koku min wa zai sho nu
te ei rei narabini | ko gun ko ta me ki neu o | sa sa ge | sori - - daijin | no kan |
wa ho so go no ban 43 sho ni sho wa shi (ro) jiu ja | ji in to wa | kan ra ku |
ho koku sai (ta te ma tsu ru tsu ge ru) oyobi sen su kan su i ki gan sai | o o ko
nai (ha) kan ko sho ga ku ko. sho dan tai to 1 nioi(te) wa | shu IvU ga | shi ki | o |
0 ko no ho ka ko gun i | lv;a zo ku no i mon . jiu ja | san pa i . l)U do | tai i ku | tai
kai . ko en kai . bu so . on ga ku ko shin . eho clii ku sono ta koku sa ku kyo ryo
ku I no ji tsu sen o te ki | gi | ji tsu shi | su ru | ko to (new para)
Na o I sliu ku ga gyo | ji ji tsu | shi ni a ta ri | te wa zo san o so gai shi . shi
zai I 0 I ran pi | shi | bo ku ni kyo ge ke | o | sho seshimu ru ko to | o ] sa ku
ru I shu shi yori | nai chi | ni | oi (te) wa i cho chin | gyo re tsu . ha ta | gyo
re tsu I to wa | o ko na wa za ru | ko to | to | na ru o ru | to ko ro | China | man
shu I ni I oi (te) | wa | chi ho to ku shu | ji jo | ni o ji I o | ma tsu ri | sa wa gi | ni |
0 chi i ra za ru gen do | nioi (te) ] kan kei | ki kan | to f kyo zi 1 no | ue | te ki gi | so
chi I serare | sashitsukae | na shi
Togo.
009 26 Jan 42.
Hababa
Report on difficulty in getting good materials for bridge building and the pub-
lishing of severe laws in papers.
Methods of handling problems of Eurasians of American parent based on
previous residence.
009 Jan 26, p. m. (Army) "PA."
Gaimodaijin Tokyo.
Too ti ka kyoo no fu ryoo bun si so zyuu kei boo soo u ke u ri no a dc si
tu no de ma kiden (dai . . . goo) to ba si si min wo sa wa ga se wo ru tokovo
zyuu rai too ha no ei. Bei zin kon ke tu ka zo ku wa tai zin tosite i zen zyuu
ni ki kyo si wo nyoo. Na ke ni no zen ki ka kyoo to renraku dan mo nt
mono a ru mo yoo ni te poo tyoo zyoo hakarigata (si) za nitui (tewa) tai
ga wa ni tyuu i si ke ri on zei syu tei i kei gi pe?
Habapa,
Chiengoa.
"PA."
22 Dec. 1.941.
From: Tokio (Army).
To : Shanghai #710.
Net 1947.
kiden (dai 842 go) nikan.shi (new Para)
Belgium tai shi kan ji gyo fu tei denpo (dainngo) V A F AV GI JG OK wa te
ki ni taieuru nichi to do yo no tariatsuka (i) suo na shi GI JU (go) sashitsukai
na shi Belgium jin oyoki Belgium ken e ki nitaishi te wa nai chi ni oite wa
tokubetsu no so chi mo to ri mo ra za I'u mo Cliina gen chi ni oite kimitsu (dai
ungo) ho ji ma ta wa ken e ki ho zon no ken chi yori tokuni nan ra ka no so
chi wo to ru no hi tsvi yo a ru baai ni oite wa te ki koku ni okom jun ji
toriatsuka(i) wa re (go) sashitsuka(e) na shi (New Para) nan dai Shanghai
zai ho toshite shi ko kan cho cho ka ko e ten den se ri ni tsui (te wa) CQIOQ
From : Tokyo.
To : Shanghai #710.
1947.
In relation to your despatch numbered 842 there is no objection to handling the
Belgium Embassy's — despatch — in the same fashion as an enemy countries de-
spatch. In Japan no special disposition is being made for Belgians nor Belgian
interests also in China in the cases when the necessity of taking special, methods
in order to preserve — of you secret message — there is no objection to using
same type of handling as for an enemy country.
In relation to method handling banking, gold silver deposits etc.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1179
"PA." (Army) 31 Dec. 1941.
From : Peiping.
To: (No heading) #759.
- Koii a kai sen ni to mo mai China ni cite te ki koku gin ko. ju kei kei gin ko
to nitsui (tewa) sa shi wo sa e ta ru kin gin oyohi gin ko ken (ho jo ka narabi
(ni) mi ha tsu ko ken wo (o) fuku (mi) mu) wa kaku chi BYYM (Tsinan)
uo to ku shu ji jo tsu mi niyori te sho bun suru koto nu ku kon go ni okeru tei
koku no zen pan te ki shi sa shuku to no kan ren ni oite m go te ki ken clii ni
ta chi te kore wo wo hino ha i i no nut to ni I<'1GL (Manchukuo) niyori sho uyo
suru mono to su (new Para) ki (Para)
1. sa slii mo sa e a ru kin gin oyobi i;in led ken wa sashitari gun no kan ri ka
ni wo ki Niliow ga wa gin lio (sliO kin wo yo tei su) ni yo uyu suru Icoto za
2. Migi 1. no kin gin oyobi gin den ken wa gen so ku toshite yo nyu sa ki gin
ko wo shite wagaho ni yu ri ni un yo se shi nu ru mono to suru mo hitsuyo
ni 6 ji ko no yo nyu wo mi kai ri toshite sa shi GC sa e giu ko nitaishi ka shi
tsu ke wo na su koto ma ta wa kan ri wo kai jo suru ta me yo nyii no ha rai
to do shi doku jo su koto wo mito (me) bu (suV) ru koto (new Para)
6 ku ra slio wa yo sii re ba yo nyu sa ki gin ko nitaishi ryu ga nen sho (nen
no ta me no nen kaku) wo ko fu suru koto (new Para)
3. gun wa kyalvu kan ri to wo gen clii ko a in kikau no cho ni i nin suru
koto (new Para)
Migi ji mu nikanshi ju yo na ru mono wa chu o no shi zu wo ma chi to kore
rei wo ko no koto to shi nan yo suraba gen chi ui oite sho ri iin kai wo so shi
ki pan koto (new Para)
— H ko ho ku shi gen gin no sho ben nitsui (tewa) te wa liow ken to wa
shutsu tsu ko RZ so chi wo to ru oyobi wo mito (me) wo shite ru mono to
su gyaku ka u BN AMRI
1. Enemy diplomatic officials in China (Consular officials included) and per-
sons of influence will not be employed in our service. In relation to the payment
of living expenses by enemy peoples, special budget appropriations will be made
by the Japanese government.
2. All deposits will be frozen, but enemy national will be allowed to withdraw
one months wages. And future matters will be handled by law.
3. It is desired that a system will be develoi)ed for exchange of unminted
silver between The Chung-King Bank and The Japanese Silver bank.
22 Dec. 1941.
"PA." (Army)
From: Tokio.
To: Net #1950. • '
China ni okern te ki koku gai ko kan (ryoji kan wo (o) fuku (mi) mu)
oyobi wagaho ni oite ei gyo nai shi shu slioku wo yu ru sa zu | sono shu nyu no mi
chi wo to ze tsu se shi me ta ka | te ki koku jin no sei ka tsu hi shi ben
nikanshi te wa shu ju kan kei cho t0i kyo gi no kekka izure baai niyori te wa
Nihow seifu ni oite yo san wo kei jo suru y5 a ru koto to narube (ku) ki mo
sashiatari no so chi toshite wa betsuden (dai 2651go) ni yoru koto to se ru nitsui
(tewa) migi niyori so chi serareta(shi) (Para)
2. yo kin zen bu wo 1 ka tsu [bu-<hy5] shi yo kin na ki shun MJ ni mo
kore niyori shi ben shi ya ru an mo ko ryo shi ta ru ga wagaho ga shi yu zai
san wo shiO bun shi ta ru | ka ta chi | wa kore wo sa ku ru yo a pa wo motte
te be koku jin kan ni nin i ni so go fu jo se shi mu ru yo go shi doku arita (shi)
(new Para)
3. Wagaho su sa shi wo sa e ra re ta ru te ki koku no ju kei kei gin ko
no na ma gin oyobi gin ko ken to wa sa QI ni ko a in YY se tsu iin kai no (go)
kettei su kore wo gun kan ri ka ni wo ki Nihon ga gin gin ko ni yo nyu sui'u koto to
na ha wo ru tokoro mi ka e ri ka wo u ku be ki te ki san yo nyu gin ko na ki chi
ni oite wa migi son zai suru ko kan to renraku none sho LD serareta(shi) CURB
go. Rest garbled.
1180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Received feom U. S. Akmy — Hono.
Subsequent to 7 Dec. 1941 Copies of Their Translations
From: CHEFOO.
To: TOKIO.
Sang Toei.
(KYU BA) 10 - CHINA 10 SE. PERU O - GERMANY ITO SE --- SE
BELGIUM TO HAND. BELGIUM OHEHA BEGIN ENGLISH SPELL S
END ENGLISH O - EN - NI TONA. EGYPT KANKA HA -- MAN SYU KOKU
KAI NI. MAN SYU KOKU NA I. RO TYO KA -- HA ENGLAND NI FUTU
KOKU ISEI. - ONAHE. CHINA KATOHA. ARGENTINA GORU Un' (NYU --
NEA) NI IHA. NE -- NYU - KYO - 1 NIIHA 1 (NYU ZI - DO) NO 2 NI
IHA. (NYU ZI RAN DO) NO 3 -- I - (- KA - GU A) I HENI. (RO SUTARI
KAN) IHENI I (KO RON BIA) IHENI RE (HON DE YU RASU) KA SENA
URAGUAY NI IKA. NORWAY KANUGE RE NORWAY FU ZO KAN 1
HYO KANA RE. (ARA SUKA) KARU EN.
#663 A
From: TOKIO. •^^'^ ^^•
To: SHANGHAI.
KIN HYAKU EN KIKAN ATE DENSO SU HARADA . . . SEI ESYU KO
ARITASI o u XXV.,
#634 A
From : TOKIO. '^^^' ^^'
To: SHANGHAI
JANUARY 20th GEN ZAI NIOI (TE) KE RUKI KAN HO KAN NO DENSIN
FUGO SYO WA ZYU 4 NEN YU GO DAI 5 GO KUN REI NIYO (RI) DENPO
ARITASI PA v^ V V 7 ^luiyrr^j
#635 A
ST ^ TOKIO-. ^^^ "^ 1«^-
ENGLAND NINITO
KEI.NASEKA,
GERMANY NAOK NA HE.
BELGIUM - - INI SO IHA. ROITO. OIHE MO - -
NANAHA ANA NARU - - RO - - K HESETO. POLAND KA - - HA GEN KA
SEI. KAKA SEI SA - -. KA HENAS - - RU - - KUN KE HE OHENA
KORUKA. ///0 yjnrjiy^
CHINA HERU. RU SENUN YU - - HETO SEAKA TOKA
HOLLAND KANA OHE. ORU. lOSE
TAI KOKU NAO.
CANADA ISE SEI ISE NI.
BAI SESEMI SENI ZI - - S NIRUNI.
MEXICO RU.
PERU NANA - - NARU HEO HEHE ARU I - - KAONI IKA
ONA I ISEHE. ISE RU. NINAI M NI NAHA
BOLIVIA TONI.
EGYPT NISE
MAN SYU KOKU I O S INA.
SPECIAL CODE . . . TIHA OK lOI
(NIKARA GA) IHAO - - INOI
(KOSUTA RIKA) IHA OA lOI
SPEC. CODE .... O (C SI ZIGO HYO KA. ZEN - - YO - - O)
NYU 1 NE4) I NA HE I IHE HA.
SPEC. CODE ... I NAHE KI HEHA PUN SPEC. CODE O TO
PARAGUY O TO . ■ kj ±kj
URAGUY I HENI MI HENA
PANAMA KATO -- S KANA HA (TOKU SIN BAN GO -- RON HASU ZI
( SON DAI 1 KA - - NASA SU - - HYO DAI 2 KA TO OK KANAHA)
DENMARK RU SE (SONO TAFU ZOKU ISI - - 5 SATU)
^'ORWAY KAKU HANA - - KA HA HE FU ZO KU KANZI HYO KA HANA
KA HA HE.
(ARA SUKA) RUNL
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1181
KASI -- IKA. ORU. TOE. TONI.
HI ZOKU - - NIKA. NINA
TUBAKI - - HETO. HENA.
KA - - DE - - RO HETO. HE NA
YANA GI -- HARU
Rest of msg lost due to station interference.
FROM: KALGAN. 1-20-42
To : TOKIO.
CANADA KARU HE
(KYU BA) KARU HE
PERU ISEO
HOLLAND O O
ENGLAND REPEAT INDICATOR NIKA NA ANIKA HE LST
REPEATER
FRANCE KAKA HA
BELGIUM OHE IKO HENI
HUNGARY HATO
EGYPT HERU) I IRU
TURKEY HA IHA UHA 10
CHINA KASEI
PORTUGAL KANASE
MAN SYU KOKU HEO
AGENTINA Nil
SIAM NINA
(KORON BIA) REPEAT INDICATOR INA NAKI NAHE 2ND REPEATER
(NIKA RAGA) 2ND REPEATER
(KOSU TARIKA) 2ND REPEATER
(NYU GI NEA 1ST REPEATER
NYU ZI ZE RAN DO) 1ST REPEATER
(HON ZYU RAsu) KASEHA
(ARA SUKA) KAKA SE (IZYO KOKU HEI NO SITAWA ZEN BU KANAMO
ZI)
#643
From : Cliefoo.
To : Tokyo. _ Jan 20.
As follows: (KYU BA) May mean emergency, — emergency code? — or may be
the first in the list of names of countries appearing in this message.
The message is impossible to translate as it is. However, it should be taken
in connection with #674A, which shows a similar list of names of countries
with varying letter groups after them. We may have here a new code in
use, or possibly the suggestion of new code groups to benused for the countries
in future — the latter, however, seems pretty crude.
In connection with the former suggestion, should we not consider #635A,
which seems to call for a new code to be put in use on January 20th., the date
of this message?
RSS.
# 663 A
From : Kalgan.
To : Tokyo. Jan 20.
(Kindly refer #635, #663, #674. Letter groups after names of countries
seem to indicate that message is in connection with code.)
Groups in Parenthesis in this message are as follows :
Line 2. Cuba
Last line. Colombia
Second page:
Nicaraugua
Costa Rica
New Guinea
New Zealand
Honduras
1182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"Alaska KAKASE (In the above, that which follows names of countries
are all in Kana)
1/23/42
# 643 A
FUNADA.
Canada— KARU HE
Cuba— KARU HE
Peru— ISEO
Holland — oo
England— NIKA NA ANIKA HE
France— KAKA HA
Belgium— OHE IKO HENI
Hungary— HATO
Egypt—. . . I IRU
Turkey— HA IHA UHA 10
China— KASEI
Portugal— KANASE
Manclmkuo— HEO
Argentina — Nil
SIAM— NINA
Columbia— INA NAKI NAHE
Nicaragua — " "
Costa Rica " "
New Guinea— NIKA NA ANIKA HE
New ZealaiHl— NIKA NA ANIKA HE
Honduras— K A SEH A
Alaska— KAKA SE (IZYO KOKU MEI NO SITAWA ZEN BU KANAMO ZI)
From Peiping #227 to Tokyo (Urgent). March 9.
Your wire No. 160 says, "OfBcial Yoshihara of Kalgan has been ordered as
from the 6th to take a post at DAIYA. Please have him leave immediately".
Is this not a mistake? Please investigate and reply immediately.
1254 A
From Tokyo (Urgent) #174 to Peiping. Makch 0.
With regard to our wire #718 of last year.
1. Regarding the elevation of the status of Settlements, those who have
MOSU SEI KOSHI (Note: Might not SEI, which follows MOSU in other parts
of this message also, he something else, sudi as IDE? The only translation
which would fit the context in any way wM)uld be "Voice" so that MOSU SEI
KOSHI would be "sent in their voice" i.e., "repoi'ted") are as follows. If the
arrangements of all the offices are completed, we exiject to put the establishment
(of elevation of status) into effect on the 1st of April. Although we have
received reports direct from the chiefs of the branch offices of Paotao and
KAISHUU. we should receive reports from KOOWA and JYONI, so please
arrange to have these reports in first.
2. With regard to governmental oi-ders ; in the case of colonies only, it will
be alright to put into effect the completion of organization, in line with previous
experience, and after sufficient leadership.
3. With regard to the desires of making the Settlement Chief's position an
honorary one, especially bear in mind the relationship with Article 69 of the
Regulations of Establishment. SPECIAL CODE by way of assurance.
1. HOTEI (Settlement Chief System; however, honorary position)
2. KAISHUU (Council System) No report from JOSHUU Consul.
3. TAAKUU (Council system) DENPOO Consul General has sent report.
However, no report regarding governmental order.
4. TYOOTEN (Council system) Report received from Tsinan Consul General.
5. KOOWA (Settlement Chief System, Salaried) No report concerning govern-
mental order.
6. Paotiio (Settlement Chief System. However, honorary) No report from
KOOWA Consul General, therefore, also no report regarding governmental order.
1255 A funada
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1183
Maech 9.
From Peiping # 229 to Tokyo.
Regarding your message # 157.
Because of the phenomenal rise in price of building materials, an additional
amount of approximately Yen 10,113.70 (for building materials) Yen
805.30 ; making a total appropriation* of Yen 35,919.00 which will be necessary
or else the work caimot be completed, we are informed by tiie workmen. This
situation here makes the (increase) unavoidable. Wherefore, we request that
the difference amounting to Yen 8.232.50 may be sent as a supplementary appro-
priation. In case this seems, upon consideration, difficult, we will have no
recourse (here) l)Ut to reduce the amount (of the building) SPECIAL CODE.
# 1260 A
RSS
*Tliere seems to be something lack, or in error, in the figures, as they do not work out
properly. The message does, however, indicate something of the difficulties being en-
countered by the New Order in a rapidly rising cost price.
March 9.
From Peiping #220 to Tokyo.
Circ. #170 to Nanking. Shanghai.
With regard to our wire Extra No. 56.
The various offices concerned with the establishment of Settlements have
carried out temioorary enactment, and there being considerations to make in con-
nection with this, it is desired that arrangements be made to MAI BIRO (?) the
rules and regulations. Further the newly established Settlements are Paotinii,
Shanhaikwan, Tanshan, KOOWA, Paotao, Haichow, TYOTEN, Tangku, SINGOO,
Chefoo and Kaifeng, totalling 11.
B^irther, the matters in the rules, which are short of those necessary towards
putting the matter into effect, (which must be known with regard to putting the
matter into effect) are 1. To put into effect on April First. 2. The book of
names which is to be built up for the first (election) will be built up by the 15th
of that month in accordance with the rules of February 1st, 1943. (In article
83 of tax regulations ; the first period levy, 6 months from the end of July, of
the business tax ; those having paid income taxes for this period will have votes
by virtue of their having paid a business tax. Therefore, elections
are not to be held will be alright. 3. In respect to the establishment
of colonies, the directors of the colonies will be appointed by the consuls and
their period of service will be until there is an election which will take place in
accordance vv-ith regulations. The question of whether or not these three points
are necessary is being considered.
(Note: It is believed that SHOWA ZYUU 8 NEN, 1943 in above message
might be a mistake for some previous year)
1261 A
funada
Mauch 10.
From Peiping #136 to Tokyo
Circ. #181 Tientsin
There being also a strong desire on the part of the military in this area, it has
been decided that following the conference of the heads of legations and consu-
lates (V), on the ISth. (only one day) at 9 am. a conference of con.suls having
charge of military affairs (Note; HEIJI which has been translated "military
affairs" might also be translated "everyday affairs") will take place. Above for
your information SPECIAL CODE. Further, Consuls, heads of branch offices
and heads of dispatched offices (mi.nht be instead "Higher officials of consulates,
branch offices and dispatched offices") will remain as they are. From
office (s) it will be alright to dispatch consul (s) or Vice Consul (s) so kindly
include this SPECIAL CODE.
1262 A
Maech 11.
From Shanghai to Hankow
Extra
there has been no order as yet and (we) do not know
when the order will be issued. Details will be sent by mail.
1263 A
funada
1184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mabch 11.
From Tokyo (Urgent)
Cire. #455 to Tientsin. Taiyuan. Tatung. Hankon. Canton.
Witli regard to No. 1, Our wire. A 3 GOKUHI ( ?)
Send in immediately SPECIAL CODE. Further, SPECIAL CODE.
1265 A
March 11.
From Tokyo (Urgent) #019 to Shanghai Minister
Re ; my message No. 017
Temporary enactment documents from Hangchow and KAKOO are at hand.
However, no requests as to governmental orders have arrived.
1266 A
March 11.
From Tokyo (Urgent) #159 to Canton. Shanghai Minister
Re your wire No. 169.
Concerning the enforcement of the Settlement Chief System, this is approved
■as of March 10th. Further, by way of assurance it is advised that there is a
need for revision of the details of regulations for the enforcement of govern-
mental orders.
1267 A
funada
From Tokyo (Urgent) #032 to Peiping
#183 to ?
March 11.
Re: your wire No. 90
With respect to the system of (forming a) treasury examination committee,
please avoid this. With regard to the others, for this time, please follow the
instructions of the Peking (Ambassador), establish in accordance with previous
experience and put in effect. (It will be alright to follow instructions of the
Peking ambassador, establish in accordance with previous experience and put
in effect).
1268 A
From Tokyo to Peiping. March 11.
Extra
Repeat wire with regard to your wire Extra as follows.
Regard your wire No. 175.
From Yosano to Harada.
The Spanish Legation in Tokyo has at last, recently, received in
Swiss Francs. So far, the arrangements, (i-ed tape) necessary have been com-
plicated and (they) are fed up (disgusted), so that they no longer desire
to as has been done thus far.
1269 A
funada.
March 11.
From Taiyuan Urgent #028 to Tokyo, Kalgan.
Your Circular #612, Paragraph 9.
Hashimoto is at present caring for the writing (secretarial work?) at the
Settlement School, and the telegraphic work alone, and in April the new organ-
ization of the colony, official business, and the putting into operation of the new
tax for the colony, are all pressing duties — If (in addition) this man
is expected to DAIKOO (teach for another; become a substitute teacher ?), we
expect that troubles not a few will arise concerning the completion of the official
business. Further, this man's wife is at present pregnant and the doctor has
forbidden travel before the end of May, which situation - - RU FUTU GAN this
interpreter (Hashimoto) will complete business connected with the Colony
(organization) by the end of May, and completing that stage will be sent on
to his new post in Kalgan early in June regarding which, after an
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1185
examination of the situation, we ask that special consideration be given, and
permission be given that the removal to his new post of this interpreter be
postponed until the end of May.
#1270 A
RSS.
Mabch 12,
From Tokyo Urgent
To Peiping Consul General
Regarding your message #221 (1259 A)
1- The Department Orders at present in force base the power of control in the
sttlements under enforcement regulation paragraph 5 (Paragraph 19 of the Law
regarding the Duties of a Consul, applicable to occasions when decisions shall
be made by a s^iecial order). But this section does not apply to subordinate
consular offices and sub-stations.
2- Having said which, however, in colonies under the authority of a subordinate
consular office or sub-station, there arise not a few circumstances in which un-
reasonable situations with regard to the resident head. In such situations
there is no other way but to act in the name of the head (consul) of the main
consulate; so after consultation with the head (or heads) of the department,
we wish to send you a further message regarding the practical method of handling
such situations.
#1274 A
INlARCH 12.
From Peiping #028 to Nanking Minister,
Upon the visit of your excellency, the Ambassador, to this place, the total
of all expenses paid out was Yen 24,898.67, and the sum received was Yen 15,000.
The balance of Yen 9,898.67 has been advanced and paid by this office, for which
we request reimbursement by wire. Further, the receipted bills will go forward
to you by air.
#1275 A RSS
March 12.
From: Tokyo. #191 to Peking
#021 to Shanghai Ambassador
With regard to Settlement Chief, Settlement System, and the selection of people
(officers?) of the settlement and their treatment (salary, hoiising etc.), please
bear in mind the following and instruct apuropriately SPECIAL CODE by way
of assurance.
1. The Settlement Chief system will be applicable only when an appropriate
person is being obtained for the settlement. Therefore, the settlement chief
will be thought of as a principle, and to hurry the selection of people for the
settlement will be considered wrong.
2. The settlement chief, without regard for whether he is salaried or honorary,
in connection with the business of the settlement, (based on the
restrictions of Article 69) will take full responsibility with respect to the failure
of business. Therefore, a spare time settlement chief is wrong.
3. With respect to the Chief of the Settlement and the other leaders, the
character, the insight, etc., will be considered seriously before selection ; the
treatment (same as above) also, it is considered, should not be considered
merely from the budget but should be arranged from considerations of the status,
(rank) of the settlement (set by the government) and the candidate himself (it is
understood of course that the amount of payment made must not be too much).
(Because of these considerations), the chief of the settlement, his assistants and
directors and the treatment of these should be, it is considered, arranged
after your approval is given.
4. Further, with regard to Settlement Chiefs, their assistants, and directors,
consideration is made of the future changes in personnel, and it is desired that
arrangements be made in such a way that people will serve the settlements for
long periods.
1276 A
funada
1186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Makch 12,
From Tokyo #163 to Canton.
Travel and other expenses to the amount of Yen 3,4 0.89 and being sent by
wire to your excellency as agent.
ITEM : Travel expense for bring out the family of Consul Oozek'i, Yen 171.50 ;
Return expense to Japan of the family of Consul Kobayashi, Yen 145.30; Travel
expense of Vice-Consul Uyeda to Nanking and Shanghai, Yen 1,051.00 ; Sato, going
to his post, Yen 111,70 ; Expense of transfering Shiroto, Yen 167.00
# 1277 A
In the humble judgement of the translator, the balance of the message is not
worth bothering about.
Mabch 12.
From Peiping #002 Nanking Minister ; Circ. #185 Hankow, Tientsin, Tsingtao.
Regarding your circular #020.
In our area we are continuing under the organization of the Women's De-
fense Association, and have not set up a New Women's Oi:ganization as yet.
The SHUU (Masses, popular) Women's Defense Association is a specialty of the
Army, wiiich is directing it, and goes on the principle that the president (of the
association) should be the leading woman of the region, (here) the wife of the
head of the Settlement being tlie president, and the wife of the Consul advisor.
# 1278 A RSS.
IVIabch 12.
From Shanghai # 489 cut in to Nanking, Peiping.
Following the recent sudden drop in emergency messages, the postal receipts
from the sale of stamps, etc., and from all other sources up to the 10th (having
fallen) a plan to limit (expenditures?) in the interests of thrift (economy)
has betn announced and will be put into effect immediately. (This information
is given out after a conference with the Chief of the TAI KOO Communications
Department, who is in the citv on a trip).
# 1279 A
March 12.
From Manchull # 023 to Tokyo, Hsingking.
Although we fully iniderstand that the matter of the arrangement for a train
on the Soviet side for Ambassador Satoo and his entourage, who is to arrive
here on the 19th and that same day enter the Soviet, is in the hands of the
Home Office, we would appreciate a wire about the matter emerely that we may
have the information, in this office.
# 1280 A
From Tokyo # 036 to Harbin.
Although the matter raised in your ordinary wire of # 34 should be approved,
should not the coinpletion of the work be done according to the estimate for the
bviilding submitted last year? We desire to have the amount NOOJI(?) (defi-
nitely settled ? ).
# 1281 A RSS.
M/,KCH 12.
From Tokyo #053 to Hankow.
Regarding your massage HI number 154 of February 17th., the announcement
of the regulations regarding promotion (or. advance in salary) was completed in
our Out-bound message #18 of last December 31st.
#1282 A
March 12.
From Tokyo #182 to Hsingking Minister.
Regarding your message #169.
As travel for Government Officials appointed abroad FOREIGN
MO KU — - Yen 8.200 special supplementation has been made, and will be sent
in advance by wire. Kindly transfer Mutankiang's share (to that office).
#1283A RSS,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1187
, March 13.
From : Tokyo
To : Hsingking Minister.
Extra-numeral message.
To Communications Offi.-ial Ogawa, from Nomura.
Replying to your extra-numeral message both of the gentlemen are going
along with the Ambassador on his journey, and are expected to start today, the
33tli, in the evening. After they have started we will communicate with you
again.
#1286 A
March 13.
From Shanghai #065 to Canton ; to Consul Kimura, in Hongkong from Sone.
With regard to your humble servant's message of the 10th. Ryuu Suu Ketsu
(parenthesis is probably an explanation of how to write the name in Chinese
characters) sends information that Ryuu Saku Min and others are to sail from
Hongkong on the boat of the 15th. The Ryuu family have again and
again asked that you would take the trouble to arrange it so that they could
travel along on the same boat, so if that is possible, I beg you to take the trouble
to make the arrangements.
#1287A RSS.
Mabch 13,
From Nanking #002 to Peiping. Circ. #021 to Kalgan, Canton.
Regarding your Circ. #186 ( A).
At present they are engaged in urging the organization of a real Women's
Defense Association in Naichi (Japan proper), but here, in general (we are
proceeding) under the direction of this Office, the Chief of the Department of
Military Affairs, The Defense Command, the Chief of Staff, the Commandment
of Guards of the Navy, and the Chief of the Military police being advisors. Mat-
ters having to do with defense, and related to militaiy matters, are first taken
up by our office, with the military department involved, and then we proceed
to guide them ; this is the plan under which we are working.
#1288 A
Maech $
From : Tokyo.
To: Hankow.
We desire that you send a message to Daiya.
#12"89 A
RSS.
March 9,
From Canton #195 to Tokyo. Circ. #069 to Peiping, Nanking, Shanghai.
Regarding my message #182.
In view of the fact that the Army authorities here report having recently re-
ceived orders from headquarters (Tokyo), we have been pressing the study of
a definite plan for caring for enemy aliens living, and causing them to do their
cooking for themselves jointly, in order to reduce the cost of living, and we have
been making preparations as far as was possible, to carry this out in accordance
with your message of December last, 4th and following columns (or lines),
and especially in accordance with colunni (or, line) 1 and the upper (or, former)
part of column 4 (or, line 4). However, the Army's proposition is something
approximating internment, which we feel is unfortunate (literally, not interest-
ing). In general, we have expressed our opinion that enemy aliens (with the ex-
ception of those subject to exchange) should be encouraged of their own accord
to form groups, and thus to bring down the expense of living for each individual.
This is sent to keep you informed.
#1256 A
The above message seems to be connected with #1214 A.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 2 34
1188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
March 10.
From Nanking Minister #266 to Tokyo ; Cir. #146 to Hsiugking, Canton, Han-
liow and 1 otlier.
Chunking Broadcast (8tli).
1 — The United States is dispatching a commission to New Delhi to offer en-
couragement in the matter of tlie protection of India and the construction of a
route for transportation of supplies to China. This informations comes from a
source with direct contact with the White House.
2 — The Chungking government has dispatched their Minister to Turkey, Choo
I Shun (instructions how to write in Chinese characters) to Iran to conclude
a treaty of commerce, and also to arrange for the exchange of ministers.
3 — According to a dispatch from Angora, the former United States Ambassador
to Moscow, Steinhart, called upon the Turkish Foreign Minister on the 7th., and
the call lasted for more than an hour; moreover, TAI MI, German
Ambassador, is reported to be returning to his counary for consultation with his
government.
4 — Chiang Kaishek held a long conference with the British Ambassador on
the 7th.
5— After the arrival of the visiting commission, Chiang Kaishek will organize
through the Burmese Cultural Society for the observance of a Burma Day, on
the 8th., when the British Ambassador, Go Tetsu Jo, (Wu Tieh-cheng), 5 Bun
KG (Weng Wen-hao), and TIN KA FU (Chen Kuo-fu), are to broadcast to the
Burmese people.
#1257 A RSS.
Mabch 9.
I'rom Peiping Minister #037 to Tokyo.
Peter Hansen, a citizen of Germanv. resident here, (at present 62 years of age),
in charge of the Yale students abroad of the Peking TOO SOO FU KO DOO HEI
6 ZYUU GOO believed to be the name of institution. Possible, P(eking U(ni-
versity) M(edical) C(ollege) "with an average or about sixty students ?)
has expressed the request that we confer with the Home OflSce and secure a
vise that he may attend a meeting of the Yale Students Abroad, to be held
in the building "of the K. K. Laygold Company;, Kyoobashi Ku, Tokyo City.
We request that you will send us instructions in reply by wire.
##1258 A
March (.
From Peiping #221 to Tokyo.
Regarding my message # 220
In the case of the new organization of a settlement in any Consular area or
subconsular area, the head of the mindan has according to the fifth article
of the rules, met with the consul and (carried out) the GAITOO JIKOO
(literally, applicable items) appropriate items of the detailed regulations, and
has been accustomed to appoint the members of the settlement governing body
of their first meeting. There is some doubt here, however, as to whether this
method of handling is acceptable, and so we request your wired instructions
in reply.
# 1259 A RSS.
Maboh 34I,
From Nanking #276 to Peiping; Circ. #2450 to Tokyo. Hsinking. Canton.
Chunking Broadcast (10th).
1. Chiang Kai Shek spoke, in general, as follows at the gathering of CHU
SUU KI NEN (CHU is probably for CHUGOKU to mean China, but it is not
known what the SUU might be. KINEN denotes anniversary or memorial,
but contact with several Chmese in Honolulu failed to produce any knowledge
of an anniversary on the 9th.) on the 9th.
"During my visit of half a month in India, I received a hearty welcome from
the Indian government and the Indian people. China and India are in agree-
ment with each other ( ?) and are great countries. With the nobility and the
leaders of India, I had meetings at which our hearts were opened and the
people have been inspired into cooperating with each other mutually and without
regard for party or faction. The Indian government too, has now decided to
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1189
fight. I hope that England will give political freedom to India and that the
power of anti-aggression might be thus strengthened. The idea that India
should be proud of China's 5 year fight has been conveyed to the Indian people,
and a recognition of our country has been brought to them sufficiently. I be-
* lieve firmly that should Japan invade India, India will have the ability to
destroy Japan.
2. On the afternoon of the 8th, Chiang Kai Shek met the Minister from
Holland and a (military) Attache (under said minister) and also the Austral-
ian Minister (Igston).
1264 A
Punada
March 11.
From: Tokyo (Urgent) #082 to Peiping.
#183 to ?
Re; your wire No. 90
With respect to the system of (forming a) treasury examination committee,
please avoid this. With regard to the others, for this timie, please follow the
instructions of the Peking (Ambassador), establish in accordance with pre-
vious experience and put in effect. (It will be alright to follow instructions of
the Peking ambassador, establish in accordance with previous experience and
put in effect).
1268 A
March 11.
From Tokyo to Peiping.
Extra
Repeat wire with regard to your wire Extra as follows.
Regarding your wire No. 175.
From Yosano to Harada.
The Spanish Legation in Tokyo has at last, recently, received - - in Swiss
Francs. So far, the arrangements, (red tape) necessary have been compli-
cated and (they) are fed up (disgusted), so that they no longer desire to
as has been done thus far.
1269 A
Funada.
March 12.
From: Tokyo.
To : Hsingking Minister.
Regarding your extra-numeral message:
(forwarding will be completed)
The wire was forwarded by the night of the 11th.
#1271 A
March 12.
From: Tokyo.
To: Harbin.
Regarding your extra-numeral message of the 7th :
Although we have made investigations here, as per your wire, there is no
evidence of larceny.
#1272 A
March L"
From : Peiping. #186 Cir. to Nanking, Hankow, Shanghai, Canton, Kalgan.
Recently, in Japan proper, a union of all the women's organizations was car-
ried out, and in every place a Women's Defense Organization have been set up,
so that one imagines that the form of the new women's organization can be seen
appearing. For the information of this office, we beg to trouble you to inform
us by wire as to the system of controlling the new Women's Organization in your
area.
#1273 A
RSS.
1190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Maboh 12.
From : Canton. #210 to Tokyo ; Cir. #077 to Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping.
Regarding your circular #181 :
At noon today the resident Japanese of every class gathered at the Canton
Jinja (shrine), and under the organization of the Resident Japanese Colony,
reverence to the flag, bowing to the direction of the Imperial Palace, and prayer
before the flag was followed by the reading of the Imperial Rescript by the
Minister, a message of congratulation from the head of the advisory body of the
Conoly, greetings from a representative of the Army, and holy voices joined
in the Banzai were had. Thus solemnly and splendidly was the second affair
in celebration of victory carried out. China is involved in the celebration of the
Old New Year through the 15th (of March), but (after that) a mass meeting
of every class (of people) is planned to celebi-ate the second occasion of victory
in the war.
#1284 A
March 13.
From : Tokyo.
To : Peiping.
Extra-numeral. To Telegraphic oflBcial, Kato, from Nomura.
Your telegram and your volume have been respectfully read, but here we have
been so upset by the events following the death of Onishi, and now the departure
of Mr. Akiyama for the Soviet that I have been unable to carry out your wish.
Please grant a little more time, much as I regret to ask for it.
#1285 A
RSS.
22 Deckmber 1941.
From : Tokio.
To: Net #1950.
1. Enemy diplomatic officials in China (Consular officials included) and per-
sons of influence will not be employed in our service. In relation to the payment
of living expenses by enemy peoples, special budget appropriations will be made
by the Japanese government.
2. All deposits will be frozen, but enemy national will be allowed to withdraw
one months wages. And future matter will be handled by law.
3. It is desired that a system will be developed for exchange of unminted
silver between the Chung-King Bank and the Japanese Silver bank, (rest garbled)
Decripted Traffic.
31 December 1941.
FVom : Peiping.
To: (No heading) #759.
Method handling banking; gold silver deposits, etc.
Decrypted Traffic.
22 December 1942.
From : Tokio.
To: Shanghi.
Net #1947.
In relation to your despatch numbered 842 there is no objection to handling
the Belgium Embassy's despatch X in the same fashion as an enemy
countries despatch. In .lapan no special disposition is being made for Belgians
nor Belgian interests also in China in the cases when the necessity of taking
special methods in order to preserve of you secret message there is
no objection to using same type of handling as for an emey country.
In relation to
Decrypted Traffic
January 26— PM— 0(39.
Gaimuaijin Tokyo
Report on difficulty in getting good materials for bridge building and the
publishing of severe laws in papers.
Methods of handling problems of Eurasions of American parent based on
previous residence.
Harada.
Decrypted Traffic
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1191
28 Jantjaey 1942.
From : Foi-eign Minister Tokyo #038 (re your msg #061).
To : Minister Saigon.
Re the victory celebration to be carried out upon the fall of Singapore in-
cluding to be presented to the throne, decided upon in the special Diet
on 19 January I desire these details carried out in a suitable manner.
1. The celebrations will be completed by sunset on the day of the triumphal
entry into Singapore (this day will be published by the Information Bureau)
2. From the day of the fall until the day of the celebration the national flag
will be flown at every door.
On the day of the ceremony —
(a) Before noon get all the citizens out doors and commemorate the day
with stories of Imperial army and spirits of the departed. After the Prime
Minister's broadcast #43 tell stories to the children.
(b) Have Shinto and Budhist temples conduct "reporting the fall" cere-
monies and fan, water sprinkling and prayer ceremonies.
(c) Carry out primary school sightseeing (trips) celebration ceremonies
by junior organizations. Have military doctors comfort families ; worship
at shrines, drinking contests, athletic meets, military contests, military
music (Emphasize) the savings and other national policies.
Furthermore there are no objections in carrying out these ceremonies, if in
addition to cooperating with affiliated organizations which celebrate according
to local circumstances in China and Manchuria as long as they do not result in
confusion, if you take any suitable measures avoiding such things as impairing
industrial output, wasting funds, injui'ing air defense and carrying on lantern and
flag parades/
Togo.
27 Jan 1942.
From : Chengoai Thia #010.
To : Foreign Minister Tokyo.
garbled )
The Tai Army now on the northern frontier, including police amounts to over
10,000. On the 21st a portion of them were sent to Piruma at Me - -
Sataya they were bombed by the enemy,
Harada.
28 Jan 1942.
From. Harada #012 (Re your msg #431),
To : Foreign Minister — Tokio.
1. The lower classes who were rounded up in the recent drive were
leaders of the subversive party, and it is only natural that Tailand, at a time
when rumors have been rife and in spite of the fact that it looked like the work
of spies, should put the blame on the Japanese,
2. The problem goes deeper than just the dual-nationality question, and enemy
sympathizers of whatever nationality have had to be controlled. All the more
so when you consider the Tailanders who have become Japanized, and it would
set a bad precedent if these were treated like the cases of those who made a trip
some time ago for Mitsubishi. Since there remains the smirch of the Mitsubishi
incident, I plan to carry out a thorough investigation.
Jan 21.
681 A
From: Canton.
To: Naking, Peking, Shanghai.
Since the investment of Hongkong, our army has lost no time in using trans-
ports, and opening up transportation, although the permits were limited (at
first) only to those who were actually engaged in carrying on the fighting, but
from the 1.5th of this month, the Shirogane Maru, Guyo Mary and 6 other bottoms,
scrapped ships of the Nai Ka - - - Transport Co., have been put into operation
from the controlled territory, and the general populace and freights are being
carried.
However, between this place (Canton) and Makao and between Hongkong and
Maljao, traflSc has not yet been opened up.
1192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
603A
From : Tokio. 17 Jan 1942.
To: Hsingking.
When we had an interview with the diplomatic representative (of Russia,
the context shows,) on the 13th, (we said that) from the news which came to this
oflBce from a certain daily news agency, it was stated on the authority of a
Chinese telegram in November that an American vessel had been sunk as
the result of striking a mine. The United States, after some difficulties, bad
ignored this matter, it was reported, but (we inquired) if he did not think was
an American tanker : Also, we asked if there were absolutely no case of Russian
vessels sinking after striking a mine. The diplomatic representaive denied abso-
lutely that there was any truth in the former statement; regarding the latter
statement he said that last year Government - - - A Soviet vessel struck
a mine in Pita (Peter) Bay and received injuries, but was able to make port
safely. Aside from this, there had been no cases of Soviet vessels striking mines,
and this he wished received as his reply.
17 Jan. 1942.
604 A
From: TOKYO.
To: HSINGKING.
The Soviet newspapers are reporting on the 15th, under the caption "From
the Progress of the Greater Asia Struggle" under date line of the 12th the public
announcement of the United States that since the opening of hostilities that
country has sunk 2 battleships, 3 cruiser, 5 destroyers, 1 gunboat, 1 minesweeper,
10 transports, 4 freight ships, total 29 ships. . . . The losses of the American
Navy are reported to be 1 battleship, 3 destroyers, 1 minelayer, 1 target ship,
total (AH lost in the attack on Hawaii.)
19 Dec. 1941.
131 A
From: PEKING.
To : NANKING, SHANGHAI, CANTON, HSINGKING.
News from Yenan-Fu (Communist Headquarters)
. . . Chungkings broadcast (says that) taking example from the Axis strategy
of attack, the Allies received the suggestion that an immediate attack upon Japan
should be attempted. The Yenan-Fu Kaiho Nippo (writes) already in point of
fact we are Allies with Britian and the United States. The war against Japan
is nothing more than a screen, this war merely offering an opportunity for the
Anglo American front to develop another attack upon the Axis Powers, which is
something we should find it important to realize at this time. Among the Axis
Powers, the most important is Germany, and the harming of Germany is the
main purpose of the world wide strategems. That is to say, taking advantage
of the crisis in Germany is, as a craft (strategem) the expansion of the line of
operations on the continent is most important. The importance of the war in
the Pacific to the British and Americans is clear, and the Imperial Command
for China in this connection is the pressing of war against aggressor nations
regardless of consumption (of materials) and the overthrow of Hitler will be
victory for China (?) so at the present time cooperation with the Allies plus the
greater and gi-eater extension of the jjolicy of long time resistance, is the method
of hastening the total victory of those opposed to the Axis Powers. . . . This is
the attitude which the paper (Kaiho Nippo) explains.
19 Dec. 1941.
130A
From : Peking.
To : Nanking, Shanghai, Hankow.
Yenan-Fu report
The official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party Kai Ho Niti To (Kaiho
Jib Pao) in the editorial on the 13th said that Japan's purposes in the present
war are to incite peoples of all of the South Seas areas in order to secure the re-
sources (of that area) , expel British and American Interests — act in union —
Germany and Italy — to increase her power. Japan's southward advance is, at
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1193
the same time, the strengthening of tlie policy of encircling southweste/u Cliina,
and also of grabbing the Pacific, and is truly inseparable from tlie China Japanese
war.
On this critical occasion you(?) must calmly build up a battle line of all anti-
Japanese parties of the Pacific countries. All of China military forces must
attack actively ; together with this the 8th route army, and the new fourth army
must open up Rokoho opposition, begin a counter action against border friction,
stirring up the Chinese people of the South Seas against the Japanese. Make
most important duty of stirring an anti-war feeling among the people of Formosa,
and strengthening the plans toward carrying this out.
(Fuhada).
100 A
Dec. 18 0443.
From : Buenos Aires.
Ho : Tokyo.
Today the seventeenth all local papers carried the speech of the navy minister
before the Diet in Tokyo, showing great respect. (In the report of American
losses) 3 battleships, a mine layer, transport, (one each?) but in addition the
loss of 1 aircraft carrier, which is in the present report, seems not to have been
reported, so I ask your honorable inquix'y into the matter.
/s/ HoRKiKiRi, Japanese Ambassador.
Dec. 16.
From: Nanking.
To: Tsingtao, Amoy, Hsingking, Peking, Kalgan, Tientsin.
. . . regarding the rejection by the British military in HongKong of the well
intentioned advice (to surrender) on the 16th the special propaganda chief made
the announcement ; the rejection by British of the humane advice tendered by
Japan lays upon the barbarous British the entire responsibiliay of the exposure
of a million several hundred thousand compatriots to the horrors of war. Our
compatriots (?) in Kongkong Yotai notice of subjugation compatriots
in line with the national policy we are pushing the plans in connection with
the greater Asia war in a positive manner, and at this time we appeal to you
people to strive from the protection of your Asiatic country and drive out
1 expunge) the humiliation of your country which has been practiced by the
English for a hundred years. I earnestly desire that you will work for the
revival of East Asia . . . along this line he gave out his interview.
Dec. 16
From : Tsinan.
To: Tientsin, Peking, Nanking.
... in the tactics employed against the harming of the road (railroad) by the
local maintalnance guild, all of the Chinese living within your area (our area?)
have been commandeered, materials and domestic animals have as far as possi-
ble been confiscated, and everything possible has been carried out to prevent
(coiling up — the word used of snakes coiling to spring). About a month and a
half have passed since the beginning of these tactics and the efficacy —
carrying out was becoming evident, then the Japan Anglo-American war began
and again there are evidences that the enemy in this area are beginning to crawl
about again.
The army lines of communication and the regular communication systems
are constantly sabotaged (it is attempted). On the night of the 9th, 10 ri (25
miles, if Japanese "ri" ; 39.30 kilometers. If Chinese "li" is intended, then the
distance would be 6.54 kilometers). Sotith of Daimon Station, on the Shimpo
Line, an attempt was made upon the roadbed (no harm was wrought) ; on the
Kosai Line, in the neighborhood of Senshu village a freight train was wrecked :
and the like. The chief in charge of the line, and the guard have been warned
that in case of trouble due to carelessness, they cannot escape punishment.
According to Okai Sen, in that section after the local police had applied
appropriate encouragement (or pressure) the conduct of the Chinese, while not
showing anything which could be definitely defined, has, nevertheless, steadily
shown a tendency to trust more than formerly, with the arrival of the news of
Japanese victories. This information is sent for your information.
1194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mabch 2.
From : Tokyo to Manchuli.
Ambassador Sato and entourage (Minister Morishima, secretaries Takeuchi
and Yuhasih and 5 other people) are expected to arrive at your city at noon on
the 19th and then enter Soviet Territory on the same day. Please arrange.
March 2.
From. Shanghai to Tientsin, Peiping ?
The smallpox cases in this area during February (new cases) numbered 21
of vsfhich 11 were Japanese and the total of cases since the beginning of the year
has come up to 50 of which Japanese are 27.
March 2.
From : Tokyo to ?
The trend (or "indications") in 1 of your wire (*. . .) approved (or "under-
stood"). However, (perhaps, "the wording of the wire leads to misunder-
standing" and so please explain to — that the — is not higher than the starting
point.
March 2.
From : ? to Canton.
Official Ogawa, who is in Tokyo has been special code as from 2nd (first name
"Seiichiro"). If possible, have Official Ishikawa leave (perhaps for a new post)
without waiting for arrival of Ogawa.
March 2.
From : Tokyo to Shanghai.
Please send Special Employee Fukuda (first name "Ippei") to Tokyo on a
temporary schedule of about a ten day stay in Tokyo for the purpose of consulta-
tion on business.
March 2.
From: Tokyo to ?
Special code with regard to hiring on the spot.
(Perhaps, "Please arrange for) additional employment of No. 20 Shinichi
Matsuo and No. 24, Hideo Takahashi. With above, have been decided.
March 2.
From : ? to Canton.
Official Ogawa, who is in Tokyo has been SPECIAL CODE as from 2nd (first
name "Seiichiro"). If possible, have Official Ishikawa leave (perhaps for a
new post) without waiting for arrival of Ogawa.
1203 A
March 2.
From Tokyo to Shanghai.
Please send Special Employee Fukuda (first name "Ippei") to Tokyo on a tem-
porary schedule of about a ten day stay in Tokyo for the purpose of consultation
on business.
1204 A
March 2.
From Tokyo to ?
SPECIAL CODE with regard to hiring on the spot
(Perhaps, "Please arrange for) additional employment of No. 20 Shinichi
Matsuo and No. 24, Hideo Takahashi. With above, have been decided.
1205 A
funada
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1195
March 2.
From Shanghai to Tokyo.
With regard to the case of the employment of Noboru Nakano to take the place
of Hosokawa as temporarily enacted by means of Contidential Wire No. 170 of
January 22nd, this year, please wire all related information immediarely.
1206 A
March 2.
From Tokyo to Paotao.
Although, because (he) is an assistant, (he) has been considered on the the
same basis as a special employee if it is difficult to hire him at 110 Yen.
please wait until a personal history has been submitted and then select.
1207
March 2.
From Tokyo to Peiping.
Former SPECIAL CODE, Konji Hawegawa has been SPECIAL CODE as from
February 28th ; he has been appointed to take post at your office temporarily
and will be ordered to leave by himself about the middle of March.
Please wire (convey to) councillor.
1208 A
funada
From Shanghai to Tokyo. March 2.
With regard to the case of the employment of Noboru Nakano to take the
place of Hosokawa as temporarily enacted by means of Confidential Wire No.
170 of January 22nd, this year, please wire all related infoi-mation immediately.
1206 A
Fi'om Tokyo to Paotao. March 2.
Although, because (he) is an assistant, (he) has been considered on the same
basis as a special employee if it is difficult to hire him at 110 Yen, please
wait until a personal history has been submitted and then select.
1207
From Tokyo to Peiping. March 2.
Former SPECIAL CODE, Kanji Hawegawa has been SPECIAL CODE as from
February 28th ; he has been appointed to take post at your office temporarily
and will be ordered to leave by himself about the middle of March.
Please wii-e (Convey to) councillor.
1208 A
funada
From Shanghai to Tokyo. March 2.
With regard to the case of the employment of Noboru Nakano to take the place
of Hosokawa as temporarily enacted by means of Confidential Wire No. 170 of
January 22nd, this year, please wire all related information immediately.
1206 A
From Tokyo to Paotao. M.vrch 2.
Although, because (he) is an assistant, (he) has been considered on the the
same basis as a special employee if it is dfficult to hire him at 110 Yen,
please wait until a personal history has been submitted and then select.
1207
From Tokyo to Peiping. March 2.
Former SPECIAL CODE, Kanji Hawegawa has been SPECIAL CODE as from
February 28th ; he has been appointed to take post at your office temporarily and
will be ordered to leave by himself about the middle of March.
Please wire (convey to) councillor.
1208 A
funada
1196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From Tokio to Hsinking. March 2.
Because we find, after consultation with the War Department, that tliere is a
necessity of reinvestigating Si Mei (perhaps names), please send back report on
your examination along with papers relating to this affair.
1200 A
3-5-42
Yamashiro
Memorandum to Gr-2 :
Herewith messages #1210-1224 for your infoi'mation.
For the Department Signal Officer :
SECRET
Signal Office,
Hawauan Department.
March .',, 19J,2.
G. A. BiCHER,
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.
From Canton to Tokyo. March 3.
Extra.
With regard to your wire (extra) (# . . .) of the 3rd.
Wire No. 71 from NAN DAI (perhaps "Southern Platform" i. e., "Southern
Station") to this oflice should have been replied to in General Wire No. 48 of
February 20th, but we are sending again bv way of assurance.
1210 A
From Shanghai to Tokyo. March 3.
Extra.
From Takahashi to Telegraph Officer Akij^ama; How is the (previous) ques-
tion coming? Please reply as to progress made.
1211 A
From Canton to Nanking, Shanghai, Peiping, Tokyo. March 4.
With regard to taxation in China as assesed at the present time, it is thought
that studies are being made in the central office. In this area, it has been decided,
in view of the special situation here, that an agency for the purpose of studying
this question, the China Tax Rates research committee would be formed through
the advice of the SANSHOO (may be "Three Leaders' ") meeting, with the local
Chamber of Commerce and the league of Commodity Importers and Distributors
as a center, and that this agency would be made an agency of inquiry (perhaps
"on tax matters".
1212 A funada.
From Amoy to Tokyo. March 4.
And with regard to your wire 1212 of last June.
Police Chief . TIN KAN. Policemen, Tadashi Harada, Eichi Taniguchi,
Ankichi (?) Nakamura, SI JUN SEI (?) above are higher investigators. Police
Chief RIN KEI (perhaps "position held concurrently") with that of Policeman.
RYUU TEN SIN (?) (above ) Chief of Police, Zempei Yamashita, Takashl
Asakura, Ryuzoo Fukumoto (above Special Duties)
1213 A
funada.
From Canton to Tokyo, Hankow, Nanking, Shanghai, Swatow and Hoihow.
March 4.
With regard to your wires Nos. 133 and 400.
