PERSIAN GULF VETERANS' ILLNESSES
Y 4. G 74/7.P 43/7
Persian Gulf Veterans' Illnesses. H...
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
DECEMBER 10 AND 11, 1996
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
' iM birr.
mm?"-
JUL 3 1997
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
38-025 CC WASHINGTON : 1997
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-054219-7
\ti
PERSIAN GULF VETERANS' ILLNESSES
Y4.G74/7:P 43/7
Persian Gulf Veterans 7 Illnesses/ H. . .
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
DECEMBER 10 AND 11, 1996
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
$&$M
JUL 3 199?
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
38-025 CC WASHINGTON : 1997
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-054219-7
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr., Pennsylvania, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
DAN BURTON, Indiana
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois
CONSTANCE A MORELLA, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New Hampshire
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
PETER BLUTE, Massachusetts
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia
DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana
RANDY TATE, Washington
DICK CHRYSLER, Michigan
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, New Jersey
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
MICHAEL PATRICK FLANAGAN, Illinois
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, South
Carolina
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
SCOTT L. KLUG, Wisconsin
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina
louise Mcintosh slaughter, New
York
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GARY A. CONDIT, California
COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota
KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, Michigan
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
Columbia
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
GENE GREEN, Texas
CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
BILL BREWSTER, Oklahoma
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)
James L. Clarke, Staff Director
Kevin Sabo, General Counsel
Judith McCoy, Chief Clerk
Bud Myers, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia
DICK CHRYSLER, Michigan
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, New Jersey
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, South
Carolina
Connecticut, Chairman
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
TOM LANTOS, California
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont (Ind.)
THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
GENE GREEN, Texas
CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Ex Officio
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr., Pennsylvania CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director
Robert Newman, Professional Staff Member
Thomas M. Costa, Clerk
Cheryl Phelps, Minority Professional Staff
(ID
CONTENTS
Page
Hearing held on:
December 10, 1996 1
December 11, 1996 183
Statement of:
Dyckman, Julia, Persian Gulf war veteran and registered nurse 189
Eddington, Patrick, former CIA Analyst 142
Grass, Gunnery Sergeant George J., chemical/biological instant response
force, U.S. Marine Corps 98
Hebert, Major Randy Lee, U.S. Marine Corps, accompanied by Loyd
Hebert and Kim Hebert 105
Jackson, Charles, Tuskegee, AL, VA Medical Center; and Victor Gordan,
Manchester, NH, VA Medical Center 275
Johnson, Major Michael F., U.S. Army 41
Larrisey, Robert, Persian Gulf war veteran 214
Mather, Susan H., M.D., chief public health and environmental hazards
officer, Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans Af-
fairs; and Francis Murphy, M.D., director, Environmental Agents Serv-
ice 224
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Cullinan, Dennis, deputy director, national legislative service, Veterans
of Foreign Wars of the United States 38
Dyckman, Julia, Persian Gulf war veteran and registered nurse, prepared
statement of 192
Eddington, Patrick, former CIA Analyst, prepared statement of 150
Gordan, Victor, Manchester, NH, VA Medical Center, prepared statement
of 284
Grass, Gunnery Sergeant George J., chemical/biological instant response
force, U.S. Marine Corps, prepared statement of 100
Hebert, Major Randy Lee, U.S. Marine Corps, prepared statement of 109
Jackson, Charles, Tuskegee, AL, VA Medical Center, prepared statement
of 278
Johnson, Major Michael F., U.S. Army:
Prepared statement of 74
Report on the Fallout From the Destruction of Iraqi Chemical War-
fare Agent Research, Production, and Storage Faculties into Areas
Occupied by U.S. Military Personnel During the 1991 Persian Gulf
War 43
Mather, Susan H., M.D., chief public health and environmental hazards
officer, Veterans Health Administration, Department of Veterans Af-
fairs, prepared statement of 228
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Connecticut:
Questions posed to the Veterans Affairs 3
Prepared statement of 27
Towns, Hon. Edolphus, a Representative in Congress from the State
of New York, prepared statements of 35, 187
(III)
PERSIAN GULF VETERANS' ILLNESSES
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1996
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Human Resources and
Intergovernmental Relations,
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:05 p.m., in room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Morella, Sanders, and Fattah.
Also present: Representative Buyer.
Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and counsel;
Robert Newman, professional staff member; Thomas Costa, clerk;
and Cheryl Phelps, minority professional staff.
Mr. Shays. I would like to call this hearing of the Subcommittee
on Human Resources, of the Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight, to order.
Alarms have been sounding for almost 6 years. Only now are
they being heard. From the start of Operation Desert Shield, when
Iraqi munitions and chemical weapons production facilities were
bombed, and throughout the troop movements in Operation Desert
Storm, coalition forces heard thousands of chemical weapons
alarms.
On numerous occasions technicians, trained to operate sophisti-
cated detection equipment, confirmed the presence of nerve and
blister agents near United States troop positions in Iraq, Kuwait,
and Saudi Arabia. Individual soldiers reported SCUD attacks fol-
lowed by toxic mists and powdery fallout. They reported dead ani-
mals in the desert, and a notable lack of insects or other carrion
scavengers on the carcasses.
After the fighting stopped, United States forces detonated Iraqi
chemical munitions stored in bunkers at Khamisiyah.
To this day, many Gulf war veterans report the symptoms —
memory loss, fatigue, muscle and joint pain — that can characterize
a neurologic exposure.
Routinely, all these reports have been dismissed, discounted, dis-
credited, or denied. Some were dismissed as false positive readings.
Others were discounted as detections below life-threatening levels.
Still others were discredited as attributable only to operator error.
Based on those denials, commanders sounded the "all clear" for
U.S. troops to proceed, unprotected, against an invisible enemy.
Now we know the "all clear" came too soon. Last March when we
began these hearings, the Pentagon's position on chemical and bio-
(l)
logical weapons in the Persian Gulf war consisted of three noes: no
credible detections; no exposures; and therefore, no provable health
consequences among Gulf war veterans.
These denials were echoed by the Department of Veterans Affairs
and reflected in their research and treatment priorities.
Today, two of the three pillars of denial have crumbled under the
weight of reluctantly disclosed facts. There were credible, verified
detections of chemical nerve and blister agents. The President's Ad-
visory Committee on Persian Gulf Veterans' Illnesses concluded de-
tections of chemical nerve agents by Czech technicians in January
1991, were credible. The Department of Defense investigative team
is examining records from 20 other detections previously dismissed
or discounted. Seven of these detections were acknowledged just
last week.
As a result, the number of U.S. Gulf war veterans presumed to
have been exposed to some level of chemical warfare agents has
climbed from zero to 400 to 1,100 to 5,000 to 15,000 to more than
20,000. In the weeks and months ahead, that number of credible
exposures may go much higher.
This is our fifth hearing on Gulf war veterans' illnesses. Our pur-
pose in all these hearings is to ensure that Gulf war veterans are
properly diagnosed, effectively treated, and fairly compensated.
Since 1991, one of their health concerns has been the role of low-
level exposures to a variety of toxins, including chemical nerve
agents, in causing permanent neurological damage and chronic,
often debilitating, symptoms.
Our purpose today and tomorrow is to ask how evidence of chem-
ical nerve agent detections, including the firsthand accounts of Gulf
war veterans, is gathered, confirmed, and disseminated.
Even now, more than 5 years after the war, chemical detection
information is a critical piece of medical intelligence for a sick vet-
eran trying to establish a service-connected disability claim or try-
ing to provide his or her doctor with a complete toxic exposure his-
tory.
Sadly, that information has not been forthcoming. Our witnesses
today will describe how evidence of toxic chemical detection in the
Gulf war has been lost, destroyed, misrepresented, perhaps even
suppressed, in an effort to support the premature, now insupport-
able conclusion that coalition forces encountered no chemical war-
fare agents.
For want of that information, vital research into the effects of
low-level chemical exposures has been tragically delayed, and many
Gulf war veterans have gotten sicker. Some have died. Only when
all this information is available will veterans, their families, and
their physicians be able to determine the true role of toxic chemi-
cals in causing the variety of illnesses now called the "Gulf war
syndrome." Only then can we sound the "All Clear."
This committee welcomes our witnesses today. We look forward
to their testimony.
I would like to recognize Mr. Sanders, the active ranking mem-
ber.
[The information referred to follows:]
Attachment 1
IA*JO*¥TY-CW) Z2M074
ONE HUNDRED POURTH CONGRESS
Congress of ttje Uniteb States
SJous'e of fcfprfScntatibfs
^^5 t " 5 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
iimm urn 2157 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington. DC 20515-6143
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
A Christopher Shays, Connecticut
Chairman
Room B-372 Rayburn Building
Washington. 0.C 20515
Tel: 202 225-2548
Fax: 202 225-2382
October 3, 1996
The Honorable Jesse Brown
Secretary
Department of Veterans Affairs
810 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20420
Dear Mr. Secretary:
The Subcommittee is deeply concerned that Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
diagnosis, treatment, research and compensation policies with regard to Persian Gulf War
veterans continue to rely on discredited conclusions by the Department of Defense (DOD)
concerning exposure of U.S. troops to chemical weapons and other toxins.
At our September 19, 1996 hearing on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, Dr. Frances
Murphy, Director of the VA Environmental Health Service, conceded in testimony that the VA
research agenda through 1995 placed a low priority on low-level chemical warfare agent
exposure "because military and intelligence sources had stated that U.S. troops had not been
exposed to chemical agents." We fear more than VA research has been distorted by reliance on
premature, erroneous and misleading conclusions by DOD about the presence and effects of
chemical weapons in the Gulf War theater.
As part of our continuing oversight of VA activities to address the serious illnesses
suffered by Gulf War veterans, the Subcommittee requests your prompt response to the following
inquiries:
1. Why did the VA diagnostic screening protocol for Gulf War veterans fail to
identify even one veteran exposed to chemical weapons agent(s) or other toxins?
Hon. Jesse Brown
October 3, 1996
Page 2
The DOD now estimates more than 1 5,000 troops were in the path of the toxic
plume generated by the detonation of Iraqi chemical weapons in the pit area at
Khamisiyah. We can only expect that number to increase. From an initial estimate of
400, Pentagon estimates of U.S. troops probably exposed to toxic nerve or blister agents
have steadily increased, first to 1,100, then 5,000, now 15,000. A recent news report
indicates the number could be as high as 1 30,000.
VA adherence to the DOD "no exposures" doctrine, often in the face of
compelling clinical evidence to the contrary, could be viewed as Department-wide
medical malpractice. Many of those exposed have been examined by the Gulf War
Health Registry program. Others have sought treatment at VA facilities. How is it that
VA doctors appear to have misdiagnosed all of them?
2. Please identify each specific element of the VA diagnostic screening protocol for
Gulf War veterans designed to capture evidence of chemical exposure.
Recently, both Dr. Kenneth Kizer, Under Secretary for Health Affairs, and Dr.
Murphy testified the "VA has always remained open to the possibility that [Persian Gulf
War] PGW veterans were potentially exposed to a wide variety of hazardous agents while
serving in the Southwest Asia theater of operations, including chemical warfare agents."
Yet veterans consistently tell the Subcommittee that VA officials ignore or discount their
recollections of batdefield exposures.
As a result, the variable range of veterans' illnesses, characterized by rashes,
headaches, muscle and joint pain, gastrointestinal dysfunction and impaired cognition, are
diagnosed as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), somatoform disorder or other
psychological conditions. Could these same symptoms be associated with exposure to
low levels of toxic agents?
Has the VA ignored logical, even obvious, theories of toxicological causation for
Gulf War veterans illnesses for five years simply because DOD had already concluded,
erroneously, that U.S. troops had not been exposed?
3. What immediate changes will VA make to diagnosis, treatment and
compensation policies in light of recent disclosures by DOD regarding exposure of
U.S. troops to chemical agents?
In testimony before a joint hearing of the Senate Select Intelligence and the
Senate Veterans Affairs Committees, Dr. Kizer said, "The diagnosis of conditions related
to nerve toxins, whether they be chemical warfare agents, pesticides or hazardous
Hon. Jesse Brown
October 3, 1996
Page 3
industrial chemicals, is based on two things: first, known or presumed [emphasis added]
exposure to the chemical agent, and second, symptoms or physical signs consistent with
the known biological effects of the chemical. Absent definite exposure data and/or
typical symptoms and signs, it is essentially impossible to make a definitive diagnosis of
chemical-related neurotoxicity."
Do you believe you now have "definitive exposure data?" Prior to the recent
revelations, the VA neither acknowledged nor presumed exposures in diagnosis,
treatment or compensation of Gulf War veterans. Now that exposures may, indeed must,
be presumed, will VA policies change? In what way?
4. On what data does the VA rely to conclude that low-level chemical exposures
cause no chronic health effects in the absence of chronic symptoms at the time of
exposure?
Both DOD and VA continue to insist that low-level exposures cause no long-term,
chronic health effects unless acute symptoms appeared at the time of exposure. However,
given the status of research in this area, that conclusion seems premature. Dr. Kizer told
the joint Senate hearing "the research in this area is sparse and in VA's judgment it
should not be construed to mean that clinically important adverse health effects cannot or
definitely do not occur in the setting of low-level neurotoxin exposures." Shouldn't sick
veterans be given the benefit of any doubts in this regard?
While VA research in this area is underway, what role will VA health screening
and health care play in gathering data to support, rather than disprove, the hypothesis that
low-level exposures can cause chronic health effects, even in the absence of evidence of
acute symptoms at the time of exposure? The Subcommittee has been troubled by the
VA's selective, even disingenuous, use of Gulf War Health Registry information to
support epidemiological hypotheses favorable to the "no exposure" conclusion, while the
VA aggressively disputes any contrary implications drawn from Registry data due to the
self-selected nature of the cohort
5. Why does the VA assume there were no acute symptoms of chemical exposure?
What does the VA consider an "acute" symptom? What evidence does VA
require to support a veteran's claim that acute symptoms were the direct result of an
exposure? Does the VA believe only incapacitating symptoms are acute?
Sick veterans consistently reported flu-like symptoms, rashes, headaches and
other maladies during their service in the Gulf. Others simply went about their duties as
Hon. Jesse Brown
October 3, 1996
Page 4
best they could, and did not report the ill-effects variably attributed to pills, vaccines,
pesticides, engine fumes, rocket fuel, oil fires, indigenous infectious agents ... and
chemical warfare agents.
Even when illnesses were reported, DOD medical records are not complete.
Some were "1051" or destroyed. Unit chemical detection logs are also missing. DOD
troop locator data is unreliable. Given this lack of consistent or reliable DOD
information on chemical exposures and their effects, as opposed to consistent and
persistent reports of illnesses by veterans, why does the V A choose to listen to DOD
rather than the veterans? How can the VA conclude that Gulf War exposures caused no
immediate health effects?
At our most recent hearing, medical witnesses discussed the possibility that
pyridostigmine bromide (PB) could mute or mask the onset of acute symptoms resulting
from chemical exposure. Could this account for any lack of acute symptoms noted by
DOD?
Finally, I am personally skeptical of the Pentagon's call for another review of its handling
of this matter by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS).
Those are both prestigious institutions, but the IOM has already made detailed recommendations
about the quality and quantity of government research into Gulf War illnesses. Another review
of the current investigation could involve the IOM in a critique of their own earlier work. If only
to avoid the perception that DOD is seeking a friendly forum for its a priori conclusions,
shouldn't another review of these issues be truly independent of all that went before?
Moreover, many of die disease conditions of which Gulf War veterans often complain -
chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, multiple chemical sensitivity - are poorly understood
and only recently characterized by standardized diagnostic criteria. Shouldn't an independent
review of the issues surrounding Gulf War veterans' illnesses be broad enough to include
researchers and practitioners involved in the study and treatment of these disease states?
These inquiries are made pursuant to the Subcommittee's oversight authority under
House Rule X, clause 2(b) and clause 4(c). Please provide a written response, accompanied by
any source documents referenced in your reply, as soon as possible but in no event later than
5p.m., Monday, October 14, 1996. Should you anticipate difficulty providing a complete
response by that date, please so advise Mr. Lawrence Hal loran, Subcommittee Staff Director and
Counsel, by phone and in writing no later than October 9. Please indicate at that time the nature
of the problem and that exact date when your response will be provided. Absent that
communication, we expect receipt of a complete response on October 14.
Hon. Jesse Brown
October 3, 1996
Page 5
Please feel free to provide responsive material as it becomes available, rather than waiting
for all of it to be collected and forwarded at one time. Also, please note this request for
information is continuing in nature, so that if additional events, information or materials
responsive to our specific requests occurs or develops after your initial response, you are
requested to provide that information to the Subcommittee in a timely manner.
Sincejdf,
Chairman m
Rep. William F. Clinger, Jr.
Rep. Edolphus Towns
Rep. Bob Stump
Attachment 2
THE SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON
nov 1B96
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman, Subcommittee on Human Resources
and Intergovernmental Relations
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6143
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Enclosed are the Department's responses to post-hearing questions you posed in
connection with the September 19, 1996, hearing on issues related to Persian Gulf
veterans.
We regret the delay in getting these questions answered and appreciate the
opportunity to submit this information for the record.
Sincerely yours,
^ Jesse Brown
Enclosure
JB/rlh
Hon. William F. Clinger, Jr.
Hon. Edolphus Towns
Hon. Bob Stump
Hon. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery
POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THE SEPTEMBER 19, 1996
HEARING ON ISSUES RELATED TO
PERSIAN GULF WAR VETERANS
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
FROM THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER SHAYS
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
Question 1: Why did the VA diagnostic screening protocol for Gulf War veterans fail to
identify even one veteran exposed to chemical weapons agent(s) or other toxins?
The DoD now estimates more than 15,000 troops were in the path of the toxic plume
generated by the detonation of Iraqi chemical weapons in the pit area at Khamisiyah. We
can only expect that number to increase. From an initial estimate of 400, Pentagon
estimates of U.S. troops probably exposed to toxic nerve or blister agents have steadily
increased, first to 1,100, then 5,000, now 15,000. A recent news report indicates the
number could be as high as 130,000.
VA adherence to the DoD "no exposures" doctrine, often in the face of compelling clinical
evidence to the contrary, could be viewed as Department-wide medical malpractice. Many
of those exposed have been examined by the Gulf War Health Registry program. Others
have sought treatment at VA facilities. How is it that VA doctors appear to have
misdiagnosed all of them?
Answer: The question assumes that there is some diagnostic test to detect temporally remote
neurotoxic exposure. Unfortunately, there is no such test. The challenge we face with neurotoxic
chemical warfare agents is that there is no pathognomonic set of signs or symptoms, diagnostic
test or biomarker for chronic toxicity. Likewise, there is no specific treatment for any chronic
effects from these exposures once they occur in an individual. Causal inference in most cases is
not scientifically possible, unless exposure has been quantified by specific measurement and
accurately documented. There are many similar examples where medical science cannot link a
specific outcome to a specific toxic exposure in an individual patient Conversely, similar clinical
effects can be the end result of a variety of different toxic or nontoxic causes.
Inability to assign a definitive cause for an individual veteran's diagnosis hardly equates to
misdiagnosis. VA's Registry physicians are aware of the environmental exposures and toxins
relevant to Persian Gulf War service and have been instructed to ask questions in the veteran's
medical history concerning this wide range of exposures. These exposures include, but are not
10
limited to: chemical warfare agents; smoke from oil well fires, tent heaters, and burning trash;
CARC paint; fuels and solvents; pyridostigmine bromide; vaccinations; and depleted uranium.
Many veterans report exposure to one or more of these agents during their Gulf service. In some
cases, a diagnosed medical condition has been causally linked to one of the reported exposures,
e.g., CARC paint and asthma. However, in many cases medical science is simply unable to
determine the cause for individual symptoms or diagnoses. This does not mean such individuals
were "misdiagnosed."
We strongly disagree that VA has either adhered to a "no exposures" belief or ignored compelling
clinical evidence. Our policy makers, researchers, and clinicians have been open to all
possibilities, and we are deeply disappointed that you would intimate that the Department
committed medical malpractice. VA has diligently pursued scientifically supportable medical
diagnoses in Persian Gulf War veterans. Our care is consistent with medical community
standards. There is simply no factual support for your statement that there was "compelling
clinical evidence" for chemical warfare agent exposure.
Question 2: Please identify each specific element of the VA diagnostic screening protocol
for Gulf War veterans designed to capture evidence of chemical exposure.
Recently, both Dr. Kenneth W. Kizer, Under Secretary for Health and Dr. Frances M.
Murphy testified the "VA has always remained open to the possibility that [Persian Gulf
War] PGW veterans were potentially exposed to a wide variety of hazardous agents while
serving in the Southwest Asia theater of operations, including chemical warfare agents."
Yet veterans consistently tell the Subcommittee that VA officials ignore or discount their
recollections of battlefield exposures.
As a result, the variable range of veterans' illnesses, characterized by rashes headaches,
muscle and joint pain, gastrointestinal dysfunction and impaired cognition, are diagnosed
as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), somatoform disorder or other psychological
conditions. Could these same symptoms be associated with exposure to low levels of toxic
agents?
Has VA ignored logical, even obvious, theories of toxicological causation for Gulf War
veterans illnesses for five years simply because DoD had already concluded, erroneously,
that U.S. troops had not been exposed?
Answer: The Registry examination requires a careful medical history including an exposure
history. The exposure history asks the veteran to report whether he or she believes that they were
exposed to a nerve agent or mustard gas. A complete physical examination is required, which
includes mental status and neurologic examinations. The Phase II protocol, a set of clinical
guidelines for Persian Gulf veterans with difficult- to-diagnose medical conditions, contains
symptom-specific diagnostic guidelines for numbness, muscle complaints, and memory loss which
could potentially result from a toxic exposure to chemical warfare nerve agents. A copy of the
manual and code sheet are attached (Attachment 1 ), and the relevant sections are tagged and
11
highlighted. As outlined in our testimony, the issue of chemical warfare agents is given specific
attention and focus in the protocol.
Many of the signs, symptoms, and medical diagnoses of individual Persian Gulf veterans who have
undergone VA registry examinations are not conventionally considered to be causally linked to
chemical warfare agent exposures. You have stated "Both DoD and VA continue to insist that
low-level exposures cause no long-term, chronic health effects unless acute symptoms appeared at
the time of exposure." In VA's view, the published literature, while limited, does not demonstrate
the development of readily identifiable, long-terra adverse health effects due to nerve agent
exposures in human subjects who have not shown signs of acute toxicity or poisoning. There are
no scientifically endorsed, published studies showing clinically important adverse health effects
after low dose exposures. Several prestigious medical advisory groups, including The National
Academy of Science's Institute of Medicine and the Armed Forces Epidemiology Board, have
also concluded that the available published scientific literature does not contain clear evidence that
long-term, chronic adverse health effects result from exposures that do not produce acute clinical
signs and symptoms. However, as we stated in our testimony before a joint hearing of the Senate
Veterans' Affairs Committee and the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, "[IJn VA's judgment
this should not be construed to mean that clinically important adverse health effects cannot or
definitely do not occur in the setting of low-level neurotoxin exposures, especially if combined
with other components or environmental stressors." Because there are so few studies on this
question, we believe that additional research is needed to determine whether exposure to low-
levels (non-poisoning, subtoxic) of chemical warfare nerve agents cause long-term health effects,
including chronic or delayed onset of a characteristic set of symptoms, signs or medical
conditions.
VA is fully committed to pursuing answers to this question. VA will work with DoD on a call for
proposals to fund research in this area. VA is also sponsoring an international symposium on
low-level chemical warfare and nerve agent exposure to stimulate scientific thinking and benefit
from the scientific experts published and unpublished knowledge of the topic.
Question 3. What immediate changes will VA make to diagnosis, treatment and
compensation policies in light of recent disclosures by DoD regarding exposure of U. S.
troops to chemical agents?
In testimony before a joint hearing of the Senate Select Intelligence and the Senate
Veterans' Affairs Committees, Dr. Kizer said, 'The diagnosis of conditions related to nerve
toxins, whether they be chemical warfare agents, pesticides or hazardous industrial
chemicals, is based on two things: first, known or presumed [emphasis added] exposure to
the chemical agent, and second, symptoms or physical signs consistent with the known
biological effects of the chemical. Absent definite exposure data and/or typical symptoms
and signs, it is essentially impossible to make a definitive diagnosis of chemical-related
neurotoxicity."
12
Do you believe you now have "definitive exposure data?" Prior to the recent revelations,
the VA neither acknowledged nor presumed exposures in diagnosis, treatment or
compensation of Gulf War veterans. Now that exposures may, indeed must, be presumed,
will VA policies change? In what way?
Answer: In light of the recent DoD announcements concerning the destruction of the
Khamisiyah Ammunition Storage Area in March 1991 , we believe there is evidence of release of
nerve agents to the atmosphere and exposure of U.S. troops in the vicinity to unknown levels of
these agents. No verifiable determination of the amount of nerve agents released or
measurements of sarin or cyclosarin concentrations in the air at the time of release is available to
us. Therefore, despite use of modeling techniques, the identification of troops exposed and level
of the exposure will never be exact or absolute.
VHA has also requested that our advisory groups review the protocols in light of this new
information. We have begun a thorough review of the evidence utilizing internal, interagency, and
external advisory groups.
We have reviewed our clinical protocols and compensation policies. Based on currently available
scientific information and evidence and the fact that we have always accepted the possibility of
exposures, no changes in diagnosis, treatment or compensation policies will be undertaken, until
the review is completed. As discussed in Response 2, current clinical protocols were designed to
identify the sequelae of neurotoxic exposures. In the absence of a definitive diagnostic test and
lack of specific treatment, clinical care for Persian Gulf veterans will not immediately change.
Treatment, appropriate to symptoms and/or diagnosis, will continue to be provided. We have
initiated several continuing medical education activities to ensure that VA health care providers
have the latest information regarding chemical warfare agent exposure of Persian Gulf veterans.
These activities reinforce appropriate use of the Phase I and II protocols.
While we will continue to assess our compensation policies on an ongoing basis, no immediate
changes appear to be indicated. Current VBA policies already allow compensation for conditions
which began during or were exacerbated by military service, including exposure to chemical
warfare agents resulting in medically recognized disabling sequelae. In addition, VA can
compensate Persian Gulf veterans for chronic disabilities resulting from undiagnosed conditions
which develop within two years of military service in the Persian Gulf.
Question 4. On what data does VA rely to conclude that low-level chemical exposures
cause no chronic health effects in the absence of chronic symptoms at the time of exposure?
Both DoD and VA continue to insist that low-level exposures cause no long-term, chronic
health effects unless acute symptoms appeared at the time of exposure. However, given the
status of research in this area, that conclusion seems premature. Dr. Kizer told the joint
Senate hearing "the research in this area is sparse and in VA's judgment it should not be
construed to mean that clinically important adverse health effects cannot or definitely do
13
not occur in the setting of low-level neurotoxin exposures." Shouldn't sick veterans be
given the benefit of any doubts in this regard?
While VA research in this area is underway, what role will VA health screening and health
care play in gathering data to support, rather than disprove, the hypothesis that low-level
exposures can cause chronic health effects, even in the absence of evidence of acute
symptoms at the time of exposure? The Subcommittee has been troubled by the VA's
selective, even disingenuous, use of Gulf War Health Registry information to support
epidemiological hypotheses favorable to the "no exposure" conclusion, while the VA
aggressively disputes any contrary implications drawn from Registry data due to the self-
selected nature of the cohort
Answer: VA's assessment, based on current published scientific literature, is that low-level
asymptomatic exposures to chemical warfare nerve agents have not been shown to cause delayed
or long-term health effects. However, VA also recognizes that the existing scientific data is
incomplete and contains gaps which need to be addressed by further scientific investigations. We
have based these conclusions regarding the potential health effects of exposure on our review of
the available medical literature on the subject Several bibliographies of relevant literature are
attached (Attachment 2). In addition, VA has given due consideration to the expert opinions of
external scientific advisory committees. The Armed Forces Epidemiology Board and the National
Academy of Science's Institute of Medicine Committee on the Health Consequences of Persian
Gulf War Service have recently released reports which support this conclusion (Attachment 3).
Despite the lack of scientific evidence that long-term adverse health outcomes result from
subtoxic exposures to organophosphate nerve agents, VA has provided Registry examinations and
ambulatory and inpatient medical care under special medical care eligibility. In 1993, legislation
that we supported gave special eligibility for VA health care to any Persian Gulf veteran whose
health concerns or problems cannot be attributed to a cause other than an environmental or toxic
exposure which occurred during their Gulf War service. Thus, our health care policies resolve
benefit of the doubt in favor of the Persian Gulf veteran.
We strongly disagree with your statement that VA has been "disingenuous" in its use of the
Persian Gulf Registry data. We would also like to emphasize that the clinical information
contained in the Persian Gulf Registry and patient treatment file (PTF) databases has not been
used as a method to support a conclusion of "no exposure" on any Persian Gulf health issue. VA
has repeatedly stated that all exposures are still under active consideration.
The VA Persian Gulf Registry Health Examination program was established in 1992 as a health
surveillance program and a mechanism for Persian Gulf veterans to gain entry to the VA health
care system. The Persian Gulf Health Registry and the VA patient treatment file databases are not
epidemiologic tools and, therefore, cannot be used to determine that low-level chemical warfare
nerve agent exposures cause chronic health effects in the absence of acute symptoms at the time
of exposure, as you suggest in your letter. However, these clinical databases can be utilized as a
health surveillance and hypothesis-generating tool for future research studies. To date, VA has
not found evidence from the Registry to support a hypothesis that neurotoxic exposures are
14
responsible for the illnesses of the majority of Persian Gulf veterans. If there were a neurotoxic
exposure that could cause serious neurologic disease in a high proportion of Persian Gulf
veterans, it would probably have been identified in the 60,000 Registry exams completed to date.
However, if the illness was mild or affected a very small number of veterans, it may not be
recognized in the larger clinical case series. This negative data did not change VA's resolve to
continue to look for evidence to support the hypothesis that Persian Gulf veterans' illnesses could
be caused by low level chemical warfare exposure but did cause that particular hypothesis to be
given a lower priority by both the internal and external scientific reviewers prior to DoD's June
1996 announcement In contrast, if a high frequency of certain peripheral or central nervous
system conditions had been identified which suggested the possibility that neurotoxic exposures
occurred, research is this area would have been aggressively pursued at an earlier date. These
conclusions were supported by numerous internal and external scientists who have reviewed the
information contained in this database.
Our use of the Registry and other clinical databases has been appropriate and scientifically
accurate. In the past, VA has resisted inappropriate use or interpretation of this clinical data. VA
will continue to utilize these databases in a scientifically sound manner.
Question 5: Why does VA assume there were no acute symptoms of chemical warfare
exposure?
What does VA consider an "acute" symptom? What evidence does VA require to support
a veteran's claim that acute symptoms were the direct result of an exposure? Does VA
believe only incapacitating symptoms are acute?
Sick veterans consistently reported flu-like symptoms, rashes, headaches and other
maladies during their service in the Gulf. Others simply went about their duties as best
they could, and did not report the ill-effects variably attributed to pills, vaccines, pesticides,
engine fumes, rocket fuel, oil fires, indigenous infectious agents ... and chemical warfare
agents.
Even when illnesses were reported, DOD medical records are not complete. Some were
'lost" or destroyed. Unit chemical detection logs are also missing. DoD troop locator data
is unreliable. Given this lack of consistent or reliable DoD information on chemical
exposures and their effects, as opposed to consistent and persistent reports of illnesses by
veterans, why does VA choose to listen to DoD rather than the veterans? How can VA
conclude that Gulf War exposures caused no immediate health effects?
At our most recent hearing, medical witnesses discussed the possibility that pyridostigmine
bromide (PB) could mute or mask the onset of acute symptoms resulting from chemical
exposure. Could this account for any lack of acute symptoms noted by DoD?
Finally, I am personally skeptical of the Pentagon's call for another review of its handling
of this matter by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and the National Academy of Sciences
15
(NAS). Those are both prestigious institutions, but the IOM has already made detailed
recommendations about the quality and quantity of government research into Gulf War
illnesses. Another review of the current investigation could involve the IOM in a critique of
their own earlier work. If only to avoid the perception that DoD is seeking a friendly forum
for its a priori conclusions, shouldn't another review of these issues be truly independent of
all that went before?
Moreover, many of the disease conditions of which Gulf War veterans often complain -
chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, multiple chemical sensitivity- are poorly
understood and only recently characterized by standardized diagnostic criteria. Shouldn't
an independent review of the issues surrounding Gulf War veteran's illnesses be broad
enough to include researchers and practitioners involved in the study and treatment of
these disease states?
Answer: In medical terminology, acute symptoms are not synonymous with incapacitating
symptoms. Acute in this context is defined as occurring "immediately" or "in a short period of
time" after exposure to the chemical warfare nerve agents.
Exposures to high concentrations of organophosphate nerve agents, such as sarin or cyclosarin,
cause loss of muscle control, generalized twitching, paralysis, unconsciousness, convulsions, and
coma or even death. The most common cause of death is acute respiratory failure due to
diaphragmatic paresis/paralysis. Exposure to moderate or even small amounts of these agents
may result in sudden onset of impaired vision, drooling, coryza, severe flu-like symptoms, chest
discomfort, and hyperhidrosis. These symptoms would have occurred either immediately or a
short time after exposure. Since both pyridostigmine bromide (PB) and organophosphate nerve
agents increase the amount of synaptic acetylcholine of cholinergic nerves, even if PB
pretreatment had been used, one would not expect PB to blunt these acute symptoms. Troops
located in the same geographic area would be expected to experience and report this
characteristic constellation of symptoms simultaneously. Such outcomes were very evident after
the unexpected terrorist attacks in Matsumoto and Tokyo, Japan, in 1994 and 1995, respectively.
The release of sarin during these incidents resulted in large numbers of emergency room visits and
hospital admissions. Neither DoD nor veterans responding to their telephone survey have
reported that this occurred at Khamisiyah. Furthermore, DoD reports that no such characteristic
set of signs or symptoms were reported or identified by specially-trained military physicians in the
vicinity of Khamisiyah. A characteristic pattern of toxicity was not identified on DoD's review of
the medical information for units in the vicinity of Khamisiyah. Veterans likewise have not
reported to VA that they noted sudden onset of this symptom complex in their units near
Khamisiyah in Southern Iraq during early March 1991.
In order to confirm DoD's conclusions regarding the health of troops in the vicinity of
Khamisiyah in early March 1991, VA has asked to review the data upon which their conclusions
were based. The data would include data from medical logs, surveys, and questionnaires. We
would also welcome the review and opinions of other external scientific advisory committees on
these matters.
16
Finally, you asked whether VA supported an independent review of these issues. VA feels that
the reviews of the National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine, the VA Persian Gulf
Expert Scientific Advisory Committees and the Presidential Advisory Committee will provide
such independent, objective reviews. You also ask whether these reviews shouldn't be broad
enough to include researchers and practitioners from the multiple chemical sensitivity, chronic
fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia community. I can assure you that these groups have been
represented on the previous and current external, independent advisory committees, and we
would welcome continuing input from credible experts in these areas. We look forward to the
recommendations of these advisory groups on this important issue.
17
Attachment 1
Q^N Department ol Veterans Aflairs
RSIAN GULF REGISTRY CODE SHEET
1. UsePTF
Number Only
FACILITY NO
PART 1 (Phasa I)
TV nfoniMtKa die «
INSTRUCTIONS Pleaae pat U«e only ooc loner
i p»j bloct 1/ poeubk »* hUct t*Upou» o< (ell Up per, Stadcl >
e ooly (DO NOT USE BLUE INK)
2. LAST NAME (a-»)
MOOO-n) DAY (72 73) VB (74.75)
«. ADDRESS (SnwtNMn* and Ac«i«iwmNtfi«w.ft«B*aH»)
•A OTY OR TOWN (102127)
•c afcooe(i»iE)
t RACtVET>MCITY(En»o
10. MARITAL STATUS (Efltor on* ood* at right)
12 CURRENT STATUS (EfdB
> Dwy (OmnwtJ
IS BRANCH OF lEflvCC (■ m
2~A*Foroa I IliiaieCctpa «-Ora»
ALASTPENOD
•.NEXT TO LAST
U0 060-1B1) YR (162 183)
ISA. ». WHAT AREAS 010 VETERAN SEKVT?
p— ajpaaaaaii mm ■ Ma* WJ
1SB » OTHER SMWCC Of) TKJNT
IS kdUTARTUNrrSAMOMOS
HtS. LIST MJJTARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (MOS)
ISO. F TES. UST HERE AND M CONSOUOATED HEALTH RECORD
^AJJfc Taaae tmlnt could be dllTereat (rom the ape to which toe
I m amifcwod if yalcfim wm od deucrcd duly.
. ENTER THE DATES Of THE LAST TWO PERIODS Of SERVICE (It Start Iran •»»)
B NEXT TO LAST
M0|17>-iao) vR<iai i«2>
jo\',°.»10-9009a(RS)
18
NAME:
SSN:
18. VETERANS EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS (ENTER APPROPRIATE COOES)
18B. IF YES. HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU BEEN SMOKING CIGARETTES? ENTER THE NUMBER OF
YEARS IN BLOCK 184 AND 185.
18C. ON THE AVERAGE HOW MANY PACKS ARE YOU SMOKING PER DAY? ENTER THE NUMBER OF
PACKS IN BLOCKS 186 AND 187
180. HAVE YOU SMOKED CIGARETTES IN THE PAST? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING COOES IN 8L0CK
188. IF NO, GO TO ITEM 18G.
18E. IF YES. HOW MANY YEARS HAD YOU SMOKED? ENTER NUMBER OF YEARS IN BLOCKS 189 AND
190.
18F. ON THE AVERAGE. HOW MANY PACKS DID YOU SMOKE PER DAY? ENTER THE NUMBER OF PACKS
IN BLOCKS 191 AND 192.
18G-21 .WHILE IN THE PERSIAN GULF DO YOU BELIEVE YOU WERE EXPOSED TO ANY OF THE FOLLOW-
ING:
18G. SMOKE FROM OIL FIRES? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 193.
Y=YES N=NO
18H. SMOKE OR FUMES FROM TENT HEATERS? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK
(194)
18J. DIESEL AND/OR OTHER PETROCHEMICAL FUMES? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CODES IN Y=YES N=NO
BLOCK 196. U^UNKNOWN
r8K. EXPOSURE TO BURNING TRASH/FECES? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK Y=YES N=NO
(195)
(196)
(197)
18L. SKIN EXPOSURE TO DIESEL OR OTHER PETROCHEMICAL FUEL? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOW-
ING CODES IN BLOCK 198.
18M. CARC (CHEMICAL AGENT RESISTANT COMPOUND)? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CODES IN
BLOCK 199.
