The "people's War" in France, 1870-1871

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1 TKS PALL /^.ULi^

5 MILITARY ^^^
SERIES ^^H

4

THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE ^

1870-71

f'Hsft"

THE "PEOPLE'S WAR"
IN FRANCE

-f=>. — ^

JA- SAME SKIilKS

THE CAMPAIGN IN
BULGARIA

1877-78

BY

F. V. GREENE (U.S. Army)
8s. Od. net

THE ELEMENTS OF
STRATEGY

BY THE LATE

LT.-COL. TOVEY, R.E.
New Edition. Gs. net

LETTERS ON APPLIED
TACTICS

BT

MAJOR GRIEPENKERL

8s. 6d. net

THE "PEOPLE^S WAR"
IN FRANCE

1870-1871

BY

COLONEL LONSDALE HALE

" There is for a Leader nothing more oppressive than a
situation that is not clear, nothing more trying than
bands of armed irregular troops, aided by the popula-
tion and the nature of the country, and relying for
support on a strong army in the neighbourhood."

Pbince Fbsdebick Chakles op Peussia.

LONDON

HUGH REES, Limited

124 PALL MALL, S.W.

1904

^

.:4

All rightt reterved

TO MY

MANY BROTHER-SOLDIERS OF ALL RANKS

FROM

FIELD-MARSHALS TO PRIVATES

TO WHOM I HAVE, IN VARIOUS CAPACITIES, TALKED ABOUT
WAR FOR NEARLY FORTY-THREE YEARS, THIS LTTTLS
" SOMETHING TO READ " IS DEDICATED AS A MEMENTO OP
THE ENCOURAGEMENT THAT I HAVE ALWAYS RECEIVED
FROM THEM IN MY WORK, AND OF AN ENDURING CONNEC-
TION WITH THEM, WHICH THEY HAVE ALWAYS MADE SO
PLEASANT AND WHICH I VALUE DEEPLY

L. A. H.

CONTENTS

OHAV. VAQK

I. Introductory 1

II. Conditions of the Second War : State of Affairs to the

End of September ....... 11

III. October 33

IV. Human Nature in War and the " Personlichkeit " of the

German Leaders 56

V. The first fortnight of November 67

VI. The Grand Duke's Detachment from November 14th

to 20th 95

VII. The Second Army from November 10th to 20th . .114

VIII. The Grand Duke's Detachment from November 21st

to 23rd 126

IX. The Second Army from November 21st to 23rd . . 139

X. November 24th 160

XI. November 26th 173

XII. November 26th 184

XIII. November 27th 195

XIV. November 28th— Battle of Beaune la Rolande . . 202
XV. November 29th 215

viii CONTENl^

CHAI'. PAfllR

XVI. November 30th 222

XVII. December Ist 228

XVIII. December 2nd — Battle of Loigny-Poupry . . 236

XIX. December 3rd — First Day, Second Battle of Orleans 251

XX. December 4th — Second Day, Second Battle of Orleans —

Capture of the City 265

XXI. Conclusion 282

MAPS
General Map of the Operations in France 187v')-71

To fact page 1

Large Scale Map of Country round Orleans in pocket at end

PREFACE

In a long course of the study of War I have acquii-ed
quite enough knowledge of the subject to deter me from ever
making the futile attempt to write " Military Histoiy.'"' That
work must be left to the gifted few. So in these pages I
am simply a narrator of some incidents of War, though in
my narrative I have from time to time endeavoured to lay
before the reader some of the lessons which seem to me
deducible from the incidents narrated.

Very many years'" close connection with British officei's of
all arms and branches of the Service has led me to the con-
clusion that urging them to read and study Military History
because Napoleon and Wellington did so, raises in them no
responsive echo. The examples given are far above their
ambitions; they aspire to become good soldiers, but not
Napoleons or Wellingtons. But they will all admit that the
more an officer, field-marshal, or subaltern, on taking the
field, knows of what has happened, and what may happen, in
War, the better practical soldier he will be ; for to those who
know nothing of the past, everything that comes is new and
unexpected, and they are taken by surprise. One night about
Chi'istmastide during the South African War, a piquet guard-
ing a very steep hillside was sui'prised by the Boers, who had

X PREFACE

clambered up, and the camp was rushed ; but if whoever was
in charge of the piquet had ever been at Bude, on the north
coast of Cornwall, and, not necessarily with a volume of
military history in his hand, but with a threepenny guide-
book, had explored the neighbourhood, he would have leai-nt
of the incident of war at Stamford Hill in 1643, when Sir
Bevil Greenvil, with a band of Royalists, clambering up
the steep sides of the hill, surprised and defeated the
Parliamentarian forces on the top, with an eventual loss to
these forces of 2000 men, their ordnance and baggage train ;
and he would have been doubly watchful.

So in these pages I have narrated for the British officer
" something to read "" about War.

This small book does not pretend to be an erudite work ;
so I hope if the aforesaid British officer takes up the book to
read it, he will not think it necessary to sit at a table on
which to rest his elbows with his head between his hands,
and with a pair of compasses by him to measure distances.
Let him repose in an arm-chair with, on his knees, the
excellent map thoughtfully provided by the publishers, and I
think he will be able to follow the nan*ative quite easily.
He will find also that the first time a place is named I have
appended to the name, in rectangular brackets, the distances
at which the place is from important points ; and further, in
those brackets are illustrative or explanatory remarks of my
own.

The English rendering of some of the many extracts from
the German archives will doubtless appear stiff and unpolished ;

PREFACE xi

but I have most carefully endeavoured to adhere as closely as
possible to the originals. On active service, " elegant " com-
position gives way before the need for brevity and for saving
time, so even the best staff officers are apt to write " inelegantly."
So as V. Stiehle wrote to v. V. Rhetz that the latter was to
send off at once his " intaktesten brigade," I have designated
the brigade by the equally horrible English expression " the
most intact brigade."

" Qui s'excuse s'accuse," but, nevertheless, I must say that
probably grammatical slips in these pages may be easy to find,
in spite of the efforts of a young friend who has read the proofs
with me, and to whom I am deeply indebted for doing her
best to persuade me to write English ; but after years of
relating the incidents of War colloquially from brief notes to
listeners, the ti'ansition to communicating them in cold blood
from a study chair by means of a pen I have found to be
somewhat trying.

kATIONS IN F

THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE

1870-71

CHAPTER I

ERRATA

The reader is requested to make the following corrections
•which escaped my notice until too late for alteration of the
text. — L. A. II.

Page 35, line 17 from top, for " 1880 " read " 1870." ^
I. 39. •• 14 •• '• for " on " read '• in."
.. 44. i> 13 from bottom, should read " When Gambetta

assumed control at Tours." .

,, G8. ,, 2 irom top, after "enemy" insert " irom.'^
,, 69. .. 15 » »» for "vf est" read ''east." l- '
,, no, last line, fur " west " read " east."
,, 127, line 3 from top, for ** Roland " read " Rolande."
,, 147, „ 7 from bottom, Note: le Grand Orme is two miles

from Orleans.
,,192, „ 18 from top, /or " practise" wfld "practice."
,, 211, last line, for "v. Stosch " read " v. Stiehle.'"
,, 265, line 4 from top, for " 8 p.m." read " 8 a.m." U
,, 273, first line, for " 9 guns " read " 4 guns.'l

8 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870^71

frequently based on guesses and hypotheses only, and his opera-
tions are then those of blindfolded strategy and blindfolded
tactics.

For some twenty years this scrupulous care of prestige
lasted, and then the German military authorities came to the
conclusion that the s^uppressio veri was not only no longer
necessary, but was now a danger to the efficiency of their
army ; for they argued, and rightly so, that the representa-
tion of the experiences of the ** People's War" of 1870-71,
as given in the history, was one-sided, erroneous, and incom-
plete, and yet it was this untrustworthy representation that,
for a score of years, had been before the younger generations
of the German officers as a guide and exemplar for the future.
To Captain Fritz Hoenig, who had served in the 57th Infantry
Regiment during the campaign , the compilation of a real
history was entrusted, and he was given access to the official
archives at Berlin. This history is in six volumes, of which
the first was published in 1893, the last in 1897, can-ying the
history to December 6th, 1870, the account being confined to
the operations against the Fu'st Army of the Loire. But
there are certain indications in the work that Hoenig was not
altogether free in the amount of information he wbs at
liberty to give to the public. Hoenig's history always will
be, and must be, the starting-point for any study of this
'* People's War," but excellent and adnurable as it is, it
can but serve as the introductory step to the study of the
inner life of the German operations, for as yeai's go by
more and more information will come to light. Even since
the publication of Hoenig's last volume, there have come
before us the Journals of General v. Blunienthal, who was
Chief of the Staff of the Third Army, and these throw a
new light on the subject, much of which now assumes an
aspect very different fram that it presents in the pages of
Hoenig. In this war, Prince Frederick Chprles played, in
the field operations, the leading part. It is believed that for
many years the Prince's Diary has been ready for publication,
hut it is still withheld from all except the favoured few.

INTRODUCTORY

Without that diary, and similar materials from others of the
leading soldiers, such as the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-
Schwerin, General v. Stiehle and others, judgments on the
leading and on the leaders must be provisional only; and
even the narrative is not altogether complete. In v. Maltke"'s
own published correspondence during the war there is some-
times a remarkable hiatus. Still, from the materials avail-
able, much may be learnt, not only of this " People's War,""
but of war in the widest sense of the word, for in Hoenig's
work we are presented with a striking picture of the German
control and command during the period of which he ti'eats ;
and we see that, admirable as is their staff system, and their
system of devolution of i-esponsibility, those systems some-
times failed in difficult circtimstances, as every system
worked by fal liable human beings must fail. With the
three great battles of this war, Beaune-la-Rolamle, Loigny-
Poupry and the second battle of Orleans, Hoenig deals in
the fullest deiiail, and, notwithstanding the great changes
in modem firearms, his accoimts of them are full of valuable
lessons.

In the following pages, Hoenig and his extracts from the
archives, together with v- d. Goltz's semi-official "History
of the Operations of the Second Army," have been taken as
the chief sources of supply for the material of the nai'rative ;
and though many other works have been consulted and
utilised, there is no pretence at composing a military history
from even all the materials available at the present time.
This small work is merely an introductory sketch of a war,
of which the study and thorough knowledge appears to the
writer to be of far greater value to the British officer than
that of the part of the campaign of 1870-71 which alone is
regarded by most military men as the " Franco-German
War," and which began at Weissenburg and terminated at
Sedan. From it soldiers will learn the "seamy side" of
command and of staff work ; the regular army will form a
better appreciation than they at present pcjssess of the
capabilities of the rank and file of even the shortest service

2 THE PEOPLRvS WAU IN FRANCE, 1870 71

defend their country provided they carried some distinctive
murk (If bad^, and had been accepted as j>ait of the defending
foit-ti by tlie Goveninif Jit of their country ; but as regards
the civilians, the decision was praetiadly shelved, and, as one
of iUa delegates, towards the close of the Conference, said :
"'["lie Confereiiiee will^ then, break up without deciding
whetlier ii civilian who destroys a bridge in rear of the
ini.7iders may be shot for so doing." At first sight it appears
ahriont al).snrd to quci^tion the right of any man to tfike jiart
in the defence of his country ; theoit.'tically, active participa-
tion in that defence is not a mei*e right, it is a bounden duty;
whether he shall do so or not is, however, a (juestion of
ex|iedieney. Hinnanitarians» whose sympathies are, of course,
with the invaded people, assert that with the participation of
the non-mi litary population in the w,ar, reprisals enter into
tlu! war, and it lM.>eonies embittered and barbaric \ they assert
that the sulFerings resulting to the whole country in conse-
ipienee are not in nny way counterbalanced by the value of
the assistance given to the general defence. There are also
military men who would restrict participation in a war to the
tjrgnnised arniy only, and on the grounds that the population
out-^ide the army is mi reliable as an instrument of war, and
also, that the mei\' inci-etise of numbei-s is rather a probable
cause of confudon in the tjperatioas than an increase of
defeu.sive strength. But it wkis none of the.^e reasons that
influenced the greater land Powers at the Brussels Conference;
it WHS the knowletige of the enornioui-' increase in the difficulties
to be encountei'ed by an invader, if the resistance is not
confined to the organised army alone. So long as the
opptinents are tlie reispeetive organised armies only, the
sti"uggle is a species of military chess, iu which victory must
inevitably dei-lare itself on the side where the players are the
t>etter, and the pieces are the stranger. There are certain
data, mainly thotse of time and space, known to both opponentis
and on these are based calculations for movements ; sentiment
does not enter into the proceedings or iofluenee them, and
the game is played by profe^^onal experts only. Moreover,

INTRODUCTORY 3

every Fo\ver hiis fur reference i» the pigeon-holes of its
Intelligence Department the strength and compoiiitioii of
the organised armies of its opponents ; so at the outset of a
campaign it know.s the probable strength of its adversary,
and can make its plans accordingly. Rut ifj in the coui-se of
the invasion, the population outside the organised array
hrows itself into the fray, theiH2 conies in a disturbing
element J the composition of which is unknown to the in-
vader, and of which the resisting value cannot be ascer-
tained except by practical experience ; patriotii^ni may work
wonders ; andj moreover, patriotism very often dechnes to
confine its action according to the rules of the game ; so
the situation sometimes becomes very perplexing and
embarrassitiij to the iiivadei'B. Tliis sort of war is a war
of defence carried on by the whole people of the country,
and is therefore denominated a " People's War.^ The
recent war in South Afriwi was a " People's War," and
although its long duration was mainly due to the vast size
of the theatre of war, some of the gi'eatewt difficulties encoun-
tered by our invading army arose from the fact of it being
a " People's War."

Most persons, if asked to name the latest " People's War"
in Europe, would give the war in the Spanish Peninsula in
the early yeai-s of the last century, for it is not generally
known that of the seven months'' war between France and
Germany in 1870-71, whilst during the iirst seven or
eight weeks it was a war lietween only the organised armies
of the two countries, during the remaining five months it
was a " People's War " for the defence of France. This great
campaign is usually regarded as a single war which commenced
with the Declaration of War by France on July 19thj 1870,
and terminated with the surrender of Helfort to the Germans
on February 16th, 1871. Rut in this campaign there were
these two phases, so different from each other as forms of
warfare that virtually they were two distinct wai*8, the second
commencing immediately after the conclusion of the first.
The hrst, carried on by the organised armies of the two

4 THE PEOPLFS WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

couutriesi, came to a close on September 1st, 1870, with the
Battle of Sedan and the surrender of the Emperor
Napoleon TIL and of MflcMahoti'ji army of Chalons ; the
second, in which the German Army found itself opposed
by the French people as well as the French organised Army,
began on the 4th of the same month, when the Germans
commenced their march on Paris, where, on that day, the
Imperial Dynasty was dethroned, and there was established
in its place a Kepuhlican Government, which at once assumed
the title, " The Government of National Defence.'" So
coijiplete had been the overthrow of the original organised
Fi-ench Army which took the field at the commencement of the
campaign, that when, on September 19th, Paris was invested
by the Germans, the only remaining organised units of the
regular army available for operations in France outside the
capital were three three-battalion infantry regiments, a single
battalion from each of three infantry regiments, nine regiments
of cavalry, and, according to de Freycinet, there was only one
battery of artillery complete in material and personnel. Of
dep6t troops thci-e were a large numlier. With every
battalion there was a depot company, consisting of ** the halt,
the maimed and the blind," and untrained soldiers. Besides
these there Mere a number of trained soldiers who had not
joined the army in the first stages of the war, or who, having
taken part in it, had managed to escape being captured.
The depot companies had, before the catastrophe of Sedan,
been collected into three battalion regiments denominated
Marche Regiments or Regiments de Marche ; but in all the
new formations it was in the want of good officers that their
deficiencies were most apparent. It was out of these indifferent
and insufficient regulai- troops that the nucleus of the French
armies which fought during the '* Pcople"'s War ^' were formed.
The resources of material and men in the provinces were
abundant, but the njen were not professional soldiers, they
were the People ; and even when subsequently they wore some
distinctive dress or badge, carried some sort of fii-earm in
theh' liaiidij, and were designated by military appellations, it

INTRODUCTORY

was as the People that they fought against the invader. And
besides all these, a multitude of menj. ordinary civilians, and
of women as well, took their part in the defence. So the
second war was a real " People's War."

The forces that the Governraient employed in the national
defence were hastily impro%'ised ; the organisation of the
defence was hastily aiTanged, and time was wanting for Its
completion. To these causes, and to the absence of unison
of views between the chief civil and military authorities in
the provinces, wan due the eventual collapse of the national
defence ; but notwithstanding the* disadvantageous conditions
under which it was carried on, it brought the invaders to the
vei^ of a catastrophe; and it is iinpossiblo to study the
struggle without arriving at the conclusion that a country
which relies for defence on its organised army alone, and does
not avail itself of the defensive power outside the ranks of
that army, deliberately deprives itself of auxiliary aid of the
very greatest military value to itself. On this point there
are two witnesses whose evidence mnst necessarily have gi-eat
weight. Baron v. d. Goltz, who was an officer of the Gennan
General Staff' of the Second Ai'my during the war. says, in
his *' Gambetta und Seine Armeen '' : ** The war revealed the
existence of forces for wai' that, without that expei'ience, we
should still to-day undervalue"; and Prince Frederick Charlr'^
the commander of that ai-my, when he was in a very difficult
situation during the war, spoke as follows: "The Franc-
tii'eurSj aided by the country, have done the French good
service. Now I am reduced to a waiting attitude, . . , There
is for a leader nothing more oppressive than a situation that
is not clear, nothing more trying than bands of armed
in-egular troops aided by the population and the nature of
the country, and relying for support on a strong army in the
neighbourhood." At the Brussels Conference, the leading
German representative was Colonel v. Voigts-Rhetz, who
had been the Chief Staff Officer of the Third Army Corps,
which took so conspicuous a part in the Franco-German War,
both before and after Sedan ; and he knew, by^ bitter

14 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

cQminatider for his squadron, with which he had ridden miles on
ill front of the I'est of the Crerman ti'oops into the town, the

dinner was prepaifd and laid in the .sqnare of the city, and
"(uiies waited on the visitoi^^. Tlie o|)position offcird to the
Germans, and the fighting against the Geiinaus, \s'ere almost
entirely on the battle-fields. Hut in the second war, patrols and
small ptu'ties seeking infonnation were held Imck at every
village; they carried their lives in their hands; the patrol would
l>e siiot down by a countryman behind a hedge ; and to obtain
trirthftd information was extremely difficult. The officer or
uiilerly, earning a report or an order, sometimes disaiipeared
mysteriously ; a small party of soldiers would^ perhaps, be
surpriised at night by a few inhabitants who had noted dovin
their sleeping quartei-s. When the hostile Armies were so near
to each other that their outposts were in contact, the inhabi-
tants lied freely when asked about the position of their own
Army ; and, observing closely that of the invadei-s, passed the
information on to their own troops. The Germans, therefore,
from want of the necessary knowledge, had no true data on
which to frame their strategical operations : these were eonse-
(juently based on guess work only ; and large forces were
marched off in wrong directions against a foe which was else-
where, or which existed in imagination only. The supplies
of food could be obtained only by threats and force;
hospitality ceased, and every man's and every woman's
hand was against the intruders. The whole country became
a possible battle-field, and from woods, cover, and villages the
advanced guards were met by fire, and had to make good their
progress by force of arms along roads and paths cut across,
baiTicaded, or partially destroyed by the inhabitants of the
district.

And there is one difficulty peculiar to, and encomitered in
every "People's War," and markedly in this war, namely,
the impossibility of ascertaining, except by the test of prac-
tical experience, the real worth of the assistance that the
population may give to the defence. It may, on the one hand,
be merely loud talking and shouting ; perhaps incessant sing-

CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR

•S

ing of the " Marseillaise," *' God Pi-eserve the Emperor,*' or
" Rule, Britannia "" : on the other haiitl, it may mean real,
patnotic self-devotion, self sacrifice. The Germans, with a
few exceptions, believed that in France it would be of the first
kind; to their cost they found is was of the second kind.
Dinbelieving in its realitv, they invested Paris, confident
that the inhabitants would insist on its surrender in a few
days ; the subsequent disposition of their forces was based
on the assnmpbion that their corps could now traverse
France from one end to the other without let or hindrance.
So lar^ detachments found themselves scattered wide apart
about the counti'y, just at the time %vhen they wej"e all
wanted as a conibinetl force at some point seveml marches
away.

But besides the difficulties from these sourees, there vfoa in
the conditions one other gi*eat change, the disadvantage of
which to the Germans can hardly be ovcrratL'd- They had no
longer any Ordre de BataiHe of the French Forces ; of the
hastily-improvised and newly- organ isetl Army.

An Ordre de Bataille, showing the grouping of the smaller
units into the larger ones, and giving the names of the com-
manders and staff- officers, is a necessity in any military forces
as much as is a catalogue of a library for the librarian and the
frequenters of the library. Without an Ordi'e de Bataille,
command, control, and even the conduct of the ordinary
niilitai'y life would be impossible; but, at the same time, it is
a '^' necessary evil."" If a force could but keep the knowledge
of its Ordre de Bataille to itself, the existence of documents
of this kind would be ([uite hannless to it ; but, unfortunately,
the enemy sometimes gets hold of a copy, or he learns the
contents, or he even manages to construct one himself; and
then the Ordre de Bataille is a great assistance to him in
adapting his plans to meet and counteract those of his
opponent. The Ordre de Bataille enables him to com]mre
his resources in nien and materiel with those of his foes. And
the capture of even a single private soldier wearing some dis-
tinctive button or badge will, perhaps, on i-eference to the

1 6 THE PEOPLES WAH IN FRANCE, 1870^71

Ordre de Bataille, reveal to him the brigade, division, or even
army corps in front of him.

In the first war the Germans, when entering upon it, and
during all the time it lasted, knew the organisation, compo-
aition, and strength of the French forces opposed to them-
Previous to its outbreak, the Intelligence Branch of the German
Array had obtained full information as to the French Army
that would take the field. Very few ti"oops had, however,
formed part, of an army or army corps in peace, but from the
newspapers were gathered the numbers of nnraerous regiments
coming from different parts of France, and suppositional
combinations of them were formed^ based on the gi'ouping of
the troops in the peace garrisons. On this data an Ordre de
Bataille was compiled, which was communicated to the Army
on July 24, and which was afterwards found to require but
few unimportant alterations to be perfectly eoiTcct. The places
where the several corps were collecting were soon known -
The names of the different corps conimandei"s, and the strength
of their corps in infantry divisions were correctly known.
Very few mistakes were made in the names of the division and
brigade comniandei's, and in the numbers of the regiments
composing these units. Consequently, the German Staff,
knowing where the French Array was, and what it was, were
able to forecast its probable lines of advance, its strategy if it
took the offensive, and to prepare their own plans to meet it ;
whilst if the French remained on the defensive, the Germans,
knowing beforehand what it was they would have to fight and
its position, could arrange their dispositions for attack to the
best advantage.

But almost the whole of the French Array that had taken
the field at the commencement of the war were now either
prisoners or in invested fortresses. One Army Corps, the
13th, which was formed in August, had, after advancing
towards Sedan, regained the capital, where had been
formed a little later the 14th Army Corps.

In the second war, the French Army in the field was a new
army that had not been in existence during the first war. It

CONTHTTONS OF THE SECOND WAR

17

was improvised after the Battle of Sedan. From small
beginnings it acliievetl vast proportions ; and, notwitlii§tanding
all the efforts of the Intelligence Branch of the German Army,
Tery little reliable information as to its strength, composition,
and distribution was ever obtained, at all events during the
critical period of the second war, the months of October and
November, and the first few days of December ; so that,
contrary to the Germans' experience of the first war, they
sometimes were totally ignorant of what they had to fight, or
where it was. The errors they committed in consequence
were of the gravest character.

The first war had been for the Germans a continnous and
itninterruptcd series of successes ; the path to victory had
been, if not easy, at all events very smooth : in the second
war the whole scene changes. The first war was, so far as
fighting was concerned, finished in little moi-e than a month ;
the second war dragged on its weary course for nearly five
months. So intense and continuous was the fighting in the
former that of the total casualties of the whole campaign,
close on 130,000, it claimed the larger portion — 73,000. The
leading in the fii-st war, whether the leading of Armies, Army
Corps, or Divisions was plain and simple, since for the leading
there was always a definite and recognisable objective, the
enemy in front in the field ; but in the second war it was
not always easy or even possible to select an objective, or
even to be sure of the existence of the objective aimed at ; so
the leading became difficult, and it not infrequently went
altogether astray, and to snch an extent that e\'en some of
the larger units escaped defeat and destruction by a hair'^s
breadth only. And, as was inevitable, there came with the
diflSculties and dangers, dissensions among the leadei-s. Also,
during the first war, there was in progress but one campaign
in the field, that against the Emperor's Army ; during the
critical period of the second, there were being can-ied on
simultaneously, one in the North- West of France against the
Army of the North, one in the South-East against the Army
of the East, one to the South against the First Army of the

i8 THE FEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

Loire, and it may be added that the Germans carried out to
the West, at the same time, a campaign Against an Army of
only a very shadowy character, the "Anny of the West."
Besides these camjwigns, they had on their hands the siege of
Belfort in tlie East, and the Investment of Paris, L.ater on
came the campaign of le Mans, in lieu of that on the Loire,
but by that time the stress of danger had gone by- l^he
decisive period of the whole campaign was that dealt with
here; the ultimate issue of the whole cani|mign depended on
the successful coiu'se of the campaign on the Loire, and upon
maintaining the Investment of Paris unbroken ; failure in one
meant, perhap!=j, failure in the other. Real anxiety liardly
existed during the first war, it w^as absent hardly a day during
the second.

Whilst the French Army in the field during the first war
had been gradually undergoing the process of almost total
extinction, the German Army in France, notwithstanding its
losses in the battles, became larger and larger. At the com-
mencement of the campaign it was necessary to make
provision for home defence against a possible attack on the
North Coast, and also against possible reverses. To pi-ovide
for these eventualities, the 17th Infantry Division, which
originally belonged to the IX th Army Corps, was left in
Germany, as were also some Regular Infantry Regiments.
The Landwehr were also organised into Divisions, and there
were also formed Reserve Divisions ; but when the uninter-
rupted course of success of the German Army rendered the
presence of these troops in the Home Country unnecessary
they were brought forward into t^-ance, thus greatly increas-
ing for further operations the numerical strength of the
German Forces in the field. It is necessary now to take stock
of the French Forces available for the second w&t. Of the
remnant of the regular organised Army, as it was before the
war, an account has already been given.

The Imperial Government had, from the fii-st, done its best
to increase its forces to meet the unexpected success of the
invader. And the resources, both in men and in material.

CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR

19

were ample in numbers and quantity, but there lacked
that, without which numbers and quantity are of little
use, namely, well -considered previous organisation. Under
the laws in existence before the vvaxj and thosje passed
in July and August, there were altogether no less than
626,114 men liable for service in the active Army. As
regards guns and artillery equipment, there were enough for
all the batteries likely to be wanted, even for a very large
army, but, necessarily, there was a great deficiency in person-
nel for the batteries. Of rifles thei-e was a vast quantity.
But besitles the so-called '* active Army," there was another
force, only in it^ infancy, but which was now utilised for
service with the active Army • this was the Garde Mobile.

This force was instituted by Marshal Niel in 1868, The
institution was the apj)lication> territorially, of liability to
compulsory pei'sonal service to all men, from twenty-one to
twenty-sis yeai*s of age, who had escaped being taken for
service in the active Army. It was very unpopular in
France, and had made but little progress at the outbreak
of the war. The training was of the most meagre charac-
ter, and the choice of officers wa.% at one time during
the war, left to the men. The military value of the Garde
Mobile was determined mainly by the characteristics of the
population whence they were drawn. Those of Paris were
essentially Parisian ; those of the South-East, turbulent and
undisciplined ; but those of the Loire and Cher were the
peasanti-y, led to battle by their feudal lords : of these it has
been said — -" The whole of the young nobility of Touraine lie
buried before the walls of Beaune-la-Rolande," Hoenig
gives the strength of the Garde Mobile at 6S3,458 men, so
the active Army and the Garde Mobile together numbered
1,S49,57S. Forty thousand marines of no use at sea after
the German Fleet had been compelled to retire to safe
quarter, and 8,000 men in the Customs and Forest Depart-
ments, further increased the total. Of these foregoing bodies
of armed men Hoenig estimates that there were 180*000
either wholly or partly trained.

20 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

The Republican Government opened, on September 15th,
a new source of supply by calling on all civilians from thirty-
one to sixty vcfti's of age to enrol themselves in the Garde
Nationalcj subsequently mobilising them, organising them,
and placing thera at the disposal of the Minister of War.
The Gaiide Nationale was a species of universal service for
local defence. From very eai'Iy times this force had existed
in France, but not until the Great Revolution did it receive
its designation of Garde Nationale, Being composed of
citizens who were not actually soldiers, it played frequently a
prominent part in political dissensions. In 1855 it had been
almost entirely dissolved ; but in 1870, when the people
joined in the defence, the nation demanded its revival.
Although some of the force took an active part in the defence
of Paris, and a whole division was in the Army of the
north, it was mainly in the defence of the localities to which
they belonged that they were at their best. It was here that
they offered real and serions resistance to the invadei-s. The
number available is ^ven by Hoenig at no less than
788,800.

At the disposal of the Minister of War were, at the end of
September, placed the Franc-tireurs, some 40,000. The
value of these depended mainly on the locality of their origin.
Some were a terror to the population ; but the Franc-tireurs
under Cathelineau were magnificent irregular troops, and did
real good service on the Loire. The Corps was from La
Vendee, the men "wei-e Catholics, their priest recited certain
offices of the Church every morning, and on Sundays Mass
was celebrated. Their motto was : " For God and the
Country," and for God and the country they fought and
died.

The Franc-tireurs, the Germans regarded with bitter
hatred, and by every means of severity in their pow-er strove
to suppress them ; and no wonder, for many of them were
men of daring and enterprise, and took advantage of any
little carelessness or want of caution on the pai-t of small
German detachments, or convoy escorts, to inflict damage and

CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR

21

loss on the invaders. Even while the Army was on its
tnnmphant march from E^edan to Paris, the Fraiic-tiieurs

appeared in its rear and recaptured a number of horses from
the small German escort. It was Franc-tireurs who, on a
night in November, surprised the outposts of the ith Cavalry
Division, obtaining possession of important documents, and
nearly captuiing the commander of the Division. They were
like swarms of wasps round the smaller German detach-
ments. Of these V. Moltke in his correspondence writes, on
October 27th : " The audacity of the Franc-tireui^ must be
punished by severe reprisiils,, as the war is assuming a horrible
aspect. It is bad enough when armies have to tear each
other to pieces, but to set nations against each other is not
an advance but a lapse into barbarism."^

A total of 2,126,372 men nominally available, must yield,
except in a nation destitute of all patriotism and all self-
respect, a very fair amount of men at the colours. The
decnees calling up the several classes of men came into the
hands of the Germans ; their Intelligence Bi-anch had at hand
all the works showing the human statistics of France, so it
was easy for them to have estimated correctly the number of
defenders available. The result of their studies differed
entirely from the actual results of the decrees, and markedly
were these under-estimated. It was not that the Germans
were bad calculators or bad arithmeticians, but most pro-
bably, disbelieving in the practical character of the proud
spirit of the French nation, they anticipated that the French-
men who, on hearing the call to come to aid in savirig
their country, would do so, would be but comparatively
few.

The Imperial Government, immediately after the disasters
of Worth and Spicheren, had published an apj^eal to the
country. It ran as follows :

" Frenchmen, — We have told you the whole truth ; it is
now for you to fulfil your duty. I^et one single cry issue
fironj the breasts of all — from one end of France to the other.
Let the whole people rise quiveriug, and sworu to hght the

22 THE PEOPl-E'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

great fight. Some of our regiments have succumbed before
overwhelming numbers, but our Army has not been vanquished.
The same intrepid breath still animates it ; let us support it.
To a momentarily successful audacity, we will oppose a union
which conquers destiny- Let us fall back upon ourselves, and
our invaders Khali hm-l themselves against a rampart of human
breasts. As in 1792 and at Sebastopolj let our reverses be
the school of our victories. It would be a crime to doubt
for an instant the safety of our country, and a greater still
not to do our pai-t to secure it. Up I then, up ! and you
inhabitants of the Centre, the North and the South, upon
whom the burden of the war does not fall, hasten with
unanimous enthusiasm to the help of your brethren of the
East. Let France, united in success, be more united still
under trial ; and may God bless our arms ! ^ Th&se are words
and nothing more.

Immediately after the new Government came into power,
Gambetta sent to the prefetis of the eighty-nine Depait-
ments into which France is divided the following communica-
tion :

"Our new Republic is a Government of National Defence,
a Republic of battle to the la>;t against the intruders. Gather
around you citizens who, like yourselves, ai-e animated by the
lasting desire to save the country, and are prejiared not to
shrink from any sacrifices."

What a contrast, as thoroughly practical, compared to the
emotional declamation of the Imperial Government ! And
Gambetta showed, in addressing the prefets, and not the
people, that he was both w^ise and far-seeing.

He approaches the people through the local representatives
of the central Goveniment, and reminds these representatives
that in the Provinces they are the delegates who will be the
instruments of that Government in organising and conducting
in the Provinces the National Defence, and he looks forwartl
to the Provinces taking part in the campaign against the
invader. The idea embodied in the saying ** Paris is France"'
was acting powerfully at this, time in the minds of the leadei-s

(CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR

23

on both sides. Tlie capture of PsLiis was the one aim of

V. Moltke — as of supreme importance. Within Paris itself,
the defence of the capital, and the concentration there of the
mihtary force of the country, took a strung hold, almost to
tlie complete exclusion of the consideration of any part that
the rest of the country could take in the continuation of the
struggle, Gambetta was always opposed to these vievis. He
gaid : " Only one thing was thought of, naniely, to defend
Paris ; and this idea became so exclusive that nothing was
thought of but Paris ; I even found that the rest of the
country was somewhat forgotten. It was believed that Paris
alone would not only be able to set herself free, but to drive
away the invader," General Trochu, who became the head
of the Government in Paris, and General Chanzy, who after-
wards played a prominent part in the war, also deprecated
this attributing to Paris such a monopoly of the National
Defence. The new Government deterjnined that it was at
Paris it ought to remain. It was decided, therefore, to re-
present in the Provinces the central Government by means
of a delegation of its memberfi, which established itself at
Tours, 120 miles from Paris, on the Ix>ire, Mons, Cremieux,
a barrister, who was the chief of the delegation, was seventy-
four yeai-s. of age ; Mons. Glais-Bizoin, also a barrister, was
seventy years old, and Vice-Adiiiiral Fourichon, who com-
bined the Ministries of Marine and War, was comparatively
young, sixty -one years of age. This delegation could hardly
possess the physical and mental amount of vigour necessary
for governing all France, less Paris, so until Gambetta,
escaping from Pai'is in a balloon, aiTived at Tours on
October 9th, and practically superseded the delegation, little
progress was made in utilising the enormous resources which
existed in the Provinces.

As already stated, the march to Paris began on Sep-
tember 4th, and it was on the 19th that the German Army,
marching with its front covered by the Cavalry Divisions,
arrived before the capital, and took up positions forming a
complete circle of investment. To the Army of the Meusc

24 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE,

was assigned the noi'thein semicircle ; the Third Army taking
charge of the southern semicircle. The Royal Hcad(|uartersj
and those of the Thiitl Aniiy were very soon established at
Versailles — six miles south-west of the enceinte of the forti-
ficationH. The artillery park was at Villacoublay^ four miles
east of Vcr8ainei<, on the main road. From the Seine below
Paris, the Guard and Saxon Cavah'y Divisions guaiiied the
rear of the northern semicircle; and, starting from the same
point, the 5th, 6th» 4th, and 2nd Cavalry Divisions guarded
the southern line.

But September 10th marks the close of a period, of which
one of the most proniinent characteristics had been the
marvellous mobilitv of the German host that had entei-ed
France. Immediately after the battle of Worth, as has been
already mentionedj the Baden Field Division was despatchetl
to Strassburg, and ceased to he a force on the move in the
Held ; the rest of the Germans moved rapidly on ; but after
the battle of Gravelotte, a very large |K>rtion was detached
from it and became an immobile force round Metz. From
Me tz, by Sedan, the reniaimler tramped on to the capital,
and when they had completely formetl the inviting cii-cle,
there was no longer any mobile force of Germans in France
— one and all of them had become iunnobile. For the success
of an invasion, no attitude that the invader may assume is
more fraught with possible dangers in the future than is the
cessation or the sus^peiision of his onward cai-eer. Not merely
is time afforded to the invaded for fresh pi-eparations for
defence, but the prestige inherent in the continued offensive
is lost ; the invaded have time to recover their self-possession
and their moral ; and they attribute to the invader either
exhaustion arising from his previous efforts, or an acknow-
ledgment of inability to pui-sne his t-ai-eer of victory owing to
the numerical weakness of his forces.

Although by tiegrees the Germans wei-e able to put large
forces again into the (ield, yet, as will appuar in tlie course of
this narmtive, it ^^as no less a period than ten weeks that
France was given to make, undisturbed by the Germans, her

CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR

25

preparations in the Provinces for a renewal of the struggle ;

and this fact alone, not merely justifiesj but compels, us to
regard the second phase of the campaign as a new and second
war. There was no truce between the belligerents, but in
the subjugation of lYance, there was almost a suspension of
arms. Energetically and persistently did the French work
at their preparations for defence duritjg the last seven of
those ten weeks, but of the natuj'e, character^ and extent of
those preparations the Germans were able to learn but little.
The amount of French territory in actual occupation by the
invader was comparatively veiy small, and the nation did its
best to prevent these Germans seeing or learning what was
going on outside the limits of the occupied territory ; but
from the large and extensive unoccupied teiTitory, there was
telegraphic communication with the rest of the world through
Spain, Switzerland, and Belgium, whibt the outlets along the
coast-line were many and open. It seems strange, thereforcj
not that the Germans on French soil should have been ignorant
of w^hat was taking [jlace close at hand, but that the German
Government at Heriin should not, by means of spies and
similar devices, have obtained from the unoccupied territory
itself full information of what w^as taking jilace there. When,
at the end of September, Strasshurg fell, the German troops
hitherto employed in the siege took the field, but were com-
pelled to remain in Eastern and South-Eastern France to
guard the main German line of communication against attacks
from tiiese districts. Under any circumstances, this was their
natural sphere of action, but it was later on when, at the end
of October, the sun-euder of Metz set free the First and Second
Armies, and in the middle of November, when a large force
from the troops investing Paris became available for service
in the field, that tlie want of knowledge told so against the
Germans ; and some 100,000 men were despatched in direc-
tions away from the main scene of the jireparations for the
National Defence ; mistakes only possible to be retiieved
through errors and misleading on the French side.

Whether the Germans were wise in determining to continue

36 THE PEOrLE^S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

at once the invasion after Sedan, or whether Paris should
have been selected as the next objective is one of those deep
political and military problems which may afford a .subject
for never-ending discussion among students of war. Mr.
O'Connor Mon'is, in his " Life of v. Moltke," deab with the
question with great ability. But, whether the decisions were
right or wrong, there cannot be the very slightest doubt that
the beliefs on which they were based were absolutely false,
and that consequently tlie Germans soon found themselves
confronted by a situation totally unexpected, and they became
involved in a prolonged war of a character of which they had
no previous experience, and with which they knew not how
to deal effectively.

The erroneous views with which v. Moltke entered on the
second war were : a disbelief that France, as a nation, would
continue the struggle after the terrible defeats inflicted on
her, and, therefore, that Paris would surrender as soon as
she found herself cut off from the outer world, and with
the prospect of hunger before her ; further, that m Paris was
said to be France, France without Paris would be helpless.
But there arose, as regards the future of this campaign, a
division of opinion at the Royal Headquarters of theGernmn
Army, inmiediately after Sedan. V'. Moltke and his immediate
associates disbelieved in French practical patriotism, and
anticipated a speedy ending of the war ; on the other hand,
Bismark, v, Roon the ^Minister of War, R-inee Fi*ederick
Charles, and the King himself, greatly doubted that the pride
of the French would allow them to yield a speedy submission,
and they anticipated therefore a prolongation of the war.
Mr. O'Connor Morris says: ** Like most soldiers, v. Moltke
had little faith in moral power in conflict with material force ;
he had a rooted dislike and contempt for Frenchmen, and he
did not believe that France w-ould make a real effort to
vindicate her great name^ and to oppose the invader . . .
Omniscience is not given to the children of men.""

On September 6th, v. Roon wrote : " Whether, old as I am,
1 shall live to see the end of the war is indeed a matter of

CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAH

27

indifference, but I doubt it."** But for some time after the
investment was completed, the optimist spirit prevailed at
Versailles, and there was no anxiety as to the future. Eight
days was the limit of endurance' first accepted. V. Moltke
believed that the Parisians would surrender ** if they had
no fresh milk " ; both he and v. Roon calculated fourteen
days as the extremity of endurance ; on September Slst, v.
Moltke wrote : " Dear Adolph, — I wish that you and yours
could spend the winter somewhei-e in a warmer climate. If
possible I will come too. Moreover, I still hope that at the
end of October I shall be shooting hares in Creisau," On
October 3, Lieut. -Colonel Verdy du Vemoisj one of v. Moltke's
principal subordinatesj wrote : " According to the infonniatiou
at hand, Paris is said to be provisioned for six weeks—
fourteen days of that time have now Glapsed,"' But the
Parisians belied all expectations, and held the Germans out-
iiide her waUa for some sixteen times eight days. It was not
a mere handful of soldiei-s, the garrison of Paris, the six line
battalions that kept the gates closed ; it was the Parisians,
this section of the French People, the French women as well
as the Fixinch men, that by their endurance of the terrible
sufferings due to famine and sickness during that bitter
winter kept outside but held close to the walls of the capital
— those 120,000 German infantry and their GOO guns, and
prevented them cairying devastation into the fair Provinces
of France.

And the Provinces, recognising their patriotism, endeavoured
to emulate them in their practical excercise of this national
virtue, and to render their suffering not in vain. Ere long
800,000 men had flocked to the standards, on which were
inscribed the words ; " Paris is hungry : come and help
her.'

And this obstinacy of the Parisians gave rise outside and
near the walls to very serious inconveniences for the Germans.
Food, in the early days of the investment, was not too
abundant) as the only line of communication to the Third
Army was the main railway &om Nancy, already broken near

28 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

Nanteuil^ whilst that of the Army of the Meuse was by
ordinary road from Pont-a-MoiLSSon. Requisitionitig became,
therefore, all -important. When the Germans approached
Paris, not only wci-e villages found deserted, but aSJ sup|ilies
of food had been carried away ; the French population had
already taken the alarm, and the earlier decrees Itad begun
to work, m the requisitioning parties of cavalry that were
sent out found themselves everywhere opposed, whether when
endeavouring to enter villages or to caiTy away the supplies
dragged from the unwilling owners. Inhabitants armed,
men in the uniform of Garde Mobile or Garde Nationale, and
Franc-tireurs ached in connnon against the intruders. Rut
few of the cavalry carried firearms, so detachments of infantry,
and even guns, wei-e ere long added to the requisitioning
parties. It was mainly in the close and difficult country
lying to the west of Paris that the greatest I'esistance was
encountered ; in the open country, which lies a few miles
south of Paris, the cavalry were able to obtain better results
from their work.

No doubt this requisitioning was not a congenial occupa-
tion. In v. BlumenthaFs Journal is the following entry of
Septeml>er 27th : " I had to talk severely to the Cavalry
Divisions to-day for the very indifferent supplies of provisions
they have retjuisitioned of late, owing to their dread of
the Franc-tirenrs "" ; on the S8th : " Again this morning I
had so much to do, especially in the matter of the directions
which had to be given to the Cavalry Divisions on the -subject
of requisitioning supplies, that at one o'clock I was nearly
dead."

Inasmuch aa every day that Paris continued to hold out
and to keep the investing Army enchained round the city was
a day"'s gain in the preparations for national defence in the
Provinces, the Royal Hcadquai-ters had necessarily to take in
hand at once the consideration of the possible and probable
result of the preparations, to ascertaiti whence and where the
effect of those preparations would fii-st make itself apparent,
and what mea^im'es, pending the surrender of the capital, it

CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR

29

would be necessary to adopt in view of the future. A mere
glance at the map of France would jjuffice for the identification
of the localities most favourable for the preparations.

First and foremost, Central and South- \ Vest Fi'ancc, beyond
the river Loire, and where, covered by the river, was the
great ai^eiial of France, Bourges, having good raibvay com-
munication to both the East and North' West of FrancCj and
Nevers, the arsenal for naval stores and equipment. Moreover,
the importance of this district had been increased by the
selection of Tours, on the river, as the seat of the Delegation
entrusted by the chief Government in Paris with the conduct
of affairs in the Provinces. Far off*, in the South-East, in the
turbulent district of Lyon, was another probable base for
hostile operations. Besant^'on, and the strong fortress of
Belfort, lay on the northern boundary of this district. It
was a good starting-point for any operations against the long
and thread -like line of communications that connected the
Germans round Paris with their own country. But the
vulnerability of the German line of communications, and the
great results likely to follow from even an unsuccessful
attempt against it, do not seem to have received from the
Delegation the attention they deserved until too late in the
war. As France had command of the sea, the district in the
North- West of France, with its fortresses of Douai, Lille,
Valenciennes, and others, was another favourable base of
operation.

But the district which seems to have had special advan-
tages, not as a centre of preparation by itself, but both as a
centre, and as a base of operations in connection with the
Loire district, was that to the west of Paris — the lower Seine
and the country further south. Through Havre, with its
large docks and excellent roadstead, it is connected by sea
with the south of Prance and the rest of the world, while by
land there is good railway connection with the Loire district
by Alenijon, le Mans, and Tours, the connection being pro-
tected from the east by the close country already mentioned.
It lay, also, opposite to the wea,kest portion of the investment

30 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

line, at the numerous bends of the Seine near the capital.
Neither of the arms — artillery and cavalry — in which the
Germans were so superior to the French, could utilise that
superiority to full advantage against an advance from this
quarter.

But a knowledge of the mere places of assembly was of
little value without a knowledge also of the strength col-
lecting at each, and of the extent of the preparations in
progress at each. And here we come to that peculiar charac-
teristic of all People's Wai*s, and strikingly so of this war—
the dense Fog of War which the invader finds encompassing
him all round. Sometimes it is a Strategical Fog. He
cannot tell wliat it is behind that Fog; if there is anything
behind it, he knows not where it is ; and, possibly, there may
be nothing behind it at all. So he knows not whence a blow
may be suddenly delivered against him ; and when he himself
is prepared to deliver a blow, he may strike simply en Pair.
And the very composition of the Fog enables the forces of the
invaded country to see through it ; in fact, it is one of the
instniments of vision as to the movements of the invader.
It is the irregular local levies and the able-bodied civilian
inhabitants of the locality, with arms in their hands, that
give to the Fog» by their stolid resistance, the density of the
Fog. But on the invader's side the Fog almost insensibly
blends into the population on that side—the population
among which He the invading troops. It is an old saying
that ill news flies apace, and what ill news would be of more
rapid flight than that in a particular area in the possession
of the invader there was a ceitain body of troops preparing
to move off into the Fog in some particular direction ? Hence,
whilst the defenders have information on which to base then-
plan of operations, the data on which the invader forms his
plans are seldom reliable, and may be entirely, or at all
events seriously, misleading. But, on the other hand, a civilian
population is apt to form very exaggerated ide-as of the
strength of the forces that may come to its notice.

Sometimes, again, it is the Tactical Fog, as when the

CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND WAR 31

opponents are ftctually in contact. The invader knows not
aught about his opponent; but his opponent knows all
about him.

At the end of September there were in the Loire District
the ISth Army Corps, approximately 60,000 stmng, but a
mere mob under the command of General dela Motte-Rouge,
In the Corps were three Hne regiments ; of the i-est, two-
thirds were ifarche Regiments, one- third Gardes Mobiles.

In North- West France the territorial commander, General
Fiereck, was assembling battalions of Garde Mobile, General
Gudin, with 14,000 armed men, was at Rouen and Elboeuf,
on the Lower Seine ; General Dclarue, with 4,000 men, at
Vernon and Dreux, protected the railway communication
between Rouen and the South. In the South-East General
Cambriels was organising for the protection of Lyou an
army at Besan(j:on.

But the German Staff were unable to ascertain the numbers
at the several centres. A con-ect estimate of the response of
France in fighting men would, however, not have iii any way
alarmed them. At the Royal Headquarters was one General
V. Podbielski, the Quartermaster-General of the Forces, a
bluff, outspoken man, one of that invaluable class of men
who, though they may see the darker side of affairs, express
themselves in optimistic language and treat difficulties_with
contemptuous speech. To the new lencs he applied a term
et|uivalent to " ragamuffins,"" and it was easy enough to find
arguments to support the optimist views propounded by the
general, and accepted, doubtless, by many.

Deficient in tmining and discipline, and with but few
good officers to lead or to staff them, the men could not
be of much value either as fighting or marching troops.
There were difficulties in organising and equipping the
large units into which, for military operations, any great
mass of men must be subdivided ; there were administrative
branches to be organised and pi-ovided for these units ; there
were no generals of knowledge and experience to lead Armies ^
the Government itself, which had been created by the people,

32 THE PEOPLED WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

could hardly be regarded as a Grovemment strong enough to
hold its own against popular anger in the event of the war
going against the new Armies in the field; and a single
disaster might wreck all authority; it could b^ only by
some lucky chance that there would exist suflRcient unity of
thought and action among the new civil and new military
leaders to secure unity of aims and purposes in the employ-
ment of the new Armies in the fortJicoming campaign. So
for the present, Versailles took matters very calmly.

CHAFrER III

OCTOBER

In the early flays of October, disquieting reports I'eached
Versailles from the direction of the Loire, whei-e the 15th
Corpfj was knowTi to be in course of formation. Considerable
activity was apjmrent on the hither side of the river, and out-
side the foreiit which suiTOunds the city of Orlean?* for some
miles. Orleans is only sixty-five miles from Paris. On October
5th, the French under General Reyau had made, with a force
mainly of cavalry, but in which some guns and infantry were
included, a reconnaissance northward from Orleans in the
neighbourhood of Toury, forty-seven miles from Paris. They
wei-e met by the 4th Cavalry Division, under the command of
Prince Albrecht of Prussia (lather), and after an encounter,
the Germans fell back to Etampes, less than thirty miles from
the Capita], evacuating the country north of Orleans. It wa^
just at this time that the command of the French ti'oops in
Orleans and on the Loire was given to General de la Motte-
Rouge, a veteran from the reserve of officers, and who had
seen much service in Africa as well as in the Crimea and Italy.
At an interview he had bad with the Delegation at Tours, one
of the Ministei-s, in bidding him adieu, said to him, *' For
God's sake do something or other as soon as you possibly can,
Public opinion insists on it.*' On being placed in command
he proceeded, therefore, at once to draw his ti'oops forwai'd to
Orleans, in view of futm-e operations, and he took up^ with
some of them, a position north of the forest. On the 7th he
visited and inspected the positions taken iip, going to Toui-s
the next day in obedience to a summons from the Delegation ;

c

3+ THE PEOrLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

but on his return, on ths

nf the 9th. he found on his

evemnj
liaiids work he had not anticipated.

