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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

isOSTON 

PUBLIC 

LIBRARY 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 

OF THE PEAEL HAEBOR AHACK 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGKESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 39 

REPORTS, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS OF ROBERTS 

COMMISSION, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD, NAVY 

COURT OF INQUIRY, AND HEWITT INQUIRY WITH 

INDORSEMENTS 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Atta<^ 






BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
UBRARY 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAKL HAEBOE ATTACK 

CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 39 



REPORTS, FINDINGS, ANDi^ONCLUSIONS OF ROBERTS 

COMMISSION, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD, NAVY 

COURT OF INQUIRY, AND HEWITT INQUIRY, WITH 

ENDORSEMENTS 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
-"^'le WASHINGTON : 1946 



JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 

HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 

JERB COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 

WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 

SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 

North Carolina 



COUNSEL 

(Through January 14, 1946) 

William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JuLE M. Hannafoed, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 

Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samuel H. Kacfman, Associate General Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. morgan, Assistant Counsel 
Logan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 


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Hearings 



Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19 
Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18 
Dec. 31, 1945, and 
Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 
Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1 
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19^ 
Apr. 9 and 11, and 



, 20, and 21, 1945. 

30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 
11, 12, and 13, 1945. 
, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 
Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946, 
, 19, and 21, 1946. 

26, 28, and 29, 1946. 
, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 

13, and 14, 1946. 

and 20, 1946. 

May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 

Part 

No. Exhibits Nos. 

12 1 through 6. 

13 7 and 8. 

14 9 through 43. 

15 44 through 87. 

16 88 through 110. 

17 111 through 128. 

18 129 through 156. 

19 157 through 172. 

20 173 through 179. 

21 ISO through 183, and Exhibitd-Illustrations. 

22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings 

35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



ni 



JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 157 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

1. Report of Roberts Commission, dated January 23, 1942 1 

2. Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board dated October 20, 1944 23 

3. Appendix No. 1 : Supplemental Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board on 

phases mentioned in House Military Affairs report which relate to 

the Pearl Harbor disaster 179 

4. Exhibits A and B to appendix No. 1 (above) 219 

5. Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board 220 

6. November 25, 1944, memorandum, from Judge Advocate General for 

Secretary of War, re APHB report 231 

7. September 14, 1945, memorandum, from Judge Advocate General for 

Secretary of War, re Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen's Investigation 270 

8. September 14, 1945, memorandum, from Judge Advocate General for 

Secretary of War, re APHB Top Secret Report reviewed in connec- 
tion with Clausen Investigation 283 

9. Report of Naval Court of Inquiry, dated October 19, 1944 297 

10. Addendum to Navy Court of Inquiry findings of fact 323 

11. First endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report, by Navy Judge 

Advocate General for Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and 
Chief of Naval Operations, dated November 2, 1944 330 

12. November 3, 1944, memorandum from CincUS and CNO to Secretary 

of Navy, listing parts of Navy Court of Inquiry record that contain 
information of super secret nature 332 

13. Second endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report, by CincUS and 

CNO to Secretary of Navy, dated November 6, 1944 (not made 
public) 335 

14. Paraphrase of second endorsement (item 13) which was made public 345 

15. Third endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report, by Secretary of 

Navy, dated December 1, 1944 354 

16. Fourth endorsement (undated) to Navy Court of Inquiry report, and 

fourth endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Secretary of 
Navy (not made public) 1 355 

17. Paraphrase of fourth endorsement (item 16), dated August 1945, made 

public August 29, 1945 371 

18. December 3, 1944, memorandum, from CincUS and CNO to Secretary 

of Navy, commenting on report of Army Pearl Harbor Board 383 

19. Third endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by CincUS and CNO 

to Secretary of Navy, dated August 13. 1945 387 

20. Second endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Navy Judge Advo- 

cate General for CincUS and CNO, dated August 10. 1945 388 

21. First endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Seci-etax-y of Navy, 

dated July 25, 1945 389 

22. Report of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt to Secretary of Navy, dated July 

12, 1945 390 

IV 



REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 

January 23, 1942. 
The President, 

The White House. 
Sir : The undersigned were appointed by Executive order of Decem- 
ber 18, 1941, which defined our duties as a commission thus : 

to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed 
forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941. 

The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to jjrovide bases for 
sound decisions wliether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the 
part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes as 
were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned ; and, if so, what these 
derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor. 

The Congress speedily supplemented the Executive order by grant- 
ing the Commission power to summon witnesses and examine them 
under oath. 

The Commission held three meetings in Washington, December 18, 
19, and 20, and, on the latter day, proceeded to Honolulu, T. H., where 
the Commission arrived December 22 and held meetings December 
22, 23, 24, and 26 at the headquarters of the Hawaiian Department, 
Fort Shafter, and December 27, 29, 30, and 31, 1941, and January 2 
and 3, 1942, at the submarine base, Pearl Harbor ; and January 5, 6, 
7, 8, and 9 at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu. January 10 the 
Commission left Honolulu for Washington, D. C. ; held meetings Jan- 
uary 12, 13, and 14; arrived at Washington January 15 and held 
further meetings January 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23. 

The Commission examined 127 witnesses and received a large num- 
ber of documents. All members of the Military and Naval Estab- 
lishments, and civil officers and citizens who were thought to have 
knowledge of facts pertinent to the inquii'y, were summoned and 
examined under oath. All persons in the island of Oahu, who be- 
lieved they had knowledge of such facts, were publicly requested to 
appear, and a number responded to the invitation and gave evidence. 

Various rumors and hearsay statements have been communicated to 
the Commission. The Commission has sought to find and examine 
witnesses who might be expected to have knowledge respecting them. 
We believe that our findings of fact sufficiently dispose of most of 
them. 

The evidence touches subjects which in the national interest should 
remain secret. We have, therefore, refrained from quotation of testi- 
mony or documentary proof. Our findings, however, have been made 
with the purpose fully and accurately to reflect the testimony which 
as respects matters of fact is substantially without contradiction. 

It is true, as we have found, that due to the enormous demand on 
the Nation's capacity to produce munitions and war supj^lies, there 



2 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was a deficiency in the provision of materiel for the Hawaiian area. 
This was but natural, in the circumstances, and was well known to 
the Government departments and local commanders. We have made 
no detailed findings on the subject since, as will appear from our 
report, we find that this deficiency did not affect the critical fact of 
failure to take appropriate measures with the means available. 

At our hearings reference was made to what has long been a matter 
of common knowledge — that there are, and have been, diverse views 
of national policy respecting the basing of the entire United States 
Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, T. H. We feel that the national policy 
in this matter is one that has been settled by those responsible for 
such decisions and that it is not within our province — that of finding 
the facts respecting the attack of December 7, and the responsibility 
for the resulting damage to the United States — to discuss any such 
topic. 

Regrettable loss of life and extensive damage resulted from the 
air raid. The nature of that damage and the details of the measures 
taken to repair it have no direct bearing on the execution of the man- 
date appointing this Commission, and the subject is dealt with in 
our report only to the extent that it bears on questions of responsi- 
bility for the disaster. 

The evidence taken covered a wide scope. The Commission inten- 
tionally invited such latitude of testimony and inquiry in the belief 
that thereby incidental light might be thrown upon the main issues 
involved. As an example, the Commission heard evidence to show 
what had been done at Pearl Harbor and on the island of Oahu by 
naval and military commands subsequent to December 7, 1941, in 
the view that this might throw some light upon the matters sub- 
mitted for our consideration. Again, the Commission lieard much 
testimony as to the population of Hawaii, its composition, and the 
attitude and disposition of the persons composing it, in the belief that 
the facts disclosed might aid in appraising the results of investiga- 
tive, counterespionage, and antisabotage work done antecedent to 
the attack of December 7, 1941. 

The Commission visited the naval base at Pearl Harbor and air 
fields of the Military and Naval Establishments, as well as the Army 
posts and forts and certain of the coast fortifications on the island 
of Oahu. 

The minutes of each meeting of the Commission are of record. 
The statements of witnesses received in the meetings previous to 
that of December 22 have been recorded in summaries. All testimony 
received at the meeting of December 22 and the subsequent meetings 
was stenographically reported and transcribed. 

The oral evidence received amounts to 1,887 typewritten pages, and 
the records and documents examined exceed 3,000 printed pages in 
number. 

Appended hereto is a map of the island of Oahu showing the location 
of the principal naval and military establishments. 

All the testimony and evidence received have been considered and, 
as the result of its deliberations, the Commission submits the 
following : 



report of roberts commission 
Findings of Fact 



About 7 : 55 a. m. Honolulu time (1 : 25 p. m. eastern standard time) 
on Sunday, December 7, 1941, Japanese forces attacked Army and 
Navy installations and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Oahu, T. H. 

Although the United States and Japan were at peace on that morn- 
ing, Japan planned to announce to the Secretary of State of the United 
States at 1 p. m. of that day, eastern standard time (7 : 30 a. m. Hono- 
lulu time) the severance of diplomatic relations and simultaneously to 
attack the island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor. The military prepara- 
tions for this breach of international faith and honor were put in train, 
and the forces for its consummation had been dispatched weeks prior 
to any intimation of the planned severance of relations. 

n 

The Territory of Hawaii comprises the group of islands known as 
the Hawaiian Islands. This group consists of the larger islands — 
Hawaii, Maui, Molokai, Oahu, and Kauai — and a number of smaller 
islands. They extend from Hawaii in the south some 300 miles in a 
northwesterly direction, including Kauai in the north. For purposes 
of certain developments and protection, the islands of Midway, Wake, 
Johnston, Palmyra, Christmas, and Canton had been placed under the 
responsible naval and military heads in the Hawaiian area. 

The importance of the Territory of Hawaii from a national defense 
standpoint is the fact that Pearl Harbor, the main outlying naval 
base in the Pacific, is located in the island of Oahu, one of the Hawaiian 
group. For this reason all measures for the protection and defense 
of the Territory have centered in and around Oahu, the other islands 
being garrisoned by minor forces only. A main outlying naval base, 
such as Pearl Harbor, is intended for the use of the fleet for taking 
on fuel and supplies, for recreation and rest of the fleet personnel, and 
for the repair and refitting of ships. 

in 

It has been well known that the policy of the United States as to 
affairs in the Pacific was in conflict with the policies of other govern- 
ments. It was realized by the State, War, and Navy Departments 
of the United States that unless these policies were reconciled war in 
the Pacific was inevitable. 

IV 

Plans and preparations against the contingency of war are the 
joint responsibility of the military and naval authorities, and, within 
the limits of funds and authorizations provided by the Congress, were 
being ceaselessly carried out. 

Under these plans the general function of the Army is to conduct 
military operations in direct defense of United States territory. The 
general function of the Navy is to conduct naval operations to gain 
and maintain control of vital sea areas, thereby contributing to the 
defense of the coastal frontiers. 



4 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Specific plans for the protection of the Hawaiian area against 
every contingency had been prepared. These included joint Army 
and Navy war plans, and War Department and Navy Department 
plans subsidiary thereto which establish the Hawaiian coastal fron- 
tier, assign tasks and forces to both Army and Navy for its joint 
defense, and prescribe that the system of coordination between the 
responsible Army and Navy commanders shall be by mutual co- 
operation. 

V 

The responsibilit}' for the joint defense of the Hawaiian coastal 
frontier rested upon the commanding general, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, and the commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, the latter act- 
ing as a subordinate of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. 
The commander in chief of the fleet, in addition, was assigned the 
task of protecting the territory within the Hawaiian naval coastal 
frontier by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land 
and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions within 
that frontier, and the further task of covering the operations of the 
Hawaiian coastal frontier forces. The commanding general, Ha- 
w^aiian Department, could properly deal, respecting defense measures 
and dispositions, with either the commander in chief of the Pacific 
Fleet or the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. 

The commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet from February 1 to 
December 17, 1941, was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. The com- 
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District, from April 11, 1940, to date is 
Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch. The commanding general, Ha- 
waiian Department, from February 7 to December 17, 1941. was Lt. 
Gen. Walter C. Short. 

A local joint defense plan entitled "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense 
plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier," was prepared by General Short 
and Rear Admiral Bloch, the latter acting under the direction of 
Admiral Kimmel. Each commander adopted a standing operating 
procedure, or standing orders, to carry out his obligation under the 
joint agreement. This joint coastal frontier defense plan was in- 
tended to become operative upon order of the War and Navj^ Depart- 
ments or, as agreed upon by the local commanders in the case of an 
emergency, a threat of hostile action, or the occurrence of war. 

VI 

The means available to the Army, ,for the fulfillment of its mis- 
sion, consist of coast defense and antiaircraft artillery, mobile ground 
forces, the Hawaiian air force, and an aircraft warning service. The 
supporting elements of the Navy consist of local naval defense forces 
comprising light surface craft and shore-based aircraft not assigned 
to the fleet. The fleet as such was not charged with the defense of 
Pearl Harbor, except that certain aircra.ft attached to the fleet, when 
present, and the antiaircraft weapons of such units of the fleet as 
were in port, were available. 

It was recognized that, prior to furnishing the full war strength 
garrison, insufficient forces were available to maintain all the de- 
fenses on a war footing for extended periods of time. The respon- 



REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 5 

sible commanders made numerous recommendations to the War and 
Navy Departments for additional forces, equipment, and funds which 
they deemed necessary to insure the defense of the Hawaiian coastal 
frontier under any eventuality. The national situation permitted 
only a partal filling of these requirements. However, presupposing 
timeh' dispositions by the Army and Navy commands in Hawaii, the 
forces available to them were adequate to frustrate a surprise air 
attack or greatly to mitigate its effectiveness. 

VII 

In a letter of January 24, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy advised 
the Secretary of War that the increased gravity of the Japanese 
situation had prompted a restudy of the problem of the security of 
the Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor. The writer stated: 

If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities 
would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl 
Harbor. 

The writer stated that the — 

inherent possibilities of a major disaster — 

warranted further speedy action to — 

increase the joint readiness of the Ariuy and Navy to withstand a raid of the 
character mentioned * * *. 

The letter proceeded : 

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are con- 
sidered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabo- 
tage, (4) submarine attack, (.5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire. 

It stated the defenses against all but the first two were then satis- 
factory, described the probable character of an air attack and urged 
consideration by the Army of dispositions to discover and meet such 
attack and provision of additional equipment therefor. It concluded 
with recommendations for the revision of joint defense plans with 
special emphasis on the coordination of Army and Navy operations 
against surprise aircraft raids. It also urged the conduct of joint 
exercises to train the forces to meet such raids. 

The Secretary- of War replied February 7, 19-41, giving the present 
and prospective status of the Hawaiian Department in respect of 
airplanes and antiaircraft artillery, and stating with respect to the 
other proposals of the Secretary of the Navy that a cop}^ of the letter 
was being forwarded to the commanding general, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, with direction to him to cooperate with the local naval authori- 
ties in makmg the suggested measures effective. 

Admiral Kimmel and General Short received copies of these letters 
at about the time they assumed the commands which they held De- 
cember 7, 1941. Rear Admiral Bloch also received copies. 

The joint coastal frontier defense plan and plans subsidiary thereto 
envisaged the possibility of an air attack and estimated that, if made, 
it would most likely occur at dawn. An agreement between the 
Hawaiian air force and the commander, Navy patrol wing 2, estab- 
lished the responsibilities for the joint use ancl operation of the avail- 
able air forces of the Army and Navy. The standing operating pro- 
cedure, Hawaiian Department, and standing orders of the United 



t) CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

States Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District also prescribed 
measures for protection against air attack. Frequent joint drills and 
exercises were conducted during the year 1941 to insure such measures 
would be effective. 

VIII 

For months prior to December 7, 1941, the Secretary of State was 
repeatedly in contact with the Secretary of War and the Secretary 
of the Navy, not only in Cabinet meetings, but in meetings of the 
war council ; and on the occasions of those contacts, and in conference 
with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, discussed 
negotiations with Japan and the growing tensity of the relations 
of the United States with Japan. At meetings of the war council 
the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations were also present. 
The Secretary of State constantly kept the Secretary of War and 
the Secretary of the Navy informed of the progress of the negotia- 
tions, and all three of these officials were cognizant of the growing 
threat of hostilities and of the military and naval needs and measures 
consequent thereupon. The Secretaries of War and Navy were in 
constant touch with the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions, and imparted to them the information received from the Secre- 
tary of State and the results of their conferences with him. The 
latter officers in turn advised the responsible commanders in the field 
of the progress of events and of the growing threat of hostilities. 
The responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area were aware that 
previous Japanese actions and demonstrated Axis methods indicated 
that hostile action might be expected prior to a declaration of war. 

IX 

October 16, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, 
and the commander in chief of the fleet were advised by the War and 
Navy Departments of the changes in the Japanese Cabinet, of the 
probability of hostilities between Japan and Russia, and of the pos- 
sibility of an attack by Japan on Great Britain and the United States. 
Both commanders were warned to take precautions and to make 
preparatory dispositions which would not disclose their strategic in- 
tentions or constitute provocation as against Japan. Admiral Kimmel 
made certain dispositions of units of the fleet, and placed additional 
security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor. 
At that time various task forces of the Navy were engaged in train- 
ing operations and maneuvers which were deemed highly important 
to the training of the fleet personnel, and the Army was also conduct- 
ing intensive training, particularly of its air arm. The responsible 
commanders testified that to undertake increased defense measures 
respecting Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian area would necessitate 
curtailment of training, if not its virtual suspension, and they thought 
the situation was not such as to require this. 

November 24, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message 
to Admiral Kimmel, in which he stated that, in the opinion of the 
Navy Department, a surprise aggressive movement in any direction 
by the Japanese, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, 
was a possibility ; that the doubt as to favorable outcome of pending 



REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 7 

negotiations, the statements of the Japanese Government, and the 
movements of its army and naval forces, supported this opinion. The 
communication enjoined secrecy to prevent complication of the tense 
existing situation. The message advised that the Chief of Staff of 
the Army requested that the local senior Army officers be advised 
that he concurred in the despatch. This message was seen by both 
the commander in chief of the fleet and the commanding general of 
the Hawaiian Department. 

The responsible commanders in Hawaii knew that negotiations had 
been continued through October and November, and were awaiting 
further developments. November 27, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the 
Army informed the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, that 
the negotiations with Japan seemed to be ended, with little likelihood 
of their resumption; that Japanese action was unpredictable; that 
hostilities on the part of Japan were momentarily possible; that in 
the event hostilities could not be avoided the United States desired 
that this Nation should not commit the first overt act ; that the depart- 
ment commander was not to be restricted to any course which would 
jeopardize his defense. The message directed him, even prior to 
hostile action, to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures 
as he deemed necessary, but to carry them out in such a way as not 
to alarm the civil population or disclose his intent. He was directed 
to restrict the information contained in the message to the minimum 
of essential officers, and to report to the Chief of Staff the measures 
taken. The purpose of this message was communicated by the de- 
partment commander to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. 

On the same day (November 27 ,1941), the Chief of Military Intelli- 
gence sent a message to the intelligence officer on the staff of the com- 
manding general, Hawaiian Department, directing him to inform the 
commanding general and his chief of staff that negotiations with 
Japan had practically ceased; that hostilities might ensue; and that 
subversive activity might be expected. 

On the same day (November 27, 1941), the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions sent a message to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, 
which stated in substance that the dispatch was to be considered a 
war warning; that the negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize 
conditions in the Pacific had ended ; that Japan was expected to make 
an aggressive move within the next few days; that an amphibious 
expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or 
possibly Borneo, was indicated by the number and equipment of Japa- 
nese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. It 
directed the execution of a defensive deployment in preparation for 
carrying out war tasks. It stated that Guam, Samoa, and continental 
districts had been directed to take appropriate measures against sabo- 
tage, and that a similar warning was being sent by the War Depart- 
ment. It ordered that the addressee inform naval district and Army 
authorities. The commander in chief of the fleet communicated the 
purport of this message to the general commanding the Hawaiian 
Department of the Army- 

At the time of our hearing General Short had no independent 
recollection of the last-mentioned message, although he felt that it 
must have been shown to hirn, 



8 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

November 27, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, in response to the direction of the Chief of Staff that he report 
measures taken, informed the Chief of Staff that he had alerted his 
command against sabotage and that he was maintaining liaison with 
the Navy. No reply referring to this message was sent by the War 
Department ; but General Short testified that he considered the Adju- 
tant General's message referred to in the next succeeding paragraph 
a reply. 

November 28, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, received from The Adjutant General of the Army a message 
stating that the critical situation required every precaution to be taken 
at once against subversive activities, within the scope of the Army's 
responsibility; that all necessary measures be taken to protect military 
establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage, against 
propaganda affecting Army personnel, and against all espionage. 
The message disclaimed ordering any illegal measures, and warned 
that protective measures should be confined to those essential to se- 
curity, so as to avoid unnecessary publicity and alarm. The mes- 
sage stated that identic communications were being sent to all air 
stations and, on November 28, the Chief of the Army Air Forces sent 
such an identic message to the commanding general, Hawaiian Air 
Force. 

November 29, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, replied to the last-mentioned message, outlining at length and 
in detail the measures taken to prevent sabotage of military establish- 
ments and property and essential industrial and public-utility instal- 
lations. No reply was sent by the War Department to this message. 
General Short testified that he considered this series of messages a 
tacit agreement that the measures taken were all that were intended 
by the Department. 

November 29, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message 
to the commander in chief of the fleet, which was in substance a quo- 
tation of the Chief of Staff's despatch of November 27 to the com- 
manding general, Hawaiian Department ; and in addition directed the 
addressee to take no offensive action until Japan had committed an 
overt act, and ordered certain action in case hostilities should occur. 

November 30, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a despatch 
to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, and also forwarded 
the message to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet for his 
information, in which it was stated the indications were that Japan 
was about to launch an attack on the Kra Isthmus, directing the com- 
mander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet to do certain scouting, but to 
avoid the appearance of attacking. Admiral Kimmel testified that 
he had viewed this message as indicating that the Navy Department 
was not expecting a Japanese attack on Hawaii. 

The Navy Department sent three messages to the commander in 
chief of the Pacific Fleet; the first of December 3, 1941, stated that 
it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying thir 
codes and buittiing secret documents; the second of December 4, 
1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential documents and 
means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were 
necessary, the latter to be destroyed in event of emergency (this was 
sent to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet for information 



REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 9 

only) ; and the third of December 6, 1941, directing that in view of 
the tense situation the naval commands on the outlying Pacific 
islands might be authorized to destroy confidential papers then or 
later, under conditions of greater emergency, and that those essential 
to continued operations should Ije retained until the last moment. 

The foregoing messages did not create in the minds of the respon- 
sible officers in the Hawaiian area apprehension as to probable im- 
minence of air raids. On the contrary they only served to emphasize 
in their minds the danger from sabotage and surprise submarine 
attack. The necessity for taking a state-of-war readiness which 
would have been required to avert or meet an air-raid attack was 
not considered. 

X 

December 1, 1941, the Director of Naval Intelligence issued a bul- 
letin which, under the caption "Japanese Naval Situation," stated : 

Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that 
extensive preparations are under way for hostilities. At the same time troop 
transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and north- 
ern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indochina and For- 
mosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by 
small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now 
definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. 
To date this task force, under the command of the commander in chief, Second 
Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually 
concentrating off the southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each 
constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the 
combined air force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division 
of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains 
in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers. 

The Naval Intelligence Service in Hawaii, due to lack of informa- 
tion indicating that the bulk of Japanese carriers were at sea, con- 
cluded they were in home ports. 

XI 

At about noon, eastern standard time (6:30 a. m. Honolulu time), 
December 7, an additional warning message, indicating an almost 
immediate break in relations between the United States and Japan, 
was dispatched by the Chief of Staff after conference with the Chief 
of Naval Operations, for the information of responsible Army and 
Navy commanders. Every effort was made to have the message reach 
Hawaii in the briefest possible time, but due to conditions beyond 
the control of anyone concerned the delivery of this urgent message 
was delayed until after the attack. 

XII 

The commanding general, Hawaiian Department, the commander- 
in-chief of the fleet, and the commandant. Fourteenth Naval District, 
their senior subordinates, and their principal staff officers, considered 
the possibility of air raids. Without exception they believed that the 
chances of stich a raid while the Pacific Fleet was based upon Pearl 
Harbor were practically nil. The attack of Sunday, December 7, 1941, 
was therefore a complete surprise to each of them. 



10 CONGRESSIONAL mVESTIGATlON PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

While General Short and Admiral Kimmel conferred frequently 
with respect to joint Army-Navy plans and procedures, they did not, 
on or subsequent to November 27, 1941, hold any conference specifi- 
cally directed to the meaning of the messages received from the War 
and Navy Departments or concerning action required to be taken pur- 
suant to those messages. 

For some time prior to November 27, 1941, the War Department 
and the Navy Department had under consideration the possibility of 
sending Army airplanes to Wake and Midway and withdrawing 
Marine planes then on those islands; of relieving marines stationed 
there by the substitution of units of the Army. General Short, Ad- 
miral Kimmel, and Rear Admiral Bloch had been in conference con- 
cerning this proposal. 

At the time of the receipt of the messages of November 27 by Ad- 
miral Kimmel and General Short, respectively, this proposal was a 
subject of discussion. General Short held discussions with Admiral 
Kimmel on November 27, December 1, 2, and 3 concerning this matter 
in an effort to compose certain differences of view. At one of these 
conferences Admiral Kimmel inquired of his war-plans officer. Cap- 
tain McMorris, who was present, concerning the probability of a 
surprise air attack on Oahu. According to General Short, Captain 
McMorris replied there was no probability of such an attack; and, 
according to Captain McMorris, his reply was that the Japanese 
would never so attack. According to the testimony Admiral Kimmel 
and General Short did not discuss means or measures for Hawaiian 
defense to be adopted in the light of the messages. 

On and after November 27, 1941, the commanding general, Hawaiian 
Department, and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, inde- 
pendently took such action as each deemed appropriate to the existing 
situation. Neither informed the other specifically of the action he was 
taking, and neither inquired of the other whether or not any action 
had been taken, nor did they consult as to the appropriateness of the 
actions taken by them respectively. 

After receipt of the messages of November 27 the following actioru 
was taken: 

The commanding general, Hawaiian Department, ordered alert No*.. 
1 (see next succeeding paragraph) into effect on November 27, and 
it was maintained in effect until December 7. At the same time he> 
ordered that the aircraft warning system operate daily from 4 to T 
a. m. The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, in his ca- 
pacity as base-defense officer, called a conference of all the destroyer 
commanders of the inshore patrol, advised them that something might 
happen, and that they should be on the alert. The commander in 
chief of the fleet made certain dispositions of units of the fleet for the 
purpose of strengthening his outposts to the south and west of the 
Hawaiian Islands, and also issued an order that any Japanese sub- 
marines found in the operating areas around the island of Oahu should 
be attacked. This order went beyond the authority given him by the 
Navy Department. 

In the Hawaiian Department's standing operating procedure gor- 
erning the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, three states of 



REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION H 

readiness were prescribed, known as alert No. 1, alert No. 2, and alert 
No. 3. Alert No. 1 was thus defined : 

This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the Islands, 
with no threat from without. 

Alert No. 2 was thus defined : 

This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than alert No. 1. Security 
against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to 
defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided. 

Alert No. 3 was thus defined : 

This alert requires occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for 
maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands. 

XIII 

The responsibilities of the Army included the installation and oper- 
ation of an aircraft warninor system for the detection of water-borne 
and air-borne craft at a distance from the coast. Throughout the 
late spring and summer of 1941 the Army was engaged in the instal- 
lation of permanent facilities for this purpose on the Hawaiian 
Islands. Permanent installations had not, on December 7, 1941, been 
completed. By November 27, 1941, certain mobile equipment had 
been installed at temporary locations, and was being operated inter- 
mittently throughout the day for the purpose of training persomiel 
in its operation. On November 27, 1941, in connection with the order 
for alert No. 1, the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, 
ordered that this system be operated each day during the period 
from 4 until 7 a. m. It was intended that in the near future the 
Navy should have officer personnel in the information center, but up 
to December 7 such officers had not been designated. In accordance 
with the order in effect, the system closed at 7 a. m. Sunday, Decem- 
ber 7. A noncommisisoned officer who had been receiving training 
requested that he be allowed to remain at one of the stations, and 
was granted leave so to do. At about 7 : 02 a. m. he discovered what 
he thought was a large flight of planes slightly east and north of 
Oahu, at a distance of about 130 miles. He reported this fact at 
7 : 20 a. m. to a lieutenant of the Army who was at the central infor- 
mation center, having been detailed there to familiarize himself with 
the operation of the system. This inexperienced lieutenant, having 
information that certain United States planes might be in the vicinity 
at the time, assumed that the planes in question were friendly planes, 
and took no action with respect to them. The recording of the obser- 
vation made indicated that these airplanes were tracked toward the 
island and then lost. 

On November 27, 1941, there was sufficient partially trained per- 
sonnel available to operate the aircraft warning system throughout 
24 hours of the day, as installed in its temporary locations. An 
arc of nearly 360° around Oahu could have been covered. 

Admiral Kimmel, on and prior to December 7, 1941, assumed that 
the aircraft warning system was being fully operated by the Army, 
but made no inquiry after reading any of the messages of October 
and November from the War and Navy Departments as to what 
the fact was with respect to its operation. 



12 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

XIV 

The joint coastal frontier defense plan provided that, when it 
became effective, the Army should conduct an inshore airplane patrol, 
coverinof the circumference of the island of Oahu to a distance of 
about 20 miles. Prior to December 7, 1941, no inshore patrol was 
conducted, except during drills and maneuvers. Pilots were being 
trained on weekdays, and the training involved flying around the 
confines of Oahu from about 8 o'clock in the morning throughout 
the day. On Sunday morning no inshore airplane patrol was 
conducted. 

XV 

Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan, when the plan became 
effective the Xav}^ was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiat- 
ing from Oahu to a distance of from 700 to 800 miles. Prior to 
December 7, 1941, no distant reconnaissances were conducted, except 
during ch'ills and maneuvers. The fleet from time to time had task 
forces operating in various areas off the island of Oahu and, in 
connection with such operations, carrier and patrol planes conducted 
reconnaissances of the operating areas. The sectors searched, how- 
ever, constituted but small arcs of the total arc of 360% and rarely 
extended to a radius of 700 miles. 

Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have 
afforded a measure of security against a surprise air attack. 

General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant 
reconnaissance, but after seeing the warning messages of October and 
November from the War and Navy Departments he made no inquiry 
with respect to the distant reconnaissance, if any, being conducted 
by the Navy. 

XVI 

There were, prior to December 7. 1941, Japanese spies on the island 
of Oahu. Some were Japanese consular agents and other were per- 
sons having no open relations with the Japanese foreign service. 
These spies collected and, through various channels transmitted, in 
formation to the Japanese Empire respecting the military and naval 
establishments and dispositions on the island. 

In Hawaii the local Army Intelligence Service has always devoted 
itself to matters pertaining to Army personnel and property; and 
the local Naval Intelligence Service to mattei-s pertaining to Navy 
personnel and property. In addition, prior to the establishment of 
an office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Hawaii, Naval 
Intelligence investigated enemy activities amongst the civil popula- 
tion. When the Bureau's office was established it was agreed by the 
three governmental agencies that the Bureau should take over and 
become primaril}' responsible for investigation of matters connected 
with the civil population, and that the three services should cooper- 
ate with each other. Efforts were made by the Bureau to uncover 
espionage activities in Hawaii. The United States being at peace 
with Japan, restrictions imposed prevented resort to certain methods 
of obtaining the content of messages transmitted by telephone or 
radio telegraph over the commercial lines operating between Oahu 



REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 13 

and Japan. The Bureau and the local intelligence staffs were unable, 
jirior to December 7, to obtain and make available significant infor- 
]nation respecting Japanese plans and fleet movements in the direc- 
tion of Hawaii. 

In the summer of 1941 there were more than 200 consular agents 
acting under the Japanese consul, who was stationed in Honolulu, 
T. H. The naval district intelligence office raised a question with 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and with the intelligence officer 
of the Hawaiian Department of the Army, whether these agents 
should not be arrested for failing to register as agents of a foreign 
principal as required by statutes of the United States. In confer- 
ences respecting this question, the commanding general, Hawaiian 
Department, objected to the arrest of any such persons at least until 
they had been given notice and an opportunity to register, asserting 
that their arrest would tend to thwart the efforts which the Army 
had made to create friendly sentiment toward the United States on 
the part of Japanese aliens resident in Hawaii and American citi- 
zens of Japanese descent resident in Hawaii and create unnecessary 
bad feeling. No action was taken against the agents. 

It was believed that the center of Japanese espionage in Hawaii 
was the Japanese consulate at Honolulu. It has been discovered that 
the Japanese consul sent to and received from Tokyo in his own and 
other names many messages on commercial radio circuits. This ac- 
tivity greatly increased toward December 7, 1941. The contents of 
these messages, if it could have been learned, might have furnished 
valuable information. In view of the peaceful relations with Japan, 
and the consequent restrictions on the activities of the investigating 
agencies, they were unable prior to December 7 to obtain and ex- 
amine messages transmitted throuh commercial channels by the Japa- 
nese consul, or by persons acting for him. 

It is now apparent that through their intelligence service the Japa- 
nese had complete information. They evidently knew that no task 
force of the United States Navy was anywhere in the sector north- 
east, north, and northwest of the Hawaiian Islands. They evidently 
knew that no distant airplane reconnaissance was maintained in any 
sector. They evidently knew that up to December 6 no inshore air- 
plane patrol was being maintained around the periphery of Oahu. 
They knew, from maps which they had obtained, the exact location 
of vital air fields, hangars, and other structures. They also knew 
accurately where certain important naval vessels would be berthed. 
Their flyers had the most detailed maps, courses, and bearings, so that 
each could attack a given vessel or field. Each seems to have been 
given a specified mission. 

XVII 

The passes and liberty granted the personnel of the Army and 
Navy in Hawaii on Saturday, December 6, were normal for a period 
when the forces were not upon a war footing, with the following 
exceptions : The normal Army guard had been increased by approxi- 
mately 100 percent; two battalions of infantry were held in reserve 
for antisabotage defense; antiaircraft gun crews were maintained 
on ships in harbor for instant defense ; all Na^^ personnel, with the 
exception of those authorized to be absent, were required to be in 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 157 2 



14 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

their quarters at midnight; all places of amusement in Honolulu 
and all entertainments at the Army posts were closed at midnight; 
all saloons and drinking places in Honolulu were closed at midnight. 

On the night of December 6 numerous officers of the Army and 
Navy attended social functions at various points on the island of 
Oahu, principally the usual Saturday functions at the various posts 
and naval establishments. The commanding general, Hawaiian De- 
partment, and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet were both 
guests at dinners away from their posts of command on that evening, 
but returned to their quarters at an early hour. 

The percentages of strength in the Army present for duty on the 
island of Oahu at 8 a. m. December 7. 1941, reported by all major 
echelons and posts, were: Twenty-fourth Infantrj' Division, 90 per- 
cent; Twenty-fifth Infantry Division, 85.6 percent; Coast Artillery 
Corps, 87.5 percent; Air Force, 88.9 percent; miscellaneous, including 
department headquarters, ordnance, quartermaster, and medical, 92 
percent. Estimated general percentage, 88.8 percent. Reports from 
large ships and destroyers that were in Pearl Harbor during the 
attack show 60 percent of officers on board and 96 percent of the men. 
Of 75 vessels of the fleet, of all kinds, 49 commanding officers were 
aboard during the attack and 22 were en route to their ships, 1 was 
on another ship, and 1 was on authorized leave, which leaves 2 for 
whom we are unable to account. 

Intoxicating liquor is sold on the island of Oahu, and men on pass or 
on liberty have the opportunity to buy and consume it. Following 
the established procedure, at home and abroad, the Army exercises dis- 
ciplinary control of men on pass through its military police, and the 
Navy of men on liberty by the use of shore patrols. These organiza- 
tions take into custody any person showing evidence of intoxication. 
On the night of December 6-7, 1941, from 6 p. m. to 6 a. m., arrests of 
soldiers by the military police, for intoxication, were 38, and arrests of 
sailors by the Navy shore patrol, for intoxication, were 4. By compar- 
ison the arrests of civilians for drunkenness on that night were 39. 
Thorough inquiry disclosed there is no evidence of excessive drinking 
by any officer of either service on that night. The evidence shows that 
as respects the use of intoxicating liquor and intoxication, the condi- 
tions amongst the men of the Army and of the Navy on the night of 
December 6 compare closely with similar conditions for the several 
preceding months. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, the usual percent- 
age of enlisted strength entitled to passes or liberty took advantage of 
such privilege to spend the afternoon or evening in the city of Hono- 
lulu, Application of this ratio to total numbers of all the services 
then on the island of Oahu and in Pearl Harbor, amounting to about 
75,000 men, indicates that no less than 11,000 soldiers, sailors, and 
marines visited Honolulu that afternoon and evening. 

In normal times more enlisted men of both services are absent from 
duty by permission on Saturday nights than on other nights ; and on 
Saturday nights more officers are customarily absent than on week- 
day nights. 

bn the morning of Sunday, December 7, Army posts and naval ves- 
sels and stations were adequately manned, for the readiness and alert 
then in effect, by men fit for duty. 



REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 15 

XVIII 

The attack on the morning of December 7, 1941, was a combined air- 
raid and submarine attack on the island of Oahu, a bombardment of 
Midway, and a continuous air attack and bombardment on Wake 
Island. 

Available information indicates that the force attacking Oahu con- 
sisted of either three or four Japanese carriers, with supporting surface 
craft and a few small submarines, and that this force had maintained 
radio silence during its approach, which, except for the submarines, was 
from the northward of Oahu. 

In the attack on Oahu a suspicious object was sighted in the pro- 
hibited area off Pearl Harbor at 6 : 30 a. m., by the U. S. S. Antares. 
Between 6: 33 and 6: 45 this object, which was a small submarine, was 
attacked and sunk by the concerted action of a naval patrol plane and 
the U. S. S. Ward. A report of this action by the Warxl reached the 
naval-base watch officer at 7 : 12 a. m., who notified his chief of staff. 
The ready destroyer was despatched to investigate, but no alert warn- 
ings were issued based upon this report. Another small submarine 
was fired upon, depth-charged, rammed, and sunk inside the harbor 
between 8 : 35 and 8 : 43 a. m. A third small submarine grounded in 
Kaneohe Bay and was captured. There is no evidence of any damage 
by torpedoes fired by these submarines. 

Pearl Harbor was provided with an antitorpedo net which would 
have prevented the entrance of torpedoes into the harbor, and would 
have revealed the entrance of a submarine. The procedure prior to 
December 7, 1941, was to keep the net closed during the hours of dark- 
ness, opening it only when necessary for a vessel to pass through. It 
was kept open during daylight hours, on the theory that, during day- 
light, the channel entrance destroyer, the net vessel, and other vessels 
in the vicinity, would detect a submerged or partially submerged sub- 
marine. December 7 the net was opened at 4 : 58 a. m. for the entrance 
of two mine sweepers. It was kept open until 8 : 40 a. m., when it was 
closed by orders. The net was not damaged. The submarine was first 
sighted in the harbor at 7 : 45 a. m. The time of its entrance is not 
known, but probably it passed in about 7 a. m. 

An estimated force of from 150 to 200 fighting, bombing, and tor- 
pedo planes simultaneously attacked P'earl Harbor and all air bases 
on Oahu at about 7:55 a. m. All attacking planes had withdrawn 
before 11 a. m. As a result of the attack serious loss of life was 
caused and serious damage was inflicted on ships in the harbor, and 
planes, hangars, and other facilities at Hickam Field, Ewa Field, 
Ford Island, Wlieeler Field, Bellows Field, and Kaneohe. 

The major part of the damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted 
from torpedoes launched from planes. The torpedoes were of an 
obsolete type, altered to increase their explosive load, to decrease 
their radius, and fitted with side vanes to insure functioning in 
shallow water — a weapon peculiarly adapted to an attack such as 
the one delivered upon ships in Pearl Harbor. Many of the bombs 
had extra heavy cases, and appeared to be modified armor-piercing 
shell. 



16 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

December 7, 1941, at 9 : 30 p. m. Midway time (11:30 p. m. Hono- 
lulu time), a force believed to consist of two cruisers and two de- 
stroyers, approached from the southward, opened fire and shelled 
Midway Island for about 30 minutes. About noon December 8, 1941 
(2:50 p. m. December 7, Honolulu time), some 27 land planes made 
a strafing and bombing attack on Wake Island. Some loss of life 
and damage to material resulted on each island. Attacks on Wake 
continued until its capture on December 22, 1941 (December 21, Hono- 
lulu time). 

Immediately upon realizing that the Japanese were attacking, the 
commanding general, Hawaiian Department, ordered alert No. 3. 
The alert was executed with reasonable promptness. At the same 
time the commander in chief placed the fieet on a full war basis and 
issued a series of orders in an effort to intercept and destroy the 
attacking force. 

Officers and enlisted men, in defending against the attack, demon- 
strated excellent training and high morale. Antiaircraft weapons 
aboard ship, which were not already manned, and antiaircraft weap- 
ons ashore, which were in position, were promptly manned. Junior 
officers and enlisted men on their own intiative procured from stor- 
age every possible automatic weapon. These weapons continued in 
action during and in spite of low-level strafing and dive bombing 
which have been known to demoralize even seasoned; troops. At 
least three fighter pilots, in total disregard of their own safety, 
attempted to take off in the face of greatly superior forces then at- 
tacking their airdrome, but lost their lives in the attempt. A few 
fighter planes parked on an outlying gunner}^ training field, which 
was not attacked, took the air. This combined antiaircraft and 
fighter action resulted in the destruction of approximately 30 enemy 
aircraft, and a number of others were lost at sea because they were 
unable to rejoin their carriers. 

XIX 

The state of readiness prescribed for Army aircraft prior to the 
attack required them to be ready for flight only after 4 hours' notice. 
The type of alert in effect required all Army aircraft to be con- 
centrated in order more effectively to guard against possible sabotage, 
instead of being dispersed in order to afford greater security against 
air attack, and greater facility in taking the air. This state of 
readiness, this concentration of airplanes, and the element of surprise, 
all contributed to the effectiveness of the Japanese attack, and re- 
sulted in such permanent or temporary disablement of airplanes 
that very few fighter airplanes were able to take the air during the 
course of the action. For the same reasons it was impossible to get 
airplanes into the air in time to trail the Japanese airplanes back 
to their carriers. 

The aircraft warning system, which was remanned by about 8 : 30 
a. m. December 7, 1941, failed during the balance of that day to 
furnish any reliable information of enemy aircraft returning to their 
carriers. Such information as it afforded indicated enemy forces 
to the southward and southwestward of Oahu. A report of an actual 
contact with an enemy carrier, which later proved to be erroneous, 



REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 17 

gave credence to numerous reports from other sources indicating 
enemy carriers might be to the southward and southwestward thus 
causing futile searches in those areas. 

On December 7 naval Task Force 8 was about 200 miles west of 
Oahu, proceeding toward Oahu. Another was about TOO miles west 
of Oahu. A third, Task Force 11, was in the vicinity of Johnston 
Island, about TOO miles southwest of Oahu. These task forces were 
engaged in operations connected with strengthening the defenses of 
the outlying islands. 

On the morning of December T, 1941, prior to the attack, the follow- 
ing searches of sea areas were being made. Six patrol planes were 
searching south and southeastwardly from Midway. Three patrol 
planes were in the air engaged in a joint exercise with submarines 
south of Oahu. Eighteen scouting planes from Task Force 8 had been 
dispatched to scout in advance of the force which was on its way to 
Oahu. These scouted to the southwestward of Oahu. After the attack 
the f ollowig searches were made : The 3 planes in the air south of 
Oahu, according to their standing orders, searched to the northwest 
of Oahu a distance of about 375 miles. Xine planes were dispatched 
by Task Force 8 and searched to the south and southwest of Oahu. 
Carrier planes of Task Force 11 searched in an area about 500 miles 
southwestward of Oahu. About 11 : 2T a. m. 2 heavy Army bombers 
and 4 light bombers took off to attack a carrier reported about 25 miles 
off Barber's Point. After failure to make contact the 2 heavy bombers 
searched first to the southwestward and then in areas to the northwest 
of Oahu. The other 4 searched to the southwestward. At 11 : 50 a. m. 
6 Navy VS planes searched southward of Oahu. Thereafter 9 planes 
searched the sector southwest to northwest of Oahu. Two utility 
planes searched northward of Oahu to a distance of 300 miles, and 9 
planes which had arrived from carriers and refueled searched some 
200 miles to the northward. No contacts were made with enemy air- 
craft or carriers, except that 1 Navy airplane was attacked by a Japa- 
nese airplane some 300 miles north of Oahu. This incident was not 
reported until the next clay. 

SUMMARY or THE MORE IMPORTANT FACTS 

Pearl Harbor is an important outlying naval base, and its security 
is vital to both offensive and defensive operations. It is the Army's 
function to insure the security of Pearl Harbor against hostile at- 
tack, and the Navy's function to support the Army indirectly by 
operations at sea and directly by making available therefor such in- 
strumentalities of the Navy as are on the vessels of the fleet when in 
harbor and are located or based on shore either temporarily or per- 
manently. 

Effective utilization of the military power of the Nation is essential 
to success in war and requires that the operations of the Army and 
the Navy be coordinated. Under the then existing plans the joint 
defense of the Hawaiian frontier was to be coordinated by mutual 
cooperation between the commanders concerned. Plans for the de- 
fense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier were prepared by the com- 
manding general, Hawaiian Department, and the commandant of the 
Fourteenth Naval District, the latter acting as a subordinate of the 



18 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Adherence to such a plan 
prepared in advance of hostilities does not suffice to relieve com- 
manders of their responsibility to apply and adapt the plan to the 
situation as it develops. 

Where, as here, the defense of an area is the joint responsibility of 
two commanders who are to coordinate their activities by mutual co- 
operation, the first duty of such commanders in the case of an emer- 
gency is conference and consultation with respect to the measures to 
be taken under the existing plans and the adaptation of those plans 
in whole or in part to the situation. 

At about the time that Admiral Kimmel and General Short as- 
sumed their respective commands, the War and Navy Departments 
were in correspondence with respect to adequate defense against air 
raids on Oahu and the naval base. The correspondence between the 
departments exhibits a deep concern respecting the probability of 
this form of attack. These commanders were acquainted with this 
correspondence. Nevertheless there has been amongst the responsible 
commanders and their subordinates, ithout exception, a conviction, 
which persisted up to December 7, 1941, that Japan had no intention 
of making any such raid. Consequently this form of attack was a 
complete surprise to all of the superior officers of Army and Navy 
stationed in the Hawaiian area. This conviction persisted notwith- 
standing messages containing warnings and orders, brought to the 
attention of both commanders over a period of weeks prior to the 
attack. As early as October 16 the commanders were warned of the 
possibility of an attack by Japan on the United States and were 
directed to take precautions and make preparatory dispositions in 
the light of this information. A significant warning message was 
communicated to both the local commanders on November 24. On 
November 27 each responsible commander was warned that hostilities 
were momentarily possible. The warnings indicated war, and war 
only. 

Both of these messages contained orders. The commanding gen- 
eral was ordered to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures 
as he deemed necessary. The commander in chief of the fleet was 
ordered to execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying 
out war tasks. Other significant messages followed on succeeding 
days. These emphasized the impending danger and the need for war 
readiness. 

In this situation, during a period of 10 days preceding the Japanese 
attack, the responsible commanders held no conference directed to a 
discussion of the meaning of the warnings and orders sent them, and 
failed to collaborate and to coordinate defensive measures which 
should be taken pursuant to the orders received. Dispositions as a 
result of the messages were independently made by each commander. 
Neither of them informed himself of the measures and dispositions 
taken by the other. 

The dispositions so made were inadequate to meet a surprise air 
attack. 

Both commanders were handicapped by lack of information as 
to Japanese dispositions and intent. The lack of such knowledge 
rendered more urgent the initiation of a state of readiness for defense. 

The personnel, materiel, and equipment were insufficient to place 
the forces on a war footing and maintain them on that footing for 



REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 19 

an extended period. These deficiencies did not preclude measures 
which would have to a great extent frustrated the attack or mitigated 
its severity, 

A considerable number of the Army and Navy personnel were 
on pass or liberty December 6, for the reason that the state of alert 
or of readiness demanded by the emergency had not been put into 
effect. With immaterial exceptions Army and Navy personnel had 
returned from leave and liberty hours before the attack ensued, fit 
for duty. 

Both officers and men responded immediately in the emergency and 
exhibited initiative, efficiency, and bravery, in meeting the raid. 

Based upon its findings of fact, the Commission reaches the following 

Conclusions 

1. Effective utilization of the military power of the Nation is essen- 
tial to success in war and requires : First, the coordination of the 
foreign and military policies of the Nation; and, second, the coordina- 
tion of the operations of the Army and Navy. 

2. The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping the 
War and Navy Departments in close touch with the international 
situation and fully advising them respecting the course and probable 
termination of negotiations with Japan. 

3. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled 
their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State 
and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief 
of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with 
Japan and the significant implications thereof. 

4. The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled 
their obligations by consulting and cooperating with each other, and 
with their superiors, respecting the joint defense of the Hawaiian 
coastal frontier; and each knew of, and concurred in, the warnings 
and orders sent by the other to the responsible commanders with re- 
spect to such defense. 

5. The Chief of Staff of the Army fulfilled his command responsi- 
bility by issuing a direct order in connection with his warning of 
probable hostilities, in the following words: "Prior to hostile Jap- 
anese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and 
other measures as you deem necessary." 

6. The Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled his command responsi- 
bility by issuing a warning and by giving a direct order to the com- 
mander in chief, Pacific Fleet, in the following words : 

This despatch is to be considered a war warning. 

and 

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out 
the tasks assigned. 

7. The responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area, in fulfillment 
of their obligation so to do, prepared plans which, if adapted to and 
used for the existing emergency, would have been adequate. 

8. In the circumstances the responsibility of these commanders was 
to confer upon the question of putting into effect and adapting their 
joint defense plans. 



20 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

9. These coniiiuuiders failed to confer with respect to the warnings 
and orders issued on and after November 27, and to adapt and use 
existing plans to meet the emergency. 

10. The order for alert No. 1 o fthe Army command in Hawaii was 
not adequate to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning 
messages. 

11. The state of readiness of the naval forces on the morning of 
December 7 was not such as was required to meet the emergency 
envisaged in the warning messages. 

12. Had orders issued by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval 
Operations November 27, 1941, been complied with, the aircraft warn- 
ing system of the Army should have been operating; the distant 
reconnaissance of the Navy, and the inshore air patrol of the Army, 
should have been maintained ; the antiaircraft batteries of the Army 
and similar shore batteries of the Navy, as well as additional anti- 
aircraft artillery located on vessels of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, 
should have been manned and supplied with ammunition ; and a high 
state of readiness of aircraft should have been in effect. None of 
these conditions was in fact inaugurated or maintained for the reason 
that the responsible commanders failed to consult and cooperate 
as to necessary action based upon the warnings and to adopt meas- 
ures enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and 
Navy commands in Washington. 

13. There were deficiencies in personnel, weapons, equipment, and 
facilities to maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended 
periods of time, but these deficiencies should not have affected the 
decision of the responsible commanders as to the state of readiness 
to be prescribed. 

14. The warning message of December 7, intended to reach both 
conmianders in the field at about 7 a. m. Hawaiian time, December 
7, 1941, was but an added precaution, in view of the warnings and 
orders previously issued. If the message had reached its destina- 
tion at the time intended, it would still have been too late to be of 
substantial use, in view of the fact that the commanclers had failed 
to take measures and make dispositions prior to the time of its antici- 
pated receipt which would have been effective to warn of the attack or 
to meet it. 

15. The failure of the officers in the War Department to observe 
that General Short, neither in his reply of November 27 to the Chief 
of Staff's message of that date, nor otherwise, had rex)orted the 
measures taken by him, and the transmission of two messages con- 
cerned chiefly wdth sabotage which warned him not to resort to illegal 
methods against sabotage or espionage, and not to take measures 
which would alarm the civil population, and the failure to reply to 
his message of November 29 outlining in full all the actions he had 
taken against sabotage only, and referring to nothing else, tended 
to lead General Short to Ijelieve that what he had done met the 
requirements of the warnings and orders received by him. 

16. The failure of the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, 
and the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to confer and cooperate 
with respect to the meaning of the warnings received and the measures 
necessary to comply with the orders given them under date of No- 
vember 27, 1941, resulted largely from a sense of security due to the 



REPORT OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 21 

opinion prevalent in diplomatic military, and naval circles, and in 
the public press, that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the 
Far East. The existence of such a view, however prevalent, did not 
relieve the commanders of the responsibility for the security of the 
Pacific Fleet and our most important outpost, 

17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate 
action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and 
December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then 
in effect for joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction 
of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with 
the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the 
apjDropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostili- 
ties. The attitude of each, that he was not required to inform him- 
self of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other 
to carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provi- 
sions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a 
lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent 
in their positions as commanders in chief, Pacific Fleet, and command- 
ing general, Hawaiian Department. 

18. The Japanese attack was a complete surprise to the commanders, 
and they failed to make suitable dispositions to meet such an attack. 
Each failed properly to evaluate the seriousness of the situation. 
These errors of judgment w^ere the effective causes for the success 
of the attack. 

19. Causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack were : 
Disregard of international law and custom relating to declaration 

of war by the Japanese and the adherence by the United States to such 
laws and customs. 

Restrictions which prevented effective counterespionage. 

Emphasis in the warning messages on the probability of aggressive 
Japanese action in the Far East, and on antisabotage measures. 

Failure of the War Department to rej^ly to the message relating to 
the antisabotage measures instituted by the commanding general, 
Hawaiian Department. 

Nonreceipt by the interested parties, prior to the attack, of the 
warning message of December 7, 1941. 

20. When the attack developed on the morning of December 7, 1941, 
the officers and enlisted men of both services were present in sufficient 
number and were in fit condition to perform any cluty. Except for a 
negligible number, the use of intoxicating liquor oil the preceding 
evening did not affect their efficiency. 

21. Subordinate commanders executed their superiors' orders with- 
out question. They were not responsible for the state of readiness 
prescribed. 

Respectfully submitted. 

Owen J. Roberts. 
W, H. Standley. 
J. M. Reeves. 
F'rank R. McCoy. 
Joseph T. McNarney. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 23 



[A] REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 

Appointed by the Secretary of War, pursuant to the Provisions of 
Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, to Ascertain 
and Report the Facts Relating to the Attack Made by Japanese Armed 
Forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on T December 1941, and to Make 
such Recommendations as It May Deem Proper. Also, To Consider 
the Phases Which Related to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the Report 
of the House Military Affairs Committee, as Directed by the Acting 
Secretary of War, in His Memorandum for The Judge Advocate 
General, 12 July 1944. 

[B] TABLE OF CONTENTS 



Page ' 
Chapter I. Preamble: Authority for the Army Pearl Harbor Board and 

Its Action .Taken 1 

Chapteir II. Background 9 

Chapter III. The Story of Pearl Harbor 55 

Chapter IV. Responsit)ilities in Washington 218 

Chapter V. Wyman and Construction Delays in Hawaii 242 

Chapter VI. Conclusions 294 

Chaptee VII. Recommendations 304 

Appendices Second Volume 

LEGENDS 

RR — Roberts Record. D — Document. 

R— APHB Record. Ex— Exhibit. 

Italics ours unless otherwise stated. 

[i] Chapter I. Preamble: Authority for the Army Pearl 
Harbor Board and Its Action Taken 

This Board was appointed pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 
339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, by Letter Order A. G. O. 
8 July 1944 (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (24 Jim 44) ) as amended by Letter 
Order A. G. O. 11 July 1944 (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (10 Jun 44) ) and 
Letter Order A. G. 0. 22 AugTist 1944 (AGPO-A-A 248.7 (2 Aug 44) ) , 
and as supplemented by Supplemental Letter Order A. G. O. 22 July 
1944 (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (21 July 44) ) which order made reference 
to a memorandum for The Judge Advocate General of 12 July 1944 — 
Subject : Report of House Military Affairs Committee dated 14 June 
1944 alleging neglect and misconduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, 
Jr., and others, concerning Hawaiian and Canadian Defense Projects, 
and which was signed by Robert P. Patterson, Acting Secretary of 

» Pages referred to are represented by Italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

War. This supplemental order directed the Board to consider the 
phase of the report which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster.- 
Composition of the Board : 

Lt. Gen. George Grunert, 01534, USA 

Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, 0212769, USA 

MaJ. Gen. Walter H. Frank, 02871, USA 

Col. Charles W. West, 012774, JAGD, Recorder (without vote) 

Col. Harry A. Toulniin, 0205520, AC, Executive Officer (without 

vote) 
Maj. Henry C. Clausen, O907613, JAGD, Assistant Recorder 
(without vote) 
[2] The Board interpreted these orders and the memorandum 
referred to as confining its investigation to the Pearl Harbor disaster. 
The Board convened 20 July 1944 and was in continuous session from 
24 July 1944 to 20 October 1944. It held hearings twice in Washing- 
ton, D. C. ; twice in San Francisco, California; and in Hawaii. It has 
heard a total of 151 witnesses and has interviewed many additional 
potential -s^itnesses whom it found did not have any pertinent infor- 
mation. There has been no available document, witness, suggestion 
or lead which promised any materialitj^ that has not been carefully 
investigated by this Board. Every witness has been invited to give, 
in addition to his testimony, any suggestions, opinions, leads to evi- 
dence, or any other information that might possibly be pertinent. It 
has been our purpose, and we believe we have effected it, to explore 
every available piece of information on this- subject. We have not 
had the opportunity, nor the organization, to comb personally and 
exhaustively the official files, but we have called for the pertinent let- 
ters, documents, and memoranda. We believe that practically all of 
them have been secured, although we have found a few files from which 
important and vital papers are missing. In many instances we found 
these documents elsewhere or were able to prove them through copies 
in other hands. 

This Board has been without power of subpoena, but in no instance 
has its invitation to appear and testify been ignored. 

In view of the fact that the War Department appointed this 
[3] Board, under Joint Resolution of Congress,^ to examine the 
Army's part in the Pearl Harbor disaster because Congress desired, 
as appears from the legislative history of the Joint Resolution, a 
more thorough study, it has been necessary to examine the record of 
the Roberts Commission and the Roberts Report in the light of the 
new testimony adduced by this Board, new witnesses, and new docu- 

'■' See copies of orders and memorandum, Exhibits 65 to 69, inclusive. 

^ Public Law 339 — 78th Congress, Chapter 247 — 2d session, S. J. Res. 133, .Joint Resolu- 
tion : To extend the statute of limitation in certain cases. 

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled. That effective as of December 7, 1943, all statutes, resolutions, laws, 
articles, and regulations, affecting the possible prosecution of any person or persons, mili- 
tary or civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or in- 
volved in any other possil)le or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against 
the United States, that operate to prevent the court martial, prosecution, trial or punish- 
ment of any person or persons in military or civil capacity, involved in any matter in 
connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any 
other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, 
are hereby extended for a further period" of six months, in addition to the extension 
provided for in Public Law 208, Seventy-eighth Congress. 

"Sec. 2. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to 
proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described 
in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts 
may justify. 

"Approved June 13, 1944." 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 25 

ments; and to set forth wherein the Board's findings are in harmonj' 
with the Roberts Report ; or, if in conflict, are correct and supported 
by fuller evidence. 

The Board has made, therefore, a careful review of the record and 
exhibits of the Roberts Commission. This Board has been materially 
helped and enlightened by the Report and Record [4] of the 
Roberts Commission. We append to this report a section indicating 
the additional information and documents which have been made 
available as a result of our extended investigation, and which prob- 
ably did not come to the attention of the Roberts Commission; or, 
at least, were not mentioned in either the testimony, documents or 
report of the Roberts Commission. 

We have been greatly aided by the Interim Report, Committee on 
Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-eighth Congress, 
2nd Session, pursuant to H. Res. 30, A Resolution Authorizing the 
Committee on Military Affairs and the Committee on Xaval Affairs 
to Study the Progress of the National War Effort, and the com- 
mittee's records, counsel, and investigators, with particular reference 
to the activities of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., Hans Wilhelm 
Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, and others, as such activities had 
a bearing upon the Pearl Harbor disaster and what led up to it. 
We have been aided by the testimony of counsel from that committee 
and the complete record of the investigation of that committee 
on this subject and its exhibits. We have also heard testimony and 
investigated reports and reviewed affidavits of additional affiants, 
whose testimony came to light, or documents were discovered, after 
the conclusion of the investigation of the Committee on Military 
Affairs, as indicated in its Interim Report. We have also been aided 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, 
and the Report of the Tenney Committee in California. 

We transmit with this report the record of testimony of the 
witnesses consisting of 41 volumes and TO exhibits. In the appendix 
to this report is a tabulation in detail of the [J] witnesses 
who testified and a list of the exhibits. 

In order to facilitate the examination of the Board's record by 
the War Department and by any others who may have occasion to 
review the record and exhibits, we append to this report and make a 
part of it extensive analysis of the testimony of every witness, in- 
dexing each statement by reference to the record, and with cross ref- 
erences of those statements to different parts of the record where 
similar or different statements on the same subject were made by 
other witnesses. We have also added cross references to the same 
subject matter in the record of the Roberts Commission or the ex- 
hibits presented before that commission. It is, therefore, possible 
for anyone reviewing this report to have a complete and, we believe, 
exhaustive analysis of every phase of the Pearl Harbor matters, so 
that any part of the situation can be easily and promptly reviewed. 

In formulating this report the Board has been conscious of the 
deep spiritual and moral obligation, as well as its professional and 
patriotic duty, to present an impartial and judicial investigation 
and report. This we have earnestly endeavored to do, and have 
spared no pains or effort to that end. With that spirit animating 
our actions, we have deemed it helpful and wise to present the state 



26 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of mind and the background against which the events of the drama 
of Pearl Harbor could be adequately judged ; and to sketch in retro- 
spection the events and the knowledge of such events of each of the 
principal actors on the scene, so that their actions might be more 
fully understood and justly evaluated [G] and judged. At 
no time, however, has the Board acted as a court.* 

This is necessary because we are now passing upon the matter 
several years after the event. AVe have endeavored to effect this re- 
construction to some degree in the second chapter entitled, "Back- 
ground". The same considerations have been evaluated in the suc- 
ceeding chapters, as this background atitected the events and actions 
of those involved in the matters under consideration. In so doing, 
we hope we have avoided the human failing so aptly pointed out by 
St. Paul of 

forgetting those things which are behind and reaching forth unto those things 
which are before. 

In Chapter III we have presented the story of Pearl Harbor. This 
is a running chronological story of the events that took place leading 
up to the Pearl Harbor attack and through that fateful day and 
for a short period thereafter, so far as subsequent events reflected 
upon the conditions previously existing. We have discussed in this 
Chapter III the arguments for and against each principal propo- 
sition, have examined all of the representations and defenses of 
General Short and others involved in this matter. We have en- 
deavored to state the surrounding facts and circumstances, the back- 
ground, the considerations and factors which influenced each prin- 
cipal officer or official in the execution of his duties. 

[7-8] Therefore, whoever reads this report will have before him 
all of the considerations for and against any proposition, all facts, any 
defense or any claim put forward by those interested, and answers to 
such questions of import to the services and to the public, in order to 
have the foundation for an impartial judgment. 

In Chapter IV we continue the story in so far as it pertains to Wash- 
ington. In Chapter V we relate the story concerning the Pre-Pearl 
Harbor construction activities and in Chapter VI come to Conclusions. 

The Board was after facts; and the surrounding conditions, back- 
ground, and atmosphere which influenced the actors in this drama and 
brought them to their fateful decisions. This we believe we secured 
successfully from military and naval personnel of widely varying 
ranks; from civilians of varied stations in life; and from official and 
other contemporaneous publications. The range of witnesses ran 
from men in the ranks to Generals and Admirals, and from the hum- 
blest in civil life to United States Senators and the President's Cab- 
inet.^ Each witness was invited, additionally, to express freely liis 
views and opinions on the record, and to submit any facts or leads to 
the discoveries of facts which might be helpful to this Board. 

We set out with no thesis to prove, nor person to convict. Our ap- 

* Whenever any interested witness raised a question of proof ttiat had not been previ- 
ously discussed, or fully examined, or any newspaper report raising any question came to 
our attention, we endeavored to get an answer so that the whole truth would be known 
once and for all. 

^ Whenever there was a shadow or a shade of a doubt, we resolved it in favor of running 
down the suggestion and introducing proof, if it had any suspicion of materiality 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 27 

proach has been, we hope, diligently and completely factual ; and also 
equally impartial. Our conclusions are those compelled by the clear 
weight of the evidence from the facts set forth in the record. 

[9] Chapter II. Background 

1. Introduction 

Confusion of Thinking, Organization, Conflict of Opinions and Diversity of 
Views ; Nation Not Geared to War. 

2. Ptiblic Opinion 

Psychological Conditions and Their Effect ; Army Dependent on Public Opin- 
ion and State of Public Mind and Its Readiness for War ; American Public Re- 
luctant to Consider A War ; Japan Ready for War. 

3. U. 8. Policy (1922-1939) 

Study of Long-Term Treatment of Japan Important; the Mandated Islands 
and Exclusion of the United States and Fortification of the Islands by Japan ; 
the Navy's Efforts to Get Into the Islands and Its Relationship to the State De- 
partment ; Diplomatic Status of Consular Agents of Japan in Hawaii and Their 
Spying Activities ; Strong National Policy for the Pi-otection of American Rights 
Lacking and Effect Upon the Army and Navy ; the Effect of This Policy on the 
Japanese Oriental Trading Mind. 

-'/. U. S. Policy (1939-1941) 

Avoidance of a Conflict with Japan 1939-1941 by Avoiding Open Breach ; Ne- 
cessity for Delay to Prepare for War ; Negotiations Based Upon Lack of In- 
cidence. 

5. Moral Embargoes Versus Japanese Expansion 

Morale Embargoes ; Economic Sanctions by Direct Embargoes ; Coincident 
Forming of Public Opinion Against Japan ; Japanese Making No Concessions and 
Proceeding with Aggressions; Threatening Hostile Action; Lack of Public Un- 
derstanding of Importance of Hawaii ; War and Navy Departments Mak- 
ing [10] Great Effort to Prepare for War with Grave Deficiencies; Diver- 
sion of Resources to Assist England and France Retarding our Own Rearming; 
Coordination of Action by the Government Through Conference in War Council, 
Etc.; Lack of Appreciation of Where Japan Would Attack and Miscalculation 
of Time of Attack ; Japanese Full Understanding of Our Dilemma. 

6. Ptiblic Demands Action Against Japanese 

National Policy Against War ; Attempt to Negotiate and Apply Economic Sanc- 
tions Put Government in Difiicult Contrary Positions ; Conflicting Elements of 
Policy Communicated to Field Commanders to Both Prepare tor War and Not 
Precipitate an Incident Causing War ; Public Opinion in 1941 More Belligerent 
Than the Preparations for War Justified Complicating Government Position. 

7. Economic Sanctio7is Against Japan 

The Economic Effect on Japan of Progressive Sanctions Considered in Detail; 
the Rising Tempo of Economic Disaster to Japan and the Decreasing Success of 
Negotiations ; Inevitable Showdown Between Japanese Economic Strangulation 
and Military Action Approaching; the Impasse Reached on November 26, 1941; 
the State Department Passes Responsibility for the Nation to the War and Navy 
Departments. 

8. The Hawaiian Population Problem, 

Sabotage Complex; the Japanese Population Conditions Analyzed in Hawaii; 
the Rising Dominance Economically and Politically of the Japanese Group; 
Sabotage of War Action Possible by the Hawaiian Japanese Group ; the Diffi- 
culty of Alerts Without Disturbing the Civilian Japanese Population To An Overt 
Act ; Effect of Japanese Atmosphere in Hawaii and Government Policy Against 
Overt Acts Upon the Responsible Commanders in Hawaii ; the Local Opposition 
of Commercial Interests to [11] Putting Japanese Under Control ; OlBcial 

Reluctance to Put Local Japanese Population under Civilian Surveillance ; Free 
Japanese Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in Hawaii. 



28 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

9. Euwaiian Press 

Constant Reiteration of Progressively Increasing DiflBculties witli Japan and 
Threats of War Accentuated the State of Mind of Local Commanders as to Diffi- 
culties with Local Population. 

10. Summary 

Preparatory Period Immense Effect Upon State of Mind of Public Officials and 
Commanders ; Our Complacency Our Weakness ; Our National Pride and Vanity 
our Weakness ; the Result was Lack of Action, Coordination, Cooperation, Team- 
work, and War Spirit; United States Was Unprepared Mentally, Physically, or 
as an Organization for War. 

[l^l 1. Introduction. — The purpose of this explanation of the 
background of j^iiblic and private events as they existed in 1940 and 
1941 IS this. There existed during this critical period much confusion 
of thinking and of organization, of conflict of opinion and diversity 
of views. The nation was not geared to war, either mentally or as an 
organization. It was a period of conflicting plans and purposes. The 
winds of public opinion were blowing in all directions; isolationists 
and nationalists were struggling for predominance ; public opinion was 
both against war and clamoring for reprisal against Japan; we were 
negotiating for peace Avith Japan, and simultaneously applying eco- 
nomic sanctions that led only to war; we were* arming our forces for 
war and at the same time giving away much of such armament. The 
Administration, State, War and Navy Departments in their policies, 
plans and operations were likewise being pushed here and there by 
the ebb and flow of war events, public reactions, diplomatic negotia- 
tions and newspaper attacks. 

The War Department by its actions and its organization was still 
on a peacetime basis ; neither its management nor its general staff had 
perfected its organization for war or for the conduct of a large enter- 
prise. The whole machinery of government was geared to a different 
purpose and tempo than war. Valiant and brilliant men were strug- 
gling to bring order out of chaos, rather as individuals or as small 
groups, attempting simultaneously both to establish policies and to 
accomplish practical things. As a result a few men, without organiza- 
tion in the true sense, were attempting to conduct large enterprises, 
take multiple actions, and give directions that sliould have been 
[i<?] the result of carefully directed commands, instead of action 

taken by conference. We were preparing for a war by the conference 
method. We were directing such preparations by the conference 
method ; we were even writing vital messages by the conference method, 
and arriving at their contents by compromise instead of by command; 
that was the product of the time and conditions due to the transition 
from peace to war in a democracy. 

Such was the confusion of men and events, largely unorganized for 
appropriate action and helpless before a strong course of events, 
that ran away with the situation and prematurely plunged us into 
war. 

[i4] 2. Public Opinion. — The disaster of Pearl Harbor and the 
responsibilities and courses of action taken by those connected there- 
with can better be understood when the background of public opinion 
and the state of the public mind are likewise understood. Psycholog- 
ical conditions had a material effect upon the events that took place. A 
brief review of the then state of mind of officials and the public ; and 
the facts known to the public and to the government ; and our national 
policy are all necessary in order to view the picture in its proper 
perspective. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 29 

Our Army, like other armies of democracies, in its policies and its 
actions to a degree was dependent upon and was influenced by public 
opinion and the state of the public mind. Successful war is waged 
through a state of mind and a state of public readiness for war. A 
recognition of this fact is necessary to the understanding of the back- 
ground of public opinion and the state of our desire to make war, 
which undoubtedly had its influence on the War Department and the 
responsible commanders in Hawaii. A brief resume of that situation 
will lead to an understanding of what influenced the taking of certain 
actions, or the failures to take action, on the part of the Washington 
departments concerned and the higher commanders in the field. 

For a long period of time prior to the war the public was reluctant 
even to consider a war.*^ There was a distinct [15] lack of a 
war mind in the United States. Isolationist organizations and prop- 
aganda groups against war were powerful and vital factors affecting 
any war action capable of being taken by our responsible leadership. 
So influential were these campaigns that they raised grave doubts in 
minds of such leadership as to whether they would be supported by 
the people in the necessary actions for our defense by requisite moves 
against Japan. Public opinion in the early stages had to be allowed 
to develop ; in the later stages it ran ahead of preparation for war. 
There was little war spirit either amongst the general public or in the 
armed forces, due to this conflicting public opinion having its in- 
fluence.'^ The events hereinafter recited must be measured against 
this important psychological factor. 

At the same time, Japan was pursuing an opposite policy of prepa- 
ration. It had been at war for several years in China ; both its people 
and government were psychologically and physicall}^ geared to war 
and were implemented with a polished plan of action and equipment 
to do the job. It was animated by cunning, hatred and patriotism in 
a land where life is cheap ; and nurtured in an atmosphere of insane 
nationalism [16] and oriental intrigue. Japan was a nation 
united for the single purpose of world conquest based on more than a 
thousand years of conflict. 

As Ambassador Grew testified, from the time of his arrival in Japan 
in 1932, he constantly developed the theme of the grave necessity for 
adequate preparation militantly to implement our diplomatic polisy, 
because of Japan's readiness for war. As he said to Mr. Stimson, then 
Secretary of State, in the latter part of 1932 : 

The Japanese Army has been built for war, it feels prepared for war, and it 
wants war. 

And he continued : 

At that time I said it would be criminally "short-sighted", I think not to recog- 
nize this fact and be prepared for anything that might develop in the Far Bast. 
Those warnings were, as I say, continued in my telegrams and dispatches 
throughout the ten years of my service there, right up to the end." (R. 4291.) 

8 The close vote of Congress on recalling the National Guard from active service and 
on a proposal to abandon Lend-Lease clearly reflect public opinion of that day and time in 
1941. 

' Rear Admiral McMorris testified as to the weak status of our fleet with respect to the 
strong Japanese task force that attacked Pearl Harbor, and what would have happened 
if our fleet had gone out into deep blue water to fight : "A fight would have occurred in 
which our losses might have been even greater than actually occurred. * * * our own 
losses would have been extremely heavy and might well have included the loss of both our 
carriers." (R. 2878.) 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 157 3 



30 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[77] 3. V. S. Policy, {1922-1939) .—The events leading up to 
the Pearl Harbor disaster can only be understood when we examine 
our national policy as administered by the State Department. That 
policy must be examined back a number of years to see the long-term 
treatment of Japan which had its bearing on the Pearl Harbor 
disaster. 

An early step in a direction considered adverse to the interests of 
the United States was our failure to have a showdown with Japan on 
its fortifications of the mandated islands. 

The Mandate for the German possessions in the Pacific Ocean lying 
north of the Equator under date of December 17, 1920, the Convention 
for the Control of Trade and Arms and Ammunition between the 
Allied Powers under date of September 10, 1919, and the Mandates 
between the United States and Japan regarding the former German 
Islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator and particularly 
the island of Yap under date of February 11, 1922, have the following 
in common : 

a. "Full power of administration and legislation over the Mandated territory, 
Including control of public works and services, the importation of arms, etc. In 
Bhort, it was a 'government in trust.' " 

b. "No military or naval bases shall be established or fortification^ erected 
in the territory." 

c. "The Mandatory . . . allow all missionaries, nationals of any state, 
member of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the [18] 
territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling." 

d. "Any dispute between Japan and the other nations signing the Mandates, 
whether it be the first two Mandates mentioned, or the one direct with thie 
United States, are to be settled by a negotiation of 'The Permanent Court of 
International Justice.' " 

e. "Vested property rights in the Mandated Islands shall be respected and 
In no way impaired." 

f. 'The existing treaties between the United States and Japan shall be 
applicable to the Mandated Islands." 

g. "The United States and its nationals shall have free access to the island 
of Yap on a footing of entire equality with Japan or any other nations and 
their respective nationals and all that relates to the landing and operation of 
the existing Yap-Guam cable, or over any cable which may be hereafter laid 
or operated by the United States or its nationals connecting with the island 
of Yap." 

h. There are many other provisions of the same effect of entire freedom of 
action with respect [19] to Yap.* 



* The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, advised this Board : "Japan was given under a League 
of Nations mandate full power to administer tlie Mandated Islands as an integral part of 
Japan and to apply Japanese laws in the islands. The United States had expressly agreed 
in a treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, to administration by Japan of the islands pur- 
suant to the League mandate. Among the Japanese laws the operation of which was 
extended to include the Mandated Islands was that which stipulated that all ports and 
harbors shall be closed to foreign vessels except those that were specifically opened to for- 
eign trade. The opened ports in the Mandated Islands were Saipan, Palau, Angaur, Truk, 
Ponape, and Jaluit. 

"Article II (3) of the Treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, regarding the Mandated 
Islands provided that : 'Existing treaties between the United States and Japan shall be 
applicable to the mandated islands.' Article IV of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation 
concluded between the United States and Japan on February 21, 1911, contained the follow- 
ing provisions : 'The citizens or subjects of each of the Contracting Parties, equally with 
the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation, shall have liberty freely to come with 
their ships and cargoes to all places, ports and rivers in the territories of the other which 
are or may be opened to foreign commerce, subject always to the laws of the country to 
which they thus come.' 

"By an exchange of notes which took place concurrently with the signing of the treaty 
with Japan of February 11, 1922, regarding the Mandated Islands, Japan assured the 
United States that 'the usual comity will be extended to nationals and vessels of the 
United States in visiting the harbors and waters of those islands'. The term 'usual 
comity' in its application to visits by the nationals and vessels of other countries means 
the courtesy which is normally accorded by a country to the nationals and vessels of 
other countries." 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 31 

Had the United States successfully insisted upon Japan living up 
to those treaty stipulations, the entire naval and military structure in 
the key Pacific Islands erected by the Japanese might have been made 
impossible. Japan, without authority of international law and in 
violation of the treaties and mandates above referred to, for nearly 
twenty years successfully and completely excluded other nationals 
from the mandated territories, and during this time built up army, 
navy and air installations of tremendous strategical value. 

[W] As a consequence of the foregoing, Japan gained the enor- 
mous advantage of a string of naval and air and army bases across our 
lifeline to the Philippines and rendered futile and impotent any forti- 
fication of our own islands, such as Guam, Midway, Christmas, Pal- 
myra, etc. It also placed the dagger's point at the heart of the 
Hawaiian Islands because such a base as Jaluit in the mandated islands 
was a thousand miles closer to Hawaii than to the homeland of Japan. 

Our policy through the successive years appears to have been based 
upon a combination of fear of the Japanese and of an obsession not to 
give offense to the Japanese; a policy which because of their temper- 
mental characteristics, proved to be one of weakness rather than of 
strength ; it was also a policy of endeavoring to treat the Japanese on 
the basis that they were civilized and that their word could be trusted 
and at the same time one which treated them as if they were uncivilized 
and could not be trusted, and consequently we excluded them from the 
United States. 

We entered the jear of 1941 with two purposes in mind : first, to 
avoid war and settle our troubles by negotiation, treaties, and con- 
tracts ; and, while negotiating, we applied exactly the opposite remedy 
of economic sanctions. 

Efforts to visit the Mandated Islands, presumably to glean informa- 
tion, were said to have been made and were unsuccessful. (R. Miles, 
101-107; Pye, 1061-1065; Bloch, 1503, 1527-1529; DeLaney 1702- 
1703; Kimmel, 1807-1808; Layton, 3054-3055.) The State Depart- 
ment explanation concerning these efforts is set forth below. The net 
result was, however, that we did not get into these Islands ; the Japa- 
nese fortified the Islands and in [21] consequence the United 
States suffered. The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, presented his 
Department's views as follows : 

The matter of visits to the Mandated Islands by American nationals or private 
American vessels, just as visits in genei-al by American nationals and American 
private vessels to ports and places elsewhere in the world, did not call for a pro- 
cedure involving requests through diplomatic channels by this Government to the 
Japanese Government and would not therefore have come within the cognizance 
of the Department of State, except in cases where, because of a refusal of the 
Japanese Government to permit such visits, this Government had taken diplomatic 
action at the instance of the American parties at interest. No record has been 
found in the Department's files of any application having been made by the 
Department to the Japanese Government for permission for American nationals 
or American private vessels to visit the Mandated Islands during the year 1940- 
1941, the years concerning which you made inquiry. According to the informa- 
tion made available to the Department in 1940, an officer attached to the office of 
the Naval Attache in Tokyo inquired in August 1939 at the ticket office of the 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha Steamship Company with regard to possibilities of making 
reservations for passages were filled for a period of three months. His subsequent 
efforts to obtain passage were frustrated by dilatory tactics on the part of the 
Japanese. No request for diplomatic assistance was made in that instance. 



32 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The procedure followed by this Government in asking permission from the 
Japanese Government for visits by public vessels to Japanese ports or ports in 
Japanese mandated areas was in accord with the procedure followed by this 
Government in requesting permission for visits by its public vessels to the ports 
of other countries. 

No record has been found of any requests in 1940 and 1941 by the War or 
Navy Department to this Department that there be taken up with the Japanese 
Government proposals for visits to the Mandated Islands or of this Government's; 
having approached the Japanese Government during those years in regard to 
visits to the Mandated Islands. In previous years the Navy Department at vari- 
ous times asked this Department to obtain permission for certain United States 
naval vessels to visit certain specified opened and unopened ports in the Man- 
dated Islands. The Department of State promptly made representations to the 
Japanese Government requesting the necessary permission. With regard to 
applications made prior to 1936 the Japanese Government indicated its readi- 
ness [22] to permit American public vessels to visit the opened ports but 
not the unopened ports named in the lists submitted by the Navy Department. 
The Navy Department, however, canceled the proposed visits to the opened ports 
for which permission to visit had been granted. In the approaches made by this 
Government in 1936 and in 1937, the Japanese Government, on grounds of incon- 
venience, withheld its permission for United States public vessels to visit the 
opened ports as well as the unopened ports of the Mandated Islands. 

In view of the fact that the Japanese Government in 1936 refused in,' actual 
practice to permit visits to the opened ports as well as to the unopened ports in 
the Mandated Islands and in view also of the fact that with the termination in 
1936 of the Treaty Limiting Naval Armament, signed at Washington in 1922, this 
Government became free to fortify the Aleutian Islands, this Government decided 
10 adopt a more restrictive policy with regard to the admission of Japanese war 
or other public vessels to the Aleutians and to Alaska. After 1936 visits by 
Japanese public vessels were permitted only to Dutch Harbor, also known as 
Unalaska, and. on two occasions, to the PribilofE Islands which the Jaijanese were 
permitted to visit because of special circumstances arising out of the Convention 
of 1911 for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals. Subsequent to 1936 
permission was withheld for all visits by Japanese public vessels to the territorial 
waters of the western Aleutian Islands. 

The Japanese consulate and its consular agents in Hawaii enjoyed 
diplomatic immunity. This gave them a free rein in their spying 
activities and unrestricted communication by radio and cable with the 
mainland of Japan in reporting upon the movements of our fleet and 
the status of our armed defenses in Hawaii.^ Neither the Army, the 
Navy, nor the F. B. I. had [23] authority to tap these lines and 
find out what was going on because of our own legal restriction, the 
Communications Act of 1934.^° 

No better example of the failure to control consular agents and the 
results thereof can be found than the case of the consul general in 
Honolulu. This man had about 200 consular agents in the Islands. 
He used the commercial telephone and telegraph for reporting on our 
defenses and fleet movements with impunity. When he was arrested 
with his agents on December 7th, a large number of his messages were 
found in the wastepaper basket, torn up and partially burned. As a 
result of eight months' work in piecing a portion of these together, 

" Admiral McMorris. head of the War Plans Division of Staff of Commander-in-Chief 
Pacific Fleet, 1941, said : "I never entertained any doubt, any time during 1941, that the 
Japanese were fully informed of all military activities in this area." (R. 2882.) 

1* Memorandum of September 29, 1944, from James Lawrence Fly, Chairman, Federal 
Communications Commission : "The United States was at peace with Japan prior to the 
attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the Communications Act of 19.S4, under 
Which the Federal Communications Commission was organized and from which it derives 
its powers, prohibited the tapping of wires or other interception of messages transmitted 
between points in the United States, including its territories, and a foreign country (Sec- 
tion 605). Since that prohibition upon the Commission had hot been in any way super- 
seded, the Commission did not intercept any messages over the radiotelegraph, cable tele- 
graph or radiotelephone circuits between the United States (including Hawaii) and Japan 
prior to December 7, 1941." 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 33 

Colonel Fielder, G-2 under General Short and since that time G-2 in 
Hawaii, produced a number of these reconstructed messages which 
clearly revealed that military information was being gathered and 
transmitted to Japan. The day before this event took place a radio- 
phone message, that was monitored, between a Japanese doctor's house 
[24] in Honolulu and a newspaper in Japan was heard and re- 
ported, late on December 6, and was given extensive consideration by 
General Short and Colonel Fielder, G-2; but its exacting meaning 
could not be made out. This message is referred to as the jNIori mes- 
sage. (E. 2961.) The next morning the Japanese struck. The evi- 
dent trend of this message was to report upon the state of the naval 
defenses and the presence of the fleet as well as the Army defenses. 

This Board believes that Japan's spying activities could have been 
determined, the intentions of the Japanese revealed and much im- 
portant information gathered, which would probably have prevented 
in large measure the Pearl Harbor disaster, had the Army and Navy 
been permitted, with the F. B. I., to tap these lines and find out what 
was going on. If the consular agents were conducting commercial 
business, no harm would have been done; if they were not limiting 
their activities to consular business, we then had a right to know it 
and to take action accordingly, either by an open breach or by pre- 
paring ourselves to meet what thej^ were doing. 

Ambassador Grew has well stated that there are three lines of 
defense for a nation such as ours ; the diplomatic line of defense, the 
Navy, and the Army. However, the diplomatic line — held by the 
State Department — ofttimes handicaps and influences the prepara- 
tion for the Army and Navy defense lines. As an illustration, the 
policy of compromise between economic [^5] " sanctions and 
negotiations^^ in turn influenced War Department action, in that 
Short was told by the War Department, which in turn reflected the 
so he was told not to alarm the population nor to disclose intent.^' 
There appears to be no evidence of a strong policy of standing up for 
American rights and boldly stepping out and making the Japanese 
behave themselves; and this in the face of the fact that it was well 
known that people of the character of the Japanese and their national 
attitude of mind respect only force and strength and do not respect 
a polic}' of good intentions nor demands of conduct without means 
to enforce same. 

The Board is impressed with the necessity for a closer, more ag- 
gressive relationship between the Department of State, the Depart- 
ment of Justice, and the War and Nav}' Departments, in using all 
of their facilities as a coordinated team for the defense of the United 
States.^^ 



" The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, said : "With regard to the lines along which this 
Government's foreign policy with respect to Japan was directed in 1941, a detailed record 
is given in Chapter XIV of Peace and War (a publication issued by the Department in 
1943), and on pages 325-386 of Volume II of Foreign Relations of the United States- 
Japan, 1931-1941." 

^ The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, said : "With regard to your request for an expression 
of the Department's views touching upon the influence of foreign policy upon military 
directives, it was not the policy of this Government to take provocative action against any 
country or to cause Japan to commit an act of war against the United States." 

^3 The State Department counter proposals of the 26th of November, which Japan con- 
sidered as an ultimatum, the day before the Army and Navy, Marshall-Stark memorandum 
could be delivered asking no ultimatum, is a case in point. Mr. Hull said after delivering 
his ultimatum that he washed his hands of the matter and left it to the Army and Navy, 
(R. Stimson, 4051-4053, 4078-4079.) 



34 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[261 The Japanese policy was typical of the oriental mind, 
which is predominantly a bargaining mind, asking twice as much as 
they expect to get and then settling on a compromise. Any show of 
weakness merely strengthens the hand of the bargainer, and any 
crack in the bargainers front causes him to lose face and bargaining 
power. Therefore the action of the United States in demilitarizing 
Guam by removing its guns and other equipment and thus attempt- 
ing to show Japan the peaceful intentions of the Untied States, was 
undoubtedly considered by Oriental Japan as an evidence of weak- 
ness and merelv served to put our interests backward instead of for- 
ward. (R. 3062.) 

[27] 4. U. jS. Policij, {1939-1941).— We had been following the 
polic}^ immediatel}^ before the war which broke out between Ger- 
many, England, and France, of veering away from anything that 
would precipitate a conflict with the Japanese. In view of the tense 
international situation, particularly after the outbreak of the Euro- 
pean War in August 1939, it became apparent that it would be neces- 
sary for us to redouble our efforts to avoid any open friction with the 
Japanese, both because we wished to devote what resources were avail- 
able to the assistance of England and France, with whom we were 
in deep sympathy; and also, for the further purpose, that we were 
inadequately prepared to meet any attack from Japan in the Pacific." 

[2S\ As events became more critical in 1940 and 1941, the neces- 
sity of following a policy for delay and apparent appeasement of 
Japan increased to one of great national urgency. We were faced 
with a dual load of unpreparedness for any war and the necessity 
of sending England and France what equipment and supplies were 
available. 

It was, therefore, natural with this factual situation to bow to the 
necessity of avoiding war by trying to appease Japan. We found it 
expedient to lean over backwards to avoid any appearance in Hawaii 
of a war-like or belligerent attitude, particularly, in view of and 
towards the large Japanese population of the islands.^^ 

Our general national policy and, particularly the War Department 
policy, very naturall}'^ conveyed itself to the Commanders in residence 
in Hawaii. Their acts were colored and their dispositions tempered 
by the repeated cautions in this direction as we sought for time to 
prevent an untoward incident from precipitating war with Japan 
before we were ready to meet it. The fact that they were not more 
fully advised of the progress towards a critical international situation 
in the Pacific must be taken into account. 



" Captain Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, gave this very significant testimony, when 
aslfed if the American Navy, with two of its carriers, had discovered the task force that 
attacked Hawaii and had attacked this force at sea, what would have been the outcome : 

"Captain Layton. I think the American forces here would have taken the licking of 
their life, first, because the American people were not psychologically prepared for war. 

"General Russell. How would the psychology of the American people influence a naval 
engagement off of Oahu ? 

"Captain Layton. I am referring to the American Navy as a part of the American 
people, and I use this example : During the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a portion of 
a squadron of American carrier planes were then flying in from a carrier to Ford Island. 
They were attacked by Japanese fighters, and it is to be observed that these planes were 
armed with machine gun ammunition and machine guns ready to fire, and I can find no 
record of any of these carrier planes firing one single shot at any Japanese plane." (R 
3047.) 

" 160.000 Japanese were in the Islands, composing about one-third of the population. 
(R. 2947.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 35 

This policy of avoiding any act to offend the Japanese was offset to 
some degree by one at right angles to it, of the application of commer- 
cial restrictions which tended to strangle her economic life and her 
preparation for war. For instance, the refusal to sell scrap to Japan, 
the abrogation [fP] of Japanese commercial rights mider 
treaty and the failure to renew that treaty with Japan, the oil embargo 
and similar incidents were at variance with this general policy. 

The net result was a national policy towards Japan which reflected 
itself in the "Do-Don't" type of instructions that characterized the 
messages from the War Department to Hawaiian Commanders up until 
December 7, 1941. 

The policy of our government as practiced by our public officials 
in their attitude towards Japan was not one of appeasement openly, 
but it was that in effect. Every effort was being exerted to prevent a 
rupture of relations with Japan, while presenting a show of face by 
economic sanctions to restrain Japanese aggression. Every effort was 
made to maintain the status quo until we were ready. Time was our 
most precious commodity in 1941. 

[30'] 5. Moral Emhargoes Versus Japanese Expamion. — No 
competent understanding can be gained of the relationship with Japan 
unless we break down the problem into its essential aspects. Japanese 
industry had received a succession of serious blows by reason of our 
successive steps of not renewing the commercial treaty with Japan, 
the cutting off of scrap to Japan, the cessation of our trade in silk with 
Japan, the oil embargo, the freezing of credits and assets, and numerous 
other incidents. On the diplomatic front, strong efforts were being 
made to maintain the status quo leading up to the final visit of Japanese 
special Ambassadors to the United States terminating with Pearl 
Harbor. This situation generally trended, however, towards placat- 
ing and appeasing Japan with such firmness as was necessary to keep 
the negotiations going. 

During all of this period the government was not supported by a 
public that was war-minded ; just the contrary. Public irritation was 
increasing, but it was still hoping to avoid war. On the contrary, 
Japan's attitude toward the United States was one of increasing hos- 
tility. Its policy was to conduct its aggressions starting in 1935 
against China, as rapidly and as effectively as its resources would 
permit, while maintaining a diplomatic screen and pretense of con- 
sidering the views of the United States. Being unable to agree with 
them, it had no intention of doing so whatsoever. 

During this period Japan made no concessions. It was quite ap- 
parent that she would continue her course until the patience of the 
United States was exhausted; and the United States was forced into 
a position of an open breach — the time of that breach was stipulated 
clearly to the President \3T\ November 27 by General Mashall 
and Admiral Stark. The delivery of the counter proposals to Japan 
on November 26 anticipated that time — war came before we were fully 
prepared. 

It was well known that Japan's entry into all wars of the past had 
been characterized by the first overt act of of war coming simultane- 
ously with the declaration. The services, both Army and Navy, were 
well aware of this Japanese characteristic. It was, therefore, to be 



36 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

expected that an unexpected attack would be made by Japan as the 
first indication of a breach of relations. This is well expressed by 
the Secretary of "War, Mr. Stimson, who testified : 

General Russell. Then you were not surprised at the air attack on 
the 7th of December ? 

Mr. Stimson. Well, I was not surpi'ised. in one sense, in any attack that 
would be made ; but I was watching, with considerably more care, because I knew 
more about it, the attack that was framing up in the southwestern Pacific. 
And I knew also that there was a concentration in the mandated Islands — I 
know now, because I was shown by General Arnold the letter about the telegram, 
and an order ; so that that was an additional threat, and that might fall on either 
Hawaii or Panama. (R. 4072.) 

Indeed, Ambassador Grew on January 27, 1941, sent the State 
Department the following message : 

Tokyo, January 27, 19-'fl — 6 p. m. 
(Received January 27 — 6: 38 a. m.) 
A member of the Embassy was told by my . . . colleague that from many 
quarters, including a Japanese one. he had heard that a surprise mass attack 
on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese Military forces, in case of "trouble" 
between Japan and the United States ; that the attack would involve the use of all 
the Japanese military facilities. My colleague said that he was prompted to pass 
this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed 
fantastic. 

Grew. 

[S2] Japan, well knowing the policy of the United States had 
been to avoid war to the limit of its endurance, took advantage of our 
situation. It was. therefore, obvious that the United States would 
have to avoid friction with Japanese nationals as that would be a 
ready excuse for Japan to precipitate the issue prematurely. On the 
other hand, sabotage was to be expected from these Japanese na- 
tionals. A large body of them, as in Hawaii, was a potential source 
of great danger, not only as to what they might do, but as the basis 
of precipitation of an international incident with Japan. 

The public generally did not understand the importance of Hawaii. 
It had no appreciation of the danger except as the press became in- 
creasingl}^ insistent in pointing out the progress of the advance to- 
wards war and the likelihood that this outpost would be involved 
in the conflict as one of the first line elements of our western clefense.^^ 

The War Department was urging officially and privately that every 
effort be made to delay the declaration of war by Japan because of 
our serious state of unpreparedness and because much of our available 
military resources were being utilized to assist the United Nations. 
The battle of the Atlantic Avas the predominant factor in the public 
mind and dominated the policy of the War Department, as evidenced 
by the transfer of a considerable part of the Pacific Fleet to the At- 
lantic. Therefore, the entire consciousness of the war [3o~\ De- 
partment was directed towards avoiding any incident that might 
precipitate war with Japan while, at the same time, exerting its efforts 
to prepare for such a war. The War Department was confronted 
with a grave lack of planes, antiaircraft guns, and other implements 

i« Fortune magazine polled the public in late 1939 and made a report in January which 
showed that 55% of those questioned were in favor of defending Hawaii ; 25% not to de- 
fend ; and the balance did not know what they wanted. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 37 

of war with which to equip Hawaii with an adequate defense mechan- 
ism. The previous dehiy in implementing our defense had left us 
two years after war had started in Europe, gravely lacking in our 
preparations. The strong anti-war group in the United States made 
it unwise for the United States to take stronger action against Japan. 

These general policies apparently were the subject of discussion of 
the War Council.^^ Its policies were reflected [36] in the ac- 
tions of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, as to measures taken for defense 
m the Pacific. It is necessary to keep these factors in mind in reading 
the messages from the War Department to the Commanding General of 
the Hawaiian Department. The handling of Japan had been a mix- 
ture of diverse policies ; and this reflected itself in War Department 
messages to Hawaii, which both told Short to prepare for defense and 
at the sanie time to do nothing in preparing it that might precipitate 
trouble with the local Japanese population or excite the local public 
As evidence of this was the fact that Short responded to the situation 
by selecting an anti-sabotage alert and the War Department took no 
exception to it. These two conflicting courses of action were reflected 
m the messages and m the policies of the War Department : they ac- 
count m part for the attitude of mind of Short and others in the 
HaAvaiian Department. Whether justified or not, we consider latei- 

Ihen, too, official War Department thought on the subject of Pacific 
defense wa s almost wholly concentrated as to what might happen 

tJ'Pl?'® l^ some apparent confusion of that testimony in the use of this term and thp 

wTo saM? '" ''""''^ '' '■"'"'■'• ^-'^'^ '""^"°° ^^^ ^i^^^ifi^^ by thi testimony of M?!' St"mson! 

"The first subject that was listed here is that of the 'War Councils' Bv the 'Wnr 

board. It (lid not^have any members trom tbe Navy or from any other depLESt™ U. 

Mr K„o\- nml T^nnia 5nV^ ^r^ ''l^nified by tile -organization'— but early, very soon after 

we■■^e7o"?^a''l'Sf;U:f.™,r^i°d^°Ji?l?.''f,',.'°,rJ!i°f,■ "V? !"<■' ""' 'l'-' "■»'■'•"■ ««■' 
itist before Fear! HnrhAr l-I hA.^ 1J.*1 ^*- ^'^ ^^'^^ ^* ^"'""^'^ -^"O" «'"'' about to inquire. 

that -n-it, ^lc,^ i^i,\\.„ ^'^^J^"^^ P™e Admiral Stark and sometimes, General Arnold Well 
mrht J%yl^° improy sed, so to speak ; it had no custom before it It was creXri in the 
'War Cal net •'^r7hi""xfrn'T'^''"?' ^"^ ''^'"""^ ourselves, as a nicknan^^ we called it thi 

w^lj ?o^X' ^.s^ei't^fiat^;i:';,r^eSj'i;i^h^ir^S'"pi.;'^r^ *^^*^ ^""^ ^^^^-"^ ''^- s""' ^■•- 

the Pre'sldTnt Tt hf."office''^^n':l fo^tlle meetings of 'that body. They met on the call of 
antiimn v.? io;ii *!, ^ office: and during this time about which vou liarticularlv ask the 
! harkeJt'^ecorKuTi'n' Hie't '^f^T.^'-'/r^^T^'^-' ^'^^ ■- ^^^^^- folTn.K I ha^e records 
and without Si rpfprp,f^^^ *}'" ''*''■<'• ^" ^'"'^'1 I h«^<^ •'^et down very brieflv. 

everything that wo/ fmnnr^^ sometimes, what was taking pl.nce, includiiig 

thit warcomfne a1on""^«nfi V^ni^'v* I deemed to be Important: in regard to the crisis 
I can gile vmi date! nf Iwf ri'I^l"'''"^ these meetings : so that I am in a position where 
R 5-6 you dates of these meetings pretty fully." (R. 4041-4043.) (General Marshall, 



38 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to the Philippines, the intermediate ishinds, and Panama. It was 
there that the main attack, in the first phase, was expected from Japan. 
No early attack was expected on Hawaii. As the Chief of Staff testi- 
fied, it was a surprise to him. (R. 9.) 

All efforts were being made towards strengthening these outposts. 
Such modern bombing aircraft as could be made available was being 
flown to the Philippine theater. Likewise, efforts were being made to 
strengthen the defenses of Midway, Guam, Wake, and other localities 
judged to become the first [36] involved. The Hawaiian de« 
fense was clearly secondary at that time, although prior thereto it was 
considered as our strongest outpost and had first priority on equip- 
ment and maintenance. (R. 14, 184.) ^ -.n^i ^ 

Planes flown from the mainland as late as December 7, 1^41 to 
Hawaii en route to the Philippines were not supplied with ammu- 
nition until they were ready to depart from Hawaii. General Arnold 
explains this was because of the necessity of carrying sufficient gas to 
insure a safe arrival. (R. 168.) This too led to a state of mind, both 
officially and personally, in the responsible officers of the Hawaiian 
Department, that, even if war with Japan was about to start, Japan 
would not initially attack Hawaii. It was felt that Hawaii was quite 
well down on the list of objectives of Japan, as those parts of Ameri- 
can territory closer to Japan would be the first to feel the blow and 
that the implementing of other defenses must giveaway m priority to 
those thought to become the first involved. (R. 2872.) 

Japan shrewdly calculated and estimated correctly this state ot 
mind It arrived at this conclusion and acted accordingly, tempo- 
rarily by-passing the Philippines and the intermediate American 
islands, for a direct attack on Hawaii December 7, 1941, just as Am- 
bassador Grew had clearly warned in his message of January 27, 1941. 
So clearly did Japan understand our national psychology that it 
selected Sunday morning, early, as the time for attack well knowing 
this to be the best time to achieve surprise. Japan took, as the Chiet 
of Staff of the Hawaiian Air Force estimated, a 50 to 1 shot. Later, 
it will appear how well that venture was [37] prepared and 
executed, and how well timed as an answer to our counter proposals 
of November 26, which the Japanese considered an ultimatum ; be- 
cause it was on and after the delivery of that document against which 
General Marshall and Admiral Stark warned too late, that the task 
force of Japan that attacked Hawaii moved out of its rendezvous at 
Tankan Bay on the 27th or 28th of November to launch the attack 
againstPearlHarboronDecember 7, 1941.^«_ 

[38] 6 Public Demands Action Against Japanese.— Uur na- 
tional policy has been to avoid war. The difficulty with our policy 
appears to have been its conflicting nature, m that m the case ot 
Japan we desired to avoid war, to continue m business with Japan, 
and at the same time to prevent Japanese aggression by both negotia- 
tion and simultaneously to apply economic sanctions against Japan. 
As our nation was not prepared for war, it left the administration, 
particularly the State Department, without the full support of the 
public so it could proceed with a firm policy toward Japan; and it 
left the War and Navy Departments without sufficient means to imple- 
ment a more aggressive policy towards Japan. 