18N. OTHER PAINTS AND/OR SOLVENTS AND/OR PETROCHEMICAL SUBSTANCES? ENTER ONE OF THE
FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 200.
ISO. DEPLETED URANIUM? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 201 .
18P. MICROWAVES? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING COOES IN BLOCK 202
180. PERSONAL PESTICIDE USE. INCLUDING CREAMS. SPRAYS OR FLEA COLLARS7 ENTER ONE OF
THE FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 203.
1SR. NERVE GAS OR OTHER NERVE AGENTS? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING COOES IN BLOCK
204.
18S. DRUG (PYRIDOSTIGMINE) USED TO PROTECT AGAINST NERVE AGENTS? ENTER ONE OF THE
FOLLOWING COOES IN BLOCK 205.
18T. MUSTARD GAS OR OTHER AGENTS? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK
206.
18U. ATE OR DRANK FOOD CONTAMINATED WITH SMOKE OIL OR OTHER CHEMICAL? ENTER ONE OF
THE FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 207.
Y=YES N=NO
U-UNKNOWN
Y»YES tfaNO
OUNKNOWN
Y.YES N=NO
U-UNKNOWN
Y=YES N»NO
U=UNKNOWN
19
NAME
SSN:
I 18V. ATE FOODOTHER THAN PROVIDE BV ARMED FORCES? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING COOES
M BLOCK 206.
Y.YES N-NO
U-UNKNOWN
18W. BATHEO IN OR DRANK WATER CONTAMINATED WITH SMOKE OR OTHER CHEMICAL? ENTER ONE
OF THE FOLLOWING COOES IN BLOCK 209
Y.YES N-NO
U-UNKNOWN
18X BATHED IN WATER OTHER THAN PROVIDED BY ARMED FORCES? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOW-
ING COOES IN BLOCK 210.
Y-YES N-NO
U-UNKNOWN
18Y. IMMUNIZATION AGAINST ANTHRAX? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING COOES IN BLOCK 211.
Y.YES N-NO
U-UNKNOWN
16Z. IMMUNIZATION AGAINST BOTULISM? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWtMG CODES M BLOCK 212.
Y.YES N-NO
U-UNKNOWN
18Z1. OTHER EXPOSURES? ENTER HERE AND IN CHR ONLY.
DID VETERAN HAVE ANY OF THE FOLLOWING EXPERIENCES WHILE M THE PERSIAN GULF?
ENTER APPROPRIATE CODE.
19A DID YOU EVER GO ON COMBAT PATROLS OR HAVE OTHER VERY DANGEROUS DUTY? ENTER
ONE OF THE FOLLOWING COOES IN BLOCK 213.
1-NO 2-1-3X 3»4-12X 4.13-50X S-5W TIMES
19B. WERE YOU EVER UNDER ENEMY FIRE (INCLUDING "SCUDS!? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING
COOES IN BLOCK 214.
1- NEVER 2="1DAY 3 =< 1 WEEK 4«1-<4WEEKS 5 = 4 WEEKS OR MORE
19C. WHAT PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE IN YOUR UNIT WERE KILLED (MA). WOUNDED OR MISSING IN AC-
TION (MIA). ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING COOES IN BLOCK 215.
1-NONE 2-1-25% 3-26-50% 4-51-75% 5-76% OR MORE
190. HOW OFTEN 0ID YOU SEE SOMEONE HIT BY INCOMING OR OUTGOING ROUNDS? ENTER ONE OF
THE FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 216.
1 .NEVER 2=1 -ZX 3-3-12X 4-13-50X 5=51 OR MORE TIMES
w
19E. HOW OFTEN WERE YOU IN DANGER OF BEING INJURED OR KILLED (IJE. PINNED DOWN. OVERRUN.
AMBUSHED. NEAR MISS, ETC.)? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 217.
1.NEVER 2-1-2X 3-3-12X 4.13-50X 5-51 OR MORE TIMES
19F. DID YOU WITNESS CHEMICAL ALARMS? ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK
216.
Y.YES N-NO
U-UNKNOWN
VETERAN'S HEALTH (VETERAN'S EVALUATION)
WHICH BEST DESCRIBES VETERAN'S HEALTH AFTER PERSON GULF SERVICE? ENTER ONE OF
THE FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 219.
1 - Very Good 2 . Good 3 « Fair 4 . Poor 5 - Vary Poor
VETERAN'S FUNCTIONAL IMPAIRMENT
WHICH BEST DESCRIBES VETERAN'S OWN ASSESSMENT OF FUNCTIONAL IMPAIRMENT? ENTER 1
ONE OF THE FOLLOWING COOES IN BLOCK 220.
1-NO IMPAIRMENT 2-SUGHT IMPAIRMENT 3-MOOERATE IMPAIRMENT 4-SEVERE IMPAIRMENT
HOW MANY WORKDAYS WERE LOST BY VETERAN DUE TO ILLNESS IN THE PAST 90 DAYS? ENTER
NUMBER OF DAYS LOST IN BLOCKS 221-222.
HOW MANY CHILDREN DOES VETERAN HAVE? ENTER NUMBER IN BLOCKS 223 ANO 224.
(IE. 65). IF NONE. LEAVE BLANK AND GO TO ITEM 22C.
20
NAME:
SSN:
22B. HOW MANY OF THESE CHILDREN WERE BORN WITH BIRTH DEFECTS? (BIRTH OEFECTS ARE
ANY STRUCTURAL, FUNCTIONAL, OR BIOCHEMICAL ABNORMALITY AT BIRTH WHETHER GE-
NETICALLY DETERMINED OR INDUCED DURING GESTATION THAT IS NOT DUE TO INJURIES SUF-
FERED DURING BIRTH.) ENTER NUMBER IN BLOCKS 225 AND 226. IF NONE, GO TO ITEM 22C.
(225)
(226) |
i
22B1 . HOW MANY OF THESE CHILDREN WERE CONCEIVED BEFORE GULF SERVICE? ENTER THE NUM-
BER OF CHILDREN IN BLOCKS 227 AND 228. IF NONE. LEAVE BLANK AND GO TO ITEM 22B2.
(227)
(228) (
I
2261(a) STATE MATERNAL AGE AT CONCEPTION OF FIRST CHILD CONCEIVED BEFORE GULF
SERVICE? ENTER AGE IN BLOCKS 229 AND 230.
(229)
(230),
I
22B2. HOW MANY OF THESE CHILDREN WERE CONCEIVED DURING AND AFTER GULF SERVICE? EN-
TER NUMBER IN BLOCK 231 AND 232. IF NONE. LEAVE BLANK AND GO TO ITEM 22C.
(231)
B32)
2282(a) STATE MATERNAL AGE AT CONCEPTION OF FIRST CHILD CONCEIVED DURING AND AFTER
GULF SERVICE? ENTER AGE IN BLOCKS 229 AND 230.
(233)
(234)
22C. HAS VETERAN OR SPOUSE HAD INFERTILITY PROBLEMS? (INFERTILITY PROBLEMS OF VETERAN
OR SPOUSE BECOMING PREGNANT. NOTE; INFERTILITY - RELATIVE STERILITY DEFINED AS IN-
ABILITY TO CONCEIVE AFTER 12 OR MORE MONTHS OF INTERCOURSE WITHOUT USE OF CON-
TRACEPTION AND WHEN NEITHER SPOUSE IS SURGICALLY STERILIZED.) ENTER ONE OF THE
FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 235. IF NO, GO TO ITEM 22D. Y.YES N=NO
(235)
22C1. HAS VETERAN OR SPOUSE HAD INFERTILITY BEFORE GULF SERVICE? ENTER ONE OF THE FOL-
LOWING COOES IN BLOCK 236. IF NO, GO TO ITEM 22C2. Y.YES N«NO
(236)
22C1(a). STATE MATERNAL AGE DURING FIRST ATTEMPTS TO CONCEIVE ENTER AGE IN BLOCKS
237 AND 238.
(237)C238)
22C2. HAS VETERAN OR SPOUSE HAD INFERTILITY AFTER RETURN FROM GULF SERVICE? ENTER ONE
OF THE FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 239. IF NO, GO TO ITEM 22D. Y.YES N*NO
(239)
22C2(a). STATE MATERNAL AGE DURING FIRST ATTEMPTS TO CONCEIVE. ENTER AGE IN BLOCKS
240 AND 241.
(240) (241)
220. HAS VETERAN OR SPOUSE HAD MISCARRIAGES) (NOTE: MISCARRIAGES ARE SPONTANEOUS
EXPLUSION OF THE PRODUCTS OF CONCEPTION BEFORE 20 WEEKS OF GESTATION - SPONTA-
NEOUS ABORTION) ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 242. IF NO, GO TO ITEM
S2E- Y.YES N.NO
(242)
22D1. HAS VETERAN OR SPOUSE HAD MISCARRIAGES BEFORE PERSIAN GULF? ENTER ONE OF THE
FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 243. IF NO. GO TO ITEM 22D2 Y=YES N=NO
(243)
2201(a). STATE MATERNAL AGE AT CONCEPTION. ENTER AGE IN BLOCKS 244 AND 245.
(244) (245)
22D2. HAS VETERAN OR SPOUSE HAD MISCARRIAGES AFTER PERSIAN GULF? ENTER ONE OF THE
FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 248. IF NO. GO TO rTEM 22E. Y.YES N=NO
(246)
2202(a) STATE MATERNAL AGE AT CONCEPTION, ENTER AGE IN BLOCKS 247 AND 248.
(247)jC48)
22E. HAS VETERAN OR SPOUSE HAD STILL BIRTH(S)? (NOTE: STILL BIRTH IS BIRTH AFTER 20 WEEKS
OF GESTATION OF AN INFANT WHO SHOWED NO EVIDENCE OF LIFE AFTER BIRTH.) ENTER ONE
OF THE FOLLOWING COOES IN BLOCK 249. IF NO, GO TO ITEM 22F. Y-YES N=NO
(249)
22E1. HAS VETERAN OR SPOUSE HAD STILL BIRTH(S) BEFORE GULF SERVICE? ENTER ONE OF THE
FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 250. IF NO. GO TO ITEM 22E2. Y=YES feNO
(250)
22E1(a). STATE MATERNAL AGE AT CONCEPTION. ENTER AGE IN BLOCKS 251 AND 252.
(251)
(252)
??FJ HAS VETERAN OR SPOUSE HAD STILL BIRTH(S) AFTER RETURN FROM GULF SERVICE? ENTER
ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 253. IF NO. GO TO ITEM 22F. Y=YES N=NO
(253)
22E2(a). STATE MATERNAL AGE AT CONCEPTION. ENTER AGE IN BLOCKS 254 AND 2S5.
(254)
(255)
22F. HAS VETERAN OR SPOUSE HAD INFANT DEATH(S). (NOTE: DEATH THAT OCCURRED WITHIN ONE
YEAR OF BIRTH AMONG BABIES BORN AUVE.) ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK
256. IF NO, GO TO ITEM 220. Y=YES N>NO
(256)
22F1 . HAS VETERAN OR SPOUSE HAD INFANT DEATH(S) BEFORE GULF SERVICE? ENTER ONE OF THE
FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 257. IF NO, GO TO ITEM 22F2. Y=YES N=NO
(257)
?F1(a). STATE MATERNAL AGE AT CONCEPTION. ENTER AGE IN BLOCKS 258 AND 259.
(258)
(259)
22F2. HAS VETERAN OR SPOUSE HAD INFANT DEATH(S) AFTER GULF SERVICE ENTER ONE OF THE
FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 260. IF NO. GO TO ITEM 22G. Y.YES N.NO
(260)
21
NAME:
SSN:
22F2(A) STATE MATERNAL AGE AT CONCEPTION ENTER AGE IN BLOCKS 261 AND 262
22G IF A WOMAN VETERAN REPORTS SHE WAS PREGNANT IN PERSIAN GULF. RECORD DATE OF CHILD'S BIRTH AND HOSPITAL OF BIRTH
HERE AND IN VETERAN'S CHR ONLY TO FACILITATE FOLLOW-UP. IF NEEDED. (AAC WILL NOT ENTER THIS DATA IN PGR DATABASE).
DATE OF BIRTH
NAME OF HOSPITAL
LOCATION
MWfTW/OAY/VEWl
PART II TO BE COMPLETED BY EXAMINING PHYSICIAN
23. DATE OF EXAM
MONTH
DAY
YEAR
(263-264)
(265-266)
(267-270)
1
1
1 1 1
24. TOTAL NO. OF
VETERAN'S
COMPLAINTS.
(271-272)
25A/J. UST UP TO TEN MAJOR. CURRENT SYMPTOMS. ICD 9 COOES. MO. 4 YR OF ONSET. DURATION IN MOS AND IF SYMPTOM IS CUR-
RENTLY PRESENT ON LINES A-J. ITEMS 1 -5. IF VETERAN HAS MORE THAN 10. ENTER THE MOST SEVERE & ADDITIONAL SYMPTOMS
IN CHR. MAS CODERS: USE ITEM 2. BLOCKS 271-320 FOR ICD-9-CM CODES.
(2) ICD-9-CODES
(4) DURATION
(MONTHS)
(5) CURRENTLY
PRESENT?
Y=Yes N=N0
(403-412)
(273-277)
(323-328)
(403)
(278-282)
(283-287)
(288-292)
(293-297)
(298-302)
(308-312)
25K. UST MOST SEVERE SYMPTOM (A SYMPTOM FROM rTEM A^. WHICH VETERAN CONSIDERS THE MOST SEVERE I.E.
CHIEF COMPLAINT). ENTER ICD-^CM CODE W BLOCKS.
28. DIAGNOSTIC CONSULTATION. ENTER THE FOLLOWING COOES IN BLOCKS 418-435.
1-NO WORKUP. NO CONSULTATION DONE. 3=WORKUPAX)NSULTATXDN DONE DIAGNOSIS ESTABLISHED.
2>WC*1KLIP/DONSULTAT10N DONE. UNEXPLAINED ILLNESS 4=WORK)JP/OONSULTATION DONE NO DIAGNOSIS.
A. ALLERGY/IMMUNOLOGY. BLOCK 418
(418)
(419)
B. AUDIOLOGY. BLOCK 419
C. CARDIOLOGY. BLOCK 420
J420J.
(421)
(422)
(423)
(<2<)
(425)
D. DENTISTRY. BLOCK 421
DERMATOLOGY. BLOCK 422
F. EAR, NOSE AND THROAT 423
G. ENDOCRINOLOGY. BLOCK 424
H. GASTROENTEROLOGY. BLOCK 425
22
NAME:
SSN:
HEMATOLOGY/ONCOLOGY. BLOCK 426
(426)
J.
NFECTIOUS DISEASES/PARASITOLOGY. BLOCK 427
(427)
K. NEPHROLOGY. BLOCK 428
(428)
L NEUROLOGY. BLOCK 429
(429)
M. OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE. BLOCK 430
(430)
N. PULMONARY. BLOCK 431
(431)
O. PSYCHIATRY. BLOCK 432
(432)
P. PSYCHOLOGY/PSYCHOMETRIC TESTING. BLOCK 433
(433)
Q. RHEUMATOLOGY. BLOCK 434
(434)
a OTHER, ENTER FOLLOWING CODES IN BLOCK 435
Y-YES
(435)
N=NO
S.
ADDITIONAL WORKUPS/CONSULTATIONS PERFORMED WHICH WERE NOT LISTED IN ITEMS 26A-Q. LIST HERE
AND IN CHR.
L
23
NAME:
SSN:
ZT DIAGNOSE USTUPTO10MAJ0R06FMTEM6DCALD(AONOSESONUKES27AJUSTPBIMABYDIAGNOSISONLINEA BLOCKS438-485FeflCOHRESPONC>E>CE
cd-s-cm cooes leave blank r no oaonosis is made, mas coders: use co*cm cooes in first five numbered blocks of each duwsnosis
, A DESCRIBE DIAGNOSIS (Narrative)
(27B)
IC0-9-CM (Codes)
A. (PRIMARY)
(«»)
(«1
(««)
(438) | (440)
a
(441)
|4«)
(«)
(444)
(4451
c.
14481
L44»J
[4401 I I4S0)
D.
1451}
(4521
E.
F.
mn
1«SL
Q.
H.
1.
(47«)
(477)
|47»|
(4m)
J.
(4«5|
NOTE: CODERS: DO NOT REPEAT OR UST SYMPTOM CODE ALREADY LISTED UNDER ITEM 2SA-J.
28. BLOCK 486 IF NO DIAGNOSIS IS MADE. ENTER TIN BLOCK AT RIGHT. OTHERWISE. LEAVE BLANK THIS ITEM MUST BE CONSIDERED
IN CONJUNCTION WITH ITEM 27 "DIAGNOSIS.'
4S8
; 29. DISPOSITION (Enter code Y-Yes or N-No)
an SUMMATION COMPLETED?
Y.V» N-No
487
2SO HOSPITALIZED AT VAMC FOR FURTHER
Y-Y« H-No
4sa
29C. HOSPfTALQED AT VAMC FOR TREATMENT?
Y-YM N-No
488
SO REFERRED FOR OLTrPArCNT CARE?
Y.Y4. N-No
•0
BE. REFERRED TO PRWATE PHYSICIAN. NON-VA
CUMC OR NON-VA HOSPITAL?
V-Y«. »»
4SI
29F BIOPSY?
Y-YM m-No
483
JO. AFTTiROC4«PlETlC>NOFPHAS£IEXAM(R£FERTOPAR5VT>*PHVS»aANHA3
OETERM1NED THE VETERAN HAS UNEXPLANED UMM
V»Ym N-No
493
31 HAS PHASE » EXAM (REFER TO CH 3) BEEN MTUTED?
Y-YM N-No
484
tJ. UTTLBETMS SECTION FOH AOOmONU. KORUAnON (E.a PAH 1 j07 • M-IO. FT ■).
33. NAME OF EXAf en. (PHUT n>i HAW)
TITUl OF EXAMMEH (PULL TTTlf OF EXAMHER)
ml — mwuBwa
3BA. StONATURE OF VHP (VETERANS REOISTRY PHYSICIAN)
24
NAME:
SSN:
r PART III
PHASE II • UNIFORM CASE ASSESSMENT (UCA)
1. WERE THE FOUOWING TESTS PERFORMED? Enter the following codn In Mocks 1-24. Y « YES N.NO
2. BLOOD TESTS. BLOCKS 1-16: OTHER - BLOCKS 19-24
A. CSC (COMPLETE BLOOO COUNT)
(1)
a SED RATE7 (SKIN ERETHYUA DOSE)
(2)
C C-REACTTVE PROTEM
(3)
RHEUATOW FACTOR?
W
E FUXWESCEmANA?(ANT1-NUCLEARAMTVeOOY)
(5)
(GLUTAMIC
F. SOOT (AST)? OXALOACETIC
TRANSAMINASE)
(TRANSAMINASE
SOFT (ALT) GLUTAMIC
PYRUVATE)
P)
H. LDH (LACTIC ACIO HYDROGENASE)
(•)
1. ALKALINE PHOSPHATASE
(»)
J. CPK7 CREATINE PHOSPHOKTNASE)
(10)
K HEPATITIS ■ SURFACE ANT1800V7
(»)
L HEPATTT1S SCORE ANTIGEN?
(12)
(VENEREAL
M. VDRL? DISEASE RESEARCH
LABORATORY)
(13)
N. VITAMIN B- 12
(")
FOLATE?
(1!)
p m (HUMAN MMUNO-
DEFICIENCY)
(16)
a T4 (THROXINE TOTAL SERUM)?
(17)
R. TSH (THYROID STIMULATING HORMONE)?
X URINALYSIS
(19)
4. TBSXMTEST(PPD)?
(TUBERCULOSIS SKIN TEST
PURIFIED PROTEIN DERIVATIVE)
(20)
6. CHEST XRAY
(21)
PSYCMATBJC EVALUATION?
(23)
6A. SOD FOR DSM-III-H
(STRUCTURED CLINICAL INTERVIEW
FOR DIAGNOSIS)
(23)
6B CAPS PTSO SCALE
(CLINICAL ADMINISTERED POST
TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER)
(24)
7. UST DIAGNOSES: MAS CODERS: ENTER ICD-9-CM CODE IN BLOCKS 25-39. IF NONE. LEAVE BLANK.
DESCRIBE DIAGNOSES (NvnM)
CO-MODES
1.
(25)
'"'
(27)
|2«l
en
2.
(So)
131)
132)
1331
(34)
3
PS)
1361
(37)
(36)
(39)
« PSYCHC40GY-NEUr«PSYCHCX\OGICAI.TEST7
EnMroodthibtocfcW)
Y>V« >W*>
(40)
ftA UST DIAGNOSES MAS CODERS: ENTER ICD-9-CM COOES IN BLOCKS 4 146. IF NONE. LEAVE BLANK
DESCRIBE DIAGNOSES (Nvr»«»»)
CD-9-CO0ES
1.
(«1)
(«)
(*3)
(44)
(45)
2.
(46)
(47)
(46)
(49)
(SO)
X
(SI)
(Ml
(53)
(54)
(56)
9. INFECTIOUS DtSEASE ■ SCREENING EXAM?
(MwoMtotiMMkm
Y-TM N-Mo
(56)
9A UST CHAGNOSES MAS CODERS ENTER ICD-&-CW CODES IN BLOCKS 57 -m IF NONE. LEAVE BLANK
DESCRIBE DIAGNOSES (NunM)
CO-OCOOES
■■
(57)
(58)
(56)
(SO)
(6t)
2.
n
((0)
(64)
l«5)
(60)
10 DENTAL EXAM? (Enw ood» h Moe* 67)
(67)
tOA UST DIAGNOSES MAS CODERS: ENTER ICO-KM COOES IN BLOCKS 66-77. IF NONE. LEAVE BLANK
DESCRBE DIAGNOSES (NwrmlN*)
CO-9-CODES
1.
(6»
(»)
(70)
(71)
(72)
2.
(73)
(74)
(75)
f?«)
(77)
25
11. DIARRHEA AND/OR ABDOMINAL PAIN
IUL 01 laMUNUMIttVIMHUCOMUUI
(Ena>oa»KUoc«7S)
Y ■ Yd N - MO
tb
tie UST DIAGNOSES UAS COOERS ENTER ED*CM COO€S IN BLOCKS 70-98 If NONE. LEAVE BLANK.
OE SCRIBE DIAGNOSES |N«rr«iK»)
COt-COOCS
'•
(m
(BO)
(•')
(B2I j IBS)
2.
(84)
(BS)
(BO
an (so
3.
(89)
(»0)
l»'l | <S2) > (S3)
4.
(04)
(85)
(85) 1 07) | |96)
1 !
12. HEADACHE AND/OR MEMORY LOSS
ISA. WEUflOLOOY CONSULT?
(ErtsroodvtoNockBO
Y • YOB N » NO
bb
126 LIST DIAGNOSES MAS COOERS ENTER CD-MM COOES IN BLOCKS 100- 100 If NONE. LEAVE BLANK.
DESCRIBE DIAGNOSES (IttnMI
CC-OCOOES
<•
(1001
(101)
(102)
(IBS) j (104)
2.
(105)
(I0»l
(107)
(100
(109)
13. MUSCLE ACHES AND/OR NUMBNESS
IK NEUROLOGY CONSULT!
(Enurcoa*tobtook110)
Y • Ym N . No
no
1JB UST DIAGNOSES- UAS COOERS: ENTER CC-4-CU COOES « BLOCKS II II 20 If NONE. LEAVE BLANK.
OESCRBJE DIAGNOSES (NvnM)
CTX-COOES
1.
(111)
(112)
(113)
(114) j (115)
ff.
(IIB)
(117)
("0
("0 I (120)
14. CHRONIC FATIGUE
l*A CHROME FATTOUr?
(Em, com n but 121(
Y.YB6 N.Mo
12'
t«8 LIST DIAGNOSES UAS COOERS: ENTER COB-CM COOES M BLOCKS 122-1S1 . F NONE. LEAVE BLANK
DESCRBJE OUONOSES (NanuM)
ICO-f-COOES
1.
(122)
(123)
(124)
(125)
(120
t.
(127)
(I2B)
(120
(ISO)
(131)
IS. JOINT PAIN
ISA RHEUMATOLOGY CONSULT?
(Enkw mm to wo* 132)
Y • Yoo N . No
m
■SB UST 01AGNCSES- UAS COOERS ENTCTCOiCM COOES »l BLOCKS l»l« FNONE. LEAVE BLANK.
OESCRBE DIAONOSES (NuruMI
CO-9-COOES
1.
(123)
(134)
(135) I (ISO
(137)
2.
(ISO
(ISO
(l«D 1 ("11
(142)
16. CHRONIC COUGH AND/OR SHORTNESS OF BREATH
MA PUMONARY CONSULT?
(Fj«*r and* to otook 1«S)
Y . Yo* N - No
ia
MS. UST DIAGNOSES UAS COOERS: ENTER C0-6-O4 COOES H BLOCKS I44-IS3. 0* NONE. LEAVE BLANK.
DESCRBJE DIAGNOSES (NNIBM)
ICO-SCODES
1.
(144)
(145)
("0
(M7)
(ISO
2.
(14»)
(ISO)
(151)
(152)
(153)
17. SKIN RASH
17A OCnuATOLOOY CONSULT!
(EM> 000* to Nook 154)
Y . YoS N . No
IM
17B UST OHGNOSES. UAS COOERS: ENTER 0>«CU OCOESM BLOCKS I1S-1B4. r NONE. LEAVE BLANK.
DESCRBK DIAGNOSES (IkmM)
CC-*OOOES
1.
(1S5)
(ISO
(157)
(1M)
(150
2.
(ISO)
(IS!)
(162)
(163)
(164)
18. VERTIGO AND/OR TINNITUS
t«A AUOOLOOY7
(Era* wN to bb* IBS)
Y . YM N . No
MB
IBB. LIST DIAGNOSES UAS CODERS: ENTER CD+CM CODES W BLOCKS 1S6-17S.F NONE. LEAVE BLANK.
DESCMJE DIAGNOSES (NbtmM)
ICO-B-COOES
'•
(IBS)
(1BT)
(160
(1B9I
(170)
t.
(171)
(172)
(173)
(171)
(ITS)
26
NAME:
SSN:
19. CHEST PAIN AND/OR PALPITATIONS
V CARDIOLOGY CONSULT
176
tM-USTCMAOMOSIS UAfl CODERS ENTER £&*CUCOOfSMILOCK8 177 IBS IF NONE. LEAVE BLANK
(Enter cods In Nock 176)
v.vts N-NO
OtSCRFBE 0IAQNO5ES &*r***>
CO-»<-OOES
1.
(177)
(178)
(179)
(iso;
(181)
2.
(IK)
(183)
(184)
(185)
(186)
20. REPRODUCTIVE CONCERNS
20A. MALES - UROLOGY CONSULT?
(Enter code h block 167)
V'YCS N-NO
187
IBS. LIST DIAGNOSES UAS CODERS ENTER ICD 9-CN CODES IN SLOCKS '69 196 IF NONE. LEAVE BUN'
mill— eniii I
CO-SKOOES
1.
(189)
(190)
(191)
(192)
(193)
20B. FEMALES - GYN CONSULT?
(Enter code In block 188)
Y.VtS N>N0
188
2.
(194)
(196)
(196)
(197)
(198)
21. FINAL DIAGNOSES: PHASES II
21A. DIAGNOSES. UST UP TO 10 MAJOR DEFINITE MEDICAL DIAGNOSES ON UNES 20A^J. LIST PRIMARY DIAGNOSIS ON LINE A BLOCKS
199-248 OR CORRESPONDING ICD-9-CM CODES. LEAVE BLANK IF NO DIAGNOSIS IS MADE. MAS CODERS: USE ICD-9-CM CODES IN FIRST
FIVE NUMBERED BLOCKS OF EACH DIAGNOSIS
DESCRIBE DIAGNOSES MtJTBftn))
ieo*cocies
A. (PRIMARY)
(199)
(200)
(201)
(202)
(203)
B.
(204)
(205)
(206)
(207)
(208)
C.
(209)
(210)
(211)
1212)
(213)
*v
(214)
(215)
(216)
(217)
(218)
E.
(219)
(220)
(221)
(222)
(223)
F.
(224)
(225)
(226)
(227)
(228)
G.
(229)
(230)
(231)
(232)
(233)
H.
(234)
(235)
(236)
(237)
(238)
1.
(239)
(240)
(241)
(242)
(243)
J.
(244)
(245)
(246)
(247)
(248)
22. AFTER COMPLETING PHASE II. UNIFORM CASE ASSESSMENT PROTOCOL, THE PHYSICIAN FEELS THAT THE VETERAN HAS AN
UNEXPLAINED ILLNESS? (Enter code In block 249) y.vis n-no
(249)
27
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH OOMMM
Congress of Hie ©niteo States
jejouaif of Rtprrttntatibrt
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
21S7 Ravburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-6143
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
Christopher Shays. Connacticut
Chairman
Room B-372 Raybum Budding
Washington. D.C. 205 IS
Tel 202 226 2548
Fax: 202 225 2382
Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays
December 10, 1996
Alarms have been sounding for almost six years. Only now are they being heard.
From the start of Operation Desert Shield, when Iraqi munitions and chemical weapons
production facilities were bombed, and throughout the troop movements in Operation Desert
Storm, coalition forces heard thousands of chemical weapons alarms.
On numerous occasions, technicians trained to operate sophisticated detection equipment
confirmed the presence of nerve and blister agents near U.S. troop positions in Iraq, Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia. Individual soldiers reported Scud attacks followed by toxic mists and powdery
fallout They reported dead animals in the desert, and a notable lack of insects or other carrion
scavengers on the carcasses.
After the fighting stopped, U.S. forces detonated Iraqi chemical munitions stored in
bunkers at Khamisiyah.
To this day, many Gulf War veterans report the symptoms - memory loss, fatigue, muscle
and joint pain - that can characterize a neurotoxic exposure.
Routinely, all these reports have been dismissed, discounted, discredited or denied. Some
were dismissed as false positive readings. Others were discounted as detections below life-
threatening levels. Still other were discredited as attributable only to operator error.
Based on those denials, commanders sounded the "All Clear" for U.S. troops to proceed,
unprotected, against the invisible enemy.
Now we know the "All Clear" came too soon.
28
Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays
December 10, 1996
Page 2
Last March, when we began these hearings, the Pentagon position on chemical and
biological weapons in the Persian Gulf War consisted of three noes: No credible detections; no
exposures; and therefore no provable health consequences among Gulf War veterans. Those
denials were echoed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (V A), and reflected in their research
and treatment priorities.
Today, two of the three pillars of denial have crumbled under the weight of reluctantly
disclosed facts. There were credible, verified detections of chemical nerve and blister agents. The
President's Advisory Committee on Persian Gulf Veterans' Illnesses concluded detections of
chemical nerve agent by Czech technicians in January, 1991 were credible. The Department of
Defense (DoD) investigative team is examining records from 20 other detections previously
dismissed or discounted. Seven of those detections were acknowledged just last week.
As a result, the number of U.S. Gulf War veterans presumed to have been exposed to some
level of chemical warfare agents has climbed from zero, to 400, to 1,100, to 5,000, to 15,000 to
more than 20,000. In the weeks and months ahead, that number of credible exposures may go
much higher.
This is our fifth hearing on Gulf War veterans' illnesses. Our purpose in all these hearings
is to insure that Gulf War veterans' are properly diagnosed, effectively treated and fairly
compensated.
Since 1991, one of their health concerns has been the role of low-level exposures to a
variety of toxins, including chemical nerve agents, in causing permanent neurological damage and
chronic, often debilitating, symptoms.
Our purpose today, and tomorrow, is to ask how evidence of chemical nerve agent
detections - including the first hand accounts of Gulf War veterans - is gathered, confirmed and
disseminated.
Even now, more than five years after the war, chemical detection information is a critical
piece of medical intelligence for a sick veteran trying to establish a service-connected disability
claim or trying to provide his or her doctor with a complete toxic exposure history.
Sadly, the information has not been forthcoming. Our witnesses today will describe how
evidence of toxic chemical detection in the Gulf War has been lost, destroyed, misrepresented,
perhaps even suppressed, in an effort to support the premature, now insupportable conclusion that
coalition forces encountered no chemical warfare agents.
For want of that information, vital research into the effects of low-level chemical
exposures has been tragically delayed and many Gulf War veterans have gotten sicker. Some have
died.
29
Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays
December 10, 1996
Page 3
Only when all this information is available will veterans, their families and their physicians
be able to determine the true role of toxic chemicals in causing the variety of illnesses now called
the "Gulf War Syndrome." Only then can we sound the "All Clear."
I welcome our witnesses today and look forward to your testimony.
30
Mr. Sanders. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I really
want to applaud you for your persistence in dealing with this issue
and the successes that you have been having.
Answers to questions about troop exposure to chemical agents
and their connection to the Persian Gulf war syndrome are long
overdue. Over the last 5 years approximately 50,000 men and
women connected with the American military have complained of
various ailments associated with the Persian Gulf war, and the
time has long passed when they should be getting answers to their
problems.
Mr. Chairman, clearly one of the major concerns all of us had on
this committee is that even though the Pentagon had information
since 1991 — and this was not top secret information; this is infor-
mation that was publicly disseminated — that coalition troops may
have been exposed to chemical agents, I think the key question all
of us want to know is how come it took the Pentagon 5 years to
acknowledge that. In fact, as you indicated, it was an acknowledg-
ment, kicking and screaming as a result of congressional action. I
think we have a right, the American people have a right, and most
importantly, Persian Gulf war veterans have a right to know why
this information was not forthcoming and, in fact, who is respon-
sible for what might be termed at least an apparent cover-up, why
did we not get this information.
What disturbs me very much, I don't think anyone here or any
place in this country knows the exact cause of the problems. We
wish we did. Scientists are working very hard to try putting to-
gether the various pieces. But if in fact what now appears to be the
case, that at least some of our soldiers were exposed to chemical
agents, then think about the waste of time our researchers and our
physicians had to undergo not to have this information.
With that information they could have come up with better diag-
noses, better treatments, but they did not have that information.
I think there are people at the Pentagon who should be held ac-
countable for that.
What makes me especially sad is that it appears that we went
through this syndrome once before in terms of Agent Orange. Some
of us had hoped that the Pentagon had learned its lessons.
These are complicated issues; nobody knows all of the answers.
But the very least that the American people and the veterans have
the right to believe is that the Pentagon will be honest and forth-
coming and will bring forth all of the information, so that our sci-
entists and our physicians can get to work in trying to make life
as best they can for the people who are suffering from the various
ailments.
Mr. Chairman, let me just conclude by thanking you and thank-
ing, mostly, all of the witnesses and the people who have worked
so hard on these hearings; and I am confident that this committee
will go forward to get to the bottom of the story.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Sanders.
Mrs. Morella.
Mrs. Morella. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to com-
mend you for holding this hearing, not only this hearing, but I
guess, as you have said, this is No. 5. We have another one coming
up tomorrow. All of these hearings are in search of the truth.
31
At some of the hearings we have heard from Gulf war veterans
who have given us all of the symptoms and the concerns, the
stress, the manifestations of what would be considered the Gulf
war syndrome. Then we have had testimony saying that there was
nothing to be concerned about, that in fact it didn't happen, it was
all imaginary. Now we know that there has been some detection of
the toxic chemicals, but we don't know what happened to the detec-
tion.
This is, again, a search for the truth. The public needs to know
Gulf war veterans have suffered for too long. I appreciate the fact
that you have had this hearing, and look forward to hearing from
the witnesses. Thank you for coming.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mrs. Morella.
Mr. Fattah.
Mr. Fattah. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
This is our fifth hearing convened to explore issues related to the
diseases suffered by some of the Persian Gulf war veterans and
their families. There is compelling evidence that these illnesses are
related to Gulf service and, in particular, to exposure to Iraqi
chemical and biological weapons.
Our purpose today is to determine what is known about the
United States troop exposure to chemical and biological agents dur-
ing the Persian Gulf war. Toward this end, I welcome the views of
today's witnesses, and thank them for their hard work in preparing
for this hearing. Especially I would like to thank the active duty
personnel, both for their presence before the subcommittee and for
their service to the Nation.
The subcommittee is revisiting this matter because our under-
standing of what has happened to our soldiers in the Persian Gulf
has changed. In the 10-month timeframe encompassed by the sub-
committee's hearings, the Pentagon's position has evolved from de-
nial that any chemical exposures occurred to its current view that
some 20,000 troops may have been exposed to chemical weapons.
Serious questions have also arisen that troops may have been ex-
posed to biological warfare agents.
DOD's questionable handling of intelligence reports on chemical
detections, coupled with its poor management of the issue in gen-
eral, has jeopardized its credibility with the American public. More-
over, the Department of Defense's early conclusions that no troops
were exposed have clearly influenced medical and compensation
policies at the Department of Veterans Affairs. We should be trou-
bled that these policies were insufficient and inappropriate, and
may have resulted in the provision of unresponsive health care to
Gulf veterans and their families. ,
It is critical that we understand that there has been a sincere
effort from the President to call explicitly in his directives for the
Pentagon to pursue this issue more aggressively. He has named
Rear Admiral Paul Busick at the White House to coordinate Per-
sian Gulf illnesses and an appropriate response.
Also, since our last meeting, Secretary Perry has designated Ber-
nard Rosker, Navy Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs, to lead the Pentagon's inquiry into troop exposures and the
medical consequences.
32
Further, in response to public and congressional criticism, DOD
has adopted six initiatives to improve its efforts. I am hopeful these
very positive steps will help DOD intensify its focus, and we will
see meaningful outcomes.
Mr. Chairman, I encourage you to convene another hearing in
the 105th Congress, perhaps jointly with the National Security
Subcommittee, in which we can receive a report from the Depart-
ment of Defense on its response and what has happened with its
new approaches.
I also urge you to include DOD's current findings, if any, regard-
ing chemical and biological exposures, so that today's hearing
record accurately reflects the information the Pentagon now en-
dorses.
Mr. Chairman, I commend your diligence and interest in this
critical issue, and I look forward to working closely with you as we
continue this investigation in the 105th Congress.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, likewise, Mr. Fattah. Thank you very
much.
We are joined, the Human Resources Subcommittee is joined by
our colleague, Steve Buyer, from the National Security Committee.
He, it is my understanding, will be chairing the personnel side of
that subcommittee, and also serves on the Veterans Affairs Com-
mittee.
Without objection from any of the other committee members, we
welcome you as a participating member today in our hearing. You
have been in the past, and I would also just point out that Mr.
Buyer is a Persian Gulf veteran as well.
Mr. Buyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a couple of
comments I would like to make at this point. Having dealt with
this issue now for 4 years, I am hopeful that the new Secretary of
Defense will clean house with some of the individuals who have
been stonewalling myself, Joe Kennedy, Lane Evans, and this com-
mittee likewise, not only on the operational side but also on the
health aspects of this Gulf war illness issue.
