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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

ibOSTON 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK 

conctKess of the united states 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 37 
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 





BOSTOT^ 
PUBLIC 
UBRARY 





PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 

OF THE PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGEESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OP THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7. 1041, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 37 

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 



S^ 



UNITED STATES 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 1946 



JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLET, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERB COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER P. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W, MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFB, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 



(Through January 14, 1946) 

William D. Mitchell, Oeneral Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JDLB M. Hannaford, Assistant Counsel 
John B. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 

Skth W. Richardson, Oeneral Counsel 
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate Oeneral Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
Logan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 


No. 




pages 


1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


8 


337^3927 


9108-10517 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 



Hearings 

Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 
Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 
Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 
Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946. 
Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 
Apr. 9 and 11, and Mav 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 




No. 


Exhibits Nos. 


12 


1 through 6. 


13 


7 and 8. 


14 


9 through 43. 


15 


44 through 87. 


16 


88 through 110. 


17 


Ill through 128. 


18 


129 thj-ough 156. 


19 


157 tlu-ough 172. 


20 


173 through 179. 


21 


180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations, 



22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings, 
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 

Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 661 

[See Index of Exhibits, supra pp. 2-4] 

He\yitt Inqtjiey Exhibit No. 11 

(This exhibit is the book entitled "BATTLE KEPORT— Pearl 
Harbor to Coral Sea," by Commander WALTER KARIG, USNR, 
and Lieutenant WELBOURN KELLEY, USNR. It was published 
(1944) for The Council on Books in Wartime, by Farrar & Rinehart, 
Inc., New York, N. Y., and is not being reproduced here.) 

Hewitt Inquiey Exhibit No. 12 

TOP secret 

United States of Amebica, 
Federal Communications Commission, 

Washington, D. C, August 18, 1944. 
I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as 
follows : 

Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather messages which Major 
Wesley T. Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the 
Commission's monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and 
to advise Colonel Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such message 
was intercepted. This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approxi- 
mately 2140 GMT. 

Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station 
JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 22 GMT, De- 
cember 4, 1941, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been 
unable to contact Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant 
Brotherhood, 20-G, Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he 
was authorized to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office. 

Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station 
JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941, 
which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7 : 50 p. m. 
EST, December 5, 1941. 

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by 
Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ between 0002 
and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusen- 
bury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at 
approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains 
the Romaji version of these messages, 
on file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same. 

In Witness wheeeof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the 
Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of August, 
1944. 

T. J. Slowie, 
T. J. Slowie, 

Secretarjj. 
Document No. 1 

GROUP ONE IS EAST WIND RAIN. 
GROUP TWO IS NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND. 
GROUP THREE IS WEST WIND CLEAR STOP. 

GROUPS REPEATED TWICE IN MIDDLE AND AT END OF BROAD- 
CAST. 
The above are the weather messages Maj. Wesley T. Guest requested the 
Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941. 

Document No. 2 

TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME 
CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE 
WEATHER 

KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM 
AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS 

CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME 
SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM 
Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 
2200 GMT, December 4, 1941. 



662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Document No. S 

TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR 
BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER 
FROM SOUTH, (repeated 3 times) 
Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 ti'ansmitted at approximately 
2130 gmt December 5, 1941. 

Document No. Jf 
English Romaji 

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI- 

NBWS BUT TODAY, SPECIALLY AT MASU GA HONJITSU WA TOKU NI 

THIS POINT I WILL GIVE TEtE KOKO DE TENKI YOHO WO MOSHI- 

WEATHER FORECAST : AGE MASU 

WEST WIND, CLEAR NISHI NO KAZE HARE 

WEST WIND, CLEAR NISHI NO KAZE HARE 

THIS IS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NYUSU NO TOCHU DE GOZAI- 

NEWS BUT TODAY, AT THIS POINT MASU GA KYO WA KOKO DE TOKU 

SPECIALLY I WILL GIVE THE NI TENKI YOHO WO MOSHIAGE 

WEATHER FORECAST : MASU 

WEST WIND, CLEAR NISHI NO KAZE HARE 

WEST WIND, CLEAR NISHI NO KAZE HARE 

Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ trans- 
mitted by them between 0002 GMT December 8, 1941. 



Hewitt Inqxhrt Exhibit No. 13 

INDEX 

A — Messages relating to Japanese interest in ships 1, 2, 

3, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24 

B — Messages relating to "winds code" 4 

C — Message advising Germany of war between Japan and Anglo-Saxon nations 5 

D — Messages relating to "hidden word" code 6, 8, 11, 12, 17, 20 

B — Message indicating steps to be taken as to Holland on opening of war with 
Britain and America 21 

TOP SECEET 

The Seceetaby of the Navy, 
Washington 25, D. 0., 14 May 19^5. 
Op-2a-4-mp 
Serial 0002020 
(SC)A17-24(1) 

From : The Secretary of the Navy. 

To : John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant. 

Subj : Testimony and documentary evidence to be presented to Admiral H. Kent 

Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor investigation. 
Ref : (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, concern- 
ing further Pearl Harbor investigation. 

1. Forwarded herewith are photostatic copies of the following dispatches, 
certified in jacket form NJA 24, to be used in the proceedings directed by refer- 
ence (a) : 

JD-1: 1842 JD-1: 7063 JD-1: 7214 

JD-1: 5696 JD-1: 7111 JD-1: 7280 

JD-1: 5730 JD-1: 7148 JD-1: 7294 

JD-1: 6850 JD-1: 7157 JD-1: 7360 

JD-1: 6943 JD-1: 7158 JD-1: 7335 

JD-1: 6985 JD-1: 7178 JD-1: 7370 

JD-1: 7029 JD-1: 7179 JD-1: 7511 

JD-1: 7122 JD-1: 7212 JD-1: 8007 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 663 

2. Your attention Is directed to the fact that these dispatches are classified 
TOP Secret. When used in accordance with reference (a), the return of these 
dispatches to this oflSce is directed. 

James Foebestal. 



From: Honolulu (Okuda). 
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin). 
10 March, 1941. 
(J18K8)* 
#043 

Vessels seen in Pearl Harbor on (9th) were the following: 

Four battleships (two of the New Mexico class and two of the Pennsylvania 
class). 

Five heavy cniisers (two of the class, one of the class, and 

two of the class). 

Six light cruisers (four of the class and two of the Omaha class). 

Yorktown. 

25 destroyers ( ) 

Two destroyer tenders. 

Several submarines. 

One submarine tender. 

Several transports. 

Mailed to Washington, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle. 

•Note : This is first translation of J18K8, a new system effective 1 March, 1941. 

JD-1: 1842 Navy Trans. 4-5-41 (S) 



SECEET 

From: Tokyo (Toyoda). 
To : Honolulu. 
September 24, 1941. 
J-19. 
#83. 

Strictly secret. 

Henceforth, we would like to have you make rejwrts concerning vessels along 
the following lines insofar as possible: 

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. 
(We have no objections to your abreviating as much as you like.) 

Area A. Waters between F'ord Island and the Arsenal. 

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. This 
area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.) 
Area C. East Loch. 
Area D. Middle Loch 
Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes. 

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you 
i-eport on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys 
and in docks. (Designate tyi>es and classes briefly. If possible we would like 
to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along 
side the same wharf. ) 



JD-1 : 5696 

From: Honolulu (Kita). 

To : Washington. 

29 September 1941. 

Circular #041. 

Honolulu to Tokyo #178. * 

Re your #083.* 

(Strictly secret.) 

The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels : 

1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (The repair basin referred to in my message to 
Washington #48**) : KS. 

2. Navy dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier) : KT. 

3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island : FV. 

4. Alongside in Ford Island : FG. ( East and west sides will be differentiated 
by A and B respectively. 

Relayed to Washington, San Francisco. 

JD-1: 5730 23312 (D) Navy Trans. 10-10-41 (X) 

•Not available. 

••Available, dated 21 August. 



664 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From: Tokyo. 
To : Washington. 
19 November 1941. 
(J19). 
Circular #2354. 

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the fol- 
lowing at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts : 

(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI." 

(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA." 

(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), "NISHI." 
The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end. 
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco. 

JD-1: 6850 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S) 



SECBET 

From: Tokyo. 

To: Berlin. j 

November 30, 1941. 

Purple. (CA). 

#985. (Parti of 3.)' 

Re my Circular #2387." 

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during 
the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the 
Imperial Government, now stand ruptured — broken. (I am sending you an out- 
line of developments separately.) 

In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with 
determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor 
HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate 
to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and 
the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that 
they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia 
and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very 
secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out 
between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add 
that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone 
dreams. 

JD-1: 6943 ARMY 25552 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (MR) 

" Part 2 not available. 
»> Not available. 



SECBET 

From: Tokyo. 
To: Berlin. 
November 30, 1941. 
Purple. (CA). 
#985. (Part 3 or 3.) 

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about 
our attitudes toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude 
toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present 
moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and 
that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and 
resists us with, hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; 
however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time 
being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north. 

5. This directive is important from a strategic point of view and must under 
all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without say- 
ing. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how im- 
portant secrecy is. 

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to 
the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI 
and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the 
Germans and Italians, please let me know. 

Will you please forward this directive to Rome, together with the separate one 
following. 
JI>-1:6943 ARMY 25553 SECRET Trans 12-1-41 (RIR) 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 665 

From: Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
27 November 1941. 
(J19) 

Circular #2409 (In 4 parts, complete). 
Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular #324. 

(Washington sent to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Havana, Panama, 
New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message). 

(Part 1) 

Handle as Chief of OflSce routing. 

With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency 
system of despatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language 
telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully. 

Make up a table with the left column containing the code words and the right 
the corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that there is no mistake in 
transcribing this. 

EXAMPLE : A message meaning : 

"Japan and U. S. S. R. military have clashed", will read : 
"HIJIKATA and KUBOTA, clerks, have both been ordered to your em- 
bassy on 15th (begin spell) STOP (end spell)." 

In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word STOP will 
be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word "OWARl" (end) 
will not be used). 

{Part 2) 

Code Word Meaning 

ARIMUR.A Code communications prohibited. 

ASAI Communications will be by radio broadcasts. 

ASAKURA Will communicate by radio broadcast. You are directed 

to listen carefully. . 

ASIKA.QA Reception of overseas broadcast impossible due to 

interference. 

AZUMA Pressure on Japan increasing continually. 

EDOGUTI Prepare for evacuation. 

HANABUSA Preparations for evacuation have been completed. 

HANAZONO (?) Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suitable foreign 

envoy (or consul) there. 

HATAKEYAMA Relations between Japan and . . . (blank) . . . have 

been severed. 

HATTORI Relations between Japan and . . . (blank) . . . are not 

in accordance with expectation. 

(Part S) 

HIZIKATA Japan's and . . . (blank's) . . . military forces have 

clashed. 

HOSINO Japan and . . . (blank) . . . are entering a full fledged 

general war. 

IBARAGI Communicate to us probable date of breaking off of rela- 
tions between Japan and the country to which you are 
&ccrpditGd 

INAKAKI Have you --?-- the . . . (blank) . . . matter? 

ISHIKAWA I have—? the . . . (blank) . . . matter. 

KASHIWAGI- We are commencing military action? against . . . (blank) 

KOBAYAKA.WA Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas to Japan, to 

persons of . . . (blank) . . . nationality. 

KODAMA Japan. 

KOMIYAMA China. 

KOYANAGI England. 

KUBOTA U. S. S. R. 

KURIBARA France (?). 

KUSUNOKI Germany. 

MATUTANI Italy. 



666 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

{Part ^) 

MINAMI U. S. A. 

MIWATA Canada. 

MIYAZAKI Mexico. 

MOROKOSI Brazil. 

MOTIZUKI Panama. 

NAGAMINE Argentina. 

NAKAZATO Thailand. 

NANGO French Indo-China. 

NEGI (?) Netherlands East-Indies. 

OGAWA Burma (?). 

OKAMOTO Malaya. 

OKUMZRA Australia. 

ONIZUKA Union of South Africa (?). 

ONODERA Enemy country. 

OTANI ? (Possibly : friendly, or allied country?) 

ONISI Year. 

SIMANAKA Day (?). 

SAKAKIBAEA Tsuki) Month. 

SIGENOI (KO) Pargraph. 

SANZYO (Toki) Time. 

ITIRO 1. 

NISAKU 2. 

SANTARO 3. 

YOITI 4. 

GORO 5. 

MASAROKU 6. 

SIMETARO 7. 

TASOKITI 8. 

HISAMATU 9. 

ATUMI 0. 

JD-l: 6985 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-2^1 (7) 



From: Tokyo (Togo). 
To: Honolulu. 
November 20, 1941. 
#111. Strictly secret. 

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet — bases in the neighborhood of the 
Hawaiian military reservation. 

ARMY 25694 JD 7029 Trans. 12-4-41 (S) 



From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii). 

To : Santiago. 

2 December 1941. 

(J19.) 

Circular #329 (In 3 parts, complete). 

Tokyo to Rio as Circular No. 2482, on 29 Nov. 

Re my Circular No. 2409*. 

The following are added this date to my Circular No. 2409*, for special use in 
your area. Please use them together with the others, (after making them up in 
a table). 

(Translator' 8 note: Undellned values are doubtful due to garbles. Probable correct 
value added below in parenthesis.) 

Code Word Meaning 

ASAHINA From - - (blank) - - (date), Japanese ships stopping 

here will not be allowed to take on fuel. 
DATE Please telegraph probable amount of - - (blank) - - 

that can be imported. 
BLAWAHARA I estimate we can probably import about (blank) 

tons of - - (blank) - -. 

•JD-l : 6985. List of code names to be used In plain language messages, with indictor 
STOP at end. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 667 

Code Word Meaning 

NIWAGUCHI It is impossible to carry out - - blank) - -. 

(Kawaguchi) 

NAKAMIITA Are in the process of arranging for importation of - - 

(NakamuraT (blank) - -. 

SATUNAKATA Send communications via - - (blank) - - (country). 

(Munakata) 

KAZAMA Communications will be through office stationed in - - 

(blank) - - (country). 

TOKUSIMA Japanese ship should arrive in - - (blank) - - (coun- 
try) on - - (blank) - - (month) - - (blank) 
- - (day). 

TAKENOUTI Is it possible for Japanese ships to come to - -(blank)- - 

(country)? 

YA — GI It is not possible to send Japanese ships to - - (blank) - - 

(Yanagi) (country). 

TONEGI It is possible to send Japanese ship(s) to - -(blank)- - 

(country). 
(Part 2) 

TAKAGI Minerals. 

SAWAMURA Lead. 

— SUMI Mercury. 

(Kasumi) 

IWASAKI Petroleum. 

HIROHATA Diamonds for industrial use. 

ITAMI Platinum. 

KADA Copper. 

NAKAGAWA Carat. 

MAEHATA Peru. 

MASUKO Chile. 

SENEDA Colombia. 

TAKENAKA Paraguay or Uruguay (?). 

SIMAZU Paraguay or Uruguay (?). 

IMAZAWA Venezuela. 

FUJIKAKE San QINY.** 

HASIMOTO Cuba. 

SINDO__ Havana. 

TIBA__1 Rio de Janeiro. 

TOZAWA Sao Paulo. 

(Part S) 

HASEGAWA Riberao Preto. 

IRIFUNE Santos. 

ENOMOTO BAURU. 

BEPPU Curityba. 

TIKAMATU Belem. 

SUETUGU Buenos Aires. 

OKIZUMI Santiago. 

YAMATO Lima. 

UMEGAWA Bogota. 

HARA Caracas. 

ISONO Montevideo (?). 

PUKAMATI Asuncion. 

Relay from Rio de Janeiro to TPT***, Lima, Sao Paulo, Mexico City relay to 
"Washington, Panama, Havana, Caracas (?), Bogota. 

••Code value is QINY, (probably Salvador or Domingo). 
•••Probably "Buenos Aires and Santiago". 



668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
JD— 1:7122 Secret (Y) Navy Trans, 12-5-41 (7) 

SECEET 

From : Tokyo (Togo). 
To : Honolulu. 
November 18, 1941. 
J-19. 
#113. 

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein : Area "H", 
Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay," and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your inves- 
tigation with great secrecy. ) 

JD-1 : 7063 ARMY 25773 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (3) 



» Probably means Mamala Bay. 



From Honolulu (Kita). 
To : Tokyo. 
November 18, 1941. 
J-19. 
#222. 

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my 
#219 " on that day. 

Area A" — A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port. 
Area O ' — 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor. 

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, 
or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, 
one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "XB". 4 merchant vessels were 
at anchor in Area D."^ 

3. At 10 : 00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed enter- 
ing the Harbor. Their course was as follows : In a single file at a distance of 
1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. 
From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to 
which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 
degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers 
entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side. 

Relay to . 

JD-1: 7111. Middle Loch. SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2) 



• Available In WE code dated November 14. Code nnder study. 

•» Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal. 

« Bast Loch. 

<i Middle Loch. 

From: Tokyo. 

To: (Circular telegram). 

7 December 1941. 

(Plain Japanese language using code names). 

Circular #2494. 

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation. 

JD-1:7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT) 



From : Tokyo (Togo) 

To Honolulu 

November 28, 1941 

J19 (Priority) 

#118. 

Re your #232\ 

To be handled in government code. 

Anticipating the possibility of ordinary telegraphic communication being sev- 
ered when we are about to face the worst of situations, these broadcasts are 
intended to serve as a means of informing the diplomats in the country concerned 
of that situation without the use of the usual telegraphic channels. Do not de- 
stroy the codes without regard to the actual situation in your locality, but 
retain them as long as the situation there permits and until the final stage is 
entered into. 

JD-1: 7157 ARMY 25859 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (5) 

• Not available. 

■• S. I. S. #25482 in which Tokyo sends a circular giving hidden-meaning words which 
will be broadcast In the event that code communication Is cut off. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 669 

From: Tokyo (Togo). 

To: Honolulu. 

November 28, 1941. 

#119 Re your message #243". 

Secret outside the Department. 

Intelligences of this kind which are of major importance, please transmit to us 
in the following manner : 

1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement but 
once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the 
Hawaiian Islands, but could also have travelled far. Use your own judgment in 
deciding on reports covering such movements. 

2, Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of time 
they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the departure. 

ARMY 25880 JD-7158 Trans. 12/8/41 (S) 



a Available in code under study. 



From: Honolulu. 

To: Tokyo. 

December 6, 1941. 

#253 Re the last part of your #123', 

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage 
balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four 
or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of 
these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is con- 
cerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl 
Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the 
troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for 
the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are 
no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that 
they have actually any. However, even tliough they have actually made prepara- 
tions, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of 
the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Fort and Ewa", there are 
limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability 
there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack 
against these places. 

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are 
not known. I will report the results of my investigation. 

ARMY 25877 JD 7178 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT) 



" Not available. 
" Kana spelling. 



From: Honolulu. 
To : Tokyo. 
December 6, 1941. 

#254. 

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were — 
and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on 
the 6th : 

Nine battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in 
addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy 
cruisers and airplane carriers have all left. 

2. It appears that no air reconnaisance is being conducted by the fleet air arm. 
ARMY 25874 JD-7179 Trans. 12/8/41 (2^TT) 

P'rom : Honolulu. 
To : Tokyo. 
November 28, 1941. 
#238. 
Military report : 

(1) There are eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the altitude range of their 
anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet ?). 

(2) Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are: number of shots — 12; 



670 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

interval of flight — 13 seconds ; interval between shots — 2 minutes ; direct hits — 
none. 

(3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in 
Honolulu during December or January. 

(4) There has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet ?) south 
of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor, 

ARMY 25928 JD-7212 Trans. 12/8/41 (7) 



From : Tokyo. 
To : Singapore. 
December 2, 1941. 
,J19-19. 

Circular #2450. (5 yards complete.) 

Re my Circular #2409'. 

We have drawn up the following table for the particular needs of your localities 
to supplement for the already given list. 

Code Word Meaning 

KIKUTI Shipments on the road whereby CHIANG receives assist- 
ance (the Burma road ?) are now very lively. 

KAGEYAMA Shipments along the road whereby CHIANG receives 

assistance (the Burma road ?) have now virtually 
stopped. 

(DE ?)OUTI (blank (blank) has been forced backward 

at (blank) — 

AYAOKA The Bumese Independents movement is gradually gaining 

momentum. The officers are endeavoring to quell this 
with every resource, however, the movement is grad- 
ually growing more fierce. 

ITAOISI On the the Burma (blank) was attacked by the 

Independents wing with pistols (or dynamite). 

FUKUNISI On the th in the (blank) area rioting broke out. 

MIYAMOTO I will continue the action I described to you until advised 

by you to do otherwise, then I will end it immediately. 
PART II 

KITAMURA Recently (blank) American military planes arrived 

at (blank) 

MTJTO (blank) — and pilots numbering (blank) ar- 
rived at (blank) 

NAGAOKA (blank) divisions of (blank) troops arrived 

at (blank) and left for (blank) on the th. 

INABA (blank) divisions of (blank) troops are re- 
portedly concentrated on the (blank) border. 

YASIROEW The Independents movement at (blank) and nego- 
tiations thwarting England are now progressing smoothly. 
TUMURA At present there is a total of (blank) enemy mer- 
chant men docked at (blank) 

NINO < Merchant ships now docked at — (blank) — are as fol- 
lows: American (blank) ; British (blank) ; 

Netherlands (blank) 

NAGAY .. an merchant ships left for (blank) loaded with 

arms. 

NIOGUTI Our means of communication witb Burma and the South 

Seas is disrupted and we cannot receive. 

SEGAWA Our resident Nationals have been camped. 

PART III 

YASUI It is reported that riots are breaking out. 

MARUSE Progressing with preparations to bomb oil fields. 

KUBOTA Oil fields bombed. 

NIRA The residents of area are preparing to flee. 

MOORI Orders issued to residents of (blank) area to fleo. 

SEKYA Morale wavering. 

TUKAMOTO Netherlanders. 

OCHIAI Japanese Nitta Natives. 

KURIBAPA Japanese. 

SISIYAMA 

YAMANOUTI Premier. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 671 

Code Word Meaning 

NOSE Specialists' Commission. 

KURODA High tide (?). 

NIRAI Some officers and private citizens 

INOYAMA Telegraphy. 

ENDOO The Yamashita Agency. 

ATUKAX The Nakamura Company, 

KOIZUMI India. 

AER Java. 

EDOGUTI Sumatra. 

HIROSE Celebes. 

HUKUI Borneo. 

INOCYE 

FUKA British India. 

KASAURA Ceylon. 

IKAWA 

PART IV 

HUJIMURA Hainan Island. 

IIJIMA The Spratleys. 

ARIASA Singapore. 

HORUTA Pinan. 

NIWA Bangkok. 

KAMIYA Chien mai* Singora. 

ISIDA Saigon. 

NINOMIYA 

HOSOKAWA 

NEZU Tonkin. 

YOKOTA Cambodia. 

NUMATA 

WATAMZAWA Manila. 

NOKAKI 

KERI Batavia. 

SERINE Menado. 

SERISAWA Makassar. 

SOWE 

ANDO Pankaran-Brandau*. 

DOBASI Pankau Sasu*. 

FUKUSIMA Mandalay. 

BAKAMATSU Palembang. 

PART V 

ISTUMOTO Jambi. 

NAKINO Tarakan. 

MAKING Pa Pan. 

SAKURAI Sagsirinda*. 

TAKANO Sanga Sanga*. 

UEDA Paura*. 

YANAGIYA Banka*. 

WATAGI Biriton*. 

FOAWA Runda*. 

AIDA Malacca. 

BANDO Sumaran*. 

FUNARASI Timor. 

TKEDA New Guinea. 

KATAGIRI Lashie. 

MIXOGUYI The Periswisa* region. 

NICK.\DA The Geta* region. 

SAWAKARA The Keta Eharu Region. 

TAKESITA East. 

UTSUMONIYA West. 

YAMASE Sooth. 

ARAWAKI North. 

DOOKY Island. 

JD-1:7214 ARMY 25943 SECRET Trans. 12/9/41 (NR) 



• See S. I. S. #25609 in ■which Tokyo sends out a circular containing hidden-meaning 
words to be used as an emergency system for dispatches. 
•Kena spelling. 



672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From: Honolulu (Kita). 

To: Tokyo. 

5 December 1841. 

#252. 

(1) During Friday morning, th,e 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my 
message #239* arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days. 

(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day. 

(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th: 
8 battleships. 

3 light cruisers. 
16 destroyers. 
Four ships of the Honolulu class and * * * were in dock. 

26029 

JD-1: 7280 (D) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2) 

♦Available, dated 29 November. 



From: Honolulu (Kita). 

To : Tokyo. 

1 December 1941. 

#241 (In 2 parts, complete). 

Re your #119.* 

Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor : 

1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles 
southeast of here. 

Direction based on : 

(1) The direction taken when the ships start out is usually southeast by south 
and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction. 

(2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or liead for the "KAIUI" straits 
northwards. 

(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and islands and is 
not suitable as a ocean maneuver practice sea. 

(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and official travel 
routes. 

Distance based on : 

(1) Fuel is plentiful and long distance high speed is possible. 

(2) Guns can not be heard here. 

(3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my message 
#231** were for the duration of four full days of 144 hours), a round trip to a 
distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached (if speed is 12 knots), or 1152 
nautical miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 1440 nautical miles (if speed is 20 miles) 
is possible, however, figuring on 50 percent of the time being used for maneuver 
technicalities, a guess that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be a 
point of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor. 

(2) The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: leaving 
on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on 
Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week. 

JD-1: 7294 26053 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2) 

• JD-1 : 7158. 

•♦Available, dated 23 November. 



From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii). 
To : Santiago. 
2 December 1941. 
(J19). 

Circular #328. 

Tokyo to Rio de Janeiro as Circular #2431, 29th November. 
Re my Circular #2409* 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 673 

Additions to the list already sent ; please use with others. 
Code Word Mewning. 

KASIMA Have Japanese living there been interned? 

K4NO Japanese living here are all safe. 

KIKUTI Japanese living here have all been interned. 

KATDNO . Some of Japanese living here have been interned. 

KAWASIMO The wave length of General Information broadcast will 

be changed to kilocycles from (day) 

(month) 

KAKAO Reception of General Information broadcast bad, please 

(Kayao) change wave length. 

TUJIKITA Please change wave length of General Information 

broadcast to a shorter wave length than the present 
"^ wave length. 

TABUSE Please change wave length of General Information 

(Tabuti) broadcast to a longer wave length. 

SAITO The time of General Information broadcast is to be 

changed starting on (day) from 

(time) to (time) 

HAYASAKI Please change time of General Information broadcast, 

starting on (day) to, from (time) 

to (time) 

ISEZAKI 100 (hyaku) 

WANAMI 1,000 (sen) 

YASUNO" 10,000 (man) 

UNO 100,000 (jyii man) 

ITIOTA 1,000,000 (hyaku man) 

(perhaps ITIOKA) 
(probably UTIOKA) 

JD-1:7360 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7) 



*JD-1 : 6985. List of code words similar to above. 



From : Tientsin (7) Peking 

To: Tokyo. 

5 December 1941. 

(Purple). 

#625, (Circular Number.) 

To be handled in government code. 

Re my secret military communication #262* of November 30th. 

1. Concurrent with opening war on Britain and America we have considered 
Holland as a semi-belligerent and have exercised strict surveillence over her 
consulates and prohibited all communication between them and the enemy 
countries. 

2. Coincident with the beginning of the war against Britain and America we 
have taken steps to prohibit the use of code messages and the use of wireless by 
the Holland consulates. 

3. In case war breaks out with Holland we will take the same steps toward 
that country that we havei taken in the case of Britain and America. 

JD-1: 7335 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (AR) 



♦Not available. 



79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2- 



674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From: Honolulu (Kita). 

To : Tokyo. 

3 December 1941. 

#245 (In 2 pai-ts, complete). 

(Military secret.) 

From Ichiro Fuji to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters. 

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following; 

1. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows : 



Meaning 




Signal 


Battleship divisions including scouts and screen 
units. 


Preparing to sortie . . - 


1 


Preparing to sortie 


2 




All departed between 1st and 3d 


3 




Several departed between 1st and 3d 


4 






6 




All departed between 4th and 6th 


6 




Several departed between 4th and 6th 


7 




All departed between 4th and 6th.-- 


8 









26145. 
JD-1: 7370 



(continued) (M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7) 



2. Signals. 

I. Lanikai* Beach. 



House will show lights during the night as follows: 



Signal 

One light between 8 and 9 p. m 1 

One light between 9 and 10 p. m . 2 

One light between 10 and 11 p. m 3 

One light between 11 and 12 p. m 4 

II.— 

Two lights between 12 and 1 a. m 5 

Two lights between 1 and 2 a. m 6 

Two lights between 2 and 3 a. m _ 7 

Two lights between 3 and 4 a. m 8 

(Part 2.) 

III. Lanikai* Bay, during daylight. 

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 
1, 2, 3, or 4. 

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8. 

IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House** will indicate the following : 

Times ' Signal 

1900-2000 - 3 

2000-2100 4 

2100-2200 5 

2200-2300 6 

2300-2400 7 

0000-0100 8 

V. K. G. M. G. *** Want Ads. 



A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6. 

B. CHIC— CO farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7. 

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8. 
3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from 

Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium**** at 
a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20° 
40' N., longitude 156° 19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and south- 



* Between Waimanala and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu. 

**A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai. 

***A radio broadcast station in Honolulu. 

•***At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W- 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 675 

west of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your 

EXEX signal is received. 

Time ' Signal 

From 7-8 3 or 6 

From 8-9 4 or 7 

From 9-10 5 or 8 

JD-1:7370 (M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7) 



B. MESSAGES TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941 

From: Honolulu (Kita). 
To: Tokyo. 
November 24, 1941. 
#231. (Part of 2) 

Re your #114.'' 

Strictly Secret. 

1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts ma- 
neuvers and forthwith returns. 

2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted 
maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaina Roads. Destroyers and submarines 
are the only vessels who ride at anchor there. 

3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. 
Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas. 

4. The manner in which the fleet moves : 

Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. 
They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of 
Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas 
sea plane tenders operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Air- 
plane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern 
extremity of the island of Kahoolawe. 

ARMY 26351 (Japanese) Trans. 12-16-41 (2) 

JD-7511. 

« Not available. 



From: Honolulu. 
To: Tokyo. 
November 24, 1941. 
#234. (Part 2 of 2.) 

The heavy cruisers in groups of six carry on their operations over a period of 
two to three weeks, doubtless going to Samoa. The length of time that they 
remain at anchor in Pearl Harbor or tied up at docks is roughly four or five days 
at a stretch. 

The light cruisers in groups of five spend one to two weeks in operations. It 
would seem that they carry on their maneuvers in the vicinity of Panama. 

The submarines go out on 24-hour trips Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. 

The destroyers, in addition to accompanying the principal units of the fleet, 
carry on personnel training activities in the waters adjacent to Hawaii. 

Mine layers (old-style destroyers) in group sf , have been known to spend 

more than three weeks in operations in the Manila area. 

Furthermore, on the night of the 23rd, five mine layers conducted mine laying 
operations outside Manila harbor. 

ARMY 26352 (Japanese) Trans. 12/16/41 (2) 

JD-7511. 

From: Tokyo (Togo). 
To: Honolulu. 
December 2, 1941. 
J-19. 

#123, (Secret outside the department) 

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane 
carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your 
ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there 
are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications 



676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are 
provided with anti-mine nets. 

Note : This message was received here on December 23. 
JD-1:8007 ARMY 27065 SECRET (Japanese) Trans. 12/30/41 (5) 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 14 

(Exhibit No. 14 originally consisted of four parts: Exhibits 14A, 
14B, 14C, and 14D, being photostatic copies of a Japanese submarine 
chart, showing courses and locations of U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor. 
These photostatic copies are reproduced as a single chart and will be 
found as Item No. 106, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTKATIONS, Hewitt 
Inquiry.) 

Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 15 

From : Washington. 

To : Tokyo. 

25 July 1941. 

(Purple). 

#571. 

Apparently Admiral Pratt had put in a good word for me to the Chief of 
(Naval) Operations, for ever since I assumed this post, I have been shown 
many courtesies by him. His opinions concerning U. S.-Japanese relations co- 
incide with mine; he told me that the only result of a war between the two 
countries would be mutual exhaustion. 

Once while conversing with the Admiral (Stark) I happened to mention that 
it seemed to me that the higher officials in the Navy Department here seemed 
to be men of excellent character and qualifications. 

To this, the Admiral replied that both the Assistant to the Chief of Naval 
Operations and the Director of War Plans were exceedingly able men. The 
same is true of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. As for the fleets, he 
continued, both Kimmel and King were recommended by him, and both are of 
the highest caliber. Although Hart had reached the age of retirement, he had 
been kept on in active duty because of the critical times, he added. 

Please relay this information to the Navy. 

JD-1:4063 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 7-29-41 (7) 



8ECBET 

From: Washington (Nomura). 
To: Tokyo. 
October 14, 1941. 
Purple. 

#943 (Part 1 of 2)" (To be handled in Government Code). 

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told 
me, it is this : 

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. 
Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a 
definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be 
made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. 
Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters 
independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most 
of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of 
withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all 
at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between 
Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal." 



' For part 2 see S. I. S. # 23516. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 677 

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. 
It seems that this opinion of his has also heen given to the Secretary of State. 
Army 5854 23570 SECRET Trans. 10/16/41 (2) 

SECBET 

From: Tokyo (Toyoda). 
To: Washington. 
October 16, 1941. 
Purple (CA). 
#671 

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambas- 
sadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-Ameri- 
can negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, 
been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German 
attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival ?) of the 
movement for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities de- 
manded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government 
a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the 
ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, 
a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on 
the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would provide the 
reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agree- 
ment and might lead Japan to joinn immediately the war in opposition to the 
United States. We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view 
of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider care- 
fully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German au- 
thorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are rea- 
sons which do not permit this matter to be postponed. 

ARMY 5901 23631 SECRET 

From : Berlin. 
To : Tokyo. 
1 October 1941. 
(Purple). 
#1198. 

On this the occasion of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign 
Minister Ribbentrop has come to Berlin from the Imperial Headquarters 
especially and I have had several visits with him. Using this opportunity I, 
and the other members of the staff, have mingled with people from all classes 
of society and visited with them. I am endeavoring to sum up all these experi- 
ences and analyze the present state of feeling toward Japan held by Germany 
In this report to you. 

1. Ribbentrop said that he had absolute proof that, while reports of the 
content of the Japanese-American negotiations were withheld from Am- 
bassador Ott, America was in secret communication with England in regard to 
the Japanese-American negotiations. Even Ribbentrop who is supposed to under- 
stand Japan's position, expressed great dissatisfaction regarding Japan's 
attitude. 

2. That the Foreign Office staff from Weizsacker down and also everyone in 
general were thoroughly disgusted with Japan was very apparent from their 
attitude toward myself and other members of the staff. Everyone who feels 
kindly disposed toward Japan is deeply concerned over this state of aiTairs. 
Even those who do not come to the same conclusion that Ambassador Ott did 
in his telegram are outspoken in their dissatisfaction and expression of pessi- 
mistic views. I am trying to take the position in interviews with newspaper 
correspondents and other concerned with the outside that Germany is cognizant 
of the Japanese-American negotiations and that they are no indication of an 
alienation between Japan and Germany. 

3. Foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents of third countries show 
great interest in the Japanese attitude and seem to. consider it in a certain 
sense as a barometer by which the course of the European war can be judged. 
However we receive the Impression that the greater number feel that Japan is 
avoiding war because of the impoverishment resulting from the China incident 
and Is taking a pessimistic attitude toward the course of the European war. 

4. Even though It might be said that Germany is prepared for these machina- 



678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tions of estrangement by third countries and that she is keeping up the pretence 
that there is no change in her feeling toward Japan, the fact that the feeling 
of German leaders and the people in general toward Japan is getting bad is one 
that cannot be covered. Please bear this fact in mind. If Japan takes a 
wishy-washy attitude and goes ahead with her negotiations without consulting 
Germany there is no telling what step Germany may take without consulting 
Japan. 

Relayed to Rome. 

JD-1: SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 10-18-41 (4) 



From: Washington (Nomura). 
To: Tokyo. 
October 22, 1941. 
Purple. (CA). 

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure 
that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time 
the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how 
little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my 
ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice 
and who say that things will g0t better for me, but, alas, their encouragement 
is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are also 
some who feel the same way, but alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for 
Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do 
I image that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the bones of a 
dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other 
people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle*, but as a 
man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send 
me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgive- 
ness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the 
depth of my rudeness. 

ARMY 6017 23859 SECRET Trans. 10-23^1 (7) 



From: Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
23 October 1941. 
(Purple-CA). 

Unnumbered. 

From you message (s) I am advised of the various difficulties you are coping 
with and I wish to express to you that I appreciate the efforts you are making. 
As you are well aware, the outcome of those negotiations have a great bearing 
upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue. As such, 
it is an exceedingly important matter. We are placing all of our reliance on Your 
Excellency's reports for our information on this matter. 

For the above reason, we express our hope that you will see fit to sacrifice all 
of your own personal wishes, and remain at your post. 

JD-1: 6016 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 10-23-41 (S-TT) 



From: Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
5 November 1941. 
(Purple-OA). 

#736 

(Of utmost secrecy). 

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrange- 
ments for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. 
I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an 
unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of 
saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so 
with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you. 

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only. 

JD-1: 6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT) 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 679 

SBCBEIV 

From: Washington (Nomura). 
To: Tokyo. 
November 10, 1941. 
Purple (CA) (Urgent). 
#1066. Part 1 of 2. 

1. I sent MOORE" to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Re- 
lations Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows : 

"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States 
will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The 
Navy is prepared and ready for action." 

2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discarding all 
quibbling, began by saying to me: 

"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then 
he continued: "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable 
reports that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does 
not believe that ydur visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. 
KURUSU will have any effect on the general situation." 

I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown 
since the freezing ; how they are eager for a quick understanding ; how both 
the Government and the people do not desire a Japanese- American war; and 
how we will hope for peace until the end. 

He replied, however: 

"Well, our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the Secretary 
of State." 

Army 6440 24655 SECRET Trans. 11/12/41 (2) 

• Frederick Moore — Legal Adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. 



SECBETT 



From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 10, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#106a (Part 2 of 2.) 

In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily News 
and the Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are much more 
eager for a war with Japan than they are for one with Germany. It is said 
that some of the British are using this inclination for their own advantage 
and that already parleys have been started for joint Anglo-American action. 
Suggestions have already been made to the effect that it is necessary for 
some of the British fleet to be located in the Pacific. Now even if the Presi- 
dent and other statesmen do not follow this trend, who can say how it will 
be? The friend I just spoke of told me that the United States cannot stop 
now because if Japan moves something will have to be done since it is a 
question of the United States saving its face. 

3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk with 
him on the basis of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very 
best. 

Army 6440 24656 SECRET Trans. 11/12/41 (2) 



SECEET 

From : Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
November 16, 1941. 
Purple (Ca) (Urgent). 

For your Honor's own information. 

1. I have read your #1090," and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude 
for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender 
thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before. 



680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and 
I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to 
the fundamental policy laid down in my #725." Will you please try to realize 
what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war 
takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation 
renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these 
negotiations in my #786,' and there will be no change. Please try to understand 
that. You see how short the time is : therefore, do not allow the United States 
to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution 
on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate 
solution. 

ARMY 24878. JD-1:6638. SECRET Trans. 11/17/41 (S). 



" S I S. # 24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the 
Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United 

<= S. I. S. # 24378 in which TOGO says that It is absolutely necessary that all arrange- 
ments for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. 



SECRET 

From: Tokyo. 
To : Washington. 
November 22, 1941. 
Purple CA (Urgent). 

#812. 

To both you Ambassadors. 

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.' 
You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed 
policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution 
we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to 
settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or 
four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans ; if the signing 
can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you — twenty ninth) ; if the 
pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great 
Britain and the Netherlands ; and in short if everything can be finished, we have 
decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline abso- 
lutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. 
Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever 
have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassa- 
dors alone. 

ARMY 6710. 25138. SECRET Trans. 11/22/41 (S). 



» See S. I. S. # 24373. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circum- 
stances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be 
completed by the 25th of this month. 



SECEET 

From : Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
November 26, 1941. 
Purple. 

#836. To be handled in Government Code. 

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take 
too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of nego- 
tiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the 

« See JD 1 : 6553 In which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 8 
not available. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



681 



America Bureau on the telephone and make 
we will use the following code : 

Japanese 

Sangoku Joyaku Mondai 

(Three-Power Treaty 
question ) 

Musabetsu Taiguu Mondai 

(The question of non-dis- 
criminatory treatment) 

Shina Mondai 

(The China question) 

Soori 

(Premier) 

Gaimudaijin 

(Foreign Minister) 

Rikugun 

(The Army) 

Kaigun 

(The Navy) 

Nichi-bei kooshoo 

(Japan-American nego- 
tiations) 

Daitooryoo 

( President ) 

Haru 

(Hull) 

Kokunaijoosei 
(Internal situation) 
Jooho Suru 
(To yield) 
Jooho Sesu 
(Not to yield) 
Keisei Kyuuten Suru 
(Situation taking critical 
turn) 

For your information, telephone addresses 
as follows : 

Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO : 
Section Chief KASE: 
The Minister's residence 
The Vice-Minister's resi- 
dence 

ARMY 25344 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (S) 

From : Tokyo. 

To : Washington. 

19 November 1941. i 

(J19). 

Circular #2354. 

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the fol- 
lowing at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts : 

(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI". 

(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA". 

(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), "NISHI" 
The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end. 
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco. 
JD-1:6850 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S) 



your report to him. At that time 

English 
Nyuu Yooku 
(New York) 

Shikago 
(Chicago) 

Sanfuranshisuko 

(San Francisco) 

Itoo Kun 

(Mr. Itoo) 

Date Kun 

(Mr. Date) 

Tokugawa Kun 

(Mr. Tokugawa) 

Maeda Kun 

(Mr. Maeda) 

Endan 

(Marriage proposal) 

Kimiko San 
(Miss Kimiko) 
Fumako San 
(Miss Fumako) 
Shoobai 
(Trade) 
Yama Wo Uru 
(To sell the mountain) 
Yama Wo Urenu 
(Not to sell the mountain) 
Kodomo Gaumareru 
(The child is born) 

other than our Home Office are 

Setagaya 4617 
Yotsuya 4793 
Ginza 3614 
Ginza 1022 



682 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From: Tokyo. 

To: Nanking. 

15 November 1941. 

(Purple). 

#499. 

Re your #818* 

To Naval authorities: 

We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached 
an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for 
a while. 

jd-1: 6848 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (6-AR) 



♦Not available. 



From : Tokyo. 
To : Washington. 
19 November 1941 
(J19) 
Circular #2353. 

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency. 

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and 
the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be 
added in the middle of the daily .Japanese language short wave news broadcast. 

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.* 

(2) Japan-U. S: S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.** 

(3) Japan-British relations : NISHI NO KAZE HARE*** 

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast 
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy 
all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement. 

Forward as urgent intelligence. 

JD-1: 6875 SECRET (Y) Navy Tran.s. 11-28-41 (S-TTi. 

*East wind rain. 
**North wind cloudy. 
***West wind clear. 



From : Washington. 

To : Tokyo. 

November 26, 1941. 

Purple. ( Extremely urgent) . 

#1180. (Parti of 2.) 

From NOMURA and KURUSU. 

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having 
them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situa- 
tion remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will 
inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure 
and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situa- 
tion. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President 
ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of iposterity he hopes that Japan and 
the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of iieace in the Pacific 
(just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this 
sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply 
with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also 
gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United 
States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection 
through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should pro- 
nose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Nether- 
lands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT 
proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai. ) 

ARMY 6891 25435 SECRET Trans. 11-28-11 (1) 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 683 

From: Washington. 

To : Tokyo. 

November 26, 1941. 

Purple. (Extremely urgent). 

#1180. (Part 2 of 2.) 

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily 
mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we 
said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England 
and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them 
would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel 
duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. 
Again, you must remember that the Sino-Jajxanese incident would have to wait 
until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled. 

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have 
to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it 
to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him ; then we hope that you will wire us 
back instantly. 

ARMY 25436 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1) 



From: Washington (Nomura). 

To: Tokyo. 

November 26, 1941. 

Purple. (Extremely urgent.) 

#1189. (Parti of 2.) 

At 4 : 45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with 
Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours. 

HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been 
getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the 
nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on 
the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. 
At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without 
commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 
21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the follow- 
ing two proposals : 

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles." 

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, 
Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok. 

(2) Agreement between .Tapan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, 
China, and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of 
economic treatment in French Indo-China. 

(3) The complete evauation of Japanese forces from China and all French 
Indo-China. 

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime 
in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK. 

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China. 
ARMY 25441 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1) 



From: Washington (Momura). 

To : Tokyo. 

November 26, 1941. 

Purple. (Extremely urgent.) 

#1189. (Part 2 of 2.) 

(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the 
United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment. 

(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders. 

(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange. 

(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has 
contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties 
will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the 
maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate 
the Three-Power Pact.) 



684 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we 
could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Toyko. We argued 
back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States 
have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and 
China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit 
helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have 
been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there 
have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that" she give us complete 
control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard pro- 
posals, or we think so. 

ARMY 25442 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1) 



From: Tokyo. 
To : Washington. 
November 28, 1941. 
Purple. (CA.) 

#844. 

Re your #1189." 

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of 
this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. 
This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government 
can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of 
the views of the Imperial Goveirnment on this American proposal which I will 
send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. 
This is inevitable. However, 1 do not wish you to give the impression that the 
negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instruc- 
tions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to 
you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made 
just claims and has borne great sacritices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. 
Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, 
but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it 
impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this 
pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 " and he said that under 
the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on 
do the best you can. 

ARMY 6S98 25445 SECRET Trans. 11-28-^1 (S) 



» S. I. S. # 25441, # 25442, 
" S. I. S. # 25435, # 25436. 

From: Tokyo. 

To: Washington. 

29 November 1941. « 

(Purple-CA.) 

#857. 

Re my #844* 

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines : 

The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial 
position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims 
of both sides. 

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has 
now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made 
the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore 
actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the 
Imperial Government. 

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, 
what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made 
the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points 



*JD-1 : 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new 
U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days 
giving its views on them the negotiations will be 'de facto' ruptured. However, do not 
give the impression that negotiations are broken off. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 685 

we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States 
government. 

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead 
to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.) 

JD-1: 6921 SECRET (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT) 



From: Washington. 

To: Tokyo. 

30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST). 

Telephone Code. 

Transpacific Radio Telephone. 

(NOTE: Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation be- 
tween Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division 
Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night.) 

Kurusu: "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a 
short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. 
There is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see) 
him about the short one." (i. e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's 
reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.) 

Yamamoto: "Yes. I see." 

Kurusu : "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home." 

Y. "Is there any special significance to this?" 

K. "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is 
having strong repercussions here." 

Y. "Is that so." 

K. "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried 
large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of 
it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the up Tspapers 
are giving," 

(Pause) 

"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, 
it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out 
about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani." 

Y. "We are being careful." 

K. "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the 
correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the 
Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that 
we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we 
get this." (i. e. Premier's speech) 

JD-1: 6922 SECRET (M)Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5) 



(After a pause, Kurusu continues ; using voice code) 

K. "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan) 

Y. "No particular (one or two words faded out) " 

K. "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?" 

Y. "Yes." 

K. "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you: hut now you 
want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and 
the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches ! ! ! ! Do you 
understand? Please all use more discretion." 

Y. "When will you see them. The 2nd?" 

K. "Let's see — this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. 
That will be Monday morning here." 

(Pause) 

"Actually the real problem we are up against is the ejffects of happenings 
in the South. You understand don't you?" 

Y. "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?" 

K. "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:0 this 
afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime." 

Y. "Well then— Goodbye." 

JD-1: 6922 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-o) 



686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From: Tokyo. 
To : Washington. 
1 December 1941. 
(Purple-CA). 

#865. 
Re my #857 *. 

1. The date set in my message #812 ** has come and gone, and the situation 
continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States 
from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others 
that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United 
States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information) . 

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to 
Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124 ***. Please make 
the necessary representations at your end only. 

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital 
is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President 
did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please 
make investigations into this matter. 

JD-1: 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT) 

♦JD-l : 6921. 
**JD-1:6710. 
•♦•Not available. 



SEOBin' 
From : Tokyo. 
To : Berlin. 
November 30, 1941. 
Purple. 

#986. (Strictly Secret.) (To be handled in Government Code.) (Part 1 of 2.) 
Secret outside the Department.) 

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this 
year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that 
period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as 
the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the inter- 
national situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan 
and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the 
scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from 
participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through 
these negotiations. 

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of 
defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a Just and equitable basis, has 
continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and 
ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations 
rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French 
Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other. 

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first 
came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional 
idealogical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her 
fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried 
on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The mo- 
tive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent 
the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and 
in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long 
as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could 
be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States 
was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate 
a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri- 
Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say 
that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become 
gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer 
continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a con- 
tinuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause. 

ARMY 6944 25554 SECRET Trans. 12/1/41 (MR) 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 687 

BECKETT 

From: Tokyo. 

To: Berlin. 

November 30, 1941. 

Purple. 

#986. (Part 2 of 2.) 

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude 
of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says 
that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will 
not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, 
namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the 
Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European 
war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance 
to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, 
makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. 
What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred 
with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China — they did so repeatedly. 
Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those 
nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as 
an ememy. 

ARMY 6944 25555 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (MR) 



SEXJEET 

From: Washington (Nomura). 
To : Tokyo. 
November 28, 1941. 

Purple. 

#1214. 
To be handled in Government Code. 
Re my #1190". 

So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United 
States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and 
headlines like this are appearing in the papers: "Hull Hands Peace Plans to 
Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second :\Iunich." The papers say that it is 
up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, 
or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan. 

This we must carefully note. 

ARMY 6971 25548 SECRET Trans. 12-1^1 (2) 



« S. I. S. # 25444 and # 25480 in which NOMURA expresses the danger of the responsi- 
bility for the rupture of negotiations being cast upon Japan should Japan enter into her 
scheduled operations during the course of the negotiations. He suggests that the negotia- 
tions be irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy 
in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption. 



From: Tokyo (Togo). 
To: Honolulu (Riyoji). 
15 November 1941. 
(J19). 

#111. 

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make 
your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although 
you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy. 

.TD-1: 6991 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (8) 



688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SECEET 

From : Wasliington. 

To : Tokyo. 

December 2, 1941. {Completed Translation) 

Purple. 

#1232. (Parti of 2) 
Re my #1231 '. 

Today, tlie 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under- 
Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying 
that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he 
turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233 ". * Thereupon we 
said : "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning 
the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations 
directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that 
such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 
20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand 
the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of 
the world." Thereupon we replied : "The United States and' other countries have 
pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I 
made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful ag- 
gression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or 
the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, 
and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this 
pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. *We want you to realize this 
as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of 
the four-year incident in China ; the President recently expressed cognizance of 
the latter situation. 



■ Not available. 

•Original translation incomplete from this point on. 



EECBEV 
From : Washington. 
To : Toyko. 
December 2, 1941 
Purpla 
#1232. (Parti of 2.) 

Re my #1231 ». 

Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under- 
Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying 
that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he 
turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1223'. Thereupon we 
said : "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning 
the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representa- 
tions directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered 
that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of Novem- 
ber 20th." The Under-Secretary then said : "I want you to know that the stand 
the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of 
the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries 
have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. 
(I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful 
aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question 
or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure 
and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this 
pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. Recently the President, too, 
the four year incident 

ARMY 7021 25659 SECRET Trans. 12-3-41 (7) 



• Not available. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 689 



From : Washington ( Nomura j. 

To: Tokyo. 

December 2, 1941. 

Purple. 

#1232. (Part 2 of 2.) 

Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American 
proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration 
to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under- 
Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: 
"We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is 
virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now 
stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 
25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the pi'evious proposal, still 
stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the ofling, 
it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to 
the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement 
f>f the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from 
French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident 
and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settle- 
ment of fimdamental questions, the question of the representations of this date 
would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretai-y assiduously heard us out and 
then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the 
necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal 
situation here." Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have 
expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary." 

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan 
in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room. 

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my 
conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to 
peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they 
would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in 
niind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American pro- 
posals and to my separate wire #1233." 

AR-SIY 2.")660 SECRET Trans. 12-3-41 (7) 



Not available. 



Fi-om : Tokyo. 
To : Hsinking. 
1 December 1941. 
(Purple.) 
#893. 

In the event that Manchuria participates in the war in view 

of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in 
the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and 
America that his country will take in case war breaks out. 

A summary follows : 

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized 
as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code 
telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However, it is 
desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be 
comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries 
resident in Japan. 

2. The treatment accorded to British and Ani9rican public property, private 
pro]ierty. and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded 
by Jfipan. 

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular 
offices and interests will not be recognized. 

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchuokuo shall be equitable 
and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan. 

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform 
to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be 
exercised not to antagonize Russia. 

JD-1: 7002 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (.^)-AR) 



690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From : Washington. 

To: Tokyo. 

i December 1941. 

(Purple.) 

#1227. 

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations 
even if it is necessarj' to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. 
However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck 
in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any fur- 
ther developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to 
conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a 
conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for 
example. Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the 
former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser 
to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some 
midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany 
these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reacli some agreement, 
using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each. 

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or 
peace. 

We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former 
Premier liouoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, 
it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U. S. attitude on this possibility. 
Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the ob- 
jectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given 
this matter. 

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, 
it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion 
that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U. S. attitude re- 
garding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this 
procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then 
how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and 
in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the 
government could make the official proposal. 

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter. 

JD-1:7055 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-^-41 (1) 



SKCRET 

From : Tokyo. 
To: WasliiiigTon. 
December 4, 1941. 
Purple. (Urgent.) 
#891. 

To be handled in Government Code. 

Re your #1256." 

What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be 
a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my #875.'' 
I would advise against it because unfortunate results might follow, so please 
replv in accordance with my aforementioned message. 

ARMY 7105 25731 SECRET Trans. 12-4^1 (S) 



« Not available. 
"S. I. S. #25725. 



From : Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
3 December 1941. 
(Purple.) 
#875. 

Chief of Office routing. 

Re your #1232.* 

Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines: 

There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French 
Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been 

♦JD-l : 7021. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 691 

an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino- 
French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts 
of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of 
troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the 
nunors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have 
in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense 
agreement. 
JD-1:7057 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT) 



SECBETT 

From: Washington (Nomura). 

To: Tokyo. 

December 2, 1941. 

Purple. (Urgent.) 

#1234. 

Strictly Secret. 

Ee your #862 ». 

I know that to leave that error in the publication of this speech as it now 
stands would have a bad effect on negotiations, so on the morning of the 2nd 
prior to my interview with WELLES I sent TERAZAKI to visit BALLANTINE 
at the State Department to explain the substance of your #862. BALLANTINE 
said, "At this tense psychological moment in Japanese-American negotiations, 
the fact that such a strong statement as this has been circulated has given a 
severe shock to the American Government and people and it is very unfortunate 
and dangerous." TERAZAKI replied, "Well, as it was the American newspapers 
that made such a clamor about it, I did not come to vindicate ourselves or make 
any explanation. I merely wished to state the facts." He added, "At present 
the newspapers of both countries ought both to be cool and calm, so will you please 
advise them hereafter concerning this point." 

ARlvrr 7059 25730 SECRET Trans. 12-4r41 (2) 



■ Not available. 



From: Washington. 

To: Tokyo. 

3 December 1941. 

(Purple.) 

#1243. 

If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that 
the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should 
be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls. 

JD-1: 7050 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT) 



8BCBBX 

From: Berlin. 
To: Tokyo. 
December 4, 1941. 
Purple. (CA.) 
#14J0. 

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like 
to arrange to have. Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE 
and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other 
officials ( UKHARA and TUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end. 

ARMY 7134 25807 SECRET Trans. 12-5-41 (W) 



From: Washington. 

To: Tokyo. 

3 December 1941. 

(Purple.) 

#1243. 

Judging from all indications, we feel that some Joint military action between 
Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is 
a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand. 

•UD-l: 7098 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7) 

79716 — 46— Ex. 140, vol. 2 3 



692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From : Washington. 

To: Tokyo. 

1 December 1941. 

(Purple.) 

#1225 (Part 1 of 3). 

When I and Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull on the 1st, we con- 
veyed to him the matter contained in your message #857*. Roughly speaking, 
Hull's reply stayed within the bounds of his earlier explanations. He placed the 
most emphasis on two points, namely, the tone and trend of the Japanese Gov- 
ernment's expressions and movements and that of the general public opinion 
organs ; and, the increase in strength of the garrisons in French Indo-China. 

From the beginning of today's conference, Secretary Hull wore a deeply pained 
expression. Without wasting any time, he brought up the subject of the Pre- 
mier's statement, (see my message #1222**), and said that that was one of the 
reasons for the President's sudden return to Washington. (Upon our arrival at 
the State Department, we found not only newspaper men, but even some members 
of the Departmental staff crowding the corridors. Some of these speculators 
were of the opinion that the issue of war or peace was to be immediately decided 
upon. In general, the scene was highly dramatic.) 

We, therefore, replied that we were convinced that the Premier's statement 
had been erroneously and exaggeratedly reported in the vernacular. We pointed 
out that regardless of who the speaker may be if only an exerpt from his speech 
is reported, without having the entire text available, it is quite possible that the 
reader will get exactly the opposite meaning from that intended by the speaker. 

We went on to advise the Secretary that we were at present awaiting the 
delivery of the entire text. 

During the course of our explanations, the Secretary showed visible signs of 
relief. 

He said: "Since our talks were begun recently, there has not been a single 
indication of endorsement and support from Japan. I have not heard of any 
steps being taken in Japan aimed at facilitating these conversations, all of which 
is exceedingly regrettable." 

JD-1: 7(H2 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2) 



•JD-l : 6921. 

•♦Available, Purple dated 30 November. 



From: Washlngton. 

To: Tokyo. 

1 December 1941. 

(Purple.) 

#1225 (Part 2 of 3) (Parts 1 and Snot available). 

(Message having the indicator 20803* is part one of three.) 

For this reason CHA has been the target of considerable attack and dissatis- 
faction. It was admitted that he was in a very tight spot. As the President 
recently said, it is clearly understood that the people of Japan, after over four 
years of the Japanese-Chinese incident, are very tense. 

Japan, too, is highly desirous of having peace on the Pacific assured by success- 
fully concluding these negotiations. It is our hope that he would give his support 
and encouragement to the efforts that Hull and we are making in this direction. 

With regard to the matters pertaining to French Indo-China - - - - the gov- 
ernment of the United States, too, cannot help but feel concern since it has been 
receiving report after report during the past few days, from U. S. officials sta- 
tioned in that area, of unusual movements of the Japanese army and navy ; the 
landing of various types of arms ; and the movements of transport vessels. Con- 
cern is felt as to the goal of all these activities (the implication was that they 
feared that they were going to be used not only against Thailand but in the 
southwestern Pacific area). 

As to what plaps the responsible persons in the Japanese army and navy are 
planning are not difficult to guess if one goes on the assumption that the Japanese 
army and navy joins forces with the Germans ; even if, in actuality, that is not 
what is taking place, preparations must be made for this possible eventuality, and 
aU nations concerned must concentrate their fighting forces in that area. 

JD-1: 7042 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (7) 

•Not available, probably Is Part 1 of this message. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 693 

From : Washington. 

To: Tokyo. 

1 December 1941. 

(Purple.) 

#1225. (Part 3 of 3.) 

Hull : "In the final analysis, that means that Hitlerism is being given indirect 
support, and for this reason please exercise the utmost of caution. 

"In view of the fact that Japan is acting in the manner described above, there 
is absolutely no way of bringing about a settlement of the situation, 

"Disruptions in Japanese-U. S. relations is exceedingly unfortunate, not only 
for our two countries, but to the world in general. There shall be nothing con- 
structive about a Japanese-U. S. war. We fully realize that it can be nothing 
other than destructive. For this reason, we are still highly desirous of bringing 
these conversations to a successful conclusion. 

"However, with the existence of the above described conditions, and because of 
the nature of this country, the Secretary of State and the President are placed in 
an exceedingly difficult position." 

I : "It seems mutually regrettable that all of our efforts which lead to the 21 
June and 25 September proposals, should have been in vain." 

In general he expressed his agreement to this. 

Hull: "The recent situation in Japan and the U. S. public opinion made it 
necessary for us to return to the most recent proposal." 

We then said that behind the problems at hand, there has always been the 
China problem. 

"As I have pointed out on several occasions," I said, "this has been the bitterest 
experience since the Washington Conference. Peace between Japan and China 
could not be attained through any such terms as were contained in your most 
recent proposal. We hear your argument to the effect that you cannot stand by 
and do nothing while China dies. The converse of that argument should be even 
stronger. That is, that it is of the utmost importance for us to avoid standing by 
and watching our own respective countries die, just because of the China problem.'' 

Hull indicated his agreement with this, but went on to say : 

"Because the situation is as I have already described, I hope that Japan will 
take steps to bring about order through her public organs." 

JD-1:7042 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2). 



From: Washington (Nomura). 

To: Tokyo. 

November 30, 1941. 

Purple. 

#1224. 

Re your #857.' 

I at once requested HULL for an interview ; however, I failed to be notified of 
the exact time for it for the reason, among others, of the President's expected ar- 
rival tomorrow morning. I am afraid I shall miss a good opportunity and so wiD 
you transmit yours message at once to Ambassador GREW? (7 : 30 p. m.) 

ARMY 7089 25762 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (2). 

■ See S. I. S. # 25496. Tokyo Instructs Washington to make one more attempt verbally 
to the eflfect that the Imperial Government i^ at a loss to understand -why the United States, 
In view of the fair position it has always taken, should have changedin their front with 
regard to the China problem. 



From: Tokyo. 
To: Honolulu. 
29 November 1941. 
(J19.) 

#122. 

We have been receiving reports from yon on ship movements, but In future will 
you also report even when there are no movements. 
JD-1 : 7086 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2) 



694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR A^FTACK 

From: Tokyo (Togo.) 
To: Honolulu. 
November 18, 1941. 
J-19. 
#113. 

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein : Area "N," 
Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay," and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your inves- 
tigation with great secrecy.) 

ARMY 7063 25773 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (S). 

* Probably means Mamala Bay. 



From: Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
December 6, 1941. 
Purple. 
#901. 
Re my #844". 

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th 
of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United 
States contained in my separate message #902 (in English). 

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts 
and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situa- 
tion is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it 
secret for the time being. 

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I 
will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to 
put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the 
Americans just as soon as you receive instructions. 

ARMY 7149 25838 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (S) 



• See S. I. S. # 25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot 
accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial 
Government which will be sent In two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto 
ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations 
are brolien ofC. 



From: Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
December 6, 1941. 
Purple. 

#902. (Part 1 of 14.) 
Separate telegram. 

MEMOBAirorrM 

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an 
amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that 
the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area 
and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued 
negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the 
United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American 
relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area. 

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning 
the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the 
measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during 
these eight months. 

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Gove^'nment to insure the stabil- 
ity of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to 
find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world. 

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China 
to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for 
the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent 
tlie extention of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September 
last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy. 

JI>-1:7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6^1 (S) 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 695 

From: Tokyo. 

To: Washington. 

December 6, 1941. 

Purple. 

#902. (Part 2 of 14.) 

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every 
possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the estab- 
lishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's 
constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pres- 
sure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they 
have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common 
prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in 
accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of 
French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinter- 
preted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands 
government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing 
economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile 
attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations per- 
fecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which 
endangers the very existence of the empire. 

JD-1:7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 



From: Tokyo. 

To: Washington. 

December 6, 1941. 

Purple. 

#902. (Part 3 of 14.) 

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, 
in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of 
important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. 
However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that 
the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached 
on fundamental — (75 letters garbled) — The Japanese government submitted 
a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking 
fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating' Japanese 
views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agree- 
ment of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, 
moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of 
difiiculty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settle- 
ment. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original pro- 
posal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The 
negotiation made no progress. 

JD-1:7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 



Fi'om: Tokyo. 

To: Washington. 

December 6, 1941. 

Purple. 

#902. (Part 4 of 14.) 

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for 
averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th 
still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more 
essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipu- 
lated the following points : 

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dis- 
patch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the 
Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area. 

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisi- 
tion in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which 
the two countries are in need. 

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations 
to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets. 

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity 
of oil. 



696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures 
and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace 
between Japan and China. 

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed 
in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and 
China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area ; and it is 
prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo- 
China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement. 

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 



From: Tokyo. 

To : Washington, 

December 6, 1941. 

Purple. 

#902. (Part 5 of 14.) 

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness 
to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of 
peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an un- 
dertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the resto- 
ration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct 
negotiations. 

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new pro- 
posal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek ; and 
in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President 
to act as the so-caUed "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading 
that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to 
impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently main- 
tained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese 
claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government. 

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 



From: Tokyo. 

To: Washington. 

December 6, 1941. 

Purple. 

#902. (Part 6 of 14.) 

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government 
has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its 
best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in 
spite of great difficulties. 

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the 
negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. 

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, ad- 
vocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its 
desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that 
along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese 
Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including 
China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China 
economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. 

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French 
Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to 
carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China 
as a measure of easing the situation. 

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 



From : Tokyo. 

To : Washington. 

December 4, 1941. 

Purple. 

#902. (Part 7 of 14.) 

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree 
by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the 
Aiperican government. 

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 697 

in disregard to realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical prin- 
ciples, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand 
this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires 
to call the attention of the American government especially to the following 
points : 

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those 
principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the accep- 
tance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering 
a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation 
and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores 
realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the 
purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations. 

7143 SECRET 

From : Tokyo. 

To : Washington. 

December 6, 1941. 

Purple. 

#902. (Part 8 of 14.) 

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis 
of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese govern- 
ment is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, 
it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to at- 
tempt to force their immediate adoption. 

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between 
Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Nether- 
lands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective se- 
curity, is far removed from the realities of East Asia. 

The American proposal contains a stipulation which states : "Both governments 
will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, 
shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental pur- 
pose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout 
the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed 
with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite 
Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it 
cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government. 

JD:1 7143 SECRET Army Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 



From : Tokyo. 

To : Washington. 

December 6, 1941. 

Purple. 

#902. (Part 9 of 14.) 

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be 
said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one 
hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other 
hand in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-de- 
fense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order 
in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon 
which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific 
area through peaceful means. 

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, 
objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising 
in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. 
Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations 
should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure. 

JD-1: 7143 Army Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 



698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From : Tokyo. 

To : Washington. 

December 6, 1941. 

Purple. 

#902. (Part 10 of 14.) 

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government 
desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other 
powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in 

other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr (45 letters 

garbled or missing) been compelled to observe the satus quo under the An- 
glo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice" the es to 

the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate 
the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's 
fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the 
world. 

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 



From: Tokyo. 

To : Washington. 

December 6, 1941. 

Purple. 

#902. (Part 11 of 14) 

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French 
Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. 
That the six countries — Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Nether- 
lands, China and Thailand — excepting France, should undertake among them- 
selves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China 
and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to 
placing that territory under the joint garantee of the governments of those six 
countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position 
of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrange- 
ment cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a 

system similar to the n__(50 letters missed) sible for the present predicament 

of East Asia. 

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-^1 (S) 



From: Tokyo. 

To: Washington. 

December 6, 1941. 

Purple. 

#902. (Part 12 of 14) 

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding 
China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the 
principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual 
conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the 
stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in 
demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any 
regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence 
of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. 
This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its 
above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demon- 
strates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the 
restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of 
peace to East Asia. 

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-&-41 (S) 



From: Tokyo. 

To : Washington, 

December 6, 1941. 

Purple. 

#902. (Part 13 of 14) 

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such 
as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, 
mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 699 

Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the 
other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the 
four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and 
disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the 
Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of 
negotiation. 

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the 
negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese- 
American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other inter- 
ested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. 
However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 
26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The 
Netherlands and Chunking, ANDND* presummably by catering to the wishes 
of the Chungking regime on the questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT** be con- 
cluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring 
Japan's position. 

JD:1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 

•Probably "and as" 
•♦Probably "China, can but" 



From : Tokyo 
To: Washington 
7 December 1941 
(Purple-Eng) 
#902. Part 14 of 14 

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, 
appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT") 

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with 
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's eiforts toward tiie estab- 
lishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and espe- 
cially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and 
China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the 
present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to 
adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of 
the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been 
lost. 

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Gov- 
ernment that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but 
consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations. 

JD-1:7143 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7Dec.l941 (S-TT) 



SECRET 

From: Honolulu (Kita). 
To: Tokyo. 
November 18, 1941. 
J-19. 

#222. 

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my 
#219' on that day. 

Area A " — ^A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port. 
Area C ' — 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor. 

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier. Enterprise, 
or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, 
one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were 
at anchor in Area D *. 

3. At 10 : 00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed en- 
tering the Harbor. Their course was as follows : In a single file at a distance 
of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl 
Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area 
C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 

" — Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study. 
•> — Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal. 
* — East Loch. 
* — Middle Loch. 



700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers en- 
tered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side. 

Relayed to . 

ARMY 7111 25817 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2) 



SECBET 

From: Tokyo, 

To: Washington. 

December 7, 1941. 

Purple (Urgent — Very Important). 

#907. To be handled in government code. 

Re my #902 \ 

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if pos- 
sible to the Secretary of State) our x'eply to the United States at 1 : 00 p. m. on 
the 7th, your time. 

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (3) 

« — S. I. S. #25843 — text of Japanese reply. 



From: Budapest. 
To: Tokyo. 
December 7, 1941. 
LA. 
#104. 

Re my #103». 

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this 
country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war 
would break out on the 7th. 

Relayed to Berlin. 

ARMY 7184 25866 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2) 



SECBET 

From: Washington. 
To: Tokyo. 
December 6, 1941. 
Purple (Urgent). 
#1272. 

In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and 
HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members hav- 
ing close relations with the President and through individuals equally influ- 
ential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep 
this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to 
report : 

(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and 
advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "intro- 
ducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not 
make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of 
the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed 
matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he 
did so on the advise of these individuals. 

(2) Tliiose carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 
20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating these sections in 
the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or 
advantageous to us (MESSAGE INCOMPLETE) 

ARMY 7176 25846 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 2T) 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 701 

SECBET 

From: Washington (Nomura). 
To: Tokyo. 
December 3, 1941. 
Purple (Urgent). 
#1256. Re your #875«. 

I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply 
was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States 
Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially 
since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among 
the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be 
war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but 
what the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how 
our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive 
at a settlement, the explantion you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy 
them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to — even if your reply 
is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, 
in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the 
President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer 
impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this 
question with this in mind and wire me at once. 

AKMY 7128 25849 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (1) 



» See S. I. S. # 25725 — Explanation of Japan's Increase of their forces in French Indo- 
China. 



From: Tokyo (Togo). 
To : Honolulu. 
December 6, 1941. 
PA-KZ. 

#128. 

Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123* the movements of the 
fleet subsequent to the fourth. 

ARMY 7381 26158 (Japanese) SECRET Trans. 12/12/41 (5) 

• Not available. 



SECBET 
From: Tokyo (Togo). 
To: Honolulu. 
December 2, 1941. 
J-19. 
#123. (Secret outside the department) 

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane 
carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your 
ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are 
any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that 
they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided 
with anti-mine nets. 

Note : This message was received here on December 23. 

ARMY 8007 27065 (Japanese) SECRET Trans. 12/30/41 (5) 



702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
Hewitt Inqxtiey Exhibit No. 16 

SECRET 

Naval message — Navy Department 



Phone Extension Number: 2027 


Addressees 


Message precedence 


From: COMSIXTEEN. 

Release'l by . - 


For Action: 
CINCPAC. 
OPNAV. 
. COMFOURTEEN. 


Priority 
Routine 


Date: 28 November 1941. 


Deferred 


TOR Coderoom --- 


Information. 


Priority 


Decoded by P. R. WHITE. 


Routine 
Deferred 







Indicated by asterislf addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory. 
[Hand written:] Reported to ONI in Serial 26-11. 

281510 
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence. 
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time OCT 



Comment Naval attache thai Astalusha Sharda two seven zero eight three 
zero X Isuzu (cl) in Formosa Straits Sunday X Subtender and four subs 
probably Subron Six plus Nagoya Maru tender X Last sentence believed to be 
sendai (cl) plus two desdivs XX Other items no comment XX Additional 
info from CN Nitta Maru sailing Yokosuka to Takao twenty ninth with military 
supplies XX Two senior construction officers and four thousand men status not 
known ordered mandates XX Unidentified ship believed to be light cruiser has 
apparently relieved Kashii as flagship southern expeditionary fleet X This ship 
now in Camranh Bay Saigon area XX 

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art. 76 (4) 
NAV REGS. 

Note. — Penned notations in italics. 



SECRET 

Naval message — Navy Department 



Phone Extension Number: 2027 


Addressees 


Message precedence 


From: COMSIXTEEN. 

Leased by _ 


For Action: 
OPNAV. 


Priority 
Routine 


Date: 1 December 1941. 


Deferred 


TOR Coderoom 


Information: 
CINCPAC. 
COMFOURTEEN. 
CINCAF. 


Priority 


Decoded by: WHITE. 


Routine 
Deferred 







Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory. 

Reported to ONI in Serial 25-41 010913 

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence. 

Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date time OCT 

[Hand written:] Reported to ONI in Serial 25-41. 



'I'H'.x'r 

From RI X Arrivals in Takao area past two days X Comdesron five in 
Natori X Naka to join Desron four X units of number two base force and Chogei 
X Last named ship considered to be tender for two divisions submarines X 
All these units now under command Cine third X Cine second in Atago shifted 
from Kure to Sasebo Comm Zone apparently en route South China waters 

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. See Art. 76 (4) 
Nav Regs. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



703 



Classified 



U. S. Naval CoMMtrNiCAXioN Service 

COMMANDEE IN CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 



Incoming 



Reassignment all orange calls occurred midnight X Same garble cable X No 
change in shore addresses XX 

3(3 Nov. 41 Crypto-Group 87 CBO HMC Serial No. 12-2 
Originator : Information : 

COM 16 CINCAF 

Action : CINPAC 

OPNAV COM 14 

Authenticated : 

F. S. Lockard, 

F. S. LocKAED, Ens. U8NR. 



Hewitt iNQtriBT Exhibit No. 17 

(Exhibit No. 17 is a photostat of a captured Japanese submarine 
chart used for Plan V of "Battle Report". This chart will be found 
reproduced as Item No. 107, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, 
Hewitt Inquiry.) 



Hewitt Inqutey Exhibit No. 18 

RADIO LOG 

of 

BISHOP'S POINT RADIO STATION 

7 December 1941 

Radio Log 

Section Base 

Bishop's Point, Oahu, T. H. 



Watch 
C, E. Gibson, Supervisor 
R. B. Moyle, Operator 



Receiver & Controls O. K. 
Freq.: 2670 KCS. 
Date: 7 December 1941 R. W. H. 



DN3L AR 

K 

DN3L AS ONE MOMENT PLEASE STAND BY 

DN3L AR 

COME IN 

K 

WHAT IS THE DISTANCE OF THE SUBMARINE K 

WHAT WAS THE APPROXIMATE DISTANCE AND COURSE 

OF THE SUBMARINE THAT YOU SIGHTED K 
THE COURSE WAS ABOUT WHAT WE WERE STEERING AT 

THE TIME 020 MAGNETIC AND ABOUT 1000 YARDS FROM 

THE ENTRANCE APPARENTLY HEADING FOR THE EN- 

RANCE K 
R 
BT DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON 

THE SUB K 
NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION K 
WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME APPROXIMATELY THAT YOU 

SAW THE SUBMARINE K 
APPROXIMATE TIME 0350 AND HE WAS APPARENTLY 

HEADING FOR THE ENTRANCE K 
R 

AR PLEASE 
K 
BT THANK YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION NOTIFY US IF 

YOU HAVE ANY MORE INFORMATION WE WILL CON' 

TINUE SEARCH K 



1445 


DZ5Y 
DN3L 
DZ5Y 
DBIL 
DN3L 
DN3L 
DZ5Y 
DZ5Y 


DBIL V 
VDZ5Y 
DBIL V 
DZ5Y V 
VDZ5Y 
VDBIL 
VDN3L 
VDN3L 


1450 


DN3L 


VDZ5Y 


1451 
1456 


DZ5Y 
DZ5Y 


VDN3L 
VDN3L 




DN3L 
DZ5Y 


VDZ5Y 
VDN3L 




DN3L 


V DZ5Y 


1458 
1505 


VDN3L 
DZ5Y 
DNSL 
DZ5Y 


VDN3L 
VDZ5Y 
VDN3L 



704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



RADIO LOG— Continued 
Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, T, H, 



-Continued 



1508 


V DZ5Y 




R 


1524 


DBIL 


VDZ5Y 


AR 




DZ5Y 


VDBIL 


K 




V DZ5Y 




WE ARE FINISHED K 


1525 


VDBIL 




R 


1535 


DR7Y 


VDJ8A 


PM DRBR EARLY 0450 K 


1538 


VDJ8A 




R 


1539 


DW2X 


VDBIL 


AR 




DBIL 


VDW2X 


K 




DW2X 


VDBIL 


CLEAR K 




V DW2X 




R 


1555 


DJ8A 


VDR7Y 


AR 




DR6Y 


VDJ8A 


K 




DJ8A 


VDR7Y 


815 FJIMALE 0525 YOU GOT THAT MESSAGE BEFORE DID YOU 




DR7Y 


VDJ8A 


R BOTH MESSAGES R LAST TWO MESSAGES K 


1557 


DJ8A 


VDR7Y 


R 


1630 


DE2A 


V DW2X 


AR 




DW2X 


VDR9Q 


K 




DW2X 


VDN3L 


K 




VDZ5I 




K 




DE2A 


V DW2X 


Z RIME WING 071614 (SEE FILE) K 


1641 


V DN3L 




R 




V DZ5I 




R 




DW2X 


VDN3L 


AR 




DN3L 


V DW2X 


K 


1642 


DW2X 


V DN3L 


ZCD DZ51 R AR 


1643 


DN3L 


V DW2X 


R 


1647 


DW2X 


VDZ5I 


AR 


1650 


D\aF2X 


VDR9Q 


ZCE DZ5I K 




DR9Q 


VDZ5I 


ZSF K 




DZoI 


VDR9Q 


S3 K 




DW2X 


V DN3L 


ZCE DZ5I AR 




DZ5I 


V DW2X 


K 




DW2X 


V DZ5I 


ZSF Ki 




V DW2X 




85 k:5 K 


165 


VDZ5I 




R 


1714 


DR7Y 


V DJ8A 


HAVE YOU ANYTHING FOR ME 




DJ8A 


VDR7Y 


YES 2307 COUNTER 0640 VA 


1715 


DR7Y 


V DJ8A 


R 



6 June 1945. 
I hereby certify that this is the radio log or the exact copy of the log that 
was made by the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, T. H., on 7 December 1941. 

Richard Wilmot Humphrey, 



This copy was certified in my presence : 
Walter H. Kozacko, 
Walter H. Kozacko, 
Lt. Comdr., VSNR. 



Richard Wilmot Humphket, 
S-06-6S, RMSc, V-S, U. S. N. 



RADIO LOG 
Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, T. H. 



Watch 
G/E. Gibson, Supervisor 
R.^B. Moyle, Operator 



R. 



Receiver & Controls 0. K. 
Freq. 2670 Kcs. 
Date: December i943 1941 R. W. H. 



1715 
1721 


DW2X 
DN3L 
DW2X 


V DN3L 

V DW2X 

V DN3L 


1723 


DW2X 
DNRL 
DW2X 


VDN3L 
V DW2X 
VDN3L 




DW2X 
V DW2X 
VDN3L 


V DN3L 



TIME OF LAST ENTRY 

AR 

K 

P BK WE HAVE DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES UPON SUBS 

OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREA AR 

STAND BY FOR MORE MESSAGES 

IMl YOUR LAST PRIORITY K 

WE HAVE ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DRIPPED DEPTH 

CHARGES UPON SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE 

SEA AREA AR 

DID YOU GET THAT LAST MESSAGE K 

R 

STAND BY FOR FUTHER MESSAGES 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



705 



RADIO LOG— Continued 
Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahtj, T. H. — Continued 



1727 VDW2X 
1749 t)W2X 
DN3L 
DW2X 

V DW2X 

1755 DW2X 

V DW2X 
DW2X 

1756 VDW2X 
1803 DJ8A 

DR9Q 

AJ8A 

DW2X 

V DW2X 
VDN3L 



1805 VDW2X 
VDN3L 
VDJ8A 
VDN3L 



DN3L 

1810 DR7Y 

1813 DJ8A 

DR7Y 

1817 DEIT 
1821 DN3L 
DW2X 
VDW2X 

1826 DW2X 
DR7Y 
DJ8A 
DR7Y 

DJ8A 
1830 DW2X 
DJ8A 



1830 



R 

V DN3L AR 
VDW2X K 

V DN3L ZMA BUT STAND BY AR 

R 

V DN3L AR 

K 

V DN3L ZMA BUT STAND BY FOR MESSAGE AT ANY TIME AR 

R 

V DN3L P P AR PLEASE 

V DN3L ZCQ DJ8A AR 

V DR9Q AR 

V DN3L P AR 

K 

BT WE HAVE INTERCEPTED A SAMPAN INTO HONOLULU 

PLEASE HAVE COAST GUARD SEND CUTTER TO RELIEVE 

US OF SAMPAN AR 

R P K 

AS 1 MINUTE 

K 

BT WE HAVE INTERCEPTED SAMPAN AND ESCORTING 

SAMPAN INTO HONOLULU PLEASE HAVE CUTTER RELIEVE 

US OF SAMPAN AR 

V DW2X Z DW2X 071807 DN3L P GR 11 BT HELID ARUQS QLUAN SVDER 

LBVQY NEXKQ TPHQX BMMQH LBPBV ARUQS HELID K 
VDJ8A IMIGRl 

V DR7Y OR 1 402 

V DJ8A R 

MOYLE AND GIBSON OFF TO BANKS AND HUMPHREY 

VDW2X AR 
VDW2X AR 

V DN3L K 

Z DW2X 071820 DEIT Q DN3L P GR 5 BT PROCEED IMMEDIATE- 
LY AND CONTACT WARD AR 

V DN3L R 

V DJ8A AR 

V DR7Y K 

V DJ8A HERE IS A MESSAGE Z DK:3K 071801 DR7Y OR 4 BT PROCEED 

CONTACT HARBOR PATROL 

V DN3L IMI THAT LAST MESSAGE 

V DR6K ZMC ZGD DR6K DR9Q DUIP 
VDN3L 

RECEIVER AND TRANSMITTER HAVE GONE OUT— POWER 

OFF 

AIR RAID BY JAPANESE PLANES 



6 June 1945. 
I hereby certify that this is the radio log or the exact copy of the log that 
was made by the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, T. H., on 7 December 1941. 

Richard Wilmot Humphrey, 



This copy was certified In my presence : 
Walter H. Kozacko, 
Walter H. Kozacko, 
Lt. Comdr., USNR. 



RicHAED Wilmot Humphrey, 
438-06-63, RM3c, V-3, U. S. N. 



R. 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 19 

14 aiAY 1945. 
Received the following secret material from Captain L. F. Safford, USN, for 
ofllcial use in the Pearl Harbor Investigation: 

(1) Three copies of Com 14 Daily RI Summaries (at Pearl Harbor) from 
1 Nov. 1941 to 6 Dec. 1941, incl. 

(2) Three photos of Station "H" Chronology, 1 Dec. 1941 to 6 Dec. 1941, incl. 

(3) Photos of the following (3 copies) : 

OpNav to CinCAF 242239 
Com 14 to OpNav 260110 
Com 16 to OpNav 261331 
OpNav to Alusna Tokyo 040330 



706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Com 13 031825 

Com 16 to OpNav 010245 

Foote's message 

Com 16 to OpNav 041502 

Hidden message of December 7 

Bainbridge Island 051830 

Com 14 052200 

(2) Three photos of Station "H" Chronology, 1 Dee. 1941 to 6 Dec. 1941, Mel. 
(JI>-1 No. 7148). 

John L. Sonnett. 

Communication Intelligence Summaey 
1 NovEMBEE 1941-6 Decembek 1941 

SECRET 

Communication Intelligence Sum/mary — 1 November 1941 

General. — ^Traffic volume a little less than normal. Receiving condition fair, 
traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new calls not very great. Fleet 
calls only changed, shore station calls and shore addresses not changed. It is 
believed that tactical calls also remain unchanged, but not enough intercepted 
traffic to so state definitely. The same garble table for calls is employed so 
the change amounts to a reassignment of calls previously used. New calls have 
appeared, but it is thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units 
or were in reserve. All of the major Fleet calls are identified and a small 
amount of individual calls were recovered today. Because the new calls are 
not yet lined up save for the major Fleet Commanders and all time today was 
spent in call recovery, this summary will deal only with general impressions. 

Combined Fleet. — The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio 
traffic. The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a bit of 
traffic to addresses placed in submarine and carrier category. No indications 
of movement of any of these units. COMBINED FLEET tactical circuits were 
heard but little tactical traffic copied due to interference by NPM. 

Carriers. — The COMMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in despatches from 
Tokyo and he took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast. 

Submarines. — Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well lined 
up yet. 

Third Fleet.— This Fleet very active as before. The SECOND and FIRST 
BASE FORCES are stUl marshalling their MARUs and the CINC, is very 
busy with Tokyo. 

China.— The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several 
messages from Saigon. 

Communication Intelligence Summary — 2 November 1941 

General. — Traffic volume normal for Sunday. Receiving conditions were fair, 
but bulk of traffic derived from the major shore circuits. Solution of new call 
system progressing satisfactorily but volume of accumulated traffic in new 
system not yet large enough to permit more than casual identification of individ- 
ual calls. The number of alternate calls for major commands is increased 
over last system. So far there are seven alternate calls for the Combined 
Fleet. 

Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The combined air force traffic 
is also very high with the Commander of the Combined Air Forces originating 
many despatches. It appears that he is now in Taiwan. Traffic to SAMA 
and BAKO is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China Fleet Intelligence 
bureaus are originating many dispatches, these from Tokyo being prefixed 
WIWI. There were several high precedence dispatches from Tokyo with the 
major fleet commanders as addressees. 

Communication Intelligence Summary — S November 1941 

Oeneral. — Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for Monday. Re- 
ceiving conditions good but all circuits slow. General messages continue to emln- 
ate from TOYKO communications. Such an amount is unprecedented and the 
import is not understood. A mere call change does not account for activities of 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 707 

this nature. The impression is strong that these messages are periodic reports 
to the Major Commander of a certain nature. Dummy traflBc is again being sent 
on the TOKYO broadcasts. Naval Intelligence TOKYO addressed two WIWI 
messages to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and to KUMI 8 (unidentified). 

Combined Fiee*.— Commander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent message 
to BUMIL information all Major Commanders, Combined Fleet, Naval Intelli- 
gence Tokyo, the Chief of Naval General Staff, and Bureau of Personnel. 
Commander in Chief Combined Fleet also was associated in traffic with offices 
in the mandates, principally RNO PALAO. The Commander in Chief, Combined 
continues to be associated with the Carriers and Submarines. 

Third Fleet. — Third Fleet trafBc continues at a high level. A movement re- 
port by It ATI G6 (unidentified) was addressed to Commander in Chief Third 
Fleet for information. 

Air.— J. WE address, today broke down as "ITIKOUKUU KANTAI". The 
literal reading of this as "1st Air Fleet" Is correct; it indicates an entirely new 
organiza»ion of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which indicated 
that this may be the case. An old call (Y0ME7) while never identified seemed 
to be in n high position with respect to the Carriers and the Air Coi-ps. Upon 
movemeit of air units to TAIWAN the association of CarDiv 4 and CarDiv 3 
with uni :s of the Combined Air Force was apparent. Their association in a com- 
mand se ise between shore based air and fleet air had never occurred before, but 
under the concept of an AIR FLEET can be easily accepted. Traffic in the Air 
Force continues at a high level. 

Communication Intelligence Summary — 4 'November 1941 

General. — ^Traffic volume normal with all circuits easily readable. More tac- 
tical traffic copied than for past few days. Combined Fleet and Carriers heard 
on tactical circuits. TOKYO Naval Intelligence sent four messages to Major 
Commanders. One of these was for information Chief of Staff China Fleet and 
one other for information of Chief of Staff Second Fleet. 

Air. — High traffic level of air activities continues. Most significant of the 
aid dispatches were some in which various air corps were addressed and BAKO 
included for information. One from Yokosuka Air was addressed to SANCHOW 
Island Radio for information TAKAO Air Corps. BAKO was also noted as an 
addressee in several messages ftrom SASEBO and originated two mesages to 
SASEBO and TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a message to two 
unidentified calls for Information of Commander Combined Air Force, Com- 
mander in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDivs collective, BAKO and others. The 
Commander Combined Air Force addressed a message to Commander in Chief 
Third Fleet. 

Mandates. — The RNO PALAO was active today, being addressed by Com- 
mander in Chief, Fourth Fleet and sent several messages to TOKYO and YOKO- 
SUKA. The PALAO weather station sent a long code message addressed to 
nearly all the Islands of the Mandates. MARCUS island appears as an origin- 
ator. No change in the location of Fourth Fleet units noted. 

Submarines. — No activity noted. 

Communication Intelligence Summary — 5 November 1941 

General. — Traffic volume above normal. All circuits heard and receiving con- 
ditions were fair to good. TOKTTO very active as an originator, sending out 
many messages of general address. Two WIWI messages in Kana Code sent 
by NGS to Chief of Staff Car Divs and TIYA 44 (Unidentified) respectively. The 
Intelligence Offices of China Fleet and TOKYO continue active with many 
dispatches passing between the two. 

Third Fleet. — Two units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKIAO area. 
Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RISI4 and Y0A2) it isnot known how 
much of this fleet they represent. It is certain that the Commander in Chief, 
Third Fleet has not yet left the Sasebo area although it is expected he will 
before long. One message which may be a movement report from him was re- 
ceived late on the 5th. The present state of call recovery on the Third Fleet does 
not permit of an estimate of the movement involved. 

A unit of the First Fleet, identified today as CARDIV 4 appeared at BAKO. 
This Carrier Division was addressed as "less FUTA SHOTAI" (2nd Section?) 
Whether or not these are other units at BAKO is not known. The Commander 
CARDIVS has been associated with SAMA and BAKO in several dispatches today. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2—4 



708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The following were also associated, SANCHOW ISLAND TAKAO AIRCORPS, 
CANTON (China) and YOKOHAMA Air. The RNO TAIHOKU originated many 
dispatches to TOKYO and the French Indo China Forces. A TAIWAN origin- 
ator sent one to Lieut. Comdr. SHIBA at the Embassy THAILAND for informa- 
tion to HANOI and the Commander French Indo China Forces. 

BAKO originated numerous dispatches to the Empire and to the Major Fleet 
Comanders. 

The South China Fleet was also the recipient of many despatches from TOKYO. 

Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that there 
is now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO area which 
will comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the past month and 
will be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet units to an un- 
known extent 

OoMmunication Intelligence Summary — 6 November 19^1 

General. — Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving conditions were 
fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches interferred somewhat. 
Today the specific call-up on the Tokyo broadcast was eliminated. Formerly 
Tokyo radio called the unit concerned when the dispatch was addressed to a 
member of that unit. Beginning yesterday afternoon, all broadcast messages 
are addressed to a single call without regard to the addressee of the message. 
The recovery of the radio organization will be hampered by this new advance 
in Communication Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this 
broadcast from which the address and originator were missing. This may be the 
start of complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits. Tokyo ad- 
dressed a WIWI message to the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and 
Submarine Force. 

TaJcao-Bako Area. — It is now certain that there is a very heavy air con- 
centration on Taiwan. This comprised practically the entire Combined Air 
Force including the Commander and his staff plus at least one carrier division 
and an unknown amount of the fleet air arm. No additional units of the Third 
Fleet were located there today but it is believed that CinC Third Fleet is now 
enroute BAKO from SASEBO. From traffic association it is believed that some 
Second Fleet units are in Takao area but this has not yet been proven. The 
South China Fleet Command has been active in dispatches to Taiwan addresses. 

Combined Fleet. — A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now appearing 
with secret (tactical) calls in use. 

Mandates. — The Mandates traffic has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth De- 
fense Force at Truk and the RNO Paloa continue to be the most active units. 

Communication Intelligence Summary — 7 Novemier 19^1 

General. — Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use of 
the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTU for delivery to all Com- 
bined Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces to which attached 
is very difficult. Use of large number of alternate calls for major fleet forces, 
many of which have not yet been definitely identified or associated with known 
calls, renders the picture more confusing. Appearance of the prefix "JITSU" 
(authenticator for bonafide traffic) in several messages indicates that a com- 
munication drill is being held but without indication as to what units are par- 
ticipating and therefore much of the traffic is suspected of being "drill". Jaluit 
Radio is handling traffic direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to congestion 
of Mandate circuits from the Marshalls caused by heavy concentration in that 
area. 

Air. — Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities, mainly 
centered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air activities in the Mandates 
included in headings of messages. Despatches originated by Fourth Fleet 
Command included Air Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and all types of Man- 
date activities in long headings. 

Fleet. — Fourth Fleet Command remains in Truk area. There are indications 
that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao area but identifica- 
tions are not sufficiently certain to confirm this. 

Greatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls to 
facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of handling 
fleet traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 709 

Communication Intelligence Summary — 8 November 19^1 

General. — Normal volume of intercepted traffic with no "dummies" appearing 
on the UTU. All UTU traffic was broadcast to the general call only. The 
Staff Communication Officer of the French Indo China Force (So. Exp. For.) 
sent a dispatch action to S. C. O. Combined INFO S. C. O. Second Fleet, Com- 
bined Air Force, unidentified fleet unit, Radio stations at Tokyo, Palao and 
Takao. This may indicate a contemplated coordination of communications be- 
tween the Indo-China-South China areas and the Palao Island-Taiwan area. 
Secret calls were used very little as compared to the past few days and only 
three circuits were heard using them, including the Combined Fleet Com- 
manders circuit and Air Station Net. North Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet. 
All mandate circuits were active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all 
classes of Mandate addressees in all areas, but with continued emphasis on the 
Palao area at one end and the Jaluit-Marshall area on the other. Chichi jima 
Air Station was included in much of the traffic between Empire Offices and Saipan 
Air with Jaluit Base Force included for information. Inclusion of Chichijima 
usually presages an air movement between Mandates and Empire but the Units 
involved are unidentified. Commander of unidentified shore activity (NEO 66) 
previously associated with the Fifth Fleet, was addressed at Chichijima Air 
which tentatively identifies him as an air activity. Previous association of the 
Fifth Fleet traffic with Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka tends to confirm the belief 
that Fifth Fleet operations are, or will be, in the area adjacent to Chichijima- 
Marcus, supplementing the Fourth Fleet in the lower island areas. 

Fleet. — Chief of Staff First Fleet originated a despatch through Kure Radio. 
Batdiv Three of the First Fleet appears to be operating separately from the 
main force, possibly in connection with the Cardivs TTiree and Four in the 
Taiwan-Naha area. An apparent movement report from Cardiv Four was ad- 
dressed to CinC Combined Fleet, First Fleet, CarDiv Commander, Combined 
Air Force Commander and to movement offices at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Kure, Mai- 
zuru, and Sasebo. Traffic from the Commander Indo China Force is handled 
from the Japanese radio station at Saigon rather than from the KASHII, in- 
dicating that the staff is based ashore at present. No identifiable submarine 
activity was noted. 

Air. — Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities. The 
area between Chichijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit appears to be particu- 
larly concerned with movement of air forces and auxiliaries, while the formation 
of a force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao-Bako area appears to 
be nearly completed as indicated by reports addressed to CinC, Combined Naval 
Minister, Commanders of Cardivs, Combined Air Force, First Fleet and shore 
addresses generally associated with movements or organization changes. This 
force is believed to include CarDiv Four, and possibly CarDiv Three, with a 
number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Force, also possibly some 
units from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders composition of the 
force highly speculative and area of operations obscure. Prior to change of 
calls, much traffic was exchanged between China, South China and Indo-China 
while at present most traffic includes Palao. 

Communication Intelligence Summary — 9 November 1941 

General. — Traffic column heavy for Sunday. Receiving conditions fair but 
heavy static caused numerous garbles fragmentary messages. Navy Minister 
sent several messages of general address including one to all First and Second 
class Naval stations. Practically all of the general messages carried SAMA as 
an information address. Carrier Division Three arrived at Takao and there are 
indications that Carrier Division Four will return to Sasebo from Takao. The 
Flagship of Carrier Divisions is AKAGI and is in Sasebo area. Some tactical 
traffic today shows units of Combined Fleet still operating. The association of 
Batdiv Three and Mandate addresses, especially Saipan may indicate operations 
of that unit in the Mariannas. The JINGEI was communicating with SAMA, 
HAINAN today. The Chief of Staff of the French Indo China Force is in Tokyo. 

One message today addressed to CinC. Combined Fleet was routed to 
MAIZURU for delivery but this is believed a communication error. The Third 
Fleet appears to be still in Sasebo area, but it was noted that considerable traffic 
passed between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the Third Fleet. The Fifth Fleet 
is still being organized with no indications yet that it has assembled. The 
Eighteenth Air Corps at Saipan originated much traffic to Yokosuka Air Corps. 



710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Communication Intelligence Summary — 10 NovemT)er 19 ^1 

General. — Traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There were fewer 
general messages sent today than for the past few weeks. Tokyo Intelligence 
still active and addressing dispatches to all Major Commanders. The Mandates 
construction traffic has decreased considerably. Call recovery is progressing but 
has been slowed down by the general call-up used on Fleet broadcast. 

ComUned Fleet. — Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A Staff officer of BatDiv 
Three was addressed there today and it is likely that this whole division is there 
also. The Cine, Second Fleet was located at Kure today as well as two cruiser 
divisions. 

Thirci Fleet. — ^The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo area. Several 
movement reports have been noted by units of this fleet but none have been noted 
other than individual ships. At least two units of this fleet still at Takao. CinC 
Three originated one movement report for information of CinC Fourth Fleet. 

Fourth Fleet. — Little activity. CinC. Fourth remains in vicinity of Truk with 
major portion of his command. The Staff Communication Officer of Submarine 
Force sent a message to the CinC Fourth for information of Jaluit. 

Fitth Fleet. — One unit of this fleet located at Chichijima. 

Air. — The Combined Air Force Command is still talking to Sama and the 
South China Fleet. From one address it appears that the Commander of Car- 
rier Division Three is with the Combined Fleet. Several units of the Carrier 
Divisions are in port at Kure and Sasebo. CinC Combined Air Force is still in 
Takao. 

Communication Intelligence Summarj/ — 12 November 1941 

General. — Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving condition 
about average. The general character of the traffic has been administrative with 
most of it being between shore logistic and technical activities. The D. F. net was 
active today with very little activity shown yesterday. Intercept operators have 
commented adversely on the major shore network which comprises all of the 
major naval activities, in the EMPIRE. Traffic has been moving slowly over this 
circuit. The reason is the non-cooperation of the operators and the definite lack 
of control exercised by TOKYO radio stations. TOKYO Intelligence is still send- 
ing messages to the major commands but the remainder of TOKYO traffic has 
been mostly from the technical bureaus. 

Combined Fleet. — The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE area. 
The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and several Mandates stations 
is borne out by a D. F. position on the flagship of BATDIV 3 which places him 
about halfway between CHICHIJIMA and MARCUS Island. Their position was 
obtained on the 4th when this unit was not yet identified. No subsequent bear- 
ings have been obtained. Also associated with the BATDIV are a Submarine 
Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although the association of this CARDIV 
(Lately returned from TAKAO) is not positive. The Third Fleet remains at 
SASEBO with the only activity exhibited in the Base Forces. 

J.ir.— CARDIV 3 returned to KURE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE. 
Most of air activity confined to dispatches between carrier and shore establish- 
ments. 

Fifth Fleet. — The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The volume 
of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The Commander Submarine Force 
is still adding JALUIT and today COMSUBRON 2 addressed a message there. 
AIRRON 24 sent a movement report but no indication of the direction. Com- 
munication exercises were held by JALUIT and several stations in that area. 
YOKOHAMA Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO. 

China. — The previous activity of SAIVIA and the French Indo China Forces 
and bases continues. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, IS November 19 U 

General. — Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several 
messages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are: 

1. UNIWIWI dispatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to Chief 
of Staff Combined Air Force, INFO RNO TAIHOKU, BAKO Naval Station. 

2. WIWI from N. G. S. to MAIZURU INRO Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet. 

3. NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, 
INFO Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third Fleet and 
SAMA, HAINAN. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 711 

4. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to Secretary First Fleet. 

5. (2 Messages) WIWI to same address as 3 above. 

6. At 3 part NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined 
Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief French Indo China Fleet. 

7. One UNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA, 
INFO Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Commander in Chief Combined 
Fleet. 

This is the only occurrence in some time of anyone save the TOKYO Intelligence 
activity using the WIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the China Fleet Intelligence 
Bureau were active all day with dispatches to the Major Commanders. 

The direction finder net was again active all day with CHINKAI, ORU 7 
(near CHINKAI), JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending in bearing reports. 

ComUned Fleet. — The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is 
operating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The Commander of 
BATDIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. The Division Communication Officer is 
communicating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other ships in this 
division remain unlocated but is assumed, lacking evidence to the contrary that 
they are with the flagship. Other units of First Fleet seem inactive. One 
Cruiser Division of Second Fleet is associated in traffic with PALAO and may 
be in that area. 

Third Fleet— ?iti\l located in SASEBO, the Commander in Chief has been 
active in the traffic, being addressed by both TOKYO and Commander in Chief 
Combined Fleet. The First BASE FORCE Commander originated several 
messages but no indication of 

Air. — Carriers remain relatively inactive. The SETTSU is still with them 
and a few may be engaged in target practice near KURE. The Combined 
AIRFORCE is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual high traffic level 
between its component Air Corps still exists. 

China. — The Commander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one of the 
RNO TAIHOKU. His Chief of Staff is stUI in SHANGHAI. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 14 Noventher 194I 

Oeneral. — Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor air receiving con- 
ditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry originated several AlNav 
dispatches. There were three WIWI messages originated today. 

1. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet, 
Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and YOKOSUKA. 

2. WIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, 
Chief of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO. 

3. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to AN1758 (Chief of Staff of an unidentified 
unit). Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Chief of Staff Com- 
bined Air Force. 

Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bearings in addi- 
tion to the others. Tactical circuits heard during day with a fair amount of 
activity. 

Combined Fleet. — ^Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three is still 
operating but no further information on this division. Two Combined Fleet 
units appear active in the traffic. They are DesRon Three (normally in First 
Fleet but has been operating with Second Fleet) and CruDiv Seven of Second 
Fleet. Both of these units have been associated in traffic with the South China 
Fleet and the French Indo China Force. They may proceed to the South China 
Area in near future. 

Third Fleet. — Still in Sasebo area. The CinC. has been addressed by Tokyo 
to a great extent and is still associated with South China activities in traffic. 
It has been noted that the association between the Third Fleet and units of the 
Combined Air Force is growing. Especially the Second Base Force has been 
talking with several Air Corps among whom is the Kure Air Corps. Will air 
units be embarked in ships of the Base Force? 

Fourth Fleet. — No movement yet from the Truk area. It appears that the 
Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various officers of the staff were ad- 
dressed at Tokyo and at unidentified locations. 

Submarines. — No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute PALAO 
and Submarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being addressed by 
Tokyo and Yokosuka originators. 



712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Air. — One Air Squadron of the Combined Air Force is at HOIHOW, HAINAN. 
The Commander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good representa- 
tion of his command. The Carriers remain in home waters with most of them 
in port. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 19^1 

General. — Traffic volume normal, with a number of general address messages 
originated by Communication Division, Tokyo, to Radio Officers, Ominato, U #9 
(D. F. Station in Marshalls), Jaluit, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Takao and Sama 
Radios Staff Communication Officers All Major Flagships, Staff Communication 
Officer South Expeditionary Force and two apparent collective shore addresses. 
Traffic from all stations mentioned except Sama and Ominato to D. F. Control 
and Plotting Room Tokyo information to Staff Cmmunication Officer Combined 
Fleet was exchanged. No Messages of the D. F. type were detected so it pre- 
sumed that the interchange had to do with arrangements for drill or organization 
of the net. The Minister of the Navy originated one Alnav and one to all Ma.ior 
Commands and collective shore. Tokyo Personnel and Tokyo Communication Di- 
vision originated several to collective fleet and shore. Significance is not deter- 
mined though it is believed possible that a further partial change of shore and air 
calls may be in prospect. The Empire air station net was normally active using 
tactical calls. Secretary First Fleet originated one Urgent Code to unidentified 
(MINI 55), Staff Communication Officer Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and 
Commanding Officer of BatDiv Three flagship. 

Combined Fleet. — Same as yesterday, same units (BatDiv Three, Desrons One 
and Three) associated through traffic with South Expeditionary Force. CinC. 
Second Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be arranging oper- 
ations of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air Units. 

Third Fleet. — Inactive. 

Fourth Fleet. — Apparent movement of Fourth Fleet units in prospect or under- 
way, with continued emphasis on the Marshalls Area. CinC. Fourth traffic still 
being handled from the Truk area, with Airron Twenty-four (Kamoi) and asso- 
ciated Yokohama and Chitose air units involved in some movement, direction 
undetermined. All Marshall Island activities, including unidentified Army For- 
ces, exchanging traffic freely. 

Submarine Force. — Little activity detected. It is believed that some activity 
is operating or preparing to operate in the Marshall area, from communication 
arrangements underway between Staff Communication Officer Submarine Force 
and same Fourth Fleet, information to Jaluit. Jaluit has been heard working 
on various frequencies, using tactical calls and procedure associated with sub- 
marine operations, but no identifications of calls used have been made. 

Air. — Continued air traffic to and from Takao area, with unidentified Airron 
(formerly YOME 7) including South Expeditionary Force and Sama addressees 
in traffic. Composition of this force and purpose still speculative but believed to 
be preparing to move southward to work with the South Expeditionary Force. 

The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders analysis of 
traffic headings very slow and difficult, but identifications and recoveries of al- 
ternates are improving as a greater volume of November traffic becomes avail- 
able for research. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 16, 'November 19Jfl 

General. — Traffic volume approximately normal for week-end period. A new 
form of despatch heading appeared in a series of dispatches broadcasted on the 
regular UTSU series. Only the originator or the address of the dispatch ap- 
peared ; it is assumed that the other pertinent call or address may be buried in 
the text. These dispatches were with one exception (in 5 numeral text) all in 
the nine-Kana period separator system and the single call in the heading fitted 
In each case Line seven of the call garble table. 