ITie advance of Reyau to Toury, and the retreat of the
4th Cavalry Division, had alarmed Versailles, where the suc-
cessful reconnaissance had been misinterpreted for an advance
ajiainst the investing Army, It was the Third Army that
forni(Mi this portion of the line of investment, the 1st Bavarian
Corps under General v. d. Tann being the reserve. The Corps
was composed of two infantry divisions, each of two brigades,
from which several battalions were absent on detached duties,
a Cuii-assier brigade of eight squadrons, twcj i*egiments of
divisional cavalry, and 112 guns. Tlie nnmerical strength
was about 16,000 infantry and 1600 cavalry- \. d. Tann
was, on the Gth, ordered to meet the threatened advance, which
he did by taking up a defensive position across the Orleans
road at Arpajon, sixteen miles south of Paris, bat as at the
Baine time a sortie from Paris was anticipated, the Corps was
at first posted so as to be able to act in either direction. To
the force were now added the J22nd Infantry Division, under
Mtijor-General v. Wittich, consisting of 5500 infantry, four
squadrons of cavalry, and S4 guns from the investing line;
and the 4th Cavalry Division, 24 squadrons and 12 guns.
The French not advancing, ordera were, on the night of the
7th-8th, given to v. d. Tann to take the offensive south.
The situation had been curious ; for two daya the Germans
had remained in a defensive position, awaiting an advance of
a distant body of an enemy, compiratively very few in number
and indifferent in quality, which had not the faintest intention
of coming forward to attack. The orders now given to v. d.
Tann were to clear the country south to Orleans, and west
to Chartres, forty-two miles south-west of Paris, and thirty
miles west of the great Paris -Orleans road, to occupy Orleans,
and, according to ciiicumstances, to carry on the pursuit as far
as Tours. The 2nd Cavalry Division of 24 squadrons and IS
guns under the command of Lieutenant-General Count zu
Stolberg, was ordered to co-operate in the intended advance,
so V. d. Tann had at his disposal some 21,500 infantry,

OCTOBER

35

6700 cavalry, and 160 guns. Genera] de la Motto-Rouge, on
his return from Tours, heard of the approach of the Germans,
and at once pushed forwaixl a small force to Artenayi four
miles outside the forest, and twelve miles from Orleans, On
the lOthj this force was easily driven back by the Germans to
the forest, and on the next day, v. d. Tann, following up
the French, drove them through the city over the river, and
ot'cupied Orleans, The losses of the Germans w^ere not,
however, insignificant, some 1200, including 60-70 officers.
There was no pursuit beyond Orleans.

The French had not shown any very great resisting power ;
and it was perhaps in accordance with the sound principle of
immediately following up a succesij, and not allowing a beaten
enemy time to i-ecover from a blow, that on the 13th, v, d.
Tann ret^eived from v, Moltke the following oider, which is
here given as found in Helvig''s work : " Das I. bayerische
Armee-Corps von der Tann ira Kriege 18W)-71-" Captain
Helvig was an officer of the General Staff on the Staff' of tlie
Corps, General v. d. Tann was directed " to extend as far as
Boarge^ " [sixty miles south] " the operations of his army and
of the 2nd Cavalry Division, ivhich was now placed under his
ordei's. It appcarctl to be of the greatest importance, for
the further course of the war, to obtain poij-session of this
town and iti> large gun manufactories, and to render the latter
useless,

" Simultaneously with the advance against Bourges, a
demonstration was to be made against Tours"''' [seventy miles
down stream from Orleans], " tht- scat of the Government,
and, finally, it wa.s mentioned in the despatches, that the only
depot of military wagons still in the hands of the French was
at Chateauroux "' [s^ome forty miles south-west of Bourgas].

" It was, however, left to General v. d. Tann to act
according to his own judgment, as the state of affairs could
not be sufficiently well known at Versailles.'"

The form of this order is that known as a "Directive" ; it
gives the operation desired or recommended by v. Moltke
to be undertaken by the commander, but it leaves, at the same

J

36 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FHiVNCE, 1870-71

tioie, full discretion to the latter as to the mode to be adopted^
or even as to whether it should be caiTied out at all.

It was ft game with very high stakes that lay before v. d.
Tann to play, and v. Moltke had left it to his jiidgmeiit
whether he would play it : it meant not ineTOly the eapture
and destruction of the enormous main arsenal of the llepubhc,
but, ou the way, the destruction of Vier^on, whicli is forty-
seven miles south of Orleans, and is the great railway junction
from which ran lines to the north, south j east, and west of
Pl^ance. Major-General v. Columb, the commander of a
brigade of the 2nd Cavalry Division, lias, in his " Diary of the
War," said : " Had the German Army been able to gain pos-
seiision of Vierzoii and Bourges, the vital nerve of the National
Defence would have been cut through." There does not
seem to have been in v. d. Tann any lack of deteruiination,
courage, or enterprise, and yet he decided that the risk of the
game rendered it not worth the playing. A brief account of
the nature of the risk, as Helvig regards it, will therefore be
given.

The strength of the army in infantry had now, owing to
casualties and detachments, been reduced to 19,000. Chartres
and Ciiateaudun, oidy thirty miles west of the road to Orleans
from Paris, were occupied by the French; Orleans, therefore,
could not be left without a garrison, for which at least a
brigade of 4000 men was necessary, thus reducing the active
force still further to 15,000; the demonstration against Tours
could not be by cavalry only. The composition of v. d,
Tann's force was peculiar as regards the proportion of the
thi-ee arms. The number of cavalry and guns was relatively
very large, and these arms had found in the open plains north
of the forest, and between Orleans antl Etampes, full play
against the poorly trained troops opposed to them ; but this
would not be the case in the country south of the Loire.
Bourges lay quite five days"* march from Orleans. The inter-
vening country is covered with large and small woods, ponds,
marshes, and brooks. The general direction of the latter is
from east to west, and they form, as it were, so many parallel

1

OCTOBEll

37

lines of defence. It is unnecessary for an enemy to manaeu\Te
on such ground ; he need only make use of its capabilities,
and follow the natural instinct of resistances in order to
exliaust his adversary, unless the latter can, at once and per-
manently, break down his opposition by numerical superiority.
In this labynnth of lakes and voods, and behind numerous
brooks, the enemy did not need, fpr obstinate resistance, troops
capable of manccnvring ; all that was rctjuircd was only partly
trained men, but plenty of them, and of these the French had
more than enough. To mass the German artillery, or to threaten
tlie enemy^s flanks by large bodies of cavalry, as at Artenay,
lias not practicable ; an open lunge was wanting for the one,
a sufficient space on which to manoeuvre for the other. Both
arms were restricted to the roads^ and the heaviest task fell on
the infantry. The enemy's outposts would be first encountered
tweive miles from Orleans, and thence tlie resistance would be
daily and continuous, and the inf'antrv would arrive before
Bourges greatly reduced in numbers. It Itad been ascertained
that at Bonrges had been already thrown up works for
defence, armed with heavy guns ; the population and the
workmen from the factories were armtd and ready to aid the
troops in ofif'ering resistance, and reinforcements could be
brought up every hour by railroad ; one hundred and thirtv
miles would be the length of the German line of communica-
tion. So far Helvig. The expedition to Tom's (seventy miles)
waji not very promising, that to Chateauroux impiTicticable.
It is certtiin, howtivcr, that had the attempt against Bourges
Kucceededj the National Defence must have taken a form
totally different from that of the subsequent cam|mign on
the Loire, but it by no means follows that a campaign of some
kind in the future would have been rendered imjK>ssible ; and
as, in the opinion of some, the selection of the Loire as a base
of operations against the invaders was by no means sound,
theit might have come about other operations with which the
Germans might have found it far more diificidt to deal. It
was not until the National Defence showed, later on, how
powerful it was, that the effect of the non-destruction of

50 THE PEOPLE^S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

great energy, who threw himself heartily inta the work.
Little, however, was done until Gambetta airivetl at Tours
on October 9th, and then, so writes the Official Historian, ** the
conviction of his patriotism, the warmth of his words gave
the necessary impulse, and made FVaiice conscious of her own
strength." General liourbaki now came to take the command
in the north, and he honestly endeavouied to carry on the
work be;^un by Colonel Farre, but differences of opinion soon
manifested themselves between him and the civil authorities?
and the Government decided to remove him to another scene
of action. Of Bourbaki we read, " His professional know-
letlge had not with it either hope of success or wish to act and
to win. Formerly Commander of the Imperial Guard, he
inspii-ed but little confidence among some of the population ;
his want of accord with the civil authorities complicated the
situation,"' So it may have been elsewhei'e in the Provinces.

On the S4th, another very impoi*tant decree was issued,
placing on the Sous-Prefets and Maires the duty of obtaining
by every means in their power, all information, however un-
important, with regard to the position, numbers and move-
ments of the enemy, and of forwarding it at once to the
Prefets for transmission to the Government. The whole
administrative work of Gambetta and de Freycinet is a
marvel of power, energy and ability.

And here it is desirable to notice how well suited to the
national needs at the time of the issue of the deci-ees, was the
system under which Governmental control has alwaysi been
exercised in France, no matter whether the Government were
Imperial, Monarchical, or Republican. This control has
taken a foiro of intense centralisation at the seat of the
Government, with the existence of a very numerous body
of Government officials, scattered over the country, who
receive the orders from the central authority, and ensure their
execution. But these officials, Prefets, Sous-Prefets and
Maires, powerful as they were locally, when armed with
authority to execute a decree, were themselves allowed but
little power of initiative. At each city, town or village, they

OCTOBKR

5^

were the representatives of the central authority to see its
orders obeyed, but few or no ordei-s could they themselves
give without having fit^t obtained its concurrence and
approval. It has been said that even for some insignificant
repair or alteration to a public building, the local repre-
sentative of the central Government has first to obtain its
saaictiou from Paris. For generations had tliis system pre-
vailed, with the result that, on the one hand, there was always
in the provinces a feeling of dependence on Paris, and a
looking to Paris for guidance ; on the other hand, the oi-ders
and decisions received from Paris came invested with all the
authority arising from custom and tradition, and were
accepted at once without demur. En this sense " Paris was
France,"' but v. Moltke rendered the phrase too literally,
and not in the spirit ; and he seems to have believed
that by isolating in a great country one large city, the i^st
of the country would be paralysed in action. He believed
rightly that at Paris was a power, but his mistake lay
in regarding that power as an attribute of the place itself,
instead of that which was inside the place, the central
Government. And when, first by ordinary means of locomo-
tion l>efore the investment, a part of that central Government
transferred itself to another city. Tours on the Loire ; and
when later on, hy extra-oi-dinary means of lot^omotion,
Gamlietta also went to that same city and made it the seat
of a really powerful central government, to v. Moltke
there remained only the shadow of the '■'Paris that is France";
the substance of the " Pai'is that is France "" had escaped his
grasp, slipped through his fingers and was at Tom's, exercis-
ing its control and influence as powerfully as ever it had done
from Paris in the history of the past. The Prefets and the
whole army of Government officials now simply looked to
the power at Tours, as before they had looked to the
power at Paris ; and they were as active in the time of
war in executing the ordei-s from the former, as when in
the days of peace they had executed the oi'dei's from the
latter. The right objective for the Germans at the time

52 THE PEOPLE'!? WAR IN FRANCE, 1H70-71

was not the titnt-honoured Government in Pari.^ ; it was
the fletlglin^ at Tours, and of this Goveninient, not all, but
only tu'o membeiTi, Gainbetta and de Fi-eycinet, But only
by a spirit of divination could this have lieen known. V.
Blmnenthal^ however^ seems from the outset to \mvt believed
Tours, aiKl the work at Tours, to have been the light objec-
tive. Without Gamhetta, all the grand self-devotion and
the patriotic spirit, the willing suiTender to snfFeruig and
death displayed in this war bv the peojxle of Fi-aiice uiiglit,
under any eUx-iinistajices, have luaiiifested itself in isolated
actions, but it would have been of no a%'ail to produce any
real effect ; it was by the o;reat mind of Gambetta that all
forces which would otherwise lia\'e run to waste ^vere gathered
up together, and their powers eoncentmted and focused ; and
thus was given to the rulers of the country from tlie |>eople
of the countrvja gift, a weapon so powei-ful in its nature that
only the int:apacity of tho.se rulei-s to wield it saved the
invader of " la Patrie/' of ** la belle France " from humilia-
tion and defeat.

One of the fii*st acts of Gambetta was the deposition of
General de la Motte-Rouge, and the ap[K»intment of General
d"'Aui'elle de Paladiiies to the counnand of the 15th Corps;
the formation of a second coi-ps., the Itith, was at once com-
mented. And to cover this formation and, at the same
time, to protect Tom's were utilised the in-egular levies,
and the men whose .sole claim to be regarded as soldiei*s
was that they wore sjome sort of uniform or distinctive
badge and can'ied rifles, and were designated Gardes Mobiles
or Garde:j Nationales, and also the other inhabitants willing
to aid. Thei-e was formed a cordon of Franc-tirein's and
Gardes Mobiles along the Loir from Cloyes (six miles below
Chateaudun) to Moree, and thence south-east along the
northern and eastern edges of the Forest of Marchenoir
(twenty miles west of Orleans) from Ecoman to Lorges, whence
it w^as prolonged due south to the Loire at Mer (twenty-two
miles below Orleans).

And on the 17th the so-called •' Armv of the West" which

OCrOBER

53

has tjeeij already itientioiied* and uhith was destined to
exertise an extraoi-dinary influence on the German stiutegy
to the marked benefit of the preparations for the National
Defence, wan placed under the conunand of General Fiereck,
the Ten'itorial Connnander in the west. It was this "Army
of the West,''' eouijxtsed of Franc- tirem"s, Gardes Mobiles,
Gardes Nationales, and armed inhabitants, little more in fact
than a population armed, with a very .small infusion of
troops of the active army, at the most seven battalions of
regulars, two of nmrnies, seven mountain guns, and a sapper
bat talioMj that affords sut-h a striking illustration how greatly,
in country suitable to its action, the inhabitants n>ay co-
operate in the defence of a country against invasion. The
** Army of the West " never thought of venturing to fight
battles with the invader ; tliat was far beyond its powers ; its
offensive work vvas confined strictly to haiussing the outlying
smaller parlies of the invader that came witliin its reacli, and
to stopping their progress ; aiid in its defence of localities it
createtf tliat Tog of War, a Fog so dense that the invader
could not ascertain, except by the employment of a small
army, what was behind it, where what might be behind it
was, or if anything at all was behind it ; and yet full know-
ledge of the actual state of affairs was indispensable to the
invader as a pi'elitninary to ulterior operations. Not only
had, therefore, the invader to employ force to find out the
real ^tatc of affairs, but in doing so he spent time urgently
needed for other purposes, and eventually he despatched an
army, at a time when its presence was pressingly needed else-
where, to a region where there was nothing to fight. A de-
scription of the theati-e of war in w hich this " bop[ns " army
played so valuable a part, and i-endered such excellent service
to the real armies of France will, therefore^ now be given.

The Eastern boundary of the area may be taken as com-
mencing on the North at Pont de TArche on the Seine at
the junction of the Eure, fifty-five miles below Paris;
thence along the f^ure for a distance of sixty miles to Chartres.
Midway it is onlv forty miles west of Versailles, and at

54 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE. 1870-71

Chartres it is thirty milta from the Paris-Orleans roatl. Here
it leaves the Upper Eure which eonies from the west, and
continuing south strikes the UpjwrLpir twenty miles distant
at Bonnevalj and then for ten miles follows the Loir to
Chatfaiidun its southern point. For a breadth of thirty to
forty niile.s westward of this line the country presents the
aspect of what may be called a tangle of hillsj valleys, rivers
and streams which reaches a climax at Nogent-le-Rotrou in
the heart of the Perche district. The eastern boimdary south
of Paris is not very difficult to cross from the East, but it is
after crossing that the invader finds his troubles begin, 'llie
Blaise and the Avra, tributaries of the Eure confront him
to the north-west, the Upper Eure and the Upper Loir with
their tributaries confront him to the south-west, whilst to
the west he finds the most broken part of the Perche district
and the Huisne River ban'ing his advance. The systeni of
defence was the establishment of certain centi-es or pivots
from which the activity started, and the holding with groups
of annecl men or companies all the roads running in from
the east, and all the principal crossings of the rivers and
tributaries. The district was thoroughly adapted for guerilla
warfare by irregular troops. The troops Mere constantly shift-
ingjbutthe three chief centres selected by General Fiereck were
on a line facing north-east — the left, being Nogent-le-Rotrou
in the valley of the Huisne, where run the railway and
high road from Paris by Chartres to le Mans, the centre
Brou on the 0>!anne a tributary of the Loir, the right
Chateaudun.

The principal road junctions, which also were the principal
as^sembly points of the force, were Bonneval, Illiers on the
I^ir, ten mile^ above BonnevaK Courville on the Upper
Eure, Chatcauneuf north-west of Courville, and finally
Di'eux- At the most important places between these were
also posted groups of Gardes Mobiles, supported to the
utmost by the population, which, generally, at this time took
part in the war. Comptmies of sappei's were employed by
the Departmental authorities acting under the decree of

I

OCTOBER

55

October 14th, to block the roads, or to make entrenchments
for the assistance of the defence.

Under these circunistances the German Cavah'V were unable
to find out what was actually taking place on the important
roads from Nogent to Courville and Illiers respectively, and
on the important lateral road running through Brou from
Nogent to Chateaudun, and the network ramification of roads
from these roads to the rear. If the Cavalry tried to get
ahead by going round the villages instead of passing through
them, they again met with armed resistance. The Cavalry
could report what places and woods were held by the French
within a semi-circle of three-quarters to one and a-half days
march radius ; but what they could not find out waj* where the
main body of the enemy wass, whether there was any main
body, or what this ever active amij was intend. ng to do.
This restless enemy seemed ubiquitous ; now here, now there,
appeai'ed bands of armed men which hindered the larger
German movementjs, then disappeared, and appeared again
kter on to play the same game elsewhere. For the Gennan
reconnoitring parties, it was not deducing the direction of the
march of a large force, by the general dii-ection of the march
of its units ; it was nothing more than noting small units
marching in every direction of the compasn. It must be
remembered that by Gambetta''^ Decree the control was
Departmental : and unfortunately there had not been time to
combine in the hands of one superior authority central control
over the Departmental authorities. This independence was,
of course, a very weak point in the general defence, lliere
was an akseuce of co-operation between Departments, and no
unity of purpose or leatling. 'Ilie cordon was continued from
the Loir south to the Loire as already described, whilst on
the left bank of the latter river, v. d. Tann''s vision at Orleans
was effectually limited by the character of the country, and
the number of hostile troops in that district.

CHAFPER IV

HUMAN NATURE IN WAB, AND THE ' PERSON LlCHKEIT"
OF THE OEBMAX LEADERS

An'D now to what at first sight may ^^eem to be a soiiiewhat
superfluous digi-essioii froiu the narrative, but a digres-
sion dealing with matters apt to Ije overlooked in following
the records of campaigns and Imttles, antl of special im-
portance for the underfitanding of this second war. The
posse^ision of a knowledge of the theatre of war being afsauuied,
the other items of information demanded for a full under-
standing of any operations ai-e, the actual movements of the
troops, the oi"ders for those movements, the reasons for which
those particular orders were issued, and, finally, the dominant
factor of all the operationsj the extent to which the judgments
of the commanders who is,Hued the orders ncre influenced,
biased, aided, or warjx^d by the fact of t)iose commanders
being human beings. For it matters not what ai'e the
differences in the social scale among the leaders ; it matters
not that an in this war, there is on the one side the head of
the Hohen/ollerns, with his Princes, Grand Dukes, Counts
and " VouH,"" and on the other side a Uarrister and a Civil
Engineer ; they are all the ,same in one rcs|>ect, they are
men, human beings, with all their little sti-engths and little
weaknesses, moved by the same little or great motives and
desiiies, and the same petty likes and petty dislikes as is he
who MTites, and he who reads these lines. And sonietimes
when i^eading what military leaders have done iti the field,
and in endeavouring to estiniate approxiniately their work at
its real value, we are apt to overlook how the " professionality "
of these men is in subjection to their exceeding ** human-ness/'

HUMAN- NATURE IN WAR

57

We forget that the niaii is, as a rule — not, however, without
some exceptions — the same whatever the clothes he wears, but

that this *' human-ness " is liable to be somewhat emphasised
when the coat is retl or of khaki ; and, as years go by, the
raore marked, the more apparent becomes this emphasis,
because the older he gets in life, and the higher the rank to
which he rises in his profession, the more free becomes the
play of self, for the fewer thei-e are in control over him, the
greater the number under him who have to acquiesce silently
and without comment in his winihes and his orders. The
genera] who is too cautious to risk anything was, it may be
assumed, never seen out on even a lovely summer day without
an umbrella in liis hand. The general who cannot decide
f|uickly,betweeiii one or more courses of action, never, we may
be sure, arranged his railway journey for a long leave until
after a prolonged investigation of the railway time-tables to
aseei-tain the j-elative advantages and disadvantages of various
routes and vaiious trains. And these habits, these little
harmless habits of peace show themselves at once in another
and less harmless form in war. Whilst of no account in peace,
in war they have serious cousetjuences, for the qualities most
essential to a leader of high position in war are a clear, cool
head, the poiver of forming a correct judgment of the situation,
its real needs and retjuirementsj and of tjuickly arriving at a
decision ; and, further, there nnist be in the mind of any raan
who is a military leader, entire freedom from prejudice against,
or jealousy of the otlicers who ha\e to co-operate \\ ith him,
or who have to execute his ordei-s. When the mind -vvhich
is striving to arrive at a correct judgment is obscui-ed by
weaknesses inherent in itself, and es^jiecially by the weakne&s
of personal likes and dislike:^, the judgment cannot possibly
be right, so armies and nations suffer. It is difficult to hit
off' the right English woi-d which signiHes the combined per-
sonal mental characteristics of the individual. " Personality "
has more than one meaning. The German word " pei'sonlich-
keit,'' tliongh .somewhat untranslatable, seems to indicate
the combination l:^est, and it will be employed here. This

58 THE rEOPLKS WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

" penionlichkeit " in the etiormouii influence that it exercised
oil the German side, as revealed in the Archives now pub-
liijhefl in Hoenig's work^ the prominent part it played, and the
evil it wrouw:htj is one of the most .striking features of this
war. It prevails in all wai-Sj but we are seldom able to unearth
it from their reeord^j. To the knowledge of the"person-
lichkeit""' of soldiers in command or in positions of influence
in a campaign, Hoenig attaches the gi-eatest importance for
the understanding of the operations of a campaign ; and a
studv of the action and effect of it, serves as a warninj' to
those soldiei-a who may find themselves in these positions. In
an introductory chapter to the fifth volume of his work,
Hoenig deals with the subject ; of his views a short precis
will therefore Ije gi'i'en.

The character of the actors affords an extremely inipoitant
asusistauce for writing history, but one most difficult to utilise
and which can only be employetl if thorough and exhaustive
data are forthcoming. If the writer has a pei-sonal know-
ledge of the character of the individual he is portraying so
much the better. Stringent ini|>artiaiity is indispensable.
Since the greatness of a leader depends mainly on the special
qualities of his character, so must the result of all examina-
tion of his practical work depend on that character. The
greatest power on earth is greatness of mind and the power
to exercise it. To exaniine into this is the first task in an
account of the art of war. If one strips men of all their
peculiarities, takes from them all the rough angles, all hard-
uess of character, smooths down all their being to one level,
all are mere cojjies of each other. Ignoring individuality
I calls to mere uniformity in the writing of history. None of
the great men, whose deeds we look up to to-day as models,
were perfect; they had their weaknesses, and tliey made
mistakes, so this brings them close to us as nven. It would
be untrue and most wrong if we praised everything without
exception, whatever they tlid. That is to detract from the
credit of others and to deal unfairly with them. Thei-e is
to^dav, unfortunately, little inclination to recount how a

HUMAN NATURE IN WAR

59

gr^it idea and a powerful resolve have failed ; -who has stood
in tlie way of its idealisation, and what great efforts were
necessary for its adoption. The feeling is utterly wrong.
The conimanderj alone, cannot, in war, think about and give
orders about everj'thiiig ; the work is too many-sided ; he
needs counsellor's and helpers who are at one with him in his
spirit as regards the work of the war. But with him alone
rests the i-esponsibility. Therefore " perwnlichkeit" must stand
more in the foret^und. Why should young people develop
their characters, if we paint all individuals, bec-ause they are
in high positions, as all alike mastei"s of their art and all
faultless i* If every one is a born hei-o and a geneml, then are
these descriptions of no value. Surely it is evident that
greatness is diminished and is brought to a lower level
thereby, " The men whom 1 have described " writes Hoenig*
" are indeeil not always geniuses or great characters ; but an
analysis of them shows that with human weaknesse-s there is
much that is edifying; and perfeet men do not exiist. A
good organisation should so provide in peace that the men
who ai^e to be at the head of affairs suit each other."

And there is yet another matter which must be noticed if
full profit is to be derived from a study of thi* war. It is
the real meaning of the mystic formula *' By Order'' ; and the
conduct of this war mc shall understand but little unless we do
know its meaning. In the German army will be found on the
staff of every di^'ision, army corps and army, an officer whose
ofHcial title may be Generalstabsofficier, Chef des General
Stabes or Chef oes Stabes, according to the im|x>rtance of the
unit. It will .suffice for all practical purposes to designate
them by one counnon title, Chief Staff' Officer, provided that
it is borne in mind that the officer so designated is in no way
the property of the General Officer to whose conunand he is
attachetl ; he is the Chief Staff" Officer of the General^ but he
never ceases to belong to, and to represent at the side of
the General that very important bo<ly, the general staff' of
the German army, of which staff' during the war, and for long
before and after, v, Moltke was the chief.

68 THE PE0PLF;S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

to thp adequacy of the number of German troops to keep the
enemj/bi-eaking out of Paris, and to hold a relieving force at
a distance may have been entertained at Versailles. But,
probably, the French collap!>e at Artenay and Orleans may
have led v. Moltke to accept v. Podbielski's estimate of the
French troops as " ragamuffins," and to determine not to be
alarmed in future by mistaking phantoms for corporeal
beings. And the reports now made to him by his Intelligence
bmnch were very reassuring ; for at the most important
hostile centre, the Loii-e, there were given as between Blois
and Salbris, thirty-three miles south of Orleans, on the further
side of the river, only 50,000 to 60,000 nien^ an erroneous esti-
mate, but inevitable in this *' People's War "" where the invader
cannot go and look for himself, and the population either
hold their tongues or lie patriotically ; erroneous, inasmuch
as on the line from Blois below Orleans to Gicn above that
city, were at least 100,000 men, mostly line or marche
troops, of which about 80,000 had completed their organisa-
tion in Army Corps, the 15th Corps in three divisions, the
16th Corps in two divisions ; whilst preparations were in pro-
gress for organising the surplus into a 17th CorpSj and a
third division for the 16th Corps, But it will be always
more or less in the dark that the German leadei-s will have to
work in determining their strategy and their operations during
this second war. The simple work in open day of the first
war will not come again to v, Moltke on French soil.

To the First Army was assigned the occupation of the
north-west of France towards Amiens and Rouen, and looking
after the numerous northern fortresses. It would thus pro-
tect the northern line of the investment from the hostile
army now forming in the north.

The Second Army, under the command of Prince Frederick
Charles, with General v. Stiehle as his Chief Staff' Officer,
consisted of the Ilird A. C. (v. Alvensleben), the IXth A. C
(v. Manstein)* the Xth A. C. (v. Voigts-Rhetii), and the Ist
Cavalry Division (v. Hartmann). The strength was approxi-
mately as follows:

THE HRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 69

Inf.

Cav.

GuiiB.

III. Corps

. . 16,500

1,100

84

IX. „

. . 16,600

1,800

90

X. „

. . 16,500

1,100

84

1st CD.

. . —

3,000

6

Totji

49,600 7,000

264

fMt

Although the II. Army Corps belon^d to this Army, it
was now drau-n to Paris to strcDgthen the line there. Paris
is one hundred and seventy miles from Metz.

The original oixler was, that the army should march with
the utmost rapidity in the geneml direction of Troyes on the
Seine and the Middle I^oire, i.e., into the centra of France.
The Prince aiTanf^ed his programme of maix^h so that on
November 10th tlie Head-quarters, the IXth A.C. and the
lf*t Cavalry Division should be at Troyes, eighty raik^s south-
maak of Paris ; the III. A.C. at Vendeuvre, some fifteen
miles east of Troyes ; and the Xth A. C. with its outer-
most brigade at Neufchateau, about seventy miles eaat of
Ti-oyes. Troyes ia ninety, and Neufchateau one hundred
and sixty riules from the great roati running from Paris to
Orleans.

On No^'ember 1st v, Moltke wrote to v. Stiehle a letter,
containing a full exposition of the situation as it presented
itself to him. It is here given as reproduced by Hoeeig
from the official archives, and it deserves the most careful
attention as giving very fully v. Moltke's view of the future
of the war at this time. Emphasis must be laid on the fact
of the already mentioned radical difference of the views of
the King and v. Moltke as to the spirit which the French
natio)» would display with regard to the continuance of the
struggle ; so although this letter is a species of " By Order,'*
it gives probably the views and opinions of the Chief Staff
Officer at the Royal Heatl-quaiiers, rather than those of the
supreme Commander. But it will be well, before reading
it, to note some of the distances between the places named
in it.

70 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

Chalons-sur-Saone is distant from Metz one hundred and
seventy railesj the fortress of Ijangres lying on the road connect-
ing them, one hundred and eighty from Paris, one hundred and
fifty from Orleans, one hnnch'ed and fifteen from Bourges.
Boui^s is two hundred and ten from Metz, one hundred and
twenty-five from Paris ; Nevere is on the Loire, thirty -five
miles fi'om Bourges, and is at the junction of the railroads
from Chalons to Bourges, to Gien and to the south. At
Chalons-sur-Saone was a areat iron-foundrv. Nevers weus a
centre of supply of naval stores ; at Bourges was the main
gun factory and small anus ammunition factory.
The letter ran as follows :

" Only the course of events will determine the tasks that
will have to be undertaken by the Second Army during its
advance. I hardly think that it will be necessary to give
support to General v. Werder, who is provisionally in a
defensive position on the line Vesoul-Gray- Dijon [in south-
eastern Fi"ance]. The south of France will hardly make
great efforts on l>ehalf of Paris. On the other hand thei^e
arc three points on the left flank where the most severe losses
to military France can be inflicted, Chalons-sur-Saone, Nevers,
and above all, Bourges, where are the great arsenal?* and the
Chassepot eartiidge manufactories. . , .

" The main object remains as before^ the destmction of the
enemy''s forces in the field, and the speedy re-infoMing of the
forees at Pans, so a.s to render possible the sending out
detachments.

" There appears, therefore, to lie no longer any need for
the employnient of tlie Second Army troops as an army ; one
of its corps on each of the named points will be sufficient to
overcome all resistance."

^Vith this letter was sent the following estimate of the
hostile situation :

1. At Lille, the Nortliern Army forming under Genei-al
Bourbaki, and said to be 30,000 strong, and composed of
Depot Troops, Gardes Mobiles and Frauc-tireui's,

2. In the West the forces under General Briant at lloueu.

THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 71

Depot Troops, Gardes Mobiles, mobilised Gardes NationaJes,
and Franc-tireurs ; 16,000 men protecting Rouen and Havre,
and harassing the rear of the army investing Paris.

3. The Army of the Loire under d'Aurelle, of 45,000 men,
said to have been raised to G0,000, and to contemplate an
attack on Orleans ; " it is the best organised, the regiments
drawn from Africa forming its nucleus.''

4. The Army of Lyons under General Carabriels in Bes-
ani^'on. Tvv^o divisions of field troop.s (Depots and Garde-s
Mobiles and Garibaldi's Detachment, a brigade of Gardes
Mobiles and Franc-tireurs), 35,000 ; objective, guarding the
road to I^yons ; eventually advance towards the Vosges.
" Besides^ during the advance larger bodies of Gardes Mobiles
may be encountered,"

So no one was wanted at Paris, except one Array Corps,
the Second. The total number^ 1 26,000, was fairly coiTect,
the distribution wrong. In one single sentence in this letter
we find the source of all the difficulties and all the troubles
which soon beset the invaders ; the aource of the prolongation
of the war for three monthsj ; the real origin of the campaigns
of le Mans and the Lisatne in 187L That source is the
belief of the man in whose hand.s lay the direction of the war,
that " the South of Fiunce will hardly make great efforts on
behalf of Paris.""

Ere long will the three corps, as a united army, be
straining every nerve to reach the Paris-Orleans Road, to
protect the Investment of Paris against attack from Orleans.
Within twenty-eight days will these thi-ee coips, as an army,
be opposing the first onslaught of a portion of a force of
some 200,000 men, whom not only southern France, but
central, northern, eastern, and western France have sent to
exert their liest efforts for the relief of Paris.

From the foregoing it will be seen that v, Moltke, v,
Podbielski, and their entourages, were totally in error
ill their estimate of the vwrai and the spirit of the nation
with which their own was at war. To v. Moltke's belief
that " Southern France is hardly likely to make great efforts

72 THE PEOPLtrs WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

on behalf of Paris ''' is due the fact that ere long the Germans
found themselves in dtre straife, from which they escaped,
not through the capacity and military genius of v, Moltke
and their other chief leaders, but through the errors and
misleading of their adversaries.

But in view of the obvious fact that the Army of the
Loire was no longer to remain quiescent, v. Moltke determined
to take the initiative and thus terminate the period of doubt
and suspense. So on November 7th the Second Army received
ordei-s by telegraph to hasten the advance of its right wing
on FontainebleaUj thirty miles south of Paris and twenty-five
east of the Paris-Orleans road, whilst, south of the investing
line, a large foree, termed a Detachment (Armee-Abtheilung)
was formed, the command being given to H.R.H. the Grand
Duke of Mecklenburg Schwerin, the Chief Staff Officer,
Colonel von Ivrenski,

The Detac:hment was formed of the I. Bav. A.C., the 17th
Inf. Division (v. Tresckow) from the investing line, the SSnd
Inf. Dividon, and the 4th v, and 6th (v. Schmidt) Cav.
Divisions, and was placed under the control of the Com-
mander of the Third Army.

The strength was approximately as follows :

,

Inf,

Cav.

Guns.

1st Bav. A.C. . .

. 17,500

2,100

118

17th Inf. Div. . .

9,800

1,200

36*

g^ndlnf.Div. . .

9,000

400

m

4th Cav. Div. . .

—

S,800

12

6th Cav. Div. . ,

—

S,700

6

Total

36,300 9,200 208

The instructions given to the Duke were as follows: " By
order of the King to march on an ' expedition ' to the west,"
The object given was to '^ break up the Army of the Loire now
in process of formation, and to compel it to retreat by le Mans.

* Including the 17 th Cav. Brig.

THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER

73

[le Mans is one huiidi-ed and ten miles S.W. of Paris.] If

the 15th and 16th Army Corps are found north at Blois and le
Mans, they may perhaps be driven apart and their re-union
be rendered impossible. A further (subsidiary) object would
be the destruction of the hostiJe communications between
Tours and Rouen, as well as the utilisation of the occupied
territory for tlie supply of the army. In order to make
the communication with the supenor command better and
quicker, the capture of one or two locomotives would be
beneficial. Reports by telegraph to be made ft-equently to
Vei'sailles.''

The Detachment was to be on the IStli inst. facing west in
the following position of concentration for the subsequent
advance. On the rif^ht at Chartres the H.Q., the 22nd Inf.
Di%^ision, and the 4th Cav. Division. On the right rear at
Raniboiiilletj twenty miles from Chartres, the 6th Cav.
Division. At Bonneval, the 17th Inf. Division, and at
Chateaudun the 1st Bav. A.C., less one Infantry Brigade,
with some guns and cavalry, a force to l>e left at Orleans and
which V. Moltke considered sufficient for the protection of that
city. But, here again, the King had shown that his view of the
situation and hi>i foresight were superior to those of the Chief
of the Staff, for later on, as will appear in due coarse, he said,
with reference to the Detachment, " The 22nd Infantry Divi-
sion was sent to v. d. Tann ; I have sent the 17th Infantry
Division after it.'- On the 7th ^ v. Moltke sent to the Second
Army a letter, explaining the reason for his order sent by
wire ; Hoenig gives from it the following extract. " The
faet that the fall of Metz has not induced the French Govern-
ment to adopt an attitude coiTesponding to the circumstances,
leave-:! u.s to conclude that, shortly, a determined attempt
will be made to relieve Paris, A more rapid advance of the
Second Army with the right wing in the direction of Fon-
tainebleau is therefore desirable , , . and the left wing of the
Second Army will remain free for employment according to
drcimistances.''"' It was no doubt annoying to the Germans
that the French Government did not take the same view as

74 THE PEOPLE'S VVAH IN FRANCE, 1870-71

they did, of what ought to be done in consequence of the fall
of Metz.

In the conduct of all businesses on a large scale, there is
bound to be sonio friction among ithe principals and chief
oianagei-s ; and in the great business of war this friction will
make its appearance, sooner or later. Hut in war, so long as
suceess in the campaign and on the field of battle attends an
army, the friction is comparatively small ; it is regarded a.s an
insignificant annoyance only, and is soon forgotten ; it has
done perhaps little serious harm ; but if the tide turns, or is
adverse to the army, friction soon makes itself felt, and gi'ows
to proportions of evil size- And the reason is not far to seek.
Take our own army in South Africa.

Any one who has met and convei'i<ed in private with
senior officers, staff officers, and others, who were in our
army in the long South African War, and has thus been
given a peep belli nd the scenes in that war, must have been
struck with the general testimony to the existence of constant
and, often, great friction, and, soinctinies, of ill-feeling
towards ejich other, among the officers who held important
positions in that canijiaign. It would be difficult to find
any cue who was really satisfied vsith the way in which the
authority,, superior to that authority of which he himself
formed a part, exercisetl its control, llarely will be met,
though sometimes it will be the case, a regimental staff
thoroughly satisfied with its brigadier and the brigade staff;
this, with its divisional general and his division staff; and
these again with the hierarchy at the supreme Head-quartei-s.
Unnecessary interference and blunder -making ai-e common
indictments against the superior by the inferior. And then,
more unpleasant still, ai-e the imputations of jealousy
among tlie seniors, jealousy that interfered seriously with
the success of the operations. The first impression derived
from this disagieeable phenomenon is, that war makes men
vei'y censorious and queer tempered, and brings the lower
nature of man prominently to the front. But this view of
the case seems hardly coiTcet, This phenomenon would

THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 75

seem to be due rather to realisation by sotdiers actually
taking part in a war that tlie work of war is one of the most
serious, one of the ^uvest kiads of work that can fall
to individuals to perform. It is a work of life or death to
tensj to hundreds, to thousands of human beings. And on
how that work is done, whether it is done the right way
or the wrong way, depend consequences fateful to the workers.
So when things are going wrong, or seem to be going wrong,
it is inevitable that minds become censorious, judgments
harsh and severe ; mistakes ai-e no longer condoned ; blunders
neither forgotten nor forgiven. And this disposition of the
minds of soldiers is not peculiar to the army of any one
country or the arniv of any one period of history ; it prevails
in all armies, it has pi-evailed and will prevail in all periods of
history. And so in the second war of 1870-71. The more
the inner life of the mihtary hierarchy, or rather hierarchies,
is revealed, the nioiie clearly do we see that this war was, in
this respect, no exception to the rule. And how different
from the first war, when the path to victory, though not easy,
was very smooth. Even the cautious v, du Vemois in a
remark in his book, when refemng to this matter as it was at
Versailles in the latter pait; of November, when difficulties
wei'c gathering all round, says :

** It lies in the natui-e of things that such stirring and
difficult times do not pass \nthout friction. Nor did we
rcmain free from it in some res|X'.(.:b^. . . . Tlie world need
not know the tiark side of glorious times. There arc too
many pco]>le who love to gloat over this, and who seek to
diminish our pride in the great things which have been done,
and detract from their well-merited acknowledgment.""

But the Editor of v. Bhimenthars Journals does not consider
expurgation to this end necessary, so we learn;, from the
extracts published, a good deal about the tone and temper of
mind prevalent in these matters. Even on August 11th v.
Blumcnthal had written : *' I must admit that General v.
Moltkc has manoeuvred very cleverly so that all are concen-
trated, but I think that he has incon*ect notions of what

76 THE PEOPLES WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-Tl

troops arc capable of, and of what they can be called upon
to do without becoming disorganised."^

But so nuiuh involved w&s the lliird Army Head-quarters in
the couti-ol of the first part of this second war, that we owe
a debt of gratitude to this editor for having so boldly put
before us such a striking picture of the highest staff life at
Versailles.

The first thing that seems to have ruffled the equanimity
of V. Blunienthal was the transfer of the Royal Head-([iiarters
to Versailles, where those of the Third Army were aheady
established. On September 29th he writes: " I do not mind
that '^ [giving up the present quarters], " but the presence of
the King^s Head-quarters will be very inconvenient to us,
especially for nie, as I have not sufficient command over
myself to deal with the many unnecessary and sudden ques-
tions and bits of advice." On October 16th: "From the
presence of the King^s Head-quarters arises for mc a diffi-
culty which cannot be overrated. Reports are requiixid about
everything, and since every nioracut more or less important
repoiH3 arrive, I have always to be thinking whither they are
to be sent, so that no one can complain that this or that
person has received the news not as soon as or even earlier
than somebody else."

But beside personal annoyance to the lower staff, there is
real evil in this close j uxtaposition, for it would seem to be
invariably the ca.se that whei'e a superior and a lower niiiitary
authority ai'e locally near each other, the lower authority
loses its power of independent action, and shrinks from the
assumption of responsibility. If the two authorities are
miles apart, the lower has not the slightest hesitation, when
difficult questions come before it, in giving a decision without
reference to the distant supenor ; but the position of the
lower authority Ijecomes very difficult when the superior is
close at hand, for it deems it often unwise to act when a
reference is easy. Moreover, if the lower does act inde-
pendently, the superior may object, that being within easy
reach, it ought to have been consulted. Anyhow the result

THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER

77

of this reference to the superior leads to delay and waste of
time. On October S2nd v. Bkimenthal wntea : '* This endless
sending of news to the Head-quartei-s ia very tiring, especially
with matters I can only call trifles. Everything comes to
me; something is wanting to be known, something to be
better done, and many arc simply childish requests. It dis-
gusts me with my good position and often puts me in a real
ill humour.'"

And on the 7th of the same month occurs an entry full of
indignation with the people at the Royal Head-quartei'S-
y, Blumenthal had, from the lirst, been in favour of an active
line being taken against the hostile army whilst it was in
course of formation, mther than to delay, and so allow the
formation to be completed. It is evident that he considered
General Reyaa's advance on Toury on October 5th ought to
have been detilt with by a quick offeiisive. On the 7th, when
V. d. Tann was in a defensive position south of Paris^ near
Arpajon, he wTites: "With regaitl to v. d. Tann being
ordered to take the offensive, Moltke fully agreed and gave
his assent J iu spite of the protest of various small minds who
always try to intei-fere/'^

On the same day, with reference to another matter, he
wiites : " To-day, however, everything again has been
altered. Why, I do not know. I fancy that there are
many who want to give their opinions, and to have their
views adopted, which would not be the case if I had the
matter in my hands. It is really most extraordinary that, in
spite of the fact that Moltke and I continually come to an
agreement on certain points, there almost always step in
between us some persons, and the orders are not so drawn up
as I had expected. It may be that he is prevented some-
times from acting exactly as he wishes,"

To return to the *' Expedition."*' From v. Blumenthars
Journals, it appears that it was with him and not v. Moltke
that the idea originated. On October SOth he writes : ** A
relief [of Paris] by a newly-formed array, we need not fear.
It would be months before one could be raised and organised

78 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

tliat could attack us with any prospect of success. It is only
necessary for us to hinder and render difficult as much as
possible the formation of a relieving army. This would be
best done if we were not so anxious not to weaken ourselves
in front of the fortress, but sent more often distant expedi-
tions asi we did to Orleans. I should regard it now as correct,
for instance, to send two Aruiy Corps to Tours to drive out
the governing body which is there, and break up the force
which is being organised."

On the 23rd, evidently referring to this plan, he writes :
" The Crown Prince has consented to my plan, and now I
have sent Bronsai-t to General v. Moltke to communicate it
to him. He will have no objection whatever to it, but
it is to me like a weight on my limlis that I now may not
properly do anything more independently, but must always
first ascertain and inquii-e whether anything against it is
said in the highest places also. In a word, our wings are
cut and paralysed, and if anything serious has to be carried
out, it is only our luck and the good God that we have to
thank." And at the beginning of November the immo-
bility of the troops round Paris irritates him. In waiting
he foresees danger. Had the two Head -quarters been
a hundred miles apart, he would have been able to employ
his army much as he chose, but here the neighbour nest
door has to be consulted. On November 4th : *' To-day I
was once again very angry. Probably my cold was partly
to blame, but perhaps also the unsatisfactory manner in
which the operations of our armies are being conducted."

But the matter appai-ently hung fire for a little time, and
immediately after the fall of Metz v. Blumenthal again
prrased it on v. Moltke. On November 5th he writes
" Bronsart drove over to Moltke, and laid before him my
request regarding the expedition to le Mans. He was quite
of my opinion in the matter, and the Cro^^ii Prince promised
me, moreover, to plead pressingly with the King for sanction
for us to undertake an expedition of the kind under the
Grand Duke of Mecklenburg. Th.e Crown Prince returned

2

THE HRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER

79

at 1^.30, saying that it was all of no use, as all were against
it . . ,

" There is a limit to strength in every marij and it is not
at all necessary that I should work night and day and under-
take such gi'eat responsibility, while a whole crowd of military
idlers loaf about in dozens, doing nothing but passing worth-
less criticisms.^

And at last, on November 7th : " This afternoon I heard
with gratification that the expedition against the so-called
array of the Loire, which I have so long intended and desired^
has been sanctioned by the King, and that the command h to
be given, as I had wished, to the Grand Duke of Mecklen-
burg/' When V. Blumenthal saw the Duke soon afterwaixls,
he found him so smart and quick in apprehending his task,
that he had " the greatest hopes of liim.""

The fact that it was with v, Blumenthal the intended
expedition originated h an illustration of the difficulty of
ascertaining who is the real source of a " why " and a
" wherefore "" m connection with military operations ; and
seems to show that military hero-worship on the one hand,
and scornful condemnation on the other, if indulged in at all,
must for fairness' sake be left for exercise by later generations
who may get low down into the deep well at the bottom of
which Truth lies concealed. But this is not the way of the
world ; so in the military profession the impostor in high
places is less rare than he should be.

As will soon appear the idea of the *' expedition " was
founded on a totally erroneous, completely mistaken view of
the military situation. Hocnig's account was published in
1893. The reader of that work must inevitably assign to v.
Moltke any discredit given for a faulty judgment in the
matter, V, Blumenthal does not appear in those pages in
connection with it ; but nine years later, appears v, Blumen-
thal's Diary, in which we find that it was to v. Blumenthal's
repeated importunity that v. Moltke eventually yielded in
ordering the expedition. Moreover, in Hoenig's work, v,
Blumenthal, dm-iiig the period that the Detachment was in

8o THE PEOPI.E'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

the field m a part of the Third Arniij» would seem to have
adopted towards the Grand l>uke a line which savoured of
want of firmness in dealing with a roynJ persona^. As
we shall see, however, fi-om v. Blumenthal"*s Jouma], the
Grand Duke and the Detachment were, so to speak, v.
Blunienthars prategh, and the apparent want of firmness
arose from a dislike to have to act as an intermediary be-
tween his pmk'gia and the Royal Head -quarters when the
latter took of the former a less complimentary view than
he did. This fact must be borne in mind if we would under-
stand the operations of the foi-tnight from the 9th to theSSrd
of November.

But the mystery that shrouds the Army of the Loire, and
the hopelessness of the efforts of the invader to choose the
scheme of operations beat suited to the realities of the situa-
tion in a People-s War, whore reconnoitring, save in force, is
rendered impracticable by the determination of the population
to shoot dowTi, somehow or other, any hostile soldier who
dai-es to ride in among tliem to spy out what is goinr^ on, is
well illustrated by the work, at this time, of Von Wittich,
who, it may be renienibered, had, after the occupation of
Orleans, gone with his Inf. Division and the 4th Cav. Division
to Chartres. Both the 4th and the 6th Cav. Divisions
were working in conjunction with v, Wittich''s Inf. Divi-
sion, and the oi-dei-s for the combined o|)erations were signed
by V. Wittich, so that apparently he was. in command of the
whole force. The General had written to v. Blumenthal
asking whether, if occasion arose, he could rely on the co-
operation of V. d. Tann (his senior officer) at Orleans. On
November Snd v. Blumenthal. who, at this time was, as we
know, pushing the " expedition " scheme through the oppo-
sition it was encountering, replied, '* Fresh orders as regards
V. d. Tann will be sent in a few days," Meantime, on
November 3rd, v. Wittich marched the whole foree to Courville,
twelve miles west of Chartrcs, and occupied it. Here, how-
ever, after dark he received fi-om v. Blumenthal the following
telegram :

THE FIRi^T FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBKU 8i

" .Vor^mftfl** 3rd, 3. .19 P.M.

"According to iiifbrmatioii, fairly reliable and just received,
the hostile army at le Mans is 60,000 strong. I advise you
to be very careful. I cannot get good intelligence agentsj.

" V. Blltmknthal/"'

The stratagem of Sicnding a few trains of troops from Tours
to le Mans had thoroughly answered its purpose. Intercepted
letters informed v. Wittich that troops of all arms were
immediately in front of him to the west, and othera referred
to a great battle imminent in the neighbourhood ; so, by a
night march, the General hastily quitted his poisition and
regained the i^helter of Chart res ; but in front of him there
were only parts of the bogus " Army of the West/' And v.
Blumenthal will not believe that v. d. Tann sees Ijettcr on the
spot what is taking place, than does he himself sixty to
seventy miles away, and unable, as he complains, to get good
intelligence agents. On November 4th, v. fl. Tann is certain
that the French are collecting in force near Marchenoir.
Patrols and scouts are constantly fired on by the inhabitants
of the villages. " These hoy^tilities," says Helvig, '* occurring
as thev did in places where our patrols and detachments had
been allowed to jiass quietly, were an unmistakable indication
of the vicinity of considerable forces of the enemy. The popu-
lation, become fanatical, and irritated to the utmost by the hard
pressure of war, seemed hardly able to restrain the practical
expression of its deep and bitter anger, and thus afforded this
valuable information to the leaders of the German army."

At the Third Army Head -quarters, however, so Hoenig says,
v, d. Tann's reports were regarded unfavourably as exagge-
rated. V. Blumenthal on the 7th writes: ** This afternoon
we received information from v. d. Tann that he is expecting
to be attacked soon. I do not anticipate any such thing, as the
enemy cannot be ready for it yet." Here, again, in view of
the actual facts of the situation, is an instance which should
ser\e as a warning to senior officers against that tendency,
already mentioned, that seems inherent in the growth towards

T

82 THE PEOrLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

seniority, to a disparagement of the judgment and opinions
of junior ranks. V. MoJtke's weakness in this respect has
already been nieationerl* and here we have v. Bhnnenthal, who
is loudly indignant because his own superiors will not accept
his views in preference to their own, exhibiting exactly the
same weakness with regard to the value of his own opinions,
compared to that of the opinions of a General conmianding
an Annv Corps in his own army.

So, at Versailles, there is a feeling of perfect security so far
as any hostile action of the Army of the Loire m concerned.
On that staff were thi^e officers, *' chiefs of sections,"" of whom
one, X^ieutenant-Colonel Bronsart von Schellendorff, was re-
sponsible for the movement of the troops, Lieutenant-Colonel
Brandcnstein for transportand commissariat affairs, Lieutenant-
Colonel V. d. Vernois for everything concerning the French
army. Every morning v. Moltke held a conference, at which
these three officei*s were present to rec-eive instructions for the
day, so permission to be absent would necessarily imply
that there was. no anxiety as to the inrmcdiate future- The
diary of Lieatenant-Colonel V. d. Vernois fumishes evidence
conclusive on the point.