Although the fact of our wire No. 173 is present (Although the information
set forth in our wire No. 173 are true) and although we should (eventually)
have to carry on in accordance with above (information), if a request (or
"petition") has to be submitted every month with respect to facility in obtain-
ing loans as dealt with in this question, it would mean an unending series of
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1197
repetitions. Thus, it is thought that one application (or "petition") should
cover at least a period of about 6 months, in order that control and business
may be facilitated.
Also with respect to the beginning of your wire No. 400 : the proclamation on
this question has been considered in this city since quite early - - - -. The
leadership and organization has been towards cutting down the living expenses
of enemy citizens as much as possible, but if these enemy citizens are to continue
as at present, to live separately and to live under conditions no different than
previous to the war, we cannot hope to limit the living expenses of these people
merely by means of leadership (encoui'agement). In our area, (therefore) a
study is being made with regard to the advisability of housing all of the enemy
nationals in a definite area, of having them live jointly and of them letting them
cook and eat jointly. If this is possible, the living expenses of these people will
fall 100 yen per head, or 500 yen for 5 people, as reported in our wire as afore-
mentioned (". . . .).
1214 A
funada
From : Canton. March 4.
To : Shanghai, Peiping, Tokio, Nanking.
The transition (or changes) as is now taking place is a matter of concern to
us - - for the preservation of peace and . Therefore, measures 0 to meet this
should be immediately effected. Due to the disruption of trading on the author-
ized (legal) lists as well as witb the under-cover transactions, it is necessary to
strengthen control of the market as much as possible. Also to effect reforms in
currency -fso ( ?), and to contrive measures of . Concrete measures will be
effected in Davao in the near future.
Of course, it is doubtful whether the above remedial measures are more urgent
than those concerning mobilization; however, locally measures will be taken to
counteract violent economic changes from the tenth.
1215 A
Prom : Nanking. Makch 4.
To : Tokyo.
Please remit by cable the sum of 36,703.48 yen to cover costs of the following :
31,164.65 yen for steel fencing (including 65 yen for changes in construction) as
per agreement ; 5,538 yen 3 sen for young persimmon plants ; and 80 sen to cover
shortage for trees already paid for and transplanted.
1216
From: Tokyo. March 4.
To : Hankow.
The proclamation (Number 7) announcing (taking FUTUROO as an error for
FUKOKU, announcing, proclaiming; which modifies the noun kokuji, proclama-
tion— a not unusual tautology in Japanese), the setting up of a Branch office of
the Greater Asia Bureau (in Hankow?) and the official opening of that branch
office on the 28th., as well as the prder Number 4 regarding the superin-
tendent of this branch office, and the area of his authority (this area of authority
being that suggested in your telegraphic message number 12), were officially
published in 'the Government Gazette of March 4th. UN (no meaning can be
assigned) — It is desired that you send a wire (in confirmation of this, or recogni-
tion of this ?) to the Greater Asia Bureau.
#1217A
From : Tokyo. March 4.
To : Shanghai.
Regarding your telegram number 4 :
Yen 7,811 are being advanced from the Incidental Actual Cost Fund for the
price of impliments and garments for Japanese fencing, including the hakama
(a pleated skirt-like garment), s Yen 2,627 will be sent forward by wire from
the WA TASHIKIRI (which we interpret to be a fund from which payments
can be made without voucher) for MEN SOMO (MEN=cotton; somekind of a
cotton garment), Chinese clothing, and accessories. FUN (Is the character to
divide, Chinese reading, used for STOP ?) (Cf. UN in previous message).
1198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Further, we desire a wired message giving detailed estimates on the basis of
the various commodities, (in explanation) of your appended statement in your
telegram giving a total for the loan fund of Yen 3,342.
# 1218 A
From: Canton. March 4.
To: Tokyo.
AA--, of this office, has never traveled to Sansootoo (which we pre.^nnie to be
a place name). Since the situation in that place is not clear to us. we desire
to send En Kido, the official entrusted with such matters, at this time, on a two
weeks trip (The exigencies of travel make such a time allowance necessary) to
investigate the situation of the Japanese resident there, and of the schools and for
tins trip we ask your approval (REN RA E; not clear; possibly, "contact"
(renraku) something.) ?
#1219 A
From : Pelping. , March 4.
To: Tokyo.
(We have found this message practically undecipherable) Line 1 — 1 your
wire number - - 57 and the same number 385 SOO (School RAI SA YOO KOKU
subject) In regard to — RA Kai — being, original document — Boo number in
N GO PYU have do not have--- GI RYOO SERARURU TO -KO- next
(or succeeding) message number -87 GOO TYOO - and regular report regarding
the residences, regarding - FUN ~ "Within this month should be sent in.
# 1220 A
From : Tokyo. March 4.
To : Shanghai.
Special employee and radio expert Uchida, who is employed in the fifth depart-
ment of the Investigation Bureau, being about to depart by air I'oute on the 4th,
we desire to advance temporarily (or perhaps, he desires us to advance tem-
porarily) the expenses for his stay here and the TIN HOO (?) of the purchase
cost of supplies.
# 1221 A
RSS
March 4.
From : Tokyo.
To: Nanking.
With regard to your wire No. 190.
Please wire contents of No. 1100 as that wire has been lost through fire.
Further, No. 99 has already been approved by means of Return Regular (wire)
No. 3800.
1222 A
March 4.
From : Tokyo.
To: Shanghai
188 bundles (rolls, or batches) of EKIN ZAI, (perhaps TEKKIN ZAI for
"steel rods" or "steel building materials"), 10 tons and 29S kilograms have been
shipped on Taiei Maru whicii left Moji on Feb. 27th. KOO SIN
1223 A
March 4.
From : Shanghai.
To: Tokyo.
your wire No. 1329 of last year.
As yet please after
1224 A
funada
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1199
SECRET
Signal Office,
Hawaiian Depaktment,
March 6, 1942.
Memorandum to G-2 :
Herewith messages #1225-1239 for your information.
For the Department Signal OflScer:
G. A. BiCHEE,
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.
March 5.
From : Tokyo.
To: Holhow.
With i-egard to your wire No. 19 :
Will send upon issuance of permits. 2 thousand 7 Yen each from Real Govern-
ment Expenditure and 1655 Yen (each) fi-om Special relief and control fund,
Miscellaneous, as follows :
Vice Consul Hirata, Kikuchi, Kaneko (officials) (for 3 persons from Real
Government Expenditure.
Three sets of equipment, their number and use as follows :
Reception room hat racks, 8.
Reception room long chair, 2. Out of three, one will be one used at present.
Inside Chair, 4, out of 6, 2 will be ones used at present.
Round table, 3.
Tea table, 3.
Dining table for dining room, 3.
Side board for dining room, 3.
Chairs for dining room, 18.
Business desk for library, 3.
Chairs for Library, 3.
Bookshelves for Library, 3.
Miscellaneous shelf for living room. 3.
Inspector Fujii, Assistant inspector Imai, and — Omura (for three people)
from Miscellaneous Special Relief and Control Fund.
Following are thi'ee sets of equipment, their numbers and use.
Hat rack for reception room, 1, used by Inspector Fu.iii.
Long chair for reception room, 1, the one presently in use.
Inside chair, 2, same as above.
Round table for reception room, 1, same as above.
Tea table for reception room, 1, same as above.
Dining tables for dining room, 3.
Sideboards for dining room, 3.
Chairs for dining room, 18.
Business desks for library, 3. Those being used presently.
Chairs for library, 3.
Bookshelves for library, 3.
Miscellaneous shelves for living room, 3.
1225 A
funada
From : Shanghai. March 5.
To : Canton, Tokyo.
Regarding the outgoing telegram from Consul Katagiri of Kiukiang to his
excellency.
Umeda, Chief police, was enroute to Shanghai, changing his post of duty,
when he received a telegram indicating an emergency (or sudden change) (in
the conditi6n of) his wife, and immediately turning back is now enroute again0
to Kiukiang. The lady, however, is not yet out of the critical state and requires
nursing, so this office has received a telegram (requesting) the postponement of
his shift of post for the present. The above circumstances seem unavoidable to
us, so we request that you will take the necessary steps to secure especial per-
mission.
# 1126 A
1200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From : Tokyo. Maech 5.
To : Kalgan.
Referring to your message number 127.
While (normally) the total cost of the repairing of the straw mats in the
Consul's residence HAMA (MA = room, and this may refer to some special room
in the residence) and also in the unoccupied residences should be paid (from
headquarters), in other government offices (it is the custom) for the resident
in the official residence to pay one quarter of the cost of the repairs and this
we desire to have assessed. SPECIAL CODE Yen 506.62 and from the Police
Outright Expenditure Fund Yen 2,209.21 SPECIAL CODE. Further, as regards
the portion for the unoccupied residences, it will be made an e.special grant this
once only. Hereafter when a resident is assigned, the necessary repairs expense
shall be defrayed from the appropriations for that purpose.
# 1227 A # 1227 A
RSS.
From: Tokyo. Maech 5.
To: Swatow.
March salary and special allowance; His Excellency Yen 893.69; MAEJIMA
SPECIAL CODE (is this not probably Vice-Consul, as in following message?)
Yen 581.21; (including balance of February salary plus removal and family
allowance); Yoshida, Yen 280.49; Kawasaki Yen 242.74; Total, Yen 1,998.13
which will be sent (by wire=the probable meaning of SPEC CODE) to your
excellency as agent.
#1128 A
From : Tokyo. March 5.
To : Amoy.
March salaries and special allowances to a total of Yen 3,582.06, will be sent
by wire to your excellency as agent. ITEMS :
Your Excellency, Yen 1,220.38; Consul Mizumoto, Yen 772.49; Vice-Consul
Imashiro, Yen 518.44; Gi , 285.09; Tadashi Takahashi, and Aoki,
each Yen 212.49; Sugihara, Yen 112.98 (Yen 2868 and his special allowance
are earmarked, for repayment) ; Morii, Yen 247.70. The end.
#1229 A
RSS
From : Tokyo. March 5.
To: Hsingking.
This message, number #1230 A, is so full of lacunae that any translation
seems impossible. It is one of several such messages from Tokyo to the Hsing-
king Consulate, apprizing them of the news that is appearing in Russian papers.
There also seems to be some report of an article in the Rome Times (if there
is such a paper) regarding Soviet-Japanese relations, and something about the
Soviet Consulate and staff in Japan. Unless the lacunae can be filled in
somewhat, re-grouping would probably accomplish nothing.
#1230 A
From: Tokyo. Maech 6.
To: Canton.
Extra numeral message.
Your messages number 44, number 53, and numbers 141 and 151 being missing,
we desire a clear cut answer regarding them. (Or possibly an "explanatory
answer").
# 1281 A
From Shanghail to Peiping. Tientsin. Toyko. Nanking March 6.
Collection of taxes at Shanghai KAI KAN (would probably mean "Association
Hall" but it is thought that SHANGHAI KAI KAN is the name of an official
building in Shanghai) for the month of February as follows, totalling 9363 Yuan,
and amounting to 40 percent of amount for same period last year, (details will
be sent by mail).
Tax collections 8169
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1201
Sur-taxes (assessments and SUISAI (probablj^ "collections of delinquent
taxes"). 443 •
Special Sur-taxes (Imports and transfers) 731.
Tonnage taxes, 20
Total- — 9303 (Please do not publish for outside purposes)
1232 A
From Peiping to Tokyo. March 6.
Although we have rented the Sanitation (or "Sanitary") KONSU (might be
abbreviation of "KONSUTORAKUSHION" for "Construction" or "Construc-
tions"), the I'epairs necessary throughout the houses in order to make them usable
will take a long time, and therefore, although we have (or "there are") quite a
tew people who are being transferi'ed here and are arriving with their families,
the situation is such that there are no houses in which to place these people.
Therefore, as a temporary measure (or "a measure to meet the immediate
situation") the houses (mentioned) in temporary enactment of our wire No. 182,
are necessary, and we ask that you send us the necessary amount for rentals
after arranging for permission to rent said houses.
1233 A
funada
From Manchuli to Cut In Tokyo. HSINKING March 6.
ROZOHATUKII (the name of the German in question) a 48 (?) year old
German National, who arrived in Mancliuria from Berlin in December of 1939
and has been head of the , a German transportaton firm, hei'e, wishes
to evacuate to Daren together with his family (wife and 1 daughter or nine
daughters). We tind that the situation (political) is alright, and that(this
person's records (?) are authentic, but would like to know if we may is.sue a
visa (would like to know if you have any objections) to issuing) to him, (to
them). Please reply immediately.
1234 A
From Shanghai to Canton March 6.
From Nakane to Vice Consul Ueda.
Matsumoto is at present holding an important (a necessary) post with the
Funds Chief (chief of the department of capital) and gets at the present time
a salary (a treatment) of about 700 yen per month. If he is to be raised to an
assistantship in the near future, but cannot obtain more than he presently gets,
it will be difficult to keep him on (prevail on him). So, in that case, will you
search for another suitable man.
1235A funada
From Tokyo to Canton. March 6.
We have already sent your wire No. 165 by means of our wire No. 139.
Regarding No. 167 we are now (probably "carying on consultation with
")
Regarding No. 171, although there has been no (maybe "objections")
from all the (maybe "department heads"), it is believed that the message
has been wired to the assistants, (secretaries) of these (people).
1236 A
From Tokyo to Nanking. March 6.
There is a supply of 5S thousand yen to cover expenses of buying land for your
otBce . . . The Minister (of cabinet) that plans be made within the year
and a part of the land (for office buildings) be surveyed, and that enactment be
carried out temporarily after proper investigation. Also, in this case the
training room (or "area") the plan is desired.
1237 A
funada
From Tokyo to Nanking March 6.
Regarding your wire No. 36, will send after obtaining permit, (probably
"1140 Yen") out of the fund for police offices under Consulates in China,
as being the amount of expenses to the end of the year. . . .
1238 A
1202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From Tokyo to Shanghai March 6.
With regard to your wire Regular No. 463 »
The BAN NOO - - ("Banuoo" means omnipotent, Bannookayu, a eureall) ac-
cording to our experience is not very efflcient and goes out of commission very
often, and so we have not been giving iiermits on it. It is difficult therefore to
approve of it and ask that the 825 Yen be sent back.
1239 A
funada
Signal Office, Hawaiian Department
March 7, 1942.
Memorandum to G-2 :
Herewith messages #1240-1253 for your information.
For the Department Signal Officer :
G. A. BiCHER,
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.
March 6.
From : Tokyo.
To : Nanking.
March allowances for Shiotaki and Takemitsu, both special employees, is being
sent by wire to your excellency as follows :
(1) Shiotaki's share, including the special allowance. Yen 1,062.50; (2)
Takemitsu, DOKU KIN (the statement of a sum of money, in Japanese,
usually begins with the character KIN) Yen 544.36. Total Yen 1,606.86.
#1240 A
March 6.
From : Tokyo.
To: Shanghai.
The plan is for Asakura to leave Kobe by the Taiyo Maru on the ITtli, and
everything connected with his landing, place to stay and the like is the re-
sponsibility of the Contact Department of your office.
#1241 A
March 6.
From: Tokyo.
To: Nanking.
To Councillor Nakamura from Minister Nichidaka.
Mr. Yasouka will be busy throughout the entire year and will have no leisure
until early next year, so he desires to resign from the position as a formality.
#1242 A
RSS
March 6.
From : Tokyo.
To: Kalgan.
KI SU FUTU (possibly, KIDEN or KISIN FUKU=Your reply wire) Regard-
ing (your reply wire) #124:
SA - - POO SPECIAL CODE. (Can't do anything with it)
Yen 6,000 Special Code. (Kin comes before and NARI after a statement of a
sum of money, in Japanese).
Yen 6,000 from the Special Police Outright Expenditure Fund.
Yen 2,000 From the Outright Expenditure Fund of the Expense budget of the
City Police (dep't ?) resident in the Consulate.
(KAN=official, KOO=public; indicate the general classifications in the Japanese
governmental budget, we believe. MO KU we do not understand).
#1243 A
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1203
Mabch 6.
From: Tokyo.
To: Shanghai.
We desire to have Secretary Shimoda, who is at present traveling in your
area, return to duty in Shanghai immediately. Please wire us as to his date
of sailing.
(The above does not sound right. We suspect that either the telegram was to
be forwarded to another point under the Shanghai Consulate, and was sent
from Tokyo at the request of the Shanghai Consul to adjust a difficult matter,
or else "Shanghai" is in the wrong place and should modify "area", the pur-
pose of the message being to have Shimoda return to duty in Tokyo).
#1244 A
Maech 6.
From : Kalgan.
To: Tokyo.
Regarding your message #72 of last year:
As we have rented house and land for the diplomatic officials resident- abroad,
we ask that you send one half year's rental, Yen 1,200, by wire.
#1245 A
RSS
From Kalgan to Tokyo. Makcii 6.
And with regard to No. 33
Please send 3, AI BOO YEN (?) (3000 Yen) SPECIAL CODE the amount of
expected shortage to the end of the year in SHUYOO HI (might be "housing",
"expropriation" asj in "hind expropriation", "training").
1246 A
From Tokyo to Nanking. Mabch 7.
Extra
As it is suspected that your wire No. 137 has not yet arrived, please send again.
(Note: happens to be UTAGAI)
1247 A
From Shainghai to Tokyo. March 7.
With regard to your wire (*...) Extra.
Please make of our wire No. 244 KETSUGO (could be either "a missing num-
ber" or "a combination"). No. 3 from tlie Minister has not been sent because
of a mistake here it was sent on 7th of this month, (today).
1248 A
funada
From Peiping to Tokyo. Maech 7.
Extra
From Kato to Telegraph Officer Homura
I believe that you have KOOHAI (probably "seen", or "your attention has
been 'drawn to'") our wire No. 216 (1) (2) (or "sections 1 and 2 of our wire
No. 216") and the wire addressed you (2). It is especially requested that (the
action mentioned) be carried out immediately.
1249 A
funada
From : Tokyo to Hsinking. March 7.
At the time of the (meeting) mentioned in our wire No. 89 (RUNOFU,
name of a Russian representative) said that he had learned of the change of
the Japanese Ambassador to Russia through a newspaper article (Red Party
Organ dated 4th) and that Ambassador Sato (the newly appointed Ambassa-
dor), through having been Foreign Minister in the Hayashi (General Senjure
Hayashi, Premier Feb. to May 1937) cabinet, is well known to the Soviet Side.
To this, I (this officer) said, that Ambassador Tatekawa (the previous Am-
bassador) had, because of ill health, been desirous of returning to Japan, that
the Soviet Union knows that all of the Japanese Ambassadors to the Soviet
Union in the past have been first class men of excellence (this clause is some-
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 2 35
1204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
what indefinite), that we believe that the Soviet Union well understands just
where the purpose of the Japanese government lies, in having esi)ecially picked
this new Ambassador who is a former Foreign Minister, a senior (old timer)
in the diplomatic field, and who has a thorough knowledge of Soviet affairs,
that we here, on this occasion, should calmly solve the various problems under
discussion such as regular shipping schedules, TAIKA (might be "exchange",
"freight accumulation" or "compensation"), petitions between Japan and Rus-
sia (?), Visas, and floating docks, and that another forward step would thus
be taken in the friendship between the two countries. To this RUNOFU
replied that he understood, and that everything will be done towards the
solving of the problems as (his) ideas concerning them were the same as
(I) had mentioned.
1250 A
funada
March 7.
From : Tientsin to Nanking. Shangliai. Tokyo. Peiping. Thingtao and
Tsinan
According to the Economic Weekly for the first week in March, the general
situation, all commodities have a tendency of falling because of the effect on
business of the doubt (distrust) of the rural (inland) areas. Cotton yarn and
cloth opened with a tendency of being supported to some extent by the rural
areas (probably "business inland") because of rapid and secret tendencies of
speculators (?).
Rates falling: Dry goods, 44.60 Yen. Cotton Yarn (8 UMA 20 TE) 1.460
Yen. MEN FUN (perhaps "cotton waste" but from context, it is thought that
this might be a mistake lor MUGI FUN or MUGI KO, flour), the import of Shang-
hai powder (flour) is progressing smoothly, and as the CHUZAI KA (perhaps
"stock here") settles down, and the movement of material stops because of low
rates in the interior, the rates weaken - - - - 25.903 Yen IJIRUSHI (?) 24.85
Yen. Sugar, a fall was seen because of the appearance of controlled commodi-
ties in the city towards the end of the previous week and the tendency of
1 JUN in the buying rate in the interior. Refined sugar, 235.80. Raw Sugar,
188.40. Peanuts, rates falling on both nuts and oil because of fall in Shanghai
through lull in the year's exports. Nuts, 53.50 (highest on 6th) Oil, 104.90 (also
highest on 6th)
1251 A
funada
Tokyo to Kalgan. Makch 7.
With regard to the application for a permit to establish the Association (per-
haps "Corporation") of MU KYOO (perhaps a mistake for MOO KYOO, Mon-
golia) Engineering and Building Industries; this has been carried out tempo-
rarily in accordance with your wire. Regular No. 97 of the 5th of last month.
Please reply on following points :
1. Is it necessary, in accordance with Article 34 of the Civil Law, to especially
make of said corporation a Juridical Corporate Person?
2. Is it impossible to attain the objectives (of said corporation) under the rules
and regulations presently followed by the League of Industries (mentioned
above) (Note: Last probably means "League of Engineering and Industrial
workers". Also, it might be more correct to say, in above first three lines, "the
Inner Mongolia Engineering and Building Corporation") ?
3. What were the characteristics of the League (s) of Mongolian Engineering
and Construction companies in the past?
4. Will the League of this industry be abolished upon formation of above
corporation?
5. It has been reported that the head of said corporation Fujisliima arrived
there and that the establishment of said corporation took place under the direc-
tion of your office; is this true? (Note The last might be a confirmation rather
than a question)
1252 A
funada
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1205
From: Tokyo. Makch 7.
To : Hankow.
To Business Representative Takano, resident in Daiya.
The expense appropriations for your office for the current year are as follows
below. These will be sent by wire to Consul General Tanaka (at Hankow?)
and you are to receive them as delivered from that office. Within the organ-
ization (or, Foundation) Fund of Yen 8,000 you are to pay immediately for re-
pairs and equipment (it being understood that expenditure for desks and desk
chairs shall be according to the plan), this grant to be completely repaid within
the current year.
Government expense, actual expense Yen 60.
Ditto, outright expense " 250.
Telegraphic expenses for a displomatic office abroad, Yen 25. Expense for the
Foundation of a diplimatic office abroad, Hankow office, Daiya branch office, and
equipment fund, Yen 8,000.
Further, employees daily (wage) GEN 0 Yen. (Gen is probably an error for
some figure) Typists within Yen 70, 11 may be employed. When appropriate
people have been found, proceed on the basis of temporary action.
# 1253 A
RSS
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 71
Classified U. S. Naval Communication Se21vice Incoming
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
War Dept Message 465 to Comgen Haw Dept — Paraphrase — Mailgram Secret
Re 2B-24 planes for special photo mission X Pilots to be instructed to photo-
graph Truk Island in Caroline group Jaluit in Marshall group X Visual recon-
naissance to be made simultaneously X Information desired number and loca-
tion of naval vessels including submarines airfields aircraft barracks guns and
camps X Warn pilots island strongly fortified and manned X Reconnaissance
and photography to be accomplished at high altitude X Do not circle or remain
in vicinity X Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude X 2 pilots
and copilots to be instructed confer with Admiral Kimnsel on arrival at Hono-
lulu for his advice X Suggest B-24 proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to
Wake, then Philippines by regular route photographing Ponape while enroute
Moresby if distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great X Best time
of day for photographing Truk and Jaluit should be told pilots X When reach
Philippines 2 copies of each photograph taken to be sent to General MacArthur,
Admiral Hart Admiral Kimmel the Chief of Naval Operation and War Depart-
ment X Insure that 2 B-24s fully equipped with gun ammunition upon depart-
ure Honolulu.
Date : 8 November 41. Crypto-Group PL/MG CBO HRF Circ. No. 11-887
Originator :
WAR DEPT
MESSAGE 465
COM GEN HAW DEPT
Action :
COMGEN HAW DEPT
Information :
CINCPAC
Classified U. S. Naval Communication Se2ivice Incoming
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Mailgram — War Dept Message #466 to Comgen Haw Dept — Mailgram
Secret PARAPHRASE Secret
2 B-24s will depart United States for Philippines via usual route within 48
hours X Secret photographs made enroute fi'om Wake to Moresby X Instruc-
tions covering photography and visual recconnaissance being sent in separate
message movements pursuit squadrons from Honolulu to Midway and Wake
contemplated X Squadrons to be ready immediately X Lack of space and
1206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
housing facilities at these points therefore personnel of these units should be
held to an absolute minimum X Provide all troops with tentage X CinCPac
instructed by Navy Department giving additional instructions to CinCPac and
arrange for transfer units and their supply X Planes to be flown ofe carrier at
destination X 30 days ammunition to be sent with planes X Two pursuit
squadrons to be sent frons United States to Hawaii as replacements as soon as
possible.
Date: 28 November 41 Crypto-Group. PL/MG CBO HRF Cir. No. 11-888
Originator :
War DEPT
MESSAGE 466
26 NOV 41
COM GEN HAW DEPT
Action :
COM GEN HAW DEPT
Information :
CINCPAC
CLASSIFIED INCOMING
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Add to War Dept. Msg. 465 of 26th Nov. Paraphrase Mailgram
"Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self
preservation".
Date : 29 Nov '41 Crypto-group Plain CBO FWR Circ. 11-887
Originator :
WAR DEPT
26 NOV '41
COM GEN HAW DEPT
MESSAGE 465
Action :
COM GEN HAW DEPT
Information :
CINCPAC
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 72
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CiNCPAC and Cincpoa
Classified Outgoing
Grp. Ct. :
Date : 8 December 1941,
From : CINCPAC
To : COMBASEFOR
Info To :
NYD PEARL
PENNSYLVANIA
Classification : Conf.
C. W. O. : 8
081055
Place 2 battle rafts outboard of each drydock caisson X One to be alongside
and one about 100 feet out X To be in place by 0530.
Certified to be a true copy.
Lt. (JG) AS Gordon
A S Gordon Lt (JG) USNE
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1207
U. S. NAVAL Communication Sebvice
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified outgoing
Date: 8 December 1941 Grp. Ct. :
From: CINCPAC Classification: Secret
To : OPNAV C. W. O. : HRF
System : 18
First evidence of hostilities was presence of submarine in Peai'l Harbor
defense area at about 0715 local X There were only a few minutes warning
of approach of aircraft which arrived at 0747 X Their first attacks against our
aircraft on ground at Pearl Harbor Eva Kaneohe Hickam and Wheeler were
so effective that practically none were immediately available except 10 VPB
which were in air X Enemy carriers were not sighted but indications of at
least 1 north and 1 south Oahu as there appeared to be 3 separate attacks ending
about 0930 X Dive bombing and torpedoing most effective and in spite of magnifi-
cent and courageous work by gun crews not more than dozen enemy shot down
including those by Army pursuits X Add to report of casualties Arizona blew
up and most of her oflicers and men including Rear Admiral Kidd were lost X
Floating drydock sunk X Personnel casualties estimated 2800 about one half
dead X Attempted bombing of dock facilities in Honolulu killed about 200
civilians X No other damage from mines X Pearl channel is usable X In
addition to ship based and planes in carriers about 30 VPB 15 Army pursuits
and 13 Army bombers available X Lexington and 4 heavy cruisers from position
east of Midway attempting to intercept southern carrier X Enterprise with
other available light forces guarding against repetition of raid X Wake reports
heavy damage from bombing by 30 planes X Guam reported being attacked by
aircraft
Certified to be a true copy.
Lt (JG) A S Gordon
A S GoBDON Lt (JG) USNR
081035
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified Outgoing
Date : 8 December 41. Classification : Secret
From: CINCPAC C. W. O. : HRF
To : COMTASKFOR 8 1 3 12 Crypto Grp. : 132 S
0S0532 GR 114
Recent radio intelligence indicated formation Japanese major units into two
task groups X First group concentrated Indo China area X Second group plus
3 Kongos unaccounted for X Opnav opinion latter force or part attacked Pearl
XX Composition second group follows 3 or 4 CA 2 or 4 CV 2 desrons of 2CL
28 DD 1 Subron of 9-12 subs and fast transport force containing 20 ODD APS
XX First fieet less seaplane tenders and 1 desron may be in support according
Opnav.
Secret Certified to be a true copy
Lt (JG) A S Gordon
A S Gordon Lt (JG) USNR
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified Outgoing
Date : 7 December 1941. , Info To : ASP Hawaiian Area Com 14
From : CINCPAC Grp. Ct. 21
To: COM 11 Classification: CON
080504
If NPM 26.1 goes off air rebroadcast message from 4205 kcs.
Certified to be a true copy.
Lt (JG) AS Gordon
A S Gordon Lt (JG) USNR
1208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
U. S. NAVAL Communication Service
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified Outgoing
Date Info To :
From: CINCPAC OPNAV
To : CINCAF
COMTASKFOR 15.1 Classification: Secret
COMTASKFOR 15.1 System: 132-S
080200
War declared by Japan on Britain and United States X Taskforce 15.1 proceed
direct San Francisco taskforce 15.5 proceed Sydney.
Certified to be a true copy.
Lt (JG) A S Gordon
A S Gordon Lt (JG) USNR
Sent at 080245
Frequency LL
Secret
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified Outgoing
Date : 8 Dec 1&41. Classification : Conf :
From: CINCPAC
To: CTF 8
080105
No definite information yet available but indications are that enemy carriers
may be both North and South of Oahu.
Certified to be a true copy.
Lt (jg) F. R. Bunting
Lt (JG) F. R. Bunting, USNR.
Sent at 0110
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified Outgoing
Date : 8 December 1941 To : CTF 8
From: CINCPAC Classification: Conf
072354
Detroit Phoenex St Louis New Orleans 14 destroyers and 4 minelayers have
sortied and are proceeding to join you X Also Minneapolis and 4 minelayers
ordered to join from operating areas send ships to Pearl for fuel as necessary.
Certified to be a true copy.
Lt (JG) AS Gordon
A S Gordon Lt (JG) USNR
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified Outgoing
Date : 7 Dec 1941 Info To :
From: CINCPAC CTF 1
To : COMTASKFOR 8 CTF 3
Grp. Ct.
Classification: Conf.
072332
Radio bearings indicate Akagi bearing 183 from Pearl another unit bearing 167
Cei'tified to be a true copy :
Lt (jg) F. R. Bunting
Sent at 072332. Lt, ( jg) F. R. Bunting, USNR No 12-305
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1209
U. S. Naval Communication Seeyice
CINCPAC AND CINGPOA
Classified Outgoing
Date: 7 December 41 . Grp- Ct. :
From: CINCPAC Classification: Conf.
To: CTF 12 Originator: 95.
CTF 3 AND 8 C. W. O. O.
072328
Cancel Midway Marine Flight
Certified to be a true copy :
Lt (jg) A S Gordon
A S GORDON Lt (jg) USNR
12-304
U. S. Naval Communication Sebvice
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified Outgoing
Date: 7 Grp. Ct. :
From: CINCPAC Classification Conf
To : ASP HAWAIIAN AREA C. W. O. : HO
System: ROO
072245
If NPM Fox goes out guard harbor circuit
Certified to be a true copy :
Lt (jg) A S Gordon
A S Gordon Lt (jg) USNR
Sent at 2258
Frequency 4205
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified outgoing
From: CINCPAC Grp. Ct.
To: MINNEAPOLIS Classification: Con
Info To : Precedence : Prior
COMTASKFOR 8 System : RDO
Crypto Grp. : 740
Use plane to search Sector 135 to 180 distant 150 miles from Pearl X
Certified to be a true copy
Lt (jg) A. S. Gordon
A. S. Gordon Lt (jg) USNR
072230 December 41 Serial No. 12-299
U. S. Naval Communication Seevice
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified outgoing
Date: 7 December 1941 Grp. Ct.
From: CINCPAC Classification: Conf.
To : ASP HAWAIIAN AREA System : RDO
C. W. O. : HO
2228
Enemy transports reported four miles off Barbers Point X Attack.
AR
Certified to be a true copy
Lt (jg) A. S. Gordon
A. S. Gordon Lt (jg) USNR
Sent at 2302
Frequency 26.1
1210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
U. S. Naval Communication Service
cincpac'and cincpoa
Classified outgoing
Grp. Ct.
Classification : Conf.
Date : 7 December 41
From: CINCPAC
To: ALL SHIPS PRESENT
Z F5L 072217 CBQ TART O BT
All cruisers and destroyers depart Pearl as soon as practicable X Report
Comtaskfor One in Detroit,
2225
SN 7
Certified to be a true copy
Sent at 2225
Frequency 2562
2562
W. C. Woods
W. C. Woods, Lt ( jg) USNR
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified outgoing
Grp. Ct.
Classification : Con
Date : 7 December 41
From: COMBATFOR
To: COMBATSHIPS
2^3 BT
Prepare available battleship planes for search and report to subbase when
ready and Number X 2 California planes at Ford Island probably ready.
Certified to be a true copy
W. C. Woods
W. C. Woods, Lt (jg) USNR
Sent at 2211
Frequency 2562
U. Si. Naval Communication Service
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified outgoing
Grp. Ct.
Classification : Conf.
C. W. O. : NL
Date : December 1941
From: CINCPAC
To : All ships present
Info to : COMTASKFORCE 8
Z 0F2 2132 m Q 0GS O BT
Urgent
All ships departing Pearl organize as Taskforce One undivided Combesbatfor
assume command report Taskforce 8.
Certified to be a true copy :
W. C. T^oods
W. C. Woods, Lt (JG) USNR.
Sent at 2135
Frequency: 26.1
■ PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1211
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified outgoing
Date : 7 December 41. Grp. Ct. :
From: CINCPAC Classification: CONF
'To: All ships this circuit System: RDO
C. W, O. : NL
090 V F5L O BT
Urgent
Enemy planes coming for Pearl Harbor from south.
Certified to be a true copy :
W. C. Woods
W. C. Woods, Lt (JO) U8XR
Sent at 2135
Frequency: 2562
U. S. Naval Communication Ser\^ce
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified outgoing
Date 7 December 41 Grp. Ct. :
From: CINCPAC Classification: CON
To : COMTASKFORCE 8
0G8 V 0F2 BT
DF bearings indicate enemy carrier bearing 178 from Barbers point.
Certified to be a true copy :
W. C. Woods
W. C. Woods, Lt (JG) USNR
Sent at 2116
Frequency: 4205
U. S. Naval Communication Ser-^ice
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified outgoing
Date 7 December 41 Grp. Ct. :
From : COMBATFORCE C. W. O. SA
To : Captain of Yard Crypto Grp. : LL
Navy Yard Adm Bldg. System : LL
The California is on fire inside probably two tugs with fire equipment could
save her.
Certified to be a true copy :
W. C. Woods
W. C. Woods, Lt (JG) USNR
Sent at 2112
Frequency: Landline
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified outgoing
Date 7 December 1941 Grp. Ct.
From : CINCPAC Classification : CONF .
To: COMTASKFORCE ONE
Z 0F2 2045 0G1 O BT
Urgent
Do not send any more cruisers to sea.
Certified to be a true copy :
Lt (JG) A. S.Gordon
A. S. Gordon, Lt (JG) USNR
Sent at 2050
Visual
1212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CINCPAO AND CINCPOA
Classified outgoing
Grp. Ct. :
Classification: Conf.
Date 7 Dec 1941
From: CINCPAC
To: ASP
Z 0F2 2025 C8Q WING O BT
Urgent
Battleships remain in port probable channel mined.
Certified to be a true copy :
Lt (Jg) F. R. Bunting
LT ( JG) F. R. Bunting
Sent at . . . 2032
Frequency . . . 2562
U. S. Naval Communication Sekvice
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified outgoing
Grp. Ct.
Classification : Conf.
System: RADIO
Date 7 DEC 1941
From: CINCPAC
To : COMTASKFORCE 8
Z 0F2 2016 0G8 O BT
Urgent
Two enemy carriers reported 30 miles southwest Barbers Point.
Certified to be a true copy :
W. C. Woods
W. C. Woods, Lt {JG) USNR
Sent at . . . 2020
Frequency . . . 4205
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified
Outgoing
Grp. Ct. :
Classification : Conf C. W. O.
System : RADIO
SA
Date 7 Dec 1941
From : CINCPAC
To: COMTASKFORCE 8
12
3
Z F5L 2012 XG2 0G3 0G8 Y 0-BT
Search from Pearl very limited account maximum twelve VP searching X
some indication enemy force northwest Oahu X addressees operate as directed
com Taskforce 8 to intercept and attack enemy composition enemy force un-
known.
Certified to be a true copy :
Sent at . . . 2048
Frequency . . 4205
Lt. (jg) F. R. Bunting
Lt. ( JG) F. R. Bunting, USNR
U. S. Naval Communication Service
CINCPAC AND CINCPOA
Classified
Outgoing
Grp Ct. :
Classification: Conf C. W. O. : SA
System : Radio
Date 7 Dec 1941
From: CINCPAC
To : COMTASKFORCE ONE
Z 0F2 1950 0G1 0 BT
Battleships remain in port until further orders. Send all destroyers to see
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1213
and destroy enemy submarines. Follow them by all cruisers to join Halsey.
Urgent.
Sent at . . . 1956 2005
Certified to be a true copy :
Lt. ( jg) F. R. Bunting
Lt. (JG) F. R. Bunting, U8NR
Hewitt Inqtjikt Exhibit No. 73
United States Pacific Fleett
AND Pacific Ocei&^n Areas
headquarters of the commander in chief
This is to certify that the attached document consisting of the following:
Copy of Cincpac Secret Itr. dated 12 December 1941, file Lll-l(l)/(50), Serial
02019, Subject : Damage to Ships of the Pacific Fleet resulting from Enemy
Attacks at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.
is a true and correct photographic copy of the document in the official files of
the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
By direction of Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area.
R. E. Keeton,
R. E. Keeton.
[i]
Cincpac File No.
United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 12, 1941.
Lll-l(l)/(50) (02019)
Secret
From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Damage to Ships of the Pacific Fleet resulting from Enemy Attacks at
Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.
References :
(a) Cincpac Secret Desp. 072244 of December 1941.
(b) Cincpac Secret Desp. 081015 of December 1941.
(c) Cincpac Secret Desp. 100220 of December 1941.
(d) Cincpac Secret Desp. 102043 of December 1941.
1. The following report relative to damage sustained by ships of the Pacific
Fleet resulting from enemy attacks on 7 December 1941 is submitted. This
amplifies reports submitted by references (a) to (d) inclusive:
(a) BATTLESHIPS.
ARIZONA sunk at berth as result of aircraft torpedoes and heavy bombs
which exploded forward magazines. Ship is considered to be a total wreck.
CALIFORNIA sunk at berth as a result of hits by two or more aircraft
torpedoes ; also received one large bomb hit amidships which caused serious
fire. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwai'ded later.
NEVADA damaged by heavy bombs, possibly mine in the channel and aircraft
torpedoes. Beached across from hospital point to prevent sinking after an at-
tempt to sortie. Batteries intact and manned though no jwwer is on the ship.
Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be made later.
OKLAHOMA capsized at berth as a result of receiving three or more hits
by aircraft torpedoes. Recommendations regarding salvage will be made later.
PENNSYLVANIA slightly damaged by bomb hit, starboard side of boat deck
while in drydock number 1, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. Repairs have been com-
pleted and ship is ready for service.
[2] MARYLAND damaged by bomb hit on forecastle and near miss. Ship
was moved to the Navy Yard on 11 December and expected to be fully ready
for service 13 December.
TENNESSEE received one heavy bomb through turret top which did not
explode, but put 2 rammers out of commission. Also one bomb hit aft which
1214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cracked one 14" gun. Heat from the ARIZONA fire melted and ignited paint
in after portion of the second decli which was badly burned out. Ship is now
heavily wedged to mooring by reason of the WEST VIRGINIA leaning against
her. Steps are being taken to dynamite the mooring to permit the removal of
the TENNESSEE. Repairs are proceeding and it is estimated that by 14
■December ship will be ready for service less one 14" gun.
WEST VIRGINIA sunk at berth as result of four aircraft torpedoes and one
bomb hit. There is considerable damage from fire. Recommendations regard-
ing salvage and repairs will be made later.
(b) CRUISERS.
HELENA damaged by bomb hit at frame 30, starboard side, opening up side
under armor belt for distance of about 50 feet. Number one and two fire rooms
and forward engine room flooded. Ship is now in dry dock #2 Navy Yard, Pearl
Harbor to eifect repairs to make seaworthy. It is estimated that new shell and
framing will be completed within two weeks and ship will be able to operate with
two shafts and with all gun batteries in commission. It is recommended -that
ship proceed to Mare Island for completion of repairs to hull and machinery.
HONOLULU damaged by near miss at approximately frame 40 port side.
Hole approximately 20 feet by 6 feet underwater. Ship being docked in drydock
#1 today and it is estimated that work will be completed to make her fully
effective by 16 December.
[3] RALEIGH damaged by one aircraft torpedo which flooded forward
half of machinery plant. Also hit by small bomb forward which penetrated
three decks and went out ships' side and did not explode. It is proposed to dock
the RALEIGH following completion of the HONOLULU to effect underwater
repairs to make seaworthy. Recommendations as to whether all repairs to
make the ship fully serviceable should be undertaken at Navy Yard, Pearl Har-
bor or a mainland navy yard, will be forwarded later.
(c) DESTROYERS.
CASSIN and DOWNES damaged by bomb in number one drydock, Navy Yard,
Pearl Harbor ahead of PENNSYLVANIA. Bomb hit DOWNES exploding her
torpedoes warheads and causing serious oil fire. CASSIN was damaged by
fire and was knocked off drydock blocking and fell over on DOWNES. DOWNES
appears to be total loss except for salvageable parts and materials. Recom-
mendations regarding salvage and repairs to CASSIN will be forwarded later.
SHAW hit by bomb while docked on floating drydock. Forward part of ship
and floating drydock badly damaged by fire resulting from oil and powder.
After part of ship not seriously damaged. Recommendations regarding repairs
will be forwarded later.
(d) AUX 11,1 ART VESSELS.
OGLALA sunk by aircraft torpedo and near miss by bomb at ten-ton dock at
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will
be forwarded at a later date.
UTAH damaged and capsized as a result of hits by aircraft torpedoes. Recom-
mendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded later.
CURTISS damaged by enemy plane out of control which fiew into crane mast
and by bomb which exploded damaging hangar space causing fire which de-
stroyed all radio equipment. Ship is entirely seaworthy. Repairs are [^]
proceeding and ship will be ready for operations less one amidships crane by
15 December.
VESTAL damaged by a bomb hit aft while at berth at Pearl Harbor, is under-
taking repairs with own repair force. It is estimated that the ship will be
fuUv ready as a repair ship by 17 December. Docking may not be required.
2. It is believed that the sinking of the OKLAHOMA, NEVADA, CALIFORNIA
and WEST VIRGINIA is in large part due to the ships having been in condition
XRAY. Had time been available to set condition ZED before receiving damage,
progressive flooding might have been avoided.
H. E. KiMMEL.
Copy to:
Buships
Buord
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1215
United States Pacifio Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
Cincpac File No.
A16-^/(05)/
Serial
SECRET
1st Endorsement on Admiral Kimmel's A16-3/02088) dated December 21, 1941
From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Via : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Report of Action of 7 December 1941.
1. Forwarded.
W. S. Pye.
United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship,
Dec. 21, 1941.
Cincpac File No.
A16-3 (02088).
SECRET.
Subject : Report of Action of 7 December 1941.
3. Before the attacks were completed, Commander Patrol Wing TWO, in ac-
cordance with standard orders, established such search as he was able to do with
tlie planes remaining.
4. It is estimated from the radio calls exchanged, bearings received, and exam-
ination of enemy crashed planes, that 4 to 6 Japanese carriers participated in the
raid. Enclosure (D), forwarded herewith, represents the disposition of our
Task Forces in effect for 7 December, as well as the action taken to locate and^
destroy the enemy forces.
5. All reports received from commands afloat are unanimous in their 'praise
for the magnificent behaviour of our personnel. Specific cases deserving com-
mendation and reward will be reported in separate correspondence.
6. Partial report of damage, as submitted in enclosure (B) is supplemented
herewith by enclosure (C).
7. Revised reports of casualties to personnel are being submitted as frequently
as sufficient accurate data are available. Additional information concerning the
results of the action on 7 December will be forwarded as soon as the remaining
missing narratives have beeo received.
H. E. KiMMEL.
[1] Cincpac File No.
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
A16-3/( 02088)
Peai-l Harbor, T. H., Dec. 21, 19U-
From : Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Via : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Report of Action of 7 December 1941.
Enclosure :
(A) Partial narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on
Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.
(B) Cincpac secret letter Lll-l(l) (90) serial 02019 of December 12, 1941,
to OpNav. Subject : Damage to Ships Pacific Fleet Resulting From
Japanese Attack 7 December 1941.
(C) Supplementary partial report of damage to ships.
(D) Disposition of our forces, sortie from harbor, and conduct of the
search.
1. The first indication of the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7
December 1941 was a telephone report received by the Staff Duty Oflicer from
the Fourteenth Naval District Duty Officer at about 0720 (LOT). It reported
an attack by the WARD on a hostile submarine off the entrance of Pearl Harbor.
Twenty minutes thereafter another telephone report from Operations Officer
1216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Patrol Wing TWO, was received that a patrol plane had sunk a hostile sub-
marine south of the entrance buoy. This was followed by an additional tele-
phone report from the Fourteenth Naval District stating the WARD was towing
a sampan into Honolulu. At about 0752 a telephone report was received from
the Navy Yard Signal Tower as follows : ''Enemy Air Raid — Not Drill". Almost
simultaneously Japanese planes were observed over the Fleet. Dive bombers
were bombing the adjacent air fields, accompanied by torpedo plane attacks
on the ships in the harbor. From then on there was almost continuous enemy
air activity of some kind over the harbor, but there seemed to be separate periods
of intense activity as if different new waves were arriving prior to departure
of last one. The first of these periods lasted from about 0755 to around 0820.
Another period was from about 0900 to 0930 and consisted mainly of dive bombers,
a third wave, by high altitude bombers, interspersed with dive bombing and
straffing came over about 0930. Meanwhile enemy submarines were reported
in Pearl Harbor. One submarine was rammed and sunk by the MONAGHAN.
All enemy planes withdrew about 1000.
2. It appears that the raid on OAHU was excellently planned and executed
in that every air field on the island was bombed and strafed in an attempt to
demobilize all planes.
(Enclosure D)
[i] Peakl Harbob, T. H., December 20, 1941.
(A) Disposition of Task Foeces
TASK FOECE ONE
Batdive 2 and 4 (less COLORADO) 5 BB
Crudiv9 (less BOISE) 4 CL
Desrons 1 and 3 (less CLARK) 17 DD
RALEIGH 1 OCL
OGLALA 4 DM
Mindiv 1 (overhaul) 1 OCM
Disposition: In port. Returned 11/28 to remain until 12/13.
TASK FORCE TWO
Batdiv 1 3 BB
Crudiv5 (less PENSACOLA) 3 CA
Desrons 4 and 6 '■ 18 DD
DETROIT ' 1 OCL
^ENTERPRISE , 1 CV
Mindiv 2 4 DM
Disposition: At sea as Task Force EIOHT In Port
ENTERPRISE Batdiv 1
Desron 6 Dearon 4
Crudiv 5 DETROIT
Mindiv 2
Position of Task Force EIGHT : 200 miles West of Pearl standing to eastward
returning from landing VMF at Wake. Planes were in the air from 0618 to
search sector 045 to 135 to 150 miles and then land at Ewa. These planes arrived
during the attack and engaged the enemy aircraft.
TASK FORCE THREE
Crudivs 4 and 6 (less LOUISVILLE) 7 CA
Desron 5 (less Desdiv 10) 5 DD
Minron 2 13 DM
LEXINGTON 1 CV
[2] Disposition: At sea as Task Force TWELVE.
LEXINGTON.
Crudiv 4 less INDIANAPOLIS and LOUISVILLE plus ASTORIA.
Desron 5 less Desdiv 10.
Position (estimated) : 23-45 N, 171-15 W, about 425 miles southeast of Midway
and 300 miles West of French Frigate Shoal on a westerly course to land Marine
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1217
VMSB's on Midway. Wlien attack was made the Task Force was ordered to turn
toward Pearl and later directed to Intercept the enemy and destroy enemy car-
riers. INDIANAPOLIS as Task Force THREE, Minron 2 less Mindivs 5 and 8
at Johnston exercising at landing exercises using landing boats. MINNEAP-
OLIS and Mindiv 5 at sea 3.W. of Oahu — normal operations. Mindiv 6 in port,
with NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO under overhaul.
TASK FORCE SEVEN
At Midway .^— 2SS
At Wake 2SS
At Mare Island 5SS
At San Diego " 4SS
En route to Pearl _-__ 4SS
At Pearl 5SS
PELIAS IAS
TASK FORCE NINE
VP-21— At Midway. 7 searching 120-170.
1450 miles. 4 on 10 minutes notice.
VP-11 — 4 hours notice . I_ 12
VP-12— 30 minutes notice 6
4 hours notice , 5
VP-14 — In air (with depth charges) 3
30 minutes notice 3
4 hours notice , . 4
VP-22 — i hours notice ^- 12
VP-23— 4 hours notice . 11
VP-24 — 4 in air conducting tactics with SS 4
on 30 minutes notice 1
72
Overhauling , 9
81
[3]
TANGIER— In port.
CURTISS— In port.
MCFARLAND
HULBERT
THORNTON
All planes on the ground on ready notice had been furnished with a search
directive in the event that any contacts with surface forces were developed
by the early morning search. This plan never became effective because damage
to the planes prevented.
MARINE PLANES
VMF 221— Wake
VMSB 231— Enroute Midway LEXINGTON
VMSB 232— Ewa 4 hours notice 18
VMJ 252— Ewa 2
BASE FORCE
ARGONNE, plus auxiliaries and repair vessels, were in port.
Aircraft of Base Force
VJ-1— 9 J2F Pearl
9 JRS Pearl
VJ-2— 10 J2F Pearl
4 PBY-1 (2 at Johnston)
VJ-3— 1 J2V Pearl
4 JRB at Maui
1 JRF
2 BT
1218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In addition the tenders (destroyer) DOBBIN and WHITNEY were in port
and the submarine tender PELIAS.
The Task Forces shown herein, except EIGHT and TWELVE which were on
special missions to improve war readiness of Wake and Midway, were in
accordance with the organization of the Pacific Fleet which had been effective
since 30 April 1941, and revised on 31 October 1941. The Task Forces were
operating in accordance with the approved employment schedule of the Fleet
and the special tasks assigned. It will be noted that all combatant vessels
were assigned to Task Forces. This assignment was in accordance with their
war missions and all training was conducted with that in mind.
(b) The Fleet was operating under the "security plan" originally issued on
15 February and revised on 14 October 1941. [-^] This provided for the
possibility of a declaration of war being preceeded by :
(a) A surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
(b) A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area,
(c) A combination of both.
The provisions of the security measures were always followed by ships in
the operating areas, even to the point of having ready ammunition at the guns.
Frequent surprise drills were held by ships in Pearl Harbor in coordination
with Army and distant activities to test the provisions of the security measures
against air and submarine attacks on ships in port. Since, however, the times
in port had to be devoted to upkeep, and limited recreation periods, and since
the iyitelUgence information indicated complete security 'from amy surprise air
attack, the provisions of the air security plan were not fully effective in port.
At the time of the attack, however, provisions had been made and were in
effect to provide against sabotage on ships, docks and equipment, and all ships
had armed patrols and careful routine in.spections of the ships during the entire
time in port. In the battleships, two machine guns were always manned and
ready and two 5"/25 guns were manned with stand-by crews and 15 rounds
of ammunition at each gun.
(c) In addition and as provided in the Security Plan, a daily search of all
operating areas was conducted by planes of Patrol Wing TWO. This was an
early morning search of about 200 miles to cover the general areas in which the
Fleet would be operating during the day.
Such a search was being conducted on 7 December and planes on that search
were in the air at the time of the attack. In addition, 4 planes were operating
with the submarines in the training of intertype exercises for communication
and recognition. They search the area toward Lahaina Roads on that morning.
(d) The first indication of any enemy force in the area was the appearance
of a submarine close aboard the ANTARES returning from Canton Island
and preparing to enter Honolulu while towing a barge. This submarine was at-
tacked by a destroyer of the off-shore patrol which was called by the ANTARES.
This was at about 0645. In addition, plane one of VP-14 dropped a bomb on a
submarine off the entrance to Pearl. In this connection numerous sonic contacts
had been reported in the operating waters close to Pearl dui'ing the last six
months but no actual visual [5] contacts had been made. In addition,
no attacks had been made on these suspected submarines because the Navy
Department had prohibited such attacks except within the 3 mile limit. When
the international situation grew more tense, however, the Commander-in-Chief
directed ships to attack submarines suspected to be operating this area, and it
was on this authority that the WARD and VP-14 attacked on the morning of
7 December.
These submarine attacks were followed by a report from the Navy Signal
Tower "Enemy air raid, this is not a drill" at about 0752. It will be noted
that the attack occurred while the crews of ships were just finishing breakfast
on Sunday morning.
The information regarding the air raid was sent to all Task Forces at 0800,
followed by a despatch "Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on
Pearl" at 0812.
The effect of the surprise attack and the damage inflicted with damage to
com.munications made it practically impossible to oi'ganizc an air search except
by the 7 PBT's in the air at the time.
(e) At 0817 Commander-in-Chief. Pacific Fleet, directed Patrol Wing TWO to
search for the enemy, and the PBY's in the air started to search. The 3 on
the morning search started to search sector 310-000 to a distance of 800 miles.
The first plane started out at once.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1219
The 4 PBY's operating with the submarine started search sector 245-285 to
300 miles ont, the first plane of that search got away at about 0945.
No plane in those areas searched was anything. At 0830 Commander-in-Chief
advised Task Force THREE, EK^HT and TWELVE to rendezvous as directed
by Commander Task Force EIGHT and stated that instructions would be issued
as soon as enemy was located.
(f) While it appeared logical that the attack should come from the Gorthwai'd
so that the planes wouhl fly down wind with their loads, no such evidence was
available from the nature of the attack. Certain information indicated that
carriers or enemy forces vv-ere operating to the southward. A direction finder
bearing of radio transmissions at 1046 was received to indicate that an enemy
force bore 178 from Pearl. This was not a positive indication of an enemy
position but did indicate the probability of an enemy carrier to the southward.