It is easy for us to pound the table. I have been involved — we all
do that, but doggone it, this one is so challenging. Having dealt
with this one for so many years, we have to almost take the issue
and divide it between the operational aspects and the health care.
I really appreciate this subcommittee getting involved. The Na-
tional Security Committee, in my conversations with the chairman,
will be very ambitious on this issue, and just because the National
Security Committee in the next Congress begins to look at this
both on the health delivery system side of this for the military and
the operational side — and I know the Veterans' Committee will also
move out on the claims aspect of this one — I encourage you to con-
tinue your focus, as you have done in the 104th Congress.
On the operational side, I am glad they are finally moving out,
but this issue with regard to the logs — and we are going to have
some testimony on the FOX vehicles — this was an issue that was
covered 3 years ago by Ike Skelton when he chaired the Personnel
Committee, and we got into this. We were giving advice to the Pen-
tagon that if you want to begin looking at whether or not there
were chemical munitions in the theater, check out the historian
with the unit, whoever has these logs down at the small unit level.
33
In the press over the last week, there has been an overplay of
the hands with regard to missing logs at CENTCOM. Don't let that
cloud the vision here. When you have a senior NBC officer at
CENTCOM, and you have a command structure that is placing a
lot of stress that there are — here is the disconnect: There are no
chemical munitions in the theater of operations. All right, then
why did you give so many innoculations to the soldiers? Why did
you prepare us for the threat? So we are all prepared for the
threat, but you have always maintained that they weren't within
the theater. It is a tremendous disconnect.
There is a filtering process that I think will begin to develop with
this testimony when they make actual positive readings, yet be-
cause of this holding on tight, based on intelligence, that there
were no munitions, chemical munitions in theater, that if you had
a reading, that then it must be a false positive.
Then you have this press from chain of command downward, so
by the time things actually get to the senior NBC officer at
CENTCOM and whatever actually he gets into a log, it has pretty
much been filtered by the time it gets to him. I just wanted to
share that with you, that we have visited that issue. Don't get too
bent out of shape with saying, well, this may be the proof. I don't
believe so.
The foot-dragging aspect of this — and I think Mr. Sanders
touched on it; he is absolutely right, the issues of causation I think
we are going to continue to struggle with for quite a while. Let us
never refer to this as a syndrome. It is not the Gulf war syndrome.
It is Gulf war illnesses, because there are many forms, common de-
nominators of causation with overlapping symptoms. The pursuit
with regard to the causation should be very real.
What has been difficult in this process and why I compliment
this subcommittee is because where I have had to go over the wall
and around the wall, you went through the wall on the issue of the
chemical munitions. A lot of compliment has to go to you and most-
ly to the veterans community, and to the spouses who have pressed
the issue. They have been living with the debilitating illnesses of
their loved ones in the face of "no chemical munitions." So there
is a lot of compliment to go around, and you share a lot of it on
this committee.
I think we are going to continue to struggle on the issues of cau-
sation on the medical side of this because, of all the millions of dol-
lars which we have funded, whether it be through the Department
of Defense, whether it be through the Veterans Administration,
whether it be even in the private delivery systems of health, much
of the research has been detection at the exclusion of chemical
weapons, in the protocols. So it is almost as if we are having now
to start over with a lot of our research.
I am pleased that Chairman Shays has taken this ball and run
with it. The only thing that we have not developed further, which
we should, is a lot of focus now, all of a sudden, has been placed
upon chemical munitions, and it should, Mr. Shays; but what about
biological? And if you gave us shots for anthrax and you gave us
shots for botulism, there must have been the biological threat
present in the theater. So if they are also denying biological in the
face of an admission now, years later, with regard to chemical, I
34
am not satisfied by saying that there were no biologicals within
theater.
In the face of Boutros Boutros-Ghali just giving an OK for Iraq
to now have sale of oil for humanitarian reasons, without them
coming forth with regard to a lot of their intelligence on biological
and chemical munitions, I am distressed at the moment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. I would want to make sure
that for the record it is clear that this has really been an undertak-
ing of the entire committee. Mr. Towns, the ranking member, has
been a proactive equal partner in this process. I have no problem
giving him the gavel at times, because this has been, in fact, a bi-
partisan undertaking to get at the truth; and the bottom line is,
we are looking to properly diagnose, treat, and fairly compensate
veterans who need to be compensated.
Before calling our witnesses, I will point out that we will be hav-
ing another hearing, our seventh hearing, on January 21. At that
time, Dr. Kenneth Kaiser, Assistant Secretary for Veterans Affairs,
head of the health care for Veterans Affairs, will be coming to tes-
tify, as will Bernard Rosker, who is the Special Assistant for Gulf
War Illnesses in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We will be
having that hearing on January 2 1st of next month.
At this time, the committee is privileged to bring to testify Major
Michael Johnson from the U.S. Army; Sgt. Grass, U.S. Marine
Corps; and Major Randy Hebert, U.S. Marine Corps, all of whom
were in the Persian Gulf. Mr. Hebert is accompanied by his father,
Loyd Hebert, and his wife, Kim. We will be having three testi-
monies, but in response to — I believe, Mr. Hebert, you will be read-
ing the testimony, and both of you will be helping your son and
your husband respond to — helping us to understand his response to
questions.
Since you are there, I am going to ask those of you who can, in-
cluding Mr. Hebert, the father, as well as Kim, his wife, to stand
and be sworn in as well; and Mr. Hebert, if you can't stand, we un-
derstand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. We are privileged to have all of you here. You may
be seated.
I will note for the record that all the witnesses have responded
in the affirmative.
If I could, just for some bookkeeping, I ask unanimous consent
that all members of the subcommittee, all members, be permitted
to place an opening statement in the record, and the record will re-
main open for 3 days with that purpose.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Edolphus Towns follows:!
35
OPENING STATEMENT OF REP. ED TOWNS
BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
HUMAN RESOURCES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
"THE IMPACT OF CHEMICAL EXPOSURE DISCLOSURES ON
VA HEALTH CARE"
December 11, 1996
MR. CHAIRMAN, THANK YOU FOR CONVENING THIS SKTH
HEARING EXAMINING ISSUES RELATED TO DISEASES SUFFERED BY SOME
GULF WAR VETERANS AND THEIR FAMILIES. TESTIMONY RECEIVED IN
YESTERDAY'S HEARING ADDRESSED THE PENTAGON'S ABYSMAL
MANAGEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ON U.S. TROOP EXPOSURE TO
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. TODAY WE WILL CONSIDER
THE IMPACT OF DOD'S REVISED CONCLUSIONS THAT 20,000 TROOPS
WERE "PRESUMED EXPOSED" ON MEDICAL PROTOCOLS AT THE
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS.
I AM CONVINCED THAT OUR SOLDIERS WERE EXPOSED TO TOXIC
AGENTS DURING THED* SERVICE IN THE PERSIAN GULF. AND I CANNOT
IGNORE THE COMPELLING EVIDENCE THAT THE NUMEROUS DISEASES
AND SYMPTOMS THAT SOME SOLDIERS ARE EXPERIENCING ARE
RELATED TO THAT EXPOSURE. ALSO, BECAUSE THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE REPEATEDLY DENIED THAT TOXIC EXPOSURES OCCURRED,
QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN RAISED THAT PERHAPS THE AGENCY WITH
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CARING FOR SICK VETERANS GAVE INSUFFICIENT
CONSIDERATION TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT A LINK EXISTED BETWEEN
EXPOSURE AND ILLNESS.
I AM DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE VA'S DIAGNOSTIC,
TREATMENT, AND COMPENSATION POLICIES REGARDING SICK GULF
VETS ARE BASED ON DOD'S ERRONEOUS PREMISE OF NO LOW LEVEL
CHEMICAL EXPOSURES. IF THIS IS THE CASE, THEN IT IS PROBABLE
THAT THOSE POLICIES ARE INAPPROPRIATE; AND IT IS CERTAINLY
PROBABLE THAT SICK GULF VETERANS AND THEIR FAMILIES HAVE
BEEN RECEIVING INAPPROPRIATE AND INSUFFICIENT CARE AND
COMPENSATION.
36
I LOOK FORWARD TO THE TESTIMONY OF DR. MATHER, THE VA'S
CHIEF PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS OFFICER, AND
VA DOCTORS JACKSON AND GORDON. I WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY
TO BE REASSURED THAT MY CONCERNS ARE MISPLACED. I AM
INTERESTED IN HOW THE VA'S POLICIES REGARDING TOXICOLOGICAL
RESEARCH, CLINICAL CARE, AND COMPENSATION OF GULF VETS HAVE
EVOLVED TO REFLECT CURRENT KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE AND
EXTENT OF TOXIC EXPOSURES.
I ALSO WELCOME THE VIEWS OF OUR VETERANS. I THANK THEM
FOR THEIR PRESENCE BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE, AS WELL AS FOR
THEIR SERVICE TO OUR COUNTRY.
FINALLY, MR. CHAIRMAN, I COMMEND YOUR DILIGENCE AND
CONTINUED INTEREST EN THIS CRITICAL ISSUE. I LOOK FORWARD TO
WORKING CLOSELY WITH YOU AS WE PURSUE THIS ISSUE IN THE 105TH
CONGRESS.
37
Mr. Shays. I ask unanimous consent that the witnesses be per-
mitted to include their written statements in the record, as well.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cullinan follows:]
38
VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES
STATEMENT OF
DENNIS CULLINAN
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE SERVICE
VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES
BEFORE THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
REGARDING POSSIBLE CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL EXPOSURES
IN THE GULF WAR
WASHINGTON, DC DECEMBER 10, 1996
MR CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:
On behalf of the 2. 1 million men and women of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, I
thank you for the opportunity to express the views of the VFW on the very important
matter of possible chemical/biological exposure by Gulf War troops in the Gulf War. The
VFW has worked diligently in the effort to resolve this controversial issue, and will
continue to do so until a resolution is reached that appropriately cares for the veterans
involved.
Of the number of proposals the VFW is advocating with regard to Gulf War
illness, three are of particular importance. The first one involves doing away with the
current two-year presumptive period for undiagnosed illnesses associated with service in
the Gulf and instead replacing it with an open-ended presumptive period. The VFW has
approached the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) about this proposal — which VA has
the authority to carry out under Public Law 103-446 — however, VA Secretary Jesse
Brown has responded that VA is unwilling at the present time to do away with the two-
year presumptive period.
Currently, the medical and scientific community cannot state with any amount of
confidence the exact long-term effects of low-level chemical/biological exposure.
* WASHINGTON OFFICE *
VFW MEMORIAL BUILDING • 200 MARY1 JVND AVENUE. N F • WASHINGTON. U C 20002-5799
AREA CODE 202 543 2239 • FAX 202 543 6719
39
Therefore, until such effects can be pinpointed, it seems irrational and counterproductive
to establish a time limit as to when exposure symptoms will manifest.
Additionally, out of the over 10,000 Gulf War veterans who have been rated for an
"undiagnosed illness" claim (Gulf War Illness), only 529 have been service-connected for
compensation. The restrictive presumptive period concerning the manifestation of the
condition is the primary reason why 95% of all "Undiagnosed-Dlness" claims have been
denied.
The second major proposal advocated by the VFW concerns either the open-ended
extension of the life of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans
Illnesses (PACGWVI) and the expansion of its authority, or in lieu thereof, the creation of
an independent oversight committee. This is of particular importance concerning the
problems associated with gathering the necessary data from the Department of Defense
(DOD). DOD has been, quite simply, less than forthright in its effort to provide all the
relevant and crucial intelligence documents necessary to reaching a resolution.
Only recently, and after much prodding by the VFW, other VSOs, and in large
part, the PACGWVI, has DOD begun cooperating in any sense of the word. This is
exemplified by the Pentagon's recent admission to the exposure of U.S. troops to chemical
warfare agents in the Gulf following the demolition of the munitions dump at Kamisiyah.
DOD had steadfastly denied any such exposures, only to alter its position in the face of
irrefutable evidence. However, even this admission came piecemeal, with its estimate on
the possible number of U.S. troops exposed starting out small and rising exponentially
over a short period of time. Additionally, recent reports that the Pentagon has "lost"
records covering certain days of the Gulf War, days which may coincide coinci dentally
with the exposure dates at Kamisiyah, warrant its oversight by an independent board.
Only an oversight board similar in scope and authority to the PACGWVI can ensure that
DOD acts appropriately. Its significant and outstanding work done thus far is testimony
to this fact.
Lastly, the VFW also urges the medical and scientific community to agree on a
case-definition for what is now commonly referred to as "Gulf War Syndrome." While it
is believed that there is probably more than just one, identifiable illness ailing Gulf War
veterans, agreement has been reached on what are the most common symptoms prevalent.
Similar to what was done with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS), a list of symptoms could
be developed. Any veteran suffering from an agreed upon number of them, who has been
clinically evaluated and who exhibits them in an unexplained, persistent manner for at least
six months, would fall under this case-definition, as is done with CFS.
By having such a case-definition, Gulf War veterans who suffer from
undiagnosable and debilitating symptoms would not be left floundering while their illnesses
go unchecked. Additionally, it would help ensure that such veterans receive due
compensation from VA for the combat-related illnesses, which is not the case given VA's
current compensation system.
40
The VFW will not rest until the questions surrounding the Gulf War illnesses are
answered in full. We will work with any and all individuals and organizations necessary to
come to an appropriate resolution.
Once again Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the VFW's entire membership, and on
behalf of those Gulf War veterans who suffer today as a result of their unselfish service to
this great nation of ours, I thank you for inviting our participation in the important
hearings that will occur over the next two days.
41
Mr. Shays. Major Johnson, we will start with you, sir, and we
will just go right down the line. Again, it is a privilege to have all
of you here. We thank you for your willingness to come before this
committee.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR MICHAEL F. JOHNSON, U.S. ARMY
Major Johnson. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to present informa-
tion on the events surrounding my unit's detection of toxic chemical
warfare agents in Kuwait on 7 and 8 August 1991. I am here today
in uniform at the invitation of this committee. My testimony is,
however, not official Army policy, but comes from my personal ex-
perience during my tour of duty in the Persian Gulf.
On those days, 7 and 8 August 1991, my unit participated in a
joint chemical detection mission with the 21st British Explosive
Ordnance Disposal Squadron, Royal Engineers, to identify the con-
tent of a container suspected of containing a toxic chemical warfare
agent. Our mission was to confirm or deny the presence of chemical
agents in the container. I was the commander of the 54th Chemical
Troop and would lead the U.S. portion of the mission.
We began by conducting a leaders* reconnaissance of the area
where the container was located. We then conducted back briefs to
the Chief of Security Assistance and Senior Defense Representa-
tive, United States Embassy, Kuwait, on our plan to execute the
mission.
On 8 August 1991 we moved to the site with two FOX nuclear,
biological, and chemical reconnaissance vehicles. We conducted 21
tests of the substance in the container. The British conducted 17
of the tests, and my unit or my FOX teams conducted the remain-
ing four tests.
Based on our analysis of the liquid in the container, we con-
firmed the presence of a blister agent commonly referred to as
Mustard or HD, traces of Phosgene, a nonpersistent choking agent,
and traces of Phosgene Oxime, a nonpersistent blistering agent.
While on the site, I observed a British soldier come in contact
with the liquid while working to take a sample collection for trans-
port out of the area. I personally observed the liquid effects on his
wrist, and concluded that he was exposed to a blistering agent
based on the reaction of the liquid-to-skin contact.
The soldier was decontaminated and transported to a hospital for
medical treatment. To date, I have no information concerning the
health condition of the soldier that was contaminated.
After completing the mission, and once the FOX vehicles were
decontaminated, I was instructed to remove the tapes from the mo-
bile mass spectrometer on the FOX vehicles. The tapes were to be
further analyzed, along with the samples that were removed from
the area by personnel in desert uniforms. I had no idea who these
personnel were or what organization they represented.
I was later given a "be prepared" mission to provide support to
the British in their efforts to move the container out of the area
for destruction. We never executed that mission. I was told by my
chain of command that we would not conduct the mission, and that
the British had complete control of the container.
42
Before departing Kuwait — and our return back to home base in
Fulda, Germany — I did not receive any information on the final
outcome of the analyzed samples that were taken from the area.
These are the facts as I observed them on 7 and 8 August 1991.
My written testimony goes into greater detail on the specifics of my
unit's actions in accomplishing the mission to confirm or deny the
presence of toxic chemical warfare agents.
Mr. Chairman, I ask that the testimony or the document that
Mr. Tuite provided be submitted into the record to support my tes-
timony.
[The information referred to follows:]
43
Report on the Fallout From the Destruction of Iraqi
Chemical Warfare Agent Research, Production, and
Storage Facilities into Areas Occupied by U.S.
Military Personnel During the 1991 Persian Gulf War
19 September 19%
James J. Tuite, HI
International Security Consultant
and Director, Gulf War Research Foundation
44
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SCOPE OF REPORT i
KEY FINDINGS 2
AERIAL BOMBING OF IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENT
RESEARCH, PRODUCTION, AND STORAGE FACHJTIES 3
Table 1. Location of Known and Suspected Chemical Agent Research
Production, Storage, Precursor and Related Hazardous Stockpiles Bombed
by Coalition Forces *
Unidentified Variables 5
STALLED FRONTAL ACTIVITY, WINDS ALOFT, AND VISIBLE AND
INFRARED SATELLITE IMAGERY «
STALLED FRONTAL ACTIVITY 6
Figure 1. NOAA-11 AVHRR Level 1 Visual Image Series 7
WINDS ALOFT •
Figure r National Weather Service Surface Chart Series
Prior to 19JAN1991 Chemical Warfare Agent Confirmations.. 10
VISIBLE AND INFRARED METEROLOGICAL SATELLITE
IMAGERY u
NOAA-11 19JAN91; 0008Z Channel 4 (10,3-11.3nin (HI)) u
Figure 3. NOAA-11 19JAN91; 0008Z Channel 4 (10.3-1 Onm
(IR)) - unannotated U
Figure 4. NOAA-11 19JAN91; 0008Z Channel 4 (10. 3-1 1.3nm
OR))-)
CZECHOSLOVAK AND COALITION DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES
Sensor Technology
Table 2. Detector/Sensor and Agent Identification Systems
Deployed by Coalition Forces Reporting the Detection of Chemical
Warfare Agents
14
NOAA-11 19JAN91; 1125Z Multispectral Image (Ch. U
(Viaible),Ch. 4 (Ht))
Figures. NOAA-11 19JAN91; 112SZ Multispectral Image (Ch. U ,,
(VunbJe),Ch. 4 (HI))
20
45
TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT.)
SUMMARY OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENT DETECTIONS... 2i
Period One: January 17, 1991 - January 24, 1991 21
Table 3. Principal Reported Chemical Agent Detections
Between January 17, 1991 - January 24, 1991 21
Observation „
Period Two: January 24, 1991 - February 28, 1991 23
Satellite Data u
CONCLUSIONS 25
FUTURE EFFORTS 26
Figure 6. Map of Iraq 27
46
SCOPE OF REPORT
This report is limited to an assessment of prior reports of the exposure of U.S. military
personnel to chemical warfare agents from fallout as a result of the bombings of Iraq's
chemical warfare production and storage infrastructure. Particular attention is given to the
relationship between the air attacks during the early phase of the Coalition "air war" campaign
and the detections of sarin by members of the Czechoslovak chemical defense units on January
19, 1991. These detections have been described by the Department of Defense as both
"reliable" and "credible."
Attention is also given to additional Czechoslovak chemical defense unit detections of the nerve
agents sarin and tabun, and the blister agent sulfur mustard, on January 19-21, 1991. These
detections are of particular importance because the Department of Defense has assessed the
Czechoslovak chemical warfare agent detection technology to be both "reliable," "credible,"
and based on "wet chemistry" analysis. According to declassified U.S. intelligence reports, the
substances housed in die facilities that were attacked in the first days of the "air war" included
sarin, tabun, and mustard, whose presence in Coalition troop areas was confirmed by these
Czechoslovak technologies. The Department of Defense has said in recent reports that these
detections are "possible."
According to the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and the CIA
subcontractor currently conducting the modeling of the distance and direction fallout from the
bombings might have traveled during this period, the Czech findings have not been considered
"confirmed" This lack of confirmation, they claim, is because the wind, and therefore the
fallout, was traveling in the wrong direction Since an explanation could not be provided to
explain the presence of these agents in Coalition troop areas, the detections were denied A
confirmation in these areas has enormous implications, since it means that hundreds of
thousands of U.S. service men and women were exposed to varying levels of chemical warfare
agents from these bombings. This report provides the necessary scientific data to refute the
Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency position and confirm the exposure of
U.S. troops to chemical warfare agents.
47
KEY FINDINGS OF THIS REPORT
This report provides evidence that establishes that U.S. soldiers were exposed to chemical
warfare agent fallout from the aerial bombings of Iraqi chemical warfare agent research,
production, and storage facilities by Coalition forces. This report identifies:
• the location of, and in many cases the date that, chemical warfare agent research
production and storage facilities known to contain chemical warfare agents, chemical
warfare agent precursors, and other hazardous chemical toxins were bombed,
• archived meteorological data, including visible and infrared satellite imagery
illustrating that the heat and smoke, and therefore the toxic debris, from these facilities
traveled directly towards U.S. military personnel; and,
• scientific confirmation of the presence of these exact compounds using technologies
evaluated by the U.S. Department of Defense to be both "credible," "reliable," and
based on scientific techniques.
Unlike previous government disclosures claiming that the number of soldiers exposed to
these compounds is minimal and limited to the immediate area around the destruction of
the Kamisiyah facility after the war, this research demonstrates conclusively that chemical
warfare agents and precursors were present in areas where hundreds of thousands of U.S.
soldiers were massing for the upcoming invasion of Iraq and liberation of Kuwait. The
evidence provided by die Czech detections of chemical warfare agents in troop areas also
lends credence to the thousands of chemical agent alarms deployed with U.S. troops that
also began sounding with the initiation of the bombings.
48
AERIAL BOMBING OF IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENT RESEARCH,
PRODUCTION, AND STORAGE FACHJTHCS
Table 1 identifies known Iraqi chemical warfare agent research, production, and
storage facilities, based on information provided in declassified Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) intelligence information reports (IIR), which are presumed to be accurate.
The geocoordinate data provides precise locations for the principal sites targeted. The
dates on which the sites were bombed is also based on declassified DIA and Joint Chiefs
of Staff reporting. ' United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) reports
confirm that chemical agents were present at many of these facilities. According to DIA
reports, "all known or suspected CW/B W storage sites were damaged or destroyed during
Desert Storm with the exception of four cruciform bunkers at Samarra [the others were
destroyed] and two 12-frame refrigerated bunkers." 2
A recent unclassified report from the Central Intelligence Agency reveals that Iraq has
declared to the United Nations that nearly 17 metric tons of sarin were destroyed during
the attacks on the Muthanna State Establishment (Samarra) and that 2. 9 metric tons of
nerve agents were destroyed during Coalition attacks on the chemical warfare agent
storage site at Muhammadiyat (33 15N04121E). 3
1 Source (classified). Subject The following are assessed to be chemical munitions storage bunkers, 23
JAN 1 991 (declassified 1 1 AUG 1 991 ). Intelligence Assessment of Chemical and Biological Warfare in
the Gulf; For the Defense Science Board investigating Desert Storm Syndrome (1993), (declassified 25
SEP 1995). Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. (declassified
21 December 1995); Internal Staff Paper, Release Covered by MOP 39, Subject Soviet Request for Info
on Chem/Radioiogic Leaks, 23 JAN 1991 (declassified 21 December 1995). McConneil, J.M., RADM, USN,
Director for Joint Staff, Intelligence Internal Staff Paper, Soviet Embassy Request for Information on
Desert Storm, 18 JAN 1991, Washington. DC (declassified 21 DEC 1995).
2 Defense Intelligence Agency. Subject (classified). 11 APR 1991 (partially declassified, 19 JUL 1991).
3 Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illnesses (2 August 1996).
49
TABLE 1. LOCATION Of KNOWN/SUSPECTED CHEMICAL AOENT RESEARCH PRODUCTION, STORAOE,
PRECURSOR, AND RELATED HAZARDOUS STOCKPILE* SOBBED BY COALITION FORCES
FACILITY
LOCATION
ACTIVITY
REPORTED DATES
OF BOMBINGS
MOSUL AIRFIELD
3B1822NO430B4BE
CW STORAGE
1/2B/B1
QAYYARAH WEST AMMO
DEPOT
JGS140NO430630E
CW STORAGE
200191
QUYYARAH WEST
AIRFIELD
3S4B11NIOC307iaE
CW STORAGE
2/1 0/91
WRKUK AMMO DEPOT
WEST
353230NO435B00E
CW STORAGE
2MW1
WRKUK AIRFIELD
3S2B10JMM42O18E
CW STORAGE
2/06*1
MUTHANNA STATE
ESTABLISHMENT - CW
RESEARCH, PRODUCTION
AND STORAGE (ate catofl
SAMARRA)
BBJBBBJUBMQWi
CW STORAGE
CW PRODUCTION
CW RESEARCH
1/17/91
H-3 AIRFIELD
325551N/0394449E
CW STORAGE
2W9/91
AL TAQADDUM AIRFIELD
3S19SBN04S38ME
CW STORAGE
2*4/91
BAGHDAD AMMO DEPOT ■
TAJI
3332223KOM1838E
CW STORAGE
2/10*1
UBAYDAH BIN AL JARRAH
AIRFIELD
322915WD4S4S44E
CW STORAGE
1/17/91
AN NASIRIYAH AMMO
STORAGE FACILITY
SOUTHWEST
305750N/0451CO0E
CW STORAGE
MM
T ALU. AIRFIELD
J05BOBMXV«K77E
CW STORAGE
1/28*1
ASHSHUAYBAH AMMO
STORAGE DEPOT
NORTHEAST
3022B40NO473830E
CW STORAGE
201/91
HAB8ANTYAH-1
(FALLUMMJI
aamoam
PESTICIDES
CW PRECURSORS 4
1/17/91
201 VI
HABBANIYAH-2
(FALLLUAH-2)
WMBfflBt
PRO0UCT1ON:
CHLORINE
HCLACID
SULFUR CHLORIDE
SULFUR TRIOX10E
TWONYL CHLORIDE
DICHLORO METHYL PHOSPHINE OXIDE
PHOSPHORUS TRICHLORIDE
PHOSPHOROUS OXYCHLORIDE
METHYL PHOSPHITE
STORAGE:
DUSOPROPYLAMME
DNEmVLMME HCL (25 TONS)
THHDOK5L YCOL (40 TONS)
1/17*1
2451*1
HABBANIYAH-3
(FALLLUAH-I)
■■MM
NO COMPLETED PRODUCTION WORKS
OR STORAGE SITES - COMPLETELY
DESTROYED BY ALLIED BOMBINGS
1/17/91
201/91
HABBANIYAH (OTHER)
3322MN331E
CW STORAGE
2/17*1
FALLUJAH (OTHER)
3313N0€M1E
CW STORAGE
2/21/91
ALQABI
33S0N04110E
CW STORAGE
2/10/91
K-2 AIRFIELD
3455N04324E
CW STORAGE
2*9*1
TIKRIT
3443NM339E
CW STORAGE
2/13/91
KARBALAH
3223N04330E
CW STORAGE
2/03*1
ADDIWANIYAH
31SSN04454E
CW STORAGE
2*3*1
QABATIYAH
33S3N0423BE
CW STORAGE
1/19*1
4 U.S. ARMY Operations Group INSCOM. Subject 1IR 2 201 0022 92. Inspection of Chemical Warfare
Facilities, 3 OCT 91 (declassified 1995) Report provides information on activities at the three Habbaniyah
sites
50
Unidentified Variables
The location or locations at which chemical munitions and bulk agent were stored
after being removed from known chemical warfare agent production and storage facilities
adds an unknown variable to estimates of bombing damage to chemical warfare stocks.
Identifying these additional facilities would complicate observations, but does not alter
events associated with known locations bombed in the days prior to detections of chemical
warfare agents in areas occupied by U.S. troops. Many of the faculties suitable for the
storage of these materials were in areas in which Iraqi forces were deployed. The
presence of three such facilities at An Nasiriyah and Kamisiyah have recently been
confirmed by the Department of Defense. Further, a declassified signals intelligence
(SIGENT) intercept report, 3 recent UNSCOM reporting, 6 and a recent press interview
with a former Iraqi commander 7 indicate that chemical rounds were deployed to the front
with the Iraqi forces and that Iraqi commanders had limited or pre-designated authority to
use them. Each of these reports indicates that the probability of chemical warfare agent
fallout from bombing targets not then known to contain these materials is also high.
5 CENTCOM CCJ3-X (NBC) Log. February 5. 1991 (partially declassified)
6 Security Council Report S/1995/864, 11 October 1995 (UNSCOM).
7 Ridino the Storm: How to Tell Lies and Win Wars, personal interview by Maggie O'Kane, Cinecontact
175 Wardour Street London. W1V3FB. U.K.
51
STALLED FRONTAL ACTIVITY, WINDS ALOFT, AND VISIBLE AND
INFRARED SATELLITE IMAGERY
STAT T FT) FRONTAL ACTIVITY
Shortly after the initiation of the air war and throughout the period covered in this section
(January 17-24, 1991), a low pressure system over Iraq and a high pressure center over
the Indian Ocean resulted in a stationary frontal partem and the development of low-level
cloud activity directly over the area occupied by coalition forces. This stalled weather
pattern was reported in the official history of the weather (Gulf War Weather) prepared by
the United States Air Force in 1992.
A composite of NOAA-1 1 visual images showing the stalled front appears on the
following page. This composite image covers the period January 18-24, 1991 (Coverage
for January 17, 1991, was not available from the National Climatic Data Center).
52
53
WINDS ALOFT
In analyzing whether or not fallout is a factor in the "valid" 8 detections we are aware of
thus far, wind directions in the hours before, not just during, the detections are relevant.
The Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency rely on point time data
rather than data over time. While this information is important, it is much less relevant
than analyzing the winds that may have transported toxic effluents to the area of detection
in the hours immediately before the detections occurred.
Winds are represented on National Weather Service (NWS) surface charts by the
following symbol: 9
(Speed: long bar 10 kts each;
short bar - 5 kts)
Example: 25 kts
Direction
However, above the fhctional surface layer, wind speeds are geostrophic and tend to
follow isobar contours. Wind speeds are subgeostrophic throughout the mixing layer
(ML) with wind directions crossing the isobars at a small angle towards low pressure 10
Low pressure is the lower isobar on each of the charts displayed on the following
composite image (page 10) for the period prior to the "credible" Czechoslovak chemical
detections on January 19, 1991.
1 Letter to the author from CoL E. Kocmgsburg, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Persian Gulf
Investigative Team (PGTT), dated April 18, 1996, acknowledging that it is the position of the DoD that
the Czech chemical detection methods are valid.
9 Dusan Djuric, w^h^ ftafaflj (Englewood Cliffs, NJ Prentice Hall) 249.
10 Roland B. Stall, An Introduction to Boundary Layer Meteorology. (NorwelL MA: Kluwer Academic
Press, 1988), 15.
54
During night time bombings the area closest to the ground is highly stable, partly due to
the absence of solar thermal activity. This stable layer normally would trap pollutants in
this surface layer. However, high explosive weapons and highly volatile agent material
would have created their own thermal activity, and toxic effluents and agent vapor
penetrated the surface layer to travel with the winds aloft in the residual layer (RL) of the
night time atmosphere. "Although the winds at ground level frequently become lighter or
calmer at night, the winds aloft may accelerate to supergeostrophic speeds in a phenomena
that is called the low-level jet or nocturnal jet... Winds exhibit very complex behavior at
night. Just above the ground the wind speeds become light or even calm. At altitudes on
the order of 200 meters above the ground, the wind may reach 10-30 meters/second [36-
108 kilometers/hour]." Regardless of the night time behavior of the pollutants, the return
of the mixing layer after sunrise results in the fanning out of the toxic effluent debris
throughout the mixing layer (altitudes of 1000 meters and higher).
The available surface weather data reveals that during the period just prior to the
January 19, 1991, chemical warfare agent detections by Czechoslovak and French forces,
surface frictional winds varied with location. However, the isobaric contours confirm that
the non-frictional winds were moving from the areas over the bombed facilities towards
the units involved in the detection activity. The next composite chart shows that
throughout this period the. lOOOmb (millibar) contours indicate that winds aloft at the
lowest recorded levels flowed directly towards the detecting elements, even when surface
winds did not.
"Ibid
55
*
S 2
z o
« *
Si
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n I -
S ° =
111
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3*1
s ■ s
bis
gfeS
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56
The confirmation necessary to establish that the bombings of these facilities caused
enormous thermal events and plumes that extended directly towards Coalition military
personnel should be observable using satellite imagery if the collected data is not obscured
by dense clouds. Such a confirmation can be made by (1) identifying the location of the
facilities (accomplished above), and (2) by reviewing both the visible and infrared imagery
available immediately before and contemporaneous with the detection of chemical warfare
agent materials in areas where Coalition forces were located which are identical to those
contained in the facilities that were destroyed.
57
VISIBLE AND INFRARED METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE IMAGERY
Source of Data: Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) Level IB
satellite images taken by NOAA-1 1 were acquired from the National Climatic Data
Center, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Asheville,
North Carolina. The AVHRR aboard NOAA-1 1 collects on five distinct spectral bands;
three infrared bands and two visible bands.
Data resolution: 1 . 1 kilometer (km)
Image Processing: ERDAS Imagine, Version 8.2, geographic information system (GIS)
software was used to process the images that follow.
Annotated images were rotated to true north alignment. Locational annotations were
geolocated using readily identifiable reference points. No enhancement or alteration of the
images was performed. Infrared images are outside of the visible spectrum; visible detail
on these images is the result of thermal and infrared reflecting activity. A map of Iraq
appears at the end of the report to assist in reader orientation.
19JAN1991; 0008Z; CHANNEL 4 (10.3-1U nanometers (IS))
The image on the following two pages was taken by NOAA-1 1 on January 19, 1991, at
0008Z, several hours prior to the first Czech detections. This is the image recorded by
AVHRR channel 4, which measures thermal and other infrared activity in the 10.3-1 1.3
nanometer range. The two other infrared channels (3, S) also measured the activity
recorded on the image. The visible imagery channels (1,2) record no activity since the
image was taken during a period of darkness. The first image in unannotated. The second
image is annotated for reader orientation.
12
58
NOAA-11 19JAN91; 0008Z; CHANNEL 4 (10.3*1 Unm (M»
GEOPIC: Copyright 1996, James J. Tuite, III
59
60
Image information:
The preceding images identify an intense point source thermal event originating in the area
directly over the Muthanna State Establishment in Iraq. This was Iraq's largest chemical
warfare agent research, production, and storage facility The plume from this facility
extends south toward a larger area of thermal activity. This larger thermal activity covers
a number of other facilities in Iraq known to contain chemical warfare agents, chemical
warfare agent precursor materials, and other hazardous industrial and agricultural
chemicals. These facilities were also bombed during this period and would have
contributed to the thermal activity. This composite plume continues southward toward
the areas in which the Czechoslovak chemical teams detected chemical agents identical to
those known to be stored or produced at the bombed facilities. These detections occurred
in an area where this warm air mass collided with the colder clouds in the stalled front
described above. This predictably would have resulted in both instability and condensation
activity. The chemical warfare agents, which are 4-6 times heavier than air, should have
dropped to the surface as a result of this activity.
15
61
19JAN1991; 1125Z; MVLTISPECTRAL IMAGE (CH. 1,2 (VISIBLE) CH. 4 (IR))
The image on the following page was taken by NOAA-1 1 on January 19, 1991, at 1 125Z.
This is the image recorded by AVHRR channels 1 and 2, which measure visible activity,
and channel 4, which measures thermal and other infrared activity in the 10.3-J 1.3
nanometer range. By analyzing the images from the 0008Z pass just prior to the Czech
detections and the 1 12SZ pass just after the Czech detections, both the direction and
nature of this enormous thermal and visible plume are confirmed.
Again, there is an intense point source multispectral plume of thermal and visible debris
originating from the area directly over the Muthanna State Establishment. This activity
extends directly southward, passing over other known and suspected chemical warfare
agent storage sites which were also attacked during this period. Again, this plume
interacts with the stalled front in the area where the detections occurred.
16
62
63
These images are from the NOAA-1 1 satellite passes that occurred just prior to and after
the first Czechoslovak chemical agent detection, which the Department of Defense has
labeled as "credible" and "reliable '" but not confirmed because the wind was allegedly
blowing the wrong way.
These images directly contradict several Department of Defense and Central Intelligence
Agency positions about the direction the fallout moved and the stated position that U.S.
forces were not exposed to chemical warfare agents "in any widespread way." They also
lend weight to other simultaneous chemical agent detection activity that occurred across
the theater by other Coalition forces during the period this front was stalled over Coalition
forces. Detection technologies and individual detections during the period of the stalled
frontal activity are discussed in the next section of this report Subsequent to this period,
however, visible satellite imagery shows that plume activity from the bombings continued
towards Coalition troop deployments. This new knowledge about the distances these
materials may have traveled demands a reassessment of the hazards associated with
bombing these facilities throughout the war.
18
64
CZECHOSLOVAK AND COALITION DETECTION TECHNOLOGffiS
Sensor Technology
The three major powers participating in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the U.S. U.K.,
and France, all expected chemical warfare agent use by the Iraqi military. These
governments brought a diverse array of chemical warfare detection and identification
equipment with them to the Gulf. Soviet equipment, such as the GSP-1 and GSP-1 1 and a
mobile chemical agent laboratory were also used by Czech chemical troops. This broad
array of equipment used varying technologies to detect and confirm the presence of
chemical warfare agents, as well as to identify the specific agent present. The following is
a listing of the different physical principles employed:
• wet chemistry
• mass spectrometry
• ion mobility spectrometry
• chemical reaction
• biochemical enzyme reactivity
• flame photometry
• ionization
The Department of Defense has only acknowledged up to this point that the Czechoslovak
technology is reliable and credible and the Czech confirmation procedure uses wet
chemistry principles, which permit a qualitative confirmation of specific chemical warfare
compounds. Only two of seven detections by Czech units have been called credible and
reliable. The remainder are said to be possible. The Department of Defense claims that
none of the detections using any of the other technologies have been confirmed.
Table 2 identifies detector/sensor and agent identification systems deployed by coalition
forces reporting the detection of chemical warfare agents.