" VEESjllIiLEa, .\ofsmber 8th. Evenitig.

** To-morrow, Bronsart, Holbein and I intend to pay a visit
to the Crown Prince of Saxony [on the north side of Paris].
I hope that nothing wiU happen meanwhile to prevent our
going, although it is not impossible^ as an advance of the
French Loire Army, and probably also a sortie from Paris are
to be expected shortly. Concerning the Army of the Loire,
four long days' work has yet to be got through before vve ai"e
quite ready to cope with the conditions which may result
from its advance.'"

So it might apparently lead to a little iiiconvenleDce if the
French were prematurely active 1

" Vebsailles, J\rotemher 9th.

"The long intended drive to the Head-quarters of the
Meuse nArmy has at last come off."

THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 83

Un the 8th v. Bluiiieiithal had written, '* Towards eVetiing
a telegram arrived from Taiin, sayitig that strong columns of
the enemy are advaiiein^ by Beaugency and that he is
accordingly taking up a concentrated position at Onnes [five
or six miles north-wesfc of the city]." .\iid on the 9th he
writes to the Gmnd Duke, '* Captain Lenke has just
arrived from Orleans, and I see from his report that the
Fii^t Bavarian Army Corps vie^vs the situation somewhat
too gloomily,'* V. Bhmienthal is still obstinately incredu-
lous. And in v. d, Goltz"'s work we find a curious letter to the
Second Army, dated Versailles, November 10th, and signed by
V. Moltke, but of which, for the ]>resent, only the fii"st part is
given here. It commences as follows; "The still continuing
resistance of Paris is based on the expectation that the in-
vestment will be broken by I'elief from the Provinces, The
reports received make it probable that actually large forces
of the enemy have been formed on the Loire into a loosely
connected army deficient in equipment ; and that this army
has already begun its advance fix>m the line Tours-le Mans.
The l:*t Bavarian Corps in Orleans, and the SSnd Inf.
Division in Chartres must therefoi-e he reinforced from the
investing line. , . . The 17th Inf, Division was sent yes-
tei'day, and the command of all the forces to be employed
towards the l^oii-e was given to the Grand Duke of Meck-
lenburg Schwerin.''"' The letter here breaks oW as will
appear from the succeeding pai'agraphs which will be given
later on. Of course it by no means follows fi-oui the fact
that the letter bears the signature of y. Moltke, that
thei-eforc he peimed it himself; it may have been drafted
for him by some Staff' Officer, but the date seems clearly
wrong, and shows how necessary it is to be careful in
dealing with even official letters as reliable records. The
Grand Duke was appointed to the command on the 7th
(not yesterday, the 9th), and the 17th Inf. Division started
on the 8th (also not yesterday, the 9th), That any officer at
Versailles penned these paragraphs on the 10th is in the
highest degree improbable, for in the evening of the 9th

84 THE PEi)PLirS WAK IN I'HANCE, 1870-71

there had fallen at \ersailles a veiitable bolt from the bUie,
V, Blmiienthal savs that on that evening " came a te!egi-am
from General v. d. Tanii reporting that after a fight which
lasted seven bom's lie had had to i-etiix' to St. reravy."' Hoe-
nig states* that v. d. Taiin at 9.30 i*.m. reported to the Third
Army that on the 10th he vvmdd fall bac-k toToury to connect
with the 2Snd Inf. Divisioiu AW rluring the morning of
the 10th, came in another report from v. d. Tann» that the
enemy, some 50,000 stronjj, wa^ at C'oulniiers ; and the Third
Army in connnunicating this to the Grand Duke, added that
according to another, but not reliable, i-eport, the enemy was
much stronger. The lack of lielief manifested by v, Blu-
men thai and v. Moltke in the value of \. d. Tann's views and
opinions is extraordinary. As ive have seen, v. d. Tanii
on the 7th tells v, Ulumenthal he experts to be attacked ; on
the 8th^ that he is actually t>n thi- move out of Orleans^ to
meet the attack ; yet away go, on the morning of the 9th^ three
of the Royal Head -quarters St aft' for a day*j» plea.su ring ; and
on the 9th v, Blumenthal Ijclievcs v, d. Tami overcoloured
the situation at Orlean.s. Vet v, lI. Tann and \"er.saiiles are-
under seventy miles fi-om each other, and the telegraph is
at work between them, so there is uo difficulty in full and
complete exchange of \ iewNs.

On the 7th a reconnaissance had been made down the right
bank of the Loire fnim Orletmss, by a stiong foire of all arms
under zu Stolberg, the commander of the 2nd Cav. Division.
The foree was driven back with considerable loss. On the
same day r. d, Tann accidentally learnt that General d'Au-
relle, the Commander of the Army of the Loire^ had his Head-
quarters at Mer. On the 8th, there were signs of a hostile
advance. For the Bavarians to have i-einained in Orleans
would have been a tactical ahsuixlity, so on the night of tlie
8th-9th V, d.Tanii, lea\ ing a very small foi-ce in Orleans, moved
out and took up a position facing west, the centre at Coul-
miers, some eleven miles "est of Orleans, and in the open
country oufaide the Forest.

V, d. Tann's force innnbered 1 4,543 Infantry, 4450

THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER

8S

Cavalry, and 110 guns. Early on the 9th, the French
army consistint^ of the Snd and 3rd divisions of the 15th
Coi-ps and the two divisions of the 16th Corps, numbering
altogether 7S,000 Infantry, 7200 Cavalry and 160 j?uns
advanced to the attack. The Bavarians offered a stubborm
resistance, but at nightfall, were driven off* the battlefield ;
but only just off it, and the faintest semblance of a pursuit
would have I'eisnlted in the capture of the whole force,
so utterly exhausted was it. After a very short i-est, the
retreat was resumed, and by the night of the lOth the
whole foite was collected at Toury. llie Bavarian losses
amounted to 51 officei"!!!, 1257 men and two guns. On
tlie 8th, General des Palhi'res with the 1st Division of the
lath Corps had crossed the Loii-e above Orleans intending to
co-operate in the attack with the main body, but the co-ope-
ration uiiiican-icd, so that the line of retreat on Toury re-
mained 0)>eii to v, d. Taun. Another forc-e had advanced on
Orleans from the south. \ . Moltke^s fii-st diagnosis of the
strategy of his o])pouenfcs had now shown itself to be abso-
lutely incorrect.

It was as eai'Iy as October 25tli, that at a conference at
Tours, at which Gambetta wm present^ it had been decided
to make Orleans the iii-st objective. Orleans recaptured, was
then to be converted into a huge entrenched camp for
150,000 to 200,000 men, to serve as a base for ulterior
operations, and as a barrier to any offensive movements on the
part of the Germans.

War is, however, full of sui-prises, and in war, it is the un-
expected that happens, so that even the substitution of a
defeat for a victorious " expedition " was not likely to
disturb the self-possession of a v. Moltke. The first measure
to be adopted was blocking the road from Orleans to Paris
against the possible advance of the victors in the battle.
At 1.30 p.iki. on the 10th the Third Army i^Tote to the Grand
Duke, " According to a report of General v. d. Tann the
enemy, some 50,000 strong, is at Coulmiers ; other information,
but not reliable, puts the hostile force much stronger. It is

88 THE FEOPLE^S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

that tlie Fi-eucli were nioviiig on Pithiviei*s, and the Bavarian^i
at once began a further retreat from Toui-y. The report
proved false, and, by order of the Grand Duke, tlie Bavarians
returned to Toury. On the evening of the llth, v. d, Tann
reported strong hostile forces south of Artenay, and that two
corpii had been engaged against him at Coulmiers.

By the evening of the 12th, the whole Detachment was in
a defensive position facing south across the great road from
Orleans to Paris, eighteen miles fi-om the former, and forty-
seven from the latter. At Toury and Outarville were the
Bavarian Corps and the i^nd Ca^. Division, with the 17th
Inf. Division eight miles in rear of it At Allaines, seven
miles west of Toury, was the !22nd Inf» Division, Five miles
to the right rear of this division uas the 4th Cav. Division
at Ymonviile, on the road from Toury to Chartresj whilst at
Chartres, twenty-seven miles north-west of Toury, was the 6th
Cav. Division. There was an advanced guard thix^e miles
south of Toury, at Tivernon. So on this day the actual
position of the Germans shows us how tompletely wrong even
wise heads may he in attempting to forecast the plan of a
campaign. V. Moltke"";! far-reaching schemes, extending to
operations on a front of two hundi'ed and thirty miles, from
Chalons-sur-Saone to le Mans, ba^ed on the supposition *' that
southern France was hardly likely to make gieat eftbi-ts on
behalf of Paris," now shrivel up to a pure defensive on one
single road — Paris-Orleans. Chalons-sur-Jsaone^ Nevers, aud
Bourges continued to ply their activities vigorously ; the
15th and 16th Corps Iiad not been foweti to retreat or been
driven apart, but had advanced together to victory ; the only
waggon depot at Chateauroux could still send out her supplies
of military vehicles for French, not for German use ; the great
railway line of communication from Vier/on by Tours, le Mans,
Alen^on to Rouen was untouclied, and on it were running the
*'oue or more" locomotives the possession of nhicli would be so
useful for speedy communication betvieen \ ei-sailks and the
Detachment. The three corps, Trvhich, sepai'ately, wei*e to carry
destruction one hundred and seventy to two hundred miles

THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 89

into Central France, icere hurrying, as an army, as fast as
they could march, to save the investing line at Paris from an
attack coming from only sixty-five miles to the south of it;
and for the gi-eat active expedition to the ^est was substi-
tuted an anxious, passive watching to the south.

The French, on the 9th, had bivouacked on the battlefield,
and, as they expected a i-enewal of the attack, fires were not
allowed. On the 10th, the army extended more to the eastj
the fi-ontj about eight miles north of Orleans, running from
Tounioisis, twelve miles west of the main road, by ChevilJy
on the edge of the forest, to Neuville aux Bois, eight miles
east of the road. On the 12th, there was a conference, at
^hich lx>th Gumbetta and de Freycinet were present, and it
was resolved to hold to the original plan of the formation of
the entrenched camp at Orleans. The army here certainly
imnibered on this day 100,000 men.

And now we come to one of the most remarkable and inex-
plicable incidents of this war. The cavalry at the dispo:^
of the Grand Duke wcm very numerous, but touch with
the French hot! been completely lost ; and on the 12th the
cavalry reported concerning this 100,000 men that Ai'tenay
was unoccupied (wliich was true)j and that between that place
and the Forest of Orleans no enemy was visible. In fact, to
German eyes, these 100,000 men had absolutely disappeared.
And at once rose at Versailles, and at the Grand Duke^s
Head -quartet's, the belief that these 100,000 men had really
marched aimy on an ott'endve expedition in another direction ;
and for some tlays v. ]VIoItke arranged his strategy on this
eri'oneons supposition. But not only did not a single French
soldier go fi'om this neighbourhood, hut soon vast reinfoi-ce-
ments were poured into it. Rarely has the Fog of War been
so dense as here. The French knew well how to keep their
secrets, and the papulation lent its aid.

How this failure of the German cavalry on the 12th can
have occun-cd would be a very interesting problem to solve ;
no doubt the very peculiar character of the ground had
something to do with it ; but the solution would require

90 THE PEOPLKS WAR IN FRAXCE, 1870-71

mainly m regimental recoiids, which moreover might be incom-
plete, an extensive and close study and comparison of the
conduct and doings of the H'=imaller cavalry unitri, such as regi-
ments and squadrons in both forces, and of officer's patrols in
the German forces, during the 10th, 11th and ISth of the
month. Here we ai-e only able to deal with the general
result — touch was lost.

During the ISth the Grand Duke came to the conviction
that there was no hostile force towards Orleans, but that the
victors at Coulmiers were now movine; round behind the
screen of the " Army of the West " to unite with the foi-ces
in the west, and thence to attack, by Dreux, the western side
of the investing line. He therefore issued ordei-s that, on
the following day, the whole force should face about, and on
its then left, its present right, should wheel up facing north-
west towards the line Chartres-Di-eux, actually with its Imck
to the enemy ; and he comniunjcated to the Thii-d Army his
intentions for the morrow. This movement was commenced
on the morning of the 13th, and the troops wei^ on the
march, when the Grand Duke, to his utter astonishment,
received from the Third Army the following connnunieation :
** His Majesty the King has, at an audience to-day [the lJ2th],
given -orders to the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Army to
inform your Royal Highness that His Majesty does not wish
your Detaclunent to take the offensive unless very s[}eeial
reasons not known here should make it necessary. The IXth
A.C, under General v. Manstein, has, with special view to this,
been so directed that its advanced guard airives at Fontaine-
bleau on the 14'th,crosses the Seine on the 15th,and can connect
with you on the 16th. Success seems to be the more certain
thereby, as General v. Manstein will j)erhaps be able to act on
the flank of the enemy, who does not expect him." The Grand
Duke, when he determined to leave the Orleans road, knew he
would be a<-ting against the directions sent to him on the 10th
by v. Bliunenthal, to remain there for some days in a defensive
position ; but, as already mentioned, he communicated his
intentions to the Third Army. This connnunieation nmst

THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER 91

have been made, probably, not later than middav, for the
letter he now received was despatched from Versailles at four
P.M.J and in the interval there had been an audience with the
King. There was telegraphic communication between Ver-
sailles and the Grand Duke at Anger\'ille, and as this place is
less than forty miles from V"ersailles, a mounted messenger
could have delivered the missive to the Grand Duke that
night. The delay in the transmission of the message is
unaccountable. The position taken tip by the Grand Duke^s
force was little short of ludicrous, and all owing to the Fog
of War. He was marching away from the enemy, and with
his back to the direct road by which that enemy could most
easily atlvance, and could in the shortest time disturb the line
of investment. The Grand Duke had now to issue orders for
the following day* and these oixlers are remarkable. The
fii*st paragraph ran as follows : " According to infonnatiou
received, hostile troops have advancetl on the road from
Orleans to Etampea as far as Artenay, and on that from
Chateaudun to Chartres as far as Bonneva!, and have halted
there. It is the intention of H.R.H. the Grand Duke that
until more full information can be obtained as to the strength
and intentions of the enemy, the Detachment will remain in
the positions reached to-day ; but to strengthen the occupa-
tion of Chartres the 22nd Inf, Division will proceed there
to-morrow at daybreak." Hoenig regards the reason given
by the Grand Duke for the halt as a deliberate misstatement,
the real reason being the orders from Versailles ; nevertheless^
it was perfectly true that Artenay and Bonneval had been
occupied that day by the French, antl strong forces were
visible beyond Artenay ; but what the Grand Duke really
knew is impossible to ascertain. On the 14th the Detachment
with the exception of the 22nd Inf. Division remained
stationary.

Here, again, in the exercise of control by the Third Army
over the Grand Duke, we have this curious abstention of the
Crown Friiice from dealing firmly with him. The Crown Prince
will not stop the Grand Duke''ii erratic insubordinate pro-

92 THE PEOPLE^S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

ceedings until he has the concurrence and support of the
King, i.e.f v. Moltke. And an examination of the entries in
V. Blumenthal's diary aftb]*ds indications that on the 13th the
Chief of the Staff' of the Third Army held opinion:^: so different
from those of its Coniniander that possibly he left the Crown
Prince to deal with the matter by himself.

" In the afternoon a telegi-ani arrived from the Grand Duke
saying that to-morrow he will march to Chaiii-es. I forgot
to send it to the King — [in the Diary there is no trace of v.
Blunienthal being chronically short of memory] — and ^vhen
the Crown Prince retui-ned in tlie evening from St. Germains
it was very unpleasant for him. It ^vas sent on then, I have
become a veritable x'eporting machine. If thi^ stirt of thing
goes on we sha]] have a repetition of the .story of the Vienna
Coimcil of War at Court.*"

" There is a very decided tendency here to dictate every
move to the Grand Duke^ and this ought to be resisted. If
I were in his place I shoukl just report nothing, and cut the
telegraph wire."

On the 14th the Grand Duke kept his troops where he had
halted them on the l^th, except the SSnd Inf. Division,
which moved to Chartres. But the march of the Grand Duke
on Chartres iva.s something very mueh like a defiance to the
Crown Prince and to the Royal Head -quarters as well ; so at
12.55 P.M. on the 14th the Prince sent to the Grand Duke
the following reminder as to his duty : "General v. Manstein
can, on the iGth, arrive with the IXth A.C. at Etampes
[twenty-eight miles from Paris], to which place he has been
directed by the supreme Head- quarters. It is, therefore, only
there that the concentration of a large force can be effected
most quickly. The road from Orleans to Paris must not be
left open, if the enemy advances by Artenay, Frederick
William, Crown Prince." To this telegram the Grand Duke
wired at 6.30 p.m. the following audacious reply : " Your
Royal Highness' despatch of niidday to-day received. In
order that I niay carry out the duty assigned to me of
protecting the investment line of Paris against attacks from

THE FIRST FORTNIGHT OF NOVEMBER

Orleans and Chai-tres, and to Imve in my own hand8 the con-
trol for the net-essary unity in the leading, I ix-qut-st that
General v. Manstein may be placed under my oi-ders. The
road from Artenay to Etanipes will then be pi"otected." It
may be mentioneil that althon|T^!i v. Manstein's t-orps;! be-
longs to Prince Frederick Charles'* Army, he is at this time
receivitijtii^ orderr* from the supreme Head -quarters, and now a
third superior wishes to get hold of him. Fortunately all three
are assigning to him the same objeetive» namely, Etam^K-s.

But in the German Army there are, for even Royal
personages, limits to insubordination ; and the Grand Duke
was, Qven in these early stages of his career as a leader of an
army* t*>i" the Detachment was a small army, reminding
Vei-sailles of the fact. Hoenig isays ; " Anyhow, affairs from
the loth to the 14th were not so managed as to raise high
expectations from the Detachment, and had there Ix^eii no
special considerations to be taken into accouut^tt vvould perhaps^
have been even at that time a tpiestion idiether it might lie-
advisable upon the whole to allow the Detachment to remain
in existence after the arri\'al of the Second Army on the scene^
or at least to consider whether tiic staff work was in proper
hands. These mattei-s weredist^usseil at that time in Versailles
and among the General Staff', but no decisive step was taken."

V. (I Vemois writes on the 14th : " We can make nothing
of the operations of the Giund Duke, it being not easy at
this distance to judge of what is going on on the sjiot, Ont
of us will pi"oliably have to go there/'' The marginal note in
Hoeniff is "BViction between the Thin! Army and the
Detachment."' But v. Bhunenthal took a very different view
of the matter, and apparently is, on this occasion, letting the
Prince carry on alone his conflict with the Gmnd Duke; it
is with the Grand Duke that ai-e the iiympathies of tlie Chief
of the Staff of the Princess army. No wonder there is friction.

On this day, the 14th, the entry in v. Blumenthars Diary
is as follows : " Certain news arrived iVom the Graml Dnke
which caused great agitation at the King's Head-tjuarterji. . . .
The march off of the Grand Duke to Chartres appears inexplic-

94 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

able, though I said to the Crown Prince and to many others
also that they could not be judges of what was happening ;
no doubt the Grand Duke has good reasons for his action, and
if he has not i*eported everything to us he had acted only
rightly and wisely. That did not please them. About
mid-day came to me Moltke, who looked at things more
calmly, but desired that I should give the Grand Duke certain
instructions. I could only say that that was entirely against
my principles ; any one to whom a responsible task is
allotted, he must also carry it through. His hands should
not be tied. Moltke assented to this, and upon the other
points we were also one. Moltke was especially dissatisfied
that the Grand Duke should from the outset have disseminated
his forces too much. He is right there, but we do not know
what were the Grand Duke's reasons for so doing.""

CHAPTER VI

THE GRAND DUKE'S OETACHMENT, FROM

NOVEMBER 14th TO Mth

It is desirable now to learn the views which v, Moltke him-
se[f» on the 14th, took of the general situation and of the
futm"e- These are given in his letter of that date to v, Stiehle.
In V. d. Goltz''s work, the letter is given apparentljf in e^f&nso,
and, with the exception of unimportant paragi-aphs^ is repro-
duced hei-e. It runs as follows : —

"It shows the resources of France and the patriotism of the
people, that after the whole army has been captured, yet in
a comparatively short time a new army, which is not to be
despised, has been put into the field. , . . The retreat [after
CoLilmiers] was continued on the 10th to Toury, and although
there were numbers of cavalry, the touch with the enemy was
lost- ■ ■ ■

"TTie reconnoitring on the 11th did not obtain sufficient
information ; on the 12th, Pithiviers was found unoccupied,
and be}'ond Artenay there was no enemy found. According
to our estimate, the Orleans army consist of the 15th and 16th
corps, numbering 24 line (Marche) regiments, andj with
Gardes Mobiles, may be over 60,000 strong. The artillery
has presumably been got together from the fortresses ; the
Algerian troops may be the nucleus of the army. The French
give their losses on the 9th as 2000, and the Army of the Loire
has J apparently, not considered itself strong enough to advance
by more fighting direct on Paris, the only mode by which
a. real success is to be obtained. It appears that it in endea-
vouring to turn by the west, our position, which it does not
consiider advisable to attack. On this march it would be able
to imite with the new formations, for which Nogent )e ttotrou

96 THE PEOPLE^S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870^71

[seventy-five miles south-west of Paris and fifty-two miles fi-oni
the Orleans Paris road] is the central j>oint, perhaps even ivith
the 30-40,000 Gartles Xationales, by whom Generals Briant
and Bourbaki, on the line Faey -Vernon -I.-es Andelys [a line
forty miles from Paris ^i cheval the Lower Seine], and as far
as Gournay have for a long time held onr detatihnicnts in
check in this direction. It cannot now be doubted that an
attack by strong' hostile forces iVoin the west would endanger
us not less than from the south. Ilie investment could be
completely raised for eiglit days, without the capital being
iTsvictualled for longer than half a day \ but on the \ei\ bank
of the Seine we have our siege artillery and the Royal Head-
quarters, and, above all, we have to take into account the
political impression. The Grand Duke has already, therefore,
to-day Ijegun his march on Chartres, which place has remained
occupied by General von Wittich. In Toury Count Stol-
berg's Cavalry Division has remained. There is no news fi-oni
it at preisent It is possible, but not probable, that the Army
of the Loire is restricting itself to the passive defence of
Orleans, and behind the Loire. Ganiljetta is well awai-e that
Pari?* cannot hold out without relief. Should, therefore, the
departure of that anny to the we**t be confirmed^ the Grand
Duke will move parallel tn this march till the jrossibility of a
deciijive attack is offei-ed to him. Then the important place
of Rouen w^ill be his next objective, Subjwt to the foregoing,
the pi"otection of the Paris-Oi'leans road must be inidcr taken
by the Second Army alone. The road cannot be left entirely
open for any time, and the Grand Duke cannot l)e weakened
by detachments.

" On the left bank of the ILoira the destruction of Bourgea
is, militarily, the driving the Delegation out of Tours is,
politically, important. I have hoped that the Second Army
would have been able to march direct on those places, but as,
unfortunatelvj there has been no favourable decision between
Paris and Orleans, the only thing to l>e done is to contimie
the advance from Fontainebleau and Sens [on the Yonne, a
tributary of the Seine, and forty miles west of Troves, ami

THE GRAM) DUKKS DETACHMENT

97

thirty miles .south-east of Fontaiiiebleau], Hrst ill a westerly
direction. Whether the Xth corps shall be directed on Gien
on the Loire, will be Ixjtter deteniiined on the 19th iiist. [the
day on which the corps wa?; to arrive at Joi^ny, higher up the
Vonne, seventeen miles beyond Sens]. The recapture of
Orleans, and the crossing the river by the Hnd Army to the
left bank will [ye inuth facilitated thereby. For the quick
approacli of H.R.H. Prince Frederick Charles, ire are very
gratcfid ; it has pulled us through a sort of crisis. . . , We
exjject with some certainty a sortie on the 15th inst. on a larger
scale than hitherto. We could not dis|>ense just now with
the half of the Hnd Army Corps. The two Divisions are the
only rasen'e of the extended southern line of the Investment.
Fortunately* the enemy continues still quiet in the north-west,
otherwise we should have to send detachments there also/'
Still not the slightest thought of the possible need of concen-
tration in this " People's War"^; and, for the long line Chalons-
sur-Soane-le Mans, facing south, which had to be abandoned,
is substituted another long line one hundred and seventy miles
long, Rouen-Bourges, lacing west.

This letter reveals two predominant ideas in the mind of
V. Moltke ; firsit, a tenacious clinging to the hypothesis he had
adopted, at the very first, namely, at the end of October, a^i to
the strategical intentions of the French leaders. The second
idea is a determined depreciation of the niilitary value of the
resistance that the French nation wus organising a^inst him.
After the hostile army that the Grand Duke was to meet, but
which existed only in the imagination of v. Moltke, had been
decisively defeated, the Grand Duke would easily traverse
the difficult country along the lower Seine, and possess him-
self of Rouen some sixty-five miles dowu the river. V. Moltke
thus contemplates directing him to a place one hundred and ten
miles from Orleans, the scene of the decisive struggle only a
fortnight later. So little able had v. Moltke been to forecast
the decisive point that he first had sent the Second Army miles
away from it in one direction, and now he is sending the
Detachment miles away from it in another direction. ITiat

G

98 THE PEOPLE^S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

the French had ah-eady put into the field two well-equipped
armv corps, which had proved their fighting power in the
open, in no way altered w Moltke's opinion that the recapture
of Orleans, and the captme of Bourges and Tours, would be
aught but easy work for the 50,000 Germans of the Second
Army. Considering the extremely defensive character of the
country this Army would have to traverse, v. Moltkels
opinion of French fighting-power must have been poor
indeed, and was painfully contradicted by plain facts within
a very tew days. But there ai*e certainly strong indications
that in this war, as will appear hereafter, v. Moltke did not
attach to " country "" much weight in connection with either
strategical or tactical operations.

During the 14th, there came in to the Grand Duke from
the Cavalry Divisions a number of reports, and Hoenig !^ys
that on these reports he determined, in spite of all the orders
he had received to the contrary, to resume on the 15th, his
march to the noi*th-west away from the Orleans road that he
had received i-eiterated and specific directions to guard. But
although these rejjorts are given to ua by Hoenig, it is well
to bear in mind that they are not necessarily the whole of
the reportjs received by the Grand Duke ; for some may have
been lost or mislaid, andj moreover, with every commander
there may be certain other sources of information, or there
may come to his knowledge certain unrecorded indications of
an euemy^s movements, all of which, taken in conjunction
with the formal reports preserved among the archives, are the
real grounds on which he forms his judgment. The general
tenour of the repoi-ts recorded, was, that towards Orleans the
situation was the same a.-* already reported on the previous
day^ but along the west and south-west lines of observation
there were many troops visible. A report from the 6th Cav.
Divi.sion seems to have had much weight. Beyond Courville,
OD the high road from Nogent le Rotrou to Paris by Chartres,
a closed body of 250 line troops had been seen on the march.
The presence of line troop where but few of any troops
save Gardes Mobiles and Gardes Nationades had hitherto been

THE GRAND DUKE'S DETACHMENT

99

seen, was a possible indication of the anival of a fighting
force. The troops v^ere really only a part of the already
mentioned small infusion of line troops in the " Army of the
West/' But the reports strengthenetl the Grand Duke so
much in his previous opinion that the attack from the west
was now really on its way, that despite orders, he deter-
mined to resume the forbidden line of march ; but he did not
report his intentions until half-past four on the niornint; of
the 15th, when he tclegraf^hed to the Thiitl Army his pro-
ceedings, and during the day he brought the Detachment to
its pi-escribed halting-places. The 2£nd Inf. Division and
the 6th Cav. Division were aheiwly at Churti*es on the 14th.
The 17th Inf. Division went to Rambouillet, twenty miles
north-east of Chartres, and on the name road to Paris ; the
Bavarians to Aimeaii, ten miles in rear of the centre of the
line ; the Snd and ith Cav. Divisions remained respectively at
Toury, and midway between Toury and Chartres at Voves,
And this time no one said, nay to him, for there was a real
"scare*"' at Versailles. This scare deserves recounting in
detail. In the narrow district between Mantes, on the
Seine, and Dreux, on a western railway from Palis, on a
front of twenty-two miles, there was only the oth Cav.
Division as protection to the rear of this part, the vulnerable
part, of the investing line; one brigade was at Mantes, another
bi-igade with a battery of Horse Artillery near Houdan, on
the railway, a third at St. Germain en Laye, six miles north
of Versailles. On the French side matters had become more
lively in front of Mantes ; at Dreux the forces, such as they
were, had been greatly re-inforcedj. as also at Illiei's and
Bonneval ; on the 14th, Courville had been occupied by
Line Infantry ; faiiJier in rear all the villages towaitls Nogent
le Rotrou were held. Tlie important town of Di'^ux lies
some thirty- five miles west of Versailles, and had formed a
centre fi-om which guerilla warfare had been caiTied on for
weeks against the 5th Cav. Division. On the 14th, this
Division mported that at Bu^ a village a few miles north-
east of Dreux, were collected 12,000 men, eight squadrons,

100 THK PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

and eight batteries. This viUage had alrettdy, on the 14th,,
been boTiihHi'ded by Hoi"se Ai'tillery, but, a-s a no\eltv in
this wflr, the French did not evacuate it but held on. At
once, on the 15th, five battalions of the Guard Laudnehr,
and fi heavy reserve liattery were hiimecl from the inveating^
line to sup|iort the Cavalry Division, for, presuming the
re|>ort to be fori-ect, there was much more than n pliantom
army in this dii-ection, -so that when, on this day, the news
eame that the right of the Detachment was marching in the
dii"et"tion whence the danger was now showing itself, thei'e
iTiust have been a great feeling of relief at Versailles^ and
probably tio one asked the question how it wan that the
Detachment was coming there. But the report u as not trne ;
the mountain was but a very small molehill indeed. In the
morning of the l4tli.sonie Uhlaushad approached Bo and had
been Hi^l on by Gaitles Nationales and Franc-tireurs ; two>
were kilUtl, one was wounded, and one escaped. At eleven
o'clock some IThlans and artillery returned to Bu, but the
French connnander in the district had bixjugbt fi-om Dreiix
two compAiiies of marines, three battalions of Gardes Alobiles-
and a section of artillery ; he at once advanced to the attack
and drove the Germans away. How this force was so-
niarvcllously exaggei*ated in the eyes of the German Cavalry
i* not esplainetl. At all events little short of a panic was
the result. At Versailles, though doubt prevailetl whether
the attackers were the " Army of the VVest "^ only, or whether
among them was also a portion of the Army of the Loire, it
seemed so certain that an attack was coming that anv
objet'tions pi-eviousily entertained to the movement of the
Graiul Duke lost all their force, and on this day v. Moltke
gdve the Grand Duke a perfectly free hand, releasing him
from the protection of Paris from the south. The letter of
release was sent to the Third Army as an instruction to theui ;
its concluding paragraphs i-an as follows : '* At the same time*
and in acconiance witli the approval of the King, the 5tJi
Cavalrv Division is placed under the orders of H.R,H. the
Gmnd IXike of Mecklenburg-lx-hwerin, to whom i> rtKxmi-

I

THE GRAND DUKES DETACHMENT loi

mended now the concentration of hi;* troops, and the speedy
offeiiijive against the hostile forires in niai'ch perhaps from
Dreux and Chartres.*"

Then, as if to reiniiid the Grand Duke that \m master is
still the C'rown Prince, and at the same time to reassure the
latter that there is no interference with his command,
V. ^Moltke writes : " Direct instructions fi-om here to H.R.H.
the Grand Duke are not given/' In transmitting the letter,
the Third Army did not add anything of importance. On
the following day, the 16th, the Duke, still pivoting on
Chartres, brought forward his right, the 1 7th Inf. Division
to Nogeiit le Hoi, on the Eure, so that the front faced
due west ; the left was at Chartres fifteen miles away,
the Bavarians were at Gallardon about ten miles in rear
of the line and the same distance from each Hank. Dreux
lay ten miles from Nogent le Roi down the Eure. Up
to this time, the Detachment had not met with any
opposition, and the work hud been one of simple marching.
But now, the task before the Grand Duke was one of vast
difficulty, and one of which none even of the tried Generals
of the German Army liad had any experience. With 52
battalions, 110 squadi-ons, S20 guns, and unweildy and huge
trains, he stood on the edge of a tract of broken, close, and
wooded country, totally unsuitable for guns or cavalry,
seamed with crossroads and lanes, and into which his cavalry
scouts; could barely penetrate ; into this he was to enter and
strike a decisive blow on an enemy moving unseen within, an
enemy of whose strength, organis^ation and whereabouts he
had not the faintest idea. Not merely to achieve success,
but to avoid disaster, two conditions were indispensable;
one, the holding the force together well in hand, the other,
perfect staff work. But, unfortunately, dissemination, not
concentration, was the principle guiding all the operations of
the Graud Duke, whilst the Staff work was indifferent. Tlie
imaginary enemy before the Grand Duke was the " Army of
the West" i^inforced possibly by some portion of the Army
of the Loire. The actual army was some 35,500 men, the

102 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-tl

force ali-eady described, extended on i\ front of more than
sixty miles from near the Lower Seine down to Bonneval ou
the Loir. On the extreme left near the Seine « ere a gi-oap
of five or six battalions of Gai-des Mobiles and Emnc-tireurs
under the ortlei's of Lieut. -Colonel Thomas. At Dreux was
General Temple with seven or eight Ijattalions. Farther
south at Chateauneuf, twelve miles from Di*eui and fifteen
from Chartresj wa^ a similar fort-e un<ler Lieut.-Colonel
Marty ; other groups continued the line to Bonneval. Not
one single piece of artillerv was there with the Aiiny. 'What
gun^ had been there had l>een withthawn >iiOuth.

And it would seem that v. Moltke, a little bit doiibtful
perhaps that the tirand Duke, as a *ioldier, eould be tru^^ted to
walk quite alone, thought it desirable to give him the benefit
of a little light and leading ; so he penned on the ITth, for
his bL-nelit, a niemorandumi which Hoenig gives ns in his
book. The Grand Duke did not receive this memorandum,
which was sent thj-ough the Thiiti Army Head-quarters, imtil
the 20th, when the situation it was intended to meet had
passed away ; whether it would have been of the slightest
owe to him will be best judged by a perusal of its contents:

" H.R.H, the Grand Duke has already been informed
through the Head-<iuarters of the Ilird Army, that from
this time he ia completely relievetl from protecting the
Orleans-Paris Road, and that His only duty is to prevent
hostile forces advancing on the western roads on the left
bank of the Seine. For watching in this direction to learn
what is taking place, there is available a very nunieroiiii
cavalry [probably 10-12,000].

" On the other hand^ it is, naturally, not intended that to
otter resistance there should be a force on every one of these
roads, but only that the advance shall be met on those on
which strong hostile forees show tliemselves. Success on one
road will hinder the advance on the others; but to ensure
the thorough defeat of the enemy, a close concentration of the
force is required, tienorally, the Detachment of his Roval

THE GHAND Dl'KE'S DETACHMENT 103

Highness has to carry out a ^v ar not so much of OLTiipatiun
as of nioveiiieiit, by only which means also can the supply of
the troops be eff*ci:tcd ; and the objectives of the operations
are not so much the gaining possession of the larger towns
as the destruction of the hostile forces which niiglit have
taken refuge in them, I need hai-dly mention the important
role which consequently falls to the ai'tillery,

" Oil the 20th, Angerville and Pithiviers will be occupied
by two corps of the Ilnd Army, and the road from
Chateaudun will be, thereby, to a certain extent, covered ;
80 that His attention may now be directed especially towards
His light wing. An advance of the enemy by Dreux-Mantes
would strike the investing line on its most sensitive point.
It was already necessary, therefore, to send li'oui here
yesterday a brigade of Guaixl i^Aiidwehr to support General
V. Rheinbaben [5th Cav. Division]. . . . The difficulty of His
task lies in detecting accurately the decisive point against
which a bloiv is to ho delivei-ed with all the concentrated
forces; that this tvill he effected I am convinced.

" (Signed) v, Moltke.*"

Hoenig remarks that at the Royal Head-quarters they had
at this time no conception of the great extent to which the
population were taking part in the wai', nor did they realise
the great difficulties that the topographical conditions of the
theatre of war presented to the operations of the Detach-
ment. It so happened that when, on the laOth, the letter
came to the Grand Duke, the main body of the enemy
was already in full retreat south-west to le Mans, Hoenig^s
remarks on this letter of v, Moltke's, though severe, are
very j ust,

" If a People's Way is carried on on the Cordon system, as
was the case hei'e, the enemy has no real decisive point, and
this cannot, therefore, be ascertained, and a blow directed
against it. Only by an extraordinary gift of divination can,
under these circumstances, the best direction be determined;
but even this does not necessarilv lead to the retreat of the

104 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

forces on the Hanks, as these are able to get away uiieiidaiigered
in every direction. Anyhow, the fonnatioii of the theatiie ot'
war in no wav lent itself to the v. Moltke Idea. The enemy
could be driven back, separattd, destroyc-d at ccrtaiti points,
but there were always open to hhn roads into *space,^anii
by nieanis of the telegraph, and by the help of the population,
he everyw'hei'e i-eceived timely warning of the movements of
the Detachment, which was established frontally against the
whole cordon. Under these tontlitions the greatest leader
could have done but little."' That Hoenig was allowed to
publish this letter, which certainly does not add much to the
military reputation of v. Moltke, shows liow imperative it
appeai-ed to the German authorities to pnt before the officers
of the army warnings not to rely blindly on all the sti"ategical
and tactical examples furnished in this war.

But V. Blnnienthal was getting very irritated at the way in
which the Royal Head-quarters were behaving to the Grand
Duke. He regarded it as ** grandmotherly,'" On the 16th
he write>; ; " At niidday to-day Moltke was with me. and he
complained that the Grantl Duke reported so little ; I ought
to order him to take the offensive. But that is not ncces^sary,
he will do it of hi^ own accord, and up to now it seems to me
he hais done perfectly rightly ; he stands fairly concentrated
between C'hartres and Maintenon." And next day he writes
even more strongly i he savis that some days before there
had been a real panic at Versailles, everything packed
and ready for a move. It had spread to his own staff
without his remarking it, for they did not dare to let him
know because they knew his views on such chicken-hearted
conduct (Hasenfusderei). *' If only the King, with his
Head-quarters and all the Princes, would go away, we could
certainly expedite matters, and peace would be near at
hand/

From these and the previous extracts will be at once
apparent the difficulties which sometimes arise in war in the
working of the higher command and of the higher control.
The dirticulty hardly exists when the scene of operations of

THE GRAND DUKFS DETACHMENT 105

tlie armies or large detachments is a considerable diistance
away from the supreme authority. Prince Frcderit-k Charles
at MetZj V. Manteuffel on Ins way from Meti: to the north-
west, were left to act for themselves ; and v. Werder, in the
south-east, though more closely watched by Versailles, was
necessarily alloued a certain amount of freedom ; but, as we
have seen, thei*e was su])ervision and control exercised over v.
d. Tann when only sixty-five miles from Versailles; and now
here is the commander of this BOjOOO Detachment showing a
determined spirit of independence, and wandering about with
his troops within a distance of only some thirty miles from the
Royal Head-quartei^ in a manner not at all to their satisfac-
tion. No wonder v, Moltke beeanio impatient; it must
have required some self-control to refrain from taking the
command into his own hands out of those of the Crown
Prince and of the Grand Duke. And the position of v.
Moltke was rendered still more unsatisfactory owing to the
attitude of v. Blumenthal. V. Blumenthal, under the existing
arrangement, was, as Chief JlitafP Officer of the Third Armv,
the intjermediary between v. Moltke and the (irand Duke;
and if v. Blumenthal, differing as he did in this matter with
V, Moltke, and favouring the Gmnd Duke, wa-* not actually
obstructive, he seems at all events not to have given supjKjrt
to V. Moltke ; and from an incident related by v. d, Vernois,
V. Blunvcnthal was a power that had to be reckoned with even
by V. Moltke and v. PtKlbielski. The Crown Pi-ince might be
amenable, but not so the Crown Prince with v, Blumenthal at
his elbow. In the early days of August tlie Royal Head-
quarters were not satisfied with the state of the preparation
of the Third Army for the field. Consequently, a telegram
containing a fresh and decided order to atlvance was drawn
up and handed by v. Podbielski to v, d. V'emois to send.
V. d. Vei'nois had been on the Crown Prince's Staff iu the
war of 186'6, when v. Blumenthal was the Prince's Chief
Staff Officer. " ^Vhen 1 read it/ he says, " I said to the
General that the telegram ought not to be sent in its present
form. I added I knew that staff' very well in the last war.

io6 THE rEOPLKS WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

If you wish to create ^^trained relations n ith them during the
whole of this campaign, send it, but I feel perfectly sure they
will feel offended, and, I think, not without cause. For a
good reason of some kind there must surely be for their not
yet fixing the date of starting,^ So the telegram was not
sent, and v, d. Veniois was entrusted with taking personally
to the Prince the expression of the wishes of the Head-
quarters.,

On the 16th, the Duke had eome to the conclusion that it
was at Dreux that the enemy >^'aB in force, so he gave oi-ders
for a movement in echelon in that direction on the 17th, the
attack to take place on the following day, the 18th. On the
16th, the Detachment as already mentioned was fadng west,
right at Nogent le Roi, left at Chartres. For the morrow,
the 5th Cav. ]>i vision, on the north, wais to advance west
and drive the enemy back on Dreux ; the 17th Inf. Division
from Nogent to advance on Ditiux, and if the place were
only weakly held, to take it ; otherwise, to establish itself in
front of Dreux, FontaJne-les-Uibouts lies eight miles up the
Blaise ; it is eighteen miles from Chartres, whence the S2nd
Inf. Division was directed on it. In the event of strong re-
sistance, the division would connect along the Blaise with the
17th Inf. Division on its right. The Bavarians were directed
on St. Cheron, ten miles from the Blaise and the same dis-
tance from the flanks. On tlie left the 6th Cav. Division, on
a wide front, accomptuued the advance, or rather the wheel
to tlie right on tlie move, as it really was. Probably the
Grand Duke believed that there was with the enemy a portion
of the army from the Loii-e, and therefore intended whilst
attacking him in front at Dreux, to t:ut off the retreat of the
Loire troops to the south ; but, on the other hand, if he
believed, as his order stated, that the hostile army was con-
centratetl in strong force at Dreux, this very disseuiinated
disposition exposed his own troops to the risk of destruction
in detail. Sometimes in war, the Commander states to his
Chief Staff Oificer the object of the operation he intends
to carry out, and leaves him to work out the details for

THE GRAND DUKE'S DETACHMENT

lo:

the units ; sometimesj the coininanders do the work them-
selves. In this instance^ we are unfortunately unable to
a^cei'tain who was responsible for the ordei"s for the march
on the ITth, the Grand Duke or Colonel v, Krenski. Helvig
states that the Bavarians at St. Cheion were to be available
not only to support the Divisions in front, but also for
employment to the south-west on the left iiaiik, if necessarv,
as it was not absolutely certain that danger was not threaten-
ing from this direction. If this be correct, then, obviously,
the Grand Duke, instead of concentrating^ his efforts on the
achievement of one object, was trying to provide for two
evenlualitiesj attack to tlie north-west, defence to the south-
west ; and it h difficult to see how, had the hostile defence
been of an efteetive character, or the hostile attack serious,
success coutd liave Ijeen achievetl by the Grand Duke in
either direction. Hoenig remarks that the Grand Duke
disregarded v. Moltke's reconnnendation for concentration,
and that in all operations carried out from a flankiiig
position, concentration is the first thing to be attended to ;
and that the flanks must be prolectt'd by cavalry and in-
fantry pushed forward a day's march ; the Infantry, com-
plete and ready to take their part where the enconnter is to
take place.

The troops met with opposition every>vhere in their
advance, but as must be apymrent from the position and
natui*e of the French forces here, the opposition, though
bitter and determined, could not hold out against the highly-
trained and well -disciplined Germans. Dreux was easily
taken by the 17th Inf. Division, but the 22nd Inf. Division
failed to arrive on the Blaise, halting at Marville, some four
miles short of its destination. And now, in the mind of v.
Moltke, OS well a.s in that of the Grand Duke, the conviction
must have begun to dawn, that the ideas that had ruled
the strategy since the ISth of the month had been baseless ;
and that the mai-ching had simply led to an ajfa'trc mauquve.
The result was a striking illustration of the difficulties
encountered by an invader in a country suited to a ** People's

io8 THE PEOPLE^S WAR IN FRANX'E, 1870-71

War," a country where the inhabitants and local troops can
find scope for their employment, and the exercise of their
special powers, and where the population take seriously their
pai-t in the National Defent-e.

The Grand Duke now came to the conclusion* and it was
coiTect, that he had not hit upon the main body even of the
nebulous '' Army of the West,"'' but on its extreme northem
flank ; and as the trend of the letreat of some of the troops
encountered was in the direction of le Man:^ to the south-
west by Nogent le Rotrou, he determined to make, on the
18th, a complete change of front from north-west to south-
west, and then to advance in the first instance on Nogent le
Rotrou. In this determination v. Moltke acquiesced, and
from a letter of his of the 18th to the Second Army, given
by V. d. Goltz, there can hardly be any doubt that it
was on this day that he at last gave up the idea which had
dominated his mind since the latter days of October, that the
French would attack him on the West ; and also the other
idea, that the whole of the Army of the Loire, which had
fouj^ht at Colli 111 iers, had gone bodily from the neighbourhood
of Orleans.

In his letter he says ; " On the question whether the main
body of the Army of the Loire is still at Orleans, or perhaps
in a moi-e westerly direction at Chateaudun, light will be
thi-own in a few days, and the information will be at once sent
to the Head-quarters of the Ilnd Army/''

It must be mentioned that General Fiereck had, on the
17th, transjferred the main botly of the " Army of the West,**
some 16,000 men, from Chateaudun to Nogent le Rotrou ;
and the troops from the neighbourhood of Ureux made their
way in the same direction with ease. The Detachment hadj
already, f^ince November 12th, ntade three wheels in mass, so
that, possibly, the Grand Duke imagined, that from the
experience acquired, thei^ would be no difficulty in performing
the manoeuvre a fourth time ; but in this he was doomed to
bitter disappintment. The Hrst three had been simply
march-manoeuvres, undisturbed by the enemy. Against the

THE GHAND DUKE^8 DETACHMENT 109

success of the fourth inarch, the eneui_v\the elements, and the
country formed an often*tive altiance of such power as most
effectually to stultify the Grand Duke's programme, and
to render the 18th a day never to be forgotten by the unfor-
tunate troops that were involved in the operation. Moreover^
the Detachment had now thrust himself into a veritable
hornet's nest, and there vvould necessarily be an accompanying
sensation of stings. Aa a warning, as a reallv profitable
example of thoroughly bad leading and bad Staff work, the
movements of the 18th are worthy of consideration in detail.
In the fii^it place, the shortness of November days must be
recalled to mind. On Novemlier 18th the sun rises at T.S3 and
sets at 4.7 ; thus giving less than nine hours of daylight for
tlie work in the field. On the day of Worth when the Bavarian*
had their first experience of njarching and fighting, there had
been fifteen hours of daylight. During tiie whole of November
18th a dense fogj limiting vision to fifty paces and rendering
artillery useless, hung, over the country, which was very much
broken and threaded with cross-lanes and devious* pathn.
Tlie task assigned to the 17th Inf. Division at Dreux was.
plain and simple, and could meet with no difficulty. It was
to inarch fifteen miles west to Brezolles, clearing the country
to the west and north-west, and for the purpose, apj^jarently,.
of cutting off the enemy's retreat in that direction. But the
goveniing factor in the movement of the rest of the Detach-
ment was the S2nd Inf. Division at Boulay and Marvi lie, some
four miles north of Chateauneuf, It was from Chateauiaeuf
that the Division was to move at ten oVlock, and pi'oceeii
south by the Dreux-Chateauneuf Road to the Eiire, aljout la
Loupe, a twelve miles march from Chateauneuf. The Brigade
of the 6th Cav. Division, which was to the east at Chene
Cheuu, between Chateauneuf and the Bavarians at St. Cheron,
was to follow the S2nd Inf. Division; whilst the 1st B.C,,.
leaving at ten a.m., 8t, Cheron, which is ten mile^s east of
Chateauneuf, was also to move west and proceed to canton-
ments on both sides of the Chateauneuf- la Loupe road in rear
of the S2nd Inf. Division. It would be an interesting War

no THP: PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

Game exeirise lo work out these oi*dei-s, as a time arid space
pi-obleiii of units on full war streiii^th with trains, ike. ike;
but here was not a War Game but prat;tical work in the
tieltl, with any amount of possible disturbing conditions.
Everything depended on the ^nd Inf. Division beino; clear of
C'hateauneuf at exactly the ri^ht time.

On the 17th, the enemy that was encountered was not one
single body, but was in two bodies; one at Drenx under
General Temple, whose line of i-etreat lay west down the
Lower Seine; the other under General Thomas, which,
though in the '* Army of the West,^ was part of the 21 st
Corps, now* fonniufr at le Mans; and \^'hose line of retreat
ran thei"efore at right angles to that of General Temple's
force. C'hateauneuf was practit-ally a defile through which
were to pass an Infantry Division, a portion of an Army
Corps, and a Cavalry Brigade ; the S^nU Inf. Division was to
lead, and even if time and space had been accurately calculated,
any delay in the passage of this Division in passing tlie defile
at the appointed time must inevitably cause a block in tlie
movements of the other troops ; besides which, any portion of
the Bavarians that was matching south of Chateauneuf across
the road to gain its destination, might bring the 2Snd Inf.
Diviiiion to a halt. And delay at once began at the very
first attempt of the Division to move. On the 17th the
Division had intruded itself into a country full of hostile
inhabitants; and the rightful occupiei's, though only too glad
to bid *' God speed " this morning to their unwelcome guests,
were determined to bid it in such a form as to impress it on
their niemories ; so when the Division prepared to move down
to Chatcauneuf, it found its departui-e in quiet so strongly
opposetl that v. Wittich was compelled fii-st to clear the hostile
troops from the dii-ection actually opposite to that he was
eventually to take. Owing to the fog, the receipt of informa-
tion, and the transmission of orders was much delayed.
Then there was the country between the Division and
Chatcauneuf to be cleared. Meantime, the Bavarians and
the Cavalry Brigade from the w^t were approaching

;,*,^<

THE GRAND DUKE^S DETACHMENT iii

Chateauneuf and the road south. General v, ^Vittkh suggested
to the Grand Duke that in order to kuep his Division together
he should let the Bavarians pass atro-ss. The Giurut Duke
refused to accept the suggestion^ so part of the Division
pushed on ; then the Bavarians crossed between it and the
rest of the Divisionj some of which paiised the night in
Chateauneuf ; the head of the Division was unable to get
further south than some live mile?^ fixjui the town. The ITth
Inf, Division had halted when at five inile?? from its destination,
doubtful, owing to the sound of firing in the siouth, whether
it ought not to move in that direction. Although the marches
had been only six or seven mileiSj the day had been necessarily
most trying to the physical endurance and the moral of the
troops. Nowhere could they move without coming under
fire ft-om an enemy quite invisible to them, and po-fse.ssing a
knowledge of which they were absolutely deficient, a knowledge
of the CO an try ; i"oads were found broken or barricaded, and
every hamlet, farmhouse and village had to be stormed-

The delays and the crossing of the Divisions had been
fatiguing. Many detachments had been on the mai-ch since
the morning ; the halts had aftbi-ded no real restj and when,
at night, the troops arrived at the shelter assigned to them, it
was as likely as not that the shelter was held by the enemy,
who had to be driven from it, or it had been abandoned and
was in flames. So the troops had to bivouac in thecotd with-
out fires. Dropping shots wei-e hoaiid till late at night in the
neighbouring woods, creating a feeling of insecurity, and com-
pelling the troops to place outposts all round. As to the train
columns, they wandered aindessly about, not knowing where
were the troops to which they were carrying the needful sup-
plies, i^o hopelessly entangled had the Detachment become,
that until disentangled no further advance was possible ; the
19th was ordered as a rest-day for this purpose. Either the
Grand Duke or Colonel v. Krenski was a master of the art
of converting, by well-chosen language, failure into success,
so the Detachment order for the 19th runs as follows:

" In to-day's advance the Detachment encountered hostile

112 THE PEOPLK^S WAU IN FllANCE, 1870-71

resistance everywhere. 'Hie advance aecured, but chiefly owin^
to the suct-es-sful fight of v. Wittich\s Division, the attainment
of its inteiKleti purpose, namely, obtaining more information
a.s to the strength and position of the enemy. It appears,
that the hostile ti-oopM in front of us Wong to the Army
of the \\''est (General Fiereck), ^shose head-quaiters are at
le Mans^^ [quite wrong], "His Royal Highness intends to
allow the troops to remain to-niotTow in their present
positions and to give them rest,'"

The imaginary charticter of \\ Moltke"'s appitciation of the
situation since the 14th had been unpleasantly brought to
light by the events of the 17th. The Army, to whose cir-
cuitous course the Grand Duke had beeii moving ^'' pai'allel,""'
had not been marching at all, for non-existent entities do not
walk about the eai-th. The driving out of Divux a few thou-
.sand irregular troop« without a ^single piece of aitillery in
their possession, can hardly be regarded as a decisive engage-
ment, llouen was hardly the next Knitable objective, an not
the pojisession of any place, but the tiestruetion of the army
in the field was the first aim in all v. MoltkeV operations ; and
so V. Moltke at once accepts the fact that he has followed the
red herring so cleverly tlrawn acrtxss the tmck, and, then occurs
to his inind the idea tliat the lost hostile army may be neai'Iy
where it was when he first lost sight of it.