A dispatch was originated by the Navy Minister addressed to all Major Fleets 
and general addresses to this effect : 

"Today the House of Peers and House of Representatives by means of a de- 
cision adopted the following resolution transmitted as follows : 

1. Resolution of House of Peers — (Expressed deepest thanks and emotion 
to Army and Navy for their glorious service over a long period to the Empire 
and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen in battle. 

2. Resolution of House of Representatives — Expressed thanks, etc., to all 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 713 

officers and men of Army Navy and Air Force for their 4i^ years service (iu 
China affair) and for their contribution to the establishment of a permanent 
world peace. Gave prayers for well being of all hands, etc." 
First and Second Fleets. — Majority of First and Second Fleet Units remain in 
the general Kure area. The units of these two fleets that have been most active 
from dispatch heading viewpoint in the last ten days appear to be : 
Airron Seven (3 Chitose class) 
Carrier Division Four 
Destroyer Squadron Seven 
Destroyer Squadron Three 
Battleship Division Three 
Cruiser Division Seven 
It is rather singular that the CinO. Second Fleet has assumed an important 
role in addressing for action several first fleet and other fleet recently. In 
some of these dispatches the call identified as Southern Expeditionary Force (Indo 
China Force) appears. Associations of addresses in several dispatches have 
thrown the Second and Third Fleets with the Combined Air Force and in other 
dispatches, these appear to an association between First Fleet, Carrier Divisions 
and the Mandates. 

It is apparent that Destroyer Squadron One has been or is operating with the 
Carrier Divisions and Battleship Division Three while Cruiser Division Seven 
and Destroyer Squadron Three have been operating together. Iwakuin Air 
sent short priority dispatch to the ATAGO, Second Fleet cruiser and submarine 
units indicating some joint minor exercises in that ax'ea. 
Third Fleet. — Believed inactive in Sasebo — Kure area. 

Fourth Fleet. — FUATU, a Tokyo address originated one UNI dispatch to an 
unidentified fleet unit (Men 33), information to CinC. Combined Fleet, Com- 
munication Officer, Fourth Fleet, Tokyo Intelligence, and NEO 66, believed to be 
a shore based air activity in Chichijima-Marcus area. 

Fifth Fleet. — Prior to the change of calls on 1 November, the composition of 
the Fifth Fleet was very indefinite, but appeared to contain several naval auxil- 
iary type vessels. Since 1 November, little has been recovered of the composition 
of this mythical fleet, but is definite that some units are operating in the general 
Yokosuka Chichijima-Marcus area. 

Bulmarines. — Little activity. Communication OflScer, Submarine Force origi- 
inated one priority dispatch to unidentified address, information to Combined 
Fleet Communication Officer. Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet 
Commands continues. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 11 November 1941 

General. — Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. More traffic 
with single call heading appeared on the broadcast circuit. These dispatches num- 
bered serially and each call different, but all fitting the same line on the call 
garble table. Since these messages are transmitted each hour on the hour and are 
of approximately the same length it appears that they are drill messages. It is 
feared that they constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a heading. 
Since none of this traffic has been found going into Tokyo, it is probably originated 
in the Navy Ministry. Very few messages of general address were noted. Tac- 
tical circuits in the Mandates were heard during the day with radio Saipan 
controlling. 

Combined Fleet. — No movement from the Kure area of any major portion of 
the First or Second Fleets. The CinC. Second Fleet very active as an originator 
today. He continues to address units which are most normally under his com- 
mand. He also addressed the CinC. Third Fleet, Palao Forces, and the Chief of 
Staff Fourth Fleet. 

Third Fleet.— Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Communication Officer of Third 
Fleet was addressed by the R. N. O. Palao. 

Fourth Fleet. — The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area centered 
about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit. Both 
these activities originated traffic. 

Air. — The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was 
addressed frequently by SAMA, HAINAN and was in two instances addressed by 
the Fourth Fleet. The carriers are mostly in the Kure-Sasebo area with the 
exception of a few which are operating in the Kyushu area. 

China. — Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined Fleet 
Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The R. N. O. Taimoku ad- 



714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

dressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow Island, Sama, Bako, CinC, South 
China, and Chief of StafE Combined Air Force. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 18 Novem'ber 1941 

Oeneral. — Traffic volume a little under normal with receiving conditions fair 
to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of general address 
emanating from the Communication section. The double originator BUMIL and 
N. G. S. sent one NIKAWIWI to the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet for informa- 
tion to all First Class Naval Stations. BUMIL also addressed an urgent dispatch 
to SAJMA, information to R. N. O. TAINOKU, Chief of StafE South China Fleet 
and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Another Tokyo originator believed to be 
N. G. S., sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff 
French Indo China Force and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. MAIZURU Naval 
Station also sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Second 
Fleet, Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force and for information to 
N. G. S. The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent three long dispatches 
to the entire Direction Finder Net which was very active today with many bear- 
ings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General Staff sent one to Chief of Staff 
Carrier Divisions and Chief of Staff French Indo China Force. 

Combined Fleet. — CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an originator 
and addressee. Since this officer is always included in the address of every 
important message, he will no longer be mentioned as an addressee unless he is 
the only addressee. The association between the CinC Second Fleet and the 
French Indo China Forces and Combined Air Force today in an urgent NIKA 
dispatch. Several units of the Combined Air Force also addressed several dis- 
patches to him. Battleship Division Three, the Carrier Divisions and two de- 
stroyer squadrons have been associated in traffic. Several dispatches occurred 
today, being addressed by N. G. S. and the Commander Carrier Divisions in sev- 
eral instances. The CinC. Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches to him. 
These form the indication that CinC. Second Fleet will be in command of a large 
Task Force compromising the Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, some carrier 
divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No movement from home waters has 
been noted. 

Third Fleet. — The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears to 
be a movement report. He also sent one to R. N. O. TAIHOKU information to 
CinC. Third Fleet. There were other units tentatively placed in Third Fleet who 
sent dispatches in which the Tokyo movement report office was an addressee. It 
is expected that the Third Fleet will move from the Sasebo area in the near 
future. This Second Base Force was having quite a bit of traffic with several 
Air Corps awhile ago and may be transporting air units for equipment. 

Fourth Fleet. — Not much activity in tliis fleet. The amount of traffic still 
interested in Jaluit. 

Communication Intelligence Summary 19 November 19^1 

General. — ^Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates 
was noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the northern circuits also very light 
Some technical traffic received from Combined Fleet units. There has been a 
noticeable increase in the afloat traffic over the normal amount usually seen. 
Fleet units seem to have a great deal of business with other Fleet units both 
within and outside of their own organization. Staff Officers are frequently 
addressed at other than their normal locations. The activity at Tokyo has sub- 
sided somewhat in that there were fewer general massages tlian for the past 
few days. Tokyo Intelligence sent out several messages addressed to Second 
Fleet, Submarine Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAMA for 
information to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet. The Navy 
Minister sent out two AlNavs. The Direction Finder net is still active with all 
stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting station making reports to major 
commanders. 

Combined Fleet. — The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears today at 
Sasebo, its southern jaunt apparently having been completed. Destroyer Squad- 
ron Four and Two appear associated with the Third Fleet. CinC Second Fleet 
continues his activity, being still associated with Combined Air Force, French 
Indo Chna Force, Third Fleet, and today with Carrier Division Three. Carrier 
Division Three was in Takao and returned to the Empire a week ago and has 
been associated with Third Fleet since. A Bako activity addressed the Chief of 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



715 



staff Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The Chief of Staff 
Second Fleet addressed an urgent dispatch to CinC. French Indo China Fleet 
information to Third Fleet and Commander Cruiser Division Five. 

Third Fleet. — Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and of 
the Base Forces originated movement reports but no indication of direction. 
CinC. Third Fleet is still in Sasebo. 

Fourth Fleet. — Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base De- 
fense Force at Palao. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and the Second Fleet 
was considerable. One call (SITI 4) appears at Jaluit today. This call has 
been identified as Carrier Division Four and if the one message is correct it 
appears that this Carrier Division (ZUIKAKU) is in the Jaluit area. This is 
not confirmed as no other indications have been found and its presence at Jaluit 
is doubted, attributing the message to be a communication error. 

Fifth Fleet — Flagship located Yokosuka. The CinC. Fifth Fleet appeared in 
a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen. 

Communication Intelligence Summary — 20-21 Novemier 1941 

General. — Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal. 
Tokyo originators active with messages addressed to all major commanders. 
N. G. S. sent a UNIWIWI to Commandant BAKO for information to Chief of 
Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The Personnel Bureau at Tokyo became 
very active on the 21st sending out a series of long personnel messages. The 
activity at Tokyo identified as R.D.F. plotting stations increased his recent high 
volume of messages with a long four part message addressed to all major com- 
manders. He also addressed several dispatches to the Direction Finder Net, 
indicating the employment and results being obtained by this activity. The 
traffic load on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 21st, so heavy 
that the circuit was n duplex operation most of the mid-watch. 

Combined Fleet. — Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area and 
most of both fleets remain in the Kure-Sasebo area. Battleship Division Three 
still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the CinC. Second Fleet continues 
abnormally high. A list of units addressed by him or who sent traffic to him and 
CinC. Third Fleet over the past two days follows : 

MIRA 9 (Carrier Division Three) END 7 (Unidentified) 

TAB 1 (Airron 7) AKU 8 (Air Unit) 

KAME 5 (Airron 6) KUSU 7 (Unidentified) 

YAWI 1 (Crudiv 5) SATU 88 (Unidentified) 

KENU 3 (Crudiv 7) KUNI 88 (Unidentified) 

EESE 4 (Desron 3) OYU 9 (Unidentified) 

AKI (Desron 4) KOA (Unidentified) 

TIYA 7 (Comdr. 1st Base For) NOTU 6 (Unidentified) 

SASE 3 (Comdr. 2nd Base For) NETE 5 (Unidentified) 

YOMO 9 (Desro 5) NSI 3 (Unidentified) 

REA 2 (Shiogama Air Corps) SUTE 1 (Unidentified) 

KUNO 9 (Erimo) YAYU 1 (Unidentifled) 

MIMO 3 (Air Unit) MARE 5 (Unidentified) 

TUE 7 (Unidentified) Plus 11 Marus 

This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assembled by him but only 
the ones occurrng in the past two days. Each one appeared not only with the 
CinC. Second Fleet but with the Third Fleet and with one of the units now in 
South China or a Taiwan-South China Address. A complete list is being made 
up but was not finished at this writing. Assuming that the entire Second Fleet 
will be included in this organization and that each unit addressed will either 
participate or contribute somewhat to the Task Force it appears that it will com- 
prise a good portion of the navy. One item stands out — so far there has been 
practically no submarine units mentioned by the Second or Third Fleets in con- 
nection with South China activities. Commander Submarine Force has not been 
included in traffic. He does appear in Tokyo Fourth Fleet and Mandates traffic. 

Communications Intelligence Summary — 20-21 November 1941 

Mandates and Fourth Fleet. — The R. N. O. Palao and Palao radio stations have 
remained active with the Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka for days. This is taken 
to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include 
the Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active witli 



716 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the R. N. O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so 
great it may be that he will assign some non-Second Fleet units to that area 
but just which ones is not yet known. From information from radio sources 
there is no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third Base 
Force which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet units 
i-outed there and the Maru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal flow to 
that area. With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday reported as either a carrier 
unit or submarine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron of the 
Submarine Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls is far 
greater than that existing at Palao. 

Communication Intelligence Summary — 22 Novemler 1941 

General. — Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical 
circuit heard today, indicating that Combined Fleet tactical exercises are now 
completed. The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs and sent two other 
messages, one to CinC Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka and Commander Sub- 
marine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out the usual long messages 
to CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. BuMil 
addressed Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan Civil Engineering Section at Peleliu and 
Yokosuka. Another imidentified Tokyo originator sent a priority message to 
all major flags and China Fleet, information to ANOS at Taihoku and Palao. 
Sasebo addressed one to Chief of Staff French Indo China Force, information 
Chief of Stafe Second Fleet, Bako, Sama, Chief of StafC South China, Chief 
of StafC Third Fleet, Commander Cruiser Division Seven and Commander De- 
stroyer Squadron Three. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three 
to South China Area soon? While the Direction Finder Net is still active, the 
station at Palao sent in more bearings than usual for that station. 

ComMned Fleet. — CinC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two un- 
identified calls, one a Maru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet. CinC Second 
Fleet was again prolific with many messages addressed to Third Fleet and 
Combined Air Force. The amount of traffic interchanged between these three 
commanders was very great. One message addressed many units as follows : 

CinC. Second Fleet. To: NETES (Crudiv?), K002 (SubronS) TIYU 66 
(CinC. Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC. Comb. Air Force) MIRA 9 (CarDivS), 
RESB 4 (Desron 3), KORE 4 (Second Fleet) (Collection), less Crudiv 8 and 
unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI 2 (BatDiv 3) (at Kure and Sasebo), Airron 
7 (at Kure), SUTI 1 (?) (atKure), SATU 8 (?) (atKm*e) META 0/ (AKASHI) 
(at KURE) META 2 (ASHI MARU), TUFU 2 (?) NARI 33 (CinC. China 
Fleet), KAKE 66 (CinC. South China Fleet), MISI 66 (CinC. Comb. Fleet). 

Third Fleet. — CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from "RIKUGUN 
SANBOUTEU ISIABDATI SEUZEU (at Tainoku). This is translated as "Army 
Chief of Staff General MAEDATI" and indicates the linking of the Taiwan 
Army Forces with Third Fleet, The CinO Third Fleet continues his association 
with Combined Air Forces. 

Fourth Fleet. — CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base 
Force at Jaluit and AirRon 24 now in Jaluit area. Third Base Force at Palao 
and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and Yokosuka. He 
also received one from Commander Submarine Force. 

China. — The Commander French Indo China Force sent one message to CinC. 
Combined Fleet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako sent one to 
Secretary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Carrier 
Divisions, Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet. 

Communication Intelligence Summary — 23 November 1941 

General. — Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic has increased. 
Some of the high precedence dispatch headings are listed : 

1. MAYURU (Tokyo Address) to HORONO MUSEKU (Collective Shore 

Precedence Information Chiefs of Staff Com- 

NIKA-WIWI bined, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 

Southern Expeditionary Force. 

2. Third Fleet Chief of StafC to Second Fleet Chief of Staff Information 

VIKA Combined and Southern Expeditionary 

Force Chief of Staff. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 717 

3. KESANA EONO (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and Southern 

WIWI Expeditionary Force. Information "SAN- 

KUYUTI" at Sama Hainan. 

4. SUTE 1 (Unidentified Fleet unit) to Eadio Takao, Hainan, Flagship 

NIKA NWA 2, information Tadio Tokyo 

and Second Fleet flagship. 
6. Imakuni Air to Iwakuni Air Detachment at NAHA information 
KIU Kure, Bako, and 

MINO 3 in Takao. 

Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to First Fleet, 
Third Fleet, and others. The following WE address was followed by Sasebo 
Radio in the delivery of a personnel Bureau dispatch "SAHOTI. RENGO. RI. 
SI." 

An unidentified fleet unit (SUITE 1) listed recently in KURE appeared on 
radio circuit with Takao Radio. Also on this circuit were the following: 

KENU 3— CruDiv 7 Flagship? 

HOWI 2— Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet. 
EKE 8 — Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet. 
MUSE 4 — ^Naval Auxiliary associated with Second Fleet. 

The above units received delivery of the long NIKA dispatch originated by 
CinC Second Fleet on the 21st of November and which appeared to outline the 
forces expected to operate in the Indo-China general area. 

Combined Fleet. — CinC Combined was included, as always, in all exchange 
of fleet commander trafiic, but not important messages originated by him were 
intercepted. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet messages mentioned 
in summaries of 22nd were still being circulated, but Third Fleet appeared as 
the most active unit in today's traffic. Indications are that Third Fleet units 
are underway in a movement coordinated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air 
Force and French Indo China Force. Commander French Indo China Force 
(So. Exp. Fr) was included in all important traffic from Second, Third and 
Combined Air Commanders, Hainan addresses were included in nearly all high 
precedence messages concerning these forces and may indicate a rendezvous 
of forces in that area. Palao appeai'ed as an information addressee on a por- 
tion of the traffic. Fourth Fleet activity involved Palao area on one end and 
Marshalls on the other. With no means of substantiating the impression, it 
is believed that more submarines are operating in, or from, the Marshalls than 
it has been possible to definitely place from radio interceptions. It is recalled 
that there was an exchange between Staff Communication Officers of the 
Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet with Jaluit included as either action or 
information around November 1st and that Jaluit opened a direct circuit, to 
Yokosuka early this month, apparently to relieve traffic congestion from that 
area. Jaluit Radio has been heard on various frequencies using and working 
with units using tactical or secret type calls, while the main submarine fre- 
quency of 6385/12770 has been relatively inactive. 

AIR. — Combined Air Traffic remains associated with Taiwan area, while the 
Mandate Air units continue high level of activity, covering the whole Mandate 
area. Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet, but with Carrier Division Three 
definitely associated with Second Fleet operations. 

CHINA. — CinC. China and South China not included with the Second, Third 
Air Force and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic were quiet. Bearings from 
Cavite and Guam place CinC. South China east of Taiwan, but this is believed 
questionable. 

Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few 
days and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent 
or actually underway, at least in part, to the southward with covering forces 
operating from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled 
or gathering in the Palao area. 

Communication Intelligence Summary — 24 November 1941 

GENERAL. — Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal 
Traffic analysis impressions are unchanged from yesterday's report. The diffi- 
culties of identifications have prevented more definite information of vessels (and 
fleets to which attached) that appear to be moving south from Kure-Sasebo area. 
If the poor reception prevailing here the last two days can be disregarded and 



718 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the assumption made that Radio Heeia intercepted their "Share" of the total 
traffic, the following impresisons are worth something : 

(a) The falling off of traffic to China addresses. 

(b) The increased activity among third fleet addressees with a high 
percentage of what appears to be movement reports. 

(c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat 
addresses. 

The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary 
Force continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in despatch 
traffic, the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the Submarine Force 
Commander with the latter. 

First and Second Fleets. — "Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio call 
believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven originated a dispatch 
to Comamnder Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second Fleet, Commander Southern 
Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. The CinC. 
Second Fleet continues to appear as the Task Force Commander of a large number 
of units fi'om First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Three and Combined 
Air Force units. 

Third Fleet. — Large number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some 
of which apepar to be movement reports. The fact that CinC Third Fleet appears 
as information addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet units 
indicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future operations. 
Yesterday, a large number of dispatches asosciating Carrier Division Three with 
CinC. Third Fleet. 

Fourth Fleet and Mandates. — Fourth Fleet appears to be concentrated in Truk 
area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet vessels have come 
from Truff. Aid Squadron Twenty-Four and perhaps a large number of sub- 
marines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall Area. 

Submarines — Comparatively little activity. 

Comparatively quiet. 

Carriers — No definite indications of location. 

Combined Air Force — Commander Kanoya Air appears in the Takao area. 
Otherwise no change. 

Communication Intelligence Summary — 25 November 1941 

General. — Traffic volume normal. Receiving conditions much unproved over 
last two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with messages to various units. 
Tokyo originated one UNI WIWI to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC. Second Fleet, 
CinC. Third Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fleet, and CinC, French, Indo China Force 
plus Yokosuka, Kure and Maizuru. The Navy Minister originated several 
AlNavs. A Direction Finder Net, controlled by Tokyo radio was active with secret 
calls being sent by the five stations. The entire fleet traffic level is still high 
which leads to the conclusion that organizational arrangements or other prepara- 
tions are not yet complete. 

Combined Fleet. — Little activity by CinO. First Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet re- 
mains highly active as an origination, addressing Third Fleet, Air Force and 
South China units. A second Fleet unit and a submarine division or squadron 
arrived in Takao communication zone today. Crudivision Seven which previously 
arrived there has been associated with Destroyer Squadron Three which indicated 
the presence of that unit in Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still ex- 
changing messages. Two new units to be associated with CinC Second Fleet and 
the Task Force now forming are the North China Fleet and Defense Division One. 

Air. — Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air Corps has 
been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe that other units of the Com- 
bined Air Force have moved from Taiwan to the French Indo China Area al- 
though this is not yet verified. One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present 
in the Mandates. 

Fourth Fleet — CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications 
with the Commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander 
Carriers. His other communications are with the Third, Fourth and Fifth 
Base Forces. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 26 November 19^1 

General. — Traffic volume normal. All circuits heard well except for Tokyo- 
Takao circuit which faded early. Traffic jjicture about the same as for the past 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 719 

week. Intra-Fleet traffic still very heavy and Tokyo Bureaus still dispatching 
AlNavs. The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed 
a succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC. Sec- 
ond and Third Fleets in particular. The only MAM schedule was NR 15 which 
was first broadcast on the twenty-fifth. Takao and Bako originated more traffic 
today than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the Cine. Second 
Fleet and the China Fleets came in for their share. Tokyo radio is working 
the ISUZU (flagship South China) SAMA and CAMRANH Bay radio stations 
directly. Takao is also working ITSUBA (Spratleys). 

ComJjined Fleet. — Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic via 
SAMA, indicating the arrival of that unit in HAINAN waters. While no indi- 
cations were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also arrived it is probable 
that this unit is still In company with Cruiser Division Seven and is also present 
at Hainan. The Takao, former flagship of the Second Fleet became active in 
the traffic today being associated with the Second and Third Fleets, The tanker 
HAYATONO appeared In several of CinC second Fleet's dispatches today as 
well as the SOYO MARU. No movement is evident yet of any of the flags of 
the newly formed force. The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and 
the Combined Air Force still continues at it's high level. 

Fourth Fleet. — No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive communica- 
tion with Hainan forces as well as Palao forces. The KATORI and Cine. Sub- 
marine Fleet appear to be at or near Chichijima. 

Fifth Fleet. — The CinC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the dispatches of 
the Second Fleet and is associated with the new Task Force. 

Submarines. — As noted above, Commander Submarine Force is in Chichijima 
area. The Submarine Squadron NETE5's location is somewhat uncertain today 
due to one dispatch being routed to MAIZURU. The routing of this dispatch 
being doubted because of the indication of theer arrival at Takao yesterday and 
her previous association with Cruiser Division Seven. 

China. — Two Marus of the Third Fleet left Bako for Sama today. 

Third Fleet. — ^Active as above but no indication of large scale movement from 
the Sasebo area. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 27 November 1941 

General. — ^Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the fre- 
quencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Tako circuit unreadable on midwatch. Some 
tactical traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sana, and Saigon active as orig- 
inators, addressing traffic to each other and to the Chiefs of Staff of Second, 
Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako addressed the Chief of Staff Third 
Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second 
Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence activity who 
send five dispatches to the major commanders. The Direction Finder activity 
was very high with all stations sending in bearings including the Marshall 
Islands Stations which has been silent for the past four days. 

Combined Fleet. — No further information as to whether or not Destroyer 
Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to still be with Cruiser Division 
Seven in that area. There is still no evidence of any further movement from the 
Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several mes- 
sages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator lately. 
Cine. Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Air 
Force, and Bako. 

Third Fleet. — Still holding extensive communication with Bako, Sama, South 
China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of WE addresses is increas- 
ing, those occurring today were : 

"DAIHATIFUTABUTAISANBOTEU" (in Taihoku) 
"KOROKUKITISIKI" 

"KIZUKEYAMASITABUTAI" (in cate of RYU JO) 
"URIZEUBAIGUNDAIGONREUSEU" 

There is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet. 

Fourth Fleet.— CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to the de- 
fense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the Commander 
Submarine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air Corps held com- 
munication with Jaluit and Cine Fourth Fleet. The Civil Engineering Units at 
IMIEJI and ENIWETOK were heard from after being silent for weeks. Chitose 
Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron Twenty-four is still operating in the 



720 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Marshalls. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in 
the Mandates, 

Air. — An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYTJ and 
SEOKAKU. Carriers ate still located in home waters. No information of fur- 
ther movement of any combined air force units to Hainan. 

/8fw&«iannes.— Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area. 

Communication Intelligence Summary 28 November 19Jfl 

General. — Traffic volume normal. Communications to and from South China 
and between Mandates and Empire very heavy. No tactical traffic seen. As has 
been previously reported the suspected Radio Intelligence net is very active and 
is becoming more so. The TOKYO plotting activity addressed more messages to 
the Radio net than previously and most of these sent for information to the 
Major Commanders. Much traffic also was directed to WRE0 (The Tokyo 
D. F Command) from all eight stations in the Mandates and OMINATO. This 
Command also originated messages of high precedence to the Major Fleet Com- 
manders. This activity is interpreted to indicate that the R. I. net is operating 
at full strength upon U. S. Naval Communications and 18 GETTING RESULTS. 

TOKYO originators were active with messages of high precedence to the Com- 
mander in Chief's of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. The 
Navy Minister sent two Alnavs. The Chief of the Naval General StafE sent one 
to the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third 
Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second fleet and RNO PALAO. The BUAERO 
sent one to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet info IMIESI and 11th Air Corps at 
SAIPAN. 

ComMned Fleet. — No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units. 
Commander in Chief Second Fleet originated his usual number of despatches to 
Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid particular attention to by 
the Commander in Chief Second Fleet were CARDIVS Five and Seven and 
DESRONS two and Four and SUBRON Five. No traffic today from the TAKAO, 
(CA). 

Third Fleet. — Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander 
in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present 
with the bulk of the Third Fleet in SASEBO but it is not yet located elsewhere. 
The Army Commander in TAIHOKU is still holding communications with the 
Commander in Chief Third Fleet. Two Third Fleet units arrived at BAKO and 
are apparently returning to KURE from BAKO. 

Fourth Fleet.— BnYk of Fourth Fleet still at TRUK. The Commander in Chief 
Fourth Fleet addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the 
Fourth Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at TUOTO and WOTJE 
and held communications with AIRRON Twenty-foui- and KAMOI. 

South China. — SAMA sent several messages to shore addresses in the Empire. 
SAMA also addressed the OMURA AIR CORPS in several messages which went 
for information to SAIGON and TOKYO. TAKAO radio station addressed the 
Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, and the French Indo-China and Com- 
bined air force. TAKAO Air Corps addressed SUKUGAWA Air Corps and 
YOKOSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a HAINAN office now at SAIGON 
originated several messages to the Naval Bases at SASEBRO and KURE. The 
Commander in Chief Second and Commander in Chief Third Fleets. 

Submarines. — Except for the mention of Subrons Five and Six in two dis- 
patches there was no submarine activity today. 

Communication Intelligence Summary 29 November 1941 

General. — Traffic volume above normal. The traffic to South China still very 
high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Tokyo-Takao circuit but 
was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of today's traffic is made 
up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo Intelligence sent eleven mes- 
sages during the day to Major Commander both ashore and afloat, while the radio 
intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the Major Commanders. 
In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, radio Yokosuka sent in 
reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The 
Direction Finder Net controlled directly by T'okyo was up during the night with 
much activity. One message from Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station in- 
cluded Commander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister originated 
his usual two AJNavs and the Naval General Staff addressed Commanders Sec- 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 721 

ond Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force and the South China Units. The 
unit which has been addressed as the "103rd Air Group" originated one dispatch 
today whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls. It is apparent 
that he has no Navy call list. On address was "juitikoukuukantai" 11th AIR 
FLEET". Since this has appeared before it is evident that the use of KANTAI 
is intentional making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its composition is 
unknown. 

Comhmed Fleet. — The arrival of Air-Squadron Seven in Takao area is con- 
firmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not confimed nor 
denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following units are under the 
immediate command of Cin C. Second Fleet : 

CARDIV THREE 

SUBRON FIVE 

SUBRON SIX 

CRUDIV FIVE 

CRUDIV SEVEN 

DESRON TWO 

DESRON FOUR 

THIRD FLEET 

FRENCH INDO CHINA FORCE 
Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships' but their assignment is not yet 
definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third Fleet, China and 
South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval General Staff ; Commander 
in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above. Only one 
message from Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This was ad- 
dressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air Force, CRUDIV Four and BUMILAFF. 
The HIYEI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fleet. 

Third Fleet. — Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one message to Comdesron 
Five, Number Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense Division One 
and Comdesron Two and Four. He held extensive communications with the 
Commander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKO. Two more units of Third Fleet 
made movement reports. 

Fourth Fleet. — Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander in 
Chief Second Fleet, Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. 
He is still in TRUK area. 

Submarines. — Traffic for Commander Submarine Force was routed through 
SAIPAN today. He was at CHICHIJIMA yesterday. 

South China. — CRUDIV Seven now in SAMA made a movement report but 
direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander ad- 
dressed several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO. The 
Commander in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South China Naval 
Bases and the South China Fleets, all for information to Commander in Chief 
Second Fleet. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, SO November 1941 

General. — Traffic volume less than for past few days. Today's traffic consisted 
largely of despatches bearing old dates, some as far back as 26 November. No 
reason can be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high vol- 
ume of traffic for past few days has prevented the repetition of despatches. The 
number of despatches originated on the 30th is very small. The only tactical cir- 
cuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several MARU'S. The TOKYO 
Intelligence activity originated two WIWI despatches to Major Fleet Com- 
manders. One urgent despatch was sent by NGS to Chief of Staff, Combined, 
Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Feets, Combined Air Force; Submarine Force 
and China Fleets. 

Combined Fleet. — The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet are 
in KURE, In the Same message the Chief of Staff Second Fleet was not at any 
location. Other traffic indications are that he is at sea. Commander in Chief 
Second Fleet sent one to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined 
Air Foi'ce, but also included KONGO and HIYEI, which places them as members 
of his Task Force. The Commander in Chief Second Fleet is no longer adding 
PALAO activities and has not for past two days. The RNO PALAO today ad- 
dressed two messages to TAIWAN GUNSIREIBU (Taiwan Army Headquarters). 

Third Fleet. — Commander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to 
COMDESRON two, Four and Five, COMCRUDIV five; First and Second Base 
Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief Second 



722 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Fleet. No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief 
Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway. 

Fourth Fleet. — Believed to be still in TRUK area. D. F. activity in Marshalls 
a little greater day than normal. JALUIT addressed Commander Submarine 
Force and A IRRON 24 in one despatch. The continued association of JALUIT 
and Commander Submarine Force plus his known progress from the Empire to 
CHICHIJIMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the Marshalls. Since 
one of his large units (SITI4) arrived in the Marshalls some time ago this unit 
cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a submarine concentration in that 
area. Every evidence points to a concentration of not only the small Fourth 
Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet Submarines of the 
Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA AIR CORPS presence in that 
area points to intended air-submarine operations from the Marshalls. Also the 
presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least 
one carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed. 

BAKO Active with despatches to Second and Third Fleets, Combined Air Force 
and SAMA. Commander in Chief China Fleet becoming more and more active 
as an originator with despatches to the Task Force. He made a movement report 
with the South China Fleet as an information addressee. The StafCommunica- 
tion Officer of the South China Fleet was addressed at Shanghai today. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 December I941 

Oeneral. — All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1 
December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of six 'months or 
more. Calls were last changed on 1 November WJ^l. The fact that service calls 
lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for 
active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to 
the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one 
to four or five days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting more 
and more security provisions. A study of traffic to deliver all dispatches using 
old calls so that promptly with the change of calls, there would be a minimum 
of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromises. Either 
that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pay the total vol- 
ume and make it apepar as if nothing unusual was pending. 

First fleet. — Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside 
of Empire waters. It is believed that such a large percentage of the First 
Fleet is operating with the Second Fleet Task Force that this fleet has ceased 
to operate in a prominent role. 

Second Fleet. — This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area 
in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to 
play an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the assumption is made 
that this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task 
Force are definitely in the Indo-China area (Cruiser Division Seven and De- 
stroyer Squadron Three most prominent). 

Third Fleet. — Nothing to report except that the same association of Second, 
Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces 
continues. 

Fourth fleet. — No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area. 

Fifth Fleet. — Nothing to report. 

Submarines. — Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the 
area to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan Flagship somewhere in 
this general area. 

Carriers. — No change. 

Combined Air Force. — No change ; 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 December 19^1 

Oeneral. — The most promenent factor in today's traffic is the apparent con- 
fusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. 
There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after 
it appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao Radio received the 
same dispatch that it has previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and 
Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao Radio was broadcasting traffic to 
these fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location 
report, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao, 
In several instances Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 723 

Summing up 0II reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made 
up of Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters hut is either 
not close enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course 
not close to Takao. Tlie change of calls on December 1st has prevented this 
office from making definite statements at this date of the units now in the South- 
ern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai Radio handled a 
considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined 
for units in the Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South China area continues 
to appear in Shanghai. Comsixteen reported nine submarines proceeding south 
by Camranh Bay. This group is believed to comprise both Submarine Squadrons 
five and six, which units normally operate with the First Fleet but have been 
Included repeatedly in the Second Fleet Task Force for Southern operations. 

There vxis a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both 
by major forces afloat and Tokyo. Hainan continues a a prominent address. 
Palao and Third Base Force is holding the same relative importance. 

First Fleet. — Dispite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet ap- 
pears relatively quiet. From inconclusive evidence it a*ppcars as if there may be 
been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff that these may 
be two supreme commanders toith staffs. As an example, traffic routing indicates 
one Combined Fleet Call associated with Second and Third Fleets and ap- 
parently in company while another Combined Fleet calls appears not associated 
with the second and Third Fleets. 

Second Fleet. — No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. 
This is partly due to lack of nevj identifications but contributes somewhcpt to the 
belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company. Cruiser 
Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unlocated and unobserved 
since change of calls. 

Third Fleet. — Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way in 
some of the Third Fleet traffic. 

Mandates. — Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues. Some 
traffic for Fourth Fleet units still going through Truk. 

Carriers. — Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today. 
Lack of identifications has some'wha<t promoted this lack of i7iformation. Hoto- 
ever, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since 
the change on the first of December, and not otie carrier call is at a low ebb. 

Combined Air Force. — This force continues to be associated closely with Sec- 
ond, Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have 
undoubtedly left the Takao area. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 December 1941 

General. — Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Present 
state of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained. 
The extensive use of alternate calls by the Major Commands slows up identifica- 
tion of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far. 
The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long despatches to the 
CINC COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence 
originated nine despatches to the same address. 

The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed 
by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takao the CINC SECOND FLEET is indi- 
cated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is 
indicated for delivery by that Station. It is the impression that both SECOND 
and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence 
means. 

There are some FOURTH FLEET Unites in the Marshall Island area includ- 
ing some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of these units is not 
known. The SIXTH BASE FORCE at Jaluit addressed several messages to 
CINC FOURTH. 

Some Swatow Unites were addressed at Saigon today indicating a movement 
of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako originated many despatches to the 
BNO Taihoku and the Task Force Commander. 

No information on Submarines or Carriers. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 December 1941 

General. — Traffic volimie normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio 
today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so 

79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 5 



724 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation. So far only a few mes- 
sages have been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number 
of urgent messages today, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. 
Among other Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven part message to Chiefs of Staff 
China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China 
Force and Saka. In all. This activity sent twelve messages to the major com- 
manders. 

Combined Fleet. — The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of mes- 
sages from the CinC. Second Fleet and Cine. Third Fleet. These previously 
very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not 
yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed 
to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now 
believed that the CinC. Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that ap- 
parently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broad- 
castcast which Cine. Second Fleet is still Copying. The CinC. Combined Fleet 
sent one message to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force 
Palao, CinC. Second Fleet and CincC. Third Fleet. 

Fourth Fleet. — The CinC. Fourth Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff Com- 
bined Air Force, information to Eleventh Air corps, Chitose Air, Air Squadron 
Twenty-Four, Third Base Force at Palao and Fourth Base Force at Truk. No 
further check could be made today on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the 
Marshalls. Jaluit appeared many times in today's traffic being associated with 
Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo Radio and MUSI 88 (Which is believed to 
be an oil tanker). 

Soiith China. — Bako continues as an active originator addressing many mes- 
sages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China Commanders, 
all units in that area quiet. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 5 December 1941 

General. — Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broad- 
cast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operation. 
There were several new intercept schedules heard. OMINATO radio working 
SAMA and BAKo sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handing traffic 
to Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic 
for these units also. It is noted that some traffic being broadcast is several 
days old which indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio 
organization. 

There were many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused 
by the jammed conditions of all circuits. 

A plain language message was sent by the Captain, OKAWA from Tokyo to 
Takao probably for further relay addressed to FUJIHARA, Chief of the Political 
Affairs Bureau, saying that "in reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said 
is considered important at this end but proceed with what you are doing, specific 
orders will be issued soon". 

Combined Fleet. — Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have orig- 
inated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving 
their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther 
south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from 
the Commander Carriers or Submarines Force has been seen either. 

TJxird Fleet. — In one WE address a "Chief of Staff" sent a message to "Com- 
mander Fourteenth Army aboard RYUJOMARU in Third Fleet." 

HITOYONGUN SATI (IRO 1 REUZEU MARU). A number of MARUs 
have been addressing the CinC. Third Fleet. 

Fourth Fleet. — The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication Officer 
of the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today strengthening the impres- 
sion that the CinC. Fourth Fleet is in the Marshalls. The Commander of the 
South China Fleet has been addressing the Palao radio and the RNO TAI- 
HOKU and the Commander Second Fleet. 

South China. — SAMA addressed much traffic to CinC. Second Fleet. BAKO 
continues as an active originator with many dispatches to Second and Third 
Fleet. The Commander Combined Air Force api)ears to be busy with the move- 
ment of Air Corps. SHIOGAMA air and at least two unidentified corps are 
moving, probably to Indo-China. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 725 

Communication Intelligence Summary 6 December 19^1 

Oeneral. — Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being 
transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic. 
This is not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level, but is the result 
of confusion in traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now 
•holding broadcasts are TOKYO (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts), 
SAIPAN, OIMAUTO and TAKAO. 

Yesterday's high level of traffic from TOKYO originators was maintained with 
the Intelligence activity still sending periodic messages. Practically all of 
TOKYO'S messages carry prefixes of high priority. 

Combined Fleet. — Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. 
These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The 
Commander in Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers, 
Fourth Fleet and the Major Commanders. 

Fourth Fleet. — The Conunander in Chief Fourth Fleet is again in the TRUK 
area. It is doubtfull that he ever went to JALUIT although it is certain that 
some members of his staff were there over the past few days. There is a definite 
close association between the Third Base Force at PALAO and the forces in 
South China. This unit is constantly sending messages to the Chief of Staff of 
the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces and BAKO. It is being almost 
entirely neglected by Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet under whose command 
it normall operates. RONGELAB radio addressed the PALAO weather observer. 

Fifth Fleet.— Th\& fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN sea with OMINATO 
broadcasting traffic for this unit. 

Submarines. — The Commander Submarine Force originated two messages to 
his command. These are the first two originated since 1 December. He is 
definitely in the MARSHALLS. 

South China. — Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAMA and TAKAO still sending 
many messages to the Task force. 

SECRET 

Station H, 1 December, 1941. 

Chronology 

South China Area : No change in location of flagships assigned to the China 
area was observed. Subron 6 is at Takao and is probably going South. Airron 7 
is in the vicinity of Hainan Isand. Comdr. Combined Air Force is still at Takao, 

Sheet #95431. RMO Tuihoku originated a message with prefix, MIN — highest 
priority, action Bako, information Sama, Takao and Chiefs of Staff of five un- 
identified calls. Sheet #95451 CinC South China Fleet originated a despatch 
with prefix, KIU NIELA WIWI — Urgent-special cipher, action three imidentified 
calls. 

Combined Fleet: CinO's Combined, First and Second Fleets are all believed 
to be in the Kure area. CinC Second Fleet sent a code movement report it is 
po.ssible that this Command will go to South China or Indo-China. 

Very little activity was observed in the Kure or Casebo area. Most of the 
activity seamed to be in South China, but this might have been caused by more 
thorough coverage of South China circuits, with less coverage of Empire circuits. 

Submarines : No activity noted in Subforce. Comdr. Subforce is in the Man- 
dates, probably with a number of submarines. Some submarine units are still 
based at Yokosuka and Kure. 

Fourth Fleet : CinC Fourth Fleet is still at Truk. 

No unusual activity noted in the Mandates, except that Comdr. Subforce is in 
the vicinity of Saipan and will probably go to Truk to join CinC Forth Fleet. 

General : Service calls for units afloat were changed on 1 December. The flrst 
new calls were noticed about 1100. Old calls were used by some units until 
evening. The "WE" (enciphered) addresses were also changed. The only shore 
call observed to be changed was 0ASI4 (Sama, Hainan) to YUIl. 

Three kana authenticators were used after the message NRs on several des- 
patches but were not used on others. This was begun after the change of calls. 

A large number of DF despatches, originated by MENUl (Jaluit), were sent 
on the UTU broadcast, information IKAl (unidentified). These messages were 
originated several days ago. Several messages, originated by Comsubforce, were 
also sent on the UTU broadcast for action of Subforce. These were also several 
days old. 

Saipan, using the call HOKO, called FUHO (Tokyo) and NUKU (Takao) on 



726 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATl.^OK 

13013 Kcs during the day. On 14310A Kcs (Takao to ships) NUKU (Takao) 
called RIKU once and then secured. 

A considerable number of messages that had been originated several days ago 
were noted in traffic intercepted. This might have been done to keep the volume 
of traffic up to cover-up for a decrease in the amount of traffic originated. 

Station H, 2 December, 1941. 

South China Area: CinC China Fleet (aboard Idzumo) is at Shanghai; CinO 
South China Fleet (aboard Isuzu) is in Canton area ; Comdr. Indo-China Force is 
at Saigon ; CinC Central China Fleet is at Shanghai. 

Takao continues to accept traffic for delivery to Comdr. Combined Air Force 
and Commanding Officer Kanoya Air Station. Desrons 4 and 5 and Chogei (flag- 
ship Subron — ) are in Takao area and are probably going South, 

Several high precedence despatches were originated by South China units, 
indicating increased activity in that area. 

The following units normally based in Japan have gone South to Hainan or 
Indo-China areas: Desrons 2, 4 and 5, Subrons 5 and 6, Airron 7 and Crudiv 7. 

Combined Fleet : CinC's Combined and First Fleets are believed to have re- 
mained at Kure with the First Fleet and most of the Second Fleet. CinC Second 
Fleet has shifted to Sasebo and is probably going to South China to direct 
operations of units sent to this area from the Empire. 

No signs of movement of the Third Fleet or Carriers were given in today's 
traffic. It is believed that they remain in the vicinity of Kyushu. Cardiv 4 is 
believed to still be at Sasebo. Cardiv 3 has not shown any activity during the 
last few days, and it is possible that this unit has gone South. 

Submarines : No activity in the Subforce has been observed. Comdr. Subforce is 
in the Mandates. Several submarine units are still at Yokosuka and Kure. 
Several despatches originated by Mandate units were given to Comsubforce for 
information. 

Fourth Fleet : CinC Fourth Fleet remains at Truk. 

Several high precedence despatches yrere originated by Fourth Fleet units, 
indicating activity of some sort is taking place in the Mandates. 

General: Takao Air Station (MER06) was heard sending traffic (broadcast), 
formerly sent on the UTU broadcast, to REHES (Combined Air Force) on 
11500M Kcs during the evening watch. 

Addition to "WE" table : YO=A. 

Station H, 3 December, 1941. 

South China Area : No change in location of major flagships assigned to South 
China waters was observed. 

Takao was acting as radio guard for CinC Second Fleet, Comdr CAF and 
Comdg. Officer Kanoya Air Corps. Bako was much more active than usual and 
was probably acting as relay station for vessels going South. Bako was heard 
vcorking Takao on 3705A Kcs during the evening ; this station stopped working 
Tako on the hour to hold schedule with ships. 

Takao, using call NUKU, was heard broadcasting traffic on 7155A Kcs (night) 
and 14310A Kcs (day). This broadcast was similar to the Tokyo UTU broad- 
cast. Traffic was broadcast to CinC's Combined, Second and Third Fleets, 
Comdr. Combined Air Force, Comdr. Indo-hina Force and several unidentified 
afloat calls. 

NUKU (Takao) and MAYA were heard working each other on 6762 Kcs dur- 
ing the evening. 

Considerable high precedence traffic was originated by South China or Indo- 
China units indicating unusual activity in this area. 

Combined neet: CinC's Combined and First Fleets are believed to be in the 
Kure area. CinC Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and is probably going 
South. 

There were no indications that CinC Third Fleet had moved South, except that 
Takao was heard broadcasting traffic for that command. It is believed that the 
Carriers are still based at or near Sasebo. 

Very little activity was observed in the Empire. 

Submarines : No activity in the Subforce was noted. Comdr. Subforce is be- 
lieved to still be in the Mandates. Submarine units are believed to be in port at 
Yokosuka and Kure. 

Fourth Fleet : Very little activity observed in the Fourth Fleet. CinC Fourth 
Fleet is still at Truk. Normal activity was indicated in traffic intercepted in this 
area. Several ships were in the Truk and Jaluit areas. No activity of any kind 
was noticed in the Palao area. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 727 

General: Tokyo (FUHO), Takao (NUKU) and Saipan (HOKO) were heard 
working each other on 13000A Kcs during the day and early evening. Takao 
relayed trafBc from Saipan to Tokyo. 

Station H, 4 December, 19^1. 

South China Ai-ea: CinC China Fleet is at Shanghai; CinC South China 
is in the vicinity of Amoy ; Comdr Indo-China Force is at Saigon. 

Takao continues to broadcast traflBc on 7155A (night) and 14310A Kcs (day) 
to ships in that vicinity. A regular series of UTU numbers are being used by 
Takao and the broadcast is similar to Tokyo's. Takao uses the call, NUKU 
and calls RIKU (All ships in my vicinity?). 

NUKU (Takao), TAI (Sama) and TANU (Saigon?) were heard working 
each other on 7008N Kcs during the evening. TANU sent traffic to Takao, 
originated by KORU0 (Kanoya Air Corps), indicating this unit is at Saigon. 

Note sheet #96819 sent by TANU (Saigon?) to TAI (Sama) for delivery 
to "WE" address, (TONUSIUDANSANJIUTEU— Army?). The text of the 
message consisted of 3 numeral groups. Sheet #96829 was similar, except that 
the text consisted of 4 numeral groups. 

Combined Fleet : CinC's Combined and First Fleets are believed to have 
remained in' the Kure area. CinC's Second and Third Fleets are probably in 
the vicinity of Takao and might be going South. Takao broadcasted traffic ad- 
dressed to CinC's Second and Third Fleets. 

Very little activity was observed in the Sasabo or Kure areas. The Carriers 
are believed to have remained in the vicinity of Kyushu. 

Submarines : No activity among the submarines was observed. Comdr. 
Subforce is still in the Mandates. Several submarine units remain at Tokosuka 
and Kure. 

Fourtn Fleet: CinC Fourth Fleet is believed to have remained at Truk. 
CinC Fifth Fleeth is probably at Chichijima. 

Very little activity was noted in the Mandates. Several messages were ex- 
changed between CinC Fourth Fleet and Commanders in South China waters. 

General: KUNIWI (Tokyo Naval Intelligence) sent a 7 part SUU WIWI 
despatch to Chiefs of Staff Combined, Second, Third, China, South China, Indo- 
China Fleets and to Sama. A number of high precedence messages were also 
sent to the above addresses, to general collective calls and to KANKA (All 
ships and stations) by Naval Intelligence and Communication Division, Tokyo. 
The large number of high precedence messages and general distribution might 
indicate that the entire Navy is being instructed to be prepared for drastic action. 

Station H, 5 December, 19Ifl. 

South China Area : No change in location of major units in South China has 
been observed. 

Increased activity in South China and Indo-China indicates that a move of 
some sort in that area is imminent. 
Takao continues the use of the UTU broadcast on 7155 Kcs to units in that 
area. From all indications CinC's Second and Third Fleets are in the Takao 
area or have moved even farther South from Takao. 

■ Tokyo Naval Intelligence and Communication Division continue sending high 
precedence messages for general distribution and especially to CinC's Combined, 
Second, Third, South China Fleets and Comdrs Indo-China and Combined Air 
Forces. From all indications CinC Second Fleet is in command of operations 
in Indo-China and South China areas. 

Combined Fleet: It is believed that CinC's Combined and First Fleets remain 
at Kure. Very little activity was observed in the Empire. 

CinC's Second and Third Fleets are probably in the Takao area or in South 
China. No indication as to location of the Carriers was noted in today's 
traffic, although it is believed they remain in the vicinity of Kyushu. 

Submarines: No activity in the Subforce was observed. Comdr. Subforce is 
in the Mandates. It is believed that one Subron is at Yokosuka and another at 
Kure. 

Fourth Fleet: Very little activity was observed in the Mandated Islands. 
CinC Fourth Fleet seems to have moved from Truk to the Jaluit area. 
Comsubfor is probably in company with CinC Fourth Fleet. 

There has been quite an exchange of messages between units in the Fourth 
Fleet and in the South China or Indo-China areas. This indicates closer cooper- 
ation between the Mandate and South China forces. 



728 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General : Saipan, Ominato and Takao were heard broadcasting traffic to vessels 
in their vicinity. Tokyo broadcasted traffic on 12330 Kcs in addition to his 
regular UTU broadcast. At a430/6th Tokyo was observed using 32 Kcs for an 
UTU broadcast. This frequency was used dual with 12330 Kcs. Signals were 
very strong during the day. The use of this low frequency indicates traffic sent 
on this broadcast is for ships at a great distance from Tokyo. 
— ? — 4 (Saigon?), LU3 (Palao) and HAKU6 (Tokyo) were heard working each 
other on 4746M Kcs at midnight. 

Ominato, Chichijima and Tokyo were heard on 6020 and 4010 Kcs during the 
evening watch. Chichijima called Yokosuka, but that station was not heard. 
Kanoyu Air, Yokosuka Air and 9NUU (Plane ?) were also on this frequency. 

Ominato was heard sending traffic to UFUl (5th fleet) on 4010 Kcs. This 
command has probably split, with part of it at Chichijima and the rest at 
Ominato. 

Station E 6 December, 1941. 

South China area: CinC China Fleet (aboard Idzumo) is at Shanghai. CinC 
South China Fleet (aboard Isuzu) is in the vicinity of Amoy. Comdr. Indo-China 
Force (aboard Kashi) is at Saigon. CinC Central China Fleet is at or near 
Hankow and CinC North China Fleet is in vicinity of Tsingtao. 

Considerable activity in the South China and Indo-China areas was indicated 
by the large amount of high precedence traffic originated by and sent to units in 
these areas. Most of the traffic sent to units in Southern waters was originated 
by Tokyo. 

CinC's 2nd and 3rd Fleets are still in the vicinity of Takao or farther south. 
Comdr. Combined Air Force is at Takao Air. Traffic for Kanova Air Corps, 
Shiogama Air Corps, Genzan Air Corps, 11th Air Corps, Takao Air Corps and other 
units believed to be Air Corps or squadrons was handled by Takao, indicating 
they are in the South China or Indo-China area. 

Takao continues to broadcast traffic for ships in that vicinity on 7155 Kcs (A) 
(night) and on 14310 Kcs (A) (day). 

Combined Fleet : CinC's Combined and 1st Fleets are believed to still be in the 
Kure area. 

Very little activity in the Empire was observed. Most of the traffic addressed 
to CinC's 2nd and 3rd Fleets and Comdrs. Combined Air Force and Indo-China 
Force is also given to CinC Combined Fleet — probably to keep that command 
informed of operations being carried out in Indo-China. 

Submarines : No activity of importance was observed in the SubForce. Com- 
SubForce originated several messages addressed to the entire Submarine force. 
This command is in the Mandates, but it is not known whether he is at Jaluit 
or Truk. Several indications lead to the belief that ComSubForce is at Jaluit. 

At least two Subrons are believed to have remained in home waters, with one 
at Yokosnka and the other at Kure. 

Fourth Fleet : It has been definitely established by traffic study that CinC 4th 
Fleet is in the Truk area. Several times traffic routing indicated that part of the 
Staff of CinC 4th Fleet was at Jaluit. It is i>ossible that this command has been 
split-up for better administration of all operations in the South Seas. The 
Kamoi (with Commanding Officer, Chitose Air Corps aboard) is in the Jaluit 
area. 

Traffic continues to be exchanged between several 4th Fleet units and Com- 
mands in the Indo-China area. 

Fifth Fleet: Ominato has been heard working the flagship and at least one 
other unit of the 5th Fleet for the last few days. This fleet has been based at 
Chichijima for some time. It is probable that part of this force has remained at 
Chichijima ; it is known that KE06 (Airron attached to 5th Fleet) is there. 

General : At 0430, Tokyo was heard using 32 Kcs, dual with 12330 Kcs, for UTU 
broadcast of traffic. This broadcast was discontinued at 1800, but 7285 Kcs (M) 
was immediately brought up and used until 1900, when it was secured. This 
broadcast was used in addition to Tokyo's regular UTU. Tokyo also broadcasted 
traffic on 6665 Kcs (A) during the evening. 

Saipan, Takao and Ominato were also heard broadcasting traffic to units in 
their vicinities. The use of this method of delivering messages tends to keep 
unknown the positions of vessels afloat, and is probably one of the first steps 
toward placing the operations of the Navy on a war-time basis. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 729 

Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 20 

top secbet 

The Secretary of the Navy, 
Washington 25, D. C, 2Jf May 1945. 
0P-2(>-4-mp 
Serial 0002720 
(SC)A17-24(1) 

From : The Secretary of the Navy. 

To : John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant. 

Subj : Testimony and documentary evidence to be presented to Admiral H. 

Kent Hewitt, USN, concerning further Pearl Harbor Investigation. 
Ref : (a) Precept, dated 2 May 1945, to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, con- 
cerning further Pearl Harbor investigation. 

1. Forwarded herewith are the following, certified in jacket form NJA 24, to 
be used in the proceedings directed by reference (a) : 

(a) Photostatic copy of station "S" intercept sheets 5651, 5652 and 5653 
(Tokyo Circular # 2492, 7 December 1941) ; and 

(b) Photographic print of JD-1 : 7148, Circular #2494, 7 December 1941. 

2. Your attention is directed to the fact that these documents are classified 
TOP SECRET. When used in accordance with reference (a), the return of 
these documents to this office is directed. 

James Forrestal. 
James Forrestal. 

SF DE JAH S 7 DEC 41 

621 S TOKYO 19 7 8508 JG 
KOSHI PANAMA 

Urgent 92494 KOYANAGI RIJIYORI SEIRINOTUGOO ARUNITUKI HAT- 
TORI MINAMI KINENBUNKO SETURITU KIKINO KYOKAINGAKU SIKYUU 
DENPOO ARITASI STOP— TOGO 

1208 S JP 
7630 
S. 387/7 850S GR23 
Obese ovals RPWMO RFNMO RTJMO RWFMO gnome 



SF DE JAH S 7 DEC 41 

622 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG KOSHI HAVANA 

623 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI HONOLULU 

624 S TOKYO 19 7 850 JG RIYOJI NEW YORK 

625 S TOKYO 22 7 850S JG JAPANESE CONSUL VANCOUVER 

626 S TOKYO 22 7 850 JG JAPANESE MINISTER OTTAWA ONT 
(Same text and sign as our NR5651) 

1220 JP 
7630 



SF DE JAH S 7 DEC 41 

627 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI S.\N FRANCISCO 

628 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI PORTLAND ORE 

629 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI SEATTLE 

680 S TOKYO 19 7 850 S JG RIYOJI NEW ORLEANS LA 

631 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI CHICAGO ILL 

632 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI LOS ANGELES CAL 
(Same text and sign as our NR5651) 

1243 JP 
7630 

From: Tokyo. 
To: (Circular telegram). 
7 December 1941. 

(Plain Japanese language using code names.) 
Circular #2494. 
Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation. 



730 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 21 
PACIFIC FLEET INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN #45-41, 27 NOVEMBER 1941 

United States Pacific Fleet 
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship HRK 

Cincpac File No. 

A8/FFl/(25) Pearl Haebor, T. H., 

Serial 01954 November 27, IHl. 

Confidential 

From : Commander-in-Cliief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

To : PACIFIC FLEET. 

Subject : Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41. 

Enclosure: (A) Subject Bulletin. 

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for information. 

2. BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF BOTH THE SOVRCB 
AND INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, IT IS OF THE HIGHEST IM- 
PORTANCE THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL CHARACTER OF THIS BE 
CAREFULLY PRESERVED. 

3. This information obtained from Naval Intelligence sources has been re- 
produced by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Any request 
for additional copies of this document will be made to the Commander-in-Chief, 
and not to the Division of Naval Intelligence. 

4. Additional copies shall not be made. This bulletin should be retained for 
study and reference (plus subsequent additions or correction) during the present 
National Emergency. 

P. C. Crosley, 
P. C. Crosley, 

By direction. 
DISTRIBUTION: (7CM-41) 
List I, Case 3 ; P, X. 
Atlantic Fleet Al ; 
Asiatic Fleet Al ; 
One copy each to : 

FATU, NTS, NC4, ND11-ND14, 
NB49, Rdo. & Snd. Lab. 

CONTENTS 

(A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEETS Pages 1 to 12 inclusive. 

Major Fleet Commands __. Page 1. 

Combined Fleet and First Fleet " 2. 

Combined Fleet and Second Fleet " 3. 

Third Fleet " 4. 

Fourth Fleet •' 5 and 6. 

Fifth Fleet " 7. 

Sixth Fleet — (Submarine Fleet) " 7. 

Carrier Fleet " 8. 

Combined Air Force " 9. 

Train for Combined Fleet " 10. 

Japanese Naval Forces in China " 11 and 12. 

(B) JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN 

THE MANDATED ISLANDS Pages 13 and 14. 

General Situation. 

Air Distribution. 

Table "A" showing distribution of material and personnel forces in 

Mandates (2 pages to be pasted together). 
Sketh of PALAO (PELEW). 
Sketch of MALAKAI Harbor, etc. 
Sketch of JALUIT Harbor, etc. 



PROCEEDINGS OP HEWITT INQUIRY 



731 



[1] 



(A) Organization of the Japanese Fleet. Octobeb 30, 1941. (10574) 



The following revision of Op-16-F-2, O. N. I. Serial #27-41 supersedes and 
replaces the former report on this subject. 

The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet coni- 
mands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane 
tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in 
connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has 
resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as shown 
below. 



MAJOR FLEET COMMANDS 

(Battle Force) 3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2 

(Scouting Force) Desrons. 

(Blockade & Transport4 Crudivs, 2 Desrons, etc. 

Force) Small craft. 

(Mandate Defense Force) 1 Desron, 1 Subron and 

many small units. 



I. Combined Fleet 

1. First Fleet 

2. Second Fleet 

3. Third Fleet 

4. Fourth Fleet 

5. Fifth Fleet 

6. Sixth Fleet 

7. Carrier Fleet 

8. Combined Air 
Force 

II. Japanese Naval 
Forces in China. 

1. First China Exped. 
Fleet. 

2. Second China Ex- 
ped. Fleet. 

3. Third China Ex- 
ped: Fleet. 

4. Southern Exped. 

Fleet. 

[2] The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than 
ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the 
line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The 
base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly in- 
creased the strength of the Navy, which is on full-wartime footing. 

COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET 

YAMAMOTO Isoroku, CinO (Admiral) 
NAGATO, Flagship 



(Submarine Fleet) 
(Aircraft Carriers) 
(Seaplane tenders, etc.) 

(Staff Headquarters) 

(Central China) 

(South China) 

(North China) 

( Saigon ) 



6 Subrons. 
5 Cardivs. 
4 Airrons, & shore based 

planes. 
1 PG and 3 DD's 

Gunboats 

1 CA, 1 CL and small 

craft. 
Torpedo Boats, etc. 

1 . CL, transports and 
mine craft. 



FIRST FLEET 



Batdiv One 

NAGATO (F) 

MUTSU 

YAMASHIRO 
Batdiv Tico 

FUSO (F) 

ISE 

HYUGA 
Batdiv Three 

HIYEI (F) 

KONGO 

KIRISHIMA 
*HARUNA 
Crudiv Six 

KAKO (F) 

FURUTAKA 

AOBA 

KINUGASA 



Desron One 

ABUKUMA (F) 
Desdiv 6 

IKAZUCHI (F) 
INAZUMA 
SAZANAMI 
HIBIKI 

Desdiv 21 

NENOHI (F) 

HATSUHARU 

HATSUSHIMO 

WAKABA 
Desdiv 21 

SHIRATSUYU (F) 

ARIAKE 

YUGURE 

SHIGURE 



*NOTB 

repairs. 



The HARUNA has been inactive during 1941, and is probably undergoing major 



732 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET— Continued 



Desron Three 

SENDAI (F) 

Desdiv 11 

FUBUKI (F) 
SHIRAYUKI 
HATSUYUKI 

Desdiv 12 

SHIRAKUMO (F) 
SHINONOME 
USUGOMO 
MURAKUMO 



Desron Three — Continued 
Desdiv 19 

ISONAMI (F) 
SHIKINAMI 
AYANAMI 
URANAMI 
Desdiv 20 

AMAGIRI (F) 
ASAGIRI 
YUGIRI 
SAGIRI 
Total : 10 BB, 4 CA, 2CL, 27 DD. 



[S] 



COMBINED FLEET 
SECOND FLEET 



TAKAO, Flagship 



Crudiv F'jur 

TAKAO (F) 

ATAGO 

CHOKAI 

MAYA 
Crudiv Five* 

MYOKO (F) 

NACHI 

HAGURO 
Crudiv Seven 

KUMANO (F) 

MOGAMI 

MIKUMA 

SUZUYA 
Crudiv Ei(j}it 

TONE (F) 

CHIKUMA 
Desron Two 

JINTSU (F) 

Desdiv 8 

ASASHIO (F) 
ARASHIO 
OSHIO 
MICHISHIO 

Desdiv 15 

KUROSHIO 
OYASHIO 
NATSUSHIO 
HAYASHIO 



Desron Two (Cont'd) 

Desdiv 16 

HATSUKAZE 
YUKIKAZE 
AMATSUKAZE 
TOKITSUKAZE 

Desdiv 18 

KASUMI 
ARARE 
KAGERO 
SHIRANUHI 
Desron Four 

NAKA (F) 

Desdiv 2 

YUDACHI (F) 
MURASAME 
HARUSAME 
SAMIDARE 

Desdiv 9 

ASAGUMO 
YAMAGUMO 
MINEGUMO 
NATSUGUMO 

Desdiv 24 

KAWAKAZE (F) 
YAMAKAZE 
SUZUKAZE 
UMIKAZE 



Total: 13 CA, 2 CL, 28 DD. 



♦Note : There is a possibility that a new cruiser has been added to Crudiv 5. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



733 



U] 



THIRD FLEET 
TAKAHASHI Ibo— Vice Admiral 



« NAGARA, Flagship 

NORTHERN BLOCKADE FORCE Minelayer Division 

- CHOGEI (F) ITSUKUSHIMA (F) 

Subdiv AOTAKA 

HATSUTAKA 

Mine Sweeper Division 1 and 21 

AM-1 AM-7 

Subdiv AM-2 AM-8 

AM-3 AM-9 

_ AM-4 AM-10 

AM-5 AM-11 

2nd BLOCKADE FORCE AM-6 AM-12 

Desron Five Gunboat Division 1 

NATORI (F) ~ 6 Gunboats (Converted Fish- 

Desdiv 5 in" Vessels) 

ASAKAZE SUBCHASER SQUADRON 

HAKUKAZE . (F) 

MATSUKAZE Suoctiaser Division 1 and 11 

HATAKAZE PC-1 PC-7 

r» ^- ^o PC-2 PC-8 

Desdiv 12 pp o pp Q 

^TfArTrroTTCT Subcliaser Division 21 and 31 

■c Uiuli-bUivl pp_4 PP in 

MINATSUKI pp:t ^^-f*/ 

NAGATSUKI ^^_^ ^gfj^ 

Desdiv 34 21 AP— Names Unknoimi 

HAKAZB 2nd BASE FORCE 

AKIKAZE Maru, (F) 

YUKAZE Minelayer Division 11 

TACHIKAZB SHIRATAKA 

1st BASE FORCE YAEYAMA - 

Maru (F) KUNAJIRI 

At least 5 other men of war, and 17 
merchant ships. 

Total, 1 CL, 12 DD, 1 AS, 6 SS, 6 CM, 
12 AM, 6 XPG, 12 PC, 46 AP. 



[5] 



Crudiv Eighteen 
TENRYU (F) 
TATSUTA 
KASHIMA 

Desron Six 

YUBARI (F) 

Desdiv 29 
01 TE 
HAYATE 
ASANAGI 
YUNAGI 

Desdiv SO 

MITSUKI (F) 
KISARAGI 
YAYOI 
MOCHITSUKI 



FOURTH FLEET 

HIRATA— Vice Admiral 

KASHIMA, Flagship 

Subron Seven 
JINGEI 
Subdiv 26 
RO-60 
RO-61 
RO-62 
Subdiv 21 
RO-65 
RO-66 
RO-67 
Subdiv 33 
RO-63 
RO-64 
RO-68 
Subdiv 

8 XPG 



734 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



FOURTHTFLEET— Continued 



Survey and Patrol Division 
KOSHU 

KATSURIKI (CM) 
KOMABASHI (AS) 

Repair and Salvage Division 
MATSUEI ]MARU 
NAGAURA (MARU) 
3rd BASE FORCE 

Palao, Headquarters 

Maru (F) 

Chiard Division S 
Maru 



Subdiv 6 

RO-56 

RO-57 

RO-58 

RO-59 
Subchaser Division 55 

Maru (F) 



(?) 
(?) 
(?) 
(?) 



XPG 551 
XPG 552 
XPG 553 
XPG 554 
9 AP or AK 
THIRD DEFENCE 
PALAO) 
Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in- 
cluding Air Group #16 and TOBI 
detachment of 4th Defence Force 
Detach. 4th Def. Force 



FORCE (HQ 



[6] 



(Estimate these unknown loca- 
tions to be SOROL, HELEN 
REEF, ULITHI, YAP and 
ANGUAR). 
4th BASE FORCE 
Truk, Headquarters 

Maru (F) 

Guard Division 4 

Maru (F) 



4 AP or AK 
FOURTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ- 
TRUK 

Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in- 
cluding Air Group #17 and 
Ponape Detachment of 4th Def. 
Force, Kusaie Detachment of 4th 
Def. Force, Olol Detachment of 
4th Def. Force, Greenwich De- 
tachment of 4th Def. Force, Mort- 
lock Detachment of 4th Def. 
Force, Pingelap Detachment of 
4th Def. Force, Puluwat Detach- 
ment of 4th Def. Force, Lamotrek 
Detachment of 4th Def. Force, 

(Hall ?) Detachment of 

4th Def. Force. 



5th BASE FORCE 

Saipan, Headquarters 
SHOEI MARU ^) 
Guard Division o 

Composition unknown 
Minelayer Division 19 
OKINOSHIMA (F) 
TOKIWA 
Stihchaser Division 56 
KASHI (F) 
XPG 561 (?) 
XPG 562 (?) 
XPG 563 (?) 
Gunhoat Division 8 

Composition unknown 
9 AP or AK 
FIFTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ— 
SAIPAN) 
Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in- 
cluding Air Group #18 
T^enian Detachment, 5th Defence 
Force PAGAN 
6th BASE FORCE 

Jaluit, Headquarters 
TAKUHAN MARU (F) 
Mine Siveeper Division 16 
NAGATA MARU (F) 
CHOKAI MARU 
DAIDO MARU 
IKUTA MARU 

'This may 
? be the 

l"_"I~l'_"r_"Maru J SALVAGE 

Maru 1 Unit known 

Maru to be in 6th 

iBase Force 
SuTjcJiaser Division 5 
PC-51 
PC5-52 
PC-53 
SIXTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ- 
JALUIT) 

KAIKEI Maru 
#5 FUKU Maru 

Maru 

Miscellaneous Forces ashore in- 
cluding AIR GROUP #19 at 
IMIBJI, Jaluit Atoll and 
probable Air Groups at 
WOT.JE and KWAJALEIN 
and RUOTTO Is. (Kwajaleiu 
Atoll)— Detachment 6th De- 
fence Force KWAJALEIN 
Is. (Kwajalein Atoll), 
TARO A Is. ( Maloelap Atoll ) , 
ENIV7ET0K Is (Eniwetok 
Atoll), UJELANG Atoll, 
ENYBOR Is. (Jaluit Atoll), 
IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit Atoll), 
WOTJE Atol— Detach, of 6th 
Def. Force, UTIRIK Atoll- 
Detach, of 6th Def. Force 

Total : 4 CL, 9 DD, 2 AS, 16 SS, 1 Sur- 
vey Ship, 3 CM, 15 XPG, 3 PC, 4 XAM, 
41 AP or AK. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



735 



[7] 



FIFTH FLEET 
CL (F) 



The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown. 
The Flagship has been reported at Maisuru. 

SIXTH FLEET 

(Subarine Fleet) 

KATORL Flagship 



Subron One 

TAIGEI (F) 
Subdiv 1 

1-9 

1-15 

1-16 

1-17 
SuMiv 2 

1-18 

1-19 

1-20 
Subron Two 

KITAGAMI (F) 
Subdiv 7 

I-l 

1-2 

1-3 

1-7 
Subdiv 8 

1-4 

1-5 

1-6 
Subron Three 

NAGOYA MARU (F) 
Subdiv 11 

1-74 

1-75 
Subdiv 12 

1-8 

1-68 

1-69 

1-70 
Subdiv 20 

1-71 

1-72 

1-73 



Subron Five 
YURA (F) 
Subdiv 28 

1-59 

I-€0 
Subdiv 29 

1-61 (Sauk 10-2-41) 

1-62 

1-64 
Subdiv 30 

1-65 

1-66 

Subron Six 
KINU (F) 
Subdiv 9 

1-123 

1-124 

Subdiv 13 
1-121 
1-122 

Subron Ten 

KARASAKI (F) * 
Subdiv 18 

1-53 

1-54 

1-55 
Subdiv 19 

1-56 

1-57 

1-58 
Subdiv 21 

RO-33 

RO-34 



TOTAL : 3 CL, 2 AS, 1 AP, 42 SS. 

•NOTE : The old sub-tender KARASAKI appears to have been recommissioned. 



[8] 



Cardiv 1 

AKAGI 
KAGA (F) 
Desdiv 7 

OBORO (F) 
USHIO 
AKEBONO 
AKATSUKI 



CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs) 
CV KAGA, Flagship 

Cardiv 2 



SORYU (F) 
HIRYU 
Desdiv 23 
UZUKI 
KTKUTSUKI 
MIKATSUKI 
YUZUKI 



736 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK 
CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs)— Continued 



Cardiv 3 

RYUJO (F) 
HOSHO 
Desdiv 17 

ISOKAZE 

URAKAZE 

HAMAKAZE 

Cardiv Jf 

ZUIKAKU 
SHOKAJMU 

TOTAL : 10 OV, 16 DD. 



Cardiv 4 — Continued 
Desdiv 3 

HOKAZE 
SHIOKAZE 
KAMIKAZE 
NU]VIAKAZE 
Cardiv 

CV KORYU 

CV KASUGA (MARU) 



[9] 



COMBINED AIR FORCE 



Kanoya Naval Air Station, Hdqtrs. 

Shore-basecl land planes and seaplanes. The organization provides for great 
mobility. Air units are ordered to work with other forces, and return to the 
Combined Air Force pool when their mission is fulfilled. The named Air Groups 
(e. g. the Takao Air Group) are not tied down to their stations, but are sent 
freely wherever they are needed. Furthermore, the various air squadrons and 
air groups frequently split into smaller units, and are scatered over wide areas. 

Because of this extreme mobility, tlie picture is constantly changing. Accord- 
ingly, the following list makes no attempt to indicate all the temporary group- 
ings into which the various units may be combined. 



Ship-Based Squadrons 



Shoeb-Based Gkoups 



Air Ron 6 






8th Air Group 




KAMIKAWA MARU (F) 






10th Air Group 




FUJIKAWA MARU 






11th Air Group 




KEN.TO MARU 






12th Air Group 




(Has been working with 


the 


3rd 


14th Air Group 




Fleet) 






16th Air Group 




Air Ro?i 7 






17th Air Group 




CHITOSE (F) 






18th Air Group 




CHIYODA 






19th Air Group 




MIZUHO 






23rd Air Group 




(Has been working with 


the 


1st 


Chichijima 




Fleet) 






Chinkai 




Air Ron 24 






Genzan 




KAMOI (F) 






Hyakurihara (or 


Moriibara) 


IXAV 






Iwakuni 




Yokohama Air Group 






Kanoya (Hdqtrs.) 




Chitose Air Group 






Kashima 




(Has been working with 


the 


4th 


Kasumigaura 


Sasebo 


Fleet) 






Kisarazu 


Suzuka 


Patrol Squadron 2 






Kure 


Takao 


NOTORO 






Maizuru 


Tateyama 


(Formerly with Air Ron 6) 






Oita 

Ominato 

Omura 

Saeki 


Tsukuba 
Usa 
Yatabe 
Yokosuka 



Total : 5 AV, 3 XAV, 85 Air Groups. 



UO] 

SHIRETOKO 

SATA 

TSURUMI 

SHIRIYA 

IRO 



TRAIN FOR COMBINED FLEET 



ONDO 

HAYATOMO 

NARUTO 

MAMIYA 

ASAHI 



AKASHI 
MUROTO 
OTOMARU 
SETTSU 



Total : 8 AO, 1 AF, 2 AR, 1 AC, 1 Ice Breaker, 1 Target Ship. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



737 



IW 



JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA 

KOGA, Mineichi — Vice Admiral 

IZUMO, Flagship 



Shanghai Base Force 

ASUGA KURI 
TSUGA HASU 

Shanghai Hartor Affairs Section 
Special Naval Landing Force, Shanghai 
Nanking Base Force 
Special Naval Landing Force, Nanking 

TOTAL : 1 OCA, 1 PG, 3 DD. 

Centeal China Fleet, or First Expedi- 
tionary Fleet 

•KOMATSU, Teruhisa— Vice Admiral 
UJI, Flagship 

Partol Division 11 



ATAMI 

FUTAMI 

FUSHIMI 

SUMIDA 

HASHIDATE 



(F) 



ATAKA 

SETA 

KATADA 

HIRA 

HOZU 

TOBA 
Air Group 10 
Hankow Base Force 
Kiukiang Base Force 
Gunboat Division t f 

SHINFUKU MARU 

HITONOSE 

CHIKUBU 

TOTAL : 4 PG, 10 PR, 1 AP. 

South China Fleet, or Second Expedi- 
tionary FLEErr 

NIIMI, Masaichi, Vice Admiral 
ISUZU, Flagship 
Crudiv 15 

ISUZU (F) 

ASHIGARA 
Patrol Division 14 

SAGA 

AM-17 

AM-18 

TOTAL: 1 OCA, IDD, 8-TB, 1 AP. 



South China Fleet, or Second Expe- 
ditionary Fleet — Continued 

Torpedo Boat Division 1 

OTORI 

HAYABUSA 

HIYODORI 

KASASAGI 
Guard Division 15 
Guard Division 16 
Canton Base Force 
Amoy Base Force 
Hainan Is. Base Force 
13 Special Service Ships 

TOTAL: 1 CA, 1 CL, 4 TB, 1 PG, 
2 AM, 13 Misc. 
[12] 

North China Fleet, or Third Expedi- 
tionary Fleet 

SUGIYAMA, Rokozo, Vice Admiral 
IWATE, Flagship 
Patrol Division 12 

IWATE (F) 

MANRI MARU 
Torpedo Boat Division 11 

HATO KARI 

SAGI KIJI 

Torpedo Boat Division 21 

CHIDORI 

MANAZURU 

TOMOZURU 

HATSUKARI 

KARUKAYA 
Gunioat Division 1 
Gunboat Division 2 
Gunboat Division 13 
Gunboat Division 14 
Tsingtao Base Force 

Southern Expeditionary Fleet 

KASHII (F) (CL) 

SHIMUSHU (CM) 
AP 



[13] 



(B Japanese Forces and Installations in the Mandated Islads 



1. FOURTH FLEET, which may be termed the MANDATE FLEET, appar- 
ently administers the Naval activities, afloat and ashore and also the Army 
Garrisons units in the Mandated Islands. While the forces afloat exercise ad- 
ministrative jurisdiction over the Mandate area, the Yokosuka Naval District 
is directly responsible for the supply of stores, material and provisions. Truk 
is the headquarters for supply and munitions and has been principle Fourth Fleet 
operating base. 

2. Up to the present the entire Mandate Islands have been lightly garrisoned, 
the majority of the garrison units being Naval Defence Foi'ces ("special Landing 
Forces" corresponding to our Marine Corps) but some Army troops are believed 
to be on SAIPAN, PALAO, PONAPE, TRUK and JALUIT. The total garrison 
force has been estimated at fifteen thousand. In addition, there are Civil Engi- 
neering Units engaged in development work on various islands. Working in 



738 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

conjunction with these are naval engineering units, naval ordnance specialists, 
navy yard units with civilian navy yard workers and technicians. The network 
of naval radio stations has been greatly expanded, meteorological stations and 
high frequency direction finders installed at strategic locations, aviation facilities 
increased both in scope and number, and shore-batteries emplaced on strategic 
islands of key Atolls. 

3. I tis apparent that a decision to expedite the fortification, expansion of 
facilities and militarization of the Mandated Islands, was made late in 1940, 
probably concurrently with the signing of the Tripartite Pact. The movement 
of naval auxiliaries, small and medium cargo, freight-passenger vessels (ex- 
merchant marine) to the Mandates began in December, 1940, and has increased 
in scope and number until some seventy odd vessels are engaged in this traffic, 
the average number present in the Mandate area at any one time being some 
forty odd vessels. 

4. The function of supply of munitions, supplies, material and provisions to 
the Mandates is under the YOKOSUKA Naval District with a Headquarters for 
Civil Engineering, Munitions, Military Stores and Supplies for the Mandates 
centered at Truk, although this function is normally under the jurisdiction of 
Yokosuka as the Mandates are in the First (HQ— YOKOSUKA) Naval District. 

5. The Commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Base Forces are subordinate 
commanders under Commander-in-Chief, 4th Fleet ; they have a designated Flag- 
ship and a Headquarters or Administrative Section, the latter remaining ashore 
at the home base regardless of the movements of the command or the Flagship. 
Each Base Force contains a DEFENCE FORCE, detachments of which are sta- 
tioned on outlying islands of that general area. Four Ro Class submarines have 
been reported to be attached to the PALAO BASE FORCE. 

[i^] 6. Considerable air activity has been in evidence in the SAIPAN, 
PALAO-PELELIU, TRUK, PONAPE and JALUIT-KWAJALEIN areas. Close 
cooperation has been noted between the Defence Forces and the Aircraft activi- 
ties at their home bases. Foreign steamers nearing the SAIPAN area have been 
subject to aircraft observation and close scrutiny by Patrol planes, Bombers, and 
Kghters. Heavy laud plane bombers and patrol planes, undoubtedly ORANGE, 
have made reconnaissance flights over the Gilbert Islands (TARAWA, BUTARI- 
TARI, andBERU). 

7. The distribution of material, personnel, and installations in the Mandated 
Islands is indicated in table "A". While this is admittedly incomplete and may 
be subject to inaccuracies, it represents the latest and best intelligence on this 
subject. In addition to those listed in Table A, there are a number of potential 
bases, principally in the lagoons of the naturally protected atolls, which may be 
used as emergency basis or may be earmarked for "priority two" development. 

8. The latest information (up to 25 November 1941) indicates that the present 
distribution of the Air forces (believed to be a temporary strategical disposition 
rather than a permanent assignment) in the Mandates is: 

Identification Location Includes 

Airron 24 Marshall Area (AV) KAMOI 

(AV?) Maru 

ex-CHITOSE Air Group 
ex- YOKOHAMA Air Group 

11th Air Group PALAO Area: 

16th Air Group PALAO Area 

17th Air Group TRUK 

18th Air Group SAIPAN 

19th Air Group IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit Atoll) 

Air Station (and Air Group?) WOTJE 
Air Station (and Air Group?) KWAJALEIN 
? AIR GROUP TRUK 

The exact composition of these Air Groups is unknown and the estimates of 
total plane strength in the Mandates vary widely: 62-268 planes. 

(Table A, referred to in the foregoing paragraphs, consisting of 
pages 1 and 2 reflecting the distribution of Japanese material, per- 
sonnel, and installations in the Mandated Islands, will be found re- 
produced as Items Nos. 108 and 109, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, 
Hewitt Inquiry.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 739 

Last Page of Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41 

(At this point in Exhibit No. 21 there appear two sketch maps of 
Palao Islands and of Malakal Harbor and approaches. These maps 
will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 110 and 111, respectively, 
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.) 

Notes to Accompany Sketch of Jalvtt 

1. Aviation Facilities — Two landing fields, each with a hangar capable of hous- 
ing twenty medium sized planes. Engineering Shop (camouflaged) situated 
between the two fields. Adjacent storehouses (galv. iron) camouflaged. Diesel 
fuel and gasoline storage in camouflaged, above-ground tanks adjacent to air 
fields. Diesel power plant (June-1940). Eighty planes reported based here 
(November, 1940). 

On beach opposite southern air field is Naval Air Station having small ramp 
and one hangar for seaplanes (June 1940). This may be an auxiliary as present 
indications jvDint to naval air Base on Imieji (EMIDJ) Is. 

2. Headquarters — Two story concrete building. Large building to SE of Head- 
quarters is Post Office and Telephone central. Flagstaff adjacent to Post Office 
is also used as signal tower. In town are many one story concrete stores. Good 
bitumen and powdered coral roads. 

3. Rarlio towers — Two steel combination radio and lookout towers 40O feet 
high. Diesel engine power plant near southern tower (1940). 

4. Shore Batteries — Bases and trunnions along the three quarter mile water- 
front street called the Marine Parade (1940) (guns not mounted in June, 1940 
but are now). Also three 6" guns and a battei-y of four 4.7" field pieces. Bar- 
racks for regular garrison of 500 soldiers (1940) (probably enlarged now). 

Mobile Batteries — Machine guns and AA guns mounted on Diesel-tractor towed 
trailers. 10" searchlights on pneumatic tired truck assemblies (1940). 

5. Oovernment Pier — 600 feet long, 75 feet wide (18'-25' alongside) equipped 
with two railroad tracks and three 10 ton mobile cranes. Storehouse on end of 
pier (1940). 

6. Mole — 1.50' concrete mole constructed parallel to shore line along NW corner 
of JABOR (1933). 

7. Conspicous red building (may be red-roofed building) (1936). 

8. South Seas Trading Co. PIER (N. B. K. or "NAMBO") also called "SYDNEY 
Pier". Two water tanks and warehouses. Coal and briquette storage (1938). 

9. Two buildings (resembling hangars) with tracks leading down to water from 
one of them (beaching gear? — small marine railway?). A gasoline storage 
located near the two buildings (1936). 

(The sketch of Jaluit, to which the foregoing notes apply, will be 
found reproduced as Item No. 112, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, 
Hewitt Inquiry.) 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 22 
Communication Intelligence Summary, 14 October 1941 

D F Bearings — 

30 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates. 
lOsiiioTis^^ 

FUI 5 (M) Communication— Sama (SASI 4) to Takao (FUWI 4) 

KURU 8 (M) do — Ponape (RESU 0) to Truk (YUMI 0) 

WINI 5 (M) do —Sama (SASI 4) to MENU 3 (Maru) 

KONA 9 (M) 34. 7 139. 5 

SIKA 4 (M) 14. 1 156. 6 

TEE .5 (M) 21. 2 141. 5 

TEFU (M) 17. 1 136. 2 

MESU 4 (M) 19. 144. 2 

YOHA 6 (M) 08. 8 165. 

SUWI 4 (M) 11. 3 139. 3 

SAYU 5 (M) 14. 3 162. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 



740 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Vessels in Mandates October 14-16 



October 15, 1941. 



Call 



Type 



Location 



E ME 5.- 
EKO0.-. 
HAKI3.. 
HI I 5-... 
HIKO 9.. 
HOME 1. 
FUNE9. 
IKI3.... 
KARI3.. 
KA 7.. 
KEBO 8. 
KENO 2. 



KINI 5-... 
K0NA9.. 
KAMA 6- 
KURU8.. 
MESA0.. 
MENE 5_. 
MESU4.. 
MENA 6.. 
MIN0 2_. 
MITA 5... 
MURU3.. 
MUTUl.. 
NAU5.-.. 
NINO 0.08- 
NOSA 2... 
NUR0 4-. 
0S0 8.... 
O YO 8.— 
RARU5.- 
RASE0... 
RATU5.. 
RIR0 5... 

RISI6 

RISA 2.... 
RIYU6... 
SAYU 5_.. 
SIKA 4.... 
SEWA4.. 
SETO 1... 
SUWI4... 
S0Y0 9... 
TE E 5... 
TETU 7.. 
TETU 2.. 
TEFU 0.. 
TOHI 1... 
TOWA 2__ 
TOYA 3.. 
TUHO 33- 
TUYU 00. 
WINI 5... 
YAYI 6— 
YOHA 6- 
YOKU 5.. 
YUHO 8_. 
YUMO 3.. 
MOTO 6- 
SEWI 7... 



M under CNO 

SubDiv in 4th Fit. 

Mara 

DesRon in 4th Flt. 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

In 4th Fit 

Maru - 

Maru 

KATSURIKI 

KOSHU 



Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

TAMA, 4th Fit 

Maru 

Maru 

Minesweep Div, 4th Fit. 

Air Tender, 4th Fit 

Maru. 

DcsDivin4th Fit 

Maru . 

CofS., 4thFlt 

Maru 

JINGEI, 4th Fit/ 

SubRon, 4th Fit 

KAMOI, 4th Fit 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru.. 

Maru 

Maru, Air Tender, CAF. 
HAYAT0M0,4th Fit.. 

MUROTO, 4th Fit 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

4th Fit 

Maru 

Fit Unit, 4th Fit 

Unidentified 

Maru 

KOMOBASHI 

4th Fit Vessel 



CinC 4th Fit... 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

SHIRETOKO- 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 

Maru 



In Mandates 

In Mandates 

In Mandates (Comdr MINO 2 onboard) 

In Mandates 

Jaluit— Chichijima area? 

In Mandates 

In Mandates 

In Mandates 

In Mandates 

In Mandates 

In Mandates 

In radio company with RIYU 6 who contacts 

RDO YOKOSUKA 
Posit— 163-29, 11-34N 

139-31, 34-45 
In Mandates 

(14th) Between Ponape (going to) Truk. 
Posit— 157-47, 07-58 
In Mandates 

Enroute Saipan ? 144-11, 19-00 
In Mandates 
In Mandates 

Not in Jaluit area (where generally). 
Posit— 164-47, 09-40 
In Mandates 
In Mandates 
In Truk area. 
.Taluit area. 
In Mandates 
In Mandates 
In Mandates. 

In Mandates (Call doubtful) 
In Mandates 
In Mandates 
In Mandates 
In Mandates 
In Mandates 
In Mandates 

Yokosuka to Truk or Ponape, 162-00 14-30 
Saipan to .Taluit, 153-36, 1406 
In isiandates 
In Mandates 
Near Yap, 1,39-18 11-16 
In Mandates 
Posit— 141-32 21-09 
In Mandates. 
In Truk area. 
Posit— 136-13 17-05 
Jaluit area. 
In Mandates. 
In Mandates. 

In Jaluit— Chichijima area. 
In Mandates. 

Hainan to MENU 3 (In Mandates)? 
In Mandates. 
Posit— 164-58 08-47. 
In Mandates. 
Saipan area. 
In Mandates. 

Japan or outside Mandates. 
In Yokosuka zone— may be going Mandates. 



Communication intelligence summary, 15 Octoher lOJfl 



General. — TraflSc above normal. Several more new radio calls representing 
shore stations and Naval auxiliaries appeared lately. Bureau of Personnel traflBc 
again reached a high peak. Many general despatches (addressed to "all hands" 
or large collective addresses) appeared. It is worthy of note to list the radio 
stations called by Radio TOKYO to deliver general despatches originated by 
Toliio Personnel, Tokio Naval Minister, Tokio Communication and Tokio Bureau 
Military Affairs. 

Radio Yokosuka and Flagships S. China Fleets 
Radio Kure " " 1st Fleet 

Radio Sasebo " " 2ud Fleet 

Radio Maizuru " " 3rd Fleet 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 741 

Radio Ominato " " 4th Fleet 

Radio Takao " " Subforce 

Radio Shanghai " " CarDivs. 

Radio Saipan " " Combined Fleet. 

Radio Palao 

Radio Kanoya 

Radio Spratley Island 

Tokyo Communications also originated a despatch addressed to "all hands" 
information to a Naval auxiliary (SITU 1) indicating possible future operations 
of this vessel. A large number of vessels appear to be in Saseho area. However, 
the Commander First Base Force, Third Fleet at Saseho addressed units of his 
command at Kure and Yokosuka. Some maneuvering traffic observed on 7024 
(using 3 kano calls) and 5897 kcs. 

First and Second Fleets. — 2nd Fleet units observed at Kure. A New Naval 
auxiliary (NIRA 8) reported to the 1st Fleet Secretary. Relatively little activity 
among 1st and 2nd Fleet vessels indicated in radio traffic. A vessel identified as 
YAMASHIRO (BB) originated one dispatch to the KOMOBASHI in Jaluit Area. 

Suhmarines. — Continued activity on submarine frequency (6385) by vessels 
using secret calls. DF bearings indicate they are approximately in the Chichi- 
jima Yokosuka-Kagoshima area. 

Air Activities. — Kaga continues as flagship of Cardivs. The SHOKAKU and 
Commander of the Cardiv are in the NAHA-Takao area. Also it is believed one 
of the large airons in Combined Air Force (TOME 2) is also in same vicinity and 
that Commander Cardiv 3 (NUYA 88) and the HOSHO are connected with these 
vessels in some maneuver going on or planned as all were associated in despatch 
headings. Indications are that two or three large groups of Combined Air 
Force are in the Genzan-Chiukai Area. (YUMO 8, YOME 7, MOO 0?). Ashigara 
originated dispatch to 11th Air Base which was forwarded to Maizuru for 
delivery. 

Fourth Fleet. — Traffic above normal. Many new calls observed, some of which 
are undoubtedly garbled. 

Fifth Fleet f — The new fleet or force which has been mentioned at various 
times in the past (NARE (6) appeared in dispatch headings frequently today. 
The call was associated with 4th fleet units and some Naval auxiliaries which 
appear-to be new or newly commissioned. One dispatch originated by Commimi- 
cation Officer 5th Fleet was addressed for action to the 5th Fleet, a new fleet 
unit in parenthesis (TOYU 5) and for information to Radio Takao, Tokyo, 
Saipan, Palao, Truk, Jaluit and to Communication Officers 2nd, 4th Fleets, Sub- 
Force, Cardivs and Combined Air Force. 

D F Bearings.— 21^ Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates. 

Pos/ito?!*.— NESU 5 (M) Comm-Kure #4 SLF (SIKA 8) to Shanghai 
(KAMO 0) 

YOKE 7 (M) 06.4 155.1 

KIMO 5 (KASHI) 20.9 112.0 

KENO 2 (KOSHU ?) 

Communication Inteixigence Summaby, 16 October 1941 

General. — Average amount of traffic intercepted, with complete absence of 
"dummy" traffic for the first time since early October. All forces active in origi- 
nated and addressed traffic except South China. A considerable number of WE 
addresses appeared, usually associated with air activities. One broke as 
"Chinkai Defense Force" indicating newly organized activity at that location. 
Ominato transmitted a despatch with three WE addresses, which broke as Chief 
A Area, Chief B Area and Chief C Area. Stations addressed in this despatch fit 
the call table line designated tentatively as "Temporary Shore" or "Advanced 
Base" stations, which were most commonly associated with the South China 
activities up to and including the Indo China campaign. Stations fitting this 
classification are increasing in the Chinkai-Chosen area, one unidentified unit 
(TAWI 7) which was formerly connected with So China Forces, has reappeared 
in the Chosen area, with line of bearing from Oahu D/F pa.ssing thru the Rashin, 
Seisin area. Units of 12th Air Corps are apparently embarked on two unidenti- 
fied Marus and probably proceeding to join the 12 A. C. Commander at Genzan 
Air. 

Combined Fleet. — CinC Combined, possibly back on NAGATO, appears to be 
acting as radio guard for an increasing number of units from 1st. 2nd- CarrierSi 



742 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and Subfor. The tentatively identified 5th Fleet appeared as action and infor- 
mation addressee in several despatches concerning addressees in the Mandates, 
Chichijima, and major force commanders. The 2nd Fleet was a heavier origi- 
nator -with traflic addressed to major units of the Combined. No indication of 
change of location of 1st or 2nd fleets. Third fleet continued actively originat- 
ing and receiving traffic from Sasebo area. Flagship of #2 Base Force, 3rd Fleet, 
with commander aboard at Sasebo. 

Carriers. — Active in exchange of traffic as yesterday. No indicated change 
of location. Planes from Kasanoliara Air are operating aboard or with the 
HIRYU. Commander Carriers still aboard KAGA in area between Sasebo and 
Taiwan. AKAGI and SORYU at Yokosuka. 

Air Force. — Chitose Air enroute to Mandates, probably to Marshall area, with 
Yokohama Air at or near Truk. Indications that Yokosuka Air is, or will be, 
moving to the Mandates, possibly to the Palau area. 

)S'm6 Force. — Same activity on Subfor frequencies as previously reported, bear- 
ings remaining the same. 

China. — Activity appears confined Takao, and North China areas, with 
Shanghai continuing normal. A despatch addressed to China Fleet collective 
exempted the North China Force from delivery, thus placing N. China Force as 
part of CINC CHINA FLEET (on Idzumo) Command. 

Miscellaneous. — Many new calls appearing, including MARUS, which have 
been very recently taken over, as they are not equipped with call books and use 
WE addresses for activities which have assigned calls. One new unit apparently 
containing both Marus and Combatau vessels appeared today without indication 
of which Force he is attached. 

D F Bearings. — 31 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates. 
Positions. — 

KINE 9 ( ?) Comm. KURE RETJ 3 to YOKOSUKA HOMI 3. 

ERO 6 ( V) Comm. Takao FUWI 4 to Bako NOTI 7. 

YUKO 9 ( •?) Comm. Canton RUYO 6 to Bako NOTI 7. 

MURU 3 (M) Comm. Remain with Ponape and establish with Truk RESU 

to YUMI 
MISE 5 (Fleet Unit)— Comm. Sasebo KIMU 9 to KINU 7 (Maru) 
KARO 9 (ERIMO)— Comm. Sasebo KIMU 9 to Kure RETI 3 
NIRI (M) Comm. Yokosuka HOMI 3 to Saipan OSI 
RETI 5 (M) Comm. Remain with Shanghai (KAMO/0) establish with 

SIKA 8. 
KUNA 1 (M) 10.7 166.7 
TEFU (M) 23.0 137.4 
TIWI 1 (M) 28.5 140.9 

JAPANESE NAVY — OCT 16TH 

1st. Fleet: 
BB's believed in INLAND SEA-SASEBO area. 
AIRRON 7 and a CARDIV in NAHA-TAKAO area. 
KONGO and HIYE had busy traffic with SAEKI AIR. 

2nd. Fleet: 

Some units are definiately at KURE. 
8rd. Fleet: 

Concentrated with few exceptions in general SASEBO area. 

ASHIGARA is mentioned in 3rd. Fleet traffic with major units of that Fleet. 

CHOGEI (Flag of NORTHERN BLOCKADE FORCE) appears with NAGARA 
(3rd. Fleet Flag). 

4th. Fleet: 

Definitely in TRUK area. Large air concentration in the MARSHALLS. 
5th. Fleet: 

Still in process of organizing. CHICHIJIMA RADIO, 4th FLEET and CINC 
COMBINED are interested parties in traffic which includes this hypothetical 
fleet. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 743 

SUBMARINES: 

Many units definitely in KURE area. Perhaps a dozen are operating in 
exercizes in the general CHICHIJIMA-TOKOSUKA area. With a few as far 
south as the MANDATES. 

From one indication it appears that COMSUBFORCE is at SASEBO. 

A large part of COMBINED AIR FORCE appears to be in CHINKAI-SASEBO- 
GENZAN area. One section of CAF operating with a CARDIV of 1st. FLEET 
in TAKAO area. CARRIER LOCATIONS: AKAGI and ZUIKAKU in YOK- 
SUKA area. KORYU at KURE. KAGA at SASEBO. 
Oeneral: 

Several fleet auxiliaries (tankers etc.) appear to be in SASEBO area. KASHII 
near SAIGON. ISUZU (Acting Flag South China) in HAINAN-SOUTH CHINA 
area. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 17 October, lOJfl 

General. — Traffic volume about normal. (Traffic flow now being analyzed 
by statistical machinery and normals are established for all major and secondary 
stations). Dummy traffic again absent from TOKYO — Fleet broadcast. Sprat- 
ley Islands radio sent a message to TAKAO. This message must have been 
relayed to TOKYO because TOKYO repeated the message under a priority pro- 
cedure sign to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Comcardiv 4 (SUTU 7) ESARO 
(believed to be their Radio Intelligence unit) BAKO, Chief of Staff South 
China Fleet, Chief of Staff French Indo China Forces, RNO TAIHOKU, Com- 
mander 11th Air Corps and Chief of Staff of South China Air Forces. It seems 
that the Spratley report caused considerable excitement. The resignation of the 
Cabinet was reported to the fleet by plain language today. 

Combined Fleet. — The impressions grow that there is underway a concen- 
tration of units upon the Combined Fleet Flagships. Subrons 5 and 6 appear 
with him today. 

The following is what is believed to be the circumstances surrounding the 
relief of the Combined Fleet Flags. On September 23 the MUTSU was in Kure 
Navy Yard. On September 27th or 28th she joined the Second Fleet. On 
October 1 CinC 2nd Fleet relieved as CinC Combined Fleet and hoisted Flag 
in MUTSU. He was active today in addressing messages to general calls. The 
CinC Second Fleet also originated many dispatches. One message, originated on 
the 14th of October was repeated again today. It was addressed as follows : 

2nd Fleet Collective 

3rd Fleet Collective 

Combined Air Force 

Subron 5 

Subron 6 

Airron 7 

BatDiv 3 

Information to 

Comcardivs. 

C in C Combined Fleet 

Radio Takao 

Radio Palao 

Radio Tokyo. 

South China. — Traffic to this area with si)ecial reference to TAKAO was 
higher today than usual. The movement of the ZUIKAKU to Taiwan as reported 
by Com. 16 today is only partially confirmed here. A call (SIHA 5) identified 
here as the SHOKAKU of Cardiv 4 appeared today in care of the Combined 
Air Force at TAKAO and was routed to that station for delivery. No indication 
of any other units in her company. Direction Finder bearings place some Car- 
riers together in the area east of TAIWAN and south of KYUSHU. These units 
could and probably will establish radio Communication with TAKAO. While 
they may move to TAKAO it is expected that they will not but will remain in 
the area east of TAIWAN. Some slight indications exist that the Flagship of 
the Combined Fleet is with these carriers but is not confirmed. 

Suhmarines. — KATORI and submarines are still in area southward and east 
of KYUSHU. 



07.5 N 


165 E 




26 


153 




18 


155 




18 


148.5 




06 


170.5 




30.5 


134.5 




05.5 


165 




05.5 


164. 5 




11.5 


163. 5 




16.5 


140 




12.5 


165 




08. 


154 




11.5 N 


102. 


E 


24. 7 N 


142.4 


E 


33. 2 N 


142-3 


E 


16. 2 N 


144. 4 


E 


3. 5 N 


160.4 


E 


32. 3 N 


140.9 


E 


TRUK to SAIPAN 


CZ 




18.8 N 


145. 1 


E 


22.0 N 


116.0 


E 


26. 7 N 


123.3 


E 


Estab. Comm. with YOKOSUKA 


AMOY to TAKAO. 


CZ 




19. 8 N 


159.4 


E 


Saipan to Chichijima. CZ 




Jaluit to Saipan. 


CZ 





744 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Fourth Fleet. — Very little fourth Fleet activity. 

D/F Bearings. — 38 Naval auxiliaries in Mandates including: 

HAKI 3 

KENO 2 

KERO 8 

MESU 4 

MEMU 7 

NIRI 

NOTA 4 

OYO 8 

ORU 6 

TEE 5 

TOHI 1 

KIME 3 
Positions. — 

NORU 6 

TIWI 1 

TUU 5 

MAO 5 

YOHA 6 

SEWI 7 

MURU 3 

OMI MARU 

SINI 2 

FURI 6 

KUSU 9 

TIKA 9 

RIRO 5 

KURU 8 

YOHA 6 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 18 October 1941 

General. — Traffic volume about normal. Traffic consisted largely of adminis- 
trative traffic. There was one WIWI message from TOKYO to CinC •Combined 
Fleet for information of CinC China Fleet, CinC South China Fleet and an uni- 
dentified unit in the French Indo China Force. Naval Communications TOKYO 
has originated several messages of general address. These may indicate a com- 
ing change of call or cipher systems. The Secretary to the Navy Minister sent 
out a plain language message announcing the appointment of Admiral Shimada 
Shigetaro in Tojo's Cabinet. •Tfeis moosagc was give-a a ge»ei=a4 distributi o n as 
is uaual witfe mcooagc o ef ^tfeis efe aractc f fe«* aise ieehided was ' - 'ZAIGAITAIKO ^S- 
IKANTUKIBUKAN". Wbiie i* is n ndcrotood that- t^ie Attaehe *e Tbailftftd 
we«}4 fee i ntGrootcd, ye* the ifte luai o n el feifti as as addrc oa cc e» ft» ethe-pwise 

OTriC tiy litlVQjT QGQpftt'Cfi "Wirx til ft KG 1% ftOpCfti* rilftr xfiCFO "WftS 9'0'fJlG S0Ft Or ft miilL'flFy 

t ie - up between J a pa a a»4 Thai laadr Another plain language despatch from the 
Secretary China Fleet to INOUE, Head of the Military Mens Association, thanks 
him for message to newly appointed Commander in Chief of the China Seas Fleet. 
This is the first intelligence of the relief of the China Command. 

Combined Fleet. — No information received today to check location of First Fleet 
The flagship is still acting as guard for units previously reported as being in 
company. One Cardiv (UYU 3) had its traffic accepted by the MUTSU today. 
The CHITOSE also joined the flagship. Desron 3 is in SASEHO area. HAGURO 
is in KURE area. 2nd Fleet traffic is being routed thru KURE. 

Third Fleet. — Still in SASEHO area, little activity except for the Commander 
2nd Base Force who addressed several MARUS of his unit. 

Fourth Fleet. — Mandates traffic largely concerns air activities. The impression 
is that there is a considerable amount of air movement between the Mandates 
and the Empire. CHITOSE air is very active in the MARSHALS. KATSURIKI 
is at JALUIT. 

Subm.arine% — The Chief of Staff of SubForce is receiving his traffic via 
SASEHO. There were fewer submarine calls on tactical circuits than for the 
past few days. It is believed that all submarines are nearing SASEHO. 

Carriers. — AKAGI and SORYU are at Yokosuka. From traffic it appears that 
SORYU is finished with whatever she was doing at SASEHO and is about to 
join her division which is in company with CinC Combined. Cardiv 4 is definitely 
in TAKAO area. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 745 

China. — Little activity save for tlie Spratley Islands Radio Station which 
originated several messages today. 

D/F Bearings. — None. 
Pobitions. — 

SIHI 2 22.0 N 115.0 E 

TUYA 2 From RETI 3 to SUKA 2 C. Z. 

HIRE 4 20.4 N 114.4 E 

YOHA 6 15.7 N 158.4 E 

TIWI 1 21.7 N 145.2 E 

RUTI 2 22.8 N 146.1 E 

NOSA 2 11.6 N 169.0 E 

TEFU Chichijima (EME 6) to Yokosuka (HOMI 3) 

TIWI 1 18.7 N 145.2 E 

TUU 5 29.1 N 147.1 E 

Cormnunication Intelligence Summary, 19 Octoher 1941 

General. — Traffic volume below normal. Less traflBc was copied at Heeia due 
to poor receiving conditions but since there were numerous dummy messages 
among those intercepted, the traffic volume is considered below the daily average 
attained in the last two months. There has been a perceptible increase in the 
use of secret (or tactical) calls and addresses with not only drill and maneuvering 
traffic but in administrative despatches as well. Todays traffic included some 
maneuvering type (4 kana uigori) traffic with HE one and two letter calls being 
broadcasted by Tokyo Radio to presumably submarine units. Kanoya Air was 
also employing tactical calls on 8915 kcs with a call 1 MIYA. Tokyo Radio in 
delivering an "all hands" despatch called all Major Fleet Flagships less the call 
identified as FIFTH FLEET. Tokyo Radio originated one despatch for action 
to Radio Sasebo, Kure, Takao, Maizuru, Chichijima, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Jaluit, 
FUMU 44 (may be new Chinkai Station), Ominato, TAU 77, KUMO 66, Indo-China 
and "HOROMUSIRO Air Corps Base. This list just above covers all outlying 
stations. KUMO 66 is believed to be Shanghai and TAU 77 definitely is in the 
far North (Kuriles). The WE addresses included the No. 2 and No. 61 Air 
Corps Commanders associated with Kanoya Air. 

First d Second Fleets. — Very little activity among 1st Fleet Units as far as 
traffic is concerned. Some traflic for second Fleet units was handled by Kure 
Radio. Combined Fleet Flagship was guard for Suzuya, Midzuho and SUBRON 5 
among others. Combined Fleet frequency (6775kcs) was active with secret calls. 

Submarines. — Radio Saipan accepted a despatch for SUBDIV 29 (UFU 11). 
While this one instance may represent a garble, it matches fairly well the past 
reports that some of the units using secret calls on 6385 kcs lately were submarines 
in the general Mandate area. Some of the Submarine service calls were associ- 
ated in despatch headings with CARDIV and COMBINED AIR FORCE Units. 

Air. — Continued indications that a large part of the Combined Air Force is 
spread from Takao area to Genzan. Shokaku ("C" calls him Zuikaku.) definitely 
associated with this concentration in the Takao area with at least one additional 
unit SUYO 8 (probably DesDiv plane guards). Also RYU JO appears to be 
associated with same operation but may be as far North as the Sasebo area. 
Chinkai radio guard for a few additional fleet vessels associated with China Air 
activities formerly. AKAGI and SORYU definitely in Yokosuka area. All other 
Carriers appear to be in the general Sasebo area except for SHOKAKU. 

Third Fleet.— SUsiht decrease in THIRD FLEET traffic observed. 

Fourth Fleet & Mandates. — Very few 4th Fleet Units appear outside of Man- 
dates. Bearings of the KOMABASHI place this unit between Ellice and Gilbert 
Islands but one bearing was labeled poor so that it is believed this vessel still 
in Jaluit vicinity. Thirteen new Naval auxiliaries reported by GUAM in Man- 
dates ; some of these verified by C0M^14 reports. 