18 The best attainable evidence supports this statement (R. 3033.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 39 

The result of this conflicting situation made it extremely difficult 
for the State Department to handle negotiations with Japan, which 
well knew our national policy. It was difficult both to negotiate 
for a peaceful solution of differences with a nation such as Japan, and 
at the same time impede negotiations by applying economic sanctions 
such as the freezing of assets and credits, the cutting off of the supply 
of oil and scrap, and the termination of a commercial treaty with 
Japan. 

This conflicting element of policy reflected itself in the actions 
directed by the War Department to its field commanders, who were 
required to both take all the necessary precautions to meet war and 
at the same time to take no steps either to excite the civil population 
or to precipitate war by overt acts. Such a policy was particularly 
difficult to carry out in Hawaii, where there was a very large propor- 
tion, some thirty percent, of the population of the nationality of 
[39] Japan. The danger, therefore, was great in carrying out 
the War Department policy, that in our preparations for war we 
would precipitate an issue with Japanese nationals in the Hawaiian 
Islands which would be an excuse by Japan to open hostilities. 

This state of public mind was further inflamed to demand action 
by the Government against Japan, because of the latter's open aggres- 
sions in 1941; but effective action was impossible of fulfillment be- 
cause of the long public policy of only maintaining a very modest 
army and navy. Public opinion can change far faster than a nation 
can make ready for war. The time element of making preparations 
for war is so long that it always lags behind a sudden change of 
public views, as in our case with Japan. Our public opinion had 
changed against Japan faster than preparations for war could be 
made. 

This left the Department of State with the most difficult task of 
negotiation without means of enforcing its views by force of arms. 
It likewise left the War and Navy Departments unable to fully sup- 
port the State Department in its negotiations. This led to a compro- 
mise solution, due to this public opinion as expressed by the press, in 
the form of a resort to economic sanctions. 

But the difficulty with economic sanctions was that, while it indi- 
cated a firm policy on the part of the United States, it also so aggra- 
vated the situation in that it made negotiations difficult of either 
progress or consummation. At most, our national policy was one 
of defensive character while waiting for the preparations for war 
to catch up with the new state of the public mind that Japan should 
be made to [401 behave herself and that our government should 
do something about it. 

7. Economic Sanctions Against Japan. — In 1938 and 1939 a series 
of "moral embargoes" or commercial sanctions were applied to Japan 
by the United States. During those two years there had been brought 
about a cessation of the United States' export to Japan of airplanes, 
aeronautical equipment, and certain other materials. There also re- 
sulted a state of decline of export to Japan of strategic materials, and 
as of July 1940, under the Export Control Act, the President had cur- 
tailed or prohibited the export of basic war materials. Licenses were 
refused for the export to Japan of aviation gasoline and most types of 
machine tools as of September 1940. 



40 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The testimony of Ambassador Grew throws light upon the effect and 
result of embargoes. He said : 

During the period up to, I think it was, the autumn of 1940, I took the position 
that economic embargoes against Japan— and embargoes are in the nature of 
sanctions and therefore are always interpreted as international insults— I took 
the position that we should not put embargoes on Japan, until we were prepared 
to go all the way through with whatever might result from those embargoes. 
I pointed out that when we put embargoes against Japan into effect, our relations 
with that country were bound to go steadily down-hill and it might, and probably 
would, end in war ; and that until we were prepared to go to war with Japan, 
I felt it would be very short-sighted to get into a situation where we might be 
obliged at a later date to withdraw those embargoes. There is nothing so 
conducive to a lowering of national prestige, reputation, and authority as to make 
threats and then have to recall those threats or modify those threats. We saw 
that working out in the relations between Great Britain and Italy at the time of 
the Abysinnian campaign. 

[^i] But. In the autumn of 1940, I telegraphed the Secretary of State that I 
felt that time had then come, since Japan was threatening not only our national 
interests, but, I would say, our vital national interests ; I felt that the time had 
■come to consider, not whether we must call a halt to Japan's expansion, but 
when. It seemed to me at that time, whether we were fully prepared for war 
or not. that we must in our own interests put those embargoes into effect; and 
shortly thereafter, those embargoes were put into effect. 

Our" relations then started directly on a downhill course, and they ended 
in war; but at least we were more prepared for war at that time than we had 
been two years earlier. 

It w^s in the fall of 1940 that we cast the die and adopted economic 
sanctions. And we find it significant that about June 1940 General 
Herron as Commanding General of the Haw-aiian Department upon 
Washington orders went into an all-out alert into battle positions with 
ili^"^ ammunition for six weeks. (R. 212.) 

In September the export of iron and steel scrap was prohibited. 
The effect of the United States policy was to cut off from Japan by the 
winter of 1940-1941 the shipment of many strategic commodities, in- 
cluding arms, ammunition, and implements of war, aviation gasoline 
and many other petroleum products, machine tools, scrap iron, pig 
iron and steel manufactures, copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, and a vari- 
ety of other commodities important to a war effort. 

Further parallel to this course of action by the United States was 
the decision in August 1941 between President Roosevelt and Prime 
IMinister Churchill of Great Britain that the United States and Great 
Britain should take parallel action in Avarning Japan against new 
imoves of aggression, that the United States would continue its con- 
versation with the [43] Japanese govermiient and offer her 
u reasonable and just alternative to the course upon which that country 
was embarked.^^ 

As was stated in the White Papers-" as to economic sanctions, he 
'(Grew) said that 

•considering the temper of the people of Japan it Was dangerously uncertain to 
base United States policy on a view that the imposition of progressive and rig- 
orous economic measures would probably avert war ; that it was the view of the 
Embassy that war would not be averted by such a course . . . Finally he 
warned of the possibility of Japan's adopting measures with dramatic and dan- 
gerous suddenness which might make inevitable a war with the United States, 

" "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1931-41," Department of State, 
Washington, p. 129. 

20 "Foreign Relations of the United States, Janan, 1931-1941, Vol. I and Vol II- and 
Peace and TF.ar, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, Department of State, Washing- 
.toDj D. C/' 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 41 

As Ambassador Grew testified in summary : 

However, I can say, in brief compass, that the trend of our relations during 
the period you mention ; that is, the years 1940 and 1941 ; was almost steadily 
down-hill ; We, of course, in our embassy in Tokyo, leaving nothing undone to 
arrest that trend; and I think everything was done that could possibly have 
arrested it, in our work in Tokyo. But, we were up against what I would call 
a "tidal wave"' of military extremism in Japan ; and I think the results as culmi- 
nating in Pearl Harbor proved that fact. 

The testimony of Ambassador Grew as to his actions as reflected in 
the State Department's White Papers and in extracts from his diary 
indicate that he too was acting under what [4-^] apparently 
was a conflicting policy but with a full recognition of the inevitable 
date of a final trial of strength with Japan. A review of Grew's com- 
munications to the State Department in the year 1941 is an excellent 
perspective of the cour.se of the fatal events that led to Pearl Harbor. 

On January 27, 1911, he communicated by wire with the State 
Department indicating that an attack on Pearl Harbor b}' all means 
available to the military and naval forces of Japan was being dis- 
cussed, and he felt that it was so serious that it should be reported, 
even though it was fantastic to consider it; on February 1 he said the 
outlook was never darker for peace ; on July 25 the United States froze 
Japanese assets, causing bitter Japanese resentment ; on August 18 he 
reported the Japanese protest on U. S. economic pressure ; on August 
29 the United States applied the oil embargo, decided to send oil 
tankers to Russia and a military mission to China; on September 6 
Grew reported the statement of the Japanese Premier that if the 
United States continued its economic sanctions it would prevent any 
settlement for six months to a year after they terminated, and on 
September 29 Grew sent an important message to Washington that 
the Japanese could only be brought to a halt by a show of force. He 
pointed out that any agreement would be a mere breathing spell for 
Japan, that war was likely in any event, and unless results were shown 
in the negotiations, more than had been demonstrated to date, the 
Japanese would conclude the United States was only playing for time 
and would act accordingly. On September 30 Grew protested at the 
secrecy of our conversations with Japan as practiced by the United 
States without advising the public, [4-41 whereas it was com- 
mon knowledge in Japan. 

On October 9 he significantly reported that the frozen-credit policy 
of the United States was driving Japan into national bankruptcy and 
she would be forced to act. His prediction was correct, because Tojo,, 
the only Japanese Premier to stay on the active Army list in that 
position, was made Premier on October 16. There was an indication 
of trouble when the Premier of Japan was a dominant military figure 
on the active Army list, and on October 25 he reported that the Em- 
peror ordered the Privy Council before him and asked them if they 
intended war. When they refused to answer, he instructed them that 
there should be no war with the United States. This was the final 
effort by conservative Japanese to avoid war. The next step would 
j^robably be war itself. 

Grew warned on October 30 that the situation was fraught with 
the greatest danger. On November 3 he said that war was not only 
possible but probable and that Japan was preparing for hostilities 
"with dangerous and dramatic suddenness." It was on that date that 



42 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Kurusu left for Washington, refusing to take a later clipper for "tech- 
nical reasons", the significance of which was apparent. 
On November 7 Secretary Hull informed the Cabinet 

that relations between Japan and the United States were "extremely critical" 
and that there was "imminent possibility" that Japan might at any time start a 
new military movement of conquest by force. (White Papers, p. 136.) 

This was followed by warnings of the impending seriousness of the 
situation in speeches made by Secretary of the Navy Knox and Under 
Secretary of State Welles, November 11, 1941. 

[4'^] The White Papers continue : 

On November 17 Ambassador Grew cabled from Tokyo that we could expect a 
"sudden Japanese Naval or military attack in regions not then involved". 

Secretary Hull on November 25 and November 28 at meetings of 
high officials of this government, 

stated there was practically no possibility of agreement being achieved with 
Japan ; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time 
with new acts of conquest by force ; and that the matter of safeguarding our 
national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy. The Secretary ex- 
pressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an 
assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central 
point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously 
with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for the 
purpose thereof. (White Paiiers, p. 144.) 

It does not appear that such a statement was sent by the Army and 
Navy to their field forces. 

Oil November 26 the Secretary of State handed the President's 
Ten Points of Settlement to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu. 
These proposals were verbally rejected by the Japanese Ambassadors 
at once, but they inquired as to any other basis of negotiation or a 
modU'S vivendi. The following day, at the request of the Japanese 
Ambassadors, the President received them and Secretary of State Hull, 
at which time the President reaffirmed with finality the "Ten Points", 
stating the three primary considerations upon which the "Ten Points" 
were based. On the same day, General Marshall and Admiral Stark 
" wrote a joint memorandum to the President requesting that no ulti- 
matum be delivered to the Japanese as the Army and Navy were not 
ready to precipitate an issue with Japan, and notified him of the agree- 
ment reached with the British and the [4-6] Dutch for recip- 
rocal action in the case either one of them was attacked. 

The proof indicates that the Marshall-Stark memorandum of the 
27th to the President did not reach him until after the meeting with 
the Japanese Ambassador on the 27th or possibly on the 28th of No- 
vember. Whether or not the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, now dis- 
claims that this document of the 26th was an ultimatum. Ambassador 
Grew testifies that the Japanese so regarded it. (R. 4208, 4215, 4221, 
4222.) They so acted upon it and Mr. Hull likewise so acted because 
he so informed the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, on the morning of 
November 27. The latter testified, based on his diary of contempora- 
neous events, thus : 

The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what his final 
decision had been with the Japanese — whether he had handed them the new 
proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested 
yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken 
the whole matter off. As he put it, "I have washed my hands of it, and it is now 
in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy." 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 43 

General Russell. Mr. Secretary, I don't like to disturb you, but I have become 
a little confused on dates, about this telephone call. Was that on the 26th of 

Mr..STiMS0N. This was the 27th. 

General Russell. 2Tth. 

Mr. Stimson. The day after the 26th. 

General Russell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Stimson. The 26tli was the day he told me he was in doubt whether he 
would go on with it. 

General Russell. Yes. 

Mr. Stimson. Or whether he would break it off ; and on the morning of the 27th, 
by telephone, he told me that he decided to break it off. 

I then called up the President and talked with him about it. (R. 4052^05r3) . 

On November 29 Secretary Hull said to the British Ambassador, 

The matter will now go to the officials of the [//7] Army and Navy. 

He warned that the Japanese action would probably be 
a desperate gamble and require the utmost boldness and risk. 

His predictions were uncanny. (White Papers, pp. 144—145). On 
November 29, Ambassador Grew relates that there had just reached 
Japan news that the President had made a proposition to settle Japa- 
nese grievances by giving her substantially most of what she wanted,^^ 
and on December 1 Grew repoiled Japan cold to the proposals, a fact 
Secretary Hull had found on the 26th when he handed the President's 
Ten Points to the Japanese Ambassador. On the same day, December 
1, his diary shows that he had a conversation with a Japanese friend 
apparently high in that government, Grew saying 
everything was over and that I would soon be leaving Japan. 

On December 6 an address of To jo was read for the Diet different 
from all others heretofore delivered by him, the tone of which clearly 
indicated Japanese intentions. The following day, on Sunday morn- 
ing, the Pearl Harbor attack occurred. 

\[4^] 8. The Hmvaiian Population Problem: Sabotage Com- 
plex. — The conditions in Hawaii and the state of the public mind in 
Hawaii were considered apparently by the War Department to be 
primary factors to be taken into consideration in the carrying out of 
the military mission of the defense of the islands and defense of the 
fleet. As elsewhere indicated in War Department communications, 
this was a fact; and the responsible commanders in Hawaii in the 
Army also gave great weight to the state of the Hawaiian situation 
on the civil side. 

It is significant that it had been the national policy of the United 
States to exclude Japanese nationals from the United States and its 
territories, both for self-protection and to protect American labor 
against cheap foreign labor of the yellow races. Yet in Hawaii, our 
fleet base and one of our most important defense outposts, we per- 
mitted the introduction into the population of the islands of Japanese, 
to the extent of 30% of the total population or 160,000." 

21 "Ten Years in Japan " by Ambassador Grew. 

=- There are three classes of Japanese population: (a) old aliens known as Issei, about 
37,500; (b) Hawaiian-born Japanese who are sent back to the mainland of Japan for 
education known as Kibei, about 2,509 ; and (c) Hawaiian-born Japanese and Hawaiian- 
educated known as Nisei, composing the balance of 160,000. 95% of the Japanese children 
attended the Japanese language schools. Under Japanese Law no Japanese is released 
from Japanese citizenship until he goes through a formal procedure securing his release 
from that citizenship. Most Japanese in the Islands have not secured such a release and 
they therefore have dual citizenship in the United States and Japan. Approximately 
50,000 Japanese attended the Shinto temples of which there were 55. Around these 
temples were centered the teachings of Japanese culture, patriotism, and family fealty. 



44 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[4^] Many were Japanese of dnal citizenship who, ahhoiigh 
born in the United States, had not yet taken the steps made available 
by Japan to become released from their Japanese citizenship. These 
Japanese laborers and artisans were comparatively economical in 
terms of performance, useful both in agricultural pursuits and as 
artisans, were highly prized by the great commercial interests in sugar 
cane, pineapples, shipping, and other interests of the Islands : and it 
was the urgent desire of tJiese commercial interests apparently both 
to enjoy the protection and profits from the basing of the fleet in 
Hawaii' and also to have no disturbance of such labor or to be led into 
anv situation that would disturb these profitable labor relations. 

This policy of encouraging the Japanese and permitting them to 
become dominant in the affairs of the Islands has even gone so far as 
to permit the Japanese to become important political factors with 
membership in both the Senate and the House of Hawaii, and to domi- 
nate, by way of majority, the Island governing councils in some of the 
islands of tiie Hawaiian Group. (R. 2941.) 

Sabotage was a critical consideration by the local Army authorities. 
But up to December 7 there had been not a single instance of sabotage. 
On December 7 a number of illegal radio stations interfered with the 
radio operations of the Army. No other specific instance of sabotage 
or alien enemy action had been reported either by the War Department 
of Hawaii or by G-'2 or the F. B. I. in Hawaii. 

Additionally, the placing of the Army upon alert by War Depart- 
ment order to General Herron, by which his troops moved [60] 
into the field in battle positions with live ammunition in June 1940, 
had no effect upon the civilian population or their anxieties. Subse- 
quent frequent alerts and maneuvers which were constantly going on, 
including Short's Alert Number 1 as to sabotage, had had no effect 
upon the civil population. All activities of the Army in disturbing 
the local populace paled by comparison with the contents of the local 
newspapers and their reports of the war news and the progressively 
increasing threats of Japanese action. Indeed, approximately a week 
before the attack at Pearl Harbor, a local newspaper in Hawaii car- 
ried a complete prediction of this attack on the following Sunday. 
(Exhibits 19-19a.) 

The foregoing statement of fact as to background should be con- 
sidered in connection with the communication of the War Depart- 
ment warnings as to sabotage, the action of General Short in placing 
the Department under the Number 1 Alert against sabotage on No- 
vember 27, and the claimed reasons for not taking other defensive 
measures, because of the reluctance to disturb both the civilian popu- 
lation and the alien population of Hawaii. 

The effect of such an atmosphere upon the policies and actions of 
the responsible commanders and their resulting state of mind is an 
important factor for consideration. As part of this state of mind, 
it was generally considered that Japan would never dare attack; 
and certainly, iii the early stages of a war, she would not dare risk the 
major portion of her carriers for the launching of such an attack. 

(R. 3919-3920.) See also Chapter I, "Gentlemen of Japan" by B. S. Haven, Ziff-Davis 
Publishing Co. : "Feudal Hawaii ; Paradise, Ltd." by Stanley High, Readers Digest, June 
1943, pp. 19-23: and "Are the Japs Hopeless?" by Gjeorge Home, Saturday Evening Post, 
September 9, 1944. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 45 

The probabilities were strongly against such a bold and possibly 
suicidal move by Japan. 

['51] The state of mind engendered by the sabotage issue and 
the presence of the large Japanese population built up a sabotage con- 
sciousness in the responsible authorities as a more likely course of 
Japanese action than what was regarded as the more remote military 
operation of a direct air attack. This background is important to 
consider in evaluating the decisions arrived at by the Army com- 
mander and the actions taken by his associates. 

The existence of this state of public opinion had its effect upon the 
evaluation by the Army of the Japanese capabilities. Likewise, it 
was supplemented by the American attitude that Japan would not 
dare attack the United States in what was regarded as its home terri- 
tory in the Islands, in the presence of the fleet, which was consid- 
ered an asset and not, in reality, a liability. 

Senator Hill of the Hawaiian Senate testified (E. 2939-2940) as to 
the protests of local commercial interests to General Emmons when 
he proposed to take action in removing the dangerous Japanese from 
the sugar plantations after the Pearl Harbor attack. He said the 
political pressure brought to bear by these interests was sufficient to 
bring about a cancellation of this effort of General Emmons. It was 
significant of the propaganda pressure on the subject of doing noth- 
ing to offend the Japanese in the Islands and to let them alone so 
they could work for these Island industries and agriculture, which 
must have been imposed heavily upon General Short. The constant 
application of such pressure for a period of nearly a year upon Gen- 
eral Short doubtless had a material effect upon his mind and upon 
his anxiety about the Japanese population, [r52] about which 
he could do nothing. This was particularly reflected in his refusal 
to have legal action taken against those who failed to register as 
aliens. (E. 3255-3256.) 

It was well known in Honolulu to both the F. B. I. and G-2 of the 
Army that there were certain Japanese activities that were inimical to 
the best interests of the United States in the Hawaiian Islands. A 
Japanese combines in his Shinto religion, centering about the Shinto 
temples, three things : patriotism, religion, and family fealty. Those 
three things compose his entire emotional, political, and family life. 

The Shinto priests and the large number, 55, of Shinto temples in the 
Islands were the focal point of Japanese propaganda, patriotism, and 
disloyalty to the United States. This was all well known and could 
have been cured promptly by closing the temples and arresting the 
priests, as was done after December 7. Then there were the Shinto 
societies, and particularly the Black Dragon Society. The Japanese 
are well known as great organizers and they had countless organiza- 
tions, many of which were of potential subversive character. The 
Japanese ran their own Japanese-language newspapers which pro- 
moted the same national spirit. They had Japanese-language schools 
in which they taught Japanese customs, ffemily fealty, religion, and 
patriotism to Japanese children one hour each day after their regular 
education in the American schools. Here again our national policy,, 
due to freedom of the press and freedom of religion and of education, 
permitted these people to jeopardize the- defense of Hawaii. After 
December. 7( the Japanese newspapers, were put under strict controJ^ 

7971fr7-46— Ex. 157: 4. 



46 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and used by the United States for propaganda agencies to control 
the [5-3] Japanese population, and the Shinto temples were 
closed. 

9. Hawaiian, Press. — The state of mind and the state of information 
in the Hawaiian Islands leading up to Pearl Harbor, and particularly 
before it, is not better illustrated than the articles appearing in the 
Honolulu Advertiser and the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. A mere recita- 
tion of these headlines would seem to have been sufficient to have 
warned General Short and his subordinate officers of the critical inter- 
national situation. 

The newspaper headlines in question read as follows : "U. S. Waits 
Japan Reply" (29 Nov 41 — Honolulu Star-Bulletin) ; "Japanese May 
Strike Over Weekend"; "Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready For 
Battle" (30 Nov 41 — Honolulu Advertiser) ; "Hull, Kurusu In Crucial 
Meeting Today" (1 Dec 41 — Honolidu Advertiser) ; "U. S. Army 
Alerted in Manila, Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows"; 
"Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension"; "War Fears Grow in 
Philippines" (1 Dec 41 — Honolulu Star-Bulletin) ; "Japan Called Still 
Hopeful of Making Peace with U. S." ; "Japan Gives Two Weeks More 
to Negotiations" (2 Dec 41 — Honolulu Advertiser) ; "Huge Pincer 
Attack on U. S. By Japan, France Predicted" (3 Dec 41 — Honolulu 
Advertiser) ; "Japan Spurns U. S. Program" (4 Dec 41 — Honolidu 
Star-Bulletin) ; "Pacific Zero Hour Near ; Japan Answers U. S. Today" 
(4 Dec 41 — Honolulu Advertiser):, "Singapore on War Footing"; 
"New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo"; "Civilians Urged to Leave 
Manila" (6 Dec 41 — Honolulu Star-Bulletin) ; "America Expected to 
Reject Japan's Reply on Indo-China" ; "Japanese Navy Moving South" ; 
"Detailed Plans Completed for M-Day Setup" (6 Dec 41 — Honolulu 
Advertiser) ; "F. D. R. Will Send Message [5^] to Emperor 
on War Crisis" (7 Dec 41 — Honolidu Advertiser) ."^ 2* 

10. SuTwmary. — We have learned a great deal about psychological 
warfare since this nation went to war. Looking backwards, it is pos- 
sible to see that the psychological phases of the preparatory period 
for war leading up to the conflict with Japan had an immense effect 
upon the state of mind of our own public, officials and commanders; 
and upon what they did or did not do, prior to December 7. The de- 
ception of Japan and its actions based upon that deception in combi- 
nation with our own failures to take precautions against the attack 
played no small part in the disaster of December 7th. 

Our complacent nation appeared to be sure, in view of its wealth 
and industrial strength and its prestige and leadership, that no one 
would presume to attack it. 

This national pride and vanity and sense of false security, so prev- 
alent on the mainland, undoubtedly had its influence in Hawaii. 

With the foregoing backgi^ound it is possible to understand more 
accurately and judge the following story of Pearl Harbor from early 
January 1941 until the attack and shortly thereafter. 

23 Complete excerpts from the newspapers during this period will be found in Exhibits 
19 and 19A. 

=* The editors of both papers were called and examined as witnesses. They testified 
that these headlines resulted from deductions based on current trends in international 
relations gleaned from news dispatches. No other factual data was available to them. 
(R. .3107-3108, 3169-3170) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 47 

[i] Chapter III. The Story of Pearl Harbor 

A. GENERAX 

1. Introduction: Scope of the Chapter and its Purpose 

Chronological story of the events, documents, and actions culminating in the 
Pearl Harbor disaster ; statement of the facts and circumstances ; two primary 
periods, from January through September and from October through December. 

2. Geographical 

Hawaii and outposts ; reason for location of naval and military establishments 
in the Islands. 

3. Mission of Army in Haicaii 

Joint tasks, Army tasks ; Navy tasks. 

4. Condition of the Hawaiian Department at the Time of Short's Assumption of 

Comanmd and Just Prior Thereto 
Report of the Navy on weaknesses of Army Pearl Harbor defenses concurred 
in by the Army ; action of the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of War. 

5. Organization of the Navy at Pearl Harbor 

Organization of the Navy complex, duties of Admiral Kimmel ; duties of 
Admiral Bloch ; duties of Admiral Bellinger ; problem of Short in dealing with 
this complex organization. 

B. EVENTS FROM JANUAKY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1941 

1. Selection of General Shoi't 

Selection by General Mai'shall ; instructions and basis of his action ; corre- 
spondence between the Chief of Staff and Commanding General Hawaiian De- 
partment as to plans, policies, and status of defense in Hawaii. 

2. Short's Staff 

Selection of Colonel Phillips and his training for Chief of Staff, qualifications 
of Phillips ; Short's relationship with his senior officers. 

3. Short's Actions i7i Building Defense Installations and Adding Equipment 
Short diligent in his demands for equipment, defense construction, and per- 
sonnel ; status of defenses summarized as of December 7, 1941. 

[//] 4- Short's Reorganization of Divisions 

Reorganization of the Hawaiian Division into triangular divisions, unusually 
heavy fire power in the divisions. 

5. ShoH's Relationship With the Navy 

Efforts to carry out Chief of Staff's direction as to cooperation ; resulting agree- 
ments with tlie Navy generally considered and their effect. 

6'. Abandonment of Herron's Field Order #1: Adoption of Triple Alert System: 
Sabotage Issue 

Standard Operating Procedure of July 14 and November 5, 1941 ; the three 
alert system ; the distribution of Standard Operating Procedure ; the effect of the 
three alerts ; the composition of the Japanese population in Hawaii and the 
sabotage issue; views on sabotage by the Japanese in the Islands from local 
leaders in Hawaii. 

7. Navy Long Distance Reconnaissance 

Short's assumptions as to the Navy's conducting long distance reconnaissance 
by air and water ; Navy's acceptance of the resijonsibility for long distance recon- 
naissance; the long distance reconnaissance essence of defense of Oahu ; failure 
to take steps to implement the agreement by the Navy to do long distance recon- 
naissance; effect of the failure to have long distance reconnaissance; relationship 
of Army's close-in reconnaissance; place of the Aircraft Warning Service in the 
reconnaissance system ; the radio interceptor system ; the failure of the recon- 
naissance arrangements. 



48 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

8. Agreements Between Army and 'Navy 

War plans, Joint Action of tlie Army-Navy 1935; Rainbow War Plan; Joint 
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier; category of defense 
D ; Joint Air Agreement ; Short's problem in dealing with Kimmel, Bloch, or 
Bellinger to fix responsibility of the Navy under the agreements ; failure to imple- 
ment the agreements; failure to put the agreements, into operation; uncertainty 
as to when the agreements would go into operation ; unity of command issue ; 
agreements go into effect upon actual emergency too late without previous prac- 
tice and organization of staff; training explanation as reason [///] for 
not putting agreements into effect ; complete absence of ability to implement the 
agreement between the Navy and the Army. 

9. Estimate of the Situation 

Estimate pursuant to the Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941; operating 
plans by Bellinger and Martin April 9, 1941; joint estimate of the situation; 
Short's responsibilities under the estimate of the situation; concurrence by the 
Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of War, Admiral Richardson, Admiral Kimmel, 
General Herrou, and General Short in air attack the primary danger ; Chief 
of Staff's repeated warnings that air superiority against air attack matter of 
first priority ; responsibility of Short to provide defense to the primary threat of 
air attack. 

C. CRITICATj period OCTOBER 1 TO DECEMBER 7, 1941 

1. Vital Messages 

Short's action in taking Air Force personnel and putting them on military police 
duty ; Chief of Staff's objections supporting the Air Force ; Navy message October 
16, warning Japanese relations deteriorating ; War Department radio of October 
18, 1941 Japanese deteriorating relationships, November 24, 1941 radio Chief of 
Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet doubtful outcome of nego- 
tiations with Japan and warning surprise attack possibility ; November 26, 1941 
War Department radio instructing Short special photo mission Jaluits ; November 
27, 1941 Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet "war 
warning" ; November 27, 1941 Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaiian, 
Department, negotiations with Japan terminated practical purposes ; instructing, 
action to be taken ; November 27, 1941 G-2 War Department to G-2 Hawaiiartj 
Department possible hostilities may begin ; Short's selection of Alert Number I 
and reply to War Department advising such selection November 27, 1941 ; kn»wl- 
edge of the War Department of his decision ; significant Navy messages ol De- 
cember 3, 4, and 6, 1941. 

2. Analysis of the Situation Fi-om November 24 to November 21 

War Council action on the 25 November 1941 ; War Council and Seci-etary of" 
State action with the Japanese on November 26, 1941 ; absence of th« Chief of" 
Staff from Washington from evening of the 26th to the 28th ; draft of message- 
of 27th by Chief of Staff on 26th ; counter proposals handed by the Secretary of: 
State to Japanese Ambasadors 26 November 1941 ; construction of the counter 
proposals by the Japanese and their action ; the Marshall-Stark memorandum. 

3. The Drafting of the Message #412 of the 21th 

Meeting with the Secretary of War to modify the message to be sent General 
Short ; authorship of various parts of the message identified ; Short's position 
as to the position with reference to loug distance reconujaissance ; Short's claim 
of ambiguity in the message considered ; Gerow's recollection of the conferences 
of the 27th ; communication of the contents of the message by Short to his prin- 
cipal commanders ; the question of secrecy and method, of transmission considered.. 

4. Analysis of the November 21, 1941 Message 

Parts of the message considered in light of Short's x^esponsibilities and knowl- 
edge ; message considered in connection with estimate of the situation ; message; 
considered in connection with the aleyt t© be adopted ; message considered im 
connection with the communication of its contents in view of restrictions on Short. 

5. Messages 28th N^ovembet: to 6th D)Ccetiiber, Inclusive 

G-2 message N-overn,ber 28, 1941 #484 ; War Department message November 28, 
194a #482 ; S;hort's reply to #482 on 28 November, 1941 ; December 3, 1941 Navy 
message on destruction of codes ; Navy message of December 4, 1941 on codes ; 
Navy message Djecember 6, 1941 on codes; Short's position as to reception of this 
information. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 49 

6. December 7, 1941 Message 

Its method of sending, status of communication ; what happened in transmis- 
sion ; other means of communication available. 

7. Failure of Navy To Advise Short of Enemy Submarine in Pearl Harbor on 

Morning December 7, 1941 
Submarine reported ^unk by the Navy about 7 : 15 a. m. ; no report made to 
Short. 

8. Failure of Aircraft Warning Service To Advise of Approaching Planes, Decem- 

ber 7, 1941 
Status of aircraft warning system, detection of the approaching planes ; efforts 
of the mobile station to communicate the information to higher authority ; Lt. 
Tyler's disposal of the matter. 

9. Navy Failure To Advise Short of Suspected Naval Concentration in the Jaluits 
Loss of radio contact 25th af November to December 1. 

10. Navy Account of the Japanese Task Force That Attacked Pearl Harbor: 

Sources of Information to Japanese 
Origin of information of the attacking forces ; history of the attacking forces 
and the dates of its movement; intelligence sources to the Japanese as to the dis- 
position ; activities of the Japanese consulate ; maps of the Japanese based upon 
intelligence information; Japanese information of the disposition from Alert 
Number 1. 

11. Information not Given Short 

Jaluit task force ; information on negotiations with Japanese ; no disapproval 
of his selection of sabotage alert number 1 ; additional information available in 
Washington. 

D STATUS OF THE PRINCIPAL HAWAIIAN DEFENSES IN 19 41 AND THEIR STATE OF READI- 
NESS ON DECEMBER 6, 1941 Ofi THE EEASONS FOR THEIR LACK OF READINESS 

1. Aircraft Warning Service and Interceptor Command 

Service operative prior to December 7, 1941 ; operations of the service on Decem- 
ber 7 1941 • nature of technical difficulties ; state of training of the personnel ; 
probable effectiveness of interception. [VI] Necessity for immediate use 
not appreciated in Hawaii by senior commanders; doubtless whether would have 
been used by Department commander even if in perfect condition. 

2. Status of the Aircraft Warning Service on December 7th 

System operative for month prior to December 7 ; Department commander would 
not turn operations over to Air Force and take it away from the Signal thorps; 
mobile radio stations and information center in a reasonably operative condition 
prior to December 7 ; lacked full manpower to operate this service ; Department 
commander holding on to it using it as training stations instead ot operating 
station • cooperation of the Navy, permanent construction did not hold up Pitting 
the aircraft warning service into operation ; Short's action in putting the au'cratt 
warning service on a partial operating basis insufficient ; relationship with the 
interceptor command and the information center. 

3. Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Defenses 

Composition of the force ; relationship to the interceptor command ; status of 
the mobile antiaircraft and its ammunition ; mobile batteries seldom placed in 
combat position prior to December 7. 

4. Ammunition Issue: Short's and the Ordnance DepartmenVs responsibility 
Short refused to permit the timely issuance of antiaircraft or artillery am- 
munition ; small arms ammunition issued to divisions ; insufficient small arms 
ammunition issued to Air Force to meet the attack. 

5. Status of Aircraft Defenses 

Deficiency in aircraft spare parts, etc.; efforts of General Mai'ti" Jo secum 
equipment; relative status of Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska m equipment , pi loi 
ities on airfield construction ; ui5e of Hawaii as a training ground by the Air 
Corps. 



50 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[VII] E. STATUS OF DEFENSES ON SUNDAY MORNING, DECEMBEE 7TH, 1941 

1. Army Aircraft 

Under Alert Number 1 aircraft was substantially grounded and assembled wing 
to wing ; Navy had no PBY's in the air that morning. 

2. Naval Long Distance Reconnaissance 

Navy had insufficient means of conducting adequate long distance reconnais- 
sance by air; Navy reconnaissance by air was confined to observation of ma- 
neuver areas for the fleet with particular reference to submarines ; Navy's fleet 
maneuvers were for the purpose of training and such aircraft reconnaissance was 
primarily antisubmarine. 

3. Aircraft Warning Service 

Service working from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. on December 7, 1941 ; one station con- 
tinued in operation beyond 7 o'clock for the training of Elliott ; interceptor com- 
mand was operating daily but no formal orders had gone out from Short. 

4. Antiaircraft defenses 

Mobile guns had seldom gone into battle position ; ammunition was not issued 
to mobile guns ; it took up to six hours to draw and distribute the ammunition. 

5. Summary 

F. THE ATTACK ON DECEMBEE 7, 1941 

1. Japanese Intelligence 

Japanese submarines in the harbor prior to Pearl Harbor attack ; completeness 
of Japanese maps ; completeness of Japanese information as shown by the maps. 

2. Nature and Composition of the Attacking Force 

,'Strength of the attacking force ; planning done by the attacking force ; the 
submarine phase of the attack ; the planning phase of the attack. 

G. TIME ELEMENT IN THE EXPECTED ATTACK, THE EFFEXJT OF USING HAWAII AS A TRAIN- 
ING GROUND IN ADDITION TO ITS BEING A COMBAT OUTPOST 

1. Attack a Surprise 

Chief of Staff, Navy and Army witnesses all admit the attack was a surprise ; 
accuracy of Japanese estimate of the situation ; the Japanese gamble. 

[VIII] 2. Time Element — The Important Factor in All Estimates 
Estimate of the attack by Air Force ; error in the estimate was in the time it 

would occur which led to unexpected results. 

3. Expected Time to Continue Training 

Error in estimate of the time of the attack brought decision to continue train- 
ing ; Hawaiian forces disposed for training at the time of attack ; personnel or- 
ganized for training rather than combat at time of attack. 

4. Shorts' Trust iri Navy to Give Him Timely Notice: Time Element Again 
Short's relationship with the Navy ; Short's belief that naval forces were doing 

long-distance reconnaissance ; Short's belief that the Navy planes were doing 
long-distance reconnaissance; Short's belief that the Navy was not withholding 
any evidence from him ; Short's policy of not pressing for information from the 
Navy. 

H. WHAT WAS DONE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ATTACK? 

1. Reason for Analysis of Action Taken After 7 December 1941 

To determine how effectively General Short was able to use the materiel, per- 
sonnel and facilities after the attack which he had before the attack ; and to de- 
termine what Washington supplied Hawaii after the attack which it could have 
supplied before. 

2. Hawaii and Washington Action 

Troop dispositions and troop increases ; increased activation of all engineer- 
ing ; increased equipment in the air sent from the mainland ; activation of the 
interceptor command ; dispositions of the antiaircraft artillery and coast artil- 
lery ; condition of readiness of the interceptor command and aircraft warning 
service ; reorganization of the District Engineer's Office and delegation of au- 
thority by the Corps of Engineers ; treatment of the civilian Japanese popula- 
tion ; lack of check on the Hawaiian situation by Washington. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 51 



I. SUMMARY 



[55] Chapter III. The Story of Pearl Harbor 

A. general 

1, Introduction: Scope Of The Chapter And Its Purpose. — This 
is a running story of the principal events, documents, and actions taken 
leading up to Pearl Harbor. We accompany this story with a discus- 
sion of the pro's and con's of each situation in order that all arguments 
for and against every explanation and the circumstances surrounding 
every set of facts may be clearly understood and evaluated. Against 
such a background, all claims, arguments, facts and explanations can 
be considered. We believe this chronological history of the entire 
transaction will make our succeeding conclusions clearly stand forth. 

After setting forth some general considerations in this chapter, we 
direct attention to the two primary periods, from January through 
September and from October through December. As will be noted 
elsewhere this is a logical chronological division. In the latter part 
of the year 1941 there seemed to be a change of understanding, appre- 
ciation, and apprehension of forthcoming events on the part of those 
in Hawaii. In reading this chronological history this should be ob- 
served because it is an important factor in what was done or not 
done in Hawaii. 

2. Geographical. — The Territory of Hawaii comprises an island 
group of which the Island of Oahu is the primary element. Oahu 
contains Pearl Harbor, located on its southern rim. Pearl Harbor 
is the base for the Pacific Fleet, and was also the headquarters during 
1941 of the Commander-in-Chief of the [56] Pacific Fleet and 
Headquarters of the 14th Naval District, which had naval jurisdiction 
over the Hawaiian Islands and our other island possessions in the 
Pacific including Midway and Wake but not the Philippines. Oahu 
was also the location of one of the largest troop concentrations in the 
national defense system of the United States while other national 
defense elements are located on the adjacent islands. 

It is important to emphasize that Hawaii was an outpost in the 
American Defense system. In view of that fact, certain fundamental 
requirements of action resulted which were incumbent upon the com- 
mander of the Hawaiian Department to follow. Hawaii is both an 
outpost for defense and offense, and is one of the primary bastions of 
our national defense system. In priority of importance it is rated on 
a par with the Panama Canal. 

The primary mission of the Army was the defense of Hawaii and 
particularly of Pearl Harbor and the fleet there, when in residence; 
and the fleet sea and air base at all times. Aside from the necessity 
of preventing these islands from falling into the hands of other nations 
as a springboard for an attack upon the United States, the foregoing 
primary mission was that incumbent upon General Short at the time 
of the Pearl Harbor disaster. 

The whole reason for having this outpost was that it should be on 
the alert to repel attack and to furnish the springboard from which 
attacks could be launched upon our enemies. For this reason this 



52 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

outpost was implemented with the major portion of the fleet and 
very substantial Army installations in order that the mainland might 
rest securely [S7\ and be protected. There is no other funda- 
mental reason for the great concentration of naval and military 
power on the Island of Oahu and associate islands. The very loca- 
tion of the Hawaiian Islands, approximately 2,000 miles from our 
Pacific Coast, makes it an admirable location for naval, air and ground 
forces for it gives, by reason of its position, a scope and flexibility of 
attack and defense, sufficiently remote from the Pacific Coast to insure 
the maximum latitude of action against our enemies and the maximum 
protection of the mainland of the United States. 

3. Mission Of Army In Hawaii. — The Army in Hawaii had a mis- 
sion and a duty to perform. As stated in the Joint Coastal Frontier 
Defense Plan this was : 

a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to con- 
ti-ol and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone. 

b. AKMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attaclis by sea, land, and air forces, 
and against hostile sympathizers, to support the Naval forces. 

c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect ship- 
ping therein, to support the Army Forces. 

The Army's mission was primarily that of protecting Hawaii, be- 
cause it was the sea and air base for the fleet; and, when the fleet was 
in the harbor, it was there to render such protection as it could to the 
fleet. The protection of the Islands, other than for these purposes, 
was secondary and only necessary to the extent of making it possible 
for the Army to execute its jDrimary mission. It should be observed 
that the very fact of the fleet being in the harbor increased the respon- 
sibilities of the Army, because of the dual facts [^S] that the 
fleet when in the harbor was not in a position to support the Army 
forces either by reconnaissance or by the protection incident to its 
being at sea in waters adjacent to the islands, and when in the harbor 
itself needed protection for its ships that were temporarily immo- 
bilized and particularly vulnerable to air attack. 

4, Condition Of The Hawaiian Department At The Time Of Shorfs 
Assumption Of Command And Just Prior Thereto. — With tne above 
mission in mind, the condition of the Hawaiian Department just prior 
to the assumption of command by General Short and Admiral Kimmel 
is a matter of interest. Admiral Richardson was the Senior naval 
officer in command of the fleet, and General Herron the senior Army 
officer in command of the Hawaiian Department. These officers 
jointly reviewed the situation as to the Army. As a result Admiral 
Richardson addressed a letter on the 25th of January, 1941, as to the 
status of the Army's deficiencies for the defense of Hawaii, which was 
sent to the Secretary of the Navy. (R. 1802.) The Secretary of the 
Navy, in turn, wrote to the Secretary of War, and called his attention 
to the serious conditions existing.^^ 

Admiral Kimmel summed up the situation in his testimony : 
He taas ^'■astoumded at the then existing weaknesses'''' of the Pearl 
Harbor defenses^-^ and collaborated with his [55] predecessor 
in the preparation of a letter dated 25 January 1941 to the Chief of 
Naval Operations. This letter pointed out: 

=" See p. 99 in this chapter for a discussion of this correspondence. 
^'' Italic by the Board. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 53 

(a) The critical inadequacy of A. A. gnus available for the defense of Pearl 
Harbor, necessitating constant manning of Ship's A. A. guns while in port. 

(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land based aircraft, 
necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of 
Fleet planes for local patrols. 

(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District, 
etc. 

(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore. (Roberts Rec. 544.) 

He communicated this information to General Short. (R. 1768.) 

It is therefore apparent from the considered investigations by 
Richardson and Herron, which conditions were concurred in by Short, 
that the hick of adequate defense equipment and what was needed 
to bring it up to a satisfactory status, were clearly known to both the 
Army and the Navy in Hawaii and to the War and Navy Departments. 
Short, therefore, came to the command on the 5th day of February, 
1941, with a clear and unmistakable recognition by all concerned of 
the condition of the Department of which he had assumed command. 

General Herron, who preceded General Short, had been directed on 
June 17, W40, by Washington, to institute an alert. (R. 213.) This 
alert lasted six weeks. (R. 214-215.) After it w^as suspended at the 
end of six weeks it was reinstated for a period. The alert was an 
all-out alert w^ith complete dispersion of forces into combat positions 
and with full equipment and ammunition. 

[60] General Herron testified that there was no disturbance 
of the civilian population by the use of this all-out alert which was 
instituted under conditions similar to those which later prevailed for 
General Short's alert. 

Wlien asked as to the Alerts 1, 2, and 3 of Short, he disposed of 
these alerts with the following language : 

General Hereon. That was a refinement that the training men put over on 
General Short when he came out there. I told him I would not do any such 
thing. There was only one kind of alert, and that was a total alert, and then 
I would do it in accordance with the situation. But the training men liked 
refinements, and they recommended three kinds because the Navy had three 
kinds. But they did not get to the real point of the thing. The Navy has three 
kinds, but the all-out alert is number one, always. Now they ease up into two 
and three; but these young men did not know that, and when Short came out 
they put over the three and got them reversed, so that Short went into the Num- 
ber 1, which was sabotage. It did not seem to him a very important change, I 
don't suppose, and it turned out to be vital. It was too much of a refinement. 
(R. 226-227.) 

In this connection, General Herron made a significant observation 
on the responsibility of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian 
Department. 

General Grunekt. I have one more question on alerts. The fact that you 
received a directive from the War Department to alert the command : Did that 
leave the impression in your mind that if anything serious happened in the 
future the War Department would direct you to go on the alert, or leave it 
up to your .iudgment? 

General Hereon. I always felt that I was entirely responsible out there and I 
had better protect the island. (R. 228.) 

5. Organisation of The Navy At Pearl Harhor. — Before proceeding 
to a consideration of the Army's problems and the action taken 
by the Army in preparing the defenses of Hawaii, it is necessary to 
understand the organization of the Navy with whom General Short 
was to deal extensively and with which he was to \61\ enter 



54 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

into various agreements and understandings, which have a material 
bearing upon which was done or was not done. 

To an Army man the organization of the Navy at Hawaii appeared 
to be quite complex. Admiral Kimmel was Commander-in-Chief of 
the United States Fleet and Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. 
Admiral Bloch was the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. 
Admiral Bloch's duties consisted of the following : 

a. Commandant of the 14th Naval District, reporting directly to 
the Navy Department; the 14th Naval District was a decentralized 
Navy Department for local aflfairs, dealing with administrative matters 
such as plans, buildings, work of the Navy Yard, repairing ships 
and the like, and providing for the Fleet oil, docks, water protection 
and such services as minesweeping, antisubmarine patrol, and the like. 

&. An officer of the Fleet, reporting to Admiral Kimmel, and acting 
as a subordinate of Admiral Kimmel ; his duties related to the prepara- 
tions for the offensive and defensive actions in time of war and to 
purely military matters. 

c. Adminstrative control over Admiral Bellinger, Commander of 
the Base Defense Air Force. 

d. Commander of Task Force No. 4 in control of the naval installa- 
tions at the outlying island bases, such as Midway. Wake, Guam, etc. 

It will be noted from the foregoing that Admiral Bloch dealt directly 
with the Navy Department on certain phases of [^^] his work. 
He was primarily charged as the Naval Defense Commander of the 
naval installations on shore. He was also a Task Commander under 
Admiral Kimmel. He was the responsible commander over the shore- 
based naval air forces, which were charged with the mission of naval 
long-distance reconnaissance. 

Additionally, Bloch, in his capacity as a Defense Commander, had 
administrative control over Admiral Bellinger, the Naval Air Officer, 
who was responsible for cooperation in the air with the Army, but he 
had no power of disciplinary control over Admiral Bellinger, who was 
under Admiral Kimmel. 

Admiral Bellinger's duties, in turn, were as follows : 

a. Commander, Hawaiian Base Patrol Wings, and Commander, 
Patrol Wing 2. Included in the larger command were the patrol 
squadrons and aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings 1 and 2. 

6. Commander, Task Force 9. This comprised Patrol Wings 1 
and 2, plus other units as assigned by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 
Fleet, for conduct of Pacific operations. 

e. Commander, Fleet Air Detachment Pearl Harbor. The responsi- 
bilities of this function included administrative authority in local mat- 
ters over all Fleet aircraft actually based ashore. 

d. Liaison with Commandant, 14th Naval District, for aviation 
development within the District, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, 
and Johnston Islands. 

e. Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. In connection with 
the above five major duties, Admiral Bellinger operated under the fol- 
lowing senior officers: 

\_63\ (1) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who as Fleet 
Commander for patrol wings was based at San Diego. 

(2) Commander, Scouting Force, the 4th Command of which 
Patrol Wings 1 and 2 were a part. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 55 

(3) Directly under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in his 
capacity as Commander, Task Force 9. 

(4) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as 
Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. 

(5) Commanders of Fleet Task Forces 1, 2, and 3 of patrol planes 
assigned to those forces for specific operations. 

To summarize, Admiral Bellinger indicated that he held six posi- 
tions in Honolulu on December 7, 1941, namely — 

(1) Commander, Base Patrol Wing. 

(2) Commander, Patrol Wing 2. 

(3) Commander, Task Force 9. 

(4) Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. 

(5) Liaison Commander with the 14th Naval District. 

(6) Commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force. 
In these various capacities he was responsible to the — 

(1) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force. 

(2) Commander, Scouting Force 1 and 2, 

(3) Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for his duties in con- 
nection with Task Force 9. 

[64] (4) Commander of the 14th Naval District, for his 
duties in connection with the Naval Base Defense Air Force. 

(5) Commander-in-Chief, the Pacific Fleet, for his duties with 
respect to Patrol Wings 1, 2, and 3. 

In Admiral Bloch's testimony he testified that he (Bloch) wore 
three hats. He was in command of the 14th Naval District, in which 
capacity he reported direct to the Navy Department. In another ca- 
pacity, as an officer of the Fleet, he was directly under the Commander- 
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. And again under the Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific Fleet, in another capacity, with respect to the Joint Coastal 
Frontier Defense Plan, as Naval Defense Commander. 

As may be realized, in this organization in which there were two 
governing heads, Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, with whom General 
Short had to do business, and their respective staffs with whom Short's 
staff had to deal, as well as the many-titled Admiral Bellinger with 
whom General Martin dealt, the problem of cooperation was made 
somewhat difficult. 

By way of contrast, the Navy only had to deal with General Short 
as the sole responsible commander over all activities, both ground and 
air. General Martin was in command of the Army Air Forces and 
presented a single air commander with whom the Navy had to deal; 
and Martin was under the direct command of Short. "\\ hen the agree- 
ments and methods of operation arrived at between the Army and 
Navy are examined hereinafter, these relationships will become im- 
portant in understanding what was done and what was not done and 
some of the reasons for the failure of the competent defense of Hawaii. 

[6*5] B. EVENTS FROM JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 19 41 

1. /Selection of General Short. — General Short was selected for his 
high post of command by General Marshall. Upon being notified of 
this selection, he was called to Washington to confer with General 
Marshall, to receive special written instructions from him and to con- 
fer with the sections of the General Staff and particularly the War 



56 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Plans Division. The purpose of this visit and these conferences was 
to equip him with the latest and most up-to-date information and in- 
structions as to the responsibilities of his new command. 

Thereafter, General Short proceeded to Hawaii, arriving there on 
the fifth day of February, 1941. He assumed command on February 
7, 1941, Both Short and Herron concur that the latter fully advised 
Short of the problems and conditions with which he was confronted. 

At the time of General Short taking over command, there existed 
certain basic documents constituting fundamental instructions for his 
guidance in the conduct of the command, such as the Joint Army and 
Navy Plan of 1935. This was modified by the subsequent agreements 
between Short and Kimmel, Bloch and Short, and Bellinger and 
Martin. 

Coincident with the assumption of command by General Short on 
Februarj^ 7, 1941, a letter was written on that date by General Marshall 
to General Short comprising a full presentation of the problems con- 
fronting General Short in his new command. The letter was based 
upon a conversation with Admiral Stark, then Chief of Naval Oper- 
ations, and said in part : 

[66] Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length ^bout the 
deficiencies of Army materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred 
specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns . . . 

What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this materiel 
throughout the Army and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other 
command in the Army. The fullest protection for the fleet is the rather than a 
major consideration for us, there can be little question about that ; but the Navy 
itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it 
difiicult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. . . . 

You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that 
is humanly possible to build up the Army's defenses of the naval overseas installa- 
tions, but we cannot perform a miracle. . . . 

. . . However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that 
our first concern is to protect the Fleet. 

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is 
done us during the first sis hours of known liostilities, thereafter the existing 
defenses will discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk 
of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, 
constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat 
in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority. 

Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to 
protect the base and the naval concentration and that purpose should be made 
clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yesterday, 
for example, in a matter of tremendous importance that old Army and Navy fueds, 
engendered from fights over appropriations, with the u.sual fallacious arguments 
on both sides, still persist in confusing issues on National defense. We must 
be completely impersonal in these matters, as least so far as our own nerves and 
irritations are concerned. . . ." (R. 14-17.) 

Thus General Short was provided by his chief with both sound ad- 
vice and an admirable set of clear-cut signposts to guide him. Such 
being the measure of his instructions, it is interesting to observe in what 
particulars he complied with [67] them or varied from them 
and the reasons for his actions. In conformity with the instructions as 
to the Navy, General Short proceeded to establish cordial and coopera- 
tive relationships, the exact nature of which is discussed elsewhere. 
By the 19th of February he "had made a pretty thorough inspection 
or survey" (E.. 321), and on that date wrote a letter to the Chief 
of Staff as to things that required immediate attention, which were : 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 57 

As a result of my short study of conditions here I believe that the following 
are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary 
changes : 

(1) Cooperation with the Navy. 

(2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and 
servicing of aircraft. 

(3) ImproA-ement of the Antiaircraft defense. 

(4) Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery. 

(5) Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights. 

(6) Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improve- 
ment in roads and trails. 

(7) Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communi- 
cation centers. 

{8) Iucrea.se in the number of Engineer troops-. 

The interim from February 19 to December 7 is replete with the 
efforts of Short to secure approvals and money for improving the 
'defenses of Hawaii. It is also replete with various instances of his 
being turned down by the War Department, particularly because 
(of lack of money in connection with permanent installations. 

Undue weight should not be given, however, to the aspects of the 
(equipment, as General Marshall said in his letter of February 7th, 

Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in tlie Army, 

and the fundamental question to be considered is : "What did Short do 
with what he had to meet the attack? 

[6S] As elsewhere stated, he was granted his request for the con- 
istruction of many types of installations, including the important air- 
icraft warning system. (See the discussion of suppl}' of ecjuipment 
:and construction, and also the delays in construction.) (P. 256.) 

Again on March 5, 1941, the Chief of Staff wrote General Short as 
to the air situation in clear, unmistakable language: 

I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory 
system or coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority. 
(B, 19.) 

On March 6, General Short wrote General Marshall, with particular 
reference to Aircraft Warning System and the delaj^s in its construc- 
tion, and delays in sites clue to the Department of Interior delays : 

One of the first projects which I investigated in this department was the Air- 
craft Warning Service which I believe is vital to the defense of these islands. 
At the pre.sent time the maximum distance an approaching airplane can be de- 
tected is about five miles. The radio detector equipment of tlie Aircraft Warn- 
ing Service increases this distance to one hundred and twenty miles, and in these 
islands, the use of this equipment is the only way by which the detection dis- 
tance can be increased. With the present international situation it seems to me 
that if this equipment is to be used at all the need for it is now here. 

The Navy is vitally interested in this project. At present with the fleet in 
Hawaiian, waters, there is no adequate warning service. * * * i believe that 
this matter is sufficiently important to be brought to the attention of the Secre- 
tary of War to see if permission can not be obtained from tlie Secretary of the 
Interior to construct the Haleakala installation without the necessity of submit- 
ting detailed plans for consideration by the National Park Service. 

Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet 
is so dependent upon the [6'.9] early completion of this Aircraft Warn- 
ing Service that I believe all quibbling over details .should be stopped at once. 
This project was very thoroughly studied by a board of officers in this department 
who made several personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic 
decisions as to locations, types of stations, and general plans have been approved 
by the War Department, I strongly recoTOmen(J tliat this project be decentralized 



58 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and that I be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and other details 
to expedite its completion. 

On March 13, General Marshall wrote General Short : 

The progress that you are making in reaching close coordination with local 
naval authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your De- 
partment, is most gratifying. * * * 

The several letters which you have submitted to The Adjutant General request- 
ing personnel, materiel and funds are being processed. To avoid delay in initiat- 
ing projects that may be approved, I am tentatively including $3,000,000 in the 
estimates now being prepared. 

On March 15, General Marshall again wrote General Short as to the 
Aircraft Warning Service, showing the delays due to the necessity of 
getting approvals from the Department of Interior regarding matters 
pertaining to its National Park Service : 

The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establish- 
ment of the aircraft warning service stations in the Hawaiian Department. How- 
ever, it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in those cases 
where facilities are to be established on lands pertaining to the Department of 
the Interior. The National Park Service ofiicials are willing to give us the tem- 
porary use of their lands when other lands are not suitable for the purpose, but 
they will not waive the requirements as to the submission of preliminary build- 
ing plans showing the architecture and general appearance. They are also very 
definitely opposed to permitting structures of any type to be erected at such 
places as will be open to view and materially alter the natural appearance of 
the reservation. 

I have given these matters my personal attention, and have conferred with 
officials of the National Park Service. War Department radiogram of March 12, 
1941, outlines what appears to be the most practical solution, at this time. 

[70] On March 15 General Short wrote General Marshall a 
letter showing full appreciation of the necessity for the dispersion and 
the protection of aircraft. Among otlier tilings he said : 

On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would 
suffer terrific loss. As I wrote you in my letter of February 19th some work has 
been done towards the preparation of emergency fields on outlying islands, but 
in no case have arrangements been completed for the dispersion of the planes 
in the vicinity of the field or the preparation of bunkers to protect them. I asked 
for money and Engineer troops to do this work. The pursuit planes must 
necessarily be protected on the Island of Oahu on accoiint of their limited cruising 
radius. (E. 21-22.) 

In this letter he also discussed at length the question of anti-aircraft 
defense. 

On March 28, 1941, General Marshall replied to this letter as follows : 

Your proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of one additional 
field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at exist- 
ing airfields is undoubtedly sound. As soon as you have submitted sufiicient 
details to support the defense of the anticipated expenditui-es, funds for those 
purposes will be included in estimates. 

On April 14, General Short again wrote General Marshall and 
amongst other things reported progress, as follows : 

Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making 
in cooperating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following agreements made 
with them : 

1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth 
Naval District. Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure. 

2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and 
Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement. 

3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army 
the provisions of the joint agreement. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 59 

I have found both Admiral Kinimel and Admiral [71] Bloch very 
cooperative and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the 
Army and Navy Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as 
the situation requires. 

We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air 
force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we sliall arrive at something on that 
in the near future. The more I go into the details the more I am becoming 
convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command. (R. 
26-27.) 

Oil May 2, 1941, Short wired General Marshall as to the sums of 
money needed for the construction of airports and other defense 
projects totaling over $27,000,000. General Short followed this up 
with a letter on May 2 to General Marshall in further explanation of 
his radiogram forwarding supporting data. 

On May 5, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short acknowl- 
edging the receipt of these estimates and supporting data, saying : 

The matter of locating strongpoints at various points tliroughout the Island 
looks souncT to me, and authority to go ahead on the leasing of land parcels was 
radioed on April 22nd. War Plans and the Air Corps are still looking into the 
matter of the additional airdrome on Oahu, and I expect to have an answer for 
you in a short time. 

* * * ■ * * !|: :|i 

It is most gratifying to have you say that everything is going along extremely 
well and do not hesitate to write at any time. (R. 28.) 

On May 29, 1941, General Short furnished General Marshall a com- 
plete report on current maneuvers, the plans for the organization of 
the ground and the construction of field fortifications, and the plans 
for repelling a serious attack, and reporting his theory of the defense 
of Hawaii, saying : 

\72] My theory of the defense of Hawaii is based upon the following: 

1. Complete organization of the ground at all important points. 

2. Holding of the most important field fortification lightly. 

3. Holding of large mobile reserves centrally located with sufficient motor 
transportation to move all reserves at once if necessary. 

4. Detailed plans for the employment of reserves with complete reconnaissance 
and reserves actually rehearsed in carrying out of the plans. 

5. All troops to be highly trained in delaying action and counter-attack. 

On July 7 The Adjutant General sent General Short the following 
wire: 

For your information stop Deduction from information from numerous sources 
is that the Japanese government has determined upon its future policy which is 
supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups stop This 
policy is present one of watchful waiting involving probably aggressive action 
against the maritime provinces of Russia if and when the Siljerian garrison has 
been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will 
win a decisive victory in European Russia stop Opinion is that Jap activity in 
the south will be for the present coniined to seizure and development of naval 
comma army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the 
British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out stop The Neutrality Pact with 
Russia may be abrogated stop They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic 
ports to be west of Panama Canal by first of August stop Movement of Jap 
shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are 
being requisitioned end. 

This wire contained notation by the Chief of Staff of July 7, 1941. 

On July 11, 1941, General Short asked the location of a new airfield 
on the Island of Oahu. 

On July 25, 1941, General Short reported to General [73] 
Marshall the Joint Air Arrangements of the Army, Navy, and ex- 



60 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

change of facilities such as airfields. On July 25, 1941, a very sig- 
nificant message was sent by the Chief of Staff and the Chi^f of Naval 
Operations as a joint dispatch to General Short warning him of the 
application of economic sanctions against Japan on July 26, particu- 
larly saying : 

Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff do not anticipate 
immediate hostile reaction by Japanese through the use of military means, but 
you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate pi-e- 
cautionary measures against any possible eventualities. 

On August 19, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short as to 
the establishment of an airfield base for the 15th Pursuit Group and 
his reasons for so doing. This brings to conclusion the communica- 
tions between the Chief of Staff and General Short to October 1, 1941. 

2. Short^s Staff. ^Short brought one. Colonel Phillips to Hawaii 
with the view to making him his Chief of Staff, and to train him for 
that assignment he placed him successive^ in various sections of his 
General Staff. On November 1 Colonel Phillips was made Chief of 
Staff. Evidence indicates that Phillips failed to measure up to that 
most responsible and important assignment — the ''alter ego" of the 
Commanding General ; that he was but a weak echo of his Commander 
and failed to furnish him, as his principal adviser, with vigorous and 
candid advice of high professional character and with a competent 
vision and knowledge of what was taking place or might take place. 

His administration of the staff, as we view it, was weak [74] 
and reflected itself in the work of the several General Staff sections 
and in the output thereof as a whole. While the various Assistant 
Chiefs of Staff' testified that harmony existed, the results are more 
important in their conclusive effect that there was a lack of requisite 
harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident to the Board that 
their testimony was colored bv their very evident lovalty to General 
Short. 

Phillips was recognized by the staff as without force and far too 
weak for a position of such importance.-' Short's selection of Phillips 
appears to have been a mistake. An examination of Phillips' testi- 
mony as to his conception of his duty and what he did and failed to 
do in aiding Short to competent decisions in critical situations, is 
sufficient evidence of the matter. (R. 1134-1144.) In justice to Phil- 
lips it should be pointed out that while he was Chief of Staff he never 
was present at important Navy conferences, (R. 393-394, 534), and 
that information of important and vital events came to him second- 
handed. 

Although Short did not insulate himself from his staff, he had 
Phillips conduct most of the staff conferences and apparently rarely 
dealt directly with his principal staff officers. He delegated to his 
staff little more than mere routine duties. His direct relationship 
with his G-2 seemed particularly inadequate in view of the then exist- 
ing tense situation. (R. 393, 519, 520, 521.) Although he frequently 
visited and consulted with his principal subordinate commanders he 
held no periodic conferences, and his second [75] in command. 
General Burgin, was not taken into his confidence as to existing con- 
ditions nor was his advice sought. (R. 2625.) 

^ R. 265, 1408-1409, 1946, 1977-1978, 2625-2626. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 61 

3. JShorfs Actions In Building Defense Installations A7id Adding 
Equipment.— There is no question that Short made many demands 
for equipment, defense construction, and personnel. He was active 
and diligent in this matter. Except as to aircraft and antiaircraft, 
his command appears to have been well supplied. In many instances, 
lono- delays were incurred in the approval of defense construction and 
making funds available therefor and some of the recommended de- 
fense construction was disapproved by the War Department. 

4. Shorfs Reorganization of Divisions. — Short converted the square 
division, known as the Hawaiian Division, into two triangular divi- 
sions and equipped them with unusually heavy fire power in both 
artillery and machine guns as a basis for future expansion in time 

of war. 

General Maxwell Murray, commanding the 25th Division, testified : 

General Geuneet. And in your division you had what artillery? 

General Murray. I had the Eighth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Field Artillery, 
but it is not generally known that we had practically doubled the gun strength 
of the brigade before the 75-mm. gun batteries ; the Eighth and the Thirteenth 
vsrere 75-mm. gun regiments, and each of those batteries had eight guns to the 
battery instead of four. The Eleventh was the 155-howitzer regiment, but they 
were in addition manning two batteries of 155 guns, and some 240-mm. howitzers. 
The 75 regiments both had 240-mm. howitzers assigned to them, too. ( R. 3076-77. ) 

[76'] 4. Short's Relationship With The Navy.— Tnvwmg from 
Short's efforts to build up the physical installations and equipment of 
Hawaii and his staff, and the successful conversion of his single square 
division into two triangular divisions on which his staff seemed pri- 
marily engaged, we come to his actions with the Navy. Acting upon 
General Marshall's instructions and admonitions of February 7, 1941, 
which seemed to greatly impress him. Short succeeded in establishing 
an amiable relationship with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch and 
Admiral Bellinger. 

As stated hereinafter, he entered into a series of agreements with 
the Navy. Suflice it to say that these agreements, while admirable in 
concept and in many particulars equally admirable in the proposed 
plan of administration, under the handicap of joint action by cooper- 
ation instead of unity of command, were of quite limited effectiveness 
because neither the Army nor the Navy had sufficient means to prop- 
erly implement them. 

The agreements were difficult of execution. To make them effec- 
tive would have taken skilled professional officers of both services, 
guided by a well organized composite staff, and practiced in opera- 
tional tests. 

The agreements themselves were not to go into effect until either a 
period of strained relations occurred, or M-Day was declared, or in 
the actual event of war. Neither the Army nor Navy seemed to appre- 
ciate this defect. 

Short apparently mistook the conduct of "war by contract" for a 
conduct of "war by command". 

Even without the full means of putting these agreements physically 
into effect, had the equipment and materiel available been utilized, 
iiad there been in existence a [77] detailed plan of operation 
of the staff and lower echelons, and had sound judgment been exer- 
cised in the selection of the alert, the disaster of Pearl Harbor un- 

7971 6— 4<V— Ex. 157 5 



62 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

doubtedly would have been materially mitigated, if not wholly 
avoided. 

(For a full discussion of the agreements see p. 88 to p. 97.) 
6. Aba^idonment of Eerrons Field Order #1: Adoption of Triple- 
Alert /System: Sabotage Issue. — A further step, and one of great im- 
port, taken by Short was the study that he initiated through his staff 
with a view to abandoning the Field Order No. 1, in vogue under the 
regime of General Herron, and substituting his temporary Standard 
Operating Procedure, which was published tentatively on July 14, 
1941. The final draft of this vital document came out on November 
5, 1941 (R. 283), and provided for three types of alerts, which are 
defined by Short as follows: 

Our Alert No. 1 was a defense against sabotage, espionage, and subversive 
activities witliout any threats from the outside. 

Alert No. 2 included all these sabotage measures in No. 1, and, in addition, 
defense against air attacks and sui'face and submarine attacks. 

Alert No. 3 was a defense against an all-out attack where everybody moved 
to their battle stations and carried out their duties as if there was a possible 
attempt at landing in sight. (R. 283.) 

Short says that he sent ten copies to the Navy. (R. 395, 400.) He 
says he sent a copy to Washington. (E. 431. ) Alert No. 1 was purely 
antisabotage. Its effect when executed was to concentrate the planes 
in groups, wing-tip to wing-tip, where they were vulnerable from the 
air but less vulnerable from sabotage on the ground. He said he did 
this because of [78] his deficiency of personnel in protecting 
his planes agamst sabotage. If they had been put in dispersed posi- 
tions about the fields within bunkers, they would have been less vul- 
nerable to wholesale destruction from the air. This alert concentrated 
equipment and personnel and in effect set up almost perfect conditions 
for a successful enemy air attack. 

Alerts Number 2 and Number 3, on the contrary, constituted wide 
dispersion of men and equipment in battle positions, with ammunition 
at the guns and troops and planes in positions of readiness for action 
and maximum j)rotection. Under Alert Number 1, the earliest time 
in which planes were planned to get off the ground was four hours, 
while under Alerts Number 2 and Number 3 available aircraft is ready 
and can take to the air in from seven to eight minutes. Likewise, in 
connection with putting into action the antiaircraft guns and other 
similar establishments, the contrast between Alert Number 1 and Alerts 
Numbers 2 and 3 was the difference between minutes and hours. 

As the entire attack upon Pearl Harbor did not extend beyond ap- 
proximately three hours, it is obvious that tlie selection of the correct 
alert was vital. Historically, and by way of precedent, Short had 
before him the action of General Herron in the preceding year of an 
all-out alert under Filed Order No. 1 of Herron by which complete 
dispersal of planes and troops and guns was effected, with ammunition 
at the guns. The record shows (Colonel Capron and other witnesses — 
Pv. 1398, 2025, 2720, 2728, 2772-2773, 3096-3097) that there was no 
disturbance of the civilian population as a result of the action by 
Herron. This is significant, in view [79] of the fact, as will 
later appear, that General Short gives that explanation as one of his 
primarv reasons for the selection of Alert Number 1, because he might 
alarm the population. (R. 427-428, 532-533.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 63 

It should be kept in mind that the civilian population was accus- 
tomed to the continued movements of the Army and Navy in their 
frequent maneuvers and practice operations. Much of the civilian 
pojjulation in this instance was living practically in the midst of one 
of the greatest military and naval installations anywhere, so that their 
state of mind would be far different from that of people on the main- 
land unaccustomed to such sights. Then, too, the newspapers ofttimes 
contained much more exciting news, threats and disturbing events, 
than anything that an alert could stir up, either by the Army or Navy 
or both. The explanation therefore lacks both substance and credi- 
bility. 

At this point the question of sabotage which led to the selection 
and implementation of Alert No. 1 should be examined. No single 
instance of sabotage occurred while Short was in command up to 
December 7. It was true that there were 35,000 aliens of Japanese 
origin and there was a total of 160,000 or about 37% of the population 
of Japanese origin or affiliations (E. 289), but in no case was there 
any instance of misbehavior, despite a very exhaustive investigation 
being made constantly by the F. B. I. and by G-2. as well as by Naval 
Intelligence. 

We have investigated the state of mind and the information as to 
the actions of the Japanese population in an endeavor to understand 
why it was that General Short adopted his anti-sabotage alert on No- 
vember 27 in the face of the [SO] increasing international ten- 
sion, and of his own estimate and that of the Navy that an air attack 
was the most dangerous form of attack likely to be encountered. We 
therefore resorted to the testimony of a great variety of witnesses in 
all walks of life in Honolulu, resident there during 1941, and inquired 
of their feelings and views and the whole situation as to the Japanese 
population. 

We could find no substantial evidence of any fear by these witnesses, 
including some of the best-informed leaders in the civil life of the 
Islands, that the Japanese would commit acts of sabotage. Their 
knowledge was based upon long residence in the Islands and experi- 
ence with the Japanese. Governor Poindexter, newspaper editors like 
Raymond S. Coll, of the Honolulu Advertiser, United States District 
Attorney Angus Taylor, Shivers, head of the F. B. I., General Wells, 
executive vice-president of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, 
and Walter Francis Dillingham, president of the Oahu Railway and 
Land Companj" and owner or director of many other enterprises in the 
Islands, concurred with many other witnesses such as ranch owners, 
government officials, leaders in business, that the risk of sabotage, so 
long as the Army and Navy were in a predominant position, before 
an actual landing and show of success by the Japanese, was a relatively 
minor matter. However, the Army was sabotage-minded. There 
appeared to be no substantial basis for this fear other than speculation 
as to what a large body of citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry 
might do in case of stress. 

[5i] 7. Navy Long-Distance Reconnaissance. — He assumed that 
the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance, and in this he 
was joined by a large group of ranking subordinates, but an inquiry by 
him, if it had been made, would have soon revealed the fact that his as- 



64 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sumption that the task forces went out for conductmg reconnaissance 
at long distance was not true. Such reconnaissance as they were con- 
ducting was only incident to the maneuvers of the task forces of the 
fleet, who were operating for training purposes and were looking for 
Japanese submarines so as not to interfere with their training opera- 
tions. The Navy was submarine- and training-minded. (K. 1527, 
1600,1725,1773,1802.) 

It should have been apparent upon examination of the facts by him 
that any such operations of the task forces were not only intermittent 
and limited in scope but they could not possibly cover the entire 360 
degrees around the Island. A further understanding by him of the 
actual facts would have disclosed very promptly, as it did to his air 
force subordinates, that the Navy did not have any means for such 
long-distance reconnaissance, nor did the Navy get from the Army 
any such assistance, even thougli under the agreements the Army on 
call was to supply a substantial portion of the long-range aircraft for 
this purpose. In fact, the Army had at the time of Pearl Harbor avail- 
able for this purpose only six planes capable of this work. 

The Navy acceptance of responsibility for long-distance recon- 
naissance is set forth in pargraph 18 (i) of the Joint (^oastal Frontier 
Defense Plan, which provides : 

[82] IS. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, 
shall provide for : 

******* 
i. Distant reconnaissance. (R. 1745.) 

The purpose of long-distance reconnaissance, which the Navy as- 
sumed in its agreements with the Army, was to discover hostile naval 
forces and particularly carriers before they could launch an attack. 
The area of search extended two to six hundred miles from the shore. 
It was assumed by Short that the presence of task forces of the Navy 
at sea insured such reconnaissance being conducted. Long-distance 
reconnaissance was obviously the very heart of the defense of Oahu 
because upon its results would depend not only the opportunity to 
destroy the carriers and carrier-borne planes of the Japanese but 
also put the forces on Oahu on the alert for an effective reception of 
the attack if it got through. But, as elsewhere stated, this long-dis- 
tance reconnaissance was not being conducted by the Navy and such 
air reconnaissance as was being conducted was for the purpose of 
clearing the area of submarines where the fleet was in training. 
The inshore reconnaissance by the Army, up to twenty miles from 
shore, was substantially for the same purpose. 

The record showed it was the well-considered estimate of the Army 
and Navy commanders and their staffs that carriers and their sup- 
porting craft would attempt to approach Pearl Harbor, arriving in 
position at dark preceding the dawn of the day on which the attack 
was to be made. (R. 106.) Under the protection of darkness 300 
additional miles could be covered so that at dawn the attack could 
be launched within [88] approximately 300 miles from shore. 
This is apparently substantially what actually did happen. (Roberts 
Record 556-F.) 

The conception and estimate of the situation was correct; steps 
taken to meet it were either absent completely or so defective as to 
amount to little. The Navy had available for long-distance recon- 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 65 

naissance, from November 27 to December 7, 1941, 50 PBY's and the 
Army had six heavy bombers while at least 270 planes would have 
been required as a minimum for conducting such a reconnaissance 
if a 360-degree area around Oahu was to be covered. (R. 1762, 1766.) 
It is significant that in the joint Army-Navy plan of 1935 distant 
reconnaissance was made a mission of the Army but Short and Bloch 
agreed early in 1941, in the joint plan for the defense of the Hawaiian 
frontier and for the employment of the Army-Navy Air Forces, to 
place the responsibility for distant reconnaissance on the Navy, leav- 
ing to the Army reconnaissance only to about 20 miles from shore. 
This is due to the fact that almost all of the planes suitable for dis- 
tant reconnaissance were naval. This Joint Coastal Frontier De- 
fense Plan was O. K.'d by Kimmel and approved by the War 
Department. 

The result was that the critical band of sea around Hawaii (the 
600- to 900-mile area) was not patrolled. Observations therein were 
infrequent and incidental. Admiral Kimmel reached a decision that 
the few planes available would be wholly ineffective for this purpose 
and emploj^ed them otherwise. (R. 1763.) 

Both Admiral Kimmel and Genreal Short were conversant with 
these conditions. (R. 375, 1763, 4438-4439.) It was obvious, [84] 
therefore, that a Japanese task force with carriers could launch an 
attack upon Oahu with a reasonable certainty of success since its 
discovery prior to such launching would have been purely accidental 
and its chances of discovery remote. 

An early alert by the Navj to the Army would have permitted of 
a dispersion of its planes with the result that they could have been 
aloft, ready to intercept the attack, and the damage done would have 
been greatly lessened. 

The remaining factor for reconnaissance' and detection was in the 
Aircraft "Warning System, which was a responsibility of the Army.^* 
The Army had put into operation in the fall of 1941, on a training 
basis, which was operating for all practical purposes, a number of 
mobile radar sets and an aircraft information center. That it was 
in operating condition, even with the state of training of the per- 
sonnel that then existed in late November and early December 1941 
was amply proven by the successful operation of the system during 
previous tests and exercises and of the station that discovered the 
attacking Japanese force 132 miles from the Island and the correct 
interpretation by the two enlisted men operating the station, who duly 
reported the presence of a strange force but were told by an inex- 
perienced and only partially trained Air Force lieutenant to "forget 
it". This was at 0702 on December 7, 1941. 

If this information had been transmitted to the Air Force and to 
the Navy the latter would have had the anti-aircraft weapons on its 
ships in action, since only three to five minutes were required for that 
purpose, the Army anti-aircraft [85] system could have been 
alerted and many of the Army planes dispersed and some could 
have gotten off the ground. 

The only other reconnaissance instrumentality available was that 
being operated by the Navy, known as the Radio Intercept System. 

"8 See p. 147 for complete story of construction difficulties of an aircraft warning system, 
signal difficulties, and how the enemy fleet was discovered. 



66 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

It was functioning officially in the latter part of 1941 and was con- 
stantly supplying information of the greatest value to important 
naval commanders, a part of which information was communicated 
to General Short by Admiral Kimmel. (R. 1771-1772.) 

The one notable and tragic exception was the failure to advise 
General Short that on or about November 25 a Japanese task force 
was discovered in the Marshall Islands, in which force there were 
reported as present two or three carriers, 15 f o 20 submarines, and pos- 
sibly other vessels. (R. 361.) About the first of December radio 
contact was lost with this force as it apparently went into radio 
silence, which was known to be by the Navy the third and last and 
most dangerous phase of the movement of the enemy fleet. (R. 1654— 
1655, 1662.) The loss of such contact of a threatening fleet in the 
year preceding was the occasion for a directive from AVashington 
for an all-out alert by which all troops went into the field with li>e 
ammunition and remained there for six weeks. 

So here again, as in the case of the Army radar system, there was 
u failure of transmission of the information by the Navy to the 
Army as the Army had failed to transmits its radar information on 
the morning of December 7lh to the Navy. Such a Japanese task 
force in the Marshall Islands was 72 hours away from Pearl Harbor 
and nearly a thousand miles closer to Pearl Harbor than the Japa- 
nese fleet resident in Japan, from whence [86] the main attack 
was expected if it ever did arrive. (R. 106-107.) 

After extensive testimony had been given before this Board on the 
Jaluit task force and the fact that there was long belief that it was 
from Jaluit that the attacking force had moved against Pearl Harbor, 
there was produced in Hawaii the more certain proof that this force 
had assembled at Tankan Bay in northern Japan and had moved 
from that point eastward and then southward for the attack, leaving 
Tankan Bay on the 27th-28th of November 1941. If this proof be 
accepted of the later naval witnesses as against the testimony of the 
earlier naval witnesses, who seemed equally well informed, it does 
not change the situation. The Navy failed to give to the Army a 
very vital and important piece of information. 

In conclusion, the last element in the tragic situation was the fail- 
ure of the subordinate officers of the Navy to report to the Army the 
presence in the outer harbor, on the early morning of December 7, 
at about 0630, of a Japanese submarine which was sunk by naval 
action (the destroyer "U. S. S. Ward*' and a naval patrol plane) 
about 0633 to 0645 hours, which would have indicated that something 
was on the move and the whole naval and military establishments 
should have been correspondingly alerted. The "Ward" reported 
this action to the naval base watch officer at 0712 hours, who notified 
the Naval Chief of Staff. The Army was not notified. (R. 536- 
537; Roberts Record 1725.) 

The situation as to this reconnaissance is best set forth in excerpts 
in testimony from senior commanders. The [<97] long-dis- 
tance patrol of the Navy consisted of only two or three PBY's and 
it was "nothing to amount to much." (R. 1820.) General Martin 
said: 

I complained to Admiral Bellinger about the lack of patrolling that was being 
done. "Well," he said, "this is all that I have." This is all I can put up." 
(R. 1822.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 67 

General Frank. But so far as there having been a reconnaissance for the 
actual protection of Oahu. such continuous reconnaissance had not been done? 

Admiral Bloch. That is correct; and that was a matter subject to the orders 
of the Commander-in-Chief. I think that might as well be cleared. He would 
be the man to order that, in my opinion. (R. 1527.) 

As to Armj^ reconnaissance, General Mollison testified that such 
reconnaissance as was being conducted from Bellows Field did not 
operate on Sundays, saying;: 

I'm sure it did not. It may have on this Sunday, but I doubt very much if 
it did. (R. 812.) 

So far as inshore patrol is concerned, he said that the Army Air 
Forces did so little that it would amount to "a token payment only''. 
(E. 824.) 

General Rudolph. On that particular Sunday morning I understood they 
didn't have a boat out — an airplane, seaplane. (R. 1232.) 

General Frank. But you understand that they were not out on that morning? 

General Rtjdolph. So I was informed. (R. 1233.) 

General Grunert. Then, according to the instructions under which you were 
functioning you had no responsibility for distant air reconnaissance? 

Admiral Bloch. There was no distant air reconnaissance ordered in that 
order. That is the only order that I know which was operative. 

[88} General Grunebt. But actually was there some distant air reconnais- 
sance being made from time to time or continuously? 

Admiral Bloch. I do not know. I do not know whether there was or not. 
That would not be under me. (R. 14S4.) 

With reference to distant reconnaissance, means of performing it 
under the joint air agreement. Admiral Bloch testified : 

So I had no implements to perform distant reconnaissance in the 14th Naval 
District force. (R. 1484.) 

General Grunert. Do you know on the morning of the 7th of December 
whether any such planes were in the air on any reconnaissance mission? 

Admiral Bloch. I heard planes taking off. I do not know exactly what mis- 
sions they were on, but there were planes in the air. (R. 1494.) 

So now let us turn to the agreements upon which Short placed such 
reliance for protection by Naval long-distance reconnaissance and 
joint air action with the Navy. 

8. Agreements Between Army and Navy. — The basic document 
governing the relationship of the Army and Navy in the formulation 
of clefense plans for the Hawaiian Islands is contained in the docu- 
ment entitled "War Plans, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 
1935". This was prepared in pursuance of the directive of the Kain- 
bow War Plan. It covers the over-all policies of the functions and 
agreements between the Army and Navy as to their relative responsi- 
bilities in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal 
Frontier, 

The category of defense in this document which applied to Hawaii 
was Category D. This category was defined as "Coastal Frontiers 
That May Be Subject to Major Attack." Under this [89] cate- 
gory the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with 
means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval 
operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of 
defense will generally find application. 

... In addition, antiaircraft defense of important areas outside of harbor 
defenses should be organized; . . . Long-range air reconnaissance will be 
provided. . . . (Page 39.) 



68 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

And the purpose of coastal frontier defense was stated to be 

Protecting our Military and Civil Installations and Facilities; . . . Insur- 
ing the security of those portions of our coastal frontiers which are vital to 
military, industrial and commercial operations. 

It was also provided that there be furnished 

a communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service 
among the elements of the land defense with provision for the prompt exchange 
of information or instructions with the Navy. 

This was a responsibility of the Army. 

Pursuant to the foregoing plan, an agreement was entered into 
entitled "Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan." (Pre- 
pared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the 
Commandant, 14th Naval District.) This agreement was signed by 
Admiral Bloch and General Short and provided the fundamental 
plan for the defense of Hawaii. 

The third agreement was that entitled "Joint Air Agreement", 
signed March 28, 1941. This document was prepared by Major 
General Martin, U. S. Army Air Force, and Admiral Bellinger, as 
Base Defense Air Force Commander, and signed by Admiral Bloch 
and General Short. It provided for the combined air action as 
follows : 

[90] Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under 
the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine 
the Army Bombardment strength to participate in each mission, etc. 

Defensive air operation over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be 
executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense 
Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these mis- 
sions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of 
fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practical. This 
force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for 
maintenance of the required alert status, until, due to a change in the tactical 
situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to 
Navy control. (Roberts Record 555.) 

Tliis Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941, signed by Bloch and 
Short, was implemented by certain additional documents signed by 
Bellinger and Martin as operating plans. The date of these operat- 
ing plans was April 9, 1941. (Eoberts Record 556a-0 Vol. 5.) 

Under this agreement Admiral Bloch, not an air officer, was acting 
on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief in signing the document, and 
there operated under him Admiral Bellinger, who had the command 
of the planes, so far as the Navy could implement the Agreement, as 
Commander of the Air Base Force. Bellinger, however, was under 
the command of Admiral Kimmel, and Bloch, who was charged with 
the responsibility for the operation orders and plans of operation for 
the base defense air force, had no air force with which to implement 
the Agreement. Bellinger had the job to do and such means as existed 
to do it with was Fleet aviation. Bloch had supervisory control over 
Bellinger, but the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Kimmel, had to 
approve the Agreement. (R. 1522.) 

[91] Bloch was called upon to designate the condition of readi- 
ness of the aircraft, but did not have control of the aircraft, the read- 
iness of which he was to determine. The confusion inherent from 
the Navy's organization is best expressed in the following question : 

General Grunebt. Who would the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, 
hold responsible in case something went wrong? Would he hold you or Bellinger? 
Admiral Bloch. I do not know. (R. 1522.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 69 

This agreement was the result of a report of a Joint Army and Navy 
board dated October 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations 
covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian 
Islands. This report was signed by Major General Martin and 
Admiral Bellinger. (E. 1581.) 

Under such circumstances the Army had a difficult time in deter- 
mining under which of the three shells (Kimmel, Bloch, or Bellinger) 
rested the pea of performance and resjDonsibility. 

Plans which must wait to be put into practice and only become 
operative when war strikes under all the unexpected and changing 
conditions of an attack inevitably prove unsound in practice. The 
basic difficulty of the Short-Bloch-Kimmel agreements was inherent 
in all such agreements, as they constituted a vain paper attempt to 
predict war procedure without having properly tested out the pro- 
posed arrangements in training and by joint staff action to see if they 
were practical measures. 

The proof of the soundness of the plans is whether they work, 
and the Short-Bloch-Kimmel agreements were never tested out far 
enough to find out if their plans were sound in practice. There was 
inadequate practice of them to enable [92] the respective or- 
ganizations to acquire that automatic facility in their execution so 
that the plans would be carried out effectively despite all the stresses, 
strains and unexpected developments to personnel and equipment 
that were incidents of a conflict. We desire to emphasize this syn- 
thetic structure of agreements and plans based upon them. The fol- 
lowing analysis of these agreements shows that : 

There were two joint agreements. The first was known as the 
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. It was based on the war plan 
and the "Joint Action of the Army and Navy" of 1935. The second 
agreement was the Joint Air Force Agreement signed by Admiral 
Bloch and General Short and based upon it as Appendix #7 was an 
operating plan worked out by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger. 

As Admiral Bloch said : 

Ordinarily it would not be operative. (R. 1478.) 

He also testified : 

The plan was never operative as a plan because the War and Navy Depart- 
ments never ordered it to become operative, either in part or in whole. The 
local comm.anders never mutually agreed to have it become operative in part. 
(R. 1474.) 

And again he testified : 

General Russell. So that respecting missions of the Army and Navy, accord- 
ing to your construction of the agreement, reconnaissance missions were not 
effective until December 7, 1941? 

Admiral Bloch. Under the circumstances that obtained, that is the way it 
happened. I will say that I accepted the responsibility in that agreement for 
distant reconnaissance for the Navy, and I did my utmost to implement my 
responsibility by demanding patrol plans for that purpose, but I never had any; 
I never had one. (R. 1487.) 

The agreements entered into between the Navy and the Army 
[93] had two basic defects. First, they did not become operative 
until an emergency arose. The agreement said (paragraph 15 (c), 
2) : 

Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior 
to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departm.ents or as mutually agreed 
upon by local commanders. (R. 1584.) 



70 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The local commanders as testified to by Admiral Bellinger were 
miderstood to be General Short and Admiral Bloch. These com- 
manders apparently took no action to "mutually agree" to implement 
parts of the plan and, evidently were going to let the agreements go 
until an emergency arose, when they became operative automatically. 
As Admiral Bellinger testified : 

That could have been done at any time by the commandant of the 14th Naval 
District, who was Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, if it was ap- 
proved by and agreed upon by General Short. (R. 1591.) 

But it was not done. The selection of M-Day to initiate the put- 
ting of the joint plan and agreements thereunder into effect accord- 
ing to the terms of the agreement just quoted was a function of the 
War and Navy Departments. They took no action to put it into 
effect although a copy of this agreement was forwarded to the War 
Department and presumably to the Navy Department. (R. 1474.) 

The consequence was that not until the morning of December 7th 
did the agreement become operative, when it was too late to have 
gotten the benefit of the cooperative action that it implied, and the 
training which would result from this close teamwork by the Army 
and Navy. As Admiral Bellinger testified : 

The Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, did not have the authority 
to place that organization in the functioning status, except in case of an actual 
emei'gency. (R. 1582.) 

[94] This brings us to the second defect : unity of command. If 
that had been put into effect as provided in paragraph 9 (b) of the 
Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan this air agreement 
would have become effective by reason of such unity of command. As 
Admiral Bellinger again testified : 

I was not satisfied with the setup under the estimate and directives concern- 
ing the Naval Base Defense Air Force. I thought that it was necessary to have 
a unity of command to make such an operation a success. 

General Frank. You mean a unity of command before something happened? 

Admiral Beixingee. Yes. 

General Feank. Rather than when it happened? 

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. (R. 1.589.) 

Under the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the unity 
of command could be put into effect either by the President of the 
United States or by joint agreements of the Secretary of War and 
the Secretary of the Navy or when the commanders of Army and Navy 
forces agreed that the situation required unity of command and who 
was to exercise it. No one of these agencies took steps to effectuate 
what all of the witnesses have concurred in stating was the principal 
cause of difficulties on December 7, 1941, and the events leading up 
to and causing those difficulties, that is, unity of command. (K. 1587- 
1588.) 

It is interesting to observe the reason why this air agreement was 
not put into effect, in addition to lack of equipment to make it effective. 
As Admiral Bellinger testified : 

The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization into a func- 
tioning status [95] would have necessitated the substantial cessation of 
training activities in order to concentrate on defense. (R. 1582.) 

Likewise General Short testified : 

General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we should 
do nothing that would interfere with the training or ferrying group. The respon- 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 71 

sibility was definitely on the Hawaiian Department. It was up to us to get 
the ships there and get them there without loss ; and we could not do it if we 
started them out with untrained crews. 

That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into Alert No. 1, rather 
than Alert No. 2 or No. 3. (R. 286. ) 

As I say, none of these fixed stations was in operation. We had gotten, along 
in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we got them we started using 
them right away ; and when this message of the 27th came along, I prescribed 
that the Aircraft Warning Service would function those hours (4:00 to 7:00 
A. M.). In addition to that, they had their normal training. They trained then 
from 7 to 11, and they had maintenance work, work of that kind, from 12 to 4. 
(R. 298.) 

By making it 4 hours (time for aircraft to get into the air) it gave the pos- 
sibility to the men going ahead with recreation and athletics without being 
worried about getting that alert. They could go right ahead with their normal 
functions. They might have been out on a problem where it would take them 
an hour to get back in. (R. 460.) 

Alert No. 2 would have practically stopped the training of the Air Corps and 
the Antiaircraft Corps. It would not have interfered seriously with the training 
of the infantry divisions. (R. 528.) 

The reason for not so doing is sliown by Kimmel's words : 

We wanted to maintain our training status. Up to the last minute we had 
received no orders to mobilize. (R. 1811.) 

Admiral Kimmel observed that while the responsibility was on 
the Commandant, 14th Naval District and himself, on behalf of the 
Navy, for putting this plan into effect, yet it would have been necessary 
to refer to Washington for a decision. When asked why this would 
be so, he said : 

196] It would have alarmed the population. It might have been consid- 
ered by Japan an overt act. It would have tended to upset the Japanese-Ameri- 
can relations, which we had been enjoined to maintain in status quo ; and it 
would have required, so far as the Navy is concerned, certain movements of the 
fleet and certain action which should not have been taken without reference to 
the Department. (R. 1756.) 

Therefore it is apparent that the local commanders waited for 
Washington and Washington took no action under the Joint Hawaiian 
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, relying upon Hawaii to do so; and 
that in turn meant that the Martin-Bellinger Air Plan of Coopera- 
tion, which depended upon the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier 
Defense Plan, did not go into operation. 

The second reason why the air plan was ineffective was that Admiral 
Bloch, Commandant of the 14th Naval District, as testified by Admiral 
Kimmel, "had no planes assigned to him at this time." (R. 1751) , so 
that he could do nothing to carry it out. As to the Army, Admiral 
Kimmel pointed out : 

There weren't any general headquarters Army aircraft available in Hawaii, 
and we knew that there weren't going to be any. (R. 1753.) 

When asked why the Navy accepted the responsibility for distant 
reconnaissance without any effective means of carrying it out. Admiral 
Kimmel testified, 

he accepted responsibility for distant reconnaissance, because he couldn't do 
anything else and be sensible. (R. 1753. ) 

Admiral Bellinger confirms Admiral Kimmel's statement on long- 
distance reconnaissance means not being available. (R. 1595, 1606.) 
Therefore, paragraph 18 in the air agreement providing the Navy 
will furnish distant reconnaissance was without effect. (R. 1605-- 



72 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1606.) Bloch had no planes and such planes as Bellinger had were 
under command of Kimmel and were [97] being used for 
other purposes in connection with reconnaissance with the fleet for 
protecting maneuver areas against submarines. 

For the dual reason that the instrumentalities were not available 
and to the extent that any planes were available the use of them would 
have interfered with training, and for the further reason that the 
agreements were not to go into effect until an emergency, the Joint 
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and the Martin-Bellinger 
Air Agreement signed by Short and Bloch were ineffectual. The 
Army and Navy agreed that when and if the time came that they had 
to put the plan into effect, the documents could only show what the 
working scheme would be. The inherent weakness in making such 
plans was the fact of their not being operative in time to meet the 
attack. Neither the local commanders nor Washington took steps 
to make them operative as they could have done. (R. 1606-1607, 
1609.) However, unity of command in Washington would have been 
a condition precedent to unity of command in Hawaii. 

9. Estimate of the Situation. — The best indication of what the 
Army and Navy recognized as the primary danger to the defense 
of Hawaii is found in the estimate of the situation in the implement- 
ing, operating plans signed by Bellinger and Martin on April 9, 
1941, in execution of the Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941. 
This estimate was prophetic in its accuracy and called for vigorous 
implementation to meet the worst the enemy could do, as estimated 
in this document. The document says : 

b. In the past Orange (Japan) has never preceded hostile action by a declara- 
tion of war. 

c. A successful, sudden raid against our [98] ships and naval installa- 
tions on Oahu might prevent effective defensive action by our forces in the Western 
Pacific for a long period. 

d. It appears possibly that Orange (Japan) submarines and/or an Orange 
fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from 
our Intelligence Service. ... II (a) Orange might send into this area one 
or more submarines, and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of car- 
riers supported by fast cruisers. . . . Ill (b) It appears that the most 
likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is 
believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from 
one or more carriers, which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. . . . 
(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would be delivered 
as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it 
might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow 
to start. . . . (Roberts Record 556-D-F.) 

It is also significant that in this estimate of the situation it was 
stated : 

Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable 
undiscovered surface force, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a 
carrier. (Roberts Record 556-F.) 

It will be recalled that a submarine appeared off the entrance to 
Pearl Harbor and was sunk at about 6:45 a. m. on December 7th, 
but was not reported by the Navy to the Army. Such a report would 
have been a sure warning of an hour before the attack of what was 
coming as recognized by paragraph 3 (d) of the Estimate of the Situ- 
ation, forming a part of the Martin-Bellinger Plan. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 73 

In reviewing the situation as Short knew it in order to judge of the 
information that he had upon which to premise a successful course 
of action, it is necessary both to take into consideration the back- 
ground in the first chapter and of the official communications and 
official actions of those estimates [99'\ of the situation at the 
time. 

It will be recalled that Ambassador Grew had warned the State 
Department on January 27th by wire of the possibility of an air 
attack upon Pearl Harbor. This possibility had already been appar- 
ently thoroughly considered by the War and Navy Departments, and 
it had been concluded that that was the strongest danger to Hawaii. 
In early January, Admiral Richardson, with the concurrence of Ad- 
miral Kimmel and General Herron, had written at length to the Navy 
Department on this subject, with particular reference to the weak- 
nesses of the Army defenses against air attack. This letter and the 
resulting correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and the 
Secretary of War must be read in the light of the Joint Army and 
Navy Defense Plan of 1935, which places upon the Army the follow- 
ing mission : 

6. Army — Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea and air forces and against 
hostile sympathizers. 

General Marshall testified, however, as follows : 

We anticipated, beyond a doubt, Japanese movement in Indo-China and the 
Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay Peninsula. We anticipated also an assault 
on the Philippines. We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack on 
Hawaii ; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern 
planes, that the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazard- 
ous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack. (R. 9.) 

As a result. Secretary of Navy Knox wrote to Secretary of War 
Stimson on January 24, 1941, in part as follows : 

My Deae Me. Sbcretaey : The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl 
Harbor and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed 
study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. 
This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the 
situation with respect to Japan, and by reports [iOO] from abroad of 
successful bombing and torpedo-plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war 
eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be 
initiated by a surprise attack on the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor. 

In my opinion, the inherent possibility of a major disaster to the fleet or naval 
base warrant taking every step as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the 
joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character men- 
tioned above. 

The dangers envisioned in their order of importance and probability are con- 
sidered to be : 

(1) Air bombing attack. 

(2) Air torpedo-plane attack. 

(3) Sabotage. 

(4) Submarine attack. 

(5) Mining. 

(6) Bombardment by gunfire. 

Defense for all but the first two appears to have been provided for satis- 
factorily. 

It will be noted that an anxiety of Secretary Knox was as to air 
attack and that he was satisfied that precautions as to sabotage were 
sufficient by the Army. It will be recalled that Admiral Richardson's 
letter stimulating this letter of Secretary Knox was based on Richard- 
son's personal inspection and knowledge of the Army situation. 



74 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Secretary ICiiox concludes his letter with the following recommen- 
dations to the Army : 

Assign the highest priority to the Increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft 
artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii . . . that 
the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readi- 
ness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against 
Pearl Harbor. 

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu 
for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long 
as the present uncertainty exists. 

So this letter clearly outlined the considered judgment [-?^-?] 
then existing that the most serious threat was an air attack and that 
all means should be taken to implement against it. 

On February 7, 1941, the Secretary of War replied to this letter of 
the Secretary of the Navy under the subject "Air Defense of Pearl 
Harbor, Hawaii," and said : 

In reply to your letter of January 24, 1941, regarding the possibility of sur- 
prise attacks upon the fleet or naval base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express 
complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and of the urgency of 
our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort , . . 

(6) V^ith respect to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding 
a copy of your letter and of this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian 
Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities 
in making those measures effective. 

On the same day another communication was addressed to General 
Short, and this time by General Marshall : 

Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the defi- 
ciencies of Navy materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred spe- 
cifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns. 

The risk of sabotage and tlie risk involved in a surprise raid and by submarine, 
constitute the real peril of tlie situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing 
threat in the Hawaiian Islands, as long as we have air superiority. 

And not satisfied with this first letter. General Marshall on March 
5, 1941, again addressed General Short, saying: 

I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment with i-egard to defense from air attack. Tlie establishment of a satisfac- 
tory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first 
priority. 

And to that General Short replied on March 15, 1941, at length 
with reference to the vulnerability of Hawaii to air attack and the 
measures being taken to meet this situation. [lOB] He points 
out that antisabotage measures and suppression of local disorders 
could be handled by battalions of National Guard, which come from 
the islands. The rest of the letter dealt with defenses against air 
attacks. His estimate of the situation was : 

The most serious situation with reference to au air attack is the vulnerability 
of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack. 

Short realized the necessity for the dispersion of planes, the use of 
emergency fields on the outlying islands and the preparation of 
bunkers to protect the dispersed planes, as he discusses such a problem 
at length and its solution. (R. 21-25.) 

On April 14, 1941, Short wrote the Chief of Staff sending him the 
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and 14th 
Naval District. Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure ; 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 75 

Agreement signed by the Commander of tJie Hawaiian Air Force and 
Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above 
agi-eement, and Field Orders No. 1-NS (Naval Security) putting into 
effect for the Army the provisions of the Joint Agreement. ( R. 26-27. ) 
He also stated that Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch and 
himself felt all steps had been taken 

which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Forces to act together with 
the unity of command as the situation requires. ( R. 27. ) '* 

This statement was in error at the tune it was made, as the agree- 
ments could not be implemented for lack of means to do so in any 
material way and there was no unity of command, none [103^ 
proposed and none was ever put into effect under these agreements. 
Open hostilities were necessary to make the agreement operative. 

This communication was acknowledged by General Marshall on 
May 5th. 

This brings us to the estimate of the air situation thus transmitted 
to the Chief of Staff on April 1-tth as indicating the best judgment in 
estimating the situation by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger 
and approved by General Short and Admirals Kimmel and Bloch. 

It is a familiar premise of military procedure in estimating a situa- 
tion to select the most dangerous and disastrous type of attach the 
enemy may make and dei^ote your 'primary efforts to meeting this most 
serious of the attacks. (R. 1121, 2662.) In the present instance, it 
was clearly recognized, not only in the foregoing correspondence, but 
in this formal joint estimate by the Army and Navj^ of the situation, 
that the most serious attack to he met hy the Army and Navy was cm 
air attack 'by Japan. Herewith is the following statement from that 
estimate signed by the Army and Navy through General Martin and 
Admiral Bellinger and approved by Kimmel, Short and Bloch. This 
estimate is prophetic in its accuracy and uncanny in its analysis of 
the enemy's intention. 

2. Assumptions : 

* * * « ■ * * « 

c. The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of 
hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach within range of Oahu where 
they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or attack on Oahu. 

* * * * * * * 

\_10Ii^ e. Our most likely enemy, Orange, can probably employ 

a maximum of six carriers against Oahu. 

« « * * * « * 

(?.*** The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan 
of action open to the enemy. 

2. a. The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and 
the action upon lohich we should hase our plans of operation., is the 
early morning attack in which the enemy must make good the 
following time schedule. 

(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the 
day before attack. 

(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the 
day of the attack. 



Excerpts from letter dated April 14, 1941 (R. 21\ 



76 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

4. * * * The sole purpose of the existence of the military es- 
tablishment on Oahu, ground, and air, is for the defense of Oahu as 
an outlying naval base. * * * 

It has been said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the 
strongest outlying naval base in the world and could, therefore, 
withstand indefinitely attacks and attempted invasions. Plans based 
on such convictions are inherently weak and tend to create a false 
sense of security with the consequent unpreparedness for offensive 
action. 

