History of the Peloponnesian War, done into English by Richard Crawley

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EVERYMAN'S LIBRARY
EDITED BY ERNEST RHYS

CLASSICAL

THUCYDIDES' PELOPON-
NESIAN WAR. TRANSLATED
BY RICHARD CRAWLEY

THIS IS NO. 455 OF eFe^KJi'-^M^C^S

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CONNOP THIRLWALL

HISTORIAN OF GREECE

THIS TRANSLATION OF THE WORK OF HIS
GREAT PREDECESSOR

IS RESPECTFULLT INSCRIBED
THE TRANSLATOR

INTRODUCTION

I BEGAN this translatioQ when I was still almost a school-
boy, very much in love with my author, and sufficiently
simple to think that all the world must be eager to read
* Thucydides.' The publication of the first book very
quickly convinced me of my error ; nobody took the
least notice of my labours, and I had not even the satis-
faction of hearing them abused. Although not a little
discouraged by this indifference, I nevertheless translated
the second book some time afterwards, being now
actuated, not by any idea of fame or usefulness, but
merely by an instinctive wish to finish what I had once
begun. In the course of the year 1873 I completed the
remaining six books, and now offer the whole work to
the public in the hope that it may meet with the attention
which a fragment failed to obtain. It is not for me to
say how it is executed ; but I think I have bestowed
more care on my work than is often given by labourers
in so unprofitable a field, and if I have failed in doing
justice to my original, it is from the innate difficulty of the
task, or my own want of the proper ability, and not from
any lack of diligence. I have throughout attempted to
convey the meaning of my author, not only as faithfully
but as clearly as possible, and to avoid the intrusion of
the Greek idioms which so often disfigure translations,
rendering them only fit for pedants or schoolboys. If I
have not completely succeeded in this last endeavour, I
hope the reader will consider the nature of the under-

x INTRODUCTION

taking, and hold me absolved for my good intention. 1
have also adopted a new arrangement of chapters, to pro-
vide the breaks to which use has accustomed us, and
without which the most determined attention flags ;
though for convenience of reference I have retained at
the top of each page the numbers of the original divi-
sions.

Since the time when * Thucydides ' was first read in
England, the number of good histories has so much in-
creased, and the domain of history itself has been so
much enlarged, that it would be vain to claim for his
work the importance which it once possessed. The
days are past in which the translation of a Greek author
could attain to the proportions of a national event. The
modern world has now teachers of its own ; and classical
literature, which might formerly have been called the
Bible of all men, is rapidly becoming the book of a
learned class. If Mr. Cobden really said that a file of
the Times newspaper is worth all the works of Thucydides,
he after all only expressed openly an opinion which a
great number of educated men unconsciously assent to.
There is, however, perhaps more resemblance between
the newspaper and the historian than has been generally
perceived. They both treat of contemporary events
and of states of society, politically, very like each other.
A lamented historian was able to fight the battle of
English party politics under the names of <Nicias*
and ' Cleon,' and there are probably few books that
have so much contributed to the spread of liberal
opinions in modern England as Mr. Grote's reflec-
tions upon the aflairs of ancient Greece. Indeed, as
Arnold remarked, the portion of history dealt with by
Thucydides is only ancient in the sense that the events
related happened a long while ago ; in all other respects
it is more modern than the history of our own country-
men in the Middle Ages. If the reader of the news-

INTRODUCTION xl

paper will condescend to cast an eye on my translation,
he will find there the prototypes of many of the figures to
which he is accustomed in his favourite journal. He will
discover the political freedom which he glories in, and
the social liberty which he sometimes sighs for, in full
operation at Athens ; factions as fierce as those of the
Versaillais and Communists at Corcyra ; and in the <best
men * of the Four Hundred oligarchs as self-seeking and
unpatriotic as the gens du hien of the Figaro. He will
see the doctrine of arbitration, welcomed as a newly-
discovered panacea by our amiable enthusiasts, more firmly
established in theory than it is yet likely to be in modern
Europe, and as impotent to avert the evils of war from
the communities who provided for it in every treaty, and
invoked it whenever it seemed their interest to do so.
In short, besides the practical lessons to be drawn for his
own conduct, he will enjoy the philosophic pleasure of
observing how the nature of man, in spite of all changes
of time and circumstance, remains essentially the same,
and how short is the distance from the civilised inhabi-
tant of Athens or Corinth to the dweller in London or
Vienna. The reader will also see that nature painted in
its true colours, free from the varnish with which it is
often decorated. The actors in our author's pages avow
their motives with a plainness sometimes shocking to
modern feeling ; whether it be that we have an improved
standard of right, to which even the most determined
offenders must do homage, or that hypocrisy is more
congenial to our artificial civilisation, and less difficult
than it must have been in the intense political life of the
small Greek communities. Finally, there are certain
qualities in which the historian of the Peloponnesian war
has never been surpassed. Apart from his profound
knowledge of human nature, and the passion and dramatic
interest which he infuses into the events which he relates,
if brevity, impartiality, and a sparing use of the imagina-

xn INTRODUCTION

tion are itill regarded as merits in an historian, more than
one eminent writer might well take a lesson from Thucy-
dides. I may point, as an example, to his celebrated
account of the Plague of Athens. In five short pages he
has set forth the symptoms of the disorder with a pre-
cision which a physician might envy, and the suffering
and moral anarchy which it produced with a vividness
which may teach the lover of picturesque description
how much force there lies in truth and simplicity. The
troubles at Corcyra are related at not much greater length,
with a few masterly touches that appeal to the imagina-
tion more powerfully than the most detailed history, and
a fulness of philosophic reflection that has left little to be
said by his successors on the evils of a time of revolution.
Among the number of English men and women who,
without being Greek scholars, take an interest in Grecian
history, there may perhaps be some enough in earnest not
to be deterred from testing the truth of these assertions
by the unavoidable dulness of a translation.

,876. R. CRAWLEY.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Editions: First edition, Venice, 1502; Florence, 1506.

Later Editions: Boppo, 1821-40, 1866, &c; Bckker, 1S21,
1868 ; with other texts and notes by S. T. Bloomfield, 1830 ;
with notes by Thomas Arnold, 1832-35, 1840-42, 1847-54 ;
J. G. Donaldson, 1859 ; Kruger, third edition, i860; Bohme,
fourth and fifth editions, 1874-85; Stahl, 1873-74; Classen,
fourth edition (Steup), 1897, &c. ; H. S. Jones (Scrip. Class.
Bibl. Oxon.), 1900, &c. ; Hude, 1898-1901, smaller edition,
1903.

English Translations : T. Nicolls (from the French),
1550; T. Hobbcs, 1629, 1676, with notes, &c., 1824, 1841 ;
W. Smith, 1753, 1815, 1831, in Lubbock's Hundred Books,
vol. xxvii., 1892 ; Translation with Memoir, by S. T. Bloom-
field, 1829; li. Dale (Bohn), 1848; R. Crawley, 1874, revised
by R. Feetham, Temple Classics, 1903 ; B. Jowctt, 1881, second
edition, revised by W. H. Forbes and E. Abbott, 1900.

CONTENTS

BOOK I

CHAP. " PAIS

I. The State of Greece from the earliest Times to the

Commencement of the Peloponnesian War . i

II. Causes of the War — The AfFair of Epidamnus — The

Affair of Potidaia i6

III. Congress of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at

Lacedzmon 42

IV. From the End of the Persian to the Beginning

of the Peloponnesian War — The Progress from
Supremacy to Empire,. . , . . .58 ^

V, Second Congress at Lacedzmon — Preparations for
War and Diplomatic Skirmishes — Cylon — Pau-
sanias — Themistocles

BOOK II ^/

75

VI. Beginning of the Peloponnesian War — First In-
vasion of Attica — Funeral Oration of Pericles . 98

VII. Second Year of the War— The Plague of Athens-
Position and Policy of Pericles — Fall of Potidsea 128

VIII. Third Year of the War — Investment of Platza—
Naval Victories of Phormio — Thracian Irruption
into Macedonia under Sitalces .... 146

xm

xiv CONTENTS

BOOK III
OiAF. rxca

IX. Fourth and Fifth Years of the War — Rerolt of

Mitylene . . 173

X. Fifth Year of the War — Trial and Execution of the

Platzans — Corcyrxan Revolution . . . 204

XI. Sixth Year of the War — Campaigns of Demosthenes

in Western Greece — Ruin of Ambracia , , 228

BOOK IV

XII. Seventh Year of the War — Occupation of Pylos —

Surrender of the Spartan Army in Sphacteria . 247

XIII. Seventh and Eighth Years of the War— End of

CorcyrjBan Revolution — Peace of Gela — Capture
of Nisza

XIV, Eighth and Ninth Years of the War — Invasion of
Boeotia — Fall of Amphipolis — Brilliant Successes
of Brasidas

BOOK V

XV. Tenth Year of the War— Death of Cleon and Bra.
sidas — Peace of Nicias

»74

294

335

XVI. Feeling against Sparta in Peloponnese — League
of the Mantineans, Eleans, Argives, and Athe-
nians— Battle of Mantinea and breaking up of
the League .^j

XVII. Sixteenth Year of the War— The Melian Con-
ference— Fate of Melos ana

%

CONTENTS Tf

BOOK VI

CHAr. rAGB

XVIII. Seventeenth Year of the War—The Sicilian Cana-
paign — Affair of the Hermae — Departure of the
Expedition 4<>*

XIX. Seventeenth Year of the War — Parties at Syracuse
— Story of Harmodius and Aristogiton — Dis-
grace of Alcibiades ...... 4^4

XX. Seventeenth and Eighteenth Years of the War —
Inaction of the Athenian Army — Alcibiades at
Sparta — Investment of Syracuse • • • 444

BOOK VII

XXI. Eighteenth and Nineteenth Years of the War —
Arrival of Gylippus at Syracuse — Fortification
of Decelea — Successes of the Syracusans . , 476

XXII. Nineteenth Year of the War — Arrival of Demos-
thenes— Defeat of the Athenians at Epipol* —
Folly and Obstinacy of Nicias .... 504

XXIII. Nineteenth Year of the War— Battles in the Great
Harbour — Retreat and Annihilation of the
Athenian Army 511

BOOK VIII

1/

XXIV. Nineteenth and Twentieth Years of the War —
Revolt of Ionia — Intervention of Persia — The
War in Ionia 541

XXV. Twentieth and Twenty- first Years of the War
— Intrigues of Alcibiades — Withdrawal of the
Persian Subsidies — Oligarchical Coup d'fetat
at Athens — Patriotism of the Army at Samos . 567

XXVI, Twenty-first Year of the War — Recall of Alci-
biades to Samos — Revolt of Eubcea and Down-
fall of the Four Hundred — Battle of Cynossema 592

THE HISTORY OF
THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

BOOK I

CHAPTER I

The State of Greece from the earliest Times to the
Commencement of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides, an Atheniap, wrote the history of the war CHAP, l,
between the PelogODD£sian« and the.,,^^heiDiaps, beginning Early"
at the moment that it broke out, and believing that it history a
would be a great war, and more worthy of relation than ° "
any that had preceded it. This belief was not without
its grounds. The preparations of both the combatants
were in every department in the last state of perfection ;
and he could see the rest of the Hellenic race taking sides
in the quarrel ; those who delayed doing so at once having
it in contemplation. Indeed this was the greatest move-
ment yet known in history, not only of the Hellenes, but
of a large part of the barbarian world — I had almost said
of mankind. For though the events of remote antiquity,
and even those that more immediately precede the war,
could not from lapse of time be clearly ascertained, yet
the evidences which an inquiry carried as far back as was
practicable leads me to trust, all point to the conclusion
A 455

2 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [2

BOOK I. that there was nothing on a great scale, either in war or
The ^° other matters,
future pQr instance, it is evident that the country now called
a?e^alytt Hellas had in^ancjent times no jettled po^lation ; on the
nomad contrary, migrations were^oFjre^entoccurrence, the
^*' several tribes readiIy"a"Ban3onmg their homes under the
pressure of superior numbers. Without cojnmerce, with-
out freedoni_Qf._gggiJll"fli^^^'"" either by^and or sea,
cultivating no more of their territory than the exigencies
of life required, destitute of capital, never plan^Bg their
land (for they could not~teIl when an invader might not
come and take it all away, and when he did come they
had no walls to stop him), thinking that the necessities of
daily sustenance could be supplied at one place as well as
another, they cared little for shifting their habiution, and
consequently neither built large cities nor attained to any
other form of greatness. The richest soils were always
most subject to this change of masters ; such as the
district now called Thessaly, Boeoti^ most of the Pelo-
ponnese, Arcadia_excep^, and the most fertile parts of
the rest of HellasT'T^e goodness of the land favoured
the aggrandisement of particular individuals, and thus
created faction which proved a fertile source of ruin. It
also invited invasion. Accordingly Attica^jfrom the
poverty]oTTts~loir enjoying from a very remote period
freedom from faction, never changed its inhabitants.
And here is no inconsiderable exemplification of my
assertion, that the migrations were the cause of there
being no correspondent growth in other parts. The
most powerful victims of war or faction from the rest
of Hellas took refuge with the Athenians as ^ safe
j:etreat; and at an early period, becoming naturalised,
swelled the already large population of the city to such
a height that Attica became at last too small to hold
them, and theyjiad to_8end_out_colonie8jo Ionia.

There is also another circumstance that contributes

3, 4] HISTORY OF EARLY TIMES 3

not a little to my conviction of the weakness of ancient CHAP. I.
times. Before the Trojan war there is ng,in<dication of without
anj^ommon actjonjn Hellas, nor indeed of the universal commcm
prevalence of the name ; on the contrary, before the time ends, or
of Hellen, son of Deucalion, no such appellation existed, H^J-^^
but the country went by the names of the different tribes, name,
in particular of the Peiasgian. It was not till Hellen and
his sons grew strong in Phthiotis, and were invited as
allies into the other citielij that one by ^ne they^ gradually
acquired from the connection the name of Hellenes ;
though a long time elapsed before that name could fasten
itself upon all. The best proof of this is furnished by
Homer. Born long^ter the Trolao. war, he nowhere
calls all of them by that name, nor indeed any of them
except the followers of Achillea^Jrom^Phthiotis, who
were the original Hellenes : in his poems they are called
Danaans, Argives, and Achaeans. He does not even use
the term barbarian, probably because the Hellenes had
not yet been marked off from the rest of the world by
one distinctive appellation. It appears therefore that the
several Hellenic communities, comprising not only those
who first acquired the name, city by city, as they came to
understand each other, but also those who assumed it
afterwards as the name of the whole people, were before
the Trojan war prevented by their want of strength and
the absence of mutual intercourse from displaying any
collective action.

Indeed, they could not unite for this expedition till
they had gained increased familiarity with the sea. And
the first person known to us by tradition as having es^ab-
lished a navy is Minos. He made himself master of what is
now called the Hellenic sea, and ruled over the Cyclades,
into most of which he sent the first colonies, expelling
the Carians and appointing his own sons governors ; and
thus did his best to put down piracy in those waters, a
necessary step to secure the revenues for his own use.

4 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [5, 6

BOOK I. For in early times the Hellenes and the barbarians of
^j^_ the coast and islands, as communication by sea became
in early more common, were jtempted_to^turnj)ir3tes, under the
its disl condjictjjfjtieirmost ^werful men ; the motives being
appear- ^q serve their own cupidity and to support the needy.
* They would_Jall_upon_atown_unpcQtected by walls, and
consisting of a mere collection of villages, and would
plunder it ; indeed, this came to be the main source of
their livelihood, no disgrace being yet attached to such
an achievement, but even some glory. An illustration
of this is furnished by the honour with which some of
the inhabitants of the continent still regard a successful
marauder, and by the question we find the old poets
everywhere representing the people as asking of voyagers —
* Are they pirates ? * — as if those who are asked the
question would have no idea of disclaiming the imputa-
tion, or their interrogators of reproaching them for it.
The same rapine prevailed also by land.

And even at the present day many parts of Hellas still
follow the old fashion, the Ozolian Locrians for instance,
the ^tolians, the Acarnanians, and that region of the
continent ; and the custom of carrying arms is still kept
up among these continentals, from the old piratical habits.
The whole of Hellas used once to carry arms, their
habitations being unprotected, and their communication
with each other unsafe ; indeed, to wear arms was as
much a part of everyday life with them as with the
barbarians. And the fact that the people in these parts
of Hellas are still living in the old way points to a time
when the same mode of life was once equally common
to all. The Athenians were the first ^oJay__aside their
weapons, and to adopt an easier and more luxuriousjnode
of life ; indeed, it is only^ately^ tHaTTFieirnch old men
left off the luxury of wearing undergarments of linen, and
fastening a knot of their hair with a tie of golden grass-
hoppers, a fashion which spread to their Ionian kindred.

7.8] HISTORY OF EARLY TIMES 5

and long prevailed among the old men there. On CHAP. I
the contrary a modest style of dressing, more in con- -pijg
formity with modern ideas, was first adopted by the *°^°g*^^
Lacedjemonians, the rich doing their best to assimilate be fort-
their way of life to that of the common people. They ^^^^^^
also set the example of contending naked, publicly come em.
stripping and anointing themselves with oil in their P°"*'
g^^mnastic exercises. Formerly, even in the Olympic
contests, the athletes who contended wore belts across
their middles ; and it is but a few years since that the
practice ceased. To this day among some of the bar-
barians, especially in Asia, when prizes for boxing and
wrestling are offered, belts are worn by the combatants.
And there are many other points in which a likeness
might be shown between the life of the Hellenic world
of old and the barbarian of to-day.

With respect to their towns, lateron, at a^era of in-
creased facilities of navigation and^lTgreateF supply of
capitalTwe find the shores becbrning the^site of walled
towns, anXthe^Tsthmuses being occupied for the purposes
of commerce, and defence against a neighbour. But the
old towns, on account of the great prevalence of piracy,
were built away from the sea, whether on the islands or
the continent, and still remain in their old sites. For the
pirates used to plunder one another, and indeed all coast
populations, whether seafaring or not.

The islanders, too, were great pirates. These islanders
were Carians and Phoenicians, by whom most of the
islands were colonised, as was proved by the following
fact. During the purification of Delos by Athens in
this war all the graves in the island were taken up, and
it was found that above half their inmates were Carians :
they were identified by the fashion of the arms buried
with them, and by the method of interment, which was
the same as the Carians still follow. But as soon as
Minos had formed his navy, communication by sea be-

6 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [9

BOOK I. came easier, as he colonised most of the islands, and thus

A — ^eat exp^ll^^ ^^^ malefactors. The coast populations now

national began to apply themselves more closely to the acquisition

suS'as of wealth, and their life became more settled ; some even

the war began to build themselyes walls on the strength of their

Tfoy??s newly-acquired riches. For the love of gain would re-

possible. concile the weaker to the dominion of the stronger, and

the possession of capital enabled the more powerful to

reduce the smaller towns to subjection. And it was at a

somewhat later stage of this development that they went

on the expedition against Troy.

What enabled Agamemnon to raise the armament was
more, in my opinion, his superiority in strength, than the
oaths of Tyndareus, which bound the Suitors to follow
him. Indeed, the account given by those Peloponnesians
who have been the recipients of the most credible tradi-
tion is this. First of all Pelops, arriving among a needy
population from Asia with vast wealth, acquired such
power that, stranger though he was, the country was called
after him ; and this power fortune saw fit materially to
increase in the hands of his descendants. Eurystheus
had been killed in Attica by the Heraclids. Atreus was
his mother's brother ; and to the hands of his relation,
who had left his father on account of the death of
Chrysippus, Eurystheus, when he set out on his expedi-
tion, had committed Mycenae and the government. As
time went on and Eurystheus did not return, Atreus
complied with the wishes of the Mycenasans, who were
influenced by fear of the Heraclids, — besides, his power
seemed considerable, and he had not neglected to court
the favour of the populace, — and assumed the sceptre of
Mycenas and the rest of the dominions of Eurystheus.
And so the power of the descendants of Pelops came
to be greater than that of the descendants of Perseus.
To all this Agamemnon succeeded. He had also a
navy far stronger than his contemporaries, so that, in

lo] HISTORY OF EARLY TIMES 7

my opinion, fear was quite as strong an element as love CHAP. I.
in the formation of the confederate expedition. The p^^
strength of his navy is shown by the fact that his own of Aga-
was the largest contingent, and that of the Arcadians enabled
was furnished by him ; this at least is what Homer says, J?^^^*^
if his testimony is deemed sufficient. Besides, in his larger
account of the transmission of the sceptre, he calls him than any
« Of many an isle, and of all Argos king.* known.

Now Agamemnon's was a continental power ; and he
could not have been master of any except the adjacent
islands (and these would not be many), but through the
possession of a fleet.

And from this expedition we may infer the character
of earlier enterprises. Now Mycenae may have been a
small place, and many of the towns of that age may
appear comparatively insignificant, but no exact observer
would therefore feel justified in rejecting the estimate
given by the poets and by tradition of the magnitude of
the armament. For I suppose if Lacedaemon were to
become desolate, and the temples and the foundations of
the public buildings were left, that as time went on there
would be a strong disposition with posterity to refuse to
accept her fame as a true exponent of her power. And yet
they occupy two-fifths of Peloponnese and lead the whole,
not to speak of their numerous allies without. Still, as
the city is neither built in a compact form nor adorned
with magnificent temples and public edifices, but com-
posed of villages after the old fashion of Hellas, there
would be an impression of inadequacy. Whereas, if
Athens were to suffer the same misfortune, I suppose
that any inference from the appearance presented to the
eye would make her power to have been twice as great as
it is. We have therefore no right to be sceptical, nor
to content ourselves with an inspection of a town to the
exclusion of a consideration of its power ; but we may

8 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [ii

BOOK I. safely conclude that the armament in question surpassed
.j^gjj_ all before it, as it fell short of modern efforts ; if we can
pedition here also accept the testimony of Homer's poems, in
°'scale'as which, without allowing for the exaggeration which a
compared poet would feel himself licensed to employ, we can see
modern that it was far from equalling ours. He has represented
mentl" ^' ^^ Consisting of twelve hundred vessels ; the Boeotian
complement of each ship being a hundred and twenty
men, that of the ships of Philoctetes fifty. By this, I
conceive, he meant to convey the maximum and the
minimum complement : at any rate he does not specify
the amount of any others in his catalogue of the ships.
That they were all rowers as well as warriors we see
from^iis_accoiLii^oflKe~ships of Phifogtete87iir"which all
the xpen at the oar ^e bownien. Now it is improbable
that many supernumeraries sailed if we except the kings
and high officers ; especially as they had to cross the
open sea with munitions of war, in ships, moreover, that
had no decks, but were equipped in the old piratical
fashion. So that if we strike the average of the largest
and smallest ships, the number of those who sailed will
appear inconsiderable, representing, as they did, the whole
foroe of Hellas. And this was^u^ npj^o much to
scarcity oT men as of money. Difficujty of subsistence
made the invaders reduce the numbers_of xhi? army to
a point~at_which it mighl,live j)n_tHe^ country during the
prosecution of the war. Even alter the victory they
obtained on their arrival — and a victory there must have
been, or the fortifications of the naval camp could never
have been built — there is no indication of their whole
force having been employed ; on the contrary, they seem
to have turned to cultivation of the Chersonese and to
piracy from want of supplies. Thii_wa8_^^£hat__really
enabled the Trojans to keep the field for tex^-ygars aanigst
them ; thedispeif'sionof the enemy making them always
a match for the detachment left behind. If they had

12] HISTORY OF EARLY TIMES 9

brought plenty of supplies with them, and had persevered CHAP I.
in the war without scattering for piracy and agriculture, UnT
they would have easily defeated the Trojans in the fig]d ; ^f^^J^®"*.
since they could hold their own against them with the Hellas
division on service. In short, if they had stuck to the ^^^^ ^^^
siege, the capture of Troy would have cost them less Trojan
time and less trouble. But as want of money proved the "'
weakness of earlier expeditions, so from the same cause
even the one in question, more famous than its predeces-
sors, may be pronounced on the evidence of what it
effected to have been inferior to its renown and to the
current opinion about it formed under the tuition of the
poets.

Even after the Trojan ^war_Hellaswasjtill engaged in
removing and settling, and^ thus coM^slLi-^^^^" ^^ ^^^
quiet which must precede growth. The late return of
the Hellenes from Ilium caused many revolutions, and
factions ensued almost everywhere; and it was the citi-
Tens thus driven into exHe jwh^q^fpunded the^cities. Sixty
years after the captur<_ji£_IliumLjLhfiJiiodernJ^oe^
were driven out of Arne by the Thessalians, and settled
in the preseQt_Bceotiaa_the-fcriner Cadmeis ; though there
was a division of them there before, some of whom joined
the expedition to Ilium. Twentv_years later the Dorians
and the Heraclids became masters_o£^elopo^nese ; so
that much had lo~be~done and many years had to elapse
before Hellas could attain to a durable tranquillity undis-
turbed by removals, and could begin to send out colonies,
as Athens did to Ionia and most^f^he^ isla,nds, and the
Peloponnesians to most_o£J[taly__and_ Sicily and some
places m the rest of Hellas. All these places were
founded subsequently to the war with Troy.

But as the power of Hellas grew, and the_acquisition
of wealth became inore an object^the revenues^" the
states increasing, tyrannies were bytKeir means established
almost everywhere, — the old form of government being

lo THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [13

BOOK I. hereditary monarchy with definite prerogatives, — and
— ^_ Hellas began to fit out fleets and apply herself more
archy closely to the sea. It is said that the Corinthians were
on^Birth the first, tfl-^-approaclx,_the-JBodern style of^nayal archi-
&ives tecture, and that Corinth was the first place in Hellas
•fyranny where galleys were built ; and we have Ameinocles, a
^ W^"^th° Corinthian shipwright, making four ships for the Samians.
& Navies Dating from the end of this war, it is nearly three hun^
B.C?^os- dred years ago that Ameinocles went to Samos. Again,
sai- the earliest sea-fight in history was between^ the Corin-
thians and Corcyraeans ; this was about two hundred and
sixty years ago, dating from the same time. Planted on
an isthmus, Corinth haH frnm time nut-oO^isd-beea- a
commercial emporium ; as formerly almost all commu-
nication between the Hellenes within and without Pelo-
ponnese was carried on overland, andthe___Conaihian
territorywas the highway through whi(gh_it travelled.
iSHeTrndconsequently great rnoneyTesources, asTs^lhown
oy the epithet ' wealthy ' bestowed by the old poets on
the place, and this enabled her, when traffic by sea be-
came more common, to procure her navy and put down
piracy ; and as she could offer a mart for both branches
of the trade, she acquired for herself all the power which
a large revenue affords. Subsequently __the_2onian8^ at-
tained to great naval 8trengdiJjL...the_j:£ign_ofjCjTU8j_the
first king of the Pef8ians,'and of his son Cambyses, and
while they were at war with the former commanded for
a while the Ionian sea. Polycxates also, the tyrant of
SamosT^HadTa powerful navy in the re?ign of Cambyses
with which he reduced many of the islands, and among
them Rhenea, which he consecrated to the Delian Apollo.
About this time also_the Phocasansw^whik-tliey were
founding Marseilles, defeated the Carthajjinians in a sea-
fight^ These were the most powerful navies. And
even these, although so many generations had elapsed
since the Trojan war, seem to have been principally com-

14, 15] HISTORY OF EARLY TIMES ii

posed of the old fifty-oars and long-boats, and to have CHAP. L
counted few galleys among their ranks. Indeed it was i^"]^.
only shortly before the Persian war and the death ofanceof
Darius the successor of Cambyses, that the Sicilian power :
tyrants and the Corcyrasans acquired any large number of °° ff^eat
galleys. For after these there were no naries of any land,
account in Hellas till the expedition of Xerxes ; jEgina,
Athens, and others may have possessed a few vessels, but
they were principally fifty-oars. It was quite at the end
of this period that the war with ^gina and the prospect
of the barbarian invasion enabled Themistocles to per-
suade the Athenians to build the fleet with which they
fought at Saiamis ; and even these vessels had not com-
plete decks.

The navies, then, of the Hellenes during the period we
have traversed were what I have described. All their
insignificance did not prevent their being an element of *

the greatest power to those who cultivated them, alike in
revenue and in dominion. They were the means by
which the islands were reached and reduced, those of the
smallest area falling the easiest prey. Wars by land there
were none, none at least by which power was acquired ;
we have the usual border contests, but of distant expedi-
tions with conquest for object we hear nothing among
the Hellenes. There was no union of subject cities
round a great state, no spontaneous combination of equals
for confederate expeditions ; what fighting there was
consisted merely of local warfare between rival neigh-
bours. The nearest approach to a coalition took place
in the old war between Chalcis and Eretria ; this was a
quarrel in which the rest of the Hellenic name did to
some extent take sides.

Various, too, were the obstacles which the national
growth encountered in various localities. The povv^er of
the lonians was advancing with rapid strides, when it
came into collision with Persia, under King Cyrus, who,

12 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [i6, 17, 18

BOOK I. after having dethroned CrcEsus and overrun everything

BC~~ 5. between the Halys and the sea, stopped not till he had
' ^. reduced the cities of the coast ; the islands being only

a^S-eS l^ft ^o be subdued by Darius and the Phoenician navy.

sors and Again, wherever there were tyrants, their habit of pro- .
Snder viding simply for themselves, of looking solely to their

°*owth^ personal comfort and family aggrandisement, made safety
Maral the great aim of their policy, and prevented anything

sSi^is! g^*^2t proceeding from them ; though they would each
have their affairs with their immediate neighbours. All
this is only true of the mother country, for in Sicily they
attained to very great power. Thus for a long time
everywhere in Hellas do we find causes which make
the states alike incapable of combination for great and
national ends, or of any vigorous action of their own.

But at last a time came when the tyrants of Athens
and the far older tyrannies of the rest of Hellas were,
with the exception of those in Sicily, once and for all put
down by Lacedosmon ; for this city, though after the
settlement of the Dorians, its present inhabitants, it
suffered from factions for an unparalleled length of time,
still at a very early period obtained good laws, and en-
joyed a freedom from tyrants which was unbroken; it
has possessed the same form of government for more than
four hundred years, reckoning to the end of the late war,
and has thus been in a position to arrange the affairs of
the other states. Not many years after the deposition of
the tyrants, the battle of Marathon was fought between
the Medes and the Athenians. Ten years afterwards
the barbarian returned with the armada for the subjugation
of Hellas. In the face of this great danger the command
of the confederate Hellenes was assumed by the Lacedae-
monians in virtue of their superior power ; and the
Athenians having made up their minds to abandon their
city, broke up their homes, threw themselves into their
ships, and became a naval people. This coalition, after

19, 2o] HISTORY OF EARLY TIMES 13

repulsing the barbarian, soon afterwards split into two CHAP. I.
sections, which included the Hellenes who had revolted B.cTIyd-
from the king, as well as those who had aided him in the 431.
war. At the head of the one stood Athens, at the head Lace-
of the other Lacedjemon, one the first naval, the other d^emon-
the first military power in Hellas. For a short time federacy
the league held together, till the Lacedaemonians and Athenian
Athenians quarrelled, and made war upon each other with empire,
their allies, a duel into which ail the Hellenes sooner or
later were drawn, though some might at first remain
neutral. So that the whole period from the Median war
to this, with some peaceful intervals, was spent by each
power in war, either with its rival, or with its own re-
volted allies, and consequently afforded them constant
practice in military matters, and that experience which
is learnt in the school of danger.

The policy of Lacedsemon was not to exact tribute
from her allies, but merely to secure their subservience
to her interests by establishing oligarchies among them ; ^
Athens, on the contrary, had by degrees deprived hers of
their ships, and imposed instead contributions in money
on all except Chios and Lesbos. Both found their re-
sources for this war separately to exceed the sum of their
strength when the alliance flourished intact.

Having now given the result of my inquiries into early
times, I grant that there will be a difficulty in believing
every particular detail. The way that most men deal
with traditions, even traditions of their own country, is
to receive them all alike as they are delivered, without
applying any critical test whatever. The general Athenian
public fancy that Hipparchus was tyrant when he fell
by the hands of Harmodius and Aristogiton ; not knowing
that Hippias, the eldest of the sons of Pisistratus, was
really supreme, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were
his brothers; and that Harmodius and Aristogiton
fcuspecting, on the very day, nay at the very moment

14 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [21

BOOK I. fixed on for the deed, that information had been conveyed
Thetnith ^° Hippias by their accomplices, concluded that he had
of the been warned, and did not attack him, yet, not Jiking to
of ear^ be apprehended and risk their Hves for nothing, fell upon
ha/d to Hipp^rchus near the temple of the daughters of Leos, and
ascertain, slew him as he was arranging the Panathenaic procession.
There are many other unfounded ideas current among
the rest of the Hellenes, even on matters of contemporary
history which have not been obscured by time. For in-
stance, there is the notion that the Lacedemonian kings
have two votes each, the fact being that they have only
one ; and that there is a company of Pitane, there being
simply no such thing. So little pains do the vul^rar take
in rh^ 'nv^titigationof truth, accepting readily the^fic^l-
story that comes to~Hand. On the whole, however, the
conclusions I have drawn from the proofs quoted may,
I believe, safely be relied on. Assuredly they will not
be disturbed either by the lays of a poet displaying the
exaggeration of his craft, or by the compositions of the
chroniclers that are attractive at truth's expense ; the sub-
jects they treat of being out of the reach of evidence, and
time having robbed most of them of historical value by
enthroning them in the region of legend. Turning from
these, we can rest satisfied with having proceeded upon
the clearest data, and having arrived at conclusions as
exact as can be expected in matters of such antiquity.
To come to this war ; despite the known disposition of
the actors in a struggle to overrate its importance, and
when it is over to return to their admiration of earlier
events, yet an examination of the facts will show that it
was much greater than the wars which preceded it.
■^ With reference to the speeches in this history, some
,'fl were dehvered before the war began, others while it was
n going on ; some I heard myself, others I got from various
quarters ; it was in all cases difficult to carry them word
for word in one's memory, so my habit has been to make

22, 23] HISTORY OF EARLY TIMES 15

the speakers say what was in my opinion demanded of CHAP. I.
them by the various occasions, of course adhering as closely sources
as possible to the general sense of what they really said, of this
And with reference to the narrative of events, far from speeches
permitting myself to derive it from the first source that ^atlve*^'
came to hand, I did not even trust my own impressions,
but it rests partly on what I saw myself, partly on what
others saw for me, the accuracy of the report being always
tried by the most severe and detailed tests possible. My
conclusions have cost me some labour from the want
of coincidence between accounts of the same occurrences
by different eye-witnesses, arising sometimes from imper-
fect memory, sometimes from undue partiality for one \
side or the other. The absence of romance in my his- 1 Vj/Cv ,
tory will, I fear, de^act somewhat from its jnterest ; but ^^ v rj^
if it be judged useful by those inquirers who"^sire an \\t/^^^
exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation
of the future, which in the course of human things must
resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be content. In
fine, I have written my work, not as an essay which is
to win the applause of the moment, but^ as a possession
for all time.

^The Median war, the greatest achievement of past times,
yet found a speedy decision in two actions by sea and
two by land. The Peloponnesian war was prolonged
to an immense length, and long as it was it was short
without parallel for the misfortunes that it brought upon
Hellas. Never had so many cities been taken and laid
desolate, here by the barbarians, here by the parties con-
tending (the old inhabitants being sometimes removed to
make room for others) ; never was there so much banishing
and blood-shedding, now on the field of battle, now in
the strife of faction. Old stories of occurrences handed
down by tradition, but scantily confirmed by experience,
suddenly ceased to be incredible ; there were earthquakes
of unparalleled extent and violence ; eclipses of the sun

i6 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [24

BOOK I. occurred with a frequency unrecorded in previous history ;
Causes ^^^^^ ^^^^ great droughts in sundry places and con-
ofthe sequent famines, and that most calamitous and awfully
real a^d ^'*^^^ visitation, the plague. Ail this came upon them
osten- ^ith the late war, which was begun by the Athenians
' and Peloponnesians by the dissolution of the thirty years'
truce made after the conquest of Euboea. To the ques-
tion why they broke the treaty, I answer by placing first
an account of their grounds of complaint and points of
difference, that no one may ever have to ask the immediate
cause which plunged the Hellenes into a war of such
magnitude. The real cause I consider to be the one
which was formally most kept out of sight. The
growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this
inspired in Lacedasmon, made war inevitable. Still it is
well to give the grounds alleged by either side, which led
to the dissolution of the treaty and the breaking out of
the war.

CHAPTER II

Causes of the War — The Affair of Epidamnus —
The Affair of Potidaea

The city of Epidamnus stands on the right of the
entrance of the Ionic gulf. Its vicinity is inhabited
by the Taulantians, an Illyrian people. The place is a
colony from Corcyra, founded by Phallus, son of Era-
tocleides, of the family of the Heraclids, who had
according to ancient usage been summoned for the pur-
pose from Corinth, the mother country. The colonists
were joined by some Corinthians, and others of the
Dorian race. Now, as time went on, the city of
Epidamnus became great and populous ; but failing a
prey to factions arising, it is said, from a war with her

25] CAUSES OF THE WAR— EPIDAMNUS 17

neighbours the barbarians, she became much enfeebled, and CHAP.
lost a considerable amount of her power. The last act be- J^l
fore the war was the expulsion of the nobles by the people. Epidam-
The exiled party joined the barbarians, and proceeded to pelit^o
plunder those in the city by sea and land ; and the Epi- porcyra
damnians finding themselves hard pressed, sent ambassadors
to Corcyra beseeching their mother country not to allo'w
them to perish, but to make up matters between them and
the exiles, and to rid them of the war with the barbarians.
The ambassadors seated themselves in the temple of Hera
as suppliants, and made the above requests to the Cor-
cyrasans. But the Corcyrseans refused to accept their
supplication, and they were dismissed without having
effected anything.

When the Epidamnians found that no help could be
expected from Corcyra. they were in a strait what to do
next. So they sent to Delphi and inquired of the god,
whether they should deliver their city to the Corinthians,
and endeavour to obtain some assistance from their founders.
The answer he gave them was to deliver the city, and
place themselves under Corinthian protection. So the
Epidamnians went to Corinth, and delivered over the
colony in obedience to the commands of the oracle.
They showed that their founder came from Corinth, and
revealed the answer of the god ; and they begged them
not to allow them to perish, but to assist them. This
the Corinthians consented to do. Believing the colony
to belong as much to themselves as to the Corcyraeans,
they felt it to be a kind of duty to undertake their pro-
tection. Besides, they hated the Corcyrasans for their
contempt of the mother country. Instead of meeting
with the usual honours accorded to the parent city by
every other colony at public assemblies, such as prece-
dence at sacrifices, Corinth found herself treated with
contempt by a power, which in point of wealth could
stand comparison with any even of the richest communi-

B 455

i8 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [26

BOOK I. ties in Hellas, which possessed great military strength,

g~ g and which sometimes could not repress a pride in the

Corinth high naval position of an island whose nautical renown

troops dated from the days of its old inhabitants, the Phaeacians.

to Epi- TJiis ^as one reason of the care that they lavished on

amnus. ^^^.^ ^^^^^ which became very efficient ; mdeed they

began the war with a force of a hundred and twenty

galleys.

All these grievances made Corinth eager to send the
promised aid to Epidamnus. Advertisement was made
for volunteer settlers, and a force of Ambraciots, Leu-
cadians, and Corinthians was despatched. They marched
by land to Apollonia, a Corinthian colony, the route by
sea being avoided from fear of Corcyraean interruption.
When the Corcyraeans heard of the arrival of the settlers
and troops in Epidamnus, and the surrender of the colony
to Corinth, they took fire. Instantly putting to sea with
five-and-twenty ships, which were quickly followed by
others, they insolently commanded the Epidamnians to
receive back the banished nobles — (it must be premised
that the Epidamnian exiles had come to Corcyra, and
pointing to the sepulchres of their ancestors, had appealed
to their kindred to restore them) — and to dismiss the
Corinthian garrison and settlers. But to all this the
Epidamnians turned a deaf ear. Upon this the Cor-
cyraeans commenced operations against them with a fleet
of forty sail. They took with them the exiles, with a
view to their restoration, and also secured the services of
the Illyrians. Sitting down before the city, they issued
a proclamation to the effect that any of the natives that
chose, and the foreigners, might depart unharmed, with
the alternative of being treated as enemies. On their
refusal the Corcyraeans proceeded to besiege the city,
which stands on an isthmus ; and the Corinthians, re-
ceiving intelligence of the investment of Epidamnus, got
together an armament and proclaimed a colony to Epi-

27, 28] CAUSES OF THE WAR— EPIDAMNUS 19

damnus, perfect political equality being guaranteed to all CHAP.
who chose to go. Any who were not prepared to sail at _l^
once, might by paying down the sum of fifty Corinthian Corcyra
drachmae have a share in the colony without leaving EpidSn-
Corinth. Great numbers took advantage of this pro- ^^^ '• .
clamation, some being ready to start directly, others expedi-
paying the requisite forfeit. In case of their passage corinth?
being disputed by the Corcyrseans, several cities were
asked to lend them a convoy. Megara prepared to
accompany them with eight ships, Pale in Cephallonia
with four ; Epidaurus furnished five, Hermione one,
Troezen two, Leucas ten, and Ambracia eight. The
Thebans and Phliasians were asked for money, the
Eleans for hulls as well ; while Corinth herself furnished
thirty ships and three thousand heavy infantry.

When the Corcyraeans heard of their preparations they
came to Corinth with envoys from Lacedaemon and
Sicyon, whom they persuaded to accompany them, and
bade her recall the garrison and settlers, as she had
nothing to do with Epidamnus. If, however, she had
any claims to make, they were willing to submit the
matter to the arbitration of such of the cities in Pelo-
ponnese as should be chosen by mutual agreement, and
that the colony should remain with the city to whom the
arbitrators might assign it. They were also willing to
refer the matter to the oracle at Delphi. If, in defiance
of their protestations, war was appealed to, they should
be themselves compelled by this violence to seek friends
in quarters where they had no desire to seek them, and
to make even old ties give way to the necessity of assist-
ance. The answer they got from Corinth was, that if
they would withdraw their fleet and the barbarians from
Epidamnus negotiation might be possible ; but, while
the town was still being besieged, going before arbitrators
was out of the question. The Corcyraeans retorted that
if Corinth would withdraw her troops from Epidamnue

20 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [29

BOOK I. they would withdraw theirs, or they were ready to let

3 Q g both parties remain in statu quo, an armistice being con-
War eluded till judgment could be given.
Corcyra Turning a deaf ear to all these proposals, when their
Sh and ^^^V^ ^^^^ manned and their allies had come in, the Cor-
defe'at of inthians sent a herald before them to declare war, and
Connt getting under weigh with seventy-five ships and two thou-
sand heavy infantry, sailed for Epidamnus to give battle
to the Corcyraeans. The fleet was under the command of
Aristeus, son of Pellichas, Callicrates, son of Callias, and
Timanor, son of Timanthes ; the troops under that of
Archetimus, son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas, son of
Isarchus. When they had reached Actium in the terri-
tory of Anactorium, at the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia,
where the temple of Apollo stands, the Corcyraeans sent
on a herald in a light boat to warn them not to sail
against them. Meanwhile they proceeded to man their
ships, all of which had been equipped for action, the old
vessels being undergirded to make them seaworthy. On
the return of the herald without any peaceful answer from
the Corinthians, their ships being now manned, they put
out to sea to meet the enemy with a fleet of eighty sail
(forty were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus), formed
line and went into action, and gained a decisive victory,
and destroyed fifteen of the Corinthian vessels. The
same day had seen Epidamnus compelled by its besiegers
to capitulate ; the conditions being that the foreigners
should be sold, and the Corinthians kept as prisoners of
war, till their fate should be otherwise decided.

After the engagement the Corcyrseans set up a trophy
on Leukimme, a headland of Corcyra, and slew all their
captives except the Corinthians, whom they kept as pri-
soners of war. Defeated at sea, the Corinthians and their
allies repaired home, and left the Corcyrseans masters
of all the sea about those parts. Sailing to Leucas, a
Corinthian colony, they ravaged their territory, and burnt

30, 31] CAUSES OF THE WAR— EPIDAMNUS 21

Cyllcne, the harbour of the Eleans, because they had CHAP,
furnished ships and money to Corinth. For almost the _^
whole of the period that followed the battle they remained B.C. 434-
masters of the sea, and the allies of Corinth were harassed Prepara-
by Corcyraean cruisers. At last Corinth, roused by the ^°^? o^f
sufferings of her allies, sent out ships and troops in the Embassy
fall of the sumfner, who formed an encampment at Actium °™°^o
and about Chimerium, in Thesprotis, for the protection of Athens.
Leucas and the rest of the friendly cities.' The Corcy-
rseans on their part formed a similar station on Leukimme.
Neither party made any movement, but they remained
confronting each other till the end of the summer, and
winter was at hand before either of them returned home.

Corinth, exasperated by the war with the Corcyrasans,
•spent the whole of the year after the engagement and that
succeeding it in building ships, and in straining every nerve
to form an efficient fleet ; rowers being drawn from Pelo-
ponncse and the rest of Hellas by the inducement of large
bounties. The Corcyraeans, alarmed at the news of their
preparations, being without a single ally in Hellas (for
they had not enrolled themselves either in the Athenian
or in the Lacedaemonian confederacy), decided to repair
to Athens in order to enter into alliance, and to endeavour
to procure support from her. Corinth also, hearing of
their intentions, sent an embassy to Athens to prevent the
Corcyraean navy being joined by the Athenian, and her
prospect of ordering the war according to her wishes being
thus impeded. An assembly was convoked, and the rival
advocates appeared : the Corcyraeans spoke as follows : —

* Athenians ! when a people that have not rendered
any important service or support to their neighbours in
times past, for which they might claim to be repaid, ap-^
pear before them as we now appear before you to solicit
their assistance, they may fairly be required to satisfy
certain preliminary conditions. They should show, first,
that it is expedient or at least safe to grant their request ;

22 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [32

BOOK I. next, that they will retain a lasting sense of the kindness.

ThTcor- -^^^ ^^ ^^^y cannot clearly establish any of these points,
cyraean they must not be annoyed if they meet with a rebuff.
^soUcit Now the Corcyracans beliere that with their petition for
the alii- assistance they can also give you a satisfactory answer on
Athens, these points, and they have therefore despatched us hither.
It has so happened that our policy as regards you with
respect to this request, turns out to be inconsistent, and as
regards our interests, to be at the present crisis inexpe-
dient. We say inconsistent, because a power which has
never in the whole of her past history been wilHng to ally
herself with any of her neighbours, is now found asking
them to ally themselves with her. And we say inex-
pedient, because in our present war with Corinth it has left
us in a position of entire isolation, and what once seemed-
the wise precaution of refusing to involve ourselves in alli-
ances with other powers, lest we should also involve
ourselves in risks of their choosing, has now proved to be
folly and weakness. It is true that in the late naval
engagement we drove back the Corinthians from our
shores single-handed. But they have now got together
a still larger armament from Peloponnese and the rest of
Hellas ; and we, seeing our utter inability to cope with
them without foreign aid, and the magnitude of the danger
which subjection to them implies, find it necessary to ask
help from you and from every other power. And we
hope to be excused if we forswear our old principle of
complete political isolation, a principle which was not
adopted with any sinister intention, but was rather the
consequence of an error in judgment.

' Now there are many reasons why in the event of your
compliance you will congratulate yourselves on this request
having been made to you. First, because your assistance
will be rendered to a power which, herself inoffensive, is a
victim to the injustice of others. Secondly, because all
that we most value is at stake in the present contest, and

33] CAUSES OF THE WAR— EPIDAMNUS 23

your welcome of us under these circumstances will be a CHAP.

proof of good will which will ever keep alive the grati- '_

tude you will lay up in our hearts. Thirdly, yourselves What
excepted, we are the greatest naval power in Hellas, will gain
Moreover, can you conceive a stroke of good fortune -Jf^^"®**'
more rare in itself, or more disheartening to your enemies, Corcyra's
than that the power whose adhesion you would have '"^'l"®^^'
valued above much material and moral strength, should
present herself self-invited, should deliver herself into
your hands without danger and without expense, and
should lastly put you in the way of gaining a high char-
acter in the eyes of the world, the gratitude of those
whom you shall assist, and a great accession of strength
for yourselves ? You may search all history without
finding many instances of a people gaining all these ad-
vantages at once, or many instances of a power that comes
in quest of assistance being in a position to give to the
people whose alliance she solicits as much safety and
honour as she will receive. But it will be urged that it
is only in the case of a war that we shall be found useful.
To this we answer that if any of you imagine that that
war is far off, he is grievously mistaken, and is blind to
the fact that Lacedaemon regards you with jealousy and
desires war, and that Corinth is powerful there, — the
same, remember, that is your enemy, and is even now
trying to subdue us as a preliminary to attacking you.
And this she does to prevent our becoming united by a
common enmity, and her having us both on her hands,
and also to insure getting the start of you in one of two
ways, either by crippling our power or by making its
strength her own. Now it is our policy to be beforehand
with her — that is, for Corcyra to make an offer of alli-
ance and for you to accept it ; in fact, we ought to form
plans against her instead of waiting to defeat the plans she
forms against us.

* If she asserts that for you to receive a colony of hers

24 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [34, 35

BOOK I. into alliance is not right, let her know that every colony
Corinth ^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ treated honours its parent state, but becomes
will have estranged from it by injustice. For colonists are not
cause"of sent forth on the understanding that they are to be the
com- slaves of those that remain behind, but that they are to be
their equals. And that Corinth was injuring us is clear.
Invited to refer the dispute about Epidamnus to arbitra-
tion, they chose to prosecute their complaints by war
rather than by a fair trial. And let their conduct to-
wards us who are their kindred be a warning to you not
to be misled by their deceit, nor to '^ield to their direct
requests ; concessions to adversaries only end in self-
reproach, and the more strictly they are avoided the
greater will be the chance of security.

* If it be urged that your reception of us will be a
breach of the treaty existing between you and Lace-
dsemon, the answer is that we are a neutral state, and
that one of the express provisions of that treaty is that it
shall be competent for any Hellenic state that is neutral
to join whichever side it pleases. And it is intolerable
for Corinth to be allowed to obtain men for her navy not
only from her allies, but also from the rest of Hellas, no
small number being furnished by your own subjects ;
while we are to be excluded both from the alliance left
open to us by treaty, and from any assistance that we
might get from other quarters, and you are to be accused
of political immorality if you comply with our request.
On the other hand, we shall have much greater cause to
complain of you, if you do not comply with it ; if we,
who are in peril, and are no enemies of yours, meet with
a repulse at your hands, while Corinth, who is the aggres-
sor and your enemy, not only meets with no hindrance
from you, but is even allowed to draw material for war
from your dependencies. This ought not to be, but you
should either forbid her enlisting men in your dominions,
or you should lend us too what help you may think advisable.

36] CAUSES OF THE WAR— EPI DAMN US 25

* But your real policy is to afford us avowed coun- CHAP.

tenance and support. The advantages of this course, as '_

we premised in the beginning of our speech, are many. ^*^"® °^
We mention one that is perhaps the chief. Could there cyraean"
be a clearer guarantee of our good faith than is offered by °^^v
the fact that the power which is at enmity with you, is the island
also at enmity with us, and that that power is fully able nautical
to punish defection. And there is a wide difference station,
between declining the alliance of an inland and of a
maritime power. For your first endeavour should be to
prevent, if possible, the existence of any naval power
except your own ; failing this, to secure the friendship of
the strongest that does exist. And if any of you believe
that what we urge is expedient, but fear to act upon this
belief, lest it should lead to a breach of the treaty, you
must remember that on the one hand, whatever your fears,
your strength will be formidable to your antagonists ; oq
the other, whatever the confidence you derive from refus-
ing to receive us, your weakness will have no terrors for a
strong enemy. You must also remember that your decision
is for Athens no less than for Corcyra, and that you are
not making the best provision for her interests, if at a
time when you are anxiously scanning the horizon that you
may be in readiness for the breaking out of the war which
is all but upon you, you hesitate to attach to your side a
place whose adhesion or estrangement is alike pregnant
with the most vital consequences. For it lies conveniently
for the coast-navigation in the direction of Italy and
Sicily, being able to bar the passage of naval reinforce-
ments from thence to Peloponnese, and from Peloponnese
thither ; and it is in other respects a most desirable station.
To sum up as shortly as possible, embracing both general
and particular considerations, let this show you the folly
of sacrificing us. Remember that there are but three
considerable naval powers in Hellas, Athens, Corcyra,
and Corinth, and that if you allow two of these three to
*B 455

26 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [37

BOOK I. become one, and Corinth to secure us for herself, you will
Speech of ^^^^ '° ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ against the united fleets of Corcyra
the Co- and Peloponnese. But if you receive us, you will havt
envoys o^r ships to reinforce you in the struggle.'
agrainst Such were the words of the Corcyrgsans. After they
Corey- had finished, the Corinthians spoke as follows : —
r«ans. < These Corcyrasans in the speech we have just heard
do not confine themselves to the question of their recep-
tion into your alliance. They also talk of our being
guilty of injustice, and their being the victims of an
unjustifiable war. It becomes necessary for us to touch
upon both these points before we proceed to the rest of
what we have to say, that you may have a more correct
idea of the grounds of our claim, and have good cause to
reject their petition. According to them, their old policy
of refusing all offers of alliance was a policy of modera-
tion. It was in fact adopted for bad ends, not for
good ; indeed their conduct is such as to make them by
no means desirous of having allies present to witness it,
or of having the shame of asking their concurrence. Be-
sides, their geographical situation makes them independent
of others, and consequently the decision in cases where
they injure any lies not with judges appointed by mutual
agreement, but with themselves, because while they seldom
make voyages to their neighbours, they are constantly
being visited by foreign vessels which are compelled to
put in to Corcyra. In short, the object that they propose
to themselves in their specious policy of complete isola-
tion, is not to avoid sharing in the crimes of others, but
to secure a monopoly of crime to themselves, — the license
of outrage wherever they can compel, of fraud wherever
they can elude, and the enjoyment of their gains without
shame. And yet if they were the honest men they pre-
tend to be, the less hold that others had upon them, the
stronger would be the light in which they might have put
their honesty by giving and taking what was just.

38, 39] CAUSES OF THE WAR-EPIDAMNUS 27

< But such has not been their conduct either towards CHAP,
others or towards us. The attitude of our colony towards _1
us has always been one of estrangement, and is now one Corinth
of hostility ; for, say they, '* We were not sent out to colonies,
be ill-treated." We rejoin that we did not found the
colony to be insulted by them, but to be their head, and
to be regarded with a proper respect. At any rate our
other colonies honour us, and we are very much beloved
by our colonists ; and clearly, if the majority are satisfied
with us, these can have no good reason for a dissatisfaction
in which they stand alone, and we are not acting im-
properly in making war against them, nor are we making
war against them without having received signal provoca-
tion. Besides, if we were in the wrong, it would be
honourable in them to give way to our wishes, and dis-
graceful for us to trample on their moderation ; but in
the pride and license of wealth they have sinned again
and again against us, and never more deeply than when
Epidamnus, our dependency, which they took no steps to
claim in its distress, upon our coming to relieve it, was
by them seized, and is now held by force of arms.

' As to their allegation that they wished the question
to be first submitted to arbitration, it is obvious that a
challenge coming from the party who is safe in a com-
manding position, cannot gain the credit due only to him
who, before appealing to arms, in deeds as well as words,
places himself on a level with his adversary. In their
case, it was not before they laid siege to the place, but
after they at length understood that we should not tamely
suffer it, that they thought of the specious word arbitra-
tion. And not satisfied with their own misconduct
there, they appear here now requiring you to join with
them not in alliance, but in crime, and to receive them in
spite of their being at enmity with us. But it was when
they stood firmest, that they should have made overtures
to you, and not at a time when we have been wronged,

28 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [40

BOOK I. and they are in peril ; nor yet at a time when you will

A — eals ^^ admitting to a share in your protection those who never

to inter- admitted you to a share in their power, and will be

"^^law incurring an equal amount of blame from us with those

in whose offences you had no hand. No, they should

have shared their power with you before they asked you

to share your fortunes with them.

* So then the reality of the grievances we come to
complain of, and the violence and rapacity of our
opponents have both been proved. But that you cannot
equitably receive them, this you have still to learn. It
may be true that one of the provisions of the treaty is
that it shall be competent for any state, whose name was
not down on the list, to join whichever side it pleases.
But this agreement is not meant for those whose object
in joining is the injury of other powers, but for those
whose need of support does not arise from the fact of
defection, and whose adhesion will not bring to the
power that is mad enough to receive them war instead of
peace ; which will be the case with you, if you refuse to
listen to us. For you cannot become their auxiliary and
remain our friend; if you join in their attack, you must
share the punishment which the defenders inflict on
them. And yet you have the best possible right to be
neutral, or failing this, you should on the contrary join
us against them. Corinth is at least in treaty with you ;
with Corcyra you were never even in truce. But do not
lay down the principle that defection is to be patronised.
Did we on the defection of the Samians record our
vote against you, when the rest of the Peloponnesian
powers were equally divided on the question whether
they should assist them ? No, we told them to their
face that every power has a right to punish its own allies.
Why, if you make it your policy to receive and assist
all offenders, you will find that just as many of your
dependencies will come over to us, and the principle that

41, 42] CAUSES OF THE WAR— EPIDAMNUS 29

you establish will press less heavily on us than on your- CHAP,
selves. — 1-

< This then is what Hellenic law entitles us to demand ^°jjg^9^
as a right. But we have also advice to offer and claims grati-
on your gratitude, which, since there is no danger of our *^"'^®-
injuring you, as we are not enemies, and since our friend-
ship does not amount to very frequent intercourse, we say
ought to be liquidated at the present juncture. When
you were in want of ships of war for the war against the v
jEginetans, before the Persian invasion, Corinth supplied
you with twenty vessels. That good turn, and the line
we took on the Samian question, when we were the cause
of the Peloponnesians refusing to assist them, enabled you
to conquer iEgina, and to punish Samos. And we acted
thus at crises when, if ever, men are wont in their efforts
against their enemies to forget everything for the sake of
victory, regarding him who assists them then as a friend,
even if thus far he has been a foe, and him who opposes
them then as a foe, even if he has thus far been a friend ;
indeed they allow their real interests to suffer from their
absorbing preoccupation in the struggle.

* Weigh well these considerations, and let your youth
learn what they are from their elders, and let them de-
termine to do unto us as we have done unto you. And
let them not acknowledge the justice of what we say, but
dispute its wisdom in the contingency of war. Not only
is the straightest path generally speaking the wisest ; but
the coming of the war which the Corcyraeans have used
as a bugbear to persuade you to do wrong, is still uncertain,
and it is not worth while to be carried away by it into
gaining the instant and declared enmity of Corinth. It
were, rather, wise to try and counteract the unfavourable
impression which your conduct to Megara has created.
For kindness opportunely shown has a greater power of
removing old grievances than the facts of the case may
warrant. And do not be seduced by the prospect of a

30 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [43, 44

BOOK I. great naval alliance. Abstinence from all injustice to
(T^l^, other first-rate powers is a greater tower of strength, than
sion of a anything that can be gained by the sacrifice of permanent
auSmce tranquillity for an apparent temporary advantage. It is

with Cor- now our turn to benefit by the principle that we laid down
' at Lacedaemon, that every power has a right to punish her
own allies. We now claim to receive the same from you,
and protest against your rewarding us for benefiting you
by our vote by injuring us by yours. On the contrary,
return us like for like, remembering that this is that very
crisis in which he who lends aid is most a friend, and he
who opposes is most a foe. And for these Corcyraeans
— neither receive them into alliance in our despite, nor be
their abettors in crime. So do, and you will act as we
have a right to expect of you, and at the same time best
consult your own interests.'

Such were the words of the Corinthians.
When the Athenians had heard both out, two assemblies
were held. In the first there was a manifest disposition
to listen to the representations of Corinth ; in the second,
public feeling had changed, and an alliance with Corcyra
was decided on, with certain reservations. It was to be
a defensive, not an offensive alliance. It did not involve
a breach of the treaty with Peloponnese : Athens could
not be required to join Corcyra in any attack upon Corinth.
But each of the contracting parties had a right to the
other's assistance against invasion, whether of his own
territory, or that of an ally. For it began now to be felt
that the coming of the Peloponnesian war was only a
question of time, and no one was willing to see a naval
power of such magnitude as Corcyra sacrificed to Corinth ;
though if they could let them weaken each other by
mutual conflict, it would be no bad preparation for the
struggle which Athens might one day have to wage with
Corinth and the other naval powers. At the same time
the island seemed to lie conveniently on the coasting

45-47] CAUSES OF THE WAR— EPIDAMNUS 31

passage to Italy and Sicily. With these views, Athens CHAP.
received Corcyra into alliance, and on the departure of the ^
Corinthians not long afterwards, sent ten ships to their B.C. 43a-
assistance. They were commanded by Lacedaemonias, ^"ps*sent
the son of Cimon, Diotimus, the son of Strombichus, to their
and Proteas, the son of Epicles. Their instructions were to
avoid collision with the Corinthian fleet except under cer-
tain circumstances. If it sailed to Corcyra and threatened
a landing on her coast, or in any of her possessions, they
were to do their utmost to prevent it. These instructions
were prompted by an anxiety to avoid a breach of the
treaty.

Meanwhile the Corinthians completed their prepara-
tions, and sailed for Corcyra with a hundred and fifty
ships. Of these Klis furnished ten, Megara twelve,
Leucas ten, Ambracia twenty-seven, Anactorium one,
and Corinth herself ninety. Each of these contingents
had its own admiral, the Corinthian being under the
command of Xenochdes, son of Euthycles, with four col-
leagues. Sailing from Leucas, they made land at the
part of the continent opposite Corcyra. They anchored in
the harbour of Chimerium, in the territory of Thesprotis,
above which, at some distance from the sea, lies the city
of Ephyre, in the Elean district. By this city the
Acherusian lake pours its waters into the sea. It gets
its name from the river Acheron, which flows through
Thesprotis, and falls into the lake. There also the river
Thyamis flows, forming the boundary between Thesprotis
and Kestrine ; and between these rivers rises the point of
Chimerium. In this part of the continent the Corinthians
now came to anchor, and formed an encampment. When
the Corcyraeans saw them coming, they manned a hundred
and ten ships, commanded by Meikiades, Aisimides, and
Eurybatus, and stationed themselves at one of the Sybota
isles; the ten Athenian ships being present. On point
Leukimme they posted their land forces, and a thousand

32 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [48,49

BOOK 1. heary infantry who had come from Zacynthus to their

Sesufiffht assistance. Nor were the Corinthians on the mainland

oetween without their allies. The barbarians flocked in large

^s\nd numbers to their assistance, the inhabitants of this part of

Corey- the continent being old allies of theirs.

When the Corinthian preparations were completed they
took three days' provisions, and put out from Chimeriura
by night, ready for action. Sailing with the dawn, they
sighted the Corcyraean fleet out at sea, and coming towards
them. When they perceived each other, both sides
formed in order of battle. On the Corcyrsean right wing
lay the Athenian ships, the rest of the line being occupied
by their own vessels formed in three squadrons, each
of which was commanded by one of the three admirals.
Such was the Corcyraean formation. The Corinthian
was as follows : on the right wing lay the Megarian and
Ambraciot ships, in the centre the rest of the allies in
order. But the left was composed of the best sailers in
the Corinthian navy, to encounter the Athenians and the
right wing of the Corcyraeans. As soon as the signals
were raised on either side, they joined battle. Both sides
had a large number of heavy infantry on their decks, and
a large number of archers and darters, the old imperfect
armament still prevailing. The sea-tight was an obstinate
one, though not remarkable for its science ; indeed it was
more like a battle by land. Whenever they charged each
other, the multitude and crush of the vessels made it by
no means easy to get loose ; besides, their hopes of victory
lay principally in the heavy infantry on the decks, who
stood and fought in order, the ships remaining stationary.
The manoeuvre of breaking the line was not tried : in
short, strength and pluck had more share in the fight than
science. Everywhere tumult reigned, the battle being one
scene of confusion ; meanwhile the Athenian ships, by
coming up to the Corcyraeans whenever they were pressed,
served to alarm the enemy, though their commanders could

5o] CAUSES OF THE WAR— EPIDAMNUS 33

not join in the battle from fear of their instructions. The CHAP.

right wing of the Corinthians suffered most. The Corey- '_

rseans routed it, and chased them in disorder to the In which

. , , . . 1 J , • J the Athe-

continent with twenty ships, sailed up to their camp, and nian ships

burnt the tents which they found empty, and plundered v^toiy^
the stuff. So in this quarter the Corinthians and their of Conn-
allies were defeated, and the Corcyraeans were victorious. t^^^"s-
But where the Corinthians themselves were, on the left,
they gained a decided success ; the scanty forces of the
Corcyrasans being furthered weakened by the want of the
twenty ships absent on the pursuit. Seeing the Corcy-
raeans hard pressed, the Athenians began at length to assist
them more unequivocally. At first, it is true, they re-
frained from charging any ships ; but when the rout was
becoming patent, and the Corinthians were pressing on,
the time at last came when every one set to, and all dis-
tinction was laid aside, and it came to this point, that the
Corinthians and Athenians raised their hands against each
other.

After the rout, the Corinthians, instead of employing
themselves in lashing fast and hauling after them the hulls
of the vessels which they had disabled, turned their atten-
tion to the men, whom they butchered as they sailed
through, not caring so much to make prisoners. Some
even of their own friends were slain by them, by mistake,
in their ignorance of the defeat of the right* wing. For
the number of the ships on both sides, and the distance
to which they covered the sea, made it difficult after they
had once joined, to distinguish between the conquering
and the conquered ; this battle proving far greater than
any before it, any at least between Hellenes, for the
number of vessels engaged. After the Corinthians had
chased the Corcyraeans to the land, they turned to the
wrecks and their dead, most of whom they succeeded in
getting hold of and conveying to Sybota, the rendezvous
of the land forces furnished by their barbarian allies.

34 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [51

BOOK I. Sybota, it must be known, is a desert harbour of Thes-

Checked P^otis. This task over, they mustered anew, and sailed

by the against the Corcyrasans, who on their part advanced to
arrival of , • 1 11 , • . • , r r

more ro^^t them With all their ships that were fit for service and

*from r^'^^^^i^g ^o them, accompanied by the Athenian vessels,
Athens, fearing that they might attempt a landing in their terri-
tory. It was by this time getting late, and the pasan had
been sung for the attack, when the Corinthians suddenly
began to back water. They had observed twenty Athe-
nian ships sailing up, which had been sent out afterwards
to reinforce the ten vessels by the Athenians, v/ho feared,
as it turned out justly, the defeat of the Corcyrseans and
the inability of their handful of ships to protect them.
These ships were thus seen by the Corinthians first. They
suspected that they were from Athens, and that those
which they saw were not all, but that there were more
behind ; they accordingly began to retire. The Cor-
cyrseans meanwhile had not sighted them, as they were
advancing from a point which they could not so well see,
and were wondering why the Corinthians were backing
water, when some caught sight of them, and cried out
that there were ships in sight ahead. Upon this they also
retired ; for it was now getting dark, and the retreat of
the Corinthians had suspended hostilities. Thus they
parted from each other, and the battle ceased with night.
The Corcyrseans were in their camp at Leukimme, when
these twenty ships from Athens, under the command of
Glaucon, the son of Leagrus, and Andocides, son of
Leogoras, bore on through the corpses and the wrecks,
and sailed up to the camp, not long after they were sighted.
It was now night, and the Corcyrseans feared that they
might be hostile vessels ; but they scon knew them, and
the ships came to anchor.

The next day the thirty Athenian vessels put out to
sea, accompanied by all the Corcyraean ships that were
seaworthy, and sailed to the harbour at Sybota, where

52, 53] CAUSES OF THE WAR-EPIDAMNUS 35

the Corinthians lay, to see if they would engage. The CHAP.

Corinthians put out from the land, and formed a line in ;_

the open sea, but beyond this made no further move- Neutral
ment, having no intention of assuming the offensive. For fensive
they saw reinforcements arrived fresh from Athens, and Jj^^l^^^*
themselves confronted by numerous difficulties, such as Athenian
the necessity of guarding the prisoners whom they had on squadron,
board, and the want of all means of refitting their ships
in a desert place. What they were thinking more about
was how their voyage home was to be effected ; they
feared that the Athenians might consider that the treaty
was dissolved by the collision which had occurred, and
forbid their departure. Accordingly they resolved to put
some men on board a boat, and send them without a
herald's wand to the Athenians, as an experiment. Hav-
ing done so, they spoke as follows ; * You do wrong,
Athenians, to begin war and break the treaty. Engaged
in chastising our enemies, we find you placing yourselves
in our path in arms against us. Now if your intentions
are to prevent us sailing to Corcyra, or anywhere else that
we may wish, and if you are for breaking the treaty, first
take us that are here, and treat us as enemies.' Such was
what they said, and all the Corcyrasan armament that were
within hearing immediately called out to take them and
kill theni. But the Athenians answered as follows :
* Neither are we beginning war, Peloponnesians, nor are
we breaking the treaty ; but these Corcyrasans are our
allies, and we are come to help them. So if you
want to sail anywhere else, we place no obstacle in
your way ; but if you are going to sail against Corcyra,
or any of her possessions, we shall do our best to stop
you.'

Receiving this answer from the Athenians, the Corin-
thians commenced preparations for their voyage home,
and set up a trophy in Sybota, on the continent ; while
the Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead that had

36 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [54,55

BOOK I. been carried out to them by the current, and by a wind
Caoture ^^ich fose in the night and scattered them in all direc-
of Anac- tions, and set up their trophy in Sybota, on the island,
'°"h™Co^ as victors. The reasons each side had for claiming the
rlathians. victory were these. The Corinthians had been victorious
in the sea-fight until night ; and having thus been enabled
to carry off most wrecks and dead, they were iD possession
of no fewer than a thousand prisoners of war, and had
sunk close upon seventy vessels. The Corcyrssans had
destroyed about thirty ships, and after the arrival of the
Athenians had taken up the wrecks and dead on tlieir
side ; they had besides seen the Corinthians retire before
them, backing water on sight of the Athenian vessels, and
upon the arrival of the Athenians refuse to sail out against
them from Sybota. Thus both sides claimed the victory.
The Corinthians on the voyage home took Anac-
torium, which stands at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf.
The place was taken by treachery, being common ground
to the Corcyrseans and Corinthians. After establishing
Corinthian settlers there, they retired home. Eight
hundred of the Corcyrasans were slaves ; these they sold ;
two hundred and fifty they retained in captivity, and
treated with great attention, in the hope that they might
bring over their country to Corinth on their return ; most
of them being, as it happened, men of very high position
in Corcyra. In this way Corcyra maintained her politi-
cal existence in the war with Corinth, and the Athenian
vessels left the island. This was the first cause of the
war that Corinth had against the Athenians, viz. that
y^^ they had fought against them with the Corcyraeans in time
of treaty.

Almost immediately after this, fresh differences arose
between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, and contri-
buted their share to the war. Corinth was forming schemes
for retaliation, and Athens suspected her hostility. The
Potidaeans, who inhabit the isthmus of Pallene, being a

56, 57] CAUSES OF THE WAR— POTIDiEA 37

Corinthian colony, but tributary allies of Athens, were CHAP.

ordered to raze the wall looking towards Pallene, to give _ii_

hostages, to dismiss the Corinthian magistrates, and in Potidaea
r \ . • .u . c n ' \ ordered

future not to receive the persons sent from Cormth annu- to give

ally to succeed them. It was feared that they might be l^ostagres,
persuaded by Perdiccas and the Corinthians to revolt, and
might draw the rest of the allies in the direction of Thrace
to revolt with them. These precautions against the Poti-
daeans were taken by the Athenians immediately after the
battle at Corcyra. Not only was Corinth at length openly
hostile, but Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of the
Macedonians, had from an old friend and ally been made
an enemy. He had been made an enemy by the Athen-
ians entering into alliance with his brother Philip and
Derdas, who were in league against him. In his alarm
he had sent to Lacedasmon to try and involve the Athen-
ians in a war with the Peloponnesians, and was endeavour-
ing to win over Corinth in order to bring about the revolt
of Potidaea. He also made overtures to the Chalcidians
in the direction of Thrace, and to the Bottiaeans, to per-
suade them to join in the revolt ; for he thought that if
these places on the border could be made his allies, it
would be easier to carry on the war with their co-opera-
tion. Alive to all this, and wishing to anticipate the
revolt of the cities, the Athenians acted as follows. They
were just then sending off thirty ships and a thousand
heavy infantry for his country under the command of
Archestratus, son of Lycomedes, with four colleagues.
They instructed the captains to take hostages of the Poti-
daeans, to raze the wall, and to be on their guard against
the revolt of the neighbouring cities.

Meanv/hile the Potidasans sent envoys to Athens on
the chance of persuading them to take no new steps in
their matters ; they also went to Lacedaemon with the
Corinthians to secure support in case of need. Failing
after prolonged negotiation to obtain anything satisfactory

38 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [58,59,60

BOOK I. from the Athenians ; being unable, for all they could say,
g^ to prevent the vessels that were destined for Macedonia
Revolt of from also sailing against them ; and receiving from the
Arriv5of Lacedaemonian government a promise to invade Attica,
troops if the Athenians should attack Potidaea, the Potidaeans,
Corinth, thus favoured by the moment, at last entered into league
with the Chalcidians and Bottiseans, and revolted. And
Perdiccas induced the Chalcidians to abandon and de-
molish their towns on the seaboard, and settling inland at
Olynthus, to make that one city a strong place : mean-
while to those who followed his advice he gave a part of
his territory in Mygdonia round Lake Bolbe as a place
of abode while the war against the Athenians should last.
They accordingly demolished their towns, removed inland,
and prepared for war.

The thirty ships of the Athenians, arriving before the
Thracian places, found Potidaea and the rest in revolt.
Their commanders considering it to be quite impossible
with their present force to carry on war with Perdiccas,
and with the confederate towns as well, turned to Mace-
donia, their original destination, and having established
themselves there, carried on war in co-operation with
Philip, and the brothers of Derdas, who had invaded the
country from the interior.

Meanwhile the Corinthians, with Potidaea in revolt, and
the Athenian ships on the coast of Macedonia, alarmed
for the safety of the place, and thinking its danger theirs,
sent volunteers from Corinth, and mercenaries from the
rest of Peloponnese, to the number of sixteen hundred
heavy infantry in all, and four hundred light troops.
Aristeus, son of Adimantus, who was always a steady
friend to the Potidaeans, took command of the expedition,
and it was principally for love of him that most of the
men from Corinth volunteered. They arrived in Thrace
forty days after the revolt of Potidasa.

The Athenians also immediately received the news of the

6i, 62] CAUSES OF THE WAR— POTID^A 39

revolt of the cities. On being informed that Aristeus and CHAP,
his reinforcements were on their way, they sent two thousand _^
heavy infantry of their own citizens and forty ships against And of
the places in revolt, under the command of Callias, son forces
of Calliades, and four colleagues. They arrived in Jjp^^^
Macedonia first, and found the force of a thousand men donia.
that had been first sent out, just become masters of
Therme and besieging Pydna. Accordingly they also
joined in the investment, and besieged Pydna for a while.
Subsequently they came to terms and concluded a forced
alliance with Perdiccas, hastened by the calls of Potidasa,
and by the arrival of Aristeus at that place. They with-
drew from Macedonia, going to Beroea and thence to
Strepsa, and, after a futile attempt on' the latter place,
they pursued by land their march to Potidaea with three
thousand heavy infantry of their own citizens, besides a
number of their allies, and six hundred Macedonian horse-
men, the followers of Philip and Pausanias. With these
sailed seventy ships along the coast. Advancing by
short marches, on the third day they arrived at Gigonus,
where they encamped.

Meanwhile the Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians with
Aristeus were encamped on the side looking towards
Olynthus on the isthmus, in expectation of the Athenians,
and had established their market outside the city. The
aUies had chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry ;
while the command of the cavalry was given to Perdiccas,
who had at once left the alliance of the Athenians and
gone back to that of the Potidasans, having deputed lolaus
as his general. The plan of Aristeus was to keep his
own force on the isthmus, and await the attack of the
Athenians; leaving the Chalcidians and the allies out-
side the isthmus, and the two hundred cavalry from Per-
diccas in Olynthus to act upon the Athenian rear, on the
occasion of their advancing against him ; and thus to
place the enemy between two fires. While Callias the

40 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [63

BOOK I. Athenian general and his colleagues despatched the Mace-
DeTeat of ^0°^^° horse and a few of the allies to Olynthus, to pre-
the Poti- vent any movement being made from that quarter, tiie
***^°*' Athenians themselves broke up their camp and marched
against Potidsea. After they had arrived at the isthmus,
and saw the enemy preparing for battle, they formed
against him, and soon afterwards engaged. The wing of
Aristeus, with the Corinthians and other picked troops
round him, routed the wing opposed to it, and followed
for a considerable distance in pursuit. But the rest of
the army of the Potidaeans and of the Peloponnesians was
defeated by the Athenians, and took refuge within the
fortifications. Returning from the pursuit, Aristeus per-
ceived the defeat of the rest of the army. Being at a
loss which of the two risks to choose, whether to go to
Olynthus or to Potidaea, he at last determined to draw
his men into as small a space as possible, and force his
way with a run into Potid^a. Not without difficulty,
through a storm of missiles, he passed along by the break-
water through the sea, and brought off most of his men
safe, though a few were lost. Meanwhile the auxiliaries
of the Potidasans from Olynthus, which is about seven
miles off, and in sight of Potidaea, when the battle began
and the signals were raised, advanced a little way to render
assistance ; and the Macedonian horse formed against
them to prevent it. But on victory speedily declaring
for the Athenians and the signals being taken down, they
retired back within the wall ; and the Macedonians re-
turned to the Athenians. Thus there were no cavalry
present on either side. After the battle the Athenians
set up a trophy, and gave back their dead to the Poti-
daeans under truce. The Potidaeans and their allies had
close upon three hundred killed ; the Athenians a hun-
dred and fifty of their own citizens, and Callias their
general.

The wall on the side of the isthmus had now works

64, 65] CAUSES OF THE WAR— POTID^A 41

at once raised against it, and manned by the Athenians. CHAP.
That on the side of Pallene had no works raised against __
it. They did not think themselves strong enough at Arrival of

.•^ ..... , ° ° Phormio,

once to keep a garrison in the isthmus, and to cross over and com-
to Pallene and raise works there ; they were afraid that Pj^^^^.,
the Potidseans and their alHes might take advantage ovmentof
their division to attack them. Meanwhile the Athenians P°tidaea.
at home learning that there were no works at Pallene,
sometime afterwards sent off sixteen hundred heavy in-
fantry of their own citizens under the command of Phor-
mio, son of Asopius. Arrived at Pallene, he fixed his
head-quarters at Aphytis, and led his army against Poti-
daea by short marches, ravaging the country as he advanced.
No one venturing to meet him in the field, he raised works
against the wall on the side of Pallene. So at length
Potidasa was strongly invested on either side, and from
the sea by the ships co-operating in the blockade. Aris-
teus, seeing its investment complete, and having no hope
of its salvation, except in the event of some movement
from the Peloponnese, or of some other improbable con-
tingency, advised all except five hundred to watch for a
wind, and sail out of the place, in order that their pro-
visions might last the longer. He was willing to be him-
self one of those who remained. Unable to persuade
them, and desirous of acting on the next alternative, and
of having things outside in the best posture possible, he
eluded the guardships of the Athenians and sailed out.
Remaining among the Chalcidians, he continued to carry
on the war ; in particular he laid an ambuscade near the
city of the Sermylians, and cut off many of them ; he
also communicated with Peloponnese, and tried to con-
trive some method by which help might be brought.
Meanwhile, after the completion of the investment of
Potidsa, Phormio next employed his sixteen hundred
men in ravaging Chalcidice and Bottica : some of the
towns also were taken by him.

42 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [66, 67

BOOK I

CHAPTER III

Congress of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at
Lacedaemon

B.C. 432. The Athenians and Peloponnesians had these antecedent
summoned grounds of complaint against each other : the complaint of
to Sparta Corinth was that her colony of Potidasa, and Corinthian
stanceTf and Peloponnesian citizens within it, were being besieged •,
Corinth. ^■^^^ Qf Athens against the Peloponnesians that they had
incited a town of hers, a member of her alliance and a
contributor to her revenue, to revolt, and had come and
were openly fighting against her on the side of the Poti-
dseans. For all this, war had not yet broken out : there
was still truce for a while ; for this was a private enter-
prise on the part of Corinth.

But the siege of Potidasa put an end to her inaction ;
she had men inside it : besides, she feared for the place.
Immediately summoning the allies to Lacedasmon, she
came and loudly accused Athens of breach of the treaty
and aggression on the rights of Peloponnese. With
r her, the jEginetans, formally unrepresented from fear of
\ At¥ens, in secret proved not the least urgent of the
advocates for war, asserting that they had not the in-
dependence guaranteed to them by the treaty. After
extending the summons to any of their allies and others
who might have complaints to make of Athenian aggres-
sion, the Lacedaemonians held their ordinary assembly,
and invited them to speak. There were many who came
forward and made their several accusations ; among them
the Megarians, in a long list of grievances, called special
attention to the fact of their exclusion from the ports of
the Athenian empire and the market of Athens, in de-
fiance of the treaty. Last of all the Corinthians came

68] CONGRESS AT LACED-«MON 43

forward, and having let those who preceded them inflame CHAP.

the Lacedaemonians, now followed with a speech to this '_

effect : Speech of

* Lacedaemonians ! the confidence which you feel in thians.
your constitution and social order, inclines you to receive
any reflexions of ours on other powers with a certain
scepticism. Hence springs your moderation, but hence
also the rather limited knowledge which you betray in
dealing with foreign politics. Time after time was our
voice raised to warn you of the blows about to be dealt
us by Athens, and time after time, instead of taking the
trouble to ascertain the worth of our communications, you
contented yourselves with suspecting the speakers of being
inspired by private interest. And so, instead of calling
these allies together before the blow fell, you have delayed
to do so till we are smarting under it ; allies among whom
we have not the worst title to speak, as having the greatest
complaints to make, complaints of Athenian outrage and
Lacedaemonian neglect. Now if these assaults on the
rights of Hellas had been made in the dark you might be
unacquainted with the facts, and it would be our duty to
enlighten you. As it is, long speeches are not needed
where you see servitude accomplished for some of us,
meditated for others — in particular for our allies — and
prolonged preparations in the aggressor against the hour
of war. Or what, pray, is the meaning of their reception
of Corcyra by fraud, and their holding it against us by
force ? what of the siege of Potidaea r — places one of
which lies most conveniently for any action against the
Thracian towns ; while the other would have contributed
a very large navy to the Peloponnesians ?

* For all this you are responsible. You it was who
first allowed them to fortify their city after the Median
war, and afterwards to erect the long walls, — you who,
then and now, are always depriving of freedom not only
those whom they have enslaved, but also those who have

44 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [69

BOOK I. as yet been your allies. For the true author of the sub-

~Com- jugation of a people is not so much the immediate agent,

plaints as the power which permits it having the means to prevent
of the . • 1 1 -r 1 • t I r 1 •

supine- It ; particularly it that power aspires to the glory of bemg

Lacedae^ the liberator of Hellas. We are at last assembled. It
mon. has not been easy to assemble, nor even now are our
objects defined. We ought not to be still inquiring into
the fact of our wrongs, but into the means of our defence.
For the aggressors with matured plans to oppose to our
indecision have cast threats aside and betaken themselves
to action. And we know what are the paths by which
Athenian aggression travels, and how insidious is its pro-
gress. A degree of confidence she may feel from the
idea that your bluntness of perception prevents your
noticing her ; but it is nothing to the impulse which her
advance will receive from the knowledge that you see,
but do not care to interfere. You, Lacedaemonians, of
all the Hellenes are alone inactive, and defend yourselves
not by doing anything but by looking as if you would do
something ; you alone wait till the power of an enemy is
becoming twice its original size, instead of crushing it in
its infancy. And yet the world used to say that you
were to be depended upon ; but in your case, we fear, it
said more than the truth. The Mede, we ourselves know,
had time to come from the ends of the earth to Pelo-
ponnese, without any force of yours worthy of the name
advancing to meet him. But this was a distant enemy.
Well, Athens at all events is a near neighbour, and jet
Athens you utterly disregard ; against Athens you prefer
to act on the defensive instead of on the offensive, and to
make it an affair of chances by deferring the struggle till
she has grown far stronger than at first. And yet you
know that on the whole the rock on which the barbarian
was wrecked was himself, and that if our present enemy
Athens has not again and again annihilated us, we owe it
more to her blunders than to your protection. Indeed,

70] CONGRESS AT LACED^MON 45

expectations from you have before now been the ruin of CHAP
some, whose faith induced them to omit preparation. ]}}i

* We hope that none of you will consider these words Athenian
of remonstrance to be rather words of hostility ; men t^n ch'^"
remonstrate with friends who are in error, accusations actercon-

• 1 1 J L T> trasted.

they reserve for enemies who have wronged them. x5e-

sides, we consider that we have as good a right as any
one to point out a neighbour's faults, particularly when
we contemplate the great contrast between the two
national characters ; a contrast of which, as far as we
can see, you have little perception, having never yet con-
sidered what sort of antagonists you will encounter in the
Athenians, how widely, how absolutely different from
yourselves. The Athenians are addicted to innovation,
and their designs are characterised by swiftness alike in
conception and execution ; you have a genius for keeping
what you have got, accompanied by a total want of in-
vention, and when forced to act you never go far enough. •
Again, they are adventurous beyond their power, and
daring beyond their judgment, and in danger they are
sanguine ; your wont is to attempt less than is justified by
your power, to mistrust even what is sanctioned by your
judgment, and to fancy that from danger there is no
release. Furtiier, there is promptitude on their side ^
against procrastination on yours ; they are never at home,
you are never from it : for they hope by their absence to
extend their acquisitions, you fear by your advance to
endanger what you have left behind. They are swift to
follow up a success, and slow to recoil from a reverse.
Their bodies they spend ungrudgingly in their country's
cause ; their intellect they jealously husband to be em-
ployed in her service. A scheme unexecuted is with
them a positive loss, a successful enterprise a comparative
failure. The deficiency created by the miscarriage of an
undertaking is soon filled up by fresh hopes ; for they
alone are enabled to call a thing hoped for a thing got.

46 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [71

BOOK I. by the speed with which they act upon their resolutions.
g~^t^ Thus they toil on in trouble and danger all the days of
must their life, with little opportunity for enjoying, being ever
*bo?der engaged in getting : their only idea of a holiday is to do
policy, ^hat the occasion demands, and to them laborious occu-
pation is less of a misfortune than the peace of a quiet
life. To describe their character in a word, one might
truly say that they were born into the world to take no
rest themselves and to give none to others.

* Such is Athens, your antagonist. And yet, Lacedae-
monians, you still delay, and fail to see that peace stays
longest with those, who are not more careful to use their
power justly than to show their determination not to
submit to injustice. On the contrary, your ideal of fair
dealing is based on the principle that if you do not injure
others, you need not risk your own fortunes in preventing
others from injuring you. Now you could scarcely have

• succeeded in such a policy even with a neighbour like
yourselves ; but in the present instance, as we have just
shown, your habits are old-fashioned as compared with
theirs. It is the law as in art, so in politics, that im-
provements ever prevail; and though fixed usages may
be best for undisturbed communities, constant necessities
of action must be accompanied by the constant improve-
ment of methods. Thus it happens that the vast ex-
perience of Athens has carried her further than you on
the path of innovation.

* Here, at least, let your procrastination end. For the
present, assist your allies and Potidaea in particular, as
you promised, by a speedy invasion of Attica, and do
not sacrifice friends and kindred to their bitterest enemies,
and drive the rest of us in despair to some other alliance.
Such a step would not be condemned either by the gods
who received our oaths, or by the men who witnessed
them. The breach of a treaty cannot be laid to the
people whom desertion compels to seek new relations,

72, 73] CONGRESS AT LACEDiEMON 47

but to the power that fails to assist its confederate. But CHAP.
if you will only act, we will stand by you ; it would be ^
unnatural for us to change, and never should we meet Speech
with such a congenial ally. For these reasons choose Atheniln
the right course, and endeavour not to let Peloponnese envoys,
under your supremacy degenerate from the prestige that
it enjoyed under that of your ancestors.'

Such were the words of the Corinthians. There
happened to be Athenian envoys present at Lacedgemon
on other business. On hearing the speeches they thought
themselves called upon to come before the Lacedas-
monians. Their intention was not to offer a defence on
any of the charges which the cities brought against them,
but to show on a comprehensive view that it was not
a matter to be hastily decided on, but one that demanded
further consideration. There was also a wish to call
attention to the great power of Athens, and to refresh
the memory of the old and enlighten the ignorance of
the young, from a notion that their words might have the
effect of inducing them to prefer tranquillity to war. So
they came to the Lacedemonians and said that they
too, if there was no objection, wished to speak to their
assembly. They replied by inviting them to come
forward. The Athenians advanced, and spoke as
follows : —

* The object of our mission here was not to argue with
your allies, but to attend to the matters on which our
State despatched us. However, the vehemence of the
outcry that we hear against us has prevailed on us to
come forward. It is not to combat the accusations of
the cities (indeed you are not the judges before v^hom
either we or they can plead), but to prevent your taking
the wrong course on matters of great importance by
yielding too readily to the persuasions of your allies.
We also wish to show on a review of the whole indict-
ment that we have a fair title to our possessions, and that

48 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [74

BOOK I. our country has claims to consideration. We need not

Services ^^^^^ ^^ remote antiquity : there we could appeal to the

of Athens voice of tradition, but not to the experience of our

the audience. But to the Median war and contemporary

iS*"l^°^' history we must refer, although we are rather tired of
Marathon .•',,,.. ,; i-r 1 t

and contmually brmgmg this subject forward, in our action

anus. J^J-J^g that war we ran great risk to obtain certain
advantages : you had your share in the solid results, do
not try to rob us of all share in the good that the glory
may do us. However, the story shall be told not so
much to deprecate hostility as to testify against it, and to
show, if you are so ill-advised as to enter into a struggle
with Athens, what sort of an antagonist she is likely to
prove. (We assert that at Marathon we were at the
front, and raced the barbarian single-handed. That
when he came the second time, unable to cope with him
Thy land we went on board our ships with all our people,
and joined in the action at Salamis. This prevented his
taking the Peloponnesian states in detail, and ravaging
them with his fleet ; when the multitude of his vessels
would have made any combination for self-defence im-
possible. Tile, best proof of this was furnished by the
invader himself. ""^iDefeated at sea, he considered his
power to fee no longer what it had been, and retired as
speedily as possible with the greater part of his army, ff

r— 4* Such, then, was the result of the matter, and it was
clearly proved that it was on the fleet of Hellas that her
cause depended. Well, to this result we contributed
three very useful elements, viz. the largest number of
"binii tb*^ flblpat rprnmander, and ttie m^g»- nnh«>c;ra»i'ng
patriotism^ Our contingent of ships was little less than
"^ two- thirds of the whole four hundred ; the commander

was Themistpcles, through whom chiefly it was that the
^^pttl^ tnnV plT/-A in thp straits, the acknowledged salva-
tjon of our cause. Indeed, this was the reason of your
receiving him with honours such as had never been

75] CONGRESS AT LACEDiEMON 49

accorded to any foreign visitor. While for daring CHAP,
patriotism we had no competitors. Receiving no rein- — 1
forcements from behind, seeing everything in front of us The Em-
already subjugated, we had the spirit, after abandoning conse-
our city, after sacrificing our property (instead of desert- ^"^J"
ing the remainder of the league or depriving them of our Supre-
services by dispersing), to throw ourselves into our ships '"^'^y-
and meet the danger, without a thought of resenting your
neglect to assist us. We assert, therefore, that we con-
ferred on you quite as much as we received. For you
had a stake to fight for ; the cities which you had left
were still filled with your homes, and you had the
prospect of enjoying them again ; and your coming was
prompted quite as much by fear for yourselves as for us ;
at all events, you never appeared till we had nothing left
to lose. But we left behind us a city that was a city no
longer, and staked our lives for a city that had an exist-
ence only in desperate hope, and so bore our full share
in your deliverance and in ours. But if we had copied
others, and allowed fears for our territory to make us
give in our adhesion to the Mede before you came, or if
we had suffered our ruin to break our spirit and prevent
us embarking in our ships, your naval inferiority would
have made a sea-fight unnecessary, and his objects would
have been peaceably attained

< Surely, Lacedaemonians, neither by the patriotism
that we displayed at that crisis, nor by the wisdom of
our counsels, do we merit our extreme unpopularity with
the Hellenes, not at least unpopularity for our empire.
That empire we acquired by no violent means, but because
you were unwilling to prosecute to its conclusion the war .
against the barbarian, and because the allies attached them- 1
selves to us and spontaneously asked us to assume the »
command. And the nature of the case first compelled
us to advance our empire to its present height ; fear being
our principal motive, though honour and interest after-

C 455

50 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [76

BOOK I. wards came in. And at last, when almost all hated us,

J^tjg. when some had already revolted and had been subdued,

cation when you had ceased to be the friends that you once

Empire were, and had become objects of suspicion and dislike, it

appeared no longer safe to give up our empire ; especially

as all who left us would fall to you. And no one can

quarrel with a people for making, in matters of tremendous

risk, the best provision that it can for its interest.

* You, at all events, Lacedaemonians, have used your
supremacy to settle the states in Peloponnese as is agree-
able to you. And if at the period of which we were
speaking you had persevered to the end of the matter,
and had incurred hatred in your command, we are sure
that you would have made yourselves just as galling to
the allies, and would have been forced to choose between
a strong government and danger to yourselves. It follows
that it was not a very wonderful action, or contrary to
the common practice of mankind, if we did accept an
empire that was offered to us, and refused to give it up
under the pressure of three of the strongest motives, fear,
honour, and interest. And it was not we who set the
example, for it has always been the law that the weaker
should be subject to the stronger. Besides, we believed
ourselves to be worthy of our position, and so you thought
us till now, when calculations of interest have made you
take up the cry of justice — a consideration which no one
ever yet brought forward to hinder his ambition when he
had a chance of gaining anything by might. And praise
is due to all who, if not so superior to human nature as
to refuse dominion, yet respect justice more than their
position compels them to do.

* We imagine that our moderation would be best de-
monstrated by the conduct of others who should be
placed in our position ; but even our equity has very
unreasonably subjected us to condemnation instead of
approval Our abatement of our rights in the contract

77] CONGRESS AT LACEDiEMON 51

trials with our allies, and our causing them to be decided CHAP

by impartial laws at Athens, have gained us the character '_

of being litigious. And none care to inquire why this ^f®f^°°
reproach is not brought against other imperial powers, unpopu-
who treat their subjects with less moderation than we ^^/f^^
do ; the secret being that where force can be used, law Empire,
is not needed. But our' subjects are so habituated to
associate with us as equals, that any defeat whatever that
clashes with their notions of justice, whether it proceeds
from a legal judgment or from the power which our
empire gives us, makes them forget to be grateful for
being allowed to retain most of their possessions, and
more vexed at a part being taken, than if we had from
the first cast law aside and openly gratified our covetous-
ness. If we had done so, not even would they have
disputed that the weaker must give way to the stronger.
Men's indignation, it seems, is more excited by legal
wrong than by violent wrong ; the first looks like being
cheated by an equal, the second like being compelled by
a superior. At all events they contrived to put up with
much worse treatment than this from the Mede, yet they
think our rule severe, and this is to be expected, for the
present always weighs heavy on the conquered. This at
least is certain. If you were to succeed in overthrowing
us and in taking our place, you would speedily lose the
popularity with which fear of us has invested yod, if your
policy of to-day is at all to tally with the sample that
you gave of it during the brief period of your command
against the Mede. Not only is your life at home regu-
lated by rules and institutions incompatible with those of
others, but your citizens abroad act neither on these rules
nor on those which are recognised by the rest of Hellas.
* Take time then in forming your resolution, as the
matter is of great importance; and do not be persuaded
by the opinions and complaints of others to bring trouble
on yourselves, but consider the vast influence of accident

52 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [78,79

BOOK I. in war, before you are engaged in it. As it continues,

Arbitra- ^^ generally becomes an affair of chances, chances from

tion pre- which neither of us is exempt, and whose event we must

to wan ri''^ i° ^^^ dark. It is a common mistake in going to

Speech of vvar to begin at the wrong end, to act first, and wait for

damus' disaster to discuss the matter. But we are not yet by

any means so misguided, nor, so far as we can see, are

you ; accordingly, while it is still open to us both to

choose aright, we bid you not to dissolve the treaty, or

to break your oaths, but to have our differences settled

by arbitration according to our agreement. Or else we

take the gods who heard the oaths to witness, and if

you begin hostilities, whatever line of action you choose,

we will try not to be behindhand in repelling you.*

Such were the words of the Athenians. After the
Lacedaemonians had heard the complaints of the allies
against the Athenians, and the observations of the latter,
they made all withdraw, and consulted by themselves on
the question before them. The opinions of the majority
all led to the same conclusion ; the Athenians were open
aggressors, and war must be declared at once. But
Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king, came forward,
who had the reputation of being at once a wise and a
moderate man, and made the following speech: —

* I have not lived so long, Lacedaemonians, without
having had the experience of many wars, and I see those
among you of the same age as myself, who will not fall
into the common misfortune of longing for war from
inexperience or from a belief in its advantage and its
safety. This, the war on which you are now debating,
would be one of the greatest magnitude, on a sober
consideration of the matter. In a struggle with Pelo-
ponnesians and neighbours our strength is ot the same
character, and it is possible to move swiftly on the
different points. But a struggle with a people who live in
a distant land, who have also an extraordinary familiarity

8o, 8i] CONGRESS AT LACEDiEMON 53

with the sea, and who are in the highest state of prepara- CHAP

tion in every other department ; with wealth private and 1

public, with ships, and horses, and heavy infantry, and "^^^^^^
a population such as no one other Heiknic place can and
equal, and lastly a number of tributary allies— what can 2^thlns°^
justify us in rashly beginning such a struggle ? wherein is
our trust that we should rush on it unprepared ? Is it in
our ships ? There we are inferior ; while if we are to
practise and become a match for them, time must inter-
vene. Is it in our money ? There we have a far greater
deficiency. We neither have it in our treasury, nor arc
we ready to contribute it from our private funds. Con-
fidence might possibly be felt in our superiority in heavy
infantry and population, which will enable us to invade
and devastate their lands. But the Athenians have plenty
of other land in their empire, and can import what they
want by sea. Again, if we are to attempt an insurrection
of their allies, these will have to be supported with a fleet,
most of them being islanders. What then is to be our
war ? For unless we can either beat them at sea, or
deprive them of the revenues which feed their navy, we
shall meet with little but disaster. Meanwhile our honour
will be pledged to keeping on, particularly if it be the
opinion that we began the quarrel. For let us neve-
be elated by the fatal hope of the war being quickly
ended by the devastation of their lands. I fear
rather that we may leave it as a legacy to our children ;
so improbable is it that the Athenian spirit will be the
slave of their land, or Athenian experience be cowed
by war.

< Not that I would bid you be so unfeeling as to suffer
them to injure your allies, and to refrain from unmasking
their intrigues ; but I do bid you not to take up arms at
once, but to send and remonstrate with them in a tone
not too suggestive of war, nor again too suggestive of
submission, and to employ the interval in perfecting our

54 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [82, 83

BOOK 1. own preparations. The means will be, first, the acquisi-

^^j^^ tion of allies, Hellenic or barbarian it matters not, so

needs long as they are an accession to our strength naval

prepara- or pecuniary — I say Hellenic or barbarian, because the
tion. odium of such an accession to all who like us are the
objects of the designs of the Athenians is taken ^way
by the law of self-preservation — and secondly the de-
velopment of our home resources. If they listen to our
embassy, so much the better ; but if not, after the lapse
of two or three years our position will have become
materially strengthened, and we can then attack them
if we think proper. Perhaps by that time the sight of
our preparations, backed by language equally significant,
will have disposed them to submission, while their land is
still untouched, and while their counsels may be directed
to the retention of advantages as yet undestroyed. For
the only light in which you can view their land is that
of a hostage in your hands, a hostage the more valuable
the better it is cultivated. This you ought to spare as
long as possible, and not make them desperate, and so
increase the difficulty of dealing with them. For if while
still unprepared, hurried away by the complaints .of our
allies, we are induced to lay it waste, have a care that
we do not bring deep disgrace and deep perplexity upon
Peloponnese. Complaints, whether of communities or
individuals, it is possible to adjust ; but war undertaken
by a coalition for sectional interests, whose progress
there is no means of foreseeing, does not easily admit
of creditable settlement.

* And none need think it cowardice for a number of
confederates to pause before they attack a single city.
The Athenians have allies as numerous as our own, and
allies that pay tribute, and war is a matter not so much of
arras as of money, which makes arms of use. And this is
more than ever true in a struggle between a continental
and a maritime power. First, then, let us provide money.

84] CONGRESS AT LACEDiEMON 55

and not allow ourselves to be carried away by the talk of CHAP.

our allies before we have done so : as we shall have the '_

largest share of responsibility for the consequences be ^'^^'ffjr
they good or bad, we have also a right to a tranquil spartan
inquiry respecting them. ^ ^ ^^d^""^^'

* And the slowness and procrastination, the parts of p»licy.
our character that are most assailed by their criticism,
need not make you blush. If we undertake the war
without preparation, we should by hastening its com-
mencement only delay its conclusion : further, a free
and a famous city has through all time been ours. The
quality which they condemn is really nothing but a wise
moderation ; thanks to its possession, we alone do not
become insolent in success and give way less than others
in misfortune ; we are not carried away by the pleasure
of hearing ourselves cheered on to risks which our
judgment condemns ; nor, if annoyed, are we any the
more convinced by attempts to exasperate us by accusa-
tion. We are both warlike and wise, and it is our
sense of order that makes us so. We are warlike,
because self-control contains honour as a chief con-
stituent, and honour bravery. And we are wise, because
we are educated with too little learning to despise the laws,
and with too severe a self-control to disobey them, and
are brought up not to be too knowing in useless matters, —
such as the knowledge which can give a specious criticism
of an enemy's plans in theory, but fails to assail them
with equal success in practice, — but are taught to con-
sider that the schemes of our enemies are not dissimilar
to our own, and that the freaks of chance are not
determinable by calculation. In practice we always base
our preparations against an enemy on the assumption that
his plans are good ; indeed, it is right to rest our hopes
not on a belief in his blunders, but on the soundness
of our provisions. Nor ought we to believe that there is
much difference between man and man, but to think that

$6 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [85,86

BOOK I. the superiority lies with him who is reared in the severest
Pleafor school. These practices, then, which our ancestors have

delay and deHvered to us, and by whose maintenance we have

°^^tion" always profited, must not be given up. And we must

Speech of ^qj ^e hurried into deciding in a day's brief space a

Sthene- . 6 j r ^j

laidas. question which concerns many lives and fortunes and

many cities, and in which honour is deeply involved,
— but we must decide calmly. This our strength
peculiarly enables us to do. As for the Athenians,
send to them on the matter of Potidsea, send on the
matter of the alleged wrongs of the allies, parti-
cularly as they are prepared with legal satisfaction ;
and to proceed against one who offers arbitration as
against a wrongdoer, law forbids. Meanwhile do
not omit preparation for war. This decision will
be the best for yourselves, the most terrible to your
opponents.'

Such were the words of Archidamus. Last came
forward Sthenelaidas, one of the Ephors for that year,
and spoke to the Lacedaemonians as follows : —

* The long speech of the Athenians I do not pretend
to understand. They said a good deal in praise of them-
selves, but nowhere denied that they are injuring our
allies and Peloponnese. And yet if they behaved well
against the Mede then, but ill towards us now, they
deserve double punishment for having ceased to be good
and for having become bad. We meanwhile are the
same then and now, and shall not, if we are wise, dis-
regard the wrongs of our'allies, or put off till to-morrow
the duty of assisting those who must suffer to-day.
Others have much money and ships and horses, but we
have good allies whom we must not give up to the
Athenians, nor by lawsuits and words decide the matter,
as it is anything but in word that we are harmed, but
render instant and powerful help. And let us not be
told that it is fitting for us to deliberate under injustice ;

87, 88] CONGRESS AT LACED^MON 57

long deliberation is rather fitting for those who have CHAP.

injustice in contemplation. Vote therefore, Lacedae- 1

monians, for war, as the honour of Sparta demands, and ^/^^jj|'°°
neither allow the further aggrandisement of Athens, nor assembly
betray our allies to ruin, but with the gods let us advance ^^^ ^^•
against the aggressors.'

With these words he, as Ephor, himself put the ques-
tion to the assembly of the Lacedaemonians. He said
that he could not determine which was the loudest
acclamation (their mode of decision is by acclamation
not by voting) ; the fact being that he wished to make
them declare their opinion openly and thus to increase
their ardour for war. Accordingly he said, ' All Lace-
dcemonians who are of opinion that the treaty has been
broken, and that Athens is guilty, leave your seats and
go there,* pointing out a certain place ; * all who are of
the opposite opinion, there.' They accordingly stood up
and divided ; and those who held that the treaty had
been broken were in a decided majority. Summoning
the allies, they told them that their opinion was that
Athens had been guilty of injustice, but that they wished
to convoke all the allies and put it to the vote ; in order
that they might make war, if they decided to do so, on a
common resolution. Having thus gained their point,
•the delegates returned home at once ; the Athenian
envoys a little later, when they had despatched the objects
of their mission. This decision of the assembly judging
that the treaty had been broken, was made in the four-
teenth year of the thirty years* truce, which was entered
into after the affair of Euboea.

The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been
broken, and that war must be declared, not so much
because they were persuaded by the arguments of the
allies, as because they feared the growth of the power of
the Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to
them.

*C 455

58 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [89

BOOK I

CHAPTER IV

From the end of the Persian to the beg^inning of the
Peloponnesian War— The Progress from Supremacy
to Empire

B.C. 479. The way in which Athens came to be placed in the

Return . ■' j i • i i i •

to Athens Circumstances under which her power grew was this,
after the After the Medcs had returned from Europe, defeated by
invasion, sea and land by the Hellenes, and after those of them
who had fled with their ships to Mycale had been
destroyed, L^ot^^liides, King of the Lacedemonians,
the commander of the Hellenes at Mycale, dg^rted
'^^ h^me^ W'th the allies from Peloponnese. Kii^- the
^Athenians and the allies from Ionia and Hellespont,
v^who had now revolted from the king, remained and laid
^Lsiege to Sestos, which was still held by the Medes.
After wintering before it, they became masters of the
place on its evacuation by the barbarians ; and after this
^they sailed away from Hellespont to their respective
cities. Meanwhile the Athenian people, after the de-
parture of the barbarian from their country, at once
proceeded to carry over their children and wives, and
such property as they had left, from the places where they
had deposited them, and prepared to rebuild their city
and their walls. For only isolated portions of the cir-
cumference had been left standing, and most of the houses
were in ruins; though a few remained, in which the Persian
grandees had taken up their quarters.

Perceiving what they were going to do, the Lace-
daemonians sent an embassy to Athens. They would
have themselves preferred to see neither her nor any
other city in possession of a wall ; though here they acted
principally at the instigation of their allies, who were

9o] FROM SUPREMACY TO EMPIRE 59

alarmed at the strength of her newly acquired navy, and CHAP.

the valour which she had displayed in the war with the 1

Medes. They begged her not only to abstain from j^|^^f"^-
building walls for herself, but also to join them in the city
throwing down the walls that still held together of the ^^^^l;^
ultra-Peioponnesian cities. The real meaning of their gom
advice, the suspicion that it contained against the Athen- p*^ ^
ians, was not proclaimed; it was urged that so the L^-
barbarian, in the event of a third invasion, would not /
have any strong place, such as he now had in Thebes, C
for his base of operations ; and that Peloponnesc would )
suffice for all as a base both for retreat and offence. (
After the Lacedaemonians had thus spoken, they were,
on the advice of Themistocles, immediately dismissed by
the Athenians, with the answer that ambassadors should
be sent to Sparta to discuss the question. Themistocles
told the Athenians to send him off with all speed to
Lacedaemon, but not to despatch his colleagues as soon
as they had selected them, but to wait until they had
raised their wall to the height from which defence was
possible. Meanwhile the whole population in the city
was to labour at the wall, the Athenians, their wives and
their children, sparing no edifice, private or public, which
might be of any use to the work, but throwing all down.
After giving these instructions, and adding that he would
be responsible for all other matters there, he departed.
Arrived at Lacedasmon he did not seek an audience with
the authorities, but tried to gain time and made excuses.
When any of the government asked him why he did not
appear in the assembly, he would say that he was wait-
ing for his colleagues, who had been detained in Athens
by some engagement ; however, that he expected their
speedy arrival, and wondered that they were not yet
there. At first the Lacedaemonians trusted the words
of Themistocles, through their friendship for him; but
when ethers arrived, all distinctly declaring that the

6o THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [91

BOOK I. "U'ork was going on and already attaining some elevation,
Themis- ^^^Y ^^^ ^'^^ know how to disbelieve it. Aware of this,
tocles he told them that rumours are deceptive, and should not
Sp^ans* be trusted ; they should send some reputable persons from
Sparta to inspect, whose report might be trusted. They
despatched them accordingly. Concerning these Them-
istocles secretly sent word to the Athenians to detain
them as far as possible without putting them under open
constraint, and not to let them go until they had them-
selves returned. For his colleagues had now joined
him, Abronlchus, son of Lysicles, and Aristides, son
of Lysimachus, with the news that the wall was suffi-
ciently advanced : and he feared that when the Lace-
daemonians heard the facts, they might refuse to let them
go. So the Athenians detained the envoys according to
his message, and Themistocles had an audience with the
Lacedsemonians, and at last openly told them that Athens
was now fortified sufficiently to protect its inhabitants ;
""that any embassy which the Lacedaemonians or their
allies might wish to send to them, should in future
proceed on the assumption that the people to whom they
were going was able to distinguish both its own and. the
'""Jr ,. ' general interests. That when the Athenians thought fit
ff^^, .. y to abandon their city and to embark in their ships, they
^^^ ventured on that perilous step without consulting them ;

'^ '^ and that on the other hand, wherever they had deliberated

with the Lacedaemonians, they had proved themselves to
-be in judgment second to none. That they now thought
it fit that their city should have_a wall, and that this
would be more for the~ad^vantage of both the citizens of
Athens and the Hellenic confederacy ; for without equal
military strength it was impossible to contribute equal or
fair counsel to the common interest. It followed, he
observed, either that all the member-s of the confederacy
should be without walls, or that the present step should
be considered a right one.

92,93] FROM SUPREMACY TO EMPIRE 6i

The Lacedasmonians did not betray any open signs of CHAP.
anger against the Athenians at what they heard. The |Xl
embassy, it seems, was prompted not by a desire to Fortifica-
obstruct, but to guide the counsels of their government : p^%us.
besides, Spartan _ feeling was at that time very friendly ^/ , ^r
towards Athens on account of the patriotism which she ,,^| ^^s.-^
had displayed in the struggle with the Mede. Still the -^ ,*,^^w
defeat of their wishes could not but cause them secret '^4^.*rM t
annoyance. The envoys of each state departed home ^

without complaint.

In this way the Athenians walled their city in a little
while. To this day the building shows signs of the haste
of its execution ; the foundations are laid of stones of all
kinds, and in some places not wrought or fitted, but placed
just in the order in which they were brought by the
different hands ; and many columns, too, from tombs
and sculptured stones were put in with the rest. For the
bounds of the city were extended at every point of the
circumference ; and so they laid hands on everything
without exception in their haste. "j^jiemistocles also |^
persuaded them to finish the walls of Pira:,us, which had j
been begun before, in his year of office as archon ; ^eing
influenced alike by the fineness of a locality that has
three natural harbours, and by the great start ^yhich. the
Athenians would gain in the acquisition of powej:, by
becoming a naval p^eople. For ^ he first ventured to tell
them to stick to the jea and forthwith began to lay the
foundations of the empire. It was by his advice, too,
tha*. they built the walls of that thickness which can still
be discerned round Piraeus, the stones being brought up
by two waggons meeting each ocher. Between the walls
thus formed there was neither rubble nor mortar, but great
stones hewn square and fitted together, cramped to each
other on the outside with iron and lead. About half the
height that he intended was finished. His idea was by
their size and thickness to keep off the attacks of an

n

> ,?-

macy
ended by
the con-
duct of
Pau

62 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [94,95

BOOK I. ^ncmy ; he thought that they might be adequately de-

B C~478 ^"^^^^"i ^y ^ small garrison of invalids, and the rest be

The freed for service in the fleet. For the fleet claimed most

§upr^ #pf ^is attention. He saw, as I think, that the approach

by sea was easier for the |dng's army than that by land :

he also thought Piraeus more valuable than the upper city ;

indeed, he was always advising the Athenians, if a day

sanias./ should come when they were hard pressed by land, to go

down into Piraeus, and defy the world with their fleet.

Thus, therefore, the Athenians completed their wall, and

commenced their other buildings immediately after the

retreat of the Mede.

Meanwhile Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, was sent
out from Lacedsemon as commander-in-chief of the
Hellenes, with twenty ships from Peloponnese. With
him sailed the Athenians with thirty ships, and a number
of the other alliesi They made ~an" expedition against
C-^fgrus and subdued most of the islanHpand afterwards
against Byzantium, which was in the hands of the Medes,
and compelled it to surrender. This event took place
while the Spartans were still supreme. But the Tiolence
of Pausanias had already begun to be disagreeable to the
Hellenes, particularly to the lonians and the newly
liberated populations. These resorted to the Athenians
and requested them as their kinsmen to become their
leaders, and to stop any attempt at violence on the part
of Pausanias. The Athenians accepted their overtures, and
determined to put down any attempt of the kind and to
settle everything else as their interests might seem to
demand. In the meantime the Lacedsemonians recalled
Pausanias for an investigation of the reports which had
reached them. Manifold and grave accusations had
been brought against him by Hellenes arriving in Sparta ;
and, to all appearance, there had been in him more of
the mimicry of a despot than of the attitude of a general.
As it happened, his recall came just at the time when

96] FROM SUPREMACY TO EMPIRE 63

the hatred which he had inspired had induced the allies CHAP
to desert him, the soldiers from Peloponnese excepted, }Xl
and to range themselves by the side of the Athenians. B.C. 477.
On his arrival at Lacedaemon, he was censured for his tion "r"
private acts of oppression, but was acquitted on the the Athe-
heaviest counts and pronounced not guilty ; it must be pire.
known that the charge of Medism formed one of the
Drincipal, and to all appearance one of the best founded
articles against him. The Lacedaemonians did not,
however, restore him to his command, but sent out
Dorkis and certain others with a small force ; who
found the allies no longer inclined to concede to them
the supremacy. Perceiving this they departed, ami
the Lacedaemonians did not send out any to succeed
them. They feared for those who went out a dete-
rioration similar to that observable in Pausanias ; besides, 1
they desired to be rid of the Median war, and were I
satisfied of the competency of the Athenians for the /
position, and of their friendship at the time towards /
themselves. (

■^he Athenians having thus succeeded to th6 supremacy <
by the voluntary act of the allies through their hatred of
Pausanias, fixed which cities were to contribute money
against the barbarian, which ships ; their professed object
being to retaliate for their sufferings by ravaging the
king's country. Now was the time that the office of
< Treasurers for Hellas ' was first instituted by the
Athenians. These officers received the tribute, as the
money contributed was called. The tribute was first
fixed at four hundred and sixty talents. The common
treasury was at Delos, and the congresses were held in the i ^ y
temple. Their supremacy commenced with independent )"'
allies who acted on the resolutions of a common congress.
It was marked by the following undertakings in war and)
in administration during the interval between the Mediam
and the present war, against the barbarian, against their

a

64 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [97.98,99

BOOK I. own rebel allies, and against the Peloponnesian powers

B C~A 6- w^^ch would come in contact with them on various

466. occasions. My excuse for relating these events, and for

Scyros.' venturing on this digression, is that this passage of history

Ca^stus. has been omitted by all my predecessors, who have

and re- Confined themselves either to Hellenic history before the

^duction Median ^ar, or to the Median war itself. Hellanicus,

it is true, did touch on these events in his Athenian

history ; but he is somewhat concise and not accurate in

his dates. Besides, the history of these events contains

I an explanation of the growth of the Athenian empire.

First the Athenians besieged and captured Eion on
the Strymon from the Medes, and made slaves of the
inhabitants, being under the command of Cimon, son of
Miltiades. Next they enslaved Scyros the island in the
-£gean, containing a Dolopian population, and colonised
it themselves. This was followed by a war against
Carystus, in which the rest of Euboea remained neut-
ral, and which was ended by surrender on conditions.
After this Naxos left the confederacy, and a war ensued,
and she had to return after a siege ; this was the first
instance of the engagement being broken by the sub-
jugation of an allied city, a precedent which was followed
by that of the rest in the order which circumstances pre-
scribed. Of all the causes of defection, that connected
with arrears of tribute and vessels, and with failure of
service, was the chief; for the Athenians were very
severe and exacting, and made themselves offensive by
applying the screw of necessity to men who were not
used to and in fact not disposed for any continuous labour.
In some other respects the Athenians were not the old
popular rulers they had been at first ; and if they had
more than their fair share of service, it was corre-
fipondingly easy for them to reduce any that tried to
ieave the confederacy. For this the allies had them-
selves to blame ; the wish to get off service making most

loo, loi] FROM SUPREMACY TO EMPIRE 65

of them arrange to pay their share of the expense in CHAP
money instead of in ships, and so to avoid having to leave
their homes. Thus while Athens was increasing her B.C. 466-
navy with the funds which they contributed, a revolt always cimon's
found them without resources or experience for war. It'^the ^*

Next we come to the actions by land and by sea at Eury-
the river Eurymedon, between the Athenians with their Rlvohof
allies, and the Medes, when the Athenians won both Thasos.
battles on the same day under the conduct of Cimon, son
of Miltiades, and captured and destroyed the whole
Phoenician fleet, consisting of two hundred vessels. Some
time afterwards occurred the defection of the Thasians,
caused by disagreements about the marts on the opposite
coast of Thrace, and about the mine in their possession.
Sailing with a fleet to Thasos, the Athenians defeated
them at sea and effected a landing on the island. About
the same time they sent ten thousand seg;lers of their
own citizens and the allies to settle the place then called
Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways, now Amphipolis. They
succeeded in gaining possession of Ennea Hodoi from
the Edonians, but on advancing into the interior of
Thrace were cut oflP in Drabescus, a town of the
Edonians, by the assembled Thracians, who regarded
the settlement of the place Ennea Hodoi as an act of
hostility. Meanwhile the Thasians being defeated in P'^' '^
the field and suffering siege, appealed to Lacedsemon,
and desired her to assist them by an invasion of Attica.
Without informing Athens she promised and intended
to do so, but was prevented by the occurrence of the
earthquake, accompanied by the secession of the Helots
and the Thuriats and ^thaeans of the Perioeci to Ithome.
Most of the Helots were the descendants of the old
Messenlans that were enslaved in the famous war ; and
so all of them came to be called Messenians. So the
Lacedaemonians being engaged in a war with the rebels
in Ithome, the Thasians in the third y^ar of the siege

66 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [102, 103

BOOK I. obtained terms from the Athenians by razing their walls,
B 07463. delivering up their ships, and arranging to pay the monies
Reduc- demanded at once, and tribute in future ; giving up their
Thasos. possessions on the continent together with the mine.
Breach -p^e Lacedasmonians meanwhile finding the war against ^
Athens & the rebels in Ithome likely to last, invoked the aid of A "'
ft^omei ^^^^^ allies, and especially of the Athenians, who came •' '^'
in some force under the command of Cimon. The
reason for this pressing summons lay in their reputed
skill in siege operations ; a long siege had taught the
Lacedemonians their own deficiency in this art, else they
would have taken the place by assault. The first open
quarrel between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians arose
out of this expedition. The Lacedaemonians, when assault
failed to take the place, apprehensive of the enterprising
and revolutionary character of the Athenians, and further
looking upon ^hem as of alien extraction, began to fear
that if they remained, they might be tempted by the be-
sieged in Ithome to attempt some political changes. They
accordingly dismissed them alone of the allies, without' .
declaring their suspicions, but merely saying that they had
now no need of them. But the Athenians, aware that
their dismissal did not proceed from the more honourable
reason of the two, but from suspicions which had been
conceived, went away deeply offended, and conscious of
having done nothing to merit such treatment from the
Lacedaemonians ; and the instant that they returned home
they broke off the alliance which had been made against
the Mede, and allied themselves with Sparta's enemy i^y^l I
Argos ; each of the contracting parties taking the same
oaths and making the same alliance with the Thessalians.
Meanwhile the rebels in Ithome, unable to prolong
further a ten years' resistance, surrendered to Lacedxmon;
the conditions being that they should depart from Pelo-
ponnese under safe conduct, and should never set foot in
it again : any one who might hereafter be found there was

£04] FROM SUPREMACY TO EMPIRE 67

to be the slave of his captor. It must be known that the CHAP.

Lacedaemonians had an old oracle from Delphi, to the effect :

that they should let go the suppliant of Zeus at Ithome. Megara
So they went forth with their children and their wives, ffilns.
and being received by Athens from the hatred that she ||^lt of
now felt for the Lacedsemonians, were located at Naupactus, from
which she had lately taken from the Ozolian Locrians. Pe"^*-
The Athenians received another addition to their con-
federacy in the Megarians ; who left the Lacedaemonian
alliance, annoyed by a war about boundaries forced on
them by Corinth. The Athenians occupied Megara and
Peaa°, and built the Megarians their long walls from the
city to Nisaea, in which they placed an Athenian garrison.
This was the principal cause of the Corinthians conceiving
such a deadly hatred against Athens
^ Meanwhile Inaros, son of Psammetichus, a Libyan
<.ing of the Libyans on the Egyptian border, having his
head- quarters at Marea, the town above Pharos, caused a
revolt of almost the whole of Egypt from King Artaxerxes,
and placing himself at its head, invited the Athenians to
his assistance. Abandoning a Cyprian expedition upon ^5
which they happened to be engaged with two hundred
ships of their own and their allies, they arrived in Egypt
and sailed from the sea into the Nile, and making them-
selves masters of the river and two-thirds of Memphis,
addressed themselves to the attack of the remaining third,
which is called White Castle. Within it were Persians
and Medes who had taken refuge there, and Egyptians
who had not joined the rebellion.

Meanwhile the Athenians, making a descent from their
fleet upon Haliae, were engaged by a force of Corinthians
and Epidaurians ; and the Corinthians were victorious.
Afterwards the Athenians engaged the Peloponnesian
fleet off Cecruphalia ; and the Athenians were victorious.
Subsequently war broke out between iEgina and Athens,
and there was a great battle at »ea off jEgina between

68 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [105, 106

BOOK I. the Athenians and -£ginetans, each being aided by their
"^^.^ allies ; in which victory remained with the Athenians,
thianin- who took seventy of the enemy's ships, and landed in the
^oahe country and commenced a siege under the command of
Me&arid, Leocrates, son of Stroebus. Upon this the Peloponnesians,
feat by desirous of aiding the iEginetans, threw into ^gina a
Mj'°- force of three hundred heavy infantry, who had before been
* serving with the Corinthians and Epidaurians. Mean-
while the Corinthians and their allies occupied the heights
of Geraneia, and marched down into the Megarid, in the
belief that with a large force absent in iEgina and Egypt,
Athens would be unable to help the Megarians without
raising the siege of jEgina. But the Athenians, instead
of moving the army of ^gina, raised a force of the old
and young men that had been left in the city, and marched
into the Megarid under the command of Myronides.
After a drawn battle with the Corinthians, the rival hosts
parted, each with the impression that they had gained
the victory. The Athenians, however, if anything, had
rather the advantage, and on the departure of the Corin-
thians set up a trophy. Urged by the taunts of the elders
in their city, the Corinthians made their preparations, and
about twelve days afterwards came and set up their trophy
as victors. Sallying out from Megara, the Athenians cut
off the party that was employed in erecting the trophy,
and engaged and defeated the rest. In the retreat of the
vanquished army, a considerable division, pressed by the
pursuers and mistaking the road, dashed into a field on
some private property, with a deep trench all round it,
and no way out. Being acquainted with the place, the
Athenians hemmed their front with heavy infantry, and
placing the hght troops round in a circle, stoned all who
had gone in. Corinth here suffered a severe blow. The
bulk of her army continued its retreat home.

About this time the Athenians began to build the long
walls to the oea, that towards Phalerum and that towards

107] FROM SUPREMACY TO EMPIRE 69

Piraeus. Meanwhile the Phocians made an expedition CHAP.

against Doris, the old home of the Lacedsemonians, 1

containing the towns of Boeum, Kitinium, and Erineum. B.C. 458-
They had taken one of these towns, when the Lacedae- tuilding
monians under Nicomedes, son of Cleombrotus, command- °^^^^
ing for King Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, who was still Walls.
a minor, came to the aid of the Dorians with fifteen xJnal^a-
hundred heavy infantry of their own, and ten thousand of
their allies. After compelling the Phocians to restore
the town on conditions, they began their retreat. The
route by sea, across the Crissaean gulf, exposed them to
the risk of being stopped by the Athenian fleet; that
across Geraneia seemed scarcely safe, the Athenians hold-
ing Megara and Pegse. For the pass was a difficult one,
and was always guarded by the Athenians ; and, in the
present instance, the Lacedaemonians had information that
they meant to dispute their passage. So they resolved to
remain in Bceotia, and to consider which would be the
safest line of march. They had also another reason for
this resolve. Secret encouragement had been given them
by a party in Athens, who hoped to put an end to the
reign of democracy and the building of the long walls.
Meanwhile the Athenians marched against them with
their whole levy and a thousand Argives and the respective
contingents of the rest of their allies. Altogether they
were fourteen thousand strong. The march was prompted
by the notion that the Lacedaemonians were at a loss how
-to effect their passage, and also by suspicions of an attempt
to overthrow the democracy. Some cavalry also joined
the Athenians from their Thessalian allies ; but these went
over to the Lacedaemonians during the battle.

The battle was fought at Tanagra in Bceotia. After
heavy loss on both sides victory declared for the Lacedgs-
monians and their allies. After entering the Megarid and
cutting down the fruit trees, the Lacedaemonians returned
home across Geraneia and the isthmus. Sixty-two days

70 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [io8, 109

BOOK I. after the battle the Athenians marched into Boeotia under

g~ 5. the command of Myronides, defeated the Boeotians in

455. battle at CEnophyta, and became masters of Bceotia and

oflffiotlL* Phocis. They dismantled the walls of the Tanagrasans,
Destruc- took a hundred of the richest men of the Opuntian

Athenian Locrians as hostages, and finished their own long walls.

an^en^ This was followed by the surrender of the jEginetans to
Athens on conditions ; they pulled down their walls, gave
up their ships, and agreed to pay tribute in future. The
Athenians sailed round Peloponnese under Tolmides, son
of Tolmaeus, burnt the arsenal of Lacedaemon, took Chalcis,
a town of the Corinthians, and in a descent upon Sicyon
defeated the Sicyonians in battle.

Meanwhile the Athenians in Egypt and their allies
were still there, and encountered all the vicissitudes of
war. First the Athenians were masters of Egypt, and
the king sent Megabazus a Persian to Lacedasnion with
money to bribe the Peloponnesians to invade Attica and
so draw off the Athenians from Egypt. Finding that
the matter made no progress, and that the money
was only being wasted, he recalled Megabazus with the
remainder of the money, and sent Megabuzus, son of
Zopyrus, a Persian, with a large army to Egypt. Ar-
riving by land he defeated the Egyptians and their allies
in a battle, and drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and
at length shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where
he besieged them for a year and six months. At last,
draining the canal of its waters, which he diverted into
another channel, he left their ships high and dry and
joined most of the island to the mainland, and then
marched over on foot and captured it. Thus the enter-
prise of the Hellenes came to ruin after six years of war.
Of all that large host a few travelling through Libya
reached Cyrenc in safety, but most of them perished.
And thus Egypt returned to its subjection to the king,
except Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes, whom they

110,111] FROM SUPREMACY TO EMPIRE 71

were unable to capture from the extent of the marsh ; CHAP.

the marshmen being also the most warlike of the Egyp- '_

tians. Inaros, the Libyan king, the sole author of the B.C. 454-
Egyptian revolt, was betrayed, taken, and crucified. Athenian
Meanwhile a relieving squadron of fifty vessels had sailed fjJPg'^^"
from Athens and the rest of the confederacy for Egypt. Thessaly
They put in to shore at the Mendesian mouth of tlie Nile, ^Cyprus
in total ignorance of what had occurred. Attacked on
the land side by the troops, and from the sea by the
Phoenician navy, most of the ships were destroyed ; the
few remaining being saved by retreat. Such was the end
of the great expedition of the Athenians and their allies
to Egypt.