A message was received from a ship with the MINNEAPOLIS call at 0950 stating
that carrier had been sighted. The MINNEAPOLIS was then south of Oahu.
At 1010 4 DM's sent a message that they were in area Sail 2 and that two carriers
were in sight. This was later corrected to say the [6] • message should
have been NOT in sight.
In addition, a message from Kaneohe received at 1000 stated "Captured enemy
have marked positions, bearing 223 — 90 miles from Pearl Harbor." These marks
in Japanese script were later found not pertinent to the attack.
This information was passed to Task Forces at sea as an indication of probable
location of enemy forces. In addition, at 1018 the Task Force Commanders were
advised that there were only 12 VP's available in Pearl for search and that
there was some indication that the enemy was to the northward. They were
directed to locate and attack the enemy of unknown composition. Search was
instituted at once by Task Force EIGHT who was then somewhat south bv west
of Pearl. At 1020, 15 VSB from ENTERPRISE loaded with 1000 lb. bombs
were launched to search for and attack a reported group of 4 transports off
Barber's Point. The origin of the report about the transports is unknown and
it probably was enemy deception because surface craft proceeding to attack
them were attacked by enemy submarines in that area. Ships that could do so .
cleared the harbor by this time and were organized as a separate Task Force
ONE at 1105 and directed to report to Commander Task Force EIGHT to assist
in locating and destroying the enemy.
(g) It was not possible to start an organized search with aircraft with the
forces on Oahu until the late morning. By atjout 1100, however, in addition to
the 7 PBY's which had started the search between 0815 and 0915, as the planes
became serviceable they were started on the following searches :
Army— 2 B-17
2 A-20A
3 B-IS
3 B-17 095-165, 300 miles
Navy— 4 planes VP-24, 245-275, 300 miles
2 planes VJ, 355-005, 300 miles.
3 planes VP-14, 295-350, 200 miles
4 planes VP-23, 215-245, 200 miles
Battleship d Cruiser Planes
0 VOS, 135-215, 200 miles
9 SBD, 330-030, 200 miles
6 J2F in westward sector
[7] The concentrated air search was conducted to the northward and
westward because of the belief that the ma.ior enemy attack force was in that
direction. In addition, the disposition of Task Forces at sea was such that
they were able to search to the southward.
At about 1345 one plane of the ENTERPRISE reported contact with surface
forces in position 20-32 N and 158-40 W, and followed closely by a report that
the patrol was being attacked by a VF plane. This report was apparently in error
because the position is only about 60 miles from Pearl.
At 1330 a radio direction finder bearing on an enemy frequency and by a ship
using the "AKAGI" call was picked up and gave a bearing of 183° from Pearl
and another unidentified unit was found to be on bearing 167 from Pearl. This
information was passed to the Task Forces at sea and on that information and
the supposition, that any enemy forces in the area south of Oahu would retire,
toward Jalint, the senior Task Force Commander at sea directed Task Force
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 2 3G
1220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TWELVE at 1552, to intercept and destroy the enemy. In addition, Task Force
ONE which had joined Task Force EIGHT was directed to proceed to search with
surface force and attack. The surface force search was also based on a retirement
toward Jalint.
No contacts were made and the enemy was not located, except that 2 planes
from the cruiser NORTHAMPTON made contact with an enemy fighter at 1120
just north of NIIHAU and after 20 minutes in spite of the enemy superior speed
and gun power succeeded in shooting him down. No report of this attack ever
reached the Commander-in-Chief.
From the chart later discovered from enemy planes shot down there is no
indication that any carriers operated to the southward of Oahu. The charts do
indicate, however, that the attack was launched from a point about 200 miles
to the northward and that the carrier retired to the northward at full speed while
waiting planes to return from the attack. (It appears then that the enemy
carriers in this area were well beyond the daylight search curve of the planes
sent out to find them and therefore were successful in evading all contacts with
our air forces in the area).
The search by surface craft, carrier aircraft and their shii)-based planes to
the southward was not successful. It appears probable that the enemy used
radio deception by placing a ship to the southward to use deceptive radio calls,
to indicate the presence of enemy foi-ces in that area. It may be possible too
that if enemy forces were in that area that they retired at high speed to the
southward beyond the range of our ships and aircraft.
[8] (h) At 0800 the positions of the ships at sea were approximately as
follows:
Task Force TWEL'S'T] — 18-30 N
168-^0 W
Task Force EIGHT — 20-50 N
158-50 W
Task Force ONE — 20-32 N
159-45 W
Task Force EIGHT was proceeding on course 170 at 17 knots. His position
was in the area to the northwestward of Johnston Island. The cruiser planes
searched to the northward of the island and the carrier planes in a south-
easterly direction to a distance of 200 miles for the 0800 position.
In addition, the planes of VP-21 departed Midway and searched the area
from Midway to Johnston and then from Johnston to Pearl Harbor. Six planes
of Patwing TWO searched the sector with the median of 220° from Pearl Harbor
to a distance of 5.50 miles. The planes from the ENTERPRISE searched the
sector 315 to 270 from the carrier's daylight position.
By these searches practically the entire area in the Oahu-Midway-Johnston
Island triangle was completely covered.
In addition, the available planes of Patwing TWO searched an area of 200
miles all around Oahu. It was not possible to extend this search further to
seaward because of the small number of available planes.
(i) Because Task Force EIGHT was low in fuel, that Force entered Pearl
Harbor after dark on 8 December, fueled, provisioned and took on ammunition
and departed for sea before daylight on 9 December.
9 Decemter
On 9 December the position of Task Force TWELVE was about 600 miles
&. S. W. of Oahu proceeding toward the island. A 200 mile search was being
conducted in the morning all around the carrier position during the morning
and a 150 mile search along the line of the carrier course during the afternoon.
After departure from Pearl Harbor Task Force EIGHT proceeded to the
northeastward from Oahu for search operations in that area.
Task Force ONE returned to port on 9 December.
rS] Using Oahu based planes the following search was conducted starting
in the morning of 9 December :
300-010 500 miles 10 VP
010-060 300 miles 10 B-18
060-210 200 miles 18 VSO
210-030 300 miles 6 VJ
and in the afternoon
330-020 4 Army B-20
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1221
The sector to the southwest of Oahu was covered by the LEXINGTON planes
as mentioned before.
No contact with enemy or surface forces were made. Numerous submarines
were reported, probably many false contacts, but all were attacked by planes.
Cinepac File No.
United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship,
Pearl Harlor, T. E., Dec 23, lO-il.
A16-3/(05)/
Serial 02100
Secret
1st Endorsement on Admiral Kimmel's A16-3/ (02088) dated December 21, 1941.
From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Via : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Report of Action of 7 December 1941.
1. Forwarded,
W. J. PYE.
Cinepac File No. United States Pacifio Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship,
A16-3/ (02088) Pearl Harlor, T. H., Dec 21 1941.
SECRET
From : Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Via : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Report of Action of 7 December 1941.
Enclosure :
(A) Partial narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on
Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1&41.
(B) Cinepac secret letter Lll-l(l) (50) serial 02019 of December 12, 1941,
to OpNav. Subject: Damage to Ships Pacific Fleet Resulting From
Japanese Attack 7 December 1941.
(O) SuppleiDentary partial report of damage to ships.
(D) Disposition of air forces, sortie from harbor, and conduct of the search.
1. The first indication of the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of
7 December 1941 was a telephone report received by the Staff Dxity Officer from
the Fourteenth Naval District Duty Officer at about 0720 (LCT). It reported
an attack by the WARD on a hostile submarine off the entrance of Pearl Harbor.
Twenty minutes thereafter another telephone report from Operations Officer,
Patrol Wing Two, was received that a patrol plane had sunk a hostile submarine
south of the entrance buoy. This was followed by an additional telephone
report from the Fourteenth Naval District stating the WARD was towing a
sanpan into Honolulu. At about 0752 a telephone report was received from
the Navy Yard Signal Tower as follows: "Enemy Air Raid^-Not Drill". Almost
simultaneously Japanese planes were observed over the Fleet. Dive bomibers
were bombing the adjacent air fields, accompanied by torpedo plane attacks
on the ships in the harbor. From then on there was almost continuous enemy
air activity of some kind over the harbor, but there semed to be separate periods
of intense activity as if different new waves were arriving prior to departure of
last one. The first of these periods lasted from about 0755 to around 0820.
Another i)eriod was from about 0900 to 0930 and consisted mainly of dive
bombers, a third wave, by high altitude bombers, interspersed with dive bomb-
ing and straffing came over about 0930. Meanwhile enemy submarines were
reported in Pearl Harbor. One submarine was rammed and sunk by the
MOMAGHAN. All enemy planes withdrew about 1000.
2. It appears that the raid on OAHU was excellently planned and executed
in that every air field on the island was bombed and strafed in an attempt to
demobilize all planes.
3. Before the attacks were completed, Commander Patrol Wing TWO, in accord-
ance with standard orders, established such search as he was able to do with the
planes remaining.
1222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. It is estimated from the radio calls exchanged, bearings received, and ex-
amination of enemy crashed planes, that 4 to 6 Japanese carriers participated in
the raid. Enclosure (D), forwarded herewith, represents the disposition of our
Task Forces in effect for 7 December, as well as the action taken to locate and
destroy the enemy forces.
5. All reports received from commands afloat are unanimous in their praise for
the magnificent behavior of our personnel. Specific cases deserving commenda-
tion and reward will be reported in separate correspondence.
6. Partial report of damage, as submitted in enclosure (B) is supplemented
herewith by enclosure (C).
7. Revised reports of casualties to personnel are being submitted as frequently
as sufficient accurate data are available. Additional information concerning the
results of the action on 7 December will be forwarded as soon as the remaining
missing narratives have been received.
H. E. KiMMEX..
The attached report (enclosure (A)) is compiled from the narrative reports
received from each ship listed in the second column, in addition to the incoming
and outgoing messages of the Commander-in-Chief's file and a few intelligence
reports.
This is only a partial report as individual ship's reports are still being received.
The report contains a few inaccuracies which when time permits, will be checked
and verified and a corrected report submitted to the Department.
Narrative of Events Occukring Dueing Japanese Air RAro on Decembeb 7, 1941
0618
0630 ANTARES
0633 ANTARES
0645 ANTARES
0700
On the morning 7 Dec. Task Force 8 (ENTERPRISE,
NORTHAMPTON, SALT LAKE CITY, CHESTER,
(Crudiv 5), DUNLAP, ELLOT, FANNING, BENHAM,
GRIDLEY, MAURY, BALCH, (Desron 6) were re-
turning to Pearl Harbor after completing mission vi-
cinity Wake Island. From position approxirnately
215 miles West of Pearl routine scouting flight
launched. Flight had orders to search ahead sector
through 045-135° for distance 150 miles. These planes
to proceed Pearl.. Three planes also launched to es-
tablish inner air patrol.
Arrived oft Pearl Harbor, from Canton and Palmyra
with 500 tons steel barge in tow. Sighted suspicious
object 1500 yds. on stbd. quarter. Appeared to be
small submarine but could not positively identify it.
Accordingly notified inshore patrol ship, WARD, to
investigate it.
Observed Navy Patrol plane circle and drop 2 smoke
pots near object.
Observed WARD commence firing for 2 minutes. Pa-
trol plane appeared to drop bombs or depth charged
object which disappeared.
0700 VP Squadron 24
Had four of the six PBY5 planes depart Pearl Harbor
for scheduled training exercise in operating area C-5.
One of the remaining two planes was out of commis-.
sion for structural changes ; the other in standby
status for ready duty.
Plane 14P-1 sank enemy sub. 1 mile off P. H. en-
trance. FORCES UNDER COMMAND OF PAT WING
TWO (COMTASKFOR 9) disposed as follows:
Patron 21-Midway ; Patron 11, 12, 14, Kaneohoe ; Pat-
ron 21, 22, 23, 24, Pearl Harbor. WRIGHT enroute
from P.H. for Midway. Condition of readiness B-5.
(50% aircraft on 4 hours notice). Specific duty
assignments required 6 planes from Patron 14 24 and
12 to be ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. Total
number of planes ready for flight or in the air in 4
hours or less : 72. At the time first bomb dropped 14
patrol aircraft were in the air (7 on search from
Midway) 58 ready for flight in 4 hours or less. Nine
undergoing repairs.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1223
0735 PATRON 21
0740 PATRON 21
0715 KEOSANQUA
0726 HELM
0743
0745 AVOCET
TUCKER
PATRON 11
0745 PATRON 12
0750 TRACY
0750 TAUTOG
0750 CALIFORNIA
0750 CASSIN's
0750 PATRON 21
0750 OKLAHOMA
Patwing 2 staff duty officer received and decoded
message 14P-1 sank enemy submarine one mile off
Pearl Harbor.
Staff duty officer C-C informed by CPW2 of patrol
plane sinking report. Patwing 2 proceeded to draft
a search plan.
Began to receive tow from ANTARES. 0758.
Underway from berth X-7 for deperming buoys at
West Loch. All hands at special sea detail stations.
Both boats manned and in the water with instruc-
tions to follow the ship to West Loch. All magnetic
compasses and chronometers had been left in the
BLUE preparatory to deperming.
Local hostilities commenced with air raid on Pearl.
Received message from plane #1 of VP14 to CTF 3
that plane had sunk one enemy submarine one mile
off Pearl Harbor entrance.
Moored at Berth F-IA, NAS Dock, Pearl Harbor.
Bomb explosion and planes heard and sighted attack-
ing Ford Island hangars.
Nested alongside WHITNEY. 5" gun #3 could not
be fired. All other guns and .50 cal. machine guns
fired at attacking planes during all attacks. No loss
of personnel or material. It is believed this vessel
shot down three or four enemy planes.
Two planes in hangar — 4 planes at south end of
hangar — 6 planes on ramp. As soon as raid started
three rifles were manned immediately. Two machine
guns manned in a plane being removed from the
hangar. Machine gun position in plane abandoned
and guns moved to safer position. Set up 2 machine
gun nests near south end of hangar. Damage re-
ceived : 7 planes burned ; one wrecked ; and four dam-
aged but can be repaired. All hangar, office equip-
ment, and stores destroyed.
Two planes moored in Kaneohe Bay, two in hangar
and 8 on parking apron. Upon being attacked manned
machine guns in planes, mounted machine guns in
pits and used rifles. Observed second wave of hori-
zontal bombers did not release bombs. Own losses —
8 PBY-5's — planes completely destroyed, two severely
damaged ; two moderately damaged, all hangar, office
equipment and stores destroyed.
Moored port side to Berth 15, Navy Yard, Pearl Har-
bor, undergoing overhaul. PREBLE and CUMMINGS
moored to starboard in that order. Ship totally dis-
abled with main auxiliary machinery boilers and gun
batteries dismantled.
Observed enemy three plane formation of dive bomb-
ers over Aiea fleet landing on southwest course.
Enemy character not discovere(^ until bombs were
dropped.
Sounded general quarters and set condition Zed.
Lieutenant Commander M. N. Little, First Lieuten-
ant, was S. O. P. on board and made preparations for
getting underway.
Commanding Officer observed about 100 feet away
from starboard side of dry dock #1 at altitude of 100
feet an airplane with large red disks on bottom of
wings. Sounded general quarters and made attempts
to locate amm.nnition; part of 5" guns under overhaul.
.50 calibre machine guns were unlirabered.
Drafting of CPW2 search plan completed.
(0750 or 0753) struck by 3 torpedoes on port side
frames 25, 35-40 and 115. Ship heeled to port 45"
meanwhile A. A. batteries manned and G. Q. exe-
cuted. Rapid heeling of ship and oil and water
on decks rendered service to guns ineffective.
1224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0750 CURTIS
0750 PYRO
0752 AVOCET
0753 PRUITT
0753 TERN
0753 TRACY
0754 GAMBLE
0755 BAGLEY
BOBOLINK
BREESE
CACHALOT
CASTOR
CONYNGHAM
Moored in berth X-22, condition X-RAY. Number
3 boiler steaming. Ship at G. Q. Ship straffed by
fighter planes. Observed bomb hit on VP hangar
at NAS. UTAH, RALEIGH and RICHMOND at-
tacked by torpedioes.
Secured along West Loch dock, stbd. side to. Heard
noise of low flying aircraft and explosion in Navy
Yard area. Observed two low wing monoplanes
about 100 feet above water head for PYRO's port
beam. Planes zoomed clear of ship and was ob-
served to be Japanese. Sounded General Quarters
and prepared to get underway.
Sounded General Quarters and opened fire with 3"
A. A. battery. Hit Japanese plane which had just
turned away after torpedoing CALIFORNIA.
Plane burst into flames and crashed near Naval
Hospital. Fired 144 rounds 3" 50 cal. and 1750
rounds .30 cal.
PRUITT reports 10 planes flying low, 200 ft., bombed
Ford Island and blew up hangar.
Notified of attack and made preparation for getting
underway.
Observed BB's attacked from astern by about 10
dive bombers. Torpedo planes at about lOO feet
approached from Easterly direction attacking BB's.
TRACY O. O. D. saw dive bombers attack BB's (10
planes and Ford Is. from North). Attack followed
by horizontal and dive bombers on same objective
plus ships in dry dock. 1 dive bomber passed
close enough to observe that it was a single engine
by-plane probably type 94.
Heard explosions on Ford Island.
Moored Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, berth B-22, repairs
to starboard bilge keel. Sighted dive bombers in
action over Hickam Field. They were believed at
that time to be Army bombers.
Shortly after this time enemy plane approached from
the direction of Merry Point at about 30-40 feet alti-
tude and dropped torpedo on OKLAHOMA and x-e-
tired. Opened up with forward machine guns on at-
tacking plane. Machine gun fire bagged 8th plane,
it swerved and torpedo dropped and exploded in bank
30 feet ahead of BAGLEY. Plane finally downed in
channel. Continued machine gunning enemy planes.
3 planes believed to have been shot down by BAGLEY.
Observed about 12 dive bombers centering their at-
tack south hangars of Ford Island.
Moored in berth D-3, Middle Loch, in nest with di-
vision order of ships from starboard U. S. S. RAM-
SAY, BREESE, MONTGOMERY, and GAMBLE.
Observed bombing of old hangar on Ford Island.
Sounded General Quarters, set Condition "A", and
made preparations for getting under way. Sent boats
to landing to pick up men.
Moored at Berth #1, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor under-
going scheduled overhaul.
Sounded general quarters. Ship berthed at Merry
Point.
Heading north moored starboard side to WHITNEY
at berth X-8. REID, TUCKER, CASE, and SELF-
RIDGE outboard. Ship undergoing routine tender
overhaul, receiving power from tender. Noted large
fire on Ford Island and observed horizontal and dive
bombing planes attacking. Sounded General Quar-
ters,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1225
DEWEY Observed UTAH to be torpedoed and to list rapidly.
DEWEY at nest, DesDiv ONE, with PHELPS along-
side port side DOBBIN at X-2 under overhaul.
0755 DOLPHIN Moored portside to Pier 4, Submarine Base, Pearl
Harbor. Japanese aircraft delivered dive bomb and
torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor. Sounded General
Quarters.
HEIM Turned into West Loch channel and headed up toward
deperming buoys.
HENLEY Through error in gangway watch in calling crew to
quarters for muster at 0755, General Alarm was
sounded instead of gas alarm as customary. Ob-
served first torpedo plane attack on UTAH. Crew
proceeded to Battle Stations while General Alarm
sounded the second time. Set material condition
AFIRM. Made preparations for getting iniderway.
Opened fire on light bomber, altitude about 17,000
feet apparently steady on Northerly course ; approach-
ing from seaward and passing over Ford Island.
HONOLULU Moored port side to berth B21 Navy Yard, Pearl
with U. S. S. St. LOUIS alongside stbd. side.
Planes were seen diving on HICKAM FIELD. At
the same time a wave of torpedo planes were seen ap-
proaching over fleet landing. Sounded general quar-
ters and passed word "Enemy Air Raid". Ship pre-
pared to get underway. A. A. batteries came into
action gun by gun as they were manned. 50 caliber
and 30 caliber M. G.'s fired on enemy torpedo planes
attacking the BB's. From this time until raid ended
So caliber, 50 caliber and 5"/25 A. A. guns tired at
every available target. Service ammunition expend-
ed 2,800 rounds of 30 caliber, 4,500 of 50 caliber, 250
rounds of 5"/25 caliber.
12 two-seat low wing monoplanes flying low from
Southeast dropped one torpedo at each battleship.
Saw two planes destroyed.
18 low-wing dive bombers from Southeast. All
bombed Hickam Field.
Undergoing scheduled overhaul, moored in repair
base. Guns and ammunition removed. Crews, ex-
cept the watch on board, living in Navy Yard receiving
barracks.
Japanese planes were seen to attack the BB's. Men
were sent to adjacent ships, NEW ORLEANS, SAN
FRANCISCO, and GUMMING S, to assist in manning
A.A. guns and handle ammunition. Meanwhile re-
ceiving barracks sent men (our) to other ships to
assist, in fighting fires or handling ammunition.
These men reported to PENNSYLVANIA, CALI-
FORNIA, and WHITNEY. Also in the Yard.
Miner's Mates were sent to West Loch. 50 and 30
caliber MG's were reassembled and remounted and
ammunition was obtained from NEW ORLEANS,
SAN FRANCISCO and Marine Barracks. These
guns were used against the enemy making the later
attacks. No ship of division suffered damage.
PATTERSON Moored at berth X-11, battle stations manned.
Opened fire with main and 50 caliber batteries. The
PATTERSON considered that at least one enemy
plane was shot down. The plane Claimed by PAT-
TERSON was one observed diving on CURTISS ap-
proaching from ahead at about 400 ft. altitude.
Plane was seen to fall apart at same time shot was
fired by #2 gun.
MinDiv ONE
0755 MinDiv ONE
1226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
PHOENIX
PREBLE
RALEIGH
RAJVIAPO
RAMSAY
REID
SOLACE
SUMNER
SWAN
TAUTOG
0755
0755 VESTAL
First attacking plane sighted from Signal Bridge at-
tacking from north of Ford Island. Plane had all guns
firing. Passed over stern of Raleigh and proceeded
toward Ford Island Control Tower and dropped bomb.
On 7 December was undergoing Navy Yard overhaul
at berth B-15 with no ammunition on board and the
engineering plant dismantled. First attack on battle-
ships began with about 20 torpedo planes. Planes
were in low horizontal flight when observed and
attacked from eastward. Enemy planes approached
battleships to close range before releasing torpedoes.
Commanding Officer felt dull explosion and looking
out airport observed water boiling amidships. Re-
ceived report that Japanese were attacking fleet.
Sounded general quarters.
Both planes were successfully hoisted out by hand
power. Docter was directed to report to SOLACE.
Damage repair party was sent to capsized UTAH to
cut men out of hull. Sent Signal to send pontoon and
a lighter alongside from BALTIMORE to RALEIGH.
These were delivered and secured to port quarter
and acted as an outrigger. Torpedoes, minus war-
heads were pushed overboard and beached at Ford
Island. Al stanchions, boat skids and life rafts and
booms were jettisoned. Both anchors let go.
O. O. D. observed Japanese dive bomber come in close
and drop couple of bombs. Sounded General Quar-
ters and opened fire with A. A. Guns (3"/)- Motor
Torpedo Boats on board also opened- fire with ma-
chine guns. Order of attack observed to be dive
bombers strafing, torpedo planes, dive bombers bomb-
ing, horizontal planes bombin.
Our personnel reported 3" shell hit plane. No losses
in personnel and no material damage,
floored at berth D-3 observed bomb land on western
end of Ford Island.
Observed unidentified planes attacking Ford Island.
Received report of air raid, closed all watertight doors
and ports, called away rescue parties ; prepared hos-
pital facilities and sent 2 motor launches with rescue
parties to ARIZONA.
Was moored to the new dock at the southern end of
the Submarine Base, port side to, bow to eastward.
Armament is four 3" 25 caliber A. A. guns, four 50
caliber machine guns, and one 5" 51 caliber broadside.
Sounded General Quarters. In Marine Railway,
boiler upkeep. Observed bomb dropped on South
ramp of Fleet Air Base.
Observed about 20 planes approaching on line of OAHU
railroad tracks, and over Merry's point. Torpedoes
were dropped from about 50 feet after submarine base
pier was passed. Fourth plane in line and plane near
end of line were shot down by this ship and HULBERT
before torpedoes were dropped.
A Japanese plane fiew from North to South over a fish
pond adjacent to water front resident of Lt. B. B.
Black, U. S. N. R. on the East shore of Pearl City
Peninsula. A long burst of machine gun fire was
directed at the breakwater enclosing the fish i)ond,
and a single fisherman wearing a white shirt was seen
to run rapidly along the breakwater. This material
is forwarded to indicate that enemy pilots were direc-
ting fire at individuals (civilians) at a considerable
distance from any military military objectives.
Sounded General Quai'ters. IManned A. A. battery, 3"
A. A. and 5" broadside and .30 cal. M. G.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1227
VIREO
WIDGEON
WEST VIRGINIA
0756 BOBOLINK
GAMBLE
MinDiv TWO
THORNTON
0757
BREESE
CONYNGHAM
DEWEY
HELENA
HULL
0757 NEW ORLEANS
0757 PENNSYLVANIA
Moored inboard at Coal Dock (seaward end) with
TURKEY, BOBOLINK, and RAIL, outboard.
No remarks except machine gun and rifle fire used
against enemy. No losses or damage.
Passed word "Away fire and rescue party" followed
by General Quarters. Two heavy shocks felt on hull
of W. Va. apparently forward and on port side. Ship
began to list rapidly to port. Another third heavy
shock felt to port. Plane on top of turret 4 caught on
fire. A heavy explosion occurred with about 20° list
on ship to port. Central station directed to counter-
flood. The following last explosion flashed a flame
about 15 feet high occurred forward on ARIZONA.
A second flash occurred on the ARIZONA higher than
the foretop. Burning debris rained on quarter deck
of W. Va. After the 2 ARIZONA explosions the
W. VA. began to right itself when a large fire broke
out a:midships. Word received from central station
to abandon ship. A wall of flame advancing toward
the W. VA. and TENNESSEE from the ARIZONA.
W. VA. personnel began to abandon ship as fire had
grown out of control. Meanwhile magazines of W.
VA. had been flooded. W. VA. personnel report to
TENNESSEE. Remaining survivors ashore and
elsewhere sent back to W. VA. to fight fire. Fire on
W. VA. extinguished Monday afternoon.
Ready duty status, moored at next end, of coal docks
with VIREO and TURKEY inboard, RAIL outboard.
Informed by gangway watch that Japanese planes
were bombing as. Sounded general quarters.
Wave of about 50 Japanese planes attacked battle-
ships and Naval Air Station, Ford Island, planes
flying at low altitudes about 500 feet over battleships
from direction of Diamond Head, about 700 feet over
Ford Island. Five successive waves of the attack of
about 10 planes each.
Went to General Quarters and set condition "A".
Reports attack by Japanese aircraft commenced ;
general alarm was sounded and all hands went to
air defense stations. THORNTON moored port side
to dock at berth S-1, Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor.
Stations manned were as follows : Control, Machine
gun Battery Control, Repair, and 4 .50 cal. machine
guns, 3 .30 cal. Lewis machine guns. 3 .30 Browning
automatic rifles, and 12 .30 cal. Springfield rifles.
Ensign Chiles of JARVIS called Lieut. Ford and said
"Someone is bombing us".
Opened fire with .50 cal. machine guns.
Observed Torpedo planes attacking RALEIGH, UTAH,
and DETROIT from the West.
Sounded general quarters.
Moored at 1010 dock, berth 2, portside to dock,
OGLALA alongside starboard side. Reported ob-
served planes over Ford Island, 14,000 ft. altitude.
Signalman on bridge with previous duty on Asiatic
Station identified planes immediately. General alarm
sounded and service ammunition broken out.
General Quarters. Prepared to get underway.
Moored at berth 16, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor under-
going engine repairs, receiving power and light from
dock. Sighted enemy planes dive bombing Ford
Island ; sounded G. Q.
In dry dock #1. 3 propeller shafts removed. De-
stroyers CASSIN and DOWNES in dock ahead of
PENNSYLVANIA. Floating dock west of new dry
dock ajoining PENNSYLVANIA occupied by SHAW.
1228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0757 SUMNER
0757 TREVER
0757 WASMIJTH
0757 PATRON 21
0757 ZANE
0758 ANTARES
0758 BAGLEY
Cruiser HELENA and OGLALA at Berth B-2,
(PENNSYLVANIA normal berth). CALIFORNIA
in F-3, MD F-4 inboard, OKLAHOMA outboard;
Berth F-6 TENNESSEE inboard WEST VIRGINIA
outboard, F7 ARIZONA, F8 NEVADA. Machine guns
in foremast manned and condition watch of A. A.
personnel available. Ship receiving steam water and
power from yard. Heard explosions on end of Ford
Is. and realized an air raid in progress after 2nd
explosion. Air defense sounded, followed by Gen.
Qtrs. Set Condition YOKE.
Signal watch and quartermaster on bridge sighted
ten dive bombers attacking Navy Yard. Observed
two explosions in Navy Yard. Sounded alarm.
Mine Division FOUR moored at buoys D-7, bows to-
wards Pearl City, in order from north : TREVER,
WASMUTH, ZAND, and PERRY. Sounded general
quarters at time when first bomb was dropped by
Japanese on north side of Ford Island.
WASMUTH reports first Japanese planes attacked.
Went to General Quarters at once with all guns in
action within 3 minutes. However, as ship was in-
side nest of four only two after guns could bear.
Made all preparations for getting underway.
First bomb dropped near VP-22 hangar. Message
order broadcast to all ships present "AIR RAID P. H.
X THIS IS NOT DRILL" (a similar message was sent
by CinCPac).
ZANE moored bow and stern in nest with Mine Divi-
sion Four at buoys D-7 ; order from port to starboard;
TREVER, WASMUTH, ZANE and PERRY. First
call to standbye colors sounded. Signalmen on watch
observed single Jap plane drop bomb from about 10000
feet on southern end Ford Island after approach from
Northward. Sounded General Quarters; manned
A. A. battery. Commenced firing with A. A. battery
at all planes passing within reasonable distances.
Made all preparations to get underway.
ANTARES heard explosion in P. H. and observed
Japanese planes delivering attack.
BAGLEY observed torpedo plane come in from direc-
tion of Merry Point between Navy Yard and Kuahua
Island, 30 or 40 feet altitude, headed for OKLAHOMA.
About 2 to 3 hundred yards from OKLAHOMA, plane
dropped its torpedo and hit OKLAHOMA amidships.
Sounded General Quarters and commenced firing.
Hit fourth plane coming in which was seen to crash
in channel off OflBcers Club landing. Machine gun
fire on 8th plane made it swerve to left causing tor-
pedo to drop and explode in bank about 30 feet ahead
of BAGLEY. Number one machine gun downed plane
in Navy Yard channel. Third torpedo plane hit by
BAGLEY was observed headed for light cruisers
HONOLULU and ST. LOUIS astern of BAGLEY.
Plane went out of control, dropped its torpedo and
seemed to hit I-head crane in Navy Yard. This was
about the eleventh plane to come in. Next plane hit by
BAGLEY came over dock but was downed with a
short burst. Torpedo dropped in lumber pile and
plane believed to have crashed on dock. Fifth plane
brought down by BAGLEY came down on starboard
side, nose directly up into air and spun into crash
loosing its torpedo. Sixth plane brought down by
BAGLEY was a dive bomber during second phase of
attack and after torpedo attack. This plane was shot
down by 5" gun and those from other ships.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1229
0758 CUMMINGS
0758 GAMBLE
0758 JARVIS
0758 HULBERT
0758 HULL
0758 MUGFORD
0758 REID
0758 RIGEI
0758 TENNESSEE
0758 THORNTON
0759 GAMBLE
0759 HELM
0759 JARVIS
0759 SUMNER
CUMMINGS observed enemy planes making torpedo
attack on BBs moored to East side Ford Island.
Sounded General Quarters.
Went to General Quarters, opened fire with .50 cal.
machine guns on planes passing over nest at about 800
feet altitude. Set material condition affirm except for
certain protected ammunition passages.
General Quarters sounded on JARVIS.
HULBERT sounded general quarters. Torpedo plane
sighted heading west over east lock preparing to
launch torpedo against battleship ofi: Ford Island.
HULBERT reports bringing down 1 Japanese torpedo
plane by .50 cal. A. A. fire from berth S-3, Submarine
Base.
Gang%vay watch opened fire with .45 caliber pistol on
two (2) planes crossing bow within 50 yards.
Moored port side to the U. S. S. SACRAMENTO, berth
No. 6, Navy Yard. U. S. S. JARVIS moored port side
to MUGFORD. Attack started. Japanese planes
dive on Ford Island. Several large bombs struck the
sea plane landing ramps followed by explosions near
hangars. Several Japanese planes came in low from
southwest and released torpedoes which struck OKLA-
HOMA and WEST VIRGINIA. Enemy torpedo
planes came in continuously from same direction and
fired torpedoes at the BBs.
REID went to General Quarters.
Ford Island attack by 10 dive bombers from North at
10,000 feet.
TENNESSEE attacked by enemy planes (Japanese),
Oily water around stern burning. Canvas awning on
stern on fire, Turret III. Smoke pouring into Repair
I. Smoke so thick, cannot see. Repair I have man
standby magazine flood. Turret III. All boats on fire.
Fire in maintop, secondary aft. Fire in maintop
seems to be out. WEST VIRGINIA'S quarterdeck and
planes on fire. Fire on Turret III. Could not get
morphine out of doctor's room because it was unsafe ;
men report that room was too hot to go in and cut safe
open. D-310 excessively hot — investigate. Squadron
of planes diving on Navy Yard. Repair I, unit 3, aban-
doned station — too hot. Fire on topside seems to be
under control. D-310-A is all right. Set Condition
ZED in lower handling room of Turret IIL OKLA-
HOMA seems to be capsizing. CALIFORNIA down by
the stern. WEST VIRGINIA has pretty bad fire be-
low Signal Bridge. TENNESSEE was hit twice, soon
after attack began; one hit (bomb) on face of Turret
II, and bomb hit on top of Turret III, penetrating.
THORNTON commenced firing with .50 cal. machine
gun battery followed immediately by .30 cal. machine
guns and .30 cal. rifles.
GAMBLE opened fire with 3"/23 cal. AA guns, firing
as planes came within range, fuses set 3 to 8 sees.
First enemy plane sighted in shallow dive over Ford
Island, headed Northwest. Observed first bomb hit on
hangar at southwest end of Ford Island. Called crew
to General Quarters. Opened magazines and got am-
munition to guns.
Lieut. Ford and Lieut. Johansen of JARVIS reach
bridge. Jap torpedo planes coming in at 30 to 60 sec-
ond intervals, approaching from Merry Point direction
and attacking BBs.
Observed torpedo planes approach over S. E. Loch at-
tacking BBs, circling Ford Island and flying off to
south west.
1230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0759 WHITNEY
0759 PELIAS
0800
0800 VIERO
0800 ANTARES
0800 COMINBATFOK
0800 CASSIN
0800 CASTOR
0800 DOLPHIN
Observed air raid attack by Japanese air force and
explosions on Ford Island. WHITNEY moored bow
and stern to buoys X-8 and X-8x, 6 fatboms of water,
supplying steam, electricity, fresh and flushing water
to CONNYNGHAM, REID, TUCKER, CASE, and
SELFRIDGE, moored alongside to port.
PELIAS reports 9 dive bombers attacked out of di-
rectitin of sun the Battleships. One broke off and
dive bombed PENNSYLVANIA.
Two officers from ship hiking in back of AJea witnessed
attack. They stated later that 3 separate flights of
planes appeared at 3 levels : low, medium and high
from the north.
O. O. VIERO heard an explosion. Immediately
Japanese planes were seen, and General Quarters
sounded.
ANTARES under machine gun fire. Topside hit by
machine gun bullets. Bomb and shell fragments.
Being unarmed no offensive tactics were possible. In
order to avoid placing ship and personnel in jeopardy,
authority was requested to enter Honolulu harbor.
Comincraft in OGLALA observerd enemy bomb fall
seaward and Ford Island ; no damage. The next
bomb caused fires near waters. Flames flared up
from structures southend of island. Next bomb fell
alongside or on board 7 battleships moored at F-1
eastside of Ford Island. Jap planes flew between
fifty and 100 feet of water, dropping 3 torpedos or
mines in channel on line between OGLALA and sea-
ward end of Ford Island.
Torpedo hit OGLALA and HELENA simultaneously.
These ships were moored abreast of B-2 of ten ten
dock OGLALA outboard. Both ships opened fire with
A.A. battery. OGLALA signalled C-C possibility that
mines had been dropped. Two contract tugs were
hailed to haul OGLALA aft of HELENA. Submersi-
ble pumps for OGLALA were obtained from HELENA,
but could not be used as no power was available.
Observed one Jap plane shot down. Planes were
strafing as well as bombing. Observed 4 battleships
hit with bombs, fires broke out, and one battleship
tured over. Enemy planes appeared to fly in groups
of 6 to 10. NEVADA underway to clear channel, but
apparently was struck by torpedo or mine. A minute
later 2 bombs fell only one hit in the NEVADA. On
2nd attack observed bomb dropped on fwd part of
PENNSYLVANA in dry-dock. Flames appeared from
two destroyers in the same dock. Observed another
Jap plane fall in water. Observed bomb fall close to
destroyers in floating drydock. Destroyer later
caught on fire.
CASSIN saw another plane come down to about 75
feet on parallel course drydock #1. Plane dropped
torpedo ainiied at CALIFORNIA at range 200 yards.
CASTOR 3" A. A. and .30 cal. machine guns com-
menced firing against enemy torpedo planes, low and
close aboard, and against dive bombers. Observed
one enemy torpedo plane at about 500 to 700 yards
range and 500 ft. altitude due aft of ship and heading
across to Ford Island with parts of fuselage shot
away. Plane grounded either on Ford Island or bfe-
yond. Removed covered lighter alongside with 450
aerial depth charges.
Machine guns and rifles manned and fired at enemy
aircraft which were flying very low. Ready identifi-
cation could be made by the large red balls on each
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1231
0800 BLUB
0800 RIGEL
0800 WHITNEY
0800 HELM
0800 HELM
0800 JARVIS
0800 MUGFORD
0800 PHOENIX
0800 RALEIGH
0800 RALEIGH
wing. Report received plane had been sliot down and
dove into channel oi£ pier 3.
UTAH torpedoed. General alarm was sounded, and
word passed throughout the ship to man battle sta-
tions and prepare to get underway immediately.
RIGEL vicinity #1 dry dock and ten ten dock strafed
and bombed by 15 dive bombers from South. Altitude
600 to 100 feet.
WHITNEY sounded general quarters. First plane
passed over ship low altitude, stratlng with machine
guns.
Torpedo planes sighted approaching from direction of
Barber's Point. They passed over West Loch channel
and dropped torpedoes either in North Channel or
across the island. Targets for these planes appeared
to be ships in berths F-9 to F-13. The planes came
in low, and several straffed the ship. All bullets
missed the ship by a few feet. No fire was opened,
since the forward machine guns, which could bear,
were covered with preservative grease and had to be
cleaned before they could fire.
Backed engines and commenced maneuvering ship out
of West Loch channel to head for entrance.
Ensign Greene OOD of JARVIS reported on bridge.
Prior to this he had been directing activities ai'ound
the quarterdeck. He was told to go to the after
firing battery. Ensign -X^hiles was actively organiz-
ing the forward battery without orders. Ensign
Fleece already on the director. Orders given to open
fire.
Commenced assembly of engineering.plant which had
been placed out of commission for yard overhaul.
Connected fuel oil hose to yard line. 8,000 gallons
total on board.
Bombing attack on BBs. Plane markings, varied
U. S. swastikas, and rising sun painted on fusilage.
Opened fire with AA battery of 3"/50 cal. 1.1" and
.50 cal. guns. Ship started to heel to port and re-
ceived report that torpedo had struck #2 fireroom.
#1 and 2 firerooms and forward engine-room com-
pletely flooded. Fire in #3 went out. Directed
counter-flooding. As it appeared that ship would cap-
size, orders were given to jettison topside.
Both planes successfully hoisted out by hand. Doctor
was directed to report to SOLACE. Damage repair
party was sent to capsized UTAH*to cut men out of
hull. Sent signal to send pontoons and lighter from
alongside BALTIMORE to RALEIGH. These were
delivered and secured to port quarter and acted as
outrigger. Torpedoes minus warheads were beached
at Ford Island. All stanchions, boat skids., and life
rafts and booms were .I'ettisoned. Anchors were
let go.
Attacked by torpedo plane and bombing plane.
Sounded General Quarters. Received severe un-
derwater hit frame 84, portside. Followed by
another hit which caused ship to list 15°. Passed
word "all hands on deck". Not possible to repel
attack as all ammunition was in magazines and
secured. 5" and 1.1 guns covered with steel hous-
hig; .50 and .30 caliber machine guns dismounted
and stowed below decks. Ship covered with two
layers 6 by 12 timbers. Above conditions neces-
sitated by UTAH being used by ships as bombing
target during current operations. Received bomb
explosion in port aircastle.
1232 CONGRESSIONi^L INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0801 PRUITT
0801 NEVADA
0801 MUGFORD
0801 SUMNER
0801 HELENA
0802 DEWEY
0802 TREVER
0802 NEVADA
0802 PENNA.
0803 CUMMINGS
0803 CALIFORNIA
0803 SWAN
0803 CACHELOT
0803 NEVADA
0804 JARVIS
0804 WHITNEY
Reported OKLAHOMA and ARIZONA attacked from
southerly direction. Number of torpedo planes
attacked from southeast.
Observed enemy air attack. Sounded general quart-
ers. Two machine guns forward and two aft had
been already on continuous watch under the alert
program.
Sounded General Quarters.
Saw dense smoke rising behind Kuahuai Peninsula
believed from ARIZONA, blazing oil floating down
from line of BBs. Opened fire — #3 gun manned and
commenced firing four minutes after the attack on
Navy Yard was observed, and before any other gun
in the vicinity had commenced firing. Made direct
hit on and destroyed torpedo plane making ap-
proach on BBs.
Opened fire. Hit by torpedo, range 500 yds., star-
board side, approximately frame 75, 18 feet below
water line. Four near misses from bombs received
and one trafing attack with little damaged. Issued
gas masks and protective clothing. Once gun op-
position was in full swing, Japanese planes were
noted to turn away from gunfire or keep at re-
spectable altitude.
Four .50 caliber machine guns fired at planes attack-
ing battleships and Ford Island.
Opened fire with .50 caliber machine guns.
Opened fire with machine guns on enemy planes
approaching on port beam. One plane brought down
100 yards of NEVADA'S port quarter; one plane
dropped torpedo which struck the NEVADA on port
bow.
Attack by Torpedo planes from west and south, about
12 or 15. PENNA. reported as first ship opening fire
on plane. After release of torpedoes three planes
came in low from port beam strafing PENNA., though
not affected. Bearing of torpedo attack and one
enemy plane observed to burst into flames 2000 yds
on stbd bow. Dive bombing attacks and torpedo at-
tacks on Pearl Harbor, and dive bombing attacks on
Hickam Field.
After Machine Guns opened fire on Japanese torpedo
planes.
Opened fire with machine guns and ready guns, on
torpedo planes.
Opened fire with 3" A. A. guns. All sea valves and
hatches closed and commenced placing boilers in com-
mission. Observed one direct hit with 3" gun —
plane crashed beyond drydock area. No material
damage suffered.
Enemy planes passed within range and arc of guns.
Opened up with .30 and .50 caliber machine guns.
NEVADA opened fire with 5" A. A. Members of
crew claim both broadside scored direct hit on torpedo
plane which disintegrated in midair.
Machine guns opened fire.
Commenced firing with .50 cal. AA guns.
Received signal to get underway.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1233
0805 MUGFORD
0805 TRACY
0805 NEW ORLEANS
0805 VESTAL
0805 VESTAL •
0805 RIGEL
0805 HELM
0805 HULL
0805 CURTIS S
0805 UTAH
0805 SUMNER
0805 JARVIS
0805 BREESE
0805 RAMSAY
0805 GAMBLE
0805 BLUE
0805 CASSIN
0805 CALIFORNIA
0806 PHOENIX
Opened fire with .50 caliber MG's. Shot down Jap-
anese plane, altitude 800 feet on the stbd. quarter,
passing aft on stbd. hand. This plane had fired a
torpedo at the U. S. S. OGLALA.
Observed torpedo planes coming in from easterly
direction and launching torpedoes at BBs at Ford Is.
At first attack ship closed up as much as possible and
broke out fighting equipment.
Sighted enemy torpedo planes on port quarter, flying
low across stern. Rifle fire and pistol fire opened
from fantail as first planes flew by to launch tor-
pedoes at battleships. Manned 1.1 battery and ma-
chine guns aft in time to fire at three or four enemy
planes.
Struck by two bombs. VESTAL moored to port side
of ARIZONA B-F7. One bomb struck stbd. side fr.
44. Penetrated 3 decks, exploding in GSK stores,
cutting fire main and electric cables in crew space.
Hold set on fire and wrecked. Another bomb struck
at fr. 110 on port side, passed through the shops and
fuel oil tank. Bomb explosion forward damaged
practically all stores. Heat of explosion necessitated
flooding fwd. magazines. Material damaged con-
sisted of 3 life rafts, 6 mooring lines, one gangway,
port lenses and windows broken.
Opened fire, and shortly after A. A. breach jammed,
blast from ARIZONA cleared gun station, killing one
man. Fired with machine guns on enemy planes
until they were- withdrawn. Fired at torpedo plane
which was seen to burst into flame and disappear
over Ford Island. Following personnel damage was
done : 9 dead, 7 missing, 19 in hospital.
BBs attacked from altitude 185 feet from southeast
by 12 torpedo planes, 300 to 500 yard range.
Opened fire with after machine guns at planes over
main channel, followed shortly by forward machine
guns firing at passing torpedo planes.
#4 machine gun opened fire.
Firing with 5" local control and .50 cal. machine
guns. Lighted off boilers 1, 2 and 4.
Listed about 40° to port. Attacking planes straffed
crew as ship was abandoned.
Torpedo plane passed close aboard within 100 yards of
SUMNER, stern on West course, altitude 75'.
Leveled off for launching torpedo at BB. Struck by
direct hit from sumner's #3 A. A. gun, range 300
yards. Plane disintegrated in smoke and sank in
fragments. Torpedo believed sunk without exploding.
5" opened fire. #3 gun believed to be the first 5"
gun in harbor to open fire.
Opened fire with 3" A. A. guns.
Sounded general quarters and opened fire with .50
cal and 3" cal guns. RAMSAY liberty party return-
ing in MONTGOMERY boat was straffed by torpedo
planes which were observed to fire 3 torpedoes into
UTAH and RALEIGH.
Mounted and commenced firing with .30 cal. machine
guns on galley deck house.
Opened fire with .50 caliber machine guns on Japanese
planes diving on ships in harbor.
Observed HELENA open fire followed by PENN-
SYLVANIA.
Reported two torpedoes struck port side, frame 100,
making 40 ft. long hole extending from first seam
below armor belt to bilge keel.
Made radio signal to ships of sector four "prepare to
get underway".
1234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0806
0806
PRUITT
BOBOLINK and
0807 BLUE
0807
0807
0808
0807
HELM
HULL
CURTISS
PHOENIX
0S08
CUMMINGS
0808
CONYNGHAM
080S
MUGFORD
0809
WHITNEY
0809
HULL
0810
0810
THORNTON
CUMMINGS
0810
0810 NEW ORLEANS
0810
0810
UTAH
UTAH
Observed Jap Ijomber shot down. ARIZONA listed
sharply, smoke and flames.
TURKEY commenced firing. Directed other boats in
next to tie up to destroyer buoys adjacent to battle
rafts in order to disperse.
Opened fire with 5"/38 caliber guns on Japanese
planes. The engine room was ordered immediately to
light oft No. 2 boiler ( #1 already steaming) and made
all preparations for getting underway. Repair party
cleared the ship for action, and made all preparations
for slipping quiclvly from the mooring.
Opened fire with 5" battery. No hits observed.
#1 5"/38 cal. opened fire.
Sent Engine Room emergency underway signal.
One plane burning in water at end of pipe — line astern
of berth F-8.
Opened fire on horizontal bombers approaching over
Navy Yard from southerly direction.
Opened fire with 5" gun and machine guns on at-
tacking planes.
U. S. S. OKLAHOMA had capsized. W. VA. listed
heavily to port, ARIZONA blew up.
Making preparations for getting underway. Supplies
issued to destroyers alongside.
#5 gun, 5"/38 cal. opened fire, followed by guns #2,
#3, and #4.
First dive bombing attack ended.
Commenced preparations for getting underway in ac-
cordance general signal. Opened fii-e main battery on
dive bombers over BBs.
Enemy aircraft bomb struck hangar and aircraft
parking space adjacent to VP-21 parking area. Ready
plane suffered a severed wing spar. Plane was then
machine gunned and caught fire. Fire was extin-
guished and plane has been repaired and is in serv-
ice. Plane undergoing structural changes not dam-
aged and is now operating. Personnel present
mounted machine guns in available planes and opened
fire on attacking planes. One low-winged biplane fly-
ing from across hangar 54 on course about 250 lost
both wings.
All batteries NEW ORLEANS except 8" battery in
action. Area around berths 14-19 incl, subjected to
dive bombing attack by approximately ten enemy
planes. Attack turned away by combined fire of
HONOLULU and NEW ORLEANS. Observed three
bombs drop; one falling ahead of and another falling
astern of the RIGEL. These failed to explode. Third
bomb landed midway between RIGEL and NEW OR-
LEANS exploding and causing damage from flying
fragments. During raid yard power failed or was cut
off leaving vessel in darkness without power except
auxiliary battery power. Heavy drain of machinery
raising steam for getting underway exhausted aux-
• iliary batteries so much that lighting was very dim
and of practically no use. All work in engineering
spaces, magazines and ammunition passageways con-
ducted by flashlight. Hoists and guns worked b;.
hand with consequent reduction of volume of fire. AA
directors were off ship.
Listed 80° to port mooring lines parting and two
minutes later ship capsized. Ship abandoned.
Capsized. Salvage operations undertaken immedi-
ately in order to rescue entrapped personnel. 32 men
thus rescued. Estimated number of torpedoes to hit
ship about 5 ; no bombs were observed to have hit.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1235
0810
CASSIN
0810
0810
PRUITT
GAMBIE
0810
0810
CALIFORNIA
W. VIRGINIA
0810
WHITNEY
0810
JARVIS
0810 PHOENIX MG battery opened fire on attacking planes.
0810 DEWEY Guns 1-2-3 and 5.5", no power on ship.
0810 HELM Fire from i)ort machine gun hit plane approaching
from' South. Plane observed to veer sharply, catch
on fire and crash behind trees near Hickam Field.
Damage to enemy: — 1 plane shot down by machine
gun fire.
Observed Japanese plane crash over tree near hospi-
tal. Five high altitude, 12,000 ft, bombers passed
overhead from forward aft and dropped large bombs.
Observed OKLAHOMA roll over.
Commenced making preparations to get underway.
Lighted ofE four boilers.
Opened fire with 5" guns on dive bombers.
Commanding Officer, Captain M. S. Bennion mortally
wounded.
Set condition aflfirm'. Commenced firing with 3" A. A.
guns.
Counted 6 or 7 torpedoes in OKLAHOMA. NEVADA,
WEST VIRGINIA, and ARIZONA also torpedoed.
Apparently, ARIZONA forward magazine exploded.
Noted OGLALA torpedoed alongside HELENA at
10-10 dock.
0610 REID Opened fire with after machine guns.
0810 WHITNEY No material or personnel damage.
0810 PELIAS Reports formation of high altitude planes came in
from S. W. attacking battleships and Ford Island
followed by another wave from the same direction.
Torpedo planes were small and carried only one bomb.
Dive bombers also small and carried but one bomb.
0810 RAIL At coal docks nested with 4 minesweeps. Opened fire
with 3" A. A. 15 minutes after first bomb dropped oa
Pearl. Opened fire with .30 macliine guns, rifles and
pistols 20 minutes after first attack. A string of 20
bombs fell in channel astern. Shrapnel fell through-
out ship. No material or personnel damage.
OGLALA listing to port. Attack started again.
Heavy A. A. fire.
Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on
Pearl.
FOUR ; Sector 4 Prepare to get underway
AH machine guns plus two automatic rifles on the
bridge and one on after deck, firing.
Torpedo planes attacked from S. E. at 500 feet and
attacked BBs from altitude 125 feet, range 300 to 50O
yards.
Task Force 8 received Message from CinC Air Raid on
Pearl Harbor. This is no drill. This time about
coincided with expected arrival ENTERPRISE planes
at Pearl. Task Force Comdr. first concerned that
planes were assumed to be unfriendly by harbor de-
fenses. It was not until subsequent dispatches were
received that it was realized hostilities with Japan
had begun. TF-8 operated in area South Kaula Rock
for air attack should enemy be located North or South
of Oahu. No authentic information available regard-
ing location. Maintained combat and inner air
patrols.
0812 SI6ARD Undergoing overhaul in Navy Yard stbd side to
PRUIT Perth 18. Ship totally disabled as to main
and auxiliary machinery and gun battery. Observed
Squadron of Japanese planes coming in from South-
west, diving from 5,000 feet on Ford Island.
0813 CONYNGHAM Observed attacking plane shot down by fire from nest.
Plane crashed near GURTISS.
0813 HELM Passed gate vessel.
0812
MUGFORD
9812
Outgoing
0812
0812
COMSECTOR
HULL
0812
RIGEL
0812
79716—46 — Ex. 149, vol. 2-
-37
1236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0815
0815 PENNA
0815 VIREO
0815 RIGEL
0815 SICARD
0815 MUGFORD
0815 PHOENIX
0815 CAS SIN
0815 PRUITT
0815 JARVIS
0815 SUMNER
0817 CINCPAC
0817 HELM
0818 CONYNGHAM
0820 TRACY
0820 HELM
0620 SICARD
Aircraft in flight informed hostilities with Japan
commenced with air raid on Pearl. VP-24 directed
to search sector 240-280 for carriers. Ten miles south
of Barbers Point plane 24-VP-4 sighted unidentified
submarine near force consisting of INDIANAPOLIS
and 4 Destroyers. Submarine made crash dive and
spot marked by float lights. Completed search
through 20O miles and. returned to Pearl.