19
65
TABLE 2 DETECTOR/SENSOR AND AGENT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS DEPLOYED BY
COALITION FORCES REPORTING THE DETECTION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS
NATION/
SYSTEM
CHEMICAL AGENTS
SENSITIVITY
METHOD/
TECHNOLOGY
FRANCE/F1
G/V AGENTS
DATA NOT AVAILABLE
BIOCHEMKAL ENZYME
DETECTOR
FRANCE/TOCC
GAA36
AC
CK
i mgrnia
300 ino/mS
2000 mgm3
CHEMKAL/BIOCHEMKAL
DETECTOR
FRANC E/ADLIF
GBA30
DATA NOT AVAILABLE
FLAME SPECTROMETRY
UK/CAM
G/V AGENTS
H AGENTS
0.1 maHnS
Z0m&m3
ION MOBILITY SPECTROMETRY
(QUANTITATIVE FEATURE)
UK/NAIAD
G AGENTS
V AGENTS
0.09mgAn3
0.005 mg/m3
BIOCHEMICAL ENZYME
DETECTOR (CHOUNESTERASE
REACTIVITY)
UKMARKI
G/V AGENTS
H AGENTS
DATA NOT AVAILABLE
BIOCHEMKAL/CHEMKAL
REACTTVITY
UR-CZA3SP-1
G/V AGENTS
0.06mgftTl3
AIR SAMPLING/ BIOCHEMKAL
ENZYME
(CHOUNESTERASE REACTIVITY)
UR-C2VGSP-11
G/V AGENTS
OOSmgrtnS
AIR SAMPLING/ 640-CHEMCAL
ENZYME
(CHOUNESTERASE REACTIVITY)
CZ/PPCHL-BO
MOSTCHEMCAL
WARFARE AGENTS
AGENT IDENTIFICATION
THROUGH WET
CHEMBTRY ANALYSIS
FIELD PORTABLE CHEMKAL
AGENT LABORATORY •
CHEMKAL REAGENTS/ WET
CHEMBTRY ANALYSIS
USMB(A1)
G AGENTS
V AGENTS
0.1 ms/M
0_2mg/m3
IONIZATION
AUTOMATIC ALARM
warn paper
G/V AGENTS
H AGENTS
YES/NO
YES/NO
CHEMKAL REACTIVITY
COLOR INTERPRETATION
US/MB PAPER
GAy AGENTS
H AGENTS
YES/NO
YES/NO
CHEMICAL REACTIVITY
COLOR INTERPRETATION
USM256
G AGENTS
V AGENTS
H AGENTS
O.OSmaftnS
0.15mg/m3
3 0rnym3
BIOCHEMICAL ENZYVIE
DETECTOR (CHOUNESTERASE
REACTIVITY)
CHEMKAL REACTIVITY
US/M25SA1
G AGENTS
V AGENTS
H AGENTS
0.005 moAnS
0.02meAn3
S.Oms/M
BIOCHEMICAL ENZYME
DETECTOR (CHOUNESTERASE
REACTIVITY)
CHEMKAL REACTTVITY
US/CAM
GA/ AGENTS
H AGENTS
0.1 mglMS
ZOmoAnS
ION MOBILITY SPECTROMETRY
(QUANTITATIVE FEATURE)
US/MM1
FOX NBC VEHICLE
G AGENTS
SOOTHER
PREPROGRAMMED
AGENT SPECTRA
SEVERAL mg/m3
M6A1 (M«3) IONIZATION
BACKUP UNIT (EARLY
WARNING)
QUADRAPOLE GC-MS
FULLGC-MS
Specifications (where available) obtained from DOO FM Sane* 3; the Chemical Research, Engineering
and Development Command (CRDEC). Ab erd e e n Proving Grounds, MD, the manufacturers: and, Jane's
NBC Protection Equipment 1991-1902. and 1995-1996 .
66
SUMMARY OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENT DETECTIONS
PERIOD ONE: JANUARY 17. 1991 - JANUARY 24. 1991
During this critical period, coalition forces targeted and bombed the key Iraqi chemical
warfare research, production, and storage facility at Samarra (also known as Muthanna)
on January 17, 1991; major chemical warfare agent production and storage facilities at
Habbaniyah I, Habbaniyah II, and Habbaniyah m ( also known as Fallujah I, n, Iff) on
January 17-18, 1991; and chemical weapons storage facilities at An Nasiriyah and
Ubaydah Bin Al Jarrah Airfield on January 17, 1991. This pattern of chemical weapons
facility bombing activity is likely incomplete, but the bombings of these critical targets are
confirmed in contemporaneous intelligence reports. u
TABLE 3. PRINCIPAL REPORTED CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTIONS BETWEEN
17 JANUARY 1991 - 24 JANUARY 19»1 14
DATE
LOCATION
NATION/UNIT
AGENT
DETECTED
METHOD/TECHNOLOGY
17 JAN 91
N.W. HAFIR
ALBATIN
US/
2/5THSFG
UNKNOWN NERVE
AGENT
IONIZATION, BIOCHEMICAL
REACTION, ION MOBILITY
SPECTROMETRY
M8A1, M256, CAM
19 JAN 91
N. HAFIR
ALBATIN
CZJ
CHEM. DET.
UNIT
SARIN (GB)
BIOCHEMICAL REACTIVITY
WET CHEMISTRY
GSP-1(11). PPCHL-90
19 JAN 91
N.E. HAFIR
ALBATIN
CZJ
CHEM. DET.
UNIT
SARIN (GB)
BIOCHEMICAL REACTIVITY
WET CHEMISTRY
GSP-1(11), PPCHL-90
13 Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Assessment of Chemical and Biological Warfare in the Gulf
For the Defense Science Board investigating Desert Storm Syndrome, Washington, D.C. (1993)
(declassified September 25, 1995);OSD-CCC SOA 1294, Subject Soviet Request for Info on
Chemical/Radiological Leaks, 17 JAN 1991, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of
Defense, Washington, DC (declassified 21 December 1995); Internal Staff Paper, Release Covered by
MOP 39, Subject Soviet Request for Info on Chem/Radiologic Leaks, 23 JAN 1991 (declassified 21
December 1995); McConnell, J.M., RADM, USN, Director for Joint Staff, Intelligence Internal Staff Paper,
Soviet Embassy Request for Information on Desert Storm, 18 JAN 1991, Washington, DC (declassified
21 DEC 1995); Memorandum for the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Soviet and East
European Affairs, Subject Soviet Embassy Request for Information on Desert Storm (declassified 21
DEC 1995).
14 Detection/confirmation reports are primarily from CENTCOM CCJ3-X log (partially declassified 1995),
Defense Science Advisory Board (DSAB) report (June 1994), reports from the Czech government
regarding detection activity during the Persian Gulf War, and declassified DIA reports regarding chemical
detection activity. Several events (3) are identified in CENTCOM reporting and discounted by CENTCOM
but confirmed by interviews with chemical detection specialists. These reports have been included only if
the reports are corroborated or documented by multiple independent sources.
21
67
19 JAN 91
KKMC
CZJ
CHEM DET
UNIT
UNKNOWN NERVE
AGENT
BIOCHEMICAL REACTIVITY
WET CHEMISTRY
GSP-1(11), PPCHL-90
19 JAN 91
30 KM FROM
FR
UNKNOWN NERVE
AGENT
BIOCHEMICAL REACTIVITY
19 JAN 91
30 KM FROM
CZJ
CHEM. DET
UNIT
CONFIRM FRENCH
DETECTION
WET CHEMISTRY
PPCHL-90
19 JAN 91
KKMC
CZJ
CHEM. DET
UNIT
SULFUR MUSTARD
(HO)
WET CHEMISTRY
PPCHL-90
19 JAN 91
JUBAYL
UK
UNKNOWN BUSTER
(AFTER
UNEXPLAINED
EXPLOSIONS)
CHEMICAL REACTIVITY.
ION MOBILITY
SPECTROMETRY
M-9, CAM
19 JAN 91
JUBAYL
us/
NMCB-24
UNKNOWN BUSTER
(AFTER
UNEXPLAINED
EXPLOSIONS)
CHEMICAL REACTIVITY
M-258 (2/3 TESTS)
20 JAN 91
NW of KKMC
US/
SOOTH MP BDE
UNKNOWN NERVE
AGENT
IONIZATION, BIOCHEMICAL
REACTIVITY
M8A1, M256
20 JAN 91
DHAHRAN
UK
UNKNOWN NERVE
(AFTER SCU0
ATTACK)
BIOCHEMICAL REACTIVITY
(SEPARATE DEVICES)
NAIAD, MARK 1
20 JAN 91
NEAR KKMC
CZJ
CHEM. DET
UNIT
SULFUR MUSTARD
(HD) FOR2HRS
WET CHEMISTRY
PPCHL-90
20 JAN 91
NEAR KKMC
FR
UNKNOWN NERVE
AGENT
BIOCHEMICAL REACTIVITY
20 JAN 91
FRENCH
SECTOR
KKMC
CZ
SARIN (GBVTABUN
(GA)
BIOCHEMICAL REACTIVITY
WET CHEMISTRY
PPCHL-90
21 JAN 91
KKMC
FR
UNKNOWN NERVE
AGENT
BIOCHEMICAL REACTIVITY
21 JAN 91
CZ/
CHEM. DET.
UNIT
SARIN (GBVTABUN
(GA), SULFUR
MUSTARD (HO)
BIOCHEMICAL REACTIVITY
WET CHEMISTRY
PPCHL-90
21 JAN 91
KKMC
FR
UNKNOWN CW
CHEMICAL OR BIOCHEMICAL
REACTIVITY
22 JAN 91
RAF HA
US
UNKNOWN NERVE
AGENT
IONIZATION, BIOCHEMICAL
REACTIVITY
MSA1,M2Se
23 JAN 91
KKMC
CZJ
CHEM. DET.
UNIT
UNKNOWN CW
WET CHEMISTRY
PPCHL-90
23 JAN 91
NEAR KKMC
CZJ
CHEM. DET
UNIT
PATCH OF SULFUR
MUSTARD (HD)
WET CHEMISTRY
PPCHL-90
23 JAN
91
CENTCOM
US/
CENTCOM NBC
CELL
ORDER TO CENTAF
DISREGARD CHEMICAL
AGENT REPORTS COMING
FROM THE CZECHS
17 JAN -
23 JAN 91
THEATER-
WIDE
US
UNKNOWN NERVE
AGENT
IONIZATION
M8A1
68
OBSERVATION
This period of widespread chemical agent sensing by the instruments and methodologies
cited above directly coincides with the release of the detected material, the identification
of thermal and visual plume activity extending from the area of the damaged facilities
towards prepositioned military personnel, and a meteorological phenomena that would
stall the toxic vapors and debris directly over the area in which coalition troops were
deployed.
PERIOD TWO JANUARY 24. 1991 - FEBRUARY 28. 1991
This period is marked by the continued bombing of Iraqi chemical weapons research,
production and storage facilities and by the continued sounding of the M8A1 automatic
ionization nerve agent alarms throughout the area occupied by U.S. and Coalition forces.
In testimony before the Senate Banking Committee on May 24, 1994, Department of
Defense officials acknowledged that the 14,000 chemical agent alarms deployed with U.S.
forces in the Gulf sounded three times per day, on average, during the period of the air
and ground war.
French, Czech, and U.S. commanders publicly or privately reported that the alarms
sounded because of traces' of nerve agent in the air from the bombing of Iraqi chemical
weapons facilities, but asserted, incorrectly, that the amount of agent present was
insufficient to cause physiological harm. The commander of the Soviet Chemical Troops,
Major General Igor Yestafyev and Soviet Foreign Minister, Vitaly Churkin, publicly
expressed concern over the bombings and their potential impact to the safety of the Soviet
Union. 15
15 Associated France Presse. Paris, February 4, 1991 as reprinted in The Independent (cites General
Raymond Germanos that chemical fallout-related neurotoxins from allied bombings were being detected 'a
little bit everywhere;' Kanishchev, A. and Timofeyev. L, 'Soviet Spokesman on Attacks on Iraqi Chemical
Objects,' TASS. February 8, 1991; Handlernan, S , 'Kremlin Growing Frustrated with Role of Outsider,'
Toronto Star. February 10, 1991.
23
69
Soldiers continued to report flu-like illnesses, rashes, and large unexplained cross-
species/cross-fiuniry die-offs of animals in the desert. Several reports of chemical nerve
agent detections/confirmations using US/M256 chemical agent detection kits were also
received.
During this period, the general pattern of reliable known or reported chemical agent
detections decreased, but it is unclear whether this is the result of (1) a CENTCOM
directive on January 23, 1991, ordering subordinate elements to disregard reliable
detections such as those made by the Czechs; (2) U.S. units reportedly being told to
ignore or disable chemical agent detection equipment; (3) an absence of data based on the
refusal of the Department of Defense to declassify the entire CENTCOM CCJ3-X NBC
and other subordinate unit log entries for most of this period; or (4) a reduction of the
levels of agent material present due to the passing of the stationary front observed during
Period One.
Satellite Data
Visible and thermal satellite imagery and smoke plume data shows that the debris from the
bombings consistently moved with the weather patterns towards and over positions
occupied by coalition forces assembling for the upcoming invasion of Kuwait and Iraq.
One study conducted after the war on the debris from the Kuwaiti oil well fires indicated
that satellite imagery revealed visible debris observed at heights of 6-7 km above ground
level and at distances of nearly 2,000 km from their source. " While the smoke and toxic
debris from the bombings of the chemical warfare agent research, production, and storage
facilities were not always visible, there is no reason to believe that, except for the
decomposition of the agents themselves, they would behave any differently than any other
airborne effluent debris.
limaye, S. , Suomi, V., VeWen, C. Tripoli, G. 'Satellite Observations of Smoke from Oil Fires in
Kuwait,' Science. Vol 252, 15 June 1991 pp. 1536-1539.
24
70
CONCLUSIONS
U.S. soldiers were exposed to detectable levels of chemical warfare agent fallout from the
aerial bombings of Iraqi chemical warfare agent research, production, and storage facilities
by Coalition forces. This report identifies the location of, and in some cases the date that,
chemical warfare agent research, production, and storage facilities known to contain
chemical warfare agents, chemical warfare agent precursors, and other hazardous chemical
toxins were bombed. Archived meteorological data, including visible and infrared satellite
imagery illustrates that the heat and smoke, and therefore the toxic debris, from these
facilities traveled directly towards U.S. military personnel. Finally, it establishes scientific
confirmation of the presence of these exact compounds by technologies evaluated by the
U.S. Department of Defense to be both "credible" and "reliable."
Unlike previous government disclosures claiming that the number of soldiers exposed to
these compounds is minimal and limited to the immediate area around the destruction of
the Kamisiyah facility after the war, this research demonstrates that chemical warfare
agents were present in areas where hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers were massing
for the upcoming invasion of Iraq and liberation of Kuwait. A review of other detections
and detection technologies is needed. In cases where sensor technologies utilizing
different and complementary scientific principles simultaneously indicated the presence of
chemical warfare agents, these detections should also be considered credible.
25
71
FUTURE EFFORTS
Additional research is being conducted on plume and fallout activity occurring throughout
the entire war. Further, imagery should be able to determine the extent of fallout resulting
from the destruction of the Kamisryah facility Imagery datasets for the entire war have
been acquired and will be analyzed to determine, as far as possible, just how extensive the
these exposures may have been. Such a research approach will also assist in identifying
areas of potential exposures. The fallout data developed in this report should, however,
result in a policy determination assuming that all U.S. military personnel may have been
exposed to these materials
Additional independent interdisciplinary research is also being conducted to determine the
course and progress of this disease, which appears to have neurological, immunological,
and microbiological aspects. This type of research is a necessary first step to develop
inexpensive diagnostic tools and possible treatment protocols for Persian Gulf War
Related Illnesses.
72
SOU MOtLOOO
UO MOMki
m »dii < > n Ji > iyn m< itk
— — International boundary
•k National capital
• Province capital
1 Railroad
- — Expressway
Road
Track
73
Major Johnson. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before this committee to share my personal experience in
the Persian Gulf. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to answer your
questions.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Major. We are going to defer questions
until all the witnesses in this panel have given their testimony.
[The prepared statement of Major Johnson follows:]
74
RECORD VERSION
STATEMENT BY
MAJOR MICHAEL F. JOHNSON
TRAINING WITH INDUSTRY STUDENT
UNITED STATES ARMY STUDENT DETACHMENT
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNT/1ENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
104TH CONGRESS
INVESTIGATIONS ON THE PERSIAN GULF WAR VETERAN'S ILLNESSES
AND EXAMINATION OF REPORTS OF ADDITIONAL CHEMICAL DETECTIONS AND
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE TO TROOPS
10 DECEMBER 1996
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL
RELEASED BY THE HUMAN RESOURCES AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
AND OVERSIGHT
75
RECORD TESTIMONY
INVESTIGATIONS ON THE PERSIAN GULF WAR VETERAN'S ILLNESSES
AND EXAMINATION OF REPORTS OF ADDITIONAL CHEMICAL DETECTIONS AND
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE TO TROOPS
TRAINING WITH INDUSTRY STUDENT
UNITED STATES ARMY STUDENT DETACHMENT
UNITED STATES ARMY
76
RECORD TESTIMONY
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity
to present my information on the activities and events that occurred on 7 & 8 August 1991
regarding the positive identification of chemical warfare agents in Kuwait I was the Commander
of the 54th Chemical Troop, 1 lth Armored Cavalry Regiment My primary mission was to
provide decontamination, deliberate offensive and defensive smoke, and NBC (Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical) Reconnaissance support to the 1 lth Armored Cavalry Regiment 1 am
here today in uniform at the invitation of this Committee, My testimony, however, is not official
Army policy, but comes from my personal experience during my tour of duty in the Persian Gulf.
Specifically, I will discuss my unit's role in detecting the presence of Iraqi toxic chemical warfare
agents in Kuwait on 7 & 8 August 1 991 .
My intent is to provide you with a detailed analysis of our actions on 7 & 8 August 1991 in
support of a joint and combined live toxic chemical agent detection mission involving US and
British forces. The information provided are the facts as they occurred on bom days during the
detection operation.
On 4 January 1994. 1 prepared a report tided IRAQI CHEMICAL AGENTS-
INFORMATION PAPER. The purpose of the report was to present first hand knowledge of
Iraqi chemical agents identified in Kuwait At that time, three years had passed since Operation
Desert Shield / Storm. I was concerned mat it was possible mat the history of my unit's chemical
detection actions with the 21 st British Explosive Ordnance (BOD) Royal Engineers, was not
properly documented. I had not seen any official or unofficial record of those actions. Itwaimy
intent, on 4 January 1994, to inform my chain of command at the United Stales Army Infantry
School - Fort Benning. Georgia, wcrclwas the chief instructor for Nuclear, Biological, and
77
Chemical Operations, about my unit's actions in the desert and to get approval to modify some of
my course instruction for my Advanced and Basic Course Officers (students), which would focus
on the lessons learned in NBC defensive operations during the Gulf War.
My report was returned back to mc. I was told by my division chief that the comments from
me Infantry School Leadership were that my report was a good lay down of information on odd
facet of chemical operations in Kuwait 1 was then told to file the report in my office. I was
given guidance to add some discussion time to my courses on NBC operations during (he Gulf
War with emphasis on Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TiiV), osc of NBC defense
equipment, and future challenges to our NBC defense doctrine, equipment, and training. I made
the changes to my courses and added discussions on NBC defease lessons learned from the Gulf
War.
The remainder of my testimony is the actual report I prepared with supporting documentation
to show what took place on 7 & 8 August 1 991 . On 4 January 1 994, 1 submitted the report
through the Combined Arms and Leadership Division Chief to the Combined Arms and Tactics
Director at Fort Bcnning, Georgia. Once again, the report contains detailed information on the
chemical detection mission of the 54lh Chemical Troop, 1 lth ACR and the 21 st British Explosive
Ordnance Disposal Battalion, Royal Engineers in Kuwait
78
c. 1 am concerned that the in formation regarding the history of this action has not been
documented.
END OF REPORT.
In closing, 1 would like to reemphasize that these are the facts of my unit's actions to detect
and identify Iraqi toxic chemical warfare agents. I know that my unit in a joint chemical detection
role with British forces did in fact detect and confirm the presence of toxic chemical warfare
agents in Kuwait I know that our NBC detection and protection equipment worked properly on
8 August 1991 . 1 know that the soldiers under my command were the best trained on the FOX
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle and did their assigned jobs far and
above the expected performance standards. Mr. Chairman, 1 appreciate the opportunity to appear
before this committee today and share my personal experience during my tour of duty in the
Persian Gulf. T sincerely hope these hearings shed some light on the mystery why Persian Gulf
War veterans are sick. I know we all continue to share a common interest in the good health and
welfare of our great Persian Gulf War veterans. Thank you.
79
4 January 1 994
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CATD
SUBJECT: IRAQI CHEMICAL AGENTS-INFORMATION PAPER
1 . Purpose. To present first hand knowledge of Iraqi chemical agents identified in Kuwait.
2. Discussion.
a. Nearly three years have passed since Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Recent
headlines have aroused considerable interest in the possible exposure of coalition forces to Iraqi
chemical agents. Much of this interest is the result of health problems by Gulf War Veterans that
indicated exposure to chemical agents. Although no government officials have confirmed use,
there is a high likelihood that some coalition forces experienced exposure to chemical agents.
b. On 7 August 1991, the 54th Chemical Troop of the 1 1th ACR received the tasking
(TAB A) to support the 21st EOD Squadron, British Royal Engineers. The mission was to
confirm the presence of a suspect liquid chemical agent. The Royal Engineers anticipated that the
agent was an H-agent (Mustard-a highly volatile blister agent) discovered on 5 August 1991 while
clearing unexploded ordnance at the Sabahiyah High School for Girls (Grid TNI 8832039). TAB
80
B is a detailed report by the 21st EOD Squadron. I was the Commander of the 54th Chemical
Troop and would lead the mission.
c. To accomplish the tasking, the 54th Chemical Troop employed two FOX NBC
Reconnaissance Vehicles. The FOX accurately detects 60 known chemical agents simultaneously
using a highly sophisticated, laboratory quality mass spectrometer. Through the use of a
collective protection system, the FOX also provides a high degree of crew protection in a field
environment. The mission required two FOX vehicles to validate results.
d. 54th Chemical Troop Leadership went to the US Embassy in Kuwait to receive a
complete mission brief by the Military Attache. The Troop Leadership gave a back brief to the
Military Attache on the capabilities of the FOX and how the Troop would conduct the mission.
e. Since this was the first joint and combined live chemical detection mission
involving US and British forces, it was essential that the operation be carefully planned to insure
any differences in doctrine, TTPs, or other possible concerns were resolved. A leader's
reconnaissance and detailed rehearsals occurred to ensure everyone knew their assigned duties
and responsibilities.
81
f. At TAB C are photographs of the site during the 8 August 1 991 mission. One
FOX team moved to the suspected contamination area and began to conduct point surveys using
the detection probe to a depth of approximately four centimeters. The mass spectrometer results
showed the presence of micro levels of H-Agent in the soil. Simultaneously, a dismounted
collection team, in full chemical over garments, moved to the container (estimated to be 800-1000
liter capacity) with Chemical agent Monitors(CAM) and other assorted chemical detection
equipment. The collection team took off the storage container's seals and there was an emission
of a vapor into the air under pressure that sounded similar to the opening of a soda container. We
saw a light copper to amber color vapor exiting from the seal hole. The dismounted collection
team employed chemical detection paper and the CAM: The detection paper changed color to
reflect the color of H-Agent detection; the CAM registered eight bars, confirming H-Agent.
g. We inserted a medical syringe with catheter tube into the container to extract the
liquid for detection paper, CAM, and FOX testing. We placed the sample into a Kidney shaped,
metal medical dish. Immediately, the liquid began to evaporate into the atmosphere. By the time
the ground team member moved to the rear of the FOX probe, there was not enough liquid
available to get a credible reading. The first test was unsuccessful because of the volatility of the
liquid. We performed a second test with success. The ground detection team extracted a larger
sample of the liquid and placed it into the metal dish. They moved to the FOX probe and the
system drew in the liquid for analysis. Within six (6) seconds, the mass spectrometer detected and
identified the liquid as highly concentrated (6.4 bars) H-Agent. Further analysis indicated some
82
traces of Phosgene (CG), a non-persistent choking agent and Phosgene Oxime (CX), a non-
persistent blister agent. The FOX team took another sample test to validate previous
identification. The test results confirmed the presence of H- Agent and traces of Phosgene (CG)
and Phosgene Oxime (CX). We initiated a third test utilizing the second FOX team to rule out
any possibility of false readings from the first FOX. The second FOX began its test executing the
same procedures as the first FOX. The second FOX team reported the same findings with the
exception of identifying much higher levels of CX in the liquid. The ground collection team
extracted more liquid and prepared it for transport out of the area for further testing and
evaluation.
h. A British team member, while withdrawing the liquid from the container, had
some of the liquid drops make contact with his left wrist. The soldier had an immediate reaction
to the liquid contact. The soldier was in extreme pain and was going into shock. Immediately he
went to the decontamination site. The decontamination team covered the soldier with Fillers of
Earth (decontamination powder) and cut him out of his individual protective equipment. The
decontamination team doused him with a mixture of Fillers Of Earth and Industrial Bleach.
Within one minute, we observed that the soldier had a small blister forming on his left wrist the
size of a stick-pin head. Five minutes later, the blister reached the size of a (US) half-dollar coin.
The medics screened die casualty for residual liquid contamination and sent die casualty to the
hospital for further treatment Further decontamination of personnel and equipment continued
until all were free of contamination.
83
I. In a controlled area, the FOX team leaders removed the tapes from the mass
spectrometer by order of LTC Kilgore, Task Force Victory Chemical Officer. The tapes are the
paper records of the exact chemical breakdown of the liquid by the Mass Spectrometer. The
tapes listed the percentage of the Mustard and Phosgene agent concentrations and any other
chemical compounds present in the liquid. These tapes would eventually go with the collected
samples as supporting documentation to assist in further testing of the liquid. The tapes and
samples were turned over to personnel wearing desert camouflage uniforms with no rank or
distinguishing patches. It is unknown what happened to the tapes and samples. Although the
Troop had an on order mission to assist in the removal of the container, the disposition of the
container is unknown as the troop was never directed to execute that mission.
3. Conclusion.
a. Iraqi Blister and Phosgene agents where present in Kuwait. It is, however, confusing
why the Iraqi Army would leave such a large container sitting in the open and exposed next to a
school. It is possible that the fleeing Iraqi Army left it there and never had the time to retrieve it
or forgot it because of the rapid advancement of Coalition ground forces' into Kuwait.
b. Coalition soldiers did experience exposure to Iraqi chemical agents. I can confirm that
at least one Coalition soldier (British) did experience exposure to a liquid chemical agent.
84
c. I am concerned that the information regarding the history of this action has not been
documented. END OF REPORT.
In closing, I would like to reemphasize that these are the facts and not speculation of what
actions we took in the detection, confirmation, and identification of Iraqi toxic chemical warfare
agents. I know that my unit in a joint chemical detection role with British forces did in fact detect
and confirm the presence of toxic chemical warfare agents in Kuwait. I know that our NBC
detection and protection equipment worked properly on 8 August 1991. I know that the soldiers
under my command were the best trained on the FOX Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Reconnaissance Vehicle and did their jobs far and above the standards place upon them. Mr.
Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee today and share my
personal experience during my tour of duty in the Persian Gulf. I sincerely hope these hearings
shed some light on the mystery why Persian Gulf War veterans are sick. I know we all continue
to share a common interest in the good health and welfare of our great Persian Gulf War veterans.
Thank you.
(A
85
Tab A
(Tasking to Do the Mission)
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, Task Force VICTORY (Fwd)
Camp Doha, Kuwait
APO 09889-0003
AETSBGC-V 7 August 1991
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, 11th ACR, ATTN: RS3
Subject: Tasking Number 91-047
1. You are tasked to provide the following support: Two FOX NBC
Reconnasiance Vehicles in support of Kuwaiti MOD and British EOD.
2. Personnel: Personnel to operate 2 FOX NBC Reconnaissance Vehicles.
3. Equipment required: 2 FOX Reconnasiance Vehicles.
4. Specific instructions:
' a. Initially FOX Vehicles will be used to provide NBC
reconnasiance/detect ion.
b. On order be prepared to provide two FOX NBC Reconnasiance
Vehicles for escort/monitoring of EOD operations.
c. Standard NBC SOPs will be followed to ensure safety of FOX
vehicle crews.
d. Direct coordination with Major Jon Watkinson, British Royal
Engineers, Commander 2lst EOD Group, Beteal Camp Messlack, grid 181376,
539-4505 (Comm) is authorized.
e. Report status to TF Victory POC LTC Killgore, 5056 (AT&T).
5. The attached report from the British Army is provided for your
information.
'fijfflL-
Encl-as JOSEPH W. MILLER
re, GS
ACofS, G-3
CF:
Chief of Staff, TF Victory (Fwd)
1~A3 f\
86
Tab B > :
(The British Report on the Container)
RESTRICTED
MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE
21 EOD SON GP
OP PINSEEKER
21:1542/20 BFPO 635
Mentor Ext 0004
See Distribution 0? Aug 91
INITIAL REPORT
SUSPECTED CHEMICAL CONTAINER
BACKGROUND
1. Whilst attending the International EOD meeting at Kuwait MOD on
5 Aug 91 I was tasked to Investigate a container which was thought
to be leaking Mustard Gas. The task was detailed by Lt Col Saleh Al
Ostath (Kuwait Army) and agreed by Mr Lucas of Royal Ordnance.
INITIAL FINDINGS
2. After some confusion in locating the suspect container I was
shown to a metal storage tank with a capacity of approximately 2000
litres, which had been penetrated by a bullet of approximately 7.62
calibre creating an entry hole and exit hole. A brown gas/vapour
was emerging from both holes. The storage tank was outside the
perimeter walls of the Sabahiyah High School for Girls, at Grid TN
18832039 (Magellan). The school was not in use but an American
civilian contractor was in the process of clearing Explosive
Ordnance (EO) and rubbish.
ACTIONS TAKEN
3. All personnel were moved up wind to a distance of 100 metres.
Further evacuation was not considered necessary as the school was
situated in an open area and the vapour leakage was small.
4. Wearing full Individual Protection Equipment (IPE) I approached
the container and tested the brown coloured vapour emerging from the
bullet holes with Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM). It gave a reading
of 8 Bars on H and no bars on G. I then tested the vapour with one
colour detector paper which showed no effect. I then tested the
vapour with 3 colour detector paper which showed a pink colour,
Indicating an H agent.
5. On a second visit to the container I fed a piece of D10 wire
through the bullet hole and on extracting the wire wiped an oily
substance on both types of detector paper (both of which may have
exceeded there shelf life). The one colour detector paper turned
brown and the 3 colour detector paper turned pink, the latter again
a positive Indication of an H agent. I effected a temporary seal of
both holes with black masking tape.
TA&3
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1
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87
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6. On a third visit the holes were uncovered and the vapour was
tested using the M18A2 chemical detector kit. The test was repeated
6 times. On four of the tests the colour indication turned blue
indicating H agent. For the remaining 2 test3 the colour Indicator
went yellow but some hours later turned blue. On a subsequent
control test in an uncontaminated environment 3 phials showed no
colour change. A further wire dip test was conducted using the
three colour detector paper from the M18A2 kit. The paper turned
pink/orange again indicating and H agent. Some of the chemicals
within the M18A2 showed signs of being beyond their shelf life. The
bullet holes were resealed with black masking tape.
7. On the fourth and final visit the black masking tape was removed
and the holes were both sealed using an industrial silicone filler
and plaster of paris bandages. The container was checked with CAM
for leaks and none were found. \ ^/
8. The container was guarded overnight by the civil police and a
school security officer. The following morning (6 Aug 91) orange
poles and white marker tape were positioned at 50 metres radius
outside the school wall around the container. The container was
rechecked for leaks with CAM, none were found. The school security
officer was told that nobody should go near the container but
otherwise clearance activity in the school could continue.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
9. The school security officer was employed at the school prior to
the conflict and was certain that the container was not there prior
to the invasion. He first noticed the container on 20 Mar 91 when
he had returned to the school. He thought that the container was
leaking on that date. It is understood that samples of the vapour
were taken for laboratory analysis by the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC).
10. The positioning of the container suggested that it had been
placed in a hasty manner using some heavy lifting equipment.
11. There were Iraqi defensive positions In the surrounding area
but no obvious indications as to why such a container should be
located where it was. The area was also contaminated with items of
EO.
12. The only markings on the container were the arabic numbers "< V"
(translated 27) marked with green paint on one end.
13. The vapour leak from the container dispersed from visual
recognition over a distance of 20 - 25 cm. It equated to a heavily
smoking cigar.
14. It is estimated that the container is approximately 30% - 50%
full of liquid suspected to be H agent (800 - 1000 litres).
TfiBB
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2
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88
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DETAILED INFORMATION
15. A 1:50,000 nap showing the location of the container ie a Annex
A. The school Is not narked on the nap.
16. Various photographs of the container are at Annex B.
17. A drawing showing dimensions of the container Is at Annex C.
18. The following timings were noted:
a. 050891 1435 hrs - Police escort to the school.
b. 1440 hrs - Viewed container. Set up ICP.
1450 - 1505 hrs
First approach In IPE.
test.
CAM and paper
d. 1530 - 1555 hrs - Second approach in IPE. Wire dip and
liquid on paper test. Temporary seal
using black masking tape.
e. 1705 - 1730 hrs
Third approach with BD Engr in IPE. Test
with M18A2 6 times. Wire dip and liquid
test on M18A2 3 colour paper. Resealed
with black masking tape.
f . 1830 - 1900 hrs - Fourth approach with BD Engr in IPE.
Sealed holes with silicone sealant and
plaster of paris. Tested for leaks.
Polaroid photographs taken.
g. 060891.
1030 - 1130 hrs - Checked for leaks visually and using CAM.
Measured dimensions. Took polaroid
photographs .
CONCLOSION
19. There is no obvious explanation for this container being in its
current location adjacent to a school and an Iraqi defensive
position. It probably contains an H agent and nay have been placed
by the Iraqi Army during their occupation of Kuwait. The leak
caused by a bullet hole was ninor and only vapour has escaped,
however the leak has probably been occurlng for 3-5 months with no
apparent casualties or ill effects.
20. The container is now sealed and represents no hazard provided no
tampering occurs.
MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE
itee>
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89
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RECOMMENDAT I ONS
21. Kuwait MOD are advised to promulgate a description and drawing
of the container with a view to locating any other similar
containers.
22. A low key discrete guard of the school area is recommended to
prevent tampering or theft of the container.
23. The samples of vapour reported to have been taken for laboratory
analysis by KOC should be tested thoroughly to confirm the chemical
substance.
24. In due course the container and Its contents should be moved
with care and close supervision to a suitable location where the
contents can be safely destroyed. This is a specialist task and one
which is within the capabilities of 21 EOD Sqn Group.
Annexes:
A. Location Map
B . Photographs
C. Drawing showing dimensions
Distribution:
External :
Action:
Kuwait MOD
Comd British Forces Kuwait
Information:
British Embassy - Attn DA/lst Secretary
American Embassy
MOl MOD UK Army - for Maj Parsons
JHQ High Wycombe - for Engrs
Tech Int Army MOD DI60 - for Maj C King
HO UKLF - for Engrs
US Forces Kuwait - DRAO
DNBCC
CDE Porton Down - for Mr P Hearn
33 Engr Regt (EOD) - for CO and Int Sgt
EODTIC
MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE
J P WATKINSON
Major
Officer Commanding
T*3B
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90
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Internal :
Information:
OC
Int Cpl
Pile
MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE
5
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TabC
(Copy of Pictures of the Site)
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96
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98
Mr. Shays. Sergeant Grass.
STATEMENT OF GUNNERY SERGEANT GEORGE J. GRASS,
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL INSTANT RESPONSE FORCE, U.S.
MARINE CORPS
Sergeant Grass. My name is Gunnery Sergeant Grass. I am cur-
rently a member of the Marine Corps Biological and Chemical Inci-
dent Response Forces based at Camp LeJeune, NC. While I was as-
signed to Southwest Asia, I was assigned as a FOX vehicle com-
mander for Task Force Ripper, First Marine Division. I was further
assigned the Third Tank Battalion, which was going to be a lead
element of Task Force Ripper. My mission was to observe and con-
firm or deny the presence of nuclear, biological and chemicals used
on the battlefield in such case. My first job was to — as I was proc-
essing through the breaches, was to check all the lanes on the first
belt and second belt on the breach of the mine fields.
Going through the first mine field breach, we detected small
traces of nerve agent. I reported that back as small detections, al-
though there was not enough concentration in the air for me to be
able to run a full spectrum on the mass spectrometer.
Once we had taken Al-Jaber Airfield, I was positioned just north
of there, and my alarm went off on my FOX vehicle with a full con-
centration of Sulfur Mustard. I printed out that spectrum. We did
a background check. We also had put in there samples of the oil
fire vapors that were in the air, so we knew there was no way that
could conflict with the Sulfur Mustard reading.
I tried to pass that up my chain of command, but they contin-
ually told Chief Warrant Officer Biedenbender, the NBC officer at
3d Tank Battalion, that it had to have been false readings from the
AMTRACS and tanks that were around me. I told them, no, that
comes up as fat, oil, wax, and several other possible false positives
they were saying; and we still said that there was no way that
could happen because we did our thorough checks. We did the
background checks; we did everything we were supposed to do ac-
cording to the way we were taught on how to run that mass spec-
trometer.
Once we got up to Kuwait City, and after our troops had taken
the international airport and we were sitting — my job was to travel
and verify — the Iraqi EPWs had given our intelligence personnel
information saying that there were possible chemical weapons
stored in the Third Armored Corps' ASP circling Kuwait City. My
job was to go find those chemical weapons.
I must say that I spent 6 years as an ammunition technician. I
have been through the Army Technical Escort School prior to going
to the Persian Gulf. I was a noncommissioned officer in the offen-
sive chemical weapons unit, and I know what chemical weapons
look like, and I received, stored, issued, inventoried, filled, built,
chemical weapons. I know what they look like. I know how to store
them.
In this one particular area there were built-up berms. There
were various different 55-gallon drums stored all over the place in-
side this area. As I was driving through this area, the alarm on the
mass spectrometer went off with a full reading of Sulfur Mustard.
We saw the weapons that were sitting there. They were 155 rounds
99
with bands around them. They also had skull and crossbone tapes
with red and yellow tape around them. They were from the United
States. A little bit further along in the same ammunitions storage
area my mass spectrometer
Mr. Shays. You say they were from the United States, the Iraqi
weapons?
Sergeant Grass. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. They were United States?
Sergeant Grass. Yes. Throughout the whole ammunitions stor-
age area there were weapons there from the United States, Jordan,
and Holland.
Next, a little ways away from there, my mass spectrometer
alarm went off again, and it showed a full reading of HT Mustard.
We backed up to the bunkers there, and they were rounds that
were all boxed up in ammo boxes. Again, a little bit farther
through this area here in a metal-looking container J. had received
another alarm that went off on the mass spectrometer, and this
one was for the incapacitating agent Benzobromide.