Meanwhile Orestes, son of Echecratidas, the Thes- > ,

salian king, being an exile from Thessaly, persuaded the
Athenians to restore him. Taking with them the Boeotians
and Phocians their allies, the Athenians marched to
Pharsalus in Thessaly. They became masters of the
country, though only in the immediate vicinity of the
camp ; beyond which they could not go for fear of the
Thessalian cavalry. But they failed to take the city or
to attain any of the other objects of their expedition, and
returned home with Orestes without- having effected any-
t-hin5« Not long after this a thousand of the Athenians
embarked in the vessels that were at Pegae (Pegas, it must
be remembered, was now theirs), and sailed along the
coast to Sicyon under the command of Pericles, son of
Xanthippus. Landing in Sicyon and defeating the Sic-
yonians who engaged them, they immediately took with
them the Achaeans, and sailing across, marched against
and laid siege to CEniadae in Acarnania. Failing however
to take it, they returned home.

Three years afterwards a truce was made between the
Peloponnesians and Athenians for five years. Released
from Hellenic war, the Athenians made an expedition
to Cyprus with two hundred vessels of their own and

72 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [112, 113

BOOK I. their allies, under the command of Cimon. Sixty of
B C~i4o- ^hcs^ w^J*^ detached to Egypt at the instance of Amyrtaeus,
445. the king in the marshes ; the rest laid siege to Kitium,
dea?h^ from which, however, they were compelled to retire by
Battle of the death of Cimon and by scarcity of provisions. Sail-
loss of ing off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought with the Phoenicians,
Eu^a& Cyprians, and Ciiicians by land and sea, and being vic-
Megara. torious on both elements departed home, and with them
the returned squadron from Egypt. After this the
Lacedaemonians marched out on a sacred war, and be-
coming masters of the temple at Delphi, placed it in the
hands of the Delphians. Immediately after their retreat,
the Athenians marched out, became masters of the temple,
and placed it in the hands of the Phocians.

Some time after this, Orchomenus, Chasronea, and
some other places in Boeotia, being in the hands of the
Boeotian exiles, the Athenians marched against the.above-
mentioned hostile places with a thousand Athenian heavy
infantry and the allied contingents, under the command
of Tolmides, son of Tolmseus. They took Chasronea,
and made slaves of the inhabitants, and leaving a garrison,
commenced their return. On their road they were
attacked at Coronaea, by the Boeotian exiles from Orcho-
menus, with some Locrians and Euboean exiles, and
others who were of the same way of thinking, were de-
feated in battle, and some killed, others taken captive.
The Athenians evacuated all Boeotia by a treaty providing
for the recovery of the men ; and the exiled Boeotians re-
turned, and with all the rest regained their independence.
This was soon afterwards followed by the revolt of
Euboea from Athens. Pericles had already crossed over
with an army of Athenians to the island, when news was
brought to him that Megara had revolted, that the Pelo-
ponnesians were on the point of invading Attica, and that
the Athenian garrison had been cut off by the Megarians,
with the exception of a few who had taken refuge in

114. 115] FROM SUPREMACY TO EMPIRE 73

Nissea. The Megarians had introduced the Corinthians, CHAP.
Sicyonians, and Epidaurians into the town before they iXl
revolted. Meanwhile Pericles brought his army back in B.C. 44s-
all haste from Eubcea. After this the Peloponnesians §uboea
marched into Auica as far as Eleusis and Thrius, ravag- ^^3°"'^^,,,
ing the country under the conduct of King Pleistoanax, Pericles,
the son of Pausanias, and without advancing further re- yei?
turned home. The Athenians then crossed over again Truce,
to Eubcea under the command of Pericles, and subdued
the whole of the island : all but Histisea was settled by
convention ; the Histiaeans they expelled from their
homes, and occupied their territory themselves.

Not long after their return from Eubcea, they made a
truce with the Lacedaemonians and their allies for thirty
years, giving up the posts which they occupied in Peio-
ponnese, Nisasa, Pegse, Trcezen, and Achaia. In the
sixth year of the truce, war broke out between the Samians
and Milesians about Priene. Worsted in the war, the
Milesians came to Athens with loud complaints against
the Samians. In this they were joined by certain private
persons from Samos itself, who wished to revolutionise
the government. Accordingly the Athenians sailed to
Samos with forty ships and set up a democracy ; took
hostages from the Samiars, fifty boys and as many men,
lodged them in Lemnos, and after leaving a garrison in
the island returned home. But some of the Samians had
not remained in the island, but had fled to the continent.
Making an agreement with the most powerful of those in
the city, and an alliance with Pissuthnes, son of Hystaspes,
the then satrap of Sardis, they got together a force of seven
hundred mercenaries, and under cover of night crossed
over to Samos. Their first step was to rise on the
commons, most of whom they secured, their next to steal
their hostages from Lemnos ; after which they revolted,
gave up the Athenian garrison left with them and its
commanders to Pissuthnes, and instantly prepared for an

74 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [ii6, 117

BOOK !• expedition against Miletus. The Byzantines also revolted
£~^. with them,
tion of As soon as the Athenians heard the news, they sailed
to^^amoY ^*^^ ^^^^y ^^^P^ against Samos. Sixteen of these went
and its re- to Caria to look out for the Phoenician fleet, and to Chios
^^ *°°' and Lesbos carrying round orders for reinforcements, and
80 never engaged ; but forty-four ships under the com-
mand of Pericles with nine colleagues gave battle, off the
island of Tragia, to seventy Samian vessels, of which
twenty were transports, as they were sailing from Miletus.
Victory remained with the Athenians. Reinforced after-
wards by forty ships from Athens, and twenty-five Chian
and Lesbian vessels, the Athenians landed, and having
the superiority by land invested the city with three walls ;
it was also invested from the sea. Meanwhile Pericles
took sixty ships from the blockading squadron, and de-
parted in haste for Caunus and Caria, intelligence having
been brought in of the approach of the Phoenician fleet to
the aid of the Samians ; indeed Stcsagoras and others had
left the island with five ships to bring them. But in the
meantime the Samians made a sudden sally, and fell on
the camp, which they found unfortified. Destroying the
look-out vessels, and engaging and defeating such as were
being launched to meet them, they remained masters of
their own seas for fourteen days, and carried in and
carried out what they pleased. But on the arrival of
Pericles, they were once more shut up. Fresh reinforce-
ments afterwards arrived — forty ships from Athens with
Thucydides, Hagnon, and Phormio ; twenty with Tlepo-
lemus and Anticles, and thirty vessels from Chios and
Lesbos. After a brief attempt at fighting, the Samians,
unable to hold out, were reduced after a nme months*
siege, and surrendered on conditions ; they razed their
walls, gave hostages, delivered up their ships, and arranged
to pay the expenses of the war by instalments. The
Byzantines also agreed to be subject as before.

ii8] SECOND CONGRESS AT LACEDiEMON 75

CHAP.

V.
CHAPTER V

Second Congress at Lacedaemon— Preparations for War
and Diplomatic Skirmishes — Cylon — Pausanias —
Themistocles

After this, though not many years later, we at length Charao-
come to what has been already related, the affairs of Cor- of'the"^*
cyra and Potidasa, and the events that served as a pretext period of
for the present war. All these actions of the Hellenes b!c.' \IV
against each other and the barbarian occurred in the fifty Jthrns '
years' interval between the retreat of Xerxes and the and
beginning of the present war. During this interval the |parta.°^
Athenians succeeded in placing their empire on a firmer
basis, and advanced their own home power to a very great
height. The Lacedaemonians, though fully aware of it,
opposed it only for a little while, but remained inactive
during most of the period, being of old slow to go to war
except under the pressure of necessity, and in the present
instance being hampered by wars at home ; until the
growth of the Athenian power could be no longer ignored,
and their own confederacy became the object of its en-
croachments. They then felt that they could endure it
no longer, but that the time had come for them to throw
themselves heart and soul upon the hostile power, and
break it, if they could, by commencing the present war.
And though the Lacedaemonians had made up their own
minds on the fact of the breach of the treaty and the guilt
of tht Athenians, yet they sent to Delphi and inquired of
the god whether it would be well with them if they went
to war ; and, as it is reported, received from him the
answer that if they put their whole strength into the war,
victory would be theirs, and the promise that he him-
self would be with them, whether invoked or uninvoked.

76 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [119, 120

BOOK 1. Still they wished to summoo their allies again, and to

Second ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^°^^ *^° ^^^ propriety of making war. After

congress the ambassadors from the confederates had arrived and a

^dtmla. congress had been convened, they all spoke their minds,

most of them denouncing the Athenians and demanding

that the war should begin. In particular the Corinthians.

They had before on their own account canvassed the

cities in detail to induce them to vote for the war, in the

fear that it might come too late to save Potidasa ; they

were present also on this occasion, and came forward the

last, and made the following speech : —

* Fellow allies, we can no longer accuse the Lacedae-
monians of having failed in their duty : they have not
only voted for war themselves, but have assembled us
here for that purpose. We say their duty, for supremacy
has its duties. Besides equitably administering private
interests, leaders are required to show a special care for
the common welfare in return for the special honours
accorded to them by ail in other ways. For ourselves,
all who have already had dealings with the Athenians
require no warning to be on their guard against them.
The states more inland and out of the highway of com-
munication should understand that if they omit to support
the coast powers, the result will be to injure the transit
of their produce for exportation and the reception in ex-
change of their imports from the sea ; and they must not
be careless judges of what is now said, as if it had nothing
to do with them, but must expect that the sacrifice of the
powers on the coast will one day be followed by the
extension of the danger to the interior, and must recog-
nise that their own interests are deeply involved in this
discussion. For these reasons they should not hesitate
to exchange peace for war. If wise men remain quiet,
while they are not injured, brave men abandon peace for
war when they are injured, returning to an understanding
CD a favourable opportunity : in fact, they are neither

122] SECOND CONGRESS AT LACED^EMON 77

intoxicated by their success in war, nor disposed to take CHAP,
an injury for the sake of the delightful tranquillity of __
peace. Indeed, to falter for the sake of such delights Advan-
is, if you remain inactive, the quickest way of losing the thf^lies
sweets of repose to which you cling ; while to conceive '"•fu'^*'"
extravagant pretensions from success in war is to forget Athens,
how hollow is the confidence by which you are elated.
For if many ill-conceived plans have succeeded through
the still greater fatuity of an opponent, many more, appa-
rently well laid, have on the contrary ended in disgrace.
The confidence with which we form our schemes is never
completely justified in their execution ; speculation is
carried on in safety, but, when it comes to action, fear
causes failure.

* To apply these rules to ourselves, if we are now kind-
ling war it is under the pressure of injury, and with
adequate grounds of complaint ; and after we have chas-
tised the Athenians we will in season desist. We have
many reasons to expect success, — first, superiority, in
numbers and m^ military experience, and secondly our.
general_anjjiin varying obedlencejn^the^jcecu^^^
I'he naval strength which they possess shall be raised by
us from our respective antecedent resources, and from the
monies at Olympia and Delphi. A loan from these
enables us to seduce their foreign sailors by the offer of
higher pay. For the power of Athens is more mercenary
than national ; while ours will not be exposed to the same
risk, as its strength Hes more in men than in money. A
single defeat at sea is in all likelihood their ruin : shoidd
they hold out, in that case there will be the more time
for us to exercise ourselves in naval matters ; and as soon
as we have arrived at an equality in science, we need
scarcely ask whether we shall be their superiors in cou-
rage. For the advantages that we have by nature they
cannot acquire by education ; while their superiority in
science must be removed by our practice. The money

78 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [122

BOOK I. required for these objects shall be provided by our con-

~^ll, tributions : nothing indeed could be more monstrous than

tion of the suggestion that, while their allies never tire of contri-

■ buting for their own servitude, we should refuse to spend

for vengeance and self-preservation the treasure which by

such refusal we shall forfeit to Athenian rapacity, and see

employed for our own ruin.

* We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such
as revolt of their allies, the surest method of depriving
them of their revenues, which are the source of their
strength, and establishment of fortified positions in their
country, and various operations which cannot be foreseen
at present. For war of all things proceeds least upon
definite rules, but draws principally upon itself for con-
trivances to meet an emergency ; and in such cases the
party who faces the struggle and keeps his temper best
meets with most security, and he who loses his temper
about it with correspondent disaster. Let us also reflect
that if it was merely a number of disputes of territory
between rival neighbours, it might be borne ; but here
we have an enemy in Athens, that is a match for our
whole coalition, and more than a match for any of its
members ; so that unless as a body and as individual
nationalities and individual cities we make an unanimous
stand against her, she will easily conquer us divided and
in detail. That conquest, terrible as it may sound, would,
it must be known, have no other end than slavery pure
and simple ; a word which Peloponnese cannot even hear
whispered without disgrace, or without disgrace see so
many states abused by one. Meanwhile the opinion would
be either that we were justly so used, or that we put up
with it from cowardice, and were proving degenerate sons
in not even securing for ourselves the freedom which our
fathers gave to Hellas ; and in allowing the establishment
in Hellas of a tyrant state, though in individual states we
think it our duty to put down sole rulers. And we do

123, 124] SECOND CONGRESS AT LACEDiEMON 79

not know how this conduct can be held free from three of CHAP,
the gravest failings, want of sense, of courage, or of vigi- ^
lance. For we do not suppose that you have taken refuge War a
in that contempt of an enemy which has proved so fatal "®*^®^** ^
in so many instances, — a feeling which from the numbers
that it has ruined has come to be called, not contemptuous
but contemptible.

♦ There is, however, no advantage in reflexions on the
past further than may be of service to the present. For
the future we must provide by maintaining what the
present gives us and -redoubling our efforts; it is hereditary
to us to win virtue as the fruit of labour, and you must
not change the habit, even though you should have a
slight advantage in wealth and resources ; for it is not
right that what was won in want should be lost in plenty.
No, we must boldly advance to the war for many reasons;
the god has commanded it and promised to be with us,
and the rest of Hellas will all join in the struggle, part
from fear, part from interest. You will not be the first to
break a treaty which the god, in advising us to go to war,
judges to be violated already, but rather to support a treaty
that has been outraged: indeed, treaties are broken not by
resistance but by aggression.

* Your position, therefore, from whatever quarter you
may view it, will amply justify you in going to war ; and
this step we recommend in the interests of all, bearing in
mind that identity of interests is the surest of bonds
whether between states or individuals. Delay not, there-
fore, to assist Potidaea, a Dorian city besieged by lonians,
which is quite a reversal of the order of things ; nor to
assert the freedom of the rest. It is impossible for us to wait
any longer when waiting can only mean immediate disaster
for some of us, and, if it comes to be known that we have
conferred but do not venture to protect ourselves, like
disaster in the near future for the rest. Delay not, fellow
allies, but convinced of the necessity of the crisis and the

8o THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [125

BOOK I. wisdom of this counsel, vote for the war, undeterred by
^Ijg its immediate terrors, but looking beyond to the lasting

allies vote peace by which it will be succeeded. Out of war peace
Embassies gains fresh stability, but to refuse to abandon repose for
^eut to ^ac |g jjQj SQ gyj.g ^ method of avoiding danger. We
must believe that the tyrant city that has been established
in Hellas has been established against all alike, with a
programme of universal empire, part fulfilled, part in con-
templation ; let us then attack and reduce it, and win
future security for ourselves and freedom for the Hellenes
who are now enslaved.*

Such were the words of the Corinthians. The Lacedas-
monians having now heard all give their opinion, took the
vote of all the allied states present in order, great and
small alike ; and the majority voted for war. This
decided, it was still impossible for them to commence at
once, from their want of preparation ; but it was resolved
that the means requisite were to be procured by the
different states, and that there was to be no delay. And
indeed, in spite of the time occupied with the necessary
arrangements, less than a year elapsed before Attica was
invaded, and the war openly begun.

This interval was spent in sending embassies to Athens
charged with complaints, in order to obtain as good a
pretext for war as possible, in the event of her paying no
attention to them. The first Lacedaemonian embassy was
to order the Athenians to drive out the curse of the
goddess; the history of which is as follows. In former
generations there was an Athenian of the name of Cylon,
a victor at the Olympic games, of good birth and power-
ful position, who had married a daughter of Theagenes, a
Megarian, at that time tyrant of Megara. Now this
Cylon was inquiring at Delphi ; when he was told by the
god to seize the Acropolis of Athens on the grand festival
of Zeus. Accordingly, procuring a force from Theagenes
and persuading his friends to join him, when the Olympic

126] STORY OF CYLON 8i

festival in Peloponnese came, he seized the Acropolis, CHAP.

with the intention of making himself tyrant, thinking that '_

this was the grand festival of Zeus, and also an occasion The
appropriate for a victor at the Olympic games. Whether the God.
the grand festival that was meant was in Attica or else- ^^q' ^f
where was a question which he never thought of, and Cylon.
which the oracle did not offer to solve. For the Athenians
also have a festival which is called the grand festival of
Zeus Meilichios or Gracious, viz. the Diasia. It is cele-
brated outside the city, and the whole people sacrifice
not real victims but a number of bloodless offerings
peculiar to the country. However, fancying he had
chosen the right time, he made the attempt. As soon as
the Athenians perceived it, they flocked in, one and all,
from the country, and sat down, and laid siege to the
citadel. But as time went on, weary of the labour of
blockade, most of them departed ; the responsibility of
keeping guard being left to the nine archons, with plenary
powers to arrange everything according to their good
judgment. It must be known that at that time most
political functions were discharged by the nine archons.
Meanwhile Cylon and his besieged companions were dis-
tressed for want of food and water. Accordingly Cylon
and his brother made their escape ; but the rest being
hard pressed, and some even dying of famine, seated
themselves as supphants at the altar in the Acropolis.
The Athenians who were charged with the duty of keep-
ing guard, when they saw them at the point of death in
the temple, raised them up on the understanding that no
harm should be done to them, led them out and slew
them. Some who as they passed by took refuge at the
altars of the awful goddesses were despatched on the
spot. From this deed the men who killed them were
called accursed and guilty against the goddess, they and
their descendants. Accordingly these cursed ones were
driven out by the Athenians, driven out again by Cleo-

D 455

82 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [127, 128

BOOK I. menes of Lacedaemon and an Athenian faction ; the living

Pericles ^^^e driven out, and the bones of the dead were taken up ;

con- thus they were cast out. For all that, they came back

^"th^the afterwards, and their descendants are still in the city.

curse. This, then, was the curse that the Lacedaemonians

the Athe- ordered them to drive out. They were actuated primarily,
°'^^ as they pretended, by a care for the honour of the gods ;
but they also knew that Pericles, son of Xanthippus, was
connected with the curse on his mother's side, and they
thought that his banishment would materially advance
their designs on Athens. Not that they really hoped to
succeed in procuring this ; they rather thought to create
a prejudice against him in the eyes of his countrymen from
the feeling that the war would be partly caused by his
misfortune. For being the most powerful man of his
time, and the leading Athenian statesman, he opposed the
Lacedsemonians in everything, and would have no con-
cessions, but ever urged the Athenians on to war

The Athenians retorted by ordering the Lacedae-
monians to drive out the curse of Taenarus. The
Lacedaemonians had once raised up some Helot suppli-
ants from the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, led them
away and slain them ; for which they believe the great
earthquake at Sparta to have been a retribution. The
Athenians also ordered them to drive out the curse of
the goddess of the Brazen House ; the history of which
is as follows. After Pausanias the Lacedaemonian had
been recalled by the Spartans from his command in the
Hellespont (this is his first recall), and had been tried by
them and acquitted, not being again sent out in a public
capacity, he took a galley of Hermione on his own
responsibility, without the authority of the Lacedae-
monians, and arrived as a private person in the Helles-
pont. He came ostensibly for the Hellenic war, really
to carry on his intrigues with the king, which he had
begun before his recall, being ambitious of reigning over

129] HISTORY OF PAUSANIAS 83

Hellas. The circumstance which first enabled him to CHAP.

lay the king under an obligation, and to make a begin- '_

ning of the whole design was this. Some connexions Intrigues
and kinsmen of the king had been taken in Byzantium, sanias'
on its capture from the Medes, when he was first there, ^^^^^
after the return from Cyprus. These captives he sent
off to the king without the knowledge of the rest of the
allies, the account being that they had escaped from him.
He managed this with the help of Gongylus, an Eretrian,
whom he had placed in charge of Byzantium and the
prisoners. He also gave Gongylus a letter for the king,
the contents of which were as follows, as was afterwards
discovered : * Pausanias, the general of Sparta, anxious
to do you a favour, sends you these his prisoners of
war. I propose also, with your approval, to marry your
daughter, and to make Sparta and the rest of Hellas
subject to you. I may say that I think I am able to do
this, with your co-operation. Accordingly if any of
th.'s please you, send a safe man to the sea through whom
we may in future conduct our correspondence.'

This was all that was revealed in the writing, and
Xerxes was pleased with the letter He sent off Aru-
bazus, son of Phainaces, to the sea with orders to
supersede Megabates, the previous governor in the satrapy
of Daskylion, and to send over as quickly as possible to
Pausanias at Byzantium a letter which he entrusted to
him ; to show him the royal signet, and to execute any
commission which he might receive from Pausanias on
the king's matters, with all care and fidelity. Artabazus
on his arrival carried the king's orders into effect, and
sent over the letter, which contained the following
answer : — * Thus aaith King Xerxes to Pausanias. For
the men whom you have saved for me across sea from
Byzantium, an obligation is laid up for you in our house,
recorded for ever ; and with your proposals I am well
pleased. Let neither night nor day stop you from dili-

84 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [130, 131

BOOK 1. gently performing any of your promises to me ; neither

His ^or cost of gold nor of silver let them be hindered, nor

^^'^^ant ^^^ ^°^ number of troops, wherever it may be that their

conduct presence is needed ; but with Artabazus, an honourable

his^recalL "^^° whom I send you, boldly advance my objects and
yours, as may be most for the honour and interest of us
both/

Before held in high honour by the Hellenes as the
hero of Plataea, Pausanias, after the receipt of this letter,
became prouder than ever, and could no longer live in
the usual style, but went out of Byzantium in a Median
dress, was attended on his march through Thrace by a
bodyguard of Medes and Egyptians, kept a Persian table,
and was quite unable to contain his intentions, but be-
trayed by his conduct in trifles what his ambition looked
one day to enact on a grander scale. He also made
himself difficult of access, and displayed so violent a
temper to every one without exception that no one could
come near him. Indeed, this was the principal reason
why the confederacy went over to the Athenians.

The above-mentioned conduct, coming to the ears of
the Lacedosmonians, occasioned his first recall. And
after his second voyage out in the ship of Hermione,
without their orders, he gave proofs of similar behaviour.
Besieged and expelled from Byzantium by the Athenians,
he did not return to Sparta ; but news came that he had
settled at Colonae in the Troad, and was intriguing with
the barbarians, and that his stay there was for no good
purpose ; and the Ephors, now no longer hesitating, sent
him a herald and a scytale with orders to accompany the
herald or be declared a public enemy. Anxious above
everything to avoid suspicion, and confident that he could
quash the charge by means of money, he returned a second
time to Sparta. At first thrown into prison by the
Ephors (whose powers enable them to do tliis to the
king), he soon compromised the matter and came out

132] HISTORY OF PAUSANIAS 85

again, and offered himself for trial to any who wished to CHAP.
institute an inquiry concerning him. _^

Now the Spartans had no tangible proof against him — Causes
neither his enemies nor the nation — of that indubitable p°cion*
kind required for the punishment of a member of the "»? i°-
royal family, and at that moment in high office ; he witii^the
being regent for his first cousin King Pleistarchus, helots.
Leonidas' son, who was still a minor. But by his con-
tempt of the laws and imitation of the barbarians, he
gave grounds for much suspicion of his being discontented
with things established ; all the occasions on which he
had in any way departed from the regular customs were
passed in review, and it was remembered that he had
taken upon himself to have inscribed on the tripod at
Delphi, which was dedicated by the Hellenes as the
first-fruits of the spoil of the Medes, the following
couplet : —

' The Mede defeated, great Pausanias raised
This monument, that Phoebus might be praised.'

At the time the Lacedaemonians had at once erased
the couplet, and inscribed the names of the cities that
had aided in the overthrow of the barbarian and dedi-
cated the offering. Yet it was considered that Pausanias
had here been guilty of a grave offence, which, inter-
preted by the light of the attitude which he had since
assumed, gained a new significance, and seemed to be
quite in keeping with his present schemes. Besides, they
were informed that he was even intriguing with the
Helots ; and such indeed was the fact, for he promised
them freedom and citizenship if they would join him in
insurrection, and would help him to carry out his plans
to the end. Even now, mistrusting the evidence even of
the Helots themselves, the Ephors would not consent to
take any decided step against him ; in accordance with
their regular custom towards themselves, namely, to be

86 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [133

BOOK I. slow in taking any irrevocable resolve in the matter of a
HiTmes- Spartan citizen, without indisputable proof. At last, it
sengrer to is said, the person who was going to carry to Artabazus
betrays the last letter for the king, a man of Argilus, once the
*"™- favourite and most trusty servant of Pausanias, turned
informer. Alarmed by the reflexion that none of the
previous messengers had ever returned, having counter-
feited the seal, in order that, if he found himself mistaken
in his surmises, or if Pausanias should ask to make some
correction, he might not be discovered, he undid the
letter, and found the postscript that he had suspected,
viz., an order to put him to death.

On being shown the letter the Ephors now felt more
certain. Still, they wished to hear Pausanias commit
himself with their own ears. Accordingly the man
went by appointment to Taenarus as a suppliant, and there
built himself a hut divided into two by a partition ;
within which he concealed some of the Ephors and let
them hear the whole matter plainly. For Pausanias
came to him and asked him the reason of his suppliant
position; and the man reproached him with the order that
he had written concerning him, and one by one declared
all the rest of the circumstances, how he who had never
yet brought him into any danger, while employed as
agent between him and the king, was yet just like the
mass of his servants, to be rewarded with death. Ad-
mitting all this, and telling him not to be angry about
the matter, Pausanias gave him the pledge of raising
him up from the temple, and begged him to set off as
quickly as possible, and not to hinder the business in
hand.

The Ephors listened carefully, and then departed,
taking no action for the moment, but, having at last
attained to certainty, were preparing to arrest him in the
city. It is reported that, as he was about to be arrested
in the street, he saw from the face of one of the Ephors

»34, 135] HISTORY OF PAUSANIAS 87

what he was coming for ; another, too, made him a CHAP.

secret signal, and betrayed it to him from kindness. 1

Setting off with a run for the temple of the goddess of His death
the Brazen House, the enclosure of which was near at vatton."
hand, he succeeded in taking sanctuary before they took J^®^ ^^
him, and entering into a small chamber, which formed the
part of the temple, to avoid being exposed to the House?
weather, lay still there. The Ephors, for the moment
distanced in the pursuit, afterwards took off the roof of the
chamber, and having made sure that he was inside, shut
him in, barricaded the doors, and staying before the
place, reduced him by starvation. When they found
that he was on the point of expiring, just as he was, in
the chamber, they brought him out of the temple, while
the breath was still in him, and as soon as he was brought
out he died. They were going to throw him into the
Kaiadas, where they cast criminals, but finally decided to
inter him somewhere near. But the god at Delphi after-
wards ordered the Lacedaemonians to remove the tomb
to the place of his death — where he now lies in the
consecrated ground, as an inscription on a monument
declares — and, as what had been done was a curse to
them, to give back two bodies instead of one to the
goddess of the Brazen House. So they had two brazen
statues made, and dedicated them as a substitute for
Pausanias. Accordingly the Athenians retorted by tell-
ing the Lacedaemonians to drive out what the god him-
self had^ pronounced to be a curse. «fVV^^"!^
^ o return to the Medism of Pausanias. Matter was » y""^
found in the course of the inquiry to impHcate Themis- -^
tocles ; and the Lacedasmonians accordingly sent envoys
to the Athenians, and required them to punish him
as they had punished Pausanias. The Athenians con-
sented to do 80. But he had, as it happened, been
ostracised, and^ with a residence at Argos, was in the
habit of visiting other parts of Peloponnese. So they

88 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [136

BOOK I. sent with the Lacedgemonians, who were ready to join
7— . in the pursuit, persons with instructions to take him

tocles im- wherever they found hirn. But Themistocles got scent

wffpS of their intentions, and fled from Peloponnese to Corcyra,
sanias : which was under obhgations towards him. But the

to Periia' Corcyrseans alleged that they could not venture to shelter
him at the cost of oiFending Athens and Lacedxmon,
and they conveyed him over to the continent opposite.
Pursued by the officers who hung on the report of his
movements, at a loss where to turn, he was compelled
to stop at the house of Admetus, the Molossian king,
though they were not on friendly terms. Admetus
happened not to be indoors, but his wife, to whom he
made himself a suppliant, instructed him to take their
child in his arms and sit down by the hearth. Soon
afterwards Admetus came in, and Themistocles told
him who he was, and begged him not to revenge on
Themistocles in exile any opposition which his requests
might have experienced from Themistocles at Athetfs.
Indeed, he was now far too low for his revenge ; retalia-
tion was only honourable between equals. Besides, his
opposition to the king had only affected the success of a
request, not the safety of his person ; if the king were to
give him up to the pursuers that he mentioned, and the
fate which they intended for him, he would just be
consigning him to certain death.

The king listened to him and raised him up with his
son, as he was sitting with him in his arms after the
most effectual method of supplication, and on the arrival
of the Lacedaemonians not long afterwards, refused to
give him up for anything they could say, but sent him
off by land to the other sea to Pydna in Alexander's j
dominions, as he wished to go to the Persian king.
There he met with a merchantman on the point of
starting for Ionia. Going on board, he was carried
by a storm to the Athenian squadron which was block-

137] HISTORY OF THEMISTOCLES 89

ading Naxos. In his alarm — he was luckily unknown CHAP.
to the people in the vessel — he told the master who he ^
was and what he was flying for, and said that, if he Wel-
refused to save him, he would declare that he was taking by°Arta-
him for a bribe. Meanwhile their safety consisted in xerxes.
letting no one leave the ship until a favourable time for
sailing should arise. If he complied with his wishes, f3 T
promised him a proper recompense. The master acted
as he desired, and, after lying to for a day and a night
out of the reach of the squadron, at length arrived at
Ephesus.

After having rewarded him with a present of money,
as soon as he received some from his friends at Athens
and from his secret hoards at Argos, Themistocles
started inland with one of the Coast- Persians, and sent a
letter to King Artaxerxes, Xerxes' son, who had just
come to the throne. Its contents were as follows :
* I, Themistocles, am come to you, who did your house
more harm than any of the Hellenes, when I was com-
pelled to defend myself against your father's invasion, —
harm, however, far surpassed by the good that I did him
during his retreat, which brought no danger for me but
much for him. For the past, you are a good turn in my
debt,' — here he mentioned the warning sent to Xerxes
from Salamis to retreat, as well as his finding the
bridges unbroken, which, as he falsely pretended, was due
to him, — * for the present, able to do you great service,
I am here, pursued by the Hellenes for my friendship
for you. However, I desire a year'^s grace, when I
shall be able to declare in person the objects of my
coming.'

It is said that the king approved his intention, and
told him to do as he said. He employed the interval in
making what progress he could in the study of the
Persian tongue, and of the customs of the country.
Arrived at Court at the end of the year, he attained

*D 455 .

90 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [138

BOOK 1. to rery high consideration there, such as no Hellene has
~C^^. ever possessed before or since ; partly from his splendid
acter of antecedents, partly from the hopes which he held out
tocies" of effecting for him the subjugation of Hellas, but
d ^^ principally by the proof which experience daily gave of
his capacity. For Themistocles was a man who ex-
hibited the most indubitable signs of genius ; indeed, in
this particular he has a claim on our admiration quite
extraordinary and unparalleled. By his own native
capacity, alike unformed and unsupplemented by study,
he was at once the best judge in those sudden crises
which admit of little or of no deliberation, and the best
prophet of the future, even to its most distant possi-
bilities. An able theoretical expositor of all that camp-
within the sphere of his practice, he was not without the
power of passing an adequate judgment in matters in
which he had no experience. He could also excellently
divine the good and evil which lay hid in the unseen
future. In fine, whether we consider the extent of his
natural powers, or the slightness of his application, this
extraordinary man must be allowed to have surpassed all
others in the faculty of intuitively meeting an emergency.
Disease was the real cause of his death ; though there is
a story of his having ended his life by poison, on finding
himself unable to fulfil his promises to the king. How-
ever this may be, there is a monument to him in the
market-place of Asiatic Magnesia. He was governor of
the district, the king having given him Magnesia, which
brought in fifty talents a year, for bread, Lampsacus,
which was considered to be the richest wine country, for
wine, and Myos for other provisions. His bones, it is
said, were conveyed home by his relatives in accordance
with his wishes, and interred in Attic ground. This
was done without the knowledge of the Athenians ; as it
is against the law to bury in Attica an outlaw for treason.
So ends the history of Pausanias and Themistocles, the

I

139J DIPLOMATIC SKIRMISHES 91

Lacedaemonian and the Athenian, the most famous men CHAP,
of their time in Hella^gijLji. L

To return to the Lacedaemonians. The history of Further
their first embassy, the injunctions which it conveyed, from*"
and the rejoinder which it proroked, concerning the ex-
pulsion of the accursed persons, have been related already.
It was followed by a second, which ordered Athens to
raise the siege of Potidaea, and to respect the inde-
pendence of ^gina. Above all, it gave her most dis-
tinctly to understand that war might be prevented by
the revocation of the Megara decree, excluding the
Megarians from the use of Athenian harbours and of the
market of Athens. But Athens was not inclined either
to revoke the decree, or to entertain their other proposals ;
she accused the Megarians of pushing their cultivation
into the consecrated ground and the unenclosed land on
the border, and of harbouring her runaway slaves. At
last an embassy arrived with the Lacedaemonian ulti-
matum. The ambassadors were Ramphias, Melesippus,
and Agesander. Not a word was said on any of the old
subjects ; there was simply this : — * Lacedaemon wishes
the peace to continue, and there is no reason why it
should not, if you would leave the Hellenes independent.*
Upon this the Athenians held an assembly, and laid the
matter before their consideration. It was resolved to
deliberate once for all on all their demands, and to give
them an answer. There were many speakers who came
forward and gave their support to one side or the other,
urging the necessity of war, or the revocation of the
decree and the folly of allowing it to stand in the way of
peace. Among them came forward Pericles, son of
Xanthippus, the first man of his time at Athens, ablest
alike in counsel and in action, and gave the following
advice : —

* There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold to
through everything, and that is the principle of no con-

92 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [140

BOOK I. cession to the Peloponnesians. I know that the spirit
NoTon- 'which inspires men while they are being persuaded to
cessions make war, is not always retained in action ; that as
"made! circumstances change, resolutions change. Yet I see
that now as before the same, almost literally the same,
counsel is demanded of me ; and I put it to those of you,
who are allowing yourselves to be persuaded, to support
the national resolves even in the case of reverses, or to
forfeit all credit for their wisdom in the event of success.
For sometimes the course of things is as arbitrary as the
plans of man ; indeed this is why we usually blame chance
for whatever does not happen as we expected. Now it
was clear before, that Lacedaemon entertained designs
against us ; it is still more clear now. The— W€aly__piLQ-
vides that we shall mutually submit our differences to
legal settlement, and that we shall meanwhile each keep
''*^' what we have. Yet the Lacedaemonians never yet made

us any such offer, never yet would accept from us any
such offer ; on the contrary, they wish complaints to be
settled by war instead of by negotiation ; and in the end
we find them here dropping the tone of expostulation
and adopting that of command. They order us to raise
the siege of Potidsea, to let jEgina be independent, to
revoke the Megara decree ; and they conclude with an
ultimatum warning us to leave the Hellenes independent.
I hope that you will none of you think that we shall be
going to war for a trifle if we refuse to revoke the Megara
decree, which appears in front of their complaints, and the
revocation of which is to save us from war, or let any
feeling of self-reproach linger in your minds, as if you
went to war for slight cause. Why, this trifle contains
the whole seal and trial of your resolution. If you give
way, you will instantly have to meet some greater de-
mand, as having been frightened into obedience in the
first instance ; while a firm refusal will make them clearly
understaad that they must treat you more as equals.

141] SPEECH OF PERICLES 93

Make your decision therefore at once, either to submit CHAP.

before you are harmed, or if we are to go to war, as I '_

for one think we ought, to do so without caring whether ^^^°^'
the ostensible cause be great or small, resolved against the two
making concessions or consenting to a precarious tenure P^^f"
of our possessions. For all claims from an equal, urged pared,
upon a neighbour as commands, before any attempt at
legal settlement, be they great or be they small, have only
one meaning, and that is slavery.

* As to the war and the resources of cither party, a de-
tailed comparison will not show you the inferiority of
Athens. Personally engaged in the cultivation of their
land, without funds either private or public, the Pelo-
ponnesians are also without experience in long wars across
sea, from the strict limit which poverty imposes on their
attacks upon each other. Powers of this description are
quite incapable of often manning a fleet or often sending
out an army : they cannot afford the absence from their
homes, the expenditure from their own funds ; and be-
sides, they have not command of the sea. Capital, it
must be remembered, maintains a war more than forced
contributions. Farmers are a class of men that are
always more ready to serve in person than in purse.
Confident that the former will survive the dangers, they
are by no means so sure that the latter will not be pre-
maturely exhausted, especially if the war last longer than
they expect, which it very likely will. In a single battle
the Peloponnesians and their allies may be able to defy
all Hellas, but they are incapacitated from carrying on a
war against a power different in character from their own,
by the want of the single council-chamber requisite to
prompt and vigorous action, and the substitution of a diet
composed of various races, in which every state possesses
an equal vote, and each presses its own ends, a condition
of things which generally results in no action at all. The
great wish of some is to avenge themselves on some par-

94 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [142

BOOK I. ticular enemy, the great wish of others to save their own

l^val pocket. Slow in assembling, they devote a very small

skill only fraction of the time to the consideration of any public

*by°long object, most of it to the prosecution of their own objects.

practice. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come of his

neglect, that it is the business of somebody else to look

after this or that for him ; and so, by the same notion

being entertained by all separately, the common cause

imperceptibly decays.

* But the principal point is the hindrance that they will
experience from want of money. The slowness with
which it comes in will cause delay ; but the opportunities
of war wait for no man. Again, we need not be alarmed
either at the possibility of their raising fortifications in
Attica, or at their nary. It would be difficult for any
system of fortifications to establish a rival city, even in
time of peace, much more, surely, in an enemy's country,
with Athens just as much fortified against it, as it against
Athens ; while a mere post might be able to do some
harm to the country by incursions and by the facilities
which it would afford for desertion, but can never prevent
our sailing into their country and raising fortifications
there, and making reprisals with our powerful fleet. For
our naval skill is of more use to us for service on land,
than their military skill for service at sea. Familiarity
with the sea they will not find an easy acquisition. If
you who have been practising at it ever since the Median
invasion have not yet brought it to perfection, is there any
chance of anything considerable being effected by an
agricultural, unseafaring population, who will besides be
prevented from practising by the constant presence of
strong squadrons of observation from Athens ? With a
small squadron they might hazard an engagement, en-
couraging their ignorance by numbers ; but the restraint
of a strong force will prevent their moving, and through
want of practice they will grow more clumsy, and con-

143] SPEECH OF PERICLES 95

sequently more timid. It must be kept in mind that CHAP.

seamanship, just like anything else, is a matter of art, and '_

will not admit of being taken up occasionally as an occu- The city
-- . r 1 • ^ ^1 / V • and the

pation for times or leisure ; on the contrary, it is so sea must

exacting as to leave leisure for nothing else. tended

* Even if they were to touch the moneys at Olympia
or Delphi, and try to seduce our foreign sailors by the
temptation of higher pay, that would only be a serious
danger if we could not still be a match for them, by
embarking our own citizens and the aliens resident
among us. But in fact by this means we are always a
match for them ; and, best of all, we have a larger and
higher class of native coxswains and sailors among our
own citizens than all the rest of Hellas. And to say
nothing of the danger of such a step, none of our foreign
sailors would consent to become an outlaw from his
country, and to take service with them and their hopes,
for the sake of a few days' high pay.

* This, I think, is a tolerably fair account of the
position of the Peloponnesians ; that of Athens is free
from the defects that I have criticised in them, and has
other advantages of its own, which they can show nothing
to equal. If they march against our country we will sail
against theirs, and it will then be found that the deso-
lation of the whole of Attica is not the same as that of
even a fraction of Peloponnese ; for they will not be able
to supply the deficiency except by a battle, while we
have plenty of land both on the islands and the continent.
The rule of the sea is indeed a great matter. Consider
for a moment. Suppose that we were islanders : can
you conceive a more impregnable position ? Well, this
in future should, as far as possible, be our conception of
our position. Dismissing all thought of our land and
houses, we must vigilantly guard the sea and the city.
No irritation that we may feel for the former must pro-
voke ui to a battle with the numerical guperiority of the

96 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [144

BOOK I. Pcloponnesians. A victory would only be succeeded by

^^j^gy another battle against the same superiority : a reverse

to be involves the loss of our allies, the source of our strength,

^Iface- who will not remain quiet a day after we become unable

daemon, jq march against them. We must cry not over the loss

of houses and land but of men's lives ; since houses and

land do not gain men, but men them. And if I had

thought that I could persuade you, I would have bid you

go out and lay them waste with your own hands, and

show the Peloponnesians that this at any rate will not

make you submit.

* I have many other reasons to hope for a favourable
issue, if you can consent not to combine schemes of fresh
conquest with the conduct of the war, and will abstain
from wilfully involving yourselves in other dangers ;
indeed, I am more afraid of our own blunders than of the
enemy's devices. But these matters shall be explained
in another speech, as events require; for the present
dismiss these men with the answer that we will allow
Megara the use of our market and harbours, when the
Lacedaemonians suspend their alien acts in favour of us
and our allies, there being nothing in the treaty to pre-
vent either one or the other : that we will leave the cities
independent, if independent we found them when we
made the treaty, and when the Lacedaemonians grant to
their cities an independence not involving subservience to
Lacedaemonian interests, but such as each severally may
desire : that we are willing to give the legal satisfaction
which our agreements specify, and that we shall not
commence hostilities, but shall resist those who do
commence them. This is an answer agreeable at once
to the rights and the dignity of Athens. It must be
thoroughly understood that war is a necessity ; but that
the more readily we accept it, the less will be the ardour
of our opponents, and that out of the greatest dangers
communities and individuals acquire the greatest glory.

I4S, 146] SPEECH OF PERICLES 97

D»d not our fathers resist the Medes not only with CHAP.

resources far different from ours, but even when those i_

resources had been abandoned ; and more by wisdom Athe-
than by fortune, more by daring than by strength, did accept
not they beat off the barbarian and advance their affairs ^|yjjjf*
to their present height ? We must not fall behind them,
but must resist our enemies in any way and in every way,
and attempt to hand down our power to our posterity
unimpaired.'

Such were the words of Pericles. The Athenians,
persuaded of the wisdom of his advice, voted as he
desired, and answered the Lacedaemonians as he recom-
mended, both on the separate points and in the general ;
they would do nothing on dictation, but were ready to
have the complaints settled in a fair and impartial
manner by the legal method, which the terms of the
truce prescribed. So the envoys departed home, and
did not return again.

These were the charges and differences existing
between the rival powers before the war, arising
immediately from the affair at Epidamnus and Corcyra.
Still intercourse continued in spite of them, and mutual
communication. It was carried on without heralds, but
not without suspicion, as events were occurring which
were equivalent to a breach of the treaty and matter
for war.

rr.a

BOOK n

CHAPTER VI

Beg^inning of the Peloponnesian War — First Invasion of
Attica — Funeral Oration of Pericles

BOOK The war between the Athenians and Peloponneslans and
"• the allies on either side now really begins. For now all

B.C. 431 intercourse except through the medium of heralds ceased,
and hostilities were commenced and prosecuted without
intermission. The history follows the chronological
order of events by summers and winters.

The thirty years' truce which was entered into after the
conquest of Euboea lasted fourteen years. In the fifteenth,
in the forty-eighth year of the priestess-ship of Chrysis
at Argos, in the Ephorate of iEnesias at Sparta, in the
last month but two of the Archonship of Pythodorus at
Athens, and six months after the battle of Potidaea, just
at the beginning of spring, a Theban force a little over
three hundred strong, under the command of their
Boeotarchs, Pythangelus, son of Phyleides, and Diemporus,
son of Onetorides, about the first watch of the night,
made an armed entry into Plataea, a town of Boeotia in
alliance with Athens. The gates were opened to them
by a Plataean called Naucleides, who, with his party,
had invited them in, meaning to put to death the citizens
of the opposite party, bring over the city to Thebes, and
thus obtain power for themselves. This was arranged
98

3] THEBAN ATTEMPT ON PLATiEA 99

through Eurymachus, son of Leontiades, a person of CHAP,
great influence at Thebes. For Platasa had always been XL
at variance with Thebes ; and the latter, foreseeing that ^;C- 43«.
war was at hand, wished to surprise her old enemy in atten^t
time of peace, before hostilities had actually broken out. |" ^^
Indeed this was how they got in so easily without being
observed, as no guard had been posted. After the
soldiers had grounded arms in the market-place, those
who had invited them in wished them to set to work at
once and go to their enemies' houses. This, however,
the Thebans refused to do, but determined to make a
conciliatory proclamation, and if possible to come to a
friendly understanding with the citizens. Their herald
accordingly invited any who wished to resume their old
place in the confederacy of their countrymen to ground
arms with them, for they thought that in this way the city
would readily join them.

On becoming aware of the presence of the Thebans
within their gates, and of the sudden occupation of the
town, the Plataeans concluded in their alarm that more
had entered than was really the case, the night preventing
their seeing them. They accordingly came to terms, and
accepting the proposal, made no movement ; especially as
the Thebans offered none of them any violence. But
somehow or other, during the negotiations, they dis-
covered the scanty numbers of the Thebans, and decided
that they could easily attack and overpower them ; the
mass of the Platseans being averse to revolting from
Athens. At all events they resolved to attempt it.
Digging through the party walls of the houses, they thus
managed to join each other without being seen going
through the streets, in which they placed waggons with-
out the beasts in them, to serve as a barricade, and arranged
everything else as seemed convenient for the occasion.
When everything had been done that circumstances per-
mitted, they watched their opportunity and went out of

lOO THE PELOPO'NNESIAN WAR [4

BOOK their houses against the enemy. It was still night,

"• though daybreak was at hand : in daylight it was thought

B.C. 431. that their attack would be met by men full of courage

turned on ^"'^ on equal terms with their assailants, while in dark-

the as- oess it would fall upon panic-stricken troops, who would

" also be at a disadvantage from their enemy's knowledge

of the locality. So they made their assault at once, and

came to close quarters as quickly as they could.

The Thebans, finding themselves outwitted, imme-
diately closed up to repel all attacks made upon them.
Twice or thrice they beat back their assailants. But the
men shouted and charged them, the women and slaves
screamed and yelled from the houses and pelted them
with stones and tiles ; besides, it had been raining hard
all night ; and so at last their courage gave way, and
they turned and fled through the town. Most of the
fugitives were quite ignorant of the right ways out, and
this, with the mud, and the darkness caused by the moon
being in her last quarter, and the fact that their pursuers
knew their way about and could easily stop their escape,
proved fatal to many. The only gate open was the one
by which they had entered, and this was shut by one of
the Plataeans driving the spike of a javelin into the bar
instead of the bolt ; so that even here there was no longer
any means of exit. They were now chased all over the
town. Some got on the wall and threw themselves over,
in most cases with a fatal result. One party managed to
find a deserted gate, and obtaining an axe from a woman,
cut through the bar ; but as they were soon observed only
a few succeeded in getting out. Others were cut off in
detail in different parts of the city. The most numerous
and compact body rushed into a large building next to the
city wall : the doors on the side of the street happened
to be open, and the Thebans fancied that they were the
gates of the town, and that there was a passage right
through to the outside. The Plataeans, seeing their enemiee

5] THEBAN ATTEMPT ON PLAT^A loi

in a trap, now consulted whether they should set fire CHAP.

to the building and burn them just as they were, or whether 1

there was anything else that they could do with them ; BX^ gi.
until at length these and the rest of the Theban surviyois the^
found wandering about the town agreed to an unconditional pri|on"rs.
surrender of themselves and their arms to the Platseans.

While such was the fate of the party in Plataea, the
rest of the Thebans who were to have joined them with
all their forces before daybreak, in case of anything mis-
carrying with the body that had entered, received the
news of the affair on the road, and pressed forward to
their succour. Now Plataea is nearly eight miles from
Thebes, and their march was delayed by the rain that
had fallen in the night, for the river Asopus had risen
and was not easy of passage ; and so, having to march
in the rain, and being hindered in crossing the river, they
arrived too late, and found the whole party either slain
or captive. When they learned what had happened, they
at once formed a design against the Plataeans outside the
city. As the attack had been made in time of peace,
and was perfectly unexpected, there were of course men
and stock in the fields ; and the Thebans wished if
possible to have some prisoners to exchange against their
countrymen in the town, should any chance to have been
taken alive. Such was their plan. But the Plataeane
suspected their intention almost before it was formed,
and becoming alarmed for their fellow-citizens outsidt
the town, sent a herald to the Thebans, reproaching them
for their unscrupulous attempt to seize their city in time
of peace, and warning them against any outrage on those
outside. Should the warning be disregarded, they
threatened to put to death the men they had in their
hands, but added that, on the Thebans retiring from
their territory, they would surrender the prisoners to
their friends. This is the Theban account of the matter,
and they say that they had an oath given them. The

loa THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [6, 7

BOOK Plataeans, on the other hand, do not admit any promise
"• of an immediate surrender, but make it contingent upon

B.C. 431. subsequent negotiation : the oath they deny altogether.

the Ath- Be this as it may, upon the Thebans retiring from their
enians. territory without committing any injury, the Platseans
hastily got in whatever they had in the country and im-
mediately put the men to death. The prisoners were a
hundred and eighty in number ; Eurymachus, the person
with whom the traitors had negotiated, being one.

This done, the Plataeans sent a messenger to Athens,
gare back the dead to the Thebans under a truce, and
arranged things in the city as seemed best to meet the
present emergency. The Athenians meanwhile, having
had word of the affair sent them immediately after its
occurrence, had instantly seized all the Boeotians in
Attica, and sent a herald to the Platseans to forbid their
proceeding to extremities with their Theban prisoners
without instructions from Athens. The news of the men's
death had of course not arrived ; the first messenger
having left Plataea just when the Thebans entered it, the
second just after their defeat and capture ; so there was
no later news. Thus the Athenians sent their orders in
ignorance of the facts ; and the herald on his arrival
found the men slain. After this the Athenians marched
to Plataea and brought in provisions, and left a garrison
in the place, also taking away the women and children
and such of the men as were least efficient.

After the affair at Platsea the treaty had been broken
by an overt act, and Athens at once prepared for war,
as did also Lacedaemon and her allies. They resolved
to send embassies to the king and to such other of the
barbarian powers as either party could look to for assist-
ance, and tried to ally themselves with the independent
states at home. Lacedaemon, in addition to the existing
marine, gave orders to the states that had declared for
her in Italy and Sicily to build vessels up to a grand

8] BEGINNING OF THE WAR 103

total of five hundred, the quota of each city being deter- CHAP.

mined by its size, and also to provide a specified sum '_

of money. Till these were ready they were to remain B.C. 431.
neutral and to admit single Athenian ships into their tionslbr"
harbours. Athens on her part reviewed her existing ™-^ ^^
confederacy, and sent embassies to the places more feeling in
immediately round Peloponnese, Corcyra, Cephallenia, Greece.
Acarnania, and Zacynthus ; perceiving that if these
could be relied on she could carry the war all round
Peloponnese.

And if both sides nourished the boldest hopes and put
forth their utmost strength for the war, this was only
natural. Zeal is always at its height at the commence-
ment of an undertaking ; and on this particular occasion
P'eToponnese and Athens were both full of young men
whose inexperience made them eager to take up arms,
while the rest of Hellas stood straining with excitement
at the conflict of its leading cities. Everywhere pre-
dictions were being recited and oracles being chanted
by such persons as collect them, and this not only in
the contending cities. Further, some while before this,
there was an earthquake at Delos, for the first time in
the memory of the Hellenes. This was said and thought
to be ominous of the events impending ; indeed, nothing
of the kind that happened was allowed to pass without
remark. The good wishes of men made greatly for the
Lacedaemonians, especially as they proclaimed themselves
the liberators of Hellas. No private or public effort that
could help them in speech or action was omitted ; each
thinking that the cause suffered wherever he could not
himself see to it. So general was the indignation felt
against Athens, whether by those who wished to escape
from her empire, or were apprehensive of being absorbed
by it. Such were the preparations and such the feelings
with which the contest opened.

The allies of the two belligerents were the following.

104 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [9, 10

SOOK These were the allies of Lacedsemon : all the Pelo-
}};_ ponnesians within the Isthmus except the Argives and
B.C. 431. Achaeans, who were neutral ; Pellene being the only
"'spa^rta Achaean city that first joined in the war, though her
and example was afterwards followed by the rest. Outside
*°^' Peloponnese the Megarians, Locrians, Boeotians, Phocians,
Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians. Of these,
ships were furnished by the Corinthians, Megarians,
Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leu-
cadians ; and cavalry by the Boeotians, Phocians, and
Locrians. The other states sent infantry. This was
the Lacedsemonian confederacy. That of Athens com-
prised the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians in
Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyraeans,
Zacynthians, and some tributary cities in the following
countries, viz., Caria upon the sea with her Dorian
neighbours, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian towns,
the islands lying between Peloponnese and Crete towards
the east, and all the Cyclades except Melos and Thera.
Of these, ships were furnished by Chios, Lesbos, and
Corcyra, infantry and money by the rest. Such were
the allies of either party and their resources for the war.

Immediately after the affair at Plataea, Lacedaemon
sent round orders to the cities in Peloponnese and the
rest of her confederacy to prepare troops and the pro-
visions requisite for a foreign campaign, in order to
invade Attica. The several states were ready at the
time appointed and assembled at the Isthmus ; the con-
tingent of each city being two-thirds of its whole force.
After the whole army had mustered, the Lacedaemonian
king, Archidamus, the leader of the expedition, called
together the generals of all the states and the principal
persons and officers, and exhorted them as follows : —

< Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made many
campaigns both within and without Peloponnese, and the
elder men among us here are not without experience in

II] INVASION OF ATTICA 105

war. Yet we have never set out with a larger force CHAP

than the present ; and if our numbers and efficiency are 1

remarkable, so also is the power of the state against B.C. 431.
which we march. We ought not then to show ourselves ArchU
inferior to our ancestors, or unequal to our own reputa- ^^^^^
tion. For the hopes and attention of all Hellas are bent leaders of
upon the present effort, and its sympathy is with the ^"^ ^''^^
enemy of the hated Athens. Therefore, numerous as
the invading army may appear to be, and certain as
some may think it that our adversary will not meet us
in the field, this is no sort of justification for the least
negligence upon the march ; but the officers and men
of each particular city should always be prepared for
the advent of danger in their own quarters. The course
of war cannot be foreseen, and its attacks are generally
dictated by the impulse of the moment ; and where over-
weening self-confidence has despised preparation, a wise
apprehension has often been able to make head against
superior numbers. Not that confidence is out of place
in an army of invasion, but in an enemy's country it
should also be accompanied by the precautions of appre-
hension : troops will by this combination be best inspired
for dealing a blow, and best secured against receiving
one. In the present instance, the city against which we
are going, far from being so impotent for defence, is
on the contrary most excellently equipped at all points ;
so that we have every reason to expect that they will
take the field against us, and that if they have not set out
already before we are there, they will certainly do so
when they see us in their territory wasting and destroy-
ing their property. For men are always exasperated at
suffering injuries to which they are not accustomed, and on
seeing them inflicted before their very eyes ; and where least
inclined for reflexion, rush with the greatest heat to action.
The Athenians are the very people of all others to do
this, as they aspire to rule the rest of the world, and are

100 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [12

BOOK more in the habit of invading and ravaging their neigh-
^^' hours' territory, than of seeing their own treated in the

B.C. 431. Uke fashion. Considering, therefore, the power of the
Archi- state against which we are marching, and the greatness
^V^?^ of the reputation which, according to the event, we shall

Isthmus, win or lose for our ancestors and ourselves, remember
as you follow where you may be led to regard discipline
and vigilance as of the first importance, and to obey with
alacrity the orders transmitted to you ; as nothing con-
tributes so much to the credit and safety of an army as
the union of large bodies by a single discipline.'

With this brief speech dismissing the assembly,
Archidamus first sent off Melesippus, son of Diacritus,
a Spartan, to Athens, in case she should be more inclined
to submit on seeing the Peloponnesians actually on the
march. But the Athenians did not admit him into the
city or to their assembly ; Pericles having already carried
a motion against admitting either herald or embassy from
the Lacedasmonians after they had once marched out.
The herald was accordingly sent away without an
audience, and ordered to be beyond the frontier that
same day; in future, if those who sent him had a
proposition to make they must retire to their own ter-
ritory before they despatched embassies to Athens. An
escort was sent with Melesippus to prevent his holding
communication with any one. When he reached the
frontier and was just going to be dismissed, he departed
with these words : * This day will be the beginning of
great misfortunes to the Hellenes.' As soon as he arrived
at the camp, and Archidamus learnt that the Athenians
had still no thoughts of submitting, he at length began his
march, and advanced with his army into their territory.
Meanwhile the Boeotians, sending their contingent and
cavalry to join the Peloponnesian expedition, went to
Platsa with the remainder and laid waste the country.
While the Peloponnesians were still mustering at the

13] INVASION OF ATTICA 107

Isthmus, or on the march before they invaded Attica, CHAP.

Pericles, son of Xanthippus, one of the ten generals of ^

the Athenians, finding that the invasion was to take B.C. 431.

place, conceisred the idea that Archidamus, who hap- revTews

pened to be his friend, might possibly pass by his estate ^^® '"®" -

without ravaging it. This he might do, either from a Athens.

personal wish to oblige him, or acting under instructions

from. Lacedaemon for the purpose of creating a prejudice

against him, as had been before attempted in the demand

for the expulsion of the accursed family. He accordingly

took the precaution of announcing to the Athenians in the

assembly that, although Archidamus was his friend, yet

this friendship should not extend to the detriment of the

state, and that in case the enemy should make his houses

and lands an exception to the rest and not pillage them,

he at once gave them up to be public property, so that

they should not bring him into suspicion. He also gave

the citizens some advice on their present affairs in the

same strain as before. They were to prepare for the

war, and to carry in their property from the country.

They were not to go out to battle, but to come into the

city and guard it, and get ready their fleet, in which their

real strength lay. They were also to keep a tight rein on

their allies — the strength of Athens being derived from

the money brought in by their payments, and success in

war depending principally upon conduct and capital. Here

they had no reason to despond. Apart from other sources

of income, an average revenue of six hundred talents of

silver was drawn from the tribute of the allies ; and there

were still six thousand talents of coined silver in the

Acropolis, out of nine thousand seven hundred that had

once been there, from which the money had been taken

for the porch of the Acropolis, the other public buildings,

and for Potidaea. This did not include the uncoined gold

and silver in public and private offerings, the sacred vessels

for the processions and games, the Median spoils, and

io8 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [14

BOOK similar resources to the amount of five hundred talents.

L To this he added the treasures of the other temples.

B.C. 431. These were by no means inconsiderable, and might fairly
ulation of be used. Nay, if they were ever absolutely driven to it,
'moves'^fo ^^^^ might take even the gold ornaments of Athene her-
Athens. self; for the statue contained forty ulents of pure gold
and it was all removable. This might be used for self-
preservation, and must every penny of it be restored.
Such was their financial position — surely a satisfactory
one. Then they had an army of thirteen thousand heavy
infantry, besides sixteen thousand more in the garrisons
and on home duty at Athens. This was at first the
number of men on guard in the event of an invasion ; it
was composed of the oldest and youngest levies and the
resident aliens who had heavy armour. The Phaleric
wall ran for four miles, before it joined that round the
city ; and of this last nearly five had a guard, although
part of it was left without one, viz. that between the
Long Wall and the Phaleric. Then there were the
Long Walls to Piraeus, a distance of some four miles
and a half, the outer of which was manned. Lastly, the
circumference of Piraeus with Munychia was nearly seven
miles and a half; only half of this, however, was guarded.
Pericles also showed them that they had twelve hundred
horse including mounted archers, with sixteen hundred
archers unmounted, and three hundred galleys fit for
service. Such were the resources of Athens in the dif-
ferent departments when the Peloponnesian invasion was
impending and hostilities were being commenotd. Pericles
also urged his usual arguments for expecting a favourable
issue to the war.

The Athenians listened to his advice, and began to
carry in their wives and children from the country, and
all their household furniture, even to the woodwork, of
their houses which they took down. Their sheep and
cattle they sent over to Euboea and the adjacent islands.

15) INVASION OF ATTICA 109

But they found it hard to move, as most of them had been CHAP.

always used to live in the country. 1

From very early times this had been more the case B^C. 43«.
with the Athenians than with others. Under Cccrops tastes of
and the first kings, down to the reign of Theseus, Attica JJfn^*^^®'
had always consisted of a number of independent town-
ships, each with its own town-hall and magistrates.
Except in times of danger the king at Athens was not
consulted ; in ordinary seasons they carried on their
government and settled their affairs without his inter-
ference ; sometimes even they waged war against him, as
in the case of the Eleusinians with Eumolpus against
Erechtheus. In Theseus, however, they \^d a king of
equal intelligence and power ; and one of the chief
features in his organisation of the country was to abolish
the council-chambers and magistrates of the petty cities,
and to merge them in the single council-chamber and
town-hall of the present capital. Individuals might still
enjoy their private property just as before, but they were
henceforth compelled to have only one political centre,
viz. Athens ; which thus counted all the inhabitants of
Attica among her citizens, so that when Theseus died he
left a great state behind him. Indeed, from him dates the ^
Syncecia, or Feast of Union ; which is paid for by the
state, and which the Athenians still keep in honour of
the goddess. Before this the city consisted of the present
citadel and the district beneath it looking rather towards
the south. This is shown by the fact that the temples of
the other deities, besides that of Athene, are in the
citadel ; and even those that are outside it are mostly
situated in this quarter of the city, as that of the Olym-
pian Zeus, of the Pythian Apollo, of Earth, and of
Dionysus in the Marshes, the same in whose honour the
older Dionysia are to this day celebrated in the month of
Anthesterion not only by the Athenians but also by their
Ionian descendants. There are also other ancient temples

no THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [i6, 17

BOOK in this quarter. The fountain too, which, since the
Jil alteration made by the tyrants, has been called Ennea-

B.C. 431. crounos, or Nine Pipes, but which, when the spring was
of the open, went by the name of Callirhoe, or Fairwater, was

a?leavt ^^ those days, from being so near, used for the most

ing their important offices. Indeed, the old fashion of using the
homes, ^^^^j. before marriage and for other sacred purposes is still
kept up. Again, from their old residence in that quarter,
the citadel is still known among Athenians as the city.

The Athenians thus long lived scattered over Attica in
independent townships. Even after the centralisation of
Theseus, old habit still prevailed ; and from the early
times down tp the present war most Athenians still lived
in the country with their families and households, and
were consequently not at all inclined to move now,
especially as they had only just restored their establish-
ments after the Median invasion. Deep was their
I trouble and discontent at abandoning their houses and
the hereditary temples of the ancient constitution, and at
having to change their habits of life and to bid farewell to
what each regarded as his native city.

When they arrived at Athens, though a few had houses
of their own to go to, or could find an asylum with
friends or relatives, by far the greater number had to take
up their dwelling in the parts of the city that were not
built over and in the temples and chapels of the heroes,
except the Acropolis and the temple of the Eieusinian
Demeter and such other places as were always kept
closed. The occupation of the plot of ground lying
below the citadel called the Pelasgian had been forbidden
by a curse ; and there was also an ominous fragment of a
Pythian oracle which said —

* Leave the Pelasgian parcel desolate,
Woe worth the day that men inhabit it 1 '

Yet this too was now built over in the necessity of the

i8] INVASION OF ATTICA iii

moment. And in my opinion, if the oracle proved true, CHAP
it was in the opposite sense to what was expected. For X_
the misfortunes of the state did not arise from the unlawful B.C. 431.
occupation, but the necessity of the occupation from the state of
war ; and though the god did not mention this, he foresaw *^^ "^y-
that it would be an evil day for Athens in which the plot
came to be inhabited. Many also took up their quarters
in the towers of the walls or wherever else they could.
For when they were all come in, the city proved too
small to hold them ; though afterwards they divided the
long walls and a great part of Piraeus into lots and settled
there. All this while great attention was being given to
the war; the allies were being mustered, and an armament
of a hundred ships equipped for Peloponnese. Such was
the state of preparation at Athens.

Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians was ad-/^
vancing. The first town they came to in Attica was
CEnoe, where they were to enter the country. Sitting
down before it, they prepared to assault the wall with
engines and otherwise. CEnoe, standing upon the Athenian
and Boeotian border, was of course a walled town, and was
used as a fortress by the Athenians in time of war. So
the Peloponnesians prepared for their assault, and wasted
some valuable time before the place. This delay brought
the gravest censure upon Archidamus. Even during the
levying of the war he had gained credit for weakness and
Athenian sympathies by the half measures he had advo-
cated ; and after the army had assembled he had further
injured himself in public estimation by his loitering at the
Isthmus and the slowness with which the rest of the march
had been conducted. But all this was as nothing to the
delay at CEnoe. During this interval the Athenians were
carrying in their property ; and it was the belief of the
Peloponnesians that a quick advance would have found
everything still out, had it not been for his procrastination.
Such was the feeling of the army towards Archidamus

112 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [19,20

BOOK during the siege. But he, it is said, expected that the
'_ Athenians would shrink, from letting their land be wasted,

B.C. 43X. and would make their submission while it was still un-

Pelopon- injured ; and this was why he waited,
at Ach- -^^^ ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ assaulted CEnoe, and every possible
arnae. attempt to take it had failed, as no herald came from
Athens, he at last bvoke up his camp and invaded Attica.
This was about eighty days after the Theban attempt
upon Plataea, just in the middle of summer, when the corn
was ripe, and Archidamus, son of Zeuxis, King of Lace-
daemon, was in command. Encamping in Eleusis and the
Thriasian plain, they began their ravages, and putting to
flight some Athenian horse at a place called Rheiti, or
the Brooks, they then advanced, keeping Mount iEgaleus
on their right, through Cropia, until they reached Acharnse,
the largest of the Athenian demes or townships. Sitting
down before it, they formed a camp there, and continued
their ravages for a long while.

The reason why Archidamus remained in order of
battle at Acharnae during this incursion, instead of descend-
ing into the plain, is said to have been this. He hoped
that the Athenians might possibly be tempted by the
multitude of their youth and the unprecedented efficiency
of their service to come out to battle and attempt to stop
the devastation of their lands. Accordingly, as they had
not met him at Eleusis or the Thriasian plain, he tried if
they could be provoked to a sally by the spectacle of a
camp at Acharnas. He thought the place itself a good
position for encamping ; and it seemed likely that such an
important part of the state as the three thousand heavy
infantry of the Acharnians would refuse to submit to the
ruin of their property, and would force a battle on the rest
of the citizens. On the other hand, should the Athenians
not take the field during this incursion, he could then
fearlessly ravage the plain in future invasions, and extend
his advance up to the very walls of Athens. After the

21] INVASION OF ATTICA 113

Acharnians had lost their own property they would be CHAP,
less willing to risk themselves for that of their neighbours ; XL
and 80 there would be division in the Athenian counsels. B.C. 43X.
These were the motives of Archidamus for remaining at mentat
Acharnae. Athens.

In the meanwhile, as long as the army was at Eleusis
and the Thriasian plain, hopes were still entertained of
its not advancing any nearer. It was remembered that
Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, king of Lacedasmon, had •
invaded Attica with a Peloponnesian army fourteen years
before, but had retreated without advancing farther than
Eleusis and Thria, which indeed proved the cause of his
exile from Sparta, as it was thought he had been bribed
to retreat. But when they saw the army at Acharnse,
barely seven miles from Athens, they lost all patience.
The territory of Athens was being ravaged before the ^ ^
very eyes of the Athenians, a sight which the young men
had never seen before and the old only in the Median
wars ; and it was naturally thought a grievous insult, and
the determination was universal, especially among the
young men, to sally forth and stop it- Knots were formed
in the streets and engaged in hot discussion ; for if the
proposed sally was warmly recommended, it was also in
some cases opposed. Oracles of the most various import
were recited by the collectors, and found eager listeners
in one or other of the disputants. .^Foremost in pressing
for the sally were the Acharnians, as constituting no small
part of the army of the state, and as it was their land that
was being ravaged. In short, the whole city was in a
most excited state ; Pericles was the object of general
indignation ; his previous counsels were totally forgotten ;
he was abused for not leading out the army which he
commanded, and was made responsible for the whole of
the public suffering.

He, meanwhile, seeing anger and infatuation just now
in the ascendant, and confident of his wisdom in refusing
E 455

114 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [22,23

BOOK a sally, would not call either assembly or meeting of the
Jil people, fearing the fatal results of a debate inspired by

B.C. 43«- passion and not by prudence. Accordingly he addressed
nessTf himself to the defence of the city, and kept it as quiet as

Pericles, possible, though he constantly sent out cavalry to prevent
ture of raids on the lands near the city from flying parties of the
vaders' ^°^"^y« There was a trifling affair at Phrygia between a
squadron of the Athenian horse with the Thessalians and
the Boeotian cavalry ; in which the former had rather the
best of it, until the heavy infantry advanced to the support
of the Boeotians, when the Thessalians and Athenians were
routed and lost a few men, whose bodies, however, were
recovered the same day without a truce. The next day
the Peloponnesians set up a trophy. Ancient alliance
brought the Thessalians to the aid of Athens ; those
who came being the Larisaeans, Pharsalians, Cranonians,
Pyraslans, Gyrtonians, and Pherasans. The Larisasan
commanders were Polymedes and Aristonus, two party
leaders in Larisa ; the Pharsalian general was Menon ;
each of the other cities had also its own commander.

In the meantime the Peloponnesians, as the Athenians
did not come out to engage them, broke up from Acharnae
and ravaged some of the demes between Mount Parnes
and Brilessus. While they were in Attica the Athenians
sent off the hundred ships which they had been preparing
round Peloponnese, with a thousand heavy infantry and
four hundred archers on board, under the command of
Carcinus, son of Xenotimus, Proteas, son of Epicles, and
Socrates, son of Antigenes. This armament weighed
anchor and started on its cruise, and the Peloponnesians,
after remaining in Attica as long as their provisions lasted,
retired through Boeotia by a difl"erent road to that by
which they had entered. As they passed Oropus they
ravaged the territory of Graea which is held by the
Oropians from Athens, and reaching Peloponnese broke
up to their respective cities.

24,25] THE ATHENIAN FLEET 115

After they had retired the Athenians set guards by CHAP.
land and sea at the points at which they intended to have Xll
regular stations during the war. They also resolved to B.C. 431.
set apart a special fund of a thousand talents from the ing^h^'
monies in the Acropolis. This was not to be spent, but fu^p°/
the current expenses of the war were to be otherwise ponnese.
provided for. If any one should move or put to the vote
a proposition for using the money for any purpose what-
ever except that of defending the city in the event
of the enemy bringing a fleet to make an attack by
sea, it should be a capital offence. With this sum of
money they also set aside a special fleet of one hundred
galleys, the best ships of each year, with their captains.
None of these were to be used except with the money
and against the same peril, should such peril arise.

Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred ships round
Peloponnese, reinforced by a Corcyraean squadron of fifty
vessels and some others of the allies in those parts, cruised
about the coasts and ravaged the country. Among other
places they landed in Laconia and made an assault upon
Methone ; there being no garrison in the place, and the
wall being weak. But it so happened that Brasidas, son
of Tellis, a Spartan, was in command of a guard for the
defence of the district. Hearing of the attack, he hurried
with a hundred heavy infantry to the assistance of the
besieged, and dashing through the army of the Athenians,
which was scattered over the country and had its attention
turned to the wall, threw himself into Methone. He
lost a few men in making good his entrance, but saved
the place and won the thanks of Sparta by his exploit,
being thus the first officer who obtained this notice during
the war. The Athenians at once weighed anchor and
continued their cruise. Touching at Pheia in Elis, they
ravaged the country for two days and defeated a picked
force of three hundred men that had come from the vale
of Elis and the immediate neighbourhood to the rescue

Ii6 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [26,27,28

BOOK But a stiff squall came down upon them, and not liking

_^ to face it in a place where there was no harbour, most

B.C. 431. of them got on board their ships, and doubling Point

sionofihe Ichthys sailed into the port of Pheia. In the meantime

JE^e- xhe Messenians, and some others who could not get on

iEgina. board, marched over by land and took Pheia. The

fleet afterwards sailed round and picked them up and then

put to sea ; Pheia being evacuated, as the main army

of the Eleans had now come up. The Athenians con-

^ tinued their cruise, and ravaged other places on the

coast.

About the same time the Athenians sent thirty ships
to cruise round Locris and also to guard Euboea ; Cleo-
pompus, son of Clinias, being in command. Making
descents from the fleet he ravaged certain places on the
sea-coast, and captured Thronium and took hostages from
it. He also defeated at Alope the Locrians that had
assembled to resist him.

During the summer the Athenians also expelled the
iEginetans with their wives and children from iEgina,
on the ground of their having been the chief agents in
bringing the war upon them. Besides, ^gina lies so
near Peloponnese, that it seemed safer to send colonists
of their own to hold it, and shortly afterwards the settlers
were sent out. The banished -£ginetans found an asylum
in Thyrea, which was given to them by Lacedaemon, not
only on account of her quarrel with Athens, but also
because the ^ginetans had laid her under obligations at
the time of the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots.
The territory of Thyrea is on the frontier of Argolis and
Laconia, reaching down to the sea. Those of the JEgine-
tans who did not settle here were scattered over the rest
of Hellas.

The same summer, at the beginning of a new lunar
month, the only time by the way at which it appears
possible, the sun was eclipsed after noon. After it had

29] ALLIANCE WITH SITALCES 117

assumed the form of a crescent and some of the stars had CHAP,
come out, it returned to its natural shape. XL

During the same summer Nymphodorus, son of Pythes, B.C. 431
an Abderite, whose sister Sitalces had married, was made and his
their Proxenus by the Athenians and sent for to Athens, family.
They had hitherto considered him their enemy ; but he
had great influence with Sitalces, and they wished this
prince to become their ally. Sitalces was the son of
Teres and king of the Thracians. Teres, the father
of Sitalces, was the first to establish the great kingdom
of the Odrysians on a scale quite unknown to the rest of
Thrace, a large portion of the Thracians being indepen-
dent. This Teres is in no way related to Tereus who
married Pandion's daughter Procne from Athens ; nor
indeed did they belong to the same part of Thrace.
Tereus lived in Daulis, part of what is now called Phocis,
but which at that time was inhabited by Thracians. It
was in this land that the women perpetrated the outrage
upon Itys ; and many of the poets when they mention
the nightingale call it the Daulian bird. Besides, Pandion
in contracting an alliance for his daughter would consider
the advantages of mutual assistance, and would naturally
prefer a match at the above moderate distance to the
journey of many days which separates Athens from the
Odrysians. Again the names are different ; and this
Teres was king of the Odrysians, the first by the way
who attained to any power. Sitalces, his son, was now
sought as an ally by the Athenians, who desired his aid
in the reduction of the Thracian towns and of Perdiccas.
Coming to Athens, Nymphodorus concluded the alliance
with Sitalces and made his son Sadocus an Athenian
citizen, and promised to finish the war in Thrace by per-
suading Sitalces to seni^ the Athenians a force of Thracian
horse and targeteers. He also reconciled them with Per-
diccas, and induced them to restore Therme to him ;
apon which Perdiccas at once joined the Athenians and

ii8 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [30,31.32

BOOK Phormio in an expedition against the Chalcidians. Thus
_[ll Sitalces, son of Teres, king of the Thracians, and Per-

B.C. 431. diccas, son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians,

^mvdll became allies of Athens.

^]f Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred vessels were
^^^" ' still cruising round Peloponnese. After taking Sollium,
a town belonging to Corinth, and presenting the city and
territory to the Acarnanians of Palaira, they stormed Asta-
cus, expelled its tyrant Evarchus, and gained the place
for their confederacy. Next they sailed to the island
of Cephallenia and brought it over without using force.
Cephallenia lies off Acarnania and Leucas, and consists
of four states, the Paleans, Cranians, Samasans, and
•Pronseans. Not long afterwards the fleet returned to
Athens. Towards the autumn of this year the Athenians
invaded the Megarid with their whole levy, resident aliens
included, under the command of Pericles, son of Xan-
thippus. The Athenians in the hundred ships round
Peloponnese on their journey home had just reached
jEgina, and hearing that the citizens at home were in
full force at Megara, now sailed over and joined them.
This was without doubt the largest army of Athenians
ever assembled, the state being still in the flower of her
strength and yet unvisited by the plague. Full ten thou-
sand heavy infantry were in the field, all Athenian citizens,
besides the three thousand before Potidasa. Then the
resident aliens who joined in the incursion were at least
three thousand strong ; besides which there was a multi-
tude of light troops. They ravaged the greater part of
the territory, and then retired. Other incursions into the
Megarid were afterwards made by the Athenians annually
during the war, sometimes only with cavalry, sometimes
with all their forces. This went on until the capture of
Nisaca. Atalanta also, the desert island oflT the Opuntian
coast, was towards the end of this summer converted into
a fortified post by the Athenians, in order to prevent

33, 34] FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR ENDS 119

privateers issuing from Opus and the rest of Locris and CHAP.
plundering Euboea. Such were the events of this summer Y}l.
after the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica. B.C. 431.

In the ensuing winter the Acarnanian Evarchus wish- funeral ot
ing to return to Astacus, persuaded the Corinthians to '^^l^^j"^^
sail over with forty ships and fifteen hundred heavy fallen in
infantry and restore him ; himself also hiring some mer- ^^^ ^^
cenaries. In command of the force were Euphamidas,
son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus, son of Timocrates,
and Eumachus, son of Chrysis, who sailed over and
restored him, and after failing in an attempt on some
places on the Acarnanian coast which they were desirous
of gaining, began their voyage home. Coasting along
shore they touched at Cephallenia and made a descent on
the Cranian territory, and losing some men by the trea-
chery of the Cranians, who fell suddenly upon them after
having agreed to treat, put to sea somewhat hurriedly and
returned home.

In the same winter the Athenians gave a funeral at the
public cost to those who had first fallen in this war. It
was a custom of their ancestors, and the manner of it is
as follows. Three days before the ceremony, the bones
of the dead are laid out in a tent which has been erected ;
and their friends bring to their relatives such offerings as
they please. In the funeral procession cypress coffins are
borne in cars, one for each tribe ; the bones of the de-
ceased being placed in the coffin of their tribe. Among
these is carried one empty bier decked for the missing,
that is, for those whose bodies could not be recovered.
Any citizen or stranger who pleases, joins in the pro-
cession : and the female relatives are there to wail at the
burial. The dead are laid in the public sepulchre in the
Beautiful suburb of the city, in which those who fall in
war are always buried ; with the exception of those slain
at Marathon, who for their singular and extraordinary
valour were interred on the spot where they fell. After

I20 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [35

BOOK the bodies have been laid in the earth, a man chosen by
^^- the state, of approved wisdom and eminent reputation,

B.C. 431- pronounces over them an appropriate panegyric ; after
oraSon'^of which all retire. Such is the manner of the burying ;

Pericles. ^^(^ throughout the whole of the war, whenever the occa-
sion arose, the established custom was observed. Mean-
while these were the first that had fallen, and Pericles,
son of Xanthippus, was chosen to pronounce their eulogium.
When the proper time arrived, he advanced from the
sepulchre to an elevated platform in order to be heard
by as many of the crowd as possible, and spoke as
follows :

* Most of my predecessors in this place have commended
him who made this speech part of the law, telHng us that
it is well that it should be delivered at the burial of those
who fall in battle. For myself, I should have thought
that the worth which had displayed itself in deeds, would
be sufficiently rewarded by honours also shown by deeds ;
such as you now see in this funeral prepared at the people's
cost. And I could have wished that the reputations of
many brave men were not to be imperilled in the mouth
of a single individual, to stand or fall according as he
spoke well or ill. For it is hard to speak properly upon
a subject where it is even difficult to convince your hearers
that you are speaking the truth. On the one hand, the
friend who is familiar with every fact of the story, may
think that so.me point has not been set forth with that
fulness which he wishes and knows it to deserve ; on the
other, he who is a stranger to the matter may be led by
envy to suspect exaggeration if he hears anything above
his own nature. For men can endure to hear others
praised only so long as they can severally persuade them-
selves of their own ability to equal the actions recounted^:
when this point is passed, envy comes in and with it
incredulity. However, since our ancestors have stamped
this custom with their approval, it becomes my duty to

36, 37] FUNERAL ORATION OF PERICLES 121

obey the law and to try to satisfy your several wishes and CHAP,
opinions as best I may. Y}i

* I shall begin with our ancestors : it is both just and B.C. 431.
proper that they should have the honour of the first men- Lurces of
tion on an occasion like the present. They dwelt in the Athens'
country without break m the succession from generation aess.

to generation, and handed it down free to the present
time by their valour. And if our more remote ancestors
deserve praise, much more do our own fathers, who added
to their inheritance the empire which we now possess,
and spared no pains to be able to leave their acquisitions
to us of the present generation. Lastly, there are few
parts of our dominions that have not been augmented by
those of us here, who are still more or less in the vigour
of life ; while the mother country has been furnished by
us with everything that can enable her to depend on her
own resources whether for war or for peace. That part of
our history which tells of the military achievements which
gave us our several possessions, or of the ready valour
with which either we or our fathers stemmed the tide of
Hellenic or foreign aggression, is a theme too familiar to
my hearers for me to dilate on, and I shall therefore pass
it by. But what was the road by which we reached our
position, what the form of government under which our
greatness grew, what the national habits out of which it
sprang ; these are questions which I may try to solve
before I proceed to my panegyric upon these men ; since
I think this to be a subject upon which on the present
occasion a speaker may properly dwell, and to which the
whole assemblage, whether citizens or foreigners, may
listen with advantage. ]

* Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighbour- J
ing states ; we are rather a pattern to others than imitators
ourselves. Its administration favours the many instead of

the few ; this is why it is called a democracy. If we
look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in thuir

*E 455

122 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [38,39

BOOK private differences ; if to social standing, adrancement in

public life falls to reputation for capacity, class considera-

B.C. 431. tions not being allowed to interfere with merit ; nor again

freedcfm <ioes poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve the

andSpar- state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition,
tan con- _^ ' _ •' . . •'

straint The freedom which we enjoy m our government extends

also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a

jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel called

upon to be angry with our neighbour for doing what he

likes, or even to indulge in those injurious looks which

cannot fail to be offensive, although they inflict no positive

penalty. But all this ease in our private relations does

not make us lawless as citizens. Against this fear is our

chief safeguard, teaching us to obey the magistrates and

the laws, particularly such as regard the protection of the

injured, whether they are actually on the statute book, or

belong to that code which, although unwritten, yet cannot

be broken without acknowledged disgrace.

* Further, we provide plenty of means for the mind to
refresh itself from business. We celebrate games and
sacrifices all the year round, and the elegance of our
private establishments forms a daily source of pleasure and
helps to banish the spleen ; while the magnitude of our
city draws the produce of the world into our harbour, so
that to the Athenian the fruits of other countries are as
familiar a luxury as those of his own.

* If we turn to our military policy, there also we differ
from our antagonists. We throw open our city to the
world, and never by alien acts exclude foreigners from
any opportunity of learning or observing, although the
eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit by our liberality ;
trusting less in system and policy than to the native spirit
of our citizens ; while in education, where our rivals from
their very cradles by a painful discipline seek after manli-
ness, at Athens we live exactly as we please, and yet are
just as ready to encounter every legitimate danger. In

40] FUNERAL ORATION OF PERICLES 123

proof of this it may be noticed that the Lacedaemonians CHAP,
do not invade our country alone, but bring with them all __^
their confederates ; while we Athenians advance unsup- B.C. 431.
ported into the territory of a neighbour, and fighting upon" culture ;
a foreign soil usually vanquish with ease men who are '^^P^'**"
defending their homes. Our united force was never yet
encountered by any enemy, because we have at once to
attend to our marine and to despatch our citizens by land
upon a hundred different services ; so that, wherever they
engage Vjvith some such fraction of our strength, a success
against a detachment is magnified into a victory over the
nation, and a defeat into a reverse suffered at the hands
of our entire people. And yet if with habits not of labour
but of ease, and courage not of art but of nature, we are
still willing to encounter danger, we have the double ad-
vantage of escaping the experience of hardships in antici-
pation and of facing them in the hour of need as fearlessly
as those who are never free from them.
^ * Nor are these the only points in which our city is
' worthy of admiration. We cultivate refinement without
extravanance and knowledge without effeminacy ; wealth
we employ more for use than for show, and place the
real disgrace of poverty not in owning to the fact but in
declining the struggle against it. Our public men have,
besides politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our
ordinary citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of in-
dustry, are still fair judges of public matters ; for, unlike any
other nation, regarding him who takes no part in these
duties not as unambitious but as useless, we Athenians
are able to judge at all events if we cannot originate,
and instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block
in the way of action, we think it an indispensable pre-
liminary to any wise action at all. Again, in our enter-
prises we present the singular spectacle of daring and
deliberation, each carried to its highest point, and both
united in the same persons ; although usually decision is

124 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [41

BOOK the fruit of ignorance, hesitation of reflexion. But the

"• palm of courage will surely be adjudged most justly to

B.C. 431- those, who best know the difference between hardship

might aD'i pleasure and yet are never tempted to shrink from

of the danger. In generosity we are equally singular, acquiring

empire. *> . , , r • u • • r \r ^

our friends by conferrmg not by receivmg favours. Yet,

of course, the doer of the favour is the firmer friend of
the two, in order by continued kindness to keep the
recipient in his debt ; while the debtor feels less keenly
from the very consciousness that the return he makes will
be a payment, not a free gift. And it is only the
Athenians who, fearless of consequences, confer their
benefits not from calculations of expediency, but in the
confidence of liberality.

* In short, I say that as a city we are the school of
Hellas ; while I doubt if the world can produce a man,
who where he has only himself to depend upon, is equal
to 80 many emergencies, and graced by so happy a
versatility as the Athenian. And that this is no mere
boast thrown out for the occasion, but plain matter of
fact, the power of the state acquired by these habits
proves. For Athens alone of her contemporaries is
found when tested to be greater than her reputation, and
alone gives no occasion to her assailants to blush at the
antagonist by whom they have been worsted, or to her
subjects to question her title by merit to rule. Rather,
the admiration of the present and succeeding ages will be
ours, since we have not left our power without witness,
but have shown it by mighty proofs ; and far from need-
ing a Homer for our panegyrist, or other of his craft
whose verses might charm for the moment only for the
impression which they gave to melt at the touch of fact,
we have forced every sea and land to be the highway of
our daring, and everywhere, whether for evil or for good,
have left imperishable monuments behind us. Such is
the Athens for which these men, in the assertion of their

42j FUNERAL ORATION OF PERICLES 125

resolve not to lose her, nobly fought and died ; and well CHAP,
may every one of their survivors be ready to suffer in her ]^
cause. B.C. 43X.

* Indeed if I have dwelt at some length upon the gyricof
character of our country, it has been to show that our *^® ^^^^
stake in the struggle is not the same as theirs who have
no such blessings to lose, and also that the panegyric
of the men over whom I am now speaking might be by
definite proofs established. That panegyric is now in a
great measure complete ; for the Athens that I have
celebrated is only what the heroism of these and their
like have made her, men whose fame, unlike that of
most Hellenes, will be found to be only commensurate
with their deserts. And if a test of worth be wanted, it
is to be found in their closing scene, and this not only in
the cases in which it set the final seal upon their merit,
but also in those in which it gave the first intimation of
their having any. For there is justice in the claim that
stedfastness in his country's battles should be as a cloak
to cover a man's other imperfections ; since the good
action has blotted out the bad, and his merit as a citizen
more than outweighed his demerits as an individual. Bui
none of these allowed either wealth with its prospect of
future enjoyment to unnerve his spirit, or poverty with
its hope of a day of freedom and riches to tempt him
to shrink from danger. No, holding that vengeance
upon their enemies was more to be desired than any
personal blessings, and reckoning this to be the most
glorious of hazards, they joyfully determined to accept
the risk, to make sure of their vengeance and to let their
wishes wait ; and while committing to hope the un-
certainty of final success, in the business before them they
thought fit to act boldly and trust in themselves. Thus
choosing to die resisting, rather than to live submitting,
they fled only from dishonour, but met danger face to
face, and after one brief moment, while at the summit of

126 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [43

BOOK their fortune, escaped, not from their fear, but from their
"• glory.

B.C. 43»- ' So died these men as became Athenians. You, their
Athens suFvivors, must determine to have as unfaltering a resolu-

must in- tion in the field, though you may pray that it may have a
s^urvivors happier issue. And not contented with ideas derived only

" ^°ihek ^^°^ words of the advantages which are bound up with

example, the defence of your country, though these would furnish
a valuable text to a speaker even before an audience so
alive to them as the present, you must yourselves realise
the power of Athens, and feed your eyes upon her from
day to day, till love of her fills your hearts ; and then
when all her greatness shall break upon you, you must
reflect that it was by courage, sense of duty, and a keen
feeling of honour in action that men were enabled to win
all this, and that no personal failure in an enterprise could
make them consent to deprive their country of their
valour, but they laid it at her feet as the most glorious
contribution that they could offer. For this offering of
their lives made in common by them all they each of
them individually received that renown which never grows
old, and for a sepulchre, not so much that in which their
bones have been deposited, but that noblest of shrines
wherein their glory is laid up to be eternally remembered
upon every occasion on which deed or story shall call for
its commemoration. For heroes have the whole earth
for their tomb ; and in lands far from their own, where
the column with its epitaph declares it, there is enshrined
in every breast a record unwritten with no tablet to pre-
serve it, except that of the heart. These take as your
model, and judging happiness to be the fruit of freedom
and freedom of valour, never decline the dangers ot war.
For it is not the miserable that would most justly be
unsparing of their lives ; these have nothing to hope for :
it is rather they to whom continued life may bring re-
verses as yet unknown, and to whom a fall, if it came,

44,45] FUNERAL ORATION OF PERICLES la?

would be most tremendous in its consequences. And CHAP
surely, to a man of spirit, the degradation of cowardice XL
must be immeasurably more gri^evous than the unfelt P-^^^JJ
death which strikes him in the midst of his strength and for the
patriotism ! ^^'^^"^^

* Comfort, therefore, not condolence, is what I have
to offer to the parents of the dead who may be here.
Numberless are the chances to which, as they know, the
life of man is subject ; but fortunate indeed are they who
draw for their lot a death so glorious as that which has
caused your mourning, and to whom life has been so
exactly measured as to terminate in the happiness in which
it has been passed. Still I know that this is a hard
saying, especially when those are in question of whom
you will constantly be reminded by seeing in the homes
of others blessings of which once you also boasted : for
grief is felt not so much for the want of what we have
never known, as for the loss of that to which we have
been long accustomed. Yet you who are still of an age
to beget children must bear up in the hope of having
others in their stead ; not only will they help you to
forget those whom you have lost, but will be to the state
at once a reinforcement and a security ; for never can a
fair or just policy be expected of the citizen who does
not, like his fellows, bring to the decision the interests
and apprehensions of a father. While those of you who
have passed your prime must congratulate yourselves with
the thought that the best part of your life was fortunate,
and that the brief span that remains will be cheered by
the fame of the departed. For it is only the love of
honour that never grows old ; and honour it is, not gain,
as some would have it, that rejoices the heart of age and
helplessDCss.

* Turning to the sons or brothers of the dead, I see an
arduous struggle before you. When a man is gone, all
are wont to praise him, and should your merit be ever so

128 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [46, ^^

BOOK transcendent, you will still find it difficult not merely to

1 overtake, but even to approach their renown. The living

^T^' *'^^' ^^^^ envy to contend with, while those who are no longer
^.vards for in our path are honoured with a goodwill into which
merit, rivalry does not enter. On the other hand, if I must say
anything on the subject of female excellence to those of
you who will now be in widowhood, it will be all com-
prised in this brief exhortation. Great will be your
^lory in not falling short of your natural character ; and
greatest will be hers who is least talked of among the men
whether for good or for bad.

* My task is now finished. I have performed it to the
best of my ability, and in word, at least, the require-
ments of the law are now satisfied. If deeds be in
question, those who are here interred have received part
of their honours already, and for the rest, their children
will be brought up till manhood at the public expense :
the state thus offers a valuable prize, as the garland of
victory in this race of valour, for the reward both of those
who have fallen and their survivors. And where the
rewards for merit are greatest, there are found the best
citizens.

*And now that you have brought to a close your
lamentations for your relatives, you may depart.'

CHAPTER VII

Second Year of the War— The Plague of Athens— Posi-
tion and Policy of Pericles— Fall of Potidaea

Such was the funeral that took place during this winter,
with which the first year of the war came to an end.
In the first days of summer the Lacedaemonians and their
allies, with two-thirds of their forces as before, invaded
Attica, under the command of Archidamus, son of Zeuxi-

48] PLAGUE OF ATHENS 129

damus, king of Lacedaemon, and sat down and laid waste chap
the country. Not many days after their arrival in Attica Xli'
the plague first began to show itself among the Athenians. B.C 430.
It was said that it had broken out in many places pre- intas^on
viously in the neighbourhood of Lemnos and elsewhere; q^^^^^\
but a pestilence of such extent and mortality was nowhere of the
remembered. Neither were the physicians at first of any P^^sme.
service, ignorant as they were of the proper way to treat
it, but they died themselves the most thickly, as they
visited the sick most often ; nor did any human art
succeed any better. Supplications in the temples, divina-
tions, and so forth were found equally futile, till the
overwhelming nature of the disaster at last put a stop to
them altogether.

It first began, it is said, in the parts of Ethiopia above
Egypt, and thence descended into Egypt and Libya and
into most of the king's country. Suddenly falling upon
Athens, it first attacked the population in Piraeus, — which
was the occasion of their saying that the Peloponnesians
had poisoned the reservoirs, there being as yet no wells
there — and afterwards appeared in the upper city, when
the deaths became much more frequent. AH speculation
as to its origin and its causes, if causes can be found
adequate to produce so great a disturbance, I leave to other
writers, whether lay or professional ; for myself, I shall
simply set down its nature, and explain the symptoms by
which perhaps it may be recognised by the student, if it
should ever break out again. This I can the better do,
as I had the disease myself, and watched its operation in
the case of others.

That year then is admitted to have been otherwise
unprecedentedly free from sickness ; and such few cases
as occurred all determined in this. As a rule, however,
there was no ostensible cause ; but people in good health
were all of a sudden attacked by violent heats in the head,
and redness and inflammation in the eyes, the inward

130 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 49?

BOOK parts, such as the throat or tongue, becoming bloody and
"• emitting an unnatural and fetid breath. These symptoms

B.C. 430- were followed by sneezing and hoarseness, after which
'^ \oms? the pain soon reached the chest, and produced a hard
cough. When it fixed in the stomach, it upset it ; and
discharges of bile of every kind named by physicians
ensued, accompanied by very great distress. In most
cases also an ineffectual retching followed, producing
violent spasms, which in some cases ceased soon after,
in others much later. Externally the body was not
very hot to the touch, nor pale in its appearance, but
reddish, livid, and breaking out into small pustules and
ulcers. But internally it burned so that the patient could
not bear to have on him clothing or linen even of the
very lightest description ; or indeed to be otherwise than
stark naked. What they would have liked best would
have been to throw themselves into cold water ; as indeed
was done by some of the neglected sick, who plunged
into the rain-tanks in their agonies of unquenchable thirst ;
though it made no difference whether they drank little 01
much. Besides this, the miserable feeling of not being
able to rest or sleep never ceased to torment them. The
body meanwhile did not waste away so long as the dis-
temper was at its height, but held out to a marvel against
its ravages ; so that when they succumbed, as in most
cases, on the seventh or eighth day to the internal inflamma-
tion, they had still some strength in them. But if they
passed this stage, and the disease descended further into
the bowels, inducing a violent ulceration there accompanied
by severe diarrhoea, this brought on a weakness which
was generally fatal. For the disorder first settled in the
head, ran its course from thence through the whole of the
body, and even where it did not prove mortal, it still left
its mark on the extremities ; for it settled in the privy
parts, the fingers and the toes, and many escaped with the
loss of these, some too with that of their eyes. Others

50,51] PLAGUE OF ATHENS 131

again were seized with an entire loss of memory on their CHAP.
first recovery, and did not know either themselves or their Yli"
friends. B.C. 43a

But while the nature of the distemper was such as to ings^of
baffle all description, and its attacks almost too grievous <:^e Athe-
^ . ^ 1 • Ml • 1 r II • mans,

for human nature to endure, it was still in the tollowmg

circumstance that its difference from all ordinary disorders
was most clearly shown. All the birds and beasts that
prey upon human bodies, cither abstained from touching
them (though there were many lying unburied), or died
after tasting them. In proof of this, it was noticed that
birds of this kind actually disappeared ; they were not
about the bodies, or indeed to be seen at all. But of
course the effects which I have mentioned could best be
studied in a domestic animal like thejio^.

Such then, if we pass over the varieties of particular
cases, which were many and peculiar, were the general
features of the distemper. Meanwhile the town enjoyed
an immunity from all the ordinary disorders ; or if any
case occurred, it ended in this. Some died in neglect,
others in the midst of every attention. No remedy was
found that could be used as a specific ; for what did good
in one case, did harm in another. Strong and weak con-
stitutions proved equally incapable of resistance, all alike
being swept away, although dieted with the utmost pre-
caution. By far the most terrible feature in the malady
was the dejection which ensued when any one felt himself
sickening, for the despair into which they instantly fell
took away their power of resistance, and left them a
much easier prey to the disorder ; besides which, there
Was the awful spectacle of men dying like sheep, through
having caught the infection in nursing each other. This
caused the greatest mortality. On the one hand, if they
were afraid to visit each other, they perished from
neglect ; indeed many houses were emptied of their
inmates for want of a nurse : on the other, if they vtn-

132 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [52

BOOK tured to do so, death was the consequence. This was
iJl especially the case with such as made any pretensions to
B.C. 430 goodness: honour made them unsparing of themselves in
state of their attendance in their friends' houses, where even the
the city, members of the family were at last worn out by the
moans of the dying, and succumbed to the force of the
disaster. Yet it was with those who had recovered from
the disease that the sick and the dying found most com-
passion. These knew what it was from experience, and
had now no fear for themselves ; for the same man was
never attacked twice — never at least fatally. And such
persons not only received the congratulations of others,
but themselves also, in the elation of the moment, halt
entertained the vain hope that they were for the future
safe from any disease whatsoever.

An aggravation of the existing calamity was the influx
from the country into the city, and this was especially
felt by the new arrivals. As there were no houses to
receive them, they had to be lodged at the hot season of
the year in stifling cabins, where the mortality raged
without restraint. The bodies of dying men lay one
upon another, and half-dead creatures reeled about the
streets and gathered round all the fountains in their long-
ing for water. The sacred places also in which they
had quartered themselves were full of corpses of persons
that had died there, just as they were ; for as the disaster
passed all bounds, men, not knowing what was to become
of them, became utterly careless of everything, whether
sacred or profane. All the burial rites before in use were
entirely upset, and they buried the bodies as best they
could. Many from want of the proper appliances,
through so many of their friends having died already,
had recourse to the most shameless sepultures : sometimes
getting the start of those who had raised a pile, they
threw their own dead body upon the stranger's pyre and
ignited it ; sometimes they tossed the corpse which they

53,54] PLAGUE OF ATHENS 133

were carrying on the top of another that was burning, CHAP.

and so went off. .*

Nor was this the only form of lawless extravagance B.C. 430.
... ,. .. ', , ,4 ° ,, Demora-

which owed its origin to the plague. Men now coolly Uzation

ventured on what they had formerly done in a comer, ^y"*ifg
and not just as they pleased, seeing the rapid transitions plague,
produced by persons in prosperity suddenly dying and
those who before had nothing succeeding to their pro-
perty. So they resolved to spend quickly and enjoy
themselves, regarding their lives and riches as alike things
of a day. Perseverance in what men called honour was
popular with none, it was so uncertain whether they
would be spared to attain the object ; but it was settled
that present enjoyment, and all that contributed to it, was
both honourable and useful. Fear of gods or law of man
there was none to restrain them. As for the first, they
judged it to be just the same whether they worshipped
them or not, as they saw all ahke perishing ; and for the
last, no one expected to live to be brought to trial for his
offences, but each felt that a far severer sentence had been
already passed upon them all and hung ever over their
heads, and before this fell it was only reasonable to enjoy
life a little.

Such was the nature of the calamity, and heavily did
it weigh on the Athenians ; death raging within the city
and devastation without. Among other things which
they remembered in their distress was, very naturally,
the following verse which the old men said had long ago
been uttered :

•A Dorian v/ar shall come and with it death.'

So a dispute arose as to whether dearth and not death
had not been the word in the verse ; but at the present
juncture, it was of course decided in favour of the latter ;
for the people made their recollection fit in with their
sufferings. I fancy, however, that if another Dorian war

134 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [55,56

BOOK should erer afterwards come upon us, and a dearth should
L happen to accompany it, the verse will probably be read

B.C. 430. accordingly. The oracle also which had been given to
on the the Lacedaemonians was now remembered by those who

pSopon- ^^^^ °^ *^* When the God was asked whether they
nese. should go to war, he answered that if they put their
might into it, victory would be theirs, and that he would
himself be with them. With this oracle events were
supposed to tally. For the plague broke out so soon as
the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, and never entering
Peloponnesc (not at least to an extent worth noticing),
committed its worst ravages at Athens, and next to
Athens, at the most populous of the other towns. Such
was the history of the plague.

After ravaging the plain the Peloponnesians advanced
into the ParaUan region as far as Laurium, where the
Athenian silver mines are, and first laid waste the side
lookmg towards Peloponnese, next that which faces
Euboea and Andros. But Pericles, who was still general,
held the same opinion as in the former invasion, and
would not let the Athenians march out against them.

However while they were still in the plain, and had
not yet entered the Paralian land, he had prepared an
armament of a hundred ships for Peloponnese, and when
all was ready put out to sea. On board the ships he
took four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, and three
hundred cavalry in horse transports, then for the first
time made out of old galleys ; fifty Chian and Lesbian
vessels also joining in the expedition. When this
Athenian armament put out to sea, they left the Pelopon-
nesians in Attica in the Paralian region. Arriving at
Epidaurus in Peloponnese they ravaged most of the
territory, and even had hopes of taking the town by an
assault : in this however they were not successful.
Putting out from Epidaurus, they laid waste the territory
of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, all towns on the

57, 581 PLAGUE OF ATHENS I35

coast of Peloponnese, and thence sailing to Prasiai, a CHAP

maritime town in Laconia, ravaged part of its territory, ."

and took and sacked the place itself ; after which they B.C. 430
returned home, but found the Peloponnesians gone and attacks
no longer in Attica. '^%^^'"

During the whole time that the Peloponnesians were in Potidaea.
Attica and the Athenians on the expedition in their ships,
men kept dying of the plague both in the armament and
in Athens. Indeed it was actually asserted that the de-
parture of the Peloponnesians was hastened by fear of the
disorder ; as they heard from deserters that it was in the
city, and also could see the burials going on. Yet in this
invasion they remained longer than in any other, and
ravaged the whole country, for they were about forty days
in Attica.

The same summer Hagnon, son of Nicias, and Cleo-
pompus, son of Clinias, the colleagues of Pericles, took
the armament of which he had lately made use, and went
off upon an expedition against the Chalcidians in the
direction of Thrace and Potidasa, which was still under
siege. As soon as they arrived, they brought up their
engines against Potidaea and tried every means of taking
it, but did not succeed either in capturing the city or in
doing anything else worthy of their preparations. For
the plague attacked them here also, and committed such
havoc as to cripple them completely, even the previously
healthy soldiers of the former expedition catching the
infection from Hagnon's troops ; while Phormio and the
sixteen hundred men whom he commanded only escaped
by being no longer in the neighbourhood of the Chal-
cidians. The end of it was that Hagnon returned with
his ships to Athens, having lost oae thousand and fifty
out of four thousand heavy infantry in about forty days ;
though the soldiers stationed there before remained in the
country and carried on the siege of Potidsea.

After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians a

136 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [59,60

BOOK change came over the spirit of the Athenians. Their
"• land had now been twice laid waste ; and war and

B.C. 430. pestilence at once pressed heavy upon them. They

nians^fn began to find fault with Pericles, as the author of the

their ^gr and the cause of all their misfortunes, and became

^dency eager to come to terms with Lacedasmon, and actually

Perides* ^^^^ ambassadors thither, who did not however succeed
in their mission. Their despair was now complete and
all vented itself upon Pericles. When he saw them
exasperated at the present turn of affairs and acting
exactly as he had anticipated, he called an assembly,
being (it must be remembered) still general, with the
double object of restoring confidence and of leading
them from these angry feelings to a calmer and more
hopeful state of mind. He accordingly came forward
and spoke as follows ;

* I was not unprepared for the indignation of which I
have been the object, as I know its causes ; and I have
called an assembly for the purpose of reminding you upon
certain points, and of protesting against your being un-
reasonably irritated with me, or cowed by your sufferings.
I am of opinion that national greatness is more for the
advantage of private citizens, than any individual well-
being coupled with public humiliation. A man may be
personally ever so well off, and yet if his country be
ruined he must be ruined with it ; whereas a flourishing
commonwealth always affords chances of salvation to
unfortunate individuals. Since then a state can support
the misfortunes of private citizens, while they cannot
support hers, it is surely the duty of every one to be
forward in her defence, and not like you to be so con-
founded with your domestic afflictions as to give up all
thoughts of the common safety, and to blame me for
having counselled war and yourselves for having voted it.
And yet if you are angry with me, it is with one who,
as I believe, is second to no man either in knowledge of

6i] POLICY OF PERICLES i37

the proper policy, or in the ability to expound it, and who CHAP
is moreover not only a patriot but an honest one. A man — ;
possessing that knowledge without that faculty of exposi- Pg^:^f|J-
tion might as well have no idea at all on the matter : if vindi-
he had both these gifts, but no love for his country, he pjffcy"*
would be but a cold advocate for her interests ; while
were his patriotism not proof against bribery, everything
would go for a price. So that if you thought that I was
even moderately distinguished for these qualities when
you took my advice and went to war, there is certainly
no reason now why I should be charged with having done
wrong.

* For those of course who have a free choice in the
matter and whose fortunes are not at stake, war is the
greatest of follies. But if the only choice was between
submission with loss of independence, and danger with
the hope of preserving that independence, — in such a case
it is he who will not accept the risk that deserves blame,
not he who will. I am the same man and do not alter,
it, is you who change, since in fact you took my advice
while unhurt, and waited for misfortune to repent of it ;
and the apparent error of my policy lies in the infirmity
of your resolution, since the suffering that it entails is
being felt by every one among you, while its advantage is
still remote and obscure to all, and a great and sudden
reverse having befallen you, your mind is too much de-
pressed to persevere in your resolves. For before what is
sudden, unexpected, and least within calculation the spirit
quails ; and putting all else aside, the plague has certainly
been an emergency of this kind. Born, however, as you
are, citizens of a great state, and brought up, as you have
been, with habits equal to your birth, you should be ready
to face the greatest disasters and still to keep unimpaired
the lustre of your name. For the judgment of mankind
is as relentless to the weakness that falls short of a
recognised renown, as it is jealous of the arrogance that

138 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [62

BOOK aspires higher than its due. Cease then to grieve for
"• your private afflictions, and address yourselves instead to

B.C. 430. the safety of the commonwealth.

meanSig ' If you shrink, before the exertions which the war
of Athens' makes necessary, and fear that after all they may not
superi- have a happy result, you know the reasons by which I
°"*y* have often demonstrated to you the groundlessness of your
apprehensions. If those are not enough, I wiJl now re-
veal an advantage arising from the greatness of your
dominion, which I think has never yet suggested itself to
you, which I never mentioned in my previous speeches,
and which has so bold a sound that I should scarce
adventure it now, were it not for the unnatural depression
which I see around me. You perhaps think that your
empire extends only over your allies ; I will declare to
you the truth. The visible field of action has two parts,
land and sea. In the whole of one of these you are com-
pletely supreme, not merely as far as you use it at present,
but also to what further extent you may think fit : in fine,
your naval resources are such that your vessels may go
where they please, without the king or any other nation
on earth being able to stop them. So that although you
may think it a great privation to lose the use of your land
and houses, still you must see that this power is something
widely different ; and instead of fretting on their account,
you should really regard them in the light of the gardens
and other accessories that embelHsh a great fortune, and
as, in comparison, of little moment. You should know
too that liberty preserved by your efforts will easily re-
cover for us what we have lost, while, the knee once
bowed, even what you have will pass from you. Your
fathers receiving these possessions not from others, but
from themselves, did not let slip what their labour had
acquired, but delivered them safe to you ; and in this
respect at least you must prove yourselves their equals,
remembering that to lose what one has got is more dis-

63] POLICY OF PERICLES 139

graceful than to be baulked in getting, and you must con- CHAP.

front your enemies not merely with spirit but with disdain. ^"

Confidence indeed a blissful ignorance can impart, ay, B.C. 430.
even to a coward's breast, but disdain is the privilege of pirecan-
those who, like us, have been assured by reflexion of their °°* "°^
superiority to their adversary. And where the chances doned.
arc the same, knowledge fortifies courage by the contempt
which is its consequence, its trust being placed, not in
hope, v/hich is the prop of the desperate, but in a judg-
ment grounded upon existing resources, whose anticipa-
tions are more to be depended upon.

* Again, your country has a right to your services in
sustaining the glories of her position. These are a
common source of pride to you all, and you cannot
decline the burdens of empire and still expect to share
its honours. You should remember also that what you
are fighting against is not merely slavery as an exchange
for independence, but also loss of empire and danger
from the animosities incurred in its exercise. Besides,
to recede is no longer possible, if indeed any of you in
the alarm of the moment has become enamoured of the
honesty of such an unambitious part. For what you hold is,
to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny ; to take it perhaps
was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe. And men of these
retiring views, making converts of others, would quickly
ruin a state ; indeed the result would be the same if they
could live independent by themselves ; for the retiring
and unambitious are never secure without vigorous pro-
tectors at their side ; in fine, such qualities are useless to
an imperial city, though they may help a dependency to
an unmolested servitude.

* But you must not be seduced by citizens like these or
angry with me, — who, if I voted for war, only did as you
did yourselves, — in spite of the enemy having invaded
your country and done what you could be certain that
he would do, if you refused to comply with his demands;

I40 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [64

BOOK and although besides what we counted for, the plague
_^ has come upon us — the only point indeed at which our
B.C. 430- calculation has been at fault. It is this, I know, that
nians ^as had a large share in making me more unpopular than
have a J should otherwise have been, — quite undeservedly, unless
reputa- you are also prepared to give me the credit of any success
maintaijL ^^^^ which chance may present you. Besides, the hand
of Heaven must be borne with resignation, that of the
enemy with fortitude ; this was the old way at Athens,
and do not you prevent it being so still. Remember,
too, that if your country has the greatest name in all the
world, it is because she never bent before disaster ; be-
cause she has expended more life and effort in war than
any other city, and has won for herself a power greater
than any hitherto known, the memory of which will
descend to the latest posterity ; even if now, in obedience
to the general law of decay, we should ever be forced
to yield, still it will be remembered that we held rule
over more Hellenes than any other Hellenic state, that
we sustained the greatest wars against their united or
separate powers, and inhabited a city unrivalled by any
other in resources or magnitude. These glories may
incur the censure of the slow and unambitious ; but in
the breast of energy they will awake emulation, and in
those who must remain without them an envious regret.
Hatred and unpopularity at the moment have fallen to
* the lot of all who have aspired to rule others ; but where

odium must be incurred, true wisdom incurs it for the
highest objects. Hatred also is short-lived ; but that
which makes the splendour of the present and the glory
of the future remains for ever unforgotten. Make your
decision, therefore, for glory then and honour now, and
attain both objects by instant and zealous effort : do not
send heralds to Lacedsemon, and do not betray any sign
of being oppressed by your present sufferings, since they
whose minds are least sensitive to calamity, and whose

65] POLICY OF PERICLES 141

hands are most quick to meet it, are the greatest men and CHAP.

the greatest communities/ .*

Such were the arguments by which Pericles tried to B.C. 430.
Gure the Athenians of their anger against him and to fined, and
divert their thoughts from their immediate afflictions. ^^/^^
As a community he succeeded in convincing them ; they restored
not only gave up all idea of sending to Lacedsemon, but ° P^^er.
applied themselves with increased energy to the war ;
still as private individuals they could not help smarting
under their sufferings, the common people having been
deprived of the little that they ever possessed, while the
higher orders had lost fine properties with costly estab-
lishments and buildings in the country, and, worst of all,
had war instead of peace. In fact, the public feeling
against him did not subside until he had been fined.
Not long afterwards, however, according to the way of
the multitude, they again elected him general and com-
mitted all their affairs to his hands, having now become
less sensitive to their private and domestic afflictions, and
understanding that he was the best man of all for the
public necessities. For as long as he was at the head
of the state during the peace, he pursued a moderate and
conservative policy ; and in his time its greatness was at
its height. When the war broke out, here also he seems
to have rightly gauged the power of his country. He
outlived its commencement two years and six months,
and the correctness of his previsions respecting it became
better known by his death. He told them to wait
quietly, to pay attention to their marine, to attempt no
new conquests, and to expose the city to no hazards
during the war, and doing this, promised them a favour-
able result. What they did was the very contrary,
allowing private ambitions and private interests, in matters
apparently quite foreign to the war, to lead them into
projects unjust both to themselves and to their allies —
projects whose success would only conduce to the honour

142 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [65

BOOK and advantage of private persons, and whose failure en-
^ tailed certain disaster on the country in the war. The

B.C. 430- causes of this are not far to seek. Pericles indeed, by
acter^a^nd his rank, ability, and known integrity, was enabled to

policy of exercise an independent control over the multitude — in
' short, to lead them instead of being led by them ; for
as he never sought power by improper means, he was
never compelled to flatter them, but, on the contrary,
enjoyed so high an estimation that he could afford to
anger them by contradiction. Whenever he saw them
unseasonably and insolently elated, he would with a word
reduce them to alarm ; on the other hand, if they fell
victims to a panic, he could at once restore them to
confidence. In short, what was nominally a democracy
became in his hands government by the first citizen.
With his successors it was different. More on a level
with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they
ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs
to the whims of the multitude. This, as might have
been expected in a great and sovereign state, produced
a host of blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian ex-
pedition ; though this failed not so much through a
miscalculation of the power of those against whom it
was sent, as through a fault in the senders in not taking
the best measures afterwards to assist those who had
gone out, but choosing rather to occupy themselves with
private cabals for the leadership of the commons, by
which they not only paralysed operations in the field,
but also first introduced civil discord at home. Yet
after losing most, of their fleet besides other forces in
Sicily, and with faction already dominant in the city,
they could still for three years make head against their
original adversaries, joined not only by the Sicilians, but
also by their own allies nearly all in revolt, and at last by
the king's son, Cyrus, who furnished the funds for the
Peloponnesian navy. Nor did they finally succumb till

66, 67] FATE OF ENVOYS TO PERSIA 143

they fell the victims of their own intestine disorders. So CHAP.

superfluously abundant were the resources from which the ;

genius of Pericles foresaw an easy triumph in the war over B.C. 430.
the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians. nesian

During the same summer the Lacedaemonians and 1^^°^^
their allies made an expedition with a hundred ships and put
against Zacynthus, an island lying off the coast of Elis, *° ®^
peopled by a colony of Achseans from Peloponnese, and
in alliance with Athens. There were a thousand Lace-
daemonian heavy infantry on board, and Cnemus, a
Spartan, as admiral. They made a descent from their
ships, and ravaged most of the country ; but as the in-
habitants would not submit, they sailed back home.

At the end of the same summer the Corinthian
Aristeus, Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Pratodamus, envoys
from Lacedaemon, Timagoras, a Tegean, and a private in-
dividual named PoUis from Argos, on their way to Asia
to persuade the king to supply funds and join in the war,
came to Sitalces, son of Teres in Thrace, with the idea
of inducing him, if possible, to forsake the alliance of
Athens and to march on Potidaea then besieged by an
Athenian force, and also of getting conveyed by his
means to their destination across the Hellespont to
Pharnabazus, who was to send them up the country to
the king. But there chanced to be with Sitalces some
Athenian ambassadors, Learchus, son of Callimachus,
and Ameiniades, son of Philemon, who persuaded
Sitalces* son, Sadocus, the new Athenian citizen, to
put the men into their hands and thus prevent their cross-
ing over to the king and doing their part to injure the
country of his choice. He accordingly had them seized,
as they were travelling through Thrace to the vessel in
which they were to cross the Hellespont, by a party
whom he had sent on with Learchus and Ameiniades,
and gave orders for their delivery to the Athenian am-
bassadors, by whom they were brought to Athens. On

144 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [68

BOOK their arrival, the Athenians, afraid that Aristeus, who

}}^ had been notably the prime mover in the previous affairs

B.C. 430. of Potidaea and their Thracian possessions, might live to

cSt at- do them still more mischief if he escaped, slew them all

tack the same day, without giving them a trial or hearing the

Amphi- defence which they wished to offer, and cast their

Argos* ^odi^s into a pit ; thinking themselves justified in using

in retaliation the same mode of warfare which the

Lacedaemonians had begun, when they slew and cast

into pits all the Athenian and allied traders whom they

caught on board the merchantmen round Peloponnese.

Indeed, at the outset of the war, the Lacedaemonians

butchered as enemies all whom they took, on the sea,

whether allies of Athens or neutrals.

About the same time towards the close of the summer,
the Ambraciot forces, with a number of barbarians that
they had raised, marched against the Amphilochian Argos
and the rest of that country. The origin of their enmity
against the Argives was this. This Argos and the rest
of Amphilochia were colonised by Amphilochus, son of
Amphiaraus. Dissatisfied with the state of affairs at
home on his return thither after the Trojan war, he built
this city in the Ambracian gulf, and named it Argos
after his own country. This was the largest town in
Amphilochia, and its inhabitants the most powerful.
Under the pressure of misfortune many generations after-
wards, they called in the Ambraciots, their neighbours
on the Amphilochian border, to join their colony ; and
it was by this union with the Ambraciots that they learnt
their present Hellenic speech, the rest of the Am-
philochians being barbarians. After a time the Ambra-
ciots expelled the Argives and h^d the city themselves.
Upon this the Amphilochians gave themselves over to
the Acarnanians ; and the two together called the
Athenians, who sent them Phormio as general and
thirty ships ; upon whose arrival they took Argos by

69,70] FALL OF POTID^EA 14S

storm, and made slaves of the Ambraciots ; and the CHAP

Amphilochians and Acarnanians inhabited the town in ;

common. After this began the alliance between the B.C. 43a
Athenians and Acarnanians. The enmity of the Ambra- between
ciots against the Argives thus commenced with the en- A^^^"
slavement of their citizens ; and afterwards during the and Acar-
war they collected this armament among themselves and Fau1)T'
the Chaonians, and other of the neighbouring barbarians. Potidaea.
Arrived before Argos, they became masters of the
country ; but not being successful in their attacks upon
the town, returned home and dispersed among their
different peoples.

Such were the events of the summer. The ensuing
winter the Athenians sent twenty ships round Peloponnese,
under the command of Phormio, who stationed himself at
Naupactus and kept watch against any one sailing in or
out of Corinth and the Crissaean gulf. Six others went
to Caria and Lycia under Melesander, to collect tribute
in those parts, and also to prevent the Peloponnesian
privateers from taking up their station in those waters and
molesting the passage of the merchantmen from Phaselis
and Phoenicia and the adjoining continent. However,
Melesander, going up the country into Lycia with a
force of Athenians from the ships and the allies, was
defeated and killed in battle, with the loss of a number
of his troops.

The same winter the Potidaeans at length found them-
selves no longer able to hold out against their besiegers.
The inroads of the Peloponnesians into Attica had not
had the desired effect of making the Athenians raise
the siege. Provisions there were none left ; and so
far had distress for food gone in Potidsea that, besides a
number of other horrors, instances had even occurred of
the people having eaten one another. So in this extremity
they at last made proposals for capitulating to the
Athenian generals in command against them, Xenophon,

F 455

146 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [71

BOOK son of Euripides, Hestiodorus, son of Aristocleides, and

Pnanomachus, son of Callimachus. The generals

B.C. 430. accepted their proposals, seeing the sufferings of the

Terms of ^. ^ / .. ^l -j v.- i, i.

capitula- army in so exposed a position ; besides which the state
tion. j^gj already spent two thousand talents upon the siege.
The terms of the capitulation were as follows : a free
passage out for themselves, their children, wives and
auxiliaries, with one garment apiece, the women with
two, and a fixed sum of money for their journey. Under
this treaty they went out to Chalcidice and other places,
according as was in their power. The Athenians, how-
ever, blamed the generals for granting terms without in-
structions from home, being of opinion that the place
would have had to surrender at discretion. They
afterwards sent settlers of their own to Potidsea, and
colonised it. Such were the events of the winter, and so
ended the second year of this war of which Thucydides
was the historian.

CHAPTER VIII

Third Year of the War— Investment of Plataea— Naval
Victories of Phormio— Thracian Irruption into Mace-
donia under Sitalces

The next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, in-
stead of invading Attica, marched against Platsa, under
the command of Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king
of the Lacedsemonians. He had encamped his army
and was about to lay waste the country, when the
Plataeans hastened to send envoys to him, and spoke as
follows : * Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, in invading
the Piatcean territory, you do what is wrong in itself,
and worthy neither of yourselves nor of the fathers who
begot you. Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, your country-

72] INVESTMENT OF PLATiEA 147

man, after freeing Hellas from the Medes with the help CHAP
of those Hellenes who were willing to undertake the risk XI}}'
of the battle fought near our city, offered sacrifice to B.C. 429.
Zeus the Liberator in the market-place of Plataea, and meSt "be-
calling all the allies together restored to the Plataeans tweenthe
their city and territory, and declared it independent and and ^^"^
inviolate against aggression or conquest. Should any ^l^l
such be attempted, the allies present were to help accord-
ing to their power. Your fathers rewarded us thus for
the courage and patriotism that we displayed at that
perilous epoch ; but you do just the contrary, coming
with our bitterest enemies, the Thebans, to enslave us.
We appeal, therefore, to the gods to whom the oaths
were then made, to the gods of your ancestors, and lastly
to those of our country, and call upon you to refrain from
violating our territory or transgressing the oaths, and to
let us live independent, as Pausanias decreed.'

The Platseans had got thus far when they were cut
short by Archidamus saying, * There is justice, Platseans,
in what you say, if you act up to your words. Accord-
ing to the grant of Pausanias, continue to be independent
yourselves, and join in freeing those of your fellow-
countrymen who, after sharing in the perils of that period,
joined in the oaths to you, and are now subject to the
Athenians ; for it is to free them and the rest that all
this provision and war has been made. I could wish that
you would share our labours and abide by the oaths your-
selves ; if this is impossible, do what we have already
required of you — remain neutral, enjoying your own ;
join neither side, but receive both as friends, neither as
allies for the war. With this we shall be satisfied.'
Such were the words of Archidamus. The Plataeans,
after hearing what he had to say, went into the city and
acquainted the people with what had passed, and pre-
sently returned for answer that it was impossible for
them to do what he proposed without consulting the

148 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [73, 74

BOOK Athenians, with whom their children and wives now

were ; besides which they had their fears for the town.

B.C. 429. After his departure, what was to prevent the Athenians

remain from coming and taking it out of their hands, or the

'*A^h^^^° Thebans, who would be included in the oaths, from

" taking advantage of the proposed neutrality to make a

second attempt to seize the city ? Upon these points he

tried to reassure them by saying: * You have only to

deliver over the city and houses to us Lacedaemonians,

to point out the boundaries of your land, the number of

your fruit-trees, and whatever else can be numerically

stated, and yourselves to withdraw wherever you like as

long as the war shall last. When it is over we will

restore to you whatever we received, and in the interim

hold it in trust and keep it in cultivation, paying you

ji sufficient allowance.*

When they had heard what he had to say, they re-
entered the city, and after consulting with the people said
that they wished first to acquaint the Athenians with this
proposal, and in the event of their approving to accede to
it ; in the meantime they asked him to grant them a truce
and not to lay waste their territory. He accordingly
granted a truce for the number of days requisite for the
journey, and meanwhile abstained from ravaging their
territory. The Plataean envoys went to Athens, and
consulted with the Athenians, and returned with the
following message to those in the city : * The Athenians
say, Plataeans, that they never hitherto, since we became
their allies, on any occasion abandoned us to an enemy,
nor will they now neglect us, but will help us according
to their ability ; and they adjure you by the oaths which
your fathers swore, to keep the alliance unaltered.'

On the delivery of this message by the envoys, the
Plataeans resolved not to be unfaithful to the Athenians
but to endure, if it must be, seeing their lands laid waste
and any other trials that might come to them, and not to

753 INVESTMENT OF PLATiEA 149

send out again, but to answer from the wall that it was CHAP,
impossible for them to do as the Lacedaemonians pro-
posed. As soon as he had received this answer, King B.C. 429-
Archidamus proceeded first to make a solemn appeal to damus
the gods and heroes of the country in words following : — f^^t^^^
* Ye gods and heroes of the Platasan territory, be my gods and
witnesses that not as aggressors originally, nor until these the sieee.
had first departed from the common oath, did we invade
this land, in which our fathers offered you their prayers 1
before defeating the Medes, and which you made auspi-
cious to the Hellenic arms ; nor shall we be aggressors
in the measures to which we may now resort, since we
have made many fair proposals but have not been success-
ful. Graciously accord that those who were the first to
offend may be punished for it, and that vengeance may be
attained by those who would righteously inflict it.'

After this appeal to the gods Archidamus put his army
in motion. First he enclosed the town with a palisade
formed of the fruit-trees which they cut down, to prevent
further egress from Platasa ; next they threw up a mound
against the city, hoping that the largeness of the force
employed would insure the speedy reduction of the place.
They accordingly cut down timber from Cithacron, and
built it up on either side, laying it like lattice-work to
serve as a wall to keep the mound from spreading abroad,
and carried to it wood and stones and earth and whatever
other material might help to complete it. They continued
to work at the mound for seventy days and nights without
intermission, being divided into relief parties to allow of
some being employed in carrying while others took sleep
and refreshment; the Lacedaemonian officer attached to
each contingent keeping the men to the work. But the
Platasans observing the progress of the mound, con-
structed a wall of wood and fixed it upon that part of the
city wall against which the mound was being erected,
and built up bricks inside it which they took from the

150 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [76

BOOK neighbouring houses. The timbers served to bind the

L building together, and to prevent its becoming weak as it

B.C. 429- advanced in height; it had also a covering of skins and
works of hides, which protected the woodwork against the attacks
^^taans" °^ burning missiles and allowed the men to work in
safety. Thus the wall was raised to a great height, and
the mound opposite made no less rapid progress. The
Plataeans also thought of another expedient ; they pulled
out part of the wall upon which the mound abutted, and
carried the earth into the city.