Positions.— TVJJ 5 (M) ' 27.8 150.3 

YOHA 6 (M) 18.0 155.7 

Communication Intelligence Summary 20 October 1941 

General. — Traffic volume far below normal. Receiving conditions good but 
traffic light on all circuits. In the early evening the major circuits were quite 
active but all traffic was cleared by midnight. The TOKYO broadcast carried a 
good percentage of dummy traffic. Maneuvering traffic intercepted on 13560 



746 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Kcs. and 8710 Kcs. That intercepted on 8710 Kcs. indicates that a tactical 
problem is being worlied out. The traffic usually carries an EN in the heading, 
has an additional number at the beginning of the text, and all originator numbers 
are fairly close together. Numbers being in proximity indicate that all series 
were started at the same time, i. e. the beginning of the exercise. The secret 
calls used are mostly unidentified but MUTSU (9 HEFU), a submarine-unit 
(3 TEI), and TOKYO RADIO (7 MARI) were among those heard. The type 
traffic which is believed to be Direction Finder or Radio Intelligence has been 
received from CHINKAI and an unidentified station in the CHOSEN or MAN- 
CHUKUO area. Other identified stations sending it are TAKAO TAIWAN), 
JALUIT, and three other stations in the MANDATES. JALUIT sends these 
messages singly but CHINKAI combines several at a time in one transmission. 
The amount of this traflic is increasing. 

Combined Fleet. — Little traflic concerning the First and Second Fleets seen. 
What traflic did appear was handled via KURE radio. A staff officer of the 
French Indo China Force is aboard NEGATO. JALUIT addressed a message 
to Commanding Officer, Batdiv 3. 

Submarines. — The Staff Communication Officer of Subron 1 addressed a message 
to TRUK. The nunsber of submarines operating with Combined Fleet is not 
known but is believed to comprise the greater part of the Submarine Force. 

Air. — Air traffic in Mandates centers about CHITOSE AIR and Airron 24. 
No change in status of carriers as previously reported. 

Mandates. — Except for air activities and civil engineering traffic, 4th Fleet 
and Mandates very quiet. 

China. — No change in dispositions. The China Fleet Intelligence Bureau 
addressed one of thgir members at MACAO. The Commander of the French 
Indo China Forces originated several despatches to an unidentified unit which 
was addressed by TOKYO in a WIWI message two days ago. 

DIF Bearings. — 27 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates. 

KINO 5 (KASA II) SAIGON— Base 217 . 
TUU 5 (M) 24. 7 153. 5 

RUTI 2 (M) 15. 3 149. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 21 October, 1941 

General. — Traffic volume returned to about normal today. There was no 
dummy messages in the TOKYO broadcast. Last night this TOKYO to Fleet 
Circuit was interf erred with by station KTK (Mussel Rock, California, Globe 
Wireless). This interference also botliered the Japanese for TOKYO shifted 
his frequency down 10 Kcs. to avoid it. Statistical analysis of total navy traffic 
for period 15-19 October shows a close agreement with the normal established 
for the past 3 mouths. CinC Combined Fleet originated about 50% more traffic 
than normal and CinC 1st Fleet originated far less than his normal. These 
were the only variations noted. The major shore stations are not now exi)eri- 
encing as many difficulties as before in the routing of traffic, the whereabouts of 
all units being apparently better known. Sasebo radio today sent traffic identified 
as direction finder bearings. The stations now sending this traffic are CHINKAI, 
ORU 4 (in Manchuko), FUIMU 4 (in Chosen ?), JALUIT and SASEBO. The 
amount of this traffic is still increasing. All High North Circuits checked but 
little activity. 

Combined Fleet. — Little traffic concerning these fleets. The Commander in 
Chief appears as an addressee but did not originate much to his command. It is 
known that Subron 5 is in company with MUTSU but the flagship of Subron 5 
(YURA) is in CHINKAI area. This leaves doubt as to the location of his com- 
mand. If with him there MUTSU must also be in that area. The Second Fleet 
has been quiet for some time. 

Third Fleet. — Apparently inactive in Sasebo area. Comairron 6 made a move- 
ment report to CinC 3rd Fleet. The Commander 1st Base Force is fairly active 
with his Marus. 

Fourth Fleet. — Inactive in Truk area. SAIPAN was in communication with 
KAGOSHIMA Air and Commander Cardivs. 

Fifth Fleet. — No indication yet of any attempt to organize and concentrate 
this vague unit. The Commander 5th Fleet sent a despatch to CinC Combined 
today. 

Submarines. — Submarines tactical circuits heard today. A Staff Officer of 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 747 

Commander Submarine Force addressed a message to the SubForce collective and 
for information to all major Fleet flags. 

Air. — The Commander Combined Air Force addressed a message as follows : 
Action to : MINISTER OF NAVY. 

CHIEF OF NAVAL GENERAL STAFF. 

COMBINED AIRFORCE. 

CINC COMBINED FLEET. 

CARDIV 4 less HOSHO and ORU 4 (unidentified). 

CARDIV 3. 

Information to: CINC CHINA FLEET. 

CINC SOUTH CHINA FLEET. 
ALL MAJOR FLEET FLAGSHIPS. 

It would appear from this message that whatever the combined Air Force in- 
tends to do will interest the China Fleet. It is apparent that he has all ready 
located parts of his command from TAIWAN northward at least as far as 
GENZAN. The fact that he has had Carriers added to his force (Carriers are 
not normally part of the Combined Air Force) indicates a large scale operation 
over a long distance. 

D/F Bearings. — 33 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates. 

Positions. — 

9 (M) Comm— Takao (FUWI 4) to SAMA (SASI 4) 

4 (M) Comm— Palao (MISE 8) to Yap (INE 6) 

8 (M) Comm— Chichijima (EME 6) to Yokosuka (HOMI 3) 

4 (M) Comm— Sasebo (KIMU 9) to Bako (NOTI 7) 

5 (M) Comm— Sasebo (KIMU 9) to Bako (NOTI 7) 
2 (M) Comm— Establish with Sasebo (KIMU 9) 

6 (M) 22.5 151.5 
8 (Katsuriki) 10.0 169.0 
2 (M) 12.8 150.5 

6 (M) 27.5 124.2 

7 (M) 22.7 149.0 
7 (M) 16.3 147.5 
2 (M) 19.2 159.9 
6 (M) 24.3 122.1 

Commuhication Intelligence Summary, 22 Octoler 19Itl 

General — Larger volume of traffic intercepted than normal, with no "dummy" 
traffic appearing. The traffic was dominated by exchanges between Staff Com- 
munication Officers of all major forces, with highly significant increase in China 
and South China activities. UNI WIWI from a Tokio originator was addressed 
action to CinC Combined, info to CinC's Com. Air Force China, South China Air 
Command (at Sama, Hainan) KORYU (CV) plus Yokosuka and Bako addresses. 
The use of tactical (numeral two-kana) calls is increasing with despatches coming 
through on regular shore channels carrying NR and SMS of identified service 
calls. Air activities ,afloat and ashore, in all areas, were heavy traffic originators, 
with greatest emphasis on the Whole mandate area, Takao-China-Hainan. 11 
Marus yesterday and today were noted using the suffix denoting "C. O. Naval 
Detachment aboard" without definite indication of affiliations, though most ap- 
peared connected with the Takao-Hainan air movement. 

Combined Fleet. — Most traffic from CinC Staff was fi-om Staff Comm. Officer, 
V7ith suffix "Secretary" second in volume. Many general address despatches were 
originated, embracing all areas in specific callups and leading to believe that a 
call change may be impending or that some communication change is scheduled. 
The D/F net collective appeared with most general address messages. No indi- 
cation of movement of CinC from Kure-Sasebo area. 

First Fleet. — ^Addressed frequently but little originated. No area change 
indicated. 

Second Fleet. — Same as First. 

Third Fleet. — Apparently still in Sasebo area. 

Fourth Fleet. — Communications to and from CinC continue through TRUK. 
Originates several collectively addressed to 4th Fleet. NIKA WIWI (Special 
key URGENT) from Naval Intelligence Tokio addressed for action Ch, of St. 4th 
Fleet info Combined and Maizuru address. SUU UNA WIWI from MAYURU 
(Tokio) to Ch. of St. 4th, info all air and base forces in the Mandates. 



748 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Fifth Fleet. — This nebulous unit is very elusive. The tentatively identified 
Commander was exempted in a general address message and again appeared in 
the proper order between 4th Fleet and Subfor in an addi'ess. Delivery routing 
and guard stations have never been determined. 

Suhmariyies. — Some activity with tactical calls on Subfor frequencies as re- 
ported all October. No detectable change in operating areas previously reported. 
Carriers. — Cardiv 4 addressed care Takao Radio and included with China and 
Hainan addresses, indicating probable operating area South of Taiwan. Cardiv 5 
(UYU 3) with the Koryu and Zuikaku are operating with Yokosuka and Omura 
air stations. AKAGI and SORYU appear to be preparing to leave Yokosuka and 
resume operations. Carrier Comdr. still aboard KAGA in company HIRYU and 
traffic still appears through Sasebo routing. 

Combined Air Force. — Air Force and communications most active in todays 
traffic. The reshuffling of air units which was underway in September and the 
first half of October is apparently completed and large scale operations in the 
Mandates, Chosen-Manchukuo, and Taiwan-Hainan-Amoy areas are in prospect 
or progressing. The Special Task Force or Southern Expeditionary Force of 
which the KASHII is Flagship is assuming considerable importance in despatch 
headings and is connected with the Combined Air Force and CARDIV 4 in forth- 
coming maneuvers or operations. A call tentatively identified as Spratley Island 
(NRE 0) is addressed in several general collective despatches originated by 
Tokyo Communication Division and Tokyo Plotting and DF Sections and is called 
directly from Tokyo for delivery, indicating probable DF activity in that area. 

With nothing definite to point to, the impression grows that a large scale 
screening maneuver or operation, at least, is in progress, involving mainly air 
units in the Mandates, Takao-Hainan Indo-China area, the Kuriles, and Sub- 
marines Marcus and Chichijima to the Kuriles. Identification of Horomushiro 
as an Air Base the otJier day places air operations up to the Northern Kuriles. 
D F Bearings. — 33 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates. 
Positions. — 

HONA 6 (M) Communication— Chinkai (SUTI 5) to Tsingtao (UYO 5). 

SAHO 2 (M) Communication— sasebo (KIMU 9) to TIKU (shore) . 

KIMO 5 (Kashii)— Base 217— Saigon. 

KENO 2 (Koshu?) 09.3 151.1. 

KERO 8 (Katsuriki) 10.0 169.0. 

HAO 7 (M) 13.5 149.4. 

YOHA 6 (M) 25.0 148.7. 

FURI 6 (M) 27.3 124.4. 

SATE (M) 23.1 148.3. 

SEMI MARU 13.7 144.6. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 23 October 19Jfl 

General. — Traffic interception about normal volume with continuing absence 
of dummy traffic. The collective address communication messages continue, 
either presaging a call change or correcting communication publication to conform 
with organization changes. There was less exchange of traffic between Empire 
and Mandate areas due to confusion on the Orange circuits but it was indicated 
that the volume and character was similar to yesterday. Expansion of the China 
activity into the Indo-Cliina area was indicated by increasing traffic to and from 
the Southern Expeditionary Force, in the Saigon area, with information ad- 
dressees including all forces attached to China waters northward to Chinkai. 

Fleet. — No changes in locations previously reported except that traffic routing 
places the tentative Fifth Fleet as at or near Yokosuka and traffic headings with 
information addressees may indicate that this force is charged with operations 
in the area from Chichijima northward. Tentatively, this would place task areas 
for various forces as below : 

Combined, 1st, 2nd and Subforce nucleus plus some carriers Yokosuka to 
Sasebo. 

3rd Fleet, Sasebo, Japan Sea, Maizuru. 

4th Fleet, Marshalls to Palau to Chichijima. 

5th Fleet, Chichijima to Kuriles (vague). 

Southern Expeditionary Force (KASHII Flag) Indo China, South China 
Sea. 

South China Force (ISUZU Flag) Hainan-Taiwan. 

Combined Air with Carriers, Taiwan-Naha, Chichijima. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 749 

Fourth Fleet. — Cine Truk area as before. 

Significant despatches included six URGENTS plus several routines as below : 

UNI— Cine CombFlt to Comdr. CombAirFor INFO : Cine China, SoChina, 
Ch. NavGenSt, Tokyo, plus Yokosuka, Bako and Hainan addressees. 

NIKA WIWI— Tokyo origin to CinC Combined, CinO 4th. 

UNI— CinC CombFlt to St. Comm. Officer Corab.AirFor infor St. Comm. 
Officers China Fit., SoChinaForce, SoChAirFor, Comm. Div. Tokyo, plus 
Sasebo and Bako addressees. 

UNI— Chief of Staff China Fleet to Naval Intelligence Tokyo. Retrans- 
mitted by Communication Division Tokyo for information to Staff Com- 
munication Officer, Combined Fleet. 

Routine — Chief of Staff South China Force — same as above. 

WIWI— Naval Intelligence Tokyo to Chief of Staff China Fleet informa- 
tion Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, South China Force. 

Routine — Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet to Naval Intelligence Tokyo infor- 
mation Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, and Maizuru address. 

SUU WIWI— Chief Navy General Staff Tokyo to Staff Communication 
Officer Fourth Fleet. 

Routine— Chief of Staff Submarine Force to Collective ALL FORCES 
COMBINED FLEET, Collective Submarine Force, information DF head- 
quarters Tokyo and new station in South China sea area. (NRE 0) 

Routine — Long 3 part despatch from DF headquarters Tokyo to Collective 
ALL MAJOR FLAGSHIPS information Tokyo Tracking Section, Stations 
of DF Net. 

Routine SUU— Short 5 numeral despatch from joint origin Bureau Military 
Affairs— Navy General Staff Tokyo to Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, First, 
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Submarine Force, Carrier Divisions, Combined 
Air Force, China Fleet, North China Fleet, Southern Expeditionary Force, 
Sasebo, Bako, Chinkai addresses— information — unidentified addresses plus 
collective shore. In this it is noted that CINC SOUTH CHINA FORCE is 
omitted but the Southern Expeditionary Force is included. This is similar 
to operations in Indo-China occupation vrhen the Third Fleet assumed major 
Importance with CINC SOUTH CHINA FORCE apparently subordinated. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 2-'t October 19->{1 

General. — Traffic volume light due to very poor receiving conditions obtaining 
here. Heavy static and fading ruined reception on the night watches when most 
traffic is copied. The TOKYO broadcast carried no dummy traffic. The number 
of general messages emanating from Tokyo continues to be high. Most of these 
today came from the Communications activities of the Ministry. There were a 
few from the double originator, Navy Minister and Chief of the General Staff. 
Especially prominent today was the activity of the SUTU 7 and ESARO combina- 
tion, thought by this Unit to be radio intelligence and direction finding activities. 
ESARO received frequent reports from Chinkai and ORU 4 (station in that area), 
JALUIT, and PALAO. He in turn originated messages to the CINC COMBINED 
and CINC SECOND AND was, more frequently than not, at lea.st an information 
addressee in all messages between the major commanders. The interest in the 
South China Activities continues. There has been much traffic directed to the 
French Indo China Force, to HAINAN activities and to NRE0 (identified as 
Spratley Islands but thought to be in vicinity of Camranh Bay). This particular 
wave of South China interest seems to date from the 15th of October when NRE0 
sent a dispatch to Takao which was then reported to all major commanders. 

First Fleet. — Little activity by fleet units except as noted under Second Fleet. 
CinC Combined Fleet received a KIU from C. N. G. S. and from the Commander 
of Direction Finder Activities (SUTU 77). He sent one to a general collective 
call, SUTU 7 and NREO (Spratley? Camranh?). 

Second Fleet. — After a long period of comparative inactivity ihe CinC Second 
Fleet today sent a message with the following heading : 

Third Fleet (Collective) (Now in 

Sasebo area) 
Combined Air Force (Collective) 
Second Fleet (Collective), 
BatDiv Three, 
Desron Three, 



750 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Information : 

Palao Radio French Indo China Force 

NERO (Spratley ?, Camranh ?) Subron Six 

SUTU 77 (D/F) Subron Five 

Toliyo Radio Taliao Radio 

ComsubFor CinC Combined Fleet 

ComCarDiv Five 

Attention is invited to the action addressees of this message. They have 
appeared separately in the traflSc for weeks and are here grouped in one 
message a single commander. Secondly, the units named are not normally under 
the Command of the Second Fleet. The geographic area indicated is to the 
south (Palao, Takao, Spratley). 

Third Fleet. — Same activity by Second Base Fleet but little traffic from this 
unit. 

Fourth Fleet. — Comairron Tvs^enty-four addresfeed a message to 6 Tokyo 
addressees and part of his unit at Yokohama Air Station, less the Chitose Air 
Corps. No other activity in Fourth Fleet. 

Air. — The Communication Officer CarDivs sent a message v^ith the following 
heading : 

Com.Off. SubFor. 
" " Desron One. 
" " BatDiv Three. 
" " CruDiv 8. 
Cardivs less Cardiv 3. 
Information : 

Tokyo Radio. 
SUTU 749. 

ComOfiE Combined Fleet. 
The air activities of the Air Force and the Cardivs continues as previously 
reported. 

Submarines. — Comsubfor addressed a message to Jaluit, Tokyo Radio and 
Communication Officer Carrier Divisions. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 25 October, 19^1 

General. — Traffic volume about normal. All circuits heard well except for the 
Yokosuka-Saipan circuit which was poor. At 0730 Tokyo radio began transmit- 
ting traffic with tactical calls, from that time until noon these calls were of the 
single and doube KANA variety. At 1200 he worked apparently the same people 
but sent only the numeral kana hand variety. In aU cases these messages began 
a new numbering series for each originator. The normal or administrative traffic 
continued on in the old series. The conclusion is drawn that these new number 
series while continuing the old indicator the beginning of tactics akin to a fleet 
problem with that traffic to form separate files. Activity of the direction Finder 
net was indicated by transmissions from the Chinkai and ORU 4 stations. None 
was received from the mandates Stations but this was due to the poor reception 
of the Saipan circuit. Tokyo Communication originated several more messages 
of general address. One NIKA WIWI was originated by^okyo and sent to 
Chief of StafC Carrier Divisions, Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Carrier 
Division Two. 

First Fleet. — Little information relative this fleet but at sea in the Kyushu area. 
Practically the only traffic concerning it was in the tactical systems mentioned 
above. 

Second Fleet. — ^No activity. 

Third Fleet. — Commander Second Base Force originated a movement report 
which went for information to Maizuru. Bumil sent one to Chief of Staff Third 
Fleet for information of Commander First and Second Base Forces. 

Fourth Fleet. — Air Squadron Twenty-fourth is still very active with Jaluit 
and Truk. 

China. — Little activity. Spratley Island addressed a message to NRE0 
(Camranh) for information of a First Fleet Unit, Saipan, Chichijima, Hainan 
and Takao. The Chief of Staff of the French Indo China Force sent one to CinO 
Combined Fleet for information of all Combined Fleet Commanders. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 751 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 26 October, 19^1 

General. — Large amount of tactical call traffic intercepted on frequencies used 
for communication between Tokyo and Mandate Stations. Identifications of calls 
showed that Tokyo, Saipan, Palau, Truk, Jaluit and two or three unplaced shore 
calls handled the bulk of the traffic. Guards for all forces of the Combined Fleet 
were also present, using a large number of alternate calls and addresses. Analysis 
of the routing and handling of this type of traffic leads to the belief that the 
activity is largely concerned with a major communication drill or test, combined 
with possible maneuvers of the Fourth Fleet and air units in the Mandates. 
Control of the operation appears to rest with Tokyo Radio, who transmitted 
several high precedence-urgent despatches in abbreviated procedure on the UTU, 
calling collective Combined Fleet for delivery. The prefix "Jitsu" appeared 
occasionally, meaning that the despatch was bona fide, indicating that the bulk 
of the ti-afBc was drill. This is reverse of the usual procedure of indicating the 
drill trafiic by the prefix "Enshu" when normal traffic constitutes the bulk of the 
load. Possible active participation of the Fourth in maneuvers is indicated by 
exemption of this force in several messages under normal addresses and general 
collectives. Contradictory routing to tactical addresses previously identified as 
major force flagships and commanders and the lack of "jigs" and repeats tends 
to confirm the primary communication nature of the exercise. This may be 
preliminary to a major call change in the near future. Normal administrative 
traffic intercepted indicates that there has been no movement of major units into 
areas in which the tactical traffic would place them. 

Combined Fleet. — Flags of Combined, First, Second and Submarine Force ap- 
pear to still be located in the Kyushu area, with Air Force commander and 
Carrier Division Four in Takao. Preparations for an unidentified air command 
(YOME 7) to move from Taiwan to South China appear to be under way. It is 
believed that Carrier Division Three (NUYA 8) is proceeding to join Carrier 
Division Four to operate under Air Force Commander. One despatch heading 
indicates that the HOSHO may also be rejoining Carrier Division Four. Com- 
manding Officers of the SORYU and KORYU were aboard the KAGA (Com- 
mander Carriers Flagship) yesterday. The AKAGI has left Yokosuka Navy Yard 
and will probably rejoin the KAGA. The Fifth Fleet is assuming a slightly more 
tangible form, with an additional alternate recovered and a movement report, 
involving a new fleet unit with this force (?). Yokosuka continues to accept 
traffic addressed to Fifth Fleet. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 27 October IBJfl 

General. — Traffic volume below normal attributed to weekend and possible non 
coverage. A few dispatches in tactical systems using new types of calls observed ; 
these were undoubtedly late deliveries of the previous day's heavy traffic in 
tactical communications. A survey of the past few days traffic and location 
sheets reveals the definite association of certain naval auxiliaries with several 
component parts of the Combined Fleet. Some of these naval auxiliaries are 
known to be tankers. Examples (1) Commanding Officer KYOKUTO Maru that 
made two or three fast tanker trips to California last spring is aboard the KAGA, 
(2) the NARUTO and another new auxiliary (YUMAJ3) appeared at least twice 
with those first fleet units most likely to move. 

First and Second Fleets. — COM-16 reports the majority of First and Second 
Fleets in the Inland Sea-Ariaki area. Also that the YAMASHIRO is in Yokosuka 
while KONGO is in Maizuru. The units of the First Fleet that appear to be 
involved in movements, present or immediate future, include: 

SENDAI— CL. 

MIDZUHO— AV. 

HYUGA— BE. 

1 other BB— (WAFU0) with HYUGA. 

BatDiv 3— (Includes KONGO, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA, HIYEI). 

Desron 1 and 3. 
Submarines. — COM-16 reports ComSubForce and large part of the Submarine 
Force in the Inland Sea-Ariaki area. One important Submarine Squadron 
(NASU4) has appeared frequently associated with Cruiser Division 8 in the Sec- 
ond Fleet and Destroyer Squadron 1 in First Fleet. There is a slight indication 
that a part of Carrier Divisions and these forces will operate in the Mandates. 
Several dispatches forwarded to ComSubForce and ComCarDivs have also in- 



752 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

eluded JALUIT and TRUK Radio Stations. Additionally Tokio Radio originated 
a despatch to Communication Officer Cruiser Division 8 information to COMOFFS 
CAF, Second Fleet, BatDiv 3, CARDIVS and JALUIT Radio. While SubForce is 
exempted in this last despatch, there seems to be a tie-in between these forces and 
the Mandates. 

Air. — The following units appear to comprise all air activities of Combined 
Fleet now operating in Takao-South China Area : 

MOO0— 11th Air Corps. 

NTI4— CAF (Comdr., and COMOFF). 

OTOfi— KANOYA Air Corps. 

REA2— SHIOGAMA Air Corps. 

SIHA5— ZnJIKAKU. 

SUY08— Plane guards for ZUIKAKO. 

T0ME2— Large AIRON in CAF. 

YUHI7— KASUGA MARU (new Converted carrier)? 
Also CarDiv 3, HOSHO, and RYUJO appear to be in Takao general area but 
not with the above forces. 

Mandates. — A considerable concentration of air activities continues in the 
Mandates. One Mandate naval auxiliary YUH08 originated a dispatch to a 
FUSAN (Korea) address. Fourth Fleet and Chitose Air Corps both appear at 
TRUK. 

China. — North and South China appear relatively quiet if Takao is placed 
outside of this category. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 28 October 1941 

General. — Traffic volume normal with good reception on all circuits except 
Tokyo to Shanghai which was poor. The direction finder stations throughout the 
Mandates were active indicating an exercise of this net. The types of tactical 
traffic previously reported as being very heavy has now been reduced to very light. 
It is now apparent that such traffic was in the nature of a drill embracing the 
entire Communication System. A few tactical circuits heard, Carriers were 
heard on 9606 kcs.. Central China Forces on 4690 kcs. and the Direction Finder 
Net on 4955 kcs. 

First Fleet. — No indication of movement of this fleet. Today a message ad- 
'dressed to Chief of Staff Second Fleet and Battleship Division One was sent to 
the Second Fleet for delivery. Another message originated by CinC. Combined 
Fleet was intercepted on Jaluit radio station frequency. This last message is 
discounted as being a communication error of some discription. The Chief of 
Staff of the French Indo China Force, is aboard the Combined Fleet Flagship 
today. It will be recalled that the Radio Officer of this force was aboard the 
Flagship several days ago. 

Second Fleet. — No comment. 

Third Fleet. — Except for some activity among units of the First Base Force, 
Third Fleet very quiet. 

Fourth Fleet and Mandates. — Indications are growing stronger that the Fourth 
Fleet is preparing for operations. The CinC. Fourth Fleet has been originating 
considerable traffic for the past two days and this has been addressed to the 
Combined Fleet, Submarine Force, Carrier Divisions and several Tokyo addres- 
sees. The Base Forces at Saipan, Jaluit, Truk and Imieji have become active 
in traffic. The air activity in the Marshals is increasing although there have been 
no reinforcements of the air units all ready there. Truk radio has been active 
in transmitting weather originated by stations at Mortlock, Ololo, Kwajalang, and 
one unidentified station. His frequent communication with Commander Carrier 
Divisions plus above weather may indicate coming augmentation of the air 
forces there. 

Submarines. — Little activity. 

China. — ^Tokyo originators are still addressing much traffic to Sama, Takao, 
Bako, Saigon and the South China Fleet. The latter made a movement report 
today but the movement is believed to be a local one. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 29 October 19^1 

General. — Less volume of intercepted traffic today. The heavy use of tactical 
calls and addresses on the Tokyo-Mandate Fleet general circuit which com- 
menced on 25 October and was tagged as a communication test-drill, was com- 
pleted early on the 28th. Use of tactical calls with maneuvering traffic on 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 753 

various Fleet frequencies, with Combined, First, Second Fleet flagships and units 
of these Fleets participating continues and a revival of tactical trafhc on sub- 
marine frequencies indicates that portions of these forces are at sea. Carriers 
were also heard working. The Third Fleet was especially prominent as an 
originator with code movement reports from Comdesron Five, Comairron Six, 
Number Two Base Force, First Defense Division of Third Fleet indicating prep- 
arations for some activity on the part of this force. The Fifth Fleet is daily 
assuming more tangible form and it is believed that it will shortly appear as an 
active unit of the Combined Fleet. 

Combined Fleet. — Continued operations with First, Second Fleet Units, AKAGI, 
SORYU and SHOKAKU apparently in same south Kyushu area. It is believed 
the Commander Submarine Force is also operating in the same area. 

Third Fleet .—Thi's, unit apparently preparing to move from Sasebo area. The 
CinC Third Fleet is not aboard his usual flagship, NAGARA, today. "Various 
Third Fleet units initiated movement reports as reported above under general 
notes. 

Fourth Fleet. — Remains Truk area, with general air activity continuing 
throughout Mandate area but especially Siapau-Truk-Jaluit areas. 

Stihmarine Force. — Jaluit Radio came up under tactical call on Submarine 
Force frequency working three previously unheard sliips with D/F bearings 
running through the Marshalls. 

China. — Carrier Divisions Three and Four continue association with Com- 
bined Air Force Commander in the Takao area, with HIKUl (Unidentified 
Sasebo Office) apparently having cognizance over forces in Taiwan, South China 
and Hainan areas, as well as the South Expeditionary Force in Indo China area. 

It is still felt that the areas of operations of the various forces as outlined in 
the summary of 23 October is substantially correct. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 30 October 1941 

General. — Traffic volume a little above normal. TOKYO Communication is 
continuing to originate messages for general distribution. This activity has 
covered a considerable period now and is, I believe, unprecedential. The subject 
matter is unknown because of the general address always involved. The only 
conclusions are that a major change in the communication system is imminent 
or that regular reports are being made to the Navy concerning communications. 
Very little tactical traffic intercepted. The High North circuits continue to be 
quiet. Base HO 4 heard calling HO 1 and exchanged signal strengths but no 
traffic sent. Jaluit, Saipau, and Truk heard working each other. Direction 
Finder activities quiet ; Jaluit did not send in any bearings, Saipan sent two 
and Chinkai sent four. 

Combined F/eef.— Little activity evidenced by either the 1st or 2nd Fleets. 
The CINC COMBINED Fleet was prominent as an addressee but originated very 
little traffic. The greater part of these Fleets appear to be in Kure area but 
CINC is indicated as being in Sasebo, 

Third Fleet.- — This Fleet very active in radio traffic. The Commander in Chief 

originated much traffic as did the Commanders of the 1st and 2nd Base Forces. 

Yesterday the despatches seemed to be of the movement report variety while 

those today appear to be regarding organizations. Some typical headings are: 

From: TIYA 77 (Com.dr 1st Base Force) 

To : CINC COMBINED FLEET 

Chief of Naval General Staff 
Info: All Major Unit Commanders (less 4th Fleet, French Indo-China 
Force, 1st Defense Division and COMAIRRON 6) 
CINC THIRD FLEET sent one as follows : 
Action : CINC COMBINED FLEET 

Chief of Naval General Staff. 
Info: MESA 1 (unidentified) ; All Major Commanders (less 4th Fleet) ; 
AIRRON 6; NITU 7 (A Division in 3rd Fleet) ; Defense Division 1; NA- 
GARA ; Comdr 2nd Base Force ; Comdr 1st Base Force. 
There has been no confirmation of movement of this Fleet by other means 
than traffic headings. Normal delivery of traffic via Sasebo continues. No 
confirmation by DF hearings. It is therefore believed that the movement is 
imminent. The directive is not evident but Cavite reports that the ASHIGARA 
has departed for South. BuMil is in active touch with Bako and the UNO 
Taihoku. 



754 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Fourth Fleet. — One despatch today addresed the Commander in Chief of the 
4th Fleet in care of Naval Intelligence at Tokyo. For the past two days all 4th 
Fleet Traffic has been addressed to the Chief of StafE rather than the CINC. 
Most of the activity in this F'leet still centers about the 4th, 5th and 6th Defense 
Divisions. Today both Saipan and Truk sent messages to MOMU/0 (a new 
Carrier identified here as KORYU). The association of the KORYU, SAIPAN, 
TRUK and YOKOSUKA Air Corps leads to the belief that KORYU and 
YOKOSUKA Air will move toward Saipan soon. 

Subniarines. — Nothing to report. 

China. — The traffic load on the South China circuits has greatly increased. 
SAMA, HAINAN is quite prominent as an addressee and has originated far more 
traffic recently than for the past few months. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, SI Octo'ber, 19^1 

General. — at 0000, 31 October, Japanese Navy service calls changed in all fleet 
and air units, as expected. Shore station calls and addresses remain unchanged. 
Insufficient data is at hand at time of writing to determine whether tactical 
calls in the fleet were also switched ; however these shifted on 20 September and 
may carry over. Traffic intercepted on 31st about normal volume with continua- 
tion of general address messages from Communication Division Tokyo, Naval 
Ministry and China Fleet Intelligence. Increasing traffic involving the Fifth 
Fleet appeared, including communication officers of this force and of the Fourth, 
probably indicating early activity of the Fifth Fleet in connection with, or in 
areas adjacent to, the Fourth Fleet. Naval Ministry originated a despatch to 
CinCs Fourth, Fifth, Yokosuka addressee. Information to Saipan Base Force, 
Jaluit Base Force, Fifth Defense Force (at Saipan), Sixth Defense Force (at 
Wotje), unidentified activity associated with Fifth Fleet organization (NEO 6), 
and unidentified activity (SETA 6). 

CinC Second to Second Fleet (collective SuflSx 88), Batdiv 3, Subrons Five and 
Six, Desrons One and Three, Unidentified Maru, Second Fleet (Suffix 29). In- 
formation to Commanders Combined Fleet, Cardivs, Subfor, and movement 
offices at Tokyo, Kure, Yokosuka and Sasebo. Significance of this address is 
obseure, possibly indicating organization or movement. 

Combined Fleet. — Bearings place combined flagship. First fleet flag, carriers 
and subfor units previous mentioned in the same general area Kure to south 
and southeast of Kyushu. 

First Fleet. — Inactive as traffic originator. 

Second Fleet. — No indication of area from traffic, but it is believed that some 
units of this force in connection BatDiv Three and units mentioned in the heading 
of the despatch quoted above are preparing to operate. 

Third Fl^et. — Continued movement reports from units and individual ships 
as noted past three days, but no direction indicated. 

Fourth Fleet. — Flagship remains in Truk area. Activity among air units and 
shore based forces continues, with increasing emphasis on the Jaluit area. 
Jaluit exchanged communication officer despatches with Combined and Fourth 
Fleets. No D/F activity from this area was noted today. 

Fifth Fleet. — As mentioned under general. 

Submarine Force. — Exchange of despatches by communication officers of Com- 
mander Carriers and Submarine Force indicate arrangements being made for 
coordination of operations. 

China. — Taiwan continues to be the center of Combined Air Force activity 
with communications between Air units concentrated in that area and bases in 
Palao and Truk areas in one direction and China, South China, Hainan and 
Indo China Southern Expeditionary Force on the other. Commanders Eleventh 
and Twelfth Air Corps, Shiogama Air, Takao area. This is a concentration of 
practically the same units which were together at Hankow Air during latter July 
and August. First Base Defense Force of the China Fleet (TIFU 0) is included 
as an action addressee in practically all despatches originated by China force 
commanders, including China Fleet, North China Foi-ce, Central China, South 
China, South China Air Force, China Fleet Intelligence and South Expeditionary 
Force. Carrier Divisions Three and Four traffic still goes via Takao. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 November 1941 

General. — Traffic volume is a little less than normal, receiving conditions fair 
but traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new calls not very great. Fleet 
calls only changed, shore station calls and shore addresses not changed. It 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 755 

is believed that tactical calls also remain unchanged but not enough intercepted 
traffic to so state definitely. The same garble table for calls is employed so 
the change amounts to a reassignment of calls previously used. New calls have 
appeared but it is thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units 
or were in reserve. All of the major Fleet calls are identified and a small amount 
of individual calls were recovered today. Because the new calls are not yet 
lined up save for the major Fleet Commanders and all time today was spent 
in call recovery, this summary will deal only with general impressions. 

ComUned Fleet.— The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio traf- 
fic. The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a bit of traffic 
to addresses placed in submarine and carrier category. No indications of 
movement of any of these units. COMBINED FLEET tactical circuits were 
heard but little tactical traffic copied due to interference by NPM. 

Carriers.— The COMMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in despatches from 
Tokyo and he took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast. 

Submarines.— Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well lined 
up yet. 

Third Fleet.— This Fleet very active as before The SECOND and FIRST 
BASE FORCES are still marshalling their MARUs and the CINC is very busy 
with Tokyo. 

China.— The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several 
massages from Saigon. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 November, 19^1 

General. — Traffic volume normal for Sunday. Receiving conditions were fair 
but bulk of traffic derived from the major shore circuits. Solution of new call 
system progressing satisfactorily but volume of accumulated traffic in new sys- 
tem not yet large enough to permit more than casual identification of individual 
calls. The number of alternate calls for major commands is increased over last 
system. So far there are seven alternate calls for the Combined Fleet. 

Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The combined air Force 
traffic is also very high with the Commander of the Combined Air Force originat- 
ing many dispatches. It appears that he is now in Taiwan. Traffic to SAMA 
and BAKO is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China Fleet Intelligence 
bureaus are originating periodic despatches, those from Tokyo being perfixed 
WIWI. There were several high precedence dispatches from Toky» with the 
major fleet commanders as addressees. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 November 1941 

General. — Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for Monday. 
Receiving conditions good but all circuits slow. General messages continue 
to eminate from TOKYO communications. Such an amount is unprecedented 
and the import is not understood. A mere call change does not account for 
activities of this nature. The impression is strong that these messages are 
periodic reports to the Major Commander of a certain nature. Dummy traffic 
is again being sent on the TOKYO broadcasts. Naval Intelligence TOKYO 
addressed two WIWI messages to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and to KUMI 
8 (unidentified). 

Combined Fleet. — Commander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent message 
to BUMIL information all Major Commanders, Combined Fleet, Naval Intelli- 
gence Tokyo, the Chief of Naval General Staff, and Bureau of Personnel. Com- 
mander in Chief, Combined Fleet also was associated in traffic with offices in the 
mandates, principally RNO PALAO. The Commander in Chief, Combined con- 
tinues to be associated with the Carriers and Submarines. 

Third Fleet. — Third Fleet traffic continues at a high level. A movement report 
by RATI66 (unidentified) was addressed to Commander in Chief Third Fleet 
for information. 

Air.— A WE address today broke down as "ITIKOUKUU KANTAI". The 
literal reading of this as "1st Air Fleet" is correct it indicates an entirely new 
organization of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which indicate 
that this may be the case. An old call (Y0ME7) while never identified seemed 
to be in a high position with respect to the Carriers and the Air Corps. Upon 
movement of air units to TAIWAN the association of CarDiv 4 and CarDiv 3 
with units of the Combined Air Force was apparent. Their association in a 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 1^9, vol. 2 7 



756 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

command sense between shore based air and fleet air had never occured before 
but under the concept of an AIR FLEET can easily be accepted. TraflSc in 
the Air Force continues at a liigh level. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 November 1941 

General. — Traffic volume normal vrith all circuits easily readable. More tac- 
tical traffic copied than for past few days. Combined Fleet and Carriers heard 
on tactical circuits. TOKYO Naval Intelligence sent four messages to Major 
Commanders. One of these was for informa.tion Chief of Staff China Fleet 
and one other for information of Chief of Staff Second Fleet. 

Air.— High traffic level of air activities continues. Most significant of the air 
despatches were some in which various air corps were addressed and BAKO 
included for information. One from Yokosuka Air was addressed to SANCHOW 
Island Radio for information TAKAO Air Corps. BAKO was also nated as an 
addressee in several messages from SASEBO and originated two messages to 
SASEBO and TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a message to two 
unidentified calls for information of Commander Combined Air Force, Com- 
mander in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDivs Collective, BAKO and others. The 
Commander Combined Air Force addressed a message to Commander in Chief 
Third Fleet. 

Mandates. — -The RNO BALAO was active today, being addressed by Commander 
in Chief, Fourth Fleet and sent several messages to TOKYO and YOKOSUKA. 
The PALAO weather station sent a long code message addressed to nearly all 
the islands of the Mandates. MARCUS Island appears as an originator. No 
Change in the location of Fourth Fleet units noted. 

Submarines. — No activity noted. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 5 November 19^1 

General. — Traffic volume above normal. All circuits heard and receiving con- 
ditions were fair to good. TOKYO very active as an originator, sending out 
many messages of general address. Two WIWI messages in Kana Code sent by 
NGS to Chief of Staff CarDivs and TIYA44 (unidentified) respectively. The 
Intelligence Offices of China Fleet and TOKYO continue active with many des- 
patches passing between the two. 

Third Fleet. — Two units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKAO area. 
Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RISI4 and YA02) it is not known how 
much of this fleet they represent. It is fairly certain that the Commander in 
Chief, Third Fleet has not yet left the Sasebo area although it is expected that 
he will before long. One message which may be a movement report from him 
was received late on the 5th. The present state of call recovery on the Third 
Fleet does not. permit of an estimate of the movement involved. 

A unit of the First Fleet, identified today as CARDIV 4 appeared today at 
BAKO. This Carrier Division was addressed as "less FUTA SHOTAI" (2nd 
Section?) Whether or not there are other units at BAKO is not known. The 
Commander CARDIVS has been associated with SAMA and BAKO in several 
dispatches today. The following were also associated, SANCHOF ISLAND, 
TAKAO AIRCORPS, CANTON (China) and YOKOHAMA Air. The RNO 
TAIHOKU originated many despatches to TOKYO and the French Indo China 
Forces. A TAIWAN originator sent one to Lieut. Comdr. SHIBA at the Embassy 
THAILAND for information to HANOI and the Commander French Indo China 
Forces. 

BAKO originated numerous despatches to the Empire and to the Major Fleet 
Comnianders. 

The South China Fleet was also the recipient of many despatches from 
TOKYO. 

Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that there is 
now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO area which will 
comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the past month and will 
be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet units to an unknown 
extent. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 6 November, 19'tl 

General. — Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving conditions were 
fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches interferred somewhat. 
Today the specific call-up on -the Tokyo broadcast was eliminated. Formerly 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 757 

Tokyo radio called the unit concerned when the dispatch was addressed to a 
member of that unit. Beginning yesterdaj^ afternoon all broadcast messages 
are addressed to a single call without regard to the addressee of the message. 
The recovery of the radio organization will be hampered by this new advance in 
Communication Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this 
broadcast from which the address and originator were missing. This may be 
the start of complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits. Tokyo 
addressed a WIWI message to the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and 
Submarine Force. 

Takao-Bako Area. — It is now certain that there is a very heavy air concen- 
tration on Taiwan. This comprises practically the entire Combined Air Force 
including the Commander and his staff plus at least one carrier division and an 
unknown amount of the fleet air arm. No additional units of the Third Fleet 
were located there today but it is believed that CinC Third Fleet is now enroute 
BAKO from SASEBO. From traffic association it is believed that some Second 
Fleet units are in Takao area but this has not yet been proven. The South 
China Fleet Command has been active in dispatches to Taiwan addresses. 

Comhined Fleet. — A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now appearing 
with secret (tactical) calls in use. 

Mandates. — The Mandates trafllc has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth De- 
fense Force at Truk and the RNO PALOA continue to be the most active units. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 7 November lOJfl 

General. — Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use of 
the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTU for delivery to all Combined 
Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces to which attached is very 
difficult. Use of large number of alternate calls for major fleet forces, many 
of which have not yet been definitely identified or associated with known calls, 
renders the picture more confusing. Appearance of tlie prefix "JITSU" (authen- 
ticator for bonafide traffic) in several messages indicates that a communication 
drill is being held but without indication as to what units are participating and 
therefore much of the traflic is suspected of being "drill". Jaluit Radio is han- 
dling traffic direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to congestion of Mandate 
circuits from the Marshalls caused by heavy concentrations in that area. 

Air. — Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities, mainly cen- 
tered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air activities in the Mandates included 
in headings of messages. Despatches originated by Fourth Fleet Command in- 
cluded Air Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and all types of Mandate activities 
in long headings. 

Fleet. — Fourth Fleet Command remains in Truk area. There are indications 
that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao area but identifica- 
tions are not .sufficiently certain to confirm this. 

. Greatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls to 
facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of handling fleet 
traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped. 

_ Communication Intelligence Summary, 8 November 19^1 

General. — Normal volume of intercepted traffic with no "dummies" api)earing 
on the UTU. All UTU traffic was broadcast fo the general call only. The Staff 
Communication Officer of the French Indo-China Force (So. Exp. For.) sent a 
despatch action to S. C. O. Combined INFO. S. C. O. Second Fleet, Combined Air 
Force, unidentified fleet unit. Radio stations at Tokyo, Palao and Takao. This 
may indicate a contemplated coordination of communications between the Indo- 
China-South China areas and the Palao Island-Taiwan area. Secret calls were 
used very little as compared to the past few days and only three circuits were 
heard using them, including the Combined Fleet Commanders circuit and Air 
Station Net. North .Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet. All mandate circuits 
were active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all classes of Mandate 
addressees in all areas, but with continued emphasis on the Palao area at one 
end and the Jaluit-Marshall area on the other. Chichijima Air Station was in- 
cluded in much of the traffic between Empire Offices and Saipan Air with Jaluit 
Base Force included for information. Inclusion of Chichijima usually presages 
an air movement between Mandates and Empire but the Units involved are un- 
identified. Commander of unidentified shore activity (NEO 66) previously asso- 
ciated with the Fifth Fleet, was addressed at Chichijima Air which tentatively 



758 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

identifies him as an air activity. Previous association of the Fifth Fleet traflBc 
with Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka tends to confirm the belief that Fifth Fleet 
operations are, or will be, in the area adjacent to Chichijima-Marcus, supple- 
menting the Fourth Fleet in the lower island areas. 

Fleet. — Chief of staff First Fleet originated a despatch through Kure Radio. 
Batdiv Three of the First Fleet appears to be operating separately from the main 
force, possibly in connection with Cardivs Three and Four in the Taiwan-Naha 
area. An apparent movement report from Cardiv Four was addressed to CinC 
Combined Fleet, First Fleet, CarDiv Commander, Combined Air Force Commander 
and to movement offices at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru and Sasebo. Traffic 
from the Commander Indo-China Force is handled from the Japanese radio sta- 
tion at Saigon rather than from the KASHII, indicating that the staff is based 
ashore at present. No identifiable submarine activity was noted. 

Air. — Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities. The 
area between Chichijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit appears to be par- 
ticularly concerned with movement of air forces and auxiliaries, while the for- 
mation of a force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao-Bako area ap- 
pears to be nearly completed as indicated by reports addressed to CinO. Combined, 
Naval Minister, Commanders of Cardivs, Combined Air Force, First Fleet and 
shore addresses generally associated with movements or organization changes. 
This force is believed to include CarDiv Four, and possibly CarDiv Three, with 
a number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Force, also possibly some 
units from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders composition of the 
force highly speculative and area of operations obscure. Prior to change of 
calls, much traffic was exchanged between China, South China and Indo-Chinn 
while at present most traffic includes Palao. 

Communicatioti Intelligence Summary, 9 November, 1941 

Oeneral. — Traffic volume heavy for Sunday. Receiving conditions fair but 
heavy static caused numerous garbles and fragmentary messages. Navy 
Minister sent several messages of general address including one to all First and 
Second class Naval stations. Practically all of the general messages carried 
SAMA as an information address. Carrier Division Three arrived at Takao 
and there are indications that Carrier Division Four will return to Sasebo 
from Takao. The Flagship of Carrier Divisions is AKAGI and is in Sasebo 
area. Some tactical traffic today shows units of Combined Fleet still operating. 
The association of Batdiv Three and Mandate addresses, especially Saipan may 
indicate operations of that unit in the Mariannas. The JINGEI was com- 
municating with SAMA. HAINAN today. The Chief of Staff of the French- 
Indo China Force is in Tokyo. 

One message today addressed to CinC. Combined Fleet was routed to 
MAIZURU for delivery but this is believed a communication error. The Third 
Fleet appears to be still in Sasebo area but it was noted that considerable 
traffic passed between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the Third Fleet. The 
Fifth Fleet is still being organized with no indications yet that it has 
assembled. The Eighteenth Air Corps at Saipan originated much traffic to 
Yokosuka Air Corps. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 10 November, 19^1 

Oeneral. — ^Traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There were 
fewer general messages sent today than for the past few weeks. Tokyo Intel- 
ligence still active and addressing dispatches to all Major Commanders. The 
Mandates construction traffic has decreased considerably. Call recovery is 
progressing but has been slowed down by the general call-up used on Fleet 
broadcast. 

Combined Fleet. — Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A staff officer of 
BatDiv Three was addressed there today and it is likely that this whole divi- 
sion is there also. The CinC, Second Fleet was located at Kure today as well 
as two cruiser divisions. 

Third Fleet. — The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo area. Several 
movement reports have been noted by units of this fleet but none have been 
noted other than individual ships. At least two units of this fleet still at 
Takao. CinC Three originated one movement report for information of CinO 
Fourth Fleet. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 759 

Fourth Fleet. — Little activity. CinC. Fourth remains in vicinity of Truk 
with major portion of his command. The Staff Communication Officer of Sub- 
marine Force sent a message to the CinC. Fourth for information of Jaluit. 

Fifth Fleet. — One unit of this fleet located- at Chichijima. 

Air. — The Combined Air Force Command is still talking to Sama and the 
South China Fleet. From one address it appears that the Commander of Car- 
rier Division Three is with the Combined Fleet. Several units of the Carrier 
Divisions are in port at Kure and Sasebo. CinC. Combined Air Force is still 
in Takao. 

Communication InteUigence Summarj/, 12 November, 1941 

General. — Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving condition 
about average. The general character of the traffic has been administrative 
with most of it being between shore logistic and technical activities. The 
D. F. net was active today with very little activity shown yesterday. Inter- 
cept operators have commented adversely on the major shore network which 
comprises all of the major naval activities in the Empire. Traffic has been 
moving slowly over this circuit. The reason is the non-cooperation of the 
operators and the definite lack of control exercised by TOKYO radio stations. 
TOKYO Intelligence is still sending messages to the major commands but the 
remainder of TOKYO traffic has been mostly from the technical bureaus. 

ConiMned Fleet. — The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE area. 
The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and several Mandates 
stations is born out by a D. F. position on the flagship of BATDIV 3 which 
places him about halfway between CHICHIJIRIA and MARCUS Island. Their 
position was obtained on the 4th when this unit was not yet identified. No 
subsequent bearings have been obtained. Also associated with this BATDIV 
are a Submarine Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although the association of 
this CARDIV (Lately returned from TAKAO) is not positive. The Third 
Fleet remains at SASEBO with the only activity exhibited in the Base Forces. 

4tr.— CARDIV 3 returned to KURE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE. 
Most of air activity confined to dispatches between carrier and shore estab- 
lishments. 

Fifth Fleet. — Nothing to report. 

Fourth Fleet. — The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The vol- 
ume of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The Commander Sub- 
marine Force is still adding JALUIT and today COMSUBRON 2 addressed a 
message there. AIRRON 24 sent a movement report but no indication of the 
direction. Communication exercises were held by JALUIT and several stations 
in that area. YOKOHAMA Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO. 

China. — The previous activity of SAMA and the French Indo China Forces 
and bases continues. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 13 November 1941 

General. — Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several 
messages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are : 

1. UNIWIWI despatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to Chief 
of Staff Combined Air Force, INFO RNO TAIHOKU, BAKO Naval Station. 

2. WIWI from N. G. S. to MAIZURU INFO Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet. 

3. NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, 
INFO Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third Fleet and 
SAMA, HAINAN. 

4. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to Secretary First Fleet. 

5. (2 messages) WIWI to same address as 3 above. 

6. A 3 part NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined 
Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief French Indo China Fleet. 

7. One UNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA, 
INFO Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Commander in Chief Combined 
Fleet. 

This is the only occurence in some time of anyone save the TOKYO intelligence 
activity using the WIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the China Fleet Intelligence 
Bureau were active all day with despatches to the Major Commanders. 

The direction finder net was again active all day with CHINKAI, ORU 7 (near 
CHINKAI), JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending in bearing reports. 

Combined Fleet. — The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is 
operating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The Commander of 



760 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

BATDIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. Ttie Division Communication Officer is 
communicating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other ships in this divi- 
sion remain unlocated but it is assumed, lacking evidence to the contrary, that 
they are with the flagship. Other units of First Fleet seem inactive. One 
Cruiser Division of Second Fleet is associated in traffic with PALAO and may 
be in that area. 

Third Fleet. — Still located in SASEBO, the Commander in Chief has been active 
in the traffic, being addressed by botli TOKYO and Commander in Chief Com- 
bined Fleet. The First BASE FORCE Commander originated several messages 
but no indication of change of location. 

Fourth Fleet. — The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is in communication 
with the Sixth BASE FORCE JALUIT. Several messages were exchanged. He 
appers to be preparing for a move from TRUK but no movement has yet occurred. 
SUBRON 2 is again in communication with JALUIT and today originated a 
movement report, but no indication of direction. 

Air. — Carriers remain relatively inactive. The SETTSU is still with them 
and a few may be engaged in target practice near KURE. The Combined AIR 
FORCE is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual high traffic level between 
its component Air Corps still exists. 

China. — The Commander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one of the 
RNO TAIHOKU. His Chief of Staff is still in SHANGHAI. 

Commutiication Intelligence Summary, l.'f November 19^1 

General. — Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor to fair receiving 
conditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry originated several AlNav 
dispatches. There were three WIWI messages originated today. i 

1. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet. 
Information Chief of Staff" Combined Fleet and YOKOSUKA. 

2. WIV/I from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief 
of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO. 

3. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to ANI758 (Chief of Staff of an unidentified 
unit). Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Chief of Staff Com- 
bined Air Force. 

Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bearings in addi- 
tion to the others. Tactical circuits heard during day with a fair amount of 
activity. 

Combined Fleet. — Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three is still 
operating but no further information on this division. Two Combined Fleet units 
appear active in the traffic. They are DesRon Three (normally in First Fleet 
but has been operating with Second Fleet) and CruDiv Seven of Second Fleet. 
Both of these units have been associated in traffic with the South China Fleet 
and the French ludo China Force. They may proceed to the South China area 
in near future. 

Third Fleet. — Still in Sasebo area. The CinC. has been addressed by Tokyo 
to a great extent and is still associated with South China activities in traffic. 
It has been noted that the association betvv'een the Third Fleet and units of the 
Combined Air Force is growing. Especially the Second Base Force has been 
talking with several Air Corps among whom is the Kure Air Corps. Will air 
units be embarked in ships of the Base Force? 

Fourth Fleet. — No movement yet from the TRUK area. It appears that the 
Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various officers of the staff" were 
addressed at Tokyo and at unidentified locations. 

Submarines. — No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute PALAO and 
Submarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being addressed by Tokyo 
and Yokosuka originators. 

Air. — One Air Squadron of the Combined Air Force is at HOIHOW, HAINAN. 
The Commander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good representation of 
his command. The Carriers remain in home waters with most of them in port 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 19^1 

General. — Traffic volume normal, with a number of general address messages 
originated by Commiunication Division, Tokyo, to Radio Officers, Ominato, U E 
9 (D. F. Station in Marshalls), Jaluit, Palao, Truk, Saipan. Takao and Sama 
Radios, Staff Communication Officers All Major Flagships, Staff Communica- 
tion Officer South Expeditionary Force and two apparent collective shore ad- 
dresses. Traffic from all stations mentioned except Sama and Ominato to 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 761 

D. F. Control and Plotting Room Tokyo information to Staff Communication 
Officer Combined Fleet was exchanged. No messages of the D. F. type were 
detected so it is presumed that the interchange had to do with arrangements 
for drill or organization of the net. The Minister of the Navy originated one' 
Alnav and one to all Major Commands and collective shore. Tokyo Personnel 
and Tokyo Communication Division originated several to collective fleet and 
shore. Significance is not determined though it is believed possible that a 
further partial change of shore and air calls may be in prospect. The Empire 
air station net was normally active using tactical calls. Secretary First Fleet 
originated one Urgent Code to unidentified (MINI 55), Staff Communication 
Officer Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and Commanding Officer of Batdiv 
Three flagship. 

Cotnbined Fleet. — Same as yesterday, same units (Batdiv Three, Desrons One 
and Three) associated through traffic with South Expeditionary Force. CinC 
Second Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be arranging 
operations of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air Units. 

Third Fleet. — Inactive. 

Fourth Fleet. — Apparent movement of Fourth Fleet units in prospect or 
underway, with continued emphasis on the Marshalls Area. CinC. Fourth traf. 
fie still being handled from the Truk area, with Airron Twenty-four (Kamoi) 
and associated Yokohama and Chitose air units involved in some movement, 
direction undetermined. All Marshall Island activities, including unidentified 
A.rmy Forces, exchanging traffic freely. 

Suhmarine Force. — Little activity detected. It is believed that some sub- 
marine activity is operating or preparing to operate in the Marshall area, from 
communication arrangements underway between Staff Communication Officer 
Submarine Force and same Fourth Fleet, information to Jaluit. Jaluit has 
been heard working on various frequencies, using tactical calls and procedure 
associated with submarine operations, but no identifications of calls used have 
been made. 

Air. — Continued air traffic to and from Takao area, with unidentified Airron 
(formerly YOME 7) including South Expeditionary Force and Sama addressees 
in traffic. Composition of this force and purpose still speculative but believed 
to be preparing to move southward to work with the South Expeditionary 
Force. 

The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders analysis 
of traffic headings very slow and difficult, but identifications and recoveries 
of alternates are improving as a greater volume of November traffic becomes 
available for research. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 16 November 19Jfl 

General. — Traffic volume approximately normal for week-end period. A new 
form of despatch heading appeared in a series of dispatches broadcasted on 
the regular UTSU series. Only the originator or the address of the dispatch 
appeared ; it is assumed that the other pertinent call or address may be buried 
in the text. These dispatches were with one exception (in 5 numeral text) 
all in the nine-Kana period separator system and the single call in the heading 
fitted in each case Line seven of the call garble table. 

A dispatch was originated by the Navy Minister addressed to all Major 
Fleets and general addresses to this effect : 

"Today the House of Peers and House of Representatives by means of 
a decision adopted the following resolution transmitted as follows : 

1. Resolution of House of Peers — (Expressed deepest thanks and 
emotion to Army and Navy for their glorious service over a long period 
to the Empire and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen in 
battle. 

2. Resolution of House of Representatives — Express«>d thanks, etc., 
to all officers and men of Army, Navy and Air Force for their 4i/^ years 
service (in China affair) and for their contribution to the establish- 
ment of a permanent world peace. Gave prayers for well being of all 
hands, etc." 

First and Second Fleets. — Majority of First and Second Fleet Units remain 
in the general Kura area. The units of these two fleets that have been most 
active from dispatch heading viewpoint in the last ten days appear to be : 

Airon Seven (3 Chitose class) 

Carrier Division Four 



762 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Destroyer Squadron Seven 

Destroyer Squadron Three 

Battleship Division Three 

Cruiser Division Seven. 
It is rather singular that the CinC. Second Fleet has assumed an important role 
in addressing for action several first fleet and other fleet units recently. In 
some of these dispatches the call identified as Southern Expeditionary Force (In- 
do-China Force) appears. Associations of addresses in several dispatches have 
thrown the Second and Third Fleets vi^ith the Combined Air Force and in other 
dispatches, there appears to be an association between First Fleet, Carrier Di- 
visions and the Mandates. It is apparent that Destroyer Squadron One has 
been or is operating with the Carrier Divisions and Battleship Division Three 
while Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three have been oper- 
ating together. Iwakuin Air sent short priority dispatch to the ATAGO, Sec- 
ond Fleet cruiser and submarine units indicating some joint minor exercises in 
that area. 

Third Fleet. — Believed inactive in Sasebo-Kure area. 

Fourth Fleet. — FUATU, a Tokyo address originated one UNI dispatch to an 
unidentified fleet unit (MEN 33), information to CinC. Combined Fleet, Com- 
munication Officer, Fourth Fleet, Saipan Base Force, Kure Movement Oflicer, CinC, 
Fifth Fleet, Tokyo Intelligence, and NEO 66, believed to be a shore based air activ- 
ity in Chichijima-Marcus area. 

Fifth Fleet.— Prior to the change of calls on 1 November, the composition of 
the Fifth Fleet was very indefinite but appeared to contain several naval aux- 
iliary type vessels. Since 1 November, little has been recovered of the composi- 
tion of this mythical fleet but it is definite that some units are operating in the 
general Yokosuka Chichijima-Marcus. , 

Submarines. — ^Little activity. Communication Oificer, Submarine Force orig- 
inated one priority dispatch to unidentified address, information to Combined 
Fleet Communication OflScer. Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet 
commands continues. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 17 November, 1941 

General. — Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. More traffic 
with single call heading appeared on the broadcast circuit. These dispatches 
numbered serially and each call different but all fitting the same line in the call 
garble table. Since these messages are transmitted each hour on the hour and 
are of approximately the same length it appears that they are drill messages. 
It is feared that they constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a head- 
ing. Since none of this traffic have been found going into Tokyo it is probably 
originated in the Navy Ministry. Very few vessels of general address were 
noted. Tactical circuits in the Mandates were heard during the day with radio 
Saipan controlling. 

Combined Fleet. — No movement from the Kure area of any major portion of the 
First or Second Fleets. The CinC. Second Fleet very active as an originator 
today. He continues to address units which are normally under his command. 
He also addressed the CinC. Third Fleet, Palao Forces, and the Chief of Staff 
Fourth Fleet. 

Third Fleet. — Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Communication Officer of Third 
Fleet Avas addressed by the R. N. O. Palao. 

Fourth Fleet. — The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area centered 
about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit. Both 
these activities originated traffic. 

Air. — The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was 
addressed frequently by SAMA, HAINAN and was in two instances addressed by 
the Fourth Fleet. The carriers are mostly in the Kiire-Sasebo area with the 
exception of a few which ai'e operating in the Kyushu area. 

China. — Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined Fleet 
Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The R. N. O. Taihoku ad- 
dressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow Island, Sama. Bako, CinC. South 
China, and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 18 November 19^1 

General. — Traffic volume a little under normal with receiving conditions fair 
to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of general address 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 763 

emanating from the Communication Section. The double originator BUMIL and 
N. G. S. sent one NIKAWIWI to the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet for infor- 
mation to all First Class Naval Stations. BUMIL also addressed an urgent 
dispatch to SAMA, information to R. N. O. TAINOKU, Chief of Staff South China 
Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Another Tokyo originator, believed 
to be N. G. S., sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief 
of Staff French Indo China Force and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. MAIZURU 
Naval Station also sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, 
Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force and for informa- 
tion to N. G. S. The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent three long 
dispatches to the entire Direction Finder Net which was very active today with 
many bearings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General Staff sent one to 
Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions and Chief of Staff French Indo China Force. 

Conibined Fleet. — CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an originator 
and addressee. Since this officer is always included in the address of every im- 
portant message, he will no longer be mentioned as an addressee unless he is 
the only addressee. The association between the CinC Second Fleet and the 
French Indo China Forces and Combined Air Force is very plain. He was ad- 
dressed by CinC. French Indo China Force today in an urgent NIKA dispatch. 
Several units of the Combined Air Force also addressed several dispatches 
to him. Battleship Division Three, the Carrier Divisions and two destroyer 
squadrons have been associated in traffic. Several dispatches occurred today, 
being addressed by N. G. S. and the Commander Carrier Divisions in several 
instances. The CinC. Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches to him. 
These form the indication that CinC. Second Fleet will be in command of a 
large Task Force comprising the Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, some car- 
rier divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No movement from home waters 
has been noted. 

Third Fleet. — The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears 
to be a movement report. He also sent one to R. N. O. TAIHOKU, informa- 
tion to CinC. Third Fleet. There were other units tentatively placed in Third 
Fleet who sent dispatches in which the Tokyo movement report office was an 
addressee. It is expected that the Third Fleet will move from the Sasebo area 
in the near future. This Second Base Force was having quite a bit of traffic 
with several Air Corps a while ago and may be transporting air units or 
equipment. 

Fourth Fleet. — Not much activity in this fleet. The amount of traffic between 
this fleet and Palao is noticeable with the submarines still interested in Jaluit. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 19 Novetnher 194I 

General. — Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates 
was noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the northern circuits also very light. 
Some tactical traffic received from Combined Fleet units. There has been a 
noticeable increase in the afloat traffic over the normal amount usually seen. 
Fleet units seem to ha'Ve a great deal of business with other Fleet units both 
within and outside of their own organization. Staff Officers are frequently 
addre,ssed at other than their normal locations. The activity at Tokyo has sub- 
sided somewhat in that there were fewer general messages than for the past 
few days. Tokyo Intelligence sent out several messages addressed to Second 
Fleet, Submarine Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAMA for 
information to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet.* The Navy 
Minister sent out two AlNavs. The Direction Finder net is still active with all 
stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting station making reports to major 
commanders. 

Combined Fleet. — ^The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears today 
at Sasebo, its southern jaunt apparently having been completed. Destroyer 
Squadron Four and Two appear associated with the Third Fleet. Cine. Second 
Fleet continues his activity, being still associated with Combined Air Force, 
French Indo China Force, Third Fleet, and today with Carrier Division Three. 
Carrier Division Three was in Takao and returned to the Empire a week ago 
and has been associated with Third Fleet since. A Bako activity addressed the 
Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The Chief 
of Staff Second Fleet addressed an urgent dispatch to CinC. French Indo China 
Fleet information to Third Fleet and Commander Cruiser Division Five. 

Third Fleet. — ^Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and 
of the Base Forces originated movement reports but no indication of direction. 
CinC. Third Fleet is still in Sasebo. 



764 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Fourth Fleet. — ^Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base De- 
fense Force at Palao. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and the Second Fleet 
was considerable. One call (SITI 4) appears at Jaluit today. This call has 
been identified as Carrier Division Four and if the one message is correct it ap- 
pears that this Carrier Division (ZUIKAKU) is in the Jaluit area. This is not 
confirmed as no other indications have been found and its presence at Jaluit 
is doubted, attributing the message to be a communication error. 

Fifth Fleet. — Flagship located at Yokosuka. The CinC. Fifth Fleet appeared 
in a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 20-21 November 19Jfl 

General. — Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal. 
Tokyo originators active with messages addressed to all major commanders. 
N. G. S. sent a UNI WIWI to Commandant BAKO for information to Chief 
of Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The Personnel Bureau at Tokyo become 
very active on the 21st sending out a series of long personnel messages. The 
activity at Tokyo identified as R. D. F. plotting stations increased his recent 
high volume of messages with a long four part message addressed to all major 
commanders. He also addressed several dispatches to the Direction Finder net, 
indicating the employment and results being obtained by this activity. The 
traffic load on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 21st, so heavy 
that the circuit was in duplex operation most of the mid-watch. 

Combined Fleet. — Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area 
and most of both fleets remain in Eure-Sasebo area. Battleship Division Three 
still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the CinC. Second Fleet continues 
abnormally high. A list of units addressed by him or who sent traffic to him 
and CinC. Third Fleet over the past two days follows : 

MIRA 9 (Carrier Division Three) 

TAE 1 (Airron 7) AKU 8 (Air Unit) 

KAME 5 (Airron 6) KUSU 7 (Unidentified) 

YAWI 1 (Crudiv 5) SATU 88 (Unidentified) 

KENU 3 (Crudiv 7) KUNI 88 (Unidentified) 

RESE 4 (Desron 3) OYU 9 (Unidentified) 

AKI (Desron 4) KONA (Unidentified) 

TIYA 7 (Comdr. 1st Base For) MOTU 6 (Unidentified) 

SASE3 (Comdr. 2nd Base For) NETE 5 (Unidentified) 

YOMO 9 (Desron 5) NSI 3 (Unidentified) 

REA 2 (Shiogama Air Corps) SUTE 1 (Unidentified) 

KUNO 9 (Erimo) YAYU 1 (Unidentified) 

MIMO 3 (Air Unit?) MARES (Unidentified) 

TUE 7 (Unidentified) Plus 11 Marus. 
ENO 7 (Unidentified) 

This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assembled by him but 
only the ones occurring in the past two days. Each one appeared not only with 
the CinC. Second Fleet but with the Third Fleet and with one of the units 
now in South China or at Taiwan-South China Address. A complete list is being 
made up but was not finished at this writing. Assuming that the entire Second 
Fleet will be included in this organization and that each unit addressed will 
either participate or contribute somewhat to the Task Force it appears that 
it will comprise a good portion of the navy. One item stands out — so far 
there has been practically no submarine units mentioned by the Second or 
Third Fleets in connection with South China activities. Commander Subrnarine 
Force has not been included in traffic. He does appear in Tokyo Fourth Eleet 
and Mandates traffic. 

Mandates and Fourth Fleet. — The R. N. O. Palao and Palao radio stations 
have remained active with the Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka for days. This is 
taken to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include 
the Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active with 
the R. N. O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so 
great it may be that he will assign some non-Second Fleet units to that area 
but just which ones is not yet known. From information fi'om radio sources 
there is no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third 
Base Force which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet 
units routed there and the Maru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal 
flow to that area. With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday reported as either 
a carrier unit or submarine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 765 

of the Submarine Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls 
is far greater than that existing at Palao. 

Communication Intelligence Sutnmary, 22 November I94I 

General. — Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical 
circuit heard today, indicating that Combined Fleet tactical exercises are 
now completed. The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs and sent two 
other messages, one to CinC Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka and Com- 
mander Submarine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out the usual long 
messages to CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. 
BuMil addressed Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan Civil Engineering Section at Peleliu 
and Yokosuka. Another unidentified Tokyo originator sent a priority message to 
all major flags and China Fleet, information to ANOS at Taihoku and Palao. 
Sasebo addressed one to Chief of Staff French Indo China Force, information 
Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Bako, Sama, Chief of Staff South China, Chief of 
Staff Third Fleet, Commander Cruiser Division Seven and Commander Destroyer 
Squadron Three. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three to 
South China Area soon? While the Direction Finder Net is still active, the 
station at Palao sent in more bearings than usual for that station. 

Combined Fleet. — CinC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two uniden- 
tified calls, one a Maru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet. CinC. Second 
Fleet was again prolific with many messages addressed to Third Fleet and Com- 
bined Air Force. The amount of traffic interchanged between these three com- 
manders was very great. One message addressed many units as follows : 

CinC. Second Fleet. To: NETE 5 (Crudiv ?), KOO 2 (Subron 5) TIYU 66 
(CinC. Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC. Comb. Air Force), MIRA 9 (CarDiv 3), 
RESE 4 (Desron 3), KORE 4 (Second Fleet) (Collective), less Crudiv 8 
and unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI 2 (BatDiv 3) (at Kure and Sasebo), 
Airron 7 (at Kure), SUTI 1 (?) (at Kure), SATU 8 (?) (at Kure), META 
(AKASHI (at Kure) META 2 (ASAHI MARU), TUFU 2 (?), NARI 33 
(CinC. China Fleet), KAKE 66 (CinC. South China Fleet), MISI 66 (CinC. 
Comb. Fleet). 

Third Fleet.— CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from "RIKUGUN SAN- 
BOUTEU MAEDATI SEUZEU (at Tainoku). This is translated as "Army Chief 
of Staff General MAEDATI and indicates the linking of the Taiwan Army 
Forces with Third P"'leet. The CinC Third Fleet continues his association with 
Combined Air Forces. 

Fourth Fleet. — CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base 
Force at Jaluit and AirRon 24 now in Jaluit area. The Third Base Force at 
Palao and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and Yokosuka. 
He also received one from Commander Submarine Force. 

China. — The Commander French Indo China Force sent one message to CinC. 
Combined Fleet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako sent one to Sec- 
retary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Carrier Divisions, 
Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 23 November, 1941 

General. — Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic has increased. 
Some of the high precedence dispatch headings are listed : 

1. MAYURU (Tokyo address) to HORONO MUSEKU (CoUective Shore 

Precedence Information Chiefs of Staff Combined, 1st, 

NIKA-WIWI 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and Southern Expedition- 

ary Force. 

2. Third Fleet Chief of Staff to Second Fleet Chief of StaflF Information 

NIKA Combined and Southern Expeditionary 

Force Chief of Staff. 

3. KESANA EONO (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and Southern 

WIWI Expeditionary Force. Information "SAN- 

KUYUTI" at Sama Hainan. 

4. SUTE 1 (Unidentified Fleet unit) to Radio Takao, Hainan, Flagship 

NIKA NWA 2, information Radio Tokyo and 

Second Fleet flagship. 

5. Imakuni Air to Iwakuni Air Detachment at NAHA Information Kure, 

KIU Bako, and MING 3 in Takao. 



766 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to First Fleet, Third 
Fleet, and others. The following WE address was followed by Sasebo Radio in 
the delivery of a personnel Bureau dispatch "SAHOTI.RENGO.RI.SI". 

An unidentified fleet unit (SUTE 1) listed recently in Kure appeared on radio 
circuit with Takao Radio. Also on this circuit were the following: 

KENU 3— CruDiv 7 Flagship? 
HOWI 2 — Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet. 
EKE 8 — Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet. 
MUSE 5 — Naval Auxiliary associated with Second Fleet. 

The above units received delivery of the long NIKA dispatch originated by 
CinC Second Fleet on the 21st of November and which appeared to outline the 
forces expected to operate in the Indo-China general area. 

Combined Fleet. — CinC Combined was included, as always, in all exchange of 
fleet commander traffic, but no important messages originated by him were inter- 
cepted. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet messages mentioned in sum- 
maries of 22nd were still being circulated but Third Fleet appeared as the most 
active unit in today's traffic. Indications are that Third Fleet units are under- 
way in a movement coordinated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air Force and 
French Indo China Force. Commander French Indo China Force (So. Exp. For) 
was included in aU important traffic from Second, Third and Combined Air Com- 
manders, Hainan addressees were included in nearly all high precedence messages 
concerning these forces and may indicate a rendezvous of forces in that area. 
Palao appeared as an information addressee on a portion of the traffic. Fourth 
Fleet activity involved Palao area on one end and Marshalls on the other. With 
no means of substantiating the impression, it is believed that more submarines 
are operating in, or from, the Marshalls than it has been possible to definitely 
place from radio interceptions. It is recalled that there was an exchange between 
Staff Communication Officers of the Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet with 
.Taluit included as either action or information around November 1st and that 
Jaluit opened a direct circuit to Yokosuka early this month, apparently to relieve 
traffic congestion from that area. Jaluit Radio Has been heard on various fre- 
quencies using, and working with units using tactical or secret type calls, while 
the main submarine frequency of 6385/12770 has been relatively inactive. 

Aii'. — Combined Air Traffic remains associated with Taiwan area, while the 
Mandate Air units continue high level of activity, covering the whole Mandate 
area. Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet, but with Carrier Division Three 
definitely associated with Second Fleet operations. 

China. — CinC. China and South China not included with the Second, Third, 
Air Force and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic and were quiet. Bearings 
from Cavite and Guam place CinC. South China east of Taiwan, but this is 
believed questionable. 

Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few 
days and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent or 
actually underway, at least in part, to the southward, with covering forces operat- 
ing from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled or gathering 
in the Palao area. 

Communication intelligence summary, 2^ November, 1941 

General. — Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal. Traf- 
fic analysis impressions are unchanged from yesterday's report. The difficulties 
of identifications have prevented more definite information of vessels (and fleets 
to which attached) that appear to be moving south from Kure-Sasebo area. If 
the poor reception prevailing here the last two days can be disregarded and the 
assumption made that Radio Heeia intercepted their "share" of the total traffic, 
the following impressions are worth something : 

( a ) The falling off of traffic to China addresses. 

(b) The increased activity among third fleet addresses with a high per- 
centage of what appears to be movement reports. 

(c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat 
addresses. 

The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force 
continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in despatch traffic, 
the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the Submarine Force Com- 
mander with the latter. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 767 

First and Second Fleets. — Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio call 
believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven originated a dispatch 
to Commander Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second Fleet, Commander South- 
ern Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. The 
CinC. Second Fleet continues to appear as the Task Force Commander of a large 
number of units from First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Three and 
Combined Air Force units. 

Third Fleet. — Large number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some 
of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC. Third Fleet ap- 
pears as information addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet 
units indicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future 
operations. Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division 
Three with CinC. Third Fleet. 

Fotirth Fleet and Mandates. — Fourth Fleet appears to be concentrated in Truk 
area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet vessels have come 
from Truk. Air Squadron Twenty-four and perhaps a large number of sub- 
marines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall Area. 

Submarines. — Comparatively little activity. 

China. — Comparatively quiet. 

Carriers. — No definite indications of location. 

Combined Air Fo7-ce. — Commander Kanoya Air appears in the Takao area. 
Otherwise no change. 

Communication Intelliffence Summary 25 Novemher, I94I 

Genera?.— Trafiic volume normal. Receiving conditions much improved over 
last two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with messages to various units. 
Tokyo originated one UNI WIWI to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC. Second Fleet, 
CinC. Third Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fleet and CinC. French, Indo China Force plus 
Yolj;osuka, Kure and Maizuru! The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs. 
A Direction Finder Net, controlled by Tokyo radio was active with secret calls 
being sent by the five stations. The entire fleet traffic level is still high which 
leads to the conclusion that organizational arrangements or other preparations 
are not yet complete. 

Combined Fleet. — ^Little activity by CinC. First Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet 
remains highly active as an originator, addressing Third Fleet, Air Forces and 
South China units. A Second Fleet unit and a submarine division or squadron 
arrived in Takao communication zone today. Crudivision Seven which previously 
arrived there has been associated with Destroyer Squadron Three which indicates 
the presence of that unit in Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still ex- 
changing messages. Two new units to be associated with CinC Second Fleet and 
the Task Force now forming are the North China Fleet and Defense Division One. 

Air. — Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air Corps has 
been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe that other units of the Combinetl 
Air Force have moved from Taiwan to the French Indo China Area although 
this is not yet verified. One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the 
Mandates. 

Fourth Fleet. — CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications 
with the Commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander 
Carriers. His other communications are with the Third, Fourth and Fifth Base 
Forces. 

Communication Intelligence Summanj 26 November, 19Ifl 

Oeneral. — TraflBc volume normal. All circuits heard well except for Tokyo- 
Takao circuit which faded early. Traffic picture about the same as for the past 
week. Intra-fleet traffic still very heavy and Tokyo Bureaus still dispatching 
AlNavs. The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed 
a succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC. Second 
and Third Fleets in particular. The only MAM schedule was NR15 which was 
first broadcast on the twenty-fifth. Takao and Bako originated more traffic today 
than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC. Second Fleet 
and the China Fleets came in for their share. Tokyo radio is working the ISUZU 
(flagship South China) SAMA and CAMRANH Bay radio stations directly. 
Takao is also working ITSUBA (Spratleys). 

Combined Fleet. — Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic via 
SAMA, indicating the arrival of that unit in Hainan waters. While no indica- 



768 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tions were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also arrived it is probable that 
this unit is still in company with Cruiser Division Seven and is also present at 
Hainan. The Takao, former flagship of the Second Fleet became active in the 
traffic today being associated with the Second and Third Fleets. The tanker 
HATATOMO appeared in several of CinC. Second Fleet's dispatches today as 
well as the SOYO MARU. No movement is evident yet of any of the flags of the 
newly formed force. The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the 
Combined Air Force still continues at it's high level. 

Fourth Fleet. — No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive communi- 
cation with Saipan forces as \yell as Palao forces. The KATORI and CinC. 
Submarine Fleet appear to be at or near Chichijima. 

Fifth Fleet. — The CinC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the dispatches of 
the Second Fleet and is associated with the new Task Force. 

Suhmarines. — As noted above Commander Submarine Force is in Chichijima 
area. The Submarine Squadron NETES's location is somewhat uncertain today 
due to one dispatch being routed to MAIZURU. The routing of this dispatch is 
doubted because of the indication of her arrival at Takao yesterday and her 
previous association with Cruiser Division Seven. 

China. — Two Marus of the Third Fleet left Bako for Sama today. 

Third Fleet. — Active as above but no indication of large scale movement from 
the Sasebo area. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 21 November 19^1 

. General. — Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the fre- 
quencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Takao circuit unreadable on mid-watch. Some 
tactical traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama, and Saigon active as 
originators, addressing traffic to each other and to the Chiefs of Stafit of Second, 
Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako addressed the Chief of Staff Third 
Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second 
Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence activity who sent 
five despatches to the major commanders. The Direction Finder activity was very 
high with all stations sending in bearings including the Marshall Islands Stations 
which has been silent for the past four days. 

Combined Fleet. — No further information as to whether or not Destroyer 
Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to be still with Cruiser Division 
Seven in that area. There is still no evidence of any further movement from 
the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several 
messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator lately. 
CinC. Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, 
and Bako. 

Third Fleet. — Still holding extensive communication with Baka, Sama, South 
China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of WE addresses is increas- 
ing, those occurring today were : 

"DAIHATIEUTABUTAISANBOTEU" (in Taihoku) 
"KOROKUKITISIKI" 

"KIZUKEYAMASITABUTAI" (in care of RYU JO) 
"HEIZEUKAIGUNDAIGONREUSEU" 
These is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet. 

Fourth Fleet. — CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to the de- 
fense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the Commander Sub- 
marine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air Corps held com- 
munication with Jaluit and CinC. Fourth Fleet. The Civil Engineering Units at 
IMIBJI and ENIWETOK were heard from after being silent for weeks. Chitose 
Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron Twenty-four is still oijerating in the 
Marshalls. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in 
the Mandates. 

Air. — An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and 
SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of fur- 
ther movement of any Combined Air Force units to Hainan. 

Submarines. — Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area. 

Communication Intelligence Summarif, November 28, 1941 

General.— Traffic volume normal. Comnmnications to and from South China 
and between Mandates and Empire very heavy. No tactical traffic seen. As has 
been previously reported the suspected Radio Intelligence net is very active and is 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 769 

becoming more so. The TOKYO plotting activity addressed more messages to the 
Radio net than previously and most of these sent for information to the Major 
Commanders. Much traffic also was directed to NRE0 (the TOKYO D. F. Com- 
mand) from all eight stations in the Mandates and OMINATO. This Command 
also originated messages of high precedence to the Major Fleet Commanders. 
This activity is interpreted to indicate that the R. I. net is operating at full 
strength upon U. S. Naval Communications and IS GETTING RESULTS. 

TOKYO originators vpere active with messages of high precedence to the Com- 
mander in Chief's of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. The 
Navy Minister sent to Alnavs. The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent one to 
the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third 
Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second Fleet and RNO PALAO. The BUAERO 
sent one to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet info IMIESI and 11th Air Corps at 
SAIPAN. 

Combined Fleet.^-No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units. 
Commander in Chief Second Fleet originated his usual number of despatches to 
Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid particular attention to by 
the Commanded in Chief Second Fleet were CRUDIVS Five and Seven and 
DESRONS Two and Four and SUBRON Five. No traffic today from the TAKAO 
(CA). 

Third Fleet. — Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander 
in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present 
with the bulk of the Third Fleet in SASEBO but it is not yet located elsewhere. 
The Army Commander in TAIHOKU is still holding communications with the 
Commander in Chief Third Fleet. Two Third Fleet units arrived at BAKO and 
are apparently returning to KURE from BAKO. 

Fourth Fleet.— Bulk of Fourth Fleet still at TRUK. The Commander in Chief 
Fourth addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the Fourth 
Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at RUOTTO and WOTJE and 
held communications with AIRRON Twenty-Four and KAMOI. 

South China. — SAMA sent several messages to shore addresses in the Empire. 
SAMA also addressed the OMURA AIR CORPS in several messages which went 
for information to SAIGON and TOKYO. TAKAO radio station addressed the 
Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, the French Indo China Force and 
Combined Air Force. TAKAO Air Corps addressed SUKUGAWA Air Corps and 
YOKOSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a HAINAN office now at SAIGON 
originated several messages to the Naval Bases at SASEBO and KURE. The 
Commander in Chief China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and ad- 
dressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief Second 
and Commander in Chief Third Fleets. 

Subinarinesl. — Except for the mention of SUBRONS Five and Six in two 
despatches there was no submarine activity today. 

Communication Intelligence Summary 29 November 1941 

General. — Traffic volume above normal. The traffic to South China still 
very high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Tokyo-Takao circuit 
but was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of today's traffic is 
made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo Intelligence sent eleven 
messages during the day to Major Commanders both ashore and afloat, while the 
radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the Major Com- 
manders. In addition to the stations normally reiwrting to Tokyo, radio Yoko- 
suka sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. 
The Direction Finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night 
with much activity. One message for Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station in- 
cluded Commander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister originated 
his usual two AlNavs and the Naval General Staff addressed Commanders Sec- 
ond Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Aid Force and the South China Units. The 
unit which has been addressed as the "103rd Air Group" originated one dispatch 
today whose address was composed entii'elv of enciphered calls. It is apparent 
that he has no Navy call list. One address was "JUITIKOUKUUKANTAI" 
"11th AIR FLEET". Since this has appeared before it is evident that the use 
of KANTAI is intentional making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its com- 
position is unknown. 

Combined Fleet. — The arrival of Air Squadron Seven in Takao area is con- 
firmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not confirmed nor 



770 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following units are under the 
immediate command of CinC. Second Fleet : 



CARDIV THREE CF 2CV 
SUBRON FIVE CL+IOSS 
SUBRON SIX CL+4SM 
CRUDIV FIVE 3CA 
CRUDIV SEVEN 4CA 



DESRON TWO-1 CI^12DD 
DESRON FOUR-1 CL-12DD 
THIRD FLEET 
FRENCH INDO CHlNA FORCE 



Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships but their assignment is not 
yet definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third Fleet, China and 
South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval General Staff; Com- 
mander in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above. 
Only one message from Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This 
was addressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air Forces, CRUDIV Four and LUMIL- 
AFF. The HIYEI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fli^et. 

Third Fleet. — Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one iflessage to Comdes- 
ron Five, Number Tivo Base Force. Number One Base Force, Defense Division 
One and Comdesron Two and Four. He held extensive communications with 
the Commander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKO. Two more units of Third 
Fleet made movement reports. 

Fourth Fleet. — Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander 
in Chief Second Fleet, Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air 
Force. He is still in TRUK area. 

Submarines. — Traffic for Commander Submarine Force was routed through 
SAIPAN today. He was at CHICHIJIMA yesterday. 

South China. — CRUDIV Seven now in SAMA made a movement report but 
direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander ad- 
dressed several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO. The 
Commander in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South China 
Naval Bases and the South China Fleets, all for information to Commander in 
Chief Second Fleet. 



Communication Intelligence Summanj Novem'ber 30, 194i- 

General. — Traffic volume less than for past few days. Today's traffic consisted 
largely of despatches bearing old dates, some as far back as 26 November. No 
reason can be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high 
volume of traffic for past few days has prevented the repetition of despatches. 
The number of despatches originated on the 30th is very small. The only tac- 
tical circuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several MARXJS. The 
TOKYO Intelligence activity originated two WIWI despatches to Major Fleet 
Commanders. One urgent despatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff, Com- 
bined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force ; Submarine 
Force and China Fleets. 

Combined Fleet.— The Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet 
are in KURE. In the same message the Chief of Staff Second Fleet was not at 
any location. Other traffic indications are that he is at sea. Commander in 
Chief Second Fleet sent one to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and 
Combined Air Forces but also included KONGO and HIYEI. which places them 
as members of his Task Force. The Commander in Chief Second Fleet is no 
longer adding PALAO activities and has not for past two days. The RNO 
PALAO today addressed two messages to TAIWAN GUNSIREIBU (TAIWAN 
Army Headquarters). 

Third Fleet. — Commander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to 
COMDESRON Two, Four and Five; COMCRUDIV Five: First and Second 
Base Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief 
Second Fleet. No information obtained as to the location of the Commander 
in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway. 

Fourth Fleet. — Believed to be still in TRUK area. D. F. activity in INIar- 
shalls a little greater today than normal. JALUIT addressed Conunander Sub- 
marine Force and AIRRON 24 in one despatch. The continued association of 
JALUIT and Commander Submarine Force plus his known progress from the 
Empire to CHICHIJIMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the Mar- 
shalls. Since one of his large units (SITI 4) arrived in the Marshalls some 
time ago this unit cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a submarine 
concentration in that area. Every evidence points to a concentration of not only 
the small Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 771 

submarines of the Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA AIR CORPS 
presence in tbat area points to intended air-submarine operations from the Mar- 
shalls. Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence 
of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this has not. been confirmed. 

South China. — BAKO active with despatches to Second and Third Fleets, Com- 
bined Air Force and SAMA. Commander in Chief, China Fleet becoming more 
and more active as an originator with despatches to the Task Force. He made 
a movement report with the South China Fleet as an information addressee. The 
Stafe Communication Officer of the South China Fleet was addressed at Shanghai 
today. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 December 1941 

General. — All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1 
December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of six months or 
more. Calls were last changed on 1 November, 1941. The fact that service calls 
lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for 
active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the 
change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four 
or five days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting more and more 
security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December indicates that 
an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly 
with the change of calls, there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches 
and consequent confusion and compromises. Either that or the large number of 
old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear 
as if nothing unusual was pending. 

First Fleet. — Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside 
of Empire waters. 

Second Fleet. — This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in 
the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play an 
important role in today's traffic ; consequently, the assumption is made that this 
fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force are 
definitely in the Indo-China area (Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squad- 
ron Three most prominent). 

Third Fleet. — Nothing to report except that the same association of Second, 
Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces 
continues. 

Fourth Fleet. — No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area. 

Fifth Fleet. — Nothing to report. 

SKhmarines. — Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the area 
to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan. Elagship somewhere in 
this general area. 

Carriers. — ^No change. 

ComMned Air Force. — No change. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 December 1941 

General. — The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent confusion 
in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There 
were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it ap- 
pared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao Radio received the same 
dispatch that it had previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and Third 
Fleets in Takao area and that Takao Radio was broadcasting traffic to these 
fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location report, 
there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In 
several instances Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. Sum- 
ming up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of 
Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not 
close enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course 
not close to Takao. The change of calls on December first has prevented this 
office from making definite statements at this date of the imits now in the 
Southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai Radio handled a 
considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined 
for units in the Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South China area continues to 
appear in Shanghai. ComSixteen reported nine submarines proceeding south by 
Camranh Bay. This group is believed to comprise both Submarine Squadrons Five 
and Six, which units normally operate with the First Ileet but have been included 
repeatedly in the Second Fleet Task Force for Southern operations. 
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 8 



772 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both 
by major forces afloat and Tokyo. Hainan continues as a prominent address. 
Palao and Third Base Force is holding tlie same relative importance. 

Fi7'st Fleet. — Despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appears 
relatively quiet. From inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have 
been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff and that these may be 
two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routing indicates 
one Combined Fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets and appar- 
ently in company while another Combined Fleet call appears not associated with 
the Second and Third Fleets. 

Second Fleet. — No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. 
This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the 
belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company. Cruiser 
Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unlocated and unobserved 
since change of calls. 

Communication Intelligence Smmnary, 2 December 19^1 

Tlm-d Fleet. — Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way in 
some of the Third Fleet traffic. 

Mandates. — Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues. 
Some traffic for Fourth Fleet units still going through Truk. 

Carriers. — Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today. Lack 
of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, 
since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the 
change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it 
is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb. 

Combined Air Force. — This force continues to be associated closely with Second, 
Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have 
undoubtedly left the Takao area. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 December 1941 

General. — Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Present state 
of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The 
extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slows up identification of 
even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far. The 
Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long despatches to the CINC 
COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence originated 
nine despatches to the same addresses. 

The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed 
by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takao the CINC SECOND FLEET is indi- 
cated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is 
indicated for delivery by that Station. It is the impression that both SECOND 
and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence 
means. 

There are some FOURTH FLEET Units in the Mar.'^hall Islands area including 
some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of these units is not known. 
The SIXTH BASE FORCE at Jaluit addressed several messages to CINC 
FOURTH. 

Some Swatow Units were addressed at Saigon today indicating a movement 
of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako originated many despatches to the 
RNO Taihoku and the Task Force Commander. 

No information on submarines or Carriers. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 December 194 i 

General. — Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio 
today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so that 
there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation. So far only a few messages 
have been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent 
messages today, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Among 
others Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven part message to Chiefs of Staff 
China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China 
Force and Sama. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major com- 
manders. 

Combined Fleet.— The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of mes- 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 773 

sages from the CinO. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet. These previously 
very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not 
yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to 
that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed 
that the CinC. Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently 
conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which 
CinC. Second Fleet is still copying. The CinC. Combined Fleet sent one message 
to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force Falao, CinC. Second 
Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet. 

Fourth Fleet.- — The CinC. Fourth Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff Com- 
bined Air Force, information to Eleventh Air Corps, Chitose Air, Air Squadron 
Twenty-four, Third Base Force at Palao and Fourth Base Force at Truk. No 
further check could be made today on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the 
Marshalls. Jaluit appeared many times in today's traffic being associated with 
Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo Radio and MUSI 88 (which is believed 
to be an oil tanker). 

South China. — Bako continues as an active originator addressing many mes- 
sages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China Com- 
manders, all units in that area quiet. 

Communication intelligence summanj, December 5, 1941 

General. — Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broad- 
cast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operation. 
There were several new intercept schedules heard. OMINATO radio working 
SAMA and BAKO sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic 
to Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic 
for these units also. It is noted that some traffic being broadcast is several 
days old which indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio or- 
ganization. 

There were many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused by 
the jammed condition of all circuits. 

A plain language message was sent by the Captain, OKAWA from Tokyo 
to Takao probably for further relay addressed to FUJIHARA, Chief of the 
Political Affairs Burejau saying that "in reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, 
what you said is considered important at this end but proceed with what you 
are doing, specific orders will be issued soon". 

Combined Fleet. — Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have orig- 
inated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving 
their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther 
south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic 
from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either. 

Third Fleet.— In one WE address a "Chief of Staff" sent a message to "Com- 
mander Fourteenth Army aboard RYUJOMARU in Third Fleet. HITOYONGUN. 
SATI (IRQ 1 REUZEU MARU). A number of MARUS have been addressing 
the CinC. Third Fleet. 

Fourth Fleet. — The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication Officer 
of the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today strengthening the impression 
that the CinC. Fourth Fleet is in the Marshalls. The Commander of the South 
China Fleet has been addressing Palao radio, the RNO PALAO and the Com- 
mander Second Fleet. 

South China. — SAMA addressed much traffic to CinC. Second Fleet. BAKO 
continues as an active originator with many dispatcher to Second and Third 
Fleet. The Commander Combined Air Force appears to be busy with the move- 
ment of Air Corps. SHIOGAMA Air and at least two unidentified corps are 
moving, probably to Indo-China. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, December 6, 1941 

General. — Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being 
transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 Decembe/r were seen in the traffic. 
This is not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level but is the result 
of confusion in traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now 
holding broadcasts are TOKYO (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts), 
SAIPAN, OMINATO and TAKAO. 

Yesterday's high level of traffic from TOKYO originators was maintained 
with the Intelligence activity still sending periodic messages. Practically all 
of TOKYO'S messages carry prefixes of high priority. 



774 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ComUned Fleet. — Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Com- 
manders. These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO 
broadcasts. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet originated several mes- 
sages to the Carriers, Fourth Fleet and the Major Commanders. 

Fourth Fleet. — The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is again in the TRUK 
area. It is doubtful that he ever went to JALUIT although it is certain that 
some members of his staff were there .over the past few days. There is a 
definite close association between the Third Base Force at PALAO and the forces 
in South China. This unit is constantly sending messages to the Chief of Staff 
of the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces and BAKO. It is being 
almost entirely neglected by Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet under whose 
command it normally operates. RONGELAB radio addressed the PALAO weather 
observer. 

Fifth Fleet. — This fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN Sea with OMI- 
NATO broadcasting traffic for this unit. 

Suhmarines. — The Commander Submbarine Force originated two messages 
to his command. These are the first two originated since 1 December. He is 
definitely in the MARSHALLS. 

South Chi7ia.— Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAMA and TAKAO still sending 
many messages to the Task Force. 

Convmunication Intelligence Summary, 9 December W^i 

Combined Fleet. — The Combined Fleet Commander-in-Chief and Staff are be- 
lieved to be in Empire waters. There appeared to be a split in this command in 
Mid-November which led to the belief that the operations as initiated by Second 
Fleet Commander in South East Asia occasioned a supreme Commander in 
Empire waters with a secondary Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet in South. 
East Asia or elsewhere. 

First Fleet. — First Fleet is believed to be temporarily in the background as 
some first fleet units should be operating with the Second and Third Fleets and 
the majority of the remainder is operating with the Carrier Dvisions. Battle 
Ship Division One and Two have disappeared as far as our identifications 
are concerned. Battleship Division Three is believed to be operating with 
Carrier Divisions which outfit is in turn divided so that HI YE I and KIRI- 
SHIMA are operating with Striking Force #1 in the Blue Pacific and HARUNA 
and KONGO are probably with the or a #3 Striking Force. Destroyer Squadron 
One and ABUKUMA are believed also in the #1 Striking Force. From one 
dispatch in plain text and associations, it appears likelv that Striking Force #1 
is still in the Oahu-Midway area (Lat. 32 N Long. 164 W). 

Second Fleet. — Cruiser Division Eight of this Fleet may be operating with 
Sti-iking Force #1. Other units are probably with the Commander-in-Chief, 
Second in Southeast Asia. One indication is that the bulk of the Second Fleet 
is operating against Malay and Singapore while the Third Fleet took care of 
Luzon. The indications continue that Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined 
Air Force are under one command ; also that Indo-China Force and South China 
Force seem to have lost some of the close association with this combination, 
probably because South China and Indo-China Force are holding the South China 
Coast and Indo-China. 

Third Fleet. — Together with some units of the Combined Air Force is probably 
operating against the Philippines and also in Malay. The close connection of 
Palao with Third Fleet addresses and Palao prior to war is the basis for this 
assumption. 

Fourth Fleet. — Operating in the Mandates. No recent indications of opera- 
tions of this fleet outside of the Mandates. On one hand there is a close con- 
nection between Fourth Fleet and Fifth Fleet in the north ; on the other hand 
Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet must be working together in the defense of 
the southern flank. Air Squadron Twenty-four figures prominently in the traffic 
and is still in the Marshall area. Saipan Radio initiated a broadcast similar ro 
Takao. Jaluit appears to have taken over some of the promary duties of a 
radio intelligence unit and is as.sumed to be headquarters in the "Field". 

Fifth Fleet. — Definite information that this fleet is in the northern area con- 
tinues. Ominato Radio handles traffic to and from the Fifth Fleet units. This 
fleet appeared to shift from Yokosuka north to Ominato area shortly before war 
opened. The composition of this fleet is still somewhat obscure but is believed 
to have very few so called fleet vessels. ' Probably as large percentage of fleet 
auxiliaries and converted air tenders? 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 775 

Carriers. — #1 Striking Force, operating in Blue Pacific. Believed to comprise 
Carrier Division One — AKAGI (Flagship Cardivs) 

KAEA 
Carrier Division Two— HIRYU 
SORYU 
Carrier Division 

Four (or Five) — SHOKAKU 
ZUIKAKU 
Cruiser Division Eight 
Destroyer Squadron One 

KIRISHIMA— —First Section BatDiv Three. 

HIYEI. 
By deduction #2 Striking Force, if such an organization exists, comprises 
Carrier Division Three — ^RYUJO 
HOSHO 
Carrier Division 

Five (or four) — KORYU 

and probably other combatant units. Carrier Division Three and RYUJO were 
definitely associated with Second and Third Fleet prior to war. 

Submarines. — A strong force of submarines believed to be operating with 
Fourth Fleet and another force operating with Carrier Divisions. 
China. — China Fleet Commanders in normal bases or locations. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 10 December 1941 

General. — Traffic volume continues very high with proportionate amount of 
high precedence traffic. The actual amount of traflic intercepted at Heeia has 
not increased materially since the Eighth but this is due to the concentration 
of efforts on obtaining all transmissions of Japanese vessels in the Hawaiian 
area somewhat at the expense of obtaining the maximum traffic on all Imown 
circuits. There were very few signals identified as emanating from the imme- 
diate Hawaiian area. A great many bearings have been obtained the last two 
days in the sector 295-300 true from Oahu ; since most calls involved have been 
tentatively identified as vessels in the North China and Takao areas, increased 
activity in that region may be the reason therefor. The Navy Minister originated 
the following dispatch to the Secretary of the Combined Fleet which was broad; 
casted from Takao Radio : 

"164. From the Cabinet, Prime Minister and Admiral Arihama Takaza Igo 
received a request for a congratulatory telegram as follows addressed to all 
hands (?). 

"Congratulations (upon) there having been attained manifold results (war 
results) (at) the outset of the naval war. We pray for the success of the 
fortunes of war for all ranks of officers and enlisted men". 

Combined Fleet. — No change. 

First Fleet. — No indications of any change. The calls identified as First 
Fleet have practically disappeared from the traffic lately. This is submitted 
as a partial strengthening of the opinion that the First Fleet has lost its identity 
as such and has been split between Carrier Divisions and the large task force 
operating in the Malay area. The report of United States bomber action on a 
HARUNA type Battleship in the Philippine area, if true, substantiates this. 

Second and Third Fleets. — Appear to be "intact" in the Southeastern Asia area. 

Fourth Fleets. — Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Fleet and some of the Fourth 
Fleet vessels definitely show in the Mandates. It is believed that Air Squadron 
Twenty-four is still in the Marshall area and that the Commander-in-Chief, 
Fourth Fleet, is in the Truk area. While complete coverage at Heeia is not 
possible under present conditions, the available traffic does not indicate the 
previous association between Palao and Second-Third Fleet combination. 

Fifth Fleet. — No apparent change in the available information on this fleet. 
Considerable activity has been noted in the High North and Ominato area shore 
stations. 

Submarines. — Commander Submarine Force continues to show in the routing 
of traffic to and from Mandate stations, particularly the Marshall Island area. 
From all the reports of submarine activity in the Hawaiian area and the well 
established fact that Submarine Squadrons Five and Six went south to Malay 
prior to declarations of war, it appears that practically all submarines are 
away from Empire waters or that our estimates of Japanese submarine strength 
were lower than actual numbers. 



776 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Carriers. — Very little radio activity the past twenty-four hours. One possible 
significant clue to Carrier Divisions future operations was contained in a 
despatch from Tokyo Radio to the Commander of First Air Fleet flagship, 
AKAGI, listing a long string of Tokyo Broadcast messages which it is assumed 
provided a reminder or check on those dispatches which should have been received 
for the First Air Fleet during the period 7-10 December. To this office, the 
inference is that for the past three days (during radio silence in Hawaiian 
waters), a check up was not practicable but now may be done without breaking 
radio silence. While this may be far-fetched, it still remains a possibility. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 11 December 19-il 

G'eneral. — Intercepted traffic volume lower than normal due to employment of 
receivers in search watch. The amount intercepted was however, indicative that 
the traffic volume for the Fleet was high, Jaluit and Saipan broadcast overloaded 
and the Yokosuka to Saipan was in continuous operation. 

Local Operations. — Continuous search watch was maintained on all known Air 
and Submarine frequencies during the day. No air circuits heard. It was ex- 
pected that after dark the submarines circuit 6385 kcs. would liven up but there 
was very little activity. Two bearings of submarines in this vicinity were ob- 
tained. HEHIYA was heard and a bearing of 050° True was obtained. HIMI 
was heard on 1$0.2° True. Other submarine calls were faintly heard and bearings 
were all to the westward. 

First Fleet. — Nothing to report. 

Second Fleet. — Together with Third Fleet in the Malay Area. 

Fourth Fleet. — Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Fleet is in the Mandates with 
most of the Fourth Fleet. He is believed to be in the Truk area but is main- 
taining close liaison with the Marshalls in which is stationed Air Squadron 
Twenty-four and KAMOI. Jaluit radio is handling all traffic for the Submarine 
Fleet which indicates this place as the base for the submarine operating in the 
Hawaiian area. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 12 December 19-ii 

General. — No apparent change in traffic volume or high precedence traffic. No 
material change in fleet locations has been definitely established. However, it is 
apparent that several minor units have altered positions and, after combining 
several British conflicting reports, many units are more definitely located than 
heretofore. 

Combined Fleet. — Singapore reported Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet at 
Sama Bay in Hainan. Both Corregidor and Pearl Harbor report the Supreme 
Commander today in the Chichijima-Mandate area. If it is assumed that there 
is a split in the command, which possibility was brought up recently by this office, 
then both British and our reports may be correct. Our evidence here points to 
Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet very closely associated with Mandate 
addresses and possibly in the general Saipan area. 

First Fleet. — First fleet calls showed again after a period of obscurity. Chief 
of Staff, Combined Fleet originated one despatch to Chief of Staff, First Air 
Fleet (recently near Oahu) ; Chief of Staff, First Fleet; Yokosuka Air Group; 
Chichi jima Air Group? Chief of Staff, Fifth Fleet ; Chief of Staff, Fourth Fleet? 
and other commands. 

Second and Third Fleets. — There appears to be a difference of opinion as to 
locations of these forces. The only definite point of agreement between British 
and United States reports is that the entire Second and Third Fleets are in the 
Luzon-Singapore-Saigon triangle. The best estimate of locations is as follows: 

Saigon-Malay Area In Philadelphia Area 

CinC, Second Fleet (Singapore?) CinC, Third Fleet 

Second Fleet (Singapore area ?) Third Fleet 

First Fleet Units operating with Second Base Force of Third Fleet 

Second Fleet : 2 BB of Batdiv 3 AKASHI (Repair Ship) 

(less sunkship), Desron3, 3CL (flag- Possibly Air outfits from Takao area. 

ship Subrons and Desron) (N. E. 

coast of Malaya) 
CinC. Southern Exp. Force (Saigon) 
Comdr. Combined Air Force (Saigon) 
CarDiv. 3— HOSHO-RYUJO (Siam) 
Subrons Five and Six 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 777 

Fourth Fleet. — There appears to be little change in location of Fourth Fleet 
— still in Truk-Saipan-Marshall area. Fourth Fleet addresses and First Air 
Fleet appeared together in several despatch headings. This is submitted as 
possible clue to the present disposition of -the Striking Force against Oahu. 
Air Squadron Twenty-four normally in Marshalls and unidentified Fourth 
Fleet command (RATA9) also included in this same association. 

Fifth, Fleet. — Little change or information. 

Submarines. — During the past twelve hours, there have been four to five single 
bearings of submarines in the Oahu area bearing 302 True to 49 True from Oahu 
Direction Finder Stations. Bearings were equally spread. One bearing of sub- 
marine unit from Dutch Harbor provided a possible fix in L. 30 N, 146 W. Ad- 
ditionally six bearings of submarine units were received from West Coast sta- 
tions — these were also somewhat spread over North Pacific area. Since west 
coast stations are untrained to copy Japanese, no calls were given, consequently 
no fixes obtained. Evidence is conclusive that majority of submarine units in 
Eastern Pacific are widely sprea'd in the Dutch Harbor-Oahu-San Diego area, 
perhaps several in immediate vicinity of Hawaiian Islands. Tokyo Radio came 
up on 17 Kcs. with a powerful broadcast on the 11th December. This is believed 
to be an additional safeguard for widespread submarine units communications as 
practically all addressees have been identified as submarine units. The best 
estimate from Direction Finder bearings of the of the number of submarines in 
the Northeast Pacific including the immediate Hawaiian area- is 8 to 12 sub- 
marines. There appears to be a split in serial numbers of Submarine Force Com- 
manders despatches. The assumption is that perhaps one serial series is for 
submarines in the Pacific and the other for Submarine units in the South Eastern 
Asia area. Commander Submarine Force is believed to continue in the Marshall 
area. 

China. — Report received of part of South China Fleet in Jaluit area. This is 
not believed to be correct. From inconclusive evidence, China's depleted fleet 
and South China Fleets are still spread between Shanghai and Canton-Haiau 
area. 