Reports NEVADA underway and about on PENNA
stbd qtr. Distance about 600 yds when dive bomb-
ing attack observed approaching PENNA on port bow.
10 or 15 planes coming in succession just before reach-
ing PENNA % planes appeared to swerve to left.
Number of them dropping bombs at the NEV. 1 dive
bomber dropped bomb on SHAW in floating dry dock
and set it on fire. NEV observed to slowly swing
around head to port broadside to channel, on fire fwd.
Observed 2iul Group of enemy planes fly toward
Hickam Field. VIREO opened fire expending 22
rounds 3" A. A. Ammunition.
Undergoing major repairs and conversion at Navy
Yard. No motive power available. All power etc.
from yard. Air attack began. As this vessel had no
armament no ofCenaive action could be taken. Ac-
cordingly rescue work was commenced on WEST VIR-
GINIA personnel. About 100 men (in track of burn-
ing oil) had been blown into the water. These were
rescued first. The torpedo, bombing and machine gun
assaults on the WEST VIRGINIA continued while the
rescue operations progressed. One rescue boat was
struck by bomb and sunk. Crew thrown into water.
Moored B-13 Navy Yard undergoing major repairs.
Services from Navy Yard.
Set condition of readiness "AFFIRM". 2 fire par-
ties were formed fore and aft.
Shot down one enemy plane bearing astern making
approach on battleship at altitude 20 feet off water.
Plane crashed on Fofd Island aflame, torpedo not
launched.
A. A. battery opened flre.
Observed another group of 5 high altitude bombers
passed overhead and let loose bombs.
Observed 12 bombing planes in close "V" formation
bombed (horizontal attack) from 10,000 feet from
Southwest.
All guns and machine guns of JARVIS in action.
MUGFORD noted to be delivering high volume of
fire.
Checked fire.
Directed Compatwing TWO locate enemy force.
Sighted conning tower of submarine to right of
channel* Northward of buoy #1. Gave orders to
open fire, pointer fire, but submarine submerged
before guns could get on.
Opened fire with remaining 5" guns at horizontal
bombers passing overhead in direction of Schofield
Barracks.
Sent men to CUMMINGS to assist batteries and
approximately 15 men to PENNA to fight fires.
Opened fire on submarine off Tripod Reef; no hits
observed. Submarine appeared to be touching bot-
tom on ledge of reef, and in line of breakers.
Stearing motor short circuited — bridge Lost stearing
control.
Was manned 2 .30 cal. M. G.s. Bombers began to
attack ships at 1010 dock and battleships in vicinity
of Ford Island. SICARD hits were observed on
planes but no apparent damage was done.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1237
0620 VESTAL
0820 PYRO
0820 MUGF'ORD
0820 SUMNER
0820 CALIFORNIA
0820 SOLACE
0820 NEVADA
0820 REID
0820 WHITNEY
0820 CUMMINGS
0820 HULBERT
0821 HELM
0825 TRACY
0825 MUGFORD
0825 CALIFORNIA
0825 BREESE
0S25 Outgoing
0825 SUMNER
0826
0826 BREESE
0827 SICARD
0830 PENNSY
0830 CONYNGHAM
Observed torpedo pass astern and hit ARIZONA.
Simultaneously ARIZ received bomb hit followed by
her forward magazine exploding. Latter started fires
aft and amidship of VESTAL. Shortly after that,
ARIZ observed to be settling and fuel oil between
VESTAL and ARIZ ignited.
Opened fire on planes.
Opened fire with 5"/38 battery.
Ship ready for getting underway. Members of broad-
side gun crew and available engineers were armed
with rifles and BAR'S and stationed in upper works
to act as snipers.
Torpedo struck port side, frame 47, making an irregu-
lar hole 27 X 32 ft., the top of which is 6 ft. below
bottom of armor belt.
Reports boat loads of casualties began to arrive. By
this time all hospital supplies and facilities had been
prepared for maximum service.
Attack slackened.
Opened fire with after 5"/38 caliber on high altitude
and dive bombers.
Observed Japanese plane fall in flames north channel
vicinity X-5.
Lull in air attack ; ceased firing. Lack of DC power
prevented use of director. Sound powered telephone
and local control used.
Claims share in bringing down a bomber.
Observed torpedo pass close under stern on a north-
erly course.
Ready to open fire with 3 .30 caliber.
Signal received that parachutists or wrecked pilots
were landing in Hickam Field.
Opened fire on horizontal bombers at 10,000 ft. with
5" guns.
Received signal to get underway but being inside nest
could not do so.
To COMTASKGB 12 & COMTASKGR 8 : Report posi-
tion.
Opened fire on ten dive bombers attacking Navy Yard
Dry Dock. These planes approached from cloud bank
in South East. Heard terrific explosion in Navy
Yard — vicinity of Dry Dock followed by dense cloud
of smoke. Dive bomber passed 300 vards from SUM-
NER and DD's HULBERT and THORNTON, tail of
plane ignited. Plane turned southward and disap-
peared over Halawa district. Observed six horizon-
tal bombers approaching from southeast at 8,000 feet.
Planes circled and approached Ford Island from
Southwest and dropped bombs over DD's. Planes
then circled to Southeast. One plane left it's forma-
tion, turned towards Navy Yard loosing altitude
rapidly, passed SUMNER at 400 feet altitude range
500 yards; was fired on by SUMNER. When over
center Southeast Loch, plane began smoking and was
lost in thick smoke over Navy Yard. It was a two-
seater monoplane, gunner in rear seat protected by
shield, orange disk on side just abaft rear cockpit.
Planes crossing low ahead of nest to Northeast were
taken under fire by CONYNGHAM and nest. One
burst into flame and exploded in clump of trees in
Aiea Hights.
Received report submarine was in harbor.
Cease firing, expended 300 rounds .30 cal. M.G. am-
munition.
Lighted fires under #4 boiler.
Reports another plane diving toward Ford Island from
Northeast shotdown by combined fire of the nest.
1238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0830 PENNA
0830 VIREO
0830
0830
VESTAL
MUGFORD
0830
0830
SUMNER
RIGEL
0830
WHITNEY
0830
HELM
0830
0830
NEVADA
HULL
0830
CALIFORNIA
0830
BREESE
0830 ZANE
0830 CASSIN
0830 HENLEY
0830 DOWNES
0830 RIGEL
0835 CURTIS
0830 RBID
0830 Outgoing
Reports about 5 high bombing attacks obs. to have
passed over PENNA. one from port bow one from
ahead one from ahead to stbd 2 from astern. Alti-
tude about 2000 feet.
Brought down one enemy plane which landed in
vicinity of Hickam Field. 400 rounds of .30 cal,
M.G. ammunition expended. One personnel casualty
to PRICE, Radioman, on telephone watch astern of
vessel. PRICE returned to duty 10 December.
No damage to vessel. Made ready to get underway.
Prepared to get underway.
Five enemy planes in V formation passed directly
overhead, making horizontal bombing attack.
Checked fire.
15 Heavy bombers in 3-V formation 8 to 10 thousand
feet from S. E. bombed BB's.
Issued ammunition and ordnance stores to destroyers
alongside. Secured steam to destroyers.
Fired at enemy plane with forward machine guns.
May have hit plane.
Heavy bombing attack received.
Two Vee's high level bombers (10,000 feet) directly
overhead seen intermittently through the clouds.
Opened fire with all guns. Formations broke up and
dropped their bombs in cane field.
Opened fire on Dive bombers with 5" and forward
machine guns ; shot down one enemy dive bomber
which crashed in flames.
Sighted conning towers of two submarines in North
channel but could not open fire because of interior
berth. Observed MONAGHAN proceed down channel
at full speed to r.im leading submarine which had just
fired torpedo at U. S. S. CURTIS but missed. U. S. S.
MONAGHAN dropped 2 depth charges and submarine,
about 250 ton type arose upside down and sank.
Sighted strange submarine 200 yards astern of
MEDUSA moored in K-23. Guns would not bear as
ZANE was inboard ship.
Received signal from PENNSYLVANIA, Senior de-
stroyer ofl^cer report on board.
Underway from buoy X-] 1. Large bomb struck water
150 yards from port bow. Received signal "sub-
marine in harbor". MACDONOUGH directly ahead
made depth charge attack and cleared at high speed.
HENLEY was third ship in sortie. After rounding
Hospital Point, subjected to straffing attack by light
bomber, coming up from astern and showing five dis-
tinct sources of machine gun fire from plane as plane
passed ship. It was seen to crash offshore in a few
minutes. Another light bomber approached from star-
board at 2,000 feet and was taken under fire with
another destroyer. Close burst forces plane to dive
and it crashed into sea.
Open fire with 5-inch, on blocks. DOWNES struck
on after deck house by bombs.
Captain returned on board. Bomb struck astern and
midway between piers 13 & 14. 150 small holes were
blown into port quarter RIGEL. Above waterline.
Ready to get underway. Sighted submarine peri-
scope on starboard quarter, distance 700 yards.
Opened fire on submarine.
First group of enemy planes taken under fire of REID
with forward 5" and .50 caliber machine gims.
To MPL RDO SAN DIEGO & MPM RDO WALLUPE :
I must have instantaneous relay for my dispatches,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1239
0830 COM-14
0832 CALIFORNIA
0832 SICARD
0832 PYRO
0835 SICARD
0835 BOBOLINK
0833 PREBLE
0836 COM-14
0838 MUGFORD
0840 CALIFORNIA
0840 CURTIS
0843 CURTIS
0840 CUMMINGS
0840 JARVIS
0840 TREVER
0842 MUGFORD
0845 PHOENIX
0845 SICARD
0845 VESTAL
0845 MUGFORD
0845 CALIFOHNIA
0845 CACHALOT
To NAS Pearl : Hostile Japanese air attack x Hickham
Field bombed x stay clear this area as long as gas
permits x keep in contact this station.
Reported one enemy plane shot down over Ford
Island.
observed 4 flights horizontal bombers attacking bat-
tleships, followed by 8 torpedo bombers. OKLA-
HOMA struck by several torpedoes, took heavy list
to Stbd and capsized. ARIZONA struck by torpedoes
and heavy bomb.
Observed enemy planes crash and burst into flame
towards Barbers Point. Pilots bailed out. Observed
damage to ship which consisted of broken steam line ;
repaired by ship's force.
Sent working party 20 men to CUMMINGS to handle
ammunition, and 4 gunner's mates to NEW ORLEANS
to assist her battery. 10 men previously detailed to
PENNSYLVANIA to assist damage control.
Moored out of next and to first buoy. Observed Jap-
anese plane crash near Hickam Field. Believe it
result of minesweeper firing.
Reports first phase of attack completed.
To SHIPS PRESENT : Send boats to Ford Island.
W. VA burning. ARIZONA on fire. Tugs trying to
pull overturned OKLA clear. U. S. S. VESTAL clear-
ing NEVADA.
Shaken by 4 near bomb hits and splintered consider-
ably by fragments.
Submarine surfaced and fired one toi'pedo up North
channel toward destroyers. Conning tower hit twice
by gun #3.
Ceased firing on submarine and observed MONAG-
HAN drop 2 depth charges. Air bubbles and slick
appeared.
Opened fire to repel straflSng attack. Glide bomber
observed to veer away from ship with smoke trail-
ing, passed over new boiler shop and disappeared
in smoke.
Noted NEVADA underway and standing out. Dive
bombed, hit several times and beached. SHAW hit
and caught on fire in drydock. Two destroyers in
drydock with PENNSYLVANIA hit.
Ready for getting underway. TREVER could not
clear because other ships astern were clearing buoys
D-3 and D-4. Enemy plane brought down vicinity
of Pearl City. Second plane brought down 200
yards off Beckoning Point.
U. S. S. VESTAL clear of NEVADA.
Ship ready to get underway.
Observed attack broken off.
Observed ARIZONA quarterdeck awashed. With no
steering g^ar VESTAL got underway while tug
pulled her bow away from ARIZONA. Starting to
list to Stbd VESTAL was maneuvered into position
with South end of MCrews Point bearing 30° dis-
tance 910 yds.
Executed signal to get underway to Task Forces
One and Two. Tugs pulled OGLALA clear of
HELENA.
Commander Stone;, executive officer, arrived and
assumed command of CALIFORNIA. Combatfor
returned on board.
Dive bomb and strafiing attacks made by enemy.
1240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0845 HULL
0845 CASTOR
0847 BLUE
0850 MUGFORD
0850 ZANE
0850 SUMNER
0850 DOWNES
0850 COMDESFLOT 1
0S51 MUGFORD
0851 COM-14
0854 MUGFORD
0855 CONYNGHAM
085^
1017
0855 MUGFORD
0855 PRUITT
0855 WHITNEY
0855 USS RALPH
TALBOT
0855 RAMSAY
0857 CTF 2
0859 UNKNOWN
0900 TRACY
0900 MUGFORD
0900 RIGEL
0900 SICARD
Second Attack. All attacks except one was broken
up. One formation of three planes continued on.
Two of these were shot down ; one by USS DOBBIN
and one by the next of ships. Two bombs landed
astern of next, close to side of DOBBIN.
Ready to get underway.
Underway upon execution of signal to get under-
way from berth X-7. Maintained fire on enemy
planes with main battery and machine guns while
steaming out of harbor. Four planes fired on with
main battery were later seen to go down in smoke.
It is claimed that two of these planes were defin-
itely shot down by this vessel. One was seen to
crash in field on Waipio Pena., and the second
crashed into crane on stern of USS CURTISS. Two
planes that dove over the ship were fired on by the
.50 caliber machine guns. It is claimed that one of
these planes, seen to crash near Pan American
Dock, was shot down by this vessel.
W. VA. listed heavily to port.
Reports MONAGHAN approached and depth charged
submarine. Enemy plane brought down flying over
nest, struck deperming station.
Dispatched ship's boats to Ford Island to assist in
hauling ammimition.
Hit again by bombs and set on fire. Abandoned ship.
To DESFLOT 1 : Desdiv TWO establish Offshore pa-
trol.
Executed signal to get underway and sortie according
to plan E-S.
to Cincpac. Submarine reported in Pearl Harbor for
Sector Commdrs.
Attacked started again from North.
Fired at plane straffing ahead and astern.
Underway from Buoy D-3 Middle Lock RAMSEY,
BREESE, GAMBLE, and MONTGOMERY. Opened
fire with AA.
NEVADA Underway. Dense smoke over Ford Island.
A tanker was towed clear of Ford Island.
Observed about 10 planes made high altitude horizon-
tal bombing.
Observed second air attack by Japanese bombing
planes.
Was moored bow to southward to buoy X-11 with
PATTERSON to port and HENLEY to Starboard.
Underway proceeding out of harbor. Believe RAM-
SAY is responsible for shooting down plane with .50
cal. Assumed anti-submarine patrol on clearing
channel.
To all ships : Enemy submarine in North Channel.
To Cincpac: Ten aircraft approaching Pearl Harbor
from Southwest.
Reports high altitude bombers passed overhead in
several waves. One bomb fell in slip between stern
of RIGEL and CUMMINGS at Berth 15.
Attack started again from the South. Army planes
taking off from HICKAM FIELD.
Executive Officer returned on board. Traffic conges-
tion delayed all hands. The one exception to all
hands was Lt. H. E. Morgan who did not return until
0800 next morning. Lt. Morgan's behavior is being
investigated.
Observed dive bombers from S. E. attack ships moored
to Navy Yard docks, followed by waves of dive and
horizontal bombers on ships at Ford Island and docks.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1241
0900 OGLALA
0900 PHOENIX
0900 HONOLULU
0900 TAUTOG
0900 CALIFORNIA
0900 BREESE
0900 RALPH TALBOT
0900 DEWEY
0900 PATTERSON
0900 SOLACE
0900 BOBOLINK
0900 BOBOLINK
Approaching 40° list to port. Ordered all hands
abandon ship. Only gun crews and Cominhatfor re-
mained.
Formation of 11 planes passed over fleet on heading
070. Approximate altitude 10,000 feet. Planes ap-
peared to be painted silver. Expended fifty rounds
of 5". No apparent damage to planes.
There were two flights of this nature. Time of second
cannot be approximated. Expended fifty rounds
of 5".
Enemy bomber sighted flying directly towards this
ship from direction Merry Point with an altitude of
1,000 feet. Was seen to swerve to its left, pass over
the Navy Yard, smoking, losing altitude and appeared
to crash near Naval Hospital. This plane was under
the fire of several ships, including the port 5" and
machine gun batteries of the HONOLULU. Damage
to enemy observed, one torpedo plane shot down
between berth 21, Submarine Base, one torpedo plane
shot down between berth 21 BB. (Note: Damage
listed above is at unknown times).
Observed planes approaching in direction Hickam
Field high in southwest and mostly obscured by
clouds. App. 18 planes turned left over Hickam Field
and made dive bombing attacks on ships in yard.
Dive api)eared slow and bombs released were very
low. One plane observed out of control in flames.
Scattered enemy planes observed until 1130. Most
dive bombers appeared to drop two bombs each.
One bomb, possibly 15" projectile with tale vanes,
struck CALIFORNIA abreast casemate one, frame 59,
penetrated to second deck and exploded rupturing
forward and after bulkheads of A-611 and overhead
into A-705. Armored hatch to machine shop badly
sprung and couldn't be closed, resulting in serious
fire.
Projectile from BREESE 3" AA battery struck dive
bomber which had just attacked CURTISS. Forward
section of plane with motor landed on North side of
Waipie Peninsula.
Underway. While enroute to entrance expended 150
rounds 5"/38 cal. and 1500 rounds .50 cal. Observed
two planes crash and another start to smoke badly.
Two enemy planes dove low over bridge and was hit
by our .50 cal machine guns. Plane crashed along
shore Pearl City abeam of us. Used after 5" guns to
fire on plane attacking CURTISS.
Second wave attack started by light bombers lasting
10 minutes under fire by DWEY throughout attack.
Underway and stood out of harbor. No damage sus-
tained by PATTERSON.
Ship underway and shifted from Berth X4 to Berth
X13. No material or personnel damage to ship
proper. ^
Observed suspicious sign of Japanese submarine and
signalled to destroyers, but signal apparently not seen.
Observed three flights of high altitude bombers ap-
proaching from due south to north. 7 planes in each
flight, altitude about 17,000 feet. One flight dropped
bombs on Hickam, second flight passed directly over
coal docks and dropped bombs further up in yard ;
third flight passed over West Lock, one plane dropping
bombs near entrance while others maintained course
and dropped them beyond Ford Island.
1242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0900 RALEIGH
0900 HONOLULU
0900 RIGBL
0900 SOLACE
0900 DOBBIN
0900 OGLALA
OgQQ-
0015 PHOENIX
0900-
0030 PHOENIX
0901 CUMIMINGS
0902 MUGFORD
0903 DOLPHIN
0903 Outgoing
0903 Outgoing
0905 CURTISS
0905 SUMNER
0905 TRACY
0905 PREBLE
0905 WHITNEY
0906 PENNSYLVANIA
Dive bomber attack came in which was met with warm
reception. One bomb hit ship a glancing blow going
through carpenter shop and oil tank, piercing the
skin below water line and finally detonating on bottom
of harbor. Plane machine gunned ship also. ^ Steam
raised in 3 and 4 firerooms and pumps started. Five
bombing planes under fire were observed to crash close
aboard. •
5 high altitude bombers, 12 to 15,000 feet appeared.
5 high altitude bombers from South, 12 to 15,000 feet.
All bombed Pearl Harbor and Ford Island Area.
15 dive bombers 6 to 10 thousand feet from N. attacked
DDs and NEVADA.
Got underway and shifted from Berth X-4, near
BOBBIN and destroyers to berth X-13 in the clear.
Made boat trips to WEST VIRGINIA to bring back
casualties.
Fired upon enemy plane headed astern of ship. Plane
crashed upon trees in Navy Yard.
Capsized along 10-10 deck.
Dive bombing attack on ships berth northern side of
Ford Island. Attack was made at about 30* angle,
opposed with AA and MG batteries. Expended 20
rounds of 5". One plane disintegrated by DD fire.
Effected periodic fire on planes delivering low-level
bombing attack on navy yard and ships berth there.
Observed twelve scattered planes over Ford Island;
air raid resumed. Opened fire with main battery on
horizontal bombers approaching over Navy Yard in-
dustrial section.
Formation of planes sighted to South. Decks of
ARIZONA and W. VA. level with water. Dense
simoke pouring from NEVADA.
Reports another attack from higher altitude.
To MIDWAY: Pearl Harbor bombed no indication
direction attack take off attempt locate Japanese
Forces.
To WAKE : Pearl bombed by Japanese be on alert.
Obs. 1 of 3 planes pulling out of dive was hit by
CURTISS and crashed into #1 crane. Tank ex-
ploded and plane burned on Boat Deck.
Fired on wave of dive bombers approaching, Navy
Yard. Dive bombers also attacked HICKAM FIELD
and BB. No hits, when firing on latter planes. Ob-
served light dive bomber with conspicuous red tail
zig-zag over Navy Yard as if observing casualties at
end of phase.
Attack by approximately 10 dive bombers from direc-
tion of the sun, which indicated drydock as objec-
tive. Group of 6, 3, and 9 planes observed at altitude
of 8 to 10,000 feet. Bomb seen to fall between berths
13 and 15 in slip. TRACY gig damaged by frag-
mentation ; no casualties.
Observed about 30 dive bombers make second attack
in twin-motored monoplanes. Observed one bomb
fall in slip 25 yards on starboard quarter. Ob-
served a bomb fall astern of HONOLULU in berth
B-21. Observed numerous bombs fall in vicinity of
drydock area.
Observed one Japanese plane fall down in flames on
hilltop, bearing northeast, true.
The second attack coming in slightly on port bow
dropped bombs on ships in drydock. One heavy
bomb hit the destroyer DOWNES in dock ahead of
PENNSYLVANIA, and one hit dock approximately
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1243
0906 MUGFORD
0907 PRUITT
0907 PENNSYLVANIA
0907 Outgoing
0908 C50NYNGHAM
0908 Com 14
to ASP
0908 NEVADA
0909 MUGFORD
0910 PERRY
0910 SecNav to Alnav
0910
0910 DOBBIN
0910 BLUE
0910 RIGEL
0910 PHOENIX
0910 VESTAL
0912 OURTISS
0910 <X)NYNGHAM
0910 THORNTON
abreast frame 20 while one hit the boat deck of the
PENNSYLVANIA a few feet abaft gun #7. This
bomb passed through boat deck and detonated in
#5 gun #9 casemate. Fifth bomb believed to have
struck water outside of dock. Observed plane crash
in hospital grounds. Observers claim to have
destroyed six enemy planes. Consider two hit by
PENNSYLVANIA.
Japanese planes diving at Ford Island from south-
east. NEVADA standing down south channel.
Observed straffing and light bombing attack, plus
heavy horizontal bombing attack from about 10,000
feet made on ships and Ford Island. One bomb hit
close to stern of RIGEL.
Bomb hit on dock and cut yard power, subsequently
power on the ship was taken from storage batteries,
meanwhile, fireraain pressure cut off.
ALL HANDS: Cease firing on Bl7's attempting to
land at Hickam.
Reports one plane attacking on starboard bow shot
down by nest and crashed in Pearl City.
Do not fire on our planes coming in.
Attack slackened.
Bomb dropped some 400 yards on MUGFORD port
bow. Ship in repair basin hit.
Mine Division FOUR underway at intervals and stood
out to take off shore patrol duty.
Execute WPL FORTY SIX against Japan.
Dive bombers attacked ships at Pier 19 ; bombs fell
in water ahead and astern within 25 yds. of CUM-
MINGS.
Attacked by 3 enemy planes. 3 bombs dropped — all
near misses. Fragments struck stern of ship injuring
#4 3" AA gun crew. 3 killed, 2 injured. Damage:
small holes through decks, bulkheads, booms, #1
MWB hull damaged beyond repair.
Passed channel entrance buoys, and set course 120
true. Proceeded to sector three to patrol station.
10 to 12 dive bombers from S. attacked ships in Repair
Basin with bombs and mach. guns.
Second bombing attack on BB. Expended sixty
rounds of 5". After planes came out of dive and
turned towards berth C-6, planes were brought under
fire of MQ battery.
Anchored in 35' of water. Soundings and draft read-
ings showed ship settling at and listing to stbd. Draft
aft increased to 27', list 6^°. 0. O. Vestal decided
to ground ship.
Reports group of planes under heavy fire attacked.
During attack one bomb hit stern mooring buoy.
1 fell short, one over, one hit ship starboard side of
boat deck, passed through Carpenter Shop and Radio
Repair Shop, entered Hangar and detonated on Main
Deck. Explosion destroyed bulk heads, deck, etc.,
within radius of 30 feei. Equipment destroyed iu
Hangar, Handling Room etc. One plane shot down
1000 yards on port bow and 1 500 yards on port beam.
Another plane shot on port beam landing in water
off Pan-Air dock. One plane reported crashed in cane
field astern and one forward of ship.
Opened fire on horizontal bombers approaching from
ahead and from direction oi" Schofield.
Second wave dive bombing attack commenced and
ended at 0917. Throughout the entire period there
was horizontal bombing in various Pearl Harbor areas.
1244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0911 MUGFORD
0912 PYRO
0912 MUGFORD
0913 MUGFORD
0913 PREBLE
0015
0915 HELM
0915
0915 NEVADA
0915 MUGFORD
0915 TRACY
0917 PRUITT
0917 BREESE
0920
0920 HONOLULU
0920
Horizontal Japanese bombers passed overhead.
Observed dive bombers approach from port bow, alti-
tude 5,000 feet and release bombs. Bombs landed on
concrete dock 12' from ship's side amidships. Pene-
trated dock exploding underneath and jaring ship.
Heavy black smoke coming from SHAW in floating
drydock.
NEVADA stopped south side of south channel.
Attack completed. No damage. No casualties sus-
tained by this ship.
Large explosion on DOWNES.
Small enemy fighter approached ship from astern in
medium glide and dropped two bombs, which exploded
in water about 50 yards off port bow and 20 yards of
starboard bow. After machine guns opened fire but
did not hit plane. Shock shorted relay to steering
(which had just been repaired) and damaged gyro
rotor. Choke coils, tubes and resistors in sound gear
burned out, echo ranging inoperative. Seems below
waterline on starboard side forward sprung. A-15,
A-501, A-401, and A-402 flooded. These compart-
ments closed off and pumped out during afternoon.
FS smoke generators jumped track, breaking air line
connection.
Captain Bunkley returned to CALIFORNIA and as-
sumed command.
5" AA battery fired on enemy planes to eastward.
NEVADA suffered at least 6 bomb hits and one torpedo
hit.
Thick black smoke coming from drydock.
Commanding Officer returned aboard and found 2 .50
cal. mach. guns mounted and ready. 2 dive bombers
attacked out of the sun. 1 plane pulling out over sub.
base and flying low over building 155 crashed in flames
in vicinity of hospital point after salvo by CUMMINGS.
Plane appeared to be a type 95 dive bomber, planes
appeared to be at about 3,000 feet to seaward of
Hickam, were 18 planes in formation type V.
Observed low flying pursuit planes strafing with
machine gun fire on ships moored in the vicinity of
Berth 18. Observers on this ship believe many high
altitude horizontal bombs either failed to explode or
landed outside the harbor area where they could not
be observed. An indeterminate number of fighters
took part in the raid, with approximately 30 bombers.
Approaches were made on a steady course and all
horizontal bombing was made in close formation at
about 10,000 feet. The four cruisers and light mine-
layers in the Navy Yard were strafed several times
by low flying planes but not a single bomb appeared
to have been aimed at those ships. Small caliber fire
of minelayers brought down one Japanese plane.
Cleared nest and proceeded down channel.
CUMMINGS fired on a light bomber. Plane observed
smoking heavily as it flew out of sight to southwest-
ward.
Observed low winged dive bombers from South to
Southeast, 400 feet pullout. Two bombers bombed in-
dustrial and drydock areas. One bomb, (clearly visi-
ble on its descent, 250 lbs), passed through edge of
concrete dock, angle of descent 45°, and exploded
underwater between ship and dock.
Damage to HONOLULU: oil tanks various, decks
bulged in magazines, various leaks sprung and decks
slightly fuckled, power lease to turret #2 grounded,
turret #1 partially grounded, mercury thrown out of
gyros, fore and aft, range finders, main battery de-
ranged fore and aft.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1245
0920
0920 CONINGHAM
0920 PENNSYLVANIA
0921 Outgoing
0921 Outgoing
0923 MUGFORD
0923 Outgoing
Landline
0924 Received
0924 Received
0925 CALIFORNIA
0925 WASMUTH
0925 GAMBLE
0925 MUGFORD
0926 Outgoing
Unknown
0927 Received
0927 CURTISS
0927 Received
0928 MUGFORD
0928 Received
0930 MUGFORD
0980 Received
0930 Received
More Japanese planes from northwest.
Opened fire on plane diving from port side of nest.
No personnel or material damage.
Flooding of drydock commenced. Both destroyers
heavily on fire. Fire being transmitted to fire on wa-
ter and dock which set fire to paint on starboard side
of PENNSYLVANIA. No hose available for fighting
fire on DOWNES, available hose being used on
CASSIN.
ALL HANDS : Reported that enemy ships have red
dot on bottom of fuselage.
COMBATFOR : TO ALL SHIPS PRESENT : Get un-
derway immediately.
PATTERSON standing out.
COMBATFOR TO COMCRUBATFOR : Cruisers pro-
ceed as soon as posible.
Send over boats to capsized battleship.
COMSUBSCOFOR TO COMSUBDIV 43: Assume
service ammunition readiness condition ONE be pre-
pared to attack on information furnished later.
Com 14 : All planes approaching from Fox George and
Easy.
plane 205 capsized and sunk while being removed to
avoid gasoline fire hazard.
Reports second phase of attack as glide bombers and
torpedo planes approached from westerly direction.
Scored hits on several planes and shot down one plane
which crashed on Waipio Peninsula near Middle Loch.
This plane should be credited to James Patrick Han-
non, seaman first class, U. S. Navy.
One Japanese plane shot down by AA fire, falling in
water on port beam about 1,000 yards away from
ship. Believed shot down by ROBERTS, W. L.,
BM-2c, USS GAMBLE port machine gunner ( #2 ma-
chine gun) .50 cal., and JOOS, H. W., GM-3c., USS
GAMBLE (#1 machine gun) starboard.
White smoke pouring from amidships on ARIZONA.
CTF 1 : Battleships remain in port until further or-
ders. Send all destroyers to sea and destroy enemy
submarines. Follow them by all cruisers to join
Halsey.
Fire at will.
COM 14 : Aircraft coming from Barbers Point 20 or
30 miles. Flash : Enemy planes appear to be massing
around Easy. Enemy planes coming from Wheeler
Field.
After engine room out of commission and evacuated.
RDO SANFRANCISCO to AS: USAT CYNTHIA
OLSEN sent distress reports enemy submarine Lat.
33 R 42 N Long 145 R 29 W.
Shot down enemy plane after it pulled out from dive
on port bow. Altitude 200 feet. With forward 50
caliber M. G. The plane was a dive bomber.
COMAIRBATFOR TO CINCPAC : 220P planes to
arrive Pearl about 0820.
OGLALA going over to port. Personnel abandoned
ship and getting on dock.
COMSUBSCOFOR TO THRESHER, GUDGEON &
LITCHFIELD : Assume service ammunition readi-
ness condition ONE x remain in present position x
report position.
CURTISS TO CINCPAC : Unable to sortie because of
damage.
After OGLALA sank her crew were pooled out and
sent to various units of the Fleet to assist ships in
maintaining their batteries.
1246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0930 GAMBLE
0930
0930 TREVER
0930 TENNESSEE
0930 HELM
0930 CALIFORNIA
0930 BREESE
0930 DOBBIN
0930 WHITNEY
0930 PENNSYLVANIA
0932 WASMUTH
0933 Received
0935 Received
0935 Received
0935 Received
0936 Received
0936 CURTISS
0937 WASMUTH
0937 Received
0937 GAMBLE
0937 MUGFORD
0938 MUGFORD
0940 WASMUTH
0940 BAGLEY
0940 TENNESSEE
0940 BAGLEY
Got underway and cleared mooring buoy. Reports
Division commenced getting underway. U. S. S.
BREESE underway.
Enemy planes strafed CASTOR and NEOSHO. De-
tailed men to handle NEOSHO lines astern of CAS-
TOR.
Underway, standing out of entrance. Observed
PERRY fire at submarine and MONAGHAN raming
and dropping depth charge.
Observed enemy planes coming in on port beam.
WEST VIRGINIA gangway still burning.
Shifted steering motor power to diesel generator;
regained bridge control of steering.
Fire broke out on main deck, starboard side of "F"
Division compartment and casemates 3, 5, and 7.
Lookout reported periscope oft' Coal Docks but could
not be observed from bridge, or pickup by supersonics.
Reports attacks appeared to have been discontinued.
Reports second air attack completed.
Explosions on destroyers commenced, in floating dry-
dock ahead of PENNSYLVANIA.
Underwav following TREVER on orders from Lt.
Comdr. L. M. LeHardy, CO ZANE and S. O. P. Min-
div 4.
COM 14 : Flash : planes coming in from George.
RALEIGH TO CINCPAC : Two fire rooms and engine
room and stern compt. flooded x damage under con-
trol at present x unable to get imderway.
CHICAGO to CRUSCOFOR: Japanese submarines
reported inside and outside Pearl.
ARMY HDQTRS: Flash: Fishing boat 1 mile off
Hanakuli.
CPW 2 to CPW 1 : We are being attacked by 15 Jap-
anese planes.
Fire under control.
Lieut. J. W. Leverton, Jr., USN, Executive Officer, re-
ported aboard and relieved Lt. (jg) J. R. Grey, USN,
who had been in command until this time.
ARMY HDQTRS REPORT'S : Friendly aircraft com-
ing from toward Barbers Point 20 or 30 planes.
Japanese planes attacked near main channel en-
trance.
Explosion on destroyer ahead of the U. S. S. PENN-
SYLVANIA, in drydock.
Japanese subs reported inside and outside of Pearl
Harbor.
Lt. Comdr. D. M. Agnew, USN, CO U. S. S. TREVER
reported aboard. Proceeded out of Pearl Harbor
and took up patrol off entrance.
Ship underway from dock. Material damage:
Broken windows and light globes and glasses on re-
duction gears causing loss of lubricating oil. Per-
sonnel damage : 4 men slightly injured.
Reports wounded being removed from the WEST
VIRGINIA. OKLAHOMA upside down. Bow blown
away on ARIZONA. Destroyers getting underway
on other side of Ford Island. Fire either on AR-
GONNE or dock. Air attack coming in on starboard
bow. WEST VIRGINIA on fire from turret 1 to bow.
Flames up as high as foretop. Fire on port quarter
(oil on water).
Underway from dock and proceeded around north
side Ford Island under belief that other channel was
blocked. Because of defective bilge keel, ship was
ordered to patrol off shore area and did not accom-
pany Task Force 8. No damage to ship.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1247
0940 NEVADA
0941 PENNSYLVANIA
0942 BREESE
0942 Received
0942 MUGFORD
0943 TERN
0945 DEWEY
0945 CACHALOT
0945 MUGFORD
0946 MUGFORD
0947 MUGFORD
0948 TENNESSEE
0950 VESTAL
0950 BLUE
0950 Outgoing
0951 TENNESSEE
0951 Received
0952 Outgoing
0954 TENNESSEE
0954 Received
Grounded off Hospital Point.
Observed warheads on DOWNES explode covering
area with debris. Section of torpedo tube, weighing
about 1,000 lbs. landed on PENNSYLVANIA fore-
castle. Fire brought under control before serious
damage resulted. CASSIN rolled over on DOWNES.
It was noted by everyone participating in action that
after an hour or more heavy thirst was experienced
requiring considerable drinking water., This con-
firms the necessity of having water at all battle
stations.
Cleared channel entrance with degaussing gear cut in
and took station as offshore patrol in section 3.
COM 14 To ASP & NAVSHORE ACTIVITIES : Brief
ccncentrations reported 25 miles south by south east
of Barbers Point x not definite.
BAGLEY underway.
Underway from alongside deck to pick up survivors
in harbor. Received 47 survivors.
Third wave of attack started by dive bombers. DOB-
BIN and Desdiv One were target with 3 or 4 planes
attacking. One bomb hit close aboard starboard
quarter and one hit water between HULL and
DEWEY astern. No damage, Guns 1 and 2 firing
when not blanked by DOBBIN. It is believed that
Desdiv ONE destroyed two planes. Ammunition ex-
pended: 76 rounds 5", 1300 rounds .50 cal.
Joined in fire against enemy bombers. No damage
received. Nearest enemy bomb dropped 20' off star-
board quarter and did not explode. Nearest torpedo
passed 100 yards astern.
OGALA capsized to port.
Japanese planes in from SW low.
HONOLULU underway.
Observed planes coming in on starboard bow ; did not
know whether enemy or friendly. Ship will not get
underway until further orders. Engineering Depart-
ment, stand by. Destroyer, from Navy Yard, getting
underway. Unidentified ship in Pearl Harbor down
by stern.
Grounded.
Good sound contact on submarine. Maneuvered to
attack and dropped four depth charges. Regained
sound contact on same submarine. Dropped two
depth charges. Investigated and observed large oil
slick and air bubbles rising to surface. It is felt that
this submarine was definitely sunk. Obtained third
contact on a submarine that was apparently headed
for ST. LOUIS, which was at the time heading out
on course approximately 150 true, at high speed. Two
depth charges dropped, and upon return noticed large
oil slick on surface. It is claimed that one, and pos-
sibly two, submarines were sunk.
Two enemy carriers reported 30 miles southwest Bar-
bers Point. ( Sent to CTF 8) .
Reports lighter alongside starboard beam on fire (am-
munition lighter, top blown out, can see no ammuni-
tion on it).
COM 14 TO ASP: Two planes seen dropping heavy
charges off harbor entrance which did not explode;
think they are mines.
Battleships remain in port probable channel mined.
Observed bow of MARYLAND on fire.
SOPA SANDIEGO TO ASP HAWAIIAN AREA : Los
Angeles Harbor Air Defense Plan Number ONE
effective.
1248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Unknown SIGNAL
TOWER
0955 GAMBLE
0955 TENNESSEE
0955 MUGFORD
0956 TENNESSEE
0957 MUGFORD
0958 MUGFORD
0958 TENNESSEE
1000 CUMMINGS
1000 WHITNEY
1002 CALIFORNIA
1002 TENNESSEE
1003 MUGFORD
1005 GAMBLE
1005 FT. SHAFTER
1005 SOPA San Diego
1005 MUGFORD
1008 TENNESSEE
1010 UNKNOWN
1010 REID
1010 PHOENIX
1010 SUMNER
1010 TENNESSEE
1011 OPW 2
1013 MUGFORD
UNKNOWN VP-24
UNKNOWN USCG 400
1014 Com 14
1015 GTF 9
1015 GAMBLE
The following ships have left Pearl Harbor
DALE ST LOUIS
HENLEY PHELPS
RAMSEY WASMUTH
PATTERSON MONTGOMERY
Temporarily anchored, astern of USS MEDUSA.
Still playing fire hose on ammunition lighter. Fire
seems to be under control.
Commenced receiving fuel oil from the yard line.
PERRY and GAMBLE standing out.
Observed SOLACE getting underway.
CALIFORNIA listing to port.
BB's order to remain in port.
Observed fire on bow of MARYLAND was under con-
trol. Superstructure on WEST VIRGINIA on fire— 4
or 5 men trapped, trying to escape by crane. Fire
(oil and water) at stern of TENNESSEE was out.
Fire very close to D-310-M.
Opened fire to repel horizontal bombing attack from
the southward. One horizontal bomber observed to
lose its wing. CUMMINGS gun captain #4 claimed
a hit.
WHITNEY reports REID and SELFRIDGE under-
way.
Oil fire on surface of water inveloped ship starting
many fires, particularly intense one on forecastle.
Captain Bunkley, with approval of Commander Bat-
tle Force ordered ship to be abandoned temporarily
due to enveloping oil fire on surface of water.
Flood D-510-M (D-306-M and D-312-M also flooded,
not isolated ) .
Japanese planes reported dropping mines in channel.
Underway proceeding out of channel.
Some heavy bombs dropped at entrance of Pearl
Harbor did not explode. Think they are mines.
To ASP SAN DIEGO : San Diego Harbor Air Defense
Plan Number ONE effective.
U. S. S. SHAW in floating dry-dock exploded. Main
engines and two boilers of MUGFORD ready to get
underway.
Observed ARIZONA aflame all over.
To RDO WAILUPE : This vessel and 4 DM in South-
west S2 two enemy carriers in sight. (Rec'd by
phone.)
REID got underway on 4 boilers. No damage or
easualities. ~
Got underway, but returned to Berth C-6 on receiving
orders not to sortie.
Fired two rounds at bomber on port beam, altitude
8,000 — no hits. Also fired 50-caliber machine guns,
two and four.
Observed planes approaching from starboard beam;
did not come in.
To DENT: Report CPW 2 for duty.
U. S. B. SCHLEY and ALLEN ready to get under-
way.
To CPW 2: Right man of war Lat. 21.10 Long 160.
16 course 090 degrees.
To OG RDO STATION: Report immediately to
Commander Honolulu Base.
Was Lualualei NAD damaged.
To COMPATRON 21 : Seareu Sector 000 to 300 Jap-
anese Carriers.
Shifted .30 cal. A. A. machine guns to top of pilot
house on fire contriol platform.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1249
1018 CINCPAC
1018 CTF 8
1020 TENNESSEE
1020 Ginspac
1020 CTG 1.9
1020 MUGFORD
1020
1021 GAMBLE
1022 MUGFORD
1023 WASMUTH
1023 MUGFORD
1024 TENNESSEE
1027 TENNESSEE
1027 MUGFORD
1028. NAS PEARL
1028 PENNSYLVANIA
1030 CASTOR
1030 ARMY HDQTS
1030 HENLEY
1030 BLUE
1030 SIGARD
1030 PHOENIX
1030 MUGFORD
1030 PENNSYLVANIA
1031 UNKNOWN
1032 TENNE&SEE
To CTF 8, 12, 3: Search from Pearl very limited
account maximum twelve VP searching X Some
indication enemy force northwest Oahu X Ad-
dressees operate as directed Com Task Force 8 to
intercept and attack enemy compositiion enemy force
unknown.
Is Ford Island available reservice and rearm car-
rier planes in case necessity.
TENNESSEE reports ARIZONA looks as if she is
on the bottom. Word passed for the 5th division
to lay aft to relieve fire party.
To CTF One: Do not send any more cruisers to
Sea.
To All Air Corns Patwing 1 & 2. Observe ap-
proach Doctrine when near Oahu.
U. S. S. JARVIS cleared starboard side.
Attack group of 15 VSB's with 1,000 lb. bombs each
dispatched to position 30 miles south Barber's Point
where numerous reports had been received of enemy
carriers and other forces ; no contact. CinC in-
formed Contaskfor EIGHT? depended on Pearl Har-
bor for scouting information. This in order main-
tain carrier striking group in readiness.
Cleared channel entrance. Eight depth charges were
armed and the ship commenced offshore and anti-
submarine patrol off Pear Harbor entrance.
Navy MTB standing out.
Dropped one depth charge on suspicious water,
setting 200 feet, results negative.
Floating dry-dock sinking.
TENNESSEE reports Torpedo boats leaving harbor.
TENNESSEE reports people coming from WEST
VIRGINIA on board TENNESSEE by way of a five
inch gun.
A transport and CUMMINGS underway standing
out.
To CTF 8: Your 2023 AflJrmative. (Ref: Is Ford
Island available reservice and rearm carrier planes
in case necessity).
Power on ship taken on two generators.
CASTOR transferred ammunition to NEOSHO for
use of that vessel.
Two enemy coming in 30 miles south of affirm 28.
Visual signal from TREVER reported the HENLEY'S
captain and executive officer on board that vessel.
Upon completion , of attacks, BLUE screened ST.
LOUIS.
SICARD observed attack break ofT. Mustered crew,
no injuries or casualties.
Got underway and started out north of channel. Re-
ceived message from TENNESSEE from CINCPAC
"Do not Sortie". Turned around in channel and
started back to berth C-6. On receipt of orders from
Comcrubatfor proceeded via -south channel and com-
pleted sortie and joined Comtaskfor ONE.
Fuel oil barge moored starboard quarter.
Sent motor launches to West Lock for more am-
munition.
This vessel and 4 DM In southwest S2 NO enemy
carriers in sight.
TENNESSEE observes ARIZONA abandoning ship.
Repair II reports all C&R soundings normal. Repair
IV reports all soundings normal. Repair III reports
all soundings normal. Pull circuit L28 at aft. Dis-
tribution Board. Mr. Teague says hatches cannot be
opened from inside wardroom country — too hot.
1250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1032 SIGNAL TOWER
1033 COMBATSHIPS
1033 C5TF3, CTF8
1033 TENNESSEE
1036 TENNESSEE
1036 WASMUTH
1040
1040 Comdesron 3
1040 COMBASEFOR
1040 MUGFORD
1040 TRACT
1042 Combatfor
1045 DOWNES
1046 COMBATSHIPS
1046 CTF8
1048 TENNESSEE
1050 TERN
1051 CPW 1
Unknown CTF 8
1053 MINNEAPOLIS
1055 CTF 8
1055 CTF 8
1055 SUMNER
1056 MUGFORD
1058 MUGFORD
1058 TENNESSEE
1058 PATRON 23
1100 TRACY
1100 COM 14
To CINCPAC: These ships underway but have not
cleared the entrance yet: DETROIT— JARVIS—
PERRY— NEW ORLEANS— GAMBLE— CHEW.
Be ready to repel repeated air attacks.
To ASP: Submarines reported 10 miles south Bar-
ber's Point.
TENNESSEE 6° down by stern from flooding of
D-306, D-312-M.
Unit 2, Repair I, combatting fire in W. R. Country.
Dead men forward of conning tower, sent stretcher
party.
Dropped sound depth charge on suspicious water,
setting 200 feet, bearing 217°, distance 3.4 miles from
Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. Brought up large
quantities of oil, but no wreckage.
June 8 bearing (bilateral) 357° or 178° T from
HEEIA. June 8 in COMCARDIVS ( AKAGI ) .
Underway accordance signal from tower, and oral
orders. Joined antisub patrol operating off entrance.
Made two sound contacts; dropped 3 and 2 depth
charges. Oil observed on water but no conclusive
evidence of submarine loss.
To Cominron 2 : Sweep South channel from East Loch
to entrance magnetic and moored mines.
Commenced receiving fuel from oil barge in addition
to oil from yard line.
TRACY reported CUMMINGS underway after re-
turning all TRACY men. 10 men sent to help flght
fire in CALIFORNIA.
To Cap't. NYD : The CALIFORNIA is on fire inside.
Probably two tugs with fire equipment could save
her.
Fire on CASSIN brought under control.
To BATSHIPS IN COMPANY : All battleships send
pilots and aviation personnel to Ford Island imme-
diately.
DF bearings indicate enemy carrier bearing 178 from
Barber's Point.
To CINCPAC: TENNESSEE 30% damage. CALI-
FORNIA has been sunk. Doubtful — checking.
Proceeded to put out fire on USS ARIZONA. Shifted
over to WEST VIRGINIA by orders from MARY-
LAND.
To Plane 2 VP14: Search sector 310 to 320. Take
due caution.
To CINCPAC : CINCPAC 2012 Acknowledge.
To CINCPAC : MINNEAPOLIS center area VICTOR
ONE.
To CINCPAC : Am depending on Pearl for scouting
information.
CTF 8 launched six VCS to search sector 000-045° to
150 miles.
Fired two rounds 3" at plane dead ahead, altitude
8,000. No hits. Fired all 50 caliber.
Japanese planes attacking from North. (Note : These
are apparently friendly planes.)
Numerous explosions from WEST VIRGINIA and
ARIZONA
Observed Naval Air Station planes in air.
To CPW ONE : Investigating suspicious vessel 21 00,
1.j9 59.
Japanese have definitely withdrawn.
To NAS PEARL, CPW2 : Hawaiian Air Force con-
templates moving headquarters. MUX lines will be
kept in commission.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1251
UNKNOWN
1100 TENNESSEE
1100 HELM
1100 SIGAED
1100 MUGFORD
1103 TENNESSEE
1103 VP23 #11
1105 NAS Kaneohe
1105
1105
1108 BREESE
1108 ST. LOUIS
1108 CPW2
1110 NYD OPERATIONS
1110 SICARD
1115 NORTHAMPTON
1115 BREESE
1118 NAS
1121 TENNESSEE
1121 TENNESSEE
1125 SUMNER.
1128 CPW 2
1130 WHITNEY
1130 HENLEY
1130
1130 TENNESSEE
1132 MUGFORD
1132 ST. LOUIS
1133 SIGARD
1135 SIGARD
1135 SUMNER
1135 CSD 43
COMBASKFOR, COMINRON TWO to COM 14 : Sweep
South channel from East Loch to entrance magnetic
and moored mines.
Repair II told to open drain valve and core valves in
GSK. Valves to Sick Bay, Enemy plane coming in
on bov7. All hands not engaged in fighting fire, seek
cover.
Sound listening watch heard screws on starboard
quarter. Ship circled for attack but lost contact.
No depth charges dropped.
Observed horizontal bombing attack.
Fire appeared to be under control on NEVADA.
Observed destroyer putting to sea, (other side of
Ford Island). Gasoline stowage filled with C02.
To CPW2: Ships investigated 2 subs unknown na-
tionality course 271 submerged on my approach.
To CINCPAC : Ship nationality unknown 10 miles off
Kahana Point.
To ASP : Info CTFS : All ships departing Pearl or-
ganize as TASKFORCE ONE UNDIVIDED Comdes-
batfor assume comand report CTF 8.
To ASP this Circuit : Enemy planes coming for Pearl
Harbor from South.
Received report Motor Torpedo Boat sighted peri-
scope.
To OINCPAC : Formed attack group ST. LOUIS,
LAMSON, PHELPS, I am proceeding to locate
EVEMY.
To PATRON 23 : Empty tanker no guns showing iden-
tity unknown lat. 21 00, Long. 259 59.
To CINCPAC : NYD Operations reports another air
raid expected within twenty minutes.
Observed horizontal diving attack completed.
Two NORTHAMPTON planes launched to conduct
search 150 miles to the north.
BREESE dropped 2 depth charges on spot indicated
with no apparent results. Bearings: Barber's Point
297° (t), and Hickam Tower 357' (t).
Kaneohe Bay to CINCPAC : Ship nationality unknown
10 miles off Kahana Point.
2° list to port.
To CINCPAC : Damage 00% to TENNESSEE : WEST
VIRGINIA sunk. Note: Correction WEST VIR-
GINIA for CALIFORNIA. Correction 00% instead
of 30% for TENNESSEE.
Fired four rounds 3" at plane crossing ahead from
starboard, altitude 6,000 feet, no hits. Fired 50 cali-
ber machine guns No. 1 and 2.
TO VP 14 #1, VF14 # 3 : STAY OUT.
Received orders to remain at anchor.
Picked lip captain and executive officer from
TREVER. No losses or damage experienced by
HENLEY.
PATRON 24, CPW 2 to CPW 2, CTF 3 : Eight men of
war Lat. 21 10, Long. 160 16, course 090 degrees.
Bridge steering telegraph out (being repaired).
Sending planes from Hickam Field.
Horizontal bombers approaching from port (Jap).
To COMDESRON 1 : What is your position?
Observed another horizontal bombing raid.
Observed bombers withdrawal. No material dam-
aged and no personnel casiialties.
Fired 11 rounds 3" at formation of five bombers
crossing ahead from port — no hits. Fifed all ma-
chine guns.
To Comsubsoofor : Point 21 54— Point 56 12.
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2-
-38
1252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1135 NORTHAMPTON
1135 TENNESSEE Sighted two planes bearing 270».
1135 BREESE Picked up sound of submarine in same vicinity.
Dropped 2 depth charges and oil slick with debris
appeared. 2nd attack was made with 4 deep-set
charges to make certain but no additional results
appeared. Meanwhile destroyers in vicinity dropped
additional charges.
Approximately 15 miles west of Kauai. Section at-
tacked by enemy single seat monoplane, engagement
lasting about 20 minutes. Enemy plane made total
of seven attacks diving frojm above and side; all re-
coveries were made above or to the side of the scout-
ing section. On all diving attacks presented an ex-
ceptionally good target as he squashed down toward
the section. Apparent enemy speed 275 miles or
better. Enemy plane broke out in smoke and de-
parted. Search continued until completed.
1136 MUGFORD U. S. Navy planes taking ofE from Ford Island.
1136 TENNESSEE Observed light cruiser putting out to sea. Turning
engines over to keep fire on water away from ship.
To CTFl: MINNEAPOLIS 2DMs center southern
boundary. VICTOR ONE Course 105 speed 15/UKX
CAB6.
TO VP24 Planes #1, #2, #3, #5, #11, CPW2:
Search to 200 miles.
TO CINCPAC : TF8 flying colors bearing 184 distance
22 from Kaula Rock at 1115.
Japanese planes on starboard beam.
To all Stations This Circuit: Guam attacked.
To CTF8 : Int posit desig zero George eight.
NORTHAMPTON plane engaged enemy fighter. This
was not known to Comtaskfor 8 until 8 December.
To COMBATSHIPS: Prepare available battleship
planes for search and report to subbase when ready
and number. 2 CALIFORNIA planes at Ford Island
probably ready.
To Cincpas: Submarine due south Aloha Tower 4
miles has been bombed. Surface covered with oil
slick.
To COMINRON 2: Designate two DMs sweep ap-
proaches to Pearl magnetic mines.
To CINCPAC : Have no ships in sector 4.
ANTARES moored to B-5A Honolulu.
To Unknown : Enemy troops landing on north shore,
Blue coveralls with red emblems.
To Cinopas: Parachutists are landing at Barber's
Point.
To Cinopas, CPW2 : 3 planes security patrol patrol
14 are searching assigned sector. All planes have
depth charges aboard.
To Cinopas: SARATOGA ready depart San Diego
0900 tomorrow Monday x escorting ships so far as
known have not been designated. Request instruc-
tions.
1155 To ASP: All cruisers and destroyers depart Pearl
as soon as practicable x report OTF 1 in DETROIT.