Discovering this the Peloponnesians twisted up clay in
wattles of reed and threw it into the breach formed in
the mound, in order to give it consistency and prevent its
being carried away like the soil. Stopped in this way
the Platasans changed their mode of operation, and dig-
ging a mine from the town calculated their way under
the mound, and began to carry off its material as before.
This went on for a long while without the enemy outsidtf
finding it out, so that for all they threw on the top their
mound made no progress in proportion, being carried away
from beneath and constantly settling down in the vacuum.
But the Plataeans fearing that even thus they might not
be able to hold out against the superior numbers of the
enemy, had yet another invention. They stopped work-
ing at the large building in front of the mound, and
starting at either end of it inside from the old low wall,
built a new one in the form of a crescent running in
towards the town ; in order that in the event of the
great wall being taken this might remain, and the enemy
have to throw up a fresh mound against it, and as they
advanced within might not only have their trouble over
again, but also be exposed to missiles on their flanks.
While raising the mound the Peloponnesians also brought
up engines against the city, one of which was brought up
upon the mound against the great building and shook
down a good piece of it, to the no small alarm of the

77] INVESTMENT OF PLATiEA 151

Plataeans. Others were advanced against different parts CHAP,
of the wall but were lassoed and broken by the Plataeans ; Yli.^-
who also hung up great beams by long iron chains from B.C. 429,
either extremity of two poles laid on the wall and pro- Peiopon-
jecting over it, and drew them up at an angle whenever nesians
any point was threatened by the engine, and loosing to fire the
their hold let the beam go with its chains slack, so ^°^'*'
that it fell with a run and snapped off the nose of the
battering ram.

Atter this the Peloponnesians, finding that their engines
effected nothing, and that their mound was met by the
counterwork, concluded that their present means of offence
were unequal to the taking of the city, and prepared for its
circumvallation. First, however, they determined to try
the effects of fire and see whether they could not, with
the help of a wind, burn the town as it was not a large
one ; indeed they thought of every possible expedient by
which the place might be reduced without the expense of
a blockade. They accordingly brought faggots of brush-
wood and threw them from the mound, first into the
space between it and the wall ; and this soon becoming
full from the number of hands at work, they next heaped
the faggots up as far into the town as they could reach
from the top, and then lighted the wood by setting fire
to it with sulphur and pitch. The consequence was a
fire greater than any one had ever yet seen produced by
human agency, though it could not of course be com-
pared to the spontaneous conflagrations sometimes known
to occur through the wind rubbing the branches of a
mountain forest together. And this fire was not only
remarkable for its magnitude, but was also, at the end of
so many perils, within an ace of proving fatal to the
Platasans ; a great part of the town became entirely in-
accessible, and had a wind blown upon it, in accordance
with the hopes of the enemy, nothing could have saved
them. As it was, there is also a story of heavy rain and

152 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [78, 79

BOOK thunder having come on by which the fire was put out

_^ and the danger averted.
B.C. 429- Failing in this last attempt the Peloponnesians left a
sort^to^a portion of their forces on the spot, dismissing the rest,
blockade, ^nd built a wall of circumvallation round the town,
dividing the ground among the various cities present ; a
ditch being made within and without the lines, from
which they got their bricks. All being finished by
about the rising of Arcturus, they left men enough to
man half the wall, the rest being manned by the Boeotians,
and drawing off their army dispersed to their several
cities. The Plataeans had before sent off their wives and
children and oldest men and the mass of the non-
combatants to Athens ; so that the number of the besieged
left in the place comprised four hundred of their own
citizens, eighty Athenians, and a hundred and ten women
to bake their bread. This was the sum total at the
commencement of the siege, and there was no one else
within the walls, bond or free. Such were the arrange-
ments made for the blockade of Piatasa.

The same summer and simultaneously with the ex-
pedition against Plataea, the Athenians marched with two
thousand heavy infantry and two hundred horse against
the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace and the
Bottiseans, just as the corn was getting ripe, under the
command of Xenophon, son of Euripides, with two
colleagues. Arriving before Spartolus in Bottigea, they
destroyed the corn and had some hopes of the city coming
over through the intrigues of a faction within. But those
of a different way of thinking had sent to Olynthus ; and
a garrison of heavy infantry and other troops arrived accord-
ingly. These issuing from Spartolus were engaged by the
Athenians in front of the town : the Chalcidian heavy
infantry, and some auxiliaries with them, were beaten and
retreated into Spartolus ; but the Chalcidian horse and
light troops defeated the horse and light troops of the

8o] NORTHERN GREECE 153

Athenians. The Chalcidians had already a few targeteers CHAP

from Crusis, and presently after the battle were joined by

some others from Olynthus ; upon seeing whom the light B.C. 4*9.

troops from Spartolus, emboldened by this accession and defeat of

by their previous success, with the help of the Chalcidian ^P Athe-
I 11 • r • -1 • II nian force

horse and the reinforcement just arrived again attacked by Chal-

the Athenians, who retired upon the two divisions which " **"^"
they had left with their baggage. Whenever the Athe-
nians advanced, their adversary gave way, pressing them
with missiles the instant they began to retire. The
Chalcidian horse also, riding up and charging them just
as they pleased, at last caused a panic amongst them and
routed and pursued them to a great distance. The
Athenians took refuge in Potidaea, and afterwards re-
covered their dead under truce, and returned to Athens
with the remnant of their army ; four hundred and thirty
men and all the generals having fallen. The Chalcidians
and Bottiaeans set up a trophy, took up their dead, and
dispersed to their several cities.

The same summer, not long after this, the Ambraciots
and Chaonians, being desirous of reducing the whole of
Acarnania and detaching it from Athens, persuaded the
Lacedaemonians to equip a fleet from their confederacy and
send a thousand heavy infantry to Acarnania, represent-
ing that if a combined movement were made by land and
sea, the coast Acarnanians would be unable to march,
and the conquest of Zacynthus and Cephallenia easily
following on the possession of Acarnania, the cruise
round Peloponnese would be no longer so convenient for
the Athenians. Besides which there was a hope of
taking Naupactus. The Lacedaemonians accordingly at
once sent off a few vessels with Cnemus, who was still
high admiral, and the heavy infantry on board ; and sent
round orders for the fleet to equip as quickly as possible
and sail to Leucas. The Corinthians were the most
forward in the business ; the Ambraciots being a colony

*F 455

154 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [81

BOOK of theirs. While the ships from Corinth, Sicyon and
Jil the neighbourhood were getting ready, and those from
B.C. 429- Leucas, Anactorium and Ambracia, which had arrived
dot^and before, were waiting for them at Leucas, Cnemus and his
Pelopon- thousand heavy infantry had run into the gulf, giving the
* pedition sHp to Phormio, the commander of the Athenian squad-
^^car* '"0° stationed off Naupactus, and began at once to prepare
nania for the land expedition. The Hellenic troops with him
consisted of the Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Ajiac-
torians, and the thousand Peloponnesians with whom he
came ; the barbarian of a thousand Chaonians, who, be-
longing to a nation that has no king, were led by Photys
and Nicanor, the two members of the royal family to
whom the chieftainship for that year had been confided.
With the Chaonians came also some Thesprotians, like
them without a king, some Molossians and Atintanians
led by Sabylinthus, the guardian of king Tharyps who
was still a minor, and some Paravasans, under their King
Oroedus, accompanied by a thousand Orestians, subjects
of King Antiochus and placed by him under the com-
mand of Oroedus. There were also a thousand Mace-
donians sent by Perdiccas without the knowledge of the
Athenians, but they arrived too late. With this force
Cnemus set out, without waiting for the fleet from Corinth.
Passing through the territory of Amphilochian Argos,
and sacking the open village of Limnaea, they advanced to
Stratus the Acarnanian capital ; this once taken, the rest
of the country, they felt convinced, would speedily follow.
The Acarnanians, finding themselves invaded by a large
army by land, and from the sea threatened by a hostile
fleet, made no combined attempt at resistance, but remained
to defend their homes, and sent for help to Phormio, who
replied that when a fleet was on the point of sailing from
Corinth, it was impossible for him to leave Naupactus
unprotected. The Peloponnesians meanwhile and their
allies advanced upon Stratus in three divisions, with the

8i] WESTERN GREECE iS5

intention of encamping near it and attempting the wall by CHAP,
force if they failed to succeed by negotiation. The order '

of march was as follows : the centre was occupied by the B.C. 429.
Chaonians and the rest of the barbarians, with the Leu- ^ith dis-
cadians and Anactorians and their followers on the right, |^^%*g
and Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots on
the left ; each division being a long way off from, and
sometimes even out of sight of, the others. The Hellenes
advanced in good order, keeping a look-out till they
encamped in a good position ; but the Chaonians, filled
with self-confidence, and having the highest character for
courage among the tribes of that part of the continent,
without waiting to occupy their camp, rushed on with
the rest of the barbarians, in the idea that they should
take the town by assault and obtain the sole glory of the
enterprise. While they were coming on, the Stratians,
becoming aware how things stood, and thinking that the
defeat of this division would considerably dishearten the
Hellenes behind it, occupied the environs of the town
with ambuscades, and as soon as they approached engaged
them at close quarters from the city and the ambuscades.
A panic seizing the Chaonians, great numbers of them
were slain ; and as soon as they were seen to give way
the rest of the barbarians turned and fled. Owing to the
distance by which their allies had preceded them, neither
of the Hellenic divisions knew anything of the battle, but
fancied they were hastening on to encamp. However,
when the flying barbarians broke in upon them, they
opened their ranks to receive them, brought their divisions
together, and stopped quiet where they were for the day;
the Stratians not offering to engage them, as the rest of
the Acarnanians had not yet arrived, but contenting them-
selves with slinging at them from a distance, which
distressed thera greatly, as there was no stirring without
their armour. The Acarnanians would seem to excel in
this mode of warfare.

156 THE PELOPONNESIAN V/AR [82.83

BOOK Ai sooD a= r.;gh: fell, Cnemus ha.;:iiy drew off his

'"' '-'^" •- ■'-- '■""- A-^r'-s, abc^' r.-'-e railes from S:ra:u5,

E ;- ^- : r.rx: :-v ,: :r truce, and being mere

crfNi-- ''-:;::.•=:■':'.:.;"- .:'■:.'. their city

•'r-'-.'e :.'.e ere~ . = :- ' :ora hence

1::. : : : ::i; 11: St:: _p a trci^ny

without

e C:

?: of the

t.ev u-ere

'.5 tor

wi:x. Lhena ; i : _ , i s : r 1 : : : : - Patras

in Ach-g^a tc • -: - ^ r, -.- - W2v

to ■ ' - r. .._.; -

C- : ,■ '\ - .

. OD-

The Peiot>OD-

e out at a morDent'e

c.c: trreatened bv the cncrav.

84] NAVAL VICTORIES OF PHORMIQ 157

The Athenians, formed in line, sailed round and round CHAP
them, and forced them to contract their circle, by con- ^^^
tinually brushing past and making as though they would B.C. 439.
attack at once, having been previously cautioned by oAhe'
Phormio not to do so till he gave the signal. His hope Pelopon-

1 1 r> I I J • 1 • 1 nesians.

was that the reloponnesians would not retam their order
like a force on shore, but that the ships would fall foul of
one another and the small craft cause confusion ; and if
the wind should blow from the gulf (in expectation of
which he kept sailing round them, and which usually rose
towards morning), they would not, he felt sure, remain
steady an instant. He also thought that it rested with
him to attack when he pleased, as his ships were better
sailers, and that an attack timed by the coming of the
wind would tell best. When the wind came down, the
enemy's ships were now in a narrow space, and what
with the wind and the small craft dashing against them, i
at once fell into confusion : ship fell foul of ship, while
the crews were pushing them off with poles, and by their
shouting, swearing and struggling with one another, made ^
captains* orders and boatswains* cries alike inaudible, and
through being unable for want of practice to clear their
oars in the rough water, prevented the vessels from obey-
ing their helmsmen properly. At this moment Phormio
gave the signal, and the Athenians attacked. Sinking
rirst one of the admirals, they then disabled all they came
across, so that no one thought of resistance for the con-
fusion, but fled for Patrae and Dyme in Achsea. The
Atiienians gave chase and captured twelve ships, and
taking most of the men out of them sailed to Molv-
crium, and after setting up a trophy on the promontory
of Rhium and dedicating a ship to Poseidon, re-
turned to Naupactus. As for the Peloponnesians, they
at once sailed with their remaining ships along the
coast from Dyme and Patrae to Cyllene, the Eleian
arsenal; where Cnemus and the ships from Leucas that

158 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [85,86

BOOK were to have joined them, also arriyed after the battle at

"• Stratus.
B.C. 429, The Lacedemonians now sent to the fleet to Cnemus
^tfonYto three commissioners, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lyco-
renewthe phron, with orders to prepare to engage again with better
s rugg . £Qj.^yjjg^ ^^^ jjQj {.Q Kg driven from the sea by a few
vessels; for they could not at all account for their dis-
comfiture, the less so as it was their first attempt at sea ;
and they fancied that it was not that their marme was so
inferior, but that there had been misconduct somewhere,
not considering the long experience of the Athenians as
compared with the little practice which they had had
themselves. The commissioners were accordingly sent in
anger. As soon as they arrived they set to work with
Cnemus to order ships from the different states, and to
put those which they already had in fighting order.
Meanwhile Phormio sent word to Athens of their pre-
parations and his own victory, and desired as many ships
as possible to be speedily sent to him, as he stood in daily
expectation of a battle. Twenty were accordingly sent,
but instructions were given to their commander to go first
to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who was
Proxenus of the Athenians, had persuaded them to sail
against Cydonia, promising to procure the reduction of
that hostile town ; his real wish being to oblige the
Polichnitans, neighbours of the Cydonians. He accor-
dingly went with the ships to Crete, and, accompanied by
the Polichnitans, laid waste the lands of the Cydonians ;
and, what with adverse winds and stress of weather,
wasted no little time there.

While the Athenians were thus detained in Crete, the
Peloponnesians in Cyllene got ready for battle, and coasted
along to Panormus in Achasa, where their land army had
come to support them. Phormio also coasted along to
Molycrian Rhium, and anchored outside it with twenty
ships, the same as he had fought with before. This

87] NAVAL VICTORIES OF PHORMIO 159

Rhium was friendly to the Athenians. The other, in CHAP.

Peloponnese, lies opposite to it ; the sea between them is "

about three-quarters of a mile broad, and forms the mouth B.C. 429.
of the Crissgean gulf. At this, the Achaean Rhium, not of the
far off Panormus, where their army lay, the Pelopon- ^es|^iJf""
nesians now cast anchor with seventy-seven ships, when captains
they saw the Athenians do so. For six or seven days cJews.''^
they remained opposite each other, practising and prepar-
ing for the battle ; the one resolved not to sail out of the
Rhia into the open sea, for fear of the disaster which had
already happened to them, the other not to sail into the
straits, thinking it advantageous to the enemy to fight in
the narrows. At last Cnemus and Brasidas and the rest
of the Peloponnesian commanders, being desirous of bring-
ing on a battle as soon as possible, before reinforcements
should arrive from Athens, and noticing that the men
were most of them cowed by the previous defeat and out
of heart for the business, first called them together and
encouraged them as follows : —

' Pelopomiesians, the late engagement which may have
made some of you afraid of the one now in prospect,
really gives no just ground for apprehension. Preparation
for it, as you know, there was little enough ; and the
object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea
as an expedition by land. Besides this, the chances of
war were largely against us ; and perhaps also inex-
perience had something to do with our failure in our first
naval action. It was not, therefore, cowardice that pro-
duced our defeat, nor ought the determination which force
has not quelled, but which still has a word to say with its
adversary, to lose its edge from the result of an accident ;
but admitting the possibility of a chance miscarriage, we
should know that brave hearts must be always brave, and
while they remain so can never put forward inexperience
as an excuse for misconduct. Nor are you so behind the
enemy In experience as you are ahead of him in courage ;

i6o THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [88

BOOK and although the science of your opponents would, if
^ valour accompanied it, have also the presence of mind
B.C. 4*9. to carry out at an emergency the lesson it has learnt, yet
S'better a faint heart will make all art powerless in the face of
than danger. For fear takes away presence of mind, and
science, ^^^.j^^.^^ valour art is useless. Against their superior
experience set your superior daring, and against the fear
induced by defeat the fact of your having been then un-
prepared ; remember, too, that you have always the
advantage of superior numbers, and of engaging off your
own coast, supported by your heavy infantry ; and as a
rule, numbers and equipment give victory. At no point,
therefore, is defeat likely ; and as for our previous mis-
takes, the very fact of their occurrence will teach us better
for the future. Steersmen and sailors may, therefore,
confidently attend to their several duties, none quitting
the station assigned to them : as for ourselves, we promise
to prepare for the engagement at least as well as your
previous commanders, and to give no excuse for any one
misconducting himself. Should any insist on doing so,
he shall meet with the punishment he deserves, while the
brave shall be honoured with the appropriate rewards of
valour.'

The Peloponnesian commanders encouraged their men
after this fashion. Phormio, meanwhile, being himself
not without fears for the courage of his men, and noticing
that they were forming in groups among themselves and
were alarmed at the odds against them, desired to call
them together and give them confidence and counsel in
the present emergency. He had before continually told
them, and had accustomed their minds to the idea, that
there was no numerical superiority that they could not
face ; and the men themselves had long been persuaded
that Athenians need never retire before any quantity of
Peloponnesian vessels. At the moment, however, he
saw that they were dispirited by the sight before thera.

89] NAVAL VICTORIES OF PHORMIO i6i

and wishing to refresh their conndence, called them CHAP,
together and spoke as follows : — VIII.

* I see, my men, that you are frightened by the number B.C. 429. \
of the enemy, and I have accordingly called you together, Pho?mio ' ) f"
not liking you to be afraid of what is not really terrible, to his 1 i^
In the first place, the Peloponnesians, already defeated, ^^^ °"'
and not even themselves thinking that they are a match
for us, have not ventured to meet us on equal terms, but
have equipped this multitude of ships against us. Next,
as to that upon which they most rely, the courage which
they suppose constitutional to them, their confidence here
only arises from the success which their experience in
land service usually gives them, and which they fancy will
do the same for them at sea. But this advantage will in
all justice belong to us on this element, if to them on that ;
as they are not superior to us in courage, but we are each
of us more confident, according to our experience in our
particular department. Besides, as the Lacedaemonians
use their supremacy over their allies to promote their own
glory, they are most of them being brought into danger
against their will, or they would never, after such a de-
cided defeat, have ventured upon a fresh engagement.
You need not, therefore, be afraid of their dash. You,
on the contrary, inspire a much greater and better founded
alarm, both because of your late victory and also of their
belief that we should not face them unless about to do
something worthy of a success so signal. An adversary
numerically superior, like the one before us, comes into
action trusting more to strength than to resolution ; while
he who voluntarily confronts tremendous odds must have
very great internal resources to draw upon. For these
reasons the Peloponnesians fear our irrational audacity
more than they would ever have done a more com-
mensurate preparation. Besides, many armaments have
before now succumbed to an inferior through want of skill
or sometimes of courage ; neither of which defects cer-

i62 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [^o

BOOK tainly are ours. As to the battle, it shall not be, if I can
iL help it, in the strait, nor will I sail in there at all ; seeing

B.C. 429. that in a contest between a number of clumsily managed
plains hTs vessels and a small, fast, well-handled squadron, want of
tactics, gea room is an undoubted disadvantage. One cannot run
down an enemy properly without having a sight of him a
good way off, nor can one retire at need when pressed ;
one can neither break the line nor return upon his rear,
the proper tactics for a fast sailer ; but the naval action
necessarily becomes a land one, in which numbers must
decide the matter. For all this I will proride as far as
can be. Do you stay at your posts by your ships, and be
sharp at catching the word of command, the more so as
we are observing one another from so short a distance ;
and in action think order and silence all important —
quaiiiies useful in war generally, and in naval engagements
in particular — ; and behave before the enemy in a manner
worthy of your past exploits. The issues you will fight
for are great — to destroy the naval hopes of the Pelo-
ponnesians or to bring nearer to the Athenians their fears
tor the sea. And I may once more remind you that you
have defeated most of them already ; and beaten men do
not face a danger twice with the same determination.'

Such was the exhortation of Phormio. The Pelo-
ponnesians finding that the Athenians did not sail into the
gulf and the narrows, in order to lead them in whether
they wished it or not, put out at dawn, and forming four
abreast, sailed inside the gulf in the direction of their own
country, the right wing leading as they bad lain at anchor.
In this wing were placed twenty of their best sailers ; so
that in the event of Phormio thinking that their object
was Naupactus, and coasting along thither to save the
place, the Athenians might not be able to escape their
onset by getting outside their wing, but might be cut off
by the vessels in question. As they expected, Phormio,
in alarm for the place at that moment emptied of its

90 NAVAL VICTORIES OF PHORMIO 163

garrison, as soon as he saw them put out, reluctantly and CHAP,
hurriedly embarked and sailed along shore ; the Messenian Xiil*
land forces moving along also to support him. The Pelo- B.C. 4«j.
ponnesians seeing him coasting along with his ships in battle:
single file, and by this inside the gulf and close in shore ^*,
as they so much wished, at one signal tacked suddenly nesians
and bore down in line at their best speed on the Athenians, fdian°
hoping to cut off the whole squadron. The eleyen lead- tage.
ing vessels, however, escaped the Peloponnesian wing and
its sudden movement, and reached the more open water ;
but the rest were overtaken as they tried to run through,
driven ashore and disabled ; such of the crews being slain
as had not swum out of them. Some of the ships the
Peloponnesians lashed to their own, and towed off empty;
one they took with the men in it ; others were just being
towed off, when they were saved by the Messenians dash-
ing into the sea with their armour and fighting from the
decks that they had boarded.

Thus far victory was with the Peloponnesians, and the
Athenian fleet destroyed ; the twenty ships in the right
wing being meanwhile in chase of the eleven Athenian
vessels that had escaped their sudden movement and
reached the more open water. These, with the exception
of one ship, all outsailed them and got safe into Naupactus,
and forming close in shore opposite the temple of Apollo,
with their prows facing the enemy, prepared to defend
themselves in case the Peloponnesians should sail in shore
against them. After a while the Peloponnesians came
up, chanting the pjean for their victory as they sailed on ;
the single Athenian ship remaining being chased by a
Leucadian far ahead of the rest. Bu* there happened to
be a merchantman lying at anchor in the roadstead, which
the Athenian ship found time to sail round, and struck
the Leucadian in chase amidships and sank her. An
exploit so sudden and unexpected produced a panic
among the Peloponnesians; and having fallen out of

i64 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [92,93

BOOK order in the excitement of victory, some of them dropped
}};_ their oars and stopped their way in order to let the main

B.C. 429. body come up — an unsafe thing to do considering how
Jctory o^ near they were to the enemy's prows ; while others
the Athe- j-an aground in the shallows, in their ignorance of the

mans. , ,.^. °

locahties.

Elated at this incident, the Athenians at one word
gave a cheer, and dashed at the enemy, who, embarrassed
by his mistakes and the disorder in which he found
himself, only stood for an instant, and then fled for
Panormus, whence he had put out. The Athenians
following on his heels took the six vessels nearest them,
and recovered those of their own which had been dis-
abled close in shore and taken in tow at the beginning of
the action ; they killed some of the crews and took some
prisoners. On board the Leucadian which went down
off the merchantman, was the Lacedasmonian Timocrates,
who killed himself when the ship was sunk, and was cast
up in the harbour of Naupactus. The Athenians on
their return set up a trophy on the spot from which they
had put out and turned the day, and picking up the
wrecks and dead that were on their shore, gave back to
the enemy their dead under truce. The Peloponnesians
also set up a trophy as victors for the defeat inflicted
upon the ships they had disabled in shore, and dedicated
the vessel which they had taken at Achaean Rhium, side
bv side with the trophy. After this, apprehensive of the
reinforcement expected from Athens, all except the
Leucadians sailed into the Crisssean gulf for Corinth.
Not long after their retreat, the twenty Athenian ships,
which were to have joined Phormio before the battle,
arrived at Naupactus.

Thus the summer ended. Winter was now at hand ;
but before dispersing the fleet, which had retired to
Corinth and the Crissaean gulf, Cnemus, Brasidas, and
the other Peloponnesian captains allowed themselves to

94] PELOPONNESIAN FLEET AT SALAMIS 165

oe persuaded by the Megarians to make an attempt upon CHAP.
Pirgeus, the port of Athens, which from her decided ^'^
superiority at sea had been naturally left unguarded and ^^^^^^
open. Their plan was as follows : — The men were to su?-
each to take their oar, cushion, and rowlock thong, and pr>/^„^
going overland from Corinth to the sea on the Athenian
side, to get to Megara as quickly as they could, and
launching forty vessels, which happened to be in the
docks at Nisaea, to sail at once to Pirasus. There was
no fleet on the look-out in the harbour, and no one had
the least idea of the enemy attempting a surprise ; while
an open attack would, it was thought, never be deliber-
ately ventured on, or, if in contemplation, would be
speedily known at Athens. Their plan formed, the
next step was to put it in execution. Arriving by night
and launching the vessels from Nisasa, they sailed, not
to Piraeus as they had originally intended, being afraid of
the risk, besides which there was some talk of a wind
having stopped them, but to the point of Salamis that
looks towards Megara ; where there was a fort and a
squadron of three ships to prevent anything saiKng in or
out of Megara. This fort they assaulted, and towed off
the galleys empty, and surprising the inhabitants began to
lay waste the rest of the island.

Meanwhile fire signals were raised to alarm Athens,
and a panic ensued there as serious as any that occurred
during the war. The idea in the city was that the
enemy had already sailed into Piraeus : in Piraeus it was
thought that they had taken Salamis and might at any
moment arrive in the pore ; as indeed might easily have
been done if their hearts had been a little firmer :
certainly no wind would have prevented them. As soon
as day broke the Athenians assembled in full force,
launched their ships, and embarking in haste and uproar
went with the fleet to Salamis, while their soldiery
mounted guard in Piraeus. The Peloponnesians, on

166 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [95,96

BOOK becoming aware of the coming relief, afcer they had
iL overrun most of Salamis, hastily sailed off with their

B.C. 429. plunder and captives and the three ships from Fort
fion of Budorum to Nissea ; the state of their shirks also causing

S'talces them some anxiety, as it was a long while since they had
Perdic- been launched, and they were not water-tight. Arrived
"^" at Megara, they returned back on foot to Corinth. The
Athenians finding them no longer at Salamis, sailed back
themselves ; and after this made arrangements for guard-
ing Piraeus more diligently in future, by closing the
harbours, and by other suitable precautions.

About the same time, at the beginning of this winter,
Sitalces, son of Teres, the Odrysian king of Thrace,
made an expedition against Perdiccas, son of Alexander,
king of Macedonia, and the Chalcidians in the neighbour-
hood of Thrace ; his object being to enforce one promise
and fulfil another. On the one hand Perdiccas had made
him a promise, when hard pressed at the commencement
of the war, upon condition that Sitalces should reconcile
the Athenians to him and not attempt to restore his
brother and enemy, the pretender Philip, but had not
offered to fulfil his engagement ; on the other he,
Sitalces, on entering into alliance with the Athenians,
had agreed to put an end to the Chalcidian war in
Thrace. These were the two objects of his invasion.
With him he brought Amyntas, the son of Philip, whom
he destined for the throne of Macedonia, and some
Athenian envoys then at his court on this business, and
Hagnon as genera! ; for the Athenians were to join him
against the Chalcidians with a fleet and as many soldiers
as they could get together.

Beginning with the Odrysians, he first called out the
Thracian tribes subject to him between mounts Haemus
and Rhodope and the Euxine and Hellespont ; next the
Getae beyond Haemus, and the other hordes settled
south o{ the Danube in the neighbourhood of the

97] THRACIAN IRRUPTION 167

Euxine, who, like the Getas, border on the Scythians CHAP.

and are armed in the same manner, being all mounted '

archers. Besides these he summoned many of the Hill B.C. 429-
Thracian independent swordsmen, called Dii and mostly odrysian
inhabiting Mount Rhodope, some of whom came as empire,
mercenaries, others as volunteers ; also the Agrianes and
Laeans, and the rest of the Paeonian tribes in his empire,
at the confines of which these lay, extending up to the
Laeaean Pasonians and the river Strymon, which flows
from Mount Scombrus through the country of the
Agrianes and Laeseans ; there the empire of Sitalces
ends and the territory of the independent Paeonians
begins. Bordering on the Triballi, also independent,
were the Treres and Tilataeans, who dwell to the north
of Mount Scombrus and extend towards the setting sun
as far as the river Oskius. This river rises in the same
mountains as the Nestus and Hebrus, a wild and extensive
range connected with Rhodope.

The empire of the Odrysians extended along the sea-
board from Abdera to the mouth of the Danube in the
Euxine. The navigation of this coast by the shortest
route takes a merchantman four days and four nights
with a wind astern the whole way : by land an active
man, travelling by the shortest road, can get from Abdera
to the Danube in eleven days. Such was the length of
its coast line. Inland from Byzantium to the Laeasans
and the Strymon, the farthest limit of its extension into
the interior, it is a journey of thirteen days for an active
man. The tribute from ail the barbarian districts and the
Hellenic cities, taking what they brought in under
Seuthes, the successor of Sitalces, who raised it to its
greatest height, amounted to about four hundred talents
in gold and silver. There were also presents in gold
and silver to a no less amount, besides stuff, plain and
embroidered, and other articles, made not only for the
king, but also for the Odrysian lords and nobles. For

i68 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [98

BOOK there was here established a custom opposite to that
"• prevailing in the Persian kingdom, namely, of taking
B.C. 429- rather than giving ; more disgrace being attached to not
Sifalcesf g^^'^g when asked than to asking and being refused ; and
army, although this prevailed elsewhere in Thrace, it was prac-
tised most extensivelv among the powerful Odrysians, it
being impossible to get anything done without a present.
It was thus a very powerful kingdom ; in revenue and
general prosperity surpassing all in Europe between the
Ionian gulf and the Euxine, and in numbers and military
resources coming decidedly next to the Scythians, with
whom indeed no people in Europe can bear comparison,
there not being even in Asia any nation singly a match
for them if unanimous, though of course they are not on
a level with other races in general intelligence and the
arts of civilised life.

It was the master of this empire that now prepared
to take the field. When everything was ready, he set
out on his march for Macedonia, first through his own
dominions, next over the desolate range of Cercme that
divides the Simians and Paeonians, crossing by a road
which he had made by feUing the timber on a former
campaign against the latter people. Passing over these
mountains, with the Pasonians on his right and the
Sintians and Maedians on the left, he finally arrived at
Doberus, in Paeonia, losing none of his army on the
march, except perhaps by sickness, but receiving some
augmentations, many of the independent Thracians volun-
teering to join him in the hope of plunder ; so that the
whole is said to have formed a grand total of a hundred
and fifty thousand. Most of this was infantry, though
there was about a third cavalry, furnished principally by
the Odrysians themselves and next to them by the Getae.
The most warlike of the infantry were the independent
swordsmen who came down from Rhodope ; the rest of
the mixed multitude that followed him being chiefly for-
midable by their numbers.

99, lOo] THRACIAN IRRUPTION 169

Assembling in Doberus, they prepared for descending CHAP

from the heights upon Lower Macedonia, where the '

dominions of Perdiccas lay; for the Lyncestae, Elimiots, ^9-.^9-
and other tribes more inland, though Macedonians by the king-
biood and allies and dependents of their kindred, still ^™ °^^
have their own separate governments. The country on donia.
the sea coast, now called Macedonia, was first acquired
by Alexander, the father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors,
originally Temenids from Argos. This was effected by
the expulsion from Pieria of the Pierians, who afterwards
inhabited Phagres and other places under Mount Pangseus,
beyond the Strymon (indeed the country between Pan-
gasus and the sea is still called the Pierian gulf) ; of the
Bottiseans, at present neighbours of the Chalcidians, from
Bottia, and by the acquisition in Paeonia of a narrow
etrip along the river Axius extending to Peila and the
sea ; the district of Mygdonia, between the Axius and
the Strymon, being also added by the expulsion of the
Edonians. From Eordia also were driven the Eordians,
most of whom perished, though a few of them still live
round Physca, and the Almopians from Almopia. These
Macedonians also conquered places belonging to the other
tribes, which are still theirs — Anthemus, Crestonia, Bis-
altia, and much of Macedonia Proper. The whole is
now called Macedonia, and at the time of the invasion
of Sitalces, Perdiccas, Alexander's son, was the reigning

king-

These Macedonians, unable to take the field against so
numerous an invader, shut themselves up in such strong
places and fortresses as the country possessed. Of these
there was no great number, most of those now found in
the country having been erected subsequently by Archelaus,
the son of Perdiccas, on his accession, who also cut straight
roads, and otherwise put the kingdom on a better footing
as regards horses, heavy infantry, and other war material
than had been done by all the eight kings that preceded

170 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [loi

BOOK him. Advancing from Doberus, the Thracian host first
"• invaded what had been once Philip's government, and
B.C. 429- took Idomene by assault, Gortynia, Atalanta, and some
'^'^of'the other places by negotiation, these last coming over for love
Thracian of Philip's son, Amyntas, then with Sitalces. Laying
siege to Europus, and failing to take it, he next advanced
into the rest of Macedonia to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus,
not proceeding beyond this into Bottia and Pieria, but
staying to lay waste Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus.
The Macedonians never even thought of meeting him
with infantry ; but the Thracian host was, as opportunity
offered, attacked by handfuls of their horse, which had
been reinforced from their allies in the interior. Armed
with cuirasses, and excellent horsemen, wherever these
charged they overthrew all before them, but ran con-
siderable risk in entangling themselves in the masses of
the enemy, and so finally desisted from these efibrts, de-
ciding that they were not strong enough to venture against
numbers so superior.

Meanwhile Sitalces opened negotiations with Perdiccas
on the objects of his expedition; and finding that the
Athenians, not believing that he would come, did not
appear with their fleet, though they sent presents and
envoys, despatched a large part of his army against the
Chalcidians and Bottiasans, and shutting them up inside
their walls laid waste their country. While he remained
in these parts, the people farther south, such as the
Thessalians, Magnetes, and the other tribes subject to
the Thessalians, and the Hellenes as far as Thermopylae,
all feared that the army might advance against them, and
prepared accordingly. These fears were shared by the
Thracians beyond the Strymon to the north, who in-
habited the plains, such as the Panaeans, the Odomanti,
the Droi and the Dersasans, all of whom are independent.
It was even matter of conversation among the Hellenes
who were enemies of Athens whether he might not be

102] WESTERN GREECE 171

invited by his ally to advance also against them. Mean- CHAP.
while he held Chalcidice and Bottice and Macedonia,
and was ravaging them ail ; but finding that he was not B.C. 429.
succeeding in any of the objects of his invasion, and that in Acar-
his army was without provisions and was suffering from °a-oia.
the severity of the season, he listened to the advice of
Seuthes, son of Sparadocus, his nephew and highest
officer, and decided to retreat without delay. This
Seuthes had been secretly gained by Perdiccas by the
promise of his sister in marriage with a rich dowry. In
accordance with this advice, and after a stay of thirty
days in all, eight of which were spent in Chalcidice,
he retired home as quickly as he could ; and Perdiccas
afterwards gave his sister Stratonice to Seuthes as he
had promised. Such was the history of the expedition
of Sitalces.

In the course of this winter, after the dispersion of the
Peloponnesian fleet, the Athenians in Naupactus, under
Phormio, coasted along to Astacus and disembarked, and
marched into the interior of Acarnania with four hundred
Athenian heavy infantry and four hundred Messenians.
After expelling some suspected persons from Stratus,
Coronta, and other places, and restoring Cynes, son of
Theolytus, to Coronta, they returned to their ships, de-
ciding that it was impossible in the winter season to
march against (Eniadge, a place which, unlike the
rest of Acarnania, had been always hostile to them ;
for the river Achelous flowing from Mount Pindus
through Dolopia and the country of the Agraeans and
Amphilochians and the plain of Acarnania, past the town
of Stratus in the upper part of its course, forms lakes
where it falls into the sea round CEniadae, and thus
makes it impracticable for an army in wmter by reason
of the water. Opposite to CEniadae lie most of the
islands called Echinades, so close to the mouths of the
Achelous that that powerful stream is constantly forming

172 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [103

BOOK deposits against them, and has already joined some of
"• the islands to the continent, and seems likely in no long
B.C. 439, while to do the same with the rest. For the current is
'^^%'f^the strong, deep, and turbid, and the islands are so thick to-
Acbelous. gether that they serve to imprison the alluvial deposit and
prevent its dispersing, lying, as they do, not in one line,
but irregularly, so as to leave no direct passage for the
water into the open sea. The islands in question are
uninhabited and of no great size. There is also a story
that Alcmaeon, son of Amphiraus, during his wanderings
after the murder of his mother was bidden by Apollo to
inhabit this spot, through an oracle which intimated that
he would have no release from his terrors until he should
find a country to dwell in which had not been seen by
the sun, or existed as land at the time he slew his
mother ; all else being to him polluted ground. Per-
plexed at this, the story goes on to say, he at last observed
this deposit of the Achelous, and considered that a place
sufficient to support life upon, might have been thrown up
during the long interval that had elapsed since the death of
his mother and the beginning of his wanderings. Settling,
therefore, in the district round CEniadas, he founded a
dominion, and left the country its name from his son
Acarnan. Such is the story we have received concerning
Alcmaeon.

The Athenians and Phormio putting back from Acar-
nania and arriving at Naupactus, sailed home to Athens
in the spring, taking with them the ships that they had
captured, and such of the prisoners made in the late
actions as were freemen ; who were exchanged, man for
man. And so ended this winter, and the third year of
this war, of which Thucydides was the historian.

1,2]

BOOK III

CHAPTER IX

Fourth and Fifth Years of the War— Revolt of Mitylene

The next summer, just as the corn was getting ripe, the CHAP.
Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica under the _[^
command of Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of B.C. 428.
the Lacedaemonians, and sat down and ravaged the land ; of^ttTcL
the Athenian horse as usual attacking them, wherever it
was practicable, and preventing the mass of the light
troops from advancing from their camp and wasting the
parts near the city. After staying the time fcr which
they had taken provisions, the invaders retired and dis-
persed to their several cities.

Immediately after the invasion of the Peloponnesians
all Lesbos, except Methymna, revolted from the Athe-
nians. The Lesbians had wished to revolt even before
the war, but the Lacedaemonians would not receive them ;
and yet now when they did revolt, they were compelled
to do so sooner than they had intended. While they
were waiting until the moles for their harbours and the
ships and walls that they had in building should be finished,
and for the arrival of archers and corn and other things
that they were engaged in fetching from the Pontus, the
Tenedians, with whom they were at enmity, and the
Methymnians, and some factious persons in Mitylene itself,
who were Proxeni of Athens, informed the Athenians

X73

174 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [3

BOOK that the Mitylenians were forcibly uniting the island under
their sovereignty, and that the preparations about which
B.C. 428. they were so active, were all concerted with the Boeotians
ans send their kindred and the Lacedsemonians with a view to a
^L ^^b ^° revolt, and that unless they were immediately prevented,
Athens would lose Lesbos.

However, the Athenians, distressed by the plague, and
by the war that had recently broken out and was now
raging, thought it a serious matter to add Lesbos with
its fleet and untouched resources to the list of their
^ /i enemies ; and at first would not believe the charge, giving
"^ I too much weight to their wish that it might not be true.
But when an embassy which they sent had failed to per-
suade the Mitylenians to give up the union and preparations
complained of, they became alarmed, and resolved to strike
the first blow. They accordingly suddenly sent off forty
ships that had been got ready to sail round Peloponnese,
under the command of Cleippides, son of Deinias, and
two others ; word having been brought them of a festival
in honour of the Malean Apollo outside the town, which
is kept by the whole people of Mitylene, and at which,
if haste were made, they might hope to take them by
surprise. If this plan succeeded, well and good ; if not,
they were to order the Mitylenians to deliver up their
ships and to pull down their walls, and if they did not
obey, to declare war. The ships accordingly set out ; the
ten galleys, forming the contingent of the Mitylenians
present with the fleet according to the terms of the alliance,
being detained by the Athenians, and their crews placed
in custody. However, the Mitylenians were informed of
the expedition by a man who crossed from Athens to Eu-
bcea, and going overland to Geraestus, sailed from thence
by a merchantman which he found on the point of put-
ting to sea, and so arrived at Mitylene the third day after
leaving Athens. The Mitylenians accordingly refrained
from going out to the temple at Malea, and moreover

4,5] REVOLT OF MITYLENE 175

barricaded and kept guard round the half-finished parts CHAP.
of their walls and harbours. 1

When the Athenians sailed in not long after and saw BX. 428.
how things stood, the generals delivered their orders, and begins at
upon the Mitylenians refusing to obey, commenced hos- Mitylene.
tilities. The Mitylenians, thus compelled to go to war
without notice and unprepared, at first sailed out with
their fleet and made some show of fighting, a little in
front of the harbour ; but being driven back by the
Athenian ships, immediately offered to treat with the
commanders, wishing, if possible, to get the ships away
for the present upon any tolerable terms. The Athenian
commanders accepted their offers, being themselves fear-
ful that they might not be able to cope with the whole
of Lesbos ; and an armistice having been concluded, the
Mitylenians sent to Athens one of the informers, already
repentant of his conduct, and others with him, to try
to persuade the Athenians of the innocence of their
intentions and to get the fleet recalled. In the meantime,
having no great hope of a favourable answer from Athens,
they also sent off a galley with envoys to Lacedgsmon,
unobserved by the Athenian fleet which was anchored at
Malea to the north of the town.

While these envoys, reaching Lacedsemon after a
difficult journey across the open sea, were negotiating for
succours being sent them, the ambassadors from Athens
returned without having effected anything ; and hostilities
were at once begun by the Mitylenians and the rest of
Lesbos, with the exception of the Methymnians, who
came to the aid of the Athenians with the Imbrians and
Lemnians and some few of the other allies. The Mity-
lenians made a sortie with all their forces against the
Athenian camp; and a battle ensued, in which they
gained some slight advantage, but retired notwithstanding,
not feeling sufficient confidence in themselves to spend
the night upon the field. After this they kept quiet,

176 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [6,7

BOOK wishing to wait for the chance of reinforcements arriving
from Peloponnese before making a second venture, being

B.C. 428. encouraged by the arrival of Meleas, a Laconian, and
son in Hermaeondas, a Theban, who had been sent off before
Acar- t^e insurrection but had been unable to reach Lesbos
before the Athenian expedition, and who now stole in
in a galley after the battle, and advised them to send
another galley and envoys back with them, which the
Mitylenians accordingly did.

Meanwhile the Athenians, greatly encouraged by the
inaction of the Mitylenians, summoned allies to their aid,
who came in all the quicker from seeing so little vigour
displayed by the Lesbians, and bringing roand their ships
to a new station to the south of the town, fortified two
camps, one on each side of the city, and instituted a
blockade of both the harbours. The sea was thus closed
against the Mitylenians, who however commanded the
whole country, with the rest of the Lesbians who had
now joined them ; the Athenians only holding a limited
area round their camps, and using Malea more as the
station for their ships and their market.

While the war went on in this way at Mitylene, the
Athenians, about the same time in this summer, also
sent thirty ships to Peloponnese under Asopius, son of
Phormio ; the Acarnanians insisting that the commander
sent should be some son or relative of Phormio. As the
ships coasted along shore they ravaged the seaboard of
Laconia ; after which Asopius sent most of the fleet
home, and himself went on with twelve vessels to Nau-
pactus, and afterwards raising the whole Acarnanian
population made an expedition against CEniada?, the fleet
sailing along the Achelous, while the army laid waste
the country. The inhabitants, however, showing no
signs of submitting, he dismissed the land forces and
himself sailed to Leucas, and making a descent upon
Nericus was cut off during his retreat, and most of his

8, 9, lo] REVOLT OF MITYLENE 177

troops with him, by the people in those parts aided by CHAP.

some coast-guards ; after which the Athenians sailed 1

away, recovering their dead from the Leucadians under B.C. 428.
^ ° Speech of

truce. Mity.

Meanwhile the envoys of the Mitylenians sent out in g^jj"^^ ^^
the first ship were told by the Lacedaemonians to come Olympia.
to Olympia, in order that the rest of the allies might hear
them and decide upon their matter, and so they journeyed
thither. It was the Olympiad in which the Rhodian
Dorieus gained his second victory, and the envoys having
been introduced to make their speech after the festival,
spoke as follows.

* Lacedaemonians and allies, the rule established among
the Hellenes is not unknown to us. Those who revolt in
war and forsake their former confederacy are favourably
regarded by those who receive them, in so far as they are
of use to them, but otherwise are thought less well of,
through being considered traitors to their former friends.
Nor is this an unfair way of judging, where the rebels
and the power from whom they secede are at one in
policy and sympathy, and a match for each other in
resources and power, and where no reasonable ground
exists for the rebellion. But with us and the Athenians
this was not the case ; and no one need think the worse
of us for revolting from them in danger, after having
been honoured by them in time of peace.

' Justice and honesty will be the first topics of our
speech, especially as we are asking for alliance ; because
we know that there can never be any solid friendship
between individuals, or union between communities that
is worth the name, unless the parties be persuaded of
each other's honesty, and be generally congenial the one
to the other ; since from difference in feeling springs
also difference in conduct. Between ourselves and the
Athenians alliance began, when you withdrew from the
Median war and they remained to finish the business.
G 455

178 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [ii

BOOK But we did not become allies of the Athenians for the

]}}i subjugation of the Hellenes, but allies of the Hellenes

B.C. 4*8. for their liberation from the Mede ; and as long as the

status Athenians led us fairly we followed them loyally ; but

as inde- ^vhen we saw them relax their hostility to the Mede, to

^^alUes try to compass the subjection of the allies, then our

was pre- apprehensions began. Unable, however, to unite and
canous. rr o r i t_ r

defend themselves, on account ot the number or con-
federates that had votes, all the allies were enslaved,
except ourselves and the Chians, who continued to send
our contingents as independent and nominally free. Trust
in Athens as a leader, however, we could no longer feel,
judging by the examples already given ; it being unlikely
that she would reduce our fellow-confederates, and not
do the same by us who were left, if ever she had the
power.

* Had we all been still independent, we could have
had more faith in their not attempting any change; but
the greater number being their subjects, while they were
treating us as equals, they would naturally chate under
this solitary instance of independence as contrasted with
the submission of the majority ; particularly as they
daily grew more powerful, and we more destitute. Now
I the onlv sure basis of an alliance is for each party to
I be equally afraid of the other : he who would like to
/ encroach is then deterred by the reflexion that he will
not have odds in his favour. Again, if we were left
independent, it was only because they thouj^ht they saw
their way to empire more clearly by specious language
and by the paths of policy than by those of force. Not
only were we useful as evidence that powers who had
votes, like themselves, would not, surely, join them in
their expeditions, against their will, without the party
attacked being in the wrong ; but the same system also
enabled them to lead the stronger states against the
weaker first, and so to leave the former to the last,

12, 133 REVOLT OF MITYLENE 179

stripped of their natural allies, and less capable of CHAP

resistance. But if they had begun with us, while all

the states still had their resources under their own |-^-4?*-
control, and there was a centre to rally round, the work off%om
of subjugation would have been found less easy. Besides ^^g®°^i
this, our navy gave them some apprehension : it was acting
always possible that it might unite with you or with some JfeSice.
other power, and become dangerous to Athens. The
court which we paid to their commons and its leaders
for the time being, also helped us to maintain our
iDdependence. However, we did not expect to be able
to do so much longer, if this war had not broken out,
from the examples that we had had of their conduct to
the rest.

* How then could we put our trust in such friendship or
freedom as we had here ? We accepted each other against
our inclination ; fear made them court us in war, and
us them in peace ; sympathy, the ordinary basis of con-
fidence, had its place supplied by terror, fear having more
share than friendship in detaining us in the alliance ; and
the first party that should be encouraged by the hope of
impunity was certain to break faith with the other. So
that to condemn us for being the first to break off,
because they delay the blow that we dread, instead of
ourselves delaying to know for certain whether it will
be dealt or not, is to take a false view of the case. For
if we were equally able with them to meet their plots
and imitate their delay, we should be their equals and
should be under no necessity of being their subjects ; but
the liberty of offence being always theirs, that of defence
ought clearly to be ours.

' Such, Lacedaemonians and allies, are the grounds and
the reasons of our revolt ; clear enough to convince our
hearers of the fairness of our conduct, and sufficient to
alarm ourselves, and to make us turn to some means of
safety. This we wished to do long ago, when we sent ,

i8o THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [13

BOOK to you on the subject while the peace yet lasted, but
^ were baulked by your refusing to receive us ; and now,
B.C. 4*8. upon the Boeotians inviting us, we at once responded
the^M?ty- to the call, and decided upon a twofold revolt, from
lenian thg Hellenes and from the Athenians, not to aid the
Lace- latter in harming the former, but to join in their libera-
damon. ^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^ allow the Athenians in the end to
destroy us, but to act in time against them. Our revoh,
however, has taken place prematurely and without pre-
paration— a fact which makes it all the more incumbent
on you to receive us into alliance and to send us speedy
relief, in order to show that you support your friends,
and at the same time do harm to your enemies. You
have an opportunity such as you never had before.
Disease and expenditure have wasted the Athenians :
their ships are either cruising round your coasts, or
engaged in blockading us ; and it is not probable that
they will have any to spare, if you invade them a second
time this summer by sea and land ; but they will either
offer no resistance to your vessels, or withdraw from
both our shores. Nor must it be thought that this is
a case of putting yourselves into danger for a country
which is not yours. Lesbos may appear far off, but
when help is wanted she will be found near enough.
It is not in Attica that the war will be decided, as
some imagine, but in the countries by which Attica is
supported ; and the Athenian revenue is drawn from the
allies, and will become still larger if they reduce us ; as
not only will no other state revolt, but our resources will
be added to theirs, and we shall be treated worse than
those that were enslaved before. But if you will frankly
support us, you will add to your side a state that has a
large navy, which is your great want ; you will smooth
the way to the overthrow of the Athenians by depriving
them of their allies, who will be greatly encouraged to
come over ; and you will free yourselves from the im-

14, 15. i6] REVOLT OF MITYLENE i8i

putation made against you, of not supporting insurrection. CHAP
In short, only show yourselves as liberators, and you may i^
count upon having the advantage in the war. B.C. 428.

* Respect, therefore, the hopes placed in you by the received
Hellenes, and that Olympian Zeus, in whose temple we '^^^^ the
stand as very suppliants ; become the allies and defenders nesian
of the Mitylenians, and do not sacrifice us, who put our ^®^^^
lives upon the hazard, in a cause in which general good
will result to all from our success, and still more general
harm if we fail through your refusing to help us ; but
be the men that the Hellenes think, you, and our fears
desire.*

Such were the words of the Mitylenians. After hearing
them out, the Lacedaemonians and confederates granted
what they urged, and took the Lesbians into alliance,
and deciding in favour of the invasion of Attica, told
the allies present to march as quickly as possible to the
Isthmus with two-thirds of their forces ; and arriving
there first themselves, got ready hauling machines to
carry their ships across from Corinth to the sea on the
side of Athens, in order to make their attack by sea and
land at once. However, the zeal which they displayed
was not imitated by the rest of the confederates, who
came in but slowly, being engaged in harvesting their
corn and sick of making expeditions.

Meanwhile the Athenians, aware that the preparations
of the enemy were due to his conviction of their weak-
ness, and wishing to show him that he was mistaken, and
that they were able, without moving the Lesbian fleet, to
repel with ease that with which they were menaced from
Peloponnese, manned a hundred ships by embarking the
citizens of Athens, except the knights and Pentecosio-
medimni, and the resident aliens ; and putting out to the
Isthmus, displayed their power, and made descents upon
Peloponnese wherever they pleased. A disappointment so
signal made the Lacedaemonians think that the Lesbians

i82 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [17. 18

BOOK had not spoken the truth ; and embarrassed by the non-
^ appearance of the confederates, coupled with the news

B.C. 428. that the thirty ships round Peloponnese were ravaging

of^Athe- the lands near Sparta, they went back home. After-
nian wards, however, they got ready a fleet to send to Lesbos,

commis- and ordering a total of forty ships from the different cities
^'°°* in the league, appointed Alcidas to command the expedi-
tion in his capacity of high admiral. Meanwhile the
Athenians in the hundred ships, upon seeing the Lacedae-
monians go home, went home likewise.

If at the time that this fleet was at sea, Athens had
almost the largest number of first-rate ships in commis-
sion that she ever possessed at any one moment, she had
as many or even more when the war began. At that
time one hundred guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis ;
a hundred more were cruising round Peloponnese, besides
those employed at Potidgea and in other places ; making
a grand total of two hundred and fifty vessels employed
on active service in a single summer. It was this, with
Potidaea, that most exhausted her revenues — Potidasa
being blockaded by a force of heavy infantry (each draw-
ing two drachmas a day, one for himself and another for
his servant), which amounted to three thousand at first,
and was kept at this number down to the end of the
siege ; besides sixteen hundred with Phormio who went
away before it was over ; and the ships being ail paid at
the same rate. In this way her money was wasted at
first ; and this was the largest number of ships ever
'' manned by her.

About the same time that the Lacedaemonians were at
the Isthmus, the Mitylenians marched by land with their
mercenaries against Methymna, which they thought to
gain by treachery. After assaulting the town, and not
meeting with the success that they anticipated, they with-
drew to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus ; and taking measures
for the better security of these towns and strengthening

19, 2o] REVOLT OF MITYLENE 183

their walls, hastily returned home. After their departure CHAP
the Methymnians marched against Antissa, but were de- }^
feated in a sortie by the Antissians and their mercenaries, B.C. 4j8.
and retreated in haste after losing many of their number, invests
Word of this reaching Athens, and the Athenians learn- Mitylene
ing that the Mitylenians were masters of the country and
their own soldiers unable to hold them in check, they
sent out about the beginning of autumn Paches, son of
Epicurus, to take the command, and a thousand Athenian
heavy infantry ; who worked their own passage, and
arriving at Mitylene, built a single wall all round it, forts
being erected at some of the strongest points. Mitylene
was thus blockaded strictly on both sides, by land and by
sea ; and winter now drew near.

The Athenians needing money for the siege, although , ,
they had for the first time raised a contribution of two
hundred talents from their own citizens, now sent out
twelve ships to levy subsidies from their allies, with
Lysicles and four others in command. After cruising
to different places and laying them under contribution,
Lysicles went up the country from Myus, in Caria, across
the plain of the Meander, as far as the hill of Sandius ;
and being attacked by the Carians and the people of
Anaia, was slain with many of his soldiers.

The same winter the Plataeans, who were still being
besieged by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians, distressed
by the failure of their provisions, and seeing no hope of
relief from Athens, nor any other means of safety, formed
a scheme with the Athenians besieged with them for
escaping, if possible, by forcing their way over the enemy's
walls ; the attempt having been suggested by Theaenetus,
son of Tolmides, a soothsayer, and Eupompides, son of
Daimachus, one of their generals. At first all were to
join : afterwards, half hung back, thinking the risk great;
about two hundred and twenty, however, voluntarily
persevered in the attempt, which was carried out in the

i84 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [21

BOOK following way. Ladders were made to match the height
]}};_ of the enemy's wall, which they measured by the layers

B.C. 428. of bricks, the side turned towards them not being

siegers' thoroughly whitewashed. These were counted by many
lines persons at once ; and though some might miss the right

Plataea, calculation, most would hit upon it, particularly as they
counted over and over again, and were no great way from
the wall, but could see it easily enough for their purpose.
The length required for the ladders was thus obtamed,
being calculated from the breadth of the brick.

Now the wall of the Peloponnesians was constructed as
follows. It consisted of two hnes drawn round the place,
one against the Plataeans, the other against any attack on
the outside from Athens, about sixteen feet apart. The
intermediate space of sixteen feet was occupied by huts
portioned out among the soldiers on guard, and built in
one block, so as to give the appearance of a single thick
wall with battlements on either side. At intervals of
every ten battlements were towers of considerable size,
and the same breadth as the wall, reaching right across
from its inner to its outer face, with no means of passing
except through the middle. Accordingly -on stormy and
wet nights the battlements were deserted, and guard kept
from the towers, which were not far apart and roofed
in above.

Such being the structure ot the wall by which the
Plataeans were blockaded, when their preparations were
completed, they waited for a stormy night of wind and
rain and without any moon, and then set out, guided by
the authors of the enterprise. Crossing first the ditch
that ran round the town, they next gained the wall of the
enemy unperceived by the sentinels, who did not see them
in the darkness, or hear them, as the wind drowned with
its roar the noise of their approach ; besides which they
kept a good way off from each other, that they might not
be betrayed by the clash of their weapons. They were

22] ESCAPE FROM PLAT^A 185

also lightly equipped, and had only the left foot shod to CHAP.

preserve them from slipping in the mire. They came up 1

to the battlements at one of the intermediate spaces where |j-^JJ^-
they knew them to be unguarded : those who carried the piata;ans
ladders went first and planted them ; next twelve light- ^^^^^^^^
armed soldiers with only a dagger and a breastplate
mounted, led by Ammias, son of Coroebus, who was
the first on the wall ; his followers getting up after him
and going six to each of the towers. After these
came another party of light troops armed with spears,
whose shields, that they might advance the easier, were
carried by men behind, who were to hand them to them
when they found themselves in presence of the enemy.
After a good many had mounted they were discovered by
the sentinels in the towers, by the noise made by a tile
which was knocked down by one of the Piataeans as he
v/as laying hold of the battlements. The alarm was
instantly given, and the troops rushed to the wall, not
knowing the nature of the danger, owing to the dark
night and stormy weather ; the Platseans in the town
having also chosen that moment to make a sortie against
the wall of the Peloponnesians upon the side opposite to
that on which their men were getting over, in order to
divert the attention of the besiegers. Accordingly they
remained distracted at their several posts, without any
venturing to stir to give help from his own station, and at
a loss to guess what was going on. Meanwhile the three
hundred set aside for service on emergencies went outside
the wall in the direction of the alarm. Fire-signals of an
attack were also raised towards Thebes ; but the Piataeans
in the town at once displayed a number of others, pre-
pared beforehand for this very purpose, in order to render
the enemy's signals unintelligible, and to prevent his
friends getting a true idea of what was passing and coming
to his aid, before their comrades who had gone out should
have mad6 good their escape and be in safety.

*G 455

i86 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [23,24

BOOK Meanwhile the first of the scaling-party that had got
l^ up, after carrying both the towers and putting the sentinels
B.C. 4*8. to the sword, posted themselves inside to prevent any one
storm coming through against them ; and rearing ladders from
^^^th""- ^^^ wall, sent several men up on the towers, and from
escape, their summit and base kept in check all of the enemy that
came up, with their missiles, while their main body
planted a number of ladders against the wall, and knocking
down the battlements, passed over between the towers ;
each as soon as he had got over taking up his station at
the edge of the ditch, and plying from thence with
arrows and darts any who came along the wall to stop
the passage of his comrades. When all were over, the
partv on the towers came down, the last of them not
without difficulty, and proceeded to the ditch, just as the
three hundred came up carrying torches. The Plataeans,
standing on the edge of the ditch in the dark, had a good
view of their opponents, and discharged their arrows and
darts upon the unarmed parts of their bodies, while they
themselves could not be so well seen in the obscurity for
the torches ; and thus even the last of them got over the
ditch, though not without effort and diiriculty; as ice had
formed in it, not strong enough to walk upon, but of that
watery kind which generally comes with a wind more east
than north, and the snow which this wind had caused to
fall during the night had made the water in the ditch rise,
so that they could scarcely breast it as they crossed.
However, it was mainly the violence of the storm that
enabled them to effect their escape at all.

Starting from the ditch, the Plataeans went all together
along the road leading to Thebes, keeping the chapel of
the hero Androcrates upon their right ; considering that
the last road which the Peloponnesians would suspect
them of having taken would be that towards their enemies*
country. Indeed thev could see them pursuing with
torches upon the Athens road towards Cithaeron and

25, 26] REVOLT OF MITYLENE 187

Druos-kephalai or Oakheads. After going for rather CHAP,
more than half a mile upon the road to Thebes, the i^
Plataeans turned off and took that leading to the moun- B.C. 4ia
tain, to Erythrae and Hysise, and reaching the hills, made monfans"
good their escape to Athens, two hundred and twelve men sTlithu-:
in all ; some of their number having turned back into the to Mity-'
town before getting over the wall, and one archer having ®°®'
been taken prisoner at the outer ditch. Meanwhile the
Peloponnesians gave up the pursuit and returned to their
posts ; and the Plataeans in the town, knowing nothing of
what had passed, and informed by those who had turned
back that not a man had escaped, sent out a herald as
soon as it was day to make a truce for the recovery of the
dead bodies, and then learning the truth, desisted. In
this way the Plataean party got over and were saved.

Towards the close of the same winter, Salaethus, a
Lacedaemonian, was sent out in a galley from Lacedaemon
to Mitylene. Going by sea to Pyrrha, and from thence
overland, he passed along the bed of a torrent, where the
line of circumvallation wa.5 passable, and thus entering
unperceived into Mitylene, told the magistrates that Attica
would certainly be invaded, and the forty ships destined
to relieve them arrive, and that he had been sent on to
announce this and to superintend matters generally. The
Mitylenians upon this took courage, and laid aside the
idea of treating with the Athenians ; and now this winter
ended, and with it ended the fourth year of the war of
which Thucydides was the historian.

The next summer the Peloponnesians sent off the forty-
two ships for Mitylene, under Alcidas, their high admiral,
and themselves and their allies invaded Attica, their
object being to distract the Athenians by a double move-
ment, and thus to make it less easy for them to act against
the fleet sailing to Mitylene. The commander in this
invasion was Cleomenes, in the place of King Pausanias,
son of Pieistoanax, his nephew, who was still a nucor.

i88 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [27, 28

BOOK Not content with laying v/aste whatever had shot up in

1 the parts which they had before devastated, the invaders

B.C. 427. now extended their ravages to lands passed over in their
Mity- . . ° , , . f .

lenians previous incursions ; so that this invasion was more

^ d"/to s^^^^'^^y ^^^^ ^y ^^^ Athenians than any except the second ;

Paches. the enemy staying on and on until they had overrun most

of the country, in the expectation of hearing from Lesbos

of something having been achieved by their fleet, which

they thought must now have got over. However, as

they did not obtain any of the results expected, and their

provisions began to run short, they retreated and dispersed

to their different cities.

In the meantime the Mitylenians, finding their pro-
visions failing, while the fleet from Peloponnese was
loitering on the way instead of appearing at Mitylene,
were compelled to come to terms with the Athenians in
the following manner. Salaethus having himself ceased
to expect the fleet to arrive, now armed the commons
with heavy armour, which they had not before possessed,
with the intention of making a sonie against the Athe-
nians. The commons, however, no sooner found them-
selves possessed of arms than they refused any longer to
obey their olhcers ; and forming in knots together, told
the authorities to bring out in public the provisions and
divide them amongst them all, or they would themselves
come to terms with the Athenians and deHver up the
city.

The government, aware of their inability to prevent
this, and of the danger they would be in, if left out of the
capitulation, publicly agreed with Paches and the army to
surrender Mitylene at discretion and to admit the troops
into the town ; upon the understanding that the Mity-
lenians should be allowed to send an embassy to Athens
to plead their cause, and that Paches should not imprison,
make slaves of, or put to death any of the citizens until
its return. Such were the terms of the capitulation ; in

29, 30] REVOLT OF MITYLENE 189

spite of which the chief authors of the negotiation with CHAP
Lacedgemon were so completely overcome by terror when }^
the army entered, that they went and seated themselves B.C. 427
by the altars, from which they were raised up by Paches ^ith tife
under promise that he would do them no wrong, and ^^^.^

, ^ 3.1T1VCS

lodged by him in Tenedos, until he should learn the too late,
pleasure of the Athenians concerning them. Paches also
sent some galleys and seized Antissa, and took such other
military measures as he thought advisable.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesians in the forty ships, who
ought to have made all haste to relieve Mitylene, lost
time in coming round Peloponnese itself, and proceeding
leisurely on the remainder of the voyage, made Delos
without having been seen by the Athenians at Athens,
and from thence arriving at Icarus and Myconus, there
first heard of the fall of Mitylene. Wishing to know
the truth, they put into Embatum, in the Erythraeid, about
seven days atter the capture of the town. Here they
learned the truth, and began to consider what they were
to do ; and Teutiaplus, an Elean, addressed them as
follows ; —

< Alcidas and Peloponnesians who share with me the
command of this armament, my advice is to sail just as
we are to Mitylene, before we have been heard of. We
may expect to find the Athenians as much off their guard
as men generally are who have just taken a city : this
will certainly be so by sea, where they have no idea of
any enemy attacking them, and where our strength, as
it happens, mainly lies ; while even their land forces are
probably scattered about the houses in the carelessness of
victory. If therefore we were to fall upon them suddenly
and in the night, I have hopes, with the help of the
well-wishers that we may have left inside the town, that
we shall become masters of the place. Let us not shrink
from the risk, but let us remember that this is just the occa-
sion for one of the baseless panics common in war ; and

I90 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [31,32

BOOK that to be able to guard against these in one's own case, and

^ to detect the moment when an attack will find an enemy

B.C. 427. at this disadvantage, is what makes a successful general.'

cUity°and These words of Teutiaplus failing to moYe Alcidas,

^ aT ^^d °^ ^0"^^ o^ ^^^ Ionian exiles and the Lesbians with the

expedition began to urge him, since this seemed too

dangerous, to seize one of the Ionian cities or the jEolic

town of Cyme, to use as a base for effecting the revolt of

Ionia. This was by no means a hopeless enterprise, as

their coming was welcome everywhere ; their object would

be by this move to deprive Athens of her chief source of

revenue, and at the same time to saddle her with expense,

if she chose to blockade them ; and they would probably

induce Pissuthnes to join them in the war. However,

Alcidas gave this proposal as bad a reception as the other,

being eager, since he had come too late for Mitylene, to

find himself back in Peloponnese as soon as possible.

Accordingly he put out from Embatum and proceeded
along shore ; and touching at the Teian town, Myonnesus,
there butchered most of the prisoners that he had taken
on his passage. Upon his coming to anchor at Ephesus,
envoys came to him from the Samians at Anaia, and told
him that he was not going the right way to free Hellas in
massacring men who had never raised a hand against him,
and who were not enemies of his, but allies of Athens
against their will, and that if he did not stop he would
turn many more friends into enemies than enemies into
friends. Alcidas agreed to this, and let go all the Chians
still in his hands and some of the others that he had taken ;
the inhabitants, instead of flying at the sight of his vessels,
rather coming up to them, taking them for Athenian,
having no sort of expectation that while the Athenians
commanded the sea Peloponnesian ships would venture
over to Ionia.

From Ephesus Alcidas set sail in haste and fled. He
had been seen by the Salaminian and Paralian galleys,

33,34] REVOLT OF MITYLENE 191

which happened to be sailing from Athens, while still CHAP.
at anchor off Clarus ; and fearing pursuit he now made }^
across the open sea, fully determined to touch nowhere, 8.0.437,
if he could help it, until he got to Peloponnese. Mean- A?ddas.*'
while news of him had come in to Paches from the Pachesat
Erythrasid, and indeed from ail quarters. As Ionia was
unlortiiied great fears were felt that the Peloponnesians
coasticg along shore, even if they did not intend to stay,
might make descents in passing and plunder the towns ;
and now the ParaHan and Salaminian, having seen him
at Clarus, themselves brought intelligence of the fact.
Paches accordingly gave hot chase, and continued the
pursuit as far as the isle of Patmos, and then finding that
Alcidas had got on too far to be overtaken, came back
again. Meanwhile he thought it fortunate that, as he
had not fallen in with them out at sea, he had not over-
taken them anywhere where they would have been forced
to encamp, and so give him the trouble of blockading
them.

On his return along shore he touched, among other
places, at Notium, the port of Colophon, where the Colo-
phonians had settled after the capture of the upper town
by Itamenes and the barbarians, who had been called in
by certain individuals in a party quarrel. The capture
of the town took place about the time of the second
Peloponnesian invasion of Attica. However, the re-
fugees, after settling at Notium, again split up into factions,
one of which called in Arcadian and barbarian mercenaries
from Pissuthnes, and entrenching these in a quarter apart,
formed a new community with the Median party of the
Colophonians who joined them from the upper town.
Their opponents had retired into exile, and now called
in Paches, who invited Hippias, the commander of the
Arcadians in the fortified quarter, to a parley, upon con-
dition that, if they could not agree, he was to be put back
safe and sound in the fortification. However, upon his

192 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [35, 36

BOOK coming out to him, he put him into custody, though not
in chains, and attacked suddenly and took by surprise
B.C. 427. the fortification, and putting the Arcadians and the bar-
nation of barians found in it to the sword, afterwards took Hippias
Mity- into it as he had promised, and, as soon as he was inside,
seized him and shot him down. Paches then gave up
Notium to the Colophonians not of the Median party ;
and settlers were afterwards sent out from Athens, and the
place colonised according to Athenian laws, after collecting
all the Colophonians found in any of the cities.

Arrived at Mitylene, Paches reduced Pyrrha and
Eresus ; and finding the Lacedaemonian, Salasthus, in
hiding in the town, sent him off to Athens, together
with the Mitylenians that he had placed in Tenedos, and
any other persons that he thought concerned in the revolt.
He also sent back the greater part of his forces, remain-
ing with the rest to settle Mitylene and the rest of Lesbos
as he thought best.

Upon the arrival of the prisoners with Salaethus, the
Athenians at once put the latter to death, although he
offered, among other things, to procure the withdrawal of
the Peloponnesians from Plataea, which was still under
siege ; and after deliberating as to what they should do
with the former, in the fury of the moment determined to
put to death not only the prisoners at Athens, but the
whole adult male population of Mitylene, and to make
slaves of the women and children. It was remarked that
Mitylene had revolted without being, like the rest, sub-
jected to the empire ; and what above all swelled the
wrath of the Athenians was the fact of the Peloponnesian
fleet having ventured over to Ionia to her support, a fact
which was held to argue a long meditated rebellion.
They accordingly sent a galley to communicate the decree
to Paches, commanding him to lose no time in despatch-
ing the Mitylenians. The morrow brought repentance
with it and reflexion on the horrid cruelty of a decree,

37] REVOLT OF MITYLENE 193

which condemned a whole city to the fate merited only CHAP.
by the guilty. This was no sooner perceived by the i^
Mitylenian ambassadors at Athens and their Athenian B.C. 427.
supporters, than they moved the authorities to put the tion re^^
question again to the vote ; which they the more easily JJI^J-g'
consented to do, as they themselves plainly saw that most speech,
of the citizens wished some one to give them an oppor-
tunity for reconsidering the matter. An assembly was
therefore at once called, and after much expression of
opinion upon, both sides, Clepn, son of Cleaenetus, the
same who had carried the former motion of putting the
Mitylenians to death, the most violent man at Athens,
and at that time by far the most powerful with the
commons, came forward again and spoke as follows : —

* I have often before now been convinced that a de-
mocracy is incapable of empire, and never more so than
by your present change of mind in the matter of Mitylene.
Fears or plots being unknown to you in your daily re-
lations with each other, you feel just the same with regard
to your allies, and never reflect that the mistakes into
which you may be led by listening to their appeals, or by
giving way to your own compassion, are full of danger to
yourselves, and bring you no thanks for your weakness
from your allies ; entirely forgetting that your empire is
a despotism and your subjects disaffected conspirators,
whose obedience is insured not by your suicidal con-
cessions, but by the superiority given you by your own
strength and not their loyalty. The most alarming feature
in the case is the constant change of measures with which
we appear to be threatened, and our seeming ignorance of
the fact that bad laws which are never changed are better
for a city than good ones that have no authority ; that
unlearned loyalty is more serviceable than quick-witted
insubordination ; and that ordinary men usually manage
public affairs better than their more gifted fellows. The
latter are always wanting to appear wiser than the laws,

194 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [38

BOOK and to overrule every proposition brought forward, think-
l}}^ ing that they cannot show their wit in more important

B.C. 427. matters, and by such behaviour too often ruin their

Athenian country ; while those who mistrust their own cleverness
orators aj-g content to be less learned than the laws, and less able

^°^ ences" to pick holes in the speech of a good speaker ; and being
fair judges rather than rival athletes, generally conduct
affairs successfully. These we ought to imitate, instead
of being led on by cleverness and intellectual rivalry to
advise your people against our real opinions.

* For myself, I adhere to my former opinion, and
wonder at those who have proposed to reopen the case
of the Mitylenians, and who are thus causing a delay
which is all in favour of the guilty, by making the
sufferer proceed against the offender with the edge of
his anger blunted ; although where vengeance follows
most closely upon the wrong, it best equals it and most
amply requites it. I wonder also who will be the man
who will maintain the contrary, and will pretend to show
that the crimes of the Mitylenians are of service to us,
and our misfortunes injurious to the allies. Such a man
must plainly either have such confidence in his rhetoric
as to adventure to prove that what has been once for all
decided is still undetermined, or be bribed to try to delude
us by elaborate sophisms. In such contests the state gives
the rewards to others, and takes the dangers for herself.
The persons to blame are you who are so foolish as to
institute these contests ; who go to see an oration as you
would to see a sight, take your facts on hearsay, judge of
the practicability of a project by the wit of its advocates,
and trust for the truth as to past events not to the fact
which you saw more than to the clever strictures which
you heard ; the easy victims of new-fangled arguments,
unwilling to follow received conclusions ; slaves to every
new paradox, despisers of the commonplace ; the first
wish of every man being that he ''ould speak himself, the

39] REVOLT OF MITYLENE 195

next to rival those who can speak by seeming to be quite CHAP,
up with their ideas by applauding every hit almost before ^
it is made, and by bemg as quick in catching an argument B.C. 427
as you are slow in foreseeing its consequences ; asking, if ter^o?^"
I may so say, for something different from the conditions Mity-
under which we live, and yet comprehending inadequately revolt,
those very conditions ; very slaves to the pleasure of the
ear, and more like the audience of a rhetorician than the
council of a city.

* In order to keep you from this, I proceed to show
that no one state has ever injured you as much as Mity-
lene. I can make allowance for those who revolt because
they cannot bear our empire, or who have been forced to
do so by the enemy. But for those who possessed aa
island with fortifications ; who could fear our enemies
only by sea, and there had their own force of galleys to
protect them ; who were independent and held in the
highest honour by you — to act as these have done, this is
not revolt — revolt implies oppression ; it is deliberate and
wanton aggression ; an attempt to ruin us by siding with
our bitterest enemies ; a worse offence than a v/ar under-
taken on their own account in the acquisition of power.
The fate of those of their neighbours who had already
rebelled and had been subdued, was no lesson to them ;
their own prosperity could not dissuade them from affront-
ing danger ; but blindly confident in the future, and full
of hopes beyond their power though not beyond their
ambition, they declared war and made their decision to
prefer might to right, their attack being determined not
by provocation but by the moment which seemed pro-
pitious. The truth is that great good fortune coming
suddenly and unexpectedly tends to make a people in-
solent : in most cases it is safer for mankind to have
success in reason than out of reason ; and it is easier for
them, one may say, to stave off adversity than to preserve
prosperity. Our mistake has been to distinguish the

196 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [40

BOOK Mitylenians as we have done : had they been long ago
^^ treated Hke the rest, they never would have so far for-
B.C. 427- gotten themselves, human nature being as surely made
example arrogant by consideration, as it is awed by firmness. Let
must be them now therefore be punished as their crime requires,
Mitylene. and do not, while you condemn the aristocracy, absolve
the people. This is certain, that all attacked you without
distinction, although they might have come over to us,
and been now again in possession of their city. But no,
they thought it safer to throw in their lot with the aristo-
cracy and so joined their rebellion ! Consider therefore !
if you subject to the same punishment the ally who is
forced to rebel by the enemy, and him who does so by
his own free choice, which of them, think you, is there
that will not, rebel upon the slightest pretext ; when the
reward of success is freedom, and the penalty of failure
nothing so very terrible ? We meanwhile shall have to
risk our money and our lives against one state after
another ; and if successful, shall receive a ruined town
from which we can no longer draw the revenue upon
which our strength depends ; while if unsuccessful, we
shall have an enemy the more upon our hands, and shall
spend the time that might be employed in combating our
existing foes in warring with our own allies.

* No hope, therefore, that rhetoric may instil or money
purchase, of the mercy due to human infirmity must be
held out to the Mitylenians. Their offence was not
involuntary, but of malice and deliberate ; and mercy is
only for unwilling offenders. I therefore now as before
persist against your reversing your first decision, or giving
way to the three failings most fatal to empire — pity,
sentiment, and indulgence. Compassion is due to those
who can reciprocate the feeling, not to those who will
never pity us in return, but are our natural and necessary
foes : the orators who charm us with sentiment may find
other less imoortant arenas for their talents, in the place

40] REVOLT OF MITYLENE 197

of one where the city pays a heavy penalty for a CHAP.

momentary pleasure, themselves receiving fine acknow- 1

iedgments for their fine phrases ; while indulgence should S'^- .^7.
be shown towards those who will be our friends in future, rebellion
instead of towards men who will remain just what they '^ death,
were, and as much our enemies as before. To sum up
shortly, I say that if you follow my advice you will do
what is just towards the Mitylenians, and at the same
time expedient ; while by a different decision you will
not oblige them so much as pass sentence upon yourselves.
For if they were right in rebelling, you must be wrong
in ruling. However, if, right or wrong, you determine
to rule, you must carry out your principle and punish
the Mitylenians as your interest requires ; or else you
must give up your empire and cultivate honesty without
danger. Make up your minds, therefore, to give them
like for like ; and do not let the victims who escaped the
plot be more insensible than the conspirators who hatched
it ; but reflect what they would have done if victorious
over you, especially as they were the aggressors. It is
they who wrong their neighbour without a cause, that
pursue their victim to the death, on account of the danger
which they foresee in letting their enemy survive ; since the
object of a wanton wrong is more dangerous, if he escape,
than an enemy who has not this to complain of. Do
not, therefore, be traitors to yourselves, but recall as
nearly as possible the moment of suffering and the
supreme importance which you then attached to their
reduction ; and now pay them back in their turn, with-
out yielding to present weakness or forgetting the peril
that once hung over you. Punish them as they deserve,
and teach your other allies by a striking example that
the penalty of rebellion is death. Let them once under-
stand this and you will not have so often to neglect
your enemies while you are fighting with your own
confederates.'

198 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [41, 42

BOOK Such were the words of Cleon. After him Diodotus,
i^ son of Eucrates, who had also in the previous assembly
B.C. 427- spoken most strongly against putting the Mitylenians to
D?odotusf death, came forward and spoke as follows : —

* I do not blame the persons who have reopened the
case of the Mitylenians, nor do I approve the protests
which we have heard against important questions being
frequently debated. I think the two things most opposed
to good counsel are haste and passion ; haste usually goes
hand in hand with folly, passion with coarseness and
narrowness of mind. As for the argument that speech
ought not to be the exponent of action, the man who uses
it must be either senseless or interested : senseless if he
believes it possible to treat of the uncertain future through
any other medium ; interested if wishing to carry a dis-
graceful measure and doubting his ability to speak well
in a bad cause, he thinks to frighten opponents and
hearers by well-aimed calumny. What is still more
intolerable is to accuse a speaker of making a display in
order to be paid for it. If ignorance only were imputed,
an unsuccessful speaker might retire with a reputation for
honesty, if not for wisdom ; while the charge of dis-
honesty makes him suspected, if successful, and thought,
if defeated, not only a fool but a rogue. The city is no
gainer by such a system, since fear deprives it of its
advisers ; although in truth, if our speakers are to make
such assertions, it would be better for the country if
they could not speak at all, as we should then make
fewer blunders. The good citizen ought to triumph not
by frightening his opponents but by beating them fairly
in argument ; and a wise city without over-distinguishing
its best adviseis, will nevertheless not deprive them of
their due, and far from punishing an unlucky counsellor
will not even regard him as disgraced. In this way
successful orators would be least tempted to sacrifice
their convictions to popularity, in the hope of still higher

43,44] REVOLT OF MITYLENE 199

honours, and unsuccessful speakers to resort to the same CHAP.
popular arts in order to win over the multitude.

* This is not our way ; and. besides, the moment that B.C. 437.
a man is suspected of giving advice, however good, from biiity of
corrupt motives, we feel such a grudge against him for Jo^at*'
the gain which after all we are not certain he will Athens,
receive, that we deprive the city of its certain benefit.

Plain good advice has thus come to be no less suspected
than bad ; and the advocate of the most monstrous measures
is not more obliged to use deceit to gain the people,
than the best counsellor is to lie in order to be believed.
The city and the city only, owing to these refinements,
can never be served openly and without disguise ; he who
does serve it openly being always suspected of serving
himself in some secret way in return. Still, considering
the magnitude of the interests involved, and the position
of affairs, we orators must make it our business to look a
little further than you who judge offhand ; especially as
we, your advisers, are responsible, while you, our audience,
are not so. For if those who gave the advice, and those
who took it, suffered equally, you would judge more
calmly ; as it is, you visit the disasters into which the
whim of the moment may have led you, upon the single
person of your adviser, not upon yourselves, his numerous
companions in error.

* However, I have not come forward either to oppose
or to accuse in the matter of Mitylene ; indeed, the
question before us as sensible men is not their guilt, but
our interests. Though I prove them ever so guilty, I
shall not, therefore, advise their death, unless it be
expedient ; nor though they should have claims to in-
dulgence, shall I recommend it, unless it be clearly for
the good of the country. I consider that we are de-
liberating for the future more than for the present ; and
where Cleon is so positive as to the useful deterrent
effects that will follow from making rebellion capital, I

20O THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR Us

BOOK who consider the interests of the future quite as much as

^"- he, as positively maintain the contrary. And I require

B.C. 437. you not to reject my useful considerations for his specious

mfnt^a^^a o°e8 : his speech may have the attraction of seeming the

deterrent, more just in your present temper against Mitylene ; but

we are not in a court of justice, but in a political

assembly ; and the question is not justice, but how to

make the Mitylenians useful to Athens.

' Now of course communities have enacted the penalty
of death for many offences far lighter than this : still
hope leads men to venture, and no one ever yet put him-
self in peril without the inward conviction that he would
succeed in his design. Again, was there ever city
rebelling that did not believe that it possessed either
in itself or in its alliances resources adequate to the
enterprise ? All, states and individuals, are alike prone
to err, and there is no law that will prevent them ;
or why should men have exhausted the li.^t of punish-
ments in search of enactments to protect them from evil-
doers ? It is probable that in early times the penalties
for the greatest offences were less severe, and that, as
these were disregarded, the penalty of death has been by
degrees in most cases arrived at, which is itself dis-
regarded m like manner. Either then some means of
terror more terrible than this must be discovered, or it
must be owned that this restraint is useless ; and that as
long as poverty gives men the courage of necessity, or
plenty fills them with the ambition which belongs to
insolence and pride, and the other conditions of life
remain each under the thraldom of some fatal and master
passion, so long will the impulse never be wanting to
drive men into danger. Hope also and cupidity, the
one leading and the other following, the one conceiving
the attempt, the other suggesting the facility of succeed-
ing, cause the widest ruin, and, although invisible agents,
are far stronger than the dangers that are seen. Fortune,

46] REVOLT OF MITYLENE 201

too, powerfully helps the delusion, and by the un- CHAP,
expected aid that she sometimes lends, tempts men to ^^
venture with inferior means ; and this is especially the B.C. 427.
case with communities, because the stakes played for are se^erSy
the highest, freedom or empire, and, when all are acting J^^jJ^^j^j.^.
together, each man irrationally magnifies his own capacity, despe-
In fine, it is impossible to prevent, and only great sim- ^^^^'
plicity can hope to prevent, human nature doing what it
has once set its mind upon, by force of law or by any
other deterrent force whatsoever.

* We must not, therefore, commit ourselves to a false
policy through a belief in the efficacy of the punishment
of death, or exclude rebels from the hope of repent-
ance and an early atonement of their error. Consider
a moment ! At present, if a city that has already
revolted perceive that it cannot succeed, it will come to
terms while it is still able to refund expenses, and pay
tribute afterwards. In the other case, what city think
you would not prepare better than is now done, and
hold out to the last against its besiegers, if it is all
one whether it surrender late or soon ? And how can
it be otherwise than hurtful to us to be put to the ex-
pense of a siege, because surrender is out of the question ;
and if we take the city, to receive a ruined town from
which we can no longer draw the revenue which forms
our real strength against the enemy ? We must not,
therefore, sit as strict judges of the offenders to our own
prejudice, but rather see how by moderate chastisements
we may be enabled to benefit in future by the revenue-
producing powers of our dependencies ; and we must
make up our minds to look for our protection not to
legal terrors but to careful administration. At present
we do exactly the opposite. When a free community,
held in subjection by force, rises, as is only natural, and
asserts its independence, it is no sooner reduced than we
fancy ourselves obliged to punish it severely ; although

202 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [47, 48

BOOK the right course with freemen is not to chastise them
|l[l rigorously when they do rise, but rigorously to watch

B.C. 427- them before they rise, and to prevent their ever enter-
aHenat- taining the idea, and, the insurrection suppressed, to

ingdemo- make as few responsible for it as possible,
party in ' Only consider what a blunder you would commit in

the cities. ^Q^j^g ^^ Qeon recommends. As things are at present,
in all the cities the people is your friend, and either does
not revolt with the oligarchy, or, if forced to do so,
becomes at once the enemy of the insurgents ; so that in
the war with the hostile city you have the masses on
your side. But if you butcher the people of Mitylene,
who had nothing to do with the revolt, and who, as
soon as they got arms, of their own motion surrendered
the town, first you will commit the crime of killing your
benefactors ; and next you will play directly into the
hands of the higher classes, who when they induce their
cities to rise, will immediately have the people on their
side, through your having announced in advance the
same punishment for those who are guilty and for those
who are not. On the contrary, even if they were guilty,
you ought to seem not to notice it, in order to avoid
alienating the only class still friendly to us. In short, I
consider it far more useful for the preservation of our
empire voluntarily to put up with injustice, than to put
to death, however justly, those whom it is our interest
to keep alive. As for Cleon's idea that in punishment
the claims of justice and expediency can both be satis-
fied, facts do not confirm the possibility of such a
combination.

* Confess, therefore, that this is the wisest course,
and without conceding too much either to pity or to in-
dulgence, by neither of which motives do I any more
than Cleon wish you to be influenced, upon the plain
merits of the case before you, be persuaded by me to
try calmly those of the Mitylenians whom Paches sent

49, 50] REVOLT OF MITYLENE 203

off as guilty, and to leave the rest undisturbed. This is CHAP.

at once best for the future, and most terrible to your ^

enemies at the present moment; inasmuch as good policy ^C-w-
, ^ . . 1 Li' J 1 £■ iJioaotus

agamst an adversary is superior to the blind attacKS or motion

brute force/ ^ ^*"'«^-

Such were the words of Diodotus. The two opinions
thus expressed were the ones that most directly con-
tradicted each other ; and the Athenians, notwithstand-
ing their change of feeling, now proceeded to a division,
in which the show of hands was almost equal, although
the motion of Diodotus carried the day. Another
galley was at once sent off in haste, for fear that the first
might reach Lesbos in the interval, and the city be found
destroyed ; the first ship having about a day and a night's
start. Wine and barley-cakes were provided for the
vessel by the Mitylenian ambassadors, and great promises
made if they arrived in time ; which caused the men
to use such dihgence upon the voyage that they took
their meals of barley-cakes kneaded with oil and wine as
they rowed, and only slept by turns while the others were
at the oar. Luckily they met with no contrary wind, and
the first ship making no haste upon so horrid an errand,
while the second pressed on in the manner described,
the first arrived so little before them, that Paches had
only just had time to read the decree, and to prepare to
execute the sentence, when the second put into port and
prevented the massacre. The danger of Mitylene had
indeed been great.

The other party whom Paches had sent off as the
prime movers in the rebellion, were upon Cleon's motion
put to death by the Athenians, the number being rather
more than a thousand. The Athenians also demolished
the walls of the Mitylenians, and took possession of their
ships. Afterwards tribute was not imposed upon the
Lesbians ; but all their land, except that of the Methym-
nians, was divided into three thousand allotments, three

204 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [51

BOOK hundred of which were reserved as sacred for the gods,

^ and the rest assigned by lot to Athenian shareholders,

B.C. 427. who were sent out to the island. With these the

'^iccupa" Lesbians agreed to pay a rent of two minae a year for

tion of each allotment, and cultivated the land themselves. The

"* ** Athenians also took possession of the towns on the

continent belonging to the Mitylenians, which thus

became for the future subject to Athens. Such were the

events that took place at Lesbos.

CHAPTER X

Fifth Year of the War— Trial and Execution of the
Plataeans— Corey raean Revolution

During the same summer, after the reduction of Lesbos,
the Athenians under Nicias, son of Niceratus, made an
expedition against the island of Minoa, which lies off
Megara and was used as a fortified post by the Megarians,
who had built a tower upon it. Nicias wished to enable
the Athenians to maintain their blockade from this nearer
station instead of from Budorum and Salamis ; to stop
the Peloponnesian galleys and privateers sailing out un-
observed from the island, as they had been in the habit
of doing ; and at the same time prevent anything from
coming into Megara. Accordingly, after taking two
towers projecting on the side of Nisaea, by engines from
the sea, and clearing the entrance into the channel be-
tween the island and the shore, he next proceeded to cut
off all communication by building a wall on the mainland
at the point where a bridge across a morass enabled
succours to be thrown into the island, which was not far
off from the continent. A few days sufficing to accom-
plish this, he afterwards raised some works in the island also,
and leaving a garrison there, departed with his forces.

52, S3] TRIAL OF THE PLATiEANS 205

About the same time in this summer, the Plataeans CHAP

being now without provisions, and unable to support the '_

siege, surrendered to the Peloponnesians in the following B.C. 427.
manner. An assault had been made upon the wall, which der of '
the Plataeans were unable to repel. The Lacedsemonian P^a-taa.
commander, perceiving their weakness, wished to avoid
taking the place by storm ; his instructions from Lace-
dasmon having been so conceived, in order that if at any
future time peace should be made with Athens, and they
should agree each to restore the places that they had
taken in the war, Platasa might be held to have come
over voluntarily, and not be included in the list. He
accordingly sent a herald to them to ask if they were
willing voluntarily to surrender the town to the Lace-
daemonians, and accept them as their judges, upon the
understanding that the guilty should be punished, but no
one without form of law. The Platasans were now in
the last state of weakness, and the herald had no sooner
delivered his message than they surrendered the town.
The Peloponnesians fed them for some days until the
judges from Lacedaemon, who were five in number,
arrived. Upon their arrival no charge was preferred ;
they simply called up the Plataeans, and asked them
whether they had done the Lacedaemonians and allies any
service in the war then raging. The Plataeans asked
leave to speak at greater length, and deputed two of their
number to represent them ; Astymachus, son of Asopolaus,
and Lacon, son of Aeimnestus, Proxenus of the Lacedae-
monians, who came forward and spoke as follows : —

* Lacedaemonians, when we surrendered our city we
trusted in you, and looked forward to a trial more agree-
able to the forms of law than the present, to which we
had no idea of being subjected ; the judges also in whose
hands we consented to place ourselves were you, and you
only (from whom we thought we were most likely to
obtain justice), and not other persons, as is now the case.

2o6 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [54

BOOK As matters stand, we are afraid that we have been doubly
ill: deceived. We have good reason to suspect, not only

B.C. 427. that the issue to be tried is the most terrible of all, but

Platseans* that you will not prove impartial ; if we may argue from

past ^}^g faj.|. ^]^2ii jjQ accusation was first brought forward for

in the US to answer, but we had ourselves to ask leave to speak,

"^^cause. ^^^ from the question being put so shortly, that a true
answer to it tells against us, while a false one can be
contradicted. In this dilemma, our safest, and indeed
our only course, seems to be to say something at all
risks : placed as we are, we could scarcely be silent
without being tormented by the damning thought that
speaking might have saved us. Another diiiiculty that
we have to encounter is the difficulty of convincing you.
Were we unknown to each other we might profit by
bringing forward new matter with which you were un-
acquainted : as it is, we can tell you nothing that you do
not know already, and we fear, not that you have con-
demned us in your own minds of having failed in our
duty towards you, and make this our crime, but that to
please a third party we have to submit to a trial '.he result
of which is already decided. Nevertheless, we will place
before you what we can justly urge, not only on the question
of the quarrel which the Thebans have against us, but
also as addressing you and the rest of the Hellenes ; and
we will remind you of our good services, and endeavour
to prevail with you.

* To your short question, whether we have done the
Lacedaemonians and allies any service in this war, we
say, if you ask us as enemies, that to refrain from serving
you was not to do you injury ; if as friends, that you are
more in fault for having marched against us. During the
peace, and against the Mede, we acted well : we have
not now been the first to break the peace, and we were
the only Boeotians who then joined in defending against
the Mede the liberty of Hellas. Although an inland

55, 56] TRIAL OF THE PLATiEANS 207

people, we were present at the action at Artemisium ; in CHAP,

the battle that took place in our territory we fought by the 1

side of yourselves and Pausanias ; and in all the other p-^- W
Hellenic exploits of the time we took a part quite out of honour to
proportion to our strength. Besides, you, as Lacedse- Athens,
monians, ought not to forget that at the time of the
great panic at Sparta, after the earthquake, caused by the
secession of the Helots to Ithome, we sent the third part
of our citizens to assist you.

' On these great and historical occasions such was the
part that we chose, although afterwards we became your
enemies. For this you were to blame. When we asked
for your alliance against our Theban oppressors, you re-
jected our petition, and told us to go to the Athenians
who were our neighbours, as you lived too far off. In
the war we never have done to you, and never should have
done to you, anything unreasonable. If we refused to
desert the Athenians when you asked us, we did no
wrong ; they had helped us against the Thebans when
you drew back, and we could no longer give them up
with honour ; especially as we had obtained their alliance
and had been admitted to their citizenship at our own
request, and after receiving benefits at their hands ; but
it was plainly our duty loyally to obey their orders.
Besides, the faults that either of you may commit in
your supremacy must be laid, not upon the followers, but
on the chiefs that lead them astray.

* With regard to the Thebans, they have wronged us
repeatedly, and their last aggression, which has been the
means of bringing us into our present position, is within
your own knowledge. In seizing our city in time of
peace, and what is more at a holy time in the month,
they justly encountered our vengeance, in accordance with
the universal law which sanctions resistance to an invader;
and it cannot now be right that we should suffer on their
account. By taking your own immediate interest and

2oS THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [57

BOOK their animosity as the test of justice, you will prove

^ yourselves to be rather waiters on expediency than judges

B.C. 4»7- of right ; although if they seem useful to you now, we

orfhebes and the rest of the Hellenes gave you much more valu-

duringthe ^ble help at a time of greater need. Now you are the

Persian ., ^ , , ,° , , .•'. ,.,

invasion, assailants, and others rear you ; but at the crisis to which

we allude, when the barbarian threatened all with slavery,
the Thebans were on his side. It is just, therefore, to
put our patriotism then against our error now, if error
there has been ; and you will find the merit outweighing
the fault, and displayed at a juncture when there were
few Hellenes who would set their valour against the
strength of Xerxes, and when greater praise was theirs
who preferred the dangerous path of honour to the safe
course of consulting their own interest with respect to the
invasion. To these few we belonged, and highly were
we honoured for it ; and yet we now fear to perish by
having again acted on the same principles, and chosen to
act well with Athens sooner than wisely with Sparta,
Yet in justice the same cases should be decided in the
same way, and policy should not mean anything else than
lasting gratitude for the service of a good ally combined
with a proper attention to one's own immediate interest.

* Consider also that at present the Hellenes generally
regard you as a pattern of worth and honour ; and if you
pass an unjust sentence upon us in this which is no obscure
cause, but one in which you, the judges, are as illustrious
as we, the prisoners, are blameless, take care that dis-
pleasure be not felt at an unworthy decision in the matter
of honourable men made by men yet more honourable
than they, and at the consecration in the national temples
of spoils taken from the Piatgeans, the benefactors of
Hellas. Shocking indeed will it seem for Lacedas-
nionians to destroy Plataea, and for the city whose name
vour fathers inscribed upon the tripod at Delphi for its
good service, to be by you blotted out from the map of

58] TRIAL OF THE PLATiEANS 209

Hellas, to please the Thebans. To such a depth of CHAP.

misfortune have we fallen, that while the Medes' success L

had been our ruin, Thebans now supplant us in your p[^^^l^^^
once fond regards ; and we have been subjected to two be sacri-
d angers, the greatest of any — that of dying of starvation pfg^se^
then, if we had not surrendered our town, and now of Thebes,
being tried for our lives. So that we Plaraeans, after
exertions beyond our nower in the cause of the Hellenes,
are rejected by all, forsaken and unassisted ; helped by
none of our allies, and reduced to doubt the stability of
our only hope, yourselves.

* Still, in the name of the gods who once presided over
our confederacy, and of our own good service in the
Hellenic cause, we adjure you to relent ; to recall the
decision which we fear that the Thebans may have
obtained from you ; to ask back the gift that you have
given th^i, that they disgrace not you by slaying us ; to
gain a pure instead of a guilty gratitude, and not to gratify
others to be yourselves rewarded with shame. Our lives
may be quickly taken, but it will be a heavy task to wipe
away the infamy of the deed ; as we are no enemies whom
you might justly punish, but friends forced into taking
arms against you. To grant us our lives would be,
therefore, a righteous judgment ; if you consider also
that we are prisoners who surrendered of their own
accord, stretching out our hands for quarter, whose
slaughter Hellenic law forbids, and who besides were
always your benefactors. Look at the sepulchres of
your fathers, slain by the Medes and buried in our
country, whom year by year we honoured with gar-
ments and all other dues, and the first fruits of all that
our land produced in their season, as friends from a
friendly country and allies to our old companions* in
arms ! Should you not decide aright, your conduct
would be the very opposite to ours. Consider only :
Pausanias buried them thinkin£ that he was laying them

H 455

210 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [59

BOOK in friendly ground and among men as friendly ; but you,

]}}i if you kill us and make the Piataean territory Theban,

B.C. 427. will leave your fathers and kinsmen in a hostile soil and

formercy. among their murderers, deprived of the honours which

they now enjoy. What is more, you will enslave the

land in which the freedom of the Hellenes was won,

make desolate the temples of the gods to whom they

prayed before they overcame the Medes, and take away

your ancestral sacrifices from those who founded and

instituted them.

' It were not to your glory, Lacedsemonians, either to
offend in this way against the common law of the Hellenes
and against your own ancestors, or to kill us your bene-
factors to gratify another's hatred without having been
wronged yourselves : it were more so to spare us and to
yield to the impressions of a reasonable compassion ;
reflecting not merely on the awful fate in store for us,
but also on the character of the sufferers, and on the
impossibility of predicting how soon misfortune may fall
even upon those who deserve it not. We, as we have a
right to do and as our need impels us, entreat you, calling
aloud upon the gods at whose common altar all the
Hellenes worship, to hear our request, to be not unmind-
ful of the oaths which your fathers swore, and which
we now plead — we supplicate you by the tombs of your
fathers, and appeal to those that are gone to save us from
falling into the hands of the Thebans and their dearest
friends from being given up to their most detested foes.
We also remind you of that day on which we did the
most glorious deeds, by your fathers' sides, we who now
on this are like to suffer the most dreadful fate. Finally,
to do what is necessary and yet most difficult for men in
our situation — that is, to make an end of speaking, since
with that ending the peril of our lives draws nt'cLV — in
conclusion we say that we did not surrender our city to
the Thebans (to that we would have preferred inglorious

6o, 6i] TRIAL OF THE PLATiEANS 211

starvation), but trusted in and capitulated to you; and it CHAP.
would be just, if we fail to persuade you, to put us back ___
in the same position and let us take the chance that falls B.C. 437.
to us. And at the same time we adjure you not to give of the
us up, — your suppliants, Lacedasmonians, out of your hands ^^'^^^"^
and faith, Plataeans foremost of the Hellenic patriots, to the feud.
Thebans, our most hated enemies, — but to be our saviours,
and not, while you free the rest of the Hellenes, to bring
us to destruction.'

Such were the words of the Plataeans. The Thebans,
afraid that the Lacedaemonians might be moved by what
they had heard, came forward and said that they too
desired to address them, since the Plataeans had, against
their wish, been allowed to speak at length instead of
being confined to a simple answer to the question. Leave
being granted, the Thebans spoke as follows : —

* We should never have asked to make this speech if
the Plataeans on their side had contented themselves with
shortly answering the question, and had not turned round
and made charges against us, coupled with a long defence
of themselves upon matters outside the present inquiry
and not even the subject of accusation, and with praise of
what no one finds fault with. However, since they have
done so, we must answer their charges and refute their
self-praise, in order that neither our bad name nor their
good may help them, but that you may hear the real
truth on both points, and so decide.

* The origin of our quarrel was this. We settled
Piataea some time after the rest of Boeotia, together with
other places out of which we had driven the mixed
population. The Plataeans not choosing to recognise our
supremacy, as had been first arranged, but separating
themselves from the rest of the Boeotians, and proving
traitors to their nationality, we used compulsion ; upon
which they went over to the Athenians, and with them
did as much harm, for which we retaliated.

212 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [62,63

BOOK * Next, when the barbarian invaded Hellas, they say
lil: that they were the only Boeotians who did not Medise ;
B.C. 427. and this is where they most glorify themselves and abuse
^or co^ us. We say that if they did not Medise, it was because
Thebes ^^^ Athenians did not do so either ; just as afterwards
in the when the Athenians attacked the Hellenes they, the
^®"'^" Piataeans, were again the only Boeotians who Atticised.
And yet consider the forms of our respective govern-
ments when we so acted. Our city at that juncture had
neither an oligarchical constitution in which all the nobles
enjoyed equal rights nor a democracy, but that which is
most opposed to law and good government and nearest a
tyranny — the rule of a close cabal. These, hoping to
strengthen their individual power by the success of the
Mede, kept down by force the people, and brought him
into the town. The city as a whole was not its own
mistress when it so acted, and ought not to be reproached
for the errors that it committed while deprived of its
constitution. Examine only how we acted after the
departure of the Mede and the recovery of the constitu-
tion ; when the Athenians attacked the rest of Hellas
and endeavoured to subjugate our country, of the greater
part of which faction had already made them masters.
Did not we fight and conquer at Coronea and liberate
Boeotia, and do we not now actively contribute to the
liberation of the rest, providing horses to the cause and
a force unequalled by that of any other state in the
confederacy ?

' Let this suffice to excuse us for our Medism. Wc
will now endeavour to show that you have injured the
Hellenes more than we, and are more deserving of con-
dign punishment. It was in defence against us, say you,
that you became allies and citizens of Athens. If so,
you ought only to have called in the Athenians against
U8, instead of joining them in attacking others : it was
open to you to do this if you ever felt that they were

64] TRIAL OF THE PLATiEANS 213

leading you where you did not wish to follow, as CHAP.
Lacedasmon was already your ally against the Mede, as _^
you 80 much insist ; and this was surely sufficient to B.C. 427.
keep us off, and above all to allow you to deliberate in thelTlyof
security. Nevertheless, of your own choice and without Athens,
compulsion you chose to throw your lot in with Athens, enemy of
And you say that it had been base for you to betray your ^^^^s*
benefactors ; but it was surely far baser and more ini-
quitous to sacrifice the whole body of the Hellenes, your
fellow-confederates, who were liberating Hellas, than the
Athenians only, who were enslaving it. The return that
you made them was therefore neither equal nor honour-
able, since you called them in, as you say, because you
were being oppressed yourselves, and then became their
accomplices in oppressing others ; although baseness
rather consists in not returning like for like than in not
returning what is justly due but must be unjustly paid.

* Meanwhile, after thus plainly showing that it was not
for the sake of the Hellenes that you alone then did not
Medise, but because the Athenians did not do so either,
and you wished to side with them and to be against the
rest ; you now claim the benefit of good deeds done to
please your neighbours. 'This cannot be admitted : you
chose the Athenians, and with them you must stand or
fall. Nor can you plead the league then made and claim
that it should now protect you. You abandoned that
league, and offended against it by helping instead of
hindering the subjugation of the jEginetans and others
of its members, and that not under compulsion, but while
in enjoyment of the same institutions that you enjoy to
the present hour, and no one forcing you as in our case.
Lastly, an invitation was addressed to you before you
were blockaded to be neutral and join neither party : this
you did not accept. Who then merit the detestation of
the Hellenes more justly than you, you who sought their
ruin under the mask of honour ? The former virtues

214 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [65,66

BOOK that you allege you now show not to be proper to your
^ character ; the real bent of your nature has been at
B.C. 427- length damningly proved : when the Athenians took, the
eiftered pa^h of injustice you followed them.

Plataea. < Q[ our unwilling Medism and your wilful Atticising
this then is our explanation. The last wrong of which
you complain consists in our having, as you say, lawlessly
invaded your town in time of peace and festival. Here
again we cannot think that we were more in fault than
yourselves. If of our own proper motion we made an
armed attack upon your city and ravaged yoar territory,
we are guilty ; but if the first men among you in estate
and family, wishing to put an end to the foreign con-
nexion and to restore you to the common Boeotian
■ country, of their own free will invited us, wherein is our
crime ? Where wrong is done, those who lead, as you
say, are more to blame than those who follow. Not
that, in our judgment, wrong was done either by them
or by us. Citizens like yourselves, and with more at
stake than you, they opened their own walls and intro-
duced us into their own city, not as foes but as friends,
to prevent the bad among you from becoming worse ; to
give honest men their due ; to reform principles without
attacking persons, since you were not to be banished
from your city, but brought home to your kindred, nor
to be made enemies to any, but friends alike to all.

* That our intention was not hostile is proved by our
behaviour. We did no harm to any one, but publicly
invited those who wished to live under a national,
BcEOtian government to come over to us ; which at first
you gladly did, and made an agreement with us and
remained tranquil, until you became aware of the small-
ness of our numbers. Now it is possible that there may
have been something not quite fair in our entering with-
out the consent of your commons. At any rate you did
not repay us in kind. Instead of refraining, as we had

67] TRIAL OF THE PLAT^ANS 215

done, from violence, and inducing us to retire by negotia- CHAP,
tion, you fell upon us in violation of your agreement, and ___
slew some of us in fight, of which we do not so much B.C. 427.
complain, for in that there was a certain justice ; but tre\5ery
others who held out their hands and received quarter, gl^^e^^
and whose lives you subsequently promised us, you law- punish-
lessly butchered. If this was not abominable, what is ? °^^^^'
And after these three crimes committed one after the
other — the violation of your agreement, the murder of
the men afterwards, and the lying breach of your promise
not to kill them, if we refrained from injuring your
property in the country — you still affirm that we are the
criminals and yourselves pretend to escape justice. Not
so, if these your judges decide aright, but you will be
punished for all together.

* Such, Lacedaemonians, are the facts. We have gone
into them at some length both on your account and on
our own, that you may feel that you will justly condemn
the prisoners, and we, that we have given an additional
sanction to our vengeance. We would also prevent you
from being melted by hearing of their past virtues, if any
such they had ; these may be fairly appealed to by the
victims of injustice, but only aggravate the guilt of
criminals, since they offend against their better nature.
Nor let them gain anything by crying and wailing, by
calling upon your fathers* tombs and their own desolate
condition. Against this we point to the far more dreadful
fate of our youth, butchered at their hands ; the fathers
of whom either fell at Coronea, bringing Boeotia over to
you, or seated, forlorn old men by desolate hearths, with
far more reason implore your justice upon the prisoners.
The pity which they appeal to is rather due to men who
Buffer unworthily ; those who suffer justly as they do, are
on the contrary subjects for triumph. For their present
desolate condition they have themselves to blame, since
they wilfully rejected the better alliance. Their lawless

2i6 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [68

BOOK act was not provoked by any action of ours : hate, not

1^ justice, inspired their decision ; and even now the satisfac-

B.C. 427- tion which they afford us is not adequate ; they will suffer

Platsean by a legal sentence, not as they pretend as suppliants

prisoners asking for quarter in battle, but as prisoners who have

executed. °i 1 1 1 • • 1 t7- j-

surrendered upon agreement to take their trial. Vindicate,

therefore, Lacedasmonians, the Hellenic law which they
have broken ; and to us, the victims of its violation, grant
the reward merited by our zeal. Nor let us be sup-
planted in your favour by their harangues, but offer an
example to the Hellenes, that the contests to which you
invite them are of deeds, not words : good deeds can be
shortly stated, but where wrong is done a wealth of
language is needed to veil its deformity. However, if
leading powers were to do what you are now doing, and
putting one short question to all alike were to decide
accordingly, men would be less tempted to seek fine
phrases to cover bad actions.'

Such were the words of the Thebans. The Lace-
daemonian judges decided that the question whether they
had received any service from the Plateaus in the war,
was a fair one for them to put ; as they had always
invited them to be neutral, agreeably to the original
covenant of Pausanias after the defeat of the Mede, and
had again definitely offered them the same conditions
before the blockade. This offer having been refused,
they were now, they conceived, by the loyalty of their
intention released from their covenant ; and having, as
they considered, suffered evil at the hands of the Plataeans,
they brought them in again one by one and asked each of
them the same question, that is to say, whether they had
done the Lacedaemonians and allies any service in the
war ; and upon their saying that they had not, took them
out and slew them, all without exception. The number
of Plataeans thus massacred was not less than two hundred,
with twenty-five Athenians who had shared in the siege.

69, 70] TRIAL OF THE PLATiEANS 217

The women were taken as slaves. The city the Thebans CHAP.

gave for about a year to some political emigrants from '_

Megara, and to the surviving Platseans of their own party BC. 427.
.*',,. . r 1 J • 1 J r L Theendof

to mhabit, and aiterwards razed it to the ground from the piatsea.

very foundations, and built on to the precinct of Hera an
inn two hundred feet square, with rooms all round above
and below, making use for this purpose of the roofs and
doors of the Platseans : of the rest of the materials in the
wall, the brass and the iron, they made couches which
they dedicated to Hera, for whom they also built a stone
chapel of a hundred feet square. The land they con-
fiscated and let out on a ten-years' lease to Theban
occupiers. The adverse attitude of the Lacedaemonians
in the whole Plataean affair was mainly adopted to please
the Thebans, who were thought to be useful in the
war at that moment raging. Such was the end of
Platsea, in the ninety-third year after she became the ally
of Athens.

Meanwhile, the forty ships of the Peloponnesians that
had gone to the relief of the Lesbians, and which we left
flying across the open sea, pursued by the Athenians,
were caught in a storm off Crete, and scattering from
thence made their way to Peloponnese, where they found
at Cyllene thirteen Leucadian and Ambraciot galleys,
with Brasidas, son of Tellis, lately arrived as counsellor
to Alcidas ; the Lacedaemonians, upon the failure of
the Lesbian expedition, having resolved to strengthen
their fleet and sail to Corcyra, where a revolution
had broken out, so as to arrive there before the twelve
Athenian ships at Naupactus could be reinforced from
Athens. Brasidas and Alcidas began to prepare accord-
ingly.

The Corcyraean revolution began with the return of
the prisoners taken in the sea-fights off Epidamnus. These
the Corinthians had released, nominally upon the security
of eight hundred talents given by their Proxeni, but iD

*H 455

2i8 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [71

BOOK reality upon their engagement to bring over Corcyra to
i_ Corinth. These men proceeded to canvass each of the

B.C. 427. citizens, and to intrigue v/ith the view of detaching the
assassi- city from Athens. Upon the arrival of an Athenian and

nate sixty ^ Corinthian vessel, with envoys on board, a conference
popular was held in which the Corcyrasans voted to remain allies
party. ^^ ^j^^ Athenians according to their agreement, but to be
friends of the Peloponnesians as they had been formerly.
Meanwhile, the returned prisoners brought Peithias, a
volunteer Proxenus of the Athenians and leader of the
commons, to trial, upon the charge of enslaving Corcyra
to Athens. He, being acquitted, retorted by accusing
five of the richest of their number of cutting stakes in the
ground sacred to Zeus and Alcinous ; the legal penalty
being a stater for each stake. Upon their conviction, the
amount of the penalty being very large, they seated them-
selves as suppliants in the temples, to be allowed to pay it
by instalments ; but Peithias, who was one of the senate,
prevailed upon that body to enforce the law ; upon which
the accused, rendered desperate by the law, and also
learning that Peithias had the intention, while still a
member of the senate, to persuade the people to conclude
a defensive and offensive alliance with Athens, banded
together arrr.ed with daggers, and suddenly bursting into
the senate killed Peithias and sixty others, senators and
private persons ; some few only of the party of Peithias
taking refuge in the Athenian galley, which had not yet
departed.

After this outrage, the conspirators summoned the
Corcyrseans to an assembly, and said that this would turn
out for the best, and would save them from being en-
slaved by Athens : for the future, they moved to receive
neither party unless they came peacefully in a single ship,
treating any larger number as enemies. This motion
made, they compelled it to be adopted, and instantly sent
off envoys to Athens to justify what had been done and

72 73, 74] CORCYRiEAN REVOLUTION 219

to dissuade the refugees there from any hostile proceedings CHAP.
which might lead to a reaction.

Upon the arrival of the embassy the Athenians arrested ^•.^- **7-
the envoys and all who listened to them, as revolutionists, infhe*°^
and lodged them in ^gina. Meanwhile a Corinthian ?^ty-
galley arriving in the island with Lacedaemonian envoys, of the
the dominant Corcyrsean party attacked the commons and ^°'^°^°°^
defeated them in battle. Night coming on, the commons
took refuge in the Acropolis and the higher parts of the
city, and concentrated themselves there, having also pos-
session of the Hyllaic harbour; their adversaries occupying
the market-place, where most of them lived, and the
harbour adjoining, looking towards the mainland.

The next day passed in skirmishes of little importance,
each party sending into the country to offer freedom to
the slaves and to invite them to join them. The mass of
the slaves answered the appeal of the commons ; their
antagonists being reinforced by eight hundred mercenaries
from the continent.

After a day's interval hostilities recommenced, victory
remaining with the commons, who had the advantage in
numbers and position, the women also valiantly assisting
them, pelting with tiles from the houses, and supporting
the melee with a fortitude beyond their sex. Towards
dusk, the oligarchs in full rout, fearing that the victorious
commons might assault and carry the arsenal and put them
to the sword, fired the houses round the market-place and
the lodging-houses, in order to bar their advance ; sparing
neither their own, nor those of their neighbours ; by
which much stuff of the merchants was consumed and
the city risked total destruction, if a wind had come to
help the flame by blowing on it. Hostilities now ceasing,
both sides kept quiet, passing the night on guard, while
the Corinthian ship stole out to sea upon the victory of
the commons, and most of the mercenaries passed over
secretly to the continent.

220 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [75, 76

BOOK The next day the Athenian general, Nicostratus, son
_J^ of Diitrephes, came up from Naupactus with twelve ships

B.C. 4a7- and five hundred Messenian heavy infantry. He at
^o"t^ once endeavoured to bring about a settlement, and per-
Athenian suaded the two parties to agree together to bring to trial
squa ron. ^^^ ^^ ^^^ ringleaders, who presently fled, while the
rest were to live in peace, making terms with each
other, and entering into a defensive and offensive
alliance with the Athenians. This arranged, he was
about to sail away, when the leaders of the commons
induced him to leave them five of his ships to make
their adversaries less disposed to move, while they
manned and sent with him an equal number of their
own. He had no sooner consented, than they began to
enroll their enemies for the ships ; and these fearing that
they might be sent off to Athens, seated themselves as
suppliants in the temple of the Dioscuri. An attempt
on the part of Nicostratus to reassure them and to per-
suade them to rise proving unsuccessful, the commons
armed upon this pretext, alleging the refusal of their
adversaries to sail with them as a proof of the hollow-
ness of their intentions, and took their arms out of their
houses, and would have dispatched some whom they fell
in with, if Nicostratus had not prevented it. The rest
of the party seeing what was going on, seated themselves
as suppliants in the temple of Hera, being not less than
four hundred in number ; until the commons, fearing
that they might adopt some desperate resolution, induced
them to rise, and conveyed them over to the island in
front of the temple, where provisions were sent across to
them.

At this stage in the revolution, on the fourth or fifth
day after the removal of the men to the island, the
Peloponnesian ships arrived from Cyllene where they
had been stationed since their return from Icnia, fifty-
three in number, still under the command of Alcidas,

77,78] CORCYR^AN REVOLUTION 221

but with Brasidas also on board as his adviser ; and CHAP.

dropping anchor at Sybota, a harbour on the mainland, _21.

at daybreak made sail for Corcyra. B.C. 427.

The Corcyrasans in great confusion and alarm at the Pelopon-

state of things in the city and at the approach of the 2®^^^"..^
J ^ J y . . ^* , , . , fleet with

invader, at once proceeded to equip sixty vessels, which Alcidas.

they sent out, as fast as they were manned, against the
enemy, in spite of the Athenians recommending them to
let them sail out first, and to follow themselves after-
wards with all their ships together. Upon their vessels
coming up to the enemy in this straggling fashion, two
immediately deserted : in others the crews were fighting
among themselves, and there was no order in anything
that was done ; so that the Peioponnesians seeing their
confusion, placed twenty ships to oppose the Corcyrseans,
and ranged the rest against the twelve Athenian ships,
amongst which were the two vessels Salamin'ia and
Paralus,

While the Corcyrasans, attacking without judgment
and in small detachments, were already crippled by their
own misconduct, the Athenians, afraid of the numbers of
the enemy and of being surrounded, did not venture to
attack the main body or even the centre of the division
opposed to them, but fell upon its wing and sank one
vessel ; after which the Peioponnesians formed in a
circle, and the Athenians rowed round them and tried
to throw them into disorder. Perceiving this, the
division opposed to the Corcyraeans, fearing a repetition
of the disaster of Naupactus, came to support their
friends, and the whole fleet now bore down, united,
upon the Athenians, who retired before it, backing
water, retiring as leisurely as possible in order to give
the Corcyraeans time to escape, while the enemy was
thus kept occupied. Such was the character of this
sea-fight, which lasted until sunset.

The Corcyraeans now feared that the enemy would

222 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [79. 80, 81

BOOK follow up their victory and sail against the town and

rescue the men in the island, or strike some other blow

B.C. 427. equally decisive, and accordingly carried the men over

of Sury- again to the temple of Hera, and kept guard over the

•th^^'^t" ^^^y* '^^^ Peloponnesians, however, although victorious

ships, in the sea-fight, did not venture to attack the town, but

took the thirteen Corcyraean vessels which they had

captured, and with them sailed back to the continent

from whence they had put out. The next day equally

they refrained from attacking the city, although the

disorder and panic were at their height, and though

Brasidas, it is said, urged Alcidas, his superior officer,

to do so, but they landed upon the promontory of Leu-

kimme and laid waste the country.

Meanwhile the commons in Corcyra, being still in
great fear of the fleet attacking them, came to a parley
with the suppliants and their friends, in order to save
the town ; and prevailed upon some of them to go on
board the ships, of which they still manned thirty,
against the expected attack. But the Peloponnesians
after ravaging the country until midday sailed away, and
towards nightfall were informed by beacon signals of the
approach of sixty Athenian vessels from Leucas, under
the command of Eurymedon, son of Thucles ; which
had been sent off by the Athenians upon the news of the
revolution and of the fleet with Alcidas being about to
sail for Corcyra.

The Peloponnesians accordingly at once set off in
haste by night for home, coasting along shore ; and
hauling their ships across the Isthmus of Leucas, in
order not to be seen doubling it, so departed. The
Corcyraeans, made aware of the approach of the Athenian
fleet and of the departure of the enemy, brought the
Messenians from outside the walls into the town, and
ordered the fleet which they had manned to sail round
into the Hyllaic harbour ; and while it was so doing,

82] CORCYRiEAN REVOLUTION 223

slew such of their enemies as they laid hands on, dis- CHAP
patching afterwards as they landed them, those whom J^
they had persuaded to go on board the ships. Next B.C 427.
they went to the sanctuary of Hera and persuaded about terror uf
fifty men to take their trial, and condemned them all to Corcyra.
death. The mass of the suppliants who had refused to
do so, on seeing what was taking place, slew each other
there in the consecrated ground ; while some hanged
themselves upon the trees, and others destroyed them-
selves as they were severally able. During seven days that
Eurymedon stayed with his sixty ships, the Corcyrasans
were engaged in butchering those of their fellow-citizens
whom they regarded as their enemies : and although the
crime imputed was that of attempting to put down the
democracy, some were slain also for private hatred,
others by their debtors because of the monies owed to
them. Death thus raged in every shape ; and, as
usually happens at such times, there was no length to
which violence did not go ; sons were killed by their
fathers, and suppliants dragged from the altar or slain
upon it ; while some were even walled up in the temple
of Dionysus and died there.

So bloody was the march of the revolution, and the \
impression which it made was the greater as it was one
of the first to occur. Later on, one may say, the
whole Hellenic world was convulsed ; struggles being /
everywhere made by the popular chiefs to bring in ,
the Athenians, and by the oHgarchs to introduce the
Lacedaemonians. In peace there would have been neither ;
the pretext nor the wish to make such an invitation ; but 1
in war, with an alliance always at the command of
either faction for the hurt of their adversaries and \
their own corresponding advantage, opportunities for \
bringing in the foreigner were never wanting to the revo- I
iutionary parties. The sufferings which revolution entailed I
upon the cities were many and terrible, such as havo 1

224 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [82

BOOK occurred and always will occur, as long as the nature of
^ mankind remains the same ; though in a severer or milder
B.C. 427. form, and varying in their symptoms, according to the
through! variety of the particular cases. In peace and prosperity
out Hellas states and individuals have better sentiments, because they
thrfwo do not find themselves suddenly confronted with imperious
parties, necessities ; but war takes away the easy supply of daily
wants, and so proves a rough master, that brings most men's
characters to a level with their fortunes. Revolution thus
ran its course from city to city, and the places which it
arrived at last, from having heard what had been done
before, carried to a still greater excess the refinement of
their inventions, as manifested in the cunning of their en-
terprises and the atrocity of their reprisals. Words had
to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which
was now given them. ^Reckless audacity came to be con-
sidered the courage of a loyal ally ; prudent hesitation,
specious cowardice ; moderation was held to be a cloak
for unmanliness ; ability to see ail sides of a question
inaptness to act on any. Frantic violence became the
attribute of manliness ; cautious plotting, a justifiable means
of self-defence. The advocate of extreme measures was
always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected.-i
To succeed in a plot was to have a shrewd head, to divine
a plot a still shrewder ; but to try to provide against
having to do either was to break up your party and to be
afraid of your adversaries. In fine, to forestall an intend-
ing criminal, or to suggest the idea of a crime where it
was wanting, was equally commended, until even blood
became a weaker tie than party, from the superior readi-
ness of those united by the latter to dare everything with-
out reserve ; for such associations had not in view the
blessings derivable from established institutions but were
formed by ambition for their overthrow ; and the con-
fidence of their members in each other rested less on any
religious sanction than upon complicity in crime. The

83] CORCYRiEAN REVOLUTION 225

fair proposals of an adversary were met with jealous pre- CHAP.

cautions by the stronger of the two, and not with a generous '_

confidence. Revenge also was held of more account than B.C. 437.
self-preservation. Oaths of reconciliation, being only ization
proffered on either side to meet an immediate difficulty, ^fg^^^
only held good so long as no other weapon was at hand ; revoiu-
but when opportunity offered, he who first ventured to p^edodf
seize it and to take his enemy off his guard, thought this
perfidious vengeance sweeter than an open one, since, con-
siderations of safety apart, success by treachery won him
the palm of superior intelligence. Indeed it is generally
the case that men are readier to call rogues clever than
simpletons honest, and are as ashamed of being the second
as they are proud of being the first. The cause of all these
evils was the lust for power arising from greed and ambi-
tion ; and from these passions proceeded the violence of
parties once engaged in contention. The leaders in the
cities, each provided with the fairest professions, on the
one side with the cry of political equality of the people,
on the other of a moderate aristocracy, sought prizes for
themselves in those public interests which they pretended
to cherish, and, recoiling from no means in their struggles
for ascendancy, engaged in the direst excesses ; in their
acts of vengeance they went to even greater lengths, not
stopping at what justice or the good of the state demanded,
but making the party caprice of the moment their only
standard, and invoking with equal readiness the condem-
nation of an unjust verdict or the authority of the strong
arm to glut the animosities of the hour. Thus religion
was in honour with neither party ; but the use of fair
phrases to arrive at guilty ends was in high reputation.
Meanwhile the moderate part of the citizens perished be-
tween the two, either for not joining in the quarrel, or
because envy would not suffer them to escape.

Thus every form of iniquity took root in the Hellenic
countries by reason of the troubles The ancient simplicity

226 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [84

BOOK into which honour so largely entered was laughed down
iiil and disappeared ; and society became divided into camps
B.C. 427. in which no man trusted his fellow. To put an end to
ScSlls this, there was neither promise to be depended upon, nor
Corcyra gath that could command respect ; but all parties dwelling
^^^^first rather in their calculation upon the hopelessness of a per-
example. ^nanent state of things, were more intent upon self-defence
than capable of confidence. In this contest the blunter
wits were most successful. Apprehensive of their own
deficiencies and of the cleverness of their antagonists, they
feared to be worsted in debate and to be surprised by the
combinations of their more versatile opponents, and so at
once boldly had recourse to action : while their adver-
saries, arrogantly thinking that they should know in time,
and that it was unnecessary to secure by action what policy
afforded, often fell victims to their want of precaution.

Meanwhile Corcyra gave the first example of most of
the crimes alluded to ; of the reprisals exacted by the
governed who had never experienced equitable treatment
or indeed aught but insolence from their rulers — when
their hour came ; of the iniquitous resolves of those who
desired to get rid of their accustomed poverty, and
ardently coveted their neighbours' goods ; and lastly, of
the savage and pitiless excesses into which men who had
begun the struggle not in a class but in a party spirit,
were hurried by their ungovernable passions. In the
confusion into which life was now thrown in the cities,
human nature, always rebelling against the law and now
its master, gladly showed itself ungoverned in passion,
above respect for justice, and the enemy of all superiority;
since revenge would not have been set above religion, and
gain above justice, had it not been for the fatal power of
envy. Indeed men too often take upon themselves in the
prosecution of their revenge to set the example of doing
away with those general laws to which all alike can look
for salvation in adversity, instead of allowing them to

85,86] CORCYRiEAN REVOLUTION 227

subsist against the day of danger when their aid may be CHAP,
required. ^ — L

While the revolutionary passions thus for the first time B.C. 427-

. , ^ • 1 r • c r> TT Athenian

displayed themselves m the tactions ot Corcyra, tLury- squadron
medon and the Athenian fleet sailed away ; after which g°jy°
some five hundred Corcyraean exiles who had succeeded
in escaping, took some forts on the mainland, and becom-
ing masters of the Corcyrsean territory over the water,
made this their base to plunder their countrymen in the
island, and did so much damage as to cause a severe
famine in the town. They also sent envoys to Lace-
daemon and Corinth to negotiate their restoration ; but
meeting with no success, afterwards got together boats
and mercenaries and crossed over to the island, being
about six hundred in all ; and burning their boats so as to
have no hope except in becoming masters of the country,
went up to Mount Istone, and fortifying themselves there,
began to annoy those in the city and obtained command of
the country.

At the close of the same summer the Athenians sent
twenty ships under the command of Laches, son of
Melanopus, and Charoeades, son of Euphiletus, to Sicily,
where the Syracusans and Leontines were at war. The
Syracusans had for allies all the Dorian cities except
Camarina — these had been included in the Lacedaemonian
confederacy from the commencement of the war, though
they had not taken any active part in it — the Leontines
had Camarina and the Chalcidian cities. In Italy the
Locrians were for the Syracusans, the Rhegians for their
Leontine kinsmen. The allies of the Leontines now
sent to Athens and appealed to their ancient alliance and
to their Ionian origin, to persuade the Athenians to send
them a fleet, as the Syracusans were blockading them by
land and sea. The Athenians sent it upon the plea of ^ r . , .
their common descent, but in reality to prevent the ex- !
portation of SiciHan corn to Peloponnese and to test the

228 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [87, 88

BOOK possibility of bringing Sicily into subjection. Accord-

"^- ingly they established themselves at Rhegium in Italy,

B.C. 427- and from thence carried on the war in concert with their

Reap- ,,-
pearance ai^ico.

of the
plague at
Athens. CHAPTER XI

Sixth Year of the War— Campaigns of Demosthenes
in Western Greece— Ruin of Ambracia

Summer was now over. The winter following, the
plague a second time attacked the Athenians ; for al-
though it had never entirely left them, still there had been
a notable abatement in its ravages. The second visit
lasted no less than a year, the first having lasted two ;
and nothing distressed the Athenians and reduced their
power more than this. No less than four thousand four
hundred heavy infantry in the ranks died of it and three
hundred cavalry, besides a number of the multitude that
was never ascertained. At the same time took place the
numerous earthquakes in Athens, Euboea, and Boeotia,
particularly at Orchomenus in the last-named country.