The address "OKASHUDANSO.SATI" originated despatch to CinC. Second 
Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force using a four numeral code. The origina- 
tor appears to be the OKA army division headquarters-location, except as to asso- 
ciation addresses, not evident. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, 13 December 19^fl 

General. — ^Traffic volume heavy with a great number of high precedence mes- 
sages. Practically all traffic being handled by broadcast. Large parts of inter- 
cepted traffic addressed to submarine units but this is due to our concentration 
on submarine frequencies. 

Combined Fleet. — Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet is still taking his traffic 
from Saipan. Tokyo gives some traffic for Combined Fleet units to Chichi jlma 
for delivery showing that some units are in that vicinity. In several dispatches 
the Commander-in-Chief, First Fleet was associated with Commander Striking 
Force, Commander First Air Fleet and Commander Submarine Fleet. Tokyo 
Intelligence addressed messages to this group of commands. The Commander of 
the Second and Third Fleets are still closely associated in the traffic. It is not 
possible to definitely separate them in areas as yet but it is still believed that 
Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet is concerned with operations in Malaya while 
Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet appears to be situated a little farther north, 
making him concerned in Philippine operations. Since the Second Base Force 
is associated with Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet it is probable that this unit 
is in the Philippine area. 

Fourth Fleet. — The Commander, Fourth Fleet is indicated at Truk or Saipan. 
He is not in the Marshalls. Air Squadron 24 and KAMOI in Marshalls with 
Air Squadron 24 basing on the northern-most ATOLL (radio call HII5) and is 
beyong a doubt the unit raiding Wake. Yokohama Air Corps has moved to a 
base established in the Gilberts. 

Fifth Fleet. — Commander-in-Chief, Fifth Fleet in communication with OMI- 
NATO radio. He has a number of units with him as indicated by his radio ac- 
tivity on 4640 kcs. These units furnished the greater part of the radio activity 
last night. This force appears to be guarding the northern approach to Japan. 

Suhmarines. — Little submarine activity last night. Some traffic heard on 6385 
kcs. but no bearings outside of the 250-300 sector obtained. One unit (6RI) fixed 



778 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

by Direction Finder bearings from Dutch Harbor and Oahu. At a position just 
N. E. of wake Island. Commander Submarine Fleet at Jaluit and is continually 
broadcasting. 

Air. — The Commander, First Air Fleet has appeared in dispatches as mentioned 
above but no other carrier traffic found. 

Communication Intelligence Summary, lit December 1941 

Oeneral. — High traffic volume continues. An increase in tactical traffic over 
the past two days was evident in the Siam-Philippine area. Also radio activity 
was on the increase in the North China Area and the Yokosuka sector. Dispatch 
headings and radio activity on 5350 kcs. indicated a grouping of several Naval 
auxiliaries (MARU's) with a few fleet vessels. Only bearings on this group 
placed them in the Northern sector — Chinkai or Japan Sea area? To take one 
case, Chinkai Radio was very active on 6345 kcs. with about 16 units. All these 
indications point to reinforcements organizing or proceeding from the Japan area 
to other locations. In another area, a bearing of the Fourth Base Force Detach- 
ment at Greenwich Island (Y0ME6) showed 270 degrees which is 15 degrees 
above Greenwich Island, and associated traffic indicated this force was probably 
afloat in the Saipan area since several Naval Auxiliaries were included in the 
traffic. Another significant despatch heading which was repeated several times 
contained the action address "Communication Officers of Major Fleet units (or 
Forces) less Fifth Fleet, Submarine Force, and First Air Fleet". These three 
organizations seem to be the ones on the "loose" at the present date. 

ComUned and First Fleet. — First Fleet showed a little in the dispatch headings. 
Chiefs of Staff, Combined Fleet and the First Air Fleet appeared to be associated 
with Yokosuka Radio and the calls believed to represent Yokosuka Air, Tateyama 
Air, and Chichi jima Air. 

Second, Third Fleets, Comtined Air Force. — No indications of any material 
changes in locations these fleets. Tactical traffic was particularly heavy among 
the major units operating the Siam-Philippine area. Commandant, Sixteenth 
Naval District reported an identity of Air Corps 22 which has figured prominently 
in the S. E. Asia sector. It is believed this group may be shore based in Hainan 
or Siam. Several air units showed at Takao which have been inconspicuous 
lately — Kanoya Air, Takao Air, Shiogama Air, and Staff Combined Air Force. 
This may or may not indicate change in disiwsitions due to the fact that the traffic 
routing through Takao Radio has never been clearly defined or understood. 

Fourth Fleet. — The 17th Air Corps, Air Squadron 24, and possibly Kisaratsu 
Air was represented at a Marshall Island Station (HII5). This group was very 
busy with tactical traffic and apparently was operating, possibly in Wake area. 
Commander-in-Chief Fourth Fleet remains at Truk. Palao was not prominent. 

Fifth Fleet. — No indication of locations or plans. 

Subma7-ines. — Traffic to submarine units particularly heavy. No bearings of 
submarine units in the Hawaiian area were obtained. Traffic to some submarine 
units are repeated several times indicating difficulties of communicating with 
distant locations. The tactical call ITO, which from Direction Finder bearings 
passed from west to east of Hawaii on the 12th, 13, appears to be a Submarine 
Squadron Commander. No bearings on ITO obtained since 13th. 

Carriers. — Remarks on First Air Fleet contained in above. Only indication as 
to present location is the associations in traffic with three air activities in the 
general Yokosuka area. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 779 

Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 23 
PACIFIC FLEET INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM OF 1 DECEMBER 1941 

Location of Japanese Fleet Units 

Cincpac File No. 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Peabl Haeboe, T. H., December 1, 1941. 
C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 

M-E-M-0-R-A-N-D-U-M 

From : Fleet Intelligence Officer. 

To : Admiral. 

Subject : ORANGE FLEET— Location of. 

1. From best available information units of the ORANGE fleet are thought to 
be located as listed below : — 
Yokosuka Area 

TAKAO (CA) 1 CA 

3rd Fleet HQ ? 

#1 Patrol Force ? 

AIRGROUPof 5th Fleet (Chichi jima?) 36 planes ? 

Total— 1 CA plus ? 36 planes. 
Kui-e — Sasebo Area 

CinC Combined Fleet 
CinC First Fleet 

BatDiv 1 & 2 6 BB ? 

Crudiv6 — may head for Mandates (?) 4 CA ? 

Desron 1 1 CL 

12 DD 
^me^Srdfihet m N AGAR A "i ^t 

4 €t i efe 

©eediv i3 f?)- i Gi, 

4©© 
Cruiser Division EIGHT 2 CA 

Total— 6 BB— 6 CA— 1 CL— 16 DD. 
Shanghai Area 

CinC China Fleets in IZUMO 1-OCA 

Shanghai Base Force It-PG 

3-ODD 

plus miscellaneous craft 
#10 Air Group 36 planes (?) 

Total— 1 OCA— 1 PG — 3 ODD— 36 planes, etc. 
Bako — Takao Area 

THIRD Fleet Submarine Squadrons 1 AS 

6 SS (I) 

Subron-S 1 CL 

6 SS 
8ubron-6 1 CL 

4 SM 
Desron-5 less Desdiv 22 1 CL 

8 DD 
#2 Base Force 3 CM 

5 XPG or XPO 
17 AP or AK 

Desron-Jf 1 CL 

12 DD 



780 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Location of Japanese Fleet Units — Continued 

Baeo — Takao Area — Continued 
Comdr. Combined Air Force 

5th Air Battalion (Army ?) 

11th Air Group 36 planes 

Air Squadron 6 3 XAV 

30 planes 

Air Squardon 7 3 AV 

48 planes 

23rd Air Group 36 planes 

" Air Group 36 planes 

" Air Group 36 planes 

" Air Group 36 planes 

Genzan Air Group__^ 36 planes 

Shiogama Air Group 36 planes 

Kanoya Air Group 36 planes 

Kasuga Maru 1 XCV 

36 planes 
at 
CinC 2nd Fleet with units enroute TAKAO 

plus Crudiv-5 4 CA possibly 5 CA 

Desron-2 1 CL 

16 DD 

Cardiv-4 2 CV & 4 DD 

Cardiv-3 2 CV & 3 DD 

Batdiv-3 less HARUNA 3 BE (maybe 2 BB) 

Total— 3 BB— 4 CV— 7 CL^-47 DD— 4 SIM— 3 AV— 4 XAV— 4 CA- 
3 CM- 17 XAP— 5 XPC— 450 planes. 
Hainan — Canton Area 

CinC South China (in ISUZU) 1 CL 

CinC Sm Exp Force 1 CA 

Crudiv-7 4 OA 

Desron-3 1 CL 

15 DD 

1st Base Force (?) 3 CM 

(part of this may be in Formosan waters) . 12 AM's 

6 XPG 
12 PC 
27 AP 



Total— 5 CA— 2 CL— 15 DD— 3 CINI- 12 AM's— 6 XPG— 12 PC— 
27 AP. 
French Indo China 

CinC S. Exp. Fleet in CHOKAI 1 CA 

1 CL 

1 CM 

9 Torpedo Boats 

? XPG 



Total — 1 CL— 1 CM — 9 Torp. Boats & Miscellaneous. - 
Some of 1st & 2nd Base Force are m»y fee here ( ?) 
OMURA AIR GROUP 36 planes 

12 Air Group f [ 36 planes (?) 

13 Air Group] Some may be on Hainan 1 36 planes (?) 

14 Air Group [ I 36 planes (?) 
Mojtdate Area 

PALAO 

16th Air Group 36 planes 

Srd Base Force 10 XPG 

4 SS (Ro) 



Total— 36 planes— 10 XPG-^ SS. ' 
Truk 
CinC 4th Fleet '- 1 CL 

2 OCL 
1 CL 
8 DD 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



781 



Location of Japanese Fleet Units — ContinuedJ 

Mandate Area — Continued 

4ih Base Force 4 XPG 

4 XAP 

17th Air Group 4 XAM's 

36 planes 



Total— 36 planes— 2 CLr-2 OCLr-8 DD— 4 XPG— 4 XAP— 4 XAM. 
Saipan 

CinC Submarine Force 1 CL 

plus subs (?) 1 Suron (?) 1 AS 

7 SS 

Chitose Air Group 36 planes 

IStli Air Group 36 planes 

5th Base Force 2CM 

8 XPG 
5 XAP 



Total— 78 planes— 1 CL— 1 AS— 7 SS— 2 CM— 8 XPG— 5 XAP. 
Marshall Area 

19th Air Group 36 planes 

Yokohama Air Group 36 planes 

Wotje Air Group 34 planes 

Kwajalein Air Group 24 planes 

Air Squadron 24 2 XAV 

KORYU (?) plus plane guards 30 planes 

1 CV 
4 DD 

Submarine Squadron 7 1 AS 

9 SS (Ro) 

Sudiv(?) 4 SS (I) 

Submarine Squadron 3 9 SS (I) 

6th Base Force 4 XAM's 

8 XPG 
3 PC 
KATSURIKI 1 AG (survey) 



Total— 140 planes— 2 XAV— 1 CV— 4 DD— 1 AS— 22 SS— 4 XAM- 
8 XPG— 3 PG— 3 PC— 1 AG. 



Respectfully, 



E. T. Layton 
Lieutenant Comm'ander, U. S. N.. 

Fleet Intelligence Officer. 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 24 

sealed — secret 

Naval message — Navy Department 



'Phone Ext. No. Op-12. Br. 2992 


Addressees 


Message Precedence 


R17R 
From' Chief of Naval Operations 


Action: 

To CinCaf. 
CinCpao 
Comll. 
Coml2, 
Coml3. 
ComlS. 


Priority. 


Released by: Ingersoll .. . 


Routine. 


Date: November 24, 1941 . 


Deferred. 






TOR Code Room .. 


Info: 

Spenavo London. 
Cinclant. 


Pricrlty. 




Routine. 


Paraphased by 


Deferred. 







Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory. 

242OO5CR0443. 
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with Deferred precedence. 
Originator fill in date and time for Deferred and Mail Delivery: Date Time OCT. 

[Hand written]: Cincaf Cincpac, Coms Eleven Twelve, Thirteen, and Fifteen for action spenavo London 
and Cinclant for infoxx. 



782 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X. 
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements 
their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive 
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possi- 
bility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action Adees 

to inform senior Army Officers ,,^^![, areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order 

your 

not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X 

Guam will be informed separately 

Copy to (WPD, War Dept.) and to OP-12 but no other distribution. 

[Handwritten:] plus 3 copies to sealed secret file. 

Make original only. Deliver to Conununication Watch Ofiicer in person. (See Art. 76 (4), Navy Regu 
lations.) 

Note.— Linetype and italics denote change. 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 25 

sealed — secret 
Naval message — Navy Department 



Phone extension number: Op-12, Ext. 2992 


Addressees 


Message precedence 


From: Chief of Naval Operation. 
Released by . . . 


For action: 
CINCAF. 
CINCPAC. 


Priority X. 
Routine. 


Date: November 27, 1941. 


Deferred. 


TOR Coderoom 


Information: 

CINCLANT. 
SPENAVO. 


Priority. 


Decoded by .. . 


Routine. 


Paraphrased by 


Deferred. 







Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory. 

GKVJL BVKLW 2723370921 
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence. 
Originator fill in date and time for deferred and mail delivery: Date Time OCT 



This despatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan 
looking toward Stabilization of Conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an 
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number 
and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces 
indicates an amphibious expedition pf obab ty against either the Philippines 
[Written: Thai] or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate 
defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46X 
Inform district and Army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War 
Department X Spenavo inform British X 

[Handwritten:] Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate 
measures against sabotage. 

Copy to WPD War Dept. 

Make original only, deliver to Communication Watch Officer ta person. See Art. 76 (4) Nav. Regs. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 783 

Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 26 

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS BY PACIFIC FLEET INTELLIGENCE OFFICER 

6 October 1941-2 December 1941 

Confidential 

Secret Intelligbnqe Repoet 

Reliability Rating : B3. Serial No. 82. Date : October 6, 1941 

Anchored in a Bay near HAKODATE on 26 September : 

7 SS 

2 CL 

2 CA 
Underway headed South in Japan Sea night of 26th : 5 CA. 
29th departed YOKOHAMA: 1 CL (NAKA) Class. 
29th Located South of Hong Kong (CL) ISUZI& (DM) SHUMUSHU. 
26th departed Shanghai (OCA) : IZUMO. 
26th departed Shanghai (PG) : TOBA. 
26th arrived CHEFOO : 1 TB. 
Week ending 27th : Mouth Pearl River — 

12 AP upstream. 

14 AP downstream. 

Serial No. 83 

Air Groups are reported at : Takao, Hoihow, Taichu (?) and Kagi ( ?) . 
ASHIGARA is reported to have left Sasebo with probable destination South 
China. 



Secret Intelligence Report 

Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 85. Date : 27 October 1941 

Latest information of locations of units of Orange Fleet is : 
Takao Area : 

GVs AVs 

RYUJO NOTORO 

ZUIKAKU KENJO MARU 

unidentified Maru Type 

Maru Type 
DD (Plane Guards) 
DD 
Takao : Commander Combined Air Force 

Inland Sea & Ariake Ba^ Area : FIRST & SECOND FLEET plus SUBFORCB 
except: 

Yokosuka : YAMASHIRO. 
Maizuru : KONGO. 
Kanoya-Eastern Kyushu Area : 
CVs: AKAGI HIRYU 
ICAGA HOSHO 

Unidentified 
Unidentified 
Unidentified 
Sasebo Area : THIRD FLEET 

(continued) 



784 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Secret Intelligence Report 

Reliability Rating: A-1. Serial No. 84. Date: 4 November, 1941 

The following information is from a source which has been thoroughly reliable 
in the past : 

From 1 Nov. the navigation through URAGA CHANNEL is restricted as 
follows. Seven fixed buoys are in the channel. 

(1) Lighted buoy : From ASHIKA JIMA lighted buoy 136 degrees, 6050 meters 
(3.27 miles) . Lighted painted black. 

(2) Lighted buoy : From ASHIKA JIMA lighted buoy 104 degrees, 6500 meters 
(3.55 miles). Painted black. 

(3) Lighted buoy : From ASHIKA JIMA lighted buoy 104 degrees, 6700 meters 
(3.66 miles). Painted red. 

(4) Flag buoy : From ASHIKA JIMA" lighted buoy 87 degrees, 6600 meters 
(3.61 miles). 

(5) Flag buoy: From buoy (4) 190(170?) degrees, 500 meters (.27 miles). 

(6) Flag buoy: From KANNONSAKI LIGHT 88 degrees, 4900 meters (2.67 
miles) . 

(7) Flag buoy: From buoy (6) 170 degrees, 500 meters (.27 miles). 

NAVIGATION 

Sail to the east of lighted buoy (1) and between lighted buoys (2) and (3). 
Sail to the east of the northern four buoys because the sea area to west of them 
is dangerous. Do not enter (this area) . 

When meeting (another ship) going to the entrance between buoys (2) and (3), 
the ship leaving port is to wait. 

There will probably be maintenance by naval patrol vessels and by the lookout 
station on the northwest point of NOKOGIRI YAMA. 

Take care ! 



Secret Intellige;nce Report 

Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 85. Date : 10 November 1941 

Reliable information indicates the ZUIKAKU, NOTORO and two Maru Tenders 
have returned to the Sasebo-Kure Area. RYU JO is still in Taiwan. The KEN JO 
MARU is in the Saigon-Camanh Bay Area. 



Secret - Intelugence Report 

Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 86. Date : 12 November 1941 
It is reliably reported that the RYUJO has returned to Kure. 



Secret Intelugence Report 

Reliability Rating: (?). Serial No. 87. Date : 22 Nov. 1941 ' 

Dutch Authorities in the NEI have received information that a Japanese ExpCr 
ditionary Force which is strong enough to constitute a threat against the NEI 
or Portugese Timor has arrived in the vicinity of Palau. If this force moves past 
a line through Davao-Waigea-Equator the Governor General of the NEI will 
regard it as an act of hostility and will consider war to have begun. 



Secret Intelligence Report 

Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 88. Date : 23 Nov. 1941 

CinCAF has no information confirming the Dutch report of a Japanese Expe- 
ditionary Force near Palao. His information does not indicate the presence of 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 785 

units other than the Fourth Fleet in the mandates and no unusual concentration 
of that force. It is possible that there may be an increase in the number of 
transports and marus. There has been a concentration of 30-40 marus in the 
Saipau area since the middle of October. CinC Fourth is at Saipan as of the 
22nd and it is possible that Airon 24 may also be present. Slight indications 
are that one battleship division and two carriers are preparing to proceed to the 
mandates but so far there has been no signs that the movement has begun. 



Secret Intelligence Report 

Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 89. Date : 23 Nov. 1941 

CinC Fourth Fleet is now reported to have returned to Truk after a trip to 
Saipan in the Kashima. There has been increased activity of the cruiser division 
and other units of the Fourth Fleet in the Truk-Saipan area. The following 
increases in Base Forces are estimated: Third (Palao), one (1) division marus; 
Fourth (Truk), two divisions marus, two maru air tenders, special landing 
force (?) ; Fifth (Saipan), two divisions marus; Sixth (Jaluit), three divisions 
marus, three unidentified shore commands, two maru air tenders. 

The activity of the Combined Air Force is increasing. The Eleventh Air Corps 
is believed to be at Palao and Airon Twenty four is concentrated in the Mar- 
shalls. The Fifth Fleet is apparently at Chichijima with portions possibly at 
Marcus. There have been approximately seventy arrivals or departures of 
marus since one November, mostly in the Truk and Jaluit areas. 



Secret Intelligence Repokt 

Reliability Rating : Serial No. 90. Date : 25 November 1941 

The U. S. N. Shipping Adviser in Batavia reports that the Dutch report con- 
cerning the Japanese Expeditionary Force near Palao originated from the Dutch 
Army in Timor. Portugese Timor was named as the objective of the Expedition. 
The information was classed as doubtful and no further confirmation has been 
obtained. 



Secret Intelligence Report 

Reliability Rating : Serial No. 91. Date : 25 Nov. 1941 

The' British report that Germany is obtaining rubber from Saigon in the fol- 
lowing shipments. All routing is from Saigon to Bordeaux around Cape Horn. 
Six thousand tons was shipped in two Japanese ships on 15 October and 14 
November respectfully. Five thousand tons is to be shipped in a German ship 
on about one December. The Jap ships may be German vessels under Japanese 
charter. The ships have not yet been identified. 



top secret 

Secret 

Intelligence Report 

Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 12. Date ; 25 November 1941 

Opnav reports that the chances of any favorable result coriiing out of the 
present negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. It is his opinion that this, 
.coupled with the statements of the Japanese government, and the movements 
of their military and naval forces, indicates that they may make a surprise 
aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines 
or Guam. The Chief of Staff of the Army concurs in this opinion. Senior Army 
Officers in the Far East, Pacific and West Coast areas (including Panama) have 
been informed. Utmost secrecy is enjoined regarding this opinion in order to 
not further complicate the present tense situation or to precipitate Japanese 
action. 



786 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TOP SECRET 

tiecret 

Intelligence Report 

Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 13. Date : 25 Nov. 1941 

For the past month the Commander Second Fleet has been organizing a Force 
composed of the following: 

Second Fleet — Third Fleet (including 1st and 2nd Base Forces and 1st 
Defense Division) — Combined Air Force — Desron Three — Airron 7 — 
Subron 5 — possibly units of Batdiv 3 (from First Fleet). 

These units are linked vpith the South China Fleet and French Indo-China 
Force as well as the Naval Stations at Sama, Takao and Bako. Thp Commander 
Second Fleet has intensely been interested in operations at Palao and the Third 
Base Force which is at Palao. 

The Combined Air Force has assembled at Takao with some indications that 
certain units have moved on to Hainan. 

The Third Fleet is believed moving in the direction of Takao and Bako. 

The Second Base Force appears to transporting the equipment of air forces to 
Taiwan. 

An unidentified Second Fleet unit and a submarine unit appears to be in the 
vicinity of Takao. Crudiv 7 and Desron 3 appear to be an advance unit and 
may be en route South China. A strong concentration of submarines and air- 
craft is believed in the Marshalls comprising Airron 24, at least one cardiv and 
one third of the submarine force. 

Com 14 believes the above indicates a strong force is preparing to operate in 
SoutliEastern Asia while certain units operate from Palao and the Marshalls. 



top secret 

Secret 

Inteujgence Kepokt 

Reliability Rating : A. Serial No. 94. Date : November 26. 1941 

A reliable source of information evaluates the situation during the past few 
days as follows. He considers it reliable: 

1. He believes that various units of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th Fleets are being 
directed by CinC 2nd Fit in a loosely-knit organization. He further states that 
the organization appears to be subdivided into two sections. And expects : 

Section I to operate in South China Area. 
Section II to operate in the Mandates. 

2. Forces which appear to be under CinC 2nd Fit. 

« 
section I 

CruBiv 7 (From 2nd Fit) (4 CA's— KUMANO, MOGAMI, MIKUMA, 

SUZUYA) 
Airon 6 (From Combined Air Force) (3 XAV's— ICAMIKAWA MARU, 

FUJIKAWA MARU, KEN JO MARU) 
1st Defense Division (From 3rd Fit) 

Sulron 6 (From 6th Fit) (1 CL, 2 Subdivs (4 ss) ) (note 4 SMs) 
It is possible but not known for sure that Crudiv 6 may be included herein. 
(From 1st Fit) (4 CA's— KAKO, FURUTAKA, KOBA, KINUGASA) 

section II 

Crudiv 5 (From 2nd Fit) (3 CA's (maybe 4)— MYOKO, NACHI, HAGURO) 
Cardiv 3 (From Carrier Fit) (2 CV's— RYUJO?, HOSHO) RYU JO and 1 

MARU 
Desron 2 (From 2nd Fit) (1 CL, 3 Desdivs(12 DD's) ) 
Desron 2 (From 2nd Fit) (1 CL, 3 Desdivs(12 DD's) ) 
Subron 5 (From 6th Fit) (1 CL, 3 Subdivs (6 or 7 SS's) ) 
Desdiv 23 (From Carrier Pit) (4 DD's) 
1st Base Force (From 3rd Fit) 
3rd Base Force (At PALAO) 
Sth Base Force (At SAIPAN) 
Other lesser units (Names not known) 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 787 

It is possible but not known for sure that Batdiv S may be Included herein. 
(From 1st Fit) (4 BBs— HIYEI^ KONGO, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA) (HARUNA 
may be undergoing major repairs) 

3. Disposition of remainder of 3rd Fit in doubt but it is assumed they will 
be stationed around the BAKO-TAKAO area or further south. 

4. Indications are that today (Nov. 26th) Desron S (1st Fit), Crudiv 7 (2nd 
Fit) and Suiron 6 (6th Fit) are in the TAKAO area. Units of Combined Air 
Forces from the Empire are at TAKAO, HOCHOW, PAKHOI, SAIGON and other 
bases along the CHINA COAST and in TAIWAN. 

5. He cannot confirm report there being large force of SS and CVs in the 
MANDATES. Thinks all known carriers of 1st and 2nd Fits are still in the 
KURE-SASEBO area. 

6. He believes that: 

CinC Combined Fit is in NAGATO (BB) 
1st " " " EYVGA (BB) 

2nd " " " AT AGO (CA) (In KURE area) 
3rd " " " ASHIGARA (CA) (In SASEBO area) 
. 5th " » " CHICHIJIMA area 

6th " " " £:4firir/i/4 (CL) (In YOKOSUKA area but this 

is unreliable) 

7. CinC 2nd Fit, CinC 3rd Fit and CinC Southern Expeditionary Force ap- 
parently have the major roles. 

8. Units from North or Central appear to have joined the South China Fleet 
(probably torpedo boats). 

9. One Base Force unit apparently being used to strengthen Southern Expedi- 
tionary Force. 



Secret Intelligence Repobt 

Reliability Rating : A. Serial No. 95. Date : November 27, 1941 

A reliable agent states that there appears to be ORANGE Army activity in the 
air that envolves Imperial Headquarters, Combined Army Forces and Com- 
mander OPTION KING AFIRM. Commander OPTION KING AFIRM and Com- 
bined Army Taiwan and Combined Army Forces Sama. 



Confidential Intelligence Report 

Reliability Rating : B-3. Serial No. 96. Date : 27 November 1941 

Information from British Intelligence (Far East) sources states: 

Japan will commence Military Operations on 1 December against the KBA 

Isthmus, Thailand, with the objective of interposing between Bankok and 

Singapore. 
Main landing and center of effort at SINGORA (SONGKHLA). 
Japanese Assault Forces to proceed direct from TAIWAN (FORMOSA) 

and HAINAN Is. 



TOP 8ECBET 

Secret Intelligence Repokt 

Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 97. Date : 28 Nov. 41 

Absoutely reliable reports from Singapore are that the following procedure 
will be carried out on Japanese news broadcasts in the event that diplomatic 
relations are on the verge of severance : 

On ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts, the following words repated five times 
at the beginning and the end will have this significance : 
HIGASHI HIGASHI : Japanese-American. 
KITA KITA : Russia. 

NISHI NISHI: England (including occupation of Thai or invasion of 
Malaya and NEI). 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 1 9 



788 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

On Japanese language foreign news broadcasts, the following sentences repeated 
twice in the middle and twice at the end will be used : 
"HIGASHI NO KAZE AME" (America). 
"KITA NO KAZE KUMORI" (Russia). 
"NISHI NO KAZE HARE" (England). 
The British and Com 16 are monitoring the above broadcasts. 



Secret Inteixigence Report 

Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 98. Date : 28 Nov. 1941 

Com 16 reports location of following units : 
In Formosa Straits : 
ISUZU 
SubTender 

4 Subs (probably Subron 6) 
NAGOYA aiARU 
NITTA MARU sailing Yogosuka to Takao on 29th with military supplies. 
Two senior construction otficers and 400O men (status unknown) order to 
the Mandates. 

Unidentified CL (?) has apparently relieved KASHWI as flagship of the 
Southern Expeditionary Fleet and is now in the Camranh Bay Saigon Area. 



Secret iNTBnxiGENCB Report 

Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 99. Date : 29 Nov. 1941 

Com 16 reports recent developments noted : 

"COMDR FIRST PATROL FORCE" has headquarters apparently in Palao 
or Yokosuka along with other forces of this nature. 
"FIFTH AIR BATTALION" is at Takao. 
"COMDR AIR BORNE TROOPS" (location unknown). 
"FRENCH INDOCHINA BILLETING DETACHMENT" in Saigon Area. 
"THIRD FLEET HEADQUARTERS" probably at Yokosuka. 
CinC Third has shifted flag from ASHIGARA to NAGARA. 
CinC Southern Expeditionary Force shifted flag from KASHII to CHOKAI. 
New additions to the First Section (Ser. # 94) : 
DESRON 4. 
SUBRON (?). 

AIRRON 7 (CHITOSE type). 
The HIYEI and KONGO now appear to be definitely in the First Section but 
no movement has been noted. 

Completely reliable information indicates that CinC Combined will leave Kure 
Zone at 0400 today, leave Sasebo Zone at midnight on the 1st and enter Bako 
Zone at midnight on the 2nd. 



Secret iNTEaxiGENCE Report 

Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 100. Date : 1 Dec. 41 
There have arrived in the Takao Area in the past two days : ComDesRon 5 
in the NATORI : NAKA to join DesRon4 ; Units of Number Two Base Force ; 
CHOGEI (believed to be tender for two subdivs). All of these units are under 
command of CinC Third. CinC Second has shifted from Kure to Sasebo Area 
in the ATAGO apparently en route South China Waters. 



Secret Intelligence Report 

Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 101. Date : 1 Dec 1941 

Absolutely reliable agent in Bangkok reports that on the 29th conferences 
were in progress considering plans to force the British to attack Thai at Padang 
Bessa near Singora as counter move to Japanese landing at Kota Bharu. Thai, 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 789 

at present, intends to consider the first invader as her enemy therefore Japan 
believes this landing in Malay would force the British to invade Thai at Padang 
Bessa. Thai would then declare war against the British and call on Japan 
for help. This plan appears to have the approval of the Thai Chief of Staff 
Bijitto. Up until 25 November Thai government circles have been sharply 
divided between pro-British and pro-Japanese but now those favoring Japan 
seem to have silenced the anti-Japan group and intend to force Premier Pibul 
to make a decision. They expect early and favorable developments. 



Secret Inteujgenob Rkpoet 

Reliability Rating : A-1. Serial No. 102. Date : 2 December 1941 

CinC Second Fleet [handwritten: in ATAGO] and the Cine Third Fleet have 
put in their appearance in the TAKAO Area. The Commander Southern Expe- 
ditionary Force in the CHOKAI has arrived at SAMA, HAINAN. 

The U. S. Ambassador at Bangkok on the 30th requested permission to 
destroy all but a limited number of Codes. 

Three I-class submarines were sighted bearing 070 distant 180 miles from 
SAIGON, course 180 speed 15. 

Nine (9) ORANGE Submarines sighted at 0230 GCT 2nd Latitude 13-10, 
longitude 110-00 East course 180 speed 10. 

Reported at CAMRANH Bay 21 ORANGE transports with a six plane patrol 
overhead. 



Hevtitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 27 
U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIO FI>EET 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflBcer 
for burning when of no further use 

In ^ okyo Yokohama area at present time, Kamakura and Nitta Marus X 
Yokohama Dock Yard finished, not long ago, 2 escort ships X 2 transports left 
Yokohama last Thursday in November one carrying aircraft, the other Navy 
men 

CBO HRF Date 5 December 41 Serial No. 12-129 
Originator : NAVATT TOKYO 
Action : OPNAV 
Information : 

CINCPAC 

CINCAF 

COM 16 



U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraghrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflBcer 
for burning when of no further use. 

Nazis from Shanghai who are of military age are being transferred to Japan 
for training thought for purpose of serving on German ships which are now 
in Japan. In this connection 80 have departed in last 10 days average age of 
these men 30 years. A great deal of pressure is being brought to bear on French 
Concession by 9 Shanghai officials to bring about the discharge of Anglo Ameri- 
can civilian volunteer members of police reserves for the purpose of replacing 
them with Italians and Germans. The following information from British In- 



790 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

telligence who gave it a reliability classification of B2: Kamakura, Nitta and 
Argentina Maru carrying personnel, oil, supplies, and building material have 
visited Caroline Islands since September ; Majuro, Mejit, and Katherine Islands 
are being specially developed; laborers numbering 3000 have been landed at 
Jaluit. 

CBO S Date 4 Dec 41 Serial No. 12-102 
Originator : 

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI 
Action : 

OPNAV 
Information : 

CINCPAC 

CINCAF 

COM 16 

NAVATT CHUNGKING 

U. S, Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 

(Classification): Confidential. Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflBcer for 

burning when of no further use. 

In response to the reference (Cincpac Serial No. given below). The unidentified' 
modern vessel was a 10,000 ton cargo ship which has been converted into a sea- 
plane carrier. , , , 

Characteristics: Flush deck, with raised foe s'l, with raked bow and cruiser stem, 
mounting 14.7" gun on elevated platiform foward. and 14.7 gun on poop deck. 

RAISED FORE CASTLE A^^© *:t¥S» DECK. 

Ref: No. 11-827 

Subref: No. 11-759 

CBO MRQ Date 4 Dec 41 Serial No. 12-103 

Originator: Information: 

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC 

Action: CINCAF 

OPNAV COM 16 



U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PAOIFTC FLEET 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer 
for burning when of no further use. 

State Department advises : 

Jap troop and supply ships commenced making Saigon November 21, and have 
disembarked approximately 20,000 men, using all wharves possible. From Friday 
to Wednesday, 10,000 further troops came by train from the north. Present 
concentration of troops in South Indo China believed about 70,000 with estimates 
as high as 128,000 although latter figure discredited as being too high. Large 
number of trucks landed, carrying materials and men inland, in a large movement, 
of such size that it appears to point to immediate action against Siam. All above 
received from Saigon, following from Hanoi, all reports on November 26 unless 
otherwise noted. 

On the morning of November 25, the mayor of Haiphong notified all affected 
parties the Japs were going to commandeer all stores being shipped to China 
and to this end ordered that they must have all keys to all bonded storehouses 
prior to noon that day, despite the fact that protest was made by the French. 
He advised also that those concerned should exercise their own judgment as to 
compliance with the order. Report from Hanoi further stated that recently 
augmented stores and military gear, landed at Haiphong, (consisting principally 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 791 

of gasoline and railway equipment, including rolling stock) are being further 
shipped south. 

It is said Nipponese intend to buy as many as 500 native boats, and have, in 
fact, acquired a great many along the coast of Tongking Province, which they 
have moved south. Tuesday, the U. S. Consul at Hanoi obtained report from 
dependable sources, stemming from Governor General's Office to the effect that 
the latter had learned from an agent of proposed Japanese move. This movement 
was said to be contemplated in the form of simultaneous Army-Navy action, sea 
forces to open hostilities on Isthmus Kra, while land forces attacked Thailand. 
Same information was credited with statement that the above advances would 
be made without advance warning in form of ultimatum or declaration of war. 

Wednesday report from Hanoi stated that there has been considerably more 
activity in the way of landing and movement south of armed forces, 4000 men 
having been disembarked in the last few days. A special train will carry about 
1500 south on Tuesday and Wednesday of this week. Tongking is said to contain 
some 25000 (estimated) Nipponese troops with 90 planes present at Gialam. 

CBO HRF Date 29 November 41 Serial No. 11-891 
Originator : Information : 

OPNAV CINCPAC 

Action : COM 16 

CINCAF COM 14 



U. S. Naval Communication Sebvich 

COMMANDBB-IN-OHIEF, U. S. PACIFIO FLEEH- 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflScer for 
burning when of no further use. 

During period mentioned in your 182250 United States merchant vessels were 
in the vicinity of Ellice and Gilbert. 

CBO FWR Date 29 Nov '41 Serial No. 11-879 
Originator : Information : 

OPNAV CINCPAC 

Action : 

NAVOBS AT WELDINGTON 



U. S. Naval Communication Skbvicb 

OOMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflScer for 
burning when of no further use. 

Kamakura Nitta and Argentia Marus have been engaged since September in 
hauling materials in the form of supplies, oil, construction supplies, as well as 
personnel to the mandate islands X On one trip to the Marshall group, 3000 
workmen were carried and disembarked at Jaluit X Two trips have been made 
to the Caroline Islands X Awaiting transportation, seemingly, at Yokahoma 
Naval pier, is approximately 8000 Wadts gasoline in drums X Development of 
the Marshall group is proceeding on the following islands: Katherine (Ujae 
Atoll ), Ma juro X Mejit X Watt (Ailuk) 

CBO HRF Date 27 November 41 Serial No. 11-823 
Originator : Information : 

NAVATT TOKYO CINCPAC 

Action : CINCAF 

OPNAV COM 16 

CINCPAC COM 14 



792 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for 

burning -when of no further use. 

Following report received from commanding officer of a foreign merchant sMp 
by the office of the Naval attache at Shanghai : Left Hongkong for Shanghai, 
Sunday, November 23. While on the way, saw numerous transports. There 
were approximately 3 or 4 ships sighted during each watch the first three days 
of this week. They were travelling in a general southerly direction. Trans- 
ports were sailing either alone or in groups of few ships. 

Following is also noted by the Shanghai attache's office : There is an unusually 
small amount of supplies on the military docks in Shanghai. 

CBO HRF Date 27 November 41 Serial No. 11-834 
Originator : Information : 

AS ST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC 

Action : CINCAF 

OPNAV NAVATT CHUNGKING 

NAVATT TOKYO 
COM 16 



U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for 

burning when of no further use. 

Following Jap naval ships sighted : 

Northeast Amoy 20th course southwest 10,000 ton modern ship fitted as sea- 
plane carrier with catapult. On deck 8 seaplanes Navy type 95. 

OfE Swatow: 19th; course South, light cruiser and destroyer Soihow 17th: 
20 merchant type ships left heading for Formosa off Saigon 15th : 7 transports. 

CBO WBM Date Nov. 25 Serial No. 11-759 
Originator : Information : 

ASST NAVATT CINCPAC 

SHANGHAI NAVATT TOKYO 

Action : NAVATT CHUNGKING 

CINCAF OPNAV 

COM 16 



U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for 

burning when of no further use. 

The following 5 ships, previously Japanese merchant motor ships, arrived here 
with names blocked out and painted grey — Atutasan, Mitsui line. 1 more same 
type. 

Sato Nyk. 

2 sister ships Tekasii Maru, Ockshima Steamship Co. 

They were armed with 10 to 16 AA guns apiece. The ships with 10 guns have 
mounts placed for 6 more machine guns. They had an average of 7 3-inch dual 
purpose guns with the other guns being automatic and seemed to be approximate- 
ly 50 caliber. 

CBO WBM Date Nov. 25 Serial No. 11-751 
Originator : Information : 

ASST NAVATT CINCPAC 

SHANGHAI CINCAF 

Action : NAVATT^ TOKYO 

OPNAV NAVATT CHUNGKING 

COM 16 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 793 

U. S. Naval Commttnication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF V. S. PACIFIC FLEET 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for 

burning when of no further use. 

Shipping here is now normal. No large movements seen either north or south 
along coast to date. About 24,000 troops with large amount of military equip- 
ment sailed from Woosung between the 15th and 23rd. Several trucks leaving 
were seen to be newly camouflaged, mostly green in color. This type of camou- 
flage is unusual in this locality. 184 landing boats besides others on 5 vessels 
were included in the above equipment. Could not obtain exact check. 

CBO WBM Date Nov. 25 41 Serial No. 11-761 
Originator : Information : 

ASST NAVATT CINCPAC 

SHANGHAI CINCAF 

Action : NAVATT CHUNGKING 

OPNAV NAVATT TOKYO 



U. S. Naval Communication Ser\'Ice 

COMMANDEB-IN-CHIEF IT. S. PACIFIC FLEET 

(Classification : ) Confidential 

Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for 
burning when of no further use 

At 2115 November 24 about 1,000 miles east of Guam, the ANSAC clipper 
sighted 4 Japanese seaplanes flying south at 10,000 feet. 

CBO WBM Date Nov 25 41 Serial No. 11-766 

Originator COM 14 

MARDET WAKE INFORMATION : 

COM 14 CINCPAC 

Action : 



U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEP U. S. PACIFIC FLEETT 

(Classification:) Confidential 

Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for 
burning when of no further use 

Five transports departed Woosung Saturday with undetermined number of 
troops and small boats X Present at Woosung on the same day were eight 
other transports of from four to twelve thousand tons each. 

No activity was noted between Shanghai and Darien X 2000 troops arrived 
Shanghai from Nanking by rail Thursday night. 

Some observers believe that the transports which left Woosung last week 
were possibly going to northern Formosa avoiding shipping lanes. Upon leav- 
ing Woosung these vessels did not change course until out of sight of the pilot 
boat. No convoys were seen along coast and foreign vessels from Hong Kong 
report only a few scattered transports south-bound with troops and landing boats. 

One 10,000 ton ispecial landing craft carrier which departed Shanghai 18th 
was sighted 20th off Wenchow on southwesterly course. 

CBO WJE Date 24 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-725 

Originator : Information : 

ASST NAVAL ATTACHE^ SHANG- CINCPAC 

HAI CINCAF 

Action : NAV ATT CHUNGKING AND 

OPNAV TOKYO 



794 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
U. S. Naval Communication Service 

OOMMANDEB-IN-CHIEF V. S. PACIFIC FLEET 

( Classification : ) Confidential 

Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflScer for 
burning when of no further use 

Reliable report at Singapore of monoplane with two engines and one rudder 
making reconnaissance flights over Gilbert Islands on November 15th X Re- 
I)eated on the 16th November by single wing silver flying boat number of engines 
undetermined 

CBO S Date 22 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-686 

Originator : Information : 

NAVATT SINGAPORE CINCPAO 

Action : CINCAF 

OPNAV 



U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF XT. S. PACIFIC FUCET 

(Classification:) Confidential 



Paraphrase 



This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflacer for 
burning when of no further use 

Transports with limited number horses troops and roughly 115 landing boats 
assorted equipment trucks and anti-aircraft guns sailed from Shanghai from 
14th to 17th X 7 ships of similar type are present X Hasidate sailed Canton 
14th Nov X 1 minelayer transport 6 destroyers 3 torpedo boats departed Amoy 
X 2 destroyers 1 troop ship and cruiser of the Natori class were anchored off 
Bias Bay 15th Nov X 2 destroyers sighted on southerly course south of Hong- 
kong on 16th Nov X Night of 17th Italian escort vessel Eritrea departed Shang- 
hai with 190 tons Diesel oil bound Okon X 14th observed 12 transports down- 
stream and 18 upstream at mouth Pearl River X From 10 to 14 Nov master 
sighted 17 tran^orts southbound at intervals between Crown Colony and 
Woosung 

CBO S Date 21 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-626 

Originator : Information : 

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC 

Action : OPNAV 

CINCAF NAVATT TOKYO 

NAVATT CHUNGKING 
COM 16 



U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDEB-IN-CHIEP U. 8. PACIFIC FLEEH" 

(Classification:) Confidential 

Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for 
burning when of no further use 

Close to 14000 Japanese troops with about 80 tanks and 20 field pieces have 
arrived here from Nanking during the past 5 days by rail believed awaiting water 
transportation from this point X During the first part of November lesser num- 
ber of young recruits were sent inland from Shanghai after their arrival from 
Japan. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 795 

CBO S Date 21 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-627 

Originator : Information : 

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAO 

Action : CINCAF 

OPNAV NAVATT TOKYO 

NAVATT CHUNGKING 
COM 16 



U. S. Naval Communication Sebvice 

COMMANDEE-IN-CHIEF IT. S. PACmo FLEETT 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflBcer for 
burning when of no further use. 

1000 troops left Swatow 15th Nov X Installation machine gun mounts being 
completed here after arrival on several vessels vphich appear to have been only 
recently taken over X 3 outbound ships Shanghai were observed to carry sec- 
tions of trestles on deck sections were 60 feet long by 8 feet high by 8 feet wide 
and made of creosoted heavy timbers X Woosung military base has shown intense 
activity since Nov 15th X There are an unusual number of ships present which 
include former merchant vessels of 10000 tons and up average X 10 transports 
departed 19th 8 of these were carrying troops 32 more transports anchored 
lower WhangiK)o X Landing boats still constitute part of outgoing equipment. 

CBO S Date 21 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-630 

Originator : Information : 

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC 

Action : CINCAF 

OPNAV COM 16 

NAVATT TOKYO 
NAVATT CHUNGEaNG 



U. S. Naval Communication Sebvice 

COMMANDEE-IN-CHIEF U. 8. PACIFIO FLEET 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for 
burning when of no further use. 

On 16 and 17 November, planes, apparantly Japanese, were sighted over Gilberts. 
On the 16th the plane was a twin engine monoplane and on the 17th a flying 
boat. The flying boat was on a generally north and south course, speed 125. 
These flights indicate a daily patrol from Jaluit, over Gilberts, to an area south 
near shipping routs. 

Truk and Saipan were each recently reinforced with half a squadron of bombers 
and half a squadron of fighters. 

Several unknown ships have been reported near EUlce and Gilbert. Also, re- 
ports have been received of Japanese liners carrying either troops or laborers to 
Mandates. 

Note. — ^The source of the above report is the New Zealand Naval Intelligence. 

CBO MRQ Date 19 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-550 

Originator : Action : 

ALUSNOB OPNAV 

WELLINGTON Information : 

CINCPAO 



796 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF XT. S. PACIFIO FLEET 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflQcer for 
burning when of no further use. 

Strict regulations being enforced in Camranh Bay area. The following from a 
responsible foreign traveler on an orange ship which anchored in Camranh Bay 
last month while riding out a typhoon : Japanese building activity being rushed. 
Freighters observed in harbor discharging cargo. French 75's on surrounding 
hills, 4 long range rifles on hills over looking outer bays with a number if minor 
caliber guns. Island inner bay has 4 small guns. 

CBO 19 Nov '41 Date FWR Serial No. 11-564 

Originator : Information : 

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC 

Action : CINCAF 

OPNAV NAVATT TOKYO 

NAVATT CHUNGKING 
COM 16 



U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIO FLEET 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for 
burning when of no further use. 

Following obtained from supposedly accurate French military source regard- 
ing military situation in Indo-China as of Nov 12 X Amassing of great amount of 
gasoline, ammunition and oil X Japanese forces present reported to be as fol- 
lows X Cambodia-Saigon area 31,000 X Tongking 24,700 X South part of 
Annam 2,500 X It is reported by reliable traveller from that vicinity that large 
amount of heavy artillery has been landed at Saigon and Haiphong during past 
thirty days. 

CBO HRF Date 17 November 41 Serial No. 11-498 

Originator : Information : 

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC 

Action : CINCAF 

OPNAV NAV ATT TOKYO 

COM 16 
NAV ATT CHUNGKING 



U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIO FLEET 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer for 
burning when of no further use. 

Mouth of Pearl River 18 cargo vessels upstream 29 down Sunday to Thursday X 
6 transports present at Shanghai Friday X Same day Canton minesweeper with 
vice admiral's flag departed gun boat Saga X Minelayer Yaeyama class sighted 
9th Canton outbound X Kuma type cruiser and 2 torpedo boats Tuesday Bias 
Bay X 6 destroyers X 3 torpedo boats X 1 transport arrived at Amoy 
W^ednesday X 1 Sendia class south of turnabout Island Tuesday. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 797 

CBO HKF Date 16 November 41 Serial No. 11-486 

Originator : Information : 

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC 

Action : OPNAV 

CINCAF COM 16 

NAVATT CHUNGKING 
NAVATT TOKYO 



U. S. Naval Communication Sekvicb 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF V. S. PACIFIC FLEBTT 

( Classification : ) Confidential Paraphrasa 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer 
for burning when of no further use. 

Below Hongliong Nov 6 13 transports 2 trawlers 28 motor boats on southerly 
course X Off Turnabout Island Nov 4 17 sliips ranging from 2000 tons to 
10,000 tons in a convoy headed southwesterly X Departed Saturday Nov 2 
fram Canton, Shimushu X Following day gunboat Saga was seen at Pearl 
River X Monday Nov 4, cruiser Natori departed Amoy X In period between 
1 and 4 Nov 7 transports left Shanghai X Loaded as follows X 2 with rail- 
way trucks and coaches one each old locomotives X Tanks and trucks remainder 
with miscellaneous military gear including 49 landing boats 

CBO HRF DATE 10 November 41 Serial No. 11-245 

Originator : Information : 

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC 

Action: NAVATT CHUNGKING 

CINCAF NAVATT TOKYO 

OPNAV 
COM 16 



U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIO FLEHTr 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer 
for burning when of no further use. 

During the last two weeks Jap troop trains passing through Tehchow and 
Shihnei from North Pingham Line enroute Tsingtao total approximately 40 
or 50 trains X Movement has now been carried out X No indications of 
Nip divisions being transported north China to Manchuria during the month 
of October X Movement of 20 trains Taiyuanfu Shansi to Tsingtao via Shihnei 
and Tehchow just commencing 

CBO JMS Date 9 Nov 41 Serial No. 11-235 

Originator : Information : 

ASST NAVATT PIEKING ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI 

Action: i NAVATT CHUNGKING 

OPNAV CINCPAC 

CINCAF 
COM 16 



798 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
U. S. Naval Communication Sebvicb 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEP U. 8. PACIFIO FLEET 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer 
for burning when of no further use. 

Supposedly accurate report from sources in Hongkong X Left outward bound 
Monday on Pearl River, 28 trawlers and 35 transports for undetermined points X 
Haiphong, today, Japanese forces to the extent of 12,000 men disembarked, 
with more ready 

CBO HRF Date 8 November 41 Serial No. 11-194 

Originator : Information : 

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI CINCPAO 

Action : CINCAF 

OPNAV COM 16 

NAVATT CHUNGKING 
NAVATT TOKYO 



U. S. Naval Communication Seevicb 

COMMANDEB-IN-CHIEP V. S. PACIFIO FLEBTT 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer 
for burning when of no further use. 

Please forward brief summary by dispatch ahead of full report on information 
requested below X For your information, there is now being sent you by mail 
14th N D intelligence report 1027 of 30 October concerning Edward John 
Coquelle, who is confined in Honolulu X He was according to his statment, 
born French and is a naturalized U S citizen (1930) having taken papers in 
San Francisco X Coquelle's avowed nephew, Alfred Munson, now on Midway, 
is involved in confession made by the former in which he admits addressing 
secret plans to Mrs. Alice Coquelle at 3229 21st Ave., San Francisco X Plans 
were intercepted here, and were contained in a suitcase sent by Coquelle from 
Midway in the sirius during October X U S attorney wishes C N O to have in- 
vestigation of Coquelle's service record made X Also desires San Francisco 
authorities study records to ascertain whether or not Mrs. Coquelle has been 
naturalized and check on her personally X Coquelle avers he was a member 
of Army Intelligence and was with overseas armed forces in first world war 

CBO HRF Date 7 November 41 Serial No, 11-172 

Originator: Action: Information: 

COM 14 OPNAV COM 12 



U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDEE-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIO FLEIffr 

(Classification:) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer 
for burning when of no further use. 

16 destroyers and 14 other naval vessels, probably transports or auxiliaries 
were observed far away, anchored in Wakasa Bay, Obama Harbor area X Above 
are Japanese and were sighted on the thirtieth of October. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



799 



CBO HRF Date 6 November 41 Serial No. 11-153 



Originator : 

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI 
Action : 

CINCAF 



Information : 
CINCPAC 

NAVATT CHUNGKING 
OPNAV 
COM 16 



U. S. Naval Communication Seevicb 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIO FLEBJT 



( Classification : ) Confidential 



Paraphrase 



This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflBcer 
for burning when of no further use. 

The following Japanese naval craft have been observed: Monday the 27th 
10 transports in ballast averaging 6000 tons each anchored off Namow Island 
Swatow X Tuesday 10 small transports south Hongkong course southwest 
loaded with cargo X Sailed Amoy 1 destroyer and cruiser Kuma X A vessel 
departed Shanghai with 600 troops X Sighted at the mouth of the Pearl River 
during the past week 34 transports have passed upstream and 21 downstream. 

At Shanghai the Italian escort vessel Eritrea continued to load oil in drums 
small lots as obtainable X 

German ship Quito left Shanghai night of 31st escorted by 2 Jap gunboats X 
Its cargo included large quantity of Diesel oil and antifouling paint X Its 
destination is believed to be Kobe 

CBO DCG Date 5 Nov Serial No. 11-118 



Originator : 

ASST NAV ATT SHANGHAI 
Action : 

CINCAF 



Information : 
CINCPAC 

NAV ATT CHUNGKING 
NAV ATT TOKYO 
OPNAV 
COM 16 



U. S. Naval Communication Service 

C0MMANDEai-IN-CHIE3' U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 



(Classification.) Confidential 



Paraphrase 



This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer 
for burning when of no further use. 

Following information from Navatt Chungking relaying from chief of SRKO 
intelligence : 

Report from private agent Hongkong states that Orange Fleet has been 
mobilized at Sasebo since 20 October, although he is in doubt as to the reliabil- 
ity of the above information X Probable origin British X Londin notified 
local attache of a general mobilization recently, and he, it is believed, repeated 
information X He has been asked to check through the naval attache at 
Hongkong X Original report from London did not give date or place X 
Chinese claim of Japanese naval concentration at Chainan or Gulf of Siam is 
without confirmation, although there is the usual local unit activity in those 
places. 

CBO HRF Date 27 October 41 Serial No. 10-734 



Oi^iginator : 

NAVATT CHUNGKING 
Action : 

CINCAF 



Information : 

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI 

CINCPAC 

OPNAV 

COM 16 

COMSOPAT 



800 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 



(Classification.) Confidential 



Paraplirase 



This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding ofiicer 
for burning when of no further use. 

Although the Chinese maintain claims that the Japanese intend to attack 
Siberia in the near future, foreign observers claim this hinges upon Russian 
failure in the West X Chungking Russian Attache refuses to make statement 
concerning Russian strength in the East, although suggesting that severe 
weather handicaps Japanese action as well as sufficient Russian strength to 
give Nipponese severe punishment X Chinese also insist the Japs are sending 
four unidentified divisions into Manchuria and are holding four more in read- 
iness in Northern China X British Naval Attache doubts this latter since he 
claims the Chinese obtained it via backdoor, information being originally 
transmitted by me to the Soviet Embassy in my 62/4 Oct. for checking, and by 
the British Attache to London also for cross check. 

CBO HRF Date 27 October 41 Serial No. 10-736 



Originator : 

NAVATT CHUNGKING 

Action : 

CINCAF 



Information : 

ASST NAVATT SHANGHAI 

CINCPAC 

COMSOPAT 

OPNAV 

COM 16 

NAVATT PEIPING 



U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 



(Classification.) Confidential 



Paraphrase 



This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding ofiicer 
for burning when of no further use. 

The following were sighted: 

Thursday — 10 trawlers heading south, near turn about island. 

Thursday — Orange convoy, course southwest, consisting of 11 cargo ships 
and 4 tankers sighted off Amoy. 

Monday — 20 trawlers proceeding southwest off Wenchow with destroyer, 1 
transport. 

Saturday — 2 transports loading small boats at Woosung X Yangtze entrance 
2 transports outbound with landing craft and few troops on board. 

Sharps Peak Jap naval garrison below Foochow for past 2 weeks abandoned 
station on the morning of the 25th. 

FOR25/ 

CBO FWR Date 27 October 41 Serial No. 10-750 



Originator : 

ASNAVAT SHANGHAI 
Action : 

CINCPAC 

CINCAF 



NAVAT CHUNGKING 
NAVAT TOKYO 
OPNAV 

COM 16 
Information : 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 801 

U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 

(Classification.) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding oflScer 
for burning when of no further use. 

2300 Thursday 13 orange transports were seen off Wenchow Tuesday on a 
southwest course X A hospital ship departed Shanghai from upriver with 
2000 wounded X Seen off Wenchow on Wednesday afternoon 9 transport 
averaging 3000 tons moderately loaded, with no troops reported. 

CBO EBR Date 27 Oct. 41 Serial No. 10-703 

Originator : Information : 

ASST NAV AT SHANGHAI CINCPAC NAVATTS 

Action: CHUNGKING, TOKYO 

CINCAF OPNAV, COM 16 



U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 

(Classification.) Confidential Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. Please return to coding officer 
■ for burning when of no further use. 

It is reported that all Jap tankers are being armed with 2 guns. 

Izumo, converted carrier, was launched at Kobe October 30th and was moved 
to the dock formerly occupied by the Zuikaku. 

The main Japanese Fleet departed on 28 October for the Kure area. 

Master of foreign vessel order charter to Nips states that a guard ship is 
now stationed at Tsucaru strait and signals all passing ships for name, nationality, 
and destination. 

CBO MRQ Date 5 Oct. 41 Serial No. 11-117 

Originator : Information : 

ASST NAV ATT SHANGHAI CINCPAC 

Action : CINCAF 

OPNAV NAV ATT CHUNGKING 

COM 16 



8-e-c-r-e-t 



Hewitt Inquirt Exhibit No. 28 

United States Pacific Fleett 
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

PHARii EUrbor, T. H., November 28, 1941. 



Memorandum for: Admiral. 

Subject : Projected Reconnaissance Flight over Mandates Islands. 

1. The subject was discussed with the Intelligence Section, Hawaiian Air 
Force, on 27 and 28 November, 1941, and will be further discussed this afternoon 
at 1430. 

2. I have furnished the Intelligence Officer, Hawaiian Air Force, with Meet 
Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, giving the general summary of the installations 
and developments in the Mandates. The Chief of G-2, H. A. F., has promised 
me that this publication will not be reproduced by them nor given any circulation 
except to the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and to the commanders of the 
Army squadrons to be stationed on Wake and Midway. This document will not 
be carried in any aircraft. 



802 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. The urgent need for as wide a reconnaissance of the Marshalls, Truk and 
Ponape was stressed with particular reference to Jaluit, Eniwetok, Kwajelien, 
Rongelap, Wotje and Maloelap. 

4. The Fleet Aerological Officer was present at this morning's conference and 
is working up meteorological data in conjunction with the proposed reconnais- 
sance. From a point of view of photographic interpretation the hours of medium 
shadow 9-11 a. m. and 2-4 p. m. are considered most advantageous and fog con- 
ditions are expected to be best at around 10 a. m. Consequently, that hour has 
been tentatively agreed upon for arrival at first objective. 

5. The Army plans to fly two (2) B-24 planes fully manned with defensive 
armament and photographic equipment from Wake on the selected day, de- 
partures to be staggered so that arrivals over assigned initial points would be 
practically simultaneous. Lacking definite information as to Radar installa- 
tions in the Mandates it is proposed (tentatively) to make the first objective of 
the planes Jaluit and Truk respectively. The Jaluit plane returning via Maloelap, 
Wotje, Kwajelien, Rongelap and Pokaakku. The Truk plane returning via 
Ujelang and Eniwetok. These return objectives being dependent upon discovery 
or detection at or after first objective, and existing conditions at the time. 

6. The second reconnaissance is to be conducted over Ponape enroute to Port 
Moresby was assigned Ujelang, Ponape and Kapingamarangi (Greenwich Island). 

7. The Hawaiian Air Force has requested that I sit in on all conferences after 
the arrival here of the photographic planes and that I brief the pilots on all 
matters relating to the Mandates prior to their takeoff. 

[s] B. T. Latton. 



HEwrrr Inquibt Exhibit No. 29 

U. S. Naval Communication Sehvioh 
Classified commandeb-in-ohief u. s. pacific rLEOT Incoming 

From : Togo, Foreign Minister. 
To: Consul Honolulu. 

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of warships 
after the 4th. 

Togo. 
Date : 6 Dec. 41. 



U. S. Naval Commttnication Service 
Classified commander-in-chief tj. s. paciftc fleet Incoming 

From: Kita. 
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo. 

1. The three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning the 5th 
entered port. They expect to depart port on the 8th. 

2. On the same day the LEXINGTON and 5 heavy cruisers departed. 

3. The following warships were anchored on the afternoon of the 5th : 

8 Battleships 
3 Light cruisers 
16 Destroyers 
Coming in were 4 cruisers of the Honolulu tyi)e and 2 destroyers. 

Kita. 
Date : 5 Dec. 41. 



U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEETT 

Classified Incoming 

From: Foreign Minister. 

T^o : Kita, Consul, Honolulu. 

Strictly Secret. 

Would like you to hold on to your list of code words (also those used in connec- 
tion with radio broadcast) right up until the last minute. When the break comes 
burn immediately and wire us to that effect. 

Togo. 

Date: 3 Dec 41. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 803 

U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COM MANDEE-IN -CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET 

Classified Incoming 

From: Kita. 

To : Foreign Minister. 

On tlie afternoon of the 3rd a Britisli man of war entered Honolulu and de- 
parted early on the 4th about 1100 tons ; one stack, and had a 4 inch gun fore 
and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went ashore and were re- 
ceiving mail at the British consulate. 

KiTA. 

Date : 4 Dec. 41. 

U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDEB-IN-CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEBI 

Classified Incoming 

From: Kita. 

To : Foreign Minister, Tokyo. 

At 1300 on the 4th a light cruiser of the Honolulu class hastily departed. 

KiTA. 

Date : 4 Dec. 41. 



Cincpac File No. United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Consul Kita in Honolulu sent following as #245 on 3 December, 1941. 
From : Ichiro Fujii. 
To : Chief of 3rd Section of General Staff. 

1. I wish to change method of communication by signal to following: 

Signal # 

1. Battleship divisions including screen Preparing to sortie. 

2. Aircraft carriers Preparing to sortie. 

3. Battleship divisions including screen All dep. 1-3 Dec. 

4. Aircraft carriers Several dep. 1-3 Dec. 

5. Aircraft carriers All dep. 1-3 Dec. 

6. Battleship divisions including screen All dep. 4-6 Dec. 

7. Aircraft carriers Several dep. 4-6 Dec. 

8. Aircraft carriers AH dep. 4r-6 Dec. 

2. (A and B.) 

Lanakai beach house will show one light before midnight and two after mid- 
night during the hour number representing the signal : 

Hour Signal # 

2000-2100 1 

2100-2200 2 

2200-2300 3 

2300-2400 4 

2400-0100 5 

0100-0200 6 

0200-0300 7 

0300-0400 8 

(C) During daylight star bot at Lanakai showing masthead star indicates 
signals 1-4. Star and roman numeral three indicates signals 5-8: 

Signal 

1 * 

2__i * 

3__^ * 

4 * 

5 *III 

6 *III 

7 *iir 

8 *III 

79716— 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 10 



804 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(D) At the times indicated a one hour light in tlie attic window of Kalama 
house indicates the corresponding signal : 

Hours Signal # 

1900-2000 1 3 

2000-2100 4 

2100-2200 5 

2200-2300 6 

2300-2400 7 

2400-0100 8 

( E ) In the KGMB Want Ads at 0945, these ads have following signal meaning : 
Want Ad Signal # 

Chinese rug for sale. Apply P. O. Box 1476 3 or 6 

Chicken farm for sale. " " " " 4 or 7 

Beauty Operator wanted. " " " " 5 or 8 

2. If the above signals cannot be made from Oahu a bonfire on Maui about 6 
miles north of Kula Sanatarium between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road 
at point Lat. 20-40 and Long. 156-19 will be made for several days between 1900 
and 2200. It can be seen from the south west or south east of Maui and the 
hour at which it is shown will have the following signal meaning: 

Hour Signal # 

19-2000 3 or 6 

20-2100 4 or 7 

21-2200 5 or 8 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 80 

(Exhibit No. 30 consisted of two Japanese panorama views of Pearl 
Harbor with Japanese log on the reverse side recovered from a Jap- 
anese submarine. These items were returned to Captain Layton.) 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 30A 

(This exhibit consists of a photostat of a Japanese log which ap- 
peared on the reverse side of Exhibit No. 30, This photostat will be 
found reproduced as Item No. 113, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, 
Hewitt Inquiry.) 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. SOB 

Log of Attack 

1300 Completed last work on the tube (TN: midget sub?). Went aboard. 

Waves fairly high. 
1500 OAHU I. sighted. Radio station, red light, and surf (?) sighted. L 20°. 

This ship 90°. 
1615 Barbers Point Light seen operating. L 40°. 
1800 Cruising submerged, depth 25 meters. 

1815 According to intelligence reports, ships present in the harbor on the 5th 
are as follows : 

5 BB's, 3 CL's, 16 DD's docked. 
4 HONOLULU Class CL's, 5 DD's. 
Im 

5 Lt 180 m 

7 220 m 

12 430 m 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 805 

Hewitt Inquiby Exhibit No. 31 

(Exhibit No. 31 consisted of a panorama sketch of Pearl Harbor 
from positions five miles south of Pearl Harbor, -which was recovered 
from a Japanese submarine. This sketch was returned to Captain 
Lay ton.) 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 31A 

(Exhibit No. 31A consists of two photostats of Exhibit No. 31, being 
a panorama sketch of Pearl Harbor from a position five miles south 
of Pearl Harbor which was recovered from a Japanese submarine. 
These photostats will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 114 and 115, 
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.) 



Hewitt Inqubt Exhibit No. 32 

(Exhibit No. 32 was an original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor 
recovered from a Japanese midget submarine. This chart was re- 
turned to Captain Layton.) 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 32A 

(Exhibit No. 32 A consists of three photostatic copies of Exhibit 
No. 32, as follows : 

1. Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from 

a Japanese midget submarine, bearing the original Jap- 
anese characters. 

2. Ihid, with the English translations of the Japanese 

characters. 

3. Photostatic copy of the reverse side of the Japanese chart 

mentioned in Item No. 1 above. 
The foregoing material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 116, 
117, and 118, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.) 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 33 



(Exhibit No. 33 was an original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor 
recovered from a Japanese submarine showing defensive installations. 
This chart was returned to Captain Layton.) 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 33A 



(Exhibit No. 33A is a photostatic copy of Exhibit No. 33, being an 
original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from a Japanese 
submarine, showing defensive installations. This photostatic copy 
will be found reproduced as Item No. 119, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRA- 
TIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.) 



806 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Hewitt Inquiky Exhibit No. 34 

RESTRICTED 

STAFF INSTRUCTIONS 

Staff of the Commandeb-in-Chief United States Pacifio Flkkt, 1941 

A2-12(05) United States Pacific Fleett 

Serial 1525 U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Peael Haeboe, T. H., July 14, 1941. 
The following Staff Instructions are published for the guidance of all persons 
attached to or serving with the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States 
Pacific Fleet, and also the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, 
while both commands are administered jointly. 

The 1938 edition of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff Instructions are hereby 
superseded and all copies should be destroyed. 

W. W. Smith, 
Captain, U. S. Navy, 

Chief of Staff. 
Approved : 

H. E. KiMMEL, 

Admiral, U. S. Navy, 

Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET STAFF INSTRUCTIONS, 1941 

Page Nos . 

Section I Composition, Organization and General Cognizance of Duty 1-3 

Section II Individual Cognizance of Duties 3-15 

Section III Battle Stations Ifi 

Section IV Flag Office Personnel and General Instructions ..- 17-20 

Section V Handling of Correspondence 21-28 

Section VI Confidential and Secret Correspondence 29-30 

Section VII Libraries ._ 31 

Section VIII Rapid Communications t-.. ..- J2-39 

Section IX Registered and other Secret and Confidential Publications 40 

Section X Relationship between Flag and Ship _ 41-43 

STAFF INSTRUCTIONS 1941 

DISTRIBUTION LIST 

COMMAND No Copies 

Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet 40 

Opnav 10 

Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet 5 

Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet 5 

Commander Battle Force, Pacific Fleet 5 

Commander Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet 5 

Commander Base Force, Pacific Fleet (including Subordinate Command) (3 each) 6 

Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet 2 

Commander Battleships, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet 2 

Commander Cruisers, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet 2 

Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet 2 

Commander Mineeraft, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet 1 

Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet , 2 

Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet 1 

Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet 2 

Compatwing Two 1 

Commander Mine Squadron THREE 1 

Commander Transports, Base Force, Pacific Fleet 2 

Commanding General, Second Mnrine Division, Fleet Marine Force 5 

Commandants 11th, 12th, & 14th Naval Districts (each 2) 2 

Fleet Flagship 5 

Fleet Personnel Officer 1 

Total 107 

Spares 40 

Grand total 147 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



807 



STAFF INSTRUCTIONS 
Section I. Composition, Organization and Geneeal Cognizance of Duty 

111. The composition of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States 
Pacific Fleet is as indicated in the following paragraphs. 

112. The Commander-in-Chief is available to the entire Staff for consultation, 
but all questions for decision or action should pass through the Chief of Staff 
whenever such a procedure will not involve an undue delay. 

113. The below tables indicate in general the assignment of duties to the 
members of the Staff. Primary functions are indicated at the top of each 
column ; the officer whose number appears first after each of the subheads 
under (a), (b), (c), or (d) is the leader in the duty specified: 



COMMA NDER-IN- CHIEF— 00 



Chief of Staff— 01. 
Assistant Chief of Staff— 02. 



Personal Aides— 01, 05, 15. 
Staff Duty Officer— 14. 



(a) OPERATIONS 

11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 90, 

95. 

Estimates, Plans, 

Orders, Instructions. 

11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 90, 

95. 



Communications. 

20, 05, 15, 18, 21, 22, 

30. 

Schedules, Train- 

ing.Exercises, Reports 

of Exercises. 11,12, 

13, 15, 16, 20, 50, 90, 

95. 

Tactics. 11, 12, 13, 

15. 



Anchorages, An- 
choring, Getting 
Underway, Operat- 
ing Areas. 11, 12, 
13, 15. 

Joint Army and 
Navy Operations. 

11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 86. 
Ship and Airplane 
Movements. 11, 

12, 13, 95, 15, 20, 50, 
90. 
Navigation. 12. 

Logistics. 50, 12, 90, 
95. 



Intelligence. 11, 25. 

Censorship. 25, 05. 

Aerologies!. 96, 95. 

Navy Relief Force. 
U, 12, 13, 88. 
Security. 21. 
Propaganda. 05, 25, 
26. 



Damage Control. 
60, 11, 90, 75. 
Chemical Warfare 
and Mines. 90. 
Base Hospitals. 11, 
75. 



(b) ADMINISTRA- 
TION 
01, 05, 20, 21, 25, 75, 
90, 95, 96. 

Correspondence 
Files, Records, Le- 
gal Matters, Flag 
Allotment and 
Office, Print Shop, 
Flag Personnel. 05. 
Communications. 

20, 05, 15, 18, 21, 22, 
30. 

Secret and Confi- 
dential Registered 
Publications. 20, 

21, 33. 

Guard Duty, Uni- 
forms, Calls, Cele- 
brations, Ceremo- 
nies, Band, Boats, 
Official Cars. 15. 
Characteristic 
Cards. 50, 18, 90, 
95. 



Athletics and Rec-. 
reation. 15, 96. 

Requisitions, Sur- 
veys, Ship's Serv- 
ice. 50. 

Landing Force and 
Parades. 86, 15, 90. 
Annual Report. 05. 
(Assisted by each 
member of the 
Staff). 

Intelligence. 25, 26, 
20,05. 

Censorship. 25, 26, 
05,20. 

Navy Relief Force 
11, 12, 13, 86. 
Aerological and Per 
sonnel. 96. 
Security. 21. 
Medical (Sanita 
tion, etc.) and Re 
ligous Activities 
75. 

Public Relations, 
27, 25, 26, 05. 
Damage Control 
50, 90, 75. 
Base Hospitals. 75, 

Customs and Agri 
cultural Inspection 
Liaison. 75, 96. 



(c) WAR PLANS 

16, 17, 18, 19, 86. 

Estimates, Plans 
. Orders. 16, 17, 18, 
19. 



Marine Corps mat- 
ters. 86. 

Landing Force. 86. 



Mobilization plans. 
16, 17, 18, 19, 86. 



Joint Army and 
Navy Operations. 
16, 17, 18, 86, 11. 



Logistic Readiness 
for War. 16, 17, 18, 
19, 50, 86, 90, 95. 
Radio and Sound 
(Signal Equip- 
ment. 18, 20, 50, 22, 
16. 

Navy Relief Force. 
11, 12, 13, 86. 



(d) MAINTENANCE 

fO, 90, 95. 

Overhauls, Dock- 
ing. 50. 



Repairs, Altera- 
tions. 50, 90, 95. 

Technical Services. 
50, 18, 20, 90, 95. 



Bureau of Ships 
Activities. 50. 



Navigation. 50, 12. 
Bureau of Ord- 
nance. 90, 95. 



Aviation. 95. 
Aerological. 96. 



Mines, Chemical 
Equipment. 90. 

Base Hospitals. 71. 



Notk: Detailed assignments of duties are contained in section II. 



808 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

COGNIZANCE AND DUTY 

114. The following numbers are employed to identify the duties of the officers 
attached to the Staff : 

01 — Chief of Staff. 

02 — Assistant Chief of Staff. 
05 — Flag Secretary. 

11 — Operations Officer. 

12 — 1st. Assistant Operations Officer. 

13 — 2nd. Assistant Operations Officer. 

14 — Staff Duty Officer. 

15 — Flag Lieutenant. 

16 — War Plans Officer. 

17 — 1st. Assistant War Plans Officer. 

18 — 2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer. 

19 — 3rd. Assistant War Plans Officer. 

20 — Communication Officer. 

21 — Communication Security Officer. 

22 — Radio Officer. 

23 — Assistant Communication Officer. 

24 — Assistant Communication Officer. 

25 — Intelligence Officer. 

26 — Assistant Intelligence Officer. 

27 — Public Relations. 

30 — Assistant Communication Officer. 

31 to 43 — Communication Duty and Coding Officers. 
50 — Maintenance Officer. 

75 — Medical Officer. 

86 — Marine Officer, (Assistant War Plans Officer). 

90 — Gunnery Officer. 

95 — Aviation Officer. 

96 — Aerological and Personnel Officer. 

115. The following table shows the reliefs for members of the Staff who ma'y 
be absent for any reason : 



PRIMARY DUTY 

01— Chief of Staff. 

05 — Flag Secretary. 

11 — Operations Officer. 

12— 1st. Assistant Operations Offi- 
cer. 

13— 2nd Assistant Operations Offi- 
cer. 

15— Flag Lieutenant and Athletic 
Officer. 

16— War Plans Officer. 

17— 1st. Assistant War Plans Offi- 
cer. 

18— 2nd. Assistant War Plans Offi- 
cer. 

19— 3rd. Assistant War Plans Offi- 
cer. 

20— Communication Officer. 

21— Communication Security Offl- 

22— Radio Officer. 

23 — Assistant Communication 

Officer. 
24 — Assistant Communication 

Officer. 
25— Intelligence Officer. 
26 — Assistant Intelligence Officer. 
27— Public Relations Officer. 
30 — Assistant Communication 

Officer. 
31 to 43 inclusive — Communication 
50— Maintenance Officer. 
75— Medical Officer. 
86— Marine Officer. 



RELIEF 

02— Assistant C*ief of Staff. 

25— Intelligence Officer. 

16— War Plans Officer. 

13— 2nd Assistant Operations Offi- 
cer. 

12— 1st. Assistant Operations Offi- 
cer. 

26 — Assistant Intelligence Officer. 



90— Gunnery Officer. 
95— Aviation Officer. 
96— Aerological and Personnel 
Officer. 



17— 1st. Assistant War Plans Offi- 
cer. 

18— 2nd. Assistant War Plans Offi- 
cer. 

19— 3rd. Assistant War Plans Offi- 
cer. 

18— 2nd. Assistant War Plans Offi- 

22— Radio Officer. 

30— Assistant Communication 
Officer. 

20 — Communication Officer. 

24 — Assistant Communication 
Officer. 

23 — Assistant Communication 
Officer. 

26— Assistant Intelligence Officer. 

25 — Intelligence Officer. 

05 — Flag Secretary. 

31 — Assistant Communication 
Officer. 

Watch Officers and Coding Board. 

13— Assistant Operations Officer. 

05— Flag Secretary. 

05 — Flag Secretary; (and Gun- 
nery Officer for Landing 
Force etc.) 

95 — Aviation Officer. 

90 — Gunnery Officer. 

95— Aviation Officer. 



REMARKS 

(02 is same as 11.) 

16 — Relieves if available, other- 
wise 12 relieves 11. 



20 — Relieves for visual communi- 
cations. 



Senior CWO. 



War Plans Section by 16, 17, 
18, 19. 

Assisted by 12. 
Assisted by 96. 
Assisted by 05 for personnel. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 809 

Section II. Individual Cognizanck of Duties 

200. Chief of Staff— 01— Personal Aide. 

(See Navy Regulations Articles 785 — 786). 

(a) Carries out policies prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief. 

(b) Exercises general supervision over and coordinates work by members 
of the Staff. 

(c) Advises the Commander-in-Chief on all matters concerning the war readi- 
ness and battle efficiency of the Fleet. 

(d) Supervises the preparation of campaign orders and plans, as well as 
strategical and tactical problems of the Fleet. 

(e) Signs correspondence as follows: 

(1) Routine Matters. 

(2) Minor recommendations, or minor forwarding endorsements on same, 
to material Bureaus regarding repairs and alterations concerning which a 
policy has been established. 

(3) Orders to and requests from officers not in Command. 

(4) Matters concerning which the policy is of long standing. 

(5) Letters from the Navy Department noted for compliance, informa- 
tion, or guidance. 

(6) The Commander-in-Chief personally will sign correspondence regard- 
ing questions of particular importance involving criticism, approval, or 
disapproval of previous recommendations ; action on legal papers. 

201. Assistant Chief of Staff— 02— See Operations Officer (11). 

202. Flag Secretary — 05 — Personal Aide. 

(a) Responsible for the receipt, dispatch, recording, routing, and filing of all 
official written correspondence. He shall be assisted by an officer (Assistant 
Communication Officer) designated to handle the SECRET mail. 

(b) Authenticates and checks the distribution of operation plans, orders, 
movement orders and multiple address correspondence requiring authentication. 

(c) In charge of the Flag Office organization and personnel connected there- 
with. 

(d) Ascertains that outgoing correspondence is in agreement with current 
instructions and properly distributed. 

(e) Brings to the attention of the officers concerned all conflicting, incon- 
sistent or overdue communications. 

(f) Responsible for the general dissemination of administrative information. 

(g) Supervises the handling of U. S. and Guard Mail within the Fleet, 
(h) Printing. 

(i) Legal and disciplinary matters. 

(j) Signs correspondence "by direction" for: 

(1) Papers forwarded or returned without comment. 

(2) Correspondence consisting of information or appropriate minor action 
only. 

(3) Receipts and tracers. 

(4) Transmission of registered mail, or publications. 

(5) Transfers and orders for enlisted personnel, 
(k) Controls Flag Office Allotment. 

(1) War Diary. 

203. Operations Officer— 11— {Assistant Chief of Staff 02). 

(a) Assists the Chief of Staff as required, signing correspondence in bis 
absence as "Assistant Chief of Staff". 

(b) As head of Operations Section coordinates operations and employment 
activities. 

(c) Develops Fleet tactics and doctrine, and originates recommendations 
for revision of same. 

(d) Prepares problems and exercises. 

(e) Assignments of vessels to special duties. 

(f ) Prepares estimates of the situation, campaign orders, operations orders, 
and plans and movement orders. 

(g) Assisted by other members of Staff reviews and analyzes Fleet exercises, 
(h) Acts as head of the Schedule Board for preparing the Fleet operation 

plans. 



810 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR. ATTACK 

(i) Navy Relief Force. 

(j) Fleet anchorages, bases, and operating areas. 

204. First Assistant Operations Officer — 12. 

(a) Acts as Fleet Navigator with corresponding cognizance of navigational 
equipment, charts, etc. 

(b) Assists in all the duties under the cognizance of the Operations Oflacer. 

(c) Coordinates the duties of Operations Officer with those of the War Plans 
Section. 

(d) Acts as member of the Schedule Board. 

(e) Commander-in-Chiefs Night Order Book. 

205. Second, Assistant Operations Officer — 13. 

(a) Assists the Operations Officer in all the duties of that office. 

(b) Responsible for maintaining location plot and movement report system 
for vessels of the Fleet. 

(c) Edits Quarterly Fleet Organization information. 

205A. Staff Duty Officer— U. 
(See paragraph 226). 

206. Flag Lieutenant — 15 — Personal Aide. 

(a) Acts as Fleet Signal Officer; supervises the dissemination of tactical 
signals, under the Fleet Communication Officer; is responsible for the efficiency 
of Fleet signalling operations and material. 

(b) Fleet Athletic Officer; liaison officer with Fleet Recreation and Morale 
Officer based ashore. 

(c) Boarding officer. 

(d) Has cognizance of: 

(1) Matters relating to ceremonies, salutes, honors, and official calls. 

(2) Entertainments. 

(3) Club privileges, invitations, etc. 

(4) Uniform. 

(5) Boats, boat crews, and official cars. 

(6) Military and Medical Guard Dpties. 

(7) Band or orchestra. 

(e) When on board during working hours, attends the side. 

(f) Maintains flag combat bill. 

(g) Acts on requests for bands, parades, visits to ships, etc. 
(h) In charge of Admiral's mess attendants. 

207. War Plans Officer— 16. 

(a) As head of the War Plans Section is responsible, under the Chief of Staff, 
for the preparation of War Plans for the Fleet and for all matters pertaining 
thereto. 

(b) Has general custody of War Plans and secret letters relative thereto. 

(c) Member of Schedule Board. 

(d) Maintains liaison with War Plans representatives of subordinate Com- 
manders. 

(e) Maintains liaison with U. S. Army in War Plans matters, — via District 
Commandant if appropriate. 

(f) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships — general features — and 
on alterations of old ships that affect military characteristics. 

(g) Makes recommendations on matters pertaining to reserves of material, 
particularly ammunition, mines, bombs, torpedoes, fuel, provisions, etc., and 
their distribution. 

(h) Maintains liaison with Commandants of Naval Districts in War Plans 
matters. 

(i) Is responsible for the review of War Plans of subordinate commanders 
and of District Commandants and Coastal Frontier Commanders insofar as these 
Plans may affect the Fleet. 

208. Assistant War Plans — 17. 

(a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following: 

(1) Fleet estimates and plans. 

(2) Collaboration with Naval Coastal Frontiers and Commandants of 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 811 

Naval Districts. 

(3) Liaison witli Army on War Plans matters. 

(4) Duties of 18 when that assignment is vacant. 

209. Assistant War Plans — 18. 

(a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following: 

(1) Review of subordinate plans, including those of Naval Coastal Fron- 
tiers and Naval Districts. 

(2) Prosecution of current War Plans tasks and projects. 

(3) Action on administrative matters and correspondence in which War 
Plans has an interest. 

(4) Logistic studies and data. 

210. Assistant War Plans — 19. 

(a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following: 

(1) Office administration and correspondence. 

(2) Compilation and assembly of data. 

(3) Specific custody of War Plans publications and files. 
Fleet Marine Officer — 86. (See paragraph 222). ' 

211. Fleet Communication Officer — 20. 

(a) Responsible for the efficiency of Fleet communications. 

(b) Supervises training in Fleet communications. 

(c) Assists Operations Officers and War Plans Officers with strategic opera- 
tions and with war plans. 

(d) Prepares Fleet communication plans. 

(e) Directs activities of flag radio and sound schools and assignments of com- 
munication personnel. 

(f) Collaborates with "96" concerning radio and sound schools and assign- 
ments of communication personnel. 

(g) Supervises activities ashore of communication stations when manned by 
Fleet personnel. 

(h) Supervises the assignment and utilization of Fleet radio frequencies, 

(i) Coordinates with "50" on matters of communication material, 

(j) Responsible for registered publications, 

(k) Supervises communication watch officers. 

(1) Cryptographic and radio security, with "21". 

212. Communication Security Officer — 21. 

(a) Assists Fleet Communication Officer. 

(b) Is responsible for security of Fleet Communications and directly those of 
Fleet flagship : 

(1) Inspection of radio traffic handled by Fleet flagship. 

(2) Inspection of communication plans and orders of subordinate com- 
manders. 

(3) Supervision and control of monitor watch. 

(4) Preparation of Fleet Letters and orders on communication security. 

(5) Recommendations for improvement of crytographic aids. 

(6) Recommendations for distribution and allowances of cryptographic 
aids. 

(7) By personal contact and instruction improve security of communi- 
cations. 

(c) Is in immediate charge of Radio Intelligence Unit. 

(d) Is in charge of Commander-in-Chief's registered publications library. 
Signs all routine transfer and destruction reports and inventories "by direction". 

(e) Is responsible for production and security of U. S. F. publications and 
other classified publications and printed matter issued by the Commander-in- 
Chief. 

(f ) Advises concerning and ensures security of handling of secret and confiden- 
tial correspondence. 

(g) Is responsible for the organization and training of the Fleet Coding Board. 

213. Fleet Radio Officer— 22. 

(a) Assists Fleet Communication Officer. 

(b) Assists "50" in regard to technical aspects of Degaussing. 

(c) Recommends assignment of Radio frequencies to 20. 

(d) Supervises radio, sound and landwire communications and material in- 
stallations of the Fleet. 



812 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(e) Initiation and conduct of radio training operations in the Fleet. 

(f ) Instruction and training of radio and sound personnel. 

(g) Liaison with commercial radio and cable companies. 

(h) Material inspection reports of radio and sound installations in the Fleet, 
(i) Recognition and identification installations in the Fleet. 

234. Intelligence Officer — 25. 

(a) Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluates same, disseminating 
to various members of staff, indicating where action is required. 

(b) Provides Operation Officer and War Plans Officer information essential for 
current estimates (monograph material). 

(c) Maintains Section II (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Estimate 
of Situation (Enemy Forces) . Maintains location plot of Fleets of possible enemy 
or allies. 

(d) Directs counter espionage and counter information. 

(e) Maintains Intelligence Records (See Naval Intelligence Manual). 

(f ) Prepares Fleet Intelligence Bulletins. 

(g) Evaluates Intelligence Information received of procedures or practices of 
other navies and prepares deSnite recommendation as to any action to be taken 
within own Fleet. 

(h) In charge of censorship. 

(i) Internal Security of ships. 

(j) Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities. 

215. Assista7it Intelligence Officer — 26 

In addition to assisting "25" in all duties of the Intelligence section, performs 
the following additional assignments : 

(a) Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analysis. 

(b) Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination 
to Fleet. 

(c) Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of Eenemy information. 

(d) Maintenance of Current Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces) and loca- 
tion plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies. 

216. Pumic Relations Officer— 21. 

(a) Liaison officer with the Press. 

(b) Releases all Fleet publicity requiring the Commander-in-Chief's review. 

(c) Maintains file of clippings from current periodicals. 

(d) Maintains photographic file. 

(e) Maintains biographical file of flag and commanding officers. 

(f) Cognizance of Staff library. 

(g) Motion Picture Officer. 

(h) Assists in recruiting activities in collaboration with the Bureau of 
Navigation. 

( i ) In charge of Staff photographer. 

(j) Assists 15 (Flag Lieutenant) in connection with press releases for visitors, 
visits, social activities, athletics, and other recreational subjects. 

(k) Publicity liaison with other U. S. government activities. 

(1) Propaganda in time of war. 

(m) When directed assist "25", and "26" with censorship and collaborates in 
intelligence matters as necessary. 

(n) Reviews ship's papers in the fleet. 

(o) Reviews congressional records, bills, etc. 

217. Assistant Communication Officer — 30. 

(a) In addition to the following, assists the Fleet Communication Officer as 
directed. 

(m) Is in charge of internal distribution and contduct of Flag rapid com- 
munications within the Flagship. 

(c) Is in charge of the Flag Communications Office, including personnel, rou- 
tine operations, files, forms, and publications. 

(d) Coordinates the duties of the Communication Watch Officers and Coding 
Watch Officers. 

(e) Under Flag Secretary, has duty as officer responsible for receipt, routing, 
custody, and dispatch of secret mail. 

(f) Responsible for cleanliness and upkeep of the Flag Communication Office 
and communication spaces. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 813 

218. Communication Watch Officers — 31, 32. 33, 34. 

(a) Communication Watch Officers stand communication desk watches, being 
governed in the i)erformance of these duties by the provisions of the Communi- 
cation Instructions and such orders and instructions as may be issued by the Fleet 
Communication Officer, Fleet Radio Officer, or Assistant Communication Officer. 

(b) A Communication Watch Officer is the Flag Division Officer. He is assisted 
in this assignment by the communication watch officers who are designated as 
Junior Division Officers for the Flag Division. 

(c) Communication Watch Officers must become proficient in the use of codes 
and ciphers and be familiar with Fleet Operations, routine, and staff procedure. 
In addition to performing routine code and cipher duties they may be assigned 
coding board duties at a battle station. 

(d) One Communication Watch Officer is detailed as custodian of non-regis- 
tered communication publications which he shall keep corrected. 

(e) One Communication Watch Officer is detailed as custodian of the Regis- 
tered Publications which he shall keep corrected. 

219. Coding Board Officers— 35, 36, 37, 38, (39, 40). 

(a) Coding Board Officers stand Coding Board watches, being governed in the 
performance of these duties by the instructions issued by the Assistant Communi- 
cation Officer. 

(b) They shall familiarize themselves with all cryptographic systems in use 
and become proficient in their proper use. 

(c) They shall assist the Fleet Security Officer in matters of Fleet Crypto- 
graphic Security. 

(d) They shall familiarize themselves with the duties of Communication 
Watch Officers to the end that they may stand Communication Watch Officer 
watches when required. 

(e) All Coding Board Officers shall assist Fleet Security Officer in the correc- 
tion, custody, preparation, and care of registered and classified matter. 

(f) The Coding Board of the Fleet Flagship is required to perform Flag Coding 
Board functions, as directed. 

220. Fleet Engineer and Maintenance Officer — 50. 

(a) Docking and overhaul schedules. 

(b) Engineering performances. 

(c) Repairs, preservation and alterations of ships of the Fleet. 

(d) Fleet repair and docking facilities. 

(e) Tests and upkeep of material. 

(f) Design, construction, and operation of machinery and governing in- 
instructions. 

(g) Orders for and reports of military and material inspections, 
(h) Damage Control. 

(i) Allowance lists (Bureau of Ships), requisitions and surveys, 
(j) Chip's Service store activities, 
(k) Training of engineering personnel. 
(1) Member of Schedule Board, 
(m) Fuel and provisioning schedules, 
(n) Ship's characteristics cards and logistics. " 
(o) Supply Department matters. 

(p) Assists War Plans Officer in preparation of War Plans, 
(q) Makes recommendations on design of new ships (Bureau of Ships 
cognizance). 

(r) Degaussing. 

221. Fleet Medical Officer— 75. 

(a) Keeps himself informed by inspections, and advises Commander-in-Chief of 
the sanitary conditions of ships of the Fleet. 

(b) Prepares a periodic F'leet Medical News Letter. 

(c) Acts as liaison officer with civilian medical activities. 

(d) Interests himself in making such provisions for medical services at bases 
as may not be otherwise provided for. 

(e) Customs and agricultural inspections. 

(f ) Shall obtain for, or advise Units of the Fleet in the obtaining of Bills of 
Health and the securing of pratique in accordance with local and foreign health 
regulations. 

(g) Holds periodic conferences with medical officers of the Fleet for the 



814 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

purpose of standardizing practices not specially provided for by regulations and 
for other purposes in the interest of increased efficiency of the medical department. 

(h) Has cognizance of religious activities. 

(i) Has cognizance of and advises upon Damage Control Activities within the 
purview of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. 

222. Fleet Marine Officer— 86. 

(a) General cognizance of matters concerning Marine Corps and Fleet Marine 
Force. 

(b) Data on organization, strength, equipment, etc., of Marine Divisions, 
Defense Battalions, and Detachments. 

(c) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with the following: 

(1) Plans for amphibious operations. 

(2) Seizure, establishment, and defense of advance bases. 

(3) Demolition and related operations. 

(4) Logistic data (Marines and Army). 

(5) Review of Marine Corps subordinate plans. 

223. Fleet Gunnery Officer— 90. 

(a) Supervises gunnery, training, gunnery exercises, and the care and upkeep 
of the armament of the Fleet. 

(b) Keeps informed of the efficiency in gunnery and the condition of the 
armament of the Fleet. 

(c) Advises in regard to tactical maneuvers for obtaining advantageous range 
bands, greatest fire effect, and dispositions for the best use of the armament. 

(d) Prepares outlines of schedules of gunnery exercises for the Fleet and 
advises concerning detailed schedules prepared by Force Commanders. 

(e) Supervises small arms training and exercises of the Fleet. 

(f ) Consults with Aviation Officer in connection with aircraft and antiaircraft 
gunnery. 

(g) In charge of the following matters, consulting with Operations Officer 
regarding tactical aspects : " , 

(1) Mining and sweeping exercises and material. 

(2) Torpedoes and torpedo practices. 

(3) Smoke screens, both offensive and defensive. 

(4) Chemical warfare service — Material and training of personnel. (In 
collaboration with Fleet Maintenance Officer). 

(h) Supervises courses of study in Ordnance and Gunnery technical schools of 
the Fleet. 

(i) Assists War Plans Officer in preparation of War Plans and in matters of 
liaison with Army. 

(j) Reviews military and material inspection reports. 

(k) Consults with Fleet Maintenance Officer on Damage Control. 

(1) Exercises particular supervision over recommendations for changes to 
"Orders for Gunnery Exercises," "Gunnei-y Instructions" and other ordnance, 
gunnery and fire control publications. 

(m) Makes recommendations on designs of news ships (Bureau of Ordnance 
cognizance. 

(n) Member of Schedule Board. 

(o) Advises on gunnery features of tactical plans and publications. 

(p) With 86 has cognizance of matters involving landing forces. 

(q) Handles matters affecting training, assignments, rating, and qualifications 
of gunnery personnel (consults with 96). 

224. Fleet Aviation Officer— 95. 
(a) Advises with reference to: 

(1) All aircraft operations and aviation matters including those pertaining 
to policy with respect to : 

(A) Material. 

(B) Personnel. 

(C) Gunnery arid Bombing. 

(D) Radio. 

(2) Aircraft Operations, and aviation shore facilities. 

(3) Coordination of aviation activities of the Fleet. 

(4) Employment of aircraft in tactical exercises, analysis and reports 
thereon. 

(5) The development of aircraft tactics, gunnery and doctrine. 

(6) Naval air operating policy. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 815 

(b) Assists War Plans Officer in the preparation of War Plans. 

(c) Keeps informed as to the effectiveness of aircraft units of the Fleet. 

(d) Assists Operation Officer in the preparation of Fleet Schedules dealing with 
aircraft and aircraft services. 

(e) Consults v?ith Gunnery Officer in connection with aircraft and anti-aircraft 
gunnery. Handles Aircraft Gunnery Reports. 

(f) Member of Schedule Board. 

(g) Has cognizance of, keeps informed of aircraft material matters. 

225. Fleet Aerological and Personnel Office?- — 96. 

(a) In charge of the aerological office and keeps the Commander-in-Chief and 
members of his staff advised of weather conditions as concerns the planning and 
executions of Fleet Operations. Assists War Plans Officer. 

(b) Advises with reference to the establishment of new aerological units in 
matters concerning : 

(1) Equipment. 

(2) Personnel. 

(3) Weather information required. 

(c) Coordinates aerological activities in the Fleet, including: 

(1) Collection and dissemination of weather reports. 

(2) Weather forecasts and advisory storm warnings. 

(3) Aerological research. 

(d) Exercises supervision over the training and instruction of aerological 
personnel. 

(e) Prepares such weather summaries as are required in connection with 
orders for Fleet Problems and Tactics. 

(f) Consults with Gunnery Officer in connection with atmospheric ballistic 
information pertaining to gunnery. 

(g) Advises with reference to exchange of weather information between the 
Fleet and the U. S. Weather Bureau or other activities maintaining meteorologi- 
cal facilities. 

(h) In charge of all matters relating to : 

(1) Orders for officers and enlisted i)ersonnel. 

(2) Naval Reserve Officers on active duty. 

(3) Transportation in ships of the Fleet. 

(4) Congressional mail regarding personnel matters. 

(5) Action on leave requests for all officers and preparation of endorse- 
ments for signature of Admiral, Chief of Staff and Flag Secretary, depend- 
ing upon the rank of officer requesting leave. 

(6) Examinations and promotions. 

(7) Navy Relief and Red Cross. 

(i) In charge of entertainment and welfare of enlisted personnel. 

(j) Shore Patrol. 

(k) Liberty for the Fleet. 

226. Staff Duty Officer— IJ,. 

(a) Such Officers as may be designated by the Chief of Staff shall stand a 
day's duty in port and a watch on the Flag Bridge at sea when a watch is 
established. 

(b) The officer having the day's duty shall : 

(1) Receive routine reports. 

(2) Act on routine matters. 

(3) Act as necessary on matters when the officer having cognizance and 
his relief are absent, informing officers concerned of action taken as soon as 
possible. 

(4) Attend the side when the Flag Lieutenant is not available. The pro- 
cedure for tending the side is laid down in Section X of these Staff instruc- 
tions. 

(5) Regulate movements of Admiral's Barge, Chief of Staff's Gig, and 
Staff boats in absence of Mag Lieutenant or outside of working hours. The 
Officer-of-the-Deck will keep the Staff Duty Officer and Flag Lieutenant 
informed of the movements of the Admiral's Barge, Chief of Staff's Gig, 
and Staff Duty boats. 

(6) Keep informed as to Staff Officers on board or absent from the ship. 

(7) In the absence of the Flag Lieutenant see that boarding calls on visit- 
ing men of war are made by an officer from Fleet flagship. 



816 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(8) Receive aerological forecasts from the Aerologist and when bad 
weather is forecast transmit the necessary information to the ships present. 

(9) Initial all dispatches, taking action if necessary when action officer is 
not on board. 

(10) See that the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff are kept in- 
formed of all important matters, and particularly that they are informed 
promptly upon their return to the sliip of all important matters that occur 
during their absence ; and similarly keep the Operations Officer informed of 
all ship movements observed by the signal watch. 

(11) Examine all mail received during the absence of the Flag Secretary 
or his regularly designated relief, and decide what action if any shall be 
taken. 

(c) Day's duty will begin at 0900, except Sundays and holidays when it will 
begin at 1100. The sequence will be uninterrupted by the fact that the ship may 
be at sea when regular watches are set. » 

(d) The duties of the Staff Duty Officer assume particular importance when, 
in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff, or other members of 
the staff, he is called upon to make decisions in cases of emergency, or on matters 
which cannot be delayed for reference to higher authority or to the officers having 
cognizance. This fact makes it imperative that all officers standing duty keep 
themselves informed as to existing situations, the policies of the Commander-in- 
Chief and the usual and proper manner of taking action on all matters which 
may arise. 

(e) In important emergency cases the Staff Duty Officer will take such action 
as may be necessary. lastructions should be obtained by the most expeditious 
manner of communication with the Chief of Staff and, failing to locate him, with 
the Commander-in-Chief. The Operations Officer should, if practicable, be fully 
informed of the situation. 

(f ) When civilians or officials, other than personal friends of the Commander- 
in-Chief or officials whose status is a matter of doubt, come on board the flagship 
to confer with the Commander-in-Chief, he shall first present them to the Chief 
of Staff, Flag Lieutenant, or in their absence, to the Operations Officer. 

(g) Should an emergency arise necessitating action involving the Fleet Relief 
Force, the Staff Duty Officer will carry out the following : 

(1) Notify the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff and Operations Officer. 

(2) Send staff boats to landing, keeping one at ship as may be advisable. 

(3) Land field radio and signalmen if BASRAD is out of commission. 

(h) Assignment of Berths. Requests for berths are received occasionally by 
the Staff Duty Officer for immediate action during the absence of the Operations 
Officers. To assist the Staff Duty Officer in assigning berths, an anchorage chart 
is kept in the Oi)erations Office, together with a copy of current instructions. 
See also the Commander-in-Chief's current letter in regard to anchorage assign- 
ments. 

(i) In the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, or Chief of Staff, he shall take 
steps to correct any defects in external Fleet routine which would constitute an 
adverse i-eflection on the Fleet. 

(j) Leave— Relief for Day's Dutij. (1) The Day's Duty list for Staff Duty 
Officers is prepared on the basis that the sequence will not be interrupted by the 
fact that the ship may be at sea. Nor is it to be interrupted by absence on, duty, 
illness or leave. 

(2) Staff Duty Officers are "Relief Officers" in inverse order of seniority. A 
Relief Duty List is posted in the Staff Duty Book. When an officer stands a 
relief duty watch, he will inform the senior watch officer. The next officer on 
the list then becomes the "Relief Duty Officer." 

(3) For extended periods of leave, greater than 10 days the Relief Duty Officer 
will take the duty for the officer scheduled for the Day's Duty. For shorter 
periods of leave, officers are expected to arrange for their own reliefs by agreeable 
shifts with other Staff Duty Officers. In every case, inform the Senior Staff 
Duty Officer of the arrangements made. 

SEA WATCHES 

(k) An officer of the Staff shall be on the bridge at all times when the Fleet 
flagship is imderway in company with vessels of the Fleet acting as a unit. 

(1) He is the representative of the Commander-in-Chief on the bridge and bears 
the same relation to him that the Officer-of-the-Deck bears to the Captain of the 
ship. He shall keep himself informed of the location of all units and ships in 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 817 

whatever disposition or formation tlie Fleet is at tlie time ; whatever land or lights 
are in sight ; \Vhether either are likely to be seen ; and of all other particulars 
which may be of use to the Commander-in-Chief in keeping the ships of the forma- 
tion out of danger. 

(1) In case of emergency, when neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the Chief 
of Staff is on the bridge, he shall make such signals as are required by the circum- 
stances, reporting his action immediately to the Commander-in-Cliief, the Chief 
of Staft and the Operations Officer. ACT FIRST, REPORT AFTERWARDS. 
Under all other conditions the formation shall not be maneuvered without the 
authority of the Commander-in-Chief or the Chief of Staff. Furthermore, under 
these latter conditions, the Staff Duty Officer shall report the circumstances to 
the Operations Officer. Also, he shall call the Flag Lieutenant and Operations 
Officer to the bridge at once if immediate action is required — otherwise those 
officers shall be informed of the time when their presence on the flag bridge will 
be required and the reasons therefor. 

(m) He shall promptly report to the Commander-in-Chief, through the Chief 
of Staff, all land, shoals, rocks, lighthouses, beacons, buoys, discolored water, ves- 
sels, or wrecks sighted ; all changes of weather or shifts of wind ; all signals 
made; all changes in speed, formation, disposition, or course; in general, all 
occurrences worthy of notice. 

(n) He shall handle all dispatches which in port are routed to the Officer 
having the day's Staff duty. 

(o) When the Flag Lieutenant is on the Bridge he will handle all tactical 
signals, relieving the Staff Duty Officer of this function of his usual duties. 

(p) Record of events. — ^A Record of Events during the watch will be kept by 
the Staff Officer on watch assisted by a duty yeoman. This record will include 
items of importance, movements, major and minor contacts with the enemy, aerial 
and submarine activity, weather information, etc. The Record of Events 
will be typed in quadruplicate, signed by the Officer on watch and handled as 
follows: Original to be placed in a file folder in Flag Plot. (This folder will be 
kept in Flag Plot until the completion of the exercise, when it shall be turned over 
to the file yeoman by the yeoman securing the watch) . At 0800 each day the three 
copies of the Record of Ev,ents covering the watches of the preceding 24 hours 
shall be turned over to the Flag Office for the following distribution : one copy 
to the Admiral, one copy to the Chief of Staff, and one copy to the Operations 
Officer. ) 

(q) When necessary to make a signal to change course or speed to avoid a vessel 
or unit having the right of way, make such changes great enough, and execute 
the signal soon enough to leave no doubt in the minds of the other officers of the 
deck as to your intentions. Avoid crossing ahead of vessels or units having the 
right of way. 

(r) When fog closes in : 

(1) Order bridge radios manned if not already in effect. 

(2) Order fog buoys streamed. 

(3) Order fog searchlights manned. 

(4) Comply with Fleet Communication letter — 2RLr-41 summarized briefly 

as follows : 

(a) Take soundings at short intervals to ensure safety of the forma- 

tion. 

(b) Designate a ship to: At least half-hourly or oftener; obtain 

bearings froip shore radio direction finder stations, and radio 
bearings of ships in company. 

(c) Plot all bearings and soundings on a chart. This ensures safety. 

(d) Establish a transmitting and receiving watch, (on distress fre- 

quency). 

(e) Provided Radio, restrictions so permit broadcast in plain language 

followed by International Code : visibility conditions, names of 
ships in compai^y, position, and time of origin OCT. If other 
ships reply to this safety transmission shift to 422 kcs. and ex- 
change information. 

227. The night order book is written by the Commander-in-Chief for guidance 
of officers having night watches. Each officer having a night watch shall initial 
the book after reading the orders, and before relieving the watch. The night 
order book is prepared by the Fleet Navigator (12) . 

228. Nothing herein is intended to contravene existing regulations or to pre- 
clude taking such additional precautions as may seem desirable. 



818 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Section III. Battle Stations 

300. The Ctombat Organization of the Staff is covered in a separate confidential 
issue of this section. It is distributed to the flagship and flag personnel only. . 

Section IV. Flag Office Peesonnel and General Instructions 

401. The authorized Flag Allowance of yeomen is : 

Chief Yeoman 3 

Yeoman 1st class , 4 

Yeoman 2nd class 5 

Yeoman 3rd class : 6 

Total 18 

Yeoman on board are assigned in general as follows: 
1 Yeoman — In general charge. 
1 Yeoman — ^Admiral, Chief of Staff and Flag Lieutenant. 

1 Yeoman — Flag Secretary and Division Officer. 

3 Yeomen — Operations and Assistant Operations Officers. 

2 Yeomen — War Plans Officers. 

2 Yeomen — Communication, Radio, and Comm. Security Officers. 

1 Yeoman — Intelligence Officer. 

1 Yeoman — Aviation Officer. 

1 Yeoman — Gunnery Officer. 

1 Yeoman — Engineer and Maintenance Officer. 

1 Yeoman — Aerological Officer. 

1 Yeoman — Files and Correspondence Classification. 

1 Yeoman — Outgoing Mail Desk. 

1 Yeoman — Communication Office. 
These assignments will be augmented by yeoman strikers. Yeoman 
strikers will also be assigned to other Flag Office details, such as incoming 
mail, File Section, Tracer desk, etc. 

402. Assignment of yeomen will necessarily depend largely on their individual 
aptitude for certain duties, and their availability. One Pharmacist's Mate 
is included in the Flag Allowance and is assigned to the Fleet Medical Officer. 
One Marine Sergeant Major is assigned to the Marine Officer. 

403. Whenever an officer finds that he requires additional clerical assistance, 
he will apply to the Flag Secretary. Additional clerical assistance can in this 
way be secured with a minimum of delay and without interfering with the 
routine of the office. 