[105] C. CRITICAL PERIODS OCTOBER 1 TO DECEMBER 7, 1941 

1. Vital Messages. — ^In view of the foregoing, the estimate of the 
situation showed that an all-out attack by air was the judgment of 
the best military and naval minds in Hawaii. Under established 
military doctrine, that called for preparation for this worst eventual- 
ity. (R. 436-437) Short so admitted that this was the correct 
procedure. (R 436-437) 

The contrast between the written statements of many of the re- 
sponsible actors in this matter prior to Pearl Harbor and after 
Pearl Harbor, as to their estimate of an air attack by Japan on 
Oahu, is startling. 

The Secretary of the Navy wrote on January 24, 1941, to the 
Secretary of War: 

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are 
considered to be: 

(1) air bombing attack. 

(2) air torpedo attack. 

(3) sabotage. (Roberts Record, 1824-1825.) 

However, when Secretary of the Navy arrived in Hawaii a few 
days after December 7, following the Japanese attack, Admiral Pye 
testified his (Secretary Knox) first remark was: 

No one in Washington exipected an attack — even Kelly Turner. 

Admiral Kelly Turner was in the War Plans Division of the Navy 
and was the most aggressive-minded of all. (R. 1070.) 

General Marshall, in a letter to General Short on February 7, 1941, 
said: 

The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid 'by air and 
submarine constitute the real perils of the situation. (R. 17.) 

[106] On October 7, 1944, General Marshall testified before 

this Board : 

We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack upon Hawaii. (R. 9.) 

It will be recalled that Admiral Bellinger and General Martin 
were responsible for the Joint Estimate, particularly with reference 
to air, and that this was based upon the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Fron- 
tier Defense Plan. In that estimate they put attack by air as the 
primary threat against Hawaii. 

Contrast what Admiral Bellinger said on this record: 

If anyone knew the attack was coming, why, I assume they would have been 
in a functioning status. (R. 1626.) 

Contrast what General Martin said : 

I didn't see any more danger from attack than General Short did, that is 
from a surprise attack with the information we had. (R. 1827.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 77 

Admiral Kimmel said : 

We had no reason to believe, from any intelligence we had, that the Japanese 
were going to make an air attack on Pearl Harbor or even that any attack was 
going to be made on Pearl Harbor. (R. 1771.) 

The foregoing statement by Kimmel was in 1944 before this Board, 
whereas the joint agreements he entered into with the Army and 
the instructions from the Secretary of the Navy as well as his own 
recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy show that an air at- 
tack was the principal concern. 

Likewise, Admiral Bloch, who signed the Joint Air Agreement 
based on the air estimate of Bellinger and Martin, testified as follows : 

General Frank. "Was the attack a complete surprise to you? 
Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir. (R. 1518.) 

General Short was the signer of the agreements specifying [107'\ 
the air attack as a primary threat and he had received the Marshall 
letter of February 7, 1941, and similar letters of General Marshall, 
and had replied setting forth in letters that the air attack was his 
primary concern. 

Witness what General Short says on this record to the contrary : 

General Grtjnert. "Was the attack of December 7 a complete surprise to you? 
General Shokt. It was. (R. 536.) 

We must therefore conclude that the responsible authorities, the 
Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Staff in Washington, down 
to the Generals and Admirals in Hawaii, all expected an air attack 
before Pearl Harbor. As a general statement, when testifying after 
the Pearl Harbor attack, they did not expect it. 

Apparently the only person who was not surprised was the Secre- 
tary of War, Mr. Stimson, who testified : 

Well, I was not surprised. (R. 4072.) 

Short's Standard Operating Procedure, which he had formulated 
with his staff in July and finally put into complete form on November 
5, 1941, (E. 333) had been sent to the Chief of Staff. (K. 431.) 
General JSIarshall wrote General Short on October 10th that it had 
just come to his attention and that upon an examination of the Stand- 
ard Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department, dated July 
14, containing those three alerts. 

I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. (R. 29.) 

He objected to the assignment to the Hawaiian Air Force of the 
mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all \.108'\ airfields 
on Oaliu against sabotage and ground attacks, and with providing a 
provisional battalion of 500 men for military police duty. He thereby 
clearly warned General Short that the air force should not be used for 
antisabotage, for General Marshall further said in his letter : 

This (the action of using the air force for antisabotage duty) seems inconsistent 
with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii, particulaiiy in view 
of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have been 
provided. (R. 29.) 

General Short replied on October 14, as follows : 

The plan was to use them (Air Force personnel) for guarding certain essential 
utilities. . . . However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just 
passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon. 
79716 — 16— Ex. 157 6 



78 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall again wrote General Short on the 28th of October, 
and in it he clearly indicated to Short that he should change his alert 
plan (of which there was no proof that he ever did) and only use the 
Air Force for guard during the last stage when the Air Force as such 
had been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. General Marshall 
further indicated that no potential ground duty should be used as an 
excuse for not continuing the specific Air Force training, saying : 

I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the 
assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile lauding effected. 
This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for 
ground defense and afford a means of Indoctrinating them in ground defense 
tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be subordinated to their own 
specific training requirements. 

It would appear that the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on 
technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion program 
and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned. 
(R. 30.) 

[109] Here, again, General Marshall cautioned Short to use his 
Air Force for its normal purposes and not upon antisabotage guard 
duty and emphasizes that the use of the Air Force must be free and 
unfettered. 

On October 16 Short received the following Navy message : 

The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the C.N.O. which I have been 
directed to pass to you. Quote : "Japanese Cabinet resignation creates a grave 
situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be anti-American and 
extremely nationalistic. If the Konoye Cabinet remains it will operate under a 
new mandate which will not include reapproacliment with the United States. 
Either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since 
Britain and the United States are held responsible by Japan for her present situa- 
tion there is also a possibility that Japan may attack those two powers. In view 
of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory 
deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative 
action against .Japan." (R. 279.) 

On October 18, 1941, a radiogram was sent by the War Department 
to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, reading as fol- 
lows: 

Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your informa- 
tion. Tension between the United States and Japan remain strained but no 
abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent. (R. 4258.) 

This message was dated October 18, 1941, according to the Gerow 
statement. Exhibit 63, but in the copy of communications produced by 
General Marshall, the same message was dated October 20, 1941, as 
#266. 

On October 28, General Marshall wrote General Short as to details 
of the training of the air corps personnel. 

On November 24, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, a message that Short thinks he saw, 
reading as follows : 

[110] There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome 
of negotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements 
of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military 
force is, in our opinion, that a surprise aggressive movement in any 
direction^ including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possi- 
bility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and 
requests action, * * * inform senior Army officers in respective 
areas utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already 
tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. (R. 4258.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 79 

On November 26, 1941, the following secret cablegram was sent to 
the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department : 

It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on special 
photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Caroline Group while simul- 
taneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location 
and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps, and naval vessels 
including submarines XXX before they depart Honolulu insure that both 
B-24's are fully supplied with ammunition for guns. (R. 4259.) 

On November 27 the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, a message which was delivered by the 
liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, to G-3 of General Short, which reads 
as follows : 

Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an 
effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to 
make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition 
against either the Philippines. Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is 
indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization 
of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in prepara- 
tion for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 only. Guanij Samoa and 
Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against 
sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform 
naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo. 
(R. 1775.) 

And on the same day the Chief of Staff sent the following radio 
to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department : 

[111] No. 472. "Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to 
all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Govern- 
ment might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpre- 
dictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat 
cannot, be avoided, the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This 
policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action 
that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are 
directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem 
necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to 
alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should 
hostilities occur, you will carry out task assigned in Rainbow Five as far as 
they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information 
to minimum essential officers." (R. 280-281, 4259-4260.) '° 

This completes the pattern of the communications and information 
that was in Short's possession when he made the fatal decision to 
elect the antisabotage Alert No. 1 and not select either Alert No. 2 
or No. 3 which would have constituted the defense against the most 
serious attack that could be made upon him in view of the previous 
estimate of the situation and warnings he had received from all quar- 
ters of an air raid.^^ 

On the same day, November 27, 1944, but after Ms decision to select 
Alert No. 1 and the sending of a reply to the message. Short received 
from G-2, War Department, through liis G-2, Hawaiian Department, 
the following message : 

Advise only the C. G. and the C. of S. It appears that the conference with 
the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage 
probable. Also possiWiiies that hostiUties may begin. (R. 4260.) 

'° A full discussion of the message follows. 

" Significant naval messages from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in- 
Chief Pacific Fleet, under dates of December 3, 4, and 6, 1941, relating to the destruction 
of codes and secret documents by Japanese consulates and instructions regarding destruc- 
tion of similar means of our own evidentl.v never reached General Short. (R. 424-42.5.) 



80 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[11^] Short was asked what were his reasons for his action. The 
following colloquy is important : 

General Fkank. I would like to develop this thought for just a minute. This 
is in consideration generally of military operations. In estimating the situation 
with which a military commander is confronted, our teachings in the military 
establishment generally have been along the lines of taking all infoi-mation that 
is available, evaluating it and using it as a guide. Is that correct? 

General Short. Yes. 

General Frank. That is in accordance with our Leavenworth teaching, our 
War College teaching and our actual practice in the organization. Now, in com- 
ing to a decision on military disposition and general practice in the Army, Army 
teachings, as perhaps Army tradition, indicate that a commander should prepare 
for enemy action of what character? 

General Short. The worst. 

General Frank. The worst. Now, can you tell me why that was not done in 
this instance? 

General Short. Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not 
believe that there was going to be anything moi-e than sabotage ; and, as I have 
explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air Corps par- 
ticularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at that time that 
we couldn't meet the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also 
the fact that they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an 
influence because when I reported action and there was no comment that my 
action was too little or too much I was a hundred ipercent convinced that they 
agreed with it. They had a lot more information than I had. (R. 436-437.) 

it * ^ -j^ ^ !¥ 

General Feank. All right. Now, you have given considerable testimony about 
how you arrived at your conclusion of the adequateness of Alert No. 1, and in 
general may we say that you came to this conclusion as a result of your faith in 
the effectiveness of naval operations and the influence of Naval opinion and to 
a certain extent of the line of thought as a result of what was contained in 
messages between the 16th of November and the 27th? 

General Short. Yes, sir. And that was later confirmed by, may I add, actions 
of the War Department in not replying to my message and stating they wanted 
more, and in sending planes without any ammunition. 

[113] General Frank. All right. Did you feel that the wording of mes- 
sages coming in there to you indicated an effort toward a supervisory control? 

General Short. I thought that it indicated very definitely two things : That they 
wanted me to be extremely careful and not have an incident with the Japanese 
population that would arouse Japan, and the other thing was not to violate ter- 
ritorial laws in my eagerness to carry out defensive measures. 

General Frank. The question has arisen in the minds of the Board as to why, 
when that air estimate anticipated just exactly what happened, steps were not 
taken to meet it. I assume that the answer 

General Short. You mean the estimate of the year — you mean the year before? 

General Frank. No. The Martin-Bellinger estimate. 

General Short. Oh. 

General Frank. Of 1941. 

General Short. Yes. 

General Frank. I assume the answer is the answer that you gave to the ques- 
tion asked two or three questions back. 

General Short. Yes. (R. 471-472.) 

General Short within an hour after receiving the message from the 
Chief of Staff of November 27 ordered the No. 1 Alert, which con- 
tinued up to the attack on December 7. (R. 282.) His message in reply 
to General Marshall was : 

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy. Reuard 
four seventy two Nov. 27th. (R. 38, 286.) 

The indorsements so appearing on this reply are as follows : In the 
handwriting of the Secretary of War there appear the words "Noted 
HLS", written in pen ; "Noted — Chief of Staff", stamped by a rubber 



REPORT OF ARAIY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 81 

stamp on the message without initials; and a rubber stamp "Noted, 
WPD" (in red ink) followed by pen mitials "L.T.G." (R. 38, 4287.) 

[ii4] -^1^ examination of the wire received from General 
MacArthur, in response to a similar message sent to General Short,^^ 
shows the same indorsements, including "Xoted — Chief of Staff," 
with a rubber stamp but no initials. However, this message has 
written in General ]\Iarshairs handwriting the words "To Secretary 
of War, GCM."' This indorsement does not appear on the following 
message that came from Short. (See General Marshall's explanation 
below.) 

The message from Short to the Chief of Staff indicates that it was 
the "Action Copy'' as noted in pencil at its foot "OCS/18136-120." 

When questioned about this vital message, the Chief of Staff said : 

General Russeix. Subsequently General Short sent a reply to that message in 
which he refers to the November 27 message from you over your signature by 
number. That message of General Short reporting action merely states : 

"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy REURAD 
four seven two twenty-seventh." 

The original of General Short's report indicates that it was initialed by Sec- 
retary Stimson and has a stamp "Noted — Chief of Staff," and was initialed by 
General Gerow. 

The Board has been interested to know the procedure in your office as it relates 
to stamping documents which do not bear your signature. Does that indicate 
that you did or did not see those messages? 

[115] General Mabshall. Well, I think if you look at the preceding message 
from the Pihilippines you will find that same rubber stamp on there, "Noted — 
Chief of StafE." 

General Russeix. That is true. 

General Mabshaix. And you will find it at the top of the message. You will 
find my initials. 

General Russell. Yes ; I do see them. 

General Maeshall. But not on the other one. I do not knovf about that. 
I do not know what the explanation is. I initial them all ; that is my practice. 
One goes to the particular section that has the responsibility for working on it, 
which in this case was the War Plans Division, now the Operations Division, 
and then one comes to me. I initial it and then it goes out to the record. Where 
I think the Secretary of War ought to see it, and if he is not in the distribution, 
I check it to him. iMiere I think there is somebody else that should be notified, 
I indicate on the face of my copy who else is to be informed of this. As a matter 
of routine one agency is charged with the execution of the matter pertaining to 
the message. But in this particular case I do not know. I have no recollection 
at all. 

General Russell. The fact that it reached the Secretary of War's ofBce and 
was by him initialed — would that or not indieate that you had sent it up to him 
or that it might have been sent up to him by someone else? 

General ^Iabshall. In this connection I invite your attention to the fact that 
this was filed behind a message from General MacArthur. I note that I did not 
initial it. They evidently came in together. 

General Russell. If they were together you might or might not have seen 
them? 

General IMaeshall. I have no recollection at all. The presumption would be 
that I had seen it. (R. 38-40.) 

No one of these persons, or any of their subordinates, have any 
record, either internally in the War Department or externally, of any 
message to Short showing the slightest exception taken to his course of 
action. It will be noted as to the Chief of Staff, that while he did not 

'- On November 27tli the War Department sent messages similar to one sent to General 
Short, to MacArthur in the Philippines, Andrews in Panama, and DeWitt on the West 
Coast, each of which called for a report of measures taken. All replies except that from 
Short indicated the taking of measures of greater security than those envisaged in the 
Hawaiian Alert No. 1. 



82 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

initial the Short reply, he did initial the top message from General 
[J 16] Mac Arthur on the same subject, and apparently they both 
went together to the Secretary of War, as they had come at substan- 
tially the same time in answer to the same message from the Chief 
of Staff. The inference from General Marshall's testimony is that 
possibly he only initialed the top one, but that is speculation, as he 
said, 

I do not know what the explanation is. (R. 39.) 

2. Analysis of the Situation from NoveTriber 21^ to Novetriber 27 — 
The vital message of November 27, #472, heretofore quoted as having 
been sent by the Chief of vStaff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian 
Department, can be understood and its proper place in this narrative 
determined only when we know the events which led up to its being 
sent; when we know by whom drafted and by what procedure the 
drafting was accomplished ; and the circumstances under which it was 
forwarded. Its relationship to surrounding circumstances and other 
documents must also be understood before we proceed to analyze the 
message and the meaning of each part of it.^^ 

[117] The War Council met on the 25th of November 1941. 
Fortunately, we have the advantage of the contemporaneous diary of 
the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who has pictured in his diary with 
great clarity and precision the events as they transpired, which were 
material to this issue. This diary reads : 

At 9 :30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull showed 
us the proposal for a three months' truce which he was going to lay before the 
Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I 
thought, as we read it, but I don't think that there is any chance of the Japanese 
acceipting it because it was so drastic. . . . We were an hour and a half with 
Hull, and then I went back to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall. Then 
at twelve o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half 
past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There 
the President brought up the relations with the Japanejse. He brought up the 
event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as — perhaps next Monday, 
for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the 
question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem. (R. 
4050-4051.) 

This was the end of the discussions on the 25th of November, 1941 
(R. 4050-4051), with the exception that when the Secretary of War 
returned to his office, he found a G-2 message that a Japanese expe- 
dition had started southward, south of Formosa; and he at once called 
Mr. Hull and sent him copies of the report and a copy to the President. 

On the following day, November 26, 1941, the diary continues : 

Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his 
mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day 
(the 25th) to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and to tell them 
that he had no other proposition at all. (R. 4051-4052.^ 

'3 The Secretary of War has cleared some ambiguity in this record, and an ambiguity in the 
White Papers l)y defining with precision the War Council. There were really three bodies 
that were loosely referred to from time to time by this title. The true War Council was 
tliat established under the National Defense Act of 1920, solely within the War Depart- 
ment. The second body was that created by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and the 
Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, when they entered into their positions, by which they 
srathered together at regular intervals with the Secretary of State, and sometimes with 
General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The third group was that which joined the President 
at fairly regular intervals, consisting of the President, the Secretary of State. Secretar.v 
of War, Secretary of the Navy, and from time to time General ^larshall and Admiral 
Stark, and occasionally General Arnold. (R. 4041-4042-4043-4044, 4047-4048, 5-6.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 83 

There is some proof that, before General Marshall left Washington 
for North Carolina on maneuvers on the afternoon of [i^5] the 
26th, he had drafted in the rough a proposed message to General Short 
apprising him of the situation as it was developed. General Gerow, 
Chief of the War Plans Division, testifies that he believes he discussed 
such a draft with General Marshall. (R. 4244-424G.) 

General Marshall was away on the 27th and returned on the 28th, 
at which time he saw the complete draft of the message of the 27th 
together with the report from General Gerow of the events during 
the 27th which we are now about to relate. (R. 36-37.) 

Before the closing of the story of the 26th, Mr. Stimson defines it 

as: 

The 26th was the day he (Hull) told me he was in doubt whether he would go 
on with it. (R. 4051-4052-4053.) 

What the Secretary of State appears to have done was to have his 
conference with the Japanese Ambassadors and to hand to them the 
"Ten Points". As Ambassador Grew testifies, the Japanese considered 
these "Ten Points" to be an ultimatum. (R. 4221.) Whether or not 
the Secretary of State considers now that this is not an ultimatum 
(see his letter of September 28, 1943) , nevertheless, the Japanese did so 
consider it and acted upon it as such by notifying the task force, as the 
evidence shows was waiting at Tankan Bay, to start the movement 
against Hawaii, and it did move out on the 27th-28th of November. 
As well put by Ambassador Grew : 

Naturally, they (the Japanese) had all their plans made for years beforehand, 
in the case of war with America. They were very foresighted in those respects, 
and they had their plans drawn up probably right down to the last detail ; but 
as for the moment at which the button was touched, I don't myself know exactly 
how long it would have taken their carriers to get from where they were to the 
point at which [119] they attacked Pearl Harbor; but it has always 
been my belief that it was about the time of the receipt of Mr. Hull's memorandum 
of November 26 that the button was touched. (R. 4215) 

On the morning of the 27th of November 1941, Mr. Stimson's diary 
reads : 

The first thing in the morning, I called up Hull to find out what his final 
decision had been with the Japanese — whether he had handed them the new 
proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggestetl 
yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken 
the whole matter off. As he put it, "I have washed my hands of it, and it is 
now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy." 

Then the Secretary of War states : 

I then called up the President and talked with him about it. 

He (Stimson) then approved the orders presented to him by Genei-al 
Arnold to move two large planes over the Mandated Islands to take 
pictures. (R. 4053.) 

The Secretary related that General Marshall "is down at the ma- 
neuvers today," and "Knox and Admiral Stark came over and con- 
ferred with me and General Gerow." At this point he says : 

A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the Presi- 
dent was examined, and the question of the need for further time was discussed. 
(R. 4054.) 

This is the memorandum asking the President not to precipitate 
an ultimatum with the Japanese and to give the Army and Navy more 



84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

time within which to prepare ; but it was too late, as the die had been 
cast by the Secretary of State in handing the "Ten Points" counter- 
proposals to the Japanese on the previous day, which was, as the 
Secretary of State remarked, "washing his hands of the matter". 

[120] When Ambassador Grew so testified he apparently did 
not know of the very complete evidence in this record of the move- 
ment of the Japanese task force starting on the 27th-28th from Tankan 
Bay to the attack. Mr. Hull's statement on this subject is of interest : 

I communicated on November 26 to the Japanese spokesmen — who were 
urgently calling for a reply to their proposals of November 20 — what became 
the last of this Government's counter-proposals. ... It will thus be seen 
that the document under reference did not constitute in any sense an ultima- 
tum." (Letter from Secretary of State to the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
September 28, 1944.) 

3. The Drafting of the Message #4.72 of the 27th.— We now turn 
to the drafting of the message of the 27th as related by the Secretary 
of War, Mr. Stimson, and other witnesses. The first meeting was 
between Mr. Stimson, General Bryden and General Gerow. (K.. 4239- 
4240.) A second meeting between Secretary Stimson, Secretary 
Knox, Admiral Stark and General Gerow was held later in the day. 
(K. 4240.) As the diary of Mr. Stimson says : 

But the main question at this meeting was over t.ie message thjat we shall 
send to MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasi-alert or the first signal 
for an alert; and now, on talking with the President this morning over the 
telephone I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final 
alert, namely, that he should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him 
how the situation was. (R. 4055.) 

To continue with the diary : 

So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him (Mr. 
Stimson here verbally testified — "We were sending the messages to four people, 
not only MacArthur, but Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska". So Gerow and Stark 
and I went over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully, 
finally got it into shape, and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull 
I got the exact statement from him of what the situation was. (R. 4056.) 

[121] The Secretary of War then stated : 

The thing that I was anxious to do was to be sure that we represented with 
correctness and accuracy what the situation was between the two governments, 
and this part I got fiom Hull, as I said, by telephone, to be sure I was right. 
(R. 4056.) 

The two sentences which the Secretary of War apparently wrote in 
the message of the 27th were these : 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes 
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come 
liack and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile 
action possible at any moment." 

The Secretary continues his testimony : 

That was what I was interested in getting out at the time, because that had 
been a decision which I had heard from the President, as I have just read, and 
I had gotten the exact details of the situation between the State Department 
and the envoys from iNIr. Hull ; and, as I pointed out here, the purpose in my 
mind, as I quote my talk with the President, was to send a final alert, namely, 

'^ However, General Gerow (R. 4247) testified that he believed that the sentence 
".Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment" was 
insprted by him or Oolonel Bundy. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 85 

that the man should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him how the 
situation was here. (R. 4056.) 

The task that the Secretary of War was engaged upon was normally 
that of the Chief of Staff. As Mr. Stimson said : 

That was why I was in this matter. Marshall was away. I had had a 
decision from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as my business 
to do what I of coui'se normally do ; to see that the message as sent was framed 
in accordance with the facts. (R. 4057.) 

The message to Hawaii now under consideration of the 27th has 
endorsed upon it, "Shown to the Secretary of War". (R. 4057.) 
[1^^] The Secretary testified : 

I went over very carefully the whole message. . . . And I saw it after it 
was finally drawn, as shown by the memorandum there. (R. 4058.) 

With reference to the other meeting that took place on the 27th in 
the drafting of this message, #472, General Gerow's testimony is that 
at the meeting with the Secretary of War the first two sentences, re- 
ported by the Secretary of War as being drafted by him, were sen- 
tences which were softened by instructions or information furnished 
by the Secretary of State in a conversation over the telephone with 
the Secretary of War the morning of the 27th. (R. 4247.) General 
Gerow testifies that the sentences so softened originally read 

Negotiatons with Japan have been terminated. (R. 4270.) 

The sentence, 

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any mo- 
ment 

was put in by General Gerow or Colonel Bundy. (R. 4247.) 
The sentence, 

If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that 
Japan commit the first overt act, 

was thus phrased because as Gerow said he testified before the Roberts 
Commission : 

We pointed out in the message the possible danger of attack and directed 
reconnaissance and other necessary measures without fully carrying into effect 
the provisions of this plan, which would have required hostile action against 
Japan, and the President had definitely stated that he wanted Japan to commit 
the first overt act. (R. 4251-4252.) 

The next sentence : 

This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course 
of action that might jeopardize your defense 

was inserted by General Gerow or by Colonel Bundy. The [12S] 
purpose of this language was to insure freedom of action to the Com- 
manding General of the Hawaiian Department. (R. 4252.) 

General Gerow said that there had been no discussion of the am- 
biguity of the message or its apparent conflicting instructions as a 
"Do-or-Don't" message. (R. 4252.) 

He said that nothing in the message told General Short about the 
relations between the American Government and the Japanese Em- 
pire. (R. 4256.) The sole information passed on to General Short 
by the War Department from October 20th to November 27th about 
what the soldier calls "enemy information" w^as in this particular mes- 



86 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sage. (R. 4263.) The only previous message that Short had had 
of the international situation from the War Department was on Oc- 
tober 20, which read : ^^ ^® 

[i2^] Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your 
information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained 
but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent. (R. 4264.) 

The sentence : 

This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action 
that might jeopardize your defense 

was put in by the War Plans Division. ( R. 4271.) 
With reference to the phrase, 

You are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem 
necessary, 

apparently at that time no investigation was made by the War De- 
partment to ascertain just what means General Short had of conduct- 
ing the reconnaissance; but aside from this fault, the fact is that 
General Short did have some planes plus radar to conduct a degree 
of reconnaissance. This the record shows he did not fully and gain- 
fully employ these means for this purpose. General Short was re- 
called at substantially the end of all the testimony and questioned 
on this point. Short's position on this message was that the direc- 
tion to him to conduct reconnaissance was a futile directive and that 
it indicated to him that the man who wrote the message was entirely 
unfamiliar with the fact, 

that the Navy was responsible for long distance reconnaissance. 

He said this was 

in spite of the fact that the Chief of Staff had approved that plan that provided 
for that, whoever wrote the message was not familiar with it, or it had slipped 
nis mind that it was the Navy and not the Army that was responsible. (R. 4436- 
4437.; 

He said when questioned as to why he did not call attention to this 
matter in his reply to the War Department : 

I think if the War Department had intended to abrogate tbat agreement, 
they would have told me so. 

[125] He said he based everything on the responsibility of the 
Navy for long distance reconnaissance, because it had been approved 
by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. (R. 4438.) 

He could not explain why he failed to use his own reconnaissance 
aircraft even though the agreement was not actually in effect at that 
time or the War Department had overlooked the agreement because 
he says, as elsewhere admitted, that the Army and Navy agreement 
was not to go into effect until hostilities, or other equivalent, had 
occurred. His reconnaissance planes were still under his control and 
could have been used by him to carry out this direct order in this 
message. 

^"However, General Gerow testified (R. 4258) that there was a Navy Department 
message of November 24th which contained information of the Japanese situation and 
indicated possible Japanese aggressive action and which directed the Commander-in-Chief 
Pacific Fleet to inform General Short of its contents. 

^"^ Information gleaned by the Board indicates that G-2, War Department, on November 
3, 1941, sent a letter to G-2, Hawaiian Department, in which was set forth the prophecy 
of war between Japan and the United States in December 1941 or Februarv 1942. as made 
by a prominent Japanese. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 87 

For instance, the following colloquy occurred: 

H2. General GRUNERr. Yon might clear np two additional points. First, we 
will take up the point that you have brought out, there, that the War Depart- 
ment had evidently overlooked the agreement that your command had with 
the Navy, as to distant reconnaissance. Did you call the War Deiiartment's 
attention to the fact, when you were ordered to make reconnaissance, about 
that agreement? 

General Shoet. I did not, but I reported to them exactly what I was doing. 

63. General Geunkrt. Then you considered your report the answer to that? 
General Short. Tliey called on me for a report. If they had not called on 

me for a report, I think the situation would have been quite different; but 
they definitely told me to "report action taken," which I did; and I heard 
nothing further from them. 

64. General Grunert. We have had testimony before the Board, from a member 
of the Navy, calling the Board's attention to the fact that this Joint Hawaiian 
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was not operative until an emergency arose, and 
apparently the emergency, or the imminency of [126] such an emergency, 
was not agreed to, locally, to make the provisions operative. With that under 
standing, was it the Navy's business to conduct long-distance reconnaissance, 
prior to such an emergency? 

General Short. If the emergency existed, it was their business ; if it did not 
exist, there was no necessity. 

65. General Grunekt. Then, when do you judge the emergency came about? 
General Short. It very definitely came about, at 7 : 55 on the morning of the 

7th. (R. 4438-44.39.) 

This is sufficient in itself to clearly demonstrate that Short was 
not taking the action which he could and should have taken of 
either more fully carrying out the order, or of specifically and defi- 
nitely reporting the complete circumstances of his inability to do so. 
He did not call the attention of the War Department to what was an 
apparent misunderstanding on its part. He was relying upon the 
Navy reconnaissance without any reasonable energetic inquiry to as- 
certain the correctness of his assumption that the Navy was conduct- 
ing long distance reconnaissance. He has no adequate explanation 
for not using the radar 24 hours a day (which was in full operation 
Sunday prior to December 7) after getting the message of the 27th, 
and which was used continuously after December 7. (R. 4441-4444.) 
For some time after December 7th the situation as to the dearth of 
spare parts was the same as before December 7th. 

The Secretary of War did not know the authorship of the part, 

Report measures taken * * * Limit dissemination * * * to mini- 
mum essential officers. (R. 4071.) 

He said he knew it was there and he understood it. 

There were two conferences with the Secretary of War, one [J^7^ 
at 9 : 30 the morning of the 27th, and one later in the day. At the 
first conference, the Secretary of War, General Bryden, Deputy Chief 
of Staff, and General Gerow were there. At that time General Gerow 
received instructions with reference to the preparation of the message. 
He then consulted Admiral Stark. (R. 4239-4240.) The second 
conference took place later with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and 
Mr. Stimson. (R. 4240.) General Bryden has testified that although 
he was Deputy Chief of Staff, and Acting Chief of Staff in General 
Marshall's absence, he does not remember the message nor the con- 
ference thereon. (R. 900.) While the Chief of Staff reviewed the 
message of the 27th on the 28th, it is unforunate that during this 
critical period he was off on maneuvers in North Carolina and missed 



88 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the drafting of the message which was the composite work of a num- 
ber of people, which may account for its confusing and conflicting 
tenor. Possibly had he been present, the Marshall-Stark memoran- 
dum might have reached the President in time to have influenced the 
momentous decisions of November 26th. 

It is equally obvious that the November 27th message was the only 
message that attempted to translate the long and tempestuous course 
of events terminating in the counter-proposals on the 26th of Novem- 
ber to Japan. 

No other picture of the situation was given to Short, except in this 
message. It is apparent that the message of November 27 was entirely 
inadequate to properly and adequately translate to Short's mind the 
background of events that had been taking place. While this does 
not excuse Short, it does necessitate an assessment for the responsi- 
bility on others. 

[1£8] The three principal Major Generals who were commanders 
under Short have testified that they received substantially nothing 
by way of information as to the international situation except what 
they read in the newspapers. The fact that the newspapers were 
urgent and belligerent in their tone was discounted by them, because 
they were not receiving any confirmatory information from the War 
Department through Short. Information that was of tremendous 
value both as to content and substance, which the Secretary of State, 
Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and other high officers of the War 
Department had, was not transmitted to Short. The only summary of 
this information was the brief and conflicting tone of the message of 
November 27, which was but a faint echo of what had actually oc- 
curred. 

It is significant tliat the Japanese upon the termination of negotia- 
tions by the counter-proposals of the 26th, considered by them as an 
ultimatum, were thereby in full possession of all the information, 
which our ultra-secrecy policy did not permit of full transmission to 
field commanders. The Japanese knew everything. The War and 
Navy Departments transmitted to Short and Kimmel only so much 
of what they knew as they judged necessary. ^^ 

It is also significant that the Secretary of War had to go and call 
Mr. Hull to get the information on what amounted to the practical 
cessation of negotiations, which was the most vital thing that had oc- 
curred in 1941. If it had not been for [129] Mr. Stimson's in- 
itiative in calling the Secretary of State, it is uncertain as to when he 
would have been advised of this most important event. As it turned 
out, the delay of from ten to twelve hours in getting the information 
was not material since the Japanese delayed striking until December 
7th. 

The effect of the counter-proposals of November 26th on the result- 
ing responsibilities of the Army and Navy is indicated in Mr. Stim- 
son's quotation of Mr. Hull's comment to him, as follows : 

Now it is up to the Army and Navy to take care of the matter. I have veashed 
my hands of the Japanese. 

3^ Both General Marshall and Admiral Stark expressed themselves as of the opinion that 
the warnings transmitted to Short and Kimmel were sufficient to properly alert their 
vespective commands. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 89 

4. Analysis of the Noveiriber ^7, 191^1^ Message. — The message of 
November 2T, 1941, from the Chief of Staff to Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department, consists of the following component parts : 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practicable purposes 
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government may come back 
and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action 
possible at any moment. 

Comment: This statement on Japanese information is inadequate. 
It did not convey to Short the full import of the information con- 
cerning the American-Japanese relations which was in the hands 
of the War Department. It was misleading in that it stated that 
there was a bare possibility of the resumption of negotiations, which 
carried with it the implication that such resumption would influence 
the Japanese-American relations, i. e., that war might not come. The 
War Department was convinced then that war would come. 

The statement that "Japanese future action unpredictable" 
{ISOA^ was in conflict with the Navy message which the War De- 
partment had directed be shown to Short, to the effect that the attack 
would be in the Kra Peninsula and elsewhere in the Far East. It 
did not convey to Short the fixed opinion of the War Department 
General Staff as to the probable plan of Japanese operations. 

A warning that "hostile action possible at any moment" indicated 
the necessity of taking adequate measures to meet that situation. 
This is particularly true in view of the Navy message of 16 October, 
1941, which said that there was a possibility that Japan might attack. 
There was also received from the Navy on November 27 a message 
containing these words, 

Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an 
effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to 
make an aggressive move within the next few days. 

The next statement in the Chief of Staff's message to the Command- 
ing General, Hawaiian Department : 

If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided comma the United 
States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not 
comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action 
that might jeopardize yoxir defense. 

/Comment: This instruction embodied our well known national 
i:»olicy against initiating war. The responsibility for beginning the 
war must be Japan's. It gives Short the right of defense, notwith- 
standing the restriction, but creates an atmosphere of caution which 
he must exercise in preparing for such defense. 

The third portion of the message is this : 

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such recon- 
naissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should 
be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma alarm [iSi] the civilian 
population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. 

Comment : This was an order. Short could take such measures, in- 
cluding reconnaissance, as he deemed necessary. Wliat was available 
to Short for reconnaissance and defensive action and the measures 
taken by him are fully discussed elsewhere. 



90 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Here again we find the limitation that he must act cautiously. 
However, the weight of evidence indicates that a higher form of 
alert than that taken would not have alarmed the public. 

Short did report within an hour the measures taken. (K.. 286.) 

Short's answer to General Marshall's radio said : 

Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. Reuard four 
seven two twenty seventh. 

This in itself was sufficient to show that such steps were inadequate, 
but as he did not say he was taking any other steps, the War Depart- 
ment erroneously assumed that its responsible commander was alert 
to sabotage and to liaison with the Navy and was taking the necessary 
responsible other steps mentioned in the radio because he had been 
warned in this radio of the 27th by General Marshall. 

Having asked for a report of what he was doing, the War Depart- 
ment placed itself in the position of sharing the responsibility if it 
did not direct Short to take such measures as they considered adequate 
to meet this serious threat. This is particularly true in view of the fact 
that much material information relating to Japanese-American rela- 
tions was in the War Department, which had not been made available 
to Short. 

[13£'\ The next and last portion of the message : 

should hostilities occiu-, you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Number 5 
as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret in- 
formation to minimum essential officers. 

Comment : (a) This was a clear recognition, and advice to Short, that 
his basic war plan and all joint Army and Navy plans based upon 
it was to be used and was a clear indication to him to adopt adequate 
preparatory measures to insure the execution of Rainbow Number 5. 

( b ) A s to t he di recti ve to 

Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential 
officers— 

The War Department was security-conscious. The construction 
which Short appears to have placed upon this language may have un- 
duly limited the information which reached responsible subordinate 
commanders. This part of the message left broad discretion in Short 
as to the dissemination of the information contained in the message, 
and had the personnel operating the Air Warning Service on the 
morning of December 7th known of the absolute imminence of war 
they doubtless would have interpreted the information obtained from 
the radar station much differently. 

It is of a piece with the other provisions of the instructions — not 
to alarm the public, not to disclose intent, and to avoid commission 
of the first overt act. 

Cormnevt on the message as a whole. — General Short, as the Com- 
manding General, Hawaiian Department, was charged with the defense 
of the Hawaiian Islands and as such had a fundamental duty to prop- 
erly employ all available means at his disposal for that purpose in the 
face of any threat, with or without notification of impending 
hostilities. 

1^133'] Notwithstanding receipt of conflicting and qualifying 
information, which undoubtedly had its effect on Short's mental con- 
ception of the situation, the responsibility rested on him to take meas- 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 91 

iires to meet the worst situation with which he might be confronted, 
and such action on his part, as Commander on the spot, was mandatory 
despite the fact that he was not kept fully advised by the War Depart- 
ment of the critical situation and of the positive, immediate inmiinence 
of war. 

The same day G-2 of the War Department wired to G-2 Hawaiian 
Department, which clearly indicated that hoth sabotage and hostilities 
might begin and be concurrent. This message said : 

Advise only the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff that it appears 
that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Ac- 
tions of sabotage and espionage probable. Also probable that hostilities may 
begin. 

This G-2 message nullifies all Short's explanation that his mind 
was put on sabotage because of the War Department's emphasis on 
this subject. The message shows that hostilities were just as possible 
as sabotage. His decision to adopt Alert Number 1 came on the 27th, 
before receipt of any message having reference to sabotage. He had 
two threats : he only took measures as to one. The third message, upon 
which he particularly relies as to sabotage, which came on November 
28 from the War Department (G-2), came after he had made his 
decision to go to xilert Number 1. This last message again mentions 
the critical situation as to sabotage activities. It does not in any way 
change previous messages. Short should have known, as a trained 
soldier, that a G-2 message is informative and is of [IS^] lesser 
authority than a commanding message from the Chief of Staff. 

Wlien General Short was asked if he had known that negotiations 
with Japan had practically ended when he received the message of 
November 27th, he said : 

I think it would have made me more conscious that war was practically 
unavoidable ... If I knew it was immediately imminent . . . but if I had known 
It was immediately imminent, then I should think I would have gone into Alert 
Number 3 ... It would have looked to me definite that the war was almost 
upon us. (R. 450.) 

General Russell. General Short, did you know that on the 26th of November 
the State Department handed to the Japanese representatives a memorandum 
Which G-2 of the War Department at least considered as an ultimatum to the 
Japanese government? 

General Short. I knew nothing of anything of the kind until a year or so 
afterwards, whenever that State Department paper came out. 

General Russell. Did you know on the 27th of November, when you received 
that message that the Secretary of State had in a meeting on the 25th of 
November told the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and probably 
the Chief .of Staff of the Army, and Admiral Stark, that the State Department 
had gone as far as it could in its negotiations with the Japanese and that the 
security of the nation was then in the hands of the armed forces? 

General Short. I did not. 

General Russeix. Did you know that in January of 1941 Ambassador Grew 
made a report to the State Department or to the Secretary of State in whicli 
he stated that there were rumors in Japan that in event of trouble with America 
the Japs would attack Pearl Harbor? 

General Short. At that time I was not in command ; but I have known of that 
hiter, I think probably a year or so later. I do not think I knew anything about 
it at that time. (R. 451.) 

This concludes the status of affairs to the 27th. There still remained 
the period from the 27th to the 6th of December, inclusive, during 
which time messages and even letters could have been sent outlining 
and completely delineating the entire [ISS] situation to Short. 



92 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Even a courier could have readied Honolulu in 36 hours from Wash- 
ington The War Department, although it had additional informa- 
tion of a most positive character, left Short with this fragnient of 
information regarding the U. S.-Japanese negotiations contained m 
the two sentences inserted in the message of the 27th by the Secretary 
of War, and took no action either to investigate Short's reply to the 
message of November 27 to determine the steps being taken for defense, 
or to assure that adequate defensive measures were being taken. 

5 Messages 28th November To 6th December, Inckisive.—Un 
November 28th the War Department sent message No. 482 to Short, 
reading as follows:^* 

Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against 
subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Depart- 
ment (See paragraph 3 MID SC thirty dash forty-five) stop. Also desired that 
you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protec- 
tion of your establishments comma protection of your personnel against sub- 
versive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop. This 
does not repeit not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop. Pro- 
tective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoid- 
ing unnecessary publicity and alarm. To insure speed of transmission identica 
telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect 
your responsibility under existing instructions. 

ll36^ Short sent a reply to wire 482 of November 28th on the 
same day which outlined at length the sabotage precautions he was 
taking. The War Department copy of this wire, which is addressed 
to the A G. O., shows that a copy was sent to the Secretary o± the 
General Staff, but no other indorsements are on it showing it was read 
or considered by anyone else. This wire reads : 

Re your secret radio for eight two twenty eighth, full precautions are being 
taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility 
S Wa? Dept paren paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five end paren 
and military establishments including personnel and equipment. As regards 
proteS ion of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power 
p ants telephone exchanges and highway bridges, this Hqrs by confidential 
Sttei dS June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the 
Ten tory to use the broad powers vested in him by Section sixty seven of the 
or-a™c act which provides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the Com- 
manders of Military and Naval Forces of the United States in the Territory of 
Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection etc. 
Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentietli confidentially 
made a formal written demand on this Hqrs to furnish and continue to furnish 
such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawless 
v^olenceT connection therewith, being committed against vital installations 
^ ml structures in the territory. Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate 
miitary proScUon IS now being afforded vital civilian installations. In this 
connection, at the instigation of this headquarters the city and conn y of Honolulu 
ou June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordnance which permits the 
Commanding General Hawaiian Dept. to close, or restr ct the use of and travel 
up^n any highway within the city and county of Honolulu, whenever the Com- 
manding General deems such action necessary in the interest of naional defense 
The authority thus given has not yet been exercised. Relations with FBI and all 
other federal and territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual 
cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters. Short. 

It is to be noted that the official file does not show a copy of radio 
#482, sent to Short by the War Department on [1S7] Novem- 
ber 28th. 

^ A similar message, No. 484, was sent on the same day to the Commanding General 
Hawaiian Air Force by General Arnold. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 93 

On December 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the follow- 
ing wire to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet : 

On 3d December we have, "Op Nav informs" — this is a paraphrase, you 
understand, sir. * * * — "informs C in C Asiatic, CincPac, Combat 14-16 
that highly reliable information has been received that instructions were sent 
Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Wash- 
ington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn 
secret documents." (Admiral Bloch, Vol. 13, Page 1513, APHB.) ^ 

The story as to whether Short ever saw or received this message is 
as follows : Admiral Kimmel visited Short December 2 and December 
3, 1941. (R. 1513.) Short says : '"I never saw that message" (R. 424) , 
referring to the 3 December message. He also denied seeing the mes- 
sage from the Navy of December 4th and 6th hereinafter quoted. 
(R. 424-425. ) However, Short was advised by the F. B. I. that it had 
tapped the telephone line of the Japanese Consuls' cook and had found 
the Consul was burning his papers. (R. 3204.) All other lines were 
tapped by the Navy. (R. 3204.) Phillips testified Short was "in- 
formed of it," but nothing was done about it. (R. 1243.) Short 
denies such G-2 information, saying : "I am sure he didn't inform me." 
(R. 525.) Colonel Fielder sa^^s the matter was discussed by Colonel 
Phillips at a staff conference, but nothing was done about it. Colonel 
Bicknell, G-2, Hawaiian Department, confirmed Fielder. (R. 1413- 
1414.) 

[1S8] This record does not provide either a true copy or a para- 
phrase copy of the message of December 4, 1941, or December 6, 1941. 
The information we have is no better than that contained in the 
Roberts Report, which reads as follows: 

the second of December 4, 1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential 
documents and means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were 
necessaiy, the latter to be destroyed in event of emergency (this was sent to the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only) ; and the third of 
December 6, 1941, directing that in view of the tense situation the naval com- 
mands on the outlying Pacific islands might be authorized to destroy confidential 
papers then or later, under conditions of greater emergency, and that those 
essential to continued operations should be retained until the last moment. 
(Roberts Report, page 8.) 

These messages were received because Admiral Bloch testified that he 
remembered them. (R. 1513-1514.) 

Irrespective of any testimony on the subject the record shows that on 
December 3, 1941, Short and Kimmel had a conference about a cable- 
gram relative to the relief of marines on Wake and Midway. (R. 302, 
394.) 

There is a serious question raised why the War Department did not 
give instructions to Short direct which would have put him on his 
guard as to the tenseness of the situation. 

On December 6 there was reported to the Chief of Staff, Phillips, 
the message about the Japanese burning their pajpers, and he reported 
it at a staff meeting on December 6. (R. 1414.) 

6. December 7, 194-1 Message. — This brings us to the final message 
from Washington. It was filed b}^ the Chief of Staff at 12 : 18 p. m. 
Washington time, December 7th, which was 6 : 48 a. m. Honolulu time. 

Japanese are presenting at 1 p. m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts 
to an ultimatum. [130] Also they are under orders to destroy their code 

'"This message also paraphrased by General Grunert, Vol. 4, Paso 424. This same 
message also paraphrased in Roberts Testimony, Vol. 5, Page 583, and Vol. 3 7, Page S-85. 

79716 -46~-Ex. 157-— 7 



94 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

machine immediately stop. Just what significance the hour set may have we do 
not know but be on alert accordingly stop. Inform naval authorities of this 
communication. 

The story of the sending of this message, which, if it could have 
been sent so as to have reached Short a few hours prior to the attack 
might at least have greatly lessened the results of the attack, will be 
set forth at length. It was sent by commercial radio, the R. C. A. 
This is a commercial line. Earl}^ in the morning in Honolulu the 
Hawaiian Department radio had had great difficulty in keeping in 
communication with the War Department radio. It is significant that 
the Hawaiian Department only had a small 10 k. g. set. It was not 
a powerful set, like that of the Navy or the R. C. A. The Message 
Onter of the War Department, which is charged with the expeditious 
handling of messages, decided to send this vital message liy commercial 
R. C. A. instead of War Department radio, because it could not get 
through on its own net. Why this message was not sent by the Navy 
radio, ;by F. B. I. radio, or by telephone, and why these means of 
possibly more rapid conmiunication were not investigated, is not satis- 
factorily explained. The explanation that ''secrecy'' was paramount 
does not appear to apply to these means. 

Shivers of the F. B. I. testified : 

We had our own radio station ... I would say within — depending on the 
length of the message ; a 20-word message could be probably gotten to Washington 
by — could have gotten to the receiving station in Washington within a period of 
twenty minutes . . . our channels were not jammed . . . We used a 
frequency that was assigned to us by the F. C. C. . . . All of the stuff that 
went out from here to — that went out over that radio, was coded. (R. 3221.) 

[140] General Gruxket. Then any message that Washington wanted to get 
to you during that morning or just prior to the attack on that morning you think 
could have gotten to you within the leeway of an hour? 

Ml'. Shivers. The message could have been sent out within an hour, yes. Yes, 
sir. (R. 3221.) 

It is to be noted in this connection that not only was the F. B. I. 
radio working between Washington and Honolulu on December 6-7, 
but that testimony shows numerous telephone conversations were con- 
ducted just after the attack, over the telephone between Washington 
and Honolulu, 

Th^ story of the sending of this message in the War Department 
is as follows : 

[1^1] This message arrived in Honolulu at 7 : 33 a. m,, Honolulu 
time, December 7th. The attack struck 22 minutes later. The message 
was not actually delivered to the signal office of the Hawaiian De- 
partment until 11 : 45 a, m., the attack having taken place at 7 : 55 a, m. 
The message was decoded and delivered to The Adjutant General 
at 2 : 58 p. m., 7 hours and 3 minutes after the attack. 

The status of communications between Washington and Hawaii on 
the mornmg of December 7th and for 24 hours previous to that time 
was as follows : The Hawaiian Department had a scrambler telephone 
connection direct with Washington by which you could ordinarily 
get a message through from Washington to Hawaii in ten or fifteen 
minutes. After the attack on December 7, Colonel Fielder (G-2) 
himself talked to Washington twice on this phone and received a 
call from Washington on the same phone : it took no more than an 
hour as a maximum to get the cull through despite the heavy traffic 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 95 

to Hawaii by reason of the attack. (R. 2999.) Furthermore, a war 
message conld have demanded priority. 

It is important to observe that only one means of communication was 
selected by Washington. That decision violated all rules requiring 
the use of multiple means of communication in an emergency. In 
addition to the War Department telephone there also existed the 
F. B. I. radio, which was assigned a special frequency between Wash- 
ington and Hawaii and over which it only took twenty minutes to 
send a coded message from Hawaii to Washington or vice versa. 
Shivers of F. B. I. so testified. (R. 3222.) Short testified : 

General Marshall stated that the reason he did not telephone was that it 
took some time, that he had called the Philippines before he called Hawaii, and 
there was a [l-i2] possibility of a leak which would embarrass the State 
Department. In other words. I think there was a feeling still at that time that 
secrecy was more important than the time element in getting the information to 
us as rapidly as possible. Whatever the reason was, we got that information 
seven hours after the attack. (R. 310.) 

Apparently, the War Department at that time did not envisage 
an immediate attack, rather they thought more of a breaking of diplo- 
matic relations, and if the idea of an attack at 1 : 00 p. m. E. S. T. 
did enter their minds they thought of it as probably taking place in 
the Far East and not in Hawaii. Hence secrecy was still of paramount 
interest to them. We find no justification for a failure to send this 
message by multiple secret means either through the Navy radio or 
F. B. I. radio or the scrambler telephone or all three. 

The result was the message did not get through in time due to the 
failure of the War Department to use the telephone as the Chief of 
Staff used it to the Philippines (Short R. 310) or take steps to insure 
that the message got through by multiple channels (by code over 
naval or F. B. L radio to Hawaii), if the War Department radio was 
not working. He left Short without this additional most important 
information. Short testified as follows : 

If they had used the scrambled phone and gotten it through in ten or fifteen 
minutes we would probably have gotten more of the import and a clearer idea 
of danger from that message and we would have had time to warm up the 
planes and get them in the air to meet any attack. (R. 310.) 

Colonel French, in charge of Traffic Operations Branch, Chief 
Signal Office, in the War Department testified that on December 7, 
1941, Colonel Bratton brought the message to the code room in the 
handwriting of the Chief of Staff which "I had typed for clarity" in 
a few minutes. Colonel Bratton read and authenticated it. The 
message was given to the code clerk and transmission facilities 
checked. It was decided to send [^4^] the message by com- 
mercial means, choosing Western Union, as the fastest. He stated 
that he personally took the message from the code room to the tele- 
type operator and advised Colonel Bratton it would take 30 to 45 
minutes to transmit message to destination. It left at 12 : 01 (Eastern 
Standard Time, 6:31 a. m. Honolulu time). The transmission to 
Western Union was finished 12 : 17 p. m. Eastern Standard Time, or 
7 : 33 a. m. Honolulu time. It took 45 minutes in transmission. The 
message w^as actually delivered at 11:45 a. m. Honolulu time. The 
messenger was diverted from liis course during the bombing. (R. 
189-202.) 



96 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel French had no knowledge of the type of communication the 
F. B. I. used to Hawaii ; he never used the scrambler telephone and 
sometimes he used the Navy to send messages, but did not inquire on 
the morning of December 7, although the Navy has a more powerful 
radio. (R 203-204.) 

7. Failure of Navy to Advise Short of Enemy Suhmarine in Pearl 
Earhor on morning December 7, 19Ji.l. — The second failure was by the 
Navy Department, upon whom Short so trustingly relied. A two- 
man submarine entered Pearl Harbor area at 6 : 30 a. m. Between 
6 : 33 and 6 : 45 a. m. it was sunk by the Navy. This was reported at 
7 : 12 a. m. by naval base officers to the Chief of Staff but the Navy 
made no such report to Short. (R. 310-311; See Roberts Report 
p. 15.) As Short said : 

That would, under the conditions, have indicated to me that there was danger. 
The Navy did not visualize it as anything but a submarine attack. They con- 
sidered that and sabotage their greatest danger; and it was Admiral Bloch's 
duty as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away. 
He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized 
it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of {IW it 
and just failed to notify me ; that he could see then, after the fact, that he had 
been absolutely wrong, but that at the time the urgent necessity of getting the 
information to me had not — at any rate, I did not get the information until after 
the attack. (R. 311.) 

8. Failure of Aircraft Warning Service to Advise of A'pproaching 
Planes, December 7, 19Jf.l. — The third event that might have saved the 
day was the following : 

The aircraft warning service had established mobile aircraft warn- 
ing stations on the Island of Oahu, as elsewhere related in detail, and 
had set up an Information Center to utilize the aircraft warning in- 
formation, plot the course of any incoming planes and to advise the 
responsible authorities. The organization was set up and operating 
and was being utilized from 4 a. m. to 7 o'clock on the morning of 
December 7th as a training method and had been so used for some time 
past. The Navy was supposed to have detailed officers in the Infor- 
mation Center to be trained as liaison officers, but had not yet gotten 
around to it. In the Information Center that morning was a Lieu- 
tenant Kermit A. Tyler, a pursuit officer of the Air Corps, whose tour 
of duty thereat was until 8 o'clock. It was Tyler's second tour of duty 
at the Center and he was there for training and observation, but there 
were no others on duty after 7 o'clock except the enlisted telephone 
operator. He was the sole officer there between 7 and 8 o'clock that 
morning, the rest of the personnel that had made the Center operative 
from 4 : 00 to 7 : 00 a. m. had departed. 

At one of the remote aircraft warning stations there were two 
privates who had been on duty from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. One of them 
was Private Lockard, who was skilled in operating the radar aircraft 
detector, and a Private George E. Elliott, who was [i-^] the 
plotting man to plot the information picked up on the radar. This 
plotter was anxious to learn how to operate the radar, and Private 
Lockard agreed to show him after the station was supposed to close 
at 7 o'clock and while they were waiting for the truck to take them to 
breakfast. He kept the radar open for further operation to instruct 
his partner, Private Elliott. While Lockard was adjusting the ma- 
chine to begin the instruction of Private Elliott, he observed on the 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 97 

radar screen an unusual formation he had never seen in the machine. 
He thought there was something wrong with it, as the indicator 
showed such a large number of planes coming in that he was sure 
that there was nothing like it in the air and there must be a machine 
error. He continued to check, however, and finally concluded that 
the machine was operating correctly and that there was a considerable 
number of planes 132 miles away from the island approaching from a 
direction 3 degrees east of north. The time was 7 : 02 a. m., December 
7, 1941. 

In this record Private Elliott, now Sergeant Elliott, testified that 
he plotted these planes and suggested to Lockard that they call up the 
Information Center. After some debate between them, Lockard did 
call the Information Center and reported to the switchboard operator. 
The switchboard operator, an enlisted man who testified, was unable 
to do anything about it, so he put Lieutenant Tyler on the phone. 
Tyler's answer proved to be a disastrous one. He said, in substance, 
"Forget it." Tyler's position is indefensible in his action, for he says 
that he was merel}^ there for training and had no knowledge upon 
which to base any action ; yet he assumed to give directions instead of 
seeking someone competent to make a decision. 

If that be a fact, and it seems to be true, then he should [^46] 
not have assumed to tell these two men. Private Lockard and Private 
Elliott, to ''forget it", because he did not have the knowledge upon 
which to premise any judgment. (R. 1102.) He should, in accordance 
with customary practice, have then used initiative to take this matter 
up with somebody who did know about it, in view of the fact that he 
said he was there merely for training and had no competent knowledge 
upon which to either tell the men to forget it or to take action upon it. 
By this assumption of authority, he took responsibility and the conse- 
quences of his action should be imposed upon him. 

If Tyler had communicated this information, the losses might have 
been yerj greatly lessened. As General Short testified : 

If he had alerted the luterceptor Command there would have been time, if the 
pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes. There would not 
have been time to get them in the air ... It would have made a great dif- 
ference in the loss ... It would have been a question of split seconds instead 
of minutes in getting into action. (R. 312-313.) 

The attack actually took place at 7 : 55 a. m. 

When the information that showed up on the oscilloscope was com- 
municated, apparently Lieutenant Tyler had in his mind that a flight 
of B-l7s was coming from the mainland and he thought that they 
might represent what was seen on the screen of the radar machine. 
As a matter of fact, that probably had something to do with it, as they 
did come in about this period and were attacked by the Japanese, some 
of them being destroyed. 

9. Navy Failure to Advise Short of Siispected Naval Concentration 
in the Jaluits. — About November 25, 1941, the Navy through its intel- 
ligence sources in the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor and in 
Washington had reports showing the presence in Jaluit in the 
[7^7] ]\Iarshall Islands of the Japanese fleet composed of aircraft 
carriers, submarines, and probably other vessels. Information of this 
fleet ceased about December 1, 1941. As Jaluit was 1,500 miles closer 
to Oahu than the mainland of Japan, the presence of such a strong 



98 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

force capable of attacking Hawaii was an important element of naval 
information. This information was delivered to G-2 of the War De- 
partment as testified to by General Miles. No information of this 
threat to Hawaii was given to General Short by either the War or 
Navy Departments in Washington nor the Navy in Hawaii. Short 
and his senior commanders testified that such information would have 
materially altered their point of view and their actions. 

Such information should have been delivered by the War Depart- 
ment or the Navy for what it was worth to permit Short to evaluate 
it; this was not done. 

The fact that the actual force which attacked Hawaii has now been 
identified does not change the necessity for the foregoing action. 

10. The Navy Account of the Japanese Task Force That Attacked 
Pearl liarhor; tSources of Lnformat'wn, to Japanese. — The following 
account is based upon the testimony of Captain Layton, who has been 
Fleet Combat Intelligence Officer, and was at the time of December 
Tth and sliortly before Fleet Litelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet. 

He said that the task force which had been identified by the Navy 
through numerous captured documents, orders, maps, and from inter- 
viewing prisoners who were in a position to know personally the or- 
ders and preparations for the attack, had the following history, ac- 
cording to the Navy view of the correct \,148^ story : *° 

Japan started training its task force in either July or August, 1941, 
for the attack on Pearl Harbor. They were evidently trained with 
great care and precision as disclosed by the maps which w^ere found in 
the planes which were shot down in the attack on Pearl Harbor and 
in the two-man submarines. These papers and orders show meticu- 
lous care in planning and timing, which would take very considerable 
practice. The initial movement from Japan to the rendezvous at 
Tankan Bay was about November 22nd, and they awaited word to act 
before the force moved out on the 27th-28th of November, 1941.^*^ 

The elements of the fieet for this task force consisted of six carriers, 
two battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and a destroyer 
division. This is one of the most powerful task forces ever assembled 
and after the date of [-?4'^] the attack upon Pearl Harbor, it 
took part in a number of similar successful and very disastrous at- 
tacks in the Pacific southwest. The elements of this task force left 
individually from the Japanese mainland and assembled at Tonkan 
Bay in an uninhabited spot where they would be unobserved. The 
assembly was completed and the task force departed on November 
27th-28th, Eastern Longitude Time, which was apparently after the 

■^ Tlie Japanese striking force assembled in home waters during November and departed 
from the Bungou Channel area in Japan about 22 November, proceeding to Tankan Bay 
(sometimes called Hittokapu Bay). This assembly had started between the Tth and 22nd 
of November. Tankan Bay is located at Etorofu Island in North Japan. It does not 
appear on the ordinary maps or charts, but is shown in a map of the Japanese Empire in 
a Japanese encyclopedia under the title "Hittokapu Bay." The task force arrived in this 
bay approximately November 25th. The entire force departed on the 27th-28th of No- 
vember (see footnote 2), taking a northerly route south of the Aleutians directly to the 
east (to avoid being sighted by shipping) and then headed for a position to the north of 
(^ahu. arriving there on the early morning of the 8th of December (Japanese time) or 
the Tth of December (Hawaiian time). The date of departure of November 2Tth-28th, 
according to the numerous documents and prisoners interviewed who had intimate knowl- 
edge of this matter and who independently picked the same date, is confirmed beyond 
doubt according to Admiral McMorris and Captain Layton. This force consisted of six 
aircraft carriers, two fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and some 
destroyers as well as submarines. 

^^ Japanese time and date must be taken into consideration because our December Tth 
at Honolulu is Japanese December 8th. The time difference between Tokyo and Hawaii 
is 4i/{. hours, the time difference between Washington and Tokyo is 10 hours. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 99 

date that the counter-proposals (considered by the Japanese as an 
ultimatum) were delivered by the President of the United States to 
Japan through Secretary Hiill on November 26, 1941. It is signifi- 
cant that the attack of the Japanese task force aircraft upon the Army 
and Navy planes parked together wing-to-wing as protection against 
sabotage (Alert #1) must have been as a result of knowledge of that 
fact, in view of their carefully rehearsed and scheduled attack for- 
mations in which they ran down the aprons, setting the planes on fire 
with incendiary ammunition : it is equally significant that it was well 
known in the island that Alert #1 was put into effect November 27th 
aiid therefore can be assumed to have been communicated to Japan, 
and that advantage of such information was apparently taken by 
reason of the nature of the attack and the way it was conducted. 

It is also significant, a map having been found upon the pilot of a 
shot-down Japanese attacking plane, and another map having been 
found upon one of the crew in a two-man submarine, that there had 
been entered on these maps, which were old Geodetic Survey maps pf 
the Pearl Harbor area, the location of the hangars that had been built 
on Hickam Field and of those that were yet to be built. Five of these 
hangars had been built. Earlier 1936 maps issued by the Hawaiian 
DejDartment [-?5^] or by the Air Force, showing Hickam Field, 
showed five of these hangars in full lines and three in dotted lines as 
being hangars yet to be built. The Japanese are well known as precise 
copyists. It is apparent that Avhen they made the maps found on the 
aviator and the submarine crew members they had knowledge later 
than 1936 of construction either that had been constructed or was 
to be constructed, because they entered on such maps the additional 
three hangars in full lines. 

The task force ]^roceeded in radio silence due east to a point sub- 
stantially due north of Oahu and thence proceeded southward under 
forced draft to a i)oint between 300 and 250 miles from Oahu, from 
which the flight took off. The two-man submarines were carried 
on top of the mother submarines and released adjacent to the harbor. 

Captain Layton further testified that the orders that were captured 
and those that they had knowledge of did exist, as reported by captured 
prisoners, show that the attacking forces were to destroy without a 
trace any third power's vessels including Japanese and Russian within 
600 miles of the destination of the task force ; to capture and maintain 
in ladio silence any such vessels including Japanese and Russian within 
600 miles of the destination of the task force, but if such vessels had 
sent any radio communications to destroy them. (R. 3043) This is 
a good evidence of Japanese character, being unwilling to trust their 
own people and to sink them without mercy because they happened 
to be operating by accident in this vacant sea where no vessels normally 
operate. 

This task force was very powerful in the air, having a total of 
approximately 424 planes ; (R. 3048) of this number about 300 actuallv 
attacked Pearl Harbor. (R. 3053.) The pilots [151] were of 
the highest quality and training that have ever been encountered in 
this war with the Japanese, with the exception of the Battle of Midway 
where four of these same carriers were engaged and were sunk. (R. 
3046.) The maximum total number of airplanes on carriers that the 
United States could muster on December 7th, on the carriers "Lexing- 
ton" and "Enterprise", was approximately 180 planes. (R. 3049.) 



100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Layton testified that our Navy in Pearl Harbor would have 
been unable to have brought the Japanese task force under gunfire be- 
cause our battleships v^'ere too slow and the remainder of our force 
would probably have suffered severe damage if not defeat on the high 
seas by reason of the great superiority in the air before our superior 
gunfire could have been brought to bear. The only possible hope of 
overcoming such a Japanese force would be in weather that pre- 
vented flight of their planes so that the United States force would have 
superiority of gunfire, irrespective of Japanese superiority of air 
power. 

He stated that no word of this task force was received in any way, 
from any source, by the Navy. The attack was wholly unexpected, and 
if it had been expected the probability of the United States' winning 
in any engagement of this task force was not a bright one. He stated 
that this task force represented a substantial per cent of the entire 
Japanese Navy. It provided alone on the Jap carriers 424 aircraft 
against a possible ISO which we might have mustered if we had had our 
own two carriers available to operate against them. (R. 8048-?>049.') 

The information upon which the story of the attack is based has been 
revealed so far as coming from several sources. [1521 First, the 
Otto Kuehn trial revealed his complete disclosure of the fleet disposi- 
tions and locations in Pearl Harbor in the period December 1 to De- 
cember 6, and a code delivered with the information, so that communi- 
cation of the information to Japanese offshore submarines adjacent 
to Oahu could be used. The same information was delivered by the 
fJapanese Consul direct to the homeland. 

Otto Kuehn and his co-conspirators, Japanese of the Japanese Con- 
sulate in Honolulu, had conspired to send information as to the units of 
the fleet in Pearl Harbor and their exact positions in the harbor. This 
information the Japanese Consul communicated principally by com- 
mercial lines to Japan. Additionally Kuehn provided a code indicat- 
ing what units were in the harbor and what were out and means of 
signaling consisting of symbols on the sails of his sailboat, radio signals 
over a short-wave transmitter, lights in his house, and fires in his yard, 
all in order to signal to Japanese submarines offshore. The period 
during which the signals were to be given was December 1 to 6. If 
such information has been available to our armed forces it would have 
clearly indicated the attack. The messages taken from the Japanese 
Consulate on the subject show clearly what was done and the inten- 
tion of the Japanese, If authority had existed to tap these lines, this 
information w^ould have been available to both the Army and Navy. 
Kuehn was tried by a military commission after signed confessions of 
his actions and sentenced to death. This was later commuted to im- 
prisonment for fifty years. It is significant that Kuehn was a German 
agent and had for a long time been living on funds forwarded to him 
from Japan and had conducted his espionage with impunity until 
after Pearl Harbor, right [^^^1 under the nose of the Army, 
the F. B. I., and naval Intelligence. 

As Shivers, head of the F. B. I. in the islands, said : 

If we had been able to get the messages that were sent to Japan by the Japa- 
nese Consul, we would have known, or we could have reasonably assumed, that 
the attack would come, somewhere, on December 7; because, if you recall, this 
system of signals that was devised by Otto Kuehn for the Japanese Consul gen- 
eral simply included the period from December 1 to December 6. (R. 3218.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD IQl 

Shivers testified that the reason why the information being sent over 
the commercial lines to Japan, other than telephone, was not secured 
was that while he had the approval of the Attorney General to tap the 
telephone wires and to intercept telephone conversations, yet they could 
not get the information out of the cable offices. He testified : 

Colonel TouLMiN. I would like to ask him one question. What other means 
of communication did the Japanese Consul have with the homeland other than 
a telephone connection? 

Mr. Shiveks. He had commercial communication system. 

Colonel ToxiLMiN. Did you have any opportunity of tapping the commercial 
lines or of securing any information o£E the commercial lines ? 

Mr. Shivers. OfE of the lines themselves? 

Colonel TouLMiN. Yes. 

Mr. SHivEass. No, sir. 

Colonel TouLMiN. So that he did have a free, undisturbed Gommunication over 
those lines? 

Mr. Shivees. Yes, sir. (R. 3223.) 

It was later discovered, when the torn messages of the Japanese Con^ 
sul were reconstructed after they had been taken on December 7th, that 
many vital messages were being sent by the Japanese Consul, who was 
keepmg Japan advised of the entire military and naval situation and 
every move we made in Hawaii. 

Another example of this Japanese activity is the telephone [I64.] 
message on December 5th from the house of Dr. Mori by a woman 
newspaper reporter, ostensibly to her newspaper in Japan, an ap- 
parently meaningless and therefore highly suspicious message. It 
was this message that was tapped from the telephone by the F. B. I., 
translated, and delivered to Military Intelligence and submitted by it 
to General Short at six o'clock on December 6th. (R. 1417-1419, 
2993.) As Short was unable to decipher the meaning, he did noth- 
ing about it and went on to a party. (E. 1420.) The attack followed 
m the morning. 

In this same connection, the story of the spying activities of the 
German, von Osten, is in point. (E. 2442-2443, 3003.) The tele- 
phone hues of the Japanese Consulate were tapped by the Navy with 
the exception of one telephone line to the cook's quarters, which was 
overlooked, and this was tapped by the F. B. I. (E. 3204.) 

The last and one of the most sigiiificant actions of the Japanese was 
the apparent actual entry of their submarines into Pearl Harbor a 
few days prior to December 7th, their circulation in the harbor, by 
which they secured and presumably transmited complete information 
as to our fleet movements and dispositions. 

The story of the bold Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor prior to 
tJie attack on December 7th is even more astounding as to the complete 
free(^om with which Japan operated in getting intelligence out of 
Hawaii. Shivers of the F. B. I. produced maps 1 and 2, which were 
copies of maps captured from the Japanese two-man submarines that 
came into Pearl Harbor on December 7th. The F. B. I., in endeavor- 
ing to reconstruct the '{16S] intelligence operations of any 
agent who may have been operating in Hawaii prior to the attack, 
secured these maps from Naval Intelligence. (E. 3210.) Maps 1 
and 2 have a legend translating all of the Japanese characters and 
writing appearing on the maps. Shivers said : 

An examination of the map indicated to me rather delinitely fliat there liad 

/?f°oo.n^^^"^^^ snbinaiiiH-s in Pearl Harbor immedintolv before (he attack. 
(K. 0^10.) 



102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, on this map is various information relating to tlie installations at Hickam 
Field, Pearl Harbor, and areas adjacent to both places. (R. 3211.) 

There appeared on the map a code in Japanese which was translated 
by the F, B. I. and shows that it was intended for use by the sub- 
marine commanders in communicating with the Japanese task force 
enroute to Hawaii. It contains such messages as "indication strong 
that enemy tieet will put out to sea," or "enemy fleet put out to sea 
from or through;" in other words, describing the presence, size, com- 
position, and movement of the fleet. (R. 3212.) 

As this map shows the complete timed movement in and out of 
the harbor of the submarine and this information had been prepared 
partly written in Japanese, it is obvious that the Japanese must have 
been in the harbor a few days before the attack and evidently were 
moving into and out of the harbor at will. The data on the chart shows 
the submarine was so well advised that it went in at about 0410 when 
the submarine net was open to permit the garbage scow to leave 
the harbor, and stayed in the harbor until about 0600 and then left 
by the same route. The map shows the location of our battleships and 
other naval vessels observed by the submarine. (R. 3212-3213.) 
As the ships actually in the harbor on December Tth were somewhat 
different from those shown on the map, it is conclusive proof [166] 
that this submarine was in the harbor and probably advising the fleet 
of Japan as to our dispositions prior to December Tth. (R. 3210- 
3213.) 

The real action that should have been feared from the Japanese 
was not open sabotage, but espionage. It is obvious that the reason 
why the Japanese aliens did not conunit sabotage was that they did 
not want to stimulate American activity to sjtop their espionage and 
intern them. That was the last thing they intended to do ; and Short 
appears to have completely misapprehended the situation, the psychol- 
ogy and intentions of the enemy, by putting into effect his sabotage 
alert. 

Undoubtedly the information of the alert, the placing of planes 
wing-to-wing, etc., as well as the disposition of the fleet was reported 
l.y Kuehn through the Japanese Consul, were all known to the Jap- 
anese task force proceeding toward Hawaii. That will explain why 
the}' were able to conduct such precise bombing and machine-gunning. 
The bomb pattern on Hickam Field and the machine-gunning of that 
field, as well as other fields, show that the attack was concentrated 
on the hangars, marked on the Japanese maps, and upon the ramps 
where the planes were parked wing to wing. There was no attack 
of any consequence upon the landing strips. 

From the foregoing it appears that there were a large number of 
events taking place bearing on the attack; and that a clue to such 
events and the Japanese actions was in part available to Short and 
in part not available to him. Both the War Department and the 
Navy failed to inform him of many vital matters, and our govern- 
mental restrictions as to intercepting the communications of the Jap- 
anese Consul prevented him from getting still additional information. 
[157] If General Short had any doubt on the subject of his 
authority, he had ample opportunity from November 27th to December 
6th to inquire of higher authority and make his position and his actions 
certain of support and approval. This he did not do. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 103 

11. Information Not Given Short. — In judging the actions of Gen- 
eral Short and whether he carried out his responsibilities, there must 
be taken into account inforn^tion that he was not told either by the 
War Department or by the Navy. Briefly summarized, the funda- 
mental pieces of information were the following : 

1. The presence of the task force in the Marshall Islands at 
Jaluit from November 27th to November 30th and the disappear- 
ance of that force. Neither the War Department nor the Navy 
Department saw tit to advise Short of this important piece of 
information. 

2. The fact that the Chief of Staff with the Chief of Naval 
Operations had jointly asked (on November 27th) the President 
not to force the issue with the Japanese at this time. (R. 9.) 

3. The delivery on the 26th of November to the Japanese Am- 
bassadors by the Secretary of State of the counter-proposals; and 
the immediate reaction of the Japanese rejecting in effect these 
counter-proposals which they considered an ultimatum and indi- 
cating that it was the end of negotiations. 

4. Short not kept advised of the communications from Grew 
reporting the progressive deterioration of the relationship with 
the Japanese. 

[158\ 5. No reaction from the War Department to Short as 
to whether his report of November 27th as to "measures taken", 
i. e., a sabotage alert and liaison with the Navy, were satisfac- 
tory or inadequate in view of the information possessed by the 
War Department. 

6. The following information not furnished also existed in the 
War Department: 

Information from informers, agents and other sources as 
to the activities of our potential enemy and its intentions in 
the negotiations between the United States and Japan was 
in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in 
November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a rea- 
sonably complete knowledge of the Japanese plans and in- 
tentions, and were in a position to know their potential moves 
against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in 
possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions and 
proposals. 
This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in 
November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the neces- 
sity for resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate 
day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to pre- 
]iare for the eventualities of war. 

The messages actually sent to Hawaii by the Army and Navy gave 
only. a small fraction of this information. It would have been pos- 
sible to have sent safely, information ample for the purpose of orient- 
ing the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives for an all-out 
alert. 

Under the circumstances, where information has a vital [159'\ 
bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and cannot 
be disclosed to them, it would appear incumbent upon the War De- 
])artment then to assume the responsibility for specific directives to 
such commanders. 



104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Short got neither form of assistance after November 28th from the 
War Department, his immediate supervising agency. It is believed 
that the disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been lessened to the 
extent that its defenses were available and used on December 7 if 
properly alterted in time. The failure to alert these defenses in time 
by directive from the War Department, based upon all information 
available to it, is one for which it is responsible. The War Department 
had an abundance of vital information that indicated an immediate 
break with Japan. All it had to do was either get it to Short or give 
him a directive based upon it. Short was not fully sensitive to the 
real seriousness of the situation, although the War Department 
thought he was. It is believed that knowledge of the information 
available in the War Department would have made him so. 

General discussion of the information herein referred to follows : 

The records show almost daily information on the plans of the 
Japanese Government. In addition to that cited above and in con- 
junction therewith the War Department was in possession of in- 
formation late in November and early in December from which it 
made deductions that Japan would shortly commence an aggressive 
war in the South Pacific; that every effort would be made to reach 
an agreement with the United States Government which would result 
in eliminating the American people as a contestant in the war to 
come ; and that failing to reach the agreement the [160'} Jap- 
anese Government would attack both Britain and the United States. 
This information enabled the War Department to fix the probable 
time of war with Japan with a degree of certainty. 

In the first days of December this information grew more critical 
and indicative of the approaching war. Officers in relatively minor 
positions who were charged with the responsibility of receiving and 
evaluating such information were so deeply impressed with its sig- 
nificance and the growing tenseness of our relations with Japan, which 
pointed only to war and war almost immediately, that such officers 
approached the Chief of the War Plans Division (General Gerow) 
and the Secretary of the General Staff (Colonel Smith) for the ex- 
press purpose of having sent to the department commanders a true 
picture of the war atmosphere which, at that time, pervaded the 
War Department and which was uppermost in the thinking of these 
officers in close contact with it. The efforts of these subordinate offi- 
cers to have such information sent to the field were unsuccessful. 
They were told that field commanders had been sufficiently informed. 
The Secretary of the General Staff declined to discuss the matter when 
told of the decisions of the War Plans Division. 

Two officers then on duty in the War Department are mentioned 
for their interest and aggressiveness in attempting to have something 
done. They are Colonel E. S. Bratton and Colonel Otis K. Stadler. 

The following handling of information reaching the War Depart- 
ment in the evening of December 6 and early Sunday morning De- 
cember 7 is cited as illustrative of the apparent lack of appreciation 
by those in high places in the War Department of the seriousness 
of this information which was so [161] clearly outlining the 
trends that were hastening us into war with Japan. 

At approximately 10 : 00 o'clock p. m. on December 6, 1941, and 
more than 15 hours before the attack at Pearl Harbor, G-2 delivered 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 105 

to the office of the War Plans Division and to the office of the Chief 
of Staff of the Army information which indicated very emphaticallj^ 
that war with Japan was a certainty and that the beginning of such 
war was in the immediate future. The officers to whom this inf ornia- 
tion was delivered were told of its importance and impressed with 
the necessity of getting it into the hands of those who could act, the 
Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of the War Plans Division. 

On the following morning December 7 at about 8 : 30 a. m. other 
information reached the office of G-2, vital in its nature and indicating 
an almost immediate break in relations between the United States 
and Japan. Colonel Bratton, Chief, Far Eastern Section, G-2, at- 
tempted to reach the Chief of Staff of the Army in order that he 
might be informed of the receipt of this message. He discovered 
that the General was horseback riding. Finally and at approxi- 
mately 11 : 25 a. m. the Chief of Staff reached his office and received 
this information. General Miles, then G-2 of the War Department, 
appeared at about the same time. A conference was helcl between 
these two officers and General Gerow of the War Plans Division who 
himself had come to the Office of the Chief of Staff. Those hours 
when Bratton was attempting to reach someone who could take 
action in matters of this importance and the passing without effec- 
tive action having been taken ]3re vented this critical information from 
reaching General Short in time to be of value to him. 

[162] About noon a message was hastily dispatched to overseas 
department commanders including Short in the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment. This message which has been discussed elsewhere in this re- 
port, came into Short's possession after the attack had been completed. 

D. Status of the Principal Hawaiian Defenses in 1941 and Their 
State of Keadiness on December 6, 1941, or the Reason for Their 
Lack of Readiness 

1. Aircraft Warning Service and Interceptor Gonvmand. — The Air- 
craft Warning Service on the morning of December T, 1941, was in 
operative condition for all practical purposes. It had an information 
center and five mobile stations. It was sufficiently operative to success- 
fully pick up the Japanese force 132 miles from Oahu. This W' as done 
by Private Lockard and Private Elliott, respectively radar operator 
and plotter, and reported by these privates on their own initiative to 
the information center, where the Sergeant in charge of the switch- 
board received the information and relayed it to Lieutenant Tyler, 
who was a pursuit officer of the Air Corps on temporary duty for 
training. The stations had been used from 0400 to 0700 hours each 
morning for the training personnel, and the personnel was reasonably 
trained by that time, with the exception of certain liaison officers who 
were still getting their training, like Lieutenant Tyler. If the radar 
system and information center had been fully manned, as it could 
have been and as it was immediately upon the disaster at Pearl 
Harbor and thereafter without further physical additions, it could 
have been successfully operated on December 7th. 

The Air Warning Service had been operating on tactical exercises 
and maneuvers prior to December 7th for some weeks. 

[163] On December 7, 1941 this service could have been a great 
asset to the defense of the islands had the Command and Staff under- 



106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

stood its value and capabilities and had taken more interest in imple- 
menting the temporally setup instead of awaiting completion of the 
permanent installations. 

The only mechanical difficulty that was being experienced was in 
connection with the stand-by motor generator sets, which were to be 
used to supplement commercial power in case the latter failed. There 
had been some minor difficulty with the pumps on the motor generator 
set for the internal combustion engines, but that was not of serious 
character. 

The story of the delay in installing both the temporary, mobile sets 
and the permanent sets is as follows : 

Army personnel had been receiving radar instructions on Navy 
surface ships and had gone to sea with the ships and had had the 
benefit of such practical training. Unfortunately the Navy had not 
detailed its liaison officers to the Information Center, and in that it 
failed. There also had not been brought about, due to the failure 
on the part of General Short and Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, a com- 
plete integration into a single system of Army and Navy defense 
including radar and particularly the Army, Navy and Marine fighters 
which were to pass to the jurisdiction of the Army to form a composi- 
tive interceptor command, so that the three elements of the system 
would be working — the aircraft warning service, the interceptor com- 
mand, and the antiaircraft artillery. 

The only reason that the aircraft warning service as not on a full 
operating basis on the morning of December 7th was due to the type of 
alert put into effect but otherwise it should have been in full effect. 
It was a fully operating [i^-i] service and did so operate 
shortly after the attack. 

Major Bergquist and Major Tindal had been sent to the Interceptor 
School at Mitchell Field in the early summer of 1941. At that time 
the AWS was new to the U. S. Army and its organization and devel- 
opment had just started in the United States. For the system to be 
operative required a considerable amount of highly technical electrical 
and radar equipment, the supply and manufacture of which was 
critical. 

The whole AWS project was new, novel, and somewhat revolu- 
tionary in practice. It took time to get the equipment through War 
Department priorities, and it took time to teach and train operating 
personnel, and to indoctrinate the whole Army as well as the public 
to its operation and value. This process had been going on since May 
and June, 1941. 

Testimony before the Board has indicated that neither the Army, 
Navy, nor civilian population of the United States or Hawaii antici- 
pated the necessity for inunediate use of this service. There was, 
however, a small group directly in charge of the AWS development in 
Hawaii, including Major Bergquist, Major Tindal, Major Tetley, and 
Major Powell, all of the Army, and Lieutenant Taylor of the Navy, 
who were pushing the AWS project to the fullest extent that their 
level of authority would permit. As a result of their efforts it is 
believed that this service in the normal course of events would have 
been established and in operation in another two or three weeks, which 
in view of the lack of war-mindedness of the services would have been 
to the great credit of this group. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 107 

Since the No. 1 Alert was the decision due to the logic and judg- 
ment of the Department Commander, it is very doubtful had the 
AWS been 100 per cent completed that it would have been \^6^] 
on a full-out operating basis on the 7th of December. General Short 
has stated in the Roberts report testimony, Volume 14, page 1G42, that 
had he had the materiel and fully equipped radar stations he prob- 
ably would have operated them just as he did. 

Nevertheless, had General Short's judgment led him to have de- 
cided to go to Alert 2 or 3 on November 27th, or at any time prior 
to December 7th, the AWS could have functioned and the fighter 
airplanes could have been ready for active defense within a period of 
minutes. From the damage that Avas accomplished by the few fighters 
that did get into the air from the Haliewa Airdrome it can be assumed 
that the seventy or eighty fighters that could have been in the air 
under a normally active alert system would have made the Jap at- 
tack a much more costly venture. This paragraph, however, is 
hypothesis. 

2. Status of the Airo'aft Warning Service on December 7th. — 
The aircraft warning service consisting of the Information Center and 
five mobile radar stations was in operation on the morning of December 
7th and had been for several weeks prior to that date. The fact that 
the Information Center was not in its permanent location and the 
radar stations were not permanently built had no bearing upon the 
operation and effectiveness of the aircraft warning system. 

It was set up and the men were Deing trained for, I would say, possibly a 
month prior to the attack on December 7th. 

As testified by General Martin (R. 18i?5). 

The difficulty of putting the AWS into full operation as a prac- 
tical matter was the insistence of General Short that he retain con- 
trol for training purposes whereas the best training would have been 
to put the system into practical operation. [-?^^] Of this Gen- 
eral Martin said : 

The Department commander would not turn those (the operating stations) 
over to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Forces until he ( Short) had 
completed the training under his Department Signal Officer. He refused to turn 
them over unless he considered they were properly trained. So they were still 
training under those conditions and had not been turned over to the Air Force 
the morning of the attack on December 7th. (R. 1824.) 

Here again is another example of the whole organization of the 
Army in Hawaii being held in a training status instead of acquiring 
its training in or near combat positions, where it would have been 
ready for any eventuality. As General Martin said : 

They were capable of operating . . . the equipment used primarily in the 
training of personnel to take over the operation of the control area. (11. 1824.) 

General Martin is confirmed in this by Commander Taylor, 
loaned by the Navy for the purpose of getting this service into opera- 
tion. Commander Taylor confirmed the fact that: 

On December 7th the plotters were reasonably well trained to watch and 
able to do checking without any controller on the plane. The only source of 
controllers we could find was to see the Squadron Commander of the Pursuit 
Squadrons at Wheeler Field . . . We had no liaison people to man any of the 
positions ... On December 7 all the comninnication lines were in ; the radar 
stations ; the Derax equipment was working satisfactorily enough to give air 
warning and possibly to make interceptions. The air-to-grountl radio equipment 



108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was not satisfactory for interception work, but it was possible that enough 
advance information could be given to pilots so that they could come back without 
being intercepted. (R. 1082.) 

However, the radio equipment that would have enabled control 
through interception a reasonable distance offshore had been given 
to the Ferry Command. This situation is treated elsewhere, but it 
should be pointed out, to avoid confusion, that on and before Decem- 
ber 7th the aircraft warning center was able to pick up incoming- 
planes and to give notification of that fact. It was not fully able to 
perform its other function, [167'] which was supplementary to 

the Information Center, that is, for full cooperation in conjunction 
with an Interceptor Command to intercept the incoming planes in the 
full sense of that arrangement. 

So far advanced was the organization and apparatus that it would 
have been fully complete within ten days to two weeks at the time 
of the attack. As Commander Taylor said : 

The only thing that was not carried through after this meeting (a conference 
to wind up the details of organization) to bring the thing into operation at the 
end of wo weeks was the manpower to operate it. (R. 1083.) 

Taylor, in turn, is confirmed in this by one of the most energetic 
officers who was working with Taylor in pressing this aircraft warning 
system to conclusion, Colonel Bergquist, then a Major. He endeavored 
to have 24-hour service by November 24th and stated that the mobile 
units could have stood it. There was some minor trouble with the 
stand-by power gas engines, but this was of little importance and the 
system could have run 24 hours a day. He had been running a school 
since October known as the "Air Defense School" in which he was 
training Army and Marine officers and as many pursuit officers of the 
Air Corps as he could get. The delay was from the Signal Corps. As 
Colonel Bergquist said : 

I was continually harping to the Signal Corps people to get the stations up 
and get them operating. (R. 1201.) 

Despite the efforts of General Martin with Department Head- 
quarters, very few results were secured in making the Signal Corps 
let go their technical operation and allow the practical people who 
were going to operate it go to work. This is described by Colonel 
Bergquist, who said : 

One of the big arguments was : we wanted to take over the radar stations and 
get them set up and operating. The [i6S] Signal Corps said no, that was 
their job; they wanted to get them up and get them operating and then turn 
them over to us for our operational control. The Department headquarters 
decided in favor of the Signal Corps. (R. 1196.) 

This delayed the ultimate completion of the system by a month. 
(R. 1196.) 
He stated that: 

My opinion on that is that they (the enlisted men) were fairly well trained 
at that stage of the game. (R. 1197.) 

This state of training is further described by him as follows : 

Well, I think we had had the sets operating in practice a sufficient length of 
time so that the radar scope operators that we had were fairly well trained. We 
had plotters and information center personnel of the Signal Corps fairly well 
trained. I was in the process of training what I called pursuit officers, which ie 
one of tJie positions on the board — on the control platform, that is — by running 



REPORT OF ARIMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 109 

a roster of the fighter pilots in the Interceptor Command in order to do two things : 
to both train them to function as pursuit officers on the control board and to 
acquaint them with the workings of the board in order to better carry out in- 
structions that they received from the board on flying missions. The only con- 
trollers that we had, we considered, that could operate, that were trained suffi- 
ciently, were myself. Major Tindal — I mean Colonel Tindal ; he was a Major 
at that time — and I did have with me at that time Commander William E. G. 
Taylor of the Navy. The other positions on the control platform, we did have an 
antiaircraft liaison officer, and had conducted problems with them so that tliey 
were in a fair state of training. We had not been able to get the Navy liaison 
officers assigned, so there was no one trained in that. The same applies to the 
bomber command liaison, the liaison officers with the Hawaiian Department 
headquarters. (K. 1191-1192.) 

At thi^ time the system had a maximmn range of approximately 130 
miles. (R. 1190.) 

On November 24th there was a conference of interested Army and 
Navy officers on this subject, and the consensus of opinion of these 
experts amon^ the younger officers who were actually getting this 
Information Center into operation was expressed by Commander 
Taylor : 

[169] It was felt that the Information Center could be made to function 
adequately within the next two weeks. (The conference was on November 24, 
1941.) We found after that, after this, to qualify it, that that would be except 
for the air-to-ground radio communications. We learned that we could not keep 
contact with the fighter aircraft more than five miles offshore with the communi- 
cation equipment we had at that time. (R. 1077.) 

This confirms the testimonj^ of others that the only thing lacking 
was the IFF equipment on the planes to enable identification of the 
planes in the air by ground personnel. Considerable equipment had 
been withdrawn from the Interceptor Command and the Hawaiian 
Air Force for this purpose for the use of the Ferry Command. 
(R. 1079.) 

As to the operatability of the aircraft warning service on the morning 
of December 7th, Commander Taylor testifying said : 

If we had had the Information Center completely manned there would have 
been some method of identification. Anybody could have told what that (the 
Japanese) flight was. (R. 1085.) 

The Navy had not yet participated in the operation, although 
Commander Taylor said they had been requested to do so about a 
week before Pearl Harbor. (R. 1086.) 

This brings us to the question of why General Short or his staff 
did not take more vigorous action in putting this most important part 
of the defenses into operation, particularly in view of the fact that 
both the long-distance reconnaissance by the Navy and the inshore 
reconnaissance by the Army were, for all practical purposes, non- 
existent. Commander Taylor was asked, when he found these delays, 
whether he had ever seen General Short, to which Taylor replied in 
the negative by saying : 

I saw his chief of staff. I saw his operations officer. We were very closely 
tied in with his staff and the Air Force staff. (R. 1089.) 

[170] We saw every chief of staff, but we found that somebody else was 
always responsible. (R. 1088.) 

Colonel Powell, Hawaiian Department Signal Officer, said repeated 
efforts to get the Navy to cooperate by supplying naval officers to 
complete the working of the service were fruitless. They were not 
interested. (R. 3906.) 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 157 8 



110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

It is significant that when Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, was 
asked if Short had tried to expedite these matters he professed ig- 
norance (K. 1143), but it was Phillips, as Chief of Stall to Short, 
who Taylor and others said was principally responsible for acting 
on Short's behalf in this matter. (K. 1088.) .. ^i 

Colonel Powell testified that the constiniction of permanent instal- 
lations did not hold up the placing of the Information Center and 
the radar stations into operation because there was adequate equip- 
ment for this purpose that was actually installed m temporary build- 
ings for the Information Center and that radar mobile stations were 
placed around the Island. t . ^ ^• 

As a consequence the Information Center and the radar stations 
were in operation some time prior to December 7th. The only reason 
they were not operated continuously 24 hours a day was the desire 
to conserve tubes, as they were short of tubes and other spare parts. 
Two permanent radars. No. 271, were received on June 3, and a 
third radar, No. 271-A, was also received on June 3. On August 1 
six mobile radar stations were received and shortly thereafter put 
into operation. They were complete and self-contained and only 
needed to be placed at some appropriate elevation. 

Colonel Powell testified that the entire service was oper- \_171- 
17'3] ative about the 1st of November, 1941. The installations for 
the permanent radar and Information Center were held up by the 
Engineer construction and were not held up by any lack of informa- 
tion or drawings or equipment of the Signal Corps. 

Colonel Powell testified that the location of the centers was made 
by a board from Washington. This board ordered the abandonment 
of Kaala at 4,000 feet on the theory that while the range would be 
extended to 150 miles from Hawaii yet there would be no detection 
of planes within the 20-inile radius close to shore. This does not 
sound logical because the great necessity was the locating of planes 
at a maximum distance from Hawaii. The other stations lower 
down were fully capable of picking up the close, inshore approach of 

aircraft 

Colonel Powell added the significant statement that the Navy took 

little interest in the radar system and 

We were never able to get any liaison officer over from the Navy to take 
part in the exercises or carry on the work. ( R. 3906. ) 

This is confirmed bv the fact that Navy liaison officers never were 
supplied for the Information Center although it had been m oper- 
ation for some weeks prior to December 7 and the Army had supplied 
a number of officers to be trained. (E. 3906.) 

General Short testified again as to the reason why he was intj^rested 
in keeping the aircraft warning service in training. He said: 

We had gotten along in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we 
-ot them we started nsing them right away; and when this message of tlie 
^>7tli came along. I prescribed that the aircraft warning service wonld f"nction 
those hours. In addition to that, they had their normal training. They 
trained then from 7 to 11, and they had maintenance work, work of that kind, 

^^^^731 ^ Now, it turned out that we were putting a little bit too great a 
strain on this materiel, and later in the afternoon period we had three stations 
working from 11 to 1, and three working from 1 to 4, so that there was a^ little 
more chance for maintenance work and keeping them in shape. But tMt was 
the situation, and the Interceptor Coinn<and was working with them. We were 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 111 

trying to educate the Interceptor Commancl and the Aircraft Warning Service, 
and using this training period as an opportunity to give them work at what 
we considered the most dangerous time of the day. The Navy had a liaison 
officer functioning with this outfit. (R. 298.) 

Two explanations have been advanced as to the reason why the 
aircraft warning service was not put into operation fully. The first 
was that the signal equipment was not ready until very late; the 
testimony of Colonel Powell, in charge of this matter for the Signal 
Corps, plus what actually occurred as to its actually going into op- 
eration for nearly a month before the permanent construction was 
erected, is ample to overrule this objection. (R. 3896-3898.) 

The second explanation was that there were serious delays in 
construction. But such delays in permanent construction did not 
delay the aircraft warning service because it was using temporary 
housing for its Information Center, and its mobile radar stations 
were operative without any permanent housing. (R. 3885.) 

As to the Interceptor Command and the Information Center of 
the aircraft warning service. General Burgin, Conmianding General 
of the antiaircraft artillery, said : 

It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming 
in, and immediately the Interceptor Command would take over. (R. 2604.) 

He explained how the Interceptor Command had been working 
during previous trials and exercises. While the Interceptor Com- 
mand was not fully functioning due to the lack of IFF instruments 
on the planes, yet there was ample AWS means for [i'/"^] de- 
fense and interception that it could have used to a material degree 
on the morning of December 7, 1941. The Interceptor Command 
was just being set up, but the nucleus of its operation was there, and 
it would have been an effective instrument had it been used when the 
attack came. This was not done. 

3. Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Defenses. — General Burgin 
commanded the Coast Artillery Command consisting of seacoast ar- 
tillery plus all antiaircraft artillerj^ in the Hawaiian Department. 
He commanded the 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade composed of the 
64th Regiment, 251st Regiment, and the 98th Regiment. 

He testified that the Interceptor Command was being organized 
on a temporary basis saying: 

We had constant training and maneuvers, practice, where* that particular 
thing was stressed, and the antiaircraft was turned over to interceptor Com- 
mand * * * For at least six weeks or two months prior to December 7, 
we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy. Our AA 
would go out in the tield and take their field positions. They would know 
that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, andi they would simu- 
late an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the road- 
ways, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this simu- 
lated attack made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to 
December 7 * * * On Sunday ; but, by some stroke, we did not go out on 
December 7. The fleet was in the harbor. 

And again he said, as to the Interceptor Command: 

It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming 
in, and immediately the interceptor command would take over. AU that is, 
so far as turning it over to the interceptor command, is that the interceptor 
command tells you when to hold fire and when to resume fire. (R. 2602- 
2604.) 



112 CONGRESSIONAL IN\T:STIGATI0N PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

This brought him to his opinion expressed in the record that if the 
Interceptor Command had worked during the drills and exercises on 
the morning of December 7, then it could have worked for the attack. 
He said in his opinion it would not [175] have made any 
difference anyway, 

because we didn't have ammunition with our mobile antiaircraft. If they 
had been out in the field without any ammunition, they would have been worse 
off than they actually were. (R. 2604.) 

He said of his antiaircraft batteries: 

They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that 
the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. (R. 2604.) 

A reference to the next section will show that it was General 
Short who supported the Ordnance Department in refusing to issue 
this ammunition to troops when thev went out for exercises in the 
field. 

Additionally, General Burgin found that he could not even put 
his guns into final positions because of the conditions now described. 

General Burgin pointed out one of the great handicaps to de- 
velopment of field artillery positions was resistance from land owners 
to letting the artillery go on the land or lease it for the placing of 
battery positions. He described the situation as follows : 

General Russell. Is it true, therefore, General, that prior to December 7, 
1941, so far as you can recall, you had never had all of your mobile batteries 
in the positions which they were to occupy in the event of hostilities? 

General Bubgin. That is correct ; they had not all been in the actual position 
they were to go in. 

Geneial Fkank. Was that because of this opposition of the people who owned 

the land? 

General Bubgin. Yes. and the fact that we had not yet gotten the leases all 
fixed up, so that we could move into those positions for practice. (R. 2628.) 

He also pointed out that if General Short had gone to Alert No. 3 
there would have been great opposition from important and influential 
civilians on the island and particularly [176] those who com- 
pose what is known as the Big Five. 

As to this he said : 

General Russehji Is there in your mind some thought that there would have 
been developed a considerable opposition among the influential civilian popula- 
tion here on the island toward the results of Alert Number 3? 

General Bubgin. I think there is no doubt about it, in the world. 

General Russell. In other words, if General Short had ordered Alert Number 
3— and I am asking this question in the interest of clarity— if General Short had 
ordered Alert Number 3 and thrown all of his people into readiness for immediate 
combat, including the issuing of ammunition, it might, or, in your opinion, it 
would have provoked opposition on the part of some of the responsible and 
influential civilian population here on the island? 

General Bubgin. I feel positive it would. 

General Gbunekt. Even though he might have explained that to the influential 
citizens, there would still have been opposition? 

General Bubgin. I don't believe you could have explained it, at that time. 

General Geuneet. Who are some of those influential citizens that you think 
might have voiced their objection? 

General Burgin. Oh, my ! 

General Gbunebt. Is Dillingham one of them? 

Genei-al Bubgin. Mr. Dillingham, Mr. Walker. 

General Fbank. Which Walker? 

General Bubgin. I don't know. He is a sugar man. General Wells. (R. 2629.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 113 

He said amongst those people were the Hawaiian Sugar Planters 
Association, and those having the land and crop interests in sugar, 
pineapples, etc. 

In this connection it should be noted that there is proof in this record 
that one of the things that may have influenced Short in selecting Alert 
Number 1 and not stirring up the Japanese population was the opposi- 
tion that developed then and [177] later from the large com- 
mercial interests on the Island using Japanese labor, that they did not 
want it disturbed and that they would be shut down in their business 
if a substantial portion of it was either deported or interned. (R. 
2654.) 

As General Buigin testified, if the tables had been reversed and 
Americans had been situated in Japan like the Japanese were in Hawaii 
they would have been locked up before the war started and not after- 
wards. (R. 2649.) 

4. AmTnunition Issue: Shorfs and the Ordnance Departments Re- 
sponsibility. — The Ordnance Department in the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment in its misdirected effort to safeguard and maintain ammunition 
in a serviceable condition objected to a full issue thereof to troops 
except in an emergency. Such issues in an emergency entailed delays 
which delayed troops in getting into position and action. (E. 2607.) 

General Burgin, who commanded the antiaircraft artillery, stated 
that he and General Murray, who commanded one of the infantry divi- 
sions, personally went to the staff and to General Short, who turned 
them down and refused to allowthe issue of the ammunition for the 
artillery and the infantry. Later there was some relaxation of the 
issue of infantry ammunition. Colonel Weddington testified that on 
the morning of December 7th he had insufficient ammunition, that 
there was none for his rifles and ground machine guns, and that the 
only extra supply of ammunition was belted ammunition for his 
aircraft machine guns. (R. 3026-2027.) 

The artillery ammunition situation is summed up by General Burgin 
as follows: 

[i7S] They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception 
that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries along 
the seacoast, those batteries bolted down to concrete, had the ammunition 
nearby. I had insisted on that with General Short in person and had gotten his 
permission to take this antiaircraft ammunition, move it into the seacoast gun 
battery positions, and have it nearby the antiaircraft gims. It was, however, 
boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out. The ammunition for the 
mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which, you may know or 
may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter, up in the old volcano. The mobile 
batteries had to send there to get ammunition. In addition to that, the mobile 
batteries had to move out from the various posts to their field positions. They 
were not in field positions. (R. 2604-2605.) 

He described the efforts of General Murray and himself to get the 
Ordnance Department to release this ammunition and how he was 
overruled by General Short's staff and General Short himself, in the 
following language: 

General Buegin. Yes, sir, we did. I would like to answer that a little more 
elaborately. You may recollect yourself the great difficulty in prying loose am- 
munition from our storehouses and from the ordnance during peacetime. It 
was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out because in the 
minds of everyone who has preservation of ammunition at heart it goes out, 
gets damaged, comes back in, and has to be renovated. The same was especially 



114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammunitiou out of the maga- 
zines We tried the ordnance people without results. General Max Murray 
and mvself went personally to General Short. General Murray pled for his 
ammunition for the field artillery. I asked for ammunition for the antiair- 
craft. We were put oE, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammu- 
nition in plenty of time, that we would have warning before any attack ever 

General Frank. Was that putting ofE made directly by the Commanding 
General or by a staff department? 

General Burgin, Both ; staff departments first, then the Commanding General 
in person. 

General Frank. Supported them? 

[179] General Burgin. In his own office, to General Murray and to me. 

General Frank. Well, what were the staff' departments who opposed it ? 

General Btjrgin. The Gs : G-4s, the Ordnance. 

General Frank. And their i-easons were? 

General Burgin. Same old reason, that they didn't want to issue any of the 
clean ammunition, let it get out and get dirty, have to take it back in later on 
and renovate it ; and, besides, we would get our ammunition in plenty of time 
should any occasion arise. (R. 2607-2608.) 