The same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the
Rhegians, with thirty ships, made an expedition against
the islands of jEoIus ; it being impossible to invade them
in summer, owing to the want of water. These islands
are occupied by the Liparaeans, a Cnidian colony, who
live in one of them of no great size called Lipara ; and
from this as their headquarters cultivate the rest, Didyme,
Strongyle, and Hiera. In Hiera the people in those
parts believe that Hephaestus has his forge, from the
quantity of flame which they see it send out by night,
and of smoke bv day. These islands lie off the coast of
the Sicels and Messinese, and were allies of the Syra-
cusans. The Athenians laid waste their land, and as the
inhabitants did not submit, sailed back to Rhegium.

89, 9o] SIXTH YEAR OF THE WAR 229

Thus the winter ended, and with it ended the fifth year CHAP,
of this war, of which Thucydides was the historian. 21^

The next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies |-^- 4»fi-
set out to invade Attica under the command of Agis, son quakes
of Archidamus, and went as far as the Isthmus, but J^ti'Ss""
numerous earthquakes occurring, turned back again with-
out the invasion taking place. About the same time that
these earthquakes were so common, the sea at Orobias, in
Euboea, retiring from the then line of coast, returned in a
huge wave and invaded a great part of the town, and
retreated leaving some of it still under water ; so that
what was once land is now sea ; such of the inhabitants
perishing as could not run up to the higher ground in
time. A similar inundation also occurred at Atalanta,
the island off the Opuntian-Locrian coast, carrying away
part of the Athenian fort and wrecking one of two ships
which were drawn up on the beach. At Peparethus also
the sea retreated a little, without however any inundation
following; and an earthquake threw down part of the
wall, the town-hall, and a few other buildings. The
cause, in my opinion, of this phenomenon must be sought
in the earthquake. At the point where its shock has
been the most violent the sea is driven back, and suddenly
recoiling with redoubled force, causes the inundation.
Without an earthquake I do not see how such an accident
could happen.

During the same summer different operations were
carried on by the different belligerents in Sicily ; by the
Siceliots themselves against each other, and by the
Athenians and their allies : I shall however confine
myself to the actions in which the Athenians took part,
choosing the most important. The death of the Athenian
general Charceades, killed by the Syracusans in battle,
left Laches in the sole command of the fleet, which he
now directed in concert with the allies against Mylie, a
place belonging to the Messinese. Two Messinese

230 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [91,92

BOOK battalions in garrison at Mylae laid an ambush for the

"^- party landing from the ships, but were routed with great

B.C. 426. slaughter by the Athenians and their allies, who thereupon

nii^s^at assaulted the fortification and compelled them to surrender

Melos the AcropoUs and to march with them upon Messina.

TanagrL This town afterwards also submitted upon the approach

of the Athenians and their allies, and gave hostages and

all other securities required.

/ The same summer the Athenians sent thirty ships round
Peloponnese under Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and
Procles, son of Theodorus, and sixty others, with two
thousand heavy infantry, against Melos, under Nicias, son
of Niceratus ; wishing to reduce the Melians, who, al-
though islanders, refused to be subjects of Athens or even
to join her confederacy. The devastation of their land
not procuring their submission, the fleet, weighing from
Melos, sailed to Oropus in the territory of Graea, and
landing at nightfall, the heavy infantry started at once
from the ships by land for Tanagra in Boeotia, where
they were met by the whole levy from Athens, agreeably
to a concerted signal, under the command of Hipponicus,
son of Callias, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles. They
encamped, and passing that day in ravaging the Tana-
graean territory, remained there for the night ; and next
day, after defeating those of the Tanagrsans who sallied
out against them and some Thebans who had come up
to help the Tanagrasans, took some arms, set up a trophy,
and retired, the troops to the city and the others to the
ships. Nicias with his sixty ships coasted along shore and
ravaged the Locrian seaboard, and so returned home.

About this time the Lacedaemonians founded their
colony of Heraclea in Trachis, their object being the
following. The Malians form in all three tribes, the
Paraiians, the Hiereans, and the Trachinians. The last
of these having suffered severely in a war with their
neighbours the CEtaeans, at first intended to give them-

93] NORTHERN GREECE 231

selves up to Athens ; but afterwards tearing not to find CHAP.

in her the security that they sought, sent to Lacedsemon, 1

having chosen Tisamenus for their ambassador. In this ^-^^^
embassy joined also the Dorians from the mother country attempt
of the Lacedaemonians, with the same request, as they ^^4°^°"
themselves also suffered from the same enemy. After Heraclea*
hearing them, the Lacedaemonians determined to send
out the colony, wishing to assist the Trachinians and
Dorians, and also because they thought that the proposed
town would lie conveniently for the purposes of the war
against the Athenians. A fleet might be got ready there
against Eubcea, with the advantage of a short passage to
the island ; and the town would also be useful as a station
on the road to Thrace In short, everything made the
Lacedaemonians eager to found the place. After first
consulting the god at Delphi and receiving a favourable
answer, they sent off the colonists, Spartans and Periceci,
inviting also any of the rest of the Hellenes who might
wish to accompany them, except lonians, Achacans, and
certain other nationalities ; three Lacedaemonians leading
as founders of the colony, Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon.
The settlement effected, they fortified anew the city, now
called Heraclea, distant about four miles and a half from
Thermopylae and two miles and a quarter from the sea,
and commenced building docks, closing the side towards
Thermopylae just by the pass itself, in order that they
might be easily defended.

The foundation of this town, evidently meant to annoy
Euboea (the passage across to Cenaeum in that island
being a short one), at first caused some alarm at Athens,
which the event however did nothing to justify, the town
never giving them any trouble. The reason of this was
as follows. The Thessalians, who were sovereign in
those parts, and whose territory was menaced by its
foundation, were afraid that it might prove a very powerful
neighbour, and accordingly continually harassed and made

232 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [94

BOOK war upon the new settlers, until they at last wore them
^^ out in spite of their originally considerable numbers,

B.C. 426. people flocking from all quarters to a place founded by

theneyS '^^ Lacedasmonians, and thus thought secure of prosperity.

Western Qn the other hand the Lacedaemonians themselves, in
reece. ^^^ persons of their governors, did their full share towards
ruining its prosperity and reducing its population, as they
frightened away the greater part of the inhabitants by
governing harshly and in some cases not fairly, and thus
made it easier for their neighbours to prevail against
them.

The same summer, about the same time that the
Athenians were detained at Melos, their fellow-citizens
in the thirty ships cruising round Peloponnese, after
cutting off some guards in an ambush at Ellomenus in
Leucadia, subsequently went against Leucas itself with
a large armament, having been reinforced by the whole
levy of the Acarnanians except CEniadas, and by the
Zacynthians and Cephallenians and fifteen ships from
Corcyra. While the Leucadians witnessed the devasta-
tion of their land, without and within the isthmus upon
which the town of Leucas and the temple of Apollo
stand, without making any movement on account of the
overwhelming numbers of the enemy, the Acarnanians
urged Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to build a wall
so as to cut off the town from the continent, a measure
which they were convinced would secure its capture and
rid them once and for all of a most troublesome enemy.

Demosthenes however had in the meanwhile been per-
suaded by the Messenians that it was a fine opportunity
for him, having so laige an army assembled, to attack the
iEtolians, who were not only the enemies of Naupactus,
but whose reduction would further make it easy to gain
the rest of that part of the continent for the Athenians.
The ^tolian nation, although numerous and warlike, yet
dwelt in unwalled villages scattered far apart, and had

95] DEMOSTHENES INVADES -^TOLIA 233

nothing but light armour, and might, according to the CHAP

Messenians, be subdued without much difficulty before

succours could arrive. The plan which they recom- B.C. 4a&
mended was to attack first the Apodotians, next the scheme
Ophionians, and after these the Eurytanians, who are ^^rainst
the largest tribe in ^tolia, and speak, as is said, a lan-
guage exceedingly difficult to understand, and eat their
flesh raw. These once subdued, the rest would easily
come in.

To this plan Demosthenes consented, not only to
please the Messenians, but also in the belief that by
adding the ^tolians to his other continental allies he
would be able, without aid from home, to march against
the Boeotians by way of Ozolian Locris to Kytinium in
Doris, keeping Parnassus on his right until he descended
to the Phocians, whom he could force to join him if
their ancient friendship for Athens did not, as he anti-
cipated, at once decide them to do so. Arrived in
Phocis he was already upon the frontier of Bceotia. He
accordingly weighed from Leucas, against the wish of the
Acarnanians, and with his whole armament sailed along
the coast to Sollium, where he communicated to them
his intention ; and upon their refusing to agree to it on
account of the non-investment of Leucas, himself with
the rest of the forces, the Cephallenians, the Messenians,
and Zacynthians, and three hundred Athenian marines
from his own ships (the fifteen Corcyrsean vessels having
departed), started on his expedition against the ^tolians.
His base he established at CEneon in Locris, as the
Ozolian Locrians were allies of Athens and were to meet
him with all their forces in the interior. Being neigh-
bours of the -ZEtolians and armed in the same way, it was
thought that they would be of great service upon the
expedition, from their acquaintance with the locahties and
the warfare of the inhabitants.

After bivouacking with the army in the precinct of

234 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [96,97

BOOK Nemean Zeus, In which the poet Hesiod is said to have
"^- been killed by the people of the country, according to an

B.C. 426. oracle which had foretold that he should die in Nemea,
^near Demosthenes set out at daybreak to inrade jEtoIia. The

ffigfitium. f^rst day he took Potidania, the next Krokyle, and the
third Tichium, where he halted and sent back the booty
to Eupalium in Locris, having determined to pursue his
conquests as far as the Ophionians, and in the event of
their refusing to submit, to return to Naupactus and make
them the objects of a second expedition. Meanwhile the
^tolians had been aware of his design from the moment
of its formation, and as soon as the army invaded their
country came up in great force with all their tribes ; even
the most remote Ophionians, the Bomiensians, and Callien-
sians, who extend towards the Malian Gulf, being among
the number.

The Messenians, however, adhered to their original
advice. Assuring Demosthenes that the iEtolians were
an easy conquest, they urged him to push on as rapidly as
possible, and to try to take the villages as fast as he came
up to them, without waiting until the whole nation should
ht in arms against him. Led on by his advisers and
trusting in his fortune, as he had met with no opposition,
without waiting for his Locrian reinforcements, who were
to have supplied him with the light-armed darters in
which he was most deficient, he advanced and stormed
TEgitium, the inhabitants flying before him and posting
themselves upon the hills above the town, which stood on
high ground about nine miles from the sea. Meanwhile
the .iEtolians had gathered to the rescue, and now attacked
the Athenians and their allies, running down from the
hills on every side and darting their javehns, faUing back
when the Athenian army advanced, and coming on as it
retired ; and for a long while the battle was of this
character, alternate advance and retreat, in both which
operations the Athenians had the worst. .

98-100] DEMOSTHENES INVADES ^TOLIA 235

Still as long as their archers had arrows left and were CHAP

able to use them, they held out, the light-armed ^tolians 1

retiring before the arrows ; but after the captain of the B.C. 426.
archers had been killed and his men scattered, the soldiers, trous "
wearied out with the constant repetition of the same exer- ^f ^^the-
tions and hard pressed by the ^tolians with their jarelins, nians.
at last turned and fled, and falling into pathless gullies and
places that they were unacquainted with, thus perished,
the Messenian Chromon, their guide, having also unfor-
tunately been killed. A great many were overtaken in
the pursuit by the sv/ift-footed and light-armed ^tolians,
and fell beneath their javelins ; the greater number how-
ever missed their road and rushed into the wood, which
had no ways out, and which was soon fired and burnt
round them by the enemy. Indeed the Athenian army
fell victims to death in every form, and suffered all the
vicissitudes of flight ; the survivors escaped with difficulty
to the sea and CEneon in Locris, whence they had set
out. Many of the allies were killed, and about one
hundred and twenty Athenian heavy infantry, not a man
less, and ail in the prime of life. These were by far the
best men in the city of Athens that fell during this war.
Among the slain was also Procles, the colleague of
Demosthenes. Meanwhile the Athenians took up their
dead under truce from the -/Etolians, and retired to
Naupactus, and from thence went in their ships to
Athens ; Demosthenes staying behind in Naupactus and
in the neighbourhood, being afraid to face the Athenians
after the disaster.

About the same time the Athenians on the coast of
Sicily sailed to Locris, and in a descent which they
made from the ships defeated the Locrians who came
against them, and took a fort upon the river Halex.

The same summer the ^tolians, who before the
Athenian expedition had sent an embassy to Corinth
and Lacedaenion, composed of Tolophua, an Ophionian,

236 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [loi, 102

BOOK Boriades, an Eurytanian, and Tisander, an Apodotian,
• obtained that an army should be sent them against

B.C. 4*6. Naupactus, which had invited the Athenian invasion.

numians The Lacedaemonians accordingly sent off towards autumn
^^°^ three thousand heavy infantry of the allies, five hundred

Naupac- of whom were from Heraclea, the newly-founded city
^*" in Trachis, under the command of Eurylochus, a Spartan,
accompanied by Macarius and Menedaius, also Spartans.
The army having assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus
sent a herald to the Ozolian Locrians ; the road to
Naupactus lying through their territory, and he having
besides conceived the idea of detaching them from
Athens. His chief abettors in Locris were the Amphis-
sians, who were alarmed at the hostility of the Phocians.
These first gave hostages themselves, and induced the
rest to do the same for fear of the invading army ; first,
their neighbours the Myonians, who held the most diffi-
cult of the passes, and after them the Ipnians, Mes-
sapians, Tritseans, Chalseans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and
CEanthians, all of whom joined in the expedition ; the
Olpasans contenting themselves with giving hostages,
without accompanying the invasion ; and the Hyaeans
refusing to do either, until the capture of Polls, one of
their villages.

His preparations completed, Eurylochus lodged the
hostages in Kytinium, in Doris, and advanced upon
Naupactus through the country of the Locrians, taking
upon his way CEneon and Eupalium, two of their towns
that refused to join him. Arrived in the Naupactian
territory, and having been now joined by the iEtolians,
the army laid waste the land and took the suburb of the
town, which was unfortified ; and after this Molycrium
also, a Corinthian colony subject to Athens. Meanwhile
the Athenian Demosthenes, who since the affair in -£tolia
had remained near Naupactus, having had notice of the
army and fearing for the town, went and persuaded the

I03] WESTERN GREECE 237

Acarnanians, although not without difficulty because of his CHAP.

departure from Leucas, to go to the relief of Naupactus. 1

They accordingly sent with him on board his ships a B.C. 4*6.
thousand heavy infantry, who threw themselves into the Demos-
place and saved it ; the extent of its wall and the small ^^enes.
number of its defenders otherwise placing it in the greatest
danger. Meanwhile Eurylochus and his companions,
finding that this force had entered and that it was im-
possible to storm the town, withdrew, not to Peloponnese,
but to the country once called jEolis and now Calydon
and Pleuron, and to the places in that neighbourhood
and Proschium in ^tolia ; the Ambraciots having come
and urged them to combine with them in attacking
Amphilochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia and
Acarnania ; affirming that the conquest of these countries
would bring all the continent into alliance with Lace-
dxmon. To this Eurylochus consented, and dismissing
the jEtolians, now remained quiet with his army in those
parts, until the time should come for the Ambraciots to
take the field, and for him to join them before Argos.

Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the
Athenians in Sicily with their Hellenic allies, and such
of the Sicel subjects or allies of Syracuse as had revolted
from her and joined their army, marched against the
Sicel town Inessa, the Acropolis of which was held by
the Syracusans, and after attacking it without being able
to take it, retired. In the retreat, the allies retreating
after the Athenians were attacked by the Syracusans
from the fort, and a large part of their array routed with
great slaughter. After this. Laches and the Athenians
from the ships made some descents in Locris, and defeat-
ing the Locrians, who came against them with Proxenus,
son of Capaton, upon the river Ca'ieinus, took some arms
and departed.

The same winter the Athenians purified Delos, in
compliance, it appears, with a certain oracle. It had

238 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [104

BOOK been purified before by Pisistratus the tyrant ; not indeed
the whole island, but as much of it as could be seen from

B.C. 426. the temple. All of it was, however, now purified in the
"t?on of following way. All the sepulchres of those that had
Delos. (]iej [j^ Delos were taken up, and for the future it was
commanded that no one should be allowed either to die
or to give birth to a child in the island ; but that they
should be carried over to Rhenea, which is so near to
Delos that Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, having added
Rhenea to his other island conquests during his period
of naval ascendancy, dedicated it to the Delian Apollo
by binding it to Delos with a chain.

The Athenians, after the purification, celebrated, for
the first time, the quinquennial festival of the Delian
games. Once upon a time, indeed, there was a great
assemblage of the lonians and the neighbouring islanders
at Delos, who used to come to the festival, as the lonians
now do to that of Ephesus, and athletic and poetical
contests took place there, and the cities brought choirs
of dancers. Nothing can be clearer on this point than
the following verses of Homer, taken from a hymn to
Apollo : —

Phoebus, where'er thou strayest, far or near,
Delos was still of all thy haurtts most dear.
Thither the robed lonians take their way
With wife and child to keep thy holiday,
Invoke thy favour on each manly game,
And dance and sing in honour of thy name.

That there was also a poetical contest in wliich the
lonians went to contend, again is shown by the following,
taken from the same hymn. After celebrating the
Delian dance of the women, he ends his song of praise
with these verses, in which he also alludes to himself: —

Well, may Apollo keep you all ! and so,
Sweethearts, good-bye — yet tell me not I ^o

I05] REVIVAL OF THE DELIAN FESTIVAL 239

Out from your hearts ; and if in after hours CHAP.
Some other wanderer in this world of ours ^^-

Touch at your shores, and ask your maidens here g ^ ^

Who sings the songs the sweetest to your ear, Homer's

C Think of me then, and answer with a smile, witness

« A blind old man of Scio's rocky isle." Inchfnt

Homer thus attests that there was anciently a great
assembly and festival at Delos. In later times, although
the islanders and the Athenians continued to send the
choirs of dancers with sacrifices, the contests and most
of the ceremonies were abolished, probably through ad-
versity, until the Athenians celebrated the games upon
this occasion with the novelty of horse-races.

The same winter the Ambraciots, as they had pro-
mised Eurylochus when they retained his army, marched
out against Amphilochian Argos with three thousand
heavv infantry, and invading the Argive territory occu-
pied Olpas, a stronghold on a hill near the sea, which
had been formerly fortified by the Acarnanians and used
.IS the place of assizes for their nation, and which is
about two miles and three-quarters from the city of
Argos upon the sea-coast. Meanwhile the Acarnanians
went with a part of their forces to the relief of Argos,
and with the rest encamped in Amphilochia at the
place called Crenas, or the Wells, to watch for Eury-
lochus and his Peloponnesians, and to prevent their
passing through and effecting their junction with the
Ambraciots ; while they also sent for Demosthenes,
the commander of the ^tolian expedition, to be their
leader, and for the twenty Athenian ships that were
cruising off Peloponnese under the command of Aristotle,
son of Timocrates, and Hierophon, son of Antimnestus.
On their part, the Ambraciots at Olpas sent a messenger
to their own city, to beg them to come with their whole
levy to their assistance, fearing that the army of Eury-
lochus might not be able to pass through the Acarnanians,
and that they might themselves be obliged to fight single-

240 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [io6, 107

BOOK handed, or be unable to retreat, if they wished it, without
"^' danger.

B.C. 4«6. Meanwhile Eurylochus and his Peloponnesians, learn-
lochus ing that the Ambraciots at Olpae had arrived, set out

^h*^ '^™" from Proschium with all haste to join them, and crossing

at Olpae. the Achelous advanced through Acarnania, which they
found deserted by its population, who had gone to the
relief of Argos ; keeping on their right the city of the
Stratians and its garrison, and on their left the rest of
Acarnania. Traversing the territory of the Stratians,
they advanced through Phytia, next, skirting Medeon,
through Limnsea ; after which they left Acarnania behind
them and entered a friendly country, that of the Agrseans.
From thence they reached and crossed Mount Thyamus,
which belongs to the Agraeans, and descended into the
Argive territory after nightfall, and passing between the
city of Argos and the Acarnanian posts at Crenae, joined
the Ambraciots at Olpse.

Uniting here at daybreak, they sat down at the place
called Metropolis, and encamped. Not long afterwards
the Athenians in the twenty ships came into the Am -
bracian Gulf to support the Argives, with Demosthenes
and two hundred Messenian heavy infantry, and sixty
Athenian archers. While the fleet ofl^ Olpas blockaded
the hill from the sea, the Acarnanians and a few of the
Amphilochians, most of whom were kept back by force
by the Ambraciots, had already arrived at Argos, and
were preparing to give battle to the enemy, having chosen
Demosthenes to command the whole of the allied army in
concert with their own generals. Demosthenes led them
near to Olpas and encamped, a great ravine separating the
two armies. During five days they remained inactive ;
on the sixth both sides formed in order of battle. The
army of the Peloponnesians was the largest and outflanked
their opponents ; and Demosthenes fearing that his right
might be surrounded, placed in ambush in a hollow way

io8, 109] BATTLE OF OLPiE 241

overgrown with bushes some four hundred heavy infantry CHAP.

and light troops, who were to rise up at the moment of

the onset behind the projecting left wing of the enemy, 'B.C. 426.

J 11 • . \Tru u 1 -J ■'Defeat

and to take them in the rear. When both sides were ©f their

ready they joined battle ; Demosthenes being on the combined
right wing with the Messenians and a few Athenians, Demos-
while the rest of the line was made up of the different ^^^^^s-
divisions of the Acarnanians, and of the Amphilochian
darters. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were
drawn up pell-mell together, with the exception of the
Mantineans, who were massed on the left, without however
reaching to the extremity of the wing, where Eurylochus
and his men confronted the Messenians and Demosthenes.

The Peloponnesians were now well engaged and with
their outflanking wing were upon the point of turning
their enemy's right ; when the Acarnanians from the
ambuscade set upon them from behind, and broke them
at the first attack, without their staying to resist ; while
the panic into which they fell caused the flight of most
of their army, terrified beyond measure at seeing the
division of Eurylochus and their best troops cut to pieces.
Most of the work was done by Demosthenes and his
Messenians, who were posted in this part of the field.
Meanwhile the Ambraciots (who are the best soldiers in
those countries) and the troops upon the right wing,
defeated the division opposed to them and pursued it to
Argos. Returning from the pursuit, they found their
main body defeated ; and hard pressed by the Acarnanians,
with difficulty made good their passage to Olpae, suffer-
ing heavy loss on the way, as they dashed on without
discipline or order, the Mantineans excepted, who kept
their ranks best or any in the army during the retreat.

The battle did not end until the evening. The next

day Menedaius, who on the death of Eurylochus and

Macarius had succeeded to the sole command, being at

a loss after so signal a defeat how to stay and sustain a

I 455

242 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [no, iii

BOOK siege, cut off as he was by land and by the Athenian

[ fleet by sea, and equally so how to retreat in safety,

B.C. 426. opened a parley with Demosthenes and the Acarnanian
Conduct ^ I r j • • j 1

of the generals tor a truce and permission to retreat, and at the

Pelopon- same time for the recovery of the dead. The dead they
officers, gave back to him, and setting up a trophy took up their
own also to the number of about three hundred. The
retreat demanded they refused publicly to the army ;
but permission to depart without delay was secretly
granted to the Mantineans and to Menedaius and the
other commanders and principal men of the Pelopon-
nesians by Demosthenes and his Acarnanian colleagues ;
who desired to strip the Ambraciots and the mercenary
host of foreigners of their supporters ; and, above all, to
discredit the Lacedaemonians and PeloponneSians with
the Hellenes in those parts, as traitors and self-seekers.

While the enemy was taking up his dead and hastily
burying them as he could, and those who obtained per-
mission were secretly planning their retreat, word was
brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians that the
Ambraciots from the city, in compliance with the first
message from Olpas, were on the march with their whole
levy through Amphilochia to join their countrymen at
Olpae, knowing nothing of what had occurred. Demos-
thenes prepared to march with his army against them,
and meanwhile sent on at once a strong division to beset
the roads and occupy the strong positions In the mean-
time the Mantineans and others included in the agreement
went out under the pretence of gathering herbs and fire-
wood, and stole off by cwos and threes, picking on the
way the things which they professed to have come out
for, until they had gone some distance from Olpas, when
they quickened their pace. The Ambraciots and such of
the rest as had accompanied them in larger parties, seeing
them going on, pushed on in their turn, and began
running in order to catch them up. The Acarnanians

112] BATTLE OF IDOMENE 243

at first thought that all alike were departing without CHAP

permission, and began to pursue the Peloponnesians ; and 1

believing that they were being betrayed, even threw a |-C. 4*6.
dart or two at some of their generals who tried to Ambra-
stop them and told them that leave had been given. rou\SI°'
Eventually, however, they let pass the Mantineans and
Peloponnesians, and slew only the Ambraciots, there
being much dispute and difficulty in distinguishing
whether a man was an Ambraciot or a Peloponnesian.
The number thus slain was about two hundred ; the rest
escaped into the bordering territory of Agraea, and found
refuge with Salynthius, the friendly king of the Agraeans.
Meanwhile the Ambraciots from the city arrived at
Idomene. Idomene consists of two lofty hills, the
highest of which the troops sent on by Demosthenes
succeeded in occupying after nightfall, unobserved by
the Ambraciots, who had meanwhile ascended the
smaller and bivouacked upon it. After supper Demos-
thenes set out with the rest of the army, as soon as it was
evening ; himself with half his force making for the pass,
and the remainder going by the Amphilochian hills. At
dawn he fell upon the Ambraciots while they were still
abed, ignorant of what had passed, and fully thinking
that it was their own countrymen, — Demosthenes having
purposely put the Messenians in front with orders to
address them in the Doric dialect, and thus to inspire
confidence in the sentinels, who would not be able to see
them as it was still night. In this way he routed their
army as soon as he attacked it, slaying most of them
where they were, the rest breaking away in flight over
the hills. The roads, however, were already occupied,
and while the Amphilochians knew their own country,
the Ambraciots were ignorant of it and could not tell
which way to turn, and had also heavy armour as against
a light-armed enemy, and so fell into ravines and into the
ambushes which had been set for them, and perished

244 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [113

BOOK there. In their manifold efforts to escape some even

turned to the sea, which was not far off, and seeing the

B C. 426. Athenian ships coasting along shore just while the action

the* Am- was going on, swam off to them, thinking it better in the

^^'^} panic they were in, to perish, if perish they must, by the

* hands of the Athenians, than by those of the barbarous

and detested Amphilochians. Of the large Ambraciot

force destroyed in this manner, a few only reached the

city in safety ; while the Acarnanians, after stripping the

dead and setting up a trophy, returned to Argos.

The next day arrived a herald from the Ambraciots
who had fled from Olpse to the Agraeans, to ask leave to
take up the dead that had fallen after the first engagement,
when they left the camp with the Mantineans and their
companions, without, like them, having had permission to
do so. At the sight of the arms of the Ambraciots from
the city, the herald was astonished at their number, know-
ing nothing of the disaster and fancying that they were
those of their own party. Some one asked him what he
was so astonished at, and how many of them had been
killed, fancying in his turn that this was the herald from
the troops at Idomene. He replied, * About two hun-
dred ; ' upon which his interrogator took him up, saying,
* Why, the arms you see here are of more than a thousand.'
The herald replied, * Then they are not the arms of those
who fought with us ? ' The other answered, ' Yes, they
are, if at least you fought at Idomene yesterday.' * But
we fought with no one yesterday ; but the day before in
the retreat.' * However that may be, we fought yesterday
with those who came to reinforce you from the city of
the Ambraciots.' When the herald heard this and knew
that the reinforcement from the city had been destroyed,
he broke into wailing, and stunned at the magnitude of
the present evils, went away at once without having per-
formed his errand, or again asking for the dead bodies.
Indeed, this was by far the greatest disaster that befell

114] RUIN OF AMBRACIA 245

any one Hellenic city in an equal number of days during CHAP,
this war ; and I have not set down the number of the ^^
dead, because the amount stated seems so out of proper- B.C. 426.
tion to the size of the city as to be incredible. In any ^iJween
case I know that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochians Acar-
had wished to take Ambracia as the Athenians and Demos- ^d^Am-
thenes advised, they would have done so without striking a ^^'^^ciots
blow ; as it was, they feared that if the Athenians had it
they would be worse neighbours to them than the present.
After this the Acarnanians allotted a third of the
spoils to the Athenians, and divided the rest among their
own different towns. The share of the Athenians was
captured on the voyage home ; the arms now deposited
in the Attic temples are three hundred panoplies, which •

the Acarnanians set apart for Demosthenes, and which
he brought to Athens in person, his return to his country
after the ^tolian disaster being rendered less hazarde^us
by this exploit. The Athenians in the twenty ships also
went off to Naupactus. The Acarnanians and Amphi-
lochians, after the departure of Demosthenes and the
Athenians, granted the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians
who had taken refuge with Salynthius and the Agraeans
a free retreat from CEniadse, to which place they had
removed from the country of Salynthius, and for the
future concluded with the Ambraciots a treaty and
alliance for one hundred years, upon the terms following.
It was to be a defensive, not an offensive alliance ; the
Ambraciots could not be required to march with the
Acarnanians against the Peloponnesians, nor the Acar-
nanians with the Ambraciots against the Athenians ; for
the rest the Ambraciots were to give up the places and
hostages that they held of the Amphilochians, and not to
give help to Anactorium, which was at enmity with the
Acarnanians. With this arrangement they put an end to
the war. After this the Corinthians sent a garrison of
their own citizens to Ambracia, composed of three hundred

246 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [115, 116

BOOK heavy infantry, under the command of Xenocleides, son

]}}_ of Euthycles, who reached their destination after a diffi-

B.C. ±z6. cult journey across the continent. Such was the history

Another r \ rr ■ r a t ■

Athenian of the aftair ot Ambracia.

squadron The same winter the Athenians in Sicily made a
Sicily, descent from their ships upon the territory of Himera, in
concert with the Sicels, who had invaded its borders
from the interior, and also sailed to the islands of ^olus.
Upon their return to Rhegium they found the Athenian
general, Pythodorus, son of Isolochus, come to supersede
Laches in the command of the fleet. The allies in
Sicily had sailed to Athens and induced the Athenians
to send out more vessels to their assistance, pointing out

• that the Syracusans who already commanded their land

were making efforts to get together a navy, to avoid
being any longer excluded from the sea by a few vessels.
The Athenians proceeded to man forty ships to send to
them, thinking that the war in Sicily would thus be the
sooner ended, and also wishing to exercise their navy
One of the generals, Pythodorus, was accordingly sent
out with a few ships ; Sophocles, son of Sostratides, and
Eurymedon, son of Thucles, being destined to follow
with the main body. Meanwhile Pythodorus had taken
the command of Laches' ships, and towards the end of
winter sailed against the Locrian fort, which Laches had
formerly taken, and returned after being defeated in battle
by the Locrians.

In the first days of this spring, the stream of fire issued
from Etna, as on former occasions, and destroyed some
land of the Catanians, who live upon Mount Etna, which
is the largest mountain in Sicily. Fifty years, it is said,
had elapsed since the last eruption, there having been
three in all since the Hellenes have inhabited Sicily.
Such were the events of this winter ; and with it ended
the sixth year of this war, of which Thucydidec was the
historian.

I]

BOOK IV

CHAPTER XII

Seventh Year of the War— Occupation of Pylos— Sur-
render of the Spartan Army in Sphacteria

Next summer, about the time of the corn's coming into CHAP
ear, ten Syracusan and as many Locrian vessels sailed to ^^*
Messina, in Sicily, and occupied the town upon the invita- B.C. 42s
tion of the inhabitants ; and Messina revolted from the occupied
Athenians. The Syracusans contrived this chiefly be- by the
cause they saw that the place afforded an approach to cusans.
Sicily, and feared that the Athenians might hereafter use
it as a base for attacking them with a larger force ; the
Locrians because they wished to carry on hostilities from
both sides of the Strait and to reduce their enemies, the
people of Rhegium. Meanwhile, the Locrians had in-
vaded the Rhegian territory with all their forces, to pre-
vent their succouring Messina, and also at the instance of
some exiles from Rhegium who were with them ; the
long factions by which that town had been torn rendering
it for the moment incapable of resistance, and thus fur-
nishing an additional temptation to the invaders. After
devastating the country the Locrian land forces retired,
their ships remaining to guard Messina, while others were
being manned for the same destination to carry on the
war from thence.

About the same time in the spring, before the corn was
947

248 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [2,3

BOOK ripe, the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica
}Xl. under Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedae-

B.C. 42S- monians, and sat down and laid waste the country,
fieet^pifts Meanwhile the Athenians sent off the forty ships which
in at they had been preparing to Sicily, with the remaining
' generals Eurymedon and Sophocles ; their colleague
Pythodorus having already preceded them thither.
These had also instructions as they sailed by to look to
the Corcyraeans in the town, who were being plundered by
the exiles in the mountain. To support these exiles sixty
Peloponnesian vessels had lately sailed, it being thought
that the famine raging in the city would make it easy for
them to reduce it. Demosthenes also, who had remained
without employment since his return from Acarnania, ap-
plied and obtained permission to use the fleet, if he wished
it, upon the coast of Peloponnese.

Off Laconia they heard that the Peloponnesian ships
were already at Corcyra, upon which Eurymedon and
Sophocles wished to hasten to the island, but Demos-
thenes required them first to touch at Pylos and do what
was wanted there, before continuing their voyage. While
they were making objections, a squall chanced to come
on and carried the fleet into Pylos. Demosthenes at
once urged them to fortify the place, it being for this that
he had come on the voyage, and made them observe there
was plenty of stone and timber on the spot, and that the
place was strong by nature, and together with much of
the country round unoccupied ; Pylos, or Coryphasium,
as the Lacedaemonians call it, being about forty-five
miles distant from Sparta, and situated in the old country
of the Messenians. The commanders told him that there
was no lack of desert headlands in Peloponnese if he
wished to put the city to expense by occupying them.
He, however, thought that this place was distinguished
from others of the kind by having a harbour close by ;
while the Messenians, the old natives of the country,

4, 5, 6] OCCUPATION OF PYLOS 249

speaking the same dialect as the Lacedaemonians, could CHAP.

do them the greatest mischief by their incursions from it, ^ ;

and would at the same time be a trusty garrison. B.C. 425

After speaking to the captains of companies on the fortified
subject, and failing to persuade either the generals or the ^"Jj^_
soldiers, he remained inactive with the rest from stress of soned
weather ; until the soldiers themselves wanting occupation
were seized with a sudden impulse to go round and fortify
the place. Accordingly they set to work in earnest, and
having no iron tools, picked up stones, and put them together
as they happened to fit, and where mortar was needed,
carried it on their backs for want of hods, stooping down
to make it stay on, and clasping their hands together behind
to prevent it falling off; sparing no effort to be able to com-
plete the most vulnerable points before the arrival of the
Lacedaemonians, most of the place being sufficiently strong
by nature without further fortification.

Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians were celebrating a fes-
tival, and also at first made light of the news, in the idea
that whenever they chose to take the field the place would
be immediately evacuated by the enemy or easily taken by
force ; the absence of their army before Athens having also
something to do with their delay. The Athenians fortified
the place on the land side, and where it most required it,
in six days, and leaving Demosthenes with five ships to
garrison it, with the main body of the fleet hastened on
their voyage to Corcyra and Sicily.

As soon as the Peloponnesians in Attica heard of the
occupation of Pylos, they hurried back home; the Lace-
daemonians and their king Agis thinking that the matter
touched them nearly. Besides having made their invasion
early in the season, and while the corn was still green,
most of their troops were short of provisions : the weather
also was unusually bad for the time of year, and greatly
distressed their army. Many reasons thus combined to
hasten their departWe and to make this invasion a very

*I 455

2SO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [7,8

BOOK short one ; indeed they only stayed fifteen days in

iX: Attica.
B.C. 425. About the same time the Athenian general Simonides

Pelopon- . 1 r ^ 1 ■ /- 1 • 1

nesians getting together a tew Athenians from the garrisons, and
Pyk)s* ^ number of the allies in those parts, took Eion in Thrace,
a Mendasan colony and hostile to Athens, by treachery,
but had no sooner done so than the Chalcidians and
Bottixans came up and beat him out of it, with the loss of
many of his soldiers.

On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica the
Spartans themselves and the nearest of the Periceci at
once set out for Pylos, the other Lacedsemonians
following more slowly as they had just come in from
another campaign. Word was also sent round Pelopon-
nese to come up as quickly as possible to Pylos ; while
the sixty Peloponnesian ships were sent for from Corcyra
and being dragged by their crews across the isthmus of
Leucas, passed unperceived by the Athenian squadron
at Zacynthus, and reached Pylos, where the land forces
had arrived before them. Before the Peloponnesian fleet
sailed in, Demosthenes found time to send out unobserved
two ships to inform Eurymedon and the Athenians on
board the fleet at Zacynthus of the danger of Pylos and
to summon them to his assistance. While the ships
hastened on their voyage in obedience to the orders of
Demosthenes, the Lacedaemonians prepared to assault the
fort by land and sea, hoping to capture with ease a work
constructed in haste, and held by a feeble garrison.
Meanwhile, as they expected the Athenian ships to
arrive from Zacynthus, they intended, if they failed to
take the place before, to block up the entrances of the
harbour to prevent their being able to anchor inside it.
For the island of Sphacteria, stretching along in a line
close in front of the harbour, at once makes it safe and
narrows its entrances, leaving a passage for two ships on
the side nearest Pylos and the Athenian fortifications, and

9] OCCUPATION OF PYLOS 251

for eight or nine on that next the rest of the mainland : CHAP,
for the rest, the island was entirely covered with wood, ^^'
and without paths through not being inhabited, and about B.C. 435.
one mile and five furlongs in length. The inlets the gJSson
Lacedaemonians meant to close with a line of ships placed "^ Sphac.
close together, with their prows turned towards the sea,
and, meanwhile, fearing that the enemy might make use
of the island to operate against them, carried over some
heavy infantry thither, stationing others along the coast.
By this means the island and the continent would be alike
hostile to the Athenians, as they would be unable to land
on either ; and the shore of Pylos itself outside the inlet
towards the open sea having no harbour, and, therefore,
presenting no point which they could use as a base to
relieve their countrymen, they, the Lacedaemonians, with-
out sea-fight or risk would in all probability become
masters of the place, occupied, as it had been on the
spur of the moment, and unfurnished with provisions.
This being determined, they carried over to the island
the heavy infantry, drafted by lot from all the companies.
Some others had crossed over before in relief parties, but
these last who were left there were four hundred and
twenty in number, with their Helot attendants, com-
manded by Epitadas, son of Molobrus.

Meanwhile Demosthenes, seeing the Lacedasmonians
about to attack him by sea and land at once, himself was
not idle. He drew up under the fortification and en-
closed in a stockade the galleys remaining to him of those
which had been left him, arming the sailors taken out of
them with poor shields made most of them of osier, it
being impossible to procure arms in such a desert place,
and even these having been obtained from a thirty-oared
Messenian privateer and a boat belonging to some Mes-
senians who happened to have come to them. Among
these Messenians were forty heavy infantry, whom he
made use of with the rest. Posting most of his men,

252 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [lo

BOOK unarmed and armed, upon the best fortified and strong

points of the place towards the interior, with orders to

B.C. 425. repel any attack of the land forces, he picked sixty heavy
Demos- infantry and a few archers from his whole force, and with
thenes. these went outside the wall down to the sea, where he
thought that the enemy would most likely attempt to
land. Although the ground was difficult and rocky,
looking towards the open sea, the fact that this was the
weakest part of the wall would, he thought, encourage
their ardour, as the Athenians, confident in their naval
superiority, had here paid little attention to their defences,
and the enemy if he could force a landing might feel
secure of taking the place. At this point, accordingly,
going down to the water's edge, he posted his heavy
infantry to prevent, if possible, a landing, and encouraged
them in the following terms : —

' Soldiers and comrades in this adventure, I hope that
none of you in our present strait will think to show his
wit by exactly calculating all the perils that encompass
us, but that you will rather hasten to close with the
enemy, without staying to count the odds, seeing in this
your best chance of safety. In emergencies like ours
calculation is out of place ; the sooner the danger is faced
the better. To my mind also most of the chances are
for us, if we will only stand fast and not throw away our
advantages, overawed by the numbers of the enemy. One
of the points in our favour is the awkwardness of the
landing. This, however, only helps us if we stand our
ground. If we give way it v/ill be practicable enough,
in spite of its natural difficulty, without a defender ; and
the enemy will instantly become more formidable from
the difficulty he will have in retreating, supposing that we
succeed in repulsing him, which we shall find it easier to
do, while he is on board his ships, than after he has
landed and meets us on equal terms. As to his numbers,
these need not too much alarm you. Large as they may

11] ATTACK ON PYLOS 253

be he can only engage in small detachments, from the chap.
impossibility of bringing to. Besides, the numerical ^^^-
superiority that we have to meet is not that of an army B.C. 4*5.
on land with everything else equal, but of troops on board Ts^l'^it.^^
ship, upon an element where many favourable accidents
are required to act with effect. I therefore consider that
his difficulties may be fairly set against our numerical
deficiencies, and at the same time I charge you, as Athe-
nians who know by experience what landing from ships
on a hostile territory means, and how impossible it is to
drive back an enemy determined enough to stand his
ground and not to be frightened away by the surf and the
terrors of the ships sailing in, to stand fast in the present
emergency, beat back the enemy at the water's edge, and
save yourselves and the place.'

Thus encouraged by Demosthenes, the Athenians felt
more confident, and went down to meet the enemy,
posting themselves along the edge of the sea. The
Lacedaemonians now put themselves in movement and
simultaneously assaulted the fortification with their land
forces and with their ships, forty- three in number, under
their admiral, Thrasymelidas, son of Cratesicles, a Spar-
tan, who made his attack just where Demosthenes ex-
pected. The Athenians had thus to defend themselves
on both sides, from the land and from the sea ; the enemy
rowing up in small detachments, the one relieving the
other — it being impossible for many to bring to at once —
and showing great ardour and cheering each other on, in
the endeavour to force a passage and to take the fortifica-
tion. He who most distinguished himself was Brasidas.
Captain of a galley, and seeing that the captains and
steersmen, impressed by the difficulty of the position,
hung back even where a landing might have seemed pos-
sible, for fear of wrecking their vessels, he shouted out to
them, that they must never allow the enemy to fortify
himself in their country for the sake of saving timber, but

254 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [12, 13

BOOK must shiver their vessels and force a landing ; and bade

• the allies, instead of hesitating in such a moment to sacri-

B.C. 42s fice their ships for Lacedasmon in return for her many

of Brasi^ benefits, to run them boldly aground, land in one way or

'^**- another, and make themselves masters of the place and its

garrison.

Not content with this exhortation, he forced his own
steersman to run his ship ashore, and stepping on to the
gangway, was endeavouring to land, when he was cut
down by the Athenians, and after receiving many wounds
fainted away. Falling into the bows, his shield slipped
off his arm into the sea, and being thrown ashore was
picked up by the Athenians, and afterwards used for the
trophy which they set up for this attack. The rest also
did their best, but were not able to land, owing to the
difficulty of the ground and the unflinching tenacity of the
Athenians. It was a strange reversal of the order of
things for Athenians to be fighting from the land, and
from Laconian land too, against Lacedaemonians coming
from the sea ; while Lacedemonians were trying to land
from shipboard in their own country, now become hostile,
to attack Athenians, although the former were chiefly
famous at the time as an inland people and superior by
land, the latter as a maritime people with a navy that had
no equal.

After continuing their attacks during that day and most
of the next, the Peloponnesians desisted, and the day
after sent some of their ships to Asine for timber to make
engines, hoping to take by their aid, in spite of its height,
the wall opposite the harbour, where the landing was
easiest. At this moment the Athenian fleet from Zacyn-
thus arrived, now numbering fifty sail, having been rein-
forced by some of the ships on guard at Naupactus and
by four Chian vessels. Seeing the coast and the island
both crowded with heavy infantry, and the hostile ships
in harbour showing no signs of sailing out, at a loss where

14] SPARTANS SHUT UP IN SPHACTERIA 255

to anchor, they sailed for the moment to the desert island CHAP,
of Prote, not far off, where they passed the night. The ^^"
next day they got under weigh in readiness to engage in B.C. 425.
the open sea if the enemy chose to put out to meet them, Athemaa
being determined in the event of his not doing so to sail ^^^'=-
in and attack him. The Lacedaemonians did not put out
to sea, and having omitted to close the inlets as they had
intended, remained quiet on shore, engaged in manning
their ships and getting ready, in the case of any one sailing
in, to fight in the harbour, which is a fairly large one.

Perceiving this, the Athenians advanced against them
by each inlet, and falling on the enemy's fleet, most of
which was by this time afloat and in line, at once put it
to flight, and giving chase as far as the short distance
allowed, disabled a good many vessels, and took five, one
with its crew on board ; dashing in at the rest that had
taken refuge on shore, and battering some that were still
being manned, before they could put out, and lashing on
to their own ships and towing off empty others whose
crews had fled. At this sight the Lacedaemonians, mad-
dened by a disaster which cut oflF their men on the island,
rushed to the rescue, and going into the sea with their
heavy armour, laid hold of the ships and tried to drag
them back, each man thinking that success depended on
his individual exertions. Great was the melee, and quite
in contradiction to the naval tactics usual to the two
combatants ; the Lacedaemonians in their excitement and
dismay being actually engaged in a sea-fight on land,
while the victorious Athenians, in their eagerness to push
their success as far as possible, were carrying on a land-
fight from their ships. After great exertions and numer-
ous wounds on both sides they separated, the Lacedae-
monians saving their empty ships, except those first taken;
and both parties returning to their camp, the Athenians
set up a trophy, gave back the dead, secured the wrecks,
and at once began to cruise round and jealously watch the

256 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [15, 16

BOOK island, with its intercepted garrison, while the Pelopon-

'_ nesians on the mainland, whose contingents had now all

B.C. 425. come up, stayed where they were before Pylos.
aVpyios^ When the news of what had happened at Pylos reached
Sparta, the disaster was thought so serious that the Lace-
daemonians resolved that the authorities should go down
to the camp, and decide on the spot what was best to be
done. There seeing that it was impossible to help their
men, and not wishing to risk their being reduced by
hunger or overpowered by numbers, they determined,
with the consent of the Athenian generals, to conclude
an armistice at Pylos and send envoys to Athens to obtain
a convention, and ta endeavour to get back their men as
quickly as possible.

The generals accepting their offers, an armistice was
concluded upon the terms following : —

That the Lacedsemonians should bring to Pylos and
deliver up to the Athenians the ships that had fought in
the late engagement, and all in Laconia that were vessels
of war, and should make no attack on the fortification
either by land or by sea.

That the Athenians should allow the Lacedaemonians
on the mainland to send to the men in the island a certain
fixed quantity of corn ready kneaded, that is to say, two
quarts of barley meal, one pint of wine, and a piece of
meat for each man, and half the same quantity for a servant.

That this allowance should be sent in under the eyes
of the Athenians, and that no boat should sail to the
island except openly.

That tiie Athenians should continue to guard the
island the same as before, without however landing upon
it, and should refrain Irom attacking the Peloponnesian
troops either by land or by sea.

That if either party should infringe any of these terms
in the slightest particular, the armistice should be at once
void.

17] OVERTURES OF PEACE 257

That the armistice should hold good until the return chap
of the Lacedaemonian envoys from Athens — the Athenians ^^^•
sending them thither in a galley and bringing them back B.cTas.
again — and upon the arrival of the envoys should be at an l^cS^*
end, and the ships be restored by the Athenians in the monian
same state as they received them. Athens*'

Such were the terms of the armistice, and the ships
were delivered over to the number of sixty, and the
envoys sent off accordingly. Arrived at Athens they
spoke as follows : —

* Athenians, the Lacedaemonians sent us to try to find
some way of settling the affair of our men on the island,
that shall be at once satisfactory to your interests, and as
consistent with our dignity in our misfortune as circum-
stances permit. We can venture to speak at some length
without any departure from the habit of our country.
Men of few words where many are not wanted, we can
be less brief when there is a matter of importance to be
illustrated and an end to be served by its illustration.
Meanwhile we beg you to take what we may say, not in
a hostile spirit, nor as if we thought you ignorant and
wished to lecture you, but rather as a suggestion on the
best course to be taken, addressed to intelligent judges.
You can now, if you choose, employ your present success
to advantage, so as to keep what you have got and gain
honour and reputation besides, and you can avoid the
mistake of those v/ho meet with an extraordinary piece
of good fortune, and are led on by hope to grasp con-
tinually at something further, through having already
succeeded without expecting it. While those who have
known most vicissitudes of good and bad, have also justly
least faith in their prosperity ; and to teach your city and
ours this lesson experience has not been wanting.

* To be convinced of this you have only to look at our
present misfortune. What power in Hellas stood higher
than we did ? and yet we are come to you, although we

258 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [i8, 19

BOOK formerly thought ourselves more able to grant what we

fXl are now here to ask. Nevertheless, we have not been

B.C. 425- brought to this by any decay in our power, or through

alliance having our heads turned by aggrandisement ; no, our

offered in resources are what they have always been, and our error

for has been an error of judgment, to which all are equally

prisoners, jja^jg^ Accordingly the prosperity which your city now

enjoys, and the accession that it has lately received, must

not make you fancy that fortune will be always with you.

Indeed sensible men are prudent enough to treat. their

gains as precarious, just as tiiey would also keep a clear

head in adversity, and think that war, so far from staying

within the limit to which a combatant may wish to confine

it, will run the course that its chances prescribe ; and

thus, not being puffed up by confidence in military success,

they are less likely to come to grief, and most ready to

make peace, if they can, while their fortune lasts. This,

Athenians, you have a good opportunity to do now with

us, and thus to escape the possible disasters which may

follow upon your refusal, and the consequent imputation

of having owed to accident even your present advantages,

when you might have left behind you a reputation for

power and wisdom which nothing could endanger.

* The Lacedasmonians accordingly invite you to make
a treaty and to end the war, and offer peace and alliance
and the most friendly and intimate relations in every way
and on every occasion between us ; and in return ask for
the men on the island, thinking it better for both parties
not to stand out to the end, on the chance of some favour-
able accident enabling the men to force their way out, or
of their being compelled to succumb under the pressure of
blockade. Indeed if great enmities are ever to be really
settled, we think it will be, not by the system of revenge
and military success, and by forcing an opponent to swear
to a treaty to his disadvantage, but when the more for-
tunate combatant waives the^e his privileges, to be guided

20] OVERTURES OF PEACE 259

by gentler feelings, conquers his rival in generosity, and CHAP
accords peace on more moderate conditions than he ^
expected. From that moment, instead of the debt of B.C. 42s
revenge which \iolence must entail, his adversary owes a wiUbe
debt of generosity to be paid in kind, and is inclined by T^^°^
honour to stand to his agreement. And men oftener act
in this manner towards their greatest enemies than where
the quarrel is of less importance ; they are also by nature
as glad to give way to those who first yield to them, as
they are apt to be provoked by arrogance to risks con-
demned by their own judgment.

*To apply this to ourselves: if peace was ever desirable
for both parties, it is surely so at the present moment,
before anything irremediable befall us and force us to hate
you eternally, personally as well as politically, and you to
miss the advantages that we now offer you. While the
issue is still in doubt, and you have reputation and our
friendship in prospect, and we the compromise of our
misfortune before anything fatal occur, let us be recon-
ciled, and for ourselves choose peace instead of war, and
grant to the rest of the Hellenes a remission from their
sufferings, for which be sure they will think they have
chiefly you to thank. The war that they labour under
they know not which began, but the peace that concludes
it, as it depends on your decision, will by their gratitude
be laid to your door. By such a decision you can
become firm friends with the Lacedasmonians at their
own invitation, which you do not force from them, but
oblige them by accepting. And from this friendship
consider the advantages that are likely to follow : when
Attica and Sparta are at one, the rest of Hellas, be sure,
will remain in respectful inferiority before its heads.'

Such were the words of the Lacedaemonians, their idea
being that the Athenians, already desirous of a truce and
only kept back by their opposition, would joyfully accept
a peace freely offered, and give back the men. The

26o THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [21, 22

BOOK Athenians, however, having the men on the island,

}Xl. thought that the treaty would be ready for them when-

B.C. 435^ ever they chose to make it, and grasped at something

prop^s^^ further. Foremost to encourage them in this policy was

rejected Cleon, son of Cleaenetus, a popular leader of the time and

very powerful with the multitude, who persuaded them to

answer as follows : First, the men in the island must

surrender themselves and their arms and be brought to

Athens. Next, the Lacedaemonians must restore Nissea,

Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia, all places acquired not by

arms, but by the previous convention, under which they

had been ceded by Athens herself at a moment of disaster,

when a truce was more necessary to her than at present.

This done they might take back their men, and make a

truce for as long as both parties might agree.

To this answer the envoys made no reply, but asked
that commissioners might be chosen with whom they
might confer on each point, and quietly talk the matter
over and try to come to some agreement. Hereupon
Cleon violently assailed them, saying that he knew from
the first that they had no right intentions, and that it was
clear enough now by their refusing to speak before the
people, and wanting to confer in secret with a committee
of two or three. No ! if they meant anything honest let
them say it out before all. The Lacedaemonians, how-
ever, seeing that whatever concessions they might be
prepared to make in their misfortune, it was impossible
for them to speak before the multitude and lose credit
with their allies for a negotiation which might after all
miscarry, and on the other hand, that the Athenians
would never grant what they asked upon moderate
terms, returned from Athens without having effected
anything.

Their arrival at once put an end to the armistice at
Pylos, and the Lacedaemonians asked back their ships
according to the convention. The Athenians, however,

23, 24] BLOCKADE OF SPHACTERIA 261

alleged an attack on the fort in contravention of the truce, CHAP
and other grievances seemingly not worth mentioning, and
refused to give them back, insisting upon the clause by B.C. 425,

iiuru ■ r ■ ju •• •/ Athenian

which the slightest mrringement made the armistice void, bad faith
The Lacedaemonians, after denying the contravention and
protesting against their bad faith in the matter of the
ships, went away and earnestly addressed themselves to
the war. Hostilities were now carried on at Pylos upon
both sides with vigour. The Athenians cruised round
the island all day with two ships going different ways ;
and by night, except on the seaward side in windy weather,
anchored round it with their whole fleet, which having
been reinforced by twenty ships from Athens come to
aid in the blockade, now numbered seventy sail ; while
the Peloponnesians remained encamped on the continent,
making attacks on the fort, and on the look-out for any
opportunity which might offer itself for the deliverance of
their men.

Meanwhile the Syracusans and their allies in Sicily had
brought up to the squadron guarding Messina the rein-
forcement which we left them preparing, and carried on
the war from thence, incited chiefly by the Locrians from
hatred of the Rhegians, whose territory they had invaded
with all their forces. The Syracusans also wished to try
their fortune at sea, seeing that the Athenians had only a
few ships actually at Rhegium, and hearing that the main
fleet destined to join them was engaged, in blockading the
island. A naval victory, they thought, would enable them
to blockade Rhegium by sea and land, and easily to reduce
it ; a success which would at once place their affairs upon
a solid basis, the promontory of Rhegium in Italy and
Messina in Sicily being so near each other that it would
be impossible for the Athenians to cruise against them and
command the strait. The strait in question consists of
the sea between Rhegium and Messina, at the point where
Sicily approaches nearest to the continent, and is the

262 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [25

BOOK Charybdis through which the story makes Ulysses sail ;

IXl and the narrowness of the passage and the strength of

B.C. 4«5- the current that pours in from the vast Tyrrhenian

^ir- and Sicilian mains, have rightly given it a bad re-

'^n the P^^^^^o"*

•trait of In this Strait the Syracusans and their allies were com-
Messina. ^q\[q^ to engage, late in the day, about the passage of a
boat, putting out with rather more than thirty ships
against sixteen Athenian and eight Rhegian vessels.
iSefeated by the Athenians they hastily set off, each for
himself, to their own stations at Messina and Rhegium,
with the loss of one ship ; night coming on before the
battle was finished. After this the Locrians retired
from the Rhegian territory, and the ships of the Syra-
cusans and their allies united and came to anchor at Cape
Pelorus, in the territory of Messina, where their land
forces joined them. Here the Athenians and Rhegians
sailed up, and seeing the ships unmanned, made an attack,
in which they in their turn lost one vessel, which was
caught by a grappling iron, the crew saving themselves by
swimming. After this the Syracusans got on board their
ships, and while they were being towed along shore to
Messina, were again attacked by the Athenians, but
suddenly got out to sea and became the assailants, and
caused them to lose another vessel. After thus holding
their own in the voyage along shore and in the engage-
ment as above described, the Syracusans sailed on into the
harbour of Messina.

Meanwhile the Athenians, having received warning that
Camarina was about to be betrayed to the Syracusans by
Archias and his party, sailed thither ; and the Messinese
took this opportunity to attack by sea and land with all
their forces their Chalcidian neighbour, Naxos. The
first day they forced the Naxians to keep their walls, and
laid waste their country ; the next they sailed round with
their ships, and laid waste their land on the river Akesines,

26] ATHENIANS IN SICILY 263

while their land forces menaced the city. Meanwhile the CHAP.
Sicels came down from the high country in great numbers, ^^
to aid against the Messinese ; and the Naxians, elated at B.C. 425
the sight, and animated by a belief that the Leontines and ofthe^
their other Hellenic allies were coming to their support, Messi-
suddenly sallied out from the town, and attacked and
routed the Messinese, killing more than a thousand of
them ; while the remainder suffered severely in their
retreat home, being attacked by the barbarians on the
road, and most of them cut off. The ships put in to
Messina, and afterwards dispersed- for their different
homes. The Leontines and their allies, with the
Athenians, upon this at once turned their arms against
the now weakened Messina, and attacked, the Athenians
with their ships on the side of the harbour, and the land
forces on that of the town. The Messinese, however,
sallying out with Demoteles and some Locrians who
had been left to garrison the city after the disaster, sud-
denly attacked and routed most of the Leontine army,
killing a great number ; upon seeing which the Athenians
landed from their ships, and falling on the Messinese in
disorder chased them back into the town, and setting up
a trophy retired to Rhegium. After this the Hellenes in
Sicily continued to make war on each other by land,
without the Athenians.

Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos were still besieg-
ing the Lacedgemonians in the island, the Peloponnesian
forces on the continent remaining where they were.
The blockade was very laborious for the Athenians from
want of food and water ; there was no spring except one
in the citadel of Pylos itself, and that not a large one,
and most of them were obliged to grub up the shingle on
the sea beach and drink such water as they could find.
They also suffered from want of room, being encamped
in a narrow space ; and as there was no anchorage for
the ships, some took their meals on shore in their turn.

264 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [27

BOOK while the others were anchored out at sea. But their

1 greatest discouragement arose from the unexpectedly long

B.C. 425. time which it took to reduce a body of men shut up in a
cessofthe desert island, with only brackish water to drink, a matter
^^teria ^^^'^^ ^^^Y ^^^ imagined would take them only a few
blockade, days. The fact was, that the Lacedsemonians had made
advertisement for volunteers to carry into the island
ground corn, wine, cheese, and any other food useful in a
siege ; high prices being offered, and freedom promised
to any of the Helots who should succeed in doing so.
The Helots accordingly were most forward to engage
in this risky traffic, putting off from this or that part of
Peloponnese, and running in by night on the seaward
side of the island. They were best pleased, however,
when they could catch a wind to carry them in. It was
, more easy to elude the look-out of the galleys, when it
blew from the seaward, as it became impossible for
them to anchor round the island ; while the Helots had
their boats rated at their value in money, and ran them
ashore, without caring how they landed, being sure to
find the soldiers waiting for them at the landing-places.
But all who risked it in fair weather were taken. Divers
also swam in under water from the harbour, dragging
by a cord in skins poppy-seed mixed with honey, and
bruised linseed ; these at first escaped notice, but after-
wards a look-out was kept for them. In short, both
sides tried every possible contrivance, the one to throw in
provisions, and the other to prevent their introduction.

At Athens, meanwhile, the news that the army was in
great distress, and that corn found its way in to the
men in the island caused no small perplexity ; and the
Athenians began to fear that winter might come on and
find them still engaged in the blockade. They saw that
the convoying of provisions round Peloponnese would be
then impossible. The country offered no resources in
itself, and even in summer they could not send round

28] BLOCKADE OF SPHACTERIA 265

enough. The blockade of a place without harbours could CHAP
no longer be kept up ; and the men would either escape
by the siege being abandoned, or would watch for bad B.C. 42^
weather and sail out in the boats that brought in their cieon.
corn. What caused still more alarm was the attitude
of the Lacedasmonians, who must, it was thought by the
Athenians, feel themselves on strong ground not to send
them any more envoys ; and they began to repent having'
rejected the treaty. Cieon, perceiving the disfavour with
which he was regarded for having stood in the way of
the convention, now said that their informants did not
speak the truth ; and upon the messengers recommending
them, if they did not believe them, to send some com-
missioners to see, Cieon himself and Theagenes were
chosen by the Athenians as commissioners. Aware
that he would now be obliged either to say what had
been already said by the men whom he was slandering,
or be proved a liar if he said the contrary, he told the
Athenians, whom he saw to be not altogether disinclined
for a fresh expedition, that instead of sending commis-
sioners and wasting their time and opportunities, if they
believed what was told them, they ought to sail against
the men. And pointing at Nicias, son of Niceratus,
then general, whom he hated, he tauntingly said that it
would be easy, if they had men for generals, to sail with
a force and take those in the island, and that if he had
himself been in command, he would have done it.

Nicias, seeing the Athenians murmuring against Cieon
for not sailing now if it seemed to him so easy, and
further seeing himself the object of attack, told him
that for all that the generals cared, he might take what
force he chose and make the attempt. At first Cieon
fancied that this resignation was merely a figure of
speech, and was ready to go, but finding that it was
seriously meant, he drew back, and said that Nicias, not
he, was general, being now frightened, and having never

266 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [29

BOOK supposed that Nicias would go so far as to retire in his
^ favour. Nicias, however, repeated his offer, and re-
B.C. 425. signed the command against Pylos, and called the
sent*to Athenians to witness that he did so. And as the
Pylos. multitude is wont to do, the more Clean shrank from
the expedition and tried to back out of what he had
said, the more they encouraged Nicias to hand over his
command, and clamoured at Cleon to go. At last, not
knowing how to get out of his words, he undertook the
expedition, and came forward and said that he was not
afraid of the Lacedsemonians, but would sail without
taking any one from the city with him, except the
Lemnians and Imbrians that were at Athens, with some
targeteers that had come up from ^nus, and four
hundred archers from other quarters. With these and
the soldiers at Pylos, he would within twenty days either
bring the Lacedaemonians alive, or kill them on the spot.
The Athenians could not help laughing at his fatuity,
while sensible men comforted themselves with the re-
flexion that they must gain in either circumstance ;
either they would be rid of Cleon, which they rather
hoped, or if disappointed in this expectation, would
reduce the Lacedaemonians.

After he had settled everything in the assembly, and
the Athenians had voted him the command of the
expedition, he chose as his colleague Demosthenes, one
of the generals at Pylos, and pushed forward the pre-
parations for his voyage. His choice fell upon Demos-
thenes because he heard that he was contemplating a
descent on the island ; the soldiers distressed by the
difficulties of the position, and rather besieged than
besiegers, being eager to fight it out, while the firing of
the island had increased the confidence of the general.
He had been at first afraid, because the island having
never been inhabited was almost entirely covered with
wood and without paths, thinking this to be in the

30] BLOCKADE OF SPHACTERIA 267

enemy's favour, as he might land with a large force, CHAP,
and yet might suffer loss by an attack from an unseen ^^•
position. The mistakes and forces of the enemy the B.C. 425.
wood would in a great measure conceal from him, while onthe°°^
every blunder of his own troops would be at once island
detected, and they would be thus able to fall upon him b"fire?^*
unexpectedly just where they pleased, the attack being
always in th.eir power. If, on the other hand, he should
force them to engage in the thicket, the smaller number
who knew the country would, he thought, have the
advantage over the larger who were ignorant of it, while
his own army might be cut off imperceptibly, in spite of
its numbers, as the men would not be able to see where
to succour each other.

The ^tolian disaster, which had been mainly caused
by the wood, had not a little to do with these reflexions.
Meanwhile, one of the soldiers who were compelled by
want of room to land on the extremities of the island
and take their dinners, with outposts fixed to prevent a
surprise, set fire to a little of the wood without meaning
to do so ; and as it came on to blow soon afterwards,
almost the whole was consumed before they were aware
of it. Demosthenes was now able for the first time to
see how numerous the Lacedaemonians really were,
having up to this moment bet-n under the impression that
they took in provisions for a smaller number ; he also
saw that the Athenians thought success important and
were anxious about it, and that it was now easier to land
on the island, and accordingly got ready for the attempt,
sent for troops from the allies in the neighbourhood, and
pushed forward his other preparations. At this moment
Cleon arrived at Pylos with the troops which he had
asked for, having sent on word to say that he was
coming. The first step taken by the two generals after
their meeting was to send a herald to the camp on the
mainland, to ask if they were disposed to avoid all risk

268 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [31. 32

BOOK and to order the men on the island to surrender them-

}Xl selves and their arms, to be kept in gentle custody until

B.C. 425. some general convention should be concluded.

tionoKe O" ^^e rejection of this proposition the generals let

g^arrison, one day pass, and the next embarking all their heavy

and plan . ^ ij r i • l -l j '

oi attack, infantry on board a tew ships, put out by night, and a
little before dawn landed on both sides of the island from
the open sea and from the harbour, being about eight
hundred strong, and advanced with a run against the first
post in the island. The enemy had distributed his force
as follows : — In this first post there were about thirty
heavy infantry ; the centre and most level part, where
the water was, was held by the main body, and by
Epitadas their commander ; while a small party guarded
the very end of the island, towards Pylos, which was
precipitous on the sea-side and very difficult to attack
i from the land, and where there was also a sort of old

Ifort of stones rudely put together, which they thought
might be useful to them, in case they should be forced to
retreat. Such was their disposition.

The advanced post thus attacked by the Athenians
was at once put to the sword, the men being scarcely
out of bed and still arming, the landing having taken
them by surprise, as they fancied the ships were only
sailing as usual to their stations for the night. As soon
as day broke, the rest of the army landed, that is to say,
all the crews of rather more than seventy ships, except
the lowest rank of oars, with the arms they carried, eight
hundred archers, and as many targeteers, the Messenian
reinforcements, and all the other troops on duty round
Pylos, except the garrison on the fort. The tactics of
Demosthenes had divided them into companies of two
hundred, more or less, and made them occupy the
highest points in order to paralyse the enemy by sur-
rounding him on every side and thus leaving him without
any tangible adversary, exposed to the cross-fire of their

tbeniao
rce.

33, 34] ASSAULT ON BPHACTERIA 269

host ; plied by those in his rear if he attacked in front, CHAP.

and by those on one flank if he moved against those on ;

the other. In short, wherever he went he would have |C. ^s-
the assailants behind him, and these light-armed assailants, of tiie
the most awkward of all ; arrows, darts, stones, and ^^f^^
slings making them formidable at a distance, and there ii the
being no means of getting at them at close quarters, as
they could conquer flying, and the moment their pursuer
turned they were upon him. Such was the idea that
inspired Demosthenes in his conception of the descent,
and presided over its execution.

Meanwhile the main body of the troops in the island
(that under Epitadas), seeing their outpost cut off and
an army advancing against them, serried their ranks and
pressed forward to close with the Athenian heavy in-
fantry in front of them, the light troops being upon their
flanks and rear. However, they w,ere not able to engage
or to profit by their superior skill, the light troops
keeping them in check on either side with their missiles,
and the heavy infantry remaining stationary instead of
advancing to meet them ; and although they routed the
light troops wherever they ran up and approached too
closely, yet they retreated fighting, being lightly equipped,
and easily getting the start in their flight, from the
difiicult and rugged nature of the ground, in an island
hitherto desert, over which the Lacedaemonians could
not pursue them with their heavy armour.

After this skirmishing had lasted some little while,
the Lacedaemonians became unable to dash out with the
same rapidity as before upon the points attacked, and the
light troops, finding that they now fought with less
vigour, became more confident. They could see with
their own eyes that they were many times more numerous
than the enemy ; they were now more familiar with his
aspect and found him less terrible, the result not having
justified the apprehensions which they had suffered, when

270 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [35

BOOK they first landed in slavish dismay at the idea of attack-
}Xl. ing Lacedaemonians ; and accordingly their fear changing

B.C. 425. to disdain, they now rushed all together with loud shouts
^ oVthe upon them, and pelted them with stones, darts, and

Lacedae- arrows, whichever came first to hand. The shouting
accompanying their onset confounded the Lacedaemonians,
unaccustomed to this mode of fighting ; dust rose from
the newly-burnt wood, and it was impossible to see in
front of one with the arrows and stones flying through
clouds of dust from the hands of numerous assailants.
The Lacedaemonians had now to sustain a rude conflict ;
their caps would not keep out the arrows, darts had
broken off in the armour of the wounded, while they
themselves were helpless for offence, being prevented from
using their eyes to see what was before them, and unable
to hear the words of command for the hubbub raised by
the enemy ; danger encompassed them on every side, and
there was no hope of any means of defence or safety.

At last, after many had been already wounded in the
confined space in which they were fighting, they formed
in close order and retired on the fort at the end of the
island, which was not far off, and to their friends who
held it. The moment they gave way, the light troops
became bolder and pressed upon them, shouting louder
than ever, and killed as many as they came up with in
their retreat, but most of the Lacedaemonians made good
their escape to the fort, and with the garrison in it
ranged themselves all along its whole extent to repulse
the enemy wherever it was assailable. The Athenians
pursuing, unable to surround and hem them in, owing to
the strength of the ground, attacked them in front and
tried to storm the position. For a long time, indeed
for most of the day, both sides held out against all the
torments of the battle, thirst, and sun, the one endeavour-
ing to drive the enemy from the high ground, the other
to maintain himself upon it, it being now more easy for

3b, 37] ASSAULT ON SPHACTERIA 271

the Lacedaemonians to defend themselves than before, as CHAP,
they could not be surrounded upon the flanks. ^^*

The struggle began to seem endless, when the com- B.C. 425.
mander of the Messenians came to Cleon and Demos- de%^°'
thenes, and told them that they were losing their labour : ^^^"1^^
but that if they would give him some archers and light two fires.
troops to go round on the enemy's rear by a way he
would undertake to find, he thought he could force the
approach. Upon receiving what he asked for, he started
from a point out of sight in order not to be seen by the
enemy, and creeping on wherever the precipices of the
island permitted, and where the Lacedaemonians, trusting to
the strength of the ground, kept no guard, succeeded after
the greatest difficulty in getting round without their seeing
him, and suddenly appeared on the high ground in their rear,
to the dismay of the surprised enemy and the still greater
joy of his expectant friends. The Lacedaemonians thus
placed between two fires, and in the same dilemma, to
compare small things with great, as at Thermopylae, where
the defenders were cut off through the Persians getting
round by the path, being now attacked in front and behind,
began to give way, and overcome by the odds against them
and exhausted from want of food, retreated.

The Athenians were already masters of the approaches
when Cleon and Demosthenes perceiving that, if the
enemy gave way a single step further, they would be
destroyed by their soldiery, put a stop to the battle and
held their men back ; wishing to take the Lacedaemonians
alive to Athens, and hoping that their stubbornness might
relax on hearing the offer of terms, and that they might
surrender and yield to the present overwhelming danger.
Proclamation was accordingly made, to know if they would
surrender themselves and their arms to the Athenians to
be dealt with at their discretion.

The Lacedaemonians hearing this offer, most of them
lowered their shields and waved their hands to show that

272 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [38, 39

BOOK they accepted it. Hostilities now ceased, and a parley
was held between Cleon and Demosthenes and Styphon,
B.C. 42s son of Pharax, on the other side; since Epitadas, the
ancfsur^ first of the previous commanders, had been killed, and
render. Hippagretas, the next in command, left for dead among
the slain, though still alive, and thus the command had
devolved upon Styphon according to the law, in case of
anything happening to his superiors. Styphon and his
companions said they wished to send a herald to the
Lacedaemonians on the mainland, to know what they
were to do. The Athenians would not let any of them
go, but themselves called for heralds from the mainland,
and after questions had been carried backwards and
forwards two or three times, the last man that passed
over from the Laced asmonians on the continent brought
this message : * The Lacedaemonians bid you to decide
for yQurselves so long as you do nothing dishonourable ; '
upon which after consulting together they surrendered
themselves and their arms. The Athenians, after guard-
ing them that day and night, the next morning set up a
trophy in the island, and got ready to sail, giving their
prisoners in batches to be guarded by the captains of
the galleys ; and the Lacedaemonians sent a herald and
took up their dead. The number of the killed and
prisoners taken in the island was as follows : four hundred
and twenty heavy infantry had passed over ; three hundred
all but eight were taken alive to Athens ; the rest were
killed. About a hundred and twenty of the prisoners
were Spartans. The Athenian loss was small, the battle
not having been fought at close quarters.

The blockade in all, counting from the fight at sea to the
battle in the island, had lasted seventy-two days. For
twenty of these, during the absence of the envoys sent to
treat for peace, the men had provisions given them, for the
rest they were fed by the smugglers. Corn and other
victual was found in the island ; the commander Epitadas

40, 41] SURRENDER OF SPARTAN ARMY 273

having kept the men upon half rations. The Athenians CHAP
and Peloponnesians now each withdrew their forces from ^^•
Pyios, and went home, and crazy as Cleon's promise was, B.C. 425.
he fulfilled it, by bringing the men to Athens within the Spartan'
twenty days as he had pledged himself to do. prestige.

Nothing that happened in the war surprised the Hel-
lenes so much as this. It was the opinion that no force
or famine could make the Lacedaemonians give up their
arms, but that they would fight on as they could, and die
with them in their hands ; indeed people could scarcely
believe that those who had surrendered were of the same
stuff as the fallen ; and an Athenian ally, who some time
after insultingly asked one of the prisoners from the island
if those that had fallen were men of honour, received for
answer that the atraktos — that is, the arrow — would be
worth a great deal if it could tell men of honour from
the rest ; in allusion to the fact that the killed were those
whom the stones and the arrows happened to hit.

Upon the arrival of the men the Athenians determined
to keep them in prison until the peace, and if the Pelo-
ponnesians invaded their country in the interval, to bring
them out and put them to death. Meanwhile the de-
fence of Pylos was not forgotten ; the Messenians from
Naupactus sent to their old country, to which Pylos
formerly belonged, some of the likeliest of their number,
and began a series of incursions into Laconia, which their
common dialect rendered most destructive. The Lace-
daemonians, hitherto without experience of incursions or
a warfare of the kind, finding the Helots deserting, and
fearing the march of revolution in their country, began to
be seriously uneasy, and in spite of their unwillingness
to betray this to the Athenians began to send envoys
to Athens, and tried to recover Pylos and the prisoners.
The Athenians, however, kept grasping at more, and
dismissed envoy after envoy without their having effected
anything. Such v/as the history of the affair of Pylos.

K455

274 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [42,43

BOOK
IV.

CHAPTER XIII

Seventh and Eighth Years of the War— End of Corcyraean
Revolution— Peace of Gela— Capture of Nisaea

B^C. 425. The same summer, directly after these events, the Athe-
tion nians made an expedition against the territory of Corinth

cifrLntf ^^''^ eighty ships and two thousand Athenian heavy
' infantry, and two hundred cavalry on board horse trans-
ports, accompanied by the Milesians, Andrians, and
Carystians from the allies, under the command of Nicias,
son of Niceratus, with two colleagues. Putting out to
sea they made land at daybreak, between Chersonese and
Rheirus, at the beach of the country underneath the
Solygian hill, upon which the Dorians in old times
established themselves and carried on war against the
JEolhn inhabitants of Corinth, and where a village now
stands called Solygia. The beach where the fleet came
to is about a mile and a half from the village, seven miles
from Corinth, and two and a quarter from the Isthmus.
The Corinthians had heard from Argos of the coming
of the Athenian armament, and had all come up to the
Isthmus long before, with the exception of those who
lived beyond it, and also of five hundred who were away
in garrison in Ambracia and Leucadia ; and they were
there in full force watching for the Athenians to land.
These last, however, gave them the slip by coming in
the dark ; and being informed by signals of the fact, the
Corinthians left half their number at Cenchreae, in case
the Athenians should go against Crommyon, and marched
in all haste to the rescue.

Battus, one of the two generals present at the action,
went with a company to defend the village of Solygia,
which was unfortified ; Lycophron remaining to give

44] EXPEDITION AGAINST CORINTH 275

battle with the rest. The Corinthians first attacked the CHAP.

right wing of the Athenians, which had just landed in *

front of Chersonese, and afterwards the rest of the army. B.C. 425.
The battle was an obstinate one, and fought throughout the Conn-
hand to hand. The right wing of the Athenians and thians.
Carystians, who had been placed at thd end of the line,
received and v/ith some difficulty repulsed the Corinthians,
who thereupon retreated to a wall upon the rising ground
behind, and throwing down the stones upon them, came
on again singing the paean, and being received by the
Athenians, were again engaged at close quarters. At
this moment a Corinthian company having come to the
relief of the left wing, routed and pursued the Athenian
right to the sea, whence they were in their turn driven
back by the Athenians and Carystians from the ships.
Meanwhile the rest of the army on either side fought on
tenaciously, especially the right wing of the Corinthians,
where Lycophron sustained the attack of the Athenian
left, which it was feared might attempt the village of
Solygia.

After holding on for a long while without either giving
way, the Athenians aided by their horse, of which the
enemy had none, at length routed the Corinthians, who
retired to the hill and halting remained quiet there, with-
out coming down again. It was in this rout of the right
wing that they had the most killed, Lycophron their
general being among the number. The rest of the army,
broken and put to flight in this way without being seriously
pursued or hurried, retired to the high ground and there
took up its position. The Athenians, finding that the
enemy no longer offered to engage them, stripped his
dead and took up their own and immediately set up a
trophy. Meanwhile, the half of the Corinthians left at
Cenchreas to guard against the Athenians sailing on
Crommyon, although unable to see the battle for Mount
Oneion, found out what was going on by the dust, and

276 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [45, 46

BOOK hurried up to the rescue ; as did also the older Corinthians
^ from the town, upon discovering what had occurred.

B.C. 425. The Athenians seeing them all coming against ihem, and
tion^of thinking that they were reinforcements arriving from the

Methana. neighbouring Peloponnesians, withdrew in haste to their
ships with their spoils and their own dead, except two
that they left behind, not being able to find them, and
going on board crossed over to the islands opposite, and
from thence sent a herald, and took up under truce the
bodies which they had left behind. Two hundred and
twelve Corinthians fell in the battle, and rather less than
fifty Athenians.

Weighing from the islands, the Athenians sailed the
same day to Crommyon in the Corinthian territory, about
thirteen miles from the city, and coming to anchor laid
waste the country, and passed the night there. The next
day, after first coasting along to the territory of Epidaurus
and making a descent there, they came to Methana be-
tween Epidaurus and Trcezen, and drew a wall across
and fortified the isthmus of the peninsula, and left a post
there from which incursions were henceforth made upon
the country of Troezen, Haliae, and Epidaurus. After
walling off this spot the fleet sailed off home.

While these events were going on, Eurymedon and
Sophocles had put to sea with the Athenian fleet from
Pylos on their way to Sicily, and arriving at Corcyra,
joined the townsmen in an expedition against the party
established on Mount Istone, who had crossed over, as
I have mentioned, after the revolution, and become
masters of the country, to the great hurt of the inhabitants.
Their stronghold having been taken by an attack, the
garrison took refuge in a body upon some high ground
and there capitulated, agreeing to give up their mercenary
auxiliaries, lay down their arms, and commit themselves
to the discretion of the Athenian people. The generals
carried them across under truce to the island of Ptychia,

47, 48] MASSACRE AT CORCYRA 277

to be kept in custody until they could be sent to Athens, CHAP,
upon the understanding that if any were caught running ^^^^^
away, all would lose the benefit of the treaty. Mean- B.C. 425.
while the leaders of the Corcyrasan commons, afraid that ^j.^^^^"*
the Athenians might spare the lives of the prisoners, had prisoners,
recourse to the following stratagem. They gained over
some few men on the island by secretly sending friends
with instructions to provide them with a boat, and to tell
them, as if for their own sakes, that they had best escape
as quicklv as possible, as the Athenian generals were going
to give them up to the Corcyrsean people.

These representations succeeding, it was so arranged
that the men were caught sailing out in the boat that was
provided, and the treaty became void accordingly, and
the whole body were given up to the Corcyrseans. For
this result the Athenian generals were in a great measure
responsible ; their evident disinclination to sail for Sicily,
and thus to leave to others the honour of conducting the
men to Athens, encouraged the intriguers in their design
and seemed to affirm the truth of their representations.
The prisoners thus handed over were shut up by the
Corcyrseans in a large building, and afterwards taken out
by twenties and led past two lines of heavy infantry, one
on each side, being bound together, and beaten and stabbed
by the men in the lines whenever any saw pass a personal
enemy ; while men carrying whips went by their side and
hastened on the road those that walked too slowly.

As many as sixty men were taken out and killed in
this way without the knowledge of their friends in the
building, who fancied they, were merely being moved from
one prison to another. At last, however, so.me one opened
their eyes to the truth, upon which they called upon the
Athenians to kill them themselves, if such was their plea-
sure, and refused any longer to go out of the building,
and said they would do all they could to prevent anv one
coming in. The Corcyraeans, not liking themselves to

278 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [49, 50

BOOK force a passage by the doors, got up on the top of the
^ building, and breaking through the roof, threw down
B.C. 425. the tiles and let fly arrows at them, from which the
"don of prisoners sheltered themselves as well as they could,
oligarchs Most of their number, meanwhile, were engaged in dis-
party patching themselves by thrusting into their throats the
^^?nd° arrows shot by the enemy, and hanging themselves with
the cords taken from some beds, that happened to be
there, and with strips made from their clothing ; adopting,
in short, every possible means of self-destruction, and also
falling victims to the missiles of their enemies on the roof.
Night came on while these horrors were enacting, and
most of it had passed before they were concluded. When
it was day the Corcyrasans threw them in layers upon
waggons and carried them out of the city. All the
women taken in the stronghold were sold as slaves. In this
way the Corcyrasans of the mountain were destroyed by the
commons ; and so after terrible excesses the party strife came
to an end, at least as far as the period of this war is con-
cerned, for of one party there was practically nothing left.
Meanwhile the Athenians sailed off to Sicily, their primary
destination, and carried on the war with their allies there.

At the close of the summer, the Athenians at Nau-
pactus and the Acarnanians made an expedition against
Anactorium, the Corinthian town lying at the mouth
of the Ambracian gulf, and took it by treachery ; and the
Acarnanians themselves sending settlers from all parts of
Acarnania occupied the place.

Summer was now over. During the winter ensuing
Aristides, son of Archippus, one of the commanders of
the Athenian ships sent to collect money from the allies,
arrested at Eion on the Strymon Artaphernes, a Persian,
on his way from the king to Lacedaemon. He was con-
ducted to Athens, where the Athenians got his despatches
translated from the Assyrian character and read them.
With numerous references to other subjects, they in sub-

SI, 52] CHIOS AND LESBOS 279

stance told the Lacedaemonians that the king did not CHAP
know what they wanted, as of the many ambassadors they ^"^-
had sent him no two ever told the same story ; if how- B.C. 424.
ever they were prepared to speak plainly they might send ^xllellS
him some envoys with this Persian. The Athenians Antan-
afterwards sent back Artaphernes in a galley to Ephcsus, ™^"
and ambassadors with him, who heard there of the death
of King Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, which took place
about that time, and so returned home.

The same winter the Chians pulled down their new
wall at the command of the Athenians, who suspected
them of meditating an insurrection, after first however
obtaining pledges from the Athenians, and security as far
as this was possible for their continuing to treat them as
before. Thus the winter ended, and with it ended the
seventh year of this war of which Thucydides is the
historian.

In the first days of the next summer there was an
eclipse of the sun at the time of new moon, and in the
early part of the same month an earthquake. Mean-
while, the Mitylenian and other Lesbian exiles set out,
for the most part from the continent, with mercenaries
hired in Peloponnese, and others levied on the spot, and
took Rhoeteum, but restored it without injury on the
receipt of two thousand Phocaean staters. After this
they marched against Antandrus and took the town by
treachery, their plan being to free Antandrus and the
rest of the Actaean towns, formerly owned by Mitylene
but now held by the Athenians. Once fortified there,
they would have every facility for shipbuilding from the.
vicinity of Ida and the consequent abundance of timber,
and plenty of other supplies, and might from this base
easily ravage Lesbos, which was not far off, and make
themselves masters of the JEoliajx towns on the continent.

While these were the schemes of the exiles, the
Athenians in the same summer made an expedition with

28o THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [53, 54

BOOK sixty ships, two thousand heavy infantry, a few cavalry,

iXl and some allied troops from Miletus and other parts,

B.C. 424- against Cythera, under the command of Nicias, son of

conquest Niceratus, Nicostratus, son of Diotrephes, and Autocles,

c th °^ ^°° °^ Tolmasus. Cythera is an island lying off Laconia,

opposite Malea ; the inhabitants are Lacedaemonians of

the class of the Perioeci ; and an officer called the Judge

of Cythera went over to the place annually from Sparta.

A garrison of heavy infantry was also regularly sent

there, and great attention paid to the island, as it was

the landing-place for the merchantmen from Egypt and

Libya, and at the same time secured Laconia from the

attacks of privateers from the sea, at the only point where

it is assailable, as the whole coast rises abruptly towards

the Sicilian and Cretan seas.

Coming to land here with their armament, the Athe-
nians with ten ships and two thousand Milesian heavy
infantry took the town of Scandea, on the sea ; and with
the rest of their forces landing on the side of the island
looking towards Malea, went against the lower town of
Cythera, where they found all the inhabitants encamped.
A battle ensuing, the Cytherians held their ground for
some little while, and then turned and fled into the upper
town, where they soon afterwards capitulated to Nicias
and his colleagues, agreeing to leave their fate to the
decision of the Athenians, their lives only being safe. A
correspondence had previously been going on between
Nicias and certain of the inhabitants, which caused the
surrender to be effected more speedily, and upon terms
more advantageous, present and future, for the Cytherians ;
who would otherwise have been expelled by the Athe-
nians on account of their being Lacedaemonians and their
island being so near to Laconia. After the capitulation,
the Athenians occupied the town of Scandea near the
harbour, and appointing a garrison for Cythera, sailed to
Asine, Helus, and most of the places on the sea, and

55.56] CONQUEST OF CYTHERA 281

making descents and passing the night on shore at such CHAP

spots as were convenient, continued ravaging the country '

for about seven days. ^.C. 434.

The Lacedaemonians seeing the Athenians masters of sion at
Cythera, and expecting descents of the kind upon their ^q"^^"
coasts, nowhere opposed them in force, but sent garrisons
here and there through the country, consisting of as many
heavy infantry as the points menaced seemed to require,
and generally stood very much upon the defensive. After
the severe and unexpected blow that had befallen them
in the island, the occupation of Pylos and Cythera, and
the apparition on every side of a war whose rapidity
defied precaution, they lived in constant fear of internal
revolution, and now took the unusual step of raising four
hundred horse and a force of archers, and became more
timid than ever in military matters, finding themselves »
involved in a maritime struggle, which their organisation \
had never contemplated, and that against Athenians, with 1
whom an enterprise unattempted was always looked upon
as a success sacrificed. Besides this, their late numerous
reverses of fortune, coming close one upon another with-
out any reason, had thoroughly unnerved them, and they \
were always afraid of a second disaster like that on the
island, and thus scarcely dared to take the field, but
fancied that they could not stir without a blunder, for
being new to the experience of adversity they had lost
all confidence in themselves.

Accordingly they now allowed the Athenians to ravage
their seaboard, without making any movement, the garri-
sons in whose neighbourhood the descents were made
always thinking their numbers insufficient, and sharing
the general feeling. A single garrison which ventured to
resist, near Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, struck terror by its
charge into the scattered mob of light troops, but re-
treated, upon being received by the heavy infantry, with
the loss of a few men and some arms, for which the

*K 455

282 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [57, 5S

BOOK Athenians set up a trophy, and then sailed off to Cythera.
^ From thence they sailed round to the Limeran Epidaurus,
B.C. 424. ravaged part of the country, and so came to Thyrea in
Capture ^^^ Cynurian territory, upon the Argive and Laconian
Thyrea. border. This district had been given by its Lacedae-
monian owners to the expelled iEginetans to inhabit,
in return for their good offices at the time of the earth-
quake and the rising of the Helots ; and also because,
although subjects of Athens, they had always sided with
Lacedasmon.

While the Athenians were still at sea, the .^ginetans
evacuated a fort which they were building upon the
coast, and retreated into the upper town where they
lived, rather more than a mile from the sea. One of
the Lacedasmonian district garrisons which was helping
them in the work, refused to enter here with them at
their entreaty, thinking it dangerous to shut themselves
up within the wall, and retiring to the high ground re-
mained quiet, not considering themselves a match for the
enemy. Meanwhile the Athenians landed, and instantly
advanced with all their forces and took Thyrea. The
town they burnt, pillaging what was in it ; the ^ginetans
who were not slain in action they took with them to
Athens, with Tantalus, son of Patrocles, their Lacedae-
monian commander, who had been wounded and taken
prisoner. They also took with them a few men from
Cythera whom they thought it safest to remove. These
the Athenians determined to lodge in the islands : the
rest of the Cytherians were to retain their lands and pay
four talents tribute; the ^ginetans captured to be all
put to death, on account of the old inveterate feud ; and
Tantalus to share the imprisonment of the Lacedae-
monians taken on the island.

The same summer, the inhabitants of Camarina and
Gela in Sicily first made an armistice with each other,
after which embassies from all the other Sicilian cities

59. 6o] CONGRESS OF GELA 283

assembled at Gela to try to bring about a pacification. CHAP.
After many expressions of opinion on one side and the ^^^^-
other, according to the griefs and pretensions of the B.C. 424,
different parties complaining, Hermocrates, son of Her- Hermo-°
mon, a Syracusan, the most influential man among them, crates,
addressed the following words to the assembly : —

* If I now address you, Sicilians, it is not because my
city is the least in Sicily or the greatest sufferer by the
war, but in order to state publicly what appears to me to
be the best policy for the whole island. That war is an
evil is a proposition so familiar to every one that it would
be tedious to develope it. No one is forced to engage in
it by ignorance, or kept out of it by fear, if he fancies
there is anything to be gained by it. To the former the
gain appears greater than the danger, while the latter
would rather stand the risk than put up with any im-
mediate sacrifice. But if both should happen to have
chosen the wrong moment for acting in this way, advice
to make peace would not be unserviceable ; and this, if
we did but see it, is just what we stand most in need of
at the present juncture.

* I suppose that no one will dispute that we went to
war at first, in order to serve our own several interests,
that we are now, in view of the same interests, debating
how we can make peace ; and that if we separate without
having as we think our rights, we shall go to war again.
And yet, as men of sense, we ought to see that our
separate interests are not alone at stake in the present
congress : there is also the question whether we have still
time to save Sicily, the whole of which in my opinion is
menaced by Athenian ambition ; and we ought to find in
the name of that people more imperious arguments for
peace than any which I can advance, when we see the
first power in Hellas watching our mistakes with the few
ships that she has at present in our waters, and under the
fair name of alliance speciously seeking to turn to account

284 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [61

BOOK the natural hostility that exists between us. If we go to

1 war, and call in to help us a people that are ready enough

B.C. 424. to carry their arms even where thev are not invited ; and
Athens .-- • • 1 ■' , ,

is the " we injure ourselves at our own expense, and at the

common game time serve as the pioneers of their dominion, we may

Gncmy ^ -^

of all expect when they see us worn out, that they will one day
Sic ans. (,Qj^g ^f;\lh a larger armament, and seek to bring all of us
into subjection.

* And yet as sensible men, if we call in allies and court
danger, it should be in order to enrich our different
countries with new acquisitions, and not to ruin what they
possess already ; and we should understand that the
intestine discords which are so fatal to communities gene-
rally, will be equally so to Sicily, if we, its inhabitants,
* absorbed in our local quarrels, neglect the common enemy.
These considerations should reconcile individual with indi-
vidual, and city with city, and unite us in a common
effort to save the whole of Sicily. Nor should any one
imagine that the Dorians only are enemies of Athens,
while the Chalcidian race is secured by its Ionian blood ;
the attack in question is not inspired by hatred of one of
two nationalities, but by a desire for the good things in
Sicily, the common property of us all. This is proved
by the Athenian reception of the Chalcidian invitation :
an ally who has never given them any assistance whatever,
at once receives from them almost more than the treaty
entitles him to. That the Athenians should cherish this
ambition and practise this policy is very excusable ; and
I do not blame those who wish to rule, but those who
are over ready to serve. It is just as much in men*s
nature to rule those who submit to them, as it is to resist
those who molest them ; one is not less invariable than
the other. Meanwhile all who see these dangers and
refuse to provide for them properly, or who have come
here without having made up their minds that our first
duty is to unite to get rid of the common peril, are mis-

62,63] CONGRESS OF GELA 285

taken. The quickest way to be rid of it is to make peace CHAP.
with each other ; since the Athenians menace us not from ^"^'
their own country, but from that of those who invited B.C. 424.
them here. In this way instead of war issuing in war, tarntle's
peace quietly ends our quarrels ; and the guests who come of war.
hither under fair pretences for bad ends, will have good
reason for going away without having attained them.

* So far as regards the Athenians such are the great
advantages proved inherent in a wise policy. Indepen-
dently of this, in the face of the universal consent that
peace is the first of blessings, how can we refuse to make
it amongst ourselves ; or do you not think that the good
which you have, and the ills that you complain of, would
be better preserved and cured by quiet than by war ; that
peace has its honours and splendours of a less perilous
kind, not to mention the numerous other blessings that
one might dilate on, with the not less numerous miseries
of war ? These considerations should teach you not to
disregard my words, but rather to look in them every one
for his own safety. If there be any here who feels
certain either by right or might to effect his object, let
not this surprise be to him too severe a disappointment.
Let him remember that many before now have tried to
chastise a wrongdoer, and failing to punish their enemy
have not even saved themselves ; while many who have
trusted in force to gain an advantage, instead of gaining
anything more, have been doomed to lose what they had.
Vengeance is not necessarily successful because wrong has
been done, or strength sure because it is confident ; but
the incalculable element in the future exercises the widest
influence, and is the most treacherous, and yet in fact the
most useful of all things, as it frightens us all equally, and
thus makes us consider before attacking each other.

* Let us therefore now allow the undefined fear of this
unknown future, and the immediate terror of the Athenians*
presence to produce their natural impression, and let us

\

286 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [64

BOOK consider any failure to carry out the programmes that we
}Xl niay each have sketched out for ourselves as sufficiently

B.C. 424. accounted for by these obstacles, and send away the

^ust intruder from the country ; and if everlasting peace be

unite in impossible between us, let us at all events make a treaty

a)mmon for as long a term as possible, and put off our private

danger, differences to another day. In fine, let us recognise that
the adoption of my advice will leave us each citizens of a
free state, and as such arbiters of our own destiny, able to
return good or bad offices with equal effect ; while its
rejection will make us dependent on others, and thus not
only impotent to repel an insult, but on the most favour-
able supposition, friends to our direst enemies, and at feud
with our natural friends.

' For myself, though, as I said at first, the representative
of a great city, and able to think less of defending myself
than of attacking others, I am prepared to concede some-
thing in prevision of these dangers. I am not inclined to
ruin myself for the sake of hurting my enemies, or so
blinded by animosity as to think myself equally master of
my own plans and of fortune which I cannot command ;
but I am ready to give up anything in reason. I call
upon the rest of you to imitate my conduct of your own
free will, without being forced to do so by the enemy.
There is no disgrace in connexions giving way to one
another, a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to his
brethren ; above and beyond this we are neighbours, live
in the same country, are girt by the same sea, and go by
the same name of Sicilians. We shall go to war again,
I suppose, when the time comes, and again make peace
among ourselves by means of future congresses ; but the
foreign invader, if we are wise, will always find us united
against him, since the hurt of one is the danger of all ;
and we shall never, in future, invite into the island cither
allies or mediators. By so acting we shall at the present
moment do for Sicily a double service, ridding her at

65,66] PEACE IN SICILY 287

once of the Athenians, and of civil war, and in future tenAP.
shall live in freedom at home, and be less menaced from }. ^^^^-
abroad.' B.C. 424,

Such were the words of Hermocrates. The Sicilians fo^nduded
took his advice, and came to an understanding among ^"^ Sicily,
themselves to end the war, each keeping what they had —
the Camarinasans taking Morgantina at a price fixed to be
paid to the Syracusans — and the allies of the Athenians
called the officers in command, and told them that they
were going to make peace and that they would be in-
cluded in the treaty. The generals assenting, the peace
was concluded, and the Athenian fleet afterwards sailed
away from Sicily. Upon their arrival at Athens, the \ '
Athenians banished Pythodorus and Sophocles, and fined \
Eurymedon for having taken bribes to depart when they 4
might have subdued Sicily. So thoroughly had the 5
present prosperity persuaded the citizens that nothing
could withstand them, and that they could achieve what
was possible and impracticable alike, with means ample
or inadequate it mattered not. The secret of this was
their general extraordinary success, which made them
confuse their strength with their hopes.

The same summer the Megarians in the city, pressed
by the hostilities of the Athenians, who invaded their
country twice every year with all their forces, and
harassed by the incursions of their own exiles at Pegae,
who had been expelled in a revolution by the popular
party, began to ask each other whether it would not
be better to receive back their exiles, and free the
town from one of its two scourges. The friends of the
emigrants perceiving the agitation, now more openly than
before demanded the adoption of this proposition ; and
the leaders of the commons, seeing that the sufferings of
the times had tired out the constancy of their supporters,
entered in their alarm into correspondence with the
Athenian generals, Hippocrates, son of Ariphron, and

288 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [67

BOOK Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and resolved to betray

1X1 the town, thinking this less dangerous to themselves than

B.C. 42f the return of the party which they had banished. It was

?a?y^to accordingly arranged that the Athenians should first take

betray ^he long walls extending for nearly a mile from the city to

egara, ^^^ ^^^^ ^^ Nisxa, to prevent the Peloponnesians coming

to the rescue from that place, where they formed the sole

garrison to secure the fidelity of Megara ; and that after

this the attempt should be made to put into their hands

the upper town, which it was thought would then come

over with less difficulty.

The Athenians, after plans had been arranged between
themselves and their correspondents both as to words and
actions, sailed by night to Minoa, the island off Megara,
with six hundred heavy infantry under the command of
Hippocrates, and took post in a quarry not far off, out of
which bricks used to be taken for the walls ; while
Demosthenes, the other commander, with a detachment
of Plataean light troops and another of Peripoli, placed
himself in ambush in the precinct of Enyalius, which was
still nearer. No one knew of it, except those whose
business it was to know that night. A little before day-
break, the traitors in Megara began to act. Every night
for a long time back, under pretence of marauding, m
order to have a means of opening the gates, they had been
used, with the consent of the officer in command, to carry
^ by night a sculling boat upon a cart along the ditch to the
sea, and so to sail out, bringing it back again before day
upon the cart, and taking it within the wall through the
gates, in order, as they pretended, to baffle the Athenian
blockade at Minoa, there being no boat to be seen in
the harbour. On the present occasion the cart was
already at the gates, which had been opened in the usual
way for the boat, when the Athenians, with whom this
had been concerted, saw it, and ran at the top of their
speed from the ambush in order to reach the gates before

68] SURPRISE OF NISiEA 289

they were shut again, and while the cart was still there to CHAP.
prevent their being closed ; their Megarian accomplices ^^}}}'
at; the same moment killing the guard at the gates. The B.C. 424.
first to run in was Demosthenes with his Platasans and of*^ ^^^
Peripoli, just where the trophy now stands ; and he was Megara's
no sooner within the gates than the Plataeans engaged and waUs.
defeated the nearest party of Peloponnesians who had
taken the alarm and come to the rescue, and secured the
gates for the approaching Athenian heavy infantry.

After this, each of the Athenians as fast as they entered
went against the wall. A few of the Peloponnesian
garrison stood their ground at first, and tried to repel the
assault, and some of them were killed ; but the main body
took fright and iled ; the night attack and the sight of the
Megarian traitors in arms against them making them think
chat all Megara had gone over to the enemy. It -so hap-
pened also that the Athenian herald of his own idea
called out and invited any of the Megarians that wished,
to join the Athenian ranks ; and this was no sooner heard
by the garrison than they gave way, and, convinced that
they were the victims of a concerted attack, took refuge
in Nisaea. By daybreak, the walls being now taken and
the Megarians in the city in great agitation, the persons
who had negotiated wiih the Athenians, supported by the
rest of the popular party which was privy to the plot, said
that they ought to open the gates and march out to battle.
It had been concerted between them that the Athenians
should rush in, the moment that the gates were opened,
while the conspirators were to be distinguished from the
rest by being anointed with oil, and so to avoid being
hurt. They could open the gates with more security, as
four thousand Athenian heavy infantry from Eleusis, and
six hundred horse, had marched all night, according to
agreement, and were now close at hand. The con-
spirators were all ready anointed and at their posts by the
gates, when one of their accomplices denounced the plot

290 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [69

BOOK to the opposite party, who gathered together and came in

}Xl a body, and roundly said that they must not march out —

B.C. 424, a thing they had never yet ventured on even when in

*de/of greater force than at present — or wantonly compromise the

Nisaea. safety of the town, and that if what they said was not

attended to, the battle would have to be fought in Megara.

For the rest, they gave no signs of their knowledge of the

intrigue, but stoutly maintained that their advice was the best,

and meanwhile kept close by and watched the gates, making

it impossible for the conspirators to effect their purpose.

The Athenian generals seeing that some obstacle had
arisen, and that the capture of the town by force was no
longer practicable, at once proceeded to invest Nissea,
thinking that if they could take it before relief arrived,
the surrender of Megara would soon follow. Iron,
stone-masons, and everything else required quickly com-
, ing up from Athens, the Athenians started from the wall
A which they occupied, and from this point built a cross
'\ wall looking towards Megara down to the sea on either
\ side of Nisasa ; the ditch and the walls being divided
among the army, stones and bricks taken from the suburb,
and the fruit-trees and timber cut down to make a palisade
wherever this seemed necessary ; the houses also in the
suburb with the addition of battlements sometimes enter-
ing into the fortification. The whole of this day the
work continued, and by the afternoon of the next the
wall was all but completed, when the garrison in Nisaea,
alarmed by the absolute want of provisions, which they
used to take in for the day from the upper town, not
anticipating any speedy relief from the Peloponnesians,
and supposing Megara to be hostile, capitulated to the
Athenians on condition that they should give up their
arms, and should each be ransomed for a stipulated sum ;
their Lacedaemonian commander, and any others of his
countrymen in the place, being left to the discretion of
the Athenians. On these conditions they surrendered

70,71] MEGARA SAVED BY BRASIDAS 291

and came out, and the Athenians "broke down the long CHAP,
walls at their point of junction with Megara, took posses- ^^^^-
sion of Nissea, and went on with their other preparations. B.C. 424.

Just at this time the Lacedaemonian Brasidas, son of rialS^'
Teilis, happened to be in the neighbourhood of Sicyon at first
and Corinth, getting ready an army for Thrace. As Brasidas
soon as he heard of the capture of the walls, fearing for ^^^
the Peloponnesians in Nissea and the safety of Megara, he
sent to the Boeotians to meet him as quickly as possible
at Tripodiscus, a village so called of the Megarid, under
Mount Geraneia, and went himself, with two thousand
seven hundred Corinthian heavy infantry, four hundred
Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and such troops of
his own as he had already levied, expecting to find Nisaea
not yet taken. Hearing of its fall (he had marched out
by night to Tripodiscus), he took three hundred picked
men from the army, without waiting till his coming should
be known, and came up to Megara unobserved by the
Athenians, who were down by the sea, ostensibly, and
really if possible, to attempt Nisaea, but above all to get
into Megara and secure the town. He accordingly in-
vited the townspeople to admit his party, saying that he
had hopes of recovering Nisaea.

However, one of the Megarian factions feared that he
might expel them and restore the exiles ; the other that
the commons, apprehensive of this very danger, might
set upon them, and the city be thus destroyed by a battle
within its gates under the eyes of the ambushed Athe-
nians. He was accordingly refused admittance, both
parties electing to remain quiet and await the event ; each
expecting a battle between the Athenians and the relieving
army, and thinking it safer to see their friends victorious
before declaring in their favour. f

Unable to carry his point, Brasidas went back to the i
rest of the army. At daybreak the Boeotians joined him. \
Having determined to relieve Megara, whose danger they

292 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [72,73

BOOK considered their own, even before hearing from Brasidas,

they were already in full force at Platasa, when his mes-

B.C. 424. senger arrived to add spurs to their resolution ; and they

Skirmish ^ l-l j ljjl

between at once sent on to him two thousand two hundred heavy

Boeotian Infantry, and six hundred horse, returning home with the
Athenian main body. The whole army thus assembled numbered

cavaky. gj^^ thousand heavy infantry. The Athenian heavy
infantry were drawn up by Nissea and the sea ; but the
light troops being scattered over the plain were attacked
by the Boeotian horse and driven to the sea, being taken
entirely by surprise, as on previous occasions no relief
had ever come to the Megarians from any quarter.
Here the Boeotians were in their turn charged and
engaged by the Athenian horse, and a cavalry action
ensued which lasted a long time, and in which both
parties claimed the victory. The Athenians killed and
stripped the leader of the Boeotian horse and some few of
his comrades who had charged right up to Nisaea, and
remaining masters of the bodies gave them back under
truce, and set up a trophy ; but regarding the action as a
whole the forces separated without either side having
gained a decisive advantage, the Boeotians returning to
their army and the Athenians to Nisasa.

After this Brasidas and the army came nearer to the
sea and to Megara, and taking up a convenient position,
remained quiet in order of battle, expecting to be attacked
by the Athenians and knowing that the Megarians were
waiting to see which would be the victor. This attitude
seemed to present two advantages. Without taking the
offensive or willingly provoking the hazards of a battle,
they openly showed their readiness to fight, and thus
without bearing the burden of the day would fairly reap
its honours ; while at the same time they effectually served
their interests at Megara. For if they had failed to show
themselves, they would not have had a chance, but would
have certainly been considered vanquished, and have lost

74] REVOLUTION AT MEGARA 293

the town. As it was, the Athenians might possibly not CHAP
be inclined to accept their challenge, and their object ^^^^'
would be attained without fighting. And so it turned B.C. 434.
out. The Athenians formed outside the long walls, and delrlin^ed,
the enemy not attacking, there remained motionless ; their ^^f'^'^h*
generals having decided that the risk was too unequal, nians
In fact most of their objects had been already attained ; ^^^
and they would have to begin a battle against superior
numbers, and if victorious could only gain Megara,
while a defeat would destroy the flower of their heavy
soldiery. For the enemy it was different ; as even the
states actually represented in his army risked each only a
part of its entire force, he might well be more audacious.
Accordingly after waiting for some time without either
side attacking, the Athenians withdrew to Nisasa, and
the Peloponnesians after them to the point from which
they had set out. The friends of the Megarian exiles
now threw aside their hesitation, and opened the gates to
Brasidas and the commanders from the different states —
looking upon him as the victor and upon the Athenians
as having declined the battle — and receiving them into
the town proceeded to discuss matters with them ; the
party in correspondence with the Athenians being para-
lysed by the turn things had taken.

Afterwards Brasidas let the allies go home, and himself
went back to Corinth, to prepare for his expedition to
Thrace, his original destination. The Athenians also
returning home, the Megarians in the city most impli-
cated in the Athenian negotiation, knowing that they had
been detected, presently disappeared ; while the rest con-
ferred with the friends of the exiles, and restored the
party at Pegae, after binding them under solemn oaths to
take n<p vengeance for the past, and only to consult the
real interests of the town. However, as soon as they
were in ofhce, they held a review of the heavy infantry,
and separating the battalions, picked out about a hundred

294 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [75

BOOK of their enemies, and of those who were thought to be

1 most involved in the correspondence with the Athenians,

B-C. 424. brought them before the people, and compelling the vote

chical to be given openly, had them condemned and executed,

Uon^at ^°^ established a close oligarchy in the town — a revolu-

Megara. tion which lasted a very long while, although effected by

a very few partisans.

CHAPTER XIV

Eighth and Ninth Years of the War — Invasion of
Boeotia — Fall of Amphipolis — Brilliant Successes of
Brasidas

The same summer the Mitylenians were about to fortify
Antandrus, as they had intended, when Demodocus and
Aristides, the commanders of the Athenian squadron
engaged in levying subsidies, heard on the Hellespont
of what was being done to the place (Lamachus their
colleague having sailed with ten ships into the Pontus)
and conceived fears of its becoming a second Anaia, — the
place in which the Samian exiles had established them-
selves to annoy Samos, helping the Peloponnesians by
sending pilots to their navy, and keeping the city in agita-
tion and receiving all its outlaws. They accordingly got
together a force from the allies and set sail, defeated in
battle the troops that met them from Antandrus, and
retook the place. Not long after, Lamachus, who had
sailed into the Pontus, lost his ships at anchor in the river
Calex, in the territory of Heraclea, rain having fallen in
the interior and the flood coming suddenly down upon
them ; and himself and his troops passed by land through
the Bithynian Thracians on the Asiatic side, and arrived
at Chalcedon, the Megarian colony at the mouth of the
Pontus.

76,77] INTRIGUES IN BCEOTIA 295

The same summer the Athenian general, Demosthenes, CHAP

arrived at Naupactus with forty ships immediately after '

the return from the Megarid. Hippocrates and himself B.C. 424-
1111 J 1 L • • L Demo-

had had overtures made to them by certam men m the cratic

cities in Boeotia, who wished to change the constitution conspir-

o a.cy in

and introduce a democracy as at Athens ; Ptoeodorus, a Boeotia.

Theban exile, being the chief mover in this intrigue.

The seaport town of Siphas, in the bay of Crisae, in the

Thespian territory, was to be betrayed to them by one

party ; Chseronea (a dependency of what was formerly

called the Minyan, now the Boeotian, Orchomenus), to

be put into their hands by another from that town, whose

exiles were very active in the business, hiring men in

Peloponnese. Some Phocians also were in the plot,

Chasronea being the frontier town of Boeotia and close to

Phanotis in Phocis. Meanwhile the Athenians were to

seize Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the territory of

Tanagra looking towards Euboea ; and all these events

were to take place simultaneously upon a day appointed,

in order that the Boeotians might be unable to unite to

oppose them at Delium, being everywhere detained by

disturbances at home. Should the enterprise succeed,

and Delium be fortified, its authors confidently expected

that even if no revolution should immediately follow in

Boeotia, yet with these places in their hands, and the

country being harassed by incursions, and a refuge in

each instance near for the partisans engaged in them,

things would not remain as they were, but that the rebels

being supported by the Athenians and the forces of the

oligarchs divided, it would be possible after a while to

settle matters according to their wishes.

Suchjwas the plot in contemplation. Hippocrates

with a force raised at home awaited the proper moment

to take the field against the Boeotians ; while he sent on

Demosthenes with the forty ships above mentioned to

Naupactus, to raise in those parts an army of Acarnanians

296 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [78

BOOK and of the other allies, and sail and receive Siphas from

i^ the conspirators ; a day having been agreed on for the

B.C. 424. simultaneous execution of both these operations. De-

B?as£ai mosthenes on his arrival found CEniadge already compelled

througrh by the united Acarnanians to join the Athenian con-

^' federacy, and himself raising all the allies in those

countries marched against and subdued Salynthius and

the Agrgeans; after which he devoted himself to the

preparations necessary to enable him to be at Siphae by

the time appointed.

About the same time in the summer, Brasidas set out
on his march for the Thracian places with seventeen
hundred heavy infantry, and arriving at Heraclea in
Trachis, from thence sent on a messenger to his friends
at Pharsalus, to ask them to conduct himself and his
army through the country. Accordingly there came to
Melitia in Achaia Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas,
Torylaus, and Strophacus, the Chalcidian Proxenus,
under whose escort he resumed his march, being accom-
panied also by other . Thessalians, among whom was
Niconidas from Larissa, a friend of Perdiccas. It was
never very easy to traverse Thessaly without an escort ;
and throughout all Hellas for an armed force to pass
without leave through a neighbour's country, was a
delicate step to take. Besides this the Thessalian people
had always sympathised with the Athenians. Indeed if
instead of the customary close oligarchy there had been
a constitutional government in Thessaly, he would never
have been able to proceed ; since even as it was, he was
met on his march at the river Enipeus by certain of the
opposite party who forbade his further progress, and
complained of his making the attempt without the con-
sent of the nation. To this his escort answered that
they had no intention of taking him through against
their will ; they were only friends in attendance on an
unexpected visitor. Brasidas himself added that he

79] MARCH OF BRASIDAS 297

came as a friend to Thessaly and its inhabitants ; his CHAP.

arms not being directed against them but against the •

Athenians, with whom he was at war, and that although B.C. 424.
he knew of no quarrel between the Thessalians and arrival in
Lacedaemonians to prevent the two nations having access 9^^-
to each other's territory, he neither would • nor could
proceed against their wishes ; he could only beg them
not to stop him. With this answer they went away,
and he took the advice of his escort, and pushed on
without halting, before a greater force might gather to
prevent him. Thus in the day that he set out from
Melitia he performed the whole distance to Pharsalus,
and encamped on the river Apidanus ; and so to Phacium,
and from thence to Perrhaebia. Here his Thessalian
escort went back, and the Perrhaeblans, who are subjects
of Thessaly, set him down at Dium in the dominions of
Perdiccas, a Macedonian town under Mount Olympus,
looking towards Thessaly.

In this way Brasidas hurried through Thessaly before
any one could be got ready to stop him, and reached
Perdiccas and Chalcidice. The departure of the army
from Peloponnese had been procured by the Thracian
towns in revolt against Athens and by Perdiccas, alarmed
at the successes of the Athenians. The Chalcidians
thought that they would be the first objects of an
Athenian expedition, not that the neighbouring towns
which had not yet revolted did not also secretly join in
the invitation ; and Perdiccas also had his apprehensions
on account of his old quarrels with the Athenians,
although not openly at war with them, and above all
wished toj reduce Arrhabasus king of the Lyncestians.
It had been less difficult for them to get an army to
leave Peloponnese, because of the ill fortune of the
Lacedaemonians at the present moment. The attacks
of the Athenians upon Peloponnese, and in particular
upon Laconia, might, it was hoped, be diverted most

298 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [80, 8 1

BOOK effectually by annoying them in return, and by sending
}Xl an army to their allies, especially as they were willing
B.C. 424. to maintain it and asked for it to aid them in revolting,
^ans^mur- The Lacedaemonians were also glad to have an excuse
der 2000 for sending some of the Helots out of the country, for
fear that the present aspect of affairs and the occupation
of Pylos might encourage them to move. Indeed fear
of their numbers and obstinacy even persuaded the
Lacedaemonians to the action which I shall now relate,
their policy at all times having been governed by the
necessity of taking precautions against them. The
Helots were invited by a proclamation to pick out those
of their number who claimed to have most distinguished
themselves against the enemy, in order that they might
receive their freedom ; the object being to test them, as
it was thought that the first to claim their freedom would
be the most high-spirited and the most apt to rebel. As
many as two thousand were selected accordingly, who
crowned themselves and went round the temples, rejoic-
ing in their new freedom. The Spartans, however, soon
afterwards did away with them, and no one ever knew
how each of them perished. The Spartans now there-
fore gladly sent seven hundred as heavy infantry with
Brasidas, who recruited the rest of his force by means of
money in Peloponnese.

Brasidas himself was sent out by the Lacedaemonians
mainly'at his own desire, although the Chalcidians also
were eager to have a man so thorough as he had shown
himself whenever there was anything to be done at
Sparta, and whose after-service abroad proved of the
utmost use to his country. At the present moment his
just and moderate conduct towards the towns generally
succeeded in procuring their revolt, besides the places
which he managed to take by treachery ; and thus
when the Lacedaemonians desired to treat, as they
ultimately did, they had places to offer in exchange, and

82,83] BRASIDAS AT ACANTHUS 299

the burden of war meanwhile shifted from Peloponnese. CHAP
Later on in the war, after the events in Sicily, the ^^ '
present valour and conduct of Brasidas, known by B.C. 4*4-
experience to some, by hearsay to others, was what Bras?das.
mainly created in the allies of Athens a feeling for the
Lacedsemonians. He was the first who went out and
showed himself so good a man at all points as to leave
behind him the conviction that the rest were like him.

Meanwhile his arrival in the Thracian country no
sooner became known to the Athenians than they
declared war against Perdiccas, whom they regarded as
the author of the expedition, and kept a closer watch on
their allies in that quarter.

Upon the arrival of Brasidas and his army, Perdiccas
immediately started with them and with his own forces
against Arrhabaeus, son of Bromerus king of the
Lyncestian Macedonians, his neighbour, with whom he
had a quarrel and whom he wished to subdue. How-
ever, when he arrived with his army and Brasidas at the
pass leading into Lyncus, Brasidas told him that before
commencing hostilities he wished to go and try to per-
suade Arrhabaeus to become the ally of Lacedaemon,
this latter having already made overtures intimating his
willingness to make Brasidas arbitrator between them,
and the Chalcidian envoys accompanying him having
warned him not to remove the apprehensions of Perdiccas,
in order to insure his greater zeal in their cause. Be-
sides, the envoys of Perdiccas had talked at Lacedasmon
about his bringing many of the places round him into
alliance with them ; and thus Brasidas thought he might
take a larger view of the question of Arrhabaeus.
Perdiccas however retorted that he had not brought
him with him to arbitrate in their quarrel, but to put
down the enemies whom he might point out to him ;
and that while he, Perdiccas, maintained half his army
it was a breach of faith for Brasidas to parley with

3O0 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [84. 85

BOOK Arrhabaeus. Nevertheless Brasidas disregarded the

}Xl wishes of Perdiccas and held the parley in spite of him,

B.C. 424. and suffered himself to be persuaded to lead off the

brasidas army without invading the country of Arrhabasus ; after

to the vvhich Perdiccas, holding that faith had not been kept

thians. with him, contributed only a third instead of half of the

support of the army.

The same summer, without loss of time, Brasidas
marched with the Chaicidians against Acanthus, a colony
of the Andrians, a little before vintage. The inhabitants
were divided into two parties on the question of receiving
him ; those who had joined the Chaicidians in inviting
him, and the popular party. However, fear for their
fruit, which was still out, enabled Brasidas to persuade
the multitude to admit him alone, and to hear what he
had to say before making a decision ; and he was ad-
mitted accordingly and appeared before the people, and
not being a bad speaker for a Lacedaemonian, addressed
them as follows : —

* Acanthians, the Lacedaemonians have sent out me and
my army to make good the reason that we gave for the
war when we began it, viz. that we were going to war
with the Athenians in order to free Hellas. Our delay
in coming has been caused by mistaken expectations as to
the war at home, which led us to hope, by our own
unassisted efforts and without your risking anything, to
effect the speedy downfall of the Athenians ; and you
must not blame us for this, as we are now come the
moment that we were able, prepared with your aid to
do our best to subdue them. Meanwhile I am astonished
at finding your gates shut against me, and at not meeting
with a better welcome. We Lacedaemoniars thought of
you as allies eager to have us, to whom we should come
in spirit even before we were with you in body ; and in
this expectation undertook all the risks of a march of
many days through a strange country, so far did our zeal

86] BRASIDAS AT ACANTHUS 301

carry us. It will be a terrible thing if after this you have CHAP.
other intentions, and mean to stand in the way of your ^^^'
own and Hellenic freedom. It is not merely that you B.C. 424.
oppose me yourselves ; but wherever I may go people to offer ^*
will be less inclined to join me, on the score that you, to ^^^Jj^*
whom I first came — an important town like Acanthus,
and prudent men like the Acanthians — refused to admit
me. I shall have nothing to prove that the reason which
I advance is the true one ; it will be said either that there
is something unfair in the freedom which I offer, or that
I am here in insufficient force and unable to protect you
against an attack from Athens. Yet when I went with
the army which I now have to the relief of Nisasa, the
Athenians did not venture to engage me although in
greater force than I ; and it is not likely they will ever
send across sea against you an army as numerous as they
had at Nisaea. And for myself, I have come here not to
hurt but to free the Hellenes, witness the solemn oaths
by which I have bound my government that the aUies
that I may bring over shall be independent; and besides
my object in coming is not by force or fraud to obtain
your alliance, but to offer you mine to help you against
your Athenian masters. I protest, therefore, against any
suspicions of my intentions after the guarantees which I
offer, and equally so against doubts of my ability'to pro-
tect you, and I invite you to join me without hesitation.

' Some of you may hang back because they have private
enemies, and fear that I may put the city into the hands
of a party : none need be more tranquil than they. I am
not come here to help this party or that ; and I do not
consider that I should be bringing you freedom in any
real sense, if I should disregard your constitution, and
enslave the many to the few or the few to the many.
This would be heavier than a foreign yoke ; and we
Lacedaemonians instead of being thanked for our pains,
should get neither honour nor glory, but contrariwise

302 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [87

BOOK reproaches. The charges which strengthen our hands in

1 the war against the Athenians would on our own showing

B.C. 4^^. be merited by ourselves, and more hateful in us than in

offer is those who make no pretensions to honesty ; as it is more

^^^^theh- <^isgraceful for persons of character to take what they

fields will covet by fair-seeming fraud than by open force; the one

waste, aggression having for its justification the might which

fortune gives, the other being simply a piece of clever

roguery. A matter which concerns us thus nearly we

naturally look to most jealously ; and over and above the

oaths that I have mentioned, what stronger assurance can

you have, when you see that our words, compared with

the actual facts, produce the necessary conviction that it

is our interest to act as we say ?

* If to these considerations of mine you put in the plea
of inability, and claim that your friendly feeling should
save you from being hurt by your refusal ; if you say that
freedom, in your opinion, is not without its dangers, and
that it is right to offer it to those who can accept it, but
not to force it on any against their will, then I shall take
the gods and heroes of your country to witness that I
came for your good and was rejected, and shall do my
best to compel you by laying waste your land. I shall
do so without scruple, being justified by the necessity
which constrains me, first, to prevent the Lacedasmonians
from being damaged by you, their friends, in the event
of your non-adhesion, through the monies that you pay
to the Athenians ; and secondly, to prevent the Hellenes
from being hindered by you in shaking off their servitude.
Otherwise indeed we should have no right to act as we
propose ; except in the name of some public interest, what
call should we Lacedaemonians have to free those who do
not wish it ? Empire we do not aspire to : it is what we
are labouring to put down ; and we should wrong the
greater number if we allowed you to stand in the way of
the independence that we offer to all. Endeavour, there-

88.89,90] REVOLT OF ACANTHUS 303

fore, to decide wisely, and strive to begin the work, of plHAP.

liberation for the Hellenes, and lay up for yourselves "

endless renown, while you escape private loss, and cover ^^^^^^j
your commonwealth with glory.* Acan-

Such were the words of Brasidas. The Acanthians, Athenian
after much had been said on both sides of the question, invasion^
gave their votes in secret, and the majority, influenced by
the seductive arguments of Brasidas and by fear for their
fruit, decided to revolt from Athens ; not however ad-
mitting the army until they had taken his personal security
for the oaths sworn by his government before they sent
him out, assuring the independence of the allies whom he
might bring over. Not long after, Stagirus, a colony of
the Andrians, followed their example and revolted.

Such were the events of this summer. It was in the
first days of the winter following that the places in Boeotia
were to be put into the hands of the Athenian generals,
Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the latter of whom was
to go with his ships to Siphae, the former to Delium. A
mistake, however, was made in the days on which they
were each to start ; and Demosthenes sailing first to
Siphae, with the Acarnanians and many of the allies from
those parts on board, failed to effect anything, through
the plot having been betrayed by Nicomachus, a Phocian
from Phanotis, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they
the Boeotians. Succours accordingly flocked in from all
parts of Bceotia, Hippocrates not being yet there to make
his diversion, and Siphae and Chxronea were promptly
secured, and the conspirators, informed of the mistake,
did not venture on any movement in the towns.

Meanwhile Hippocrates made a levy in mass of the
citizens, resident aliens, and foreigners in Athens, and
arrived at his destination after the Boeotians had already
come back from Siphx, and encamping his army began
to fortify Delium, the sanctuary of Apollo, in the follow-
ing manner. A trench was dug all round the temple and

304 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [91

BOOK the consecrated ground, and the earth thrown up from
the excavation was made to do duty as a wall, in which
B.C. 424. stakes were also planted, the vines round the sanctuary
°tion of being cut down and thrown in, together with stones and
Delmm. bricks pulled down from the houses near ; every means,
in short, being used to run up the rampart. Wooden
towers were also erected where they were wanted, and
where there was no part of the temple buildings left
standing, as on the side where the gallery once existing
had fallen in. The work was begun on the third day
after leaving home, and continued during the fourth, and
till dinner-time on the fifth, when most of it being now
finished the army removed from Delium about a mile and
a quarter on its way home. From this point most of the
light troops went straight on, while the heavy infantry
halted and remained where they were ; Hippocrates
having stayed behind at Delium to arrange the posts,
and to give directions for the completion of such part of
the outworks as had been left unfinished.

During the days thus employed the Boeotians were
mustering at Tanagra, and by the time that they had
come in from all the towns, found the Athenians already
on their way home. The rest of the eleven Boeotarchs
were against giving battle, as the enemy v/as no longer in
Boeotia, the Athenians being just over the Oropian border,
when they halted ; but Pagondas, son of ^olidas, one of
the Boeotarchs of Thebes (Arianthides, son of Lysima-
chidas, being the other), and then commander-in-chief,
thought it best to hazard a battle. He accordingly called
the men to him, company after company, to prevent their
all leaving their arms at once, and urged them to attack
the Athenians, and stand the issue of a battle-, speaking as
follows : —

* Boeotians, the idea that we ought not to give battle to
the Athenians unless we came up with them in Bceotia, is
one which should never have entered into the head of any

92] SPEECH OF PAGONDAS 305

of us, your generals. It was to annoy Boeotia that they CHAP,
crossed the frontier and built a fort in our country ; and ^il^*
they are therefore, I imagine, our enemies wherever we B.C. 424.
may come up with them, and from wheresoever they may Athens is
have come to act as enemies do. And if any one has ^^^1°°^
taken up with the idea in question for reasons o^ safety, Boeotia.
it is high time for him to change his mind. The party
attacked, whose own country is in danger, can scarcely
discuss what is prudent with the calmness of men who are
in full enjoyment of what they have got, and are thinking
of attacking a neighbour in order to get more. It is your
national habit, in your country or out of it, to oppose the
same resistance to a foreign invader ; and when that in-
vader is Athenian, and lives upon your frontier besides, it
is doubly imperative to do so. As between neighbours
generally, freedom means simply a determination to hold
one's own ; and v/ith neighbours hke these, who are
trying to enslave near and far alike, there is nothing for
it but to fight it out to the last. Look at the condition
of the Euboeans and of most of the rest of Hellas, and be
convinced that others have to fight with their neighbours
for this frontier or that, but that for us conquest means
one frontier for the whole country, about which no dis-
pute can be made, for they will simply come and take by
force what we have. So much more have we to fear
from this neighbour than from another. Besides, people
who, like the Athenians in the present instance, are
tempted by pride of strength to attack their neighbours,
usually march most confidently against those who keep
still, and only defend themselves in their own country,
but think twice before they grapple with those who meet
them outside their frontier and strike the first blow if
opportunity offers. The Athenians have shown us this
themselves ; the defeat which we inflicted upon them at
Coronea, at the time when our quarrels had allowed them
to occupy the country, has given great security to Boeotia

3o6 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [93

BOOK until the present day. Remembering this, the old must
}Xl equal their ancient exploits, and the young, the sons of

B.C. 42-}. the heroes of that time, must endeavour not to disgrace
tion^of their native valour ; and trusting in the help of the god
the whose temple has been sacrilegiously fortified, and in the
victims which in our sacrifices have proved propitious, we
must march against the enemy, and teach him that he
must go and get what he wants by attacking some one
who will not resist him, but that men whose glory it is to
be always ready to give battle for the liberty of their own
country, and never unjustly to enslave that of others, will
not let him go without a struggle.'