I reported all this information back to Chief Warrant Officer
Cottrell, who was the NBC officer of Task Force Ripper. When I got
back to Task Force Ripper's main, myself, Chief Warrant Officer
Cottrell, and other officers went into a tent. I briefed those on the
readings that I had gotten back at Al-Jaber Airfield, and also the
Sulfur Mustard, HT Mustard, Benzene Bromide that I had just re-
ceived at the ammunition storage area outside Kuwait City. I ex-
plained to them about the atomic mass and atomic weight over
300. I explained to them other readings that were on the spectrom-
eter tickets. They all agreed that an EOD team, Explosive Ord-
nance Disposal team, should go check this area out.
The next day I asked the ordnance EOD team. They had phoned
up from Al-Jaber Airfield. They had stated they never came for-
ward from Al-Jaber Airfield until that point right there. I asked,
are those people out to this chemical weapons storage area. They
donned their full protective equipment, went inside there, and they
began to catalog the lot numbers, because they were more con-
cerned about these lot numbers coming into— into Iraq after the
sanctions were imposed.
Once they had finished checking the area — they were in there for
about an hour or so — they came back out and decontaminated
themselves. I took them back to the international airport where I
had first received them, and that was the last time I saw them. I
gave the mass spectrometer tickets to Chief Warrant Officer
Cottrell and the rest of my chain of command. I have not seen
these tickets since.
Sir, I would be willing to answer; any questions that you may
have, sir.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Sergeant. We will be asking you some
questions.
[The prepared statement of Sergeant Grass follows:]
100
Statement of
Gy/Sgt. George J. Grass
Chemical/Biological Instant Response Force
Camp LeJeune, North Carolina
before the
Subcommittee on Human Resources and
Intergovernmental Relations
December 10, 1996
101
I Gysgt George J Grass do make the following statement:
Upon my arrival in South West Asia, I was assigned as the NBC Fox Recon Vehicle
Commander (Serial#5604) for 1st Marine Division, Task Force Ripper.
CWO Cottrell was the NBC Officer for Task Force Ripper. Due to the mission and
other circumstances, I was attached to 3d Tank Battalion which was the lead element of
Ripper. The NBC Officer at 3d Tank Battalion was CWO Biedenbender.
My overall mission was to provide the Task Force with a Recon and Survey of the
battlefield in case of any NBC attack and report that information through my chain of
command which began with CWO Biedenbender and CWO Cottrell.
Aproximately 24-48 hours prior to the breaching operations, all of the Fox vehicles
within 1st Marine Division were sent to the Northern Division Support Center for a final
operations and functions test. These tests included checking and verifying the Mobile
Mass Spectrometer for accuracy. The civilian technicians from General Dynamics
performed these checks and determined that all the Fox vehicles assigned to 1st Marine
Division were fully functional and accurate to include mine.
During operations at both minefield breaches, I was tasked with checking all eight (8)
lanes for any possible chemical contamination that may have been present. At the
morning meeting at 3d Tank Battalion's Command Operation Center (COC) on 22 Feb
1991, the intelligence brief was as follows "Recon reports back that from grid
coordinates QS756771 to QS754773 there have been observed to be numerous Viscella
69 mines with a high probability of chemicals". As my Fox vehicle drove through each
lane we monitored for both liquid and vapor contamination. The probe used to "sniff" for
any contamination detected small traces of Nerve Agent in the air. It is difficult to say
whether these traces were from vapor or liquid contamination. The computer system
notified us that the amount of chemical agent vapor in the air was not significant enough
to produce any casualties. As a result, it was impossible for the Mass Spectrometer to run
a complete check on the agent except by visually observing the agent and spectrum on
the computer screen. These minute reading continued on the screen for the duration of
each lane surveyed. Once my Fox vehicle departed the first minefield breach, those
Nerve Agent readings went away. I do not remember the type of Nerve agent we
detected. I told CWO Biedenbender and CWO Cottrell face to face what had been
detected and the trace amounts of the agent and they both agreed that since we had no
solid proof there was nothing we could do about it. Several Marines worked to complete
the lanes while wearing only MOPP level 2 and no gas mask while we detected these
readings. No further chemical agents were detected as we checked the lanes of the
second minefield breach.
After the Task Force had arrived and taken Al-Jaber airfield, I was positioned
somewhere on the northern side of the airfield with elements of 3d Tank Battalion
monitoring for any chemical agent vapor contamination in the air. The following day
the smoke from the burning oil fires rolled in and made daylight hours look completely
black. The Mass Spectrometer was programmed with a sample of the oil fire vapors and
it was labeled as unknown #1 . Whenever the thick smoke was present, there was always
a slight reading on the Mass Spectrometer screen. These slight readings were the same
regardless of the concentration or location of the vehicle. Because these readings
102
became common place whenever the thick smoke rolled in, it was easily recognizable
when compared to an actual chemical agent appearing on the monitor. As the Mass
Spectrometer was monitoring for chemical agent vapor contamination with the usual
readings from the oil fires, the alarm on the Mass Spectrometer sounded alerting us of a
lethal vapor concentration of the chemical agent S-Mustard The vapor concentration
was present in the air for several minutes and allowed the Mass Spectrometer to do a
complete analysis of the vapor present. A complete chemical spectrum was run and
printed out for future evidence of the chemical contamination. Upon hearing the alarm
and observing a lethal vapor concentration of the Blister agent S-Mustard in the air, I
alerted the entire Task Force of our findings. After receiving the proper authority, my
Fox vehicle conducted an area recon and survey to determine the limits of contamination.
While performing the survey, the readings went away and the only readings appearing on
the monitor were the typical readings from the oil fire vapors. The detection of the
positive readings were reported through 3d Tank Battalions COC by CWO Biedenbender
and myself to the 1st Marine Division NBC Officer, CWO Bauer. Division stated that our
readings were false and that the readings were produced by the burning oil fire vapors.
We explained to him that we already knew what the oil fire vapors looked like on the
monitor and the readings were clearly distinct with the words S-Mustard printed across
the screen and on the tape printed out as evidence of the contamination the Marines were
exposed to. Division then stated that the readings had to be false positive readings from
the fuel/exhaust systems of the M60 tanks andAmtracs, etc. that were around my Fox
vehicle. Again I explained to Division that the Mass Spectrometer already had a fuel
vapor sample programmed into the system and comes up on the monitor as its chemical
name and the words "Fat, oil, wax". Division still insisted that we had false readings and
abruptly signed off the radio. CWO Biedenbender instructed me to keep the printed copy
as proof of our detection in case we needed it at a later date.
After Task Force Ripper left Al-Jaber airfield heading toward Kuwait City, several
chemical attacks were reported throughout the Task Force from positive readings taken
by personnel using the Chemical Agent Monitor(CAM). My Fox Vehicle was called to
survey every possible contaminated area and verify/check for any vapor or ground
contamination present. All surveys performed by my Fox vehicle were negative when
called to survey possible chemical agent attacks although the CAM had two-three bar
positive readings. Element Commanders began to perform selective unmasking
procedures by use of the M256A1 Chemical agent detection kit until my Fox vehicle
verified the absence of chemical contamination in their area of operation. Once my Fox
vehicle determined that there was no contamination present, the Marines removed their
field protective mask.
The next time my Fox vehicle had verifiable positive chemical agent readings was
from an Ammunition Storage Area located just outside of Kuwait City.
On 28 Feb 1991, 1 was now part of Task Force Ripper's main element and controlled
by CWO Cottrell. During the intelligence briefing that morning, it was stated by the S-2
that the Iraqi's had established the 3d Armored Corps Ammunition Supply Point(ASP)
just outside of Kuwait City and that sources (Iraqi prisoners) have stated there were
chemical weapons stored somewhere within the Ammo Storage Area. I was informed
that my task was to do a complete survey of the entire ASP and locate any chemical
103
weapons that may be stored there. CWO Cottrell directed me to call back nonchalantely
as finding some "HONEY" instead of alerting the entire Task Force of my findings. My
Fox vehicle began conducting the survey that afternoon. While monitoring for chemical
agent vapors in an out of the way ammo storage area next to 1st Bn 5th Marines location,
the alarm on the Mass Spectrometer sounded with a full and distinct spectrum across the
monitor and a lethal vapor concentration of S-Mustard . We drove the Fox vehicle
closer to the dug in ammo bunkers and fully visible were the skull and cross bones either
on yellow tape with red lettering or some boxes had red skull and cross bones painted on
the boxes, and a small painted sign next to the bunkers. On top of several of the boxes
of ammunition were 155mm rounds with colored bands around them. The labeling on
the boxes was from the United States. A full and complete spectrum was taken and
printed out as proof of the detection. I notified CWO Cottrell of the "HONEY" and he
instructed me to return to Ripper's main area but to be aware that some VTP's and the
media were there. As we continued driving through the same ammo storage area the
alarm sounded again. The chemical agent HT-Mustard in a lethal dose came across the
monitor. Again, the skull and cross bones were present although the boxes were closed
with markings from the United States and Holland Again a full spectrum on the Mass
Spectrometer was easily accomplished and printed out as proof of the detection. Before
driving out of the ammo storage area, the alarm sounded once more showing a positive
reading of Benzene Bromide . This reading was taken next to a large metal container
with no distinct markings. The vapor concentration was in the air and a full spectrum
was ran on the Mass Spectrometer and printed out as proof of the detection. All of the
positive chemical agent readings were all within 100 yards of each other near grid
coordinate QT766395. Although I did not have time to survey the entire area, all of the
ammunition that I observed stored in the area was either from Holland, Jordan and/or the
United States. No Marine unit had gone into that storage area before we entered it.
Completing the Army Technical Escort course seven months prior to deployment to
SWA, being a former Ammunition Technician for 6 years and working as the NCOIC of
the Marine Corps offensive chemical weapons unit, I observed several signs of possible
chemical weapons storage. There were fire extinguishers colored in red, blue or green
with each grouped in a specific area according to their color. Also this particular storage
area was positioned far out of the way from the rest of the 3rd Armored Corps ASP. It
was blocked off by a thick row of trees making it difficult to see from the main highway
leading into Kuwait City. Also this particular storage area had several bung and open top
55 gallon drums that were painted all blue, red and blue, olive drab green, and white and
green. Each set of drums were grouped together according to its color and whether the
color of the drum was solid or striped. No other area of the entire 3d Armored Corps
ASP that my Fox vehicle checked was designed and set up like that area. Task Force
Ripper's intelligence section was notified in great detail of this area.
Upon arrival at Ripper's COC, myself, CWO Cottrell and other officers were taken
into a command post tent I explained to all of them about the S-Mustard detection at
Al-Jaber airfield and of the S-Mustard, HT-Mustard, and Benzene Bromide detected
at the chemical weapons storage area I had just left. I explained the comparison between
both S-Mustard tickets and also pointed out that each had an atomic mass/weight over
300 which is comparable to a chemical compound and they all agreed that Division must
104
be notified. As I was standing there, one of the officers contacted Division. When he
hung up the radio, it was determined that I would meet an EOD team at 0700 at Division
HQ located at the Kuwait International Airport and escort them to the ammo storage area
the next morning. I gave my superior officers all of the printed out Mass Spectrometer
tickets taken from Al-Jaber airfield and the 3rd Armored Corps ASP. I never saw the
tickets I had given them again. The EOD team had not come forward of Al-Jaber airfield
at this point in the war and was concerned with the unexploded munitions located there.
When the EOD team finally arrived by helicopter, I escorted them to where the
chemical weapons were detected. Upon arrival, the EOD team donned full protective
equipment and entered the area. They worked in the area for aproximately one hour.
Upon completion of their mission, they deconned themselves and verbally acknowledged
the presence of chemical weapons in the storage area but stated that their main concern
was to catalogue lot numbers to see if those lot numbers had come into the country after
sanctions were imposed on Iraq. We escorted the EOD team back to the International
Airport and never heard from them again. Task Force Ripper and my Fox vehicle
departed Kuwait aproximately two days later.
Since returning from the Persian Gulf War, I have spoken to almost every Fox Vehicle
commander from both 1st and 2nd Marine Division and every one of them has verbally
acknowledged the positive identification of chemical agents in their area of operation.
105
Mr. Shays. I am going to refer to the father as "Mr. Hebert" and
to the son as "Major."
Major Hebert, your testimony will be read by your dad; is that
correct?
Major Hebert. Yes.
Mr. Loyd Hebert. My son would like to make the opening state-
ment.
Mr. Shays. He is allowed and welcome to make any comments
he wants. We are as patient as can be, so he doesn't need to rush.
You don't need to rush, Major.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR RANDY LEE HEBERT, U.S. MARINE
CORPS, ACCOMPANIED BY LOYD HEBERT AND KIM HEBERT
Mr. Loyd Hebert. Mr. Chairman, my son has said: Mr. Chair-
man, members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen, my name
is Randy Hebert. I appreciate the opportunity to present the truth
today.
In December 1990, I was assigned to Second Combat Engineering
Battalion, Second Marine Division, where I served as Assistant Op-
erations Officer, Operations Officer, and Officer in Charge of
breaching the division's left flank to create two emergency lanes to
evacuate casualties, if needed.
On 23 February 1991, the eve prior to our ground attack, we
moved into our attack position approximately 2V-2 to 3 miles from
the border of Kuwait, near the area known as the elbow, Umm
Gudair Oil Fields.
On G-day, 24 February 1991, we were to link up with a section
of tanks. This never happened. In the confusion, I radioed to Bat-
talion Three to let him know the situation. I decided to halt my
men south of the berm dividing Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. I pro-
ceeded about 500 meters to the east by a HUMWV with my driver
and radio man to a traffic control point.
As we approached, we received the hand and arm signal for
chemical attack. We put on our masks and gloves. In doing so, I
recall my right hand feeling cool and tingling. I was mad because
we were just starting, and already receiving the signs for chemi-
cals. I jumped from the vehicle and asked the MP in strong Marine
Corps language who had told him to go to MOPP level 4. He point-
ed to another Marine, whom I asked the same question. He told
me, "Someone on the radio." We drove back and radioed to my Ma-
rines to get to MOPP level 4.
When we arrived, some were, others were not. The driver and I
jumped from the vehicle, giving the signals for chemicals. I ap-
proached the MP controlling traffic to ask why he wasn't in MOPP
level 4. He told me the alarm was false. I was angry and removed
my mask. I now feel that was a mistake. I radioed to the Battalion
Three and told him, "We are rolling and we have not made contact
with the tanks." He said, "OK." Within a minute of rolling, he
called back, saying that "Your lane is dirty. Chemical mine has
gone off. Go to MOPP 4." I called back and verified his statement.
Then I told him "Roger that." We all went to MOPP 4. Lane Red
One was the lane where the chemical mine detonated.
After about 30 minutes, we had finished firing line charges. We
had several mines that needed to be cleared from the hedgerow.
106
We were still in MOPP 4, and I radioed to the Battalion Three ask-
ing where we would decontaminate. A lieutenant told me that we
should check to see if chemicals were in the air. I again asked
where we would decontaminate. I received the same response. I
was mad and hung up. We stayed in MOPP 4 another 2V2 to 3
hours. During this time much of the division moved quickly
through the area, some in MOPP 4s, others not. Although we had
finished our portion of the lane, we remained by Lane Red One, be-
cause the far right flank was having great difficulty due to the den-
sity of the mine field.
The battalion commander wanted us all to proceed to the next
obstacle belt together. I remember a dead camel lying by the en-
trance to our lane. It did not have any insects feeding on it. After
several hours in MOPP 4, I had my driver check the area for
chemicals. After we determined that chemicals were no longer
present, my driver selectively unmasked. Then after he displayed
no symptoms, I had my other Marines unmask.
I forgot to mention that once we arrived at the breach site, I had
communicated directly with the lieutenant working with me, ask-
ing if he felt funny, or if he was having problems breathing. He
told me he didn't think so, but he asked why. I told him that I felt
funny. I also recall two large explosions while we were breaching
that I thought were artillery. However, they only left dust clouds
after they hit. I now believe they may have been chemical rounds.
We remained between the two mine fields the night of 24 February
1991, and the next day and night, 25 February 1991. On the 25th,
I heard a large explosion in the area. The following day we moved
to an area known as the Ice Cube Tray, where we built a POW
camp. I later learned the area just north was the headquarters for
the Iraqi chemical brigade. During our movement to this area, we
heard several explosions. I am not sure what they were. A few days
later, 28 February 1991, we moved to an area about 8 miles south-
west of Kuwait City near a small town called Al Jahra. I later
learned this area was an old garbage dump that had been covered.
Around the beginning of March, perhaps the 10th, I became very
ill with flu-like symptoms. I remember many others were ill also.
Around the 22d of February, I started taking Pyrostigmine Bro-
mide pills, PB, for antinerve agent protection. I believe I took the
pills for 11 to 14 days.
Once we returned to Saudi Arabia in April, early April, I began
to have some difficulty with sleep. This continued upon my return
home on 15 May 1991, until early July, at which time I was having
difficulty reading and remembering what I had read. I was ex-
tremely aggressive, moody, and excitable. I had headaches, vomit-
ing, and diarrhea. I was also diagnosed with moderate depression.
I was given medications for several months, at which time the ma-
jority of the symptoms went away.
I continued to have headaches almost on a daily basis, and took
as many as 8 to 10 aspirins a day until April 1995. Besides the
headaches, I felt I was not able to breathe as well when I ran. In
May 1994, I noticed a decrease in my upper body strength. In early
July, I had a lump on my throat area the size of a walnut. I was
not sick. I had a friend who was a medical doctor come to my
107
house, to my home, to examine me. He was not sure what caused
the lump. It remained for IY2 to 2 weeks.
In October 1994, I experienced problems with my throat muscles,
and coughed very frequently and uncontrollably. There were times
when my throat muscles would constrict and I could not breathe
for 10 to 15 seconds. In November of the same year, I noticed atro-
phy in my right arm and hand, and began having difficulty control-
ling my hand and arm. In January 1995, while being evaluated at
the National Naval Medical Center, I developed another lump on
the right side of my face just forward of my right ear. It also was
the size of a walnut.
During the same 3-week period I had a very large rash from the
middle of my nose to the middle of my forehead which was red,
swollen, and extremely itchy. Also it had three white, watery
pustules. When the rash subsided, I was left with a scar in be-
tween my eyebrows.
From January 1995, until October 1995, I was evaluated at sev-
eral different hospitals. During some of these visits I saw, spoke to,
and learned of other servicemen and women who served in the Gulf
who were having problems. These problems included cancer, res-
piratory disease, muscle twitches, fatigue, memory loss, joint pains,
ulcers, rashes, lumps under the skin, hearing problems, atrophy of
one limb, atrophy of the brain, insomnia, depression, heart prob-
lems, tearing of the eyes, and others.
During this time I developed a rash on my buttocks, tearing of
the eyes with burning, and occasional ringing in both ears. In Octo-
ber 1995, I was diagnosed with ALS, amyelotrophic lateral sclero-
sis, also known as Lou Gehrig's disease. I believe the medical prob-
lems I have discussed are due to low-level chemical exposure over
an extended period.
I learned after the war that the chemical mine detonated in Lane
Red One was confirmed for the nerve agent Sarin and also for the
agent Lewisite Mustard Gas by FOX vehicle in the lane. I also
learned that two Marines in an AMTRAC received chemical burns,
and that the chemical mine confirmation was reported by the regi-
mental commander of the Sixth Marines. It was also reported up
the chain of command by the Second Marine Division Commander.
It has been brought to my attention that there have been at least
seven other cases of ALS in service members who served in the
Gulf. To me, this is more than chance or coincidence.
Besides myself, there have been numerous others with various
experiences. For example, one, I have spoken to a Marine who be-
lieves a missile attack occurred in Al JuBail that was a chemical
attack. He made the duty officer from the Second Division read the
division log book to him. He has the statement recorded on audio-
tape. It says that Mustard Gas was detected.
Two, I have also spoken to a Marine who was evaluated with
several other Marines from his squad upon their return from the
war. They were told they were being studied for adverse effects
from the desert sun. They were told this by someone whom he be-
lieves was a civilian doctor. They all were observed for 1 week. The
following week the Marines went back to the hospital to find the
results. They were told that they were never there. Also, there is
not an indication in their records they were ever there.
108
Three, I have learned of a Marine Corps investigation that was
directed at the general officer level to determine the possible expo-
sure to chemical agents of Marine Sergeant Randy G. Wheeler. As
a result of that investigation, I have learned of other chemical de-
tections just to our northeast near Al Jahra Airfield in the First
Marine Division's area, both on the 24th and 25th of February
1991. One of the opinions of the general officer reviewing the inves-
tigation was that Sergeant Wheeler may be suffering from expo-
sure to chemicals or other contaminants, and his condition may be
combat-related.
Finally, on 12 November 1996, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps was speaking at Camp LeJeune. I had an opportunity to ask
him if the Marine Corps had an official position on Gulf war syn-
drome illness. The Commandant told me that the Marine Corps
does have a position, and they believe chemical weapons were used.
He also said the Marine Corps is in the process of trying to contact
Marines who may have been exposed.
In conclusion, I believe with 100 percent certainty that chemicals
and possibly biological agents were used during the war. I base my
belief on several facts: One, Iraq had the capability and resources
to deploy chemical weapons and had done so in the past; two, the
United States was primarily concerned with the enemy's use of
chemical and biological weapons both prior to the start of the air
war and the ground war; three, the primary targets during the air
campaign were chemical munitions plants and storage areas; four,
prior to the ground campaign, we were all told to expect chemical
attacks; five, FOX vehicles, extremely sophisticated pieces of detec-
tion equipment, were tested by General Dynamics only days before
the ground war; six, the FOX vehicles were operated by highly
skilled, professionally trained individuals; seven, FOX vehicles con-
firmed chemical agents in several locations; eight, many service
members became ill with flu-like symptoms shortly after the
ground war. These symptoms are consistent with research findings
of low-level chemical exposure; nine, other countries detected
chemicals in the theater. The Czechoslovakians are considered the
best in the world at chemical detection. They detected chemicals.
Ten, individuals received blisters and burns consistent with chemi-
cal exposure; eleven, close to 130,000 men and women are now sick
with many different ailments which are consistent with research on
low-level chemical exposure; twelve, chemical alarms sounded
throughout the theater of operation; thirteen, the Pentagon has
changed its position on chemical detections; fourteen, there were
dead animals and insects throughout the theater, consistent with
chemical exposure; fifteen, colonels and generals in the Marine
Corps, including the Commandant, believe chemical weapons were
used; sixteen, I was extremely healthy and fit prior to the war.
Over the last 5V2 years, I have experienced most of the symptoms
known as Gulf war syndrome.
This concludes my statement to the committee. I would be glad
to answer any questions that you might have. Very respectfully,
Major Randy L. Hebert.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Major, for your very helpful testimony.
[The prepared statement of Major Hebert follows:]
109
STATEMENT OF MAJOR RANDY LEE HEBERT, USMC
Testimony for the Hearing on Persian Gulf War Veteran's Illnesses
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
December 10, 1996
Mister Chairman, Members of the Committee, Ladies and Gentlemen, my name is
Randy Hebert. / appreciate the opportunity to present the truth today.
In December 1990 I was assigned to 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion, 2nd Marine
Division where I served as Assistant Operations Officer, Operations Officer, and Officer in
Charge of Breaching the Division's left flank to create two emergency lanes to evacuate
casualties if needed.
On 23 February 1991, the eve prior to our ground attack, we moved into our
attack position approximately two and one-half to three miles from the border of Kuwait,
near the area known as the elbow (Umm Gudair Oil Fields). On G-day, 24 February
1991, we were to link up with a section of tanks, this never happened. In the confusion, I
radioed to the Battalion Three to let him know the situation. I decided to halt my men
south of the berm dividing Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. I proceeded about five hundred
meters to the east via a HUMWV with my driver and radio man to a traffic control point.
As we approached, we received the hand and arm signal for chemical attack. We
put on our masks and gloves. In doing so, I recall my right hand feeling cool and tingling.
I was mad because we were just starting and already receiving the sign for chemicals. I
jumped from the vehicle and asked the Marine MP in strong Marine Corps language who
110
had told him to go to MOPP Level Four. He pointed to another Marine whom I asked the
same question. He told me, "Someone on the radio."
We drove back and radioed to my Marines to get to MOPP Level Four. When we
arrived some were, others were not. The driver and I jumped from the vehicle giving the
signal for chemicals. I approached the MP controlling traffic to ask why he wasn't in
MOPP Level Four. He told me the alarm was false. I was angry and removed my mask.
/ now feel that was a mistake. I radioed to the Battalion Three and told him, "We are
rolling and we have not made contact with the tanks." He said, "OK." Within a minute of
rolling he called back saying that, "Your lane is dirty, chemical mine has gone off, go to
MOPP Four." I called back and verified his statement. Then I told him, "Roger that."
We all went to MOPP Four Lane Red One was the lane where the chemical mine
detonated.
After about 30 minutes, we had finished firing line charges. We had several mines
that needed to be cleared from the hedge row. We were still in MOPP Four and I radioed
to the Battalion Three asking where we would decontaminate. A Lieutenant told me that
we should check to see if chemicals were in the air. I again asked where we would
decontaminate. I received the same response. I was mad and hung up.
We stayed in MOPP Four another two and one-half to three hours. During this
time much of the Division moved quickly through the area, some in MOPP Four, others
not. Although we had finished our portion of the lane, we remained by Lane Red One
because the far right flank was having great difficulty due to the density of the minefield.
The Battalion Commander wanted us all to proceed to the next obstacle belt together. I
Ill
remember a dead camel lying by the entrance to our lane It did not have any insects
feeding on it.
After several hours in MOPP Four, I had my driver check the area for chemicals.
After we determined that chemicals were no longer present, my driver selectively unmasked
Then, after he displayed no symptoms, I had my Marines unmask. I forgot to mention that
once we arrived at the breach site, I had communicated directly with the Lieutenant working
with me, asking if he felt funny or if he was having problems breathing. He told me he didn't
think so, but he asked why. I told him that I felt funny I also recall two large explosions
while we were breaching that I thought were artillery However they only left dust clouds
after they hit I now believe they may have been chemical rounds.
We remained between the two minefields the night of 24 February 1991 and the next
day and night, 25 February 1991. On the 25th, I heard a large explosion in the area. The
following day we moved to an area known as the Ice Cube Tray where we built a POW
camp. I later learned the area just north was the headquarters for the Iraqi Chemical Brigade.
During our movement to this area we heard several explosions. I am not sure what they
were.
A few days later, 28 February 1991, we moved to an area about eight miles
southwest of Kuwait City, near a small town called Al Jahra. I later learned this area was an
old gaib^qe dump that had been covered. Around the beginning of March, perhaps the tenth,
I became very ill with flu like symptoms. I remember many others were ill also.
Around the 22nd of February, I started taking Pyrostigmine Bromide Pills for anti-
nerve agent protection. I believe I took the pills for eleven to fourteen days Once we
112
returned to Saudi Arabia -in early April, I began to have some difficulty with sleep. This
continued upon my return home on 15 May 1991 until early July, at which time I was having
difficulty reading and remembering what I had read, I was extremely aggressive, moody, and
excitable. I had headaches, vomiting, and diarrhea. I was also diagnosed with moderate
depression. I was given medications for several months, at which time the majority of the
symptoms went away.
I continued to have headaches almost on a daily basis and took as many as eight to
ten aspirins a day until April 1995. Besides the headaches, I felt I was not able to breathe as
well when I ran. In May of 1994 I noticed a decrease in my upper body strength. In early
July, I had a lump on my throat area the size of a walnut. I was not sick. I had a friend,
who is a medical doctor, come to my home to examine me. He was not sure what caused
the lump. It remained for one and a half to two weeks.
In October of 1994, 1 experienced problems with my throat muscles and coughed
very frequently and uncontrollably. There were times when my throat muscles would
constrict and I could not breathe for ten to fifteen seconds. In November of the same year, I
noticed atrophy in my right arm and hand and began having difficulty controlling my hand
and arm.
In January 1995 while being evaluated at the National Naval Medical Center, I
developed another lump on the right side of my face just forward of my right ear. It also
was the size of a walnut. During the same three week period, I had a very large rash from
the middle of my nose to the middle of my forehead which was red, swollen, and extremely
113
itchy. Also, it had three white watery postules When the rash subsided, I was left with a
scar in between my eye brows.
From January 1995 until October 1995 I was evaluated at several different hospitals
During some of these visits, I saw, spoke to, and learned of other service men and women
who served in the Gulf who were having problems. These problems included cancer,
respiratory disease, muscle twitches, fatigue, memory loss, joint pains, ulcers, rashes, lumps
under the skin, hearing problems, atrophy of one limb (Monomelic Amythrophy - a rare
disease in the United States), atrophy of the brain, insomnia, depression, heart problems,
tearing of the eyes, and others.
During this time, I developed a rash on my buttock, tearing of the eyes with burning,
and occasional ringing in both ears. In October 1995 I was diagnosed with ALS
(Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis also known as Lou Gehrig's Disease). I believe the
medical problems I have discussed are due to low level chemical exposure over an
extended period.
I learned after the war that the chemical mine detonated in Lane Red One was
confirmed for the nerve agent Sarin and also the agent Lewisite Mustard Gas by a FOX
vehicle in the lane. I also learned that two Marines in an Amtrack received chemical burns
and that the chemical mine confirmation was reported by the Regimental Commander of
the Sixth Marines. It was also reported up the chain of command by the Second Marine
Division Commander. It has been brought to my attention that there have been at least
seven other cases of ALS in service members who served in the Gulf. To me this is more
than mere chance or coincidence.
114
Besides myself, there have been numerous others with various experiences. For
example:
1 . I have spoken to a Marine who believes a missile attack occurred in Al JuBail
that was a chemical attack. He made the duty officer from the 2nd Division read
the Division log book to him. He has the statement recorded on audio tape. It
says that mustard gas was detected.
2. I have also spoken to a Marine who was evaluated with several other Marines
from his squad upon their return from the war. They were told they were being
studied for adverse effects from the desert sun. They were told this by someone
whom he believes was a civilian doctor. They all were observed for one week.
The following week the Marines went back to the hospital to find the results.
They were told that they were never there. Also there is not an indication in
their records they were ever there.
3. I have learned of a Marine Corps investigation that was directed at the General
Officer Level to determine the possible exposure to chemical agents of Marine
Sergeant Randy G. Wheeler. As a result of that investigation, I have learned of
other chemical detections, just to our northeast, near Al Jaber Airfield; in the
First Marine Division's Area, both on the 24th and 25th of February 1991 . One
of the opinions of the General Officer reviewing the investigation was that,
"Sergeant Wheeler may be suffering from exposure to chemicals or other
contaminants and his condition may be combat related."
115
• Finally, on 12 November 1996 the Commandant of the Marine Corps was speaking
at Camp LeJeune I had an opportunity to ask him if the Marine Corps had an official
position on Gulf War Syndrome/Illness. The Commandant told me that the Marine Corps
does have a position and that they believe chemical weapons were used He also said, the
Marine Corps is in the process of trying to contact Marines who may have been exposed
In conclusion, I believe with 100% certainty that chemicals and possibly biological
agents were used during the war I base my belief on several facts:
1 . Iraq had the capability and resources to deploy chemical weapons and had
done so in the past.
2. The United States was primarily concerned with the enemy's use of chemical
and biological weapons both prior to the start of the air war and the ground
war.
3 The primary targets during the air campaign were chemical munitions plants
and storage areas.
4. Prior to the ground campaign we were all told to expect chemical attacks.
5. FOX vehicles, extremely sophisticated pieces of detection equipment, were
tested by General Dynamics only days before the ground war.
6. The FOX vehicles were operated by highly skilled, professionally trained
individuals.
7. FOX vehicles confirmed chemical agents in several locations.
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8. Many service members became ill with flue like symptoms shortly after the
ground war. These symptoms are consistent with research findings of low
level chemical exposure.
9. Other countries detected chemicals in the theater. The Czechoslovakians are
considered the best in the world at chemical detection. They detected
chemicals.
10. Individuals received blisters and bums consistent with chemical exposure.
1 1 . Close to 100,000 men and women are now sick with many different ailments
which are consistent with research on low level chemical exposure.
12. Chemical alarms sounded throughout the Theater of Operation.
13 The Pentagon has changed its position on chemical detections.
14. There were dead animals and insects throughout the Theater, consistent with
chemical exposure.
15. Colonels and Generals in the Marine Corps, including the Commandant,
believe chemical weapons were used.
16. 1 was extremely healthy and fit prior to the war Over the last five and one-half
years, I have experienced most of the symptoms known as "Gulf War
Syndrome."
This concludes my statement to the Committee. I would be glad to answer any
questions that you might have.
Very Respectfully,
Randy L. Hebert
117
Mr. Shays. Before I call on Mr. Sanders to start the line of ques-
tioning, I would like to just accept for the record a definition of
MOPP 4 for the testimony, for the record. I would invite anyone
to describe what that was.
Sergeant Grass. MOPP 4 stands for Mission-Oriented Protective
Posture. It consists of a chemical protective overgarment, a char-
coal impregnated suit for your tops, for your jacket, and your trou-
sers. You also wear a pair of rubber booties over that, that are cov-
ering the combat boots. You wear a pair of rubber gloves covering
your hands, and you wear a field protective mask.
Mr. Shays. It is my understanding that is the highest level that
you would go to. You are in full protective gear; correct, sir?
Sergeant Grass. Yes, sir; in a military environment, yes, sir.
Major Johnson. Sir, I also would like to add that in a MOPP
posture, you have a range from level to MOPP level 4, zero being
the lowest of it, not wearing the uniform, and as you go up to each
level, up to MOPP 4, you add a piece of that garment on. So when
you hear us say "full MOPP," we are also meaning full MOPP 4
protective mask, gloves, booties, the actual overgarment, zipped up,
with our other detection tapes on our uniforms.
Mr. Shays. For the record, both you, Major, and you, Gunnery
Sergeant, were in FOX equipment. You were basically ahead of the
charge; is chat correct?
Major Johnson. With my detections, I was not actually inside
the vehicle. I was 100 to 150 meters to the north-northeast of
where the container was located, at a location called the Initial
Command Post, that was set up by the British. So I was outside
of the vehicles. However, I had radio communication with both ve-
hicles and could talk, as I'm talking with you, to each member in
that vehicle to find out exactly what was going on inside the vehi-
cle, and what tasks, what findings they had discovered at any
given point during that mission.
Mr. Shays. Just for the record, both of you in the FOX equip-
ment in those units, how often were you in full protective gear?
Major Johnson. During my unit's detection, we were at the com-
mand post. We were not in any MOPP — increased MOPP posture,
basically because the commander had identified a location that was
upwind from where the actual container was, so that if any vapors
were released into the atmosphere they would float downwind from
us, away from our position. Inside our FOX vehicles, as a battle
drill, as another precaution, if our overpressure system failed in-
side the system, my soldiers were already at a level called MOPP
level 2 where they already had their overgarment on, zipped up.
The only thing they did not have on was their protective mask and
gloves, so if vapor was able to escape and make it inside the vehi-
cle, they would have had enough time based on the other detection
systems inside the vehicle to go to full MOPP 4 to protect them-
selves, as well as continue on with their mission.
Mr. Shays. Sergeant Grass, were you in the vehicle, and there-
fore not fully under protective gear, or were you in both conditions?
Sergeant Grass. Sir, my FOX vehicle was positioned on the for-
ward element. The units that were in front of me were tow vehicles
because they had a better one-on-one contact with the tank fighting
against the tow. It was also the Mark 19 vehicles that were in front
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of me. I was positioned back just a little bit, back from those for-
ward of the tanks. I had everybody's frequencies and call signs, so
anywhere within Task Force Ripper, whether it be First Battalion
Seventh Marines or First Fifth Marines, if there was a chemical at-
tack or nuclear, biological and chemical attack, they just basically
contacted me and I went straight to their area with my security.
To answer the other question, sir, we had the choice, just like the
Major did, the overpressure system inside the FOX vehicle that
prevented chemicals from coming in. In the case that I had to open
up the top of the vehicle and return fire with the machine gun on
top, then, yes, sir, we would also have been in MOPP level 2 inside
that vehicle.
Mr. Shays. Basically, I really proceeded in asking a line of ques-
tioning, and I thought I was just going to establish something for
the record, but I'm just going to continue for 2 more minutes here.
What I am just trying to understand, I consider this more house-
keeping than really getting into the nuts and bolts of what we
want to ask you, what I'm trying to visualize is that when you were
out to test something, by the time the alarm goes off, is it not too
late?
Sergeant Grass. There is no purpose to get outside that FOX ve-
hicle sir. It's fully enclosed and everything can be run from inside.
Mr. Shays. FOX vehicles preceded Major Hebert and his unit.
And it is your testimony, Major Hebert, that FOX equipment that
preceded your units were alerting you to chemical agents?
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. He was in the first wave
with six Marines. And the FOX vehicle was with six Marines.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Sanders will proceed with questions.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It goes with-
out saying that all of us are very thankful for all of you being here
today and giving us the information that you have. We appreciate
it.
It seems to me that a common thread running through all of
your testimony is that you had difficulty communicating, or lack of
success, if you like, communicating your experience to your higher-
ups.
Now, it seems fairly obvious that if one wants to understand the
problems associated with the illnesses that our soldiers are experi-
encing, the more information that we have, the better we can deal
with the problem. That is true for any problem.
It took 5 years before the Pentagon finally acknowledged that our
soldiers were exposed to chemical agents. In your judgment, given
your particular difficulties in being able to communicate your own
experiences to the higher-ups, why do you think it took 5 years be-
fore the Pentagon finally acknowledged what you have told us
today and what many other people have told us? And anyone in
any order, please answer.
Major Johnson. Sir, on my part, I think it was maybe a lack of
understanding of the seriousness behind what information was
being presented 5 years ago. My intent was to provide my super-
visors with information about all our actions in the desert with the
hope of being able to go and teach our lessons learned from the
Gulf, because at the time that I submitted my report, I was an in-
structor at the Infantry School at Fort Benning and I thought what
119
a great opportunity it would be to present that type of information,
because in all the classes that I taught on NBC, I also began to
hear a lot of common things coming back from officers who had
participated in the Gulf war: confidence in the equipment, con-
fidence in the soldiers who were actually utilizing that equipment.
It, to me, was the best atmosphere to give them reassurance that
our equipment was the best at that time and still is today, and
that we could continue on by educating everybody, in this case in
the Infantry School, with the advanced course officers, young lieu-
tenants and captains that were coming through. When the report
went forward, it came back to me with great information: Go ahead
and modify your classes to talk about those topics.
But I think as far as it going any farther than that, to me it
would have been maybe, I just don't fully understand what is in
my hands coming from the supervisors.
Mr. Sanders. So, Major, you really don't have a good answer, I
think, as to why it took 5 years?
Major Johnson. Right.
Mr. Sanders. Would somebody else like to respond?
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. If he understands your
question, you want to know why the Pentagon took 5 years?