1156 TENNESSEE Observed Army fortresses in the air. Believe enemy
planes and submarines lying in channel.
1159 MUGFORD The end of period during which ship maintained
50 caliber and 5" fire.
1200 Location of Forces 1200, 7 Decemher, 1941.
T. F. 8 ENTERPRISE 21-30, 160-55.
T. F. 12 LEXINGTON 23-50, 171-15.
Subdiv 43 (3 SS) 80 Miles East, coming ready.
GUDEON C-5 Ready.
THRESHER & LITCHFIELD 80 Miles West empty.
1137 COMBATSHIPS
1139 OTF 9
1139 CTF8
1140 MUGFORD
1140 RDG Wailupe
1140 DESBATFOR
1140 NORTHAMPTON
1141 COMBATFOR
1142 Com 14
1144
1145
1146
1146
1150
1152
COMBASEFOR
COMCRUBATFOR
PATWING
COM 14
CPW 1
1153 COMCARDIV 1
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1253
1200 GWIN
1200 BOBOLINK
1200 ST. LOUIS
1201 COMPATWING
1202 CTF 8
1204 BAMBLB
1205 MUGFORD
1205 Comdesbatfor
1205 SIGNAL TOWER
1205 Com 11
1205 Com 14
1209 MUGFORD
1209 COMBATSHIPS
1209 Combatships
1210 TENNESSEE
1213 SOLACE
1214 MUGFORD
1215 HELM
1217 CTF 9
1221 RDO WAILUPE
1225 BOBOLINK
1228 CINCPAC
1228 Combatships
Unknown CPW 2
1229 SIGNAL TOWER
T. F. 1 and 2 less 8 in Pearl.
T. F. 3 less 12 areas.
Task F 3 rendezvousing with MINNEAPOLIS and
20Ms southern boundary VI Course 105.
To Comdesbatfor : Reporting forduty with LAMSON
and PHELPS. I am proceeding to South to locate and
attack enemy carrier.
Received orders from Combasefor to sweep Pearl
Harbor with TURKEY.
To Comerusoofor : Reporting for duty with LAMSON
and PHELPS. I am proceeding south to locate and
attack enemy carrier.
To Compatron 24 : Have search for assign sector 300
miles am returning.
To CINCPAC : Your 2100 refers Task Force 8 with 13
ships X request all units be notified.
Established sound contact with submarine and dropped
three depth charges. Position bearing 168 T from
Diamond Head light, distance 2.5 miles.
Discontinued fueling. 115000 gallons on board.
To Comdesflot ONE : About nine thirty witnessed
MONAGHAN sink enemy submarine by ramming and
depth charges. Excellent piece of work.
About 0930 witnessed MONAGHAN sink enemy sub.
by ramming and depth charges. Excellent piece of
work. Believe RALEIGH accounted for three planes.
Xo KENNISON : Submarine reported twenty miles
bearing 235 from Pt. Loma investigate.
All lights extinguished except control lights.
Oil barge cleared starboard side.
To Cincpac : Design cast desig king baker jig.
To Cruisers and Destroyers : Sortie in accordance
until plan indicated.
Draft of ship (internal) : Fwd. 34'6; Aft. 35'lOVi" ;
Mean, 35'4i/^". Enemy transport reported 40 miles
off Barber's Point. Parachute troops landing on
Barber's Point 'later proved false). After Battle
Dressing Station send stretcher party to left gun,
turret III, and remove casualties. Three planes on
starboard beam coming this way (do not know
whether enemy or not). Said planes flying low; ap-
parently, turning away. Organize a crew of about
30 men to relieve men of Turret IV who are fighting
fire on water.
To Com 14 : Expedite your boat all tannic acid, tannic
acid jelley, pecric acid, tetanus antitoxin, gas gan-
grene combined serum, morphine sulphate, morphine
syretts, sutures, needles, hypo needles and adhesive
type can be spared.
Underway. Standing out in channel.
Rejoined DETROIT. Ceased patrolling.
To PW 24, 23, 19: Search to 300 miles.
To all stations : Nine unidentified aircraft over Guam.
Moored alongside coal dock to take wire aboard.
To ASP Hawaiian Area : If NPM fox goes out guard
harbor circuit.
To Cincpac: PENNSYLVANIA dive bomb hit star-
board side grame 86 drydock now flooded. MARY-
LAND down by the head forward, bomb hit, 50 caliber
magazines flooded. TENNESSEE fire in wardroom
country. OKLAHOMA capsized. WEST VIRGINIA
sunk but upright. CALIFORNIA down by the head
and heavy list to port — probably on bottom. ARI-
ZONA sunk. NEVADA beached off Hospital Point.
To VP23 : Search to 200 miles any instructions.
THORNTON is underway and standing out.
1254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1230 CURTISS
1230 MUGFORD
1216 SIGNAL TOWER
1219 Combatships
1223 CTF 8
1223 Rdo Wailupe
1230 TENNESSEE
1230
1232 CINCPAC
1235 CTF 12
1240 MU* HE SARA
1240 MU* HE SARA
1300 KANURE
1300 SISO
1300 KASO
1300 KANURE
1235 CTF 12
1235 MUGFORD
1235 COMBATSHIPS
1235 RALEIGH
1244 Plane 12, VP23
1245 TENNESSEE
1246 __
1246 WP OFF. 14ND
Unknown Cincpac
1247 CURTISS
1247 Combatships
1248 Combasefor
To Cincpac: Unable to sortie because of damage.
Japanese plane crashed on beach of HICK AM FIELD.
(Note) It is believed the ship observed this at this
time; (wreckage), not that the crash occurred at this
time.)
These ships have cleared Pearl Harbor Channel :
DALE WASMUTH MONTGOMERY
HENLEY RAMSAY WORDEN
PATTERSON ST LOUIS CUMMINGS
PHOENIS DETROIT
To Com 14 : Serious oil fire alongside W. Va.
TENNESSEE and MARYLAND send fire boats.
To Cincpac : 21 VSB from ENTERPRISE should have
landed Ford Island about 0830. Request informa-
tion.
To ASP : Air alarm standby.
Secure all fresh water, except galley and drinking.
While GAMBLE conducting depth charge attack off
Diamond Head, received three despatches from CinC
addressed to ASP. Ships ordered to attack transports
reported four miles off Barber's Point. All vessels
having departed Pearl Harbor organized as Task
Force ONE to report to CTF 8 Task Force ONE or-
dered to take course West after clearing harbor and
to report position, composition, and speed. GAMBLE
continued with depth charge attack until contact was
lost then proceeded to Barber's Point where no trans-
ports were found. Continued westward.
To ASP : Enemy transports reported four miles off
Barbers Point. Attack.
To : CTF 3 & 8 : Cancel Midway Marine flight.
HAHO on 47S0 BRG 186 (Believed Submarine).
HAHO on 4580 BRG (Believed Submarine).
Appears to be O. T. C. on 6581 BRG. 183.
On 7033 BRG 1671/2
Seems to be Task Force Commander,
is probably Commander in the Air.
To Cincpac : Is Midway Marine flight cancelled.
Passed entrance to channel. Four 50 cal. and four
5"/38 cal guns during the entire period 0809 to 1159
whenever any planes came within range and bearing
maintained fire.
To Combatfor: (Combatships in Maryland.
To Cincpac : Two fire rooms and engine room and
stern compt. flooded. Damage under control at pres-
ent. Unable to get underway.
To CPW2 : Approaching 300 able to search more gas
700 25 I request instructions.
Planes on port bow (do not know whether enemy or
not)
CALIFORNIA sinking fast, stern underwater. Close
all topside hatches, as turrets will be fired. (Did
not). Gun four port reported Hoist #22, 5"/51, in
B-510 was damaged. Powder can be sent up, but is
slowed. Draft of ship, FWD : 84'9". Magazine tem-
perature of Turret 1—84°
High altitude bombing attack coming in over Diamond
Head.
To Rdo San Diego : Receive me on 26.1, transmit on
30.6 (cable to Navy radio San Diego) Via Globe.
To CPW2: All of our transmitters are out.
To COLORADO : If vessels are not longer in service
will furnish men and oflScers to ships in service to
man complete anti-aircraft batteries for continuous
watch.
To Cominron TWO: Designate two DMs sweep ap-
proach to Pearl magnetic mines.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1255
1255 GAMBLE
1300 ST LOUIS
Unknown Cincpac
1256 MTB SQUAD
1258 Com 14
1300 RALEIGH
1300 Comdesbatfor
1300 CTF 1
1300 RAMSEY
1301 CPW 2
Unknown Comtrainron
EIGHT
1302 Cincpac
1303 CPW 2
1305 NAS Kanoehe
1309 Signal Tower
1310 Combasefor
1312 HULBERT
1312 ST LOUIS
1313 Combatships
1317 Edo Wailupe
1319 FRANK
FRANK
FRANK
1322 —
Proceeded on course 270T at 20 knots to join
friendly forces upon receipt of orders from Cincpac.
To Comdesbatfor: ST LOUIS, BLUE, LAMBON,
PHEILPS posit Lat 20.51 Long 158, course 275, speed
25K.
To CTF 8: Your 2206 only nine arrived.
Out guarding 3445 voice sqdn. Comdrs. PT20, PT22,
PT28, PT24. At dock guarding 3445 voice PT21. On
dock at crane no power PT26, PT28. Aboard
RAMAPO underway PT27, PT29, PT30, PT42.
Four Japanese transports off Barbers Point.
Reports tugs SUNNADIN and AVOCET came along-
side and furnished light and power. One torpedo ran
between bow of RALEIGH and stern of DETROIT and
apparently sank in shoal water at Ford Island with-
out exploding. The following planes were destroyed,
in which it is considered the RALEIGH contributed :
l---Bomber flying over stern stbd to port crashed on
deck of CURTISS.
2- Plane flew over bow from gtbd to port and crashed
near Pearl City.
3- Plane flying north on our stbd beam crashed in
water between DOBBIN and BALTIMORE.
4- Plane off our stern flying over air station was
hit by 3" shell and blown to pieces in air.
5- Plane flying across our stern had tail blown off
and fell over Pearl City.
Own DD reports no enemy vessels off Barbers Point.
At 1300 join DETROIT course 210 speed 18 from point
51. (Action to ST. LOUIS)
Jap ship four miles from Barbers Point. Two sam-
pans further out. Parachute troops landing on North
shore, (reported by VJ plane)
Search sector 220 to 230. Return. (Action to 12-
VP23)
ANTARES docked pier five afirm Honolulu. Struck
by several machine gun bullets but no damage to
material or personnel.
To CTF 8 : Radio bearings indicate AKAGI bearing
183 from Pearl another unit bearing 167°.
To Comscoron 6: Reported Jap rendezvous 223° 90
miles from Ford Island. Search to 200 miles sector
235 to 215.
Captured enemy chart has marked positions bearing
223 distant 90 miles from Pearl Harbor.
DETROIT and PHOENIX are near Barbers Point.
Signal Tower sees no transports.
To Comtrainron 6, Com 14, Cominron 2 ; Sweep chan-
nel from East Lock to entrance magnetic and moored
mines.
Army reports that four enemy transports off Barbers
Point.
Am proceeding with three destroyers to attack Barbers
Point. Speed two five position lat. 21-57 long. 158-03.
Tn NAS Pearl : For Capt. Bode CALIFORNIA urgently
needs AA ammunition.
Signals intercepted and bearing true north believed to
be enemy carrier by character of transmission.
By phone: Enemy sampan about to land at Naval
ammunition Depot.
Enemy landing party off shore Nanakull. Friendly
planes firing at them.
Op-1 Southeast enemy and friendly planes in dog-
fight.
Enemy naval attack coming in towards Barbers Point,
Present position nine miles.
1256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1322 Opnav
1323 HELENA
1324 CTP 8
1328 MINNEAPOLIS
CINCPAC
1330
1337
1341
1344
1345
1330
—
1331
CTF 1
1333
CPWl
1337
CTF 3
1340
TENNESSEE
1345
1348 VIREO
1351
1353
1354
To Mardet Tientsin, Coml5, Mardet AM Emb, Peiping
Astnavatt Shanghai, Rdo Wake, Navatt Chungking,
Jonnstonis, Rdo Guam, Palmyra, Coml6, Rdo Tutuila,
HOPKINS : This confirms air raid by. Japan on Oahu
at 1800 today followed by declaration of war by Japan
against US and Great Britain
To Comerubatfor : Due contamination feed water can-
not maintain underway status longer than 8 hours.
During this time speed limited to 10 kts. Ready this
condition on one hour notice F power for fire control
limited to two diesel generators. View condition and
to effect repairs recommend letting fires under all
boilers die out.
UPSN Junction Task Force One and Eight. Propose
send Crudiv FIVE to Pearl for fuel.
Your 072234 (Cincpac's) complying. Ref. #12-299
Use plane to search sector 135 to 180 distance 154
miles from Pearl.
To CFT 8: DETROIT, PHOENIX, ST LOUIS, NEW
ORLEANS fourteen destroyers and four minelayers
have sortied and are proceeding to join you. Also
MINNEAPOLIS and four minelayers ordered join
from operating areas send ships to Pearl for fuel
Reports— 7632 kes (M) following calls:— SIME;
SISO; KASHO; SUREMO; SAMORE ; Sends fol-
lowing type of to . . .095.45 085.42
Bearing on SISO— 170 S5.
Bearing on SAMORE— 165
Report following msg. . . KIBC to SIME Nr. 1 SIME
354.56
Reports SISO (Good bearing) 7632 (M) 337
BOBOLINK'S orders to sweep channel changed to
sweeping approaches to Pearl Harbor and Honolulu
Harbor. Arriving off Pearl it appeared all ships
there were engaged in sweeping.
To Cincpae : Task Force ONE proceeding off Barbers
Point Notify Army.
To OPW 2 : Request instructions for dawn patrol
upon their return.
To CTF 8: My force INDIANAPOLIS and 5 DMS.
INDIANAPOLIS proceeding from JOHNSTON
Island course 054 speed 25. Dog Mike Sail directed
proceed Pearl for fuel and rejoin later.
Plane coming in on starboard beam. (Proved to be
friendly).
CTF 8 launched 9 VSB's to cover sector 11()-200T
to 175 miles. One of latter reported contact with
surface forces believed enemy including a carrier
in position Lat. 20-32 Long. 158-16 and cruiser
Lat. 20-32 Long. 158-40. Scout reported being at-
tacked by VF's. No further radio contact estab-
lished with scout. Scout landed later at Kaneohe,
reports believed to have been in error.
Received orders to report to Combasefor thence to
West Loch to bring up 5", 3", and .50 M. G. Ammuni-
tion for CALIFORNIA.
Reports SISO calling SAMORE S5 bearing 337 Very
loud signal.
Reports bearing SAREMU bearing 337.
Reports bearing SUREMU 165.
Following bearings: 7632 kes (M) 0036— SUSU S5
340
7632 (M) 0040— SYME 336
'Following bearings: 7632 (M) 0054— bearing SISO
338 S 3
7050 (M) 0055— bearing SISO 338.5 S.^
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1257
KANURB
KANUEE 1410
1450
1410
1412 GAMBLE
1415 TENNESSEE
1426 BOBOLINK
1435 GAMBLE
1455 VIREO
1500 TENNESSEE
1600 MIDWAY
1505 DEWEY
1550 BOBOLINK
1551 TENNESSEE
1552 —
1626 GAMBLE
KANURE sez at 1235 (Local Time) "I HAVE FUEL
FOR 10 MINUTES"
at 1240 "I WILL FLY AS LONG AS I HAVE FUEL".
Someone on 7033 at 1247 said "HAVE NOT BE
OPPOSED."
SAME FREQUENCY BELIEVE SINIRE FROM
"SISO" at 1250 "WHAT IS YOUR COURSE".
RUS18 and YUNES believed to be Commander Car-
riers.
SUT12 believed to be a Carrier.
SISORE is either another Comdr in the Air or Comdr
Transport Group.
SISO is Boss of SISORE.
No further bearings of radio intelligence of the
Striking Force until following day 8 December 1941.
TRANSMISSION :
SIME 010.01 I— HA«NKIARIYA
ANSWER :
2 HA«NKAIARI
BEARINGS— SAREMU 338. S. 4 on 7632 kes (M)
WASMUTH rigges twin, ship moored minesweep with
USS ZANE, 400 fathoms of wire between ships, de-
pressers at 5 fathoms, no floats. At 1547 entered
Pearl Harbor entrance channel and swept up channel
to gate vessel, where wire parted. At 1620 anchored
off Coal Dock and retrieved sweep gear. At 1628
underway. At 1635 the Captain returned aboard,
Lieutenant Commander Agnew, USN, left and joined
TREVER. Returned off harbor entrance and re-
sumed patrol in company with Mindiv 4.
Sighted sampan bearing 320 T.
Set condition ZED from Turret III, second deck, aft.
Repair I, Unit 2, leading out fire hose to play water
on WEST VIRGINIA. Received report that one of
our destroyers sank Jap submarine.
Passed sweep wire to TURKEY and commenced
sweeping off Honolulu Harbor.
Slowed to investigate but did not search. Sampan
position approximately 4 miles south of Barbers
Point.
While waiting for arrival of ammunition, towed
ammunition lighter with 14" powder away from
deck to decrease menace of explosion. Delivered
ammunition to ARGONNE.
Report states that Wake Island had been bombed by
30 bombers. Ens. Kable still alive. Hudgell dead;
also Miller and Adams.
Via Commercial Cable . . . "On 7073 SISO
246 .. . Fair SIME 245 Poor NAS Midway"
Plane language SASO V SAREMU #3 ... A FU"-
KUMA YORI 150 to "30 MAIRU NEN 200 1115 . . .
Underway and standing out of harbor.
Received orders from Commander Base Force to re-
port 1010 dock immediately.
Repair 4. — All outboard voids normal. All soundings
normal. Received report that PENNSYLVANIA had
been hit while in drydock. No. 2 machine gun re-
paii'ed and in commission again.
CTF 12 given orders by CTF 8 to intercept and de-
stroy possible enemy carriers operating south coast
of Oahu. It was assumed after attacks enemy car-
riers would withdraw via Jaulit.
Sighted smoke bomb off port bow.
1258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1628 TENNESSEE
1630 n
1631 GAMBLE
1632 GAMBLE
1640 BOBOLINK
1642
1647 GAMBLE
1647 TENNESSEE
1655 WHITNEY
1659 TENNESSEE
1703 TENNESSEE
1705 WHITNEY
1730 BOBOLINK
1732 GAMBLE
1736 - -
1740 BOBOLINK
1744 GAMBLE
0755 PELIAS
(Insert on p. 12)
1755
TENNESSEE
1800
PENNSYLVANIA
1828
1833
TENNESSEE
TENNESSEE
1835
1837
TENNESSEE
TENNESSEE
1838
1855
1900
TENNESSEE
TENNESSEE
TENNESSEE
1953
TENNESSEE
2100
TRACY
2100
TRACY
Open up wardroom country and sleepy hollow. Fire
on WEST VIRGINIA seems to be under control. Re-
pair I cut off # 32 vent system ; smoke coming down.
Task Force ONE just ordered by CTF 8 proceed and
attack.
Reports submarine surfaced.
Fired one shot 4" gun and missed, short and to the
left. Submarine displayed U. S. Colors, and ceased
.firing. Submarine submerged and fired recognition
red smoke bomb.
While ofC dock 1010, received orders to assist
NEVADA. Orders changed to go alongside CALI-
FORNIA.
Attack group of 16 VF, 18 VTB's and 4 VSB smokers
launched by Comtaskforce EIGHT with no results.
(VTB planes armed with torpedoes recovered after
dark.) Six VF planes proceeded Pearl mistaken for
unfriendly and four shot down.
Proceed west.
Told forward Battle Dressing Station to send doctor
and stretcher party to WEST VIRGINIA bridge to
get Captain. Ship astern (ARIZONA) blew up.
Two planes bearing 350°.
Reports CASE left from alongside.
Engines ahead 1/3. Repairs 2 and 4; — send 2
rescue breathers each, and spare oxygen bottles to
starboard side of WEST VIRGINIA quarterdeck.
Word received to stop main engines. Delivered 6 gas
masks to WEST VIGINIA.
Reports TRUCKER left from alongside.
Moored alongside WIDGEON next to CALIFORNLi
for salvage purposes.
Sighted ENTERPRISE and exchanged calls. In-
structed by Commander Aircraft, Battle Force to
join ENTERPRISE.
Comairbatfor ordered GAMBLE to join that vessel
as part of AS Screen.
Commenced pumping to continue throught the night.
Joined ENTERPRISE and took station as third ship
with two other plane guard destroyers'.
Moored at Berths S-11 and 12, Submarine Base,
reports first attack was indicated by sound of
machine gun fire directed at single engine Jap
torpedo plane flying low over ship's bow. The plane
launched a torpedo at ARIZONA which seen later
burst into flames.
Plane bearing 345. Plane signalled with red light;
did not understand meaning of signal.
Reports complete replacement of ammunition
effected.
Observed^ plane bearing about 300.
Plane bearing about 345 (Running lights on; be-
lieved friendly).
Plane on port beam ; running lights on.
Plane coming in from dead ahead; bright lights
on it.
Plane bearing about 245.
ENTERPRISE planes approaching Cahu.
Plane bearing from dead ahead ; running lights
burning.
Word passed -over loudspeaker "All men having
hammocks in port hammock nettings remove them,
and stow same inboard."
Reports friendly planes with running lights were
by AA batteries, but TRACY did not fire.
Moored alongside CALIFORNIA and commenced
salvage work.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1259
2100 SICARD Observed 3 lighted planes, altitude 5000 approach-
ing FORD ISLAND from South NEW ORLEANS
challenged without success and opened. Other ships
followed too. SICARD checked fire considering
planes were friendly. Other ships continued firing.
2110 VIREO Observed AA fire opened and planes shot down.
Aviator fell astern of VIREO, was rescued and
identified from ENTERPRISE. Dispatch was sent
to inform control that ENTERPRISE planes were
in air.
(Enclosure B)
United States Pacific Fleet
Cincpac File No. U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Lll-l(l)/(50) (02019) Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 12, 19U-
From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Damage to Ships of the Pacific Fleet resulting from Enemy Attacks
at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.
References :
(a) Cincpac Secret Desp. 072244 of December 1941.
(b) Cincpac Secret Desp. 081015 of December 1941.
(c) Cincpac Secret Desp. 100220 of December 1941.
(d) Cincpac Secret Desp. 102043 of December 1941.
1. The following report relative to damage sustained by ships of the Pacific
Fleet resulting from enemy attacks on 7 December 1^1 is submitted. This
amplifies reports submitted by references (a) to (d) inclusive:
(a) BATTLESHIPS.
ARIZONA sunk at berth as result of aircraft torpedoes and heavy bombs
which exploded forward magazines. Ship is considered to be a total wreck.
CALIFORNIA sunk at berth as a result of hits by two or more aircraft tor-
pedoes ; also received one large bomb hit amidships which caused serious fire.
Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded later.
NEVADA damaged by heavy bombs, possibly mine in the channel and air-
craft torpedoes. Beached across from hospital point to prevent sinking after
an attempt to sortie. Batteries intact and manned though no power is on
the ship. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will be made later.
OKLAHOMA capsized at berth as a result of receiving three or more hits
by aircraft torpedoes. Recommendations regarding salvage will be made later.
PENNSYLVANIA slightly damaged by bomb hit, starboard side of boat deck
while in drydocK number 1, Navy Yard Pearl Harbor. Repairs have been
completed and ship is ready for service.
MARYLAND damaged by bomb hit on forecastle and near miss.- Ship was
moved to the Navy Yard on 11 December and is expected to be fully ready for
service 13 December.
TENNESSEE received one heavy bomb through turret top which did not ex-
plode, but put S rammers out of comniis.^iun. Also one bomb hit aft which
cracked one 14" gun. Heat fi-om the ARIZONA fire melted and. ignited paint in
after portion of the second deck which was badly burned out. Ship is now heavily
wedged to mooring by reason of the WEST VIRGINIA leaning against her. Steps
are being taken to dynamite the mooring to permit the removal of the TEN-
NESSEE. Repairs are proceeding and it is estimated that by 14 December ship
will be ready for service less one 14" gun.
WEST VIRGINIA sunk at berth as result of four aircraft torpedoes and one
bomb hit. There is considerable damage from fire. Recommendations regarding
salvage and repairs will be made later.
(b) CRUISER.
HELENA da;maged by bomb hit at frame 50, starboard side, opening up side
under armor belt for distance of about 30 feet. Number one and two fire rooms
and forward engine room flooded. Ship is now in drydock #8, Navy Yard, Pearl
Harbor, to effect repairs to make seaworthy. It is estimated that new shell and
framing will be completed within two weeks and ship will be able to operate with
two shafts and with all gun batteries in commission. It is recommended that
ship proceed to Mare Island for completion of repairs to hull and machinery.
1260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HONOLULU damaged by near miss at approximately frame 40 port side.
Hole approximately 20 feet by 6 feet underwater. Ship being docked in drydock
#1 today and it is estimated that work will be completed to make her fully
effective by 16 December.
RALEIOH damaged by one aircraft torpedo which flooded forward half of
machinery plant. Also hit by small bomb forward which penetrated three decks
and went out ships' side and did not explode. It is proposed to dock the RAL-
EIGH following completion of the HONOLULU to effect underwater repairs to
make seaworthy. Recommendations as to whether all repairs to make the
ship fully serviceable should be undertaken at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor or a
mainland navy yard, will be forwarded later.
(c) DESTROYERS.
GAS SIN and DOWNES damaged by bomb in number one drydock, Navy Yard,
Pearl Harbor ahead of PENNSYLVANIA. Bomb hit DOWNES exploding her
torpedoes warheads and causing serious oil fire. CASSIN was damaged by fire
and was knocked off drydock blocking and fell over on DOWNES. DOWNES ap-
pears to be total loss except for salvageable parts and materials. Recommenda-
tion regarding salvage and repairs to CASSIN will be forwarded later.
SHAW hit by bomb while docked on floating drydock. Forward part of ship
and floating drydock badly damaged by fire resulting from oil and powder. After
part of ship not seriously damaged. Recommendations regarding repairs will
be forwarded later.
(d) AUXILIARY VESSELS.
OOLALA sunk by aircraft torpedo and near miss by bomb at ten-ten dock at
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. Recommendations regarding salvage and repairs will
be forwarded at a later date.
UTAH damaged and capsized as a result of hits by aircraft torpedoes. Recom-
mendations regarding salvage and repairs will be forwarded later.
CURTISS damaged by enemy plane out of control which flew into crane mast
and by bomb which exploded damaging hangar space causing flre which destroyed
all radio equipment. Ship is entirely seaworthy. Repairs are proceeding and
ship will be ready for operations less one midships crane by 18 December.
VESTAL damaged by a bomb hit aft while at berth at Pearl Harbor is under-
taking repairs with one repair force. It is estimated that the ship will be fully
ready as a repair ship by 17 December. Docking may not be required.
2. It is believed that the sinking of the OKLAHOMA, NEVADA, CALIFORNIA
and WEST VIRGINIA is in large part due to the ships having been in condition
XRAY. Had time been available to set condition ZED before receiving damage,
progressive flooding might have been avoided.
H. E. KIMMEL.
Copy to :
Bushlps
Buord
Cincpac File No.
(Enclosure C)
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 21, 1941.
Summary of damage sustained by ships of Pacific Fleet from enemy attacks at
Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941
Ship
Damage incurred and cause
Repairs proceeding and proposed
ARIZONA
CALIFORNIA
MARYLAND.
NEVADA
Sunk at berth. Aircraft torpedoes and
heavy bombs exploding, forward maga-
zines.
Sunk at berth. Two or more aircraft
torpedoes and one large bomb hit
amidships causing fire. Part of A. A.
battery still manned and available.
Bomb hit frame 14, penetrated and ex-
ploded, holing shell, decks and bulk-
heads forward of fr. 24.
Heavy bombs, aircraft torpedoes and
possibly a mine in channel. Beached
across from Hospital Pt. AA batter-
ies still manned and available.
Propose caisson the ship and make recom-
mendation thereafter.
Propose caisson ship, repair to make
watertight and return to mainland for
complete repairs. (Tow) .
NYPH repairing shell to make sea-
worthy. Decks, bulkheads to be com-
pleted at NYPS.
Propose float ship (caisson may not be
required), repair to make watertight
and return to mainland yard for com-
plete repairs. (Tow).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1261
Summary of damage sustained by ships of Pacific Fleet from enemy attacks at
Pearl Harbor, December 1941 — Continued
Ship
Damage incurred and cause
[Eepairs proceeding'and proposed
OKLAHOMA.
PENNSYLVANIA,
TENNESSEE
WEST VIRGINIA
HELENA
HONOLULU
RALEIGH.
CASSIN...
DOWNES-
SHAW.
OQLALA..
UTAH
CURTISS.
VESTAL..
Capsized at berth,
craft torpedoes.
Three or more air-
Bomb hit starboard side boat deck
One heavy bomb (dud) through turret
top. One medium bomb aft cracked
14" gun. Fire aft 2nd deck due to
heat from ARIZONA. Electrical
circuits 2nd deck aft damaged by fire.
Sunk at berth. Four aircraft torpedoes
and one heavy bomb hit. Consider-
able damage by fire.
Forward fire and enginerooms flooded by
aircraft torpedo. Some machinery
badly damaged.
Bomb. Near miss frame 40, port.
Flooded five magazines and handling
room II turret. Damaged electrical
circuits in flooded spaces.
One aircraft torpedo, and small bomb
(dud) which penetrated three decks
and ship's side aft. Forward engine-
room and forward firerooms flooded
and damaged.
Drydock No. 1 ahead of PENNSYL-
VANIA. Bomb hit DOWNES ex-
ploding her torpedo warheads and
causing serious fire. CASSIN knock-
ed off blocks and fell over on
, DOWNES.
Bombed while docked on floating dry-
dock. Forward part of ship and float-
ing dock badly damaged by fire.
Sunk by aircraft torpedo and possibly
near miss by bomb.
Capsized and sunk by aircraft tor-
pedoes.
^Enemy plane out of control flew into
crane mast. One bomb exploded in
hangar space. All radio equipment
- destroyed. Ship entirely seaworthy.
Bomb hit aft, holmg shell. Beached
Propose right and float ship (caisson may
not be required) repair to make water-
tight and return to mainland yard for
complete repairs. (Two).
Repairs completed.
NYPH repairing shell to make sea-
worthy and habitable. NYPS com-
plete habilitation, renew 14" gun, and
watertight integrity.
Propose caisson ship. Repair to make
watertight and return to mainland for
complete repairs. (Tow).
NYPH repairing shell to make sea-
worthy. Propose return to NYMI
for complete repairs. (Two shafts).
NYPH proceeding with complete re-
pairs.
NYPH to make repairs to make sea-
worthy when HONOLULU is un-
docked. Propose return to NYMI
(on 2 shafts) for complete repairs.
Propose upright, patch and float out
CASSIN for possible repairs to re-
turn to full or limited service. Fur-
ther recommendations later.
Propose float and reconstruct forward
tpart — return to mainland yard for
complete repairs, possibly under own
power.
Salvage doubtful. Recommendation
later.
Recommendations re salvage and re-
; ; pairs later.
NYPH, replace radio and efiect neces-
sary repairs to hangar space.
Repairs proceeding by own repair fore?.
May not require docking.
(Enclosure D)
CinC File No.
United States Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship.
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 20, 1941.
(A) DISPOSITION OF Task Forces
task FOBCE ONE
Batdivs 2 and 4 (less COLORADO) 5 BB
Crudiv9 (less BOISE) ^- 4 CL
Desrons 1 and 3 (less CLARK) 17 DD
RALEIGH 1 OCL
OGLALA 1 OOM
Mindiv 1 (overhaul) "1 DM
Disposition: In port. Returned 11/28 to remain until 12/13.
TASK FOBCE TWO
Batdiv 1 3 BB
CrudivS (less PENSACOLA) 3 CA
Desrons 4 and 6 18 ^^
DETROIT 1 OCL
ENTERPRISE 1 GV
Mindiv 2 4 DM
1262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Disposition: At sea as Task Force EIOHT In Port
ENTERPRISE Batdiv 1
Desroa 6 Desron 4
Crudiv 5 DETROIT
Mindiv 2
Position ojf Task Force EIGHT : 200 miles West of Pearl standing to eastward
returning from landing VMP at Wake. Planes were in the air from 0618 to
search sector 045 to 135 to 150 miles and then land at Ewa. These planes arrived
during the attack and engaged the enemy aircraft.
TASK POEC?E THREE
Crudivs4and6 (less LOUISVILLE) 7 CA
Desron 5 (less Desdiv 10) 5 DD
Minron 2 13 DM
LEXINGTON 1 CV
Disposition: At sea as Task Force TWELVE
LEXINGTON
Gradiv 4 less INDIANAPOLIS and LOUISVILLE plus ASTORIA
Desron 5 less Desdiv 10
Position (estimated) : 23-45 N, 171-15 W, about 425 miles southeast of
Midway and 800 miles West of French Frigate Shoal on a westerly course
to land Marine VMSB's on Midway. When attack was made the Task
Force was ordered to turn toward Pearl and later directed to intercept
the enemy and destroy enemy carriers. INDIANAPOLIS as Task Force
THREE, Minron 2 less Mindivs 5 and 6 at Johnston exercising at land-
ing exercises using landing boats, MINNEAPOLIS and Mindiv 5 at sea
S.W. of Oahu — normal operations. Mindiv 6 in port, with NEW ORLEANS
and SAN FRANCISCO under overhaul.
TASK FOEOE SEVEN
At Midway - 2SS
At Wake 2SS
At Mare Island 5SS
At San Diego 4SS
Eh route to Pearl 4SS
At pearl 5SS
PELIAS \ 1A3
TASK FOBCE NINE
VP-21 — At Midway. 7 searching 120-170, 450 miles. 4 on 10 minutes notice.
VP-11 — 4 hours notice 12
VP-12 — 30 minutes notice 6
4 hours notice 5
VP-14 — In air (with depth chai-ges) 3
30 minutes notice 3
4 hours notice 4
VP-22 — 4 hours notice 12
VP-23— 4 hours notice v H
VP-24 — 4 in air conducting tactics with SS 4
On 30 minutes notice 1
72
Overhauling 9
81
TANGIER— In port.
CURTISS— In port.
MCFARLAND
HULBERT
THORNTON
All planes on the ground on ready notice had been furnished with a search
directive in the event that any contacts with surface forces were developed by
the early morning search. This plan never became efEective because damage to
the planes prevented.
i
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1263
MABINE FLANES
VMF221 —Wake
VM3B 231— Enroute Midway LEXINGTON
VM3B 232— Ewa 4 hours notice 18
VMJ 252 —Ewa 2
BASE FORCE
ARGONNE, plus auxiliaries and repair vessels, were in port.
Aircraft of Base Force
VJ-1— 9 J2F Pearl
9 JRS Pearl
VJ-2— 10 J2F Pearl
4 PBY-1 (2 at Johnston)
VJ-3— 1 J2V Pearl
4 JRB at Main
1 JRF
2 BT
In addition the tenders (destroyer) DOBBIN and WHITNEY were in port
and the submarine tender PELLAS.
The Task Forces shown herein, except EIGHT and TWELVE which were on
special missions to improve war readiness of Wake and Midway, were in accord-
ance with the organization of the Pacific Fleet which had been effective since 30
April 1941, and revised on 31 October 1941, The Task Forces were operating in
accordance with the approved employment schedule of the Fleet and the special
tasks assigned. It will be noted that all combatant vessels were assigned to Task
Forces. This assignment was in accordance with their war missions and all
training was conducted with that in mind.
(b) The Fleet was operating under the "security plan" originally issued on
15 February and revised on 14 October 1941. This provided for the possibility of
a declaration of war being preceeded by :
(a) A surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
(b) A surpri.se submarine attack on ships in the operating area,
(e) A combination of both.
The provisions of the security measures were always followed by ships in the
operating areas, even to tl)e point of having ready ammunition at the guns. Fre-
quent surprise drills were held by ships in Pearl Harbor in coordination with
Army and distant activities to tost the provisions of the security measures
against air and submarine attacks on ships in port. Since, however, the times
in port had to be devoted to upkeep, and limited -recreation periods, and since
the intelligence information indicated complete security from any surprise air-
attack, the provisions of the air security plan were not fully effective in port.
At the time of the attack, however, pi-ovisions had been made and were in
effect to provide against sabotage on ships, docks and equipment, and all .ships
had armed patrols and careful routine inspections of the ships during the entire
time in port. In the battleships, two machine fiuns wer(> *iiways manned and
ready and two 5-/25 guns were manned with stand-by crews and 15 rounds of
ammunition at each gun.
(c) In addition and as provided in the Security Plan, a daily search of all
operating areas was conducted by planes of Patrol Wing TWO. This was an
early morning search of about 200 miles to cover the general areas in which the
Fleet would be operating during the day.
Such a search was being conducted on 7 December and planes on that search
were in the air at the time of the attack. In addition, 4 planes were operating
with the submarines in the training of intertype exercises for communication and
recognition. They searched the area toward Lahaina Roads on that morning.
(d) The first indication of any enemy force in the area was the appearance of
a submarine close aboard the ANTARES returning from Canton Island and pre-
paring to enter Honolulu while towing a barge. This submarine was attacked
by a destroyer of the off-shore patrol which was called by the ANTARES. This
was at about 0645. In addition, plane one of VP-14 dropped a bomb on a sub-
marine off the entrance to Pearl. In this connection numerous sonic contacts
had been reported in the operating waters close to Pearl during the last six
months but no actual visual contacts had been made. In addition, no attacks
had been made on these suspected submarines because the Navy Department had
1264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
prohibited sueti attacks except within the 3 mile limit. When the international
situation grew more tense, however, the Commander-in-Chief directed ships to
attack submarines suspected to be operating this area, and it was on this au-
thority that the WARD and VP-14 attacked on the morning of 7 December.
These submarine attacks were followed by a report from the Navy Signal Tow-
er "Enemy air raid, this is not a drill" at about 0752. It will be noted that the
attack occurred while the crews of ships were just finishing breakfast on Sunday
morning.
The information regarding the air raid was sent to all Task Forces at 0800,
followed by a despatch "Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on
Pearl" at 0812.
The effect of the surprise attack and the damage inflicted with damage to
communications made it practically impossible to organize an air search except
by the 7 PBY's in the air at the time.
(e) At 0817 Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, directed Patrol Wing TWO
to search for the enemy, and the PBY's in the air started to search. The 3 on
the morning search started to search sector 310-000 to a distance of 300 miles.
The first plane started out at once.
The 4 PBY's, operating with the submarines started search sector 245-285 to
300 miles out, the first plane of that search got away at about 0945.
No plane in these areas searched saw anything. At 0830 Commander-in-Chief
advised Task Force THEEE, EIGHT and TWELVE to rendezvous as directed
by Commander Task Force EIGHT and stated that instructions would be issued
as soon as enemy was located.
(f) While it appeared logical that the attack should come from the north-
ward so that the planes would fly down wind with their loads, no such evidence
was available from the nature of the attack. Certain information indicated
that carriers or enemy forces were operating to the southward. A direction
finder bearing of radio transmissions at 1046 was received to indicate that an
enemy force bore 178 from Pearl. This was not a positive indication of an
enemy position but did indicate the probability of an enemy carrier to the south-
ward. A message was received from a ship with the MINNEAPOLIS call at 0950
stating that carrier had been sighted. The MINNEAPOLIS was then south of
Oahu. At 1010 4 DM's sent a message that they were in area Sail 2 and that
two carriers were in sight. This was later corrected to say the message should
have been NOT in sight.
In addition, a message from Kaneohe received at 1000 stated "Captured enemy
have marked positions, bearing 223—90 miles from Pearl Harbor". These marks
in Japanese script were later found not pertinent to the attack.
This information was passed to Task Forces at sea as an indication of probable
location of enemy forces. In addition, at 1018 the Task Force Commanders were
advised that there were only 12 VP's available in Pearl for search and that there
was some indication that the enemy was to the northward. They were directed
to locate and attack the enemy of unknown composition. Search was instituted
at once by Task Force EIGHT who was then somewhere west by south of Pearl.
At 1020, 15 V-19 from ENTERPRISE loaded with 1000 lb. bombs were launched
to search for and attack a reported group of 4 transports off Barbor's Point. The
origin of the report about the transports is unknown and it probably was enemy
deception because surface craft proceeding to attack them were attacked by
enemy submarines in that area. Ships that could do so cleared the harbor by
this time and were organized as a separate Task Force ONE at 1105 and directed
to report to Commander Task Force EIGHT to assist in locating and destroying
the enemy.
(g) It was not possible to start an organized search with aircraft with the
forces on Oahu until the late morning. By about 1100, however, in addition to
the TPBY's which had started the search between 0815 and 0915, as the planes
became serviceable they were started on the following searches :
Army— 2 B-17
2 A-20A
3 B-18
3 B-17, 095—165, 300 miles
Navy— 4 planes VP-24. 245-275, 300 miles.
2 planes VJ, 355-005, 300 miles
3 planes VP-14, 29.5-350, 200 miles
4 planes VP-23, 215-245, 200 miles
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1265
Battleship d Cruiser Planes
6 VOS, 135-215, 200 miles
9 SBD, 330-030, 20O miles
6 J2F in westward sector
The concentrated air search was conducted to the northward and westward
because of the belief that the major enemy attack force was in that direction.
In addition, the disposition of Task Forces at sea was such that they were able
to search to the southward.
At about 1345 one plane of the ENTERPRISE reported contact with surface
forces in position 20-32 N and 158-40 W, and followed closely by a i*eport that
the patrol was being attacked by a VF plane. This report was apparently in
error because the position is only about 60 miles from Pearl.
At 1330 a radio direction finder bearing on an enemy frequency and by a ship
using the "AKAGI" call was picked up and gave a bearing of 189° from Pearl
and another unidentified unit was found to be on bearing ltj7 from Pearl. This
information was passed to the Task Forces at sea and on that information and the
supposition that any enemy forces in the area south of Oahu would retire, toward
Jalint, the senior Task Force Commander at sea drected Task Force Twelve at
1552, to intercept and destroy the enemy. In addition. Task Force ONE which
had joined Task Force EIGHT was directed to proceed to search with surface
force and attack. The surface force search was also based on a retirement
toward Jalint.
No contacts were made and the enemy was not located, except that 2 planes
from tlie cruiser NORTHAMPTON made contact with an enemy fighter at 1120
just north of NIIHAU and after 20 minutes in spite of the enemy superior speed
and gun power succeeded in shooting him down. No report of this attack ever
reached the Commander-in-Chief.
From the chart later discovered from enemy planes shot down there is no
indication that any carriers operated to the southward of Oahu. The charts do
indicate, however, that the attack was launched from a point about 200 miles
to the northward and that the carrier retired to the northward at full speed
while waiting planes to return from the attack. (It appears then that the
enemy carriers in this area were well beyond the daylight search curve of the
planes sent out to find them and therefore were successful in evading all con-
tacts with our air forces in the area).
The search by surface craft, carrier aircraft and their ship-based planes to
the southward was not successful. It appears probable that the enemy used
radio deception by placing a ship to the southward to use deceptive radio calls,
to indicate the presence of enemy forces in that area. It may be possible too
that if enemy forces were in that area that they retired at high speed to the
southward beyond the range of our ships and aircraft.
(h) At 0800 the positions of the ships at sea were approximately as follows :
Task Force TWELVE— 18-30N, 168-4:0 W.
Task Force EIGHT— 20-50 N, 108-50 W.
Task Force ONE— 20-32 N, 159-45 W.
Task Force TWELVE was proceeding on course 170 at 17 knots. His position
was in the area to the northwestward of Johnston Island. The cruiser planes
searched to the northward of the island and the carrier planes in a southeasterly
direction to a distance of 200 miles for the OSOO position.
In addition, the planes of VP-21 departed Midway and searched the area from
Midway to Johnston and then from Johnston to Pearl Harbor. Six planes of
Patwing TWO searched the sector with the median of 220° from Pearl Harbor
to a distance of 550 miles. The planes from the ENTERPRISE searched the
sector 315 to 270 from the carrier's daylight position.
By these searches practically the entire area in the Oahu-Midway-Johnston
Island triangle was completely covered.
In addition, the available planes of Patwing TWO searched an area of 200
miles all around Oahu. It was not possible to extend this search further to
seaward because of the small number of available planes.
(i) Because Task Force EIGHT was low in fuel, that Force entered Pearl
Harbor after dark on 8 December, fueled, provisioned and took on ammunition
and departed for sea before daylight on 9 December.
9 December
On 9 December the position of Task Force TWELVE was about 600 miles S.S.W.
of Oahu proceeding toward the island. A 200 mile search was being conducted
1266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in the morning all around the carrier position during the morning and a 150-
mile search along the line of the carrier course during the afternoon.
After departure from Pearl Harhor Task Force EIGHT proceeded to the
northeastward from Oahu for search operations in that area.
Task Force ONE returned to port on 9 December.
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, flagship
Using Oahu based planes the following search was conducted starting in the
liiorning of 9 December :
300-010 500 miles 10 VP
010-060 300 miles 10 B-18
060-210 200 miles 18 VSO
210-030 300 miles 6 VJ-
and in the afternoon
330-020 4 Army B-20
The sector to the southwest of Oahu was covered by the LEXINGTON planes
as mentioned before.
No contact with enemy or surface forces were made. Numerous submarines
were reported, probably many false contacts, but all were attacked by planes.
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 74
Office of the Commandant,
FOUKTEENTH NaVAL DISTRICT,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 3 February, 1942.
Confidential
From : Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
To : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject : War Diary for period 7 December to 1 January.
Reference: (a) Couf. desp. 032307 dated 3 January, 1942 from CinCPac to
Coml4.
Enclosure: (A) Three copies of subject diary.
1. In compliance with reference (a), enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.
This diary has been compiled from the logs and reports submitted by various
district activities. In certain instances, reports of individuals have been quoted
not because their opinions or remarks are considered of special value, but in
order to give an insight to the reactions of the personnel concerned.
O. C. Bloch,
Confidential
WAR DIARY OF FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT FOR PERIOD
7 DECEMBER TO 1 JANUARY
INDEX
Page*
1. Preliminary Action on 7 December 1—3
2. The Air Raid— 3-6
3. Sequence and Type of Attacks 6
4. Number of Planes Involved 7-9
5. Attacks at Kaneohe Bay Naval Air Station and Ewa Field 10
6. Damage 11-12
7. Public Works Department Activities 12-13
8. Action by Yard Fire Department and Yard Craft 13
9. Action reported by District Marine Ofllcer 13-14
10. Care of Fleet Personnel , 14-15
11. Medical Department Activities 15-16
12. Diary of Industrial Department 17-26
13. Notes on Activities of the Base Force Salvage Organization 26-27
14. Pearl Harbor Water Area Defense Activities 27-28
15. District Material Report 28-29
16. Supply Department Activities 29-30
17. Communication Activities 30-31
18. Port Director's Report 31-37
19. Activities of the District Intelligence Office and Office of the Cable and Radio
Censor 37—38
20. Personnel Office Report 38-39
21. Action at Wake • 39
22. Action at Midway 40
23. Action at Johnston 40-42
24. Action at Palmyra • 42-43
25. Actions Against Submarines — Summary of 43
* Pages referred to are indicated by italic flgures enclosed by brackets and refer to
pages of original exhibit.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1267
[1] WAB DiAEY of FOXmTEENTH NAvAL DISTRICT FOE PERIOD 7 DeCEMBES
TO 1 Januaby
PreUminaru Action on 7 December:
The first indication of au enemy force was the sighting of a submarine peri-
scope at 0850 by the U. S. S. CONDOR, engaged in minesweeping close to the
entrance buoys of the Pearl Harbor channel.
After verification, the CONDOR reported the situation by blinker to the guard
ship, U. S. S. WARD. The submarine was seen to turn inshore and head in a
westerly direction toward Barbers Point.
The WARD'S log reports that general quarters was sounded at 0408 and search
was made for the unidentified submarine. The ship secured from general quar-
ters at 0435 and continued on patrol of the Pearl Harbor entrance.
The initial positive contact occurred at 0637 when the WARD sighted the con-
ning tower and periscope of a submarine apparently headed for Pearl Harbor,
trailing the U. S. S. ANTARES.
The WARD started an attack at 0G40, bearing down on the submarine while
increasing speed from 5 to 25 knots. She opened fire at 0645 with guns 1 and 3,
firing one shot from each gun. The first shot, at a range of 100 yards, passed
directly over the conning tower. The second shot, fired at a range of 50 yards or
[2] less from No. 3 gun, scored a direct hit at the waterline junction of the
hull and conning tower. The submarine was observed to heel over to starboard
and start to sink and, after running into the WARD'S depth charge barrage,
went down in 1,200 feet of water. A large amount of oil appeared on the surface
where the depth charges exploded.
A despatch by voice transmission was sent to the commandant at 0654
stating: We have attacked, fired upon and dropped charges upon submarine
operating in defensive sea area."
This message was reported delivered to the district duty officer, Lieutenant
Commander Harold Kaminski, at 0712. He immediately notified the chief of
staff, Captain J. B. Earle, who informed the commandant.
Lieutenant Commander Kaminski notified the duty oflicer of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, at 0715 and also notified Commander Charles
B. Momsen, war plans oflicer for the district.
The commandant ordered the ready duty destroyer (Monaghan) sent out.
At 0737 a despatch was sent to the WARD, asking verification of the report and
details of the attack.
Following the WARD'S message and prior to the Japanese air raid, no other
reports were received at headquarters tc indicate or verify the enemy's presence.
Within a few minutes after the raid started, the commandant arrived at
headquarters and took charge. Orders issued were: [3] "Close all
navy yard gates to traffic. Have the Captain of the Yard detail fire parties.
Notify marines to make all men available to assist in fighting fires. Notify
marines to bring in from Salt Lake camp all available marines. Notify yard
to flood dry docks. Make arrangements for civilian workmen to be rounded up
and brought to the yard to assist in damage control. Notify hospital to estab-
lish emergency measures for caring for killed and wounded."
The Air Raid:
The air raid on Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field areii started at 0755, accord-
ing to most observers. Spme reports indicate the end of the raid came about
0940, although apparently there were enemy planes active as late as 1130,
Captain H. F. Bruns, the district public works officer, stating in his report that
the raid lasted until approximately 11.30. (NOTE: Residents on Milhau sighted
two planes between 1300 and 1400 flying over that island. One crashed and the
other flew on West. Presumably these planes had left Oahu after 1200).
The district supply officer. Captain John J. Gaffney, reported the final attack
was over by 0940. Plis summary follows :
"The heavy pall of smoke from burning fuel oil afforded not only a point of
aim for the dive bombing attack which came about 0920 but somewhat obscured
vision. A seaplane hangar was on [//] fire at Ford Island and the float-
ing drydock with the SHAW appeared to be burning. The all directional bomb-
ing attack came shortly after the NEVADA cleared the dredge opposite Fox-1
where three hits halted the NEVADA in the channel. She dropped one anchor,
backed on it, came over in th(> direction of. the floating dock and finally moved
over to Waipio Point. A hit in Drydock No. 1 struck the DOWNES and another
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 39
1268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
hit of a smaller bomb was made on the PENNSYLVANIA. The Japanese pressed
home the dive bombing well under 600 feet. Wing and fuselage marking were
clearly visible. Their maneuverings to avoid collisions were noteworthy. The
attack concentrated over the NEVADA which was underway in the channel
and evidently every effort was directed toward sinking her in the channel.
This attack was over by 0940. . . "
First Lieutenant J. S. O'Halloran, duty officer, 3rd Defense Battalion, F. M. F.,
stated in his report : "At about 0940, after about one hour and 45 minutes after
the attack started, the air was clear of enemy aircraft."
Commander Harry R. Hayes, USN (Ret.), directed by Captain C. C. Baughman,
captain of the yard, to a station on the signal tower to handle, insofar as pos-
sible, the movements of ships and other craft in the harbor, stated : "The attack
on the NEVADA apparently ended tbe raid on Pearl Harbor, but for some time
enemy aircraft were observed bombing Hickam Field. . . ."
[5] Captain Baughman, in a summary of events obtained from personnel
under him, stated that at 0855 the NEVADA got underway and stood down South
Channel. This summary further reported that at "0910 enemy dive bombers
attacked Hickam Field, the PENNSYLVANIA, CAS SIN, DOWNES, SHAW and
NEVADA, the last named ship being in the South Channel opposite YFD-2 (the
floating dry dock). The three destroyers were set on fire and minor damage was
inflicted on the PENNSYLVANIA. The NEVADA was badly damaged and
lost way, and with the assistance of tugs was grounded on Waipio peninsula
southeast of Beckoning Point."
The captain of the yard's summary placed the end of the raid at 0920.
In line with some observations that the air raid occurred in three waves of
planes is the report of Russel B. Smith, radioman 3rd class, in the U.S.S.
NEVADA, who was later assigned to duty at tbe Lualualei radio station. Smith
was blown from his ship during the attack in the south channel and swam ashore.
His report follows in part :
"I proceeded to the bridge during the lull after the first attack. From there
the AKIZONA was plainly visible, a mass of flames. Her after turrets and
mainmast were all that could be seen, the rest was a mass of flames. We cast
off lines and started to get underway. As we passed the battle line, I saw the
OKLAHOMA completely capsized and the rest of the damaged battleships,
some burning fiercely. There were several other ships underway in the harbor.
[6] "As we neared tbe floating drydock the second attack began. Our anti-
aircraft guns again went into action. Suddenly there was a deafening roar.
Smoke and debris was flying everywhere. Shortly after another bomb struck,
setting the ship on fire.
"The next thing I remember is the cold water hitting ine in the face. I was
near the drydock, which was burning fiercely, and quite a distance from shore.
The life preserver that I had securely strapped on was gone. After reaching
shore, I and several other men who had swam ashore started for the naval
hospital. At this time the third attack came but the Jap planes were kept off
by the antiaircraft fire."
Sequence and Type of Attacks:
Reports received by the commandant indicate the following sequence of attack :
1. Attack on the naval air station, Ford Island, and Hickam Field. This
started about 0755 and consisted of dive bombing and strafing.
2. Attack on major units of the fleet, launched by torjiedo plane and dive
bombers and accompanied by strafing.
3. Attack on area by horizontal bombing from high altitude. This is reported
to have occurred about 0815.