By these arguments Pagondas persuaded the Boeotians
to attack the Athenians, and quickly breaking up his
camp led his army forward, it being now late in the day.
On nearing the enemy, he halted in a position where a
hill intervening prevented the two armies from seeing each
other, and then formed and prepared for action. Mean-
while Hippocrates at Delium, informed of the approach
of the Boeotians, sent orders to his troops to throw them-
selves into line, and himself joined them not long after-
wards, leaving about three hundred horse behind him at
Delium, at once to guard the place in case of attack, and
to watch their opportunity and fall upon the Boeotians
during the battle. The Boeotians placed a detachment to
deal with these, and when everything was arranged to
their satisfaction appeared over the hill, and halted in the
order which they had determined on, to the number of
seven thousand heavy infantry, more than ten thousand
light troops, one thousand horse, and five hundred tar-
geteers. On their right were the Thebans and those of
their province, in the centre the Haliartians, Coronaeans,
Copaeans, and the other people around the lake, and on
the left the Thespians, Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians,
the cavalry and the light troops being at the extremity
of each wing. The Thebans formed twenty- five shields

94. 9S> 96] BATTLE OF DELIUM 307

deep, the rest as they pleased. Such was the strength and CHAP.
disposition of the Boeotian army. '

On the side of the Athenians, the heavy infantry B.C. 434-
throughout the whole army formed eight deep, being in Hippo-
numbers equal to the enemy, with the cavalry upon the ^J|*®* *°
two wings. Light troops regularly armed there were Athen-
none in the army, nor had there ever been any at Athens. *^^*
Those who had joined in the invasion, though many
times more numerous than those of the enemy, had mostly
followed unarmed, as part of the levy in mass of the
citizens and foreigners at Athens, and having started first
on their way home were not present in any number. The
armies being now in line and upon the point of engaging,
Hippocrates, the general, passed along the Athenian
ranks, and encouraged them as follows : —

* Athenians, I shall only say a few words to you, but
brave men require no more, and they are addressed more
to your understanding than to your courage. None of
you must fancy that we are going out of our way to run
this risk in the country of another. Fought in their
territory the battle will be for ours : if we conquer, the
Peloponnesians will never invade your country without the
Boeotian horse, and in one battle you will win Bceotia and
in a manner free Attica. Advance to meet them then
like citizens of a country in which you all glory as the
first in Hellas, and like sons of the fathers who beat them
at CEnophyta with Myronides and thus gained possession
of Bceotia.'

Hippocrates had got half through the army with his
exhortation, when the Boeotians, after a few more hasty
words from Pagondas, struck up the paean, and came
against them from the hill ; the Athenians advancing to
meet them, and closing at a run. The extreme wing
of neither army came into action, one like the other being
stopped by the water-courses in the way; the rest
engaged with the utmost obstinacy, shield against shield.

3o8 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [97

BOOK The Boeotian left, as far as the centre, was worsted by
£5^ the Athenians. The Thespians in that part of the field

B.C. 424. suffered most severely. The troops alongside them
o^the having given way, they were surrounded in a narrow
Athen- spact and cut down fighting hand to hand ; some of the
Athenians also fell into confusion in surrounding the
enemy and mistook and so killed each other. In this
part of the held the Boeotians were beaten, and retreated
upon the troops still fighting ; but the right, where the
Thebans were, got the better of the Athenians and
shoved them further and further back, though gradually
at first. It so happened also that Pagondas, seeing the
distress of his left, had sent two squadrons of horse,
where they could not be seen, round the hill, and their
sudden appearance struck a panic into the victorious wing
of the Athenians, who thought that it was another army
coming against them. At length in both parts of the
field, disturbed by this panic, and with their line broken
by the advancing Thebans, the whole Athenian army
took to flight. Some made for Delium and the sea,
some for Oropus, others for Mount Parnes, or wherever
they had hopes of safety, pursued and cut down by the
Boeotians, and in particular by the cavalry, composed
partly of Boeotians and partly of Locrians, who had come
up just as the rout began. Night however coming on
to interrupt the pursuit, the mass of the fugitives escaped
more easily than they would otherwise have done. The
next day the troops at Oropus and Delium returned
home by sea, after leaving a garrison in the latter place,
which they continued to hold notwithstanding the defeat.
The Boeotians set up a trophy, took up their own dead,
and stripped those of the enemy, and leaving a guard over
them retired to Tanagra, there to take measures for
attacking Delium. Meanwhile a herald came from the
Athenians to ask for the dead, but was met and turned
back by a Boeotian herald, who told him that he would

98] BATTLE OF DELIUM 309

effect nothing until the return of himself the Boeotian CHAP
herald, and who then went on to the Athenians, and ^^^'
told them on the part of the Boeotians that they had done B.C. 424.
wrong in transgressing the law of the Hellenes. Of breach of
what use was the universal custom protecting the temples ^'^^

,. T, Ai- r ^-r custom of

in an mvaded country, 11 the Athenians were to fortify war.
DeHum and live there, acting exactly as if they were on
unconsecrated ground, and drawing and using for their
purposes the water which they, the Boeotians, never
touched except for sacred uses ? Accordingly for the god
as well as for themselves, in the name of the deities con-
cerned, and of Apollo, the Boeotians invited them first
to evacuate the temple, if they wished to take up the
dead that belonged to them.

After these words from the herald, the Athenians
sent their own herald to the Boeotians to say that they
had not done any wrong to the temple, and for the
future would do it no more harm than they could help ;
DOt having occupied it originally in any such design, but
to defend themselves from it against those who were
really wronging them. The law of the Hellenes was
that conquest of a country, whether more or less exten-
sive, carried with it possession of the temples in that
country, with the obligation to keep up the usual cere-
monies, at least as far as possible. The Boeotians and
most other people who had turned out the owners of a
country, and put themselves in their places by force, now
held as of right the temples which they originally entered
as usurpers. If the Athenians could have conquered
more of Boeotia this would have been the case with
them : as things stood, the piece of it which they had
got they should treat as their own, and not quit unless
obliged. The water they had disturbed under the im-
pulsion of a necessity which they had not wantonly
incurred, having been forced to use it in defending
themselves against the Boeotians who had first invaded

3IO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [99, 100

BOOK Attica. Besides, anything done under the pressure of
^^' war and danger might reasonably claim indulgence even

B.cr424. in the eye of the god ; or why, pray, were the altars the

S*ake up asylum for involuntary offences ? Transgression also
Athen- was a term applied to presumptuous offenders, not to the

^efiiel victims of adverse circumstances. In short, which were
most impious — the Boeotians who wished to barter dead
bodies for holy places, or the Athenians who refused to
give up holy places to obtain what was theirs by right ?
The condition of evacuating Bceotia must therefore be
withdrawn. They were no longer in Bceotia. They
stood where they stood by the right of the sword. All
that the Boeotians had to do was to tell them to take
up their dead under a truce according to the national
custom.

The Boeotians replied that if they were in Boeotia,
thev must evacuate that country before taking up their
dead ; if they were in their own territory, they could do
as they pleased : for they knew that, although the Oropid
where the bodies as it chanced were lying (the battle
having been fought on the borders) was subject to
Athens, yet the Athenians could not get them without
their leave. Besides, why should they grant a truce for
Athenian ground ? And what could be fairer than to
tell them to evacuate Boeotia if they wished to get what
they asked ? The Athenian herald accordingly returned
with this answer, without having accomplished his object.
Meanwhile the Boeotians at once sent for darters and
slingers from the Malian gulf, and with two thousand
Corinthian heavy infantry who had joined them after the
battle, the Peloponnesian garrison which had evacuated
Nisaea, and some Megarians with them, marched against
Delium, and attacked the fort, and after divers efforts
finally succeeded in taking it by an engine of the follow-
ing description. They sawed in two and scooped out
a great beam from end to end, and fitting it nicely

loi] RECOVERY OF DELIUM 311

together again like a pipe, hung by chains a cauldron at CHAP.
one extremity, with which communicated an iron tube pro- ^
jecting from the beam, which was itself in great part plated B.C. 424.
with iron. This they brought up from a distance upon o/^DeUum
carts to the part of the wall principally composed of vines ^J^^^
and timber, and when it was near, inserted huge bellows setting
into their end of the beam and blew with them. The ^^^ ^^*
blast passing closely confined into the cauldron, which was
filled with lighted coals, sulphur and pitch, made a great
blaze, and set fire to the wall, which soon became
untenable for its defenders, who left it and fled ; and in
this way the fort was uken. Of the garrison some were
killed and two hundred made prisoners ; most of the
rest got on board their ships and returned home.

Soon after the fall of Delium, which took place seven-
teen days after the battle, the Athenian herald, without
knowing what had happened, came again for the dead,
which were now restored by the Boeotians, who no
longer answered as at first. Not quite five hundred
Boeotians fell in the battle, and nearly one thousand
Athenians, including Hippocrates the general, besides a
great number of light troops and camp followers.

Soon after this battle Demosthenes, after the failure of
his voyage to Siphae and of the plot on the town, availed
himself of the Acarnanian and Agraean troops and of the
four hundred Athenian heavy infanftry which he had on
board, to make a descent on the Sicyonian coast. Before
however all his ships had come to shore, the Sicyonians
came up and routed and chased to their ships those that
had landed, killing some and taking others prisoners ;
after which they set up a trophy, and gave back the dead
under truce.

About the same time with the affair of Delium took
place the death of Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, who
was defeated in battle, in a campaign against the Triballi ;
Seuthes, son of Sparadocus* his nephew, succeeding to

312 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [102, 103

BOOK the kingdom of the Odrysians, and of the rest of Thrace

1 ruled by Sitalces.

B.C. 424. The same winter Brasidas, with his allies in the
founding Thracian places, marched against Amphipolis, the Athe-
^1^^^ nian colony on the river Strymon. A settlement upon
the spot on which the city now stands, was before
attempted by Aristagoras, the Milesian (when he fled
from king Darius), who was however dislodged by the
Edonians ; and thirty-two years later by the Athenians,
who sent thither ten thousand settlers of their own
citizens, and whoever else chose to go. These were cut
off at Drabescus by the Thracians. Twenty-nine years
after, the Athenians returned (Hagnon, son of Nicias,
being sent out as leader of the colony) and drove out
the Edonians, and founded a town on the spot, formerly
called Ennea-hodoi or Nine Ways. The base from
which they started was Eion, their commercial seaport
at the mouth of the river, not more than three miles
from the present town, which Hagnon named Amphi-
polis, because the Strymon flows round it on two sides,
and he built it so as to be conspicuous from the sea and
land alike, running a long wall across from river to river,
to complete the circumference,

Brasidas now marched against this town, starting from
Arne in Chalcidice. Arriving about dusk at Aulon and
Bromiscus, where the lake of Bolbe runs into the sea,
he supped there, and went on during the night. The
weather was stormy and it was snowing a little, which
encouraged him to hurry on, in order, if possible, to take
every one at Amphipolis by surprise, except the party
who were to betray it. The plot was carried on by
some natives of Argilus, an Andrian colony, residing
in Amphipolis, where they had also other accomplices
gained over by Perdiccas or the Chalcidians. But the
most active in the matter were the inhabitants of Argilus
itself, which is close by, who had always been suspected

f04] SURPRISE OF AMPHIPOLIS 313

by the Athenians, and had had designs on the place. CHAP.

These men now saw their opportunity arrive with Brasidas, — '

and having for some time been in correspondence with |^^gj^*^

their countrymen in Amphipolis for the betrayal of the das'

town, at once received him into Argilus, and revolted ^rdtS

from the Athenians, and that same night took him on before

... , . , 1 r J 1 the town,

to the bridge over the river ; where he found only a

small guard to oppose him, the town being at some
distance from the passage, and the walls not reaching
down to it as at present. This guard he easily drove
in, partly through there being treason in their ranks,
partly from the stormy state of the weather and the
suddenness of his attack, and so got across the bridge,
and immediately became master of all the property out-
side; the AmphipoHtans having houses all over the
quarter.

The passage of Brasidas was a complete surprise to the
people in the town ; and the capture of many of those
outside, and the flight of the rest within the wall, com-
bined to produce great confusion among the citizens ;
especially as they did not trust one another. It is even
said that if Brasidas, instead of stopping to pillage, had
advanced straight against the town, he would probably
have taken it. In facr, however, he established himself
where he was and overran the country outside, and for
the present remained inactive, vainly awaiting a demon-
stration on the part of his friends within. Meanwhile
the party opposed to the traitors proved numerous enough
to prevent the gates being immediately thrown open, and
in concert with Eucles, the general, who had come from
Athens to defend the place, sent to the other commander
in Thrace, Thucydide^, son of Olorus, the author of this
history, who was at the isle of Thasos, a Parian colony,
half a day's sail from Amphipolis, to tell him to come to
their relief. On receipt of this message he at once set
sail with seven ships which he had with him, in order,

*L 455

314 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [105, 106

BOOK if possible, to reach Amphipolis in time to prevent its
1 capitulation, or in any case to save Eion.

B.C. 424. Meanwhile Brasidas, afraid of succours arriving by sea
dJdes from Thasos, and learning that Thucydides possessed the

\°o°save ^^S^^ °^ working the gold mines in that part of Thrace,
Amphi- and had thus great influence with the inhabitants of the
^° **■ continent, hastened to gain the town, if possible, before
the people of Amphipohs should be encouraged by his
arrival to hope that he could save them by getting to-
gether a force of allies from the sea and from Thrace,
and so refuse to surrender. He accordingly offered
moderate terms, proclaiming that any of the Amphi-
politans and Athenians who chose, might continue to
enjoy their property with full rights of citizenship ; while
those who did not wish to stay had five days to depart,
taking their property with them.

The bulk of the inhabitants, upon hearing this, began
to change their minds, especially as only a small number
of the citizens were Athenians, the majority having come
from different quarters, and many of the prisoners outside
had relations within the walls. They found the pro-
clamation a fair one in comparison of what their fear had
suggested ; the Athenians being glad to go out, as they
thought they ran more risk than the rest, and further,
did not expect any speedy relief, and the multitude
generally being content at being left in possession of their
civic rights, and at such an unexpected reprieve from
danger. The partisans of Brasidas now openly advocated
this course, seeing that the feeling of the people had
changed, and that they no longer gave ear to the Athe-
nian general present ; and thus the surrender was made
and Brasidas was admitted by them on the terms of his
proclamation. In this way they gave up the city, and
late in the same day Thucydides and his ships entered
the harbour of Eion, Brasidas having just got hold of
Amphipolis, and having been within a night of taking

I07, io8j FALL OF AMPHIPOLIS 315

Eion : had the ships been less prompt in relieving it, in CHAP

the morning it would have been his. •

After this Thucydides put all in order at Eion to B.C. 424.

•^ * r 1 r -n • J The news

secure it agamst any present or future attack 01 iirasidas, causes
and received such as had elected to come there from the ^^fj^^*^
interior according to the terms agreed on. Meanwhile
Brasidas suddenly sailed with a number of boats down
the river to Eion to sec if he could not seize the point
running out from the wall, and so command the entrance;
at the same time he attempted it by land, but was beaten
off on both sides and had to content himself with arrang-
ing matters at Amphipolis and in the neighbourhood.
Myrcinus, an Edonian town, also came over to him ;
the Edonian king Pittacus having been killed by the
sons of Goaxis and his own wife Brauro ; and Galepsus
and CEsime, which are Thasian colonies, not long after
followed its example. Perdlccas too came up immediately
after the capture and joined in these arrangements.

The news that Amphipolis was in the hands of the
enemy caused great alarm at Athens. Not only was the
town valuable for the timber it afforded for shipbuilding,
and the money that it brought in ; but also, although the
escort of the Thessalians gave the Lacedasmonians a
means of reaching the allies of Athens as far as the
Strymon, yet as long as they were not masters of the
bridge but were watched on the side of Eion by the
Athenian galleys, and on the land side impeded by a large
and extensive lake formed by the waters of the river, it
was impossible for them to go any further. Now, on
the contrary, the path seemed open. There was also
the fear of the allies revolting, owing to the moderation
displayed by Brasidas in all his conduct, and to the
declarations which he was everywhere making that he
was sent out to free Hellas. The towns subject to the
Athenians, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis and of
the terms accorded to it, and of the gentleness of Brasidas,

3i6 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [109

BOOK felt most strongly encouraged to change their condition,
1X1 and sent secret messages to him, begging him to come on

B.C. 424- to them ; each wishing to be the first to revolt. Indeed
nefs^of there seemed to be no danger in so doing; their mistake

Athenian [^ their estimate of the Athenian power was as great as
revolt, that power afterwards turned out to be, and their judgment
was based more upon blind wishing than upon any sound
prevision ; for it is a habit of mankind to entrust to
careless hope what they long for, and to use sovereign
reason to thrust aside what they do not fancy. Besides
the late severe blow which the Athenians had met with in
Boeotia, joined to the seductive, though untrue, statements
of Brasidas, about the Athenians not having ventured to
engage his single army at Nisaea, made the allies con-
fident, and caused them to believe that no Athenian force
would be sent against them. Above all the wish to do
what was agreeable at the moment, and the likelihood
that they should find the Lacedaemonians full of zeal at
starting, made them eager to venture. Observing this,
the Athenians sent garrisons to the different towns, as far
as was possible at such short notice and in winter ; while
Brasidas sent despatches to Lacedaemon asking tor rein-
forcements, and himself made preparations for building
galleys in the Strymon. The Lacedaemonians however
did not send him any, partly through envy on the part
of their chief men, partly because they were more bent on
recovering the prisoners of the island and ending the war.
The same winter the Megarians took and razed to the
foundations the long walls which had been occupied by
the Athenians ; and Brasidas after the capture of Amphi-
polis marched with his alHes ac:;ainst Acte, a promontory
running out from the king's dike with an inward curve,
and ending in Athos, a lofty mountain looking towards the
^gean sea. In it are various towns. Sane, an Andrian
colony, close to the canal, and facing the sea in the
direction of Euboea ; the others being Thyssus, Cleone,

no, III] SURPRISE OF TORONE 317

Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dium, inhabited by mixed CHAP

barbarian races speaking the two languages. There is *

also a small Chalcidian element ; but the greater number ^-^^J^^-^
are Tyrrheno-Pelasgians once settled in Lemnos and admitted
Athens, and Bisaltians, Crestonians, and Edonians ; the t^it^^
towns being all small ones. Most of these came over to into
Brasidas ; but Sane and Dium held out and saw their land '^oro^e-
ravaged by him and his army.

Upon their not submitting, he at once marched against
Torone in Chalcidice, which was held by an Athenian
garrison, having been invited by a few persons who were
prepared to hand over the town. Arriving in the dark
a little before daybreak, he sat down with his army near
the temple of the Dioscuri, rather more than a quarter
of a mile from the city. The rest of the town of Torone
and the Athenians in garrison did not perceive his approach ;
but his partisans knowing that he was coming (a few of
them had secretly gone out to meet him), were on the
watch for his arrival, and were no sooner aware of it
than they took in to them seven light-armed men with
daggers, who alone of twenty men ordered on this service
dared to enter, commanded by Lysistratus an Olynthian.
These passed through the sea wall, and without being
seen went up and put to the sword the garrison of the '
highest post in the town, which stands on a hill, and
broke open the postern on the side of Canastraeum.

Brasidas meanwhile came a little nearer and then halted
with his main body, sending on one hundred targeteers to
be ready to rush in first, the moment that a gate should
be thrown open and the beacon hghted as agreed. After
some time passed in waiting and wondering at the delay, the
targeteers by degrees got up close to the town. The Toro-
nasans inside at work with the party that had entered, had
by this time broken down the postern and opened the gates
leading to the market-place by cutting through the bar,
and first brought some men round and let them in by the

3i8 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [112-114

BOOK postern, in order 10 strike a panic into the surprised towns-

^ men by suddenly attacking them from behind and on both

B.C. 424. sides at once ; after which they raised the fire-signal as

*of the had been agreed, and took in by the market gates the rest

town, of the targeteers.

Brasidas seeing the signal told the troops to rise, and
dashed forward amid the loud hurrahs of his men, which
carried dismay among the astonished townspeople. Some
burst in straight by the gate, others over some square
pieces of timber placed against the wall (which had fallen
down and was being rebuilt) to draw up stones ; Brasidas
and the greater number making straight uphill for the
higher part of the town, in order to take it from top to
bottom, and once for all, while the rest of the multitude
spread in all directions.

The capture of the town was effected before the great
body of the Toronjeans had recovered from their surprise
and confusion ; but the conspirators and the citizens of
their party at once joined the invaders. About fifty
of the Athenian heavy infantry happened to be sleeping
in the market-place when the alarm reached them. A
few of these were killed fighting ; the rest escaped, some
by land, others to the two ships on the station, and took
refuge in Lecythus, a fort garrisoned by their own men
in the corner of the town running out into the sea and cut
off by a narrow isthmus ; where they were joined by the
Toronaeans of their party.

Day now arrived, and the town being secured, Brasidas
made a proclamation to the Toronasans who had taken
refuge with the Athenians, to come out, as many as chose,
to their homes without fearing for their rights or persons,
and sent a herald to invite the Athenians to accept a truce,
and to evacuate Lecythus with their property, as being
Chalcidian ground. The Athenians refused this offer, but
asked for a truce for a day to take up their dead. Brasi-
das granted it for two days, which he employed in fortifying

IIS] SURPRISE OF TORONE 319

the houses near, and the Athenians in doing the same to CHAP.

their positions. Meanwhile he called a meeting of the "

Toronasans, and said very much what he had said at |;.^;jf ^•
Acanthus, namely, that they must not look upon those das'
who had negotiated with him for the capture of the town ^^^^^^^^ ^<=
as bad men or as traitors, as they had not acted as they nasans.
had done from corrupt motives or in order to enslave the
city, but for the good and freedom of Torone ; nor again
must those who had not shared in the enterprise fancy that
they would not equally reap its fruits, as he had not come
to destroy either city or individual. This was the reason
of his proclamation to those that had fled for refuge to the
Athenians : he thought none the worse of them for their
friendship for the Athenians ; he believed that they had
only to make trial of the Lacedaemonians to like them
as well, or even much better, as acting much more justly :
it was for want of such a trial that they were now afraid
of them. Meanwhile he warned all of them to prepare
to be staunch allies, and for being held responsible for all
faults in future : for the past, they had not wronged the
Lacedaemonians but had been wronged by others who were
too strong for them, and any opposition that they might
have offered him could be excused.

Having encouraged them with this address, as soon as
the truce expired he made his attack upon Lecythus ; the
Athenians defending themselves from a poor wall and from
some houses with parapets. One day they beat him off";
the next the enemy were preparing to bring up an engine
against them from which they meant to throw fire upon
the wooden defences, and the troops were already coming
up to the point where they fancied they could best bring
up the engine, and where the place was most assailable ;
meanwhile the Athenians put a wooden tower upon a
house opposite, and carried up a quantity of jars and casks
of water and big stones, and a large number of men also
climbed up. The house thus laden too heavily suddenly

320 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [ii6, 117

BOOK broke down with a loud crash ; at which the men who

}Xl were near and saw it were more vexed than frightened;

B.C. 424. but those not so near, and still more those furthest off

x)f^£ecy- thought that the place was already taken at that point, and

thus, fled in haste to the sea and the ships.

Brasidas, perceiving that they were deserting the para-
pet, and seeing what was going on, dashed forward with
his troops, and immediately took the fort, and put to the
sword all whom he found in it. In this way the place
was evacuated by the Athenians, who went across in their
boats and ships to Paliene. Now there is a temple of
Athene in Lecythus, and Brasidas had proclaimed in the
moment of making the assault, that he would give thirty
silver minas to the man first on the wall. Being now of
opinion that the capture was scarcely due to human means,
he gave the thirty minae to the goddess for her temple,
and razed and cleared Lecythus, and made the whole of
it consecrated ground. The rest of the winter he spent
in settling the places in his hands, and in making designs
upon the rest ; and with the expiration of the winter the
eighth year of this war ended.

In the spring of the 'summer following, the Lacedae-
monians and Athenians made an armistice for a year ; the
Athenians thinking that they would thus have full leisure
to take their precautions before Brasidas could procure
the revolt of any more of their towns, and might also, if
it suited them, conclude a general peace ; the Lacedae-
monians divining the actual fears of the Athenians, and
thinking that after once tasting a respite from trouble
and misery they would be more disposed to consent to
a reconciliation, and to give back the prisoners, and
make a treaty for the longer period. The great idea
of the Lacedaemonians was to get back their men while
Brasidas' good fortune lasted : further successes might
make the struggle a less unequal one in Chalcidice, but
would leave them still deprived of their men, and even

Ii8] TRUCE FOR ONE YEAR 321

m Chalcidice not more than a match for the Athenians CHAP,
and by no means certain of victory. An armistice was ^^^-
accordingly concluded by Lacedaemon and her allies upon B.C. 433.
the terms following :— t^,"^'*"

1. As to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, terms
ive are agreed that ivhosoever ivill shall have access to it, Athens
<without fraud or fear, according to the usages of his fore- 1"^^.
fathers. 7 he Lacedemonians and the allies present agree

to this, and promise to send heralds to the Boeotians and
Phocians, and to do their best to persuade them to agree
likewise.

2. As to the treasure of the god, ive agree to exert our-
selves to detect all malversators, truly and honestly folloiV'
ing the customs of our forefathers, ive and you and all others
ivilling to do so, all folloiving the customs of our forefathers.
As to these points the Lacedemonians and the other allies are
agreed as has been said.

3. As to ivhat folloivs, the Lacedamonians and the other
allies agree, if the Athenians conclude a treaty, to remain,
each of us in our own territory, retaining our respective
acquisitions ; the garrison in Coryphasium keeping ivithin
Buphras and Tomeus ; that in Cythera attempting no com-
munication ivith the P eloponnesian confederacy, neither ive
ivith them, nor they ivith us ; that in Nisaa and Minoa
not crossing the road leading from the gates of the temple of
Nisus to that oj Poseidon and from thence straight to the
bridge at Minoa ; the Megarians and the allies being equally
bound not to cross this road, and the Athenians retaining the
island they have taken, ivithout any communication on either
tide ; as to Troezen, each side retaining ivhat it has, and as
ivas arranged ivith the Athenians.

4. As to the use of the sea, so far as refers to their oivn
coast and to that of their confederacy, that the Lacedamo-
nians and their allies may voyage upon it in any vessel
roived by oars and of not more than five hundred talents
tonnage, noi a vessel of ivar.

322 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [119

BOOK 5. That all heralds and embassies, ivith as many at-

tendants as they please, for concluding the ixjar and adjusting

B.C. 4*3- claims, shall have free passage, going and coming, to Pelo^

armis- ponnese or Athens by land and by sea.

^^^' 6. That during the truce, deserters nvhether bond or free

shall be received neither by you, nor by us,

7. Further, that satisfaction shall be given by you to us
and by us to you according to the public laiu of our several
countries, all disputes being settled by laiv ivithout recourse
to hostilities.

The Lacedamonians and allies agree to these articles : but
if you have anything fairer or juster to suggest, come to
Lacedamon and let us knoiv ; ivhatever shall be Just ivill
meet tvith no objection either jrom the Lacedamonians or
from the allies. Only let those nvho come come luith full
poivers, as you desire us. The truce shall be for one year.
Approved by the people

The tribe of Acamantis had the prytany, Phcenippus ivas
secretary, Niciades chairman. Laches moved, in the name
of the good luck of the Athenians, that they should conclude
the armistice upon the terms agreed upon by the Lacede-
monians and the allies. It ivas agreed accordingly in the
popular assembly, that the armistice should be for one year,
beginning that very day, the fourteenth of the month of
Elaphebolion ; during -which time ambassadors and heralds
should go and come betiveen the tivo countries to discuss
the bases of a pacification. That the generals and prytanes
should call an assembly of the people, in tuhich the Athenians
should first consult on the peace, and on the mode in which
the embassy for putting an end to the ivar should be ad-
mitted. That the embassy noiv present should at once take
the engagement before the people to keep ivell and truly this
truce for one year.

On these terms the Lacedaemonians concluded with
the Athenians and their alhes on the twelfth day of
the Spartan month Gerastius ; the allies also taking the

120] REVOLT OF SCIONE 323

oaths. Those who concluded and poured the libation CHAP,
were Taurus, son of Echetimides, Athenasus, son of ^}X.'
Pericleidas, and Philocharidas, son of Eryxilaidas, Lace- B.C. 4*3-
daemonlans ; iEneas, son of Ocytus, and Euphamidas, a/s^ciwfe.
son of Aristonymus, Corinthians ; Damotimus, son of
Naucrates, and Onasimus, son of Megacles, Sicyonians ;
Nicasus, son of Cecalus, and Menecrates, son of Amphi-
dorus, Megarians ; and Amphias, son of Eupaidas, an
Epidaurian ; and the Athenian generals Nicostratus, son
of Diitrephes, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Autocles,
son of Tolmaeus. Such was the armistice, and during
the whole of it conferences went on on the subject of
a pacification.

In the days in which they were going backwards and
forwards to these conferences, Scione, a town in Pallene,
revolted from Athens, and went over to Brasidas. The
Scionaeans say that they are Pallenians from Peloponnese,
and that their first founders on their voyage from Troy
were carried in to this spot by the storm which the
Achasans were caught in, and there settled. The Scio-
naeans had no sooner revolted than Brasidas crossed over
by night to Scione, with a friendly galley ahead and
himself in a small boat some way behind ; his idea being
that if he fell in with a vessel larger than the boat he
would have the galley to defend him, while a ship that
was a match for the galley, would probably neglect the
small vessel to attack the large one, and thus leave him
time to escape. His passage effected, he called a meet-
ing of the Scionasans and spoke to the same effect as at
Acanthus and Torone, adding that they merited the
utmost commendation, in that, in spite of Pallene within
the isthmus being cut off by the Athenian occupation of
Potidasa and of their own practically insular position, they
had of their own free will gone forward to meet their
liberty instead of timorously waiting until they had been
by force compelled to their own manifest good. This

324 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [121, 122

BOOK waB a sign that they would valiantly undergo any trial,
^V- however great ; and if he should order affairs as he in-

B.C. 423. tended, he should count them among the truest and

^e^trice sincerest friends of the Lacedaemonians, and would in

arrives— every Other way honour them.
*^^as"to The Scionasans were elated by his language, and even
Scione. those who had at first disapproved of what was being done
catching the general confidence, they determined on a
vigorous conduct of the war, and welcomed Brasidas with
all possible honours, pubhcly crowning him with a crown
of gold as the liberator of Hellas ; while private persons
crowded round him and decked him with garlands as
though he had been an athlete. Meanwhile Brasidas left
them a small garrison for the present and crossed back
again, and not long afterwards sent over a larger force,
intending with the help of the Scionaeans to attempt
Mende and Potidxa before the Athenians should arrive ;
Scione, he felt, being too like an island for them not to
relieve it. He had besides intelligence in the above
towns about their betrayal.

In the midst of his designs upon the towns in question,
a galley arrived with the commissioners carrying round
the news of the armistice, Aristonymus for the Athenians
and Athenasus for the Lacedaemonians. The troops now
crossed back to Torone, and the commissioners gave
Brasidas notice of the convention. All the Lace-
daemonian allies in Thrace accepted what had been done ;
and Aristonymus made no difficulty about the rest, but
finding, on counting the days, that the Scionaeans had
revolted after the date of the convention, refused to in-
clude them in it. To this Brasidas earnestly objected,
asserting that the revolt took place before, and would not
give up the town. Upon Aristonymus reporting the case
to Athens, the people at once prepared to send an expedi-
tion to Scione. Upon this, envoys arrived from Lace-
daemon, alleging that this would be a breach of the truce,

123, 124] REVOLT OF MENDE 325

and laying claim to the town upon the faith of the CHAP
assertion of Brasidas, and meanwhile offering to submit ^ '
the question to arbitration. Arbitration, however, was B.C. 413.
what the Athenians did not choose to risk ; being de- and"
termined to send troops at once to the place, and furious Brasidas
at the idea of even the islanders now daring to revolt, in
a vain reliance upon the power of the Lacedaemonians by
land. Besides the facts of the revolt were rather as the
Athenians contended, the Scionaeans having revolted two
days after the convention Cleon accordingly succeeded
in carrying a decree to reduce and put to death the
Scionasans ; and the Athenians employed the leisure
which they now enjoyed in preparing for the expedition.

Meanwhile Mende revolted, a town in Pallene and a
colony of the Eretrians, and was received without scruple
by Brasidas, in spite of its having evidently come over
during the armistice, on account of certain infringements
of the truce alleged by him against the Athenians. This
audacity of Mende was partly caused by seeing Brasidas
forward in the matter and by the conclusions drawn from
his refusal to betray Scione ; and besides, the conspirators
in Mende were few, and, as I have already intimated,
had carried on their practices too long not to fear de-
tection for themselves, and not to wish to force the
inclination of the multitude. This news made the
Athenians more furious than ever, and they at once
prepared against both towns. Brasidas expecting their
arrival conveyed away to Olynthus in Chalcidice the
women and children of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans,
and sent over to them five hundred Peloponnesian heavy
infantry and three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, all
under the command of Polydamidas.

Leaving these two towns to prepare together against
the speedy arrival of the Athenians, Brasidas and Per-
diccas started on a second joint expedition into Lyncus
against Arrhabaeus ; the latter with the forces of his

326 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [125

BOOK Macedonian subjects, and a corps of heavy infantry

^^' composed of Hellenes domiciled in the country; the

B.C. 433. former with the Peloponnesians whom he still had with

paign him and the Chalcidians, Acanthians, and the rest in such

against force as they were able. In all there were about three
baeus. thousand Hellenic heavy infantry, accompanied by all the
Macedonian cavalry with the Chalcidians, near one thou-
sand strong, besides an immense crowd of barbarians.
On entering the country of Arrhabaeus, they found the
Lyncestians encamped awaiting them, and themselves
took up a position opposite. The infantry on either side
were upon a hill, with a plain between them, into which
the horse of both armies first galloped down, and engaged
a cavalry action. After this the Lyncestian heavy in-
fantry advanced from their hill to join their cavalry and
offered battle ; upon which Brasidas and Perdiccas also
came down to meet them, and engaged and routed them
with heavy loss ; the survivors taking refuge upon the
heights and there remaining inactive. The victors now
set up a trophy and waited two or three days for the
Ulyrian mercenaries who were to join Perdiccas. Per-
diccas then wished to go on and attack the villages of
Arrhabseus, and to sit still no longer ; but Brasidas,
afraid that the Athenians might sail up during his absence,
and of something happening to Mende, and seeing besides
that the Illyrians did not appear, far from seconding this
wish was anxious to return.

While they were thus disputing, the news arrived that
the Illyrians had actually betrayed Perdiccas and had
joined Arrhabaeus ; and the fear inspired by their warlike
character made both parties now think it best to retreat.
However, owing to the dispute, nothing had been settled
as to when they should start ; and night coming on, the
Macedonians and the barbarian crowd took fright in a
moment in one of those mysterious panics to which great
armies are liable ; and persuaded that ao army many times

126] SPEECH OF BRASIDAS 327

more numerous than that which had really arrived was CHAP.

advaEciog and all but upon them, suddenly broke and ^^ •

fled in the direction of home, and thus compelled Per- B.C. 423.

diccas, who at first did not perceive what had occurred, das'

to depart without seeing Brasidas, the two armies being |P3*|J.^y*^

encamped at a considerable distance from each other.

At daybreak Brasidas, perceiving that the Macedonians

had gone on, and that the Ulyrians and Arrhabgsus were

on the point of attacking him, formed his heavy infantry

into a square, with the light troops in the centre, and

himself also prepared to retreat. Posting his youngest

soldiers to dash out wherever the enemy should attack

them, he himself with three hundred picked men in the

rear intended to face about during the retreat and beat off

the most forward of their assailants. Meanwhile, before

the enemy approached, he sought to sustain the courage

of his soldiers with the following hasty exhortation : —

* Peloponnesians, if I did not suspect you of being dis-
mayed at being left alone to sustain the attack of a
numerous and barbarian enemy, I should just have said a
few words to you as usual without further explanation.
As it is, in the face of the desertion of our friends and
the numbers of the enemy, I have some advice and in-
formation to offer, which, brief as they must be, will, I
hope, suffice for the more important points. The bravery
that you habitually display in war does not depend on
your having allies at your side in this or that encounter,
but on your native courage ; nor have numbers any terrors
for citizens of states like yours, in which the many do not
rule the few, but rather the few the many, owing their
position to nothing else than to superiority in the field.
Inexperience now makes you afraid of barbarians ; and
yet the trial of strength which you had with the Mace-
donians among them, and my own judgment, confirmed
by what I hear from others, should be enough to satisfy
you that they will not prove formidable. Where an

328 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [127

BOOK enemy seems strong but is really weak, a true knowledge

}Xl of the facts makes his adversary the bolder, just as a

B.C. 423. serious antagonist is encountered most confidently by

barbarian those who do not know him. Thus the present enemy
^°formid- "^^g^^ terrify an inexperienced imagination, they are

able than formidable in outward bulk, their loud yelling is un-
appean bearable, and the brandishing of their weapons in the
air has a threatening appearance. But when it comes to
real fighting with an opponent who stands his ground,
they are not what they seemed ; they have no regular
order that they should be ashamed of deserting their
positions when hard pressed ; flight and attack are with
them equally honourable, and afford no test of courage ;
their independent mode of fighting never leaving any one
who wants to run away without a fair excuse for so
doing. In short, they think frightening you at a secure
distance a surer game than meeting you hand to hand ;
otherwise they would have done the one and not the
other. You can thus plainly see that the terrors with
which they were at first invested are in fact trifling
enough, though ^o the eye and ear very prominent.
Stand your ground therefore when they advance, and
again wait your opportunity to retire in good order, and
you will reach a place of safety all the sooner, and will
know for ever afterwards that rabble such as these, to
those who sustain their first attack, do but show off their
courage by threats of the terrible things that they are
going to do, at a distance, but with those who give way
to them are quick enough to display their heroism in
pursuit when they can do so without danger.'

With this brief address Brasidas began to lead off his
army. Seeing this, the barbarians came on with much
shouting and hubbub, thinking that he was flying and that
they would overtake him and cut him off. But wherever
they charged they found the young men ready to dash
out against them, while Brasidas with his picked company

I28J RETREAT OF BRASIDAS 329

sustained their onset. Thus the Peloponnesians withstood CHAP.

the first attack, to the surprise of the enemy, and after- '

wards received and repulsed them as fast as they came on, P.^- 4»3-

, . 1 • T'u Masterly

retirmg as soon as their opponents became quiet. 1 ne retreat ol
main body of the barbarians ceased therefore to molest Brasidas.
the Hellenes with Brasidas in the open country, and
leaving behind a certain number to harass their march,
the rest went on after the flying Macedonians, slaying
those with whom they came up, and so arrived in time
to occupy the narrow pass between two hills that leads
into the country of Arrhabaeus. They knew that this
was the only way by which Brasidas could retreat,
and now proceeded to surround him just as he entered
the most impracticable part of the road, in order to cut
him off.

Brasidas, perceiving their intention, told his three
hundred to run on without order, each as quickly as he
could, to the hill which seemed easiest to take, and to try
to dislodge the barbarians already there, before they
should be joined by the main body closing round him.
These attacked and overpowered the party upon the hill,
and the main army of the Hellenes now advanced with
less difficulty towards it ; the barbarians being terrified at
seeing their men on that side driven from the height, and
no longer following the main body, who, they considered,
had gained the frontier and made good their escape.
The heights once gained, Brasidas now proceeded more
securely, and the same day arrived at Arnisa, the first
town in the dominions of Perdiccas. The soldiers, en-
raged at the desertion of the Macedonians, vented their
rage on all their yokes of oxen which they found on the
road, and on any baggage which had tumbled off (a«
might easily happen in the panic of a night retreat), by
unyoking and cutting down the cattle and taking the
baggage for themselves. From this moment Perdiccas

330 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [129

BOOK began to regard Brasidas as an enemy and to feel against
]Xl the Peloponnesians a hatred which could not be congenial

B.C. 423. to the adversary of the Athenians. However,' he departed

sent^to from his natural interests and made it his endeavour to

ChaJci- come to terms with the latter and to get rid of the
dice, r

former.

On his return from Macedonia to Torone, Brasidas
found the Athenians already masters of Mende, and
remained quiet where he was, thinking it now out of his
power to cross over into Pallene and assist the Mendasans\
but he kept good watch over Torone. For about the
same time as the campaign in Lyncus, the Athenians
sailed upon the expedition which we left them preparing
against Mende and Scione, with fifty ships, ten of which
were Chians, one thousand Athenian heavy infantry and
six hundred archers, one hundred Thracian mercenaries
and some targeteers drawn from their allies in the neigh-
bourhood, under the command of Nicias, son of Niceratus,
and Nicostratus, son of Diitrephes. Weighing from
Potidasa, the fleet came to land opposite the temple of
Poseidon, and proceeded against Mende ; the men of
which town, reinforced by three hundred Scionasans, with
their Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred heavy
infantry in all, under Polydamidas, they found encamped
upon a strong hill outside the city. These Nicias, with
one hundred and twenty light-armed Methonasans, sixty
picked men from the Athenian heavy infantry, and all
the archers, tried to reach by a path running up the hill,
but received a wound and found himself unable to force
the position ; while Nicostratus, with all the rest of the
army, advancing upon the hill, which was naturally
difficult, by a different approach further off, was thrown
into utter disorder ; and the whole Athenian army
narrowly escaped being defeated. For that day, as the
Meudgeans and their allies showed no signs of yielding,

I30] RECAPTURE OF MENDE 331

the Athenians retreated and encamped, and the Mendaeans CHAP.

XIV

at nightfall returned into the town. "

The next day the Athenians sailed round to the Scione B C. 433.
side and took the suburb, and all day plundered the country, nians
without any one coming out against them, partly because 55^°^®*"
of intestine disturbances in the town ; and the following
night the three hundred Scionseans returned home. On
the morrow Nicias advanced with half the army to the
frontier of Scione and laid waste the country; while
Nicostratus with the remainder sat down before the town
near the upper gate on the road to Potidasa. The arms
of the Mendasans and of their Peloponnesian auxiliaries
within the wall happened to be piled in that quarter,
where Polydamidas accordingly began to draw them up
for battle, encouraging the Mendasans to make a sortie.
At this moment one of the popular party answered him
factiously that they would not go out and did not want a
war, and for thus answering was dragged by the arm and
knocked about by Polydamidas. Hereupon the infuriated
commons at once seized their arms and rushed at the
Peloponnesians and at their allies of the opposite faction.
The troops thus assaulted were at once routed, partly
from the suddenness of the conflict and partly through
fear of the gates being opened to the Athenians, with
whom they imagined that the attack had been concerted.
As many as were not killed on the spot took refuge in
the citadel, which they had held from the first ; and the
whole Athenian army, Nicias having by this time returned
and being close to the city, now burst into Mende, which
had opened its gates without any convention, and sacked
it just as if they had taken it by storm, the generals even
finding some difficulty in restraining them from also
massacring the inhabitants. After this the Athenians
told the Mendasans thit they might retain their civil
rights, and themselves judge the supposed authors of the

332 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [131, 132

BOOK revolt ; and cut off the party in the citadel by a wall built

^Xi down to the sea on either side, appointing troops to
B.C. 423. maintain the blockade. Having thus secured Mende,

dicc^as ^hey proceeded against Scione.

recon- The Scionacans and Peloponnesians marched out against
the^Athe- them, occupying a strong hill in front of the town, which

'"^°^- had to be captured by the enemy before they could invest
the place. The Athenians stormed the hill, defeated and
dislodged its occupants, and having encamped and set up
a trophy, prepared for the work of circumvallation. Not
long after they had begun their operations, the auxiliaries
besieged in the citadel of Mende forced the guard by the
sea side and arrived by night at Scione, into which most
of them succeeded in entering, passing through the
besieging army.

While the investment of Scione was in progress,
Perdiccas sent a herald to the Athenian generals and
made peace with the Athenians, through spite against
Brasidas for the retreat from Lyncus, from which
moment indeed he had begun to negotiate. The Lace-
dsemonian Ischagoras was just then upon the point of
starting with an army overland to join Brasidas ; and
Perdiccas, being now required by Nicias to give some
proof of the sincerity of his reconciliation to the
Athenians, and being himself no longer disposed to let
the Peloponnesians into his country, put in motion his
friends in Thessaly, with whose chief men he always
took care to have relations, and so effectually stopped the
army and its preparation that they did not even try the
Thessalians. Ischagoras himself, however, with Am-
einias and Aristeus, succeeded in reaching Brasidas ; they
had been commissioned by the Lacedaemonians to inspect
the state of affairs, and brought out from Sparta (in
violation of all precedent) some of their young men to
put in command of the towns, to guard against their

i33» 134] NINTH YEAR OF THE WAR 333

being entrusted to the persons upon the spot. Brasidas chap.
accordingly placed Clearidas, son of Cleonymus, in ^^^-
Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas, son of Hegesander, in B.C. 4*3.
Torone. events of

The same summer the Thebans dismantled the wall this year,
of the Thespians on the charge of Atticism, having
always wished to do so, and now finding it an easy
matter, as the flower of the Thespian youth had perished
in the battle with the Athenians. The same summer
also the temple of Hera at Argos was burnt down,
through Chrysis, the priestess, placing a lighted torch
near the garlands and then falling asleep, so that they all
caught fire and were in a blaze before she observed it.
Chrysis that very night fled to Phlius for fear of the
Argives, who, agreeably to the law in such a case,
appointed another priestess named Phaeinis. Chrysis at
the time of her flight had been priestess for eight years
of the present war and half the ninth. At the close of
the summer the investment of Scione was completed, and
the Athenians, leaving a detachment to maintain the
blockade, returned with the rest of their army.

During the winter following the Athenians and Lacedae-
monians were kept quiet by the armistice ; but the Manti-
neans and Tegeans, and their respective allies, fought a
battle at Laodicium, in the Oresthid. The victory
remained doubtful, as each side routed one of the wings
opposed to them, and both set up trophies and sent
spoils to Delphi. After heavy loss on both sides the
battle was undecided, and night interrupted the action ;
yet the Tegeans passed the night on the field and set
up a trophy at once, while the Mantineans withdrew to
Bucolion and set up theirs afterwards.

At the close of the same winter, in fact almost in
spring, Brasidas made an attempt upon Potidaea. He
arrived by night, and succeeded in planting a ladder

334 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [135

BOOK against the wall without being discovered, the ladder

}Xl being planted just in the interval between the passing

B.C. 423- round of the bell and the return of the man who brought

^^^"^SJ"- it back. Upon the garrison, however, taking the alarm

prise of immediately afterwards, before his men came up, he

° * *^ quickly led off his troops, without waitmg until it was

day. So ended the winter and the ninth year of this

war of which Thucydides is the historian.

1,2]

BOOK V

CHAPTER XV

Tenth Year of the War — Death of Cleon and Brasidas
—Peace of Nicias

The next summer the truce for a year ended, after CHAP.

lasting until the Pythian games. During the armistice '

the Athenians expelled the Delians from Deles, con- B.C. 42a.
eluding that they must have been polluted by some old tlonofthe
offence at the time of their consecration, and that this a^"iistice.
had been the omission in the previous purification of the
island, which, as I have related, had been thought to
have been duly accomplished by the removal of the
graves of the dead. The Delians had Atramyttium in
Asia given them by Pharnaces, and settled there as they
removed from Delos.

Meanwhile Cleon prevailed on the Athenians to let
him set sail at the expiration of the armistice for the
towns in the direction of Thrace with twelve hundred
heavy infantry and three hundred horse from Athens, a
larger force of the allies, and thirty ships. First touch-
ing at the still besieged Scione, and taking some heavy
infantry from the army there, he next sailed into Cophosa
harbour in the territory of Torone, which is not far from
the town. From thence, having learnt from deserters
that Brasidas was not in Torone, and that its garrison
was not strong enough to give him battle, he advanced
with his army against the town, sending ten ships to sail
round into the harbour. He first came to the fortifica-
tion lately thrown up in front of the town by Brasidas in
order to take in the suburb, to do which he had pulled

336 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [3

BOOK down part of the original wall and made it all one city.
^- To this point Pasitelidas, the Lacedaemonian commander,

B.C. 422. with such garrison as there was in the place, hurried to
^^p°5-! repel the Athenian assault; but finding himself hard
tion to pressed, and seeing the ships that had been sent round
^^ice' sailing into the harbour, Pasitelidas began to be afraid
that they might get up to the city before its defenders
were there, and the fortification being also carried, he
might be taken prisoner, and so abandoned the outwork
and ran into the town. But the Athenians from the
ships had already taken Torone, and their land forces
following at his heels burst in with him with a rush over
the part of the old wall that had been pulled down, kill-
ing some of the Peloponnesians and Toronasans in the
melee, and making prisoners of the rest, and Pasitelidas
their commander amongst them. Brasidas meanwhile had
advanced to relieve Torone, and had only about four
miles more to go when he heard of its fall on the road,
and turned back again. Cleon and the Athenians set up
two trophies, one by the harbour, the other by the fortifi-
cation, and making slaves of the wives and children of
the Toronasans, sent the men with the Peloponnesians
and any Chalcidians that were there, to the number of
seven hundred, to Athens; whence, however, they all
came home afterwards, the Peloponnesians on the con-
clusion of peace, and the rest by being exchanged against
other prisoners with the Olynthians. About the same
time Panactum, a fortress on the Athenian border, was
taken by treachery by the Boeotians. Meanwhile Cleon,
atrer placing a garrison in Torone, weighed anchor and
sailed round Athos on his way to Amphipolis.

About the same time Phscax, son of Erasistratus, set
sail with two colleagues as ambassador from Athens to
Italy and Sicily. The Lcontines, upon the departure of
the Athenians from Sicily after the pacification, had
placed a number of new citizens upon the roll, and the

4, 5] AFFAIRS IN SICILY 337

commons had a design for redividing the land ; but the CHAP.

upper classes, aware of their intention, called in the '

Syracusans and expelled the commons. These last were B.C. 42*
scattered in various directions ; but the upper classes envoys
came to an agreement with the Syracusans, abandoned ^. .,
and laid waste their city, and went and lived at Syracuse,
where they were made ciiizens. Afterwards some of
them were dissatisfied, and leaving Syracuse occupied
Phocaeas, a quarter of the town of Leontini, and Bricin-
nijE, a strong place in the Leontine country, and being
there joined by most of the exiled commons carried on
war from the fortifications. The Athenians hearing this,
sent Phasax to see if they could not by some means so
convince their allies there and the rest of the Sicilians of
the ambitious designs of Syracuse, as to induce them to
form a general coalition against her, and thus save the com-
mons of Leontini. Arrived in Sicily, Phaeax succeeded
at Camarina and Agrigentum, but meeting with a repulse
at Gela did not go on to the rest, as he saw that he should
not succeed with them, but returned through the country
of the Sicels to Catana, and after visiting Bricinnias as
he passed, and encouraging its inhabitants, sailed back to
Athens.

During his voyage along the coast to and from Sicily,
he treated with some cities in Italy on the subject of
friendship with Athens, and also fell in with some
Locrian settlers exiled from Messina, who had been sent
thither when the Locrians were called in by one of the
factions that divided Messina after the pacification of
Sicily, and Messina came for a time into the hands of
the Locrians. These being met by Phseax on their
return home received no injury at his hands, as the
Locrians had agreed with him for a treaty with Athens.
They were the only people of the alHes who, when the
reconciliation between the Sicilians took place, had not
made peace with her ; nor indeed would they have done

M 455

33« THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [6

BOOK SO now, if they had not been pressed by a war with the
_Xl Hipponians and Medmaeans who lived on their border,

B.C. 422. and were colonists of theirs. Phaeax meanwhile pro-
^Eion. ceeded on his voyage, and at length arrived at Athens.

Cleon, whom we left on his voyage from Torone
to Amphipolis, made Eion his base, and after an un-
successful assault upon the Andrian colony of Stagirus,
took Galepsus, a colony of Thasos, by storm. He now
sent envoys to Perdiccas to command his attendance with
an army, as provided by the alliance ; and others to
Thrace, to Polles, king of the Odomantians, who was
to bring as many Thracian mercenaries as possible ; and
himself remained inactive in Eion, awaiting their arrival.
Informed of this, Brasidas on his part took up a position
of observation upon Cerdylium, a place situated in the
Argilian country on high ground across the river, not far
from Amphipolis, and commanding a view on all sides,
and thus made it impossible for Cleon's army to move
without his seeing it ; for he fully expected that Cleon,
despising the scanty numbers of his opponent, would
march against Amphipolis with the force that he had got
with him. At the same time Brasidas made his prepara-
tions, calling to his standard fifteen hundred Thracian
mercenaries, and all the Edonians, horse and targeteers ;
he also had a thousand Myrcinian and Chalcidian targe-
teers, besides those in Amphipolis, and a force of heavy
infantry numbering altogether about two thousand, and
three hundred Hellenic horse. Fifteen hundred of these
he had with him upon Cerdylium ; the rest were stationed
with Clearidas in Amphipolis.

After remaining quiet for some time, Cleon was at
length obliged to do as Brasidas expected. His sol-
diers, tired of their inactivity, began also seriously to
reilect on the weakness and mcompetence of their com-
mander and the skill and valour that would be opposed
to him. and on their own original unwillingness to accom-

7,8] CLEON BEFORE AMPHIPOLIS 339

pany him. These murmurs coming to the ears of Cleon, CHAP
he resolved not to disgust the army by keeping it in the ^'
same place, and broke up his camp and advanced. The B.C. ^zt.
temper of the general was what it had been at Pylos, his advance
success on that occasion having given him confidence in *^? A™:
his capacity. He never dreamed of any one coming out
to fight him, but said that he was rather going up to view
the place ; and if he waited for his reinforcements it was
not in order to make victory secure in case he should be
compelled to engage, but to be enabled to surround and
storm the city. He accordingly came and posted his
army upon a strong hill in front of Amphipolis, and pro-
ceeded to examine the lake formed by the Strymon, and
how the town lay on the side of Thrace. He thought
to retire at pleasure without fighting, as there was no one
to be seen upon the wall or coming out of the gates, all
of which were shut. Indeed, it seemed a mistake not to
have brought down engines with him ; he could then
have taken the town, there being no one to defend it.

As soon as Brasidas saw the Athenians in motion he
descended himself from Cerdyiium and entered Amphi-
polis. He did not venture to go out in regular order
against the Athenians; he mistrusted his strength, and
thought it inadequate to the attempt ; not in numbers —
these were not so unequal — but in quality, the flower of
the Athenian army being in the field, with the best of the
Lemnians and Imbrians. He therefore prepared to assail
them by stratagem. By showing the enemy the number
of his troops, and the shifts which he had been put to to
arm them, he thought that he should have less chance of
beating him than by not letting him have a sight of them,
and thus learn how good a right he had to despise them.
He accordingly picked out a hundred and fifty heavy
infantry, and putting the rest under Clearidas determined
to attack suddenly before the Athenians retired ; thinking
that he should not have again such a chance of catching

340 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [9

BOOK them alone, if their reinforcements were once allowed to

_Xl come up ; and so calling all his soldiers together in order

B.C. ^2*. to encourage them and explain his intention, spoke as

Brasidas r 11

to his follows :

soldiers. * Peloponnesians, the character of the country from
which we have come, one which has always owed its
freedom to valour, and the fact that you are Dorians and
the enemy you are about to fight lonlans, whom you are
accustomed to beat, are things that do not need furthei
comment. But the plan of attack that I propose to pur-
sue, this it is as well to explain, in order that the fact of
our adventuring with a part instead of with the whole oi
our forces may not damp your courage by the apparent
disadvantage at which it places you. I imagine it is the
poor opinion that he has of us, and the fact that he has no
idea of any one coming out to engage him, that has made
the enemy march up to the place and carelessly look about
him as he is doing, without noticing us. But the most
successful soldier will always be the man who most
happily detects a blunder like this, and who carefully
consulting his own means makes his attack not so much
by open and regular approaches, as by seizing the oppor-
tunity of the moment ; and these stratagems, which do
the greatest service to our friends by most completely
deceiving our enemies, have the most brilliant name in
war. Therefore, while their careless confidence con-
tinues, and they are still thinkmg, as in my judgment
they are now doing, more of retreat than of maintaining
their position, while their spirit is slack and not high-
strung with expectation, I with the men under my com-
mand will, if possible, take them by surprise and fall
with a run upon their centre; and do you, Clearidas,
afterwards, when you see me already upon them, and, as
is likely, dealing terror among them, take with you the
Amphipohtans, and the rest of the allies, and suddenly
open the gates and dash at them, and hasten to engage as

10] SPEECH OF BRASIDAS 341

quickly as you can. That is our best chance of establish- CHAP.

ing a panic among them, as a fresh assailant has always ;

more terrors for an enemy than the one he is immediately BX. 4^*^
engaged with. Show yourself a brave man, as a Spartan of his
should ; and do you, allies, follow him like men, and re- ^°^^^
member that zeal, honour, and obedience mark the good
soldier, and that this day will make you either free men
and allies of Lacedaemon, or slaves of Athens ; even if
you escape without personal loss of liberty or life, your
bondaoe will be on harsher terms than before, and you •
will also hinder the liberation of the rest of the Hellenes.
No cowardice then on your part, seeing the greatness of
the issues at stake, and I will show that what I preach to
others I can practise myself.*

After this brief speech Brasidas himself prepared for the
sally, and placed the rest with Clearidas at the Thracian
gates to support him as had been agreed. Meanwhile he
had been seen coming down from Cerdylium and then in
the city, which is overlooked from the outside, sacrificing
near the temple of Athene ; in short, all his movements had
been observed, and word was brought to Cleon, who had
at the moment gone on to look about him, that the whole
of the enemy's force could be seen in the town, and that
the feet of horses and men in great numbers were visible
under the gates, as if a sally were intended. Upon hear-
ing this he went up to look, and having done so, being
unwilling to venture upon the decisive step of a battle
before his reinforcements came up, and fancying that he
would have time to retire, bid the retreat be sounded and
sent orders to the men to effect it by moving on the left
wing in the direction of Eion, which was indeed the only
way practicable. This however not being quick enough
for him, he joined the retreat in person and made the
right wing wheel round, thus turning its unarmed side to
the enemy. It was then that Brasidas seeing the Athe-
nian force in motion and his opportunity come, said to the

342 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [lo

BOOK men with him and the rest, * Those fellows will never

Jf_ stand before us, one can see that by the way their spears

B.C. 4^a. and heads are going. Troops which do as they do seldom

o1"the stand a charge. Quick, some one, and open the gates I

^:^^'^- snoke of, and let us be out and at them with no fears for
cians, r , , a i- i • • i i i- j

the result. Accordmgly issuing out by the pahsade gate

and by the first in the long wall then existing, he ran at

the top of his speed along the straight road, where the

trophy now stands as you go by the steepest part of the

hill, and fell upon and routed the centre of the Athenians,

panic-stricken by their own disorder and astounded at his

audacity. At the same moment Clearidas in execution of

his orders issued out from the Thracian gates to support

him, and also attacked the enemy. The result was that

the Athenians, suddenly and unexpectedly attacked on

both sides, fell into confusion ; and their left towards

Eion, which had already got on some distance, at once

broke and fled. Just as it was in full retreat and Brasidas

was passing on to attack the right, he received a wound ;

but his fall was not perceived by the Athenians, as he was

taken up by those near him and carried oif the field. The

Athenian right made a better stand, and though Cleon,

who from the first had no thought of fighting, at once fled

and was overtaken and slain by a Myrcinian targeteer,

his infantry forming in close order upon the hill twice or

thrice repulsed the attacks of Clearidas, and did not finally

give way until they were surrounded and routed by the

missiles of the Myrcinian and Chalcidian horse and the

targeteers. Thus the Athenian army was ail now in

flight ; and such as escaped being killed in the battle or

by the Chalcidian horse and the targeteers, dispersed

among the hills, and with difticulty made their way to

Eion. The men who had taken up and rescued Brasidas,

brought him into the town with the breath still in hmi :

he lived to hear of the victory of his troops, and not

long after expired. The rest of the army returning with

11, 12] DEATH OF BRASIDAS 343

Clearidas from the pursuit stripped the dead and set up a CHAP.
trophy. ^•

After this all the allies attended in arms and buried ?-^- 4**-

Honour

Brasidas at the public expense in the city, in front of done to

- ■- Brasida

memory

what is now the market-place, and the Amphipolitans ^'"•'^sidas

having enclosed his tomb, ever afterwards sacrifice to hira
as a hero and have given to him the honour of games and
annual offerings. They constituted him the founder of
their colony, and pulled down the Hagnonic erections
and obliterated everything that could be interpreted as a
memorial of his having founded the place ; for they con-
sidered that Brasidas had been their preserver, and courting
as they did the alliance of Lacedaemon for fear of Athens,
in their present hostile relations with the latter they could
no longer with the same advantage or satisfaction pay
Hagnon his honours. They also gave the Athenians back
their dead. About six hundred of the latter had fallen
and only seven of the enemy, owing to there having been
no regular engagement, but the affair of accident and
panic that I have described. After taking up their dead
the Athenians sailed off home, while Clearidas and his
troops remained to arrange matters at Amphipolis.

About the same time three Lacedaemonians — Ramphias,
Autocharidas, and Epicydidas — led a reinforcement of
nine hundred heavy infantry to the towns in the direction
of Thrace, and arriving at Heraclea in Trachis reformed
matters there as seemed good to them. While they
delayed there, this battle took place and so the summer
ended.

With the beginning of the winter following Ramphiaa
and his companions penetrated as far as Pierium in Thes-
saly ; but as the Thessaiians opposed their further advance,
and Brasidas whom they came to reinforce was dead, they
turned back home, thinking that the moment had gone by,
the Athenians being defeated and gone, and themselves
not equal to the execution of Brasidas* designs. The

344 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [13, 14

BOOK main cause however of their return was because they knew
^' that when they set out, Lacedaemonian opinion was really

B^C. 42a. in favour of peace.

de^fr"e^for Indeed it 80 happened that directly after the battle of
peace. Amphipolis and the retreat of Ramphias from Thessaly,
both sides ceased to prosecute the war and turned their
attention to peace. Athens had suffered severely at
Delium, and again shortly afterwards at Amphipolis, and
had no longer that confidence in her strength which had
made her before refuse to treat, in the belief of ultimate
victory which her success at the moment had inspired ;
besides, she was afraid of her allies being tempted by her
reverses to rebel more generally, and repented having let
go the splendid opportunity for peace which the affair of
Pylos had offered. Lacedasmon, on the other hand,
found the event of the war falsify her notion that a few
years would suffice for the overthrow of the power of the
Athenians by the devastation of their land. She had
suffered on the island a disaster hitherto unknown at
Sparta ; she saw her country plundered from Pylos and
Cythera ; the Helots were deserting, and she was in
constant apprehension that those who remained in Peio-
ponnese would rely upon those outside and take advantage
of the situation to renew their old attempts at revolution.
Besides this, as chance would have it, her thirty years*
truce with the Argives was upon the point of expiring ;
and they refused to renew it unless Cynuria were restored
to them ; so that it seemed impossible to fight Argos and
Athens at once. She also suspected some of the cities in
Peloponnese of intending to go over to the enemy, as was
indeed the case.

These considerations made both sides disposed for an
accommodation ; the Lacedaemonians being probably the
most eager, as they ardently desired to recover the men
taken upon the island, the Spartans among whom belonged
to the first families and were accordingly related to the

15, i6] NICIAS AND PLEISTOANAX 345

governin::^ body in Lacedaemon. Negotiations had been CHAP.

begun directly after their capture, but the Athenians in '

their hour of triumph would not consent to any reasonable B.C. 4".
terms ; though after their defeat at Delium Lacedaemon, ofthe°"
knowing that they would be now more inclined to listen, leaders
at once concluded the armistice for a year, during which
they were to confer together and see if a longer period
could not be agreed upon.

Now, however, after the Athenian defeat at Amphi-
polis, and the death of Cleon and Brasidas, who had
been the two principal opponents of peace on either side
— the latter from the success and honour which war gave
him, the former because he thought that, if tranquillity
were restored, his crimes would be more open to de-
tection and his slanders less credited — the foremost
candidates for power in either city, Pleistoanax, son of
Pausanias, king of Lacedaemon, and Nicias, son of
Niceratus, the most fortunate general of his time, each
desired peace more ardently than ever. Nicias, while
still happy and honoured, wished to secure his good
fortune, to obtain a present release from trouble for
himself and his countrymen, and hand down to posterity
a name as an ever-successful statesman, and thought the
way to do this was to keep out of danger and commit
himself as little as possible to fortune, and that peace
alone made this keeping out of danger possible. Pleis-
toanax, again, was assailed by his enemies for his restora-
tion, and regularly held up by them to the prejudice ot
his countrymen, upon every reverse that befell them,
as though his unjust restoration were the cause ; the
accusation being that he and his brother Aristocles had
bribed the prophetess of Delphi to tell the Lacedaemonian
deputations which successively arrived at the temple to
bring home the seed of the demigod son of Zeus from
abroad, else they would have to plough with a silver share.
In this way, it was insisted, in time he had induced the

*M 455

346 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [17

BOOK Lacedaemonians in the nineteenth ^'^ear of his exile to

^' Lycjeum (whither he had gone when banished on

B.C. 47.3. suspicion of having been bribed to retreat from Attica,

Quests ^°^ ^^^ ^"^^^ ^^^f ^^^ house within the consecrated
to be precinct of Zeus for fear of the Lacedsemonians), to
restore him with the same dances and sacrifices with
which they had instituted their kings upon the first
settlement of Lacedasmon. The smart of this accusa-
tion, and the reflexion that in peace no disaster could
occur, and that when Lacednsmon had recovered her
men there would be nothing for his enemies to take hold
of (whereas, while war lasted the highest station must
always bear the scandal of everything that went wrong),
made him ardently desire a settlement. Accordingly
this winter was employed in conferences ; and as spring
rapidly approached, the Lacedsemonians sent round
orders to the cities to prepare for a fortified occupation
of Attica, and held this as a sword over the heads of the
Athenians to induce them to listen tQ their overtures ;
and at last, after many claims had been urged on either
side at the conferences, a peace was agreed on upon the
following basis. Each party was to restore its conquests,
but Athens was to keep Nisasa ; her demand for Pbtaea
being met by the Thebans asserting that they had acquired
the place not by force or treachery, but by the voluntary
adhesion upon agreement of its citizens ; and the same,
according to the Athenian account, being the history
of her acquisition of Nisasa. This arranged, the
Lacedaemonians summoned their allies, and all voting
for peace except the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans,
and Megarians, who did not approve of these proceedings,
they concluded the treaty and made peace, each of the
contracting parties swearing to the following articles : —

The Athenians and LacecLemonians and their allies made
a treaty, and sivore to it, city by city, as folloivs : —

I. Touching the national temples, there shall he a free

i8] PEACE OF NICIAS 347

passage hy land and by sea to all who tvtsh It, to sacrifice, CHAP.

travel, consult, and attend the oracle or games, according to ;

the customs of their countries, B.C. 4ax.

^ 2. The temple and shrine of Apollo at Delphi and the of the
Delphians shall he governed by their oivn laivs, taxed by treaty.
their own state, and judged by their own judges, the land
and the people, according to the custom of their country.

3 . The treaty shall be binding for fifty years upon the
Athenians and the allies of the Athenians, and upon the
Lacedemonians and the allies of the Lacedamonians, with'
out fraud or hurt by land or by sea.

4. // shall not be lawful to tqke up arms, with intent
to do hurt, either for the Lacedamonians and their allies
against the Athenians and their allies, or for the Athenians
and their allies against the Lacedemonians and their allies,
in any way or means tvhatsoever. But should any differ-
(nee arise between them they are to have recourse to law
and oaths, according as may he agreed betiveen the parties.

5. The Lacedamonians and their allies shall give back
Amph'tpolis to the Athenians. Nevertheless, in the case of
cities given up by the Lacedemonians to the Athenians, the
inhabitants shall be allowed to go where they please and to
take their property with them ; and the cities shall be inde-
pendent, paying only the Jribute of Aristides. And it shall
not be lawful for the Athenians or their allies to carry on
war against them after the treaty has been concluded, so
long as the tribute is paid. The cities referred to are Argi-
lus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scoius, Olyntbus, and Spartolus.
These cities shall be neutral, allies neither of the Lacede-
monians nor of the Athenians ; but if the cities consent, it
shall be lawful for the Athenians to make them their allies,
provided always that the cities wish it. The Mecyberneans ,
Saneans, and Singeans shall inhabit thetr oivn cities, as
also the Olynthians and Acanthians ; but the Lacedemo-
nians and their allies shall give back Panactum to the
Athenians.

348 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [i8

BOOK 6. The Athenians shall give lack Coryphasium^ Cythera,

^' Methana, Pteleum, and Atalanta to the Lacedamonians^ and

B.C. 4ai. also all Lacedamonians that are in the prison at Athens or

of't^e elsewhere in the Athenian dominions, and shall let go the

treaty. Peloponnesians besieged in Scione, and all others in Scione

that are allies of the Lacedamonians , and all tuhom Bra~

sidas sent in there, and any others of the allies of the

Lacedamonians that may be in the prison at Athens or

elseiuhere in the Athenian dominions.

7. The Lacedamonians and their allies shall in like
manner give bad any of the Athenians or their allies that
they may have in their hands.

8. In the case of Scione, Torone, and Sermylium, and
any other cities that the Athenians may have, the Athenians
may adopt such measures as they please.

9. The Athenians shall take an oath to the Lacedamo-
nians and their allies, city by city. Every man shall sivear
by the most binding oath of his country, seventeen from
each city. The oath shall be as follonvs : — * / luill abide
by this agreement and treaty honestly and ivithout deceit.^
In the same ivay an oath shall be taken by the Laceda-
monians and their allies to the Athenians ; and the oath
shall be reneived annually by both parties. Pillars shall be
erected at Olympia, Pythia, the Isthmus, at Athens in the
Acropolis, and at Lacedamon in the temple at Amycla.

10. If anything be forgotten, nvhatever it be, and on
ivhatever point, it shall be consistent ivith their oath for
both parties the Athenians and Lacedamonians to alter it,
according to their discretion.

The treaty begins from the Ephoralty of Pleistolas in
Lacedamon, on the 2']th day oj the month of Ariemisium,
and from the Archonship of Alcaus at Athens, en the 2^th
day of the month of ElapheboUon. Those 'who took the
oath and poured the libations for the Lacedamonians
ivere Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionisf
Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas,

19, 2o, 21] PEACE OF NICIAS 349

Zeuxldas^ Ant'ippus, Tellisy Alcinadas, Empediasy Menasy CHAP.

and JLaphilus ; for the Athenians, Lampon, IsthmlonkiUy .*

N'tc'taSy Laches^ Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, B.C. 421.

Myrt'ilusy Thrasyclesy Theagenesy Aristocratesy lolciuSy of

Timocratesy Leon, Lamachusy and Demosthenes. reckoa-

m, • 1 • I • • 1 1 r i"S tunc

i his treaty was made m the spring, just at the end or

winter, directly after the city festival of Dionysus, just

ten years, with the difference of a few days, from the

first invasion of Attica and the commencement of this

war. This must be calculated by the seasons rather than

by trusting to the enumeration of the names of the several

magistrates or offices of honour that are used to mark

past events. Accuracy is impossible where an event may

have occurred in the beginning, or middle, or at any

period in their tenure of office. But by computing by

summers and winters, the method adopted in this history,

it will be found that, each of these amounting to half a

year, there were ten summers and as many winters

contained in this first war.

Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians, to whose lot it fell to

begin the work of restitution, immediately set free all the

prisoners of war in their possession, and sent Ischagoras,

Menas, and Philocharidas as envoys to the towns in the

direction of Thrace, to order Clearidas to hand over

Amphipolis to the Athenians, and the rest of their allies

each to accept the treaty as it affected them. They,

however, did not like its terms, and refused to accept it ;

Clearidas also, willing to oblige the Chalcidians, would

not hand over the town, averring his inability to do so

against their will. Meanwhile he hastened in person

to Lacedsemon with envoys from the place, to defend his

disobedience against the possible accusations of Ischagoras

and his companions, and also to see whether it was too

late for the agreement to be altered ; and on finding the

Lacedaemonians were bound, quickly set out back again

with instructions from them to hand over the place, if

350 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [22, 23

BOOK possible, or at all events to bring out the Peioponnesians

^' that were in it.
B.C. 42X- The allies happened to be present in person at Lacedae-
to restore mon, and those who had not accepted the treaty were
Amphi- now asked by the Lacedaemonians to adopt it. This,
however, they refused to do, for the same reasons as
before, unless a fairer one than the present were agreed
upon ; and remaining firm in their determination were
dismissed by the Lacedaemonians, who now decided on
forming an alliance with the Athenians, thinking that
Argos, who had refused the application of Ampelidas
and Lichas for a renewal of the treaty, would without
Athens be no longer formidable, and that the rest of the
Peloponnese would be most likely to keep quiet, if the
coveted alliance of Athens were shut against them.
Accordingly, after conference with the Athenian ambas-
sadors, an alliance was agreed upon and oaths were
exchanged, upon the terms following : —

1. The Lacedxmoniafu shall be allies of the Athenians for
fifty years,

2. Should any enemy invade the territory af Lacedamon and
injure the Lacedamonians ^ the Athenians shall help them in
such ivay as they most effectively can, according to their power.
But if the invader be gone after plundering the country, that
city shall be the enemy of Lacedamon and Athens, and shall
he chastised by both, and one shall not make peace ivithout the
other. This to be honestly, loyally, and 'without J raud.

3. Should any enemy invade the territory oj Athens and
injure the Athenians, the Lacedemonians shall help them in
such way as they most effectively can, according to their
power. But if the invader be gone after plundering the
country, that city shall be the enemy of Lacedamon and
Athens, and shall be chastised by both, and one shall not
make peace without the other. This to be honestly y loyally,
and without fraud.

4. Should the slave population rise, the Athenians shall

24] ALLIANCE OF ATHENS AND SPARTA 351

help the JLacedamonians iviih all their might, according to CHAP.
their potuer.

5. This treaty shall be sworn to by the same persons on B.C. 4ai.
either side that sivore to the other. It shall be renewed ai^anccS
annually by the Lacedtzmonians going to Athens for the
Dionysia, and the Athenians to Lacedamon for the Hya-
cinthia, and a pillar shall be set up by either party ; at
Lacedizmon near the statue of Apollo at Amycla, and at
Athens on the Acropolis near the statue of Athens. Should
the Lacedamonians and Athenians see Jit to add to or take
anvay from the alliance in any particular, it shall be consistent
ivith their oaths for both parties to do so, according to their
discretion.

Those ivho took the oath for the Lacedamonians ivere
Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Meta-
genes. Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas^ Zeux-
idas, Antippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Mencu, and
Laphilus ; for the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches^
Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myr^
tilus, Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, lolcius, Timocrates,
Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes.

This alliance was made not long after the treaty ; and
the Athenians gave back the men from the island to the
Lacedaemonians, and the summer of the eleventh year
began. This completes the history of the first war, which
occupied the whole of the ten years previously.

352 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [25. 26

BOOK

V.

CHAPTER XVI

Feeling: against Sparta in Peloponnese— League of the
Mantineans, Eleans, Argives, and Athenians— Battle
of Mantinea and breaking up of the League

B.C. 4*1. After the treaty and the alliance between the Lacedae-
"nessTf monians and Athenians, concluded after the ten years'
the peace, ^ar, in the Ephorate of Pleistolas at Lacedaemon, and
the Archonship of Alcaeus at Athens, the states which
had accepted them were at peace ; but the Corinthians
and some of the cities in Peloponnese trying to disturb
the settlement, a fresh agitation was instantly commenced
by the allies against Lacedasmon. Further, the Lacedas-
monians, as time went on, became suspected by the
Athenians through their not performing some of the
provisions in the treaty ; and though for six years and
ten months they abstained from invasion of each other's
territory, yet abroad an unstable armistice did not prevent
either party doing the other the most effectual injury,
until they were finally obliged to break the treaty made
after the ten years' war and to have recourse to open
hostilities.

The history of this period has been also written by
the same Thucydides, an Athenian, in the chronological
order of events by summers and winters, to the time
when the Lacedasmonians and their allies put an end
to the Athenian empire, and took the Long Walls and
Piraeus. The war had then lasted for twenty-seven
years in all. Only a mistaken judgment can object to
including the interval of treaty in the war. Looked at
by the light of facts it cannot, it will be found, be
rationally considered a state of peace, where neither
party either gave or got back all that they had agreed,

27] INTRIGUES OF THE CORINTHIANS 353

apart from the violations of it which occurred on both CHAP.
sides in the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars and other ^^'
instances, and the fact that the allies in the direction of B.C. 421.
Thrace were in as open hostility as ever, while the history of
Boeotians had only a truce renewed every ten days. J^^'
So that the first ten years' war, the treacherous armistice
that followed it, and the subsequent war will, calculating
by the seasons, be found to make up the number of years
which I have mentioned, with the difference of a few
days, and to afford an instance of faith in oracles being
for once justified by the event. I certainly all along
remember from the beginning to the end of the war its
being commonly declared that it would last thrice nine
years. I lived jhrqugh the whole of it, being of an age
to comj)xeHend events, and giving my attention to them
in"order to know the exact truth about them. It was
also my fate to be an exile from my country for twenty
years^ after my'command at Amphipolis ; and being
pfesenF with both parties, and more especially with the
Peloponnesians by reason of my exile, I had leisure to
observe affairs somewhat particularly. I will accordingly
now relate the differences that arose after the ten years'
war, the breach of the treaty, and the hostilities that
followed.

After the conclusion of the fifty years' truce and of
the subsequent alliance, the embassies from Peloponnese
which had been summoned for this business returned
from Lacedaemon. The rest went straight home, but
the Corinthians first turned aside to Argos and opened
negotiations with some of the men in office there,
pointing out that Lacedaemon could have no good end
in view, but only the subjugation of Peloponnese, or she
would never have entered into treaty and alliance with
the once detested Athenians, and that the duty of con-
sulting for the safety of Peloponnese had now fallen upon
Argos, who should immediately pass a decree inviting

354 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [28, 29

BOOK any Hellenic state that chose, such state being indepen-
_Xl dent and accustomed to meet fellow-powers upon the
B.C. 4»». fair and equal ground of law and justice, to make a
^Xglve defensive alliance with the Argives ; appointing a few
confeder- individuals with plenipotentiary powers, instead of
^^^' making the people the medium of negotiation, in order
that, in the case of an applicant being rejected, the fact
of his overtures might not be made public. They said
that many would come over from hatred of the Lace-
daemonians. After this explanation of their views the
Corinthians returned home.

The persons with whom they had communicated re-
ported the proposal to their government and people, and
the Argives passed the decree and chose twelve men to
negotiate an alliance for any Hellenic state that wished
it, except Athens and Lacedaemon, neither of which
should be able to join without reference to the Argive
people. Argos came in to the plan the more readily
because she saw that war with Lacedasmon was inevitable,
the truce being on the point of expiring ; and also because
she hoped to gain the supremacy of Peloponnese. For
at this time Lacedaemon had sunk very low in public
estimation because of her disasters, while the Argives
were in a most flourishing condition, having taken no
part in the Attic war, but having on the contrary profited
largely by their neutrality. The Argives accordingly
prepared to receive into alliance any of the Hellenes that
desired it.

The Mantineans and their allies were the first to come
over through fear of the Lacedaemonians. Having taken
advantage of the war against Athens to reduce a large
part of Arcadia into subjection, they ♦bought that
Lacedaemon would not leave them undisturbed in their
conquests, now that she had leisure to interfere, and
consequently gladly turned to a powerful city like Argos,
the historical enemy of the Lacedaemonians, and a sister

30] INTRIGUES OF THE CORINTHIANS 355

democracy. Upon the defection of Mantinea the rest CHAP,
of Peloponnese at once began to agitate the propriety of ^if}'
following her example, conceiving that the Mantineans B.C. Aai.
would not have changed sides without good reason ; monfan^'
besides which they were angry with Lacedaemon among protests
other reasons for having inserted in the treaty with Corinth.
Athens that it should be consistent with their oaths for
both parties, Lacedasmonians and Athenians, to add to
or take away from it according to their discretion. It
was this clause that was the real origin of the panic in
Peloponnese, by exciting suspicions of a Lacedsemonian
and Athenian combination against their liberties : any
alteration should properly have been made conditional
upon the consent of the whole body of the allies. With
these apprehensions there was a very general desire in
each state to place itself in alliance with Argos.

In the meantime the Lacedaemonians perceiving the
agitation going on in Peloponnese, and that Corinth was
the author of it and was herself about to enter into
alliance with the Argives, sent ambassadors thither in
the hope of preventing what was in contemplation. They
accused her of having brought it all about, and told her
that she could not desert Lacedaemon and become the
ally of Argos, without adding violation of her oaths to
the crime which she had already committed in not
accepting the treaty with Athens, when it had been
expressly agreed that the decision of the majority of the
allies should be binding, unless the gods or heroes stood
in the way. Corinth in her answer, delivered before
those of her allies who had like her refused to accept
the treaty, and whom she had previously invited to
attend, refrained from openly stating the injuries she
complained of, such as the non-recovery of Sollium or
Anactorium from the Athenians, or any other point in
which she thought she had been prejudiced, but took
shelter under the pretext that she could not give up her

356 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [31

BOOK Thracian allies, to whom her separate individual security
_Xl had been given, when they first rebelled with Potidaea,

6.C._ 4^1. as well as upon subsequent occasions. She denied, there-
^^Arffos* fore, that she committed any violation of her oaths to the
allies in not entering into the treaty with Athens ; having
sworn upon the faith of the gods to her Thracian friends,
she could not honestly give them up. Besides, the ex-
pression was, ' unless the gods or heroes stand in the
way.' Now here, as it appeared to her, the gods stood
in the way. This was what she said on the subject of
her former oaths. As to the Argive alliance she would
confer with her friends, and do whatever was right. The
Lacedasmonian envoys returning home, some Argive am-
bassadors who happened to be in Corinth pressed her to
conclude the alliance without further delay, but were told
to attend at the next congress to be held at Corinth.

Immediately afterwards an Elean embassy arrived, and
first making an alliance with Corinth went on from thence
to Argos, according to their instructions, and became
allies of the Argives, their country being just then at
enmitv with Lacedaemon and Lepreum. Some time back
there had been a war between the Lepreans and some of
the Arcadians; and the Eleans being called in by the
former with the offer of half their lands, had put an end
to the war, and leaving the land in the hands of its
Leprean occupiers had imposed upon them the tribute of
a talent to the Olympian Zeus. Till the Attic war this
tribute was paid by the Lepreans, who then took the war
as an excuse for no longer doing so, and upon the Eleans
using force appealed to Lacedaemon. The case was thus
submitted to her arbitrament ; but the Eleans, suspecting
the fairness of the tribunal, renounced the reference and
laid waste the Leprean territory. The Laced jemonians
nevertheless decided that the Lepreans were independent
and the Eleans aggressors, and as the latter did not abide
by the arbitration, sent a garrison of heavy infantry into

32] NEW LEAGUE UNDER ARGOS 357

Lepreum. Upon this the Eleans, holding that Lace- CHAP.

daemon had received one of their rebel subjects, put '

forward the convention providing that each confederate B.C. 4m.
should come out of the Attic war in possession of what an active
he had when he went into it, and considering that justice "f^^e**^
had not been done them went over to the Argives, and leagrue.
now made the alliance through their ambassadors, who
had been instructed for that purpose. Immediately after
them the Corinthians and the Thracian Chalcidi.ans be-
came allies of Argos. Meanwhile the Boeotians and
Megarians, who acted together, remained quiet, being
left to do as they pleased by Lacedsemon, and thinking
that the Argive democracy would not suit so well
with their aristocratic government as the Lacedgemonian
constitution.

About the same time in this summer Athens succeeded
in reducing Scione, put the adult males to death, and
making slaves of the women and children, gave the land
for the Platceans to live in. She also brought back the
Delians to Delos, moved by her misfortunes in the field
and by the commands of the god at Delphi. Meanwhile
the Phocians and Locrians commenced hostilities. The
Corinthians and Argives being now in alliance, went to
Tegea to bring about its defection from Lacedaemon,
seeing that if so considerable a state could be persuaded
to join, all Peloponnese would be with them. But when
the Tegeans said that they would do nothing against
Lacedaemon, the hitherto zealous Corinthians relaxed
their activity, and began to fear that none of the rest
would now come over. Still they went to the Boeotians
and tried to persuade them to alliance and a common
action generally with Argos and themselves, and also
begged them to go with them to Athens and obtain for
them a ten days' truce similar to that made between the
Athenians and Boeotians not long after the fifty years'
treaty, and in the event of the Athenians refusing, to

358 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [33, 34

BOOK throw up the armistice, and not make any truce in future
^- without Corinth. These were the requests of the Corin-
B.C. 4ai. tbians. The Boeotians stopped them on the subject of
m^*SaS the Argive alUance, but went with them to Athens,
invade where however they failed to obtain the ten days' truce;
" the Athenian answer being, that the Cormthians had
truce aheady, as being allies of Lacedasmon. Never-
theless the Boeotians did not throw up their ten days'
truce, in spite of the prayers and reproaches of the
Corinthians for their breach of faith ; and these last had
to content themselves with a de facto armistice with
Athens.

The same summer the Lacedsemonians marched into
Arcadia with their whole levy under Pleistoanax, son of
Pausanias, king of Lacedsemon, against the Parrhasians,
who were subjects of Mantinea, and a faction of whom
had invited their aid. They also meant to demolish, if
possible, the fort of Cypsela which the Mantincans had
built and garrisoned in the Parrhasian territory, to annoy
the district of Sciritis in Laconia. The Lacedasmonians
accordingly laid waste the Parrhasian country, and the
Mantineans, placing their town in the hands of an Argive
garrison, addressed themselves to the defence of their
confederacy, but being unable to save Cypsela or the
Parrhasian towns went back to Mantinea. Meanwhile
the Lacedaemonians made the Parrhasians independent,
razed the fortress and returned home.

The same summer the soldiers from Thrace who had
gone out with Brasidas came back, having been brought
from thence after the treaty by Clearidas ; and the
Lacedsemonians decreed that the Helots who had fought
with Brasidas should be free and allowed to live where
they Hked, and not long afterwards settled them with
the Neodamodes at Lepreum, which is situated on the
Laconian and Elean border ; Lacedaemon being at this
time at enmity with Elis. Those however of the Spartans

35] DISTRUST OF SPARTA AT ATHENS 359

who had been taken prisoners on the island and had sur- CHAP.

rendered their arms might, it was feared, suppose that '

they were to be subjected to some degradation in conse- B.C. 4at.
quence of their misfortune, and so make some attempt at to carry
revolution, if left m possession of their franchise. These ^^^^^
were therefore at once disfranchised, although some of
them were in office at the time, and thus placed under a
disability to take office, or buy and sell anything. After
some time, however, the franchise was restored to them.

The same summer the Dians took Thyssus, a town on
Acte by Athos in alliance with Athens. During the
whole of this summer intercourse between the Athenians
and Peloponnesians continued, although each party began
to suspect the other directly after the treaty, because of
the places specified in it not being restored. Lacedasmon,
to whose lot it had fallen to begin by restoring Amphipolis
and the other towns, had not done so. She had equally
failed to get the treaty accepted by her Thracian allies, or
by the Boeotians or the Corinthians; although she was
continually promising to unite with Athens in compelling
their compliance, if it were longer refused. She also kept
fixing a time at which those who still refused to come in
were to be declared enemies to both parties, but took care
not to bind herself by any written agreement. Meanwhile
the Athenians, seeing none of these professions performed
in fact, began to suspect the honesty of her intentions, and
consequently not only refused to comply with her demands
for Pylos, but also repented having given up the prisoners
from the island, and kept tight hold of the other places,
until Lacedsemon's part of the treaty should be fulfilled.
Lacedasmon, on the other hand, said she had done what
she could, having given up the Athenian prisoners of war
in her possession, evacuated Thrace, and performed every-
thing else in her power. Amphipolis it was out of her
ability to restore ; but she would endeavour to bring the
Boeotians and Corinthians in to the treaty, to recover

36o THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [36

BOOK Panactum, and send home all the Athenian prisoners of

'_ war in Boeotia. Meanwhile she required that Pylos

B.C. 4*»- should be restored, or at all events that the Messenians
of policy and Helots should be withdrawn, as her troops had been
g ^' from Thrace, and the place garrisoned, if necessary, by
the Athenians themselves. After a number of different
conferences held during the summer she succeeded in
persuading Athens to withdraw from Pylos the Messenians
and the rest of the Helots and deserters from Laconia,
who were accordingly settled by her at Cranii in Cephal-
lenia. Thus during this summer there was peace and
intercourse between the two peoples.

Next winter, however, the Ephors under whom the
treaty had been made were no longer in office, and some
of their successors weredirectly opposed to it. Embassies
now arrived from the Lacedaemonian confederacy, and
the Athenians, Boeotians, and Corinthians also presented
themselves at Lacedaemon, and after much discussion and
no agreement between them, separated for their several
homes ; when Cleobulus and Xenares, the two Ephors
who were the most anxious to break off the treaty, took
advantage of this opportunity to communicate privately
with the Boeotians and Corinthians, and advising them to
act as much as possible together, instructed the former
first to enter into alliance with Argos, and then try and
bring themselves and the Argives into alliance with
Lacedasmon. The Boeotians would so be least likely to
be compelled to come in to the Attic treaty ; and the
Lacedaemonians wouid prefer gaining the friendship and
alliance of Argos even at the price of the hostility of
Athens and the rupture of the treaty. The Boeotians
knew that an honourable friendship with Argos had been
long the desire of Laced^mon ; for the Lacedaemonians
believed that this would considerably facilitate the conduct
of the war outside Peloponnese. Meanwhile they begged
the Boeotians to place Panactum in her hands in order

37, 3S] MANOEUVRES OF BCEOTARCHS 361

that she might, if possible, obtain Pylos in exchange for CHAP.
it, and so be more in a position to resume hostilities with '

Athens. B.C. 4»«.

After receiving these instructions for their governments anf °^
from Xenares and Cleobulus and their other friends at BcBotia.
Lacedasmon, the Boeotians and Corinthians departed. On
their way home they were joined by two persons high in
office at Argos who had waited for them on the road,
and who now sounded them upon the possibility of the
Boeotians joining the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans
In becoming the allies of Argos, in the idea that if this
could be effected they would be able, thus united, to make
peace or war as they pleased either against Lacedaemon or
any other power. The Boeotian envoys were pleased at
fclius hearing themselves accidentally asked to do what
their friends at Lacedasmon had told them ; and the two
Arglves perceiving that their proposal was agreeable,
departed with a promise to send ambassadors to the
Boeotians. On their arrival the Boeotians reported to
the Boeotarchs what had been said to them at Lacedasmon
and also by the Arglves who had met them, and the
Boeotarchs, pleased with the idea, embraced it with the
more eagerness from the lucky coincidence of Argos
soliciting the very thing wanted by their friends at Lace-
dasmon. Shortly afterwards ambassadors appeared from
Argos with the proposals Indicated ; and the Boeotarchs
approved of the terms and dismissed the ambassadors
with a promise to send envoys to Argos to negotiate the
alllnnce.

In the meantime it was decided by the Boeotarchs, the
Corinthians, the Megarlans, and the envoys from Thrace
first to Interchange oaths together to give help to each
other whenever it was required and not to make war or
peace except in common ; after which the Boeotians and
Megarlans, who acted together, should make the alliance
with Argos. But before the oaths were taken the

362 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [39

BOOK Boeotaichs communicated these proposals to the four
^- councils of the Bceotians, in whom the supreme power

B.cTiai. resides, and advised them to interchange oaths with all

^SuncUs such cities as should be willing to enter into a defensive
.of league with the Boeotians. But the members of the

Bceotia. -q^^^^^^ councils refused their assent to the proposal,
being afraid of offending Lacedaemon by entering into a
league with the deserter Corinth ; the Bceotarchs not
having acquainted them with what had passed at Lace-
daemon and with the advice given by Cleobulus and Xenares
and the Boeotian partisans there, namely, that they should
become allies of Corinth and Argos as a preliminary to a
junction with Lacedaemon ; fancying that, even if they
should say nothing about this, the councils would not
vote against what had been decided and advised by the
Bceotarchs. This difficulty arising, the Corinihians and
the envoys from Thrace departed without anything having
been concluded ; and the Bceotarchs, who had previously
intended after carrying this to try and effect the alliance
with Argos, now omitted to bring the Argive question
before the councils, or to send to Argos the envoys whom
they had promised ; and a general coldness and delay
ensued in the matter.

In this same winter Mecyberna was assaulted and
taken by the Olynthians, having an Athenian garrison
inside it.

All this while negotiations had been going on between
the Athenians and Lacedaemonians about the conquests
still retained by each, and Lacedaemon, hoping that if
Athens were to get back Panactum from the Boeotians
she might herself recover Pylos, now sent an embassy to
the Boeotians, and begged them to place P?nactum and
their Athenian prisoners in her hands, in order that she
might exchange them for Pylos. This the Boeotians
refused to do, unless Lacedaemon made a separate alliance
with them as she had done with Athens. Lacedaemon

40. 41] CHANGE OF POLICY AT ARGOS 363

knew that this would be a breach of faith to Athens, as CHAP.

it had been agreed that neither of them should make peace "

or war without the other ; yet wishing to obtain Panactum B.C. 4«>
which she hoped to exchange for Pylos, and the party seeks
who pressed for the dissolution of the treaty strongly ^[^^^
affecting the Boeotian connexion, she at length concluded Sparta,
the alliance just as winter gave way to spring ; and
Panactum was instantly razed. And so the eleventh
year of the war ended.

In the first days of the summer following, the Argives,
seeing that the promised ambassadors from Boeotia did
not arrive, and that Panactum was being demolished, and
that a separate alliance had been concluded between the
Boeotians and Lacedaemonians, began to be afraid that
Argos might be left alone, and all the confederacy go over
to Lacedasmon. They fancied that the Boeotians had
been persuaded by the Lacedaemonians to raze Panactum
and to enter into the treaty with the Athenians, and that
Athens was privy to this arrangement, and even her
alliance, therefore, no longer open to them — a resource
which they had always counted upon, by reason of the
dissensions existing, in the event of the non-continuance
of their treaty with Lacedasmon. In this strait the
Argives, afraid that, as the result of refusing to renew the
treaty with Lacedasmon and of aspiring to the supremacy
in Peloponnese, they would have the Lacedaemonians,
Tegeans, Boeotians, and Athenians on their hands all at
once, now hastily sent off Eustrophus and ^son, who
seemed the persons most likely to be acceptable, as envoys
to Lacedacmon, with the view of making as good a treaty
as they could with the Lacedaemonians, upon such terms
as could be got, and being left in peace.

Having reached Lacedaemon, their ambassadors pro-
ceeded to negotiate the terms of the proposed treaty.
What the Argives first demanded was that they might
be allowed to refer to the arbitration of some state or

364 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [42

BOOK private person the question of the Cynurian land, a piece
V- of frontier-territory about which they have always been
B.C. 420. disputing, and which contains the towns of Thyrea and
tfdtSrml Anthene, and is occupied by the Lacedaemonians. The
of treaty. Lacedaemonians at first said that they could not allow
this point to be discussed, but were ready to conclude
upon the old terms. Eventually, however, the Argive
ambassadors succeeded in obtaining from them this con-
cession: — For the present there was to be a trace for
fifty years, but it should be competent for either party,
there being neither plague nor war in Lacedasmon or
Argos, to give a formal challenge and decide the question
of this territory by battle, as on a former occasion, when
both sides claimed the victory ; pursuit not being allowed
beyond the frontier of Argos or Laced remon. The
Lacedaemonians at first thought this mere folly; but at
last, anxious at any cost to have the friendship of Argos,
they agreed to the terms demanded, and reduced them to
writing. However, before any of this should become
binding, the ambassadors were to return to Argos and
communicate with their people, and in the event of their
approval, to come at the Feast of the Hyacinthia and
take the oaths.

The envoys returned accordingly. In the meantime,
while the Argives were engaged in these negotiations,
the Lacedaemonian ambassadors, Andromedes, Phasdimus,
and Antimenidas, who were to receive the prisoners from
the Boeotians and restore them and Panactum to the
Athenians, found that the Boeotians had themselves
razed Panactum, upon the plea that oaths had been
anciently exchanged between their people and the Athe-
nians, after a dispute on the subject, to the effect that
neither should inhabit the place, but that they should
graze it in common. As for the Athenian prisoners of
war in the hands of the Boeotians, these were delivered
over to Andromedes and his colleagues, and by them

43] FIRST MENTION OF ALCIBIADES 365

conveyed to Athens and given back. The envoys at CHAP.

the same time announced the razing of Panactum, which '

to them seemed as good as its restitution, as it would no f -P- ^ao-

r A 1 »T«i • Alcibiades

longer lodge an enemy of Athens. 1 his announcement leads the

was received with great indignation by the Athenians, Ip'^^^j.^^
who thought that the Lacedaemonians had played them party,
false, both in the matter of the demolition of Panactum,
which ought to have been restored to them standing, and
in having, as they now heard, made a separate alliance
with the Bceotians, in spite of their previous promise to
join Athens in compelling the adhesion of those who
refused to accede to the treaty. The Athenians also
considered the other points in which Lacedaemon had
failed in her compact, and thinking that they had been
overreached, gave an angry answer to the ambassadors
and sent them away.

The breach between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians
having gone thus far, the party at Athens, also, who
wished to cancel the treaty, immediately put themselves
in motion. Foremost amongst these was Alcibiades, son
of Clinias, a man yet young in yearf for any other H*ellenic
city, but distinguished by the splendour of his ancestry.
Alcibiades thought the Argive alliance really preferable,
not that personal pique had not also a great deal to do
with his opposition ; he being offended with the Lacedae-
monians for having negotiated the treaty through Nicias
and Laches, and having overlooked him on account of
his youth, and also for not having shown him the respect
due to the ancient connexion of his family with them as
their Proxeni^ which, renounced by his grandfather, he
had lately himself thought to renew by his attentions to
their prisoners taken in the island. Being thus, as he
thought, slighted on all hands, he had in the first instance
spoken against the treaty, saying that the Lacedaemonians
were not to be trusted, but that they only treated, in
order to be enabled by this means to crush Argos, and

366 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [44. 45

BOOK afterwards to attack. Athens alone ; and now, immediately

1 upon the above breach occurring, he sent privately to the

B.C. 4ao. Argives, telling them to come as quickly as possible to
envoys Athens, accompanied by the Mantineans and Eleans,
duped. yf^'iiYi proposals of alliance ; as the moment was propitious
and he himself would do all he could to help them.

Upon receiving this message and discovering that the
Athenians, far from being privy to the Bceotian alliance,
were involved in a serious quarrel with the Lacedae-
monians, the Argives paid no further attention to the
embassy which they had just sent to Lacedsemon on the
subject of the treaty, and began to incline rather towards
the Athenians, reflecting that, in the event of war, they
would thus have on their side a city that was not only an
ancient ally of Argos, but a sister democracy and very
powerful at sea. They accordingly at once sent ambas-
sadors to Athens to treat for an alliance, accompanied by
others from Elis and Mantinea.

At the same time arrived in haste from Lacedasmon
an embassy consisting of persons reputed well disposed
towards the Athenians — Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius,
for fear that the Athenians in their irritation might con-
clude alliance with the Argives, and also to ask back
Pylos in exchange for Panactum, and in defence of the
alliance with the Boeotians to plead that it had not been
made to hurt the Athenians. Upon the envoys speaking
in the senate upon these points, and stating that they had
come with full powers to settle all others at issue between
them, Alcibiades became afraid that if they were to repeat
these statements to the popular assembly, they might gain
the multitude, and the Argive alliance might be rejected,
and accordingly had recourse to the following stratagem.
He persuaded the Lacedemonians by a solemn assurance
that if they would say nothing of their full powers in the
assembly, he would give back Pylos to them (himself,
the present opponent of its restitution, engaging to obtain

46] ATHENS AND SPARTA 367

this from the Athenians), and would settle the other CHAP.
points at issue. His plan was to detach them from ^^^'
Nicias and to disgrace them before the people, as being B.C. 420.
without sincerity in their intentions, or even common strives to
consistency in their language, and so to get the Ar- ^^^^^^°
gives, Eleans, and Mantineans taken into alliance. This ance.
plan proved successful. When the envoys appeared
before the people, and upon the question being put to
them, did not say as they had said in the senate, that
they had come with full powers, the Athenians lost all
patience, and carried away by Alcibiades, who thundered
more loudly than ever against the Lacedsemonians, were
ready instantly to introduce the Argives and their com-
panions and to take them into alliance. An earthquake,
however, occurring, before anything definite had been
done, this aiisembiy was adjourned.

In the assembly held the next day, Nicias, in spite of
the Lacedsemonians having been deceived themselves,
and having allowed him to be deceived also in not
admitting that they had come with full powers, still
maintained that it was best to be friends with the Lace-
dsemonians, and, letting the Argive proposals stand over,
to send once more to Lacedsemon and learn her intentions.
The adjournment of the war could only increase their own
prestige and injure that of their rivals ; the excellent state
of their affairs making it their interest to preserve this
prosperity as long as possible, while those of Lacedaemon
were so desperate that the sooner she could try her
fortune again the better. He succeeded accordingly in
persuading them to send ambassadors, himself being
among the number, to invite the Lacedaemonians, if
they were really sincere, to restore Panactum intact with
Amphipolis, and to abandon their alliance with the
Bcsotians (unless they consented to accede to the treaty),
agreeably to the stipulation which forbade either party to
treat without the other. The ambassadors were also

368 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [47

BOOK directed to say that the Athenians, had they wished to
^' play false, might already have made alliance with the
B.C. 420. Argives, who were indeed come to Athens for that
alliance very purpose, and went off furnished with instructions as
with tQ any other complaints that the Athenians had to make.
" Having reached Lacedasmon they communicated their
instructions, and concluded by telling the Lacedemonians
that unless they gave up their alliance with the Boeotians,
in the event of their not acceding to the treaty, the
Athenians for their part would ally themselves with the
Aj-gives and their friends. The Lacedaemonians, how-
ever, refused to give up the Boeotian alliance — the party
of Xenares the Ephor, and such as shared their view,
carrying the day upon this point — but renewed the oaths
at the request of Nicias, who feared to return without
having accomplished anything and to be disgraced ; as
was indeed his fate, he being held the author of the treaty
with Lacedaemon. When he returned, and the Athenians
heard that nothing had been done at Lacedaemon, they
flew into a passion, and deciding that faith had not been
kept with them, took advantage of the presence of the
Argives and their allies, who had been introduced by
Alcibiades, and made a treaty and alliance with them
upon the terms following : —

The j^tJjenians, Argives ^ Mant means , and Eleatis^ acting
for themselves and the allies in their respective empires, made
a treaty for a hundred years ^ to he nvithout fraud or hurt by
land and by sea.

I . It shall not be lawjul to carry on ivar, either for the
Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies, against the
Athenians, or the allies in the Athenian empire ; or for the
Athenians and their allies against the Argives, E leans,
Mantineans, or their allies, in any ivay or means 'what-
soever.

The Athenians, Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall be
allies for a hundred years upon the terms following : —

47] ATHENS AND ARGOS 369

2. If an enemy invade the country of the Athenians, the CHAP.
Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to the relief of ^^^'
Athens, according as the Athenians may require by message, B.C. 4*x
in such way as they most effectually can, to the best of their auu^o!*
power. But if the invader be gone after plundering the ter-
ritory, the offending state shall be the enemy of the Argives,
Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, and war shall be made
against it by all these cities ; and no one of the cities shall be

able to make peace with that state, except all the above cities
agree to do so.

3. Likewise the Athenians shall go to the relief of Argot,
Mantinea, and Elis, if an enemy invade the country of
Elis, Mantinea, or Argos, according as the above cities may
require by message, in such ivay as they most eff^ectually can,
to the best of their poiver. But if the invader be gone after
plundering the territory, the state offending shall be the
enemy of the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans,
and war shall be made against it by all these cities, and peace
may not be made with that state except all the above cities
agree to it.

4. No armed force shall be allowed to pass for hostile
purposes through the country of the powers contracting, or of
the allies in their respective empires, or to go by sea, except all
the cities — that is to say, Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and
Elis — vote for such passage.

5. The relieving troops shall be maintained by the city
sending them for thirty days from their arrival in the city
that has required them, and upon their return in the same
way ; if their services be desired for a longer period the city
that sent for them shall maintain them, at the rate of three
jEginetan obols per day for a heavy-armed soldier, archer, or
light soldier, and an jEginetan drachma for a trooper.

6. The city sending for the troops shall have the command
when the war is in its own country ; but in case oj the cities
resolving upon a joint expedition the command shall be equally
divided among all the cities.

N 455

370 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR L48

BOOK 7. The treaty shall he savorn to by the Athenians for

^- themselves and their allies^ by the Argtves, Mantineans,

B.C. 420. Eleansy and their allies, by each state Individually. Each

*iuLnce. J'^'^// sivear the oath most binding In his country over full-

gronvn victims ; the oath being cu follonus :

* I WILL STAND BY THE ALLIANCE AND ITS ARTICLES,
JUSTLY, INNOCENTLY, AND SINCERELY, AND I WILL NOT
TRANSGRESS THE SAME IN ANY WAY OR MEANS WHATSO-
EVER.*

The oath shall be taken at Athens by the Senate and the
magistrates^ the Prytanes administering It ; at Argos by the
Senate, the Eighty, and the Artyna, the Eighty administering
It ; at Mantlnea by the Demlurgl, the Senate, and the other
magistrates, the Theorl and Polemarchs administering It ;
at Ells by the Demlurgl, the magistrates, and the Six Hun-
dred, the Demlurgl and the Thesmophylaces administering It,
The oaths shall be renenved by the Athenians going to Ells,
Mantlnea, and Argos thirty days before the Olympic games ;
by the Arglves, Mantlneans, and Eleans going to Athens ten
days before the great feast of the Panathenaa. The articles
of the treaty, the oaths^ and the alliance shall be Inscribed on
a stone pillar by the Athenians In the citadel, by the Arglves
In the market-place. In the temple of Apollo ; by the Afan-
tlneans In the temple of Zeus, In the market-place ; and a
brazen pillar shall be erected jointly by them at the Olympic
games noiv at hand. Should the above cities see good to
make any addition to these articles, tuhatever all the above
cities shall agree upon, after consulting together, shall be
binding.

Although the treaty and alliances were thus concluded,
still the treaty between the Lacedjemonians and Athenians
was not renounced by either party. Meanwhile Corinth,
although the ally of the Argives, did not accede to the
new treaty, any more than she had done to the alliance,
defensive and offensive, formed before this between the
Eleans, Argives, and Mantineans, when she declared

49] ELIS AND SPARTA 371

herself content with the first alliance, which was defensive CHAP.
only, and which bound them to help each other, but not ^^^-
to join in attacking any. The Corinthians thus stood B.C. 430.
aloof from their allies, and again turned their thoughts ^f fje
towards Lacedasmon. * Olympic

At the Olympic games which were held this summer,
and in which the Arcadian Androsthenes was victor the
first time in the wrestling and boxing, the Lacedaemonians
were excluded from the temple by the Eleans, and thus
prevented from sacrificing or contending, for having re-
fused to pay the fine specified in the Olympic law
imposed upon them by the Eleans, who alleged that they
had attacked Fort Phyrcus, and sent heavy infantry of
theirs into Lepreum during the Olympic truce. The
amount of the fine was two thousand minae, two for each
heavy-armed soldier, as the law prescribes. The Lace-
dtemonians sent envoys, and pleaded that the imposition
was unjust ; saying that the truce had not yet been pro-
claimed at Lacedsemon when the heavy infantry were
sent off. But the Eleans affirmed that the armistice with
them had already begun (they proclaim it first among
themselves), and that the aggression of the Lacedaemonians
had taken them by surprise while they were living quietly
as in time of peace, and not expecting anything. UpoB
this the Lacedaemonians submitted, that if the Eleans
really believed that they had committed an aggression, it
was useless after that to proclaim the truce at Lacedasmon;
but they had proclaimed it notwithstanding, as believing
nothing of the kind, and from that moment the Lace-
daemonians had made no attack upon their country.
Nevertheless the Eleans adhered to what they had said,
that nothing would persuade them that an aggression had
not been committed ; if, however, the Lacedaemonians
would restore Lepreum, they would give up their own
share of the money and pay that of the god for them.

As this proposal was not accepted, the Eleans tried a

37a THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [50, 51

BOOK second. Instead of restoring Lepreum, if this was ob-
_Xl jected to, the Lacedaemonians should ascend the altar
B.C 4«>. of the Olympian Zeus, as they were so anxious to have
monia^ access to the temple, and swear before the Hellenes that
excluded tj^gy would surely pay the fine at a later day. This being
games, also refused, the Lacedasmonians were excluded from
the temple, the sacrifice, and the games, and sacrificed
at home ; the Lepreans being the only other Hellenes
who did not attend. Still the Eleans were afraid of the
Lacedasmonians sacrificing by force, and kept guard with
a heavy-armed company of their young men ; being also
joined by a thousand Argives, the same number of Man-
tineans, and by some Athenian cavalry who stayed at
Harpina during the feast. Great fears were felt in the
assembly of the Lacedaemonians coming in arms, especially
after Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, a Lacedaemonian, had
been scourged on the course by the umpires ; because,
upon his horses being the winners, and the Boeotian
people being proclaimed the victor on account of his
having no right to enter, he came forward on the course
and crowned the charioteer, in order to show that the
chariot was his. After this incident all were more afraid
than ever, and firmly looked for a disturbance : the Lacedas-
monians, however, kept quiet, and let the feast pass by,
as we have seen. After the Olympic games, the Argives
and the allies repaired to Corinth to invite her to come
over to them. There they found some Lacedaemonian
envoys ; and a long discussion ensued, which aiter all
ended in nothing, as an earthquake occurred, and they
dispersed to their different homes.

Summer was now over. The winter following a battle
took place between the Heracleots in Trachinia and the
^nianians, Dolopians, Malians, and certain of the Thes-
salians, all tribes bordering on and hostile to the town,
which directly menaced their country. Accordingly,
after having opposed and harassed it from its very founda-

52, S3] MOVEMENTS IN PELOPONNESE 373

tion by every means in their power, they now in this CHAP.
battle defeated the Heracleots, Xenares, son of Cnidis, ^Xh
their Lacedsemonian commander, being among the slain. B.C. 4»9-
Thus the winter ended and the twelfth year of this war ^^Peijf^'
ended also. After the battle Heraclea was so terribly ponnese
reduced that in the first days of the summer following the
Boeotians occupied the place and sent away the Lacedae-
monian Agesippidas for misgoveroment, fearing that the
town might be taken by the Athenians while the Lacedse-
monians were distracted with the affairs of Peloponnese.
The Lacedasmonians, nevertheless, were offended with
them for what they had done.

The same summer Alcibiades, son of Clinias, now one
of the generals at Athens, in concert with the Argives
and the allies, went into Peloponnese with a few Athe-
nian heavy infantry and archers, and some of the allies
in those parts whom he took up as he passed, and with
this army marched here and there through Peloponnese,
and settled various matters connected with the alliance,
and among other things induced the Patrians to carry
their walls down to the sea, intending himself also to build
s fort near the Achasan Rhium. However, the Corin-
thians and Sicyonians, and all others who would have
suffered by its being built, came up and hindered him.

The same summer war broke out between the Epi-
daurians and Argives. The pretext was that the Epi-
daurians did not send an offering for their pasture-land
to Apollo Pythasus, as they were bound to do, the Argives
having the chief management of the temple ; but, apart
from this pretext, Alcibiades and the Argives were de-.
termined, if possible, to gain possession of Epidaurus, and
thus to insure the neutrality of Corinth and give the Athe-
nians a shorter passage for their reinforcements from ^gina
than if they had to sail round Scyliaeum. The Argives
accordingly prepared to invade Epidaurus by themselves,
to exact the offering.

374 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [54, 55

BOOK About the same time the Lacedosmonians marched out
^- with all their people to Leuctra upon their frontier, opposite
B.C. 419. to Mount LycsEum, under the command of Agis, son of
^n^Epi- Archidamus, without any one knowing their destination,
daurus. QQt even the cities that sent the contingents. The sacri-
fices, however, for crossing the frontier not proving pro-
pitious, the Lacedasmonians returned home themselves,
and sent word to the allies to be ready to march after the
month ensuing, which happened to be the month of Car-
. neus, a holy time for the Dorians. Upon the retreat of
the Lacedaemonians the Argives marched out on the last
day but three of the month before Carneus, and keeping
this as the day during the whole time that they were out,
invaded and plundered Epidaurus. The Epidaurians
summoned their allies to their aid, some of whom pleaded
the month as an excuse; others came as far as the frontier
of Epidaurus and there remained inactive.

While the Argives were in Epidaurus embassies from
the cities assembled at Mantinea, upon the invitation of
the Athenians. The conference having begun, the Corin-
thian Euphamidas said that their actions did not agree
^v^th their words ; while they were sitting deliberating
about peace, the Epidaurians and their allies and the
Argives were arrayed against each other in arms ; deputies
from each party should first go and separate the armies,
and then the talk about peace might be resumed. In
compliance with this suggestion they went and brought
back the Argives from Epidaurus, c^nd afterwards re-
assembled, but without succeeding any better in coming
to a conclusion ; and the Argives a second time invaded
Epidaurus and plundered the country. The Lacedae-
monians also marched out to Caryae ; but ♦he frontier
sacrifices again proving unfavourable, they went back
again, and the Argives, after ravaging about a third of the
Epidaurian territory, returned home. Meanwhile a thou-
sand Athenian heavy infantry had come to their aid under

56, 57] ARGJVES AND ATHENIANS 375

the command of Alcibiades, but finding that the Lacedae- CHAP,
monian expedition was at an end, and that they were no
longer wanted, went back again. B.C. 419.

So passed the summer. The next winter ihc Lacedae- sea"d°**"'
monians managed to elude the vigilance of the Athenians, Helots to
and sent in a garrison of three hundred men to Epidaurus,
under the command of Agesippidas. Upon this the
Argives went to the Athenians and complained of their
having allowed an enemy to pass by sea, in spite of the
clause in the treaty by which the allies were not to allow
an enemy to pass through their country. Unless, there-
fore, they now put the Messenians and Helots in Pylos
to annoy the Lacedsemonians, they, the Argives, should
consider that faith had not been kept with them. The
Athenians were persuaded by Alcibiades to inscribe at
the bottom of the Laconian pillar that the Lacedaemonians
had not kept their oaths, and to convey the Helots at
Cranii to Pylos to plunder the country ; but for the rest
they remained quiet as before. During this winter hos-
tilities went on between the Argives and Epidaurians,
without any pitched battle taking place, but only forays
and ambuscades, in which the losses were small and fell
now on one side and now on the other. At the close of
the winter, towards the beginning of spring, the Argives
went with scaling-ladders to Epidaurus, expecting to find
it left unguarded on account of the war and to be able to
take it by assault, but returned unsuccessful. And the
winter ended, and with it the thirteenth year of the war
ended also.

In the middle of the next summer the Lacedaemonians,
seeing the Epidaurians, their allies, in distress, and the
rest of Peloponnese either in revolt or disaffected, con-
cluded that it was high time for them to interfere if they
wished to stop the progress of the evil, and accordingly
with their full force, the Helots included, took the field
against Argos, under the command of Agis, son of

376 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [58

BOOK Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. The Tegeang

and the other Arcadian allies of Lacedsemon joined in

B.C. 418- the expedition. The allies from the rest of Peloponnese

invacSs ^°^ ^^^^ outside mustered at Phlius ; the Boeotians with

ArgolU. five thousand heavy infantry and as many light troops, and

five hundred horse and the same number of dismounted

troopers; the Corinthians with two thousand heavy infantry ;

the rest more or less as might happen ; and the Phliasians

with all their forces, the army being in their country.

The preparations of the Lacedaemonians from the first
had been known to the Argives, who did not, however,
take the field until the enemy was on his road to join
the rest at Phlius. Reinforced by the Mantineans with
their allies, and by three thousand Elean heavy infantry,
they advanced and fell in with the Lacedaemonians at
Methydrium in Arcadia. Each party took up its position
upon a hill, and the Argives prepared to engage the
Lacedaemonians while they were alone ; but Agis eluded
them by breaking up his camp in the night, and pro-
ceeded to join the t ist of the allies at Phlius. The
Argives discovering this at daybreak, marched first to
Argos and then to the Nemean road, by which they
expected the Lacedaemonians and their allies would
come down. However, Agis, instead of taking this
road as they expected, gave the Lacedaemonians,
Arcadians, and Epidaurians their orders, and went
along another difficult road, and descended into the
plain of Argos. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and
Phliasians marched by another steep road; while the
Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians had instructions to
come down by the Nemean road where the Argives
were posted, m order that if the enemy advanced into
the plain against the troops of Agis, they might fall
upon his rear with their cavalry. These dispositions
concluded, Agis invaded the plain and began to ravage
Saminthus and other places.

59, 6o] DANGER OF ARGOS 377

Discovering this, the Argives came up from Nemea, CHAP.

day having now dawned. On their way they fell in '

with the troops of the Phliasians and Corinthians, and ^p:*^^-
killed a few of the Phliasians, and had perhaps a few iead*Jrs
more of their own men killed by the Corinthians. ^.J^^r
Meanwhile the Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians, Agis.
advancing upon Nemea according to their instructions,
found the Argives no longer there, as they had gone
down on seeing their property ravaged, and were now
forming for battle, the Lacedaemonians imitating their
example. The Argives were now completely sur-
rounded ; from the plain the Lacedaemonians and their
allies shut them off from their city ; above them were
the Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pellenians ; and on the
side of Nemea the Boeotians, Sicyonians, and Megarians.
Meanwhile their army was without cavalry, the Athenians
alone among the allies not having yet arrived. Now the
bulk of the Argives and their allies did not see the
danger of their position, but thought that they could not
have a fairer field, having intercepted the Lacedaemonians
in their own country and close to the city. Two men,
however, in the Argive army, Thrasylus, one of the five
generals, and AJciphron, the Lacedaemonian Proxenus,
just as the armies were upon the point of engaging, went
and held a parley with Agis and urged him not to bring
on a battle, as the Argives were ready to refer to fair
and equal arbitration whatever complaints the Lacedae-
monians might have against them, and to make a treaty
and live in peace in future.

The Argives who made these statements did so upon
their own authority, not by order of the people, and Agis
on his accepted their proposals, and without himself
either consulting the majority, simply communicated the
matter to a single individual, one of the high officers
accompanying the expedition, and granted the Argives
a truce for four months, in which to fulfil their promises ;

*N 455

378 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [6i

BOOK after which he immediately led off the army without
giving any explanation to any of the other allies. The

B.C. 418. Lacedaemonians and allies followed their general out of
drawaJ respect for the law, but amongst themselves loudly blamed
°^^&!^Agi8 for going away from so fair a field (the enemy
army, being hemmed in on every side by infantry and cavalry)
without having done anything worthy of their strength.
Indeed this was by far the finest Hellenic army ever
yet brought together ; and it should have been seen
while it was still united at Nemea, with the Lacedaemo-
nians in full force, the Arcadians, Bceotians, Corinthians,
Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians and Megarians, and all
these the flower of their respective populations, thinking
themselves a match not merely for the Argive con-
federacy, but for another such added to it. The army
thus retired blaming Agis, and returned every man to
his home. The Argives however blamed still more
loudly the persons who had concluded the truce without
consulting the people, themselves thinking that they had
let escape with the Lacedaemonians an opportunity such
as they should never see again ; as the struggle would
have been under the walls of their city, and by the side of
many and brave allies. On their return accordingly they
began to stone Thrasylus in the bed of the Charadrus,
where they try all military causes before entering the
city. Thrasylus fled to the altar, and so saved hjs life ;
his property however they confiscated.

After this arrived a thousand Athenian heavy infantry
and three hundred horse, under the command of Laches
• and Nicostratus ; whom the Argives, being nevertheless
loth to break the truce with the Lacedaemonians, begged
to depart, and refused to bring before the people, to
whom they had a communication to make, until com-
pelled to do so by the entreaties of the Mantineans and
Eleans, who were still at Argos. The Athenians, by the
mouth of Alcibiades their ambassador there present, told

62,633 FALL OF ORCHOMENOS 379

the Argives and the allies that they had no right to CHAP.
make a truce at all without the consent of their fellow- ^^•
confederates, and now that the Athenians had arrived so B.C. 4«*.
opportunely the war ought to be resumed. These & allies
arguments proving successful with the allies, they im- q^^^
mediately marched upon Orchomenos, all except the menos,
Argives, who, although they had consented like the rest,
stayed behind at first, but eventually joined the others-
They now all sate down and besieged Orchomenos,
and made assaults upon it ; one of their reasons for
desiring to gain this place being that hostages from
Arcadia had been lodged there by the Lacedaemonians.
The Orchomenians, alarmed at the weakness of their
wall and the numbers of the enemy, and at the risk
they ran of perishing before relief arrived, capitulated
upon condition of joining the league, of giving hostages
of their own to the Mantineans, and giving up those
lodged with them by the Lacedaemonians. Orchomenos
thus secured, the allies now consulted as to which of the
remaining places they should attack next. The Eleans
were urgent for Lepreum ; the Mantineans for Tegea ;
and the Argives and Athenians giving their support to
the Mantineans, the Eleans went home in a rage at
their not having voted for Lepreum ; while the rest
of the allies made ready at Mantinea for going against
Tegea, which a party inside had arranged to put into
their hands.

Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians, upon their return
from Argos after concluding the four months' truce,
vehemently blamed Agis for not having subdued Argos,
after an opportunity such as they thought they had never
had before ; for it was no easy matter to bring so many
and so good allies together. But when the news
arrived of the capture of Orchomenos, they became more
angry than ever, and, departing from all precedent, in the
heat of the moment had almost decided to raze his house.

38o THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [64

BOOK and to fine him ten thousand drachmae. Agis however

1 entreated them to do none of these things, promising to

B.C. 418. atone for his fault by good service in the field, failing
march out which they might then do to him whatever they pleased ;
T *^^ ^^^ ^^^y accordingly abstained from razing his house or
fining him as they had threatened to do, and now made
a law, hitherto unknown at Lacedasmon, attaching to
him ten Spartans as counsellors, without whose consent
he should have no power to lead an army out of the
city.

At this juncture arrived v/ord from their friends in
Tegea that unless they speedily appeared, Tegea would
go over from them to the Argives and their allies, ii
it had not gone over already. Upon this news a force
marched out from Lacedsemon, of the Spartans and
Helots and all their people, and that instantly and upon
a scale never before witnessed. Advancing to Orestheum
in Msenalia, they directed the Arcadians in their league
to follow close after them to Tegea, and going on them-
selves as far as Orestheum, from thence sent back the
sixth part of the Spartans, consisting of the oldest and
youngest men, to guard their homes, and with the rest
of their army arrived at Tegea ; where their Arcadian
allies soon after joined them. Meanwhile they sent to
Corinth, to the Boeotians, the Phocians, and Locrians,
with orders to come up as quickly as possible to Mantinea.
These had but short notice ; and it was not easy except
all together, and after waiting for each other, to pas?
through the enemv's country, which lay right across
and blocked up the line of communication. Never-
theless they made what haste they could. Meanwhile
the Lacedcsmonians with the Arcadian all'es that had
joined them, entered the territory of Mantinea, and en-
camping near the temple of Heracles began to plunder the
country.

Here they were seen by the Argives and their allies

6s] BATTLE OF MANTINEA 381

who immediately took up a strong and difficult position, CHAP,
and formed in order of battle. The Lacedaemonians at ^^'
once advanced against them, and came on within a stone's B.C. 41a
throw or javelin's cast,^when one of the older men, seeing a^Lace
the enemy's position to be a strong one, hallooed to Agis a"<^
that he was minded to cure one evil with another ; mean-
ing that he wished to make amends for his retreat, which
had been so much blamed, from Argos, by his present
untimely precipitation. Meanwhile Agis, whether in
consequence of this halloo or of some sudden new idea
of his own, quickly led back his army without engaging,
and entering the Tegean territory, began to turn off into
that of Mantinea the water about which the Mantineans
and Tegeans are always fighting, on account of the ex-
tensive damage it does to whichever of the two countries
it falls into. His object in this was to make the Argives
and their allies come down from the hill, to resist the
diversion of the water, as they would be sure to do when
they knew of it, and thus to fight the battle in the plain.
He accordingly stayed that day where he was, engaged
in turning off the water. The Argives and their allies
were at first amazed at the sudden retreat of the enemy
after advancing so near, and did not know what to make
of it ; but when he had gone away and disappeared,
without their having stirred to pursue him, they began
anew to find fault with their generals, who had not only
let the Lacedaemonians get off before, when they were
so happily intercepted before Argos, but who now again
allowed them to run away, without any one pursuing them,
and to escape at their leisure while the Argive army was
leisurely betrayed. The generals, half-stunned for the
moment, afterwards led them down from the hill, and
went forward and encamped in the plain, with the inten-
tion of attacking the enemy.

The next day the Argives and their allies formed in
the order in which they meant to fight, if they chanced

382 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [66,67

BOOK to encounter the enemy ; and the Lacedaemonians return-
Xl iiig from the water to their old encampment by the temple

B.C. 418. of Heracles, suddenly saw their adversaries close in front
battle, of them, all in complete order, and advanced from the
hill. A shock like that of the present moment the Lace-
daemonians do not ever remember to have experienced :
there was scant time for preparation, as they instantly and
hastily fell into their ranks, Agis, their king, directing
everything, agreeably to the law. For when a king is in
the field all commands proceed from him : he gives the
word to the Polemarchs ; they to the Lochages ; these
to the Pentecostyes ; these again to the Enomotarchs,
and these last to the Enomoties. In short all orders
required pass in the same way and quickly reach the
troops; as almost the whole Lacedaemonian army, save
for a small part, consists of officers under officers, and the
care of what is to be done falls upon many.

In this battle the left wing was composed of the
Sciritae, who in a Lacedaemonian army have always that
post to themselves alone ; next to these were the soldiers
of Brasidas from Thrace, and the Neodamodes with
them ; then came the Lacedaemonians themselves, com-
pany after company, with the Arcadians of Heraea at
their side. After these were the Maenalians, and on the
right wing the Tegeans with a few of the Lacedaemonians
at the extremity ; their cavalry being posted upon the two
wings. Such was the Lacedaemonian formation. That
of their opponents was as follows : — On the right were
the Mantineans, the action taking place in their country ;
next to them the allies from Arcadia ; after whom came
the thousand picked men of the Argives, to whom the
state had given a long course of military training at the
pubHc expense ; next to them the rest of the Argives,
and after them their allies, the Cleonaeans and Orneans,
and lastly the Athenians on the extreme left, and their
own cavalry with them.

68, 69] BATTLE OF MANTINEA 383

Such were the order and the forces of the two com- CHAP.

batants. The Lacedaemonian army looked the largest ; *

though as to putting down the numbers of either host, or B.C. 41a
of the contingents composing it, I could not do so with made to
any accuracy. Owing to the secrecy of their government different
the number of the Lacedaemonians was not known, and gents,
men are so apt to brag about the forces of their country
that the estimate of their opponents was not trusted.
The following calculation, however, makes it possible to
estimate the numbers of the Lacedaemonians present upon
this occasion. There were seven companies in the field
without counting the Sciritx, who numbered six hundred
men : in each company there were four Pentecostyes,
and in the Pentecosty four Enomoties. The first rank
of the Enomoty was composed of four soldiers : as to the
depth, although they had not been all drawn up alike, but
as each captain chose, they were generally ranged eight
deep ; the first rank along the whole line, exclusive of
the Sciritae, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men.