The 19th November wa,s e»nploye<l b) the Detachment in
disentangling itself and in pi-eparing for the advance on the
morrow to the south-west. The repoiis received dming the
day pointed conclusively to a general withdrawal in tliat dii^ec-
tion bv the enemy, and also to a sti^tng occupation of Nogent
le Roti-on. On the SOth the advance was continued, but for
only a very short distance on to the ten miles front — ^la
Loupe-Courville, with the 17th Infantry Division on the right
rear at Senonches. It is* worthy of notice that the Bavanans
had not with then* a single map of the country ; the Bavarian
^Var Office had been unable in its prepiiution and despatch
of the maps to keep pace with the movements. In this
advance, the advantages of cavah-y and artillery altogether

THE GRAND DUKE'S DETACHMENT 113

disappeared, and the large trains were veritable impedimenta ;
but the district was eminently the theatre for a national war
carried on by young untrained soldiers, intelligent enough to
utilise the advantages offered by the ground. Although the
information obtained on the 20th showed that there were on
both flanks of the Detachment not unimportant bodies of
troops, yet everything indicated that Nogent le Rotrou was the
stronghold where the French would make a determined stand
to arrest the further progress of the invaders. And now on
the 20th we must leave the Detachment for a time and go to
the Second Army to learn what had been taking place there
since, in obedience to the orders received at Troyes on
November 10th, it commenced its march towards the Paris-
Orleans road.

CHAPTER VII

THE SECOND ARMY FEOM NOVEMBER 10th TO MTH

On the night of November 10th the front of the array
faced souths and extended from Troves to Neufchateau* a
distance of seventy miles. On the 16th the IXth Army
Corps, covered by the 1st Cavalry Division, arrived at Mere-
ville, near Angerville, on the Paris-Orleans road. The
Army Head-quarters and the Ilird Army Corps were at and
near Sens, on the Yonne, sixty miles from the road ; the
leading echelon of the Xth Army Corps (one brigade of
which was far in rear) had reached Tonnerre, forty miles
south-east of Sens, and ninety miles from the road.

On this day v. Stiehle replied to v. Moltke's letter of the
14th ; the reply shows how completely, at this time, Prince
Frederick Charles lioncurred in the under-estimate formed by
V. Moltke. The writer, when he penned it, little dreamed
that in only five days all the ambitious plans for the army
would have to be abandoned, and that until the commence'
ment of the following month his chief, overwhelmed by the
threatening appearance of the enemy he had bearded in his
very den, would adopt in front of Orleans a passive attitude,
and hold to it so determinedly, that it would need the express
order of the King to move him to the attack.

The letter runs: "His Royal Highn^s, in conformity
with the oi-ders received, and the information communicated,
purposes to dispose of the army as follows :

" The IXth Army Corps which, owing to its forced marches
must be somewhat exhausted, will close up at Angerville, and
pushing forward an advanced guard in support of the 2nd
Cavalry Division at Toury wiU rest firom the 18th. On the

THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 10~S0 115

21st, the Corps will commence its advance on Artenay and
Orleans, , . .

" The Ilird Army Corps will march from the Loing, where,

on the 18th, it arrives at Nemours and Chateau Landon [both
places thirty to thirty-five miles from the Paris-Orleans Road],
on the 19th to PuiseauXj Beaumont ; on the SOth to Pithiviers
[fifteen miles from the Paris road and fifteen miles south-east
of Angerville] ; and on the 21st continue the advance on
Orleans in co-operation with the IXth Army Corps, if, as is
asserted by a deserter, the enemy, some 30-40,000 strong, is in
camp at Chevilly, south of Artenay.

" By the capture of Orleans his Hoj^al Highness believes
he can best carry out the duty assigned to him ' protecting
the investing army against Orleans.' Afterwards, according
to circumstances, his Royal Highness intends to move down
the Loire by Blois on Tours, the IXth Army Corps on the
right bank, the Ilird Army Corps on the left bank of the river.
There is no risk in the operation, although d cheval the river,
because between Orleans and Tours there are exclusive of both
places five permanent bridges, and also the Hlrd Army Corps
has with it its pontoon train. If a portion of the Ilnd Army
Coi-ps could be employed to occupy Orleans, where all the
trains must i-emain, the operation would be thei-eby facilitated.

" The Xth Army Corps, now advancing by Tonnerre, will
until the SOth march direct to Montargis [twenty-five miles
south-east of Pithiviers, forty miles east of Orleans, and twenty
miles north of Gien] ; thence it can reach the Loire in two
marches, and eventually operate against Bourges [forty miles
south], render it of no fui-ther military importance, and then,
perhaps, advance down the Cher against Tours [eightv miles].
If it happens that the enemy is decisively defeated, then,
perhaps, from Bourges and Tours, the converging direction
on Poitiers [sixty miles from Tours and one hundred from
Bourges] may be taken, and all railway communication between
northern and southern France thus destroyed.

*' His Royal Highness proceeds on this plan, from the con-
viction that without a decisive victory, the French spirit will

n6 THE PEOPI.E'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

not bend, and that we shall force the eneniy to fight if
we advance du'ect against his political or military chief
centres.

"The Ilird and IX th Army Corps will, together, be more
surely equal to their work, if, before coming into contact
with the enemy, they have not suffered from forced marches.

"The Xth Army Corps is, momentarily, only of three
Infantry Brigades with seventy-two guns. His Royal High-
ness will, however, reinforce it with six or seven squadrons of
Hes-sitm Cavalry* which are to go to Montgaris, and he will
bring up the mixed brigade left behind at Chauniont under
Gen. V. Kraatz, and leave only two battalions, one battery, and
a squadron watching towards Langres. , . . Since the part of
the Ai-my of the Loire which is capable of carrying out
operations, and is provided with cavalry, is acting north of
the Loire, General v. ^^oigts-Rhetz will find opposed to him
only loose infantry formations, to which he must, with his
artillery, be superior ; but even if he does not advance rapidly,
the direction of this attack would greatly disturb the whole
of the hostile operations. . . ,"^

And, unknown to the Prince, the missing 100,000 men of
the Army of the Loire, and more, stood in his path to
success.

The march assigned to the Xth Army Corps led it direct
into districts, in which, owing to their proximity to the Armv
of the Loire, the population would be emboldened to take an
active part in the defence. The corps had hardly commenced
its march towards Orleans than it began to experience the
influence on the population of the defeat at Coulmiers, and
the evacuation of Orleans. On the 15th, when arriving at
Chatillon on the Seine, thirty miles short of Tonnerre, it
found unmistakable signs of the " People's War.'^ So evi-
dent were these that on this day General v. V. Rhetz sent
hack word to the 39th Brigade, which was & d&y^s march in
rear : '* Attitude of the inhabitants of Chatillon hostile ; the
place evacuated only early this morning by French troof^ ;
armed parties in the neighbouring woods ; casualties must

THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 10-20 117

not be left behind, but be brought on in waggons " (a reversal
of a previous order). He also ordered that raen coming up
to join the Army should march in parties of not less than
3-400. On the 15th the General heard that a surprise by
Franc-tireurs was intended for the 16th or following days.
Althoug-h he knew that this might be a rumour only, he
deemed advisable to take special precautions for the further
advance.

The march was along one road and in echelon, coveiing a
length of two days' march ; the 40th Brigade, far in rear, had
to march independently. The 38th Brigade, the General
with it J led as advanced guard : to the next, the 37 th, was
assigned for protection the Corps Artillery and the 1st Train
Column ; the 39th Brigade with the 2nd Train Column, a
light bridge train EUid a Pontoon Company brought up the
rear. With each brigade were two batteries and two
squadrons of cavalry. The General determined not to
depend on his line of conimuiucation for ^^upplies. The
leading echelon had to collect supplies on the spot for itself
and for those in rear. The daily destination of the troops was
kept secret. Each echelon looked after its own security and
had to find its own quarters. If necessary, a whole Division
and all the Corps Artillery could be concentrated in a day.
The packs were now carried on vehicles to save the men in the
trying march. Each battalion earned with it three to four
days' supplies on waggons, the columns being thei-cby unfor-
tunately much lengthened. At night the infantry went into
cantonments, but the most careful precautions were taken
against surprise. It was found impossible to keep up com-
munication uninterruptedly between the Corps and the Army
Head-quarters. Infantry iescorts were necessary for the field
post, and even for the transmission of orders. The country
was pretty well deserted by the able-bodied men, ajs these
had gone away south to Auxerre, a centre for the hostile
in-egular troops. To ascertain how mattei's stood, an officer
with sonic dragoons was despatched in this dii-ection. They
were sni'priaed in Ablis, where they were I'e.stiiig for the

u8 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

night, the officer being killed. The few cavalry in advance
were constantly under lire ; and the country was so close that
the woods on either side of the marching columns had to be
cleared by infantry. The road was in manj places cut
through or barricaded ; telegi'aphs were found broken, bridgea
destroyed, and all materials for their repair removed. It
was in the towns and villages, not in the open country,
that the hostility of the population displayed itself. The
resistance soon took a more active form, artillery being
necessary to drive away the Gardes Mobiles and the Franc-
tireurs who now opposed the march of the column. The
rapidity of the advance of the Second Army, tc^ther with
the lighting power of the German columns, had, however,
disarranged the departmental plans for resistance, and, con-
sequently, all the hostile troops fell back behind the Loire,

V. d. Goltz writes of this time as follows: *' If aiFaire very
soon took a course entirely different from that which had
been anticipated, the reason is that the ground on which the
anticipations were based — namely, the estimate fonned of the
enemy — whs alterecK During the following days, the Army
got a ghmpiie of the difficulties, of which it had regarded
even hardly any as possible, and which it soon had to
encounter. It could no longer be concealed that against the
success of the whole campaign on the Loire, a danger might
crop up which could be averted only by the employment of
al! available forces. Already it had become known through
the outspoken remarks of the population which eyed, with a
certain amount of contempt, the weak marching columns of
the advancing Ilnd Army that, on the Loire, was asscm-
bhng an army numbering hundreds of thousands, well
equippetl, and animated by the highest spirit The expres-
sion La bdle Armie de lu Loire was heard here and there.
On the German side, this was at first regarded as mere
rhodomontade,as an exaggeration due to the constitutionally
excitable temperament."

But, at the very outset, the plan adopted on the 16th was
disarranged^ owing to the altered views of the population a&

THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 10^'iO 119

to the transmission of ordei-s and messages among the
invaders ; the officer carrying the order, and with a small escort,
from Sens to the Xth Army Corps found himself stopp«l
bj Franc-tireurs ; and it was not until by the chance arrival
of a small detachment of the Ilird Army Corps that the road
was cleared, and he could proceed on his mission. The delay
in the delivery of the order rendered impossible the arrival of
the corps at Montargis at the appointed time. The Prince
was at Nemours on the Loing on the 18th, and there in news-
papers were found stfttements that the strength of the Array of
the Loire was from S00,000 to 300,000 ; the Prince also heard
there of the fortifications at Orleans, and that the hostile Army
was concentrated at Orleans. Another corps, not hitherto
mentioned, was also spoken of, the 18th ; it was asserted
that General Michel of the Army of the East was to take
command of the Cavalry Division of the corp.'s. Also it was
stated that a body of troops 30—40,000 strong, under General
des Pallieres, which had not fought at Coulmiers, had arrived
from Bourges by Gien, It then occurred to the Prince that,
possibly, reinforcements were being drawn from the East by
rail to the Loire; and at 4 p.m. on the 18th he wired to
Versailles a report in which he said: "Perhaps for the
decision troops are being drawn from the Rhone by rail to
the Loire, and these will act against our left flank,"

On the 19th, the Prince received from v. Moltke the
answer, dated 18th, to his letter of the 16th. In it, v.
Moltke stated that the King approved the plan of operations
proposed on the 16thj and he continued: "a decision,
whether the Xth Army Corps should move direct on
Bourges cannot yet be given because it cannot yet be fore-
seen whether the employment of the whole Army towards
Chateaudun and Orleans may not be necessary. The question
will mainly depend on the result of the advance of the De-
tachment on le Mans commencing to-day "" : then come the
words already quoted : " On the question whether the main
body of the Army of the Loire is still at Orleans, or perhaps
in a more westerly direction at Chateaudun, light will be

120 THE PE0P1J^;S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

thrown in a few days and the information will be at once
sent to the Head-quarters of the Second Army." With this
letter came copies of two despatches from London, The
first stated that Orleans had been fortified and armed with
heavy guns ; that a body of 10,000 men had been em-
ployed at the work; and that the French Army was massed
between Artenay and Orleans. It was alleged that on the
l*oire, boats had been collected to facilitate crossing the
river, as soon as necessity arose for the dcstmctiou of the
bridges. Tlie second despatch stated that the railways from
Vierzon and Blois to Orleans had been nestored, and could be
used for bringing up reinforcements.

No doubt, the Prince, by his conduct of the operations of this
war has laid himself open to much ad verse criticism as a Leader ;
but one indispensable qualification for good leadership he
possessed in a marked degree^ he knew the importance of
information respecting the enemy, and he sparetl no pains to
obtain it from every possible source. Later on, just when
assigning its true value to the information obtained was of
the utmost importance, he seems sornetiutes to have allowed,
unfortunately, his personal prejudices against the informant
to weigh in forming his judgment with consequences that
were disastrous ; but from the 16th to the end of this
month J during which period this particular manifejstation of
*' peraonlichkeit " had no opportunity of exercising its per-
nicious influencej the eagerly sought-for information, when
obtained, was judicially, though not always satisfactorily,
weighed and considered.

On the 17th he had sent west in advance from Sens by
Chateau Landon to Boynes near Pithiviei's, in order to obtain
information, and to provide for the quartering of the IIIixl
Army Corps a small flying column of two squadrons with two
riile companies in waggons ; c4Stvalry acting alone being useless
in these disturbed districts. The debichment marched on a
line sweeping far round to the south- The detachment and
also the left flank of the corps in its further advance, came
fi'cquently into conflict with strong hostile foives. On the

THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 10-20 121

18th, another small flying column with two guns was also
sent south towai'ds Joigny. It was this column that came
across the officer with the orders for the Xth Army Corps and
opened the road for him. On the 20th the Illi-d Army Corps
arrived at its destination Pithiviers, and so hostile was the
population, that its patrols were fired at from the fields even
by country people armed with flint-lock muskets.

All this time, the 2nd Cav. Division and the IXth Army
Coips on the Orleans Road, had been unremitting in their
efforts to obtain information. The Cavalry Division had on
the ISth regained touch with the enemy towards QrleanSj and it
had been placed under v. Manstein's orders on the 16th. On
the ISth, the Prince sent directions to v. Manstein as follows :
" It h of the first impoi-tance to obtain detailetl information
respecting the position of the enemy noi-th of Orleans, espe-
cially as regards his strength, general dispositionii, and the
extent and positions towards the flanks. The Commanders of
the 1st and 2nd Cav. Divisions are therefore diiiected to clear
up in detail these matters, by reconnaissances which are to be
carried out during the folloiiiing days, preferably round the
Hanks, and for the same purpose to capture as many prisoners
as possible. Your Excellency will, until further orders, scad
an officer every day (by midday) to my I lead- quarters with the
information obtained about the enemy, and anything that
may have taken place on Your Kxcellcncy^s right flank."
But V. Majistein needed no urging, for he realised the need
of information, and at 6.30 p.m. on the 18th he had tele-
graphed to both Versailles and the Prince : " Enemy's out-
posts on the line St. Germain le Grand-Riian-Dambix>n ; a
detachment at Chilleui's aux Bois, bivouac fires on the line
Bougy-St. Lye [a little south] and south of Artenay.
Accoi-ding to a consensus of reports, the enemy is pi-eparing a
defensive position at St. Lye and Chevilly.'" Next day, at
10.15 A.M., he reported that on the outpost line, but with the
right a little more forw ard, are line troops ; there are infantry
and artillery at Chillcurs ; bivouac Wreti as before ; according
to a eoiisensuy of iufortilation received, the line Bougy-St. Lye

122 THK PEOPLE'S WAH IN FRANCE, 1870^71

is prepared for defence. At St, Lye, which is on the edge of
the forest, and on an old Roman road from Orleans to
Etampes on the main road, workmen have been summoned
to prepare artillery emplacements in the woods there. On
the SOth at 4 p.m. *' No change since 17th, but infantry and
cavalry are at and south of Orgeres [ten miles west of the main
road]; strong bodies at Chilleurs aus Bois and further east
to Chanibon ; many bivouac fires south of Artenay. On this
day the 2nd Cav» Division reported, " According to statements
of prisoners, there are 150,000 men at Orleans, one army
corps is at Gidy and another at Chevilly."

On the 19th the Prince sent two of the General Staff
Officers of his jVrmy to make personal reconnaissances on
both sides of the Paris road. These officers rode through
the French outpost Jine, which was found to be continuous,
and the result of the reconnaissance was that the mass
of the French Army was reportetl to be on this road. On
the SOth were named in the newspapers as belonging to this
Army the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th Corps, whose total
strength was given as from 150,000 to 200,000 men.

One failure to obtain information deserves recording. The
actual text of the Army Oixier on the 16th from Sens is not
given in the works that have been consulted, but v, d. Goltz
in his account of it says ; " In order to reinforce the Xth
Army Corps, and to enable it better to act independently, the
Hessian Cavalry Brigade of the IXth Corps was given to it.
This Brigade was to march by Pithiviers on Montargis, and
arrive at the latter place on the 19th, and seek to connect
with the Xth Corps in the direction of Joigny [thirty miles
east of Montargis]," A note runs : " General v. Manstein
was ordered to give over (abzugebeu) 6-7 Squadrons of this
Brigade and to send them to Montargis," The strength of
the Brigade was eight squadrons. The note is not incon-
sistent with the Army Order ; and its insertion seems as if
intended to account in some degree for the subsequent failure
in the execution of the Army Order. Hoenig, in his version
of the Ainiy Order, adds another duty ; the squadroni^ were

THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBEH 10-gO 123

to march by PUhiviers m order to reconnoitre in this
direction and to the south, and at the same time conceal
from the enemy the approacJi of the Army Corps ; but v.
d. GoltJt says^ that this wa^ not alluded to in the order. It
is unfortunate that all the order or orders actually received
by V. Manstein in connection with this march, and the sources
whence they originated cannot be ascertained. The Cavalry
Brigade had had very hai"d work in the March from Troves^
so V. Manstein did not despatch it to Montargis on the 17th,
but delayed the new march until the 18th; and he left to
the commander, Maj.-Gen, v, Rantzaij, the selection of the
route to be taken. The distance from Angerville to Mon-
targis by the direct road through Pithiviers is a little over
forty miles, so if no opposition were encountered on the
march, it was quite practicable for the Brigade to arrive at
Montargis on the 19th day named in the Army Orders.
V. Rantzaii selected, however, a road running north of
Pithiviers, and after a march of some twenty miles, halted
for the night at Puiseauxj at 2 p.m. On the following day he
continued his march, not as ordered by Pithiviers, because the
place was reported to be held by S-3000 Gardes Mobiles,
but right across the line of march of the Illrd Army Corps
on its way to Pithiviers, and he halted for the night eight
miles short of the place at Prefontaine. The Ilird Army
Corps declining to comply with the request for support, the
General on the SOth entered into negotiations with the Mail's
for the evacuation of the town ; and not until noon on the
following day, just before the aiTival of the leading troops of
the Xth Army Corps, did v. Kantzau enter the place. The
2500 Gardes Mobiles had laid down their arms and had
dispersed to their homes, but the arms had been removed.

When the account of these proceedings reached the Prince
his anger was great. His intention in sending this cavalrv had
been to hide the flank march of the Illrd Army Corps by the
cavalry moving between it and the enemy, though in the
reverse direction, and also by active reconnaissance to obtain
that most important information, namely, what was takijjg

124 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

place on his exposed flank on the side of the enemy. And
yet since neither General v. Manstein nor v, Hant:^u

regarded the march as anything but au ordinary route-inait;h
for the tmnsfer of a force of cavalry, it would seem probable
that the Head-quarters of the Army had not made clear its
wishes to the corps commander. V. d. Goltz admits that
it is doubtful whethcrj in the state of ferment among the
population, this small body of cavalry could have made its
way through by Pithiviera.

Of coui'se, it had been only by degrees that the Prince
came fully to realise the complete difference between the
character of this war and of that which had terminated at
Sedan. But the realisation was completed on the 20th,
when, whilst shifting his Head-quarters from Puiseaux to
Pithivieritj he bent away from the direct road between those
places to ascertain personally for himself the character of the
theatre of war into which his army was now moving, and also
the attitude of the population in this " People's War," He
recognised at once, fully, that the whole character of the war
had altered; that it was not merely the hostile army that
was his enemy, but the whole of the population also, and that
from the physical nature of the country both these eneraiea
would denve gi-eat assistance. During the ride, the farms
and villages were found deserted ; in the fields bodies of
armed men were visible; bullets fell all round irregularly;
prisoners, some of them priests with gloomy faces, bearing
expressions of the deepest hatred, came before the Prince ; the
roads were in many places cut through and tlestroyed, the
sign -posts carried away ; and the bells of the churches
signalled from church tower to church tower the march of
the invadei-s. By this gloomy November picture the Prince
was so deeply impressed that he repeatedly made remai'ks to
those around him about the rising of the Spanish nation
against Napoleon I, And the situation could hardly appear
otherwise to him, for the French people were in an unmis-
takable state of frenzy ; aloud and openly they declared in
the towns that the Germans would be crushed on the Loire

THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 10-20 125

by the masses full of deep hatred, and that the decision
was close at hand. And there were, indeetl, unmistakable
indications of a near decision ; everything seemed to point to
it. Moreover, on the SOth, the Prince had received from the
Detachment^ a report according to which there were in front
of it only troops of the " Army of the West," and there were
not there any of the Army of the Loire,

It was tiie combination of all these items of information
from all the various sources mentioned, that led the Prince
to telegraph from Pithiviers! to v. Moltke at T.15 ?.h. on
the SOth the following important message :

" Head-quarters and Ilird Army Coi-ps have anived here ;
the advanced parties drove the enemy to-day out of Nancray
and Beaune la RoJande. No news of the Xth Army Corps
since the 17th, but no ground for anxiety ; its arrival at Mon-
targis is awaited. Our impression is that after the Hght at
Coulmiers none of the enemy moved away to the North West,"

The Prince's message ci-ossed a letter of the SOth from
V. Moltke. " Whether he (the Grand Duke) now has in
front of him in this direction the Army of the Loire, or this
is at Chateaudun (report has just come in tlrnt the gan-ison
of Chartrcs has been ' alarmed '') or whether it is at Orleans,
or is divided with the 16th Corps still at Orleans, and the 15th
fmiiher west, is at the present time quite uncertain. From the
Ilird Army has just come in the foilowing report : ' Columns
of the enemy have advanced from IHiers and Bonneval (Cha-
teaudun) in the night (19-SO) and have compelled the 4th
Division Cav. to fall back to the neighbourhood of Charti*es,
. . . Everywhere on an arc from Verjieuil [well to the w^est
of Dreus] round to Bonneval, the enemy, Line Troops and
Gardes Mobiles, are encountei-ed.' "' The Royal Head-
quarters had further stated that the strength of the Arniy
of the Loire amounted to 80-90,000 infantry, and that much
had been done to augment its ai'tillery."'

128 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

direction in the employment of the Detachment. This direc-
tion was here indicated to the Detachment by the mention of
the fact, that on the previous day^ the enemy vvas extended
from Orgtres to BeauTie la Rolande ; and that the Detat-hmeut
might, at any moment, be ordered to move in this new direc-
tioiij was at least probable from the 4th Cav. Division being
ordered, to connect with the Itnd Army. The telegraph being
employed for the communication must have given rise at the
Detachment to the conviction that time was pressing. In short,
this simple telegi-am of General v, Moltke was a weighty and
clear sti-agetical indication, and had been sent by wire in order
rt;i' '■'' • '"' 'ttflnnont might, by proper preparations, be ready
for iiti .t* ' 1»«).^^si.>ilitit^s that might occur. It must be admitted,"
he continues, "that for the recognition of the importance of
such an intimation, the penetration and intuition of a Leader
far-seeing and of clear judgment were necessary. In the tele-
gram the Detachment saw, however, only the order to cairy
out the duty of connecting ^vith the Ilnd Army by means
of the 4tli Cavalry Division ; the mere subsidiary mechanical
side of it; but the rest of the contents in no way led to the
consideration of operative measures, so General v, Moltke
remained completely mi.sunderstood. The Detachment held
firmly to its view of continuing in the direction hitherto taken,
and when entirely different important operations fell to it,
it was not prepared for them, and, as will be shown, could
not carry them out. The Leader, v. Moltke, could not on the
other hand say, in his telegram of the 21st, more than he said ;
in it there is not a word too many, not a word too few ; for, at
present, it was essential to be sure whether strong hostile forces
had come to Nogent le Rotrou, If this was not the case,
then the Detachment must necessarily, to a certain extent,
use its thinking power in the spirit of v, Moltke, and at least
acknowledge that the military situation indicated a crisis.
Then it was advisable to give attention to favorable operative
conditions, and indeed in this case probably to the East,
for to this direction attention was drawn ; above all, to kalt^
to remain statlo7iary^ to watch the enemy only with cavalry,

THE GRAND DUKE'S DETACHMENT 129

to advance uo furthtr to the south- <v est, and to wait ; but, on
the other hand, to think out and pi-^ipaiT all orders for a
inarch oft' to the east. Only if a fommand that is tar oil'
thinks out matters in this way, and co-operates, can strategical
intimations be I'eckoned on to produce the intended I'esults.
Thisj telegram is one of this kind, and on account of its great
inijiortance, as well also as a type of the v. Moltke strategical
intimations, it deserves this examination ; the more so, because
the Detachment isoon found itself in a niofst unfaxmirablc
operative situation owing to the telegram not having been
understood."" So far Hoenig.

But whatever view may be takeu of the matter, it does seem
remarkable, even on Hoenig^s own showing, that as v. Moltke,
and the Crwvn Prince, and Versailles generally, had already
formed but a poor opinion of the Grand Duke as a
commander and of Colonel v. Krenski a,s a Chief of the
Staff, V, Moltke should have adopted in his communica-
tion so enigmatical a mode of expressing his views, a mode
suitable enough to big minds like those of v, Manteuft'el
and V. Goeben, but quite beyond the compreliensioti of men
like the leaders of the Detachment. Here, the relyiiig on
the much-lauded "directive" system of command was a
failure.

The truth is that it is doubtful whether during the whole
of the Franco-German War there was a day of much gi'eater
anxiety at the Uoyal Head-quartei-s than this November 21st,
1870. On the evening of the 20th there had been sent from
Prince Fi-ederick Chai'les at Pithiviers the telegram already
given. \'ery threatening was the situation as on the Slst
it presented itself to v. Moltke. For the direct protection of
the main road from Orleans a tbrce of only two Army Corps
(one fatigued by a long march) and two Cavalry Divisions ;
a third corps missing on the left ; the force confronted bv a
hostile army which had had time not only to complete its
preparations, but to be very strongly reinforced ; to the
south-west, moving farther away day by day from the road,
the Detachment, and thiij might find in front of it the

fjo THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

eneiwy in a strongly prepared position at Nogentj sixty
miles away from the road ; and he hears also that between
the Detachment and the rood from Orleans to Paris, the
enemy is now advancing so as to ticparate the two German
forces here in the field ; whilst everywhere, on the front,
flanks, and rear of the Detachment there are hostile troops.
It is diflficult to see why v. Moltke did not by telegi^aph give
some advice and counsel to the Duke. It vv ould seem as if he
himself felt that he could not say what was the best thing to
be done, and therefore resigned himself to letting matteris
take their course uninfluenced by him.

On the S^ud the Grand Duke moved to the attiick of Nogeut,
and, contrary to expectation, the town, which had been one
of the chief centres of the ** Army of the West," n town in
the heart of specially defensible country, was found aJi-eady
evacuated, a general retirement on le Mans having begun on
the previous day ; and the " Army of the West " disappears
fi-om the war just at the place where such an army might have
offered strong resistance, just at the time when, to keep the
advancing Detachment in the south-west would seem specially
desiiable. And that short-lived ai'my, in its strength and its
weaknesseSj offers much subject for thought to those who
believe in Home Defence really national in character. This
army was composed mainly of civilians whose sole claim to be
regarded as soldiers was their wearing a uniform or a distinc-
tive badge and carrying a firearm of some sort in their hands.
The younger men bore the title of Gardes Mobiles, and were
those Gardes Mobiles for whom no place could be found in the
larger organisations, the Army Carps ; they formed small
independent fighting bodies of men employed in-espective of
the locality fi-om which they had been drawn. The elder men
bore the title of Gardes Nationales, and to these was, as a rule,
eiitrusted the defence of the localities or districts in which
they lived. Time had not permitted the bringing this
organisation into thorough working order, and making the
regulations that would have ensured the greatest amount
of result being obtained from itb action in the field. There

THE GBAND DUKE'S DETACHMENT 131

was little cohesion, little combination in the work. But
considering the short time that those in this Army had been
assisting in the defence of the country, they had carried
oat admirably and excellently the work of forming a screen,
raising a dense Fog of War around the invading army,
the only work of war for which such an army is fittedi. It
was this army that led v. Moltke to carry out strategical
operations worse than unsiiited to the military situation ; it
was this army that had helped so greatly in luring 50,000
men and 200 guns away from the Loire, where their presence
woidd have been invaluable, to this district whence uo danger
threatened ; in giving to the Loire Army yet more time for
uninterrupted preparations for the field ; and in drawing the
Detachment so far away from the decisive point, that when the
real conflict ensued, antl the decisive struggle took place, the
fate of the weak force of the Germans hung for hours in the
Imlaiice ; and that the balance did not turn against them was
due, not to their wisdom, but to the hopelessly bad leading of
their opponents. No wonder that v. Moltke detested un-
professional soldiers, patriotic citixens in uniform and out of
uniform. But for acting as anything but a screen, the "Army
of the West,"" as must be all "people in arms,^ was powerless;
for as soon as a " People's Army " encounters on the field
of battle a trained army, its fate is sealed. And that a
" People's Army "" may give its value to the full as a stTeeii
in war, most careful organisation and preparation in peace is
an absolutely necessary condition. So clearly had the power-
lessness of the '* Army of the West "" in battle shown ibself
since the 17th, that the authorities at Tours determined,
since in it were many fighting men^ no longer to sacrifice
them uselessly; so, on the Slst, was begun a general retreat
to le Mans, where the 21st Corp3 was in course of organisa-
tion, and into which the remnants of the "Army of the West '"''
were to be incorporated. So it had happened that the Grand
Duke had to suffer a second time the mortification of dealing
a blow en rair, even less hurtful to the enemy than that he had
delivered at Dreux.

132 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

But although disappointed by having been lured to Nogent
hy a. mirage only, the Grand Duke did not lose heart; for a
third time did the decisive point seem to beckon him on ; this
time it was le Mans, only thirty-five miles distant, a place iso
important that its abandonment by the enemy without a Hght
was impossible, and to it the road nosv lay open ; so onwai'ds
without delay ; he at onee pushed forward a Bavarian brigade
twelve miles to la Ferte Bernard, At night the Detachment
was somewhat scattered, the main body of the Bavarians and
the SJ^nd Inf. Division being in Nogent and the neighbourhood,
the 17th Inf. Division ten miles to the ue>it at Ifelleme. Tlie
6th Cav, Division was at Authon, ten miles east of La Ferto
Bemai-d ; the 4th Cav. Division was at least twenty miles east
of Nogent, at Illiera and the neighbourhood. Le Mans is
nearly eighty miles from Orleans. Truly v. Moltke's inti-
mation had been completely ignored. But there was much to
justily the Grand Duke in his independent action, for early in
the morning he had received a communication which must
have fully confirmed him iu the belief that his strategy was
correct. At 7 a.m. had come a letter from Prince Fixxlerick
Charles, which had been despatched from Pithiviera 3.30 the
previous afternoon, the 21st.

" I beg to inform your Royal Highness that the Second
Army iii with the IXth Army Corps at Angerville,and with the
IlIrd Army Corp, and my Head -quarters at Pithiviei's; the 1st
and 2nd Cavalry Divisions arc in touch with the enemy, whose
outposts extend from north of Artenay to Chilleurs aux Bois."
[This situation cei-tainly does not coii-espond with that given in
V. Moltke's telegram.] " The enemy opposite to us is, according
to our impressiion derived from all the i-eports received, the
entire Army of the Loire. I am awaiting before attacking
it the arrival of the Xth Army Corps, of which, by forced
marches, the leading troops arrive to-day at Montargis, I
hope to attack the enemy in four or five days, and eventually
to drive him to the south-west. I suggest to your Hoyal
Highness to co-operate in this purpose by an advance
by le Mans on Tours, if the instructions from the Head-

THK GRAND DUKE'S DETACHMENT 133

quarters of his Majesty the King do not require something
else."

To this the Grand Duke i-eplied by wire :

" Co-o]>eration in the direction of le Mans, with the pro-
jected further advance on Tours, already prepareil for by my
depai'ture from tlie Paris-OiieaTis road. Advance to-day for
concentrated attack on Nogent leRotrou; 4th Cavah'y Divi-
sion remains on the Chartres-Chateaudun road, and is ordered
to obtain connection with Stolber^fr's Division, as oufrht already
yesterday to have been effected." The Third Army received
on the evening of the 22nd, by wire, the report from the
Grand Duke of his movements for the morrow.

The Gmnd Duke had fair cauae for believing that he had
adopted the course of action best suited to the situation.
The Royal Head-quarters had informed him that the enemy
was in front of the Prince ; and by the l^rince, who was
on the spot, he had been told how best to help him,
so the only course to be taken was to comply with his
request. But on the SSnd, thci-e came to hand fi-om v.
Blumenthal a letter of the same date as that of Prince
Frederick Charles, and suggesting a totally opposite course of
action.

*' For some days I have wished to write to your Royal
Highness to offer suggestions as regards the general situation
a'j it appears to us here ; but our information is so indefinite,
that I have always been afraid of saying something that was
incorrect. And even now things are so little clear, that I
must restrict my remarks to the tbllowing matters. As you
will have learnt from the telegram of General v. Moltke, the
Army of the Loire, apparently the 15th and 16th Army
Corps, was yesterday on the line Orgeres-Axtenay, opposite
General v. Manstein. He was to-day to have advanced
under Prince Frederick Charles with the Hlrd Army Corps
against Orleans. But it appears as if the Xth Army Corps is
ijtill too far away, and, thei-efore, Prince Frederick Charles
will delay for some days making the attack. For your Royal
Highness this is inconvenient, because under these circum-

134 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

stances, your line of communication can be threatened
through Chartres ; but it is to be hoped that the 4th Cav.
Dividon, if rightly handled, will wani you in time so that
you will not be takei» by surprise. Meantime you may also
have in front of you more perhaps than there appears to be,
Nogent le Rotrou and also le Mans are said to be foi-tifiedj
andj as you will see from the newspaper cutting sent here-
with» the Army of Brittany, perhaps now 50^000 men, is said
to be in an entrenchetl camp at Conlie (apparently fourteen
to nineteen miles north-west of le Mans).

" I thinks therefore, that it would be desirable not to
advance too quickly on le Mans, but rather to defer the
attack for a few days, till you know with certainty about the
advance of Prince Frederick Charles.

** His Royal Highness has authorised me to send this
letter, and desires to add only, that General v. Rheinbaben
may be obliged to advance further towards Evreus., unless the
movements of the Army of the Loire compel us to keep hira
more within reach for the protection of Chartres and the
whole line of communication.^

And now what a very strange situation has arisen. It was
the Crown Priuce that was the Grand Duke's superior com-
mander ; the Detachment was part of the Third Army, and
with any portion of that Army no one but v, Moltke had the
slightest right to interfere ; yet here we find the commander
of another army. Prince Frederick Charles, sending direct
to a subordinate commander of the Thii-d Army his wishes
as to the line of action he should take, instead of first
asking the Commander supreme over both for permission for
the co-operation. How was it possible for the King of
Prussia to regulate a campaign in which the commander of
one of his armies delibeiately and independently interfered
directly in the opemtions of anotha* of his armies ? And, as
a matter of fact, the result of this interference was to dis-
arrange the plan of campaign of the Royal Head -quarters.
Again does Hoenig find fault with the Grand Duke for acting
in conformity with the Prince's wishes and against the advice

THE GRAND DITKE*S DETACHMENT 135

received from Versailles, but the Grand Duke would have
been more than human had he not done so. Moreover, an
attack on le Mans must create a panic among the delegation
at Tours, who, for their own safety, must at once bring from
the Ai-ni_y in front of Prince Frederick Charles strong detach-
ments, and the attack would thus give to the Prince the aid
specially asked for by him. In the communications from v,
Moltke, the Prince and v. Blumcnthal, there was a discrepancy
on one very important matter. V. Moltke said that the front
of the hostile force extended from Orgeres as far east as Beaune-
la-RoIande. The Prince gave as the front only the centre
third of this line, Chillcure aux Bois to Artenay ; v. Blumcn-
thal gave the western third, Artenay to Orgeves ; and as the
Prince reported from the spot it would be probable that his
statement was correct. In this case, the left wing of the Second
Army had nothing in front of it, and would be free to attack
effectively the Army of the Loire, dimtnis^ied by the detach-
ments sent in haste to le Mans. Neither the^tone nor the
contents of v. Bhimenthars letter was calculated to make much
impression on a Commander, who had shown Nfhat he could
take the bit between his teeth if he chose to do s6. It had an
uncertain sound, was hesitating and painfully apologetic. It
was hardly a communication, still less an order, from his
commander the Crown Prince, for he had simply approved of
it. It seemed to be the expression of opinion of a Staff
Officer, of very high degree it is true, but an expression of
personal opinion only. And this Staff Officer showed how he
misjudged the situation because there was not more, but far
iessj in front of the Grand Duke than had been anticipated.
Nogent was, as v. Blumcnthal stated, fortified ; but as the
fortifications were found destitute of defenders, they were not
of a sort to stop an advance. So also the Army of Brittany
and the fortificationis at le Mans might prove to be of
similarly little value. Then, as regards the danger to the
line of communications, the anxiety for these was altogether
a new feature in the campaign, Gravelotte, Sedan> the
advance on Paiis, the instructions to v. d. Tann to advance

138 THE PEOPLF/S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

And here again, for a time, we must leave the Grand Duke,
at the conclusion of a series of operations yielding nothing
but disappointment to him as the independent commander of
as good and effective a force of 60,000 men as ever were put
into the field ; and we must go to both Pithiviers and Ver-
sailles, and we shall then ascertain the reason for the order
to march to Beaugency.

CHAPTER IX

THE SECOND AftMT, FEOM NOVEMBER 31bt TO 23BD

During the night SOth-Slst more confirmatory reports came
in from the front to the Prince, who now saw that the task
before him, which on the 16th had appeared to be so easy, was
something very different from what he had anticipated i and
he therefore determined to delay the contemplated convergent
attack on Orleans for a few days until the tliree Brigades
of the Xth Army Corps should have rejoined the Army. At
midday on the 21st v. Stiehle communicated this resolve to
V. Moltke in a letter, in which he embodied the information
obtained. In the letter he also isaid : " The great length of
the enemy"'s outpost line is only possible from the wild excite-
ment of the population since the recapture of Orleans. From
every place even not occupied by troops j {ire opens on the
approach of onr troops. If we send strong detachments the
enemy falls back to the nest place and repeats the same game.
This is facilitated by the close cultivation, . . , These cir-
cumstances taken together have produced in ns the conviction
that large hostile forces are south of Artenay, on the Paris-
Orleans road (16th Coips), and four and three-quarter miles
east at St. Ly«^, on the Roman road to Orleans (15th Corps).
For the present, in view of the presumable strength of the
enemy, it would be unwise, before the Xth Army Corps has.
joined the Second Array, to appeal to a decision of arms, which
will influence the whole course of affairs in France, Gen. v. V.
Bhetz an-ives to-day at Montargis with the head of the corps.
But his closing on the left wing of the army, as will be
necessary for the fight will, under the most favorable ciroum-
stauces, require three to four days, because his troops, during

HO THE PPIOPI^^S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870 71

their forced marches, have been constantlv in fight with the
insurgents, and have had no halt-day. ... In the last report
from Gen. v. V. Rhetz from Joigny, which is of the morning
of the 19th, he states that his three Infanti"}' Brigades number
1S,000 riHes. . . . His Royal Highness hopes to be able to
carry out the attack with concentrated forces on the 36th
inst,, and proposes to drive the enemy towards Tours. Should
H.R.H. the Grand Duke advance snecespfully towards le
Mans, our operations would work very well together. Up to
that time the Second Army, by concentrating here, and by
daily reconnaissances of the enemy, will carry out the duty
ft.ssigned to it, ' the protection of the road from Orleans to
Paris.' "" With the letter the Prince sent some a{ldenda, some
con-ect, some incorrectj to the Ordre de Bataille, the German
staff were endeavouring to construct as regards the Army of
the Loire.

The Prince, in his order of the 16th to the Xth Army Corps
dircctitig it on Montargis, had said that it wa.s possible that
all three corps might be required for the convergent
attack on Orleans, but that it was more probable that, on
the arrival of the corps, this would be unnecessary, and the
corps w^ould be given the direction of Bourges by Gien.
" Reaching this point is of the greatest military impoi-tance.
It cannot be foreseen whether the corps will meet with any
serious opposition in this dii'cction ; but, prasumably, even
before Gen, v. Kraatz''s detachment joins the corps, this,
eKpeeialJy owing to its numerous artillery, will l>e able suc-
cessfully to deal with much larger hostile forces. It mu&t be
left until the sot h, whether the Xth Army Corps goes towards
Bourges, and I reserve to myself the details. Meantime I
now request Your Excellency to be so good as to com-
municate to me your opinion on the operation mentioned,'"

It is not certain whether the answer from v. Voigts Rhetx
to this request was received before or after the Prince came to
the decision to defer the attack until the S6th, but in either
case the answer was conclusive as regai-ds the proposed march
on Bourges : the General wi-ote as follows :

THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 21 -S3 141

" At the present luoment^ owing to the absence of all
iiifonnatioD, I am unable to ^ive a decided opinion as
r*ijriirds an o])eratic>n against Bourgas. I must conline niv-
sclf tlierefore iit ctrtisideriiig the strength I shall have with
my available for the purpose." The General then states
that he will have to leave behind liini to hold certain
jioints and also m escorts^ to the trains, detachments which
will have reduced the corps on its arrival at Gien to fif-
teen battalions, some sixty guns and ten to tweK'e
squadroiiN. "It is very probable that with this force I
could capture Gien and cross to the left bank if the
bridgf is not destrojetl. But I must take special care, as
I have no pontoon train with me, to keep hold of Gien
antl its bridge whilst 1 advance beyond. In Gien, therefore,
I shall have to lL'a\'e some three btittalions (1500 to 1800
u)en)j and two batteries even if I have the aid of entrench-
ments. Even if it should be not necessary to leave another
dL'tachnient at, perhaps, Aubigny, I should have with nic,
on my arrivnl at Bonrges, some twelve battalions, some 70(K>
to 8000 virtcN and fifty guns. Whether this force would be
sufficient, I cannot tell, as I do not know in what strength
the enemy is there, or whethei' the reports which I have read
in the newspai^ei-s are eorrectj that Bourge« has been put in a
state of defence,

" If it had not been necessary to send the Xth Army (-orps
to Montargis, it would seem to me to have been desirable pre-
paratory to an expedition to Bourges first to clear out Auxerre,
and this, as I believe, would have had the eftect of (juieting
the population on my line of mtirch, and then of enabling me
to choose a crossing point somewhat hightT up the Loire.
Gien lies nearer to Orleans which is occupied by the enemy
than to Bourges which I shall have to reach."

On the 21st had come to the Prince from the 4th Cav,
Division an officer who informed him of the advance of the
Grand Duke on Nogent le Rotrou where, according to
rumour, it was anticipated the enemy w-as ; and that the
enemy who had been iu very laige force at Dreux had been

J +2 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

broken up by the victorious encounter of the 17th Inf.
Division with territorial troops. The officer then gave the
details of the intended operation. Hence the despatch to the
Grand Duke of the communication already given , asking him
to continue his advance on le Mans.

The telegram of the 20th from the Prince to v. Moltke,
wm undoubtedly so brief, that v, Moltke niayj perhaps, have
regarded it merely as the expression of the personal views of
a comniander, to whose opinion he did not attach any great
weight ; but the letter of the Si st which was received on the
SJJind must have been conclusive. If, however, any doubt
remained, as to the gi'avity of the situation on the Loire^ it
niu«t have finally been dissipated by the receipt that day of a
despatch from General v. Werder in the south-east stating,
that according to reports received, *' Michers Corps had gone
on the 16th and 17th in a westerly direction from Autun "
near Chalons sur Soane "and on the railway line to Gien,
Orleans, and Bourges.

On the Slst there had been much anxiety at V^ersaiiles
with regard to the action of the Grand Duke ; istrong forces
were believed to be in front of hini, and the further advance
appeared to involve great risk to the line of commynications,
especially a-s the 4th Cav. Division on the left flank was
not able to hold its own against some hostile force which
was pressing forward north, whilst the Detachment moved
south-west; and it was believed that v. Bluraenthal's recom-
mendation would be regarded by the Grand Duke as an
order. There is not in Prince Frederick Charles' letter, as
given in Hoenig's words, and which was despatched at mid-
day, any indication that he was going to connnunicate his
wishes to the Grand Duke, as he did at 3,30 p.m,, and it does
not appear that the Grand Duke cared to be over-com-
municative to the Third Army ; in this, as we have seen,
V. Blumenthal regarded him as wise. Had the Prince's
message been known to Versailles, its effect on the Grand
Duke could have been counteracted ; but where two com-
manders at a distance co-operate with each other and keep

THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 21-23 143

their counsel to themselvesj the Hiiprenie authority is more or
less helpless. Without honest, cordial, and thorough co-
operation, combined movements in war have little chance of
success. At VersailleSj it was thought that the only hc)stile
army corps, needing to be dealt with, were the 15th and 16th.
They had heard of the I7th, 18th, and the Slst, but whei-e
they were and the degree of organisation ai-rived at by them,
was not known. Of the 20th even less had been heard.
The Prince's letter of the ^Ist made, on its receipt, a gi-eat
impres.sion at Vei"sailles, intensified by the iie\r,s from v.
Werder. It was not known that the Grand Duke hati
obtained possession of Nogent, but this success, and even a
inarch on to le Mans, v, Moltke could not regard as counter-
bolaijcing the danger that must arise for the Second Army
if, whilst the enemy opposite the latter was receiving
strong reinforcements from the east, the Detachment should
be maiiching Rway south-west, and be rendering itself every
mile more and more useless to the Second Army, as an aid
against the increase of hostile strength. Hence the audience
with the king, and the peremptory oivier to give up the
march on le Mans and move on Beaugency. At once had
been realised the imminent danger in which the Second Army
was. With a greatly nnmerically superior enemy in front and
in touch with it, it was extended over a front of forty miles,
from Anger ville to Montargis, with one of its corps fatigued
by long and trying marches, and only tlie head yet at
Montargis, the Detachment sixty miles to the westwai-d and
intending to go still further away.

Bat, unfortunately, v. Moltke and the Prince differed in
their views as to the measures to be adopted to minimise the
danger. The Prince wished for such a demonstration to the
south-west as would force the enemy to send away part of
his army to protect Tours, the seat of the government of the
Provinces ; v. Moltke determined that a blow should be struck
against the left flank of tiie enemy in his present position by
the seizure of a point on the Loire, whence co-operating
attacks could be made^ either up the right bank against the

144 THE PEOPLE^S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

position, or with a portion, of the force on. the left bank
against the eneniv's L-ommuiiications with Toars and the rest
ol" I'Vanct;. This difference in viewss was fundamental as
regards the future sti'ategy of the canipaji^n.

On the ^2nd the IXth Army Corps iidvanced down the
Orleans Itoad as far as Tourv ; aiid at Jlontfirgis the three
hrigswles of the Xth Army C'orps completed their concentra-
tion. During the day the Prince i^eceived information leadinf^
him to l>eUeve in a wastward movement of the enemy. From
the Detarhnient came the report that the Grand Duke had
nhtained possession of Nogent and would continue his advance
on le Mans the following day. From Versailles came at 10
at night the news of the desj)Htch of MichePs corps from the
east to the Ixiire. The actual situation on the French side
wa.s therefore anything but clear.

On the iiSrd the 38th Brigade, v. \Veilell,the leading brigatle
of the Xtli Army Corps, marched from Montargis to Beaune-
k-Roknde and the Pnnce himself reconnoitred, from Pithi-
viers to the westwaixl ; but the information a.s to a wtfstward
movement of the French wtis conflicting. A report of the
f^Snd, i-eceived this day, stated that on the 2Snd there were
30,000 men in Gieu. The Prince determined to remain on
the defenisive until the arrival of the Detachment^ and he
eonimunicated to Veinailles at midday his intention. Inhabi-
tants re{>orted during the day that troops were marching
uoi'th from Gien, and it was also asserted tliat on the ^Ist
General d'Aurelle had his Head-quarters in Gien. The Royal
Head -tjuarters informed the Prince that the attack on Orleans
bv the Detachment could not be expected before the 38th.