His belief is the Pentagon knew from day one that chemicals
were used in the theater.
And the reason that he says that, they have a reason to cover
the truth. They have done so in the past since World War II veter-
ans. Also with Agent Orange, Vietnam. The main reason, it boils
down to money. They don't want to be held responsible for all the
people who are now sick and for the ones that have already died.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you very much, Major.
Gunnery Sergeant, did you want to give a thought on that?
Sergeant Grass. Sir, my chain of command began with Chief
Warrant Officer Cottrell who appeared in front of the committee,
I believe it was — I saw him when I was with the 3d Marine Divi-
sion on Okinawa in January 1993. At that moment right there, I
immediately let my chain of command know that he was talking
about his FOX vehicle.
So that is when the investigation that Major Hebert was men-
tioning about General Chripas's investigation on Randy Wheeler.
Randy Wheeler was one of the security that was attached with me.
So when I appeared in front of the advisory committee in May,
they asked me why it has taken me so long, from January 1993 till
May of this year, to appear in front of a committee; and my answer
to them was, I don't know why. Once the questioning was over and
I had listened to the Department of Defense investigative military
personnel, I had mentioned to them out in the hallway that I had
information that could help them with their investigation. I gave
them the names of Master Sergeant Bradford, who was the FOX
vehicle commander for six Marines, that to this day has not been
asked a question. I gave them the information about the FOX vehi-
cle commander that was back at Jabayl that chased the SCUDs
that had possible chemical contamination, and I gave them the
FOX vehicle commanders for several other of the task forces within
First and Second Marine Divisions, and they have not been con-
tacted to this day. So my answer is, I am not sure.
120
Mr. Sanders. I don't want to put you on the spot, you can de-
cline to comment, but do you agree with Major Hebert that, in fact,
perhaps the Pentagon did know from day one that chemical agents
were used and, for whatever reason, chose not to make that public?
Sergeant Grass. Sir, the FOX — I will answer that in my style of
answer, sir. The FOX vehicles were checked by General Dynamics.
They entrusted a lot of Marines, sailors, airmen and soldiers' lives
with the FOX vehicles and the crews that ran them. If the vehicles
were false and the crews were not trained properly, then that is
one thing; but the crews were well trained, that is why they were
chosen by whatever Department of Defense service they were from,
because of their knowledge of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons.
Personally, the chemical weapons storage area outside Kuwait
City, as I stated in my opening statement, I know what a chemical
weapons storage area looks like and I know what chemical weap-
ons look like. That's my answer sir.
Mr. Sanders. Major, do you want to revisit that question? What
is your feeling about what Major Hebert said?
Major Johnson. Sir, I was not there during the air or ground
war. However, where I was located, I thought at the time that they
in fact had used chemical weapons or had employed them, and that
was based purely on the fact that alarms were going off, detections
were being made, and individuals who were actually responsible for
manning those detection systems knew what they were doing. So
I thought that they had
Mr. Sanders. Is it your impression that they did know?
Major Johnson. At that time it was my impression that they had
employed chemical weapons.
Mr. Sanders. My last question, with your permission, Mr. Chair-
man, it appears that one of the frustrating things that many of us
and you and the country are dealing with is that more information
seems to be eking out month after month. Is it your judgment that
up to this point there has been full disclosure on the magnitude of
possible chemical exposures, or do you think we are going to be
hearing more in the coming weeks and months and perhaps years?
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. In his opinion, we'll be
finding out a lot more information over the next several months.
And there will be many more veterans that become ill because of
the low-level chemical exposure. We have seen over the last 3
years — we have seen the number of veterans who are ill increase
dramatically.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you very much. Did either of you gentlemen
want to comment on that briefly?
Major Johnson. Sir, I think that we will see in the months to
come more information being presented that exposure to chemical
agents, it is possible that it actually happened. I think more veter-
ans will present more information on their personal experiences
during that time period, both during and after the ground cam-
paign.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you, Major.
Gunnery Sergeant, did you want to comment?
Sergeant Grass. Sir, I think that if the attitude of the commit-
tee, just like in a court of law, is that you're innocent until proven
121
guilty, that if the committee takes a positive approach with the
thought that there possibly was exposure to chemical agents or
there was exposure to chemical or biological agents instead of tak-
ing the approach that possibly that it's not, in going from the nega-
tive aspect and then taking this from the positive aspect and then
checking all avenues of approach, then I think that others will
start coming forward and admitting that some of these people were
exposed to chemical agents over there.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. With Mr. Fattah's permission, being a member of the
committee, he is going to give Mr. Buyer a chance to ask a ques-
tion.
Mr. Buyer. Thank you for yielding, and I will yield immediately
back to you. I have to leave, and I apologize to my comrades for
that. I think that Mr. Sanders is right on point, but the Depart-
ment of Defense to my knowledge has not given the admission that
chemical weapons were used during the war. They have given the
admission with regard to Khamisiyah but we should not move out
on the presumption that they are accepting this testimony as fact.
And that is what is very difficult and very challenging for us, Mr.
Sanders, is that this testimony that we have just now received is
no different from a lot of testimony that has been given to us on
many different subcommittees, but the powers that be in the Pen-
tagon are not accepting the word of these men. And that is very
bothersome. So they have given the admission of Khamisiyah; they
are not giving this as an admission of fact that chemical weapons
were used in the theater. They are not even claiming that chemical
mines were even used. They keep saying, well, there is no evidence,
there is no evidence.
Yet we have soldiers that give oral testimony, have logs, have the
FOX vehicles, and yet are still stonewalling, foot dragging, and
that kind of thing. So Godspeed to you, keep it up, and your testi-
mony, as a matter of fact your presence will keep this going in the
National Security Committee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Fattah.
Mr. Fattah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I just want to try to put this in some context, at least for
myself and perhaps for others.
The United States knew that during the Iran-Iraq war that
chemical weapons had been used, and as the process at the begin-
ning of Desert Shield moved forward, and Desert Storm, there was
clearly throughout the ranks an understanding that if we were
going to deploy troops, there was a possibility that there could be
use of chemical and biological warfare weapons, and that is why
there were some statements to make sure that we were well pre-
pared.
So it is perhaps confusing to the public, given the knowledge of
Iraq's use of these weapons in their conflict with Iran and state-
ments that were made then by both President Bush, Secretary of
Defense Cheney, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell,
Schwarzkopf and all involved, that we were very concerned about
this whole issue as we proceeded forward, that the reluctance of
the Department of Defense in the way that this information has
122
been processed up to date really is strongly contradictory to the
concerns as illustrated by those facts from the beginning.
The Khamisiyah we have heard about, we have heard now from
people who have been trained by the armed forces. Commander
Johnson, is it?
Major Johnson. Major Johnson.
Mr. Fattah. Major Johnson. You were trained as an expert in
this area in terms of nuclear, biological and chemical agents, is
that correct?
Major Johnson. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Mr. Fattah. When you were in Kuwait, you indicated that you
were assigned to confirm or deny in a particular instance whether
or not there were chemical agents. After your work was completed,
you said you gave tapes to people who were in desert uniforms?
Major Johnson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Fattah. And they took those tapes and you cannot identify
at this point who those people were. Were they Americans? Were
they British troops?
Major Johnson. Sir, I thought that either they were American
or British. During that operation, I had no contact, contact mean-
ing verbal contact, with those individuals because I was more
Mr. Fattah. You were following orders?
Major Johnson. I was following orders and I was concerned
about the men that I had in those vehicles. So the only thing that
was on my mind was ensuring that they were continuing to do the
mission right and that their safety was No. 1. And so I focused on
that, and after completion of the mission I followed orders from the
senior representative on the ground and U.S. representative under
my chain of command, I responded to his orders.
Mr. Fattah. Let me ask you a question, given your expertise.
The FOX detection vehicles and the concern about positive or false
readings. If it were the case that there was some question about
whether or not a reading of detection was false or positive, would
it not be your instructions always to act as if the reading was posi-
tive until it was verified to be false?
Major Johnson. Sir, that's why we continued — to answer your
question, yes, sir. In order to ensure that we verified the presence
or confirmed the presence of the agent, that is the reason why I
had two vehicles present. They were on two different radio fre-
quencies. I had the ability to communicate to both. I wanted to en-
sure, one, that the first FOX, if it was successful in detecting an
agent, the other crew, the second crew that was in a down position,
would not hear what was coming over the net; therefore, create
some type of bias or some motivation on their part to say we have
to find something as well. So I kept them on two different fre-
quencies. We ran the test twice for future vehicles and they both
registered with the same chemical compounds.
Mr. Fattah. The CIA was brought in to do an examination. They
issued a report saying that there was, as I remember the last hear-
ing, Mr. Chairman, that they felt that there were no chemical
agents in the field.
Sergeant Grass, you have said that your job, in layman's terms,
was that you were supposed to make sure that as these mine fields
were being cleared out, that there were no chemicals that were
123
being exploded as you cleared the mine field that would endanger
troops that were going to be following you. Is that a fairly accurate
description of what your mission was?
Sergeant Grass. Sir, during the breaching operations, I sat and
I watched the line charges from the combat engineers shoot across
the mine fields. Once they had shot across and then the mine plow
went across, my job was to drive down that lane, checking for ei-
ther liquid or chemical contamination, and I checked all 8 lanes.
Mr. Fattah. I think we are saying the same thing.
Now, what I am concerned about, and I know that in the midst
of a war things are not as neat as we might suspect, but there
seems to be from your testimony clear indications that the level of
communications back and forth about whether or not there were
chemicals was at best misleading at times and perhaps jeopardized
soldiers as they proceeded forward, because as you indicate in your
testimony, there were radio communications that indicated positive
and then there was a lack of clarity; there were people who were
moving into MOPP conditions, MOPP 4, and there were people who
were not, and there seemed to be a lot of confusion.
One of the things that hopefully — this committee does not have
jurisdiction over DOD — but obviously one of the things that we
should be concerned about is, as we go forward, that that type of
communications difficulty be worked out to the benefit of the sol-
diers involved until it is clear one way or the other of whether it
is a false indication or a positive indication.
I want to move as quickly as possible, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. If I could just clarify one point, the full Committee
on Government Reform and Oversight has oversight of DOD.
Mr. Fattah. I was talking about the subcommittee.
Mr. Shays. And our chairman has given us the authorization,
and that is why DOD has appeared before us.
Mr. Fattah. Mr. Chairman, I was not suggesting that we were
improper in our inquiry.
Mr. Shays. I know. I just don't want the DOD to get a comfort
level that they may not be invited to continue to participate before
this committee.
Mr. Fattah. I thank you. I did want to, by way of that bridge
ask — because one of the items under this subcommittee's particular
jurisdiction, ongoing, is the VA — is to ask the Major whether or not
DOD's official opinion that no exposures had occurred, their pre-
vious position, whether that had affected your ability to receive
treatment from the VA.
Mrs. Kim Hebert. My husband is still on active duty, sir.
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. So the VA has not come
into play at all at this point.
Mr. Fattah. Thank you very much.
Let me just say in conclusion then, Mr. Chairman, that one of
the items that has become clear through some of the other testi-
mony is that we have to be concerned that, notwithstanding these
official pronouncements, that care from the VA be afforded to each
and every veteran that presents themselves and has possibly been
exposed to low-level contamination.
Finally, I just think that the Congress, even though this sub-
committee has been very aggressive, that it is clear to me that the
124
public should demand and we actually be even more aggressive on
this matter in the 105th Congress, and not just this subcommittee
and not just hearing from people like the people here but higher-
ups. I know that we want DOD to come forward, but I would also
indicate that there were people in upper echelons of this govern-
ment during this period of time, like Secretary Cheney and others,
and Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell, who we should attempt to un-
derstand whether the Major is correct or not, and that is whether
or not on day one there was information that could have aided in
providing adequate care and knowledge about this, and I think
that we should be as serious in that investigation as this Congress
has been looking into other matters of interest to the Congress.
We have been very aggressive on some matters and I would like
to see our chairman have this subcommittee's inquiry be expanded
in a much more aggressive manner because I trunk this sub-
committee has carried the weight, but there is more here that we
should examine. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
We have a number of other questions that we are going to ask.
I want to just establish a little bit of history here and also to state
for the record that this subcommittee would not proceed if we did
not feel we would have the full cooperation of the chairman of the
full committee and full jurisdiction to have DOD, the CIA and VA,
the Veterans Affairs Department, come before this committee. We
are not going to allow for a minute the kind of problem that we
have encountered for 5 years, and that is DOD does its thing, the
CIA does its thing, the VA does its thing and they don't seem to
talk and we are going to get and we have in the past, get all par-
ties at the same table so we can compare testimony.
I just need to say this for the record again. All three are going
to be invited. In fact, DOD is coming before this committee in Jan-
uary. The DOD, Mr. Joseph, was here previously. He will be in-
vited back as we pointed out, and the CIA was here. Seared in my
memory is the CIA saying they never once spoke to our own troops,
to learn from our own troops vital information. They saw their job
as going to other people outside our own government, and they said
whatever they got from the DOD was the information they accept-
ed. And just reading, frankly, the New York Times today, we have
got to get beyond the point where we are just accepting certain in-
formation.
Your testimony is vital to this committee. I do not accept for a
minute the comment that this is information that we have contin-
ually had. We are going in a very structured way to document. And
every hearing we are going to have veterans come, because you all
are voices in the wilderness that nobody has been listening to and
you are the first people that should be listened to. And you are the
experts. And when I read what Colin Powell and Mr. Schwarzkopf,
since you brought up their names, talking about how alarms went
off all the time, but in essence since no one dropped dead, we didn't
think there was a problem. That is the short version of my take
of their view. It just defies logic, because we know after World War
I that we had some troops who died instantly from nerve gas. Mus-
tard gas, rather. We knew that some came home and years later
125
they became ill and died. And we had to acknowledge it after the
fact. They weren't cared for or treated.
But we knew after World War I, there was acute illness and then
we knew there was low-level exposure that led to ultimately chron-
ic illness, that led to death; and we learned that with nuclear, our
whole entry into nuclear warfare and the soldiers that cleaned the
planes when they dropped the bombs for testing, who became sick
and died years later from exposure then but not an acute illness
then. And we learned from Agent Orange. So, I mean, this is old
stuff for us.
I just want to say to you, you all have taken some risk. You are
all soldiers in our military. You are active soldiers in our military.
But you believe in the code that you swore to and that code was
that when you have information that your superiors need, you
come forward. And you are very brave people. And I believe that
your superior officers respect you for what you are doing. But you
are giving a contrary view. This is why your testimony here is so
vital. So vital.
Gunnery Sergeant Grass, I want to be clear. Let me just preface
these comments by saying the only acknowledgment, true, is
Khamisiyah. And the only reason I think we have that is one of
your comrades, one of your brothers, stepped forward and basically
had pictures of the plumes and had pictures of some of the weap-
ons. And only then at 4 on a Friday afternoon before our Tuesday
hearing did the Department of Defense have a press conference to
acknowledge that our troops may have been exposed at
Khamisiyah. Only then. And it was one of you, one of your people,
one of your soldiers that basically forced the DOD to act. Thank
goodness. And so we are going to get to the point where we are
going to have the truth be known.
Now, what I need to be clear on is you are an expert; is that cor-
rect, Sergeant Grass? You are a trained person in detecting chemi-
cal weapons; is that right? To identify them and to detect them?
Sergeant Grass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. For the record, it is my understanding that biological
agents cannot be detected by the FOX equipment or any other
equipment; is that correct or not?
Sergeant Grass. The FOX vehicle can take a sample, but they
have to give that sample to somebody else. There is biological iden-
tification equipment that is being tested such as in Utah and var-
ious places that, being a member of the chemical biological incident
response force, I'm privy to that information right now. It's still
under — they're still looking at biological detection, sir.
Mr. Shays. Now we had FOX equipment that would detect chem-
ical agents. We also had other equipment that weren't part of the
FOX units, is that correct, that would also detect chemical agents?
Sergeant Grass. Yes, sir. You have the M-8 alarm, you have the
M-256 kit, you have M-8 paper, you have the chemical agent mon-
itor.
Mr. Shays. The most reliable, though, would be what's on your
units? In other words, the soldiers who weren't part of the FOX
unit had equipment that would detect chemical agents?
Sergeant Grass. Yes, sir, with different varying detection capa-
bility, yes, sir.
126
Mr. Shays. We have soldiers who have said these alarms went
off all the time. We even have the highest in command saying they
went off all the time. What is your reaction to their comment that
basically we discounted them? What is the logic behind discounting
them as far as you understand it? Thousands of these alarms went
off during the course of the war and afterwards.
Sergeant GRASS. My guess is that they were exposed to some low
level of chemical exposure, sir.
Mr. Shays. Major Johnson? My point is when you hear your su-
perior officers basically say they went off all the time and we dis-
counted them, and discounted data that came from FOX equip-
ment, from FOX units, which I would consider trained specialists,
you are, what was your reaction?
Major JOHNSON. My reaction, sir, was that it was hard to believe
that all the alarms went off, that the other detection equipment
like the Gunnery Sergeant mentioned, M-8 paper, M-9 paper, gave
false readings. Based on my knowledge of NBC operations, that I
know that the equipment that we have is designed to detect chemi-
cal agents and that the soldiers that are in control of those detec-
tion pieces of equipment know what they're doing, and I believe
that when they said detections happened, they happened.
Mr. Shays. I'm trying to put myself in your position. I was think-
ing that, if I was doing my job and I gave it to superior officers
and they basically discounted it, I wonder why I'm even there. I
mean, what is the point? What is the point of having the equip-
ment if we are not going to listen to it? What is the point of having
the FOX units if we are not going to pay attention to it? What was
your reaction? Do you see it the same way I would think of it?
Major Johnson. Yes, sir. My reaction during our detections was
that everyone there believed what we found. When I informed the
senior leadership there that we had detected chemicals, when we
moved the vehicles to a contamination-free area and I was in-
structed to remove the tapes, the senior leadership on the ground
looked at it. They looked at me. They looked at my soldiers. And
when you looked at those soldiers, in their eyes, they were con-
fident and they knew that they had detected chemical agents. Ev-
eryone that day believed that that system, the FOX, worked, and
we all left with that thought that it worked properly. There was
no doubt in anybody's mind, when we left, that chemicals that I
had mentioned earlier were actually found.
Mr. Shays. At what level did you have those detections?
Major Johnson. We had them at what I called microlevels, very
low level readings that were in the soil initially when we moved
into the area. One of our tasks before we move into an area to
check it, we start our area surveys up to the point where we actu-
ally go to a point survey, where the vehicles are in a static position.
They detected microlevels of mustard. Then when the actual con-
tainer was open and liquid was withdrawn and it was applied to
the mobile mass spectrometer, and the readings came out, they
were very high level readings on a scale of 8 where we identified
that there were 6.4 bars, meaning a highly volatile chemical war-
fare agent, a blister agent present with some traces of other chemi-
cal agents.
127
Mr. Shays. Did you take a sample that was ultimately given to
the chemical and biological defense establishment of Great Britain?
Major Johnson. Sir, I did not — at that time I did not know — I
did not submit anything to that agency you just mentioned. I did
not even know that Porton Downs in the UK existed until they no-
tified me to question me about my report, to dispute my findings
in the report.
Mr. Shays. But Great Britain basically, their unit disputes that
it was mustard gas. Their view was that it was basically fuel for
the SCUD missiles?
Major Johnson. Yes, sir. Their comment back was that it was
red fuming nitric acid, which is a rocket propellant or oxidizer.
Mr. Shays. What's your reaction to that?
Major Johnson. I don't believe it. Because during that day we
had functioning FOX reconnaissance vehicles, calibrated mobile
mass spectrometers, which is the nerve center for that FOX to de-
tect chemical agents that was calibrated the day before by General
Dynamics land systems, plus the soldiers are trained to do their
precalibration of the system.
Mr. Shays. Would you be able to tell the difference between the
SCUD fuel and this with that equipment?
Major Johnson. After investigations by Senator Riegle's staff
and his professional staff aides, they submitted questions to the In-
stitute of Science and Technology on the ability of a mobile mass
spectrometer to detect or identify red fuming nitric acid. Based on
their comments back, it was that it is virtually impossible to detect
red fuming nitric acid because the mass spectrometer would be de-
stroyed in the process. The membranes within would be destroyed.
I didn't know that at that time, but when I was on the ground, I
knew for a fact that our systems were working. There was no doubt
in my mind that our equipment functioned properly and that we
detected properly those chemical warfare agents.
Mr. Shays. So your testimony is that you would acknowledge
that the chemical and biological defense establishment disputes
your finding but you take issue with their finding and don't accept
their finding?
Major Johnson. Yes, sir, and there are a couple of reasons why
in addition to the mass spectrometer reports. The British labora-
tory identified that the soldier that was contaminated on the
ground, his suit was removed from the area and transported back
to the UK for analysis. As members from the office of chemical and
biological matters contacted me to dispute my report, they stated
to me that that suit was moved out of the area. And I said, well,
that's impossible because I observed the suit being burned there
onsite. Because the commander in charge at that time, the British
commander, stated that anybody that went past what we called the
contamination control line or the hot zone line, if you were in the
hot zone line, once you came out of it, your equipment would be
decontaminated and then you would have it centrally located, and
an individual would move it to an area, a depression in the area
for a controlled burn.
And I with my own eyes looked at the equipment, because not
only did the British move equipment into that area to be destroyed,
I had a soldier who was assisting the British decon team who actu-
128
ally had his suit removed and put into that burn site, and we ob-
served the suit being burned. I also was informed that it was pos-
sible that followup investigations at that site had happened and it
was possible or likely that they could have picked up some of their
residue in that burn site. But I just don't believe that.
Mr. Sanders. Mr. Chairman, if I could just briefly pick up on
this point. Presumably the taxpayers of this country are spending
many millions of dollars on this and other equipment which is de-
signed to pick up chemical and biological agents, correct?
Major Johnson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sanders. And what we are hearing is that presumably every
time there was a detection of an agent, it was discarded, because
all of the machinery in every single instance was faulty?
Major Johnson. Sir, I would only say that on the day of our de-
tection, every senior officer, senior person on the ground did not
dispute our findings. They acknowledged.
Mr. Sanders. On the ground.
Major Johnson. On the ground, that based on the evidence of a
functioning mass spectrometer and the tapes that were produced
from that and the accident with the British soldier, that, yes, in
fact it was a chemical warfare agent.
Mr. Sanders. But as the chairman has indicated, a higher-up
knew when these disclosures and this information was discarded.
Am I correct, Mr. Chairman, that by definition every single in-
stance of an alarm going off or detection from the FOX vehicles at
the top was suggested that there was faulty equipment?
What is the explanation being officially given as to how come all
of this equipment which presumably cost us millions of dollars
which was designed to protect your lives and your comrades' lives,
what is the official line being given as to how come all of this
equipment is faulty and have we thrown it all out or have we gone
back to the manufacturers and demanded our money back, so to
speak? What is the explanation of how come all this equipment was
faulty? Does anyone have a thought on that?
Sergeant Grass. Sir, speaking from my point of view, sir, the
FOX vehicles — when I first arrived in Saudi Arabia, the Marines
did not know what a FOX vehicle was. And neither did the com-
manders. So because of that, I took the vehicle around and I
showed and demonstrated what the capabilities and the mission of
the FOX was. As I was doing that, because it was such a strange
looking vehicle to the Marines, I had tanks and machine gunners
and even the cobras that were part of our air want to blow up my
FOX vehicle.
So when I passed information at Jabar Air Field about the sulfa
mustard reading up the chain of command, the Marines and the
sailors in the immediate area donned their field protective masks
and went into full MOPP level 4. I think because when we were
passing it up the chain of command, for one thing they told me to
run a mass spectrometer, which meant they didn't know what they
were talking about because the equipment on the FOX vehicle is
a mass spectrometer and they told me to run one. So they knew
what the FOX vehicle was about because they had had a dem-
onstration, but they weren't fully aware of what the capabilities of
the FOX vehicles were at that time.
129
Mr. Shays. Let me if I could, Mr. Fattah, I know you have to
leave, sir, and I'd like to make sure that you get to ask some ques-
tions again.
Mr. Fattah. I wanted to follow up on Sergeant Grass's comment,
and I was going to go back through it. But you mentioned that at
some point you came along an ammunition bunker or warehouse
and that there were what appeared to be drums containing chemi-
cal agents. Is that correct? Did you say that?
Sergeant Grass. No, sir.
Mr. Fattah. You stated you found drums that had a skull on the
exterior?
Sergeant Grass. Around Kuwait City was known as the Third
Armored Corps ASP in an area that was far off the road. In order
to get to this area, I had to go over a large hill, past this big group
of trees into an area that was built-up berm. Next to that area was
a First Battalion 5th Marines. They were set up about 100 yards
away from this area. Also in this area there was a Winnebago type
vehicle that was pretty fancy looking. It was dug into the ground.
It was concreted with cinder blocks up around it. Within that same
office, there was leather couches, crystal, pictures of Saddam Hus-
sein all within this area right here.
It was obvious that this was some kind of a command area.
About 100 yards, or 50 yards away from this right here was larger
berms. Once we went inside this ammunition storage area, the
metal drums that were in the area were there just as if an ammu-
nition storage area here in the United States, you have different
placarding to let you know the different style and what kind of am-
munition is stored in there.
So there is a good probability that the all blue drum or the green
fire extinguisher or the olive drab 55-gallon drum or whatever were
probably empty. They were just there because there was no other
way that they could use in order to placard the area to let some-
body else know that was familiar with those placarding procedures
of what kind of ammunition was in there.
Mr. Fattah. So there was normal nonchemical ammunition
being stored there?
Sergeant Grass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Fattah. That was American made.
Sergeant Grass. In those 55-gallon drums. They were open and
bung type drums that were painted.
Mr. Fattah. I understand. You mentioned that they were Amer-
ican-made ammunitions?
Sergeant Grass. Sir, within that area is where I had also, there
was 1-5-5 rounds that were sitting on top of the boxes, that I had
a full spectrum of sulfa mustard on there. They had taped off ei-
ther red or yellow taping with skull and cross bones on it. They
had little signs next to them with the little skull and cross bone
next to it and the sulfa mustard 1-5-5 rounds were the same exact
ammo box that we would use in the United States, the NSN, every-
thing else like that. And we were getting a full spectrum of sulfa
mustard.
That particular area right there was from the United States.
Further along inside this chemical weapon area is where I detected
the HT mustard, which is a derivative of the sulfa mustard and
130
that had boxes from the United States and Holland. All the ammu-
nition within that chemical weapons storage area was from Hol-
land, Jordan, and the United States.
Mr. Fattah. The last thing I want to say, and I want to thank
the chairman for yielding to me.
Mr. Shays. You have as much time as you want.
Mr. Fattah. That it is obvious that one of the other issues here
is that during the Iran-Iraq conflict, we supplied items, some of
these ammunitions to Iraq, which is problematic to say the least.
Now, Major Johnson, you are an active duty officer in the serv-
ice. I really want to take a minute and commend you, you and Ser-
geant Grass and the major for appearing because it is obvious,
given the testimony, that it conflicts with everything that we have
heard from official — from the CIA, from the Department of De-
fense, from people who are much higher up in the chain of com-
mand. It is my hope that from your testimony here today, it will
elicit more candid responses from the Department of Defense and
others as we go forward. I hope, and I know the chairman agrees,
that this should not in any way impair any of your efforts as you
move up in the Department of Defense. I know that you should not
be concerned about that.
I want to commend you for coming forward. I do think that your
testimony, all of it, raises a lot of issues for us to deal with as we
go forward, not the least of which is this fact of American-made
ammunition getting into the hands of people who we identify our-
selves having a conflict with.
I want to thank the chairman for that opportunity. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. When I was elected in 1987,
one of the first briefings that I had was a briefing about chemical
and nuclear potential in the Middle East. The bottom line to my
briefing was that there wasn't hardly anyone in Congress who did
not know that both, obviously the Iraqis and Iranians, had chemi-
cals and that some other countries did as well. We knew that be-
fore the war proceeded, we obviously knew that there were chemi-
cal weapons in many places. We knew Iran and Iraq had obviously
both used them.
I will say parenthetically that I got on bended knee. I remember
when the Israelis bombed the nuclear plant in Iraq. I was shocked
at the time, I was a State legislator, until I had my first briefing,
and I mentally got down on my hands and knees in gratitude for
the Israelis for bombing that plant.
Having said that, sir, I was not intending, Gunnery Sergeant
Grass, to get into this issue, but because you have mentioned it,
it may be a factor in this whole reason of why we are not hearing
things as quickly as we want. When you say that there was U.S.
made, we are not talking about something that would project a
missile, or a shell; we are talking about actual chemical agents that
were U.S. made.
Sergeant Grass. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Mr. Shays. Was there any concern on the part of your superiors
that that was the case? I mean, was this basically taken from
you — is it your judgment — I don't want to put words in your mouth.
Tell me a little bit more about the reaction of your superiors when
you knew and they knew that some of the weapons were actually
131
U.S. made and some of the chemical agents were U.S. made in your
judgment.
Sergeant Grass. Sir, before I took off to that area, Chief Warrant
Officer Cottrell had told me that, if I found chemicals out there, to
report back as finding some honey. That way it wasn't going to
alert the entire task force unnecessarily.
Mr. Shays. What does that mean?
Sergeant Grass. That meant because the proper procedure is
when you detect a chemical, you use radio procedures as flash,
flash, flash.
Mr. Shays. Let me just ask you, we are talking about in a sense
dormant chemicals versus chemicals that have been put into use to
stop the enemy. What you uncovered here was chemical storage,
correct?
Sergeant Grass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. That wasn't potentially a threat to anyone in that
condition?
Sergeant Grass. At the time, yes, sir. Although the First Battal-
ion 5th Marines was right outside that area.
Mr. Shays. But they were not in the hands of the Iraqis, these
chemicals, these shells and so on? These were under our control by
the time you saw them?
Sergeant Grass. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Mr. Shays. So you went there, and what were your orders?
Sergeant Grass. That once — if I did find any chemical weapons
around there, I was to call back and let Chief Warrant Officer
Cottrell know that we had found some honey.
Mr. Shays. You called it honey?
Sergeant Grass. Yes, sir. We had mentioned that we had some
honey. After I had got the three different chemicals, the sulfa mus-
tard, the HT mustard and the benzobromide, I went back to Chief
Warrant Officer Cottrell. Before I left, I wrote down information in
rny little book here on the different drums and the fire extinguish-
ers, and I got a visual picture on the way that this chemical weap-
ons storage area was made, being a former ammunition technician.
When I got back and I had gotten out of the FOX vehicle, Chief
Warrant Officer Cottrell and the commanding officer of Task Force
Ripper and several other officers including the intel officers went
inside there. I gave them great detail on what we saw out there,
including the ammunition from Jordan, Holland and the United
States.
Mr. Shays. Before continuing that part, when you went to the
site, you got out of your FOX vehicle to make visual verification,
or were you in the FOX vehicle the whole time?
Sergeant Grass. We didn't get out of the FOX vehicle for any
reason, sir.
Mr. Shays. Maybe I don't need for you to explain this, but the
disadvantage of being asked by civilians is we don't know certain
things, and the advantage is we don't know certain things; and the
bottom line is we learn through this process.
So I am asking ignorant questions to you, but it's helpful to us
in this committee in ultimately how we report our findings. What
I'm not clear about is, if it were in a dormant state, why wouldn't
you get out of the FOX vehicle?
132
Sergeant GRASS. There were thousands of ammo bunkers in the
Third Armored Corps ASP or ammunition storage and supply area,
and we drove, monitoring for any vapor contamination because
there were just so many. Unless it was a suspicious liquid on the
ground, that's when I checked that, suspicious liquid for liquid con-
tamination.
Because of the ability of the mass spectrometer, there's no reason
why one of the crew members of the FOX vehicle has to get outside
of the FOX in order to take any kind of reading.
Mr. SHAYS. And it's your training not to get out, correct? I mean,
you're told not to for various reasons.
Sergeant Grass. Absolutely, sir. If my mass spectrometer is tell-
ing me there's a chemical out in the air, them I'm definitely not
going to get out of the vehicle.
Mr. Shays. What I'm trying to nail down is, it is out in the air,
but it's dormant, it's in containers? Or is some of it out?
Sergeant Grass. It could have possibly been a leaking weapon,
sir.
Mr. Shays. For all you know, we could have had our soldiers who
could have gone into that position after you left without any of the
knowledge that you had, correct?
Sergeant Grass. That is correct, sir. Even back at Jabar Air
Field, the Third Tank Battalion was surrounding me as I got that
sulfa mustard reading, and I know that after we had taken Jabar
Air Field and continued onward toward Kuwait City that other ele-
ments of the First or Second Marine Division went through Jabar
Air Field.
Mr. Shays. So your expertise tells you to stay in the FOX vehi-
cle?
Sergeant Grass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. You leave, you get out of the FOX vehicle when you
are back at your destination, but you have no way to verify wheth-
er that was cordoned off and that our soldiers were warned not to
go in that area.
Sergeant Grass. Before I went back to Task Force Ripper's main
to see Chief Warrant Officer Cottrell, I went over to First Battalion
Fifth Marines, talked to the NBC officer, Chief Warrant Officer
Fletcher, and the commanding officer of First Battalion Fifth Ma-
rines and told them that I just found chemical weapons over there.
I told them to stay out of that area. Because basically nobody had
gone into that area — we were the first ones to go into the area. The
Winnebago that was dug into the ground was like a tourist area.
So there's a good possibility.
Mr. Shays. But you cannot confirm whether or not your warning
was heeded? You did your job, Sergeant, but you don't know how
it was treated by anyone else.
Sergeant Grass. I'm sure that the commanding officer of 1-5 had
passed it down his chain of command, and I'm sure that they
stayed out of that chemical weapons storage area.
Mr. Shays. One of the things that I'm not too impressed with is
the chain of command. When I'm hearing that, I'm losing faith,
with all due respect. You did your job. But who knows what he
said, who knows what was said to the next person in line.
You got back, you got out of the FOX vehicle, and?
133
Sergeant Grass. Myself and Chief Warrant Officer Cottrell and
the commanding officer of Task Force Ripper and executive officer
and several other officers went into a tent. Inside that tent I had
the three mass spectrometer printout tickets from the chemical
weapons storage area I had just left.
I also had the printout from back at Jabar Air Field from the
sulfa mustard back there. I showed them the similarities between
both sulfa mustard tickets. I also explained to them in great detail
about the chemical weapons storage area, and they determined
that the division which was located at the Kuwait International
Airport must be notified, First Marine Division.
So one of the officers had called over there and they made it so
that I was going to escort an EOD, an explosive ordnance disposal
team, to that chemical weapons storage area the next day. So at
that point right there the chain of command was acknowledging
that there was a possible chemical weapons storage over there and
that the readings from the storage area and Jabar Air Field were
positive, and they wanted to find out exactly what was going on.
Mr. Shays. Major Hebert, is it your testimony — I'm forgetting
now whose testimony — a concern about shells containing chemical
agents and mines containing chemical agents. That was your testi-
mony?
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. What again was the reason why you believed that
one or two of the mines had actual chemical agents? What made
you believe that? Was it what you were told? Was it something, an
alarm system that you had? Tell me again how you felt there was
a chemical agent.
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. He was told by his Battal-
ion 3 that a chemical mine had gone off, and he learned later that
the FOX vehicle confirmed positive nerve agents, sarin, and also
neurocyte mustard.
Mr. Shays. If I could have you stop here a second. Major Johnson
and Sergeant Grass, would you respond to what we were just told
by the Major? Tell me your reaction to that.
Sergeant Grass. The FOX vehicle commander for six Marines is
Master Sergeant Bradford, located at 2d Marine Division at NBC
at Camp Lejeune. He was never called in order to give his testi-
mony on this, although I gave that information to the Advisory
Committee in May.
Mr. Shays. The Advisory Committee being?
Sergeant Grass. The Presidential Advisory Committee on the
Persian Gulf. As I stated, Master Sergeant Bradford has not been
contacted.
Mr. Shays. He has been contacted now? You said he has now
been contacted?
Sergeant Grass. As of Friday, he has not been contacted.
Mr. Shays. He has not yet been contacted?
Sergeant Grass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Forget the Advisory Commission to start with. What
I am having a hard time reconciling is why a few months later, cer-
tainly within a year, all the people involved would not have been
interviewed. That is what I am having a hard time understanding.
134
How many times have you been interviewed by your superior offi-
cers without you proactively asking to be?
Sergeant GRASS. I have always let my chain of command know
at every unit I have been with. They know
Mr. Shays. So when you go to another unit, you say the same
story?
Sergeant Grass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. That is my definition of someone crying in the wilder-
ness. No one has proactively sat down, talked with you, questioned
you, compared your records and so on?
Sergeant Grass. No, sir, they have not.
Mr. SHAYS. Major Johnson, what is your reaction?
Major Johnson. Sir, I have never been contacted by anyone in
the chain of command regarding my report of my findings, but
when I presented my report and stood by it, apparently that was
3 years after.
Mr. Shays. You say you presented it to
Major Johnson. Presented it to my supervisors to modify some
instruction. It seemed to not be an issue to anyone. No one really
gave it much weight. They just said, go ahead and go do great and
wonderful things with teaching. But when it got into the hands or
into the realm of Members up here in Washington who were inter-
ested in it, then the interest increased. Then the matter of disput-
ing my findings jumped to what I call an all-time high.
Three years have went by. I left the desert, the Persian Gulf,
with the fact in my mind that we were successful in our findings.
I questioned the chain of command or asked the chain of command
that I was assigned to if they had heard anything. Nothing ever
came of it. So I left there thinking that we had done the right
thing. It did not become an issue until 3 years after the fact, after
it was found out that my report was of interest to someone outside
of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense.
Mr. Shays. I am haunted by the CIA telling me in a matter of
fact way that they never communicated with any of our officers. It
would seem to me our own people would get information from our
own people before we would go somewhere else. They may be able
to say that is not their jurisdiction. It, to me, was a warning sign
to me that, and this is just extraordinarily pervasive. I want you
to respond to what Major Hebert said, talking about the mines,
talking about the shells — excuse me, the shells, Major Hebert, you
were saying you saw the shells explode and a plume of smoke, but
you didn't see what would be viewed as an explosion.
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebertl. Yes, sir. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. So you actually, you saw this, this is not some report,
this is something you witnessed?
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. During the actual breach-
ing of the first mine field, he saw and heard the first explosion and
the second one he only heard the explosion.
Mr. Shays. But the first one you basically saw it more as a
plume of smoke than what you would ordinarily view as a weapon
designed to destroy?
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebertl. Yes, sir.
135
Mr. Shays. I have no knowledge of how you clear a mine field.
Is the process basically blowing up the mines, you just try to blow
up the mines along the way, or do you physically remove them?
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. He has a device called a
line charge that is fired across the mine field. And it is 1,750
pounds of explosives.