404. The Chief Yeoman in charge has general supervision of the Flag Office 
and personnel under the Flag Secretary, who is in direct charge of the offices 
of the Commander-in-Chief. The Chief Yeoman in Charge is responsible for 
the cleanliness of the offices and storerooms, for the carrying out of the office 
instructions, for the conduct and proper performance of duty by the enlisted 
personnel and for regulating watch lists, liberty and leave in accordance with 
existing instructions and orders. He will supervise the drawing of office sup- 
plies against the flag allotment, issuing of stationery, etc., and exercise care 
that expenditures are kept within requirements. 

405. Routine Duty, (a) Routine hours of duty in flag offices and print shop 
are as follows : 

Daily 0800 to 1600 

Half Holidays 0800 to 1130 

(b) Handling of work outside regular office hours. Routine work outside 
of regular office hours will be handled by the yeoman of the officer desiring 
such work done, when that yeoman is on board, otherwise by the duty section. 
There is always a duty printer on board who sleeps in the print shop. 

(c) No uncompleted work shall be stowed away in office desk drawers, but 
shall be kept above the desks in labeled baskets or envelopes, and available 
to the staff officers concerned, or to the duty section, if required. 

406. Eamdling of mail upon arrival in port. The taking up and distribution 
of mail upon arrival in port will, without exception, be an "all hands" job. 
All yeomen will prepare routing sheets and assist in clearing up all mail re- 
ceived. No liberty will be granted on arrival in port until such mail has been 
received, routed and distributed to the cabinets of the officers concerned. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 819 

407. Liberty and Lewve. (a) Liberty and leave for the flag ofl3ce personnel 
will be regulated to conform, as closely as work will permit, to that of the 
flagship. Subject to the approval of the officers for whom the yeomen work, 
after routine working hours, or Saturdays after 1130, Wednesday afternoons, 
Sundays and holidays, will be considered routine liberty periods. Liberty cards 
are issued under the supervision of the Division Officer for all flag personnel. 

(b) All requests for other than regular liberty shall first be referred to the 
officer for whom the yeoman works, the Flag Division Officer and to the Chief 
Yeoman in Charge for designation of relief if required, then to the Flag Secre- 
tary for approval or disapproval. If the request is one for leave and is approved 
by the Flag Secretary as Head of Department, it will then be sent to the Execu- 
tive Officer for issuance of formal leave papers. 

40S. Cleanliness of Offices, (a) The cleanliness of flag offices and storerooms 
will be under the supervision of the Chief Yeoman in Charge. Each yeoman 
will be required to keep his own desk neat and clean, as well as the desk 
of the officer for whom he works. Offices will be cleaned daily, prior to 0800, 
and a field day shall be held between 1200 and 1300 each Friday. 

(b) Flag offices, shops, storerooms and other spaces will be included in the 
commanding officer's inspection of adjacent ship spaces. Personnel in charge 
of offices, shops, storerooms and other flag spaces shall have their spaces open 
and ready and shall stand by for inspection at the times designated in the daily 
schedule issued by the flagship. Yeomen shall have the drawers of their desks 
neatly stowed and ready for removal should they be directed to do so by the 
inspecting officers. 

409. FlG}g Office Duty Section, (a) The Flag Office personnel will be divided 
into duty sections of not less than three men, one of whom shall be a com- 
petent stenographer. Duty changes at 0900 daily, Sundays excepted. The Duty 
Section will function in the Flag Office during the following hours: 

Daily 0730 to 0815 

1130 to 1300 

1600 to 2200 
Half Holidays 0730 to 0815 

1130 to 2200 
Whole Holidays 0730 to 2200 

(b) The duty section will handle all emergency work outside of regular work- 
ing hours and if the Outgoing Mail Yeoman is not on board, will mail all signed 
outgoing correspondence. The entire duty section will remain in the flag offices 
during the hours specified in subparagraph (a) except: 

(1) Only one rated man need remain in the flag office during mealtimes. 

(2) When the press of work permits and when in the discretion of the senior 
duty yeoman their services are not immediately required, members of the duty 
section may be allowed to attend the evening movies on deck, subject to call ; 
however, one rated member of the duty section shall remain in the flag office 
during the authorized absence of the rest to attend the movies. From time 
to time, if the Staff Duty Officer grants permission to do so, the offices may be 
locked and keys turned over to him, during movies, smokers, etc. 

(3) When the Flag is based temporarily ashore, the Duty Section will maintain 
a continuous one-man security watch in the Flag Office during the following 
hours : 

Daily 1600 to 0800 

Half-holidays 1200 to 0800 

Holidays 0800 to 08GO 

This watch will be armed, the primary duty of which is to prevent 
unauthorized persons from entering the Fleet War Plans Offices and all 
other Flag Offices of the Commander-in-Chief. This Security Watch will 
normally be sufficient to remain in the Flag Office after working hours. 
The entire Duty Section is available for call by the Staff Duty Officer at 
any time. 

(c) Handling of mail and correspondence. Before going on liberty the incom- 
ing and outgoing mail yeomen will inform the senior duty yeoman of any special 
instructions, who in turn will inform his section. Special instructions may be : — 
To watch for special correspondence exi)ected in the incoming mail — to see that 
certain U. S. or guard mail is dispatched. File numbers will not be entered on 
incoming mail by the duty section unless the correspondence is of an urgent 

79716 — 46 — ^Ex. 149, vol. 2 11 



820 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

nature, in which case a file number will be entered on the routing sheet and 
file yeoman notified when he returns from liberty. Incoming correspondence 
shall be made ready for the examination of the Staff Duty Ofiicer with minimum 
delay and report shall be made to him that it is ready for his examination. On 
hoard ship, immediately after the end of working hours, the duty section shall 
gather up all confidential and other important correspondence from the Staff 
Officers' rooms and retain such correspondence in the Flag Ofiice overnight, dis- 
tributing it immediately after 08(00 the following working day. In offices ashore, 
immediately after the end of working hours, the duty section shall gather up all 
confidential correspondence from the desks of the Staff officers and deposit it in 
the locked cabinet provided for this purpose. Just prior to 0800 the next working 
day, the correspondence shall be returned to the respective officers' desks. 

(d) Security of Flag Offices. The duty section will stand watch in the main 
flag office. The offices will be secured promptly at 2200 and keys turned over to 
the Flag Secretary, if on board, otherwise to the Staff Duty Officer. If, for any 
urgent reason, it is desired to keep offices open after 220O, permission should be 
requested from the Staff Duty Ofiicer. Flag offices shall never be left unguarded. 
Outside regular working hours a constant check should be kept on the Staff 
offices, operations office, and file room to see that it is either occupied by staff 
personnel, or looked. If it is necessary for everyone to leave flag offices on duty, 
the last person to leave will lock offices and take keys with him, posting a note 
on main flag office door as to who has keys. Offices should be reopened as soon as 
possible. 

(e) Visitors to flag offices. No general visitors will be permitted. Other than 
flag personnel admitted by senior duty yeoman, only officers and men on duty, or- 
persons accompanied by staff duty officer, will be permitted in the flag offices out- 
side of working hours. 

(f) Waste paper baskets in Cabins and Staterooms. Waste paper baskets in 
Admiral's Cabin, Chief of Staff''s Cabin and Staff officers' staterooms will be 
emptied and the contents burned, or stowed in flag office pending burning, at the 
following times : 

Regular working days 1500 

Half and Whole Holidays 1115 

410. Security of Classified Matter. All personnel of the staff of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief whose duties require handling of classified matter, shall acquaint 
themselves with the Navy Regulations and other instructions pertaining to the 
security of classified matter. 

(a) Offices, Print Shop, Mnltilith Shop, Flag Plot Officers' Staterooms. Flag 
personnel are responsible that classified matter under staff routing, or in spaces 
in which flag activities are paramount, is constantly attended. Attended, as 
employed herein, signifies that the matter is receiving care while being used, or 
that it is under surveillance with respect to possible pilferage or perusal by un- 
authorized persons, or that it is under lock. 

(b) Trash and waste. Will be removed from flag activities and burned at 
times specified in subparagraph 409 (f). Should the incinerator be secured, or 
out of commission, such rubbish will be returned to flag oflices, flag plot, print or 
multilith shops for retention awaiting suitable opportunity for its burning. The 
Senior Duty Yeoman will personally supervise collection and burning as set out 
in 409 (f ). However, during routine hours of duty (see Article 405), this may be 
done by a rated yeoman designated by the Chief Yeoman in Charge. 

(c) Keys. The key to the flag storerooms, the keys to the flag offices and 
mimeograph shop, and duplicate keys to the print shop and multilith shop are 
in the custody of the Flag Secretary. The Chief Printer and the Duty Printer 
will each retain a key to the print shop, and the Multilith Printer will retain a 
key to the multilith shop. Keys to the Flag Office files will be in the custody 
of the Flag Secretary, Gunnery Yeoman, File Yeoman, or Duty Yeoman. At the 
end of working hours, whenever classified matter is being produced in the print 
shop or multilith shop, the keys to the print shop galley racks and stowage 
locker will be placed in the main flag office key locker. During office hours the 
key to the flag offices will be in the main flag office. When offices are secured 
for the night, the keys to confidential files will be placed in the main flag ofiice 
key locker and the keys to the flag offices turned over to the Flag Secretary, if on 
board, otherwise to the Staff Duty Officer. Except as herein specified, personnel 
are forbidden to have duplicate keys to flag offices and print shop spaces in their 
possession. 

(d) Files, Lockers, Storerooms. Access to the flag storeroom by other than 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 821 

regularly authorized personnel may be had upon application to the Flag Secre- 
tary. In all cases when a confidential file jacket is to be removed from the flag 
offices, a receipt will be required from the recipient. 

(e) Nonconfidential file jackets should be obtained from the File Yeoman or 
in his absence from the duty yeoman. If the file jacket is to be removed from 
the flag office, a receipt will be signed by the recipient. 

(f ) Classified matter may be removed from the Print Shop only at the instance 
of the officer for whom the work is being done, or an officer of the Staff. Classi- 
fied matter will not be allowed to remain in the multilith shop overnight, but 
will be stowed under lock in the print shop stowage locker. 

Section V. Handling of Coebespondence 

501. (a) Incoming Mail, is delivered to the Incoming Mail Desk. 

(b) Upon receipt of Registered U. S. Mail in the Main Flag Office, it shall be 
taken immediately to the Secret Mail Officer or the Chief Yeoman designated as 
Secret Mail Yeoman. In their absence the mail shall be taken to the Duty Com- 
munication Watch Officer who shall open it and extract the envelopes marked 
"SECRET". A receipt for the envelopes so retained shall, in all cases, be ob- 
tained on the "Incoming Registered Guard Mail Log". The envelopes marked 
"CONFIDENTIAL" .shall be returned to the Flag Duty Yeoman. All "SECRET" 
mail received by the C. W. O. shall be logged in the book provided for that purpose, 
and then taken to the Staff Duty Officer who shall open it in order to determine 
its urgency. If the Staff Duty Officer retains any of the Secret Mail his receipt 
therefor shall be obtained. All Secret Mail shall be delivered to the Secret Mail 
Officer at the first opportunity. 

(c) Incoming personal mail for the Commander-in-Chief will be delivered to 
his orderly and placed on his desk. If Admiral is not on board, it will be placed 
in the routing cabinet in the Flag Office and will be delivered upon the Admiral's 
return to the ship. 

(d) Incoming personal mail for other staff officers will be delivered by a Flag 
Office messenger immediately upon its receipt in the Flag Office. In the absence 
of any Staff Officer his personal mail will be placed in the routing cabinet in the 
Flag Office and delivered to him upon his return to the ship. 

502. Urgent Correspondence. When URGENT correspondence is received on 
board, routing sheets shall be prepared immediately, an URGENT tag securely 
attached to and visible on the routing sheet, and correspondence delivered by 
hand to the Flag Secretary, or in his absence, to the Staff Duty Officer. Such 
correspondence shall be shown to Action Officer and a copy delivered to him if 
desired, prior to routing to other officers. If a copy is delivered to Action Officer, 
a notation of this fact will be made on routing sheet. If file yeomen are not on 
duty or in the office when URGENT mail is received, such mail shall be assigned 
a file number by the Duty Yeoman and handled as indicated above. No corre- 
spondence, or other papers, shall be kept visible as the top paper on the corre- 
spondence. If correspondence or other papers are of an urgent nature and no 
URGENT tag accompanies it, the officer concerned shall indicate to this yeoman 
that the matter is urgent and the latter shall then attach an URGENT tag. 

503. Routine Correspondence. 

(a) Incoming Mail Yeoman. Opens all incoming mail immediately upon its 
receipt, except U. S. registered mail, which is handled in accordance with sub- 
paragraph 501 (b), above. (See Section VI for method of handling registered 
U. S. mail by receiving officers.) 

Logs the envelope number and descriptive data of all correspondence received 
via registered guard mail and U. S. Mail. 

Carefully checks all incoming mail to insure that it is complete and the listed 
enclosures are attached, or in case enclosures have been forwarded under sepa- 
rate cover keeps a memorandum check-off record of such enclosures so that they 
can be readily identified and properly distributed upon receipt. 

I'asses correspondence to File Yeoman and then, after File Yeoman has assigned 
office file numbers, prepares routing slips for all matter received except certain 
routine reports designated by the Flag Secretary, and MAILGRAMS. MAIL- 
GJRAMS received by registered mail are logged and then sent to the Flag Com- 
munication office without being taken up on routing slips. 

After routing slips have been typed, detaches memorandum routing slip and 
delivers mail to Chief Mail Yeoman in Charge. From data shown on the retained 
memorandum routing slips, maintains the Incoming Mail Log in loose-leaf form. 



822 CONGRESSIOISI AL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

This log shall be a permanent record of all correspondence received and will 
show: 

Date of receipt. 

OflBce of origin. 

File and serial number of office of origin. 

Date of correspondence. 

Subject. 

Cincus file number of jacket in which permanently filed. 

Serial number of routing slip on which correspondence has been taken up. 

(b) File Yeoman. Assigns file numbers. (See Article 505.) 

(c) Chief Yeoman in Charge. Routes correspondence. 

(d) Flag Secretary. Confirms routing of correspondence, or changes routing 
where required. 

(e) Tracer Yeoman. Removes routed correspondence from the outgoing bas- 
ket of the Flag Secretary, detaches duplicate routing sheet, stamps date of 
delivery to first ofiicer indicated in order of routing and delivers the correspond- 
ence, (except URGENT — see Article 502), through routing cabinet to officers 
concerned in accordance with the assigned order of routing. 

Files duplicate routing sheet as a tracer against outstanding correspondence in 
the office. 

(f ) Yeoman Concerned. Takes cognizance of and removes all correspondence 
from routing boxes of officers for whom he works and delivers to officers as 
directed. 

When the officer for whom he works is absent, he will return the correspond- 
ence checked to that officer for Information, to the Tracer Yeoman, to be checked 
to the next officer in the order of routing, and deliver Acti'bn correspondence to 
the assigned relief officer. 

(g) Officer Concerned. In general, papers will pass from one officer to another 
via Tracer Yeoman as indicated on the routing sheet. 

Correspondence requiring action will be routed first, if the Flag Secretary 
deems it necessary, to the Action Officer, the latter being responsible that other 
interested officers are consulted before letter or endorsement is prepared. 

Correspondence routed for information should not be placed in the routing 
cabinet for an officer temporarily absent until it has been noted by all other officers 
checked for information. 

Ordinarily, when necessary data is available, action should be completed on 
correspondence within forty-eight hours after receipt. 

Any officer desiring to hold correspondence, in order to compile data, reports, 
etc., should return the correspondence to the files and draw it from the files when 
needed. 

A list will be furnished each officer on Tuesday showing all correspondence 
which the records of the Flag Office indicate has been in his possession since the 
preceding Tuesday. Officers indicated as being charged with the correspondence 
should check this list and mark in the column provided the items which they 
have in their possession. 

(h) Yeoman Concerned. Prepares outgoing letter or endorsement as directed 
(See Article 504). 

Keeps outgoing basket of officer for whom he works empty — delivering routed 
correspondence on which action is required or taken to Tracer Yeoman. 

Insures that officer concerned has initialed in the space provided on the rout- 
ing sheet and that notation is made when action is taken by a method other 
than a letter or endorsement. 

(i) Tracer Yeoman. Delivers through the routing cabinet, correspondence 
on which routing is incomplete. 

Scrutinizes all correspondence on which routing is complete to see that no 
correspondence requiring action goes to file and that officers concerned have 
initialed in the space provided on the routing sheet. 

The correspondence to be finally cleared by the Tracer Yeoman falls into 
three classes : 

(1) Incoming letters on which no action is required, or on which dispatch 
action was taken and so noted on the original routing slip. 

(2) Incoming letters which were endorsed or are the basis for additional 
correspondence. 

(3) Letters originated by the Commander-in-Chief with no incoming corre- 
Bpondence attached. 

When correspondence described by (1) above has completed its routing the 
!rracer Yeoman will destroy his duplicate routing slip, initial in the space pro- 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 823 

vided on the original routing slip under "Tracer," and pass this correspondence 
to the File Yeoman, However, if there is a cross file, the duplicate routing slip 
shall not be destroyed but will be attached to the correspondence for filing. 

When correspondence described by (2) above has completed its routing the 
Tracer Yeoman will destroy his duplicate routing slip (unless it has a cross file 
number) initial in the upper right-hand corner of the file copy of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief's action, and on the original routing slip, and pass this corre- 
spondence to the File Yeoman. 

504. Outgoing Mail. 

(a) General . — ^Dates and serial numbers will be stamped by the Outgoing 
Mail Yeoman after the letter is actually signed. The original sheet of corre- 
spondence of a personal nature shall not bear a file or serial number. The 
originator's yeoman shall address envelopes for this class of correspondence. 

The use of staples in fastening correspondence should be limited to printed 
or mimeographed letters of two or more pages. Staples shall then be used in 
the upper left hand corner. 

Letterhead paper shall be used for the original sheet and all copies of corre- 
spondence. 

(b) Corresiwndence for signature shall be prepared and assembled as follows: 

(1) Sheets shall be arranged in numerical order from bottom to top, i. e., 
page one on the bottom, last page or endorsement on top. Enclosures to the 
entire correspondence shall be in alphabetical sequence, fastened directly behind 
the letter or endorsement to which it is an enclosure and securely fastened by 
brass fasteners, with ends turned over the face of the sheet. When enclosures 
are too bulky to be attached, then a separate slip with notation should indicate 
that the enclosures have been temporarily retained by the originator. 

(2) In preparing endorsements, reference should be made to the basic corre- 
spondence as prescribed by Fleet Regulations. 

(3) In preparing a letter, the original shall : Indicate the distribution, 
acknowledgement (if desired), signature, and obtain file number from file yeo- 
man or, in the case of a reply, assign same file number as has been placed on 
the routing sheet of the incoming letter plus the originator's symbol number. 

Ascertain that there is a : 

(A) Green file copy (pinned on top of a complete copy of the Incoming 
correspondence with the routing sheet on the bottom. ) 

(B) Yellow information copy. The day following the mailing of corre- 
spondence, information copies shall be bound and routed to all oflicers. 
After completion of routing, these copies shall be destroyed. 

(0) Pink Copy. This is retained by the tracer yeoman until the corre- 
spondence is signed, after which it is sent to the outgoing mail desk and 
subsequently returned to the originator bearing the date and serial number. 

(4) The original and all copies shall show in the upper right-hand corner the 
initials of the yeoman typing the letter and the originator's symbol number 
immediately following the file number. 

(5) Correspondence shall be clipped together with paper clips in the following 
order: Original and copies for information addresses; file copy (green) ; infor- 
mation copy (yellow) ; pink copy. The green copy shall extend at least an inch 
to the right side of the correspondence to permit the initials of the originator 
(indicated by red diagonal mark) as well as other interested officers (indicated 
by pencil diagonal mark). 

(c) Correspondence to be printed. Four copies shall be typed, original on 
green paper, copy on white bond for the printer, one yellow information copy 
and one pink copy. The word ''PRINT" shall be typed on the left side of the 
last page, opposite the signature, and immediately over the word "DISTRIBU- 
TION." When the green copy (original) has been signed, it will pass through 
the outgoing mail desk to be numbered and dated, and for the preparation of a 
printing order. 

(d) Correspondence to he mimeographed. In order to reduce the amount of 
typing required for letters that will be mimeographed, the yeoman doing the typing 
will insert a green sheet provided for this purpose under the stencil when cutting 
the latter. When this impression copy has been signed by the Admiral or Chief 
of Staff, the Flag Secretary affixes his authentication, using a stencil stylus, 
and the stencil and impression copy are then delivered to the Outgoing Mail 
Yeoman for entry of date and serial number, mimeographing, (done by the 
Mimeograph Yeoman), and ultimate mailing. (Article 504 (j) (10)). 

(e) Multiple Address Letters. Multiple address letters are those addressed 
to more than one office. The original of the multiple address letter shall be 



824 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

made on green paper, and one onion skin copy stiall be made for each addressee. 
Thiese onion skin copies shall be checked off by the yeoman preparing the corre- 
spondence, an arrow check being placed immediately after the office addressed. 
All action copies of multiple address letters shall be authenticated by the Flag 
Secretary. The original (green), arranged in the manner prescribed in Art. 
504 (b) (5), will be signed by the Commander-in-Chief or Chief of Staff and is 
kept as the file copy. 

(f ) When a letter is required to be rewritten, the pink copy shall be removed 
from the file on the tracer desk and all copies of the letter as originally pre- 
pared shall be immediately destroyed except the one copy on which corrections 
have been indicated. This copy shall be attached to the pink copy of the letter 
as rewritten and will be returned with the pink copy to the yeoman of the officer 
taking action. With the exception of recommendations on a subject made by 
various staff officers, these instructions shall also apply to rough drafts of let- 
ters or endorsements. Copies of letters on which corrections have been made 
and rough drafts of letters or endorsements shall not be filed in the correspond- 
ence files unless retention in the file is indicated. 

(g) Letters that have not been signed should be returned to the tracer yeo- 
man in order that the latter may inform the originator accordingly, meanwhile 
returning to him the pink copy. 

(h) When correspondence is signed by other than the Commander-in-Chief, 
the following words shall be typed immediately below the name of the officer 
signing : 

Signed by Signatubh Typewritten 

Chief of Staff — name 

Chief of Staff 

Operations Officer when Chief — name 

of Staff is absent Acting Chief of Staff 

Flag Secretary or Flag Lleur — name name 

tenant (Authentication of Flag Secretary Flag Lieutenant 

multiple address letters). (or Acting Flag Secretary) 

Flog Secretary or Flag Lieu- — ■ name 

tenant (for single address by direction 

letters). 

(i) When information addressees are directed to take action by copy of 
letters or endorsements, such copy shall be authenticated by the Flag Secretary. 

(j) When correspondence is ready for signature the following procedure shall 
be followed: 

(1) Deliver to Tracer Yeoman. 

(2) Tracer Yeoman. Uses the pink copy for tracing correspondence circulat- 
ing through the staff for initialing. When correspondence is initialed by all 
officers except Flag Secretary and Chief of Staff, delivers to Chief Yeoman in 
Charge. 

(3) Chief Yeoman in Charge. Checks correspondence to see that it is com- 
plete and in agreement with regulations, policies and current instructions. 

(4) Flag Secretary. Checks correspondence to see that it is complete and 
that it is in agreement with regulations, policies and current instructions. 

Brings to the attention of officers concerned any conflicting or inconsistent 
orders or instructions. 

Authenticates all multiple address letters, and copies of letters or endorse- 
ments directing action. Signs single address letters. 

Releases printed and mimeographed letters for mailing. 

(5) Tracer Yeoman. Removes correspondence from the outgoing basket of 
Flag Secretary. * 

Delivers correspondence signed "By direction" to the Outgoing Mail Yeoman, 
attaching pink. 

Places unsigned correspondence in the Chief of Staff's box in the routing 
cabinet and indicates by notation on pink copy date and time that it has been 
placed in Chief of Staff's box in the routing cabinet for signature or initialing. 

(6) Chief of Staff's Orderly or Yeoman. Removes correspondence from Chief 
of Staff's box in the routing cabinet, and delivers to Chief of Staff for initials 
or signature. 

Removes correspondence from outgoing basket of Chief of Staff and delivers 
to Tracer Desk. 

(7) Tracer Yeoman. When correspondence is initialed by Chief of Staff, 
places it in Commander-in-Chief's box in the routing cabinet, indicating by 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 825 

notation on pink copy date and time that it has been placed on Commander-in- 
Chief's box for signature. Delivers mail signed by the Chief of Staff to the 
Outgoing Mail Yeoman, attaching pinks. 

(8) Flag Secretary. Removes correspondence from the Commander-in-Chief's 
box in the routing cabinet. Sees that all correspondence is initialed by Chief 
of Staff and delivers to the Commander-in-Chief for signature. 

(9) Tracer Yeoman. When correspondence has been signed by the Com- 
mander-in-Chief removes pink copies from tracer file, and attaches same to the 
letters to which they belong; delivers them to Outgoing Mail Yeoman. 

Makes daily check on pink copies vphere letters are outstanding. 

(10) Outgoing Mail Yeoman. Insures that correspondence is complete; en- 
closures, if any, attached; properly arranged (See Art. 504 (b) ) ; initialed by 
Flag Secretary ; signed ; that there are sufficient copies for all action and infor- 
mation addressees ; that each copy of CONFIDENTIAL correspondence is so 
marked ; that information and pink copies have been prepared where necessary. 

Returns correspondence which is found to be delinquent in any of the above 
respects to the Chief Yeoman in Charge for corrective action. 

Stamps serial number (except on personal letters) and date on original and 
all copies ; stamps date of mailing on file information and pink copies, and 
initials file copy. 

Provides for the registry of all records of proceedings of Naval Courts and 
Boards, all SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL correspondence and other corre- 
spondence as directed. Maintains a record of all registry numbers and records 
the serial file number or other description of the correspondence for which each 
register number is used. ' 

Is responsible for the correct addressing of envelopes for all mail passing 
over the Outgoing Mail Desk and for its being placed in the mail properly 
protected to insure its delivery free from damage by normal handling. In 
connection with the former, he shall keep himself informed of the location and 
prospective movements of all ships and transfers of all Flags. 

Requests instructions from Flag Secretary regarding mailing of multiple 
addressed letters, operation orders, plans, etc., to Commanders who are absent 
when several of the vessels under their command are present with the 
Commander-in-Chief. 

Under the direction of Flag Secretary determines the distribtuion and number 
of copies necessary to be printed or mimeographed using "U. S. Fleet Mail 
Distribution Lists" or such other distribution as may be assigned. Prepares 
Distribution Memorandum on Printing Orders. 

Prepares Printing Order and forwards with White copy of the letter to be 
printed to print shop. The print shop shall send the Printing Order with each 
proof to the yeoman designated to proof-read it. This yeoman shall initial in 
the space provided for each proof and when correct in all respects and con- 
sidered ready for printing the yeoman shall refer the final proof and the 
printing order to the originating ofiicer, who shall, if he approves for printing, 
initial on the Printing Order in the space "Read and found correct". The Flag 
Secretary will release all letters for printing and distribution. The green (file 
copy) is held by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman until the letter is printed and 
mailed, when it is given to the Tracer Yeoman for necessary action. Yellow 
and pink copies, are handled in the same manner as for other outgoing corre- 
spondence. The date sent to the print shop, instead of the date of mailing 
will appear on the file copy. When distribution is made and entered in the 
outgoing mail log, a printed copy with original "Printing Order" securely 
attached thereto, shall be sent to file. 

Note : The Mimeograph Yeoman will mimeograph the required number of 
copies shown on the Distribution Memorandum. 

A copy of each mimeographed letter originating in the office of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief will be marked "INFORMATION COPY", and will be handled 
in the same manner as other "Information" copies. 

When the Distribution Memorandum is released for mailing by the Flag Secre- 
tary, the Outgoing Mail Yeoman mails the printed or mimeographed letter and 
furnishes the Tracer Yeoman with the necessary copies for a Staff Distribution ; 
stamps date of mailing and initials on the Distribution Memorandum ; sends file 
copy to the Tracer Yeoman with the Distribution Memorandum securely attached 
thereto. 

Assigns and maintains a record of serial numbers, in their proper numerical 
sequence, of Operation Plans, Operation Orders, U. S. and Pacific Fleet Letters, 
Memoranda, Notices, etc. 



826 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Insures that when required, URGENT tags are securely attached to the cor- 
respondence, and to the outside envelope. (See Article 502). 

Removes any SPECIAL NOTICE tags before mailing. 

Handles all guard mail, incoming and outgoing, and will promptly inform Flag 
Secretary of any variation from the scheduled trips called for by Fleet Regula- 
tions. Logs registered number, originator and addressee of all incoming regis- 
tered guard mail. Delivers incoming mail to Incoming mail Yeoman, and has 
outgoing mail ready for Guard Mail Petty Officers at the designated times. When 
the ship is at the Navy Yard, is responsible that necessary guard mail trips are 
made to the Commandant's Office. 

lAt the end of each day, checks numerical sequence and enters in the outgoing 
mail log, loose leaf form, all correspondence mailed that day. This log shall be a 
permanent record of correspondence mailed and will show: 

(1) Serial number of letter. 

( 2 ) Cincpac file number of jacket in which filed. 

(3) To whom sent. 

(4) Date of letter, 

(5) Subject. 

The above data shall also be entered for all mimeographed and printed letters 
dated and serialled that day, even though they are not mailed on that day. A note 

"Mailed on " shall be made in "Subject" column of log and the date of 

mailing inserted on the date the mimeographed or printed letter is mailed. 

Confidential and Secret correspondence will be so designated in the log and, 
in the case of secret correspondence, the subject will not be entered. 

When correspondence has been entered in the log, gives file copies to Tracer 
Yeoman, pink copies to the yeoman of the officer taking action as indicated by the 
officer's number (not the initials of the yeoman) . 

Arranges yellow information copies in numerical sequence and prepares routing 
sheets next morning and delivers to Chief Yeoman in Charge. 

(11) Tracer Yeoman. Takes appropriate action being governed by the pre- 
ceding provisions of this Article. 

(12) File Yeoman. Handles correspondence as directed in Article 506-1. 

505. FILE NUMBERS. The file yeoman will assign file numbers to all cor- 
respondence. If the File Yeoman is not on duty or in the office when URGENT 
mail is received, such mail shall be handled as directed in Article 502. In assign- 
ing file numbers to correspondence, the File Yeoman shall use the U. S. Navy Filing 
Manual as the basis for filing arrangement. Correct file numbers are essential 
in order to locate correspondence readily. A new jacket shall be prepared for 
each new number so assigned. 

506. In addition to the standard file numbers assigned to outgoing correspond- 
ence, the originator's symbol number and a serial number wiU be used. The 
originator's symbol number shall be placed after the file number and enclosed 
in parenthesis. The serial number will appear after the word "Serial" and will 
not be in parenthesis. New serial numbers will be started on each January 1st, 
and will run throughout the calendar year. The first figure of all CONFI- 
DENTIAL serial numbers shall be a "0". 

506-1. The File Yeoman shall: 

Scrutinize correspondence to see that none goes to file unless complete action 
has been taken; that routing sheet has been initialed by all officers and the 
Tracer Yeoman and that original routing sheet is attached to correspondence. 

Prepare correspondence for file, retain spare copies in the spare copy file 
when action is so indicated on routing sheet. 

File correspondence. CONFIDENTIAL correspondence must actually be 
placed in the jackets by the File Yeoman himself. He may utilize his assistants 
for filing correspondence of a lower classification. 

Check off, in colored pencil, all entries in the incoming and outgoing mail 
logs to see that all mail received and originated has been checked to file. Undue 
delays shall be reported after check has been made with the Tracer Yeoman. 

Keep an up-to-date Index of the files. 

Cooperate with the Tracer Yeoman in preparing the Weekly List of Outstanding 
Correspondence. 

507. Where correspondence treats of more than one subject, it shall be filed 
under the principal subject, and cross-index tracers prepared and filed under 
the other subjects treated or referred to. Cross-index tracers shall be printed 
on white paper. 

508. Yeomen preparing correspondence shall type the file number appearing 
on the routing sheet, the symbol number of the originator in parenthesis and 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 827 

the word "Serial" below the file number after which the serial number will be 
entered by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman. 

509. FILING OF PRINTED MATTER. Fleet Letters, Memoranda, Notices, 
etc., must be kept in an unbroken serial titled "file for ready reference" in addi- 
tion to being placed in the subject file jacket. Care must be taken to make cross- 
index files complete and to make sure that signed copy is filed. 

None of the above matter will be removed from the files merely because it has 
been cancelled or superseded, but a notation to this effect shall be made on the 
file copy showing reference numbers of the dispatch or letter cancelling and 
superseding it. Extra copies held for issue will, however be destroyed. When- 
ever the number of spare copies of a particular publication is low, or a request 
for spare copies is large, the requests will be referred to the Flag Secretary. 
Normally requests from ships should be handled by Type commanders. 

510. WEEKLY CHECK OF OUTSTANDING CORRESPONDENCE. On Tues- 
days of each week a sight check will be made by the Tracer Yeoman of all 
outstanding correspondence that records indicate has been in the possession of an 
oflScer since the preceding Tuesday, and a list prepared for each such oflicer 
showing correspondence thus outstanding. The duplicate routing sheet will be 
used as a "tickler" tracer for checking outstanding letters in the office. A nota- 
tion will be made on the outstanding correspondence sheet showing the date 
the check was made and the officer who acknowledges having each piece of 
correspondence in his possession on that date. 

511. If, after making a thorough canvass of the offices, no trace can be found 
of a letter that has not moved in its routing from one officer to another within 
the past week, the outstanding correspondence sheet will be delivered to the 
Flag Secretary with a report of the search. 

512. Lists of outstanding correspondence checked to the Admiral and Chief of 
Staff will be delivered to the Flag Secretary, 

Seotion VI. — Confidential and Seobet Coreespondence 

601. Confidential mail shall be handled in accordance with Article 410 and the 
following : 

( a ) All correspondence classified as CONFIDENTIAL wUl have the word "CON- 
FIDENTIAL" stamped and typed, or printed in the upper left-hand corner, under 
file number, of each sheet. 

(b) All routing sheets for confidential correspondence shall be printed on blue 
paper and are plainly marked "CONFIDENTIAL". 

(c) All confidential correspondence will be filed in separate filing cases known 
as "the CONFIDENTIAL files". 

(d) All confidential correspondence placed in U. S. or Guard Mail will be placed 
in double envelopes with the inner envelope stamped "CONFIDENTIAL". Con- 
fidential correspondence forwarded by U. S. Mail or Guard Mail must be registered. 

602. SECRET correspondence shall be handled in accordance with the following 
instructions : 

(a) Stoicage and Handling. (1) SECRET correspondence files shall be kept 
in a safe under the immediate supervision of the Secret Mail Officer ; except corre- 
spondence regarding War Plans which may be retained by the War Plans Officer, 
and that concerning Communication Intelligence which may be retained by the 
Fleet Security Officer. 

(2) The yeomen assigned to the War Plans Officer and the Secret Mail Yeoman 
are authorized to handle secret correspondence. Secret correspondence shall not 
be typed or handled by any enlisted personnel other than the yeoman who have 
been so authorized. Secret correspondence must not be permitted to pass out of 
the personal custody of staff officers at any time. 

(b) Incoming Mail. (1) The Secret Mail Officer, or in his absence, his au- 
thorized relief, the duty communication officer, will receive all incoming Officer 
Messenger Mail, and show same to the Flag Secretary or in the latter's absence 
to the Staff Duty Officer. 

(2) Incoming mail marked SECRET will be handled by the Secret Mail Officer 
subject to instructions by the Flag Secretary. 

(3) The Secret Mail Yeoman, under the supervision of the Secret Mail Officer, 
shall log all incoming SECRET correspondence, attach secret routing slips, and 
deliver to the Flag Secretary for routing. 

(4) The Secret Mail Officer or the Secret Mail Yeoman shall deliver the SECRET 
correspondence to the staff officers concerned. Receipts shall be obtained for all 



828 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SECRET correspondence left in the custody of officers. Officers not having au- 
thorized secret stowage shall not retain correspondence overnight. 

(c) Outgoing Mail. (1) An officer desiring to originate a SECRET letter 
shall prepare a rough draft in long hand or dictate the letter to a yeoman au- 
thorized to handle secret correspondence. The letter shall be typed and delivered 
by personnel authorized to handle secret documents to staff officers concerned for 
initialling and signature. 

(2) The file copy of outgoing secret correspondence prepared by the War Plans 
Officer may be retained in his files. In such cases a copy of the letter shall be 
delivered to the Secret Mail Officer for filing in the secret correspondence files. 

(3) SECRET correspondence will be forwarded in accordance with Article 
76(4), U. S. Navy Regulations. 

(4) Outgoing SECRET mail will be marked with an identification number of 
five figures preceded by CINCPAC or CINCUS as appropriate. Franked cards 
bearing a return receipt shall be enclosed with each letter and will indicate the 
identity of the letter by both the serial and shipment numbers. 

Section VII. Libraries 

701. Every effort will be made to maintain an office library of official publica- 
tions required for reference by members of the Staff. Officers are requested to 
advise the Flag Secretary of publications they desire to have ordered. 

The office library consists of various books and pamphlets such as : — ^Annual 
Reports, Regulations, Bureau Manuals, Registers, Directories and miscellaneous 
publications. The library will be added to as publications are received from time 
to time. Any publications carried in the library which have become obsolete 
will be submitted to the Flag Secretary, who will issue the necessary instructions 
as to their disposition. 

Each publication is listed and assigned a serial number, and filed according to 
that number. 

The File Yeoman will be responsible for the proper classification and filing of 
the library. 

702. The Commander-in-Chief's Library is maintained under the supervision 
of the Fleet Public Relations Officer. It consists principally of non-fiction although 
some works of fiction may be included. The books are kept in book cases in the 
Admiral's and guest cabins and elsewhere as necessary. The Fleet Public Rela- 
tions Officer will publish to the staff a list of books on hand and lists of additions 
as received. All members of the staff are invited to make use of the facilities 
afforded by this library. It is desired to augment and improve the Commander- 
in-Chief's library. To this end suggestions as to books which should be obtained 
are requested from all members of the Staff. Keys to the bookcase of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief's Library will be kept in the key locker in the flag office. 

Section VIII. Rapid Communications of Commander-in-Chief, United States 

Paoifo Fleet 

part a GENERAL 

801. Drafting of Despatches, (a) In order that the Commander-in-Chief may 
set an example of propriety in drafting of despatches, all officers of the Staff 
will familiarize themselves with the provisions of Communication Instructions 
relative to that subject. Communication watch and coding board officers should 
bring to the attention of originating officers all violations of these instructions 
and recommend necessary corrections. In no case will a change in a despatch 
be made without the consent of the originating officer. 

(b) An officer originating a non-classified or restricted despatch will have the 
message typed by his own yeoman, or duty seaman. After it has been initialed 
by the originating officer it will be delivered to the communication watch officer 
who will obtain the initials of the information and releasing officers and super- 
vise the transmission of the despatch. 

(c) An officer originating a classified despatch will write or type the message 
on an outgoing classified despatch blank. After initialing by the originating 
officer it will be delivered to the communication watch officer who will obtain 
initials of the information and releasing officers, have the despatch encrypted 
and supervise its transmission. 

(d) All despatches will normally be released only by the Admiral or Chief of 
Staff. In case of emergencies or special circumstances, despatches may be re- 
leased by other members of the Staff. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 829 

(e) An officer desiring to have a message passed to supplementary addresses 
for action or information will inform the communication watch officer who will 
prepare the necessary despatch or procedure signal and obtain initials of 
originating, information and releasing officers. 

802. Security of Communications, (a) Visual methods or landline will be used 
for transmission of despatches whenever practicable. The use of radio for trans- 
mission of administrative despatches shall ie kept at a minimum. 

(b) If a delay in the delivery of a despatch is acceptable, such message should 
be sent by despatch mail (mailgram). Mail grams should be used particularly 
for transmission of despatches to information addresses when it is desirable 
that their radio calln do not appear in the heading of the radio despatch. 

803. Distribution of Despatches, (a) Copies of all outgoing and incoming non- 
classified and restricted administrative despatches are provided for the Admiral, 
Chief of Staff, Operations Officer, Staff Duty Officer, Flag Secretary and Com- 
munication Officer. Outgoing despatch books also contain a copy for the originat- 
ing officer. Incoming despatch books also contain an action copy and two in- 
formation copies which are available to any member of the Staff who may 
request such copies from the communication orderly. The Communication 
Officer's copies of despatches will be placed on a file in the Staff Office where 
they will be available for perusal by all members of the Staff. 

(b) Only one copy of outgoing and incoming classified administrative des- 
patches (other than restricted despatches) will be made. Paraphrases of 
secret and confidential despatches shall be kept at a minimum and will be 
furnished only at the specific request of officers, and must be returned to the 
coding room for burning when no longer needed. Paraphrases of secret messages 
will be furnished only to the action or originating officer, and shall be receipted 
for in the same manner as registered publications. 

(c) Only four copies of the translations of tactical despatches will be made 
for distribution to appropriate boards. 

804. Routing and Delivery of Despatches. (Internal) (a) Correct and com- 
plete routing of despatches is a function of the communication watch officer. 

(b) The Staff Duty Officer should see all despatches when the action officer 
is not on board. In such cases instructions will be requested by the orderly from 
the Staff Duty Officer as to whether the latter wil accept responsibility for the 
message or whether it should be held for the action officer. 

(c) Whoever initials the message for the action officer and accepts the action 
copy assumes full responsibility for taking the required action and for informing 
the designated action officer of the action taken. 

805. Movement Reports, (a) The movement report sheets and cards will be 
corrected and maintained by communication personnel under the supervision 
of the communication watch officer designated as Movement Report Officer. 

(b) Movement reports of the flag plane will be originated by the pilot making 
the flight and will be prepared and released by the flagship. 

806. Fleet Coding Board, (a) The fleet coding board will consist of four 
officers of the Staff and five officers detailed by the Commanding Officer of the 
Fleet Flagship. 

(b) The fleet coding board will be charged with encrypting and decrypting 
messages sent or received by the Commander-in-Chief or the Fleet flagship, as 
directed by the Fleet Communication Officer. 

(c) The Communication Security Officer will be responsible for the organiza- 
tion and training of the fleet coding board. 

807. Shutting Down Transmitters. Except in ca«e of emergency, permission 
for securing transmitters must be obtained from the Fleet Communication Officer. 

PABT B — ^INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMUNICATION PERSONNEL 

808. Administrative Communication Organization, (a) The following stations 
will normally be manned : 

(1) Main radio room ; 

(2) Signal bridge; 

(3) Main communication station; 

(4) Flag communication office; 

(5) Coding room. 

(b) The communication watch will normally consist of: 

(1) Communication Watch Officer 

(2) Coding Board Officer 

(3) Communication Supervisor 



830 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(4) Communication Yeoman 

(5) Communication Orderly 

(6) Radio Supervisor 

(7) Signal Supervisor 

(8) Radio Operators 

(9) Signalmen 

(c) The communication watch oflicer will stand a day's duty, relieving the 
watch at 0800. He will inform his relief regarding unfinished business, effective 
organization, frequency plan in effect, circuits up, visual signalling conditions, 
and all pertinent information necessary for the proper conduct of his duties. 

(d) The coding board oflBcer will stand a day's duty, relieving the watch at 
0800. He will inform his relief regarding unfinished business and all pertinent 
information necessary for the proper conduct of his duties. 

(e) Relief Communication Watch Officers. The first and second relief com- 
munication watch officers will maintain a continuous watch in the Flag Com- 
munication Office during working hours. The second relief communication 
watch officer will stand watch for 0800 until after lunch. The first relief com- 
munication officer will stand watch from after lunch until 1530, at which time 
he will be relieved by the communication watch officer with the day's duty. Other 
relief communication watch officers are available for duty when the traffic 
situation requires. 

(f ) The first and second relief coding board officers will maintain a continuous 
watch in the Coding Room during working hours. The watches will correspond 
to those stood by relief communication watch officers. Other relief coding 
board officers are available for duty when the traffic situation requires. 

(g) Communication Supervisor. The communication supervisor will stand a 
day's duty under the administrative organization in the Main Communication 
Station. He will act as an assistant to the communication watch officer. The 
time of relieving and hours on watch will be the same as those prescribed for 
the communication watch officer. The watches for the communication super- 
visors will be arranged by the Senior Chief Radioman and will be approved by 
the Assistant Communication Officer. 

(h) The radio and signal supervisors shall maintain continuous watches in 
the Main Radio Room ,and Signal Bridge respectively. The watches for 
supervisors will be arranged by the leading radio and signal chief petty officers 
and will be approved by the flagship's Radio and Signal Officers, respectively. 

(i) Communication Yoeman. Communication yoemen will maintain a con- 
tinuous watch in the Flag Communication Office. The watches will be arranged 
by the Senior Communication Yoeman and approved by the Assistant Com- 
munication Officer. 

(j) The flagship will provide sufficient communication orderlies to permit a 
continuous watch in the Flag Communication Office. When the flagship is 
underway a continuous watch will also be maintained on the Flag Bridge. 
Orders for the communication orderlies will be promulgated by the Assistant 
Communication Officer. 

(k) Watches prescribed In the preceding articles will not be exchanged without 
permission of the officers concerned. 

809. Tactical Communication Organization, (a) The following Stations will 
normally be manned : 

(1) Main Radio Room; 

(2) Signal Bridge 

(3) Main Communication Station ; 

(4) Flag Communication Office 

(5) Flag Bridge Radio Station; 

(6) Flag Bridge Communication Office; 

(7) Coding Room. 

(b) The communication watch normally consists of: 

(1) Communication watch officer; 

(2) Coding board officer; 

(3) Two communication yoemen; 

(4) Two communication orderlies; 

(5) Communication Supervisor; 

(6) Radio Supervisor ; 

(7) Signal Supervisor; 

(8) Radio Operators ; 

(9) Signalmen; 

(10 Additional members of coding board as necessary. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 831 

(c) Communication watch offices shall maintain a continuous watch in the 
Flag Bridge Communication Office. Off-watch communication watch officers are 
available for handling administrative traffic and coding duties as the situation 
requires. 

(d) Coding Board Officers shall maintain a continuous watch in the Coding 
Eoom. Off-watch coding board officers are available for coding duties as the 
situation requires. 

(e) The Chief Radiomen assigned to the Flag Allowance shall maintain a 
day's duty watch in the Main Communication Station, and a continuous watch 
as radio supervisor in the Flag Bridge Radio Station. This watch list may be 
augmented by qualified first class radiomen as required. 

(f ) The radio and signal supervisors shall maintain a continuous watch in the 
Main Radio Room and Signal Bridge. 

(g) Communication yoemen shall maintain continuous watches in the Flag 
Bridge Communication Office and the Flag Communication Office. 

(h) The flagship will provide sufficient communication orderlies to permit 
continuous watches in the Flag Communication Office and on the Flag Bridge. 

810. Duties of Communication Watch Offlcer. (a) The communication watch 
officer is in direct charge of the communications of the Commander-in-Chief. 

(b) The communication watch officer is responsible for the efficiency of the 
communication watch and will require an alert and military watch of all 
communication personnel. 

(c) The communication watch offlcer is responsible for complete and rapid 
internal distribution of despatches and for the expeditious handling of outgoing 
traffic, 

(d) The communication watch offlcer is responsible for the handling of en- 
crypted despatches and the efficiency of the coding watch. 

(e) The communication watch officer must be fully cognizant of the effective 
organization of the Fleet and is responsible for setting up and maintaining the 
communication channels required by the organization. 

811. Duties of Coding Board Officers, (a) The coding board offlcer is in charge 
of the operation of the Commander-in-Chief's coding room. 

(b) The coding board officer is responsible for expeditious, accurate and 
efficient encryption and decryption of despatches. 

(c) The coding board officer must be fully cognizant of the rules for crypto- 
graphic security and will ensure strict observance of these rules in the handling 
of the encrypted traffic of the Commander-in-Chief. 

(d) The coding board officer is responsible for the custody of the cryptographic 
aids, publications and devices in the coding room. 

812. Qualification of Communication Watch Officers and Coding Board Officers. 
Upon reporting for duty communication watch officers and coding board officers 
must undergo sufficient instruction to qualify taking over a watch. To be con- 
sidered qualified a communication watch officer or coding board officer must : 

(a) have a working knowledge of Communication Instructions, Basic Com- 
munication Plan, Frequency Plans and Tactical Instructions; 

(b) have a working knowledge of the call systems, the General Signal Book 
and Signal Vocabulary; 

(c) have a thorough knowledge of the U. S. Fleet Staff Instructions and Staff 
Organization ; 

(d) have a thorough knowledge of the operation of the communication plant 
of the Fleet Flagship; 

(e) be proficient in the use of all cryptographic systems held by the Com- 
mander-in-Chief. 

(f ) have a thorough knowledge of the principles and rules of communication 
and ci'yptographic security and their application. 

813. Routing of Despatches, (a) Full and complete routing of despatches is a 
function of the communication watch officer. A despatch must be seen by every 
officer having a possible interest in it. Intelligent and complete routing requires a 
thorough knowledge of the Staff organization and a careful application of this 
knowledge to each despatch. 

(b) Copies of dispatches concerning routine reports and requests should not be 
delivered to the Admiral. Such despatches will be marked "NN" and the Ad- 
miral's copy will be delivered to the Assistant Communication Officer for dis- 
position. 

(c) Classified despatches, other than restricted, shall be routed to the Chief of 



832 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Staff, Operations Officer, Communication Officer and Communication Security 
Officer in addition to action or information officers. The Chief of StafE shall be 
the first to see classified despatches and shall approve the routing prior to further 
delivery. When the Chief of StafE is not available despatches may be shown to 
the action officer prior to final approval of the routing. 

(d) The flag is responsible for delivery of messages addressed to the flagship. 
Copies of such messages and copies of messages which are not addresed to, but 
which are of interest to the flagship, shall be delivered to the flagship communi- 
cation office for internal distribution. 

814. Delivery of despatches, (a) The communication watch officer will be 
responsible for requiring orderlies to deliver all messages promptly between 
0800 and 2230 unless otherwise directed. Between 2230 and 0700 messages will 
be delivered to action and information officers when so directed by the communi- 
cation watch officer. In case of doubt, messages will be delivered regardless of 
the hour. Priority despatches will always be delivered to the action officer 
immediately. 

(b) Delivery of all traffic accumulated during the night will be completed by 
0900 daily. 

(c) Speed in delivery of despatches, especially those of priority precedence, is 
essential and the system must not be allowed to delay action. However, it is 
also essential that despatches be accurately written up. It is the responsibility 
of the communication watch officer to insure that a complete and accurate copy 
of all despatches is delivered to the proper officers as soon as possible. 

815. Emergencies, (a) The communication watch officer should bear in mind 
that speed in the delivery of a message indicating an Emergency is the primary 
consideration. 

(b) Make use of the telephone as well as messengers. Above all, do not let 
the system delay action. 

(c) Call relief watches as necessary to assist in handling the situation and 
retain them on watch as long as required. 

(d) Be prepared to handle any emergency at night. Before turning in leave 
clear and definite instructions to be notified immediately in the case of any 
unusual occurrence. 

816. Encrypted Despatches, (a) If time permits, the encryption of each out- 
going encrypted despatch will be checked prior to transmission by an officer other 
than the one who encrypted the despatch. If time does not permit the encryption 
to be checked prior to transmission it will be checked as soon as possible there- 
after, 

(b) All intercepted encrypted despatches will be delivered to the coding room 
where they will be decrypted for information if traffic conditions permit. 

817. Intercepted Traffic. Intercepted traffic of possible interest to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief will be written up and distributed for information. Each copy 
will be marked "Written up for Cincpac information." 

818. Radio Logs. Radio logs shall be kept in accordance with Articles 1413- 
1417, Communication Instructions, 1937. The communication watch officer will 
examine radio logs carefully during his watch for despatches addressed to the 
Commander-in-Chief, for violations of communication instructions, for inter- 
cepted despatches of possible interest to the Commander-in-Chief, and to ascer- 
tain that circuit discipline in being maintained. 

19. Transmitting and Receiving Data. Transmitting and receiving data will 
be recorded by the radio operator or signalman as indicated below : 

Radio 

(1) Time of Delivery or Receipt 

(2) Frequency 

(3) Operator's sign. 

Visual 

(1) Time of Delivery or Receipt 

(2) System 

(3) Signalman's sign. 

820. Communication Files, (a) General File. The general file includes one 
copy of each message transmitted or received. Service messages (except des- 
patches) shall be stapled to the message to which they refer. Procedure signals 
not classified as service messages and messages not bearing time groups shall 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



833 



be filed according to time of receipt or delivery. Classified mailgrams (other than 
restricted) shall be filed in the classified tiles and a tickler filed in the general file. 

(b) Shore station Schedule Files. A copy of each message received by I or F 
method shall be filed in these files. A separate file shall be maintained for each 
shore station. Messages shall be filed by shore station serial numbers. 

(c) Movement Report File. A copy of each notice or modification to the Ship 
Movement Report Sheets shall be placed in this file. 

(d) Flag Files. The flag file includes one copy of each message originated by 
the Commander-in-Chief, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, or vpritten up 
for information of the Commander-in-Chief. These messages shall be filed in 
chronological order of time groups under the headings incoming and outgoing. 

(e) AInav File. A copy of each alnav message shall be placed in this file in 
order of alnav number. 

(f ) Fleet File. A copy of each fleet message shall be placed in this flle in order 
of fleet number. 

(g) Classifled Files. Translations of classified despatches shall be placed 
in these files in order of coding room serial number. Secret despatches shall be 
placed in a file separate from the regular classified files. 

(h) Tactical Translation Files. The tactical translation files'contain one copy 
of the exact translation of each encrypted tactical despatch and one copy of each 
plain language tactical despatch. Messages will be filed in chronological order 
of date time groups. 

821. Composition and Standard Distribution of Message Books: 
(a) Outgoing Circuit 



Front Cover 
First copy 
Second copy 
Third copy 
Back copy 

(b) Outgoing Administrative 

Fi'ont cover 
First copy 
Second copy 
Third copy 
Fourth copy 
Fifth copy 
Sixth copy 
Seventh copy 
Eighth copy 
Ninth copy 
Back cover 

(c) Outgoing Tactical 

Front cover 
First copy 
Second copy 
Back cover 

(d) Outgoing Umpire 

Front cover 
First copy 
Back cover 

(e) Incoming Circuit 

Front cover 
First copy 
Second copy 
Back copy 

(f) Incoming Administrative 

Front cover 
* First copy 
Second copy 
Third copy 
Fourth copy 
Fifth copy 
Sixth copy 
Seventh copy 
Eighth copy 
Back cover 



General File 
Station File 
Flag File 
Originator 
Ship 

General File 

Flag File 

Originator 

Admiral 

Chief of Staff 

Operations Officer 

Flag Secretary 

Staff Duty Officer 

Communication Officer 

Station File 

Ship 

Translation File 
Flag Plot 
Flag Plot 
Coding Board 

Translation File 
Umpire 
Coding Board 

General File 
Spare copy 
Advance action 
Check copy 

Flag File 

Action 

Admiral 

Chief of Staff 

Operations Officer 

Flag Secretary 

Staff Duty Officer 

Information 

Information 

Communication Officer 



834 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(g) Incoming Tactical 

Front cover — Translation File 

First copy — Flag Plot 

Second copy — Flag Plot 

Back copy — Coding Board 
(h) Incoming Contact Report 

Front cover — Translation File 

First copy — Flag Plot 

Second copy — Flag Plot 

Back cover — Ship 

(i) Incoming Umpire — 

Front cover — Translation File 

First copy — Umpire 

Back cover — Coding Board 

Section IX. Registeeed and Otheb Sexjeei and Confidential Publications 

901. The Communication Security OfBcer is responsible to the Commander- 
in-Chief and to the Department for the custody of all registered publications. 

902. A Communication Watch OflScer, designated as Registered Publications 
Officer, is the custodian of registered and other secret and confidential p)ubli- 
cations. He shall receipt to the Fleet Communication Security Officer for all 
registered publications and for other important confidential, secret or restricted 
documents which must be accounted for by the Commander-in-Chief. 

903. All registered and other important publications shall be catalogued to 
show their receipt and the safes in which they are stowed. No registered pub- 
lication shall be issued except on written receipt of an authorized individual, 
which receipt shall be obtained at the time of issue. Other confidential or 
secret publications and important documents shall be handled in a similar 
manner, 

904. In accounting for registered publications when preparing quarterly returns, 
each publication actually must be sighted by the officers taking the inventory. 

905. Confidential and secret publications shall be kept only in authorized 
stowages. 

906. The Coding Board Officer on watch shall be responsible for the publi- 
cations in the communication office safes. The Registered Publications Officer 
shall make a weekly inventory of the contents of the communication office safes. 

907. The Registered Publications Officer shall be the only person regularly 
in possession of the combinations of safes containing un-issued registered 
publications, except for: (a) communication office safes: (b) War plans safe; 
(c) Security Officer's safe. In order that access to any safe may be had in 
the absence of the regular custodian, the Registered Publications Officer shall 
maintain in sealed envelopes the combinations of all safes assigned to the 
Staff. These sealed envelopes shall be kept in the communication office secret 
safe. Prompt report shall be made to the regular custodian of a safe whenever 
the envelope containing the combination thereto is opened for any purpose. 

908. The Registered Publications Officer shall change the combination of all 
safes when he first receipts for the registered publications, and from time to 
time thereafter; particularly subsequent to the opening of a safe by another 
officer. 

909. The Registered Publications Officer shall keep a record of all "shipment 
memoranda" to insure receipt of all new matter. He is responsible that all 
publications in his custody are corrected to date. It is desirable that members 
of the staff correct their own publications ; but even though they do so, their 
work shall be checked by the Registered Publications Officer, who is responsible, 
for their being corrected. 

910. When not actually in use, war plans shall be stowed in the safes es- 
pecially provided for them. Corrections to the war plans shall be made under 
the direction of the War Plans Officer. War plans shall not remain out of the 
above safes overnight. The War Plans Officer shall have custody of all War 
Plans in use by the War Plans Section, receipting for them to the Registered 
Publication Officer. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 835 

Section X. Relationship Between Flag and Ship. 
A — Station keeping and maneuvering of flagship. 

1001. When in formation, the flagship will normally maneuver in obedience) 
to signal in the same manner as other vessels of the formation. 

1002. The Commander-in-Chief will, however, as circumstances warrant, ver- 
bally direct the flagship to make changes in course, speed, or jjosition. 

1003. When, for any reason, the movements of thci flagship are no longer 
to be directed by the flag, the Captain of the flagship will be so informed. He 
will be further informed as may be practicable, of the interval during which 
he is expected to act independently. 

1004. When in position, the commanding ofiicer is responsible for the station 
keeping, course, and speed of the flagship as circumstances dictate. 

B — Honors. 

1005. Responsibility for rendering proper honors lies with the flagship except 
that no gun salutes shall be fired without the authority of the Commander-in- 
Chief. Advance information as to honors shall be furnished by the Flag 
Lieutenant or Staff Duty Officer. 

O — Personnel 

1006. Officers of the Staff shall be careful to preserve the unity of command 
of the flagship. To this end they shall give no orders to the officer-of-the-deck 
except in an emergency. Personal requests may be made to subordinate officers 
of the flagship but official requests to the ship shall always be made direct 
to the Captain or Executive Officer. Such requests should be headed, "The 
Admiral desires you Etc." 

1007. The Flag Division Officer and the Division Officers will be the Com- 
munication Watch Officers or Coding Board Officers so designated. 

1008. Leaver and liberty for all men assigned special duty with the flag will 
be regulated by the Flag Secretary who will regulate it to conform as closely 
to that of the flagship, as flag work will permit. (See Article 407(a)). The 
flagship will regulate, control, and administer the following functions pertaining 
to flag personnel : 

(a) Reports, inspections, records and accounts, and advancements in ratings. 

(b) Personal requests (via Flag Secretary). 

(c) Disciplinary matters. 

(d) The division parade is assigned by the flagship. The Flag Division 
Officer is in charge at division parade. He reports to the Executive Officer 
at quarters, the number of unauthorized absentees. 

1009. The following instructions govern the routine muster or flag personnel : 

(a) All flag personnel except the marines will muster at quartcirs with the 
flagship. 

(b) The marines assigned as flag allowance, will muster with the ship's 
marine detachment. 

1010. Flag Division personnel will be stationed for abandon ship drill and 
will report at quarters for this drill unless excused. At fire and collision drills 
and general quarters. Flag division personnel will, when men detailed by the 
ship have failed to do so, secure ports, etc., in offices and other places devoted 
strictly to Flag activities. The Flag division, will not go to quarters for these 
drills except that radio and visual communications will actually be manned. 

1011. The Flag division officer and the junior Flag division officers will conduct 
bag and bedding inspections of the Flag Division. The ship will provide berthing 
and messing for all personnel of the Flag Division. Flag Division personnel under 
the direction and supervision of the Flag Division Officer will clean all compart- 
ments dedicated exclusively to Flag use. Boat crews, under the direction of the 
Flag Lieutenant, will clean the barges and staff boats ; the signal force, under 
the direction of the Flag Lieutenant, will clean the Flag Signal Bridge and Flag 
Conning Tower. 

1012. All members of the Staff shall be assigned battle stations which will be 
manned when "General Quarters" is sounded. Enlisted men of the Flag not 
required for Staff Battle Stations will be assigned to ship battle stations. En- 
listed men of the Flag will stand Flag condition and cruising watches, but will 
not stand ship cruising watches. 

1013. The Flag Lieutenant is in direct charge of the boat crews, chauffeur, 
signal force, Admiral's mess attendants, boats, and automobiles (Band and 

79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 12 



836 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK. 

Orchestra is assigned), and is directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief 
for their appearance, training and performance. The ship is responsible for 
maintenance and upkeep. The Flag Lieutenant, and, in his absence, the Staff 
Duty Officer, regulates the employment of the Staff motor boats and the Chief of 
Staff's barge when it is used as the Staff duty boat. He will prepare the schedules 
for all staff motor boats, prescribing the routine hours for securing and the places 
of securing away from the ship and will furnish information as to liberty of 
boat crews, after securing, to the Flag Secretary. The Officer-of-the-Deck will 
keep the Flag Lieutenant, and in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, informed of 
the movements of the barges and the staff motor boats. 

1014. The Commanding Officer of the Flagship shall be responsible that all 
safety precautions of the barge and staff gig be made as are required by existing 
regulations and instructions. 

D — Routine Reports 

1015. In order that the routine reports to the Commander-in-Chief may be 
complete and uniform, the Commanding Officer of the flagship is requested to 
promulgate the following instructions : 

(a) AT ANCHOR 

(1) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall make reports to Commander-in-Chief as 
follows : 

(a) The hours of 0800, 1200 and 2000. 

(b) Ship's Movements. 

(c) All marked changes in the weather. . 

(d) Display of storm signals. 

(e) All occurrences worthy of notice. 

(2) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall report salutes fired, exchanges of official calls, 
shifting of personal flags and movements of ships to the Commander-in-Chief, the 
Chief of Staff, and to the Flag Lieutenant, or in the absence of the Flag Lieu- 
tenant to the Staff Duty Officer. 

(3) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall announce requirements for Staff attendance 
at the accommodation ladder by loud speaker: "Staff Gangway". Boat gongs 
shall also be sounded in number equal to the number of side boys required In 
attendance; e. g., for Admiral and Vice Admiral, eight (8) gongs; for Rear 
Admiral, six (6) gongs; and for Captain, four (4) gongs. The above procedure 
shall be carried out by the Officer-of-the-Deck in sufficient time for the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, and the Flag Lieutenant, or, in his absence, 
the Staff Duty Officer, to reach the Quarter Deck and properly meet visiting 
officers. When the Commander-in-Chief is leaving the ship, the Officer-of-the- 
Deck will notify the Flag Lieutenant, or in his absence, the Staff Duty Officer, 
and the Chief of Staff, when the barge or automobile is alongside. - 

(4) The signal Bridge supervisor shall report all movements of ships getting 
underway, or coming to anchor, shifting of personal flags, exchange of salutes, 
and any occurrences worthy of notice to the Officer-of-the-Deck. 

(5) When the Admiral has retired, the Officer-of-the-Deck shall make necessary 
reports to the Staff Duty Officer who will indicate what action is to be taken. 

(6) During the night the Officer-of-the-Deck shall report to the Staff Duty 
Officer only such movements of ships as he deems necessary. The Signal Bridge 
supervisor will report to the Flag Lieutenant or to the Staff Duty Office, prior to 
0800, any movements of ships occurring during the preceding night. 

(b) UNDERWAY 

(1) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall report to the Commander-in-Chief via the 
Staff Duty Officer on watch on the Flag Bridge : 

(a) The sighting of land, rocks, shoals, lighthouses, beacons, buoys, and dis- 
colored water. 

(b) All vessels or wrecks discovered. 

(c) All marked clianges in the weather. 

( d ) All occurrences worthy of notice. 

If the ship is operating independently, the Officer-of-the-Deck shall make the 
above listed reports direct to the Chief of Staff and officer with the day's Staff 
Duty. 

(2) If the Commander-in-Chief should be on the Navigating Bridge, the Officer- 
of-the-Deck will make reports direct to him, reporting thereafter to the Staff 
Duty Officer on watch. 

(3) When underway making passage or outside the usual operating areas the 
Navigator shall report the ship's position at 0800, 1200 and 2000. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 837 

Hewitt Inquiey Exhibit No. 35 

My 

SECRET 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 
Cincpac file no. 
A16/WPPac-46(16) 
Serial 063W 

Pearl Harbor, T, H., July 25, 1941. 

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46. 
Subject: WPPac-46. 

1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet 
been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect 
prior to the receipt of such approval. 

2. Attention is invited to the Introduction, Chapter III, article 0301 of the 
Plan concerning the preparation of supporting plans by Task Force Commanders. 
At the present time it is desired that the following submit supporting plans for 
approval by the Commander-in-Chief: 

Commanders Task Forces Two, Three, Six, Seven and Nine. (Commander 
Task Force Nine may, if he desires, delegate preparation of the plan to the 
Senior Officer of that type in the Hawaiian Area.) 

The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers addressed may provide for 
the accomplishment of such tasks as are assigned them in this 0-1 Plan by 
including suitable measures in their 0-4 or other plans, rather than to prepare 
separate supporting plans for this 0-1 Plan. The Commander Southeast Pacific 
Force (Commander Cruiser Division Three) is required to submit the plan for 
operations of that force after its detachment from the Fleet to the Chief of Naval 
Operations for approval. 

3. Supporting Plans as required above will be submitted for approval of the 
Commander-in-Chief prior to 20 August 1941. After approval they will be 
incorporated with the Fleet Plan as annexes as prescribed by the Commander- 
in-Chief. 

4. Further annexes prepared by the Commander-in-Chief to cover operations 
to be undertaken in later phases of the war will be distributed when completed 
and approved. 

5. Suitable binders for this Plan will be forwarded as soon as received by this 
command. 

H. E. Kimmel. 
H. E. Kimmel. 

[i\ SECRET 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 
CinCpac File 
A16/WPPac-46(16) 
Serial 056W. 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., July 21, 1941. 
From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. 
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46. 
Subject: WPPac-46, promulgation of. 
Enclosures: 

(A) Pages for WPPac-46; Reg. No. 5Jncluding list of effective pages. 

(B) Receipt form in duplicate. 

1. U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Navy Plan 0-1, 
Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46) is promulgated herewith. Holders of Commander- 
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Secret letter A16(R-5)040W of May 27, 1941 and 
the tentative Operation Plan promulgated thereby, will destroy them by burning 
and make report of destruction to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 

2. A receipt form is enclosed to be accomplished and forwarded to the Chief 
of Naval Operations (Registered Publications Section). 

3. This publication will be handled and accounted for in accordance with the 
instructions contained in the Navy Regulations, the System of War Planning and 
the Registered Publication Manual. 

4. This volume shall not be carried in aircraft, and when not in use, shall be 
kept in Class "A" storage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual. 



838 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

5. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY POR- 
TIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY 
FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED 
FOR IN CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION 
MANUAL. 

6. SPECIAL WARNING— the contents of this publication shall be given 
the nainimum dissemination compatible with thorough preparation of the sub- 
ordinate plans. 

P. C. Crosley, H. E. Kimmel. 

P. C. Crosley, 

Flag Secretary. 

InJ U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan — Rainbow Five (Navy Plan 0-1, 

Rainbow Five) 
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES— WPPa^jie 



Subject Matter 


Page Number > 


Change 
in Effect 


Promulgating letter: C 


incPacfile A16/WPPac-46(16) Serial 056W 
WPPac-46 


1 


Original 


of July 21, 1941. 
List of Effective Pages 


ii 




Table of Corrections- 








Distribution List 


iv 




Title Page. 


1 




Table of Contents 


2, 2a, 2b . 




Parts I to V (incl.) 


3-52 incl 








52a-52h incl 






53-56 incl 






56a-56d incl 






57-74 incl 




Annex I. 


I-l to I-ll incl 




Annex II. _. 


II-l to II-9 inci 




AnnexIII 


III-l to III-5 inci 




Annex IV •_ 


IV-1 to IV-3 incl 











^ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent 
pages of original exhibit. 
[««] TABLE OF CORRECTIONS 



Change No. 


Date of 
entry 


Signature and rank of officer entering change 





















[iv] 



DISTRIBUTION LIST 



Regis- 
tered 
Official to Whom Issued Nos. 

Chief of Naval Operations .. 1,2,3,4,5,6 

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet 7,8 

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet 9 

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet 10,11 

Commander, Task Force One (Combatfor) 12,13 

Commander, Task Force Two (Comairbatfor) 14, 15 

Commander, Task Force Three (Comscofor) 16,17 

Commander, Battleships Battle Force 18 

Commander, Battleship Division One 19 

Commander, Battleship Division Two. 20 

Commander, Cruisers Battle Force 22 

Commander, Cruiser Division Three 23 

Commander, Carrier Division One.. ... . . ... 25 

Commander, Destroyers Battle Force 26 

Commander, Destroyer Flotilla One 27 

Commander, Minecraft Battle Force 28 

Commander, Cruisers Scouting Force. 29 

Commander, Cruiser Division Five 30 

Commander, Cruiser Division Six 31 

Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force 32 

Commander, Patrol Wing Two. _ 33 

Commander, Submarines Scouting Force . . . 34 

Commander, Base Force _ 35,36 

Commanding General, Second Marine IDivision 37 

Commandant, Naval Station, Samoa 38 

Commandant, Eleventh Naval District . .. .. 39 

Commandant, Twelfth Naval District . ... 40 

Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District. 41 

Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District 42 

Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District 43 

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet is holding registered numbers 21, 24, and 44 to 60 in 
reserve. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 839 

SECRET 

[1] U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW FIVE 
(NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE) 

WPPac-46 

[i] TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Subject Page Nos. i 
Introduction: 

Chapter I. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) - 3 

Chapter II. Format of Fleet Plans 4 

Chapter III. Subordinate Plans. 1... 6 

Chapter IV. Mobilization. 8 

Part I. Task Organization, Assumptions, Information: 

Chapter I. Task Organization 9 

Chapter II. Assumptions 15 

Section 1. General Assumptions _ 15 

Section 2. Special Assumption 16 

Chapter III. Information 17 

Section 1. General Information 17 

Section 2. Enemy Information 20 

Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action 21 

Part II. Outline of Tasks: 

Chapter I. Tasks Assigned by Navy Basic Plan, — Mission.. 24 

Chapter II. Tasks Formulated to Accomplish the Assigned Missions 25 

Part III. Task AssignmeiU: 

Chapter I. Phase 1 28 

Section 1. Task Force One 28 

Section 2. Task Force Two 29 

Section 3. Task Force Three 30 

Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) 32 

Section 5. Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) 33 

Section 6. Task Force Eight (Mining Force) 34 

Section 7. Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) 35 

Sections. Naval Coastal Frontiers 36 

Section 9. Tasks Jointly Applicable 38 

\ia] Chapter II. Phase lA 39 

Section 1. Task Force One. 39 

Section 2. Task Force Two 40 

- Section 3. Task Force Three 41 

Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) 42 

Section 5. Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) 45 

Section 6. Task Force Eight (Mining Force) 48 

Section 7. Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) 49 

Section 8. Naval Coastal Frontiers 50 

Section 9. Tasks Jointly Applicable 51 

Chapter III. Phases Succeeding Phase lA 52 

Section 1. Task Force One 52 

Section 2. Task Force Two 52a 

Section 3. Task Force Three 62b 

Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) 52c 

Section 5. Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) 52d 

Section 6. Task Force Eight (Mining Force) 52e 

Section 7. Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) 52f 

Section 8. Naval Coastal Frontiers 52g 

Section 9. Tasks Jointly Applicable 52h 

Chapter IV. Execution of the Plan 53 

Chapter V. Initial Transfer of Units 54 

Part IV. Logistics: 

Chapter I. General 56 

Chapter II. Transportation 56a 

Chapter III. Hospitalization and Evacuation 56b 

Chapter IV. Prize Crews 56c 

Chapter V. Salvage..... 56d 

Part V. Special Provisions: 

Chapter I. Time to be Used 57 

Chapter II. Communications 58 

Chapter III. Location of Commander-in-Chief 59 

Chapter IV. Tentative Operations Plans— Phase land lA 60 

Section 1. Phase I 61 

Section 2. Phase lA 68 

[Sb] Annex I. Patrol and Sweeping Plan '. I-l to I-ll 

Annex II. Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan.. _. II-l to II-9 

Annex III. Communication Plan _.. III-l to III-5 

Annex IV. Command Relationship and Coordination of Activities at Outlying Bases_ IV-1 to IV-3 

* Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent 
pages of original exhibit. 



840 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
[S] SECRET 

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN RAINBOW FIVE 
(NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE) 

Introduction 

chapter i. navy basic war plan (rainbow five) 

0101. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) is the directive which this U. S. 
PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) is designed to implement in 
so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET are concerned. As the 
Basic Plan is in the possession of most of the recipients of this Fleet Plan, only 
particularly pertinent parts of it will be repeated herein. These parts have to do 
chiefly with assumptions, concepts of enemy action, and tasks. 

[4] CHAPTER II. FORMAT OF FLEET PLANS 

0201. This Plan follows the standard War Plan form of WPL-8 except for small 
variations made for the purpose of facilitating ready reference and quick dissemi- 
nation on the outbreak of war. These, in brief, are as follows: 

a. In Part I the order of presentation is: 

Chapter I — Task Organization. 
Chapter II — Assumptions. 
Chapter III — Information. 

b. In Part II are incorporated: 

Chapter I — Task assigned by Basic Plan. 

Chapter II — Phases; and specific tasks, arranged by phases, for accom- 
plishing the assigned mission together with (in a few in- 
stances) decisions as to how they will be initially carried 
out. 

c. In Part III the first three chapters each cover one phase. Within each of 
those chapters the tasks assigned to each task force are grouped in a separate 
section, except the naval coastal frontiers, which are grouped together. Perti- 
nent special information and logistic instructions are placed with the tasks given 
therein or they are placed in an appropriate annex of this 0-1 Plan. Where a 
task requires coordinated action with other task forces, reference is simply made 
to the annex which comprises the plan for such coordinated action. 

d. Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter IV, Part V are tentative fleet operation plans 
which, when completed by'the assignment of forces actually available at the time, 
and modified to meet any change in the conditions whi^h have been visualized 
in this Fleet War Plan {tj. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan — Rainbow Five), are 
considered suitable, together with the annexes, for placing into eff'ect the measures 
of Phase I and Phase lA of this Plan. In other words Chapter IV, Part V could 
be omitted as the material therein is completely covered in the text that precedes 
{5\ them. They are included, however, for the sake of clarity and in order to 
have immediately available tentative fleet operation plans in the conventional 
form with which all concerned are familiar. 

e. Annexes I, II, etc., are plans, special plans issued by the Commander-in- 
Chief for a particular purpose. They may be made effective separately if occa- 
sion requires. The forces affected are indicated in the annex itself. Some of 
the annexes may ultimately be only guides for promulgation of an operation order 
by despatch or letter. 

f. Supporting plans of subordinate commanders, which are prescribed in the 
next chapter, are to be appended as lettered annexes. 

[6] CHAPTER in. SUBORDINATE PLANS 

0301. Subordinate plans to support this Fleet Operating Plan will be prepared 
as follows: 

a. The Commanders of the forces designated in the Task Organization in 
Chapter I, Part I of this Plan, will prepare supporting plans for each assigned 
task, the accomplishment of which would be facilitated by further planning. 

b. These supporting plans will be, as closely as practicable, in the standard 
form of operation plans, and will be incorporated as annexes to this Fleet Operat- 
ing Plan. Where the nature of the tasks lends itself to such procedure, the plan 
for their accomplishment may be in the form of a single annex. Where such is 
not the case, as where tasks are assigned in one or more of the Commander-in- 
Chief's annexes, several plans may be required. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 841 

c. Letter designations for annexes are assigned to each commander as listed 
below. The first annex to be prepared will be designated as "Letter-1", the 
second as "Letter-2", etc. It should be noted that if the nature of a task as- 
signed at present does not require the preparation of a subordinate plan by a 
commander, the annex assigned him below will be vacant. 

Task Force One A-1, etc. 

Task Force Two B-l) " 

Task Force Three C-l] " 

Aircraft Scouting Force D-l', " 

Submarines Scouting Force E-1,' " 

Minecraft Battle Force F-l' " 

Base Force G-l, " 

Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier H-l' " 

Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier ' J-l/ " 

Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier K-l, " 

d. In the subordinate plans, forces should, in general, be listed in the task 
organization by organizations and approximate numbers of types rather than 
by name, unless it is known that specific units will be available. 

e. If a commander considers it desirable to disseminate the considerations 
which have governed his decision and task assignments, he should append a 
brief and sum- [7] marized estimate of the situation as an addendum to 
his plan. Auxiliary directives such as communication plans should also be ap- 
pended as addenda to the task force commander's plan. 

f. If the execution of the subordinate plans would be facilitated by still further 
preliminary planning, task force commanders should require their group com- 
manders to submit plans for the accomplishment of the tasks assigned them in 
the task force commander's plans. These will be designated as addenda, but 
will not be incorporated with this Fleet Plan. They need be submitted only to 
the task force commander for acceptance, 

g. If appropriate, each subsidiary plan will include in an addendum, the logistic 
requirements for carrying out the plan in so far as they can be foreseen. Such 
addenda may or may not be incorporated in the Fleet Plan, but, in every case, 
copies will be supplied to Commander Base Force. 

h. The plans must be predicated upon realities and must provide for maximum 
possible utilization of forces presently available. Unless absolutely necessary, 
plans should not be based upon either conceptions or material not reasonably 
attainable. When material, equipment or personnel, not immediately available, 
is necessary for the successful execution of the measures to be undertaken, this 
shall be made the subject of an addendum. The commander concerned shall take 
immediate action to remedy the deficiencies, forwarding necessary correspondence 
through the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Thereafter the Commander- 
in-Chief shall be informed of corrections of these deficiencies as the}' occur. 

i. Task force commanders will employ, in subdividing their forces, the decimal 
system of numbering subdivisions. 

j. In numbering the pages of the plans which form annexes of this Fleet Plan, 
lower case letters to correspond to the letters assigned in subparagraph c above 
will be used. Thus the first page of the plan of Commander Task Force One 
will be "a-1". 

[8] CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION 

0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually 
mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl 
Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can 
be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. 
To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which 
hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout 
the Plan as W-da}'. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated 
J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day. 

[9] Part I. Task Organization, Assumptions, Information 

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION 

1101. The forces available to the Pacific Fleet are listed in the current Appendix 
II of the Basic Plan. In addition, the Commanders of the Pacific Southern, 
Pacific Northern, and Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the Commandants 



842 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of the Naval Stations Guam and Samoa are considered to be oflBcers of the U. S. 
Pacific Fleet, and, through them, the local defense and coastal forces are subject 
to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. 

1102. For planning purposes, tasks are assigned to the commanders of the 
current task forces in the Fleet and to certain other commanders who are to 
become task force commanders as indicated in paragraph 1107 below. 

1103. As of July 1, 1941, the major task forces, their commanders, and their 
broad tasks for which they are training, are as follows: 

Task Force One. — for covering operations — Commander Battle Force in 
command. 

Task Force Two. — for reconnaissance in force and raiding operations — Com- 
mander Aircraft Battle Force in command. 

Task Force Three. — for landing attack operations — Commander Scouting 
Force in command. 

1104. The subdivision of the Fleet which is made in paragraph 1107 below is 
designed to provide a flexible overall task organization from which may be drawn 
the task forces to accomplish the operations which can be visualized at this time. 
It must be realized that, for most operations, certain units must be transferred 
between task forces, some will be absent in the navy yard or for other reasons, 
and, in some cases, two or more task forces will be merged under the command of 
the senior oflBcer concerned. Also many of the tasks assigned to a task force in 
this plan do not require the employment of the whole task force. In such cases 
the task force commander will utilize such units of his force as are required to 
accomplish the assigned task. 

[10] CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION 

1105. It is not expected that the Task Organization as shown below will be 
efi"ective throughout the campaign. Rather it will be the basis for making up 
particular task organizations for the various operations that may be required. 
It will be the specific plans and orders in effect at any given time which will show 
the task organizations at that time. 

1106. Units assigned to a task force or to a task group in the normal organiza- 
tion that are subsequently assigned to another task force or task group will 
thereafter continue as an integral part of the last organization to which assigned 
until released by the commander thereof. The commanders mentioned will 
release such units as promptly as the situation at the time permits when the 
period of assignment to their commands has terminated or when further reassign- 
ment is made by competent authority. 

[11] 1107. The Normal Task Organization for this Plan is as follows: 

1. TASK FORCE ONE Commander Battle Force 

Batdivs 2, 4 6 BB 

SARATOGA 1 CV 

Crudivs 3, 9 5 CL 

Desflot 1 less Desrons 5, 9 4 OCL# 

2 DL 
16 DD# 
2 AD 
(Wncludfts Southeast Pacific Force of 2 OCL and 4 DD.) 

2. TASK FORCE TWO Commander Aircraft Battle Force 

Batdiv 1 3 BB 

Cardiv 2 less YORKTOWN 1 CV 

Crudiv 5 1 4 CA# 

Desflot 2 less Desrons 4, 8 and Desdiv 50 1 OCL 

8 DD 
2 AD 
(#lncludes Atlantic Reenforcement of 4 CA.) 

3. TASK FORCE THREE Commander Scouting Force 

Crudivs 4, 6 8 CA 

Cardiv 1 less SARATOGA 1 CV 

Desrons 4, 5 2 DL 

16 DD 

Minron 3, less Mindivs 5, 6 5 DM 

Available Transports Base Force — AP 

— APD 

2d Marine Div less Defense Batt. 
2d Marine Air Group. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 843 

[12] 4. TASK FORCE NINE (Patrol Plane Force) Commander Aircraft 
Scouting Force 

All units of Aircraft Scouting Force 107 VP 

2 AV 
2 AVP 
4 AVD 
Utility Squadron from Base Force _ 10 VJR 

5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (Undersea Force) Commander Submarines Scouting 
Force 

All units of Submarines Scouting Force except Sound School. _ 30 SS 

2 OSS 
1 SM 

1 ODD 

3 AS 

2 ASR 
1 AM 

6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (Mining Force) Commander Minecraft Battle 
Force 

All units of Minecraft Battle Force 1 CM 

8 DM 

7. TASK FORCE SIX (Logistic & Control Force) Commander Base Force 

All units of Base Force except AP, APD and Minron 3 less 8 DMS 
Divs 5 and 6 and 10 VJ. 4 AF 

6 AT 

1 AH 
13 AO 

2 AR 

1 ARD 

2 AK 
2 AE 

1 AKS 
10 AM 

4 AG 
Utility 

Wing 
[13] 8. TASK FORCE FOUR (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) Com- 
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 
Local defense forces. 

9. TASK FORCE FIVE (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) Com- 
mandant, Twelfth Naval District. 

Coastal and local defense forces. 

10. TASK FORCE TEN (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) Com- 
mandant, Thirteenth Naval District. 

Local defense forces. 
[14] 1108. The Southeast Pacific Force and the Atlantic Reenforcement, 
composed as indicated above, will operate under the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. 
Pacific Fleet until specifically detached by the Chief of Naval Operations. They 
will not, however, be sent to* such distances from Pearl Harbor as would prevent 
their arrival in the Canal Zone twenty-one days after their transfer is ordered. 

[IS] Chapter II. Assumptions 

Section 1. General Assumptions 

1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are: 

a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the 
British Commonwealth, (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Govern- 
ments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, 
comprising either: 

1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or 

2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand. 
Note. As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, 

and the latter may be tentatively considered as an aUy against that part of 
the Axis but not necessarily against Japan. 

b. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility 
of their intervention must be taken into account, 

c. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive 



844 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

elements, but will remain in a non-belligerent status unless subject to direct 
attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will 
be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense. 

d. That the principal military effort of the Associated Powers will be in the 
Atlantic and European Areas, and that operations in other areas will be so con- 
ducted as to facilitate that effort. Therefore, transfer of units from the Pacific 
Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet is provided for in the Navy Basic Plan, and additional 
transfers may become necessary. 

e. That the Asiatic Fleet will not be reinforced by the Pacific Fleet, but that 
eventually, if Japan enters the war, heavy British reenforcements will be made 
in the Far East. 

[16] Section 2. Special Assumption 

1221. That the Pacific Fleet is virtually mobilized and is based at Pearl Harbor, 
but regular navy yard overhauls are in progress which would reduce forces 
immediately available by about one-fifth. 

[17] CHAPTER III. INFORMATION 

Section 1. General Information 

1311. a. The Pacific Area, which is under the command of the Commander-in- 
Chief, Pacific Fleet, is that part of the area of the Pacific Ocean: 

1. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East. 

2. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East. 

3. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American 
Coast and Longitude 74° West. 

4. Less waters in which Canada may assume strategic direction of military 
forces. 

b. In addition, the United States will afford support to British Naval Forces 
in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East. 

c. The Southeast Pacific Sub- Area, when established^ wUl be that part of the 
Pacific Area south of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier and between the West 
Coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West. 

d. The Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone 
extending from the northern boundary of California to the southern boundary of 
Mexico. 

e. The Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone of 
the Northwestern United States north of the northern boundary of California, 
and, in addition, Alaska. 

f . The Pacific sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal 
zone defined to be within a broken line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala 
boundary to a point in Latitude 5° South, Longitude 95° West and thence to the 
Peru-Ecuador border, and to include the sea routes near the southern and western 
borders of that zone. 

[18] g. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu, and all the 
land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to 
a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and 
Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef. 

h. The Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude 
30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east 
to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on 
the south coast, thence westward 'to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, 
thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence 
north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma. 

i. In the Far East Area, responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval 
forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the 
defense of the Philippines will be assumed by the British Naval Commander-in- 
Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be 
responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of 
the Philippines. 

j. The Australia and New Zealand Area comprises the Australian and New 
Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the equator. 
The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, is responsible for the strategic 
direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in this Area. 

1312. The foregoing delineation of principal areas and the agreements as to 
cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth are con- 
tained in the Report of United States-British StafiF Conversations (ABC-1). 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 845 

Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22) is now in the process of 
preparation. Similar agreements with the Netherlands East Indies are being 
made. 

[19] 1313. The following principles of command will obtain: 

a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the United 
Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsi- 
bility of their own Power. 

b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting 
the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations 
into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances. 

c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic 
direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their 
type, be emploj^ed as task forces charged with the execution of specific strategic 
tasks. These task forces will operate under their own commanders and will 
not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power. 
Only exceptional military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension 
of the normal strategic tasks. 

d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised 
by that oflBcer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of 
time in grade. 

e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate 
under United States Naval command, and will remain an integral part of United 
States Naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their 
operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups. 

1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth^in ABC-1 is as foUows: 
Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis 
Powers, it would stiU be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their 
forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does 
enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defen-. [20] 
sive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military 
strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet 
offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, 
and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese 
strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its 
forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Common- 
wealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East. 

Section 2. Enemy Information 

1321. Information of the enemy will be disseminated prior to and on the exe- 
cution of this Plan, by means of intelligence reports. 

1322. Information which is of special interest with respect to a specific task 
is included with that task in Part III or in the Annexes. 

[21] Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action 

1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be 
limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional 
pocket battleship or heavy cruiser. 

1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows: 

a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia 
(including the Philippines) and Hong Kong. 

b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American 
and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, 
and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions. 

c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only. 

d. The principal defensive efforts to be: 

1. Destruction of threatening naval forces. 

2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central 
and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced 
bases. 

3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches. 

1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is beUeved that Japan's initial action 
wiU be toward: 

a. Capture of Guam. 

b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and 
the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced 
bases, and by the [22] destruction of United States and aUied air and 
naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon. 

c. Capture of Northern Borneo. 



846 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline- Marianas 
area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light 
naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet. 

e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval 
forces. 

f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying 
United States positions. 

1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows: 

a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong 
concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines, 
and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls. 

b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position 
(possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the 
Mandates. 

c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main 
base in Halmahera). 

d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces 
in that area. 

e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the 
Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there. 

f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and sub- 
marines in the Hawaiian Area. 

[S3] g. Obsolete and weaker units on patrol of coastal areas and focal areas 
of lines of communication. 

h. Merchant ships in neutral ports or proceeding home via detours wide of 
usual routes. 

[S4] Part II. Outline of Tasks 

CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN — MISSION 

2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks 
within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet: 

a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting 
enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture 
of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications 
and positions; 

b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall 
Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk; 

c. Destroy axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading 
directly or indirectly with the enemy; 

d. Support British naval forces in the'area south of the equator as far west as 
longitude 155" east; "^"'^^ -^ p.. 

e. Defend Samoa in category "D"; W W^ w'-f^<^-^ *• ^ p'^' 

f . Defend Guam in category " F" ; '^ b» ^ -^ -. u„ « ^ >- 

g. Protect the sea communications'^of^the associated powers by escorting, 
covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy 
raiding forces; 

h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent 
the extension of enemy military power^^into the Western Hemisphere by destroying 
hostile expeditions and]by supporting land and air forces Jn denying the enemy 
the use of land positions in that hemisphere; 

i. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces; 

j. Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits^from time to time as 
circumstances require; 

k. Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones. 

[25] CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSIONS 

2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based 
upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks 
the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption al and divides the 
tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows: 

a. PHASE I — Initial tasks — Japan not in the war. 

b. PHASE lA — Initial tasks — Japan in the war. 

c. PHASE II, etc. — Succeeding tasks. 

2202. Phase I tasks are as follows: 

a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter main- 
tain all types in constant readiness for distant service. 

b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea. 



PEOCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 847 

c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered. 

d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered. 

e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a 
similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-day. 

f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern 
Naval Coastal Frontier on M.day. 

g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and 
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by 
patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups 
as necessary. In so doing support the British Naval Forces south of the equator 
as far west as Longitude 155° East. 

h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway. 

[S6] 2202. i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the 
possible raider bases in the Japanese mandates, if authorized at the time by the 
Navy Department. 

j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, 
Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized. 

k. Continue training operations as practicable. 

1. Move the maximum practicable portion of second Marine Division to Hawaii 
for training in landing operations. 

m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan. 

Phase I A 

2203. Phase lA tasks are as follows: 

a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k. ■ 

b. AccompUsh such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been com- 
pleted. 

c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and 
tenders in the northern Pacific. 

d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the asso- 
ciated powers, and of the naval coastal frontier forces, chiefly by covering opera- 
tions. 

e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands. 

2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids 
against Japanese shipping in waters between Hansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto. 

f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against 
Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland. 

g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and 
outlying bases. 

[27] 2203. h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, be- 
tween the Hawaiian rea Aand the West Coast. 

i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established. 

j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier 
as necessary. 

k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the 
Second Marine Division. 

1. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island Area. 

Phase II and subsequent phases 

2204. Tasks of Phase II and Subsequent Phases which can be formulated at 
this time are: 

a. Capture and establish a protected fleet anchorage in the Marshall Island 
Area. 

b. Capture or deny other positions in the Marshall Island Area as necessary 
for further advance to the westward. 

c. Raid other Japanese land objectives and sea communications. 

d. Capture and establish an advanced fleet base at Truk. 
6. Continue uncompleted tasks of Phase lA. 



848 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
[28] PA.RT III. Task Assignment 

CHAPTER I. PHASE I 

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE 

3111. Task Force One will perform tasks as required by the following para- 
graphs of this section. 

3112. When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division 
to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the navy basic plan. 

3113. Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I). 

[39] Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO 

3121. Task Force Two will: 

Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I) . 
[SO] Section 8. TASK FORCE THREE 

3131. Task Force Three will perform the tasks assigned in the following para- 
graphs of this section. 

3132. Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I). 

3133. a. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of 
the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports. 

b. Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the 
Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan 
for capture of Eniwetok. 

c. 1. Special Information. 

As of July 1, 1941, the Marine defenses in Hawaii and the outlying islands are 
as follows: 

MIDWAY —34 officers 
750 men 

6 5' 751 caliber guns 
12 3'750 caliber AA guns 
30 0.50 caliber machine guns 
30 0.30 caliber machine guns 
4 searchlights. 
JOHNSTON— 18 men 

2 5'751 caliber guns 
4 0.30 caliber machine guns 
PALMYRA —4 officers 
101 men 

4 5' 751 caliber guns ' 

4 3' 750 caliber A A guns 
4 0.50 caliber machine guns 
4 0.30 caliber machine guns 
[31] OAHU —32 officers 

620 men 

4 5' 751 caliber guns 
8 3' 750 caliber A A guns 
20 0.50 caliber machine guns 
16 0.30 caliber machine guns 

Note: The above personnel are defense battalion person- 
nel only and are in addition to personnel employed in guard 
duty, barracks duty, etc. 
WAKE —None. 

2. Task 

Furnish additional -defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by the 
Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander- 
in-Chief. 
[3S] Section 4. TALK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE) 

3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following para- 
graphs of this section. 

3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the 
Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue admin- 
istration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion. 

3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I). 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 849 

[S3] Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE) 

3151. Task Force Seven will perform tasks as required by the following para- 
graphs of this section. 

3152. a. Special Information. 

1. There are indications that Axis raiders^^have been basing in the Marshall 
area. 

2. The imminence of the entry of Japan into the war requires a deploy- 
ment suitable for this eventuality. 

3. NARWHAL and NAUTILUS are fitted to carry 13,500 gallons of 
aviation gasoline each for fueling patrol planes. 

b. Task. 

Maintain patrols required by the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I) . 

c. Special Logistics. 

Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor and to a limited degree at Midway. 

3153. Assign one submarine division to Task Force Three as required for land- 
ing attack training. 

3154. On W-day transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to 
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaskan 
sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion. 

[34] Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT {MINING FORCE) 
3161. Task Force Eight will: 
Continue operations and training under commanders Task Forces One and Two. 

[35] Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE) 

3171. Task Force Six will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs. 

3172. Provide logistic service to the fleet and cooperate with Commander 
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases. 

3173. Perform tasks required by The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I). 

3174. Maintain in the office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an 
officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the fleet, the 
loading of base force and NTS vessels, and the routing and protection of U. S. 
and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval 
Coastal Frontier for the same purposes. 

3175. Transfer ten VJR to Commander Task Force Nine. 

[36] Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS 

Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) 

3181. Special Information. 

The Basic Plan assigns the following tasks to the Commander, Hawaiian 
Naval Coastal Frontier: 

a. Defend the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in Category "D". (Category 
"D" — May be subject to major attack). (N. B. The Commander-in-Chief, 
U. S. Pacific Fleet, does not consider Category "D" will apply during Phase I.) 

b. Protect and route shipping within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. 
~~ c. Support the U. S. Pacific Fleet. 

d. Support the Army and Associated Forces within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal 
Frontier. 

3182. By this Fleet Plan, Task Force Four is assigned the tasks below. 

a. Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian 
Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned. 
(As of the date of issue of this plan, the security plan of the Commander, Hawaiian 
Naval Coastal Frontier (as Commander, Base Defense) is already in eff"ect). 

b. Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, 
Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized. Assist as practicable in the 
development of Samoa and Guam. 

c. Make the facilities of outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in 
the vicinity; and directly and through own task group commanders cooperate 
with other task force and task group commanders in coordinating the military 
activities at these bases. (See Annex IV.) 



850 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPER ATI NGIPL AN—RAINBOW FIVE 
{NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE) 

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT 

CHAPTER I. PHASE I. 

[37] 3182. d. Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for 
the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, 
Wake and Canton. 

Task Force Five {Pacific Southern) and Task Force Ten {Pacific Northern 
Naval Coastal Frontier) 

3183. Commanders Task Forces Five and Ten perform tasks assigned by the 
Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I). 

[38] Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE 

3191. Until detached from the Fleet, all forces less those of Naval Coastal 
Frontiers will perform the following tasks: 

|f a. Units in the Hawaiian Area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor by the 
end of four W-day; units designated for early operations complete mobilization 
prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the 
Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible. 

b. Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service. 

0. Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating 
with commanders of naval coastal frontiers while within the limits of those 
frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese forces. 

d. Continue such training activities of the fleet as the commander-in-chief 
may direct. 

e. Reinforce local defense and coastal forces as directed. 

f. Protect the territory and communications of the associated powers, the 
operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other opera- 
tions as directed by the commander-in-chief. 

{Sd\ CHAPTER II. PHASE lA 

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE 

3211. Task Force One will perform tasks as required by the following para- 
graphs of this section. 

3212. Perform task assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I). 

3213. Reenforce and support operations of Task Force Two as required in the 
Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II). 

[40] Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO 

3221. Task Force Two will perform tasks as required by the following para- 
graph, 

3222. Conduct reconnaissance and raid in force against the Marshalls as 
required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II). 

[41] Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE 

3231. Task Force Three will perform tasks as required by the following para- 
graphs of this section. 

3232. Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required 
in The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I). 

3233. Reenforce Task Force Two as required by the Marshall Reconnaissance 
and Raiding Plan (Annex II). 

3234. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of 
the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises. 

3235. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2. 

[42] Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE {PATROL PLANE FORCE) 

3241. Task Force Nine will perform tasks as required in the following para- 
graphs of this section. 

3242. a. Special Information. 

1. Patrol plane operations from Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and 
Canton are feasible, the extent of such operations being dependent upon the 
defenses, facilities and supplies available at the time operations commence. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 851 

Those defenses, facilities and supplies are being augmented. As of July 1, 1941, 
tenders cannot base at Wake or Canton, but Pan-American Airways' facilities 
may be used by special arrangement or by commandeering. A project for the 
improvement of Wake as a base is underway. No such project for Canton has 
been approved. 

2. No aircraft are assigned a-t present to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval 
Coastal Frontier. 

3. Our submarines will assist in the defense of Midway and Wake, and will 
habitually operate offensively in enemy waters. 

4. Land defenses exist on outlying islands, as described in paragraph 3133c, 
1. Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), is charged 
with the defense of these outlying islands and will make them available for patrol 
plane operations. 

5. It is believed that enemy action in the area subject to our patrol plane search 
will comprise: 

(a) Submarine raids and observation off Oahu and outlying islands and along 
our lines of communication. 

[45] (b) Surface raids on our lines of communications. 

(c) Surface and air raids against Wake and possibly against iMidway, Johnston, 
Palmyra and Canton. 

(d) Possibly carrier raid against Oahu. 

b. Tasks. 

1. Perform patrols required by patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I). 

2. Subject to the specific tasks prescribed elsewhere in this plan, operate patrol 
planes in the Hawaiian Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest 
possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only 
when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of 
damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on 
the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result. 

3. Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces. 

4. Perform tasks assigned in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan 
(Annex II). 

5. Coordinate operations of patrol planes with submarines operating in same 
general area. 

6. Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid dis- 
proportionate losses. 

[44] 3242. b. 7. Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ 
Squadron from base force) based on Oahu at all times. During the absence of 
major portions of the fleet from the vicinity of Oahu, such squadrons, at dis- 
cretion, may be temporarily transferred to commander Task Force Four (Hawai- 
ian Naval Coastal Frontier). 

c. Special Logistics. 

Logistic support at outlying bases will be supplied by own tenders, Hawaiian 
Naval Coastal Fontier, Base Force, and, if necessary, by Pan-American Airways 
facilities. 

[45] Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN {UNDERSEA FORCE) 

3251. Task Force Seven will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph. 
3252a. 1. Special Information. 

1. Surface units of the Fleet will initially conduct the operations required by 
the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) and the Marshall Reconnaissance and 
Raiding Plan (Annex II). Thereafter operations will be conducted for the cap- 
ture of the Marshalls and Carolines, with. occasional sweeps toward the Marianas 
and the Japanese Homeland. 

2. Our patrol planes will be operating from Midway, and possibly Wake and 
Johnston Islands. 

3. Japan is developing extensively the defenses of the Mandated Islands. 
Land planes are known to be based at Saipan, Truk and Jaluit and have been 
reported at Marcus Island. Air fields are believed to exist at Wotje and Maloe- 
lap. Port Lloyd in the Bonins is a minor operating base and some aircraft 
usually base there and at Hachijo Jima. Aircraft may be present on Amami 
Oshima. 

4. Considerable air strength is based on the Japanese Homeland but it is be- 
lieved that, with many commitments elsewhere and a general lack of patrol 
planes, the air patrol surrounding the Homeland will not be particularly intensive. 

5. The main units of the Japanese Fleet will probably be operating from the 
Inland Sea. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 13 



852 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

6. All important harbors will probably be mined and netted against submarines 
and are well fortified. A considerable number of small patrol craft must be 
expected. 

[4-6] 3252. a. 7. The southwestern and western lines of communications 
from Japan may be considered vital needs and those toward the Mandates are 
very important. 

8. It is expected that all Japanese Merchantmen will be armed or will be 
operating under naval control, and will therefore be subject to submarine attack. 
Specific instructions on this subject will be issued later. 

9. Arrangements will be made with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to 
extend the Pacific Area sufficiently for submarines to pass through the Nansei 
Shoto as far south as Latitude 28°-30' N. 

10. Mining Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. The 
specific authority for such mining will be issued later. 

b. Tasks 

1. Continue patrol of two submarines each at Wake and Midway. 

2. Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese homeland and 
thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating condi- 
tions, giving Stations the following priority. 

YOKOHAMA 

BUNGO CHANNEL 

KII CHANNEL 

TSUSHIMA 

NAGASAKI 

SHIMONOSEKI 

TSUGARU 

3. Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces including shipping, utilizing 
torpedoes and mines, and, if appropriate, gunfire. 

[47] 3252. b. 4. Report important enemy movements by radio if success of 
attack mission is not thereby jeopardized. 

c. Special Logistics. 

Utilize facilities at Midway as necessary to increase endurance on patrol. 

[48] Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT {MINING FORCE) 

3261. Task Force Eight will: 

Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the 
local defense forces during this phase. 

[49] Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX {LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE) 

3271. Task Force Six will: 

Continue tasks assigned for Phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the 
patrol and sweeping plan (annex I) and the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding 
plan (annex II). 

[50] Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS 

3281. Task Force Five (Pacific Northern) and Task Force Ten (Pacific Southern 
Naval Coastal Frontier) will: 

Continue tasks assigned for phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the 
patrol and sweeping plan (annex I). 

3282. Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) will: 
Continue tasks assigned for phase I. 

[51] Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE 
3291. All task forces concerned: 

a. Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3191. 

b. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I). 

[52] CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE lA 

Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE 

3311. Task Force One will: 

Cover operations of other forces as prescribed in the Eniwetok plan (annex — ), 
and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines. 

[52a] Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO 

3321. Task Force Two will: 

Reenforce Task Forces One and Three as required in Eniwetok and other plans 
and perform such reconnaissance and raiding as is directed. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 853 

[Sm Section 8. TASK FORCE THREE 
3331. Task Force Three will: 

a. Continue training for landing attacks. 

b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — ) and other operations 
involving landing attacks. 

c. Patrol as directed in subsequent plans. 

d. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2. 

[52c] Section 4- TASK FORCE NINE {PATROL PLANE FORCE) 
3341. Task Force Nine will: 

a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3242 b, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7. 

b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — ) and other plans for 
the capture of the IMarshalls and Carolines. 

[52d] Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (UNDERSEA FORCE) 
3351. Task Force Seven -will: 

a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3252 b, 1,2, 3, and 4. 

b. Carry out tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — ) and other plans for 
the capture of the IMarshalls and Carolines. 

L^ S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW FIVE 
(NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE) 

PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT 

CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE lA 

[d2e] Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE) 

3361. Task Force Eight will: 

Perform such mining tasks as may be assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — ) 
and other operations and continue to augment local patrols as directed. 

[52f] Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC AND CONTROL 
FORCE) 
3371. Task Force Six will: 

a. Continue tasks prescribed in paragraphs 3172 to 3174. 

b. Prepare plans for the establishment of a fleet anchorage at Eniwetok and 
a fleet base at Truk after the positions have been captured. 

[52g] Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS 
3381. Task Forces Four, Five, and Ten will: 
Continue the tasks assigned in paragraphs 3182 and 3183. 

[52h] Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE 
3391. All task forces concerned: 
Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3291. 

[53] CHAPTER IV. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN 

3401. The execution of this Plan may be in one or two steps depending on 
whether Japan does or does not become a belligerent on the first day of execution. 

a. If action against European Axis Powers only is to be taken the despatch will 
be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE 
PHASE ONE". 

b. When action against JAPAN is to be taken the despatch for execution will 
be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE 
PHASE ONE AFIRM". 

3402. In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power against the United 
States prior to the existence of a state of war, it is the duty of the senior commander 
on the spot to take such action in the defense of his command and the national 
interests as the situation may require, and report the action taken to superior 
authority at once. 

[54] CHAPTER V. INITIAL TRANSFER OF UNITS 

3501. The table below gives, for ready reference, a summary of the transfers 
to be made in going from the current peace time organization to the task organ- 
ization as of W-Day and as of J-Day. Those transfers for W-Day will be made 
upon the placing into effect of Phase I of this Plan. Those for J-Day will be 



854 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



made when the execution of Phase lA is ordered. Units concerned will report by 
despatch to the commanders of the task forces to which they are transferring. 



From 


To 


Unit transferred 


Transfer eflected 


Remarks 




Southeastern Pa- 
cific For. 
Taskfor 3 


f2 OCL 


[when directed- - 
W-Day 

W-Day 

When directed.. 

When directed.. 

W-Day. 






U Desdiv 






1 CL 


For rotation on patrol 




Taskfor 3 


1 CA 


until J-Day. 
For rotation on patrol 




Atlantic Reen 

Taskfor 2 -. 