Apparently one of the reasons in General Short's mind was sabo- 
tage, if the ammunition was out with the guns. As General Burgin 
testified: 

As long as the ammunition could be left locked up in the magazines, it was 
pretty safely guarded and could not be tampered with to any great extent. 
(R. 2608.) 

He testified that without ammunition for his guns it would take 
from a few minutes to six hours before he could get his guns into 
position and firing. He was never permitted to take live ammunition 
on any of his practices and as 50% of the mobile gims were on private 
land he had been unable to even place half of his guns in position, and 
they were unable to take ammunition with them. (R. 2608-9-10. ) 

Therefore on the morning of December 7th he was caught in this 
position with only armnunition adjacent his fixed gun batteries, but 
half of his guns were without ammunition. 
As General Burgin summed it up, 

It was just impossible to pry the ammunition loose from the Ordnance, the 
G-4s, or from General Short himself. (R. 2612.) 

General Maxwell Murray testified as to his difficulties in getting 
ammunition for both his field artillery and his [180] infantry, 
as follows : 

General Grunebt. . . . First, I would like to talk to you about artillery 
ammunition, and ask you this question : Why was not sufficient ammunition at 
hand for the artillery, on December 7? 

General Muekat. There was sufficient artillery ammunition on hand, but it 
had not been issued to troops. 

General Gkunebt. I mean 'at hand,' not 'on hand.' 

General Murray. I was not authorized to draw the artillery ammunition from 
the magazines. I requested authority from General Short to draw artillery am- 
munition and stack it ; T suggested either in the gun parks or the division review 
field, in small stacks. The division review field, as you know, is a large area 
immediately adjacent to the old artillery park, and had been planned as the 
dispersal area for the artillery. (R. 3075-^076.) 

General Geunert. Now, we get back to the ammunition. You say there was 
no ammunition immediately available to you for quick action; is that right? 

General Murray. So far as I can recall, we did not have a round of ammuni- 
tion in the gun parks. 

General Gbunert. And, in case you were turned out. to go on an alert which 
required ammunition, you would then have to draw it from somewhere? 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 115 

General Murray. We had to draw it. 

General Gbukebt. Where did it come from? 

General Mubray. We drew it directly ; the majority of it was drawn at Scho- 
field Barracks, although the artillery units of the Eighth Field Artillery, which 
came directly to the positions in Honolulu and Hickam Field, immediately adja- 
cent to it, were to draw ammunition at the Aliamanu Crater, which was down 
liere near Pearl Harbor. ( R. 30S0. ) 

General Murray had made arrangements to have separate entrances 
to get the ammunition out of the storage houses, but even with that 
effective arrangement, plus piling ammunition in the warehouses ac- 
cording to unit, it -would take an hour at least to get the ammunition 
so the guns could [iSl] go to the beaches to defend the island. 

As General Murray said : 

I was not satisfied, myself, witli the status of our ammunition for either the 
infantry or the artillery. (R. 3081.) 

He had a limited amount of machine gun ammunition and rifle am- 
munition. He liad a large number of machine guns in each rifle com- 
pany, extra guns, and 

It was obviou.sly impossible — most of our ammunition was not belted— it was 
obviouslv impossible to get out the ammunition and belt it without serious delay. 
(R. 3081.) 

He had only two belt loading machines for each heavy weapon corn- 
pan}^, and it had taken three days to load up the belted ammunition on 
a previous trial. (E.. 3081.) After applying to General Short he had 
been authorized to draw and belt machine-gun ammunition, draw the 
necessary rifle ammunition, and store it in the parks. He was not 
allowed to have mortar ammunition or high-explosive grenades inside 
the barracks ; that ordnance had to be left in the Ordnance Depot, as 
was the artillery ammunition. He testified (R. 3081) that it w^as Gen- 
eral Short who was personally supporting his ordnance officer and G-4 
in following the peacetime practice of holding ammunition in depots 
where it would take hours to get it out in the event of a raid. 

He testified that his movement of ammunition into the barracks was 
in violation of the standing orders of the post, but he had made 
that movement of ammunition on the express authorization of Gen- 
eral Short. (R. 3091.) 

It is to be recalled that when the War Department ordered General 
Herron, in 1940, into an alert in which he stayed for six weeks, he was 
able to draw his ammunition immediately and [18^^] take it 
with him imto the field. 

The testimony of General Burgin as to his inability to get ammuni- 
tion for use with his antiaircraft ^uns is borne out by the testimony 
of Colonel Weddington of the Air Corps that when he was in command 
of the Bellows Field base his efforts to get ammunition for bis machine 
guns and rifles were met by a response from the Ordnance Department, 
on each request he made, that the ammunition was not available and 
was not authorized and that This was by General Short's order. 

Lack of ammimition preparations was shown in the testimony of 
Colonel Weddington, who was in command of Bellows Field prior 
to and on December 7th. (R. 3026-3027.) He tej^tified that it was the 
custom for the ships (aircraft) that were at gunnery practice to be 
parked on the ramp on Satui'day afternoon, close to one anotlier. Tlie 
guiis were taken on the planes for deanhig, the i)Uuie^ were out of gas 



116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and were not to be refueled until Sunday, and the gas was brought over 
by truck from Honolulu and did not arrive until sometime later 
in the day. He also indicated that many of the pilots were away over 
the weekend. 

It was in this condition that the attack was launched upon them and 
they were unable to defend themselves. He said they had 30,000 round3 
of belted ammunition but no rifle ammunition for their guards and no 
machine-gun ammunition. When the attack came they were also 
without any 30-caliber machine-gun bullets. His repeated efforts to get 
ammunition from the Ordnance Department met with the statement 
that it was not available and not authorized, and its failure to be issued 
was on General Short's order. 

[1831 ' S. Status of Aircraft Defenses. — The difficulties with sup- 
ply of both aircraft and parts to maintain aircraft, due to the condi- 
tions depicted in Chapter 2, Background, are no better illustrated than 
in the case of aircraft. The failure previous to 1941 to provide ex- 
tended aircraft programs and the necessity for revising designs to 
meet modern combat conditions, as revealed by the European War, 
joined together to put the War Department in a difficult situation with 
respect to a sufficienty of aircraft. 

On the deficiency of equipment in Hawaii, General Martin, Com- 
manding General, Hawaiian Air Force, testified he had written 
General Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Force, personal letters as well 
as sent official communications with reference to his obsolete aircraft, 
the lack of spare parts for the modern craft that he had, and the 
necessity for placing his aircraft in combat condition with adequate 
weapons, et cetera. R. 1858-A, 1859, 1860, 1861, 1862, 1863, 1874 
to 1889, inclusive.) 

While correspondence shows a failure on the part of the Army Air 
Forces to supply the correct equipment, adequate equipment, spare 
parts, and enough of it to be effective, yet Hawaii was better off than 
other commands. As General Marshall expressed it : 

As to Hawaii, that had the largest troop concentration we possessed, it had the 
maximum of materiel that we possessed, and we were accumulating the first 
fighter planes, of the type that we possessed at that time, in the Hawaiian 
garrison. 

As to Panama : if the Hawaiian state of preparation in men and materiel was 
100, Panama was about 25 percent, and the Philippines about 10 percent, and 
Alaska and the Aleutians completely negligible. 

[ISJi-l As elsewhere stated, on December 7, 1941, General Martin 
had under his command 123 modern pursuit and bombardment planes, 
15 observation planes, 2 transports, 5 observation amphibians, and 8 
basic trainers. He had non-modern medium bombers to the number 
of 39, 9 light bombers, and 62 non-modern pursuit ships. 

General Martin testified : 

When I took over from General Frank in the Hawaiian Islands we had, you 
might say, no combat equipment. We had some P-26s, an old obsolete type of 
fighter which we then called a pursuit airplane. We had some old observation 
planes, some B-18 bombers which could never protect themselves in any combat 
at all. They could be used for reconnaissance, but you would lose them as fast 
as you sent them out, if they went into combat. They were always recognized as 
not being a combat ship. In the spring of 1941 we received possibly 50 P-36s. 
They were obsolescent at the time they came over. A little later — as I remember 
it, about May— we received some P-40 fighters. These ships were brought in on 
carriers and flown off to the station after they arrived in Hawaii. About May 
we received 21 B-17s that were ferried over by air. 9 of these, about the 5th 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 117 

or 6th of September, were transferred to the Philippines by air. The 12 remain- 
ing were ordered to proceed to the Philippines ; and upon our request that they 
be delayed, that we could continue the training of combat crews for that type 
of ship, as the two bombardment groups at Hickam Field would be equipped with 
that type of airplane, they would go on the tail of some 60-odd airplanes that 
were being transferred from the mainland to the Philippines. . . . The types 
of ships which could have been used in combat, which is the P-40, B-17, and ten 
A-20s, were always possibly 50 percent out of commission due to spare parts 
In the beginning of our production program all monies, as possible, were placed 
into the producing of additional engines, and the spare parts requirements were 
neglected at the time. Therefore the new airplanes coming out were deficient 
to meet the requirements of spare parts. We had sent cablegrams and letters on 
the subject of spare parts through proper channels to our supply agencies and 
they were not in a position to help us. I knew that, but I did want them to be 
sure to realize how important it was to improve the spare-part situation as 
rapidly as possible. If we had an accident in one of our ships we used what they 
call cannibalism to rob it of certain spare parts to repair other ships. 
Therefore the training program had to be rather extensive for the fighters We 
were receiving men just out of the schools, who had not had advance training 
at the time: that is, a limited advance training but not on any of the modern 
equipment. So they were put through a demonstration of their ability to handle 
the old, obsolescent P-26, then through the P-36 and on to the P^O, and consid- 
erable progress was being made in training these men to take over the P^O 
equipment. . . . The bombers, as soon as we got B-17s, in I think it was 
sometime in May, we had a few of our pilots that had flown the B-17s They 
started training others, and as I remember there were one or two officers re- 
mained with the first flight of bombers that came over, and helped train other 
additional crews. So they had to train the pilots to operate the ship, the co-pilots 
and all other members of the crew. We had no knowledge of repairing its 
engines or any of its equipment. ... In other words, they had consumed 
some of their own fat, so to speak, to meet the enlargement of the technically 
school facility. We were getting but a fpw technical trained men There 

were possibly 400 men in these schools, as I remember. (R. 18.58-1 to 1861.) 

It is to be remembered that the record shows that the Japanese 
carriers had over 400 modern aircraft which they brought against 
the Island, so that the superiority was overwhelming. 
^ Although General Short gave a high priority to airfield construc- 
tion, there were many delays due in part to slowness in getting funds 
and to the inefficiency of contractors under the supervision^of the 
District Engineer. 

Some elements of the Air Force in Hawaii had been used durino- 
1941 primarily as a training force for officers and men who were bein^ 
sent into the Philippines and into the outlying islands. The per"^ 
sonnel of these elements, therefore, were largely untrained or par- 
tially trained personnel, as the more competent were constantly beino- 
forwarded into what was then advance theaters where the danger wa*s 
deemed to be greater. Therefore, much of the Air Force was in a 
training status primarily. This has been pictured elsewhere in this 
r.?2n^ through the testimony of General Short, General Martin, 
11^6} Colonel Mollison, and others. 

-, o J!^^ ?^^'^* ^^^^^ "^ ^^^^ ^^*^^^ P^^t of 1941 was to get B-l7s, of which 
180 had been allotted to Hawaii. As there were only 109 B-l7s in the 
entire Army (E. 154) it was obviously impossible to comply with this 
request. General Marshall testified that he had sent General Arnold 
to the West Coast to see what he could do to get these B-l7s to the 
Philippines via Hawaii, and that they had been held up by contrary 
winds and production delays for more than three or four weeks. (R 
167-168.) General Arnold testified as follows : 

General Frank. Had anything held up B-17 production that in any way had 
an effort on this situation? 



118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Arnold. No ; we did not have the facilities to get the numbers that we 
wanted. If you will remember, at that time in our endeavor to get B-17s we had 
!)0 in January, and by June the 90 was up to 109, and by November it had only 
gone up to 148. That was the total number of B-17s produced by the Boeing 
Company. We just did not have the productive capacity to get the numbers 
required. (R. 180.) 

Due to this condition the pLanes had been flown out with their guns, 
but without their ammunition, to save weight, a factor that was inter- 
preted by Short as indicating that no attack was expected on Hawaii. 

However, the impression in Washington, as testified to by General 
Arnold, was that the Hawaiian Air Force was in good shape despite 
its heavy training mission. He "testified: 

We were always of the belief that the Hawaiian Air Force was probably better 
trained than any of our air forces. That is the impression we had here in. 
Washington as a result of our inspections and due to the fact that they were 
always carrying out some form of mission simulating what they would do in 
active combat. (R. 179.) 

[187] In order to develop this further, the following question 
was put and answer gained : 

General Frank. What I was about to approach was this point, which your 
present answer seems to disclaim, namely, that because of the fact that they were 
charged with training a lot of crews to fly B-17s from California to Honolulu 
and then conduct a lot of transition training in Honolulu, and do certain training 
work in preparation for transferring squadrons to the Philippines, that perhaps 
they got themselves into a training state of mind rather than a war state of 

General Arnold. I wrote to General Martin, as I said, from time to time, and 
the establishment of a transition school in Hawaii was not done until we were 
•issured that they would get more effective results by carrying this transition on 
in Hawaii tlian if it were done in the United States. In other words, we had 
no air force, as such, anvwhere at that time. No matter where you had that 
training it was going to disrupt something. Where could we put that training 
<<() it would interfere least with the creation of the small air force that we did 
have'' And it looked to us as if they could carry on this transition m Hawaii 
jind interfere less with the training than anywhere else because we would have 
the airplanes then available, in case of an emergency, where they would be most 
needed. (R. 179-180.) 

It will, therefore, be seen that the Hawaiian Air Force was handi- 
capped by conducting a training program not only for itself but also 
for othertheaters of action ; its ships were mainly obsolete, its modern 
ships were few, and there was a marked deficiency of spare parts, and 
its airfield construction was lagging. Such was the status on Decem- 
ber 7, 1941, of the Army Air Force installations. 

[188] E. STATUS OF DEFENSES ON 8UNDAT MORNING, 

DECEMBER 7, 1941 

1. Arm/1/ Aircraft.— On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, the 
status of the island defenses was at the minimum. 

As General Burgin testified : 
"Tpeculiar thing attaches to that. For at least six weeks or two months prior 
to December 7, we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the 
Navy. 

Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions. They would 
know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would 
simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the 
roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating tire against this simu- 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 119 

lated attack made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to 
l)ecember 7. 

General Feank. On Sunday? 

General Bukgin. On Sunday but, by some stroke, we did not go out on Decem- 
ber 7. The fleet was in tlie harbor. (R. 2603.) 

On that morning, due to Alert #1, all planes, with some minor ex- 
ceptions, were grouped together wing to wing. There were 80 pur- 
suit planes in commission and 09 out of commission in various states 
of repair. There were 'VJ bombers in commission and l]o out of com- 
mission. Of the bombers in commission the only ones available for 
a real mission were C flying fortresses and 10 A-20s. The old B-18s 
were of minor value. There were a few fighter aircraft that morning 
that were at a remote field, apparently unknown to the Japanese, where 
a squadron was practicing short landings. It was out of this group 
that there came the brilliant performance of Major (then Lieutenant) 
Welch, who courageously got his ship off the ground, together with his 
wing man. Major Welch and his w^ing man shot clown a number 
of Japanese [■^'^^J aircraft. 

The Navy hacl no PBYs in the air that morning, although they 
usually had four to six for doing reconnaissance. Perhaps this is 
explained by General Burgin's testimony that while every Sunday 
morning the antiairci-aft artillery had an exercise with the Navy when 
the Navy sent its carrier-based planes from ship to shore, and this 
continued up to the Sunday before December 7th, the Navy planes 
did not get into the air on this particular December 7th. (E.. 2603.) 
The fleet was also in the harbor that Sunday, the only vessels of 
material character that were out being the carriers ENTEKPRISE 
and LEXINGTON. The ENTERPEISE. with the addition of 
heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, was about 200 miles west 
of Oahu. Task Force No. 12 was approximately 425 miles southeast 
of Midway, with the carrier LEXINGTON (R. 44^^^-445) ; therefore 
there was not a single carrier in Pearl Harbor that morning. 
(R. 540.) 

2. Naval Long -Distance Reconnaissance. — The situation as to the 
long-distance reconnaissance supposed to have been conducted by the 
Navy is admirably and frankly explained by Admiral DeLany, who 
was assistant chief of staff for operations on the staff of the Comman- 
der-in-Chief, United States Fleet, during this period : Admiral DeLany 
testified that there was absolutely no protection or screen thrown out 
by the Navy on the morning of December 7th, and no attempt to 
obtain information about the launching of an attack upon Oahu. He 
further testified, "There were neither planes, pilots, nor other facili- 
ties available to conduct and maintain such a U^O'] continuous 
reconnaissance" as would be necessary in order to maintain a 360- 
degree reconnaissance around the island. They realized the danger 
but there was nothing that could be done about it. (R. 1728.) 

Admiral Bellinger, who was Commander of the Navy Base Defense 
Air Force, Commander, Patrol Wing 2, and Commander, Task Force 
9, said that on the morning of December 7th he had a total of 81 PBYs 
in Patrol Wings 1 and 2, which included those at Midway, leaving a 
total of 69 on Oahu, with 9 out of commission. The reconnaissance 
work that was being conducted normally each morning at sunrise was 
merely to search the fleet operating areas for submarines so that the 



120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

fleet could operate on exercises without molestation. He usually sent 
out three to six planes "to guard against submarine attack." He testi- 
fied that the only patrolling being done as a defense against a surprise 
attack was in the vicinity of Midway. (R 1600.) He testified as fol- 
lows: 

General Frank. You had no instructions from anybody to conduct any search 
against a force to protect you from a surprise attack? 

Admiral Belmngeu. We had had on specific occasions, when there was some 
apparent reason for doing so. That instance had occurred for one or two differ- 
ent sectors over the periods during the year. (R. 1601.) 

Admiral Kimmel summarized the situation when he testified as 

follows : 

General Russell. You have testified, and it has been supported by a line of 
evidence here, that there was not available to the Army and Navy any means 
for distant reconnaissance to ascertain the location of a Japanese task force. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. (R. 1805.) 

[191] General Gkunebt. Were there any planes on distant reconnaissance 
on that morning? . . ^-u j. 

Admiral Bellingee. There were no planes on distant reconnaissance in the true 
sense of the term "distant reconnaissance." (R. 1629-1630.) 

This failure to do distant reconnaissance cannot be excused for lack 
of planes under Navy control because the Navy had 50 PB Ys available. 
The only excuse for not using them was, as stated by Admiral Kmimel : 

We wanted to maintain our training status. Up to the last minute we had 
received no orders to mobilize. (R. 1811.) 

Admiral Bellinger testified that the relationship between the Navy 
and the Army for the use of Army planes from the fighter group of 
the Army was not in a functioning status. (K. 1622.) He had 33 
scout bombers, 7 fighters, and 9 scouts available on the morning of 
December 7th, but they were not being used. ( R. 1623.) As witnesses 
testified, they were accustomed to seeing PBYs go out each morning, 
but on Sunday morning, December 7th, they did not go out. (See 
General Rudolph's and Colonel Brooks' testimony, R. 993-994, 1232- 
1234.) 

3. Aircraft Warning System. — The radar aircraft warning system 
had the information center completed and organized with five mobile 
radar stations which were operating. They had been in operation 
from four to seven o'clock each morning for training purposes but had 
not gone into regular operation. It was because of their being in oper- 
ation that Lockard and Elliott picked up the Japanese attack force 
132 miles from Oahu, and this organization functioned continually 
after the attack, so it can be assumed it was in operating condition. 
(R. 439-440-441.) ( See Lockard in other testimony.) 

{192'] As General Short said : 

I think that the men were not experts, but I think they were getting trained 
to the point where they could do pretty well, 

as of December 7, 1941. (R. 508.) They had three heavy radar sets 
complete and six mobile sets complete. (R. 509.) The mobile sets 
were opcTating. (R. 510.) 

General Frank. ... the AWS system was operated with mobile sets up to a 
distance of about 130 miles. Is not that correct? 
General Shoet. That is correct. (R. 512.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 121 

The Interceptor Command "was actually operating," according to 
General Short. He said, "it Avas actually operating daily." (R. 525.) 
An order had not gone out to Burgin and Martin, but it was working. 

4. Antiaircraft Defenses.— M to the antiaircraft, much of it had 
never gone into position so far as mobile guns were concerned, and 
none of the mobile guns was in position on the morning of December 
7th. Ammunition had not been issued because the Ordnance Depart- 
ment objected to having it out convenient to the guns l)ecause it might 
get dirty. As General Burgin said, 

they didn't want to issue any of the clean ammunition. . . . and, besides, we 
would get our ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise. (R. 2608.) 

As it took about six hours to get the ammunition fully out, distrib- 
uted, and broken open, the delay was a very diiScult one. (R. 2608.) 
As General Burgin again testified : 

_ It was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out because 
]n the minds of everyone who has preservation of ammunition at [193] 
heart is goes out, gets damaged, comes back in, and has to be renovated The 
same was especially true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammuni- 
tion out of the magazines. We tried the ordnance people without results Gen- 
eral Max Murray and myself went personally to General Short. General Murray 
pled for his ammunition for the field artillery. I asked for ammunition for 
the antiaircraft. We were put off, the idea behind it ])eing that we would 
get our ammunition in plenty of time, that we would have warning before anv 
attack ever struck. (R. 2607.) 

The two divisions were in their quarters so that it took them a num- 
ber of hours to move out after the attack. One of the principal diffi- 
culties was the necessity of drawing their ammunition, as elsewhere 
discussed. 

The status of the antiaircraft was this : The mobile guns had to secure 
their ammunition from Aliamanu Crater, between two and three miles 
from Fort Shafter. The fixed guns had their ammunition in boxes 
adjacent to the guns. He had 60 mobile guns and 26 fixed o-uns and 
the usual complement of 50-caliber and 30-caliber. He testified as 
follows : 

They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the 
mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. (R. 2604.) 

On the morning of December 7th he had not gone into operation 
with the Navy as one previous Sundays. (R. 2603.) This was due 
to the fleet being in the harbor on that Sunday, and for some reason 
the Navy was not conducting its usual Sunday exercises with him. 
(xi. 2603.) 

5. /Simwa^T/.— Therefore, iliQ situation on December 7th can be 
summed up as follows: No distant reconnaissance was being con- 
ducted by the Navy; the usual four or five PBYs were not out; the 
antiaircraft artillery was not out on its usual Sunday maneuvers with 
the fleet air arm; the naval carriers [194'\ with their planes 
were at a distance from Oahu on that Sunday ; the aircraft were on the 
ground, were parked, both Army and Navy, closely adjacent to one 
another; the fleet was m the harbor with the exception of Task Forces 
? ^^S}^,^^^}^1^ included some cruisers, destrovers, and the two carriers 
LEXINGTON and ENTERPRISE. Ammunition for the Army was, 
with the exception of that near the fixed antiaircraft guns, in ordnance 



122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Storehouses, and the two combat divisions as well as the antiaircraft 
artillery were in their permanent quarters and not in I jattle positions. 
Evervthin^ was concentrated in close confines by reason of the anti- 
sabotage alert No. 1. This made of them easy targets for an air attack. 
In short, everything that was done made the situation perfect tor an 
air attack and the Japanese took full advantage of it. 

[19S] F, THE ATTACK ON DECEMBER 7, 1941 

1 Javanese Intelligence.— Th^ details of the attack have been al- 
ready adequately described. To have a competent understanding of 
the attack and the perfection with which it was executed, we should 
remember that the Japanese had had exceptional opportunities for 
securing the very latest information from a wide variety of sources m 
the islands as to the exact dispositions of the fleet and of our military 
forces. The maps that were found upon Japanese aircraft that were 
shot down or on Japanese aviators or upon Japanese submarine crew 
men indicated a vast amount of meticulously accurate, up-to-date in- 
formation. The fact that one or more submarines were m Pearl Har- 
bor prior to December Tth and had circulated in the harbor and then 
gone out again showed a knowledge of what was going on m Pearl 
Harbor that was substantially complete. 

It is interesting to contrast this activity of the Japanese JNavy m 
o-aining detailed information of our Fleet with the failure of our Navy 
?o glean any information concerning the task force that attacked Pearl 
Harbor from the time that it left Japanese home waters, about Novem- 
ber 22, 1941, and left Tankan Bay about November 28, 1941, until the 
attack took place. . 

For instance, the map found on a Japanese aviator brought down 
'At Fort Kamehameha on December 7th, Exhibit No. 22 ; Exhibits 23, 
24. 25. and 26; and Exhibit No. 48, illustrate with what meticulous 
detail 'the entire operation was worked out, based upon adequate and 
complete intelligence bv the Japanese. It is difficult to understand 
this attack and its ' [196] perfection without first studying 
these maps. The Japanese came to the attack with full information 
of our dispositions and defenses : we met the attack with absolutely 
no information about the Japanese attacking force. The details of 
the securing of this information are set forth elsewhere m this report. 
The Japanese realized that this was the foundation of their war and 
that perfection of execution would have a profound effect politically 
upon their allies and upon the countries of the Far East m which 
they intended to operate. . „ rr^i ^ ^i 

2. Nature and Co^nposition of the Attacking Force.— l.he strength 
of the attacking force has already been stated m this report, based 
upon the extended testimony of Admiral McMorris and Captain 
Layton. It was one of the most powerful naval attacking forces ever 
assembled up to that time, because of the large complement of car- 
riers. Its aviators were of the highest quality of Japanese encoun- 
tered during this war. After they were finally disposed of during 
the later days of the present Pacific war, the testimony is to the effect 
that no equal or superior Japanese aviators have been met. 

Japan evidently brought to bear upon this attack the best brains, 
the best equipment, and the finest intelligence, with the most expert 
planning, which it had. 



PEPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 123 

The first indication of the attack on the IsL^nd of Oahu was the 
detection by the U. S. S. ANTARES of a suspicious object in the 
prohibited area off Pearl Harbor at 6 : 30 a. m. This was found to be 
a small two-man submarine, which was attacked and sunk by the 
concerted action of the U. S. S. WAED and a naval patrol plane be- 
tween 6:33 and 6:45 a. m. on December Tth. The WARD sent a 
report of this action to the Naval Base [197] watch officer 
at 7 : 12 a. m., who immediately notified his chief of staff. A ready 
destroyer was dispatched to investigate, but no alert warnino- was 
issued based upon the report. This was one of the most important 
of a succession of mistakes made during this fateful morning. The 
Navy admits that it did not advise General Short as it should have 
done. 

A second small two-man submarine was sunk inside the harbor be- 
tween 8:35 and 8:43 a. m., and a third one was grounded in the 
Kaneohe Bay and was captured. There was a total altogether of 
five such submarines equipped with two-man crews, one of which was 
captured. The remaining nine crew members were killed, as confinned 
by a Japanese citation later given to these ten men raising them in 
rank. (R. 3038.) These two-man submarines were launched from 
mother submarines a short distance fi-om the Island of Oahu. 

While Pearl Harbor was provided with an antitorpedo net to pre- 
vent the entrance of submarines and this net was kept closed during 
the hours of darkness, being opened only when necessary for a vessel 
to pass through the net, it was kept open continuously durino- day- 
light hours, upon the assumption that the channel entrance destroyer 
the net vessel, and other vessels in the neighborhood, would detect 
any submarines. On the morning of December Tth, the net was opened 
at 4: 58 a. m. for the entrance of two minesweepers and was left open 
until 8 : 40 a. m. when it was closed by order as a result of the attack. 
Ihe net was not damaged and it was fully functioning. Apparently 
the submarine got into the harbor at 7 a. m. It will be recalled that 
prior to December Tth one or more Japanese submarines had already 
been m this harbor, passing [W8] through the net when it 
was opened at 4 a. m. to permit the garbage scow to go throuo-h 

The attacking planes from the six carriers of the attacking force 
numbered approximately 424. (R. 3048.) 

Of this number about 250 to 300 took part in the attack. They con- 
sisted of fighting, bombing and torpedo planes that simultaneously 
and successively attacked Pearl Harbor and the adjacent air bases 
and airfields on Oahu, starting at about T : 55 a. m. The attack was 
oyer by 11 a. m. On these fields the aircraft were carefullv lined up 
wmg to wmg, tip to tip, in the most perfect target position for both 
bombing and machme-gim strafing. This is true both of the Armv 
and of the Navy. The PBYs of the Navy were substantially all de- 
stroyed, and a large number of the Army aircraft met a similar fate, 
ihe landing strips were substantially without damage, possiblv in- 
dicating some subsequent intention on the part of the Japanese to 
employ those landing strips. 

Immediately upon the attack being known to General Short he 
ordered Alert No. 3. This was executed with more than expected 
promptness. 

As already related, this foj-ce of attacking Japanese planes was 
detected about 132 miles north of Oahu. The Japanese force came 



124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

over the island as follows : One force came from the north directly 
across the island, over Schoefield Barracks, Wheeler Field, to Pearl 
Harbor, attacking Wheeler Field and Pearl Harbor. Another force 
came in from the east attacking Kaneohe Field, Bellows Field, and 
Pearl Harbor, and a third force came in from the south attacking 
Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor. The torpedo planes devoted their 
[199] attention to the ships in the harbor. A study of the bomb 

pattern of such places as Hickam Field shows that the attack was 
concentrated upon the aprons where the planes were parked and upon 
the hangars as well as upon the machine shops. All objectives were 
entered and carefully identified by legends placed upon the U. S. 
Geodetic Survey maps used by the Japanese. 

It is significant as to maps secured by the Federal Bureau of In- 
vestigation, that there is an abbreviation of a code which takes care 
of every major contingency before, during and as a result of the at- 
tack. Nothing was left to chance. It is particularly noted that the 
information of construction was shown by the fact that as to Hickam 
Field the legend indicated, 

All concrete structures— or in the process of construction. 

[200] G. TIME ELEMENT IN THE EXPECTED ATTACK; THE EFFECT OF 

USING HAWAII AS A TRAINING GKOUND IN ADDITION TO ITS BEING A COM- 
BAT OUTPOST 

1. Attack a Surprise. —The Chief of Staff and all other witnesses, 
including Kimmel and Short, have without exception stated that the 
attack was a surprise. General Marshall testified that tlie Hawaiian 
commanders indicated their views that an air attack was their very 
serious concern. (R. 52.) Yet he also testified : 

We did not, so far as I can recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii ; the reason 
being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that the de- 
fenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japa- 
nese to attempt such an attack. (R. 9.) 

An analysis of the probabilities of success from the Japanese point 
of view shows that the Japanese took an extraordinary chance, if the 
facts as to their strength as we now know them are reasonably accu- 
rate. In race track parlance, it was a "long-shot" and an extraordi- 
nary risk because the consequences of failure to the Japanese might 
have been greater than those to the United States in the event oi suc- 
cess. It was a bold and considered venture. 

Japan knew with reasonable accuracy the movements and location 
oi our fleet. It' knew weekend conditions in Hawaii with the fleet hi 
the harbor as well as we did. It apparently knew of our assumption 
that Japan would not dare attack the United States and that if it did, 
it would be in the remote islands of the Pacific, including the Philip- 
pines. It accurately gauged our belief that Japan had its eyes turned 
on Indo-China and the Dutch Indies and was proceeding southwardly 

with its conquest. ■, i i i 

Based upon this shrewd estimate of our national psychology and our 
estimate of their intentions, Japan proceeded to the [201] ex- 
ecution of the unexpected, the gain from which it estimated would 
be of incalculable value. In the daring attack Japan was compensated 
bv the gain 1o her of immobilizing and substantially destroying the 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 125 

Pacific Fleet, which was a major threat to Japan's left flank in its 
southward move. The value of such a result was tremendous. 

It gave both safety and freedom of action to Japan; and the ability 
to concentrate both on the Pacific Islands of the United States and 
the Philippines. By that time Japan believed it would be so in- 
trenched that dislodgment would be substantially impossible. 

Japan used in this attack from four to six carriers out of the total 
of eight available to its fleet. The failure of this mission, by the de- 
struction of such carriers, would have been really fatal to its fleet, 
at least for long months to come. The daring, therefore, of this at- 
tack was out of all proportion to its value because had it not been 
successful and had its carriers been destroyed it would have been dis- 
astrous to the Japanese Navy. 

But in making this estimate of Japan's risky action and its consid- 
ered chances, we were doing so from the occidental point of view. We 
were completely ignoring the oriental attitude, the Japanese cheap 
price of life, and her willingness to conduct a suicide attempt without 
any foundation of occidental reasoning in order to gain an extraordi- 
nary advantage. Hull and Grew had warned of this psychology and 
her penchant for unexpected, reckless, and suicidal moves. 

This national urge to take a desperate chance of a military nature 
has since then become well-known. It Avas our failure to take into 
consideration this extraordinary chance [202] taking charac- 
teristic, due to the violent and uncivilized reasoning of the Japanese 
mind, that would approve the making of such a long military and 
naval chance for the satisfaction of the first blow, and a disastrous 
one, that was so satisfactory to the oriental mind, which misled us. 

2. Thne Element — I'he Important Factor in All Esthmites. — This 
analysis is recited for tlie reason that apparently no one from the 
Chief of Staff down considered at the time the attack was made that 
any such attempt would be made. 

This time element is im^wrtant in understanding the state of mind 
of the responsible authorities of the United States. The military esti- 
mates of the situation from the War Department, the Navy Depart- 
ment, and in Hawaii, clearly show a reasoned and correctly stated 
analytical estimate of the situation. The missing link in our search 
for the reason why steps were not taken to carry out the logic of the 
military and psychological estimate of the situation seems to be in 
this belief that there was ample time to prepare Hawaii. It was gen- 
erally thought that Japan would not attempt this attack, if at all, 
until some time later after it had made its attacks upon the Philippines 
and intermediate islands. In that, the United States' calculations 
went far astray for lack of understanding of the long-chance type 
of the military and naval minds of oriental Japan. 

As a consequence a policy was followed that was disastrous to the 
defense of Hawaii. They gambled upon having time for preparation 
that did not exist. 

3. Expected Time to Continue Trainhu/. — That assumption of time 
for preparation resulted in using a portion of tlie Hawaiian Army 
Air Force and the Navy as a training force for the train [203'] 
ing of green personnel followed by the removal of experienced person- 
nel thereof, as they were trained, to other theaters. The Board, al- 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 157 9 



126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

though it realizes the great need of organized air forces to serve as 
training units and that the Hawaiian Air Force was one of the few 
available, nevertheless it considers it a mistake to so utilize this out- 
post which should have been on a purely combat basis and not subject 
to the weakening process of a periodic turnover. 

Let us look at the consequence of this. The Navy was either train- 
ing asliore or constantly training at sea through its three task forces. 
Those operations in the areas were not, as Short thought, for the 
purpose of combat reconnaissance or defense duty, but they were 
training maneuvers for the constant training of new personnel to 
be used elsewhere. 

The training problem, which had been frequently discussed with the 
"War Department and was well known by it, had assumed a position 
of importance in Hawaii. This evidently strongly influenced Short's 
decision to adopt Alert No. 1. 

He testified : 

In addition to that, it was a question of training. Alerts Nos. 2 and 3 would 
require so many men on duty. Alert No. 3 would take every man, practically, 
so it would elfmiuate any training. Alert No. 2 would practically put every 
man of the harbor defense, the antiaircraft, and the air on duties that would 
prohibit training. The situation in the air with regard to training was quite 
serious. We had been given the mission of ferrying B-17s to the Philippines. 
We had already sent, I think, two groups, one of 9 and one of 12. We had also 
sent some crews to San Francisco for the purpose of bringing them back to the 
Philippine Islands. We had only G flying fortresses in commission to train 
all of these crews. If you remember, at that time a flying fortress was relatively 
new and you could not just pick up a pilot here and there say he could fly 
a flying fortress. He had to be stepped up. We had a bunch of the old obsolete 
B-18 bombers tliat were death traps if you put anybody in them to fight, but it 
was one step in teaching a pilot how to handle larger ships. They were put on 
those They were put on A-20s [204] for a little time, and finally got 
to the B-lTs. With the limited number of ships we had it took time to train 
these crews; not just the pilots. In addition to that we had to train the 
bombardiers and the gunners so they could protect themselves from the Japanese 
going over the Mandated Islands. ^ ,^ ^-^ . 1,1^ 

General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we should 
do nothing that would interfere with the training or the ferrying group. The 
responsibility was definitely on the Hawaiian Department. It was up to us 
to get the ships there and get them there without loss ; and we could not do it it 
we started them out with untrained crews. 

That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into Alert No. 1 rather 
than Alert No. 2 or No. 3. (R. 285-286.) '■ , 

... We felt that we required all possible time for training in the Air Corps, 
because we had to prepare these teams for ferrying to the Philippines. Just as 
soon as we got a trained unit we lost it by transferrmg it to the Philippines. 
(R. 390.) 

And again he testified before the Eoberts Commission : 

Frankly, that is more nearly correct, that I was more serious about training 
rather than expecting something to happen at the time. (Roberts Record 1622.) 
(See page 531 of the Grunert Record.) 

General Martin, Chief of the Hawaiian Air Force, testified even 
more vigorously that the selection of Alert No. 1 was largely influenced 
by their desire to keep on training. 

General Fkank. Was there any advantage to conducting Air Corps training 
in any one of the three alerts? . . . 

General Martin. There most certainly was, because we were hard pressed to 
get the men properly trained to meet our requirements in the new organization. 

General Feank. Could you do more technical training for the Air Force in No. 3 
Alert, No. 2 Alert, or No. 1 Alert, or was there no difference? 



EEPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 127 

General Martin. Of course there was a difference. There would be more under 
Alert No. 1. (R. 1864-1865.) 

Admiral Kimmel said : 

The principal one that arises at once is the question of personnel, the necessity for 
training personnel, from the fact that certainly the Navy was training personnel and 
shipping them back to the States, that we were constantly getting new personnel. 
"That intensive training program was essential if we were not to have a fleet that 
was utterly impotent. I have been informed, and I believe firmly, that [2051 
the Army had just as many troubles as we had, if not more. They brought pilots 
out there that needed training, and they were depleting their trained airmen of all 
ratings, and in the weeks immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, the 
primary effort for their Hawaiian Air Force, I think it is fair to say, was in ferry- 
ng planes to the Asiatic station, and they very greatly depleted their stuff. (R. 
1764-1765.) 

It is therefore apparent that both services were placing great em- 
phasis on training, possibly to the detriment of preparedness to meet 
an attack. 

4. Shores Trust in Navy to Give Him Timely Notice. Time Ele- 
ment Again. — Genera] Short accomplished what he set out to do, to 
establish a cordial and friendly relationship with the Navy. His 
instructions from the Chief of Staff to do this were not for the pur- 
pose of social intercourse, but for more effectively accomplishing the 
objective of a sound and complete detail working agreement with the 
Navy to get results. He successfully accomplished fully only the 
cordial relationship with his opposite numbers in the Navy, i. e., the 
top rank of the Navy ; he did not accomplish fully the detailed working 
relationship necessary for his own full information, the complete 
execution of his own job and the performance of his mission. The 
claim of a satisfactory relationship for practical purposes is not sub- 
stantiated. General Short testified : 

The one thing that that letter (General Marshall's first letter of February 7th, 
1941) emphasized to me, I think, more than anything else, was the necessity for 
the closest cooperation with the Navy. I think that that part of the letter im- 
pressed me more than anything else. (R. 355. ) 

Apparently Short was afraid that if he went much beyond social 
contacts and really got down to business with the Navy to get what he 
had a right to know in order to do his job, he would give offense to the 
Navy and lose the good will of the 1^06'] Navy which he was 
charged with securing. That is evidenced by his following statement : 

I would say frankly that I ima,gine that as a Senior Admiral, Kimmel would 
have resented it if I had tried to have him report every time a ship went in or out. 
and as I say, our relations were such that he gave me without any hesitancy any 
piece of information that he thought was of interest. (R. .Sfi.S.) 

He testified that he relied for reconnaissance upon the task forces 
of the Navy, which employed carriers to search the ocean 300 miles 
to each side, giving each task force 600 miles of reconnaissance area, 
and with three forces that would have meant covering 1,800 miles. 
(R. 284, 384.) Admiral Pye, commander of one of the three task 
forces of the Pacific Fleet, testified that : 

The schedule as arranged was that one task force was at sea practically all 
the time, that is, one of the three task forces, leaving a period normally of about 
eight days and about fourteen days in port. (R. 1036.) 

Kimmel testified the task forces were in training and not out for 
reconnaissance. (R. 1773, 1794-1795; Cf. Pye 1037, Burgin 2673.) 



128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

He said that this was well known and undoubtedly Short knew about 
it. (E. 1771-1773 ; CI Short 359.) The Short and Kimmel testimony 
is in conflict on this point. 

Again, Short said he was dependent on the Navy, and particularly 
the 14th Naval District, or the War Department for securing informa- 
tion as to the movement of Japanese ships. (R. 291.) He said that 
the combination of the continuous flow of information that the Navy 
Department had as to the location of Jap ships and the Navy task 
forces doing long-distance reconnaissance with their carrier-borne 
planes, led him to the position that 

it was a natural thing that I should accept the opinion of the Navy on that 
particular subject. It seemed to be the best informed opinion that there was 
in the vicinity [207] (R. 300-301.) 

It was for that reason that he accepted the Captain McMorris state- 
ment, when visiting with Admiral Kimmel and his staff, that there 
would be no Japanese attack in early December. (R. 299-301.) 

He said he was further strengtliened in his opinion, during the pe- 
riod of the 27th of November to the Gth of December, that the Navy 
either knew 

where the Japanese carriers were, or had enough information that they were not 
uneasy, and with the task forces that I knew they. had out, that they felt they 
could handle the situation. (R. 303.) 

Short evidently believed that he was getting full information from 
the Navy that was available to them. There does not seem to have 
occurred anything that led him to think he was not being told all 
the pertinent official naval information there was available. He relied 
upon complete official interchange which was not in practice. 

An examination of the facts showed that the naval forces were in- 
sufficient for long-distance patrol, and General Short frankly con- 
fesses this situation (R. 375) ; General Short further points out that 
the Army had insufficient planes for reconnaissance. R. 377-378.) 
Although General Short "looked on task forces as the best means of 
reconnaissance" (R. 384), he did not know nor try to find out their 
routes. (R. 359-360, 475.) Short could easily have learned that the 
task forces conducted only incidental reconnaissance (R. 1773, 1794- 
1795) and that the Navy was devoting itself to the submarine menace 
in the areas in which they had their exercises. (R. 1040, 1757, 3041.) 
Short knew that his inshore patrol was of limited value (R. 473) ; 
that Admiral Bloch did not have the planes to carry out the agree- 
ment (R. 375) ; and that all that Admiral Bellinger had was a limited 
number of PBY reconnaissance planes (R. 456, 1598, 1810) ; that 
Bloch had none (R. 1493, 1526. [308] 1532, 1751) and the car- 
rier-borne planes were normallv used for antisubmarine reconnais- 
sance. (R. 1039-1040.) 

General Short's knowledge of the situation at the time of these 
events in 1941 is shown in the testimony of General Martin, who said : 

I feel that our decision was influenced to a certain extent by the fact that 
the Navy was patrolling with task forces in waters of which we had no knowl- 
edge. Now, as to what areas they were covering, we did not know, but it did 
affect a decision as to the paramount danger coming from within rather than 
from without. (R. 1856.) 

General Martin said emphatically the fact that the Navy had task 
forces out influenced his decision, saying : 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 129 

. . . I had a feeling that the Navy was not properly equipped to conduct 
a reconnaissance that would be completely satisfactory to me; . . . (R. 
1873.) 

This was despite the fact, as he said : 

. . . we were not completely satisfied with the way this reconnaissance 
was being done, because there wasn't enough in the air, and your reconnaissance 
from the air would extend over a larger territory in the limited amount of 
time, and that was the thing I was complaining to Admiral Bellinger about. 
(R. 1857.) 

As an indication that Short was not getting the information is his 
own admission : 

General Frank. Another thing : Do you now feel that the Navy withheld from 
you certain information that they had available that would have been invaluable 
to you? 

General Short. I don't believe that they purposely withheld anything from 
me that they thought really concerned me. 

General Frank. Don't you think that that information about the naval task 
force with carriers and submarines and battleships down in Jaluit would have 
vitally affected you? 

General Short. Yes, possibly. 

General Grunebt. Did the Navy understand your mission and your respon- 
sibility sufficient to be able to be a good judge of what should be passed to you 
or what shouldn't be passed to you? 

General Short. Oh, I think they did, definitely. (R. 409^10). 

[209] He did not learn of the early visit on the morning of 
December 7th of the Japanese submarine. He did not learn of it 
until the 8th, when Admiral Kimmel himself told him about it. 
(R. 364-365.) By his implicit trust in the Navy he let them not only 
get the information but to evaluate it. In connection with the in- 
formation about the Japanese submarine sunk by the Navy early 
December 7th, he said this as to the Navy action : 

They did not connect it (the submarine which was sunk by the Navy) with 
the general raid, they thought it was separate. (R. 365.) 

But the point is that Short should have been given this information 
and have made his own evaluation. As he now testifies, if he had 
known of this submarine information it 

might have worked out to our very great advantage if they (the Navy) had 
been handled differently. (R. 310.) 

In this connection he said, 

It was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that informa- 
tion to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of Seci'tetary Knox that 
at the time he visualized it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that 
phase of it and just failed to notify me; that he (Bloch) could see then, after 
the fact, that he had been absolutely wrong. . . . (R. 311.) 

Again, he was not advised of the Japanese task force in the Mar- 
shalls, between the 25th and the 30th of November. (R. 361.) He 
said he was not advised of the naval dispatch of December 3rd, 1941, 
and never saw that message. That was the message that showed that 
the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts were destroying certain 
codes and ciphers, and burning certain documents. He said that he 
did not receive the naval messages of December 3rd, December 4th, 
and December 6th from [210] the Navy Department to the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, regarding the destruction 
of confidential documents. 



130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

He said : 

Greneral Gbuneet. You had none of the information that was disclosed in 
those three messages? 

General Shoet. No, sir. (R. 425.) 

He expressed his relationship with the Navy in this wise : 

I felt that Admiral Klmmel and Admiral Bloch, either one, would have defi- 
nitely given me anything they thought had any bearing on my job ; that if they 
were sure it was an absolutely inside naval proposition that did not concern 
me in any way they might not have given it (the information) to me. (R. 358.) 

This situation was summed up as follows : 

General Frank. The question as to whether or not you got the information 
was placed upon a trust that you had that they would have given it to you? 
General Shoet. Absolutely. 

General Frank. Do you feel that you were secure in that? 
General Short. I do not know what other basis you could work on. I had no 
right to demand that they give me all information they had. (R. 358.) 

As to naval task forces on which he so thoroughly relied for recon- 
naissance, he did not have any regular means of knowing where they 
were or what they were doing, 

except as we (Admirals Kimmel, Bloch and Bellinger) happened to talk about 
in a personal kind of way. (R. 359.) 

This brings us to the further observation that Short in dealing with 
the Navy was trying to do the job himself (R. 1248-1249), which 
resulted in that he neither got the information completely, accurately, 
nor consistently, instead of delegating it to his trained staff officers 
dealing with equally trained [^i^] staff officers of the Navy so 
a professional, systematic job could be done. He relied on confidence 
and natural trust rather than certainty of information; and on per- 
sonal visits and informal conferences instead of the definiteness of an 
established organization smoothly operating to an effective end. 

II. WHAT WAS DONE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ATTACK.? 

1. Reason For Analysis of Action Taken After 7 December 19Jfl. — 
The question of insufficient means with which to adequately defend 
Oahu has been raised. General Short's energy was admirable and 
well directed towards improving the defense of Oahu. As a conse- 
quence, we have examined the situation as to what he did before the 
attack and what he did after the attack with what he had. The first 
part of the examination has already been related in the previous 
portions of the report. AVe now propose to examine two questions: 
How effectively was Short able to use this very same material, person- 
nel, and available facilities after the attack ; and what did Washington 
do after the attack in giving help to Hawaii that might have been done 
before ? 

2. Hawaii and Washington Action. — Upon learning of the attack 
General Short immediately ordered the Number 3 Alert. (E. 1118). 
The 24th Division was in all battle positions by 1600 hours 7 Decem- 
ber 1941. The 25th Division was in all battle positions by 1700 
hours 7 December 1941. The Division Artillery drew its ammunition 
and secured its issue of a unit of fire to take to beaches within one to 
two hours. It is significant that the war garrison was increased by 



EEPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 131 

Washington from 59,000 to 71,500 after December 7 to defend 
Kaneohe Bay, "back door to the island," and that increases in air 
strength and in engineers for [212] aviation purposes were 
granted. (R. 325.) Harbor troops had ammunition "immediately at 
hand." The antiaircraft had theirs sometime later. The first of the 
sixteen surgical teams reported to the hospital at 0900. At noon there 
was started evacuation of women and children from Hickam and 
Wlieeler Fields and harbor defense positions. The Ordnance Depot 
went into two underground rooms. Slit trenches were then dug. (R. 
316-317.) 

The Department Engineer, under the Department Commander, was 
put by Washington in complete control of building of field fortifica- 
tions. The troops started on field fortifications. The slit trenches 
were not completed on 8 December. (R. 321.) The outlying islands 
were further garrisoned. (R. 332.) Orders were issued in connec- 
tion with the defense against chemical air attack, air raid instructions 
w^ere issued, klaxon horns were distributed for the aircraft warning 
service and old gas masks were exchanged for new. (R. 529-531.) 
The Interceptor Command, inactive before December 7 and still in 
the training stage (R. 1825), was activated 17 December. (R. 4136- 
4137.) After December 7 

the Navy took us over body and soul .... we did exactly as they ordered 
us to. We vrere a part of their Naval Air Force, so to spealv, 

said General Rudolph. (R. 1223.) Washington gave unity of com- 
mand. Directives came from the War and Navy Departments to 
establish a joint operating center for a joint staff of Army and Navy. 
This was done in tunnels in the Aliamanu Crater and put into use in 
February 1942. (R. 1534.) 

Daily reconnaissance was made after December 7, using Army 
B-17s and Navy PBYs and "anything they had," even the B-18s. 
Navy planes were sent from the mainland by Washington after 
December 7 ; many B-l7s came out almost immediately. Additional 
PBYs were received and those damaged on December 7 were repaired. 
[21S] If the planes that were available by Washington after 
December 7 had been available before December 7, distance reconnais- 
sance could have been made, according to the testimony of Admiral 
Bloch. (R. 1532-1534.) However, the necessity for the ferrying of 
bombers to the Philippines ceased since they, too, were under attack. 

The Interceptor Command was activated immediately after Decem- 
ber 7. (R. 2604.) 

The status of the antiaircraft artillery and coast artillery was as 
follows. After December 7 the ammunition was issued for use with 
the guns in the field. (R 2605.) The skeleton crews were replaced 
with full crews on the fixed coastal guns. (R. 2611.) Only 40 per 
cent of the allowance of automatic weapons existed before December 
7, which was rectified after that date. (R. 2613.) The whole com- 
mand was put on a five-minute alert and old Alerts Number 1, 2, and 
3 became obsolete, the men in camp after December 7 remaining right 
at their guns. (R. 2639.) The radar and Interceptor Command 
installations, formerly under the control of the Signal Corps, were 
taken away from the Signal Corps immediately after December 7 
and placed under the Interceptor Command. (R. 2644.) 



132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The aircraft warning system was started full time on December 7 
as it could have been weeks before, had the order been given. (R. 
4133.) After December 7 the aircraft warning system personnel 
continued to operate efficiently. They did so in conjunction with the 
24-hour duty of the Interceptor Command. As Colonel Bergquist 
said, in contrasting his efforts to get the aircraft warning service and 
the Interceptor Command [214-] cooperating before December 
7, after December 7 

I just had to snap my fingers and I got what I wanted. (R. 1205-1206.) 

The AWS work moved much faster after December 7. (R. 1218.) 
After December 7 the controversy between the Air Corps and the 
Signal Corps, which contributed to the delay in the activation of the 
Interceptor Command, disappeared. (R. 12*16-1217.) 

After December 7 the fighter planes were kept ready to take off 
instantly (R. 3911) and the antiaircraft warning service was put on a 
24-hour basis, as it could have been before, said Colonel Powell, Sig- 
nal Officer of the Hawaiian Department Corps. (R. 3913.) The air- 
craft warning sets were in continuous operation after December 7 
with three groups operating four hours each. (R. 1029.) 

Tillman, an Engineer Corps civilian employee, testified that he as 
a trouble shooter took charge of construction pertaining to the air- 
craft warning service after Colonel Wyman was relieved because 
progress was unsatisfactory. (R. 2135.) He found he was able to 
complete certain construction projects at aircraft warning stations 
by scouting around for parts. Prior to December 7 the crews on those 
projects were not working because they said they had nothing to work 
with. (R. 2149-2151.) 

The most remarkable change between December 6 and December 7 
was the change in construction activities under the District Engineer, 
Colonel Wyman. 

A new field was begun at Kahuku on December 7. Bunkers were 
built at Hickam Field ; the field at Haliewa was expanded ; construc- 
tion of a new field at Kipapa was started ; a temporary field was put 
on the Schofield golf course. The troops started on field fortifica- 
tions. (R. 321.) Authority was requested to [^IS] build ten 
airfields. Bombers were put on the outlying islands. 

We were able to go ahead and do a lot without funds. 

Barracks were built with WPA money. (R. 325.) A pool of lumber 
was authorized for the Quartermaster. (R. 328.) 

All the material and contractors with their machinery were taken 
over and put to work. Priorities were established on jobs to get more 
work accomplished, according to Benson, President of the Hawaiian 
Contracting Company, (R. 3737.) A job at Wheeler Field had not 
been completed for a longtime, due to the delay of plans from the 
Engineers. (R. 2542.) Barking Sands airport and Kokee radar 
station jobs had been delayed for many weeks with the material on the 
ground awaiting someone to act. The Hawaiian Constructors had 
not put it up. After December 7 the witness Bartlett went to the 
site, erected the tower in five days and had the station operating. 

On December 7 the runways under construction at Bellows Field 
were incomplete. On the Wednesday after December 7 the work 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 133 

began on a 24-hour-a-day basis. The second runway was completed 
in seven days, that is, by the following Thursday, said Colonel Wed- 
dington, base commander at Bellows Field. (K. 3020.) After De- 
cember 7 antiaircraft emplacements were constructed at Bellows Field. 
When the attack struck, the planes were concentrated practically 
wing to wing, but after the attack they were dispersed on the field, 
50 to 75 feet apart. (R. 3014.) 

The Corps of Engineers also evidenced an appreciation of the 
situation by raising the contracting authority of the District Engineer 
from $50,000 before December 7 to $5,000,000 after December 7. The 
Corps of Engineers' red tape of sending [B16'\ all contracts 
and changes to Washington to the Chief of Engineers was then eli- 
minated by Washington; testimony of Colonel Wyman. (R. 3485, 
3874.) The Robert E. McKee Company, which had been discarded 
by Wyman when he went to the Islands in the middle of 1940, was 
invited by him after December 7 to join the Hawaiian Constructors. 
(R. 2405-2407.) 

Slit trenches had not been built until the day of Pearl Harbor (R. 
1916), but they were built extensively, together with air raid shelters, 
after December 7. (R. 838.) 

After December 7 Admiral Pye testified the Navy kept its forces 
out of the harbor fairly continuously except for the time necessary 
in port to overhaul materiel and receive supplies. (R. 1045.) 

We, therefore, find that after December 7 an active and vigorous 
employment of facilities, materiel and personnel was made, and full 
support and supplies were furnished by Washington some of which 
might have been done before December 7. The support from the 
mainland was vastly different after December 7 than before, and 
the record so reflects this condition. For instance, before December 7 
G-2 did not submit to General Short any strategical estimates but 
after December 7 they submitted such a statement weekly. After 
December 7 the suspected aliens were rounded up and interned, the 
Japanese consul and his 200 agents were put out of business and all 
necessary steps were taken to monitor both telephone and radio com- 
munication, all of which might have been done without stirring up 
the civilian population or the Japanese prior to December 7, 1941.'*2 

[£17] I. SUMMARY 

The foregoing concludes the story of Pearl Harbor with the excep- 
tion of the matter of the construction of the Hawaiian defenses and 
the particular part of Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., with respect to those 
defenses. Col. Wyman's part in the Pearl Harbor disaster is treated 
in Chapter V. 

*2 List of things done and action taken on or after 7 December 1941 bv persons in the 
Hawaiian Islands : Bloch, volume 13, pages 1532-34 ; Klatt, v. 13, p. 1465-66 ; Pye, v. 9, 
p. 1045 ; Phillips, v. 10, p. 1118 ; Murray, v. 27, p. 3080 ; Martin, v. 17, p. 1825, 1850, 
1911; Lockard, v. 9, p. 1029; Bartlett, v. 22, p. 2510-11; Midkiff, v. 25, p. 2805-07-14- 
40-41 ; Bergquist. v. 10, p. 1205-06-16-17-18 ; Rudolph, v. 10, p. 1223 ; Weddington, v. 27, 
p. 3020-13-14 ; Howard, v. 17, p. 1916 ; Pratt, v. 18. p. 1986 ; Locev, v. 25, p. 2790 ; King, 
V. 23. p. 2542-37-38 ; Fielder, v. 26, p. 2981 ; McKee, v. 21, p. 2405-07 ; Burgin, v. 24, 
p. 2603-04-07-09-11-13-14-15-39-44 : Reybold, v. 6, p. 580 ; Davidson, v. 36. p. 4133- 
36-38-42 ; Powell, v. 82, p. 3904-11-13 ; Wyman, v. 29, p. 3435-36, v. 32, p. 3874 (affi- 
davit — V. 29, p. 3433-34 ; Perliter, v. 30, p. 3712 ; Benson, v. 30, p. 3737 ; Farthing, 
V. 7, p. 838 ; Tillman, v. 19, p. 2135^9-51 ; Short, v. 4, p. 314-15-16-17-19-20-21-22- 
25-28-30-31-32-37, v. 5, p. 500, 529-30-31-34-36. 



134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In order to not disturb the continuity of the complete Pearl Harbor 
story both at Hawaii and in Washington, the next succeeding Chapter 
No. IV is devoted primarily to the responsibilities for the Pearl Harbor 
disaster of those in Washington who had some part in the matter. 
In this way Chapters III and IV, when read together, will give a 
balanced and complete picture of the principal events and actions 
taken which contribute to the result of the attack on December 7, 1941. 

1^8} Chapter IV. Responsibilities in Washington 

1. General 

2 War Council 

Three groups of conferees. 

3. Secretary of State 

Responsibility for dealing with the Japanese; no authority to commit the 
United States to War; indecision of the Secretary of State November 25-26; 
advice to the Secretary of War of the action by the Secretary of State; action 
by the Secretary of War on the 27th. 

4. War Department 

Policy of War Department to avoid conflict ; policy as evidenced in the War 
Department messages to prevent overt acts; no information to Short of the 
Secretary of State's counter proposals ; confusion resulting from the Navy 
messages of October 16 and 24; confusion from the messages of the 27th and 
28th ; hovF the Long message was delivered and what was done about it ; failure 
to act promptly to notify Hawaii. 

5. Conflict Between the Army and Navy Messages 

The Army-Navy messages were conflicting; the Navy messages predominated 
with warnings of a conflict : Army messages predominant to avoid overt acts. 

6. Military Intelligence Division 

Field of investigation ; necessity for a larger scope in the future ; intelligence 
a national problem. 

7. War Plans Division 

Responsibility for Overseas Departments ; responsibility to see the War Plans 
implemented ; no action on Alert No. 1 ; Gerow's failings ; inadequate supervision. 

8. Navy Department 

Failure to carry out agreement with the Army for long-distance reconnais- 
sance ; failure to advise of enemy submarine sinking ; failure to give Short 
information of Jaluit task force. 

9. Chief of Staff 

Responsibility for organization and operation of War Department ; failure to 
delegate authority ; responsibility to keep General Short advised of international 
situation ; delay in sending message on December 6 and 7 : no action on Short's 
report of measures taken ; and lack of knowledge of conditions of i*eadiness in 
Hawaii November 8 to December 7, 1941. 

10. Summary 

\219'] 1. General. — The preceding chapter has dealt primarily 
with Hawaii and the actions of the responsible officers in the Hawai- 
ian Department. It has to some degree and to a lesser extent, by rea- 
son of the chronological sequence, dealt with what was done in 
Washington both with respect to the internal activities in Washing- 
ton and what Washington sent to Short. This chapter, therefore, will 
be devoted primarily to the activities in Washington and only sec- 
ondarily in Hawaii. 

2. War Council. — The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, has dis- 
cussed the activities of the group in the War Department known as 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 135 

the War Council. He also described the group consisting of the 
Secretary of State, Secretary of Navy, Secretary of War and the 
Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy, 
who were also called colloquially the "War Council". The third 
group was that which included the President, Secretary of State, 
Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, usually the Chief of Staff and 
the Chief of Naval Operations, and occasionally Commanding Gen- 
eral, Air Force, General Arnold. 

All three of these bodies were informal and constituted simply a 
group of men exchanging ideas and attempting to determine policies 
without regularity of record of what they did, as far as this Board 
has been able to determine. It was a sort of clearing house for in- 
formation, a gathering place for discussion of policies, so that each 
of the independent actors in the scene would know what was going 
on and would have information to guide him in making his own 
decisions that were more or less independent, but at the same time 
also somewhat dependent on the action of other members of the 
group. 

[2201 3. Secretary of State. — The responsibility apparently as- 
sumed by the Secretary of State (and we have no other proof that 
anyone else assumed the responsibility finally and definitely) was to 
determine when the United States would reach the impasse with 
Japan. It was the Secretary of State who was in charge of the 
negotiations with the Japanese; it was the Secretary of State who had 
long and numerous conferences with the Japanese. He was the con- 
tact man and the responsible negotiator. 

He was doubtless aware of the fact that no action taken by him 
should be tantamount to a declaration of war. That responsibility 
rests with Congress. It is important to observe that the President 
of the United States had been very careful, according to the testimony 
of the Secretary of War, to be sure that the United States did nothing 
that could be considered an overt act or an act of war against the 
Japanese. 

For, as Mr. Stimson testified in the phrasing of the message of 
November 27, he was particularly concerned with so phrasing it so 
as to carry out the President's directive which was in accordance with 
our constitutional method of doing business. Mr. Stimson said : 

I had had a decision from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as my 
business to do what I of course normally would do ; to see that the message as 
sent was framed in accordance with the facts. (R. 4057.) 

Mr. Stimson was referring to the status of the negotiations of the 
previous day on November 26, when the Ten Points were handed by 
Secretary Hull to the Japanese, and to the fact that the President, as 
of the 27th of November, 1941, was still desirous that no overt act be 
committed by [2211 the United States. 

With this clear understanding, let us see how these serious respon- 
sibilities were discharged. In making this statement we are deeply 
sympathetic with the state of mind, the irritation, the exasperation, 
the chicanery, trickery and deception of the Japanese ambassadors 
with whom the Secretary of State had so long and manfully strug- 
gled. Wliat he did was human, but the results are the things with 
which we are concerned. 



136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Undoubtedly the Secretary of State had been frequently advised 
through the meetings of the War Council of the inadequate status of 
the defenses of the United States. Our Army and Na^^ were not 
ready for war, and undoubtedly the Secretary of State had been fully 
advised of that fact. So serious was this situation that General 
Marshall and Admiral Stark drafted a joint memorandum under 
date of November 27 on this subject. 

This memorandum was addressed directly to the President, accord- 
ing to the testimonv of General Marshall. It contained two things : 
first, a statement tliat the most essential thing then from the United 
Sates viewpoint was to gain time and to avoid precipitating military 
action so long as this could be done consistent with the National Pol- 
icy because of the fact that the Army and Navy were not ready for 
war; and second, attention was called to the desirability of counter 
military action against Japan in event she engaged in specific acts of 
aggression (described in the memorandum). The memorandum then 
recommended among other things that 

steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch 
for the [222] issuance of warnings to the Japanese against taking such 
aggressive action. (R. 9-10-11.) 

The situation was delicate. 

Now let us turn back to Mr. Stimson's testimony. The War Council 
met with Mr. Hull on the 25th of November 1941. The tentatw& 
U. S. proposals to the Japanese were so drastic and harsh that Mr. 
Stimson testifies that when he read it his diary shows this was his 
contemporaneous impression of it : 

Hull showed me the proposal for a three months' truce which he was going to 
lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our 
interests, I thought, secured it, but I don't think that there is any chance of the 
Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic. 

Apparently the Secretary of War, in the light of his long experience 
with the Japanese, with whom he dealt extensively when he was Secre- 
tary of State to this government, was concerned at the situation, for 
his diary continues : 

We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department, 
and I got hold of Marshall. 

Thus the Secretary of War felt the situation that was to be precipi- 
tated by the action of the Secretary of State, Hull, necessitated his 
informing the Chief of Staff immediately of the threatened difficulty. 

Next, the Secretary of War attended a meeting at the White House. 

His diary describes it : 

Then at 12 o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly halfi 
past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There 
the President brought up the relationship with the Japanese. He brought up 
the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as— perhaps next 
Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and 
the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problehi. 

Apparently, at that time no decision was reached and the [223'] 
entire matter was left for further consideration. 

On the following day, November 26, 1941, the Stimson diary con- 
tinues : 

Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his 
mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other d^y (the^ 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 137 

25th) to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and tell them that Jhe 
had no other proposal at all. 

Apparently on the 26tli in the morning, Mr. Hull had made up his 
mind not to go through with the proposals shown the day before to 
the Secretary of War containing the plan for the "Three Months' 
Truce". 

Evidently the action "to kick the whole thing over" was accom- 
plished by presenting to the Japanese the counter proposal of the "Ten 
Points" which they took as an ultimatum. 

It was the document that touched the button that started the war, 
as Ambassador Grew so aptly expressed it. 

Again Mr. Stimson's diary relates : 

The 26th was the day he (Hull) told me he was in doubt whether he would go 
on with it. (R. 4051-2-3.) 

Apparently the Secretary of War was not advised by the Secretary 
of State that he had handed this so-called ultimatum to the Japanese. 
The diary of the Secretary of War and his actions indicate that to ba 
a fact. 

Witness what it says as of the morning of the 27th of November 
1941: 

The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what his final deci- 
sion had been with the Japanese — whether he had handed them the new proposal 
which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday, 
he had broken the whole matter oft. He told me now he had broken the whole 
matter ofE. As he put it, "I have washed my hands of it, and it is now, in the 
hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy." 

[^^4-] His diary continues : 

I then called up the President and talked with him about it. 

He then took prompt action to confer with Secretary Knox, Admiral 
Stark, and with General Gerow, who appeared to be representing 
General Marshall in his absence at maneuvers. He was concerned 
with revising the draft radio of General Marshall, which became 
radio #472. Also, as he says, 

A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the 
President was examined, and the question of need for further time was 
discussed. (R. 4054.) 

The advice from the Army and Navy to delay matters and get 
more time for defense preparations and not precipitate the issue 
evidently did not reach the President or the Secretary of State 
in time to be considered before the memorandum of the 26th was 
delivered to the Japanese. It seems well established that the send- 
ing of this "Ten Point" memorandum by the Secretary of State 
was used by the Japanese as the signal for starting the war by the 
attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese attacking force departed 
from Tankan Bay on the 27-28 November for its attack on Hawaii. 
It also appears that the delivery of the 14-point reply of the Japanese 
to this memorandum was contemporaneous with the attack. 

4. Wm^ Department. — The intentions of the War Department not 
to precipitate war, as far as the War Department was concerned, are 
clear and unmistakable. The messages sent to the Hawaiian De- 
partment show this to be a fact. The Navy apparently had the same 
idea because many of their messages likewise so indicate the situation 



138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and the Hawaiian Department was given the benefit of those 
messages. 

[£25] To be concrete: the Navy message of October 16 con- 
cluded with the sentence, 

In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such 
preparatory deployments as will not disclose previous intention nor con- 
stitute provocative action against Japan. — 

the message of November 24, from the Navy Department to Hawaii 
said in conclusion: 

Inform seniior Army officers in respective areas utmost secrecy is necessary in 
order not to complicate the already tense situation nor precipitate Japanese 
action. — 

the message of November 27, #472 from the Chief of Staff to General 
Short says, 

The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act . . . 
these measures should be carried out so as aot, repeat not, to alarm the civil 
population or disclose intent. — 

the message from G-2 on the same day warns against an incident 
with the Japanese population by saying, 

Axis sabotage and espionage probable. 

All this had an effect upon Short because his reply to the message 
of the 27th was 
Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. 

In order to prevent an untoward action by Short the message of 
the 27th as originally drafted started with the opening words, 
"Negotiations with Japan have been terminated" (R. 4270) were 
changed by the Secretary of War after consultation with the Secre- 
tary of State to the softer caution contained in the Stimson-drafted 
sentences : 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes 
with only the barest possibility that the Japanese government might come 
back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable. Hostile 
action possible at any moment. 

Then followed the caution not to commit the first overt act. 

[££6] In continuing on beyond November 27th, was the message 
from G-2 on November 28, #484, sent by General Arnold which was 
devoted to sabotage and defensive measures. On the same day the 
War Department sent message #482 to Short with similar tone and 
tenor. Short replied to #482 on the 28th with a very long message 
all dealing with sabotage and espionage. This ends the communica- 
tions with Short by the Army until the final message of December 7 
which arrived too late. 

Short was never informed of the Secretary of State's action in 
delivering the "Ten Points" counter proposals. He testified he first 
saw or heard of that document after the White Papers were published. 
General Short said, 

I knew nothing of anything of the kind until a year or so afterwards, whenever 
that State Department paper came out. 

The message of November 27th did not convey to Short what it 
was meant to convey by the people who drafted it. While confusing, 
it contained information and instructions the significance of which 
should have been appreciated by Short and his staff. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 139 

The two Navy messages of October 16 and 24, both of which cau- 
tioned against'precipitation of an incident, could have added to Short's 
confusion in interpreting the message. 

The impression that the avoidance of war was paramount was 
heightened by the messages immediately following the one of the 27th. 
In the first place, Short had no reaction from the War Department to 
his reply that he was acting only to prevent sabotage and to keep 
contact with the Navy. He felt confirmed in this action by the mes- 
sage on the 27th, from G-2, saying. 

Actions of sabotage and espionage probable. 

[227] Immediately following that the next day were two addi- 
tional messages dealing with sabotage and espionage. 

From that time on, November 28, until the message that was received 
after the attack. Short received no other word by courier, letter, radio, 
or otherwise. The only claim that he received any additional informa- 
tion was that he was told of messages of December 3, 4, and 6, about 
the Japanese destroying their codes and the Navy being instructed 
to destroy some of its codes. Short denies receiving this information. 

These acts of omission and commission on the part of the War 
Department undoubtedly played their part in the failure to put the 
Hawaiian Department in a proper state of defense. 

The record shows that from informers and other sources the War 
Department had complete and detailed information of Japanese inten- 
tions. Information of the evident Japanese intention to go to war 
in the very near future was well known to the Secretary of State, 
the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary 
of Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations. It was not a question 
of fact; it was only a question of time. The next few days would 
see the end of peace and the beginning of war. 

If it be assumed that for any reason the information could not have 
been given to the Hawaiian Department, then it was a responsibility 
of the War Department to give orders to Short what to do, and to tell 
him to go on an all-out alert instead of a sabotage alert. 

As elsewhere related in detail, when vital information of Decembei' 
Gth reached G-2 of the War Department, not later than nine o'clock 
the evening of December 6, it was placed in [£28] the locked 
pouch and delivered to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel 
Bedell Smith, now Lt. Gen Smith, with a warning from Colonel 
Bratton, Chief of Far Eastern Section of G-2, that it contained a. 
vitally important message. In fact the message implied war and 
soon. Wliatever was the reason of Colonel Bedell Smith for not con- 
veying this message to General Marshall on the night of December 
Gth, it was an unfortunate one. And further, with the top War 
Department officials fully aware of the critical nature of this situation, 
standing operating procedure should have required delivery of this 
vital information to General Marshall at once. He, himself, was 
responsible for the organization and operation of his own immediate 
office. 

This information could have been sent to Short on the afternoon 
(Honolulu time) of December 6. Additionally, this same information 
was given to General Gerow's Executive, Colonel Gailey, of the War 
Plans Division, and there is no evidence of action taken by that 
Division. 



140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The responsibility of War Department is clearly defined and plain. 
Action by it would have been sufficient further to have alerted the 
Hawaiian Department. It was in possession of the information which 
was the last clear chance to use the means available to meet an attack. 
It had the background of the full development of the Japanese prepa- 
ration for war and its probable date. 

Again, the equally important and vital information of December 
7th, the day of the attack, was in the possession of the War Depart- 
ment at 0900 on the morning of December 7. Colonel Bratton made 
an immediate effort to get the Chief of [229] Staff at that 
hour. It was not until nearly three hours later that any action was 
taken by the War Department, when time was of the greatest im- 
portance. 

Under the circumstances of the clear and explicit revelation of 
Japanese intentions, arrangements should have been made for imme- 
diate action to further warn Hawaii and not leave the situation to 
be acted upon when the Chief of Staff could not immediately be 
reached. The responsibility is the Chief of Staff's for not providing 
an arrangement by which another could act in so critical a situation 
when he could not readily be reached. 

Strange as it may appear, the War Department did not know the 
actual state of readiness of Short's command from November 27th 
to December 7th, 1941, though this information was contained in 
Short's report of action taken on November 27th. 

5. Oonfiict between the Aiviiy and Navy Messages. — The practice 
of having General Short secure through the Navy in Hawaii copies of 
the naval messages tended towards confusion. We have taken occasion 
to compare the messages of the Navy and the messages of the Army 
delivered to General Short from October IG to December 7. We find : 
a. That they were conflicting. 

h. That the Navy messages were predominant with warnings 
of a conflict and the Army messages predominant with the idea of 
avoiding a conflict and taking precautions against sabotage and 
espionage. 

Short naturally took his choice between the two types of \230'\ 
messages and followed that of the War Department. Examination 
of the Navy messages of October 16, 24, November 27, December 3, 4, 
and 6, will show that their tenor was predominantly war. One Army 
message of November 27 and two of November 28 predominated in 
antisabotage warnings. 

Furthermore, the Navy message of November 27 and the Army 
message of November 27 from the Chief of Staff were conflicting: the 
Navy message flatly stated, 

This is a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize 
conditions in the Pacific have ended. 

Now, contrast the opening sentences of the Army message which indi- 
cates that negotiations may still continue, where it says : 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes.* Only 
barest possibility that the Japanese government might come back and offer to 
continue. 

The Navy message contained no warning to Hawaii to take precau- 
tions against sabotage or overt acts, and no precautions as to the 
civilian population. To the contrary, the Army message gave explicit 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 141 

directions on this subject. This was followed on the same day b}^ a 
G-2 message, which said, 

It appears that the conference of the Japanese had ended in an apparent 
deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. 

The Navy war warning was further diluted in its effect upon Short 
by the Arnold-AG sabotage message on the 28th of November; and 
the additional G-2 message on sabotage on the 28th. These November 
28 sabotage messages undoubtedly influenced Short to continue on 
his sabotage alert. 

Thereafter Short had only silence from Washington. Short was 
given no further clarification of this conflict amongst the messages. 

[SSI] There is no explanation why Short was not told of the 
so-called ultimatum. It was known to the Japanese because it was 
handed to them. 

6. Military Intelligence Division. — Within the gcope of its activities, 
this division performed well. It gathered much valuable and vital 
data. Through Colonel Bratton it insisted on the dissemination of 
this information to Field Commanders. 

There was a broad field for investigation, however, which was not 
touched by it or any intelligence agency of the American Government, 
either military or civil. In this field were the mandated islands, the 
home land and the home waters of the Japanese empire, and the areas 
in which the Japanese Navy and Army were operating. 

In these fields, reliance was placed upon sources of information which 
were inadequate. The Japanese Navy Avas lost to us for considerable 
periods in those months prior to the outbreak of war. The task force 
which made the attack on 7 December 1941, left home ports, assembled 
at Tankan Bay, and notwithstanding that it was a relatively large 
convoy, sailed for thousands of miles without being discovered!^ Part 
"of its aircraft was in flight for the targets at Pearl Harbor and on 
Oahu before we knew of its existence. Its detection was primarily a 
naval job, but obviously the army was intensely interested. Elsewhere 
in this report, the mass of detailed information which the Japanese 
had assembled relating to American activities has been discussed and 
is not repeated here. 

Discussing this subject before the Board, General Miles, G-2 in 1941, 
testified as follows : 

[252] But to answer your question more succintly, I do not think any 
Intelligence officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or 
attack force or task force in Japan before it sailed and know where it was going. 
That was beyond our terms of efficiency. (R. 107. ) 

The disadvantages accruing from this situation could have been 
calamitous. The Japanese armed forces knew everything about us. 
We knew little about them. This was a problem of all our intelligence 
agencies. This should not come to pass again. Our intelligence serv- 
ice must be brought in line with the part which we are to play in world 
affairs. 

We must know as much about other major world powers as they 
know about us. This is an absolute condition precedent to intelligent 
planning by those charged with formulating our international policies 
and providing for our security. Our intelligence service should be 
second to none in its efficiency. It must not be inferred that this is the 
exclusive function of the M. I. D. It is a national problem. 

79716— 46— Ex. 157 10 



142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In the past our intelligence service has suffered from lack of funds, 
lack of interest, and legal obstacles and regulations. Steps should be 
taken to correct all of these. 

7. War Plans Division. — The War Plans Division, the supervising 
agency for the War Department for Overseas Departments, was 
charged with directing the preparation of and coordinating the war 
plans for Hawaii. It had the responsibility and duty to insure the 
implementing of such plans. 

Aside from the letters and telegrams sent throughout 1941 to General 
Short (and there were no letters from General Marshall to General 
Short after the first of November 1941,) no action after November 1, 
1941, appears to have been taken by way of communications or in- 
spections, or full report of [233] any sort, to reveal whether 
General Short was doing anything, whether he was doing it correctly, 
what his problems were, and what help could have been given him. 

The War Plans .Division took no action when Short put the 
Alert Number 1 into operation and so reported. It took no steps to 
stop the use of the Hawaiian Department as a training station and put 
it on a combat basis, such as an outpost should have been, with 
threatened war. It took no steps to find out if the Hawaiian defenses 
were being implemented and built according to schedule and the right 
priorities. It took no steps to put the control of the building of its 
defenses on the Department Commander so that he could coordinate 
the building of defenses with his other defense preparations. 

General Gerow's own testimony clearly pictures the lack of organiza- 
tion and management of the War Plans Division of the Overseas 
Departments, such as the Hawaiian Department. The War Plans 
Division was responsible for the Overseas Department, said General 
Gerow. (R. 4334-4335.) The War Plans Division was familiar with 
the equipment situation in Hawaii, such as lack of parts for radar. 
(R. 3425.) It was their duty to do all they could to correct the' 
deficiencies but there is no proof that any action was taken. 
( R. 4325-4326. ) The War Plans Division was responsible for drafting 
the operational messages to the Hawaiian Department. Gerow was 
responsible for drafting the message of the 27th and managed the 
drafting and final sending of that message. He admitted that he 
failed to follow up to see if the message of the 27th was being carried 
out and that was the War Plans Division's responsibility. 

[234'] He said : 

Admiral Standle:t. Then who would have been interested in following up that 
message to see whether those instructions were obeyed or not? 

General Gekow. The War Plans Division, sir, should have been 

Admiral Standley. War Plans Division. 

General Geeow. Should have been responsible for following it up, sir. 

Admiral ^andley. That was not done then? 

General Geeow. No, sir, it was not. 

4: ****** 

Admiral Standley. Then those instructions went by the board ; nobody fol- 
lowed them up, then? 

General Gerow. That is correct, sir; that is, between the 27th and the 7th. 
(Roberts Report 1857-1858.) 

And he again admitted that he made an error in not realizing that 
the reply of Short, which referred to Message No. 472 by number, 
referred to that message. He thought it referred to a G-2 message, 
(Iloberts lieport 1857-1858.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 143 

He also testified as follows : 

General Grunert. Without such coordination, there was liable to be confusion 
and misunderstanding as to the intent of each one of the messages. Was that 
the War Plans Division? Was it the Chief of Staff? 

General Gerow. It was done, usually, General, I believe by a matter of getting 
concurrences between the various divisions of the General Staff, on something 
that was going to be sent out. (R. 4336.) 

• ••***• 

General Gerow. The coordination of concurrences, and then most of these 
important messages, I believe, went through the Secretary of the General Staff. 

General Grunert. Then it appears to be the Secretary of the General Staff? 

General Geeow. N/O. 

[235] General Grunert. It appears you do not know just who does it, 
do you? 
General Gerow. Well, no, sir. (R. 4337.) 

He testified that it was not his particular duty in 1941 to coordinate 
all messages of the War Department that went to our overseas pos- 
sessions. (R. 4338.) 

Therefore the War Plans Division under General Gerow failed as 
follows : 

a. General Gerow failed to take action on Short's reply show- 
ing that he was taking precautions against sabotage only. He 
again failed to take action in that he assumed liaison with the 
Navy meant Short was taking the correct steps. The documents 
in the War Plans Division show that the Navy's responsibilities 
did not start until war was imminent or had taken place and that 
some formal action by Washington or the Hawaiian Department 
putting the agreements into effect was necessary. 

h. He was responsible for drafting the confusing message of 
November 27. 

c. He took no steps to deliver to Short additional available in- 
formation. As Gerow testified as to Short's reactions to the 
message of the 27th : 

No one knows what he would have done had he been in that position and 
not having perhaps all information ice Jiad here. (R. 1851.) 

d. He did not check on the Hawaiian Department's activities to 
determine its state of readiness from November 28 through De- 
cember 7. (R. 4306.) 

[236] e. He relied upon the message of November 27 to give 
Short all the information he needed for full preparation for war, 
but did not check to find out if that was a fact. (R. 4256.) 

/. The joint air estimate of General Martin and Admiral Bell- 
inger under the joint agreement of General Short and Admiral 
Bloch as approved by Admiral Kimmel, stated that air attack was 
the prime threat against Hawaii ; and when General Gerow was 
advised in a conference with the Secretary of War and the report 
to the Secretary of War from the Secretary of State, in addition 
to the intelligence information with which he was provided as 
to the status of the international situation, it was incumbent up- 
on him to do two things which he failed to do : 

(1) To correct Short's mistake in going to Alert Number 1 in- 
stead of to Alerts Number 2 or 3 ; and 

(2) To direct immediately the activation of the Joint Hawai- 
ian Coastal Defense Plan to put the Army, in conjunction with 



144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the Navy, on a complete war footing, ready for any eventuality. 

8. Navy DefaTtnient. — The Navy Department undertook by a signed 
agreement to provide long-distance reconnaissance in Hawaii. It 
assumed this responsibility admittedly without means of carrying it 
out in Hawaii. 

The Navy in Hawaii failed to advise Short of the sinking of enemy 
submarines in the outer harbor between six and seven \237'\ 
a. m. the morning of December 7. The Navy failed to advise Short of 
the Jaluit task force so that he could evaluate the information for 
himself. 

9. Chief of Staff. — The responsibility for the conditions in the 
military component of the War Department as depicted in this chap- 
ter rests with the Chief of Staff. 

At about this time, November 25-December 7, 1941, there seemed to 
have been in the War Department a firm conviction that war was 
imminent but also there seems to have been the conviction that it would 
start in the Southwest Pacific and evidently nobody had any belief 
that Hawaii was immediately in danger. There was the belief both in 
Hawaii and in Washington that war was on our doorstep but not on 
Hawaii's doorstep. This resulted in the main consideration being 
given to General MacArthur and the Philippine Islands and the re- 
sulting second consideration during this critical time to Hawaii. The 
unfortunate thing was that the Japanese "crossed us up" with a daring 
surprise attack. When the famous November 27 message was being 
prepared, consideration first was given to send it only to MacArthur 
and then it was decided to include Panama, Hawaii and the Western 
Defense Command. This shows the trend. 

As a result of the message of November 27 Short ordered only a 
sabotage alert and so reported to the War Department as of the same 
day. The import of Short's reply was little noticed in the War De- 
partment by either General Marshall or General Gerow. Just as 
General Short failed to interpret the full seriousness of the November 
27 message, likewise the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the War Plans 
Division failed to [238'] interpret the limited defense that 
Short's reply indicated in the face of known impending war. 

There was failure of understanding at both ends of the line. The 
Washington officials had full knowledge of impending events, which 
full knowledge was not available to Short. 

A cardinal principle in good management is the necessity to "fol- 
low up" on directions. The War Department had nine days in which 
to check up on the state of defense in Hawaii, which it did not do. 

Repeatedly, since General Short took command in Hawaii in Feb- 
ruary 1941, General Marshall during this peacetime had written to 
him at length, advising him on details of operating and here, late in 
November, with war expected almost daily, he communicated none of 
those personal messages containing needed inside information. 

The evidence indicates that the manner in which authority to act 
was delegated or not delegated had its influence on this situation. 
The Chief of Staff had three deputies, Generals Bryden, Arnold, and 
Moore. None of these three was given the secret information concern- 
ing the known Jap intentions. When General Marshall went away on 
November 27 he had, prior to departure, prepared a first draft of the 
November 27 message. It was the Secretary of War who initially fol- 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 145 

lowed through on it on November 27. Then it was given to Gerow to 
complete. Complete authority to act in General Marshall's absence 
does not seem to have been given to any one subordinate. Had there 
been an officer either with authority or with courage to act on the 
information that was in the War Department on the evening of De- 
cember 6, and had he sent a message to Short, [239] Hawaii 
should have been fully alei-ted. 

As has been repeated so many times, there was positive evidence in 
the War Department that it was only a matter of days before war 
would ensue and the War Department had notice that Hawaii was 
on only a sabotage alert, inadequate for full warfare. Had a full war 
message, unadulterated, been dispatched or had direct orders for a full, 
all-out alert been sent, Hawaii could have been ready to have met the 
attack with what it had. What resulted was failure at both ends of 
the line. Kesponsibility laid both in Washington and in Hawaii. 
Hawaiian responsibility has been treated in Chapter III. 

To summarize: insofar as the Chief of Staff is related to these 
events there are specific things which appear in the record with which 
he was personally concerned. The following are of this nature : 

a. Failure to advise his Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Bryden, Arnold, 
and Moore, of the critical situation in the Pacific so that they 
might act intelligently for him in his absence. 

h. Failure to keep General Short fully informed as to the in- 
ternational situation and the probable outbreak of war at any time. 
G. The delay in getting to General Short the important in- 
formation reaching Washington on the evening of December 6 
and the morning of December 7. 

d. Noting without taking action the sabotage message of Short 
which presumptively was on his desk on the morning of Novem- 
ber 28, 1941. ^ 

e. His admitted lack of knowledge of the condition of readiness 
of the Hawaiian Command during the period [240] of 
November 8 to December 7, 1941. 

The Board is impressed with the absolute necessity of considering 
the conduct of all responsible officers in the light of the situation as 
it existed in November and early December, 1941. 

It was a case of intelligent men arriving at the best decision possible 
with all the facts that were before them. This is the basis for suc- 
cessful procedure in either military or civil affairs. In both of these 
fields occasional mistakes are made notwithstanding that such prin- 
ciples are followed. Such was the case at Pearl Harbor. 

This recital is in explanation, not justification. The thinkino- in 
the War Department and the Hawaiian Department was faulty in 
that it emphasized probabilities to the exclusion of capabilities 

10. SwmmarT/.— In summarizing the "Kesponsibilities in Washing- 
ton It appears that the issue between the United States and Japan 
was precipitated before the Army and Na^^ could prepare them- 
selves to follow through on the consequences thereof and that coordi- 
nation and cooperation between the State, War and Navy Depart- 
ments lacked effectiveness, at least in this respect. 

As to the War Department's responsibilities there was— 
a. A lack of organization for war. 



146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

h. A lack of adequate procedure under which to advise the 
Hawaiian Department and to control its actions. 

c. A lack of instructions to the Hawaiian Department based 
upon full knowledge of its actions [Ui] and full knowl- 
edge of the international situation. . 

d. Failures on November 26-27, November 28, durmg the period 
from November 28 to December 7, and on December 6 and 7, to 
take adequate and prompt action on vital information then at 

hand. i ci <. 

These responsibilities in no wav mitigate those of General bhort as 
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. However, they 
do add others to the list of those responsible. 

[24^] Chapter V. Wyman and Construction Delays in Hawau 

A. PRE-PEAKL HARBOE ASSOCIATIONS OF WYMAN AND KOHL : SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION 

1. Relationship of Wyman and Rohl in Los Angeles 

2. Hawaiian Actions of Wyman and Rohl 

Wyman's actions in Hawaii with other contractors ; the initiation of the secret 
defense construction in Hawaii in November, 1940; Wyman's selection of con- 
tractors for the tasli ; the difficulty of Rohl's alien status ; Wyman s efforts to 
get the naturalization of Rohl ; the yacht VEGA. 

3. RohVs Associations 

Rohl's origin and German affiliations; Rohl's association with Werner Plack; 
Rohl's perjury ; Wyman's association with Rohl and Rohl's citizenship considered. 

//. SiCbsequent Relations— Wyman and Rohl 

The Rohl-Wyman association and the reason for selection of the Hawaiian 
Constructors. 

5. Delays in Construction 

Wyman's inefficient administration and management; typical delays listed. 

6. Directive of November 24, IG'fl 

Relationship between contractors and the Corps of Engineers disregarded by 
Wyman; Rohl's continued relationship with Wyman; Rohl's conduct in the 
Islands and removal, 

7. ResponsiiiUty of the Corps of Engineers 

Lack of supervision bv the District Engineer and the Chief of Engineers; 
inspections made by the inspector General on the complaint of civilians in Con- 
gress ; inspections made by direction of Secretary of War. 

B. OVEBT ACTS 

1. False Official Statement fty Wyman as to His Knowledge of RohVs Alien 

Status 

2. Refusal to Accept Loto Bidder on Hawaiian Contracts— Wyman Preferred 

His Friends 

3. Irregular Purchase of Machinery by Wyman From the Hawaiian Constructors 

and His Associates 

C. SUMMARY 

[J43] A. pre-pearl harbor associations of wyman and rohl: 

SCOPE OF investigation 

1 Relationship of Wyman and Rohl in Los Angele^.—T\i^ in- 
v^estigation represented by the following summary and by the more 
detailed report attached hereto on Colonel Wyman ( AT>pendix — ) 
is the result of the direction of the Acting Secretary of War, the Hon- 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 147 

orable Robert P. Patterson, to investigate the conduct of Colonel 
Theodore Wyman, Jr. as District Engineer in the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment as his activities had affected Pearl Harbor. We have found it 
necessarj^ to consider Colonel Wyman 's activities and those of his con- 
tractor associates prior to his advent in the Hawaiian Islands, because 
some of them were initiated prior to the departure of Colonel Wyman 
for the Islands ; We f omid it was necessary to consider the acts for a 
time after December 7, 1941, as many of them were the fruits of the 
things done and mistakes made that were initiated before December 7 
and the full effect and importance of which would not be appre- 
ciated unless the subsequent events after December 7, 1941, were 
recorded. 

In making this summary report we have divided it into two parts : 
the first part is a running story of Colonel Wyman's activities on the 
mainland with Hans Wilhelm Rohl and the associated contractors 
involved in this matter, and the results upon the Pearl Harbor opera- 
tions by reason of such associations ; the second part is an explanation 
of typical acts of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. which represent many 
other matters of similar nature which can be found in his conduct. In 
no sense has this board attempted to draw any complete specifications 
or charges, but we have confined ourselves to findings of fact. 

[244-] The record shows that Wyman, as a Captain going to duty 
as a District Engineer at Los Angeles, was an able and steady officer, 
devoted to his professional duties and to the government's interest, 
with a forceful disposition. 

While at Los Angeles he fell into the company of Hans Wilhelm 
Rohl, German alien, who was in a contracting firm that became the 
successful bidder on a contract to build a breakwater at Los Angeles. 
This contract was under the administration and iurisdiction of Wy- 
man (R. 3359, 3378). 

Rohl's methods of doing business and his personal life were at that 
time apparently the antithesis of Wyman's. Rohl was a man-about- 
town in Los Angeles and had become increasingly prominent in the 
night life and social activities of Los Angeles and Hollywood. His 
personal habits in connection with extreme drinking and with "party 
girls" of the community, his extravagant methods of living and his 
disregard of the domestic and social proprieties of a responsible per- 
son increased as the years went by, but they were already well devel- 
oped at the tinie of his initial associations with Wyman, who was 
introduced by him into new and more extravagant methods of living. 
Rohl evidently introduced Wyman, or at least influenced him to joi*n 
in extravagant and disgraceful parties as Rohl's house guest in Los 
Angeles hotels, and in heavy drinking over considerable periods. 
Trips on Rohl's yacht were expensive and lavish.^^ [24S] This 
association involved pleasure trips on Rohl's yacht, membership in a 
large number of clubs and a scale of riotous living, drunkeimess and 
both priva te and public misconduct by Wyman and Rohl together. 

K^"o9i°^""f'TT?""* ^° ^^^ Inspector Generars Report found : "These yacht trips, as described 
th« n nnr^^Lr l"^^^' ^^^^ ^°^ *^^ greater part essentially business trips, primarily to inspect 
fmli^^r 1^- '^bove referred to. Actually, there existed no necessity for conducting the 
^"«rl .''^=.noK.°^P^*'^'*.?«^!^'^'"^^'°^ activities on Catalina Island in this manner, since there 
^?,Jl 'i^ailable to the District Engineer adequate Government-owned vessels. These trips 
?,, il5 1 + 1 ^^ .classed as pleasure trips at Mr. Rohl's expense, official business being 
nn l.^^il orfi consideration. It is therefore apparent that Colonel Wyman was 

on close and intimate social relations with Mr. Rohl during the period when, as the 



148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Thus was born an intimate association, characterized by improper 
conduct, and it continued over a considerable period into and through 
the Pearl Harbor events. Rohl, at that earlier time, had distin- 
guished himself by his lack of domestic propriety ; he was the father 
of four illegitimate children bv what he called a common-law wife, 
later discarded. (E. 2223, 2441, 4113.) In 1938, Wyman also_ di- 
vorced his wife of 30 years standing and shortly thereafter acquired 
another wife. This Rohl association continued actively up until 
Wyman was ordered to Honolulu as the Hawaiian District Engineer.*^ 
It also [^-4^] continued in Hawaii.^^ 

2. Haioaiian Actions of 'Wy7nan and Rohl. — ^Wyman reported to 
Hawaii in July 1940 (R. 3371) . In the Islands there were not only a 
large number of able and competent resident contractors but also one 
of the leading contracting firms in the United States, which had 
opened up an office in Honolulu and which had been building millions 
of dollars worth of construction for the Army and Navy. This was 
an organization of great wealth, high integrity and unquestioned 
ability and a successful government contractor for a long period of 
years. They were just concluding some of their contracts when Wy- 
man arrived (R. 2399-2400). 

When the contract began to develop for the defenses of Hawaii in 
November 1940, apparently the general outline of the project was well 
known and fully considered by Wyman and the [^-^7'] Ha- 
waiian Department. They knew generally what they wanted to do, 
although the details of the plans probably had not been fully worked 
out by the time of the actual execution of the contract hereinafter 
mentioned as having been entered into by the Corps of Engineers 
with the Hawaiian Constructors. Generally, it was desired to have 
built as a part of the Hawaiian defenses the following : a war reserve 
storage system for gasoline, aircraft warning service, and improved 

Government's representative, he administered extensive work for which Mr. Rohl was the 
contractor. . „ , , .rrr 

"The yacht trips and house parties given by Mr. Rohl and attended by Colonel Wyman 
were expensive and lavish. Intoxicating liquors were habitually served, with no limitation 
except the guest's capacity to imbibe. Colonel Wyman, claiming an ability to hold his 
liquor, imbibed freely. It is not in evidence, however, that his acceptance of Mr. Rohl's 
entertainment was in any sense necessary to that desirable degree of acquaintance between 
the Corps of Engineers and the construction industry which may be considered necessary 
to their mutual interests. These contacts were essentially, if not entirely, social and 
personal affairs, which by their frequency and character tended strongly to bring discredit 
upon the Corps of Engineers and to give rise to just such allegations as the ones now in 
question.'' » , „ . ^ , ^ , j, „ 

« Colonel Hunt in his Inspector General's report found : "A very careful study of all 
facts and circumstances brought to light in the course of this investigation leads to the 
following conclusions : 

"During the vears 1936-1939, Colonel Wyman. as District Engineer, Los Angeles, main- 
tained a close personal friendship, as distinguished from a business friendship, with Mr. 
Hans Wilhelm Rohl, which was inappropriate on the part of a United States Army officer 
administering costly works on which the said Mr. Rohl was engaged as contractor. This 
relationship extended so far beyond the need for ordinary cordial business relation as to 
give rise to such presumptions of impropriety as formed, in part, the basis of this investi- 
gation. In maintaining that relationship. Colonel Wyman was not sufficiently mindful of 
that unquestionable reputation for integrity and impartiality which it was the duty of 
a man in his position to cultivate at all times. 

"The flattery of Colonel Wyman personally and professionally, which was bestowed 
upon him by his wealthy associate, Mr. Rohl, evoked in Colonel Wyman so complete a 
confidence in the former as to lead him to an unwise acceptance of Mr. Rohl's judgment 
and advice during their subsequent association in Hawaii. He thereby relinquished to 
some extent that independence of judgment required of an officer in charge of the Gov- 
ernment's interest, as indicated in his too ready acceptance of Mr. Rohl's recommendations 
relating to equipment purchases and appraisals." (R. 749-750.) 

« Colonel Hunt also reported : "d. Various witnesses testified to having seen Colonel 
Wyman with Mr. Rohl at various semi-public functions, when both men indulged freely 
in" intoxicating beverages. So far as could be ascertained most of those Instances were 
prior to the attack of 7 December. No witness was found who could testify to drunkenness 
on Colonel Wyman's part." (R. 2114.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 149 

or new airfields . . . There were in all about 148 maior proiects.*® 
(R. 3432, 3570-3572.) 

Wlien it came time to place the contract and negotiate, the Corps of 
Engineers decided upon a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. Wyman 
stated that onl}^ certain Los Angeles contractors were interested in this 
work. This is contrary to the evidence. The McKee Company, then 
doing millions of dollars of work in [^4S] the Islands, and a 
number of Island contractors with full equipment and a fine record of 
performance were anxious and willing to bid on the job. (R. 2416- 
2418.) Wyman's reason for selecting his friends is without founda- 
tion and the net result condemns his choice. 

Wyman now proceeded to secure contractors for this task in this 
manner. By virtue of using a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee type of contract he 
was able to award the work to contractors comprising his old friends 
and immediately excluded all others from consideration, both in the 
Hawaiian Islands and the United States.^" (R. 3632, 3722.) He 
turned to his old Los Angeles alien friend Rohl, who was president of 
the firm of Rohl-Connolly (and half owner), and their associate com- 
panies, the Callahan Company and the Gunther & Shirley Company 
(R. 2240, 2295, 2319) . These companies much later, when they found 
them [^49] selves in difficulty in performing the work, took 
into partnership certain of the local Hawaiian contractors in a sub- 
ordinate position. (R. 3727, 3750-51.) These several contractors 
formed what was known as the Hawaiian Constructors. The chair- 
man of the executive committee and the principal executive steering 
the organization of Hawaiian Constructors at the outset and the signer 
of the contract was Mr. Paul Grafe (R. 2299-2301, 2345) . Grafe was 
Vice-president of the Callahan Company. 

f Colonel Hunt in his Inspector General's Report found : "As to whether this relation- 
ship influenced Colonel Wyman to find a place for the Rohl-Connolly Company in the 
Hawaiian Constructors contractor for work ultimately totaling about $100,000,000 in 
Hawaii aiul the South Pacific, there is no conclusive evidence. Colonel Wvman became 
District Engineer in Hawaii in June 1940. In November of that year, funds became avail- 
«1 nQ£°JTQ°^'k railroad, fortifications, and allied work- to the estimated cost of about 
^l,U9(,b7d. Details of this work were not available. Colonel Wvman testified that he 
proposed to perforni the work by hired labor, since a proper basis for contracting the 
work -nms lacking. Due to a marked propensity on the part of Colonel Wyman to conduct 
Dusiness orally to the exclusion of written records where possible, other references to 
which will be made in this report, no positive proof of this claim was developed. It was 
hv r^nnoi w ^."^"^^M ""T^f contractors in Honolulu that at about the time mentioned 
by Colonel W.vman they had been requested to indicate what equipment they had avail- 
able for rental. Neither Mr. Phillip C. Chew, Chief Clerk of Colonel Wyman's office nor 
^l I i^enibers thereof could confirm the statement that Colonel Wyman proposed doing 
the work by hired labor, nor could anything be found in the files which would confirm it 
However, there is no .reason to doubt that such was Colonel Wvman's original intention' 
?T,J^-Jffi*^ ° ^^Pfif^^o'"'^? work by contract appears to have reached Colonel Wvman through 
the office of the South Pacific Engineer Division and the then Division Engineer at San 
Francisco, California, Brigadier General (then Colonel) Warren T. Hanniim CE On 
6 November 1940. General Hannum in a letter to the District Engineer, Honolulu' sug- 
gested a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract due to the probable difficulties of conducting' 
the work on a fixed price basis while large Navy works in Hawaii were being performed 
Pni^n^i w '"''•'• P^^'^^'^Si^ ^'^^'■^ followed some telephone conversations bet^^pn 
^lUm T'^"*" f"'^ ^^c^^Ji^""^^ Hannum, records of which were not kept, and about the 
,^Stf December 1940, negotiations were started in the San Francisco office, wh ch 
ultimately resulted in the signing of Contract "-414-Eng-6n2. That contract originallv 
contemplating a job totaling .?1. 097.673 and a fixed fee of $52,220 value of work to be 
performed thereunder approached $100,000,000 and the fee approximated SI 000 000" 

Rohl-Connolly Company, the W. E. Callahan Companv and the Gunther c(- Shirlev 
Company who became co-adventurers as the Hawaiian Constructors. Colonel Hunt's re- 
r.bf^r^^^l "Colonel 'Wyman testified that he had tried to interest local contractors in 
taking on the work originally proposed, ,nnd that they showed no interest. That statement 
^ tT,o°io?<^" T,*^ ?^.,,""'"i''^ among those contractors, seven of whom were questioned 
worir ThlrV^nV^o.I '''" '^'^"^1"*^ havinc: heen given a chance to take on any part of the 
work. These contractors were then seeking new work, and the bringing in of an outside 
reSme°nt on th" ^''^t"" ^''*'"' ^ chuuce to participate, created a considerable natural 



150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

There was a federal statute that prevented an alien from having any 
interest in or the management of a secret national defense contract. 