Mr. Shays. So if in fact some of the mines were chemical instead
of an explosive, you in effect would be basically blowing up the
mines and the mines, unknown to you, would actually be causing
the very harm they were intended to cause?
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. If they were chemical
mines, sir, yes.
Mr. Shays. Now, we are almost done with this panel. Mr. Sand-
ers is going to have some questions. I am going to come back for
a quick second. But, Mr. Hebert, I am going to give you an oppor-
tunity to make just a short statement at the end and so you might
want to think about what you want to say. Mrs. Hebert, as well,
at the end I am going to give you an opportunity to make a state-
ment instead of just being a scribe under order. Both of you will
be able to make a comment at the end.
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. He wants you to know that
he was with the 2d Marine Division. The gunnery was with 1st
Marine Division. They were operating within 2V-2 to 3 miles within
each other. And on the 25th of February, when they were having
positive confirmations of agents in the area, they were 2d Combat
Engineer Battalion, we were not, they were not in MOPP level 4
for the entire day. And that was February 25th.
Mr. Shays. Thank you for that information.
Major, did you want to make a comment before I give the floor
to Mr. Sanders?
Major Johnson. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Sanders.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As Mr. Fattah mentioned a little while ago, it was no secret that
when you went over to the Persian Gulf there was concern about
the possibility of the use of chemical weapons. Everybody knew
that and presumably we were prepared to respond to that danger.
Let me read you a quote from the front page of the New York
Times, December 3d. General Powell, the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff at the time in 1991, said in an interview that while
chemical detection alarms had sounded repeatedly during the war,
American commanders in the Gulf had been unable to confirm the
detections and had believed them to be false alarms.
Another quote, December 5, New York Times, the chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the war, General Powell, also now
retired, said in an interview on Monday that chemical alarms
sounded repeatedly during the war but that American commanders
in the Gulf were unable to confirm them and considered them false
alarms.
Now, my question is this, if the military gave you rifles and the
rifles did not fire or misfired, presumably people would be con-
cerned and there would be a change of equipment, there would be
a study. There would be a scandal. There would be an attempt to
understand what was going on. Sergeant Grass, is the FOX vehicle
136
still being used or, based on the experiences of the Persian Gulf
war, has it been discarded? Have we sued the manufacturer for
producing equipment which is just a faulty piece of equipment? Is
it now recognized that the piece of equipment that you were utiliz-
ing is a piece of garbage, or, in fact, might be considered something
else?
Sergeant GRASS. Sir, as I stated earlier, I am a member of the
Marine Corps Biological Incidents Response Force. We have two
FOX vehicles assigned to us.
Mr. Sanders. Still using them?
Sergeant Grass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sanders. Well, if every time your piece of equipment, the ve-
hicle, the FOX vehicle detected something and if we also had other
pieces of equipment that were giving us alarms during the war,
and if the generals perceived that in every single instance these
were false positives, should we not have done something with that
equipment? Shouldn't we have said this is useless equipment? Or
else that maybe the equipment was not false positive and that
maybe we had a problem?
Sergeant Grass. Sir, there has also been modifications to the
FOX vehicle that upgrades it with, I believe, a Rascal. I am sure
the Major might be able to answer that.
Mr. Sanders. One of two things, either you have a faulty piece
of equipment and after the war we want to find out why it is faulty
or else we have a piece of equipment which was functioning cor-
rectly and we want to find out why that information was not trans-
mitted to the public and to our soldiers.
Major, did you want to
Major Johnson. Sir, from my last encounter with the FOX vehi-
cle and the personnel that are trained with it, we are still in fact
using that system. We are still training soldiers at the U.S. Army
Chemical
Mr. Sanders. You are using a piece of equipment that ostensibly
during the war its evidence and its information was not taken seri-
ously.
Major Johnson. Yes, sir. There have been several modifications
to the vehicle. I cannot confirm if it is the result of activities in the
Persian Gulf or during the Persian Gulf. I can assume all day long,
but I know that one of the things that was mentioned to me was
that my report in the dispute step were presented against it and
they did in fact state in a document that the developer has gone
back to relook, relook the system. And that was the end of that.
But we are still in fact using it, sir.
Mr. Sanders. Mr. Chairman, one of the issues that I hope we
will pursue is just that issue. Either you had faulty equipment and
clearly we should not be paying to continue to use that equipment
or else the equipment was working properly and there is something
wrong when the information that that equipment gave us was not
transmitted properly to the public and to our soldiers.
The second question that I would ask Major Hebert if I might.
You are hurting now physically, and that is clear. And we very
much appreciate your bravery and willingness to come here today.
Do you know of people with whom you associated, people in your
137
area during the war who are suffering illnesses that might be at-
tributed to the conflict?
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. Yes, sir, he knows a few
in our area.
Mr. Sanders. Similar problems to yours or just other kinds
of
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. All different problems,
mainly rashes, joint pains, those type of problems.
Mr. Sanders. Did either of the other two gentlemen want to
comment on that?
Sergeant Grass. Yes, sir. In my case, as I stated before, my secu-
rity, because we are such a strange looking vehicle to the Marine
forces, they gave us tow vehicles which are on the back of a
Humvee. Several of my security, including former Sergeant Randy
Wheeler, are showing some of the same symptoms that Major
Hebert is. Other personnel within Task Force Ripper from 3d
Tanks are also suffering from some of the same symptoms. Some
of the other FOX vehicles
Mr. Sanders. Same symptoms that Major Hebert is suffering
from?
Sergeant GRASS. Yes, sir. Other elements within Task Force Rip-
per are also suffering from some of the same symptoms. They have
either been discharged from the Marine Corps or are still remain-
ing on active duty and trying their best to get medical assistance,
especially the ones that have been discharged from the Marine
Corps are trying to get medical assistance and just getting the run-
around from the VA, just like Randy Wheeler is. And there's others
within 2d Marine Division that are under the same kind of medical
care and same illnesses.
Major Johnson. Sir, this is a tough area for me because prior to
going, deploying to the Gulf, I was in perfect health. After return-
ing from the Gulf, I have begun to question my health and I start-
ed documenting it back in 1993. There are several things that I am
concerned about. Changes, for example, in my blood pressure, hav-
ing to fight constantly to control the blood pressure. Headaches,
burning eyes, joint pain, having a scope, an arthroscope procedure
down in my left knee to remove a growth that has been left to the
doctors as a mystery as to why it was there; have not had any knee
injuries since high school football and this growth is there. Chest
pains off and on. I just was released out of the hospital on the 26th
of September, after being diagnosed with gastrointestinal bleeding,
or basically I had three bleeding ulcers that were repaired.
Every day it is a constant fight with me to say to myself, is it
a result from the Gulf? It is hard for me to say because I keep say-
ing to myself, well, maybe I wasn't there long enough but what is
long enough? One day, 180 days or what? I don't know. But since
that time, I have experienced changes in my health. I don't know
if it is due to the fact of the normal process of aging in the body
or if it is an advanced aging process going on in the body but each
day gives me a concern that comes back to activity in the Persian
Gulf.
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. In Randy's testimony, in
his testimony he mentioned several different elements, most of
which he has observed from members of all branches of the service.
138
Also from one of the Marines that were operating with Gunnery
Sergeant Grass, he is an ordinance officer, he was with Gunnery
Sergeant Grass. Several members — seven members of his unit were
sent to Portsmouth Naval Hospital to be observed after the war.
Only two of them are now living.
Mr. Sanders. Does the term "aflatoxin" mean anything to any-
body?
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. Yes, sir.
Major Johnson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sanders. Anybody want to comment on what we have heard
about that.
Major Johnson. Sir, from what little I know about aflatoxin, it
is a carcinogen. It is a biological agent. Some individuals refer to
it as black cancer. It is a process where once you are exposed, it
could take months, it could take maybe a year or so before the ef-
fects from it really begins to take a toll on the body. There has not
been much discussion from my understanding about aflatoxin, just
that it is a biological agent and that it was possible several months
ago that the Iraqis had that capability in their biological arsenal.
Mr. Sanders. Any other thoughts on that?
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. Randy has the same com-
ment as Major Johnson. And he heard about that 3 days ago.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you all very, very much.
Mr. Shays. We are almost done here. I thank you all for your pa-
tience.
Did any of you or all of you undergo the DOD health exam for
Gulf war veterans, the comprehensive clinical evaluation program
called the CCEP?
Major Johnson. No, sir, I have not.
Sergeant Grass. I was afforded the opportunity, if it is the same
thing that you are talking about, sir, in 1993, when I was at Oki-
nawa.
Mr. Shays. You chose not to take the opportunity?
Sergeant Grass. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. Yes.
Mr. Shays. When was that?
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. December 1995.
Mr. SHAYS. I am going to ask this question and you will have to
have your own good judgment on how you answer it; you are all
soldiers and you don't necessarily volunteer information. You make
yourself available and we have to have the good sense to ask the
right questions. My fear is that we have not asked the right ques-
tion. If there is something you felt we should have asked, I would
like you to ask yourself that question. Sergeant Grass, was there
a question we should have asked you? If there was and you don't
want to tell me what that question was, I will live with that. I just
need to know. Were there some questions we should have asked
that we didn't.
Sergeant Grass. One of the questions you didn't ask me was
whether any other chemical alarms within Task Force Ripper's
area of operation that I was not called upon to verify or check. The
answer to that question is, yes, there were other areas within Task
Force Ripper that had possible chemical exposure. It is just that I
139
believe at the time they just chose not to call the FOX vehicle be-
cause of whatever reason they chose.
Mr. Shays. Your response to that excellent question was that
there were other potential exposures and your FOX equipment was
not called to verify?
Sergeant Grass. That is correct. Also the detector tickets were
given to my chain of command beginning with Chief Warrant Offi-
cer Cottrell, and I never saw those detector tickets again.
Mr. Shays. We are going to try to track that down. I need to be
clear, you touched a point, there is a printout and a tape. They are
two different things. The equipment gives a printout. It also gives
you a tape. Are those two different items?
Sergeant Grass. It is on the same ticket.
Mr. Shays. OK Thank you. Major Johnson, is there a question
we should have asked or questions we should have asked that you
would like to ask yourself?
Major Johnson. Sir, I agree with the Gunnery Sergeant. There
is a question, chain of custody, of samples once they move from an
area, the audit trail of where those agents go to. Immediate re-
sponse, bringing information back down so individuals, team mem-
bers, other soldiers know exactly what the bottom line was or is,
on what they found. Not to wait years later to say, here is what
the deal is about your equipment, which makes you wonder in your
mind, makes you begin to speculate when you deal with people that
I have dealt with in the Office of Chemical and Biological Matters
on my competence in the ability to use that equipment, because I,
for 3 years at the time of the report, knew in my heart and my
mind that the equipment worked. Soldiers worked well, did well.
And then to come back later and tell you, you didn't know what
you were doing, it is hard for me to really grab that because I know
that at that time, with functioning equipment and properly trained
soldiers, those soldiers did their job. I think that that is, to me that
is a letdown.
I think that leads into the confidence in our equipment. It works.
If it does not work, we have to be able to present information im-
mediately to say that it does not work and find a way to improve
it so that we protect our soldiers. We do the mission. We protect
the force. That was important to me, if there was a question, its
custody and confidence in the equipment.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I am going to invite each of you to just
make a closing statement, if you did by your question — Mr. Hebert,
what question, is there a question that we should have asked you
or questions?
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. Do you feel that the United
States exported chemical precursors
Mr. Loyd Hebert. Precursors, the word was "precursors."
Major Hebert [continuing through Kim Hebert]. To Iraq prior to
the war? The answer to that question based on the hearing back
in May and October 1994, is yes, there were.
Mr. Shays. An American soldier who fought in the Persian Gulf,
you would have wanted me — and who is now suffering, you would
have wanted me to ask the question, did I think that the — did you
think the United States exported chemicals to the Persian Gulf and
your answer is
140
Mr. LOYD Hebert. Chemical precursors.
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. To make the chemical
weapon.
Mr. Shays. The components to make the chemical weapons. And
your response to that question would be?
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. Yes, they did, based on the
hearing that you held back in May and October 1994.
Mr. Shays. That was the Riegle committee in the Senate.
I am going to invite each of you, and that includes your father
and your dear wife, but Major Johnson, is there any last point you
want to make before we end this panel?
Major Johnson. The only point I would make, in conclusion, is
that the facts that I presented on today regarding the 7th and the
8th, I believe strongly by those facts, that those activities occurred
during that day. I stand behind what I said. Even though there
have been disputes, I still stand to say that our equipment was
functioning. We properly detected chemical warfare agents, which
to me confirmed that they were present in the region or in the the-
ater of operation, in this case Kuwait, and that I observed first-
hand a coalition soldier, a British soldier come in contact with it
on the 8th of August, which in my mind confirms for me that a sol-
dier was exposed to a toxic chemical warfare agent.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Sergeant Grass.
Sergeant Grass. Sir, I just want to say that there are many Ma-
rine Corps NBC defense specialists that detected chemicals in their
area of operation, not just myself with my FOX vehicle. The other
FOX vehicle commanders, not just they detected chemicals but
some of the Marines that were within 1st and 2d Marine Divisions
also detected chemicals. Chemical exposure is obviously not just
within Task Force Ripper's area or 6th Marine Regiment's area. It
is also within other elements of the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions.
I know some of these individuals have information, although
there is really no solid proof as a piece of paper, as a printout from
the mass spectrometer or a coffee can full of liquid chemical agents
or something to that sort to prove it. But I think the proof goes
with the number of personnel that have died or the personnel that
have — that are seriously ill from the effects of the Gulf war. Myself,
I have got little rashes on my ankle and other parts of my body.
My wife has been diagnosed with multiple sclerosis within the last
couple months, and there are just numerous other cases of illnesses
that people have from something that went on over there, whether
that was the exposure of chemical weapons or the biological weap-
ons or both. And I just want to thank the committee for taking this
time in pursuing this in a positive manner. Thank you, sir.
Mr. SHAYS. You have done your son honor by joining him in this
very important, his very important testimony. We really appreciate
you sharing this experience with your son. I would be happy to
hear from you.
Mr. Loyd Hebert. I appreciate the — on behalf of my wife
Shirdale and I, we appreciate the opportunity to be here with
Randy and Kim. It is — to me it is quite obvious the facts speak for
themselves. We have soldiers, men and women who fought in
Desert Storm/Desert Shield with all kinds of ailments. And it ap-
pears that nothing or very little is being done to help them. It is
141
time to stop this search for someone to necessarily put the blame
and focus our efforts on what we need to do to help these young
men and women who so bravely fought for us.
We have in the past brought our resources together to build the
atom bomb, to do all kinds of things. Certainly we can cooperate
together and bring our resources together to focus on ways of help-
ing them, not only them but the people of the United States. We
are all exposed to Desert Storm. We are all exposed. Our experi-
ence with our son Randy is one in which he came home appearing
healthy and only in the last several years has it been that his
symptoms have progressed very rapidly. Exposures to chemicals
and other agents in our atmosphere, on our grounds, the chemicals
that we are putting within our environment, these have caused —
to my opinion have caused his situation, his symptoms to move
more rapidly.
We need to get the experts. We do not need those people who do
not have the facts making the decisions at this point in time. We
need people with the facts coming together to discuss them in an
open way without any questions about who is right, who is wrong,
but to protect our boys and our women and ourselves. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, sir.
Mrs. Hebert, would you like to make a comment? Then I will ask
your husband to make a comment. Thank you for appearing with
him and thank you for helping to make it easier for us to commu-
nicate with each other. Mrs. Hebert.
Mrs. Hebert. I just want to thank you for the opportunity to ap-
pear before you. I am speaking for all spouses all over the country
of our frustrations, watching our husbands go to war, fight for their
country, willing to die for their country and still today if my hus-
band was healthy and was — if it was laid before him that he would
come home in this condition, I can guarantee my husband would
still go to war. Knowing this, of how brave my husband is and that
he fought for his country and so many other military wives are
standing behind their husbands going through the same situation
that I am with children, we are just stressed out. We are just cry-
ing out for the government to do something for these brave men.
I hope today that some good will come out of this hearing and
I hope that all the men that are suffering from illnesses, even if
it is rashes or to the extreme such as my husband, for the govern-
ment to please do not forget these men and do something and take
action immediately. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Major Hebert, you have done your country proud in
service then and your service now, as both Major Johnson and Ser-
geant Grass. I would like you to end this part of the panel with
any comment you would like to make.
Major Hebert [through Kim Hebert]. Myself, Major Johnson and
Gunnery Sergeant Grass all took an oath when we came into the
military to support the Constitution of the United States against
all enemies, both foreign and domestic, and some of our enemies
are within our own government, unfortunately.
Thank you for your efforts to continue to find the source, the
truth also. The best source of military intelligence is the individual
Marine, Air Force, soldier, airmen and Navy personnel that were
on the ground. And these men right here were on the ground and
142
they know the truth also. It would be beneficial if the committee
would pursue higher level officers in the Marine Corps for their
opinion because only less than 1 month ago his commandant said
he believes chemical weapons were used. And if he feels they were
used, he is supporting the statement of the FOX vehicle command-
ers, in Randy's opinion. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. God bless you. We are going to have a 5-minute re-
cess.
[Brief recess.]
Mr. Shays. The hearing is called to order and we call our last
panel.
Our last panel is Patrick Eddington, former CIA analyst. Mr.
Eddington, if you would stay standing, I will swear you, sir.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Shays. You may be seated.
We will note for the record that the witness has responded in the
affirmative. We welcome your testimony and thank you for your
patience. Our first panel was a little longer than we may have ex-
pected, but it is great to have you here and thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF PATRICK EDDINGTON, FORMER CIA ANALYST
Mr. Eddington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously it was
compelling testimony. I think we would all agree.
I have a brief oral statement.
Mr. Chairman, Acting Ranking Member Sanders, members of the
committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss an issue that affects both the national security of our
Nation and the health of tens of thousands of Desert Storm veter-
ans: Chemical agent exposure during the Persian Gulf war.
For the record, my written statement details the attempts of my-
self and my wife to raise this issue within the Central Intelligence
Agency over an approximately 1-year period. I do not feel the need
at this time to go into any additional detail on that statement. I
will obviously be happy to answer any questions regarding the
statement.
Additionally, today I am prepared to discuss any issues related
to potential chemical agent exposures during Operation Desert
Storm. However, in addition to my written statement, I have one
further disclosure and comment that I would like to offer.
Recently a medically retired U.S. Army nuclear biological and
chemical noncommissioned officer contacted me regarding his pos-
sible exposure to chemical agents. Like man}' Gulf war veterans
this soldier claimed to have long showing chemical agent alarms
going off and unit personnel being exposed to chemical nerve
agents from leaking chemical munitions. The difference in this case
was that neither the soldier nor his unit were deployed to the Per-
sian Gulf. Sergeant First Class Michael Morrissey had been an
NBC NCO assigned to the 330th Ordnance Company of the 59th
Ordnance Brigade.
Mr. Shays. I am getting a feedback. I don't know if it is the
mikes that we have that are on that need to be turned off so just
your mike is on.
Mr. Eddington. Sergeant First Class Michael Morrissey had
been an NBC NCO assigned to the 330th Ordnance Company of
143
the 59th Ordnance Brigade, located near Clausen, Germany. Be-
tween July and October 1990, Morrissey's unit was involved in Op-
eration Steel Box, the removal of more than 170,000 aging chemical
weapons, nerve agent munitions from the American chemical weap-
ons depot in Germany. On November 23, 1996, my wife and I flew
to Seattle to hear Sergeant Morrissey's story. "I would have done
this earlier," he told us, "but I am just now recovering from my
bone marrow transplant at the Seattle VA hospital." Morrissey had
developed CML leukemia in May 1995. That particular form of leu-
kemia is caused, according to Sergeant Morrissey, by exposure to
ionizing radiation or toxic chemicals such as nerve agents. Ser-
geant Morrissey kept all the unit logs from the Operation Steel Box
period even though the officer in charge had ordered him to destroy
them.
Morrissey informed me that his unit had to report any chemical
incidents, accidents or leaks up the chain of command. According
to Sergeant Morrissey, this form of reporting requirement was con-
gressionally mandated. Morrissey indicated that all the reports
sent up the chain stated that there had been no chemical incidents.
Morrissey stated that the reports were deliberately falsified. In my
presence, Morrissey pulled out a log entry for July 10, 1990 show-
ing that an M-8 alarm had gone off at one of the chemical storage
bunkers. There were no other contaminants in the area and the de-
vice was fully functional and working normally.
Additional detection equipment was dispatched to the bunker
and, according to the log extract, the air sample readings appeared
to indicate a slight trace of nerve agent in the air. Quote, I was
told to "overlook" such incidents, Morrissey noted.
The 10 weeks of logs that Morrissey retained appear to have sev-
eral such incidents to include some personnel who displayed pin-
point pupils and other telltale signs of nerve agent exposure.
Within a year of leaving the unit, Morrissey began to experience
periodic paralysis in his extremities. He also began having memory
problems. Quote, I used to be able to quote you chapter and verse
from any NBC manual. Now I sometimes can't remember what I
did yesterday or even 5 minutes ago.
What upset Morrissey the most was that his chain of command
clearly understood the potential risks. They have said they didn't
know about possible effects of low-level chemical exposure, he said,
referring to the Department of Defense. If that is true, why did ev-
eryone in my unit have to sign this? Morrissey handed me a docu-
ment previously classified secret and entitled General Information:
Nerve Agent Intoxication and Treatment. Two paragraphs imme-
diately caught my attention. Signs and symptoms of chronic, low
dose exposure, memory loss, decreased alertness, decreased prob-
lem solving ability and language problems are suspected but have
not been proven by scientific study. Teratogenicity, ability to cause
birth defects, although some organophosphate pesticides have been
shown to be teratogenic in animals
Mr. Shays. I just need to get a perspective. This is not your testi-
mony yet. What is this
Mr. EDDINGTON. If I can continue, you will see where I am going
with this.
144
Mr. Shays. I like to put things in boxes. I need to know where
I was and where I am headed. What is, what are you sharing with
us now? What is the motivation of what you are sharing with us
now?
Mr. Eddington. The information that this NBC NCO provided
to me I believe has a direct bearing on the health issues that are
affecting the
Mr. Shays. It does, but you are here as a former CIA agent. You
are not yet into your own official testimony; is that correct?
Mr. Eddington. I have submitted my written statement for the
record. I wanted to ensure that this information from this particu-
lar soldier
Mr. Shays. I know. You are the only witness. I will stay here as
long as it takes. If you have any concern about your not being able
to share something, don't be concerned with that.
Mr. Eddington. That is not my concern at all.
Mr. Shays. I want to come back to it. I want to make sure — we
have a specific reason for having you here. I want to make sure
that you specifically address your expertise as a CIA agent and
what your concern is. Then we will come back in more detail with
this. I was not with you in the beginning so I am not with you now.
Mr. Eddington. I believe when I complete the next page, we will
have a very clear understanding. As I indicated, this document in-
dicated there were problems with regards to organophosphate pes-
ticides showing birth defect possibilities in animals. This Depart-
ment of Defense document states that these effects have not been
shown in carefully controlled experiments using nerve agents.
The last sentence of this paragraph was misleading. To the best
of my knowledge, the Department of Defense has never conducted
carefully controlled experiments with nerve agents to determine
their possible implications for birth defects. Despite this, DOD sus-
pected that chronic low level nerve agent exposure could produce
serious chronic health problems in exposed personnel, a year before
the coalition bombing campaign would result in the release of tons
of such toxic agents over American forces in Saudi Arabia.
Every member of Morrissey's unit was required to sign an iden-
tical document. The fact that DOD classified this information sheet
and the medical records of the entire 330th Ordnance Company se-
cret is irrefutable evidence that DOD knew it was placing these
men at risk and it did not want the outside world to know about
it-
Mr. Chairman, Sergeant Morrissey's revelations obliterate DOD's
claims that it had no concerns regarding the potential effects of low
level chemical agent exposures to American personnel working in
close proximity to chemical agents. Clearly this information bears
directly on the issue of the health effects from similar exposures
among Gulf war veterans. Gulf war veterans have testified before
this and other committees regarding chemical agents detections in
close proximity to Iraqi chemical munitions.
In addition, United States inspectors have destroyed thousands
of such leaking rounds in Iraq since 1991. Sergeant Morrissey's
revelations have broader implications. The spectre of leaking chem-
ical munitions at an American arsenal raises questions about po-
tential chemical agent exposures among German civilians living
145
near the depot as well as potential exposures among our own citi-
zens living near similar depots here in the continental United
States. I urgently recommend that the Congress require the De-
partment of Defense to immediately release all relevant unit logs
and similar records maintained by every chemical weapons depot
operated by the U.S. Government to determine whether additional
chemical agent releases or detections may have occurred at these
facilities. Anything else would be a disservice not only to our veter-
ans but to the public as large. That concludes my oral statement.
I will be happy to answer any questions about that statement.
Mr. Shays. You are here for a specific reason. What is your testi-
mony before this committee?
Mr. Eddington. My testimony before this committee is that we
have a very serious problem with regard to low level exposures
among American forces, in addition to the entire issue of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense failing
to make information available to the American public with regard
to this.
That information is contained in detail in my written statement
for the record.
Mr. Shays. The purpose of your having a written testimony is to
help guide this committee. We want that testimony in some way
presented, whether you give it in full or in part, because we want
for the record your testimony which relates to your involvement as
a CIA employee analyst and what your concern is about the CIA.
We will be happy to touch on a whole host of efforts, but we have
a specific need to have that testimony. You have not yet shared
that.
Why don't you give us your testimony; that is the reason why I
swore you in and the reason why you are here today. Then we will
cover anything else you would like to.
Mr. Eddington. If the Chair would like to indulge me, I would
be happy to read my entire statement.
Mr. Shays. I would like you to summarize it.
Mr. Eddington. In that case, I will briefly summarize it.
Mr. Shays. It doesn't have to be briefly. You can summarize it.
Mr. Eddington. When I began the process of trying to raise this
issue within the Central Intelligence Agency in July 1994
Mr. Shays. For the record, "this issue" being what?
Mr. Eddington. Gulf war syndrome and the entire issue of po-
tential biological and chemical agent exposures among U.S. forces.
When I began this project in July 1994, it ultimately culminated
in my leaving the Central Intelligence Agency in protest over their
policy for refusing to deal honestly and openly with information
that bore directly upon the health consequences of these veterans
during their service.
Mr. Shays. How many years did you work in the CIA?
Mr. Eddington. Almost 9.
Mr. Shays. You were employed for 9 years. Was your work in-
volved in this area that you ultimately presided over?
Mr. Eddington. I worked as a military analyst for almost 9
years at the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center.
For the benefit of those who are not familiar with it, that particu-
146
lar organization was responsible for finding the Soviet missiles in
Cuba in 1962.
From February 1994 until — pardon me, from May 1994 until
February 1996, I worked in the CIA's Director of Intelligence, the
Office of Scientific and Weapons Research, in an all-source analyt-
ical shop that was responsible for providing targeting support to
military planners at the Pentagon.
It was during that particular period of time, as a result of my
wife's own tenure on the Senate Committee on Banking, that I be-
came aware of this entire issue of potential exposures among Amer-
ican forces during the Gulf war.
Mr. Shays. Your wife was employed with the CIA?
Mr. Eddington. That is correct. She was an analyst with the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Mr. Shays. Over what period of time?
Mr. Eddington. Just over 8 years.
Mr. Shays. You met there, or were you married before?
Mr. Eddington. That's correct, we met there.
In the course of attempting to raise this issue, beginning in July
1994, we ran into a series of roadblocks, a great deal of resistance
to our ideas. In order to even get the Central Intelligence Agency
to pay attention to what I had to say on this subject, I was forced
to write a letter to the editor of the Washington Times in December
1994.
After that letter was published, my superiors reluctantly agreed
to hear what I had to say on the subject. Between January and
March 1995, 1 conducted a series of briefings within the Central In-
telligence Agency at increasing levels of managerial responsibility,
trying to get them to deal with this issue of chemical agent expo-
sures, and to get them to deal with the Department of Defense's
lack of integrity in addressing this entire issue.
My wife attended several of those briefings. The reaction was rel-
atively uniform. It was one of hostility. It was one of, at times, con-
tempt. It was a very difficult process. Essentially we got nowhere,
because we were giving them a message they simply did not want
to hear. That has continued to this day.
Mr. Shays. What was your responsibility at the CIA that relates
to the whole issue of the Gulf war illnesses?
Mr. Eddington. During 1990 and 1991, I was part of a team at
the National Photographic Interpretation Center who was respon-
sible for monitoring Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, the sub-
sequent buildup, and the war itself. A few years after that, I was
responsible for working on Iraqi military forces, Iran military
forces, Persian Gulf military forces; and when I worked at OSWR
in the Director of Intelligence at CIA headquarters, I also had re-
sponsibilities dealing with contingency scenarios for attacks on Iraq
and other Persian Gulf countries, so I have had a very long history
of involvement in Persian Gulf security issues.
As far as my direct involvement, the investigation that I initiated
I did on my own. I initiated that myself, because the Central Intel-
ligence Agency was not even looking at this issue until we brought
it to their attention.
147
Mr. SHAYS. OK. How do you know what they were looking at and
not looking at? I am unclear as to what would give you that scope
of information on that.
Mr. Eddington. Because when my wife worked on Senator
Riegel's staff beginning in February 1994, she went over to CIA
headquarters and made direct inquiries as to whether or not the
Central Intelligence Agency and the specific components respon-
sible for looking into these issues were in fact conducting an in-
quiry. They were not. I made my own separate inquiries through
my own channels and found out exactly the same thing.
Mr. Shays. Under law, what would have been the responsibility
of the CIA as it relates to the Gulf war and our involvement as it
relates to chemical information? What is their responsibility, as
you understand it?
Mr. Eddington. Under the National Security Act of 1947, it is
my understanding that the Central Intelligence Agency is to pro-
vide independent, unbiased advice to the President, the National
Security Council, Congress, all policymaking organizations, regard-
ing potential threats to the United States and national security.
The attitude that I took going into it was if Saddam Hussein had
used chemical or biological agents against our forces and that had
not been properly reported or dealt with during the war and after
the war, the CIA had a responsibility to raise those particular is-
sues and assure that they were addressed.
Mr. Shays. So this was not your direct area of expertise. Is it
your testimony before the committee that the CIA did not do any
work, or the work they did was faulty?
Mr. Eddington. There is absolutely no question that the Central
Intelligence Agency made a concerted effort to exclude entire class-
es of information from its inquiry, and you have alluded to some
of those. When Ms. Copeland testified before this committee in Sep-
tember, she admitted to you that the Central Intelligence Agency
had not talked to a single veteran. That was one of the issues I
raised from day one, because the Central Intelligence Agency has
had, throughout its entire existence, a specific component that is
designed to do nothing but contact American citizens about their
experiences overseas and their travels overseas.
So for the Central Intelligence Agency to refuse to talk to Amer-
ican veterans about this issue is a complete departure from stand-
ard operating procedure.
Mr. Shays. Would it be a complete departure as it relates to
talking to the military? My view is obviously they should talk to
any source that could give them information. The best source is ob-
viously the people who were there, our own military. But I was left
with the impression in that hearing that it is not that — that basi-
cally they rely on DOD testimony and do not individually interview
people in DOD. Is that their practice, or just the practice in this
case?
Mr. Eddington. In my view it was simply their practice in this
case. And just a quick point on that. The CIA has consistently used
DOD reporting and reporting from DOD sources in the course of
putting together its estimates.
To me it seemed a politicization of intelligence to use that par-
ticular information coming from DOD in 1991, 1992, 1993, indicat-
148
ing that no chemical agents had been detected, and then when you
get information 2 years later that, yes, they were detected on a
widespread scale, now you are not going to talk to people who
worked for DOD, many of whom, like the witnesses we saw just a
few moments ago, are still working for DOD. They have refused to
talk to any of those folks.
Mr. Sanders. Mr. Eddington, all day long the issue we have
been focusing on, an issue of great concern, is the possibility of
chemical agents, that our soldiers and other soldiers were exposed
to chemical agents during the Persian Gulf war. Generally speak-
ing, the speculation is that we exploded some munitions depots, at
Khamisiyah. There is some speculation that we may have bombed
chemical factories in several locations and that the wind may have
carried them over to our soldiers.
Am I correct in assuming that you are adding a new dimension
to this; that it is your belief, in fact, that Saddam Hussein, in an
offensive manner, actually used chemical weapons against our
troops?
Mr. Eddington. Congressman Sanders, that is correct. It is not
simply my view. This committee was provided a report by Dr. Jona-
than Tucker of the Center of Nonproliferation Studies at the Mon-
terey Institute in California on January 29, 1996, in which he also
makes the argument that the Iraqis employed these agents at least
once against the Saudi port of Jubail on the 19th of January 1991,
and I endorse that.
Mr. Sanders. That is an element, though, that as we are trying
to understand what may have happened, there is — and reluctantly
the Pentagon has agreed that our soldiers were exposed to chemi-
cal weapons. They do not accept your thesis, though; is that cor-
rect?
Mr. Eddington. No. They continue to maintain that no attacks
occurred. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. If you want to continue with your testimony.
Mr. Eddington. Very briefly, we attempted to raise this issue
between January and March 1995. As I indicated, we were unsuc-
cessful. At the request of the former Senate Committee on Banking
investigator James Tuite, I gave a classified briefing to Select Intel-
ligence Committee staff on the 21st of March 1995. I turned over
roughly 100 documents to the Senate Intelligence Committee staff
at that time. Those documents included specific references to at-
tacks against American forces, and I outlined my evidence very,
very briefly. The Secretary of Defense and chairman of the Joint
Chiefs had told the Banking Committee in writing that no such in-
formation existed. I produced 100 documents that basically said
otherwise. Unfortunately
Mr. Shays. Is this the Banking or the Intelligence Committee?
Mr. Eddington. I gave a classified briefing — an approximately
10- to 15-minute classified briefing to the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee on the 21st of March 1995, in which I provided them with
approximately 100 classified documents, almost all of which, by the
way, originated with the Department of Defense, and I made just
a very simple point: The Department of Defense claimed that this
type of information on attacks and potential chemical agent expo-
149
sures, and even the presence of chemical munitions in Kuwait, did
not exist. In my view, those documents proved exactly the opposite.
Unfortunately, the Senate Intelligence Committee never followed
up on that. After that, the last opportunity we had to try to raise
this within the executive branch was when Dr. Tucker was on the
Presidential Advisory Committee. Dr. Tucker came to basically the
same conclusions we did, but he ultimately left the Advisory Com-
mittee.
After that, we were simply marking time at the CIA. When I felt
I had exhausted all of my avenues for trying to raise this issue
within channels, I made the decision that it was time for me to
leave the CIA.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Eddington follows:]
150
PREPARED STATEMENT OF PATRICK G. EDDINGTON
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1996
"CHEMICAL WEAPONS EXPOSURE TO U.S. TROOPS IN THE GULF WAR"
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Towns, distinguished members of the subcommittee.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss an issue that affects
both the national security of our nation and the health of tens of thousands of Desert
Storm veterans: chemical agent exposures during the Persian Gulf War. Let me briefly
describe how I became involved in this issue
I first learned of chemical agent exposures among American forces through my wife
Robin in February, 1994. Robin had just begun a fellowship with the Senate Banking
Committee, which had been conducting an investigation into the issue since the summer of
1993. Robin provided me with a copy of the committee's first report-issued in
September, 1993-which contained limited but compelling eyewitness testimony from
veterans describing incidents of chemical agent exposures or chemical agent attacks.
Reading that report brought back memories of a limited number of other, then-classified
reports detailing similar incidents that I had seen during Desert Storm. At the time those
classified accounts were issued, my colleagues and I at the National Photographic
Interpretation Center (NPIC) were repeatedly told by our management that according to
CENTCOM all such reports of chemical attacks or agent detections were false. The
information uncovered by the Senate Banking Committee investigation clearly showed
that in fact DoD and CENTCOM had misled the American people about chemical agent
detections-repeatedly- both during and after war.
Once I realized the magnitude of DoD's deception, I made two decisions. The first
was to reconstruct all the available information on the subject from every possible source,
classified or unclassified. This was necessary in order to get as complete a picture as
possible of the number and types of chemical or biological incidents that had occurred
during or after the war. The second decision was to attempt to get the Central Intelligence
Agency to reexamine its post-war conclusions that no chemical incidents or detections had
occurred during or after the war. Those conclusions were based almost exclusively on
official DoD assurances that no such incidents had occurred. I believed that the Senate
Banking Committee investigation had made DoD's claims in the matter at best dubious,
and at worst, outright fabrications. If CIA had based major post-war estimates on false,
policy-driven information supplied by DoD, those estimates and their conclusions would
151
Prepared Statement of Patrick G. Eddington
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relation!
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
Tuesday, December 10, 1996
have misled the Congress and the American public as to what actually transpired during
the war.
Having worked the Iraqi military problem during and after the war, I had access to
most of the reporting from the Desert Shield/Desert Storm period, and was thus able to
reassemble and analyze most of the data by late May, 1994. 1 raised the issue with my first
line supervisor, Mr. Dana S., on July 21, 1994. In an electronic mail message to Mr. S., I
utilized a combination of classified and unclassified data outlining my case. In essence, I
made the following points:
1. The May, 1993 CIA post-war estimate that Iraq had not used chemical agents and
that it had removed chemical munitions from the theater was based largely on official DoD
assurances to that effect. The Senate Banking Committee investigation, eyewitness
testimony from veterans, and a large body of classified data indicated exactly the opposite;
that Iraq did, on a least a limited number of occasions, use or attempt to use chemical
agents; that multiple chemical agent detections were recorded during and after the war,
and that U.S. forces encountered Iraqi chemical munitions both in Kuwait and in
Coalition-occupied areas of southern Iraq.
2. 1 recommended that the Agency dispatch a chemical sampling team to several
specific sites in Kuwait to collect soil samples for chemical agent analysis in a laboratory.
Additionally, I provided two copies of the May 25, 1994 Senate Banking Committee
report to Mr. S , and asked him to shop the reports around the appropriate Directorate of
Intelligence (DI) offices for comment. I emphasized the gravity of the situation to Mr. S.
as well as my view that DoD's lack of integrity on the issue of chemical agent detections
had serious implications for the health and welfare of the affected Desert Storm veterans.
Mr. S. promised to shop the reports around However, he also cautioned me that this
matter was not part of my "official duties" and that I should not let my involvement in the
issue interfere with my formal responsibilities as a military targeting support analyst. I
agreed to his request to restrict my on-the-job investigative activities pending an Agency
review of the Senate report.
Regrettably, Mr. S. did not take either my allegations or the Senate Banking
Committee's findings seriously. My wife Robin returned to the Agency from her
committee fellowship in early November, 1994. Shortly after arriving in her new
assignment as a chemical and biological warfare imagery analyst, Robin learned that Mr.