The armies being now on the eve of engaging, each
contingent received some words of encouragement from
its own commander. The Mantineans were reminded
that they were going to fight for their country and to
avoid returning to the experience of servitude after having
tasted that of empire ; the Argives, that they would con-
tend for their ancient supremacy, to regain their once
equal share of Peloponnese of which they had been so
long deprived, and to punish an enemy and a neighbour
for a thousand wrongs ; the Athenians, of the glory of
gaining the honours of the day with so many and brave
allies in arms, and that a victory over the Lacedaemonians
in Peloponnese would cement and extend their empire,
and would besides preserve Attica from all invasions in
future. These were the incitements addressed to the
Argives and their allies. The Lacedaemonians mean-
while, man to man, and with their war-songs in the

384 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [70,71

BOOK ranks, exhorted each brave comrade to remember what

L he had learnt before; well aware that the long training

^•C. 418. of action was of more saving virtue than any brief verbal
ceuvre exhortation, though never so well delivered.

4ifAgis. After this they joined battle, the Argives and their
allies advancing with haste and fury, the Lacedsemonians
slowly and to the music of many flute-players — a standing
institution in their army, that has nothing to do with
religion, but is meant to make them advance evenly,
stepping in time, without breaking their order, as large
armies are apt to do in the moment of engaging.

Just before the battle joined, King Agis resolved
upon the following manoeuvre. All armies are alike in
this : on going into action they get forced out rather on
their right wing, and one and the other overlap with this
their adversary's left; because fear makes each man do
his best to shelter his unarmed side with the shield of the
man next him on the right, thinking that the closer the
shields are locked together the better will he be protected.
The man primarily responsible for this is the first upon
the right wing, who is always striving to withdraw from
the enemy his unarmed side ; and the same apprehension
makes the rest follow him. On the present occasion the
Mantineans reached with their wing far beyond the
Sciritse, and the •Lacedaem.onians and Tegeans still
farther beyond the Athenians, as their army was the
largest. Agis, afraid of his left being surrounded, and
thinking that the Mantineans outflanked it too far,
ordered the Sclritae and Brasideans to move out from
their place in the ranks and make the line even with the
Mantineans, and told the Polemarchs Hipponoldas and
Aristocles to fill up the gap thus formed, by throwing
themselves into it with two companies taken from the
right wing ; thinking that his right would still be strong
enough and to spare, and that the line fronting the
Mantineans would gain in solidity.

72, 73] BATTLE OF MANTINEA 385

However, as he gave these orders in the moment of CHAP
the onset, and at short notice, it so happened that ^^Xi'
Aristocles and Hipponoidas would not move over, for B.C. 41&
which offence they were afterwards banished from Sparta, of the*^
as having been guilty of cowardice ; and the enemy Laceda-
ineanwhile closed before the Sciritx (wnom Agis on
seeing that the two companies did not move over ordered
to return to their place) had time to fill up the breach in
question. Now it was, however, that the Lacedaemonians,
utterly worsted in respect of skill, showed themselves as
superior in point of courage. As soon as they came to
close quarters with the enemy, the Mantinean right broke
their Sciritx and Brasideans, and bursting in with their
allies and the thousand picked Argives into the unclosed,
breach in their line cut up and surrounded the Lacedae-
monians, and drove them in full rout to the waggons,
slaying some of the older men on guard there. But the
Lacedasmonians, worsted in this part of the field, with
the rest of their army, and especially the centre, where
the three hundred knights, as they are called, fought
roiind King Agis, fell on the older men of the Argives
and the five companies so named, and on the Cleonaeans,
the Orneans, and the Athenians next them, and instantly
routed them ; the greater number not even waiting to
strike a blow, but giving way the moment that they
came on, some even being trodden under foot, in their
fear of being overtaken by their assailants.

The army of the Argives and their allies having given
way in this quarter was now completely cut in two, and
the Lacedaemonian and Tegean right simultaneously
closing round the Athenians with the troops that out-
flanked them, these last found themselves placed between
two fires, being surrounded on one side and already
defeated on the other. Indeed they would have suffered
more severely than any other part of the army, but for
the services of the cavalry which they had with them.

386 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [74,75

BOOK Agis also on perceiving the distress of his left opposed to
^- the Mantineans and the thousand Argives, ordered all

B.C. 418. the army to advance to the support of the defeated
*of the wing ; and while this took place, as the enemy moved
killed, past and slanted away from them, the Athenians escaped
at their leisure, and with them the beaten Argive division.
Meanwhile the Mantineans and their allies and the picked
body of the Argives ceased to press the enemy, and
seeing their friends defeated and the Lacedaemonians in
full advance upon them, took to flight. Many of the
Mantineans perished ; but the bulk of tlie picked body
of the Argives made good their escape. The flight and
retreat, hov/ever, were neither hurried nor long ; the
.Lacedaemonians fighting long and stubbornly until the
rout of their enemy, but that once effected, pursuing for
a short time and not far.

Such was the battle, as nearly as possible as I have
described it ; the greatest that had occurred for a very
long while among the Hellenes, and joined by the most
considerable states. The Laced semonians took up a
position in front of the enemy's dead, and immediately
set up a trophy and stripped the slain ; they took up
their own dead and carried them back to Tegea, where
they buried them, and restored those of the enemy under
truce. The Argives, Orneans, and Cleonaeans had seven
hundred killed ; the Mantineans two hundred, and the
Athenians and jEginetans also two hundred, with both
their generals. On the side of the Lacedteraonians, the
allies did not suffer any loss worth speaking of: as to the
Lacedaemonians themselves it was diflicult to learn the
truth ; it is said, however, that there were slain about
three hundred of them.

While the battle was impending, Pleistoanax, the
other king, set out with a reinforcement composed of the
oldest and youngest men, and got as far as Tegea, where
he heard cf the victory and went back again. The

76] BATTLE OF MANTINEA 387

Lacedaemonians also sent and turned back the allies from CHAP.
Corinth and from beyond the Isthmus, and returning
themselves dismissed their allies, and kept the Carnean B.C. axS.
holidays, which happened to be at that time. The efifect
imputations cast upon them by the Hellenes at the time, of this
whether of cowardice on account of the disaster in the
island, or of mismanagement and slowness generally,
were all wiped out by this single action : fortune, it was
thought, might have humbled them, but the men them-
selves were the same as ever.

The day before this battle, the Epidaurians with all
their forces invaded the deserted Argive territory, and
cut off many of the guards left there in the absence of
the Argive army. After the battle three thousand Elean
heavy infantry arriving to aid the Mantineans, and a
reinforcement of one thousand Athenians, all these allies
marched at once against Epidaurus, while the Lacedae-
monians were keeping the Carnea, and dividing the
work among them began to build a wall round the city.
The rest left off; but the Athenians finished at once the
part assigned to them round Cape Heraeum ; and having
all joined in leaving a garrison in the fortification in
question, they returned to their respective cities.

Summer now came to an end. In the first days of
the next winter, when the Carnean holidays were over,
the Lacedjemonians took the field, and arriving at Tegea
sent on to Argos proposals of accommodation. They
had before had a party in the town desirous of over-
throwing the democracy ; and after the battle that had
been fought, these were now far more in a position to
persuade the people to listen to terms. Their plan was
first to make a treaty with the Lacedaemonians, to be
followed by an alliance, and after this to fall upon the
commons. Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, the Argive
Proxcnusy accordingly arrived at Argos with two pro-
posals from Lacedxmon, to regulate the conditions of

388 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [77

BOOK war or peace, according as they preferred the one or the

other. After much discussion, Alcibiades happening to

B.C. 418- be in the town, the Lacedaemonian party who now

between ventured to act openly, persuaded the Argives to accept

^^^^^ the proposal for an accommodation; which ran as

follows : —

The assembly of the Lacedamonians agrees to treat ivitk
the Argives upon the terms following —

1. The jirgives shall restore to the Orchomenlans their
childreuy and to the Manalians their men, and shall restore
the men they have in Mantinea to the Lacedamonians.

2. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and ra'z.e the forti-
fication there. If the Athenians refuse to nvithdraiv from

Epidaurusy they shall be declared enemies of the Argives
and of the Lacedamonians , and of the allies of the Lace-
damonians and the allies of the Argives,

3. If the Lacedamonians have any children in their
custody, they shall restore them every one to his city.

4. As to the offering to the god, the Argives, if they
tuish, shall impose an oath upon the Epidaurians, but, if
not, they shall sivear it themselves.

5. All the cities in Peloponnese, both small and great,
shall be independent according to the customs of their
country.

6. If any of the powers outside Peloponnese invade
Peloponnesian territory, the parties contracting shall unite
to repel them, on such terms as they may agree upon^ at
being most fair for the Peloponnesians.

7. All allies of the Lacedamonians outside Peloponnese
shall be on the same footing as the Lacedamonians, and the
allies of the Argives shall be on the same footing as the
Argives, being left in enjoyment of their own possessions.

8. This treaty shall be shown to the allies, and shall be
concluded, if they approve : if the allies think fit, they may
send the treaty to be considered at home.

The Argives began by accepting this proposal, and the

78,79] ALLIANCE OF SPARTA AND ARGOS 389

Lacedasmonian army retxirned home from Tegea. After CHAP.

this intercourse was renewed between them, and not long '

afterwards the same party contrived that the Argives B.C. 4x8.
should give up the league with the Mantineans, Eleans, alliance.
and Athenians, and should make a treaty and alliance
with the Lacedaemonians ; which was consequently done
upon the terms following : —

The Lacedamonians and Argives agree to a treaty and
alliance for Jlfty years upon the terms foUoiving : —

r . All disputes shall be decided by fair and impartial
arbitration, agreeably to the customs of the two countries.

2. The rest of the cities in Pehponnese may be included
in this treaty and alliance, as independent and sovereign,
in full enjoyment of ivhat they possess ; all disputes being
decided by fair and impartial arbitration, agreeably to the
customs of the said cities.

3. All allies of the Lacedamonians outside Pehponnese
shall be upon the same footing as the Lacedemonians them'
selves, and the allies of the Argives shall be upon the same

footing as the Argives themselves, continuing to enjoy what
they possess,

4. If it shall be anywhere necessary to make an expedi-
tion in common, the Lacedemonians and Argives shall
consult upon it and decide^ as may be most fair for the
allies.

5. If any of the cities, whether inside or outside Pelo'
ponnese, have a question whether of frontiers or otherwise,
it must be settled ; but if one allied city should have a
quarrel with another allied city, it must be referred to some
third city thought impartial by both parties. Private citi-
zens shall have their disputes decided according to the laws
of their several countries.

The treaty and above alliance concluded, each party
at once released everything whether acquired by war or
otherwise, and thenceforth acting in common voted to
receive neither herald nor embassy from the Athenians

390 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [80, 8j

BOOK unless they evacuated their forts and withdrew from
'_ Peloponnese, and also to make neither peace nor war

B.C. 4»8. with anv, except jointly. Zeal was not wanting : both
tion at parties sent envoys to the 1 hracian places and to 1 er-
Argos. diccas, and persuaded the latter to join their league.
Still he did not at once break off from Athens, although
minded to do so upon seeing the way shown him by
Argos, the original home of his family. They also re-
newed their old oaths with the Chalcidians and took
new ones : the Argives, besides, sent ambassadors to the
Athenians, bidding them evacuate the fort at Epidaurus.
The Athenians, seeing their own men outnumbered by
the rest of the garrison, sent Demosthenes to bring them
out. This general, under colour of a gymnastic contest
which he arranged on his arrival, got the rest of the
garrison out of the place, and shut the gates behind them.
Afterwards the Athenians renewed their treaty with the
Epidaurians, and by themselves gave up the tortress.

After the defection of Argos from the league, the
Mantineans, though they held out at first, in the end
finding themselves powerless without the Argives, them-
selves too came to terms with Lacedaemon, and gave up
their sovereignty over the towns. The Lacedasmonians
and Argives, each a thousand strong, now took the field
together, and the former first went by themselves to
Sicyon and made the government there more oligarchical
than before, and then both, uniting, put down the demo-
cracy at Argos and set up an oligarchy favourable to
Lacedaemon. These events occurred at the close of the
winter, just before spring ; and the fourteenth year of the
war ended. The next summer the people of Dium, in
Athos, revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcidians,
and the Lacedaemonians settled affairs in Achica in a way
more agreeable to the interests of their country. Mean-
while the popular party at Argos little by little gathered
new consistency and courage, and waited for the moment

82, 83] LONG WALLS AT ARGOS 39i

of the Gymnopasdic festival at Lacedasmon, and then CHAP,
fell upon the oligarchs. After a fight in the city victory XVI.
declared for the commons, who slew some of their B.C. 4i7.
opponents and banished others. The Lacedasmonians oAhe°
£or a long while let the messages of their friends at commons
Argos remain without effect. At last they put off the
Gymnopasdije and marched to their succour, but learning
at Tegea the defeat of the oligarchs, refused to go any
further in spite of the entreaties of those who had
escaped, and returned home and kept the festival. Later
on, envoys arrived with messages from the Argives in
the town and. from the exiles, when the allies were also
at Sparta ; and after much had been said on both sides,
the Lacedasmonians decided that the party in the town
had done wrong, and resolved to march against Argos,
but kept delaying and putting off the matter. Mean-
while the commons at Argos, in fear of the Lacedx-
monians, began again to court the Athenian alliance,
which they were convinced would be of the greatest
service to them ; and accordingly proceeded to build
long walls to the sea, in order that in case of a blockade
by land, with the help of the Athenians they might have
the advantage of importing what they wanted by sea.
Some of the cities in Peloponnese were also privy to the
building of these walls ; and the Argives vyith all their
people, women and slaves not excepted, addressed them-
selves to the work, while carpenters and masons came to
them from Athens.

Summer was now over. The winter following the
Lacedasmonjans, hearing of the walls that were building,
marched against Argos with their allies, the Corinthians
excepted, being also not without intelligence in the city
itself; Agis, son of Archidamus, their king, was in com-
mand. The intelligence which they counted upon within
the town came to nothing ; they however took and razed
the walls which were being built, and after capturing the

392 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR I84

BOOK Argive town Hysiae and killing all the freemen that fell
_Xl into their hands, went back and dispersed every man to
B.C. A17. his city. After this the Argives marched into Phlius
Dians and and plundered it for harbouring their exiles, most of
Perdic- whom had settled there, and so returned home. The
" same winter the Athenians blockaded Macedonia, on the
score of the league entered into by Perdiccas with the
Argives and Lacedaemonians, and also of his breach of
his engagements on the occasion of the expedition pre-
pared by Athens against the Chalcidians in the direction
of Thrace and against Amphipolis, under the command
of Nicias, son of Niceratus, which had to be broken up
mainly because of his desertion. He was therefore pro-
claimed an enemy. And thus the winter ended, and the
fifteenth year of the war ended with it.

CHAPTER XVII

Sixteenth Year of the War— The Melian Conference —
Fate of Melos

The next summer Alcibiades sailed with twenty ships to
Argos and seized the suspected persons still left of the
Lacedaemonian faction to the number of three hundred,
whom the Athenians forthwith lodged in the neighbouring
islands of their empire. The Athenians also made an ex-
pedition against the isle of Melos witn thirty ships of their
own, six Chian, and two Lesbian vessels, sixteen hundred
heavy infantry, three hundred archers, and twenty mouDted
archers from Athens, and about fifteen hundred heavy
infantry from the allies and the islanders. The Melians
are a colony of Lacedaemon that would not submit to the
Athenians like the other islanders, and at first remained
neutral and took no part in the struggle, but afterwards
upon the Athenians using violence and plundering their

85-88] THE MELIAN CONFERENCE 393

territory, assumed an attitude of open hostility. Cleo- CHAP.
medes, son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, son of Tisimachus, ^Xl}'
the generals, encamping in their territory with the above B.C. 416.
armament, before doing any harm to their land, sent to^J" ^^
envoys to negotiate. These the Melians did not bring followed.
before the people, but bade them state the object of their
mission to the magistrates and the few ; upon which the
Athenian envoys spoke as follows : —

jlthenians. — * Since the negotiations are not to go on
before the people, in order that we may not be able to
speak straight on without interruption, and deceive the
ears of the multitude by seductive arguments which would
pass without refutation (for we know that this is the
meaning of our being brought before the few), what if
you who sit there were to pursue a method more cautious
still ! Make no set speech yourselves, but take us up at
whatever you do not like, and settle that before going anv
farther. And first tell us if this proposition of ours suits
you.'

The Melian commissioners answered : —

Melians, — * To the fairness of quietly instructing each
other as you propose there is nothing to object ; but your
military preparations are too far advanced to agree with
what you say, as we see you are come to be judges in your
own cause, and that all we can reasonably expect from
this negotiation is war, if we prove to have right on
our side and refuse to submit, and in the contrary case,
slavery.' \j*\

Athenians, — * If you have met to reason about pre- i •

sentiments of the future, or for anything else than to
consult for the safety of your state upon the facts that
you see before you, we will give over ; otherwise we
will go on.'

Melians, — * It is natural and excusable for men in our
position to turn more ways than one both in thought
and utterance. However, the question in this conference

394 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [89-91

BOOK is, as you say, the safety of our country; and the
^- discussion, if you please, can proceed in the way which
B.C. 416. you propose.'

^^f tbi Athenians. — * For ourselves, we shall not trouble you
Athe- ^rJth specious pretences — either of how we have a right
°'*°^' to our empire because we overtJirew the Mede, or are
now attacking you because of wrong that you have done
us — and make a long speech which would not be be-
lieved ; and in return we hope that you, instead of think-
ing to influence us by saying that you did not join the
Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or that you
have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible,
holding in view the real sentiments of us both ; since you
know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is
only in question between equals in power, while the
strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they
must.'

Melians. — * As we think, at any rate, it is expedient — we
speak as we are obliged, since you enjoin us to let right
^ alone and talk only of interest — that you should not

destroy what is our common protection, the privilege
of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and
right, and even to profit by arguments not strictly valid
if they can be got to pass current. And you are as much
interested in this as any, as your fall would be a signal
for the heaviest vengeance and an example for the world
to meditate upon.'

Athenians. — * The end of our empire, if end it should,
does not frighten us : a rival empire like Laced^mon,
even if Lacedxmon was our real antagonist, is not so
terrible to the vanquished as subjects who by themselves
attack and overpower their rulers. This, however, is a
risk that we are content to take. We will now proceed
to show you that we are come here in the interest of our
empire, and that we shall say what we are now going to
say, for the preservation of your country ; as we would

V
92-98] THE MELIAN CONFERENCE 395 y"-^

fain exercise that empire over you without trouble, and CHAP.

see you preserved for the good of us both/ XVII.

Me/ians. — * And how, pray, could it turn out as good B.C. 416.
for us to serve as for you to rule ? * ^fAth^s

Athenians, — * Because you would have the advantage of to
submitting before suffering the worst, and we should gain
by not destroying you/

Melians. — ' So that you would not consent to our being
neutral, friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither
side.'

Athenians. — * No ; for your hostility cannot so much
hurt us as your friendship will be an argument to our
subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our
power.'

Melians, — * Is that your subjects' idea of equity, to put j'

those who have nothing to do with you in the same -^
category with peoples that are most of them your own
colonists, and some conquered rebels ? *

Athenians. — *As far as right goes they think one has
as much of it as the other, and that if any maintain their *'*

independence it is because they are strong, and that if we ' i.^
do not molest them it is because we are afraid; so that
besides extending our empire we should gain in security
by your subjection ; the fact that you are islanders and
weaker than others rendering it all the more important
that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of
the sea.'

Melians. — * But do you consider that there is no
security in the policy which we indicate ? For here
again if you debar us from talking about justice and invite
us to obey your interest, we also must explam ours, and
try to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide. How
can you avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals
who shall look at our case and conclude from it that one
day or another you will attack them ? And what is this
but to make greater the enemies that you have already,

Yf

396 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [99-103

BOOK and to force others to become so who would otherwise

1 have never thought of it ? '

Ho^elifrl -^//:'^niflnj'. — ' Why, the fact is that continentals generally
ceivesthe give US but little alarm ; the liberty which they enjoy will
r^* ■ long prevent their taxing precautions against us ; it is
rather islanders like yourselves, outside our empire, and
subjects smarting under the yoke, who would be the most
likely to take a rash step and lead themselves and us into
obvious danger.*

Melians. — * Well then, if you risk so much to retain
your empire, and your subjects to get rid of it, it were
surely great baseness and cowardice in us who are still
free not to try everything that can be tried, before sub-
mitting to your yoke.*

Athenians » — * Not if you are well advised, the contest not
being an equal one, with honour as the prize and shame as
-;--' vj the penalty, but a question of self-preservation and of not
A/ Q J'i resisting those who are far stronger than you are.'

Melians^ — * But we know that the fortune of war is

sometimes more impartial than the disproportion of

numbers might lead one to suppose ; to submit is to give

A 5 ourselves over to despair, while action still preserves for

U8 a hope that we may stand erect.*

Athenians. — * Hope, danger's comforter, may be in-
dulged in by those who have abundant resources, if not
without loss at all events without ruin ; but its nature is to
be extravagant, and those who go so far as to put their all
upon the venture see it in its true colours only when they
are mined ; but so long as the discovery would enable
them to guard against it, it is never found wanting. Let
not this be the case with you, who are weak and hang on
a single turn of the scale ; nor be like the vulgar, who,
abandoning such security as human means may still afford,
when visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to in-
visible, to prophecies and oracles, and other such inven-
tions that delude men with hopes to their destruction.'

I04-I06] THE MELIAN CONFERENCE 397

Meliaru. — * You may be sure that we are as well aware CHAP

as you of the difficulty of contending against your power "

and fortune, unless the terms be equal. But we trust B C. 41^
that the gods may grant us fortune as good as yours, favour /'
since we are just men fighting against unjust, and that ^^ ' "

what we want in power will be made up by the alliance
of the Lacedaemonians, who are bound, if only for very "^

shame, to come to the aid of their kindred. Our confidence,
therefore, after all is not so utterly irrational.'

Athenians. — * When you speak of the favour of the gods,
we may as fairly hope for that as yourselves ; neither our ^ ^

pretensions nor our conduct being in any way contrary to , f '

what men believe of the gods, or practise among them-
selves. Of the gods we believe, and of men we know,
that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever
they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make
this law, or to act upon it when made : we found it
existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever
after us ; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that
you and everybody else, having the same power as we
have, would do the same as we do. Thus, as far as the
gods are concerned, we have no fear and no reason to
fear that we shall be at a disadvantage. But when we
come to your notion about the Lacedaemonians, which
leads you to believe that shame will make them help you, /i

here we bless your simplicity but do not envy your folly. A"

The Lacedaemonians,' when their own interests or their
country's laws are in question, are the worthiest men
alive ; of their conduct towards others much might be
said, but no clearer idea of it could be given than by
shortly saying that of all the men we know they are most
conspicuous in considering what is agreeable honourable,
and what is expedient just. Such a way of thinking does
not promise much for the safety which you now unreason-
ably count upon.'

Melians. — * But it is for this very reason that we now

.p-

398 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [107-111

BOOK trust to their respect for expediency to prevent them from

'_ betraying the Melians, their colonists, and thereby losing

B.C. 416. the confidence of their friends in Hellas and helping their

The pros- . , ^ °

)ect of enemies.

/J- ,.n pect ot tut unto.

\ / ^LacedS Athenians, — « Then you do not adopt the view that

V f mon. expediency goes with security, while justice and honour

\- ,' cannot be followed without danger; and danger the Lace-

dasmonians generally court as little as possible.'

Melians. — ' But we believe that they would be more

likely to face even danger for our sake, and with more

f jt confidence than for others, as our nearness to Peloponnese

U vV^ makes it easier for them to act, and our common blood

xq"^ insures our fidelity.'

Athenians. — * Yes, but what an intending ally trusts to,

I . is not the goodwill of those who ask his aid, but a decided

|\ superiority of power for action ; and the Lacedaemonians

look to this even more than others. At least, such is their

distrust of their home resources that it is only with nume-

^ rous allies that they attack a neighbour ; now is it likely

that while we are masters of the sea they will cross over

to an island ? '

Melians. — * But they would have others to send. The
\ Cretan sea is a wide one, and it is more difficult for those
f^ who command it to intercept others, than for tliose who
wish to elude them to do so safely. And should the
Lacedsemonians miscarry in this, they would fall upon
your land, and upon those left of your allies whom
Brasidas did not reach ; and instead of places which are
not yours, you will have to fight for your own country
and your own confederacy.'

Athenians. — ' Some diversion of the kind you speak of
you may one day experience, only to learn, as others have
done, that the Athenians never once yet withdrew from a
siege for fear of any. But we are struck by the fact, that
after saying you would consult for the safety of your
^ ^ country, in all this discussion you have mentioned nothing

?4'

112] THE MELIAN CONFERENCE 399

which men might trust in and think to be saved by. CHAP.
Your strongest arguments depend upon hope and the
future, and your actual resources are too scanty, as com- B.C. 416.
pared with those arrayed against you, for you to come sion to
out victorious. You will therefore show great blindness A*^^f°*

o involves

of judgment, unless, after allowing us to retire, you can no dis-

find some counsel more prudent than this. You will ^"'*°*^'

surely not be caught by that idea of disgrace, which in V^*^^^

dangers that are disgraceful, and at the same time too ^f-*^ ^

plain to be mistaken, proves so fatal to mankind ; since 1 *>^

in too many cases the very men that have their eyes per- ; ' y-

fectly open to what they are rushing into, let the thing

called disgrace, by the mere influence of a seductive name, %/^

lead them on to a point at which they become so enslaved ^"^ \^

by the phrase as in fact to fall wilfully into hopeless : ;-l

disaster, and incur disgrace more disgraceful as the

companion of error, than when it comes as the result

of misfortune. This, if you are well advised, you will

guard against ; and you will not think it dishonourable to (^ ,,♦-

submit to the greatest city in Hellas, when it makes you / /

the moderate offer of becoming its tributary ally, without

ceasing to enjoy the country that belongs to you ; nor

when you have the choice given you between war and

security, will you be so blinded as to choose the worse.

And it is certain that those who do not yield to their

equals, who keep terms with their superfors, and are

moderate towards their inferiors, on the whole succeed

best. Think over the matter, therefore, after our with- .

drawal, and reflect once and again that it is for your

country that you are consulting, that you have not more

than one, and that upon this one deliberation depends its

prosperity or ruin.'

The Athenians now withdrew from the conference ;
and the Melians, left to themselves, came to a decision
corresponding with what they had maintained in the
discussion, and answered, * Our resolution, Athenians,

400 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [113-115

BOOK is the same as it was at first. We will not in a moment

_Xl deprive of freedom a city that has been inhabited these

B.C. 416. seven hundred years ; but we put our trust in the fortune

*^ MdS^s by which the gods have preserved it until now, and in the

to submit help of men, that is, of the Lacedaemonians ; and so we

■ will try and save ourselves. Meanwhile we invite you

■ ^ to allow us to be friends to you and foes to neither

\. party, and to retire from our country after making such

a treaty as shall seem fit to us both.'

Such was the answer of the Melians. The Athenians
now departing from the conference said, * Well, you
alone, as it seems to us, judging from these resolutions,
regard what is future as more certain than what is before
your eyes, and what is out of sight, in your eagerness, as
already coming to pass ; and as you have staked most
on, and trusted most in, the Lacedaemonians, your for-
tune, and your hopes, so will you be most completely
deceived.'

The Athenian envoys now returned to the army ; and
the Melians showing no signs of yielding, the generals
at once betook themselves to hostilities, and drew a Une
of circumvaliation round the MeHans, dividing the work
among the different states. Subsequently the Athenians
returned with most of their army, leaving behind them a
certain number of their own citizens and of the allies to
keep guard by land and sea. The force thus left stayed
on and besieged the place.

About the same time the Argives invaded the territory
of Phlius and lost eighty men cut off in an ambush
by the Phliasians and Argive exiles. Meanwhile the
Athenians at Pylos took so much plunder from the
Lacedaemonians that the latter, although they still re-
frained from breaking off the treaty and going to war
with Athens, yet proclaimed that any of their people that
chose might plunder the Athenians. The Corinthians
also commenced hostilities with the Athenians for private

n6] FALL OF MELOS 401

quarrels of their own ; but the rest of the Peloponnesians CHAP,
stayed quiet. Meanwhile the Melians attacked by night ^^"'
and took the part of the Athenian lines over against the B.C. 416.
market, and killed some of the men, and brought in corn Melians
and all else that they could find useful to them, and so exter-
returned and kept quiet, while the Athenians took
measures to keep better guard in future.

Summer was now over. The next winter the
Lacedasmonians intended to invade the Argive territory,
but arriving at the frontier found the sacrifices for crossing
unfavourable, and went back again. This intention of
theirs gave the Argives suspicions of certain of their
fellow-citizens, some of whom they arrested ; others,
however, escaped them. About the same time the
Melians again took another part of the Athenian lines
which were but feebly garrisoned. Reinforcements
afterwards arriving from Athens in consequence, under
the command of Philocrates, son of Demeas, the siege
was now pressed vigorously ; and some treachery taking
place inside, the Melians surrendered at discretion to the
Athenians, who put to death all the grown men whom
they took, and sold the women and children for slaves,
and subsequently sent out five hundred colonists and
inhabited the place themselves.

O 455

[1.2

BOOK VI

CHAPTER XVIII

Seventeenth Year of the War — The Sicilian Campaign
—Affair of the Hermae — Departure of the Ex-
pedition

BOOK The same winter the Athenians resolved to sail again to
Y}^ Sicily, with a greater armament than that under Laches

B C. 416 and Eurymedon, and, if possible, to conquer the island ;

of stcLly^ most of them being ignorant of its size and of the number
of its inhabitants, Hellenic and barbarian, and of the fact
that they were undertaking a war not much inferior to
that against the Peloponnesians. For the voyage round
Sicily in a merchantman is not far short of eight days ;
and yet, large as tlie island is, there are only two miles
of sea to prevent its being mainland.

It was settled originally as follows, and the peoples
that occupied it are these. The earliest inhabitants
spoken of in any part of the country are the Cyclopes
and Laestrygones ; but I cannot tell of what race they
were, or whence they came or whither they went, and
must leave my readers to what the poets have said of
them and to what may be generally known concerning
them. The Sicanians appear to have been the next
settlers, although they pretend to have been the first of
all and aborigines ; but the facts show that they were
Iberians, driven by the Ligurians from the river Sicanus

in Iberia. It was from them that the island, before
402

33 RACES INHABITING SICILY 403

called Trinacria, took its name of Sicania, and to the CHAP,
present day they inhabit the west of Sicily. On the ^^^^^'
fall of Ilium, some of the Trojans escaped from the Trojans,
Achaeans, came in ships to Sicily, and settled next to phreni-
the Sicanians under the general name of Elymi ; their ciaas.
towns being called Eryx and Egesta. With them
settled some of the Phocians carried on their way from
Troy by a storm, first to Libya, and afterwards from
thence to Sicily. The Sicels crossed over to Sicily
from their first home Italy, flying from the Opicans, as
tradition says and as seems not unlikely, upon rafts,
having watched till the wind set down the strait to effect
the passage ; although perhaps they may have sailed over
in some other way. Even at the present day there are
still Sicels in Italy ; and the country got its name of
Italy from Italus, a king of the Sicels, so called. These
went with a great host to Sicily, defeated the Sicanians
in battle and forced them to remove to the south and
west of the island, which thus came to be called Sicily
instead of Sicania, and after they crossed over continued
to enjoy the richest parts of the country for near three
hundred years before any Hellenes came to Sicily ;
indeed they still hold the centre and north of the island.
There were also Phoenicians living all round Sicily, who
had occupied promontories upon the sea coasts and the
islets adjacent for the purpose of trading with the Sicels.
But when the Hellenes began to arrive in considerable
numbers by sea, the Phoenicians abandoned most of their
stations, and drawing together took up their abode in
Motye, Soloeis, and Panormus, near the Elymi, partly
because they confided in their alliance, and also because
these are the nearest points, for the voyage between
Carthage and Sicily.

These were the barbarians in Sicily, settled as I have
said. Of the Hellenes, the first to arrive were
Chalcidians from Euboea with Thucles, their founder.

404 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [4

BOOK They founded Naxos and built the altar to Apollo

Y}^ Archegetes, which now stands outside the town, and

Founda- upon which the deputies for the games sacrifice before

SyraSse sailing from Sicily. Syracuse was founded the year

and other afterwards by Archias, one of the Heraclids from

towns, Corinth, who began by driving out the Sicels from the

island upon which the inner city now stands, though it

is no longer surrounded by water : in process of time the

outer town also was taken within the walls and became

populous. Meanwhile Thucles and the Chalcidians set

out from Naxos in the fifth year after the foundation of

Syracuse, and drove out the Sicels by arms and founded

Leontini and afterwards Catana ; the Catanians themselves

choosing Evarchus as their founder.

About the same time Lamis arrived in Sicily with a
colony from Megara, and after founding a place called
Trotilus beyond the river Pantacyas, and afterwards
leaving it and for a short while joining the Chalcidians
at Leontini, was driven out by them and founded Thap-
8US. After his death his companions were driven out
of Thapsus, and founded a place called the Hyblsean
Megara; Hyblon, a Sicel king, having given up the
place and inviting them thither. Here they lived two
hundred and forty- five years ; after ^which they were
expelled from the city and the country by the Syracusan
tyrant Gelo. Before their expulsion, however, a hun-
dred years after they had settled there, they sent out
Pamillus and founded Selinus ; he having come from
their mother country Megara to join them in its founda-
tion. Gela was founded by Antiphemus from Rhodes
and Entimus from Crete, who joined in leading a colony
thither, in the forty-fifth year after the foundation of
Syracuse. The town took its name from the river Gelas,
the place where the citadel now stands, and which was
first fortified, being called Lindii. The institutions
which they adopted were Dorian. Near one hundred

5] COLONISATION OF SICILY 405

and eight years after the foundation of Gela, the Geloans CHAP.
founded Acragas (Agrigentum), so called from the river ^^"^-
of that name, and made Aristonous and Pystilus their Messina
founders ; giving their own institutions to the colony, cama-'^'
Zancle was originally founded by pirates from Cuma, "na-
the Chalcidian town in the country of the Opicans :
afterwards, however, large numbers came from Chalcis
and the rest of Euboea, and helped to people the place ;
the founders being Perieres and Crataemenes from Cuma
and Chalcis respectively. It first had the name of Zancle
given it by the Sicels, because the place is shaped like a
sickle, which the Sicels call Zanclon ; but upon the original
settlers being afterwards expelled by some Samians and
other lonians who landed in Sicily flying from the Medes,
and the Samians in their turn not long afterwards by
Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, the town was by him
colonised with a mixed population, and its name changed
to Messina, after his old country.

Himera was founded from Zancle by Euclides, Simus,
and Sacon, most of those who went to the colony being
Chalcidians ; though they were joined by some exiles
from Syracuse, defeated in a civil war, called the Myle-
tidae. The language was a mixture of Chalcidian and
Doric, but the institutions which prevailed were the
Chalcidian. Acrse and Casmenae were founded by the
Syracusans ; Acrse seventy years after Syracuse, Casmenas
nearly twenty after Acrae. Camarina was first founded
by the Syracusans, close upon a hundred and thirty-five
years after the building of Syracuse ; its founders being
Daxon and Menecolus. But the Camarinaeans being
expelled by arms by the Syracusans for having revolted,
Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, some time later receiving
their land in ransom for some Syracusan prisoners, re-
settled Camarina, himself acting as its founder. Lastly,
it was again depopulated by Gelo, and settled once more
for the third time by the Geloans.

4o6 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [6, 7

BOOK . Such is the list of the peoples, Hellenic and barbarian,
2^ inhabiting Sicily, and such the magnitude of the island

B.C. 4»6. which the Athenians were now bent upon invading ;
ments being ambitious in real truth of conquering the whole,

uad pro- although they had also the specious design of succouring

of Eges- their kindred and other allies in the island. But they
^^"*- were especially incited by envoys from Egesta, who had
come to Athens and invoked their aid more urgently
than ever. The Egestaeans had gone to war with their
neighbours the Selinuntines upon questions of marriage
and disputed territory, and the Selinuntines had procured
the alliance of the Syracusans, and pressed Egesta hard
by land and sea. The Egestaeans now reminded the
Athenians of the alliance made in the time of Laches,
during the former Leontine war, and begged them to
send a fleet to their aid, and among a number of other
considerations urged as a capital argument, that if the
Syracusans were allowed to go unpunished for their
depopulation of Leontini, to ruin the allies still left to
Athens in Sicily, and to get the whole power of the
island into their hands, there would be a danger of their
one day coming with a large force, as Dorians, to the aid
of their Dorian brethren, and as colonists, to the aid of
the Peloponnesians who had sent them out, and joining
these in pulling down the Athenian empire. The
Athenians would, therefore, do well to unite with the
allies still left to them, and to make a stand against the
Syracusans ; especially as they, the Egestasans, were pre-
pared to furnish money sufficient for the war. The
Athenians, hearing these arguments constantly repeated
in their assemblies by the Egestaeans and their supporters,
voted first to send envoys to Egesta, to see if there was
really the money that they talked of in the treasury and
temples, and at the same time to ascertain in what posture
was the war with the Selinuntines.

The envoys of the Athenians were accordingly de-

8] LACEDiEMONIANS AND ARGIVES 407

spatched to Sicily. The same winter the Lacedaemonians CHAP.

and their allies, the Corinthians excepted, marched into

the Argive territory, and ravaged a small part of the land, B.C. 41s.
J 1 1 r J • / nr Return of

and took some yokes of oxen and carried on some corn, envoys

They also settled the Argive exiles at Orneae, and left £°gg^

them a few soldiers taken from the rest of the army;

and after making a truce for a certain while, according to

which neither Orneatae nor Argives were to injure each

other's territory, returned home with the army. Not

long afterwards the Athenians came with thirty ships and

six hundred heavy infantry, and the Argives joining them

with all their forces, marched out and besieged the men

in Orneas for one day ; but the garrison escaped by night,

the besiegers having bivouacked some way off. The

next day the Argives, discovering it, razed Orneae to the

ground, and went back again ; after which the Athenians

went home in their ships. Meanwhile the Athenians

took by sea to Methone on the Macedonian border some

cavalry of their own and the Macedonian exiles that

were at Athens, and plundered the country of Perdiccas.

Upon this the Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian

Chalcidians, who had a truce with Athens from one ten

days to another, urging them to join Perdiccas in the

war, which they refused to do. And the winter ended,

and with it ended the sixteenth year of this war of which

Thucydides is the historian.

Early in the spring of the following summer the

Athenian envoys arrived from Sicily, and the Egestasans

with them, bringing sixty talents of uncoined silver, as a

month's pay for sixty ships, which they were to ask to

have sent them. The Athenians held an assembly, and

after hearing from the Egestaeans and their own envoys

a report, as attractive as it was untrue, upon the state of

affairs generally, and in particular as to the money, of

which, it was said, there was abundance in the temples

and the treasury, voted to send sixty ships to Sicily,

4o8 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 9]

BOOK under the command of Alcibiades, son of Clinias, Nicias,

^ son of Niceratus, and Lamachus, son of Xenophanes,

B.C. 415. who were appointed with full powers ; they were to help

iJt^Atheis the Egestaeans against the Selinuntines, to restore Leon-

to con- tini upon gaining any advantage in the war, and to order

ways and all Other matters in Sicily as they should deem best for

means, ^^le interests of Athens. Five days after this a second

assembly was held, to consider the speediest means of

equipping the ships, and to vote whatever else might be

required by the generals for the expedition ; and Nicias,

who had been chosen to the command against his will,

and who thought that the state was not well advised,

but upon a slight and specious pretext was aspiring to the

conquest of the whole of Sicily, a great matter to achieve,

came forward in the hope of diverting the Athenians from

the enterprise, and gave them the following counsel : —

* Although this assembly was convened to consider the
preparations to be made for sailing to Sicily, I think, not-
withstanding, that we have still this question to examine,
whether it be better to send out the ships at all, and that we
ought not to give so little consideration to a matter of such
moment, or let ourselves be persuaded by foreigners into
undertaking a war with which we have nothing to do.
And yet, individually, I gain in honour by such a course,
and fear as little as other men for my person — not that I
think a man need be any the worse citizen for taking some
thought for his person and estate ; on the contrary, such
a man would for his own sake desire the prosperity of his
country more than others — nevertheless, as I have never
spoken against my convictions to gain honour, I shall not
begin to do so now, but shall say what I think best.
Against your character any words of mine would be weak
enough ; if I were to advise your keeping what you have
got and not risking what is actually yours for advantages
which are dubious in themselves, and which you may or
may not attain. I will, therefore, content myself with

10, II] SPEECH OF NICIAS 409

showing that your ardour is out of season, and your am- CHAP
bition not easy of accomplishment.

< I aiRrm, then, that you leave many enemies behind you 5;.^:*^
here to go yonder and bring more back with you. You state of
imagine, perhaps, that the treaty which you have made ^f home,
can be trusted ; a treaty that will continue to exist nomi-
nally, as long as you keep quiet — for nominal it has become,
owing to the practices of certain men here and at Sparta —

but which in the event of a serious reverse in any quarter
would not delay our enemies a moment in attacking us ;
first, because the convention was forced upon them by
disaster and was less honourable to them than to us ; and
secondly, because in this very convention there are many
points that are still disputed. Again, some of the most
powerful states have never yet accepted the arrangement
at all. Some of these are at open war with us ; others (as
the Lacedaemonians do not yet move) are restrained by
truces renewed every ten days, and it is only too probable
that if they found our power divided, as we are hurrying
to divide it, they would attack us vigorously with the
Siceliots, whose alliance they would have in the past
valued as they would that of few others. A man ought,
therefore, to consider these points, and not to think of
running risks with a country placed so critically, or of
grasping at another empire before we have secured the
one we have already ; for in fact the Thracian Chal-
cidians have been all these years in revolt from us without
being yet subdued, and others on the continents yield us
but a doubtful obedience. Meanwhile the Egestaeans,
our allies, have been wronged, and we run to help them,
while the rebels who have so long wronged us still wait
for punishment.

< And yet the latter, if brought under, might be kept
under ; while the Sicilians, even if conquered, are too far
off and too numerous to be ruled without difficulty. Now
it is folly to go against men who could not be kept under

*0 455

4IO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [12

BOOK even if conquered, while failure would leave us in a very

different position from that which we occupied before the

B.C. 4»5 enterprise. The Siceliots, again, to take them as they

ger from are at present, in the event of a Syracusan conquest (the

Sicily if favourite bugbear of the Egestsans), would to my think-
left alone. ., ° . ° , ^\ r a'

mg be even less dangerous to us than before. At present

they might possibly come here as separate states for love
of Lacedaemon ; in the other case one empire would
scarcely attack another ; for after joining the Pelopon-
nesians to overthrow ours, they could only expect to see
the same hands overthrow their own in the same way.
The Hellenes in Sicily would fear us most if we never
went there at all, and next to this, if after displaying our
power we went away again as soon as possible. We all
know that that which is farthest oft and the reputation of
which can least be tested, is the object of admiration ; at
the least reverse they would at once begin to look dov/n
upon us, and would join our enemies here against us. You
have yourselves experienced this with regard to the
Lacedaemonians and their allies, whom your unexpected
success, as compared with what you feared at first, has
made you suddenly despise, tempting you further to aspire
to the conquest of Sicily. Instead, however, of being
puffed up by the misfortunes of your adversaries, you
ought to think of breaking their spirit before giving your-
selves up to confidence, and to understand that the one
thought awakened in the Lacediemonians by their disgrace
is how they may e\en now, if possible, overthrow us and
repair their dishonour ; inasmuch as military reputation is
their oldest and chiefest study. Our struggle, therefore,
if we are wise, will not be for the barbarian Egestaeans
in Sicily, but how to defend ourselves most effectually
against die oligarchical machinations of Laced^moa.

* We should also remember that we are but now enjoy-
ing some respite from a great pestilence and from war, to
the no small benefit of our estates and persons, and that

13] SPEECH OF NICIAS 411

it is right to employ these at home on our own behalf, CHAP
instead of using them on behalf of these exiles whose ^.Xll'*
interest it is to He as fairly as they can, who do nothing B.C. 4x5.
but talk themselves and leave the danger to others, and qq ^id-
who if they succeed will show no proper gratitude, and if biades.
they fail will drag down their friends with them. And
if there be any man here, overjoyed at being chosen to
command, who urges you to make the expedition, merely
for ends of his own — especially if he be still too young to
command — who seeks to be admired for his stud of horses,
but on account of its heavy expenses hopes for some profit
from his appointment, do not allow such an one to main-
tain his private splendour at his country's risk, but remem-
ber that such persons injure the public fortune while they
squander their own, and that this is a matter of importance,
and not for a young man to decide or hastily to take in hand.
* When I see such persons now sitting here at the side
of that same individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes
me ; and I, in my turn, summon any of the older men
that may have such a person sitting next him, not to let
himself be shamed down, for fear of being thought a
coward if he do not vote for war, but, remembering how
rarely success is got by wishing and how often by forecast,
to leave to them the mad dream of conquest, and as a true
lover of his country, now threatened by the greatest danger
in its history, to hold up his hand on the other side ; to
vote that the Sicelicts be left in the limits now existing
between us, limits of which no one can complain (the
Ionian sea for the coasting voyage, and the Sicilian across
the open main), to enjoy their own possessions and to
settle their own quarrels ; that the Egestsans, for their part,
be told to end by themselves with the Selinuntines the
war which they began without consulting the Athenians ;
and that for the future we do not enter into alliance, as we
have been used to do, with people whom we must help in
their need, and who can never help us in ours.

4« THE PELOPONNESIAN V/AR [14, 15

BOOK * And you, Prytanis, if you think it your duty to care
• for the commonwealth, and if you wish to show yourself

B.C. 415. a good citizen, put the question to the vote, and take a
of Alci° second time the opinions of the Athenians. If you are

blades at afraid to move the question again, consider that a viola-
Athens. . r,i ^ -J- -1

tion of the law cannot carry any prejudice with so many
abettors, that you will be the physician of your misguided
city, and that the virtue of men in office is briefly this, to
do their country as much good as they can, or in any case
no harm that they can avoid.'

Such were the words of Nicias. Most of the Athenians
that came forward spoke in favour of the expedition, and
of not annulling what had been voted, although some
spoke on the other side. By far the warmest advocate of
the expedition was, however, Alcibiades, son of Clinias,
who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent
and also because of the attack he had made upon him in
his speech, and who was, besides, exceedingly ambitious
of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and
Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation
by means of his successes. For the position he held
among the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond
what his real means would bear, both in keeping horses
and in the rest of his expenditure ; and this later on had
not a little to do with the ruin of the Athenian state.
Alarmed at the greatness of his license in his own life and
habits, and of the ambition which he showed in all things
soever that he undertook, the mass of the people set him
down as a pretender to the tyranny, and became his
enemies ; and alt-hough publicly his conduct of the war
was as good as could be desired, individually, his habits
gave offence to every one, and caused them to commit
affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the
city. Meanwhile he now came forward and gave the
following advice to the Athenians : —

* Athenians, I have a better right to command than

i6] REPLY OF ALCIBIADES 413

others — I must begin with this as Nicias has attacked CHAP,
me — and at the same time I believe myself to be worthy ^.Xl?^'
of it. The things for which I am abused, bring fame to B.C. 415.
my ancestors and to myself, and to the country profit ofliimselt
besides. The Hellenes, after expecting to see our city
ruined by the war, concluded it to be even greater than
it really is, by reason of the magnificence with which I
represented it at the Olympic games, when I sent into the
lists seven chariots, a number never before entered by any
private person, and won the first prize, and was second
and fourth, and took care to have everything else in a
style worthy of my victory. Custom regards such dis-
plays as honourable, and they cannot be made without
leaving behind them an impression of power. Again,
any splendour that I may have exhibited at home in
providing choruses or otherwise, is naturally envied by my
fellow-citizens, but in the eyes of foreigners has an air of
strength as in the other instance. And this is no useless
folly, when a man at his own private cost benefits not
himself only, but his city : nor is it unfair that he who
prides himself on his position should refuse to be upon an
equahty with the rest. He who is badly off has his mis-
fortunes all to himself, and as we do not see men courted
in adversity, on the like principle a man ought to accept
the insolence of prosperity ; or else, let him first mete out
equal measure to all, and then demand to have it meted
out to him. What I know is that persons of this kind
and all others that have attained to any distinction,
although they may be unpopular in their lifetime in their
relations with their fellow-men and especially with their
equals, leave to posterity the desire of claiming connexion
with them even without any ground, and are vaunted by
the country to which they belonged, not as strangers or
ill-doers, but as fellow-countrymen and heroes. Such
are my aspirations, and however I am abused for them
in private, the question is whether any one manages public

414 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [17

BOOK affairs better than I do. Having united the most powerful
states of Peloponnese, without great danger or expense to

B.C. 4»5- you, I compelled the Lacedaemonians to stake their all
easy con- upon the issue of a single day at Mantinea ; and although
qnest victorious in the battle, they have never since fully re-
covered confidence.

* Thus did my youth and so-called monstrous folly find
fitting arguments to deal with the power of the Pelopon-
nesians, and by its ardour win their confidence and
prevail. And do not be afraid of my youth now, but
while I am still in its flower, and Nicias appears for-
tunate, avail yourselves to the utmost of the services of us
both. Neither rescind your resolution to sail to Sicily, on
the ground that you would be going to attack a great
power. The cities in Sicily are peopled by motley
rabbles, and easily change their institutions and adopt
new ones in their stead ; and consequently the inhabitants,
being without any feeling of patriotism, are not provided
with arms for their persons, and have not regularly estab-
lished themselves on the land ; every man thinks that
either by fair words or by party strife he can obtain
something at the public expense, and then in the event of
a catastrophe settle in some other country, and makes his
preparations accordingly. From a mob like this you need
not look for either unanimity in counsel or concert in
action ; but they will probably one by one come in as
they get a fair offer, especially if they are torn by civil
strife as we are told. Moreover, the Siceliots have not
so many heavy infantry as they boast ; just as the Hel-
lenes generally did not prove so numerous as each state
reckoned itself, but Hellas greatly over-estimated their
numbers, and has hardly had an adequate force of heavy
infantry throughout this war. The states in Sicily, there-
fore, from all that I can hear, will be found as I say, and
I have not pointed out all our advantages, for we shall
have the help of many barbarians, who from their hatred

i8] REPLY OF ALCIBIADES 415

of the Syracusans will join us in attacking them ; nor will chap

the powers at home prove any hindrance, if you judge

rightly. Our fathers with these very adversaries, which B.C. 41s
it is said we shall now leave behind us when we sail, and cannot
the Mede as their enemy as well, were able to win the f^^-f^
empire, depending solely on their superiority at sea. The her em-
Peloponnesians had never so little hope against us as at ^"^^
present ; and let them be ever so sanguine, although
strong enough to invade our country even if we stay at
home, they can never hurt us with their navy, as we
leave one of our own behind us that is a match for
them.

< In this state of things what reason can we give to
ourselves for holding back, or what excuse can we offer
to our allies in Sicily for not helping them ? They are
our confederates, and we are bound to assist them, with-
out objecting that they have not assisted us. We did not
take them into alliance to have them to help us in Hellas,
but that they might so annoy our enemies in Sicily as to
prevent them from coming over here and attacking us.
It is thus that empire has been won, both by us and by all
others that have held it, by a constant readiness to support
all, whether barbarians or Hellenes, that invite assistance;
since if all were to keep quiet or to pick and choose whom
they ought to assist, we should make but few new con-
quests, and should imperil those we have already won.
Men do not rest content with parrying the attacks of a
superior, but often strike the first blow to prevent the
attack being made. And we cannot fix the exact point
at which our empire shall stop ; we have reached a posi-
tion in which we must not be content w ith retaining but
must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others,
we are in danger of being ruled ourselves. Nor can you
look at inaction from the same point of view as others,
unless you are prepared to change your habits and make
them like theirs.

as

tion,

416 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [19

BOOK * Be convinced then that we shall augment our power
^ at home by this adventure abroad, and let us make the

B.C. 415. expedition, and so humble the pride of the Peloponnesians
soVatS ^y sailing off to Sicily, and letting them see how little we
"?ac- care for the peace that we are now enjoying ; and at the
same time we shall either become masters, as we very
easily may, of the whole of Hellas through the accession
of the Sicilian Hellenes, or in any case ruin the Syracusans,
to the no small advantage of ourselves and our allies.
The faculty of staying if successful, or of returning, will
be secured to us by our navy, as we shall be superior at
sea to all the Siceliots put together. And do not let the
do-nothing policy which Nicias advocates, or his setting
of the young against the old, turn you from your purpose,
but in the good old fashion by which our fathers, old and
young together, by their united counsels brought our
affairs to their present height, do you endeavour still to
advance them ; understanding that neither youth nor old
age can do anything the one without the other, but that
levity, sobriety, and deliberate judgment are strongest
when united, and that, by sinking into inaction, the city,
like everything else, will wear itself out, and its skill in
everything decay ; while each fresh struggle will give it
fresh experience, and make it more used to defend itself
not in word but in deed. In short, my conviction is that
a city not inactive by nature could not choose a quicker
v/ay to ruin itself than by suddenly adopting such a policy,
and that the safest rule of life is to take one's character
and institutions for better and for worse, and to live up to
them as closely as one can.'

Such were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing
him and the Egestaeans and some Leontine exiles, who
came forward reminding them of their oaths and implor-
ing their assistance, the Athenians became more eager for
the expedition than before. Nicias, perceiving that it
would be now useless to try to deter them by the old

20,21] SECOND SPEECH OF NICIAS ^i;

line of argument, but thinking that he might perhaps CHAP,
alter their resolution by the extravagance of his estimates, ^Y}}}'
came forward a second time and spoke as follows : — B.C. 415.

* I see, Athenians, that you are thoroughly bent upo i o/the^
the expedition, and therefore hope that all will turn out fl^^l^°
as we v/ish, and proceed to give you my opinion at the
present juncture. From all that I hear we are going
against cities that are great and not subject to one
another, or in need of change, so as to be glad to pass

from enforced servitude to an easier condition, or in the
least likely to accept our rule in exchange for freedom ;
and, to take only the Hellenic towns, they are very
numerous for one island. Besides Naxos and Cs^tana,
which I expect to join us from their connexion with
Leontini, there are seven others armed at all points just
like our own power, particularly Selinus and Syracuse,
the chief objects of our expedition. These are full of
heavy infantry, archers, and darters, have galleys in
abundance and crowds to man them ; they have also
money, partly in the hands of private persons, partly in
the temples at Selinus, and at Syracuse first- fruits from
some of the barbarians as well. But their chief advantage
over us lies in the number of their horses, and in the
fact that they grow their corn at home instead of
importing it.

* Against a power of this kind it will not do to have
merely a weak naval armament, but we shall want also a
large land army to sail with us, if we are to do anything
worthy of our ambition, and are not to be shut out from
the country by a numerous cavalry ; especially if the
cities should take alarm and combine, and we should be
left without friends (except the Egestosans) to furnish
us with horse to defend ourselves with. It would be
disgraceful to have to retire under compulsion, or to
send back for reinforcements, owing to want of reflexion
at fir.st : we must therefore start from home with a ccni-

4i£ THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [22,23

BOOK petent force, seeing that we are going to sail far from our

country, and upon an expedition not like any which you

BX. 415. may have undertaken in the quality of allies, among your

soamerl^s subject States here in Hellas, where any additional

needs, supplies needed were easily drawn from the friendly

territory ; but we are cutting ourselves off, and going to

a land entirely strange, from which during four months

in winter it is not even easy for a messenger to get to

Athens.

* I think, therefore, that we ought to take great
cumbers of heavy infantry, both from Athens and from
our allies, and not merely from our subjects, but also
any we may be able to get for love or for money in
Peioponnese, and great numbers also of archers and
slingers, to make head against the Sicilian horse. Mean-
while we must have an overwhelming superiority at sea,
to enable us the more easily to carry in what we want ;
and we must take our own corn in merchant vessels, that
is to say, wheat and parched barley, and bakers from the
mills compelled to serve for pay in the proper propor-
tion ; in order that in case of our being weather-bound
the armament may not want provisions, as it is not every
city that will be able to entertain numbers like ours. We
must also provide ourselves with everything else as far as
we can, so as not to be dependent upon others ; and
above all we must take with us from home as much
money as possible, as the sums talked ot as ready at
Egesta are readier, you may be sure, in talk than in any
other way.

* Indeed, even if we leave Athens with a force not
only equal to that of the enemy except in the number
of heavy infantry in the field, but even at all points
superior to him, we shall still find it difficult to conquer
Sicily or save ourselves. We must not disguise from
ourselves that we go to found a city among strangers
and enemies, and that he who undertakes such an enter-

24, 25] SECOND SPEECH OF NICIAS 419

prise should be prepared to become master of the country CHAR
the first day he lands, or failing in this to find everything ^^"^'
hostile to him. Fearing this, and knowing that we shall B.C. 41^
have need of much good counsel and more good fortune asm at* "
— a hard matter for mortal men to aspire to — I wish as ^.thens.
far as may be to make myself independent of fortune
before sailing, and when I do sail, to be as safe as a
strong force can make me. This I believe to be surest
for the country at large, and safest for us who are to go
on the expedition. If any one thinks differently I resign
to him my command.'

With this Nicias concluded, thinking that he should
either disgust the Athenians by the magnitude of the
undertaking, or, if obliged to sail on the expedition,
would thus do so in the safest way possible. The
Athenians, however, far from having their taste for the
voyage taken away by the burdensomeness of the pre-
parations, became more eager for it than ever ; and just
the contrary took place of what Nicias had thought, as
it was held that he had given good advice, and that the
expedition would be the safest in the world. All alike
fell in love with the enterprise. The older men thought
that they would either subdue the places against which
they were to sail, or at all events, with so large a force,
meet with no disaster ; those in the prime of life felt a
longing for foreign sights and spectacles, and had no
doubt that they should come safe home again ; while the
idea of the common people and the soldiery was to earn
wages at the moment, and make conquests that would
supply a never-ending fund of pay for the future. With
this enthusiasm of the majority, the few that liked it not,
feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands
against it, and so kept quiet.

At last one of the Athenians came forward and called
upon Nicias and told him that he ought not to make
excuses or put them off, but say at once before them all

420 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [26, 27

BOOK what forces the Athenians should vote him. Upon this

XL he said, not without reluctance, that he would advise

B.C. 415. upon that matter more at leisure with his colleagues ; as

tions?n far however as he could see at present, they must sail with

^^^ at least one hundred galleys — the Athenians providing as

many transports as they might determine, and sending for

others from the allies — not less than five thousand heavy

infantry in all, Athenian and allied, iind if possible more;

and the rest of the armament in proportion ; archers

from home and from Crete, and slingers, and whatever

else might seem desirable, being got ready by the generals

and taken with them.

Upon hearing this the Athenians at once voted that
the generals should have full powers in the matter of the
numbers of the army aod of the expedition generally, to
do as they judged best for the interests of Athens. After
this the preparations began; messages being sent to the
allies and the rolls drawn up at home. And as the city
had just recovered from the plague and the long war, and
a number of young men had grown up and capital had
accumulated by reason of the truce, everything was the
more easily provided.

In the midst of these preparations all the stone Hermse
in the city of Athens, that is to say the customary square
figures, so common in the doorways of private houses and
temples, had in one night most of them their faces
mutilated. No one knew who had done it, but large
public rewards were offered to find the authors ; and it
was further voted that any one who knew of any other
act of impiety having been committed should come and
give information without fear of consequences, whether
he were citizen, alien, or slave. The matter was taken
up the more seriously, as it was thought to be ominous
for the expedition, and part of a conspiracy to bring
about a revolution and to upset the democracy.

Information was given accordingly by some resident

28,29] MUTILATION OF THE HERMJE 421

aliens and body servants, not about the Hermas but about CHAP.
some previous mutilations of other images perpetrated by
young men in a drunken frolic, and of mock celebrations B.C. 4*5-
of the mysteries, averred to take place in private houses, accused.
Alcibiades being implicated in this charge, it was taken
hold of by those who could least endure him, because he
stood in the way of their obtaining the undisturbed direc-
tion of the people, and who thought that if he were once
removed the first place would be theirs. These accord-
ingly magnified the matter and loudly proclaimed that the
affair of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Herman
were part and parcel of a scheme to overthrow the demo-
cracy, and that nothing of all this had been done without
Alcibiades ; the proofs alleged being the general and un-
democratic license of his life and habits.

Alcibiades repelled on the spot the charges in question,
and also before going on the expedition, the preparations
for which were now complete, offered to stand his trial,
that it might be seen whether he was guilty of the acts
imputed to him ; desiring to be punished if found guilty,
but, if acquitted, to take the command. Meanwhile he
protested against their receiving slanders against him in
his absence, and begged them rather to put him to death at
once if he were guilty, and pointed out the imprudence
of sending him out at the head of so large an army, with
so serious a charge still undecided. But his enemies feared
that he would have the army for him if he were tried im-
mediately, and that the people might relent in favour of
the man whom they already caressed as the cause of the
Argives and some of the Mantineans joining in the expedi-
tion, and did their utmost to get this proposition rejected,
putting forward other orators who said that he ought at
present to sail and not delay the departure of the army,
and be tried on his return within a fixed number of days;
their plan being to have him sent for and brought home
for trial upon some graver charge, which they would the

422 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [30

BOOK more easily get up in his absence. Accordingly it was
Xll decreed that he should sail.

B.C. ^is After this the departxire for Sicily took place, it being
^™tiwi at °ow about midsummer. Most of the allies, with the corn

Piraeus, transports and the smaller craft and the rest of the expe-
dition, had already received orders to muster at Corcyra,
to cross the Ionian sea from thence in a body to the
lapygian promontory. But the Athenians themselves,
and such of their allies as happened to be with them, went
down to Pirseus upon a day appointed at daybreak, and
began to man the ships for putting out to sea. With
them also went down the whole population, one may say,
of the city, both citizens and foreigners ; the inhabitants
of the country each escorting those that belonged to them,
their friends, their relatives, or their sons, with hope and
lamentation upon their way, as they thought of the con-
quests which they hoped to make, or of the friends whom
they might never see again, considering the long voyage
which they were going to make from their country. In-
deed, at this moment, when they were now upon the point
of parting from one another, the danger came more home
to them than when they voted for the expedition ; although
the strength of the armament, and the profuse provision
which they remarked in every department, was a sight that
could not but comfort them. As for the foreigners and
the rest of the crowd, they simply went to see a sight
worth looking at and passing all belief.

Indeed this armament that first sailed out was by far
the most costly and splendid Hellenic force that had ever
been sent out by a single city up to that time. In mere
number of ships and heavy infantry that against Epidaurus
under Pericles, and the same when going against Potidaea
under Hagnon, was not inferior ; containing as it did four
thousand Athenian heavy infantry, three hundred horse,
and one hundred galleys accompanied by fifty Lesbian and
Chian vessels and many allies besides. But these were Bent

31] DEPARTURE FROM PIR^US 423

upon a short voyage and with a scanty equipment. The CHAP.
present expedition was formed in contemplation of a long ^^"^'
term of service ,by land and sea alike, and was furnished B.C. 415.
with ships and troops so as to be ready for either as re- tudfand
quired. The fleet had been elaborately equipped at great splendour
cost to the captains and the state ; the treasury giving a mament.
drachma a day to each seaman, and providing empty ships,
sixty men of war and forty transports, and manning these
with the best crews obtainable ; while the captains gave a
bounty in addition to the pay from the treasury to the
thranita and crews generally, besides spending lavishly
upon figure-heads and equipments, and one and all making
the utmost exertions to enable their own ships to excel in
beauty and fast sailing. Meanwhile the land forces had
been picked from the best muster-rolls, and vied with each
other in paying great attention to their arms and personal
accoutrements. From this resulted not only a rivalry
among themselves in their different departments, but an
idea among the rest of the Hellenes that it was more a
display of power and resources than an armament against
an enemy. For if any one had counted up the public ex-
penditure of the state, and the private outlay of individuals
— that is to say, the sums which the state had already
spent upon the expedition and was sending out in the
hands of the generals, and those which individuals had
expended upon their personal outfit, or as captains of
galleys had laid out and were still to lay out upon their
vessels ; and if he had added to this the journey money
which each was likely to have provided himself with,
independently of the pay from the treasury, for a voyage
of such length, and what the soldiers or traders took with
them for the purpose of exchange — it would have been
found that many talents in all were being taken out of the
city. Indeed the expedition became not less famous for
its wonderful boldness and for the splendour of its appear-
ance, than for its overwhelming strength as compared with

424 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [32

BOOK the peoples against whom it was directed, and for the fact
XIl that this was the longest passage from home hitherto at-
B.C. 415. tempted, and the most ambitious in its objects considering
cere- the resources of those who undertook it.

monies. 'pj^g ships being now manned, and everything put on
board with which they meant to sail, the trumpet com-
manded silence, and the prayers customary before putting
out to sea were offered, not in each ship by itself, but by
all together to the voice of a herald ; and bowls of wine
were mixed through all the armament, and libations made
by the soldiers and their officers in gold and silver goblets.
In their prayers joined aiso the crowds on shore, the
citizens and all others that wished them well. The hymn
sung and the libations finished, they put out to sea, and
first sailing out in column then raced each other as far as
JEgina, and so hastened to reach Corcyra, where the rest
of the allied forces weie also assembling.

CHAPTER XIX

Seventeenth Year of the War — Parties at Syracuse-
Story of Harmodius and Aristogiton— Disgrace of
Alcibiades

Meanwhile at Syracuse news came in from many quarters
of the expedition, but for a long while met with no
credence whatever. Indeed, an assembly was held in
which speeches, as will be seen, were delivered by dif-
ferent orators, believing or contradicting the report of the
Athenian expedition ; among whom Hermocrates, son of
Hermon, came forward, being persuaded that he knew the
truth of the matter, and gave the following counsel : —

♦ Although I shall perhaps be no better believed than
others have been when I speak upon the reality of the
expedition, and although I know that those who either

sion.

33] SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES 425

make or repeat statements thought not worthy of belief ^^ix^'
not only gain no converts, but are thought fools for their — '
pains, I shall certainly not be frightened into holding my f^^f*
tongue when the state is in danger, and when I am per- nence of
suaded that I can speak with more authority on the matter ,
than other persons. Much as you wonder at it, the
Athenians nevertheless have set out against us with a
large force, naval and military, professedly to help the
Egestseans and to restore Leontini, but really to conquer
Sicily, and above all our city, which once gained, the
rest, they think, will easily follow. Make up your minds,
therefore, to see them speedily here, and see how you can
best repel them with the means under your hand, and do
not be taken off your guard through despising the news, or
neglect the common weal through disbelieving it. Mean-
while those who believe me need not be dismayed at the
force or daring of the enemy. They will not be able to
do us more hurt than we shall do them ; nor is the great-
ness of their armament altogether without advantage to us.
Indeed, the greater it is the better, with regard to the
rest of the Siceliots, whom dismay will make more ready
to join us ; and if we defeat or drive them away, disap-
pointed of the objects of their ambition (for I do not fear
for a moment that they will get what they want), it will
be a most glorious exploit for us, and in my judgment by
no means an unlikely one. Few indeed have been the
large armaments, either Hellenic or barbarian, that have
gone far from home and been successful. They cannot
be more numerous than the people of the country and
their neighbours, all of whom fear leagues together ; and
if they miscarry for want of supplies in a foreign land, to
those against whom their plans were laid none the less
they leave renown, although they may themselves have
been the main cause of their own discomfort. Thus
these very Athenians rose by the defeat of the Mede, in
a great measure due to accidental causes, from the mere

426 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [34

BOOK fact that Athens had been the object of his attack ; and
^ this may very well be the case with us also.

B.C. 415- < Let us, therefore, confidently begin preparations here ;
instant let US send and confirm some of the Sicels, and obtain the

prepara- friendship and alliance of others, and despatch envoys to
the rest of Sicily to show that the danger is common to
all, and to Italy to get them to become our allies, or at
all events to refuse to receive the Athenians. I also
think that it would be best to send to Carthage as well ;
they are by no means there without apprehension, but it
is their constant fear that the Athenians may one day
attack their city, and they may perhaps think that they
might themselves suflPer by letting Sicily be sacrificed, and
be willing to help us secretly if not openly, in one way if
not in another. They are the best able to do so, if they
will, of any of the present day, as they possess most gold
and silver, by which war, like everything else, flourishes.
Let us also send to Lacedsemon and Corinth, and ask
them to come here and help us as soon as possible, and
to keep alive the war in Hellas. But the true thing of
all others, in my opinion, to do at the present moment, is
what you, with your constitutional love of quiet, will be
slow to see, and what I must nevertheless mention. If
we Siceliots, all together, or at least as many as possible
besides ourselves, would only launch the whole of our
actual navy with two months' provisions, and meet the
Athenians at Tarentum and the lapygian promontory,
and show them that before fighting for Sicily they must
first fight for their passage across the Ionian sea, we
should strike dismay into their army, and set them
on thinking that we have a base for our defensive — for
Tarentum is ready to receive us — while they have a wide
sea to cross with all their armament, which could with
difficulty keep its order through so long a voyage, and
would be easy for us to attack as it came on slowly and
in small detachments. On the other hand, if they were

34] SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES 427

to lighten their vessels, and draw together their fast sailers CHAP.
and with these attack us, we could either fall upon them _
when they were wearied with rowing, or if we did not B.C. 41s
choose to do so, we could retire to Tarentum ; while tage of
they, having crossed with few provisions just to give fj|®gjjg^y
battle, would be hard put to it in desolate places, and at sea.
would either have to remain and be blockaded, or to try
to sail along the coast, abandoning the rest of their arma-
ment, and being further discouraged by not knowing for
certain whether the cities would receive them. In my
opinion this consideration alone would be sufficient to
deter them from putting out from Corcyra ; and what
with deliberating and reconnoitring our numbers and
whereabouts, they would let the season go on until winter
was upon them, or, confounded by so unexpected a cir-
cumstance, would break up the expedition, especially as
their most experienced general has, as I hear, taken the
command against his will, and would grasp at the first
excuse offered by any serious demonstration of ours. We
should also be reported, I am certain, as more numerous
than we really are, and men's minds are affected by what
they hear, and besides the first to attack, or to show that
they mean to defend themselves against an attack, inspire
greater fear because men see that they are ready for the
emergency. This would just be the case with the
Athenians at present. They are now attacking us in
the belief that we shall not resist, having a right to judge
us severely because we did not help the Lacedaemonians
in crushing them ; but if they were to see us showing a
courage for which they are not prepared, they would be
more dismayed by the surprise than they could ever be
by our actual power. I could wish to persuade you to
show this courage ; but if this cannot be, at all events
lose not a moment in preparing generally for the war ;
and remember all of you that contempt for an assailant is
best shown by bravery in action, but that for the present

428 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [35,36

BOOK the best course is to accept the preparations which fear

XL inspires as giving the surest promise of safety, and to act

B.C. 415. as if the danger was real. That the Athenians are coming

^*goras to attack. US, and are already upon the voyage, and all but

treats the here — this is what I am sure of.'

^*w?th Thus far spoke Hermocrates. Meanwhile the people
scorn. q£ Syracuse were at great strife among themselves ; some
contending that the Athenians had no idea of coming and
that there was no truth in what he said ; some asking if
they did come what harm they could do that would not
be repaid them tenfold in return ; while others made light
of the whole affair and turned it into ridicule. In short,
there were few that believed Hermocrates and feared for
the future. Meanwhile Athenagoras, the leader of the
people and very powerful at that time with the masses,
came forward and spoke as follows : —

* For the Athenians, he who does not wish that they
may be as misguided as they are supposed to be, and that
they may come here to become our subjects, is either a
coward or a traitor to his country ; while as for those
who carry such tidings and fill you with so much alarm,
I wonder less at their audacity than at their folly if they
flatter themselves that we do not see through them. The
fact is that they have their private reasons to be afraid,
and wish to throw the city into consternation to have
their own terrors cast into the shade by the public alarm.
In short, this is what these reports are worth ; they do
not arise of themselves, but are concocted by men who
are always causing agitation here in Sicily. However, if
you are well advised, you will not be guided in your cal-
culation of probabilities by what these persons tell you,
but by what shrewd men and of large experience, as I
esteem the Athenians to be, would be likely to do. Now
it is not likely that they would leave the Peloponnesians
behind them, and before they have well ended the war
in Hellas wantonly come in quest of a new war quite as

37,38] SPEECH OF ATHENAGORAS 429

arduous, in Sicily ; indeed, in my judgment, they are only CHAP.

too glad that we do not go and attack them, being so

many and so great cities as we are. B.C. 415.

* However, if they should come as is reported, I con- repefany
sider Sicily better able to go through with the war than 'nvader.
Peloponnese, as being at all points better prepared, and

our city by itself far more than a match for this pre-
tended army of invasion, even were it twice as large
again. I know that they will not have horses with them, or
get any here, except a few perhaps from the Egestaeans ;
or be able to bring a force of heavy infantry equal in number
to our own, in ships which will already have enough to
do to come all this distance, however lightly laden, not to
speak of the transport of the other stores required against
a city of this magnitude, which will be no slight quantity.
In fact, so strong is my opinion upon the subject, that I
do not well see how they could avoid annihilation if they
brought with them another city as large as Syracuse, and
settled down and carried on war from our frontier ; much
less can they hope to succeed with all Sicily hostile to
them, as all Sicily will be, and with only a camp pitched
from the ships, and composed of tents and bare neces-
saries, from which they would not be able to stir far for
fear of our cavalry.

* But the Athenians see this as I tell you, and as I have
reason to know are looking after their possessions at
home, while persons here invent stories that neither are
true nor ever will be. Nor is this the first time that I
see these persons, when they cannot resort to deeds,
trying by such stories and by others even more abomin-
able to frighten your people and get into their hands the
government : it is what I see always. And I cannot
help fearing that trying so often they may one day
succeed, and that we, as long as we do not feel the smart,
may prove too weak for the task of prevention, or, when
the offenders are known, of pursuit. The result is that

430 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [39.40

BOOK our city is rarely at rest, but is subject to constant troubles
XL ^^^ ^o contests as frequent against herself as against the
B.C. 4x5- enemy, not to speak of occasional tyrannies and infamous
Jf demS cabals. However, I will try, if you will support me, to
cracy. let nothing of this happen in our time, by gaining you, the
many, and by chastising the authors of such machinations,
not merely when they are caught in the act — a difficult
feat to accomplish — but also for what they have the wish
though not the power to do ; as it is necessary to punish
an enemy not only for what he does, but also beforehand
for what he intends to do, if the first to relax precaution
would not be also the first to suflfer. I shall also re-
prove, watch, and on occasion warn the few — the most
effectual v/ay, in my opinion, of turning them from their
. evil courses. And after all, as I have often asked —
What would you have, young men ? Would you hold
office at once ? The law forbids it, a law enacted rather
because you are not competent than to disgrace you when
competent. Meanwhile you would not be on a legal
equality with the many 1 But how can it be right that
citizens of the same state should be held unworthy of the
same privileges?

* It will be said, perhaps, that democracy is neither
wise nor equitable, but that the holders of property are
also the best fitted to rule. I say, on the contrary, first,
that the word demos, or people, includes the whole state,
oligarchy only a part ; next, that if the best guardians
of property are the rich, and the best counsellors the wise,
none can hear and decide so well as the many ; and that
all these talents, severally and collectively, have their just
place in a democracy. But an oligarchy gives the many
their share of the danger, and not content with the largest
part takes and keeps the whole of the profit ; and this is
what the powerful and young among you aspire to, but in
a great city cannot possibly obtain.

« But even now, foolish men, most senseless of all the

41] SPEECH OF ATHENAGORAS 431

Hellenes that I know, if you have no sense of the wicked- CHAP.
ness of your designs, or most criminal if you have that ^^*
sense and still dare to pursue them, — even now, if it is not B.C. 41s
a case for repentance, you may still learn wisdom, and to^iu *
thus advance the interest of the country, the common in- garcbs.
terest of us all. Reflect that in the country's prosperity
the men of merit in your ranks will have a share and a
larger share than the great mass of your fellow-country-
men, but that if you have other designs you run a risk of
being deprived of all ; and desist from reports like these,
as the people know your object and will not put up with
it. If the Athenians arrive, this city will repulse them in
a manner worthy of itself; we have, moreover, generals
who will see to this matter. And if nothing of this be
true, as I incline to believe, the city will not be thrown
into a panic by your intelligence, or impose upon itself a
self-chosen servitude by choosing you for its rulers ; the
city itself will look into the matter, and will judge your
words as if they were acts, and instead of allowing itself
to be deprived of its liberty by listening to you, will strive
to preserve that liberty, by taking care to have always at
hand the means o{ making itself respected.'

Such were the words of Athenagoras. One of the
generals now stood up and stopped any other speakers
coming forward, adding these words of his own with
reference to the matter in hand : — * It is not well for
speakers to utter calumnies against one another, or for
their hearers to entertain them ; we ought rather to look
to the intelligence that we have received, and see how each
man by himself and the city as a whole may best prepare
to repel the invaders. Even if there be no need, there is
no harm in the state being furnished with horses and arms
and all other insignia of war ; and we will undertake to
see to and order this, and to send round to the cities to
reconnoitre and do all else that may appear desirable.
P^rt of this we have seen to already, and whatever we

432 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [42,43

BOOK discover shall be laid before you.' After these words
Xi. from the general, the Syracusans departed from the

B.C. 415. assembly.

of araa^ 1° the meantime the Athenians with all their allies had
ment at qqw arrived at Corcyra. Here the generals began by
again reviewing the armament, and made arrangements as
to the order in which they were to anchor and encamp,
and dividing the whole fleet into three divisions, allotted
one to each of their number, to avoid sailing all together
and being thus embarrassed for water, harbourage, or pro-
visions at the stations which they might touch at, and at
the same time to be generally better ordered and easier
to handle, by each squadron having its own commander.
Next they sent on three ships to Italy and Sicily to find
out which of the cities would receive them, with instruc-
tions to meet them on the way and let them know before
they put in to land.

After this the Athenians weighed from Corcyra, and
proceeded to cross to Sicily with an armament now con-
sisting of one hundred and thirty - four galleys in all
(besides two Rhodian fifty-oars), of which one hundred
were Athenian vessels — sixty men-of-war, and forty
troopships — and the remainder from Chios and the other
allies; five thousand and one hundred heavy infantry in
all, that is to say, fifteen hundred Athenian citizens from
the rolls at Athens and seven hundred Thetes shipped as
marines, and the rest allied troops, some of them Athenian
subjects, and besides these five hundred Argives, and two
hundred and fifty Mantineans serving for hire ; four hun-
dred and eighty archers in all, eighty of whom were
Cretans, seven hundred slingers from Rhodes, one hundred
and twenty light-armed exiles from Megara, and one
horse- transport carrying thirty horses.

Such was the strength of the first armament that sailed
over for the war. The supplies for this force were carried
by thirty ships of burden laden with corn, which conveyed

44,45] ARRIVAL AT RHEGIUM 433

the bakers, stone-masons and carpenters, and the tools for CHAP.
raising fortifications, accompanied by one hundred boats, ^^
like the former pressed into the service, besides many B.C. 41s
other boats and ships of burden which followed the ontalian
armament voluntarily for purposes of trade ; all of which towns,
now left Corcyra and struck across the Ionian sea
together. The whole force making land at the lapygian
promontory and Tarentum, with more or less good for-
tune, coasted along the shores of Italy, the cities shutting
their markets and gates against them, and according them
nothing but water and liberty to anchor, and Tarentum
and Locri not even that, until they arrived at Rhegium,
the extreme point of Italy. Here at length they re-
united, and not gaining admission within the walls pitched
a camp outside the city in the precinct of Artemis, where
a market was also provided for them, and drew their ships
on shore and kept quiet. Meanwhile they opened nego-
tiations with the Rhegians, and called upon them as
Chalcidians to assist their Leontine kinsmen ; to which
the Rhegians replied that they would not side v/ith either
party, but should await the decision of the rest of the
Italiots, and do as they did. Upon this the Athenians
now began to consider what would be the btrst action to
take in the affairs of Sicily, and meanwhile waited for the
ships sent on to come back from Egesta, in order to know
whether there was really there the money mentioned by the
messengers at Athens.

In the meantime came in from all quarters to the
Syracusans, as well as from their own officers sent to
reconnoitre, the positive tidings that the fleet was at
Rhegium; upon which they laid aside their incredulity
and threw themselves heart and soul into the work of
preparation. Guards or envoys, as the case might be, were
sent round to the Sicels, garrisons put into the posts of
the Peripoli in the country, horses and arms reviewed in
the city to see that nothing was wanting, and all other
p 455

434 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [46, 47

BOOK Steps taken to prepare for a war which might be upou

^^- them at any moment.
B.C. 415. Meanwhile the three ships that had been sent on came
thl's&es- from Egesta to the Athenians at Rhegium, with the news
tseans. ^^t SO far from there being the sums promised, all that
could be produced was thirty talents. The generals were
not a little disheartened at being thus disappointed at the
outset, and by the refusal to join in the expedition of the
Rhegians, the people they had first tried to gain and had
had most reason to count upon, from their relationship
to the Leontines and constant friendship for Athens. If
Nicias was prepared for the news from Egesta, his two
colleagues were taken completely by surprise. The
Egestasans had had recourse to the following stratagem,
when the first envoys from Athens came to inspect their
resources. They took the envoys in question to the
temple of Aphrodite at Eryx and showed them the
treasures deposited there; bowls, wine-ladles, censers,
and a large number of other pieces of plate, which from
being in silver gave an impression of wealth quite out of
proportion to their really small value. They also pri-
vately entertained the ships' crews, and collected all the
cups of gold and silver that they could find in Egesta
itself or could borrow in the neighbouring Phcenician and
Hellenic towns, and each brought them to the banquets as
their own ; and as all used pretty nearly the same, and
everywhere a great quantity of plate was shown, the effect
was most dazzling upon the Athenian sailors, and made
them talk loudly of the riches they had seen when they
got back to Athens. The dupes in question — who had
in their turn persuaded the rest — when the news got
abroad that there was not the money supposed at Egesta,
were much blamed by the soldiers.

Meanwhile the generals consulted upon what was to be
done. The opinion of Nicias was to sail with all the
armament to Seiinus, the main object of the expedition,

48, 49] ATHENIAN COUNCIL OF WAR 435

and if the Egestaeans could provide money for the whole CHAP.

force, to advise accordingly ; but if they could not, to ^^^

require them to supply provisions for the sixty ships that B.C. 4x5.

they had asked for, to stay and settle matters between o/the°°^

them and the Selinuntines either bv force or by agree- ^^'^^^ ,

11 1 "1 • • ^ t° r general*

ment, and then to coast past the other cities, and after

displaying the power of Athens and proving their zeal

for their friends and allies, to sail home again (unless they

should have some sudden and unexpected opportunity of

serving the Leontines, or of bringing over some of the

other cities), and not to endanger the state by wasting its

home resources.

Alcibiades said that a great expedition like the present
must not disgrace itself by going away without having
done anything ; heralds must be sent to all the cities
except Selinus and Syracuse, and efforts be made to
make some of the Sicels revolt from the Syracusans, and
to obtain the friendship of others, in order to have corn
and troops ; and first of all to gain the Messinese, who
lay right in the passage and entrance to Sicily, and would
afford an excellent harbour and base for the army. Thus,
after bringing over the towns and knowing who would be
their allies in the war, they might at length attack Syra-
cuse and Selinus ; unless the latter came to terms with
Egesta and the former ceased to oppose the restoration of
Leontini.

Lamachus, on the other hand, said that they ought to
sail straight to Syracuse, and fight their battle at once
under the walls of the town while the people were still
unprepared, and the panic at its height. Every armament
was most terrible at first ; if it allowed time to run on
without showing itself, men's courage revived, and they
saw it appear at last almost with indifference. By attack-
ing suddenly, while Syracuse still trembled at their coming,
they would have the best chance of gaining a victory for
themselves and of striking a complete panic into the

436 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [50

BOOK enemy by the aspect of their numbers — which would

V^- never appear so considerable as at present — b)/ the anti-

B.C. 415. cipation of coming disaster, and above all by the im-

auJdil mediate danger of the engagement. They might also

course count upon surprising many in the fields outside,

*^ ^°' incredulous of their coming ; and at the moment that

the enemy was carrying in his property the army would

not want for booty if it sat down in force before the city.

The rest of the Siceliots would thus be immediately less

disposed to enter into alliance with the Syracusans, and

would join the Athenians, without waiting to see which

were the strongest. They must make Megara their naval

station as a place to retreat to and a base from which to

attack : it was an uninhabited place at no great distance

from Syracuse either by land or by sea.

After speaking to this effect, Lamachus nevertheless
gave his support to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this
Alcibiades sailed in his own vessel across to Messina
with proposals of alliance, but met with no success, the
inhabitants answering that they could not receive him
within their walls, though they would provide him with
a market outside. Upon this he sailed back to Rhegium.
Immediately upon his return the generals manned and
victualled sixty ships out of the whole fleet and coasted
along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the armament behind
them at Rhegium with one of their number. Received
by the Naxians, they then coasted on to Catana, and
being refused admittance by the inhabitants, there being a
Syracusan party in the town, went on to the river Terias.
Here they bivouacked, and the next day sailed in single
file to Syracuse with all their ships except ten which they
sent on in front to sail into the great harbour and see if
there was any fleet launched, and to proclaim by herald
from shipboard that the Athenians were come to restore
the Leontines to their country, as being their allies and
kinsmen, and that such of them, therefore, as were in

5i»52] SURPRISE OF CATANA 437

Syracuse should leave it without fear and join their friends CHAP.
and benefactors the Athenians. After making this pro- ^^^'
clamation and reconnoitring the city and the harbours, and B.C. 415.
the features of the country which they would have to remo^^
make their base of operations in the war, they sailed back to
to Catana.

An assembly being held here, the inhabitants refused
to receive the armament, but invited the generals to come
in and say what they desired ; and while Alcibiades was
speaking and the citizens were intent on the assembly,
the soldiers broke down an ill -walled -up postern -gate
without being observed, and getting inside the town,
flocked into the market-place. The Syracusan party in
the town no sooner saw the army inside than they became
frightened and withdrew, not being at all numerous ; while
the rest voted for an alliance with the Athenians and in-
vited them to fetch the rest of their forces from Rhegium.
After this the Athenians sailed to Rhegium, and put off,
this time with all the armament, for Catana, and fell to
work at their camp immediately upon their arrival.

Meanwhile word was brought them from Camarina that
if they went there the town would go over to them, and
also that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. The
Athenians accordingly sailed along shore with all their
armament, first to Syracuse, where they found no fleet
manning, and so always along the coast to Camarina, .
where they brought to at the beach, and sent a herald to
the people, who, however, refused to receive them, saying
that their oaths bound them to receive the Athenians only
with a single vessel, unless they themselves sent for more.
Disappointed here, the Athenians now sailed back again,
and after landing and plundering on Syracusan territory
and losing some stragglers from their light infantry through
the coming up of the Syracusan horse, so got back to
Catana.

There they found the Salaminia come from Athens for

438 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [53. 54

BOOK Alcibiades, with orders for him to sail home to answer
Xll the charges which the state brought against him, and for

B.C. 415. certain others of the soldiers who with him were accused
^^Ald- of sacrilege in the matter of the mysteries and of the
biades. Hermas. For the Athenians, after the departure of the
expedition, had continued as active as ever in investigating
the facts of the mysteries and of the Hermae, and, instead
of testing the informers, in their suspicious temper wel-
comed all indifferently, arresting and imprisoning the best
citizens upon the evidence of rascals, and preferring to sift
the matter to the bottom sooner than to let an accused
person of good character pass unquestioned, owing to the
rascality of the informer. The commons had heard how
oppressive the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had
become before it ended, and further that that tyranny had
been put down at last, not by themselves and Harmodius,
but by the Lacedaemonians, and so were always in fear
and took everything suspiciously.

Indeed, the daring action of Aristogiton and Harmo-
dius was undertaken in consequence of a love affair, which
I shall relate at some length, to show that the Athenians
are not more accurate than the rest of the world in their
accounts of their own tyrants and of the facts of their own
history. Pisistratus dying at an advanced age in possession
of the tyranny, was succeeded by his eldest son, Hippias,
and not Hipparchus, as is vulgarly believed. Harmodius
was then in the flower of youthful beauty, and Aristogiton,
a citizen in the middle rank of life, was his lover and
possessed him. Solicited without success by Hipparchus,
son of Pisistratus, Harmodius told Aristogiton, and the
enraged lover, afraid that the powerful Hipparchus might
take Harmodius by force, immediately formed a design,
such as his condition in life permitted, for overthrowing
the tyranny. In the meantime Hipparchus, after a second
solicitation of Harmodius, attended with no better suc-
cess, unwilling to use violence, arranged to insult him in

55] HARMODIUS AND ARISTOGITON 439

some covert way. Indeed, generally their government CHAP.
was not grievous to the multitude, or in any way odious ■^^^'
in practice ; and these tyrants cultivated wisdom and Athens
virtue as much as any, and without exacting from the tyrants. *
Athenians more than a twentieth of their income, splen-
didly adorned their city, and carried on their wars, and
provided sacrifices for the temples. For the rest, the city
was left in full enjoyment of its existing laws, except that
care was always taken to have the offices in the hands of
some one of the family. Among those of them that held
the yearly archonship at Athens was Pisistratus, son of
the tyrant Hippias, and named after his grandfather, who
dedicated during his term of office the altar to the twelve
gods in the market-place, and that of Apollo in the
Pythian precinct. The Athenian people afterwards built
on to and lengthened the altar in the market-place, and
obliterated the inscription ; but that in the Pythian pre-
cinct can still be seen, though in faded letters, and is to
the following effisct ; —

Pisistratus, the son of Hippias,
Set up this record of his archonship
In precinct of Apollo Pythias.

That Hippias was the eldest son and succeeded to the
government, is what I positively assert as a fact upon
which I have had more exact accounts than others, and
may be also ascertained by the following circumstance.
He is the only one of the legitimate brothers that appears
to have had children ; as the altar shows, and the pillar
placed in the Athenian Acropolis, commemorating the
crime of the tyrants, which mentions no child of Thes-
salus or of Hipparchus, but five of Hippias, which he had
by Myrrhine, daughter of Callias, bon of Hyperechides ;
and naturally the eldest would have married first. Again,
his name comes first on the pillar after that of his father ;

440 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [56, 57

BOOK and this too is quite natural, as he was the eldest after
YIl him, and the reigning tyrant. Nor can I ever believe

The plot that Hippias would have obtained the tyranny so easily,
^ton' if Hipparchus had been in power when he was killed, and
he, Hippias, had had to establish himself upon the same
day ; but he had no doubt been long accustomed to over-
awe the citizens, and to be obeyed by his mercenaries,
and thus not only conquered, but conquered with ease,
without experiencing any of the embarrassment of a
younger brother unused to the exercise of authority. It
was the sad fate which made Hipparchus famous that
got him also the credit with posterity of having been
tyrant.

To return to Harmodius ; Hipparchus having been
repulsed in his solicitations insulted him as he had re-
solved, by first inviting a sister of his, a young girl, to
come and bear a basket in a certain procession, and then
rejecting her, on the plea that she had never been invited
at all owing to her unworthiness. If Harmodius was
indignant at this, Aristogiton for his sake now became
more exasperated than ever ; and having arranged every-
thing with those who were to join them in the enterprise,
they only waited for the great feast of the Panathenaea,
the sole day upon which the citizens forming part of the
procession could meet together in arms without suspicion.
Aristogiton and Harmodius were to begin, but were to be
supported immediately by their accomplices against the
bodyguard. The conspirators were not many, for better
security, besides which they hoped that those not in the
plot would be carried away by the example of a few
daring spirits, and use the arms in their hands to recover
their liberty.

At last the festival arrived ; and Hippias with his
bodyguard was outside the city in the Ceramicus, arrang-
ing how the different parts of the procession were to pro-
ceed. Harmodius and Aristogiton had already their

58, 59] HARMODIUS AND ARISTOGITON 441

daggers and were getting ready to act, when seeing one CHAP.
of their accomplices talking familiarly with Hippias, who
was easy of access to every one, they took fright, and Assassi-
concluded that they were discovered and on the point of Hippar-
being taken ; and eager if possible to be revenged first <=^^s-
upon the man who had wronged them and for whom
they had undertaken all this risk, they rushed, as they
were, within the gates, and meeting with Hipparchus by
the Leocorium recklessly fell upon him at once, infuriated,
Aristogiton by love, and Harmodius by insult, and smote
him and slew him. Aristogiton escaped the guards at the
moment, through the crowd running up, but was after-
wards taken and dispatched in no merciful way : Har-
modius was killed on the spot.

When the news was brought to Hippias in the
Ceramicus, he at once proceeded not to the scene of
action, but to the armed men in the procession, before
they, being some distance away, knew anything of the
matter, and composing his features for the occasion, so as
not to betray himself, pointed to a certain spot, and bade
them repair thither without their arms. They withdrew
accordingly, fancying he had something to say ; upon
which he told the mercenaries to remove the arms, and
there and then picked out the men he thought guilty and
all found with daggers, the shield and spear being the
usual weapons for a procession.

In this way offended love first led Harmodius and
Aristogiton to conspire, and the alarm of the moment to
commit the rash action recounted. After this the
tyranny pressed harder on the Athenians, and Hippias,
now grown more fearful, put to death many of the
citizens, and at the same time began to turn his eyes
abroad for a refuge in case of revolution. Thus, although
an Athenian, he gave his daughter, Archedice, to a
Lampsacene, iEantides, son of the tyrant of Lampsacus,
seeing that they had great influence with Darius. And
*P 455

442 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [60

BOOK there is her tomb in Lampsacus with this inscrip-
Xi: tion:-

B.C. 415. Archedice lies buried in this earth,

Atmos- Hippias her sire, and Athens gave her birth :

phere of ^^^^ ^^ bosom pride tvas never inoivn,

^"^^' at Though daughter, •wife, and sister to the throne.

Athens.

Hippias, after reigning three years longer over the
Athenians, was deposed in the fourth by the Lacedae-
monians and the banished AJcmasonidae, and went with
a safe conduct to Sigeum, and to jEantides at
Lampsacus, and from thence to King Darias ; from
whose court he set out twenty years after, in his old age,
and came with the Medes to Marathon.

With these events in their minds, and recalling every-
thing they knew by hearsay on the subject, the Athenian
people grew difRcult of humour and suspicious of the
persons charged in the affair of the mysteries, and per-
suaded that all that had taken place was part of an
oligarchical and monarchical conspiracy. In the state
of irritation thus produced, many persons of consideration
had been already thrown into prison, and far from show-
ing any signs of abating, public feeling grew daily more
savage, and more arrests were made ; until at last one of
those in custody, thought to be the most guilty of all,
was induced by a fellow-prisoner to make a revelation,
whether true or not is a matter on which there are two
opinion's, no one having been able, either then or since,
to say for certain who did the deed. However this may
be, the other found arguments to persuade him, that even
if he had not done it, he ought to save himself by gaining
a promise of impunity, and free the state of its present
suspicions ; as he would be surer of safety if he confessed
after promise of impunity than if he denied and were
brought to trial. He accordingly made a revelation,
affecting himself and others in die affair of the Herms ;
and the Athenian people, glad at last, as they supposed,

6i] RECALL OF ALCIBIADES 443

to get at the truth, and furious until then at not being CHAP
able to discover those who had conspired against the
commons, at once let go the informer and all the rest B.C. 415.
whom he had not denounced, and bringing the accused at Athens
to trial executed as many as were apprehended, and con- ^J'f^'
demned to death such as had fled and set a price upon blades,
their heads. In this it was, after all, not clear whether
the sufferers had been punished unjustly, while in any
case the rest of the city received immediate and manifest
relief.

To return to Alcibiades : public feeling was very
hostile to him, being worked on by the same enemies
who had attacked him before he went out ; and now that
the Athenians fancied that they had got at the truth of
the matter of the Hermas, they believed more firmly than
ever that the affair of the mysteries also, in which he was
implicated, had been contrived by him in the same
intention and was connected with the plot against the
democracy. Meanwhile it so happened that, just at the
time of this agitation, a small force of Lacedzemonians
had advanced as far as the Isthmus, in pursuance of some
scheme with the Boeotians. It was now thought that
this had come by appointment, at his instigation, and not
on account of the Boeotians, and that if the citizens had
not acted on the information received, and forestalled
them by arresting the prisoners, the city would have
been betrayed. The citizens went so far as to sleep one
night armed in the temple of Theseus within the walls.
The friends also of Alcibiades at Argos were just at this
time suspected of a design to attack the commons ; and
the Argive hostages deposited in the islands were given
up by the Athenians to the Argive people to be put to
death upon that account : in short, everywhere some-
thing was found to create suspicion against Alcibiades.
It was therefore decided to bring him to trial and
execute him, and the Salaminia was sent to Sicily for

444 THE PELOFONNESIAN WAR [62

BOOK him and the others named in the information, with

1 instructions to order him to come and answer the charges

B.C. 415. against him, but not to arrest him, because thev wished

Hises- ^ ., ' . • • • 1 '' 1

cape and to avoid causmg any agitation in the army or among the

outlawry, enemy in Sicily, and above all to retain the services of

the Mantineans and Ar gives, who, it was thought, had

been induced to join by his influence. Alcibiades, with

his own ship and his fellow-accused, accordingly sailed

off with the Salaminia from Sicily, as though to return

to Athens, and went with her as far as Thurii, and there

they left the ship and disappeared, being afraid to go

home for trial with such a prejudice existing against

them. The crew of the Salaminia stayed some time

looking for AJcibiades and his companions, and at

length, as they were nowhere to be found, set sail and

departed. Alcibiades, now an outlaw, crossed in a boat

not long after from Thurii to Peloponnese ; and the

Athenians passed sentence of death by default upon him

and those in his company.

CHAPTER XX

Seventeenth and Eigfhteenth Years of the War — In-
action of the Athenian Army — Alcibiades at Sparta
—Investment of Syracuse

The Athenian generals left in Sicily nov/ divided the
armament into two parts, and each taking one by lot,
sailed with the whole for Selinus and Egesta, wishing to
know whether the Egestaeans would give the money, and
to look into the question of Selinus and ascertain the state
of the quarrel between her and Egesta. Coasting along
Sicily, with the shore on their left, on the side towards
the Tyrrhene Gulf, they touched at Himera, the only
Hellenic city in that part of the island, and being refused

63, 64] THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT 445

admission resumed their voyage. On their way they CHAP
took Hyccara, a petty Sicanian seaport, nevertheless at ^'
war with Egesta, and making slaves of the inhabitants B.C. 415.
gave up the town to the Egestaeans, some of whose horse denceof
had joined them ; after which the army proceeded through *^® Syra-
the territory of the Sicels until it reached Catana, while
the fleet sailed along the coast v/ith the slaves on board.
Meanwhile Nicias sailed straight from Hyccara along the
coast and went to Egesta, and after transacting his other
business and receiving thirty talents, rejoined the forces.
They now sold their slaves for the sum of one hundred
and twenty talents, and sailed round to their Sicel allies
to urge them to send troops ; and meanwhile went with
half their own force to the hostile town of Hybla in the
territory of Gela, but did not succeed in taking it.

Summer was now over. The winter following, the
Athenians at once began to prepare for moving on Syra-
cuse, and the Syracusans on their side for marching
against them. From the moment when the Athenians
failed to attack them instantly as they at first feared and
expected, every day that passed did something to revive
their courage ; and when they saw them sailing far away
from them on the other side of Sicily, and going to
Hybla only to fail in their attempts to storm it, they
thought less of them than ever, and called upon their
generals, as the multitude is apt to do in its moments of
confidence, to lead them to Catana, since the enemy
would not come to them. Parties also of the Syracusan
horse employed in reconnoitring constantly rode up to the
Athenian armament, and among other insults asked them
whether they had not really come to settle with the Syra-
cusans in a foreign country rather than to resettle the
Leontines in their own.

Aware of this, the Athenian generals determined to
draw them out in mass as far as possible from the city,
and themselves in the meantime to sail by night along

446 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [65

BOOK shore, and take up at their leisure a convenient position.
^ l^iis they knew they could not so well do, if they had
B.C. 41S to disembark from their ships in front of a force prepared
^Jem for them, or to go by land openly. The numerous cavalry
Athenian ^^ ^^^ Syracusans (a force which they were themselves
generals, without), would then be able to do the greatest mischief
to their light troops and the crowd that followed them ;
but this plan would enable them to take up a position in
which the horse could do them no hurt worth speaking
of, some Syracusan exiles with the army having told
them of the spot near the Olympieum, which they after-
wards occupied. In pursuance of their idea, the generals
imagined the following stratagem. They sent to Syra-
cuse a man devoted to them, and by the Syracusan
generals thought to be no less in their interest ; he was a
native of Catana, and said he came from persons in tliat
place, whose names the Syracusan generals were ac-
quainted with, and whom they knew to be among the
members of their party still left in the city. He told
them that the Athenians passed the night in the town,
at some distance from their arms, and that if the Syra-
cusans would name a day and come with all their people
at daybreak to attack the armament, they, their friends,
would close the gates upon the trooj^s in the city, and set
iire to the vessels, while the Syracusans would easily take
the camp by an attack upon the stockade. In this they
would be aided by many of the Catanians, who were
already prepared to act, and from whom he himself
came.

The generals of the Syracusans, who did not want
confidence, and who had intended even without this to
march on Catana, believed the man without any sufficient
inquiry, fixed at once a day upon which they would be
there, and dismissed him, and the Selinuntines and others
of their allies having now arrived, gave orders for all the
Syracusans to march out in mass. Their preparations

66, 67] LANDING OF THE ATHENIANS 447

completed, and the time fixed for their arrival being at CHAP.
hand, they set out for Catana, and passed the night upon ^^
the river Symsthus, in the Leontine territory. Mean- B.C. 415.
while the Athenians no sooner knew of their approach Athenians
than they took all their forces and such of the Sicels ]^^^ *t
or others as had joined them, put them on board their ^'^^'^
ships and boats, and sailed by night to Syracuse. Thus,
when morning broke the Athenians were landing opposite
the Olympieum ready to seize their camping ground, and
the Syracusan horse having ridden up first to Catana and
found that ail the armament had put to sea, turned back
and told the infantry, and then all turned back together,
and went to the relief of the city.

In the meantime, as the march before the Syracusans
was a long one, the Athenians quietly sate down their
army in a convenient position, where they could begin an
engagement when they pleased, and where the Syracusan
cavaliy would have least opportunity of annoying them,
either before or during the action, being fenced off on one
side by walls, houses, trees, and by a marsh, and on the
other by cliffs. They also felled the neighbouring trees
and carried them down to the sea, and formed a palisade
alongside of their ships, and with stones which they
picked up and wood hastily raised a fort at Daskon, the
most vulnerable point of their position, and broke down
the bridge over the Anapus. These preparations were
allov/ed to go on without any interruption from the city,
the first hostile force to appear being the Syracusan cavalry,
followed afterwards by all the foot together. At first
they came close up to the Athenian army, and then, find-
ing that they did not offer to engage, crossed the Helorine
road and encamped for the night.

The next day the Athenians and their allies prepared
for battle, their dispositions being as follows : — Their
right wing was occupied by the Argives and Mantineans,
the centre by the Athenians, and the rest of the field by

443 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [68

BOOK the Other allies. Half their army was drawn up eight
Y}i deep in advance, half close to their tents in a hollow
B.C. 415; square, formed also eight deep, which had orders to look,
speech^o ^ut and be ready to go to the support of the troops hardest
his anny. pressed. The camp followers were placed inside this re-
serve. The Syracusans, meanwhile, formed their heavy
infantry sixteen deep, consisting of the mass-levy of their
own people, and such allies as had joined them, the
strongest contingent being that of the Selinuntines ; next
to them the cavalry of the Geloans, numbering two hun-
dred in all, with about twenty horse and fifty archers
from Camarina. The cavalry was posted on their right,
full twelve hundred strong, and next to it the darters.
As the Athenians were about to begin the attack, Nicias
went along the lines, and addressed these w^ords of en-
couragement to the army and the nations composing it: —
* Soldiers, a long exhortation is little needed by men
like ourselves, v.'ho are here to fight in the same battle,
the force itself being, to my thinking, more fit to inspire
confidence than a fine speech with a weak army. Where
we have Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the first
of the islanders in the ranks together, it were strange
indeed, with so many and so brave companions in arms,
if we did not feel confident of victory ; especially when
we have mass-levies opposed to our picked troops, and
what is more, Siceliots, who may disdain us but will not
stand against us, their skill not being at all commensurate
to their rashness. You may also remember that we are
far from home and have no friendly land near, except
what your own swords shall win you ; and here I put
before you a motive just the reverse of that which the
enemy are appealing to ; their cry being that they shall
fight for their country, mine that we shall fight for a
country that is not ours, where we must conquer or hardly
get away, as we shall have their horse upon us in great
numbers. Remember, therefore, your renown, and go

69] BATTLE BEFORE SYRACUSE 449

boldly against the enemy, thinking the present strait and CHAP.

necessity more terrible than they.'

After this address Nicias at once led on the army. B C. 415.

_,. _, , • Motives

The Syracusans were not at that moment expectmg of the
an immediate engagement, and some had even gone away ^^^JJ"^
to the town, which was close by ; these now ran up ants,
as hard as they could, and though behind time, took
their places here or there in the main body as fast as they
joined it. Want of zeal or daring was certainly not the
fault of the Syracusans, either in this or the other battles,
but although not inferior in courage, so far as their mili-
tary science might carry them, when this failed them they
were compelled to give up their resolution also. On the
present occasion, although they had not supposed that the
Athenians would begin the attack, and although con-
strained to stand upon their defence at short notice, they
at once took up their arms and advanced to meet them.
First, the stone-throwers, slingers, and archers oi either
army began skirmishing, and routed or were routed by
one another, as might be expected between light troops ;
next, soothsayers brought forward the usual victims, and
trumpeters urged on the heavy infantry to the charge ; and
thus they advanced, the Syracusans to fight for their
country, and each individual for his safety that day and
liberty hereafter ; in the enemy's army, the Athenians to
make another's country theirs and to save their own from
suffering by their defeat; the Argives and independent allies
to help them in getting what they came for, and to earn
by victory another sight of the country they had left
behind ; while the subject allies owed most of their ardour
to the desire of self-preservation, which they could only
hope for if victorious ; next to which, as a secondary
motive, came the chance of serving on easier terms, after
helping the Athenians to a fresh conquest.

The armies now came to close quarters, and for a long
while fought without either giving ground. Meanwhile

450 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [70, 71

BOOK there occurred some claps of thunder with lightning and
heavy rain, which did not fail to add to the fears of the
B.C. 415- party fighting for the first time, and very little acquainted
of th& with war; while to their more experienced adversaries
Athenians these phenomena appeared to be produced by the time of
year, and much more alarm was felt at the continued re-
sistance of the enemy. At last the Argives drove in the
Syracusan left, and after them the Athenians routed the
troops opposed to them, and the Syracusan army was thus
cut in two and betook itself to flight. The Athenians
did not pursue far, being held in check by the numerous
and undefeated Syracusan horse, who attacked and drove
back any of their heavy infantry whom they saw pursuing
in advance of the rest ; in spite of which the victors
followed so far as was safe in a bodv, and then went back
and set up a trophy. Meanwhile the Syracusans rallied
at the Helorine road, where they reformed as well as they
could under the circumstances, and even sent a garrison of
their own citizens to the Olympieum, fearing that the
Athenians might lay hands on some of the treasures there.
The rest returned to the town.

The Athenians, however did not go to the temple, but
collected their dead and laid them upon a pyre, and
passed the night upon the field. The next day they gave
the enemy back their dead under truce, to the number of
about two hundred and sixty, Syracusans and allies, and
gathered together the bones of their own, some fifty,
Athenians and allies, and taking the spoils of the enemy,
sailed back to Catana. It was now winter ; and it did
not seem possible for the moment to carry on the war
before Syracuse, until horse should have been sent for
from Athens and levied among the allies in Sicily — to do
away with their utter inferiority in cavalry — and money
should have been collected in the country and received
from Athens, and until some of the cities, which they
hoped would be now more disposed to listen to them after

72] COUNSELS OF HERMOCRATES 4Si

the battle, should have been brought over, and corn and CHAP

all other necessaries provided, for a campaign in the

spring against Syracuse. -, , ^ M . CounUfs

With this intention they sailed on to JNaxos andofHermo
Catana for the winter. Meanwhile the Syracusans burned |^y^*^f *°
their dead, and then held an assembly, in which Hermo- cusans.
crates, son of Hermon, a man who with a general ability
of the first order had given proofs of military capacity and
brilliant courage in the war, came forward and encouraged
them, and told them not to let what had occurred make
them give way, since their spirit had not been conquered,
but their want of discipline had done the mischief Still
they had not been beaten by so much as might have been
expected, especially as they were, one might say, novices
in the art of war, an army of artizans opposed to the most
practised soldiers in Hellas. What had also done great
mischief was the number of the generals (there were
fifteen of them) and the quantity of orders given, com-
bined with the disorder and insubordination of the troops.
But if they were to have a few skilful generals, and used
this winter in preparing their heavy infantry, finding arms
for such as had not got any, so as to make them as
numerous as possible, and forcing them to attend to their
training generally, they would have every chance of beat-
ing their adversaries, courage being already theirs and
discipline in the field having thus been added to it. In-
deed, both these qualities would improve, since danger
would exercise them in discipline, while their courage
would be led to surpass itiself by the confidence which
skill inspires. The generals should be few and elected
with full powers, and an oath should be taken to leave
them entire discretion in their command : if they adopted
this plan, their secrets would be better kept, all pre-
parations would be properly made, and there would be no
room for excuses.

The Syracusans heard Idm, and voted everything as

45« THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [73, 74

BOOK he advised, and elected three generals, Hermocrates him-
self, Heraclides, son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus, son of

B.C. 415. Execestes. They also sent envoys to Corinth and Lace-
winte?at dasmon to procure a force of allies to join them, and to in-
Naxos. duce the Lacedaemonians for their sakes openly to address
■themselves in real earnest to the war against the Athe-
nians, that they might either have to leave Sicily or be
less able to send reinforcements to their army there.

The Athenian forces at Catana now at once sailed
against Messina, in the expectation of its being betrayed
to them. The intrigue, however, after all came to nothing :
Alcibiades, who was in the secret, when he left his
command upon the summons from home, foreseeing that
he would be outlawed, gave information of the plot to the
friends of the Syracusans in Messina, who had at once
put to death its authors, and now rose in arms against the
opposite faction with those of their way ot thinking, and
succeeded in preventing the admission of the Athenians.
The latter waited for thirteen days, and then, as they
were exposed to the v/eather and without provisions, and
met with no success, went back to Naxos, where they
made places for their ships to lie in, erected a palisade
round their camp, and retired into winter quarters ; mean-
while they sent a galley to Athens for money and cavalry
to join them in the spring. During the winter the Syra-
cusans built a wall on to the city, so as to take in the
statue of Apollo Temenites, all along the side looking
towards Epipolae, to make the task of circumvallation
longer and more difficult, in case of their being defeated,
and also erected a fort at Megara and another in the
Olympieum, and stuck palisades along the sea wherever
there was a landing place. Meanwhile, as they knew that
the Athenians were wintering at Naxos, they marched
with all their people to Catana, and ravaged the land and
set fire to the tents and encampment of the Athenians, and
so returned home. Learning also that the Athenians

75,76] SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES 453

were sending an embassy to Camarina, on the strength of CHAP.

the alHance concluded in the time of Laches, to gain, if

possible, that city, they sent another from Syracuse to ^^^^*^^^^
oppose them. They had a shrewd suspicion that the camariiML
Camarinsans had not sent what they did send for the
first battle very willingly ; and they now feared that they
would refuse to assist them at all in future, after seeing the
success of the Athenians in the action, and would join the
latter on the strength of their old friendship. Herrao-
crates, with some others, accordingly arrived at Camarina
from Syracuse, and Euphemus and others from the
Athenians ; and an assembly of the Camarinaeans having
been convened, Hermocrates spoke as follows, in the hope
of prejudicing them against the Athenians : —

' Camaringeans, we did not come on this embassy
because we were afraid of your being frightened by the
actual forces of the Athenians, but rather of your being
gained by what they would say to you before you heard
anything from us. They are come to Sicily vith the
pretext that you know, and the intention which we all
suspect, in my opinion less to restore the Leontines to
their homes than to oust us from ours ; as it is out of all
reason that they should restore in Sicily the cities that
they lay waste in Hellas, or should cherish the Leontine
Chalcidians because of their Ionian blood, and keep in
servitude the Eubcean Chalcidians, of whom the Leontines
are a colony. No ; but the same policy which has
proved so successful in Hellas is now being tried in
Sicily. After being chosen as the leaders of the lonians
and of the other allies of Athenian origin, to punish the
Mede, the Athenians accused some of failure in military
service, some of fighting against each other, and others,
as the case might be, upon any colourable pretext that
could be found, until they thus subdued them all. In
fine, in the struggle against the Medes, the Athenians
did not fight for the liberty of the Hellenes, or the

454 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [77, 78

BOOK Hellenes for their own liberty, but the former to make
Xh. their countrymen serve them instead of him, the latter to
B.C. 415- change one master for another, wiser indeed than the
^of^nSon. first, but wiser for evil.

* But we are not now come to declare lo an audience
familiar with them the mipdeeds of a state so open tc
accusation as is the Athenian, but much rather to blame
ourselves, who, with the warnings we possess in the
Hellenes in those parts that have been enslaved through
not supporting each other, and seeing the same sophisms
being now tried upon ourselves — such as restorations of
Leontine kinsfolk and support of EgestJRan allies — do
cot stand together and resolutely show them that here
are no lonians, or Hellespontines, or islanders, who
change continually, but always serve a master, sometimes
the Mede and sometimes some other, but free Dorians
from independent Peloponnese, dwelling in Sicily. Or,
are we waiting until we be taken in detail, one city after
another ; knowing as we do that in no other way can we
be conquered, and seeing that they turn to this plan, so
as to divide some of us by words, to draw some by the
bait of an alliance into open war with each other, and to
ruin others by such flattery as different circumstances may
render acceptable ? And do we fancy when destruction
first overtakes a distant fellow-countryman that the danger
will not come to each of us also, or that he who suffers
before us will suffer in himself alone ?

* As for the Camarinaean, who says that it is the
Syracusan, not he, that is the enemy of the Athenian,
and who thinks it hard to have to encounter risk in
behalf of ray country, I would have him bear in mind
that he will fight in my country, not more for mine than
for his own, and by so much the more safely in that he
will enter on the struggle not alone, after the way has
been cleared by my ruin, but with me as his ally ; and
that the object of the Athenian is not so much to punish

793 SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES 455

the enmity of the Syracusan as to use me as a blind to CHAR
secure the friendship of the Camarinasan. As for him ^^
who envies or even fears us (and envied and feared great B.C. 415.
powers must always be), and who on this account wishes Syracuse
Syracuse to be humbled to teach us a lesson, but would m"st not
• 11 , 1 • • 1 • r ^ • • stand m

Still have her survive m the interest ot his own security, th* way.
the wish that he indulges is not humanly possible. A
man can control his own desires, but he cannot likewise
control circumstances ; and in the event of his calcula-
tions proving mistaken, he may live to bewail his own
misfortune, and wish to be again envying my prosperity.
An idle wish, if he now sacrifice us and refuse to take
his share of perils which are the same, in reality though
not in name, for him as for us ; what is nominally the
preservation of our power being really his ov/n salvation.
It was to be expected that you, of all people in the world,
Camarinaeans, being our immediate neighbours and the
next in danger, would have foreseen this, and instead of
supporting us in the lukewarm v/ay that you are now
doing, would rather come to us of your own accord, and
be now offering at Syracuse the aid which you would
have asked for at Camarina, if to Camarina the Athenians
had first come, to encourage us to resist the invader.
Neither you, however, nor the rest have as yet bestirred
yourselves in this direction.

* Fear perhaps will make you study to do right both
by us and by the invaders, and plead that you have an
alliance with the Athenians. But you made that alliance,
not against your friends, but against the enemies that
might attack you, and to help the Athenians when they
were wronged by others, not when as now they are
wronging their neighbours. Even the Rhegians, Chalci-
dians though they be, refuse to help to restore the
Chalcidian Leontines ; and it would be strange if, while
they suspect the gist of this fine pretence and are wise
without reason, you, with every reason on your side.

456 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [80, 81

BOOK should yet choose to assist your natural enemies, and

Y}l should join with their direst foes in undoing those whom

B C. 415- nature has made your own kinsfolk. This is not to do

bmty°caS" right ; but you should help us without fear of their

'^***,^5 armament, which has no terrors if we hold together, but
avoided ,-ri , j-i- j

by neut- only if we let them succeed m their endeavours to

^^•y- separate us ; since even after attacking us by ourselves
and being victorious in battle, they had to go off without
effecting their purpose. )

' United, therefore, we have no cause to despair, but
rather new encouragement to league together ; especially
as succours will come to us from the Peloponnesians, in
military matters the undoubted superiors of the Athenians.
And you need not think that your prudent policy of
taking sides with neither, because allies of both, is either
safe for you or fair to us. Practically it is not as fair as
it pretends to be. If the vanquished be defeated, and
the victor conquer, thiough your refusing to join, v/hat
is the effect of your abstention but to leave the former to
perish unaided, and to allow the latter to ollfend un-
hindered ? And yet it were more honourable to join
those who are not only the injured party, but your own
kindred, and by so doing to defend the common interests
of Sicily and save your friends the Athenians from doing
wrong.

* In conclusion, we Syracusans say that it is useless for
us to demonstrate either to you or to the rest what you
know already as well as we do ; but we entreat, and if
our entreaty fail, we protest that we are menaced by our
eternal enemies the lonians, and are betrayed by you our
fellow Dorians. If the Athenians reduce us, they will
owe their victory to your decision, but in their own name
will reap the honour, and will receive as the prize of
their triumph the very men who enabled them to gain it.
On the other hand, if we are the conquerors, you will
have to pay for having been the cause of our danger.

82,83] SPEECH OF ATHENIAN ENVOY 457

Consider, therefore ; and now make your choice between CHAP.
the security which present servitude offers and the pros-
pect of conquering with us and so escaping disgraceful B.C. 415.
submission to an Athenian master and avoiding the of Athens
lasting enmity of Syracuse/ em^Se.

Such were the words of Hermocrates ; after whom
Euphemus, the Athenian ambassador, spoke as follows : —

* Although we came here only to renew the former
alliance, the attack of the Syracusans compels us to speak
of our empirt and of the good right we have to it. The
best proof of this the speaker himself furnished, when he
called the lonians eternal enemies of the Dorians. It
is the fact ; and the Peloponnesian Dorians being our
superiors in numbers and next neighbours, we lonians
looked out for the best means of escaping their domina-
tion. After the Median war we had a fleet, and so got
rid of the empire and supremacy of the Lacedaemonians,
who had no right to give orders to us more than we to
them, except that of being the strongest at that moment ;
and being appointed leaders of the king's former subjects,
we continue to be so, thinking that we are least likely to
fall under the dominion of the Peloponnesians, if we have
a force to defend ourselves with, and in strict truth having
done nothing unfair in reducing to subjection the lonians
and islanders, the kinsfolk whom the Syracusans say we
have enslaved. They, our kinsfolk, came against their
mother country, that is to say against us, together with
the Mede, and instead of having the courage to revolt and
sacrifice their property as we did when we abandoned our
city, chose to be slaves themselves, and to try to make
us so.

*We, therefore, deserve to rule because we placed the
largest fleet and an unflinching patriotism at the service
of the Hellenes, and because these, our subjects, did us
mischief by their ready subservience to the Medes ; and,
desert apart, we seek to strengthen ourselves against the

458 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [84.85

BOOK Peloponneslans. We make no fine professions of having

Xh. a right to rule because we overthrew the barbarian single-

B.C. 415- handed, or because we risked what we did risk for the

terest^f freedom of the subjects in question any more than for

Athens in ([^^.t of all, and for our own : no one can be quarrelled

strengrth- .,. .,. r.- r rr

ening Ca- with for providing for his proper safety. If we are now
manna. ^^^^ -^^ Sicily, it is equally in the interest of our security,
with which we perceive that your interest also coincides.
We prove this from the conduct which the Syracusans
cast against us and which you somewhat too timorously
suspect ; knowing that those whom fear has made sus-
picious, may be carried away by the charm of eloquence
for the moment, but when they come to act follow their
interests.

* Now, as we have said, fear makes us hold our empire
in Hellas, and fear makes us now come, with the help of
our friends, to order safely matters in Sicily, and not to
enslave any but rather to prevent any from being enslaved.
Meanwhile, let no one imagine that we are interesting
ourselves in you without your having anything to do with
us, seeing that if you are preserved and able to make head
against the Syracusans, they will be less likely to harm
us by sending troops to the Peloponneslans. In this way
you have everything to do with us, and on this account
it is perfectly reasonable for us to restore the Leontines,
and to make them, not subjects like their kinsmen in
Eubcea, but as powerful as possible, to help us by annoy-
ing the Syracusans from their frontier. In Hellas we
are alone a match for our enemies ; and as for the asser-
tion that it is out of all reason that we should free the
Sicilian, while we enslave the Chalcidian, the fact is that
the latter is useful to us by being without arms and con-
tributing money only ; while the former, the Leontines
and our other friends, cannot be too independent.

* Besides, for tyrants and imperial cities nothing is un-
reasonable if expedient, no one a kinsman unless sure;

86] SPEECH OF ATHENIAN ENVOY 459

but friendship or enmity is everywhere an affair of time CHAP.
and circumstance. Here, in Sicily, our interest is not to ^^
weaken our friends, but by means of their strength to B.C. 415.
cripple our enemies. Why doubt this ? In Hellas we of'syr^"
treat our allies as we find them useful. The Chians and ^use.
Methymnians govern themselves and furnish ships ; most
of the rest have harder terms and pay tribute in money ;
while others, although islanders and easy for us to take,
are free altogether, because they occupy convenient posi-
tions round Peloponnese. In our settlement of the states
here in Sicily, we should, therefore, naturally be guided
by our interest, and by fear, as we say, of the Syracusans.
Their ambition is to rule you, their object to use the
suspicions that we excite to unite you, and then, when
we have gone away without effecting anything, by force
or through your isolation, to become the masters of Sicily.
And masters they must become, if you unite with them ;
as a force of that magnitude would be no longer easy for
us to deal with united, and they would be more than a
match for you as soon as we were away.

* Any other view of the case is condemned by the
facts. When you first asked us over, the fear which you
held out was that of danger to Athens if we let you come
under the dominion of Syracuse ; and it is not right now
to mistrust the very same argument by which you claimed
to convince us, or to give way to suspicion- because we
are come with a larger force against the power of that
city. Those whom you should really distrust are the
Syracusans. We are not able to stay here without you,
and if we proved perfidious enough to bring you into
subjection, we should be unable to keep you in bondage,
owing to the length of the voyage and the difficulty of
guarding large, and in a military sense continental, towns :
they, the Syracusans, live close to you, not in a camp,
but in a city greater than the force we have with us, plot
always against you, niver let slip an opportunity once

46o THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [87

BOOK offered, as they have shown in the case of the Leontines
Yh and others, and now have the face, just as if you were
B.C. 415- fools, to invite you to aid them against the power that
obje?o1 hinders this, and that has thus far maintained Sicily in-
Athenian dependent. We, as against them, invite you to a much
^° ^^' more real safety, when we beg you not to betray that
common safety which we each have in the other, and to
reflect that they, even without allies, will, by their num-
bers, have always the way open to you, while you will
not often have the opportunity of defending yourselves
with such numerous auxiliaries ; if, through your suspi-
cions, you once let these go away unsuccessful or defeated,
you will wish to see if only a handful of them back again,
when the day is past in which their presence could do
anything for you.

* But we hope, Camarinasans, that the calumnies of the
Syracusans will not be allowed to succeed either with you
or with the rest : we have told you the whole truth upon
the things we are suspected of, and will now briefly re-
capitulate, in the hope of convincing you. We assert
that we are rulers in Hellas in order not to be subjects ;
liberators in Sicily that we may not be harmed by the
Sicilians ; that we are compelled to interfere in many
things, because we have many things to guard against;
and that now, as before, we are come as allies to those
of vou who suffer wrong in this island, not without in-
vitation but upon invitation. Accordingly, instead of
making yourselves judges or censors of our conduct, and
trying to turn us, which it were now difficult to do, so
far as there is anything in our interfering policy or in our
character, that chimes in with your interest, this take and
make use of; and be sure that far from being injurious
to all alike, to most of the Hellenes that policy is even
beneficial. Thanks to it, all men in all places, even
where ws are not, who either apprehend or meditate
aggression, from the near prospect before them, in the

88] CAMARINA REMAINS NEUTRAL 461

one case, of obtaining our intervention in their favour, in CHAP,
the other, of our arrival making the venture dangerous, ^^
find themselves constrained, respectively, to be moderate B.C. 415.
against their will, and to be preserved without trouble of for^ama
their own. Do not you reject this security that is open ^^g^^^
to all who desire it, and is now offered to you ; but do
like others, and instead of being always on the defensive
against the Syracusans, unite with us, and in your turn at
last threaten them.*

Such were the words of Euphemus. What the Cama-
rinaeans felt was this. Sympathising with the Athenians,
except in so far as they might be afraid of their sub-
jugating Sicily, they had always been at enmity with
their neighbour Syracuse. From the very fact, however,
that they were their neighbours, they feared the Syra-
cusans most of the two, and being apprehensive of their
conquering even without them, both sent them in the first
instance the few horsemen mentioned, and for the future
determined to support them most in fact, although as
sparingly as possible ; but for the moment in order not to
seem to slight the Athenians, especially as they had been
successful in the engagement, to answer both alike.
Agreeably to this resolution they answered that as both
the contending parties happened to be alHes of theirs, they
thought it most consistent with their oaths, at present, to
side with neither ; with which answer the ambassadors of
cither party departed.

In the meantime, while Syracuse pursued her prepara-
tions for war, the Athenians were encamped at Naxos,
and tried by negotiation to gain as many of the Sicels as
possible. Those more in the low lands, and subjects of
Syracuse, mostly held aloof; but the peoples of the
interior who had never been otherwise than independent,
with few exceptions, at once joined the Athenians, and
brought down corn to the army, and in some cases even
money. The Athenians marched against those who

46a THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [88

BOOK refused to join, and forced some of them to do so ; in
^ the case of others they were stopped by the Syracusans

B.C. 41S sending garrisons and reinforcements. Meanwhile the
fronTco^- Athenians moved their winter quarters from Naxos to

inth and Catana, and reconstructed the cnmp burnt by the Syra-
&t ITparta^ cusans, and stayed there the rest of the winter. They
also sent a galley to Carthage, with proffers of friendship,
on the chance of obtaining assistance, and another to
Tyrrhenia ; some of the cities there having spontaneously
offered to join them in the war. They also sent round to
the Sicels and to Egesta, desiring them to send them as
many horses as possible, and meanwhile prepared bricks,
iron, and all other things necessary for the work of
circumvaliation, intending by the spring to begin hos-
tilities.

In the meantime the Syracusan envoys despatched to
Corinth and Lacedcemon tried as they passed along the
coast to persuade the Italiots to interfere with the pro-
ceedings of the Athenians, which threatened Italy quite
as much as Syracuse, and having arrived at Corinth made
a speech calling on the Corinthians to assist them on the
ground of their common origin. The Corinthians voted
at once to aid them heart and soul themselves, and then
sent on envoys with them to Lacedasmon, to help them to
persuade her also to prosecute the war with the Athenians
more openly at home and to send succours to Sicily.
The envoys from Corinth having reached Lacedxmon
found there Alcibiades with his fellow- refugees, who had
at once crossed over in a trading vessel from Thurii, first
to Cyllene in Elis, and afterwards from thence to Lace-
dasmon ; upon the Lacedaemonians' own invitation, after
first obtaining a safe conduct, as he feared them tor the
part he had taken in the affair of Mantinea. The result
was that the Corinthians, Syracusans, and Alcibiades,
pressing all the same request in the assembly of the
Lacedaemonians, succeeded in persuading them ; but as

89] SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES AT SPARTA 463

the Ephors and the authorities, although resolved to send CHAP.

envoys to Syracuse to prevent their surrendering to the

Athenians, showed no disposition to send them any B.C. 4x5.
assistance, AJcibiades now came forward and inflamed swer to
and stirred the Lacedasmonians by speaking as fol- ^f^_^
lows: — ^ ^ dices.