This brought about the disclosure to Wyman that Rohl was a (jer- 
man alien, that he was born in Lubeck, Germany, m 1886, that he had 
entered the United States as an alien, that he had never acquired citi- 
zenship, although he had applied for it, but had not consummated the 
transaction. This story is elsewhere \_^50\ related.*^ 

When the contract was about to be placed m Washington, Wyman 
went to Washington and lived in the same hotel and same hotel room 
with one of the prospective contractors, Mr. Connolly of the Rohl- 
Connolly Company and he was later joined by Mr. Grafe of the Calla- 
han Company (R. 2197, 2294-95, 3398-99, 3542). There was no deal- 
ing at this time at arms' length by Wyman, the government agent, 
and his friends. These contractors who appeared to be already pre- 
determined were to get this cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. At that 
time the contract was estimated to be worth a million dollars but which 
later was extended to an approximate gross business of a hundred and 
thirty million dollars. . . 

The alien status of Rohl put the parties m a difficult situation.^" 
Rohl was then eliminated as president of the Rohl-Connolly Company 
by a paper change without change of substance or interest (R. 2160-61) . 
Later action was taken by the Acting Chief of Engineers to write a 
letter to the Department of Justice, Immigration Bureau, on Wyman s 
urging General Kingman, requesting that RoliFs application for citi- 
zenship be expedited. Then followed efforts with government agen- 
cies, stimulated by Wyman, concluded by a hearing before Federal 
Judge O'Connor in Los Angeles, resulting in Rohl's acquiring citizen- 
ship. The complete story of Rohl's alien status and the efforts to get 
\^51\ him naturalized appears elsewhere. 

*s The statute reads : 

"National Defense 

"Chapter 440-3d Session 

"(Public — No. 671 — 76th Congress) 

"(H. K. 9822) 

"AN ACT to expedite national defense, and for other purposes 

"Sec 11 (a) No aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret, con- 
fidential or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access to the plans 
or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate in the contract trials,, 
unless the written consent of the head of the Government department concerned has first 
been obtained, and anv person who willfully violates or through negligence permits the 
viohitton of the provision of this subsection shall be finfed not more than $10,000 or im- 
Drisoned not more than five years, or botli. „ , _. , ^ • ^ i r^ 

"(b) Anv alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or restricted Govern- 
ment contrkcts by willful misrepresentation of his alien status, or who makes such willful 
misrepresentation while seeking such employment, shall be fined not more than ?10,000 
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. , , „. ^ ^ +„ ;„„i.,/i„ or, 

"(c) For the purpose of this section, the term 'person' shall be construed to include an 
individual, partnership, association, corporation, or other business enterprise. 

"Approved, June 28, 1940." (R. 4109-4110.) 

49 <;;gg p ''6'' of this report 

»» Colonel Hunt reported : "His own testimony and that of other witnesses in this respect 
indicates that Colonel Wvman maintained a totally unnecessary, and in the circumstances, 
an undesirable social familiarity with the active head or an organization whose pnnie 
business it was to profit from work under his supervision. If there is reasonable doubt 
that this relationship was with a man whose non-citizenship at the commencement of the 
contract was known to him, there is no doubt whatever that it was with -a man who at the 
time of this relationship in Hawaii, had been proven to Colonel Wyman to have concealed 
the fact of his alien status. The least that can be said of that relationship is that it 
displayed a callousness on Colonel Wyamn's part, not only toward the character of hJS 
associate, but toward the possible consequence of its public display,' 



Report of army pearl harbor board 151 

On 22 January lOil Wyman wrote a vigorous letter to assist this 
citizenship matter, indicating that Rohl was absolutely essential to 
the successful operation of the contract by Hawaiian Constructors. 
(E. 3529-3531, 4187-4188.) With Wyman 's help Rohl was natural- 
ized and proceded to Hawaii, so that he could participate actively 
in the contract. 

Wyman, during his tour in the Hawaiian Islands is shown by this 
record to have been continuing his acquired habit of drinking.^^ Wy- 
man and Rohl lived in adjoining rooms in the Pleasanton Hotel, which 
had been taken over by the contractors at government expense (R. 
1297-8, 3644-46). They negotiated a charter of Rohl's yacht, the 
VEGA, which was in the name of Mrs. Rohl. (R. 2203.) It came 
to the Islands with a cargo of liquor in a government convoy, which 
was delivered to Rohl. (R, 2266-67, 3403.) The vessel was never used 
for its intended purpose as a survey ship (R. 1311) . 

The record shows that there were many delays, confusions, ineffi- 
ciency in administration, and lack of correct administrative relation- 
ship between the contractors and the government agent. The District 
Engineer failed to secure results in the prompt construction of the 
defense projects under this contract." Grave administrative meffi- 
ciencies had arisen in the District Engineer's office (R. 2118, 3570- 
3571). 

The drinking ^^ by Rohl during duty hours in the day as [252] 
well as night after December 7 was so frequent, excessive, and such a 
detriment to the business of both the government and the contractors 
that, upon the' request of Wyman's successor. General Lyman, Rohl 
was requested to leave the Islands and cease further connection with 
the Hawaiian Constructors (R. 2534-35, 2544). This request was 
concurred in by Rohl's two associates on the executive committee of 
which Rohl was chairman (R. 2546). 

3. RohVs Associations. — There is testimony in the record of sub- 
stantial character that the impression that Rohl made a large sum of 
money on his first large contract, the Los Angeles breakwater, was notj 
well founded, yet his expenditures have been habitually for manyi 
years those of a wealthy man (R. 2445, 2449) . Rohl made at least one 
visit to Germany (R. 3996). 

There is some evidence in the record to show the following abouti 
one, Werner Plack and his associations with Rohl. Plack was anl 
employee of the German Consulate in Los Angeles, working under 

"R. 748, 777, 1173-1174, 1283-1285, 2114, 2408-1409. 

=2R. 512, 513, 1261-62, 1331, 1334, 1342, 2063, 2366, 2503-05, 2530, 3018, 3431-32, 
3439-43, 3699, 3703, 3770-71, 3837-39. 3886, 3901, 3905. 

=3 Major Meurlott, in the G-2 Department of the Hawaiian Department and G-2 at the 
time he testified said : 

"Major Clau-sen. Major Meurlott, I show you a memorandum entitled 'Memorandum 
for the files' dated July 22, 1942, to the effect that Hans Wilhelm Rohl was such a 
drunkard that he was even incompetent to be a subversive influence. Did you make this? 

"Major Meurlott. Yes, I wrote that." (R. 3925.) 

(Copy of memorandum) "7/22/42. 

"Memo for files. 

"Decision made to bring this ease to a close without the formality of a Cl-Rl report. 
Subject is claimed by Colonel Mollison to be a confirmed drunkard, and, inferentially, to 
be incompetent as a subversice influence for that reason. Irresponsibility rather than 
subversion appears to characterize the irregularities in his activities, as brought to the 
attention of this office. 
"Case closed. 

"/s/ T. M. Meurlott, 

"Capt. M. I." 



152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Doctor Gyssling, the German Consul. (R. 2387, 2429, 2442.) Rohl 
and Plack appeared publicly together in prominent night spots in Los 
Angeles and were apparently on intimate and friendly terms, as identi- 
fied by a number of witnesses, (R. 1167-1168, 2387-2388, 2390). In 
1940 Plack left the United [^^3] States under suspicion of 
being a German agent. The FBI made an exhaustive examination of 
his baggage before permitting him to depart with Fritz Weidemann, 
the Consul General at San Francisco, who left for Germany via Japan, 
taking Plack with him (R. 2519-2520). Weidemann stayed in the 
Far East as Chief of the Far Eastern Espionage and Sabotage Unit 
for Germany, while Werner Plack went on to Berlin and was placed 
by the German government in a position of high responsibility in the 
German Foreign Office (R. 2389). Flannery, Columbia Radio news 
commentator, who was then the Columbia correspondent in Berlin, 
and author of the book "Assignment to Berlin", testified in this record 
that he was personally well acquainted with Plack in Germany, having 
dealt with him repeatedly in the German Foreign Office from the 
period of early January 1941 to 29 September 1941 because Plack cen- 
sored Flannery's writings. While dealing with Werner Plack he 
found that he was high in the Nazi councils in connection with radio 
and other propaganda to the United States, in which he was regarded 
by the German government as a specialist. Flannery said he did 
brilliant work, in that he put on the broadcasts of Wodehouse, who was 
popular in the United States as a writer, the Broadcast of Count von 
Luckner, who was likewise popular, and had arranged for other simi- 
lar personalities to improve the quality of German broadcasts so that 
Nazi propaganda would be listened to (R. 2521). Evidently the 
entertainment that Werner Plack offered to friends in the Los Angeles 
area while posing as a wine salesman, during which period he associ- 
ated with Rohl, was for propaganda purposes for the Nazis. 
(R. 2522.) 

Rohl flatly denied under oath before this board that he [^SJf.] 
even knew Werner Plack (R. 2252-2253). The following witnesses 
in this record testified as to his open association with Werner Plack 
in Los Angeles over a considerable period: Willard Bruce Pine (R. 
2387-88, 2390), R. E. Combs (R. 2429, 2442), and Fulton LeM'is, Jr. 
(R. 1167-1168). 

The conditions surrounding Rohl, his long record of contact with 
pro-Nazi and German organization and associations, his repeated 
violations of the Federal laws as to his entry into this country, his 
long neglect to become a citizen, his open association with the German 
agent Plack, were widely known (R. 2430-2434) . It was Wyman who 
was responsible for bringing this man and his organization into 
Hawaii for work on defense contracts (R. 2430-2434). 

Rohl's testimon}' before this board contained conflicting statements 
either with thoroughly proven facts and documents or with his own 
previous testimony. (The records were open for investigation and 
have been for years (R. 2430). Rohl swore falsely on his income tax 
statements that he was a United States citizen (R. 2380, 2441). He 
made a false statement when he was placed on his own ship's manifest 
at Honolulu as an American citizen born in lola, Kansas (R. 2380- 
2441). 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 153 

Wyman as a commissioned officer of the United States Army openly 
and indiscreetly associated with Rohl and this association continued 
over a period of several years. 

4. Suhsequent relations — Wyman and Rohl. — Wyman had gone to 
the Pacific islands to become District Engineer at Ha^vaii in July 
1940 (R. 3371). A great defense contract program in Hawaii was 
being initiated. W3anan had only one consideration in placing these 
contracts : to get his friend Rohl as the con- 1^255'] tractor. To 
do that he exerted great efforts not only to have the contract placed 
with the group of affiliated companies of which Rohl's company was 
one but he also exerted himself to the utmost to permit Rohl in person 
to participate in the contract openh^ by getting him his citizenship. 
His written communications, his telephone calls and the pressure he 
brought to bear in Washington testify to his urgent desire for the 
accomplishment of this object. His first excuse was that these were 
the only competent contractors, and secondly that only Rohl was the 
essential man who could get results, because the representatives of 
the contractors on the ground, both the Hawaiian contractors and the 
mainland contractors, were not expediting the work (R. 768, 3481, 
3527). 

The record shows that Rohl did go to Hawaii, and that his con- 
tribution consisted primarily in adding to the disorganization, con- 
fusion and delays which were already inherent in utilizing the loose 
association of miscellaneous contractors from the mainland and the 
Hawaiian Islands under the co-adventurer's agreement which ter- 
minated in the formation of the Hawaiian Contractors (R. 2179-81). 
This loose confederation of contractors, dominated by Rohl, who be- 
came the chairman of the executive committee of the group, was poorly 
organized and was the attempt to conduct an enormous operation 
through committee management, which was fallacious in principle 
and unsatisfactory in action (R 1182-84, 2527-28, 2544, 3771-72). 

Here Rohl resumed his drunken conduct. The record is replete with 
testimony of his drinking.^* General Emmons' demand \256'\ 
for the relief of Colonel Wyman, and General Lyman's demand for 
Wyman's relief got results from the Chief of Engineers (R. 1302, 
1307-08) , It also resulted in the sending of Rohl back to the mainland 
at the request of Colonel Lyman (R. 2555) . 

5. Delays in Constnfction. — It is difficult at this late date, within 
the limited time that this board has had, to make a thorough examina- 
tion into all of the ramifications of delays in construction due to Wy- 
man's administration as District Engineer. Suffice it to say, the testi- 
mony shows ^^ that the organization of Colonel Wyman was bad in its 
administration, that it was mismanaged, that the engineering work 
was slow, defective and erratic, and the instructions to the contractors 
were repeatedly changed, resulting in delays at a time when it re- 
quired the best type of supervisory organization to meet the difficulties 
of priorities, the machinery and the personnel. Wyman's conduct in 
discarding responsible contractors, such as the INIcKee Company, and 
others, of whom there were several available in the Hawaiian Islands, 

"E. 767, 1433-34, 2114, 2526, 2544, 2555, 2574, 2575, 3288, 3296, 3299, 3648, 3925. 

=' R. 2092-2129 and reports of Colonel Luther B. Row, Inspector General, Hawaiian 
Department : R. 2094-99 and reports of Colonel Hunt, Inspector General's Office. Wash- 
ington. D. C, who made a special investisiation : R. 747-752. Also R. 2458, 2465, 2478, 
2486-87, 2494, 2502, 2530, 3602, 3625-3626, 3635, 3670, 3671. 



154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and on the mainland, and insisting on limitino; the contracts to his 
friends and intimate associates, can bear but one meaning, namely, 
that he was not conducting himself as an impartial agent of the United 
States Government or as a responsible representative and officer of 
the Corps of Engineers.^® 

Typical delays resulting from this association, aside from the greatly 
increased expense to the government, were as follows : 

[357'] (a) Only about 25 out of every 90 employees brought to 
Hawaii by the Hawaiian Constructors, were good or experienced work- 
ers (K. 3670-3671) ; (b) "a great deal of waste and unnecessary expend- 
iture of time and funds" (K. 2123) ; (c) frequent changes in super- 
visory personnel (R. 3590) ; (d) very slow in getting organized, 
finally taking four to six weeks to get started after the Under Secretary 
of AVar approved the contract negotiated 20 December 1940 (R. 3602) ; 

(e) inefficiency, poor organization, and lax planning (R. 3625-3626) ; 

(f) the fact that Rohl, their key man, was frequently drunk during 
working hours and "not particularly inclined to push the work" 
(R. 3635) ; (g) a strike by workers against supervision by Japanese 
employees (R. 2190) ; (h) bickering and appealing of disputes with 
the contracting officer, the aloofness of Colonel Wyman from the 
personnel (R. 2498-2502) ; (i) failure to use material as soon as it 
arrived (R. 2511) ; (j) lack of promptness in handling the payroll 
(R. 2465) ; and, (k) poor morale of employees (R. 2530). 

6. Directive of November ^4? 1^^- — General Robbins sent a direc- 
tive on the above date to the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman, laying 
down one of the most fimdamental of all directives for an Engineer 
office, that is, the relationship between the Corps of Engineers and 
the contractors. This document was clear and precise that the con- 
tractor's responsibility must not be undertaken by the Corps of En- 
gineers. 

This directive was honored only in the breach by Colonel Wyman. 
His organization increasingly assumed, through its inspectors and 
others, duties of management which were those of the contractor. It 
even undertook to pay the employees and to [258] feed many 
of them, which were duties of the contractor (R. 2465-2466, 2551). 

In other words, Wyman intervened to the extent of relieving con- 
tractors of some of their duties thereby adding to the confusion of his 
office and to an already difficult situation, which resulted in further 
delays, changes and gross waste. These things occurred both before 
and after Pearl Harbor. 

The testimony shows that in taking over the paying of employees 
from the contractor after Pearl Harbor, in continuing this same policy, 
that weeks would go by without paying the employees, resulting in a 
poor state of mind and low morale. This condition was aggravated 
iDy the fact that the food was bad or insufficient, except where the Army 
had charge of the messes (R. 2095, 2465-2466, 2529-2530, 2536-2538, 
2554). 

All of these things lead us to the belief that instead of having a pro- 
fessional Army organization on behalf of the Corps of Engineers 
that would exert its professional skill in engineering and administra- 
tion to see that the contractors did their duty promptly, the entire 
organization of Wyman was disorganized, the relationships with the 

«« R. 762-63, 764, 2403, 2416-2420, 3627-3629, 3722, 3725, 3751, 3754. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 155 

contractors were confused and improper, and that a large number of 
delays occurred (K. 1268, 31:25) . 

This cost-plus-a-fixed-fee arrangement resulted in a profit to the 
Hawaiian constructors of about $1,060,000 (K. 3732-33). 

Rohl's presence in the Islands, -according to the testimony of all the 
impartial witnesses, was a detriment in several ways : In the first place, 
he rendered little assistance in getting the job done on behalf of the 
contractors, and his own associates on the executive committee of the 
contractors [259] welcomed his being sent back to the mainland 
by General Lyman (R. 2525-28, 2533, 2561:), His periodic drunken 
condition interfered with his making decisions or fully attending to 
business. (R. 251:4, 2555). Wyman's contention that Rohl could aid 
the contract finds no substance in fact in this record, but there are many 
witnesses to the contrary.^^ Rohl's presence on the Island brought 
Wyman back into his old association. The record also shows that 
large extra profits were made by the contractors in unloading worth- 
less machinery upon the government.^* In these transactions we find 
little evidence of concern by Colonel Wyman for the interests of the 
United States (R. 778, 1343, 2477, 2576) . 

7. Ths BesponsihilitT/ of the Corps of Engineers. — This board feels 
impelled to direct attention to the lack of supervision and the correction 
of these conditions which were impeding some of the most important 
projects for the defense of the United States. There is no showing 
that General Hannum, the Division Engineer, conducted any investi- 
gation or had any organization to do so, to see that Colonel Wyman, 
while under his jurisdiction, was doing his work and conducting him- 
self honorably and correctly as an Army officer and as a citizen charged 
with government responsibilities. 

We find substantially no supervision, a weak control and a lack 
of inspection, which would have revealed at an early date the con- 
ditions and should have resulted in their remedy. \260] Colonel 
Wyman was given an unrestricted and free hand without adequate 
control, inspection or check. These conclusions are supported in the 
findings of Colonel Hunt in his elaborate report on behalf of the In- 
spector General's Department. This came about due to the complaints 
from Civilians directed to Congress and the action of Congressmen in 
calling this to the attention of the War Department. The Secretary 
of War in a letter in February or March of 1941 to the Hawaiian De- 
partment directed inspections of construction activities. Under the 
direction of Colonel Row there was a continuous series of investiga- 
tions made throughout 1941 as to Colonel Wyman's conduct and the 
actions of the contractors (R. 2100-2101) . 

It is pertinent to observe that there were several investigations of 
the activities of Colonel Wyman, including one by Colonel Hunt and 
two by Colonel Row. Each of these severely criticized him. Letters 
were written by Colonel Lyman to the Chief of Engineers asking for 
Wyman's relief from duty and a letter was received by G-2 from the 
American legation in Canada as a result of a complaint by the Ca- 
nadians as to Wyman's conduct. Yet in no one instance do we find 
evidence of disciplinary action in his case on the part of the Chief 
of Engineers or the War Department. 

^ R. 767, 2476, 2526-2527, 2544, 2574-2575, 3635. 
68 R. 751, 757-759, 2140-2143, 2147, 2153, 2154. 



156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

We find as a fact that there were delays in the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment construction as follows : 

(a) Delays due to red tape in approval of plans and specifications 
and choice of location for underground gasoline storage and radar sta- 
tions (K. 3429-32, 3439-43, 3449-3454, 3459-00) ; 

(b) Delays due to lack of adequate priorities (K. 3426-8, 3439-43, 
3459-3460,3566-67); 

(c) Delays due to lack of experienced clerical personnel [£61] 
(R. 3415-17); 

(d) Delays due to shortage of materials and transportation facili- 
ties (R. 3417) ; 

(e) Delavs due to necessary importing of labor from the United 
States (R. 3500); 

(f ) Delays due to changes in plans (R. 3515-17) ; 

(g) Delays due to the inaccessibility of General Short, when 
Colonel Wyman found it necessary to consult him, and had to consult 
the Chief of Staft" and Colonel Lyman (with whom he "clashed") (R. 
3515-3516) ; 

(h) Other unavoidable delays, which always occur on any job of 
such magnitude (R. 3425) ; 

(i) Delays due to poor organization and administration of the office 
of the District Engineer ; and 

(j) Delays due to poor supervision by the contractors, headed by 
Rohl. 

General Short states as follows : 

( a ) The plan for radar stations at high altitudes necessarily resulted 
in delays, as cable had to be procured to draw material up Mt. Kaala 
(R. 297-298); 
(b) "The priority proposition was very complicated"; priorities 
could not be readily obtained in Hawaii (R. 328) ; and 

(c) Local suppliers ran out of materials and could not replace their 
stock (R. 328). 

The contractors state as follows : 

Bohl testified that the delays were due to lack of material and men, 
beyond the control of the Hawaiian Constructors (R. 2280) . 

Roljert McKee testified many delays occurred, due to [262'] 
inefficiency of Hawaiian Constructors (R. 2407-2409). 

WooIIey stated that if contractors had been allowed to operate 
normully, without interference and directives from Washington, then 
operation would have been accelerated (R. 3770). 

Benson testified that Short switched men and materials on jobs, 
causing delay (R. 3738) . 

Therefore all of the witnesses called who had any material knowl- 
edge or responsibility in the Hawaiian Department, no matter what 
their interest, concur that in some cases conditions could have been 
improved or eliminated by proper inspection and prompt and agres- 
sive action. This action was not taken. 

This board has found numerous items of proof and evidence of 
Colonel Wyman's misconduct. The complete story so far as the 
record has now been developed will be found in the appendix attached 
to this report. 

However, as illustrative of the situation as revealed by countless 
witnesses and records before this board, before the House Military 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 157 

Affairs Committee, and the Tenne}^ Committee, as to the conduct of 
Colonel Wyman, w-e select the following overt acts for brief attention : 
I. False official statement by Wyman as to his knowledge of 
Rohl's alien status. 
II. Refusal to accept low bidder on Hawaiian Contracts. Wy- 
man preferred liis friends. 
III. Irregular purchases of machinery by Wyman from the 
Hawaiian Contractors and associates. 

/. False Oificial Statein&iit by Wyman as to his Knowledge of 
RohVs Al'teii Status 

Wyman stated in his testimony that in June 1941 he first learned 
that Rohl was an alien and that he received this infor- \263'\ 
mation from Grafe (R. 3503-04). This testimony is similar to that 
which was given to the Inspector General, Colonel John A. Hunt, IG, 
by Wyman (R. 3503-3505). Wyman testified: 

282. General Frank. When did you first learu that Rohl was au alien? 
Colonel Wyman. I first learned that Rohl was an alien from Mr. Grafe in 

June, 1941, when Mr. Grafe informed me that Rohl was an alien, and I imme- 
diately sat down without delay and wrote a letter to the Chief of Engineers, an- 
nouncing that I had been informed by Mr. Grafe of the Hawaiian Constnictors 
that Mr. Rohl was an alien, also that Mr Rohl had applied for citizenship. I 
do not recollect what else in the letter, I have forgotten, but I sent that through 
channels. It went to the Division Engineer, thence to the Chief of Engineers. 
That was in June, I am certain — the date of the letter is whatever the date of 
that letter is, that is the date that Grafe told me tliat Rohl was an alien. 

283. General Frank. Did you meet John Martin in Washington while you were 
negotiating that contract? 

Colonel Wyman. Well, I remember a person came there while I was in Grafe's 
room whose name was John Martin, a lawyer. He talked with — well, the group 
there, and I remember he stated that he was engaged on the claims of a contractor 
who, due to changes by orders, what we call change orders, had accumulated a 
lot of claims on the Pensylvania turnpike, and he discussed in some detail in 
my hearing the arguments for and against the claims of the contractor. He 
was there for a little while and then he departed. That was the only occasion 
I think I have ever seen Mr. John Martin. 

284. General Frank. You did not know that Martin told Grafe in Washington 
that Rohl was an alien? 

Colonel Wyman. No, I did not know that. I did not know whether he did 
or not. I do not know. 

285. General Frank. Don't you think it was rather queer, when there was 
some question about a defense contract being in the hands of an alien, that they 
should not have told you about it? 

Colonel Wyman. I do not know. If they told me about I would merely have 
told the Chief of Engineers right on the spot. 

286. General Gkuneet. What was the occasion of Grafe informing you of Rohl's 
status as an alien ; what brought it up? 

Colonel Wyman. You see, there was an act of Congress came out about em- 
ploying aliens on defense work, and [264] we wrote letters to everybody 
inquiring whether or not they had any aliens in their employ, and it came up 
as a result of that inquiry. 

287. General Gruneet. This was the date you wrote the letter? 
Colonel Wyman. Yes, sir, that he informed me that he was an alien 

288. General Grunert. Was this the time the War Department put this out? 
Colonel Wyman. Oh, no. I put the inquiry out some time before that. I don't 

know. That is a matter of record. The records show the date. You see, at 
this time Mr. Rohl was in the United States. He never had been in Honolulu 
as far as I know, he had never taken any part in the contract. 

General Frank. In these telephone conversations where you were discussing 
work on the Hawaiian Islands with Rohl, the Hawaiian Islands airdromes were 
defense contracts, were they not? 

Colonel Wyman. Yes, but he was a citizen when I talked to him. That was 
after he became a citizen. You see. he came to Honolulu after he became a 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 157 11 



158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

citizen. Then he immediately went bade to the United States to get plant and 
men to go to Canton and Christmas Islands, and he went back to the United 
States and got plant from his job at Highgate Dam, brought it to Los Angeles, 
rehabilitated it, put it in good shape. He got men and organized them into gangs, 
superintende|Uts, and put some aboard the transport LUNDINGTON. It was 
during that period that I recall talking to him about the plant for the Canton 
and Christmas Islands. 

These statements on this record and to the Inspector General were 
wrong in two particulars: (a) as to date, and (b) as to origin of the 
information. 

The proof to show that Wyman was untruthful in the two particu- 
lars is the following : 

Testimony of Colonel Lewis J. Claterbos,^^ Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 
who served under Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., Los [266] 
Angeles, California, from August 1935 to July 1937, shows Wyman 
admitted to Claterbos on December 4, 1941, in Honolulu that before 
the basic contract was signed Wyman casually remarked to Rohl, 
"You're a citizen, aren't you. Bill?"; and Rohl replied that he was 
not (R. 4098). 

The foregoing testimony is confirmed by a report of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation made by Agent Don C. Bird at Richmond, 
Virginia, on July 3, 1944, who interviewed Claterbos and obtained 
among other things the foregoing information (R. 4096 Exhibit 70). 

Hans Wilhelm Rohl testified before the California State Legisla- 
ture Joint Fact Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, Feb- 
ruary 27, 1943, that before the basic contract was signed he told the 
then Major Wyman that he was an alien (Tenney Testimony, 3807). 
He testified. 

On this particular contract, contract 602, being a secret contract, of course, 
I told him— I had to tell him. (Tenney Transcript, 3808.) 

The time that this information was given to Colonel Wyman was 
fixed as being prior to the award of the contract; in this respect, 
the Tenney Transcript indicates the following testimony : 

Question : When you first obtained the contracts for the construction of mili- 
tary installations did you tell Major Wyman that you were an alien? 
Answer: I did on the Hawaiian Constructors. (Tenney Transcript, 3807.) 

Mr. Rohl testified that he was familiar with the provisions of the 
law regarding such contracts. He testified further before we took 
this contract the War Department was told (Tenney Transcript, 
3809). 

From a letter in testimony from James A. Dillon, Immigra [£661 
tion Inspector, Honolulu, T. H, (see Immigration file) it is shown 
that Wyman knew of Rohl's alien citizenship and that Rohl knew that 
Wyman had been interviewed in Honolulu by Mr. Dillon, who advised 
him at that time, February 1941, of Rohl's alien status (R. 4193). 
Rohl also knew that Wyman had been interviewed by Mr. Dillon 
and had been informed of Rohl's alien status as indicated by Rohl's 
testimony in the file of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization 
(R. 4117).^° 

^'■' Colonel Claterbos testified that he was and still is a friend of Wyman's. His testi- 
mony can be weighed in that light. 

«" Portion of examination of Mr. Rohl by Inspector Ellis, Immigration and Naturaliza- 
tion Service, May 22, 1941. (R. 4116.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 159 

It should be borne in mind that Wyman testified that he had no 
"written communications with Rohl, but that he had had telephone con- 
versations. Rohl admitted charges of the House Interim RejDort true 
as to calls (R, 2234). Hence it is an inescapable conclusion that 
Wyman informed Rohl by telephone from Honolulu that Mr. Dillon 
had interviewed Wyman at Honolulu. Furthermore, no conclusion 
with regard to the letter of January 22, 1941 from Wyman to Rohl 
can be reached other than that this letter similarly was furnished by 
Wyman to Rohl with the express and sole purpose of assisting Rohl 
in obtaining his naturalization. 

In this regard the testimony of Wyman was to the effect that he 
took no action whatsoever when Rohl failed to comply with the order 
contained in the letter. The letter of 22 January was furnished for 
the sole purpose of initiating and expediting the getting of Rohl's 
citizenship as a special case. It was a fraud in that it inferred to the 
uninformed who read the letter that such was not its purpose, and that 
the writer did not know that Rohl was an alien, whereas he did know, 
and the letter was written for the purpose of this "speed-up," while 
[267] not committing Wyman to public knowledge of Rohl's alien 
status. (R. 2056-2058, 3972-3974) . 

Dillon, Honolulu Naturalization Examiner, received a letter from 
Los Angeles, under date of February 20, 1941, which came to him 
through the iDistrict Director, at Honolulu of the Immigration Serv- 
ice, which reads as follows : 

District Director, 
Honolulu, T. H.: 
One Hans (or John) William Rohl, a native and citizen of Germany, is an 
applicant for United States citizenship in this District, and through his attorney 
has presented a photostatic copy of a letter addressed to him by Colonel Theodore 
Wyman, Jr., District Engineer, Post Office Box 2240, Honolulu, T. H. 

A copy of the photostat referred to is enclosed, from which it appears that 
Mr. Rohl's presence in Honolulu is desired in connection with secret contract 
#W-414-eng-602. In connection with our investigation concerning the appli- 
cant's qualification for citizenship, and in order that appropriate recommenda- 
tion may be made to the court with reference to the matter, please ascertain 
whether Mr. Rohl at any time representing himself to Colonel Wyman, Jr., as a 
citizen of the United States. 
A reply by airmail at your earliest convenience will be very much appreciated. 

/s/ William A. Carmichael, 

District Director, 
■Los Angeles District. (R. 4187-4188.) 

As a result of this he interviewed Colonel Wyman a few days after 
February 20, 1941. (_R. 4189.) He identified himself to Colonel Wy- 
man by his identification card to the Department of Justice, indicating 
that he was a Naturalization Examiner from the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service. He showed him the letter of February 20, 
1941 and discussed the matter of Rohl's alien status from ten to thirty 
minutes with him. (R. 4190.) As a result, the letter was referred 
back, as it shows on its face, to the District Director at Los Angeles in 
reply to the letter of February 20, 1941. (This is under date of March 
1, 1941.) (R. 4192.) In that letter of March 1, it was written as 
[268'] follows, representing his conversation : 



160 CONGRESSIO^STAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

U. S. Department of Justice, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 

Honolulu, Hawaii, March 1, WJfl. 
Air mail. 665/Rohl 

DiSTEICT DiREOTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NaTURAUZATTON SeIRVICE, 

Honolulu, T. H.: 

Los Angeles File B-23-1876, HANS WILLIAM ROHL, Feb. 20, 1941. 

In accordance with the directions contained in the above captioned letter, I 
called on Colonel Theodore Wynian, Jr., District Engineer, United States Army, 
for information regarding subject alien and particularly whether the alien appli- 
cant had ever in any manner represented or assumed himself to be a citizen of the 
United States. 

Colonel "Wyman in substance stated that he first became acquainted with the 
alien in California some time ago. That the Eohl-Connolly Company, with 
which the alien is associated, had done construction work for the Department of 
the Interior in the Indian country as well as projects on the Colorado River. 
During the construction of a breakwater in the California area, Colonel Wyman 
came in contact more or less with Mr. Rohl. During those business relations in 
California Colonel Wyman, assumed without any basis therefor, that Mr. Rohl 
was a citizen of the United States. He knew from hearsay that Rohl was born 
in Germany and that his father had been a professor of engineering in a German 
university. Colonel Wyman stated the applicant gathered about him in his 
organization only high-grade men. That the quality of his work was excellent. 
Contracts were always faithfully carried out. That Mr. Rohl was a man of 
integrity. His outstanding social diversion was yachting. 

As a "result of the national defense efforts, the Rohl-ConnoUy Company, W. E. 
Callahan Company and another group, organized the Hawaiian Constructors, 
Ltd., to procure construction contracts in Hawaii. It was in connection with 
one of these projects that Colonel Wyman wrote his letter of January 22, 1941, 
to Mr. Rohl. To summarize in a word. Colonel Wyman said the alien never 
represented himself to be a citizen of the United States and if there was any 
misunderstanding in that regard it was due to the assumption of such citizen- 
ship by the Colonel himself. 

(seal) /s/ Jas. p. Dillon, 



Respectfully referred to District Director. 



U. S. Naturalization Examiner. 



[269] Los Angeles District 
(stamp) MAR 1 1941 



(Signed) W. G. Strbncih, 
District Director, Honolulu District. 



(Stamped on face of lette^r) RECEIVED MAR 11 1941. (R. 4193-4194.) 
******* 

General Frank. Mr. Dillon, are you positive that in your conversation with 
Colonel Wyman you made him understand positively that Mr. Rohl was an alien? 

Mr. Dillon. Very definitely, yes. 

General Frank. There is no question about that in your mind? 

Mr. Dillon. None at all. 

Colonel TouLMiN. What did Colonel Wyman say, when you told him that? 
Did he express surprise, or was it something he apparently already knew? 

Mr. Dillon. No. From reading my report in the anteroom before I came into 
the hearing. Colonel Wyman appeared to be under the apprehension that Rohl 
was a citizen of the United States. 

Major Clausen. That is what he told .you? 

Mr. Dillon. Yes. (R. 4195.) 

And witness the letter of Rohl's attorney, Cannon, to the Secretary 
of Commerce : 

Theodore Wyman, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers, War Depart- 
ment, in charge of all the above-mentioned defense work in Hawaii, has requested 
Mr. Rohl and the War Department to have Mr. Rohl give his personal service in 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 161 

connection with the emergency defense work in Hawaii, and as early as Jan- 
uary 1941 and at numerous times since that date Colonel Wyman has tendered 
Mr. Rohl transportation via clipper or boat to the Islands and has stated to Mr. 
Rohl over interocean telephone that he will personally obtain special permission, 
because of Mr. Rohl's alien status, to allow Mr. Rohl to work on this secret 
contract. (R. 2229). 

Rohl says Wyman knew lie was an alien before the contract was 
signed in December 1940 : 

126. General Frank. Just while we are on this subject, I would like to ask 
some questions about these telephone [270] conversations that you had 
with Colonel Wyman. he in Honolulu, and you in Los Angeles. Do you mean to 
say that never, in any of those telephone conversations, did yovi ever bring up 
the question with him about your alien status? 

Mr. Kohl. I don't believe I did. General. I took it for granted that he was told 
that, in Washington. 

127. Major Clausen. What did you base that on?' 
Mr. Rohl. Well, that's what I would like to explain. 

John Martin was back in Washington on other matters, not on my business, 
or Rohl-Connolly business, Hawaiian Constructors' business. He was back on 
some other business. 

128. General Frank. Having to do with your firm? 

Mr. Rohl. No, sir — with other contractors ; no one involved in Hawaiian Con- 
structors, and by accident he met Paul Grafe and Tom Connolly and told them 
not to sign the contract, until he talked to them further ; so John Martin called 
me, in Los Angeles, from Washington, and told me the nature of the contract, 
and I gave him permission — not permission, but told him to tell Mr. Grafe and 
Mr. Connolly my alien status ; which he did. 

129. General Frank. Who was responsible, in trying to get the group of con- 
tractors interested in this Hawaiian project? Was it, or was it not. Colonel 
Wyman? 

Mr. Rohl. Yes. 

130. General Frank. It was Colonel Wyman? 

Mr. Rohl. He was interested in getting a group of contractors. 

131. General Frank. Including the Rohl-CoinioUy Company, the Callahan Com- 
pany, and the Gunther & Shirley Company? 

Mr. Rohl. Yes.sir. 

132. General Frank. Now, Colonel Wyman, Mr. Connolly, and Mr. Grafe were 
in Washington together, in a group, discussing this contract, were they not? 

Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir. 

133. General Frank. And a hitch that came up in consummating the contract 
was your alien status, is that correct? 

Mr. Rohl. General, by that do you mean — now, I have no knowledge of my 
own whether Mr. 

[271] 134. General Frank. Well, I will put it in different words. Maybe 
the words "consummating" bothers you. You and they felt that you could not 
participate in the contract because it was a defense project and you were an 
alien? 

Mr. Rohl. That's right. 

135. General Frank. That is correct, isn't it? 
Mr. Rohl. That's correct. 

136. General Frank. Therefore, there was some question, considerable ques- 
tion, as to whether or not the Rohl-Connolly Company could participate in this 
project? 

Mr. Rohl. No. General. 

137. General Frank. There was, until you get out of it? 
Mr. Rohl. There was no question about Rohl-Connolly Co. 

138. General Frank. To whom were these letters being written, and with 
whom was this conversation by Wyman, in the United States. It was with you. 
wasn't it? 

Mr. RoHL. General, you mean the letter from the Hawaiian Islands? 

139. General Frank. Yes, the letter was to you? 
Mr. Rohl. Direct. 

140. General Frank. Rohl, by name? 
Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir. 



162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

141. General Frank. And the telephone conversations by Wyman were with 
you, Rohl, by name? 

Mr. Rohl. That's right. 

142. General Fbank. You were the person that he was interested in getting 
over there; is that not correct? 

Mr. Rohl. That is correct. 

143. General Frank. Yes. You were the person that he wanted on the job, 
as stated in the letteir that was written to expedite your naturalization, that 
is correct, isn't it? 

Mr. Rohl. That is correct. 

144. General Frank. Therefore, you were the man who was concerned, and 
whose alien status threw a monkey-wrench into the smooth operating of getting 
this contract through, [272] in Washington, because unless you pulled 
out, the Rohl-ConnoUy Company could not participate in the project ; that is cor- 
rect, isn't it? 

Mr. Rohl. General, by that do you mean, unless I pulled out 

145. General Frank. As an official. 
Mr. Rohl. As an active manager? 

146. General Frank. Yes. That was correct, wasn't it? 
Mr. Rohl. That is correct. 

147. General Frank. Therefore, there was some complication because of your 
personal status as an alien, wasn't there? 

Mr. Rohl. No, General. 

148. General Frank. Well, you just said so. 

Mr. Rohl. Well, I never had any intention of going to the Hawaiian Islands 
and managing that contract. 

149. General Frank. Nevertheless, Colonel Wyman in his conversation and in 
his letters was rather insistent on having you there, was he not? 

Mr. Rohl. That's right. 

150. General Frank. Now, since your alien status was the one thing that 
interfered with this thing, since your alien status was the one point that had 
to be cleared up in Washington, since your alien status was the one thing that 
blocked your going to Honolulu, and sincei Wyman, on the other side, was so 
insistent on having you come there, do you mean to say that Wyman was never 
told about it? 

Mr. Rohl. Oh, Wyman was told alout it. (R. 2239-2240-2241-2242.) 

Thomas B. Shoemaker, Deputy Commissioner, Legal Branch, Phila- 
delphia, testified that he was in the Los Angeles office when the letter 
of January 22, 1941, was brought in, shortly after that day, to the 
Los Angeles office of the Immigration Bureau, as the basis for ex- 
pediting Rohl's citizenship. It is on the basis of that and General 
Kingman's letter '^^ and the [273] activities of four lawyers, the 
Martin brothers. Cannon, and Galloway, former assistant attorney 
general of the United States, that Rohl's application for citizenship 
was expedited.*'- He testified that the report of the inspector on May 
24, 1941 in Los Angeles recommending that a warrant for Rohl's ar- 
rest be issued and he be deported for illegal entry into the United 
States was outweighed by the efforts of Colonel Wyman, as a certificate 
(from an Army officer that the alien was needed on a national defense 
contract would counterbalance the alien's past actions. 

He said the result of all these efforts was to expedite Rohl's citi- 
zenship, which was granted in September 1941. At that time there 
was also on the statute books the present statute that an alien enemy 
would have an entirely different status of naturalization than Rohl 

"' Also letter or wire from Wyman to some Immigration and Naturalization official stat- 
ing that Rohl was an alien and requesting that his application for citizenship be 
expedited which communication could not be found in the files of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Bureau. (R. 245.3-2454). 

®- See testimony of Benjamin L. Stilphen, lawyer-expediter for the Chief of Engineers. 
(R. 1540.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 163 

enjoyed, as we were not yet at war with Germany, and that was one of 
the real reasons, in addition to Wyman's solicitude for the Hawaiian 
contract, that Rohl was pressing so hard with four lawyers to get 
naturalized. The fee for a lawyer acting in this capacity is fixed 
by statute at $25. It is obvious that these four lawyers were not in the 
class of such payment of fees. Shoemaker testified it was unnecessary 
to have a lawyer for any man to become naturalized if it was justified. 
(R. 4 790.) «3 

In confirmation of the foregoing is the letter of Kohl's attorney. 
Cannon, who was handling his trouble with his alien [_^74] 
status which had resulted in Rohl being fined $25,000 for holding in 
his name as an alien vessel over 75 feet in length. This letter reads : 

Theodore Wyman, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers, War Department, 
in charge of all the above-mentioned defense work in Hawaii, has requested Mr. 
Rohl and the War Department to have Mr. Rohl give his personal servicei in 
connection with the emergency defense work in Hawaii, and as early as Janu- 
ary 1941 and at numerous times since that date Colonel Wyman has tendered 
Mr. Rohl transportation via clipper or boat to the Island and has stated to Mr. 
Rohl over interocean telephone that he will personally obtain special permission 
because of INIr. Rohl's alien status, to allow Mr. Rohl to work on this secret 
contract. (R. 2229.) 

Rohl testified that Wyman knew he was an alien before the contract 
of Hawaiian Constructors was signed in December, 1940. Witness 
the following : 

160. General Frank. Now, since your alien status was the one thing that inter- 
fered with this thing, since your alien status was the one point that had to be 
cleared up in Washington, since your alien status was the one thing that blocked 
your going to Honolulu, and since Wyman, on the other side, was so insistent on 
having you come there, do you mean to say that Wyman was never told about 
it? 

Mr. Rohl. Oh, Wyman was told about it. (R. 2242.) 

This is the same testimony that Rohl gave before the Tenney Com- 
mittee in February 1943 (p. 3807) : 

"Q. When you first obtained the contracts for the Gonstruction of military instal- 
lation (construction), did you tell Major Wyman that you were an alien? 

"A. I did, on the Hawaiian Constructors. 

"Q. But you didn't, on any other projects? 

"A. We don't have it. There are no restrictions. I mean, on a government 
contract you are not questioned as to whether you are a citizen or not, but on 
this particular contract, contract 602, being a secret contract, of course, I told 
him. I had to tell him." (R. 2243.) 

The foregoing testimony is significant in connection with what hap- 
pened at Washington thereafter when Grafe, Connolly and Wyman 
were jointly working to get from the Corps of Engineers [275] 
the contract for Wyman's friends, Rohl-Connolly Company, the Cal- 
lahan Company, and the Gunther & Shirley Company : 

General Frank. Just while we are on this subject, I would like to ask some 
questions about these telephone conversations that you had with Colonel Wyman, 
he in Honolulu, and you in Los Angeles. Do you mean to say that never, in any 
of those telephone conversations, did you ever bring up the question with him 
about your alien status? 

Mr. Rohl. I don't believe I did, General. I took it for granted that he was 
told that, in Washington. 

Major Clausen. What did you base that on? 

Mr. Rohl. Well, that's what I would like to explain. 

63 See also Barber (K. 3972-3974), Combs (R. 2428). 



164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

John INIartin was back in "Washington on other matters, not on my business, 
or Rohl-Connolly business, Hawaiian Constructors' business. He was back on 
some other business. 

General Fk,ank. Having to do with your firm? 

Mr. RoHL. No, sir — with otlier contractors ; no one involved in Hawaiian Con- 
structors, and by accident he met Paul Grafe and Tom Connolly and told them 
not to sign the contract, until the talked to them further; so John Martin called 
me, in Los Angeles, from Washington, and told me the nature of the contract, 
and I gave him permission — not permission, but told him to tell Mr. Grafe and 
Mr. Connolly my alien status ; which he did. 

General Frank. Who was responsible, in trying to get the group of contractors 
interested in this Hawaiian project? Was it, or was it not. Colonel Wyman?- 

Mr. RoHL. Yes. 

General Frank. It was Colonel Wyman? 

Mr. RoHL. He was interested in getting a group of contractors. 

General Frank. Including the Rohl-Connolly Company, the Callahan Com' 
pany, and the Gunther & Shirlejy Company? 

Mr. RoHL. Yes, sir. 

General Frank. Now, Colonel Wyman, Mr. Connolly, and Mr. Grafe were in 
Washington together, in a gi'oup, discussing this contract, were they not? 

Mr. RoHT.. Yes, sir. 

General Frank. And a hitch that came up in consum- [276] mating the 
contract was your alien status, is that correct? 

Mr. RoHL. General, by tliat do you mean — now, I have no linowledge of my 
own whether I\Ir. 

General Frank. Well, I will put it in different words. Maybe tlie word "con- 
summating" bothers you. You and they felt that you could not participate in the 
contract because it was a defense project and vou were an alien? 

Mr. RoHL. That's right. (R. 2239-2240.) 

Wyman was in Washington, as his testimony shows, and, as he 
admits, with Connolly of the Rohl-Connolly Company and Paul Grafe 
of the Callahan Company. It was on this trip they were occupying 
the same rooms together at the Hotel Carlton. It was then that the 
citizenship question came up which stopped the whole thing. 

The letter of January 22, 1941,*'* was written by Wyman to Mr. Rohl, 
Rohl-Connolly Company. This letter created an inference of lack 
of knowledge of Rohl's alien status by Wyman. Wyman stated before 
this board that at that time he did not know that Rohl was an alien. 
That was a false official statement. This letter was obviously written 
to furnish a basis of getting Rohl to Hawaii and to use any reply 
to it or action initiated by his letter as a means of pressing the govern- 
ment to expedite Rohl's naturalization. 

The testimon}' of Connolly and Grafe as to their Washington trip 
and the holdup due to this alien citizenship matter of Rohl is signifi- 
cant. (R. 2162-2170, 2189-2199, 2290-2318.) \217A, The fact 
that Rohl changed his position as president in December 1940 before 
the contract was signed, in the light of Connolly's testimony of the 
reason therefor, because of Rohl's alien status, again confinns that these 
co-conspirators well knew that there would be no contract unless Rohl 
was camouflaged in the backo^round until they could get him admitted 
to citizenship. (R. 2160-2161, 2167-2168.) 

It is further significant that when Rohl was confronted with his 
testimony in February, 1943 to the same effect that he had previously 
given before this board he began then to see the impact of his ad- 
missions and endeavored to get out by claiming some error in the 
Tenney records. (R. 2243-2245.) 

8* This letter sliows Rohl was addressed as a part of the Rohl-Connolly Company, the 
letter refers to "secret contracts No. W-414-Eng-602 with the Hawaiian Constructors" 
and "as you are actively interested in this venture" etc. (R. 3530.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 165 

Again before the Tenney Committee, before whom he admitted 
having given testimony as before this board (E,. 2246-2247) he testi- 
fied as follows : after having read to him the statute against an alien 
having anything to do with a secret defense contract he testified before 
the Tenney Committee, 

Absolutely. Now, as a matter of fact, before we took this contract, the War 
Department was told. 

So here again we have proof that he knew perfectly well that Colonel 
Wyman was fully advised because when questioned he said 

Now, whether Mr. Grafe of Mr. Connolly or Mr. Matin told Colonejl Wyman, 
or any one in the Engineer Department that, Idon't know. I simply took that 
for granted. (R. 2247.) 

It is obvious that Rohl was not the type of man, on a matter of 
this vital importance, holding up a contract that ultimately amounted 
to $100,000,000, that he would take anything for granted unless he 
was certain it was so; and one of the things of which he was very 
certain and to which he repeatedly testi- ['278] fiecl was that 
Wyman did know he was an alien before Wyman went to Washington 
to negotiate the contract. 

Rohl testified, as a matter of fact, that his alien status was not a 
secret, saying- 
There was no reason at all for dodging that point. I mean, it was a fact. I 
didn't keep it a secret. ( R. 2258. ) 

In attempting to protect his co-conspirators, it will be noted in 
Rohl's testimony that from time to time, after fully and frankly 
testifying as to one set of facts and having done so at other times to 
the same effect, when he was cornered he would try to change his 
testimony, not once but many times. Under such circumstances the 
truth probably is that testimony of Rohl's which was the natural 
and logical testimony that he did tell ^Vyman when they were nego- 
tiating the contract, because he knew, as did Wyman, that that was a 
fatality they would have to overcome or there would be no Hawaiian 
Constructors, including the Rohl- Connolly Company. 

//. Refusal to Accept Low Bidder on Haioailan Contracts: Wtjman 
Preferring His Friends 

After Colonel Wyman arrived in the Islands following the forma- 
tion of the Hawaiian Constructors he asked for bids on construction 
work involving rock excavation, furnishing of rock excavation, fur- 
nishing of rock and similar heavy construction. The bids were asked 
for on two bases, a bid on each individual job and a bid on the total 
job. The Hawaiian Constructors were one of the bidders and estab- 
lished local contractors with going organizations and equipment and 
quarries were the other bidclers. These local contractors were all 
organizations of long standing in the Islands, wdio had constructed 
some of the largest installations in the Is- [279'] lands for both 
Army and Navy and were fully competent to do the work. 

When the bids were opened publicly, a local contracting firm, Clarke- 
Halawa Rock Company, headed by Mr. Chester R, Clark, was the 
low bidder. Despite the fact that as a matter of law the District 
Engineer, Colonel Wyman, was required to place the bid with the low 
bidder and thereby save the government a sum estimated as $300,000 
by Mr. Clark, the low bidder. 



166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

But this action of Colonel Wyman's was not the end of this trans- 
action. The bids stipulated that the work must be completed withm 
90 days from the acceptance of the bid. Upon the expiration of the 
90 days from the date of the bid by Colonel Wyman to Hawaiian 
Constructors, the latter had not fulfilled the terms of bid and had not 
proceeded with the contract, thus losing the government three months 
time, where time was vital and was so stipulated in the invitation to 
bid and in the proposals by the contractors. Thereupon Mr. Uark 
wrote to Colonel Wyman and asked that the award be revoked and the 
bids reopened and again Colonel Wyman refused to desert his "friends, 
the Hawaiian Constructors. . ^i -, />. i i 

In the very beginning Mr. Clark wrote and called upon Colonel 
Wyman, as had been his custom with other district engineers for whom 
he had worked satisfactorily. He was told that Colonel Wyman had 
other plans and did not want anything to do with him. (R. 362 <, 
3633. ) He thus shut off direct dealings with local contractors as a part 
of his, Wyman's, plan as shown by the facts before this board, to deal 
exclusively with the Hawaiian Constructors headed by his friend, 
Rohl, and thus violated all dictates of good business, the best interests 
of the government, and action that would have expedited [^80) 
the contract through contractors who had going organizations, resi- 
dent in the Island, with ample equipment, quarries, men on the ground, 
working and with no need to be imported. (R. 3627-3628.) 

It is worth quoting the testimony of Mr. Clark on this subject: 
when the bids were opened on the 12th of May, 1941, a group of contractors, 
local contractors, were the low bidders as individuals, on individual airfields, 
but the organization headed by Mr. Rohl, Gunther-Shirley and I think by Mr. 
Grafe were tlie ones that had— and also a bid by McKee and Company— were high 
on the total for all the airfields. Adding up the individual bids we were several 
hundred thousand dollars low and when I consulted with Colonel Wyman in 
regard to the saving to the government he informed me that all of the local 
bids were being thrown out and the contract would be awarded to the Rohl- 
Connolly organization. We thought that quite unfair at the time and wrote two 
letters to the Engineers in protest, and both of them were ignored. (R. 3627.) 

He testified that the bids were publicly opened. He was present at 
the opening of the bids in the usual manner. He then testified : 

Had we been awarded these contracts, my own organization on the Molokai 
and the Akioiia on the Hawaiian one, and the Hawaiian Constructors on the 
Mauai field, all of us would have those fields completed within the year 1941. 

He further said : 

That was the idea, to get the fields in usable condition, and the bids specified 
that they should be within use within a hundred days. 

Accordingly, Mr. Clarke said : 

I wrote a letter to the United States Engineers on the 100th day, asking them 
what was being done, and the letter was ignored, because we felt that we had 
a right to protest, owing to the fact that the jobs were being unduly hampered 
and not started. (R. 3628.) 

He stated that his bids were $300,000 less than the bids of Hawaiian 
Constructors. (R. 3629.) 

The services of his organization were used later by the Hawaiian 
Constructors as sub-contractors and suppliers of [281] rock 
and material from the quarries of Clark's company, the Clarke-Halawa 
Rock Co. Mr. Clarke's record of construction work he had performed 
in the Island is impressive. (R. 3630-3632.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 167 

Mr. Clarke testified as to repeated news of and discourtesy and ar- 
rogant treatment by Colonel Wyman, in entire contrast to all previous 
District Engineers. (K. 3633-3634.) 

He also testified to the constantly drunken condition of Rohl as soon 
as he got to the Islands and his lack of any help to the work in the 
Islands. (R. 3634-3636.) 

Clarke's experience was not the only one. Mr. Robert E. McKee, 
general contractor, was in the Islands at this time and had been for 
several years, constructing Hickam Field and other large government 
installations. His organization is one of the largest in the country, 
having completed enormous contracts with the Federal Government 
in the United States and abroad. He is one of the leading contractors 
in the United States and heads a firm of great wealth and high reputa- 
tion for integrity and compliance with its contracts. The story of 
how McKee's organization was summarily discarded by Wyman is 
best told in Mr. McKee's words. It is to be noted that McKee had a 
going organization fully equipped with able men and equipment ready 
to do business whereas the Hawaiian Constructors were mainland 
people who had not operated in the Islands and had to import such 
second- or third-grade men as they could recruit and they were with- 
out complete equipment which all agree, including Colonel Wyman, 
were two primary factors in delaying the work of the Hawaiian Con- 
structors, i. e., the lack of men and lack of equipment and materials. 

[282] Here you have some of the reasons for the great delay in 
getting the work done on these secret defense contracts under Wyman 's 
direction. He refused to take the existing organizations, fully 
equipped with men and equipment, and went to great trouble to as- 
semble his friends whom he had dealt with in Los Angeles (The Rohl- 
Connolly Company, The Callahan Company, and the Gunther-Shirley 
Company) into a new organization and have them start from scratch 
to assemble men, who were then very scarce, and equipment, that was 
even scarcer, and get them into Hawaii and try to get started. 

It was not until sometime later that any local contractors were 
taken into the "party" of Wyman's with his favorite contractors. Let 
it be remembered that the primary excuse given by Wyman for the 
Hawaiian Constructors was that he had to get somebody whom he 
knew would be able and efficient to do the job and who was equipped 
to do it and that he could not trust anybody else. This board finds 
that such excuses were not founded in fact. 

After he began to find that the Hawaiian Constructors were not 
producing and the work was extremely slow because of the defective 
organization of the Hawaiian Constructors, their lack of men who 
were skilled and competent, their lack of machinery, etc., Hawaiian 
Constructors then invited in two local contracting concerns, Hawaiian 
Contracting, Inc., headed by Bensen, and the Woolley Company, 
headed by Woolley. 

///. Irregular Purchofies Of Machinery By Wyman From The Ha- 
vmiian Contractors and Associates 

The next chapter on the "side profits" of Hawaiian Constructors, 
was the following transaction : 

{283'] Wyman knew that he was going to be relieved on the 15th 
of March. On the morning of the 12th of March he directed his 



168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

second-in-command. Colonel Robinson, to have their official Corps of 
Engineers appraiser, a civilian named Parker, appraise the machinery 
of the Rohl-Connolly Company which had been shipped hy the latter 
from Los Angeles some three months before destined for Christmas 
Island but not being able to unload there it was returned to the U. S., 
additional renovation work on it was done, and it then was shipped 
to Hawaii. Parker was instructed to bring back his appraisal by that 
night. He was given the price of $166,000 which the Rohl-Connolly 
Company wanted for this equipment with a list of the machinery and 
the price wanted. Parker took with him a representative of the 
Hawaiian Constructors and by great effort he traveled over the Island 
on the 12th to visit various parts of the Island where the equipment 
was located. 

He found some of the machinery was in bad condition, that some of 
its defects had been repaired and then painted over, and some of the 
repairs were of such character that they were unsatisfactory. (R. 
3794.) Parker was an experienced appraiser before he came to the 
Corps of Engineers and knew Island values. 

He completed his appraisal at eight o'clock the night of the 12th 
and delivered it to Colonel Robinson. His appraisal was $131,000. 
(R. 3783, 3808.) The latccr expressed his disagreement with the ap- 
praisal value and the following day called Parker into a meeting with 
the Hawaiian Constructors, at which were present Rohl, Woolley, Ben- 
son and Middleton. (R. 3784.) Parker was placed at a table with 
these men by himself while Robinson went off and left him. Rohl 
and Middleton of Hawaiian 128^] Constructors did the talk- 
ing. (R. 3790.) He was then subjected to great pressure to have him 
change his appraisal, which he refused to do. The testimony of Parker 
on this score is significant : 

They had papers there of figures showing that they had spent so much money 
fixing up these trucks and the shovels and so forth, and I said, "Well, I still con- 
sider that my appraisal is fair, and even though you fixed it up", I said, "It was 
a poor job, because there's cracks in the pumps, all the shovels are not running 
and the trucks arc broken down right now, and," I said, "They did a very good 
job of painting over all these defects." (R. 3785.) 

Thereafter Robinson developed, under Wyman's direction in cooper- 
ation with Hawaiian Constructors, that rental should have been paid 
on this equipment ; and that, if such rental had been paid, the price 
would have been what the Rohl-Connolly Company wanted, as the 
rental plus the appraisal of Parker would have amounted to that sum 
or slightly more. 

The basic contract provided, for the rental of equipment through 
written transactions duly approved by the Secretary of War. There 
is no scrap of paper found by us showing this was done. As showing 
how unfounded such rental was, it is to be observed that the purchase 
price was one thing and the rental was another and so recognized by 
the contract. (R. 3810.) 

In the purchase of equipment outright, rental should not have been 
combined with the purchase price of the equipment, because the 
voucher for the purchase must certify that the bill is "correct and just". 
In this case the voucher was issued for $166,000 whereas Robinson 
admits that the appraised value was 26% less. (R. 3811.) The 
voucher for $166,000 was therefore in error as the actual value of the 
machinery was only $131,000 according to Robinson's own story. The 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 169 

balance of the $166,000 was rental which the contract required be han- 
dled in an entirely [£85] different way. 

This 26% of the total value for rental as approved by Wyman and 
Robinson was the government possession of the equipment for two or 
three months. (R. 3814.) 

The equipment was second-hand to begin with when they loaded it 
on the to the government transport "Luddington" at Los Angeles. No 
appraisal was made of it at that time as could have been easily done. 
(E.. 3610.) It was then finally brought to Hawaii and apparently was 
used to some extent during this period of two to three months. 

As to this matter we find the report of the Inspector General, Colo- 
net Hunt, significant. He said (p. 15, par. "e^') : 

It appears to be reasonably certain that the equipment in question had been in 
actual use for various lengths of time during January, February, and part of 
March at the time of purchase, although use records are not available and ap- 
parently were not maintained. There was no record of any rental agreement 
relating to any of this equipment. It is quite possible that assuming the fairness 
of Mr. Parker's appraisal on 12 March, the equipment had a substantially higher 
value when delivered to the site of use or at point of shipment. It does not, 
however, appear that a depreciation of a approximately $35,000 in value, or 
about 26% could have occurred in that period. No suitable basis was available 
upon which to reconstruct a fair value to apply to the equipment as of the date 
of delivery. Mr. Eohl's efforts to sway the appraiser's judgment by reference 
to rentals due, seems an obvious effort to distort the facts in his own favor. All 
trace of the retained voucher and supporting papers was missing. No memoranda 
or other papers were found in connection with Colonel Wyman's letter directing 
the purchase at Mr. Rohl's figures. In the absence of justifying evidence or 
testimony, the conclusion seems inescapable that Colonel Wyman was unduly 
swayed, contrary to the Government's interests, by an unwarranted acceptance of 
these representations of Mr. Rohl in the face of conflicting recommendations. 
(R. 3827-3828.) 

There is no document that could be found by this board, despite its 
efforts to do so, and the demand of the Corps of Engineers and of 
Robinson to produce any document of this nature, in conformance with 
the contract, allowing rental. [:£86] (R. 3815-3816.) To allow 

rental under the guise of the sales price of the equipment by Rohl- 
Connolly Company to the government was irregular. This was well 
known by Wyman and Robinson when they conducted and consum- 
mated this transaction. Robinson testifies that he did this under 
Wyman's direction and with Wyman's full knowledge. (R. 3824- 
3825-3826.) 

The reason for the great haste in making this transaction was given 
by Colonel Robinson. He said that Colonel Wyman was relieved as of 
the 15th and he wanted to close up this "loose end." (R. 3827.) 

The claimed rental appears exorbitant, even if legally paid, be- 
cause under the circumstances 26% for two to three months use for 
second-hand equipment was obviously high. 

The Board believes that the plan to pay rental and include this 
amount in the purchase price of the equipment was an afterthought. 
It was not in contemplation of the parties, at the time of the agree- 
ment, to have the equipment delivered to the government. In Wyman's 
prepared statement, delivered under oath, he said : 

It was decided in October 1941 that the equipment in question was needed on 
Christmas and Canton Islands in coiniection with the consti'uction work being 
done there by Hawaiian Constructors under contract No. l-414-eng-6()2. It was 
discovered that the Rohl Connolly Co. had the needed equipment available at a 
project it had just completed in Arizona, at Highgate Dam, Parker, Arizona. 



170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Government could either rent or buy this equipment. Since it was to be 
shipped to these remote islands, it was agreed that the equipment should be bought 
by the Government. (R. 3412-13.) 

In view of this agreement to buy, it would have been more equitable 
and resulted in the better protection of the government's interests 
had a fair value for the equipment at the time of delivery in early 
December, 1941, at Los Angeles, been determined and paid. Such 
value could have been [^87] established on March 12th very 
easily, as the equipment had been used little prior to that time. 

The procedure to establish the right of Rohl-Connolly to collect 
rentals and the methods used in assessing the rental values all appear 
to be very irregular. 

The second incident of the purchase of machinery that was against 
government interest was that involving the Hawaiian Contracting 
Company. This incident was the subject of inspections by the In- 
sp-ector General, Colonel Hunt and by Colonel Nurse (R. 3999), the 
official bottleneck buster. 

Here follows the story of the second purchase of equipment by the 
Corps of Engineers in Hawaii. 

The testimony of Colonel Nurse on this subject is significant to the 
effect that he inspected this equipment, which was purchased by 
Colonel Wyman for $156,411 from the Hawaiian Contracting Com- 
pany.''^ He, (Nurse) found that since the date of the purchase much 
of it apparently was never used because it was worthless or obsolete. 
Some of it had never been moved from the original yard in which it 
was at the time of the appraisal and this despite the fact that during 
this entire period there was the greatest demand for this typB of equip- 
ment. Colonel Nurse produced his contemporaneous reports as to this 
situation and we quote from his testimony as follows : 

Colonel NuESE. In 1943, in one of our investigations, we became aware that 
there was considerable equipment stored in the Hawaiian Contractors' yard that 
belonged to the Government and never had been removed . . . (R. 3999.) 

Colonel Nurse then read from the report that he had made, as 
follows : 



■ ] — "found stored in the yard of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, 
a large amount of construction equipment and tools which had been acquired 
by the U. S. E. D. on 15 March 1942 for $147,611.00. A good deal of this equip- 
ment i.s apparently in unserviceable condition, though it is felt that much of it 
could be put back in service or parts stripped for repair of other equipment. 
Some few items on the original purchase order had been removed and receiving 
reports are being checked to determine if it was received by the U. S. E. D. 
The list of equipment remaining includes such items as : automobiles, draglines, 
buckets, bulldozers, compressors, cranes, drill machines, finishers, graders, ham- 
mers (pile driving), hoists, mixers, pumps, road rollers, sci-apers, shovels, spread- 
ers, tractors, trucks, trailers, and also three lighting outfits (new). Apparently 
the fact that these belonged to the Government was overlooked until the curi- 
osity of a B. B. was aroused through having done some snooping. This informa- 
tion, together with a list of equipment has been turned over to Captain Spencer, 
who will take immediate action in removing it to his Base Yard." . . . 

General Frank. Do you have reason to believe or to know that after that 
equipment had been bought it had never been removed from the yard? 

Colonel Ntjkse. Well, I saw it, a great deal of it, myself, and the grass and 
the weeds were grown up around it so that you couldn't- — some of it was hard 
to find. They just had to go out there and dig it out, send men in there to cut 
the weeds and grass in order to get some of it out where they could move 
it. . . . 



" Note the difference from Hawaiian Contractors 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 171 

General Feank. Well, were they extremely short of equipment over there, so 
that they normally were in need of it and would have used it? 

Colonel Nurse. Yes, but a big portion of this equipment was unserviceable, 
and I was led to believe that it was remaining in this yard for repair at such 
time as the Hawaiian Constructors could get around to do the work, but the 
superintendent there of the Hawaiian Constructors told me that the U. S. E. D. 
had turned in so much other equipment for repair that he just was bogged down ; 
he never had been able to get at the repair of this equipment that was pur- 
chased from them. (R. 4000-4002.) 

Please contrast this finding of failure to use with Colonel Robinson's 
statement that they bought the equipment from Benson and the Ha- 
waiian Contracting Company as a member of the Hawaiian Con- 
structors because of the urgent need for the equipment. The facts 
completely refute his statement and a reasonable investigation of the 
records of the Corps of Engineers, [^SO] such as Nurse's 
"report, would have prevented him from making such a statement. 
For instance : 

General Russell. Based on that list which you saw representing the items 
of equipment purchased and the list which you compiled of the unused part 
of those items, it is now your testimony that the greater part of this property 
was never used by the Government? 

Colonel Nurse. That is my opinion, yes, sir, that is it was not used, with the 
exception of a few items which were unserviceable. Two lighting outfits were 
brand-new, never had been taken out of the box, but outside of that I think 
all the rest of the equipment in the yard, with the exception of a crane they 
had there that couldn't very well be moved, was unserviceable, and it was held, 
a good deal of it, with the idea of repairing it, although much of it was antiquated 
equipment there that — well, there were mule-drawn dump wagons and things 
of that sort that we never would use in this day and age. . . 

Colonel TouLMiN. As a matter of fact. Colonel, it was a bunch of junk, wasn't 
it? 

Colonel NuESE. That that remained in the yard, with the exception of a 
few items. 

Colonel TouLMiN. With the exception of the two lighting outfits and the one 
crane, it was a bunch of junk, wasn't it? 

Colonel Nurse. I would tell you that was pretty nearly true. 

Colonel TouLMiN. Wasn't there a demand for good equipment in the Islands? 

Colonel Nurse. Yes, sir. 

Colonel TotJLMiN. And anybody who bought that as a bunch of junk wouldn't 
be getting anything he could use. would heV 

Colonel Nurse. Some of it could be repaired, and I think they had requisitioned 
parts for the repair of some of the items. 

Colonel TouLMiN. That had never been done, had it? 

Colonel Nurse. They hadn't received parts up to the time I made my investi- 
gation. 

General Frank. And this was a year after it was bought? 

Colonel Nurse. Yes, sir. 

Colonel TouLMix. And in the interim of that year [290] there was a 
great demand for machinery, wasn't there? 

Colonel Nurse. There was. (R. 4006-4007.) 

A statement of this transaction is clearly set off in the report of the 
Inspector General, Colonel Hunt. He says : 

The procedure was to base payment upon an appraisal to be made by a Mr. 
Bruce Gentry, representing the Hawaiian Constructors; a Mr. H. J. Roblee, em- 
ployee of the Edward R. Bacon Company of Honolulu and a third man represent- 
ing the owner. In the case of the equipment purchase now in question, the 
third party was Mr. Edward Ross, employee of the Hawaiian Contracting Com- 
pany. These three appraised the equipment in question, placing an upper value 
of .$156,150 upon it. This appraisal was substantially the amount named in a 
letter addressed by Mr. Rohl to the District Engineer dated 9 January, 1942. 
In this case, the Government was not properly represented. Mr. Roblee, ostensibly 
the Government's x-epresentative, owed his livelihood to the Edward R. Bacon 



172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Company, of which the Hawaiian Conti-acting Company was a substantial cus- 
tomer in equipment purchases, his interests relating to those of his employer and 
its substantial customer. Mr. Gentry was a contractor employee and Mr. Rosa 
obviously served the interests of the vendor. 

Page 14, paragraph "c" : 

The items hauled to salvage, unused, totaling $9,100, wei*e examined by the in- 
vestigating officer. These items were so far obsolete as to warrant the descrip- 
tion "archaic". Some of the Watson wagons (hand operated, bottom dump 
wooden wagons) were arranged for animal draft, while others had been equipped 
with trailer tongues. All had been robbed of metal parts before the purchase, 
some were badly rotted and others were termite eaten beyond any possible use- 
fulness. Scrapers, scarifiers and lilie items were incomplete, badly rusted and of 
doubtful useability, even in an extremity. Other items accepted and taken into 
possession of the District Engineer subsequent to 1 July 1942 aggregated another 
$20,511. These last items were useable, but their acquisition was totally unneces- 
sary, suitable like items having been available in sufficient quantity prior to 
acceptance by the District Engineer's forces. 

Page 15, paragraph "d" : 

This transaction was directed by Colonel Wyman on 13 March 1942, and 
payment was effected in the same manner as in the case of the Rohl-Connolly 
equipm.ent (paragraph 7). The files yielded no correspondence in the matter 
other than that mentioned herein. In the course of Major Lumsden's inquiry, 
it developed that the District Engineer's appraiser had undertaken an appraisal 
of some items of this equipment, had been denied access to it on [291] the 
first attempt, and had later been permitted to examine it with the result that 
on the items inspected, values were recommended which were in substantial 
agreement with those later used, in the actual purchases. Nothing further was 
done at that time, however, and wlien the purchase was finally directed, this 
appraisal was ignored and the new one made as indicated above." (R. 3828- 
3829-3830.) 

When Colonel Kobinson was asked why worthless equipment was 
bought along with equipment that was usable from the Hawaiian Con- 
tracting Company, he said that the contractor refused to sell the good 
without the worthless (R. 3614-3616). so the government bought 
worthless property and the usual government certificate was issued 
as the basis for the voucher certifying the bill was "correct and just". 
The purpose of the certificate is to prevent matters of this character 
from occuring. 

Henry P. Benson, who headed the Hawaiian Contracting Com- 
pany, took the position that he would not sell the good equipment to 
the government which it needed without taking the junk off his hands. 
The following is probably explanatory of the holdup of the govern- 
ment that Colonel Robinson and Colonel Wyman permitted. 

Colonel ToTJLMiN. And playing fair, so-called, with the contractor at the gov- 
ernment's expense by taking the junk off his hands, because he wouldn't sell you 
the good equipment without the junk: isn't that it? That what you testified to. 

Colonel Robinson. Well, your wording is different than mine, sir, but it's all 
right. . . . 

Colonel TOTJLMIN. Well, then do you want us to understand that all the equip- 
ment you bought was good equipment? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir. I have testified to the condition of the equipment. 

Colonel TouLMiN. Some of it was good and some was worthless or substantially 
worthless; is that right? 

[292] Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

Colonel ToxiLMiN. All right. Benson told you that he wouldn't let you have the 
good equipment unless you took the other stuff that wasn't so good or was worth- 
less with it; that is right, isn't it? 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. (R. 3615-3616.) 

In this connection it is to be noted that Colonel Robinson said : 
"We desperately needed equipment." (R. 3616.) Contrast that 
statement of "desperately needed equipment", for which the price of 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 173 

$156,411 was paid, with the fact that it turned out to be either un- 
necessary because suitable items had been available in sufficient quanti- 
ties at that time to the Corps of Engineers, or "items were so far 
obsolete as to warrant the description 'archaic' ". (R. 3829-3830.) 

The evidence before the Board lacks definiteness as to the exact value 
of the property purchased from the Hawaiian Contracting Company. 
The Board believes, however, that the evidence indicates that the price 
paid was very excessive and fails to establish a valid reason for paying 
any sum for worthless equipment. This matter should be further 
investigated. 

C. SUMMARY 

Colonel Wyman's conduct in the Hawaiian Islands resulted in many 
delays in the completion of essential defenses. His association with 
Hans Wilhelm Rohl, German alien, and an interested member of the 
Hawaiian Constructors, was improper in a government agent. The 
award of the contract to the Hawaiian Constructors was favoritism on 
the part of Wyman and resulted in selecting an organization that 
was put together for the purpose of the Hawaiian contracts and was 
not equipped with personnel, mechanical equipment or organization 
to promptly and effectively do the work ; and the result was that delays 
occurred. Additionally, there were contractors, resident in [£93^ 
the Islands, and contractors from the mainland working in the Islands, 
who had organizations, equipment, personnel, and the facilities for do- 
ing the same work more promptly. These men and their organizations 
excluded arbitrarily by Colonel Wyman. 

We find that Wyman committed the following overt acts amongst 
many others : 

(1) Knowingly made a false official statement as to his knowledge 
of Kohl's alien status. 

(2) Wyman refused to accept the low bidder on a Hawaiian con- 
tract and gave the bid to the high bidder, which exceeded the low 
bidder by a large sum. 

(3) Wyman made irregular purchases of equipment from the Ha- 
Avaiian Constructors and their associate companies and directed pay- 
ment incorrectly certifying the bills as ''correct and just." 

[294^] Chapter VI. Conclusions 

INDEX 

/. Explanations 

1. Scope. 

2. Estimates upon which action was based. 

3. Relationship of Commanders in Hawaii. 

4. Interchange of information — State and War Departments. 

//. Grouping of Conclusions 
1. Pearl Harbor Attack. 
a. Attack a surprise. 
&. Two primary causes. 
c. Responsibilities. 

1. Secretary of State. 

2. Chief of Staff. 

8. War Plans Division. 
4. Hawaiian Department, 

T9716 — 46 — Ex. 157 12 



174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

//. Grouping of Conclusions — Continued 
2. Operations of Engineers in Hawaii. 

a. No evidence of intent to delay construction. 

b. Engineer peacetime operations. 

G. Field Organization of Corps of Engineers — Inspections. 

d. Hawaiian Constructors. 

e. District Engineer — Colonel Wyman. 

1. A pen picture. 

2. Associations. 

3. IneflBciencies. 

4. Neglects. 

5. False statements. 

6. Failure U> protect U. S. interests. 

[295] Chapter VI. Conclusions 

I. EXPLANATIONS 

As a p)relude to the citation of conclusions the following is perti- 
nent: 
i. Scope 

Attention is called to the fact that the record developed by the inves- 
tigation of this Board contains a great amount of evidence, both oral 
and documentary, relating to incidents and issues about which no 
conclusions are drawn. Evidence was introduced on these so that 
anything which might have had a bearing on the Pearl Harbor dis- 
aster would be fully explored. The Board considered that its mission 
implied the revealing of all pertinent facts to the end that charges 
of concealment would be fully met. In formulating its conclusions 
the Board has selected for treatment only those things which it con- 
siders material for a clear understanding of the events which collec- 
tively caused the Pearl Harbor disaster. The full report of the Board 
discusses and analyzes the testimony in its entirety and must be read 
for a clear understanding of the history of the Pearl Harbor attack. 

^. Estimates upon which action was hased 

The responsible officers in the War Department and in the Hawaiian 
Department, without exception, so far as this Board has been able to 
determine, estimated the situation incorrectly. They were influenced 
in this estimate by facts which then seemed to impel the conclusion 
that initially the impending war would be confined to the land and 
seas lying south of the Japanese homeland, as forces of the Japanese 
Army and Navy were concentrating and [296] moving in that 
direction. British and Dutch forces were being organized and made 
ready to move in opposition. The Philippine Islands which were 
in this theater constituted a threat to the flank of the Japanese forces 
if the United States should enter the war. Supplies and reinforce- 
ments were being rushed to the Philippines. There was complete ig- 
norance of the existence of the task force which attacked Pearl Harbor. 
Intelligent officers in high places made the estimate and reached the 
conclusions in the light of these known facts. They followed a sane 
line of reasoning. These statements are in explanation, not justifica- 
tion. 

The estimate was in error. The procedure in arriving at it was 
faulty, because it emphasized Japanese probabilities to the exclusion 
of their capabilities. Nevertheless, the thinking of these officers was 
colored and dominated by this estimate and their acts were similarly 
influenced. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 175 

3. Relationship of C ormnanders in Hawaii 

The relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel and 
Admiral Bloch, the commanders of the Army and Navy forces in 
Hawaii, were very cordial. They were making earnest and honest 
efforts to implement the plans which would result in the two services 
operating as a unit in an emergency. These highly desirable ends had 
not been accomplished at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. 

^. Interchange of information — State and War Departments 

The Board was impressed with the apparent complete interchange 
of information between the State Department and the War Depart- 
ment. As a result the War Department was kept in close touch with 
international developments and the State Department knew of the 
Army's progress and its preparations for war. 

\_297'\ II. GROUPING OF CONCLUSIONS 

The conclusions group themselves logically in two divisions: the 
Pearl Harbor attack, and operations of the Engineers in Hawaii. We 
shall consider these in the order stated. 

1. Pearl Harbor Attack 

a. The attack on the Territory of Hawaii was a surprise to all con- 
cerned : the nation, the War Department, and the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment. It was daring, well-conceived and well-executed, and it caught 
the defending forces practically unprepared to meet it or to minimize 
its destructiveness. 

h. The extent of the Pearl Harbor disaster was due primarily to two 
causes : 

1. The failure of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment adequately to alert his command for war, and 

2. The failure of the War Department, with knowledge of the type 
of alert taken by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 
to direct him to take an adequate alert, and the failure to keep him 
adequately informed as to the developments of the United States- 
Japanese negotiations, which in turn might have caused him to change 
from the inadequate alert to an adequate one. 

c. We turn now to responsibilities : 

1. The Secretary of State — the Honorable Cordell Hull. The ac- 
tion of the Secretary of State in delivering the counter-proposals of 
November 26, 1941, was used by the Japanese as the signal to begin 
the war by the attack [298^ on Pearl Harbor. To the extent 
that it hastened such attack it was in conflict with the efforts of the 
War and Navy Departments to gain time for preparations for war. 
However, war with Japan was inevitable and imminent because of 
irreconcilable disagreements between the Japanese Empire and the 
American Government, 

2. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, 
failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following 
particulars : 

(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation 
which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for 



176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

war, of which information he had an abundance and Short had little. 

(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General 
of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently 
he failed to realize the import of General Short's reply of November 
27th, which indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood 
and misconstrued the message of November 27 (472) and had not 
adequately alerted his command for war. 

(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and 
the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicat- 
ing an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample 
time to have accomplished this. 

[£99] (d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness 
of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7, 
1941, despite the impending threat of war. 

3. Chief of the War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, 
Major General Leonard T. Gerow, failed in his duties in the following 
particulars : 

(a) To keep the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ade- 
quately informed on the impending war situation by making available 
to him the substance of the data being delivered to the War Plans 
Division by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. 

(b) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian De- 
partment on November 27, 1944, a clear, concise directive ; on the con- 
trary he approved the message of November 27, 1941, (472) which 
contained the confusing statements. 

(c) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short's reply 
to the November 27th message was not a state of readiness for war, 
and he failed to take corrective action. 

(d) To take the required steps to implement the existing joint 
plans and agreements between the Army and Navy to insure the 
functioning oi the two services in the manner contemplated. 

[300] 4. Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, 
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, failed in his duties in the fol- 
lowing particulars : 

(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face 
of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. The 
information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was 
sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government 
and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily 
expected. This required that he guard against surprise to the extent 
possible and make ready his command so that it might be employed 
to the maximum and in time against the worst form of attack that the 
enem}^ might launch. 

(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral 
commanding the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th 
Naval District for implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and 
agreements then in existence which provided for joint action by the 
two services. One of the methods by which they might have become 
operative was through the joint agreement of the responsible com- 
manders. 

(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance re- 
connaissance being conducted by the Navy. 

(d) To replace inefficient staff officers. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 177 

[301'] 2. Operations of Engineers in Hawaii 

a. The Board found no evidence to indicate that the lack of prog- 
ress in construction activities in Hawaii and the delays connected 
therewith, were due to enemy accents, or to persons connected with 
such activities who, by intent, influenced the existing lack of progress 
and the delay that ensued, 

J). The peacetime organization and conduct of the Corps of Engi- 
neers' construction activities, together with the red tape involved in 
staff procedure, priorities, and procurement, were such as made delay 
practically inevitable. 

G. Chief of Engineers. 

1. In the field the organization of divisions and districts of the 
Corps of Engineers, under the Washington office, was a very loose 
one, without sufficient supervision and inspection. This resulted in 
the improper conduct of Colonel Wyman in Los Angeles going with- 
out official detection and in his operations as District Engineer in 
Honolulu being inefficient. 

2. Reports of inspections of Colonel Wyman's activities by Colonel 
John Hunt of the War Department Inspector General's Office and 
by Colonel Lathe B. Row of the Hawaiian Department Inspector 
General's Office, included adverse findings, some of which called for 
disciplinary measures, yet no corrective or disciplinary action seems 
to have been taken by the Chief of Engineers. 

d. The Hawaiian Constructors had a loose and inefficient organiza- 
tion; was poorly managed; lacked means with which to successfully 
prosecute the work; and generally were incapable of doing a first- 
rate job, which resulted in lack of progress and delays. 

\302'\ e. The District Engineer, Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., 
CE, the contracting officer : 

1. Was very aggressive and efficient in the execution of isolated jobs 
within his capabilities. He did not appreciate the magnitude of the 
task in Hawaii and lacked the capacity to measure up to its require- 
ments. His manner was brusque, abrupt and objectionable, and re- 
sulted in discord and inefficiency in his administration. 

2. In his associations with one Hans Wilhelm Rohl, a member of the 
Rohl-Connolly Contracting Company of the Hawaiian Constructors, 
he conducted himself in a highly indiscreet manner. 

3. He was most inefficient in the handling of his office and in admin- 
istrative matters, which indirectly caused delays. 

4. He was negligent in his duties relating to the contract, in that he 
failed : 

(a) To properly investigate the loyalty of Rohl. 

(b) To adequately investigate the availability of qualified con- 
tractors before the award of the basic contract and the supple- 
mental agreements thereto. 

(c) To properly supervise the performance of the work by the 
contractors. 

(d) To inform his higher headquarters of delays and deficien- 
cies of the confci^actors. 

(e) To take appropriate action to overcome [SOSI the 
delays and correct the deficiencies of the contractors. 

5. He made false statements under oath to the Board. 



178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



6. He failed to protect the interests of the United States in the 
purchase of equipment for the Government from the Hawaiian Con- 
structors and their associates. 



[SO^] Chapter VII. 

Recommendations: NONE. 



Friday, 20 October 19U- 



Recommendations 

George Grunert, 
Lieut. General^ U. S. Army, 

President. 
Henry D. Russell, 
Major General, U. S. Army, 

Member. 
Walter H. Frank, 
Major General, U. S. Army, 

Member. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 179 



[i] Appendix No. 1 

Supplemental Retokt of Abmy Pearl Harbor Board on Phases Mentioned in 
House Military Affairs Report Which Relate to the Pearl Harbor 
Disaster 

contents 

Page 

1. Scope and extent of inquiry by Army Pearl Harbor Board 2 

2. Findings of fact 

a. Construction work contemplated and need for speed in construc- 

tion 3 

b. Duties of the District Engineer, the Division Engineer, and the 

Chief of Engineers relating to the award of the contract 5 

c. Investigation of possible contractors 5 

d. Award of basic contract to Hawaiiian Constructors 9 

e. Award of supplemental contracts to Hawaiian Constructor 9 

f. Times fixed for completion of work 10 

g. Required manner. of performance and right of Government to 

terminate contract 10 

h. Access of Rohl to classified information 10 

i. Performance of Hawaiian Constructors 13 

j. Administration of contract and supervision of work by District 

Engineer 20 

k. Conduct of certain witnesses before Board 42 

3. Acknowledgments 77 

[2] Supplemental Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board on 

Phases Mentioned in House Military Affairs Report Which 
Relate to the Pearl Harbor Disaster 

1. Scope and extent of inquiry of Army Pearl Harhor Board 

The Secretary of War, by orders dated 12 and 22 July 1944 copies 
of which are hereto attached and marked Exhibits "A" and "B", as- 
signed the following missions to the Army Pearl Harbor Board in 
connection with the House Military Affairs Committee Report dated 
14 June 1944 : 

Ascertain the facts and make appropriate recommendations to the 
Secretary of War concerning all matters mentioned in the Congres- 
sional Committee Report which relate to the Pearl Harbor disaster. 
These phases involve primarily alleged delays and deficiencies in the 
construction of defense projects in Hawaii and alleged derelictions 
of the District Engineer, Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., C. E. 

It is the understanding of the Board that the remainder of the 
matters mentioned in the Congressional Committee Report, other than 
the Pearl Harbor matters, will be investigated in accordance with the 
order of the Sscretary of War dated 12 July 1944. 

2. Findings of fact 

The following facts have been found by the Board after careful 
consideration of the evidence and due deliberation. These findings 
are based upon the sworn testimony of many witnesses heard by the 
Board at Washington, San Francisco, and in Hawaii and the study 
of numerous authenticated documents. Specific references are made 
in some instances to the transcript, the exhibits, and other appropriate 



180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sources of reliable informa- [3] tion. The evidence so indi- 
cated is not exclusive, however, of other proof which was adduced be- 
fore the Board. 

a. C onsttmction work contemplated and need for speed in construc- 
tion. — The original w^ork contemplated in the fall of 1940 for defense 
projects in Hawaii, as later expressed in the basic contract dated 
20 December 1940 (Exhibit No. 46), comprised the following cate- 
gories : 

A. Ammunition storage magazines on tlie Island of Oahu complete with service 
roads, railroad spur tracks and appurtenances * * * 

B. Aircraft warning service stations on the Islands of Oahu, Hawaii, Maui and 
Kauai, involving certain installations, including buildings, roads, ti'ails, cable- 
ways, haulage ways as directed by the Contracting Ofhcer. 

C. Railway trackage on the Island of Oahu at certain locations to be desig- 
nated, in accordance with detailed instructions to be issued from time to time by 
the Contracting Officer * * *, 

D. Fortification structures for use in connection with fixed fortifications at 
locations to be determined by the Contracting Officer. 

E. An addition to radio station WTJ in accordance with detailed instructions 
to be issued by the Contracting Ofl!icer. 

Speed in completing this construction program was made of the 
essence in the contract. The increasing tempo of the world war, the 
sympathetic attitude which we had evidenced toward the victims of 
the aggressor nations, and the probability that we would be "next on 
the list", all pointed to the need for strengthening our Pacific outposts 
in the shortest possible time. 

The Secretary of War was personally 

taking up very vigorously * * * ^ ^(,j^g series of steps that were connected 
with use of radar in picking up attacks from the air. (R, [^J v 35, p 
4064.) 

Indicative of this interest was a letter dated 7 February 1941 from 
the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy, which stated in 
p)art : 

War Depabtment, 
Washington, February 7, 1941. 
Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. 
To : The Secretary of the Navy. 

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise 
attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express 
complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our 
making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian 
Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues 
to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the 
importance of giving full protection to the Fleet. 

* 'ii * * * If * 

4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has 
been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. AH arrangements for 
installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry 
develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made 
at an earlier date. 

(Exhibit No. 22, Robert's Comm. Report.) 
Hence, the contract provided : 

The Contractor shall, in the shortest possible time, furnish the labor, materials, 
tools, machinery, equipment, facilities, supplies not furnished by the Government, 
and services, and do all things necessary for the completion of the following work. 
(Article II, 1.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 181 

It is estimated * * * that the work herein contracted for will be ready 
for utilization by the Government within six (6) months from the date of this 
contract. (P. 4.) 

[5] T). Duties of the District Engineer^ the Division Engineer, 
and the Chief of Engineers relating to the award of the contract. — 

The District Engineer and Contracting Officer on this work in the 
Hawaiian Islands during the time in question was Colonel Theodore 
Wyman, Jr., CE. In accordance with policies established by the 
Under Secretary of War to award contracts impartially and to local 
contractors if possible, Colonel Wyman was charged with the duties 
of ascertaining and recommending the availability of competent con- 
tractors in Hawaii to undertake this construction ; and, if none were 
there available, of ascertaining and recommending the availability of 
such contractors in the United States. (R, v. 6, p. 600, 640, 642, 644, 
646; R, V. 18, p 2032.) He was also charged with the duty of investi- 
gating the loyalty and background of the contemplated contractors. 
(R, V. 6, p. 599, 648, 650, 651, 658 ; R, v. 18, p. 2037.) It was the duty of 
the Division Engineer and the Chief of Engineers to review and 
supervise the performance of these duties by the District Engineer. 
(R, V. 6, p 636, 643 ; R, v. 18, p 2037, 2065.) 

c. Investigation of possible contractors. — 

Col. Wyman did not conduct an adequate investigation to determine 
whether any contractors were available in Hawaii. He failed to com- 
municate with such local contractors as would have been able to per- 
form the work well and with speed and dispatch. R, v. 29, p. 3388; 
V. 30, p. 3626 et seq., 3721 et seq; 3750 et seq; v. 21, p. 2402, 2403, 2418 
et seq ; v. 24, p. 2764 et seq ; p. 61-63 Report of Col. John A. Hunt, IG.) 

Col. Wyman also failed to conduct an adequate investigation to 
determine the availability of competent contractors [6"] on 
the mainland. He merely came to the mainland; and, within the 
period of a very few days, interviewed several contractors in Cali- 
fornia went, to Washington, D. C. and concluded negotiations with 
representatives of a joint venture comprising the Rohl-Connolly Co., 
Gunther-Shirley Co., and the W. E. Callahan Construction Company. 
It is clear that Col. W^anan showed favoritism toward the persons who 
comprised this joint venture. He did not even inform other possible 
mainland contractors that the job contemplated by the basic contract 
would later be expanded, which was something he knew at the tjme. 
(R, V 18, p 2051 et seq ; v 29, p 3537, 3588 ; p 61-63 Report of Col. John 
A.Hunt,IG.) 

Although the contract covered secret defense projects of the most 
crucial importance to our military outpost in Hawaii, Col. Wyman 
failed also to investigate the loyalty and background of the persons 
comprising the joint venture. (T, v 6, p 600; v 29, p 3579.) A mere 
cursory investigation would have revealed that Hans Wilhelm Rohl, 
the guiding spirit of the Rohl-Connolly Co., was then a German alien 
of doubtful loyalty and with a most dubious background. He first 
entered the United States as a German alien on 23 October 1913. 
At that time he was admitted for permanent residence. Later, he 
left and returned to the United States on about twelve occasions with- 
out disclosing his alien status, thus violating immigration laws then 
in existence. He also falsely represented himself as a United States 
citizen on Federal income tax returns and to a Federal income tax 



182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

investigator and on a ship's manifest. From 1934 to 1940 he directed 
the affairs of the Rohl-Connolly Co. as its President and a stockholder. 
This firm, by reason of his alien [7] status, owned and operat- 
ed a number of ships in violation of the law. For these latter viola- 
tions the Rohl -Connolly Company paid a fine of $25,000 on 4 Septem- 
ber 1941 in lieu of a statutory penalty forfeiture of the ships. (Ex- 
hibit No. 6 ; V 10, p 1161 se seq; v 20, p 2222 et seq; v 21, p 2375 et seq; 
V 22, p 2427 et seq; v 33, p 3972 et seq; v 34, p 4015 et seq; v 35, p 4103 
et seq ; v 37, p 4338 et seq, 4366 et seq.) 

Rohl, as of the time his firm was awarded the secret Hawaiian con- 
tract, had a record of having been investigated by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation and the Office of Naval Intelligence for alleged sub- 
versive activities. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had even 
received information in July 1940 that Rohl may have been a German 
agent during the first World War. This disclosure was prompted by 
knowledge of the informant that Rohl had been granted large Army 
contracts in the vicinity of Los Angeles. The Office of Naval Intel- 
ligence was informed in October 1940 that Rohl was an alleged danger- 
ous German alien. Col. Wyman could have obtained this information 
merely making use of the telephone. 

An excerpt from a Naval Intelligence Service Report on Hans 
Wilhelm Rohl, dated 5 March 1941 (R, v. 34, p. 4032) states that the 
inspector : 

* * * believes subject to have been dishonest in his actions and that his 
actions indicate possible subversive activity. 

(R, V. 19, p. 2200 et seq. ; v. 34, p. 4027, 4030.) 

The favoritism which Col. Wyman exhibited toward Rohl stemmed 
from an unwholesome and inappropriate relationship that had long 
existed between them. Their friendship began in 1935 when Col. 
Wyman was assigned as District Engineer at Los [8] Angeles. 
Col. Wyman so mixed his business and social activities with Rohl that 
it is clear these improper activities acutely affected the discharge of his 
duties, to the detriment of the Government. He accepted from Rohl 
excessive entertainment in and out of business hours. There was 
much joint drinking, carousing, and indulgence in off-color activities. 
This questionable relationship increased in tempo and grew more 
intimate and indiscreet as time went on. Several large Army con- 
tracts were awarded to Rohl's firm on the recommendation of Col. 
Wyman. He sought to explain this relationship on the ground that 
he reciprocated the entertainment. Clearly, however, such an ex- 
planation from an Army officer does not excuse, but only aggravates the 
original wrong. 

This questionable personal and business relationship also involved 
at times Paul Grafe of the W. E. Callahan Construction Co. (Exhibit 
No. 6; R., V. 10, p. 1161 et seq; v. 21, p. 2375 et seq., 2398 et seq; v. 22, 
p. 2427 et seq ; v. 23, p. 2580-A et seq ; v. 29 p 3477 ; v. 33, p. 3957 et seq ; 
V. 34, p. 4022 et seq; v. 35, p. 4095 et seq.) 

It is significant that the Chief of Engineers, Major General Eugene 
Reybold, frankly testified concerning Col. Wyman in his business 
transactions : 

He is the most indiscreet man that I ever knew. * * * in what he does on 
the side he evidently is very, vei-y indiscreet. (R., v. 6, p. 611.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 183 

Col. Eobert J. Fleming, CE, also testified : 

There has been a lot of discussion in the engineers, sir, for years, on the fact 
that a lot of people have always believed Colonel Wyman was a little bit too 
familiar with the contractors. (R. v. 11, p. 1289.) 

[9] d. Award of basic contract to Haivaiian Constructors. — As 
previously stated, Col. Wyman came from Hawaii to California and 
spent but a few days ascertaining the availability there of contractors 
for the Hawaiian projects. He then went to Washington, D. C, and 
recommended to the Chief of Engineers that the Rohl-Connolly Co., 
W. E. Callahan Construction Co., and Gunther and Shirley Co. be 
awarded the basic contract. In pursuance of this recommendation the 
secret cost-plus-fixed-fee contract No. W-4I4-Eng-602 was executed 
with these firms on 20 December 1940. This contract called for work 
estimated to cost $1,097,673 at a fee of $52,220. ( R., v. 6, p. 639 et seq ; 
V. 18, p. 2032 et seq ; v. 29, p. 3388, 3487 et seq ; v. 20, p. 2288 et seq.) 

e. Award af supplemental contracts to Haioailan Constructors. — 
Supplemental agreements to the basic contract were later awarded the 
Hwaiian Constructors, mainly on the recommendations of Col. 
Wyman. These were 52 in number. Finally, the estimated cost of 
the work was expanded to about $112,031,375, and the fee eventually 
received by the Hawaiian Constructors was thereby increased to 
$1,060,000. In view of this fee which "ballooned" from $52,220 to 
$1,060,000, it is interesting to read the following sworn testimony given 
by Rohl on 22 May 1941 to an Inspector of the Immigration and Nat- 
uralization Service : 

Question. Have you anything further that you wish to state? 

Answer. I would like to say that the defense contract we have in Honolulu, is 
not a money making venture. We were requested to take that contract and they 
especially wanted me in on it because I have done a lot of work for Colonel 
Wyman, and he believes that I am able. We considered it our duty to take that 
contract. We are [iO] donating our services, that is why I am anxious 

to expedite this investigation in my case. (R., v. 35, p. 4117.) 

These supplements covered secret defense projects of the same general 
type as that contemplated by the basic contract. (Exhibit No. 6 : R., 
V. 31, p. 3797.) 

/. 2'imes fixed for completion of work. — At the request of the Com- 
manding General, Hawaiian Department, Col. Wyman, as the con- 
tracting officer, issued various job orders to the contractor to proceed 
with phases of the work. Summaries of some of these job orders are 
in evidence. (Exhibits 4 to 4-N ; R. v. 7, p. 778 et seq.) An examina- 
tion of the summaries will show that the facilities for the aircraft 
warning services, the ammunition storage magazines, the fire control 
stations, the underground gasoline storage tanks, and the other vital 
defense projects were supposed to have been completed long prior to 
7 December 1941. 

g. Required manrier of performance and right of Government to 
terminate contract. — The basic contract (Exhibit No. 46) provides in 
Article 1, 4, that : 

The work shall be executed in the best and most workmanlike manner by 
qualified, careful, and efficient workers, in strict conformity with the best stand- 
ard practices. 



184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The contract further provides in Article VI, 1, that : 

Should the Contractor at anytime refuse, neglect, or fail to prosecute the work 
with promptness and diligence, or default in the performance of any of the 
agreements herein contained, or should conditions arise which make it advisable 
or necessary in the interest of the Government to cease work under this contract, 
the Government may terminate this contract by a notice in writing from the 
Contracting OflScer to the Contractor. 

h. Access of Rohl to classified mformatlon. — [ii] Col. Wyman 
informed Rohl in conferences at Los Angeles and San Francisco, in 
negotiations looking toward an award of the contract, that extensive 
defense work was to be done in the Hawaiian Islands. (R., v. 20, p. 
2244, 2249 et seq.; v. 29, p. 3394.) An alien with a background of 
alleged subversive acitivities was thus informed that a program of 
highly secret defense work was to be undertaken in Hawaii. Not only 
did Col. Wyman have a responsibility as the Contracting Officer and 
the District Engineer to conduct an investigation which would have 
disclosed Rohl's alien background, but he had a clear duty under the 
provisions of AR 380-5, 10 June 1939, not to disclose to a German 
alien such as Rohl, information classified as Secret and information 
that defensive w^ork was to be undertaken in the Hawaiian Islands. 

The Chief of Engineers testified : 

General Frank. What if any rules or reguhitlons did Colonel Wyman violate 
in event that he, having been informed that Rohl was an alien, discussed with 
him details of a secret defense project contract? 

General Reybold. What did he violate? 

General Fkank. Yes. 

General Reybold. I would say, the rules of good judgment and common sense. 

General Fkank. Is there any written regulation or specific document that cov- 
ers, that? 

General Reyboid. AR 380-5, to safeguard military information, certainly cov- 
ers it. 

General Geunert. When was that published? 

General Reybold. June 10, 1939. (R. v. 6, p. 607.) 

The evidence indicates Col. Wyman knew, before the basic contract 
was signed, that Rohl was a German alien. A friend of Col. Wyman 
testified that Col. Wyman had so admitted to him. [i^] (R., v. 
35, p. 4095, et seq.) Col. Wyman admitted to the Inspector General 
that he "knew that Mr. Rohl was born in Germany, had come to the 
United States on or about the year 1912 and had been in the United 
States since." (P. 63 Report of Col. John A. Hunt, IGD.) Rohl 
testified before the California State Legislature's Joint Fact Finding 
Committee on Un-American activities that he had informed Col. 
Wyman that he was an alien. He stated, "I told him — I had to tell 
him." (P. 3807, 3808, Exhibit No. 1.) Rohl said he gave Col. 
Wyman this information because he, (Rohl), knew the law which 
prohibited an alien from having access to secret defense projects. 
(See WD Cir. No. 120, 1940.) 

Furthermore, an official of the Bureau of Immigration and Natural- 
ization informed Col. Wyman on or before 1 March 1941 that Rohl was 
an alien applicant for citizenship. (R., v. 36, p. 4186.) This in- 
formation was given Col. Wyman because officials of the Bureau con- 
sidered the employment of such an alien on such secret defense work 
very "peculiar." (R., v. 18, p. 4018-4019.) Despite this notice. Col. 
Wyman arranged for Rohl's firm to be awarded additional contracts 
for secret work. (Exhibit No. 6; v. 18, p. 2048 et seq; v. 29, p. 3501, 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 185 

3509, 3533, 3539, 3558, 3559.) Colonel Wyman testified that he was 
not informed until June 1941 that Rohl was a German alien. But 
even if this were so, then at that time at least Col. W3anan knew the 
Government had been victimized by the most crass deception. For, 
by their own admissions Thomas E. Connolly of the Rohl-Connolly 
Co., and Paul Graf e of the W. E. Callahan Construction Co. and Gun- 
ther and Shirley Co., were informed in December 1940, before the con- 
tract was signed, that Rohl was a German alien. This caused a com- 
plete reorganization because the contract was [13] secret. Mr. 
Connolly said the information was a shock and Mr. Grafe stated it 
was "a bombshell." Furthermore, both Mr. Connolly and Mr. Grafe 
met ]SIr. Martin, attorney for the Rohl-Connolly Co., in Washington 
during the conferences preceding the execution of the contract. Mr. 
Martin stated to Mr. Connolly that he ''was in Washington in the in- 
terests of acquiring citizenship or furthering citizenship applications 
for Mr, H. W. Rohl." Col. Wyman also was in Washington during 
this period and roomed and met with these associates of Rohl. (R., 
V. 19, p. 2158 ; v. 2, p. 2288 ; Exhibit No. 6.) 