It may lie reuienibei-ed that iu the telegram 0.45 p.m. of
the 32nd from the Third Aimy to the Grand Duke, orderinip
the Miarch on Beaugency, it was stated that a letter would
follow. The letter was one from the Royal Head-quarters to
those of the Third Army, and it appears from v. Blnmenthal's
diarVf that to the Third Army was left the mode of com-
munif^ting its contents to the Giund Duke. V. Blumenthal
:jays he received the order at 9 p.ai. and he adds : "The

THE SECOND AHMV, NOVEMBER 31-2i3 145

order will have to be telegraphed to-night." In the letter,
which arrived at the Detachment on the 23rd we read ; *' It
has become pi-obable that the whole of the army of the Loire
is opposite F.M. H.R.H. Prince Frederick Chai-les and is in
an entrenched position. The Prince cannot concentrate
until the 25th his three Army Corps for an attack on the
following day. According to information received ^ reinforce-
ments have come by i-ailway to the Loire from Autun.
Under these circinnstances, co-operation of the Detachment
of H.R.H. the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg appears to be
necessarv'. As no decisive defeat of the French Army of the
West haii taken place at Nogent le Rotroa, the pursuit in the
direction of le Mans is to be onlv by cavalry with small
detachments of infantry, and His Majesty orders that the
Grand Duke with all the remainder of* his troops shall at
once march in the direction of the Loire. The Detachment
will be able to arrive at Orleans or Blois on the day above-
named, the 26th, or a little later. For a simultaneous
attack, eventually on the left bank of the Loire, the necessary
aiTangements must be made with the Command of th&
Second Army. It is desirable, moreover, that the advance
shall by sui-prise gain possession of one of the permanent
river-crossings over the Loire ; if this does not happen,, then
the materiab lacking for a tield bridge must be obtained
from the Second Army." In a short addendum to the letter
v. Blumenthal remarked : *' It would be of great importance
if one of the bridges over the Loire at Beaugency or Blois
could be captured and kept intact for the operations.^

A comparison of the teiegmm and the letter shows that it
was the Third Array and not v. Moltke that definitely
determined the exact point on the Loire to which the Grand
Duke should direct his march. Hoenig points out also the
loss of time arising from its being necessary for the Hoyal
Head-quartere to communicate with the Detachmentj not
directly, but through the Head-quarters of the Third Army.

It will be desirable, having before us the views of the
German Leaders as to the state of affairs on the French side

146 THE FEOPLKS WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

and the basis, therefoi'e, of their plans of operations against
the French, to go over to the hostile army, and see how
matters really iitand there, and what has taken place since
the mysterious, disappearance of the Army of the Loire on
Novemljer IStli ; but before doing so, as it is Orleans and
the vicinity that is to be the scene of the coming decisive
struggle, a description of this small theatre of war is necessary,
the more so because without a knowledge of its peculiarities
we should hardly understand the reluctance of the Prince to
take the offensive ; nor should we realise how much in this
tract of country so admirably suited for defence by inferior
troops, the eventual defeat of the French was due to bad
leading.

The great Forest of Orleans extends north of the city and
on both »\de6 of the Orleans-Paris Road, ftt>m Rosieres nine
miles to the west, to Gien thirty-five miles to the east; and
although not of the same character throughout its extent, yet,
generally, it gave cover* so that the Germans were not able to
ascertain what was going on within it. The northern edge
on the east side v&ii from five to eight miles south of the
position of the Second Army i the southern edge was about
three miles from the l^ire. CheviUy, eight miles from Orleans,
was its northern boundaiy on the Paris road. On the w^t
side the northern edge lies some three miles farther south, and
this portion of tlw forest consists of separate woods, between
which large bodies of all arms can move without difficulty.
The woods had been connected by entrenchments, but, from
the west and north-west, the ground in front and in rear
could be seen, a great ad van tage to the attack. The real forest
extends for a length of twenty miles, and a depth of twelve
to thirteen miles on the east side of the Paris road to the
Canal d^Orleans whirh connects the Loire with the Loing at
Montai^s, The fot^est i-onsjsts of timber trees, with low
undei^rowth, passable only with some difficulty by infantry
in extended onder, and n*rely in close formation. Artillery
could move only on the imads^ cavalrv only in single file through
^ood. The forest was not all of this char«cter ; but for

THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER SI -23 147

the Gernians it presented a belt of this kind four or five miles
broad. The roads giving access to the forest east of the I'aris
road were : the old Roman I'oad from Etanipes |>a.ssing to
the west of St. Gennain-le-Grand and Neuvilte aux Bois, and
entering the forest at St. Lye five miles from the road, and
thence to Orleans, The next road comes from Pithiviers, and
at eight miles from that place enters the forest at Chilleurs
aux Bois five miles to the east, and then running south-west
by Loury five miles inside the forest, strikes a r^ad along the
bank of the Loire, a mile from Orleans, Near Lonry were
two large clearings, one on either side of the road ; the thirc
road, coming also from Pithiviers, enters the foi-est four
miles further east at Courcy atix Loges, and bending south-
west crosses the Canal, i-ecrossing at Pont aux Moires, where
it enters the river road six miles from Orleans. At Fay
aux Loges, four and a half miles short of the re- crossing,
a branch diverges due south to Jargeau on the Loire,^ three
and a-half miles east of Pont aux Moines. The next point
of entry is Chambon, three and a-half miles east by a road
running into the third road at three miles south of Coui-cy
aux Lo^es. There are other roads further east striking the
dver road, at Chateauneiif, fifteen miles. Sully, twenty miles
from Orleans, and at Gien. Lateral communications were
few ; all the roads could easily be obstructed and defended.
The edge of the forest had been prepared for defence. The
whole ai^a east of the Paris road teems with hamlets, farm
houses and defensible localities- As regaixls the entrench-
ments, a bndge head had been constructed at from half a mile
to a mile outside the city walls. About two miles beyond was
a sort of intermediate entrenched position with the right flank
on the river at St. Loup ; the left at le Grand Orme, on the
Chateaudun road. The main position ran along the edge of
the forest east of the Paris road ; on the west side it was
retired three niilas in i^ear of Chevilly to Cercottes, running
thence west to the Chateaudun road eight miles from Orleans,
Besidejs these positions^ a strongly entrenched line of localities
gave an advanced position. There were plenty of heavy guns

ISO THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

dispense with pen or pencil so far as possible. Moreover,
this Army of the Loire was never, save at the outlet, on the
side of Muctf^ssi. It was alwav?- striving under the adverse
eireunistances of defeat and disaster. It wad the pre.>ientj not
the future, that occupied the minds and thoughts of the
French officers ; of little importance, therefore, seemed the
noting down of times and plaues for some possible reference
hereafter. It was not to the memorandum book, but simply
to the nieniorv, that were committed the details of action,
the conduct of individual.s, the movements of troops, the
words and the expressed wishes, intentions and opinions of
actoi-s in the drama. Moreover, it is notorious that the
French temperament does not lend itself to a judicial descrip-
tion of any e^ent?^ of which the i^urroundings are those of
excitement and emotion- Then, again, there is the loss of
recoitls that ensues when defeat and disorder occur. So the
French ret-ord?* of this war are incomplete and frequently
contradictory. Man^'^ were destroyed in the time of the
Conunune. Of one French histoi'ian of the campaign, whose
style is very sensational and dmmatic, it has been said, " If
you ali^eady know w^hat really took place, nead hhn, for you
will Ije able to distinguish the truth fi-om the imaginary and
the former is valuable ; if you do not know what actually
happened leave him on one side, for you will mix up the one
with the other."" Hoenig goes ^erv fully into this matter in
the pi-eface to his Hfth volume. He has examined and com-
pared the various sonrc&s of information, probably more
closely and cai-efully than any tsnc else, and he states that even
that gigantic official work, " Les Actes du Gouvernnient de la
Defense National,^ teems with misstatements, and the works
written by the chief French actoi-s in the war, de Freycinet,
d'Aurelle, Chanzy, Crouzat, and others are full of contradic-
tions. There is no doubt al^o that the non -employment of
pen and pencil at important conferences or interviews led to
misunderstanding of views and intention;*, to misinterpreta-
tions of orders and of wishes, and therefore to disastrous
results. There is, however, no difficulty in following the

THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 21-23 151

inoveuients of the larger botlies of troops such as brigades,
etc ; the accounting for the movements and fixing the responsi-
bility for them is, however, for the reasons given, not always
possible. It is mainly the statements of Hoenig and Lehaut-
court, a French writer, that will be accepted in this narrative.
After the fight at Coulmiers^ the troops remained on the
ground north of Orleans, and not a nmment had been lost by
Gainbetta in organising into manageable military bodies the
huge crowd of men who, moved by the spirit he had awakened
in theia, came flocking to the standards of France in oljedience
to his summons. For the 16th Corps a third division was
organised. 'ITie formation of the 17th Corps was commenced
at Mer and Rlois, below Orleans ; that of the 18th Corps at
Nevers and Gien above Orleans ; and that of the 21st Corps
ft little later at le Mans ; whilst on November 15th or 16th,
somt; 40,000 men of the Army of the Elast were taken to form
the 20th Corps and to complete the 18th Corps. The troops
were brought from Chagny to Gien by rail on the 18th and 19th.
Of course it was^ the earlier formations that had secured the
better trained men, and to them had been posted the officers
remaining available after the catastrophes of the first war; so
that for the later fonnations there were but few well-trained
men or efficient officers. The military value of the corps
diminished in the order of their formation ; the 15th was an
excellent corps, and numerically nearly double that of an
ordinary army corps ; the 16th nearly ecjualled it in efficiency,
but the others were indifferent. The larger a force in the field,
the more essential it is that the staff should be both competent
and experienced ; but it was impossible to find for the large
Army of the Loire the number of qualified officers for the
provision of the correspondingly large and numerous staffs.
Large masses of men collected for fighting purposes are of no
use standing still. They have to move from one place to
another, and whilst on the move, the supply of food and
atn munition must be provided for, and the mode in which
they are moved, and the provision for the supply, falls to the
Staff Officers. The mechanifsm of the movements of troops iu

V

152 THE PEOPLES WAR IN FRANCE, 1870^71

large bodies, the amount of supplies requireti for them, and the
iiiechanisni ot securing the convey aiice and tlie distribution
of these suppHcs, do not enter into the pi-ofessional knowledge
of the regimental officei*. It is sometimes said that a sniaii;
adjutant makes the best Staff Officer; this may be to a great
extent true* but the best adjutant in an army will be an
incompetent Staff Officer until he has learnt what staff work is^
and has mastered its working. Not the least influential factor
in scL-uring the success of the German Army in the canipai^
of 1870-71 was the immeasurable superiority of its staff over
that of the French Army.

Captain Aube, a naval officer who connnanded the 1st
brigade of the 2nd division of the 20th corps, has given in
the Rtvue des Deua Mondi'Jt, a very interesting account of
the corps ; its General, Crouzat, in a small pamphletj also has
given his view of his conmmiid.

The corps was for the most part composed of Gardes
Mobiles di-awn from various parts of France — the Upper
Loire, Jura, Garonne, Eastern Pyreneesj Upper Rhine, Vosges,
Meurthe, and Corsica.

In the Gardes Mobiles and the Fmnc-tii'eurs there were
many officers and even in the ranks men belonging to the
highest classes of society, some bearing the greatest names in
F^nce, who had left behind then) everything — fortune, com-
fort, familifts, young wives, little children — to hasten to the
defence of their coimtry. They were bmve lei lows, facing
cheerfully all the discomforts, all the dangers of war, always
ready for any sacrifice, and deeply loving their country, The
corps was brave, disciplined, and patriotic. Officei*s and
soldieni had the simple and one idea^ — duty. The cadres,
especially in the lower gratles, were very insufficient, and in
the Gardes Mobiles had not had time to leani their work.
It was this failure of cat! res of conipanie,=i, indispensable for
leading and for controlling young soldiers under fii^, that
was the chief cause of their reverses.

The coi'}>s had all the good cpialities, and all the faults, of
young, intelligent ti'oops, often full of aj-dour, but without any

THE SECOND ARAfY, NOVEMBER 21-23 153

experience. The Mobiles invariably obeyed orders,ancl eiKlui^
uncomplainingly the fatigues of inceasant marthtng ; their
patient forgetfuhiess of self, tht-ir devotion, were ahvays equal
to the numberless privations; they had to endure ; but, whilst
obeying, they reasoned, asketl the why and the nlierefore, and
discussed the orders given, alt the nioi-Cj because the authoiity
which issued them did not, in the eyes of either the men or
the offtcei's^ possess the sanction of experience nor the prestige
of rank long possessed. Had not this Genei-al, who com^
nianded a division, been only a non-comtnissioned officer and
become a General ^ from having served his appi-enticesbip for
fomniantl in the ranks of the Sonthernei-s in America ?
Another was mily a captain when the war commenced, or
before that, perhaps, in the ranks of the army, whei'e they
had known him. That these improvised Generals were fit for
their new position by their bravery and patriotism uas not
the question. Were they, by their knowledge of their pro-
fession, equal to the command given them ?

Of the staff of the corps thei-c were only two that belonged,
or had belonged, to the staff of the regidar army. Nearly
all the others had been taken from a danng band of young
men known a.s h'.9 QtHiranie^ who had made an unsuccessful
attempt to blow up the bridge at Saverne. Some of the
newly- made Generals were conspicuous by their numeitjus
Gticortis, and the eagerness witli \rhich their aides-de-camp got
hold of, for their Head-quartcr.s, chateaux and farms, which
could have served as cantonments for a whole battalion, the
army being obliged to bivouac often vrithout shelter, straw
or wood in the snov\' and mud. The physittal privations the
coi-ps had ali"eady endured in the Vosgei were very great ; some
of the men had no shoes ; very few possessed gaiters, cartridge-
boxes, knapsacks, or camp eciuipment. In a canvas (ioUe)
bag were stowtd away promiscuously spaie things, ftmd, and
cartiidges. The men received four days'" .supply of biscuit at
a time, and could only carry them by passing a string thi-ough
them and wearing this as a sort of bandolier. The biscuits
crumbled away on the march owing to the rain or snow, and

154 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

the men were conaequentlj without bread. Even worse was
the fact that in the bags the cartridges became too damp for
uae. The Hrearms were of the most varied kind^ from a
simple rifle (model of 1815 converted) to the American
Remington ; this was another source of trouble and confusion.

At the conference between the Delegation and the
Generals that was held on the l£th November, three days
after the victory of (Jouhnieri>f it was agreed that a position
should be taken up at Orleans as a base for future operations.
General d'Aurelle did not, however, regard the position with
much favour. On the same day General Crouzatj the Com-
mander of the Army of the East, received orders to form
out of that a corps of three Divisions, the 20th Corps, and a
Brigade for the 18th Corps, forming at Nevers. At Orleans
the work of preparing the potiition was pushed on with great
energy so that by the 19th the position was nearly completed.
On this day the disposition of the Army of the Loire was as
follows :

At Gien the whole of the 20th Corps and the greater
portion of the 18th Corps, the i-emainder of the latter being
at Nevers. Close to and on the east of the Paris road wa^^
the 1st Division of the 15th Corps, the other two Divisions
were west of the road ; the line wa-* continued westward by
the 16th Corps, to the Conie Brook which joins the Loir
between Chateauduii and Bonneval; the 17th Corps was
between Meung on the Loire and Chateaudun on the Loir,
whilst the troops of the Army of the West were falling back
towards Chateaudun and Nogent le Retrou to form the 21st
Corps, of which the rendezvous was le Mans. Nominally
therefore the Army of the Loire consisted of souie 200,000
men in dx corps, but of these there were Kve fairly completed
in formation, one not completed ; the front was over forty
miles and was covered, so far as the 20th and 18th Corps
were concerned, by detachments thrown forward on the roads
to the front ; and for the rest of the Army by a strong Hue
of outposts from Ncuvilie aus Btiis, through Artenay to the
Conie Brook.

THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 31-23 iS5

It v>B,t! on the 19th that the Delegation intubated to
d'Aurelle their opinion that the purely defensive attitude
must be exchanged for active operations for the relief of Paris.
The success of any operations of the Army of the Loire
was, however, from the first, very doubtful, independently
of the inefficiency of the Army, owing to the vital diifer-
ences of opinion, which, on military questions, existed
between the civil government of the pi-ovinces, the Delegation,
and the commander-in-chief of its army. General d'Aurelle.
That amongst the generals theinaelves there was not always
unanimity of opinion was only in the ordinary course of
affairs ; but the strong counter-influence of General Chanzy,
the advocate of active measures, must have told much against
d'Aurelle. The cause of the great differences of the views
held by the Delegation and by d'Aurelle lay in the fact that
the former looked at the military !>iituation fi*oni the national
point of view, whilst the latter regartled it from the military
standpoint only. To the Delegation, the relief of Paris was
the supreme object to be accomplished for the salvation of
the country, the only purpose of the military operations of
the army ; and inasmuch as the duration of the resistance
of which Paris was capable was necessarily limited, it de-
sired the speedy initiation of nieasui-es for its relief. Even
if, owing to time being wanting, the army could not attain
the degi-ee of efficiency desii-able for the purpose, it was
better to make the attempt with it as it was, rather than not
at all, or too late.

On the other hand, d'Aurelle looked mainly to the capa-
bility of the newly raised army as determining the operations
to be undertaken ; and instead of recognising the fact that
the Delegation represented the Government of the country,
and as such its directions must be accepted and coniplietl with,
he assumed an attitude of inertia, which had the lamentable
result of causing, almost of compelling the Delegation to take
command of the Army, wnd not twily to decide what ope-
rations should be undertaken, but also to direct how they
should be carried out. There can be little doubt that, in

156 THE PEOPLKS WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

this matter, d^Aurelle's judgment failed hinij and that, in-
stead of I'eniainiiig at the head of the anny, in an attitude of
non-a!«sistauce to the Goveninieiit, he should have resigiierl
his cronnnand, and have left the Government free to appoint
Aiiothei' general in his plaee. D'Aurelle^ unfortunately, did
not i-ealise that even if a faulty plan of operations wa"; to he
adojjted, it ivould be far l>etter to aix;ept it, and, as a soldier
of experience (uid knowledge, do the best he could with it,
rather than let it be eontiolled by civilians, absolutely
ignorant of the working of the machine tliej were setting in
motion.

On the 19th de Fi^eycinet wrote to d\Aurelle " We cannot
I'eniaiu at Orleans forever. Paris is hungi-y and is calling to
us. Study the line of niarcrh to be taken to enable ujs to give
A hand to Trochu who would eonie to meet ns with 150,000
nien, whilst at the same time a demonstration would be made
towards the north. We ai-e considering here a plan of
operations. Let me know as .soon as your ideas have taken
shaj]ie, and we will meet at Toars or your Head-quarters to
discuss the plan." To this fair .suggestion d'Aurelle replied
on the SOth that his army was not 350,000 sti-ong as alleged,
that if he was to lend a hand to Trochu he must Hi-fit of all
know Tixx:hu^s intentions; and, instead of making any sug-
gestion himself as to the plan of opei-ation.s, he adopted the
extraordinary and suicidal coui*se of assuring deFreyeinet that
he was quite willing to consider any plan that the Delegation
themselves might suggest. As Lehautt'ourt rightly *«Lys, this
wa« taking a singular view of the duty of aConnuander-in-Chief
and such an exchange of duties presaged no good for the future.
Naturally, this unexpected insply gi'catly irritated Ganibetta,
who on the ^Oth in a .severe letter directed d'Aui-elle to
prejjare at once a plan of operations for the relief of Paris.
He pointed out that owing to the difficulty of communicating
with Ti-oehu, to delay until Trochu's plans were known was
to wait for what might never be obtained, and he gave to
d^Aurelle as the principles on which the operations were to be
based :

THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 21-S3 15;

(1) The best troops must be on the flank.

(S) The available forte** 11 umbered S3O,0OO men.

(3) Paris nuist be the objective, and d'Aurelle must draw'
up a plan of operations accordingly.

To tills letter d'Aurelle did not vouchsafe a reply until the
20rd, when he wrote as follows : *' The solution of the problem
(the inart-h on Paris*) is not the least of the mattei's I have to
consider. To solve it demandH the eo-operation and mutual
undei-standing l>etween the Government and the Army as
represented by the chiefs to whom you have given your con-
fidence. So far as I am ]iersonally concerned you may rely on
my complete devotion. May God make my strength etjaal to
my devotion,'"

But the Delegation^ inijmtient at his delay., had already
taken the control into their own hands. Trochu had said
that Pai'is could hold out to the end of the year, but the
relief must be effected much sooner ; and in a letter of
Novembei' 19th fram Jules Favi-e in Paris, that Minister had
said that Deceml>er loth was the limit of holding out. The
Delegation knew alsjo that Trochu contemplated a sortie
about Noveml>er 26th, so something must be done at once to
prepai-e for to- operation.

De Fi-eycinet ajssimietl that the Army of Paris would move
up to Melun along the right bank of the Seine^ which river
would thus protect its np;ht flank. The Delegation deter-
mined, therefore, on the 21st, that the Army of the Loire
should advance on Fontainebleau ; the pi-eliminary step being
an advance of the 18th and 20th Corps and a Division
of the 15th Corps on Pithiviers and Beaune la Rolande, thus
clearing the way for an advance of the whole army. This line
is parallel to and twenty miles from the Loire, and its flanks
are on good roads leading north-east to Fontainebleau.
For the intended opemtion the Delegation sent the oitlen*
for the movements of the sseveral bodies of troops to
d'Aurelle for transmission to the connnandei-s. The 18th
and SOth Corps had been constituted into an army under
Crouzat, but he vas .suboi-dinatetl to d'Aurelle. Against

158 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

tht orders sent d'Aiirelle submitted some objections, many
of considerable weight ; so de Freycinet modified them to a
certain extent, sending to d'Aurelle a reply that was both
fair and dignified.

'* If you gave nie a better plan than mine, or even if you
gave nie some plan or other, I would give up niy onn plan
and i"eciill niv ordei-s. But daring the twelve days that you
have been at Orleans you have not, notwithstanding the
repeated retjuests of M. Gambetta and myself, given us any
plan at all. You have confined yourself to fortifying Orleans
according to our recommendations after you had declai-ed the
position to be untenable, I am glat.1 to find that you have
gi-eatly modified your opinion on this point, since you no
longer wish to abandon your position. . . . Something must
be done. , . . Paris is hungry and desires to be helpetl.'" But
now there was a dual authority exercising control in the Army,
The Delegation issued its orders for the movements of Corps
or Divisions, sometimes dii-ect to the connnanders, sometimes
through d"'Aurelle ; the coniniandei:s naturally turned to
d'Aurelle for directions, but d'^Aui'clle was not in the counsels
of the Delegation, so oitlers and counter-orders succeeded each
other in rapid succession ; there was no unity of purpose or
action in the movements. On the S3rd the 20th Corps had
advanced fixim Glen to about eight or nine miles south of
Beaune la Rolande, the 18th Corps w^as still at Gien, the 15th
and 16th Corps were very much in their old positions from
the Paris-Orleans road to the Conie, whilst on the extreme
left the leading troops of the 17th Coips were as far north as
Bonneval and Chateaudun on the Loir. The troops of the
Army of the West were falling back towaixis Chateaudun and
from Nogent le Hoirou to be incoi-porated in the 21st Corps
forming at le Mans, and it had been the intention of the
Delegation to oppose the advance of the Detachment frontally
with the 21st Corps, threatening with the 17th its line of
communications. This project came to naught.

Up to the present the movemenb; of the two forces, the
Second Army and the Detachment, have been followed

1

THE SECOND ARMY, NOVEMBER 21-28 159

separately ; this has been convenient as they had separate
objects, separate aims. Now, from the 23rd, they are to
co-operate in accordance with general instructions from one
source. The operations of both on each day will therefore be
so narrated, that it may be seen to what extent the co-opera-
tion was real or was only nominal. But it is well to bear in
mind that, as is evident from the extracts of correspondence
already quoted, neither Versailles, Prince Frederick Charles,
nor the Grand Duke had any but the vaguest idea of the real
position, strength, and intentions of that Army against which
they were about to operate — the Army of the Loire.

CHAPTER X

NOVEMBER 24TH

V. Moi.TKK has now taken in hand the control of the operations
against the Army of the Loire. The Prince is to attack, but is
not required to do so before November SHth^ by which time
the movement of the Grand Duke against the left Hank of the
Army of the Loire will be producing its effect. The situation
was very similar to that of the commencement of the iam[>aign
in Bohemia in the Pruss^ian- Austrian Wai- of 1866, Then
V. Moltke i-emained at Berlin, whence by telegi-aph he niovetl
the armies of the C'roiMi Prince and Prince Fi'ederick Charles
until the time amved when he considered it necessary to go
to the theati-e of war. This method of control did succeed,
though the caution and sIo^Miess of movement of Prince
Frederick Charles were very noticeable. And now v. Moltke
is at Versailles at the apex of the tnangle, and ia connected
by wire with the Prince at Pithiviers, forty-five miles distant
at one angle, and with the Gmnd Duke at la Fei*te Beiiiai'd
eighty miles distant at the other angle ; these two leaders
being seventy-five miles apart. But there is a difference,
namely, that the ** personhchkeit " of these leaders is far tnore
marked than was the case in 1866 : each has already shown
the possession of a will of his own ; and with Prince Frederick
Charles, v. Moltke'sown relations and those of the Grand Duke
are somewhat strained. \', Moltke is somewhat in the position
of the driver of a pair of .steeds, one a kieker, the other a jibber,
and neither of the pair is inclined to run in double harness
with its companion on this occasion. As on the 24th, the
Prince's Army is the predominant partner in the scheme of co-
operation, the proceedings of this Army on this day will be

NOVEMBER 24

i6t

considered first. The two Brigades of the Xth Army Corps at
Montargis marched to Beaune la Rolande by different roads,
the 39th (v. Valentin] ) by a northern road, the 37th (v.
Lehmann) with the Divisional General (v. Woyna) by a
southern road through Ladoii. Here, however, this Brigade
met with opposition from strong hostile forces, the 20th Corps
and a Division of the 18th marching north, which, after a
short but sharp engagements ^vere driven back, and the three
Brigades were concentrated at Beaune in the evening.

The Prince, ever eager to obtain every scrap of informa-
tion procurable respecting the enemy, had, on the S3rd, ordered
I'econnai&sances along his whole front for the Sl-th. From
the right, the 2nd Cav. Division and the IXth Army Corps
came in reports of the presence of very strong forces in front,
and of the arrival, at Chevilly, of railway trains from the south,
apparently carrying troops. At Chevilly were some 10,000
men, with some batteries of artillery' ; there were no signs of
any march to the west ; on the contrary there was a move-
ment (as was the fact) of large bodies of troops towards the
east. Further, v. Manstein reported the ground west of the
Paris road to be favourable for purposes of attack. No
prisoners were taken. On the east of the Paris road, and near to
it, the Illrd Army Corps had, with a force of four battalions,
two squadrons, and two batteries, reconnoitred towards
Neuville aux Bois, where is an important junction of roads.
Here, however, the Germanij were repulsed, losing 9 officers, 16S
men, and 17 horses. It appears that the reconnaissance had
been made contrary to the warnings given by the Corps
Commander and his chief Staff Officer, Col. v. V. Rhetz.
The Prince had been persuaded by v, Stiehle to give the
order ; and when he Jeamt of the disaster, and that not even
one prisoner had been taken, there was a lively interchange
of remarks between him and v. Stiehle. The Corps Staff* had
always a poor opinion of the Army Staff, and this incident
increased the ill-feeling existing between the former and
V. Stiehle.

From the Xth Army Corps had been sent out from Beaune

1 62 THE PEOPLES WAR TN FRANCE, 1870-71

three smaU reconnoitring parties in different directions. Two
of them found strong hostile forces close in frout, but did not
succeed in taking any prisoners. The third party was directed
towards Boi scorn in iin, only three miles south-west of Beaune,
and its work was productive of most important results.
The troops here employed were three squadrons and two
companies, and they were accompanied by two of the Staff
Officers of the Corps, Captain Seebeck and Lieut, v. Kotze.
Of this reconnaissance Hoenig gives in the *' Volkskrieg'' the
chief incidentSj but in a small pamphlet he has narrated it
in detail ; and so instructive is the narrative that an abstract
of it is here put before the reader.

The Commander of the detachment was Major v. Schoeler,
but although senior to Capt. Seebeck he had to act in con-
formity to the wishes of his junior officer, who, as Staff
Officer, represented the General Commanding the Corps.
Before the detachment moved off from Beaune the officers
were assembled, and Capt. Seebeck explained to them the
situation as follows : " Of the strength, position, and inten-
tions of the enemy, whose main body is presumed to be
behind the Forest of Orleans, there ia uncertainty ; but in
the neighbourhood of Bellegarde [six miles south of Beaune]
are strong forces, so that a hostile offensive on the line
Bellegarde— Boiscommun may be expected. The front of the
Second Army is such that the X.th Army Corps forms its left
flank ; the main body of the Corps is to-day concentrated in the
neighbourhood of Beaune ; one Brigade is still away east of
Montargis. Paris can hold out at the longest only three to
four weeks. Apparently, an Italian Division of irregular troops
under Garibaldi^s son has joined the Army of the Loire, To
clear up the state of uncertainty, reconnaissances have been
ordet^ by the Seconc! Army for the 24th from all units of the
Array. From the Xth Army Corps there will be to-day one on
Boiscommun, a second on Bellegarde, a third on Ladon (Lorris)
[six miles south-east of Beaune]. If fire is heard in those
directions, it is at the reconnoitring detachments," Then
Seebeck continued: "So, gentlemen, the cavalry has to carry

NOVEMKEH S4

163

out the reconnoitring ; the companies wiil eventually take up
a position of support. The main and chief business is to
take prisoners ; for every officer captured there will be given
an ' Ii'on Cro^s,'' Be so good as to cqjnmunicate this to the
men." What an incentive! The most coveted decoration
in the German Army^ the Iron Cross.

With the Cavalry at the head, the detachment moved off
at 8 A.M. Short of Boisconimun, the leading zug [or troop],
under the command of Lieut, v. Riedesel, came on a hostile
cavalry lancer piquet dismounted ; this was driven back and
pursued to the entrance to the village. V. Riedesel now sent
scouts into and around the village, to reconnoitre, and as
their reports on their return did not fully satisfy him, he
determined to trot into the village and ascertain for himself
how matters stood. At the entrance was standing a peasant,
of whom v. Riedesel inquired whether in the village were
any more troops than the Lancers w^ho had just gone into it.
TTie peasant replied that there were none, V. Riedesel now
caught sight of Lancers in the village, and at <mce ordered the
attack, and riding in with his men, soon found himself in a
real trap. A half-squadi'on of the Snd Marche Lancer
Regiment was theiie, and Lieiit.-Col. de Brasserie, the com-
mander of the regiment, was just entering from the south
with the main body. Not only did the Lancers open fire,
but also from the houses fire was opened on the Germans ;
and as these went forward, the inhabitants, after the last
trooper had gone by, drew carts into the street to prevent
their escape. The Grermans were soon overpowered, v.
Riedesel was wounded and taken prisoner, hut the greater
part of the troopers got back towards Montbai-rois, about a
mile in rear, where the Infantry had now taken up a position
of support. Meantime, Colonel de Brasserie had arrived from
Bellegarde with the remainder of the regimeint, and he had
intended to give his squadrons a rest after their long trot.
His first object was to restore order in the village, but the
(Mmnmnder of the leading squadron, seeing an opportunity
for pursuit, had taken the initiative upon himself, and was

1 66 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

newspapers^ deserters, prisoners, and ordinary wayfarers,
information which rendered indubitable the conclusion tliat
in front of the Second Army had been collected a very large
hostile force ; that this force intended to take the offensive
immediately ; and, lastly, that the whole country for miles
round Orleans had been very strongly prepared as a defensive
position.

But from the documents of Captain Ogilvy arose other
serious matter.^ for consideiution. The delegation regarded
Gien as " the key of our position on the Loire;" it might
be the base for offensive operations ; and there were opposite
the extreme left of the Second Army > or rather beyond it and
ontflanking it, large forces assembled under the command of
L'roiizat. As a matter of fact, it was these forces on their
way from Gien towards Beaune that had been encountered
this day. That Pithiviers was now directly threatened from
both south-east and south-west did not admit of doubt.
As regards the accession of strength to the enemy in front
of the Second Ajrmy, the evidence seemed to show that this
was the 18th Corps named in the newspapers of November 20th.
And at once had to be considered the several strategical
operations, any one or more of which the enemy starting from
his \ery long base, might select for an advance for the relief
of Paris. There were four possible lines of advance : one
from the right by Gien, Montargis, and thence direct north
between the rivers Loing and Yoiine ; the second against the
eeriLre of the Second Army at Pithiviers, and theiice either to
Fontainebleau, or to the Paris road at Etampes ; the third
from the French centre along the main road to Paris, the
fouHh from the left flank by Chateaudun and Chartres on
Versailles. Opposed to this enemy, now, was the Second
Army on a front of twenty-five miles, with the Detachment
some fifty miles distant.

And it was the letter from Gambetta to Crouzat, and the
reference in it to Gien, that determined the whole of the
strategy of the Prince in the innnediate future. V. d. Goltz
'* If he [Gambetta] looked on Gien as the most im-

NOVEMBER M

167

portant point on the Loire, whilst up to this time Orleans
had been regarded as such, the intention was apparent that
the attack was to be commenced with the right wing of the
Army of the Loire, This emphasised, that the oft-promised
rehef of Paris would not be carriwl out along the great road
from Orleans to Paris, but down the Loing towards Fontaine-
bieau. A number of advantages told in favour of this
direction, and soon it acquired more and more probability."

The orders of the Prince for the S5th drew the Army a
little to the east, but it still held on to the Paris road. Each
corps was directed to be so concentrated aa to be in readiness
for any attack by the enemy. If no combat was audible
before S p.m. the corps could then commence to go into their
cantonments. It seems from Hoenig that these orders may
be taken as the commencement of the divergence of views that
existed between v. Moltke and the Prince as to the strategy
to be employed against the Army of the Loire. On the 14!th
V. Moltke had told the Prince that it devolved on the Second
Army to protect the investment from the South, and that the
Orleans road must not be " left entirely open for any
length of time ; " but at that date the Detachment was
moving away to the north-west, and so the defence of the
road fell to the Second Army alone. This defence the
Prince originally had intended to carry out ofFensiveiy by a
bold converging attack on Orleans irrespective of the Detach-
ment. Subsequently the Prince had found himself reduced
to a purely passive defence; v. Moltke, whilst acquiescing
in the change at the time, desired that it should be exchanged
for the oft'enHive as soon as possible : and in his view the right
course for the Prince to adopt now for the defence of the
road was not the posting on it a portion of the army as a
direct physical obstacle in the path of a hostile advance, but
the concentration of the whole army more to the east in
some position whence, by manoeuvring against the flank of an
advancing enemy, it could arrest the advance, whether from
the east or the west of the enemy^s long line ; where it
could, in collected force, directly repel an advance from the

i68 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, lfi70-71

centre, and where the troopa, being well in hand, a bold
offensive could be taken should opportunity offer, V. Moltke
held that now for the defence of the Paris Road there was
not merely one army, the Second, but two armies, that and
the Detachment, so that the strategy adopted should be the
co-operation of convergent forces from different bases. The
Prince would, however, for the present, have direct passive
defence only, and this oo a long front out of all propor-
tion to the small strength of his Army, Besides whicli^
he detested strategy of the cooperative kind, Hoenig
says : ** He had no opinion of combined operations, at least^
unless the combination was on such a small scale that it
could be worked by one of the two commanders. He dis-
liked any tactical stroke, unless previously assui-ed that there
would be at hand for it all forces within reach,"

The widely scattered Detachment was, on this day, moving
somewhat slowly to what might be called a preparatory
position for the march on Beaugency ; but one iiuportant
matter had come to the knowledge of the Grand Duke before
he issued his orders for the S4fth, namely, that a considerable
hostile force [the 17th Corps] was now moving up the Loir
by Chateaudun interposing between him and the Second
Army, and directly threatening his line of communications,
as he had been warned by v, Blumenthal. Strangely enough^
the Grand Duke, when on the S3rd he sent his reports to
Versailles did not mention this hostile advance. Here is
another instance of the powerlessness of v. Moltke to deal
with the situation ; powerlessness due in this case to the care-
lessness or reticence of one of the chief commanders. It is
possible that the Ttmral of the Grand Duke may have been
somewhat disturbed by the order to march on Beaugency,
Hoenig suggests that in the order, the Grand Duke perhaps
foresaw the possibility of the Detachment ceasing to be an
independent command, and of his being placed under the
orders of the Prince; or even of the Detachment ceasing to
exist as a unit, and its corps being incorporated in the Second
Army : there may have therefore been no great excess of zeal

NOVEMBER 24

169

on his part in contributing a share to the compulsory co-
operation.

On the French side it had been found impossible to move
the ^Oth Corps (30,000) to the positions assigned to it for
this day. The 18th Corps was now on the march from Gieii
to Montargis to create a diversion on the German left, whilst
des Paillieres with the 30,000 rnen of the 1st Division,
15th Coi"ps was, in conformity to ordei'S from Toura, strugghng
along bad roads from Chevilly towards Crouzat ; the thi-ee
groups were still a day''s march apart, but the 24th is marked
by what vvas practically the abandonment by d'Am'elle of the
functions of chief executive military commander. Cx'ouzat in
a despatch to d'Aurelle concluded with the words : '* I await
your ordei'S." D"*Aiirelle forwarded the despatch to Tours
with the following addition :

" Since I do not know fully the object of the morements,
it is difficult for me to give detailed orders: Generals des
Paillieres and Crouzat are a long day's march apart, and could
not therefore support each other. It is doubtful whether
General Crouzat will be able to continue his movement to-
morrow. Are the two corps to concentrate and where ? For
fear that General Crunssat may not receive his orders sufficiently
early through me, I request that they may be sent to hira by
tel^raph direct to Bellegarde, and that I may know what
they aiT.*" As Hoe nig says, d'Aurelle by this letter proved
to the Delegation his want of independence ; it was an
abdication of his leadership ; Gambetta took him at his
word.

The actual military situation on the evening of the 24th
is one of paralysing over-extension everywhere. With the
Germans, there are two bodies of troops each so widely
extended that each is unfit for any immediate strategical
operation, and they are separated from each other by an
intervening hostile corps ; whilst in front of them is a very
large hostile force intent on at once taking the offensive
against them, but unable tu do so, owing to the same cause,
incomplete concentration.

170 THE PEOPLE'S WAR LN FRANCE, 1870-71

On this day, the ^4tth, there comes before us an incident
in the inner life of German command and control, of a remark-
able character, and which is also yet one more illustration of
the breakdown, in periods of doubt and difficulty, of that
system of mutual confidence and co-operation among the
higher leaders, which, as a rule, was a characteristic of the
first war.

Readers of the German Official History of the War (v.
Moltke's own work) may have noted, that although v, Moltke
was the real chief commander of the German Armies during
the campaign^ it is to the King of Prussia that is given all
the credit for the conduct of the war ; and they may recall
to mind one remarkable passage in which the King and the
EmperorNapoleonlH. are contrasted as supreme commanders
of the opposing armies.

"The Monarch, at whose disposition lies the State with its
resources, is only entitled to be at the head of the Field
ArmVj when competent to command the troops in person,
and take upon his own shoulders the weighty responsibility
of all that may happen. Failing these conditions, his pre-
sence with the army cannot but have a paralysing influence-
. . . For by onemW alone must the operations be controlled;
when influenced by several counsels, no matter how well
meant, this will must always lose in clearness and decision,
and the leading of the army which depends on it will become
uncertain.""

The inference intended to be drawn from this passage is
clear, namely, that it was King William alone that com-
manded the host of Germans in this great campaign. Now
to another view of the matter.

At Versailles the old King stood, as the leader, above and
apart from all around him, whoever they might be, and
though he rarely interfered, yet he had his own views on all
matters that came under his cognisance ; and if need be, he
could act on those views. For some time the King liad been
dissatisfied with the state of affairs at both the Second Army
and the Detachment, and with the small ainotmt of informa-

NOVEMBER M

171

tion he received concerning them ; yet the political situation
made it necessary that he should understand fully and clearly
what was takinnj place. So he determined to find out the
truth for himself. It was the Second Army that appeared
to be the pivot of the combined operations, so to this army
he decided to send some one whom he could ti'ust to obtain
forhini the information he desired. The jselection of the
emissary was difficult, for on the one hand he must be an
otficer of great professional capacity : yet, on the other hand,
he most not be of so senior a rank as to lead the Pdnce to
suspect that there was any dissatisfaction w^ith the leading,
or that the officer sent was to exercise control either along-
side him or over him. That tact must be a gift innate in
the emissary, goes without saying. The officer to whom the
King entrusted this most delicate mission was one of his
personal aides-de-camp, thirty-eight years of age, Lt.-Col.
Count V. Waldersee, lately the Commander-in-Chief of the
allied expedition to China. It seems that on the ^rd the
King had already determined to send an officer, but not
until the following day did he carry his resolve into effect ;
and then, through Colonel v. AlbedyU, the chief of the
Military Cabinet, which coiTGsponds to our own Military
Secretarial Department, he summoned v. Waldereee to his
presence and addressed him as follows : '* We ai"e on the eve
of a decisive moment of the war. The French Army of the
Loire has gradually been more and more reinforced, and better
organised. I have foreseen that a long time and have said
80 to many ; but these gentlemen always know everything
better than I do, and they maintain that the real war is at
an end. The position of v. d. Tann's troops in and around
Orleans did not correspond to my views ; his position was
too dangerous, and he was obliged to retire witli loss. The
SSnd Division was sent there, and I desjmtched after wrards
the ITth Division, and it is clear that the Grand Duke, with
all these troops, has not become equal to dealing with the
enemy. Much about the same time Metsi fell, and now we
have succeeded in bringing up the Second Army. But it is

172 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN

very weak, and it numbers not much more than 40,000 rifles;
the enemy is estimated at from 150,000 to 200,000 men, I
know well that my troops are better than the French, hut
that does not deeeivc me into jiupposing that we have not a
crisis before us. If Pi-ince Frctleriek Charles is beaten, we
must give up the Investment of Paris. ... I have explained
in this letter J whieh you will give to the Prince, the serious
charaeter of tiie situation ; repeat to him that I have the
most thorough eontidenee in his leading and in his practical
knowledge of war. Start at ont:e, for there will be a fight
soon. You will report to me daily, and you wilt remain with
the Prince until I recall you.^

Kntrnsted with this remarkable mission, which was un-
known to V. Moltke, the Count at once started for Pithiviers,
where he an-ived on the 2.5th, and delivered the letter to the
Frinee. He was received most courteously, and wa.s a guest
at the Prince's table, y. Waldersee rode al>ont the army,
conversed with the Generals and the Staffs, learnt their views,
and daily sent his letter to the King. Substitute for these
personages respectively our own Sovereign, H.R.H. the Duke
of Connaught, Earl Roberts, and say, Col. Douglas Haig,
A.D.C., and we i-ealise the cuiious ways of the German
Army.

CHAPTER XI

NOVEMBER 25th

Ok the S5th the slight movements ordered by the Prince were
tyin-ied out ; the Xth Army Corps was directed to undertake
the protection of the left flank of the Second Army ; and to
V. V. Rhetz was it left to determine how far eastward the
Corps should extend, and also the sending detachments to
Montargis or Chateau Landon. From the Illrtl Army Corps
was sent to Nemours a detachment of two companies and a
squadroD,

Opposite the Second Army the main body of the 18th
Corps was pursuing its march on Montargis ; the 20th Corps
with a portion of the 18th Corps, remained in an entrenched
position about Boiscommun ; des PaiUici-es'* Division has
reached Chilleui's aus Dois.

The Detachment, on the 25th, after a short march of nine
or ten miles, was pointing to the Loire, the Bavarians leading
and being at Montdoubleau, on the road by Vendome to
Blois ; the two Inf. Divisions were respectively ten and
fifteen miles in rear ; the 6th Cav. Division was in front ;
whilst, strangely enough, the 4th Cav. Division had been
withdrawn from touch with the enemy, and was brought close
in to la Bazoche Gouet, on the east flank of the rear of the
long column. From the leading cavalry to the rear-guard at
Nogent le Kotrou, the Detachment was extended over thirty
miles. The shortness of the march was viewed with disfavour
at Versailles, bat it is probable that this shortness was not
due to any remissness on the part of the Grand Duke, but was
owing to his experiencing the need of sparing his tired
troops, for whom a rest-day, pleaded for by their commanding

174 THE PEOPLK^S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870=71

offioerSj and asked for by the Grand Duke, had been refused-
But, on the 25th, owing partly to reports received during the
day, and partly to the non-receipt of a delayed report, the
Grand Duke found himself compelled to determine whether
he should continue to act strategically as ordered by v. Moltke,
or atrt according to his own judgment to meet the requirements
of a completely new situation, in which he now, suddenly,
found himself.

The Bavarians, during the last few days, had Ijeen marching
on the arc of a circle, and on the 25th their ammunition
column and some bridge trains were moving to rejoin them
by its chord from Montlandon tlirough Brou to Arville.
This road had been reported to v. d. Tann as quite safe ; but
at Brou the column was suddeiily attacked by strong forces
of hostile infantry. With the aid of the 4th Cav. Division,
the escoi^t succeeded in extricating the convoy, but the
French, the advanced troops of the 17th Corps, remained
in possession of Brou, To the Grand Duke it was now
evident that the enemy had not only interposed between
the Detachment and the Second Army, but was moving
across hia line of communications, and that v. BIumenthaFs
warning was not groundless. He therefore determined to
abandon the march to the Loire, and on the next day to
turn against the threatening enemy on his flank and left
rear ; but, unfortunately, he selected as his objective the
most northerly point of the enemy's advance, Brou, so that
instead of moving south-east, or even east, he will move
north-east. Not merely did this involve a change of about
ninety degrees in the direction of the line of march of
his 50,000 men and SOO guns, with the delays, impedinga
and blockings, its necessary accompaniments, but, as will
appear later on, this selection was strategically a mistake ;
for this, however, the Gi-and Duke was not solely re-
sponsible ; a cavalry subaltern must share the responsibility.
Unfortunately, there had not come on the 24th to the
Grand Duke, a most important piece of information. On
that day Lieut, v, Busse, with ten troopers, had been sent

J

NOVTIMBER 25

175

firom the 6th Cav, Division to reconnoitre Chateaudun.
He crossed the Loir by a ford south of the townj and
entering from that direction, found it full of hostile
regular troops, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and also
Gardes Mobiles. Returning, he found that tlie ford had
meanwhile been blocked ; he swam the river elsewhere with
his little party, but his own horse was so injured that he
had to be extricated by his troopers, the horse being left
behind. Through the nearest village, losing four men and
their horses, he forced his way under a severe fire from
Franc-tireurs- He then took shelter in a neighbouring wood
for the night, reconnoitred Chateaudun again the next day,
and afterwards returned to his Division, For his i;ourage
and conduct v. Busse received great commendation in Army
Ordersj and as a brave soldier he had done his duty well, but
a» a reconnoitring officer he had let slip from his memory
how much the value of information obtained depends on its
speedy receipt by those vvho may have to act upon it. The
Grand Duke, on the 25th, knew that some French were
already as far north-east as Brou, and that was all he knew
about this alarming hoistile advance ; but the cavalry subaltern
bad learnt a great deal more about the enemy, namely, that
due east of the Detachment was a hostile force of all arms,
and, including regular troops, a force which, from its compo-
sition, was probably the main body or a portion of it ; and
owing to a little forgetfulueas, this young officer did not at
once communicate to the Grand Duke this invaluable
strategical information, but kept it to himself, thereby con-
tributing a share to the erroneous selection of an operation of
strategy. So the Duke struck a blow a^inst the point of a
spear instead of endeavouring to break the shaft. The relative
situation of the Detachment and of the French 17th Corps
recalls to mind Hamley'^s remark, that when two armies at the
same time threaten each other's line of communications, that
army which fears most for its own will give way. How far
General de Sonis, the French commander, knew the exact
position of the Detachment we do not know, so it cannot be

176 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

ascertained how he regarded the danger to his own line of
communications ; but, at all events, the Grand Duke believed
the situation to be perilous to the Detachment, for he forth-
with gave way and abandoned his own advance. It is impos-
to say, except ex post facto, whether the Grand Duke was
right or wrong ; he could not have known that the enemy was
one of the least efficient corps of those in the Army of the
Loire. Perhaps nine out of ten commanders would have acted
as he did, whilst the tenth, a man of enterprise and decision,
relying on hi;* 50,000 well-trained troops and their able
eadertj — for in the Detachment the divisional commandei's
were good soldiers^would have pushed on boldly, risking all
on this one chance of war, and knowing that at one and the
same time he was threatening both the Government of National
Defence at Tom's and its array at Oi-leans. The result of
such a stroke cannot be determined, as so much would have
depended on the moral effect produced among the French
Leaders, both military and civil.

i5o far as mere movements are concerned, November 25th is
in no way interesting or instructive, but othei-wise it is one
of the most interesting days of the campaign, and certainly
instructive. It was one of the days, too many by far, of
alteration in the strategy, but as regards drawing on the
past for lessons for the future we must go to Beaune la
Roland e and Pithiviers.

At these tvvo places the need of the moment was to
ascertain what this newly arrived hostile force in front really
was. V, Caprivi at Beaune was hard at work endeavouring
to solve the conundrum. How different from those August
days at Vionville in the fii-st war, when a glance at the button
on the coat of a prisoner or a dead enemy lying on the
ground may have sufficed to tell him, by a simple reference
to the ordre de bataUlei whether it was le Bceufs corps or
Canrobert'a corps, or some other corps that was in front of his
own, which then was exhausted by battle, as now it was wearied
by hard marching and continuous fighting. Priceless now
for the Second Army, and especially for the Xth Army Corps,

NOVEMBER ^5

177

was a true ardre tk hataille of the Army of the Loire on
November S5. How easy would its possession have rendered
the laying down on the chart the course to be steered by the
Corps and the Army.

Most unexpectedlyj however, there came to v. Caprivi a
stroke of real good luck. The wounded prisoner, Colonel de
Brasserie, had by his manner as a chivalrous soldier and
gentleman, so impressed the German staff", that they had
exercised considerable delicacy i» trying to elicit information
from him - but the Colonel alloived his aftection for hiis wife
to get tht! l)etter of his discretionj and ho wrote to her a
letter, in which he told her that he belonged to the ^Oth
Corps (Genei-al Ci-ouzat). I'his letter having nece-ssarily to go
through the German Military Post Office was opened and reatl
before transmission to Madame de Brasserie, and it gave to
V, Caprivi the information he was seeking for in vain else-
where, namely, the numerical designation of the corpf? tliat
had been engaged at Boiscommun ; moreover, it supplied the
heading missing from the ordre de hataille found in Captain
Ogilvy''s pocket-book for, in that ordrc de hataille was named
among the " 1st Division, General de Polignac," the 2nd Lancer
Regiment, the one engaged at Boiscomnmii the previous day,
and connnandctl by de Bra^erie. V. Caprivi was, however,
not satisfied with only the information that in front was one
particular corps ; he believed that the force that had been
encountered, or whose presence had been repoi-ted on the
previous day, was far larger than a single arujy coi*ps could
be; and at 9.30 a.m. he reported: "The hostile troops
with which the Second Army was eiigaged yesterday belong
partly to Michel's Corps (earlier combined with Garibaldi),
partly to three Divisions, which were on the march from
Gien, and according to an order found, wore yesterday to
arrive at Beuune, St. Loup and Juraiivillc." On the 25th
146 prisonei's were brought into the Army Head-quarters at
Pithiviers, and wei-e closely inter logated. In drawing infer-
ences from their statements, the Head- quarters had before them
V. Caprivi's report that the strength of the French was one

178 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

Army Corps, and, besides, three Divisions. Owing to de
Brasserie''s indiscretion, it was clear that the carps waw the
SOth. But among the prisoners were men from the 44th
Marche lieginient and the 73nl Gard&s Mobiles, neither of
which appeared in the ordtr de hataillf ,■ they belonged, there-
fore, not to the SOth, but to another corps ; so it was evi-
dent that there were larger forces than only one corps in
front. Not, however, that the Head-quarters accepted this
coBclusion.