PSNCF 


4 CA 


until J-Day. 
If Atlantic Reen. is de- 


Taskfor 3 


2CA ..-- 


tached. 
If Atlantic Reen. is de- 




fl2 VPB 


tached. 

fAdrninistration remains. 
1 Units may be rotated. 




h AVD 




PNNCF 


tl AVP 


W-Day 




12 VPB - 


/Administration remains. 
\ Units may be rotated. 


Taskfor 9 (Patrol 
Plane Force). 


1 AVD 


PNNCF 


1 AVP 


}w-Day 


12 SS 


(■Administration remains. 
\ Units may be rotated. 


Taskfor 7 (Under- 


\1 ASR 


Taskfor 3 


W-Day 


sea Force). 


NARWHAL or 
NAUTILUS. 

/I CM 


Base Samoa. Released 


[BS] 


Hawaiian NCF... 
Taskfor 3 


)j-Day 


on J-Day. 
Until further orders. 


Taskfor 8 (Minfor). 


\8DM 


W-Day 




Taskfor 6 (Logistic 
and Control For). 


1 AO 


Base Samoa, released on 


Taskfor 2 


1 AO 


J-Day 


J-Day. 
For fueling at sea ships 




2 AO 


J-Day.— 


in initial sweep. To 

revert when released. 

For fueling at sea ships 




Taskfor 9 


10 VJR 


J-Day 


in initial reconnais- 
sanceofMARSHALLS. 
To revert when re- 
leased. 
Until further orders. 


All Forces 


Hawaiian NCF_.. 
Taskfor 6 (Logistic 

and Control 

Force). 


As directed 

Any ship passing 
between West 
Coast and .Ha- 
waii. 


When directed- - 
Prior to sched- 
uled date of 
departure. 






For escort duty. To re- 
vert on completion. 



[56] 



Part IV. Logistics 



CHAPTER I. GENERAL 



4101. Commander Task Force Six (I>ogistics and Control Force) is charged 
with the logistic supply of the Fleet and, in cooperation with Commander Task 
Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), with supplying the present out- 
lying bases in the Mid Pacific. He will make requests for replacements as required 
by paragraph 4322 g of the Navy Basic Plan. He will maintain a liaison officer 
in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal 
Frontier) and, through him, will control the quantities and times of delivery of 
material and personnel requirements to the Fleet. In so far as practicable, a 
reserve of consumable supplies will be established and maintained at Pearl Harbor. 
After capture of bases in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES a reserve of 
supplies will be maintained at these places, as permitted by storage and transporta- 
tion facilities available. 

4102. The supply of units of the Second Marine Division after they have left 
the West Coast will be included with that of the Fleet. 

4103. Special logistic instructions affecting particular tasks have been included 
in the task assignments in Part III and the Annexes of this Plan. 

4104. For the benefit of Commander Task Force Six, Commanders of other 
task forces will include, in the plans which they prepare, their logistic require- 
ments as far as they can be foreseen. 

4105. The requirements of the U. S. Pacific Fleet are placed in the second highest 
priority classification by paragraph 4261 of the Navy Basic Plan. 

[56a] CHAPTER II. TRANSPORTATION 

4201. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force), through his 
liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern 
Naval Coastal Frontier), will coordinate the transportation of material and per- 
sonnel by Fleet transportation faciUties and the Naval Transportation Service. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY S55 

4202. The Naval Transportation Service vessels assigned to assist in the sup- 
ply of the Hawaiian and Alaskan areas will be shown in a revised Chapter IX, 
Appendix II, of the Navy Basic Plan. If practicable, they will not be employed 
for transportation farther westward than Hawaii. 

4203. The employment of commercial vessels to assist in transportation from 
the West Coast to Hawaii is most desirable and is acceptable to the Commander- 
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 

[56b] CHAPTER III. HOSPITALIZATION AND EVACUATION 

4301. The facilities of the Fleet including those of hospital ships, advanced 
base hospitals and mobile medical units will, as far as practicable, provide hospi- 
talization for sick and wounded personnel. 

4302. As necessary, such personnel will, under the coordinated supervision of 
the task force commanders responsible for the personnel and for the transportation 
facilities employed, be evacuated to the nearest shore establishment having hospi- 
tal space available. 

4303. The ships concerned will furnish hospitalization to embarked Army 
forces until ineffectives can be transferred ashore. 

[56c] CHAPTER IV. PRIZE CREWS 

4401. The Navy Department will furnish prize crews as follows: U. S. Pacific 
Fleet — 8; Southeast Pacific Force — 8. If those for the Pacific Fleet are available 
they^^will be placed aboard ships assigned to make the search for enemy merchant 
ships in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) . 

[66d] CHAPTER v. SALVAGE 

4501. All units, particularly of Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) 
and suitable units of Task Force Seven (Underseas Force) will render salvage 
service, as practicable, to naval and other vessels in the Pacific Area outside of 
a zone lying 500 miles from the continental United States, Alaska, and Panama. 
Within the above mentioned zone, salvage service will be rendered by the shore 
establishment. 

[57] Part V. Special Provisions 

CHAPTER I. time TO BE USED 

5101. GREENWICH Civil Time wiU be used in carrying out this Plan. 

[58] CHAPTER II. COMMUNICATIONS 

5201. Communications will be in accordance with USF-70 as modified by 
Annex III to this Plan. 

[59] CHAPTER III. LOCATION OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 

5301. The Fleet wiU be kept informed of the location of the Commander-in- 
Chief. 

[60] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS PHASES I AND lA 

5401. Tentative Operation Plans Nos. 1-R5 and 1A-R5 as formulated below 
are designed to facilitate the promulgation and execution of the tasks assigned for 
Phases I and I A of this U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five). It 
is expected that they will be modified and executed by despatch when the corre- 
sponding Phase of this 0-1 Plan is placed in efi"ect as prescribed in paragraph 3401. 

[61] Section 1. Phase I 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship 

Place 

Date 
Operation Plan No. 1-R5 

Initial Task Organization 

(See paragraph 1107 of this Plan for normal organization) 

(a) Task Force One — Commander Battle Force. — Normal units this task force 
plus Yz minecraft less 1 cruiser in rotation to Task Force Three patrol pool. 



856 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(b) Task Force Two — Commander Aircraft, Battle Force. — Normal units this 
task force plus }i minecraft less one cruiser in rotation to Task Force Three patrol 
pool. 

(c) Task Force Three — Commander Scouting Force. — Normal units this task 
force plus 1 cruiser each from Task Forces One and Two for cruiser patrol pool plus 
1 SS from Task Force Seven, 1 AO from Task Force Six, and (on request) 1 patron 
and tender from Task Force Seven for South Pacific operations. 

(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) (S. O. P. Airscofor Hawaiian Area). — 
Normal units this task force less 24 VP and tenders transferred to Naval Coastal 
Frontiers, and (if requested by Commander Task Force Three) 1 patron and tender 
to Task Force Three. 

[6S] (e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) — Commander Submarines, 
Scouting Force. — Normal units this task force less 2 SS and 1 ASR to Task Force 
Ten and 1 SS to Task Force Three. 

(f) Task Force Eight (Mining Force). — Non-operative as such; normal units 
thereof being divided between Task Forces One and Two. 

(g) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) — Commander Base Force. — 
Normal units this task force plus any units transferred from other forces for escort 
duty West Coast-Hawaii less 1 AO to Task Force Three. 

(h) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) — Commandant, 
Fourteenth Naval District. — Normal units this task force plus units from other 
fleet forces when and if the Commander-in-Chief directs transfer. 

(i) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) — Commandant, 
Twelfth Naval District. — Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from 
Task Force Nine. 

(j) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) — Commandant, 
Thirteenth Naval District. — Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender 
from Task Force Nine plus 2 SS and 1 ASR from Task Force Seven. 

[6S] 1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II 
and III of Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five. 

2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territorj^ and sea communica- 
tions of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south of the 
equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding 
against attack by Japan. 

3. (a) Task Force One. — (1) When directed release two small light cruisers and 
one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the 
Navy Basic Plan. 

(2) Perform the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I). 

(b) Task Force Two. — (1) Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweep- 
ing Plan (Annex I). 

(c) Task Force Three. — (1) Maintain the patrols required by the Patrol and 
Sweeping Plan (Annex I). 

(2) Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the 
Second Marine Division, employing attached transports. 

(3) Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the 
Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan 
for capture of Eniwetok. 

[64] (4) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested 
by Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Com- 
mander-in-Chief. 

(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force). — (1) Transfer twelve patrol planes 
and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval 
Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at 
discretion. 

(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I). 

(e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force). — (1) Maintain patrols required by the 
Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I). 

(2) Asi ign one submarine division to Task Force Three as required for landing 
attack training. 

(3) Transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific 
Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaska sector. Con- 
tinue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion. 

(f) Task Force Eight. (Mining Force) . — (1) Continue training under Commander 
Task Force One. 

(g) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force). — (1) Provide logistic services 
to the Fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier 
in providing logistic services to outlying bases. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 857 

[65] (2) Perform tasks required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) . 

(3) Maintain in the Office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an 
officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the Fleet, the 
loading of Base Force and Naval Transportation Service vessels, and the routing 
and protection of United States and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison 
with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes. 

(h) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier). — (1) Assist in pro- 
viding external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal 
Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned. 

(2) Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, 
Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton is authorized. Assist as practicable in the 
development of Samoa and Guam. 

(3) Make the facilities of the outlying bases available for Fleet units operating 
in the vicinity and cooperate with Commanders of Mobile Forces in coordinating 
the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV) . 

(4) Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, 
to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized. Wake and 
Canton. 

(i) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier). — (1) Perform 
tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) . 

[66] (j) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier). — 
(1) Perform tasks assigned by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I). 

(x) (1) Units in the Hawaiian area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor 
within four days of date of execution of this Plan; units designated for early 
operations complete mobilization prior to-the time designated for their operations 
to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly 
as possible. 

(2) Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service. 

(3) Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating 
with the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers while within the limits of those 
frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese Forces. 

(4) Continue such training activities of the Fleet as the Commander-in-Chief 
may direct. 

(5) Reenforce local defense and coastal forces as directed. 

(6) Protect the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, the 
operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other opera- 
tions as directed by the Comrhander-in-Chief . 

4. Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor, on the West Coast, and as specially 
provided for in the Annexes. 

5. (a) Communications in accordance with U. S. F. Seventy, as modified by 
Annex III. 

(b) Use Greenwich Civil Time. 

(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location. 



Admiral, U. S. Navy, 

Commander-in- Chief, 
United States Pacific Fleet. 

[68] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS PHASES I AND lA 

Section 2. Phase I A 

Tentative 

United States Pacific Fleet, 
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship, 
Place 
Date. 
Operation Plan No. 1A-R5. 

Initial task organization 

(See Basic Fleet Plan for normal organization.) 

(a) Task Force One. Commander Battle Force. — Normal units this task force 
less any cruiser absent on patrol with Task Force Three less 1 CV and all other 
large CL's to Task Force Two for reconnaissance of MARSHALLS. 

(b; Task Force Two. Commander Aircraft, Battle Force. — Normal units this 
task force plus 1 CV and available CL's (approximately 4) from Task Force One 



858 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

plus 1 CV from Task Force Three less any cruiser absent on patrol with Task 
Force Three. 

(c) Task Force Three. Commander Scouting Force. — Same as for Operation 
Plan 1-R5 less 1 CV to Task Force Two less 1 SS and 1 AO from SAMOA returned 
to their respective normal task forces plus 1 AO from Task Force Six for fueling 
at sea. 

(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) Senior Officer Present, Aircraft, 
Scouting Force, HAWAIIAN AREA). — Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5. 

[69] Part V. Special Provisions 

CHAPTER IV, TENTATIVE OPERATIONS PLANS PHASES I AND lA 

Section 2. Phase I A 

(e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) Commander Submarines, Scouting 
Force. 

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5 

plus 1 SS returned from Task Force Three. 

(f) Task Force Eight (Mining Force) 

Non-operative as such, normal units thereof being detached from Task 
Forces One and Two at end of Phase I and on commencement of Phase 
lA being transferred to Task Force Four. 

(g) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) Commander Base Force. 
Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5, 

plus 1 AO returned from Task Force Three 
less 2 AO transferred to Task Force Two 
less 1 AO transferred to Task Force Three. 
(h) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Four- 
teenth Naval District. 

Normal units this task force 
plus all units of Minecraft, Battle Force. 
(i) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, 
Twelfth Naval District. 

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5. 
(j) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, 
Thirteenth Naval District. 

Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5. 
1. Information, Assumptions sa previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this 
Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five. 

[70] 2. This Fleet, while protecting the sea communications and territory of 
the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area, and supporting the operations of the 
British Navy south of the equator as far west as Longitude one hundred fifty-five 
degrees East, will: 

(a) Conduct an initial sweep with light forces and aircraft against enemy 
merchant ships and raiders. 

(b) Raid Japanese communications to westward of NANPO SHOTO with 
cruisers. 

(c) Patrol Japanese homeland with submarines. 

(d) Conduct a reconnaissance and raid against the MARSHALLS, in order to 
divert Japanese forces away from MALAYSIA, and to prepare for the capture of 
the MARSHALL-CAROLINE area. 

3. (a) Task Force One. 

(1) Perform task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy 
Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five). 

(2) Reenforce and support operations of Task Force Two as required in the 
MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1, 
Rainbow Five). 

(b) Task Force Two. 

(1) Conduct Reconnaissance and Raid in force against the MARSHALLS as 
required in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to 
Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five). 

[71] (c) Task Force Three. 

(1) Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required in 
the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five). 

(2) Reenforce Task Force Two as required by the MARSHALL Reconnaissance 
and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five). 

(3) Move from SAN DIEGO to HAWAII the remaining units and equipment 
of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 859 

(4) Continue preparations and training for landing attacks on Japanese bases 
in the MARSHALLS with particular emphasis on plan for capture of ENI- 
WETOK. 

(5) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by 
Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) and approved 
by the Commander-in-Chief. 

(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force). 

(1) Subject to the specific tasks prescribed below, operate patrol planes in the 
HAWAIIAN Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible 
information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other 
types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the 
planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective 
appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result. 

[72] (2) Perform patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan Annex I 
to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five). 

(3) Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces. 

(4) Perform tasks assigned in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding 
Plan (Ajinex II to Navy Plan O-I, Rainbow Five). 

(5) Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid 
disproportionate losses. 

(6) Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ squadron from Base 
Force) based on OAHU at all times. During the absence of major portions of 
the Fleet from the vicinity of OAHU, such squadrons may, at discretion, be 
temporarily transferred to Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval 
Coastal Frontier). 

(e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force). 

(1) Continue patrol of two submarines each at WAKE and MIDWAY. 

(2) Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese Homeland 
and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating 
conditions, giving stations the following priority: 

YOKOHAMA 

BUNCO CHANNEL 

KII CHANNEL 

TSUSHIMA 

NAGASAKI 

SHIMONOSEKI 

TSUGARU 
[73] (The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements for submarines to 
pass through that part of the Far Eastern Area in the NANSEI SHOTO as far 
south as Latitude twenty-eight degrees, thirty minutes North). 

(3) Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces, including shipping, utilizing 
mines and torpedoes and, if appropriate, gunfire. Mining of Japanese waters 
outside the three mile limit may be planned. Specific authority for such mining 
will be issued later. 

(4) Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack mission 
is not thereby jeopardized. 

(f) Task Force Eight (Mining Force). 

(1) Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the 
local defense forces during this Phase. 

(g) Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force). 

(1) Continue general logistic support of Fleet and assistance to outlying bases. 

(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy 
Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five), and the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiduig 
Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five). 

(h) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier). 

(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5, with regard for the 
probable increase in enemy activities. 

[74] (i) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier), 
(j) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier). 

(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5 with regard for the 
probable increase in enemy activities. 

(2) Perform the tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to 
Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five). 

4. Logistic replenishment at PEARL HARBOR, on the West Coast, and as 
specially provided for in the Annexes. 



860 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan 0-1, 
Rainbow Five. 

(b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time. 

(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location. 



Adiniral, U. S. Navxj, 

Co m m ander-in - Chief, 

U. S. Pacific Fleet. 



[I-l] ANNEX I 



United States Pacific Fleet, 

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship 

Place 

Date 

Patrol and Sweeping Plan 

No. . 

INITIAL TASK ORGANIZATION 

(a) Task Force One. 

(b) Task Force Two. 

(c) Task Force Three. 

(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force). 

(e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force). 

(f) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force). 

(g) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier). 

(h) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier), 
(i) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) . 
(Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1-R5.) 

1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of 
this Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, 
estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the 
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution. 

2. Phase I 

This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communica- 
tions of the Associated Powers by: 

[1-2] (a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of 
the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans- 
Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa. 

(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit. 

(c) Covering. 

(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions. 

(e) Routing shipping. 

Phase I A 

This Fleet will: (a) continue the operations of Phase I, except as to patrols 
which will be modified or discontinued as necessary in order to carry out pre- 
scribed offensive operations; 

(b) attack enemy communications by making initial sweep for enemy mer- 
chant ships and raiders, and by raiding Japanese sea communications westward 
of Nanpo Shoto; 

(c) reconnoiter and raid the Marshall Islands. 

Subsequent Phases 

This Fleet will: (a) continue operations of Phase I except as to patrols, for which 
further directives will be issued later. 

3. (a) Task Force One. 

(1) Cover territory, forces and shipping of the Associated Powers as directed. 

[IS] (2) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to Task Force 
Three for cruiser patrol pool; and be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or 
a striking force, or both. 

(3) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding 
Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1) conduct such sweep as information and circum- 
stances at the time permit without interference with the primary task. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 861 

(b) Task Force Two. 

(1) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to Task Force Three for 
cruiser patrol pool. (In case of detachment of Atlantic reenforcement this sub- 

- paragraph is inapplicable) . 

(2) Be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or a striking force, or both. 

(3) Develop contacts made by patrol planes from Oahu if vessels of Task Force 
Three are not within supporting distance of such contacts. 

(4) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding 
Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1) conduct such sweep as information and cir- 
cumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task. 

(c) Task Force Three, reenforced with one cruiser each from Task Forces One 
and Two (for cruiser patrol pool), NARWHAL or NAUTILUS from Task Force 
Seven (Undersea Force), and one oiler from Task Force Six (Logistic and Control 
Force), also further reenforced by one squadron of patrol planes and tenders from 
Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) (by request on Commander Task Force 
Nine) when the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilities there permit: 

(1) Patrol against enemy units that may attack own and allied communication 
lines, operating in general as follows: 

[1-4] (a) Maintain two cruisers (one, if Atlantic Reenforcement is detached) 
on patrol between Hawaii and the Pacific Coast in areas more than five hundred 
miles from land. Reservice such ships either in Hawaii or on Pacific Coast. 

(b) (i) Maintain two cruisers, two destroyers, one submarine and one oiler 
in the South Pacific based on Samoa, normally keeping one cruiser on patrol 
within one thousand miles of Samoa along routes to New Zealand. 

(ii) When the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilitates there permit, 
request from Commander Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) assignment of a 
patrol squadron and tenders; and advance it into that area for operations. 

(iii) Coordinate activities of unit operating in the South Pacific with British 
naval forces as far west as longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East as the 
situation at the time makes expedient; and in accordance with such directives 
as may from time to time be issued. 

(c) Maintain one cruiser, based on Midway, on patrol to the northward of the 
Midway- Marianas line, in the vicinity of trans-Pacific trade routes. 

(2) Upon commencement of Phase lA, dispatch two heavy cruisers in company 
to raid Japanese communications westward of the Nanpo Shoto, and return to 
base when fuel situation or other circumstances require. Arrange directly with 
Commander Task Force Six for fueling such cruisers at or near Midway on out- 
ward passage and on return as may be feasible. The Commander-in-Chief will 
make arrangements with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, concerning the 
utilization of the portion of the Far Eastern Area involved. 

[7-5] (3) Upon commencement of Phase lA, discontinue patrols required 
by paragraph 3 (c) (1) and sweep for enemy merchant ships, operating along the 
following general lines: 

(a) Samoa based cruisers and destroyers sweep northward to latitude twenty 
thence to rendezvous designated by Task Force Commander for operations in 
conjunction with the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to 
Navy Plan 0-1). Other Samoa based units rejoin their normal commands. 

(b) Cruisers on patrol between West Coast and Hawaii sweep or search for 
specific enemy merchantmen, as Task Force Commander may require enroute to 
rendezvous designated by him for operations in conjunction with Marshall Raid. 

(c) Other available units conduct maximum practicable sweep in general area 
bounded by Hawaiian Island chain, latitude forty-six North, and longitudes one 
hundred sixty-seven West and one hundred eighty; such sweep to occupy about 
six days, and to begin on or as soon after J-day as possible. 

(d) Units operating in the foregoing northerly area originate radio traffic to 
indicate an advance toward Japan via a northern route. 

(4) (a) Upon completion of sweep directed in subparagraph (3) (c) above, 
rendezvous with oiler supplied by Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force) in 
latitude twenty-seven North, and one hundred seventy-eight West, or other 
rendezvous you may have designated. Fuel and proceed to join Task Force Two 
(Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan, Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1) on 
twelve J-day at rendezvous Tare in latitude sixteen North, longitude one hundred 
seventy -seven East or other designated time and rendezvous, 

(b) If any units will be delayed in joining Task Force Two, advise the com- 
mander thereof as to the extent of the delay. 

[1-6] (c) If conflict of tasks exists, operations against inferior enemy forces 
within striking distance take precedence over joining Task Force Two. 



862 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(5) If Atlantic Reenforcement is detached, assign two heavy cruisers to Task 
Force Two. (In such event the assignment of one cruiser from Task Force Two to 
Task Force Three, hitherto mentioned will, of course, not be made) . 

(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force). 

(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for 
conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy 
forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area. 

(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At 
discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of 
Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities 
thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable. 

(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer one 
patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South 
Pacific. 

(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders. 

(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute. 

(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval 
Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable. 

(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in 
sweeping during initial sweep of Phase lA. 

[7-7] (8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned 
in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1). 

(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible 
with assigned tasks, with other forces thereat. Be guided by principles of com- 
mand relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan 0-1. 

(e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force). 

(1) Maintain two submarmes on patrol at Wake and two at Midway for gain- 
ing information and for attack on enemy units approaching tliose places. 

(2) Be prepared, if Commander-in-Chief directs, during Phase I to conduct 
observations, by submerged submarines from outside the three-mile zone, of 
probable radar bases in the Japanese Mandates. 

(3) At commencement of Phase lA, or earlier if so directed, establish patrols 
off the Japanese homeland as prescribed in the basic Fleet Plan. 

(4) Route submarines advancing to westward for patrols so as to cover wide 
front. Coordinate such routing with other patrol and sweeping operations, 
including that prescribed for cruisers in the area westward of Nanpo Shoto, so as 
to avoid contact of submarines with own forces. 

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief and task force commanders concerned advised 
as to location and routes of own submarines. 

(6) Transfer NAUTILUS or NARWHAL to Task Force Three for operations 
in South Pacific during Phase I. 

(f) Task Force Six (Logistio and Control Force). 

(1) Through liaison with Commanders of Task Force Five (Pacific Southern) 
and Task Force Four (Hawaiian [1-8] Naval Coastal Frontiers) ensure 
that routing of shipping is in accordance with general directives of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief and is coordinated with the protection offered by Fleet patrols 
and with the routing and protective measures of the British in the South Pacific. 

(2) Escort important ships or convoys by using combatant vessels en route to 
or from the West Coast and Hawaii, which vessels are made available for that 
purpose. If escort is found necessary and suitable vessels will be not available 
by modifying schedules of escorts or convoys, make suitable representations to 
the Commander-in-Chief as far in advance as possible. 

(3) During Phase I maintain one oiler at Samoa to operate under Commander 
Task Force Three. 

(4) Provide oiler to fuel at sea units of Task Force Three on eight J-Day in 
latitude twenty-seven North, Longitude one hundred seventy-eight West, or at 
time and place designated by commander of that Task Force. 

(5) See also oiler requirements under Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding 
Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1). 

(g) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier). 

(1) Coordinate, as practicable, patrol in coastal zone with patrols by other Fleet 
forces. 

(2) Through liaison with Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Coastal 
Force) and Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) 
coordinate routing and escort of shipping in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier 
with that in the Fleet Control Zone, when and if established, and in the general 
Pacific Area. 

[1-9] (h) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier). 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 863 

(1) Coordinate routing of shipping with the protection afforded by Fleet forces 
and by British forces in accordance with current situation, and with general 
directives that may be issued by the Commander-in-Chief. 

(2) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable 
with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of informa- 
tion gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information 
direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity. 

(3) In the initial stages of Phase lA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet 
forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying rainge of the 
West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable. 

(i) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier). 

(1) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable 
with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information 
gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information 
direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity. 

(2) In initial stages of Phase lA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet forces 
in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the West 
Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable. It 
is especially desired to cover until eight J-Day UNIMAK PASS and the maximum 
area to the southward of Dutch Harbor that daily flights and available planes will 
permit. 

(x) (1) This plan effective simultaneously with Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five. 

[I-IO] (2) All task forc€f make available to Commander Task Force Six 
(Logistics and Control Force) for escort duty, all ships enroute between Hawaii 
and West Coast. 

(3) Destroy enemy combatant ships encountered. 

(4) Capture or destroy enemy merchant ships encountered. 

(5) Investigate neutral merchant ships encountered; send them to port for 
adjudication if investigation warrants; or if necessary and permissible under 
international law, destroy them. (See "Instructions for the Navy of the United 
States Governing Maritime Warfare"). 

(6) Seize any opportunity to inflict disproportinate damage on the enemy, 
modifying or discontinuing plans in operations if necessary in order to do so. 

(7) Disseminate pertinent information to other Task Force Commanders as 
conditions of radio silence and other circumstances permit. 

(8) Aircraft attempt, without taking undue risk, to force merchant ships to 
the vicinity of supporting surface vessels or to United States* ports. 

(9) This plan effective with Navy Plan 0-1. 

(10) Be prepared to transfer units of Southeast Pacific Force and Atlantic 
Reenforcement on short notice. So employ such units that if transferred they 
can reach Canal Zone within twenty-one days. If transferred, such units proceed 
along routes and conduct such sweeps as the Commander-in-Chief may prescribe. 

(11) Continue such training as these and other prescribed operations permit. 
[I-ll] 4. Logistics as in Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five. 

5. Provisions of Part V Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five apply. 



Admiral, U. S. Navy, 

Commander-in-Chief, 
United States Pacific Fleet. 



[II-l] ANNEX II 



United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship 

Place 

Date 

Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan No. 

Initial Task Organization. 
(a). Task Force One. 
(b). Task Force Two. 
(c). Task Force Three. 
(d). Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force), 
(e). Task Force Seven (Undersea Force), 
(f). Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force). 
tFnits of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1A-R5. 



864 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1. (a) Information. — (1) This plan covers the initial operations in the 
MARSHALLS for carrying out the basic task of diverting Japanese strength 
away from the MALAY BARRIER through the denial and capture of positions 
in the MARSHALLS. 

2. This force will: 

(a) Reconnoiter the MARSHALLS, particularly ENIWETOK, preparatory to 
a raid in force and to eventual capture, in order to develop the mobile and land 
defenses and material installations therein. 

(b) Raid the MARSHALLS with ships and aircraft and small landing groups 
in order to destroy enemy mobile forces, fixed defenses and facilities. 

[1 1-2] 3. (a) Task Force One. — (1) Transfer available large Jight cruisers 
and carrier to Task Force Two on J-Day. 

(2) About Five J-Day, depart PEARL HARBOR with remainder of force and 
proceed to rendezvous with Task Force Two at Point Tare on Eleven J-Day. 
If delay in arriving at rendezvous is in prospect, advise Commander, Task Force 
Two, of the probable time of arrival. Transmit any such message prior to 
departing from the PEARL HARBOR area, if possible. Sweep as practicable 
along the route as required by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan 
0-1, Rainbow Five. 

(3) If the Oommander-in-Chief is not present upon making the rendezvous, 
Commander Task Force One assume general charge of all further operations in 
connection with this reconnaissance and raid, and direct Commander Task Force 
Two to commence the raid at a suitable time after he has reported ready. 

(4) Upon making rendezvous, assume command of battleships of Task Force 
Two. 

(5) Cover operations of Task Force Two, as reenforced, from the area to the 
northward of the MARSHALLS, furnishing such support to that force as devel- 
opments require, and keeping its commander informed as to the location of Task 
Force One. Detail escorts for any damaged ships of Task Force Two which it may 
be necessary to return to base. 

(6) Utilize-security offered by operations of patrol planes at WAKE. 

[II-S] (7) After Task Force Two has completed raids and rejoined, if the 
Commander-in-Chief is not present, Commander Task Force One carry out 
further operations of a similar nature or conduct the combined forces to PEARL 
HARBOR at discretion. 

(b) Task Force Two, reenforced as provided in this plan, reconnoiter and raid 
the MARSHALLS, carrying out the following approximate procedure: 

(1) On One J-Day, unless otherwise directed, depart PEARL HARBOR with 
reenforcements provided by this Plan and proceed toward TAONGI; battleships 
and destroyer screen at fifteen knots, remainder of force at twenty knots. Sweep 
along the route in accordance with Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy 
Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five) and furnish security as practicable to Task Force One. 
Furnish destroyer escort to oilers as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) (1). 

(2) Five J-Day, fuel the advance group from oilers at Rendezvous Tare or 
other designated rendezvous. 

(3) Six J-Day to Nine J-Day reconnoiter the MARSHALLS as follows: 

(i) Reconnoiter by air such atolls as weather conditions, forces, time and devel- 
opments permit, giving particular attention to ENIWETOK, BIKINI, RONGE- 
LAP, WOTJE, JALUIT, KWAJALEIN, MALOELAP and ARNO. Recon- 
noiter ENIWETOK particularly with a view to an early attack for its seizure. 

[II-Ji] (ii) So conduct reconnaissance as to leave the enemy in doubt as to 
what further reconnaissance is about to be undertaken, or as to what particular 
places may be attacked. 

(iii) Supplement air reconnaissance by reconnaissance from surface units and 
by landing patrols, and raid with forces immediatel}^ available if the situation 
and developments at the time indicate that such supplementary action is desirable 
and feasible. 

(iv) Utilize both photographic and visual observations to determine as accu- 
rately as practicable the opposition that may be expected to raids and landing 
parties; and the targets suitable for air and surface bombardment. Of particular 
interest are: 

ships and aircraft; 

storage tanks; 

power plants and radio installations; 

docks; 

air fields; 

storehouses and other buildings; 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 865 

guns and observation posts; 

mines ; 

channel and beach obstructions; 

other defense installations; 

beaches suitable for landing operations; 

extent of anchorage area; 

hydrographic, topographic, and 

meteorological features. 

(v) Retire on own battleships or Task Force One for assistance should circum- 
stances require. 

(vi) Operate battleship group to furnish support as necessary. 

(vii) Unless persistent bad weather or other unforeseen developments prevent, 
adjust operations to complete reconnaissance in four days or less after making 
initial flights over enemy territory. 

[II-5\ (viii) Upon the completion of reconnaissance, withdraw to join 
Task Forces One and Three. Transfer battleships to Task Force One. Task 
Force Three will merge into Task Force Two at this time. 

(ix) Study and analyze information gained in reconnaissance; determine upon 
the atolls to be raided and the specific objectives for attack. Complete final 
plans therefor, with due regard for subparagraph (4) below, and issue to those 
concerned. Via destroyer, furnish the Commander, Task Force One and the 
Commander-in-Chief, if present, with information and aerial photographs ob- 
tained, and copy of raiding plan. 

(x) Report by visual (or by destroyer if out of signal distance) to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, if he is within the general area, otherwise to the Commander, 
Task Force One, the time it is desired to place the raiding plan into effect. 

(4) Beginning about Thirteen J-Day, when directed, carry out the raiding 
plan. In preparing and carrying out the raiding plan, be guided by the following: 

(i) Make such additional air reconnaissance immediately prior to attack as best 
meets the existing situation. 

(ii) Attack the selected objectives with air and surface forces, the scheme of 
attack being at the discretion of the Task Force Commander and designed to 
provide the best economy of force. Avoid directing enemy attention in advance 
to the objectives of attack. 

[1 1-6] (iii) The priority of objectives is as follows: 
combatant ships, tenders, and aircraft; 
other ships; 
fuel tanks; 

power and radio installations; 
troop concentrations; 
storehouses ; 
other installations. 

(iv) Except in unusual circumstances, no vessel expend more than twenty-five 
per cent of bombs or ammunition on fixed objectives. 

(v) Where conditions appear favorable, land personnel to demolish installa- 
tions and eliminate enemy personnel. 

(vi) Do not enter lagoons with ships. 

(vii) Make suitable arrangements for the protection of and withdrawal of 
damaged ships, requesting escorts from Task Force One. 

(viii) If sufficient weakly held positions are developed to warrant further raids, 
carry them out, otherwise discontinue raids at discretion and join Task Force One. 

(c) Task Force Three. — (1) If Atlantic Reenforcement has been detached, 
transfer two heavy cruisers at PEARL HARBOR to Task Force Two. 

(2) If carrier is available, assign it to Task Force Two for this operation begin- 
ning J-Day. 

[1 1-7] (3) While in the Northern Pacific carrying out the Patrol and Sweep- 
ing Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five) employ radio to deceive 
enemy as to intentions in the MARSHALLS. 

(4) If available, assign combat unit of about one hundred fifty marines to each 
cruiser which will eventually join Task Force Two. 

(5) Upon completion of the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan on 
about Ten J-Day, join Task Force Two with cruisers and destroyers at Point Tare 
or other designated rendezvous. Thereafter operate as part of Task Force Two 
until released upon completion of the raiding operation of this plan. 

(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) coordinate operations of patrol planes 
with those of other forces as follows: 

(1) Prior to Five J-Day advance maximum practicable patrol plane strength 



866 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to WAKE, MIDWAY, and JOHNSTON, leaving not less than two operating 
squadrons at OAHU. 

(2) JOHNSTON-based planes, during passage of units of other forces to the 
westward, search along the route of advance from the vicinity of JOHNSTON 
to longitude one hundred seventy-eight degrees west. 

(3) MIDWAY-based planes search sectors to the southwestward of MIDWAY 
to prevent surprise attack across that sector on units operating toward the 
MARSHALLS. 

[1 1-8] (4) WAKE-based planes make preliminary air reconnaissance of 
TAONGI and BIKAR on Five J-Day, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and 
acquaint Commander Task Force Two with the results. Thereafter, conduct 
search, to the extent that available planes and supplies will permit, to prevent 
surprise attack from the westward by enemy surface forces on own units operating 
toward the MARSHALLS. 

(5) On completion of the raiding operations of Task Force Two resume normal 
operations as required by paragraph 3242b. of the Fleet Operating Plan. 

(e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force). — No primary tasks in connection with 
this plan are assigned but: 

(1) Submarines which may have been in the MARSHALLS in carrying out the 
Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five) report 
enemy information obtained. 

(2)' While en route to patrol stations to the westward: 

(i) Seize opportunities to damage important enemy units. 

(ii) Avoid contacts with own forces. 

(iii) Force Commander keep other forces advised of location and movements of 
submarines. 

(f) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force). Despatch two oilers to carry 
out the following: 

(1) Proceed on J-Day with destroyer escort provided by Commander Task 
Force Two to rendezvous with the advance group of Task Force Two on Five J- 
Day at Point Tare, or as directed by Commander Task Force Two. 

[II-9] (2) Thereafter conduct fueling and proceed as directed by Com- 
mander Task Force Two. 

(x) (1) Seize every opportunity to damage the enemy, but avoid engaging 
at a disadvantage. 

(2) Be alert to detect and destroy enemy mobile forces, particularly raids or 
expeditions which may be directed at our outlying islands. 

(3) Restrict the use of radio to a minimum. 

(4) This plan effective simultaneously with the execution of PhasellA of 
U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five). 

4. (a) Fuel from oiler as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) above. 

(b) Fuel destroyers from large ships at discretion of force and group commanders. 

(c) Logistic support for submarines and patrol planes as in U. S. Pacific Fleet 
Operating Plan (Rainbow Five). 

5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan 0-1, 
Rainbow Five. 

(b) Use GREENWJCH Civil Time. 

(c) Rendezvous Tare: Latitude sixteen degrees North; Longitude one hundred 
seventy-seven degrees East. 

(d) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised as to his location. 



Admiral, 
Commander-in- Chief, 
United States Pacific Fleet. 



[III-l] ANNEX III 



United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship 

Place 

Date 

Communication Plan No. 1, Rainbow Five 

USF-70 effective as modified herein. The numbered parts, sections, and 
paragraphs of USF-70 listed are efi'ective in toto, or as indicated. Omitted 
numbered parts, sections, or paragraphs are not effective unless specifically 
made so by Task Force Commanders by supplementary communication plans. 

1110. Efi^ective. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 867 

1120. Effective. Unless otherwise directed this communication plan is effec- 
tive coincident with the placing in effect of Navy Plan 0-1 Rainbow Five. 
1170 to 1178. Effective. 

1179. Effective. The above procedure shall be usedior Radar contact reports. 
No receiver not supplied by Bureau of Ships shall be used for this or any other 

purpose until it has been thoroughly tested to assure that it does not transmit a 
carrier from its oscillating circuit. 

1180. Effective. 
1190. Effective. 
1212. Effective. 
1220. Effective. 

13S0. Allied communications in Pacific Area are governed by SP 02376; in the 
Eastern Theater by current Andus publications. 

[1 1 1-2] 2120. Condition 19 effective. 

21S1. Effective. 

2200. The radio frequency plans are as set forth in Appendix B, USF-70, except 
that Naval Coastal Frontier Defense Communication Plans will be governed by 
Article 4005, 1(a) of WPDNC-46. 

No transmission shall be made on 500 kcs. frequency without the authority of 
the O. T. C. of a Task Force. 

When the O. T. C. of a Task Force or component at sea considers that the risk 
is justified by the importance of the traffic concerned he may transmit traffic to 
the nearest shore radio station that guards the Naval Calling Frequency (355 kc) 
or to Radio Washington or Honolulu on the 4235 kc series. He shall not, except 
in extreme emergency and when he is sure that the situation justifies the risk, 
answer calls or receive traffic on 355 kc, except by interception. 

The various circuit guards required shall be so disposed as to permit the maxi- 
mum number of ships to set watches on the radio direction finder, underwater 
listening equipment and other intelligence equipment as directed by Task Force 
Commanders. 

The Senior Commander of Units from different task organizations operating 
in the same area shall arrange for rapid means of inter-communications, preferably 
by available shore stations. Task Organization Commander in a port or operat- 
ing area shall establish an area radio frequency for use under circumstances when 
visual systems will not serve. In port radio shall not be used [III-S] '■ for 
inter-communication or communication with shore when a visual link or landline 
exists or may be established. 

Guard NPM Primary Fox regardless of geographical position. 

2300. Effective. 

2400. Effective. 

2510. CSP-1161 effective with this communication plan and shall be used in 
lieu of CSP-776 for Task Organization command traffic. 

2520. Use effective Confidential Radio Call Sign lists and ciphers for adminis- 
trative traffic. 

25JfO. Effective. 

2720. Effective. 

2740. Effective. 

SOOO. Effective. • 

4120. Effective. 

5000. Effective. 

5230. Until receipt of satisfactory radio recognition device for aircraft the 
following approach and recognition procedure shall govern the approach of Naval 
aircraft to either units of the Fleet or Naval outlying island bases. Separate 
special procedure will be prescribed for major bases and areas. 

Aircraft approach from outside of gun range in simple cruising formation (if 
more than one plane) on bearing 045° T. or 225° T. [III-4] on odd days 
(OCT), and 135° T. or 315° T. on even days (OCT), from center of formation or 
station at 1000 feet or under. (These bearings may be changed if necessary by 
local authorities.) They shall never approach from the bearing on the sun when 
the sun is low. 

If station does not recognize plane as friendly it challenges by making "Zs" on 
searchlight, or by training searchlight with red filter on plane if available; other- 
wise at shore bases use a red smoke bomb during daylight and a red rocket at night. 

On seeing challenge plane, or leading plane if there is a formation, replies as 
follows : 

(a) Daytime. — On odd day of the month (GCT), leave formation, circle to the 
right and, when back on the approach course, dip right wing twice, on even days 
(GCT), leave formation, circle to the left and, when back on approach course, 
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 14 



868 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

dip left wing twice. This must be made distinctive, dipping the wing about 30 
degrees to the prescribed side and returning to horizontal after each dip. 

(b) Nighttime. — Turn on running lights and proceed as for daytime replies to 
challenge, except circling may be omitted; or make emergency identification 
pyrotechnic signal prescribed in effective CSP. 

When approaching aircraft are recognized as friendly, the recognition station 
shall [III-5] train on the approaching aircraft a powerful searchlight, 
make "Fs" or show green colored light. Those signals indicate to planes that they 
are recognized as friendly and will not be fired on. 

In a Fleet formation the recognition stations will be, unless otherwise desig- 
nated, those ships on the outer circle closest to approach bearings 045° T. and 
225° T. or 135° T. and 315° T. (depending on the day) from Fleet center. 

0131. Effective. 

6200. Effective. 

6400. Effective. 

6500. Effective. 

6610. Effective. 

7000 (less 7100). Effective. 

[IV~1] ANNEX IV 

Command relationships and coordination of activities ai outlying bases 

1. Forces operating from outlying stations or bases, under this Plan, may 
consist, broadly, of the following: 

(a) Local Defense Forces, consisting of the local garrison and the local defense 
forces (which may include submarines and aircraft especially designated for this 
purpose), operating under the direct control of the base or station commander, 
and with the primary mission of defending the base or station against hostile 
attack. 

(b; Fleet forces consisting of submarines, airplanes and possibly surface ships 
or detachments, operating under a fleet task force commander or commanders, 
whose missions, while contributing indirectly to local defense, are primarily 
dictated by broader strategical and tactical considerations in connection with 
other operations. 

2. Command relationships, under these conditions, will be governed by the 
following: 

(a) The base or station commander will, normally, command and direct the 
operations of local defense forces, in accordance with the directive of the Com- 
mander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval 
District). This base commander, a task group commander under the Commander 
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, who is himself a task force commander under 
the Commander-in-Chief, may, on occasion, also have functions of command in 
connection with Fleet units in the vicinity. 

(b) Fleet forces will, normally, be operated in accordance with directives of 
their respective Fleet task organization commanders. In entrance and egress, 
use of facilities, arrangements for berthing and services, etc., they will conform 
to and be guided by the local regulations. 

(c) In the event of contact with enemy forces which may threaten the base, 
or the forces operating [lV-2] therefrom or in connection therewith, the 
senior officer present in the base area will assume command of all forces and activ- 
ities in the vicinity as necessary to take appropriate action against the threatening 
enemy. As it is entirely possible that such procedure may temporarily divert 
Fleet forces from some broader task contemplated by their task force commanders 
of the Commander-in-Chief, local commanders must bear this in mind and reduce 
such diversion to a minimum. They must also, within the limits of the informa- 
tion available to them, and as permitted by the urgent local situation, so direct 
an}' action taken by Fleet units under their temporary command, as to further 
the broad operating plan in effect. 

(d) To obviate to a maximum the difficulties which are inherent in the com- 
mand and communication relationships at such bases, it will be necessary to 
insure that all interested commanders, including the commanders of bases con- 
cerned, are made information addressees of all appropriate plans, orders, and 
reports of enemy forces. Commanders of all forces within the area will ensure 
that the base or station commander, as well as the Senior Officer Present, is 
familiar with the general nature of their orders and with their general operations 
(unless specifically directed otherwise). 

(e) In general, the question of command in such circumstances is covered by 
articles 801 and 1486, U. S. Navy Regulations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



869 



(f) The shifting of vessels, squadrons, or other units within an area may result 
in consequent changes in seniority among those actually present. 

3. (a) A Base Defense Plan and a supporting Communication Plan will be 
prepared under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. 
They must provide for the Fleet units present participating in the defense, and 
for adequate communications among the various fixed and mobile forces, both 
local and Fleet. Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier will furnish 
copies of such plans to appropriate fleet force commanders. [IV-2] The 
latter will, whenever practicable, supply copies to units of their command prior 
to departure for operations at the outlying base. A unit commander arriving 
in the area without receiving the plans in advance, however, will obtain them as 
soon as possible after arrival. 

(b) The Base Defense Plan should be analogous to the one currently in effect 
for the Pearl Harbor area. The Senior Officer Present, in exercising his function 
of command (paragraph 2 (c) of this Annex) should normally conform to the 
Base plans. 

(c) The Communication Plan should include provisions for: 

(1) Inter-communication between units of the local defense forces, and between 
such forces and the local defense commander. 

(2) Communication between local defense commanders and fleet task organiza- 
tion commanders. 

(3) An area radio frequency which may be used within that area for both (1) 
and (2) above and for inter-communication between the fleet task organization 
commanders present. 



Hewitt Inqxjiey Exhibit No. 36 



Sep 9, 1941. 



Oi>-12B-2-djm 
(SC)A16/EF12 
Serial 098912 

D-33956 
Secret 

From : The Chief of Naval Operations. 
To : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 
Subject: The U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow No. 5 (Navy Plan 

O-l, Rainbow No. 5) WPPac-46, review and acceptance of. 
Reference: (a) CinCPac Secret let. Serial 064W of 25 July, 1941. 

1. The Chief of Naval Operations has reviewed subject Plan and accepts it. 

2. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the 
addressee in time by the next available officer coiu'ier. The originator therefore 
authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the conti- 
nental limits of the United States. 

H. R. Stakk. 



BOTJTING AND TBANSFER SUP — NA\Tr DEPT., KOOM 2055 

(SC) A16/FF12 Document No. 33956 

SUBJECT: U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan— Rainbow Five (WPPae-46) 
Date received 8-12-41 Parcel or Postal No. Five 



From— 


To— 


File 


Serial 


Date 


Copy 
No. 


With 
enclo- 
sures 


Without enclosure 


Itr: CinCPac 


CNO 


Al6/WPPae-46 (16) 


064W 


7-25-41 


1-5 




A 

Ends, received di- 
rect by 20-P 


Routed 
to— 


Copy 
No. 


With en- 
closures 


No. Cy. 
enclo- 
sures 


SECRET Remarks CONFIDENTIAL 


12 


1-5 































870 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
[SH] 

WHEN NO LONGER REQUIRED FOR ACTION OR IMMEDIATE REFERENCE PLEASE 
RETURN ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) TO ROOM 2055, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS. 

IF IT IS DESIRED TO RETAIN ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) INDEFINITELY PLEASE 
REMOVE ORIGINAL OF THIS ROUTING AND TRANSFER SLIP AND RETURN SAME TO 
ROOM 2055, OFFICE OF C. N. O. 

Doc. No. 33956 Copy No. Doc. No. 33956 Copy No. - 

With enclosures With enclosures 

9 Received Received 10 

(Date) (Date) 

Op Op 

GPO (Signature) gpo (Signature) 

Doc. No. 33956 Copy No Doc. No. 33956 Copy No. - - 

With enclosures With enclosures 

7 Received - Received 8 

(Date) (Date) 

Op — Op 

Op. GPO (Signature) 

GPO (Signature) Doc. No. 33956 Copy No 

Doc. No. 33956 Copy No With enclosures 

With enclosures Received 6 

5 Received (Date) 

(Date) Op 

Op. GPO (Signature) 

GPO (Signature) Doc. No. 33956 Copy No 

Doc. No. 33956 Copy No. 1-4 With enclosures 

With enclosures Received. 4 

3 Received 9-9-41 (Date) 

(Date) Op 

Op. 12 W. C. Blaine gpo (Signature) 

GPO (Signature) Doc. No. 33956 Copy No. 1-4 

Doe. No. 33956 Copy No. 1-5 With enclosures 

With enclosures Received 9-6-^1 2 

1 Received 8-12-41 (Date) 

(Date) Op. IOC A. Meek 

Op. 12 W. C. Blaine gpo 16-15240 (Signature) 
GPO (Signature) 

[S-ff] [Stamped :] Received S-C files, Room 2055. Aug 12 1941. Route to : 
12. Op File No. (SC) A16/FF12. Doc. No. 33956. Copy No. 1 of 5. 

UNITED STATES FLEET 

U. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FlagSllip 

Peael Haebob, T, H., July 25, 1941. 
CinC File No. 
A16/WPPac-46(16) 
Serial 064W 
Secret 

From : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 

To : The Chief of Naval Operations. 

Subject: U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan— Rainbow Five (WPPac-46). 
Reference: (a) WPLr46. 
Enclosure: (A) Six (6) copies of WPPac-46, registered numbers 1 to 6 inclusive. 

1. As required by reference (a), the subject Plan is submitted herewith for 
approval. 

2. In order that the task force commanders of the U. S. Pacific Fleet might 
have a basis for planning, and for action in case of an early outbreak of war, this 
Plan has been distributed prior to its approval by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

8. The Plan required by paragraph 8215 a.2 of reference (a) will be submitted 
when completed. 

4. Plans for other operations are under investigation and 'will be submitted as 
they are developed. 

5. This 0-1 Plan is the best that this command has been able to evolve for 
carrying out the tasks assigned in the Basic Plan. Every investigation of pro- 
spective operations among the Japanese Mandated Islands shows that risk of 
serious damage from enemy submarines and shore-based aircraft must be in- 
curred. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet finds himself severely handi- 
capped for any such operations, because of the limited forces made available to 
him, particularly by the small number of destroyers and other anti-submarine 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 871 

vessels, and the lack of transports and a properly trained and equipped marine 
force. 

6. If this Plan is put into eifect in whole or in part the actual conduct of any 
particular operation must be adjusted to accord with the situation actually ex- 
isting and the forces actually available. 

H. E. Kimmel 
H. E. Kimmel. 

Hewitt Inqtjiry Exhibit No. 36A" 

14H] [Stamped:] Received S-C files, Room 2055. Aug. 12, 1941. Route to: 
12. Op File No. (SC A16/FF12. Doc. No. 33956. Copy No. 2 of 5. 

Peabl Harbor, T. H., July 25, 1941. 
A16/WPPac-46(16) 
Serial 064W 
Secret 

From : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 

, To : The Chief of Naval Operations. 

Subject : U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan— Rainbow Five (WPPac-46). 
Reference: (a) WPL-46. 
Enclosure: (A) Six (6) copies of WPPac-46, registered numbers 1 to 6 inclusive. 

1. As required by reference (a), the subject Plan is submitted herewith for 
approval. 

2. In order that the task force commanders of the U. S. Pacific Fleet might, 
have a basis for planning, and for action in case of an early outbreak of war, this 
I'lan has been distributed prior to its approval by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

3. The Plan required by paragraph 3215 a.2 of reference (a) will be submitted 
when completed. 

4. Plans for other operations are under investigation and will be submitted as 
they are developed. 

5. This 0-1 Plan is the best that this command has been able to evolve for 
carrying out the tasks assigned in the Basic Plan. Every investigation of pro- 
spective operations among the Japanese Mandated Islands shows that risks of 
serious damage from enemy submarines and shore-based aircraft must be in- 
curred. The Comander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet finds himself severely handi- 
capped for any such operations, because of the limited' forces made available to 
him, particularly by the small number of destroyers and other anti-submarine 
vessels, and the lack of transports and a propei'ly trained and equipped marine 
force. 

6. If this Plan is put into effect in whole or in part the actual conduct of any 
particular operation must be adjusted to accord with the situation actually ex- 
isting and the forces actually available. 

H. E. Kimmel. 

[73"] charge slip 

c. n. o. files 

• 

File No. (SC) A16/FF12 

Serial No. 09S912 D-33956 

Date Sep. 9, 1941 

From CNO 

To. CincPac. 

Subject U. S. Pac. Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-1, Rain- 
bow No. 5) WPPac-46, review and acceptance of. 

Enclosures Doc. 33956— CincPiic Ltr. of July 25, 1941 to CNO on same subject. 
(Orig. & 3 copies.) - 

Charged to Comdr. Griswold For Admiral Hewitt. 

Charged by Lt. N. M. Blake 

Date May 26, 1945. 

Received by 



872 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Date 22 November, 1941. 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 37 

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE 
COMMANDEE-IN-CHIEF 





U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 




OUTGOING 


From CINCPAC [U PAC] 


Info To: 


Classification: Plain 


Originator: 12 


HO 


To COlVrt'ATWINQ 2 


Precedence: Routine 


Release: 01 






System: LL 


Show to: 13 95 



Heading: Z F5L 220130 M9U QRS 

UJ] 

URSER 0780 AFFIRMATIVE 
Ref : CLASSIFIED. 



Sent at 0131/TT 
Flag file. TS 01976 



P\v #2 0131A/22 
MHA 



(At this point in Exhibit No. 37 there appears : 

1. A copy of a routing slip bearing Cincus routing No, 10548 

and date 19 November 1941. 

2. A memorandum form bearing handwritten notations. 
This material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 120 and 121, 
respectively, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.) 

[Endorsed :] A4-3/FF12-7 A4-3/VZ 
PW2/A4-3/0780 



Confidential 
From : 
To: 

Subject : 
Enclosure 



Pateol Wing Two, 
U. S. Naval Air Station, 
Pearl Harior, T. H., 19 Nov. 1941. 



The Commander Task Force NINE. 

The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 

Revised Schedule for Remainder of Second Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942. 

(A) Two copies of proposed revised schedule. 

1. Changed conditions have necessitated a revision of the schedule for units of 
Task Force NINE for the remainder of the second quarter. 

2. Approval of enclosure (A) is requested. 



N. L. Bellinger 
N. L. Beixingeb. 
10543 



(The enclosures mentioned supra, being two copies of proposed 
revised schedule for November and December 1941 for the Commander 
of Task Force Nine, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 122 and 
123, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.) 



Hewitt Exhibit No. 38 
(This exhibit consists, of two parts, viz, Exhibit Nos. 38 A and 38B.) 



PEOCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 873 

Hewitt Inquiby Exhibit No. 38A 
INTERCEPTS, JAPANESE CONSUL GENERAL, HONOLULU, 10/1/41-12/2/41 

SECEET 

1-466 

Wednesday, 1 October 1941 

0900 o MURAOKA to TSUSHIMA.— Out— Have him call. 

0912 i NJ to OG for birth date. NI. 

1108 i Man to MURAOKA re sports. 

1115 i MIKAMI to SAKAI. NI. 

1255 MURAOKA asks Tamako /female name/ to come to see them next week. 

/This has all the earmarks of straight social talk./ 
1257 o SAKAI tells wife /?/ that they won't need the car this Sunday. 
1305 o Man asks HBD for thick drawing paper and a fountain pen. NI. 
1310 i XX to MIKAMI ordering a car for 2.15. 
1320 o SEKI to NAKAMURA of HBD re paper and maps. /No localities 

indicated./ 
1324 o To HBD for supplies. 



1-467 



End 



Thursday, 2 Octobee 1941 



0900 To NISHIKAWA.— Out.— Have him call. 

1028 i Universal Motors says the parts are ready at any time. 

1042 i MURAOKA to NISHIKAWA /commercial ; NI/. 

1055 i Man to SAKAI re XP. Routine info. 

1115 o To MIKAMI asking him to call XX. 

1121 o To RCA for messenger. 

1121 i For closing hours. 

1134 i TAKAGISHI to XX inviting him for next Monday, the 6th, at about 2 : 00. 
T. also thanks XX and apologizes for keeping him up late. T. remarks 
that XX was "high" at the /wedding/ party /of Sumida's son/ and j'elled 
a lot and XX says he remembers having a good time, but doesn't remem- 
ber yelling. T. will call for him. 

1140 XX to Mrs. ? saying he has just learned from Mr. TAKAGISHI that he 
was pretty bad the other night. He apologizes for his behavior and 
seems to be sincerely remorseful. She says that the incident T. referred 
to was quite late when XX entered the maid's room and got tangled 
with the maid. He says he learned about it from T. She giggles and 
is amused at his contrite heart. He asks what time the Incident /not 
War/ took place. — About 1 : 30. /It seems that MIKAMI failed to show 
up when he was supposed to and XX got beyond his depth in sake. He 
forgot somethink there that night, and Mrs. ? /Sumida?/ asks when 
she may return it to him. They both laugh unroariously at the "missing 
link" of his evening's adventure. She asks whether he is at home and 
learns that he is at the ofRce. She refers to it as "that", which leads to 
more merriment, and says she will send "that" up this afternoon. 

1145 o NI. 

1330 o O. G. to Rev. IKEZAKI re girl that lives at Koloa, born 7 Feb. 1916. 



1-468 



Fbiday, 3 October 1941 



0900 i NAKATSUKA to XX.— Not in. 

0905 i NAKATSUKA to XX re the Advertiser spread about Senator Gillette's 
remarks on the subversive activities of X. N. asks XX whether the 
accusations are just. — No, they are only rumors. — Do you have any 
idea how the rumor started? — ^No. I don't know at all what activities 
are referred to as leading to the X in Hawaii. — Have you heard anyone 
from the American Government asking you questions? According to 
Senator Gillette, the FBI and Army and Navy Intelligence services 
desire such an inquiry. He gives the idea that they are more or less 
following the activities of X. /They both agree that very foolish state- 



874 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ments often get into the papers./ .... Have you heai-d anything 
about the Japanese on the Pacific Coast?— No, I don't tliink so. — You 
feel they are just as loyal as the Js. in Hawaii, then? — Yes, I think so. — 
They, of course, you deny all what he says.— Yes, I deny it. — Cate- 
gorically deny it ? — Oh, yes. — He mentions here that some organizations 
send funds to Japan or help distribute propaganda films in the U. S. 
Do you feel that these allegations are true or not? — No, I've never heard 
about the Army /apparently misunderstood N. to say the Army was 
sending them/ sending films here. — You deny that X is taking part in 
any subversive activity, of course? — Yes. /N. will let XX look over 
whatever he writes on this matter./ 

0911 i KAWAMOTO of NJ to SAKAI re data on man named NITTA. NI. 

0938 i NAKATSUKA to XX reading his story re Senator Gillette's allegations 
of "unconsular" activities on the part of X. XX then asks N. to wait a 
moment. — What for? — I am preparing a statement for you. — You mean 
you are translating your J. statement into English? — Yes. — Are you 
writing a long statement? — No. /N. then continues reading his story. 
XX asks for his phone number and says he will call him back./ 

0949 SEKI TO NAKAMURA of HBD for paper. 

0959 XX to NAKATSUKA saying he put the matter in very simple Japanese, 
but believes N.'s story covers it very well. XX adds that he has heard 
for the first time of the Japanese military league in the U. S. which 
is accused of subversive activities on the West Coast. XX requests 
N. to look at his paper of 4 and 5 January. VX called XX's attention 
to the fact that Gillette made a statement on the 4th and the following 
day a S-B editorial referred to him. XX approves N.'s story including 
XX's denial that the J. War Office distributed films in America. 

1008 o SAKAI to KAWAMOTO at NJ.— Out at a meeting.— Have him call. 

1053 i /FPM/ Man tells OG he has received a letter which indicates that the 
Federal Govt, is going to treat all dual citizens as aliens beginning 1 
October. Can X do anything about it? — No. — Thanks. 

1139 i KONISHI to SAKAI. Routine request for data. 

1355 i NAWATANI to YUGE. /A very cryptic brief conversation In which 
great surprise was expressed at some telegram or wireless message 
received. No details given./ 



i-470 



1-471 



1-472 



Sattjbday, 4 October 1941 



0952 i KATSUNUMA asks OG re Nakazo FUJII. He has died in Hilo and 
his friends have phoned to find out what ken he is from. They are all 
embarrassed about the fimeral /i.e., they don't know which kenjin-kai 
will take charge/. Call 98310. 

1037 o OG to KATSUNUMA saying he is not listed, but his younger brother, 
Nobuta, is given. Yamaguchi. 

1045 i NAKATSUKA to XX. XX approves N.'s story re Gillette's accusa- 
tions. N. asks whether XX has had any commimication re the two 
NYK ships coming here. — No ; none ; I have read about them in the 
paper. I wonder where they got the information. I haven't received 
any letters from Japan since July. I haven't received any inforrnation 
at all about this. 

1050 i KONISHI to MURAOKA re XP of a Korean.— That's impossible. The 
Koreans are in the same position as the British or Germans with regard 
to dual citizenship. — This is a student at the University who has been 
told he must XP before he can be eligible for an exchange scholar- 
ship. — After a check, I find that it is impossible for a Korean to XP. 
End 



Sunday, 5 October 1941 

Not Covered 
Monday, 6 October 1941 



0945 i NAKATSUKA asks XX about ships. They agree that' the rumors are 
persistent, but no oflJcial confirmation has been received. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 875 

0957 i NOMURA /f/ to MURAOKA re passport issued in 1889 (28 Nov.) to 

Sanzuchi IWASAKI. Proof of arrival and date of marriage of parents 

lacking. 
1012 o KOTOSHIRODO /?/ to man. /Very brief, indistinct./ 
1047 SAKAI to MIHO.— He's at National Mortgage ; call 6221.— Have him call. 

He sent a check to cover some fees. We asked him to send cash. — 

Alright. /A sign of the times. Fees paid in in cash are not subject to 

control or are easily kept out of reach of the controllers. X refuses all 

checks now./ 
1053 o No answer. NR. 
1102 NOMURA to MURAOKA again.— We find we have the record. He came 

in 1887 on the 11th of December on the Wakaura Maru, ship No. 4. 

1120 i Man /possibly Dr. of Maui/ to LG arranging to see her 

• /at X ?/ this afternoon. 
1127 XX to cook saying he will not require lunch. /He also went to hear 

Bowles at PPU./ 
1137 /NR/ No answer. 

1205 o SAHARA to Mr. BEERLT /?/.— He's busy. 
1207 i Woman to MURAOKA re picnic. 
1300 SEKI to NAKAMURA.— Out.— When will he be back?— He's gone to 

McCully.— I'll call again.— Shall I have him call?— No, I'd rather call 

myself for it may be evening before I call. 
1303 OG to friend re picnic this Saturday. NC. 
1316 ? to KOGO.— Out.— When will he be back?— Probably about 4:30.— 

I'll call. 

1-473 

1359 SAKAI for ?— He's left. 

140i 01 to his OG for ?'s number.— 6361, local 105. 

1405 OI to Mr. AUSTIN /?/ at 6361, local 105. 01 says the secretary of X 
returned here in 1940 on a diplomatic passport. Is he a blocked na- 
tional? — I think he probably would be. — You do? — Sure, no doubt . . . 
What's his name? — Mr. YUGE. He has over $1,000 in one of those three 
banks. 

1410 YUGE to SUZUKI at YSB saying he made deposits the 14th June and 
26th July of this year. YUGE's balance at beginning of business 26th 
July was $7..51 ; on 14th June, $562.87. 

1420 MURAOKA to woman saying the letter is ready. This evening MURAO- 
KA will be out till about 7 : 30 this evening. — I'll see you tomorrow. 



1-m 



End 

TtTESDAY, 7 OCTOBEB 1941 



0932 i YSB To TSUKIKAWA re balance. On 1 June of last year your balance 
was $642.44. On 14 May of this year it was $730.02. On 26 July it was 
zero. 

0936 TSUKIKAWA to OI giving the data of the preceding.— If you have no 
balance, it can't be frozen. 

1026 i Man asks for date of his XP. 

1031 o NI. 

1203 o SAKAI to his wife. NI . 



1-475 



End 

Wednesday, 8 October 1941 



1147 i NAKATSUKA to XX re simplified XP procedure. N. asks whether 
"Stimson's bill" seems to XX to be a good one. XX has a stock answer 
to any and every question : I don't know. — N. : Do you think that will 
eliminate a lot of trouble? — I don't know. — Do you think it will help us 
eliminate the dual citizenship problem? — I don't know what the attitude 
of the J. Govt, will be. — What is your personal opinion then? — "I can't 
have my personal opinion if I do not know the attitude of our Govern- 
ment." — Don't you know for youi'self whether it would help or not? — 
No, I can't say. — I think it would be a good thing for both sides to know 



876 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

which side of the fence the dual citizens are going to be on. — Anyway, I 

will wait and see whethei- our Government has "an attitude to this law 

or not". — Do you have any word on J. ships' being scheduled? — None, 

except in the newspapers. 
1315 ? NI. 

1355 i /FPM/. Too brief. 
1400 i /FPM/. Girl to SAKAI re XP applied for around New Year's. Yoshito 

HIROTA. NC. 
1406 i /Cont. of 1400 conversation./ SAKAI : Your XP arrived 3 July, #433.— 

I had heard nothing about it. — The details aren't here yet, but I will 

look them up by tomorrow. 

End 



1-Jtl6 



Thursday, 9 October 1941 



0918 o XX to woman at NATSUNOYA TEA HOUSE, saying he forgot to bring 
home the syohin /could be 'trophy, prize' ; 'stolen goods' ; 'commodity, 
merchandise'./ last night. Please put the smaller package of photo- 
graphs in an envelope. I am sending some one to pick them up. — Alright. 

1028 i Man at NATSUNOYA /?/ to SAKAI saying that he will send his KT to 
X by mail. 

1040 i Man re deferment of J. military service. He asks OG whether the re- 
quest must be sent to the village office in Japan. — Yes. — But if the P. O. 
here should "open" these requests for deferment, wouldn't there be a lot 
of trouble? — Why don't you come up to the office with it? /It developed 
later that was for advice only. The forms must be sent in by the indi- 
vidual direct to the village office and should reach that office as soon after 
1 December as practicable, especially in view of the uncertainty of mail 
connections with Japan./ 

1130 i Brief. NI. 

1140 o MURAOKA to GOTO re arrival of XP permits for several members of 
the Goto family. Please come up for them and we will take the final 
_ step in XP procedure. 

1253 i Re XP ; NC ; NI. 

1322 o To MIKAMI requesting him to come to X. 

1325 ? to NAKAMURA of HBD asking him to come to X this afternoon. 
/A thing that never fails to impress me is the fact that N. is not only 
"familiar" with higher members of X staff, but he tells them he will not 
come up when they ask him to or picks his own hour. No one else is so 
discourteous, to X, as N. is./ — I can't make it today. 

1328 1 Woman asks OG whether she can get money through to Japan. — ^We 
don't know. /Later switched to SAKAI./ — Is it hard for people born 
here who do not hold J. citizenship but who are now studying in Japan 
to be naturalized Japanese? — They will have to follow the regular pro- 
cedure and apply to the Minister of the Interior. Sometimes it takes 2 
months, sometimes it takes longer. — You see, I have children in school 
there and they won't pay money out to them because they are American 
citizens. Aren't they Japanese? — No, they are foreigners. They will 
not release funds to them. — Can they acquire J. citizenship here? — No, 
they must be in Japan to be eligible for naturalization. — Where can I 
take steps to have them naturalized? — Do all this in Japan. It cannot 
be done here. 

1435 SEKI to NYK. — ^We have word that a ship is coming here about the 
20th. — Is it bound for Mexico? — I suppose so. — Are you free Saturday? — 
Yes. — Then let's have a game. /Golf./ 



1-J,78 



End 
Friday, 10 October 1941 



1305 OG to woman. NI. 

1400 i Man to VX.— Call 5243. 

1457 i Re XP of KONO. SAKAI had to send the $3.00 check back and re- 
quest cash. Caller wondered why he wasn't trusted. S. explained that 
it was the "freeze" that made the new plan necessary. 

End 



1-479 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 877 



SaTXJBDAY, 11 OCTOBEB 1941 



0930 i NAKATSUKA to XX, saying the J. short-wave broadcast this morning 
/6 : 30-?/ reported that some ships were definitely going to be sent to 
America to bring passengers from Japan and to pick up some to take 
hack. 

0932 o SEKI to restaurant reserving places for lunch for four : TSUKIKAWA, 

YUGE, SEKI, and one other. About 1 o'clock. 

0933 NI. 

0934 o SEKI to ISHIZAKA arranging to meet in front /of X-?/ at a little 

before 1 : 00. They are going to lunch together and plan to play /golf/ 
about 2 : 30. ISHIZAKA then tells SEKI that both AP and UP news 
indicates that on the 15th the Tatuta Maru will sail, on the 22nd the 
Taiyo Maru will sail for Honolulu from Kobe. From San Francisco 
the Tatuta Maru will sail direct for Japan while the Taiyo Maru will 
come to Honolulu and return. The Nitta Maru will proceed to Seattle. 
Today is Sunday in Japan and I have had no wire from the head office. 

0939 i NI. 

0955 i NI. 

0957 i /FPM/ To OG. Very brief. 

1000 /FPM/ Re picnic. NC ; NI. 

1012 i Girl to OG, arranging picnic. NC ; NI. 



1-480 



1-481 



End 

Sunday, 12 Octobek 1941 

No activity 
Monday, 13 October 1941 



0900 MURAOKA to TSUSHIMA.— Out.— Have him call. 

0930 i Woman says she wants to send parcels on the ship that is coming to 
Honolulu, but supposes that is not permitted. — We can't say about that. 

0932 o SEKI to MIKAMI re football and tennis tickets /apparently the police 
game/. 

1045 i NAKATSUKA to XX. The first edition of the H. S.— B. Saturday 
reflected that X had had no word re the ships, but this was changed in 
the second edition after I'eceipt of official news from Tokyo. No news 
since Saturday. 

1049 i Woman re request for deferment of J. military service which she wishes 
to send on the steamer leaving here the 15th. He suggests that she send 
it registered. Rest NI. If she sends it through X, however, he requests 
her not to send it before December, for the dates are 1 December to 31 
January of the following year. /Time and again I have observed that 
9 out of 10 calls connected with deferment are from women. Apparently 
they look after this detail of keeping their husbands or sons out of the 
J. Army./ 

1135 MURAOKA to Mrs. FUKUMOTO, a language school principal, re a 
questionnaire which he will send her by mail since he hasn't time to 
bring it down. It may be that he had a child at her school, /Makiki 
J. L. S./?/, but no real clues are given. 

1144 MURAOKA to Mrs. KIRIHARA asking her to telephone X tomorrow 
morning after 9 : 00. 

1320 OG orders tickets in Japanese for VX as a private individual, not as VX 
/to what?/. 

1433 i KANEKO to YUGE asking whether it is alright to give the wording of 
the cable from the F. O. to X to the press as received. — Yes, I think so. 
/YUGE starts to ask a question put as K. hangs up on him./ 

—END— 



878 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Tuesday, 14 October 1941 

0910 i For? — Still at home. 

0940 i KIRIHARA to MURAOKA, Mostly about arranging a social affair early 
enough in the day to permit children to attend. Later M. tells K. that 
Saturday is a holiday because of the great ceremony at the Yasukuni 
Shrine /enshruiement of war dead/. They will get together then. 

1003 i NAKATSUKA to XX saying there are 800 J. residents who are going 
to leave the Pacific Coast. Have you heard how many are leaving here? — 
The NYK is maldng all arrangements and I can't say what the whole 
number is. — Do J. nationals have to clear any papers with you first 
before leaving for Japan? — No. 

1026 i HBD to NAKAMURA of HDD. — He's left here. 

1307 i Castle & Cooke re pensioners. — Person in question not here yet. 

1330 o SEKI re some printing jobs. 

1343 o Re camphor and formalin. 

1420 i "Have NAKASUJI call 91043 if he comes in." 

1430 /FPI\I/ Man calls re passport. Matanosuke MURAKAMI. Routine 
check if arrival. 

1443 i MacNaughton /?/ of Castle & Cooke asks SAKAI for addresses of these 
persons who are C&O pensioners now living in Japan. Under General 
License No. 32, C&C are permitted to make these monthly remittances to 
them, but the Bank of Hawaii has no J. funds available. Should we 
approach the YSB or Sumitomo direct? — The secretary in charge will 
call you back tomorrow. He has left for today. 



1-483 



End 



Wednesday, 15 October 1941 



0913 i Kiichi KUWAHARA applied for XP in August. He is expecting a new 

KT on the next ship. Shall he bring it in? — Yes. 
0925 i DATE to SAHARA, reporting death of SHINJIRO SHINO. He wonders 

whether it has been reported. 
0927 o SAHARA to DATE. Yes, it was reported on the day he died. 
1152 i Re application for deferment of J. military service. Routine. 
1206 i /FPM/ Sports talk. They will play Saturday afternoon. /One of the 

junior members of the staff and a friend./ 



1-m 



End 
Thursday, 16 OcxoEBai 1941 



0853 Sakai to ISHIHARA.— Out. 

0858 o Sakai to OHIRA at NJ.— Out.— Have him call. 
/Ichimatsu OHIRA is NJ collector./ 

0902 i Nakatsuka to XX.— Not in ; call back. 

0913 i NAKATSUKA to XX, saying he will be up in 15 or 20 minutes to see 
XX. 

0915 i KUWATA to Sakai re application for deferment. Routine. 

0918 i Woman asks whether she can get her /son's or husband's?/ application 
for deferment off on the Taiyo Mani. OG thinks so. The woman is 
worried for fear the J. Govt. wiU not grant deferment. OG thinks every- 
thing will be alright. 

0928 i /FPM/ Man to X, saying something is at 5 o'clock today, or something 
at 9 o'clock. 

1000 i Calling in to ask about the draft deferment request. — He should send 
it in. 

1024 i NAKATSUKA to XX, reading to him in English interview for S-B 10/16 
re his ideas for the consular probe suggested by Senator Gillette. — "How 
do I say about the Hawaii-born Japanese?" — No. I make little refer- 
ence to the Hawaiian born Japanese. The talk is all more or less all 
pertaining to the when I say the Japanese people of Hawaii, I take it 
for granted that that's the older people. — Yes.^ — Because otherwise I 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 879 

I would say Americans of Japanese ancestry. — Yes. And you remember, 
one place I said : 'The elder Japanese also gladly send their American 
born sons into the Army'. — "Oh, yes, yes" /rapidly expressing under- 
standing/. — That gives the impression that all along I've been talking 
about the older Japanese. — Yes, that's alright. — Because the younger 
Japanaese, vpell, everybody would take it for granted that they are 
loyal. /Hearty laughter by XX in which N. soon joins. XX breaks in 
with :/ "Yes, yes ; quite natural." /More laughter by XX, of a polite 
sort./ — N : Do you want to mention anything about your X here? I have 
omitted it because I knew it is very delicate. — I think it alright just as 
you say now. Thank you. Goodbye. 

1039 To HBD for supplies. NX. 

1-485 

1043 o To a pharmacy for a substitute for medicine formerly gotten from 
Japan. — Will send up % lb. — If OK, may get more. 

1045 i Dr. ■ to XX, inviting him to dinner on the 19th at YMCA 

/?/ at 6:80. 

1053 1 To Sakai re request for deferment. 

1055 i NC; NI. 

1135 o OG to Mackay Radio /FPM/. OG: message received this morn- 
ing.— What number is it?— HC 169 SN /?/— 169, one moment . . .yes, 
here it is.— It's the third word.— Third word? OG: The first.— The 
first?— First.— 1 uhh 00 980.— Yes.— Do you want that word checked?— 
I want this tenth word checked.— Tenth?— Yes.— That's J U U G.— 
The next one.— The next one, G O N A N I G O N I T E?— Yes. I wish 
to have you check if it is G O N A N A.— It should be G O N A N A. 
OG : So we'd like to check on that. — Yes. I'll check that up. — And who 
is calling? — The Japanese Consulate /no particular person/. 

1209 i From Mackay Radio : This morning you got a message from Toko by 
Mackay Radio and you wanted a confirmation of the next to the last 
word. That's GONANANIGOONIT E.— I see /repeating it/. 

1310 i To Sakai about the draft deferment, whether he needs to report. NI. 

1320 i. NI. 

1434 o NI. 

1440 o Lee for taxi right away to go up to X. 



1-486 



End 



Friday, 17 October 1941 



0900 i YAMASHIRO no other name given, but X understands/ to X. Y. sent 
off a letter concerning the deferment for Tomimatsu SHIGETOSHI. 
Received under date of August 5 from Japanese city or town hall a noisy 
or vigorous letter, saying he was to return to take his physical exam for 
conscription. What is the best way to reply? Native village is Takaoka 
Prefecture, Hikujo Country, Kurotsuchi Village. He was born August 8, 
1920. X will see. Please wait. X tells him to send off something as 
soon as possible and then wait imtil January anyhow. 

0905 i Girl in English : "Ah wanta inquire where to have where the Japanese 
go to see about th' expatriation papers. Can you tell me?" /Apparently 
someone who -wants to have her maid expatriated. Accent mainland 
American, probably Southern. Calls in long distance./ — At this office. 

0925 i Inquiry whether OK to forward draft deferment by mail. — OK, but to- 
morrow is a holiday, so if you get stuck don't come in then. 

0987 i NI. 

1000 i NAKATSUKA to XX, reporting the latest news just in "that U. S. 
merchant ships have been ordered from the Chinese and Japanese waters. 
Of course, this isn't straight from the Navy Department, but it's what 

some iwople Have you received any word to that effect?" 

/No answer. Perhaps XX doesn't quite understand./ N : We have some 
word even in Honolulu that ships dovra here have been ordered to stay 
away from the Asiatic waters .... The only reason is that the Navy 
considers the situation in the Pacific quite serious. I think that's the 
only interpretation. — XX replies that he hasn't heard anything about it. 



880 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

. . . wants to know when it came in /as he didn't quite get it tlie first 

time, when conversation was in English/. 
1017 i To Muraoka /private ; NI/. 

1027 Muraoka to someone in connection witli private plans. NI. 
1047 i Evidently a mistake. 
1203 i NI. 



1-Ji87 



1-m 



l-U 



Saturday, October 18, 1941 

No Activity 

(Japanese Holiday) 

Sunday, October 19, 1941 

Out of commission 

Monday, Octobeb 20, 1941 



0840 o /FPM/ Muraoka /?/ to /?/ re : sports. NI 

0845 Muraoka /?/ to Nishimoto. Is out. 

0846 o Muraoka /?/ to Suzuki, re : tennis. NI 

0847 Muraolca /?/ to /?/ who is out. 

0848 o Muraoka to Fujikawa. Are you coming to the party? NI 

0855 o Muraoka to Sasaki. NI. 

0856 i NI 

0857 o Muraoka to another Muraoka. FPM 

0859 o To Mr. YOKOTA of Occidental Life. Not in yet. Have him call 2243, 

Mr. MURAOKA. 
0859 i To VX. Not in yet, but soon. 

0904 i 01 calling re : a conscription deferment for someone. 
0908 i To MURAOKA. NI /about the party and getting geishas/ 
0956 o To RCA for messenger. 

1003 i Man asks how soon he must hand in his application for deferment. 
1028 o MURAOKA to NISHIMOTO inviting him to a party at the Natsunoya 

the ■26th. 
1030 MURAOKA to TOMIKO (?) inviting him to dinner Sunday. Apparently 

not private invitation for the price of $2.00 is mentioned, 
10310 NC;NI 

1035 i . . . . Call 5243 (Line #2) 
1100 i Woman to Muraoka. NI. 

1120 i YSB to TSUKIKAWA saying a draft has come for him. 
1126 i KURISHIMA to Muraoka re tennis and other sporting events. Later 

there was mention of 5 cases of liquor for the big event. There will be 

exhibition game. 

1136 MURAOKA to Mrs. HIROKOTO (?) re tennis next Sunday. NI 

1147 i NI 

1248 i re office hours. 

1249 i Re XP. The man XP'ed a number of years ago and then later had his 

J. citizenship restored. His father or an elder man wants to get his 
status with regard to (J. ?) military service cleared up. SAIKI asks 
him to come to the office to talk it over. (It seems that the boy is now 
trying to dodge J. military service after becoming a Japanese citizen. 
"Restoration" of J. citizenship should automatically XP from American 
nationality, because "restoration" requires an act on the part of the 
individual and is not on a par with the accidental citizenship acquired 
by birth. This dual citizen lost his J. citizenship when he XP'ed and 
then lost (or should have) his American citizenship when he had the J. 
citizenship restored.) 

1305 o An outsider calls out for information re a form he is filling out. NI. 

1325 KUNIYOSHI of K. store in Moiliili to old man. He had asked for his 
KT in connection with XP. Call 8323 and ask for Takazu. 

1328 KUNIYOSHI to ? complaining that his XP has not come yet. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 881 

1334 o KUNIYOSHI to 4221 re his BC (Birth Certificate). There is a dis- 
crepancy in the birthdate. K. is much perturbed but J. girl at 4221 
tells him not to worry. The old man was probably late in registering 
K's birth with X and didn't wish a scolding or fine for late registration, 
so gave a later date. The Board of Health date is here taken as the 
correct one. 

1448 ? (FPM) NX 

End 

l-],90 

Tuesday, Octobeb 21, 1941 

0910 o NT (Maraoka about beer for the party!) 

0915 o MURAOKA to NISHIMURA. Not in. NI. 

0917 o MURAOKA to NISHIMURA. Not in. NI. 

0918 o MURAOKA to NISHIMURA. In! NI. /More about the beer. 4 or 

5 cases?/ 

0926 o MURAOKA to YOKOTA. NI. /a geisha— to arrange for THE party/ 

1003 o MURAOKA to FUJIKAMA. NI. 

1004 o MURAOKA /?/ to SAKATA Bon Ton. Out. 

1016 i NISHI of NYK to YUGE reporting that they have received a definite 

telegram that the ship will be off port 10 a. m. day after tomorrow /i. e. 

Thursday/ 
1019 i NAKATSUKA to XX — has' he had any word as to the exact arrival time 

of the Tatsuta. Yes. It will arrive on the 23rd and not on the 24th. 

But he doesn't know the exact time of its arrival ( !). Can't think of 

anything else. 
1045 o MURAOKA to Sec of Hawaii re SHIOMATSU (or CHIYOMATSU or 

CHINOMATSU). Secretary's man wants "everything on the card." 

"His birth September 5, 1873. 

"Arrival November 2, 1906." 

"Is that the only arrival?" 

"I see several times he went back to Japan." 

He will have to check and find out just when he first came. Continues 

re wife Hina, now dead. 

Also re one SUZUKI. 
1059 Muraoka to pal. NI. 

1103 o Muraoka to NI. 

1121 o Muraoka to Mr. Medeiros re Yamashiro' CHIYOMATSU (Chiyomatsu 

YAMASHIRO?) when he came etc. 

1-^91 

1145 i KANEKO to VX saying the prospective repatriates are very numerous 

and the accounts connected therewith are most troublesome. Many of 

them are trying to get permission from Washington to get money from 

New York and so on etc. we are having an awful time with them. 

VX — How about sending them up here to pay their fare? 

k — That's all right, but there are immigration problems too. 

VX — Let's take the whole matter up with Mr. Strench. 

K — You mena with Coleman? 

VX— Yes. With Coleman. 

K — What about white passengers? 

VX — White passengers? 

K — Yes. The head office has arranged for some haole musicians to sail 

with us. A Mr. Si Si 

VX— Mr. SIROTA? 

K — Yes. Mr. and Mrs. There is a group going first class to Slianghai. 

They are Americans. 

VX — People going to Shanghai must take a transport. There is no 

other way. 

K — These people are "foreign correspondents" of some "news service". 

They must be newspapermen. 

VX— The name is not NEWMAN, is it? 

K— No. 

End 



882 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
1-492 



1-493 



Wednesday, October 22, 1941 
Out of commission 
Thursday, October 23, 1941 



1400 o Muraoka to tai (female). M. — "Tlie person is not a passenger." 

"He didn't come back then." "No. He didn't." 

1413 i inquiring "one information about my girl friend." NI 

1414 i Inquiry. Hard to hear. NI. 
1427 o To RCA for messenger. 

1434 i fragment. NI. 

1554 i F.P.M. NI 

1603 i KATO to KANEKO. "How late will you be open?" 
Planning details, beds etc. NI. 

1618 i Dialogue between KANEKO and XX re : who is to issue the tickets and 
how they will be paid for. Apparently the rates are much lower for 
this trip than the usual ones. Kaneko is worried because many of the 
passengers have paid in yen and the company keeps its books in dollars. 
Kaneko says taking into account the discount they will get only about 
$69.75 for $85.00 and suggests that the "simplify" the system ?perhaps 
keep receipts in dollars or yen/ and cable to the main office for authority 
to do so. 

1816 i Seki to KOTOSHIRODO asking him to come over. He will. 

2032 N.R. Man (not VX) asks for taxi. 



1-494 



End 
Friday 24 October 1941 



0900 ? (FPM) Re sailing of TATUTA. 

0912 o 

0934 i Re deferment. Routine. 

0943 o Re deferment. 

0947 i NI - 

1010 i Man to MURAOKA re meeting at NATSUNOYA (Tea House) Sunday 
morning early, which they wish to postpone a week. 

1020 o Seki to MIKAMI asking him to come to take XX to ship in very few 
minutes. He wants to be there before 1100. 

1048 i Redeferment. NI 

1112 i Re BC ; NC ; NI. 

1105 o Seki to SAKAMOTO re cameras. Have your cameras all gone up 
15%? — No, only 10% — One of my friends wants to buy but they had 
sold all— we're out of those foreign made ones too. No new ones come 
in, and everyone bought before the price rise on 1 Oct. We have 
super DX and super-6 with meter — How much are the Super-6's? — • 
$176 — Is that the best one you have? — No we also have some for $219 — 
Does that include the case? — No. — I may be in soon to look them over, 

1110 i FUJITA of YSB to X saying he would like passage on the TAIYO. 
A letter has come from the Yokohama office ordering me home. X prom- 
ises to arrange passage. 

1130 o To NAKAMURA. Out. 

1138 i Very noisy. NI. 

1153 i Re deferment. NI. 

1255 i Some sort of query. Very faint/ NI. 

1-495 

1845 i For xx. Mr. NEWMAN calling. N. arrived yesterday on the Tatsuta. 
Mr. MAEDA said he would speak to XX re NEWMAN'S going back on 
the Taiyo. XX saw Maeda — but hedges when asked if anything had 
been arranged. He hasn't "approached" the NYK yet, but he will "have 
a talk" with them. N. dropped around to see XX but got to his office a 
little too late today, so missed him. N. is busy this afternoon having 
eyes examined — is getting new glasses made here before he goes back. 
N. won't be able to make it before XX goes home at 3. Could he (N.) 
see him early tomorrow morning. He has a letter from Mr. KISHI of 
of the Joho Kyoku. "He has a few things that he wants you to get for 
him so I can take them back. Also N. has to get a reentry visa to 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 883 

Tokyo. He spoke to Mr. Kishi, and also to Mr. Yokoyama and also to 
some of the people in the foreign office and they said the best thing 
would be first to start it thru here and the application has to be made 
and it will have to go thru the regular channels but they may facilitate 
it from the other side. XX thinks that in that case they will have to 
refer the matter to the Foreign Office. Says that in fact "about any- 
body that came thru now we have to refer it back." Laughter by XX/ 
Does XX think tomorrow would be all right to do that? He does. N. 
says they know all about him over there and thinks approval will be 
just a routine matter. He will drop around tomorrow morning ok. 

1312 To KANEKO NYK from SEKI of X who will come to the point at once 
re a long cable which KIMURA came and sent on the 8th of August to 
the tune of $45.82. The cable was sent to Tokyo to NYK main office. 
X would like payment please. OK. 

1315 To XX HAKUBUNDO from X to order some small swords (or small 
trees) for some of the people sailing on the boat today. OK. Appar- 
ently left addresses during earlier personal call. 

1330 i Some inquiry re Japanese made products or Japanese nationality /?/. 
X doesn't know either. NI/ 



1-496 



End 



Satubdat, 25 October, 1941 



0925 i Man discusses entering his son in a J. school. The boy is without J. 
citizenship and the authorities in Japan will not admit him. Caller 
wonders whether X cannot write a letter to the authorities that will 
explain the situation in Hawaii and facilitate the boy's admission. S. 
says the boy must go thru the regular procedure of having his J. citizenship 
restored. He must apply to the foreign minister for naturalization. As 
a person of J. descent, the procedure applied is different and simpler. It 
is called the "restoration of citizenship" instead of "naturalization" even 
in cases such as this one where the boy never was a J. citizen because 
he was not registered at X (born subsequent to 1 December, 1924). XP 
procedure must be instituted here, while citizenship restoration proceed- 
ings must be instituted in Japan. 

0929 i KAWAMOTO of NJ to Sakai saying the FBI is investigating the consular 
agents and also the members of the NJ branch office (for Kauai). 
They are accused of being Army or Navy officers. K. suggests the giving 
the NJ men identification cards to prove they are members of Domei 
News Agency. 

0955 o SEKI to MIKAMI asking him to come to X. 

1013 Sakai to Mr. Creighton at S-B. Creighton sent the money yesterday 
with Mr. Newman. The amount was $20. N. has an appointment with 
Mr. Kishi (error for Kita?) this morning. The secretary must have 
the money before he can send the wire (for permission for Creighton 
and Newman to travel on the Taiyo). S. can't send the wire without 
the money, and it has been mislaid somewhere. C. promises to get it into 
X's hands by noon. 

End 

1-497 

1427 Yuge to IKEZAWA at YSB. /This line got deep in the rain. Very 
hard to catch/. What the main trend of the conversation is I don't know, 
tho the conversation sounds important. Something is "funny — strange." 
Whether a man / one of the three getting off tlie Harrison?/ is from Tokyo 
or Yokohama. Also mention of the "situation being bad." Some men- 
tion of the Pensecola Hotel having something. The following sequence 
cannot be vouched for, but the words sounded like the following : 
"You're not returning." 
"No." 

"Keep pistol, eh." /This line in English?/ 

"Yes I have, because the situation is so bad." /The last sentence in a 
very grave voice, and clear./ 

End 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 2 15 



884 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1-498 Sunday 26 October 1941 

no activity 

Monday, Octobek 27, 1941 

0855 i NI. Wrong number. 

0900 i MURATA of Waialae to inquire about the notification of arrival at 

military age. Is referred to book stores or newspapers, advised to mail 

it on the Taiyo. 
0915 o MURAOKA to YOKOTA retennis. NI 
0926 i Inquiry about method of forvparding military age attainment forms. 

Either thru X or personally is ok. 
0943 i Inquiry about expatriation procedure. Is advised to visit X for help 
1026 i Inquiry regarding first steps in expatriation procedure. Is informed 

takes about 3 months. 
1030 i Pan Pacific Union callion. NC. Not able to come to lunch today. 
1117 o To Hakubundo from Muraoka re engraving on trophy cup. NI. 
1130 o NC/ Ran out of blank cylinders at this point until 1420. 
1135 To RCA. (NR) On 2oth of this month 33 word telegram in code was 

sent. How much is cost of telegram ? $4.79. 
1424 o Seki to 01 discussing some sort of "applicants" /for passage on the 

Taiyo?/ until the 31st. Apparently the X doesn't want to handle them. 
1437 To RCA. "Will you send a messenger boy?" 
1443 o XX to RCA. Your message #154 /poss. 164?/ which we received today 

has two pages. We received one page. She will send the other right 

over. Now XX says they have received three pages already! It's all 

right ! 
1450 i To OG. Very brief. 
1458 NI. 

End 

1-500 Tuesday, Ootobeh 28, 1941 

0820 o NI 

0828 i To Sakai/?/ Not in. 

0907 o Conversation with YANE wanted to write it, but hasn't a pen or 

anything, so can't /a country woman/ NI. 
0921 i NAKATSUKA to SAKAI ?Also asks if Kita is there. No./ Asking 

about IIZUKA, his dates etc. SAKAI was working there but "doesn't 

kOGD tr3.ck of tliG d&tGS " 

0928 i NAKATSUKA for XX— Not in. "What's happened to him this morn- 

ing?" Gets phone #4416. 

0929 i For Muraoka. Inquiry from KONISHI re FUKUDA, Michizo of Yama- 

guchi prefecture, Oshima county, Okika village. M. will phone him after 
he has looked it up. 

0940 To KANEKO from SEKI at X. Is K. returning? He is. Then he must 
be busy, but S. wiU trouble him with a little business re : the forthcoming 
Taiyo call. S. has received a cable that the Taiyo will be here on the 1st 
instead of the 31st. Also a cable that there is on board a man Taro 
TOKUNAGA who was on the Asama Maru / and of course had to go back/ 
who wants to get off here and take an American boat to S. F. Doesn't 
know whether he is- a man of wealth or influence or not. They aren't 
clear if there ate two of them or only one. If S. finds out he will call. 

0956 o SEKO to KANEKO/?/ regarding 2 passengers on the Taiyo, one from 
San Juan, the other from Philadelphia. American(s?) and honorary 
consul (s?) Pardin is a high personage who was returned to port on 
order of the government as he is going to the mainland on the Taiyo. 
They have orders from the Foreign Ministry?/ to put them off and take 
care of them. Doesn't know how old. They/?/ are Roman Catholics. 
Then the problem arises about the money the said passengers will need. 
Will arrange about it later. 

lOOOo To Rosecrans for Taxi. 

1004 i FPM. Very brief. 

1008 To Secy, of Hawaii. Line is busy. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 885 

1012 i KONISHI TO MURAOKA request for information on RIKIZO and his 
wife — how long have they been on Kauai. 

1-501 

They came September 9, 1898. Re : OTAMA. M. doesn't know. Re : 
SAITO, Kuislii and Fukuishi ; get their dates also. 

1020 i SHIMOKURI re : filing of report on conscription attainment of military 
age. Will they receive it? They will. He'll bring it. 

1022 o To NAKAMURA at /YSB?/ inquiry about yesterdays rates. N. Bays 
they are changing all the remittances for Japan into dollars, and they 
are paid in Yokohama. The price is about $24 — 24 points. /This?/ is 
to pay for a telegram so what will $5.9.3 be in yen? N. says the rate is 
about $24 for ¥100 / then giggles and opines that $24 is quite a bit to 
pay tho tliat is the rate they give their guests !/ 

1058 i NAKATSUKA reads long rebuttal by Kita denying acquaintance with 
Tadaake IIZUKA /see papers for 10-28-41/ N. at one point says he 
wants "to clear (Kita) from this case" by pointing out that IIZUKA 
was here in 1935, long before Kita. 

1110 o TUGE to 01. NI. 

1131 i Family talk. NI. 

1140 To RCA for messenger. 

1141 o For time. 
1150 ? (FPM) NI. 

1152 i NISHI to Sakai. NI. 

1200 o No answer. 

1201 o MURAOKA to HIGA (girl) asking for her father. He invites him to 

come to the office this afternoon about 3,30. 

1415 o (FPM) The ship will be in on the 31st. 

1420 Sakai to ITAGAKI re one cloisonne vase belonging to to the honorary J. 
consul at San Juan, probably an American, but whose name we do not 
know. Things could be handled infinitely better if w^e knew the other 
man's (I'ecipients?) name. (It is from the present or the previous 
Foreign Minister to the honorary consul at San Juan. There is no 
price indicated. ) Itagaki : I think we had better wait till it arrives 
and then see how to handle it. 

1-502 

1432 Sahara to YOKOYAMA /?/ Out. Have him call if he gets back by 3 
o'clock. 

1484 Seki to SATO. Out. (To MIYAMOTO) Seki wishes to talk over with 
SATO the question of 4 yards of some kind of cloth. 

1440 i Re various children of a man who died on Kauai. 

1441 i Re oflice hours. Up to three. Caller then asks whether a child born 

two months ago, but of whose birth the family had just learned, cannot 
be registered immediately with X and thereby acquire Japanese citizen- 
ship — No. It is absolutely impossible. — Isn't there any way it can be 
done? — No. None whatever — (as a matter of fact there is a way called 
"restoration" of J. citizenship, but the child would have to be in Japan 
in order to have his previously non existing J. citizenship "restored".) 
1445 i An eldest son wishes to return to Japan and asks what steps he must 
take as an eldest son who has an eldest son born here who was not 
registered at X within the prescribed period. He wants the child to 
be a J. citizen — After two weeks it is impossible to give the child J. 
citizenship if not registered at X. — Isn't there any way? — If you return 
to Japan with the child "restoration" proceedings may be inaugurated — 
You can't restore J. citizenship here? — No. there is absolutely no way 
of doing it here. After two weeks have elapsed the child is an American 
and nothing else. — Even if my ignorance of the child's birth until today 
prevented registration at X?— That has nothing to do with it. If the 
child's birth was registered with the Board of Health, take documentary 
proof along with you and the whole thing can be arranged in Japan. 

1447 o to UEDA. Out. Have him call tomorrow morning for a correction. 

1448 o Sahara to KAWAMOTO re mistake in data. Please bring for correction. 

1450 o To RCA for messenger. 

1451 i Woman to OG re XP procedure. Routine. 

1459 i Same woman for further details. She asks whether she has to have her 
parent's consent. They are opposed ; she is 1&— You will have to have 
their consent if you are under 20, for you will have to have them sign 



886 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the petition (Caller is under considerable strain. Her parents want her 
to return to Japan and want her to keep her J. citizenship but she wants 
to cut loose from it entirely.). 

End 



l-SOJf 



Wednesday, 29 October, 1941 



0905 i (FPM) Woman asks whether it is true that all baggage must be on the 
docks early — Yes (She then asks about deferment of military service.). 

0945 i Inquiry as to the meaning of "Maru". 

0946 i /can't hear it because of ruoise in record — something about a chokusen 

— straight line/. 

0947 i NISHIMURA, Mataso, asking something about enlistment. 

1021 i To SAKAI re: Conscription levies. Routine. 

1022 o to NYK. YUGB calling for "Take" YOSHIOKA giving information re 

CHRICHTON, Colvil M. directing him to issue a ticket for him. He is 
on the Taiyo. Also re: a NEWMAN /to take care of him?/. 

1034 i Fragment. 

1035 o To S. B. to Mr. CHRICHTON— will he come up and fill in the application 

for a visa. They hear he is trying to go to Japan and /they?/ have 

received a wire from Japan. C. will come in this afternoon. 
1103 i Inquiry whether there is time to get an exemption claim back for the 

conscription summons. This boat will be okay. 
1105 i To MURAOKA. NC. Somebody too busy to play today. 
1111 For Mrs. SMYTHE of the Senate chamber. Call 59471. 
1111 To 59471. Mrs. Smythe speaking. Would like a copy of the M-day bill. 

Doesn't know if they have any more. .Will check and mail one. 
1302 i Inquiry as to hours of business. 
1318 i Inquiry about conscription, deferment. 
1326 i Inquiry about conscription deferment. 

1333 i Inquiry about conscription deferment. X will receive them. 
1341 i Inquiry about sending money to Japan. Country person. NI. 

1-505 

1540 to RCA. Will you send a M. B. 

1712 i No answer 



1-505 



ThuBSDAT, 30 OCTOBEB 1941 



0845 o Staff member to sister (or sister-in-law) about groceries. NI. 
0901 i Man to Sakai. NI. 

0926 i to MURAOKA re something he wishes to send to Japan by Parcel Post/ 

Will there be duty levied on it? — We can't say. A great deal depends 
on the man inspecting the particular parcel in question. Old or new, 
one or many — all these considerations enter in. 

0927 to Mr. Hallett ABEND at RH Hotel. (Connection with Abend not made.) 
0935 o OG to Nakatsuka for address of ABEND, who is supposed to be living 

at the RH Hotel., OG reports he wasn't there this morning/ N. sug- 
gests she try the Moana. (Then to XX) SB wants a list of the Taiyo 
Maru's departing passengers. We haven't a complete list yet. There 
may be further applications. We have turned the matter over to NYK. 
Would you permit us to publish the list Monday? — I think it is all right. 

0944 i A haole at our place wants to send some chocolate candy to Japan. Is 

that permitted? — I imagine so but I don't know. 

0945 o OG to Moana for ABEND— Not in. Have him call 2243. 
1002 i FPM. Man re deferment. Routine. 

1020 XX' to ABEND at Moana. Not in. Shall I page him? Tell XX called. 
— I left that message for him. He will call you when he comes in. — 
When do you think he will come in? — I don't have the information when 
he will come back. The message is in his box and under his door and 
he will receive it as soon as he comes into the hotel. I have not any 
urgent need (XX interrupts for a long laugh) but I am one of his old 
friends and would like to hear his voice. 

1030 o KAWAMOTO of NJ re deadline for applications for passage. Saturday 
noon, 

1033 i SATO to Seki. NI. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



887 



1-506 
1100 i 

1105 o 

1107 o 

1108 o 
1114 i 



1116 i 

1120 i 

? i 

1205 i 



1210 i 
1252 i 

1255 
1315 i 



1340 
1355 



- 1413 i 

1500 o 
1-507 
1502 o 

1-^08 



0848 
0849 



0851 o 
0855 i 

0902 i 
0913 
0923 

0934 i 

0935 i 
0940 o 



0945 i 

0946 i 

0950 
1108 o 



1116 
1123 
1-509 
1127 i 



Man asks whether he can send 5# sugar and 2 or 3# nails to his parents. 
Yes, but there may be duty to pay. NO ; NI. 
Seki to merchant re bill. NI. 
NI 

Seki to MIKAMI. Out. Have him call. 

Dr. Wickerson at Moana Hotel to XX. OG says XX is out and she can't 
make out Wickerson's name. W. insists he foimd a message requesting 
him to call XX. (Could Dr. Wickerson be Hallet Abend's nom d'exile? 
Or was the note to Abend put in the wrong box?) Call 4416. 
MIKAMI to Seki asking him to come over. 
Elderly man to Sakai re XP ed deferment. 
Dr. Wickerson to XX. XX wanted ABEND, not W. 

Komatsuya Hotel to YUGE re the allotment (of space on the Taiyo) 
according to ken. Is there any disctinction made with regard to citizen- 
ship status? — ^All circumstances are taken into consideration. The funda- 
mental division is into kens. 
Girl to X. He's left. Re XP. 

Re application for passage on the Taiyo. The usual system. (What is 
the usual system? Via NYK). 
KANEKO to VX. Out. Have him call 6198. 

To MURAOKA re number of declarations of applications. Quite a num- 
ber left. 

Miss IMAMURA to Muraoka. NI. 

Girl asks for YAGI, ABE, AND HORI. None of them there. (The 
three lads who transferred from the Harrison to the Taiyo here last 
week. ) 

FPM. TOGASHI mentioned, but this conversation was interrupted by 
the next one. NC. 
NI 



NI 



End 



FbEOAT, 31 OCTOBEK, 1941 

Muraoka to ? saying the tennis matches will start at 10 o'clock Sunday. 
ABEND to XX. Out. When wUl he be in? In a few minutes— When 
I got in yesterday your office was closed. I am going out this morning, 
but I will call him later in the day. 
Muraoka. NI. 

Woman to Muraoka re deferment. Routine except that M. tells her X 
will be closed Monday, a holiday. 
Re deferment. Routine. 
Seki to 01 of JCC. Out ; I'll have him call. 
To Glabe wireless for ISHII. Out. 
Re deferment. 
Re deferment. 

Seki to HARADA. He left a few minutes ago. Then to Mrs. H. asking 
about a cool room for a (Mr?) TAKEMURA arriving the next day or so 
(presumably on the Taiyo) who will be here a week before proceeding 
to the states. She has already had word from XX to this effect and is 
going to give him a cool room being vacated very shortly. 
Re deferment. Question by woman as usual. 

SHINAGAWA to Seki re deferment (First re office supplies). Seki men- 
tions ABE and his prices. (ABE appliance Co.?) NI/ 
Muraoka to INADA ordering groceries. 

XX to KIMURA re necessary supplies. Replenishment of the oil is the 
main thing. (Long discussion but nothing of interest. K. seems very 
cooperative. He is trying to make arrangements for cleaning a place for 
the customs searches. He expects the ship to dock about 0800. He ex- 
pects to be down at the dock at 0730. Both are in good spirits. ) 
Yuge to MIKAMI asking him to come to X. 
NI 

SAKAMOTO requests information as to data of his family. 



888 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1145 i Query re an application for XP. 

1148 Muraoka to friend. 

1152 Moraoka to Tosliio (first name). Sports. NX. 

1154 o Muraoka NI. 

1155 o Muraoka NI. 

1155 i Seki to Yuge re some financial matters and how to treat the public funds 
collected /for the Taiyo/. 

1238 i Query re conscription. 

1239 i for SEKI. Out /?/. 

1244 i Inquiry for someone — ^Not in. 

1305 o Muraoka to NAKAMURA. Sports. NI. 

1306 o Muraoka. NI. 

1308 i Inquiring re afternoon hours. 

1308 o Muraoka to KIMURA. Out. Left message. NI. 

1315 o KITA to someone re Monday being a holiday, v. brief. 

1320 i OTANI (woman) to SAKAI. Something about a copy of the census 
register. She wants to take it home and he'll get it that evening or 
something. She has to make the proper moves it seems to i*e-register 
the fishing boats previously confiscated. He is explaining to her the 
difference between having the boat owned by one's own son who is a 
citizen and having it owned by a stranger or mere acquaintance who 
acts as a dummy. /But they agree that it amounts to the same thing./ 
He asks her to be sure to return the papers he is lending her and she 
promises to — she probably won't work at it after 9 PM this evening. 

1341 YUGE for SEKI. His superior over there /in Japan/ says that /it/ 
is good. IWANAGA is /on?/ the boat. Yes. probably. So there is 
only TOKUNAGA. Something about loading /chocolate?/ onto the boat. 
The words hachi hachi are mentioned toward the end of the talk. One 
says hachi hachi /lierally eight eight/ and the other says "I under- 
stand." /The recorder doesn't !/ This expression is used for a game 
of cards. Also for a squadron of 8 battleships or 8 cruisers. 

1407 o X to Mr. NEWMAN. Can he come tomorrow or Tuesday since Monday 
is a Japanese holiday. He'll try to come tomorrow. 

1448 o to NYK for Mrs. Nishi? Asks where KANEKO is. He is phoning. Here 
he comes. K. is so distorted I can't understand him at all. 



1-511 



End 
Saturday, 1 Novembee 1941 



1038 o NI. 

11)10 o To Yamashiro Hotel for a children's room, (for whom?) 

1128 i Man asks for correct spelling (in Japanese) of new premier's name. 

1140 i NI. 

1149 i to Seki. FPM. Caller went down to the ship to see if he could locate 
the cosignee thru the purser's office, but no such message had been left 
there at all. As a matter of fact? did come — I made enquiry thinking 
one of the passengers might have brought it in his baggage, but again 
the quest was unsuccessful. — Is that so? — The Embassy (probably 
J. embassy in Washington) intervened with the treasury to facilitate 
entry. I don't think there would have been any trouble — Is it a big 
thing? — Yes. Rather. (In the part recorded no name was mentioned, no 
article was specified. I have no clue as to the nature of the article.) 

1241 o NR. 

1306 Seki to Kyorakkan ) hotel) asking for one room up to the departure of 
the Taiyo on the 4th. She tells him to wait. (Cut off in the rush, but 
gist elsewhere in log as monitored direct. 

1300 1 NR. 

1309 ? FPM Re mail on Taiyo. 

1310 i Kyorakkan (a hotel) (a call-back) to Seki asking how many guests 

there are. — One. — When? — Right away. — What food? Probably occi- 
dental. — (K. will take him. Not sure who it is, but probably one of 
the diplomats or otlier leading man from the ship.) 
1315 i Man wants to send a package on the Taiyo but has heard that she will 
take no mail. He wonders whether this was a J. govt, decision. — ^No. 
It was the American Govt's decision. — I heard that the P. O. was 
turning down and returning packages already mailed. There are mobs 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 889 

of Japanese at the P. O. who want to mail letters and parcels. — They 
can't get anything very definite out of the P. O. The P. O. apparently 
doesn't know itself what it can accept and what reject. 