Thus, if Col. Wyman was not advised until June 1941, he did noth- 
ing about the deception but continued nevertheless to grant contracts 
to Rohl and his associates and later gave Rohl full access to the secret 
plans and work. 

The fact from a security standpoint is that details of secret defense 
plans for the Hawaiian Islands actually were disseminated to the 
aggressor nations who later became our enemies. (R. 31, p. 3797 
et seq; 3799 et seq.) Rohl was also shown to have been acquainted 
with one Werner Plack, a German agent (R., v. 22, p. 2375 et seq ; 2517.) 

i. Perforinanee hy Hawaiian Constructors. — It is clearly established 
that from the very inception of the construction work in Hawaii 
and Hawaiian Constructors failed and neglected to prosecute the work 
with promptness or diligence and defaulted in the performance of the 
agreements. Paul Grafe, with whom Col. Wyman had been intimate 
in Los Angeles, was the representative in Hawaii of the three firms 
comprising the Hawaiian Constructors until Rohl arrived and assumed 
charge in September 1941. Undue delays of the contractors became 
not- [74] orious. Impartial observations of the way in which 
the contractors conducted their affairs indicated that they were most 
inefficient. Projects were not completed on time and were not pros- 
ecuted in the manner required by the contract. 

A well know contractor in "Hawaii of some 15 years experience 
had observed the work of the Hawaiian Constructors and testified 
that it lagged badly and that Rohl was incapable of speeding up 
the work on account of his condition. He testified that the Hawaiian 
Constructors, in comparison with other contractors, were most inef- 
ficient. (R., V. 20, p. 2264 et seq., v. 30, p. 3623, et seq.) He cited 
several examples of delays which arose through neglect of the Hawai- 
ian Constructors after they were awarded contracts. For example, 
the Hawaiian Constructors were awarded a competitive contract, 
although they were not low bidders, for two airfields on Hawaii, 
one airfield on Mauai, and one airfield on Molokai. The Govern- 
ment would have saved about $300,000 if the contract had been granted 
to the lowest bidders. Moreover, view from a military standpoint, 
the low bidders possibly could have had the airfields completed by 



186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

7 December 1941, whereas the Hawaiian Constructors had only just 
started the construction as of that date. (R., v. 30, p. 3628.) 

Lt. Col. J. J. Kestly, C. E. classified the work done by the Hawaiian 
Constructors as third rate and testified that "the progress is what 
I am saying was poor." (E., v. 30, p. 3668.) 

Mr. Henry P. Benson, President of the Hawaiian Contracting Co. 
which later became a part of the Hawaiian Constructors, testified 
that the local contractors could have handled the work more ex- 
peditiously and more economically than did the Hawaiian Construc- 
tors. (E. V. 30, p. 3724.) 

[15] Mr. Walter F. Dillingham, one of the stock holders of the 
Hawaiian Contracting Co., testified that after the work had com- 
menced under the Hawaiian Constructors he stated to Mr. Benson, 
"It's an awful mess." (E., v. 24, p. 2758.) Following the execution 
of the basic contract and in the year 1941 the persons comprising the 
joint venture sold a 20% interest therein to Mr, Ealph E. Woolley, a 
local contractor, for the sum of $65,000. (E., y. 30, p. 3750.) 

Later in the year 1941 the persons then comprising the joint venture 
commenced negotiations which were consummated in the early part 
of the year 1942 whereby a 20% interest in the joint venture was 
sold to the Hawaiian Contracting Co. for the sum of $100,000. (E., 
V. 30, p. 3727.) During this period the work covered by the con- 
tract and the supplemental agreements was increased to over 
$100,000,000. 

In passing it may be noted from the record that a joint venture 
of this kind has been criticized as successfully preventing competition 
and creating a monopoly to the disadvantage of the Government. 
(E., V. 21, p. 2404, 2414.) 

The Inspector General, Hawaiian Department, produced many in- 
spection reports from the official files which showed irregularities and 
deficiencies of long standing in the performance of the Hawaiian 
Constructors. (E., v. 28, p. 3226.) 

Mr. A. Sisson, civilian employee of the U. S. Engineering Depart- 
ment testified regarding the work of the Hawaiian Constructors 
from his observations as an Area Engineer. He testified "All of the 
work here at the time was badly handled," * * * "It wasn't 
handled in an efficient manner." (E., v. 28, p. 3266, 3268.) 

[16] He further stated, regarding the Hawaiian Constructors, 
"I think their main fault was the inefficiency, sort of a don't care a 
darn what the costs are," and that if the contractors were efficient 
builders "they surely must have sent this 'scrub team' over here to 
do it" and that "I have thought that there was a laxity, or I would 
say that the Hawaiian Constructors or members of the Hawaiian 
Constructors have gipped the Government to a considerable extent 
in the renting of the equipment." (R., v. 28, p. 3280, 3281.) 

The former General Superintendent for the Hawaiian Construc- 
tors, Mr. H. J. King, testified from his observations that the character 
of the work which had been done was "very poor." (E., v. 23, 
p. 2529.) He referred to many examples of undue delays. (R., v. 
23, p. 2531 et seq.) To use the vernacular of an affidavit he made, 
"The work that had been accomplished under the supervision of Col. 
Wyman prior to December 7, 1941, was pretty lousy." (E., v. 23, 
p. 2529.) The basis for this opinion was his observations of what 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 187 

had been done under Col. Wyman and the conditions of Col. Wyman's 
operations. (R., v. 23, p. 2546.) He gave as Hs reasons for these 
inefficiencies the "lack of organization, lack of knowledge, lack of 
experience," and "lack of supervision" from the top all the way 
down. (E., V. 23, p. 2537.) He further stated that the system of 
the contract and the supervision by the Corps of Engineers was bad 
but that the connection of Rohl with that system aggravated an 
already bad situation. (R., v. 23, p. 2558.) 

Another former employee of the Hawaiian Constructors, Mr. Rea 
B. Wickiser, testified that the grades for the runways at the Hilo 
Airfield were changed nine times during the course of [17] 
construction. He stated that before the Pearl Harbor attack he had 
been employed by the Territory Airport Constructors and that their 
work was being capably performed on a fixed contract basis and that 
the inefficient conditions arose when the work was given to the Ha- 
waiian Constructors after the attack. (R. v. 22, p. 2458, 2465.) 

Mr. Robert E. McKee, general contractor of many years experience 
testified on the basis of what he knew concerning a contract which 
his organization had with the Hawaiian Constructors. He stated 
that "the organization (Hawaiian Constructors) wasn't very effi- 
cient" * * * "they were not operating a very efficient organiza- 
tion." He further testified as to undue delays. (R., v. 21, p. 2407 
et seq.) He stated that the basic reason for this inefficiency was 
lack of supervision; (R. v. 21, p. 2419) and mentioned that before 
Pearl Harbor he had tried unsuccessfully to get contracts for some 
of the airfields and that if these contracts had been awarded to con- 
tractors other than the Hawaiian Constructors the work would have 
been performed in a more efficient manner and at a considerable 
saving to the Government. (R., v. 21, p. 2411, 2418.) 

George F. Bartlett, a Principal Engineer with the United States 
Engineering Department testified as follows concerning the Hawaiian 
Constructors : 

General Frank. In your observation of the operation of the contractors did 
you observe anything that indicated that was any intent on the part of the 
contractors to delay the work? Was there anything that showed intent to 
delay the work? 

Mr. Baktlett. Well, that would be an opinion. My opinion is yes, there 
was an intent, but I couldn't definitely put my finger on anything right now. 

General Frank. What led you to your opinion that [18] there was 
intent? 

Mr. BAETUEnr. Well, we would want certain things done at a certain time, and 
it would be resented on the part of the contractor. If I gave them a definite 
order that such and such a thing would have to be done at a certain time to make 
the work proceed in an orderly way, why, they would quite often find some sub- 
terfuge for not doing it, apparently, and we did not get along very well. There 
was considerable bickering on the job, but we made them to a certain extent 
expedite the work. 

(R. V 22, p 2497, 2498.) 

An employee in the Operations Office United States Engineering 
Department, testified that he had been called in as a sort of trouble 
shooter on the AWS construction because the work was lagging. He 
found that the reason for these undue delays was "the superintendent 
didn't pay much attention to these AWS constructions" referring to 
the superintendents of the Hawaiian Constructors. (R. v 19, p 2137.) 
He stated that "there was quite a complaint from the Signal Corps 
that we were not making any progress." (R. v 19, p 2138.) 



188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Major General F. L. Martin, Commanding General of the Army 
Air Forces in Hawaii at the time of the attack, testified on this point 
also: 

I complained with reference to the time that was required to get these perma- 
nent stations for the RDF installation ; but as I remember those stations were 
being constructed under the supervision of Col. Wyman rather than Colonel Ly- 
man, who was the Division Engineer. Now, as to who actually had charge of 
the construction, I will not be positive, but it is my impression at the present 
time that Colonel Lyman — at least, he was pushing it at the time, trying to 
unravel the knots that were preventing progress. (R. v. 17, p. 1891.) 

Admiral Kimmel testified that General Short wrote him in August 
1941 that the Army would have the radar in operation very shortly. 
(K.vl6,pl785.) 

Colonel Robert J. Fleming, CE, who was assigned to the Hawaiian 
Department during the time in question testified that [19] the 
association of Eohl and Colonel Wyman was "unhealthy" and that as 
far as the Hawaiian Constructors were concerned "I think there were 
indications of an awful lot of inefficiency in the setup." (E.. v. 11, 
p. 1294.) He also testified that in his opinion, "If somebody with 
ability as an engineer had been District Engineer and could have been 
quick to find out what the military side of the picture had been, I think 
some of the things might have been speeded up a little bit." (R. v. 11, 
P. 1342.) As one specific example of undue delay, he cited the build- 
ing of an elaborate road to a permanent AWS site, which road was far 
in excess of what was actually needed. (R. v. 11, p. 1328.) He also 
referred to the hot feud which had existed between Col. Wyman and 
Gen. Lyman of the Hawaiian Department and said "it would certainly 
prolong discussions." (R. v. 11, p. 1278.) He also stated that Paul 
Grafe, who was the directing head of the Hawaiian Constructors be- 
fore the arrival of Rohl and who dominated the situation before Rohl 
assumed charge in September 1941, was a negative character so far as 
getting work clone. (R. v. 11, p. 1325.) 

A table set forth on pages 39 and 40 of the Report of the House Com- 
mittee on Military Ali'airs, which was substantially verified by a wit- 
ness before the Board, indicates the striking contrast between the 
estimated contract completion date of Jime 1941, the required comple- 
tion dates of the job orders, and the actual state of completion of the 
work as of 7 December 1941. (R. v. 7, p. 778, 789 ; Exhibit No. 5.) 

Some of these delays may be attributed to conditions which should 
be expected, such as lack of personnel, materials, and priorities. But 
the conclusion is clear that in the majority of cases the contractors 
were largely at fault. 

[^<?] j. Adtimiistration of contract and supervision of work hy 
District Engineers. — It was the duty of the Contracting Officer and 
District Engineer, Col. Wyman, to administer the contract and ex- 
ercise general supervision over the performance of the contractors 
and to prod them or terminate the contract, if necessary, so that the 
work would be completed in the required time and manner. (R. v. 6, 
p. 596, 656.) 

Instances abound in the record of maladministration and neglect by 
Col. Wyman. Following are a few examples of the more gross 
derelictions. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 189 

The District Engineer continued in Hawaii the improper relations 
that had existed between him and Rohl in Los Angeles. 

A former civilian employee of the United States Engineering De- 
partment testified concerning many instances of drunkenness on the 
part of Col. Wyman which she had observed from her close associa- 
tion with him m the office of the District Engineer. (R. v. 23, p. 
2568etseq.) 

Col. Robert J. Fleming, CE, also testified that Col. Wyman's addic- 
tion to excess drinking when he was assigned to the Third Engineers 
at Schofield Barracks, prior to his assignment as District Engineer, 
grew so pronounced that his superior finally forced him to take the 
pledge. (R. v. 11, p. 1284.) Col. Fleming stated that Col. Wyman's 
superior, Col. Lyman, "had enough on him (Col. Wyman) that he just 
about had to." As to Col. Wyman's general characteristics, he testi- 
fied that Col, Wyman "was about the most impossible person person- 
ally that we had in the Engineers ; that he was just one of those people 
who made everybody mad at him being alwaj's — he was just a bull 
in a china [^i]/ shop." (R. v. 11, p. 1282.) This unsatis- 
factory state of affiairs was brought to the attention of (jren. Short 
(R. V. 11, p. 1282), since the feud between Col. AVyman and Col, 
Lyman "got very bad, sir, oh, around the first of November, 1941." 
(R, V, 11, p. 1283.) On one occasion he observed Col. Wyman drink 
to excess at a party given by some Air Corps Generals about Jan- 
uary 1942 and that he made "some very regrettable statements." (R., 
V. 11, p. 1286.) 

Concernmg the relationship between Rohl and Col. Wyman in 
Hawaii, he testified (R., v. 11, p. 1290) : 

General Frank. What was it after the war? 

Colonel Fleming. After the war— well, I think after the war a lot of people 
thought that they were together too much of the time. 

General Frank. Were they drinking? 

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. 

General Fkaistk. To excess? 

Colonel Fleming. I don't know, sir. I never saw them. 

General Frank. What were the reports circulating about that drinking? 

Colonel Fleming. Oh, there were all sorts of reports circulated about it, sir, 
but I think everybody in the Territory was mad at Colonel Wyman, about that 
time. 

General Frank. Everybody was what? 

Colonel Fleming. Was mad at Colonel Wyman. 

He further testified, "I had had personal knowledge that in my 
opinion Col. Wyman associated too much with contractors," (R., v. 
11, p. 1307.) 

Col. Lathe B. Row, former Inspector General for the Hawaiian 
Department, testified concerning many derogatory reports which his 
office made of Col. Wyman's activities, and that while Col. Wyman 
repeatedly promised that corrective action would [22] be 
taken, such in fact was never done. (R., v. 19, p. 2093.) 

He further pointed out that compared with the Construction Quart- 
ermaster, the work of the Hawaiian Constructors under the direction 
of the District Engineer was distinctly inferior. (R., v. 19, p. 2126.) 
These opinions were based upon a series of construction inspections 

79716 — 46— Ex. 157 13 



190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

which were made by his office pursuant to directions of the Secretary 
of War. (R., v. 19, p. 2129.) This direction was as follows : 

AG 600.12 EJ/as 

( 2-13-41 )M-IG 

Febbtjaby 17, 1941. 
Inspection of Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Construction Projects. 
Commanding Geneeai,, 

Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shatter, T. H. 

1. Reference is made to letters from this office of November 20, 1940 (AG 
333.1 (10-31-40) M-Sec. GS-M) : of January 6 1941 (AG 600.12 ( 1-2-41 ) M-IG ) ; 
and of January 15, 1941 (AG 333.1 (1-^rAl) M-Sec GS-M), subject Assignment of 
Inspections of Constructing Quartermaster, Fiscal Year 1941. 

2. A national defense construction project on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract is 
being undertalsen in the Hawaiian Department under the supervision of the Dis- 
trict Engineer, Honolulu District, the inspection of which is a responsibility of 
the Commandng General, Hawaiian Department, under the provisions of the 
letters cited above. 

3. The Chief of Engineers has been directed to notify you of the specific loca- 
tions where military construction on cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis is being under- 
taken in your Department, and of any additional locations where projects of the 
same type may be undertaken in your Department in the future. There will be 
furnished to you for the use of your Inspector General the instructions issued 
or to be issued by the Chief of Engineers for the administration of projects being 
constructed under his supervision by cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. 

4. Inclosed for the information of your Inspector General, is a copy of "Manual 
for Field Auditors on Cost-Plus-A-Fixed Fee Contracts" issued by The Quarter- 
master General for the use of Constructing Quartermasters on Quartermaster 
construction projects, together with a copy of a Guide utilized by officers of the 
Office of The Inspector General in inspecting such projects. 

By order of the Secretary of War : 
[23] John B. Cooijnr, 

Adjuta/nt General. 
2 Incls. 

Incl. #1 — Manual for Field Auditors. 
Incl. #2 — Inspection Guide. 

The former Inspector General testified concerning the Hawaiian 
Constructors, "I was definitely of the opinion that there was a great 
deal of waste and unnecessary expenditure of time and funds." (R., 
V. 19, p. 2123.) 

Concerning certain of these deficiencies, Mr. King stated (K., v. 23, 
p. 2535) : 

General Frank. Who was responsible for that? 

Mr. King. Well, it was certainly the Engineer Corps, no one else. They were 
doing it. They were keeping the time. They were signing the pay checks. 

In this regard, since the Engineers were doing work which should 
have been done by the contractors, attention is invited to the following 
letter : 

Office of the Chief of Engineees, 

Washington, November 24, 1941. 
Subject : Conduct of Work imder Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contracts. 
To. Division and District Engineers : 

1. When work is to be done under a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract, the Govern- 
ment exercises great care to select a contractor of outstanding ability and ex- 
perience and pays him a fee for the use of his organization. It is expected that 
the contractor will be allowed to exercise the organizing and directive ability 
which he demonstrated prior to his selection by the War Dedaptrment. It is also 
to be understood that the contractor has a vital interest in the preservation of 
his reputation for performing work in a skillful and economical manner. If 
the Government forces assume any of the functions of the contractor in directing 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 191 

the work, in procurement, and in planning operations, the United States will 
not only be paying for services which are not fully rendered, but there will bq 
an increase in Government costs due to duplication of functions. 

2. It is realized that the many checks and approvals required when Govern- 
ment funds are being expended under cost-plus- [24^ a-fixed-fee contracts 
tend to make Contracting Officers and Project Engineers assume responsibilities 
with regard to the conduct of work which they would not think of doing under 
a competitive bid form of contract. This tendency must be guarded against. 
The Government's representative must, of course, prevent the waste or improper 
use of funds, see to it that the contractor maintains required progress, and that 
he builds according to the plans and specifications. However, it is believed 
these functions can be exercised without infringing upon the proper responsibili- 
ties of the contractor. 

3. It is directed that in the future each cost-plus^a-fixed fee contractor submit 
to the District Engineer on the tenth and twenty-fifth day of each month a brief 
report setting forth his views as to progress being made, difficulties encountered, 
anticipated difficulties, and recommendations for improving conduct of the work. 
This report will be submitted through the Project Engineer who will, by indorse- 
ment thereon, make such comments as are pertinent and then forward it within 
twenty-four hours to the District Engineer. The District Engineer will, without 
delay, forward thei report to this office through the Division Engineer. It is ex- 
pected that in this manner the contractor will be enabled to express his opinions 
freely on matters which affect his work and a record of the conduct of the work 
will be secured for future reference. Contractors will be encouraged to render 
frank reports and every effort will be made to insure that this system of reports 
does not develop into a useless routine. 

Thomas M. Robins, 
/S/ Thomas M. Robins, 

Brigadier General, 
Assistant to the Chief of Engineers. 
41/2733. 

Chester R. Clarke, owner and operator of the Clarke-Halawa Rock 
Co., testified that in April 1941 he and other local contractors were 
low bidders by several hundred thousand dollars on a proposal to 
construct airfields on the Islands of Hawaii, Mauai, and Molakai. 
But the Hawaiian Constructors nevertheless were given the jobs. 
They did not start or complete the work within the specified time 
limit. For this reason, the airfields were not completed by 7 De- 
cember 1941, but would have been completed had the local contractors 
been given the contract. His firm had had considerable experience in 
this type of work. He attempted without success to get work on 
Bellows Field but this also was given to the Hawaiian Constructors. 
He had observed {£5] that the work of the Hawaiian Construc- 
tors lagged badly and that Rohl, on account of his condition, was not 
capable of speeding up the work. Efforts of this contractor to do 
some of this work was unavailing. (R., v. 30, p. 3623 et seq.) 

He also testified that Rohl used a technique of getting people en- 
meshed in his wrong-doings and thus made them subservient to his 
desires. (R v 30, p 3634.) 

The Hawaiian Constructors were inefficient but Col. "Wyman failed 
to prod them into an adequate performance or to terminate the con- 
tract. Col. Wyman, in face of all the evidence, even claimed before 
the Board that the Hawaiian Constructors were not negligent. (R v 
29, p 3425.) 

Col. Wyman permitted the Hawaiian Constructors to continue in 
performance of the contract although Rohl, its directing head, who 
was in charge since about September 1941, was frequently drunk. This 
condition seriously delayed the work and reflected the unstable statQ 



192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of affairs which permeated the whole organization of the Hawaiian 
Constructors. Kohl's drunkenness and general inattention to duties 
became such a sore subject with the Army and the other members of 
the joint venture that finally he was ordered home in June 1942. 

It is significant that before Rohl went to the Hawaiian Islands on 
this work he asked the Division Engineer, Brigadier General Warren 
T. Hannum, to assist him in getting transportation. General Hanmim 
testified (R. v 18, p 2080) : 

I didn't like his appearance at the time. 
Major CT.AUSEN. What was v^rong with it? 
General Hannum. Well, he didn't appear to be absolutely sober. 
Major Clausen. And what did you do about it? 

[26] General Hannum. I assumed that he, had been out to the club, or some- 
u^here, and has just come in to see me, and that it was just a temporary matter. 
Major Clausen. What did you do about it. Sir? 
General Hannum. I did nothing further about it. 

An officer testified that while assigned to G-2, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, he conducted an investigation as a result of which he reached 
the conclusion that Rohl was such a drunkard he was even incompetent 
to be a subversive influence. (R, v 32. p 3925) . 

Mr Arthur T. Short, manager of the Pleasanton Hotel stated that 
Col. Wyman and Rohl were always together and had quarters in the 
hotel. Speaking of these quarters he said "they had more parties up 
there, dancing and drunks." (R, v 30, p 3648.) 

Miss Helen Schlesinger, a civilian girl employee of the United States 
Engineering Department, testified concerning the drunkenness of 
Rohl and that she observed his drunken condition on one occasion espe- 
cially when she responded to a call from Col. Bernard C. Robinson, 
C. E., to come down to the Pleasanton Hotel at about 9 p. m. to get out 
some contract documents. (R, v 28, p 3287 et seq.) 

Mr. Dillingham, previously referred to as a stock holder in the 
Hawaiian Contracting Co. which became a member of the Hawaiian 
Constructors, testified that he didn't like Rohl and had suspicions as 
to his sobriety. (R, v 24, p 2761.) 

Mr. King testified that Rohl was a play boy, was "playing pretty 
hard" * * * "he just wasn't paying very much attention to busi- 
ness, I know that" and that he never saw him when Rohl wasn't more 
or less drunk. (R, v 23, p 2525, 2526.) He testified further that Rohl 
originally was Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Hawaiian 
Constructors and that his supervision [^7] was generally inef- 
fective because of his use of liquor. (R, v 23, p 2544.) He stated, 
concerning Rohl that "insofar as the work was concerned, rather than 
his being of value, he was more of a detriment." (R, v 23, p 2534.) 
He pointed out that in addition to drinking so hard, Rohl would inter- 
fere with the work. For example, Rohl would commit higher author- 
ity in the military to actions without going through channels. (R, 
V 23, p 2555.) 

Mr. Ray B. Wickiser also testified to the general interference and 
disruption which Rohl caused with the work. (R, v 22, p 2476.) 

Col. Row testified that Rohl evaded attempts to obtain statements 
from him concerning his derelictions. (R, v 19, p 2107.) 

Col. Wyman favored the inefficient Hawaiian Constructors to the 
exclusion of the more competent local contractors in subcontracting 
work. Reference is made to the previously cited testimony. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 193 

Col. Wymaii shoved through government purchases of equipment 
from the Hawaiian Contracting Co. and the Rohl-Connolly Co. at 
excessive prices and without proper regard for the interests of the 
Government. For the details reference is made to excerpts from the 
report of Col. John A. Hunt, IGD, which are hereafter set forth, and 
to testimony before the Board. (R, v. 31, p 3775 et seq; R, v 19, p 
2134 ; et seq ; R, v 7, p 745 ; R, v 33, p 3996 et seq, R, v 30, p 3588, et seq ; 
v32,p3803etseq.) 

Despite these conditions and delays by the contractors the Board 
was advised by the present District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H. (1st 
Ind., 10Aug44): 

There is no record in this oflSce of any formal com- [28] plaints regis- 
tered by the Government concerning delays of the contractor during 1941. 

Mr. Clarke testified that Rohl "did not seem particularly inclined to 
push the work here" * * ^ "jje made Hawaii one round of good 
times for Mr. Rohl. There isn't any doubt of that." 

Mr. King who had been acquainted with Col. Wymaii's activities in 
Los Angeles testified : 

Major Clausen. The General has brought out that point. Did you know prior 
to Pear] Harbor, from hearsay and general knowledge, anything concerning 
Colonel Wyman? 

Mr. King. Yes, I did. 

Major Clausen. And what was that concerning his proclivities for playboying 
or drinking? 

Mr. King. Well, the general impression around Los Angeles where Colonel 
Wyman was stationed was that he was pretty much of a playboy too. 

Major Clausen. And what about his drinking? 

Mr. King. Well, that was generally understood, that he was a pretty hard 
drinker. (R, v 23, p 2526, 2527.) 

Reference is also made to the previously mentioned testimony con- 
cerning the activities and excess drinking of Col. Wyman at Los 
Angeles. 

Col. Wyman failed to inform higher authority of the delays and 
deficiencies of the contractors. (R. v 6, p 589, 600, 602, 618, 655.) 

Attention is invited to po.ssible effects of these delays and defi- 
ciencies of the contractors. Exhibit No. 5 in evidence indicates gen- 
erally the state of completion of certain of the more vital defense 
projects as of 7 Dec 41. (R, v 7, p 789.) In! addition to a lack of 
facilities for the AWS permanent stations, the ammunition storage 
magazines, the fire control station and the underground gasoline 
storage tanks, there was a dearth of [29] airfields on the 
Island of Oahu and the adjoining islands. Since this subject is one 
of primary importance, and in order that no unwarranted conclu- 
sions may be reached, the following quotations from the testimony 
are set forth: 

Major General Roger B. Colton, Chief of the Engineering and 
Technical Service, Signal Corps, testified: 

General Frank. Can you tell us what were the number and location of the 
permanent aircraft warning stations contemplated for the Hawaiian Is^lands to 
complete a phase of Contract No. W-414-Eng-602? 

General Colton. The number and location of permanent aircraft warning 
stations originally contemplated for the Hawaiian Islands were three 271 and 
271-A fixed stations and five SCR-270 mobile stations. The three fixed stations 
271 and 271-A were planned to be located at Kaala, Kokee, and Haleakala. 
Three of the five mobile stations were planned to be located at Nuuana Pali, 
Manawahua, and Mauna Loa. The other two mobile stations were designated as 



194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

roving stations. There is no record of the Corps of Engineers' contract W-414- 
Engineering-602 in the files of the Chief Signal Officer, and I have no familiarity 
with it. (R. V. 6, p. 671, 672.) 

General Frank. What equipment was to be furnished by the Signal Corps? 

General Colton. The equipment to be furnished by the Signal Corps was 
three fixed stations 271 delivered complete with shelter, except for the concrete 
foundation of the shelter, and also five mobile radar stations 270 to be de- 
livered complete and ready for operation. (R. V. 6, p. 672. ) 

General Frank. How did such priority compare with similar equipment fur- 
nished at about the same time to installations in the Philippines and Panama? 

General Colton. Under the priority furnished by the War Department under 
date of March 10, as I have already stated, Hawaii was scheduled to get the 
third, fourth, and fifth sets; Panama was scheduled to get the first and second 
Bets. (R. V. 6, p. 675.) 

General Frank. When was the Hawaiian radar equipment actually delivered 
to the quartermaster for shipment? 

General Colton. The Hawaiian I'adar equipment was delivered as follows, 
to the Quartermaster, for shipment : All components of one 271-A were turned 
over by the Signal Corps to the Quartermaster Corps for shipment by 26 May 
1941. All components of two SCR-271s were turned over to [30] the 
Quartermaster Corps for shipment by 26 June 1941. Foundation plans were 
furnished in advance of the above dates. 

The five mobile stations, SCR-270, were delivered to the Quartermaster Corps 
for shipment on 22 July 1941, together with one additional mobile station, which 
had in the meantime been authorized by the War Department for the Hawaiian 
Department. I would like to say in this connection it should be noted that 
three additional fixed stations for Hawaii were authorized by the War Depart- 
ment 28 May 1941, for inclusion by the Chief Signal Officer, in a supplemental 
estimate for fiscal year 1942. (R., v. 6, p. 675, 676.) 

General Frank. Now, when these were delivered, you say they included "all 
components." Does that mean that that included the towers? 

General Colton. Yes, sir; that included the towers. 

General Frank. Did it include the generator sets? 

General Colton. It included generator sets. 

General Frank. What about extra tubes? 

General Colton. It included the eftra tubes. Of course, they were not con- 
templated. It was not contemplated that tubes were to be furnished for the 
entire life, but SDare tubes were furnished. (R., v. 6, d. 676. 677.) 

General Frank. Was the equipment i-eady for installation when delivered? 

General Colton. The equipment was ready for installation when delivered. 
May I go back a moment. General? You asked me only about the fixed stations, 
previously? You haven't asked me as to the readiness of the mobile station. 

General Frank. Will you state as to the readiness? 

General Colton. The previous testimony related to the fixed stations. The 
mobile stations were delivered complete and ready for operation. (R., v. 6, 
p. 677.) 

General Frank. And you have already testified that three fixed sets were 
turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment, one in May and two in June 
of 1941, and five mobile sets were turned over to the Quartermaster for ship- 
ment the 22nd of July 1941 ; is that correct? Six. That is right? 

General Colton. Yes, sir; except that one additional mobile station was also 
turned over on the 22nd of July, making the total of six. (R., v. 6, p. 681.) 

General Frank. No. 

[81] When was the equipment for the information center furnished? 

General Colton. There was no standardized filteo* or information center 
arranged for equipment. Such equipment was furnished on requisition against 
project funds. 

I want to change the emphasis of that statement. I say, such equipment 
was furnished on requisition against project funds. I mean to say that thai 
was the plan set up for it, that it was intended to be requisitioned by the local 
authorities against project funds. 

In this connection, however, I would like to make reference to a document 
that I have here which indicates that information centers were in operation 
prior to the 14th of November, 1941. 

General Frank. Therefore they were equipped with the necessary equipment 
and in operation in November 1941? 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 195 

General Colton. Yes, sir ; and I may say that I have at one time or another 
seen pictures of the installation, but I have no information as to exact dates. 
(R., V. 6, p. 686, 687.) 

The following testimony was given by Col. C. A. Powell, Signal 
Officer of the Hawaiian Department during the fall of 1941 : 

General Frank. On December 7, what was the situation with respect to the 
installation of the information center? 

Colonel PowEix. The installation of the infonnation center was by means of 
a temporary structure which I had built with my own soldiers in what we 
now call the "Signal Corps Area." It was a temporary structure, and it was 
operative. 

General Fbank. Had they had exercises prior to December 7? 

Colonel PowEXL. They had, sir. 

General Fraj^k. And it had operated successfully? 

Colonel Frank. Yes, sir. 

General Frank. And what was the situation with respect to the permanent 
radar sets? Had they arrived in the island? 

Colonel Powell. They had, sir. 

General Frank. When had they arrived, please? 

Colonel Powell. Two radar SCR-271s — that is the [32] temporary 
set — were received the 3d of June, and one SCR-271-A, which has the higher 
tower, was received also the 3d of June. 

General Frank. Were they complete? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir ; they were not complete. I have a prepared memo- 
randum here which I would like to introduce, which I think would give you a 
picture. 

General Frank. Will you state the date on which all equipment was here 
and complete so that they could be erected? 

General Russell. You mean these three? 

General Frank. Yes. 

Colonel Powell. I do not have that information available, when the things 
were received, except I consider that when you say "complete" that means 
everything, including the conduit and the fittings and everything else. 

General Frank. Well, so that they could operate ; that is what I mean. 

Colonel Powell. Oh, I see. Well, to the best of my knowledge and belief, 
I think that they could have been operated in November of that year. 

General Frank. Was installation of the permanent sets held up? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, sir. 

General Frank. What were the reasons? 

Colonel Powell. The reasons were that the engineers were unable to com- 
plete the sites for these permanent installations. 

General Frank. Why were they unable to complete the sites, do you know? 

Colonel Powell. I do not know, sir. (R., v. 32, p. 3885, 3886, 3887.) 

General Frank. You had equipment for how many sites? 

Colonel Powell. We had equipment for permanent stations. Now, wait a 
minute — there were only three permanent stations. General Frank. (R., v. 32, 
p. 3887.) 

General Frank. All right. Was there any delay in furnishing the Corps of 
Engineers with drawings for the preparation of these sites — any "delay on the 
part of the Signal Corps? 

Colonel Powell. Not by my office. 

[33] General Frank. Well, was there any? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir. 

General Frank. Did you get the drawings from the Washington office of the 
Signal Corps? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, sir. We gave them all the information that they asked 
for. (R., V. 32, p. 3892.) 

General Frank. Was there any delay in the building of the roads to the 
sites ? 

Colonel Powell. That is what held us up. 

General Frank. That is what held you up? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, sir. 

General Frank. Who was responsible for building those roads? 

Colonel Powell. The Corps of Engineers. (R., v. 32, p. 3892, 3893.) 



196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Major Clausen. Sir, you referred to Kaala, Kokee, and Haleakala as being 
the sites for the permanent sets, is that correct? 

Colonel Powell. That is correct. 

Major Clausen. Wlien were those sites originally selected? 

Colonel Powell. That was approved by the "War Department on the fourth 
endorsement,' June 27, 1940. (R., v. 32, p. 3895.) 

Major Clausen. You know, therefore, that as of that date, the engineers were 
also advised that those were prospective sites? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, sir. (R., v. 32, p. 3895.) 

Major Clausen. I have a letter referring to your permanent sites dated No- 
vember 14th, 1941, to Colonel Colton, Chief, Materiel Branch, from yourself. 
Department Signal Office, then Lieutenant Colonel, Signal Corps, reading : 

(Memorandum for Colonel Colton, Chief, Material Branch, from C. A. Powell, 
Lt. Col. Signal Corps, Department Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, No- 
vember 14, 1941, is as follows :) 

"In recent exercises held in the Hawaiian Department, the operation of the 
radio set SCR-270 was found to be very satisfactory. This exercise was started 
[341 approximately 4 : 30 in the morning and with three radio sets in opera- 
tion. We noted when the planes took off from the airplane carrier in the 
oscilloscope. We determined this distance to be approximately 80 miles, due to 
the fact that the planes would circle around waiting the assemblage of the 
remainder from the carrier. 

"As soon as the planes were assembled, they proceeded towards Hawaii. This 
was very easily determined and within six minutes, the pursuit aircraft wei'e 
notified and they took off and intercepted the incoming bombers at approximately 
30 miles from Pearl Harbor. 

"It was a very interesting exercise. All the general oflScers present were 
highly pleased with the proceedings of the radio direction finding sets and the 
personnel associated with the information centers. 

"We have had very little trouble with the operation of these sets. When the 
fixed stations are installed in the higher mountains surrounding Hawaii, we 
expect to have as good an air warning system available for use as is now operat- 
ing for the British on their tight little island, as their situation is approximately 
the same as ours is on Hawaii." 

Do you recall that, sir? 

Colonel PowEJX. No, sir. 

Major Clausen.. Just to shorten our proceedings here, I am going to ask you 
the general question whether or not the facts you set forth in this letter are 
TOrrect? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, sir. (R., v. 32, p. 3896, 3897.) 

General Frank. Do yoii consider that there were any avoidable delays in 
the construction of the aircraft warning service system by the Engineers or by 
the contractors? 

Colonel Powell. I thought that they should have given the air warning a higher 
priority than they did, to get our work done. They were working on the air- 
fields, and we had to take our priority behind the airfields. (R., v. 32, p. 3901.) 

General Frank. Was this place on the priority list that the aircraft warning 
service held called to General Short's attention? 

Colonel Powell. I am sure it was, because he decided on it. I am sure he 
decided the priority. (R., v. 32. p. 3901.) 

Major Clausen. It is just a question of putting up a tower? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, the higher tower you can get the greater distance you 
obtain, due to the curvature of the earth. That is solely due to the curvature of 
the earth. That is solely due to the curvature of the earth at a low altitude. 

Major Clausen. Getting back a moment to my question, as to whether the 
Japanese planes actually did all come in [35] very low along the water, 
I show you a graph of a plat of the Opana Station, and ask you whether you 
have seen that before? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, I have seen that. 

Major Clausen. That indicates that the planes were actually picked up by 
the Opana mobile station at what range, what distance. That is exhibit No. 15 
In evidence. 

Colonel Powell. Well, I cannot figure that from this, but, as I recall it, it was 
around 80 miles. 

Major Clausein. At least SO miles? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 197 

Major Clausen. That indicates to you, therefore, what, with respect to the 
height of the attacliing Japanese planes that came in that morning? 

Colonel Powell. It would indicate they were at least 500 feet in the air. (K., 
V. 32, p. 3903. ) 

Major Clausen. Now, you said something about the fact that the mobile sets 
were subject to a conservation of instruments. Is it not true also that the mobile 
sets were powered not by commercial power but by auxiliary power or gasoline 
motors, is that correct. 

Colonel Powell. That is true. (R., v. 32, p. 3904.) 

General Gbunert. Then there is no reason why there was any delay on the part 
of the Engineers concerning the height of the towers on your permanent stations? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir. I do not see any excuse for it. (R., v. 32, p. 3905.) 

As of the date of the basic contract, 20 December 1940, the War 
Department had authorized the construction of three permanent AWS 
stations at Mt. Kaala on Oahu, Mt. Haleakala on Maui and Mt. Kokee 
on Kauai, seven mobile stations and an information center at Fort 
Shafter. (Letter from Chief of Engineers, 13 August 1944.) 

Brig. Gen. James A. ]\Iollison, AC, gave the following testimony : 

General Russell. Suppose that you people had had ample warning of the 
approach of these hostile aircraft but there had been no interference with their 
take-off from the points from which they did depart : did you have any defensive 
means to have repelled the attack of dive bombers [36 \ on the naval 
craft, naval ships? 

General Mollison. Oh, I think we could have done a lot of damage to them. 
I think that we could have kept almost all of those slow-moving torpedo bombers 
out. Those things were just like shooting fish ; they were going along at, I 
should say, a hundred and ten miles an hour. They didn't look to me as though 
they were a bit faster than that. The dive bombers were faster. They were 
probably 160 to 170. And the zero, the little fighter, was a good fast airplane. 

General Russell. What type of aircraft produced the great damage to our 
naval ships? 

General Mollison. The torpedo bomber was the one that caused the most dam- 
age to the largest number of ships. The most positive damage that was done 
was done by high-altitude horizontal bombing on the battleship Arizona. They 
just happened to get some lucky hits down the stack of the Arizona, and she 
went up. 

General Russeix. Those were the people who were 10,000 feet up. 

General Mollison. They were, I should say, between eight and ten thousand 
feet. All of our antiaircraft was hitting way below and behind these planes. 

General Russell. The question the General has stated is that if ample warn- 
ing of the attack had been given the effect of the attack could have been greatly 
minimized, if not completely eliminated. 

General Mollison. I think there is no doubt about that. If we could have put 
50 fighters in the air that morning — and we could have if we had had ample 
warning — I do not think we could have done a thing against them offensively as 
far as their carriers were concerned ; we did not have the type of aircraft with 
which to do it. But we could certainly have raised cain with their formations 
that came in if we had 50 fighters in the air. 

General Russexl. And you had more than 50 fighters available? 

General Mollison. We had 105; 103 P-40s and we had something like 22 
P-36s, but strangely enough that P-36 would not have been any good at all, 
but the chap in the P-36 did shoot down one plane. We had about 14 fighters 
in the air that morning, total. (R., v. 7, p. 829, 830.) 

General Frank. You said that under normal conditions you had a certain num- 
ber of the planes in each squadron, or certain squadrons that were designated as 
alert squadrons? 

General Mollison. That would not be under normal ; [37] that was 
under alert condition, I should have said, General ; under conditions of alert. 

General Gbunert. But not under conditions of Alert 1? 

General Mollison. Yes, sir. 

General Grunert. Sabotage? 

General Mollison. Yes, sir. There were alert squadrons, alert crews. 

General Frank. How long did it take you to get those planes off the ground in 
case of emergency? 



198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Moliison. They were supposed to be ready to go in thirty minutes, 
General. You see, that is Alert A or condition of Readiness A. 

General Frank. Where did the crews sleep? 

General Moluson. The crews slept in tents or hutments immediately adjacent 
to the planes when the bombers were in dispersed position. When they were on 
the line they slept in the operations rooms and hangars. 

General Frank. Is that where the pilots also slept? 

General Mollison. Yes, sir. 

General Frank. So there were certain pilots and crews sleeping on the line? 

General Motxison. Yes, sir. May I add that that could not help matters at all 
that morning during the attack because these things were on everybody before 
there was a possibility of doing anything about it ; they were just going down 
the line. 

General Russell. The 4-minute alert would not have helped you, would it, 
General? 

General Moixison. A 5-second alert would not have helped, because if they are 
on top of you you can't take a plane off without being shot down if you have got 
a bunch of Zeros sitting up there waiting for you to take off. 

General Grunert. Then, the only effect, as far as I can gather frorh your testi- 
mony, is that the difference between Alerts Nos. 1 and 2 as to protection against 
what happened, would have been a certain amount of dispersion? 

General Moli.ison. That is all. It would not have helped a bit, unless you had 
warning of from 30 minutes to two hours before these people are going to attack 
you, because when they are sitting up there looking down your throat you can't 
take an airplane off the gr<iund. • 

[38] General Grtjnekt. Then, your only source of warning would have 
been the air warning service or information from the Navy ; is that correct? 

General Moixison. Yes, sir, that is true. (R., v. 7, p 821, 822, 823.) 

Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, AC, testified : 

General Fkajjk. Now, had you been alerted so that your fighters could have 
taken the air, to what extent do you estimate 80 fighters could have interfered 
\\ith the attack? 

General Martin. Well, they could have done considerable damage. They could 
not have prevented it. It would have been impossible to have prevented it, but 
they could have reduced its effectiveness quite materially. 

General Frank. How many Jap planes actually were shot down over Oahu? 

General Martin. I do not know. The Air Forces shot down about 10. The anti- 
aircraft shot down others. As J remember, it was possibly 29 or 30. There is a 
record of that. 

General Frank. Yes, I know. 

General Martin. I do not remember exactly. I think it was about 29 or 30. But 
in my opinion, seeing a large number of those ships leaving the area with gasoline 
streaming out behind them, they never made the carriers, and that was true in 
many cases that I saw where there would be a white plume of gas — why it didn't 
catch fire I never new — leaving the tanks of the the airplanes that were making 
for the sea. (R.. v. 17, p. 1901.) 

General Russelt.. General Fi:ank asked you some questions a moment ago, Gen- 
eral, about what could have been accomplished by 80 fighters on December 7th. 
I want to ask you : Did you have 80 fighters available on December 7th before the 
Japanese came in and destroyed a great part of your force? 

General Makttn. Now. let me see. We had approximately 100 P^Os. 

General Russell. And they are fighters? 

General Martin. Yes, they are fighters. We had approximately 50 P-86s. 

General Russell. And they are fighters? 

General Martin. They are fighters. At least half of those were always on the 
ground, on account of lacking spare parts, so I reduced it to 75. Out of the 75 
there [39] is always probably ten or fifteen per cent that would be out of 
commission from day to day. They would be in today and out tomorrow. So it 
is something less than 75 that would be the maximum that could have been put in 
the air on that day. (R., v. 17, p. 1909, 1910.) 

Rear Admiral Husband E, Kimmel, testified : 

General Russell. Admiral, I have had some curiosity about what was done 
with your radar as far as the ships in the harbor were concerned. 



LEPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 199 

Admiral Kimmex. I have been informed by experts, and knew at the time, that 
the radar on ships in port was virtually useless on account of the surrounding 
hills, and the towers and buildings in the Navy Yai'd ; and we never made any 
attempt to use it, but depended entirely on the shore for radar information. Fur- 
thermore, radar properly mounted on shore, and high up, has much longer range 
than anything we could get, because one of the elements in the range of the radar 
is the height above the sea at which it is mounted. (R., v. 17, p. 1809.) 

General Grunert. Let us go forward with the intercepting command ; and we 
included as one of its functions the Air Warning Service. I want to find out from 
you just what you knew about that in the latter part of November and early in 
December, and what you thought of it as to its status and its ability to operate. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, at the time, I thought the aircraft warning service of 
the Army was probably somewhat better than it later proved to be. I knew that 
in the drills that we had conducted they had been quite successful in following 
the planes, and I recall that General Short, on one occasion, told me that he 
thought he could give us a coverage up to 150 miles and probably to 200 miles. 
This was just conversation, I didn't inquire ±oo closely into it, because that was 
quite satisfactory to me ; and if he could do that, that was, I thought, doing pretty 
well. 

I knew that they were standing watches in the aircraft warning center to the 
limit of their personnel and equipment ; and I knew that, even though I think now 
I had somewhat overestimated the capacity of it, I knew it was far from perfect 
and far from a finished product : but it was all we had, and I believed they were 
doing the very best they could with it. 

General Grunert. Did you know they were "standing watch," as you call it, 
only from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m., and that that was only for practice nurposes? 

Admiral Kimmel. In detail, I didn't know just the hours that they were stand- 
ing watch. The aircraft warning service was manned during most of the day. I 
had been informed of that. (R., v. 16, p. 1789. 1790.) 

l-'/O] General Russell. If the success of such an attack was assured and 
the Japanese seemed to have known everything about the situation out there, 
why would they not have made an attack which had to be successful? 

Admiral Kimjiel. Well, of course there are two or three answers to that. 
One is that the Japanese Air Force, I think, without question, was much more 
efficient than we had believed it to be. The attack was a well-planned and 
well executed attack. Another phase is that the greatest damage done there 
was done by aircraft torpedoes. We believed prior to the 7th of December 
that they could not launch an aerial torpedo in Pearl Harbor. We thought 
that the water was not deep enough. Our air service had not been able to do 
it; and we had received official information from the Navy Department which 
convinced us that it could not be done. We were wrong. The major part of 
the damage was done by such torpedoes. 

So far as reconnaissance is concerned, we had plans for reconnaissance and 
could run reconnaissance of a sort, but in our estimate which had been sub- 
mitted to Washington, and which was on file in both the War and Navy De- 
partments, it was clearly stated that we had to know the time of the attack, 
within rather narrow limits, in order to have anything like an effective search, 
because we could not maintain a search except for a very few days. Then of 
course we were hoping to get more planes all the time, and we had been promised 
additional planes, patrol planes, and additional Army bombers, all of which were 
necessary for the defense of Oahu. (R., v. 16, p. 1805, 1806.) 

General Gkuneet. Knowing what you did about radar and the information 
center, did you feel that, on December 7, that had let you down? 

Admiral Kimmel. Of course, I knew nothing about the receipt of any informa- 
tion at all in the Army radar, until the Tuesday, I think it was, following the 
attack : and when I found out that they had known where these planes came 
from and located within rather narrow limits the attacking forces — yes, I felt 
let down, because that was the information we wanted above everything else. 
T have been informed that the Navy, Admiral Bellinger, and Captain Logan 
Ramsey, called the Army information center several times each, during this 
attack of December 7, and asked them if they had been able to locate the direc- 
tion from which these planes had come, and to which they returned ; and each 
time they were informed they couldn't get anything. 

Then, when this information was reconstructed two days later, we felt that 
it was unfortunate that we had not had that information available. (R., v. 16, 
p. 1791, 1792.) 



200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Col. Lorry N. Tindal, AC, testified : 

Major Clausen. If the higher stations had been [41 ] completed, do you 
know if the direction of these returning planes could have been ascertained more 
accurately? 

Colonel Tindal. Yes. 

Major Clausen. And is it a fact they could have been obtained more quickly? 

Colonel Tindal. Yes, in my opinion. (R., v. 40, p. 4493, 4494.) 

Col. Robert J. Fleming, CE, testified regarding the lack of airfields : 

At thei beginning of the war there was only one airfield in the entire Hawaiian 
Department from which a bombardment plane could operate. That was also true 
on the day of December 7th. There was only one runway in the entire Depart- 
ment from which a B-17 could take off, and that was at Hickam Field. On the 
afternoon of Thursday, following December 7, whatever date that may be, they 
had a 5,000-foot runway at Bellows Field, on a field which was never authorized 
or approved by the War Department. (R., v. 11, p. 1331.) 

Gen. Martin gave this testimony concerning this condition : 

General Russell. Well, did any arrive? 

General Martin. On the morning of December 7th we had nothing but our 
12 B-17's coming from the mainland. Those ships arrived during the time the 
attack was taking place. We warned them in the open, because that is the only 
way we could warn them, to remain in the air as long as possible; that we had 
no airdromes at other islands that would accommodate them as yet. They were 
only partially completed. Four of the eight were lost from the attack of the 
Japanese. Eight were made available to the Air Force afterwards. Some were 
damaged in landing. One landed at a golf course. One landed at Bellows Field 
with the prevailing wind, on a very short runway. The new runway was not yet 
completed there and it was badly crashed. (R., v. 17, p. 1S96). 

Mr. Chester R. Clarke testified concerning the state of completion 
of the defense projects as of the time of the attack : 

Mr. Clarke. I would say a very pitiful condition that that should occur when 
it did, because I frankly believe that had local contractors and mainland con- 
tractors like Mr. McClure and Mr. McKee and some of the others had this work, 
we would not have been in such a condition as we were whep the .Japanese 
attacked Pearl Harbor. We were certainly far less progressed in our work than 
we should have been. (R., v. 30, p. 3636.) 

[42] Mr. George F. Bartlett of the United States Engineering Department, 
stated : 

General Frank. Which of those pi*ojects, in your opinion, should have been 
finished prior to Pearl Harbor? 

Mr. Bartlett. The radio transmitter station (AWS) on Kokee should have been 
finished. 

General Frank. That is up on Kauai? 

Mr. Bartlett. Kauai, yes, sir. And the radio transmitter (AWS) tunnel 
should have been finished. 

General Frank. On Kauai? 

Mr. Bartlet'J'. No. 

General Frank. At Shafter? 

Mr. Bartlett. At Shafter. (R., v. 22, p. 2502.) 

This witness further testified ; 

General Grunert. What do you know about that particular situation? 

Mr. Bartlett. Well, I finished the job over there. That is where they sent 
me on the second of December. I went over there as area engineer to speed 
up the Barking Sand Airport, and the Kokee radar station. 

General Grunert. You went over there on the 2nd of December? 

Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir. 

General Grunert. What did you find when you got over there? 

Mr. Bartlett. Well, I foimd the Hawaiian Constructors there with three super- 
visory personnel. They hadn't the tower up. The material had been there for 
some time. 

General Frank. How long, about? 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 201 

Ml*. Bartlett. Oh, it had been there for — it was a matter of weeks. I couldn't 
recall now just how long; but we had it up; in five days, that tower was up. 
(R., V. 22, p. 2510, 2511.) 

k. Conduct of certain witnesses hefore the Board. — Col. Wyman, 
at the request of the Board, appeared at Honolulu for the hearings. 
He was accompanied by counsel made [4^] available to him 
by the War Department, namely, Brig. Gen. John S. Bragdon, 
Office of the Chief of Engineers, and Maj. Boiling R. Powell, Jr., 
GSC, Legislative and Liaison Division, Major Lue Lozier, JAGD, 
who had studied the case while assigned to the Office of the Chief 
of Engineers, was also made available at Hawaii for their assistance. 
Col. Wyman was afforded an opportunity to present to the Board 
whatever evidence he desired. He gave testimony on various 
matters set forth in the Report of the House Military Affairs Com- 
mittee. Gen. Bragdon also testified as to his research. (R., v. 26, 
p. 2894,2923; V. 23, p. 3831.) 

Col. Wyman testified that he was first advised in June 1941 that 
Kohl was an alien. (R., v. 29, p 3503, 3534, 3552, 3579.) The falsity 
of this statement is apparent from the testimony and exhibits previ- 
ously mentioned A similar false statement was made by Col. Wyman 
to the Inspector General. (P. 68, 601, Report of Col. Hunt.) 

Col. Wyman testified that Paul Grafe was the source of his informa- 
tion that Rohl was an alien. (R., v. 29, p. 3504, 3534, 3551, 3552.) 
The falsity of this statement is observed from reading the testimony 
and exhibits previously referred to. A similar false statement in this 
respect was also made to the Inspector General. (P. 68, 601, Report 
of Col. Hunt.) 

Col. Wyman testified that he did not help Rohl get naturalized. 
(R., V. 29, p. 3506, 3507, 3530.) The falsity of this statement is readily 
shown. For example. Col. Wyman sent Rohl the letter dated 22 Jan- 
uary 1941 which was used by Rohl's lawyers (Martin at Los Angeles 
and Galloway at Washington) for the purpose of having Rohl's natu- 
ralization petition favorably con- [4^] sidered, treated as spe- 
cial, and pushed through. 

In this regard attention is invited to the startling history and 
details of Rohl's naturalization. He applied at Los Angeles, Cali- 
fornia, on February 3, 1941, for permission to file a petition for natu- 
ralization. On 10 March 1941 he filed the petition. Rohl testified at 
the preliminary examination that his marriage to his then wife was 
his second and that he was first married in 1914 to a Marian Henderson 
by whom he had four children. He also testified that this marriage 
was dissolved by a divorce in 1924. Later, on 11 March 1941, he con- 
fessed that this testimony was false. Investigations which followed 
the filing of the petition disclosed the previously mentioned violations 
of immigration laws. Consequently, on 27 May 1941, the Inspector in 
Charge at Los Angeles submitted to the Central Office a formal appli- 
cation for a warrant of arrest of Rohl on the ground that he was in 
the United States in violation of the Immigration Law of 1924. The 
Central Office did not concur in this request because the three year 
period of limitations had expired. The files of the Bureau of Immi- 
gration and Naturalization and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
indicate that the letter dated 22 January 1941 from Col. Wyman to 
Rohl was only one of several communications by Col. Wyman to have 



202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Rohrs petition favorably considered. (R., v. 22, p. 2427; v. 33, p. 
3972 et seq; v. 34, p. 4015; v. 35, p. 4103 et seq; v. 36, p. 4186, v. 37, 
p. 4338, 4366.) 

The letter reads as follows : 

145] Via Clipper 

War Department, 
United States Engineesi Office, 
Honolulu, T. H., January 22, 1941. 
Address reply to District Engineer, 
U. S. Engineer Office, P. O. Box 2240, Honolulu, T. H. 
Refer to File No. 
Contract No. W-414-eng-602 

Mr. H. W. RoHL, RoHL-CoNNOLLY Company, 

4351 Alhambra Avenue, Los Angeles, California. 
Dear Sir : Reference is made to Secret Contract No. W— 414-eng-602 with 
tile Hawaiian Constructors for work in the Hawaiian Islands. 

As you are actively interested in this venture, I desire you to proceed to 
Honolulu at your earliest convenience to consult with the District Engineer 
relative to ways and means to accomplish the purpose of the contract. You will 
he allowed transportation either by clipper or steamboat, both ways, and travel 
allowance not to exceed $6.00 per day while en route in accordance with existing 
laws and regulations. 

You will make application to either the District Engineer at Los Angeles or 
the Division Engineer, South Pacific DiTision, San Francisco, for transportation. 
Very truly yours, 

s/s Theodore Wyman, Jr., 
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers, District Engineer. 

In light of the language of this letter it is interesting to observe 
Col. Wyman's testimony to the effect that when the contract was 
signed he did not expect that Rohl would go to Hawaii. (R., v. 29, 
p. 3528). Col. Wyman testified that he received no response from 
Rohl as to the letter but nevertheless did nothing. (R., v. 29, p. 3531) . 
This testimony should be further considered with Col. Wyman's an- 
swer to Gen. Russell [46] that he sent the letter because of 
a fuss which he had with Grafe, although he later stated to General 
Russell that this fuss arose in February, 1941. (R., v. 29, p. 3556). 
Gen. Hannum indicated that Col. Wyman had this row with Grafe 
about May 1941. (R., v. 18, p. 2055). Significantly, also, Gen. 
Hannum who was the superior of Col. Wjmian was never shown a 
copy of the 22 January 1941 letter. (R., v. 18, p. 2057) . 

Attention is invited to this extract of a letter from Rohl's attorney 
David H. Cannon of Los Angeles to the Secretary of Commerce. 

INIajor Clai'sen. In any event, do you know anything about a letter by this 
Mr. Cannon, David H. Cannon, 650 South Spring Street, Los Angeles, California, 
to the Secretary of Commerce, dated August 29, 1941, which states in part as 
follows: (Paragraphs.) 

"Theodore Wyman, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of P^ngineers, War Depart- 
ment, in charge of all the above-mentioned defense work in Hawaii, has requested 
Mr. Rohl and the War Department to have Mr. Rohl give his personal service 
in connection with the emergency defense work in Hawaii, and as early as Jan- 
uary 1941 and at numerous times since that date Colonel Wyman has tendered 
Mr. Rohl transportation via clipper or boat to the Islands and has stated to Mr. 
Rohl over interocean telephone that he will personally obtain special permission, 
because of Mr. Rohl's alien status, to allow Mr. Rohl to work on this secret con- 
tract." (R., V. 20, p. 2229.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 203 

Attention is also invited to the following letter dated 15 August 
1941 which Col. Wyman sent to the Chief of Engineers : 

Via Clipi)er 

War Depabtment, 
United States Engineer O'ffice, 
Honolulu, T. H., August 15, 1941- 
In reply refer to : 
ND 600.114-602 
" 230 
Subject : Request for Final Citizenship Papers of Mr. H. W. Rohl of Rohl-Connolly 

Company, San Francisco and Los Angeles, California. 
To : The Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. 

(Through The Division Engineer, South Pacific Division.) 
[-^7] 1. Mr. Paul Grafe, Attorney-in-Fact for the Hawaiian Constructors, a 
joint venture consisting of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company, Los Angeles, 
California ; Gunther & Shirley Company, Los Angeles, California ; and Mr. Ralph 
E. Woolley, contractor of Honolulu, prosecuting Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contract 
No. W-414-Eng-602, has requested the District Engineer to bring to the attention, 
of the Engineer Department the status of Mr. H. W. Rohl, 2519 Hollywood Boule- 
vard, Los Angeles, California, one of the principal stocliholders of the firm of 
Rohl-Connolly Company. Mr. H. W. Rohl applied to the U. S. District Court at 
Los Angeles, California on January 15, 1941 for his final citizenship papers which, 
it appears, have not been issued to date. 

2. Mr. H. W. Rohl is a very skillful construction supervisor. He has person- 
ally supervised several large construction jobs for the Engineer Department under 
various contracts, also, other agencies of the United States. Some of the out- 
standing work performed by I\Ir. Rohl was the construction of the Los Angeles- 
Long Beach Detached Breakwater, the construction of the Headgate Dam at 
Parker, Arizona for the Indian Service, and miscellaneous dams, tunnels, and 
other heavy construction in the State of California. Mr. Rohl is a man of out- 
standing ability, and of excellent judgment and resourcefulness for the manage- 
ment of diflScult construction work. 

3. Due to the fact that part of the work being performed under Contract No. 
W-414-Eng-602 is of a restricted nature, and because of his alien status, Mr. 
Rohl has been reluctant to take any active part in the supervision or uanagement 
of the work under Contract No. W-414-Eng-602 ; therefore, his valuable services 
have been lost. 

4. While District Engineer at Los Angeles, California, the writer had frequent 
contacts with Mr. Rohl in connection with the Los Angeles-Long Beach Detached 
Breakwater construction and the dredging of the Los Angeles Ilarbor. It is the 
writer's opinion that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question. 

5. In view of the scarcity of qualified supervisory personnel for construction 
work in the Hawaiian Islands, it is the District Engineer's opinion that Mr. Rohl's 
services would prove invaluable in prosecuting the work at hand under the above 
cited contract ; therefore, it is recommended that the Attorney General's attention 
be invited to the case with a request that action on his application for final citizen- 
ship papers be expedited. 

OflSce, Division Engineer 

South Pacific Division Theodore Wyman, Jr., 

Aug 18 '41 9 00 AM Lt. Col, Corps of Engineers. 

San Francisco, California District Engineer. 

Inclosure: Ltr., 8/15/41 fr., Hawn. Constrs. 
cc :— Mr. H. W. Rohl. 

[48] On or about August 28, 1941, in pursuance of requests and 
information from Col. Wyman and Rohl's attorney, the Acting Chief 
of Engineers wrote the following letter to the Bureau of Immigration 
and Naturalization. (R., v. 14, p. 1539 et seq; v. 6, p. 543 et seq.) 



204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

WAR DEPARTMENT, 

Office of the Chief of Engineers, 

Washington, August 28, 19^1. 
Lemuel B. Schofieu), 

Special Assistant, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, 
Office of the Attorney General, Department of Justice, 
Washington, D. C. 
Deae Me. Schofield : The Hawaiian Constructors, a joint venture consisting 
of the W. E. Callahan Construction Co., Los Angeles, Calif. ; Rohl-Connolly Co., 
San Francisco and Los Angeles, Calif. ; Gunther & Shirley Co., Los Angeles, Calif., 
and Ralph E. Woolley, contractor of Honolulu, T. H., are working on very impor- 
tant defense construction at Honolulu, T. H., pursuant to Engineer Corps Con- 
tract No. W-414-Eng-602. 

Mr. H. W. Rohl, 8519 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif., one of the 
principal stockholders of the Rohl-Connolly Co., applied to the United States 
district court at Los Angeles, Calif., on January 15, 1941, for his final citizenship 
papers which have not, as yet, been issued. Mr. Rohl is possessed of outstanding 
ability, excellent judgment, and resourcefulness for the management of difficult 
construction work. Some of the outstanding work performed by Mr. Rohl was the 
construction of the Los Angeles-Long Beach detached breakwater, the construc- 
tion of the Headgate Dam at Parker, Ariz., for the Indian Service, and the miscel- 
laneous dams, tunnels and other heavy construction in the State of California. 
To date, Mr. Rohl's valuable services have not been available for Government 
defense projects because of his alien status. 

The services of Mr. Rohl are of vital importance to the expeditious completion 
of the afore-mentioned defense construction project because of his peculiar quali- 
fications and scarcity of qualified supervisory personnel. It is the imderstanding 
of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question. It is 
therefore requested that the granting of Mr. Rohl's final citizenship papers be 
expedited. 

Your consideration and cooperation will be very much appreciated. 
Very respectfully, 

John J. Kingman, 

Brigadier General, 
Acting Chief of Engineers. 

[-49] Accordingly, the petition of Rohl was specially heard as a 
contested case on 15 September 1941 by the United States District 
Court, Los Angeles, Judge J. F. T. O'Connor presiding. Rohl was 
represented in court by still another attorney, one David H. Cannon 
of Los Angeles. The court granted the petition after a statement of 
facts had been presented by the Bureau of Immigration and Natural- 
ization. This included a representation to the court that "no objection 
will be made to the granting of this petition." The statement also set 
forth that: 

The petitioner is the President of the Rohl-Connolly Contracting Co., located 
at 4351 Valley Blvd., Los Angeles, and has been awarded a secret contract in 
connection with a defense construction project in Honolulu. His participation 
in this project is being held up until he has been naturalized. 

The basis for this latter statement included the quoted letters. 
The Board received from the former Division Engineer a copy of 
a letter dated 10 October 1941 from the Immigration & Naturaliza- 
tion Service to attorney Benjamin L. Stilphen, of the OflSce of Chief 
of Engineers, reading in part: 

You are advised that all the facts in the case were presented to the 
court. * * * 

Wyman testified that he had maintained the same relations with 
other contractors as he maintained with Rohl. (R., v. 29, p. 3360, 
3364, 3365, 3383, 3564.) The falsity of this statement is clear from 
what has previously been found as to the extraordinary and abnormal 
relations which actually had existed between Rohl and Col. Wyman, 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD' 205 

Col. Wyman testified that he conducted an adequate investigation 
to determine the availability of contractors in Hawaii. (E.., v. 29, 
p. 3388, 3481.) 

The falsity of this statement is indicated by the proof that many 
local contractors were available in Hawaii and would [5(9] 
have welcomed the work and were more competent than the Hawaiian 
Constructors. Col. "Wyman did not even communicate with these 
contractors for this purpose. 

Col. Wyman testified that there were no delays attributable to 
the neglect of the Hawaiian Constructors. (E., v. 29, p. 3425.) 
The falsity of this statement is apparent from the showing of undue 
delays and deficiencies. 

Col. Wyman testified that he was not relieved from Hawaii for 
any deficiencies. (R., v. 29, p. 3516, 3575.) In an apparent effort 
to support this statement he referred to his award of a Distinguished 
Service Medal for his services in Hawaii. (R., v. 29, p. 3374.) Since 
the point is thus raised, it becomes necessary to examine the history 
of this decoration. The citation for this award reads: 

GENERAL ORDERS • WAR DEPARTMENT, 

No. 42 Washington, Avgust 17, 19^2. 



TI— AWARD OF DISTINGUISHED-SERVICE MEDAI^- * * * 
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.. colonel (Lieutenant colonel. Corps of Engi- 
neers), Ai-my of the United States. For exceptionally meritorious and dis- 
tinguished service in the performance of duty of great responsibility as 
District Engineer, Honolulu (T. H.) Engineer District, from October 14, 1&41, 
to March 15, 1942. On October 14, 1941, Colonel WYMAN was directed to 
proceed with emergency construction in the South Pacific Area, to be available 
for use by January 15, 1942, at locations difficult of access and widely sepa- 
rated. Under extremely difficult conditions of supply and construction. Colonel 
WYMAN completed the work in 11 weeks from the date of notice to proceed, 
and on December 28, 1941 over 2 weeks ahead of schedule, reported the 
projects ready for use. Colonel WYMAN displayed unusual judgment, fore- 
sight, and energy in carrying out his duties, and through his accomplishment 
rendered a service of great value to the defense of this and cobelligerent 
countries. * * * 

By order of The Secretary of War : 

G. C. MARSHALL, 

Chief of Staff. 
[51] Ofticiai.: 

J. A. ULIO, 

Major General, 

The Adjutant General. 

It appears that that award was recommended by Brigadier Gen- 
eral Warren T. Hannum, the former Division Engineer and superior 
of Col. Wyman. (R., v. 6, p. 630.) It further appears, however, 
that General Hannum first tried unsuccessfully to get the Com- 
manding General, Hawaiian Department, to recommend the award. 
(R., v.''l9, p. 2048.) General Hannum also knew since October 
1941 of the complaints from the Hawaiian Department against 
Colonel Wyman. (R. 2041.) 

Col. Wyman testified that he never even visited the cham of islands 
which had been prepared as an air route. (R., v. 29, p. 3545.) The 
Board further discovered that the impetus for the award came from 
Mr. Walter F. Dillingham who was a stockholder in the Hawaiian 
Contracting Co. during the period in question. This firm benefitted 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 157 14 



206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

from the mentioned equipment purchase and was one of those which 
comprised the Hawaiian Constructors. Mr. Dillingham had com- 
municated with his lawyer in Washington, Mr. Lee Warren, con- 
cerning the initiation of the award. (R., v. 24, p. 2779.) 
On this subject Mr. Wickiser testified : 

* * * But I can tell you again that as far as the men that were working 
out there, working on the construction work, they thought it was a joke. 

General Gruneet. Do you know anything about his work on the string of air 
bases down toward Australia? Did you have anything to do with that? 

Mr. Wickiser. No, sir. 

General Grunert. Then, those who may have known about it and appeared to 
be surprised that he received a decoration didn't know but what he may have 
done extraordinary work on something else of which they were not aware? 

[52] Mr. Wickiser. That might have been. But I might also say that most 
of these men also knew of Colonel Wyman in Los Angeles, sir, which goes back 
a little further than that time. (R, v 22, p 2473.) 

It was of record that Gen. Tinker finally ordered the Hawaiian 
Constructors out of the chain of islands for apparent incompetence. 
(R, V 22, p 2486.) 

With respect to the work of Col. Wyman on Christmas Island, which 
was one of the islands in question, following is a report of Col. E. W. 
Leard, lOD, to the Inspector General, Hawaiian Department : 

The following report is contained in a folder marked Secret the title of which 
is "Report of Inspection of Station "X" Christmas Island, Pacific Arch. In- 
spected : 2730 January, 1942 By : Captain W. E. Wilhelm', C. E." 

19 February, 1942. 
Memorandum for : Colonel Lathe B. Row. 
Subject : Analysis of Report of Inspection of Station X. 

1. An analysis of the report of inspection of station "X", made by Captain 
W. E. Wilhelm, CE, shows : 

a. That conditions at Station "X" are very bad. 

6. That these conditions are entirely due to the fault of the District Engineer. 

2. The following specific failures of the District Engineer are indicated : 

a. Material for assembling various types of tanks was sent, but no hardware, 
valve fittings, etc. 

ft. A ship load of lumber was sent, but no door jambs, window jambs, door 
screens, etc. 

c. Insufficient laundry facilities have been provided. 

d. Insufl3cient motor transportation has been provided. 

e. Insufficient heavy machinery has been provided. 

f. Insufficient messing and cooking equipment has been provided for personnel. 

g. Necessary quantities of asphalt, plumbing material, electrical material, 
hardware, sinks, showers, lights, fans, and furniture have not been provided. 

3. The following conditions have been permitted to exist without apparent 
remedial action : 

a. Sanitary conditions ai'e very bad. 

6. No effort has been made to provide adequate living conditions for personnel. 

[53] c. Apparently no effort has been made to provide recreation and comforts. 

d. The Navy has been permitted to take over Pan-Air facilities and Hotel, and 
the engineers operate a mess for the Navy and perform all their chores. 

e. The medical officer has not been required to fully perform his duties. 

4. The following indicates that the work of the engineers has not been satis- 
factory. 

a. Too much time is required for the construction of runways, 
ft. Runways and bays are not properly completed. 

c. Radio equipment is left unpacked and untried, and some equipment is out of 
order. 

d. One laundry is not in operating condition. 

e. No effort has been made to provide the work camp with water. 

f. No apparent effort has been made to utilize the filters and purifying appa- 
ratus of the Pan Air Station. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 207 

5. The above resume taken from the report submitted by Captain Wilhelm to 
the ofljce of the District Engineer indicates that a very bad state of affairs 
exists at Station X, and that this state of affairs can be attributed only to lack 
of proper supervision and competent personnel from the office of the District 
Engineer. 

/s/ B. W. L. 

E. W. Leakd, 
Lt. Col. I. G. D. 

The Comanding General, Hawaiian Department directed that two 
letters, dated 14 and 27 February requesting the relief of Col. Wyman 
for what amounted to gross inefficiency in office, be sent to the Chief 
of Engineers. These letters were sent and are as follows : 

Letter of February 14, 1942, Colonel Lyman to Major General Rey- 
bold: 

Major General Eugene Reybold, 
Chief of Engineers, 

Washington, D. C. 

Dear Geneeal Retbold : We have had an unfortunate and unpleasant situation 
develop here in the Hawaiian Department. The District Engineer has executed 
some of his work in a most efficient manner, however, [54] due to an un- 
fortunate personality he has antagonized a great many of the local people as 
well as some of the new employees and officers who have recently been assigned 
to his office. Since this atmosphere exists whenever any condition arises such as 
slowness in making payments to dealers or to employees, even if this condition is 
beyond the control of the District Engineer, the people wrathfully rise up in 
arms against him. 

Pi'ior to December 7 I did not have very many official dealings with the District 
Engineer and I know little about the efficiency of his administrative and engineer- 
ing organization, but since December 7, when it was believed that it would be 
more economical and in the interest of efficiency to continue using his office as the 
procurement and dispersing agency for the Department Engineer's office, I have 
had many dealings with him. Some of the work which they were called upon to 
perform for me has been carried on in a highly satisfactory manner but there 
are many other items of work, which for some reason or other there was a slow- 
ness in getting results. This, I am told by various Post and Station Com- 
manders, obtains generally and as a result many of their assistants carry re- 
sentments towards the office of the District Engineer. I shall have to state that 
there was rather a very abrupt change made when the ACQM was taken over 
by the District office and some of the difficulties were undoubtedly created by a 
lack of a suitable transition period. 

Even though this area has been officially declared a Theatre of Operations, the 
District continues to function independently or under the Division Engineer on 
certain work over which I have no control, and as a result there is a lack of cohe- 
sion in our operations, and the whole engineer program is [55] suffering 
with a consequent loss of prestige by the Engineers in both civilian and military 
circles. However, this could be overcome by certain corrective measures in the 
District Engineer's organization and methods, and many of these are now being 
undertaken. It is extremely questionable whether a change in sentiment of 
method of operation by the District Engineer at this time could better the situa- 
tion in the future due to the inense antagonism that now exists among civilians 
and worse among military personnel towards the District Engineer. It may be 
that the present District Engineer has outlived his usefulness in this Department. 

The Department Commander discussed this situation with me two days ago and 
suggested that I warn you that he may conclude that a change is necessary. I 
know that General Emmons thinks very highly of the present District Engineer 
in some of the work that he has performed; however, the General feels that 
possibly an insurmountable condition has developed which is a handicai) to 
efficient operation and he may decide to recommend a change. Before doing this, 
however, he has directed me to confer with the District Engineer and suggest 
changes in both his organization and his method of operation in an attempt to 
improve the existing unsatisfactory service. 
Very truly yours, 

A. K. B. Lyman, 
Colonel, Corps of Engineers, Department Engineer. 



208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[56] Letter 27 February 1942 from Colonel Lyman to General 
Reybold : 

Deae Generai. Reybold: I wrote you ou 14 February 1942 iu regard to the 
unsatisfactory situation in the District Engineer office here. Since that time 
I have personally investigated conditions and find that they are unsatisfactory, 
particularly in the administrative branches. The administration of his oflace 
and his handling of the air field construction program are not altogether pleasing 
(o the Department Commander and the general unpleasant feeling toward him 
makes it desirable to effect his replacement. 

With an organization as large as the present one of the District Engineer, de- 
centralization of authority is essential. Colonel Wyman appears unwilling to 
grant authority to subordinates and attempts to carry too much of the load him- 
self. As a result some phases of the work suffer from lack of sufficient attention. 
In addition three of the officers whom he has selected for important line island 
projects have had unfavorable reports submitted against them evidencing lack of 
judgment on the part of the District Engineer in the selection of key personnel. 

When I wrote before, the Department Commander had not definitely decided 
that a change in District Engineers was necessary. He realizes that Colonel' 
Wyman has done an excellent job in many respects and does not want to take offi- 
cftil action that would tarnish the record of the officer. General Emmons feels 
that perhaps Colonel Wyman has been in this semitropical climate too long or 
that the pace at which the District Engineer has been driving himself has clouded 
his judgment. On several occasions Colonel Wyman has received important ver- 
bal instructions and failed to carry them out, either through forgetfulness or fail- 
[57] ure to understand. A reconsideration of the entire situation by the De- 
partment Commander has resulted in asking me to informally request the re- 
placement of Colonel Wyman as District Engineer. 

I sincerely hope that you will see fit to ease Colonel Wyman out of the Hawaiian 
Department in such a manner as to reflect no discredit on him and replace him 
with someone who can visualize the high degree of cooperation which is necessary 
between the various commanders, civilians, and the District Engineer's office in 
order that the Engineer Service may function to the fullest extent. I, personally 
do not believe there is any solution to the problem short of the relief of the present 
District Engineer. 

In the event that you see fit to make a change I strongly recommend that two 
experienced administrative assistants, thoroughly familiar with the Departmental 
procedure, be either transferred here or sent on temporary duty to reorganize the 
administrative branch of the District office to permit it to carry the tremendous 
mass of detail expeditiously and effectively. The present administrative heads 
ha\e not had sufficient experience to manage the large organization that is now 
required to perform the administrative detail. Errors in the preparation of pay 
rolls and vouchers and delay in making payments have resulted in some hard- 
ship and unpleasant feeling among local labor, contractors, except possibly the 
one large company handling the bulk of his work, and supply firms. 
Sincerely 

(s) A. K. B. Lyman, 
Colonel, Corps of Engineers, 

Department Engineer. 

[68] To this the Chief of Engineers, Maj. Gen. Eugene Rey- 
bold replied by letter dated 16 March 1942, which reads in part : 

I appreciate very much your frank letter advising me of conditions in your 
Department. As you will know upon receipt of this letter, we have effected the 
, reassignment of Colonel Wyman for important military construction activities 
in another theatre of operations. 

The Inspector General, Hawaiian Department, made a report dated 
14 February 1942, to the Chief of Staff of the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department, concerning gross inefficiencies and irregular- 
ities of the District Engineer. This reads in part as follows : 

1. a. That the District Engineer has antagonized the business firms of Hon- 
olulu and private individuals of the community by his failure to properly meet 
obligations, peremptory actions, and lack of tact on the part of himself and cer- 
tain members of his staff. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL H'ARBOR BOARD 209 

b. That due to the District Engineer's failure to coordinate the procuring, au- 
diting, and disbursing sections of his organization payments to dealers for mer- 
chandise delivered and services rendered are in some cases long overdue. Some 
firms are threatening to refuse further sales unless outstanding obligations are 
paid in full and kept current. Many smaller businesses now are faced with 
financial diflBculties due to their inability to collect amounts due them from the 
District Engineer. It has been ascertained that of the larger firms approxi- 
mately $500,000.00 is due Lewers & Cooke and approximately $60,000.00 is due 
Mr. MURPHY, the owner of Murphy Motors and Aloha Motors. There are in- 
dications that similar large amounts are due other firms. 

c. That the District Engineer's delay in paying wages, sometimes for periods of 
several weeks, is adversely affecting the prosecution of defense projects and the 
morale of employees engaged on these projects. 

d. That the failure on the part of the District Engineer to properly and sys- 
tematically take over the activities of the Zone Constructing Quartermaster on 

.16 December has resulted in disruption of administrative functions to a marked 
degree. 

e. That the District Engineer's office as a whole has not been organized in 
such a manner as to operate with efficiency. 

f. That there is evidence that the District Engineer [59] has harassed 
the former employees of the Zone Constructing Quartermaster and has sub- 
jected them to mental persecution to such an extent that many of the key men 
have refused to work in his office. 

g. There is evidence to indicate that the employees of the former Zone Con- 
structing Quartermaster who have been transferred to the office of the District 
Engineer are discontented and dissatisfied over conditions existing therein. 

2. Mr. MURPHY, the owner of the Murphy Motors and Aloha Motors, stated 
yesterday (13 February 1942) that he has been unable to collect past due ob- 
ligations for trucks and automobiles purchased by the District Engineer. He 
further stated that he is going to the mainland by clipper within three days and 
that he contemplates bringing these matters to the attention of Delegate KING 
and such other authorities in Washington as may be necessary to secure re- 
medial action unless he can be assured his unpaid bills will be settled promptly. 
He also stated that he contemplates refusing to make delivery on orders now on 
hand for more motor transportation. Mr. MURPHY is extremely bitter of the 
manner in which he and other automobile dealers have been treated by the Dis- 
trict Engineer. 

3. In addition to the matters mentioned above, past inspections and recent 
numerous incidents requiring investigation have disclosed that the administra- 
tion and operation of the District Engineer activities since 7 December 1941 
have been exemplified by extravagance and waste and general mal-adrainistra- 
tion. It was discovered during the course of inspections of District Engineer 
activities prior to 7 December that his administrative setup was improperly 
coordinated and was so mentioned in these reports of inspection. The District 
Engineer, In his replies, has stated that steps had been initiated to correct the 
irregularities and deficiencies reported. It, is now evident that many of these 
irregularities and deficiencies still existed on 7 December 1941 and have been 
aggravated by the increased volume of his activities incident to the outbreak 
of war and the taking over of the functions of the Zone Construction Quarter- 
master on 16 December 1941. Colonel WYMAN's methods of administration 
have been such as to antagonize many persons, military and civil, both within 
and without his organization. His actions have also been ridiculed and criticized 
\n the community. I believe that this condition is to the great detriment of 
Army as a whole and the Engineer Corps in particular. 

4. In my opinion Colonel WYMAN does not possess the necessary executive 
and administrative ability or the leadership to cope with the present situation 
existing in this Department. In addition to the matters set forth in paragraph 1 
above, inefficiency of his office has further been demonstrated by : 

a. His methods of purchase, assignment and use of motor vehicles. 
[601 b. His waste of money in the renting, remodeling and furnishing of 
offices for himself and his staff. 

c. The building of elaborate and expensive ($41,652.46) air raid shelters at 
the Punahou School for the use of himself and the executives of the contractor. 
These shelters have sufficient capacity to protect only a small percentage of the 
number of employees on the Punahou Campus. 

d. Directing his contractor to take over and operate the Pleasanton Hotel at 
an estimated loss of $2,5(X).0O per ffiORtJi wb?R a mess is operated and at the 



210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

rates and room assignments fixed by the District Engineer. The principal bene- 
ficaries of the use of this hotel to date have been Colonel WYMAN and wife, 
and his staff and their dependents. This hotel was taken over on 16 January 1942 
and a mess was established on 26 January 1942. 

e. Failing to utilize to best advantage the services of Lieutenant Colonel HAR- 
ROLD, former Zone Constructing Quartermaster, and his highly trained 
assistants. 

f. His failure to stabilize assignments of personnel to positions of responsi- 
bility, and his failure to delegate authority to his administrative assistants to 
act for him. 

g. His failure to establish a system of accountability to insure the proper 
accounting for the receipt and issuance of construction material. 

h. His failure to issue directives in necessary detail and to organize his stafE 
to insure compliance with directives issued by him. 

i. His disregard for and violation of orders of the Military Governor concern- 
ing the curfew law. 

5. Although several of the investigations relative to matters mentioned in 
paragraph 4 have not ben completed, the evidence already obtained substan- 
tiates the statements made above and indicate that Colonel THEODORE 
WYMAN, Jr., C. E., does not possess the necessary executive and administrative 
ability to properly conduct the affairs of his office. The fact that Mr. MURPHY 
contemplates such drastic action and the fact that business firms threaten to 
refuse delivery on future orders submitted by the District Engineer indicate the 
seriousness of the situation and the need f<>r immediate remedial action. 

6. I strongly believe that unless a change in the administration of the office 
of the District Engineer is accomplished within a short time, most serious reper- 
cussions will result. 

7. CONCLUSION 

That it is to the best interests of the United States and [61] of the 
Hawaiian Department that Colonel WYMAN be relieved at once as District 
Engineer. 

8. BECOMMENDATION 

That Colonel WYMAN be relieved as District Engineer at once. 

Accordingly, Col. Wyman was relieved on 15 March 19-42 as District 
Eiigineer in Hawaii. 

Captain William A. E. King, JAGD, testified that in the early part 
of 1942, while assigned to the Hawaiian Department, he rendered an 
opinion as to the serious derelictions of Col. Wyman which had existed 
before 7 December 1941. (K, v. 39, p. 4455, et seq.) 

Charges that Col. Wyman was inefficient have also been confirmed 
by subsequent investigations of the Office of the Inspector General, 
Washington, D. C. Reference is made especially to that of Colonel 
John A. Hunt, IGD. (R, v. 7, p. 745, et seq.) His observations and 
studies were very helpful to the Board as a starting point for the ex- 
ploration of facts. The Board developed many additional points of 
evidence. 

[62] The report of Colonel Hunt, dated 14 June 1943 states in 
part : 

b. Mr. Rohl was owner of the yacht Ramona, at one time Commodore of the 
Newport Harbor Yacht Club and well known as a sportsman and spender. Dur- 
ing the period of Colonel Wyman's duties in Los Angeles, 1935-1939, he was the 
guest of Mr. Rohl aboard the Ramona and later the Vega, which Mr. Rohl 
acquired in 1937. Colonel Wyman testified that the number of such occasions 
was probably no more than four or five. These yacht trips, as described by 
Colonel Wyman, were for the greater part essentially business trips, primarily 
to inspect the quarrtes above referred to. Actually, there existed no necessity 
for conducting the business of inspecting quarrying activities on Catalina Island 
in this manner, since there were available to the District Engineer adequate 
Government-owne(J vessels. These trips must therefore be classed as pleasure 
trips at Mr. Rohl's expense, official business being an incidental consideration. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 211 

During the same period, Colonel Wyman was many times the guest of Mr. Rohl 
at the latter's Beverly Hills home. Colonel Wyman testified that he was very 
meticulous in the matter of removing any sense of obligation to Mr. Rohl by 
repaying these courtesies in kind. It is therefore apparent that Colonel Wyman 
was on close and intimate social relations with Mr. Rohl during the period when, 
as the Government's representative, he administered extensive work for which 
Mr. Rohl was the contractor. 

c. The yacht trips and house parties given by Mr. Rohl and attended by Colonel 
Wyman were expensive and lavish. Intoxicating liquors were habitually served, 
with no limitation excepting the guest's capacity to imbibe. Colonel Wyman, 
claiming an ability to hold his liquor, imbibed freely. It is not in evidence that 
he became intoxicated to an obvious extent. It is not evident, however, that his 
acceptance of Mr. Rohl's entertainment was in any sense necessary to that desir- 
able degree of acquaintance between the Corps of Engineers and the construction 
industry which may be considered necessary to their mutual interests. These 
contracts were essentially, if not entirely, social and personal affairs, which by 
their frequency and character tended strongly to bring discredit upon the Corps 
of Engineers and to give rise to just such allegations as the ones now in question. 

With respect to the duty of Colonel Wyman to ascertain whether 
competent contractors were available in Hawaii for the construction 
of the defense projects, Col. Hunt reported : 

e. Colonel Wyman testified that he had tried to interest local contractors in 
taking on the work originally proposed, and that they showed no interest. That 
statement was not confirmed by inquiry among those contractors, seven of whom 
were questioned in the matter, all of them [63] denying having been 
given a chance to take on any part of the work. These contractors were then 
seeking new work, and the bringing in of an outside contractor without giving 
them a chance to participate, created a considerable natural resentment on their 
part. 

Concerning the fact that Col. Wyman knew of Kohl's alien status 
when the contract was executed, Col. Hunt reported : 

It is diflScult, therefore, to escape the conclusion that Colonel Wyman knew of 
Mr. Rohl's non-citizenship when the contract was entered into, or at latest 
shortly after writing the unanswered letter summoning him to Hawaii. In such 
circumstances any close relationship between Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl there- 
after would have involved the former in dealings with a man of doubtful loyalty 
to the United States. 

As to the continuance in Hawaii of the unwholesome relationship 
between Col. Wyman and Rohl which had existed in Los Angeles, Col. 
Hunt reported : 

d. Various witnesses testified to having seen Colonel Wyman with Mr. Rohl 
at various semi-public functions, when both men indulged freely in toxicating 
beverages. So far as could be ascertained, most of these instances were prior 
to the attack of 7 December. No witness was found who could testify to drunken- 
ness on Colonel Wyman's part. His own testimony and that of other witnesses 
in this resi)ect indicates that Colonel Wyman maintained a totally unnecessary, 
and in the circumstances, an undesirable social familiarity with the active head 
of an organization whose prime business it was to profit from work under his 
supervision. If there is reasonable doubt that this relationship was with a man 
whose non-citizenship at the commencement of the contract was known to him, 
there is no doubt whatever that it was with a man who at the time of this rela- 
tionship in Hawaii, had been proven to Colonel Wyman to have concealed the fact 
of his alien status. The least that can be said of that relationship is that it dis- 
played a callousness on Colonel Wyman's part, not only toward the character of 
his associate, but toward the possible consequences of its public display. 

Concerning the purchase of equipment from the Rohl-Connolly Co. 
and the Hawaiian Contracting Co., Col. Hunt reported : 

7. a. It is next alleged that immediately prior to his departure from Hawaii, 
Colonel Wyman rushed through the purchase from the Rohl-ConnoUy Company 
of certain equipment owned by the latter, paying the price asked by Mr. Rohl, 



212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

although his own appraiser valued that equipment at approximately $35,000 less 
than the price asked. At [64] this point it is pertinent to indicate that 
the original composition of the Hawaiian Constructors had been twice changed 
by the addition of two more co-adventurers prior to the events here in discus- 
sion. On 22 May 1941, Mr. Ralph E. Wooley, an independent contractor of 
Honolulu, had been added to the membership. On 4 January 1942, the Hawaiian 
Contracting Company became the fifth associated contractor, with Mr. H. P. 
Benson, President, becoming a member of the Executive Committee. Both of 
these men figure in the purchase of the equipment here in discussion, as well 
as in other equipment purchases. Some time prior to 9 December 1941, the 
need for more construction equipment became evident as increased operations to 
the south of Hawaii became necessary. It was known by Colonel Wyman that 
the Rohl-Connolly Company owned certain equipment which was then idle at 
the Caddoa project in Colorado. It was arranged that this equipment would 
be shipped to Los Angeles for ovehaul and trans-shipment to Canton Island, 
Christmas Island, and other points in the Pacific. Efforts to trace the move- 
ments of this equipment failed, although it was determined that some reached 
Canton Island, some was en route to Christmas Island on 7 December 1941 
when the ship carrying it was diverted by Navy orders, and some reached 
Honolulu. Under date of 11 March 1942, a letter signed by Mr. Rohl on behalf 
of the Hawaiian Constructors requested the District Engineer to purchase cer- 
tain listed equipment from the Rohl-Connolly Company at prices stipulated 
therein. (Exhibit M.) The items listed appear to have been among those re- 
ferred to above, though strict identification was not found possible. On 10 
March 1942, Mr. M. C. Parker, employed by the District Engineer, was directed 
to appraise this list of equipment, which he did, reporting his findings of a 
value of $131,411.03 on 11 March 1942. On 12 March 1942, Mr. Parker was 
ordered to report to Colonel B. L. Robinson, Operations Officer under Colonel 
Wyman. The former discussed the appraisal with Mr. Parker and they directed 
him to confer with Mr. Rohl in the matter. Mr. Parker was directed to a table 
at which Mr. Rohl sat with Mr. Ralph E. Wooley and Mr. H. P. Benson. A dis- 
cussion was had, in which Mr. Rohl displayed certain paid repair bills relating 
to the equipment in question, with the evident intention of swaying Mr. Parker's 
appraisal. The latter refused to recede from his recorded judgment, where- 
upon Mr. Rohl asked him if he was aware that a good deal of back rental was 
due on the equipment. Mr. Parker disclaimed any knowledge thereof, but in- 
sisted that the fact would not alter his appraisal of the value of the equipment 
as he had observed it. 

b. Both Mr. Wooley and Mr. Benson testified that they had no part in this 
discussion and were not aware of its subject or trend. Colonel Wyman expressed 
a complete ignorance of the discussions. On 12 March, Mr. Parker sent a memo- 
randum to Colonel Robinson recommending that if back rental were due in an 
amount which, added to the amount of his appraisal, would equal or exceed the 
price requested [65] by Mr. Rohl, the latter figure be approved as the 
purchase price. (Exhibit N.) By letter dated 13 March, Colonel Wyman di- 
rected purchase of the equipment at prices stated by Mr. Rohl in his letter of 
11 March. (Exhibit O.) The purchase was completed accordingly. Payment 
in the amount of $166,423.17 was made by Captain W. P. McCrone, CE, on 19 
March who had been displaced as disbursing officer several days previously when 
disbursements were taken over by the Department Finance Officer. Diligent 
search of files and inquiry among possible witnesses having knowledge of the 
matter, failed to disclose any facts explaining or justifying the rejection of 
Mr. Parker's appraisal and the payment of prices asked by Mr. Rohl. Colonel 
Robinson could not be reached, he having been transferred to some place in 
Australia. 

c. It appears to be reasonably certain that the equipment in question had 
been in actual use for various lengths of time during January, February, and 
part of March at the time of purchase, although use records were not available 
and apparently were not maintained. There was no record of any rental agree- 
ment relating to any of this equipment. It is quite possible that assuming the 
fairness of Mr. Parker's appraisal on 12 March, the equipment had a substan- 
tially higher value when delivered to the site of use or at point of shipment. 
It does not, however, appear that a depreciation of approximately $35,000 in 
value, or about 26% could have occurred in that period. No suitable basis was 
available upon which to reconstruct a fair value to apply to the equipment as 
of the date of delivery. Mr. Rohl's effort to sway the appraiser's judgment by 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 213 

references to rentals due, seems an obvious effort to distort the facts in his 
own favor. All trace of the retained voucher and supporting papers were miss- 
ing. No memoranda or other papers were found in connection with Colonel 
Wyman's letter directing the purchase at Mr. Rohl's figures. In the absence 
of justifying evidence or testimony, the conclusion seems inescapable that Colonel 
Wyman was unduly swayed, contrary to the Government's interests, by an 
unwarranted acceptance of these representations of Mr. Rohl in the face of con- 
flicting recommendations. 

8. a. It is next alleged that just prior to his departure from Hawaii, Colonel 
Wyman rushed through a purchase of equipment from the Hawaiian Contracting 
Company paying $156,411 for the lot, including a considerable amount of equip- 
ment, as mentioned in c below, that was unfit for the emergency use for which, 
it was represented, it was immediately needed. In this connection, the procedure 
to be followed in purchasing equipment in Hawaii was recommended in a letter 
signed by Mr. Rohl. (Exhibit P.) The procedure was to base payment upon an 
appraisal to be made by a Mr. Bruce Gentry, representing the Hawaiian Con- 
structors; a Mr. H. J. Roblee, employee of the Edward R. Bacon Company of 
Honolulu and a third man representing the owner. In the case of the equip- 
ment purchase now in question, the third party was Mr. Edward Ross, employee 
of [66] the Hawaiian Contracting Company. These three appraised the 
equipment in question, placing an upper value of $156,150 upon it. This ap- 
praisal was substantially the amount named in a letter addressed by Mr. Rohl 
to the District Engineer dated 9 January 1942. In this case, the Government was 
not properly represented. Mr. Roblee, ostensibly the Government's representa- 
tive, owed his livelihood to the Edward R. Bacon Company, of which the Ha- 
waiian Contracting Company was a substantial customer in equipment pur- 
chases, his interests relating to those of his emplo.ver and its substantial cus- 
tomer. Mr. Gentry was a contractor employee and Mr. Ross obviously served the 
interests of the vendor. 

b. Data secured by Major George R. Lumsden, Assistant to the Inspector Gen- 
eral, Hawaiian Department, from the files and records of the District Engineer, 
indicated that much of the equipment concerned in this pui'chase had been ap- 
propriated by U. S. Engineer agencies upon the outbreak of war, putting it to 
use on authorized projects. Testimony taken by this investigating officer con- 
firmed tliese facts. Other items were obtained fi'oni time to time as needed, still 
others remaining in the owner's equipment yard until many months after the 
purchase was consummated, and a substantial portion remained at the time of 
the present investigation in the District Engineer's salvage yard where it had 
been placed directly from the owner's equipment yard. The facts, in detail, are 
indicated in the tabulation, Exhibit Q. 

c. The items hauled to salvage, unused, totaling $9,100, were examined by the 
investigating officer. These items were so far obsolete as to warrtnt the descrip- 
tion "archaic". Some of the Watson wagons (hand operated, bottom dump 
wooden wagons) were arranged for animal draft, while others had been equipped 
with trailer tongues. All had been robbed of metal parts before the purchase, 
some were badly rotted and others were termite eaten beyond any possible use- 
fulness. Scrapers, scarifiers and like items were incomplete, badly I'usted and 
of doubtful useability, even in an extremity. Other items accepted and taken 
into possession of the District Engineer subsequent to 1 July 1942 aggregated an- 
other $20,511. These last items were useable, but their acquisition was totally 
unnecessary, suitable like items having been available in sufficient quantity 
prior to acceptance by the District Engineer's forces. 

d. This transaction was directed by Colonel Wyman on 13 March 1942, and pay- 
ment was effected in the same manner as in the case of the Rohl-Connolly equip- 
ment (pai'agraph 7). The files yielded no correspondence in the matter other 
than that mentioned herein. In the course of Major Lumsden's inquiry, it de- 
veloped that the District Engineer's appraiser had undertaken an appraisal of 
some items of this equipment, liad been denied access to it on the first attempt, 
and had later been permitted to examine [67] it with the result that on 
the items inspected, values were recommended which were in substantial agree- 
ment with those later used, in the actual purchases. Nothing further was done 
at the time, however, and when the purchase was finally directed, this appraisal 
was ignored and the new one made as indicated above. 

e. Mr. Benson, Pi-esident of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, owner of the 
equipment, testified that in his opinion, all the equipment was useable. Con- 
fronted with the writer's description of what he found, Mr. Benson's protesta- 



214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tions weakened, being obviously insupportable. Colonel Wyman testified that 
he was not familiar with the details and that he left such matters largely to 
Colonel Robinson. Mr. Wooley and Mr. C. C. Middleton, the latter Administrator 
for the Hawaiian Constructors, professed ignorance of the matter beyond the 
fact that the purchase was made. Mr. Benson protested that by seizing his 
company's equipment, the District Engineer had deprived the company of the 
means of operating as a contractor. This was true excepting that as a part of 
the Hawaiian Constructors it did continue in business. Furthermore, Mr. Ben- 
son chose first to justify and then to ignore the fact that the questionable items 
were useless or nearly so, and that many had already been depreciated oft the 
company's books. 

f. The most charitable construction applicable to this transaction is that the 
Hawaiian Constructors, Colonel Wyman, the owner and the appraisers negli- 
gently failed to ascertain that the United States received in each case property 
reasanobly worth the price paid. Such a construction strains credulity. That 
Colonel Wyman in failing to require such assurance was negligent cannot be 
doubted. The several co-adventurers who desired to dispose of equipment to 
the Government had a common interest in upholding evaluations. The arrange- 
ment by which the Hawaiian Contracting Company's equipment was appraised is 
an obvious violation of the principle that in such matters the Government be 
directly represented, if not actually a deliberate evasion of that principle. The 
circumstances disclosed indicate a highly probable arrangement between Mr. 
Rohl and Mr. Benson to serve their respective interests. While proof of actual 
conspiracy was not procurable, the presumption thereof is strong. 

Concerning the charges connected with the lease of the Yacht Vega, 
Colonel Hunt reported : 

e. The charge that Colonel Wyman permitted his friendship for Mr. Rohl to 
govern in this transaction is lent color by the absence in the ofiicial files of any 
correspondence indicating that the chartering of the Vega had been discussed 
with the actual charterers, the Hawaiian Constructors, who were to be and 
now are being held responsible in the matter. Their first official entrance into 
[68] the case appears to have occurred only after receipt by them of Colonel 
Wyman's directions that they enter into a charter agreement some one and 
one-half months after the plan had been conceived by Colonel Wyman. Mr. 
Wooley, Mr. Benson and Mr. Grafe, the responsible heads of the Hawaiian Con- 
structors, aside from Mr. Rohl himself, all disclaimed prior contact with the 
arrangement. There is reason to believe that these gentlemen found the entire 
scheme distasteful, and that they believed that Mr. Rohl had dealt unfairly 
with them in seeking to dodge certain responsibilities by adhering to what they 
judged to be the fiction that Mrs. Rohl, not H. W. Rohl was the Vega's owner. 
(Exhibit R.) Certainly the absence of written matter, frankly and openly 
expressing interest, proper consideration and the fixing of clear responsibilities 
for action taken, is strong cause to svispect irregularity and questionable schem- 
ing. While proof of the allegation under discussion was not found, it is again 
obvious that Colonel Wyman's addiction to the making of verbal commitments 
laid the foundation for those charges, involving both himself and the Corps of 
Engineers in an undesirable situation. 

Colonel Hunt reached the following conclusions among others : 

CONCLUSIONS 

21. A very careful study of all facts and circumstances brought to light in 
the course of this investigation leads to the following conclusions : 

a. During the years 1936-1939, Colonel Wyman, as District Engineer, Los 
Angeles, maintained a close personal friendship, as distinguished from a business 
friendship, with Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl, which was inappropriate on the part 
of the United States Army officer administering costly works on which the said 
Mr. Rohl was engaged as contractor. This relationship extended so far beyond 
the need for ordinary cordial business relation as to give rise to such presump- 
tions of impropriety as formed, in part, the basis of this investigation. In 
maintaining that relationship, Colonel Wyman was not sufficiently mindful of 
that unquestionable reputation for integrity and impartiality which it was the 
duty of a man in his position to cultivate at all times. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 215 

b. The flattery of C!olonel Wyman personally and professionally, which was 
bestowed upon him by his wealthy associate, Mr. Rohl, evoked in Colonel Wyman 
so complete a confidence in the former as to lead him to an unwise acceptance 
of Mr. Rohl's judgment and advice during their subsequent association in Ha- 
waii. He thereby relinquished to some extent that independence of judgment 
required of an officer in charge of the Government's interests, as indicated in 
his too ready acceptance of Mr. Rohl's [69] recommendations relating to 
equipment purchases and appraisals. 

e. Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government's best interest when in pur- 
chasing Rohl-Connolly equipment at a cost of $166,423.17 against the appraised 
value of $131,411.03, he failed to fully justify for the record, the payment of 
the larger of the two amounts. * * * 

f. Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government's best interests in the pur- 
chase of equipment from the Hawaiian Contracting Company at a cost of $156,000, 
in that he based that payment upon a prejudiced appraisal, and failed to take 
such action as would insui'e that the equipment purchases ■njas actually required, 
was in good condition and useable and was worth the amount paid. * * » 

g. The inefficiencies charged to the management of construction matters in 
Hawaii actually existed, * * * 

Since the Board uncovered more evidence than was adduced by 
Col. Hunt, it is now possible to determine more accurately the dere- 
lictions of Col. Wyman and the extent to which the inefficiencies of 
the Hawaiian Constructors were due to his acts and omissions. 

The report of Col. Hunt was preceded by an investigation of Col. 
L. George Horowitz concerning Col. Wyman's activities on the Canol 
Project and the Alcan Highway in the Northwest Division to which 
he was assigned after his tour in Hawaii. (Exhibit No. 6.) These 
recommendations conclude with the statement: 

The retainment of the Division Engineer (Col. Wyman) in his present capacity 
will ana must eventuate in disgraceful performance or failure. 

In this regard reference is made to information supplied the Board 
by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to the effect that the Canadian 
Government had suggested the reassignment of Col. Wyman from 
Canada because of the way in which he conducted himself. (E.., v. 34, 
p. 4034.) 