The examination of the prisoners, many of them very
voluble and excited, increased the confusion of tliought.
They had l>een taken in the fight not at Boisconminn, but
at Ladon. Some said they belonged to the SOth Corps com-
manded by General Crouzat, others that they belonged to
the 18th Corps, commanded by General Michel, To these
assertions were added others that they had • come by train
from the east to Gien. But the places of formation of the
18th Corps were known not to have been in the east. But
from the east, as already mentioned, had come a brigtide for
this corps ; and as parts of both the 18th and SOth Corps had
fought at l^on, all these statements, though apparently
irreconcilable, were true. The reference to Crouzat at Gien,
tlie mention of Ogilvy being tletached fix>m the 18th Corps,
the uncertainty as to the names of the commandei"s, and the
original statement of v. Werder, that it was MiclteFs corps
that had gone went, combined to mcrease the difficulty of
drawing the true deduction i'roui the information gathered.
The Prince, however, believed that the prisonei"s were either
trying to deceive him, or were ignorant of the actual organi-
sation of their army. And he did not believe that there was
more than one corps in front of him.

During the 2.5th, and apparently in the forenoon, v. Stiehle
had written one of his long letters to v, Moltke giving his
view of the situation, but it is of little interest, except in
the concluding portion ; and here we -find one of the saddest
illustrations of " peraonliehkeit " we meet with in this wai".
The Prince had always, and not unnaturally, felt deeply

NOVEMBER S5

179

being deprived after Gravelotte of the 5th and 6th Cavalry
Divisionsj which had originally belonged to his army, and which
had played ■50 prominent a part in his successes in the earlier
period of the campaign. They had been taken from his
army, given to the Army of the Meiise, and had led the
advance to Sedan, On tlie day of Sedan, however, they were
with the Third Army, and here any prestige they had gained
was certainly diminished by their neglect in allowing General
Vinoy with Blanshard''s ]>i vision of the French 13th Corps,
to pass through them and nialse his way back to Paris, With
the Third and Fourth Armies they went on to Paris and did
good work in covering towards the west and south-west the
line of investment. When the much diminished Second
Army marched from Metz there was given to it the 1st
Cavalry Division under General v. Hartmann. The Prince
regarded v. Hartmann as an indifterent cavalry leader,
and it is certainly possible that he was justified in his
opinion. The Prince, in his advance from Meti!, placed
this Division on the right flank of the army, a position
in which it could be of the least value to the army, but it
was the nearest to Paris ; and perijistetitly, in season and out
of season* he insei-ted iu his communications to v. Moltke
a recjuest for an exchange of this Division with the 5th
and Gth.

On this matter, however, v. Moltke had been firm, for
compliance with the requests was simply impracticable.
And now iigain, on the morning of the 25th, crops up the
same demand, a demand whichj made as it was under the
existing circumstances, renders it difficult to avoid attri-
buting to the Prince some smallness of mind as a leader.
Tlie demand ran as follows: "The 2nd Cavalry Division
provides for the important and difficult task of watching the
enemy on the right flank of the Second Army. For estimat-
ing correctly the value of the reports received a thorough
knowledge of the individuals from whom they come is neces-
sai'y ; this is the principal reason why his Royal Highness
Prince Frederick Charles again and pressingly requests that

i8o THE PEOPLE^S WAK IN FRANCE, 1870-71

the 6th Cavalry Division now nearing the Second Anny

may be again part of it, because the refjimcnts and their
officers, and their mode of doing their work in the field,
are fully known to his Roy a! Highness/ The S!nd Cavalrj'
Division under Count v. Stolbevg had, since the 13th, been
closely watching the Army of the Loire, and liad acquiretl
a knowledge of the country north and west of Orleans ;
there is no trace of inefficiency in the Division, Ear
away to the west and north-west have been with the
Grand Duke the 6th Cavalry Division, under the com-
mand of Major-General v. Schmidt, the best Cavalry General
in the German Army, This Divi>iion, like the 9nd^ had
also acfjuired an intimate knowledge of the tract of
country over which it had been working; that knowledge
so important for cavalry in all its operations. Yet now
at this crisis, the Prince, himself a cavalry officer, asks
that they may exchange duties, exchange spheres of opera-
tions, each go from country they know to country they do
not know, and where they will be comparatively inefficient,
until they have had time to learn and understand the new
country.

For both the Prince and the Grantl Duke there was a very
great surprise in store this day, as agreeable to the forrjier as
it must undoubtedly have been disagreeable to the latter.
At about one o'clock in the afternoon hail been written at
Pithiviers a letter for the Duke, or it was being written ; it
informed the Grand Duke of what had taken place on the
24th, and also of the ai'rival from the east at Gien on the
Loire of a Corps 30,500 strong; and that, exclusive of this
Corps, the Army of the Loire is some 1S0,000 strong, llie
Prince will therefore defer active operations until he has the
co-operation of the Detachment, At ten minutes after the
hour there arrived from v. Moltke a telegram to the following
effect : " His Majesty the King has ordered : The Detachment
of his Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg is
placed, until further orders, under the command of Prince
Frederick Charles, The Detachment is to watch by Cavalry

NOVEMBER m

xSi

with Infantry supports the roads from Tours and le Mans
to Paris, and is to march as rapidly as possible in the direc-
tion of Beaugency until further orders. The March pro-
gramme, as proposed for the following days at the Head-
quaitei-s of his Royal Highness the Grand Duke, is to be
sent as quickly as possible by wire to the Head- quarters of
the Second Anny, which is to-day at Pithiviers, and here
also.'^ A similar telegram was sent from Versailles to the
Grand Duke.

Here we see v. Moltke suddenly giving up the control of a
strategica.1 operation which he had himself taken in hand only
three days previously. At first sight it seems incredible
that he should have counselled the King to take this step.
The Prince had already .shown that he differed from v. Moltke
in the strategical employment of the Detachment ; v, Moltke
knew already the difficulty of making the Grand Duke obey
the orders even of the King, and he must have foreseen the
improbability of his being more amenable to one who was
only a Royal Prince ; he must probably have been also aware
of the ill-feeling between the Grand Duke and his new
commander. Putting the reins into the hands of the Prince
would seem therefore equivalent to letting the operations
against the Army of the Loire go to the wall. But although
there is no record of the actual reason, the circumstances of
the moment seem to furnish grounds for an hypothesis,
which is now submitted for consideration as, not improbably,
correct.

The task of giving the necessary amount of time and
thought required for the control of the operations against
the Army of the Loire at this period must have been, men-
tally and physically, beyond tlie power of any human being
in the position of v. Moltke — a position in which the strain,
aJreatly enormous, was increasing hourly. The quarter from
which came least anxiety was the north, where v. ManteufFel
with the First Army was now commencing operations. V.
Manteuftel was a soldier of the highest ability ; with him was,
SLS a corps commander, v. Goeben, the idol of the German

1 82 THE PKOPLE^S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

soldiers, so that in the leading of that army v. Moltke justi-
fiably had the fullest confidence. Thei"e was an anxious time
as regards the south-east of France where v. Werder, a
soldier not apparently of special military ability^ was in
command ; it was from this quarter that the German line of
communications was most open to attack. But it was Paris
itself that demanded now the closest, and at the same time,
unremitting watchfulness. Here Trochu was preparing for
the gi'eat effort, known afterwards as " Ducrot's sortie." If this
were to succeed the consequences might be of a very serious
character. No wonder then that v. Moltke relieved him-
self, for a time, of some portion of his arduous work ; but
this relief was to be only for a season, inasmuch as, the
danger over, he, a week later, again took the reins into his
own hands from those into which he now siUTendered them.
The surrender was somewhat akin to making of necessity
a virtue.

The unsatisfactory leading of the Detachment and the
difficulty already experienced by v. Moltke in controUing the
commander may further have made the operations on the
Loire a burden to v. Moltke. The Grand Duke's order of the
34<th for the 25th had given great dissatisfaction at Versailles ;
so much so, that the authorities were compelled to consider
what action should be taken in the matter. It was seriously
discussed on the S4th, but the decision was left over for the
morning conference at the Royal Head-quarters on the
following day. Very early on the SSth, before the decision
was arrived at, v. Blumenthal, at 9.55 a.m., wired to the
Grand Duke that thunder was in the air ; "It is of the
utmost importance that the Detachment should move for-
ward,'" The decisive telegi-am already given was sent at
1.10 P.M. to the Grand Duke, by whom it was received at
6.16 P.M.

At Pithiviers the Prince at once made use of the freedom
given him to act contrary to v. Moltke's wishes, and he
added to the at most finished letter to the Grand Duke, before
despatching it : "I may tell your Royal Highness, in con-

NOVEMBER 25 183

sequence of this telegram, that I can only assume that the
March programme to be sent to me will give, for the move-
ment in the direction of Beaugency, the right wing at the
utmost,'' The letter did not reach its destination until the
evening of the 26th.

CHAPTER XII

NOVEMBER SBth

On the S6th nothing of importance occurred at the Second
Artny. The Prince held to the opinion, and v. ^Valdei'see
seems to have shared his belief, that only one corps, the 20th,
Crouzafs, was immediately in front. At the Xth Army Corps
V. V. Rhetz carried out his duty of protecting the left of the
Army by sending away to Chateau I^ndon six companies-, two
squadrons, and two guns from his already weakened coi-ps. In
a slight engagement at Lorcy, arising out of ahostile i-econnais-
sance, the participation of the population in the defence again
displayed itself. To the German outposts came men who,
apparently, wore well-disposed peasants, and who oifered for
sale bread and other articles of food. Conversation naturally
ensued, with the stereotyped question, *' Are there any French
troops near ? " and the equally stereotyped falsehood, " None."'
Tlie bargains concluded, and the vendors having disappeared,
out burst a French battalion. Among the peasants had been
officers and men, with one eye on the bargains, and the othei*
on the numbers and batlges of the Grerman troops.

On the French side the 18th Corps an-ived at Montargis ;
the SOth remained in position, occupying Ladon on its right,
St. Loup on its left, while des Paillieres'' division, of which
the centre was at Chilleurs, was guarding the edge of the
forest on a front of nearly twenty miles, Cathelineati's Franc-
tireurs connecting it with Crouzat-

The S6th was, however, a great day for letter- writing at
Fithiviers, but before dealing with this most interesting and
iaipoi"tant correspondence, the operative work of the day must
be given. Early in the niorning the Prince had heard from

NOVEMBER S6

185

the Grand Duke of his intended march north-east on Brou ;
so, now freed from controlj he shook off from hi^s feet the
last particle of the Beaugency dust of Versailles, and, at
11,16 A.M., wired to the Grand llnke, '* Your Uoyal Highness
is ordered, attacking the enemy by way of Chateaudmi and
Bonneval, to march without loss of time to unite with the
Second Army, of which the right flank is at Janville " [west
of and near Toury], The Detachment meanwhile pursued its
way north-east, and, in the evening, extended from Brou on
the north (J22nd Inf. Division) to Droue on the south (Bava-
rians), fifteen miles ; but as the rear corps of the previous day
was now the leading corps and vice ver.<td, there could not fail
to be again march complications. There was not, however,
any fighting ; for de Son is, alarmed by false reports to the
effect that the Second and Third Armies and the 4th Cav.
Division were closing round him, retircd on the 26th to Cha-
teandun. A somewhat alarming report had come to the
Germans from three prisoners, that a force of 75,000 men,
including three fjattalions from Chateaudun and ten from
Bonnevai were on the march in a direction they could only
indicate as " to the north.'' The Grand Duke, although he
knew that he was now under the Prince, had not, during the
day, received any orders from hinij so in a communication to
Vereailles, he mentioned this fact, and, later on, asked by
telegrapli the Third Army, " Have I anything to do with the
Third Army?" But now the Grand Duke was to receive a
serious shock to his feelings and his pride, for there came from
y. Moltke the following telegi-am :

" His Majesty the King has, at a personal audience to-day,
been pleased to cotnniand, on account of the special import-
ance which now attaches to the operations of the Detach-
ment under the orders of your Royal Highness, that Lieu-
tenant-General v. Stosch, to whom has been communicated his
Majesty's views, shall act, until fui-ther orders, as Chief of
the General St^ff of the Detachment, I must not omit to
inform your lloyal Highness, with the deepest respect, that a
special superior order will follow/"

i86 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

The step taken by v. Moltke — forol course it was his doing
— was altogether exceptional in the conduct of control, and
this cose was beset with difficulties rcquirinp;' to be treated with
the greatest delicacy. Nominally, it was merely substitution,
temporarily, of one Staff* Officer for another. But as the Com-
mander is the superior of the Staff Officer, and as, up to the
present time, the Duke does not appear to have had, or made,
any complaint against Col. v. Krenski, he was indirectly
responsible for the continued failure of the staff work i so the
change was necessarily somewhat of a reproof to him, and an
expression of dissatisfaction at the way in which this work had
been done. But in the selection of the substitute, two points
had to be taken into consideration : he must Ije, professionally*
of gi-eat ability, he must be of rank that in itself must carry
influence. The choice was, therefore, very limited, and seems
to have lain between v, Podbielski, the Quartermaster-General,
and V. Stosch, the head of the Intendance Branch. After
having undergone a certain amount of preliminary sounding,
V, Stosch, on the SOth, accepted the post, but as he couJd not
leave the Koyal Head-quarters without the sanction of his
chief, V. Roon, the Minister of War, v. Moltke had "to ask
personally for this. V. Roon saw the necessity of the case
and gave the required permission, saying that he would keep
V. Stosch's appointment open, provided that he was not away
too long.

But, possibly, it was not merely to get better staff'' work that
it was V. Stosch who was chosen for this mission. V. Moltke
knew that he had now on the Loire t^vo obstinate peraonalities,
over whom he had voluntarily given up control. V, Stosch
was an excellent soldier, a large-minded man, but in view^ of
the situation he was a good deal more. Owing to his high
position on the supreme staff* of the German forces, and his
close professional connection with v. Moltke, the chief Staff
Officer of those forces, he was, on the Ijoire, little less than
v. Moltke present by proxy. The Grand Duke must now be
aware that if he rebelled against his new^ Chief Staff' Officer
he would be rebelling against v. Moltke,^whilst the Prince

NOVEMBER 26

187

knew siniilarly> that although he might be determined to act
in future in disregard of v. Moltke's expressed views and
wishes, there was present only a few miles away from him in
the theatre of war, v, Moltke's personal representative,
endeavouring to hold him in check. Nevortholess the Prince
regarded the change as decidedly for the better. V. Stosch
quitted Versailles on the S6th and arrived at the Detachment
on the following day. And now to the letter- writing.

From Pithviers at midday v, Stiehle reported to v, Moltke
the views and intentions of the Second Army with respect to
the Detachment; he wrote also that owing to the heavy
character of the country, due to the rain, it was impossible
for the BVench to advance to the attack ; the French would,
therefore, i"euiain quiescent, hoping that the Second Army
would take the initiative, attack them in their well-chosen
and well-prepared positions in the Forest of Orleans, and
become engaged in a many days' Hght on a wide front ; then
the numerical inferiority of the Germans would enable mme
of the French forces, not engaged, to advance, compelling
the attackers to give up the fight and march after them ;
the French would not fail to claim this as a victory. So the
Prince would wait until the Detachment came near enough for
effective co-operation, and then he would determine whether
the right wing could secure a crossing over the Loire below
Orleans, whence masses of cavalry could be sent into the
country on the other side. An attack on Orleans from the
north-west would be thereby greatly facilitated. The success
of this plan, he added, depended, however, on whether the Xth
Army Corps could hold in check for several days the right wing
of the enemy, and also on the enemy not pushing forward large
bodies of troops between the Loing and the Yonne. People
travelling reported the force opposite the Xth Army Corp« to
be 60,000, but this he believed to be an exaggeration. The
Fi-ench coi"ps opposite the army were, he said, the SOth, 15th,
and 16th. The 18th [at Montargis] under Bourbaki [Billot
was in command, as Bourbaki had not yet ari'ived] was he said
at Tours [some eighty miles away] ; the 17th [at Chateaudun]

1 88 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

was at le Mans. A Fog of War indeed ; the Frencli people
in their war kept their secrets well.

On this day the Prince replied as follows to the letter he had
received from the King :

" I am fully of opinion that I must not nm any risk at
this period of the war, where the fall of Paris has to be con-
sidered. Looking at my position, twenty-eight miles long,
opposite a far numerically stronger enemy, with whose out-
posts I nm in touch at sevei-a] points, many would consider it
dangerouis. But it must bo borne in mind that the enemy
ovei-esti mates my strength very much, and that the bad
ground away from main roads can hardly, or only with great
difficulty, be used for manoeuvring, so this protects me ;
antl this sort of position deceives the enemy ; so it must
he admitted that I can remain here until the enemy learns
tike truth, and until the gi-ound improves. I do not see any
ilanger to myself, only a little inconvenience.

"The concentration of the main botly of the hostile regular
troops in the Forest of Orleans, if my impression is correct,
has been well considered and well carried out.

" Does the enemy contemplate the relief of Paris ?

" Certainly this was his iutention. That it is so now, I
doubt. Somewhere about the 15th, ordei.s uere already givf>n
for an advance on Etampes, hut were recallctl on the same day
when the approach of ' 200,000 men from Metx "* was heard
of.'" [This was not the case; no such orders were given. |
" But in this campaign we have had already some wonderful
experiences. I mean the order from Paris to MacMahon for
the relief of Metz, which led eventually to Sedan. So may
now, also I.^wyers' orders deci-ee that the Arnny of the Loire
shall under any circumstances go to relieve Paris,

" Will the enemy advance on the broad front, as his out-
posts stand now, or from one or both flanks ?

" I believe that he would specially prefer the direction liy
Pusieaux" [due north of Beaune] " to Fontaineblcau, especially
if he still wishes to take the offensive, because the ground is
there on the whole most favourable for him, the direction is

NOVEMBER S6

[S9

straiglil, tiutl bcctitise he will march past tny left Hank, and
this direction leuds away from the approaching Detachment
of the Grand Duke. I own that it would give me much
pleasure to have to deal with such an atlvance, because the
operation would be new to me. I should endeavour to
inanceiivre with the centre corps (the Illrd Array Corps) as
Napoleon did against Blitcher's Army on the Marae in 1814.
1 presume, ot" course, that the enemy, in order to deceive nie,
showii the headfiof eolunins ou all the roads to Pariai^ without
[jrejudice to the main body which marches off to the right.
I would [)ledge myself that the enemy, at the most, advances
only four or five miles a day.

" But far more difficult than this question is that of driving
the enemy out of the Forest of Orleans. If the Empei-or
Napoleon III. said with truth he had never been able, owing
to the numerous cavalry which covered my advance to the
Moselle, to find out where the main body wiis, so can I say
t^e same as respectii my own situation now. I know only,
with certainty, that this or that village or farm house is
occupied ; wheiv some large bodies of ti-oops are is also
occasionally known ; where the main body of the army is,
whether at Orleans, or on the line Gien-Bellegarde, I do not
know. We have not been successful in taking prisoners at
many places.

" I hffpe that I shall know more about the enemy when
the Grand Duke arrives, whom, under the existing circuni-
staneesj I nuist emjdoy tactically, not strategically, against
the Army of the I^oire.^

This was an honest statement of his refusal to adopt v.
Moltke's strategy.

It must here be remarked that v, Moltke was in complete
ignomnce of the correspondence carried on between the Prince
and the King, so later ou, in discussions with the latter, he wiis
somewhat surprised to find his Majesty meeting him with the
very siinie arguments that htitl been put forward to himself by
V. Stiehle. The letter continues : " I know Mothing of the con-
dition of the Grand Duke's troops, nor details of the length

194 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

strategic operation coming on him by surprise at some
unexpected point in the long front of seventy miles from Gien
to le Mans is in the highest degree unlikely. V. Moltke
wished to take advantage of a weakness, the Prince ignored
the weakness and preferred to attack under conditions the
most favourable to the enemy. Mechanically worked tactics
were to be substituted for art-like strategy.

CHAPTER XIII

NOVEMEHB 27i:u

The period from November 27th to December 2nd is the de-
cisive period not only of this "People's Wai," or of the cam-
paigfii 0)1 the Loire, but it may be regarded as the decisive period
of the whole Franco-Gernaan campaign of the Second War ;
for during it the French Army in Paris made its gi-eatest
effort to break through the investing line, whilst from the
south the Army of the Loire made its two great attempts to
force the investing Army to release the capital from its grip.
But it was on the result of any decisive encounter on the
Loire, ami not on Ducrot'^s forcinghis way tlu'ough the investing
line with some 50,000 or 60,000 men that for the Germans
the future depended. If the French Army of the Loire were
thoroughly defeated, these 50,000 or 60,000 men would l>e
aimless wanderers* easily dealt with; but if Prince Frederick
Charles were defeated, and the Army of the Loire victorious
and free to move, immediate concentration of nearly all the
remaining German forces in France became at once a necesBity
for self-preservation J and this would involve the abandonment
of the inveistment. Thereby the prairtieal sympathy of the
whole of Europe could not fail to have been enlisted in the
cause of a nation that had entlured such prolonged suffering,
and hatl by such endurance emerged successful ly from disaster
and defeat ; and it is possible that from political consideiu-
tionSj Germany might have hesitated to embark on a new
campaign against France. Hence, at this time, the import-
ance of the campiign on tlie Ijoirc. That the crisis on the
Loire lasted so long w^as due to the Fog of War, wliich now
hid from the contending commanders on Ixtth sides what was

196 THE PEOPLF/S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

in front of them ; so that m^tcadiof rapidly carrying out rtiove-
ineuts which mast liave brought the frisis to a chmax, there
was cautious refraining from activity, because any movement
seemed fraught with danger.

It is impossible to relate here all the details of the pro-
ceedings on these days, and of them only a general account
can be given, attention being drawn also to some matters
in them specially deserving notice. But even this account
may raise in the mind of the reader some not altogether
satisfactory reflections on the value of the study of the Art
of War ; and this feeling would be intensified by a careful
perusal of the large amount of recorded details. Ctd
bono, the study of war, if leaders blundering and giving
WTong oi-dersj and if troops fighting blindfolded, can thus
win in campaigns and battles ? The elements of chance,
of luckj and fortune, seem to have had here far more weight
and influence on the results than did study, thought, and
brains.

It is impossible not to sympathise with the Prince in the
anxiety lie felt from the earliest hom-s of the S7th. The
reports had told him that during the previous day, the enemy
in front of him had gained ground, slowly and not much, but
stillj ground had been gained ; and the number of the hostile
forces in front of the 9000 or 10,000 men of the Xth Ai'niy
Coi-ps must at the lowest estimate be 55,000.

On the previous day he had viewed, ^v!thout any dis-
quietude or disapproval a rest-day for the Debichment ; but
now, as the storm was certainly gathering, and might burst
on him at any moment, the sooner the Detachment came to
his aid the better ; but there arrived a telegram sent early by
the Grand Duke saying that he would reach the Loir that
day, but must take a rest-day on the 28th ; and at 8 p.m. came
from V. Stosch a confirmatory telegram ; so no help could l>e
looked for in that direction ; and al;SO from many sources
came reports that the French Army was massing to the right
at Montargis,* beyond the German left. In Ladon, had been
* A£ tbfi lucidentB aj'o now becoming localised at and ne%r Beauue, it

NOVEMBER 27

i97

found letters from French soldiers, at the camp at Montargis,
all referring to the march on Paris, and the certainty of success,
" It is evident," said most of the writers, "that now at last it is
to be an advance, for at the places where only a few days ago
there were Pi-ussians, they [the French] are now advancing
victoriously." Reading the reports, it is impossible to donbt
that the Prince waii fully justified in drawing from them the
conclusion, that the strategical advance selected by Ganibetta
was to be up the valley of the Loing. He therefore determined
for the nion-ow to carry out a general movement towards the
East, so that the army would front towards Montargis. And
yet the conclusion he drew was the opposite of the truth, for
the French had no intention whatever of taking this line of
advance ; and they had not, on the ^Tth, massed forces at
Montargis. The 18th Corps had been there on the S6th«
but on the 27th it was drawn west, leaving only a brigade to
cover the right of the delayed attack on Beaune and Pithiviers,
for which the final preparations were completed by Crouiiat
this day. It will appear later on that the ordei*s given by
the Prince, and an order given by v. V. Rhetsi, to meet a
situation that did not exist, led to the successful dealing by
the Germans with the situation that did exist.

And now to the Detachment, which, owing to the retire-
ment of de Sonis and the 17th Corps on the night of the
@6th, entered Chateaudun and Bonneval on the 27th,
encountering but little opposition. Some of the inhabitants
resisted to the last, and being taken with arms in their hands
were at once shot.

V. Stosch, in the course of his journey to Chateaudun, where
he expectetl to find the Head- quarters of the Detachment, struck
first on the ith Cav. Division and the 2Snd Inf. Division, north
of Bonneval ; and by his own personal observation, as well as
from conversation with some of the senior officers, found how
widely different was the actual condition of an ai'my that

eoeuiB desirable to warn the reader that in thia book the nama " Montargia ""
indicates Inrarlahly the town on the Loiog, and ticier the little Tilitigei four
siileB east of EeauDe.

198 THE PEOPLF/S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

had been struggling continuously for a fortnight against a
people in amis, from the idea fortned of its condition, by
Staff Officers of high degree, including perhaps himself, who
had all the time been comfortably fed and lodged at Versailles.
The whole Detachment, including its staff, was in a state
of moral depression. As the officers he met told him, this
depression was not due to the mere physical exertions, to the
raarchi[ig off before dawn, the baitings, delays and crossings
on the roads ; the arrival after dark into quarters, or into
no quarters at all, but into wet and cold bivouacs : these
trials and discomforts would not have told on the men if
only there had been some tangible result, one battle, one real
encounter ; but instead of thisj there had been only h perpetual
irritating skirmishing with guerilla bands. One big battle,
^nd the Detachment would still have been fit for any work.
V. Stosch soon became convinced that a rest-day was
absolutely necessary, and he forthvvith obtained leave for it
from Versailles.

The Duke received v. Stosch with a somewhat distant
manner ; the change of Chief Staff' Officer without con-
sult^ition with him was a departure from rule, and he might
fairly suspect that v. Stosch had Ijeen sent to keep a watch
on him. But soon v. Stosch discovered that the discontent
of the Grand Duke arose from the same cause as did the
general depression, hanl work with no result. Employing,
therefore, the utmost tact, and constantly nourishing in the
mind of his commander the prospect of a battle in the hear
future, and one worthy of the Detachment, v. Stosch succeeded
in establishing himself in the position he had been sent to
occupy, namely, accepted and trusted adviser and counsellor,
and, not improbably, as a sort of protection against the
idiosyncrasies of the Prince, whose behests the Grand Duke
had now to obey.

V. Stosch, turning to the investigation of the way in which
the staff work had been carried on, found a state of things
that fully accounted for much of the unsatisfactory !eading,and
for the meagi-eness of the information that from time to time

NOVEMBER S7

199

had been furnished to Vei-sailles, To his surprise there was
ni) I'ield Bureau, the iiecordf* were in disorder, /j?Tm of in-
foniintion received were not forthcoming, there was no proper
subdivision and distribution of Staff" Ditties; in short, there
was not at the Head-quarters any proper Staff' Organisation.
All this, V. Stosch at once refonned, and he put the staff
vs'ork on a right footing.

The 17th Corps had now quite disappeared from the neigh-
bourhood. On the 96th, de Son is, at Chateaudun, had
received permission from d''Aurelk': to retire on Orleans. But
in Tonrs a real panic had arisen on the receipt of the news
from de Soni.s, that he believetl two armies and a Cavalry
Division to be closing on him. Ordej's wei-c at once sent to
d^Aurelle to provide for the protection of the Delegation, so
he ordered de Sonis not to retire on Orleans, but d«e south
on Alarchenoir, and lie suggested anight march ; a dangerous
form of retreat even with good soldiers, but full of risk for
those here. Some hostile cavah'V [jatrols, a few stray shots, and
the 17th Corps bi'oke and fled ; a large number rallied at St.
Laiux'nt des Bois, not far from Marchenoir, some did not
stop until they hatl got to the Loire at Beaugency. On the
27th, from the coinitry far and wide, the scattered troops
were gradually collected south of the Forest of Marchenoir.

On this night of the 27th, whilst the Detachment is look-
ijig forward to the well-tmmed rest of the morrow, and the
Prince ia full of the strategic movement north from Montargis
tliat he is to thwart, Crouzat, within a few miles of him, is
at work at his j)lan of battle for tlie moiTOw, and has drawn
up his {jrdera for the decisive stroke which, w ithin four and
twenty hours shall, lie hopes, have crushed at all events the Xtir
A.C, the left of the Second German Army. During the day
the 18th Corps, with the exception of a brigade that remained
at Monbirgis, had Ijeen brought to Ladon, The plan for the
battle WAS good, and in devising it Crouzat possessed an advan-
tage not usually found with an attacking force ; he knew in detail
the positions of all the troops of the Xth Army Corps on the
uight before the battle; whereas the defenders could only

200 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

Bunnise in the vaguest way the dispositions of even the
largest units of the attacking force, and wei-e actually doubt-
ful what those units really were. Nor could it be otherwise.
The BTea. over w^hich tlie Xth Army Corps was scattered in the
neighbourhood of the battlefield is some twenty-five square
miles in extent. On it are a large number of villages and
hamlets, and roads and tracks are in profusion ; the line of
German outpossts was ten miles in length, and, in front of
Beaune, but 500 or 600 yards distant from that of the
French. It Was, therefore, impossible for the Germans to
prevent the population collecting information as to the dis-
position of the troops over the whole areaj and then trans-
mitting it to the French outposts, whence it went to Crouisat.
During the battle there were confined in the church of
Beaune, forty civilians who had been captured whilst taking
part in the previous fights, or whilst obtaining information.
Amongst them was the Cut4 of Lorcy, the Sous-Maire of
Montargis,and the Maire of a small village. Crouzat's plan was
to envelop the Xth Army Corps, to cut it off from the rest of
the Second Army, and to crush it- Crouzat considered that
the key of the position he was to endeavour to hold after its
capture w^as the village of Beaune ; v. V. RhetK seemed to
consider it also the key of his own position, though that it
was so, as the key of a position protecting the left flank of
the Second Army, his special duty, is not at all certain ; so
whilst he disposed his corps specially for its protection,
Crouzat made its capture the special object of the battle.
Crouzat determined that after the German outposts had been
driven in, the 18th Corps from l^adon should advance on the
east side of the village, whilst the 20th Corps advanced
simultaneously against its front and its west side ; the
Germans would thus find themselves enveloped on both flanks
and their line of retreat threatened. If they retiredj Beaune
must be left to its fate ; if they did not retire, they would find
themselves suri-ounded bj' overwhelming forces. On the left
of the 20th Corps were Cathelineau's Franc-tireurs, who were
maintaining connection between that corps and the 1st Division

J

NOVEMBER 27 201

(des Pallieres') of the 15th Corps, which Division, on a very
wide front, was guarding the entries ix) the Forest of Orleans
east of the Paris Road. It was intended that the troops on
the left of the 20th Corps should deal with any ,<arerman
reinforcements arriving from Pithiviers, As on the 27th des
Pallieres had been informed both by Crouzat on his right,
and by Chanzy on his left, that they expected to be attacked,
he considered it to be his duty to remain in his present posi-
tion, to look both ways, help in either direction and also
prevent the enemy breaking in between the two corps. It
must be mentioned that owing to orders being sent from
both Tours and d'Aurelle, there was great doubt at times
in the minds of the Generals as to what they were expected
to do.

CHAITER XIV

NOVEMBER 28th— BATTI,R OF BEAUNE LA ROLAlfDE

At eight oVlock on the morning of November 98th , there fell
into Beaune from the south near St, Loup, two milcij south of
Beauiie and four west of Jiiranville, a few shells, of ivhicli one
struck the house in which were the Hcatl-quartcrs of the Xth
Army Corps, The Imttle uf Bcaune la Rolandc, the effort to
auconiplish the first stage of the advance of the Army of the
Loire to the relief of Paris, had begun. It was the first of the
three battles whioh in one week were fought on the Loire. A
detaital narrative of the biittle wotdd be beyond tlie scope of
this work, so only a genei-al account of it will here be given.

The £400 men forming the ten miles line of German
outposts were soon driven in, but the 18th Corps in
advancing from Ladon towards the east side of Beaune by
Juranville and Venouille, encountered unexpectedly strong
hostile forces in the way. At the time when Crouitat allotted
this task to the corps he knew that the Germans were not in
force here ; but lui known to him, v. V, Rhetz, in accordance
with the directions from the Prince to watch towards Mon-
targis, had drawn in the early morning to this flank his one
reserve Brigade and the Corps Artiliei'y, so these were at
once utilised to stop the advance. The main body of
the Xth Army Corps was collected here about Long Cour,
which is two miles cast of Beaune. General Billot, who was in
command of the 18th Corps, endeavoured in vain, after
having captured the advanced German poats, to drive the
Germans from the main position ; but at S p.m. he abandoned
the attempt, and leaving some troops in front of the enemy,
he marched, conctaled by the close country, with the

NOVEMBER 28

203

remainder to Beanne, and took part in the unsuccessful
attacks there later on in the afternoon. Against the German
rightj Crouzat, with the SOth Corps, had been at iirst
decidedly successful, though the splendid attack of this Garde
Mobile Corps on the south-west and west side of the village of
Beaune failed against the well-disciplined resistance of the 38th
Infantry Brigade {v. Wedell). But by an enveloping attack
from the west the Germans were forced back on the north side
of the village, the defenders of which thus became isolated from
the rest of the corps, So bad wtis the outlook towards S p.st.,
that V. V. Ilhetz, on the receipt of an erroneous report from a
Staff Officer that Beaune had fallen into the hands of the
French, ordered a general retreat. Hut at the suggestion of
Colonel V. Caprivi the issue of the order was suspended, as
reinforcements wei-e on their way from Pithiviers, It was
about B p,M- that the troops of the 5th Infantry Division
arrived near enough to inHuenee the course of the fight, and
then a eounterstroke against the left flank of the atbiek drove
the French back. The garrison in Beaune had held out
against the earlier attacks of the SOth Corps and the later
ones when the 1 8th Corps also entered on the eastern side
of the village into the fray. The Ijattle was pi-olonged into
the darkness, and then the French were driven finally off the
battlefield, leaving the defenders of the position, however,
worn out and exhausted.

The initial operation fortherclief of I'aris had failed. Rarely
has an attacking force been so eoniplctcly overthrown and
rendered so thoroughly incapable for either defence or otfenoe :
rarely has the demoralisation resulting from a single defeat
in one theatre of vvar so greatly influenced the course of a
subsequent renewal of the struggle in another theatre of war,
Beaune la Rolandc made itself felt on the Ijisaine. Usually
after a battle the victor knows that he has won, but here,
strangely enough, whilst the load's fully realised the com-
pleteness of their own defeat, the victor not only did not
Idealise his victory, but he completely uiisiuiderstood what had
happened ; he believed that his> victory was only a uariow

204 THE PEOPLE^S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

escape from actual defeat, and that he would have to undergo

a similar ordeal next tiay. So the fruits of victory remained
ungarnered. And this mis owing to a very great extent to
the fact that the war of which this battle was an incident^
was a "People's War" in a tract of country singularly
adapted to a war of this character. It was by the aid of the
people that Crouzat had been able to lie hidden close to his
enemy, and to place, unknown to him, his troops in poKition
whence they could burst out on him unexpectedly ; it was
with the aid of the people that when he hail failed and was
forced to abandon the attack, he found again the safe shcltei'
from which he had emerged, a haven of security and rest.
On the night following the battle, all that the Prince knew
was the bare fact that an attack had been made on the
Xth Army Corps, and had been repulsed.

No doubt to judge con-ectly the result of a Imttle, even
if it be a victory, is often a matter of gi-eat difficulty, and
it is only the commander, possessing a real military coup
dTcell^ who can see below the surface of that which lies before
him ; but it is certain that a leader less cautious and more
physically active than the Prince would have found out some-
thing of how mattci-s stood. Until there is given to the
world the views and reasons of action of the Prince other
than those to be found in official or semi-official publications,
it would be both imjust and unfair to form any final opinion
on his capacity as the German leader of the operations against
the Army of the Loire ; and that this information is not
available is the more to be regretted because his line of action
and his conduct during the week commencing November 28th
appear to be, to say the least, somewhat strange.

For the ^8th, three possible courses of action that the
enemy might take on this day were in the mind of the Prince in
the early morning ; and whichever of the three Crouzat might
select, an attack on the Xth Army Corps at Beaune on that
day was certain. Crouzat might elect to commence opera-
tions by throwing his whole foixe on the corps and crushing
it ; or whilst attacking the corps for this purpose he might

NOVEMBER S8

205

simultaneouijiy advance from Moiitargis down the Loiiig ; or if
this advance was the main operation of the day, he must at the
same timeattack the corps strongly enough to hold it at Beamie,
thus preventing it either atfaicking him on his left flank during
the advance, or retiring quickly to the north-east to intercept
the advance short of Fontainebbau, On the early discovery
of the real meaning of the indispensable attack on the corps,
the right and successful subsequent employment of the whole
of the Prince's command depended. The Prince had told
V- V. RhetK that the mission of the corps was to protect the
left flank of the Second Array, but to regard this as its only
function, would be to take a very limited view of the situation
and its requirements, for on the corps the future course of
the campaign depended ; it was the pivot on which the future
strategy turned. If the corps were defeated at Beaune and
had to fall back» it gave to Cvouzat another starting-point
towards the capital, for from Beaune he could make not only
north-^t to Fontaiiiebleau, but north-west to Toury or
Etampew on the Orleans-Paris road ; besides which the
Prince with his two unbeaten corps could not espect to hold
his own against a now oertajn general advance of the whole
Army of the Loire. If, concurrently, Crou?;at with a real
attack on the corps, was sending forces north from Montargis,
it was indispensable to maintain the corps on its present line
for a time to cover the flank niai-eh of the two other corps
towards the east, or to enable them to concentrate ; if Crouzat,
really marching from Montargis,— was only demonstrating
against the corps, every man and gun unnecessarily detained
in the present position was a sheer w^aste of power urgently
needed elsewhere. On November 28tli it wajs at Beaune la
Rolande that the Oracle had established itself, and there
only could it be consulted as to the future. Yet the personal
behaviour of the Prince seems to throw great doubts on his
having realised the fact.

The sound of guns at Beaune was heard so plainly at
Pithiviers in the early morning that v. Waldcrsee, who was
engaged in writing his daily letter to the King, brought it

toS THE PEOPLE^S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

abruptly to a closej moimtetl his horse and rode off towards
Beaune. The firing had ai'oused the inhabitants of Fithiviers
to a high pitch of excitement. At street corners, doors of
hoitsesj and in market places and open spaces, they gathered
discussing among themselves the couj-se affairs were takiTig,
and openly speaking of this firing as the eommeneeraent of
the expected decisive battle. Meanwhile the telegraph wires
from Beaune to Pithiviers were conveying to the Prince in-
formation and reports false as well as true. Apparently
about S.SO A.M. came from v. V, llhetz at Beaune a message
dated 7.4 a.m., stating that the general had, during the
sight, been informed that on the previous evening the enemy
had occupied Font^nay on the Loing, four miles south of
Chateau Landon, and eight miles north of Montai'gia. The
general was therefore shifting his corps artillery and his
reserve brigade nearer to his left wing. It seems probable
that the French in Fontenay were only foraging parties, and
yet it was this erroneous information that caused this shifting
and led to the failure of the attack of the 18th Corps. A
little eai'lier had an-ived at Pithiviers from the neighbourhooti
of NemouiTi a sanitai-y column which reported that on the
previous evening Neuiours, which is twenty nules north of
Montargis and only eight miles from Foutaincbleau, had been
occupied by the advanced guard of the enemy. It is certain
that there were no French in Nemours, But these two
reports seemed to furnish decided indications of the advance
north down the Loing, though it must have seemed strange
that the German detachment already in Chateau L.andon
had not sent in any report to the same effect.

Soon came in reports from Beaune as to what was taking
place there and in the neighbourhood, but which in no way
conflicted with those already received ; and these latter, un-
fortunately, had led to the formation of erroneous impressions
at the very commcncemeiit of the work of the day. The
telegraph sta,tion was at the village of Beaune, but the general
had at about 8 a.m. left Beaune for Long Cour ; so there
must occasionally have been a certain amount of delay in

NOVEMRKR 98

207

rendering reports to Pithiviei's. By a wire of 9.1fi a.m,,
V. V. Rhetz reported that a fight had commenced at
Maiziej-es (ncai-Iy three miles aoutij of Long Cour), where the
enemy? the 18th Corps, had attacked the outposts.* A
second wiiie, which was received at 10 a.m., said : " There is
an outpost fight at Juranvillc [one mile nearer Long Cour],
which at this time, 9.15, appearjs to be dying out. The
enemy has shown some hostile infantry battalions, but no
artillery. At present our infantry and artillery have easily
repulsed them," The Prince now came to the conclusion
that the Loing Valley was to be the scene of the hostile
operations, and he therefore determined to move his army this
day in that direction. To v. V. Rhetz he wrote at 9,30 a.m. a
letter, proljably despatched about 10 a.m. : " I have received
your Excellency ''s report that the advanced hostile troops
have I'eachcd Fontenay. The hostile forces advancing
by Montargis belong appai-ently to the 18th Corps'' [now
actually engaged against the German left] "and whose
ativance down the Loing, especially on tlie right bank, must
lie delayed. Your Excellency will, therefore, send to-day by
Chateau Landon a brigade with artillery and cavalry which wil]
take up a position for this purpose, and push forward detach-
ments towards Joigny'" [in the direction of the expected arrival
of the last, the 40th Brigtule, of the corps]. ..." The Ilird
Army Corps has orders to close to its left, and closely connect
with your Excellency at Beanne, so as to take part decisively
in any fight that may take place there to-day. . . . According
to what happens to-day, of which I must request fi-ecjuent tele-
grams, I will settle whether the Xth Army Corps moves into
the country between the Loing and the Yonne, and the lllrd
Army Corps from Beaumont to Chateau Landon to occupy the

• Thare ie uomutimeB great difliciilty in ascertaining the meantng of the
timea named in coxinection with the telegrams quoted or mentioned hy
Hocnifr and v. d. Goltz, for it ie not always clear whether these times apply
to the writing this telei^raiu or to its rucoipt in the iiffiee of to its despatch
thijnce, through the wire. This ttilegrain 18 not mentioticd by v. d. OulU ;
Uoenig (ailed it " Die erste, von 9J uhr," An orderly welUmounted could
gallop from [iOiig Cour to Bsiuiie lu a very lew miouteii.

210 THE PEOPLE^S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

Corps) sent forward troops by rail to Montargis yesterday [it
was oil the 26th that this took place]. Last evening his lead-
ing troops were at Fontenay [only foraging parties]. This
reveals that the probable plan of the enemy is to approach
Paris along the liOing, avoiding the ojjeii ground of La
Beauce, and turning our left flank. Confirming this is the
report just reteived from the Xth Army Corps that it is being
attacked at Alaizieres. Foi'tunately, the 5th Inf. Division is
already eonceiitrated south-east of Pithiviers and goes as
support to Beau lie. Ho soon as the coui-se of the fight permits,
a strengthened Brigade of the Xth Army Corps is to go to-
day to Chateau Landon, which i-s already held by a mixed
detachment, in order to take up a position on the Loing, and
to reconnoitre to the east. His Royal Highness intends, further,
to deploy the Xth Army Corps in the district between the
Loing and the Yonne, to place the Hliid Army Corps on the line
Beaumont-Chateau Landon, and to concentrate thelXth Ai-ray
Corps at Pithiviers. Obviously, this state of affairs upets, for
the time, all plans for crossing the Loire below Orleans, The
Detachment arrived yesterday (27th) at Bonneval and
Chateaudun without fighting, and is resting there. . . . His
Royal Highness intends to draw the Detachment to-morrow
(S9th) towards Janville-Toury, and to hand over to it the
protection of the great road to Etampes and those nearest
and parallel to it. The Second Army will thus be freed to
operate against the Army of the Ivoire, which is advancing
perhaps on both banks of the Loing. . . , I suggest to your
Excellency whether, from the troops before Paris a strong
occupation of Fontainebleau and Mo ret could not be carried
out. The fight on the left ffank of the Xth Army Corps is
extending ; we go there ; " but before going time was found to
write and send to the Detachment letters similar to that to
V. Moltke. These letters were desf matched about noon. To
V, Stosch a telegram was sent at 11.30 a.m., directing the
Detachment to reach on the 29th the Orleans -Paris road at
Toui^ with as strong leading troops of the left wing as pos-
sible, and the rest closed up as much as possible. A short

NOVEMBER 2H

211

march was suggested tor the SSth. Written orders showing
the pressing urgency would be sent.

It was probably bet\veen one and two oY-lock that the
Prince arrived near Barville at the time when the 20th
Corps had reached the limit of their successful advance
against the German right ; and although the tide of success
jjoon turned, leaving the flank safe, here the Prince remained,
and gave orders in connection with the operations on this
flank, beyond which any interest he took in the battle did
not seem to extend. There is no record of his having
communicated directly or indirectly with the General at
hong Courj or having inquired of him what had taken
place, or learning his vienvs on the situation ; he seems
simply to have ignored his existence, yet there is no trace
of any ill-feeling on the part of the Prince towards v. V.
Hhetz or of any want of confidence in him. And when
at nightfall about half-past fi%e the counterstroke had
succeeded the Prince pre|mred to ride back to Pithiviei^s ;
but before he mounted his horse, v, Waldersee came to him
and made his report on the battle^ having l>een present
the whole time and in personal communication with both
V. V. Hhetz and w Alvensleben, The Count remarked to
him : " A complete victory has been won, it will be a
Kossbach for the French if there is a vigorous pursuit," The
reference to the success of Frederick the Great was made
designedly. Gen. v. Hartmann had been urged more than
once to launch his Cavalry Division in pursuit, but no order
to do so had come to him from a senior officer, and on the
plea that the ground was too heavy he scornfully ignored the
suggestion. V. Waldersee hoped that by this allusion to
Rossbach the Prince would be led to give the older. The
Prince asked whether the 1st Cav, Division had not moved
to the attack ; v. Waldersee hardly liketl to tell the Pi'ince
of the unsuccessful efforts made for this purpose and confined
himself to the reply *' there may be difficulties in the way,'^
The Prince, however, did not interfere directly in the
matter and turning to v. Stosch, said : '* According to the

212 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

report by fount v. Waldersee, the Xth Arm

it. One of

wfKS t-aunot
Its DngatJes must, however.
But a vigorous piii-smt in

be employed in pui-suit. une
move ott' to-day to the Loing.
several directions by the 5th Inf. Division and the Ist Cav.
Division promises a great success. Be so good as to convey
my wishes to Generals v, AlvcMsleben and v, W Rhetz.''
So any pursuit by the cavalry ivould not commence until the
order had i-ome to v, Hartinann by a roundabout course
through some other senior general, and the favourable
moment might then have gone by, V. Stiehle rode away
to give the oi-ders, and the Prince rode away toward*t
Pithiviers. At the desire of the Prince, v. Waldei-sce ac-
companied him on his ride back and the conversatioii
between them contituietl. ITic Prince had not seen nioi-e of
the battlefield than an outlying portion ; he hatl not been
near Beaune or any other part of it, where the hecatonibs of
dead, dying and wounded, told the history of the battle.
V. Waldei-see, from his personal observation, was convinced
that the fight had been far tnore than a demonstration or a
mask for strategical movement^), and he endeavoured to induce
the Prince to accept as correct his opinion that two hostile
army corps had taken part in the Ijattle, and that its issue
had been so decisive, that any belief in the advance down the
Loing Valley could no longer be entei'tained. But the Prince
firmly held to the opinion that the strength of the enemy
had been over-estimated i he still believed that the fight wa»
but the introduction to a powerful offensive mo>ement, and
he considered it necessary to put in the Loing Valley stronger
forces than had been there up to the present time. The
Prince on his way to Pithiviers, where he arrived alwut seven
o'clock J stopped at Boynes to draw up and send a telegram to
the king : it ran as follows :

"To H-M. the King, Vereailles.

The Xth Army Corps was from nine o'clock driven back
from the outpost position ; it has successfully held its position
at Beaune la Holande, and was iji the afternoon .supported in
ray presence by the 5th Inf. Division and the 1st Cav.

NOVEMBER 28

213

Division, The fight [kampf] was* to a certain extent severe
[zum Theil sehr enist]. The enemy was 30,000 stiiJiig. Our
loss about 1000 men, many handi'eds of prisoners. Fight
[kanipf] ended about 5 p.^i."

Prince of Prussia,

Nine thousand men not only holding their own successfully all
day against the onslaught of fifty thousand, bat driving them
back off the battlefield with a loss of 8000 to 10,000, oniy a
'* Kampf /un) Theil sehr envst I'' And this erroneous idea was
due to the waut of thoroughness in the aseei'tainment of the
facts. It would not have much mattered if the niiHConception
had stood by itself and without any influence on the future, but
here it had evil effects on the eoui-se of the operations in the
days iinnietliately following. And v, Stiehle was, as usual,
a mere ** ditto " to his chief,

V- Alvensleben when he received the message had not at
hand forces for the pursuit ; v, Stiehle rode on to give the
other oitler to v, V, Rhetz, but failing to find him sent it to
him in writing. The order in reproducetf by v. d, Goltz and
is worthy of transcription.

" His Royal Highness says that it i,s of the utmost impor-
tance that the debitching an Infantry Brigade with Artillery
to Chateau Landon, in oixler to take up a jX)sition in the
valley of the Loing, as ordered to-day, shall be carried out to-
night with the Brigade most intact. If the attack at Beauiie
is i-enewcd to-morrow the 5th Infantry Division is there, and
at 7 A.M^ the 6th Infantry Division and the Corps Artillery of
the HIrd C'orps at Boynes ; and also in the forenoon a Brigade
of the IXth Army Corps will lie available thei-e. We can thus
fight vv'ith seven Brigades. Hi-s lloyal Highness expects to-
night by the bearer a reply and information about to-day's
fight [GefechtJ,^

It uiust have been with no little eontenijit for the superior
staff that V. V. Hhetx read the missive. His reply was to the
point : " The sending a Brigade to-night to Chateau Landon

ai6 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FHANCK, 1870-71

are beaton, my plan would be to ^ive up the Investmeiit of
Paris, and to send the Crown Prince of Saxony [Fourth
Army] with ManteuHel to the notth^ and the Oow n Prince
of Prussia [Third Army] with you to the south ; and, after
winning some victory, to i-esunie the Investment of Paris, at
the surrender of which we shall recover our siege Artillery."
ITie situation as it presents itself on the 27th to v. Moltke
is giave indeed ; inniiediately in front he has to hold
back the j^eatest sortie yet attempted from Paris, aided
by small sorties from other parts of it?* wslh ; the toni-
munieations of all the German foi-ces in FraiiL'e are threat-
ened in their most vulnerable point, and at the point farthest
away from any aid he fould send ; to his south is a huge
hostile army of relief faced by an inert and inactive 90,000
Geiiiians, apparently awaiting the law from the enemy. The
meaning of the reniarkablv honest, open, and candid state-
ment in the letter is surely clear enough — so clear, that he
who runs may i-ead ; it hardly seems to admit of misunder-
standing. What he says to v. Stiehle and to the Prince may
be paraphrased truthfully : " You see the plight in which we
Germans, we invaders are, now that our comnnniications with
the Rhine are no longer safe. Now that the Detachment
is nearer to yoii, ilu mttwihing or oihef\ and do It at once.
you fail, it wun't \ye your fault, I know, and I won't blame
you. In urging you to attack the enemy, I cannot, of course.
count surely on your success, but tiy, for goodness'' sake trif ;
I here tell you what I am itady to do and intend to do if
you fail, and in any case I shall hold your boldness free front
blame/' It was almost a counsel of despair, and had the
Grand Duke been in comniand, with v, Stosch at his elbow,
the offensive, it is well nigh certain, would have been taken
on the Loire immediately after the battle of BeBune la
Rolande; but on the Prince and v, Stiehle v. ^Moltke's letter
had not the slightest effect.