4. A second high altitude bombing attack apparently carried out immediately
before the final intensive dive bombing attack and after a lull of approximately
15 minutes in the raid.
5. Dive bombing and strafing attack launched about 0910.
[7] Nutnier of Planes Involved:
Reports indicate that approximately 150 planes attacked army and navy activi-
ties on Oahu.
Marine corps observers reported that approximately 30 planes participated in
the first attack on Pearl Harbor. Other reports stated that up to 50 planes
engaged in the initial attack on the Pearl Harbor area, including approximately
20 torpedo planes.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1269
Personnel on the signal tower estimated 30 dive bombers took part in the final
Intensive bombing attacli. The smallest estimate was 18.
On the high altitude bombing, reports of the number of planes observed varied
from five to 18, and altitudes were estimated 10,000 and 16,000 feet.
Between 0745 and 0800 an estimated total of 75 planes were sighted by personnel
at Lualualei radio station, approaching the station from the west and turning
sharply In the direction of Pearl Harbor and Barbers Point upon reaching a
position near the shore line. One observer stated that he counted 75 planes.
These planes returned on this course some time later, observers reported.
W. L. Waltrous, chief radioman, stated that about 0745 he observed a large
flight of planes proceeding toward Pearl Harbor. "Upon reaching a point directly
abeam of the radio station, it appeared that a formation of 15 to 20 planes detached
themselves from the main flight and turned left. They proceeded [8] di-
rectly over the radio station at an altitude of approximately 2,000 feet, in the
general direction of Wheeler field."
An observe at the Lualualei naval ammunition depot, according to a report sub-
mitted by Captain J. S. Dowell, insi)ector of ordnance in charge, stated :
"Near 0800 while motorized patrol was being relieved I counted 25 bombers
in groups of five flying very high. They proceeded straight over the mountains
on the Nanaliuli side of the depot headed in the direction of Pearl Harbor. There
were also two units of fighter planes, about five in each. They were flying lower
than the bombers, about the height of the mountains, in a straight line one be-
hind the other. One group headed for Pohaliea pass toward Schofield ; the
other circled over the depot near the mountains and then headed over Ponakea
pass."
Captain Dowell also reported that at West Loch "at 0850, enemy planes were
observed leaving Pearl Harbor evidently en route to Ewa mooring mast, passing
close to West Loch. Planes observed were approximately 60 to 70 in num-
ber . . . ."
The officer in charge at Camp Andrews, Nanakull, reported a flight of 64 planes
passed over the camp about 0730 headed toward Pearl Harbor.
Other observations of plane approaches were submitted as follows :
Lieutenant Commander R. B. Norris, C-V(L), then an [91 employee of
RCA Communications, Inc., at Kahuku radio station, reported that "at approxi-
mately 0740 ... I observed a group of planes flying at very high altitude
approach Kahuku Point in a course from north due south. It is estimated that
20 or 22 planes were in this group . . . Low clouds made it impossible to see
the entire group at any one moment . . . The planes were soon out of visible
range but still heading due south after passing over the radio station."
A civilian at Mokuleia reported observing a flight of 32 planes coming in over
water from the direction of Kahuku Point between 0800 and 0815 and heading
directly towards Schofleld. Observer reported that the count of 32 was verified
by a resident of Waialua.
A man on duty at the direction finder unit at Lualualei reported that he ob-
served "Several formations" at about 0900 heading toward Pearl Harbor from
the northwest. "There were at least 55 planes that I was able to count, flying
in groups of fives . . . Their height was such that it was almost impossible to
see them."
According to this observer, another group of seven, flying at the same altitude
but further out from the other groups, turned seaward and circled back over
land, heading over the reservation in the direction of Wheeler field.
[10} Attacks at Kaneohe Bay Na/val Air Station and Eiva Field:
Almost simultaneously with the raid on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese attacked
Kaneohe Bay naval air station. Ewa field at Barbers Point was subjected to
enemy strafing.
Commander H. M. Martin, commanding officer of the naval air station, Kan-
eohe Bay, reported that two attacks were executed at that base.
The initial attack started about 0750, with about a squadron of planes coming
down very low in shallow dives and strafing with incendiary bullets. This at-
tack lasted 10 to 15 minutes and was followed after a 25 minute interval by
bombing and strafing by another squadron of planes, similar to our BT's. Bombs
of 100 pounds were dropped, apparently high explosive in type but some of them
probably incendiary because of the resulting fires. The majority of casualties
resulted from this attack, the men being struck by machine gun fire and bomb
fragments.
1270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Most of the injured personnel were in the squadrons atempting to either launch
their planes of trying to save those planes not yet damaged. During this at-
tack which also lasted 10 to 15 minutes, the antiaircraft fire was considerably
augmented by machine guns rigged on the planes and on temporary mounts, and
one of the enemy planes was shot down on the station. Another crashed in
Kailua bay.
[11] Damage:
Captain H. F. Bruns, district public works oflScer, following a survey after the
raid, reported :
"There was no serious damage to any navy shore structures except at Ford.
Island and Kaneohe. It was plain that ships and planes were the objectives^ of
the attackers. By concentrating even briefly on shore structures the attackers
could have caused extensive damage, particularly by an incendiary attack on
the oil tanks and other inflammable objects."
With the exception of Hangar No. 6 and its surrounding parking area, very
little major damage was done to the naval air station, Pearl Harbor. The han-
gar was apparently set on fire as a result of a bomb explosion immediately to the
east and the resultant explosive action of nearby patrol planes which were ig-
nited by the same explosion. There were about five bomb hits in the vicinity
of the hangar, the largest producing a crater approximately 20 feet in diameter
and seven feet deep. The northeast quarter of the hangar was badly gutted by
fire but relatively minor damage was done to structui'al steel.
Fresh water service to Ford Island from the navy yard was cut off. The U.
S. S. ARIZONA at mooring Pox-7 settled on the 12 inch main, crushing it, and
the six inch temporary line to the south end of the island was broken at the navy
yard side as a result of bombing. Service was restored by installing a new 16
inch main from Hospital Point.
[12] At the Kaneohe naval air station. Hangar No. 2 was set on fire
during the first attack and severe damage resulted, although the structure was
deemed salvageable. The seaplane warming up platform was also damaged by
bomb hits.
Public Woi-ks Department Activities:
Action taken by the public works department at the time of the raid was based
on the department's acceptance that its function was to maintain essential serv-
ices— power, water and communications, to furnish transportation as required,
to protect against fires and to remedy structural damage.
In a description of activities of the public works department during the attack,
Captain Bruns said :
"As rapidly as officers reported, they were despatched to various locations for
specific jobs of surveillance and fire fighting. Civilian workers went to their
regular jobs, unless otherwise directed. Sizeable forces were sent to both tank
farms. The contractors at Kuahua were quickly organized to meet emergency
calls, and men and equipment were despatched to points of need in the navy yard
area. Repeated inspections were made to locate possible fires. The drydock
contractors organized workers to get the Gantry crane clear of the fire between
the drydocks and to make the new drydock ready for service as quickly as
possible.
"The public works departm-ent through its own and contractors' [13]
personnel gave assistance in restoring water main to Ford Island, restoring
power and communication services in navy yard, furnishing trucks for the
transportation of wounded and for other purposes, withdrawing dredges to
prevent blocking of channel, establishing watcher services for administration
building, arranging burials and providing graves, and answering distress calls
generally."
Action bij Yard Fire Department and Yard Cra^ft:
In the navy yard, the fire department was first called to Building 367, near
the hospital, to extinguish a fire caused by the crash of a Japanese plane. Later
the department answered a call to extinguish the fire in Drydock No. 1 where
the CASSIN and DOWNES were burning. The major part of the yard fire
fighting equipment was used in controlling this fire and preventing its spread to
the PENNSYLVANIA. The fire in the floating drydock was also combatted.
Yard craft engaged in fighting fires on fleet units, assisted in picking up
survivors and in getting ships underway.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1271
Action Reported "by
Immediately upon the first raid by hostile planes, all sentry posts were doubled
and the remainder of the command present were alerted. Those alerted stood
by under arms under co%^er as a mobile reserve for emergency employment.
These men were soon assigned to various situations.
[l.'i'\ The defense battalions Immediately went into action with antiair-
craft machine guns with telling effect. Two gun batteries were emplaced in the
navy yard but were not ready for action until ammunition could be trucked
from the naval ammunition depot. They were ready at 1100.
All, motor transportation was pooled for general use and was active through-
out the day. Among the services rendered was assistance in collecting and
hauling casualties from the waterfront to the naval hospital.
One set of barracks (100 man type), the Noncommissioned Officei-s' Club and
the Post Exchange were vacated and prepared for caring for casualties. The
medical officers set up an operating and dressing room in the Post Exchange.
The three general messes were thrown open and served food, on a 24 hour
basis, to all comers. It is estimated that during the first 24 hours about 6,000
meals were served to civilian workmen of the navy yard. That service was dis-
continued only after the food supply at the regular established eating places
could be replenished.
Care of Fleet Personnel:
At the Yard Receiving Station, immediate steps were taken to account for
survivors and emergency hospital units were established in new barrack buildings
and Navy Arena. Fleet pooling activity centered at this station. Emergency
rations, stores, [15] bedding and clothing were issued to survivors of
sunken ships. Preparations were made for serving meals on a 24 hour basis.
Rations were prepared and served to over 8,000 personnel.
All available spaces, including the Navy Arena and barracks buildings under
construction were converted into emergency living quarters. All chief petty
officers' rooms were converted into officers' quarters.
Between December 12 and 31 all housing facilities were occupied to the fullest
degree, and an overflow of from 1,500 to 2,500 men was accommodated in the
arena, the number varying with the arrival and subsequent assignment to duties
of drafts from the mainland.
Medical Department Activities:
The district medical officer. Captain R. E. Stoops, reported 686 non-fatal
casualties were received for treatment at regular navy medical department
establishments, at civilian establishments and emergency wards established during
the crisis.
In the disposition of the dead, utmost care was taken in the matter of
identification.
A total of 313 dead were brought to the naval hospital on December 7. The
following day, it became evident that the problem of burial would be much
greater than originally contemplated. Additional land for a new navy plot was
obtained [i6] in Oahu cemetery, and a 25 acre site for a new naval
cemetery was selected between North and South Halawa streams at Red Hill.
The following is a summary of interments made during the period from Decem-
ber 7 to 31, inclusive :
Service personnel interred at Oahu cemetery 328
Service personnel interred at Halawa cemetery 204
Service personnel interred at Kaneohe Bay 18
550
Japanese service personnel buried total 18.
Of our service personnel, 293 were unidentified, but at least some of these were
expected to be identified following receipt of Forms "N" in their cases at the
Navy Department.
1272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Casualties among Fourteenth Naval District personnel.
Officers
Enlisted men
Dead
Wounded
Dead
Wounded
Navy Yard
1
7
3
Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor . . . .
43
1
4
Naval Ammunition Depot
10
1
1
Total
0
8
3
61
A total of 273 casualty patients were evacuated to the mainland.
[17] Diary of Industrial Department:
December 7, 1941. — The following vessels were at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor,
on this date in berths indicated :
Vessel
Berth
Severe
damage
Vessel
Berth
Severe
damage
USS SOTOYOMO
Docked YFD-2.
DD-1
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Sunk
near
end
1010
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
YSD-27 -
B-U
No
USS SHAW
YW-10
B-11
No
USS DOWNES
DD-1
USSRAMAPO
[18] USS RIGEL....
YC^47
B-12
No
USS CASSIN
DD-1.
B-13
No
USS PENNSYL-
DD-1
B-14....
No
VANIA.
B-1
USS TRACY
B-15
No
USS CACHALOT... .
USS PREBLE
B-15
No
USS HELENA
B-2
USSCUMMINGS....
YO-43
B-15
No
USS OQLALA . .. .
B-3 -
B-15-16
No
End 1010
End 1010
4
USS NEW OR-
LEANS.
USS SAN FRAN-
CISCO.
USS PRUITT.
B-16
No
B-17
No
USS TERN
B-18 . . ..
YO-30 .
No
USS ARQONNE.
USS SICARD
B-18
No
150-ton Floating Crane .
6
USS ONTARIO
USS SCHLEY...
B-18
No
USS SACRAMENTO.
6..
B-20
No
USS MUGFORD....
B-6... .
USS GREBE
B-20
No
USS JARVIS
B-6
USS HONOLULU
USS ST. LOUIS
USSBAQLEY
B-21
No
USS SWAN
Marine Rail-
way.
B-9
B-21
No
YT-3
End East Quay
Pier.
No
The following named vessels left the Navy Yard on this date :
USS ST. LOUIS USS RAiLAPO
USS CUMMINGS USS SWAN
USS JARVIS USS TERN
USS MUGFORD
[19] December 8, 1941. — ^Yard forces initiated repairs to damages caused in
the December 7th raid, and assisted in restoring a supply of fresh water to Ford
Island, both fresh water pipe lines to Ford Island having been destroyed. Ar-
rangements were made for Yard Public Works organization and equipment to
assist to the fullest practicable extent in ships' salvage operations.
USS ALLEN arrived at B-6.
December 9, 1941. — Emergency electrical supply from Navy Yard power plant
was furnished to Hickam Field and the Section Base. Made preliminary survey
for air raid requirements for Yard i)ersonnel. Construction begun for shelters
by personnel of Shop 70 and contractors' force. Sandbags placed for protection
of office personnel, electric power transformer substations and communication
centers.
December 10, i9^2.— USS ALLEN departed.
USS CROW departed.
USS MARYLAND arrived.
YO-43 departed.
USS SWAN arrived.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1273
The USS HELENA was docked in DD-2. Tliis is the first vessel docked in thia
new dock which was completed approximately one year in advance of the contract
date.
120] December 11, 19Ifl.—V^^ SWAN departed.
December 12, 1941. — New 25-ton crane was moved from erection tracks to per.
manent rails, around DD-2.
USS PENNSYLVANIA departed.
USS AYLWIN arrived, docked on Marine Kailway, undocked and departed.
USS NARWHAL arrived.
December IS, iP^i.— USS NEW ORLEANS departed.
USS SACRAMENTO departed.
YC-477 departed.
USS HONOLULU docked in DD-1.
USS DOLPHIN arrived, docked in Marine Railway.
USS Mcdonough arrived.
USS PHELPS arrived.
USS THORNTON arrived.
USS INDIANAPOLIS arrived.
December U, 1941.— USS DOLPHIN undocked and departed.
USS SAN FRANCISCO departed.
[21] USS HOVEY arrived and departed.
USS CHANDLER arrived and departed.
December IS, 1941. — USS MUGFORD arrived and docked in Marine Railway.
December 16. 1941.— JJSS MUGFORD undocked and departed.
USS TENNESSEE arrived.
USS KAULA arrived.
Night inspection made of exterior lighting and shop blackout conditions by
Admiral Furlong, the Captain of the Yard, the Manager, and the Production
Officer.
December 17, 1941. — Repairs to crane rail on east side of DD #1 and to 15-ton
crane were completed. Received permission from Commanding Officer, Hickam
Field, to use area in Hickam Field between Hickam Gate and main Yard Gate
for stowage.
USS SOUTHARD arrived and docked on Marine Railway.
December 18, 1941.— JJSS SOUTHARD undocked and departed.
USS CRELE departed.
Contractors started work in earnest on DD #4.
YSD-27 completed and placed in service.
[22] December 19, 1941. — New 25-ton traveling crane at Repair Basin com-
pleted.
USS SHAW docked on Marine Railway.
USS CURTISS arrived.
USS MONAGHAN arrived and departed. •
USS BREESE arrived and departed.
USS SEMINOLE arrived and departed.
December 20, 1941- — Work begun to repair and place into operation the
1,000,000 gallon concrete underground reservoir in rear of Administration Build-
ing at present unused,
USS SCHLEY departed.
USS CHANDLER arrived and departed.
USS CRAVEN arrived.
USS PENNSYLVANIA departed. This vessel had re-entered the Yard on 12
December, 1941.
USS MARYLAND departed.
USS TENNESSEE departed.
Yard help requested by Base Force salvage party on USS CASSIN, DOWNES
and OGLALA.
December 21, 1941. — Yard Public Works initiated work at Coaling Basin to
provide space for inflammables.
[23] USS CHEW arrived.
USS RAIL arrived.
Base Force took over salvage work on USS OGLALA and NEVADA.
Draft of workmen from mainland received via USS LURLINE.
1274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Blacksmiths
Electricians.
Machinists.,
Molder
Pipefitters...
Help-
ers
Journey-
men
Riggers
Sheetmetal worker
Shipfiter
Welder, Elec
Help-
ers
Journey-
men
and 88 classified laborers — total]167 men.
December 22, JS^i.— USS CHEW departed.
USS BOGGS arrived.
USS NARWHAL departed.
December 23, 1941.— \JSS BOGGS departed.
USS WARD arrived.
USS TROUT arrived.
USS RALEIGH arrived.
[24] USS THORNTON departed.
USS SONOMA arrived.
December 24, 1941.— TJSS SHAW undocked from Marine Railway,
USS CACHALOT departed.
December 25, 1941. — Rear Admiral William R. Furlong, USN, assumed duties
as Commandant of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, and assistant to the district
commandant, in accordance with competent orders.
USS TRACY docked on Marine Railway.
USS HOPKINS arrived.
USS PHOENIX arrived.
USS WARD departed.
December 26, 1941.— TJSS SCHLEY arrived.
USS NARWHAL arrived.
YP-24C arrived.
December 27, 1941.— VSS CURTISS departed.
December 28, 1941.— XJ^S CRAVEN departed.
[25] USS HOPKINS departed.
USS ALLEN arrived.
The 50-ton floating derrick Haviside was damaged, a hole being punched in
her bottom by projection from the CALIFORNIA, alongside which she was
working.
December 29, I94I. — Work completed on inflammable storage at Coal Basin.
USS FARRAGUT arrived.
USS RENHAM arrived.
USS ELLET arrived.
USS COCKATOO arrived.
December SO, iS^i.— USS PHOENIX departed.
USS CHEW arrived.
USS FARRAGUT departed.
USS SALT LAKE CITY arrived.
December SI, 1941.— TJSS HELENA undocked from DD #2.
During this month the Yard force has been engaged for twenty-four hours each
day in herculean efforts to salvage materials and repair vessels and their units
damaged during the raid of 7 December. In addition, the regular work load has
been properly [26] carried on and expedited wherever possible. Arrivals
of vessels entered in this diary indicate arrivals for work to be accomplished;
departures indicate completion of the work and release of availability. Base
I'orce Salvage parties, the Mobile Repair Unit and the Navy Yard have pulled
together to accomplish a common result.
Authenticated —
/S/ C. S. GnXETTE,
Captain U. S. N.
Notes on activities of the Base Force Salvage organization:
Base Force Salvage was organized under the Connnander base force with
Commander J. M. Steel, USN, ofiicer-in-charge. Senior Salvage Engineer, Lieu-
tenant Commander C. L. Curtis, USNR, was in immediate charge of salvage
operations.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1275
A temporary office was established, uortli of Building No. 129, and the first
vessels assigned to this unit for salvage were the USS CASEIN, DORNES, SHAW
and OGLALA.
Both the MARYLAND and TENNESSEE were delivered to the Navy Yard and
study and preparation were made for ultimate salvage of the CALIFORNA,
UTAH, WEST VIRGINIA, ARIZONA, OKLAHOMA, the floating drydock and a
Japanese submarine off Ford Island.
On December 17, the USS VESTAL was floated and the USS RALEIGH was
ready for delivery to the yard. Removal of equipment from the [27]
WEST VIRGINIA was underway. The OGLALA and NEVADA were surveyed
for refloating and this work started.
On December IS pumping operations and repair work were started on YFD-2.
On December 23, the organization had seven diving units in operation. The
Mobile Repair Unit consisting of more than 20 officers and 1,000 men reported
for duty this date.
Pearl Harltor tcater area defense activities:
Captain H. D. Bode, USN, reported for duty as Assistant to the Captain of
the Yard on December 10 and was assigned as defense oflicer in connection with
defenses of the Pearl Harbor water area.
A study w^as made of defense requirements with view to immediate and rapid
procurement of defensive material. A Pearl Harbor inner harbor patrol was
put in operation. Arrangements were made for use of motor torpedo boats and
ready attack destroyer in the harbor patrol organization, and for regular
routine sweeping of the harbor by special equipment (magnetic and acoustic).
Plan for harbor patrol was established by Naval Base Defense Order No. 11,
dated December 26, 1941.
Arrangements were made to expedite the manufacture of antitorpedo nets
of yard design. Installation of Light Indicator Net was started and this was
placed in operation December 27. Establish [28] ment of 16 observation
stations for mine watch was outlined and a start was made on installation of
temporary control lines for range entrance lights and outer channel buoys.
Manufacture of special type floating solid steel curtain of interlocking pile
sheeting was completed for Drydock No. 2 and cofferdam of Drydock No. 3.
District Material Report:
A total of 31 small yachts and sampans were acquired during the period of
7 December to 31 December 1941 for use as district craft. Such craft have been
assigned to Commander Inshore Patrol for inshore patrol, Captain of the Yard
for harbor patrol and Commander Base Force for salvage and supply facilities.
The following eight vessels were partially converted during this period : C. G.
400, C. G. 403, XYP-161, XYP-166, XYP-155, C. G. 196, XYP-157 and XYP-14-14.
During the period of this report the shipyard and drydock facilities of the
Inter-Island Drydock Co., Ltd., the Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd., and Young
Brothers, Ltd., have been available to the district for the repair and conversion
of district craft. The Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd., shipyard has experienced
some labor shortage which has limited tlie facilities to the conversion program
of sampans with deferment of small contractors tugs and barges. No improve-
ment in this labor condition is likely as long [29] as other defense con-
tracts are in progress. The work load and productive force at the Inter-Island
Drydock Co., Ltd., is satisfactory. Drydock facilities at Young Brothers, Ltd.,
are in use. The size of the dock and lack of repair facilities limits the availability
for other craft.
Supply Department Activities:
After the attack on the fleet, arrangements were made to distribute food and
clothing to certain focal points, namely : For Island, for the crews of certain
battleships, to the Arena, the Receiving Station, the Oflicers' Club, the Marine
Barracks and the Naval Hospital.
The first week of the war was a period of continuous demand for emergency
issues of clothing, food, mattresses, blankets, ordnance material, lumber, sand
bags, flash lights, batteries and innumerable ship materials. Issues and deliver-
ies of these items were expedited, but a firm check on the requiring activities was
made to justify quantities requisitioned.
Replenishment and augmentation of all critical items were immediately started
after the outbreak of war. Shipments of fresh and dry provisions, steel, clothing.
1276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
lumber, cots, helmets, small arms, burlap sand bags, bedding, salvage gear, etc.,
were requested of the west coast yards and the Navy Department.
[30] At the end of the first week, practically all of the business of the supply
department had been returned to normal, although accelerated, channels of supply.
Communication Activities:
First action taken was the transmission of air raid warning by NPM on all of
its circuits, done immediately by direction of the District Communication Officer
who was notified of the raid by the communication watch oflBcer at the navy yard.
The high power TAW transmitter at Lualualei had been shut down by previous
arrangement to repair radio towers and shift the general power transformers.
This transmitter was restored to full commission with power from the Hawaiian
Electric Co., by 0949. The high frequency transmitters were placed on auxiliary
operation without interruption.
Radio communication and radio control between the navy yard, radio Wailupe
and Lualualei, and from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to Lualualei were
established by low power sets so that there was no serious interruption of radio
communications on any circuit from the Fourteenth Naval District.
There were many cases of interruptions to telephone communications caused by
damage to cables.
[31] All radio control activities were transferred from Radio Wailupe
into bombproof building No. 2 and Radio Wahiawa by December 17 without
interruption of communications.
The activities of the District Combat Intelligence Unit at Radio Heeia have
been transferred to Radio Wailupe pending further transfer to Radio Wahiawa.
Additional telephone facilities have been installed to meet the sudden increase
of demand and to provide alternate communication channels.
Arrangements for emergency communications, using auxiliary power units
and facilities of the commercial communication companies, have been completed.
Two telephone trunks and one teletype circuit between the Harbor Control
Post and Aliamanu Crater were completed by January 1, 1942, and the laying
of a 100 pair cable to connect the navy yard and the Salt Lake area was under-
way at maximum speed.
Port Director'a Report:
The following Army, Navy, N. T. S., and commercial vessel movements were
effected :
December 7, 1941 :
S. S. JAGERSFONTEIN arrived Honolulu 0930.
U. S. S. ANTARES arrived Honolulu at 0945.
U. S. S. NAVAJO arrived Honolulu at 1400.
[32] December 8, 1941 :
S. S. MANINI arrived at 0700 from Vancouver. B. O.
S. S. PAT DOHENY (TKB) arrived Honolulu at 0730,
S. S. MALAMA arrived Honolulu at 0830 from Pacific Coast.
S. S. HALEAKALA arrived Honolulu at 1630 from Hickam.
S. S. LANSING arrived Honolulu at 0730 from New Guinea.
U. S. S. ANTARES shifted from Honolulu to Pearl Harbor at 0935.
S. S. MAKAWELI arrived Honolulu at 1425 from Pacific Coast.
December 10, 1941 :
U. S. S. ROBIN arrived Honolulu at 1100 from Palmyra.
U. S. S. ROBIN shifted from Honolulu to Pearl Harbor at 1245
S. S. WEIMEA arrived Honolulu at 1245 from San Francisco.
S. S. ROSEVILLE (Norwegian) arrived Honolulu at 1530 from Los Angeles
Harbor,
U. S. C. & Geodetic Survey EXPLORER arrived Honolulu at 1545 from sea.
S. S. PRUSA arrived Honolulu at 1800 from Manila.
December 11, 1941 :
S. S. MAUNALEI arrived Honolulu 1155 from San Francisco.
S. S. ROYAL T. FRANK arrived Honolulu at 1915 from sea.
December 12, 1941 :
S. S. PORTLAND arrived Honolulu at 1400 from Pacific Coast.
S. S. HALEAKALA sailed Honolulu at 1145 for Kahului.
S. S. HALEAKALA arrived Honolulu at 1330 from sea.
S. S. ADMIRAL CHASE arrived Honolulu 1500 from Vancouver, B. C.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1277
December 13, 1941 :
S. S. LANSING sailed Honolulu at 1300 for Vancouver, B. C.
S. S. PYRO sailed Honolulu at 1300 for Pacific Coast.
S. S. HALEAKALA sailed Honolulu at 1830 for Kahului.
S. S. COAST MERCHANT arrived Honolulu at 1400 from Pacific Coast.
U. S. S. REGULUS arrived Honolulu at 1000 from Midway Island.
December 14, 1941 :
S. S. HAWAII sailed from Honolulu at 1600 for Port Allen.
S. S. HALEAKALA arrived Kahului at 0600 from Honolulu.
133} 0615 report received that U. S. S. TREVOR was standing by torpedoed
merchantman. Position 043° true 29 miles from Makapu Point.
0615 report received that S. S. PYRO attacked but not damaged at Or350 by
submarine. Position 334° true 85 miles from Barbers Point.
0645— U. S. S. TREVOR reported picking up survivors from Norwegian
steamer HEOUGH.
0850— U. S. S. TREVOR reported standing in Honolulu, berth Pier 6, with
HEOUGH survivors.
December 15, 1941 :
S. S. HALHAKALA sailed from Kahului at 0500 for Christmas Is.
S. S. CASTOR sailed from Pearl Harbor at 0830 for Honolulu.
S. S. CASTOR arrived Honolulu at 1228 from Pearl Harbor.
S. S. HAWAII arrived Port Allen at 0600 from Honolulu.
U. S. A. T. IRVIN L. HUNT arrived Honolulu at 1242 from Manila.
December 16. 1941 :
S. S. HAWAII sailed from Port Allen at 1600 for Honolulu.
S. S. MANINI sailed from Honolulu at 1200 for Wellington, New Zealand.
S. S. MALAMA sailed from Honolulu at 1200 for Wellington, New Zealand.
S. S. RUSA sailed from Honolulu at 1200 for Panama Canal.
S. S. PATDOHENEY sailed from Honolulu at 1200 for Pacific Coast.
S. S. MAKAWELI sailed from Honolulu at 1760 for Kahului.
S. S. ADMIRAL CHASE sailed Honolulu at 1200 for Sydnej', Australia.
S. S. PERIVL4lNENTE sailed Honolulu at 1200 for Pacific Coast.
U. S. S. KAULA arrived Honolulu at 0900 from Palmyra Island.
S. S. HUMUULA arrived Honolulu at 0900 from Christmas Island.
U. S. A. T. N. L. SCOTT arrived Honolulu at 1600 from Manila, P. I.
S. S. PRES. COOLIDGE arrived Honolulu at 1600 from Manila, P. I.
S. S. STEELMAKER arrived Honolulu at ( ?) from Pacific Coast.
December 17. 1941 :
S. S. MAUNALEI sailed Honolulu at 1730 for Kahului.
S. S. MALIKO sailed Kahului at 1900 for Hilo.
S. S. HAWAII arrived Honolulu 0730 from Port Allen.
S. S. MAKAWELI arrived Kahului at 130 from Honolulu.
[34] December 18, 1941 :
U. S. S. CASTOR sailed Honolulu at 1430 for Pacific Coast.
U. S. S. JUPITER sailed Pearl Harbor at 1430 for Pacific Coast.
S. S. MEMPHIS CITY sailed Hilo at 2000 for Pacific Coast.
S. S. HUALALAI sailed Hilo at 1700 for Pacific Coast.
U. S. S. SEPULGA arrived Pearl Harbor at 1100 from Pacific Coast.
S. S. MAUNALEI arrived Kahului at 0600 from Honolulu.
S. S. MALIKO arrived Hilo at 0600 from Kahului.
S. S. LAKE FRANCIS arrived Honolulu at 0922 from Christmas Is.
December 19, 1941 :
S. S. LAKE FRANCIS sailed Honolulu at 1348 for Pacific Coast.
S. S. RAMAPO sailed Honolulu at 1300 for Pacific Coast.
S. S. LILOA sailed Port Allen at 1345 for Pacific Coast.
S. S. KOHALA sailed Ahukini at 1530 for Pacific Coast.
U. S. A. T. N. L. SCOTT sailed Honolulu at 1120 for Pacific Coast.
S. S. PRES. COOLIDGE sailed Honolulu at 1125 for Pacific Coast.
U. S. S. PROCYON arrived Pearl Harbor at 1045 from Pacific Coast.
S. S. MAPELE arrived Honolulu at 1000 from New Zealand.
S. S. ORTOLAN arrived Pearl Harbor at 1700.
S. S. ETUALALAI arrived Honolulu at 1000 from Hilo.
December 20, 1941 :
S. S. JAGERSFONTFIN sailed Honolulu at 1120 for Batvia.
S. S. MONTGOMERY CITY sailed Honolulu at 1600 for Pacific Coast.
U. S. A. T. IRVIN L. HUNT sailed Honolulu at 1630 for Pacific Coast.
1278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
S. S. MAUNALEI sailed Kahului at 1800 for Hilo.
S. S. MAPELE sailed Honolulu at 1600 for Pacific Coast.
U. S. S. WILLIAM WARD BURROWS arrived Pearl Harbor at 1000 from
vicinity Wake Island. Last port departure Johnston.
December 21, 1941 :
S. S. STEELMAKER sailed Honolulu at 1500 for Kahului.
U. S. S. WILLIAM WARD BURROWS sailed Pearl Harbor "at 0630 for
Honolulu.
S. S. KAILUA sailed Hilo at 1100 for Pacific Coast.
S. S. MALIKO sailed Hilo at 1100 for Pacific Coast.
U. S. S. WILLIAM WARD BURROWS arrived Honolulu at OSOO from
Pearl Harbor.
S. S. MAUNALEI arrived Hilo at 0600 for Kahului.
[35] Davpn — 30 survivors from S. S. LAHAINA arrived Maui and re-
ported vessel attacked by shell fire from surfaced submarine on afternoon
of December 11th. Ship sank December 12th. All the ship's crew cleared
the ship; four men died on way to Maui; survivors returned to Oahu
December 30, 1941 by plane.
December 22, 1941:
S. S. MAKAWELI sailed Kahului at 062.5 for Pacific Coast.
S. S. STEELMAKER arrived Kahului at 0700 from Honolulu.
December 23, 1941 :
S. S. MAKUA sailed Honolulu at 1755 from Ahukini.
U. S. S. LITCHFIELD arrived Pearl Harbor 1330 from sea.
December 24, 1941:
S. S. HAWAII sailed Honolulu 0720 for Kaunakakai.
S. S. HAWAII sailed Kaunakakai at 1330 for Kahului.
S. S. STEELMAKER sailed Kahului at 1730 for Hilo.
U. S. SUMNER sailed Pearl Harbor at OSOO for sea.
S. S. HUMUULA sailed Honolulu 0832 for sea.
U. S. S. DOLPHIN and 1 destroyer sailed Pearl Harbor for sea at 0930.
U. S. S. ALDEBARAN arrived Pearl Harbor at 1500 from Pacific Coast.
U. S. S. HARRIS arrived Pearl Harbor at 1500 from Pacific Coast.
U. S. S. ABINE arrived Pearl Harbor at 1500 from Pacific Coast.
U. S. A. T. TASKER BLISS arrived Honolulu at 1325 from Pacific Coast.
U. S. S. PLATTE arrived Honolulu at 1330 from Pacific Coast.
S. S. PRES. GARFIELD arrived Honolulu at 1335 from Pacific Coast.
U. S. S. HERCULES arrived Pearl Harbor at 1730 from Pacific Coast.
S. S. HAWAII arrived Kaunakakai at 1130 from Honolulu.
S. S. MAKUA arrived Ahukini at 0730 from Honolulu.
U. S. S. GREYLING and U. S. S. LITCHFIELD arrived Pearl Harbor at
1400 from sea.
December 25, 1941:
U. S. S. PROCYON sailed Pear Harbor at 0700 for Honolulu.
S. S. HAWAII sailed Kahului at 1657 for Hilo.
U. S. S. PROCYON arrived Honolulu at 0740 from Pearl Harbor.
S. S. STEELMAKER arrived Hilo at 0700 from Kahului.
[36] December 26, 1941 :
S. S. LURLINE sailed Honolulu 1045 for Pacific Coast.
S. S. MATSONIA sailed Honolulu at 1015 for Pacific Coast.
S. S. MONTEREY sailed Honolulu at 1038 for Pacific Coast.
U. S. S. SABINE sailed Pearl Harbor at 0642 for Honolulu.
U. S. S. PLATTE sailed Honolulu at 0755 for Pearl Harbor.
S. S. HAMAKUA arrived Honolulu at 0955 from sea.
U. S. S. SABINE arrived at Honolulu at 0755 from Pearl Harbor.
U. S. S. PLATTE arrived Pearl Harbor at 0835 from Honolulu.
S. S. HAWAII arrived Hilo at 0600 from Kahului.
S. S. BIRMINGHAM CITY arrived Honolulu at 1215 from Panama Canal.
December 27, 1941 :
S. S. ROYAL T. FRANK sailed Honolulu at 1725 for Port Allen.
S. S. MAKUA sailed Ahukini at 0830 for Kahului.
Twelve (12) survivors picked up off Oahu rejwrted S. S. MANINI torpedoed
December 17, 1941, at 1840 A. S. T. (0504 G. C. T. 18 December), position
18°35'N, 156°13'W. Ship sank in six minutes. Two life boats put over.
December 29, 1941. 19 more survivors picked up by U. S. S. PATERSON,
west of Oahu, making 31 survivors in all.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1279
December 28, 1941 :
U. S. S. SABINE sailed Honolulu at 1528 for Pacific Coast.
U. S. S. NEOSHO sailed Pearl Harbor at 1600 for sea.
U. S. S. CURTISS sailed Pearl Harbor at 1600 for Pacific Coast.
S. S. HAWAII sailed Hilo at 1830 for Kahului.
S. S. STEELMAKER sailed Hilo at 1830 for Kahului.
S. S. ROYAL T. FRANK sailed Port Alleu at 1700 for Honolulu.
S. S. ROYAL T. FRANK arrived Port Allen at 0700 from Honolulu.
S. S. MAKUA arrived Kahului at 0745 from Ahukini.
S. S. ARTHUR FOSS and two barges arrived Honolulu at 1500 from Wake
Island.
1000 — thirteen (13) survivors from S. S. PRUSA arrived Honolulu and re-
ported vessel sunk at 0536, IS December, 1941, — 120 miles south of southern
point Hawaii. Nine (9) missing.
December 29, 1941 :
S. S. HAWAII sailed Kahului (Time not available) for Kaunakakai.
S. S. HAWAII sailed Kaunakakai (Time not available) for Honolulu.
S. S. HAWAII arrived Kahului at 0700 from Hilo.
S. S. STEELMAKER arrived Kanului at 0700 from Hilo.
S. S. ROYAL T. FRANK arrived Honolulu at 0630 from Port Allen.
S. S. HAWAII arrived Kaunakakai at 1100 from Kahului.
[37] December 30, 1941 :
U. S. S. HERCULES sailed Pearl Harbor at 0715 for Honolulu.
S. S. PRES. GARFIELD sailed Honolulu at 1036 for Pacific Coast.
U. S. A. T. TASKER BLISS sailed Honolulu at 1043 for Pacific Coast,
U. S. PROCYON sailed Honolulu at 1010 for Pacific Coast.
U. S. S. HARRIS sailed Pearl Harbor at 0930 for Pacific Coast.
U. S. S. THRESHER sailed Pearl Harbor at 0930 for sea.
U. S. S. HERCULES arrived Honolulu at 0830 from Pearl Harbor.
U. S. S. TRITON arrived Pearl Harbor at 1830 from sea.
S. S. HAWAII arrived Honolulu at 0715 from Kaunakakai.
U. S. S. WALNUT (C. G. S.) arrived Honolulu at 0700 from sea.
December 31, 1941 :
S. S. HAMAKUA sailed Honolulu at 1752 for Nawiliwili.
S. S. HUALALAI sailed Honolulu at 1743 for Kahului.
S. S. BIRMINGHAM CITY sailed Honolulu at 1740 for Kahului.
S. S. NIAGARA arrived Pearl Harbor at 1200 from sea.
/s/ M. R. Debx.
Activities of District Intelligence Oflace and Oflice of the Cable and Radio Censor :
At 0830 December 7, the order was given to have all Intelligence personnel on
active duty report to their stations immediately.
Orders were given to mobilize all Naval Reserve Intelligence personnel and
to establish censorship of cable and overseas radio.
Appropriate intelligence reports (including interrogation of Japanese lieu-
tenant captured from small submarine stranded in Waimanalo Bay and examina-
tion of various documents and equipment from crashed Japanese planes) have
been submitted to proper [38] authorities including the U. S. Pacific
Fleet Intelligence Officer, Combat Intelligence Officer, local representatives of
the Military Intelligence Division and the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and the Office of Naval Intelligence.
During the period 7 to 31 December, 1941, the District Intelligence Service in
collaboration with the local representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion and the Military Intelligence Division conducted investigations of many
rumors and reports concerning alleged parachutists, signals, lights, poisoned
water, unexploded bombs, etc., and assisted the local representatives of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation and the Military Intelligence Division in rounding
up suspects and collecting unauthorized radios and firearms.
At 1100 December 7, censorship was established and a ban clamped down on
all incoming and outgoing cables, radiograms and trans-Pacific telephone calls.
On December 8, after niles for censorship and requirements of messages were
issued to operating companies and to the Field Censors, regular censorship and
release of all traffic were begun at 1300.
Tentative trans-Pacific telephone censorship regulations were issued to the
public on December 19.
1280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Personnel Office Report:
The following information on oflScer and enlisted personnel. [39] is Bub-
mitted for the period of 7 December to 31 December, 1941 :
Officer Personnel
Officers of the Naval Reserve called to active duty in the Fourteenth Naval
District 44
Officers of the Retired List, USN, called to active duty 1
45
Officers received in District from mainland for permanent duty 39
Officers received in District for temporary duty from Pacific Fleet Pool 115
154
Enlisted Personnel
Nmnber of new enlistments in Naval Reserve ' 25
Retired men called to active duty 3
Fleet Reserves called to active duty 0
Naval Reserves called to active duty 43
Total number of enlisted men called to active duty during this period 46
Action at Wake:
Enemy activity started with a bombing attack by 24 twin-engined land planes
on December 8. Almost daily attacks were made by Japanese aircraft until the
island was finally overwhelmed by aerial and surface attack on December 22.
A surface raid was also carried out on December 11. Enemy losses reported
include one light cruiser, four destroyers, a gunboat, a submarine and more than
12 planes.
[40] Action at Midway:
The only enemy activity against Midway was a surface raid on December 8
in which two cruisers and two destroyers are reported to have participated.
Shore batteries registered three 3 inch hits on one of the destroyers and two 5
inch hits on a cruiser. A total of 14 casualties including two dead resulted from
enemy shelling.
A curtailment of contract work was proposed under the existing situation and
plans made to eliminate projects which would require a long time for completion
to a usuable stage. It was proposed to stop work temporarily on the submarine
base buildings and modify other projects to suit immediate needs. It was further
proposed to reduce the contractors' force 50 per cent, leaving a total of 770
workers.
Action at Johnston:
Initial action against Johnston was a star shelling by a submarine on December
12, followed by other surface raids on December 15, 21 and 22. The December 15
raid saw an enemy light cruiser fire 10 salvos at 9,000 yards range. The power
house was destroyed and the stills and boilers were badly damaged. Since the
enemy ceased Are about 10 minutes after and at a time when the island was
well lighted by an oil fire, it was believed that Johnston shore batteries came close
to their mark.
[41] A star shelling, probably by a submarine, occurred on December 21, this
action ceasing after fire was returned by shore battery. On December 22, a
submarine shelled Sand Island and destroyed the CAA homing tower. The 5 inch
battery on Johnston fired 10 salvos with each gun at 7,000 yards range before
the submarine submerged.
In a directive on December 13, it was specified that a sufficient force of civilians
Was to be kept at the island to operate all of the power plants and continue with
a program as follows: Complete gasoline tanks to a usable stage, complete a
runway 2,500 feet in length, construct bachelor officers' quarters and the dis-
pensary, construct temporary magazine as necessary and splinter proof shelters,
construct an emergency sewage system and a salt water system, a power plant
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1281
and distribution system and a radar installation. A total of 270 civilian em-
ployes was estimated as necessary for the outlined work.
On December 25, the commandant directed that the resident officer in charge
and facilities of the contractors' organization be placed at the disposal of the
commanding officer of the air station for necessary defense and protection
measures in the present emergency.
The program was to include shelters and protection around key structures.
After taking care of emergency items, the contractors' force [-$2] was
to complete personnel buildings and services. Temporary storage for ammunition,
gasoline and other supplies, the runway and all essential items were to be
completed at the earliest possible date to permit evacuation of civilian employes
and make room for military personnel. The permanent bombproof shelter and
communication center were rwt to be built as originally planned. Scattered
splinter proof shelters would be substituted as needed.
The foregoing was altered the following day by a directive that Johnston
was to retain the least number of employes — not to exceed 200 — to complete
the essential defense structures including the runway to 2,500 feet length and
to operate mechanical equipment. The least skilled and the nonessential trades
would be evacuated first, and the military force would assist with unskilled
labor as necessary after evacuation.
Of a total of 307 contractors' employes, 110 were evacuated by the end of the
month.
Action at Palmyra:
There was no enemy activity against Palmyra until December 24 when the
air station was shelled by a submarine at about 3,000 yards range. Six rounds
fired registered one hit on the U. S. Engineer Department Dredge Sacramento,
causing only minor damage.
All of the island's batteries were in Condition 1 before the action. The
submarine submerged after a five inch shore battery fired two star shells and
12 navy common A. P. shells. No hits were observed. '
[J/S] Change of the construction program as required by existing condi-
tions was directed.
Palmyra was to maintain the minimum number of civilian employes — not
over 250 — needed to complete structures and essential defense measures, operate
mechanical equipment as well as the dredge and other plant. The island was
to provide a 5,000 foot runway together with emergency defenses.
On December 31, the naval air station reported its radar was in commission.
Summary of Actions Against Submarines:
A total of 52 depth charge attacks on submarine contact were reported by
district forces during the period of this diary.
Reports were received from the USS WARD, USS CHEW, USS SCHLEY,
USS COCKATOO and USCG TANEY.
Enemy submarine activity in the operating areas of these forces was mate-
rially curtailed, giving some tangible evidence of the effect of the attacks.
Hewitt Inquiey Exhibit No. 75
14th Naval Distbict
office of commandant
% Fleet Post Office, San Fbancisco, California
7 June 1945.
C-A12-1/ND14
Serial 03093
Confidential
From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
To : Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy.
Subject : War Diaries of 7 December 1941 — Extracts from.
Enclosures :
(A) Extract from War Diary, 14ND Naval Base Defense Force.
(B) Extract from War Diary of OinC, Net & Boom Defenses, 14ND.
1282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(C) Extract from War Diary of USS CONITOR.
(D) Extract from War Diary of USS WARD.
1. Pursuant to the verbal request of Lieutenant John F. Baecher, USNK, En-
closures (A), (B), (C) and (D) are forwarded herewith.
H. E. Overesch,
H. E. Overesch,
Chief of Staff.
(Enclosure A)
Extract From Wak Diary, Fourteenth Naval District Naval Base Defense
Force
Sunday, December 7, 1941
0654 U. S. S. WARD transmitted the following message to Coml4 :
"We have attacked, fired upon and dropped depth charges upon a subma-
rine operating in the Defensive Sea Area."
0712 Message decoded and delivered to Duty Officer, Lt. Comdr. Kaminski.
0713 Duty Officer notified Chief of Staff, who notified Commandant.
0715 Duty Officer notified Commander in Chief's Duty Officer.
0718 Duty Officer notified Commander Momseii, War Plans Officer.
0720 Duty Officer notified Ensign Logan to report for duty.
0725 Commander Momsen called Duty Officer and had ready duty destroyer or-
dered to proceed as soon as possible to the assistance of the WARD.
0735 Honolulu gate ordered closed.
Certified a true copy :
Geo. H. Simpson,
Geo. H. Simpson,
Aide to the Commandant, 14th Naval District.
June 6, 1945.
(Enclosure B)
Extract From War Diary of Officer, In Charge, Net & Boom Defenses,
Fourteenth Naval District. Kept In Accordance With District Order
No. 2-42.
Sunday, December 7, 1941
DUTY officer's LOG
1145 Assumed the duty December 6, 1941.
" Routine duties.
0712 Received despatch from USS WARD . . . "We have attacked, fired
upon, and dropped charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea
area". Upon receipt of despatch, immediately endeavored to raise Com-
mandant's Aide and could not contact him. Called and contacted
CINCPAC duty officer and read him the despatch. Sent message to ready
duty DD, USS MAHAN "Get underway immediately and contact USS
Ward in defensive sea area". Instnicted Communication Office to send
copy of the last message to the USS WARD for information. Called
Chief of Staff Captain Earle, notifying him of WARD'S message. He
requested confirmation from WARD. Relayed to WARD.
0720 Called War Plans Officer, Comdr. J.Iomsen, and was ordered to call Ensign
Logan. Logan arrived 0725 (approximately).
0725 Received following message from USS WARD "We have intercepted a
sampan — we are escorting this sampan into Honolulu— please inform
Coast Guard to send cutter for relieve us of sampan".
Certified a true copy :
Geo. H. Simpson,
Aide to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
June 6, 1945.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1283
(Enclosure C)
Extract Fbom the Wab Diary of the USS Condor (AMc#14) of December 1941
December 7, I94I
0210-0445 Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance buoys to Pearl
Harbor.
0342 Sighted periscope of a submerged submarine. Following diagram illus-
trates contact :
(The diagram referred to, supra, illustrating contact with a Japa-
nese submarine by the USS WARD on 7 December 1941 at 0342 will
be found reproduced as Item No. 297, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRA-
TIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Submarine when first sighted was approximately 100 feet away on the
port bow on a collision course with the CONDOR but turned sharply
to the left. The following message was sent by yardarm blinker to the
U. S. S. WARD, "Sighted submerged submarine on westerly course, speed
9 knots." About five minutes later the WARD requested by radio further
information concerning the submarine. Information concerning the
course was given and the WARD continued search while this vessel
contniued on its assigned mission. The submarine was not sighted again.
Certified a true copy :
Geo. H. Simpson,
Aide to the Commandant, Fourteehith Naval District.
[Stamped:] 6 Jun 1945.
(Enclosure D)
ExTBAOT From War Diart, U. S. S. Ward
December 7, I94I
0 to4
Steaming singly under boiler #1 and #2 on Channel Entrance patrol
off Pearl Harbor, T. H. Maneuvering on various courses and speeds
to maintain position with standard speed 15 knots, 187 r. p. m.
0200 U. S. S. CORSSBILL and U. S. S. CONDOR stood out of Pearl Harbor
and commenced mine sweeping operations.
4 to 8
0405 Received following visual message from U. S. S. CONDOR: "HAVE
SIGHTED SUBMERGED SUBMARINE ON WESTERLY COURSE".
0408 Sounded General Quarters.
0443 Secured from General Quarters.
0520 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR: "WHAT IS THE DISTANCE OF THE
SUBMARINE THAT YOU SIGHTED". By radio from U. S. S.
CONDOR : "SUBS COURSE WAS 020 MAGNETIC AND WAS HEAD-
ING FOR ENTRANCE BUOYS".
0525 U. S. S. CROSSBILL and U. S. S. CONDOR stood in channel.
0527 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR: "DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL
INFORSIATION CONCERNING THE SUBMARINE". By radio from
U. S. S. CONDOR : "THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION".
0534 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR : "THANK YOU FOR YOUR REPORT OF
SUBMARINE. WE WILL CONTINUE SEARCH. NOTIFY IF YOU
RECEIVE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION".
0605 Exchanged calls with U. S. S. ANTARES.
0640 Sighted unidentified submarine 1 point off starboard bow. Sounded Gen-
eral Quarters. All engines ahead full, course 125° T and pgc, 118 psc.
0645 Commenced firing on submarine. Fired two salves. Observed second
salvo to be direct hit on enemy submarine conning tower. Commenced
depth charge attack.
0646 Ceased firing and ceased depth charge attack.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 2 40
1284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0648 Stopped sampan number 248 (32A453) in vicinity of attack and notified
Coast Guard to escort sampan to Honolulu.
0654 By radio to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District: "WE HAVE
ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES ON
A SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS".
0703 Established sound contact on enemy submarine. Steaming on various
courses and speeds conforming to attack.
0705 Commenced depth charge attack.
0706 Sighted black oil bubble 300 yards astern. Ceased depth charge attack.
Certified a true copy :
Geo. H. Simpson,
Geo. H. Simpson,
Aide to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
June 6, 1945
Office op the Commandant Foijrteenth Naval District
AND Navt Yard, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A.
ND14/N&B/A16-3/RWO
Confidential February 14, 1942.
From : The Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Fourteenth Naval District.
To : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Via : Commander Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District.
Subject : War Diary of the Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses.
Reference: (a) District Order 2-42.
1. In accordance vnth the provisions of reference (a), subject VSTar Diary is
herewith submitted.
J. H. Hoefer,
J. H. HOEFEE,
By direction.
First Endorsement
ND14/ISP/A16^3/RWO
INSHORE Patrol,
Fourteenth Naval District,
Fel)ruary 14, 1942.
From : Commander Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District.
To : Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
1. Forwarded.
J. W. Rogers,
J. W. Rogers,
By direction.
War Diabt of Officer in Charge,-Net & Boom Defenses Fourteenth Naval
District
Kept in accordance with District Order No. 2-42
Sunday December 7 1941
DUTY officer's LOO
1145 Assumed the duty December 6, 1941,
" Routine duties.
0712 Received despatch from USS WARD. . . "We have attacked, fired upon,
and dropped charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area".
Upon receipt of despatch, immediately endeavored to raise Comman-
dant's Aide and could not contact him. Called and contacted CINCPAC
duty officer and read him the despatch. Sent message to ready duty
DD, USS MAHAN "Get underway immediately and contact USS WARD
in defensive sea area". Instructed Communication Office to send copy
of the last message to the USS WARD for information. Called Chief
of Staff Captaiii Earle, notifying him of WARD'S message. He re-
quested confirn^ation from WARD. Relayed to WARD.
0720 Called War Plans Officer, Comdr. Momsen, and was ordered to call Ensign
Logan. Logan arrived 0725 (approximately).
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1285
0725 Received following message from USS WARD "We have intercepted a
sampan — we are escortng this sampan into Honolulu — please inform
Coast Guard to send cutter for relieve us of sampan".
0726 Called Coast Guard. Could not contact an officer but was informed by
Communications Office (14ND) that Coast Guard had received WARD'S
second message simultaneously. Comdr. Momsen, arrived Operations
Office a few minutes after Ensign Logan.
9728 Started to call all department heads, after arranging with telephone office
to keep lines open.
0755 At approximately 0755 (but not later) heard a plane approaching from
south. I saw it from southerly lanai of Administration Bldg. and could
discern Rising Sun insignia of Japan under the wings. Plane was joined
shortly by others with some insignia on it. They were the dive bomber
type. Bombs were dropped and the first attack was on. Tried to reach
the YNg 17 by telephone. Unable to get through. Continued calling
YNg 17 without being able to make contact. Made telephone contact
with YNg 17 at approximately 0830 and ordered Ensign Eastman to close
the A/T and A/B immediately. About this time there was a slight
lull in the attack, followed by a much heavier and concentrated attack,
and I believe that it was in this attack that the formations of torpedo
planes came in over PEARL HARBOR. It was during this attack that
our defensive firing was increasing perceptibly. Noise was deafening.
This attack lasted much longer than the first.
Captain Earle, Chief of Staff, arrived during this second attack.
Endeavored to close HONOLULU A/T and A/B. Had considerable
difficulty in getting through. Finally, Lt. Ottley's home was called and
was informed that he had departed for the Control Station of the
HONOLULU Net and Boom. Tried to reach him there without success.
During this period the third attack began. Defensive firing exceedingly
heavy, bombing likewise.
The Commandant and his Aide arrived during the third attack.
Fires from Hickam Field and 10-10 dock were raging. Everything was
obscured by smoke. It was impossible to use the phone during this
time because of noise. This attack appeared to me to be the heaviest
and longest. After the third attack subsided, contact was made with
the Officer in Charge, HONOLULU Net Operating Station, and he was
ordered to close the HONOLULU Net and Boom immediately. Was
later informed by Mr. Ottley that the Mess Hall at Sand Island had
been bombed and one man injured, but that they were still able to operate.