* I am forced first to speak to you of the prejudice
with which I am regarded, in order that suspicion may
not make you disinclined to listen to me upon public
matters. The connexion with you as your Proxeni,
which the ancestors of our family by reason of some
discontent renounced, I personally tried to renew by my
<70od offices towards you, in particular upon the occasion
of the disaster at Pylos. But although I maintained this
friendly attitude, you yet chose to negotiate the peace
with the Athenians through my enemies, and thus to
strengthen them and to discredit me. You had therefore
no right to complain if I turned to the Mantineans and
Argives, and seized other occasions of thwarting and
injuring you ; and the time has now come when those
among you, who in the bitterness of the moment may
have been then unfairly angry with me, should look at
the matter in its true light, and take a different view.
Those again who judged me unfavourably, because I
leaned rather to the side of the commons, must not think
that their dislike is any better founded. We have always
been hostile to tyrants, and all who oppose arbitrary power
are called commons ; hence we continued to act as leaders
of the multitude ; besides which, as democracy was the
government of the city, it was necessary in most things to
conform to established conditions. However, we en-
deavoured to be more moderate than the licentious
temper of the times ; and while there were others,
formerly as now, who tried to lead the multitude astray,
the same who banished me, our party was that of the
whole people, our creed being to do our part in preserving

464 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [90

BOOK the form of government under which the city enjoyed the

]^ utmost greatness and freedom, and which we had found

B.C. 415. existing. As for democracy, the men of sense among

^^'^with us knew what it was, and I perhaps as well as any, as I

gsrhich the have the more cause to complain of it ; but there is

expedition nothing new to be said of a patent absurdity — meanwhile

dlScen." "^^ ^^^ °°^ think it safe to alter it under the pressure of

your hostility.

* So much then for the prejudices with which I am
regarded : I now can call your attention to the questions
you must consider, and upon which superior knowledge
perhaps permits me to speak. We sailed to Sicily first
to conquer, if possible, the Siceliots, and after them the
Italiots also, and finally to assail the em.pire and city of
Carthage. In the event of all or most of these schemes
succeeding, we were then to attack Peloponnese, bringing
with us the entire force of the Hellenes lately acquired in
those parts, and taking a number of barbarians into our
pay, such as the Iberians and others in those countries,
confessedly the most warlike known, and building numerous
galleys in addition to those which we had already, timber
being plentiful in Italy ; and with this fleet blockading
Peloponnese from the sea and assailing it with our armies
by land, taking some of the cities by storm, drawing
works of circumvallation round others, we hoped without
difficulty to effect its reduction, and after this to rule the
whole of the Hellenic name. Money and corn mean-
while for the better execution of these plans were to be
supplied in sufficient quantities by the newly acquired
places in those countries, independently of our revenues
here at home.

' You have thus heard the history of the pi^fsent
expedition from the man who most exactly knows what
our objects were ; and the remaining generals will, if they
can, carry these out just tlie same. But that the states in
Sicily must succumb if you do not help them, I will now

91] SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES AT SPARTA 465

show. Although the Siceliots, with all their inexperience, CHAP.

might even now be saved if their forces were united, the

Syracusans alone, beaten already in one battle with all B.C. 415.
their people and blockaded from the sea, will be unable to send help
withstand the Athenian armament that is now there. But ^°g^^^^j
if Syracuse falls, all Sicily falls also, and Italy imme- fortify
diately afterwards ; and the danger which I just now ®*^^^®*-
spoke of from that quarter will before long be upon you.
None need therefore fancy that Sicily only is in question ;
Peloponncse will be so also, unless you speedily do as I
tell you, and send on board ship to Syracuse troops that
shall be able to row their ships themselves, and serve as
heavy infantry the moment that they land ; and what I
consider even more important than the troops, a Spartan
as commanding officer to discipHne the forces already on
foot and to compel recusants to serve. The friends that
you have already will thus become more confident, and
the waverers will be encouraged to join you. Meanwhile
you must carry on the war here more openly, that the
Syracusans seeing that you do not forget them, may put
heart into their resistance, and that the Athenians may be
less, able to reinforce their armament. You must fortify
Decelea in Attica, the blow of which the Athenians are
always most afraid and the only one that they think they
have not experienced in the present war ; the surest
method of harming an enemy being to find out what he
most fears, and to choose this means of attacking him,
since every one naturally knows best his own weak points
and fears accordingly. The fortification in question,
while it benefits you, will create difficulties for your
adversaries, of which I shall pass over many, and shall
only mention the chief. Whatever property there is in
the country will most of it become yours, either by
capture or surrender ; and the Athenians will at once be
deprived of their revenues from the silver mines at
Laurium, of their present gains from their laud and

Q 455

466 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [92

BOOK from the law courts, and above all of the revenue from
X}^ their allies, which will be paid less regularly, as they

B.C. 415. lose their awe of Athens, and see you addressing your-
lovVof hfs selves with vigour to the war. The zeal and speed with

country, ^hich all this shall be done depends, Lacedaemonians,
upon yourselves ; as to its possibility, I am quite con-
fident, and I have little fear of being mistaken.

' Meanwhile I hope that none of you will think any
the worse of me if after having hitherto passed as a lover
of my country, I now actively join its worst enemies in
attacking it, or will suspect what I say as the fruit of an
outlaw's enthusiasm. I am an outlaw from the iniquity
of those who drove me forth, not, if you will be guided
by me, from your service : my worst enemies are not you
who only harmed your foes, but they who forced their
friends to become enemies ; and love of country is what
1 do not feel when I am wrongtd, but what I felt when
secure in my rights as a citizen. Indeed I do not con-
sider that I am now attacking a country that is still mine ;
I am rather trying to recover one that is mine no longer ;
and the true lover of his country is not he who consents
to lose it unjustly rather than attack it, but he who longs
for it so much that he will go all lengths to recover it.
For myself, therefore, Lacedocmonians, I beg you to use
me without scruple for danger and trouble of every kind,
and to remember the argument in every one's mouth, that
if I did you great harm as an enemy, I could likewise do
you good service as a friend, inasmuch as I know the
plans of the Athenians, while I only guessed yours. For
yourselves I entreat you to believe that your most capital
interests are now under deliberation ; and I urge you to
send without hesitation the expeditions to Sicily and
Attica ; by the presence of a small part of your forces
you will save important cities in that island, and you will
destroy the power of Athens both present and prospec-
tive ; after this you will dwell in security and enjoy the

93, 94] GYLIPPUS SENT TO SICILY 467

supremacy over all Hellas, resting not on force but upon CHAP,
consent and affection.' ^^

Such were the words of Alcibiades. The Lacedse- B.C. 415.
monians, who had themselves before intended to march Alcibiades
against Athens, but were still waiting and looking about followed,
them, at once became much more in earnest when they
received this particular information from Alcibiades, and
considered that they had heard it from the man who best
knew the truth of the matter. Accordingly they now
turned their attention to the fortifying of Decelea and
sending • immediate aid to the Sicilians ; and naming
Gylippus, son of Cleandridas, to the command of the
Syracusans, bade him consult with that people and with
the Corinthians and arrange for succours reaching the
island, in the best and speediest way possible under the
circumstances. Gylippus desired the Corinthians to send
him at once two ships to Asine, and to prepare the rest
that they intended to send, and to have them ready to sail
at the proper time. Having settled this, the envoys de-
parted from Lacedaemon.

In the meantime arrived the Athenian galley from
Sicily sent by the generals for money and cavalry ; and
the Athenians, after hearing what they wanted, voted to
send the supplies for the armament and the cavalry. And
the winter ended, and with it ended the seventeenth year
of the present war of which Thucydides is the historian.

The next summer, at the very beginning of the season,
the Athenians in Sicily put out from Catana, and sailed
along shore to Megara in Sicily, from which, as I have
mentioned above, the Syracusans expelled the inhabitants
in the time of their tyrant Gelo, themselves occupying the
territory. Here the Athenians landed and laid waste the
country, and after an unsuccessful attack upon a fort of
the Syracusans, went on with the fleet and army to the
river Terias, and advancing inland laid waste the plain
and set fire to the corn ; and after killing some of a small

46S THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [95,96

BOOK Syracusan party which they encountered, and setting up a
Xll trophy, went back again to their ships. They now sailed

B.C. 414. to Catana and took in provisions there, and going with

^^o^ their whole force against Centoripa, a town of the Sicels,
sent to Si- acquired it by capitulation, and departed, after also burn-

*^Athens! ing the corn of the Inessseans and Hybleans. Upon their
return to Carana they found the horsemen arrived from
Athens, to the number of two hundred and fifty (with
their equipments, but without their horses which were to
be procured upon the spot), and thirty mounted archers
and three hundred talents of silver.

The same spring the L acedasmonians marched against
Argos, and went as far as Cleonas, when an earthquake
occurred and caused them to return. After this the
Argives invaded the Thyreatid, which is on their border,
and took much booty from the Lacedaemonians, which
was sold for no less than twenty-five talents. The same
summer, not long after, the Thespian commons made an
attack upon the party in office, which was not successful,
but succours arrived from Thebes, and some v/ere caught,
while others took refuge at Athens.

The same summer the Syracusans learned that the
Athenians had been joined by their cavalry, and were on
the point of marching against them ; and seeing that
without becoming masters of Epipolas, a precipitous spot
situated exactly over the town, the Athenians could not,
even if victorious in battle, easily invest them, they deter-
mined to guard its approaches, in order that the enemy
might not ascend unobserved by this, the sole way by
which ascent was possible, as the remainder is lofty
ground, and falls right down to the city, and can all be
seen from inside ; and as it lies above the reet the place is
called by the Syracusans Epipolas or Overtown. They
accordingly went out in mass at daybreak into the meadow
along the river Anapus, their new generals, Hermocratcs
and his colleagues, having just come into office, and held

97, 98] THE ATHENIANS ON EPIPOL^E 469

a review of their heavy infantry, from whom they first CHAP.
selected a picked body of six hundred, under the com- ^•
mand of Diomiius, an exile from Andros, to guard Epi- B.C. 414-
poise, and to be ready to muster at a moment's notice to ^^'^"^^
help wherever help should be required. Epipolae.

Meanwhile the Athenians, the very same morning, were
holding a review, having already made land unobserved
with all the armament from Catana, opposite a place called
Leon, not much more than half a mile from Epipolae,
where they disembarked their army, bringing the fleet to
anchor at Thapsus, a peninsula running out into the sea,
with a narrow isthmus, and not far from the city of Syra-
cuse either by land or water. While the naval force of
the Athenians threw a stockade across the isthmus and
remained quiet at Thapsus, the land army immediately
went on at a run to Epipolae, and succeeded in getting up
by Euryelus before the Syracusans perceived them, or
could come up from the meadow and the review. Dio-
miius with his six hundred and the rest advanced as
quickly as they could, but they had nearly three miles to
go from the meadow before reaching them. Attacking
in this way in considerable disorder, the Syracusans were
defeated in battle at Epipolae and retired to the town,
with a loss of about three hundred killed, and Diomiius
among the number. After this the Athenians set up a
trophy and restored to the Syracusans their dead under
truce, and next day descended to Syracuse itself; and no
one coming out to meet them, reascended and built a fort
at Labdalum, upon the edge of the cliffs of Epipolae,
looking towards Megara, to serve as a magazine for their
baggage and money, whenever they advanced to give
battle or to work at the lines.

Not long afterwards three hundred cavalry came to
them from Egesta, and about a hundred from the Sicels,
Naxians, and others ; and thus, with the two hundred and
fifty from Athens, for whom they had got horses from

470 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [99

BOOK the Egestasans and Catanians, besides others that they
Yl. bought, they now mustered six hundred and fifty cavalry
B.C. 41.4- in all. After posting a garrison in Labdalum, they
progress advanced to Syca, where they sate down and quickly
of Athen- ^uilt the Circle or centre of their wall of circumvallation.
The Syracusans, appalled at the rapidity with which the
work advanced, determined to go out against them and
give battle and interrupt it : and the two armies were
already in battle array, when the Syracusan generals ob-
served that their troops found such difficulty in getting
into line, and were in such disorder, that they led them
back into the town, except part of the cavalry. These
remained and hindered the Athenians from carrying
stones or dispersing to any great distance, until a tribe of
the Athenian heavy infantry, with all the cavalry, charged
and routed the Syracusan horse with some loss ; after
which they set up a trophy for the cavalry action.

The next day the Athenians began building the wall to
the north of the Circle, at the same time collecting stone
and timber, which they kept laying down towards Tro-
gilus along the shortest line for their works from the
great harbour to the sea ; while the Syracusans, guided
by their generals, and above all by Hermocrates, instead
of risking any more general engagements, determined to
build a counterwork in the direction in which the Athe-
nians were going to carry their wall. If this could be
completed in time the enemy's lines would be cut ; and
meanwhile, if he were to attempt to interrupt them by an
attack, they would send a part of their forces against
him, and would secure the approaches beforehand with
their stockade, while the Athenians would have to leave
off working with their whole force in order to attend to
them. They accordingly sallied forth and began to build,
starting from their city, running a cross wall below the
Athenian Circle, cutting down the olives and erecting
wooden towers. As the Athenian fleet had not yet

loo, loi] SYRACUSAN COUNTER-WALL 471

sailed round into the great harbour, the Syracusans still CHAP,
commanded the sea-coast, and the Athenians brought 5^*
their provisions by land from Thapsus. B.C. 414.

The Syracusans now thought the stockades and stone- oA?i "first
work of their counter- wall sufficiently far advanced ; and Syracusaa
as the Athenians, afraid of being divided and so fighting wall,
at a disadvantage, and intent upon their own wall, did not
come out to interrupt them, they left one tribe to guard
the new work and went back into the city. Meanwhile
the Athenians destroyed their pipes of drinking-water
carried underground into the city ; and watching until the
rest of the Syracusans were in their tents at midday, and
some even gone away into the city, and those in the
stockade keeping but indifferent guard, appointed three
hundred picked men of their own, and some men picked
from the light troops and armed for the purpose, to run
suddenly as fast as they could to the counterwork, while
the rest of the army advanced in two divisions, the one
with one of the generals to the city in case of a sortie, the
other with the other general to the stockade by the
postern gate. The three hundred attacked and took the
stockade, abandoned by its garrison, who took refuge in
the outworks round the statue of Apollo Temenites.
Here the pursuers burst in with them, and after getting
in were beaten out by the Syracusans, and some few of
the Argives and Athenians slain ; after which the whole
army retired, and having demolished the counterwork and
pulled up the stockade, carried away the stakes to their
own lines, and set up a trophy.

The next day the Athenians from the Circle pro-
ceeded to fortify the cliff above the marsh which on this
side of Epipolse looks towards the great harbour ; this
being also the shortest line for their work to go down
across the plain and the marsh to the harbour. Mean-
while the Syracusans marched out and began a second
stockade, starting from the city, across the middle of the

472 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [102

BOOK marsh, digging a trench alongside to make it impossible
XIl for the Athenians to carry their wall down to the sea.
B.C. 414. As soon as the Athenians had finished their work at the
chus slafn cliff they again attacked the stockade and ditch of the
in battle. Syracusans. Ordering the fleet to sail round from
Thapsus into the great harbour of Syracuse, they de-
scended at about dawn from Epipolas into the plain, and
laying doors and planks over the marsh where it was
muddy and firmest, crossed over on these, and by day-
break took the ditch and the stockade, except a small
portion which they captured afterwards. A battle now
ensued, in which the Athenians were victorious, the right
wing of the Syracusans flying to the town and the left to
the river. The three hundred picked Athenians, wish-
ing to cut oft' their passage, pressed on at a run to the
bridge, when the alarmed Syracusans, who had with them
most of their cavalry, closed and routed them, hurling
them back upon the Athenian right wing, the first tribe
of which was thrown into a panic by the shock. Seeing
this, Lamachus came to their aid from the Athenian left
with a few archers and with the Argives, and crossing a
ditch, was left alone with a few that had crossed with
him, and was killed with five or six of his men. These
the Syracusans managed immediately to snatch up in haste
and get across the river into a place of security, themselves
retreating as the rest of the Athenian army now came up.
Meanwhile those who had at first fled for refuge to the
city, seeing the turn affairs were taking, now rallied from
the town and formed against the Athenians in front of
them, sending also a part of their number to the Circle on
Epipolas, which they hoped to take while denuded of its
defenders. These took and destroyed the Athenian out-
work of a thousand feet, the Circle itself being saved by
Nicias, who happened to have been left in it through ill-
ness, and who now ordered the servants to set -fire to the
engines and timber thrown down before the wall ; want

f03] DESPONDENCY AT SYRACUSE 473

of men, as he was aware, rendering all other means of CHAP.
escape impossible. This step was justified by the result, 2_Z!
the Syracusans not coming any further on account of the B.C. 414.
fire, but retreating. Meanwhile succours were coming up of the
from the Athenians below, who had put to flight the A*^*^®"
troops opposed to them ; and the fleet also, according to
orders, was sailing from Thapsus into the great harbour.
Seeing this, the troops on the heights retired in haste,
and the whole army of the Syracusans re-entered the city,
thinking that with their present force they would no
longer be able to hinder the wall reaching the sea.

After this the Athenians set up a trophy and restored
to the Syracusans their dead under truce, receiving in
return Lamachus and those who had fallen with him.
The whole of their forces, naval and military, being now
with them, they began from Epipolas and the cliffs and
enclosed the Syracusans with a double wall down to the
sea. Provisions were now brought in for the armament
from all parts of Italy ; and many of the Sicels, who had
hitherto been looking to see how things went, came as
allies to the Athenians : there also arrived three ships of
fifty oars from Tyrrhenia. Meanwhile everything else
progressed favourably for their hopes. The Syracusans
began to despair of finding safety in arms, no relief
having reached them from Peloponnese, and were now
proposing terms of capitulation among themselves and to
Nicias, who after the death of Lamachus was left sole
commander. No decision was come to, but as was
natural with men in difficulties and besieged more straitly
than before, there was much discussion with Nicias and
still more in the town. Their present misfortunes had
also made them suspicious of one another ; and the blame
of their disasters was thrown upon the ill-fortune or
treachery of the generals under whose command they had
happened ; and these were deposed and others, Hera-
clides, Eucles, and Tellias, elected in their stead.

*Q 455

474 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [104

BOOK Meanwhile the Lacedsemonian, Gylippus, and the ships
Xi. from Corinth were now off Leucas, intent upon going

B.C. 4»4- with all haste to the relief of Sicily. The reports that
'gJiT^us reached them being of an alarming kind, and all agreeing

iu Italy, in the falsehood that Syracuse was already completely in-
vested, Gylippus abandoned all hope of Sicily, and wishing
to save Italy, rapidly crossed the Ionian Sea to Tarentum
with the Corinthian, Pythen, two Laconian, and two
Corinthian vessels, leaving the Corinthians to follow him
after manning, in addition to their own ten, two Leucadian
and two Ambraciot ships. From Tarentum Gylippus
first went on an embassy to Thurii, and claimed anew
the rights of citizenship which his father had enjoyed ;
failing to bring over the townspeople, he weighed anchor
and coasted along Italy. Opposite the Terinscan gulf
he was caught by the wind which blows violently and
steadily from the north in that quarter, and was carried
out to sea ; and after experiencing very rough weather,
remade Tarentum, where he hauled ashore and refitted
such of his ships as had suffered most from the tempest.
Nicias heard of his approach, but, hke the Thurians,
despised the scanty number of his ships, and set down
piracy as the only probable object of the voyage, and so
took no precautions for the present.

About the same time in this summer, the Lacedae-
monians invaded Argos with their allies, and laid waste
most of the country. The Athenians went with thirty
ships to the relief of the Argives, thus breaking their
treaty with the Lacedaemonians in the most overt manner.
Up to this time incursions from Pylos, descents on the
coasts of the rest of Peloponnese, instead of on the
Laconian, had been the extent of their co-opeiation with
the Argives and Mantineans ; and although the Argives
had often begged them to land, if only for a moment,
with their heavy infantry in Laconia, lay waste ever so
little of it with^ them, and depart, they had always re-

I05] VIOLATION OF SPARTAN TREATY 475

fused to do so. Now, however, under the command of CHAP.

Pythodorus, Lasspodius, and Demaratus, they landed

at Epidaurus, Limera, Prasias, and other places, and J-^^g^j^^
plundered the country ; and thus furnished the Lacedas- fleet
monians with a better pretext for hostilities against assists
Athens. After the Athenians had retired from Argos Argives.
with their fleet, and the Lacedaemonians also, the
Argives made an incursion into the Phliasid, and re-
turned home after ravaging their land and killing some
of the inhabitants.

BOOK vn

CHAPTER XXI

Eighteenth aiid Nineteenth Years of the War— Arrival
of Gylippus at Syracuse— Fortification of Decelea —
Successes of the Syracusans

BOOK After refitting their ships, Gylippus and Pythen coasted

; along from Tarentum to Epizephyrian Locris. They now

B.C. 414. received the more correct information that Syracuse was
lanJfat not yet completely invested, but that it was still possible
Himera- jTqj. ^^ army arriving by Epipolae to effect an entrance ,•
and they consulted, accordingly, whether they should
keep Sicily on their right and risk sailing in by sea, or
leaving it on their left, should first sail to Himera, and
taking with them the Himerasans and any others that
might agree to join them, go to Syracuse by land.
Finally they determined to sail for Himera, especially
as the four Athenian ships which Nicias had at length
sent off, on hearing that they were at Locris, had not
yet arrived at Rhegium. Accordingly, before these
reached their post, the Peloponnesians crossed the strait,
and after touching at Rhegium and Messina, came to
Himera. Arrived there, they persuaded the Himerjeans
to join in the war, and not only to go with them them-
selves but to provide arms for the seamen from their
vessels which they had drawn ashore at Himera ; and
they sent and appointed a place for the Selinuntines to
t meet them with all their forces. A few troops were

476

2] GYLIPPUS IN SICILY 477

also promised by the Geloans and some of the Sicels, CHAP.

who were now ready to join them with much greater '

alacrity, owing to the recent death of Archonidas, a B.C 4x4.
powerful Sicel king in that neighbourhood and friendly arrives at
to Athens, and owing also to the vigour shown by Epipola.
Gylippus in coming from Lacedaemon. Gylippus now
took with him about seven hundred of his sailors and
marines, that number only having arms, a thousand heavy
infantry and light troops from Himera with a body of a
hundred horse, some light troops and cavalry from Selinus,
a few Geloans, and Sicels numbering a thousand in all,
and set out on his march for Syracuse.

Meanwhile the Corinthian fleet from Leucas made all
haste to arrive ; and one of their commanders, Gongylus,
starting last with a single ship, was the first to reach
Syracuse, a little before Gylippus. Gongylus found the
Syracusans on the point of holding an assembly to con-
sider whether they should not put an end to the war.
This he prevented, and reassured them by telling them
that more vessels were still to arrive, and that Gylippus,
son of Cleandridas, had been despatched by the Lacedse-
monians to take the command. Upon this the Syracusans
took courage, and immediately marched out v/ith all their
forces to meet Gylippus, who they found was now close
at hand. Meanwhile Gylippus, after taking letae, a fort
of the Sicels, on his way, formed his army in order of
battle, and so arrived at Epipolae, and ascending by
Euryelus, as the Athenians had done at first, now
advanced with the Syracusans against the Athenian
lines. His arrival chanced at a critical moment. The
Athenians had already finished a double wall of six or
seven furlongs to the great harbour, with the exception
of a small portion next the sea, which they were still
engaged upon; and in the remainder of the circle towards
Trogilus on the other sea, stones had been laid ready for
building for the greater part of the distance, and some

478 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [3,4

BOOK points had been left half finished, while others were
Yii' entirely completed. The danger of Syracuse had indeed
B.C. 414- been great.
^taEes Meanwhile the Athenians, recovering from the con-
Lab- fusion into which they had been at first thrown by the
sudden approach of Gylippus and the Syracusans, formed
in order of battle. Gylippus halted at a short distance
off and sent on a herald to tell them that if they would
evacuate Sicily with bag and baggage within five days'
time, he was willing to make a truce accordingly. The
Athenians treated this proposition with contempt, and
dismissed the herald without an answer. After this both
sides began to prepare for action. Gylippus, observing
that the Syracusans were in disorder and did not easily
fall into line, drew off his troops more into the open
ground, while Nicias did not lead on the Athenians but
lay still by his own wall. Vv''hen Gylippus saw that
they did not come on, he led off his army to the citadel
of the quarter of Apollo Temenites, and passed the
night there. On the following day he led out the main
body of his army, and drawing them up in order of
battle before the walls of the Athenians to prevent their
going to the relief of any other quarter, despatched a
strong force against Fort Labdalum and took it, and put
all whom he found in it to the sword, the place not
being within sight of the Athenians. On the same day
an Athenian galley that lay moored off the harbour was
captured by the Syracusans.

After this the Syracusans and their allies began to carry
a single wall, starting from the city, in a slanting direc-
tion up Epipolas, in order that the Athenians, unless they
could hinder the work, might be no longer able to invest
them. Meanwhile the Athenians, having now finished
their wall down to the sea, had come up to the heights ;
and part of their wall being weak, Gylippus drew out his
army by night and attacked it. However, the Athenians

5] GYLIPPUS AT SYRACUSE 479

who happened to be bivouacking outside took the alarm CHAP

and came out to meet him, upon seeing which he quickly '

led his men back again. The Athenians now built their B.C. ^14-
wall higher, and in future kept guard at this point them- fortifies
selves, disposing their confederates along the remainder Ple™-
of the works, at the stations assigned to them. Nicias
also determined to fortify Plemmyrium, a promontory
over against the city, which juts out and narrows the
mouth of the great harbour. He thought that the forti-
fication of this place would make it easier to bring in
supplies, as they would be able to carry on their blockade
from a less distance, near to the port occupied by the
Syracusans ; instead of being obliged, upon every move-
ment of the enemy's navy, to put out against them from
the bottom of the great harbour. Besides this, he now
began to pay more attention to the war by sea, seeing
that the coming of Gylippus had diminished their hopes
by land. Accordingly, he conveyed over his ships and
some troops, and built three forts in which he placed
most of his baggage, and moored there for the future the
larger craft and men-of-war. This was the first and
chief occasion of the losses which the crews experienced.
The water which they used was scarce and had to be
fetched from far, and the sailors could not go out for
firewood without being cut off by the Syracusan horse,
who were masters of the country ; a third of the enemy's
cavalry being stationed at the little town of Olympieum,
to prevent plundering incursions on the part of the
Athenians at Plemmyrium. Meanwhile Nicias learned
that the rest of the Corinthian fleet was approaching, and
sent twenty ships to watch for them, with orders to be
on the look-out for them about Locris and Rhegium
and the approach to Sicily.

Gylippus, meanwhile, went on with the wall across
Epipoloe, using the stones which the Athenians had laid
down for their own wall, and at the same time constantly

48o THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [6

BOOK led out the Syracusans and their allies, and formed them

V"- in order of battle in front of the lines, the Athenians

B.C. 4x4- forming against him. At last he thought that the

^M§^hil moment was come, and began the attack ; and a hand-to-

soldiers. hand fight ensued between the lines, where the Syracusan

cavalry could be of no use ; and the Syracusans and their

allies were defeated and took up their dead under truce,

while the Athenians erected a trophy. After this Gylip-

pus called the soldiers together, and said that the fault was

not theirs but his; he had kept their lines too much

within the works, and had thus deprived them of the

services of their cavalry and darters. He would now,

therefore, lead them on a second time. He begged tliem

to remember that in material force they would be fully a

match for their opponents, while, with respect to moral

advantages, it were intolerable if Peloponnesians and

Dorians should not feel confident of overcoming lonians

and islanders with the motley rabble that accompanied

them, and of driving them out of the country.

After this he embraced the first opportunity that offered
of again leading them against the enemy. Now Nicias
and the Athenians were of opinion that even if the Syra-
cusans should not wish to offer battle, it was necessary
for them to prevent the building of the cross wall, as it
already almost overlapped the extreme point of their own,
and if it went any further it would from that moment
make no ditference whether they fought ever so many
successful actions, or never fought at all. They accord-
ingly came out to meet the Syracusans. Gylippus led
out his heavy infantry further from the fortifications than
on the former occasion, and so joined battle ; posting his
horse and darters upon the flank of the Athenians in the
open space, where the works of the two walls terminated.
During the engagement the cavalry attacked and routed
the left wing of the Athenians, which was opposed to
them ; and the rest of the Athenian army was in conse-

7, 8] DEFEAT OF THE ATHENIANS 481

quence defeated by the Syracusans and driven headlong CHAP.

within their lines. The night following the Syracusans '

carried their wall up to the Athenian works and passed M-^'j*^*
them, thus putting it out of their power any longer to siegers'
stop them, and depriving them, even if victorious in the {jy^^^i^g"^
field, of all chance of investing the city for the future. cross

After this the remaining twelve vessels of the Corin- ^
thians, Ambraciots, and Leucadians sailed into the harbour
under the command of Erasinides, a Corinthian, having
eluded the Athenian ships on guard, and helped the Syra-
cusans in completing the remainder of the cross wall.
Meanwhile Gylippus went into the rest of Sicily to raise
land and naval forces, and also to bring over any of the
cities that either were lukewarm in the cause or had
hitherto kept out of the war altogether. Syracusan and
Corinthian envoys were also despatched to Lacedaemon
and Corinth to get a fresh force sent over, in any way
that might offer, either in merchant vessels or transports,
or in any other manner likely to prove successful, as the
Athenians too were sending for reinforcements ; while
the Syracusans proceeded to man a fleet and to exercise,
meaning to try their fortune in this way also, and gen<»
rally became exceedingly confident.

Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength of the
enemy and his own difficulties daily increasing, himself
also sent to Athens. He had before sent frequent reports
of events as they occurred, and felt it especially incum-
bent upon him to do so now, as he thought that they
were in a critical position, and that unless speedily re-
called or strongly reinforced from home, they had no
hope of safety. He feared, however, that the messengers,
either through inability to speak, or through failure of
memory, or from a wish to please the multitude, might
not report the truth, and so thought it best to write a
letter, to insure that the Athenians should know his own
opinion without its being lost in transmission, and be able

482 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [9,10,11

BOOK to decide upon the real facts of the case. His emissaries,
Y.^' accordingly, departed with the letter and the requisite
B.C. 414- verbal instructions ; and he attended to the affairs of the
Nicias to army, making it his aim now to keep on the defensive and
the Ath- ^Q avoid any unnecessary danger.

At the close or the same summer the Athenian general
Euetion marched in concert with Perdiccas with a large
body of Thracians against Amphipolis, and failing to
uke it brought some galleys round into the Strymon,
and blockaded the town from the river, having his base at
HimerjEum.

Summer was now over. The winter ensuing, the
persons sent by Nicias, reaching Athens, gave the verba!
messages which had been entrusted to them, and answered
any questions that were asked them, and delivered the
letter. The clerk of the city now came forward and
read out to the Athenians the letter, which was as
follows : —

* Our past operations, Athenians, have been made
known to you by many other letters ; it is now time for
you to become equally familiar with our present condition,
and to take your measures accordingly. We had defeated
in most of our engagements with them the Syracusans,
against whom we were sent, and we had built the works
which we now occupy, when Gylippus arrived from
Lacedxmon with an army obtained from Peloponnese
and from some of the cities in Sicily. In our first battle
with him we were victorious ; in the battle on the follow-
ing day we were overpowered by a multitude of cavalry
and darters, and compelled to retire within our lines.
We have now, therefore, been forced by the numbers of
those opposed to us to discontinue the work of circum-
vallation, and to remain inactive ; being unable to make
use even of all the force we have, since a large portion of
our heavy infantry is absorbed in the defence of our lines.
Meanwhile the enemy have carried a single wall past our

12,13] DESPATCH OF NICIAS 483

lines, thus making it impossible for us to invest them in CHAP.
future, until this cross wall be attacked by a strong force ^^•
and captured. So that the besieger in name has become, B.C. 414-
at least from the land side, the besieged in reality ; as we of the
are prevented by their cavalry from even going for any ^J^mj^ *<>
distance into the country. by sea

' Besides this, an embassy has been despatched to
Peloponnese to procure reinforcements, and Gylippus has
gone to the cities in Sicily, partly in the hope of inducing
those that are at present neutral to join him in the war,
partly of bringing from his allies additional contingents
for the land forces and material for the navy. For I
understand that they contemplate a combined attack,
upon our lines with their land forces and with their fleet
by sea. You must none of you be surprised that I say
by sea also. They have discovered that the length of
the time we have now been in commission has rotted our
ships and wasted our crews, and that with the entireness
of our crews and the soundness of our ships the pristine
efficiency of our navy has departed. For it is impossible
for us to haul our ships ashore and careen them, because,
the enemy's vessels being as many or more than our own,
we are constantly anticipating an attack. Indeed, they
may be seen exercising, and it lies with them to take the
initiative ; and not having to maintain a blockade, they
have greater facilities for drying their ships.

* This we should scarcely be able to do, even if we
had plenty of ships to spare, and were freed from our
present necessity of exhausting all our strength upon the
blockade. For it is already difficult to carry in supplies
past Syracuse ; and were we to relax our vigilance in the
slightest degree it would become impossible. The losses
which our crews have suffered and still continue to suffer
arise from the following causes. Expeditions for fuel
and for forage, and the distance from which water has
to be fetched, cause our sailors to be cut off by the

484 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [14

BOOK Syracusan cavalry ; the loss of our previous superiority
Xli" emboldens our slaves to desert ; our foreign seamen are im-

B.C. 414- pressed by the unexpected appearance of a navy against us,

?nc^of and the strength of the enemy's resistance ; such of them

the Athe- ^s were pressed into the service take the first opportunity
oian fleet - , ^ . , . . u

of departmg to their respective cities ; such as were

originally seduced by the temptation of high pay, and
expected little fighting and large gains, leave us either by
desertion to the enemy or by availing themselves of one
or other of the various facilities of escape which the
magnitude of Sicily affords them. Some even engage in
trade themselves and prevail upon the captains to take
Hyccaric slaves on board in their place ; thus they have
ruined the efficiency of our navy.

< Now I need not remind you that the time during which
a crew is in its prime is short, and that the number of
sailors who can start a ship on her way and keep the
rowing in time is small. But by far my greatest trouble
is, that holding the post which I do, I am prevented by
the natural indocility of the Athenian seaman from putting
a stop to these evils ; and that meanwhile we have no
source from which to recruit our crews, which the enemy
can do from many quarters, but are compelled to depend
both for supplying the crews in service and for making
good our losses upon the men whom we brought with us.
For our present confederates, Naxos and Catana, are in-
capable of supplying us. There is only one thing more
wanting to our opponents, I mean the defection of our
Italian markets. If they were to see you neglect to
relieve us from our present condition, and were to go over
to the enemy, famine would compel us to evacuate, and
Svracuse would finish the war without a bl&w.

' I might, it is true, have written to you something
different and more agreeable than this, but nothing cer-
tainly more useful, if it is desirable for you to know the
real sute of things here before taking your measures.

15, i6] DESPATCH OF NICIAS 485

Besides I know that it is your nature to love to be told CHAP.

the best side of things, and then to blame the teller if the *

expectations which he has raised in your minds are not B.C. 4x4.
answered by the result; and I therefore thought it safest ment"
to declare to you the truth. ™cil!ed

* Now you are not to think that either your generals or or rein-
your soldiers have ceased to be a match for the forces °''^^
originally opposed to them. But you are to reflect that a
general Sicilian coalition is being formed against us ; that
a fresh army is expected from Peloponnese, while the
force we have here is unable to cope even with our present
antagonists ; and you must promptly decide either to
recall us or to send out to us another fleet and army as
numerous again, with a large sum of money, and some
one to succeed me, as a disease in the kidneys unfits me
for retaining my post. I have, I think, some claim on
your indulgence, as while I was in my prime I did you
much good service in my commands. But whatever you
mean to do, do it at the commencement of spring and
without delay, as the enemy will obtain his Sicilian re-
inforcements shortly, those from Peloponnese after a
longer interval ; and unless you attend to the matter the
former will be here before you, while the latter will elude
you as they have done before.*

Such were the contents of Nicias* letter. When the
Athenians had heard it they refused to accept his resig-
nation, but chose him two colleagues, naming Menander
and Euthydemus, two of the officers at the seat of war,
to fill their places until their arrival, that Nicias might not
be left alone in his sickness to bear the whole weight of
affairs. They also voted to send out another army and
navy, drawn partly from the Athenians on the muster-
roll, partly from the allies. The colleagues chosen for
Nicias were Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and Eury-
medon, son of Thucles. Eurymedon was sent off at
once, about the time of the winter solstice, with ten ships,

486 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [17. 18

BOOK a hundred and twenty talents of silver, and instructions to
Y!i' tell the army that reinforcements would arrive, and that

B.C. 414. care would be taken of them ; but Demosthenes stayed

displayed behind to organise the expedition, meaning to start as

by c5or- goon as it was spring, and sent for troops to the allies,

' and meanwhile got together money, ships, and heavy

infantry at home.

The Athenians also sent twenty vessels round Pelo-
ponnese to prevent any one crossing over to Sicily from
Corinth or Peloponnese. For the Corinthians, filled with
confidence by the favourable alteration in Sicilian affairs
which had been reported by the envoys upon their arrival,
and convinced that the fleet which they had before sent
out had not been without its use, were now preparing to
despatch a force of heavy infantry in merchant vessels to
Sicily, while the Lacedaemonians did the like for the rest
of Peloponnese. The Corinthians also manned a fleet of
twenty-five vessels, intending to try the result of a battle
with the squadron on guard at Naupactus, and meanwhile
to make it leas easy for the Athenians there to hinder the
departure of their merchantmen, by obliging them to keep
an eye upon the galleys thus arrayed against them.

In the meantime the Lacedsemonians prepared for their
invasion of Attica, in accordance with their own previous
resolve, and at the instigation of the Syracusans and
Corinthians, who wished for an invasion to arrest the
reinforcements which they heard that Athens was about
to send to Sicily. Alcibiades also urgently advised the
fortification of Decelea, and a vigorous prosecution of the
war. But the Lacedaemonians derived most encourage-
ment from the belief that Athens, with two wars on her
hands, against themselves and against the Siceliots, would
be more easy to subdue, and from the conviction that she
had been the first to infringe the truce. In the former
war, thev considered, the offence had been more on their
own side, both 00 account of the entrance of the Thebans

19] THE WAR IN GREECE 487

into Plataea in time of peace, and also of their own refusal CHAP.
to listen to the Athenian offer of arbitration, in spite of ^^'
the clause in the former treaty that where arbitration B.C. 414,
should be offered there should be no appeal to arms, monfans"
For this reason they thought that they deserved their §"^'^7
misfortunes, and took to heart seriously the disaster at
Pylos and whatever else had befallen them. But when,
besides the ravages from Pylos, which went on without
any intermission, the thirty Athenian ships came out from
Argos and wasted part of Epidaurus, Prasias, and other
places ; when upon every dispute that arose as to the
interpretation of any doubtful point in the treaty, their
own offers of arbitration were always rejected by the
Athenians, — the Lacedsemonians at length decided that
Athens had now committed the very same offence as they
had before done, and had become the guilty party ; and
they began to be full of ardour for the war. They spent
this winter in sending round to their allies for iron, and in
getting ready the other implements for building their
fort ; and meanwhile began raising at home, and also
by forced requisitions in the rest of Peloponnese, a force
to be sent out in the merchantmen to their allies in Sicily.
Winter thus ended, and with it the eighteenth year of this
war of which Thucydides is the historian.

In the first days of the spring following, at an earlier
period than usual, the Lacedaemonians and their allies
invaded Attica, under the command of Agis, son of
Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. They began
by devastating the parts bordering upon the plain, and
next proceeded to fortify Decelea, dividing the work
among the different cities. Decelea is about thirteen or
fourteen miles from the city of Athens, and the same
distance or not much further from Boeotia ; and the fort
was meant to annoy the plain and the richest parts of the
country, being in sight of Athens. While the Pelopon-
nesians and their allies in Attica were engaged in the

488 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [20

BOOK work of fortification, their countrymen at home sent off,
at about the same time, the heavy infantry in the mer-

B. 0.413- chant vessels to Sicily; the Lacedaemonians furnishing a
force- picked force of Helots and Neodamodes (or freedmen),
ments for gj^ hundred hea\y infantry in all, under the command of
cuse. Eccritus, a Spartan ; and the Boeotians three hundred
heavy infantry, commanded by two Thebans, Xenon and
Nicon, and by Hegesander, a Thespian. These were
among the first to put out into the open sea, starting
from Tsenarus in Laconia. Not long after their de-
parture the Corinthians sent off a force of five hundred
heavy infantry, consisting partly of men from Corinth
itself, and partly of Arcadian mercenaries, placed under
the command of Alexarchus, a Corinthian. The Sicy-
onians also sent off two hundred heavy infantry at the
same time as the Corinthians, under the command of
Sargeus, a Sicyonian. Meantime the five-and-twenty
vessels manned by Corinth during the winter, lay con-
fronting the twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus until
the heavy infantry in the merchantmen were fairly on
their way from Peloponnese ; thus fulfilling the object
for which they had been manned originally, which was to
divert the attention of the Athenians from the merchant-
men to the galleys.

During this time the Athenians were not idle. Simul-
taneously with the fortification of Decelea, at the very
beginning of spring, they sent thirty ships round Pelopon-
nese, under Charicles, son of Apollodorus, with instructions
to call at Argos and demand a force of their heavy infantry
for the fleet, agreeably to the alliance. At the same time
they despatched Demosthenes to Sicily, as they had in-
tended, with sixty Athenian and five Chian vessels, twelve
hundred Athenian heavy infantry from the muster-roll,
and as many of the islanders as could be raised in the
different quarters, drawing upon the other subject allies
for whatever they could supply that would be ot use fot

21,22] NAVAL PREPARATIONS 489

the war. Demosthenes was instructed first to sail round CHAP
with Charicles and to operate with him upon the coasts of ^^•
Laconia, and accordingly sailed to jEgina and there waited ]^;^- 4i3-
for the remainder of his armament, and for Charicles to racusans
fetch the Argive troops. ... fight W°

In Sicily about the same time in this spring, Gylippus sea.
came to Syracuse with as many troops as he could bring
from the cities which he had persuaded to join. Calling
the Syracusans together, he told them that they must man
as many ships as possible, and try their hand at a sea-
fight, by which he hoped to achieve an advantage in the
war not unworthy of the risk. With him Hermocrates
actively joined in trying to encourage his countrymen to
attack the Athenians at sea, saying that the latter had not
inherited their naval prowess nor would they retain it for
ever ; they had been landsmen even to a greater degree
than the Syracusans, and had only become a maritime
power when obliged by the Mede. Besides, to daring
spirits like the Athenians, a daring adversary would seem
the most formidable ; and the Athenian plan of paralysing
by the boldness of their attack a neighbour often not their
inferior in strength, could now be used against them with
as good effect by the Syracusans. He was convinced also
that the unlooked-for spectacle of Syracusans daring to
face the Athenian navy would cause a terror to the enemy,
the advantages of which would far outweigh any loss that
Athenian science might inflict upon their inexperience.
He accordingly urged them to throw aside their fears and
to try their fortune at sea ; and the Syracusans, under the
influence of Gylippus and Hermocrates, and perhaps some
others, made up their minds for the sea-fight and began to
man their vessels.

When the fleet was ready, Gylippus led out the whole
army by night ; his plan being to assault in person the
forts on Plemmyrium by land, while thirty-five Syracusan
galleys sailed according to appointment against the enemy

490 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [23

BOOK from the great harbour, and the forty-five remaining came
Xli* round from the lesser harbour, where they had their

B.C. 413- arsenal, in order to effect a junction with those inside
naval and simultaneously to attack Plemmyrium, and thus to

efforts of distract the Athenians by assaulting them on two sides at
cusans. once. The Athenians quickly manned sixty ships, and
with twenty-five of these engaged the thirty-five of the
Syracusans in the great harbour, sending the rest to meet
those sailing round from the arsenal ; and an action now
ensued directly in front of the mouth of the great har-
bour, maintained with equal tenacity on both sides ; the
one wishing to force the passage, the other to prevent
them.

In the meantime, while the Athenians in Plemmyrium
were down at the sea, attending to the engagement,
Gylippus made a sudden attack on the forts in the early
morning and took the largest first, and afterwards the two
smaller, whose garrisons did not wait for him, seeing the
largest so easily taken. At the fall of the first fort, the
men from it who succeeded in taking refuge in their boats
and merchantmen, found great difficulty in reaching the
camp, as the Syracusans were having the best of it in the
engagement in the great harbour, and sent a fast-sailing
galley to pursue them. But when the two others fell,
the Syracusans were now being defeated ; and the fugi-
tives from these sailed along shore with more ease. The
Syracusan ships fighting off the mouth of the harbour,
forced their way through the Athenian vessels and sailing
in without any order fell foul of one another, and trans-
ferred the victory to the Athenians ; who not only routed
the squadron in question, but also that by which they were
at first being defeated in the harbour, sinking eleven or the
Syracusan vessels and killing most of the men, except the
crews of three ships whom they made prisoners. Their
own loss was confined to three vessels ; and after hauling
ashore the Syracusao wrecks and setting up a trophy upon

24, 25] CAPTURE OF PLEMMYRIUM 491

the islet in front of Plemmyrium, they retired to their CHAP.
own camp. '

Unsuccessful at sea, the Syracusans had nevertheless B.C. 4»3-
the forts in Plemmyrium, for which they set up three the Athe-
trophies. One of the two last taken they razed, but put ^J|^.
in order and garrisoned the two others. In the capture aines.
of the forts a great many men were killed and made
prisoners, and a great quantity of property was taken in
all. As the Athenians had used them as a magazine,
there was a large stock of goods and corn of the mer-
chants inside, and also a large stock belonging to the
captains ; the masts and other furniture of forty galleys
being taken, besides three galleys which had been drawn
up on shore. Indeed the first and chiefest cause of the
ruin of the Athenian army was the capture of Plemmy-
rium ; even the entrance of the harbour being now no longer
safe for carrying in provisions, as the Syracusan vessels
were stationed there to prevent it, and nothing could be
brought in without fighting ; besides the general impression
of dismay and discouragement produced upon the army.

After this the Syracusans sent out twelve ships under
the command of Agatharchus, a Syracusan. One of
these went to Peloponnese with ambassadors to describe
the hopeful state of their affairs, and to incite the Pelo-
ponnesians to prosecute the war there even more actively
than they were now doing, while the eleven others sailed
to Italy, hearing that vessels laden with stores were on
their way to the Athenians. After falling in with and
destroying most of the vessels in question, and burning
in the CauJonian territory a quantity of timber for ship-
building, which had been got ready for the Athenians,
the Syracusan squadron went to Locri, and one of the
merchantmen from Peloponnese coming in, while they
were at anchor there, carrying Thespian heavy infantry,
took these on board and sailed along shore towards home.
The Atlienians were on the look-out for them with

492 THE PELOPOMNESIAN WAR [25

BOOK twenty ships at Megara, but were only able to take one
Y]i" vessel with its crew ; the rest getting clear off to Syra-
B.C. 4x3. cuse. There was also some skirmishing in the harbour
^^^'the about the piles which the Syracusans had driven in the
^eat gea in front of the old docks, to allow their ships to lie
°^' at anchor inside, without being hurt by the Athenians
sailing up and running them down. The Athenians
brought up to them a ship of ten thousand talents burden
furnished with wooden turrets and screens, and fastened
ropes round the piles from their boats, wrenched them up
and broke them, or dived down and sawed them in two.
Meanwhile the Syracusans plied them with missiles from
the docks, to which they replied from their large vessel ;
until at last most of the piles were removed by the
Athenians. But the most awkward part of the stockade
was the part out of sight : some of the piles which had
been driven in did not appear above water, so that it was
dangerous to sail up, for fear of running the ships upon
them, just as upon a reef, through not seeing them.
However divers went down and sawed off even these
for reward ; although the Syracusans drove in others.
Indeed there was no end to the contrivances to which
they resorted against each other, as might be expected
between two hostile armies confronting each other at
such a short distance : and skirmishes and all kinds of
other attempts were of constant occurrence. Meanwhile
the Svracusans sent embassies to the cities composed of
Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Lacedaemonians, to tell
them of the capture of Plemmyrium, and that their
defeat in the sea-fight was due less to the strength of
the enemy than to their own disorder ; and generally, to
let them know that they were full of hope, and to desire
them to come to their help with ships and troops, as the
Athenians were expected with a fresh army, and it the
one already there could be destroyed before the other
arrived, the war would be at an end.

26, 27] DEPARTURE OF DEMOSTHENES 493

While the contending parties in Sicily were thus en- CHAP
gaged, Demosthenes, having now got together the arma- — '
ment with which he was to go to the island, put out ^-^ ^^
from jEgina, and making sail for Peloponnese, joined thenes
Charicles and the thirty ships of the Athenians. Taking g^^y^^*"
on board the heavy infantry from Argos they sailed to
Laconia, and after first plundering part of Epidaurus
Limera, landed on the coast of Laconia, opposite Cyth-
era, where the temple of Apollo stands, and laying waste
part of the country, fortified a sort of isthmus, to which
the Helots of the Lacedasmonians might desert, and from
whence plundering incursions might be made as from
Pylos. Demosthenes helped to occupy this place, and
then immediately sailed on to Corcyra to take up some
of the allies in that island, and so to proceed without
delay to Sicily; while Charicles waited until he had
completed the fortification of the place, and leaving a
garrison there, returned home subsequently with his thirty
ships and the Argives also.

This same summer arrived at Athens thirteen hundred
targeteers, Thracian swordsmen of the tribe of the Dii,
who were to have sailed to Sicily with Demosthenes.
Since they had come too late, the Athenians determined
to send them back to Thrace, whence they had come ;
to keep them for the Decelean war appearing too expen-
sive, as the pay of each man was a drachma a day.
Indeed since Decelea had been first fortified by the
whole Peloponnesian army during this summer, and then
occupied for the annoyance of the country by the garri-
sons from the cities relieving each other at stated intervals,
ii had been doing great mischief to the Athenians ; in
fact this occupation, by the destruction of property and
loss of men which resulted from it, was one of the principal
causes of their ruin. Previously the invasions were short,
and did not prevent their enjoying their land during the
rest of the time : the enemy was now permanently fixed

494 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [28

BOOK in Attica ; at one time it was an attack in force, at an-
Yli" other it was the regular garrison overrunning the country

B.C. 413. and making forays for its subsistence, and the Lace-

^oc^pa-^ clsemonian king, Agis, was in the field and diligently

tion of prosecuting the war ; great mischief was therefore done

Decelea. ^^ ^^^ Athenians. They were deprived of their whole
country : more than twenty thousand slaves had deserted,
a great part of them artisans, and all their sheep and
beasts of burden were lost ; and as the cavalry rode out
daily upon excursions to Decelea and to guard the
country, their horses were either lamed by being con-
stantly worked upon rocky ground, or wounded by the
enemy.

Besides, the transport of provisions from Euboea, which
had before been carried on so much more quickly over
land by Decelea from Oropus, was now etFected at great
cost by sea round Sunium ; everything the city required
had to be imported from abroad, and instead of a city it
became a fortress. Summer and winter the Athenians
were worn out by having to keep guard on the fortifica-
tions, during the day by turns, by night all together, the
cavalry excepted, at the different military posts or upon
the wall. But what most oppressed them was that they
had two wars at once, and had thus reached a pitch of
frenzy which no one would have believed possible if he
had heard of it before it had come to pass. For could
any one have imagined that even when besieged by the
Peloponnesians entrenched in Attica, they would still,
instead of withdrawing from Sicily, stay on there besieg-
ing in like manner Syracuse, a town (taken as a town)
in no way inferior to Athens, or would so thoroughly
upset the Hellenic estimate of their strength and audacity,
as to give the spectacle of a people which, at the begin-
ning of the war, some thought might hold out one year,
some two, none more than three, if the Peloponnesians
invaded their country, now seventeen years after the first

29] DISTRESS AT ATHENS 495

invasion, after having already suffered from all the evils CHAP

of war, going to Sicily and undertaking a new war '

nothing inferior to that which they already had with the B.C. 413.
Peloponnesians ? These causes, the great losses from financial
Decelea, and the other heavy charges that fell upon them, ^^^^'
produced their financial embarrassment ; and it was at
this time that they imposed upon their subjects, instead
of the tribute, the tax of a twentieth upon all imports and
exports by sea, which they thought would bring them in
more money ; their expenditure being now not the same
as at first, but having grown with the war while their
revenues decayed.

Accordingly, not wishing to incur expense in their
present want of money, they sent back at once the
Thracians who came too late for Demosthenes, under
the conduct of Diitrephes, who was instructed, as they
were to pass through the E'iripus, to make use of them
if possible in the voyage along shore to injure the enemy.
Diitrephes first landed them at Tanagra and hastily
snatched some booty ; he then sailed across the Euripus
in the evening from Chalcis in Eubcea and disembarking
in Boeotia led them against Mycalessus. The night he
passed unobserved near the temple of Hermes, not quite
two miles from Mycalessus, and at daybreak assaulted
and took the town, which is not a large one ; the
inhabitants being off their guard and not expecting that
any one would ever come up so far from the sea to molest
them, the wall too being weak, and in some places having
tumbled down, while in others it had not been built to
any height, and the gates also being left open through
their feeling of security. The Thracians bursting into
Mycalessus sacked the houses and temples, and butchered
the inhabitants, sparing neither youth nor age, but killing
all they fell in with, one after the other, children and
women, and even beasts of burden, and whatever other
living creatures they saw ; the Thracian race, like the

496 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [30, 3»

BOOK bloodiest of the barbarians, being ever most so when it
Yli" has nothing to fear. Everywhere confusion reigned and

B.C. 413. death in all its shapes ; and in particular they attacked a
^f My- boys' school, the largest that there was in the place, into

calessus. which the children had just gone, and massacred them
all. In short, the disaster falling upon the whole town
was unsurpassed in magnitude, and unapproached by any
in suddenness and in horror.

Meanwhile the Thebans heard of it and marched to
the rescue, and overtaking the Thracians before they had
gone far, recovered the plunder and drove them in panic
to the Euripus and the sea, where the vessels which
brought them were lying. The greatest slaughter took
place while they were embarking, as they did not know
how to swim, and those in the vessels on seeing what was
going on on shore moored them out of bowshot ; in the
rest of the retreat the Thracians made a very respectable
defence against the Theban horse, by which they were
first attacked, dashing out and closing their ranks accord-
ing to the tactics of their country, and lost only a few
men in that part of the affair. A good number who
were after plunder were actually caught in the town
and put to death. Altogethei the Thracians had two
hundred and fifty killed out of thirteen hundred, the
Thebans and the rest who came to the rescue about
twenty, troopers and heavy infantry, with Scirphondas,
one of the Boeotarchs. The Mycalessians lost a large
proportion of their population.

While Mycalessus thus experienced a calamity, for its
extent, as lamentable as any that happened in the war,
Demosthenes, whom we left sailing to Corcyra, after the
building of the fort in Laconia, found a merchantman
lying at Phea in Elis, in which the Corinthian heavy
infantry were to cross to Sicily. The ship he destroyed,
but the men escaped, and subsequently got another in
which they pursued their voyage. After this, arriving

32] VOYAGE OF DEMOSTHENES 497

at Zacynthus and Cephallenia, he took a body of heavy CHAP.

infantry on board, and sending for some of the Messenians "

from Naupactus, crossed over to the opposite coast of B.C. 413.
Acarnania, to Alyzia, and to Anactorium which was thenes
held by the Athenians. While he was in these parts ^"'^wl^
he was met by Eurymedon returning from Sicily, where
he had been sent, as has been mentioned, during the
winter, with the money for the army, who told him the
news, and also that he had heard, while at sea, that the
Syracusans had taken Plemmyrium. Here, also, Conon
came to them, the commander at Naupactus, with news
that the twenty-five Corinthian ships stationed opposite
to him, far from giving over the war, were meditating an
engagement ; and he therefore begged them to send him
some ships, as his own eighteen were not a match for
the enemy's twenty-five. Demosthenes and Eurymedon,
accordingly, sent ten of their best sailers with Conon to
reinforce the squadron at Naupactus, and meanwhile pre-
pared for the muster of their forces ; Eurymedon, who
was now the colleague of Demosthenes, and had turned
back in consequence of his appointment, sailing to Corcyra
to tell them to man fifteen ships and to enlist heavy
infantry ; while Demosthenes raised slingers and darters
from the parts about Acarnania. — -_.

Meanwhile the envoys, already mentioned, who had
gone from Syracuse to the cities after the capture of
Plemmyrium, had succeeded in their mission, and were
abojut to bring the army that they had collected, when
Nicias got scent of it, and sent to the Centoripse and
Alicyasans and other of the friendly Sicels, who held the
passes, not to let the enemy through, but to combine to
prevent their passing, there being no other way by which
they could even attempt it, as the Agrigentines would
not give them a passage through their country. Agreeably
to this request the Sicels laid a triple ambuscade for the
Siceliots upon their march, and attacking them suddenly,

R455

498 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [33

BOOK while off their guard, killed about eight hundred of them
; and all the envoys, the Corinthian only excepted, by

B.C. izx. whom fifteen hundred who escaped were conducted to

towns in Syracuse.
i'*racnse About the same time the Camarinseans also came 10
the assistance of Syracuse with five hundred heavy
infantry, three hundred darters and as many archers,
while the Geloans sent crews for five ships, four hundred
darters and two hundred horse. Indeed almost the whole
of Sicily, except the Agrigentines, who were ceutral,
now ceased merely to watch events as it had hitherto
done, and actively joined Syracuse against the Athenians.
While the Syracusans after the Sicel disaster put off
any immediate attack upon the Athenians, Demosthenes
and Eurymedon, whose forces from Corcyra and the
continent were now ready, crossed the Ionian gulf with
all their armament to the lapygian promontory, and
starting from thence touched at the Choerades Isles lying
off lapygia, where they took on board a hundred and
fifty lapygian darters of the Messapian tribe, and after
renewing an old friendship with Artas the chief, who
had furnished them with the darters, arrived at Meta-
pontium in Italy. Here they persuaded their allies the
Metapontines, to send with them three hundred darters
and two galleys, and with this reinforcement coasted on
CO Thurii, where they found the party hostile to Athens
recently expelled by a revolution, and accordingly re-
mained there to muster and review the whole army, to
see if any had been left behind, and to prevail upon the
Thurians resolutely to join them in their expedition, and
in the circumstances in which they found themselves to
conclude a defensive and offensive alliance with the
Athenians.

About the same time the Peloponnesians in the twenty-
five ships stationed opposite to the squadron at Naupactus
to protect the passage of the transports to Sicily, had got

34] SEA-FIGHT IN GULF OF CORINTH 499

ready for engaging, and manning some additional vessels, CHAP.
80 as to be numerically little inferior to the Athenians, ^^'
anchored off Erineus in Achaia in the Rhypic country. B.C. 4x3.
The place off which they lay being in the form of a bauie*
crescent, the land forces furnished by the Corinthians and A^-^rSi"
their allies on the spot, came up and ranged themselves andCor-
upon the projecting headlands on either side, while the ^^u^d^
fleet, under the command of Polyanthes, a Corinthian, rous.
held the intervening space and blocked up the entrance.
The Athenians under Diphilus now sailed out against
them with thirty-three ships from Naupactus, and the
Corinthians, at first not moving, at length thought they
saw their opportunity, raised the signal, and advanced
and engaged the Athenians. After an obstinate struggle,
the Corinthians lost three ships, and without sinking any
altogether, disabled seven of the enemy, which were
struck prow to prow and had their foreships stoven in by
the Corinthian vessels, whose cheeks had been strengthened
for this very purpose. After an action of this even
character, in which either party could claim the victory
(although the Athenians became masters of the wrecks
through the wind driving tliem out to sea, the Corinthians
not putting out again to meet them) the two combatants
parted. No pursuit took place, and no prisoners were
made on either side ; the Corinthians and Peloponnesians
who were fighting near the shore escaping with ease, and
none of the Athenian vessels having been sunk. The
Athenians now sailed back to Naupactus, and the
Corinthians immediately set up a trophy as victors,
because they had disabled a greater number of the
enemy's ships. Moreover they held that they had not
been worsted, for the very same reason that their opponent
held that he had not been victorious ; the Corinthians
considering that they were conquerors, if not decidedly
conquered, and the Athenians thinking themselves van-
quished, because not decidedly victorious. However,

500 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [35,36

BOOK when the Peloponnesians sailed off and their land forces
Ylh had dispersed, the Athenians also set up a trophy as

B.C. 413- victors in Achaia, about two miles and a quarter from
I^Iq! Erineus, the Corinthian station.

struction This was the termination of the action at Naupactus.
cusan To return to Demosthenes and Euryraedon : the Thurians
stijps- having now got ready to join in the expedition with seven
hundred heavy infantry and three hundred darters, the
two generals ordered the ships to sail along the coast to
the Crotonian territory, and meanwhile held a review of
all the land forces upon the river Sybaris, and then led
them through the Thurian country. Arrived at the river
Hylias, they here received a message from the Crotonians,
saying that they would not allow the army to pass through
their country ; upon which the Athenians descended to-
wards the shore, and bivouacked near the sea and the
mouth of the Hylias, where the fleet also met them, and
the next day embarked and sailed along the coast touch-
ing at all the cities except Locri, until they came to
Petra in the Rhegian territory.

Meanwhile the Syracusans hearmg of their approach
resolved to make a second attempt with their fleet and
their other forces on shore, which they had been collect-
ing for this very purpose in order to do something before
their arrival. In addition to other improvements sug-
gested by the former sea-fight which they now adopted
in the equipment of their navy, they cut down their prows
to a smaller compass to make them more solid and made
their cheeks stouter, and from these let stays into the
vessers sides for a length of six cubits within and with-
out, in the same way as the Corinthians had altered their
prows before engaging the squadron at Naupactus. The
Syracusans thought that they would thus have an advan-
tage over the Athenian vessels, which were not constructed
with equal strength, but were slight in the bows, from
their being more used to sail round and charge the

cusans.

37] FIRST BATTLE IN GREAT HARBOUR 501

enemy's side than to meet him prow to prow, and that CHAP,
the battle being in the great harbour, with a great many ^^'
ships in not much room, was also a fact in their favour. B.C. ^13.
Charging prow to prow, they would stave in the enemy's tactics of
bows, by striking with solid and stout beaks against ^^^ Syra.
hollow and weak ones ; and secondly, the Athenians for
want of room would be unable to use their favourite
manoeuvre of breaking the line or of sailing round, as the
Syracusans would do their best not to let them do the
one, and want of room would prevent their doing the
other. This charging prow to prow, which had hitherto
been thought want of skill in a helmsman, would be the
Syracusans' chief manoeuvre, as being that which they
should find most useful, since the Athenians, if repulsed,
would not be able to back water in any direction except
towards the shore, and that only for a little way, and
in the little space in front of their own camp. The rest
of the harbour would be commanded by the Syracusans ;
and the Athenians, if hard pressed, by crowding together
in a small space and all to the same point, would run foul
of one another and fall into disorder, which was, in fact,
the thing that did the Athenians most harm in all the
sea-fights, they not having, like the Syracusans, the whole
harbour to retreat over. As to their sailing round into the
open sea, this would be impossible, with the Syracusans
in possession of the way out and in, especially as Plem-
myrium would be hostile to them, and the mouth of the
harbour was not large

With these contrivances to suit their skill and ability,
and now more confident after the previous sea-fight, the
Syracusans attacked by land and sea at once. The town
force Gylippus led out a little the first and brought them
up to the wall of the Athenians, where it looked towards
the city, while the force from the Olympieum, that is to
say, the heavy infantry that were there with the horse and
the light troops of the Syracusans, advanced against the

S02 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [38, 39

BOOK wall from the opposite side ; the ships of the Syracusans

Ylh and allies sailing out immediately afterwards. The

B-C. 413- Athenians at first fancied that they were to be attacked

fiS°daJ by land only, and it was not without alarm that they saw

Uie battle ^h^ flg^t suddenly approaching as well ; and while some

were forming upon the walls and in front of them against

the advancing enemy, and some marching out in haste

against the numbers of horse and darters coming from the

Olympieum and from outside, others manned the ships 01

rushed down to the beach to oppose the enemy, and when

the ships were manned put out with seventy-five sail

against about eighty of the Syracusans.

After spending a great part of the day in advancing
and retreating and skirmishing with each other, without
either being able to gain any advantage worth speaking
of, except that the Syracusans sank one or two of the
Athenian vessels, they parted, the land force at the same
time retiring from the lines. The next day the Syra-
cusans remained quiet, and gave no signs of what they
were going to do ; but Nicias, seeing that the battle had
been a drawn one, and expecting that they would attack
again, compelled the captains to refit any of the ships that
had suffered, and moored merchant vessels before the
stockade which they had driven into the sea in front of
their ships, to serve instead of an enclosed harbour, at
about two hundred feet from each other, in order that
any ship that was hard pressed might be able to retreat
* in safety and sail out again at leisure. These preparations
occupied the Athenians all day until nightfall.

The next day the Syracusans began operations at an
earlier hour, but with the same plan of atuck by land
and sea. A great part of the day the rivals spent as
before, confronting and skirmishing with each other;
until at last Ariston, son of Pyrrhicus, a Corinthian, the
ablest helmsman in the Syracusan service, persuaded their
naval commanders to send to the officials in the city, and

40. 41] DEFEAT OF THE ATHENIANS 503

tell them to move the sale market as quickly as they could CHAP,
down to the sea, and oblige every one to bring whatever
eatables he had and sell them there, thus enabling the B.C. 413.
commanders to land the crews and dine at once close to nians
the ships, and shortly afterwards, the selfsame day, to attack deceived
the Athenians agam when they were not expectmg it. and de-

In compliance with this advice a messenger was sent ^®^'®**'
and the market got ready, upon which the Syracusans
suddenly backed water and withdrew to the town, and at
once landed and took their dinner upon the spot ; while
the Athenians, supposing that they had returned to the
town because they felt they were beaten, disembarked at
their leisure and set about getting their dinners and about
their other occupations, under the idea that they had done
with fighting for that day. Suddenly the Syracusans
manned their ships and again sailed against them ; and
the Athenians, in great confusion and most of them fasting,
got on board, and with great difficulty put out to meet
them. For some time both parties remained on the
defensive without engaging, until the Athenians at last
resolved not to let themselves be worn out by waiting
where they were, but to attack without delay, and giving
a cheer, went into action. The Syracusans received
them, and charging prow to prow as they had intended,
stove in a great part of the Athenian foreships by the
strength of their beaks ; the darters on the decks also did
great damage to the Athenians, but still greater damage
was done by the Syracusans who went about in small
boats, ran in upon the oars of the Athenian galleys, and
sailed against their sides, and discharged from thence their
darts upon the sailors.

At last, fighting hard in this fashion, the Syracusans
gained the victory, and the Athenians turned and fled
between the merchantmen to their own station. The
Syracusan ships pursued them as far as the merchantmen,
where they were stopped by the beams armed with dol-

504 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [42

BOOK phins suspended from those vessels over the passage.

Yll Two of the Syracusan vessels went too near in the

B.C. 413- excitement of victory and were destroyed, one of them

ence of being taken with its crew. After sinking seven of the

the Syra- Athenian vessels and disabling many, and taking most of

the men prisoners and killing others, the Syracusans

retired and set up trophies for both the engagements,

being now confident of having a decided superiority

by sea, and by no means despairing of equal success

by land.

CHAPTER XXII

Nineteenth Year of the War— Arrival of Demosthenes-
Defeat of the Athenians at Epipolae— Folly and Obsti-
nacy of Nicias

In the meantime, while the Syracusans were preparing for
a second attack upon both elements, Demosthenes and
Eurymedon arrived with the succours from Athens, con-
sisting of about seventy-three ships, including the foreigners;
nearly five thousand heavy infantry, Athenian and allied;
a large number of darters, Hellenic and barbarian, and
slingers and archers and everything else upon a corre-
sponding scale. The Syracusans and their allies were for
the moment not a little dismayed at the idea that there
was to be no term or ending to their dangers, seeing, in
spite of the fortification of Decelea, a new army arrive
nearly equal to the former, and the power of Athens
proving so great in every quarter. On the other hand,
the first Athenian armament regained a certain confidence
in the midst of its misfortunes. Demosthenes, seeing how
matters stood, felt that he could not drag on and fare as
Nicias had done, who by wintering in Catana instead of
at once attacking Syracuse had allowed the terror of his
first arrival to evaporate in contempt, and had given time

43] ARRIVAL OF DEMOSTHENES 505

to Gylippus to arrive with a force from Peloponnese, CHAP.

which the Syracusans would never have sent for if he had

attacked immediately ; for they fancied that they were a B.C. 413.
match for him by themselves, and would not have dis- resolu-
covered their inferiority until they were already invested, ^g^J^^.
and even if they then sent for succours, they would no thenes.
longer have been equally able to profit by their arrival.
Recollecting this, and well aware that it was now on the
first day after his arrival that he like Nicias was most
formidable to the enemy, Demosthenes determined to lose
no time in drawing the utmost profit from the consterna-
tion at the moment inspired by his army ; and seeing that
the counterwall of the Syracusans, which hindered the
Athenians from investing them, was a single one, and that
he who should become master of the way up to Epipolae,
and afterwards of the camp there, would find no difficulty
in taking it, as no one would even wait for his attack,
made all haste to attempt the enterprise. This he took to
be the shortest way of ending the war, as he would either
succeed and take Syracuse, or would lead back the
armament instead of frittering away the lives of the
Athenians engaged in the expedition and the resources of
the country at large.

First therefore the Athenians went out and laid waste
the lands of the Syracusans about the Anapus and carried
all before them as at first by land and by sea, the Syra-
cusans not offering to oppose them upon either element,
unless it were with their cavalry and darters from the
Olympieum. Next Demosthenes resolved to attempt the
counterwall first by means of engines. As however the
engines that he brought up were burnt by the enemy
fighting from the wall, and the rest of the forces repulsed
after attacking at many different points, he determined to
delay no longer, and having obtained the consent of Nicias
and his fellow-commanders, proceeded to put in execution
his plan of attacking EpipoltE. As by day it seemed

*R 455

5o6 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [43

BOOK impossible to approach and get up without being observed,
he ordered provisions for five days, took all the masons

B.C. 413- and carpenters, and other things, such as arrows, and

thenes' everything else that they could v/ant for the work of

night fortification if successful ; and after the first watch set out

Epipohe. with Eurymedon and Menander and the whole army for
Epipolse, Nicias being left behind in the lines. Having
come up by the hill of Euryelus (where the former army
had ascended at first), unobserved by the enemy's guards,
they went up to the fort which the Syracusans had there,
and took it, and put to the sword part of the garrison.
The greater number, however, escaped at once and gave
tlie alarm to the camps, of which there were three upon
Epipolae, defended by outworks, one of the Syracusans,
one of the other Siceliots, and one of tlie allies ; and also
to the six hundred Syracusans forming the original gar-
rison for this part of Epipolae. These at once advanced
against the assailants, and falling in with Demosthenes
and the Athenians, were routed by them after a sharp
resistance, the victors immediately pushing on, eager to
achieve the objects of the attack without giving time for
their ardour to cool ; meanwhile others from the very
beginning were taking the counterwall of the Syracusans,
which was abandoned by its garrison, and pulling down
the battlements. The Syracusans and the allies, and
Gylippus with the troops under his command, advanced
to the rescue from the outworks, but engaged in some
consternation (a night attack being a piece of audacity
which they had never expected), and were at first com-
pelled to retreat. But while the Athenians, flushed with
their victory, now advanced with less order, wishing to
make their way as quickly as possible through the whole
force of the enemy not yet engaged, without relaxing their
attack or giving them time to rally, the Boeotians made
the first stand against them, attacked them, routed them,
and put them to flight.

44] ATTACK ON EPIPOLiE 507

The Athenians now fell into great disorder and per- CHAP,
plexity, so that it was not easy to get from one side or •

the other any detailed account of the affair. By day B.C. 413,
certainly the combatants have a clearer notion, though of the
even then by no means of all that takes place, no one A'^®*"
knowing much of anything that does not go on in his
own immediate neighbourhood ; but in a night engage-
ment (and this was the only one that occurred between
great armies during the war) how could any one know
anything for certain ? Although there was a bright moon
they saw each other only as men do by moonlight, that is
to say, they could distinguish the form of the body, but
could not tell for certain whether it was a friend or an
enemy. Both had great numbers of heavy infantry
moving about in a small space. Some of the Athenians
were already defeated, while others were coming up yet
unconquered for their first attack. A large part also of
the rest of their forces either had only just got up, or
were still ascending, so that they did not know which way
to march. Owing to the rout that had taken place all in
front was now in confusion, and the noise made it diffi-
cult to distinguish anything. The victorious Syracusans
and allies were cheering each other on with loud cries, by
night the only possible means of communication, and
meanwhile receiving all who came against them ; while
the Athenians were seeking for one another, taking all in
front of them for enemies, even although they might be
some of their now flying friends ; and by constantly
asking for the watchword, which was their only means of
recognition, not only caused great confusion among them-
selves by asking all at once, but also made it known to
the enemy, whose own they did not so readily discover,
as the Syracusans were victorious and not scattered, and
thus less easily mistaken. The result was that if the
Athenians fell in with a party of the enemy that was •
weaker than they, it escaped them through knowing their

5o8 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [45,46

BOOK watchword ; while if they themselves failed to answer
Xii" they were put to the sword. But what hurt them as

B.C. 413. much, or indeed more than anything else, was the singing
^os^ses of the Paean, from the perplexity which it caused by being

owing to nearly the same on either side : the Argives and Cor-
and dis- cyrasans and any other Dorian peoples m the army, struck
order. ^g^j-Qj. j^q ^]^q Athenians whenever they raised their Paean,
no less than did the enemy. Thus, after being once
thrown into disorder, they ended by coming into collision
with each other in many parts of the field, friends with
friends, and citizens with citizens, and not only terrified
one another, but even came to blows and could only be
parted with difficulty. In the pursuit many perished by
throwing themselves down the cliffs, the way down from
Epipolae being narrow ; and of those who got down
safely into the plain, although many, especially those who
belonged to the first armament, escaped through their
better acquaintance with the locality, some of the new-
comers lost their way and wandered over the country,
and were cut off in the morning by the Syracusan cavalry
and killed.

The next day the Syracusans set up two trophies, one
upon Epipolae where the ascent had been made, and the
other on the spot where the first check was given by the
Boeotians ; and the Athenians took back their dead under
truce. A great many of the Athenians and allies were
killed, although still more arms were taken than could be
accounted for by the number of the dead, as some of
those who were obliged to leap down from the cliffs
without their shields escaped with their lives and did not
perish like the rest.

After this the Syracusans recovering their old con-
fidence at such an unexpected stroke of good fortune,
despatched Sicanus with fifteen ships to Agrigentum
where there was a revolution, to induce if possible the
city to join them ; while Gylippus again went by land

47.48] ATHENIAN COUNCIL OF WAR 509

into the rest of Sicily to bring up reinforcements, being CHAP
now in hope of taking the Athenian lines by storm, after ^^^'
the result of the affair on Epipolae. B.C. 4x3

In the meantime the Athenian generals consulted upon thenes'
the disaster which had happened, and upon the general advises
weakness of the army. They saw themselves unsuccessful
in their enterprises, and the soldiers disgusted with their
stay ; disease being rife among them owing to its being
the sickly season of the year, and to the marshy and un-
healthy nature of the spot in which they were encamped ;
and the state of their affairs generally being thought
desperate. Accordingly, Demosthenes was of opinion
that they ought not to stay any longer ; but agreeably to
his original idea in risking the attempt upon Epipolae, now
that this had failed, he gave his vote for going away
without further loss of time, while the sea might yet be
crossed, and their late reinforcement might give them the
superiority at all events on that element. He also said
that it would be more profitable for the state to carry on
the war against those who were building fortifications
in Attica, than against the Syracusans whom it was no
longer easy to subdue ; besides which it was not right to
squander large sums of money to no purpose by going on
with the siege.

This was the opinion of Demosthenes. Nicias, with-
out denying the bad state of their affairs, was unwilling
to avow their weakness, or to have it reported to the
enemy that the Athenians in full council were openly voting
for retreat ; for in that case they would be much less
likely to effect it when they wanted without discovery.
Moreover, his own particular information still gave him
reason to hope that the affairs of the enemy would soon
be in a worse state than their own, if the Athenians per-
severed in the siege ; as they would wear out the Syra-
cusans by want of money, especially with the more
extensive command of the sea now given them by their

5IO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [49

BOOK present navy. Besides this, there was a party in Syra-
^"' cuse who wished to betray the city to the Athenians, and
B.C. 4«3- kept sending him messages and telling him not to raise
stiUhoids the siege. Accordingly, knowing this and really waiting
out hopes because he hesitated between the two courses and wished
cess, to see his way more clearly, in his public speech on this
occasion he refused to lead off the army, saying he was
sure the Athenians would nerer approve of their returning
without a vote of theirs. Those who would vote upon
their conduct, instead of judging the facts as eye-witnesses
like themselves and not from what they might hear from
hostile critics, would simply be guided by the calmnniea
of the first clever speaker ; while many, indeed most, of
the soldiers on the spot, who now so loudly proclaimed
the danger of their position, when they reached Athens
would proclaim just as loudly the opposite, and would say
that their generals had been bribed to betray them and
return. For himself, therefore, who knew the Athenian
temper, sooner than perish under a dishonourable charge
and by an unjust sentence at the hands of the Athenians,
he would rather take his chance and die, if die he must,
a soldier's death at the hand of the enemy. Besides,
after all, the Syracusans were in a worse case than them-
selves. What with paying mercenaries, spending upon
fortified posts, and now for a full year maintaining a large
navy, they were already at a loss and would soon be at a
standstill : they had already spent two thousand talents
and incurred heavy debts besides, and could not lose even
ever so small a fraction of their present force through not
paying it, without ruin to their cause ; depending as they
did more upon mercenaries than upon soldiers obliged to
serve, like their own. He therefore said that they ought
to stay and carry on the siege, and not depart defeated in
point of money, in which they were much superior.

Nicias spoke positively because he had exact informa-
tion of the financial distress at Syracuse, and also because

5o3 NICIAS REFUSES TO RETREAT 511

of the strength of the Athenian party there which kept CHAP.
sending him messages not to raise the siege ; besides ^^"'
which he had more confidence than before in his fleet, 80.413,
and felt sure at least of its success. Demosthenes, how- remafn^
ever, would not hear for a moment of continuing the siege, Syracus*
but said that if they could not lead off the army without
a decree from Athens, and if they were obliged to stay on,
they ought to remove to Thapsus or Catana ; where their
land forces would have a wide extent of country to over-
run, and could live by plundering the enemy, and would
thus do them damage ; while the fleet would have the
open sea to fight in, that is to say, instead of a narrow
space which was all in the enemy's favour, a wide sea-
room w here their science would be of use, and where they
could retreat or advance without being confined or cir-
cumscribed either when they put out or put in. In any
case he was altogether opposed to their staying on where
they were, and insisted on removing at once, as quickly
and with as little delay as possible ; and in this judgment
Eurymedon agreed. Nicias however still objecting, a
certain diflSdence and hesitation came over them, with a
suspicion that Nicias might have some further information
to make him so positive.

CHAPTER XXIII

Nineteenth Year of the War— Battles in the Great
Harbour— Retreat and Annihilation of the Athenian
Army

While the Atiienians lingered on in this way without
moving from where they were, Gylippus and Sicanug
now arrived at Syracuse. Sicanus had failed to gain
Agrigentum, the party friendly to the Syracusans having
been driven out while he was still at Gela ; but Gylippus

of the
moon

512 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [51

BOOK was accompanied not only by a large number of troops
^'1" raised in Sicily, but by the heavy infantry sent off in the
3.C. 413- spring from Peloponnese in the merchantmen, who had
u^eVf arrived at Selinus from Libya. They had been carried
'^revented ^° Libya by a storm, and having obtained two galleys and
by eclipse pilots from the Cyrenians, on their voyage along shore
" " " had taken sides with the Euespcritae and had defeated
the Libyans who were besieging them, and from thence
coasting on to Neapolis, a Carthaginian mart, and the
nearest point to Sicily, from which it is only two days'
and a night's voyage, there crossed over and came to
Selinus. Immediately upon their arrival the Syracusans
prepared to attack the Athenians again by land and sea
at once. The Athenian generals seeing a fresh army
come to the aid of the enemy, and that their own cir-
cumstances, far from improving, were becoming daily
worse, and above all distressed by the sickness of the
soldiers, now began to repent of not having removed
before ; and Nicias no longer offering the same opposi-
tion, except by urging that there should be no open
voting, they gave orders as secretly as possible for all
to be prepared to sail out from the camp at a given
signal. AH was at last ready, and they were on the
point of sailing away, when an eclipse of the moon, which
was then at the full, took place. Most of the Athenians,
deeply impressed by this occurrence, now urged the
generals to wait ; and Nicias, who was somewhat over-
addicted to divination and practices of that kind, refused
from that moment even to take the question of departure
into consideration, until they had waited the thrice nine
days prescribed by the soothsayers.

The besiegers were thus condemned to stay in the
country ; and the Syracusans getting wind of what had
happened, became more eager than ever to press the
Athenians, who had now themselves acknowledged that
tliey were no longer their superiors either by sea or by

52,53] BATTLE IN THE HARBOUR 5^3

land, as otherwise they would never hare planned to sail CHAP,
away. Besides which the Syracusans did not wish them ^^"^'
to settle in any other part of Sicily, where they would B.C. 413-
be more difficult to deal with, but desired to force them defeat of
to light at sea as quickly as possible, in a position ^^^IJq^^^
favourable to themselves. Accordingly they manned
their ships and practised for as many days as they
thought sufficient. When the moment arrived they
assaulted on the first day the Athenian lines, and upon a
small force of heavy infantry and horse sallying out
against them by certain gates, cut off some of the former
and routed and pursued them to the lines, where, as the
entrance was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses
and some few of the heavy infantry.

Drawing off their troops for this day, on the next the
Syracusans went out with a fleet of seventy-six sail, and
at the same time advanced with their land forces against
the lines. The Athenians put out to meet them with
eighty-six ships, came to close quarters and engaged.
The Syracusans and their allies first defeated the
Athenian centre, and then caught Eurymedon, the
commander of the right wing, who was sailing out from
the line more towards the land in order to surround the
enemy, in the hollow and recess of the harbour, and
killed him and destroyed the ships accompanying him ;
after which they now chased the whole Athenian fleet
before them and drove them ashore.

Gylippus seeing the enemy's fleet defeated and carried
ashore beyond their stockades and camp, ran down to
the breakwater with some of his troops, in order to cut
off the men as they landed and make it easier for the
Syracusans to tow off the vessels by the shore being
friendly ground. The Tyrrhenians who guarded this
point for the Athenians seeing them come on in disorder,
advanced out against them and attacked and routed their
van, hurling it into the marsh of Lysimeleia. After-

514 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [54, 55

BOOK wards t!ie Syracusan and allied troops arrived in greater
■ numbers, and the Athenians fearing for their ships came

B.C. 41?- up also to the rescue and engaged them, and defeated and
o?the pursued them to some distance and killed a few of their
A^®- heavy infantry. They succeeded in rescuing most of
their ships and brought them down by their camp ;
eighteen however were taken by the Syracusans and
their allies, and all the men killed. The rest the enemy
tried to burn by means of an old merchantman which
they filled with faggots and pine-wood, set on fire and
let drift down the wind which blew full on the Athenians.
The Athenians, however, alarmed for their ships, con-
trived means for stopping it and putting it out, and
checking the flames and the nearer approach of the
merchantman, thus escaped the danger.

After this the Syracusans set up a trophy for the sea-
fight and for the heavy infantry whom they had cut off up
at the lines, where they took the horses ; and the Athenians
for the rout of the foot driven by the Tyrrhenians into the
marsh, and for their own victory with the rest of the army.
The Syracusans had now gained a decisive victory at
sea, where until now they had feared the reinforcement
brought by Demosthenes, and deep, in consequence, was
the despondency of the Athenians, and great their dis-
appointment, and greater still their regret for having
come on the expedition. These were the only cities that
they had yet encountered, similar to their own in char-
acter, under democracies like themselves, which had ships
and horses, and were of considerable magnitude. They
had been unable to divide and bring them over by holding
out the prospect of changes in their governments, or to
crush them by their great superiority in force, but had
failed in most of their attempts, and being already in per-
plexity, had now been defeated at sea, where defeat could
never have been expected, and were thus plunged deeper
Id embarrassment than ever.

56,57] ATHENIANS AND SYRACUSANS S^S

Meanwhile the Syracusans immediately began to sail CHAP*
freely along the harbour, and determined to close up its ^^" •
mouth, so that the Athenians might not be able to steal B.C. 41 j.
out in future, even if they wished. Indeed, the Syra- asm at* "
cusans no longer thought only of saving themselves, but Syraciua.
also how to hinder the escape of the enemy ; thinking,
and thinking rightly, that they were now much the strongest,
and that to conquer the Athenians and their allies by land
and sea would win them great glory in Hellas. The rest
of the Hellenes would thus immediately be either freed or
released from apprehension, as the remaining forces of
Athens would be henceforth unable to sustain the war
that would be waged against her ; while they, the Syra-
cusans, would be regarded as the authors of this deliver-
ance, and would be held in high admiration, not only with
all men now living but also with posterity. Nor were
these the only considerations that gave dignity to the
struggle. They would thus conquer not only the Athe-
nians but also their numerous allies, and conquer not alone,
but with their companions-in-arms, commanding side by
side with the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, having
offered their city to stand in the van of danger, and having
been in a great measure the pioneers of naval success.

Indeed, there were never so many peoples assembled
before a single city, if we except the grand total gathered
together in this war under Athens and Lacedasmon. The
following were the states on either side who came to Syra-
cuse to fight for or against Sicily, to help to conquer or
defend the island. Right or community of blood was not
the bond of union between them, so much as interest or
compulsion as the case might be. The Athenians them-
selves being lonians went against the Dorians of Syracuse
of their own free will ; and the peoples still speaking
Attic and using the Athenian laws, the Lemnians, Im-
brians, and iEginetans, that is to say, the then occupants
of -/Egina, being their colonists, went with them. To

5i6 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [57

BOOK these must be also added the Hestiasans dwelling at
XJi' Hestigea in Euboea. Of the rest some joined in the ex-

B-C 4x3. pedition as subjects of the Athenians, others as inde-
and aSies pendent allies, others as mercenaries. To the number of
'° t^e tjie subjects paying tribute belonged the Eretrians, Chalci-
army. dians, Styrians, and Carystians from Eubcea ; the Ceans,
Andrians, and Tenians from the islands ; and the Mile-
sians, Samians, and Chians from Ionia. The Chians,
however, joined as independent allies, paying no tribute,
but furnishing ships. Most of these were lonians and
descended from the Athenians, except the Carystians,
who are Dryopes, and although subjects and obliged to
serve, were still lonians fighting against Dorians. Be-
sides these there were men of ^olic race, the Methyni-
nians, subjects who provided ships, not tribute, and the
Tenedians and ^nians who paid tribute. These iEolians
fought against their iEolian founders, the Bceotians in the
Syracusan army, because they were obliged, while the
Plataeans, the only native BcEOtians opposed to Boeotians,
did so upon a just quarrel. Of the Rhodians and Cythe-
rians, both Dorians, the latter, Lacedsemonian colonists,
fought in the Athenian ranks against their Lacedaemonian
countrymen with Gylippus ; while the Rhodians, Argives
by race, were compelled to bear arms against the Dorian
Syracusans and their own colonists, the Geloans, serving
with the Syracusans. Of the islanders round Pelopon-
nese, the Cephallenians and Zacynthians accompanied the
Athenians as independent allies, although their insular
position really left them little choice in the matter, owing
to the maritime supremacy of Athens, while the Cor-
cyraeans, who were not only Dorians but Corinthians,
were openly serving against Corinthians and Syracusans,
although colonists of the former and of the same race as the
latter, under colour of compulsion, but really out of free
will through hatred of Corinth. The Messenians, as
they are now calltxl in Naupactus and from Pylos, then

58] ATHENIANS AND SYRACUSANS 51?

held by the Athenians, were taken with them to the war. CHAP.
There were also a few Megarian exiles, whose fate it was ^^"'
to be now fighting against the Megarian Selinuntines. pree***

The engagement of the rest was more of a voluntary allies,
nature. It was less the league than hatred of the Lace- ^^^^^i^^
dsmonians and the immediate private advantage of each and volun-
individual that persuaded the Dorian Argives to join the ^^^'*'
Ionian Athenians in a war against Dorians ; while the
Mantineans and other Arcadian mercenaries, accustomed
to go against the enemy pointed out to them at the
moment, were led by interest to regard the Arcadians
serving with the Corinthiaps as just as much their ene-
mies as any others. The Cretans and ^tolians also
served for hire, and the Cretans who had joined the
Rhodians in founding Gela, thus came to consent to fight
for pay against, instead of for, their colonists. There
were also some Acarnanians paid to serve, although they
came chiefly for love of Demosthenes and out of goodwill
to the Athenians whose allies they were. These all lived
on the Hellenic side of the Ionian gulf. Of the Italiots,
there were the Thurians and Metapontines, dragged into
the quarrel by the stern necessities of a time of revolu-
tion ; of the Siceliots, the Naxians and the Catanians ;
and of the barbarians, the Egestaeans, who called in the
Athenians, most of the Sicels, and outside Sicily some
Tyrrhenian enemies of Syracuse and lapygian merce-
naries.

Such were the peoples serving with the Athenians.
Against these the Syracusans had the Camarinceans their
neighbours, the Geloans who live next them, and thee
passing over the neutral Agrigentin<p:s, the Selinuntines
settled on the farther side of the island. These inhabit
the part of Sicily looking towards Libya ; the Hime-
raeans came from the side towards the Tyrrhenian sea,
being the only Hellenic inhabitants in that quarter, and
the only people that came from thence to the aid of thr

5i8 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [59, 60

BOOK Syracusans. Of the Hellenes in Sicily the above peoples
Xii' joined in the war, all Dorians and independent, and of
B.C 4*3. the barbarians the Sicels only, that is to say, such as did
Jicv^l^ not go over to the Athenians. Of the Hellenes outside
auxil- Sicily there were the Lacedaemonians, who provided a
* Spartan to take the command, and a force of Neodamodes
or Freedmen, and of Helots ; the Corinthians, who alone
joined with naval and land forces, with their Leucadian
and Ambraciot kinsmen ; some mercenaries sent by Corinth
from Arcadia ; some Sicyonians forced to serve, and from
outside Peloponnese the Boeotians. In comparison, how-
ever, with these foreign auxiliaries, the great Siceliot cities
furnished more in every department — numbers of heavy
infantry, ships and horses, and an immense multitude be-
sides having been brought together ; while in comparison,
again, one may say, with all the rest put together, more
was provided by the Syracusans themselves, both from the
greatness of the city and from the fact that they were in
the greatest danger.

Such were the auxiliaries brought together on either
side, all of which had by this time joined, neither party
experiencing any subsequent accession. It was no wonder,
. therefore, if the Syracusans and their allies thought that it
would win them great glory if they could foliow up their
recent victory in the sea-fight by the capture of the whole
Athenian armada, without letting it escape either by sea
or by land. They began at once to close up the Great
Harbour by means of boats, merchant vessels, and galleys
moored broadside across its mouth, which is nearly a
mile wide, and made all their other arrangements for the
event of the Athenians again venturing to fight at sea.
There was, in fact, nothing little either in their plans or
their ideas.

The Athenians, seeing them closing up the harbour and
informed of their further designs, called a council of war.
The generals and colonels assembled and discussed the

61] ATHENIAN COUNCIL OF WAR 519

difficulties of the situation ; the point which pressed most CHAP.

being that they no longer had provisions for immediate '

use (having sent on to Catana to tell them not to send B.C. 4x3.
any, in the belief that they were going away), and that to make
they would not have any in future unless they could gf^^j^^
command the sea. They therefore determined to eva- sea.
cuate their upper lines, to enclose with a cross-wall and
garrison a small space close to the ships, only just
sufficient to hold their stores and sick, and manning all
the ships, seaworthy or not, with every man that could be
spared from the rest of their land forces, to fight it out at
sea, and if victorious, to go to Catana, if not, to burn
their vessels, form in close order, and retreat by land for
the nearest friendly place they could reach, Hellenic or
barbarian. This was no sooner settled than carried into
effijct : they descended gradually from the upper lines and
manned ail their vessels, compelling all to go on board
who were of age to be in any way of use. They thus
succeeded in manning about one hundred and ten ships in
all, on board of which they embarked a number of archers
and darters taken from the Acarnanians and from the
other foreigners, making all other provisions allowed by
the nature of their plan and by the necessities which
imposed it. All was now nearly ready, and Nicias, seeing
the soldiery disheartened by their unprecedented and de-
cided defeat at sea, and by reason of the scarcity of
provisions eager to fight it out as soon as possible, called
them all together, and first addressed them, speaking as
follows : —

* Soldiers of the Athenians and of the allies, we have
all an equal interest in the corrring struggle, in wnich life
and country are at stake for us quite as much as they can
be for the enemy ; since if our fleet wins the day, each
can see his native city again, wherever that city may be.
You must not lose heart, or be like men without any
experience, who fail in a first essay, and ever afterwards

520 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [62.63

BOOK fearfully forebode a future as disastrous. But let the
Ylh Athenians among you who have already had experience
B.

A laiiu- !•

fight to many expedi

i.e. 413- of many wars, and the allies who have joined us m so
fight"to many expeditions, remember the surprises of war, and

be fought ^it}, ti^e hope that fortune will not be always against us,
^board prepare to fight again in a manner worthy of the number
which you see yourselves to be.

* Now, whatever we thought would be of service
against the crush of vessels in such a narrow harbour, and
against the force upon the decks of the enemy, from
which we suffered before, has all been considered with
the helmsmen, and, as far as our means allowed, pro-
vided. A number of archers and darters will go on
board, and a multitude that we should not have em-
ployed in an action in the open sea, where our science
would be crippled by the weight of the vessels ; but in
the present land-fight that we are forced to make from
shipboard all this will be useful. We have also dis-
covered the changes in construction that we must make to
meet theirs ; and against the thickness of their cheeks,
which did us the greatest mischief, we have provided
grappling-irons, which will prevent an assailant backmg
water after charging, if the soldiers on deck here do their
duty ; since we are absolutely compelled to fight a land
battle from the fleet, and it seems to be our interest neither
to back water ourselves, nor to let the enemy do so,
especially as the shore, except so much of it as may be
held by our troops, is hostile ground.

< You must remember this and fight on as long as you
can, and must not let yourselves be driven ashore, but
once alongside must make up your minds not to part com-
pany until you have swept the heavy infaniry from the
enemy's deck. I say this more for the heavy infantry
than for the seamen, as it is more the business of the men
on deck ; and our land forces are even now on the whole
the strongest. The sailors I advise, and at the same time

643 SPEECH OF NICIAS 521

implore, not to be too much daunted by their misfortunes, CHAP.

now that we have our decks better armed and a greater "

number of vessels. Bear in mind how well worth pre- B.C. 413.
serving is the pleasure felt by those of you who through of Athena
your knowledge of our language and imitation of our {*^^J°
manners were always considered Athenians, even though
not so in reality, and as such were honoured throughout
Hellas, and had your full share of the advantages of our
empire, and more than your share in the respect of our
subjects and in protection from ill treatment. You,
therefore, with whom alone we freely share our empire,
we now justly require not to betray that empire in its
extremity, and in scorn of Corinthians, whom you have
often conquered, and of Siceliots, none of whom so much
as presumed to stand against us when our navy was in its
prime, we ask you to repel them, and to show that even
in sickness and disaster your skill is more than a match
for the fortune and vigour of any other.

* For the Athenians among you I add once more this
reflexion : — you left behind you no more such ships in your
docks as these, no more heavy infantry in their flower ;
if you do aught but conquer, our enemies here will imme-
diately sail thither, and those that are left of us at Athens
will become unable to repel their home assailants, rein-
forced by these new allies. Here you will fall at once
into the hands of the Syracusans — I need not remind you
of the intentions with which you attacked them — and
your countrymen at home will fall into those of the
Lacedasmonians. Since the fate of both thus hangs upon
this single battle — now, if ever, stand firm, and remember,
each and all, that you who are now going on board are
the army and navy of the Athenians, and all that is left
of the state and the great name of Athens, in whose
defence if any man has any advantage in skill or courage,
now is the time for him to show it, and thus serve
himself and save all.'

522 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [65, 66

BOOK After this address Nicias at once gave orders to man

Xli* the ships. Meanwhile Gylippus and the Syracusans

B.C. 413. could perceive by the preparations which they saw going

^(fyUppus on that the Athenians meant to fight at sea. They haci

to the also notice of the grappling-irons, against which they

ensans" Specially provided by stretching hides over the prows and

much of the upper part of their vessels, in order that the

irons when thrown might slip off without taking hold.

All being now ready, the generals and Gylippus addressed

them in the following terms : —

* Syracusans and allies, the glorious character of our
past achievements and the no less glorious results at issue
in the coming battle are, we think, understood by most of
you, or you would never have thrown yourselves with
such ardour into the struggle ; and if there be any one
not as fully aware of the facts as he ought to be, we will
declare them to him. The Athenians came to this country
first to effect the conquest of Sicily, and after that, if
successful, of Peloponnese and the rest of Hellas, possess-
ing already the greatest empire yet known, of present or
former times, among the Hellenes. Here for the first
time they found in you men who faced their navy which
made them masters everywhere; you have already de-
feated them in the previous sea-fights, and will in all
likelihood defeat them again now. When men are once
checked in what they consider their special excellence,
their whole opinion of themselves suffers more than if
they had not at first believed in their superiority, the un-
expected shock to their pride causing them to give way
more than their real strength warrants ; and this is pro-
bably now the case with the Athenians.

♦ With us it is different. The original estimate of our-
selves which gave us courage in the days of our unskil-
fulness has been strengthened, while the conviction super-
added to it that we must be the best seamen of the time,
if we have conquered the best, has given a double measure

67, 68] SPEECH OF GYLIPPUS 523

of hope to every man among us ; and, for the most part, chap.
where there is the greatest hope, there is also the greatest ^^^'^
ardour for action. The means to combat us which they B.C. 413.
have tried to find in copying our armament are famihar to JJeet-
our warfare, and will be met by proper provisions ; while aess of
they will never be able to have a number of heavy in- glanc©.
fan try on their decks, contrary to their custom, and a
number of darters (born landsmen, one may say, Acar-
nanians and others, embarked afloat, who will not know
how to discharge their weapons when they have to keep
still), witliout hampering their vessels and falling all into
confusion among themselves through fighting not accord-
ing to their own tactics. For they will gain nothing by
the number of their ships — I say this to those of you who
may be alarmed by having to fight against odds — as a
quantity of ships in a confined space will only be slower
in executing the movements required, and most exposed to
injury from our means of offence. Indeed, if you would
know the plain truth, as we are credibly informed, the
excess of their sufferings and the necessities of their pre-
sent distress have made them desperate; they have no
confidence in their force, but wish to try their fortune in
the only way they can, and either to force their passage
and sail out, or after this to retreat by land, it being
impossible for them to be worse off than they are.

* The fortune of our greatest enemies having thus be-
trayed itself, and their disorder being what I have de-
scribed, let us engage in anger, convinced that, as between
adversaries, nothing is more legitimate than to claim to
sate the whole wrath of one's soul in punishing the
aggressor, and nothing more sweet, as the proverb has it,
than the vengeance upon an enemy, which it will now be
ours to take. That enemies they are and mortal enemies
you all know, since they came here to enslave our country,
and if successful had in reserve for our men all that is most
dreadful, and for our children and wives all that is most

524 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [bg

BOOK dishonourable, and for the whole city the name which
Xii' conveys the greatest reproach. None should therefore

B.C. 4»3- relent or think it gain if they go away without further
appeids danger to us. This they will do just the same, even if they

of Nicias. get the victory; while if we succeed, as we may expect,
in chastising them, and in handing down to ail Sicily her
ancient freedom strengthened and confirmed, we shall
have achieved no mean triumph. And the rarest dangers
are those in which failure brings little loss and success the
greatest advantage.*

After the above address to the soldiers on their side,
the Syracusan generals and Gylippus now perceived that
the Athenians were manning their ships, and immediately
proceeded to man their own also. Meanwhile Nicias,
appalled by the position of affairs, realising the greatness
and the nearness of the danger now that they were on
the point of putting out from shore, and thinking, as men
are apt to think in great crises, that when all has been
done they have still something left to do, and when all
has been said that they have not yet said enough, again
called on the captains one by one, addressing each by his
father's name and by his own, and by that ot his tribe, and
adjured them not to belie their own personal renown, or to
obscure the hereditary virtues for which their ancestors
were illustrious ; he reminded them of their country,
the freest of the free, and of the unfettered discretion
allowed in it to all to live as they pleased ; and added
other arguments such as men would use at such a crisis,
and which, with little alteration, are made to serve on all
occasions alike — appeals to wives, children, and national
gods, — without caring whether they are thought common-
place, but loudly invoking them in the belief that they
will be of use in the consternation of the moment.
Having thus admonished them, not, he felt, as he would,
but as he could, Nicias withdrew and led the troops to
the sea, and ranged them in as long a line as he was able.

70] LAST BATTLE IN THE HARBOUR 525

in order to aid as far as possible in sustaining the courage CHAP.

of the men afloat ; while Demosthenes, Menander, and *

Euthydemus, who took the command on board, put out j^-^^^^^^-
from their own camp and sailed straight to the barrier battle in
across the mouth of the harbour and to the passage left *jj|,^^^**
open, to try to force their way out.

The Syracusans and their allies had already put out
with about the same number of ships as before, a part ot
which kept guard at the outlet, and the remainder all
round the rest of the harbour, in order to attack the
Athenians on all sides at once; while the land forces
held themselves in readiness at the points at which the
vessels might put into the shore. The Syracusan fleet
was commanded by Sicanus and Agatharchus, who had
each a wing of the whole force, with Pythen and the
Corinthians in the centre. When the rest of the Athe-
nians came up to the barrier, with the first shock of their
charge they overpowered the ships stationed there, and
tried to undo the fastenings ; after this, as the Syracusans
and allies bore down upon them from all quarters, the
action spread from the barrier over the whole harbour,
and was more obstinately disputed than any of the pre-
ceding ones. On either side the rowers showed great
zeal in bringing up their vessels at the boatswains' orders,
and the helmsmen great skill in manoeuvring, and great
emulation one with another ; while the ships once along-
side, the soldiers on board did their best not to let the
service on deck be outdone by the others ; in short, every
man strove to prove himself the first in his particular
department. And as many ships were engaged in a small
compass (for these were the largest fleets fighting in the _
narrowest space ever known, being together little short of
two hundred), the regular attacks with the beak were
few, there being no opportunity of backing water or of
breaking the line ; while the collisions caused by one ship
chancing to run foul of another, either in flying from or

526 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [70

BOOK attacking a third, were more frequent. So long as a
Yli* vessel was coming up to the charge the men on the decks

B.C. 4»3- rained darts and arrows and stones upon her ; but once
**of"the alongside, the heavy infantry tried to board each other's

struggle, vessel, fighting hand to hand. In many quarters also it
happened, by reason of the narrow room, that a vessel
was charging an enemy on one side and being charged
herself on another, and that two, or sometimes more ships
had perforce got entangled round one, obliging the helms-
men to attend to defence here, offence there, not to one
thing at once, but to many on all sides ; while the huge
din caused by the number of ships crashing together not
only spread terror, but made the orders of the boatswains
inaudible. The boatswains on either side in the discharge
of their duty and in the heat of the conflict shouted inces-
santly orders and appeals to their men ; the Athenians they
urged to force the passage out, and now if ever to show their
mettle and lay hold of a safe return to their country ; to
the Syracusans and their allies they cried that it would be
glorious to prevent the escape of the enemy, and conquer-
ing, to exalt the countries that were theirs. The generals,
moreover, on either side, if they saw any in any part of
the battle backing ashore without being forced to do so,
called out to the captain by name and asked him — the
Athenians, whether they were retreating because they
thought the thrice hostile shore more their own than that
sea whiclj had cost them so much labour to win ; the
Syracusans, whether they were flying from the flying
Athenians, whom they well knew to be eager to escape
in whatever way they could.

Meanwhile the two armies on shore, while victory hung
in the balance, were a prey to the most agonising and con-
flicting emotions ; the natives thirsting for more glory
than they had already won, while the invaders feared to
find themselves in even worse plight than before. The
all of the Athenians being set upon their fleet, their fear

71] DEFEAT OF THE ATHENIANS 527

for the event was like nothing they had ever felt ; while CHAP.
their view of the struggle was necessarily as chequered as ^_
the battle itself. Close to the scene of action and not all B.C. ^13.
looking at the same point at once, some saw their friends of the
victorious and took courage, and fell to calling upon f^^^**"
heaven not to deprive them of salvation, while others who
had their eyes turned upon the losers, wailed and cried
aloud, and, although spectators, were more overcome than
the actual combatants. Others, again, were gazing at
some spot where the battle was evenly disputed ; as the
strife v/as protracted without decision, their swaying
bodies reflected the agitation of their minds, and they
suffered the worst agony of all, ever just within reach of
safety or just on the point of destruction. In short, in
that one Athenian army as long as the sea-fight remained
doubtful there was every sound to be heard at once,
shrieks, cheers, * H^e toin,^ * We lose,'' and all the other
manifold exclamations that a great host would necessarily
utter in great peril ; and with the men in the fleet it was
nearly the same ; until at last the Syracusans and their
allies, after the battle had lasted a long while, put the
Athenians to flight, and with much shouting and cheering
chased them in open rout to the shore. The naval force,
one one way, one another, as many as were not taken
afloat, now ran ashore and rushed from on board their
ships to their camp ; while the army, no more divided, but
carried away by one impulse, all with shrieks and groans
deplored the event, and ran down, some to help the ships,
others to guard what was left of their wall, while the
remaining and most numerous part ^already began to con-
sider how they should save themselves. Indeed, the
panic of the present moment had never been surpassed.
They now suffered very nearly what they had inflicted
at Pylos; as then the Lacedaemonians with the loss of
their fleet lost also the men who had crossed over to
the island, so now the Athenians had no hope of

528 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [72, 73

BOOK escaping by land, without the help of some extraordinary

^"' accident.
B.C. 4T3. The sea-iight having been a severe one, and many
*oTthe ships and lives having been lost on both sides, the
^^broklsn* victorious Syracusans and their allies now picked up their
wrecks and dead, and sailed off to the city and set up
a trophy. The Athenians, overwhelmed by their mis-
fortune, never even thought of asking leave to take up
their dead or wrecks, but wished to retreat that very
night. Demosthenes, however, went to Nicias and gave
it as his opinion that they should man the ships they had
left and make another effort to force their passage out
next morning ; saying that they had still left more ships
fit for service than the enemy, the Athenians having
about sixty remaining as against less than fifty of their
opponents. Nicias was quite of his mind ; but when
they wished to man the vessels, the sailors refused to go
on board, being so utterly overcome by their defeat as no
longer to believe in the possibility of success.

Accordingly they all now made up their minds to
retreat by land. Meanwhile the Syracusan Hermocrates
suspecting their intention, and impressed by the danger of
allowing a force of that magnitude to retire by land,
establish itself in some other part of Sicily, and from
thence renew the war, went and stated his views to the
authorities, and pointed out to them that they ought not
to let the enemy get away by night, but that all the
Syracusans and their allies should at once march out and
block up the roads and seize and guard the passes. The
authorities were entirely of his opinion, and thought that
it ought to be done, but on the other hand felt sure that
the people, who had given themselves over to rejoicing
and were taking their ease after a great battle at sea,
would not be easily brought to obey ; besides, they were
celebrating a festival, having on that day a sacrifice to
Heracles, and most of them in their rapture at the victory

74] ATHENIANS RETREAT BY LAND 529

had fallen to drinking at the festival, and would probably CHAP,
consent to anything sooner than to take up their arms and ^^^"'
march out at that moment. For these reasons the thing B.C. 413.
appeared impracticable to the magistrates ; and Hermo- crates**
crates, finding himself unable to do anything further with delays
them, had now recourse to the following stratagem of his
own. What he feared was that the Athenians might
quietly get the start of them by passing the most difficult
placej during the night ; and he therefore sent, as soon
as it was dusk, some friends of his own to the camp with
some horsemen who rode up within earshot and called
out to some of the men, as though they were well-wishers
of the Athenians, and told them to tell Nicias (who had
in fact some correspondents who informed him of what
went on inside the town), not to lead off the army by
night as the Syracusans were guarding the roads, but to
make his preparations at his leisure and to retreat by day.
After saying this they departed ; and their hearers in-
formed the Athenian generals, who put off going for that
night on the strength of this message, not doubting its
sincerity.

Since after all they had not set out at once, they now
determined to stay also the following day to give time to
the soldiers to pack up as well as they could the most
useful articles, and, leaving everything else behind, to
start only with what was strictly necessary for their
personal subsistence. Meanwhile the Syracusans and
Gylippus marched out and blocked up the roads through
the country by which the Athenians were likely to pass,
and kept guard at the fords of the streams and rivers,
posting themselves so as to receive them and stop the
army where they thought best ; while their fleet sailed
up to the beach and towed off the ships of the Athenians.
Some few were burned by the Athenians themselves as
they had intended ; the rest the Syracusans lashed on to
their own at their Jeisure as they had been thrown up on
S 455

530 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [75

BOOK shore, without any one trying to stop them, and conveyed

Xll' to the town.
B.C. 413- After this, Nicias and Demosthenes now thinking thai
Saving enough had been done in the way of preparation, the re-
cbe camp, moval of the army took place upon the second day after
'the sea-fight. It was a lamentable scene, not merely
from the single circumstance that they were retreating
after having lost all their ships, their great hopes gone,
and themselves and the state in peril ; but also in leaving
the camp there were things most grievous for every eye
and heart to contemplate. The dead lay unburied, and
each man as he recognised a friend among them shuddered
with grief and horror ; while the living whom they were
leaving behind, wounded or sick, were to the living far
more shocking than the dead, and more to be pitied than
those who had perished. These fell to entreating and
bewailing until their friends knew not what to do, begging
them to take them and loudly calling to each individual
comrade or relative whom they could see, hanging upon
the necks of their tent-fellows in the act of departure,
and following as far as they could, and when their bodily
strength failed them, calling again and again upon heaven
and shrieking aloud as they were left behind. So that
the whole army being filled with tears and distracted
after this fashion found it not easy to go, even from an
enemy's land, where they had already suffered evils too
great for tears and in the unknown future before them
feared to suffer more. Dejection and self-condemnation
were also rife among them. Indeed they could only be
compared to a starved-out town, and that no small one,
escaping ; the whole multitude upon the march being not
less than forty thousand men. All carried anything they
could which might be of use, and the heavy infantry and
troopers, contrary to their wont, while under arms carried
their own victuals, in some cases for want ot servants, in
others through not trusting them ; as they had long been

76, 77] SPEECH OF NICIAS 531

deserting and now did so in greater numbers than ever. CHAP.
Yet even thus they did not carry enough, as there was no •^^"^'
longer food in the camp. Moreover their disgrace gene- B.C. 413
rally, and the universality of their sufferings, however to of*NiSs
a certain extent alleviated by being borne in company,
were still felt at the moment a heavy burden, especially
when they contrasted the splendour and glory of their
setting out with the humiliation in which it had ended.
For this was by far the greatest reverse that ever befell
an Hellenic army. They had come to enslave others,
and were departing in fear of being enslaved themselves :
they had sailed out with prayer and paeans, and now
started to go back with omens directly contrary ; travel-
ling by land instead of by sea, and trusting not in their
fleet but in their heavy infantry. Nevertheless the great-
ness of the danger still impending made all this appear
tolerable.

Nicias seeing the army dejected and greatly altered,
passed along the ranks and encouraged and comforted
them as far as was possible under the circumstances,
raising his voice still higher and higher as he went from
one company to another in his earnestness, and in his
anxiety that the benefit of his words might reach as many
as possible : —

* Athenians and allies, even in our present position we
must still hope on, since men have ere now been saved
from worse straits than this ; and you must not condemn
yourselves too severely either because of your disasters or
because of your present unmerited sufferings. I myself
who am not superior to any of you in strength — indeed,
you see how I am in my sickness — and who in the gifts
of fortune am, I think, whether in private life or other-
wise, the equal of any, am now exposed to the same
danger as the meanest among you ; and yet my life has
been one of much devotion toward the gods, and of
much justice and without offence toward men. I have,

532 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [78

BOOK therefore, still a strong hope for the future, and our
YIL misfortunes do not terrify me as much as they might.
B.C. 413. Indeed we may hope that they -will be Hghtened : our
of hope enemies have had good fortune enough ; and if any of
still re- tj,g gQj^s ^as offended at our expedition, we have been
already amply punished. Others before us have attacked
their neighbours and have done what men will do without
suifering more than they could bear ; and we may now
justly expect to find the gods more kind, for we have
become fitter objects for their pity than their jealousy.
And then look at yourselves, mark the numbers and
efficiency of the heavy infantry marching in your ranks,
and do not give way too much to despondency, but redect
that you are yourselves at once a city wherever you sit
down, and that there is no other in Sicily that could
easily resist your attack, or expel you when once estab-
lished. The safety and order of the march is for your-
selves to look to ; the one thought of each man being
that the spot on which he may be forced to fight must be
conquered and held as his country and stronghold. Mean-
while we shall hasten on our way night and day alike,
as our provisions are scanty ; and if we can reach some
friendly place of the Sicels, whom fear of the Syracusans
still keeps true to us, you may forthwith consider your-
selves safe. A message has been sent on to them with
directions to meet us with supplies of food. To sum up,
be convinced, soldiers, that you must be brave, as there
is no place near for your cowardice to take refuge in, and
tliat if you now escape from the enemy, you may all see
again what your hearts desire, while those of you who are
Athenians will raise up again the great power of the state,
fallen though it be. Men make the cit)^ and not wails or
•hips without men in them.*

As he made this address, Nicias went along the ranks,
and brought back to their place any of the troops that he
saw straggling out of the line ; while Demosthenes did

79] DIFFICULTIES OF THE RETREAT 533

as much for his part of the army, addressing them in CHAP,
words very similar. The army marched in a hollow ^^"^'
square, the division under Nicias leading, and that of B.C 5x3.
Demosthenes following, the heavy infantry being out- racus^s
side and the baggage-carriers and the bulk of the army fortify «
in the middle. When they arrived at the ford of
the river Anapus they there found drawn up a body of
the Syracusans and allies, and routing these, made
good their passage and pushed on, harassed by the
charges of the Syracusan horse and by the missiles of
their light troops. On that day they advanced about
four miles and a half, halting for the night upon a certain
hill. On the next they started early and got on about
two miles further, and descended into a place in the plain
and there encamped, in order to procure some eatables
from the houses, as the place was inhabited, and to carry
on with them water from thence, as for many furlongs in
front, in the direction in which they were going, it was
not plentiful. The Syracusans meanwhile went on and
fortified the pass in front, where there was a steep hill
with a rocky ravine on each side of it, called the Acraean
cliff. The next day the Athenians advancing found
themselves impeded by the missiles and charges of the
horse and darters, both very numerous, of the Syracusans
and allies ; and after fighting for a long while, at length
Tetired to the same camp, where they had no longer pro-
visions as before, it being impossible to leave their position
by reason of the cavalry.

Early next morning they started afresh and forced their
way to the hill, which had been fortified, where they
found before them the enemy's infantry drawn up many
shields deep to defend the fortification, the pass being
narrow. The Athenians assaulted the work, but were
greeted by a storm of missiles from the hill, which told
with the greater effect through its being a steep one, and
unable to force the passage, retreated again and rested.

534 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [80

BOOK Meanwhile occurred some claps of thunder and rain, as
Xll" often happens towards autumn, which still further dis-

B.C. 4»3- heartened the Athenians, who thought all these things to
oaf e be omens of their approaching ruin. While they were
line of resting Gylippus and the Syracusans sent a part of their
army to throw up works in their rear on the way by which
they had advanced ; however, the Athenians immediately
sent some of their men and prevented them ; after which
they retreated more towards the plain and halted for the
night. When they advanced the next day the Syracusans
surrounded and attacked them on every side, and disabled
many of them, falling back if the Athenians advanced
and coming on if they retired, and in particular assaulting
their rear, in the hope of routing them in detail, and thus
striking a panic into the whole army. For a long while
the Athenians persevered in this fashion, but after ad-
vancing for four or five furlongs halted to rest in the
plain, the Syracusans also withdrawing to their own
camp.

During the night Nicias and Demosthenes, seeing the
wretched condition of their troops, now in want of every
kind of necessary, and numbers of them disabled in the
numerous attacks of the enemy, determined to light as
many fires as possible, and to lead off the army, no longer
by the same route as they had intended, but towards the
sea in the opposite direction to that guarded by the Syra-
cusans. The whole of this route was leading the army
not to Catana but to the other side of Sicily, towards
Camarina, Gela, and the other Hellenic and barbarian
towns in that quarter. They accordmgly lit a number
of fires and set out by night. Now all armies, and the
greatest most of all, are liable to fears and alarms, es-
pecially when they are marching by night through an
enemy's country and with the enemy near; and the Athe-
nians falling into one of these panics, the leading division,
that of Nicias, kept together and got on a good way in

8i] DEMOSTHENES SURROUNDED 535

front, while that of Demosthenes, comprising rather more cHAP.
than half the army, got separated and marched on in some XXUI.
disorder. By morning, however, they reached the sea, B.C. 4x3.
and getting into the Helorine Road, pushed on in order ^f'Semos-
to reach the river Cacyparis, and to follow the stream up thenes
through the interior, where they hoped to be met by the sep^atS
Sicels whom they had sent for. Arrived at the river,
they found there also a Syracusan party engaged in bar-
ring the passage of the ford with a wall and a palisade,
and forcing this guard, crossed the river and went on to
another called the Erineus, according to the advice of
their guides.

Meanwhile, when day came and the Syracusans and
allies found that the Athenians were gone, most of them
accused Gylippus of having let them escape on purpose,
and hastily pursuing by the road which they had no diffi-
culty in finding that they had taken, overtook them about
dinner-time. They first came up with the troops under
Demosthenes, who were behind and marching somewhat
slowly and in disorder, owing to the night-panic above
referred to, and at ot^e attacked and engaged them, the
Syracusan horse surrounding them with more ease now
that they were separated from the rest, and hemming them
in on one spot. The division of Nicias was five or six
miles on in front, as he led them more rapidly, thinking
that under the circumstances their safety lay not in stay-
ing and fighting, unless obliged, but in retreating as fast
as possible, and only fighting when forced to do so. On
the other hand, Demosthenes was, generally speaking,
harassed more incessantly, as his post in the rear left him
the first exposed to the attacks of the enemy ; and new,
finding that the Syracusans were in pursuit, he omitted to
push on, in order to form, his men for battle, and so lin-
gered until he was surrounded by his pursuers and him-
self and the Athenians with him placed in the most
distressing position, being huddled into an enclosure with

536 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [82, 83

BOOK a wall all round it, a road on this side and on that, and
Xli' olive-trees in great number, where missiles were showered

B.C. 413. in upon them from every quarter. This mode of attack
thenes the Syracusans had with good reason adopted in preference

forced to ^q fighting at close quarters, as to risk a struggle with
render, desperate men was now more for the advantage of the
Athenians than for their own ; besides, their success had
now become so certain that they began to spare them-
selves a little in order not to be cut off in the moment of
victory, thinking too that, as it was, they would be able
in this way to subdue and capture the enemy.

In fact, after plying the Athenians and allies all day
long from every side with missiles, they at length saw
that they were worn out with their wounds and other
sufferings ; and Gylippus and the Syracusans and their
allies made a proclamation, offering their liberty to any
of the islanders who chose to come over to them ; and
some few cities went over. Afterwards a capitulation
was agreed upon for all the rest with Demosthenes, to
lay down their arms on condition that no one was to be
put to death either by violence or imprisonment or want
of the necessaries of life. Upon this they surrendered to
the number of six thousand in all, laying down all the
money in their possession, which filled the hollows of
four shields, and were immediately conveyed by the
Syracusans to the town.

Meanwhile Nicias with his division arrived that day at
the river Erineus, crossed over and posted his army upon
some high ground upon the other side. The next day
the Syracusans overtook him and told him that the troops
under Demosthenes had surrendered, and invited him to
follow their example. Incredulous of the fact, Nicias
asked for a truce to send a horseman to see, and upon
the return of the messenger with the tidings that they
had surrendered, sent a herald to Gylippus and the
Syracusans, saying that he was ready to agree with them

84] ROUT AT THE ASSINARUS 537

on behalf of the Athenians to repay whatever money the CHAP.

Syracusans had spent upon the war if they would let his '

army go ; and offered until the money was paid to give P-^^j^J*^
Athenians as hostages, one for every talent. The at the
Syracusans and Gylippus rejected this proposition, and ^jjl^**
attacked this division as they had the other, standing all
round and plying them with missiles until the evening.
Food and necessaries were as miserably wanting to the
troops of Nicias as they had been to their comrades;
nevertheless they watched for the quiet of the night to
resume their march. But as they were taking up their
arms the Syracusans perceived it and raised their paean,
upon which the Athenians, finding that they were dis-
covered, laid them down again, except about three
hundred men who forced their way through the guards
and went on during the night as they were able.

As soon as it was day Nicias put his army in motion,
pressed, as before, by the Syracusans and their allies,
pelted from every side by their missiles, and struck down
by their javelins. The Athenians pushed on for the
Assinarus, impelled by the attacks made upon them from
every side by a numerous cavalry and the swarm of other
arms, fancying that they should breathe more freely if
once across the river, and driven on also by their ex-
haustion and craving for water. Once there they rushed
in, and all order was at an end, each man wanting to cross
first, and the attacks of the enemy making it difficult to
cross at all ; forced to huddle together, they fell against
and trod down one another, some dying immediately upon
the javelins, others getting entangled together and stum-
bling over the articles of baggage, without being able to
rise again. Meanwhile the opposite bank, which was
steep, was lined by the Syracusans, who showered missiles
down upon the Athenians, most of them drinking greedily
and heaped together in disorder in the hollow bed of the
river. The Peloponnesians also came down and butchered

*S 455

538 - THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [85, 86

BOOK them, especially those in the water, which was thus im-

.' mediately spoiled, but which they went on drinking just

B.C. 413- the same, mud and all, bloody as it was, most even fight-

of Nicias, ing to have it.

eaccOTtiML ^^ ^^*^ when many dead now lay piled one upon
another in the stream, and part of the army had been
destroyed at the river, and the few that escaped from
thence cut off by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered himself
to Gylippus, whom he trusted more than he did the
Syracusans, and told him and the Lacedasmonians to do
what they liked with him, but to stop the slaughter of
the soldiers. Gylippus, after this, immediately gave
orders to make prisoners ; upon which the rest were
brought together alive, except a large number secreted
by the soldiery, and a party was sent in pursuit of the
three hundred who had got through the guard during the
night, and who were now taken with the rest. The
number of the enemy collected as public property was
not considerable ; but that secreted was very large, and
all Sicily was filled with them, no convention having been
made in their case as for those taken with Demosthenes.
Besides this, a large portion were killed outright, the car-
nage being very great, and not exceeded by any in this
Sicilian war. In the numerous other encounters upon
the march, not a few also had fallen. Nevertheless many
escaped, some at the moment, others served as slaves, and
then ran away subsequently. These found refuge at
Catana.

The Syracusans and their allies now mustered and took
up the spoils and as many prisoners as they could, and
went back to the city. The rest of their Athenian and
allied captives were deposited in the quarries, this seeming
the safest way of keeping them ; but Nicias and Demos-
thenes were butchered, against the will of Gylippus, who
thought that it would be the crown of his triumph if he
could take the enemy's generals to Lacedaemon. One of

87] ATHENIAN PRISONERS 539

them, as it happened, Demosthenes, was one of her CHAP.
greatest enemies, on account of the affair of the island ^^"^'
and of Pylos ; while the other, Nicias, was for the same B.C. 413.
reasons one of her greatest friends, owmg to his exertions in^s of
to procure the release of the prisoners by persuading the pnsoners
Athenians to make peace. For these reasons the Lace- qaanies.
daemonians feh kindly towards him ; and it was in this
that Nicias himself mainly confided when he surrendered
to Gylippus. But some of the Syracusans who had been
in correspondence with him were afraid, it was said, of
his being put to the torture and troubling their success by
his revelations ; others, especially the Corinthians, of his
escaping, as he was wealthy, by means of bribes, and
living to do them further mischief; and these persuaded
the allies and put him to death. This or the like was
the cause of the death of a man who, of all the Hellenes
in my time, least deserved such a fate, seeing that the
whole course of his life had been regulated with strict
attention to virtue.

The prisoners in the quarries were at first hardly treated
by the Syracusans. Crowded in a narrow hole, without
any roof to cover them, the heat of the sun and the
stifling closeness of the air tormented them during the
day, and then the nights, which came on autumnal and
chilly, made them ill by the violence of the change ;
besides, as they had to do everything in the same place
for want of room, and the bodies of those who died of
their wounds or from the variation in the temperature, or
from similar causes, were left heaped together one upon
another, intolerable stenches arose ; while hunger and
thirst never ceased to afflict them, each man during eight
months having only half a pint of water and a pint of
corn given him daily. In short, no single suffering to be
apprehended by men thrust into such a place was spared
them. For some seventy days they thus lived all together,
after which all, except the Athenians and any Siceliots or

540 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [87

BOOK Italiots who had joined in the expedition, were sold.

' The total number of prisoners taken it would be difficult

B.C. 413. to state exactly, but it could not have been less than seven
End of 1 t '

the thousand.

fiSedS '^^^^ ^^^ ^^ greatest Hellenic achievement of any in

tion. this war, or, in my opinion, in Hellenic history ; at once

most glorious to the victors, and most calamitous to the

conquered. They were beaten at all points and alio-

together ; all that they suffered was great ; they were

destroyed, as the saying is, with a total destruction, their

fleet, their army — everything was destroyed, and few out

of many returned home.

BOOK vin

CHAPTER XXIV

Nineteenth and Twentieth Years of the War— Revolt of
Ionia — Intervention of Persia — The War in Ionia

Such were the events in Sicily. When the news was CHAP,
brought to Athens, for a long while they disbelieved ^^^^'
even the most respectable of the soldiers who had them- B.C. 413.
selves escaped from the scene of action and clearly the'dls-
reported the matter, a destruction so complete not being ^^^' *^
thought credible. When the conviction was forced upon
them, they were angry with the orators who had joined
in promoting the expedition, just as if they had not
themselves voted it, and were enraged also with the
reciters of oracles and soothsayers, and all other omen-
mongers of the time who had encouraged them to hope
that they should conquer Sicily. Already distressed at
all points and in all quarters, after what had now
happened, they were seized by a fear and consternation
quite without example. It was grievous enough for the
state and for every man in his proper person to lose so
many heavy infantry, cavalry, and able-bodied troops,
and to see none left to replace them ; but when they
saw, also, that they had not sufficient ships in their
docks, or money in the treasury, or crews for the ships,
they began to despair of salvation. They thought that
their enemies in Sicily would immediately sail with their
541

542 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [2

BOOK fleet against Pirasus, inflamed by so signal a victory ;
^^* while their adversaries at home, redoubling all their
B.C. 4«3- preparations, would vigorously attack them by sea and
Fermec^ land at once, aided by their own revolted confederates.
Greece. Nevertheless, with such means as they had, it was deter-
mined to resist to the last, and to provide timber and
money, and to equip a fleet as they best could, to take
steps to secure their confederates and above all Euboea,
to reform things in the city upon a more economical
footing, and to elect a board of elders to advise upon
the state of affairs as occasion should arise. In short, as
is the way of a democracy, in the panic of the moment
they were ready to be as prudent as possible.