The situation on the east side of the Paris Road on
the 29th was very peculiai', though presumably not without
precedent in military history. The Germans had again taken

NOVEMBER S9 217

up the outpost line they held before the battle. Close in
front at Ladon and Boistioniiiiun respectively were the 18th
and 20th Corps, the corps that had fought against them, hut
which arc now impotent for offence and are fearing an
attack hy the Germans ; the Germans still on the defensive
a^ on the previous day, and again aivaiting an attack ; and
with no thought of tlie possibility of pursuing the enemy
they had di-iven off. Troops on whom the brunt of the battle
has fallen are physically unfit to pursue; and here the corps
at the outposts, the Xth Army Corps which had done the
fighting, was worn out and exhausted, but the I II id Army
Corps was quite fresh and was close at hand. It could well
have undertaken the ta.sk, whilst the Xth Army Corps
with a little rest and its re-supply of ammunition completed,
could have followed in reserve. And had the pursuit been
taken up in the early morning, it is possible that very great
I'esults might have followed. It would have struck upon the
20th Corps, which was so completely deinoi-alisod by its defeat
that CitrnzAt was obliged to i^eport to Touix, that it ^^ ould
be absolutely unfit for any further work until after a rest of
several days. It was the Gaitle Mobile Corps ; grandly and
heroically it had fought, inspired by patriotic enthusiasm,
but without that pi-evious training which is the l)est prepara^
tion to faxic defeat calmly ; so the deepest mom! depression
had succeeded to the high hopes and anticipations of the
previous day. The IStli Corps was composed mainly of
regiments-de-niarchi^ and seems to have been less affected
morally by the defeat. Reinforcements were during the day
nearing both flanks of the French line, but a blow driven
home on one part might have been deci.sive. The actual
condition of the defeated foive was, however, unknow^n to
the Germans, for it had recired again to its previous shelter,
shrouded from view ph}sically by the character of the country,
and among a population still intent on doing its best to give
it notice of the a|iproach of tlanger and to put pursuers on the
wrong track. But there was one source from which might
be drawn some fairly sound conclusions as to the jwiver of

2i8 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FKANCE, 1870-71

resistance to pursuit. This was the aspect presented on the
morning of the 29th by the battlefield. Suspicions that the
overthrow of the French had been great were entertained by
3ome of the German Staft' Officers even on the night following
the battle ; on the morning of the 29th, the Prince de*
spatchcd from Pithiviers to the scene of conflict Staft' Officers
to report to hiin on the matter; and in their reports there was
no conflict or difference of opinion ; the disaster to the French
had been great and overwhelming. But the Prince did not go
to judge for himself, and the information being second-hand
could not produce in his mind the same impression that
would have been derived from personal observation. No
doubt it is strange, that inasmuch as he anticipated a renewal
of the attack that day, and that in meeting it two of his
three corps would have to take part, he should not have, in
the early mornings taken that short ride to asceii:ain how
mattei-s stood, and also as chief connnander to supervise the
arrangements for the expected encounter. But the same
considerations as on the previous day may have induced him
to remain at Pithiviers ; here he was at the end of the wires
connecting him with other parts of the wide area, all of
which he had to keep under his observation. Had he himself
seen things as they wei-e on the battlefield, he would possibly
hav'e found in them a complete justification for immediate
compliance with v. Moltke's urgent ap|>eal : " Do go on and
hit the Army of the Loire as haj'd as vou can,^"

About noon this day, the Prince ordered that v, \", Rhetz's
troops here should be relieved from anv further parti cipation in
the operations in the Loing Valley, as Major*General v. Kraatz
with the 4-Oth Brigade was near enough to watch now the line
of hostile advance from Montara;is on Fontainebleau. The
corps w'as to con trent rate in the country east of Beaune : then
came the illrd Army Corps, whilst at Pithiviers, and between
it and the Paris road, was to be the IXth Army Corps,

The Detachment after a good march, but occasionally
brushing against the left of tlie hostile army, arrivefl on the
S9th with the head of the 4th Cavalry Division at Touiv, and

NOVEMBER 29

219

with a small force of infantry at Allaines, five miles short of
Touty. The main body of the detachment was facing south-
east on a line ten miles long and aix or aeveix miles in
rear; the 53Snd Inf. Diviiiioti on the left at Ymonville; the
17th Inf. Division in the centre at Germignonville ; the
Bavarians on the right at Orgeres, with the 6th Cavalry Divi-
sion ten miles south at Villampuy. Head-quarters were at
Viabon in rear of the centre of the line. The Prince intimated
to the Grand Duke the approaching exchange of Cavalry
Divisions, and he onlered that whilst the Bavarians should
hold on to Orgeres, the left should extend right across the
Paris road as far as Baitochejs les Gallerandes five miles to the
east of it. The whole front of the Frince's command was
forty miles in length and extended thinly across all the lines
of approach to Paris.

On the evening of the 29th, the Prince telegraphed to the
King : "■ According to French statements, the enemy yesterday
was 70,000 men strong, from the 20th, 18th, 15th artd 16th
Corpsj of which the whole of the 20th Corps was in the fight.
[None of the 16th were in the battle, there Merc only two
batteries of the 15th, whilst the 18th Corps wa-s one brigade
short,] I sent some battaliotus of the Illrd Army Corps in
pursuit during the night. To-day little can take place,
because the state of affairn on the Loing has not vet been
cleared up, and because the i-esults stated above were known
only in the coui-se of to-day. To-morrow advanced guards
will pursue towards Montargis and Bellegardc,*^

V", Stiehle, fully aware that v, Moltke and the Prince are not
in accord on the strategy for the campaign, naturally wished
to learn exactly what were the views held at V'ersaillea ; and
as a personal interview i» worth a sheaf of letters, he wired
to V. Stosch arranging a meeting the next day at Baisoches
les Gallerandes,

The Prince appears not to have had sufficient self-confidence
to act always on his own independent judgment in arriving
at a decision. In his message to the King it is evident that
he considered pursuit, even if delayed, yet both desirable

220 THE PEOPLED WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

and practicable; but on finding that his chief Staff Officer
disa^eed with him, and believing that in any advance he wou3d
find himself confronted by a prepared defence, he had sought
advice from another quarter without letting v. Stiehle know
that he v\ as doing so ; and whilst he telegraphed in the
evening to the Xth Army Corps to advance in force on the 30th
against Montargis, he sent a Staff' Officer to con-suit the general
commanding the Ilird Army Corps, v. Alvensleben, in whose
opinion he had great confidence. The officer was to commmii-
cate the Prince's view of the situation to v. Alvensleben, and
to inform him that he intended to advance the Ulrd Army
Coi-ps on Boisconiinun, and wtmld afterwards, according to cir-
cumstances, continue the offen^siiiX' on Orleans. \'. A|venslel>en
regarded the pi'oposed operation as an isolated operation of the
Aimy Corps, and dissented therefore from its adoption. He
also tiemurred to proposals to make a reconnaissance in force
with each of his divisions. Fortified by v. Alvensleben^s opinion
the Prince deterniined to remain on the defensive ; but v. d.
Goltz states that both corps received, in the evening orders, to
reconnoitre in force towards Boiscommun and Montargis.

The position of Montargis and the character of the sur-
rounding country were specially unfavourable for reconnais-
sance ; and the peculiarities were skilfuOy turned to account
for purposes of deception in this '* People"'s W^ar." The town
with its large population and many hiding-places, wais, at thijj
time, the centre of activity of the Fi'anc-tireiirs. A great
wooti lay in fixjnt of Montargis on the right bank of the Loing,
as far as Perriei-es (8 miles). The Canal d'Oileans which ran on
the west and south-west of the town, the Fessard stream and the
Jjoing acquired great importance because the railway bridges
and many others over them were barricaded and occupied by
the tiefenders. From these bridges all the German patrols
were met with heavy fire ; the German Cavalry had not
been trained in swinuning, but even if they had been trained,
the steep canal banks would probably have formed a powerfid
obstacle. The patrols were consequently unable to recon-
noitre the town itself; this could have been effected by a

NOVEMBER 29 221

'strong force only. Whether all these facts were known to
the Prince is uncertain.

As regards the exchange of the Cavalry Divisions, it is im-
possible to understand how any leader in war, especially one who
was himself a general of Cavalry, could even allow, still less ask
for, such an exchange at this time. As both the 2nd and the
6th Divisions were in actual contact with the enemy, the ex-
change of these Divisions along the front of the armies was
impossible. The only solution practicable was that adopted ;
the 6th was exchanged for the 4th which was somewhat in
rear, at Toury ; and the two effected the exchange by a route-
march in rear of the Detachment. During this march both
divisions might as well have been non-existent for. the battle
purposes of the Detachment, and of the Second Army ; but
worse than this, the 6th Division that knew the country well
was being replaced on the eve of, and during a great battle,
by the 4th Division which not only did not know the
country, but was tired and well-nigh exhausted.

CHAPTER XVl

NOVEMBER 30th

Early in the morning of the 30th tame to the Prince from
Versailles two telegrants stating that the exj>ected great
sortie had begun towards the south. That the Army of
the Loire woultl now move to the assistance of Paris was
therefore in the highest degree probable. The Prince rode
now to the battlefield of Beauiie and watched the action of the
numerous reconnaissances sent to the fiwnt by his order.
Everywhere they met the enemy, and sometimes in force, so
that along the whole line there was fighting. Believing,
therefore, a hostile advance not improbable, he held his troops
to the position, drawing the IXth Army Corps still nearer.

But his visit to the battlefield was anything but comfort-
ing to him, as regards his inaction in the last forty-eight
hours. As he was getting into his carriage on his return
home, V. Waldersee came to him to report and was invited to
accompany him in the carriage. The Prince seemed somewhat
dissatisfied, and to think that the day following the battle
had not been put to its best use. V. Waldersee turned the
conversation on to Beaune. The Prince remarked, " The
battlefield reminds me of St. Privat. Yesterday great
results might have been obtained, for this corps (the 20th)
could not possibly be fit for a fight, and also is not so now.
To-day a strong offensive might ha%'e reaped its reward,
but — "^ and here the Prince suddenly broke off' from this topic.
After a little time he resumed : " The favourable moment for
the off"ensive is gone ; the information leads to the conclusion
that the French have been I'einforced on the line Boiscommun-
Bellegarde ; what is going on behind ihe Forest of Orleans

NOVEMBER 30

223

is out of sight. The Franc-tireurs, aided by the country,
have done the French good service. Now I am reduced to
a waiting attitude. If the French attack us once more,
the experience of the S8th to the 30th will stand me in
good Mtead, But a soldiers good fortune seldom comes
back to him with the same favour. To-dav has alreaily gone
by in juMtifiable doubt; the French vvere brought forward to
the attack at many points; they must have, however* other
plans, for it was quite clear that they did not advance beyond
the line they had hxetl for themselves. Tlwrc is for a leader
nothing more oppresswe than a sitmiiiim that is not clear,
nothing' more trying' than bands of armed 'irregular troops, aided
bif the population and the nature of the cvuntry, and relying
for support on a strong" armt/ in the neighbourhood.'''' What a
decisive testimony ik this to the aid a People may give in war.

What had not been lost by that day of inaction in Pithiviei-s !

On the 30th, the conference between the two Chief Staff
Officeiis V. Stiehle antl v. Stosch took place at Bazoches les
Gallerandes. The purpose of v, Stiehle in meeting v. Stosch
was twofold : fij-st to learn from v. Stosch the views held by
V. Moltke as to the course of the campaign on the Loire, past,
present, and future; secondly, to justify the action of the
Prince in the past and present, and his proposed action in the
future. The campaign on the Loire was only one of four large
operations which, together, constituted at this time the cam-
paign of Germany against France ; the others being the
operations in tlie north-west, those in the south-east, and the
investment of Paris. Eat-h of these four was important, but
their relative importance necessarily varied from time to time
according to the aispect that the campaign, taken as a whole,
presented from thne to time, and according to the degree in
which danger to the whole campaign wa.s! more or less
threatening at the scene of each. If danger seemed im minent at
one of these points, then in order that this might be warded off,
there might be accepted a certain amount of passivity among
the German forces elsewhere, so that troops might be diverted
to the threatened point. And it was only at Versailles that

224 THE PEOPLED WAR IN PRANCE, 1870-71

this reJativity of iiiiportauce could be correctly jiitlged. From
V, StoiK'h, fi-esh from \'fi'!4ailles, v. Stiehle could leam exactly
the importftiice Versailles attached at this moment to the
operations on the l>oire, and the result which, from those
operations it was considered would contribute most effec-
tively to the siiccesi* of the whole war. On the other hand, it
was the commandeix at the four scenes of operations who
were, or who ou^^ht to l>e, the beat judges of the measures to
he adopted for obtaining the results regarded by \'ei*sailles as
desirable and necessary. Mental vigour depends frreatlv on
physical vigour, and it was no ismall gain to the counsels
at the Ix>ire that there should come a counfjellor like v. Stosch,
physically fit, and who had not suffered from the fatigues and
anxieties of the trying work in the field- Hoenig gives a long
account of the conference, but this it seen)fi unnecessary to
reproduce here, inasmuch as the subjects diRcussed were the
mode of covering the i"oad from Orleans to Parifi, direct or
indirect cover, and the time for taking the ofFenaive, now or
later on. The views put forward respectively were the same
Bn those with which the reader is alreatly acquainted, and thev
need not therefore be repeated. The two chiefs parted, not
one hairls breadth nearer agreement than when they met.

V. Stiehle, on his return to Pithivierw, gave to the Prince an
account of the interview. The Prince considered it desirable,
especially as, whilst v. Stiehle had Ijeen away, additional infor-
mation had been erained as to the state of affairs in front of the
Ilird and Xth Army Corps, to send in writing to the Grand
Duke his o^^n view of the situation and also his iirishes. The
Prince informed the Gmnd Duke tlmt from information gained
from prisoners it was clear that " besides the 18th Corps there
was another corps in front. Since this did not take part in the
battle of the S8th, I believe that for the pi-otection of his right
wing, the 16th or the 16th corps has been drawn in this
direction." It is difficult to reconcile this statement with that
in the Prince's telegram (7.29 p.m. Si9th) to the King that
" the whole of the SOth corps and also troops from the 18th,
15th, and 16th corps had taken pai-t in the battlg^ He then

NOVEMBER 30

225

stated Ms intention of remaining on the defensive in prospect
of another attack. One brigade of the IX th Army Corps, the
main body of which wasatPithiviers and in the neighbourhood,
was at Bazoches les Gallerandes. The Prince ordered, there-
fore, that on December 1st, the 22nd Inf. Division from the
Detachment should reheve this brigade so that it might follow-
on to Pithiviers, and with its corps act as his own reserve ; and
he requested that the 22nd Inf. Division should not be em-
ployed by the Grand Duke as, if necessary, it would then serve
as the last reserve of the Second Army. The Prince gave his
opinion as to the hostile forces opposite the Detachment. '* It
is probable that to-raoiTOw there will be in front of your Royal
Highness only the 17th Corps and a part of the 16tb Corps ;
the latter has apparent! y occupied the north edge of the Forest
of Orleans along its whole extent." As a niattei' of fact, thei-e
was on December 1st the whole of the 16th corps, two divisions^
of the loth, and two and a half of the ITth coi-ps opposite
the Grand Duke, who was noiv to be deprived of about one-
third of his force. The Prince details the mode of withdrawaf
of the Gth Cav. Division, which, on the following day, is to com-
mence a route-march along the rear of the Detachment, and
on December 2nd is to be in position in rear of the centre of the
whole line and east of the Paris road ; and then comes what
may be regarded a** a reminder to v. Stosch to '* mind his own
business,"^ " Until the situation on the enemy's side is clearer,
I must reserve to myself the communication to your Royal
Highness of my further plans for driving the enemy out of
Orleans/"' How completely the Prince misconceived the
situation will soon appear. Specially noteworthy is it that
here for the first time in the Loire campaign the mei-e
regaining possession of Orleans appeal's as the objective of the
operations. V, Moltke, up to this time, certainly cannot be
credited, or rather discredited, with concurrence in this novel
idea.

Very different from the imaginative creations at Pithivien*
were the real views and intentions on the French side. The
earlier reportf^f Crouzat on the 28th had caused a great deal

226 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

of excitement at Tours, and had given rise to great hopes and
expectations, so that when the last report was received fi^om
him it caused not only deep depression, but senseless wTath
and anger. The reply of de Freycinet was full of unjust un-
deserved personal charges against the General, and was totally
unworthy of the Delegation,

On the evening of the 29th, the Delegation demun'ed to
any movement eastward, and directed that the two eorpfl,
the 18th and 20th, should be drawn to the west. On
November S^th and 26th there had arri^^ed at Tours, from
Jules Favre at Paris, despatches In which December 15th
was named as the utmost limit for the endurance of the
capital. " We cannot hold out beyond that time, even if
so long." On November 16th the Government in Paris had
estimated that the power of endurance would last to January
8th» 1871. What was the cause of the difference in the limits
assigned does not appear. Hoenig thinks that the alteration
in the dates may have been a misstatement intentionally made
to spui" on the Delegation to immediate action. If so, a step
more likely to be fatal to success could hardly have been taken.
For instead of well-considered and orderly-conducted opera-
tions, were necessarily substituted operations adopted in haste
and carried out in hurry. And to make matters worse, there
came on the 30th, to the Delegation a delayed despatch from
Gen, Trochu, which having been sent off from Paris by balloon
on the 24th, was first carried to Norway and thence telegraphed
to Tours. The despatch announced the intended sortie of the
29th by General Ducrot towards the Loire, probably in the
direction of Gien. On the night of the 30th, at 9 o'clock,
de Freycinet and the French Generals assembled, therefore,
at d'Aurelle's head-quarters to confer on the measures to be
taken to meet the new and pressing situation that had so sud-
denly presented itself. There was no agreement as to any one
plan being the best to be adopted, so, finally, de Freycinet
produced his own as approved at Tours, and he ordered it to
be carried out. Again an attack on Pithiviers, this time con-
verging, and then an advance on Fontainebleau ; the 18th and

NOVEMBER 30

227

the 20th corps by the former line, Beaune, the 15th corps on
their left against the south and south-west of Pithiviers, whilst
to the same objective the 16th corps, supported by the left
of the 15th, would move diagonally north-east across the Paris
road. The 17th corps, with the help of the 21st from le Mans,
would he entrusted with the protection of Orleans. That
there were many misunderstandings, arising out of this hastily
summoned and probably highly excited meeting, goes without
saying.

The discussion occupied so much time that the generals
separated in haste, without having had any conference among
themselves for mutual understanding, and they hurried away
to get out their orders in the early morning at all events.
But Chanzy, finding the Detachment in front of his corps,
must, necessarily, as a first step in the movement north-east,
get the Detachment out of his way, to avoid being attacked
on his left during the advance ; after submitting his pro-
posal to d'Aurelle, it was eventually agi^eed that the 16th
Corps, covered on the left by Michers Cavalry Division,
should advance northj and dislodge the enemy now there;
the 17th Corps to move in support. The advance would be
continued next day on Pithiviers. This movement on the 1st
must necessarily strike on the Bavarian Corps at Orgeres.

CHAPTER XVII

DECEMBER 1st

Ok December 1st, at 1 ,10 a.m., the Prince received from theXtb
Army Corps a somewhat belated report of the previous evening,
to the effect that according to statements of inhabitants there
were 20,000 French in Montargis, and according to those of
Prussians left behind sick at Courtenay, to the east of Mon-
targis, large supphes of provisions had lately been passing
through the former place to the latter. As a matter of fact,
there was no truth in these statements. The Prince, however,
ordered reconnaisi^ances towards Montargis and Bellegarde,
but as in his order he directed the reconnaissances to be made
after the troops hatl cooked, that towai-ds Montai^s coald be
of little use; but the information generally obtained showed
that the French had fallen back, and that no offensive opera-
tion against the Second Army was imniediately in pi-ospect.

And now the iiitei-est shifts to the right wing, the
Detachment, for events are so shaping themselves here during
the day, that it will be the Grand Duke and v. Stosch, not
the Prince and v. Stiehle, who will ward off the second and
last effort of the Army of the Loire for the relief of Paris.
The Bavarians had thrown forward troops to Tcrminiers,
three miles south of Orgeres, and to the villages west of
Terminiers. Against thi.s position advanced at about half-
past one, one division of the 16th Coi-ps and a Cavalry
Division. After much fighting the Bavarians were driven
from the position, and they fell back to another at Villepion
Chateau, Towards nightftdl their defence was broken, and
the Corps collected at Orgeres and in the neighbourhood.
In this brief encounter the Bavarians, who numbered some

DECEMBER 1

229

7000 men with forty-eight guns, against 1^,000 French, with
forty-six gmis, lost forty-two officers and nearly 900 men* It
was, however, nine o'clock at night before a full report on the
encounter came to the Head-quarters of the Detachment,
which were at Janvilie, thi-ee or foin* miles west of Toury.

V. d, Tann had at once felt the evil effects of the exchange
of the Cavah'y Divisions ; he needed cavalry on his front, and
he applied to the Grand Duke for it, but it could not be
^iven, for the cavalry was not forthcoming. The trusted and
trustworthy 6th Division was on its route-march in rear of
the Detachment ; on the right had arrived the worn -out 4th
Division, from which its commander selected the least
exhausted Brigade, to move out to the right front. This
arrangement was but a poor substitute for the close co-
operation that had hitherto been maintained between the
Bavarians on the exposed flank and their protectors, the
6th Division. Into the Head-qnarters of the Detachment at
half-past one had ridden v. Schmidt, the commander of the 6th
Division, to report himiself to the Grand Duke, who bade
him faiewell, expressing his deep sense of the value of the
services I'endered to him by the general and his Division. And
then v, Schmidt betook himself to v. Stosch. The intendew
is so interesting, and was in its consequences so imjKtrtant, that
the account of it, as recorded by Hoenig, is here given in full.

With the alert, decided, soldierlike bearing of the cavalry
conimandeFj the Chief of the Staff was very sympathetic.
But General v. Stosch was surprised, above all, by the detailed
knowledge of the country, and the thorough acquaintance
with all its peculiai'ities, that he possessed. V. Stosch re-
marked that for himself under the circumstances it was very
unfortunate that General v. Schmidt should pass over to the
Second Army. ** And I also lament it,'"' said v. Schmidt
excitedly and s(nnewhat bitterly. *' I do not grudge to
any of my comrades the laurels which undoubtedly are
immediately at hand for them^ but after I have gone
through the Perche counti-y without any satisfaction, I
am obliged at this very moment to take a ride in rear of

230 THE PEOPLE^S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

the Army, when I could reap the fruit of all my previous
hard work ; and very hard work it was. Your Excellency
will see that I am speaking only the truth. The enemy
is on the point of attacking us. I wish only that you may
have au enterprising body of cavalry. In all the world
there is no better country for good ca^'alry than the great
district in which we are now. Everything that cavalry
could desire, so far a^i country is concerned, is here ; every
stone^'s throw there are villages, fanns, small woods and wide
although shallow depressions, in which they can conceal
themselves in large bodies, and can follow up closely the
infantry and dash out and take them by surprise. We are
hercj" he exclaimed, "[in the paradise of cavalry ; and, more-
over, this enemy ! His cavalry will never stand against ours,
nor have they the spirit of enterprise and the dash to attack
our infantry. His artillery is but poorly horsed, and is
incapable of naoving quickly. His infantry, whether Line,
Marche troops, or Gardes Mobiles, cannot stand the ' Prussian
Fanfare.' During the last weeks my cavalry have come upon
them every day, and have always got the best of it, even if
they were well led. This infantry is fodder for good cavalry.'"
As V, Stosch was still under the influence of his conference
vith V, Stiehle the^day befoi-e, he asked General v. Schmidt,
without telling him of the interview, whether, in his opinion,
*' Corps or Divisions had marched eastward for an operation
towards Fontainebleau." V. Schmidt gave a most decided
ne^tive to the question, and added in his most drastic manner,
'* The whole lot are still round the salient point, Orleans, hut
if you do not look out, they will he on the top of you here ; all
reports from my patrols, and the information from the inhabit-
ants are here in my book with days and dates, and the enemy's
regimental numbers. From these, there is not the slightest
doubt that strong bodies of all arms have been pushed for-
ward to the road Orleans-Chateaudun ; and I know that
the 17th Corps is on the march here from the Forest of
Marchenoir'' [a fact]. In i-eply to the question how strong
the enemy was, v. Schmidt ^id : '* At least 50,000 men ; in

DECEMBER 1

231

any tase there are at least two Corps. The drawing forward
the 17th Corps to the north-east implies an immediate
general attack on the Orleans- Chateaudun road," In com-
pliance with General v. Stosch's i^equest, v. Schmidt put
together the reports and information received lately ; he
docketed the important ones with the substance of the
contents. To the question whether he believed that the
15th and 16th Corps wem on the line Boiscommun-Bellegai'de,
he gave a negative, and he held to his opinion, even when
V. Stosch told hitii that v. Stiehle believed the contraiT.

V. Schmidts view was prophetic ; yet it was of the invaluable
services of this leader, thus prepared and able to obtain every
possible advantage during the coming battle, that the Prince
deprived the Detachment, and incidentally the whole Army.
The interview with Genera,l v. Schmidt produced a deep and
immediate impression on v. Stosch's mind. He could not
resist the conviction that the French had shifted their base of
operations, and that the second defeat, which v. Stiehle had
named as the transition point from the defensive to the
offensive^ would be inflicted on the Army of the Ijoire this
time, not by the Second Army, but by the Detachment. But
y, Stosch wa.s far too enterprising to accept the doctrine that
it is onlv the defensive that should be employed to ward off
an approaching attack ; like v. Moltke, v. Stosch i-egarded
the attack and the moral effect of the initiative as eveiy-
thing ; and here, after his enlightenment by the great Cavalry
Leader, he saw that the long-desired chance had now come.
But both tact and diplomacy were necessary, and in both arts
he was a proficient. He now betook himself to the Duke,
and laid befoi-e him the situation depicted by v. Schmidt, and
accepted by himiself as correct. He pointed out to his com-
mander that there could be no doubt that an attack by the
French was innninent ; but that, at the present moment, the
disposition of the Detachment, in conformity with the orders of
the Prince, was far too extended to meet an attack successfully.
Concentration must be the first step ; standing fast with the
right wing, draining forwai-d the left* and then concentrating

232 THE PEOPLE'S WAR Ix\ FRANCE, 1870-^71

to the centre. But at the present moment this wag per-
mifisible only for the Bavarians and the 17th Inf. Division,
for he dared not include in the nio%'ement the S^nd Inf.
Division on the left, which the Prince had expressly said was
to be regarded as the last reserve of the Second Arm^', and
which, even now, was not as far to the east as the Prince
had ordered. V. Stosch pi-oposed, thei'efore, to the Grand
Duke that, on the very next day, preparations should be
made for attack, without giving a thought to the idea of a
retreat. " Under existing circumstances, nothing more could
be done than to get into line early under such favourable con-
ditions, that there shouhl be no difficulty in closely concen-
trating if this proved to be necessary later. As matters
stood, the roads to Paris would best be protected, if the concen-
tration west of the ( )r I cans- Anger vi lie road was kept in view^
and pushed yet more forward. But whatever was determined
to be done, the power to dispose of the ^Snd Inf. Division
must again be obtained. The Detachment could not be tied
to a position a chevcd the roiids Orleans-Angerville [tlie main
road to Paris] and Orleans- Allainville [the Paris road next to
it on the west, and diverging from it at Artenay] ; the
Detachment would accomplish the duty assigned to it if at
the right time it brought up all its troops, even to the very
last man, and beat the enemy. That would be the best
protection of the itiads, and probably also, at the same time,
the decisive blow for the subsetjuent capture of Orleans."
Provisionally, the question aa to the SSnd Inf. Division
could be put on one side. '* Anyhow, we is^hall have,'*'
added the General, " freedom of choice for the concentration
in the favourable position from Loigny to Lumeau. It
answei's best for the attack and the defence according
to the circumstances." The Grand Duke accepted this pro-
posal a little too eagerly to please v. Stosch, and said
with a sort of joyous decision: "Let it be so; we will
take the offensive to-morrow with our whole force in the
direction of Ijoigny-Lnmeau ; do what is necessary for this
purpose." The Grand Duke's idea was a little pi'ematui'e ;

DECEMBER 1

233

V. Stosch, having already gained a great dealj did not
deem it expedient to suggest a counter- proposal for a closer
concentration first as a preliminary to an attack. V. Stosch's
plan, now adopted by the Grand Duke, m^s of vast impor-
tance, for it meant in the Loire campaign the change from
the defensive to the offensive ; and, incidentally, it was a
revolution in the control of the Gerniian forces on the Loire ;
it involved the employment of those forces in a direction
totally different from that which the Commander-in-Chief
considered the best suited for the overthi'ow of the French.
It vvas more than the substitution of one scheme of operations
for another ; it was the negation of the scheme of a supreme
commander by a sub-commander. And it may be doubted
that any General of ordinary social rank, however distin-
guished as a soldier, and however good might be the Chief
Staff Officer at his side, would have dared to propose to the
nephew of the King such a radical alteration in the plan of
the campaign. But the Grand Duke was a reigning Royalty,
his Chief Staff Officer vvas v. Moltke, present by proxy ; and
at Versailles was his Staff' Patron, the determined v. Blumen-
thal. Under these circumstances the leader of the Detachment
might ** do and dare.^

The next step that v, Stosch had to take in the matter was
one far more difficult to accomplish than that of securing the
appi"oval and assent of his own conmiander. It was nothing
less than bringing about agreement in action, between two
Royal personages, "^^hose professional views were in discordj
and who, personally, were not on good terms with each other;
moreover he knew that he himself was regarded at the Prince's
Staff as somewhat of an autocratic disposition. He now
drew up a letter to v. Stiehle, in which he explained the
altered state of affairs on the French side, and requested per^
mission to attack the French, and thus in another form give
protection to the Paris road. The letter was sent at 6 p.m.
by an oi-derly officer, and was, it must be borne in mind,
written and despatched before all the events of the day at
the Bavarian Corps, had come to the knowledge of tlie

CHAPTER XVIII

DECBMBER 2UD— BATTLE OF LOIGNY-POUPBY

Eari.y on the morning of December ^d commenced the
Battle of Loigiiy-Poupry, essentially a " bataille de rencontre,^'
the Bavarians, whilst moving into poiiition, encountering the
French force on its way to the north-east to Toary, It was
thus on the Grennan right that the hastile armies first came
into contact, and here the Bavarians had, for some time, gi-eat
difficulty in holding their ground against the impetuous
attacks of the 16th Coqjs. On this right flank also the
hostile cavalries were opposed to each other. ^Vlien the
17th Inf. Division came up on the left of the Bavarians,
it was met to the south also by the French 16th Corps ;
later on the 22nd Inf. Division, iihen entering the battle-
field, had to march away east to stay the advance of two
Divisions of the 15th Corps coming up the Pai-is road. At
nightfall Loigny, on the extreme German right, where
the 17th t'orps has entered into the battle, had been
wrested from the French ; the Germans Field Poupry on the
extreme left. The defeat of the French was complete. The
isolated character of the French attacks contributed gi'eatly
to their failure, this absence of well-timed combination being
due to hurry in the preparations for the opei-ation. The
Germans owed no small part of their success to the admii-able
leading of the two Infantry Divisions by Generals v. Tresckow
and V, Wittich, who, as they came on the field, displayed
excellent judgment in the disposal of their troops to meet
the unexpected situations they found confronting them. The
Battle of Loiguy-Poupry, like that of Beaune la Kolande,
is deserving of close and careful study ; the former is an

DECEMBER 2

237

example of the higher leading in its best aspect, and
of the work of the three arms in combination; the latter
is rich in the experiences of the most minute incidents of a
battle. At the close of the battle of December 2nd, the
Grand Duke and v, Stosch were fully aware of tlie gi'eat-
ness of the success they had achieved ; and they had oidy
one thought for the morrow, the reaping the fruits of that
success.

To the leadci-s of the Detachment there appeared to be
three courses of action open to the French ; they could iietire
to the west \ they could fall back on Orleans ; or, if they
received reinforcements, they might offer resistance at Ter-
miniei-s, only three miles south of Loigny. The last course
was regarded as improbable ; it was the first course that, from
the strategical point of view, and for the prolongation of the^
war, seemed to be the one which the enemy ought to adopt.
The Detachment orders for the next day were fi-ained, there-
fore, to prevent this escape, and to drive the enemy back on to.
Orleans. This done, it would be easy for the Detachment to.
gain the Loire and carry out the strategy of v. Moltke. To.
the Prince was sent a brief telegi-am giving the general result
of the battle, with the remark : '* If the enemy is to be pursued,
to-mon'ow, it is absolutely necessary that the Second Army
should attack Artenay, and undertake the protection of the
Orleans-Paris road,"^

But the Grand Duke''s high hopes were doomed to dis-
appointment, for there came from Pithiviers the Prince's
orders, which will be dealt with later on, but which commenced
with the sentence, " The Second Army and the Detachment
of H.R.H- the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg arc to advance
to-morrow, December 3rd, to the concentric attack against
Orleans,'" and then, after detailing the movements of the
Second Army, the order ran : " The Detachment of H.R.H.
the Grand Duke will, according to its own dispositions,
advance to-morrow west of the Artcnay-Orleans road for a
coiTesponding attack." To leara how it came about that
this order was given and rigidly adhei-ed to, we must go to.

2j8 THE PEOPLE^S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

Pithiviers, and see what had been taking place there during
the day.

It was with great anxiety that Prince Frederick Charles had,
in the early hours of the morning, awaited at Pithiviers news
from the Detachment. Of his ArraVt the main body of thelXth
Army Corps was at Pithiviers, one brigade being at Bazoches
les Gallerandes ; the other two corps were reconnoitring as on
the previous day towards Montargis and Bellegarde. At 10
A.M. came in from the Grand Duke the first report, dated
8.10 A.M., informing the Prince that the whole Detachment
was concentrating for the attack on the line Tanon-Baigneux,
the 1st Bavarian Corps, and the 4th Cav. Division on the
right, the 17th and 22nd Inf. Divisions on the left. Up to
ten o'clock the Prince had not received any information as to
the state of affaii-s in front of his own Army ; he at once how-
ever, i-esolved to move the IXth Army Corps to the westward to
support the Detachment, and he telegraphed to the Duke to
that effect, but owing to the distance of the corp.s from the
road, fifteen miles, the earliest time at which the tactical
influence of the corps would be felt would be about 4 p.m.
At about 10.35 a.m. there came a telegram of a very alarming
character from Count v. Waldersee, who, believing that a
battle was imminent, had ridden very early to the Paris road.
It had been written after 9 a.m. on the Road itself, and it
seems to have been handed in at Leon-en-Beance at 10 a.m.,
and given out of the telegraph office at Pithiviers at 10.35.
It stated that east of the road the enemy had deployed a large
force, apparently fifteen battalions, eight squadrons and
artillery, and that an advance of all arms on Bazoches was
reported. This was the first news of any threatening from
the direction of Artenay. The reports now received from the
Ilird and Xth Army Corps did not make the situation more
clear, but at 11.30 a.m. the Prince directed General v.
Manstein to march his corps towards the Paris road for its
protection after the men had dined. He had also ordered the
6th Cav. Division, now on its way from the west, to halt on
the Paris road. V. Manstein, before leaving, had an interview

DECEMBER 2

239

with V. Stiehle, who made to him the sneering remark ; ** The
Grand Duke is behaving somewhat in the same way as at a
Krieg-Spiel in peace time.'

And, now, the Prince, whilst engaged in contemplating
the situation and devising plans to meet future develop-
ments in this difficult campaign, is suddenly by one fell blow
deprived of his position as independent commander in this
theatre of war, where the fate of France is to be decided, and
he has to do as v. Moltke tells him ; for now that the
failure of Ducrot's soi-tie of November 30 th^ — December Snd
has relieved v. Moltke from anxiety at Paris, he is giving his
attention again to the Loire. At 1.30 p. jr. the Prince re-
ceived from Versailles the following telegram, dated 1 S.30 p.m.,
and despatched at 1.10 p.m. :

" According to report " [Meldnng] " received, the main body
of the Army of the Loire may be south of Artenay, and the
Grand Duke alone may perhaps not be able to prevent their
further advance by Toury. His Majesty therefore considers
it absolutely necessaiy that the Second Army now proceeds
direct to the attack on Orleans, in order by so doing to bring
about the decision. This morning a few of the advanced points
of the outpost line before Paris, lost the day before yesterday,
have been rc-captured from the enemy."

" (Signed) Ghaf Moltxe."^

The origin of this peremptory order must now be explained.
The course of affairs on the Loire was being regarded at
Versailles with the deepest anxiety, and news from the Second
Army was awaited with impatience. On the morning of the
2nd none had been received. V. Moltke, therefoi-e sought an
audience with the King and laid before him the proposal
embodied in the telegram. The King gave his consent,
not, however, without considerable hesitation. Quite justi-
fiably the King, owing to the numbering of the four hostile
corps said to have been engaged at Beaune, had no reason
for believing that there were strong forces opposite the
Detachment. Hoenig states also that from private sources
had come to the King information which, though not

240 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANX'E, 18T0-71

accepted as thorou*;hly correct, was not without some ti-uth.
At the audience tlie Kin^ had alluded to the risk of the
Second Army marching; westward, if the enemy intended a
turning movement l>etween the Loing and the Yomie, V.
Moltke had never mentioned to the King v. Stiehle's ideas
on this turning movement : he was therefori^ considerably
surprised when at the audience the King brought forward
this matter in almost the very same words that v. Stiehie had
used in his correspondence with himself; there had been
wheels within wheels, revolving unknown to v, Moltke.
But he could now, owing to the faikire of the great
sortie^ calm the King':* anxiety by pointing out that the
Paris Army was no longer in a condition to make any
great eftbrt outside the capital. W Moltke advanced fui-ther
arguments, and the King yielded, but the King almost
directly afterwards heaitl of the report from the Xth Army
Corps that on the night November 30th-Deceniber 1st,
*' according to the assertions of the inhabitants, 20,000
men are in Montargi.^," Thei*eupon be doubted the wisdom
of the telegi-ani and wrote to v. Moltke : " Fram the
annexed you will see that my opinion that the great
Forest of Orleans keeps us in doubt a^ to what the enemy is
doing {is con-ect) [sic], so that moving into the forest which
is some twenty-eight miles long involves at least two days
fighting during which time the Second Army can be luarched
round on the flank and rear if there are S0,000 men in Mon-
targis. I am doubtful whether our order of to-day is still
advisable." V. Moltke held to liis point and through Coh
v. Verdy calmed the apprehensions of the King by pointing
out that the report was based only on hearsay, that evi-
dently it referred to the past, and that no con-oboration of it
liad been received. This is certainly an illustration of how
belated information may influence judgment on the present.
As regards v, Moltke's telegram of 12,30 p.m., it may be
doubted whether in the recoi-ds of this campaign there exists one
more extraordinary in its character. Tlie supreme authori-
ties at Versailles had in the early days of November refused

DECEMBER 2

241

to accept the estimate formed of the local military situation
on the Loire by the General in command there, and, in con-
sequence, a heavy penalty was paid at Coulmiers ; now, in the
lir-st days of the following month, the same authorities
intervene actively in the operations in the same theatre of
war, and misjudging completely the military situation, per-
emptorily order the immediate initiation of an operation
totally un suited to the needs and requirements of the
situation. The right wing of the German forces at the very
moment that v. Moltke sent the order was engaged in what
was almost a hand-to-hand encounter at the spot where the
French were making their real attack ; the left wing of
the German forces, extended and widely scattered, was
engaged in reconnoitring : the centre was so destitute of
troops that the direct line of hostile advance on Paris lay
almost open to the enemy. To meet these dangei-s there seems
to have been only one course of action possible, namely, to leave
in front of the French, east of the Paris i-oad, a small force to
demonstrate and hold their own, and then with every avail-
able man and gun to hurry to the west, to support the
Detachment and to cover the road. But v, Moltke at this^
critical moment steps in and says, " March ahead all of you
at once and attack the city of Orleans." Hitherto, the
guiding, paramount principle of v. Moltke's strategy has been.
the annihilation of the enemy's forces in the field ; now the
objective is the capture of an open town. But on the Snd v.
Blumenthal writes : " The Crown Prince told me that the
King has now positively ordered the Prince to attack the
Army of the Loire. Surely it is impossible for him to ignore
such an order, and he must now go forward {Fabhi,'i ctmctator).
A Prussian Field Marshal is bound to go forward."^ This is very
different from the order actually sent. The incompatibility of
the order with the military situation is so glaring, that any
critic, judging even inferentially only, would at once come to
the conclusion that v. Moltke, when he obtained the Royal
permission to send it, was in ignorance of the actual state of
affairs on the Loire, and further, had been misinformed as to

Q

242 THE FEOFLE^S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

them. The latter is clear from the order itself in which v.
Moltke gives *'^ south of Artenav ''"' as the position of the
main body of the enemy. As we know there was not one
main borly in the Army of the Loire, but two main bodies,
one of which, the 18th anil SOth Corps, was well to the east,
the other, the 16th and 17th Corps, was to the west, the 15th
Corps forming across the Paris road the connecting link be-
tween them. It is not clear as to what the wordsi " report
received "" (eingegangener Meldung) referred. There is no
record of it in the archives or journals- Had it been derived
from the Intelligence Branch, the word used would have been
" Naehrichtcn "' not '* Meldung." Hoenig is, however,
inclined to believe that this nuLst have been its source ;
and so thick is the Fog of War that v. Moltke seems to
anticipate the greatest danger to lie on the Pans road. But
still more extraordinary and inexplicable is the fact that when
V. Moltke at 1.10 p.m. issued the order he was not aware of
the battle then raging at Poupry ; nor, although from mid-
night December 1-2, thei-e was no longer any doubt at Pithi-
viers as to the critical state of affairs on the west of the road,
does there appear to have been any intimation to this effect
to Versailles, although v. Stiehle himself had on the evening
of the 1st told V. WaldcKiee he believed that there would
be a fight at the Detachment next day. And all this is still
more strange because the battlefield was little more than fifty
miles from Versailles. Toury, the German telegmph station
on the Paris road, was only six or seven miles distant from the
left of the battlefield. The battle commenced at about 8 a.m.
and lasted imtil dark. Yet nobody seems to have sent to
Versailles during the day any news whatever about what was
taking place, but between 5 and 6 p.m. v. Waldersee wired to
the King a short but very clear summary of the successful
encounter.* The inappropriateness of v. Moltke's order was

* The foLlowing extroict from a letter, whJcli I bad both the pleasiure and
honour of receiving, from Field Marghal Graf v. Waldersee nearly two years
ago, 16 coaclusjye ; " Oa the evening of Biitiutie la B«lande, as well iis that of
Loign^, I telegraphed to the King William that a somplete victory had been

DECEMBER 2

243

clearly due to the absence of knowledge of the military situa-
tion. And now we pass to the consideration of the action
taken by the Prince on the receipt of this inappropriate order.
And here we meet the question of literal obedience versu.f
intelligent disobedience, the latter, be it remarked, a form
of leading in high favour in the German Army.

It certainly seems, that peremptory as was the order, there
was open to the Prince an alteniative course to that of un-
hesitating and immediate compliam-e with it. The telegraph
wire connecting Pithiviei's and Vei-sailfes could work quickly
enough when necessary, as shown by the fact that tvienty
minutes had sufficed for the delivery of the order after its
issue. Without, therefore, any appreciable delay in the
execution of the order, the Prince could have assured himself
that the King and v. ^loltke were fully aware of the situation
on the Loire when the order wels issued. A wire, "Detach-
ment concentrated this morning to attack on line Tanon-
Baigneaus. Waldersee reports hostile advance in strong
force along Orleans-Paris Road. Does your order hold
good ? '" would have removed at Versailles! all possibility of a
misundei-standing of the situation ; and then if notwith-
standing, the onler wag confirmed, all i-esponsibility for the
consequeiioes rested on the right shoulders. But the Prince
was silent ; it is said that if speech is silver, silence is gold,
but here the gold was coinage of the counterfeit class ; for
whilst it bore the stamp, " unhesitating obedience to orders,"
it led eventually to results that were simply deplorable.

But even if the Prince determined, as he did, to accept the
order in silence, and at once to comply with it, the mode in
which he would comply depended obviously on his interpreta-
tion of it. " Die II. Arniee nunmehr direct sium Angriff
auf Orleans schreitet, um die Entscheidung herbeizufuhren."
Taken literaillyj it reads, "attack the city of Orleans by the
shortest road '''' ; and the coroUary reads, " on the capture of

won. Tbe order to Prince Frederick Charliis of the 2nd December to com-
mence the attack on Orleans was griven, by General t. Moltke before he
I received tidings that sl battle had begun on the west of the grtat Chausafe."

244 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FHAXGE, 1870-71

the City of Orleans the decision of the conflict with the Amiy
of the Loire depends." But of course the order construed
liberally and not literally runs, " At once give up your
defensive attitude and energetically assume the otfenslve.'"
The substitution of a city for the hostile forces in the field as
already noticed is very remarkable. Hoenig says that at this
time there was a general feeling, shai-ed also by the King, the
Prince, and the Grand Duke, that with the recapture of
Orleans the war would come to an end. On what grounds
this assumption was based we do not know. Sometimes
there attaches to the possession of an open town or city
either on or away from a river, some strategical advantage,
so marked that the future course of the war will be greatly
influenced by its retention or its capture. But here in the
case of Orleans, the importance attached by both sides to its
possession seems to have been to a considerable extent
fictitious. In November it was natural that the first objective
of the then newly -formed Army of the Loire should be the
ejection of v, d. Tann''s force from Orleans and its repossession
by its rightful owners. Tlie recapture exercised a great
beneficial moral effect on the country, and it covered the
future concentration here, but the value of Orleans to the
French strategically may be regarded as doubtful. De Frey-
cinet regarded Orleans as merely a point (Tappui; General
Borel, the Chief Staff Officer of the Army of the Ijoire, had
never assented to the alleged advantages of the position ; as
a Bridge Head for a force advancing from the south, it was,
in its prominently salient position, exposed to isolation hv
attacks coming from both above and below the city ; more-
over, in the French counsels there was great diversity of
opinion as to which among the several theatres of war avail-
able for the Army of National Defence would be most favour-
able for its operations. Save in its proximity to Bourges^
the chief arsenal j Orleans had little to recommend it in
connection with offensive operations on a large scale. Tlie
Germans had originally taken it in order to keep the countrv"
between it and Paris clear of the annovances inflicted on them

DECEMBER 2

245

by the half-trained troops and the bands of irregulars, and
also on the erroneous supposition that it would serve as a sort
of half' way house to Bourges and Tours, And, moreover, so
long as Orleans and the surrounding country on the right
bank were in the possession of the French the occupation was
a standing menace to the Germans. For, as has been apparent
from this nfUTative„ the Orleans position was a screen im-
penetrable to hostile observation, and therefore they could
not tell whether it was being used as a real cover for the con-
centration of some hundreds of thousands of the enemyj ready
to issue forth suddenly at the first favourable opportunity
for action, or whether there were there but a few thousandsj
sufficient however to simulate the presence of ten times their
number. As a strategic point for a German offensive it was
of no value.

It may have been that the Prince, irritated by the severe
cen?4ure implied in the order and by the form in which the
order was drawn up, determined to give vent to his resent-
ment by interpreting it according to its exact wording,
and with complete disregard of the consequences. " He
may have said to hiuiselfj ' Those people at Vei'sailles at the
centre of authority seem always to think they know so much
better what ought to be done far away from them than I do,
who am on the spot, that now I will give them their heads
and do just as they tell me, only they must not blame me
later on if we find ourselves in difficulties and obtain but a
poor return for a huge casualty list, and are obliged to begin
the business all over again." *' On this matter we may well
withhold our judgment.

The ground-work of the plan of operations selected by the
Prince for the literal execution of the order was to leave tlie 1st
Cav. Division and an Infantry Brigade to watch his own left
flank and rear towards Montargis ; to send thellird Army Corps
from the north-east to the south-west thi^ough the Forest of
Orleans ; and with the IXth Army Corps to push back the
enemy along the main road to Orleans, the Detachment co-
operating with this corps by attacking from the west the

246 THE PEOPLE^S WAK IN FBAKCE, 1870-71

enemy's positions on the road and in its vicinity ; the Xth
Array Corps to form a reserve at the centre to the whole force.
Wlien V. Moitke's order was received, the dispositions on the
left wing were not favourable for its speedy execiitioiij both
the Illrd and Xth Army Corps being engaged in recon-
noitring to the south and south-east. Telegrams were at
once sent to them giving general directions, and at S.30 p.m.
written detailed instructions followed. The Ilird Army
Coi-ps was recalled to Pithiviers, the Xth Army Corps to
Beaune and Boynes. But so scatteretl and so distant were
the coi-ps from the points named as rendezvous that it was
only by hard marching, prolonged into the night, that these
were reached. The marches were flank marches, and specially
difficult and dangerous owing to the proximity of the hostile
outpostSj but this niovementj of which the knowledge would
have been invaluable to the defenders of the forest, 'Was
apparently almost unnoticed by them.

The ordei-s for the actual advance on the 3rd were not sent
out until 10 P.M. Omitting some clauses not essential to the
consideration of the subject, they run as foUows^^ and, it may
be added, they are remarkable for their terseness and incom-
pleteness.

*'The Second Army and the Detachment of H.R.H. the
Grand Duke of Mecklenburg are to [soil] advance to-morrow
December 3rd to the concentric attack against Orleans."

(The word " soil '" clearly indicates that the Prince in
issuing the order is carrying out one he has himself received.)

"The IXth Army Corps will move to-morrow on Artenay,
which place it will attack at 9.30.

" A flank detachment from the 25th (Grand Ducal Hessian)
Division will march along the Roman road Bazoches-S. Lye.
This detachment will march into the forest as the fight on the
main road makes progre^is, endeavouring as far as possible to
maintain touch with the right.

"The llird Army Corps will march in several columns on a
wide fi-ont towards Chilleuns auxBois, proceeding to the decisive
attack on Chilleurs at 10.30, captui'e this place and the edge

DECEMBEft !^

247

of the forestj eDiplojing its artillery to the utmost, and will
push forward a strong advanced guai'd to Lourv. ITie main
body of the corps must reach JLoury to-morrow. Within the
forestj pioneer detachmentis are to Jead, iii ortier to remove
obstacles.

" Headquarters, Loury.

" The Xth Army Corps will march to-morrow out of its
cantonments, so that in the course of the afternoon it will
arrive at Villereau with its right wing, and Chilleurs uux Bois
with its left wing [on a front of six miles, the left six miles
from Loury]. It will occupy close cantonments on this line.
Head -quarters, Chilleurs aux Bois.

" Hartmann^s Cav. Division with the infantry brigade
attached will take up a position according to the judgment
of the commander, so that it can watch the tli-strict between
the Esjsonne and the Loing, and the roads running along the
latter river.