1-512 

1317 o Seki to Mrs. Harada asking her how the matter of the room was finally 
decided this morning. When they came back from the ship this morning 
Mr. IWANAGA alone (of the diplomats?) came here. A little later Mr. 
TOKUNAGA called in about a room and I had to report that matters 
were a little hard to manage just then. FUJITA is leaving shortly and 
his room will be free then! Mr. TOKUNAGA said he has a iuton of his 
own and would be glad to sleep in the closet or anywhere if space could 
be spared. Food can be arranged for them, but the main thing is a place 
to sleep — I discussed this with Mrs. Yuge and she thought they could 
stay at XX's house — But it would be not quite proper for a married 
couple to stay there (Does Seki think XX would neglect to observe the 
canons of diplomatic immunity as he did the night of the Sumida wedding 
when he got drunk and chased the Sumida maid round and round the 
bedpost?) — Fujita's room would be free on the 4th and the Tokunagas 
could take it then. How long would they want a room? — Till Friday — 
If they could stay somewhere till Tuesday we could take care of them— 
If they were an older couple they could stay at XX's without hesitation, 
but they are a newly married (or young married) couple which compli- 
cates matters. (They both laugh knowingly). In full realization of the 
risks involved in a young woman's staying at XX's. Mrs. H. agrees to 
ask Mr. HASYIYA to move to a small room for two nights to make way 
for the TOKUNAGAS if no other suitable place can be found. 

1325 o Seki to Kyorakkan re the young couple. Seki tries to be sure a married 
couple will be welcome there. (The hotel is often used by people less 
interested in the enduring bonds of life.) She says it will. 

1452 o NA. Fragment while caller was waiting for XX. 

1545 o to ? for messenger boy. 

1547 o NI. 

1605 o To Pensecola Hotel. NR ; NA. 

16-? i re ; Age for draft /American/. 

1-512~A 

(Addition entries missed on first log) 

0907 i Inquiring re passenger on Taiyo. Haven't got list yet. 

? ? To 6907. The awful nes breaks. The Taiyo will not take any mail ! 
The P. O. says so. Washington has sent a cable to the postmaster. 

0945 To Mackay radio for messenger. 

0950 i What time did Taiyo get in ? 

1000 1 Personal call for Sakai? 

1007 i Fro Sakai in good english from Alice YONENAKA. Could I come and 
see you this morning. Wants to bring her copy of certified census reg- 
istra rather her mothers. /Probably getting expatriated/. He tells her 
to bring her sheet and he'll look it over. 

1047 i Wrong number. 

1050 i FPM/ Inquiry re ; report of residence abroad for deferment of J. military 
conscription. 

1108 i NI. 

1135 o for HIROKAWA of registry department of P. O./different Hirokama no 
doubt/ to check on the mail situation. H. only knows what he heard 
and picked up. Refers X to P. M. 

1137 To P.M. Not in. Asst. P. M. will be in about 1230. 

1159 ? Fragment re XP. 

1202 To NYK. Message from Minister of Communications via XX which is 
referred to TAKASAMA at 2772 /?/, Gives his own number as 4416. 

1213 XX to KUSUNOBU /?/ his cook /?/. Wants lunch for four people at 
his residence. /Probably KIMURA is one. 

1215 o XX to /maid at home?/ In about 10 minutes 4 guests will be coming. 
But no one is there and cook is out ! 

1217 XX to /another kitchen?/ Today is a wedding day. Therefore SO 

SORRY ! /Poor Kimura ?/ 

1218 He tries again. Hooray ! Success. Orders a simple meal not party style 

since he planned to have them at his home originally, he says. 



890 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1-512-B 

0956 i 01 calling about "educational films" /?/. Afterward talking about a 
Kwanto style doll /?/ /Wasn't there some question whether one could 
be carried as an "award" to some American commission or something? 
Apparently the verdict was negative from the tone of the voices. 

— End— 

1-51S 

Sunday, Nov. 2, 1941 

1510 i Rang a long time ; finally answered but callee not there. 

End 

Monday, 3 Novbmbke, 1941 



1-5U 



0909 i from SOGA. Recently Mr. TOKUNAGA has come from the Foreign Office 
and Japan. Am inviting him for dinner, also Dr. Motokazu MORI and 
VX/& others ?/6 P. M. tonight. Some possibility of another farewell at 
the boat. Invitee will have to excuse himself from that if he can. At 
the first part of the conversation SOGA explains, I think, that he knows, 
or knows of TOKUNAGA thru Mr. Ken HARADA, his son's wife's 
brother, who is in the Foreign Office, tho born in Hawaii. Not very sure 
of this tho. 

0934 i From OMI Shoten. When will the Hikama get to Yokohama? 

0955 i NI 

1004 i Conscription. Routine. 

1024 i NI 

1026 i NI 

1221 o Routine. NI. 

1224 o to HARADA /?/. If he comes in have him call X. 

1355 i HARADA asking about Taiyo mail situation as concerns the notification 
of attainment of conscription age reports which have to arrive by Nov. 
31 in order to comply with Japanese law. Is asked to call tomorrow 
since today is a Japanese holiday. They say that since the Taiyo is 
out, another boat will probably be all right. 

1400 i NEWMAN to XX. Would like to come up for a few minutes right away. 

1508 i Inquiry. Woman with no passport is worried /lest the boat return to 
Hawaii?/ She introduces herself as an ordinary woman. Probably in- 
teresting but not urgent just now. 

1611 i NI. 

1-515 

#2 log 
0820 i NR. Star Bulletin calling. Call after 9 :00. 
0939 i NI 

1046 i NI. Re deferment. , 

1047 o 01 of JCC to Chamber of Commerce (Hamilton) asking whether there 

has been word on mail situation. No word from Sam King either. The 
postal inspectors expect word this afternoon. 



1-516 



End 
Tuesday, 4 Novbmbeb, 1941 



0918 i Man to Muraoka re 3 games (tennis?) tomorrow. 

0927 i FPM. NAKATSUKA to XX. XX has no news from Washington re mail 
situation. XX wanted the Taiyo Maru to take mail to Japan. ( See the 
S-B.) XX "Mr. King knows (the character of) Mr. Haan." This in 
answer to N's remark about the "fight" between the two. 

0986 i /VX and YOSHIOKA/ YOSHIOKA seems furious at something. Sounds 
as tho he thinks he is being cheated. Perfectly enraged. Something 
about /the authorities?/ not thinking it worth while to telegraph on the 
advice /or request or for the sake of/ a nikkei* or a whole boat load of 
them. (*nikkei American citizen of J. ancestry.). YOSHIOKA cites 
the discrimination shown towards the nikkei — the niunerous personal 
questions asked etc. etc. compared with the treatment accorded other 
Americans and VX /?/ replies that it is discrimination, isn't it? Perhaps 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 891 

he is talking about the questions asked of the incoming Taiyo passengers. 
Anyhow he is still furious and very indignant. Also something about 
the mail being held up. Towards the end of this long harrangue Y. 
suggests that VX intercede — just how is not clear — possibly thru the 
Federal courts, for the nordsai bansho is mentioned. Probably the 
effects of red tape plus extra work, worry and anxiety have added fuel to 
Yoshioka's rage. He is very disturbed to say the least. They cool down 
enough to laugh a bit toward the end. 
1028 i TAKAYANAGI. NI. 

1002 i Re deferment. 

1003 i Re deferment. 

1045 i From a fellow returning to Japan regarding military service there. Is 

advised to explain to Japanese authorities his real address (in Japan). 

and they will understand. 
1053 i KANEKO to VX re baggage. Inspected yesterday at 7 and today again — 

they have been trying to get cigarettes. Will VX help as they can't get 

enough? He will. Discuss sailing time etc. 
1126 SEKI to TOKUNAGA /?/ to say that DOI is waiting for him at X. /A 

little other talk — can't get it easily./ 
1-517 

1142 i VX to XX He's busy with someone in "that room" (the lowered-to- 

inaudibility voice indicated that it was a conference which she had 
instructions not to interrupt). Tell him when he finishes to please 
wait on the matter of the (NYK?) company's telegrams. 

1144 /to RCA?/ "Your messenger just came in here and and took 3 messages 
back. We'd like you to hold them, return them, if you will please. 
O. K. 

1203 i To SEKI to inquire as to a reasonable price for stockings, eh ! Bought 
1 dozen. 

1327 i FPM. For TAKAGISHI. Out. Gone to Ala Wai. 

1345 i to SEKI from TOKUNAGA. /very blurred, but something about a car, 
probably asking SEKI to have him driven somewhere either by taxi 
or by X car. 

1350(0 To Hiberly. XX would like to come down. Make date for 2:10. 

1405 o to KYORAKKAN asking if TOKUNAGA has gone out yet. No— not 
yet. Well, the car is "dry", so please have him wait a little please. 

1407 i for SAKAI. He's out till 3. 

1407 i Wrong number for Easy Appliances. 

1435 i Fragment 

1450 o XX Will you send a messenger boy. 



1-518 



End 
Wednesday, 5 November, 1941 



0917 ? NO ; NI 

1002 i Re deferment. 

1005 i WEST of UH wants name of XX. 

1007 i JARAKI of Mitsukoshi to VX. 

1023 i NI; NO 

1038 i Re expatriation; NI 

1058 i Inquiry re mail 

1005 i HARADA to IWANAGA ; wanted to invite him to dinner tonight, but 
since it is an hour earlier than usual will invite him for lunch. Did. 
Something about HACHIYA and Nov. 24th. Can't get last part at all. 

1113 i For /VX?/ from YOSHI at NYK. 

1115 o NI. 

1343 o For messenger boy. 

1449 i NAKATSUKA to XX re KURUSO. Is XX planning any reception? 
Hasn't yet decided. XX has received a message. It will take about 
5 days from Hong Kong. Foreign Ofiice message said he would arrive 
by clipper, but didn't say when he would arrive here. XX doesn't 
know much about KURNSO. Wife is real Caucasian. Oh ! Oh ! Oh ! 
Ah ! Ah ; "She's quite a Japanese lady. She eats Japanese food and 
is very polite and looking very nice. 

1457 i NC; NI. 

1459 o NI. 



892 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1636 o to (4)? YUGE to Mrs. NISHL She asks him to call and gives him 

the number 67182 /that of the boat/. 
1640 i KANEKO to YUGE arranging about working and the tickets etc. 

tomorrow morning. /A lot of accounting still to do. Long discussion./ 
1711 i About sailing. 
1-519 

Thuesday, 6 November, 1941 
1000 i NI. 

1020 Seki to Nakamura of HBD. NI. 
1035 i NAKAMURA to Seki. NI. 
1045 o Routine data call. Very lengthy. 
1055 o Sakai to George SAKAMOTO re deferment. 

End 



1-620 



1-521 



Fbidat, Saturday, Sunday, Novembee 7 to 9 

Out of Commission. 

Monday, 10 November, 1941 



0905 Sakai to PAA asking about arrival of clipper. About 1700 tomorrow. 

0910 i NAKATSUKA to XX re delay in arrival of KURUSU— VX and I will go 
out to meet him — The N. J. says he is going to stay at the R. H. Hotel — 
That's right. — Are you going to have a lunch for him? — No. I'm not 
organizing any parties — Will there be a private party at X? — Yes. I 
think so. — When is he leaving? — He will stay overnight. 

0915 i Komatsuya Hotel to Sakai re XP. NI 

0916 i Girl for VX re KURUSU. Not in yet. Please have him call to let us 

know when the Ambassador is arriving. 

0918 Muraoka to friend re cup (athletic trophy). NI. Very lengthy. Sports 
chatter. 

0925 o Muraoka to friend re sport. NI. 

0927 i Nakatsuka to XX asking whether KURUSU will call on governor and 
army and navy leaders here — I don't know. No word yet — Are any of 
the leaders of the J. community going with you to meet him? — SATO 
[pres. of JCC and UJS] may go. On Saturday morning he was sure 
whether he would be allowed to go to the landing at Pearl City. He will 
check with the authorities today. — Who is going to be at the dinner? — 
Not decided yet ; we are still discussing the matter — There will be about 
10 guests. XX — ^Any haoles? — No. A strictly Japanese gathering. — • 
What time will it start?— About 6.30. 

0930 i ITAGAKI to Seki re the possibility of sending parcels to the Embassy re 
American Railway Express. 

0936 i For XX ; busy ; for VX ; "You'll have to call him" "Oh shux. What's the 
number." "5243". 

0943 To tell — ? — that tho tomorrow is a holiday the stores will probably be 
open. WiU he make preparations to get in touch with them and have 
them stay closed. 

0951 o To ONOH to Sumitomo Bank. Tell him that party is postponed till 
tomorrow at 6.30 because of delay of clipper etc. Will be at oflScial 
residence. 

1030 i To XX from Pan Pacific telling him about Education week and that 
Mr. Long is speaking. She is hoping XX and VX could come. Sorry — 
today they both have to attend to "my friend's luncheon." — Yes. VX too. 
- Too bad. 

End 

1-522 

Tuesday, 11 November, 1941 

Holiday; closed. 

1207 o Seki to Morimura saying KURUSU has been delayed a day and as a 

result XX's kitchen help has been driven crazy. Seki then asks M. to 
come over with KIKAWA /?/ this evening about 1800 for dinner with 
XX [to help eat up the excess food prepared.] 

1208 i Seki to ? announcing delay and inviting him to XX's house. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 893 

1-523 

Wednesday, Novembee 12, 1941 ■ 

0839 For IMASASHIIMA. Shall she have him call? He's out, will be back 
about 10. He's at the corner of Kukui and Hall where /he/ just sent 
a blacksmith. Something about*No. 2 /house beyond a Chinese family's?/ 
She finally has X call at 10. 

0845 i Wrong No. 

0855 Yuge / ?/ calling Bob. Not in. 

0915 i FPM Routine inquiry 

0930 i For XX from Mr. FORE /?/ of the Airlines. Wants to come up this 
morning. OG says OK. /Probably going to explain what happened to 
the plane !/ 

0933 To SASAKI at YSB. Muraoka re sports. 

0935 Muraoka re sports. 

0937 o For cigarettes. NI 

0939 i Re Illumination for the party. NI. 

0954 i To Seki. The party is off. Much laughter about something. 

0958 o To "Jimmy" from NAKATA. "You tell one of my boys come get me at 
the Japanese Consul right away." NI. 

1000 i Routine re J. conscription. 
1015 o to ? No come down yet. NI 
1035 From MORIOKA. NI 

1048 to KUSANOBU /?/ re seating arrangements. 15 persons can't be divided 

well. How about 16? Also about times etc. 
1130 i Lt. Riddick to XX reporting clipper left Midway at 7.30 this morning. 
1133 o To S/B/ to NAKATSUKA. Not in. 
1145 i Inquiry on KURUSU. OG doesn't exactly know. Inquisitor gets hot at 

such ignorance. 5 :10 she says. 
1150 o To HBD for NAKAMURA from Seki to ask how the photographs turned 

out. Be careful of them. 

1-524 

1325 Q To Royal Hawaiian Hotel. SEKI went down yesterday to make a reser- 
vation and asked XX to tell hotel that plane is coming in this afternoon. 
1345 Inquiry re China Clipper. 5 : 15 

End 
1-525 

Thubsday, Novembeb 13, 1941 

0925 To P.A.A. from X. What time is the China Clipper leaving for the 
coast?" . . . "Three o'clock." X thought it was 1 or 5. Mr. KURUSU 
must be there at 2. 

0935 NI. XX asking when plane is leaving for S. F. 

0942 i NAKATSUKA of S. B. to OG. XX did give KURUSU a private party 
last night (according to OG). 

1001 o to II airways re China Clipper. 
1025 o Wrong no. 

1030 i KAWAZOE to VX. He's phoning. Call on other phone. 

1045 i KAWAZOE to SSKI tho he really wants VX. 

1147 o NI 

1155 i From a man from Royal Hawaian who has called SEKI's home and 
can't make himself understood there. "The ambassador is putting up 
a real fight to pay his own bill. He's not to pay it, eh?" "Yes (!) Mr. 
YOUKI is to get the bill and he will pay. 

End 



1-526 



Fbiday, No\t:iiber 14, 1941 



1045 For someone who is out. 

1048 For TSUSHIMA— out. For FUJIKAWA. Morioka calling. 

1050 i For MORIOKA from TSUSHIMA. The cup is finished. NI. 

1103 o To HBD. Fragment. 

1302 o MURAOKA. NI. 

End 



894 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1-521 

Satubday, November 15, 1941 

0930 OflScial at X wants someone to call him. 

0948 To Mackay radio. "Will you send a messenger boy?" XX. 

1058 i To SAKAI from CLAUDUS/?/who will come tonight to his house about 6. 
One asks the other if he has seen the new Shimpo /weekly/. There is a 
discussion of the necessity /of having or of not having/ bonds. Asks 
whether he has studied the problem in relation to the freeze. They are 
worried about the future possibility of war and especially something 
that ABEND has lately written /probably Shimpo has quoted from the 
last "Life",/ also worried about the future of commerce. 

0915 o To Mackay Radio. XX has received message #238, but has received only 
page 1, not page 2. M. says last night they sent two pages at about 7 
o'clock. Then, at 7.25, he sent corrected copy of page 1. Seattle made a 
mistake, so they sent a corrected copy of page one. Page 2 is all right. 

11151 To XX. Busy. Nakatsuka. 

End 

1-528 

Sunday, November 16, 1941 

No activity 

Monday, November 17, 1941 

0946 i Inquiry re expatriation. 

1005 to KANE from SEKI. This morning they are paying bills. 

1045 i TAKAHASHI /woman/ re : the fate of a 25 year old U. of H. graduate of 
dual citizenship who has become a public school teacher. He has never 
been registered as a Japanese citizen. First step is to get registered etc. 

1316 i From KOMATSIYA about "yesterday's case" / The hotel is apparently 
handling the deferment petitions of KOICHI and FUJIKAWA. NI. 

1340 o SEKI to OI. Something about paying /?/ for registration. Instruc- 
tions have come by cable from the minister. There is some other problem 
to it tho. They were advised, after conversations with the American 
government, that there might not be any necessity of registering /the 
money?/. So SEKI thinks it is ok. /Some diggerel about somebody 
from X rparrying a fatty /?/ Seems to be between a Miss DO and 
KIMURA of the bank. 

End 



1-529 



1-530 



Tuesday, November 18, 1941 



0905 i FPM. Muraoka on tennis. 

0910 To HBD. MORIOKA to NAKAMURA whom he asks for FUJIMURA 
with whom he discusses tennis at length. 

0915 o MURAOKA— tennis 

0917 i from a man who wants to speak to the "one who uses cables." Caller 
iS'Eigo CHIROMA — a senior at U. H. who is making a sociological study 
of the Okinawas in Hawaii. Would like to get statistical material about 
their occupation status, distribution, numbers, how many have left for 
Okinawa etc. X doesn't have those facts. C. says the Jiji Annual has 
some information — he thought they had got it from X. X says they 
don't keep record of how many come and go, and especially this was a 
long time ago — They keep "just if they come and report — but don't keep 
track of the numbers. C. asks how he'd get the materials. X says to 
ask the Okinawa people "they have some sort of club you know," — but he 
doesn't think they have such records. But X thinks he can get the 
general idea. Refers him to immigration. 

0928 i To SAKAI re hospital bill. 

0954 To SATO Music Store saying the radio at the official residence of XX last 
evening and for some time past has been so when you listen there is 
freekune /?/ — something the matter with it anyway. Asks him to come 
up and look at it. 

1007 o For Mr. /UE?/ MASE. Out. Call 2634. 

1008 To OYAMA. Out. Try 6311 /?/. 
1120 i From Mrs. NISHI to say goodbye. 

End 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 895 

1-531 Wednesday, Novembek 19, 1941 

1009 o Fragment 

1028 o MURAOKA to girl. Someone is to bring "bron paper" (birth certificate) 
in within two weeks. 

1127 i to MORIMURA /?/ frag. 

1415 YUGE to N. Y. K.'s TAKEI. NT 

1437 i From ONODA of Sumitomo who supplies or is supplied some data on 
addresses and names in Japan. 

End 

1-532 Thubsday, Novembee 20, 1941 

No activity — Holiday 

Friday, November 21, 1941 

0930 i FPM./ Mistake in log?/ Sounds like UEMURA to maud. "They haven't 

come yet, have they?" "No." 
0934 i Routine. NI 
0955 Asking YAMAMOTO about a souvenir for a deceased friend. /Has he/ 

TGCGivGd It *^ Ygs. 
1011 o URAOKA to YAMAGUCHI. Wants to get some information re him or 

his mother. Y. apologizes— he has received the letter from X but has 

been too busy to answer. Will answer in 2 or 3 days. M. says Saturday 

till noon, other days till three /for him to come in?/ 
1022 Something is at 6 tonight, gurobu? 
1027 i to MURAOKA re club affairs. 
1033 i From OAHU JUNK CO. re matter called about previously, the 

YAMAMOTOT business. No one is around now. This evening /we?/ 

will inform /him?/ and tomorrow a. m. he will let you know how much 

it is. 
1347 i to SAKAI from MACHIDA. The pictures are finished. Shall she bring 

them? No. He'll pick them up. 
1420 i to SAKAI from KOMATSUYA with a new ? Paketto HIROSHIMA 

on August 23. "I don't remember attaching and due /paper?/ on it." 

Probably NI. 
1-533 Monday, November 24, 1941 

0050 o X for U. S. Coast Guard for Mr. Anthony, (Someone speaking for 
Mr. VX.) re letter rec'd from CG. CG is preparing new passes for 
everyone who has legitimate business on the waterfront and has re- 
quested list of such people from X. 

End 

Tuesday, Novembeb 25, 1941 

1008 FPM re the evening KURUSU was here — asks for the bill for photo- 
graphs of the occasion. $27.50. 

1128 i NAKATSUKA to XX telling him about a Frederich Kuh U. P. report 

from London of a provisional agreement between J. and U. S. in 
Washington. XX : — "Is it from London?/ !/ It is ! N. al.so reports that 
the new dual citizenship bill has been approved by the House sub-com- 
mittee. Provides for compulsory renunciation of foreign citizenship by 
persons in U. S. Gov't, or armed forces, and voluntary renunciation of 
, foreign citizenship by all others holding dual citizenship. XX heard on 

the Tokyo radio about the Tatsuta, but hasn't received any official word — 
he says. He doesn't know if there will be a ship to Hawaii. 

1157 i From applicant for XP. "For a person in the government service it is 
very inconvenient to be a Japanese citizen." Wants to hurry. 

1402 o To Maekay for messenger. 

1410 o To HBD. Muraoka for either NAKAMURA or FUJIWARA. Gets F. re 
tennis. , 

End 



896 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1-535 

Wednesday, November 2G, 1941 

0931 From SAHARA /?/ Something about Satiu-day. NI. Not regular X 

call. 
1025 i For SEKI from SATO SHOTEN about a bill. 
1102 i To SAKAI from YAMAMOTO. Something about an order for 2,000 

cases of something Friday, and about the price, and about a wire in 

connection with them. 
1131 To AKAYAMA (girl) from MURAOKA. NI 
1140 o to MACKAY. X for messenger. 
1258 for ? Out. If he returns have him call SAKAI 
1317 o re Sa to Kinjiro and Saito Karoku /to a girl/ The place isn't written 

in. Please drop in and sign them. 
1357 o To Mackay for messenger. 

End 
1-536 

Thursday, November 27, 1941 

0924 i to SAKAI from /Seiichi/ HAYAMA /Pharmacist of Honolulu Pharmacy 
Co./ Your photographs are finished. OK. I'll get them tomorrow or the 
next day. 

1014 i girl /INAGE?/ asking for a census registration person. She was regis- 
tered /in Japan/ 24 years ago, but the receipt has been lost. What to do? 
Girl explains she is calling for a girl whose /parents?/ have died and be- 
cause of her job it has become inconvenient not to have it /XP/ Finally 
some satisfactory arrangement is made. 

1041 o MURAOKA to girl, ISHIURA giving an address and family information 
in Japan. Also re some relative in Pahoa. NI 

1045 i Fro SEKI from YSB re some "usual bills". YSB wants to write a letter 
about it. 

1342 i To SEKI from MIYAMOTO of YSB. It is $14.00. They have finished 

the investigation of cash on hand ; will bring it up. 

1343 i NAKATSUKA to XX. N asks him to answer Sen. GILLETTE'S charges. 

XX says he has heard from the Japanese radio that the Tatuta is coming 
to L. A. and Balboa. "I received no information at all from Tokyo. I 
was very sorry." 
1502 to NAKASHIMA or ? MOKIOKA? for a date. She puts him off till Tues. 
of next week. 

End 



1-537 



Friday, November 28, 1941 



0900 i NAKATSUKA to XX asking for a reaction to Sen Gilette. Asks XX 
if he knows that Jack Wakayama has said that the Hawaiian Japanese 
Civic Association would welcome an investigation. XX asks if he is here 
in Honolulu ! /XX is well uninformed on most subjects !/ XX says he 
has repeated that same statement many times already and thinks that 
is enough. He feels that if there were an investigation things would be 
more than 100 percent OK. N. says if they do find some un-American 
activity going on, the sooner the better so they /the U. S./ can get rid 
of them. /Friendly agreement and polite laughter Curtain/. 

0922 i About date for some dinner in past. NI 

0950 Private call by sonieone from Star Bulletin. Everybody /at X?/ is out. 
What to do? They'll be there in a few minutes. 

0952 o Man to girl. NI , 

1005 i for SAKAI from man. Lunch date. 

1030 i FPM Routine inquiry re nationality 

1038 Short conversation but can't get it. Something about "three o'clock." 

1052 i From ONO of Osaka Shoten re attainment of military age form. 

1100 to RCA re message received this morning. No. 1070 want to check. 
"On first page, second line, 8th word : CCFGR ; 10th word, ITLJS ; on page 
two, line 2, 9th word: P(B?) MEDZ-^ last line, first word, IRWPB and 
third word ZZGRO, and the ninth, FPOEN. 

1125 i Is SAKAI there? This afternoon at 1.30 I'm coming to your /house/. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 897 

1328 i FPM about something /someone has left?/ in a drawer. 

1338 o SAKAI asking about films. They (the store?) called about them this 

morning whether to send them or not. They agree that someone is to 

bring them over. 

1-538 

1442 i to MURAOKA from MIKAMI re deferment of conscription blanks. If 
born in August 6, 1905 you don't need to fill out the blank do you. No, 
you don't. Or if born in 1925 you do not need to, do you. No. Thank 
you. 

End 



1-539 



Sattjbday, November 29, 1941 



0905 o SAKAI to ? about doing something on a commission basis. Also wants 
him to takejsome pictures of the graduation /or a member of the gradu- 
ates?/ Wants 2 pictures. /Personal NI 
0925 i ProVX. "Will you call his other phone?" 

0936 FPM from VX. Sounds important, but very hard to get because of faulty 
recording./ Mention of a /black?/ smith's shop of Fort St, and a few 
isolated words, but no other clue. 
0950 i For SAKAI from HAYASHI /can't get this message but tone sounds 

legitimate and innocent./ 
1015 o to OKUMURA /having something to- do with/ children. His "card" 
in the X is incomplete. Will he come in and finish filling it out? He 
will. 
1025 o for NAKASHIMA. Out. Have him call 2243. Caller not or VX. Man. 
1150 o For Yoshino, a girl /from MURAOKA/ This is the same girl that put 
him off before. Sample talk : 
Yoshino? 
Yes. 

How about it? 

I don't know what you're talking about. 
Don't say that! 

Have you some matter to talk about? 
Of couse. 
What is it? 
etc. NI 
1200 XX /home?/ wants to eat right away. 



1-540 



End 

Sunday, Novembeb 30 
No activity 

Monday, DECEMBEit 1, 1941 

1000 to RCA, for messenger 

1045 to NYK TAKEI from SEKI who says he received a telegraph /to be 
sent thru X?/ some time ago and wants now to settle accounts. $45.82. 
They are bringing the money up today. T. asks about the situation 
but SEKI doesn't tell him anything startling. TAKEI is worried for not 
being able to get home, but admits he doesn't know what the situation is. 
(Doubt is S does either!) 

1115 i Inc. to XX, NAKATSUKA quoting an AP dispatch based on Asahi 
despatch from Washington that the closing of J. consulate is imminent. 
First public reference. "Have you had any information?" XX has not 
had any information from TOKYO to prepare for possible closing (he 
says). He saw "a few lines," in this morning's Advertiser. XX thinks 
the Tatuta will leave tomorrow, but on all else he is his usual blank self. 

1150 to HBD for NAKAMURA. Tsukikawa calling re day before yesterday. 
This morning /it was set?/ at 9.S0, __ no 10. At X? Yes. /This con- 
versation pretty fast. Translation a little unsure./ 

1305 i For someone who's not there yet. Girl calling. 



898 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1326 YOSHIOKA to MATSU/DA?/ Won't you come out in front of the office. 

/Possible taxi, because he emphasizes the words "in front of."/ 
1330 o for NAKASHIMA. Date with her. 
1352 o to a girl. NI 
1405 o to HBD for NAKAMURA. Out. When back? 3 or 4. Well then please 

/have him call me? First part was missing/. 

End 
1-5U 

Tuesday, December 2, 1941 

1429 o to TANAKA. Has he sent the things. Yes. The price will be about $30 

since prices are going up. Too bad. NI 
14291 MURAKAMI to SAKAI re Fujino. "Is it all right or do we have to 

send a letter first? The latter M. will come over. XP. NI. 



Discontinued 



/ ! Sic transit gloria mindi !/ 
RX 
R. P. P. 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 3SB 
INTERCEPTS, JAPANESE VICE-CONSUL, HONOLULU, 10/1/41—12/2/41 

SECRET 

Wednesday, 1 Octoeeh 1941 

0915 VX to MIKAMI for a car at 3 : 45. 

1143 i XX to VX. XX is going to Waikiki at about 2 : 30. 

End 
2-2J,8 

THxmsDAY, 2 October 1941 

1027 o VX to KIMURA.— He's out.— I'll call again. 

End 
2-2^9 

Friday, 3 October 1941 

1011 VX to KAWAZOE at NJ dictating a statement in reply to Gillette's state- 
ment. /See NJ for text./ Interrupted. 

1016 VX to KAWAZOE, continuing the statement. K. reads it back as a check. 

1020 o VX to KAWAZOE /?/ of the HH with the same statement on the Gillette 
question. 

1030 VX to KAWAZOE at HH /?/ adding that the S-B carried on 4 January a 
statement by Senator Gillette, followed the next day by a S-B editorial. 

End 

2-250 

Saturday, 4 October 1941 

No Activity 
2-251 

Sunday, 5 October 1941 

Not Covered 
2-252 

Monday, 6 October 1941 

0925 o /To #4./ VX tells wife that he will have lunch at the Pan-Pacific. 
/Gilbert Bowles, Sr., spoke./ 

End 



2-253 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 899 



TtTESDAT, 7 OcrroBEB 1941 



0913 i Woman to VX. — Out. /Woman speaks in English at first and then latdr 
in Japanese. It was probably MORIMURA who answered./ — When will 
he be back, do you know? — Very shortly. And what is your name, 
please? — /She falters a little in her embarrassment and says:/ I just 
wanted to talk to him personally. — I see. — I suppose that's all right, 
isn't it? /M. hangs up without answering or giving her a chance to 
finish./ 

1000 i /FPM/ /Verbatim, woman spealjing:/ It is the second street toward 
the sea from King. It's just in front of this Castle Church. You 
probably know it, don't you? The Makiki Church that looks like 
o-shiro /Japanese for "castle"/. It's just the other side of McKinley 
High. — Oh, is that so? I think I can find it quite easily. — Between 
Pensacola and Piikoi. — Oh, I see. — Most anybody knows it, because 
it's just this side. There are several apartments around a court. The 
entrance to the court is just across the street from the entrance to 
Makiki Church, this o-shiro church. — I see. — So I think you will find it 
easily. 1116-A Elm Street. — Is there any indication at the gate of the 
house or . . .? — Well, the number is out on the . . . /indistinct/. — You 
see, 1116-A faces Palm /?/ Street and 1116-A is inside the court. — 
Alright, quite right. — I'll look for your tomorrow, then. Thank you very 
much. — Shall I take Mr. XX? — Ah ha, please. — And my wife? — Please.. 
Thank you very much. — Not at all. — Goodbye. 

1121 i /Prom #4/. /Due to technical difficulties I couldn't understand any- 
thing. Neither could the principals./ 



2-254 



End 

Wednesday, 8 Octobeb 1941 



1405 VX to MIKAMI /?/ to send a car to X. Do you know Elm Street?— 
No, but I'll check it.— The number is 1116-A Elm Street. 



2-255 



2-256 



End 

ThuKSDAY, 9 OCTOBEE 1941 

No Activity 
Friday, 10 Octobee 1941 



1125 ? /FPM/ VX and woman. It is apparent that a picnic is being planned 

for this weekend. Woman reports there will be 5 or 6 to a car. 
1401 i MIKAMI to VX.— Send a taxi over. 
1415 i /FPM/ From #4 : Mrs. VX to VX. NX. 
1427 To #4 : VX to wife. VX will soon be home. 

End 
2-251 

Satueday, 11 October 1941 
0958 i YAMADA asks VX whether XX and VX can come to Shunchoro on 
Monday evening, the 13th, at 6 : 00. — Yes. 



2-258 



2-259 



End 

Sunday, 12 October 1941 
• No Activity 

Monday, 13 October 1941 



0925 i /FPM/ ? to VX re nature of the ships being sent. The word hikiage 
/evacuation/ is to be avoided, and "temporary relief" used in connection 
with these ships. 

0940 o VX to Kimura. — Out.— Have him call. 
79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 16 



900 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

0947 o VX to KUCHIBA.— Not in. 

0950 ? /FPM/ ? and VX. A few remarks about mail just received after a long 
delay. 

End 



2-260 



Tuesday, 14 October 1941 



0952 VX to KAWAMURA of HH. The Nitta Maru is being replaced by the 
Hikawa. /K. thinks this is "very interesting."/ 

1000 OG to "Trouble". 

1000 OG to Repair Service, wondering why 5243 cannot be connected with 
6091. — Try again, and dial slowly. 

1005 VX to KAWAZOE, saying the Nitta Maru has been replaced by the 
Hikawa Maru. /Probably this Kawazoe is at NJ./ 

1010 /To #4 :/ VX to wife saying a cable has come for him. He has talked 
the matter over with the NYK. /No clue given here as to the nature 
of the discussion, but it may be that VX and family will return to Japan 
on the "evacuation ship"./ 

1020 i Mrs. HAMAMOTO to VX, who can hardly understand her at all. She 
is one of the fastest chatterers ever heard here./ At 5 o'clock Saturday 
she invites herself up to see him. — How about 7 Thursday evening? — 
If business should make it impossible for me to see you, how may I 
reach you by phone? — 8428. /She jumbles it so in pidgin English that 
neither VX nor I could understand her. After long shots wide of the 
mark, he finally asks her to give it in plain Japanese. It turned out 
to be 8429./ 

1040 o VX tells ? that the Nitta Maru has been replaced by the Hikawa Maru. 

1203 i Castle & Cooke to VX re three pensioners of the Waialua Ag. Co. — 
The person in charge of these matters has just gone home. Will you 
call 2243 after 1:00? 

1430 i KANEKO to VX notifying him of the arrival of a cable re the ships being 
sent. Passengers and mail ; no cargo. There are to be 1000 persons on 
the Tatuta Maru and 500 or 600 on the others. There are no reductions 
from the full rate. Third class is $165. There are so many uncertain- 
ties that the rest of the conversation was conjecture of little interest. 



2-261 



2-262 



End 
Wednesday, 15 Octobee 1941 

No activity 
THtTRSDAY, 16 October 1941 



0943 i xxxxsxxx VX to /Mikami?/ re the October 6th issue of Life; buy 
5 copies. /Note : issue contains two articles of possible interest./ 

1130 o To 01 re the Women's Club /Fujin Kai/ something-or other wants 
to find out if it is today or tomorrow. — It is today. /He finds this 
out after a pause in which he apparently asks someone./ 

1148 i KANEKO to VX to speak of what they discussed before ; quotes rates : 
1st Class, $205 ; 2nd Class, $105 ; 3rd Class, $58 ; Children /?/, $49. Says 
if they lowered "compartments" to $165 they would be losing about $40 
per person ; also, the rates are set ; says he'd like to have an order 
to do that. — VX says not X's business to decide. The practical details 
are up to the Company ; also, the money alloted to X is Govt, money and 
the Govt. /Japanese/ is responsible for spending it. All that will have 
to be decided in Japan. /Apparently K. has hinted that X might make 
up the difference. K. then brings up the practical problem of provision- 
ing the ship /with fuel?/. They have already applied for it, I hear. 
There are about 800 /feet?/ of pier. They go on talking about prob- 
lems apparently connected with the ship./ — K: Well, it (Taiyo Maru) 
will get in on the 31st, won't it? One week before that / / Some- 
thing about leaving the matter until the 22nd — about a week before the 
ship comes in, I think./ 

End 



2-263 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 901 



Fbiday, 17 October 1941 



0921 i Mrs. GADDIS to VX. Finds out that it is the same TOJO they knew. 
/This was former War Minister in Japan/. Mrs. G : "Didn't he have 
something to do with aviation once, sometime ago?" — VX : Well /laugh- 
ing a little/ I don't know about that. /Then VX confirms that Eichi 
TOJO and Hideki TOJO are one and the same person./ 

1101 VX to KAWAZOE of NJ, dictating newspaper release. See NJ. 

1105 o Ditto to other KAWAZOE, of HH. /After dictation, K, asks if VX 
has heard anything special about the Tatuta or the Taiyo. VX has not, 
so they agree that everything probably is alright./ 

1126 o VX to Sumitomo Bank for Ono-san /manager/ to ask about Ilatte no ken 
/?/. Ono says will tomorrow a little before 8 : 00 be alright. It is. 

1348 i From HARADA to make a date for a conference about 1 : 20 tomorrow. 



End 



2-264 



Saturday, 18 October 1941 

No Activity 

(Japanese Holiday) 

Sunday, 19 October 1941 

Out of Commission 

2-266 Monday, 20 October, 1941 

1018 i KANEKO to VX. VX explains that it is not true that X is deprived of 
all funds. X is permitted to draw out money to provide necessary food 
and shelter for the staff. VX explains to K the difference between a 
diplomat and a consul. K implies that some of his staff may be trans- 
ferred to China, especially Nanking. 

1031 i KANEKO to VX asking whether he thinks the Taiyo and Tatsuta Maru 
will get here. VX thinks so. Then K. mentions that there is someone 
who wants to pay for his passage here, but VX says it cannot be sent out 
of the U. S. if paid here. (The inference is that fares should be paid 
at the other end to avoid the freeze. ) 

1035 i TAKEO of NYK to VX. T. says the accounts (connected with the spe- 
cial trips of J. vessels) will be handled at X. T. will handle all the de- 
tails as usual except that all expenditures and receipts from whatever 
source must be entered in a separate set of books. T. will go up this after- 
noon to talk it over with XX, VX, and company. 

1112 /Technical disturbances/. VX to TAKEI (?) re difficulties in making 
the arrangements. 

1520 o VX to KIMURA re a dinner for the crew. XX thinks it may be possible 
in the case of the Taiyo, but there will be no time in the case of the 
Tatuta. XX thinks it may be all right to have the purser, the (mer- 
chant marine) captain, and the Engineering officer to dinner. We could 
even limit it to the (merchant) captain and the engineering officer if the 
others are busy. 

1525 VX to KANEKO, apparently a call back. K asks what the word "permit" 
means (on the ticket issued by X). "This transportation ticket is issued 
for THe Imperial Japanese Government." Is fo7- correct? — Yes. — 
It seems to me it should be 62/ or through. — No. This is for the Cus- 
toms (U. S. or Japanese?) K. continues to find fault with the ticket, 
but VX defends it legally. Finally VX comes around to K's view that it 
should have been hy, not for. No sooner does he make this admission 
than he reverts to his old position that for stands for "in the interest of", 
"for the benefit of," "on behalf of." 

End 



902 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2-266 A 

1550 i F.F.W.M. Probably NYK. 

NYK "This passage ticket is issued for and on behalf of the Imperial 

Japanese Goverument." 

VX— "O. K. I think." 

NYK — "Consul General for Japan .... no Japanese consulate general 

at Honolulu — is that wrong." 

VX — All right I think /repeats/. 

NYK — Then the X will do the Japanese part?" 

yx "Yes." 

/ Apparently the N.Y.K. is printing special tickets for the 3 forthcoming 

trips to make clear that the government is in charge./ 



2-26y 



Tuesday, 21 Ootobeb 1941 



0956 i Request in pidgin about deferment. VX refers her to 2243. /W. N. ?/ 
0956 i Above caller. Girl at X explains that since this is a case of re-deferment 

she has from Dec. 1 till Jan. 31. If it were for the first time it ought to 

be gotten in quickly, this month. 
1029 o VX to . Saw ( ? ) yesterday re the bond procedure. The money 

will be released from the X funds in the Y. Specie Bank and the treasury 

department has OKed this. 
1031 o VX to YSB. Miyamoto — tells him the treasury in Washington has OKed 

the money proposition the release of funds. /But I'm not clear who got 

the message in the first place/. 
1142 VX to Matsuda. He's out. This is Miyamoto. Have Matsuda call 

when he comes in please. 
1155 VX to Mrs. UYETAR for Mrs. MATSUDA, wife of YSB's MATSUDA. 

Not here. I'll call her later then. 

End 



2-268 



2-269 



2-270 



Wednesday, 22 Ocax>BER, 1941 

Out of commission 
Thursday, 23 October, 1941 

No activity 
Friday, 24 October, 1941 



0916 i re deferment. Routine. 

1135 i Woman to VX. Please call 2243 (X) 

1152 i To VX— Call 2243. 

1325 i Fragment, 

1326 i From KANEKO to VX asks him if he (VX) sent the cable for him about 

the Taiyo Maru business. VX did, for it was necessary. VX says they 
are negotiating with the State Dept. about the money they have taken in. 
Thinks it will be ok. Some mention of the "search" by the immigration 
oflScials /?/ Apparently that is ok too. 

1355 o VX to KANEKO— out; for HIRADA /?/ also out; for KIMURA— call 
58234. Re the estimate of receipts from the Taiyo. They are 3rd class 
417 (before from 200 to 400). First class about 23. Second class, 33. 
Won't exceed $1000 /what?/. 

1405 i Fragment. 

End 

2-271 

Saturday, 25 October, 1941 

0929 i NI 

0935 i KAWAMOTO of NJ to VX saying the FBI is conducting an investigation 
on Kauai of Consular Agents according to a letter received today from 
the Branch Oflice (of the NJ) on Kauai. It seems that HAMADAYO 
and FUNAGAYO (in May) and HAKAMA (?) are in question. Please 
let me have names. The people are scared ; I will let you have the names 
(apparently by mail or messenger, for nothing more was said). 

End 



2-272 



2-275 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 903 

Sunday, 26 Octobeb, 1941 

No activity 
Monday, 27 Octobeb, 1941 



0916 i To VX from KANEKO /?/, Discussion of the various details of the 
forthcoming Taiyo visit ; licenses, the issuance of tickets ; the collection 
of fares; about someone who is a nikkei — a woman, and that there is 
time to settle the thing /about her/ because there is still four days / the 
Taiyo comes four days after this conversation/; how /to send?/ 
something that is quite heavy; about a further "conference". They 
agree to take in money from the 27th on, and think they can collect it 
under the special license. 

1025 i FPM/ From NTK ? Still talking about special licenses, etc. 

1108 i Very brief. 

1420 i Mrs. VX to VX / recording extremely bad/ 

xxxxxxxxxx 

End 

2-27// 

Ttjesdat, 28 October, 1941 

094.5 o VX /?/ to NIO /? phon./ wants to consult with him about Re. the 

X's ambition to hold an examination this month (until the 31st of Oct.). 
The Minister without Portfolio, then the Minister of Education is con- 
ferring an award of honor to the Commissioner (s?) for Japanese Affairs/? 
not positive tliat this is right/. 

0952 to 4. NC. NX. 

1005 i YOSHIOKA to VX, No reply yet to telegram sent to Inchikau 

/?/ in Washington on 22nd. Y. has heard nothing of the extent of 
understanding reached by the negotiations there, and has heard that they 
have broken down. VX says that there has been a reply by cable re 
certain frozen funds. The Foreign office has received a reply from the 
State Department which amounted to (question about the following) 
"Get them (the particular funds in question?) out of the country." 
Y — Is there anything especially interesting about this contract situation? 
VX — /Interrupting hurriedly/ "Wait . . that is . . that is . . . 
that is . . . wait a moment . . . that is right. 
Y — Something has come here, hasn't it? 
VX — I think so. XX has (unable to make out.) 

1355 i FPM YOSHIOKA of NYK to ? re a matter that had been taken up 
with the collector of Customs. The matter concerns the X clerk, 
MORIMURA. (Switched to VX). Y. to VX re license for oil for the 
Taiyo. When she gets in her tank will inspected and checked against 
the log. That's all right. 

End 



2-275 



Wednesday, 29 October, 1941 



1055 VX to TOYAMA /Edt. of Jitsugyo No Hawaii/, He has just stepped out 
to the barber's. VX asks about a serial text of the M-day law being 
published in the English section. VX wants 5 or 6 copies since X hasn't 
received and from the legislature yet. 

1105 i FPM. Information wanted re /Joe Gin Gee/ phone clerk in a store 
they say. Allen D. Smythe, Chief Clerk Territorial Senate. 



2-276 



End 
Thursday, 30 Octobeb, 1941 



0927 i KANEKO to VX re the method of counting passengers. Are children to 
be counted as half or as full passengers? — As adults if unaccompanied — 
A lot of these are dual citizens — Many of them have no passports at all 
and may have trouble when they reach Japan. Then, since they have 
no reentry permits they will have trouble when they attempt to come 



904 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

back here later. (This is the very problem that Mrs. NISHI scolded 
her husband of spilling to Sumitomo bank employees the other day). 
To facilitate the landing of these passengers in Japan each child should 
have an excerpt from his KT as proof of at least his parent's Japanese 
citizenship. They should also have BCs along. The passengers will 
be classified on the passenger list as Japanese and as American citizens. 

0956 o VX to TAKEI. KANEKO answers saying T. is out. T. is sick and 
took yesterday afternoon off. 

1050 ? VX to KANEKO. They will meet at official residence at 6.30. K— Goro 
TAKAYANAGI (Manager of Honolulu Fire Insurance Co., whom VX 
does not know), TAKAGISHI, TAKAHASHI, IMAZAVi'A, Hiroshi(?) 
KODAMA, SHIRAKAWA, and somebody's wife (whose name I could not 
catch) were all going to Japan together on the Taiyo. 

1146 o VX to wife. She hasn't got back yet. 

1332 i Mrs. VX tells VX that KANEKO called him. 

1414 VX to KANEKO re the plans for the search etc. Both seem perfectly 
satisfied. Taiyo will sail at 5PM Tuesday. VX says the alien registra- 
tion blanks have to be filled out if not previously registered. (NC due 
to shortage of blanks.) 

End 



2-277 



Friday, 81 October 1941 



1135 i KANEKO to VX. They discuss putting the names of arrivals in the 
newspapers. They think customs inspections will take quite a long 
time and that many will read in the papers of their relatives and friends 
before they are able to debark. 

1425 VX says it's a civil case and he doesn't know much about it. About 
something that is in the newspapers. 

End 



2-278 



Satueday, Nov. 1, 1941 



1140 o VX to KAWAZOE saying he has heard that the Taiyo is taking no mail. 
Is that true? — Yes. It is. — Is there to be an inspection of the mail? — 
Yes. — V7ho ordered it? — The postmaster — Has word to this effect come 
from J. Embassy? — No. 

End 
2-279 

Sunday, 2 No\'embh8 1941 

1048 Seki to ? re : something that has come from Washington. 

End 

Monday, Novembeb 3, 1941 



2-280 



0859 i NAKATSUKA wants a complete list of passengers. Come down in person. 

1044 i Routine re NYK. Something from Washington. XX is out. 

1045 i VX to someone re mail situation. 
1146 o VX asks for MIKAMI— out. 

1218 o VX asks where HIROSHI is. Calee says didn't he go somewhere with 
XX. Isn't he at X now? VX seems perplexed. Does calee know SAKAI 
/name uncertain/ of X ? He does. Does he know his house? Yes. Then 
please come up to X now. 

1226 i /from taxi? VX asks to take him to dock at 2PM. He wants to see 1. 
the immigration station. 2. The harbor master. 3. Hibberly. VX also 
him to go to the P. Hotel at 1.30 / A moment later he changes this, since 
apparently the P. hotel is considered too hot — and says he is to take VX 
to the three places previously planned. 

1655 To NYK. VX calling to get Hibberly's number. 

1658 o To Hibberly home, but H. is down at boat. She advises him to call the 
customs inspector. VX — "Thank you for my troubling you!" Mrs. H. 
"Bye bye." 

End 



2-281 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 905 



TTJESDAY, 4 NOVEMBEB, 1941 



1052 to Hiberly's office /from XX?/. Call 2458. 

1054 1 Fi'om (4). Re : Conscription notification. Routine. X says such notices 
will probably go on an American boat since the P. O. is receiving mail. 

1106 i From (4) . KANEKO to VX re overtime of customs. K. wanted them to 
work to ten, but Hiberly thought they should work shorter hours 
Rest NX. 

1110 o VX to wife. NT. 

1112 i Wife t© VX. NI. 

1138 1 From Nippu Jiji (which calls us first and keeps them waiting) to XX. 
/Not SOGA — sound like KABO but isn't/ re : the Washington tie-up of 
the mail. Says Star-Bull reports that X has phoned the J. ambassador 
about it and asks what their (X's) expectation is re the outcome of the 
protest. XX rather thinks the outcome will be favorable. XX says it 
was the Ambassador (muko wa) that called him to ask about it. /More 
details but stopping here./ 

1534 For girl's older brother. Not in. From VX. 

End 
2-282 

Wednesday, 5 November, 1941* 

1009 i ONOH of Sumitomo to VX. Not in. 
1037 1 Re expatriation. NI. 

1500 i $26,000 /approximate receipts?/ from YOSHICKA /?/ Talking about 
the accounting for the voyage. 

2-283 

THxmsDAY, 6 Novembee, 1941 

No activity 

Friday to Sunday, November 7 to 9 

Out of commission 

2-284 

Monday, November 10, 1941 

0936 i To VX from 01 of JCC. re the welcome for Ambassador KURUSU. The 
plane will come tomorrow. He has his wife with him. They talk about 
getting in to the field and the situation in reference to greeting the am- 
bassador. 01 says he will inform SATO and ? The ambassador 

will stop overnight. X is going to put out a party for him. 

0944 FPM VX (probably) to someone re picture taking In connection with the 
arrival tomorrow. Decide to have none because of the "big news" that 
it would be. Re the party, VX wants it to be a formal affair. /Possibly 
to newspaper editor or reporter ?/ 

.0950 o to /KOMO?/ telling him that clipper is down at Midway with motor trou- 
ble and will be 22 hours late. He is very tured so the party will be 
formal. Wants also to /neglect?/ the newspaper reporters interview. 
Also talk about taking a picture. 

0952 FPM "Value $70 for 2 cases freight prepaid,"— substance of telegram being 
explained to someone. Looks like someone is sending freight to the 
J. Embassy in Washington. They will go to get them Wednesday. If 
it is, a thousand and ten kin /or 1000 ten-kins?/. The charge is $6. Of 
course they will get it ; then take it over there to weight it. "Please 
erase the address and substitute J. Embassy, Washington." 

? ? Re the party being simple. 

1002 o VX to KAWADA /?/ asking the president of the company or someone in 
his place to come to the "pahtee" tomorrow night at X at 6.30. Callee 
will tell him. 

1005 VX inviting SOGA of NJ to the "pahtee". There will be 14 or 15 guests 
in all. 



906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1010 VX gets girl, asks for father MORI whom he invites to the simple 
"pahtee". MORI is willin. Asks if KURUSU is going to stay at the 
R. Hawaiian. 

1015 VX to TSUDA /?/ asking him to "pahtee". 

1041 1 VX from ? whom he has leit word to call him. "Pahtee". 



2-285 



2-286 



End 

Tuesday, November 11, 1941 
Holiday; closed 



Thtjbsdat, Novembee 12, 1941 

0940 i To FUKUYA /?/ from MIYA/TO?/ of the YSB re payment of telegraph 
charges. X will pay tomorrow. 

0942 i XX telling NAKATSUKA that he hasn't heard from KURUSU for 2 days 
so doesn't know. Thinks he is coming at 4 p. m. XX wants to know 
"if the plane left Midway this morning." N. doesn't know — suggests Pan 
American can tell. XX says no social events because XX has wired that 
he is tited. 

0945 i from a bank? No statement has come etc. 

0947 o To NJ to KAVTAZOE from VX. A telegram has just come from 
KURUSU. He will arrive this afternoon. Left Midway 7 : 25. Accord- 
ing to K's wish a news reporter is not to meet him — only a representative. 

1045 To 01 from VX. KURUSU is coming at 5 : 10 today. The seating order 
is SATO, SUGIMOTO, MORIFUJI, SUMITA, MORI, MATSUDA, 
KIMURA, ONOH, SOGA, MAKINO. 

1105 i Inquiry re J. census registration. Reporting a death. 

1320 i About the plane's arrival /to a guest/. 



2-287 



End 

Thursday, November 13, 1941 



1015 i KAWAZOE to VX inquiring re KURUSU's movements. Wants to know 
the Navy's representative. Knows already the army's. X boy has for- 
gotten the Navy's. Wants to know about all other movements of KU- 
RUSU. 

1030 i NAKATSUKA to VX. NI (See S. B. 11/13/41) 

1045 i Is someone there? Girl. NI. 

1445 i Hung up. 

End 

2-288 

Friday, November 14, 1941 

0955 i From Mrs. VX. Domestic business. NI. 

1040 o To (4). VX to YOSHI /?/ at NYK re: receipts from the Taiyo Maru. 
Does he want the cash? No. The figures. They haven't figured out the 
tax bill yet. They will send it over as soon as finished. 



2-289 



End 
Saturday, November 15, 1941 



0932 i "trying very hard to get the telephone number of the Nuuanu Sotoshu 
/Soto sect of Buddism — a zen sect/ (American woman speaking from the 
voice). No. is 5120. "It is listed under Rev. Kumagata /?/ 

End 
2-290 

Sunday, November 16, 1941 

No activity 



2-291 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 907 



Monday, Novembek 17, 1941 



2-293 



0945 i KA.WAZOE to VX re TOJO's speech, has VX heard any adverse reac- 
tions? VX has not. /Laughter, especially by K/- K. says /I think/ that 
previously there was talk that speeches were for overseas propaganda. 
But this time no such statements have come in. No, none have. Not in 
Japanese either. 

1117 i FPM. Fragment 

1313 ? YOSHIOKA and X about money. $10,000, $12,000 /the amount they have 
on hand?/ Apparently X wants to get all the figures, for they figure the 
taxes, the bond, and all. 

1317 i From YSB /woman/ reporting something that she has done, and very 
brief. 

End 

2-292 

Tuesday, Novembek 18, 1941 

No activity 

Wednesday, November 19, 1941 

No activity 

Thubsday, November 20, 1941 ^ 

No activity — holiday 

Friday, November 21, 1941 

0900 /to maid at home?/ telling her there is a wedding for 9 or 10 giiests. 

1037 o for Mr. MORI from VX replying to a communication via his wife yes- 
terday. Re going to NAMIKI's. VX on discussing it with his wife 
thinks it will be good /to go?/ Something about 6 volumes of books. 
/Sounds like a social engagement./ 

1408 FPM Since other "has had no opportunity, will mail be 0. k.?" VX says 
it will. 

End 

2-294 

Monday, Novembeb 24, 1941 

No activity 

TxTESDAY, November 25, 1941 

No activity 

Wednesday, November 26, 1941 

No activity 

2-295 

Thursday, November 27, 1941 

No activity 

Friday, November 28, 1941 

1109 o VX /?/ coming home quick. OK. 

1150 to YAMAMOTO from VX. Has he got some unused congratulations? Y. 

says the insurance company has them. VX asks how many there were. 

Y. doesn't know. They're all thru with them. 
1320 No ans. 

End 



908 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2-295 

Saturday, November 29, 1941 

0920 o VX for YAMAMOTO of /YSB?/. Then seems to have FUJITA instead. 
"The master (Y) is out." VX has something on liis mind, but apparently 
decides not to tell FUJITA. He asks him to have Y. call him when 
he returns. 

0926 i from? (KAWA, HARA, ZAWA?) to VX who wants to see him for a 
minute. ? is busy, how about next week. /Long pause/. VX — "If 
/the round trip/ takes only about 20 minutes couldn't you come?" He 
finally will, but it has taken a great deal of persuasion, and he is obvi- 
ously reluctant for he is alone, it being Saturday. 

0935 o to SATO (SAITO?) from VX who says he wants to have a conference 
about the recent daitoto ogikawa's recent request /don't get it. Do 
you?/ 

0946 VX to 01. VX has been talking to YAMAMOTO about there being prac- 
tically no malt (or possibly yeast. Much confusion about this word. 
Might also mean ostentation, display, a good thing, good news, a bait, 
a tempting offer) in town. (Y. brought up the question.) Discuss the 
problem of the difficulties of the J. here. 

1026 i From ONODA of the Sumitomo Bank to VX inviting him to a meal or 
something tomorrow. VX is busy except for lunch (There are some 
others coming, XX and Harada, not many). Can VX come to his place 
about 1 pm. VX can and will. /Line very noisy/. 

End 



2-296 



Sunday, November 30, 1941 

No activity 
Monday, December 1, 1941 

No activity 
Tuesday, December 2, 1941 

No activity 
Discontinued 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 39 

69512—10 

(J) Hello, is this Mori? 

(H) Hello, this is Mori. 

(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much. 

(H) Not at all. 

(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I 
would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at 
present. Are airplanes flying daily? 

[Handwritten in margin :] Prompted. Reluctant hesitation. 

(H) Yes, lots of them fly around. 

(J) Are they large planes? 

(H) Yes, they are quite big. 

(J) Are they flying from morning till night? 

(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air. 

(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right? 

(H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of 
this year and the ending part of last year. 

(J) Is that so? 

[2] (H) I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very 
few sailors here at present. 

(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meeting to discuss US- Japanese 
negotiations being conducted presently? 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 909 

(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japa- here appear calmer than 
expected. They are getting along harmoniously. 

(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese? 

(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This 
fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and 
we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the 
people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are 
some who say odd things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland, 
and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel 
like the rest of the people in the islands. 

(J) That's fine. 

(H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amazed. 

(J) Has there been any increase in ...?... of late? That is, as a result 
of the current tense situation. 

[3] (H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war 
building boom. 

(J) What do j'ou mean by enjoying a war building boom? 

(H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry 
here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army 
personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various 
sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students 
at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these 
jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work. 

(J) Are there many big factories there? 

(H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds 
are being constructed. 

(J) Is that so? 

[Handwritten in margin :] Great surprise at J. end? 

(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year. 

(J) How large is the population? 

(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy 
personnel and workers from the mainland. 

(J) What is the population? 

(H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people. 

(J) What about night time? 

(H) There seem to be precautionary measures taken. 

(J) What about searchlights? 

(H) Well, not much to talk about. Strikes attention. 

[-4] (J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night? 

(H) No. 

(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers? 

(H) The comments by the papers are very bad. They are opposite to the 
atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed 
to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. 
The main articles concern the Japanese conferences. 

[Handwritten in the margin:] Then they discuss the Southern advance [of 
Japanese into French Indo-China] every day. 

(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii? 

(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he 
was very adept at answering queries of the press. 

(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate 
Hawaii? 

(H) There are almost none wishing to do that. 

(J) What is the climate there now? 

[Handwritten in the margin:] Seemed not to understand the question about 
climate. 

(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a 
phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a 
very unusual climate recently. 

[Handwritten in the margin :] Long delay. 

(J) Is that so? 

(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the 
United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland 
today. He made no statements on any problems. 

(J) Did he make any statements concerning the US- Japan question? 

[5] (H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan 
question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. 



910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement. 

(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu. 

(H) Yes. 

(J) What kind of impression did LitvinofE make? 

(H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a 
gentleman. 

(J) Did he stop ^t the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu? 

(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already enplaned 
for the mainland. 

(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet? 

[Handwritten in margin:] M[ori] tries never to hear about the fleet. 

(H) No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking 
about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet 
here seems small. I don't [know whether] all of the fleet has done this, but it 
seems that the fleet has left here. 

(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present? 

(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. How- 
ever, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now. 

[Handwritten in margin:] Red Christmas flower with long stems [explana- 
tion of poinsettia omitted in translation]. 

*(J) Does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know. 

(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation 
of Japanese goods? 

[6] (H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japan- 
ese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are 
enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, 
at any rate it is a big inconvenience. 

(J) What do you lack most? 

(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the 
freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods 
are having a hard time. 

[Handwritten in margin:] (J) has a hard time understanding sake (re- 
peats 4 times). 

(J) Thanks very much. ^ 

(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells 
very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago 
went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors 
are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a stand- 
still due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor 
manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese 
sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland. 

[Handwritten in margin:] (J) is surprised that British liquor came in. 

[Handwritten in margin:] Taisho jijiisho Takagishi (understood as Taka- 
guchi) repeated 5 or 6 times. Sake is in style here, but there is no kazu-no-ko. 
Last year there was everything. 

(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara- 
Masamume" ; that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge 
of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain 
Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter ; and that said Takagishi re- 
turned recently to Japan on the Taiye Maru. He adds that Japanese here and 
the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J> that Japanese chrysanthemums 
are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roe for this year's New 
Year celebration. 

[Handwritten in margin:] Who is this "he" — Ogawa? Presumably it is. 

(J) How many first generation Japanese ai'e there in Hawaii according to 
last surveys made? 

[7] (H) About fifty thousand. 

(J) How about the second generation Japanese? 

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000. 

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the 
United States Army? 

(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,5(X) have entered the 
army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are 
Japanese. 

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army? 

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese. 

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army? 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 911 

(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be 
inducted in January. 

(J) Thank you very much. 

(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use. 

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife. 

(H) Wait a moment please? 

(J) Thank you, 

(J) 0£E phone. 

[Handwritten in margin:] Tried to raise Tokyo again. 



Hewitt Inquiey Exhibit No. 40 

TWO REPORTS, SUBJECT JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU- 
ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES. 

United States Naval Inteixigencb Service 

investigation kepobt 
Confidential 

Subject : JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities 
Report made at : Honolulu, T. H., 14th Naval District Date : 9 Feb., 1942 

Report made by: Lt. George P. Kimball, USNR, and Lt. (jg) W. B. Stephenson, 

USNR 
Period covered : 5 Dec, 1941—9 Feb., 1942. Status of Case : Pending in 14ND. 
Origin of Case: Receipt by DI0-14ND of variovis encrypted messages sent by 
Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign Office, Tokyo, and Japanese 
Ambassador, Washington. 
Character of Investigation : Espionage. 
Enclosures : (See first page of details) 
References : 

14ND (3) 



Copy to: ONI 


(5) 


CinCPac 


(1) 


Coml4 


(1) 


FBI-Hon 


(2) 


MID HI > 


(2) 



Source File No. : 14ND #54A ONI File No. : 

Synopsis. — On 3 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, trans- 
mitted by encrypted despatch to Tokyo a system of signalling by lights, cloths, 
fires, and radio (presumably to communicate with Japanese ships at sea, near 
the Hawaiian Islands), which signals would be used to announce the departure 
of U. S. Naval units from Pearl Harbor. The system was conceived, and sub- 
mitted to the Consulate, by Otto KUEHN, a German subject and ex-officer of the 
Germany Navy. Evidence indicates all observation and reporting of ship dis- 
positions and movements at Pearl Harbor was done by Consulate attaches or 
contacts (including, in at least one instance, KUEHN). 

Other than suspicious lights (not conforming to the signal system) seen at night 
on the island of Maui, subsequent to 7 December, 193l, no evidence has been 
found that KUEHN's signal system' ever was employed. 

The decoded body of the despatch of 3 December gave the sender's name as 
FUJII and the addressee as Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff, Efforts 
to identify FUJII have so far been unavailing. 

KUEHN, who has been in custodial detention since 8 December, 1941, will be 
charged with espionage and be tried by the Military Commission. 

Deductions : Japanese naval espionage in Honolulu prior to 7 December, 1941, 
was carried on by Consulate attaches and contacts, among whom was Otto 
KUEHN, a German subject. 

Approved. 

I. H. Mayfieu) 
Captain, U. 8. Navy 
District Intelligence Officer, 



912 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1] 

WBS/zw 

Subject : JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities 

Rcf GrGncGS " 

(a) ONI Information Card, Subject MR. AND MRS. KOEHN, 2-13-39. 

(b) Com 14 Conf. Ltr. to CNO (DNI) , Subject GERMAN LOTTERY, 4-21-39. 

(c) 14ND Suspect List, copy to ONI, 7-29-40. 

(d) 13ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA, 

UN, 5-1-41. 

(e) DI0-14ND Conf. Ltr. to R. L. Shivers, FBI, Honolulu (copy to ONI), 

5-31^1. 

(f) 12ND Investigation Report, Subject LT. CMDR. SADATOMO OKADA, 

UN, 7-17-41. 

(g) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject TAKAICHI SAKAI, 2-3-42. 
(h) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KANAYE SAHARA, 2-3^2. 
(i) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject KIMIE DOUE, 2-3^2. 

(j) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTOSHI- 
RODO, 2-8-42. 
Enclosures : 

(A) Table Showing Numbers of Battleships, Heavy Cruisers, Light Cruisers, 

Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, Destroyers, and Destroyer-Type Vessels 
in Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and 1800 22-30 November, 1941. 

(B) Table of Number and Movement of Ships in Pearl Harbor, by Types, at 

Various Times between 0600 and 180O, 28 November, 1941. 

1. On the morning of 5 December, 1941, a thoroughly reliable confidential in- 
formant furnished the District Intelligence Ofiicer with copies of certain com- 
mercial communications sent and received by Japanese Consul General Nagao 
KITA, of Honolulu, during the period, 1-4 December, 1941. These messages were 
despatch traffic between Tokyo and Honolulu and Washington and Honolulu, 
that is, between Consul General KITA and Ambassador Kichisaburo NOMURA, 
in Washington, and Foreign Minister Shigenori TOGO, in Tokyo. 

2. Preliminary evaluation of the importance of the messages was impossible 
to make, inasmuch as they were in code or cipher. They were, however, the first 
of such messages ever made available to this office, and for that reason deemed 
very important. 

[2] 3. Efforts to determine the meaning of such messages were commenced 
immediately, but this task was not completed until the morning of 11 December. 
When the meaning of the messages was determined, the District Intelligence 
Officer, acting upon orders from Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch, USN, Commandant, 
Fourteenth Naval District, immediately conferred with Lieutenant Colonel 
George W. Bicknell, assistant chief of staff for G-2, Hawaiian Department, in 
charge of the Army Contact Office, Honolulu, and Mr. Robert L. Shivers, special 
agent in charge, Honolulu field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, with 
regard thereto. (Meanwhile, arrangements to secure copies of other commercial 
radiograms and cablegrams to and from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, 
were effected.) 

4. The following message, despatched by Consul General KITA to Foreign 
Minister TOGO, on 3 December, 1941, was the basis of subsequent extensive inves- 
tigation by the three intelligence agencies : 
From : Kita 
To : Foreign Minister, Tokyo 

(Secret military message No. — by Chief of Consulate's Code) 
To : Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff. 
From : Fujii 

Re signals I wish to simplify communications as follows : 

(1) Code (following 3 section 8 line table) battle force, including scouting 
force, are about to put to sea — 

1. Several aircraft carriers plan to put to sea. 

2. All battle force has sailed first to third dates inclusive. 

3. Several aircraft carriers have sailed first to third. 

4. All aircraft carriers have sailed first to third. 

5. All battle force has sailed fourth to sixth dates inclusive. 

6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth. 

7. All aircraft carriers have sailed fourth to sixth. 
8. 



PROCEEDINGS OP HEWITT INQUIRY 913 

(2) Signal 

1. Light in Lanikai beach house at night — One light from 8 pm to 9 pm 
indicates "1", from 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "2". The below signals until 
midnight, in order, indicate "3" and "4". Two lights, according to the time, 
indicate "5", "6", "7", "8". 

— When not in accordance with (lights) above one full automobile head- 
light and one half light indicate "1", "2", "3", "4". Two full lights indicate 
"5", "6", "7", "8". 

2. On the Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 am until noon every hour 
one piece linen cloth (sheet) indicates "1", "2", "3" "4". Two pieces linen 
cloth indicate "5", "6", "7", "8". 

3. In Lanikai bay during daytime in front of harbor (offing) a star boat 
with one star on sail indicates "1", "2", "3", "4", a star and "III" indicates 
"5", "6", "7", "8". 

4. Light iu dormer window of Kalama house from 7 pm to 1 am every 
hour indicates "3", "4", "5". "6", "7", "8". 

5. "KGMB want ads" advertisements 9 : 45 am — 

(a) A Chinese rug, etc., for sale — apply P. O. Box 1476, indicates "3" or "6". 

(b) A complete chicken farm, etc., apply as above, indicates "4" or "7". 

(c) Beauty operator wanted — same — indicates "5" or "8". 

In the event that in accordance with one of three items written above from 
Oahu a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located 
between the lower road six miles north of Kula sanitarium and Haleakala road 
which can be watch from the sea to the southwest and southeast of Maui, until 
the receipt of the signal "Exex" this (the following) will be repeated for several 
days : A small fire on the high peak — 7 pm to 8 pm indicates "3" or "6" ; 8 pm to 
9 pm indicates "4" or "7" ; 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "5" or "8". 

[4] 5. At the aforementioned conference of representatives of the three 
intelligence agencies, the following preliminary evaluation of the message of 3 
December was made : 

1. That no one named FUJII, was connected with the Japanese Consulate, 
Honolulu ; but, that FUJII might be a code name or word employed by the 
Consulate or by some member of its staff, or by some person reporting to 
the Japanese Navy Ministry through the Consulate. 

2. That the "Lanikai beach house" referred to was not readily identifiable, 
there being many beach houses at Lanikai, Oahu. 

3. That the "dormer window of Kalama house" probably referred to a 
window of this type in the home of Otto KUEHN, a Class "A" German 
suspect, of Kalama, Oahu, who was put in custodial detention on 8 December, 
1941. 

4. That the method of signalling set up in the above despatch may have 
been used prior to the Japanese attack on Oahu, 7 December, and thereafter 
still might be used, to indicate the movements of United States fleet units 
from Pearl Harbor. 

In an attempt to determine whether the signals referred to in the despatch 
of 3 December were used prior to the attack, and to detect any further use of 
such signals, the three intelligence agencies assumed the following tasks : 

1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Honolulu, was to send two or 
more agents to Kalama, Oahu, to stay there and gather all possible pertinent 
information regarding signalling from "dormer window of Kalama house". 
(The Federal Bureau of Investigation at that time had a pending investiga- 
tion on Otto KUEHN and members of this family. ) 

2. The Military Intelligence Division was to maintain a watch at Kalama 
and Lanikai for a display of lights, display of cloths, or star boats with the 
indicated markings. 

[5] 3. The District Intelligence Office was to send two or more agents 
to Lanikai, Oahu, to stay there and gather all pertinent information regard- 
ing signalling from a "Lanikai beach house" ; and, in addition, to conduct 
an appropriate investigation in the vicinity of Kula Sanitarium and 
Haleakala, island of Maui. 
6. In execution of part of its agreed task, this office sent Agents Joseph P. 
McCarthy, Fred H. Paoa, and Albert K. Kai to Lanikai on the afternoon of 11 
December. On the following morning, an officer messenger flew to Wailuku, 
Maui, with full instructions for Lieutenant (jg) Morris Adelson, USNR, Branch 
Intelligence Officer, Zone III, Fourteenth Naval District, to investigate the case 
there. 



914 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

7. At Lanikai, the agents of this office early determined that of the more than 
seventy houses and cottages fronting on the ocean, only two had clothes lines 
on the premises that could be used for displaying the arranged signals, and 
that one of the two houses having a clothes line so usable was owned by Otto 
KUEHN, whose Kalama home with the dormer window already has been men- 
tioned. Under a pretext, Agents McCarthy, Paoa, and Kai interviewed all avail- 
able residents of the Lanikai area who lived on lots adjacent to the beach. It 
was determined that Otto KUEHN had no connection with the residents of the 
Lanikai beach house he owns, other than as their landlord. All star boats in 
the Lanikai area were found beached, and it was determined that none of them 
answered the description of the sailboat mentioned in the despatch of 3 
December. 

8. Upon the return of the agents of this office from Lanikai on 19 December, 
the following memorandum was submitted to the District Intelligence Officer by 
Agent McCarthy: 

"In compliance with instructions. Agents Paoa, Kai and the writer proceeded to 
Lanikai on December 11, 1941, and remained until the evening of December 19. 

"Over this period of time a complete and thorough canvass was made of all 
residences on the beach at Lanikai and all others adjacent thereto that might 
possibly been used by anyone sending the type [6] of signals reported. 
It was immediately learned that Otto KUEHN owns a house on the beach at 
Lanikai, this being the fifth house from the junction of Lanikai and Kailua. 
It was determined that this house is occupied by Lieutenants Chapman and 
Stuppy and their wives. Lieutenants Chapman and Stuppy are attached to 
Schofleld Hospital. 

"Mrs. Stuppy, when interviewed, advised that they had occupied "Kuehn's 
house for a month and left there to take another house in Lanikai on December 15. 
Mrs. Stuppy stated that during her residence there she did not have any com- 
munication with Kuehn's family nor did any members of this family put in 
their appearance at Lanikai to her knowledge. 

"All of the people interviewed during the course of this investigation reported 
that they observed no signals nor any activity that appeared to be suspicious or 
could be interpreted as signaling. This statement is made with the exception 
of the information received from Mrs. R. C. Waldron whose house is the second 
house from the Kailua junction, who reported that at 6 :45 A. M. on the morning 
of December 7, 1941, a Japanese, carrying a fishing pole, was observed running 
on the beach towards Kailua. Shortly after he left, a red flare was seen to have 
been sent from the vicinity of the beach near the Waldron residence. Mr, and 
Mrs. Waldron were unable to describe the Japanese referred to or to furnish 
any additional information concerning his identity. 

"The inquiries made generally among the people residing in Lanikai, over the 
period of this investigation, were confined primarily to suspicious activity on 
the part of anyone for the period from December 1 to 7, 1941. The inquiries 
related generally to the possible signaling with flares or lights at night time and 
the presence of sail boats off the beach during the day time. Over this period, 
and for the three weeks preceding December 1, the waters off Lanikai were too 
rough for sailing and it was generally stated by the persons interviewed, most 
of whom are boat enthusiasts, that no star boats or other types of sailing ves- 
sels were seen near this beach over this period. [7] It was pointed out 
by many of the residents that, had a sail boat of any description appeared in 
this rough weather, these residents, being interested in sailing vessels, would 
have remarked upon the presence of a boat off shore in this type of weather 
and would have remembered the presence of this boat and probably could have 
recalled the name of the owner. 

"l^ecause of the nature of the other signals reported that could have been 
used in daylight hours questions, it was felt, could not be particularly asked 
concerning these signals without endangering the source of the information. 
However, in travelling about the vicinity of Lanikai, over this period, all resi- 
dences were examined carefully for the purpose of attempting to determine from 
what residence the other day time signals might have been given. The Kuehn 
residence could have been used for all signals described except for the signalling 
with automobile headlights. A residence owned and occupied since Thanks- 
giving by Judson Roblee, which is back from the beach about 300 yards on a 
hillside, could have been used as a location from which to give all of the signals 
described. Mr. Roblee is the manager of the Edward R. Bacon Company. 
Inquiry generally concerning the Roblees resulted in the information that they 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 915 

are a veiy reputable family and should be held above suspicion in this case. Mr. 
Roblee is well known to Lieutenant (jg) G. P. Kimball of this office. 

"During the course of this investigation, the agents had access to, and the 
use of, the home of Mr. Arthur Powlison. ITiis house is set on a cliff extending 
over the Lanikai road and from which can be had a view of all of Lanikai. 

"During the period of time consumed by this investigation, a watch was kept 
for signals and for other suspicious activity from this vantage point without 
results. During the interviews, generally, those persons interviewed, who were 
found to be reputable, were advised to be on the alert for suspicious activity 
in this vicinity and requested to report any information considered worthy of 
further attention to this office." 

[S] 9. In a general report of activities on the island of Maui, dated 9 Decem- 
ber, 1941 (which report, due to poor mail service following the outbreak of war, 
did not reach this office until 13 December), Lieutenant Adelson told of the 
following incident : 

"Only one incident of a number of reports received, indicated suspected espion- 
age activities. The following is a resume of the reported incident. 

"Mr. Earl Kraft reported that on 8 December, 1941, at about 2045, while he was 
spending the night at the Kula Sanitorium, visiting Dr. Sanders, he was tele- 
phoned from the hospital to investigate the cause of frequent flashing of a light 
in the vicinity of the water tank, while a total blackout was in progress. Mr. 
Kraft proceeded to the vicinity of the water tank, and upon his arrival the person 
flashing this light disappeared in the bushes. At the approximate time this took 
place a report was also received that flashes of light were coming from a room 
in the hospital in the Kula Sanitorium occupied by Shigeo FURUKAWA, who is 
subject of a recent confidential investigation by the DIO and this office. It will 
be noted that HAIMADA and MATSUDA, who visited FURUKAWA recently at 
Kulu (DIO-Z/3-#3) , have already been picked up here as enemy aliens. Colonel 
Lyman and Major Cruckshank, of Maui Headquarters, have been advised of the 
incident and have also been given all information available here, in regard to 
FURUKAWA. This matter was referred to them for appropriate action. Follow- 
ing our report to Army authorities this day, FURUKAWA subsequently has made 
an attempt to commit suicide by drinking an excess amount of Listerine. While 
FURUKAWA is in the isolation ward, because of his attempted suicide, no mili- 
tary orders have been issued to place him in custody, as an enemy alien." 

This report was considered very significant because of the fact that an inves- 
tigation of Shigeo FURUKAWA was begun by this office shortly before the out- 
break of war because of the latter's possible connection with Lieutenant Com- 
mander Sadatomo OKADA, UN, among whose effects was found, in the summer 
of [9] 1941, FURUKAWA'e name. (References (d) and (f).) 

10. On 20 December, by officer messenger, the District Intelligence Officer 
received from Lieutenant Adelson the following report, dated 19 December, 
regarding investigation of the Haleakula and Kula Sanitarium region : 

"Every night since 12 December, 1941, this area has been under surveillance 
from nightfall to past midnight — actual observation of the area being conducted 
personally with the assistance of Lt. Hansen, H. E. Anderson (Fish and Game 
Warden), a member of Fleet Reserve, and Police Officers Albert Wong, Louis 
Fernandez and Chas. Ledward. 

"In addition the VJ3 Squadron and the Maui Range is keeping the designated 
point and its area under surveilance from their tower stations and are keeping 
this office advised. 

"On the night of 14 December, 1941, the reporting officer in company with 
Mr. Anderson from their observation post noted the following lights and fire 
which were interpreted as signals : 

"At 8 : 25 p. m. a strong blue light was seen on and off every few seconds in 
the PUUNENE area. In answer, a strong blue light was seen on and off in 
the MALAAEA BAY vicinity. Both lights went off and a definite lire signal 
was observed on the Island of Kahoolawe. This -fire last 3 minutes. At 8 : 40 
p. m. the light at Puunene came on again and in response the light at Malaaea 
Bay came on again. Both then went out. 

"Police Officers Wong and Ledward also observed the above but placed the fire 
in the channel between Kahoolawe and Lanai instead of on Kahoolawe. 

"Col. Lyman has been kept advised and particular stress laid on the Kahoolawe 
fire signal seen. 

"Kahoolawe as far as is known is uninhabited. On an average of once a week 
a sampan — "Maisie C", owned by one of the Baldwins and captained by 
an [iO] alien Japanese (Y. Yamauchi) has made a trip to the island — 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 2 17 



916 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

where Baldwin keeps some horses. Since hostilities with Japan, Mr. Baldwin 
has requested Col. Lyman's permission to send the "Maisie C" to Kahoolawe. 
Col. Lyman advised Mr. Baldwin that he would permit the trip to be made under 
armed guard. In view of the fire signal angle, Col. Lyman will notify this office 
if and when the "Maisie C" is ready to go and we will make a search of the boat 
and also arrange for a thorough search of the island. 

"Numerous reports on lights and signals from various points on the island 
have been received by Police, Provisional Police, Army, and Navy. This has 
added to confusion as many of these reports when checked were found to have 
been carelessly put on or to be made by patrol cars. 

"However, there is one such report of interest : On the night of 11 December, 
1941, (one day prior to receipt of reference (a) /referring to the District In- 
telligence Officer's letter of 11 December directing Lieutenant Adelson to investi- 
gate this case on Maui/, Provisional Police patrolling the Kula area investigated 
a report of light signals coming from a point almost the same as the one we have 
the information on. Upon investigation by Provisional Police, the person sig- 
nalling was scared away and heard to scurry through the shrubbery. On 10 
December, 1941, Provisional Police had received a similar report but could not 
locate anyone at the point. There is a strong possibility that this incident may 
have been connected with the information we have, and if such is the case, our 
suspect has been scared away or else using another point." 

11. On 18 January, 1942, the District Intelligence Officer received a further 
report regarding FURUKAWA, from Lieutenant Adelson, which is quoted, in 
part: 

". , . Miss Marie Dupont, a ward girl, who observed the light was interviewed. 

[ii] "Miss Dupont stated that at about 2130 on the night of 8 December 
1941, she saw flashes of light in the subject's room, 401-B. The subject was 
sole occupant of the room. At about the same time she also observed a strong 
light flashing in the vicinity of the water tank on the Kula Sauitorium grounds. 
Subject's room faces the mountain and is in line of vision with the water tank. 
A check was made of the subject's room and matches were found. Subject was 
questioned by Miss Dupont about the matches and he stated that he had lit them 
to see what the time was. Subject does not smoke. Miss Dupont did not actually 
see subject light any matches." 

12. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Adelson was instructed to investigate fully the 
activities of Shigeo FURUKAWA since the latter's hospitalization at Kula Sani- 
tarium. Lieutenant Adelson's findings will be set forth in a separate report being 
prepared on FURUKAWA. 

13. On 30 December, this office received information that Morima MARUYAMA, 
who lives at Kailua, Oahu, T. H. (in an area between Kalama and Lanikai, but 
very proximate to the latter), was of doubtful loyalty and lived in a house high 
on a hill from where signalling to a ship at sea might be facilitated. After 
advising the other investigative agencies, the District Intelligence Officer, on 30 
December, sent Agent Kai to Kailua with instructions to investigate MARU- 
YA]\L^ to determine whether signals hud been seen emanating from his house, 
and also to investigate the portion of Kailua immediately contiguous to Lanikai, 

14. On 2 January, 1942, Agent Kai returned from Kailua and reported, as to 
aiARUYAMA, that 'Hvhile this Subject's home is strategically situated and could 
have been used as a location from which to send signals, or as an observation 
point, no evidence has been secured to indicate any subversive activity on the 
part of Subject or to indicate that he would engage in such activities." Agent 
Kai also reported that no evidence was found to indicate that any other person in 
the area covered (about twenty houses) had engaged in any signalling to ships 
at sea. 

15. It was learned from a highly confidential source that the full name of the 
sender of the Consulate's aforementioned message of 3 December probably is 
Ichio FUJII. 

U2] 16. Confidential Informant J-1, who has been familiar with most of 
the contacts of the Consulate over a period of several years past, advised that 
the only FUJII known by him to have been close to the Consulate was Junichi 
FUJII, a prominent merchant. (It should be noted that the latter sailed from 
Honolulu for Japan aboard the TAIYO MARU on 5 November, 1941.) Former 
clerks of the Consulate who were interviewed by representatives of the three 
intelligence agencies confirmed this fact. 

17. The records of the Bux'eau of Immigration and Naturalization, at Hono- 
lulu, were checked and reveal that on 6 June, 1925, one Ichio FUJII arrived 
at Honolulu, from Japan, board the TAIYO MARU. At a hearing of a special 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 917 

board of inqury held at Honolulu, 12 June, 1925, it was found that FUJII was 
born at Moiliili, Honolulu, T. H., on 1 May, 1908. FUJII stated that he was 
taken to Japan at the age of seven by his parents, who remained there. FUJII 
stated that he was a farm laborer. No further record of this Ichio FUJII was 
found in the immigration records, nor has any clue to his present whereabouts 
been discovered. 

18. Appropriate examination of available indexes and directories with refer- 
ence to the surname FUJII (or HUZII) and possible variants, FUJIE and FUJI, 
was made, with negative results. However, investigation of this phase of the 
case is continuing. 

19. On 1 January, 1942, interrogation of certain of the clerks formerly employed 
at the Japanese Consulate was commenced by representatives of the three in- 
vestigative agencies : Special Agent F. G. Tillman, Federal Bureau of Investiga- 
tion ; Captain Frank O. Blake, Military Intelligence Division ; and, Lieutenant 
George P. Kimball, District Intelligence Office. 

20. These Consulate clerks, who are American citizens of Japanese ancestry, 
all informed the agents that they considered themselves separated from em- 
ployment at the Consulate on 7 December, 1941, and did not report for work 
on Monday, 8 December, 1941. However, none of them had submitted a letter 
of resignation or otherwise given notice to the Consulate. 

[13] 21. The names of the clerks interrogated are as follows : 
Miss Kimie DOUE 
Takaichi SAKAI 
Katsukichi MURAOKA 
Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO 
Kanaye SAHARA 
Hiyoshi SHIGEFUJI 

22. Miss DOUE, formerly employed as receptionist and typist at the Consulate, 
was the first clerical employee interrogated. Details concerning her personal 
history are set forth in reference (i) and will not be repeated herein. In her 
position as receptionist. Miss DOUE had a better opportunity to observe visitors 
to the Consulate than any of the other clerical employees. She appeared to be 
slightly above the average in intelligence for a Japanese girl of her class, and 
impressed the agents as being entirely frank and cooperative in answering 
questions. 

23. It was developed in the course of the interrogation of Miss DOUE that 
Tadasi MORIMURA, one of the secretaries of the Consulate, who had arrived 
from Japan on 27 March, 1941, for the ostensible purpose of taking charge of 
the expatriation work at the Consulate, did little or nothing in connection with 
that work after the first few days following his arrival in Honolulu. Instead, 
MORIMURA was assigned a desk in the same office with Vice Consul Otojiro 
OKUDA, where the nature of his work was unknown to Miss DOUE. The 
expatriation work was done in a different office of the Consulate, and was under 
the supervision of Kyonosuke YUGE, another secretary. Most of the clerical 
details of this work were handled by Takaichi SA^AI, one of the clerks above 
mentioned. 

24. Miss DOUE stated that MORIMURA often came to work at about 1100, 
two hours after the opening of the Consulate, and seldom was at his desk in 
the afternoon. There was a week in October or November, 1941, when he 
did not come to work at all. Miss DOUE often saw MORIMURA leave the 
Consulate in a taxi during office hours between 1000 and 1100 and would not 
see him again the same day. The staff of the Consulate usually called the 
proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, located at 6 South Vineyai'd Street, Hono- 
lulu (telephone 3299), and it was this stand that MORIMURA customarily 
called. On other occasions, Miss DOUE saw MORIMURA leave the Consulate 
during [1^] business hours with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, one 
of the aforementioned clerks. Sometimes they would drive away in KOTO- 
SHIRODO's car, and at other times they would use the above mentioned taxi. 
On several occasions, neither of them came back for the rest of the day. 

25. According to Miss DOUE, MORIMURA had a large map of Oahu which he 
used to spread out on his desk and work on from time to time. Miss DOUE stated 
that she had seen Japanese characters written in pencil on the map. She had no 
dealings with MORIMURA other than to deliver mail to his desk. 

26. Takaichi SAKAI, whose personal history is set forth in reference (g), 
also was interrogated on 1 January, 1&42. He corroborated what Miss DOUE said 
about MORIMURA's lack of connection with expatriation matters and his fre- 
quent departures from the Consulate during business hours. 



918 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

27. It was learned from Kanaye SAHARA, whose personal history is set forth 
in reference (h), that MOKIMURA had one finger, either the middle or third, cut 
off at the first joint. However, SAHARA could not remember which hand it 
was. SAHARA also corroborated what Miss DOUE had said concerning MORI- 
MURA's departures from the Consulate during business hours, accompanied by 
KOTOSHIRODO, who often wore an aloha (sport) shirt. On these occasions, 
they would be gone for the rest of the day. SAHARA stated that he suspected 
that they went to "important places", and upon being asked what he meant by 
that, said, "military places". On being asked why he thought they were going to 
such places, SAHARA said that it was because of the strained relations between 
the United States and Japan, and also because MORIMURA and KOTOSHI- 
RODO would not make any mention around the Consulate as to where they had 
been on their trips. SAHARA stated that KOTOSHIRODO had a 1937 Ford 
sedan which he and MORIMURA often used. 

28. SAHARA further stated that he did not know much about MORlMURA's 
background because he was not listed in the Japanese Foreign Ofiice publication 
containing the names and biographical data of diplomatic and consular officials. 
He stated that MORIMURA is 27 or 28 years of age, and if he is a regular member 
of the consuler service, he would have been listed, as he could not have just 
recently been graduated from college. SAHARA believed that the other three 
secretaries of the Consulate, Kyonosuke YUGE, Samon TSUKIKA"\\A, and 
Kokichi SEKI, were listed in this publication. 

[15] 29. SAHARA also informed the agents that MORIMURA and KOTO- 
SHIRODO were on good terms, as SAHARA sometimes saw them joking together 
as they came into, or left, the ofiice. Asked if he thought this was not strange, in 
view of the recognized social distinction between secretaries and clerks at the 
Consulate, SAHARA attempted to explain it by the fact that both were about the 
same age and seemed to enjoy each other's company. 

30. KOTOSHIRODO was interrogated on 3 and 4 January, 1942, and on 9 
January, 1942. His personal history is set forth in reference (j), while details of 
his activities with MORIMURA will be discussed in a subsequent report. In 
substance, this information is that MORIMURA, often accompanied by KOTO- 
SHIRODO, sometimes in a taxi driven by John Yoshie MIKAMI, subject of 
.reference (k), proprietor of the Royal Taxi Stand, and sometimes in KOTO- 
SHIRODO's car, made frequent trips for the purpose of making observations of 
military installations and operations. In addition to the trips made with MORI- 
MURA, KOTOSHIRODO made a number of trips for the same purpose, by 
himself and with MIKAMI, at the direction of MORIMURA. The names and 
addresses of certain Japanese contacted by MORIMURA were obtained from 
KOTOSHIRODO, and the joint investigation of these leads al.so will be covered by 
a separate report. Signed statements concerning his activities were obtained 
from KOTOSHIRODO on 4 and 9 January, 1942. 

31. From all the clerks interviewed an effort was made to obtain the names 
of frequent visitors to the Consulate, particularly those who saw the Consul 
General and the "Vice Consul in private. Seven or eight prominent Japanese 
business and professional men, who have been in custodial detention since 7 
December, 1941, were named, including the local managers of the Yokohama Specie 
and Sumitomo Banks and the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N. Y. K. Line). According 
to Mis<! DOUE. these men would go directly into the office of the Consul General, 
who often would summon the Vice Consul for a conference. None of the clerks 
had any idea of the nature of the conversations between these men and the 
consular officials. 

32. Asked if any persons, other than the prominent Japanese referred to above, 
visited the Consulate on what appeared to he other than routine business, Miss 
DOUE stated that a man whose nationality she did not know, came and went 
several times from the Consulate during November, 1941. This man she described 
as a "haole" (Hawaiian for "white person") [16] and looked somewhat 
Jewish. Miss DOUE did not know his name. Sometimes this man, the Consul 
General, and the Vice Consul were locked in the Consul General's private office. 
The last visit of this man rememiiered by Miss DOUE was about the end of 
November, 1941. The man referred to usually came in the morning and sometimes 
Miss DOUE would see him only when he left the Consulate. 

33. On 31 December, 1941, the dav before the investigation of the former con- 
sular clerks was commenced. Otto KUEHN was brought from detention quarters 
at the U. S. Immigration Station, Honolulu, to the headquarters of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation for questioning bv Snecial Agents J. Sterling Adams and 
George E. Allen. The interrogation of KUEHN, not having been completed on 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 919 

31 December, was resumed the following day. While Miss DOUE was being 
questioned as described above, KUEHN also was under interrogation in a nearby 
room. 

34. When Miss DOUE gave the information mentioned above concerning the 
unidentified white man who had visited the Consulate during the month of Novem- 
ber, Special Agent in Charge R. L. Shivers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
was advised. On the theory that this person might have been KUEHN, Miss 
DOUE was told by Mr. Shivers that he wanted her to observe a certain person 
and state afterwards if she had ever seen this person before. Miss DOUE v\-as 
taken to a stenographer's room and placed at a desk. KUEHN was brought to 
the door of this room and was engaged in conversation. Miss DOUE immediately 
recognized KUEHN and placed a sheet of carbon paper over her face so that she 
could not be recognized by him. 

35. After KUEHN was taken back to the room where he was being questioned. 
Miss DOUE was brought back to the room where her interrogation was being 
conducted. She was thereiipon asked whether she had ever seen the person who 
had just been shown to her. She answered immediately and with assurance that 
this was the "haole" she had previously mentioned as having come to the Con- 
sulate several times during November. Asked how she knew it was the same 
man, she stated that she knew by the shape of his head and by his Jewish appear- 
ance. Miss DOUE stated that she had seen this man leave the Consulate but 
had never seen him get into any automobile. However, she stated that on days 
when he came to the Consulate a tan-colored roadster was seen parked in front 
of the building. Miss DOUE stated that she thought his visits were peculiar 
and that she thought he was a "spy". 

[17] 36. A short biographical sketch of KUEHN, based upon written state- 
ments obtained from him on 1 and 3 January, 1942, by Special Agents Adams and 
Allen, is submitted for information : 

37. KUEHN was born in Berlin, Germany, on 25 December, 1895. In April, 
1913, he enlisted as a cadet in the German Navy, serving as a midshipman until 
captured by the British in January, 1915, and remaining a prisoner of war until 
December, 1918. In 1920, he married his present wife. From the close of the 
World War until 1927, KUEHN was employed in various occupations. In 1927, 
he entered the coffee business and continued in it until 1935, when he came to 
the United States. However, during the period 1928-1930, he was in the secret 
police of the German Navy. In 1930, he and his stepson Leopold KUEHN, who 
was born 6 July, 1911, joined the National Socialist (Nazi) party, but KUEHN 
claims not to have been active in the party until 1932, when he was considered 
for a position high in the Gestapo under Heinrich HIMMLER, but which position 
was given to Reinhold HEYDRICH. Thereafter, KUEHN was twice jailed in 
Germany, but was released, he says, through the efforts of his wife. 

38. In 1935, KUEHN decided to go to Japan to study the Japanese language, 
and passed through the mainland United States and Honolulu eni-oute to Japan. 
In 1936 KUEHN and his family returned to Honolulu where they established 
permanent residence and subsequently KUEHN returned to Japan for three 
months' further language studj\ Upon his return to Honolulu in September, 
1936, KUEHN continued the study of the Japanese language. In Honolulu, he 
engaged in the steel furniture manufacturing business. Friedel KUEHN oper- 
ated a beauty shop at Kailua and the KUEHNs have owned two homes at Kalama 
and one at Lanikai. KUEHN's furniture business failed in 1938, his wife's beauty 
shop brought in only about $80.00 a month, and they were forced to sell the 
Kalama home and mortgage the other two residences, one of which usually was 
rented. 

39. From time to time, KUEHN has received considerable sums of money 
from Eui'opean sources. He claimed that this money came from the estate of 
his father and from the liquidation of the coffee business which he had owned. 
Friedel KUEHN also received raoney from inherited property in Germany. 
According to KUEHN, great difficulties were encountered in getting this money 
out of Germany. Certain of the transfers were said to have been made through 
a friend in Japan, a Doctor HOMBERG, who is connected with a German 
steel firm, ROESCHLING STEEL WORKS in Tokyo, who assertedly purchased 
the [IS] German holdings of Friedel KUEHN for $40,000.00. Part of this 
consideration was transported in cash by Mrs. KUEHN from Japan to Honolulu 
in 1940. KUEHN said the amount so received was $6,000.00, but his wife, who 
was questioned later, said it was $9,C00.0O. In September, 1940, a payment of 
$10,000.00 was received from Dr. HOMBERG and was delivered by one KAI, 
purser of the SS KAMAKURA MARU, an N. Y. K. liner. 



920 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

40. The following additional information was obtained from KUEHN and is 
contained in his written statements made on 1 and 3 January, 1942 : 

41. In July, 1941, after the "freeze order", KUEHN contacted Vice Consul 
OKUDA at the Japanese Consulate and requested him to send a message to 
Dr. HOMBERG through a Baron KYOGOKU in Japan, whom KUEHN claims 
previously to have met on a trip to Japan. According to KUEHN, the message 
to HOMBERG was in a prearranged private code and the substance of it was 
a request to send the balance of the $40,000.00 due Mrs. KUEHN as soon as 
possible. When OKUDA was hesitant about sending the message, KUEHN in- 
formed him that he was acting for the Japanese Government and had an 
important message for KYOGOKU, a Government official in Tokyo. KUEHN 
told OKUDA that it was imperative that he receive the money before 29 October, 
1941, because of the Treasury Department's foreign funds regulations, and he 
intentionally gave OKUDA the impression that the money was to come from 
KYOGOKU as compensation for services rendered the Japanese Government. 
OKUDA finally agreed to send the message. 

42. In his statement of 1 January, 1942, KUEHN had said that he first con- 
tacted the Consulate early in November, 1941, to request assistance in sending 
money to his stepson, Leopold, in Germany, and was informed that the Vice 
Consul would take the matter up with the Yokohama Specie Bank. However, 
in his statement of 3 January, 1942, he gave the version above set forth about 
the message to Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. But, in both versions, KUEHN 
admitted having made several visits to the Japanese Consulate in November, 
1941, and stated that he called in the mornings. 

43. It was developed that on his second or third visit, either KUEHN or 
Consul General KITA suggested that KUEHN could be of assistance in obtain- 
ing information concerning United States fleet movements. KUEHN agreed to 
do what he could, and on or about 28 November, 1941, he drove to the vicinity 
of Pearl Harbor, where he said he saw very few [19] ships in the harbor. 
Later, according to KUEHN, he informed the Consulate that there were seven 
battleships, six cruisers, two aircraft carriers, twenty destroyers and twenty- 
seven submarines, "or some similar figure in Hawaiian waters." The infor- 
mation which KUEHN stated he furnished the Consulate, as set forth above, 
can be compared with the figures set forth in enclosures (A) and (B), which 
were prepared by this office (for the Federal Bureau of Investigation) from 
data furnished by the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. As to 
the figures admittedly reported by KUEHN, he said "those figures were purely 
fictitious, as far as I knew." 

44. Subsequent to the visit during which information relative to fleet move- 
ments was first discussed, the following occurred, as described in KUEHN's 
statement of 1 January, 1942: 

"At that time I made suggestions to them stating that I had a short-wave 
transmitter and could send messages for them if they so desired and I also 
outlined a system of signaling that could be used in order to furnish infor- 
mation relative to the types of ships in Pearl Harbor and those that had left. 
This system of signalling contained fifteen sets of signals. These signals were 
to have been given by a light in my home at Lanikai or Kalama which could 
have been seen out at sea by a submarine, as follows: One light between 

6 and 7 meant battle fleet in harbor ; one light between 7 and 8 meant scouting 
force in harbor ; one light between 8 and 9 meant aircraft carriers in harbor ; 
one light between 9 and 10 meant battle fleet prepared to leave; one light 
between 10 and 11 meant scouting force prepared to leave; one light between 
11 and 12 meant aircraft carriers prepared to leave ; one light between 12 and 

1 meant battle fleet left between one and two days ago ; one light between 1 and 

2 meant scouting force left one to two days ago; two lights between 6 and 

7 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two lights between 

7 and 8 p. m. meant battle fleet left three to four days ago ; two lights between 

8 and 9 p. m. meant scouting force left three to four days ago ; two lights be- 
tween 9 and 10 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left three to four days ago ; two 
lights between 10 and 11 p. m. meant fleet left five to six days ago ; two lights 
between 11 and 12 midnight meant scouting force left five to six days ago; 
two lights between 12 midnight and 1 a. m. meant aircraft carriers left five 
to six days ago. 

[20] "This same set of signals could have been sent by means of linen on 
the clothes line at my Lanikai home, one sheet between 6 and 7 a. m. in daylight 
meaning battle fleet in harbor ; one sheet between 7 and 8 a. m. meaning scouting 
force in harbor; one sheet between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers in 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 921 

harbor ; one sheet between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning battle fleet prepared to leave ; ■ 
one sheet between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning scouting force prepared to leave ; one 
sheet between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning aircraft carriers prepared to leave ; 
one sheet between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning battle fleet left one to two days 
ago; one sheet between 1 p. m. and 2 p. m. meaning scouting force left one to 
two days ago; two sheets on line between 6 a. m. and 7 a. m. meaning aircraft 
carriers left one to two days ago ; two sheets on line between 7 a. m. and 8 a. m. 
meaning battle fleet left three to four days ago ; two sheets on line between 8 a. m. 
and 9 a. m. meaning scouting force left three to four days ago ; two sheets on line 
between 9 a. m. and 10 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left three to four days 
ago ; two sheets on line between 10 a. m. and 11 a. m. meaning battle fleet left 
five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning 
scouting force left five to six days ago ; two sheets on line between 12 noon and 
1 p. m. meaning aircraft carriers left five to six days ago. 

"They told me at the time that this system of communication was too com- 
plicated and it would be necessary for me to simplify it. I went home. One or 
two days prior to the time I submitted this first set of signals I had ridden by 
Pearl Harbor and there were very few boats in the harbor at that time. About 
three days later I went back to the Consulate with a simplified system of sig- 
nalling, on what I think was December 2, 1941. This set of signals contained 
only eight combinations, as follows : No. 1 meaning battle fleet prepared to leave ; 
No. 2 meaning scouting force prepared to leave ; No. 3 meaning battle fleet left 
one to three days ago ; No. 4 meaning scouting force left one to three days ago ; 
No. 5 [21] meaning aircraft carriers left one to three days ago ; No. 6 
meaning battle fleet left four to six days ago ; No. 7 meaning scouting force left 
four to six days ago ; No. 8 meaning aircraft carriers left four to six days ago. 
These signals were to be given as follows from my Lanikai home : One light be- 
tween 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 1 ; one light between 8 and 9 meaning No. 2 ; 
one light between 9 and 10 p. m. meaning No. 3 ; one light between 10 and 11 p. m. 
meaning No. 4 ; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 5 ; two lights be- 
tween 8 and 9 p. m. meaning No. 6, etc. These lights were to have been from a 
window or automobile lights. The same system could have been used with one 
piece of linen hung on the line at Lanikai between 8 and 9 a. m., meaning No. 1, 
one between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 2 ; one between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning 
No. 3 ; one between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning No. 4 ; two pieces between 
8 and 9 a. m. meaning No. 5 ; two pieces between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 6, 
and so forth. It was also arranged that a light in the skylight at my Kalama 
home between 7 and 8 p. m. would mean No. 1 ; one between 8 and 9 p. m. would 
mean No. 2 ; one between 9 and 10 p. m. would mean No. 3 and 6 ; one between 
10 and 11 p. m. would mean No. 4 and 7 ; one between 11 and 12 p. m. (midnight) 
would mean Nos. 5 and 8. 

"It was also arranged that this same system of signalling could have been 
used with a star boat just ofC the mouth of Lanikai Beach between certain 
hours, a star on the sail or a star and a number on the sail meaning corre- 
sponding signals as those previously given, according to the time the boat 
was in that position. I do not recall the exact combinations that were to have 
been used to indicate each signal. 

"It was also arranged that on the KGMB Want-Ads program in the morning 
the signal could be effected to indicate numbers 3 and 6 if a Chinese rug was 
advertised for sale, Nos. 4 and 7 if a beauty parlor operator was advertised 
for ; and a third type of advertisement which I do not recall would indicate 
numbers 5 and 8. It was also arranged that if it was impossible to give this 
system of signals, [22] a garbage fire on Maui in a certain locality 
between certain hours would indicate the above number signals, such as a fire 
between the hours of 9 and 10 p. m. would mean signals 8 and 6, and so forth. 
In mentioning this latter plan I had in mind a locality previously described 
to me by a friend, CARL BASLER, where a number of vacant lots are located. 
I determined the exact locality of this area by reference to a map of Maui 
which showed the names of the two roads which border that locality and which 
names were mentioned in my recommended plan as bordering the area wherein 
the fire signals were to be effected. 

"It was also arranged that this same set of signals could be given by short 
wave radio and arrangements were made that if the Consulate desired to contact 
me they could do so by sending me a postcard signed "JIMMIE", to my Box 
No. 1476 at Honolulu. 

"This simplified set of signals was taken to the Consulate in an envelope 
by me about 8 : 30 in the morning. At the time I went to the Consulate I was 



922 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

accompanied by my wife, FRIEDEL, and wliile she remained in the car I went 
to the door and handed the envelope containing this set of signals and another 
envelope containing $500.00, which was to be sent to my son LEOPOLD in 
Germany, to the Vice Consul whose name I do not recall. I had no conversa- 
tion with him at this time but went back to my car and drove on into 
Honolulu. 

"I might point out that the plan outlined by me above and that submitted 
to the Japanese Consulate are probably not identical in every detail with those 
actually submitted, although the plans outlined above are basically the same 
as those submitted. Differences will probably appear in connection with the 
hours stated for the signals to be given. 

"Following the submission of these latter plans to the Consulate I have had 
no further contact with any representatives of the Consulate to date, neither 
have I received any correspondence or telephone messages from such repre- 
sentatives. Apparently [23] no effort was made by the Consulate to 
carry either of the proposed plans into effect through me. 