These resolves were at once carried into effect.
Summer was now over. The winter ensuing saw all
Hellas stirring under the impression of the great Athenian
disaster in Sicily. Neutrals now felt that even if un-
invited they ought no longer to stand aloof from the
war, but should volunteer to march against the Athenians,
who, as they severally reflected, would probably have
come against them if the Sicilian campaign had succeeded.
Besides, they considered that the war would now be
short, and that it would be creditable for them to take
part in it. Meanwhile the allies of the Lacedaemonians
felt all more anxious than ever to see a speedy end to
their heavy labours. But above all, the subjects of the
Athenians showed a readiness to revolt even beyond
their ability, judging the circumstances with passion, and
refusing even to hear of the Athenians being able to last
out the coming summer. Beyond all this, Lacedaemon
was encouraged by the near prospect of being joined in
great force in the spring by her allies in Sicily, lately
forced by events to acquire their navy. With these
reasons for confidence in every quarter, the Lacedae-
monians now resolved to throw themselves without
reserve into the war, considering that, once it was

3, 4] PREPARATIONS AGAINST ATHENS 543

happily terminated, they would be finally delivered from CHAP.
«uch dangers as that which would have threatened them ^^^^'
from Athens, if she had become mistress of Sicily, B.C. 413.
and that the overthrow of the Athenians would leave Yho^oa
them in quiet enjoyment of the supremacy over all ^?^
Hellas.

Their king, Agis, accordingly set out at once during
this winter with some troops from Decelea, and levied
from the allies contributions for the fleet, and turning
towards the Maiian gulf exacted a sum of money from
the CEtseana by carrying off most of their cattle in reprisal
for their old hostility, and, in spite of the protests and
opposition of the Thessalians, forced the Achasans of
Phthiotis and the other subjects of the Thessalians in
those parts to give him money and hostages, and de-
posited the hostages at Corinth, and tried to bring their
countrymen into the confederacy. The Lacedaemonians
now issued a requisition to the cities for building a hundred
ships, fixing their own quota and that of the Boeotians at
twenty-five each ; that of the Phocians and Locrians
together at fifteen ; that of the Corinthians at fifteen ;
that of the Arcadians, Pellenians, and Sicyonians to-
gether at ten ; and that of the Megarians, Troezenians,
Epidaurians, and Hermionians together at ten also ; and
meanwhile made every other preparation for commencing
hostilities by the spring.

In the meantime the Athenians were not idle. During
this same winter, as they had determined, they contri-
buted timber and pushed on their ship-building, and
fortified Sunium to enable their corn-ships to round it in
safety, and evacuated the fort in Laconia which they
had built on their way to Sicily ; while they also, for
economy, cut down any other expenses that seemed
unnecessary, and above all kept a careful look-out against
the revolt of their confederates.

While both parties were thus engaged, and were as

544 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR tS

BOOK intent upon preparing for the war as they had been at the
outset, the Eubceans first of all sent envoys during this

B.C. 413. winter to Agis to treat of their revolting from Athens.

subjeSs Agis accepted their proposals, and sent for Alcamenes,
to'revoft ^°° °^ Sthenelaidas, and Melanthus from Lacedsemon,
to take the command in Euboea. These accordingly
arrived with some three hundred Neodamodes, and Agis
began to arrange for their crossing over. But in the
meanwhile arrived some Lesbians, who also wished to
revolt ; and these being supported by the Boeotians, Agis
was persuaded to defer acting in the matter of Euboea,
and made arrangements for the revolt of the Lesbians,
giving them Alcamenes, who was to have sailed to
Euboea, as governor, and himself promising them ten
ships, and the Boeotians the same number. All this
was done without instructions from home, as Agis while
at Decelea with the army that he commanded had power
to send troops to whatever quarter he pleased, and to levy
men and money. During this period, one might say, the
allies obeyed him much more than they did the Lacede-
monians in the city, as the force he had with him made
him feared at once wherever he went. While Agis was
engaged with the Lesbians, the Chians and Erythrasans,
who were also ready to revolt, applied, not to him but
at Lacedaemon ; where they arrived accompanied by an
ambassador from Tissaphernes, the commander of King
Darius, son of Artaxerxes, in the maritime districts, who
invited the Peloponnesians to come over, and promised to
maintain their army. The king had lately called upon
him for the tribute from his government, for which he
was in arrears, being unable to raise it from the Hellenic
towns by reason of the Athenians ; and he therefore
calculated that by weakening the Athenians he should
get the tribute better paid, and should also draw the
Lacedaemonians into alliance with the king ; and by this
means, as the king had commanded bim, take alive of

6] PERSIAN OVERTURES 545

dead Amorges, the bastard son of Pissuthnes, who was in CHAP.
rebellion on the coast of Caria. *

While the Chians and Tissaphernes thus joined to jBC. 413'
effect the same object, about the same time Calligeitus, offers of
son of Laophon, a Megarian, and Timagoras, son of^^°"
Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both of them exiles from their Persia,
country and living at the court of Pharnabazus, son of
Pharnaces, arrived at Lacedasmon upon a mission from
Pharnabazus, to procure a fleet for the Hellespont ; by
means of which, if possible, he might himself effect the
object of Tissaphernes' ambition, and cause the cities in
his government to revolt from the Athenians, and so get
the tribute, aud by his own agency obtain for the king the
alliance of the Lacedaemonians.

The emissaries of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes
treating apart, a keen competition now ensued at Lace-
daemon as to whether a fleet and army should be sent
first to Ionia and Chios, or to the Hellespont. The
Lacedaemonians, however, decidedly favoured the Chians
and Tissaphernes, who were seconded by Alcibiades,
the family friend of Endius, one of the Ephors for that
year. Indeed, this is how their house got its Laconic
name, Alcibiades being the family name of Endius.
Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians first sent to Chios
Phrynis, one of the Perioeci, to see whether they had
as many ships as they said, and whether their city
generally was as great as was reported ; and upon his
bringing word that they had been told the truth, im-
mediately entered into alliance with the Chians and
Erythraeans, and voted to send them forty ships, there
being already, according to the statement of the Chians,
not less than sixty in the island. At first the Lace-
daemonians meant to send ten of these forty themselves,
with Melanchridas their admiral ; but afterwards, an
earthquake having occurred, they sent Chalcideus instead
of Melanchridas, and instead of the ten ships equipped

546 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [7,8

BOOK only five in Laconia. And the winter ended, and with
Yll.^* it ended also the nineteenth year of this war of which

B.C. 41a. Thucydides is the historian.

^ofSSes At the beginning of the next summer the Chians were
at urging that the fleet should be sent off, being afraid that
^ the Athenians, from whom all these embassies were kept
a secret, might find out what was going on, and the
Lacedxmonians at once sent three Spartans to Corinth
to haul the ships as quickly as possible across the Isthmus
from the other sea to that on the side of Athens, and to
order them all to sail to Chios, those which Agis was
equipping for Lesbos not excepted. The number of
ships from the allied states was thirty-nine in all.

Meanwhile Calligeitus and Timagoras did not join on
• behalf of Pharnabazus in the expedition to Chios or give
the money — twenty-five talents — which they had brought
with them to help in despatching a force, but determined
to sail afterwards v/ith another force by themselves.
Agis, on the other hand, seeing the Lacedaemonians
bent upon going to Chios first, himself came in to their
Tiews ; and the allies assembled at Corinth and held a
council, in which they decided to sail first to Chios under
the command of Chalcideus, who was equipping the five
vessels in Laconia, then to Lesbos, under the command
of Alcamenes, the same whom Agis had fixed upon, and
lastly to go to the Hellespont, where the command was
given to Clearchus, son of Ramphias. Meanwhile they
would take only half the ships across the Isthmus first,
and let those sail off at once, in order that the Athenians
might attend less to the departing squadron than to those
to be taken across afterwards, as no care had been taken
to keep this voyage secret through contempt of the im-
potence of the Athenians, who had as yet no fleet of any
account upon the sea. Agreeably to this determination
twenty-one vessels were at once conveyed across the
Isthmus.

9, lo] SUSPICIONS ABOUT CHIOS 547

They were now impatient to set sail, but the Corinthians CHAP,
were not wilHng to accompany them until they had cele-
brated the Isthmian festival, which fell at that time. B.C. ai*.
Upon this Agis proposed to them to save their scruples nesSo'"'
about breaking the Isthmian truce by taking the expedi- ^^^^^ f ,
tion upon himself. The Corinthians not consenting to Chios,
this, a delay ensued, during which the Athenians con-
ceived suspicions of what was preparing at Chios, and
sent Aristocrates, one of their generals, and charged them
with the fact, and upon the denial of the Chians, ordered
them to send with them a contingent of ships, as faithful
confederates. Seven were sent accordingly. The reason
of the despatch of the ships lay in the fact that the mass
of the Chians were not privy to the negotiations, while
the few who were in the secret did not wish to break
with the multitude until they had something positive to
lean upon, and no longer expected the Peloponnesians to
arrive by reason of their delay.

In the meantime the Isthmian games took place, and
the Athenians, who had been also invited, went to attend
them, and now seeing more clearly into the designs of the
Chians, as soon as they returned to Athens took measures
to prevent the fleet putting out from Cenchreae without
their knowledge. After the festival the Peloponnesians
set sail with twenty-one ships for Chios, under the com-
mand of Alcamenea. The Athenians first sailed against
them with an equal number, drawing off towards the open
sea. The enemy, however, turning back before he had
followed them far, the Athenians returned also, not trust-
ing the seven Chian ships which formed part of their
number, and afterwards manned thirty-seven vessels in all
and chased him on his passage along shore into Spirgeum,
a desert Corinthian port on the edge of the Epidaurian
frontier. After losing one ship out at sea, the Pelo-
ponnesians got the rest together and brought them to
anchor. The Athenians now attacked not only from the

548 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [ii, 12

BOOK 8ca with their fleet, but also disembarked upon the coast ;

^ and a m^lee ensued of the most confused and violent kind,

B,C. 4". in which the Athenians di*abied most of the enemy's

blockaded vessels and killed Alcamenes their commander, losing

by Ath- ^go a few of their own men.
Spiraeum. After this they separated, and the Athenians, detaching
a sufficient number of ships to blockade those of the
enemy, anchored with the rest ai the islet adjacent, upon
which they proceeded to encamp, and sent to Athens for
reinforcements ; the Peloponnesians having been joined
on the day after the battle by the Corinthians, who came
to help the ships, and by the other inhabitants in the
vicinity not long afterwards. These saw the difficulty of
keeping guard in a desert place, and in their perplexity at
first thought of burning the ships, but finally resolved to
haul them up on shore and sit down and guard them with
their land forces, until a convenient opportunity for escap-
ing should present itself. Agis also, on being informed
of the disaster, sent them a Spartan of the name of
Thermon. The Lacedaemonians first received the news
• of the fleet having put out from the Isthmus, Alcamenes
having been ordered by the Ephors to send off a horse-
man when this took place, and immediately resolved to
despatch their own five vessels under Chalcideus, and
Alcibiades with him. But while they were full of this
resolution came the second news of the fleet having
taken refuge in Spiraeum ; and disheartened at their
first step in the Ionian war proving a failure, they laid
aside the idea of sending the ships from their own
country, and even wished to recall some that had already
sailed.

Perceiving this, Alcibiades again persuaded Endius and
the other Ephors to persevere in the expedition, saying
that the voyage would be made before the Chians heard
of the fleet's misfortune, and that as soon as he set foot
in Ionia, he should, by assuring them of the weakness of

13, 14] THE REVOLT OF IONIA 549

the Athenians and the zeal of Lacedasmon, have no CHAP.
difficulty in persuading the cities to revolt, as they
would readily believe his testimony. He also repre- B.C. ji*.
sented to Endius himself in private that it would be ades sails
glorious for him to be the means of making Ionia revolt ^°^ 'o"'»-
and the king become the ally of Lacedaemon, instead of
that honour being left to Agis (Agis, it must be re-
membered, was the enemy of Alcibiades) ; and Endius
and his colleagues thus persuaded, he put to sea with the
five ships and the Lacedaemonian Chalcideus, and made
all haste upon the voyage.

About this same time the sixteen Peloponnesian ships
from Sicily, which had served through the war with
Gylippus, were caught on their return off Leucadia and
roughly handled by the twenty-seven Athenian vessels
under Hippocies, son of Menippus, on the look-out for
the ships from Sicily. After losing one of their number
the rest escaped from the Athenians and sailed into
Corinth.

Meanwhile Chalcideus and Alcibiades seized all they
met with on their voyage, to prevent news of their
coming, and let them go at Corycus, the first point which
they touched at in the continent. Hefe they were visited
by some of their Chian correspondents, and being urged
by them to sail up to the town without announcing their
coming, arrived suddenly before Chios. The many
were amazed and confounded, while the few had so
arranged that the council should be sitting at the time;
and after speeches from Chalcideus and Alcibiadet
stating that many more ships were sailing up, but saying
nothing of the fleet being blockaded in Spiraeum, the
Chians revolted from the Athenians, and the Erythraeans
immediately afterwards. After this three vessels sailed
over to Clazomenas, and made that city revolt also ; and
the Clazomenians immediately crossed over to the main-
land and began to fortify Folichna, in order to retreat

550 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [15, 16

BOOK there, in case of necessity, from the island where they
Yl!!- dwelt.

B.C. ^la. While the revolted places were all engaged in fortifying
'^^^ships and preparing for the war, news of Chios speedily reached
«entto Athens. The Athenians thought the danger by which
they were now menaced great and unmistakable, and
that the rest of their allies would not consent to keep
quiet after the secession of the greatest of their number.
In the consternation of the moment they at once took
off the penalty attaching to whoever proposed or put
to the vote a proposal for using the thousand talents
which they had jealously avoided touching throughout
the whole war, and voted to employ them to man a
large number of ships, and to send off at once under
Strombichides, son of Diotimus, the eight vessels, form-
ing part of the blockading fleet at Spiraeum, which had
left the blockade and had returned after pursuing and
failing to overtake the vessels with Chalcideus. These
were to be followed shortly afterwards by twelve more
under Thrasycles, also taken from the blockade. They
also recalled the seven Chian vessels, forming part of
their squadron blockading the fleet in Spiraeum, and
giving the slaves 6n board their liberty, put the freemen
in confinement, and speedily manned and sent out ten
fresh ships to blockade the Peloponnesians in the place
of all those that had departed, and decided to man thirty
more. Zeal was not wanting, and no effort was spared
to send relief to Chios.

In the meantime Strombichides with his eight ships
arrived at Samos, and taking one Samian vessel, sailed to
Teos and required them to remain quiet. Chalcideus
also set sail with twenty-three ships foi Teos from
Chios, the land forces of the Clazomenians and Erythraeans
moving along shore to support him. Informed of this
in time, Strombichides put out from Teos before their
arrival, and while out at sea, seeing the number of the

17. i8] REVOLT OF MILETUS 551

ships from Chios, fled towards Samos, chased by the CHAP.
enemy. The Teians at first would not receive the land ^^^^'
forces, but upon the flight of the Athenians took them B.C. 41a-
into the town. There they waited for some time for ades pro-
Chalcideus to return from the pursuit, and as time went Jgy^fj-^^r*
on without his appearing, began themselves to demolish Miletus,
the wall which the Athenians had built on the land side
of the city of the Teians, being assisted by a few of the
barbarians who had come up under the command of
Stages, the lieutenant of Tissaphernes.

Meanwhile Chalcideus and Alcibiades, after chasing
Strombichides into Samos, armed the crews of the ships
from Peloponnese and left them at Chios, and filling
their places with substitutes from Chios and manning
twenty others, sailed off to effect the revolt of Miletus.
The wish of Alcibiades, who had friends among the
leading men of the Milesians, was to bring over the town
before the arrival of the ships from Peloponnese, and thus,
by causing the revolt of as many cities as possible with the
help of the Chian power and of Chalcideus, to secure the
honour for the Chians and himself and Chalcideus, and, as
he had promised, for Endius who had sent them out. Not
discovered until their voyage was nearly completed, they
arrived a little before Strom bichides and Thrasycles
(who had just come with twelve ships from Athens,
and had joined Strombichides in pursuing them), and
occasioned the revolt of Miletus. The Athenians sailing
up close on their heels with nineteen ships found Miletus
closed against them, and took up their station at the
adjacent island of Lade. The first alliance between
the king and the Lacedaemonians was now concluded
immediately upon the revolt of the Milesians, by
Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, and was as follows : —

The Lacedamonians and their allies made a treaty ivith
the king and Tissaphernes upon the terms following : —

1 . Whatever country or cities the king hcUy or the king's

552 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [19, 20

BOOK ancestors had, shall be the iing's ; and whatever came in to

• the Athenians from these cities, either money or any other

B.C. fia. thing, the king and the Lacedamonians and their allies shah

tresity Jointly hinder the Athenians from receiving either money or

and 2. The nvar 'with the Athenians shall be carried on

^P^^^ jointly by the king and by the Lacedemonians and their

allies ; and it shall not be latuful to make peace ivith the

Athenians except both agree, the king on his side and the

Lacedamonians and their allies on theirs.

3. If any revolt from the king they shall be the enemies
of the Lacedamonians and their allies. And if any revolt
from the Lacedamonians and their allies they shall be the
enemies of the king in Rke manner.

This was the alliance. After this the Chians imme-
diately manned ten more vessels and sailed for Anaia, in
order to gain intelligence of those in Miletus, and also to
make the cities revolt. A message, however, reaching
them from Chalcideus to tell them to go back again, and
that Amorges was at hand with an army by land, they
sailed to the temple of Zeus, and there sighting ten more
ships sailing up with which Diomedon had started from
Athens after Thrasycles, fled, one ship to Ephesus, the
rest to Tecs. The Athenians took four of their ships
empty, the men finding time to escape ashore ; the rest
took refuge in the city of the Teians ; after which the
Athenians sailed off to Samos, while the Chians put to
sea with their remaining vessels, accompanied by the
land forces, and caused Lebedos to revolt, and after it
Erae. After this they both returned home, the fleet and
the army.

About the same time the twenty ships of the Pelopon-
nesians in Spirasum, which we left chased to land and
blockaded by an equal number of Athenians, suddenly
sallied out and defeated the blockading squadron, took
four of their ships, and sailing back to Cenchreae, pre*

21, 22] REVOLUTION AT SAMOS 553

pared again for the voyage to Chios and Ionia. Here chap
they were joined by Astyochus as high-admiral from ^^'^-
Lacedaemon, henceforth invested with the supreme com- B.C. 4x1
mand at sea. The land forces now withdrawing from revo"u^
Teos, Tissaphernes repaired thither in person with an ^o" ^^
army and completed the demolition of anything that was
left of the wall, and so departed. Not long after his
departure Diomedon arrived with ten Athenian ships, and
having made a convention by which the Teians admitted
him as they had the enemy, coasted along to Eras, and
failing in an attempt upon the town, sailed back again.

About this time took place the rising of the commons
at Samos against the upper classes, in concert with some
Athenians, who were there in three vessels. The
Samian commons put to death some two hundred in all
of the upper classes, and banished four hundred more,
and themselves took their land and houses ; after which
the Athenians decreed their independence, being now
sure of their fidelity, and the commons henceforth
governed the city, excluding the landholders from all
share in affairs, and forbidding any of the commons to
give his daughter in marriage to them or to take a wife
from them in future.

After this, during the same summer, the Chians,
whose zeal continued as active as ever, and who even
without the Peloponnesians found themselves in sufficient
force to effect the revolt of the cities and also wished to
have as many companions in peril as possible, made an
expedition with thirteen ships of their own to Lesbos ;
the instructions from Lacedaemon being to go to that
island next, and from thence to the Hellespont. Mean-
while the land forces of the Peloponnesians who were
with the Chians and of the allies on the spot, moved
along shore for Clazomenoe and Cuma, under the com-
mand of Eualas, a Spartan ; while the fleet under
Diniadas, one of the Perioeci, first sailed up to Mcthymna

554 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [23

BOOK and caused it to revolt, and, learing four ships there, with

* the rest procured the revolt of Mitylene.

RecdrV*' ^° ^^^ meantime Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian ad-
of Lesbos miral, set sail from Cenchreae with four ships, as he had
Ith^ intended, and arrived at Chios. On the third day after
his arrival the Athenian ships, twenty-five in number,
sailed to Lesbos under Diomedon and Leon, who had
lately arrived with a reinforcement of ten ships from
Athens. Late in the same day Astyochus put to sea,
and taking one Chian vessel with him sailed to Lesbos
to render what assistance he could. Arrived at Pyrrha,
and from thence the next day at Eresus, he there learned
that Mitylene had been taken, almost without a blow, by
the Athenians, who had sailed up and unexpectedly put
into the harbour, had beaten the Chian ships, and landmg
and defeating the troops opposed to them, had become
masters of the city. Informed of this by the Eresians
and the Chian ships, which had been left with Eubulus
at Methymna, and had fled upon the capture of Mitylene,
and three of which he now fell in with, one having been
taken by the Athenians, Astyochus did not go on to
Mitylene, but raised and armed Eresus, and sending the
heavy infantry from his own ships by land under Eteo-
nicus to Antissa and Methymna, himself proceeded along
shore thither with the ships which he had with him and
with the three Chians, in the hope that the Methymnians
upon seeing them would be encouraged to persevere in
their revolt. As, however, everything went against him
in Lesbos, he took up his own force and sailed back to
Chios ; the land forces on board, which were to have
cone to the Hellespont, being also conveyed back to their
different cities. After this six of the allied Pelopon-
nesian ships at Cenchreae jomed the forces at Chios.
The Athenians, after restoring matters to their old state
in Lesbos, set sail from thence and took Polichna, the
place that the Clazomenians were fortifying on the con-

24] ATHENIANS AT CHIOS 555

tinent, and carried the inhabitants back to their town upon CHAP
the island, except the authors of the revolt, who withdrew ^^^^-
to Daphnus ; and thus Clazomenae became once more B.C. 41*.
Athenian. ffSS"

The same summer the Athenians in the twenty ships "'*"* ^t
at Lade blockading Miletus, made a descent at Panormus
in the Milesian territory, and killed Chalcideus the Lace-
dsemonian commander, who had come with a few men
against them, and the third day after sailed over and set
up a trophy, which, as they were not masters of the
country, was however pulled down by the Milesians.
Meanwhile Leon and Diomedon with the Athenian fleet
from Lesbos issuing from the CEnussae, the isles off Chios,
and from their forts of Sidussa and Pteleum in the Eryth-
rasid, and from Lesbos, carried on the war against the
Chians from the ships, having on board heavy infantry
from the rolls pressed to serve as marines. Landing io
Cardamyie and in Bolissus they defeated with heavy loss
the Chians that took the field against them, and laying
desolate the places in that neighbourhood, defeated the
Chians again in another battle at Phanae, and in a third
at Leuconium. After this the Chians ceased to meet
them in the field, while the Athenians devastated the
country, which was beautifully stocked and had remained
uninjured ever since the Median wars. Indeed, after the
Lacedaemonians, the Chians are the only people that I
have known who knew how to be wise in prosperity, and
who ordered their city the more securely the greater it
grew. Nor was this revolt, in which they might seem to
have erred on the side of rashness, ventured upon until
they had numerous and gallant allies to share the danger
with them, and until they perceived the Athenians after
the Sicilian disaster themselves no longer denying the
thoroughly desperate state of their affairs. And if they
were thrown out by one of the surprises which upset
human calculations, they found out their mistake in com-

556 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [25

BOOK pany with many others who believed, like them, in the

YiU' speedy collapse of the Athenian power. While they were

B.C. 4i»- thus blockaded from the sea and plundered by land, some

of the of the citizens undertook to bring the city over to the

Athe- Athenians. Apprised of this the authorities took no

MUetus. action themselves, but brought Astyochus, the admiral,

from Erythrse, with four ships that he had with him,

and considered how they could most quietly, either by

taking hostages or by some other means, put an end to the

conspiracy.

While the ^ Chians were thus engaged, a thousand
Athenian heavy infantry and fifteen hundred Argives
{five hundred of whom were light troops furnished with
armour by the Athenians), and one thousand of the allies,
towards the close of the same summer sailed from Athens
in forty-eight ships, some of which were transports, under
the command of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides,
and putting in to Samos crossed over and encamped at
Miletus. Upon this the Milesians came out to the
number of eight hundred heavy infantry, with the Pelo-
ponnesians who had come with Chalcideus, and some
foreign mercenaries of Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes him-
self and his cavalry, and engaged the Athenians and their
allies. While the Argives rushed forward on their own
wing with the careless disdain of men advancing against
lonians who would never stand their charge, and were
defeated by the Milesians with a loss little short of three
hundred men, the Athenians first defeated the Pelopon-
nesians, and driving before them the barbarians and the
ruck of the army, without engaging the Milesians, who
after the rout of the Argives retreated into the town upon
seeing their comrades worsted, crowned their victory by
grounding their arms under the very walls of Miletus.
Thus, in this battle, the lonians on both sides overcame
the Dorians, the Athenians defeating the Peloponnesians
opposed 10 them, and the Milesians the Argives. After

26,27] RETREAT OF THE ATHENIANS 557

setting up a trophy, the Athenians prepared to draw a CHAP.

wall round the place, which stood upon an isthmus ; *

thinking that if they could gain Miletus, the other towns |-^j.'*»*-
also would easily come over to them. of Athe-

Meanwhile about dusk tidings reached them that the ^yj°j
fifty-live ships from Peloponnese and Sicily might be Pelppon
instantly expected. Of these the Siceliots, urged princi- fleet"
pally by the Syracusan Herrnocrates to join in giving the
finishing blow to the power of Athens, furnished twenty-
two — twenty from Syracuse, and two from Selinus ; and
the ships that we left preparing in Peloponnese being now
ready, both squadrons had been entrusted to Therimenes,
a Lacedaemonian, to take to Astyochus, the admiral.
They now put in first at Leros the island off Miletus,
and from thence, discovering that the Athenians were
before the town, sailed into the lasic gulf, in order to
learn how matters stood at Miletus. Meanwhile Alci-
biades came on horseback to Teichiussa in the Milesian
territory, the point of the gulf at which they had put in
for the night, and told them of the battle, in which he
had fought in person by the side of the Milesians and
Tissaphernes, and advised them, if they did not wish to
sacrifice Ionia and their cause, to fiy to the relief of
Miletus and hinder its investment.

Accordingly they resolved to relieve it the next morn-
ing. Meanwhile Phrynichus, the Athenian commander,
had received precise intelligence of the fleet from Leros,
and when his colleagues expressed a wish to keep the sea
and fight it out, flatly refused either to stay himself or to
let them or any one else do so if he could help it. Where
they could hereafter contend, after full and undisturbed
preparation, with an exact knowledge of the number of
the enemy's fleet and of the force which they could
oppose to him, he would never allow the reproach of
disgrace to drive him into a risk that was unreasonable.
It was no disgrace for an Athenian fleet to retreat when

558 • THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [28

BOOK it suited them : put it as they would, it would be more
disgraceful to be beaten, and to expose the city not only
BX:. 4i«. to disgrace, but to the most serious danger. After its
of Phry- late misfortunes it could hardly be justified in voluntarily
nichus. taking the offensive even with the strongest force, except
in a case of absolute necessity : much less then without
compulsion could it rush upon peril of its own seeking.
He told them to take up their wounded as quickly as
they could and the troops and stores which they had
brought with them, and leaving behind what they had
taken from the enemy's country, in order to lighten the
ships, to sail off to Samos, and there concentrating all
their ships to attack as opportunity served. As he spoke
80 he acted ; and thus not now more than afterwards,
nor in this alone but in all that he had to do with, did
Phrynichus show himself a man of sense. In this way
that very evening the Athenians broke up from before
Miletus, leaving their victory unfinished, and the Argives,
mortified at their disaster, promptly sailed off home from
Samos.

As soon as it was morning the Peloponnesians weighed
from Teichiussa and put into Miletus after the departure
of the Athenians ; they stayed one day, and on the next
took with them the Chian vessels originally chased into
port with Chalcideus, and resolved to sail back for the
tackle which they had put on shore at Teichiussa. Upon
their arrival Tissaphernes came to them with his land
forces and induced them to sail to lasus, which was held
by his enemy Amorges. Accordingly they suddenly
attacked and took lasus, whose inhabitants never ima-
gined that the ships could be other than Athenian. The
Syracusans distinguished themselves most in the action.
Amorges, a bastard of Pissuthnes and a rebel from the
king, was taken alive and handed over to Tissaphernes,
to carry to the king, if he chose, according to his orders :
lasus was sacked by the army, who found a very greaic

29,30] PAY FROM TISSAPHERNES 559

booty there, the place being wealthy from ancient date. CHAP.

The mercenaries serving with Amorges the Pelopon- *

nesians received and enrolled in their army without doing BX, 41,.
them any harm, since most of them came from Pelopon- phernes
nese, and handed over the town to Tissaphernes with all ^^J^ ^^^
the captives, bond or free, at the stipulated price of one nesiao
Doric stater a head ; after which they returned to ^^^
Miletus. Pedaritus, son of Leon, who had been sent
by the Lacedaemonians to take the command at Chios,
they despatched by land as far as Erythrae with the
mercenaries taken from Amorges ; appointing Philip to
remain as governor of Miletus.

Summer was now over. The winter following Tissa-
phernes put lasus in a state of defence, and passing on to
Miletus distributed a month's pay to all the ships as he
had promised at Lacedsemon, at the rate of an Attic
drachma a day for each man. In future, however, he
was resolved not to give more than three obols, until he
had consulted the king ; when if the king should so order
he would give, he said, the full drachma. However,
upon the protest of the Syracusan general Hermocrates
(for as Therimenes was not admiral, but only accom-
panied them in order to hand over the ships to Astyochus,
he made little difficulty about the pay), it was agreed that
the amount of five ships' pay should be given over and
above the three obols a day for each man ; Tissaphernes
paying thirty talents a month for fifty-five ships, and to
the rest, for as many ships as they had beyond that
number, at the same rate.

The same winter the Athenians in Samos having been
joined by thirty-five more vessels from home under Char-
minus, Strombichides, and Euctemon, called in their
squadron at Chios and all the rest, intending to blockade
Miletus with their navy, and to send a fleet and an army
against Chios ; drawing lots for the respective services.
This inteation they carried into effect; Strombichides,

56o THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [31,32

BOOK Onamacles, and Euctemon sailing against Chios, which fell

^^"- to their lot, with thirty ships and a part of the thousand

B.C. 41a. heavy infantry, who had been to Miletus, in transports ;

cSSlt while the rest remained masters of the sea with seventy-

Ciazo- four ships at Samos, and advanced upon Miletus.

Meanwhile Astyochus, whom we left at Chios collect-
ing the hostages required in consequence of the conspiracy,
stopped upon learning that the fleet with Therimenes had
arrived, and that the affairs of the league were in a more
flourishing condition, and putting out to sea with ten
Peloponnesian and as many Chian vessels, after a futile
attack upon Pteleum, coasted on to Clazomense, and
ordered the Athenian party to remove inland to Daphnus,
and to join the Peloponnesians, an order in which also
joined Tamos the king's lieutenant in Ionia. This order
being disregarded, Astyochus made an attack upon the
town, which was unwalled, and having failed to take it
was himself carried off by a strong gale to Phocaea and
Cuma, while the rest of the ships put in at the islands
adjacent to Clazomenas, Marathussa, Pele, and Drymussa.
Here they were detained eight days by the winds, and
plundering and consuming all the property of the Clazo-
menians there deposited, put the rest on shipboard and
sailed off to Phocasa and Cuma to join Astyochus.

While he was there, envoys arrived from the Lesbians
who wished to revolt again. With Astyochus they were
successful ; but the Corinthians and the other allies being
averse to it by reason of their former failure, he weighed
anchor and set sail for Chios, where they eventually arrived
from different quarters, the fleet having been scattered by
a storm. After this Pedaritus, whom we left marching
along the coast from Miletus, arrived at Erythras, and
thence crossed over with his army to Chios, where he
found also about five hundred soldiers who had been left
there by Chalcideus from the five ships with their arms.
Meanwhile some Lesbians making offers to revolt, Astyo*

33,34] CHIANS AND ASTYOCHUS 561

chus urged upon Pedaritus and the Chians that they CHAP.
ought to go with their ships and effect the revolt of ^"^^^'
Lesbos, and so increase the number of their allies, or, if B.C. 41a.
not successful, at all events harm the Athenians. The chus sail«
Chians, however, turned a deaf ear to this, and Pedaritus J°^
flatly refused to give up to him the Chian vessels.

Upon this Astyochus took five Corinthian and one
Megarian vessel, with another from Hermione, and the
ships which had come with him from Laconia, and set
sail for Miletus to assume his command as admiral ; after
telling the Chians with many threats that he would cer-
tainly not come and help them if they should be in need.
At Corycus in the Erythraeid he brought to for the night ;
the Athenian armament sailing from Samos against Chios
being only separated from him by a hill, upon the other
side of which it brought to ; so that neither perceived the
other. But a letter arriving in the night from Pedaritus
to say that some liberated Erythrasan prisoners had come
from Samos to betray Erythrae, Astyochus at once put
back to ErythrsE, and so just escaped falling in with the
Athenians. Here Pedaritus sailed over to join him ; and
after inquiry into the pretended treachery, finding that the
whole story had been made up to procure the escape of
the men from Samos, they acquitted them of the charge,
and sailed away, Pedaritus to Chios and Astyochus to
Miletus, as he had intended.

Meanwhile the Athenian armament sailing round Cory-
cus fell in with three Chian men of war off Arginus, and
gave immediate chase. A great storm coming on, the
Chians with difficulty took refuge in the harbour ; the
three Athenian vessels most forward in the pursuit being
wrecked and thrown up near the city of Chios, and the
crews slain or taken prisoners. The rest of the Athenian
fleet took refuge in the harbour called Phoenicus, under
Mount Mimas, and from thence afterwards put into
Lesbos and prepared for the work of fortification.
T 455

562 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [35.36

BOOK The same winter the Lacedemonian Hippocrates sailed
Y^' out from Peloponnese with ten Thurian ships under the
B.C. 4"- command of Dorieus, son of Diagoras, and two colleagues,
'^^capt^e on« Laconian and one Syracusan vessel, and arrived at
six ships. Cnidus, which had already revoked at the instigation of
Tissaphernes. When their arrival was known at Miletus,
orders came to them to leave half their squadron to guard
Cnidus, and with the rest to cruise round Triopium and
seize all the merchantmen arriving from Egypt. Trio-
pium is a promontory of Cnidus and sacred to Apollo.
This coming to the knowledge of the Athenians, they
sailed from Samos and captured the six ships on the
watch at Triopium, the crews escaping out of them.
After this the Athenians sailed into Cnidus and made an
assault upon the town, which was unfortified, and all but
took it ; and the next day assaulted it again, but with less
effect, as the inhabitants had improved their defences
during the night, and had been reinforced by the crews
escaped from the ships at Triopium. The Athenians
now' withdrew, and after plundering the Cnidian territory
sailed back to Samos.

About the same time Astyochus came to the fleet at
Miletus. The Peloponnesian camp was still plentifully
supplied, being in receipt of sufhcient pay, and the soldiers
having still in hand the large booty taken at lasus. The
Milesians also showed great ardour for the war. Never-
theless the Peloponnesians thought the first convention
with Tissaphernes, made with Chalcideus, defective, and
more advantageous to him than to them, and consequently
while Therimenes was still there concluded another, which
was as follows : —

The convention of the Lacedamonians and the allies iv'ith
King Darius and the sons of the iing, and 'with Tissaphernes
for a treaty and friendship, as follonvs : —

1 . Neither the Lacedamonians nor the alius of the Lace~
damonians shall make ivar against or otherwise injure any

37,38] SECOND TREATY WITH PERSIA 563

country or cities that belong to King Darius or did belong to CHAP.
bis father or to his ancestors : neither shall the Lacedemonians ^^^^'
nor the allies of the Lacedamonians exact tribute from such B.C. 41a.
cities. Neither shall King Darius nor any of the subjects 0/^ second
the king make war against or otherwise injure the Lace- treaty
dxmonians or their allies. Persia.

2. If the Lacedamonians or their allies should require any
assistance from the king, or the king jrom the Lacedamonians
or their allies, whatever they both agree upon they shall be
right in doing.

3. Both shall carry on jointly the war against the j4the'
nians and their allies ; and if they make peace, both shall do
so jointly.

4. The expense of all troops in the king*s country, sent for
by the king, shall be borne by the king.

5. If any of the states comprised in this convention with
the king attack the king's country, the rest shall stop them and
aid the king to the best of their power. And if any in the
king's country or in the countries under the king's rule attack
the country of the Lacedamonians or their allies, the king shall
stop it and help them to the best of his power.

After this convention Therimenes handed over the
fleet to Astyochus, sailed off in a small boat, and was
lost. The Athenian armament had now crossed over
from Lesbos to Chios, and being master by sea and land
began to fortify Delphinium, a place naturally strong on
the land side, provided with more than one harbour, and
also not far from the city of Chios. Meanwhile the
Chians remained inactive. Already defeated in so many
battles, they were now also at discord among themselves;
the execution of the party of Tydeus, son of Ion, by
Pedaritus upon the charge of Atticism, followed by the
forcible imposition of an oligarchy upon the rest of die
city, having made them suspicious of one another ; and
they therefore thought neither themselves nor the mer-
cenaries under Pedaritus a match for the enemy. They

564 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [39

BOOK sent, however, to Miletus to beg Astyochus to assist
Y^^' them, which he refused to do, and was accordingly

B.C. Aia. denounced at Lacedaemon by Pedaritus as a traitor.

Pdopon- Such was the state of the Athenian affairs at Chios ;
nesian while their fleet at Samos kept sailing out against the

to Ionia, enemy in Miletus, until they found that he would not
accept their challenge, and then retired again to Samos
and remained quiet.

In the same winter the twenty-seven ships equipped by
the Lacedaemonians for Pharnabazus through the agency
of the Megarian Calligeitus, and the Cyzicene Tiraagoras,
put out from Peloponnese and sailed for Ionia about the
time of the solstice, under the command of Antisthenes, a
Spartan. With them the Lacedaemonians also sent eleven
Spartans as advisers to Astyochus ; Lichas, son of Arce-
silaus, being among the number. Arrived at Miletus,
their orders were to aid in generally superintending the
good conduct of the war ; to send off the above ships or
a greater or less number to the Hellespont to Pharnabazus,
if they thought proper, appointing Clearchus, son of
Ramphias, who sailed with them, to the command ; and
further, if they thought proper, to make Antisthenes
admiral, dismissing Astyochus, whom the letters of
Pedaritus had caused to be regarded with suspicion.
Sailing accordingly from Malea across the open sea, the
squadron touched at Melos and there fell in with ten
Athenian ships, three of which they took empty and
burned. After this, being afraid that the Athenian
vessels escaped from Melos might, as they in fact did,
give information of their approach to the Athenians at
Samos, they sailed to Crete, and having lengthened their
voyage by way of precaution made land at Caunus in
Asia, from whence considering themselves in safety they
sent a message to the fleet at Miletus for a convoy along
the coast.

Meanwhile the Chians and Pedaritus, undeterred by

40,41] THE SIEGE OF CHIOS 565

the backwardness of Astyochus, went on sending mes- CHAP
sengers pressing him to come with all the fleet to assist ^^^^'
them against their besiegers, and not to leave the greatest B.C. 41a
of the allied states in Ionia to be shut up by sea and demands
overrun and pillaged by land. There were more slaves ^^^P ^o"
at Chios than in any one other city except Lacedsemon, chus,
and being also by reason of their numbers punished more
rigorously when they offended, most of them when they
saw the Athenian armament firmly established in the
island with a fortified position, immediately deserted to
the enemy, and through their knov/ledge of the country
did the greatest mischief. The Chians therefore urged
upon Astyochus that it was his duty to assist them, while
there was still a hope and a possibility of stopping the
enemy's progress, while Delphinium was still in process
of fortification and unfinished, and before the completion
of a higher rampart which was being added to protect the
camp and fleet of their besiegers. Astyochus now saw
that the allies also wished it and prepared to go, in spite
of his intention to the contrary owing to the threat already
referred to.

In the meantime news came from Caunus of the arrival
of the twenty-seven ships with the Lacedaemonian com-
missioners ; and Astyochus postponing everything to the
duty of convoying .1 fleet of that importance, in order to
be more able to command the sea, and to the safe conduct
of the Lacedsemonians sent as spies over his behaviour, at
once gave up going to Chios and set sail for Caunus.
As he coasted along he landed at the Meropid Cos and
sacked the city, which was unfortified and had been
lately laid in ruins by an earthquake, by far the greatest
in living memory, and, as the inhabitants had fled to the
mountains, overran the country and made booty of all it
contained, letting go, however, the free men. From Cos
arriving in the night at Cnidus he was constrained by the
representations of the Cnidians not to disembark the

566 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [42

BOOK sailors, but to sail as he was straight against the twenty
VIII. Athenian vessels, which with Charminus, one of the

B.C. 41a. commanders at Samos, were on the watch for the very

^o?an twenty-seven ships from Peloponnese which Astyochus

Atheoian vv^as himself sailing to join ; the Athenians in Samos

squadron, ^^^j^^^ heard from Melos of their approach, and

Charminus being on the look-out off Syme, Chalce,

Rhodes and Lycia, as he now heard that they were

at Caunus.

Astyochus accordingly sailed as he was to Syme,
before he was heard of, in the hope ot catching the
enemy somewhere out at sea. Rain, however, and foggy
weather encountered him, and caused his ships to straggle
and get into disorder in the dark. In the morning his
fleet had parted company and was most of it s:ill straggling
round the island, and the left wing only in sight of
Charminus and the Athenians, who took it for the
squadron which they were watching for from Caunus,
and hastily put out against it with part only of their
twenty vessels, and attacking immediately sank three
ships and disabled others, and had the advantage in the
action until the main body of the fleet unexpectedly
hove in sight, when they were surrounded on every side.
Upon this they took to flight, and after losing six ships,
with the rest escaped to Teutlussa or Beet Island, and
from thence to Halicarnassus. After this the Pelopon-
nesians put into Cnidus, and being joined by the twenty-
seven ships from Caunus, sailed all together and set up a
trophy in Syme, and then returned to anchor at Cnidus.

As soon as the Athenians knew ot the sea-fight they
sailed with all the ships at Samos to Syme, and without
attacking or being attacked by the fleet at Cnidus, took
the ships* tackle left at Syme, and touching at Lorymi
on the main land sailed back to Samos. Meanwhile the
Peloponnesian ships being now all at Cnidus, underwent
§uch repairs as were needed ; while the eleven Laccdse-

43.44] BREACH WITH TISSAPHERNES 567

monixn commissioners conferred with Tissaphernes, who CHAP,
had come to meet them, upon the points which did not ^^^'
satisfy them in the past transactions, and upon the best B.C. 41a
and mutually most advantageous manner of conducting offends
the war in future. The severest critic of the present Tissa-
proceedings was Lichas, who said that neither of the ^ ^°*'
treaties could stand, neither that of Chalcideus, nor that
of Therimenes ; it being monstrous that the king should
at this date pretend to the possession of all the country
formerly ruled by himself or by his ancestors — a pre-
tension which impHcitly put back under the yoke all the
islands, Thessaly, Locris, and everything as far as
Bceotia, and made the Lacedaemonians give to the
Hellenes instead of liberty a Median master. He there-
fore invited Tissaphernes to conclude another and a
better treaty, as they certainly would not recognise those
existing and did not want any of his pay upon such
conditions. This offended Tissaphernes so much that
he went away in a rage without settling anything.

CHAPTER XXV

Twentieth and Twenty -first Years of the War — In-
trigues of Alcibiades— Withdrawal of the Persian
Subsidies— Oligarchical Coup d'ttat at Athens-
Patriotism of the Army at Samos

The Peloponnesians now determined to sail to Rhodes,
upon the invitation of some of the principal men there,
hoping to gain an island powerful by the number of its
seamen and by its land forces, and also thinking that they
would be able to maintain their fleet from their own
confederacy, without having to ask for money from Tis-
saphernes. They accordingly at once set sail that same
winter from Cnidu3, and first put in with ninety-four ships

568 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [45

BOOK at Camirus in the Rhodian country, to the great alarm of

Yli^' the mass of the inhabitants, who were not privy to the

B.C. ixz. intrigue, and who consequently fled, especially as the

FThodes ^own was unfortified. They were afterwards, however,

fro™ assembled by the Lacedaemonians together with the in-

habitants of the two other towns of Lindus and lalysus;

and the Rhodians were persuaded to revolt from the

Athenians and the island went over to the Peloponnesians.

Meanwhile the Athenians had received the alarm and set

sail with the fleet from Samos to forestall them, and came

within sight of the island, but being a little too late sailed

off for the moment to Chalce, and from thence to Samos,

and subsequently waged war against Rhodes^ issuing from

Chalce, Cos, and Samos.

The Peloponnesians now levied a contribution of thirty-
two talents from the Rhodians, after which they hauled
their ships ashore and for eighty days remained inactive.
During this time, and even earlier, before they removed
to Rhodes, the following intrigues took place. After the
death of Chalcideus and the battle at Miletus, Alcibiades
began to be suspected by the Peloponnesians ; and Astyo-
chus received from Lacedaemon an order from them to put
him to death, he being the personal enemy of Agis, and
in other respects thought unworthy of confidence. Alci-
biades in his alarm first withdrew to Tissaphernes, and
immediately began to do all he could with him to injure
the Peloponnesian cause. Henceforth becoming his ad-
viser in everything, he cut down the pay from an Attic
drachma to three obols a day, and even this not paid too
regularly ; and told Tissaphernes to say to the Pelopon-
nesians that the Athenians, whose maritime experience
was of an older date than their own, only gave their men
three obols, not so much from poverty as to prevent their
seamen being corrupted by being too well off, and injuring
their condition by spending money upon enervating indul-
gences, and also paid their crews irregularly in order to

46] ADVICE OF ALCIBIADES 569

have a security against their deserting in the arrears which CHAP.
they would leave behind them. He also told Tissa- ^^^'
phernes to bribe the captains and generals of the cities, B.C. 41a.
and 60 to obtain their connivance — an expedient which blades'
succeeded with all except the Syracusans, Hermocrates ^'Jj^l® ^
alone opposing him on behalf of the whole confederacy, phernes.
Meanwhile the cities asking for money Alcibiades sent
oif, by roundly telling them in the name of Tissaphernes,
that it was great impudence in the Chians, the richest
people in Hellas, not content with being defended by a
foreign force, to expect others to risk not only their
lives but their money as well in behalf of their freedom ;
while the other cities, he said, had had to pay largely to
Athens before their rebellion, and could not justly refuse
to contribute as much or even more now for their own
selves. He also pointed out that Tissaphernes was at
present carrying on the war at his own charges, and had
good cause for economy, but that as soon as he received
remittances from the king he would give them their pay
in full, and do what was reasonable for the cities.

Alcibiades further advised Tissaphernes not to be in
too great a hurry to end the war, or to let himself be
persuaded to bring up the Phoenician fleet which he was
equipping, or to provide pay for more Hellenes, and thus
put the power by land and sea into the same hands ; but
to leave each of the contending parties in possession of
one element, thus enabling the king when he found one
troublesome to call in the other. For if the command of
the sea and land were united in one hand, he would not
know where to turn for help to overthrow the dominant
power ; unless he at last chose to stand up himself, and
go through with the struggle at great expense and hazard.
The cheapest plan was to let the Hellenes wear each
other out, at a small share of the expense and without
risk to himself. Besides, he would find the Athenians
the most convenient partners in empire as they did not

*T 455

570 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [47

BOOK aim at conquests on shore, and carried on the war upon
principles and with a practice most advantageous to the
B.C. 41*. king ; being prepared to combine to conquer the sea for
intri^es Athens, and for the king all the Hellenes inhabiting his
to pro- country, whom the Peloponnesians, on the contrary,
recall to had come to liberate. Now it was not likely that the
Athens. Lacedaemonians would free the Hellenes from the Hellenic
Athenians, without freeing them also from the barbarian
Mede, unless overthrown by him in the meanwhile.
Alcibiades therefore urged him to wear them both out
at first, and after docking the Athenian power as much
as he could, forthwith to rid the country of the Pelopon-
nesians. In the main Tissaphernes approved of this
policy, so far at least as could be conjectured from his
behaviour ; since he now gave his confidence to AJci-
biades in recognition of his rood advice, and kept the
Peloponnesians short of money, and would not let them
fight at sea, but ruined their cause by pretending that the
Phoenician fleet would arrive, and that they would thus
be enabled to contend with .the odds in their favour, and
80 made their navy lose its efficiency, which had been
very remarkable, and generally betrayed a coolness in the
war that was too plain to be mistaken.

Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes and the
king, with whom he then was, not merely because he
thought it really the best, but because he was studying
means to effect his restoration to his country, well know-
ing that if he did not destroy it he might one day hope
to persuade the Athenians to recall him, and thinking
that his best chance of persuading them lay in letting
them see that he possessed the favour of Tissaphernes.
The event proved him to be right. When the Athenians
at Samos found that he had influence with Tissaphernes,
principally of their own motion (though partly also
through Alcibiades himself sending word to their chief
men to tell the best men in the army, that if there were

4S) CONSPIRACY IN THE ARMY 571

only an oligarchy in the place of the rascally democracy CHAP.
that had banished him, he would be glad to return to his '^^^'
country and to make Tissaphcrnes their friend), the cap- B.C. 41a.
tains and chief men in the armament at once embraced cal^onl
the idea of subverting the democracy. spiracy it

The design was first mooted in the camp, and after- at S&mo*
wards from thence reached the city. Some persons
crossed over from Samos and had an interview with
Alcibiades, who immediately offered to make first Tissa-
phernes, and afterwards the king, their friend, if they
would give up the democracy, and make it possible for
the king to trust them. The higher class, who also
suffered most severely from the war, now conceived great
hopes of getting the government into their own hands,
and of triumphing over the enemy. Upon their return
to Samos the emissaries formed their partisans into a club,
and openly told the mass of the armament that the king
would be their friend, and would provide them with
money, if Alcibiades were restored, and the democracy
abolished. The multitude, if at first irritated by these
intrigues, were nevertheless kept quiet by the advantageous
prospect of the pay from the king ; and the oligarchical
conspirators, after making this communication to the
people, now re-examined the proposals of Alcibiades
among themselves, with most of their associates. Unlike
the rest, who thought them advantageous and trustworthy,
Phr)'Tiichus, who was still general, by no means approved
of the proposals. Alcibiades, he rightly thought, cared
no more for an oligarchy than for a democracy, and only
sought to change the institutions of his country in order
to get himself recalled by his associates ; while for them-
selves their one object should be to avoid civil discord.
It was not the king's interest^ when the Peloponnesians
were now their equals at sea, and in possession of some of
the chief cities in his empire, to go out of his way to side
with the Athenians whom he did not trust, when he might

572 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [49, 5°

BOOK make friends of the PeJoponnesians who had never injured
Y^' him. And as for the allied states to whom oligarchy
B.C. 4^*. was now offered, because the democracy was to be put
tion^of down at Athens, he well knew that this would not make
P^- the rebels come in any the sooner, or confirm the loyal in
' their allegiance ; as the allies would ntver prefer servitude
with an oligarchy or democracy to freedom with the con-
stitution which they actually enjoyed, to whichever type
it belonged. Besides, the cities thought that the so-called
better classes would prove just as oppressive as the com-
mons, as being those who originated, proposed, and for
the most part benefited from the acts of the commons
injurious to the confederates. Indeed, if it depended on
the better classes, the confederates would be put to death
without trial and with violence ; while the commons were
their refuge and the chastiser of these men. This he
positively knew that the cities had learned by experience,
and that siich was their opinion. The propositions of
Alcibiades, and the intrigues now in progress, could
therefore never meet with his approval.

However, the members of the club assembled, agree-
ably to their original determination, accepted what was
proposed, and prepared to send Pisander and others, on an
embassy to Athens to treat for the restoration of Alci-
biades and the abolition of the democracy in the city, and
thus to make Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians.

Phrynichus now saw that there would be a proposal to
restore Alcibiades, and that the Athenians would consent
to it ; and fearing after what he had said against it that
Alcibiades, if restored, would revenge himself upon him
for his opposition, had recourse to the following expedient.
He sent a secret letter to the Lacedasmoniin admiral,
Astyochus, who was still ip the neighbourhood of Miletus,
to tell him that Alcibiades was ruining their cause by
making Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians, and
containing an express revelation of the rest of the intrigue,

51] TREASON OF ASTYOCHUS 573

desiring to be excused if he sought to harm his enemy CHAP
even at the expense of the interests of his country.
However, Astyochus, instead of thinking of punishing B.C. 41s
Alcibiades, who, besides, no longer ventured within his orPhry-
reach as formerly, went up to him and Tissaphernes at "fichus.
Magnesia, communicated to them the letter from Samos,
and turned informer, and if report may be trusted, became
the paid creature of Tissaphernes, undertaking to inform
him as to this and all other matters ; which was also the
reason why he did not remonstrate more strongly against
the pay not being given in full. Upon this Alcibiades
instantly sent to the authorities at Samos a letter against
Phrynichus, stating what he had done, and requiring that
he should be put to death. Phrynichus distracted, and
placed in the utmost peril by the denunciation, sent again
to Astyochus, reproaching him with having so ill kept
the secret of his previous letter, and saying that he was
now prepared to give them an opportunity of destroying
the whole Athenian armament at Samos ; giving a de-
tailed account of the means which he should employ,
Samos being unfortified, and pleading that being in
danger of his life on their account, he could not now
be blamed for doing this or anything else to escape being
destroyed by his mortal enemies. This also Astyochus
revealed to Alcibiades.

Meanwhile Phrynichus having had timely notice that
he was playing him false, and that a letter on the subject
was on the point of arriving from Alcibiades, himself
anticipated the news, and told the army that the enemy,
seeing that Samos was unfortified and the fleet not ail
stationed within the harbour, meant to attack the camp ;
that he could be certain of this intelligence, and that they
must fortify Samos as quickly as possible, and generally
look to their defences. It will be remembered that he
was general, and had himself authority to carry out these
measures. Accordingly they addressed themselves to the

574 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [52, 53

BOOK work of fortification, and Samos was thus fortified sooner
Yii/" than it would otherwise have been. Not long afterwards

B.C. 4»»- came the letter from Alcibiades, saying that the army was
blades' betrayed by Phrynichus, and the enemy about to attack

efforts to it. Alcibiades, however, gained no credit, it being

win over , , , , . , ° r 1 > j •

Tissa- thought that he was m the secret of the enemy s designs,

phernes. ^^j ^^^ tried to festen them upon Phrynichus, and to

make out that he was their accomplice, out of hatred ;

and consequently far from hurting him he rather bore

witness to what he had said by this intelligence.

After this Alcibiades set to work to persuade Tissa-
phernes to become the friend of the Athenians. Tissa-
phemes, although afraid of the Peloponnesians because
they had more ships in Asia than the Athenians, was yet
disposed to be persuaded if he could, especially after his
quarrel with the Peloponnesians at Cnidus about the treaty
of Therimenes. The quarrel had already taken place, as
the Peloponnesians were by this time actually at Rhodes ;
and in it the original argument of Alcibiades touching the
liberation of all the towns by the Lacedsemonians had
been verified by the declaration of Lichas, that it was
impossible to submit to a convention which made the king
master of all the states at any former time ruled by himself
or by his fathers.

While Alcibiades was besieging the favour of Tissa-
phernes with an earnestness proportioned to the greatness
of the issue, the Athenian envoys who had been de-
spatched from Samos with Pisander arrived at Athens,
and made a speech before the people, giving a brief
summary of their views, and particularly insisting that
if AJcibiades were recalled and the democratic constitu-
tion changed, they could have the king as their ally, and
would be able to overcome the Peloponnesians. A num-
ber of speakers opposed them on the question of the
democracy, the enemies of Alcibiades cried out against
the scandal of a restoration to be effected by a violation

54] CONSPIRACY AT ATHENS 575

of the constitution, and the Eumolpidae and Ceryces pro- CHAP.
tested in behalf of the mysteries, the cause of his banish- ^^^-
ment, and called upon the gods to avert his recall ; when B.C. 41a.
Pisander, in the midst of much opposition and abuse, cal^ve-'
came forward, and taking each of his opponents aside ™®"* ^^
asked him the following question : — In the face of the
fact that the Peloponnesians had as many ships as their
own confronting them at sea, more cities in alliance with
them, and the king and Tissaphernes to supply them
with money, of which the Athenians had none left, had
he any hope of saving the state, unless some one could
induce the king to come over to their side ? Upon their
replying that they had not, he then plainly said to them :
* This we cannot have unless we have a more moderate
form of government, and put the offices into fewer hands,
and so gain the king's confidence, and forthwith restore
Alcibiades, who is the only man living that can bring
this about. The safety of the state, not the form of its
government, is for the moment the most pressing ques-
tion, as we can always change afterwards whatever v/e
do not like.'

The people were at first highly irritated at the men*
tion of an oligarchy, but upon understanding clearly from
Pisander that rhis was the only resource left, they took
counsel of their fears, and promised themselves some day
to change the government again, and gave way. They
accordingly voted that Pisander should sail with ten
others and make the best arrangement that they could
with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. At the same time
the people, upon a false accusation of Pisander, dismissed
Phrynichus from his post together with his colleague
Scironides, sending Diomedon and Leon to replace them
i'n the command of the fleet. The accusation was that
Phrynichus had betrayed lasus and Amorges ; and
Pisander brought it because he thought him a man unfit
for the business now in hand with Alcibiades. Pisander

576 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [55,56

BOOK also went the round of all the clubs already existing in

the city for help in lawsuits and elections, and urged

B.C. 41a. them to draw together and to unite their efforts for the

o^f the overthrow of the democracy; and after taking all other

Chians. measures required by the circumstances, so that no time
might be lost, set off with his ten companions on his
voyage to Tissaphernes.

In the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who had by
this time joined the fleet, made an attack upon Rhodes.
The ships of the Peloponnesians they found hauled up on
shore, and after making a descent upon the coast and
defeating the Rhodians who appeared in the field against
them, withdrew to Chalce and made that place their base
of operations instead of Cos, as they could better observe
from thence if the Peloponnesian fleet put out to sea.
Meanwhile Xenophantes, a Laconian, came to Rhodes
from Pedaritus at Chios, with the news that the forti-
fication of the Athenians was now finished, and that,
unless the whole Peloponnesian fleet came to the rescue,
the cause in Chios must be lost. Upon this they re-
solved to go to his relief. In the meantime Pedaritus,
with the mercenaries that he had with him and the whole
force of the Chians, made an assault upon the work round
the Athenian ships and took a portion of it, and got
possession of some vessels that were hauled up on shore,
when the Athenians sallied out to the rescue, and first
routing tiie Chians, next defeated the remainder of the
force round Pedaritus, who was himself killed, with
many of the Chians, a great number of arms being also
taken.

After this the Chians were besieged even more straitly
than before by land and sea, and the famine in the place
was great. Meanwhile the Athenian envoys with Pisander
arrived at the court of Tissaphernes, and conferred with
him about the proposed agreement. However, Alci-
biades, not being altogether sure of Tissaphernes (who

57] ATHENIANS AND TISSAPHERNES 577

feared the Peloponnesians more than the Athenians, and CHAP,
besides wished to wear out both parties, as Alcibiades ^^^'
himself had recommended), had recourse to the follow- B.C. 41a.
ing stratagem to make the treaty between the Athenians ^iUo"^'
and Tissaphernes miscarry by reason of the magnitude of *?5u*
his demands. In my opinion Tissaphernes desired this Tissa-
result, fear being his motive ; while Alcibiades, who now p^**^"**-
saw that Tissaphernes was determined not to treat on any
terms, wished the Athenians to think, not that he was
unable to persuade Tissaphernes, but that after the latter
had been persuaded and was willing to join them, they
had not conceded enough to him. For the demands of
Alcibiades, speaking for Tissaphernes, who was present,
were so extravagant that the Athenians, although for a
long while they agreed to whatever he asked, yet had to
bear the blame of failure : he required the cession of the
whole of Ionia, next of the islands adjacent, besides other
concessions, and these passed without opposition ; at last,
in the third interview, Alcibiades, who now feared a
complete discovery of his inability, required them to
allow the king to build ships and sail along his own
coast wherever and with as many as he pleased. Upon
this the Athenians would yield no further, and concluding
that there was nothing to be done, but that they had been
deceived by Alcibiades, went away in a passion and pro-
ceeded to Samos.

Tissaphernes immediately after this, in the same winter,
proceeded along shore to Caunus, desiring to brmg the
Peloponnesian fleet back to Miletus, and to supply them
with pay, making a fresh convention upon such terms as
he could get, in order not to bring matters to an absolute
breach between them. He was afraid that if many of
their ships were left without pay they would be com-
pelled to engage and be defeated, or that their vessels
being left without hands, the Athenians would attain
their objects without his assistance. Still more he feared

578 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR - [5SS

BOOK that the Peloponnesians might ravage the continent in

YIL^* search of supplies. Having calculated and considered

B.C. 4i»- all this, agreeably to his plan of keeping the two sides

treaty equal, he now sent for the Peloponnesians and gave them

PersSrS P^y* ^^^ concluded with them a third treaty in words

Sparta, following : —

In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, ivhile
Alexippidas ivas Ephor at Lacedamony a convention ivat
concluded in the plain of the Maander by the Lacedamonians
and their allies with Tissaphernes, Hieramenes^ and the sons
of Pharnaces, concerning the affairs of the king and of the
Lacedamonians and their allies,

1 . The country of the king in Asia shall he the hingSy and
the king shall treat his oivn country as he pleases.

2. The Lacedamonians and their allies shall not invade
or injure the king's country ; neither shall the king invade or
injure that of the Lacedamonians or of their allies. If any
of the Lacedamonians or of their allies invade or injure the
king's country, the Lacedamonians and their allies shall pre-
vent it ; and if any from the king's country invade or injure
the country of the Lacedamonians or of their allieSy the king
shaU prevent it.

3. Tissaphemes shall provide pay for the ships noiv pre-
sent, according to the agreement, until the arrival oj the king's
vessels ; but after the arrival of the king's vessels the Lace-
damonians and their allies may pay their oivn ships if they
ivish it. If, hoivever, they choose to receive the pay from
Tissaphemes, Tissaphemes shall furnish it ; and the Lace-
damonians and their alUes shall repay him at the end of the
'war such monies as they shall have received.

4. After the king's vessels have arrived, the ships of the
Lacedamonians and of their allies and those of the king shall
carry on the tuar jointly, according as Tissaphemes and the
Lacedamonians and their allies shall think best. If they
tvish to make peace ivith the Athenians, they shall make peace
also jointly.

59-61] CAPTURE OF OROPUS , 579

This was the treaty. After this Tissaphernes prepared CHAP.
to bring up the Phoenician fleet according to agreement,. ^^Y'
and to make good his other promises, or at all events B.C. 41s,
wished to make it appear that he was so preparing. ^"pture

Winter was now drawing towards its close, when the °^ Oropna.
Boeotians took Oropua by treachery, though held by an
Athenian garrison. Their accomplices in this were some
of the Eretrians and of the Oropians themselves, who
were plotting the revolt of Euboea, as the place was
exactly opposite Eretria, and while in Athenian hands
was necessarily a source of great annoyance to Eretria
and the rest of Euboea. Oropus being in their hands,
the Eretrians now came to Rhodes to invite the Pelopon-
nesians into Euboea. The latter, however, were rather
bent on the relief of the distressed Chians, and accord-
ingly put out to sea and sailed with all their ships from
Rhodes. Off Triopium they sighted the Athenian fleet
out at sea sailing from Chalce, and neither attacking the
other, arrived, the latter at Samos, the Peloponnesians at
Miletus, seeing that it was no longer possible to relieve
Chios without a battle. And this winter ended, and
with it ended the twentieth year of this war of which
Thucydides is the historian.

Early in the spring of the summer following Dercyl-
lidas, a Spartan, was sent with a small force by land to
the Hellespont to effect the revolt of Abydos, which is
a Milesian colony ; and the Chians, while Astyochus was
at a loss how to ftelp them, were compelled to fight at sea
by the pressure of the siege. While Astyochus was still
at Rhodes they had received from Miletus, as their com-
mander after the death of Pedaritus, a Spartan named
Leon, who had come out with Antisthenes, and twelve
vessels which had been on guard at Miletus, five of which
were Thurian, four Syracusan, one from Anaia, one
Milesian, and one Leon's own. Accordingly the Chians
marched out in mass and took up a strong position, while

58o . THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [62,63

BOOK thirty-six of their ships put out and engaged thirty-two
of the Athenians ; and after a tough fight, in which the

B.C. 411. Chians and their aUies had rather the best of it, as it was

Abydos. °ow late, retired to their city.

Immediately after this Dercyllidas arrived by land from
Miletus ; and Abydos in the Hellespont revolted to him
and Pharnabazus, and Lampsacus two days later. Upon
receipt of this news Strombichides hastily sailed from
Chios with twenty-four Athenian ships, some transports
carrying heavy infantry being of the number, and defeating
the Lampsacenes who came out against him, took Lamp-
sacus, which was unfortified, at the first assault, and
making prize of the slaves and goods, restored the free-
men to their homes, and went on to Abydos. The
inhabitants, however, refusing to capitulate, and his
assaults failing to take the place, he sailed over to the
coast opposite, and appointed Sestos, the town in the
Chersonese held by the Modes at a former period in this
history, as the centre for the defence of the whole Helles-
pont.

In the meantime the Chians commanded the sea more
than before ; and the Peloponnesians at Miletus and
Astyochus, hearing of the sea-fight and of the departure
of the squadron with Strombichides, took fresh courage.
Coasting along with two vessels to Chios, Astyochus took
the ships from that place, and now moved with the whole
fleet upon Samos, from whence, however, he sailed back
to Miletus, as the Athenians did not put out against him,
owing to their suspicions of one another. For it was
about this time, or even before, that the democracy was
put down at Athens. When Pisander and the envoys
returned from Tissaphernes to Samos they at once
strengthened still further their interest in the army itself,
and instigated the upper class in Samos to join them in
establishing an oligarchy, the very form of government
which a party of them had lately risen to avoid. At the

64] OLIGARCHICAL MOVEMENT 581

same time the Athenians at Samos, after a consultation CHAP
among themselves, determined to let Alcibiades alone, ^^^•
since he refused to join them, and besides was not the B.C. 411.
man for an oligarchy ; and now that they were once garchical
embarked, to see for themselves how they could best conspi-
prevent the ruin of their cause, and meanwhile to sustain
the war, and to contribute without stint money and all
else that might be required from their own private
estates, as they would henceforth labour for themselves
alone.

After encouraging each other in these resolutions, they
now at once sent off half the envoys and Pisander to do
what was necessary at Athens (with instructions to
establish oligarchies on their way in all the subject cities
which they might touch at), and despatched the other
half in different directions to the other dependencies.
Diitrephes also, who was in the neighbourhood of Chios,
and had been elected to the command of the Thracian
towns, was sent off to his government, and arriving at
Thasos abolished the democracy there. Two months,
however, had not elapsed after his departure before the
Thasians began to fortify their town, being already tired
of an aristocracy with Athens, and in daily expectation
of freedom from Lacedasmon. Indeed there was a party
of them (whom the Athenians had banished), with the
Peloponnesians, who with their friends in the town were
already making every exertion to bring a squadron, and to
effect the revolt of Thasos ; and this party thus saw exactly
what they most wanted done, that is to say, the reforma-
tion of the government without risk, and the abolition of
the democracy which would have opposed them. Things
at Thasos thus turned out just the contrary to what the
oligarchical conspirators at Athens expected ; and the
same in my opinion was the case in many of the other
dependencies ; as the cities no sooner got a moderate
government and liberty of action, than they went on to

5«a THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [65, 66

BOOK absolute freedom without being at all seduced by the show
YUi* of reform offered by the Athenians.

B.C. 411. Pisander and his colleagues on their voyage along shore
nations at abolished, as had been determined, the democracies in the

Athens, cities, and also took some heavy infantry from certain
places as their allies, and so came to Athens. Here they
found most of the work already done by their associates.
Some of the younger men had banded together, and
secretly assassinated one Androcles, the chief leader of
the commons, and mainly responsible for the banishment
of Alcibiades ; Androcles being singled out both because
he was a popular leader, and because they sought by his
death to recommend themselves to Alcibiades, who was,
as they supposed, to be recalled, and to make Tissaphemes
their friend. There were also some other obnoxious
persons whom they secretly did away with in the same
manner. Meanwhile their cry in public was that no pay
should be given except to persons seeping in the war, and
that not more than five thousand should share in the
government, and those such as were most able to serve
the state in person and in purse.

But this was a mere catchword for the multitude, as the
authors of the revolution were really to govern. How-
ever, the Assembly and the Council of the Bean still met
notwithstanding, alUiough they discussed nothing that was
not approved of by the conspirators, who both supplied the
speakers, and reviewed in advance what they were to say.
Fear, and the sight of the numbers of the conspirators,
closed the mouths of the rest ; or if any ventured to rise
in opposition, he was presently put to death in some con-
venient way, and there was neither search for the murderers
nor justice to be had against them if suspected ; but the
people remained motionless, being so thoroughly cowed
that men thought themselves lucky to escape violence,
even when they held their tongues. An exaggerated
belief in the numbers of the conspirators also demoralised

67] THE FOUR HUNDRED 583

the people, rendered helpless by the magnitude of the city, CHAP.

and by their want of intelligence with each other, and being "

without means of finding out what those numbers really B.C. 411,

„ , • • -1 1 r Govern-

were. For the same reason it was impossible tor any one ment of
to open his grief to a neighbour and to concert measures h^^^^J^
to defend himself, as he would have had to speak either to estab-
one whom he did not know, or whom he knew but did ^ ®
not trust. Indeed all the popular party approached each
other with suspicion, each thinking his neighbour con-
cerned in what was going on, the conspirators having in
their ranks persons whom no one could ever have believed
capable of joining an oligarchy ; and these it was who
made the many so suspicious, and so helped to procure
impunity for the few, by confirming the commons in their
mistrust of one another.

At this juncture arrived Pisander and his colleagues,
who lost no time in doing the rest. First they assembled
the people, and moved to elect ten commissioners with full
powers to frame a constitution, and that when this was
done they should on an appointed day lay before the people
their opinion as to the best mode of governing the city.
Afterwards, when the day arrived, the conspirators enclosed
the assembly in Colonus, a temple of Poseidon, a little
more than a mile outside the city ; when the commis-
sioners simply brought forward this single motion, that
any Athenian might propose with impunity whatever
measure he pleased, heavy penalties being imposed upon
any who should indict for illegality, or otherwise molest
him for so doing. The way thus cleared, it was now
plainly declared, that all tenure of office and receipt
of pay under the existing institutions were at an end,
and that five men must be elected as presidents, who
should in their turn elect one hundred, and each of
the hundred three apiece ; and that this body thus
made up to four hundred should enter the council
chamber with full powers and govern as they judged

584 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [68,69

BOOK best, and should convene the five thousand whenever they

Y!i*- pleased.
B.C. 4". The man who moved this resolution was Pisander, who

subver- was throughout the chief ostensible agent in putting down
ters of the democracy. But he who concerted the whole affair,
mocracy. and prepared the way for the catastrophe, and who had
given the greatest thought to the matter, was Antiphon,
one of the best men of his day in Athens ; who, with a
head to contrive measures and a tongue to recommend
them, did not willingly come forward in the assembly or
upon any public scene, being ill-looked upon by the multi-
tude owing to his reputation for talent ; and who yet was
the one man best able to aid in the courts, or before the
assembly, the suitors who required his opinion. Indeed,
when he was afterwards himself tried for his life on the
charge of having been concerned in setting up this very
government, when the Four Hundred were overthrov/n
and hardly dealt with by the commons, he made what
would seem to be the best defence of any known up to
my time. Phrynichus also went beyond all others in his
zeal for the oligarchy. Afraid of Alcibiades, and assured
that he was no stranger to his intrigues with Astyochus at
Samos, he held that no oligarchy was ever likely to re-
store him, and once embarked in the enterprise, proved,
where danger was to be faced, by far the staunchest of
them all. Theramenes, son of Hagnon, was also one of
the foremost of the subverters of the democracy — a man
as able in council as in debate. Conducted by so many
and by such sagacious heads, the enterprise, great as it was,
not unnaturally went forward ; although it was no light
matter to deprive the Athenian people of its freedom,
almost a hundred years after the deposition of the tyrants,
when it had been not only not subject to any during the
whole of that period, but accustomed during more than
half of it to rule over subjects of its own.

The assembly ratified the proposed constitution, with-

70] THE FOUR HUNDRED 585

out a single opposing voice, and was then dissolved ; after CHAP.
which the Four Hundred were brought into the council ^^'
chamber in the following way. On account of the enemy B.C. 411.
at Decelea, all the Athenians were constantly on the wall of1£e*'°°
or in the ranks at the various military posts. On that day CounciL
the persons not in the secret were allowed to go home as
usual, while orders were given to the accomplices of the
conspirators to hang about, without making any demon-
stration, at some little distance from the posts, and in case
of any opposition to what was being done, to seize the
arms and put it down. There were also some Andrians
and Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and some of the
settlers in ^gina come with their own arms for this very
purpose, who had received similar instructions. These
dispositions completed, the Four Hundred went, each
widi a dagger concealed about his person, accompanied
by one hundred and twenty Hellenic youths, whom they
employed wherever violence was needed, and appeared
before the Councillors of the Bean in the council chamber,
and told them to take their pay and be gone ; themselves
bringing it for the whole of the residue of their term of
oftice, and giving it to them as they went out.

Upon the Council withdrawing in this way without
venturing any objection, and the rest of the citizens mak-
ing no movement, the Four Hundred entered the council
chamber, and for the present contented themselves with
drawing lots for their Prytanes, and making their prayers
and sacrifices to the gods upon entering office, but after-
wards departed widely from the democratic system of
government, and except that on account of Alcibiades
they did not recall the exiles, ruled the city by force ;
putting to death some men, though not many, whom they
thought it convenient to remove, and imprisoning and
banishing others. They also sent to Agis, the Lacedae-
monian king, at Decelea, to say that they desired to make
peace, and that he might reasonably be more disposed to

586 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [71,72

BOOK treat now that he had them to deal with instead of the

^^^' inconstant commons.
B.C. 41X. Agis, however, did not believe in the tranquillity of the

maxie'^to city, or that the commons would thus in a moment give

Sparta up their ancient liberty, but thought that the sight of a
large Lacedaemonian force would be sufficient to excite
them if they were not already in commotion, of which he
was by no means certain. He accordingly gave to the
envoys of the Four Hundred an answer which held out
no hopes of an accommodation, and sending for large
reinforcements from Peloponnese, not long afterwards,
with these and his garrison from Decelea, descended to
the very walls of Athens ; hoping either that civil dis-
turbances might help to subdue them to his terms, or that,
in the confusion to be expected within and without the
city, they might even surrender without a blow being
struck ; at all events he thought he would succeed in
seizing the Long Walls, bared of their defenders. How-
ever, the Athenians saw him come close up, without
making the least disturbance within the city ; and sending
out their cavalry, and a number of their heavy infantry,
light troops, and archers, shot down some of his soldiers
who approached too near, and got possession of some arms
and dead. Upon this Agis, at last convinced, led his
armv back again, and remaining with his own troops in
the old position at Decelea, sent the reinforcement back
home, after a few days' stay in Attica. After this the
Four Hundred persevering sent another embassy to Agis,
and now meeting wnth a better reception, at his suggestion
despatched envoys to Lacedsemon to negotiate a treaty,
being desirous of making peace.

They also sent ten men to Samos to reassure the army,
and to explain that the oligarchy was not established for
the hurt of the city or the citizens, but for the salvation of
the country at large ; and that there were five thousand,
not four hundred only, concerned ; although, what with

73] THE POSITION AT SAMOS 5S7

their expeditions and employments abroad, the Athenians CHAP
had never yet assembled to discuss a question important ^^^'
enough to bring five thousand of them together. The B.C. 411
emissaries were also told what to say upon all other points, of the*^*
and were so sent off immediately after the establishment oii^archa
of the new government, which feared, as it turned out
justly, that the mass of seamen would not be willing to
remain under the oligarchical constitution, and, the evil
beginning there, might be the means of their overthrow.

Indeed at Samos the question of the oligarchy had
already entered upon a new phase, the following events
having taken place just at the time that the Four Hundred
were conspiring. That part of the [Samian population
which has been mentioned as rising against the upper class,
and as being the democratic party, had now turned round,
and yielding to the solicitations of Pisander during his visit,
and of the Athenians in the conspiracy at Samos, had bound
themselves by oaths to the number of three hundred, and
were about to fall upon the rest of their fellow-citizens,
whom they now in their turn regarded as the democratic
party. Meanwhile they put to death one Hyperbolus, an
Athenian, a pestilent fellow that had been ostracised, not
from fear of his influence or position, but because he was a
rascal and a disgrace to the city; being aided in this by
Charminus, one of the generals, and by some of the Athenians
with them, to whom they had sworn friendship, and with
whom they perpetrated other acts of the kind, and now
determined to attack the people. The latter got wind of
what was coming, and told two of the generals, Leon and
Diomedon, who, on account of the credit which they
enjoyed with the commons, were unwilling supporters of
the oligarchy ; and also Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the
former a captain of a galley, the latter serving with the
heavy infantry, besides certain others who had ever been
thought most opposed to the conspirators, entreating them
not to look on and see them destroyed, and Samos, the sole

588 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [74

BOOK remaining stay of their empire, lost to the Athenians.
Y!i^* Upon hearing this, the persons whom they addressed now
BX. 4n. went round the soldiers one by one, and urged them to
the revo- resist, especially the crew of the Paralus, which was
^"At°° ** n^acie up entirely of Athenians and freemen, and had
reaches from time out of mind been enemies of oligarchy,
the axmy. ^^^^ when there was no such thing existing ; and
Leon and Diomedon left behind some ships for their
protection in case of their sailing away anywhere them-
selves. Accordingly, when the Three Hundred attacked
the people, all these came to the rescue, and foremost of
all the crew of the Paralus ; and the Samian commons
gained the victory, and putting to death some thirty of
the Three Hundred, and banishing three others of the
ringleaders, accorded an amnesty to the rest, and lived
together under a democratic government for the future.

The ship Paralus, with Chaereas, son of Archestratus,
on board, an Athenian who had taken an active part in
the revolution, was now without loss of time sent off by
the Samians and the army to Athens to report what had
occurred ; the fact that the Four Hundred were in power
not being yet known. When they sailed into harbour the
Four Hundred immediately arrested two or three of the
Parali, and taking the veSvsel from the rest, shifted them into
a troopship and set them to keep guard round Euboea.
Chasreas, however, managed to secrete himself as soon
as he saw how things stood, and returning to Samos,
drew a picture to the soldiers of the horrors enacting at
Athens, in which everything was exaggerated ; saying
that all were punished with stripes, that no one could say
a word against the holders of power, that the soldiers*
wives and children were outraged, and that it was intended
to seize and shut up the relatives of all in the army at
Samos who were not of the government's way of thinking,
to be put to death in case of their disobedience ; besides
a host of other iniurious inventions.

75. 76] FERMENT IN THE ARMY 589

On hearing this the first thought of the army was to CHAP,
fall upon the chief authors of the oligarchy and upon all '

the rest concerned. Eventually, however, they desisted B.C. 4".
from this idea upon the men of moderate views opposing revoiutfon
it and warning them against ruining their cause, with the in army
enemy close at hand and ready for battle. After this
Thrasybalus, son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, the chief
leaders in the revolution, now wishing in the most public
manner to change the government at Samoa to a demo-
cracy, bound all the soldiers by the most tremendous
oaths, and those of the oligarchical party more than any,
to accept a democratic government, to be united, to pro-
secute actively the war with the Peloponnesians, and to
be enemies of the Four Hundred, and to hold no com-
munication with them. The same oath was also taken
by all the Samians of full age; and the soldiers associated
the Samians in all their affairs and in the fruits of their
dangers, having the conviction that there was no way of
escape for themselves or for them, but that the success of
the Four Hundred or of the enemy at Miletus must be
their ruin.

The struggle now was between the army trying to force
a democracy upon the city, and the Four Hundred an
oligarchy upon the camp. Meanwhile the soldiers forth-
with held an assembly, in which they deposed the former
generals and any of the captains whom they suspected, and
chose new captains and generals to replace them, besides
Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, whom they had already.
They also stood up and encouraged one another, and
among other things urged that they ought not to lose heart
because the city had revolted from them, as the party
seceding was smaller and in every way poorer in resources
than themselves. They had the whole fleet with which
to compel the other cities in their empire to give them
money just as if they had their base in the capital, having
a city in Samos which, so far from wanting strength, had

590 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [77,78

BOOK when at war been within an ace of depriving the Athenians
of the command of the sea, while as far as the enemy was

B.C. 411. concerned they had the same base of operations as before.

mination Indeed, with the fleet in their hands, they were better
to'errm'^ able to provide themselves with supplies than the govern-
ment at home. It was their advanced position at Samos
which had throughout enabled the home authorities to
command the entrance into Pirasus ; and if they refused
to give them back the constitution, they would now find
that the army was more in a position to exclude them
from the sea than they were to exclude the army. Be-
sides, the city was of little or no use towards enabling
them to overcome the enemy ; and they had lost nothing
in losing those who had no longer either money to send
them (the soldiers having to find this for themselves),
or good counsel, which entitles cities to direct armies.
On the contrary, even in this the home government had
done wrong in abolishing the institutions of their ancestors,
while the army maintained the said institutions, and would
try to force the home government to do so likewise. So
that even in point of good counsel the camp had as good
counsellors as the city. Moreover, they had but to grant
him security for his person and his recall, and Alcibiades
would be only too glad to procure them the alliance of
the king. And above all, if they failed altogether, with
the navy which they possessed, they had numbers of
places to retire to in which they would find cities and
lands.

Debating together and comforting themselves after this
manner, they pushed on their war measures as actively as
ever ; and the ten envoys sent to Samos by the Four Hun-
dred, learning how matters stood while they were still at
Delos, stayed quiet there.

About this time a cry arose among the soldiers in the
Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus that Astyochus and Tissa-
phernes were ruining their cause. Astyochue had not

79] MOVEMENTS OF THE FLEETS 591

been willing to fight at sea — either before, while they CHAP,
were still in full vigour and the fleet of the Athenians ^^^
small, or now, when the enemy was, as they were in- B.C. 4x1.
formed, in a state of sedition and his ships not yet united a.gsAn^^
— but kept them waiting for the Phoenician fleet from ^J^^^
Tissaphernes, which had only a nominal existence, at the his in-
risk of wasting away in inactivity. While Tissaphernes **^*'^*y'
not only did not bring up the fleet in question, but was
ruining their navy by payments made irregularly, and
even then not made in full. They must therefore, they
insisted, delay no longer, but fight a decisive naval en-
gagement. The Syracusans were the most urgent of
any.

The confederates and Astyochus, aware of these mur-
murs, had already decided in council to fight a decisive
battle; and when the news reached them of the dis-
turbance at Samos, they put to sea with all their ships,
one hundred and ten in number, and ordering the Milesians
to move by land upon Mycale, set sail thither. The
Athenians with the eighty-two ships from Samos were
at the moment lying at Glauce in Mycale, a point where
Samos approaches near to the continent ; and seeing the
Peloponnesian fleet sailing against them, retired into
Samos, not thinking themselves numerically strong enough
to stake their all upon a battle. Besides, they had notice
from Miletus of the wish of the enemy to engage, and
were expecting to be joined from the Hellespont by
Strombichides, to whom a messenger had been already
despatched, with the ships that had gone from Chios to
Abydos. The Athenians accordingly withdrew to Samos,
and the Peloponnesians put in at Mycale, and encamped
with the land forces of the Milesians and the people of
the neighbourhood. The next day they were about to
sail against Samos, when tidings reached them of the
arrival of Strombichides with the squadron from the
Hellespont, upon which they immediately sailed back to

592 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [80, 8i

BOOK Miletus. The Athenians, thus reinforced, now in their

XiilS' turn sailed against Miletus with a hundred and eight ships,

B.C 4"- wishing to fight a decisive battle, but as no one put out to
Atheni- ^ -i j u 1 . c

anssailto meet them, sailed back to oaraos.
Miletus.

CHAPTER XXVI

Twenty-first Year of the War— Recall of Alcibiades to
Samos— Revolt of Eubcsa and Downfall of the Four
Hundred — Battle of Cynossema

In the same summer, immediately after this, the Pelo-
ponnesians having refused to fight with their fleet united,
through not thinking themselves a match for the enemy,
and being at a loss where to look for money for such a
number of ships, especially as Tissaphernes proved so bad
a paymaster, sent off Clearchus, son of Ramphias, with
forty ships to Pharnabazus, agreeably to the original
instructions from Peloponnese ; Pharnabazus inviting
them and being prepared to furnish pay, and Byzantium
besides sending offers to revolt to them. These Pelo-
ponnesian ships accordingly put out into the open sea, in
order to escape the observation of the Athenians, and
being overtaken bv a storm, the majority with Clearchus
got into Delos, and afterwards returned to Miletus,
whence Clearchus proceeded by land to the Hellespont
to take the command : ten, however, of their number,
under the Megarian Helixus, made good their passage to
the Hellespont, and effected the revolt of Byzantium.
After this, the commanders at Samos were informed of
it, and sent a squadron against them to guard the Helles-
pont ; and an encounter took place .before Byzantium
between eight vessels on either side.

Meanwhile the chiefs at Samos, and especially Thrasy-
buius, who from the moment that he had changed the

82] ALCIBIADES RECALLED 593

government had remained firmly resolved to recall Alci- CHAP.
blades, at last in an assembly brought over the mass of ^^^^'
the soldiery, and upon their voting for his recall and B.C. 411.
amnesty, sailed over to Tissaphernes and brought Alci- blades
biades to Samos, being convinced that their only chance elected
of salvation lay in his bringing over Tissaphernes from
the Peloponnesians to themselves. An assembly was
then held in which Alcibiades complained of and de-
plored his private misfortune in having been banished,
and speaking at great length upon public affairs, highly
incited their hopes for the future, and extravagantly
magnified his own influence with Tissaphernes. His
object in this was to make the oligarchical government
at Athens afraid of him, to hasten the dissolution of the
clubs, to increase his credit with the army at Samos and
heighten their own confidence, and lastly to prejudice the
enemy as strongly as possible against Tissaphernes, and
blast the hopes which they entertained. Alcibiades
accordingly held out to the army such extravagant pro-
mises as the following: that Tissaphernes had solemnly
assured him that if he could only trust the Athenians
they should never want for supplies while he had any-
thing left, no, not even if he should have to coin his own
silver couch, and that he would bring the Phoenician
fleet now at Aspendus to the Athenians instead of to
the Peloponnesians ; but that he could only trust the
Athenians if Alcibiades were recalled to be his security
for them.

Upon hearing this and much more besides, the
Athenians at once elected him general together with
the former ones, and put all their aflPairs into his hands.
There was now not a man in the army who would have
exchanged his present hopes of safety and vengeance
upon the Four Hundred for any consideration whatever ;
and after what they had been told they were now inclined
to disdam the enemy before them, and to sail at once for

U 455

594 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [83,84

BOOK Piraeus. To the plan of sailing for Piraeus, leaving their
V"^' more immediate enemies behind them, Alcibiades opposed

B.C. 411. the most positive refusal, in spite of the numbers that

content insisted upon it, saying that now that he had been elected

of the general he would first sail to Tissaphernes and concert

^oesuml* with him measures for carrying on the war. Accord-
ingly, upon leaving this assembly, he immediately took
his departure in order to have it thought that there was
an entire confidence between them, and also wishing to
increase his consideration with Tissaphernes, and to show
that he had now been elected general and was in a posi-
tion to do him good or evil as he chose ; thus managing
to frighten the Athenians with Tissaphernes and Tissa-
phernes with the Athenians.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesians at Miletus heard of the
recall of Alcibiades, and already distrustful of Tissa-
phernes, now became far more disgusted with him than
ever. Indeed after their refusal to go out and give battle
to the Athenians when they appeared before Miletus,
Tissaphernes had grown slacker than ever in his pay-
ments ; and even before this, on account of Alcibiades,
his unpopularity had been on the increase. Gathering
together, just as before, the soldiers and some persons of
consideration besides the soldiery, began to reckon up
how they had never yet received their pay in full ; that
what they did receive was small in quantity, and even
that paid irregularly, and that unless they fought a de-
cisive battle or removed to some station where they could
get supplies, the ships' crews would desert ; and that it
was all the fault of Astyochus, who humoured Tissa-
phernes for his own private advantage.

The army was engaged in these reflexions, when the
following disturbance took place about the person of
Astyochus. Most of the Syracusan and Thurian sailors
were freemen, and these the freest crews in the armament
were likewise the boldest in setting upon Astyochus and

85] RECALL OF ASTYOCHUS 595

demanding their pay. The latter answered somewhat CHAP.
stiffly and threatened them, and when Dorieus spoke up ^^^
for his own sailors even went so far as to lift his baton B.C. 411.
against him ; upon seeing which the mass of the men, in ^^uf?^.
sailor fashion, rushed in a fury to strike Astyochus. He, |^e<^ ^0
however, saw them in time and fled for refuge to an ^*
altar ; and they were thus parted without his being struck.
Meanwhile the fort built by Tissaphernes in Miletus was
surprised and taken by the Milesians, and the garrison in
it turned out, — an act which met with the approval of the
rest of the allies, and in particular of the Syracusans, but
which found no favour with Lichas, who said moreover
that the Milesians and the rest in the king's country ought
to show a reasonable submission to Tissaphernes and to
pay him court, until the war should be happily settled.
The Milesians were angry with him for this and for other
things of the kind, and upon his afterwards dying of
sickness, would not allow him to be buried where the
Lacedsemonians with the army desired.

The discontent of the army with Astyochus and Tissa-
phernes had reached this pitch, when Mindarus arrived
from Lacedasmon to succeed Astyochus as admiral, and
assumed the command. Astyochus now set sail for home ;
and Tissaphernes sent with him one of his confidants,
Gaulites, a Carian, who spoke the two languages, to
complain of the Milesians for the affair of the fort, and
at the same time to defend himself against the Milesians,
who were, as he was aware, on their way to Sparta chiefly
to denounce his conduct, and had with them Hermocrates,
who was to accuse Tissaphernes of joining with Alcibiades
to ruin the Peloponnesian cause and of playmg a double
game. Indeed Hermocrates had always been at enmity
with him about the pay not being restored in full ; and
eventually when he was banished from Syracuse, and new
commanders, Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus, had
come out to Miletus to the ships of the Syracusans,

596 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [86

BOOK Tissapheraes pressed harder than ever upon him in his
Yii!" exile, and among other charges against him accused him

B.C. 411. of having once asked him for money, and then given him-
biadS" self out as his enemy because he failed to obtain it.
*«^ce While Astyochus and the Milesians and Hermocrates
State, made sail for Lacedaemon, Alcibiades had now crossed
back from Tissaphemes to Samos. After his return the
envoys of the Four Hundred sent, as has been mentioned
above, to pacify and explain matters to the forces at
Samos, arrived from Delos ; and an assembly was held
in which they attempted to speak. The soldiers at first
would not hear them, and cried out to put to death the
subverters of the democracy, but at last, after some
difficulty, calmed down and gave them a hearing. Upon
this the envoys proceeded to inform them that the recent
change had been made to save the city, and not to ruin
it or to deliver it over to the enemy, for they had already
had an opportunity of doing this when he invaded the
country during their government ; that all the Five Thou-
sand would have their proper share in the government ;
and that their hearers' relatives had neither outrage, as
Chaereas had slanderously reported, nor other ill-treatment
to complain of, but were all in undisturbed enjoyment of
their property just as they had left them. Besides these
they made a number of other statements which had no
better success with their angry auditors ; and amid a host
of different opinions the one which found most favour
was that of sailing to Pirasus. Now it was that Alci-
biades for the first time did the state a service, and one
of the most signal kind. For when the Athenians at
Samos were bent upon sailing against their countrymen,
in which case Ionia and the Hellespont would most
certainly at once have passed into possession of the
enemy, Alcibiades it was who prevented them. At that
moment, when no other man would have been able to
hold back the multitude, he put a stop to the intended

87] ENVOYS OF THE FOUR HUNDRED 597

expedition, and rebuked and turned aside the resentment CHAP.
felt, on personal grounds, against the envoys ; he dismissed ^^^^'
them with an answer from himself, to the effect that he B.C. 4x«.
did not object to the government of the Five Thousand, answer
but insisted that the Four Hundred should be deposed '° ^^®
and the Council of Five Hundred reinstated in power :
meanwhile any retrenchments for economy, by which pay
might be better found for the armament, met with his
entire approval. Generally, he bade them hold out and
show a bold face to the enemy, since if the city were
saved there was good hope that the two parties might
some day be reconciled, whereas if either were once
destroyed, that at Samos, or that at Athens, there would
no longer be any one to be reconciled to. Meanwhile
arrived envoys from the Argives, with offers of sup-
port to the Athenian commons at Samos : these were
thanked by Alcibiades, and dismissed with a request to
come when called ipon. The Argives were accompanied
by the crew of the Paralus, whom we left placed in a
troopship by the Four Hundred with orders to cruise
round Euboea, and who being employed to carry to Lace-
dsemon some Athenian envoys sent by the Four Hundred,
Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias, as they sailed by
Argos laid hands upon the envoys, and delivering them
over to the Argives as the chief subverters of the demo-
cracy, themselves, instead of returning to Athens, took
the Argive envoys on board, and came to Samos in the
galley which had been confided to them.

The same summer at the time that the return of Alci-
biades coupled with the general conduct of Tissaphernes
had carried to its height the discontent of the Pelopon-
nesians, who no longer entertained any doubt of his
having joined the Athenians, Tissaphernes wishing, it
would seem, to clear himself to them of these charges,
prepared to go after the Phoenician fleet to Aspendus,
and invited Lichas to go with him ; saying that he would

598 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [87

BOOK appoint Tamos as his lieutenant to provide pay for the
* armament during his own absence. Accounts differ, and

T^'^Ph"' ^^ ^^ °°^ ^^^y ^° ascertain with what intention he went to
nician Aspendus, and did not bring the fleet after all. That

As^fdt^* one hundred and forty-seven Phoenician ships came as
far as Aspendus is certain ; but why they did not come
on has been variously accounted for. Some think that
he went away in pursuance of his plan of wasting the
Peloponnesian resources, since at any rate Tamos, his
lieutenant, far from being any better, proved a worse
paymaster than himself: others that he brought the
Phoenicians to Aspendus to exact money from them for
their discharge, having never intended to employ them :
others again that it was in view of the outcry against him
at Lacedasmon, in order that it might be said that he was
not in fault, but that the ships were really manned and
that he had certainly gone to fetch them. To myself it
seems only too evident that he did not bring up the fleet
because he wished to wear out and paralyse the Hellenic
forces, that is, to waste their strength by the time lost
during his journey to Aspendus, and to keep them evenly
balanced by not throwing his weight into either scale.
Had he wished to finish the war, he could have done so,
assuming of course that he made his appearance in a way
which left no room for doubt ; as by bringing up the
fleet he would in all probability have given the victory to
the Lacedaemonians, whose navy, even as it was, faced
the Athenian more as an equal than as an inferior. But
what convicts him most clearly, is the excuse which he
put forward for not bringing the ships. He said that the
number assembled was less than the king had ordered ;
but surely it would only have enhanced his credit if
he spent little of the king's money and effected the
same end at less cost. In any ca«e, whatever was his
intention, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and saw the
Fhcenicians ; and the Peloponnesians at his desire sent a

88,89] FALL OF THE FOUR HUNDRED 590

Lacedaemonian called Philip with two galleys to fetch CHAP
the fleet. XXVI."

Alcibiades finding that Tissaphernes had gone to As- B.C. 411.
pendus, himself sailed thither with thirteen ships, promis- Son to "
ing to do a great and certain service to the Athenians at Jje Four
Samos, as he would either bring the Phcenician fleet to at"° '^^
the Athenians, or at all events prevent its joining the ^^«"s.
Peloponnesians. In all probability he had long known
that Tissaphernes never meant to bring the fleet at all,
and wished to compromise him as much as possible in the
eyes of the Peloponnesians through his apparent friendship
for himself and the Athenians, and thus in a manner to
oblige him to join their side.

While Alcibiades weighed anchor and sailed eastward
straight for Phaselis and Caunus, the envoys sent by the
Four Hundred to Samos arrived at Athens. Upon their
delivering the message from Alcibiades, telling them to
hold out and to show a firm front to the enemy, and say-
mg that he had great hopes of reconciling them with the
army and of overcoming the Peloponnesians, the majority
of the members of the oligarchy, who v/ere already dis-
contented and only too much inclined to be quit of the
business in any safe way that they could, were at once
greatly strengthened in their resolve. These now banded
together and strongly criticised the administration, their
leaders being some of the principal generals and men in
oflice under the oligarchy, such as Theramenes, son of
Hagnon, Aristocrates, son of Scellias, and others ; who,
although among the most prominent members of the
government (being afraid, as they said, of the army at
Samos, and most especially of Alcibiades, and also lest
the envoys whom they had sent to Lacedasmon, might do
the state some harm without the authority of the people),
without insisting on objections to the excessive concen-
tration of power in a few hands, yet urged that the Five
Thousand must be shown to exist not merely in name but

6oo THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [90

BOOK in reality, and the constitution placed upon a fairer basis.
Yil!" But this was merely their political cry ; most of them

B.C. 411- being driven by private ambition into the line of conduct

oligarchs SO surely fatal to oligarchies that arise out of democracies.

t« ^^tray Pqj. ^H at once pretend to be not only equals but each the
' chief and master of his fellows ; while under a demo-
cracy a disappointed candidate accepts his defeat more
easily, because he has not the humiliation of being beaten
by his equals. But what most clearly encouraged the
malcontents was the power of Alcibiades at Samos, and
their own disbelief in the stability of the oligarchy ; and
it was now a race between them as to which should first
become the leader of the commons.

Meanwhile the leaders and members of the Four Hun-
dred most opposed to a democratic form of government —
Phrynichus who had had the quarrel with Alcibiades
during his command at Samos, Aristarchus the bitter and
inveterate enemy of the commons, and Pisander and
Antiphon and others of the chiefs who already as
soon as they entered upon power, and again when the
army at Samos seceded from them and declared for a
democracy, had sent envoys from their own body to
Lacedoemon and made every effort for peace, and had
built the wall in Eetionia, — now redoubled their exer-
tions when their envoys returned from Samos, and they
saw not only the people but their own most trusted
associates turning against them. Alarmed at the state
of things at Athens as at Samos, they now sent off in
haste Antiphon and Phrynichus and ten others with
injunctions to make peace with Lacedaemon upon any
terms, no matter what, that should be at all tolerable.
Meanwhile they pushed on more actively than ever with
the wall in Eetionia. Now the meaning of this wall,
according to Theramenes and his supporters, was not so
much to keep out the army of Samos in case of its trying
to force its way into Piraeus as to be able to let in, at

91] FALL OF THE FOUR HUNDRED 601

pleasure, the fleet and army of the enemy. For Eetionia CHAP,
is a mole of Piraeus, close alongside of the entrance of
the harbour, and was now fortified in connexion with the B.C. 411.
wall already existing on the land side, so that a few men tan Eeet
placed in it might be able to command the entrance ; the *^ ^p'*
old wall on the land side and the new one now being
built within on the side of the sea, both ending in one of
the two towers standing at the narrow mouth of the
harbour. They also walled off the largest porch in Piraeus
which was in immediate connexion with this wall, and
kept it in their own hands, compelling all to unload there
the corn that came into the harbour, and what they had
in stock, and to take it out from thence when they sold it.
These measures had long provoked the murmurs of
Theramenes, and when the envoys returned from Lace-
daemon without having effected any general pacification,
he affirmed that this wall was like to prove the ruin of
the state. At this moment forty-two ships from Pelo-
ponnese, including some Siceliot and Italiot vessels from
Locri and Tarentum, had been invited over by the
Euboeans and were already riding off Las in Laconia
preparing for the voyage to Euboea, under the command
of Agesandridas, son of Agesander, a Spartan. Thera-
menes now affirmed that this squadron was destined not
so much to aid Euboea as the party fortifying Eetionia,
and that unless precautions were speedily taken the city
would be surprised and lost. This was no mere calumny,
there being really some such plan entertained by the
accused. Their first wish was to have the oligarchy
without giving up the empire ; failing this to keep their
ships and walls and be independent ; while, if this also
were denied them, sooner than be the first victims of the
restored democracy, they were resolved to call in the
enemy and make peace, give up their walls and ships,
and at all costs retain possession of the government, if
their lives were only assured to them.

6o2 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [92

BOOK For this reason they pushed forward the construction

■ of their work with posterns and entrances and means of

ac. 411- introducing the enemy, being eager to have it finished in
nation of time. Meanwhile the murmurs against them were at first
nichus" confined to a few persons and went on in secret, until
Phrynichus, after his return from the embassy to Lace-
daemon, was laid wait for and stabbed in full market
by one of the PeripoU^ falling down dead before he
had gone far from the council chamber. The assassin
escaped ; but his accomplice, an Argive, was taken and
put to the torture by the Four Hundred, without their
being able to extract from him the name of his employer,
or anything further than that he knew of many men
who used to assemble at the house of the commander of
the PeripoR and at other houses. Here the matter was
allowed to drop. This so emboldened Theramenes and
Aristocrates and the rest of their partisans in the Four
Hundred and out of doors, that they now resolved to act.
For by this time the ships had sailed round from Las,
and anchoring at Epidaurus had overrun -£gina ; and
Theramenes asserted that, being bound for Euboea, they
would never have sailed in to jEgina and come back to
anchor at Epidaurus, unless they had been invited to come
to aid in the designs of which he had always accused the
government. Further inaction had therefore now become
impossible. In the end, after a great many seditious
harangues and suspicions, they set to work in real earnest.
The heavy infantry in Pirseus building the wall in Eetionia,
among whom was Aristocrates, a colonel, with his own
tribe, laid hands upon Alexicles, a general under the
oligarchy and the devoted adherent of the cabal, and took
him into a house and confined him there. In this they
were assisted by one Hermon, commander of the PeripoU
in Munychia, and others, and above all had with them
the great bulk of the heavy infantry. As soon as the
news reached the Four Hundred, who happened to be

92] FALL OF THE FOUR HUNDRED 603

litting in the council chamber, all except the disaffected CHAP.

wished at once to go to the posts where the arms were, "

and menaced Theramenes and his party. Theramenes B.C. 4,,.
defended himself, and said that he was ready immediately menes'
to go and help to rescue Alexicles ; and taking with him JJp^^
one of the generals belonging to his party, went down to outbreak
Piraeus, followed by Aristarchus and some young men of the piraeus.
cavalry. All was now panic and confusion. Those in
the city imagined that Piraeus was already taken and the
prisoner put to death, while those in Piraeus expected
every moment to be attacked by the party in the city.
The older men, however, stopped the persons running up
and down the town and making for the stands of arms ;
and Thucydides the Pharsalian, Proxenus of the city,
came forward and threw himself in the way of the rival
factions, and appealed to them not to ruin the state, while
the enemy was still at hand waiting for his opportunity,
and so at length succeeded in quieting them and in keeping
their hands off each other. Meanwhile Theramenes came
down to Pirsus, being himself one of the generals, and
raged and stormed against the heavy infantry, while
Aristarchus and the adversaries of the people were angry
in right earnest. Most of the heavy infantry, however,
went on with the business without faltering, and asked
Theramenes if he thought the wall had been constructed
for any good purpose, and whether it would not be better
that it should be pulled down. To this he answered that
if they thought it best to pull it down, he for his part
agreed with them. Upon this the heavy infantry and a
number of the people in Piraeus immediately got up on the
fortification and began to demolish it. Now their cry
to the multitude was that all should join in the work who
wished the Five Thousand to govern instead of the Four
Hundred. For instead of saying in so many words *all
who wished the commons to govern,' they still disguised
themselves under the name of the Five Thousand ; being

6o4 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [93,94

BOOK afraid that these might really exist, and that they might
* be speaking to one of their number and get into trouble

Adv'anV* '^^°^Sb ignorance. Indeed this was why the Four Hun-
of the dred neither wished the Five Thousand to exist, nor to

^**from ^^^^ '^ known that they did not exist ; being of opinion

Piraus. that to give themselves so many partners in empire would
be downright democracy, while the mystery in question
would make the people afraid of one another.

The next day the Four Hundred, although alarmed,
nevertheless assembled in the council chamber, while the
heavy infantry in Piraeus, after having released their
prisoner Alexicles and pulled down the fortification, went
with their arms to the theatre of Dionysus, close to
Munychia, and there held an assembly in which they
decided to march into the city, and setting forth accord-
ingly halted in the Anaceunx Here they were joined by
some delegates from the Four Hundred, who reasoned
with them one by one, and persuaded those whom they
saw to be the most moderate to remain quiet themselves,
and to keep in the rest ; saying that they would make
known the Five Thousand, and have the Four Hundred
chosen from them in rotation, as should be decided by the
Five Thousand, and meanwhile entreated them not to
ruin the state or drive it into the arms of the enemy.
After a great many had spoken and had been spoken to,
the whole body of heavy infantry became calmer than
before, absorbed by their fears for the country at large,
and now agreed to hold upon an appointed day an
assembly in the theatre of Dionysus for the restoration of
concord.

When the Hay came for the assembly in the theatre,
and they were upon the point of assembling, news arrived
that the forty-two ships under Agesandridas were sailing
from Megara along the coast of Salamis. The people
to a man now thought that it was just what Thcramenos
ind his party had so often said, that the ships were

95] FALL OF THE FOUR HUNDRED 605

sailing to the fortification, and concluded that they had CHAP.

done well to demolish it. But though it may possibly "

have been by appointment that Agesandridas hovered B.C. 411.
about Epidaurus and the neighbourhood, he would also nes?an°
naturally be kept there by the hope of an opportunity |^®^ **
arising out of the troubles in the town. In any case the
Athenians, on receipt of the news, immediately ran down
in mass to Piraeus, seeing themselves threatened by the
enemy with a worse war than their war among themselves,
not at a distance, but close to the harbour of Athens.
Some went on board the ships already afloat, while others
launched fresh vessels, or ran to defend the walls and the
mouth of the harbour.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesian vessels sailed by, and
rounding Sunium anchored between Thoricus and Prasias,
and afterwards arrived at Oropus. The Athenians^ with
revolution in the city, and unwilling to lose a moment in
going to the relief of their most important possession (for
Euboea was everything to them now that they were shut
out from Attica), were compelled to put to sea in haste
and with untrained crews, and sent Thymochares with
some vessels to Eretria. These upon their arrival, with
the ships already in Euboea, made up a total of thirty-six
vessels, and were immediately forced to engage. For
Agesandridas, after his crews had dined, put out from
Oropus, which is about seven miles from Eretria by sea ;
and the Athenians, seeing him sailing up, immediately
began to man their vessels. The sailors, however, instead
of being by their ships, as they supposed, were gone away
to purchase provisions for their dinner in the houses in the
outskirts of the town ; the Eretrians having so arranged
that there should be nothing on sale in the market-place,
in order that the Athenians might be a long time in man-
ning their ships, and the enemy's attack taking them by
surprise, might be compelled to put to sea just as they
were. A signal also was raised in Eretria to give thena

6o6 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [96

BOOK notice in Oropus when to put to sea. The Athenians,
Yilf' forced to put out so poorly prepared, engaged off the
B.C 411. harbour of Eretria, and after holding their own for some
of Se little while notwithstanding, were at length put to flight
fl^^^t and ^°^ chased to the shore. Such of their number as took
revolt of refuge in Eretria, which they presumed to be friendly
Euboe*. ^Q them, found their fate in that city, being butchered by
the inhabitants ; while those who fled to the Athenian fort
m the Eretrian territory, and the vessels which got to
Chalcis, were saved. The Peloponnesians, after taking
twenty-two Athenian ships, and killing or making pri-
soners of the crews, set up a trophy, and not long after-
wards effected the revolt of the whole of Euboea (except
Oreus, whicfl was held by the Athenians themselves),
and made a general settlement of the affairs of the island.
When the news of what had happened in Euboea
reached Athens a* panic ensued such as they had never
before known. Neither the disaster in Sicily, great as it
seemed at the time, nor any other had ever so much
alarmed them. The camp at Samos was in revolt ; they
had no more ships or men to man them ; they were at dis-
cord among themselves and might at any moment come to
blows ; and a disaster of this magnitude coming on the top
of all, by which they lost their fleet, and worst of all
Euboea, which was of more value to them than Attica,
could not occur without throwing them into the deepest
despondency. Meanwhile their greatest and most immedi-
ate trouble was the possibility that the enemy, emboldened
by his victory, might make straight for them and sail
against Piraeus, which they had no longer ships to defend ;
and every moment they expected him to arrive. This,
with a little more courage, he might easily have done, in
which case he would either have increased the dissensions
of the city by his presence, or if he had stayed to besiege
it have compelled the fleet from Ionia, although the enemy
of the oligarchy, to come to the rescue of their country

97,98] FALL OF THE FOUR HUNDRED 607

and of their relatives, and in the meantime would have be- CHAP,
come master of the Hellespont, Ionia, the islands, and of ^^^^'
everything as far as Euboea, or, to speak roundly, of the B.C. 4.11.
whole Athenian empire. But here, as on so many other Hundred^
occasions, the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient deposed,
people in the world for the Athenians to be at war with, revolution
The wide difference between the two characters, the slow- «°^«<^
ness and want of energy of the Lacedaemonians as con-
trasted with the dash and enterprise of their opponents,
proved of the greatest service, especially to a maritime
empire like Athens. Indeed this was shown by the
Syracusans, who were most like the Athenians in char-
acter, and also most successful in combating them.

Nevertheless, upon receipt of the news, the Athenians
manned twenty ships and called immediately a first
assembly in the Pnyx, where they had been used to
meet formerly, and deposed the Four Hundred and
voted to hand over the government to the Five Thou-
sand, of which body all who furnished a suit of armour
were to be members, decreeing also that no one should
receive pay for the discharge of any office, or if he did
should be held accursed. Many other assemblies were
held afterwards, in which law-makers were elected and
all other measures taken to form a constitution. It
was during the first period of this constitution that the
Athenians appear to have enjoyed the best government
that they ever did, at least in my time. For the fusion
of the high and the low was effected with judgment, and
this was what first enabled the state to raise up her head
after her manifold disasters. They also voted for the
recall of Alcibiades and of other exiles, and sent to him
and to the camp at Samos, and urged them to devote
themselves vigorously to the war.

Upon this revolution taking place, the party of Pisander
and Alexicles, and the chiefs of the oligarchs immediately
withdrew to Decelea. with the single exception of Axis-

6oS THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [99

BOOK tarchu8, one of the generals, who hastily took, some of
Y^' the most barbarian of the archers and marched to CEnoe.
B.C. 4XX. This was a fort of the Athenians upon the Boeotian
<Sffinoe. border, at that moment besieged by the Corinthians,
irritated by the loss of a party returning from Decelea,
who had been cut off by the garrison. The Corinthians
had volunteered for this service, and had called upon the
Boeotians to assist them. After communicating with
them, Aristarchus deceived the garrison in CEnoe by
telling them that their countrymen in the city had com-
pounded with the Lacedasmonians, and that one of the
terms of the capitulation was that they must surrender the
place to the Boeotians. The garrison believed him as he
was general, and besides knew nothing of what had occurred
owing to the siege, and so evacuated the fort under truce.
In this way the Boeotians gained possession of CEnoe,
and the oligarchy and the troubles at Athens ended.

To return to the Peloponnesians in Miletus. No pay
was forthcoming from any of the agents deputed by
Tissaphernes for that purpose upon his departure for
Aspendus ; neither the Phoenician fleet nor Tissaphernes
showed any signs of appearing, and Philip, who had been
sent with him, and another Spartan, Hippocrates, who
was at Phaselis, wrote word to Mindarus, the admiral,
that the ships were not coming at all, and that they were
being grossly abused by Tissaphernes. Meanwhile Phar-
nabazus was inviting them to come, and making every
effort to get the fleet and, like Tissaphernes, to cause
the revolt of the cities in his government still subject to
Athens, founding great hopes on his success ; until at
length, at about the period of the summer which we have
now reached, Mindarus yielded to his importunities, and,
with great order and at a moment's notice, in order to
elude the enemy at Samos, weighed anchor with seventy-
three ships from Miletus and set sail for the Hellespont.
Thither sixteen vessels had already preceded him in the

100] THRASYLLUS AT ERESUS 609

same summer, and had overrun part of the Chersonese. CHAP.
Being caught in a storm, Mindarus was compelled to run
in to Icarus, and after being detained five or six days B.C. 4".
there by stress of weather, arrived at Chios. Aeet

Meanwhile Thrasyllus had heard of his having put out ^^^^^
from Miletus, and immediately set sail with fifty-five
ships from Samos, in haste to arrive before him in the
Hellespont. But learning that he was at Chios, and
expecting that he would stay there, he posted scouts in
Lesbos and on the continent opposite to prevent the fleet
moving without his knowing it, and himself coasted along
to Methymna, and gave orders to prepare meal and other
necessaries, in order to attack them from Lesbos in the
event of their remaining for any length of time at Chios.
Meanwhile he resolved to sail against Eresus, a town in
Lesbos which had revolted, and, if he could, to take it.
For some of the principal Methymnian exiles had carried
over about fifty heavy infantry, their sworn associates,
from Cuma, and hiring others from the continent, so
as to make up three hundred in all, chose Anaxander,
a Theban, to command them, on account of the com-
munity of blood existing between the Thebans and the
Lesbians, and first attacked Methymna. Baulked in this
attempt by the advance of the Athenian guards from
Mitylene, and repulsed a second time in a battle outside
the city, they then crossed the mountain and effected the
revolt of Eresus. Thrasyllus accordingly determined to
go there with all his ships and to attack the place.
Meanwhile Thrasybulus had preceded him thither with
five ships from Samos, as soon as he heard that the exiles
had crossed over, and coming too late to save Eresus,
went on and anchored before the town. Here they
were joined also by two vessels on their way home from
the Hellespont, and by the ships of the Methymnians,
making a grand total of sixty-seven vessels ; and the
forces on board nov/ made ready with engines and every
X 455

610 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [loi, 102

BOOK Other means available to do their utmost to storm
V_in. Eresus.

B.C. 41X. In the meantime Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet

Peiopon^ at Chios, after taking provisions for two days and receiv-

nesian Jng three Chian pieces of money for each man from the

to the Chians, on the third day put out in haste from the island ;

^Dont! ^^ order to avoid falling in with the ships at Eresus, they

did not make for the open sea, but keeping Lesbos on

their left, sailed for the continent. After touching at

the port of Carteria, in the Phocaeid, and dining, they

went on along the Cumasan coast and supped at Argi-

nusae, on the continent over against Mitylene. From

thence they continued their voyage along the coast,

although it was late in the night, and arriving at Har-

matus on the continent opposite Methymna, dined there ;

and swiftly passing Lectum, Larisa, Hamaxitus, and the

neighbouring towns, arrived a little before midnight at

Rhoeteum. Here they were now in the Hellespont.

Some of the ships also put in at Sigeum and at other

places in the neighbourhood.

Meanwhile the warnings of the fire-signals and the
sudden increase in the number of fires on the enemy's
shore informed the eighteen Athenian ships at Sestos of
the approach of the Peloponnesian fleet. That very
night they set sail in haste just as they were, and hug-
ging the shore of the Chersonese, coasted along to
Eixus, in order to sail out into the open sea away from
the fleet of the enemy. After passing unobserved the
sixteen ships at Abydos, which had nevertheless been
warned by their approaching friends to be on the alert to
prevent their sailing out, at dawn they sighted the fleet
of Mindarus, which immediately gave chase. All had
not time to get away ; the greater number however
escaped to Imbros and Lemnos, while four of the hind-
most were overtaken ofi^ Elasus. One of these was
stranded opposite to the temple of Protesilaus and taken

I03, 104] WAR IN THE HELLESPONT 6iz

with its crew, two others without their crews ; the fourth CHAP.

was abandoned on the shore of Imbros and burned by the '

enemy. j^X, 411.

After this the Peloponnesians were joined by the Athenian
squadron from Abydos, which made up their fleet to a fjjjjj^,
grand total of eighty-six vessels ; they spent the day in from
unsuccessfully besieging Elaeus, and then sailed back to '^**°"'
Abydos. Meanwhile the Athenians, deceived by their
scouts, and never dreaming of the enemy's fleet getting
by undetected, were tranquilly besieging Eresus. As
soon as they heard the news they instantly abandoned
Eresus, and made with all speed for the Hellespont, and
after taking two of the Peloponnesian ships which had
been carried out too far into the open sea in the ardour of
the pursuit and now fell in their way, the next day
dropped anchor at Elasus, and bringing back the ships
that had taken refuge at Imbros, during five days pre-
pared for the coming engagement.

After this they engaged in the following way. The
Athenians formed in column and sailed close along shore
to Sestos ; upon perceiving which the Peloponnesians put
out from Abydos to meet them. Realising that a battle
was now imminent, both combatants extended their
Hank ; the Athenians along the Chersonese from Idacus
to Arrhiani with seventy-six ships ; the Peloponnesians
from Abydos to Dardanus with eighty-six. The Pelo-
ponnesian right wing was occupied by the Syracusans,
their left by Mindarus in person with the best sailers in
the navy ; the Athenian left by Thrasyllus, their right by
Thrasybulus, the other commanders being in diff^erent
parts of the fleet. The Peloponnesians hastened to
engage first, and outflanking with their left the Athenian
right sought to cut them off, if possible, from sailing out
of the straits, and to drive their centre upon the shore,
which was not far off. The Athenians perceiving their
intention extended their own wing and outsailed them,

6i2 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [105,106

BOOK while their left had by this time passed the point of

Y^' Cynossema. This, however, obliged them to thin and

B.C. 4"- weaken their centre, especially as they had fewer ships

^of the than the enemy, and as the coast round Point Cynossema

Atbeni- formed a sharp angle which prevented their seeing what

aos. . f L -J r-.

was gomg on on the other side or it.

The Peloponnesians now attacked their centre and
drove ashore the ships of the Athenians, and disembarked
to follow up their victory. No help could be given to
the centre either by the squadron of Thrasybulus on the
right, on account of the number of ships attacking him,
or by that of Thrasyllus on the left, from whom the
point of Cynossema hid what was going on, and who was
also hindered by his Syracusan and other opponents,
whose numbers were fully equal to his own. At length,
however, the Peloponnesians in the confidence of victory
began to scatter in pursuit of the ships of the enemy, and
allowed a considerable part of their fleet to get into dis-
order. On seeing this the squadron of Thrasybulus dis-
continued their lateral movement and, facing about, attacked
and routed the ships opposed to them, and next fell
roughly upon the scattered vessels of the victorious Pelo-
ponnesian division, and put most of them to flight without
a blow. The Syracusans also had by this time given way
before the squadron of Thrasyllus, and now openly took
to flight upon seeing the flight of their comrades.

The rout was now complete. Most of the Pelopon*
nesians fled for refuge first to the river Midius, and
afterwards to Abydos. Only a few ships were taken by
the Athenians ; as owing to the narrowness of the
Hellespont the enemy had not far to go to be in safety.
Nevertheless nothing could have been more opportune
for them than this victory. Up to this time they had
feared the Peloponnesian fleet, owing to a number of
petty losses and to the disaster in Sicily ; but they now
ceased to mistrust themselves or any longer to think their

I07, io8] VICTORY OF CYNOSSEMA 613

enemies good for anything at sea. Meanwhile they took CHAP,
from the enemy eight Chian vessels, five Corinthian, two ^^^X}'
Ambraciot, two Boeotian, one Leucadian, Lacedasmonian, B.C. 411.
Syracusan, and Pellenian, losing fifteen of their own. the vie-
After setting up a trophy upon Point Cynossema, securing JJJJg^'
the wrecks, and restoring to the enemy his dead under
truce, they sent off a galley to Athens with the news of
their victory. The arrival of this vessel with its unhoped-
for good news, after the recent disasters of Euboea, and
in the revolution at Athens, gave fresh courage to the
Athenians, and caused them to believe that if they put
their shoulders to the wheel their cause might yet prevail.

On the fourth day after the sea-fight the Athenians in
Sestos having hastily refitted their ships sailed against
Cyzicus, which had revolted. OfFHarpagium and Priapus
they sighted at anchor the eight vessels from Byzantium,
and sailing up and routing the troops on shore, took the
ships, and then went on and recovered the town of
Cyzicus, which was unfortified, and levied money from
the citizens. In the meantime the Peloponnesians sailed
from Abydos to Elasus, and recovered such of their
captured galleys as were still uninjured, the rest having
been burned by the Elseusians, and sent Hippocrates and
Epicles to Euboea to fetch the squadron from that island.

About the same time Alcibiades returned with his
thirteen ships from Caunus and Phaselis to Samos, bring-
ing word that he had prevented the Phoenician fleet from
joining the Peloponnesians, and had made Tissaphernes
more friendly to the Athenians than before. Alcibiades
now manned nine more ships, and levied large sums of
money from the Halicarnassians, and fortified Cos. After
doing this and placing a governor in Cos, he sailed back
to Samos, autumn being now at hand. Meanwhile Tissa-
phernes, upon hearing that the Peloponnesian fleet had
sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, set off again back
from Aspendus, and made all sail for Ionia. While the

6i4 THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR [109

BOOK Peloponnesians were in the Hellespont, the Antandrians,

^"^' a people of ^olic extraction, conveyed by land across

B.C. 4"- Mount Ida some heavy infantry from Abydos, and intro-

?ure^f duced them into the town ; having been ill-treated by

Tissa- Arsaces, the Persian lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This

^'foVthe same Arsaces had, upon pretence of a secret quarrel,

^pont" invited the chief men of the Delians to undertake military

service (these were Delians who had settled at Atramyt-

tium after having been driven from their homes by the

Athenians for the sake of purifying Delos) ; and after

drawing them out from their town as his friends and

allies, had laid wait for them at dinner, and surrounded

them and caused them to be shot down by his soldiers.

This deed made the Antandrians fear that he might some

day do them some mischief; and as he also laid upon

them burdens too heavy for them to bear, they expelled

his garrison from their citadel.

Tissaphernes upon hearing of this act of the Pelo-
ponnesians in addition to what had occurred at Miletus
and Cnidus, where his garrisons had been also expelled,
now saw that the breach between them was serious ; and
fearing further injury from them, and being also vexed to
thiuk that Pharnabazus should receive them, and in less
time and at less cost perhaps succeed better against
Athens than he had done, determined to rejoin them in
the Hellespont, in order to complain of the events at
Antandros and excuse himself as best he could in the
matter of the Phoenician fleet and of the other charges
against him. Accordingly he went first to Ephesus and
offered sacrifice to Artemis. ....

[When the winter after this summer is over the twenty-
first year of this war will be completed.]

THB END

PLANS

BATTLE

OF

B.C. 479.

I. First poHtion. oetupied hy rfi« vpponrtA) artniar
JL Second position.
HL Third position

a *■■» Pfrsian* .
h MHHM Miiniians

<f ■■■■ Various ('reek allie

FLAN OF BATTLE OF PLAT^EA

riz:

'" o

- o,
X o

"II . -^ ^ r — n^

SPHACTE^^^

SICILY AND THE SCENE OF THE ATHENIAN CAMPAIGN
BEFORE SYRACUSE

EVERYMAN'S LIBRARY

By ERNEST RHYS

"A good book is the precious life-blood of a master-spirit."

Milton

VICTOR HUGO said a Library was "an act of faith,"
and another writer spoke of one so beautiful^ so perfect,
so harmonious in all its parts, that he who made it was
smitten with a passion. In that faith Everyman's Library was
planned out originally on a large scale ; and the idea was to make
it conform as far as possible to a perfect scheme. However,
perfection is a thing to be aimed at and not to be achieved in
this difficult world; and since the first volumes appeared some
years ago, there have been many interruptions, chief among
them the Great War of 1914-18, during which even the City
of Books felt a world commotion. But the series is now getting
back into its old stride and looking forward to complete its
scheme of a Thousand Volumes.

One of the practical expedients in the original plan was
to divide the volumes into separate sections, as Biography,
Fiction, History, Belles-lettres, Poetry, Philosophy, Romance,
and so forth; with a shelf for Young People. Last, and
not least, there was one of Reference Books, in which, beside
the dictionaries and encyclopaedias to be expected, there
was a special set of hterary and historical atlases, which have
been revised from time to time, so as to chart the New Europe

— 2 —

and the New World at large, which we hope will preserve Kant's
" Perpetual Peace " under the auspices of the League of Nations
at Geneva.

That is only one small item, however, in a library list which
is running on to the final centuries of its Thousand. The largest
slice of this huge provision is, as a matter of course, given to the
tyrannous demands of fiction. But in carrying out the scheme,
publishers and editors contrived to keep in mind that books,
like men and women, have their elective affinities. The present
volume, for instance, will be found to have its companion books,
both in the same section and just as significantly in other
sections. With that idea too, novels hke Walter Scott's Ivanhos
and Fortunes oj Nigel, Lytton's Harold, and Dickens's Tale of
Two Cities, have been used as pioneers of history and treated as
a sort of holiday history books. For in our day history is tending
to grow more documentary and less Hterary; and "the historian
who is a styHst," as one of our contributors, the late Thomas
Seccombe, said, "will soon be regarded as a kind of Phoenix."

As for history, Everyman's Library has been eclectic enough
to choose its historians from every school in turn, including
Gibbon, Grote, Finlay, Macaulay, Motley, and Prescott, while
among earlier books may be noted the Venerable Bede and the
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. On the classic shelf too, there is a
Livy in an admirable new translation by Canon Roberts, and
Caesar, Tacitus, Thucydides, and Herodotus are not forgotten.

"You only, 0 Books," said Richard de Bury, "are hberal and
independent; you give to all who ask." The variety of authors
old and new, the wisdom and the wit at the disposal of Everyman
in his own Library may well, at times, seem to him a Httle
embarrassing. In the Essays, for instance, he may turn to
Dick Steele in the The Spectator and learn how Cleomira dances,
when the elegance of her motion is unimaginable and "her eyes

— 3 —
are chastized with the simplicity and innocence of her thoughts."
Or he may take A Century of Essays, as a key to the whole
roomful of the English Essayists, from Bacon to Addison,
Elia to Augustine Birrell. These are the golden gossips of
hterature, the writers who have learnt the delightful art of
talking on paper. Or again, the reader who has the right
spirit and looks on all literature as a great adventure may
dive back into the classics, and in Plato's Phcedrus read how
every soul is divided into three parts (like Csesar's Gaul). The
poets next, and we may turn to the finest critic of Victorian
times, Matthew Arnold, as their showman, and find in his
essay on Maurice de Guerin a clue to the "magical power of
poetry," as in Shakespeare, with his

daffodils
That come before the swallow dares, and take
The winds of March with beauty.

William Hazlitt's "Table Talk" may help again to
show the relationship of one author to another, which is
another form of the Friendship of Books. His incomparable
essay, "On Going a Journey," forms a capital prelude to
Coleridge's "Biographia Literaria; " and so throughout the long
labyrinth of the Library shelves, one can follow the magic clue
in prose or verse that leads to the hidden treasury. In that
way every reader becomes his own critic and Doctor of Letters.
In the same way one may turn to the Byron review in Macaulay's
Essays as a prelude to the three volumes of Byron's own poems,
remembering that the poet whom Europe loved more than Eng-
land did was as Macaulay said : "the beginning, the middle and
the end of all his own poetry." This brings us to the provoking
reflection that it is the obvious authors and the books most easy
to reprint which have been the signal successes out of the many
hundreds in the series, for Everyman is distinctly proverbial in

— 4 —

his tastes. He likes best of all an old author who has worn well
or a comparatively new author who has gained something like
newspaper notoriety. In attempting to lead him on from the
good books that are known to those that are less known, the
publishers may have at times been even too adventurous. But
the elect reader is or ought to be a party to this conspiracy of
books and bookmen. He can make it possible, by his help and
his co-operative zest, to add still some famous old authors hke
Burton of the Anatomy of Melancholy, or longer novels Hke
Richardson's Clarissa Harlowe, a cut-and-come-again book for
a winter fireside, or more modem foreign writers like Heine
whom Havelock Ellis has promised to sponsor. "Infinite
riches in a httle room," as the saying is, will be the reward of
every citizen who helps year by year to build the City of Books.
It was with that belief in its possibilities that the old Chief
(J. M. Dent) threw himself into the enterprise. With the zeal of
a true book-lover, he thought that books might be alive and
productive as dragons' teeth, which, being "sown up and down
the land, might chance to spring up armed men.'' That is a great
idea, and it means a fighting campaign in which every recruit,
every new reader who buys a volume, counts.

EVER-YMAK!
I- WILL GO

DF Thucydides

229 History of the Pelopon-

T5C7 nesian War

1914„
cop. 7

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
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