Capt. Finlay, Senior Coast Guard Officer, had assumed his duties as Captain
of the Port (HONOLULU) and was in direct administrative charge of
the HONOLULU Net and Boom.
Commandant's Aide for Aviation arrived during the last attack.
There followed a lull, followed by what I considered a relatively light
attack.
Shortly thereafter the attacks ceased.
Simultaneously with the events listed above the following occurred on
December 1941.
Communications with iTNg 17 and the Section Base were out. To become in-
formed of the conditions of thev gate vessel, the PEARL HARBOR Net & Boom
Operating Crew, and of Net & Boom vessels at the Section Base, Ensign John H.
Hoefer went to the foregoing and subsequently arranged to have additional
weapons, ammunition gas mask and helmets delivered to them.
Enlisted personnel was not adequate for the war time operation of the Net &
Boom Defenses. Follow up requests for personnel requirements previously sub-
mitted were made to District Personnel Officer.
Study was given to the obtaining of standby winches for the HONOLULU Net
& Boom, and for the PEARL HARBOR Net & Boom.
Routine Duties.
H. Kaminski
Lt. Comdr. D-V (O) U8NR
Monday, December 8, 1941
1. In accordance with previously formulated plans, action was taken to pro-
vide war time ordnance, for all Net and Boom Stations and vessels. Requests
were made to the District Ordnance Officer.
1286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. An underwater inspection was requested to made of the Pearl Harbor anti-
torpedo net and anti-motorboat boom (by divers to be obtained from ComBaseFor)
for the purpose of determining whether the Nets had been directly penetrated
or disturbed during or prior to the attack of the 7th. This inspection, conducted
on the 12th of December, revealed that the nets had not been penetrated and
substantiated the belief that the Japanese submarine known to be in Pearl Harbor,
entered in the wake of our own AMc's, Sunday a. m., December 7th.
3. A recommendation was submitted to the Captain of the Yard to cancel the
system of visual signals now in effect for denoting the opened and closed status
of the Pearl Harbor Net and Boom. This was approved.
Tuesday, December 9, 1941
1. Enlisted personnel urgently needed in Net and Boom operating forces were
obtained from the Emergency Fleet Personnel ofiBce. Additional personnel re-
quests were submitted to District Personnel office to complete operating forces.
2. The attack of Dec. 7th, re-opened the subject of the unprotected areas exist-
ing under the Pearl Harbor Net and Boom. The conventional A/T Net stipu-
lated for this installation by BuOrd extends to a depth of 35' only, and was
designed primarily for torpedo protection. There is a section directly under
the main gate of approximately 350' ranging in depth from 45' to 82' (dredged
for a damaged ship channel), and the possibility of a submarine passing through
this section undetected is realized. Pending tlie receipt of reliable information
or directives it is not deemed advisable to make any immediate changes in the
Net and Boom. However changes will be made as soon as advisable.
3. The District Ordnance Superintendent advised that two 50 cal. machine
guns would shortly be made available for Net and Boom defenses. It is intended
to place one on the YNg 17 and one on the YN 47.
Wednesday, December 10, 1941
1. A study was made and action was taken to provide emergency standby open-
ing and closing wires for the Nets and Booms at both Pearl and Honolulu Harboi-s.
This wire will be available for immediate use "in case of damage to wire now
in use.
2. In view of the questionable reliability of the temporary winches installed for
operation of the Nets and Booms at Pearl and Honolulu Harbors. Tlie Bureau
of Ordnance was requested by despatch to expedite shipment of the regular
Bureau of Yards and Docks winches. In anticipation of the delay expected in
the shipping of the regular winches alternate means of opening and closing the
gates in case of breakdown were established as follows : —
HONOLXJXU A/T and A/B : — PIER 1 WINCH STATION (CLOSING STATION)
#1 equipment temporary installation, diesel winch.
Emereencv means/^^ equipment YN47, COCKENCE
J^mergency meansj^g equipment Army truck M
SAND ISLAND WINCH STATION (OPENING STATION)
#1 equipment original installation, two diesel winches
Emergencv meansif ^ equipment YN47, COCKENCE
i^^mergency meansj^g equipment Army tractors M
PEAKL HARBOR A/T AND A/B GATE VESSEL (CLOSING) STATION
#1 equipment starboard winches
I #2 equipment port winches
#3 equipment YN56. WAPELLO
#4 equipment YN2, YN7, YN53
FORT WEAVER WINCH STATION (OPENING)
#1 equipment temporarily installed two diesel winches
r#2 equipment YN56, WAPELLO
Emergency means] #3 equipment YN2, YN7, YN53
I #3 equipment Army tractors M
M Arrangements were made with the Army oflScers concerned for the use of this
equipment in event of a breakdown of equipment temporarily installed.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1287
Thursday, December 11, 1941
1. Commander Base Force designated staff officer Lieutenant Commander
RAINES to assist in the preparation of tentative plans, and also in the in-
stallation for aerial torpedo net protection of ships, berths, and drydocks in
Pearl Harbor. Working in cooperation with the Public Works Department,
improvised materials were envisioned as being temporarily necessary for this
work. Arrangements were made to obtain sheet piling, re-inforclng rods welded
to fencing, and target rafts to augment the relatively meagre quantity of
regular A/T nets and appurtenances now available at the Net Depot. Work
commenced on this project and the wire fencing separating Pearl Harbor Navy
Yard was removed for this purpose.
2. The baffle in front of the YNg 17, which serves as torpedo protection for
that part of the Pearl Harbor A./T and A/B which otherwise would be un-
protected, was moved in closer to the YNg 17, in view of the data received re-
garding the midget Japanees submarine which washed ashore at Waimanolo
Bay.
. Action was taken to provide a direct phone from the YNg 17 to the Captain
of the Yard's office.
Friday, December 12, 1941 ■
1. A study was made of the feasibility of manufacturing torpedo net grom-
mets in the Navy Yard, so as to make available as soon as possible the large
amount of net that will be needed for protection of capitol ships in Pearl Har-
bor. To this end a canvass was made of the following local fii-ms with the in-
tention of securing whatever wire could be used for this job: Honolulu Iron
Works; Theo H. Davies & Co. Ltd., Oahu Junk Co., American Factors, and
the local utility companies. Samples of some of this wire that could be ob-
tained were delivered to the District Chemical laboratory for measuring tensile
strength and ascertaining chemical composition. Reports received later re-
vealed that this wire would be unsatisfactory for the job, it being much too low
in carbon content to afford suitable wire for manufacturing A/A net grommets.
2. Plans were made to lower the inner A/T and A/B net at Pearl to within
2 feet of the bottom of the channel. This is to be done as soon as additional
net is received from the mainland.
Saturday, December 13, 1941
1. Detailed soundings and the taking of profile data was completed for the
Pearl Harbor A/T and A/B for the purpose of providing working information
as to how to best lower the nets to protect the space created by the dredging
of the damaged ship channel. The problem is attributable to the fact that
the depths of water under the nets when in a closed position is greater than
the depths of water under the nets when in an open position. This condition
prohibits the lengthening of all the nets to the deepest depths because if this
were done, the nets would then become fouled on the bottom when opened because
of the lesser depths existing as stated afore. To overcome this problem a
recommendation was made to fill in, with dredged materials, the hole directly
under the center of the net to a depth of approximately 45'. This recommenda-
tion was opposed because of the lesser depths which would then exist in the
damaged ship channel. A further study is being made of the afore problem.
Sunday, December 14, 1941
1. Plans were made to install a light indicator net at the site of the old anti-
boat log boom in Pearl Harbor channel. Operating personnel, officers and men,
equipment and supplies, were arranged for.
2. The Bureau of Ordnance was despatched to ship by Clipper material needed
for this installation.
Monday, December 14, 1941
1. Work continued on the organization of the Light Indicator Net Station.
2. Captain Bode, U.S.N., assisting the Captain of the Yard, discussed plans
for protecting ships, berths, and drydocks in Pearl Harbor. A study will b<^
made of materials needed, and BuOrd will be despatched to ship same as soon
as possible.
1288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Tuesday, December 16, 1941
1. In preparation for the installation of the Light Indicator Net, the old anti-
boat log boom was removed to the Net Depot quay wall and later stored ashore.
2. An inspection was made of part of the midget Japanese submarine now
at the Submarine Base. Available information indicates that it would be
extremely precarious, if not impossible, for an underwater craft of this type
to directly penetrate or even go under the Pearl Harbor A/T and A/B when
the gate was closed, without advertising its presence.
Wednesday, December 17 1941
1. Routine administration,
Thursday, December 18 1941
1. In consonnance with ONI reports relative to attempted attacks on British
Net and Boom Defenses, consideration was given to the installing of large
searchlights at Net and Boom stations. Approval was granted by BuShips
to install 12" searchlights on the YNg 17 and at the Honolulu Net Operating
Station. This will be done at once.
Friday, December 19, 1941
1. Installation plans were completed for the Light Indicator Net. The Net
Depot will commence assembling the Net today, using these plans for reference.
2. Arrangements were made to equip the YN 7 with electric power transmission
wire so as to enable her to supply current to the YNg 17 in event of power failure
in the gate vessel.
Saturday, December 20, 1941
1. Routine Administration.
Sunday, December 21, 1941
1. The ground moorings for the Indicator Net were layed this date.
2. Indicator Net panels were assembled and brailed up to conform to bottom
soundings. This Net will be installed December 22 and December 23rd. Indicator
floats were shipped by clipper.
Monday, December 22, 1941
1. Routine Administration.
Tuesday, December 23, 1941
1. Study is being made of the practicability of installing a Light Indicator Net
to the seaward (baulk) line (main gate section) of the Pearl Harbor A/T and
A/B. If the study reveals this expediency to be practical, then the opening now
afforded by the damaged ship channel to attacking underwater craft will be
closed. This study is being conducted in conjunction with the study of the
feasibility and advisability of installing an anti-submarine net at the entrance to
Pearl Harbor channel.
Wednesday, December 24, 1941
1. Routine Administration.
Thursday, December 25, 1941
1. Routine Administration.
Friday, December 26, 1941
1. Routine Administration.
Saturday, December 27, 1941
1. In accordance with District policy, Net and Boom vessels completed strip ship
plans.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1289
Sunday, December 28, 1941
1. In light of expanded Net and Boom operations, a complete revision of Net
and Boom enlisted personnel was submitted to District Personnel Officer for
forwarding to the Bureau of Navigation.
Monday, December 29, 1941
1. Routine Administration.
Tuesday, December 30, 1941
1. Routine Administration.
Wednesday, December 31. 1941
1. Routine Administration.
U. S. S. Wabd,
Hmcaiian Area, Fehruary 4, 1942.
DD139/A12-1 (870)
Confidential
From : Commanding Officer.
To : Commandant, 14th Naval District.
Subject: War Diary.
Reference : (a) District Order No. 2-42, Jan. 5, 1942.
Enclosure : (A) War Diary of U. S. S. WARD for month of December, 1941.
1. In accordance with instructions contained in Reference (a) there is sub-
mitted herewith War Diary of the U. S. S. WARD, in triplicate, for the month
of December, 1941.
w. w. outerbbidge.
Wab Diaky
December 7, 1941
0 to 4:
Steaming singly under boiler #1 and #2 on Channel Entrance Patrol
off Pearl Harbor, T. H. Maneuvering on various courses and speeds to
maintain position with standard speed 15 knots, 137 r. p. m.
0200 U. S. S. CROSSBILL and U. S. S. CONDOR stood out of Pearl Harbor
and commenced mine sweeping oi)erations.
4 to 8:
0405 Received following visual message from U. S. S. CONDOR: "HAVE
SIGHTED SUBMERGED SUBMARINE ON WESTERLY COURSE".
0403 Sounded General Quarters,
0443 Secured from General Quarters.
0520 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR: "WHAT IS THE DISTANCE OF THE
SUBMARINE THAT YOU SIGHTED* . By radio from U. S. S. CON-
DOR: "SUBS COURSE WAS 020 aiAGNETIC AND WAS HEADING
FOR ENTRANCE BUOYS".
0525 U. S. S. CROSSBILL and U. S. S. CONDOR stood in channel.
0527 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR: "DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUBMARINE". By radio from
• U. S. S. CONDOR : "THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION'".
0534 By radio to U. S. S. CONDOR : "THANK YOU FOR YOUR REPORT OF
SUBMARINE. WE WILL CONTINUE SEARCH. NOTIFY IF YOU
RECEIVE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION".
0605 Exchanged calls with U. S. S. ANTARES.
0640 Sighted unidentified submarine 1 point off starboard bow. Sounded Generel
Quarters. All engines ahead full, course 125°T and pgc, 118 psc.
0645 Commenced firing on submarine. Fired two salvos. Observed second
salvo to be direct hit on enemy submarine conning tower. Commenced
depth charge attack.
0646 Ceased firing and ceased depth charge attack.
Coast Guard to escort sampan to Honolulu.
0648 Stopped sampan number 248 (32A453) in vicinity of attack and notified
Coast Guard to escort sampan to Honolulu.
1290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0645 By radio to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District: "WE HAVE AT-
TACKED FIRED UPON AND DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES ON A
SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS".
0703 Established sound contact on enemy submarine. Steaming on various
courses and speeds conforming to attack.
0705 Commenced depth charge attack.
0706 Sighted black oil bubble 300 yards astern. Ceased depth charge attack.
0736 From radio to Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and Coast Guard
Station, Honolulu : "WE SIGHTED AND CAPTURED SAMPAN. WE
ARE ESCORTING SAMPAN IN TO HONOLULU. PLEASE NOTIFY
COAST GUARD TO RELIEVE US OF SAMPAN".
0754 Sighted squadrons of enemy planes approaching from Barber's Point
heading for Pearl Harbor.
0755 Japanese planes commenced bombing attack on Pearl Harbor.
DD13<)/A16-3/(759)
U. S. S. Wakd,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 13, 1941.
From : Commanding OflScer.
To: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Via: (1) Commander Destroyer Division EIGHTY.
(2) Commander Inshore Patrol.
Subject : Sinking of a Japanese Submarine by U. S. S. WARD.
1. While patrolling Pearl Harbor Entrance on Sunday, December 7, 1941,
the U. S. S. WARD attacked an unidentified submarine in the Restricted Area
off the Harjjor.
The facts are as follovps:
(1) At 0637 the Officer-of-the-deck said, "Captain come on the bridge". A
conning tower with periscope of a submarine was visible. She was appar-
ently heading for Pearl Harbor trailing the U. S. S. ANTAHES. The AN-
TARES was standing toward the channel entrance towing a lighter.
(2) At 0640 the attack started. The WARD bore down on the submarine
while accelerating from 5 to 25 knots,
(3) At 0645 the WARD opened fire with No. 1 and 3 guns and began
dropping depth charges. One shot was lired from each gun. The shot
from No. 1 gun missed, passing directly over the conning tower. The shot
from No. 3 gun fired at a range of 50 yards or less struck the submarine
at the waterline which was the junction of the hull and conning tower.
Damage was seen by several members of the crew. This was a square
positive hit. There was no evidence of ricochet. The submarine was seen
to heel over to starboard. The projectile was not seen to explode outside
the hull of the submarine. There was no splash of any size that might
result from an explosion or ricochet.
(4) Immediately after being hit the submarine appeared to slow and
sink. She ran into our depth charge barrage and appeared to be directly
over an exploding charge. The depth charges were set for 100 feet.
(5) The submarine sank in 1200 feet of water and could not be located
with supersonic detector. There was a large amount of oil on the surface
where the depth charges exploded.
(6) The attack was made at 0645 which was before Pearl Harbor was
bombed by Japanese planes.
(7) A dispatch by voice transmission was sent to Commandant, Four-
teenth Naval District at 0645 which stated:
"WE HAVE ATTACKED, FIRED UPON, AND DROPPED DEPTH
CHARGES ON A SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA
AREAS".
(8) The performance of duty by the ofllcers and men during this attack
was in accordance with the traditions of this service.
PERTINENT INFORMATION
Appearance of submarine: Cylindrical tube about 80 feet long with small
oval shaped conning tower. It had no deck. It was painted dark green and
was covered with moss indicating that it had been at sea for a considerable
period.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1291
Behavior during attack: In spite of the five minute run from the time of
sighting and time of attack, the submarine apparently did not see or detect
the WARD. It was making from 8 to 10 knots and was apparently bent on
following the ANTARES into port. Exact distances are not known but at the
time o^ the first shot the range was not more than 100 yards and for the
second shot the range was 50 yards or less. The submarine passed very close
to our stern.
W. W. OUTEEBRIDGE.
DD139/A16-3/(793)
U. S. S. Wakd,
December 23, 1941.
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
From : Commanding Ofllcer.
To : Commander Destroyer Division EIGHTY.
Subject: Attacks on Submarines, report of.
1. The following is a summary of attacks made upon submarines by this
vessel between the dates of 7 and 17 December, 1941 :
Dace
Time
12-7-41
0640
12-7-41
0705
12-7-41
0840
12-7-41
1020
12-7-41
1127
12-8-41
0619
12-8-41
0655
12-8^1
1349
12-9-41
1158
12-10-41
0033
12-10-41
1728
12-10-41
2115
12-11-41
1514
12-11-41
1547
12-11-41
1637
12-11-41
1920
12-16-41
2042
12-17-41
1648
12-17-41
2012
Summary
Fired 2 shells at and dropped 4 depth charges on enemy submarine on suiface.
Sank submarine. See Commaning Officer, Li. S. S. WARD Ltr. of IS Dec-
ember 1941 to Commandant. 11th Naval District
Dropped 5 depth cnarges on sonic contact. Sighted black oil bubble 300 yards
astern after attack _
Dropped 2 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown
Dropped 3 depth charges on sonic contact. Observed oil on surface. Dropped
2 more depth charges on sonic contact under oil slick. No further contact..
Dropped 4 depth charges on sonic contact. Sighted heavy oil slick on surface
after attack
Dropped 5 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown. Dropped 4
more charges on sonic contact after circling to verify first attack
Dropped 2 depth charges on sonic contact. Observed heavy oil slick on
surface
Dropped 4 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown
Dropped 6 depth charges on sonic contact indicated by smoke bomb from
patrol plane. Circled for second attack. Dropped 6 more charges. Con-
tacts were excellent. Large air bubble came to surface. Heavy oil slick in
ijombed area was seen. Planes also dropped depth charges
Dropped 4 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown _.
Dropped 6 depth charges on sonic contact. Heavy oil on surface.
Dropped 4 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown
Dropped 4 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown
Dropped 6 depth charges on sonic contact. Considerable oil on surface
Dropped fi depth charges on plane indication and sonic contact. Heavy oil
slick on surface —
Dropped 6 depth charges on sonic contact. Results unknown
Dropped 8 depth charges on sonic contact. Seventh charge brought up a large
air bubble accompanied with a quantity of oil...
Dropped 8 depth charges on patrol plane indication. Results unknown
Dropped 8 depth charges on sonic contact. Contact was made at 1500 yards.
Ranging was not stopped in order to listen for screw noises. Bearing was
practically steady. Sound operator reported that it might be a surface ship
at 800 yards the ship was 15° wide. Contact was clear and positive. Went
ahead full speed. At 200 yards slowed to 15 knots. 10 seconds later dropped
8 de[jth charges at 4 second intervals. Charges set alternately for 50 and 100
feet. The seventh charge sent up a double column of water in a "V" shape
which rose 2." feet higher than any other column. All charges exploded. No
contact could be made after the attack
No. of
charges
/S/ W. W. OUTERBRIDGE.
December 7, 19^1
8 to 12:
Steaming as before.
0800 Mustered crew on stations ; no absentees. Made daily inspection of maga-
zines and smokeless powder samples ; conditions normal.
0809 Sighted oil pool. Under intermittent gunfire from unidentified guns at
times during air attack, and bombed several times, no damage being
sustiiined. At one time enemy fighter planes repulsed with machine
guns.
0840 Dropped two more depth charges, continuing search with sound gear.
1292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0901 Various units of U. S. Pacific Fleet commenced standing out of Pearl
Harbor.
1020 Made attack on enemy submarine, dropping three depth charges.
1031 Dropped two depth charges on oil slicli.
1032 Steering gear jammed hard left.
1035 Steering gear repaired.
1127 Made contact with enemy submarine on sound gear. Dropped four depth
charges. Sighted heavy oil slick on surface.
1150 Made depth charge attack ; none of charges exploded.
12 to 16:
No comment.
16 to 20:
No comment.
20 to 24:
Steaming as before.
2110 Sighted anti-aircraft fire from Pearl Harbor. Sounded General Quarters.
2130 Secured from General Quarters.
December 8, 19^1
9 to 4:
No comment.
4 to 8:
Steaming as before.
0530 Sounded General Quarters.
0610 Established sound contact on enemy submarine. Steaming on various
courses and speeds conforming to attack, dropped four depth charges,
no evidence of hits scored on enemy submarine.
0645 Secured from General Quarters.
0645 Established sound contact on enemy submarine and commenced attack,
maneuvering on various courses and speeds conforming to attack;
dropped two charges.
0710 Returned to the position of attack sighted heavy oil slick.
0742 Various units of U. S. Pacific Fleet standing out of channel.
8 to 12:
No comment.
12 to 16:
Steaming as before.
1240 U.S.S. ALLEN stood into Pearl Harbor.
1349 Made contact on sound gear and attacked, dropping four depth charges.
1513 U.S.S. THORNTON escorting U.S.S. TRESKER, stood into Pearl Harbor.
16 to 20:
Steaming as before.
i648 U.S.S ENTERPRISE stood in with Destroyer Screen.
1710 U.S.S. PERRY stood out.
1745 Made contact with submarine, maneuvered for attack, lost contact.
20 to 24:
No comment.
December 9, 1941
0 to 4:
No comment.
4 to 8:
No comment.
8 to 12:
Steaming as before. Mustered crew on stations; no absentees. Made
daily inspection of magazines and smokeless iwwder samples ; conditions
normal.
0940 U. S. S. PLUNGER, U. S. S. POMPANO, U. S. S. POLLACK and an un-
identified submarine stood into Pearl Harbor.
0943 U. S. S. LITCHFIELD stood in.
1158 Spotted smoke bomb dropped from plane, sounded general quarters. Made
contact with sound gear on object believed to be submarine, maneuvered
on various courses and speeds conforming to attack and dropped six
depth charges.
12 to 16:
1207 All engine ahead full. Made sound contact on enemy submarine, maneuvei
ing on various courses conforming to attack. Dropped 6 depth charges.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1293
1230 Secured from general quarters and resumed patrol in South Western Sec-
tion of Restricted Area.
16 to 20:
1610 Sounded general quarters in accordance with air raid warning from Com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
1658 Secured from general quarters.
1740 Sounded general quarters, having contact on sound gear.
1747 Secured from general quarters.
1910 Established contact with enemy submarine. Sounded general quarters.
1916 All stations manned and ready for general quarters.
1943 Lost contact with submarine ; secured from general quarters.
20 to 2Jt:
2320 Sounded general quarters ; proceeded to position off Ahua Point to investi-
gate report that shore battery was being illuminated by light from small
boat off shore.
2345 Completed thorough Investigation which revealed nothing, returned to
patrol.
2355 Secured from general quarters.
Deceml)er 10, 1941
0 to 4:
Steaming under boilers number 1 and 2 on various courses and speeds
maintaining patrol station in Southwestern Section of Restricted Area,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., standard speed 15 knots (184 r. p. m.).
0029 Sounded general quarters.
0033 Commenced depth charge attack on enemy subjnarine. Steaming on vari-
ous courses and speeds conforming to attack. Dropped 4 depth charges.
0049 Secured from general quarters and resumed patrol.
0230 Observed U. S. S. TANEY commenced depth charge attack off starboard
quarter, distance 700 yards.
0239 U. S. S. TANEY resumed patrol duties.
4 to 8:
No comment.
8 to 12:
No comment.
12 to 16:
No comment.
16 to 20:
1724 Sounded general quarters. Steaming on various courses and speeds con-
forming to search for enemy submarine.
1725 Definite sound contact established.
1728 Dropped 6 depth charges on contact bearing 188° 2.3 miles from number 1
entrance channel buoy.
1744 Secured from general quarters. Proceeded to investigate surface water
at scene of attack and observed heavy oil slick.
20 to 24:
2110 Made contact with submarine ; sounded general quarters.
2115 Made attack on submarine, dropping 4 depth charges.
2129 Secured from general quarters.
December 11, 1941
0 to 4:
No comment.
4 to 8:
No comment.
8 to 12:
No comment.
12 to 16:
Moored as before.
1400 Commander Destroyer Division EIGHTY shifted to U. S. S. WARD.
1410 Underway pursuant to Commander Destroyer Division EIGHTY orders,
on various courses and speeds conforming with channel for Channel
Entrance Patrol. Captain at the Conn, Navigator on the Bridge.
1455 U. S. S. WARD relieved U. S. S. RAMSAY of Channel Entrance Patrol,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
1512 Made contact with submarine. Sounded general quarters.
1294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1547 Made attack, dropping 6 depth charges. Inspected slick and found con-
siderable oil in slick caused by attack.
1559 Secured from general quarters.
16 to 20:
1637 Sighted smoke bombs dropped from U. S. Navy patrol bomber. Sounded
general quarters. Made contact with sound gear on submerged object.
Navy planes dropped depth bombs two points off starboard bow, distance
2000 yards. Made depth charge attack on submerged object, dropping 6
charges. Investigation revealed heavy oil slick on surface.
1815 Secured from general quarters and resumed patrol.
1920 Made sound contact on submerged object. Sounded general quarters.
Made depth charge attack, dropping 6 depth charges.
1940 Secured from' general quarters.
20 to 24:
No comment.
December 12, 1942
No comment.
Decemler 13, 1942
0 to 4:
Steaming under boilers number 1 and 2, patrolling southwestern section
of Prohibited Area off Pearl Harbor, T. H. "Various units of U. S.
Pacific Fleet, various yard and district craft in vicinity ; U. S. S. CHEW
patrolling southeastern Prohibited Area. Maneuvering on various
courses and speeds maintaining position, with standard speed 15 knots,
182 r. p. m. Ship darkened ; condition 2 set.
0220 In accordance with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District dispatch 1236
of December 11, 1941, proceeded to Channel Entrance to search for
lighted vessel reported off entrance buoys. Found entrance and sur-
rounding area clear.
0255 Secured from' general quarters and resumed patrol.
'4 to 8:
0530 Held general quarters.
0640 Secured from general quarters.
0659 Heard propellor sounds on listening gear. Held general quarters.
0706 Secured from general quarters.
0715 U. S. S. WASMUTH, U. S. S. PERRY stood out.
0735 Sighted body of Japanese aviator bearing 220° from channel entrance
buoys, 2 miles distant.
0748 Heavy cruiser stood in.
8 to 12:
Steaming as before. Mustered crew on stations ; no absentees. Made daily
inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples ; conditions
normal.
0915 Patrol Torpedo Boat stood out of channel, picked up body of Japanese
flyer and stood in Pearl Harbor Channel.
12 to 16:
No comment.
16 to 20:
No comment.
20 to 24:
No comment. x
December 14, 1941
0 to 4:
No comment.
4 to 8:
No comment.
8 to 12:
Steaming as before.
0800 Mustered crew on stations ; no absentees. Made daily inspection of maga-
zines and smokeless powder samples ; conditions normal.
0816 Navy tanker stood in.
0925 Sounded general quarters. Proceeded to East of Channel Entrance Buoys
to search for reported submarine.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1295
0958 Discovered body of Japanese Aviator bearing 207°T from Channel Entrance
Buoys, 114 miles distant.
1015 Secured from general quarters.
1045 Various destroyers standing out preparatory to a Fleet Sortie
12 to 16:
No comment.
16 to 20:
No comment.
20 to 24:
No comment.
No comment.
December 15, 19-^1
December 16, 19^1
0 to 4:
No comment.
4 to 8:
No comment.
8 to 12:
No comment.
12 to 16:
No comment.
16 to 20:
No comment.
20 to 24:
Steaming as before.
2037 Made sound contact with submarine.
Sounded general quarters. Maneuvers on various courses and speeds con-
forming with attack, dropped 8 depth charges. Bubble from the seventh
charge was large and of a dark color.
Lay to in area of contact but could not renew contact.
Secured from general quarters.
2042
2050
2057
December 17, I941
0 to 4:
No comment.
4 to 8:
No comment.
8 to 12:
No comment.
12 to 16:
No comment.
Steaming as before.
1635 Sounded general quarters and proceeded to smoke-bomb dropped by plane
4 miles south of Hickam Tower.
1640 Dropped 8 depth charges.
1648 Secured from general quarters.
20 to 24:
2002 Made sonic contact and sounded general quarters. Attacked, dropped 8
depth charges. Location of contact : 3.2 miles, bearing 231°T from
Entrance Buoys.
2025 Secured from general quarters.
No comment.
No comment.
No comment.
No comment.
No comment.
No comment.
No comment.
December 18, I94I
December 19, 1941
December 20, I94I
December 21, I94I
December 22, I94I
December 23, 1941
December 24, I94I
1296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
No comment.
No comment.
No comment.
No comment.
No comment.
No comment.
No comment.
December 25, 1941
December 26, 19^1
December 27, 1941
December 28, 1941
December 29, 1941
December SO, 1941
December 31, 1941
USS Condor AMc #14
' December 7, 1941
0210-0445: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl
Harbor.
0342: Sighted periscope of a submerged submarine. Following diagram
illustrates contact :
(The diagram referred to, supra, illustrating contact with a Japa-
nese submarine by the USS WARD on 7 December 1941 at 0342, will
be found reproduced as Item No. 298, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRA-
TIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Submarine when first sighted was approximately 100 feet away on
the port bow on a collision course with the CONDOR but turned
sharply to the left. The following message was sent by yardarm
blinker to the U. S. S. WARD, 'Sighted submerged submarine on
westerly course, speed 9 Ijnots.' About five minutes later the WARD
requested by radio further information concerning the submarine.
Information concerning the course was given and the WARD con-
tinued search while this vessel continued on its assigned mission.
The submarine was not sighted again.
0758: General Quarters Sounded. (Moored at Section Base, Bishops
Point.) Two .30 cal. machine guns were rigged and attacking Japa-
nese Planes were fired on with no apparent results. Exi)ended 50
rounds of .30 cal. ammunition.
0943-1015: Swept for Magnetic Mines In area off entrance buoys to Pearl
Harbor.
3015 : A Cruiser of the ST. LOUIS class evidently mistaking the Oropesa
float of the CROSSBILL for a submarine turned sharply to the left
and commenced firing at said float. In so doing she severed the
magnetic cable of this ship approximately 100 yards from the out
board end. The following diagram will serve to illustrate the
situation :
(The diagram referred to, supra^ illustrating attack by a U. S.
cruiser on a float mistaken for a submarine, will be found reproduced
as Item 299, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
1205-1230 : Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor.
2110: General Quarters Sounded. (Moored at side to Berth #12 Navy
Yard, Pearl Harbor. ) Expended 50 rounds .30 cal. ammunition.
2140 : Secured from General Quarters.
2400 : No casualties to Personnel.
December 8, 1941
0435: Sounded General Quarters. Air Raid Alarm. (Moored port side
to Berth #12 Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.)
0703 : Secured from General Quarters. No action.
1010-1105: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance buoys to Pearl
Harbor and in the channel to the Net.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1297
0520;
0721-0905 :
0705-0905;
December 9^ 1941
1600: Sounded General Quarters. Standing by for an air raid. (Moored
port side to USS COCKATOO, Section Base, Bishops Point)
1815 : Secured from General Quarters. No Action.
December 10, 1941
6401: Sounded General Quarters. Air raid Alarm. (Moored port side
to USS COCKATOO, Section Base, Bishops Point)
Secured from General Quarters. No Action.
Swept for Magnetic Mines in area of entrance bouys to Pearl
Harbor and in channel to the Net.
December 11, 1941
Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl
Harbor and in channel to the Net.
December 12, 1941
0325: Sounded General Quarters. Air raid Alarm. (Moored port side
to USS COCKATOO, Section Base, Bishops Point)
0421 : Secured from General Quarter. No Action.
0732-1025 : Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Honolulu
and in channel to the Net.
December 20, 1941
0642-0900 : Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Har-
bor and in channel to the Net.
December 21, 1941
0648-0855 : Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Har-
bor and in charmel to the Net.
0927-1050: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance Bouys to Pearl
Harbor,
1350: Sounded General Quarters. Air raid Alarm. (Moored port side
to USS REEDBIRD at Section Base, Bishops Point)
1412 : Secux'ed from General Quarters. No Action.
December 22, 1941
0632-0830 : Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Har-
bor and in channel to Net.
0905-1155: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl
Harbor and in the channel to Net.
December 23, 1941
0705-1035 : Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl
Harbor and in the channel to Net.
December 24, 1941
0710-1055 : Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl
Harbor and in channel to the Net.
December 25, 1941
0655-1058: Swept for Magnetic Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl
Harbor and in channel to the Net.
December 26, 1941
0623-0930 : Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Har-
bor and in channel to the Net.
1298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
December 27, 1941
0628-0915 : Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Har-
bor and in channel to the Net.
Deeemher 28, 1941
0618-1015 : Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Har-
bor and in channel to the Net.
December 29, 1941
0623-0925 : Swept for Moored Mines off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor and
in the channel to the Net.
December 30, 1941
0618-1036 : Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Har-
bor and in channel to Net.
December 31, 1941
0623-1038 : Swept for Moored Mines in area off entrance bouys to Pearl Harbor
and in channel to the Net.
W. A. Wisler,
W. A. WiSLER,
Commanding.
Sn
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 76
United States Pacitic Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship,
c/o Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H., Jan. 4, 1942.
Cincpac File No.
A16-3/PH/(ll)
Serial 040
Confidential
First Endorsement on Com. 14 CA12-1/A16-3/ND14 (01531) of Dec. 30, 1941.
From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To : Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.
Subject : Report on Battle of Pearl Harbor, 7 December, 1941.
1. Returned.
2. The statement contained in paragraph 3 of enclosure (A) to the basic letter,
regarding the CONDOR'S sighting a periscope, at 0350, while sweeping off the chan-
nel entrance buoys, is information not previously reported to the Commander-in-
Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. It is requested that the report be confirmed,
if possible, and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, advised what
action if any was taken to inform either the Commandant or the Commander-in-
Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, in this case.
3. Return of all papers is requested.
C. W. NIMITZ.
C-A12-1/ND14
(074)
Confidential
January 7, 1942
Second and
Con 14 C-A12-1/A16-3/
MD14( 01531) of Dec. 30 1941.
From : Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
Subject : Report on battle of Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.
1. Returned.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1299
2. The information submitted in paragraph 3 of enclosure (A) was taken from
report of Commanding Officer of CONDOR dated 19 December 1941, and veri-
fied by extracts from Signal Log of WARD.
3. Statements by the Officer of the Deck, Ensign R. C. McCloy, USNR, R. C.
Uttrick Qm. 2c USNR, and R. B. Chavez, Sea Ic, USNR (Helmsman), on watch
abroad the CONDOR at the time, indicate the following: — At about 0350 on 7
December 1941 the CONDOR was conducting sweeping operations approximate-
ly 1% miles south west of entrance buoys. The attention of Ensign MJcCloy
was attracted to what, in the darkness, appeared to be a wave. After studying
it momentarily, he called Uttrick and with further examination with binoculars
they both were convinced that what they saw was the periscope of a submerged
submarine. Chavez could make out a wake but no periscope. The best estimate
of least distance from CONDOR to periscope at any time is about 50 yards.
4. The CONDOR at 0357 informed the WARD, Channel Entrance Patrol, by
visual of this contact. The WARD immediately instituted a search for the sub-
marine. At about 0650 she sank an unidentified submarine and made report as
recorded in her file 759 of December 13, 1941.
5. No report was made to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, or to
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, until the WARD had actually and definitely
established contact with an unidentified submarine.
HEwm Inquiry Exhibit No. 77
Office of the Commandant Foitbteeth Naval District and Navy Yard, Pearl
Habboe, Hawaii, U. S. A.
3 November 1941.
C-A16-1/A&N/ND14
(01171)
Confidential
From : Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
To : Chief of Naval Operations.
Via : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
References: (a) CNO Confidential dispatch 152227 of October 1941.
(b) Letter of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
dated 29 October 1941.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (b).
1. It is recommended that no steps be taken at the present time to concentrate
the Army and Navy in a common building as proposed in reference (a).
2. Since the visit of Captain Mountbatten, R. N., who gave his views on this
subject and the experiences of the British along parallel lines, this and allied
matters have been under consideration by: (a) Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific
Fleet; (b) Commanding General, Hawaiian Department ; (c) Commandant, Four-
teenth Naval District.
3. On receipt of reference (a), a paraphrased copy of this dispatch was sent to
the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department ; his comments in connection
therewith are given in reference (b), enclosure (A).
4. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, accompanied by the Command-
ant, Fourteenth Naval District, has visited the underground chambers at Alia-
manu Crater and had their functions explained in a brief way by the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department. If one or more of these chambers were to be
assigned to the Navy, ft is not apparent that any real benefit would be derived
therefrom.
5. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, has offices ashore, as has Com-
mander Submarines, Scouting Force. It appears certain that at the outbreak of
hostilities, even though the Commander-in-Chief may return to his flagship. Com-
mander Base Force will have to have offices ashore. Accordingly, the Com-
mander-in-Chief has requested that suitable offices be constructed for the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Commander Base Force, and Commander Submarines, Scouting
Force. I do not believe that the Commander-in-Chief or the Fleet operations
would be benefited by being in a common office building with the Commanding
General and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. As a matter of fact,
I am inclined to believe that his best interests would be served by being in a build-
ing with only agencies of the Fleet therein.
6. There has been established in this district a joint harbor control post ; this
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 2 41
1300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
is located at District Headquarters. Here there are provisions for officers of the
Coast Artillery, the Army Air orps, the Fleet Air Detachment, and the Submarine
Force, all in addition to the district officers who work in connection with tlie local
defense forces. So far as can be ascertained without actual experience in war,
this post fulfills the requirements of the area.
7. In addition to the above, funds are available for and construction will soon
be undertaken on a bomb-proof communication center adjacent to District Head-
quarters. Provision will have to be made in case of air raids for certain features
of the harbor control post to occupy this bomb-proof shelter.
8. The Commandant feels that no delay is acceptable in providing for the pres-
ent needs of the Commander-in-Chief. His needs are real and immediate. What
should be done later in connection with a combined operating center can best be
determined by actual experience.
C. C. Bloch.
C. C. Bloch.
Advance copy to: Chief of Naval Operations (by clipper mail).
Headquarters Hawaiian Depabtment,
Office of the Depaktment Commandek,
Fort Shatter, T. H., 29 October, 1941.
Confidential
Admiral C. C. Bloch,
Commandant, 14th Naval District, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
Dear Admiral Bloch : Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of October 21,
1941, file No. C-A16-1/A&N/ND14 (01101), with reference to a combined oper-
ating center and command post for Army and Navy functions in this
Department.
While I am strongly in favor of combined operating centers for equivalent
units of Army and Navy forces, I do not believe that all of the operating centers
should be combined into one single building. There are strong strategic and
tactical reasons why the various Army functions cannot be located together in
the same structure. The different elements have distinct missions, and while
it is necessary to establish close liaison and communications between these
various Army headquarters, it is equally necessary that they be located in
separate command posts for efficiency of individual operation. Also if the
various Army headquarters were to be combined in one location, we would be
confronted with technical problems involving communications to subordinate
elements which would be extremely difficult to solve. From a security stand-
point, I do not believe that this combination of Army activities would be
advisable; a lucky hit effecting either the structure or communication would
have a far greater adverse effect than a similar hit on one of the separate
command posts.
The Army already has its command posts under construction and these will
be completed in the near future. The Department command post is in the
Aliamanu Crater, the 18th Bombardment Wing is on the southwest outer slopes
of Aliamanu, and the Interceptor command post consisting of fighter planes,
antiaicraft artillery and the aircraft warning service, is at Fort Shaffer. The
command post of the Hawaiian Air Force is also to be located at Fort Shaffer.
Communications facilities are now available to all these locations, and arrange-
ments can easily be made to expand each into a combined operating center for
the equivalent Army and Navy units. All of these structures are being built
underground by tunneling methods ; this requires a minimum of material. A
combined operating center located in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor would prob-
ably have to be a cut and cover type of structure and to afford the same protec-
tion that we now have in the tunnels, it would have to be very massive. Under
present conditions securing the necessary materials would be difficult.
It is therefore suggested that instead of a single operating center, considera-
tion be given to the construction of additional space for Navy units adjacent to
the existing command posts of equivalent Array units. This suggestion would
mean that the Navy structure for the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, the
Commandant I4th Naval District, and various fleet echelons would be located
in the Aliamanu Crater, that the command post for Patwing two would be
located adjacent to the Army command post for the 18th Wing, and that the
Navy fighters could be located adjacent to the Army's interceptor command post,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1301
and that space for the Navy Air Headquarters could be made available either
adjacent to the headquarters of the Army Air Force, or with Patwing two.
Very sincerely yours,
/s/ Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
Navy Depaetment
office of the chief of naval operations
Washington
(Du-Et)
In reply refer to Initials and No.
OP-12B-6
(SC)A16-3(9)
Doc. 37746
Serial 01212
ConHdential
FOtTRTH MEMOKANDUM ENDORSEMENT
From : The Director, War Plans Division.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Combined operating center from Army and Navy.
References :
(a) CNO conf. despatch 182010 of December 1941.
(b) Com-14 dispatches 291535 (CR0190) and 292120 (CR0346) of December
1941.
(c) Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff's Joint letter on Joint
Operations Centers, dated December 31, 1941.
1. In view of the orders issued by Chief of Naval Operations in reference (a),
and the resulting action to establish a joint operations center in Hawaii as indi-
cated by reference (b), it is recommended that the basic letter be filed without
further action.
2. Reference (c) is expected to implement the establishment of joint oi)erations
centers in all coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors.
3. The remarks of the Director, Radio Liaison, in the 2nd Memorandum En-
dorsement, have been noted as applicable to the problem of joint operational
command in general, as well as to the specific problem at hand in this corre-
spondence.
R. K. Turner.
R. K. TuRlfEB.
Copy to :
■Op-12B
Op-14
Op 30
Navy Department
OFFICE OF the CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Washington
In reply refer to Initials and No.
OP-30C-DG
(SC)A16-3(9)
Doc. 37746
Memo foe Captain Read
December 31, 1941.
Subject: Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy (Ltr. from Com-14 to
CNO via Cincpac C-A1&-1/A&N/ND14 01171 of 11-3-41)
1. Rather than make the basic document appear more ridiculous than it now
does, I am returning this informally.
2. The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, have entirely
"missed the boat".
R. W. Gary
R. W. Cabt
Room 1066
79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 42
1302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Oi>-14/LJH
(SC)A16-3(9)
Serial 01114
Confidential
5. In other words, if the duties of the Commandant at Pearl Harbor and the
Commanding General at Fort Shafter, in Hawaii, are such that their local duties
make it essential that they remain at the Navy Yard and with th.e troops, re-
spectively, my answer is that there should be additional officers assigned spe-
cifically for the supreme command in Hawaii, and staff officers for Plans, Opera-
tions, Intelligence, and Communications transferred to these officers, and that a
protected location for their offices be provided. Certainly the importance of the
broader duties is such that their efficiency should not be confused due to the local
duties and routine.
S. C. Hooper.
In reply to Initials and No.
Op-14/LJH
(SC)Alfr-3(9)
Serial 01114
Confidential
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, Decemher S, 19 'it.
Second Memorandum Endorsement
From : The Director, Radio Liaison Division.
To : The Director, Naval Districts Division.
Subject : Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.
1. Forwarded.
2. Due to the many and complex facilities under the organization responsible for
defense in any given land area bordering the ocean, the most perfect set-up for
command is one in which the supreme command is exercised by one officer best
equipped of any for the tasli, in direct and immediate touch with his staff, com-
prising intelligence, plans, operations, and communications.
3. Because our defense is under two officers, Army and Navy, we must try and
arrange matters so that where component parts of the commands are inter-
woven these two can function as nearly as possible as one. If the duties of the
Commanders beyond command and operation duties, i. e., training duties, materiel
duties, and command of local units of their re.'^pective over-all commands, will in-
terfere with the most efficient exercise of their primary duty, which is their higher
duty in command of the over-all command, then the higher command should be re-
lieved of detail duties (except for inspection for over-all efficiency) of the lower
commands under him. and additional subordinate officers should be ordered to
assume these duties. The two higher commands of the two services will then be
free to choose together the joint operating center, with their respective staffs, with-
out regard to the lower command duties.
4. Without opportunity for consultation and evaluation of the same information,
it is not possible for two widely separated staffs to prepare efficiently decisions on
complex matters of immediate urgency for the two opposite service commanders
as well as if they have immediate access to one another. This is indisputable.
Therefore, it should be accepted, and everything within reason subordinated to
that principle, as the most efficient high command possible is necessary.
OP-12B-6 (Du-Et)
(SC)A16-3(9)
Doc. 87746 * -- .
Serial 01212
Confidential
Fourth Memorandum Endnrspment
From : The Director, War Plans Division.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Combined operating center for Army and Navy.
References :
(a) CNO conf. despatch 182010 of December 1941.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1303
(b) Com-14 dispatches 291535 (CRO190) and 292120 (CR034fi) of Decem-
ber 1941.
(c) Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff's Joint letter on Joint
Operations Centers, dated December 31, 1941.
1. In view of the orders issued by Chief of Naval Operations in reference (a),
and the resulting action to establish a joint operations center in Hawaii as indi-
cated by reference (b), it is recommended that the basic letter be filed without
further action.
2. Reference (c) is expected to implement the establishment of joint operations
centers in all coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors.
3. The remarks of the Director, Radio Liaison, in the 2nd Memorandum En-
dorsement, have been noted as applicable to the problem of joint operational
command in general, as well as to the specific problem at hand in this cor-
respondence.
R. K. TUENER.
Copy to :
Op-12B
Op-14
Oi>-30
In reply refer to Initials and No.
Op-12B-7-My
(SC)A16-3(9)
Serial 0134212
Navy Department
office of the chief of naval operations
Washington
Confidential — First Memorandum Endorsement
November 18, 1941.
From : The Director, War Plans Division.
T'o : The Director, Naval Districts Division.
Via : The Director, Radio Liaison Division.
Subject : Combined Operating Center for Array and Navy.
1. Forwarded for information, and for such recommendations and comment as
desired.
2. An informal joint working committee has been formed to endeavor to im-
prove cooperation of Army and Navy shore defense activities by the formation
of joint command centers. As the records of the conferences held by this com-
mittee are being maintained in this Division, it is requested that all papers,
comment, and recommendations be returned.
R. K. Turner.
R. K. Turner.
[2] Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier
Table of corrections
Change No.
Date of entry
Signature and rank of Oflicer Entering Change
confidentiat,
Urdis 140400 to Budocks X Request consideration be given to construction
of combined operating center sufficient in size and facilities to accommodate in
time of emergency staffs of all essential operating activities of both Army and
Navy in Hawaii such as CincPac Corafourteen Comtrain Comsubfor Compatwing
and parallel activities of Army X CNO considers concentration of Army and
1304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Navy actvities in one building of proper construction constitutes great advantage
for emergency operations X Comment with recommendations including location
and estimates of cost requested.
[Handwritten:] For Cdr Griswold — General Bd.
(This is a copy made from microfilm records.) 10 July 45.
Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4)
NAVREGS.)
OPNAV 19-68
UNiTia) States Fleett.
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
CinC File No.
A1/A&N/(18)
Serial 01810
Confidential
Ut Endorsement
on Com-14 C-A1&-1
A&N/ND14 (01171)
dated Nov. 3, 1941
From : Commander-in-Cbief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.
1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet has given careful considera-
tion to the question of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy
in Hawaii. On its face, the proposition sounds attractive, but unless it can
be shown that the advantages of such an establishment outweigh the disad-
vantages, its creation is not only unjustified, but may be undesirable.
2. The conditions likely to exist on Oahu, in the event of war, are definitely
different from those prevailing in Europe and which dictated the establishment
of the combined headquarters and operating centers in Great Britain. Sus-
tained attack of any kind is unlikely. The mission of the Army and the Fleet
are considerably different — the operation of one being defensive and local while
the operations of the other are offensive and far flung. Strategic, rather than
tactical cooperation, is indicated and therefore the necessity for rapid receipt
and exchange of information and arrival at quick decisions is of less importance.
3. On the other hand, there are manifest disadvantages, among which are the
following :
(a) A combined operating center would not relieve the necessity for local
centers for individual forces and its communication system would be very
complex. This complexity might well complicate, rather than simplify, the flow
of orders and information.
fb) It might well result in over centralization for large scale operations
and thus tend to deprive subordinates of necessary initiative.
(c) It would result in loss of contact, by virtue of physical separation from
subordinate commanders, with those commanders and their activities. A loca-
tion suitable for the Army is not suitable for the Navy and vice versa.
(d) There would be serious consequences if such a center m- its communi-
cation system were damaged or destroyed.
(e) It would tie the respective commanders to an immobile post — with the
post necessarily in an inactive area.
(f) It would have at least a p.sychological tendency to divert Fleet units
tio defensive tasks.
4. The above considerations primarily apply to a combined operating center
for the Army and thfe Fleet. They are applicable, also, but in less degree, to
the Army and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. Undoubtedly,
there is need for close cooperation and liaison between those commanders,
much of which is now provided for in current plans. The Harbor Command
Post provides for liai.son and joint control of shipping, identification of vessels,
fire of coast artillery and related questions. Offensive air operates under unity
of command by the Navy. Defensive air operates under unity of command by
the Army. Command posts are in existence for the control of these opera-
tions and, as pointed out by General Short, it is very doubtful that a central
command, superimposed on these separate and local command posts, would add
much to cooperation. Nor would the disadvantages enumerated above be much
reduced.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1305
5. In view of the above, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, is of the
opinion that the establishment of a combined operating center for the Army
and Navy in Hawaii is not only unnecessary, but definitely undesirable. The
I'ecommendation of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in paragraph
(1) is concurred in and it is further recommended that the construction of the
building for the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Commander Sub-
marines Scouting Force, and Commander Base Force be proceeded with without
further delay.
H. E. Kimmel
H. E. Kimmel.
Copy to : Com-14.
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 78
From : Tokyo.
To: (Circular telegram)
7 December 1941
(Plain Japanese language using code names)
Circular #2494
Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.
Note: The above is the translation furnished the President and other high
officials at 1100 (EST) on Dec. 7, 1941. In the rush to get it out, one code word
was overlooked. The correct translation reads as follows :
"Relations between Japan and the following countries are not in accordance
with expectation: England, United States."
This ommission, which was not discovered until January, 1944, does not
appreciably change the iufonuation that was available at 1100 (EST) on Dec. 7,
1941.
Note: The Army translation of Circular #2494 (supplied in March, 1944) is
as follows:
"Relations between Japan and are approaching a crisis (on the
verge of danger) : England, United States."
Note; See JD #6985.
original
Tokyo Circular #2494
SF DE JAH
S 7 DEC 41
621 S TOKYO 19 7 8.10S J(;
KOSHI PANAMA
URGENT 92494 KOYANAGI RIJIYORI SEIRINOTUGOO AKRUNITUKI HAT-
TORI MINAMI KINENBUNKO SETURITU KIKINO KYOKAINGAKU SIK
YUU DENPOO ARITASI STOP— TOGO
1208 S JP
7630
S 387/7 850S GR20
OBESE OVALS RPWMO RFNMO RTJMO RWFMO GNOME
JD-1:7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)
Tokyo Circular #2494 DISTRIBUTION
SF D9 JAH S 7 DEC 41
622 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG KOSHI HAVANA
623 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI HONOLULU
624 S TOKYO 19 7 850 JG RIYOJI NEWYORK
625 S TOKYO 22 7 850S JG JAPANESE CONSUL VANCOUVER
626 S TOKYO 22 7 850S JG JAPANESE MINISTER OTTAWAONT
( Same text and sign as our NR5651. )
1220 JP
7630
JD-1:7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)
1306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Tokyo Circular #2494 DISTRIBUTION
SF DE JAH S 7 DEO 41
627 S TOKYO 19 7 8.108 JG RIYOJI SANFRANCISCO
028 S TOKYO 19 7 8.'>0S JG RIYOJI PORTLANDORE
(;29 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI SEATTLE
t!30 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI NEWORLEANSLA
Oil S TOKYO 19 7 8r)0S JG RIYOJI (^HICAGOILL
632 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI LOSANGELESCAL
(Same text and sign as our NR5651.)
1243 JP
7630
JD-1:7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 79
(Exhibit No. 79 is a pilot ostutic copy of Piige 44 of u voluiue con-
taining translations of files of operations orders, orders, memoranda,
and serials dealing with Japanese Navy plans, recovered from Jap
CA NOCHI. This page will be found "reproduced as Item No. 30:),
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS. Hewitt Inquiry.)
Hewitt I.ni/uiry Exhibit No. 80
SECRET
FOUKTKENTH NaVAL DISTRHT.
Pearl Harbor, T. //.. 25 April 191,1.
S-A16-1/A7-3 (3 ) /ND14
(0398)
From: Commandant, Fourteentli Naval Di.strid.
To : Distribution List for 14ND-JCD-42.
Subject: Original 14ND-JCD-42.
References :
(a) WPL-42.
(b) FTP 155, Intimluctiun, Cbaptrr U.
Enclosures :
(A) Original 14ND-JCD-42, Reg. No. 19 iiHludiug List of Effective Pages.
(B) Receipt and Destruction Form, in duplicate.
1. Tbe Original 14ND-JCD-42 (Army Short Title HCF-41) is hereby pro-
mulgated to the officers on the Distribution List of 14ND-JCD-42, including those
on the Distribution List of 14ND-JCD-13. It was signed and placed in effect
by the Commanding General Hawaiian Deoa'.'tment and by the Commandant
P'ourteenth Naval District on 11 April 1941, to remain effective until notice in
writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in wiiole, or until dis-
approved, in part or in whole, by either the War or Navy Departments.