'*A11 important incidents, especially any possible advance
of the enemy, are to be xeported direct to General Count
Moltke at Versailles by telegraph, and also by means of
orderly officera.

" The Detachment of H.R.H. the Grand Duke will, accord-
ing to its own dispositions, advance to-morrow west of the
Artenay-Orleans road for a corresponding attack,

"The attack on the hostile position, Gidy-Cercottes, will
if it is occupied be aided by an infantry outflanking attack of
the IX th Army Corps on Cercottes in the forest.

" My Head-quartei-s go to-morrow after the fight to Chil-
leurs aux Bois,"^

It will be remarked that no directions are given for keeping
up the connection between the HIrd Army Coi-psand the i"est
of the army, nor is there vouchaated any information as
to the enemy.

In this plan and scheme there is no strategy, notwithstand-
ing the fact that on this long front of forty miles there is
plenty of scope for its employment. It is all tactics, tactics of a
kind almost barbaric : those of weight and brute force. The

248 THE rKOPLE^ WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

influence of ground on tactics^ and the selection of the ground
most suitable for a force weak in infantry but strong in the
otlier anns are alike ignort'd. The llird Array Corps with its
numerous artillery in to be plunged, isolated, into the densest
of wooflland, a theatre of war most favourable for its half-
trained defenders ; what becomes of the enemy is a matter of
indifference, so long as the pressure on the main road suffices
to force him back ; and it in precisely on this line of advance
that will be found, in all probability, numerous localities well
prepared for defence.

Since it is difficult to suppose that any commander would
have issued for December 3rd orders^ irrespective of what
had taken place at the Uebu-hmcnt on the 2nd, it is desirable
to endeavour to ascertain from the documents before us what
information had come to the Prince from the Detachment, and
at what times it had been received by him.

At 3 P.M. he received from the Grand Duke a telegram
informing him that at 1 p.m. the 17th and SSnd Inf. Divisions
were advancing on TerminicrSi, and that the much-shaken
Bavarian corps and the 4th Cav. Division were holding the
right wing. The enemy appeared to be falling back in the
direction of Bonneval.

At 3 P.M. came another tele^^m from Janville, 3.51 p.m.

*' At 2.30 P.M. 17th Division captured l^igny, and is
successfully advancing, followed by the 1st Bav. corps, with
the 4th Cs.v. Division on the flank, direction Nonneviile-
Orgeres ; the 16th French corps in front of it.

" Twenty -second Division advancing successfully on Ai'-
tenay. Apparently the 15th French corps in front of it.'^

At 9.iJ0 KM. came a message, 6 p.m. Janville, from v.
Waldei-see, briefly describing the successes of the battle, and
concluding with the words, " I regai-d the battle as a brilliant
victory.^

Hoenig states that it was whilst the Prince was issuing his
orders for the 3rd that he received from v. Stosch a telegram
from the battlefield.

" At 4.30 P.M. enemy driven back on Terminiers and also

DECEMBER g

249

on Artenay. Many prisoners taken, eleven guns captured.
K the enemy is tci be pursued to-morrow^ it is absolutely
necessary that the Second Army should attack Artenay and
<;over the Orleans-Paris Hoad/' This telegram was followed
by fl letter which described the events of the day and was
received before midnight. Yet on the orders issued, w^ith
these telegrams before him, the Prince absolutely ignores
the fact that only a few miles away a decisive victory has
been won on the right wing of what was actually his own
command. Whilst the orders were yet on their way to the
Detachment, v. Stosch at 11.16 p.m. sent to the Prince a
further telegram which arnved at Pithiviers at one in the
morning. It commenced with the words, *' In order to secure
the successful results of to-day, the pursuit will be taken up
to-morrow," then followed the arrangements made in conse-
quence. Later on he telegraphed : " A comparison of the
information obtained with regard to the hostile troops which
were in the engagement yesterday shows the 16th and 17th
Corps against the 17th Division. It is, therefore, very
probable that the Detachment will have to fight again to-
day."" Hoenig says that in earlier reports the 15th Cordis had
already been mentioned, but that the Prince did not believe
that these three corps would be encountered in the new
direction of the operations. Until four in the morning the
Grand Duke and v. Stosch waited in the hope that the Prince
would, on the later reports sent to him, modify 'the original
ordersj and then, but not till then, did the Grand Duke issue
fresh orders in conformity with the views of the Prince. Hence
so far as the planning the future campaign on the Loire was
concerned, the Battle of Loigny-Poupry might as well not
have been fought.

At 11 P.M. v. Stiehle sent to v. Moltke a letter with the
orders issued by the Prince and a brief account of the events
of December 1st and 2nd, and in the last paragraph we read ;
"The offensive movement of the Detachment of H.R.H. the
Grand Duke had been so arranged with General v. Stosch
that €tn endeavour should be made to secure a crossing over

250 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

the Loire below Orleans, but as to-day's telegram seems to
make great haste necessary, the endeavour will be made to
reach the objective Orleans by the direct road." There is
nothing in v. Moltke's published correspondence nor in
Hoenig's work to show what eifect was produced on the mind
of the Chief of the Staff of the German forces by the perusal
of this letter. If v. Moltke had abandoned his strategy of
the first war in favour of a second form of strategy ; if for
the annihilation of the hostile forces in the field he had
substituted the capture of an open town, it must have
rejoiced his heart to find his order interpreted to the very
letter ; if not, and if he still held to the old faith, then the
letter must have foreshadowed to him the beginning of the
gi'eat blunder of the whole struggle, the initiation of a course
of action that might prolong the war, involve the Germans in
fresh campaigns, and cost them dearly in blood and life. Some
day the truth may be revealed.

CHAl^^ER XIX

DBGBMBER aan^FIRST DAY, SECOND BATTLE OF ORLEANS

It sometimes happens when the line of action taken in war
by a leader appears to have been dangerous and even fool-
hardy, and yet has I'es.uJted in a brilliant success,, that there
is attributed to hiui a species of marvellous insight into the
state of affairs on the side of the enemy and his moral con-
dition. But though the Prince achieved his aims on
December 3rd and 4th, the success of the dangerous and
hazai-dous operation adopted was in no way due to his
possessing any insight of this kind. Karely has any leader
entered so com]>]etely blindfolded into a battle as did
Prince Frederick Charles into the second battle of Orleans.
Of even the general disposition of the enemy he knew
very little; of the position of even the larger hostile units*
such as the Army Corps, he was equally in ignorance, and
he refused to accept as correct the approximately correct
information furnished to him by the Detachment. He
was awai'e that, for at least a fortnight, a vast amount of
labour had been expended in putting; into a state of defence
the position he was about to attack, and that in it wei^e
heavy guns ; but of the system of works, he could see only
the fringe, and he was not certain even whether on the river
ibelf there was or was not a Bridge Head. As i-egai-ds the
moral of the enemy he was equally in the dark, except as
regards the 15th CorpsSj the best in the French Army^ the
corps tliat had fought victoriously at Coulmiers and was in no
way shaken ; the battle of December Snd must have seriously
injured the moral of the 16th and ITth Corps, but this liad
no influence on hia judgment, because he refused to believe

252 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANXE, 1870 71

that that encounter liatl been of the serious charactei* attri-
buted to it by both v. Stosch and v. Waldersee. That the
18th and 20th Corps, his opponents at Bcaune la Rolande,
had been very f^verely shaken, he did not even admit until
his delayed visit to the battlefield on the 30th, and then he
believed that the opportunity for taking advantage of the
demoralisation of the corps had gone by. With respect to
the leaders and the leading of the French, the enemy was
to hini 200,000 men under one supreme commander only,
General d''Aiire]Je, who had already, as a tactician, made his
mark at Couhniers, No doubt an eaj'ly gallop to the battle
field of Loigny-Poupry, and a personal conference with the
Grand Duke and v, Stosch, might have enabled him to get
nearer the truth, but the Prince of December 3rd does not
seem to have been the same man as the Prince of August 16th,
who had hurried in two hours from Pont-a-Moussoii to
Vionville ; and, possibly, the prospect of an interview with a
royal Prince he personally disliked, and with a Chief Staff
Officer who held views opposite to his own, was not specially
attractive.

On the morning of December 3rd began the two days battle.
No doubt, if war be a mence and an art, it ought to be caiTied
on in conformity with the principles derived from the experi-
ences of the past ; and, as a rule, war thus conducted is far more
likely to be siuccessful than is war carried on in disregard of
those principles ; but the so-called " game '' of war, like all
other games, is^ one of probabilities, and a disregard of pro-
babilities may sometimes result in pulling off" a great coup;
and so it was here in the attack on Orleans, and in no part of
the widely extended battlefield more markedly so than on the
east of the Paris road, in the great Forest of Orleans, when,
during the thirty-six hours from 9 a.m. on December 3rd the
Ilird Army Corps was, according to probabilities, marching to
certain destruction ; when the dangerssurroundingit were appa>
rentlyoverwhelming: and yet the corps not only issued from the
perils unscathed, but succeeded in depriving the defenders of
the city of Orleans of the aid of some 40,000 to 50,000 men.

DECKMBER ii

253

simply by frightening them away. It is on this aide of the
road during the two days that we gain experience of how
deeply indebted to sheer good fortune may sometimes be
even the ablest generals. The day's work of the Ulrd Army
Corps will be dealt with first, and as a preliminary step,
the position of the French must be given. At and north of
Artenay were the second and third Divisions of the 15th
Corps, and when during the 3rd they fell back towards
Orleans, their line of retreat lay on and near to the Paris
road. The village of Chevilly is on this road at the north-
west angle of the forest. No troops had been specially told
off to protect the ttve miles of front between this road and
the Roman road ; but the protection of some portion of it
would naturally fall to the retiring troops. The Koman road
was guarded outside the forest, but near to the edge by the
fortified localities of V'illereau, St. Germain-le-Grand, and
Neuville aux Bois. At Neuviile were some 8400 rifles and
twelve guns; at Villereau 1850 rifies and eight guns; these
troops were the left of the first Division of the loth Corps, and
were under General Minot. ChiDeurs aux Bois, the next point
of entry, and assigned for attack to the Ilird Army Corps, lies
a good mile outside the forest ; the village of San tea u is the
same distance further towards Pithiviers. At this entrance was
des Palliei-es with 8-500 rifles and thirty-eight guns. At Courcy
aux Loges, on the next road from Pithiviers, was the right of
the Division, 2070 rifles and six guns. The front of this Divi-
sion of some 20,000 men was eleven to twelve miles. At
Chambon, three and a half miles east, and also on a road, was
the left flank of the 20th Corps, which, with the 18th on its
right, faced north-east towards Beaune and Montargis.

As the Prince, when despatching the Illrd Army Corps on
its mission, believed that the French were in very strong force
on its left, with troops also in strength at Chilleurs, the course
he adopted was certainly a departure from his usual caution.
In fact, his whole leading during the two days wa^i that of a
man who, forced by superior authority to adopt a line of
action he regarded as both dangerous and hazardous, went

254 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

recklessly ahead, regartllesa of possible consequences. The
task set to tlie Corps, namely, after a severe night march to
march ten miles to tlie edge of a forest, drive back the enemy
from this edge which had been prepared for defence, and on
narrow and obstructed roatls to force him back five miles on
his uatural line of retreat, was a tolerably larg^e hit of work
for a short November day ; yet grand old v. Alvcnsleben
manaa;ed to accomplish the wishes of the Prince, the ten
years'* commander of the ( 'orps in old days. Nothing, during
the whole campaign, was beyond the Bi'andenburgers. V.
Alvensleben was fully aware of the difficulties confronting
him, but it was only to his Chief Staff Officer, Colonel v. V.
Rhetz, that he spoke of them. Outwardly, to othei-s, he
appeared quite unmoved. In the march of the previous night
he had brushed against the hostile outposts, and, for aught he
knew, the enemy might, in consequence, be specially on the
alert ; that if he arrived at Loury in rear of the enemy, his
presence there on the night of the 3rd would he known to
them, he could not doubt ; and in front of him at Lotirv would
be the Loire and the fortified Orleans. In the Army Orders
there was no mention of the provision of any connet^^ting link
between him and the IXth Army Corps on his right, so in the
intervening forest the enemy might, unknown to him, be. And
what an encumbrance were his own eighty-fonr guns. To take
all these with him along the forest roads, obstructed as they
were sure to be, would be great labour ; whilst, also, the
teams could easily be crippled by a few shooters concealed in
the underwood. To leave the guns in rear needed a strong
escort, and a cousetpeiit diminution of the comparatively few
infantry (14,750) of his force. He remarked, somewhat in
the spirit of j-aillery, " We are ordered to l^eat the enemy, so
we will beat him ; the position of the General is not usually
with the outposts, at least not in wooded country of this kind,
but since we cannot command unless we are at the out-posfa,
we will go there.'^ He also said ** the General in command
should nut be under the fire of the enemy, and I shall only go
there if necessary, but if I find myself there by chance it will

DECEMBER 3

255

not be proper for me to ride away .^ V, Alvensleljen estimated
the strength of the enemy at one Division on the Loury road
and one and a-half to two corps to the east of it-— a very
clofie estimate. *' I went,"^ he afterwards said, " I was fully
aware, into a den, of which the door closed of itself after
my last man had passed Chilleiu-s. With every step for-
ward diminished any chance of support, and also the possi-
bility of withdrawing or of sending any news about myself,
or of receiving news ; and if I did fortunately succeed in
aniving at the southern edge the situation of my corps
before the city could become very unpleasant. No use was
there in previous calculations and speculations. I knew
nothing as to the state of affairs south of the forest : of only
one ihing was I sure, the impossibility of employing all my
guns. And was it quite out of the question that the Prince''s
attack might be repulsed, that I should be for one or two
days in front of the Bridge Head, and with the enemy on
my line of retreat ? In this case we should certainly hold
out, but my corps could hardly escape a catastrophe."

It was at Santeau that des Pallieres determined to first
oppose the German advance. An artillery duel of great
vivacity commenced at 10.30 a,m, and the is.sue was greatly
to the advantage of the Germans. So severely did the French
artillery suffer that about midday des Pallieres ordered it back
to Orleans ; the infantry were to cover the retreat and fall
back to the edge of the forest, holding the edge on both sides
of the road ; but the Germans did not allow the retirement
to be nnide undisturbedj and the retreat of the rear-guard
became a flight. Chilleurs soon fell into the hands of the
pursuers, who also captured the edge of the forest.

Three miles within the forest at this point there is met a
perfectly straight cross road, the Alice de Nibelle, running
from east to west, and striking the Paris-Orleans road at
rather more than a mile on the Orleans side of Chevilly ; it
cuts the Loury road two miles, north of the village. Des
Pallieres now led his troops back to the Allee, sent his heavy
batteries to Orleans by Louryj and turned westward along

2 5« THE PEOPLES WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

to ward off the dangers by which he was encompassed, and that
was the utmost that the General on the spot could do to con-
tribute towards success. The credit for the success must be
given to the French comniandei's only. It has been mentioned
that the left flank of des Pallit;re''s division was, in the mornings
at Neuville aux Bois under Minot. It was against this detach^
raent that the left flanking force of the IX th Army Corps and
later the Xth Army Corps, had struck in their advance south ;
Minot had received orders from des Fallieres to hold on to the
last extremity to cover the westward flank march of the division,
and then to fall l>acV south-west on S. Lye, When des Fal-
lieres arrived in rear of Neuville aux Bois, at four o''clock, a
peasant came to him from Neuville and undertook to take any
orders to General Minot. Des Pallieres, knowing how bad was
the road from Neuville to S. J^ye, and fearful that Minot
during the march might be attacked in fl!ank, told the peasant
to tell the General that he might i-etreat south-east through
JRebrechien, by the road which nins into the Lou ry~ Orleans
road, two and a half miles on the Orleans side of Loury, and
he expressed to him the hope that the enemy, who had been
fighting during part of the day, would not have passed Loury.
It is doubtful whether the message was received, Minot had,
however, already selected the Rebrechien line of retreat. Of
the fight at Chilleurs he had received no information, and he
was not aware that the Germans had penetrated into the
wood. Not far from Neuville the road he followed bifurcates,
the left, the better road, going to Lonry, the right, a forest
track, to Rebrechien. It was quite dark, and there was a heavy
snowstorm, and at the bifurcation the wrong branch, that to
Loury, was followed. At the head of the column were two
batteries. It was this column that, marching without any pre-
cautions for security, struck on the outposts of the Ilird Army
Corps at eight o'clock, as already described. At first there was
alarm and confusion on both sides, but with the well-disciphned
troops this was only temporary ; with the less well-disciplined
troops it developed into panic. In spite of the hei-oic and
dejiperate efforts of the French gunners, it was impossible to

DECEMBER 3

259

save more than seven of the twelve guns. The column itself
broke, and the men fled through the wood to Orleans.

The small detachment on the right flank at Courey seems
to have been forgotten by dcs Pallieres. The colonel sent for
orders, but finding Chilleurs in the possession of the Germans,
he retreated to Orleans, by the outer of the four roads. It
was this detachment that had been reported to Alvensleben as
coming from the east. And there had been also peril impend-
ing from the north-east from the SOth and 18th corps. Since
November 30th these two corps had been receiving their orders,
not from d'Aui-ene, but from Tours ; but in order to carry
out the schemes which now emanated from the Delegation,
thei-e was sent, on the Snd, by Gambetta to d'Aurelle the fol-
lowing order of 4 p.m., which, however, d'Aurelle did not
receive until the night of the 3rd : " From to-day, December
Snd, it is necessary that for the operations now undertiiken, you
issue your strategical orders to the 15th, 16th, ITth, 18th, and
20th corps, I have, until yesterday^ December 1st, myself
directed the 18th and 20th corps, and for a time the 17th ; I now
hand over to you this duty. From earlier reports, 1 do not
believe that serious opposition will be encountered by you either
at Pithiviers or at the other pointy. In my opinion, the enemy
is only attempting to mask his movement to the north-east to
meet Ducrot. The column vvith which you bad to deal yes-
terday, and perhaps have to deal with to-day, is doubtless
only an isolated detachment which is endeavouring to dei^in
us. But the main body must be, I repeat, on the way to Corbeil
[fifteen miles from Faris, on the Seine]. At this moment we
have reoccupied Chateaudun."'''

Very intricate is the controversy that has arisen on the ques-
tion of responsibility for the leading of the two eastern corps at
this critical period. De Freycinet maintains that this telegram
is not to be taken *' a la lettre des mots employes par lui,"
and that d'Aurelle was already in command of them ; d'AureJle
declines to accept the responsibility earlier than the receipt of
this telegrtim. Anyhow, it was not until 7 p.m. on the 3rd that"
Bourbaki, who had superseded the very recently appointed

262 THE PEOPLE S WAH IN FRANCE. 1870-71

sion was threatening the right flank of the Detachment, and
that the Bavarians hatl now their 1st Division in action against
it, and the fight was not yet ended ; and he mentioned that on
the previous day there had been in front of the Grand Duke the
16th and 17th Corps, and strong forces of the 15th Corps ; he
also added that the whole Havarfan Corps was hardly as strong
as a weak Division, and that the 17th Inf. Division must be
left out of consideration ; the Srd Division of the 15fch Corps
was opposite to it. The Prince listened with marked attention
and then said : " Many prisoners of many regiments of the
3rd Div. of the 15th Corps have been captured in Artenay"
[they were stragglers from the Division on December 9ud] ;
" the Grand Duke has made a mistake^ this Division cannot
be opposite to him i he has nothing much opposed to him,
and he has been deceived by a demonstration;, and has again
allowed himself to be drawn away from the real point for
attack," This reference was to the conduct of the Detachment
on the Snd, the day of Loigny-Poupry. As time was of import-
ance, V. Stoseh did not carry on the discussion, but said that it
was impo-ssible to tell whether it would be possible to continue
on the morrow the convergent attack on Orleans ; that must
depend on the news from v, d, Tann about the strong hostile
forces showing themselves at TEncornie * on the right rear ;
the Detachment might be compelled to move with the main
body westward. To the Prince the words " strong hostile
forces" aeemed unworthy of credit. "They are only franc-
tireurs and Gardes Mobiles," he said, and with marked
emphasis he added, ** Orleans is the parole ; the Detachment
will advance against it to-morrow with all its forces."' To
this V. Stosch made no reply. The force at rEncorme was not
" frauc-tireurs " : it Mas Barry's Division of the 16th Corps
which comprised more Marche troops than Gardes Mobiles,
and was making a diversion against the flank of the Detach-
ment, whilst the 3rd Division of the 15th Corps was resisting
its advance. But, apparently, in the Prince's mind, the
Detachment was always in the wrong,

• A tLainlet one mile atmOi-west of Sougy.

DECEMBER 3

263

V. Stosch felt it, however, to be his duty to suggest to the
Prince the danger of the night attack. The Prince, without
in any way replying, turned to v. Stiehle and counter-ordered
the attack. Then in a quieter manner he said to v. Stosch :
** Night attacks are always bad^ they should only be under-
taken when success is certain ; I dare not run any risk. Under
the present circumstances I am not certain of success. I had
relied on the ilanking movement of the whole of the Detach-
ment. The Grand Duke will remain for the night in his present
position." V. Stosch was already riding away when the Prince
repeated the words, " But to-morrow we must be in Orleans " ;
V. Stosch replied, " It will not be our fault if we are not." Such
is the account given of the interview by Hoenig, and subse-
quently endorsed by v. Stosch himself. And yet v. d, Goltz,
the writer of the semi-official history of the Second Army, has
another and a very different tale to tell. He says : *' After it
had already begun to get dark. General v. Stosch, the Chief
of the Staff of the Detachment, came to the Commander-in-
Chief and represented to him that the Grand Duke's troops,
exhausted by the severe fight of the previous day, and tired
out by to-day'*s marching with fighting, were hardly able to
take part in a determined attack on the Chevilly position.
The Field-Marshal felt himself compelled to postpone to the
next day the capture of Chevilly and the edge of the forest,"

To the truth of this account v. Stosch has given a direct
denial and he furnished Hoenig with a statement of the con-
versation. V. d. Goltz must have obtained his version second-
hand, as only three persons were present at the interview, the
Pi-ince and the two Chief Staff Officers. What inferences are
to be drawn from this extraordinary discrepancy must be left
to the reader.

And now the fighting came to an end for the day, and at
Chevilly occurred an incident illustrative of the saying '* seeing
is believing." The oi-ders to the Detachment were that it
was to remain on its pi'csent ground; v. Wittich did not see
the force of the order : " there was nothing for my men,'"' he
writes, " bnt the bare plain covered with wet snow, a bivouac

264 THE PEOrLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870*71

without straw, wood, water or food. My troops had been

Kghting durin<i; the whole of December 2nd ; the leading
troops had arrived at 10 oV-lock that night, the last at one in
the morning, in the icy bivouac at Anneau, where they had
little to eat ; they had fallen in before daybreak, and had
be*^n in fighting formation all day, without taking into account
the duty that must now fall to the advanced guard ; so I
had determined to go back to Poupry [five miles] for the
night and come hack next morning. I waited, however, for
the receipt of information frotn my cavalry regiment, which
I had ordered to reconnoitre towards Chevilly and the Chateau
after the artillery iire had ceased, Repoi"ts came in from it
that the enemy had evacuated both the village and the
chateau.'^ The result was that both the Infantry Divisions
passed the night under shelter there,

D'Aurelle had come to Chevilly at 2 p.m. and awaited there
the arrival of des Pallieres. But no news of hira came, and
d'Aurelle saw the chance of being able to hold on at Chevilly
gradually diminish. Towards 4.30 p.m. he accepted the needs
of the situation and gave orders that Chevilly should be
held till darkness set in and then the troops should fall back
to the next prepared locality, Cercottes, three miles nearer
Orleans. The last French infantry left the village just at
the moment that the German infantry, about to advance to
storm it, were held back oxving to the counter-order.

CHAPTER XX

DECIMBEE 4th— SECOND DAT, SECOND BATTLE OF
ORLEANS— CAPTURE OF THE CITY

The Prince's orders for December 4th were sent out from
Artenay at 9 p.m. and ran a-s followfj : "The attack will be
continued to-morrow, December 4th. The IXth Army Corps
will advance at 8 qm. by the village of Chevilly, occupied by
our troops to-day, and will extend with infantry into the
wood eastward in order to co-operate later on in an enveloping
movement on Cercottes.

" The left flank detachment of the IXth Corps will con-
tinue at 7 A.M. its advance by S. Lye on the Roman Road
as ordered.

" The Ilird Army Corps will advance along the Chilleurs-
Lonry road towards Orleans, covering itself on its left flank
against any forces coming perhaps from Bellcgarde, and has,
as objective, to bring artillery into action as much as possible
against the town of Orleans. The Corps will move ofl* at 7 a.m.

"The Xth Army Corps will march in several columns
towards Chevilly, where the head is to arrive at 1 p.m. and
will take up, as reserve, a position north of the place. The
artillery columns "will accompany the corps in order to be
able to assist in the supply of the other corps if required.

'* The 6th Cav. Division will be south of Artenay at 8 a.m.j
and follow behind the right wing of the IXth Army Corps,

" The Detachment of H.R.H. the Grand Duke proceeds at
8A.M.to-morrowin the Hrst instance to the enveloping attack on
Gidy in co-operation with the attack by the IXth Army Corps.

" Reports to be sent to me on the right flank of the
IXth Army Corps."

266 THE PEOPLES WAR TN FRANCE, 1870-71

This order is a remarkftble illustration of how even ex-
periented soldiers are liable to fail in drawing up orders.
The Fritice had set hi$ heart on the capture of Orleans on the
4*A. " To-morrow we raust be in Orleans," he had with
marked emphasis told v, Stosch in the early evening. As
Hoenig remarks, it was the capture of Orleans on this day
that was the purpose of all the movements ordered^ and yet
in the order there is not even an indication of this purpose.
It is quite possible that v. Manstein, being near the Prince,
may have received from him a verbal intimation similar to
that given through v. Stosch to the Grand Duke, but v. Al-
vensleben was left completely in the dark on the matter ; and
he cannot learn from the order more than the fact that the
other Corps are to advance against a series of positions, and
also that for some purpose not coninmnicated to him he is to
endeavour to shell Orleans.

When this order was issued, the Prince knew nothing what-
ever as to the progress actually made bythe Ilird Army Corps.
At 7 P.M. had come in to Arteuay a message sent at 1 p.m.
by V. Alvensleben, " The enemy has had in action the
iDth Corps 1st Division in front of Santeau in a strongly
fortified position, and has shown three batteries and two
nvitraillense batteries. He has been driven back from
Santeau, and he retired to the position of Chilleurs, and has
also abandoned this. The wood is being attacked. One
gun taken, 200 prisoners. Our loss small up to the present.""
The delay in the delivery of the message was due to v. Alvens-
leben not being aware that the Prince, instead of making
Chilleurs aux Bois his headquarterSj as notified in the final
paragi'aph of the Army Orders of the pi-evious evening, had
shifted them to Artenay. The orderly officer who brought
the message had had much difficulty in finding the Prince,
As regards the left flank detachment of the IXth Army Corps,
the Prince knew that it had encountered serious opposition.
From the Xth Aruiy Coqis no news had arrived.

Again, a-s on the iJrd, we will begin with the left wing of
the attackers.

DECEMBER 4

267

Owing to the bad weather and a heavy snowstorm^ the
officer caiTying the measage to the Ilird Army Corps lost his
way, so it did not come to hand in time for the corps to move
off at 7 A.M., the hour named ; but the General had eveiTthing
in readiness for the march. The 6th Division was to follow
the main road to Orleans, protecting its right by a Hanking
detachment ; the 5th Division protecting itself on the left by
a flanking detachment^ and by officers' patrols, was to take a
side road a little to the east to Checy on the Loire. On
arriving at the south edge of the wood the Divisions would
halt and await further orders. The sixty guns left at Chilleurs
were to follow on the main road. They had, however, to be
brought up before the march commenced, and since, in the forest,
were numerous dispei-sed French soldiers, the protection of this
long line of guns from a sudden dash on them at some point
or other was no easy task, A peculiarity in the Army order
was, as just mentioned, that in it the llird Army Corps alone
was directed to attack Orleans on this day. But to v, Alvens-
leben there was something ridiculous about the order ; in one
resf>ect the carrying it out waa impracticable, asi a glance at
the map showed, "Armchair (sal on) strategy," he remarked :
this order to bring artillery into action against Orleans
further decreased the little value he attached to the strategy
of the Second Ai'niy. The danger from Bourbaki on his left
rear he thoroughly understood, and the left flank detachment
was, therefore, intended to act,^ if necessary, as a rearguard ;
it would be supported by the Sth Division. The divisions
arrived about noon at and near Boigny, five to six utiles from
LiOury, and halted. The 6th Division was directed to continue
its march on Orleans, the Sth to march by Bourgneuf to the
river road, a little west of Checy, and thence to proceed to
Orleans. The 6th Division, soon after moving off', was met
with infantry fire. The hostile troops were from the 1st
Division of the loth Corps that had fallen back on the
previous day. They were good troops, and occupied the
village of Vau main bert 2| miles from Orleans; and here, at
£ P.M., they offered a determined resistance. Not until

268 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

nearly four o^clock, after a tough fight, did the Germans
capture the village ; and then^ v. Alvensleben, learning that
in front of him was a real Bridge Head, determined to defer
the attack to the next day. He was urgently pressed on all
sides to continue the attack so that the Ilird Corps might
be the first in Orleans^ but he wisely refused to allow such a
foolhardy attempt in the dark. In order, if possible, to let
the centre column know of his arrival before the city, he
ordered his artillery commander to bring a battery into
action somewhere or other, and to throw some shells into
Orleans. The sound of the guns would thus signal to the
troops on the main road his arrival. So close was the
■country, that only with difficulty was found a place for a
whole battery to come into action. At last, a grass plot in
front of a villa was discovered ; a heavy battery was un-
iimbered and twelve shells were fired, and then the battery
limbered up just in time, for hardly had it g<>ne, than eleven
heavy sheKs, fired fi'om Orleans, fell on the lawn.

From the left had come in to v. Alvensleben very alarming
reports. The left flank detachment, consisting of two
battalions and one squadron under the command of Lieut.-
Colonel V. TEatoeq, had, at S p.m., amved at Checy, and was
about to go into cantonments, the main body of the Division
having arrived at Bourgneuf about a mile to the north, when
a report came in to Colonel v. TEstocq of the approach of an
enemy from Pont aox Moines, at a canal-crossing two miles
to the east. Soon the hostile infantry skirmishers, followed
by several columns, made their appearance.

The enemy was the S^Oth Corps led by General Crouzat,
A position somewhat in advance of the village was at first
taken up by two companies of the detachment, but gradually
the French came forward to the attack in increasing force so
that the Germans had to confine themselves to the defence
of Checy itself. At about three o'clock a battalion and a
battery arrived from the 5th Division, and the battery came
into action. The French now began to break off the fight
and to fall back towardis Pont aus Moines ; the Germans

DECEMBER 4

269

reiiifoi-ced bj another regiment followed. The French barri-
caded the further portion of the village as well as the bridge
by which they had recrossed the canal, and then gradually
disappeared eastward. The good star of the Germans had
been in the ascendant, for it was a whole corps that was
advancing toward this small detachment, and it was a whole
corps that i^tired when this handful of men opposed its
ad^'ance. In compliance with an order of the pi-evious
evening from de Freycinet, Bourbaki, with the 90th Coips
under Crou/^t and the 18th Corps, was marching to Orleans
from the position of the previous day, and had been moving
along roads almoist parallel to the march of the Illrd Army
Corps, The march had commenced at four in the morning.
After the troops had begun to move oif, Bourbaki received
from d'Aurelle the following despatch : '" "We have been
fighting for three days in succession against large forces.
Our losses in the ISth^ 16th, and 17th Corps are very large.
We have gone back to our line in front of Orleans. The
enemy has captured one of the most important points. I am
am afraid, now that it will be impossible for the Army of the
Loii-e to hold onto the right bank of the Loii-e. There is no
bridge between Orleans and Gien [a mistaken statement>
there was one at Sully], The 18th and SOth Corps under
your command must, if they have to cross the Loire, do so at
the last-named place. Give your orders, therefore, for the
eventuality that the retreat by Gien may be necessary."
Dui'ing the last twenty -four hours orders and counter-orders
had been showered on Bourbaki from de Freycinet and
d'Anrelle. Crouzat had during the day been fully aware of
the march of the Ilird Army Corps, which he had watched
carefully. At eleven o'clock an orderly officer came to him and
said, " We are in the midst of the Prussian Army," and gave
to him a report received from the Maire of a village that the
whole Prussian Army was around Orleans : at S p.m. Crouzat
aiTived at Fay aux Loges, four or five miles short of Pont aux
Moines, and w^hence a road leads direct to Jargeau on the
Loire. After a conference with his Generals, he determined

270 THE PEOPLES WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

to march by the right bank to Orleans, sending his trains and
artillery by the left bank after crossing at Jargeau. The
leading brigade, soon after passing Pont aux MnineSj found
themselves attacked by the two German companies. Crouzat
had sent an officer to report on the bridge at Jargeau. This
bridge had been destroyed, but the inhabitants had restored
it and made it practicable. Crou/^t now believed the
Germans were behind hinij and as the Loire was in front of
hinij his mind was much relieved by the report. He now
caused the corps to retire to opposite Jargeau, and by the
following morning it had crossed to the left bank. The
18th Corps had followed a road further east, and also
turned south, reaching the Loire higher up and crossing on
the night 5th-6tb. So the Ilird Army Corps escaped in a
man'ellous way being captured in the very den of the lion.

In the centre on the Paris road, the tactics adopted were
those of sheer weight in a concentrated form, and in complete
disregard of both the strategical and tactical situation on
either the extreme right or the extreme left. Chevilly,
which had been abandoned on the previous evening by the
French, and occupied by the 22nd Inf. Division, was the
starting-point for the attack by the IXth Army Corps down
the main road.

The road and the railroad run parallel to each other at a
distance of two to three hundred yards apart. On leaving
Cbevilly they enter a wood defile, two miles long, caused by
the projecting of an angle of the forest to the west, the woods
on either side being very close and with dense undergrowth.
At half a mile beyond the end of the defile is the strongly
fortified village of Cercottes, connected by entrenchments
with Gidy, a village, two miles west, and also fortified, whilst
in front of this line were outlying posts bearing on the
exits from the wood. These entrenchments were the right
of the main fortified position of the entrenched camp west
of the Paris road, and were occupied by the French. Along the
main road went into the defile the 36th Inf. Brigade, a regi-
ment of Cavalry and the Division Artillery, along the railroad.

DECEMBER 4 271

advancing pari passu^ the other column, the 35th Inf. Brigade
and a battalion. The corps artillery followed along the main
road. Fighting went on all day, and at seven o'clock, after dark,
the French had been driven back, or had fallen back, so far
that the railway station, les Aubrais, close to the walls of the
city, was in the hands of the Germans. The Prince had, even
late into the afternoon, held to the belief that on this day
he would enter the city ; but at 7.15 p.m. v. Manstein, very
heavy-hearted, reported that in face of the determined
opposition and the great difficulties of the locality, he must
abandon for the night any further attempt to advance, so here
the IXth Army Corps came to a standstill, close to the city,
for the night, as the Ilird Army Coi-ps had already done.

And now to the right flank. At last, the Prince has
had a personal interview with the Grand Duke, for at
9 A.M. to the surprise of the latter, the Prince came to
him at Chevilly chateau where he was. The interview is
described by an eye-witness as short, stiff and frigid. The
Prince listened coldly to the Grand Duke, and gave him his
instructions in the most distant manner. The Grand Duke
expressed his belief that the enemy was retreating over the
Loire. The Prince held a contrary opinion, that the retreat
was on Orleans. Both seem to have regarded the surrounding
the Army of the Loire as the end to be attained, but, unfor-
tunately, the orders of the Prince, which involved the whole
Detachment in the struggle on the Paris-Orleans road,
rendered the envelopment of the French left wing very im-
probable. Before the brief interview came to a close, the
Prince repeated to the Grand Duke the words of the previous
evening that Orleans must, under all circumstances, be occupied
this day. TTiis injunction must be borne in mind in view of
after events.

It would seem to have been the Prince's plain duty to have
learnt fully from the Grand Duke the work of this and the
preceding day on the west of the road ; to have ascertained
his view of the situation, and the grounds on which it was
based. But the Prince's " personlichkeit " exercised baneful

276 THE PEOPLE^S WAR IN FRANCE. 1870 71

the 16th and ITth Corps to fall back on Iteaugency and
Bloijs, the I8th and S*lth on Gien, the 15th will cross at
Orleans and inarcli into the Sologiie. Thus there will not be
any blocking of roads, and the subsiistence of the Army is
easily provided for." At the same time the General intimated
his decision to the Intendant-General in Orleans. Hardly
had the telegram been desipatched to Tours* ivheii from
de Freyt-inet came a telegi-am, lO.oO i',m., December 3rd,
criticising the disposition of the troops^ and directing a con-
centratioii of the w^hole Army at Orleans, At 5 a.m. on the
4th, de Freyciiiet sent an objectionably worded telegi-am,
refusing to endoi-se d'Aui-elle's views of the necessity of a
retreat, and reiterating the ordei's for a general concentration.
At 8 A.M. on the 4th d'Aurelle replied : '* I am here on the
spot, and am Ix'tter able to judge the situation tliaii are you.
With not less sorrow than vuti have I resolved on this extreme
meaiiure. 'Die enemy has smniomited all obstacles up to
Cercottes, he has mastered all the issues froiii the forest :
the position of Orleans is, therefore, no longer what it was.
It is now surrounded, and has lost the support of the forest,
it can no longer be defended with troops exhausted by three
days fighting and hardships, and who, owing to their gj-eat
losses, are demoralised. Besides, the strength of the enemy
exceeds all my anticipations, also the figures you gave me.
Time presses, and will not enable me to caiTy out the con-
centration you speak of. Good resistance ctinnot be organised.
In spite of all efforts which could be made, Orleans will,
it is fated, be in the enemy's hands this evening or to-
morrow. That will be a great misfortune ; but the only means
to avoid a greater catastrophe is to have the courage to make
a sacrifice whilst there is time. The Army of the Loire can
be of great service to the National Defence, but on the
condition that it can collect at those points where it can
have time to get into order again. The attempt to con-
centrate at Orleans is to invite useless destruction. 1 be-
lieve, therefore, that the orders issued must be adhered to.
As to the orders you have given to Bourbaki [to concentrate

DEtEMBEH 4

277

towards Orleans] it is not for me to alter them, I Jeave it to
JO 11 to hold to them or to i«call them. I must, however, draw
your attention to the fact that this movement towards Orleans,
in front of theeiiemj, who is master of the forest, may turn out
still more dangerous, beaiuse Bourbaki can cross only at
Orleans and Gien [not con-ectj. The restoration of the bridge
at Chateauneuf is not yet completed." D'Aurelle, for the
present, nmintained his determination. This accounts for
much of the i^alling back of the French before the Germans
during this day. At 11,15 a.m. the Delegation sent to
d'Aurelle its sanction for the evacuation of Orleans.

But now d'Aurelle, coming to Orleans before he received
at Sfti-an this sanction, learnt that des Pallieres had arrived,
and having gi-eat confidence in this general, and knowing that
his Division was the heat in the army, suddenly changed his
planij. He >vas aware of Aliuot's disaster, and of the i^eal con-
dition of the Division, but he seems to have lost his j udgment ;
he telegrapheti at 11.53 a.m. to Tours, **I am altering my
plans, directing the 16th and 17th corps to Orleans, calling
here the 18th and 20th, I am oi-ganisiag the defence, I am
at Orleans.'" Counter-oi-dei-s were at once issued. The con-
fusion arising from this change of plans was one of the most
powerful aids to the success of the Germans.

Natui'ally the Delegation at Tours was delighted at the
change of intentions, and wired at once to d'Auralle the
expression of its great satisfaction. But events proved too
strong for trAurelle, and he gradually came to the conclusion
that he must revert to the original idea of abandoning Orleans
and the right bank of the Loire; at 4 r.sr.his mind was made up,
and oi'ders wore issued accordingly. To des Pallieres was left
the covering the reti^eat. The operation rtxjuired both time
and organisation, foi' there were some iJOOO waggons in the city
\^ hich, moreover, had been a principal store depot for the army
of the Loire. During the night all was to be sent away.

It wais at half-past five in the afternoon that the Prince
began to be anxious as to the {possibility of Orleans not being
cajjtured on this day. Of the Ilird Army Corps he had heard

278 THE PEOPLE^S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

nothing. To v. Manstein he sent an officer to ascertain whether
the General thought he could enter the city on that day. By
6 P.M. the officer returned with the answer that it was doubtful.
So at 6.45 the Pnnce issued orders for the eessatioii of the fight
and its renewal next morning, Subseijuently there arrived a
report, 7-15, from v, Manstein, and later on, at 9 p.m., one
from V. Alvensleben, 4.30, both to the same effect that their
attacks on the city had been broken off. Toi Vei-siaiile*! the
Prince reported that the Army would stand ready to take
Orleans next day. But storming the city ivas pret:isely what
the Royal Head-quarters were anxious should fje avoided.

At 7 P.M. there were in Orleans some thousands of tit>ops;
the number is almost impossible to ascertain : it was at that
hour that a Zouave came to dea Pallieres and informed hiui that
he had been sent by a Prussian officer [v, Manteiiffel] who
wished to speak with the commandant. The Zouave added
that the enemy was in possession of the St. Jean suburb, and
that there were but few of the i3rd Division of the 15th corps in
front of him. There had been some 1500 men here, but under
cover of the darknes.s they had stolen away. A Stafi^' Officer,
Captain Pendezec, was sent to learn what the German General
wanted. A battalion was also despatched in this direction to
keep the enemy back. Some 300 yards outside the gate was
a Prussian officer, who conducted Pendezec to General v.
Tresckow in a house close by. Pendezec estimated the
Germans he saw at four to five battalitms [thei^e were only
two]. After Pendezec had given his name v. Tresckow spoke
to the following effect : " I have occupied the St. Jean suburb,
as you youi-self see ; in the north, on tlie road from Ai-tenay
Prince Frederick Charles has advanced a-s far as the gate on the
railroad in the Bannier suburb. If you wish, I will have you
taken there to convince yourself. I intend to occupy Orleans
to-day, but would like to avoid a street fight, which will injure
much both the city and the inhabitants ; so for that reason I
have halted here. Be so good as to convey to your Connnand~
ing Officer my summous that he evacuates the city by half-past
eleven. I shall then occupy the city as far as the Artenay

DECEMBER 4

279

road. If the commandant refuses, my batteries, which are
now in position, will immediately o^>en iire."

This was a game of hluff indeed. And to avoid mistake,
the General took out his watch, and requested the officer to
compare the time with his own watch.

Dea Pallieres^ on the return of the envoy, seems to have at
once believed all that v.Tresckowhad BAid,and to have regarded
the terms offered as an unexpected piece of good fortune^
foFj after a little thought, he told Pendezecto go back to him
and tell him that at the hour named the portion of the city
specified would be given up to him. And the French were
quite content with the agreement, for they knew what v. Tresc-
kow did not know, that there w ere hardly any troopjs in front
of him, and that by following the river bank he could probably
without firing a shot gain access to the centre of the city, and
possession of the main bridge over the Loire, along which
were now hnn'ying the waggons and the troops from other
quarters.

But now came in from d'Aurelle, to whom des Pallieres had
reported what he had doue» an order which, whilst approving
of the capitulation, directed that the entry of the Gennans
should not take place until ten oY'lock the following morning.
So on the almost hopeless mission to gain an extension of time,
General d'Aries was despatched to confer with v. Tresckow,
whom d'Aries met now on foot in the sti-eet, \'. Ti-ewkow
repeated his threat of bombardment, but eventually agi-eed
to give an extra hour, but curiously enough, owing to his
own watch having stopped he really gave an hour and a half.
The Grand Duke appi-oved of v. Tresckow's action in the
matter. Meantime had come in the Princess oi'ders to defer
the attack until the next day ; but the Grand Duke deter-
mined to defer i»ending an answer until the negotiations were
finishetl. And at 10.30 he despatched a report that the
city would be given up to him at 11.30. And at 1 a.m. the
Duke at the head of the 17th Infantry Division and a
Bavarian Brigade marched with bands playing into the
surrenderetl city. Great amount of controversy has arisen as

28o THE PKOPLE^S WAR IX FRANCE, 1870-71

to the conduct of the Grand Duke, on his having taken so
serious a step on his own responsibility without ^itibmitting
the question for the decision of the Prince his commander.
It is unnecessary to dtscUNfi the mattei* here. The Grand
Duke had carried out the Prince's injunctions ahiiont to the
letter, but when at three in the morning the report arrived
at the Army Head -quarters, thei-e was a scene, over which
Hoenig dmws but the thinnest of veils. V. W^aldersee said :
*' It was a thunderbolt. The Prince was beside himself.
He had intended to make a formal entry into Orleans ;
his joy had vanished, and all owing to the Grand Duke, of
whom he had an endming dishke,"

It was from the Grand Duke that the King first heard the
news. And the reply to the Grand Duke could have been
haidly pleasing to the Prince- **^ It is with the greatest
plefl.^ure that I tell you how I appreciate your threefold vic-
tory. I send yon my thanks and bestow on you my order
* jMJUT le merite ' with oak leaves. To Generals v. Wittich
and V, TrcBckow the same decoration without oak leaves.
WTiat important consequences these victories, and the re-
occupation of Orleans/'

To Queen Augusta at Berlin the King telegraphed :
'* Orleans has been occupied to-night without storming.
God be thanked."

On the German side there was no real thought of pursuit,
tlie objective had been the capture of the city, not the
destruction of the hostile arm y in the field ; so the enemy was a
secondary considei^atioii. At 6.30 in the morning of the 5th
the Prince had ordered the Detachment to march down the
right bank of the Loire and to occupy Beaugency, but on the
Gmad Duke representing to him the tired condition of the
troops, the Prince allowed the advance to be postponed until
the following day ; a general rest-day was therefore given,
although in the Illid, Xth» and even the IXth Army Corps
were plenty of troops fresh enough to follow up the enemy.
V. Walderaee was under the impression that both the Prince
and the Grand Duke believed that with the capture of

DECEMBER 4 281

Orleans the campaign was at an end. V. Moltke on the
other hand, considered a rapid pursuit of great imf>ortance,
but when his orders were received the favourable opportunity
had gone by. The mistake had been made and was beyond
recall. The Army of the Loire had been most severely
shaken and a large portion of it utterly demoralised ; but
the Army still existed ; it was now in two bodies. The
16th and 17th Corps, that the Prince had been mainly
instrumental in allowing to escape, fell back down the right
bank only a few miles, to Meung and Beaugency, where
joined by the 21st Corps, their leader Chanzy opposed with
them the advance of the Detachment. On the 7th at
Meung, and on the 8th, 9th, and 10th, at Beaugency, Chanzy,
before retiring further, held his enemy at bay ; then he went
west, and on the 16th commenced his retreat to le Mans,
having in these operations inflicted on the Germans a loss of
nearly 200 officers and 4000 men. Later on this portion of
the Army of the Loire compelled the Germans to undertake
the campaign of le Mans. The other body, the 15th, 18th,
and 20th Corps under Bourbaki, went eastward, where with
the 24th Corps they carried on the campaign on the Lisaine.

CHArrER XXI

CONCLUSION

Thk power shown by the hardened soldiers of Gernianv to
hold their own successfully in the field against numerically
superior farces, the failure of the leading of the French impro-
vised army when those soldiers had simply marched straight
against it, the demoralisation produced by the profitless!
endurance of suffering and misery, and the exaggei-ated
importance attached to the possession of Orleans, all com-
bined to completely take the heart out of the future National
Defence so tar an the participation of the People in it was
concerned. Henceforth it is almost solely a matter of relative
manoeuvring power in the opposing forces in the field. But
the more, and the more closely and in detail the history of the
French National Defence from October 11th to December
4th-ath is studied, the more convincing become the ill-fated
but grand efforts of Gambetta and de Freycinet as proofs of
the soundness of the principle, that in every defensive land- war
against invasion, the whole People should take their part.

The foundation-stone on which every such National Defence
rests, the pivot on which such defence turns, is the highly-
trained, thoroughly etjuipped, thoroughly disciplineii, and well-
staffed Field Army ; supplemental to this are the formation of
the dense Fog of War, the local hand-to-hand defence of every
yard of ground, and the determined holding out in every
village, town, or city which is an objective of the invader. It
is with the manhood, aye, and with the womanhood of each
particular territory that it rests to determine whether this sup-
plementary, but vitally-important, aid to the work of the Field
Army shall be given or not given.

CONCLUSION

283

And when we call to mind the fact that after having organ-
ised our Field and Fortress Annies, there will still be available
a vast number of men, either volunteers, ex-voluntcei-s, or
members of rifie-t:lub«, besides a multitude who know how to
pull a trigfljer^and all of whom are desirous, yes, and absolutely
detennined to do their best to defend their country and their
homes, we must feel it would be little short of suicidal not to
utilise their ser^^ces. The national wealth of fighting men in
thi?) country is enormous ; all that ia nen^sary to enable the
country to profit by the possession of this wealth is simply
carefully-considered and thoroughly-completed teiTitorial
organisation. Prince Frederick Charles, as we know, regarded
suitability of country as a necessary condition for the suc-
cessful employment of iri-egular ti^ops in connection uith a
Field Army. It will not be vid Salisbury Plain, but through
the close coimtry that extends down to the sea coast, south-
west, south, south-east, east, and north-cast from London, the
main objective of the invader, that the hos^tile army will
advance ; and here, especially, and to a great extent in many
other parts of our Island, this necessary condition is forth-
coming. Smokeless ]>owder and the repeating rifle have
increased greatly the power of defence of this kind, for, pai-a-
doxical as it may sound, the absence of smoke thickens the Fog
of War both on and away from the battlefield. And, more-
over, BH the cyclist manoeuvres canned out imder the super-
vision of Major-General Sir Ficderick Maurice in Sussex in
1901 clearly showed, the numerous good roads antl lanes in
England lend themselves to the very rapid concentration of
riflemen fi"om distant j)arts either to reinforce local defence
or to thicken the Fog of War. But organisation, sound,
fully-completed, and prtutically-tested, is the indisjiensable,
the necessary basis for ]>articipation of the Peojjle in the War.
Most of the country which w as the scene of the " People's
War "" in France I have visited, more than once ; the country
which would be the scene of the principal "People's War"''
against invasion in Englanfl I also fairly know. What P'rench-
nien and Frenchwomen did for their own country in the dark

284 THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71

days of October and November 1870, Englishmen and
Englishwomen will, with no les*i courage and patriotic self-
devotion, assuredly do in any dark days that may lie before
us, though at present hidden in the dim future. Let us be
wise in time dunng the day whilst we can work, and not delay
until the night conieth when work can be done only with
trouble and confusion.

On Fehruary 29th, 1804, Mr. Pitt» in the House of Com-
mons during the debate on the Defence of the Nation, spoke
the wise words that follow :

" A great mass of our population may be made fit to serve
many ui^ful purposes in the hour of danger, and I should be
therefore glad that pi-evious nioa.sures, calculated to call it into
action with effect, were concerted and carried into execution
. . . ; but I wish to give to the Lord IJeu tenant of each
county, and to a General Officer, the po%v'er of calling forth,
and arming at a moment's notice, the whole of the active
population. This measui*e should, however, be aiTanged
beforehand ; leadei-s should be appointed, companies formed,

AND NO MAJJ SHOLTLD BK ALLOWED TO RUN ABOUT IK COXFLfSlON,
CBYIXG OUT, * Oh, that I COULD BE AKY WAY USEFUL TO MY
COUXTEY I ' "

Let us of this generation, a century later, apply to practice
the words of wisdom of this great statesman.

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