[70] Col. Wyman was also officially reprimanded under the 
104th Article of War for neglect in connection with his duties as Di- 
vision Engineer in the Northwest Division. Following is the direc- 
tion of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces : 

War Depabtment, 
Headquakteks, Aemyy Service Forces, 

Washington, D. C, May 5, 19^3. 
SPAAW 201-Wyman, Jr., Theodore 
Subject : Reprimand Under 104th Article of War. 
To: CommandLng General, Eighth Service Command. 

1. It is directed that you administer a reprimand under the 104th Artcile of 
War to Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., now a member of your command, sub- 
stantially as follows : 

a. Pursuant to instructions of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, 
War Department, you are hereby reprimanded under the 104th Article of War 
for your failure to enforce safety precautions in connection with the field oi)era- 
tions of the Miller Construction Company and the Oman-Smith Company, 
which failure was in part responsible for the explosion and fire which occurred 
at Dawson Creek, British Columbia, on February 13, 1943. 

b. Should you prefer to stand trial, under the provisions of the 104th Article 
of War rather than accept this reprimand, you will so indicate, by indorse- 



216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ment hereon, within three (3) days following receipt hereof. Should you elect 
to accept this reprimand in lieu of trial, no action other than acknowledge 
receipt hereof need be taken by you. 
2. Advise this officer of your action. 
By command of Lieutenant General SOMERVELL : 

/s/ Madison Pearson, 
Madison Pe^arson, 
Brigadier Oeneral, G. S. C, 
Deputy Chief of Administrative Services. 

Col. Wyman testified that he had no rehitions with Rohl which tend- 
ed to interfere with the proper discharge of his duties. (R., v. 29, p. 
3383.) The falsity of this statement is apparent from what has pre- 
viously been shown. 

[71] Reference should also be made to the significant features of 
certain testimony of other witnesses before the Board. For example, 
the Chief of Engineers, Major General Eugene Reybold, testified that 
he conducted no investigation even after he received the derogatory 
reports concerning Rohl. (R. 576, v. 6, P- 9) ; that the system regard- 
ing the award of contracts and the investigation of contractors was ad- 
mittedly loose; (R. v. 6, p. 581, 607) that he did not know whether Col. 
Wyman had taken any steps to expedite the work. (R. v. 6 p. 593.) 
The Chief of Engineers testified : 

169. General Feank. Did you ever receive notice or have knowledge of any 
reports concerning the activities of Colonel Wyman in Hawaii that were de- 
rogatory to Colonel Wyman? 

Genei-al Reybold. No ; I never had any such report. 

170. General Frank. Were you Chief of Engineers when he was relieved from 
Hawaii? 

General Reybold. Yes. (R. v. 6 p. 608.) 

General Hannum testified : 

General Frank. Did you state that you knew nothing about the association of 
Wyman and Rohl in Los Angeles? 

General Hannum. No ; I did not know of any relationship between Wyman and 
Rohl. I knew that Rohl was a contractor, but I had no knowledge of any partic- 
ular social relations or other relations, other than official, that Wyman may have 
had with Rohl. 

[72] General Fra^nk. When Wyman had the supervision of this contract in 
which Rohl was involved, in Los Angeles, was he then under your jurisdiction? 

General Hannum. No, General Kingman was then Division Engineer, here. I 
relieved General Kingman, here, in January 1938, and that contract, as I recall, 
for the breakwater had been made the year or two before that. 

General Frank. The contract had been made, but Wyman was operating down 
there, in 1938 and 1939, while you were the division engineer here? 

General Hannum. Wyman went out there in 1935, I believe. 

General Frank. Out where? 

General Hannum. To Los Angeles. He was assigned as district engineer in 
1935 or 1936, along about that time. 

General Frank. And when did he go to Honolulu? 

General Hannum. He went out there in 1939 or 1940, as I recall. 

General Frank. Therefore, he was in Los Angeles for over a year under your 
jurisdiction while you were division engineer here? 

General Hannum. Yes, yes ; that is correct. 

General Frank. And you knew nothing of his associations? 

General Hannum. No, no. I don't know that he had any association with Rohl 
during the period that he was district engineer, after my arrival. It never came 
to my attention. We had no contracts with Rohl in the Los Angeles district, at 
that time. 

General Frank. When did they have the breakwater contract down there? 

General Hannum. That breakwater was finished, as I recall, in December 1938. 

General Frank. What kind of system or arrangement did you have as divi- 
sion engineer to check on your district engineers? 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 217 

General Hannum. Well, when the engineering papers came in, these plans 
and specifications were reviewed in the engineering division in my office, and 
comments submitted to me, and I passed on them, and the contracts at that time 
had to be approved in Washington. Copies of the contract, plans and specifica- 
tions, and I went out and [73] inspected the work with the district 
engineer, to inspect the progress, and also see whether the work was being car- 
ried out, and discussed with him as to whether it was being carried out in 
accordance with the plans and specifications. 

General Feank. Did he know you were coming, generally? 

General Hannum. Generally speaking, I think he did ; yes. I customarily , 
let him know when I was coming, to make sure that they would be there when 
I arrived. ( R., v. 18, p. 2070, 2071. ) 

Major Clausen. Do you recall, when you testified before Colonel Hunt, with 
regard to Colonel Wyman, you said: "On one occasion, not necessarily in serious 
conversation, I know that he indicated that he could hold his liquor, indicating 
that he had a capacity to consume a considerable amount, without it very seriously 
affecting him." 

General Hannum. I recall it. 

Major Clausen. When did you have that discussion with Colonel Wyman? 

General Hannum. With Colonel Wyman V I don't recall the exact incident, 
whether it was on this side, or over in Honolulu. (R., v. 18, p. 2082.) 

Major Clausen. Sir, with respect to this portion of the letter where it says— 
"There were many other items of work, on which, for some reason or 
other, there was a slowness in getting results." 
—what did Colonel Lyman tell you about that? 

General Hannum. He didn't tell me anything about that, specifically. What 
he mentioned was that he said to me when I was over there that Wyman's 
administration had not been efficient or effective. 

Major Clausen. And this was May that you were there, or October, 1942, did 
you say? 

General Hannum. I know it was in May that I went over there. No, I quess 
it was probably in October. I was over there in October 1941 ; it may have been 
that Lyman mentioned something to me about that time. There were differences 
between Wyman and Lyman at that time when I was over there in October 1941. 

[74] Major Clausen. This trip that you made in October 1941 was a sort 
of Inspection trip, was it not, sir? 

General Hannum. It was. I made one in May 1941 — I think it was May 
1941— and also in October 1941. (R., v. 18, p. 2041.) 

Colonel Bernard L. Robinson, CE, gave this testimony_ on recall 
with respect to a statement he submitted in an attempt to justify the 
purchase of equipment from the Hawaiian Contracting Co. : 

General Frank. Haven't you already submitted this as sworn testimony? 

Major Clausen. Yes. 

Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

Major Clausen. And had we not had the privilege of cross-examining you, 
don't you know that this may have swayed the Board? 

( There was no response. ) 

Major Clausen. Who is this Mr. H. J. Roblee that you refer to in your 
statement? 

Colonel Robinson. I will have to find out, sir. 

Major Clausen. You don't know? 

Colonel Robinson. I don't know at this time, no, sir. 

Major Clausen. All right. Who else was in on this appraisal that you referred 
to here? Mr. Gentry and Mr. Roblee and who else? 

Colonel Robinson. As far as I know, those were the only two appraisers, 
as given by this record right there. 

Major Clausen. Wasn't there a Mr. Ross? 

Colonel Robinson. Not to my knowledge. 

Major Clausen. A Mr. Edward Ross, an employee of the Hawaiian Con- 
tracting Company? You don't know that either, sir? 

Colonel Robinson. Well, we had the Hawaiian Contracting Company price 
here. I don't know who his represent— who brought up this price over here. 

Major Clausen. Well, do you know if a Mr. Edward [75] Ross, an 
employee of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, had anything to do witb 
this appraisal? 



218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir; I don't recall Mr. Ross. 

Major Clausen. Do you know whether this appraisal that you have offered 
to the Board here this morning is the amount, substantially, named in a letter 
addressed by Mr. Rohl to the District Engineer, dated 9 January 1942, that he 
wanted? 

Colonel Robinson. That may be true. I don't know, sir. 
Major Clausen. Do you know that? 
Colonel Robinson. No, sir, I don't. 

Major Clausen. You haven't found that in your search of the files? 
Colonel Robinson. My search of the files simply asked for — calling for the 
documents on the appraisals. 

Major Clausen. No. Colonel, you say you have reviewed the files? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 
Major Clausen. Relative to that appraisal? 
Colonel Robinson. I have reviewed these files. 

Major Clausen. Now, just refer back to the Rohl-Connolly equipment. That 
was finally at a price set by Mr. Rohl; isn't that correst? Some $166,000? 
Colonel Robinson. That was his asking price, yes, sir. I believe so, sir. 
Major Clausen. Yes. Now, I am asking you the question, with regard to 
this property purchased from the Hawaiian Contracting Company, whether 
the same thing wasn't true there, that Mr. Rohl suggested this price that was 
finally the appraisal of these three men. Gentry, Roblee, and Ross. 
Colonel Robinson. It may have been. I do not know, sir. 
Major Clausen. Now let me ask you this: You said here in this statement 

this morning 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

Major Clausen. You say now something about this equipment not being junk. 
You make the bald statement here : 

[76] "It is to be noted that each and every item of equipment was appraised 
by competent appraisers at some substantial value and any statement therefore 
that this equipment or any item of it was 'valueless', 'worthless', or 'junk' is in 
error and any inference that the government did not get full value is incorrect." 
Whose language is that sir? 
Colonel Robinson. That is my language, sir. 
Major Clausen. And when did you dictate that? 

Colonel Robinson. I did not dictate it, sir. I wrote it in longhand on the — 
Saturday, I believe it was. 

Major Clausen. Don't you know, sir, that some of that same equipment is, even 
today, or as recently as a few days ago, unused because it was just plain, clear 
junk? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir, I don't know that. 
Major Clausen. Have you looked to see? 
Colonel Robinson. No, sir. 
Major Clausen. Have you inquired to find out? 
Colonel Robinson. No, sir. 

Major Clausen. And yet you made that statement that it is not junk, and you 
haven't inquired to find out? 

Colonel Robinson. I base that on this record right here. 
Major Clausen. You base it on the appraisal? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

Major Clausen. But the appraisal was made before the price was paid, wasn't 
it? 
Colonel Robinson. Yes, sir. 

Major Clausen. So you don't know whether the equipment was ever used 
or not, do you? 

Colonel Robinson. No, sir, I don't. 

Major Clausen. All right ; that is about all. (R., v. 32, p. 3817, 3818, 3819, 
3820.) 

[77] 3. Acknowledgments. 

The Board desires to express its appreciation to the House Mili- 
tary Affairs Committee and its Cliief Counsel, H. Ralph Burton, Esq., 
and to the California State Legislature's Joint Fact Finding Commit- 
tee on Un-American Activities and its Chief Counsel, R. E. Combs, 
Esq., and to many witnesses who appeared and assisted in uncovering 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 219 

facts and leads wliicli have been the subject of this report. Through 
the courtesy of Mr. Burton and Mr. Combs the Board also received 
a great deal of reliable information from investigators for these legis- 
lative committees. 

[78] Exhibit "A" 

Wab Department, 
Washington, D. C, Jul 12 19U- 
Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General. 

Subject : Report of House Military Affairs Committee alleging neglect and mis- 
conduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and others, concerning Hawaiian 
and Canadian Defense Projects. 

1. The recommendations contained in paragraph 5 of the memorandum dated 
July 10, 1944, of Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., to Mr. Amberg, Special 
Assistant to the Secretary of War, on the above subject, are approved. Major 
Clausen is directed to continue his investigation of the above matter and to co- 
operate with the House Military Affairs Committee in its investigation of this 
matter in the way described in paragraph 5 of Major Clausen's memorandum. 

2. Immediately upon the appointment of a board of ofl5cers pursuant to Public 
Law 339, 78th Congress, to investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor 
catastrophe, the phases of the present matter relating thereto will be referred to 
such board for investigation and such other action as may be proper under the 
directive appointing such board. As it is understood Major Clausen will be 
detailed as assistant recorder of this board, he will continue in that capacity to 
coordinate the activities referred to paragraph 1 hereof with the activities of 
the Pearl Harbor Board in the present case. 

/s/ Robert P. Patterson, 
RoBEET P. Patterson, 
Acting Secretary of War. 

[79] Exhibit "B" 

WCM mer 2401 
Off Br-WCM-ph 78270 
In reply 
refer to: AGPO-A-A 210.311 (21 Jul 44). 

Wae Department, 
The Adjutant General's Office, 
Washington 25, D. C, 22 July 1944. 
Subject : Supplemental Orders. 
To : Each Officer Mentioned. 

1. The Board appointed by letter orders, this office, AGPO-A-A 210.311 (24 
Jun 44), 8 July 1944, subject: "Orders", as amended by letter orders, this office, 
AGPO-A-A 210.311 (10 Jul 44), 11 July 1944, subject: "Amendment of Orders", 
pertaining to each of the following-named officers will consider the phases which 
related to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs 
Committee, as directed by the Acting Secretary of War in bis memorandum for 
the Judge Advocate General, 12 July 1944 : 

Lt. Gen. George Grunert, 01534, USA, 
Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, 0212769, USA. 

Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, 02871, USA, Col. Charles W. West, 012774, 
JAGD. 

2. Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613. JAGD, is appointed as Assistant Recorder 
without vote on the above referred to Board. 

By order of the Secretary of War : 

/S/ W. C. MCMILLION, 

Adjutant General. 
1 Incl. Memo 12 July 

The Adjutant General's Office 

Official 

War Department 



220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



[a] ARMY PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION 

TOP SECRET REPORT AND TOP SECRET MEMORANDA 

1. Top Secret Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, discussing cer- 
tain evidence and documents. 

2. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 25 
November 1944, reviewing Secret and Top Secret Reports of Army 
Pearl Harbor Board, and recommending further investigation. 

3. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 14 
September 1945, reviewing Secret and Top Secret Reports of Army 
Pearl Harbor Board on the basis of additional evidence. 

4. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 
14 September 1945, reviewing in greater detail certain aspects of the 
Top Secret Report of Army Pearl Harbor S^ard in the light of addi- 
tional evidence and modifications of previous testimony. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 221 



[b] TOP SECRET REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR 

BOARD 

[c] Memo : To The Secretary of War : 

The following is a brief discussion of the evidence and documents 
in the possession of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, which for reasons 
of security should not be incorporated in the General Report. The Sec- 
retary of War is entirely familiar with this type of evidence and the 
Board is sure concurs in its decision to treat it separately and as Top 
Secret. 

[7] 1. General. Information from informers and other means 
as to the activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the 
negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession 
of the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December 
of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of the 
Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know what 
were the Japanese potential moves that were scheduled by them 
against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession 
of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions. 

This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late 
in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the ne- 
cessity for resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate 
day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare 
for the eventualities of war. 

The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy 
gave only a small fraction on this information. No direction was given 
the Hawaiian Department based upon this information except the 
"Do-Don "t" message of November 27, 1941. It would have been possi- 
ble to have sent safely information, ample for the purpose of orienting 
the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives could have been 
formulated to put the Department on Alert Number 3. 

This was not done. 

Under the circumstances, where information has a vital bearing 
upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and this information 
cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders, 
it is incumbent upon the War Department then [^] to assume 
the responsibility for specific directions to the theater commanders. 
This is an exception to the admirable policy of the War Department 
of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the competent field 
commanders. 

Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. 
The disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent 
that its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The 
difference between alerting those defenses in time by a directive from 
the War Department based upon this information and the failure to 
alert them is a difference for which the War Department is responsi- 
ble, wholly aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having 
selected the right alert. 

79716— 46— Ex. 157- -15 



222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The War Department had the information. All they had to do 
was either to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it. 

The details of this information follow : 

2. ^tory of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Inten- 
tions from September to December 191^1. The record shows almost 
daily information as to the Japanese plans and intentions during this 
period. 

1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 
had been fixed (Tokyo time) as the government date for Japanese 
offensive military operations. (R. 86) 

2. On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Jap- 
anese' intentions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the 
United States. (R. 87) War Department G-2 advised the Chief of 
Staff on November 26 that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported 
the \3'\ concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an un- 
known port ready for offensive action. 

3. On December 1 definite information came from three independ- 
ent sources that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the 
United States, but would maintain peace with Russia. (R. 87) 

As Colonel Bratton summed it up : 

The picture that hiy before all of our policy making and planning officials, 
from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War down to the Chief of the 
War Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it was a picture that 
was being painted over a period of weeks if not months. (R. 243-244) 

The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese inten- 
tions as to war and the attack came on December 3 with information 
that Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines. This 
was construed by G-2 as meaning immediate war. (R. 280) All 
the information that the War Department G-2 had was presented in 
one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of 
the government. These officials included Secretary of State, Secre- 
tary of War, Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division. 
In most instances, copies of our intelligence, in whatever form it was 
presented, were sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence, to keep them 
abreast of our trend of thought. (R. 297) 

Colonel Bratton on occasions had gone to the Chief of the War 
Plans Division and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and stood by 
while they read the contents of these folders, in case they wished to 
question him about any of it. Colonel Bratton testifies : 

I had an arrangement with Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General Staff, 
how he could get me on the telephone at any time in case the Chief [41 
of Staff wished to be briefed on any of them. (R. 299) 

4. When the information on December 3 came as to the Japanese 
destroying their codes and code machines, which was construed as 
certain war. Colonel Bratton took the information to General Miles 
and General Gerow and talked at length with both of them. General 
Gerow opposed sending out any further warning to the overseas com- 
mand. General Miles felt he could not go over General Gerow's 
decision. (R. 283) Colonel Bratton then went to see Commander 
McCullom of the Navy, Head of the Far Eastern Section in ONI, and 
he concurred in Bratton's judgment that further warning should be 
sent out because this action of the Japanese meant war almost imme- 
diately. Colonel Bratton then returned after making arrangements 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 223 

with McCullom and persuaded General Miles to send a message to 
G-2, Hawaiian Department, instructing him to go to Commander 
Eochefort, Office of Naval Intelligence, with the Fleet to have him 
secure from Rochefort the same information which General Gerow 
would not permit to be sent directly in a war warning message. (R. 
283-284) 

All of this important information which was supplied to higher 
authority in the War Department, Navy Department, and State De- 
partment did not go out to the field, with the possible exception of the 
general statements in occasional messages which are shown in the 
Board's report. Only the higher-ups in Washington secured this in- 
formation. (R. 302) G-2 was prevented as a matter of policy from 
giving out intelligence information of this sort to G-2 in overseas 
departments. The Navy also objected to any of this type of intelli- 
gence being, sent by the Army without its authority. 

[-5] The War Plans Division refused to act upon the recom- 
mendations of G-2. Intelligence Bulletins were distributed giving this 
information. AVhen G-2 recommended, for instance, the occupation of 
the outer Aleutians ahead of the Japanese, the War Plans Division took 
no action upon the estimate and recommendation, with the result that 
we later had to fight two costly campaigns to regain Attn and Kiska. 
(R. 301-302) 

Captain Saft'ord of the Communications Security Division in Naval 
Operations, testified as to the type of information that was coming into 
the Navy during November and December. 

Tokyo informed Nomura on the 22nd of November that the 25th was 
the last date they could permit him negotiations. (R. 121) On No- 
vember 26th specific information received from the Navy indicated that 
Japan intended to wage offensive war against the United States. (R. 
123-121) Nomura on the 26th said he thought he had failed the Em- 
peror and that his humiliation was complete, evidently referring to the 
ultimatum delivered to him by the Secretary of State. 

Colonel Sadtler testified as to the information that was coming in as 
to Japanese intentions in the fall of 191:1, saying: 

The information began to assume rather serious proportions regarding the 
tense and strained relations between the two countries, and the number of mes- 
sages about warnings of conditions that obtain in case of hostilities really reached 
a climax around the middle of November, to such an extent that we were of the 
opinion that there might be a declaration of war between Japan and the United 
States on Sunday, November 30. This, as you all know, proved to be a "dud,'" and 
on Monday, December 1, if I recall the date correctly, messages that morning 
began coming in from Tokyo telling the Consuls to destroy their codes and to reply 
to Tokyo with one code word when they had so complied with their directive. 

[6] The Japanese Embassy in Washington was advised to de- 
stroy their codes on December 3. (R. 249-250) 

3. The "TFi7?6?5'" Message. Colonel Sadtler said that about November 
20, a message was intercepted by the Federal Communications Commis- 
sion, to the effect that the Japanese were notifying nationals of possible 
war with the United States. The "winds" message was indicated in 
these instructions, which would indicate whether the war would be with 
the United States, Russia, or Great Britain, or any combination of 
them. The Federal Communications Commission was asked to listen 
for such information. 



224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

On the morning of December 5, 1941, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Naval 
Communications, called Colonel Sadtler at 9 : 30 saying, "Sadtler, the 
message is in !" He did not know whether the particular message was 
the one that meant war with the United States, but it meant war with 
either the United States, Russia, or Great Britain. He immediately 
advised General Miles and Colonel Bratton. 

Sadtler was instructed to go back to Admiral Noyes to get the precise 
wording used, but Admiral Noyes said that he was too busy with a 
conference and he would have to attend to it later. Colonel Sadtler 
protested that that would be too late. (R. 251-252) He reported back 
to General Miles. He then went to see General Gerow, Head of the War 
Plans Division, and suggested a message be sent to Hawaii. General 
Gerow said, "No, that they had plenty of information in Hawaii." He 
then went to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Smith, and 
made the same suggestion. When Smith learned that G-2 and the War 
Plans Division had been talked to, he declined to discuss it further. 
[7] It w\^s about the 5th or 6th of December that Tokyo notified the 
Japanese Embassy at Washington to destroy their remaining codes. 
It was on December 5 that Sadtler discussed this matter with General 
Gerow^ and Colonel Smith, because as Sadtler said, "I was sure war was 
coming, and coming very quickly." (R. 254) 

Colonel Bratton arranged on behalf of G-2 for monitoring of Japa- 
nese weather broadcasts with the Federal Communications Commis- 
sion, These arrangements were made through Colonel Sadtler. 
(R. 57, 103) Colonel Bratton testified that no information reached 
him as to the break in relations shown by the "winds" message prior 
to the Pearl Harbor disaster, December 7, 1941, and he does not 
believe anybody else in G-2 received any such information. (R. 
58-59) 

He conferred with Kramer and McCullom of the Navy. The mes- 
sage sent to him by the Federal Communications Commission was not 
the message he was looking for. (R. 60) Later he learned from the 
Navy about their monitoring efforts in Hawaii and the Far East, and 
the fact that they would probably secure the "winds" message sooner 
than he would in Washington. That is the reason why he sent the 
message of December 5. to Fielder, G-2, in Hawaii, to make contact 
with Commander Rochefort, to secure orally information of this sort. 
(R. 62-63) A copy of this message has been produced in the record 
showing that it was sent. Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler testi- 
fied to the fact that their records showed that it was sent. (R. 69, 70, 
71) But Colonel Fielder said he got no such message. (R. 68) The 
Navy now admits having received this "winds" activating message 
about December 6, but the War Department files show no copy of such 
message. (R. 89, 281) 

[8] From the naval point of view Captain Safford recites the 
story of the "winds" message saying that Japan announced about the 
26th of November 1941 that she would state her intentions in regard to 
war with Russia, England, the Dutch, and the United States, by the 
"winds" message. On November 28, 1941, the "winds" code was given. 
On December 3, 1941. the Naval Attache at Batavia gave another ver- 
sion of the "winds" code. All three of these messages indicated the 
probalility of the breaking off of relations and offensive warfare by 
Japan against the United States or the other nations mentioned. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 225 

On December 4, 1941, information was received through the Navy 
Department which was sent to Captain Safford which contained the 
Japanese "winds" message, "War with England, War with America, 
Peace with Eussia." (R. 132)^ 

This original message has now disappeared from the Navy files and 
cannot be found. It was in existence just after Pearl Harbor and was 
collected with other messages for submission to the Roberts Commis- 
sion. Copies were in existence in various places but they have all 
disappeared. (R. 133-135) 

[9] Captain Satford testified : 

General Russell. Have you helped or been active at all iu this search which 
has been made in the Naval Department to discover this original message? 

Captain Saffoed. I have. As a last resort I requested copies of the message 
repeatedly from 20G, and on the last occasion I aslsed the officer in charge, who 
was Captain Stone, to stir his people up a little harder and see if they couldn't 
make one more search and discover it. And when Captain Stone discovered it 
couldn't be found, he called for — required written statements for anybody who 
might have any notice of that ; and though the written statements disclosed a 
lot of destruction of other messages and things — not messages, but the intercepts ; 
not the translations — nothing ever came to light on that message, either the 
carbon copy of the original incoming message, which should have been filed with 
the work sheet, or of the translation. And one copy of the translation should 
have been filed under the JD number, which I think is 7001, because that number 
is missing and unaccounted for, and that falls very close to the proper date. It 
actually comes in with the 3rd, but things sometimes got a little bit out as far 
as putting those numbers on was concerned. Ajid the other should be filed under 
the date and with the translation. We had a double file. 

The last time I saw that message after the attack on Pearl Harbor about the 
15th of December, Admiral Noyes called for the assembling of all important 
messages into one file, to show as evidence to the Roberts Commission ; and 
Kramer assembled them, and I checked them over for completeness and to see 
that we strained out the unimportant ones ; and that "Winds" translation, the 
"Winds execute," was included in those. I do not recall whether that ever came 
back or not. So far as I know, it may even be with the original papers of the 
Roberts Commission. It never came back that I know of, and we have never 
seen it since, and that is the last I have seen of it. 

We also asked the people in the Army on several occasions if they could run 
it down and give us a copy. We were trying to find out the exact date of It and 
the exact wording of the message, to run this thing down and not make the 
thing a question depending upon my memory or the memory of Kramer or the 
memory of Murray, who do districtly recall it. 

******* 

General Russell. Well, now, let us talk cases. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

[10] General Russell. I want to know if over there in 20G you had a 
place where you had 20G files of messages, and then over here some other place 
you had a JD file which was separate and distinct from the one I have just 
discussed. 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir. 

General Russell. But you had messages over there in the JD file? 

Captain Safford. We had. Yes, sir ; that is correct. 

General Russell. And they were the same as the ones in the 20G file? 

Captain Safford. Yes, sir, but they were in a different order. 

General Russell. All right. Now, this message of December 4th, when it went 
to the JD file, was given the number, according to your testimony, of 7001? 



1 Captain Safford testified that the Japanese were no longer using the code employed to 
transmit the wind messages ; that there was no reason now why they should not be 
discussed openly. 

Colonel Rufus Bratton, on the contrary, testified that it would be dangerous to acquaint 
the Japanese with the fact that Ave intercepted the winds message, as this might result 
in further code changes by the Japanese. 

The Board, as a matter of course, decided to follow the safe plan and treat these 
messages as Top Secret. 



226 COXGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Saffobd. It probably was. 

General Russehx. You don't know that? 

Captain Sajtoed. Not to know ; only circumstantial evidence. 

General Russell. Well, is JD 7000 in that file now? 

Captain Safford. JD 7000 is there, and 7002. 

General Russell. But 7001 just isn't there? 

Captain Safford. The whole file for the month of December 1941 is present or 
accounted for except 7001. 

General Russell. Now let us talk about 20G, which is some other place in this 
office. Is this December 4th message the only one that is out of those files? 

Captain Safford. That is the only one that we looked for that we couldn't 
find. It is possible that there will be others missing which we haven't looked for, 
but we couldn't find that serial number. ,We looked all through the month to 
make certain. That is the only one that is mi.ssing or unaccounted for. 

[11] The radio station logs, showing the reception of the mes- 
sage have been destroyed, within the last year. Captain Safford 
testified that this message, and everything else they got from November 
12 on, was sent to the White Honse by the Navj^ It was a circulated 
copy that circulated to the White House and to the Admirals of the 
Navy. 

It is this message which the Army witnesses testified was never re- 
ceived by the Army. It was a clear indication to the United States 
as early as December 4, The vital nature of this message can be 
realized. 

4. Account of the Delivery of the Long 11^ Part Message; the Short 
Itnplementing Message. The first 13 parts of the long reply of the 
Japanese finally terminating the relationships with the United States 
began to come in in translated form from the Navy on the afternoon 
of December 6', and the 13 parts Avere completed between 7 : 00 and 
9 : 00 the evening of December 6. Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far 
Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of War Department G-2, 
was the designated representative for receiving and distributing to the 
Army and to the Secretary of State copies of messages of this character 
received from the Navy. The Navy undertook to deliver to the Presi- 
dent and to its own organization copies of similar messages. 

Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9 : 00 
and 10: 30 p. m., December 6, as follows: 

To Colonel Smith (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General 
Staff in a locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. (R. 238) 
He told General Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained 
v^ery important papers and General Marshall should be told at once 
so that he could unlock the U^] bag and see the contents. 
(R. 307) 

To General Miles by handing the message to hhn (R. 238), by dis- 
cussing the message with General Miles in his office and reading it in 
his presence. (R. 239-241) He stated that General Miles did nothing 
about it as far as he knows. (R. 241) This record shows no action by 
General Miles. 

Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Gailey, General Gerow's 
executive in the War Plans Division. (R. 238) 

He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the 
State Department for the Secretary of State and did so between 
10: 00 and 10 :30 p.m. (R. 234, 239)^ 

Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10 : 30, 
had urged Colonel Smith, Secretary to General Staff, to communicate 
with General Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 227 

oreneral Miles after reading the message. This record shows no action 
on the part of General Smith and none by General Miles. Apparently 
the Chief of Staff was not advised of the situation mitil the following 
morning. 

In the meantime, as the testimony of Captain Safford shows, the fol- 
lowing action was taken with the distribution of the same 13 parts 
of the message by the Nav}" which clearly indicates its importance. 

Captain Safford testifies that the first 13 parts came in on the after- 
noon of December 6 and were translated to English and delivered to 
the Army to JNIapr Doud by 9 o'clock Saturday night, December 6. 
This portion of the message was distributed as follows : Commander 
Kramer consulted with the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral 
Wilkinson, and was directed to go to the White House to deliver a 
copy. He then delivered a [13] copy to Admiral AVilkinson 
at his house. As the President was engaged, Kramer gave a copy to 
the White House Aide, Admiral Beardall. When Kramer reached 
Admiral Wilkinson's liouse he also gave a copy to Admiral Turner, 
Director of War Plans. He delivered the final copy by midnight to 
Admiral Ingersoll, who read it and initialed it. Admiral Wilkinson 
phoned Admiral Stark, as did also Admiral Turner. Admiral Stark 
ordered Kramer to be at his office at 9 : 00 Sunday morning. Kramer 
came back to the Navy Department about 1 a. m. to see if part 14 
had come in. but it had not. 

When part 14 did come in it was readv for delivery to the Army in 
English by 7 : 15 a. m.. December 7. (R. 158, 160, 164, 166) 

The net result was that no one took any action based upon the first 
13 parts until the 14th part came in and the Army took no action on 
that until between 11:30 and 12:00 on the morning of December 7, 
or about 13 hours after the first 13 parts came in which clearly indi- 
cated the rupture of relations with the Japanese. 

Nothing more was done with this clear warning in the first 13 parts 
of the long message until the following events occurred. 

Colonel Bratton received from a naval officer courier between 8 : 30 
and 9 : 00 a. m. on the Sunday morning of December 7, the English 
translation of the 14th part of the long message and the short message 
of the Japanese direction the Ambassador to deliver the long message 
at 1 p. m. on December 7 and to destroy their codes. Colonel Brat- 
ton immediately called General Marshall's quarters at 9:00 a. m. 
(R. 85) [I4] General Marshall was out horseback riding and 

he asked that he be sent for. General Marshall called him back 
between 10 : 00 and 11 : 00 a. m. General Marshall came into his office 
at 11 : 25 a. m., of which there is a contemporaneous written record 
maintained by Colonel Bratton. In the meantime. Colonel Bratton 
called his Chief, General Miles, and reported what he had done. (R. 
77) Neither General Miles nor General Gerow w'ere in their office 
on Sunday morning. General Miles arrived at the same time as Gen- 
eral Marshall at 11:25 a. m. The Chief of Staff prepared a message 
to General Short and called Admiral Stark, who said he was not send- 
ing any further warning but asked General Marshall to inform the 
Navy in Hawaii through Short. 

The answer to the following question on the record has not been 
sujDplied this Board : 

Why were not the first 13 parts, which were considered important enough by 
the Navy to be delivered to the President and everyone of the important Admirals 



228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of the Navy, delivered by the War Department officers to the Chief of Staff, and 
his attention called to it so that he could have taken some sort of action upon 
it? (R ) 

The only possible answer lies in the testimony that Colonel Smith, 
Secretary to the General Staff was told about 9 p. m. December 6 that 
there was an important document and that General Marshall should 
see it right away. (R. 242) There is no proof that Colonel Smith 
did so act except that from General Marshall, which shows that he 
was not advised of this situation until the following morning when 
he received a message from Colonel Bratton between 10 : 00 and 11 : 00 
a. m., December 7. 

The record shows that subordinate officers who were [15'] en- 
trusted with this information were so impressed with it that they 
strongly recommended that definite action be taken. 

When subordinate officers were prevented from sending this infor- 
mation to the Hawaiian Department, by arrangement with their oppo- 
site numbers in the Office of Naval Intelligence, upon learning that 
the Navy had this information in Hawaii, an apparently innocuous 
telegram was dispatched by G-2 to Colonel Fielder, G-2 in Hawaii, 
telling him to see his opposite number in the Office of Naval Intelli- 
gence, Commander Rochefort, to secure information from him of 
importance. 

The story of the message of November 27 takes on a whole new aspect 
when the facts are really known as to the background of knowledge 
in the War Department of Japanese intentions. At the time the 
Chief of Staff drafted the message of the 27th on the 26th, he knew 
everything that the Japanese had been proposing between themselves 
for a long period of time prior to that day, and knew their inten- 
tions with respect to the prospects of war. The message of the 27th 
which he drafted in rough and which was apparently submitted to the 
Joint Board of the Army and Navy, therefore could have been cast 
in the clearest sort of language and direction to the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment. 

It was no surprise that the Japanese would reject the Ten points 
on November 26 ; that course of events had been well pictured by com- 
plete information of the conversations between the Japanese Govern- 
ment and its representatives available to the Government of the United 
States. 

[16] 5. SumTTuiry. Now let us turn to the fateful period between 
November 27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous pieces 
of information came to our State, War and Navy Departments in 
all of their top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese 
including the probable exact hour and date of the attack. 

To clinch this extraordinary situation we but have to look at the 
record to see that the contents of the 13 parts of the Japanese final 
reply were completely known in detail to the War Department, com- 
pletely translated and available in plain English, by not later than 
between 7 and 9 o'clock on the evening of December 6 or approxi- 
mately Honolulu time. This information was taken by the Officer 
in Charge of the Far Eastern Section of G-2 of the War Department 
personally in a locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. Gen Smith, 
and Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, who was then Secretary to 
the General Staff, and he was told that the message was of the most 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 229 

vital importance to General Marshall. It was delivered also to G-2 
General Miles, witli whom it was discussed and to the Executive, 
Colonel Gailey, of the War Plans Division, each of whom was advised 
of the vital importance of this information that showed that the hour 
had struck, and that war was at hand. Before 10 : 30 o'clock that night, 
this same officer personally delivered the same information, to the 
Secretary of State's duty officer. 

General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This informa- 
tion, as vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him 
on that date by either Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows. 
When the final part 14 came in [17] on the morning of Decem- 
ber 7 and with it the short message directing the long message be de- 
livered to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m., December 7, 1941. It was 
then that this same officer, Colonel Bratton of G-2, took the initiative 
and went direct to General Marshall, calling him at his quarters at Fort 
Myer and sending an orderly to find him, where he was out horseback 
riding. When he finally did reach him on the phone. General Marshall 
said he was coming to the War Department. He met him at about 
11 : 25 a .m., after which time the message of December 7 was formu- 
lated by General Marshall in his own handwriting. It failed to reach 
its destination due to sending it by commercial Western Union — RCA. 
It arrived several hours after the attack. 

This brings us to the "winds" message. The "winds" message was 
one that was to be inserted in the Japanese news and weather broad- 
casts and repeated with a definite pattern of words, so as to indicate 
that war would take place either with Great Britain, Russia, or the 
United States, or all three. 

The Federal Communications Commission was asked to be on the 
outlook for these key words through their monitoring stations. Such 
information was picked up by a monitoring station. This information 
was received and translated on December 3, 1941, and the contents 
distributed to the same high authority. The Navy received during the 
evening of December 3, 1941, this message, which when translated 
said, "War with the United States, War with Britain, including the 
NEI, except peace with Russia." Captain Safford said he first saw 
the "winds" message himself about 8 a. m., on Thursday, December 4, 
1941. It had been received the previous evening, [18] accord- 
ing to handwriting on it by Commander Kramer, who had been noti- 
fied by the duty officer, Lt. (jg) Brotherhood, USNR, who was the 
watch officer on the receipt of this message. 

It was based upon the receipt of the message that Captain Safford 
prepared five messages between 1200 and 16'00 December 4, ordering 
the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential 
papers on the Asiatic stations. Captain McCullom of the Navy drafted 
a long message to be sent to all outlying fleet and naval stations. This 
was dissapproved by higher naval authority. This message was con- 
firmation to Naval Intelligence and Navy Department Communica- 
tions Intelligence Units that war was definitely set. 

This "winds execute" message has now disappeared from the Navy 
files and cannot be found despite the extensive search for it. It was 
last seen by Commander Safford about December 14, 1941, when he 
collected the papers together with Commander Kramer and turned 



230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tliem over to the Director of Naval Communication for use as evidence 
before the Roberts Commission. 

There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of 
December 4 and December 6, the imminence of war on the following 
Saturday and Sunday. December 6 and 7, was clear-cut and definite. 

Up to the morning ot December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese 
were planning to do was known to the United States except the final 
message instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part 
together with the preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock 
on December 7, or the very hour and minute when bombs were falling 
on Pearl Harbor. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 231 



[a] Memorandum for The Secretary of War 

Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board Keport, 25 November 1944 

[^] 25 Nov 1944. 

Memorandum for the Secretary of War 

Subject : Army Pearl Harbor Board Eeport. 

You have referred to me for opinion the Keport of the Army Pearl 
Harbor Board dated 20 October 1944 together with the testimony and 
exhibits. I have examined this Report with great care and submit 
herewith my views. The present memorandum does not cover so much 
of the investigation as pertains to the conduct of Colonel Theodore 
Wyman, Jr. and related matters referred to in the Report of the House 
Military Affairs Committee dated 14 June 1944. 

Technical Legality of Board's Proceedings: 

No question of the technical legality of the Board's proceedings is 
presented. As shown in the Report (Rep. 1) the Board was appointed 
by the Secretary of War by Letter Order AGO, 8 July 1944, (AGPO- 
A-A 210.311 (24 Jun 44)), as amended and supplemented, in order 
to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in Public Law 339, 78th 
Congress, approved 13 June 1944. The Board followed judicial forms, 
affording full opportunity to witnesses to produce any data in their 
possession. Interested parties such as General Short and others were 
likewise offered the fullest possible opportunity to appear before the 
Board and submit information. 

Boards Conclusions in General: 

The Board concludes broadly that the attack on Pearl Harbor was 
a surprise to all concerned : the nation, the War Department, and the 
Hawaiian Department, which caught the defending forces practically 
unprepared to meet it and to minimize its destructiveness (Rep. 297). 
The extent of the disaster was due, the Board states, (a) to the failure 
of General Short adequately to alert his command for war- (b) to 
the failure of the War Department, with knowledge of the 'type of 
alert taken by Short, to direct him to take an adequate alert; and (c) 
the failure to keep him adequately informed of the status of the United 
States-Japanese negotiations, which might have caused him to chano-e 
from the inadequate alert to an adequate one (Rep. 297). The Board 
follows these general conclusions by criticizing the conduct of the 
Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the then Chief of War Plans 
Division, and General Short (Rep. 297-300). The Board makes no 
recommendations. 

It is believed that the most feasible method of examining the Report 
is to take up first the Report's conclusions as to General Short and the 
other conclusions later. 



232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[2] Board'' 8 Conclusion As to General Short: 

Taking them up in their order the Board concludes that General 
Short failed in his duties in the following particulars : 

(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in tiie face of a 
war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. The information which 
he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the 
tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and that 
hostilities might be momentarily expected. This required that he guard against 
surprise to the extent possible and make ready his command so that it might 
be employed to the maximum and in time against the worst form of attack that 
the enemy might launch. 

(b) To reach or attempt tx) reach an agreement with the Admiral commandmg 
the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th Naval District for imple- 
menting the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements then in existence which 
provided for joint action bv the two services. One of the methods by which they 
might have become operative was through the joint agreement of the responsible 
commanders. 

(c) Toiinform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance 
being conducted by the Navy. 

(d) To. replace inefficient staff officers. (Rep. 300.) 

Shorfs Defenses: 

General Short, as the commander of a citadel taken by surprise, is 
in the position of the captain of a ship which has been wrecked : it is a 
question of the validity of his defenses. 

Within a half hour after receiving the 27 November warning radio 
signed "Marshall," (see p. 8, present memorandum) Short ordered 
Alert No. 1, which his SOP described as a defense against sabotage 
"with no threat from without." (Tr., Short 283, 395, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, 
par. 14.) He did this without consulting his staff, other than his 
Chief of Staff, and without consulting the Navy. (Tr., Short 282, 
395.) 

He also ordered into operation the radar air raid warning system, 
but only from 4 to 7 a. m., and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., 
Short 297 4442.) 

\3'] The action of Short, which was taken in pursuance of the 
27 November wire signed "Marshall," did not contemplate any outside 
threat. (Tr., Short 283, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14.) His failure to pro- 
vide for an outside threat was a serious mistake and resulted m over- 
whelming tactical advantages to the attackers, his being 'taken by 
surprise, the destruction of his aircraft on the ground, the severity 
of the damage done to the warships in Pearl Harbor and military in- 
stallations. Short testified that when he ordered Alert No. 1 he did 
not consider there was any probability of an air attack and that m 
this regard "I was wrong.""' (Tr., Short 4440.) 

Numerous witnesses confirm that the failure of Short to provide 
against an outside threat constituted a grave error of judgment. (Tr., 
Allen 3113 : Burgin 2618, 2655 ; Farthing 838-839 ; Gerow 4274 ; Hayes 
268; Herron 238; King 2700; Murray 3096-3097; Phillips 1127-1128, 
1151-1152; Powell 3911-3912; Throckmorton 1395-1396; Wells 2731; 

Wilson 1380-1381.) ^ ^. . ,,, ,^ , . . a 

Short sought to excuse his error by claiming: (1) that he tiad as- 
sumed the Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and 
would warn him in ample time in the event of an impending attack 
(Short, Ex. 1, p. 55; Tr., 299, 300, 451, 452; cf. Kmimel 1769); 
2) that in response to the radio signed "Marshall' of 27 November 
he informed the War Department of the alert against sabotage and 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 233 

the War Department had acquiesced therein and did not give him 
additional warnings after 27 November (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54; Tr. 286 
287, 308); (3) that measures to provide for threats from without 
would have interfered with training (Ex. 1, p. 16), and would have 
disclosed his intent and alarmed the civilian population (Ex. 1 p 
16-17) contrary to War Department instructions, and that the prime 
danger was sabotage. (Tr., Short 285, 286, 289, 428, 522; Ex. 1, p. 

These excuses are untenable. Short's belief that the Navy knew the 
whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in time cannot 
excuse him for his failure to take precautions against an outside threat 
In the same way he cannot be heard to justify his failure to adopt the 
necessary alert against an air attack because of fear of sabotao-e or 
disclosure of possible intent, or possibility of alarming the civifian 
population, or interference with his training program. These latter 
must clearly be subordinated to the overshadowing danger of a possible 
air attack. 

Short's testimony indicates that he felt he was not given sufficient 
information as to the true Japanese situation by Washington and that 
what information he got was at least in part misleadino- (Short 
Ex. 1, p. 54-56 ;Tr., 278-281, 291, 4427.) "" ^ ' 

The Board in its conclusion stated : 

The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was 
sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the 
Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected. (Rep. 300.) 

[4] General Short took conmiand 7 February 1941. That very 
day the Secretary of War transmitted to him a copy of a letter froM 
the Secretary of the Navy dated 24 January 1941 which stated : 

If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would 
be mitiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor 
(Roberts Report, p. 5) (Italics supplied.) 

Secretary Knox further stated that "inherent possibilities of a major 
disaster" warranted speedy action to "increase the joint readiness of 
the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character men- 
tioned * * *." The letter proceeded: 

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered 
to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage (4) 
submanne attack, (.5) mining, ((!) bombardment by gunfire. (Roberts Report 
p. 5.) ^ ' 

The letter stated that the defenses against all but the first two were 
satisfactory, described the nature of the probable air attack and urged 
that the Army consider methods to repel it. It recommended revision 
of joint Army and Navy defense plans and special training for the 
forces to meet such raids. (Eoberts Eeport, p. 5.) Short admitted 
he received Secretary Stimsoirs letter inclosing Secretary Knox's 
letter, both of which he recalled verv well. (Tr., Short 368-369.) 

On the same date, 7 February 1941, General Marshall wrote Short a 
letter containing the following statement: 

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is 
done us during the first six hours of known hostttitirs, thereafter the existing de- 
fenses would discourage an enemy against tlie hazard of an attack. Tiie risk of 
sabotage and the ri.sk involved in a surprise raid In/ Air and by sul)marine, con- 
stitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do nut see any lauding threat 



234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority. (Tr., Marshall 17) 
(Italics supplied.) 

On 5 March 1941 General Marshall wrote Short a follow-up letter 
saying : 

I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory 
system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of fir.st priority. 
(Tr., Marshall 19) (Italics supplied.) 

[5] Short replied by a letter, dated 15 March 1941, outlining 
the situation at length and stating : 

The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability 
of both the Army and Navy airfields to the attack. (Tr., Marshall 21.) (Italics 
supplied.) 

Short further stated: 

The Island is so small that there would not be the same degree of warning 
that would exist on the mainland. (Tr. Marshall 24.) 

On 14 April 1941 Short, reporting progress in coperating with the 
Navy, sent General Marshall three agreements made with the Navy 
to implement the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense F'lan and concluding 
with the remark : 

We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air 
force and the anti-aircraft defense. (Tr., Marshall 27.) (Italics supplied.) 

General Marshall on 5 May 1941 complimented him for "being on the 
job. (Tr., Marshall 27.) 

On 7 July 1941, The Adjutant General sent Short a radio fully ad- 
vising him of the Japanese situation. It told him that the Japanese 
Government had determined upon its future policy which might in- 
volve aggressive action against Russia and that an advance against the 
British and Dutch could not be entirely ruled out. It further advised 
him that all Jap vessels had been warned by Japan to be west of the 
Panama Canal by 1 August, that the movement of Japanese shipping 
from Japan had been suspended, and that merchant vessels were being 
requisitioned. (Tr., Marshall 33, Fielder 2974, Stimson 4055.) 

Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent 
General Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing 
three alerts. Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation 
of field positions ; Alert No. 2 being applicable to a condition not suf- 
ficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No. 
1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and uprisings 
within the Islands "with no particular threat from without." It will 
be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual alerts of 
the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in 
paragraph 13 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the 
earlier tentative draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, Short ex- 
pressly recognized the necessity for preparation for "« surjjrise hostile 
attack.'''' (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5. 64.) (Italics supplied.) 

\6'\ On 6 September, Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, advised the 
War Department that many of the Summaries of Information re- 
ceived from the War Department originated with the Office of Naval 
Intelligence, 14th Naval District, and that he had already received 
them. He stated that as the cooperation between his office, the Office 
of Naval Intelligence, and the FBI was most complete, that all such 



EEPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 235 

data was given him simultaneously with its dispatch to Washington 
and recommended that such notices from Washington to him be dis- 
continued to avoid duplication of effort. (Tr., Bratton D. 292-293.) 
On 16 October, the Chief of Naval Operations advised Kimmel that 
the Japanese Cabinet resignation created a grace situation, that the 
new cabinet would probably be anti-American, that hostilities between 
Japan and Russia were strongly possible, and that since Japan held 
Britain and the United States responsible for the present situation 
there was also a possibility that Japan might attack these two powers. 
The radio concluded : 

In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such 
preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention or constitute 
provocative action against Japan. (Tr. Short 279.) 

Short admits receiving this message. (Tr., Short 278.) 
Secretary Stimson testified the War Department had this warning 
sent to Short. (Tr., Stimson 4055.) 

On 17 October, Short's G-2 furnished Short's staff' with a full esti- 
mate of the Japanese situation which stated the situation was ex- 
tremely critical, that Japan would shortly announce her decision to 
challenge militarily any nation which might oppose her policy, and that 
the major successes of the Axis afforded an unparalleled opportunity 
for expansion with chances of minimum resistance, that probable 
moves included an attack upon Russia, upon British possessions in 
the Far East, a defense against American attack in support of the 
British, and a simultaneous attack upon the ABCD bloc "at whatever 
points might promise her greatest tactical, strategic, and economical 
advantages." The report stated that a simultaneous attack on the 
ABCD powers 

* * * cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan con- 
siders war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions 
against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before 
our naval program is completed. (Tr. 3(>88.) 

[7] On 18 or 20 October the War Department advised Short : 

The following War Department estimate of the Japanese situation for your in- 
formation. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but 
no, repeat no, abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy seems imminent. (Tr., 
Short 412-413, Hain 3307, Gerow 42-58, 4264. ) 

Short's G-2 gave him a further estimate of the Japanese situation 
on 25 October 1941 stating that there had been no fundamental change 
in the situation since his w^arning advice of 17 October above referred 
to. It stated that a crisis of the first magnitude was created in the 
Pacific by the fall of the Japense Cabinet, that actions of the new 
cabinet "definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States" 
and "forces America into a state of constant vigilance." It predicted 
Jap use of peace negotiations "as a means to dehide and disarm her 
potential enemies." It predicted a major move would be made before 
the latter part of November "with a chance that the great break, if 
it comes, will not occur before spring." (Tr., 3689-3694.) 

On 5 November, the War Department Gr-2 wrote Short's G-2 that 
Hirota, head of the Black Dragon Society, had stated that 

* * * War with the United States would best begin in December or in Febru- 
gj.y « «: ^ rpjjg jjg^ cabinet would likely start war within sixty days, * * * 
(Tr., Bratton D. 289-291.) 



236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Bicknell, Short's Asst. G-2, testified that early in November 
in his Weekly Intelligence Summary the statement was made that 

* * * from all information which had been gathered in our office in Hawaii 
it looked as though hostilities could be expected either by the end of November 
or, if not, then not until spring. (Tr., Bicknell 1439-1440.) 

Captain Edwin T. Layton, Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet, 
testified he believed he had informed Colonel Edwin Raley, G-2 of the 
Hawaiian Air Force and who had been assigned as liaison with the 
Navy, that Japanese troops, vessels, naval vessels, and transports were 
moving south. This information came from Naval observers in 
China, tlie naval attache in Tokyo, the naval attache in Chungking, 
British and other sources. This intelligence indicated that the Japa- 
nese would invade the Kra Isthmus. Jap submarines about this time 
had been contacted in the vicinity of Oahu. (Tr., Layton 3030, 3031, 
3040-3041.) 

[<§] On 24 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations 
radioed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, that 

There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiatiions with 
Japan. This situation coupled with statements of Nippon Government and 
movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a 
surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the 
Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch 
and concurs and requests action addresses (CINOAF, CINCAP, COMS 11, 12, 
13, 14) inform senior army officers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy is 
necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate 
Jap action. Guam will be informed in a separate dispatch. (Tr., Gerow 
4258 ; cf . Bloch 1503-C. ) 

This message was presented to General Short by Captain Layton 
with his estimate. Not only did he deliver the message but he 
discussed it fully with Short. (Tr., Layton 3058-3059.) Short said, 
"I do not think I ever got that message. * * * I might have 
seen it, * * * and I might have forgotten about it." (Tr., 
Short 414.) 

On 26 November 1941, the War Department radioed Short: 

It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on special 
photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Carolina group while 
simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to 
location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps and naval 
vessels including submarines * * * before they depart Honolulu insure 
that both B-24's are fully supplied with ammunition for guns. (Tr., Gerow 
4259.) 

The War Department sent Short three messages on 27 November, 
all of which arrived. The one signed "Marshall" read as follows : 

Negotiations with .Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purjwses 
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come 
back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile 
action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided. 
United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy 
should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action 
that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile [9] Japanese action 
you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you 
deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat 
not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. 
Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 
as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret 
information to minimum essential officers. (Tr., Gerow 4259-4260, Short 
280-281.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 237 

This same day, 27 November, G-2 of the War Department radioed 
Short's G-2 as follows : 

Advise only the Commanding Officer and the Chief of Staff that it appears 
that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. 
Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. Also possiUe that Jiostilities may 
begin. (Tr., Gerow 4260.) (Italics supplied.) 

The third message sent Short on 27 November 1941 was through 
the Navy Department, reading as follows : 

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan 
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an 
aggressve move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number 
and equipment of Jap troops and the organization of naval task forces indi- 
cates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or the Kra 
Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment 
preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District 
and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Depart- 
ment. Spanavo informed British. Continental district Guam Samoa directed 
to take appropriate measures against sabotage. (Tr., Gerow 4262.) 

Short admits he got this message. (Tr., Short 415, 416, 469.) 

The following day, 28 November, The Adjutant General sent Short a long 
radio stating that tlie critical situation demanded that all precautions be taken 
immediately against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr., Arnold 170, Short 
293, Scanlon 4176.) Short stated he took this as tacit consent to his alert 
against sabotage only (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54) and as a reply to his radio report 
of 27 November. (Tr., Short 422.) Short sent a long reply to this message 
giving the various precautions taken by him against subversive activities and 
sabotage. (Tr., Short 294-296.) 

[10] There was a further message from the Chief of Naval 
Operations, dated 30 November, stating that Japan was about to 
launch an attack on the Kra Isthmus. (Roberts Report, p. 8.) Short 
also received Admiral Kimmel's Fortnightly Summary of Current 
International Situations, dated December 1, 1941, which stated that 
deployment of Jap naval ships southward indicated clearly that ex- 
tensive preparations were under way for hostilities and referred to 
naval and air activity in the Mandates. (Tr., Kimmel 1769-1770.) 
An FBI or War Department report that the Jap Consuls in Honolulu 
were burning their codes and secret papers was given to Short's G-2 
on 5 or 6 December 1941. (Tr., Fielder 2986, Bicknell 1413-1414.) 
The Navy advised Kimmel on 3 December that Jap Consulates in 
Washington and London were destroying codes and burning secret 
documents. (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513.) There were two Navy messages 
on 4 December 1941, the first on information copy to Kimmel of advice 
to certain naval commanders to destroy confidential documents (Tr., 
Bloch 1514), the second a similar radiogram advising "be prepared 
to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you 
retain." (Tr., Bloch 1514, Safford C. 187.') Another Navy message 
of 6 December "directed that in view of the tense situation naval com- 
manders in Western Pacific areas should be authorized to destroy con- 
fidential papers." (Tr., Safford C. 189, Bloch 1514.) 

In addition to all the above, G-2 of the War Department radioed 
Short's G-2 on 5 December 1941 to contact Commander Rochefort, in 
charge of naval cryptographic work in Pearl Harbor, relative to Jap 
weather broadcasts from Tokyo "that you must obtain" and stating 
categorically "contact him at once." This had reference to the impor- 
tant "Winds" intercept, to be discussed more fully later. (Tr., Bratton 

79716— 46— Ex. 157 16 



238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

B. 62, D. 283.) Also, Colonel Bicknell of Short's G-2 staff advised 
Short's entire staff on 5 December that the Jap Consulate was burning 
papers and that to him this meant war was imminent. (Tr., Bicknell 
1413.) Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, confirmed the fact that Colonel 
Bicknell so reported. (Tr., Fielder 2986.) 

On 5 December 1941, Hawaii time. Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, 
U. S. Military Attache in Melbourne, Australia, sent a cable to the 
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, stating that the Nether- 
lands Far Eastern Command had ordered the execution of Plan A-2 
based on their intelligence report of Japanese naval movements in 
the vicinity of Palau. (Tr., O'Dell 4506-4507.) Lieutenant Kobert 
H. O'Dell who was then Assistant Military Attache in the American 
Legation, Melbourne, Australia, testified that Plan A-2 was integrated 
into the JRainbow Plan. (Tr., O'Dell 4511-4512.) The message in 
question was supposed to be relayed to the War Department by the 
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for deciphering and re- 
peat. (Tr., O'Dell 4509.) The record does not show whether Short 
ever received this message. Other messages in the same code had been 
transmitted between the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, and the American Legation in Australia. (Tr., O'Dell 4510.) 
Colonel Merle-Smith had not sent the cable in question to Washington 
in the first instance in order that there should be no delay. 

[11] Lastly, on 6 December 1941, Short's Assistant G-2, Colonel 
Bicknell, informed him that the FBI at Honolulu had intercepted a 
telephone conversation between one Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent in 
Honolulu, and a person in Tokyo who inquired as to the fleet, sailors, 
searchlights, aircraft, and "Hibiscus" and "poinsettias," (probably 
code words). This message evidently had "military significance" as 
Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge, and Colonel Bicknell testi- 
fied. (Tr., Shivers 3205, Bicknell 1415-1416.) 

Short knew that the most dangerous form of attack on Pearl Har- 
bor would be a surprise air attack at dawn. He had participated in 
plans and exercises against such a possibility. The fact is that on 
31 March 1941 he signed the Martin-Bellinger Air Operations Agree- 
ment with the Navy, paragraph IV of which provided that daily 
patrols should be instituted to reduce the probability of "air surprise." 
(Tr., Short 387-388.) Paragraphs (d) and (e) of this Agreement 
(quoted in Eeport on page 98; Roberts Record 556-D-F) state: 

(d) * * * It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on 
Oahu would be an air attack. * * * 

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would be delivered 
as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might 
find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to 
start * * *. 

General Short himself testified that he was fully aware of a possible 
surprise air attack. (Tr., Short 388.) 

General Hayes, Short's Chief of Staff up to the middle of October 
1941, (Tr., Hayes 242) testified that he. General Martin, Short's air 
chief, and Admiral Bellinger, the naval air chief, considered a surprise 
air raid as the most probable enemy action and that this was the esti- 
mate of the Hawaiian Department in Short's time and also in the time 
of his predecessor General Herron. (Tr., Hayes 267-268.) Colonel 
Donegan, Short's G-3 at the time of the attack (Tr., Donegan 1929), 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 239 

testified that the possibility of a surprise air raid had been discussed 
"many, many times." (Tr., Donegan 1961-1963.) Short had at least 
one air defense exercise each week with the Navy from March (Tr,, 
Short 293) and he conducted an air raid drill as late as 29 November 
1941. (Tr., DeLany 1727.) 

General Short admitted that while the 27 November message in- 
structed him to undertake reconnaissance, this only indicated to him 
that "whoever wrote that message was not familiar with the fact that 
the Navy had assumed the full responsibility for that long-distance 
reconnaissance * * *." (Tr., Short 4412.) 

[12] Thus, Short concluded that in drafting the message Wash- 
ington did not understand the situation but that he. Short, did. It 
should be borne in mind that Short at no time called on Washington 
for clarification of any of these messages. 

Short contended that both the War Department message of 16 
October and that of 27 November stressed the necessity of avoiding 
provocative action against Japan (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 279- 
281) and that when the 27 November message was sent there was still 
hope m the minds of the War Department that differences might be 
avoided. (Tr., Short 281.) He likewise interpreted the 27 Novem- 
ber message to mean that he must avoid any action which would alarm 
the Jjapanese population, which was confirmed by The Adjutant 
General's radio to him of 28 November. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 
293-294.) As Short testified : 

Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that tliere 
was going to be anything more than sabotage * * *. (Tr., Short 437.) 

Short testified he was confirmed in this conclusion by the action of 
the War Department in sending the flight of B-17's to Hawaii without 
ammunition for defense. The planes arrived in this condition during 
the attack. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 21, 22, 55 ; Tr., 307, 471.) 

Asked about "the possibility of confusion" created by the messages 
from Washington and whether he did not think the situation de- 
manded vigorous action on his part, Short replied "very definitely not, 
from the information I had." (Tr., Short 453.) 

The Board stated in its conclusions that the information furnished 
General Short was "incomplete and confusing." (Kep. 300.) 

Notwithstanding any information from Washington which Short 
regarded as conflicting or qualifying, the responsibility'^ rested upon 
Short to be prepared for the most dangerous situation with which he 
could be confronted. This precaution on his part as the Commanding 
General was mandatory. Short was adequately advised of the immi- 
nent rupture in diplomatic relations between the United States and 
Japan, of the imminence of war, of the probable momentary outbreak 
of hostilities by Japan against the United States, and of the possibility 
of sabotage and espionage. The prime and unanswered question was 
when and where Japan would strike. As to this danger, the limita- 
tions and restrictions set forth in the messages were at all times sub- 
ordinate to the principal instruction, namely that war was imminent 
and Short should be prepared for it. The instruction to this effect 
contained in the message of 27 November was as follows : 

|-jgj * * * rpjjjg policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restrict- 
ing you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. * * * 
(Tr., Short 280-281.) 



240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Thus, a mere reading of the messages will show that Short should 
not have been misled as to their essential meaning, namely, that he 
must be on the alert against threats both from within and froin with- 
out. 

Short stresses greatly his reply to the 27 November message signed 
"Marshall." This reads : 

Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison witli tlie Navy. (Short 
Ex. 1, p. 16; Tr. 286.) 

As previously pointed out, Short sent this brief reply within thirty 
minutes after receipt of the 27 November radio from Washington, and 
without consulting the Navy or the members of his staff. This de- 
cision and action by Short occurred before Short's G-2 received the 
message which the War Department G-2 radioed to Short on 27 
November, clearl}^ indicating that both sabotage and hostilities might 
commence and be concurrent. (Tr., Short 282, 395, 520, Fielder 2962) . 
Short claims his report to Washington, quoted above, was in effect a 
notice that he had only ordered an alert against sabotage, pursuant to 
the directive to report contained in the 27 November message signed 
"Marshall." 

He testified : 

Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe there 
was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had 
a very serions training proposition vpith the Air Corps particularly, that if we 
went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn't meet 
the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they 
told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I 
reported action taken and there was no comment that my action was to little 
or too much I was a hundred per cent convinced that they agreed with it. (Tr., 
Short 437. 1 

When, however, he was asked what that portion of his reply reading, 
"liaison with the Nav}^" meant, lie replied : 

General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with 
the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing. 

General Gkunebt. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to 
carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance? 

[7^] General Short. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that 
or not, it would have affected it, because they had sig;ned a definite agreement 
which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff. (Tr., Short 380) 

Both the Army and Navy messages of 27 November 1941 pictured 
an emergency and called for action imder the War Plan. The Navy 
message expressly stated : 

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. * * * Execute an ap- 
propriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned 
in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is 
being sent by the War Department.* * * (Tr., Gerow 4262) 

The symbols WPL 46X refer to the Kainbow Plan. (Tr., Bloch 1512) 
On 27 November 1941, the Navy informed the Army authorities of 
the message. (Tr., Layton 3041, Kimmel 1779) Short admits he re- 
ceived this message. (Tr., Short 416, 469) The corresponding warn- 
ing sent by the War Department was Radiogram No. 472, 27 Novem- 
ber 1941. That message after stating "hostile action possible at any 
moment" goes on to say that after the outbreak of hostilities the tasks 
assigned in the Rainbow Plan will be carried out in so far as they per- 
tain to Japan. The implementation of that portion of the Plan by 
means of reconnaissance refers to paragraph 18 (i) of the Plan which 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 241 

provides that the Navy shall undertake the distant reconnaissance. 
(Tr. Kimmel 1745) 

Short is in a dilemna in contending that distant reconnaissance was 
a Navy responsibility, (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 15; Tr. 54, 281, 373, 377-380, 
383, 393-394, 4443-4444) because it only became a Navy responsibility 
if and when the Joint Army and Navy Agreement was put into effect. 
Yet Short made no effort to put it into effect, even in part. (Tr., 
Lawton 2675-2676, Short 4437, 4441) 

General Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division at the time, testified : 

* * * A threat of hostile attack was clearly stated in the War Plans mes- 
sage of November 27, and there was no reason for. members of the War Plans 
Division to believe that the CG of the Hawaiian Department did not recognize 
that threat as imminent, and that he would not take action in accordance with 
the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Department and the 
Fourteenth Naval District. (Tr., Gerow 4283-4284) 

[IS] General Gerow testified further that from Short's reply 
"liaison with the Navy" it was reasonable for General Gerow to as- 
sume further that 

General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive measures 
in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure under the 
basic Plan. * * * (Tr., Gerow 4289) 

Thus, in reality, the reply of Short indicated to the War Depart- 
ment not only that he had taken precautions against sabotage but also 
that defense measures were being taken in accordance with the basic 
War Plan. There is nothing in the Plan to compel its being put into 
effect m toto. Paragraph 15 (c), (2) of the Plan provides: 

Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior 
to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed 
upon by local commanders. (Tr., Bellinger 1584) 

It is therefore clear that even assuming that the Chief of the War 
Plans Division should have checked up more thoroughly on the in- 
adequacy of the brief report by Short, nevertheless Short did not in- 
form the War Department that he had merely alerted his command 
against sabotage. In any event, a military commander with a great 
responsibility cannot entirely divest himself of that responsibility 
with respect to 7 December 1941 by giving the War Department on 27 
November 1941 the report that he did. Furthermore, during the time 
which intervened from 27 November to 7 December he received other 
messages, heretofore quoted, which called for his reexamination of 
his decision. 

Reconnaissance : Means Available: 

Short's reply did not fully or accurately inform the War Depart- 
ment of his action taken. For example, on 27 November, after receiv- 
ing the message in question, he ordered the radar air raid warning 
service into operation but only from 4 to 7 a. m. (Tr., Short 297, 
469-470) and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 516, 4442) 
No mention of this was made in his reply. One of the most important 
means of reconnaissance was the radar air raid warning service. The 
'27 November message signed "Marshall" ordered Short "to undertake 
such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary." An 
added reason for twenty-four hour operation of the radar is Short's 
claim that the Hawaiian Department did not have sufficient aircraft 



242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

for 360 degree reconnaissance. It is clear that the radar air raid warn- 
ing system was capable of twenty-four hour operation since this sched- 
ule was maintained immediately following the attack. (Tr., Short 
470) 

[16] Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance 
reconnaissance by air and water to a measurable extent (Tr., Short 284, 
385), but he also realized that such reconnaissance by the Navy was 
not perfect. (Tr., Short 375, 384) He even failed to ascertain from 
the Navy, in a business-like way, just what reconnaissance was in fact 
being conducted. (Cf. Koberts Report, p. 18, 19) The Navy con- 
ducted reconnaissance but this was only incidental to the maneuvers 
of the task forces of the fleet. These maneuvers were for training 
purposes and also to guard against Japanese submarines. (Tr., Short 
359-360, 384; Bloch 157; Bellinger 1600; DeLany 175; Kimmel 1773; 
1794-1795; 1802; McMorris 2885; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16) 

According to Admiral Kimmel, the Navy "had plans for reconnais- 
sance and couM run reconnaissance of a sort, but in our estimate which 
had been submitted to Washington, * * * it was clearly stated 
that we had to know the time of the attack, within rather narrow limits, 
in order to have anything like an effective search, because we could not 
maintain a search except for a very few days. Then of course we were 
hoping to get more planes all the time * * *" (Tr., Kimmel 1806) 
(Italics supplied) Concerning the air force necessary for naval recon- 
naissance. Admiral Kimmel stated: 

* * * I think it is generally accepted that proper reconnaissance against 
aircraft attack requires that the patrol planes run out to about 800 miles from 
Oahu, around a 360 degree arc, if you want a full coverage, a)id this will take about 
§4 planes, assuming a 15 miles visibility, for one day. * * * (Tr., Kimmel 
1763) (Italics supplied) 

How many planes were available ? From Kimmel's own testimony 
it appears that the Navy had 81 patrol planes : 

* * * it was planned to utilize so many of the patrol planes of the fleet as 
might be available at any one time, augmented by such planes as the Army could 
supply to do that distant reconnaissance. The number of patrol planes in the 
fleet was 81, all told. Of those approximately between 50 and 60 were in the 
Island of Oahu and suitable for service on the 7th of December. * * * j^jj^j 
they had to cover all the Hawaiian Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific 
Fleet * * *. (Tr., Kimmel 1739; cf. Bellinger 1598, 1630) (Italics supplied) 

Testifying from hearsay only and not purporting to render an expert 
opinion. Admiral Bloch stated 170 aircraft and 350 pilots would be 
needed for such reconnaissance. (Tr., Bloch 1494) 

According to General Martin, 72 long-range bomber planes were 
needed for distant reconnaissance, 

flying at an interval of five degrees. (Tr., Martin 1872) 

An additional 72 ships were required for the next day's reconnaissance mission, 
with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force. * * * This brought the 
total of heavy bombardment to 180. (Ti-., Martin 1873) 

Short contended that perfect 360 degi'ee reconnaissance would have 
required 180 B-17 Flying Fortresses. (Tr., Short 324, 374) But Short 
testified that he believed the naval task forces and planes from outlying 
islands were conducting reconnaissance equivalent to covering a 180 
degree arc (Tr., Short 385 ; cf . Roberts Report, p. 16) , and that the task 
force reconnaissance covered a strip 600 miles wide. (Tr., Short 4438) 
On Short's assumption only 90 B-17 Flying Fortresses would have been 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 243 

needed to cover the remaining 180 degree arc. (Tr., Short .324, 374) 
According to Kimmel 42 pLanes could have scouted that arc. (Tr., 
Kimmel 1763) The Navy had about 58 patrol phmes available in 
Oahu (Tr., Bellinger 1598, 1630; Kimmel 1739) , but how many of these 
could have been used for reconnaissance is debatable. Some at least 
were needed to scout ahead of the then operating task forces. The 
Army had available 6 B-l7's, 10 A-20's, and 54 B-18's. (Tr., Short 
281, 314, 479) These B-18's were not the best type of plane, but as 
General Martin says, 

* * * They could he used for reconnaissance, but * * * were always 
recognized as not being a combat sliip. (Tr., Martin 1859) (Italics supplied) 

General Martin was not asked whether for purposes of distant 
reconnaissance a B-18 or A-20 plane was substantially the equivalent 
of a Navy Flying Fortress. 

Thus, there were 58 naval planes and 70 army planes, or a total of 
128 planes in Oahu in late November and early December. How many 
of these planes were actually available for operations as distinguished 
from those undergoing rej^airs, is not clear from the record. It is clear, 
however, from the above that a substantial number of planes were 
available by which reconnaissance could have been undertaken to some 
extent. Hence, the testimony of both Kimmel and Short that the 
number of planes on hand was entirely insufficient for reconnaissance 
must be taken with some qualifications. 

I agree with the following statement in the Roberts Report (para- 
graph XV, p. 12) : 

[i8] Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan, when the plan became 
effective the Navy was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiating from Oahu 
to a distance of from 700 tx> 800 miles. Prior to December 7, 1941, no distant 
reconnaissances were conducted, except during drills and maneuvers. The fleet 
from time to time had task forces operating in various areas off the island of 
Oahu and, in connection with such operations, carrier and pati-ol planes conducted 
reconnaissances of the operating areas. The sectors searched, however, con- 
stituted but small arcs of the total arc of 360°, and rarely extended to a radius 
of 700 miles. 

Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have afforded 
a measure of security against a surprise air attack. 

General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance, 
but after seeing the warning messages of October and November from the War 
and Navy Departments he made no inquiry with respect to the distant recon- 
naissance, if any, being conducted by the Navy. 

Information Not Received hy Short; In General: ' 

Short claimed that the War Department had considerable important 
information prior to the attack which should have been but was not 
transmitted to him and the Board so found. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) 
The Board held that under these circumstances, where vital informa- 
tion cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders 
it is incumbent upon the War Department to assume the responsibility 
for specific instructions to these commanders. (Top Secret Rep., p. 
1) I do not feel that these are proper conclusions in the present 
case. 

It should be made clear at the outset that so far as the present 
record or the Roberts Report shows, the War Department possessed 
no information definitely pointing to an attack on Pearl Harbor and 
no advance information as to the date of an attack anywhere. This 
is contrary to many past and current newspaper stories. Indeed, aside 



244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

from the Top Secret information which will now be considered, the 
Dutch-British-United States agreement for joint action, which Short 
said would have made him "more conscious" war was practically un- 
avoidable, (Tr., Short 449-450), and possibly Navy messages not 
presented to the Board, there was no substantial information in the 
War Department which was not transmitted to Short. Short, as 
Commanding General, must be charged with having all the important 
information sent to his G-2. It is a fact also that Short received 
important information from his G-2 of which the War Department 
was not informed. 

[19] An examination of the Top Secret Report of the Board in- 
dicates that it is mainly a collection of conclusions by the Board which 
cite as a basis references to Top Secret transcripts and exhibits. These 
references in turn indicate that the testimony given by the witnesses 
consists largely of their conclusions or evaluations of certain inter- 
cepts. The testimony of some of these witnesses is undefined and in- 
conclusive. Moreover, the quantum of the information thus received 
by the War Department and not sent to Short has been magnified 
out of all proportions to its reasonable evaluation as each message was 
received from day to day. This is all the more apparent when funda- 
mental military concepts are borne in mind as to the responsibilities 
of the commander of the Hawaiian Department. The Board con- 
sidered that the most damning indictment of the War Department was 
that it has possession of information which indicated war at a time 
certain (Top Secret Rep., p. 3) and that this information was ex- 
clusively in the possession of the War Department and did not go 
to Short. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) The basis for this conclusion by 
the Board, however, is that the War Department was advised that the 
Japanese in London, Washington, and elsewhere were burning their 
consular records, and destroying their codes and confidential papers. 
(Top Secret Rep., p. 4) But Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder, and his 
Asst. G-2, Colonel Bicknell, had information before 7 December that 
the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was likewise destroying its codes 
and burning its secret papers, which information in the opinion of 
Colonel Bicknell meant war. (Tr., Fielder 2985-2986 ; Bicknell 1413- 
1417) Furthermore, Colonel Fielder testified that he believed the 
source of his information was the War Department. (Tr., Fielder 
2986) It must be presumed that Short was informed of his own G-2's 
information. Colonel Bicknell testified definitely that he told Short's 
staff he had such information and that to him this meant war. (Tr., 
Bicknell 1413-1414) Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, testi- 
fied Short was given this information. (Tr., Phillips 1242-1243) 
Moreover, the Navy at Hawaii had received information of the burn- 
ing of codes by Japanese Consular agents in London and Washing- 
ton (Tr,, Bloch 1512-1513) which information, according to Short's 
G-2 would come to him in the natural course. (Top Secret Tr., Brat- 
ton D. 292-293) 

The principal information of the character above described is con- 
tained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", a series of forty-seven intercepted 
radiograms principally between Washington and Tokyo and the so- 
called "Winds" message. In order to compare the information Wash- 
ington had and what it sent Short it is necessary briefly to recite the 
contents of these various messages : 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 245 

24 September, translated 9 October. Tokyo to Honolulu. Kequest- 
ing reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into 
various subdivisions for that purpose. 

14 October, translated 16 October. Ambassador Nomura, Washing- 
ton to Tokyo. Giving interview with Eear Admiral Turner ; Turner 
suggesting Japan abandon her obligations under the Three-Power 
Alliance and gradually withdraw Jap troops from China. 

[20] 16 October, translated presumably 17 October. Toyoda, 
Foreign Minister, Toyko to Washington. Stating war between Ger- 
many and U. S. might result in Japan joining, fulfilling its obligations 
under Three-Power agreement. At the same time, Japan wished to 
make a success of the Japanese-American negotiations, hence Japan 
was warning the U. S. of the above. 

22 October, translated 23 October. Nomura, Washington to Tokyo. 
Advises Tokyo of his lack of success in negotiations and asks to be 
relieved. 

5 November, translated 5 November, Tokyo to Washington, of ut- 
most secrecy. Setting 25 November as deadline for signing agreement 
and urging renewed effort. 

14 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Hongkong. Stat- 
ing that should U. S.-Jap negotiations collapse Japan will destroy 
British and American power in China. 

15 November, translated 3 December. Foreign Minister Togo to 
Honolulu stating: 

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your 
"ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. 

16 November, translated IT November. Tokyo to Washington. Ee- 
ferring to impossibility to change deadline of 25 November and to 
press negotiations with the U. S. 

18 November, translated 6 December. Kita, Honolulu to Tokyo. 
Bringing Tokyo up to date as to warships in Pearl Harbor and giving 
course of eight destroyers entering harbor. 

19 November, translated 20 November. Tokyo to Washington. Ad- 
vises to present "the proposal" and that "if the U. S. consent to this 
cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off." 

19 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. 
Giving three code words to be added at end of Jap intelligence broad- 
casts if Jap-U. S.-Russian-British relations should become dangerous. 

22 November, translated 22 November. Tolcyo to Washington. Ex- 
tends time for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November. 
Latter is absolute deadline. "After that things are automatically 
going to happen." 

[21] 26 November, translated 28 November. Ambassador No- 
mura and Kurusu to Tokyo. Advising hardly any possibility of U. S. 
considering the "proposal" iyi foto, that if situation remains tense as 
it is negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not 
already be called so, "Our failure and humiliation are complete." 
Suggest that rupture of present negotiations does not necessarily mean 
war between Japan and U. S. but would be followed by U. S. and 
English military occupations of Netherlands Indies, which would 
make war inevitable. 

26 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington, 
Stating "the situation is momentarily becoming more tense and tele- 



246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

grams take too long." Contains code for future telephone conversa- 
tions. 

26 November, translated 26 November. Conversation between Ku- 
rusu and Yamamoto, Kurusu stating U. S. will not yield, that he could 
make no progress. 

26 November, translated 29 November. Nomura to Tokyo. Stating 
great danger responsibility for rupture of negotiations will be cast 
upon Japan and suggesting plan to avoid this. 

28 November, translated 28 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stat- 
ing that in spite of Ambassadors super-human efforts, U. S. has "pre- 
sented a humiliating proposal and Japan cannot use it as basis for 
negotiations"; therefore answer will be sent Ambassadors in two or 
three days after which negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Am- 
bassadors are told not to give impression negotiations are broken off. 

29 November, translated 5 December. Tokyo to Honolulu. "We 
have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in the 
future will you also report even when there are no movements." 

29 November, translated 30 November. Tokyo to Washington. In- 
structing Ambassadors to make one more attempt and giving line of 
approach. 

30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Advising 
Japan's adherence to Tri-Partite Alliance and that U. S. on 26th made 
insulting proposal, in effect demanding Japan not give assistance to 
Germany and Ital}- in accordance with alliance. "This clause alone, 
let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American 
proposal for negotiations" and that United States in collusion with 
the allied nations "has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany 
and Italy, as an enemy." 

[^^] 30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. 
Stating negotiations with Washington "now stand ruptured — ^broken" 
and to give Hitler and Ribbentrop a summary of the developments; 
that England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, 
were planning to move forces into East Asia which would require 
counter measures by Japan, that there was extreme danger that war 
might suddenly break out and that "the time of the breaking out of this 
war may come quicker than anyone dreams." This message was to be 
sent to Rome and to be held "in the most absolute secrecy." 

30 November, translated 30 November. Telephone conversation be- 
tween Kurusu, Washington, and Yamamoto. Discussion as to stretch- 
ing out negotiations and effect of return of President Roosevelt. 

1 December, translated 5 December. Tokyo to London. Directing 
destruction of code machine and to confirm this by cable. 

1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Date 
set in deadline message has gone by. To prevent U. S. becoming unduly 
suspicious press has been advised negotiations are continuing. States 
note will not be presented to U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo as suggested,, 
but in Washington only. 

1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Advis- 
ing when faced with necessity of destroying codes to use chemicals on 
hand for that purpose. 

1 December, translated 4 December. Washington to Tokyo. Advis- 
ing continuation of negotiations and meeting leaders, if not top leaders 
then those lower down. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 247 

1 December, translated 4 December. Tokyo to Hsinking. Advising 
that it was Jap policy to have Manchuria participate in war and that 
British and American Consular rights would not be recognized. 

2 December, translated 3 December. Washington to Tokyo. Kecit- 
ing conversation between Jap Ambassadors and Under Secretary 
Welles wherein Japs complain against pyramiding U. S. economic 
pressure upon Japan and expressing doubt as to whether Japan could 
consider again proposals of 26th. Japan convinced U. S. would like to 
bring about a speedy settlement which fact Foreign Office should con- 
sider in making reply to new American proposals. 

2 December, translated 3 December. Tokyo to Washington. 
(Strictly Secret) Destroy all codes except one, destroy one code ma- 
chine unit and destroy all secret documents, 

[£3] 3 December, translated 5 December. Washington to Tokyo. 
Stating that in event of occupation of Thailand joint military action by 
Great Britain and U. S. with or without declaration of war was a cer- 
tainty. 

4 December, translated 5 December. Berlin to Tokyo asking for cer- 
tain members of London staff in event Jap Embassy in London was 
evacuated. 

5 December, translated 6 December. Washington to Tokyo. Re- 
ports destruction of codes and states that since negotiations are still 
continuing request delay in destruction of one code machine. 

6 December, translated 6 December. Tokyo to Washington. Gives 
advance notice of memorandum for U. S. to be sent in fourteen parts 
and to prepare to present it when directed. 

6 December, translated T December. Washington to Tokyo, urgent. 
Stating that in addition to negotiating with Hull Japs had worked with 
other Cabinet Members some of whom had dined with President 
and advised against Jap-American war. 

7 December, translated 7 December, Tokyo to Washington, ex- 
tremely urgent. Advising that after deciphering fourteenth part of 
final memorandum, Japan to U. S,, to destroy at once remaining cipher 
machine and all machine codes, also all secret documents, 

7 December, translated 7 December, Budapest to Tokyo stating: 
"On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of 
this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state 
of war would break out on the 7th," 

The final message, outside the "Winds" message which will be noticed 
in detail later was the diplomatic note of the Japanese Government to 
the United States Government sent from Tokyo to Washington 6 De- 
cember 1941 in fourteen parts, thirteen of which arrived and were 
translated on 6 December and the fourteenth part the morning of 7 
December, (Top Secret Ex, "B" ; Tr,, Safford C, 154) The Japanese 
note in general is a review of the Japanese- American negotiations and 
the Japanese position, complaining in effect of an insult and breaking 
off the negotiations, A radio from Tokyo to Washington 7 December, 
translated the same day, marked "urgent, very important," instructs 
the Ambassador to present this note to the United States at 1 : 00 p, m,, 
7 December,^ (Top Secret Ex, "B") 

[24] The Winds Message: 

The Federal Communications Commission, around 20 November 
1941, intercepted a message from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic repre- 



248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sentatives to the effect that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting 
off our diplomatic relations)" a warning message would be given in 
the middle and the end of the Japanese daily short-wave news broad- 
casts as follows : 

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: 

HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN) 

(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: 

KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY) 

(3) Japan-British relations : 

NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR) 

When this signal was heard, all codes and papers were to be de- 
stroyed. (Exhibit "B", 19 Nov., S.I.S. 25432; Tr., Marshall A. 35; 
Sadtler D. 250; Safford C. 125-126) 

A radio from Tokyo to Washington, dated 19 November and trans- 
lated 26 November, was to the same effect. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S.I.S. 
25432) Tlie Army, Navy, and Federal Communications intercept sta- 
tions immediately commenced a close watch for the second or imple- 
menting "Winds" message. On 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief 
of Navy Communications, phoned Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army 
codes and ciphers, saying, "The message is in." Asked which one it 
was. Admiral Noyes stated he did not know but b<ilieved it meant war 
between Japan and Great Britain. (Tr., Sadtler D. 251) Sadtler im- 
mediately went to General Miles, A. C. of S., G-2, where he was joined 
by Colonel Bratton of G-2. Discussing Admiral Noyes' uncertainty 
as to which message it was. General Miles stated : "Do you think you 
can verify that word ? This may be a false alarm." Colonel Bratton 
telephoned Admiral Noyes, who was on his way to a meeting and had 
no time to discuss the matter except to say that he could not verify it 
at that time but would telephone later. Sadtler reurned to General 
Miles, who told him to keep on the lookout. (Tr., Sadtler D. 252-253) 
Colonel Sadtler then advised General Gerow of the message and sug- 
gested that the various overseas stations including Hawaii should be 
notified. General Gerow replied, "I think they have had plenty of 
notification," and the matter dropped. Sadtler then informed Colonel 
(now Lieutenant General) Bedell Smith, Secretary of the General 
Staff, of the message and that he had talked to G-2 and War Plans, 
and Colonel Smith did not wish to discuss it further. (Tr., Sadtler D. 
253-254) 

It will be noted from the above that the activating or second "Winds" 
message apparently indicated a breach in diplomatic relations with 
Great Britain. Colonel Sadtler testified he told General Miles and 
Colonel Bratton that Admiral Noyes was positive that it did not in- 
dicate a breach in Japanese-American relations. ( Tr., Sadtler D. 252) 
According to [^J] Colonel Bratton no one in G-2 ever received 
a message of this latter character. (Tr., Bratton B. 59, 66-67; see 
also Marshall A. 36-38) The present record fails to show whether 
Colonel Sadtler or Colonel Bratton ever ascertained the exact mean- 
ing of the Navy activating "Winds" message. Colonel Sadtler ap- 
parently made no further inquiry of Admiral Noyes nor did the Board 
examine him further on the subject. On this general subject there is 
the testimony of General Marshall who stated : "I find that no officer 
of the Navy advised General Miles or Colonel Bratton that any mes- 
sage implementing the 'Winds' code (indicating with whom relations 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 249 

would be ruptured) had been received by the Navy." (Tr., Marshall 
A. 38-39) It seems clear that no Japanese message using the "Winds" 
code was intercepted by the FCC or by the Army Signal Corps until 
after Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A. 37) Colonel Sadtler testified 
that he discussed with General Miles and Colonel Bratton the Navy 
activating "Winds" message, indicating to him, war with Great Britain. 
(Tr., Sadtler D. 251-252) Apparently, therefore, the source of the 
activating or second "Winds" message was the Navy. 

The Navy story as to the "Winds" message is as follows : Captain 
Satford, head of the Navy Communications Security Division, stated 
that on 4 December the activating "Winds" message came in and was 
sent to him in teletype. Lieutenant Commander Kramer, the senior 
language officer, wrote on the bottom of it, "War with England, War 
with America, Peace with Russia." The message was different in 
wording from what had been expected but, according to Captain Saf- 
ford, its meaning was clear. It was given immediately to Admiral 
Noyes. (Tr., Safford C. 131-132) According to Captain Safford two 
copies were sent to the War Department. (Tr., Safford C. 133) 
Colonel Gibson of War Department G-2 testified that there is no 
record that G-2 of the War Department or the Army Signal Intel- 
ligence ever received any implementing message from the Navy. (Tr. 
Gibson D. 273) Neither the original nor copies of the message can 
now be found in the files of either the War or Navy Departments ac- 
cording to Captain Safford. The message was distributed to various 
high officials of the Navy Department and copies were sent to the State 
Department and White House. (Tr., Safford C. 133, 136-138, 172) 
The proof that it got to the Wliite House seems to be that this was 
routme distribution (Tr., Safford C. 136-138) ; the same is true as to 
Its getting to the Secretary of State. (Tr., Safford C. 138) 

Captain Safford also testified that the Navy had roughly around sixty 
intercepted Japanese messages pertaining to this period which were 
m the possession of the Navy Court of Inquiry. Tr., Safford C. 139- 
140, 152) Whether these include the forty-seven messages submitted 
in evidence by Colonel Bratton (Top Secret Ex. "B") is not known 
as they do not appear in the present record. Captain Safford testified 
that Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he submitted 
S.I.S. 25850, the message to the Jap Ambassadors to present the Jap- 
anese reply at 1 : 00 p. m., to Secretary Knox, he sent a note along with 
it saying in effect, "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today 
and possibly a midnight attack on Manila." (Tr., Safford C. 167) 

[26] Captain Safford testified that coupling the "Winds" acti- 
vating message with the messages instructing destruction of codes 
and secret papers, he became worried and telephoned Commander 
McCollum and asked him whether Naval Intelligence was doing any- 
thing to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet. McCollum said they 
were and as a result McCollum finally succeeded in having sent a 
message to the Pacific naval commanders, including the Commandant 
of the 14th Naval District, Honolulu, to the effect that the Japanese 
had been instructed to destroy their codes. (Tr., Safford C. 182- 
184) Safford stated he also arranged for four additional messages 
to be sent out to various naval attaches in the Far East advising de- 
struction of our own secret papers. (Tr., Safford C. 184-185) This 
message was sent 4 December. A message to the same effect was also 



250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sent to Guam, (Tr., Safford C. 186-187) with an information copy 
to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in Honohilu. (Tr., 
SafFord C. 187) An additional message was sent to the Commander- 
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, covering destruction of papers on Wake 
Island. (Tr., Safford C. 188-190) 

One of the members of the Board, General Russell, had in his pos- 
session a statement, unidentified as to source, but which he says 
"reached the Naval authorities and which it is alleged was sent over 
to the War Department." (Tr., Russell A. 30) This statement ap- 
parently was the testimony given by Captain Safford which was con- 
tained in a volume of the examination of various witnesses conducted 
by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, during April to June 1944, in accord- 
ance with directions of the Secretary of the Navy. (Tr., Safford C. 
120, 123, 145, 152, 168) Examining General Marshall from this 
document. General Russell stated: 

This same naval source from which I have been quoting stated that : 
"On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCoUum drafted a long warning 
message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, sum- 
marizing significant events up to that date, quoting the 'Winds Message', and 
ending with the positive warning that war was imminent." 

Now, this is on the 4th day of December : 

"Admiral Wilkinson approved this message" — 

which I shall talk about in a minute more definitely, 

— "and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the mes- 
sage to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it about three p. m., Wash- 
ington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, 'What do you 
thing of the message?' Admiral Noyes replied, 'I think it is an insult to the 
intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief.' Admiral Wilkinson stated, 'I do not 
agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man,' " 
and so forth. (Tr., Russell A. 33-34) 

[^7] Colonel Gibson referred to the above incident, stating that 
"Admiral Noyes said they had been alerted enough" and disapproved 
sending it. (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277) 

Colonel Bratton testified that on receipt of the 2 December mes- 
sage translated 4 December, from Tokyo to Washington, ordering 
destruction of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this mes- 
sage to General Miles and General Gerow and discussed it with them 
at some length. Bratton advocated sending further warnings or 
alerts to our overseas commanders. General Gerow felt that suffi- 
cient warning had already been given. General Miles felt that he 
could not go over General Gerow's decision. Bratton, however, con- 
tinued to feel uneasy about the matter and went over to the Navy 
Department where he had a conference with Commander McCoUum 
who felt as he did that further warnings should be sent out. Mc- 
Collum stated that Commander Rochefort in Honolulu had gotten 
the first "Winds" message and was listening for the implementing 
message. He suggested that as a way out of their difficulty a wire 
be sent to the Army G-2 in Hawaii to see Rochefort at once. (Tr., 
Bratton D. 283-284) Bratton stated he managed to get General 
Miles to OK this message which was sent 5 December to Short's G-2 
and read as follows: 

"Commander Rochefort, who can be located through the 14th Naval District, 
has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are 
mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once." (Tr., Bratton D. 283) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 251 

In addition to the "Winds" message, the sheaf of forty-seven inter- 
cepts, Top Secret Exhibit "B", contains a somewhat simihir message 
from Tokyo, dated 19 November 19-11, reading as follows : 

"When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following 
at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts: 

(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations "HIGASHI" 

(2) Japan Russia relations ''KIT A" 

(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malay, and NEI) 'NISHF 
(Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392) 

There is a conflict as to the meaning of the '"Winds" message, 
namelv, as to whether it meant war or only a breach of diplomatic 
relations. (Tr., [28] Bratton B. 60-71; SafFord C. 12(>-130; 
Sadtler D. 250; See also Top Secret Ex. "B", S- I- S. 25392 and 
25432, both 19 November 1941) This conflict is not significant, how- 
ever, as it was common knowledge that Japan might begin war prior 
to terminating diplomatic relations. Even Short realized this. 
(Tr., Short 456-457 ; see also Stimson 4051) 

There is no clear showing in the record as to w hat higher officers in 
the War Department got either the original "Winds" message, in 
whatever version, or the activating message, or got the brief message 
of 19 November as to the single code word to be inserted in the intelli- 
gence broadcasts when diplomatic relations became dangerous. (Top 
Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392) 

Colonel Bratton, apparently testifying from Top Secret Exhibit 
"B", a sheaf of forty-seven messages, stated : 

All the information that we had was presented in one form or another to the 
policy making and planning agencies of the Government. * * * The ofBcials to 
whom I refer include the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division (Tr., Bratton 
D. 297) 

Assuming this refers to the 47 intercepts, there is no testimony 
that any one of these specifically got to the various officials mentioned, 
or if so, when. Nor, assuming some or all of these intercepts got 
to these officials, is there any showing of the form in wdiich they re- 
ceived them. Such general testimony as that of Colonel Bratton's, 
above quoted — relying, as it apparently does, entirely on a practice, 
without specific recollection of specific occasions — cannot be regarded 
as fairly bringing home to any of the individuals concerned knowledge 
of any specific intercept. This is certainly so where the record con- 
tains a specific denial, such as in the case of General Marshall, of any 
recollection of having seen some of these documents. (Tr., Marshall 
A 30-31, 33-40, 209-211) 

Disciossion of Foregoing Information: 

It is obvious that these Top Secret intercepts show a gradual deteri- 
oration in Japanese- American relations and the probability of war. 
Short, however, was specifically advised of the possibility of the 
outbreak of hostilities at any time and in this respect these intercepts 
are merely cumulative. Some of them, however, are very pointed; 
for example, the radio of 24 September, translated 9 October, from 
Tokyo to Honolulu, requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor 
and dividing Pearl Harbor into subdivisions for that purpose; the 
radio of 15 November, translated 3 December, from Togo to Honolulu, 
.requesting that the "ships in harbor" [29] report be made 



252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

twice a week in view of the critical Jap-U. S. relations ; the radio of 
18 November, translated 6 December, from Honolulu to Tokyo, bring- 
ing Tokyo up to date as to war ships in Pearl Harbor and -giving 
the course of eight destroyers entering the harbor; the radio of 24 
November, translated 5 December, from Tokyo to Honolulu, asking 
for a "ships in harbor" report even when there were no movements. 
The above appear to point to some specific action against Pearl Har- 
bor. However, this inference is in the light of after-events ; at that 
time these radios, to an unimaginative person, were consistent with 
routine Japanese effort to keep themselves advised as to our naval 
strength in the Pacific or possible sabotage attacks on ships in Pearl 
Harbor by native Jap fishing boats. Similarly, the radio of 5 No- 
vember, translated the same day, from Tokyo to Washington, setting 
25 November as the deadline for signing the agreement; the radio of 
16 November, translated 17 November, reiterating the impossibility 
of changing the deadline ; the radio of 22 November, translated the 
same day, extending the deadline from 25 November to 29 November, 
and stating "after that things are automatically going to happen" 
indicate in the light of information we now have, but which was not 
availaljle prior to the attack, that steps were being taken for an 
early attack. But at that time these dates had no such significance. 
As General Marshall testified, November 29 came and passed and 
nothing happened. (Tr., Marshall A. 4-5) As to the "Winds" mes- 
sage, according to War Department witnesses this meant war between 
Japan and Great Britain, not war with the United States. The most 
significant messages were the radios of 1 December, translated the 
same day; 2 December, translated 3 December, 5 December, trans- 
lated 6 December, directing the destruction of codes, code machines, 
and secret papers. There is also the reference to destroying codes in 
the "Winds" message. These messages, to Colonel Bratton, meant 
war. But General Short had already been warned that war was im- 
minent and hostilities might commence at any moment. Whether, 
had General Short received these messages, he would have altered 
his view that there was no threat from without is problematical. 
One message clearly suggested an attack on Pearl Harbor, namely 
the radio of 2 December from Tokyo to Honolulu, inquiring as to the 
war ships there, whether there were barrage balloons above Pearl 
Harbor, and whether the war ships there were provided with anti- 
mine nets. But this message was not received until 23 December 
and not translated until 30 December 1941. (Top Secret Ex. "B", 
S. I. S. 27065) 

It is a fair conclusion from the testimony that the Navy interpreta- 
tion of the "Winds" message was that it meant war with the United 
States. Also, there is the testimony of Captain Safford that Com- 
mander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he handed Secretary 
Knox S. I. S. 25850 instructing the Jap Ambassadors to present the 
Japanese reply at 1 : 00 p. m., he sent along a [SO] note stat- 
ing "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today." (Tr., 
Safford C. 167) Action upon this information if believed credible, 
was a Navy responsibility. There is no testimony it was communi- 
cated to the War Department. 

The most that can be said relative to the Top Secret information 
available in Washington is that a keener and more incisive analysis 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 253 

by the intelligence sections of either service of the over-all picture 
presented by these intercepts, along the line of Commander Kramer's 
deductions (Tr., Safford C. 167) , might have led to an anticipation of 
the possibility, at least, of an attack on Pearl Harbor at or about the 
time it actually occurred. The danger in attempting to make such 
an estimate is, however, the fact that unconsciously we do so in the 
light of after-occurring events and read into each message a signifi- 
cance which was not obvious at the time of receipt. It must also be 
borne in mind that substantially all the definite information received 
as to Jap naval movements pointed to activity in the Philippines or 
in Southeast Asia. 

As to whether if Short had gotten the Top Secret information above 
referred to he would have made a different estimate of the situation 
and placed in operation a different alert, we are in the realm of con- 
jecture. The fact that Short regarded as unimportant the informa- 
tion he got on 3 December 1941 that the Japanese Consuls in Honolulu 
were destroying their codes and secret papers (which meant war to 
Short's Asst. G-2) is very significant in postulating what Short would 
have done if he had gotten all the information he complains he did 
not get. 

As I have previously stated, while there was more information in 
Washington than Short had. Short had enough information to indi- 
cate to any responsible commander that there was an outside threat 
against which he should make preparations. To the same effect was 
the testimony of General Marshall (Tr., Marshall A. 14-15), Gen- 
eral Gerow (Tr., Gerow 4300, Sadtler D. 253; Bratton D. 283), Gen- 
eral Bedell Smith (Tr., Sadtler D. 253), General Miles (Tr., Miles 
127-128, 128-129; Sadtler D. 253-254; Bratton D. 283), Admiral 
Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8, 14; Bratton B. 78), and Admiral Noyes 
(Tr., Gibson D. 276-277 ; Eussell A. 34) . This was the opinion of 
the Koberts Board. (Koberts Kep., pp. 18-21) 

Comment on Shorfs Defenses: 

The fundamental fact to bear in mind and from which there can 
be no escape is that Short was the sole responsible Army commander 
charged with the mission of defending Pearl Harbor. Knowing as 
he did that there were threats both from within and from without 
and that the most dangerous form of attack which he could expect 
was a surprise air attack, he cannot now [5i] be heard to say 
that he was led into becoming sabotage-minded to the exclusion of all 
else by War Department messages stressing sabotage. It is obvious 
that General Marshall's radio of 27 November was not intended to 
change the official War Department estimate, solidly imbedded in 
elaborate war plans and stressed continuously from Short's assump- 
tion of command 7 February 1941 into the fall of 1941, that a surprise 
air attack was a primary threat. It is equally obvious that Short's 
reply to General Marshall's radio of 27 November did not amount to 
a communication by Short to the War Department that he had ar- 
rived at a new and entirely different estimate of the situation which 
excluded a surprise air attack as a then present basic threat. 

As to Short's defense that he was not given sufficient information, 
or, as held by the Board, that the information which he had was "in- 
complete and confusing" (though the Board held it sufficient), it is 
clear that the information given Short continually stressed the pos- 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 157 17 



254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sible outbreak of war which necessarily implied a threat from with- 
out. But, as seen, Short's Alert No. 1 expressly excluded the idea of 
a threat from without. Unless it can be said that Short would have 
interpreted the Top Secret intercepts as indicating a specific attack 
on Pearl Harbor, an unreasonable assumption, they merely stress the 
inevitability of war. But this would not necessarily have led Short 
to establish Alert No. 3, bearing in mind the Navy view that there 
was no chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor and Short's claim 
that in any event he could rely upon the Navy for warning in ample 
time of the whereabouts of the Jap fleet. Short's defense that Alert 
No. 3 would have interfered with training and that Alert No. 3 would 
have disclosed his intent and alarmed the civilian population, is re- 
futed by the statement in General Marshall's radio to him of 27 
November that the policy of avoiding the first overt act should not 
be construed as restricting him to a course of action that might jeop- 
ardize his defense. But they are also answered by the fact that Alert 
No. 2, at least, would not have disclosed his intent or alarmed the 
civilian population. It should be borne in mind that Short's prob- 
lem was two-fold, both to guard against an outside attack and at the 
same time to do so without alarming the civil population. This 
should not have been beyond the capabilities of an experienced com- 
mander. 

I am of the opinion therefore that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 
300) that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a 
state of readiness for war, in the face of a war warning, appears 
justified except in so far as it holds the information which Short had 
WJ»° incomplete and confusing. 

I likewise agree that the Board's conclusion (b) that Short failed 
in his duties in not reaching an agreement with the naval authorities 
in Hawaii for joint Army and Navy action under the various plans, 
is supported by the record. I also concur in the opinion of the Board 
(c) that Short failed in his duties in not informing himself of the 
effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by 
the Navy. 

[32'] The question whether Short's failure in the performance 
of these various duties constituted a neglect of duty in the sense of an 
offense under military law, will be discussed later. In my opinion 
Short's various failures were not so much the result of a neglect of duty 
as of serious errors of judgment. His first error of judgment was in 
the erroneous estimate of the situation which he made and which led 
him to the conclusion that the Japanese would not attack Pearl Harbor 
from the air. His second error was in failing to realize that it was his 
duty to be on the alert against even what might appear to him as the 
highly improbable. I believe, however, that these mistakes were 
honest ones, not the result of any conscious fault, and, having in mind 
all the circumstances, do not constitute a criminal neglect of duty. 