"I have never been to the Island of Maui nor have I ever seen the island 
nor purchased any property there. I never had a short-wave transmitter, 
and my Lanikai Beach house is rented to Army people. I might state that 
CARL BASLER had no knowledge of my plans submitted to the Japanese 
Consulate. As a matter of fact I have not seen him or his wife since they 
departed from Honolulu about September 1941. Further, I have had no corre- 
spondence with them except for one letter received from Mrs. BASLER about 
October, 1941. I rented my Lanikai residence on November 1, 1941, to two 
couples, one an Army doctor, age about 30, and the other an employee with the 
Engineers, about the same age, both of whom had been transferred from 
Schofield Barracks to Kaneohe. I cannot recall the names of these individuals 
at the present time." 

45. In the same statement, KUEHN said that following the arrival of the 
TATUTA MARU in Honolulu in October, 1941, a Japanese attached to that 
vessel called at his residence and delivered a package enclosed in cardboard 
containing $14,000.00 in $100.00 bills. The person v?ho made this delivery 
stated to KUEHN that the package came from Dr. ROMBERG in Japan. But, 
in his statement of 3 January, 1942, KUEHN described the receipt of the money 
as follows: 

"I did not contact the Consulate again nor did I receive any post card 
until one afternoon in the very end of October, just after the first Japanese 
boat came to Honolulu, a young Japanese man came to my home in Kalama 
and he told my son that he wanted to see me. I was in the back working 
in my garden. My son came and advised me he was there and I went around. 
He very brusquely asked me if I was OTTO KUEHN and I said "Yes." and 
he said, "I have something for you from Dr. HOMBERG," so I took him back 
to my little garden house where he gave me a package and a letter and I 
asked him if he had any other information for me and he said no. I opened the 
letter first and in the letter was a sheet of paper written in English asking if 
I had a short-wave transmitter and if I would be willing [24] to make 
a test at a certain stated time which was on a night several nights later, on 
a certain wave length. This letter was typewritten and had no name on it. 
He gave me a sheet of paper and an envelope and I wrote on the sheet of 
paper that I was unable to make the test. I was quite nervous and put it in 
the envelope and gave it to him. I asked him if he knew what was in the 
package and he said no. I asked him if he wanted a receipt for the package 
and he said no, and he then left and I opened the package and counted the 
money. There were $14,000.00 in the package, mostly in new $100.00 bills, 
some $20.00 bills. I think that this was a contact KYOGOKU was trying to 
make with me through this letter. As soon as he left I tore up the sheet of 
paper asking me to make this radio test and burned it up." 

46. It was learned from KOTOSHIRODO that some time in October, 1941, 
he had been requested by Vice Consul OKUDA to drive IMORIMURA and him- 
self to Kailua. At the corner of Kuulei Road and Maluniu Avenue, Kailua, 
KOTOSHIRODO said that OKUDA directed him to stop the car, which he did, 
and there MORIMURA got out of the car and commenced walking along 
Maluniu Avenue in a northwesterly direction. OKUDA directed KOTOSHI- 
RODO to drive several blocks along Kuulei Road and to stop at the corner 
of Kuulei Road and Kalaheo Avenue. They waited there thirty or forty 
minutes before MORIMURA reappeai'ed, walking along Kalaheo Avenue from 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 923 

the dii'ection in which he had disappeared. (It is noted that the places where 
MORIMURA alighted and later rejoined OKUDA and KOTOSHIRODO are 
approximately one-half mile from the Kalama residence of Otto KUEHN.) 
On 4 January, 1942, KOTOSHIRODO directed Special Agent Tillman and 
Lieutenant Kimball to the places above mentioned, and identified the places. 

47. Eberhard KUEHN, age 15, stepson of Otto KUEHN, was interviewed 
by Special Agents Adams and Allen, and stated to them that an unidentified 
Japanese had come to see his father between 1600 and 1630 on a Saturday 
afternoon, on either 18 October or 25 October, 1941. The description he gave 
of this person is substantially similar to that of MORIMURA. Later, a pho- 
tograph of MORIMURA was shown to Eberhard KUEHN, who stated that it 
was very similar to the Japanese who called to see his father in October, and 
that he believed that it was very likely the same person, but he could not say 
positively. The same [25] photograph also was shown to Otto KUEHN, 
who stated tliat it was quite similar to the Japanese who had delivered the 
money to him ; that he is positive he has seen the person represented in the 
photograph before, and believed it probably was on the occasion when the 
money was delivered. However, KUEHN still contended tliat he was of the 
belief that the man who had come to see him had been sent by Dr. HOMBERG, 
and that a Japanese steamer was in port in Honolulu on the day in question. 
(It should be noted here that the only Japanese liner in port around the time 
in question was the TATUTA MARU, which arrived in Honolulu from the 
Orient on 23 October, 1941, and departed for San Francisco the following 
day.) 

48. At no time has KUEHN implicated anyone outside the Consulate, other 
than himself and the Japanese who delivered the $14,000.00 to him, in any of 
the activities above described. Thus far, no evidence has been developed that 
anyone, other than persons connected with the Consulate, have acted in con- 
junction with KUEHN. 

49. In the plan of the system of signals submitted by KUEHN to the Con- 
sulate, as described in KUEHN's statement of 1 January, 1942, and set forth 
in the despatch sent by Consul General KITA to Foreign Minister TOGO on 
3 December, 1941, part of the signals consisted of "KGMB want ads". KGMB 
are the call letters of the broadcasting station in Honolulu owned and operated 
by .the Hawaiian Broadcasting Company, Limited. Tlie despatch designated 
the advertisements to be: (a) for the sale of a Chinese rug; (b) for the 
sale of a complete chicken farm; and, (c) for a beauty operator wanted. 
Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation lias failed to disclose any 
record of radio advertisements on any KGMB program of the type described, 
between 24 November and 8 December, 1941. However, it was found that 
Post Office Box 1476, referred to in the message of 3 December, referred to 
KUEHN's box at the Honolulu postoffice, 

50. Of the original $14,000.00 cash received by KUEHN, $5,000.00 in new 
$100.00 Federal Reserve Bank of New York notes was found on the person of 
Mrs. KUEHN, after she was taken into custody on 8 December, 1941. It also 
was discovered that Mrs. KUEHN had given $2,000.00, in similar denominations, 
to her daughter, Mrs. J. Carson MOORE (nee Ruth KUEHN). This money also 
was recovered by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These 
funds are being traced from their source, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
to determine [26] the persons or agencies throiig'h whom they were 
transmitted to Honolulu. It has been established by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation that these notes were not obtained from, nor cleared through, 
Honolulu banks. . 

51. Otto KUEHN and his wife are the subjects of reference (a), being named 
therein as "Mr. and Mrs. KOEHN". Reference (b) states that KUEHN and 
his wife had (before 21 April, 1939) been under observation by the District 
Intelligence Office for a number of months, and that KUEHN was strongly 
suspected of being an espionage agent for either Japan or Germany, or both. 

52. Otto KUEHN was carried on the Fourteenth Naval District records (July, 
1940) as a class "A" Nazi suspect. See reference (c). The following informa- 
tion appeared on the suspect card : 

"KUEHN, Otto Kailua, Oahu (Occupation) None at present 

Formerly (1918) cflicer in German Navy; cultivates acquaintances among 
officers in U. S. Navy ; at one time received considerable sums of money from 
European source; frequent trips to Japan; Mrs. KUEHN recently (May, 
1940) returned from Japan and reportedly brought back a considerable sum 
of money with her ; has failed in business but owns considerable real estate." 



924 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

53. The name of Mrs. KUEHN was added to the Fourteenth Naval District Nazi 
list, as a class "A" suspect, on 31 May, 1941, as shown by reference (e), the 
pertinent portion of which reads as follows : 

"KUEHN, Friedel— Kailua, Oahu. Wife of Otto KUEHN, suspected of being 
a German agent. Friedel KUEHN is known to be pro-Nazi. Mr. and Mrs. 
KUEHN are suspected of being 'Mr. "and Mrs. Friedel' who are reported as 
contacts of the local Japanese consulate." 

54. The names of "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" were furnished to the District Intelli- 
gence Officer in July, 1940, by a reliable confidential informant who stated that 
the I'riedels had approached the Honolulu Japanese Consulate with the request 
that certain information of theirs be transmitted to the Japanese Navy. The 
same confidential informant reported [27] that the consul-general re- 
quested the Foreign Office to advise concerning the reliability of the Friedels, and 
that the Foreign Office replied stating that the Friedels could not be placed, but 
that any information they furnished should be received and forwarded with an 
indication that it came from the Friedels. The message further advised that the 
Japanese Navy was prepared to compensate the Friedels for any information they 
furnished according to its value. 

55. All of the information received from this confidential informant concerning 
"Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" was transmitted to the Honolulu Field Office of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. An investigation conducted by that agency 
failed to disclose any "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel" who in any way fitted the meager 
description furnished by the informant. It was concluded, however, that Otto 
and Friedel KUEHN might be "Mr. and Mrs. Friedel", but no evidence was 
obtained prior to the present investigation, indicating that either of the KUEHNs 
had contacted the Japanese Consulate. 

56. The evidence obtained in the investigation, which is set forth in substance 
in this report, has been given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Angus 
M. Taylor, Jr., United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii, who has 
pi-epared charges and specifications charging Otto KUEHN with violation of 
Sections 34, 31, and 32 of Title 50, U. S. Code. These charges and specifications 
will be preferred by Captain Eugene V. Slattery, Assistant Judge Advocate 
General, Hawaiian Department, who will act as trial judge advocate in the 
prosecution of the case before the Military Commission. 

57. Charge No. 1 is based on Section 34 of Title 50, and avers that KUEHN 
conspired with Consul General KITA and Vice Consul OKUDA on or about 20 
November, 1941, to unlawfully communicate, in violation of Section 31, informa- 
tion to the Japanese Government concerning the movements and positions of 
the United States Fleet, by means of a system of signals prepared by KUEHN, 
and that in the furtherance of the conspiracy, certain overt acts were committed 
by KUEHN. These acts include obtaining by visual observation on or about 28 
November, 1941, figures as to the number of naval vessels in Pearl Harbor and 
furnishing the same to the consular officials ; and preparing and submitting to 
the same officials on or about 2 December, 1941, the plan for the system of 
signals previously described, which plan was transmitted by Consul General 
KITA to the Japanese Government on or about 3 December, 1941. 

[28] 58. Charge No. 2 is based on an alleged violation of Section 31, 
Title 50, and specifies that KUEHN, on or about 28 November, 1941, for the pur- 
pose of obtaining information respecting the national defense, and with intent 
and reason to believe that the information to be obtained was to be used to the 
injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, namely, 
Japan, unlawfully obtained information concerning the disposition of United 
States naval vessels in Pearl Harbor. 

59. Charge No. 3 is based on an alleged violation of Section 32 of Title 50, 
and specifies that on or about 2 December, 1941, KUEHN unlawfully trans- 
mitted the information he had obtained concerning naval vessels to the Japanese 
Government, through the Consulate. 

60. No evidence has thus far been discovered by any of the three investigative 
agencies which have handled the various phases of this case which would estab- 
lish as a fact rhat any attempt was made, either before or after 7 December, 
1941, to put into actual operation the system of signals prepared by KUEHN 
for the Consul General and submitted by the latter to Tokyo. However, efforts 
still are being made to obtain such evidence, if it exists, and to determine what 
other person or persons, if any, may have been implicated in such activities. 

61. (Other messages despatched by the Consul General, both in the period, 
1-4 December, 1941, and at other times, as the same have been received by this 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



925 



ofl3ce and have been resolved into plain language, will be discussed in a report 
supplementary to this one, and bearing the same subject title. ) 
Pending— 14ND. 

6 February, 1942 

Enclosure (A): Table showing numbers of battleships, heavy cruisers, light 
cruisers, aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and destroyer-type vessels in 
Pearl Harbor, at 0800 and ISOO, SS-80 November 1941 



Date 



Time 



Types of Ships 



BBS CAs CLs CVs SSs DDs DMs AVDs (#) 



11/22 
11/23 
11/24 
11/25 
11/26 
11/27 
11/28 
11/29 
11/30 



1800 
0800 
1800 
0800 
1800 
0800 
1800 
0800 
1800 
0800 
1800 
0800 
1800 
0800 
1800 
0800 
1800 



31 
32 
32 
28 
26 
27 
31 
37 
34 
34 
34 
39 
18 
33 
31 
33 
32 
33 



Key: BB^battleship; C A^heavy cruiser; CL — light cruiser; C V — aircraft carrier; SS— submarine; DD — 
destroyer; DM — light mine layer (destroyer type); AVD— seaplane tender (destroyer type). 

(#)— Total of destroyer type craft. DMs and AVDs were built as destroyers and converted to their 
present use. To the untrained eye, they would appear as destroyers. 



Enolosueb (B) : Table of numier and movement of ships in Pearl Harbor, by 
types, at various times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, 1941 



HEAVY CRUISERS (CAS) — Continued 

0727— CHESTER cleared 

0735— SALT LAKE CITY cleared.- 8 

LIGHT CRUISERS (CLS) 

0600 — Underway in harbor 

(DETROIT) 1 

0637— DETROIT cleared 

1138— HELENA entered 1 

1131— HONOLULU entered 2 

1148— ST LOUIS entered 3 

1200— PHOENIX entered 4 

1212— RALEIGH entered 5 

1250— HELENA moored 5 

1300— HONOLULU moored 5 

1300— RALEIGH moored 5 

1305— PHOENIX moored— 5 

1328— ST. LOUIS moored 5 

1350— DETROIT entered 6 

1510— DETROIT moored 6 

1800 — At moorings 6 

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CVS) 

0600— At moorings (LEXINGTON, 

ENTERPRISE) 2 

0735— ENTERPRISE underway 2 

(#) The UTAH was commissioned as a battleship, but later demilitarized and used as a 
target ship. To the untrained observer, she might appear to be a battleship. 



BATTLESHIPS (BBS) 

0600— At moorings (ARIZONA, 

NEVADA, OKLAHOMA) 3 

0658— NEVADA underway 3 

0705— ARIZONA underway 3 

0748— NEVADA cleared 2 

0801— ARIZONA cleared 1 

1045— PENNSYLVANIA entered 2 

1053— CALIFORNIA entered 8 

1102— MARYLAND entered 4 

1110— TENNESSEE entered 5 

1123— WEST VIRGINIA entered 6 

1155— PENNSYLVANIA moored 6 

1210— CALIFORNIA moored 6 

1232— MARYLAND moored 6 

1240— TENNESSEE moored 6 

1306— WEST VIRGINIA moored 6 

1547— UTAH moored (#) 7 

1048— UTAH moored (#) 7 

1800— At moorings : 7 

HEAVY CRUISERS (CAS) 

0600— At moorings 11 

0625— NORTHAMPTON underway _ 11 

0632— CHESTER underway 11 

0640— SALT LAKE CITY underway 11 
0718— NORTHAMPTON cleared 10 



926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Enclosure (B); Table of number and movement of ships in Pearl Harbor, by types, 
at various times between 0600 and 1800, 28 November, J94/— Continued 



AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CVS) — Continued 

0838— ENTERPRISE cleared 1 

1800 — At moorings 1 

STJBMAEINES (SSS) 

0600 — At moorings 4 

1254— ARGONAUT underway 4 

1300— TROUT underway 4 

1340— ARGONAUT cleared 3 

1350— TROUT cleared 2 

1800— At moorings 2 

DESTBOYEES (DOS) 

0600 — At moorings or underway — 26 

0602— MUGFORD cleared 25 

0605— GRIDLEY cleared 24 

0608— MAURY cleared 23 

0612— BAGLEY cleared 22 

0617— HENLEY cleared 21 

0620— CRAVEN cleared 20 

0621— PATTERSON cleared 19 

0623— BALCH cleared 18 

0625— HELM cleared 17 

0628— RALPH TALBOT cleared.- 16 

0630— FANNING cleared 15 

0632— McCALL cleared 14 

0640— DUNLAP cleared 13 

0641— BENHAM cleared 12 

0647— CONYNGHAM cleared 11 

1205— WORDON entered 12 

1221— ALYWIN entered-- 13 

1228— CONYNGHAM entered 14 

1232— CASSIN entered 15 

1236— HULL entered 16 

1243— DAT^E entered 17 

1245— REID entered 18 

1247— DOWNES entered 19 

1254— DEWEY entered 20 



DESTROYERS (dds) — Continued 

1300— MONAGHAN entered 21 

1308— TUCKER entered 22 

1318— CONYNGHAM mored 22 

1330— FARRAGUT entered 23 

1333— CASE entered 24 

1336— MacDONOUGH entered 25 

1340— PHELPS entered 26 

1345— CASSIN moored 26 

1350— ALYWIN moored 26 

1350— REID mored 26 

1407— DOWNES moored 26 

1412— TUCKER mored 26 

1425— WORDON moored 26 

1435— DALE moored 26 

1440— CASE moored 26 

1446— MONAGHAN moored 26 

1446_HULL moored 26 

1459--DEWEY mored 26 

1459— FARRAGUT moored 26 

1515— PHELPS moored 26 

1530— MacDONOUGH moored 26. 

1800— At moorings 26 



MINESWEEPERS (DMS) 



0600 — At moorings 

0610— GAMBLE underway 

0612— MONTGOMERY uuderway. 

0615— BREESE underway 

0625— RAMSAY underway 

0652— GAMBLE cleared 

0655— MONTGOMERY cleared— 

0657— BREESE cleared 

0700— RAMSAY cleared 

1800 — ^At moorings 



SEAPLANE TENDERS (AVDS) 

0600— At moorings 3 

1800— At moorings 3 



Upoted States Naval iNTEixiaBNCE Service 



INVESTIGATION REPORT 
C^fi'h ff/tf f^'iiiifLl/ 
Subject : JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Activities. 
Report made at : Honolulu, T. H., 14tli Naval District. Date : 14 Feb. 1942. 
Report made by: Lieutenant (jg) W. B. Stephenson, USNR. 
Period covered : 5 Dec, 1941 to 14 Feb., 1942. Status of Case : Pending. 
Origin of Case: Receipt by DI0-14ND of various encrypted messages sent by 
Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Foreign OflSce, Tokyo, and Japanese 
Ambassador, Washington. 
Character of Investigation : Espionage. 

Enclosures: (A) Copies of mis- Copy to: ONI (5) 14ND (3) 

CinCPac (1) 
Com 14 (1) 
FBI-Hon (2) 
MID-HD (2) 
Source File No. : 14 ND #54A. ONI File No. : 
Synopsis : During the period 3-6 December, 1941, the Japanese Consul General. 
Honolulu, reported to Tokyo, by despatch, the entry and departure of Naval 
vessels at Pearl Harbor. There is no evidence at hand to show reporting of such 



cellaneous despatches from Japa- 
nese Consul General, Honolulu, to 
Tokyo and to other Consuls, con- 
cerning military and naval subjects. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 927 

facts by despatch prior to 3 December, nor has aiiy message been found which 
ordered the Consulate so to report starting on 3 December. 

Messages furtlier reported in detail as to the numbers of Naval vessels in Pearl 
Harbor on 5 and 6 December, 1941. Reports vpere accurate as to the number 
of battleships and aircraft carriers, not so accurate as to cruisers, and very inac- 
curate as to destroyers. 

Percentage of error in reporting indicates reports probably were based on 
data gathered by untrained observers stationed at some distance outside the 
Navy Yard. There is no evidence to indicate that anyone inside the Navy Yard 
was engaged in this espionage activity. 

The despatch of 1248, 6 December, indicated knowledge that anti-torpedo nets 
were not being used to protect battleships moored in Pearl Harbor. 

Deductions: Despatches of 3-6 December, 1941, while relatively inaccurate in 
many details, apprised Japan of the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor, ab- 
sence of aircraft carriers therefrom, and the non-use of anti-torpedo nets to pro- 
tect battleships in the harbor. 

Approved : I. H. Mayfield, 

Captain, U. 8. Navy, 
District Intelligence Ofjficer. 

[1] Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU— Espionage Ac- 
tivities. 
References : 

(a) 14ND Investigation Report, same subject, 2-9-42. 

(b) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject RICHARD MASAYUKI KOTO- 
SHIRODO, 2-8-42. 

(c) 14ND Investigation Report, Subject JOHN YOSHIE MIKAJNII, 2-6^2. 

1. This report is a continuation of, and an enlargement .upon, reference (a). 
It is concerned chiefly with (a) the substance of certain naval intelligence trans- 
mitted by despatch from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo, and 
(b) the accuracy of the data transmitted. 

2. Copies of some, but not all, of the encrypted despatches of the Japanese 
Consulate, Honolulu, dating back to March, 1941, were made available to the 
District Intelligence Office and to the Honolulu field office of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation by reliable confidential informants. Only such of those com- 
munications that refer to military or naval subjects will be discussed in this 
report. As stated in reference (a), copies of the despatches hereinafter dis- 
cussed were received by the District Intelligence Officer, from a highly confiden- 
tial source, on 5 December, 1941, but were in code or cipher and could not be 
evaluated immediately. The plain meaning of the despatches was not learned 
until 11 December, 1941. 

3. For the sake of clarity, it is stated at the outset that evidence gathered 
to date indicates that intelligence concerning United States vessels in Pearl Har- 
bor, and heir entry and departure therefrom, was gained by the simple expedient 
of observing ships in the harbor from points of vantage outside the Navy Yard. 
From reference (a), it appears that such fact-gathering was directed either by 
Vice Consul Otojiro OKUDA or Tadasi MORIMURA, a secretary at the Con- 
siilate; that MORIMURA personally made many trips to the vicinity of Pearl 
Harbor, with Richard Masayuki KOTOSHIRODO, a Consulate clerk, subject of 
reference (b), and with John Yoshie MIKAMI, a trusted taxi driver, subject of 
reference (c), who is at present in custodial detention; that MORIMURA per- 
sonally did most of the known observing of Pearl Harbor, and contacting ob- 
servers who lived in that vicinity; and, that Otto KUEHN, prominently men- 
tioned in reference (a), who admitted making up a signal system for the Con- 
sulate to use to convey information (presumably to Japanese ships off the shores 
of the Hawaiian Islands) , at least once visited the Pearl Harbor [2] area for 
the purpose of determining the number of ships there and reporting his findings 
to the Consulate. The modus operandi of MORIMURA and other Consulate ob- 
servers and contacts will be set forth in detail in a report to follow. 

4. On 3 December, 1941, Consul General Nagao KITA sent the following 
despatch to the Foreign Office, Tokyo: 

Wyoming and two seaplane tenders departed third. 
(It should be noted that the messages consistently refer to the WYOMING, 
where obviously the UTAH was intended.) An examination of copies of the 
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, ejitry and departure log for 22 November to 7 De- 
cember, 1941 (hereinafter referred to as "operational data"), shows the above 



928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

despatch to have been wholly in error. The UTAH cleared Pearl Harbor on 
1 December, at 1208, and did not return until 1555, 5 December. The seaplane 
tenders CURTISS and THORINTON also left Pearl Harbor on 1 December, 
clearing at 1628 and 1712, respectively, and also returned to the harbor on 
5 December, entering at 1408 and 1410, respectively. The operational data 
further reveals that no battleships cleared the harbor on 3 December (so there 
was no departure of a vessel that might reasonably have been mistaken for the 
UTAH), and that no seaplane tenders left Pearl Harbor that day. 

5. On 4 December, at 1657, the following despatch was sent to Foreign Minister 
TOGO by the local Consulate : 

USS Honolulu arrived 1300/4 th 
From the operational data aforementioned, it was determined that the USS 
HONOLULU entered Pearl Harbor at 1131, and secured at berth B-21 at 1300, 
on 28 November, 1941. She did not move from that berth before the Japanese 
attack of 7 December. Furthermore, no cruisers of the HONOLULU type either 
eptered or cleared the harbor on 4 December. The only cruiser movements at 
Pearl Harbor during the period 1-6 December, 1941, were the departure of the 
CHICAGO, PORTLAND, ASTORIA, INDIANAPOLIS, and MINNEAPOLIS, be- 
tween 0718, 5 December, and the arrival of the DETROIT, at 0947, 5 December. 

6. Obviously in response to a request from Tokyo for the same (which re- 
quest has not yet been found in the tratfic to the Consulate), the following 
message was sent by [^'j Consul General KITA at 1804 on 5 December: 

The three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning, the 
fifth, entered port. They expect to depart port on the eighth. On the same 
day the Lexington and five heavy cruisers departed. The following war- 
ships were anchored on the afternoon of the fifth : 8 battleships ; 3 light 
cruisers ; 16 destroyers. Coming in were 4 cruisers of the Honolulu type 
and 2 destroyers. 
The first sentence of the message evidently refers to Battleship Division One 
(ARIZONA, NEVADA, and OKLAHOMA), which entered Pearl Harbor between 
0856 and 0931, 5 December. The District Intelligence Officer has been informed 
by the Fleet Intelligence Officer that Battleship Division One was NOT scheduled 
to sail on 8 December, 1941, as reported in the second sentence of the despatch 
to Tokyo. 

7. The foregoing message, in its third sentence, correctly set forth the facts. 
The LEXINGTON cleared Pearl Harbor at 0810, 5 December, in company with 
the five heavy cruisers before mentioned, which cleared between 0718 and 0735, 
the same morning. 

8. After the arrival of Battleship Division One on the morning of 5 December, 
and up until the time of the Japanese air attacli on 7 December, there were 
eight battleships moored in Pearl Harbor: PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA, 
MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, WEST VIRGINIA, ARIZONA, NEVADA, and 
OKLAHOMA. The information reported to Tokyo on 5 December in this regard 
was, therefore, correct. 

9. The statement in the foregoing message, that there were (only) three 
light cruisers in the harbor on the afternoon of 5 Deee;mber reported only half 
of the vessels of that type in Pearl Harbor, which were the HONOLULU, 
HELENA, ST, LOUIS, PHOENIX, RALEIGH, and DETROIT. In addition to 
light cruisers, the heavy cruisers NEW ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO were 
in the harbor all that afternoon, but were not reported in the despatch. 

10. As shown by the operational data, at 0800 on 5 December, 1941, there 
were twenty-one destroyers in Pearl Harbor. Six more arrived, and none de- 
parted, before 1200 the same day, making a total of -twenty-seven moored (or 
underway ia the harbor, proceeding to moorings) at noon. [^] One de- 
stroyer cleared the harbor at 1539, but re-entered at 1612. Therefore, at all 
times on the afternoon of 5 December, there were at least twenty-six destroyers 
in Pearl Harbor. 

11. Assuming that the Consulate's observer or observers might not have been 
able to distinguish between destroyers (including DLs) and ex-destroyers now 
used as minelayers, mine sweepers, or seaplane tenders, the following facts 
as to all destroyer-type ships are presented : At 0800, on 5 December, 1941, there 
were twenty-eight destroyers and destroyer-type vessels moored in Pearl Harbor. 
Between 0800 and 1200, the same day, six DDs, four DMs, and two DMSs en- 
tered, and there were no departures of those types, bringing to forty the total 
of destroyers and ex-destroyers in the harbor at 1200. Subsequent departures, 
between 1200 and 1800, varied the number of such vessels in the harbor between a 
minimum of forty and a maximum of forty-three. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 929 

12. The last sentence of the above message of 5 December, to the effect that 
four cruisers of the HONOLULU class and two destroyers were coming in that 
afternoon, is not supported by the facts. On the afternoon of 5 December, the 
four HONOLULU class cruisers already named were in the harbor, and had been 
there since 28 November, 1941. No cruisers of that class did come in, or were 
coming in, on the afternoon mentioned. Furthermore, after the arrival of the 
DETROIT on the morning of 5 December, there were no further arrivals of 
cruisers of any class until after the Japanese attack. As to destroyers, four 
destroyer-type vessels entered the harbor on 5 December, at 1310, 1408, 1431, 
and at 1612. 

13. On 6 December, 1941, Consul General KITA received the following despatch 
from Foreign Minister TOGO, which is inserted here merely as a matter of 
interest : 

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of the movements of war- 
ships after the fourth. 
There has not yet been found in the Consulate traflSc any indication as to when 
the Consulate received orders to report by despatch on United States fleet move- 
ments. It is noted from the data at hand that such reporting by despatch was 
not indulged in prior to 3 December, 1941. 

14. At 1801 on 6 December, 1941, the Consulate [5] placed the follow- 
ing message for transmission to Tokyo and Washington : 

On the evening of the fifth the battleship WYOMING and one sweeper 
entered port. Ships moored on the sixth are as follows : 9 battleships ; 3 
light cruisers ; 17 destroyers ; 3 mine sweepers. Ships in dock : 4 light 

cruisers; 2 destroyers. (CA and CV ALL ) PS — CV cannot be found 

in the fleet. 
The first sentence of the foregoing message is supiwrted by the following facts : 
The UTAH (again mistakenly referred to as the WYOMING) entered Pearl 
Harbor at 1555 on 5 December, preceded by the SUNNADIN at 1530. 

15. As to the number of battleships in Pearl Harbor on 6 December, the fol- 
lowing are the true facts: If the UTAH be counted as a battleship (as it should 
be in this situation, where the Consul consistently referred to it as the WYO- 
MING), there were nine battleships in the harbor, as reported. 

16. Cruisers in the harbor at that time were two heavy cruisers, the NEW 
ORLEANS and SAN FRANCISCO, and six light cruisers, the HONOLULU, 
HELENA, ST. LOUIS, PHOENIX. RALEIGH, and DETROIT. 

17. In this message, as in that of 5 December regarding the number of vessels 
in Pearl Harbor, there is a considerable variance between the number of 
destroyers reported to be in the harbor, and the number actually there. As of 
0800, 6 December, there were twenty-seven destroyers moored in Pearl Harbor. 
Two more destroyers entered at 1115 and 1132, respectively, one cleared at 1300, 
and there were no further destroyer movements that day. Therefore, a total 
of twenty-nine destroyers were in Pearl Harbor from and after 1300 on 6 De- 
cember, as compared with a total of nineteen reported in the despatch quoted 
above. In addition, there were other destroyer-type craft present in the harbor 
that day — four high-speed mine sweepers (DMSs), eight minelayers (DMs), 
and three seaplane tenders (AVDs) — which to the untrained observer might 
have appeared also to be destroyers. 

18. As noted in the preceding paragraph, there were four mine sweepers in 
Pearl Harbor all day on 6 December. In addition, the BOGGS (DMS) entered 
at 0830, cleared at 0920, [61 entered again at 1540, and cleared again at 
1625. This is to be compared with the reported three mine sweepers in the 
harbor. 

19. It is believed that the report to Tokyo of 6 December, where the terms 
"moored" and "in dock" were used, meant to differentiate between ships at 
moorings and those berthed at docks (and not to distinguish between ships in 
drydock and those not in drydock). From Navy Yard operational data, it was 
determined that only eight battleships (counting the UTAH as such) were at 
moorings on that afternoon. The ninth battleship, the PENNSYLVANIA, was 
in Drydock #1. As to cruisers, it is noted that three light cruisers were moored, 
as reported In the despatch, while three other light cruisers and the two heavy 
cruisers were at docks. The approximate data as to destroyers was : nineteen at 
moorings, five at docks, and three in drydocks. 

20. The postscript to the above despatch is thought to mean not that there were 
no aircraft carriers in the fleet, but that there were none in the portion of the 
fleet at Pearl Harbor at the time of last observation. Such was the fact, the 
last carrier, the LEXINGTON, having sailed on 5 December. 



930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

21. Another despatch of 6 December, delivered for transmission to Tokyo at 
1248, was called for by a previous message from Tokyo twhich also has not yet 
been found in the Consulate traffic) : 

Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123 : 

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis, 
N. C, on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the 
practicability of their employment in the defen.se of Hawaii and Panama. 
Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected 
for their use or any preparations for construction moorings. No evidence of 
training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their 
installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they 
would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field, and 
Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped. 

2. Am continuing in detail- the investigation of the non-use of nets for 
torpedo defense of battleships and will report further. 

[7] Information as to the accuracy of the first paragraph of the above 
despatch is not readily available to this office and, because that portion of the 
message is not relevant to the general subject-matter of this report, no further 
comment thereon is offered. 

22. The second paragraph of the message above suggests the following facts 
which, however, it has been impossible so far to verify: (a) That the local 
Consulate (and through it, Tokyo) knew that anti-torpedo nets were not being 
used to protect battleships in Pearl Harbor; and (b) that a prior report on 
the subject had been made by the Consul General to Tokyo, or that the above 
despatch was called for by a request from Tokyo (which, however, has not yet 
been found in the Consulate traffic), or both. 

23. That the Japanese Consulate was interested in reporting not only the 
movements of United States Naval vessels, but also those of American mer- 
chantmen and British men o'war, is shown by the two despatches immediately 
following. 

24. At 1718, 3 December, 1941, Consul General KITA despatched the following 
message to Tokyo, information copy to Japanese Consul, San Francisco : 

Urgent report. Military naval transport (name unknown) departed for 
the mainland on second. Lurline arrived from San Francisco on third. 
The part of the message relating to the arrival of the Matson liner Lurline 
is correct. However, there is no record of any military or naval transport 
having left either Honolulu harbor or Pearl Harbor on 2 December, 1941. 

25. The Japanese Consulate on the evening of 4 December, 1941, placed the 
following message for transmission to Tokyo : 

On the afternoon of the third a British man of war entered Honolulu 

and departed early on the fourth. About 110 tons ; one stack ; and had 

a four-inch gun fore and aft. Immediately after entering port the crew went 

ashore and were receiving mail at the British consulate. 

[8] Reference was made to the PRINCE ROBERT, a converted Canadian 

merchantman, which arrived at Honolulu harbor on 3 December, at 1240, and 

departed at 1220 on 4 December. The registered gross tonnage of the PRINCE 

ROBERT, as a merchantman, was 6,892. Mr. Harry L. DAWSON, Vice Consul 

for Great Britain, advised that the PRINCE ROBERT has two stacks, but 

could give no figures as to her offensive armament. There is nothing of record 

in the Fourteenth Naval District regarding the vessel's armament or number 

of stacks. That part of the despatch reporting that the PRINCE ROBERT'S crew 

went ashore and received mail at the British Consulate is correct. 

26. The quality of reporting done by the Consulate to Tokyo on 3-6 December, 
1941, is considered to have been poor, noticeably in the following particulars : 

A. Complete inaccuracy of the despatch of 3 December regarding departure 
of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. (See paragraph 4, above.) 

B. Erroneous reference to the UTAH as the WYOMING. (Paragraphs 4, 
14.) 

C. Complete inaccuracy of the message regarding arrival of the HONO- 
LULU. (Paragraph 5.) 

D. Failure entirely to report heavy cruisers (Paragraphs 6, 14), and 
reporting only half the light cruisers ( Paragraphs 6, 9. ) 

E. Reporting that four cruisers of the HONOLULU class were coming in 
on 5 December, whereas none arrived. ( Paragraph 6. ) 

F. Large percentage of error in reporting number of destroyers. (Para- 
graphs 6, 10, 11, 14, 17.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 931 

G. Failure to report that the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock and not 
at moorings. (Paragraph 14.) 

27. Upon the basis of the foregoing, including references (a), (b), and (c), 
it is concluded that : 

A. There definitely were several observers who reported Pearl Harbor 
ship movements to the Consulate. This is proved by the admisisons of 
KOTOSHIRODO and MIKAMI, in references (b) and (c), respectively, 
and by other evidence to be discussed more fully in the next report. 

B. The observers were relatively untrained, with the possible exception 
of MORIMURA, who may be a naval officer. (To date, the evidence fails 
[9] to show which observers made the accurate reports, and which made 
the erroneous reports.) 

C. Observing was done from a considerable distance. This is concluded 
chiefly from the fact that the demilitarized UTAH was mistaken for the 
WYOMING (wjiereas the latest issue of Jane's Fighting Ships, readily 
available in Honolulu, clearly shows the WYOMING to have guns in her 
turrets and the UTAH not to have them), and from the fact that all battle- 
ships were reported on 6 December to have been at moorings, whereas the 
PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock. 

D. Confidential data as to Naval operations was not compromised. This 
is concluded from the fact that, in general, the data transmitted to Tokyo 
was surprisingly inaccurate. 

28. Other than the despatches above reported, none of a seasonable nature 
have been found which bear directly on fleet movements. Certain messages, 
reporting (from newspaper sources, in most instances) such facts as the arrival 
of an American "goodwill squadron" in Australia and New Zealand, Admiral 
H. E. Kimmel's trip to and return from Washington, and the passage through 
Honolulu of personnel and supplies destined for the Burma Road have been 
collected and are appended hereto in enclosure (A). 

Pending, 
[i] Enclosure (A) : Copies of miscellaneous despatches from Japanese 
consul general, Honolulu, to Tokyo and to other consiils, concerning 
military and naval subjects. 

21 March 1941. 
(To Tokyo; hy code mail to Washingto7i) 
According to despatches from Auckland and Sydney the light cruisers Brook- 
lyn and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cummings, Tucker arrived at 
Auckland on the 17th ; and the heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland, and the de- 
stroyers Clark, Cassin, Conyngham, Downs, Reid arrived at Sydney — both 
groups on a friendly visit. The first group departed from Auckland on the 20th 
and may return to Pearl Harbor. It is reported that the second group will also 
go to Brisbane. Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under 
sealed orders and that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and de- 
parted there on the 11th, that the final destination was not known by "outsiders" 
until they arrived. The maintenance of secrecy on this trip was a great suc- 
cess, it was reported. 

29 April, 1941 
(To Tokyo) 
The American Army transport Washington with 2,500 troops and 24,300 tons 
of military supplies departed New York the 11th and arrived here early the 
morning of the 26th [2]] via Panama and San Francisco. After unload- 
ing 2,000 troops, 12 student pilots, and military stores, 500 troops were embarked 
and she departed the 27th. It is believed this ship will be employed in trans- 
porting troops and evacuating Americans from the Far East. 

14 MAY, 1941 

(To Tokyo) 

With respect to message No. 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reenforcing 
the local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieutenant General Em- 
mons departed San Francisco at 1559 the 13th fiying in formation and arrived 
Hickam Field at 0558 the 14th. 



79716 — 46— Ex. 149, vol. 2 18 



932 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

7 JTTNB, 1941 

(To Tokyo ; by code mail to San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle) 

1. On the fourth received word from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started 
conservations with the Secretary of the Navy. No extraordinary significance 
seems to attach to his visit. 

2. According to an announcement by Navy Department officials Admiral Kim- 
mel brought plans for sending units [5] of the Fleet back to the mainland 
for recreation of personnel for short periods. The periods and names of vessels 
to return were not announced. 

13 JUNE 1941 

(To Tokyo; by code mail to San Francisco and Manila) 

Reference San Francisco MSG #92 : 

SS President Pierce with about 900 Army men embarked (includes some hun- 
dreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the 11th and sailed the 
12th. 

26 JUNE 1941 

(To Tokyo) 
Admiral Kimmel and Captain McMorris returned by Clipper the 25th. 

27 JUNE 1941 

(To Tokyo) 
Chungking — Burma Road — Trucks 

28 JUNE 1941 

(To Tokyo and Consul, Hongkong) 

Danial Arnstein, Harold Davis, Manco Hellman, transportation [4] man- 
agers of prominent eastern U. S. trucking companies will leave on the 28th via 
clipper for Hong Kong. Their aim will be to inspect the Burma Road from the 
standpoint of speeding help (to China). 

8 JULY, 1941 

(To Tokyo and Washington) 

A report regarding the Washington report of the Latin Pact of May that 
American pilots are joining the China air force : The local Chinese Consul Gen- 
eral on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his consulate (largely from local air groups). 
Newspapers reports indicate that the Chinese military attache in Washington 
(makes arrangements?) furthermore according to English (language) news- 
papers of the 5th, 200 men have already (Toppa Senn) gone (?). The Chinese 
Consul General avoids a statement regarding his orders. 

15 JULY 1941 

(To Tokyo, San Francisco, Washington) 

On the evening of the 14th a local broadcasting station broadcast to the effect 
that at present more than twenty Soviet ships are concentrating on the west 
coast and [5] loading for Vladivostok with machinery, parts, shoes, high 
test gasoline, etc., which had previously been released for export to Russia. 

26 JULY 1941 

(To Washington and Tokyo) 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Forrestal accompanied by Rear Admiral 
Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and his aide will leave Alameda in 
a Navy plane on the 26th and arrive at Pearl Harbor for the purpose of inspect- 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



933 



ing the U. S. Fleet and naval and military installations. In the same plane, six 
oflScials connected with the Treasury Department will arrive for the purpose of 
handling afEairs concerning the freezing of Japanese and Chinese assets here. 

2 SSaT^MBEB 1941 

(To Washington and Tokyo ) 

On the 2nd an English language paper reported that on the 1st a foreign ship 
(called a sister ship of the Egyptian ship Zamzam which was recently attacked 
by German planes, but the name and nationality was not [6] announced) 
entered port here enroute to the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and 
mechanics. Although the group declined to reveal their destination, they are 
an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma 
road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their military duties. 

23 SEPTEMBEB, 1941 

(To Tokyo) 
Magruder to Chungking via Manila. 

18 NOVEMBEB 1941 

(To Tokyo) 
Capt. Richard M. Jones, etc., Burma road trucks 3000 — 2 ton trucks. 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 41 

7 June 1945. 
I hereby certify that the annexed pages 1-28 are true and correct photostats 
of original documents on file in Frupac* 

Tho. H. Dyar, 
Captain, U. S. Navy. 

SIS TRANSLATIONS 1200-1299 
DIPLOMATIC "KO", "PA" & "LA" SYSTEMS 





Date 


Addressee 


GR 


Next to last code group 


Received 


Transmit- 
ted 


FBI has 


/3 Dec 


T 

T 

T 
SF 

W 

T 

T 
SF 

T 

T 

T 
SF 
Sea 

T 

W 

T 

T 

W 


165 
188 
56 
59 
69 
18 
25 
27 
16 
41 
42 
45 
45 
43 
45 
138 
47 
49 












\3 Dec 












(3 Dec 




!■ Same 


r 1254 

i 1254 

[ 1255 

1657 

/ 1718 

1 1718 

1834 

1833 

1804 

f 1136 

J 1139 

1 1136 

I 1132 

1258 

f 1801 

1 1801 


1315 




JsDec 




1318 




13 Dee 




1318 




3 Dee 




1707 




/3 Dec 




1 Same 


1726 




l3 Dec 




1730 




4 Dec 


lYJIE 


1848 




4 Dec 


YUAHE-... 




1850 




5 Dec - . - - 


BYJVE 




1806 




f5 Dec 


IHSGZ 

IHSGZ 

IHSGZ 

IHSGZ 

OXAQA 


> Same 


1138 




5 Dec 

5 Dec 


1139 
1139 




5 Dee .. 


1132 




6 Dec 


1304 




/6 Dec 


UEVTA..._ 
UEVTA...- 


1 Same 


1805 




\6 Dec 


1807 









•(Incorporated into Exhibits 56 and 57 — June 27, 1945.) 



934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Secret 

FOXJETEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT 
DISTRICT INTETXIGENCE OFFICE 

Sixth Floor, Young Hotel, Honolulu, Hawaii 

WBS/wbs 
Memo for : The File. 

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE GENERAL, Honolulu. 
Ref : (a) FBI-Hon. Inv. Rpt, dated 26 Dec. 1941, subject: Japanese Activities 
Honolulu, T. H. 
1. Capt. I. H. Mayfield, USN, former DI0-14ND, was interviewed regarding 
reference (a) on 17 March 1944, in the presence of Capt. Peyton Harrison, USNR, 
present DI0-14ND, and the undersigned. Upon reading reference (a) in full, 
Capt. Mayfield made the following observations, in substance : 

(a) Ref. (a), p. 2, 2nd full par. — Statement that the material was not in- 
ventoried is correct. 

(b) Ref. (a), p. 4, 3rd full par. — I did receive some of the enciphered Con- 
sulate traffic from RCA after 1 Dec. 1941 and before 7 Dec. 1941. All was 
delivered immediately by officer messenger to Comdr. J. J. Rochefort, USN, 
0-in-C of the combat intelligence "unit" at NYPH. Insofar as Comdr. Rochefort 
provided me with "clear" versions of portions of that traffic, I furnished FBI- 
Honolulu with copies thereof. 

(c) Ref. (a), p. 6, 1st full indented par. — Meeting of Mr. Shivers, Lt. Col. 
Bicknell, and myself took place in the DIG office about 1100, 11 Dec. 1941, after 
the Commandant directed me to get in touch with Mr. Shivers and work on the 
matter immediately. 

(d) Ref. (a), p. 7, top line — To my knowledge, it was never established that 
anyone ever used the signaling system to communicate with the enemy: 

(e) Ref. (a), last page, 2nd and 3rd lines from top — The action taken by me 
was to notify the appropriate District and Fleet staff officers with whom I had 
been maintaining liaison on such matters — Comdr. Rochefort, and Lt. Comdr, 
E. T. Layton, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer. 

W. B. Stephenson, 
W. B. Stephenson, 

Lieutenant, USNR. 

23 January, 1942. 
Copies of the within messages given to FBI and MID today by Lt. Kimball. 

W. B. S. 

1941 DEC 7 AM 3 20 
ZL MRHU68 TOKIO JG 19 9 PM 7TH 

Urgent 92494 koyanagi rijiyori seirinotu-goo arunituki hattori minami kinen 
bunko seturitu kidino kyokingaru sikyuu denpoo aritasi stop 

Togo. 

[Ostensible meaning: Regarding the state of adjustment [of what?] from 
Director KOYANAGI [stated by a thoroughly reliable soure to stand for "Eng- 
land"]. An ux'gent wire is requested re the sum collected for the establishment 
of the reference HATTORI [code for "relations strained"] MIANIMI [code for 
"America"] Memorial Library.] 

"Relations strained with U. S. & England" is purport, ace. to the same source. 

(The document. from which this translation was made was not received until 
after 7 December 1941. 

Denzel Carb. 

6 June 1945. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 935 

Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 42 

7 June 1045. 
I hereby certify that the amended page is a true and correct copy of an original 
document on file in Vrupac. 

Thos. H. Dyeb, 
Captain, U. S. Navy. 

(Exhibit No. 42 consists of a paper showing part of the decryption 
process of the Japanese "PA" code. This paper will be found repro- 
duced as Item No. 124, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS,- Hewitt 
Inquiry.) 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 43 

U. S. Na\t Yard, Peael Harbok, Hawaii, U. S. A. 
Office of the Captain of the Yard 

I hereby certify that the attached photostats onsisting of four sheets are true 
copies of part of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard Duty Officer's Information Sheets, 
ch are a part of the records of the Office of the aptain of the Yard, the originals of 
which records are on file in the Office of the Captain of the Yard. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the 
Captain of the Yard to be affixed, this seventh day of June, 1945. 

S. F. Craven, 
Captain, U. S. N., 
Captain of the Yard. 

U. S. Navy Yard, PEiVRi> Harbor Haw ah, U. S. A. 

Office of the Captain of the Yard 
Restricted 

DUTY' OFFICERS' INFORMATION SHEET NOS. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 

1. The following information is furnished for duty officer as of 1200, December 
G, 1941 : 

Prospective Arrivals 

2200 Litchfield out. 

Ship, ANTARES. Time, 0600. Day, 12-7. Berth, XXX K-3. Pilot, 1. Tug, 
142-153. *S. F. W. D. H. L., ARGONE. 

Antares will require customs and agricultural inspection. 

Prospective arrivels : *PLUNGER to SB 12^7, *POLLACK to SB 12-7, *POM- 
PANO to SB 12-7, 1500 Sunday. Sunday 1400, *NAVAJO towing YC-786 12-8 to 
M-1 Yardcraft take tow in "Turning Basin". 

*"A11 require agricultural inspection (inspector not notified) . 

Prospective Departures 

Ship, HENLEY. Time, 1645. Day, 12-7. Tug, XX. 
Kail, 0840 12-8 Coal dock to K5. 

DUTY TUG SECTION LEADER 

12-6 153-Holzhaus, B. M. Ic. ; 142-Fielder, C. B. M. 
Dispatchers : Kennedy, C. Q. M. & Shepard, B. M. Ic. 

12-7 130-Campbell, B. M. Ic. ; 38-Lt. Comdr. Boltz ; Dispatchers, Jones CQM 
Vigil, BMlc 

Other Information of Interest 

1930 12-6 NEOSHO Hickam Buoys to F-4, pilot 4, tugs 142^153, lines NAS. 

0100 12-7 COCKATOO & REEDBIRD sweep channel. 

0900 12-7 NEOSHO F-4 to M-3, pilot 1, tugs 142-153, lines NAS/CASTOR. 

0100 12-8 CONDOR & CROSSBILL sweep channel. 

The dredge "TURBINE" is working in the drydock channel and all tx-affic 
incoming or outgoing should be directed via the North Channel. 

The dredge "WEEBER" is working in the South Channel off Hospital Point. 
All traffic incoming or outgoing should be directed via the North Channel. Duty 
Officer can control movements of tugs and mud scows, and getting dredge cleared 
by telephone 4219. 



936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



The Anti-Torpedo Net will be closed from sunset to sunrise. To be opened and 
closed only upon orders from the Captain of the Yard, the Assistant Captain of 
the Yard, or the Yard Duty Oflacer. Can be reached by telephone S254 or via the 
tSignal Tower. 
The Assistant Captain of the Yard (Comdr. H. R. Hayes) 'phone 2141. 
Pilot's home phones : Otterson Aiea 63175 ; Green Aiea 63931 ; Hannus Aiea 
63827 ; Carlson 714 15th St., Hickam Housing Area. 

Inshore patrol— CHEW ; Ready duty destroyer— 12-6 MONAGHAN ; 12-7 
RAMSAY ; Night flying NAS none reported. 
12-6 
Duty Oflicers: Yard Lieut. Mcllhenny ; Security Lt. (jg) Lewis. 

12-7 Lt Comdr. Welden ; Ens. Peabody. 
*S. F. W. D. H. L. — Ship furnishing working detail for handling lines. 
CC: Hull Superintendent, Public Works OflScer, Power Plant, Master Rigger, 
Pilot, File. 

H. R. Hayes 
H. R. Hayes, 
Commander, U. S. Navy, 
Assistant Captain of the Nany Yard. 

(At this point in Exhibit No. 43 there appears a sketch captioned 
"Berth Numbers", dated December 6, 1941, relating to Pearl Harbor. 
This sketch will be found reproduced as Item No. 125, EXHIBITS- 
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.) 

Office of the Assistant Captain of the Yaed 

LIST OF ships present AS OF 1130 

RESTRICTED 
December 6, 1941 1941 



B-1 Cachalot 


K-1 


D-5 


B-2 Helena Oglala 


K-2 


D-6 


B-3 


K-3 


D-7 Zane Washmuth Trever 
Perry 


B-4 Argonne Tern 


K-4 


D-8 


B-5 


K-5 


D-9 


B-6 Mugford Sacramento Jarvis 


C-2 


T-1 


B-7 


C-3 


T-2 


B-8 


C-4 


T-3 


B-9 


C-5 


T-4 


B-10 


C-6 Phoenix 


XPl 


B-11 


X-1 


XP2 


B-12 


X-2 Dobbin Wroden McDon- 
ough Phelps Dewey Hull 


WBl 


B-13 Rigel 


X-3 


WB2 


B-15 Cummings Tracy Preble 


X-4 Solace 


SUBBASE 


B-16 New Orleans Ramapo 


X-5 Allen Bait. Nava. 


Litchfield Narwhal Pelias Gud- 
geon Dolphin Tautog Sumner 
Hulbert Widgeon 


B-17 Sanfrancisco 


X-6 


PT 20-30*42 


B-18 Pruitt Sicard Ontario 


X-7 Blue Helm 




B-20 Sccley Grebe 


X-8 Reid Case Tucker Whitney 
Conyngham 


, 


B-21 St Louis Honolulu 


X-9 


DDl Penna Cassin Downes 


B-24 Bagley 


X-10 


DD2 


M-1 


X-11 Patterson Talbot 


DD3 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 



937 



LIST OF SHIPS PEESENT AS OF 1130— Continued 



M-2 


X-12 


YFD2 Shaw 


M-3 


X-13 


MARREY Swan 


M-4 Castor 


X-1 Monghan Dale 
Aylwin 


Farragut 


West Loch Pyro Henley 


F-1 


X-15 


HONO 


F-2 


X-16 


HONO 


F-3 California 


X-17 


Hickam: SS Haleakala 


F-4 


X-18 


Coal Dock Bobolink Vireo 
Turkey 


F-5 Maryland Oklahoma 


X-19 




F-6 West Va, Tennessee 


X-20 


Inshore Patrol Chow 


F-7 Arizona Vestal 


X-21 




F-8 Nevada 


X-22 Curtiss 


Ready Duty Destroyer Mong- 
ghan 


F-9 


X-23 Medusa 




F-10 Tagier 


D-1 


Net Depot Reedbird CrossbDl 
Condor Cockatoo Chengho 
AshYN7 YNgl 


F-U Utah 


D-2 


YP109 YN53 


F-12 Raleigh 


D-3 Gamble Breese 
ery Ramsay 


Montgom- 


SOPA COMBATFOR CALI- 
FORNIA 


F-13 Detroit 


D-4 


IN: 



9 : 25 : Lay out fire hoses. 

9 : 30 : Fire #1 drydock. Out of hand get more men down there. 
9 : 35 : Torpedo at 0£E Club wharf unexploded. Wilder notify Capt. of Yd. I no- 
tified Capt. Yd.— Wood. 
9 : 40 Fuel off. Lower tank. 1 tank blew up. 
10 : 00 False alarm. 
4208, 3224, 3287. 

Ship Hughes FD— 3224 

10 : 25 : Murphy called saying : boats Wolse & Miduj have truck! 

10 ; 25 : 59591 — Hold trucks with in readiness. Can't get thru our lines out. 



Hewitt Inquiby Exhibit No. 44 
U. S. S. YNG-17 

CEETIFICATE 

I hereby certify that the attached six sheets are true copies of pages of the 
signal log of U. S. S. YNG-17, kept aboard this ship under my custody and com- 
mand. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 5 day of June, one thou- 
sand nine hundred and forty-five. 

J. D. Robinson, 
Joe D. Robinson, 
Lieutenant (jg), USNR, 

Officer in Charge. 
YNG-17 

(Copies of pages of the signal log of the U/SS YNG-17, referred 
to supra, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 126 through 131, 
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTKATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.) 



938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 45 

U. S. S. YNG-17 

certificate 

I hereby certify that the attached seven sheets are true copies of the quarter- 
master's log of U. S. S. YNG-17, kept aboard this ship under my custody and 
command. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 5 day of June, one thou- 
sand nine hundred and forty-five. 

J. D. Robinson, 
Joe D. Robinson, 
Lieutenant (jg), USNR, 

Officer in Charge. 
YNG-17 

(Copies of the quartermaster's log of USS YNG-17, referred to 
supra, will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 132 through 138, 
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.) 

Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 46 

Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, T. H. 

certificate 

I hereby certify that the attached one page is a true copy of the log of the signal 
tower, navy yard. Pearl Harbor, for the method stated thereon, and that the 
original log is kept under my custody and command. 

In witness wliereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the 
Captain of the Yard to be afllxed this fifth day of June, one thousand nine hun- 
dred and forty-five. 

S. F. Craven, 
Captain of the Yard, 
Navy Yard Pearl Harhor, T. H. 

(A copy of the log of the signal tower, navy yard. Pearl Harbor, for 
6-7 December 1941, referred to supra, will be found reproduced as 
Item No. 139, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.) 

Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 47 

United States Pacific Fleet 

and Pacific Ocean Areas 

headquabtr.rs of the commander in chief 

This is to certify that the attached documents consisting of the following: 

Copy of Cincpac Routing Slip 0845 dated 4 September 1941 (inscribed 
"CINCUS Routing No. 0845"), with attached copy of Hawaiian Department Itr. 
AR 311.5 Rev Of HCF-41, Subject : Annex VII and Enclosure (B) to Annex VII 
to 14ND-JCD-42. 

Copy of Cincpac Routing Slip 05710 dated 30 June 1941 (inscribed "CINCUS 
Routing No. 05710"), Subject: Annex VII to 14ND-JCD13 (Joint Security 
Measures: Protection of Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base. \VP#5. 

Copy of Cincpac Routing Slip 0604 dated 10 June 1041 (inscribed "CINCUS 
Routing No. 0604"), with attached copy of CNO Secret Itr. file Op-30B2-BP(SO) 
A7-2(2)/FFl, Serial 059230, dated 20 June 1941, Subject: Joint Security Meas- 
ures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base, and Enclosure (A). 
copy of Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements of the Joint Coastal 
Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval Distiict. 

are true and correct photographic copies of the documents in the ofiicial files of 
the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. 

R. E. Keeton, 
R. E. Keeton, 
By direction of the Commander in Chief, 
V. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 939 

(A copy of Cincpac Kouting Slip No. 0845 dated 4 September 1941, 
referred to supra, will be found reproduced as Item No. 140 EX- 
HIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.) 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department 

office of the department commander 

fort shafter, t. h. 

AG 311.5— Rev of HCF-41. 20 August 1941. 

Subject : Revision of HCF-41. 
To : Custodiaus of HCF-41. 

1. Herewith new cover sheet and Inclosure "B" Section VI, ANNEX VII HCF- 
41 for insertion in Register No. 21 of document now in your possession. 

2. Present cover sheet marl^cd "to be published later" will be destroyed. 
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT : 

O. M. McDole, 
O. M. McDoLE, 

lla]or, A. G. D. 
Assistant Adjutant Qeneral. 

Inclosure A— Annex No. VIII HFC-39 ; 14 ND-JCD-13 

AIRCRAFT DEPARTUBE, APPROACH, AND RECOGNITION PROCEDURE — OAHU AREA 

To be published later. 

Inclosure B— Annex No. VII HCF-39 ; 14 ND-JCD-13 

HARBOR CONTROL POST, HONOLULU AND PEARL HARBORS, OAHU, T. H. 

(To be published later. Pending publication of this inclosure, the Harbor 
Control Post will be established, as far as practicable in accordaoce with the 
recommendations contained in the report (dated 17 March 1941) of the joint com- 
mittee (Chairman, Commander H. B. Knowles, USN) convened to study and 
report upon the establishment of a Harbor Control Post and Measures for Com- 
munication, Coordination, and Liaison between the Inshore Patrol and the Harbor 
Defenses. ) 

(Copies of Cincpac Routing Slips Nos. 0604 and 05710, dated 10 June 
1911 and 30 June 1941, respectively, and referred to swpra, will be 
found reproduced as Items Nos. 141 and 142, EXHIBITS -ILLUS- 
TRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.) 

(SC)A7-2(2)/FFl Serial 059230 

Secret 

From : The Chief of Naval Operations. 

To : The Commandants, All Naval Districts. 

The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet. 
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet. 
Subject : Joint Security Measures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl 

Harbor Base. 
Enclosure: (A) Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements of the Joint 
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and 
Fourteenth Naval District. 

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information. Attention is invited to the 
importance of the problems presented in the subject matter. 

2. Transmission by registered mail within the continental limits of the United 
States is authorized. 

/s/ H. R. Stark. 
Copy to : Op-12 



940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1] Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District 

1939 

28 Marcli 1941 

ANNEa? No. VII Section VI Joint Agreements. Joint Security Measures, 
Protection of Fleet and Pearl Harbor Base. 

I. general 

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet 
and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air 
attacks delivered prior to a declaration of vpar and before a general mobilization 
for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF- 
39, (14ND-JCD-13) are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once 
and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their re- 
nouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to in- 
corporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable 
and necessary. 

U. JOINT AIE operations 

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval 
Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that 
the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such 
action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to 
make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the 
air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint 
operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans. 

a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the 
tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the 
Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consider- 
ation to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes 
released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will re- 
main available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion 
of the mission, when it will revert to Army control. 

[2] b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu 
will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base 
Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these 
missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number 
of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. 
This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or 
for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical 
situation ; it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant 14th 
Naval District), and i-everts to Navy control. 

c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search opera- 
tions, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the 
tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations. 

d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the 
protection xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this 
mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the 
mission. 

m. joint communications 

3. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to friendly 
and hostile aircraft, and to provide for the transmission of orders when units of 
one service are placed under the tactical control of the other service. Army and 
Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and operation, 
within the limitations of equipment on hand or which may be procured, of the 
following means of joint communication. 

a. Joint Air-Antiaircraft page printer teletype circuit with the following sta- 
tions : 

ARMY NAVY 

Hawaiian Air Force Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor 

18th Bombardment Wing Naval Air Station, Kaneche 

14th Pursuit Wing Ewa Landing Field 

Hq. Prov. AA Brigade Waialupe Radio Station 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 941 

6. Joint radio circuit on 219 kilocycles with the following stations : 

ABMY NAVY 

♦Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. Waialupe Radio Station 

Headquarters, HSCA Brigade Senior Officer Present Afloat 

Hq. Prov. AA Brigade Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor 

Hq. Hawaiian Air Force Naval Air Station, Kaneohe 

18th Bombardment Wing Marine Air Group, Ewa 
14th Pursuit Wing 

[3] c. Direct local battery telephone lines as follows : 

ARMY NAVY 

Hq. Haw. Dept. (G-3 Office) 14th Naval District 

CP, H. S. C. A. B. 14th Naval District 

CP, Pearl Harbor Gpmt (Ft. Kam) 14th Naval District 

d. Radio frequencies to be employed during joint air operations both during 
combat and joint eercises, for communication between airplanes in flight will be as 
agreed upon by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and the Com- 
mander, Base Defense Air Force. 

4. To facilitate the prompt interchange of information relating to the move- 
ments of friendly and hostile naval ships and of commercial shipping, Army and 
Navy communications personnel will provide for the installation and operation, 
within the limitations of equipment on hand, or which may be procured, of the 
following means of joint communication : 

a. Joint page printer teletype circuit connecting the Harbor Control Post with 
the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade loop. 

6. Joint radio circuit on 2550 kilocycles with the following stations : 

ARMY NAVY 

CP, PH Gpmt, Ft. Kamehameha Waialupe 

CP, Hon. Gymt, Ft. Ruger Destroyer Patrol 

Additional stations that may be deter- Mine Sweepers 
mined to be necessary 

c. Telephone circuits as provided in par. 3 c. above. 

5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, the Army will 
operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broad- 
casts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly and 
hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS are 
such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will in 
most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAAIS will be transmitted 
on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or movements of hostile air- 
craft off-shore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be trans- 
mitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade. 

6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made 
for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly 
aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of 
Navy liaison oflScers, so that they may make their own evaluation of [4] 

7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, 
the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service (after 
establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods, joint 
exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such periods 
as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the 
Naval Base Defense Officer. The temporary loan of surplus communication 
equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint communi- 
cation nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken by the 
service receiving the borrowed equipment to obtain replacements for the borrowed 
articles through their own supply channels, 

♦Net Control Station. 



942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
IV. JOINT ANTIAIRCRAFT MEASURES 

8. Arrival and departure procedure, aircraft. — ^During joint exercises, alert 
periods, and combat, and at such other times as the Commanding General Ha- 
waiian Department and the Naval Base Defense OfBcer (Commandant, Four- 
teenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy aircraft approch- 
ing Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will conform to the Arrival and 
Departure Procedure prescribed in Inslosure A. This procedure will not be modi- 
fied except when a departure therefrom is essential due to combat (real or simu- 
lated during exercises) or due to an emergency. 

9. Balloon barrages. — Reports from abroad indicate the successful development 
and use of balloon barrages by European belligerents both British and German. 
Although detailed information is not available, the possibilities of balloon bar- 
rages in the Oahu area are recognized. Further investigation and study is neces- 
sary both locally and by the War and Navy Departments in order to determine 
the practicability of this phase of local defense. 

10. Marine Corps antiaircraft artillery. — When made available by the Naval 
Base Defense Officer, (Commandant, 14th Naval District), Marine Corps units 
manning antiaircraft artillery present on Oahu will be placed under the tactical 
control of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade. 

11. Aircraft Warning Service. — The Army will expedite the installation and 
placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior 
to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of RADAR 
and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile 
attacks as may be practicable. 

[5] V. MUNITIONS, JOINT USE OF 

12. Army and Navy Officers charged with the storage and issue of ammunition 
and bombs will exchange information concerning the types, quantities, and loca- 
tions of tliese munitions which are suitable for use by the other service. Studies 
will be instituted and plans prepared for the prompt transfer of ammunition 
from one service to the other. No such transfer of munitions will be made with- 
out specific authority granted by the commander concerned for each transfer. 

VI. SMOKE SCREENS 

13. Smoke screens will not be employed for screening the Pearl Harbor-Hickam 
Field area from air attacks. 

VII. HAEBOB CONTROL POST 

14. A joint harbor control post, as described in Inclosure B, will be established 
without delay. This system will be actively manned during joint exercises, 
alert periods, and combat and for such other periods as may be agreed upon by 
the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense 
Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District). 

Approved : 2 April 1941. 

(Signed) C. C. Bloch (Signed) Walter C. Short 
C. C. Bloch, Walter C. Short, 

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 
Commandant, Commanding, 

Fourteenth Naval District. Hawaiian Department. 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 48 

Classified Incoming 

U. S. Naval Communication Service 

CinCPAC and CinCPOA 

Heading MUX 031835 GR 10 BT 
2 Submarines and tender longitude 159-12 latitude 21-05. Confidential. 
Certified to be a true copy. R. E. Cox Ensign USNR. 
Date 3 DEC 41. Crypto-Group 740. CBO MRQ. Circ. No. 12-89. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 943 

Originator : Action : Information : 

PLANE 3 VP 12 COMPATWING 1 SOPA 

031835 COMTASKFOR 2 CINCPAC, COM 14, 

COMPATWING 1 COMPATWING 2, 

PEARL 
Classified Incoming 

U. S. Naval Communication Service 

CinCPAC and CinCPOA 

NPM 823 030040 Priority 

Sound contact reported lat 20 30 Long 158 23 at 1000 X Desron 4 investigate X 
Battleships operate east long 158 X Detroit Victor 123 during niglit. Confidential. 
Certified to be a true copy. R. E. Cox Ensign USNR. 
Date 3 Dec 41. Crypto-Group 132-C. CBO OCF. Circ. No. 12-73. 

Originator : Action : Information : 

COMTASKFOR 2 DETROIT COM 14 

030040 COMDESRON 4 COMBATFOR 

COMBATDIV 1 CINCPAC 

Classified Incoming 

U. S. Naval Communication Service 

CinCPAC and CinCPOA 
NPM NR 814 Confidential Priority 

Gamble in lat 20-30 long 158-23 reports clear metallic echo picked up bearing 
097 true distant 2800 yards X Lost echo bearing 101 at 4300 yards about 3 
minutes later change of range appeared too rapid for submatine. 

Certified to be a true copy. R. E. Cox Ensign USNR. 

Date 3 Dec. Crypto-Group 132-C. CBO JSM. Circ. No. 12-58. 

Originator : Action : Information : 

NEVADA COMTASKFOR 2 SOPA PEARL 

022336 CINCPAC 

COM 14 
COMBATDIV 1 

Classified Incoming 

U. S. Naval Communication Service 

CinCPAC and CinCPOA 

4205 1845 Priority 

Searched western border and most of northern half cast 9. No contacts. 
Confidential. 
Certified to be a true copy. S. D. Lohmann Lt ( jg) USNR. 
Date 28 Nov. Crypto-Group 816. CBO DCG. Circ. No. 11-886. 

Originator: Action:- Information; 

CIG 1.4 CTF 1 CTF 2 CINCPAC 

1845/28 

Classified Incoming 

U. S. Naval Communication Service 

CinCPAC and CinCPOA 
1704/28 GR 33 

Abandon search in time to join Task Group 1.1 by 0900. Confidential. 

Certified to be a true copy. S. D. Lohmann Lt (jg) USNR. 

Date 28 Nov '41. Crypto-Group 816. CBO FWR. Circ. No. 11-876. 

Originator : Action : Information : 

COMTASKFOR 1 COMTASKGR 1.4 TASKFOR 1 

1704/28 COMTASKFOR 2 

CINCPAC 



944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Classified Incoming 

U. S. Naval Communication Service 

CinCPAC ani> CinCPOA 
1133/28 GR 17 

Keep clear area cast 9 at least 15 miles. Confidential. 

Certified to be a true copy. S. D. Lohmann Lt ( jg) USNR. 

Date 28 Nov '41. Crypto-Group 816. CBO FWR. Circ. No. 11-871. 

Originator : Action : Information : 

COMTASKFOR 1 BOGGS CINCPAC 

1133/28 TASKFOR 1 

Classified Incoming 

U. S. Naval Communication Service 



281050 P GR 44 



CinCPAO and CinCPOA 



-P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y- 



Task Group 1.4 with 3 Destroyers search area cast 9 for submarine X Task 
Group 1.1 and 1.5 keep 50 miles. From area cast nine (9) until daylight 
approach on point option from west. Confidential. 

Certified to be a true copy. S. D. Lohmann Lt ( jg) USNR. 

Date 28 Nov '41. Crypto-Group 26. CBO FWR. Circ. No. 11-870. 

Originator: Action: Information: 

COMTASKFOR 1 COMDESDIV 6 TASK FOR 2 

281050 TASK FOR 1 

CINCPAC 

Classified Incoming 

U. S. Naval Communications Service 

CiNCPAC AND CiNCPOA 

Secret 

280835 P GR 36 

-P-R^I-0-R-I-T-Y- 

Radar operator without knowledge CINCPAC 280355/6 iwsitive that a sub- 
marine was in area cast 9 during Helena firing approach about 1900. 

Ref #11-857 extreme vigilance against subs in operating areas especially dur- 
ing sorties and entrances . . . subs conduct submerged operations only in cast 5 
and cast 7 . . , depth bomb all contacts suspected to be hostile except in cast 
5 and 7. 

Certified to be a true copy W. C. Woods, Lt( jg) USNR. 

Date 28 Nov '41. Crypto-Group 137. CBO. FWR. 

ORIGINATOR : ACTION : INFORMATION : 

HELENA COMTASKGR 1.5 SERIAL NUMBER 

280835 COMTASKFOR 1 11-872 

COMTASKGR 1.5 CINCPAC 

COMTASKFOR 1 COMTASKFOR 2 

Classified Incoming 

U. S. Naval Communications Service 



CiNCPAC AND CiNCPOA 

0042 



Priority 



Your 2105 investigated scattered slicks character indefinite. Confidential. 

Ref. — Investigate and report on oil slick sighted by patrol plane. 

Certified to be a true copy R. E. Cox Ensign USNR. 

Date 4 Nov. Crypto-Group 740 CBO DCG Circ. No. 11-70. 

ORIGINATOR : ACTION : INFORMATION : 

DALE COMTASKFOR 1 CINCPAC 

0042/04 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 945 

Classified Incoming 

U. S. Naval Communications Seevice 

CiNCPAC AND CiNCPOA 

032300 

Routine 

Found scattered patches and streaks lub oil latitude 20-10 longitude 157-41 sound 

search result negative. Confidential. 

Certified to be a true copy R. E. Cox Ensign USNR 

Date Nov 4 41 Crypto-Group 740. CBO WBM. Circ. No. 11-66. 

ORIGINATOR : ACTION : INFORMATION : 

WORDEN COMTASKFOR 1 CINCPAC 

032300 
COMTASKFOR 1 

Classified Incoming 

U. S. Naval Communications Service 

CiNCPAc and Cincpoa 

4205/Z 032133 P GR 30 BT Priority 

CONFIDENTIAL 

Task Force One about twelve hours ago crossed area of oil slick reported by 
patrol plane number five. Light airs prevailed all night. 

Certified to be a true copy R. E. Cox Ens. USNR. 
Date 11/3/41, Crypto-Group 132-C. CBO LJO. Circ. No. 11-63. 

ORIGINATOR : ACTION : INFORMATION : 

COMBATSHIPS CINCPAC 

032133 

Classified Incoming 

U. S. Naval Communications Service 



MUX 



CiNCPAc AND Cincpoa 
032035 



Searched area 15 mile no result. Priority. Confidential. 

Certified to be a true copy W. M. Klepper Lt(jg) USNR. 

Date 3 Nov, Crypto-Group 740. CBO DCC. Circ. No. 11-59. 

ORIGINATOR : ACTION : INFORMATION : 

PLANE 5 VP-11 COMTASKFORCE 18 CINCPAC 

COM 14 

SOP AT PEARL 
COMPATWING 2 

Classified Incoming 

U. S. Naval Communications Service 

CiNCPAc AND Cincpoa 
MUX 

031920 

Confidential 
Investigating suspicious oil slick position 20-15 157-40, Priority. 
Certified to be a true copy A. S. Gordon Lt ( ig) USNR. 
Date 3 Nov. Crypto-Group 740. CBO, DCC, Circ, No. 11-58. 

ORIGINATOR : ACTION : INFORMATION : 

PLANE 5 COMTASKFORCE 1 CINCPAC 

VP-11 COM 14 

031920 SOP AT PEARL 

COMPATWING 2 

CofS X. F Sec X. Fl Lt X. Oper X. Avia. X. Gun X. AOO X. FCO X. 
FSO X. AOO X. 



946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Classified Incoming 

D. S. Naval Communications Service 

CiNCPAC AND CiNCPOA 

Z 1230 1932 0G1 Q MIC WING TORY 0F2 BT PRIORITY 

Investigating suspicious vessels lat 21-05 long 159. Confidential. 
Certified to be a true copy W. C. Woods, Lt ( jg) USNR. 
Date Oct 16 1941. Crypto-Group 740. CBOWBM. 

ORIGINATOR : ACTION : INFORIVIATION : 

PLANE 3 VP-23 COMTASKFORCE 1 SERIAL NO. 10-331 

1923/16 SOPA PEARL 

CINCPAC 



Hewitt Inquiky Exhibit No. 49 

This is to certify that the attached documents consisting of the following : 
Copy of Cincpac Routing Slip 03210 dated 14 April 1941 (inscribed "CINCUS 
Routing No. 03210"), with attached copy of ComPatWing Two Confidential Itr. 
file C A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14, Serial 0348 of 9 April 1941, and copy of Com 14 
Mailgram DTG 120001 of April 1941, Subject : Annex Baker to Commander Naval 
Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 dated 27 February 1941. 
are true and correct photographic copies of the documents in the official files of 
the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. 

[SEAL] 

R. E. Keeton, 
By direction of the Commander in CJiief, 
V. 8. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. 

(A copy of Cincpac Routing slip 03210 dated 14 April 1941, referred 
to supra, will be found reproduced as Item No. 143, EXHIBITS- 
ILLUSTRATIONS, Hewitt Inquiry.) 

[Mailgram] 

From: Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) 

Mailed at: Pearl Harbor, T. H. 

120001 April 1941 
Action To : CincPac, Pacific Fleet Force 

Commanders & Type Commanders 
ComPatWing 2, Dist. Mar. Officer, 
Capt. Yard, C. O.'S Dist. Activities 
& Units as per Distribution List 
of N.B.D.O. Operation Plan No. 
1-41 with Annexes A,B,C,D, & E. 
Information : CincPac 

Comdg. Gen. Hawaiian Dept. 

confidential 

In accordance with paragraph (X) of Naval Base Defense Officer Operation 
Plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941, revision of Annex Baker (Naval Base Defense 
Air Force Operational Plan No. A-1-41 dated 9 April 1941) is issued in replace- 
ment of Annex Baker dated 28 February 1941 and the latter will be destroyed. 

C. C. Bloch, 
Rear Admiral, U. S. N., 
Commander Naval Base Defense Force 
{Commandant Fourteenth Naval Dist.) 
Authenticated : 

J. W. Bays, 
Lieutenant, U. 8. Navy. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 947 

[i] Navai Aai Station, 

Pearl Harbor, T. H. April 9, 1941. 

ANNEX BAKEE TO COMMANDER NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. 1-41 

DATED FEBRUARY 2 7, 1941 

Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-l-^l. — Task Organisation 

(a) Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force 
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO)). The following units in accordance with 
current conditions of readiness : 

Patrol Squadtons. 

Shore-based VO— VS units. 

Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons. 

Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group. 

Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons. 

Army bombardment squadrons. 

Army reconnaissance squadrons. 

Navy Utility squadrons. 

(b) Air Combat Group (Senior VF Squadron Commandei'. The following 
units in accordance with current conditions of readiness : 

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons. 
Shore-based Marine VF squadrons. 
One division of shore-based carrier type VS planes. 

1. Information: This plan is made in accordance with: The Joint Air Opera- 
tions agreement approved, and promulgated on 21 March 1941 ; Joint Estimate 
covering joint Army and Navy air action, addendum I to this plan ; and Pacific 
fleet confidential letter No. 2CLr-41 dated 15 February 1941. An air combat 
group under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Air Force will : Intercept 
and destroy hostile aircraft; Identify and report type of attacking aircraft; 
Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander 
search and attack group ; and as a secondary mission support search and attack 
group upon request. 

[2] Assumptions: As in Addendum I of this plan. Antiaircraft gun control 
in the PEARL HARBOR area will be coordinated with operations under this 
plan. Air traffic lanes and recognition signals will be prescribed as found 
necessary. 

2. This force will locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against OAHU or 
Fleet Units in the Operating Ai'eas. 

3. (a) Search and Attack Group, (a) Locate, report, and track all hostile 
surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile 
ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting 
ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to : (1) carrier 
involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception. 

(b) Air Combat Group, (b) Operate as directed by the Commanding Gen- 
eral Hawaiian Air Force. 

(x) This plan is effective upon receipt. It is operative without signal in 
the event of a surprise attack on OAHU. It might be made operative by despatch. 
In the meanwhile condition of readiness prescribed in Addendum II will be taken 
as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units 
and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) 
for Navy units. This plan supersedes and replaces Annex Baker of Naval Base 
Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941. Units assigned 
to task groups of this plan shall make readiness reports in accordance with 
Addendum II of this plan. 

4. The senior carrier commander based ashore at Fleet Air Detachment, 
PEARL HARBOR, shall at all times see that one division of VS planes is 
detailed to the Air Combat Group. When all carrier planes are to embark the 
Group Commander shall so inform the Commander Second IMarine Aircraft 
Group who will make the detail required by this paragraph. 

5. Communications in accordance with Annex Easy to Naval [3] Base 
Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1^0 of 27 February 1941. Use zone plus 



79716 — 46 — Ex. 149, vol. 2 19 



948 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ten and one half time. Operation orders for the search and attack group will 
be separately distributed. 

Addendum I — Joint Estimate. 
Addendum II — Aircraft Readiness. 

P. N. L. Bellinger, 
Rear Admiral, V. 8. N(wy, 
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, 

{Commander Patrol Wing TWO). 
Approved : 

C. C. Bloch, 
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, 
Commander Naval Base Defense Force. 
Authenticated : 

J. W. Bays, 
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy. 

[1] Commander Patrol Wing Two, 

Naval Air Station, Pearl Hartor, T. H. 
Hawaiian Air Force, 

Fort Shatter, T. H. 

Addendum I to naval "base defense Air Force operation plan No. A-l-Jfl 

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden 
hostile action against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area. 

I. Sum<mary of the Situation. 

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, 
and varjlng. 

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of 
war. 

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval Installations on 
OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western 
Pacific for a long period. 

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas 
organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine 
force which initiates hostile action. 

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding 
force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelli- 
gence service. 

II. Survey of Opposing Strengths. 

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or 
more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For 
such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to 
be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. 
Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10-8" 
guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small 
(7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and 
characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However 
the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate 
from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones [2] about 60. Probably the best 
assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided be- 
tween fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and 
armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our 
similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch guns and least 12 six 
inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting 
Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection 
into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from 
their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces 
operating at sea in the Hawaiian area. 

(b) The most diflicult situation for us to meet would be when several of the 
above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore- 
based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being 
periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also 
varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of 
the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for 
flight.. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for 
any extended period, from bases on OAHU, a patrol extensive enough to insure 
that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over OAHU as a com- 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 949 

plete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support 
sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range 
scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this 
work. If present plans are used to bomb well defended ship objectives, the num- 
ber available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the 
continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of 
those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. 
Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, 
can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other 
types of aircraft, in [3] general, can perform functions that accord with 
their type. 

III. Possible Enemy Action. 

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by : 

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area. 
2. : A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl 
Harbor. 
3. A combination of these two. 

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU 
would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most 
likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach 
inside of three hundred miles. 

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more sub- 
marines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been 
drawn away by the original thrust. 

(d) A single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable 
undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a 
carrier. 

(c) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered 
as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might 
find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, 
also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second 
attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day 
to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that 
the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day 
near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be 
that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be 
observed. Under the existing condi- [4] tions this might not be a serious 
disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no 
offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. 
IMidday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the 
above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain 
advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably 
be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large 
success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack. 

IV. Action open to us: 

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to 
reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but 
can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very 
short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless 
other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow 
time limits. 

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating 
areas or on the islands : 

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of 
hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present. 

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force 
and its despatch for attack when information is available. 

(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above: 

1. The immediate despatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept 
the attackers. 

2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range 
shore based aircraft. 

3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to 
their carrier. 

[5] IV. (d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating 
area in addition to (b) above: 



950 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to 
counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent. 

2. Despatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over 
the attack area. 

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes tvs^o hundred twenty mile radius 
from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight 
period. 

(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is 
known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack 
develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum 
of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions 
assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that 
coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one 
of the visualized emei-gencies arises. To provide most effectively for the neces- 
sary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required : 

1. Search Unit. 

2. Attack Unit. 

3. Air Combat Unit. 

Carrier scouts,, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with 
very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying 
conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be 
desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordi- 
nated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group 
commander, 

V. Decisions: 

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against 
OAHU or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from 
a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated 
retaliatory measures. 

2. [6] Subsidiary decisions. In order to be in all respects prepared to 
promptly execute the above decision : 

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air opera- 
tion plan : 

1. Search and Attack Group {Comnmnder Naval Base Defense Air Force 
{Commander Patrol Wing TWO) ). The following units in accordance with 
current conditions of readiness : 

Patrol squadrons. 

Shore-based VO-VS units. 

Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons. 

Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group. 

Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons. 

Army bombardment squadrons. 

Army reconnaissance squadrons. 

Navy Utility squadrons. 
2. Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force). The follow- 
ing units in accordance with current conditions of readiness : 

Army pursuit squadrons. 

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons. 

Shore-based Marine VF squadrons. 

One division of shore-based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing 
aircraft) 

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows : 

1. Search and Attack Group. Locate, report and track all hostile surface 
units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships 
by air attack. Priority of targets : (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. 
If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier 
involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of out surface vessel intercep- 
tion. 

2. Air Combat Group. Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify 
and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail [7] attacking carrier 
type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack 
group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon 
request. 

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan 
when: 

(a) An air attack occurs on OAHU. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 951 

(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is 
probable. 

(c) Information is received that an attacli has been made on fleet units. 

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows: Condi- 
tions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number 
from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condi- 
tion of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the 
degree of readiness prescribed for that part. 

Material readiness 

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task. 

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a 
task. 

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available 
and ready for a task. 

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available 
and ready for a task. 

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes 
of this plan. 

Degree of readiness 

1. For pursuit and VF types — four minutes. 

Types other than fighters — fifteen minutes. 

2. All types — 30 minutes. 

3. All types — One hour. 

4. All types — two hours. 

5. All types — four hours. 

The armament and fuel load for each type under the [8] above condi- 
tions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory planes 
and orders and will be prescribed therein. 

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be main- 
tained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior Officers Present of 
the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. 
In using the above conditions it should be noted that : CONDITION A-1 requires 
a preparation i)eriod of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a 
short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2 require 
watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will 
decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any Condition 1, 2, or 3 
will curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can 
be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work. 

(f ) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that 
prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately 
available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, 
provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying 
from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to 
state : 

(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, 
etc. 

(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness 
as deflned above. 

(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above 
has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare 
detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situa- 
tions requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an 
emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work 
the following tempoi-ary details will be made : 

[9] (a) By commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander 
Patrol Wing TWO) : an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and 
planning to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group. 



952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an oflBcer experienced in 
Army bombardment and x'econnaissance operations and planning to assist 
the Commander of the Search and Attacli Group. 

F. L. Mabtin, 
P. N. L. Beixingee, Major General, U. S. Army, 

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force. 

Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, 
(Commanding Patrol Wi7ig TWO) 
Authenticated : 

J. W. Bays, 
Lieutenant, U. 8. Navy. 

in 

C-A16-3/A4-3 ( 5 ) /ND14 ( 0348 ) 
Confidetitial 

Base Defense Am Foece, Pateol Wing Two, 
Fleet Aib Detachment, Naval Aie Station, 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, 1941. 

Addendum II to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan 
No. A-l-U 

Conditions of readiness and readiness reports 

1. Conditions of readiness will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and 
a number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a 
condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating 
the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part. 

Material Readiness 

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task. 

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for 
a task. 

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type avail- 
able and ready for a task. 

^ D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type avail- 
able and ready for a task. 

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes 
of this plan. 

Degree of operational readiness 

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane 
of a unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with the assigned task. 

1. For pursuit and VF types — four minutes. Types other than fighters, 

fifteen minutes. 

2. All types — 30 minutes. 

3. All types — one hour. 

4. All types — two hours. 

5. All types — four hours. 

2. The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of 
readiness are dependent upon the task assigned in contributory plans and orders 
and will be prescribed in these. 

[2] 3. Readiness Reports: 

(a) A despatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day shall be made by each 
unit assigned to a task group by this plan as follows : 

(1) Units of "Search and Attack Group" to the Commander Naval Base 
Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO) . 

(2) Units of the "Air Combat Group" to the Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Air Force via Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force. 

(b) These reports shall state : 

(1) The number of operating planes in the unit by functional types as 
bomber, fighter, etc. 

(2) The number of each type in material readiness for flight and their 
degree of operational readiness as defined above. 

(c) The officer detailing VS planes to the Air Combat Unit (paragraph 4 of 
N. B. D. A. F. plan No. A-1-41) shall inform the Commander Naval Base Defense 
Air Force and Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force by despatch of the 
detail and any changes therein. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 953 

Hewitt Inqxjiry Exhibit No. 50 

Patroi- Wing Two, 
U. S. Navai, Air Station, 
Pearl Harior, T. U., 20 December 1941. 
PW2/A16-3/0850 
Gonfldential 

From: The Commander Task Force NINE (Commander Patrol Wing TWO). 
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
Subject : Operations on December 7, 1941. 

1. On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, forces under my command were 
disposed as follows : Patrol Squadron TWENTY-ONE at Midway, Patrol Squad- 
rons ELEVEN, TWELVE, FOURTEEN at Kaneohe, TWENTY-ONE, TWENTY- 
THREE AND TWENTY-FOUR at Pearl Harbor, all tenders except WRIGHT 
at Pearl Harbor; WRIGHT enroute to Pearl Harbor from Midway. 

2. The condition of readiness in force was Baker 5 (50% of assigned aircraft 
on 4 hours notice) with machine guns and ammunition in all planes not under- 
going maintenance work. In addition to the above, three squadrons (VP-21 at 
Midway, VP-23 at Pearl, and VP-11 at Kaneohe) were in condition Afirm 5 
(100% of assigned aircraft on 4 hours notice). This was augmented by specific 
duty assignments on December 7 which required six planes from Patrol Squadrons 
FOURTEEN, TWENTY-FOUR and TWELVE to be ready for flight on 30 minutes 
notice. 

The general orders listed above were modified by circumstances and planes 
actually ready for flight were as follows : 

VP-21 7 planes — in the air conducting search 120° to 170° to 450 miles from 
Midway, 

4 planes — on the surface at Midway armed each with 2 five hundred 

pound bombs and on 10 minutes notice. 
VP-11 12 planes — ready for flight on 4 hours notice. 
VP-12 6 planes ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. 

5 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice. 

VP-14 3 planes in the air on morning security patrol armed with depth charges. 

3 planes ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. 

4 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice. 
VP-22 12 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice. 
VP-23 11 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice. 

VP-24 4 planes in the air conducting inter-type tactics with submarines. 
1 plane ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. 

Total 72 in the air or ready for flight in 4 hours or less. 

In this connection it may be stated that the 4 hours notice was primarily set 
to permit rest and recreation of personnel and was in no wise, a criterion of 
material readiness. For example, one plane of VP-23, theoretically on 4 hours 
notice, was actually in the air 45 minutes after the first bomb dropped. 

To summarize the foregoing, at the moment the first bomb dropped, aircraft 
of this command were in the following condition : 

14 — in the air (7 on a search from Midway). 
58 — on the surface ready for flight in four hours or less. 
9 — undergoing repairs. 

81— Total. 

Illustrative of the efforts made by personnel, one of the nine planes undergoing 
repairs took off for a search at 1335, local time, loaded with 4 one thousand 
pound bombs. 

3. A narrative of events of the day follows : 

Time (LOT) 

0700 14-P-l sank enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance. 

0715 Message coded and transmitted to base. 

0735 Message decoded and information received by Staff Duty OflBcer. 

0737 IMessage relayed to Operations OflBcer. 

0740 Relayed by telephone to Staff Duty Officer of Commander in Chief. 

0750 Search plan drafted by Operations Officer. 

0757 First bomb dropped near VP-22 hangar. 



954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

0758 Message ordered broadcasted to all ships present quote "AIR RAIU 
PEARL HARBOR X THIS IS NO DRILL" unquote (An identical 
message was sent by Cincpac). 

0800 Search plan transmitted by radio and telephone (Received by some of 
the planes in the air at 0805), 
From this time on an accurate chronological account is impracticable. 

The Commander Patrol Wing TWO arrived at the Operations Office during the 
first attack and approved the orders that had been issued. Telephonic commu- 
nication with the various squadrons at Pearl Harbor was established in order 
to supplement and possibly accelerate the radio transmissions. As was usually 
the case, it was difficult to communicate with Kaneohe. The page printer had 
gone out of commission and it was quite difficult to obtain a telephonic con- 
nection. Immediately upon termination of the first attack, an endeavor was 
made to determine the sectors of the search actually being covered. It was 
determined, with some difficulty that, of all planes at the bases of Kaneohe and 
Pearl Harbor, only 3 were still in commission. These were dispatched to fill 
holidays in what appeared to be the most promising sectors for search. In addi- 
tion, available planes from the Utility Wing were ordered out. The 2 planes 
still available for duty at Kaneohe were ordered by telephone to cover the sector 
between 280 and 300 degrees. The one plane still available at Pearl Harbor 
had some difficulty in being launched due to the wreckage and fires of other 
planes in the way. About this time the second attack came in. Fire was opened 
by tenders of this command and from machine guns mounted in planes on the 
ground or removed from the planes to extemporized mountings with greater 
arcs of fire. As a result of this second attack, all communications, radio, tele- 
phone and page printer were knocked out of commission. Immediate steps to 
restore communications were taken while the second attack was still underway 
and communications personnel, who unfortunately have not yet been identified, 
proceeded to repair the radio antenna during the height of the attack. Before 
the end of the second attack, radio communications were established by utilizing 
all the facilities available, including some of that unin.iured on the tenders of 
this command. Shortly thereafter, telephonic communication was reestablished 
and information was received that the 2 planes at Kaneohe previously reported 
as ready for service had been destroyed. Accordingly, orders were issued for 
the 1 plane at Pearl Harbor, which had somehow escai)ed unin.iured during the 
second attack, to cover the sector from 280 to 300 degrees. The Commander 
Patrol Wing ONE at Kaneohe felt that the orders to cover the sector 280 to 300, 
which had been transmitted to him by telephone for the 2 planes on the ground, 
required his taking action and he accordingly diverted 14-P-l and 14-P-3 from 
the sector's that they had been searching, information of this action was not 
received by me. 

The Fleet Aviation Officer, Captain A. C. Davis, U. S. N., kept in constant 
touch by telephone and made many valuable suggestions. Various members of 
my staff maintained communications with Army information centers and re- 
quested that attempts be made to track the retiring Japanese planes by RADAR. 
Unfortunately, the CURTISS RADAR was placed out of commission by the 
damage sustained by that vessel. During the mid-afternoon, 14-P-2 reported 
being attacked by enemy planes and was thereafter not heard from for 2 or 
3 hours. As it was felt that this plane had been shot down and a hole thus 
left in what appeared to be the most promising sector of the search, every 
effort was made, as additional planes from whatever sovirce became available, 
to plug the gap. 

All hands exerted their utmost efforts to get more planes ready for flight 
and to arm them for offensive action. Three more patrol planes were reported 
ready at Pearl Harbor and dispatched, each carrying 4 one thousand pound 
bombs. Thirteen SED planes, loaded with 500 pound bombs, came in from 
LEXINGTON and were pressed into service. Nine were dispatched to search 
a sector to the north, while the remaining 4 were ordered to attack 4 .Japanese 
troop ships reported off Barbers Point. This report proved to be unfounded. 

The accompanying charts indicate the search as actually conducted. The 
urgent necessity for conducting daily searches since December 7 and for putting 
all planes possible back in commission, together with urgency for inimediate 
operations, have precluded an exhaustive analysis of the events of the day. 
Certain highlights however may be of interest : 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 955 

All planes in commission had guns on board together with full allowances 
of service ammunition. During the first attack, fire was opened from the guns 
as mounted in the planes, and when it was discovered that these were not 
effective for fire from the ground due to structural interference, many personnel 
removed these guns from the planes and set them up on benches in vises and 
opened up an effective fire against the second attack. As nearly as can be 
determined, a total of 4 Japanese planes were shot down by personnel of 
patrol plane squadrons by this method. 

Two planes of Utility Squadron One conducted an extensive search although 
these planes being of a noncombatant type were not equipped with machine 
guns. Despite the lack of defense against attacks by hostile aircraft, the pilots 
of these planes persisted in their search until the threatened exhaustion of 
their fuel forced their return to Pearl Harbor. The devotion to duty of these 
pilots will be made the subject of a special report. 

These and numerous other instances of distinguished conduct occurred which 
Commander Task Force NINE has not yet had time to investigate. 

4. Attention is invited to the following dispatches and mailgrams indicating 
the extensive searches conducted by units of this command during the period 
30 November to 7 December 1941, from Wake and Midway : 

Ci^^Pa^ 280450| ^, November. 

040237 of December. 
ComTaskForce NINE 2911241 

QQ'^l 01 

292103 of December. 

302359 J 

050328 of November. 

P. N. L. Bellinger. 
Copy to: 

Comairscofor. 



Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 50 (A) 

Classified outgoing 

U. S. Naval Communication Service 

CiNCPAC AND CINCPOA 

From . Info To : 

CINCPAC COMPATWING 2 

To : COMBATFOR 

COMTASKFOR2 COMBASEFOR 

COM 14 

Twelve planes marine fightrom two eleven are to base Wake accordance Myser 
101825 of 10 November X Enterprise provide transportation X After departure 
Pearl on 28 Nov form Task Force Eight consisting of Enterprise Chester North- 
hampton SaltlakeCity and Desron six and pass command task force two to Real 
Admiral Draemel with orders task force two carry out normal operations in 
Hawaiian area X proceed to arrive 200 miles 070 degrees from Wake at 
0700 on 3 Dec X ply off marine planes that vicinity and upon receiving info 
that planes have arrived Wake return Pearl X enroute to and from Wake pass 
through point afirm four hundred miles south of Midway X Patrol planes from 
Midway and Wake will cover your route and provide security while at Wake X 
communications radio condition nineteen guard NPM primary Fox continuously 
X comfourteen inform Wake that planes expected arrive there 0830 on 3 Dec 
and direct Wake report comfourteen by coded dispatch when planes arrive there 
X comfourteen furnish this final arrival information to comtaskfor eight X 
Wake submarine patrol tambor triton will be advised X Narwhal and Dolphin 
are enroute Pearl at 1200 get on 27 Nov they were about 300 miles east of Wake 



956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

280447 Nov 41 11-860 

Classified outgoing 

U. S. Naval Communication Sekvice 

CiNCPAC AND CiNCPOA 

From : Info To : 

CINCPAC COMSCOFOR 

To : COMBATFOR 

COMPATWING 2 COM 14 

COMBASBFOR 
COMAERBATFOR 

Direct 12 patrol planes now at Midway proceed Wake on 1 Dec search enroute X 
provide one squadron relieve Midway planes on 30 November X after arrival both 
squadrons direct them comply my 280447 X present intention return Wake 
squadron Pearl about 5 December 



Classified U. S. Naval Communication Service Incoming 

CiNCPAC AND CiNCPOA 

Secret Mailgram 292103 

ORIGINATOR : 
CTF 9 
292103 

ACTION : 

COMPATRONS 21, 22 
COMTASKGROUP 
9.2 

INFORMATION : 
CINCPAC 
COM 14 

COMSUBSCOFOR 
CO NAS MIDWAY 
CO NAS WAKE 

Operation order 981 x Information Cincpac 280447 and 280450 x Task Force 8 
Enterprise Chester Northampton Salt Lake City 6 DD transporting Marine Figron 
which will base on Wake x Planes will be launched 200 miles bearing 070 from 
Wake at 2000 GCT on December 3 x Enroute and returning Task Force 8 will pass 
point 400 miles south of Midway x Departed Pearl forenoon 28 Nov. x Wright 
expected arrive Midway from Wake 3 December x Mission cover route and provide 
security for TF 8 while in vicinity of Wake in order to obtain information possible 
enemy forces in threatening position and provide readily available aerial slinking 
power during period carrier will be launching marine planes x Tasks Patron 21 
search as (?) indicated ; Nov. 30 depart Pearl daylight search sector 260- 
280 degrees to longitude 165 degrees thence on track 270 to long 172-30 thence to 
Midway ; Dec 1 sector 170 dash 224 to 500 miles using 8 planes ; Dec 2 sector 209- 
237 to 525 miles using four planes ; Dec 3 sector 206-248 to 525 miles using 6 planes ; 
Dec 4 sector 170-224 to 500 miles using 8 planes ; Dec 5 sector 126-168 to 525 miles 
using 6 planes x Patron 22 search as indicated ; Dec 1 depart Midway daylight 
using 2 plane sections sector 226-249 to 525 miles thence on track 238 to far perim- 
eter of 120 mile circle from Wake thence to Wake ; Dec 2 sector 060-102 to 525 
miles using 6 planes; Dec 3 take off at 1800 GCT sector 048-092 to 500 miles 
(?) using six planes: one plane be 200 miles bearing 070 from Wake at 2000 
GCT remain with Task Force 8 until 2400 GCT unless otherwise directed by visual : 
remaining 5 planes each load with 2 500 pound bombs ; imless otherwise directed 
unload bombs at 0230 GCT December 4 x On December four x On Dec 4 take off 
daylight for Midway x On December 5 take off at daylight for Pearl xray critical 
I)eriod entire operation forenoon 3 Dec. x Logistics fuel as required x Special 
provisions use zone times x Task Force 9 basic communications and aerological 
plans X Frequency plan fox Comtaskforce 9 with fairdet at nas Pearl x Maintain 
radio silence except for contact ( ?) reports and emergencies x Arrange for 
bases to broadcast Mo's on schedule without request x. 

Date 11/30/41. Crypto-Group Mail. Grp. Ct. 100. Circ. No. 11-97* 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 957 

Classified U. S. Naval Communication Sekvice Incoming 

CiNCPAC AND CiNCPOA 

■ Mailgram 292101 Mailgram 

Operation Order 982 special provisions use zone plus 12 time x Task force nine 
basic communication and aerological plans 

Frequency plan fox information Cincpac 170429 of October x Comtask force 9 
in fairdet at nas Pearl x Mission conduct daily 

Patrols from outlying bases in order to locate jwssible enemy forces threaten- 
ing their security x Tasks search area within * 

lOO miles of Midway daily using sector search plan number 2 x Be prepared to 
shift base to Wake x Take offensive action only 

If planes or bases are actually attacked or on further orders from Cincpac x 
Report all contacts except United States naval 

Vessels x Coordinate activities with subs operation from Midway x This order 
effective upon completion of opord 981 x 

Date, 11/30/41. Grp. Ct. 100. Circ. No. 11-973. 

Originator, CTF 9, 292101. Action. COM PATRON 21. Information, CINC- 
PAC, COM 14, NAS MIDWAY (VIA VP 21), COMSUBSCOFOR. 



U. S. Naval Communication Service 



Classified 
Outgoing 



Cincpac and Cincpoa 
Date Grp. Ct. 

From CINCPAC. Mailgram to COMTASKFOR 3, COMFOURTEEN, COM- 
PATWING 2. 

Info Mailgram to: COMBATFOR, COMBASEFOR, COMAIRDATFOR, 
LEXINGTON. 

Originator 11. Release 00. 20 2101. Show to 12.95. 

Myser 01825 of 10 Nov Marine scoron two three one will base eighteen planes 
Midway X Lexington provide transportation X on 5 Dec after sortie Pearl form 
Task Force 12 under Comcruscofor consisting of Lexington Chicago Astoria 
Portland desron five less desdiv ten X task force twelve proceed by direct route 
to arrive four hundred miles ISO degrees from Midway at 2230 Oct oh 7 Dec X 
From that vicinity fly off Marine planes to Midway X return operating area and 
resume normal operations after planes have arrived Midway X Comtaskfor 
nine direct patrol planes from Midway cover Lexington flying off position 
provide security while that area and guard Marine plane fisht X communica- 
tions radio condition 19 guard continuously npm primary fox X Com 14 
inform Midway planes expected arrive about 0200 GCT on 8 Dec and require 
Midway report arrival to Com 14 by coded dispatch X Com 14 pass this report 
to Comtaskfor 12 X Midway submarine patrol will be advised 

Classified Incoming 

U. S. Naval Communication Seem:ce 

Cincpac and Cincpoa 

Copy 
Secret AMGM 

Deliver to Compatron.21 operation order 983 information Marine scoron 231 
will base Midway 18 planes X Taskforce 12 Lexington 3 CA 5 DD will launch 
400 miles 130 degrees from Midway on December 7 at GCT 2230 X mission cover 
launching position provide security while that area and guard Marine plane 
flight December 7 X logistics fuel as required tasks 5 planes search section 120 
to 170 degrees to distance 450 miles arriving outer limit at 2230 GCT X 2 planes 
arrive launching position by 2230 and escort Marscoron 231 to Midway X remain- 
ing 5 planes each load with 2 500 pound bombs and await orders at Midway unless 
otherwise directed unload bombs at 0200 GCT December 8 X special provisions 

Date 6 December '41 ; Crypto-group pl/MG ; CBO HRF/H JG. 

Originator Comtaskfor 9, Page 1 of 2 pages 050323. Action, NAS Midway. 
Information, Cincpac, Lexington, CO Maraigr 21, Commarscoron 231. Serial 
No. 12-206. 



958 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
Naval Commtjnitation Serv 

CiNCPAC AND CiNCPOA 

Classified . Incoming 

Copy 
Secret AMGM 

Use zone time X Comtaskfor 9 with fairdet at nas Pearl radio silence except 
for contact reports and emergencies use task force 9 basic communication and 
aerological plans frequency plan fox 

Copy and return to Adm. Bellinger 
Mailgbam 

U. S. Naval Communication Service 
A. S. F. stand, form No. 13 
U. S. S. Wright 

Deliver this mailgram to communication system immediately upon receipt for 
distribution an handling as a regular dispatch 

From : Comtaskfor 9 
To: NAS Midway 
Mailed at: PH TH 1124 
To: Compatron 21 (Mail) 

291124 

Your squadron departs for Wake daylight December first X Detailed orders 
via Patron 21 X Mission cover Route Taskforce 8 including carrier proceed- 
ing westward X Task on thirty November using six planes search sector 
153-195 degrees to 500 miles X Patron 21 enroute Midway will search adjacent 
sector to eastward X For Patron 22 X Present intention return your 
squadron about 5 December to Pearl X Arrange schedule for base broadcast 
MO's without request on 364 Kilocycles to cover return your squadron and 
arrival Patron 21 X Maintain radio silence except for contact reports and 
emergencies. 

Authenticated : 

Signature, name and rank. 



Copy and return to Admr. Bellinger 



A. S. P. Stand. Form No. 13 
U. S. S. Wright 

Mailgeam 

u. s. naval communication service 

Deliver this mailgram to communication system immediately upon receipt for 
distribution and handling as a regular dispatch 

From : COMTASKFOR 9 
To: NAS Midway 
Date: November 30, 1941 
Mailed at : NAS, PH, TH, 2359 
To: NAS Johnston 

302359 

Detailed plans and orders arriving via Patron 21 planes prior sunrise tomor- 
row minday X First day operations require quote December 1 depart Midway 
daylight using two plane sections search sector 226-249 degrees to 525 miles 
thence on track 238 to far perimeter of 120 mile circle from Wake thence to 
Wake unquote if necessary leave one pair planes Midway with orders depart 
directly for Wake upon receipt of pai)ers from Patron 21 X INFO ADEE 
deliver to Compatron 21 X Action ADEE to Compatron 22. 

Authenticated : 

Signature, name and rank. 



PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 959 

Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 51 

Patrol Wing Two, 
U. S. Naval Axb Station, 
Pearl Earlor, Hawaii, V. S. A., 21 Oct. WJfi- 

Secret 

PW2/A16-30027 

From : The Commander Patrol Wing TWO. 

To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

Subject : Types of Combatant Aircraft for a Pacific Campaign. 

Reference: (a) Compatwing TWO SECRET Itr. A16-3 serial 0026 of Oct. 22, 

1941, with Comairscofor SECRET 1st end. A1&-3 of Oct. 

23, 1941. 
Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a). 

1. In view of the urgent nature of the subject matter of reference (a), and, 
in view of the fact that the Commander Scouting Force is now at sea, a copy 
of reference (a), is being forwarded herewith direct. 



P. N. L. Bellinger, 
P. N. L. Bellinger. 



Copy to: Comscofor. 
A16-3 



United States Pacific Fleet 
aircraft scouting force 



Fleet Air Detachment, 
U. S. Naval Air Station, 
Pearl Harbor, T. H., October 23, 194 J. 
Secret 
First endorsement to Compatwing two secret 

Letter PW2/A16-3/0026 dated October 22, 1941. 
From : The Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force. 
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
Via : The Commander Scouting Force. 
Subject : Types of Combatant Aircraft for a Pacific Campaign. 

1. Forwarded, concurring in the recommendations of the Commander Patrol 
Wing TWO. This concurrence is emphatic with respect to the employment of 
carriers of present design. 

2. The recommendation for change in Naval Policy to permit inclusion within 
the Naval Aeronautical Organization of Air Striliing Groups of high perform- 
ance landplane- bombers and landplane interceptor fighters, for the protection 
of advanced Fleet Air Bases, meets with the hearty endorsement of the Com- 
mander Aircraft, Scouting Force. Landplane bombers and fighters with the 
characteristics as described are definitely tools that Naval Aviation requires 
today in its varied missions. Upon enlargement of the scope of Navy Policy, 
the corresponding procurement and training programs should be prosecuted. 

3. The inherent delays in accomplishing tlie change of policy with its attend- 
ant modifications in training and procurement plans, seriously influence the fac- 
tor of time, which is now not one of our superiorities to be exploited. Accord- 
ingly as a stop-gap measure, if not already pr