2. This Original Plan, prepared in accordance with references (a) and (b),
supersedes 14ND-JCD-13 (Army Short Title HCF-39) and will be handled as
follows :
a. All holders of 14ND-JCD-13 remove and destroy by bnrning all pages
now contained in 14ND-JCD-13.
b. Insert this letter and the pages of E'nclosure (A) in their proper places
in the old binder, if used, in accordance with the List of EiTective Pages
c<mtained in Enclosure (A) ; new holders on the Distribution List for 14ND-
JCD-42 provide own binders.
e. Report receipt, destruction of superseded pages of 14ND-JCD-13 and
check of contents on the form herewith. Enclosure (B). New holders
report receipt and check of contents only.
3. a. This publication v/ill be handled and accounted for in accordance with
the instructions contained in the Navy Regulations nnd in the Registered Publi-
cation Manual.
b. This volume shall not he carried in airrraft., and when not in use shall be
kept in Class "A" stow^age, as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1307
4. IT IS FORBIDDEN 1 0 MAKE EXTRACTS FROM, OR COPY, PORTIONS
OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE
CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION MANUAL.
5. It is hereby certified tliat tlie originator considers it to be impracticable
to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other
than secret.
C. C. Bloch.
Naval message — Navy Department
Extension Number
Addressees
Precedence
Drafter: NDl4/N3-l(y&D).
From: OPNAV.
Released by H. R. STARK.
Date: 15 Oct. 1941.
Asterisk (') Maiigram Ad-
dressee:
For Action:
COMFOURTEEN.
Priority
Routine
Deferred
TOR Code Room
Decoded by-
Typed by
Routed by
Information:
CINCPAC.
Priority
Routine
Deferred
UnJess otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administra-
152227 Oct 1941 NCR 425
Originator fill in date and time: Date Time GCT
On outgoing dispatches please leave about one inch clear space before beginning text
If Operational
Check Below
D
[ / ] SECEET
Register No, 19
FuiJ. Title: Joint Coaktak FkciNtiee Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal
Frontier
Hawaiian Dispaktment and Fourteenth Naval District
Shoet TiruE : HCF 41 14ND-JCD-42
Under the provisions of AR 380-5 (paragraph 27) each recipient of this docu-
ment will make return therefor on June 30, and December 31 of each year to the
Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shaffer,
T. H., except that recipient of this document serving with units of this Department
will account for same by means of the memorandum receipt system as prescribed
in letter, this headquarters, dated June 16, 1934, file No. AG 381 Misc. (Secret),
Subject : Hawaiian Department War Plans.
Navy holders of this plan will make quarterly reports as noted on Navy Dis-
tribution List, page 3.
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier
List of effective pages, I4ND-JCD-42
Subject Matter
Change
in Effect
Coml4 Secret Letr Serial
No. (0398) dated 25 April 1941.
List of Effective Pages
Title Page
Table of Corrections
Distribution List
Table of Contents
Body of Plan-_
Original
ai
1
2
3
4
5-14
inclusive
HCr-41—iii— Original, April 1941, 4ND— JCD-42.
1 Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
1308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[3] Navy distribution list
Official to whom issued
Registered
Numbers
*Chief of Naval Operations.-
'Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
♦Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Commander Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Commander Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Commander Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet___
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Commander Minecraft, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Commander Battleships, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Commander Cruisers, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
Commander Patrol Wing Two
Commander Submarine Squadron Four
Commander Submarine Base, PEARL HARBOR
fCommander Naval Air Station, PEARL HARBOR
{Commander Naval Air Station, KANEOHE
JDistrict Intelligence Officer
{District Communication Officer
C aptain of the Yard, Navy Yard, PEARL HARBOR
flnspector of Ordnance, NAD, OAHU..
and 19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
* Indicates original holders of 14ND-JCD-13.
t These holders will make quarterly reports to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who will
in return report to the Chief of Naval Operations, Registered Publication Section. All others will make
these reports to Chief of Naval Operations, information copy to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval
District.
Annexes will be issued only to those holders concerned and will not be accounted for to the Registered
Publication Section.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Subject Page *
Section I. Directives 5
Section II. Delimitation of Areas 6
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier 6
Hawaiian Coastal Zone 6
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier 6
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone 6
Hawaiian Defensive Sea Areas 6
Defensive Sea Area of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier 6
Pearl Harbor Defensive Sea Area , 6
Kaneohe Bay Defensive Sea Area 7
Palmyra, Kingman Reef, Johnston, Midway and Wake Defensive Sea
Areas 7
Oahu Defensive Coastal Area 7
Section III. Estimate of the Situation 7
Tasks and Forces 7
Joint Task 7
Army Task 7
Navy Task 7
Army Forces 8
Navy Forces 8
Overseas Reinforcements 8
Civil Organization 8
Section IV. Decisions 8
Army Tasks 9
Navy Tasks 10
Section V. Mobilization 11
Army Plans 11
Navy Plans 12
Section VI. Joint Agreements 12
Army-Navy Distribution , 14
^ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1309
[5] SECRET
HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
11 April 1941
HEADQUARTE21S FOURTEENTH NavAL DISTRICT,
Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, T. H.,
11 April 1941.
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawahan Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian
Department, and Fourteenth Naval District
section I — DIRECTI\'ES
1. RESPONSIBILITY. This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is prepared
under the direction of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
2. BASIS. This plan is based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan
RAINBOW No. 1, and Section V, page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy,
1935, and will constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects,
joint operating plans, and mobilization plans are based.
3. METHOD OF COORDINATION. The Commanding General of the Ha-
waiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have
determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual
cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army
and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of com-
mand is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935,
Chapter 2, paragraph 9&.
4. PLANNING REPRESENTATIVES. The Assistant Chief of Staff for War
Planning (G-3), Headquarters HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, and the War Plans
Officer, Headquarters FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, are designated as
planning representatives respectively for the Army and Navy Commanders in the
HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. (Par. 40a page 61, Joint Action of the
Army and the Navy, 1945).
5. JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE. A Local Joint Planning Committee is
established to consist of the Chiefs of Staff. HxVWAIIAN DEPARTMENT and
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT and such other Army and Navy Officers as
may be appointed by the Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
and the Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT (Section VI, page
133, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935). The Joint Planning Com-
mittee shall take cognizance of all matters affecting joint coordination in all
subsidiary Plans or Projects constituting the Joint Defense Plans, HAWAIIAN
COASTAL FRONTIER. The senior member thereof is authorized to designate
such standing or special sub-committees as from time to time may be necessary.
[g] SECTION II — delimitation OF AREAS
6. HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. "The HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRON-
TIER consists of OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required
for the defense of OAHU".
It has been determined that the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER consists
of land and sea areas bounded by arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers
at OPANA POINT, MAUI : KAUIKI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI : LAUPAHOEHOE
LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAAVAII ; KAI.AE LIGHT,
HAWAII; SOUTHWEST HEADLAND, KAHOOLAWE ; LEAHI POINT, NII-
HAU, LEHUA ISLAND, NIIHAU ; KAILIU POINT, KAUAI ; and arc of thirty
(30) miles radius with its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents
connecting these arcs in the order named.
7. HAWAIIAN COASTAL ZONE. The Hawaiian Coastal Zone comprises the
waters of the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.
8. HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. The Hawaiian Naval Coast-
al Frontier comprises the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER plus the areas
bounded by the territorial waters of MIDWAY ISLAND, JOHNSTON ISLAND,
PALMYRA ISLAND, CANTON ISLAND, and WAKE ISLAND.
9. HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL ZONE. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone
comprises the Hawaiian Coastal Zone plus the territorial waters of MIDWAY
1310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ISLAND, JOHNSTON ISLAND, PALMYRA ISLAND, CANTON ISLAND, and
WAKE ISLAND.
10. HAWAIIAN DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS. WPL^, paragraph 2201, de-
fines Defensive Sea Areas as of two kinds. In the Fourteenth Naval District
of the first kind— 2201.a.l of WPL-8— is the Defensive Sea Area of the HAWAI-
IAN COASTAL FRONTIER approved by the Joint Board, Secretary of War and
Secretary of the Navy and will be made effective by proclamation. Defensive
Sea Areas of the second kind — 2201.a.2. of WPL-S — have been established by ex-
ecutive order for PEARL HARBOR and KANEOHE.
(1) DEFENSIVE SEA AREA OF THE HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER.
The Defensive Sea Area of the HAWA\IIAN COASTAL FRONTIER includes all
waters within an area bounded as follows :
By arcs of twentv (20) miles radii with centers at OP ANA POINT, MAUI,
KAUIKI HEAD LIGHT. MAUI, L.\UPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE
KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII; KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTHWEST
HEADLAND, KAHOOLAWE ; LEAHI POINT, NIIHAU ; LEHUA ISLAND,
NIIHAU; KAILIU POINT, KAUAI; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with
its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting these arcs
in the order named. This area when made effective will be given the short title —
HAWAIIAN D. S. A.
(2) PEARL HARBOR— DEFENSIVE SEA AREA. The PEARL HARBOR—
Defensive Sea Area comprises —
The area of water in PEARL HARBOR lying between extreme high water
mark and the sea, and in and about the enti-ance channel to [71 said
harbor within an area bounded by the extreme high water mark at the bearing
south true from the southwestern corner of the PUULOA Naval Reservation, a
line bearing south true from AHUA POINT LIGHT, and a line bearing west true
from a point three (3) nautical miles due south true from AHUA POINT LIGHT-
HOUSE. This area is given the short title— PEARL D. S. A.
(3) KANEOHE BAT— DEFENSIVE SEA AREA. The KANEOHE BAY—
Defensive Sea Area comprises :
All waters enclosed by lines drawn as follows: A line bearing northeast true
extending three miles from KAOIO POINT, a line bearing northeast true ex
tending four (4) nautical miles from KAPOHO POINT, and a line joining the
seaward extremities of the two above-described bearing lines. This area is
given the short title— KANEOHE D. S. A.
(4) PALMYRA, KINGMAN REEF, JOHNSTON, MIDWAY, and WAKE DE-
FENSIVE SEA AREAS. These defensive sea areas comprise :
Territorial waters surrounding the islands from high water marks to a dis-
tance of three (3) nautical miles from these marks.
11. OAHU DEFENSIVE COASTAL AREA. The Defensive Coastal Area for
OAHU comprises all water areas within the area of circles and the connecting
tangents drawn with points as centers and with respective radii, as follows :
KEAHI POINT— Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards.
PUU KAPOLEI— Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards.
KaWuKU PoTnT^ Twenty-three thousand (23,000) yards.
This area is given the short title — OAHU D. C. A.
SECTION in — ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
Tasks and Forces
12. CATEGORY OF DEFENSE. Category "D", as defined in Section III.
Chapter V, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.
13. The estimate of the situation applicable to the respective forces is found in
Estimate of the Situation, Hawaiian Department, and Estimate of the Situation,
Fourteenth Naval District, RAINBOW No. 1.
14. TASKS.
a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control
and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces,
and against hostile sympathizers ; to support the naval forces.
c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect ship-
ping therein ; to support the Army forces.
[8] 15. FORCES,
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1311
a. ARMY FORCES.
The present garrison augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained
locally and by reinforcements from Continental United States as provided for in
Joint Army and Navy Basic AVar Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.
ft. NAVAL FORCES.
Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District, augmented by
personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements as provided
for in the Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1.
c. OVERSEAS REINFORCEMENTS.
(1) Army garrisons and Naval Local Defense Forces in the HAWAIIAN
COASTAL FRONTIER will be reinforced at the earliest possible date; to the
extent practicable, this will be done prior to M-Day.
(2) M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execu-
tion of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary
measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain
features of their respective plans prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are
believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War
and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.
d. CIVIL ORGANIZATION. A CIVIL ORGANIZATION, under the super-
vision of Army authorities, and in consulation and accord with Navy authorities,
to organize the TERRITORY OF HAWAII for war. utilizing all personnel and
material resources of the TERRITORY OF HAWAII in assisting the military
and naval forces.
Section IV — Decisions
16. GENERAL.
a. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District, to provide for the needs of the defense of OAHU in
accordance with the tasks, paragraph 14 above, and submit these plans to the
War and Navy Departments, respectively.
b. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the execution of the tasks given
in paragraph 14 above, these plans to include initial deployment and assignment
of reinforcements when received.
[9] c. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in consultation
and accord with the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans
for the mobilization of man-power and material resources in the TERRITORY
OF HAWAII and their allocation to the Army and Navy forces in the H.\-
WAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER in accordance with the detailed agreements
covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.
d. Army and Navy subordinate tasks ai'e assigned in accordance with Joint
Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, listed respectively, in paragraphs 17
and 19.
17. ARMY. The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall
provide for :
a. Tlie beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with par-
ticular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present
thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR. CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD
BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance
of the KANEOHE area is recognized.
6. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.
G. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands con-
sistent with available forces.
d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the
civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage,
except within naval establishments.
e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within
naval shore establishments.
f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU
D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18. a.), and an
aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aii-craft Warning Service
for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea con-
ducted within range of Army bombers.
h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control
post provided for in paragraph 18. e.
1312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated
by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint in-
structions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence.
Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be goverened by
"Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1&40".
[10] j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will
gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information
of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS.
k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
I. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS.
m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over
communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the
Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.
n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS.
p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of
supplies for the civil population.
18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall
provide for :
a. An inshore patrol.
6. An offshore patrol.
c. An escort force.
d. An attack force.
e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and
HONOLULU HARBORS.
f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and HONO-
LULU HARBORS. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed
probably will be under cognizance of the Army. )
g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D. C. A. and installation of submarine
mine fields in the defense of the OAHU-D. C. A. as may be deemed neccessary
and practicable.
//. Sweeping channels and mine fields.
i. Distant reconnaissance.
;. Attacking enemy naval forces.
k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval
shore establishments.
[11] I. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 i.,
a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of
intelligence.
m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over
communication svstems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the
Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.
n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counterespionage, for the
collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.
o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.
p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining
thereto.
SECTION V — MOBILIZATION
19. MOBILIZATION PLANf^.
a. GENERAL.
(!) Mobilization plans to be prepared under directives of the Joint Army and
Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW No. 1, will provide for the maximum possible
effort to include the variant plan for the possible situation of a cutoff from the
Mainland.
(2) The mobilization plans will present the detailed utilization of the man-
power and material resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, as well as of the
reinforcements to be received from the Mainland.
(3) Mobilization plans will provide that, where facilities do not exist for the
defense of OAHU, all work possible under current appropriations will be done to
prepare them so that M-Day operation will be possible.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1313
5. ARMY PLANS. The mobilization plans to be prepared for the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, will provide for : —
(1) A survey in time of peace of the resources of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
in men, material, supply and installations and a tabulation of those of military
value or necessary for the maintenance of the civil population.
(2) An allocation, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of the resources
of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS to the Army, to the Navy, and to the civilian,
population in conformity with Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this
document.
[12] (3) Plan for recruitment of Army personnel.
(4) Reception and distribution of Army personnel procured by selective service.
(5) Operation of a labor pool, in consultation and accord with the Navy, for use
by the Army, by the Navy, and by civilian establishments in conformity with the
detailed agreements, of this document, and utilizing to the best advantage the
Territorial Civilian Effort Plan.
(6) Operation and administration of martial law in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
except in localities under naval jurisdiction, in event of martial law.
(7) Control and care of the civil population of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
(civil organization (Par. 15 d. above) to assist) , in event of martial law.
(8) Operation or sui)ervision, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of all
civil utilities and establishments in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS vital to military
effort and civil life, in event of martial law.
(9) Maintenance and hospitalization of the civil population, in event of martial
law.
(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted
to the Army as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document,
in event of martial law.
(11) Reception, housing or storage, and distribution of all Army reinforcements
and supplies received on OAHU.
c. NAVY PLANS. The mobilization plans to be prepared by the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District, will provide for :
(1) A survey in time of peace of the Navy requirements in man-power, mate-
rial, supplies, and installations desired from local sources.
(2) Plan for recruitment of Navy personnel.
(3) Reception and distribution of Navy personnel procured by selective service.
(4) Procurement and distribution of local civil personnel needed for naval em-
ployment through the labor pool operated by the Army in conformity with the
detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements of this
document, in event of martial law.
(5) Operation or supervision of such civil utilities and establishments in the
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS as are assigned to the Navy, as covered in Section VI,
Detailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.
[13] (6) Operation or supervision of all civil agencies in the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS for the regulation of water shipping, in event of martial law.
(7) Patrol and police of water areas, to include patrol of coastal zone and pro-
tection of shipping therein.
(8) Control of harbor and coastal lights, buoys, and aids to navigation.
(9) Control of all shipping activities in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted
to the Navy as covered in Section VI, Joint Agreements, of this document, in
event of martial law.
SECTION VI — JOINT AGREEMENTS
20. The details of the allocation of local resources of man-power, supply, mate-
rial, and installations will be determined by joint agreement. Agreements will
cover the following general subjects and such others as may require coordination
from time to time :
Allocation of military and civil man-power.
Allocation of utilities and installations for furtherance of military operations.
Allocation of transportation, land and water.
Allocation of signal communications.
Allocation of material and supplies.
Allocation of food supply.
21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice
in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until dis-
approved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This
1314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HCF-41 ( JCD-42) supersedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the Annexes Nos. I
to VII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this
plan.
(Signed) C. C. Bloch,
C. C. Bloch,
Rear- Admiral, U. 8. Navy,
Comtnandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
(Signed) Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short,
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,
Commanding, Haicaiian Department.
[I4] Distribution
Custodian Register No.
AG 1-2
G-3 5
G-5 8
CG Haw Div 14
CG HSCAB 15
CG Haw Air Force 16
WPD, WD, Washington, D. C - IT
Conidt 14th ND 18-44
Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 81
Oi>-16-FE.
(SC)A17-24(1).
Sccvct
Serial 001434316.
The Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, 9 July 19Ji5.
From : The Secretary of the Navy.
To : John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant.
Subject: Testimony and documentary evidence to be presented to Admiral
H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation.
Reference: (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt,
USN, concerning a further Pearl Harbor investigation.
1. Forwarded herewith are copies of the following dispatches, certified In
jacket form NJA 24, to be used in the proceedings directed by reference (a) :
(a) FE-2 Memorandum dated November 4, 1941 — Subject "Japanese Fleet
Locations".
(b) FE-2 Memorandum dated November 10, 1941 — Subject, "Japanese Fleet
Locations".
(e) FE-2 Memorandum dated November 18, 1941 — Subject, "Japanese Fleet
Locations".
(d) FE-2 Memorandum dated November 25, 1941 — Subject, "Japanese Fleet
Locations".
(e) FE-2 Memorandum dated December 1, 1941 — Subject, "Japanese Fleet
Locations".
(f) Conf. Dispatch #012358 (April 1, 1941,) from OpNav to ComAllNav Dis-
tricts NY Wash. Governments of Guam and Samoa.
(g) Conf. Serial #27-41 (April 29. 1941) from FB to Op-16-F-2 Subject—
"Japanese Navy Organizations Fleets" with two routing slips.
2. Your attention is directed to the fact that letters (a) to (e) are classified
Secret, and (f) and (g) are Contidential. When used in accordance with refer-
ence (a), the return of these dispatches to this office is directed.
James Forrestal.
James Forrestal.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1315
OP-16-F-2
November 4, 1941.
memorandum
Subject: Japanese Fleet Locations.
(Note: See Op-16-F-2 ONI Serial #54-41, dated October 30, 1941 for the new
organization of the Japanese Fleet.)
Fleets Locations
First Fleet In Kure-Saeki area (1)
BB— NAGATO In Kure-Saeki area (1)
BB— MUTSU '•
BB— YAMASHIRO At Yokosuka
BB— FUSO— In Kure-Saeki area (1)
BB— ISE "
BB— HYUGA "
BB— HIYEI "
BB— KONGO At Maizuru
BB— KIRISHIMA In Kure-Saeki area (1)
BB— HARUNA Undergoing repairs (2)
10 BB
4 CA In Kure-Saeki area (3)
2 CL " " " *' "
27 DD "
Second Fleet In Kure-Saeki area
12 CA In Kure-Saeki area (3)
1 CA In Yokosuka (4)
2 CL In Kure-Saeki area (3)
28 DD "
Third Fleet Near Maizuru or Sasebo
1 CL Near Maizuru
4 CM "
12 AM " "
12 PC "
1 CL Near Sasebo
12 DD "
1 AS "
6 SS "
2 CM •'
6 XPG '*
46 AP or AK "
Fourth Fleet Mandated Islands
4 CL In Truk-Ponape area
8 DD "
1 AS " • "
3 SS '
Q vpr" *• «« •« •»
8 AP or~AKr"rrrr_r__r.' "
2 CM Near Saipan
1 DD " "
3 XPG " "
llAPorAK " "
. 4 SS " Palao
4 XPG "
17 AP or AK "
1 Survey Ship " Jaluit
1 AS "
4 XAM "
3 PC "
1 AP or AK "
1 CM In home waters
7 SS Near Sasebo
2 SS Near Maizuru
Fifth Fleet
1 CL Maizuru (6)
(The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)
1316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Fleets Locations
Sixth Fleet In Home waters
4 CL " "
2 AS " "
1 AP " "
42 SS " "
Carrier Fleet S. Kyushii-Takao
CV— AKAGI S. Kyushu
CV— KAGA
CV— SORYU " (?)
CV— HIRYU
CV— HOSHO
CV— KORYU " (?)
CV— KASUGA " (?)
CV— RYUJO Takao area
CV— ZUIKAKU
CV— SHOKAKU
4 DD
11 DD S. Kyushu
Combined Air Force
4l AV Kure-Saeki area
1 AV Takao
1 XAV
1 XAV Gulf of Tongkong
1 XAV Near Sasebo
Combined Fleet Train Scattered
4 AO In Kure-Saski area
2 AO Maizuru
1 AO Takao (8)
1 AO Near Yap (9)
1 AC
1 AF ■ : Kure-Saeki area
2 AR
1 Ice Breaker Saghalien
1 Target Ship Kure-Saeki area
Japanese Naval Forces in China
1 OCA Left Chefoo October 3rd
1 PG Shanghai
3 DD —
Central China or 1st Expeditionafy Fleet
4 PG Between Wuhu and Ichang
10 PR
1 AP
South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet
1 CA Sasebo
1 CL Canton-Hongkong area
4 TB " " " (10)
1 PG
2 AM " " " (10)
13 Misc
North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet
1 OCA Tsingtao
1 DD
8 TB
1 AP
Southern Expeditionary Fleet
1 CL French Indo-China coast
1 CM
NOTES
(1) The Combined Fleet has been located somewhat more exactly than before,
in the Kure-Saeki area. This includes the western portion of the Inland Sea,
between the western parts of Honshu and Shikoku, and the northern part of
Kyushu.
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1317
(2) Earlier in the year, the HARUNA was reported undergoing major repairs.
Since the HARUNA has not been specifically mentioned among the active
battleships for some time, it is believed that the ship is still undergoing repairs.
(3) It is believed that the various cruisers and destroyers in the Combined
Fleet, which were formerly divided between Yokosuka, Kure and Sasebo, have
now rejoined the main body of the Fleet in the Kure-Saeki area.
(4) The TAKAO (CA) is in dry-dock at Yokosuka.
(6) The Fifth Fleet has its flag in a light cruiser at Maizuru, but nothing else is
known about the force as yet. It is possibly the nucleus of a Japan Sea Fleet.
(7) No new information concerning the location of individual submarines is
at hand, so that the detailed survey given last week no longer holds good.
However, certain units of the submarine fleet have been active in the Chichijima-
Marcus-Saipan area, south and southeast of Honshu.
(8) The SATA has moved from Canton to Takao.
(9) The SHIRETOKO, previously reported in Jaluit, has moved near Yap.
(10) The detached torpedo boats and mine sweepers in the South China
Fleet are believed to have rejoined; the main force in the Hongkong area.
Distribution :
CNO— Copy No. 1
DNI— Copy No. 2
Op-12— Copy No. 3
Op-38W— Copy No. 4
Op-16-F— Copy No. 5
OP-16-F-2
November 10, 1941.
memorandum
Subject : Japanese Fleet Locations
Fleets . Locations
First Fleet In Kure-Saeki area
BB— NAGATO In Kure-Saeki area
BB— MUTSU "
BB— YAMASHIRO At Yokosuka
BB— FUSO In Kure-Saeki area
BB— ISE "
BB— HYUGA "
BB— HIYEI • "
BB— KONGO At Maizuru
BB— KIRISHUVIA In Kure-Saeki area
BB— HARUNA Undergoing repairs
10 BB
4 CA In Kure-Saeki area
2 CL "
27 DD "
Second Fleet In Kure-Saeki area
12 CA In Kure-Saeki area
1 CA In Yokosuka
2 CL In Kure-Saeki area
28 DD "
Third Fleet Near Maizuru or Sasebo
1 CL Near Maizuru
4 CM "
12 AM "
12 PC "
1 CL Near Sasebo
12 DD "
1 AS "
6 SS "
2 CM
6 XPG "
46 AP or AK
79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 2 43
1318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Fleets
Locations
Fourth Fleet
._ Mandated Islands
4 CL
_. In Truk-Ponape area
8 DD
1 AS _
3 SS
6 XPG
8 AP or AK
2 CMU
_ Near Saipan
1 DD
<t «t
3 XPG—
« «<
11 AP or AK
i< «
4 SS
" Palao
4 XPG
>< <•
17 AP or AK
1 Survey Ship
" Jaluit
1 AS
«< it
4 XAM
«t ti
3 PO
«• <•
1 AP or AK
« X
1 GM__
In Home Waters
7 SS
-- Near Sasebo
2 SS__
- Near Maizuru
Fifth Fleet
1 CL
-. Maizuru
(The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still uukiiown)
Sixth Fleet
4 CL
_. In Home Waters
2 AS- _ -__
ii <t «
1 AP
<i <« «
42 SS
44 44 <«
Carrier Fleet 1
— S. Kyushu — Takao
CV— AKAGI
-. S. Kyushu
CV— KAGA
«
CV— SORYU
«
CV— HIRYU
i<
CV— HOSHO
it
CV— KORYU
ti
CV— KASUGA ^
t4
CV— RYUJO
— Takao area
CV— ZUIKAKU
_. Kure-Sasebo area ( 1 )
CV— SHOKAKU _.
-- Takao area (?)
4 DD
" "
11 DD
- S. Kyushu
Combined Air Foi'ce
4 AV
_. Kure-Saeki area
1 AV __
. Sasebo-Kure area (1)
2 XAV
— Sasebo-Kure area (2)
1 XAV
— Saigon-Camranh Bay area
Combined Fleet Train
— Scattered
4 AO_
In Kure-Saeki area
2 AO
_. Maizuru
1 AO
- Takao
1 AO
_ Near Yap
1 AG —
44 4i
1 AF
_ Kure-Saeki area
2 AH
« II >i
1 Ice Breaker
_ Saghalien
1 Target Ship
- Kure-Saeki area
Japanese Naval Forces in China.
1 OCA
- Left Chef 00 October 3rd.
1 PC
_. Shanghai
3 DD__
44
Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet
4 PC
_. Betyeen Wuhu and Ichang
10 PR_ _ _ _
ft it It it
1 AP
it 44 tl It
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1319
Fleets Locations
South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet
1 CA Sasebo
1 CA Canton-Hongkong area
4 TB
1 PC
2 AM
13 Misc
North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet
1 OCA Tsingtao
1 DD
8 TB
1 AP "
southern Expeditionary Fleet
1 CL French Indo-China coast
I CM
NOTES
The tleets have remained in the same operating areas as previously reported.
Several minor changes in the position of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders
liave been observed :
(1) The ZUIKAKU (CV) and the NOTORO (AV) have moved from the For-
mosan straits to the Dure-Sasebo area.
(2) Two auxiliary seaplane tenders are now in the Sasebo-Kure area. One
of these was formerly in the Gulf of Tongking.
(3) The KENJO MARU (XAV) has moved south from Takao to the Saigon-
Camranh Bay area.
Distribution :
CNO— Copy No. 1
DNI— Copy No. 2
Op-12 — Copy No. 3
Op-38W— Copy No. i
Op-16-F— Copy No. 5
Op-16-F-2
November 18, 1941.
memokandum
Subject : Japanese Fleet Locations.
Fleets Locations
Fimt Fleet In Kure-Saeki area
BB — NAGATO In Kure-Saeki area
BB— MUTSU '• " " "
BB— YAMASHIRO At Yokosuka
BB— FUSO In Kure-Saeki area
BB— ISE " "
BB— HYUGA " "
BB— HIYEI " "
BB— KONGO At Maizuru
BB— KIRISHIMA In Kure-Saeki area
BB — HARUNA Undergoing repairs at Sasebo
10 BB
4 CA In Kure-Saeki area
2 CL " "
27 DD " '
Second Fleet In Kure-Saeki area
II CA In Kure-Saeki area
2 CA In Yokosuka (1)
1 CL In Kure-Saeki area
1 CL In Yokosuka area (2)
28 DD In Kure-Saeki area
1320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Fleets Locations
Third Fleet Near Maizuiu, Sasebo, and Bako (3)
1 CL Near Maizuru
4 CM "
12 AM "
12 PC _. "
1 CL Sailed Amoy Nov. 4tli (3)
2 DD Near Sasebo (4)
1 AS "
6 SS "
2 CM "
6 XPG "
46 AP or AK "
3 DD " Maizuru (4)
7 DD " Baljo-Takeo (4)
Fourth Fleet Mandated Islands
4 CL In Truk-Ponape area
3 DD.
1 AS "
3 SS "
8 XPG _. "
8 AP or AK "
2 DD Near Saipan (5)
2 CM
1 DD
3 XPG " "
11 AP or AK " "
4 SS '• Palao
4 XPG "
17 AP or AK " "
1 Survey Ship " Juliet
1 AS "
4 XAM •♦ «♦
3 PC •• . "
1 AP or AK " "
1 CM In home waters
3 DD Near Sasebo
7 SS "
2 SS :__. Near Maizuru
Fifth Fleet
1 CL Yokosuka (6)
(The Composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)
Sixth Fleet
2 CL Kure (7)
Sasebo (7)
Kure (7)
In Home Waters (7)
Yokosuka (7)
Yokosuka (7)
(5)
2 GL
1 AS
1 AS
1 AP
7 SS
13 SS Kure
22 SS In Home Waters
Carrier Fleet ^ S. Kyushu Takao
CV— AKAGI S. Kyushu
CV— KAGA
CV— SORYU
CV— HIRYU
CV— HOSHO
CV— KORYU
CV— KASUGA
CV— RYUJO Kure (6)
CV— ZUIKAxMU Kure-Sasebo area
CV— SHOKAKU Takao area (?)
5 DD "
11 DD S. Kyushu
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1321
Fleets Locations
Combined Air Foree
4 AV Kure-Saeki area
1 AV Sasebo-Kure area
2 XAV Sasebo-Kure area
1 XAV Saigon-Camranh Bay area
Combined Fleet Train Scattered
4 AO In Kure-Saeki area
1 AO Maizuru
1 AO Takao
1 AO Near Yap
1 AC
1 AF Kure-Saeki area
2 AR
1 Ice Breaker Saghalien
1 Target Sbip Kure-Saeki area
Japanese 'Naval Forces in China
1 OCA - Left Chafoo October 3rd
1 PG Shanghai
3 DD
Central China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet
4 PG Between Wuhu and Ichang
10 PR
1 AP
South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet
1 CA Sasebo
1 CL Foochow (9)
4 TB Canton-Hongkong area
1 PG
2 AM
13 Misc.
North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet
1 OCA Tsingtao
1 DD
8 TB
1 AP
Southern Expeditionary Fleet
1 CL French Indo-China coast
1 CM
(1) The CHOKAI (CA) is in Yokosuka. The TAKAO is still in drydock at
Yokosuka.
(2) The NAKA (CL), Flagship of Desron 4, is at Yokosuka. The destroyers
in Desron 4 are still in the Kure-Saeki area.
(3) The NATORI, Flagship of Desron 5, sailed Ainoy November 4th.
(4) Ten of the 12 destroyers in Desron 5, foi'nierly at Sasebo, have been
shifted — 3 to Maizuru, and 7 to Bako.
(5) Three of the 8 destroyers in Desron 6, formerly in the Truk-Ponape area,
have moved to Sasebo; and 2 to Saipan.
(6) The flagship of the Fifth Fleet, an unidentified CL, has moved from
Maizuru to Yokosuka.
(7) Many of the units of the 6th Fleet have been located more exactly.
(8) The RYUJO' has returned to Kure from Taiwan.
(9) The ISUZU (CL), temiK)rary flagship of the 2nd (or South) China Ex-
peditionary Fleet, has moved from Hongkong to Foochow.
Distribution :
CNO— Copy No. 1
DNI— Copy No. 2
Op-12— Copy No. 3
Op-38W— Copy No. 4
0*-16-F— Copy No. 5
1322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Op-16-F-l>
November 25, 1941.
MEMORANDtlM
Subject : Japanese Fleet Locations.
Fleets Locations
First Fleet Home Waters
BB— NAGATO Near Kure (1)
BB— MUTSU "
BB— YAMASHIRO At Yokosuka
BB— FUSO Near Kure
BB— ISE "
BB— HYUGA "
BB— HIYEI Near Sasebo (2)
BB— KONGO Near Maizuru
BB— KIRISHIMA Near Kure
BB— HARUNA "
10 BB
3 CA Near Kure (1)
1 CA Near Sasebo (4)
2 CL Near Kure (1)
27 DD "
Seeoiift Flrrf In Home Waters
11 CA Near Kure
1 CA In Yokosuka (5)
1 CA Near Sasebo (6)
1 CL Near Kure
1 CL Near Yokosuka
13 DD Near Yokosuka (7)
15 DD Near Kure (7)
Third Fleet Sasebo and Bako area
1 CL Near Sasebo (8)
5 CM " " (8)
12 AM " " (8)
12 PC " " (8)
4 DD__: " " (8)
1 AS
n ss
6 XPG
46 AP or AK
1 CL Bias Bay (8)
7 DD Near Bako
1 CM "
1 DD Near Maizuru
Fourth Fleet Mandated Islands
4 CL In Truk-Ponape area
3 DD
1 AS
9 ss
8 XPG
16 AP or AK
2 DD Near Saipan (9)
1 SS Near Saipan (9)
1 Survey Ship Near Saipan (9)
3 XPG
17 AP or AK
4 SS " Palao
4 XPG
30 AP or AK " " (9)
1 AS " Jaluit
4 XAM
3 PC
13 AP or AK
1 CM In Yokosuka
3 DD Near Sasebo (8)
1 SS At Maizuru (9)
1 SS - At Kure (9)
(9)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 1323
Fleets Locations
Fifth Fleet
1 CL Chichijima (10)
(The composition of the Fifth Fleet is still unknown)
Siseth Fleet
2 CL Near Kure
2 CL " Sasebo
1 AS " Kure
1 AS Sasebo
1 AP Yokosuka
7 SS Yokosuka
12 SS Kure
23 SS In Sasebo and other Home waters
Carrier Fleet
CV— AKAGI S. Kyushu
CV— KAGA
CV— SORYU Kure (11)
CV— HIRYU " (11)
CV— HOSHO . " (11)
CV— KORYU S. Kyushu
CV— KASUGA
CV— RYUJO Kure
CV— ZUIKAKU Kure
CV— SHOKAKU Kure (11)
10 DD S. Kyushu and Kure
5 DD Yokosuka (11)
Combined Air Force
4 AV Near Kure
1 AV Ti-uk (12)
2 XAV Near Sasebo
1 XAV Saigon-Camranh Bay Area
Combined Fleet Train
2 AO Near Yokosuka (13)
2 AO Near Kure
1 AO Near Sasebo (13)
1 AO Near Maizurn
1 AO Near Saipan
1 AO Near Yap
1 AC Near Saipan (13)
1 AF Near Yokosuka (13)
2 AR Near Kure
1 Ice Breaker Saghalien
1 Target Ship _ Sasebo
Japanese Naval Forces in China.
1 OCA___ Shanghai (14)
1 PG Shanghai
3 DD
7 AK or AP (15)
Central Chitio* or 1st Expeditionary Fleet
4 PG Between Wuhu and Ichang
10 PR
1 AP or AK
S^oufh China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet
1 CA Sasebo
1 CL Foochow
4 TB _. Canton-Hongkong area
1 PG
2 AM
13 Misc
About 30 Ap or AK South China coast (15)
'North China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet
1 OCA Tsingtao
1 DD
1 TB "
1 AP Tsingtao
Southern Expeditionary Fleet
1 CL French Indo-China coast
1 CM
1324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(1) The Kure area includes the whole Inland Sea ai'ea, together with the
Saeki area, which controls the straits between Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku.
(2) The HIYEI (BB) has moved to Sasebo from the Kure area.
(3) The HARUNA (BB), formerly luidergoing repairs at Sasebo, has rejoined
the fleet as flagship of Batdiv. 3.
(4) The FURUTAKA (CA) is at Sasebo, separated from the other CO of the
division which are near Kure.
(5) The TAKAO (CA) has left the drydock at Yokosuka, and rejoined 2nd
Fleet units near Kure.
(6) The SUZUYA(CA) shifted from the Kure to the Sasebo area.
(7) The 13 of the 28 destroyers in the 2nd Fleet have been reported near Yoko-
suka. The other 15 are still near Kiire.
(8) The Third Fleet has reduced the number of its units near Maizuru, and
increased the number in the Formosan Straits. The NATORI, which sailed from
Amoy on Nov. 4th, is now at anchor in Bias Bay.
(9) The Fourth Fleet has been augmented by the addition of 8 divisions of
ex-merchantmen (about 32 ships). Increased activity has been noticed among
other units of the Fourth Fleet, but except for the shift of 6 submarines to Truk,
the total number of fighting ships in the Mandates has not been increased.
(10) The Fifth Fleet has moved from Yokosuka to Chichijima, with certain
portions possibly near Marcus Island.
(11) The aircraft carriers SORYU, HIRYU, and HOSHO have moved from
South Kyushu to the Kure area. The SHOKAKU has moved from Takao to Kure.
The plane guard destroyers have shifted slightly.
(12) TheKAMOI (AV) is near T'ruk.
(13) The Combined Fleet Train has made a number of minor shifts.
(14) The IZUMO is assumed to be in Shanghai.
(1.5) Ten transports left Shanghai between the 14th and 17th, with troops,
supplied and landing boats ; seven transports are still there. In addition, 17
transports, southbound, were sighted between Hongkong and Shanghai between
the 10th and 14th. Over the week end, 18 transports sailed up the Pearl River,
and 12 downstream.
Distribution :
CNO— Copy No. 1
DNI— Copy No. 2
Op-12— Copy No. 8
Op-38W— Copy No. 4
Op-l(5-F— Copy No. 4
Op-16-F-2 December 1, 1941.
MEMOBANDUM
Subject : Japanese Fleet Locations.
Fleets Locations
First Fleet Home Waters
BB— NAGATO Near Kure
BB— MUTSU
BB— YAMASHIRO At Yokosuka
BB— FUSO Near Kure
BB— ISE
BB— HYUGA
BB— HIYEI Near Sasebo
BB— KONGO Near Maizuru
BB— KIRISHIMA Near Kure
BB— HARUNA
10 BB
3 CA Near Kure
1 CA Near Sasebo
1 CL Near Kure (1)
1 CL Near Sasebo (1)
27 DD Near Kure
Second Fleet In Home Waters
10 CA Near Kure (2)
2 CA Near Sasebo (2)
1 CA Off Camranh Bay (3)
1 CL Near Kure
1 CL Near Bake (4)
4 DD Near Yokosuka (4)
12 DD Near Kure (4)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1325
Fleets
Third Fleet -
1 CL
5 CM
12 AM
12 PC
4 DD
1 AS
6 SS
6 XPG
46 AP or AK.
Locations
Sasebo and Bako area
Near Sasebo
CL__
CM_.
DD_.
Fourth Fleet
4 CL
3 DD
1 AS
9 SS
8 XPG
16 AP or AK
2 DD
1 SS
1 Survey Sbip_
3 XPG
17 AP or AK___
■4 SS
4 XPG
30 AP or AK— _
1 AS
4 XAM
3 PC
13 AP or AK
Bias Bay
Near Bako
Near Maizuru
Mandated Islands
In Truk-Ponape area
Near Saipan
Fifth Fleet
CM_
DD.
SS_.
ss_.
1 CL.
(The composition of the Fiftli
Sixth Fleet
2 CL
2 CL
1 AS
1 AS
1 AP (XAS)
4 SS
5 SS
12 SS
21 SS In
Carrier Fleet
CV— AKAGI
CV— KAGA
CV— SORYU
CV— HIRYU
CV— HOSHO
CV— KORYU
CV— KASUGA
CV— RYUJO
CV— ZUIKAKU
CV— SHOKAKU
10 DD
Palao
Jaluit
In Yokosuka
Near Sasebo
At Maizuru
At Kure
Ctiichijima
Fleet is still unknown)
Near Kure
Near Sasebo
Near Kure
Sasebo
Bako (5)
Bako (5)
Yokosuka (5)
Kure
Sasebo and other Home waters (H)
S. Kyushu
Kure
S. Kyushu
Kure
S. Kyushu and Kure
Yokosuka
1326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Fleets Locations
Combined Air Force
3 AV Near Bako (6)
1 AV Near Kure (6)
1 AV Truk
2 XAV ___. Near Sasebo
1 XAV Saigon-Camranh Bay area
Combined Fleet Train
2 AO Near Yokosuka
2 AO Near Kure
1 AO Near Sasebo
1 AO Near Maiziiru
1 AO Near Saipan
1 AO Near Yap
1 AC Near Saipan
1 AF Near Yokosuka
2 AR Near Kure
1 Ice Breaker Saghalieu
1 Target Ship Sasebo
Japanese Naval Forces in China
1 OCA Shanghai
1 PG Shanghai
3 DD
7 AK or AP "
Ccntrul China or 1st Expeditionary Fleet
4 PG Between Wuhii and Ichang
10 PR
1 AP or AK " " " "
South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet
1 CA Sasebo
1 CL Foochow
4 TB _ Canton-Hongkong area
1 PG "
2 AM "
13 Misc
About 30 AP or AK South China coast
S'orth China or 3rd Expeditionary Fleet
1 OCA Tsingtao
1 DD
4 TB " (7)
4 TB Canton-Hongkong area (7)
1 AP Tsingtao
Southern Expeditionary Fleet
1 CL __. French Indo-China coast
1 CM
NOTES
(1) (CL) SENDAI moved from Kure to Sasebo.
(2) The ATAGO (CA), Flagship of the 2nd Fleet, has moved from Kure to
Sasebo. Further southward movements are expected.
(3) The CHOKAI (CA) has probably become flagship of the Southern Ex-
peditionary Fleet, off Indo-China.
(4) Desron 4, consisting of the NAKA (CL) and 12 DD have moved to Bako.
(5) The NAGOYA MARU and the 4 Minelaying SS of Subron 6 (1-121-124)
ai"e now near Baljo.
(6) Airron 7 has moved from Kure to Bako.
(7) At least one division of Torpedo Boats have moved to Soutli China.
Distribution :
CNO— Copy No. 1
DNI— Copy No. 2
OP-12— Copy No. 5
Op-88W— Copy No. 3
0P-16-F— Copy No. 4
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1327
CONFIDENTIAI.
Naval message — Navy Department
Extension Number
Addressees
Precedence
Drafter
From: OPNAV.
Released by
Date:. April 1, 1941.
For Action:
COM ALL NAV DLS-
TRICTS, NY WASH
GOVERNORS OF
GUAM AND SAMOA.
Priority
Routine
Deferred
TOR Coderoom
Decoded by
Paraphrased by
Information:
Priority
Routine
Deferred
Indicate bv asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.
012358
Unless otherwise hidicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.
Originator fill in date and time: Date Time OCT
TEXT
Personnel of your Naval Intelligence should be advised that because of the fact
that from past experience shows the Axis Powers often begin activities in particu-
lar field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the counti-y con-
cerned, they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precau-
tions are in effect.
Originator 10/11 File
ONI : 16 Copy, 16-A Copy, 16-B Copy, F-4, F-3, F-1.
Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4)
NAVREGS.)
CONFIDENTIAL
[DO NOT DETACH— This slip is a part of permanent file record]
N. N. I. 122
ROUTING SLIP 27-41
Naval Intelligence, Office of Chief of Naval Operations
NAVY department
Subject: Organization of the Japanese Fleets (Op-16-F-2. ONI Serial, dated
July 29, 1941).
Reference :
Date : July 30, 1941. File No.
From Director of Naval Intelligence
To
Secretary of the Navy
Under Secretary of the Navy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Chief, Naval Operations
Assistant Chief, Naval Operations.
Central Division
Communication Liason
Communications --:.
Fleet Training
Inspections
Fleet Maintenance _
Naval Districts.
Ships' Movements
War Plans . .
Naval Reserve Policy
General Board .
Budget Officer- - "
Aeronautics
Ships
Hydrographic . . . -
J. A. G..
Marine Corps
M.&S
Navigation
Ordnance
S. & A
Y. &D
Aeronautical Board
Office of Inventions .
(2)
(1)
1328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(2)
(1)
Remarks:
Check Action Required
Information and return O. N. I. Room 4826
Retain
Note, initial, and pass to next
For comment and return
Necessary action or reply
Cognizance activity checked
Information on which to base reply
(At this point in the Exhibit, two items appear, as follows :
1. A copy of Naval Intelligence Division Routing Slip 27-41
dated 30 July 1941.
2. Navy Department Intelligence Report, Serial No. 27-41,
dated 29 July 1941, relating to organization of the Japa-
nese Fleet.
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 301
and 302, EXHIBITS— ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.)
Combined Fleet and Fir.st Fleet
Yamaloto Isoroku, CiuC (Admiral)
MuTsu, Flagsliii)
First fleet
Bdtdiv One
MUTSU (F)
NAGATO
YAMASHIRO
Butiliv Two
FUSO (F)
ISE
NYUGA
Bdtdiv Three
KONGO (F)
NIYEI
KIRISHIMA
HARUMA
Orttdlv Six
FURUTAKA
KAKO
AOBA
KINUGASA
Cardiv S
ZUIKAKU
SHOKAKU
Dcsdiv 34
HAKAZE
AKIKAZE
YUKAZE
TACHIKAZE
Cuidiv ')
RYUJO
HOSHO
nesdiv
SHIMAKAZE
SAWAKAZE
YAKAZE
NADAKAZE
Cardiv 7
CHITOSE (F)
CHIYODA
MIZUHO
Dcsron One
ABUKUMA (F)
Desdiv 0
IKAZUCHI (F)
SAZAMAMI
INAZUMA
HIBIKI
Dcsdiv 7
OBORO (F)
USHIO
AKEBONO
AKATSUKI
Dcsdiv 21
NENOMI (F)
MATSUMARU
HATSUSHIMO
WAKABA
Dusdiv 27
SHIRATSUYU (F)
ARIAKE
YUGURE
SNIGURE
Dcsron Three
SENDAI (F)
Dexdiv It
FUBUKI (F)
SHIRAYUKI
MATSUYUKI
Desdiv 12
SHIRAKUMO (F)
SHINONOME
USUGUMO
Desdiv li)
SHIKINAMI (F)
ISONAMI
AYANAMI
Desdiv 20
AMAGIRI (F)
ASAGIRI
YUGIRI
SAGIRI
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1329
Combined Fleet
Second Fleet
KOGA Mineichi, CinC (Vice Admiral)
KAYA, Flagsliip
Crudiv Four
ATAGO
TAKAO
CHOKAI
NAYA
Crudiv Five
NACHI (F)
HAGURO
MYOKO
Crudiv Seven
KUaiANO (F)
MOGAMI
MIKUMA
SUZUYA
Crudiv Eight
CHIKUMA (F)
TONE
Curdiv 1
AKAGI (F)
KAGA
Desdiv 3
HOKAZE
SHIOKAZE
NAMIKAZE
NUMAKAZE
Cardir 2
SORYU (F)
MIRYU
Desdiv 23
UZUKI
KIKUTSUKI
MIKASUKI
YUZUKI
Desron Two
JINTSU (F)
Deiidiv 8
ASASHIO
ARASHIO
OSHIO
MICHISHIO
Desdiv 15
KUROSHIO
OYASHIO
NATSUSHIO
HAYASHIO
Desdiv 16
HATSUKAZE
YUKIKAZE
AMATSUKAZE
TOKITSUKAZE
Desdiv 18
KASUMI
ARARE
KACERO
SHIRANUHI
Desron Four
NAKA (F)
Desdiv 2
YUDACHI (F)
MURASAME
HARUSAME
SAMIDARE
Desdiv 1
HAGIKAZE
ARASHI
ISOKAZE
URAKAZE
Desdiv 9
ASAGUMO
YAMAGUMO
MINEGUMMO
NATSUGURE
Desdiv 2 If
KAWAKAZE (F)
YAMAKAZE
SUZUKAZE
UMIKAZE
Third Fleet
TAKAHASHI Ibo, Cine (Vice Admiral)
NAGARA, Flagsliip
Cardiv 6
NOTORO
KAMIKAWA IMARU
Minelayer Dir. 11
ITSUKUSHIIMA
YALYAMA
KUMAJIRI
Desron Five
NATORI (F)
Desdiv 5
ASAKAZE
HARUKAZE
MATSUKAZE
HATAKAZE
Desdiv 21
SATSUKI
FUMITSUKI
MINATSUKI
NAGATSUKI
1st Base Force
Guard Division 1
SHIRATAKA
AOTAKA
HATSUTAKA
Mine Sweeper Div. 1
AM-1
AM-2
AM-3
1330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
AM-4
AM-5
AM-6
Mine Sweeper Div. 21
AM-7
AM-8
AM-9
AM-10
AM-11
AM-12
Ounboat Division 1
Gunboats
(Converted Fishing Vessels)
Subchaser Squadron
KATSURIKI
Subchaser Division 1
PC-1
PC-2
PC-3
Subchaser Division 11
PC-4
PC-5
PC-6
Subchaser Division 2t
PC-7
PC-8
PC-9
Subchaser Division 31
PC-10
PC-11
PC-12
27 or more Transports
Fourth Fleet
Katagiri Eikichi, CinO (Vice Admiral)
Kashima, Flagship
Crudiv Eighteen
KASHIMA (F)
l-ENRYU
TATSUTA
Air Group 24
KAMOI
1— XAV
2 VP— Squadrons
Desdiv 17
MINEKAZE
OKIKAZE
Minelayer Div. 19
TOKIVVA
OKINOSHEA
Desron Six
TAMA
Desdiv 29
OITE
HAYATE
ASAMAGI
YUMAGI
Desdiv 30
KISARAGI
MUTSUKI
YAYOI
MOCHITSUKI
Subron Seven
JINGEI (F)
Subdiv 26
RO-60
RO-61
RO-62
Subdiv 27
RO-65
RO-66
RO-67
Subdiv 33
RO-63
RO-64
RO-68
Srd Base Force (At Palau)
Guard Division 3
15 XPG
Subdiv 8
RO-56
RO-57
RO-58
RO-59
10 Transports
Jfth Base Force (At Truk)
9 Transports
Air Group 7 (At Ponape)
2 Transports ( " " )
5th Base Force (At Saipan)
Guard Division 4
(Composition unknown)
Guard Division 5
(Composition unknown)
Gunboat Division
(Composition unknown)
Air Group 8
10 Transports
6th Base Force (At Jaluit)
Mine Sweeper Division (At Jaluit)
AM-13
AM-14
AM-15
AM-16
13 Transports
Subchaser Div. 5 (In Mandates)
PC-51
PC-52
P053
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY
1331
Submarine Fleet
Katobi, Flagship
^ubron One
KATORI (F)
TAIGEI
Subdiv 1
1-9
1-15
1-16
1-17
Subdiv 2
1-18
1-19
1-20
Subron Two
KITAGAMI (F)
Subdiv 7
I-l
1-2
1-3
1-7
Subdiv 8
1-4
1-5
1-6
Subron Three
ISUZU (F)
Subdiv 11
1-74
1-75
Subdiv 12
1-8
1-68
1-69
1-70
Subdiv 20
1-71
1-72
T-73
Subron Five
YURA (F)
Subdiv 28
1-59
1-60
Subdiv 29
1-61
1-62
1-64
Subdiv 30
1-65
1-66
Subron Six
KINU (F)
Subdiv 9
1-123
1-124
Subdiv 13
1-121
1-122
Subron 7>w
KISO (F)
Subdiv 18
1-53
1-54
1-55
Subdiv 19
1-56
1-57
1-58
Subdiv 21
RO-33
RO-34
Train fob Combinkd Flket
SATA
TSURULI
SHIRITA
IRQ
ONDO
NAYATOMO
NARUTO
NANIYA
ASAHI
AKASHI
MUROTO
OTOMARI
SETTSU
1332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese Naval Forces in China
Shimada Shi'getaro, ClnO (Admiral)
IzUMO, Flagship
Shanghai Base Force
Desdiv 11
KURI
TSUGA
HASU
Shanghai Harbor Affairs Section
Special Nai^al Landing Force, Shanghai
Nanking Base Force
Special Naval Landing Force, Nanking
Central China FtEHT, or
First Expeditionary Fleet
1st China Expeditionary Fleet.
KoMATsu Teruhisa, CinC (Vice Ad-
miral)
Ujt, Flagship
Patrol Diinsion 11
ATAKA
SETA
KATADA
HIRA
HOZU
TOBA
ATAMI
FUTAMI
FUSHIMI
SUMIDA
HASHIDATE
Air Group 10
Hankow Boise Force
Kiukiang Base Force
South China Fleet, or
Second Expeditionary Ft-EET
2nd China Expeditionary Fleet
NiiMi Masaichi, CinC (Vice Admiral)
Ashigaka, Flagship
Crudiv Fifteen
ASHIGARA (F)
Patrol Division 14
SAGA
AM-17
AM-18
Torpedo Boat Division 1
OTORI
HAYABUSHA
HIYODORI
KASASAGI
Guard Division 15
Composition unknown
Guard Division 16
SHIMUSHU
Canton Base Force
A won Base Force
Hainan Is. Base Force
13 Special Service Ships
North China Fleet, ok Third
Expeditionary Fleet
3rd China Expeditionary Fleet
Shimizu, Mitsunami, CincC (Vice
Admiral)
IwATE, Flagship
Patrol Division 12
IWATE (F)
MANRI MARU
Torpedo Boat Division 11
HATO
SAGI
KARI
KIJI
Torpedo Boat Division 21
CHIDORI
MANAZURU
TOMOZURU
HATSUKARI
(hinhoat Division 2
Composition unknown
Gunboat Division 13
Composition unknown
Gunboat Division I4
Composition unknown
Tsingtao Base Force
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