Boardh Conclusion {d) as to Shorfs Failure to Replace Inefficient 
Staff Officers: 
The Board found that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient 
staff' officers. (Rep. 300) This conclusion is related to the statement 
in the body of the Report that "Phillips was recognized by the staff 
as without force and far too weak for a position of such importance." 
(Rep. 74) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 255 

A careful reading of the transcript citations upon which the Board 
relies for its findings as to Colonel Phillips shows that certain wit- 
nesses were asked as to their opinion of Phillips as Chief of Staff. 
Their replies varied from complete reluctance to answer (Tr., Done- 
gan 1946) to positive expressions that the Colonel was unqualified. 
(Tr., Throckmorton 1408-1409) General Burgin considered Phillips 
"one of General Short's fair-haired boys," high-handed, not prone to 
confer with subordinates, not "extremely efficient, or otherwise — the 
average, run-of-the-mine." (Tr., Burgin 2625-2626) General 
Hayes, the preceding Chief of Staff, very mildly stated that Phillips 
had a G-3 trend, and that he did not "feel that he had worked him- 
self into the position of Chief of Staff by the time of the Pearl Harbor 
attack." (Tr., Hayes 265) Colonel Pratt merely added that he con- 
sidered that Hayes had been a stronger Chief of Staff. (Tr., Pratt 
1977-1978) 

These scattered opinions, unsupported by a factual examination of 
Phillips' training, experience, and activities can hardly be thought to 
support the blanket conclusion of the Board about Short's staff. The 
Board adds, however, that Phillips' own testimony "as to his conception 
of his duty and what he did and failed to do in aiding Short to compe- 
tent decisions in critical situations, is sufficient evidence of the matter." 
(Eep. 74) The testimony cited by the Board to support this finding 
is that Phillips and Short considered the inevitable interference with 
training which would occur if Alerts 2 or 3 were ordered, that all 
phases of the situation were discussed, the danger of a Jap landing, 
of an air attack, [=?J] what Phillips considered to be his duties 
as Chief of Staff, how Short ordered Alert No. 1 without a "specific 
recommendation" from Colonel Phillips, and a general discussion of 
activities in the Department after 27 November. (Tr., Phillips 1134- 
1144) 

It is established, of course, that Phillips was inexperienced as 
a Chief of Staff, as he had not been appointed until 5 November 
1941, (Tr., Phillips 1108) and that Short did not treat Phillips as 
a Chief of Staff, for example, in not having him present at important 
Navy conferences. (Rep. 74) But there is no substantial evidence 
that Phillips was inefficient to a degree that would require his removal 
by Short, or that Short's failure to remove Phillips was in any way 
a proximate or concurrent cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The 
most that can be said is that there were indications that Short selected 
a man not fully qualified as Chief of Staff. These indications were 
not fully investigated by the Board, either as to their accuracy or 
as to their possible contribution to the disaster on 7 December 1941. 

Aside from the above as to Colonel Phillips, there is no testimony 
in the record as to the efficiency or inefficiency of Short's G-1, G-3, 
or G-4. Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder, testified at length but there 
is no substantial testimony either from his own lips or from other 
witnesses from which the Board could hold Colonel Fielder inefficient. 
The worst that can be said against Fielder is that he failed to realize 
the importance of the Dr. Mori message and the fact that Japanese 
Consuls were destroying their codes and burning their papers. How- 
ever, this viewpoint was shared by Short who was as fully informed 
as Fielder about these matters. 

The Board also stated that 



256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

While the various assistant Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony existed, the 
results are more important in their conclusive effect that there was a lack of 
requisite harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident to the Board tliat 
their testimony was colored by their very evident loyalty to General Short. 
(Rep. 74) 

The only testimony on this score was the testimony of Colonel 
Throckmorton, Short's G-1 at the time of the attack, who testified 
there was complete harmony when General Hayes was Chief of Staff 
and that "such disharmony as existed under Phillips I do not think 
was of a serious enough nature to have affected what happened on 
December 7." (Tr,, Throckmorton 1409) There is, therefore, no 
substantial testimony as to any significant disharmony among Short's 
staff. 

It follows from the above that the Board's conclusion (Kep. 300) 
that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers is not 
justified. 

[S4-] BoarcPs Conclusions as to General Marshall: 

The Board concludes that General Marshall failed in his rehitions 
with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars : 

(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully 
advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an 
increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he 
had an abundance and Short had little. 

(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the Ha- 
waiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize 
the impoi't of General Short's reply of Nt)vember 2Tth, which indicated clearly 
that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of No- 
vember 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war. 

(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early 
morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost imme- 
diate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this. 

(d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian 
Command between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the impending 
threat of war. (Rep. 298-299) 

Adequacy of General MarshalVs 27 Novemher Warning Message: 

The Chief of Staff testified that the message of 27 November signed 
"Marshall" should be regarded as containing all the information con- 
cerning the Japanese and the instructions necessary for General Short 
to accomplish his mission. (Tr., Marshall A. 14, 15; C. 197) 

The Board's statement that General Marshall failed "to keep the 
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of 
the growing ten.seness of the Japanese situation" (Kep. 298) over- 
looks the fact that the 27 November message signed "Marshall" pic- 
tured the Japanese-United States situation accurately as it appeared 
from the information available to the War Department at that time 
and up until 7 December. The negotiations between the Japanese 
representatives in the United States and our State Department ac- 
tually continued up to 7 December, and various intercepts suggest 
the possibility that they may have been conducted by the envoys in 
good faith and with evident hope of a peaceful settlement. 

[35] Thus, on 29 November Tokyo radioed its representative in 
Washington to make one more attempt at settlement along certain 
lines and "in carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this 
does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations." (Top 
Secret Ex. "B") 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 257 

Mr. Kuriisu, in talking to Tokyo on 30 November, spoke to Tojo's 
drastic statement, and urged that unless greater caution was exercised, 
the Japanese negotiators would be in a difficult position. Further, he 
stated they were doing their best and that negotiations were to con- 
tinue. (Top Secret Ex. "B") 

On 1 December Tokyo radioed its representatives in Washington, 
suggesting a possible approach for making some progress in negotia- 
tions. (Top Secret Ex. '^B") 

On 2 December a radio intercept from Washington to Tokyo stated : 

Judging from my interview with Secretary of State Hull on the 1st and my 
considerations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to 
peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they 
would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in 
mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals 
and to my separate wire #1233. (Top Secret Ex. "B") 

On 5 December a Japanese radio to Tokyo requested approval to 
delay destruction of one code machine as Japanese negotiations were 
still continuing. (Top Secret Ex. "B") 

Former Ambassador Grew said with regard to the alleged inevita- 
bility of war : 

* * * If the whole problem had lain with the military authorities, I would 
have said without question that war was inevitable, but there were times when 
I believed the Japanese government was doing its best to prevent war for the 
reason that it realized much better than the military people did what might 
be the result of war. * * * Now the question at that time was whether tliey 
would be successful or not, and, as I say, I was not in a position to answer that 
question definitely and finally prior to the outbreak of war. (Tr., Grew 4213- 
4214) 

"Wlien asked when it became evident that war with Japan w^as in- 
evitable, Mr. Grew replied : 

136] I could not put my finger on any particular date. General. My own 
position, there, was that I was going to fight up to the last possible minute to 
prevent war ; and I did everything in my power to prevent it ; and, not being 
a defeatist by nature, I was unwilling to admit tliat war was inevitable, up to 
the last minute. So that I cannot mention any particular date, prior to December 
7, 1941, when I felt that war was definitely inevitable. (Tr., Grew 4199) 

With reference to Japan's decision to go to war, he stated that there 
were "two Japans." The Army and Navy were practically independent 
and reported directly to the Emperor over the heads of the Cabinet 
and the Prime Minister. 

I think it is perfectly possible that the Cabinet was not informed of the 
plans for attacking Pearl Harbor. My belief is— well, I won't say confirmed, 
but it is increased by the fact that I had a conversation vpith Mr. Togo, the 
foreign minister, at half past twelve, half past midnight, on December 7, 1941. 
That was about three hours before Pearl Harbor. And I have always been 
convinced from the nature of that conversation that Mr. Togo did not at that 
moment know that Pearl Harbor was about to break. I have other evidence, 
too, which convinces me personally that lie didn't know. * * * (Tr., Grew 
4214-421.5) 

When asked about the effect of the economic sanctions in forcing 
action by Japan, Mr. Grew stated : 

I do not mean to say, when you say something had to be done about it, that 
it had to be war, because there were other things to do about it besides war. 
The Japanese at that time could have taken steps to meet some of our views 
in connection with their expansion through the Far East. They could readily 
have done that, and if they had done that we might, for our part, have relaxed 



258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

some of the economic pressure which we were placing on them. I think that 
that would have been a perfectly logical thing to have happened, but it didn't 
happen. (Tr., Grew 4218) 

As to the 25 November deadline, later extended to 29 November, 
General Marshall stated that this had certain significance, but that 
the War Department was unable to tell just what it was. (Tr., Mar- 
shall A. 5) It was first thought that the 25 November deadline per- 
tained to the anti-Comitern pact. When the time was extended to 
29 November that possibility was removed. (Tr., Marshall A. 4) 
"November 29 arrived and passed, and we entered into December 
without anything happening other than the continuation of these 
movements, which we could follow fairly well, down the China coast 
and Indo-China and headed quite plainly towards Thailand and the 
Gulf of Siam." (Tr., Marshall A. 4-5) 

[371 In the light of all the information possessed by the War 
Department at that time and the fact that the 14th part of the 
Japanese note breaking off negotiations, and the direction to the 
Japanese representatives to present the fourteen parts at 1 : 00 p. m. 
(Washington time) 7 December, was not available until that day, it 
is my opinion that the 27 November message signed "Marshall" 
was an accurate and adequate description of the Japanese situation 
at the time it was sent, and up until 7 December. Furthermore, this 
message should be read in the light of the other Army and Navy 
messages to Short. 

General MarshalVs Views on Warning: 

The Chief of Staff emphasized that the so-called "Winds" mes- 
sage referred not to war but to the rupture of diplomatic relations 
and that "very remarkable things had been done under the rupture 
of diplomatic relations while still evading an actual act of war." 
(Tr., Marshall A. 45-46) With respect to other information of the 
Japanese activities which reached him from secret sources and in- 
fluenced his tliinking as to the imminence of war, the Chief of Staff 
testified that while it may have been practical and feasible to have 
sent this information to Short, nevertheless in his opinion at that 
time, it would have been unwise. (Tr., Marshall A. 46) The Chief 
of Staff conceded that "considering what has happened. * * * the 
situation might well have been helped by translating that informa- 
tion to them." (Tr., Marshall A. 46) Speaking of his decision at 
the time, however, he stated : 

In our own view, an alert of the character, particularly the char- 
acter of the two that occurred at that time, the Naval alert and then 
the later Army alert, (messages to Short from War Department and 
Navy Department) were sufiicient for any Commander with a great 
responsibility; and in addition to that j'ou must remember that we 
were pouring through Hawaii, on the way to the Philippines, con- 
voys, rushing everybody. Everything was being pushed to the last 
extreme. Nobody could look at that without realizing that some- 
thing very critical was in the wind. Our great problem was how 
to do these things, energized in the way we were — the shipments, 
and collecting the means and getting them out, particularly to the 
Philippines, which passed entirely through Hawaii — without giving 
such notice to the Japanese that it would have an unfortunate effect 
in our stalling off this affair. 



EEPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 259 

Undoubtedly they did obtain that view. I think they were rushed 
in their decision by the fact that if they didn't catch it, didn't act 
within a certain period of time, it would be too late ; we would have 
gained the necessary strength to make it undesirable, to make it too 
dangerous for them to act. 

[S8] All of that was apparent to the Commanders In the place. Only the 
most critical necessities would have involved us in taking over all that commercial 
shipping, in taxing the Pacific Fleet's resources in providing convoys. Every- 
thing was involved there at the time, and I cannot see how — I never have quite 
understood how the change from a great fear, as expressed in all the previous 
communications, of an air assault, suddenly seemed to lapse. I don't know what 
the explanation of it is, and I myself have mever discussed it. (Tr., Marshall 
A. 46-47) 

As already indicated, General Marshall had no information of 
any kind which indicated an immediate attack on Hawaii. (Tr., 
Marshall A. 27-28) 

The Chief of Staff also believed that Short had adequate weapons, 
armnunition, and other means for the discharge of his mission to 
protect Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A 27) He also was under 
the belief in late November and early December of 1941 that Short 
had adequate reconnaissance agencies to carry out the desired recon- 
naissance. In this regard, he testified: 

We had made every conceivable effort to deploy the radar out there ahead 
of other places. We had done everything we could to provide the means to carry 
out the air functions of that command, particularly as they were determined in 
the final agreement between General Short and Admiral Kimmel. (Tr., Marshall 
A. 27) 

The Chief of Staff knew that this agreement called for distant 
reconnaissance by the Navy. (Tr., Marshall A 26) 

The Chief of Staff further testified that Hawaii was but one of 
several places on the Japanese front and that "it was by far the best 
prepared that we had." (Tr., Marshall A 25) He stated : 

* * * if the Hawiian state of preparation in men and materiel was lOO, 
Panama was about 25 percent, and the Philippines about 10 percent, and Alaska 
and the Aleutians completely negligible. (Tr., Marshall A. 23) 

The Chief of Staff continued : 

I think we all knew that we were poverty stricken, * * * (Tr., Marshall 

A 26) 

To show the ramifications of the activities of the Chief of Staff 
and the over-all supervision which was required of him from a global 
perspective, the Chief of Staff testified concerning the Panama Canal 
Department : 

[39] * * * \ve had had very peculiar things there, and of course they 
could chop into us very badly there. We were open in a more vulnerable way in 
the Panama Canal than we were in Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A 13-14) 

General Marshall's 7 Decetnber Message : 

Concerning the Board's conclusion (c) (Rep. 298) that the Chief of 
Staff should have advised Short on the evening of 6 December or the 
early morning of 7 December of an almost immediate break with 
Japan, the Chief of Staff testified that he did not receive the intercept 
which indicated such a break until about 11 o'clock on 7 December. 
(Tr., Marshall A. 6) He then immediately conferred witli appropri- 
ate members of his Staff and wrote a draft of a mesage to be transmitted 



260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to Short. (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8) He gave this message when com* 
pleted to Colonel Bratton for transmittal by radio to the Western 
Defense Command, the Panama command, the Hawaiian command, 
and the Philij)pine command. (Tr., Marshall A. 8) The Chief of 
Staff knew that the time required for coding was " a very quick pro- 
cedure. It is done on a machine as rapidly as the girl types." (Tr., 
Marshall A. 13) Colonel Bratton took the message to the Message 
Center and upon his return was asked by the Chief of Staff as to the 
procedure which would be followed and the time within which it could 
be expected the message would reach the recipients. The Chief of 
Staff did not understand the explanation by Colonel Bratton, so he 
with Colonel Bundy was sent back for additional information. (Tr., 
Marshall A. 9) Colonel Bundy was on duty in the War Plans 
Division of the General Staff in charge of matters pertaining to the 
Pacific. (Tr. Marshall A. 9-10) When Colonel Bratton and Colonel 
Bundy returned they informed the Chief of Staff in effect that the 
message would be in the hands of the recipients within thirty minutes 
from that moment. (Tr, Marshall A. 10) It being still not clear to 
the Chief of Staff as to what were the time elements, he sent Colonel 
Bratton and Colonel Bundy back for a third time to check again. 
When they returned their reply confirmed that the time for transmit- 
tal would be satisfactory. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) 

The hief of Staff believed that the message would reach the recipi- 
ents before the one o'clock hour at which things might happen. (Tr,, 
Marshall A. 14) 

Actually, and unknown to the Chief of Staff, the Signal Corps sent 
the message to San Francisco by Western Union and from San Fran- 
cisco to Hawaii via Radio Corporation of America. This was because 
the Army radio was not able to get through to Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall 
A. 10) A further delay, which was also unknown to the Chief of Staff 
was caused by the nonoperation of a teletype at Honolulu on 7 Decem- 
ber. Thus when the message was received in Honolulu it was given 
to a boy for delivery on a bicycle. The boy was caught in the bombing 
and did not deliver the message until after the attack. (Tr., Marshall 
A. 10) 

[4^0] The telephone was not considered as means of transmission 
because, in the nature of things, it would have been too "time consum- 
ing." (Tr,, Marshall A. 13.) The Chief of Staff testified : 

* * * I would certainly have called MacArthur first, and then I would have 
called the Panama Canal second, * * * ^q^j from our own experience, my 
own experience, even now our telephone is a long-time procedure. * * * we 
now find we do a little bit better by teletype than we do on the telephone (Tr., 
Marshall A. 13-14). 

Colonel Bratton testified that when the Chief of Staff gave him the 
message for delivery to the Message Center : 

I took the message to Colonel French, Signal Corps oflScer in charge of the 
message center, explained to him that it was General Marshall's desire that the 
message be transmitted to the addresses by the fastest possible safe means, 
* * *. I then returned to the Office of the Chief of Staff. The latter directed 
me to find out how long it would take for the delivery of the message to the 
addressees. I returned to the message center and talked the matter over with 
Colonel French, who informed me that the message would be encoded in about 
three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addresses 
in about thirty minutes. I looked at my watch at this time and saw that it was 
11 : 50 a. m. (Tr., Bratton B. 79^0) (Ths would be 6 : 20 a. m. Honolulu time) . 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 261 

Colonel French testified that : 

Colonel Bratton was at the code room, and he asked me how long it would 
take to get the message transmitted, and I told him it would take about 30 to 
45 minutes to transmit the message to its destination (Tr. French 196). 

Concerning the question as to whether members of the General 
Staff, other than the Chief of Staff, should have transmitted to Short 
a warning without waiting for the arrival of the Chief of Staff on the 
morning of 7 December, the following testimony by the Chief of Staff 
is pertinent : 

General Russell. Was there anyone of the General Staff other than yourself 
with authority to have dispatched to the overseas departmental commanders a 
message which would have told them of these recent developments, and includ- 
ing the reply of the Japanese to our message of November 26, and particularly as 
to the substance of this message of December [4I] 7th relative to the 
delivery of the ultimatum and the destruction of the code machines? 

General Marshall. That would depend, I think, entirely on the officer con- 
cerned. There is no specific regulation about who, of those in charge of principal 
affairs, can do what in time of a great emergency. It depends on the judgment of 
the individual. If the Deputy Chief of StafE was here, if the head of the War 
Plans Division were here, if possible the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 were aware 
of this and of the possibilties of delay, they might have acted. It is very hard 
to answer, because you are inevitably involved in backsight regarding a great 
catastrophe, and I can only answer it in that way. (Tr., Marshall C. 211-212) 

Comment on Board/ s C onclusions as to General Marshall: 

As to the Board's conclusion (a) (Rep. 298) that General Marshall 
failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to 
keep Short fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese 
situation, "of which information he had an abundance and Short had 
little," I feel, as already indicated, that General Marshall's radio to 
Short of 27 November, considered along with the other messages to 
Short, accurately pictured the Japanese-American situation as it then 
existed and as it continued to exist until 7 December. Short as a mil- 
itary commander was required to take the information contained in 
this radio from his Chief of Staff' as true and not in the critical spirit 
of awaiting further information or proof of what he was told. Gen- 
eral Marshall was not in the position of carrying on a negotiation with 
a foreign plenipotentiary but was telling a subordinate what the situ- 
ation was for his guidance. The Board's conclusion reduces itself to 
a holding that General Marshall should have given Short at length 
and in detail the factual basis for his succinct statement in his 27 
November radio that there was only a bare possibility the Japanese 
might renew the negotiations, and that Japanese future action was 
unpredictable but hostile action was possible at any moment. 

So far as the transmission of information by the Chief of Staff to 
Short is concerned, mentioned in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of 
the Board's Conclusions, clearly the radiograms of 24 and 27 Novem- 
bed adequately pictured the emergency, the imminence of hostilities, 
and the necessity that Short be on the alert against threats from within 
and from without. The most that can be said is that the War De- 
partment did not transmit to Short the Top Secret messages, but these 
were cumulative. This is evident from a reading of the messages ac- 
tually sent Short over a period of months, hereinbefore referred to. 
While the War Department was possessed of more information than 
Short received, he did receive enough to require that he be on the qui 
vive. That Hawaii had already been sufficiently alerted was [4^] 



262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the opinion of Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7, 14, 15 ; Bratton B. 
78: Gibson D. 276-277), of Admiral Noyes (Tr., D. 276-277, Russell 
A. 34), of General Gerow (Tr., Sadtler D. 253, Bratton D. 283), of 
General Miles (Tr., Sadtler D. 253) , and of General Bedell Smith 
(Tr., Sadtler D. 253). 

Moreover, Short received various important naval messages. Gen- 
eral Marshall testified it was SOP that the Navy give Short these 
messages. ( Tr., Marshall 35, 36 ; Kimmel 1772. ) The Navy messages 
of 24 and 27 November specifically so provided. (Tr., Marshall 35, 
36, D. 306 ; Short 358, 363. ) Captain Layton testified that he delivered 
to and discussed with General Short in person the message from the 
Chief of Naval Operations dated 24 November 1941. (Tr. Layton 
3058-3059.) 

Thus, Short was fully advised of the tenseness of the Japanese situa- 
tion, of the requirement that he act in accordance with the clear in- 
structions from the Chief of Staff to prepare for both threats from 
within and from without, and for eventualities which could be momen- 
tarily expected. 

As to the Board's conclusion (b) that General Marshall failed in 
his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to send addi- 
tional instructions to Short when evidently he failed to realize the 
import of Short's 27 November reply, which indicated, the Board said, 
that Short had misunderstood General Marshall's radio and had not 
alerted his command for war, (Rep. 298) this statement is a non 
sequitur. But, in addition, there was no testimony before the Board 
that General Marshall ever saw Short's reply. He himself testified 
that he had no recollection of ever having seen it, though "the pre- 
sumption would be that I had seen it." (Tr., Marshal 38^0; cf. Top 
Secret Tr., Marshall C. 201.) It is si' riicant that Short's radiogram 
to the Chief of Staff, though initi?^ i "Noted" by the Secretary of 
War and General Gerow, is not init .ed by the Chief of Staff, although 
the latter initialed the correspon- .ig radio from General MacArthur. 
(Tr., Marshall 39.) The rep^ itself was indicative that Short had 
taken precautions against s' tage and in stating "liaison with the 
Navy" was susceptible of . ae interpretation that Short had also 
ordered defense measure- n accordance with the War Plan. That 
plan contemplated that ;otant reconnaissance would be conducted by 
the Navy. This war- 'ell known to General Marshall. Hence, the 
Chief of Staff, if he saw Short's reply, was entitled to believe that 
Short's use of the words "liaison with the Navy" in his reply meant 
the establishment of full reconnaissance. It must be remembered that 
Short was given a definite order in General Marshall's radio of 27 
November to conduct reconnaissance. The Chief of Staff was entitled 
to believe that his order would be obeyed. 

Short testified that "liaison with the Navy" meant to him "keeping 
in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and 
what they were doing." (Tr., Short 380.) He also stated that this 
phrase indicated he expected the Navy to carry out its part of the 
agreement for long distance -reconnaissance. (Tr., Short 380.) Gen- 
eral Gerow, head of War Plans Division for the Chief of Staff, testified 
that the portion of the reply stating "liaison with the Navy" led to the 
reasonable assumption that "General Short was working out recon- 
naissance and other defensive measures in coordination with the 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 263 

Navy. This would be normal procedure under tlie basic plan, * * *. 
(Tr., Gerow 4289.) In other words, the Chief of Staff was not defi- 
nitely advised by this reply of Short that Short had made no prepara- 
tions against an outside threat. 

[43] In a consideration of this point it should also be remembered 
that while Short had received from the Chief of Staff many communi- 
cations calling his attention to the danger of a surprise air attack 
Short at no time, so far as the record shows, questioned this estimate 
by a communication to the Chief of Staff. 

The very brevity of the reply by Short would also indicate to the 
War Department that Short had taken all necessary defense measures. 
It would be a most anomolous situation if a theater commander could 
be heard to say that because he reecived warnings from the Chief of 
Staff and had replied with a fragmentary report that ipso facto he 
was relieved of his responsibilities and that these responsibilities were 
then fastened upon the Chief of Staff. 

Also, since Short reecived numerous messages and information after 
27 November, especially the naval messages, which the Chief of Staff 
testified it was SOP to "exchange (Tr., Marshall 35, 36 ; Kimmel 1772) , 
the silence of Short after the message of 28 November would indicate 
to a busy Chief of Staff that he was ready to meet all threats, both 
those from within and those from without. 

It appears, therefore, that in his relations with the Hawaiian De- 
partment the Chief of Staff fulfilled his functions as Commander-in- 
Chief and, in point of truth, personally warned the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment with prophetic accuracy, against the very type of attack which 
occurred. 

Finally, it must be borne in mind that the functions of the Chief of 
Staff did not include the duty of personally directing and supervising 
the detailed administration of the various sections of the Office of the 
Chief of Staff. His primary duty was to advise the Secretary of War 
and the President, to plan and supervise the organization, equipment, 
and training of the Army, to make decisions and give advice concern- 
ing the over-all and vital problems of military strategy from the 
perspective of global war and the broad military problems which then 
confronted the United States. Moreover, it was a fundamental policy 
of the War Department, the wisdom of which has been demonstrated 
in the recent victories, not to interfere unduly with commanders in the 
field whose records justified the assumption of great responsibilities. 
Thus, the prime responsibility is on the theater commander. No duty 
could thus devolve upon the Chief of Staff to check personally on the 
Hawaiian Command other than as may be related to the stated funda- 
mental policy. To have singled out the Hawaiian Department for 
any different attention would have been peculiar and repugnant to 
the policy and purposes of a General Staff. The very nature of an 
over-all supervision in preparation for a global war makes mandatory 
that the Chief of Staff be divorced from administrative details. In 
no sense, of course, does the Chief of Staff avoid his responsibility in 
the event his organization is ineffective. There is a distinction, how- 
ever, between the personal performance of his especial duties and the 
performance of duties by members of his staff. 

[4-4-1 It is my opinion that the Board's conclusion (b) (Rep. 298) 
that General Marshall should have sent additional instructions to 
Short upon receipt of Short's reply, is not justified. 



264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

As to the Board's conclusion (c) that General Marshall failed to 
get to Short on the evening of 6 December or the early morning of 
7 December the critical information indicating an almost immediate 
break with Japan "though there was ample time to have accom- 
plished this" the record makes entirely clear that General Marshall 
personally did not receive this information until late in the morning 
of 7 December and that he did his best to get it to Short immediately 
but failed because of circumstances beyond his control. 

As to the Board's conclusion (d) that General Marshall failed to 
investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian 
Command between 27 November and 7 December, the record is silent 
as to whether this was the personal duty of the Chief of Staff. It has 
been already indicated that General Marshall was entitled to rely 
upon his subordinates, including Short, and to believe that elaborate 
j)reparations for the defense of Hawaii embodied in war plans formu- 
lated over a long period of time would be carried out by a theater 
commander in accordance with the traditional American military 
policy. General Marshall had been General Short's tentative SOP 
dated 14 July 1941 which contained elaborate plans for execution in 
an emergency. (Tr., Marshall 29) 

To sum up, I am of the opinion that none of the Board's conclusions 
as to General Marshall are justified. My views are confirmed by the 
Roberts Report (Roberts Report, p. 19-20). 

Board's Conclusions as to General Ger^ow: 

As to General Gerow the Board concluded that he failed in his duties 
as follows: 

(a) To keep the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department adequately 
informed on the impending war situation by making available to him the sub- 
stance of the data being delivered to the War Plans Division by the Assistant 
Chief of Staff, G-2. 

(b) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on 
November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive ; on the contrary he approved the 
message of November 27, 1941 (472) which contained confusing statements. 

(c) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short's reply to the 
November 27th message was not a state of readiness for war, and he failed to 
take corrective action. 

(d) To take the required steps to implement the existing joint plans and 
agreements between the Army and Navy to insure the functioning of the two 
services in the manner contemi^lated. (Rep. 299) 

[.^5] General Gerow was recalled from France where he was 
Commanding General of the Fifth Corps which had fought its way 
from the Normandy beach-head to the Siegfried Line. He testified 
concerning his activities as Chief or Acting Chief of the War Plans 
Division under the Chief of Staff during the time in question. (Tr., 
Gerow 4225) This Division of the General Staff was charged with 
war plans and operations, and was under the general direction and 
supervision of the Chief of Staff. 

From what has been hereinbefore stated it is apparent that General 
Short was given adequate information as to the rupture of diplomatic 
relations and the situation with Japanese, the unpredictable nature 
of Japanese future action, the imminence of hostilities, and that under 
no circumstances should any limitations or qualifications expressed in 
the messages jeoparjiize his defense, He was also ordered to establish 
feconnaissance, 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 265 

But since we know in retrospect that Short was not, apparently, 
fully alive to an imminent outside threat and since the War Plans 
Division had received substantial information from the Intelligence 
Section, G-2, the Board argues that had this additional information 
been transmitted to Short it might have convinced him not only that 
war was imminent but that there was a real possibility of a surprise 
air attack on Hawaii. In retrospect it is difficult to perceive any sub- 
stantial reason for not sending Short this additional information or, 
in the alternative, checking to see whether Short was sufficiently alive to 
the danger. General Gerow did neither. In my opinion General 
Gerow showed a lack of imagination in failing to realize that had 
the Top Secret information been sent to Short it could not have had 
any other than a beneficial effect. General Gerow also showed lack 
of imagination in failing to make the proper deductions from the 
Japanese intercepts. For instance, the message of 24 September from 
Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and 
dividing Pearl Harbor into various subdivisions for that purpose 
coupled with the message of 15 November to Honolulu to make "the 
ships in harbor report" irregular, and the further message of 29 No- 
vember to Honolulu asking for reports even when there were no ship 
movements (Top Secet Ex. "B") might readily have suggested to 
an imaginative person a possible Jap design on Pearl Harbor. Fail- 
ure to appreciate the significance of such messages shows a lack of 
the type of skill in anticipating and preparing against eventualities 
which we have a right to expect in an officer at the head of the War 
Plans Division. If this criticism seems harsh, it only illustrates the 
advisability of General Gerow transmitting the Top Secret informa- 
tion to Short. 

The Board concludes (b) that General Gerow failed in his duty in 
sending Short the 27 November radiogram, which the Board held was 
not a clear and concise directive. In various places in the Keport, 
the Board refers to this radiogram as containing confusing and con- 
flicting statements. In my opinion this is an erroneous characteriza- 
tion of the message. It fails to take into account the very essence 
of the situation which then presented [46] itself. Those in 
authority in Washington, from the President down, were confronted 
at tliat moment with a most difficult andclelicate situation. The diplo- 
matic negotiations which had been taking place between the Secre- 
tary of State and the Japanese emissaries had practically reached the 
breaking point. They knew that the Japanese might resort to war 
at any moment. On the other hand, they knew that the United States 
was not prepared for war and that every week or month of delay 
would help the situation. In a memorandum dated that very day — 
27 November 1941— the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of 
O^Derations of the Navy addressed a joint memorandum to the Presi- 
dent of the 'United States, urging him to postpone any action that 
might precipitate war as long as possible because we were not ready. 
Confronted with this situation, those in authority in the War Depart- 
ment, including the Secretary of War, participated in the preparation 
of this radiogram and similar ones (Tr., Stimson 4055, 4056), which 
were sent to other department commanders, and undertook to express 
as accurately as possible the essential elements of this delicate situa- 
tion, warning of the possibility of an attack at any moment and 



266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that nothing must be omitted to jeopardize our defense. At the same 
time they warned them of the importance of not doing anything that 
would precipitate war on our part. This naturally presented a delicate 
problem, but it was delicate because of the very nature of the facts 
and not because of any confusion of thought which was translated 
into the language. There was no other course except to present this 
problem just as it was to the responsible theater commander. In any 
delicate situation conflicting factors are bound to exist. It is because 
it requires wisdom and judgment to deal with them that only men 
supposedly qualified are given posts of such responsibility. In any 
event, the Board overlooks the Navy radio of 27 November, beginning 
"This is a war warning", which General Gerow knew was being sent. 
(Tr., Gerow 4261-4262) 

As to the Board's conclusion (c) that General Gerow failed to note 
Short's reply and to take corrective action, the Board is on firmer 
ground. General Gerow admitted that while it was physically im- 
possible for him to check every message (Tr., Gerow 4288) and that 
he considered the War Department gave Short adequate warning 
(Tr., Gerow 4300), nevertheless he had erred by asuming that the 
reply of Short was to the sabotage radiogram from The Adjutant 
General of 27 November. (Tr., Gerow 4290-4291) This being so, 
it follows that he failed also to follow up on the demand in the radio- 
gram of 27 November signed "Marshall", for a report from Short. 
As to this. General Gerow testified : 

The thought that he had not replied never occurred to me between the interval 
of November 27 and December 7. As I say, there -were many other important 
problems coming up at the time, and I expected my stafE to follow through. 
(Tr., Gerow 4290) 

[47] In fairness to General Gerow it should also be mentioned that 
Colonel Bundy, now deceased, was directly under General Gerow 
in charge of the Planning and Operational Group and had been 
handling the Pacific matters. (Tr., Gerow 4288, 4291) 

General Gerow, as head of the Division, must be held accountable 
for the failure of his Division to function with the efficiency that 
would have made impossible such an oversight. This is so even though 
the War Plans Division is concerned with the operation of many 
theaters and although its functions are not comparable to those of a 
commander of a theater who, like a sentinel on post, is charged with 
specific responsibilities. 

As to the conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to take the 
required steps to insure the functioning of the two services in Hawaii 
jDursuant to their joint agreements, it has already been seen that these 
agreements for joint defensive action could be put into effect by the 
two conunanders in Hawaii when they deemed it advisable. (Tr., 
Gerow 4284, Kimmel 1759-1760, Short 4440) General Gerow assumed 
and had the right to assume that, warned by the threat of hostile 
attack contained in the 27 November message, the two commanders 
would put into effect the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Tr., 
Gerow 4289), or at least such portions therefore as would assure ade- 
quate reconnaissance. 

On the whole, I feel that the Board's criticism (a) of General 
Gerow in failing to send Short the substance of the data delivered 
to him by G-2 is, in the light of after-events, to a degree justified. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 267 

(Rep. 299) At least it was a precautionary measure which General 
Gerow could well have taken. I agree too with the Board's con- 
clusion (c) in so far as it holds that General Gerow was culpable in 
failing to check on Short's reply to the November 27 message signed 
"Marshall." I disagree with the Board in its conclusion (b) that 
General Gerow in approving the 27 November message to Short failed 
to send a clear, concise directive. As already indicated, I feel that 
this radiogram accurately and adequately picture the situation as it 
existed and gave definite instructions. I also disagree with the Board's 
conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to take the required steps 
to implement the existing Joint Army and Navy War Plan. General 
Gerow was entitled to believe that, warned as they were, the two 
commanders would themselves put these plans into effect. 

Miscellaneous Statements of Board: 

Certain conclusions of the Board, such as those relating to Secretary 
Hull, are not in my opinion relevant to the Board's inquiry. My 
failure to discuss such matters should not be regarded as indicating 
my agreement with these conclusions. Nor has it been necessary to 
consider such irrelevant matters in arriving at my conclusions. 

[45] Unexplored Leads: 

In the course of my examination of the Report and record certain 
further inquiries have suggested themselves to me which, in my opin- 
ion, might advantageously be pursued. The answers to these inquiries 
would not, in all probability, in my opinion, affect the result; at the 
same time in order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain 
personnel these leads should be further explored. I do not mean to 
suggest that the Board should be reconvened for this purpose; the 
work could be done by an individual officer familiar with the matter. 

In the event you approve of this suggestion I will discuss these mat- 
ters in detail with the officer selected by you. 

Recommendations : 

As to General Marshall I have already expressed my opinion that 
the conclusions of the Board are unjustified and erroneous. 

As to General Gerow I have stated my agreement with the conclu- 
sions of the Board (a) that he erred in not sending to Short more 
information that he did, and (c) in not checking on Short's reply 
to the 27 November message signed "Marshall." In my opinion these 
errors do not warrant disciplinary action against General Gerow. 
General Gerow admitted the error of his division in not checking 
Short's reply, for which he frankly took the blame. The nature of 
the errors and the fact that he has since demonstrated his great quali- 
fications for field command indicate that his case is now far removed 
from disciplinary action. 

As to Short I have concurred in the conclusions of the Board (Rep. 
300) that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a 
state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting 
an alert against sabotage only; (b) in failing to reach or attempt to 
reach an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the 
Joint Army and Navy Plans for defense into operation; and (c) to 
inform himself on the effectiveness of the long distance reconnaissance 
being conducted by the Navy. As to whether Short's culpability in 



268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the above respects is of the type which constitutes a military offense 
suggesting trial by court-martial, I have already indicated as to (a) 
above that Short in failing to put into operation the proper alert was 
not so much guilty of a neglect of duty as of a serious error of judg- 
ment. It is difficult to visualize his mistake in the form of a neglect 
of duty when the evidence shows that he considered his various alterna- 
tives and came to the conclusion that Alert No, 1 was the proper alert. 
The fact that in arriving at this conclusion he failed to take into con- 
sideration certain factors such as that a surprise air attack was the 
primary threat, or that he failed to subordinate certain other factors 
such as possible alarm of the civil population does not remove the case 
from the category of a mistake of judgment. These mistakes simply 
led up to the error of judgment in establisliing the wrong alert. The 
fact also that he communicated to the AVar Department his decision to 
establish what was tantamount to Alert No. 1 is likewise inconsistent 
with the concept of a neglect of duty. 

[4^] As to whether (b) Short's failure to reach or attempt to 
reach an agreement with the naval authorities in Haw^aii to put the 
Joint Army and Navy Defense Plans into operation is a neglect of 
duty in the nature of being a triable offense, I am of the opinion that, 
on the testimony now of record, this question is answered by what has 
been said above. Short's failure stemmed from a mistake of judgment 
on his part. 

As to the Board's conclusion (c) that Short failed in his duties in 
failing to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long distance 
reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy, Short's defense would 
be, as he indicated in the present proceedings, that such reconnaissance 
was a Navy function. Whether he was entitled to rely upon the fact 
that the Navy was conducting, to the best of its ability, such recon- 
naissance as it had means to conduct, seems doubtful. I do not feel 
that it can be made the basis of charges against General Short. I 
believe the truer picture to be that General Short had adopted whole- 
heartedly what was apparently the viewpoint of the Navy, namely, 
that there was literally no chance of a surprise air attack on Pearl 
Harbor. 

Considering the matter of General Short's possible trial by court- 
martial at the present time, I have been informed that the Japanese 
are still using some of the code systems in which various intercepted 
messages were sent and that information of great military value con- 
tinues to be obtained from present day intercepts sent in these code 
systems. A present trial would undoubtedly result in disclosing these 
facts. There is also the difficulty of assembling the necessary court 
of high ranking officers and securing the attendance of numerous wit- 
nesses who would be recalled from their various war-time duties all 
over the world. I feel therefore that trial of General Short in time of 
war is out of the question. 

As to whether General Short should be tried at any time, a factor 
to be considered is what sentence, in the event of conviction, the Court 
would adjudge. As I have already indicated, upon any charge of 
neglect of duty, or of his various duties, General Short would have the 
formidable defense that he responded to the request to report measures 
he had taken with a message, incomplete and ambiguous it may be, 
but which should have prompted doubt as to the sufficiency of the 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 269 

action taken. My experience with courts-martial leads me to the 
belief that a court would be reluctant to adjudge a severe sentence in 
a case of this kind where the general picture would be clouded by a 
claim that others were contributory causes. (Cf., Roberts Report, 
Conclusion 18, p. 21) There is also in cases like this the historic prece- 
dent of President Lincoln's refusal to rebuke Secretary of War Simon 
Cameron for a gross error of judgment. (Life of Abraham Lincoln 
by Nicolay & Hay, Vol. 5, p. 125-130) I am therefore forced to con- 
clude that if General Short is tried and if such trial should result in 
his conviction there is considerable likelihood the Court would adjudge 
a sentence less than dismissal and might well adjudge nothing beyond 
a reprimand. 

[50] As on the whole, there is doubt whether a court would con- 
vict or if it convicted would adjudge a sentence in excess of reprimand, 
I am inclined to feel that some disposition of the matter other than by 
a trial should be made rather than to permit the case to linger on as a 
recurrent public irritation. I suggest therefore that a public state- 
ment be made by you giving a brief review of the Board's proceedings 
and pointing out that General Short was guilty of errors of judgment 
for which he was properly removed from command, and that this 
constitutes a sufficient disposition of the matter at this time. In the 
event further investigation should disclose a different situation the 
matter could later be reexamined in the light of such additional 
evidence. 

Mykon C. Cramer, 

Major General^ 
The Judge Advocate General. 



79716— 46— Ex. 157 18 



270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



\a] Memorandum for the Secretary of War 

Subject : Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation, 14 September 1945 

[1] 14 September 1945. 

Memorandum for the Secretary of War 

Subject: Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation 

This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally. 
Lieutenant Colonel Henrj^ C. Clausen, JAGD, appointed by you 
pursuant to your public statement, dated 1 December 1944, to con- 
tinue the Army Pearl Harbor investigation, has submitted the affi- 
davits obtained by him in the course of his further investigation. The 
l^resent memorandum is my opinion as to whether my original memo- 
randum to you, dated 25 November 1944, reviewing the report of the 
Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20 October 1944, requires modifica- 
tion either in respect of the conclusions reached or the statements 
of fact contained therein drawn from the Army Pearl Harbor Board 
report. In my opinion, the conclusions therein are in no way affected 
by the additional data obtained by Colonel Clausen's investigation. 
Certain statements of fact, however, made by me in my prior memo- 
randum, which statements I made as a result of my examination of 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board report, require clarification in some 
respects. 

The "TFmc?s" Message: 

On pages 24-28 of my memorandum I discussed as part of the in- 
formation the War Department possessed and which Short claimed 
he did not receive, the so-called "Winds Code" message of 20 Novem- 
ber 1941 from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives. This 
was to the effect that 

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)", a 
warning message would be given in tlie middle and at the end of the Japanese 
daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows : 

"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO 

KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN) 
"(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH 

WIND CLOUDY) 
"(3) Japan-British relations: NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND 

CLEAR)" 

When this signal was heard, all codes and ciphers were to be destroyed. 
It is admitted by all that this first "Winds" message, setting up a 
code or signal to be given later, was received by the War Department 
around 20 November 1941. However, the testimony before the Army 
Pearl [^] Harbor Board left in doubt whether a second or 
activating or execute "Winds" message was ever received and if so 
by whom. The testimony of Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army 
codes and ciphers, (my Memo., p. 24) that an activating "Winds" 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 271 

message indicating a breach in Japanese-British diplomatic relations 
had been received was not entirely satisfactory. This is likewise true 
of the testimony of Captain Safford, head of the Navy's Security 
Division, to the same effect (my Memo. p. 25). 

Colonel Clausen's subsequent investigation fails to disclose any tes- 
timony that an activating or implementing "Winds" message indicfjt- 
ing breach of Japanese relations with either Great Britain, Russia 
or the United States was ever received by the War Department. 
Thus, Colonel Harold Doud, in charge of B Section, Signal Intelli- 
gence Service, which was the Code and Cipher Solution Section, in 
November and December 1941, stated : 

I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know 
there was no such execute message received in the War Department. ( Affld., Col. 
Harold Doud) 

Captain Edwin T. Lay ton, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific 
Fleet, testified no such message was ever received at Pearl Harbor 
(affid., Capt. Edwin T. Layton, p. 2). A statement of Commander 
J. S. Holtwick, Commander Rochef ort's assistant at Pearl Harbor, was 
to the same effect. (Memorandum of Comdr. J. S. Holtwick) 

Colonel Rox W. Minckler, Signal Corps, in charge of Signal Intelli- 
gence Service at the time, stated : 

I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either 
before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such message was sent. 
(Affid., Col. Rex W. Minckler) 

He said there were "one or two 'false alarrns' ", which he discussed 
with representatives of G-2 and the Navy. His opposite number in 
the Navy was Captain L. F. Safford. 

Major General Sherman Miles, in charge of G-2 at the time did not 
recall meeting Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 
1941, at which meeting Colonel Sadtler is supposed to have advised 
him of Admiral Noyes' telephone call that "The message is in." (See 
Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 24) General Miles stated : "To the best 
of my knowledge and belief, no authentic execute message was ever 
received in the War Department before the outbreak of hostilities." 
(Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, p. 2) General Miles stated that 
the Far Eastern Section of G-2 was especially alerted to watch for the 
activating "Winds" message which was regarded as of vital concern. 
He stated there were several [3] messages intercepted which 
were thought at first to be the execute message but which turned out 
not to be authentic. He thought that if there was any meeting with 
Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, it concerned an unauthentic mes- 
sage. (Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, p. 2) 

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Signal Corps, in charge of military codes 
and ciphers in the Chief Signal Office, in November and December 
1941, stated that when he got word from Admiral Noyes that "The 
message is in" (See Vol. D., Top Secret testimony, p. 251), he did 
nothing further to ascertain from Admiral Noyes or other persons 
the exact wording of the intercept as he assumed that according to 
standard practice, it would be transmitted without delay to G-2 
(Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler) . In his affidavit given to Colonel Clau- 
sen, Colonel Sadtler stated that after talking to General Miles and 



272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Bratton about Admiral Noyes' message lie went to liis office 
and typed a proposed warning as follows : 

C. G.-P. I., Hawaii-Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan 
in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a repetition of 
Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall. 

However he did not show this message to anyone or make a copy 
of it and he quoted it only from memory. ( Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadtler) 
According to his original testimony he conferred with General Gerow 
and General Bedell Smith about Admiral Noyes' message. He did not 
show them the above-quoted draft but stated he did suggest that a 
warning message be sent the overseas commanders as he testified be- 
fore the Army Pearl Harbor Board (Vol. D, Top Secret testimony, 
p. 253). He reiterated this testimony before Colonel Clausen (Affid., 
Col. Otis K. Sadtler, p. 1) . Neither General Gerow nor General Smith 
had any recollection of any such conference with Colonel Sadtler or 
any such recommendation by him. General Gerow pointed out quite 
appositely that Colonel Sadtler was "purely a Signal Corps officer 
and that he was not concerned with the dissemination and interpreta- 
tion of 'Magic'" messages (Affid., General Leonard Gerow). Gen- 
eral Smith likewise has no recollection of Colonel Sadtler discussing 
the matter with him. General Smith stated that he was not on the 
very restricted list of officers with whom top secret matters of the 
"Magic" type could be discussed, and thus it would have been im- 
possible for Colonel Sadtler to have discussed the matter with him. 
(Afid., Lt. Gen. W. Bedell Smith) 

[4] Colonel Sadtler in his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen 
stated that other than his testimony relative to the Admiral Noyes 
message (probably a "false alarm"), he had never seen any execute 
message to the "Winds Code" and, so far as he knew, no such execute 
message was received in the War Department. He at no time urged 
General Miles, G-2, or any other representative of G-2 to send a 
warning message to overseas commanders. (Affid., Col. Otis. K. 
Sadtler, p. 3) 

I have been informed that Admiral Noyes and other witnesses 
appearing before Admiral Hewitt in the Navy inquiry into the Pearl 
Harbor matter, denied the receipt of an authentic execute "Winds" 
message. 

Colonel Rufus W. Bratton, in charge of the Far Eastern Section, 
G-2, in 1941, recalled a meeting 5 December 1941 with General Miles 
and Colonel Sadtler at which Colonel Sadtler presented the informa- 
tion he had received from Admiral Noyes. Colonel Sadtler was in- 
structed to get the exact text from Admiral Noyes, as there had been 
several "false alarm" reports to the same effect. So far as he knew. 
Colonel Sadtler never returned to G-2 with the text or any additional 
information. Colonel Bratton had no information about any alleged 
visit of Colonel Sadtler to General Gerow or General Bedell Smith, 
Colonel Bratton never brought Colonel Sadtler's report to the atten- 
tion of the Chief of Staff. (Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton, p. 2) 

Colonel Bratton stated that at no time prior to 7 December 1941 
did he ever see or hear of an authentic message implementing the 
"Winds Code." As to the testimony of Captain Safford of the Navy 
to the effect that two copies of such a message were sent to the Army, 
Colonel Bratton pointed out that not two but six copies of any such 



REPORT OF ARMY PEAHL HARBOR BOARD 273 

message were required to be sent by the Navy to the Army, the in- 
ference being that no copies at all were sent. Prior to 7 December 
1941, representatives of the Navy had discussed with him several 
"false alarms'' relative to the "Winds" message but no one in the 
Navy or in G-2 ever discussed with him the message supposed to 
have been sent to the Army according to Captain Safford's testi- 
mony. (Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton) 

Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, Signal Corps, in charge of radio 
interception for the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department, 
prior to 7 December 1911, testified that on receipt of the original 
"Winds" message, [5] he directed the San Francisco inter- 
ception station to be on the watch for an activating message and to 
send it to him. To the best of his knowledge, no execute message was 
ever picked up. (Affid., Col. Robert E. Schukraft) 

General Gerow's and General Bedell Smith's comment on Colonel 
Sadtler's testimony relative to the alleged execute "Winds" message 
received from Admiral Noyes has already been discussed. (See affi- 
davits. Gen. Gerow, p. 2 ; Gen. W. Bedell Smith, p. 3) . 

Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, the 1941 Executive Assistant 
to the Chief, Intelligence Branch, MID, General Staff, testified to 
Colonel Clausen that the source of his information on all "Ultra" 
(or "Magic") messages concerning Japan was Colonel Bratton and 
Major Dusenbury, Colonel Bratton's assistant. He inquired of 
Colonel Bratton on several occasions as to whether any execute mes- 
sage had come in under the "Winds Code." He did not recall re- 
ceiving any such information from Colonel Bratton and stated that 
if he had received it, he would have remembered it. No other person 
informed him of any such execute "Winds" message prior to 7 Decem- 
ber 1941 (Affid., Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts) . 

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur testified to Colonel 
Clausen that he had no recollection of having received any of the 
messages in Top Secret Exhibit B (see my first memorandum of 25 
November 1944, pp. 19-23). He never got the "Winds Code" or 
any activating or implementing message. He believed he had seen 
every "Ultra" message delivered to his headquarters. (Affid., Gen. 
Douglas MaCxA.rthur) His Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Richard 
K. Sutherland, testified to the same effect. (Affid,, Lt. Gen. Richard 
K. Sutherland) Major General C. A. Willoughby, assistant Chief 
of Staff, Southwest Pacific Area, stated he had never seen any of 
the messages in Top Secret Exhibit B except isolated fragments 
of the Kurusu series. Neither he nor anyone else in the USAFFE to 
his knowledge were advised of the "Winds Code" or of any execute 
message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby) 

Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Rowlett testified to Colonel Clausen 
that immediately prior to the Pearl Harbor attack he was a civilian 
technical assistant to the officer in charge of the Crypto- Analytic 
Unit, Signal Intelligence Service, War Depa^-tment, Washington, 
D. C, at present Branch Chief, Signal Security Agency, Signal Corps, 
War Department. In the latter capacity, he made a search for an 
activating "Winds" message, which he failed to find. (Affid., Lt. 
Col, Frank B. Rowlett) 

[6] My conclusion, from the above testimony, read in connec- 
tion with the testimony in the Pearl Harbor Report as to the 



274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"Winds" message, discussed by me in my memorandum dated 25 
November 1944, is that the most diligent search fails to reveal that 
any activating or execute "Winds" message was ever received by the 
War Department. In this connection, General Marshall's testimony 
will be recalled, "I find that no officer of the Navy advised Gen. 
Miles or Col. Bratton that any message implementing the 'Winds' 
Code had been received by the Navy." (Vol. A, Top Secret Tr., 
Marshall, P. 38.) 

The Roche fort Message : 

In my original memorandum (p. 27), I referred to Colonel Brat- 
ton's testimony that on receipt of the 2 December message, translated 
4 December, from Tokyo to the Embassy at Washington, ordering 
destruction of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this 
message to General Miles and General Gerow and after discussing 
it, recommended a further warning or alert to our overseas com- 
manders. General Gerow, felt that sufficient warning had already 
been given and General Miles stated he was in no position to over- 
rule him. Colonel Bratton, however, still feeling uneasy about the 
matter, went to the Navy, where he discussed it with Commander 
McCollum, who felt as he did. McCollum stated that as Commander 
Rochefort, the Naval Combat Intelligence Officer with the Fourteenth 
Naval District in Honolulu, had gotten the first "Winds" message 
and wsa listening for the second or implementing message, a radio- 
gram be sent to General Short's G-2 in Hawaii to see Commander 
Rochefort at once. Colonel Bratton thereupon drafted a radiogram 
signed "Miles," which was sent to the Assistant Chief of Staff, 
Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, on 5 December 1941, read- 
ing as follows : 

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately tliru Commandant Fourteenth 
Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather. 

No testimony is contained in the original Army Pearl Harbor 
Board Report, or in the Top Secret report as to whether Short was 
informed of the above message. However^ realizing its importance. 
Colonel Clausen in his subsequent investigation examined General 
Fielder, Short's G-2, and Colonel Bicknell, his Assistant G-2, as to 
whether this radiogram was received and what action was taken. 
General Fielder testified he had no recollection of ever having seen 
this radiogram ( Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, j). 2) . 

As to the likelihood of the "Winds" information being sent to him 
by the Navy, independently of the so-called Rochefort message. Gen- 
eral Fielder testified : 

[7] My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their 
combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage of in- 
formation between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and myself had to do 
primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was given to me 
by anyone in the Navy, which indicated in any way that aggression by the 
Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated. It was well known 
that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed immi- 
nent, but all my information seemed to predict sabotage and internal troubles 
for Hawaii. (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 6, p. 2.) 

General Fielder further said : 

No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies 
except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believe the Pa- 



EEPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 275 

cific Fleet Intelligence Section to have excellent information of the Japanese 
fleer and assumed that if any information which I needed to know was possessed 
by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I know now that had I 
asked for information obtained by the Navy from intercept sources it would 
not have been given me. For example Captain Layton stated that if he had 
turned any over to me he would not have divulged the source, but in fact, would 
have given some different derivation and that this he did do with Lt. Col. 
Bicknell. The Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command 
justified principally to defend the Pearl. Harbor Naval Base with fixed seacoast 
batteries, anti-aircraft batteries, mobile ground troops and the 7th Air Force 
as the weapons. The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive 
action along with the Navy constituting the first line of defense for Hawaii. 
1 have been told that prior to December 7, 1941, the Intelligence Oflicer of 
7th AF, Lt. Col. Raley, was in liaison with and received some information from 
Commander Layton, Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence, but was honor bound to 
divulge it only to his Commanding General. It did not come to me and I didn't 
know of the liaison until after the war started. (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. 
Fielder, par. 8, p. 2.) 

General Fielder had no recollection of ever having seen any of the 
Japanese messages contained in Top Secret Exhibit B which included 
the "Winds" message (referred to in my original memorandum, pp. 
19-23) (Affid., Brig. Gen. Fielder, par. 11, p. 3). 

Colonel George W. Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, in charge of the 
Contact Office in downtown Honolulu, stated that he maintained 
very close [8] liaison with Commander Rochefort and knew 
prior to Pearl Harbor Day that the latter was engaged in intercept- 
ing and decrypting Japanese messages. During the latter part of 
November, 1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted the Jap- 
anese message containing the "Winds Code." He took immediate 
action to have the local Federal Communications Commission agency 
monitor for the execute message, which was not received (Affid., Col. 
George W. Bicknell, p. 1). His attention was again called to the 
"Winds Code" when on 5 December 1941 he saw on General (then 
Colonel) Fielder's desk the radiogram from General Miles to con- 
tact Commander Eochefort. (This directlj^ conflicts with General 
Fielder's testimony that he never saw the Rochefort radiogram.) 
Colonel Bicknell that day conmiunicated with Commander Roche- 
fort to ascertain the pertinent information and was told that Com- 
mander Rochefort was monitoring for the execute message. This in- 
formation was also given to Mr. Robert L. Shivers, in charge of the 
FBI in Honolulu. 

The affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, Executive Officer of 
the Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department, who assisted in send- 
ing the Rochefort message, contains hearsay statements to the effect 
that "Hawaii had everything in the way of information that Wash- 
ington had" (including the "Winds" message), the source of which 
was Navy personnel whose identity he could not recall. His undis- 
closed Navy sources were also authority for his statement that Com- 
mander Rochefort's crypto-analytic unit in Hawaii were monitoring 
for intercepts, breaking and translating the codes and that the Army 
in Hawaii would receive all this information. He said he sent the 
Rochefort message on 5 December merely as a precautionar}^ meas- 
use. (Affid., Col. Moses W. Pettigrew) 

Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu at the 
time, does not mention the "Winds" message as such in his affidavit. 
Apparently, however, the Navy had guardedly advised him of this 



276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

message or its equivalent prior to 7 December. Thus, he said Cap- 
tain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the Navy, tolcl him he 
was aware of the code the Japanese would use to announce a break in 
Japanese relations. Mayfield gave Shivers a code by which he would 
inform Shivers of Japanese activities in this line and Shivers passed 
this information on to Colonel Bicknell. Mayfield never gave him 
the code signal. (Affid., Robert L. Shivers) 
Mr. Shivers testified: 

(Commander Rochefort did not discuss with me liis oijerations, nor did he 
disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until after 7 
December. (Affid., Robert L. Shivers) 

There is a conflict in this respect between Mr. Shivers and Colonel 
Bicknell. 

[9] General Fielder, when presented with Commander Roche- 
fort's affidavit indicating the "Winds Code" message was given to 
him, specifically denied that he received it. General Fielder stated : 

I fell sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt Col Bicknell, who accord- 
ing to his own statement did receive infomiation from Rochefort. If any of it 
came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and not recognizable as coming 
from reliable sources. I certainly had no idea that Lt Col Bicknell was get- 
ting the contents of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event 
Rochefort did not give it to me direct. (Affid., Gen. Fielder, par. 10, p. 3) 

General Short was not specifically examined as to whether he re- 
ceived the ''Winds Code" message. Impliedly it is covered by his 
general denial of the receipt of information other than that he ad- 
mitted he received. 

In my opinion, the state of the present record fails to show con- 
clusively that the "AVinds Code" message as such reached General 
Short personally either through the medium of liaison between the 
Navy and the Army Intelligence Sections in Hawaii or as a result of 
the Rochefort message. Whether Short received equivalent infor- 
mation will now be considered. 

Other Informatlo7i Possessed hy General Short: 

I have been informed that Short, when he appeared before the 
Navy Board, testified that had he gotten General Marshall's 7 Decem- 
ber radiogram prior to the attack, it might have been a different story. 
In answer to a question as to whether he would then have gone on a 
different alert, he said : 

I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in tliere, about 
the destruction of the code machines. The other matter wouldn't have made 
much of an impression on me. But when you destroy your codes or code ma- 
chines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this 
advantage also : I could have asked him the significance to him. But leaving 
that out, the destruction of the code machme icould have been very significant 
to me. I would have been very much more alarmed about that than the other 
matter. * * * i would have taken the destruction of the code machines 
very seriously. (Italics supplied) 

It is a fair inference that long prior to Pearl Harbor Day, Short 
obtained equivalent information from Colonel Bicknell and possibly 
others.. In my memorandum of 25 November 1944 (p. 10, 19, 30), 
I referred to General Fielder's and Colonel Bicknell's testimony that 
they had information prior to 7 December that the Japanese Consulate 
in Honolulu was [10] "destroying its codes and burning its 
secret papers," which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 277 

meant war. This information Colonel Bicknell brought to the atten- 
tion of General Short's staff conference on the morning of 6 Decem- 
ber, a conference presided over by General Short's Chief of Staff, 
Colonel Phillips. (Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 10, 19) Colonel 
Phillips stated he brought it to the attention of General Short (Memo. 
25 November 1944, p. 19). 

The above testimony was amplified by further testimony by Mr. 
Shivers, the FBI Ageiit in charge in Honolulu. Mr. Shivers testified 
that on 3 December 1941 Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Offi- 
cer for the Navy, called him, asking him if he could verify informa- 
tion that the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was burning his 
codes and papers. About two hours later the FBI intercepted a 
telephone message between the cook at the Japanese Consulate and a 
Japanese in Honolulu, during which the cook stated that the Consul 
General was "burning and destryoing all his important papers." 
Shivers immediately gave this information to Captain Mayfield and 
Colonel Bicknell. Shivers likewise telegraphed Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Japanese Consul 
General Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers." 
Worthy of note also is Mr. Shivers' statement that on 28 November 
1941 he received a radiogram from Mr. Hoover to the effect that peace 
negotiations between the United States and Japan were breaking 
down and to be on the alert at all times as anything was liable to hap- 
pen. Shivers gave this information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel 
Bicknell, ho stated they had already received similar information 
from their respective heads in Washington. (Affid., Robert L. 
Shivers) 

General Fielder confirmed Colonel Bicknell's testimony that the 
destruction by the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu of "codes 
and papers" was related by Colonel Bicknell at the staff conference 
on 6 December 1941. General Fielder testified, "i gave this latter 
information to General Short the same day." (Affid., Brig. Gen. 
Kendall J. Fielder, p. 3) 

Colonel Bicknell testified that about 3 December 1941 he learned 
from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japa- 
nese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. This aDparently was radio Op- 
Nav No. 031850, dated 3 December 1941, addresed to the Commander- 
in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Commandant, 14th Naval Dis- 
trict, Commandant', 16th Naval District, reading as follows : 

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent in- 
structions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy 
most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important con- 
fidential and secret documents. (Top Secret Vol. C, Safford, p. 183) 

[11] Colonel Bicknell saw the above radiogram. (Affid., Col. 
Bicknell, p. 2) 

About this time he got the information above referred to from Mr. 
Shivers, and told the staff conference "what I had learned concerning 
the destruction of their important papers by Japanese consuls." 
(Affid., Col. Bicknell, p. 2) 

He also informed the conference that because of this and subsequent 
information which he had from reliable sources, the destruction of 



278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

such papers had a very serious intent and that something war like by 
Japan was about to happen somewhere. He had previously prepared 
and signed weekly estimates given to the Chief of Staff to the same 
effect. (Vol. 30, Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, p. 3684- 
3685) Colonel Bicknell also testified further relative to giving General 
Fielder and General Short the Dr. Mori mesage intercepted by the 
FBI on 6 December 1941 (referred to in Memo., 25 November 1944, 
p. 11) . Their reaction was as follows, according to Colonel Bicknell : 

Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too 
"intelligence conscious" and that to them this message seemed to be quite in 
order, and that it was nothing to be excited about. My conference with General 
Short and Colonel Fielder was^ comparatively brief and seemed to last only for 
about five minutes. 

Following 7 December 1941, I met General Short vi^hile waiting to testify before 
the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to me words 
to the effect, "Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever happens you 
were right and I was wrong." ( AiBd., Col. George W. Bicknell, p. 3) 

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not advised prior to 
Pearl Harbor Day by General Fielder, Colonel Phillips, Colonel 
Bicknell, or all three, of current intelligence reports and, in particular, 
that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was burning its papers. In 
the interest of strict accuracy, however, I must mention statements 
made by me on pages 10, 19 and 30 of my prior memorandum, based 
on the Army Pearl Harbor Board record, that Short's G-2 and Assist- 
ant G-2 had information that the Jap Consulate in Honolulu was 
destroying its codes and secret papers. Mr. Shivers, the source of this 
information, does not mention "codes" in his affidavit but simply states 
the Consul General was "burning and destroying all his important 
papers." To most people, this would mean codes, since it is well known 
Consulates possess codes, which are in paper form. Colonel Bicknell 
evidently so interpreted it, judging from his statement that he evalu- 
ated the Dr. Mor* message (See Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 11) in 
the light of the information he had received concerning the destruction 
by Jap Consuls of their "codes and papers." This is confirmed by 
General Fielder's testimony that Colonel Bicknell told the Staff Con- 
ference 6 December 1941 that the Jap Consul was [12'] burning 
his "codes and papers. (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 3) 

Without, however, bringing home to General Short in strict accuracy 
the information that the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was 
destroying his codes^ as distinguished from other papers, the fact that 
he was destroying his secret papers and not some but all such papers 
at that juncture of world affairs is entitled to great weight in consider- 
ing whether General Short had adequate knowledge of the true Japa- 
nese-American situation. While it may be said that codes are tech- 
nically different from secret papers, or "papers," of the Jap Consulate, 
and Colonel Bicknell or other Hawaiian contacts are quite different a& 
sources of information from the Chief of Staff, the fact remains that 
to an alert commander information, from whatever source, of the 
destruction of either codes, secret papers, or merely "all important 
papers" by the Jap Consulate in Honolulu at that time should have had 
extreme significance. 

The Manila Warning Message : 

This was an urgent cablegram dispatched 3 December 1941 by Colo- 
nel G. H. Wilkinson, the British representative of Theodore H. Davies 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 279 

& Co., Honolulu, one of the Big Five, to Mr. Harry L. Dawson, an 
employee of the Davies Company, and the British Consul in Honolulu. 
Colonel Wilkinson was a member by marriage of the Davies family and 
was secretly working for the British Government as a secret agent in 
Manila. The cablegram received by the Davies Company in Honolulu 
the night of 3 December read as follows : 

We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments 
in Indo-China : 

A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways. 

2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and consider- 
able quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm). 

B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington 
Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here. 

C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities 
with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at 
present but will act in South. 

You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Inteligence Honolulu. 

[IS] Immediately upon receipt of it, Mr. John E. Russell, Pres- 
ident of Theodore H. Davies & Company, cancelled a considerable 
volume of orders for delivery in the Philippines. A copy of the cable- 
gram was given to Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr. Shivers, 
head of the FBI in Honolulu, and Captain Mayfield. the District Intel- 
ligence Officer of the Navy. (Statement of Mr. John E. Russell and 
exhibit) 

Mr. Shivers has already been informed by Colonel Wilkinson of his 
undercover activities and of his connection with Mr. Harry Dawson, 
the British Vice Consul in Honolulu, likewise an employee of the 
Davies Company. Colonel Wilkinson arranged with him in July of 
1941 to give him information through Mr. Dawson. Mr. Shivers said 
his files indicated his receipt of the cablegram of 3 December 1941 
from Colonel Wilkinson. Major General C. A. Willoughby, at that 
time G-2 of the Philippine Department, knew of Wilkinson and of 
his activities. 

Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2 admitted receipt of the Ma- 
nila cablegram from Colonel Wilkinson. He stated he gave the 
information contained in it to General Short. (Amendment to affi- 
davit of Col. George W. Bicknell) 

In addition to the cablegram above referred to. Colonel Bicknell 
stated he obtained a mass of information from the British SIS, through 
Colonel Wilkinson, which he brought to the attention of General Short, 
in one form or another. (Amend, affid.. Col. George W. Bicknell) 
A file of this information is attached to Colonel Clausen's report. 
General Fielder was shown this file. Some few items struck a respon- 
sive chord in his memory, but he could not remember if they were 
brought to his attention prior to 7 December 1941. The source of the 
information was not brought to his attention, according to General 
Fielder. (Affid., Gen. Fielder, p. 3) 

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not made aware of the 
iiighly inportant information contained in the 3 December cablegram 
from Manila. The same comment is applicable to the 27 November 
cablegram from Colonel Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, the British Vice 
Consul, which stated: 

Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1 repeat Dec. 1, without 
any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view to getting between Bangkok 
and Singapore. 



280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A copy of this cablegram also went to Colonel Bicknell, Mr, Shivers, 
and Captain Mayfield. Colonel Bicknell said this was part of the 
information he gave to Short "in one form or another." (Amend, 
affid., Col. George W. Bicknell) 

[14-] British SIS Reports Furnished Colonel Bicknell: 

These reports, referred to above, which were transmitted in triplicate 
by Colonel Wilkinson at Manila, through the British Vice Consul at 
Honolulu, Mr. Dawson, to Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, 
Mr. Shivers of the FBI, and Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence 
Officer of the Navy, are too voluminous to be discussed in detail. In 
the aggregate, these reports make an impressive showing of growing 
tension in the Far East. Much of the data contained in these reports 
found its way into Colonel Bicknell's estimates of the Japanese situa- 
tion, which he testified he furnished General Short. (Amend. Affid., 
Col. George W. Bicknell) 

Information Received By Captain Edwin T. Layton^ TJSN : 

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, was, for a year prior to the Pearl 
Harbor disaster. Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet. He 
testified to Colonel Clausen that about three months prior to 7 Decem- 
ber 1941 the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air 
Force, Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Raley, came to him and re- 
quested various items of intelligence. About ten days to two weeks 
prior to 7 December 1941, Captain Layton gave Colonel Raley certain 
top secret intelligence, without, however, disclosing its origin, which 
included the "Winds Code" message and information tending to show 
a general movement of Japanese naval forces to the South. When the 
Army proposed to make photographic reconnaissance of the Japanese 
mandated islands in November, 1941, he held a series of conferences 
with Colonel Raley about the matter. From time to time when General 
Short was in conference with Admiral Kimmel, he was called to pre- 
sent the intelligence picture to them. (Affid., Capt. Edwin T. Layton, 
USN) According to Colonel Raley, his contacts with Captain Layton 
were limited to about six conversations with him over the entire year 
1941, the last in October, 1941. He told Captain Layton and Colonel 
Bicknell that hostilities with Japan were possible at any moment. 
This was in October, 1941. They apparently shared his view. He 
also reported this to General Martin. (Affid., Col. Edward W. Raley) 

Comment on Information Which Reached General Short : 

In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, after discussing the in- 
formation as to Japanese activities which admittedly reached Short 
and additional information possessed by the War Department which 
was not sent him, I said: 

* * * while there was more information in Washington than Short had, 
Short Iiad enongh information to indicate to any responsible commander that 
there was an outside threat against which he should make preparations. (P. 30) 

Colonel Clausen's investigation has fortified me in my conclusions 
above stated. Reference is made to my memorandum to you of even 
date, subject "Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board," for a 
further discussion on this subject. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 281 

[15] Short's SOP Against Attack: 

In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, 1 stated : 

Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent General 
Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three alerts. Alert No. 1 
being the all-out alert requiring occupation of field positions ; Alert No. 2 being 
applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field 
positions as in Alert No. 1 ; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and 
uprisings within the Islands "with no particular threat from without." It will 
be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual alerts of the final 
plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in paragraph 14 of the 
SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the earlier tentative draft of the SOP, 
sent to Washington, Short expressly recognized the necessity for preparation for 
"a surprise hostile attack.''' (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64.) (Italics supplied.) 

As stated in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, Short on re- 
ceipt of the radiogram from General Marshall, dated 27 November 
1941, within half an hour ordered Alert No. 1, which is SOP described 
as a defense against sabotage "with no threat from without." (Memo., 
25 Nov. 1944, p. 2). In response to so much of General Marshall's 
radiogram as ordered him to "report measures taken," he sent the short 
reply "Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the 
Navy." (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 13) Short testified that his SOP 
of 5 November 1941 was sent to the War Department on that date or 
about that time (Tr., Short, p. 431, Vol. 5). Under this SOP, Alert 
No. 1 was against sabotage only. Apparently Short's present con- 
tention is that in advising the War Department by radiogram that 
the Department was alerted against sabotage, he brought home to the 
War Department that only Alert No. 1 under his SOP of 5 November 
1941 was being put into effect. (Tr., Short, p. 431) 

Colonel Clausen's investigation fails to disclose any evidence that 
Short transmitted his SOP of 5 November 1941 to the War Depart- 
ment on or around that date. The best evidence indicates that it was 
not received in the War Department until March of 1942. Colonel 
Clarence G. Jensen, A. C, was specially deputized to make a careful 
investigation to ascertain the date of receipt by the War Department 
of this document. He searched in the files of The Adjutant General, 
the War Plans Division, and the Army Air Forces, and made specific 
inquiries of those likely to have any knowledge of the matter. His 
search indicated that no such SOP was received by the War Depart- 
ment until March, 1942. A letter from the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department (Lt. Gen. Emmons), dated 29 January 1942, 
transmitting the SOP to the War Department bears a receipt dated 
10 March 1942. ( Affid., Col. Clarence G. Jensen) 

Receipt and Distribution of the 13 Parts and the IJfth Part of the 
Japanese Intercept of 6-7 December WJ^l : 
[16] Attached hereto is a copy of a separate memorandum by 
me to you of even date which sufficiently discusses Colonel Clausen's 
investigation of the above matter. No further comment is deemed 
necessary in this place. 

Conclusion: 

My conclusions contained in my memorandum of 25 November 1944 
relative to the Board's findings as to General Short, General Marshall, 



282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Gerow and Secretary Hull have been reexamined by me in 
the light of Colonel Clausen's investigation. I find nothing in Colonel 
Clausen's investigation which leads me to modify these conclusions. 
The statements of fact made in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, 
based upon the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and 
that Board's report, are clarified and modified in accordance with 
the present memorandum. 

Myron C. Cramer, 

Major General^ 
The Judge Ad/vocate General. 

1 Inch Copy memo from TJAG To S/W, "Top Secret Keport, 
Army Pearl Harbor Board." 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 283 



[a] Memorandum for The Secretary of War 

Subject: Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 14 Septem- 
ber 1945 

[1] 14 September 1945. 

Memorandum for the Secretary or War 
Subject : Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board 

This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally. 

The Army Pearl Harbor Board made two separate reports. One was 
classified as secret and consisted of two volumes. The other was classi- 
fied as top secret and consisted of one volume. 

I have examined the latter Top Secret Report in the light of evidence 
obtained by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, in his in- 
vestigation and feel that as a result thereof certain statements of fact 
contained in the Top Secret Report require modification. 

In its top secret report, the Board stated on pages 1 and 2 and on 
page 16 : 

Information from informers and other means as to tlie activities of our potential 
enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the United States and 
Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments In November 
and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of the 
Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know what were the 
Japanese potential moves that were scheduled by them against the United States. 
Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's 
intentions. 

This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November 
absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to every 
trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the 
Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war. 

The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave only a 
small fraction on this information. No direction was given the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment based upon this information except the "Do-Don't" message of November 27, 
1941. It would have been possible to have sent safely information, ample for the 
purpose of orienting the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives could have 
been formulated to put the Department on Alert No. 3. 

This was not done. 

Under the circumstances, where information has a vital bearing upon actions 
to be taken by field commanders, and [2] this information cannot be dis- 
closed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent upon the 
War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directions to the 
theater commanders. This is an exception to the admirable policy of the War 
Department of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the competent field 
commanders. 

Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster of 
Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that its defenses were 
available on December 7 if alerted in time. The difference between alerting those 
defenses in time by a directive from the War Department based upon this informa- 
tion and the failure to alert them is a difference for which the War Department is 
responsible, wholly aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having selected 
the right alert. 

The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to give 
it to Short or give him directions based upon it. (Pp 1 & 2) 

Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December 6, 
1941. In this period numerous pieces of information came to our State, War and 



284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Navy Departments in all of their top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of 
the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of the attack. (P 16) 

The Board then set forth what it called "the details of this informa- 
tion." I have analyzed these details and conclusions of the Board in 
the light of Colonel Clausen's investigation and find that they should be 
revised in accordance with the new and additional evidence. These 
revisions include the following : 

As to information available to the War Department, the Board set 
forth on page 2 : 

Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Intentions from Sep- 
tember to December 1941. The record shows almost daily information as to the 
Japanese plans and intentions during this period. 

1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had been 
fixed (Tokyo time) as the governing date for Japanese offensive military opera- 
tions. (R. 86) 

The reference "(K. 86)'" is to Page 86 of the Top Secret transcripts 
of the proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. These con- 
sist of volumes A to D. Examination of Page 86 shows, as a basis for 
the record reference in its report, a quotation by General Russell from 
a document as follows : 

[5] On the 24th of November we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo 
time was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations of some 
nature. We interpreted this to mean that large-scale movements for the conquest 
of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, 
at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds. 

The document from which General Russell quoted was the record 
of the Examination conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart from 
April to June, 1944, for the Secretary of the Navy. The testimony 
read by General Russell was an excerpt of that given by Captain L. F. 
Safford, USN. A more detailed examination of this testimony shows 
that it was in reality the interpretation by Captain Safford of a 
Japanese intercept message which was translated on 22 November 
1941, being a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at Wash- 
ington. This message authorized the Japanese envoys to extend the 
time for signing an agreement with the United States from 25 Novem- 
ber to 29 November and it stated that the latter time was the absolute 
deadline and "after that, things are automatically going to happen." 
The War Department did not send this specific information to the 
Hawaiian Department. 

It will be observed that the Board did not set forth the additional 
testimony of Captain Safford to the effect that "Hawaii was out of 
our minds." 

The Board further found : 

On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese' inten- 
tions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States. 
(R. 87) (P2) 

* * * On November 26th specific information received from the Navy indi- 
cated that Japan intended to wage offensive war against the United States. 
(R. 123^124) * * * (p 5) 

This finding of the Board was based on the same reference by 
General Russell to the testimony of Captain Safford. The reference 
"(R. 123-124)" is to the testimony of Captain Safford before the 
Army Pearl Harbor Board. He was asked by a member of the Board 
as to the source of the information which he mentioned in his testi- 



EEPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 285 

mony to Admiral Hart. He stated that he could not then recollect 
the source. He further stated that on 26 November the Navy had 
information that Japan contemplated oifensive action against England 
and the United States and probably against Russia. He gave as a 
basis for this information his interpretation of an intercept, SIS No. 
25392, which was a circular message from Tokyo on 19 November 
1941. Reference to additional testimony of Captain Safford set forth 
on page 125 shows that what he had in mind was the so-called 
Japanese "Winds Code" message. 

14] Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that this information 
reached Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, the latter part of 
November 1941. 

Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, 
testified before Colonel Clausen that in the latter part of November, 
1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded this 
Japanese "Winds Code." He took immediate action to monitor in 
Hawaii for the execute message. He further testified that his atten- 
tion was again called to the "Winds Code" when he saw on the desk 
of General Fielder a warning message from G-2, War Department, 
dated 5 December 1941, asking that the G-2, Hawaiian Department, 
communicate with Commander Rochefort immediately regarding 
weather broadcasts from Tokyo. This obviously refers to the "Winds 
Code." Colonel Bicknell further testified that he also received in- 
formation of the "Winds Code" broadcasts from Mr. Robert L. 
Shivers, FBI agent in charge, Honolulu, and information that Com- 
mander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Unit, 
Pearl Harbor, was also monitoring for the execute message. 

Commander Rochefort testified before Colonel Clausen that he and 
General Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, had estab- 
lished and maintained liaison pertaining to their respective functions, 
and that he gave General Fielder such information as he had received 
concerning intercepts and Japanese diplomatic messages, and con- 
cerning other information of importance in which the Army and 
Navy were jointly interested, and which came to his knowledge in 
the course of his duties. The information thus given to General 
Fielder during the latter part of November, 1941, included the sub- 
stance of the "Winds Code" intercept. 

The Board found : 

* * * War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on November '>6 
that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of the 
Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action. (Pp. 2 & 3) 

The basis for this conclusion was testimony of Colonel Rufus S. 
Bratton as he read from a summary called "A Summary of Far 
Eastern Documents" which he prepared in the Fall of 1943. The 
pertinent portion reads as follows : 

G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on 26 November that O. N. I. repoi-ted a con- 
centration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown point after movim; from 
Japanese home vpaters southward towards Formosa and that air and submarine 
activity was intensitied in the Marshall Islands. (F 87) 

This information was available in the Hawaiian Department before 
7 December 1941. 

[5] Testimony given before Colonel Clausen bv Captain Lay- 
ton, Captain Rochefort, Captain Holmes, Captain Huckins and Com- 

79716 — 46— Ex. 157 19 



286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

mander Holtwick, of the Navy, in the additional investigation indi- 
cates the probability that General Short was advised of the presence 
of Japanese navy task forces in the Marshalls. The Fleet Intelligence 
Officer had an established liaison relationship with the G-2, Hawaiian 
Air Force. In the two months preceding 7 December the Fleet In- 
telligence Officer gave to G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, pertinent infor- 
mation of the increasing Japanese naval activity m the Marshalls. 
The Navy Combat Intelligence Officer supervised a unit at Pearl Har- 
bor primarily engaged in intercepting, decrypting and analyzing 
radio traffic of the Japanese navy. The Daily Radio Intelligence 
Summaries distributed by the Combat Intelligence Officer, during 
November and continuing down to 7 December, indicated considerable 
Japanese military activity in the Mandates and concentrations of 
Japanese naval forces in the Marshalls. (See documentary evidence 
attached to Colonel Clausen's Report.) 

The Board found : 

On December 1 definite information came from three independent sources that 
Japan was going to attacli Great Britain and the United States, but would mam- 
tain peace with Russia. (R. 87.) (P. 3.) 

This again, was based on the testimony of Captain Safford in the 
Admiral Hart examination. General Russell read from this while 
questioning Colonel Bratton, as follows : 

General Russell. Yes. I will identify the questions. That is the December 
1st message, Colonel. ^ ^ i * * * 

Colonel Beatton. I have nothing on the 1st of December, General. 

(P. 88.) 

Colonel Clausen's investigation has shown that the basis for this 
statement of Captain Safford was his interpretation of messages that 
the Navy received, i. e., the Navv Department intercept of the "Winds 
Code" message and a message from Colonel Thorpe, Batavia, giving 
the substance of the "Winds Code" intercept and stating that by this 
means Japan would notify her consuls of war decision, and another 
messao-e to the same general effect from Mr. Foote, Consul General at 
BatavTa, to the State Department. Mr. Foote also stated : "I attached 
little or no importance to it and viewed it with some suspicion. Such 
have been coming since 1936." . 

As shown above, the "Winds Code" information was available m 
the Hawaiian Department. But the "Winds Code" in itself was not 
definite information that Japan was going to attack Great Britain 
and the United States. 

[6] The Board stated : 

The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions as to 
war and the attack came on December 3 with information that Japanese were 
destroying their codes and code machines. Tliis was construed by G-2 as mean- 
ing immediate war. (R. 280.) * * * (P. 3.) 

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that he learned 
from Navy sources on about 3 December 1941 that Japanese diplomatic 
representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Manila and elsewhere, had been instructed to destroy their codes and 
papers, and that he was shown a wire from the Navy Department, 
dated 3 December 1941, reading as follows : 

Highly reliable information has beeen received that categoric and urgent in- 
structions were sent vesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 287 

most of their codes and ciphers at once and burn all other important confidential 
and secret documents. 

Colonel Clausen's investigation further discloses that at about the 
time Colonel Bicknell received this information it ^yas discussed with 
Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat In- 
telligence Unit in Honolulu ; and that Mr. Shivers told him that the 
FBI in Honolulu had intercepted a telephone message from the Jap- 
anese Consulate in Honolulu which disclosed that the Japanese Consul 
General there was burning his papers. The additional evidence also 
shows that on the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual Staff Con- 
ference conducted by General Short's Chief of Staif , those assembled 
were given this information. General Fielder testified before Colonel 
Clausen that he was present at the Staff Conference and that on 6 
December 1941 he gave to General Short the information that the 
Japanese Consul at Honolulu had destroyed his codes and papers. 
(Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, also gave this information 
to Short.) General Fielder further testified that he gave General 
Short any pertinent information that came to his attention. 

The Board further stated : 

As Colonel Bratton summed it up : 

"The picture that lay before all of our policy making and planning officials, 
from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War doAvn to the Chief of the War 
Plans Division, they all had the same picture ; and it was a picture that was 
being painted over a period of weeks if not months." (R. 243-244.) (P. .3.) 

[7] * * * All the information that the War Department Gr-2 had was 
presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of 
the Government. These officials included Secretary of State, Secretary of War, 
Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division. In most instances, copies 
of our intelligence, in whatever form it was presented, were sent to the Ofiice of 
Naval Intelligence, to keep them abreast of our trend of thought. (R. 297) (P 8) 

The basis for this conclusion of the Board was the testimony given 
by Colonel Bratton, When testifying before Colonel Clausen, how- 
ever, Colonel Bratton corrected his previous testimony and asked that 
his prior testimony be modified in accordance with his testimony to 
Colonel Clausen. He stated that his testimony to Colonel Clausen 
represented a better recollection than when he previously testified. 
He had previously testified that the intercepts, of the character men- 
tioned and which were contained in the Top Secret Exhibit "B" before 
the Board, had been delivered to the President, the Secretary of War, 
the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, 
W. P. D., and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. But in testifying 
before Colonel Clausen, he stated that he could not recall with any de- 
gree of accuracy what material was delivered to whom during the 
period in question, and that there were no records to show who de- 
livered or who received the material. He had also previously testi- 
fied that he personally delivered these intercepts to the officials men- 
tioned. But in his testimony to Colonel Clausen, he stated that, as 
to such deliveries as were made, the deliveries were made not only by 
himself, but also by then Lieutenant Colonel or Major Dusenbur}^, 
Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel. 

The basis for the last-mentioned conclusion of the Board, therefore, 
must be revised in accordance with the corrected testimony of Colonel 
Bratton. Similarly, the conclusion of the Board on page 4 : 

All of this important information which was supplied to higher authority in 
the War Department, Navy Department, and State Departmeot did not go out to 



288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the field, with the possible exception of the general statements in occasional 
messages which are shown in the Board's report. Only the higher-ups in Wash- 
ington secured this information. (R. 302) 

The reference "(R. 302)" is also to testimony of Colonel Bratton 
which hence must be revised in accordance with his corrected testi- 
mony given to Colonel Clausen, and in accordance with the new evi- 
dence uncovered by Colonel Clausen as to the information sent to Gen- 
eral Short and available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 De- 
cember. 

The Board found, pages 4 and 5, other testimony of Colonel Bratton 
to the effect that on 3 December, when he was informed that the Jap- 
anese were under instructions to destroy their codes and code ma- 
chines, he asked [<§] General Gerow to send more warnings to 
the overseas commanders and that General Gerow replied, "Sufficient 
had been sent." Following this, according to the testimony of Colonel 
Bratton, he conferred with Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he 
sent, on 5 December 1941, a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to 
confer with Commander Rochefort concerning the Japanese "Winds 
Code." 

General Gerow testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not re- 
call the incident, and that if a representative of G-2 thought his ac- 
tion inadequate, he could quite properly have reported the facts to 
his superior who had direct access to General Gerow and to the Chief 
of Staff, in a matter of such importance. 

The Board set forth, on pages 5 and 6, the general type of informa- 
tion which, according to Captain Safford, came to the Navy at Wash- 
ington during November and December 1941. This included the in- 
formation already mentioned that Tokyo, on 22 November, informed 
the Washington Japanese Embassy that the deadline for signing an 
agreement, first fixed for 25 November, was extended to 29 November ; 
and also information available at Washington on 28 November in the 
form of an intercept of a message by Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo, 
advising that there was hardly any possibility of the United States 
considering the "proposal" in toto, and that if the situation remained 
as tense as it then was, negotiations would inevitably be ruptured, if, 
indeed, they might not already be called so, and that "our failure and 
humiliation are complete" and suggesting that the rupture of the pres- 
ent negotiations did not necessarily mean war between the Japanese 
and the United States but would be followed by military occupation 
of the Netherland's Indies by the United States and the English which 
would make war inevitable. The proposal referred to was the reply 
given the Japanese envoys on 26 November 1941 by the Secretary of 
State. The Board further referred to information available to the 
War Department on 5 December, as related by Colonel Sadtler, rela- 
tive to the "false alarm" execute message to the "Winds Code." 

None of the above information was given to General Short before 7 
December. However, the Secretary of War has, in his public state- 
ment of 29 August 1945, and analyzed and shown the substantial nature 
of the information which the War Department sent to General Short. 

Colonel Clausen's investigation also shows that a great deal of ad- 
ditional information was available initially to General Short in the 
Hawaiian Department, which was not given to the War Department, 
on the general subject of the tense and strained relations between Ja- 
pan and the United States and warnings of war. 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 289 

TEe British Intelligence Service gave Colonel Bicknell, Captain 
Mayfielcl, and Mr. Shivers information in the form of many intelli- 
gence reports. Colonel Clausen has collected these as documentary 
evidence [9] which is mentioned in his report to the Secretary 
of War. One such dispatch from Manila, given to these three persons 
m Honolulu on 4 December 1941, set forth prophetically : 

Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities with 
Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present 
but will act in South. 

The source of this intelligence was a British intercept of a Japanese 
diplomatic radio message which could have been based upon a Japanese 
execute niessage to the "Winds Code," or some equivalent message. 

In addition, the three persons mentioned had available over a long 
period of time intercepts of telephone conversations in and out of the 
Japanese Consulate in Honolulu and related places. Copies of some of 
these are included in the documentary evidence attached to Colonel 
Clausen's report. 

Also, the Navy had derived some information from commercial radio 
traffic out of the Japanese Consulate. 

Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that the files of the Hawaiian 
Department G-2 contained much material gathered from observers, 
travelers, and Washington sources, which, together with the other in- 
telligence and information mentioned, was evaluated and dissemi- 
nated by the G-2 sections of the Hawaiian Department. These are 
mentioned by Colonel Clausen in his report to the SecretaiT of War 
Some are initialed by General Short. 

Attention is invited to estimates by Colonel Bicknell disseminated 
on 17 and 25 October 1941 which set forth, again with prophetic 
accuracy, the probable moves of Japan. 

General Short's G-2 asked, on 6 September 1941, that the War De- 
partment cease sending certain G-2 summaries of information for the 
reason that they were duplicates of information made available to 
him m Hawaii, and that his cooperation with the Office of Naval In- 
telligence and the FBI was most complete. (See Memo., 25 Nov 
1944, p. 6.) 

General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen, in the additional 
investigation, "it was well known that relations with Japan were 
severely strained and that war seemed imminent." 

Hence, while the War Department did not send to General Short 
the specific intercepts mentioned, there was available to him or his 
Hawaiian command similar information. The reasons why the War 
Department did not send the actual intercepts were, accordino- to wit- 
nesses before Colonel [10] Clausen that this type of informa- 
tion and its source, of necessity, had to be guarded most carefully, 
and that its dissemination to the overseas commanders would have 
included not only General Short but also all the overseas commanders 
and that this, in itself, would be dangerous from a security standpoint 
since it would spread the information into too many hands. There 
has been considerable evidence given Colonel Clausen to the effect, as 
General Marshall testified before Colonel Clausen, 

* * * Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives would 
have been seriously limited if the source of intelligence mentioned had been 
so compromised. 



290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The former Commanding General of the Philippine Department, 
General Douglas MacArthur, who had received the same general War 
Department information as General Short, testified before Colonel 
Clausen, 

Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information 
and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines 
on a war basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1&41. 

The Board did not conclude that the War Department had advance 
information that Pearl Harbor was a specific attack target. It should 
be observed, however, that in addition to the intercepts received by the 
War Department, which are contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" be- 
fore the Board, there were others which, in retrospect and with the 
benefit of hindsight, indicated a possible attack on Pearl Harbor. 
These intercepts were radio messages, exchanged between Tokyo and 
the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, concerning reports to Tokyo of ship 
movements in Pearl Harbor according to a pre-arranged division of 
Pearl Harbor. The requests of Tokyo increased and the reports by 
Honolulu were made with more frequency and in greater detail as 7 
December approached. Two intercepts, which were not decrypted and 
translated until 8 December, were part of the series mentioned. These 
were not included in the Top Secret Exhibit given the Board. They 
were sent 6 December by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, 
Japanese Numbers 253 and 254. The two in question, Nos. 253 and 
254, are attached to Colonel Clausen's report to the Secretary of War. 
These latter. Colonel Clausen's investigation shows, were apparently 
intercepted at San Francisco and transmitted to Washington by tele- 
type on 6 or 7 December. They were not in the code which had the 
highest priority for immediate attention, and the teletype between 
Sail Francisco and Washington was not in operation until the night of 

6 December or the morning of 7 December. Even so, time elapsing 
between receipt at Washington and dissemination in readable English 
form (2 days) was less than the normal time required of 3.5 days. 

There was available to General Short, at Hawaii, information from 
which he could have inferred that Pearl Harber would be the attack 
target in the event of war with Japan. Colonel Clausen's investiga- 
tion shows [11] that the Navy at Honolulu arranged to obtain 
information from commercial traffic sources shortly before 7 Decem- 
ber. These arrangements included an opportunity to the Navy for 
obtaining the commercial cable traffic of the Japanese Consulate at 
Honlulu. Some of this traffic included the same types of reports as 
were intercepted and forwarded to Washington concerning ship move- 
ments in Pearl Harbor. It is not entirely clear just what commercial 
traffic was decrypted and translated by the Navy at Honolulu before 

7 December. While similar reports were being made to Tokyo by 
Japanese Consulates in other places as we, in like manner, attempted 
to keep track of Japanese ships, still the types of reports from Hono- 
lulu were more suspicious, since they were requested by Tokyo and 
made by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu with increasing fre- 
quency as 7 December approached, and were made according to the 
pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor. 

The Board set forth the findings concerning the Japanese "Winds 
Code" at pages 6 and 17. On page 6, the Board referred to testimony 
of Colonel Sadtler that, on 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 291 

Naval Communications, called him and stated the execute message 
had been intercepted. Colonel Sadtler then conferred with General 
Miles and Colonel Bratton. From Colonel Clausen's investigation it 
appears that Admiral Noyes, in his testimony before Admiral Hewitt, 
who conducted for the Secretary of the Navy the same type of inves- 
tigation Colonel Clausen conducted for the Secretary of War, stated 
that he did not recall having so informed Colonel Sadtler. Colonel 
Sadtler testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not 'follow up the 
information given by Admiral Noyes on 5 December and that to his 
knowledge this was not done by anyone else at the time. He assumed 
that the Navy would send to the Army the actual intercept which was 
before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned. 

Captain Safford had testified before the Board that on 4 December 
he saw a Navy intercept which contained the execute message to the 
Japanese "Winds Code", and that two copies were sent to the Army. 
Colonel Clausen's investigation discloses no evidence that the Arniy 
ever received any such copies and I understand the testimony of Cap- 
tain Safford has been qualified considerably by testimony of himself 
and other Navy personnel before Admiral Hewitt. 

Colonel Clausen has uncovered what amounts to a possible inference 
that the Japanese did broadcast an execute message to the "Winds 
Code" or some equivalent warning code, and that this was intercepted 
by the British Intelligence Service and formed the basis for the dis- 
patch from London to Manila and, in turn, from Manila to Honolulu 
mentioned above. This dispatch was disseminated to the British 
Intelligence Service sub-agent in Honolulu on 4 December. A com- 
plete file of the dispatches from the British Intelligence Service, and 
available to the Hawaiian Department at Honolulu, and the British 
response to Colonel Clausen's query as to the basis for the dispatch 
of 4 December, are contained in the documentary evidence collected 
by Colonel Clausen and attached to his report. 

[i^] Attention is invited to the testimony of General Gerow 
and General Smith before Colonel Clausen concerning the findings 
by the Board based on the testimony of Colonel Sadtler that he asked 
General Gerow and General Smith to send more warning to the over- 
seas commanders. Colonel Sadtler also testified before Colonel 
Clausen, as follows : 

I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in affidavits 
given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, referring 
to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my conference with 
them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941. I believe the comments by 
General Gerow and General Smith, contained in the affidavits mentioned, are 
correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as follows concerning this 
subject : 

General Gerow: "I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler 
is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal 
Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpre- 
tation of Magic' I would naturally expect that enemy information of such 
grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief 
of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps Officer. 
To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notifi- 
cation from any source of implementing message to the Japanese 'Winds 
Code.' If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would 
now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler 
told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative informa- 
tion which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written 



292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which 
evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially 
since so many major events have intervened." 

General Smith: "I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has stated. 
However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion 
between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of 
whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had 
any responsibility or authority, aud I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would 
have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I 
was not at that time an 'Ultra' officer, and it would have been impossible fpr 
him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step out 
of my rather minor province." P 2 — Affidavit of Colonel O. K. Sadtler.) 

From page 7 of the Board's Top Secret Report it may be inferred 
that the Board meant to find that Colonel Bratton sent the G-2 War 
Department Rochefort messa,ge of 5 December to G-2 Hawaiian 
Department, because [13] of receipt of an execute message to 
the "Winds Code." But Colonel Bratton has testified that the reason 
which prompted him to recommend this warning was information 
derived from other intercepts to the effect that the Japanese were 
destroying their codes and important papers. The Board, also on 
page 7, referring to the G-2 warning message of 5 December, set 
forth the contention of General Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, 
that he got no such message. In his testimony before Colonel Clausen, 
however, General Fielder stated : 

* * * I have no recollections of having received the War Department radio, 
but had it come to me, I would in all probability have turned it over to Lt Col 
Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort and had very close 
liaison with Captain Mayfield, the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer: 
particularly since the way the radio was worded it would not have seemed 
urgent or particularly important. * * * 

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that on about 5 
December he saw the War Department message on the desk of General 
Fielder and that he then communicated with Commander Rochefort 
to ascertain the pertinent information and was advised that Com- 
mander Rochefort was also monitoring for the execute message of 
the "Winds Code." 

It should be borne in mind that the execute message to the "Winds 
Code" was to notify the Japanese diplomatic and consular representa- 
tives of a crisis with the United States, Great Britain or Russia and 
to instruct the Japanese repi-esentatives to burn their codes and secret 
papers. The Japanese later sent the same information to their diplo- 
matic and consular representatives by other and more direct means. 
This latter information, it appears from Colonel Clausen's investiga- 
tion, was available in the Hawaiian Department prior to 7 December 
1941. 

On page 11 of the Top Secret Report, the Board sets forth several 
findings concerning the delivery of a 14-part intercept of a Japanese 
message from Tokyo to the envoys in Washington. The Board 
concludes : 

Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9: 00 and 10: 30 
p. m., December 6, as follows : 

To Colonel Smith, (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff in a 
locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. (R. 238.) He told General 
Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained very important papers and 
General Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the bag and 
see the contents. (R. 307.) 



REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 293 

To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by discussing the 
message with General Miles in his ofl3ce and reading it in his presence. (R. 
239-241.) He stated that [I4] General Miles did nothing about it as 
far as he knows. (R. 241.) This record shows no action by General Miles. 

Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Galley, General Gerow's executive 
in the War Plans Division. ( R. 238. ) 

He. then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State Depart- 
ment for the Secretary of State and did so between 10 : 00 and 10 : 30 p. m. 
(K. 234, 239.) 

Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10 : 30, had urged 
Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General Staff, to communicate with General 
Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with General Miles after reading 
the message. This record shows no action on the part of General Smith and 
none by General Miles. Apparently the Chief of Staff was not advised of 
the situation untU the following morning." (Pp. 11,12. ) 

To clinch this extraordinary situation, we but have to look at the record 
to see that the contents of the 13 parts of the Japanese final reply were com- 
pletely known in detail to the War Department, completely translated and 
available in plain English, by not later than between 7 and 9 o'clock on the 
evening of December 6 or approximately Honolulu time. This infor- 
mation was taken by the Officer in Charge of the Far Eastern Section of G-2( 
of the War Department personally in a locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith, 
now Lt. General Smith, and Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, who was then 
Secretary to the General Staff, and he was told that the message was of the most 
vital importance to General Marshall. It was delivered also to G-2 General 
Miles, with whom it was discussed, and to the Executive, Colonel Gailey, of 
the War Plans Division, each of whom was advised of the vital importance of this 
information that showed that the hour had struck, and that war was at hand. 
Before 10 : 30 o'clock that night, this same officer personally delivered the same 
information to the Secretary of State's duty officer. 

General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This information, as 
vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him on that date by 
either Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows. (P. 16.) 

These conclusions must be completely revised in view of the new evidence. 
The basis for these conclusions is the testimony of Colonel Bratton. In testi- 
fying before Colonel Clausen, he admitted that he gave the Board incorrect 
testimony ; that the only set of the 13 parts he delivered on the night of 6 December 
was to the duty officer for the Secretary of State; that the sets for the Secre- 
tary of War, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War 
Plans Division, were not delivered the night of 6 December ; that these sets 
were not given the night of 6 December to General Gerow, General Smith or 
[15] General Miles ; that he could not recall having discussed the message 
with General Miles on 6 December ; and that he did not know how the set for 
the Chief of Staff came into his possession the morning of 7 December. Colonel 
Bratton claimed that on the night of 6 December he had asked Colonel Dusen- 
bury to deliver the set to the home of the Chief of Staff. Colonel Dusenbury 
testified before Colonel Clausen that he received the messages the night of 6 
December but did not deliver any until after 9 : 00 a. m., on the morning of 7 
December. Colonel Dusenbury stated Colonel Bratton went home before the 
13 parts were entirely received. 

On the subject of the delivery of the 13 parts, attention is also invited to the 
testimony given Colonel Clausen by General Gerow, General Smith and General 
Miles. From Colonel Clausen's investigation, it appears that General Gerow 
and General Smith did not receive any of the 13 parts before the morning 
of 7 December. General Miles testified that he became aware accidentlly of 
the general contents of the 13 parts the evening of 6 December. He was dining 
at the home of his opposite number in the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when 
Admiral Beardall, the President's Aide, brought the information to Admiral 
Wilkinson, who transmitted it to General Miles. 

The Board, on page 14 and again on page 17, finds that Colonel Bratton 
telephoned General Marshall's quarters at 9 : 00 a. m. the morning of 7 December 
to give him the 14th part of the 14-part message and the Japanese messages 
directing the Ambassador to deliver the 14-part message at 1 : 00 p. m., 7 
December, and to destroy their code machines. The Board further finds that 
General Marshall did not come into his office until 11 : 25 a. m. 

These times so found by the Board are subject to qualification in light of 
additional evidence given Colonel Clausen. Colonel Bratton testified before 



294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Clausen that he gave the actual intercepts to the Chief of Staff, which 
would be in the office of the Chief of Staff "between 10:30 and 11:30 that 
morning." Major General John R. Deane testified before Colonel Clausen that 
on the morning of 7 December he and Colonel Bratton did not arrive at the 
Munitions Building until between 9 : 00 and 9 : 30 a. m. General Miles testified 
before Colonel Clausen that he conferred with General Marshall the morning 
of 7 December in his office at about 11 : 00 a. m. Colonel Dusenbury testified 
before Colonel Clausen that the intercept instructing the envoys to deliver the 
reply to the United States at 1 : 00 p. m., 7 December, was not received by 
Colonel Bratton until "aflter he arrived that morning, between; 9 : 00 and 
10 : 00 a. m." 

The Board further found : 

There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of December 4 
and December 6, the imminence of war on the following Saturday and Sunday, 
December 6 and 7, was [16} clear-cut and definite. (P. 15) 

The evidence does not seem to justify any such conclusion. There 
was not received between the dates of 4 December and 6 December 
any information which indicated that war would take place on Sat- 
urday or Sunday, 6 and 7 December. It is true that on the night of