S. had provided the copies of the Senate reports to Mr. Stan H, who was the chief of
NPIC's Proliferation and Defense Industries Division. Robin learned that one of Mr. H.'s
imagery analyst, Mr. Troy K, had been assigned the task of "debunking" the Senate
report — a patently absurd notion since the report itself was based on eyewitness accounts
of chemical incidents, not imagery-derived information.
152
Prepared Statement of Patrick G. Eddlngton
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
Tuesday, December 10, 1996
Frustrated over Mr. S.'s failure to treat this critical issue seriously, in December 1994,
I sent a letter to the editor of The Washington Times. In that letter, which was published
on December 7, 1994, 1 sharply criticized DoD's handling of the issue and called for
further Congressional inquiries into the matter. I did not identify myself as an Agency
employee nor did I disclose any classified information in the letter. While the publication
of the letter angered both NPIC and DI management, it did force them to address my
allegations.
Between early January and mid-March 199S, I delivered a series of briefings to various
mid-level and senior CIA and National Intelligence Community managers and analysts in
which I outlined the case for chemical agent detections and exposures among American
forces during the Persian Gulf War. Among those I briefed were Major General John
Landry, National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces and former VII Corps
chief of staff during Desert Storm; Christopher Holmes, Director of the Office of
Weapons, Technology, and Proliferation (OWTP), and Gordon Oehler, Director of the
Nonproliferation Center. During each briefing, I emphasized several key points:
1 . Chemical agents had clearly been detected — repeatedly — by U.S., U.K., French,
and Czech forces during and after the war,
2. There were credible reports of a sublethal chemical and/or biological agent attack
against Coalition units at the Saudi port of Jubayl in the early morning hours of January
19th, 1991. Additionally, eyewitness accounts of several Iraqi SCUD attacks on American
units in Saudi Arabia described symptoms consistent with low-dose chemical or biological
agent exposure during or immediately after these attacks;
3. The were also credible reports of chemical agent injuries among both American
soldiers and Marines during and after the war;
4. DoD deliberately misled the Senate Banking Committee regarding the very
existence of information concerning all of the above mentioned issues; and
5. DoD had retaliated against current and former military personnel who had
cooperated with the Senate investigation.
On each occasion that I individually, or together with my wife, delivered a
presentation, our allegations and conclusions - particularly those dealing with potential
misconduct by senior DoD officials - were met with scorn, hostility, and deliberate
avoidance. Indeed, the senior CIA official in charge of directing the Agency's
153
Prepared Statement of Patrick G. Eddtngtoo
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
Tuesday, December 10, 1996
"investigation" into our allegations, Mr. Christopher M. Holmes, authored a memo on
April 21, 1995, which reads in part:
"The CIA does not plan a comprehensive review of DoD information
such as troop testimony, medical records, or operational logs..."
This statement was a radical departure from previous CIA policy regarding the use of
DoD-derived information in intelligence assessments. I have provided committee staff with
a copy of this memo, and I ask that it be included in the record with my statement.
As I noted previously, the May 1993 CIA post-war estimate that Iraq had not used
chemical agents and that it had removed chemical munitions from the theater was based
largely on official DoD assurances to that effect. My wife and I had presented evidence -
from U.S. military personnel who were in the theater at the time - to senior CIA officials
which flatly contradicted the official DoD position on this issue. Instead of abiding by its
statutory responsibilities to provide the President and the Congress with independent,
unbiased estimates on known or potential threats to the national security of the United
States, CIA evaded its responsibilities on this issue by sharply circumscribing both the
scope of its inquiry and the types of information that would be used in its analysis. In the
intelligence business, we call this "politicization of intelligence".
Contrary to the recent statements by CIA Executive Director Nora Slatkin and CIA's
Public Affairs office, our allegations against DoD and CIA do not represent a simple
"difference of opinion." The CIA has, as a matter of official policy, deliberately excluded
entire classes of information from its so-called analysis of potential chemical agent
exposures among American forces during the Gulf War. The CIA categorically refused,
despite my repeated protests, to directly contact Gulf War veterans who had specific
knowledge of chemical incidents during the Gulf War. CIA officials have claimed ~ falsely
— that such information is not "intelligence."
This refusal to directly contact eyewitness sources with relevant, first-hand information
about chemical incidents in the Gulf War is yet another example of the CIA's politicization
of this issue. Throughout its entire history, the CIA has had an intelligence collection
component whose sole mission is to collect information from American citizens about
their overseas travel and experiences. That component was ideally suited to conduct
debriefings of Gulf War veterans and civilian contractors about their experiences with and
knowledge of chemical incidents during the war. The CIA refused to use this component
to contact Gulf War veterans about potential chemical incidents during the war,
obliterating the Agency's claim that their review of intelligence was "comprehensive."
Further evidence of CIA's analytically fraudulent approach to this issue can be found
in the Agency's claims regarding chemical and biological hazard prediction modeling. It is
my understanding that Ms. Slatkin informed committee staff that
154
Prepared Statement of Patrick G. Eddlngton
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
Tuesday, December 10, 1996
"The 1991 effort undertaken by DoD ~ since it was done before the war
or bombing of facilities — was predictive modeling using a range of
hypothetical parameters. In contrast, the recent CIA effort - which
occurred after the war — was specific and modeled actual facilities
weapons, and climatic data."
In fact, in 1994, the Department of Defense provided the Senate Banking Committee
specific documentation on their modeling of potential fallout hazards at known or
suspected Iraqi CW facilities that were attacked by Coalition forces during the war. These
were not "hypothetical sites" as claimed in the Slatkin memo. I provided two such maps to
committee staff in August; additional such data may be contained in the Senate Banking
Committee archives. Ms. Station's claims that "no specific Iraqi facilities were modeled in
1991" is false, as the Defense Nuclear Agency maps make clear.
Additionally, according to the SAIC employee responsible for the 1991 modeling
effort, Mr. Richard McNauy, DoD was in fact conducting real-time hazard prediction
during hostilities. In his testimony before the Presidential Advisory Committee on April
16th, 1996 McNauy stated
"This happens to be some of the work that I did while I was in Defense
Nuclear Agency in the basement doing near real-time hazard reporting
during Desert Storm. What we were doing there was establishing footprints
of potential hazard path, and we had a real-time weather team there
predicting the winds for us. So an initial depiction when we get the, in this
case, SCUD warning, it might look like the top graph. As we get more
weather information four hours into the process it might look like the
middle graph, and the third graph might look like what we might see after
we finally know what the wind was like during the entire duration the
hazard might have been in the air."
As the above comments make clear, Ms. Slatkin' s claim that the 1991 DoD/SAIC
modeling effort employed "hypothetical data" are also demonstrably false.
Ms. Slatkin told a Congressional committee that SAIC was asked
"...to input into the model a broad range of quantities of several types of
chemical warfare agents that were not related to any specific information
regarding Iraqi CW agent holdings."
Again, if you refer to the two DNA targeting maps, you will notice the agent modeled was
GB (sarin), which of course was already known to be the primary nerve agent in the Iraqi
inventory in 1991. Contrary to Ms. Slatkin's assertion, the DoD/DNA modeling effort
utilized real data and focused on real facilities.
155
Prepared Statement of Patrick G. Eddlngton
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
Tuesday, December 10, 1996
Furthermore, I also understand that Ms. Slatkin told committee staff that with regard
to the latest SAIC modeling project
"CIA requested modeling of specific types and amounts of chemical
agents and munitions stored at the three facilities, based on specific data
derived from UNSCOM inspections."
It should be noted that UNSCOM data is often incomplete or misleading due to Iraq's
well-established penchant for lying about the nature and scope of its CW program. Thus,
any data derived from UNSCOM reporting should be treated cautiously and must be
viewed as a conservative estimate on the number and types of munitions present at any
given facility.
Ms. Slatkin' s assertion that the 1991 DoD/DNA/SAIC modeling effort did not deal
with the issue of low-level exposures is also highly suspect. The CENTCOM CCJ3 (X)
NBC log, obtained by Gulf War Veterans of Georgia in January, 1995, has several
passages which indicate that CENTCOM was aware of the likelihood of long-range CW
fallout, including the following entry from 20 January 1991 :
"LTC Merryman called. Report from ARCENT forward (LNO w/NAC)
Czech recon, DS to French, report "Detected GA/GB" and that hazard
is flowing down from factory/storage bombed in Iraq. Predictably, this
has become/is going to become a problem " 1
Indeed, in the past year I have learned that the United States Air Force conducted
low-level chemical exposure experiments on primates during late 1990 or early 1991 at the
Armstrong Laboratory at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas. The authors specifically stated
that, "[t]he military requirement that drove this program was concern about the bioeffects
of single and repeated exposure to low levels of nerve agent." 2 The timing of the study
(during or immediately after the war), as well as military requirement driving it, make it
explicitly clear that DoD knew that there were serious potential hazards from such
exposures. Even giving the test animals relatively high doses of pyrodistigmine bromide -
the very same nerve agent pretreatment medication administered to hundreds of thousands
of Gulf War vets - was useless in low-level exposure situations. The authors noted that:
"We are, therefore, faced with a similar problem in both acute
and repeated low-level soman behavioral studies: a consistent
^CENTCOM CCJ3 (X) NBC log, entry for 201710 January 1991.
2 Stanley L. Hattgraves and Michael R. Murphy, "Behavioral Effects of Low-Dose Nerve Agents, as
reported in Chemical Warfare Agents, edited by Satu M. Somani (New York: Academic Press Inc.: 1992),
pp. 125-154.
156
Prepared Statement of Patrick G. Eddingtoa
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
Tuesday, December 10. 1996
lack of protection provided by chemical defense drugs — drugs
that are effective in protecting against lethal high-level exposures." 3
I note for the record that I found this Air Force study in the CIA library in 1995.
Despite Ms. Slatkin's assertions that the CIA/SAIC modeling effort has been
"comprehensive," CIA has in fact deliberately ignored the issue of the forward deployment
of CW weapons into Kuwait. This is not entirely surprising given the fact that at the July
9, 1996 Presidential Advisory Committee meeting in Chicago, CIA spokesperson stated
categorically that
"We conclude that Iraq did not use chemical agents, nor were chemical
agents located in Kuwait." 4
Given the detailed and voluminous nature of the testimony given by dozens of Gulf
War veterans before Congress and the Presidential Advisory Committee over the past
three years regarding the presence of chemical munitions in Kuwait, CIA's position can
only be described as intellectually and morally bankrupt.
I have personally spoken to over 220 Gulf War veterans, and at least a dozen have
credible accounts of chemical agent detections, chemical munitions discoveries, or both.
The CIA has, as a matter of official policy, refused to debrief any Gulf War veterans —
despite my repeated attempts to persuade them to do so. The CIA/SAIC refusal to deal
with the issue of chemical hazards created by the bombing of forward deployed Iraqi CW
munitions depots renders the entire SAIC model invalid, if not patently fraudulent.
Additionally, senior officials at both the Department of Defense and CIA have misled
the public and several Congressional committees since the end of the Gulf War regarding
not only the very existence of information dealing with potential exposures of American
personnel to chemical agents, but also regarding their actions in attempting to conceal
such information from the public. On May 4, 1994, in a memo to then Senate Banking
Committee chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr., the Secretaries of Defense, Veterans Affairs,
and Health and Human Services stated categorically that with regards to potential
chemical or biological agent exposures among American forces during the Gulf War:
"There is no classified information that would indicate any exposures
to or detections of chemical or biological agents."
3 Id. at 145-46.
^Testimony of Sylvia Copeland, Central Intelligence Agency, before the Presidential Advisory Committee
on Gulf War Veterans* Illnesses, July 9, 1996.
157
Prepared Statement of Patrick G. Eddington
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
Tuesday, December 10, 1996
At the time this memo was written, I was in possession of hundreds of classified
documents that dealt with the presence of exactly these types of weapons in the Kuwait
Theater of Operations, stockpiles of which were destroyed both during the Coalition air
campaign and after the war through demolition operations by American and other
Coalition forces. I note for the record that the overwhelming majority of those documents
originated with the Department of Defense.
More recently, Ms. Slatkin has claimed that CIA has never sought to block the release
of information regarding the presence of chemical or biological weapons in the Kuwait
Theater of Operations, or any other information related to this issue. Ms. Slatkin's claims
are demonstrably false.
On October 25, 1994, 1 submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to CIA
requesting the declassification of 59 specific documents and reports. In my FOIA request,
I specifically stated that I was seeking the declassification of these documents "because
they contain information and analysis which may help in establishing the specific cause of a
series of maladies which collectively are known as 'Gulf War Syndrome.' My FOIA
request was denied in February 1995, despite my appeal for the release of the information
on humanitarian and medical grounds. It was not until after my wife and I went public
with our allegations that the CIA began the process of releasing the information. I note for
the record that despite Ms. Slatkin's claims to the contrary, as far as I am aware at this
time, CIA continues to withhold some of the relevant documents, including their May
1993 assessment that no chemical munitions were in Kuwait ~ an assessment that relied
almost exclusively on official DoD assurances that no such munitions were found in the
theater.
More seriously, in early 1996, the senior most officials of the CIA ordered the Defense
Intelligence Agency to remove several hundred previously declassified documents from
DoD's GulfLINK Internet world wide web site. Ms. Slatkin, at the behest of Director of
Central Intelligence John Deutch, ordered that more than 300 of the previously
declassified GulfLINK documents be reclassified. This action by DCI Deutch and CIA
Executive Director Slatkin represented a breach of Executive Order 12958, section 1.8,
which specifically states that information declassified by competent authority cannot
subsequently be reclassified. I note for the record that the overwhelming majority of the
information that Deutch and Slatkin sought to reclassify dealt specifically with the
presence of chemical or biological munitions in the Kuwait Theater of Operations. I have
provided committee staff with a copy of an internal CIA staff note outlining Slatkin's
directive. I ask that it be included in the record with my statement.
I elected to challenge CIA's illegal actions by including several of the disputed
GulfLINK documents in a manuscript I had drafted on this subject. Per the terms of my
secrecy agreement, I submitted that manuscript for review on July 29, 1996. By
September 20, 1996, CIA had responded, insisting that I delete all reference to the
158
Prepared Statement of Patrick G. Eddington
Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
Tuesday, December 10, 1996
disputed GulfLINK data. In response, I instructed my attorney to file suit against CIA on
my behalf. That action was filed in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia
on October 16, 1996. The CIA responded by requesting a meeting with their Office of
General Counsel on October 24, 1996 to "discuss" the disputed documents. At that
meeting, I reiterated my firm intention to bring this matter before the federal courts in
order to demonstrate the illegality of CIA's conduct in the matter. Afterwards CIA
dropped its objection to the inclusion of the disputed GulfLINK data. After our allegations
became public on October 30, 1996, Ms. Slatkin stated that the CIA had never intended to
withhold any of this information from the public or Gulf War veterans. As the internal CIA
memo I provided committee staff makes clear, Ms. Slatkin was herself directly involved in
the decision to withhold previously declassified information from the public.
Mr. Chairman, I have watched in anger for nearly three years as senior officials of both
the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency have repeatedly misled the
American public, the veterans of the Gulf War, and the Congress regarding these facts. To
this day, neither the Congress nor Gulf War veterans have all of the information available
regarding the known or suspected locations of Iraqi chemical or biological munitions in
the Kuwait Theater of Operations. Until the Executive Branch adopts a policy of full
disclosure with regards to the operational and intelligence records of the Desert Storm
period, neither the Congress nor Gulf War veterans will be able to know with any certainty
the true magnitude of potential chemical or biological agent exposures among American
forces during the Gulf War. Full disclosure is a medical and humanitarian necessity. I urge
the Congress to hold the Executive Branch fully accountable in this critical matter. Thank
you for the opportunity to offer my views on this extremely important topic.
m
159
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
2 J APR I99S
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting with Pat and Robin Eddington (U)
1. On 14 April, I met with Pat and Robin Eddington to
discuss developments in various Executive Branch initiatives
pertaining to allegations of chemical weapons use in Iraq
during Desert Storm and on the phenomenon known as Gulf War
Syndrome. Also present during this meeting were
George J^MHM, OGC, and OSWR Division Chiefs
Torrey Few \m (NBCD) and Jim MOOS (SSD) . (FOUO)
2. Key points covered during this meeting included:
-- The CIA is studying the intelligence data
relevant to whether troops were exposed to chemical or
biological agents; the Agency will designate a focal point
for Gulf War Syndrome/ Iraqi CW use issues.
-- The CIA does not plan a comprehensive review
of DoD information such as troop testimony, medical records,
or operational logs. The study will check such information
against intelligence holdings, where feasible, and follow up
any leads that could help resolve continuing uncertainties.
— The Eddingtons reiterated their conviction
that Iraq used chemical weapons during the Gulf War and
grave concerns about how DoD has handled relevant
information.
-- This issue would be a part of the confirmation
process for DCl-nominee Deutch and appropriate talking
points and background material would need to be prepared.
OCA also would contact the appropriate congressional
committees, if it has not already done so.
We indicated co the Eddingtons that their role
in stimulating the Agency to focus on the issue of Iraqi CW
use was recognized and that they should be pleased with the
results.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
160
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: Meeting with Pat and Robin Eddington (U)
We also discussed with the Eddingtons the
importance of being scrupulous in keeping their personal
efforts in this matter separate from their official duties
and Agency support and information systems infrastructure.
I noted that some of Pat's actions raised questions about
the exercise of judgment, but that this was now behind us.
In view of the Edd-ingcons concern about DoD's
handling of this matter, George JmMi and I reviewed the
courses of action open to them, including contacting Agency
and/or DoD points of contact. Inspector Generals, the
Intelligence Oversight Board, the intelligence committees.
DoD's oversight committees, and the FBI/DoJ. The Eddingtons
did not accuse DoD or Deputy Secretary of Defense Deutch
personally of illegal conduct, and they did not want to
approach the DoD Inspector General because of their concern
over the integrity of the DoD process. (FOUO)
Christopher M. Holmes
Director
Scientific and Weapons Research
161
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: Meeting with Pat and Robin Eddington (U)
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162
From the Desk of!
NOTE FOR: Robin A. Eddlngton
Patrick Eddington @ Dl
from: : mmmttmmmmm
DATE: 03/04/96 04:26:06 PM
SUBJECT: Are you sick of me yet?
This It from the JIVMQ group weekly updates to the 'Director;
tor the OA Staff Meeting Minutes.
he in turn uses what she wants
DCI/DDCI Interest
Gull War Veterans' Illness Task Force developments, a significant litigation victory, and
assistance to the Defense Mapping Agency are appropriate for passage forward:
(b) To preclude any possible releases of GulflINK materials under the FOIA, we contacted
the chief of the DIA FOIA office and received his concurrence that we would be informed of any relevant
FOIA requests to DIA and that no release would be effected without the affirmative concurrence of our
CC: '
163
-■■:- - :;• az re ill, u n o^jlt lor^&'i ; '. , .- '.c4§i$§£ «i- '-
■u;-lv
.VERVZ AGENT moXIOATIO* AND Vr* A THE NT
1. GENERAL: The nerve agents are highly toxic organopho«phe te compound*
which polaon the eniym* chol lntitirtit throughout the nirvoui system,
resulting In an •.ictn of the enzyme acetylcholine. The end result If
potentially total disruption of nirvoui system function. <■
2. Routes of Entry: Inhalation, aye and akin absorption, ingestion.
Narva agents (QA, OB, QD , and VX) are readily abaorbad through all routaa
of exposure, in both liquid and vapor forms.
3. Slgna and symptoms of acute exposure: Effects may occur within
mlnutea of axpoaura or may be delayed for hours, depending on the dose and
route of entry. The effecta vary with the route of entry but generally
are as follows:
a. Zy«a: mloala (pin-pointed puplla), dimming and blurring of viaion,
excessive tearing, possibly eye pain
b. Hose: excessive secretlona
c. Mouth: exceaalvt salivation
d. Respiratory track: Difficulty breathing (hard to move air in and
~ut) , cheat tightness, wheezing, coughing, respiratory arrest -sjf
e. Kaad / Central Karvoui System: headache, mental confusion,
excitation, anxiety, difficulty concentrating, convulsions, coma
f. Stomach: cramping, pain, nausea, vomiting
g. Muscles: muscular twitching, or paralyala
h. Skin: local sweating
1. Other: Involuntary urination and defecation, death
4. Signs and symptoms of chronic, low dose exposure: Memory loss,
decreased alertness, decreaaed problem eolvlng ability, and language
problems ara suspected but have not been proven by eclentlfic atudy. The
only proven affect of long term expoaure la EEO (brain wave) changes
without clinical significance.
3. TERATOGENICITY (Ability to cause birth defects): Although some
organophoshpate pesticides have been shown to be teratogenic in animals,
these effects hava not been shown in carefully controlled experiments
using nerve agents.
8. RESPONSE: Prior to rendering aid, workers exposed should mask, clear
the area, and take hasty steps to control the apread or abaorption of
*
c amination. All clothing ahould be removed. Decontamination with BX
bleach ahould occur, except that the eye. ahould b. jlu.hed with °»P*° U «
amount, of water. Sufficient contact time (mlnutea) should be a}lowea, u
* -r .
SECRET
bi
ac
followed by rinalng with water. 'sS&lVjMP.,
/ -
164
■At ■
r
7. TREATMENT:. Atroplna la tha kay dru< In tha traatmant of narva agant
polionlnj. Follow tha CTT juldallnaa: Admlnlatar ona Kk I kit (both
atroplna and 3 Pam Chlorida) whan thraa or mora algna/aymptoma art notad.
Admlnlatar * aacond Mk I kit In 10-1B mlnutaa if algna/aymptoma paralat or
racur. Admlnlatar a third Mk I kit In 10-13 mlnutaa if aijna/aymptoma
paralat or now. With aavara axpoauraa, larga doaaa of atropina may ba
naadad to maintain aatiafaotory raaplratory atatua, and tha affacta of
atroplna may ba quita brlaf. Ba awara that tha patlant may hava to vomit,
and tharafora may naad to ramova hla maak briafly, or hava It ramovad.
8. RECOVERY la complata. Thara la no ganatic or parmanant damaga.
I hava raad and undaratood tha abova Information. All quaatlona hava baan
axplainad to my understanding and aatlaf action.
)ldlar/lmployaa V%^/^/y^^^^ ^?Madlcal Paraoniial
Data / / / 1 / 90' RICHARQWKRAMP. M.D
~^/ ^*g MAJ aflBnajjaiv
•MC
165
TELECOPIER TRANSMITTAL SHEET
TO: Committee Reporters
(202) 225-3308 6x
<fQ3VS°+3
FROM: Mark S. Zaid, Esq
1501 M Street, N.W.
Suite 1175
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 785-3801
(202) 223-4826 fax
SUBJECT: Patrick Eddington's Oral Statement
DATE 10 December 1996
NUMBER OF PAGES TRANSMITTED (INCLUDING COVER SHEET) 6
MESSAGE/CONTENTS:
AS REQUESTED.
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE
This fax\teIecopy is intended only for the use of the individual to which it is addressed and may
contain information that is privileged or confidential. If you have received this communication in
error, please notify us immediately by telephone
166
Oral opening statement for Shays' hearing
-4>""> <- /
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Towns, members of
the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss an issue that affects both the
national security of our nation and the health of tens of
thousands of Desert Storm veterans: chemical agent
exposures during the Persian Gulf War. . ^ m^(%^ v Wr ^/^~^JU-'?
Hujcov) In addition to my written statement, I have one further 2. tiMlhr-' 1 ')
disclosure and comment that I would like to offer. i^^mtJ
Recently, a medically retired U.S. Army nuclear, ^ ;,*i5atM-
biological, and chemical NCO contacted me regarding his ^^{^Kj
possible exposure to chemical agents. Like many Gulf War cL^'^l*^
veterans, this soldier claimed to have logs showing <t^ow< **■*-
chemical agent alarms going off and unit personnel being r^ ; ^
exposed to chemical nerve agents from leaking chemical
munitions. The difference in this case was that neither the
soldier nor his unit were deployed to the Gulf.
Sergeant First Class Michael M o r r iacy Had been an
NBC NCO assigned to 330th Ordnance Company of the
59th Ordnance Brigade, located near Clausen, Germany.
Between July and October 1990, Morrisey's unit was
involved in Operation Steel Box, the removal of more than
170,000 aging chemical nerve agent munitions from an
American chemical weapons depot in Germany. On
November 23, 1996, my wife and I flew to Seattle to hear
SFC Morrissey's story.
167
"I would have done this earlier," he told us, "but I'm
just now recovering from my bone marrow transplant at the
Seattle VA hospital." Morrisey had developed CML
Leukemia in May, 1995; that particular form of Leukimia is
caused, according SFC Morrissey, by exposure to ionizing
radiation or toxic chemical exposure. SFC Morrisey kept
all of the unit logs from the Operation Steel Box period,
even though the OIC (officer in charge) had ordered him to
destroy them. Morrissey informed me that his unit had to
report any chemical incidents, accidents, leaks, etc. up the
chain of command. According to SFC Morrissey, this
formal reporting requirement was Congressionally
mandated. Morrissey indicated that all of the reports sent
up the chain stated that there had been no chemical
incidents.
Morrissey stated that the reports were deliberately
falsified. In my presence, Morrissey pulled out a log entry
for July 10 1990 showing that an M-8 alarm had gone off at
one of the chemical storage bunkers. There were no other
contaminants in the area, and the device was fully
functional and working normally. Additional detection
equipment was dispatched to the bunker, and according to
the log extract, the air sample readings appeared to indicate
a slight trace of nerve agent in the air. "I was told to
'overlook' such incidents," Morrissey noted.
The 10 weeks of logs that Morrissey retained appeared
to have several such incidents, to include some personnel
168
who displayed pinpointed pupils and other tell-tale signs of
nerve agent exposure. Within a year of leaving the unit,
Morrissey began to experience periodic paralysis in his
extremities. He also began having memory problems. "I
used to be able to quote you chapter and verse from any
NBC manual," he told me. "Now, I sometimes can't
remember what I did yesterday~or even five minutes ago."
What upset Morrissey the most was that his chain of
command clearly understood the potential risks. "They've
said they didn't know about the possible effects of low-
level chemical exposure," he said, referring to the Defense
Department. "If that's true, why did everyone in my unit
have to sign this?" Morrissey handed me a document-
previously classified SECRET—entitled "General
Information: Nerve Agent Intoxication and Treatment."
Two paragraphs immediately caught my attention:
"4. Signs and symptoms of chronic, low dose
exposure: Memory loss, decreased alertness,
decreased problem solving ability, and language
problems are suspected but have not been proven
by scientific study...." (emphasis added)
5. Teratogenicity (Ability to cause birth defects):
Although some organophosphate pesticides have
been shown to be teratogenetic in animals, these
effects have not been shown in carefully controlled
experiments using nerve agents."
169
The last sentence of this paragraph was misleading: to
the best of my knowledge, DoD has never conducted
"carefully controlled experiments" with nerve agents to
determine the teratogenetic effects of the agents. Despite
this, DoD "suspected" that chronic low-level nerve agent
exposure could produce serious, chronic health problems in
exposed personnel— a year before the Coalition bombing
campaign would result in the release of tons of such toxic
agents over American forces in Saudi Arabia.
Every member of Morrissey's unit was required to
sign an identical document. The fact that DoD classified
this information sheet—and the medical records of the
entire 330th Ordnance Company- SECRET is irrefutable
evidence that DoD knew it was placing these men at
risk.... and that it did not want the outside world to know
about it.
Mr. Chairman, Sergeant Morrissey's revelations
obliterate DoD's claims that it had no concerns regarding
the potential effects of low-level chemical agent exposures
to American personnel working in close proximity to
chemical agents. Clearly, this information bears directly on
the issue of the health effects from similar exposures
among Gulf War veterans. Gulf War veterans have testified
before this and other committees regarding chemical agent
detections in close proximity to Iraqi chemical munitions in
the Kuwait Theater of Operations. United Nations
inspectors have destroyed thousands of such leaking
chemical rounds in Iraq since 1991.
170
Sergeant Morrissey's revelations have even broader
implications, however. The specter of leaking chemical
munitions at an American arsenal raise serious questions
about potential chemical agent exposures among German
civilians living near that depot, as well as potential
exposures among our own citizens living near similar
depots throughout the United States. I urgently recommend
that the Congress require the Department of Defense to
immediately release all relevant unit logs and similar
records maintained by every chemical weapons depot
operated by the United States government to determine
whether additional chemical agent releases or detections
may have occurred at these facilities. Anything less would
be a disservice not only to our veterans, but to the public at
large.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any
questions the committee may have.
171
Mr. SHAYS. You are here before the committee because you spoke
out and I told my committee I wanted you to come. I still don't
have a handle on your testimony. I just have to be very frank with
you.
What I was hoping was that you would come before the commit-
tee and you would be very specific in terms of what you saw at the
CIA that troubled you, and not in general terms but in some spe-
cific terms. Is there a part of your testimony you want to highlight
orally?
Mr. Eddington. When I discussed just a few moments ago, Mr.
Chairman, this notion of sitting down with CIA analysts, trying to
get them to deal with this issue, not only the analysts but the man-
agers were looking to exclude entire
Mr. Shays. Part of my problem is "this issue." There are too
many "this issues". I can tell you 10 "this issues." What do you
mean, this issue?
Mr. Eddington. The issue of chemical agent exposures among
American forces.
Mr. Shays. It is your testimony that you gave before the Intel-
ligence Committee, documents that said that chemicals were used
offensively?
Mr. Eddington. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. Give me examples.
Mr. Eddington. Mr. Chairman, I cannot, for security reasons, go
into the specific details of those reports. I can tell you, however,
that there are approximately two dozen of them, that they origi-
nated with the National Security Agency, and that the House Intel-
ligence Committee, I believe — counsel can correct me if I'm
wrong — but the House Intelligence Committee and the House Na-
tional Security Committee staff have the list of those specific docu-
ments because we have provided them with that. But on those spe-
cific circumstances, I would be violating my secrecy agreement.
Mr. Shays. It is your testimony that as far as you are concerned,
these documents clearly document that offensive weapons, chemical
weapons, were used or might have been used? How do you grade
it?
Mr. Eddington. There are specific examples of Iraqi units re-
porting using the weapons. There are other reports of, in some
cases, American units being on the receiving end of such attacks.
But again, it would be imprudent for me to go into more detail.
Mr. Shays. I accept that. Are they verified by detections, or were
you not able to determine that?
Mr. Eddington. This is a circumstance where we are dealing
with some specific reports that were generated by the National Se-
curity Agency. I believe some of those can be correlated in fact with
perhaps some of the testimony that was given here today. But be-
cause those reports are still specifically classified, I can't go into
that. There are many other reports that have been declassified sub-
sequently that I would be happy to discuss, such as the Iraqi am-
munition storage area located at Rumaylah in southeastern Iraq.
This is an extremely large ammunition storage area, even larger
than the Khamisiyah facility that has been in the news the last 6
months. That specific facility had very, very specific signatures that
indicated it was a chemical storage facility; for example, chemical
172
decontamination trenches located immediately outside the ammu-
nition storage area itself; the delivery means for chemical weapons,
in this case, Russian BM-21 multiple rocket launchers. There were
additional security measures that were in place around this par-
ticular facility. That facility is significant because American forces,
as you know, occupied southeastern Iraq, and had orders to destroy
all Iraqi captured ammunition in place. We have log entries from
the 24th Infantry Division which clearly show that chemical weap-
ons were found in the Rumaylah area, two separate units, the 4th
Battalion 64th Armored Division and I believe 2d Company of the
7th Mechanized Infantry Battalion. That is only one site.
There are, in my opinion, anywhere from a dozen to perhaps
three dozen different chemical weapons sites.
Mr. Sanders. Clarify for me, sir, is your point that this indicates
the Iraqi intention to use offensive weapons, or is your concern that
these depots were destroyed, then — by our troops — releasing chemi-
cal
Mr. Eddington. I think it is a little of both. As Major Hebert tes-
tified some while ago, there were specific incidents which clearly
occurred where weapons were fired at American forces that did not
have a traditional high explosive reaction when they impacted.
Mr. Sanders. Meaning that they might have been chemical?
Mr. Eddington. Meaning that they might have been chemical.
But I am also very deeply concerned about the notion of, before de-
ployment — of these chemical munitions, all the way down to per-
haps the battalion level, virtually the lowest level of the Iraqi
army, with almost every single infantry and armored mechanized
unit they had in the theater. There are several Iraqi prisoner-of-
war reports that have been declassified and placed on the Gulf
Link that deal with this specific issue. On the 20th Infantry Divi-
sion, for example, there is a report from an Iraqi prisoner stating
that his unit did specifically have chemical weapons, specifically
mustard agent rounds.
There are additional reports dealing with this whole issue of the
massive deployment of these chemical weapons throughout the the-
ater. There is a specific log entry, I believe it is contained in the
records of the 18th Airborne Corps, that speaks to the issue of Sad-
dam Hussein having given release authority for the use of chemical
agents down to brigade level.
Mr. Sanders. The essence of what you are saying is that in your
judgment, the problem is much more serious than we have been led
to believe. It is not simply a question of U.S. troops destroying
chemical weapon bunkers, but that in fact there had been an offen-
sive attack, and you regard it of some magnitude.
Mr. Eddington. I think there were three exposure scenarios that
we are looking at, Mr. Sanders. The first occurred as a result of
the allied bombing campaign. Remember that Major Hebert made
note of the fact in his testimony that the focus of the air campaign
at the tactical and operational level was to destroy not only the
Iraqi delivery means for these weapons, but also the munitions
that were located nearby as well. So when you take that into ac-
count, along with the destruction of the Iraqi chemical and biologi-
cal weapons facilities in Iraq, you get, I think, a very massive po-
tential exposure scenario there. So that is the first one.
173
The second exposure scenario deals with the limited number of
attacks that I believe occurred, and Dr. Tucker, as I have indicated,
also believes this. Finally, we have the Khamisiyah model, if you
will, for the final set of exposures, the demolition taking place after
the war.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. You are saying offensive attacks, for point two, and
then you are saying, again — one was defensive; the first was the
bombing campaign, the second was the offensive use of weapons by
Saddam Hussein's troops, and the third, you are going back to de-
fense, the bombing of Khamisiyah and maybe other sites.
Mr. Eddington. That is correct.
Mr. SHAYS. Do you have any background that you can share with
us on the Science Applications International Corporation's projec-
tions that the plumes during the war would go away from us, actu-
ally toward civilians in Iraq, but away from United States soldiers;
and now we are trying to resolve, in fact, whether SAIC actually
was accurate in their projections.
Mr. Eddington. I don't think there is any question that there
are some very serious problems with regard to the SAIC model.
One of the points that I would like to make is that it is my under-
standing that Ms. Slatkin informed committee staff "the 1991 effort
undertaken by DOD, since it was done before the war, on bombing
facilities was predictive modeling using a range of hypothetical pa-
rameters, in contrast to the recent CIA effort which occurred after
the war, and specifically modelled actual facilities, climatary data,
et cetera."
In fact, "In 1994 the Department of Defense provided the Senate
Banking Committee with specific documentation on their modeling
and potential fallout hazards at known or suspected Iraqi CW fa-
cilities that were attacked by coalition forces."
So the reality is the SAIC contractor who was involved in this,
Mr. Richard McNally, admitted to the Presidential Advisory Com-
mittee in April 1996 that he was using real-time data during the
war. So the CIA has misrepresented that aspect of this. This is not
something new that is being done. Mr. McNally had access to all
the real-time data. He used the real-time data originally. So in my
view, that aspect of the model is completely invalid.
There is another aspect of this model that is also invalid. That
is the CIA-SAIC emphasis on the attacks against these hardened
concrete and steel reinforced bunkers. We know from testimony
from the UNSCOM inspectors, as well as some of the testimony we
heard here today, that the Iraqis were storing these munitions
many times in areas that simply had open-topped earthen berms
around their sides. That means that you are automatically going to
get a great deal more in terms of collateral explosions, fallout, et
cetera, than you would from a single bomb going into a bunker and
have some effluent come out from a small hole. So there are some
very real problems with the SAIC-CIA model.
Mr. Shays. In Khamisiyah they described — we have witnesses
who described the fact they were 2 miles away, and that when they
started blowing up the depot the missiles and shells were being
projected out basically 12 miles from the site.
174
Did you take a close look at that study? Was that something that
came across your desk?
Mr. EDDINGTON. The actual — are you referring to the original
1991 report
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Eddington. That was issued? That was one of the reports
that we specifically gave to the Central Intelligence Agency analyst
who was responsible for looking at this problem. We provided him
that documentation in 1991, or excuse me, in February 1995. So
they were aware of it. It was in their possession. We had drawn
it to their attention, just as we drew the information regarding the
Rumaylah site that I have discussed, the other sites I have been
talking about for the last few minutes, we brought all of this to
their attention.
I had a stack, Mr. Chairman, it was in excess of 300 classified
documents that dealt with this specific subject, where these muni-
tions may have been located, what was known about their level of
deployment, how far down they were deployed. We put all of this
in the hands of the CIA's analysts in February 1995.
Mr. Shays. Are you aware of any total destruction of material?
Are you aware of fabricating data? Are you aware of any of this
ever — is the CIA's major offense that they did not do what they
should have done, or they actually took, in your judgment, they ac-
tually took information and doctored it?
Mr. Eddington. I don't know that I would say that they doctored
it. In the intelligence business, when we describe politicization of
intelligence, it can take many forms. The form that I saw and the
form that I can document is this notion of excluding entire classes
of information that are normally included and evaluated in analy-
ses.
Mr. SHAYS. In that context, tell me some of the exclusions.
Mr. Eddington. Again, the complete refusal to contact Gulf war
veterans. I was willing to put them in direct contact with veterans.
Mr. Shays. That is one.
Mr. Eddington. They refused to look at the medical records of
the individuals involved. They refused to look at the unit logs and
try to correlate those with the known locations or suspected loca-
tions of chemical munitions. So you have this pattern that is estab-
lished of trying to deliberately exclude entire classes of informa-
tion. If you would like, I can quote directly from the CIA document
that was authored by Christopher Holmes in 1995, in response to
our inquiry: "The CIA does not plan a comprehensive review of
DOD information, such as troop testimony, medical records, or
operational logs." That is being about as definitive as you can be
in terms of deliberately excluding classes of information.
Here is the problem I have with this. If the Central Intelligence
Agency is willing to take the testimony of a gassed Iraqi Kurd or
Shiite, and they are willing to use that in an analysis on a topic,
on an intelligence topic, why will they not use — did they refuse to
use testimony from our own citizens for exactly the same kind of
analysis?
Mr. Shays. That is a great question. Did you ever put that to any
of your co-workers?
175
Mr. Eddington. Repeatedly. The answer we received from man-
agement, from management, now, was "That is not intelligence in-
formation." That is in complete contradiction to their normal policy
of talking to people in DOD and debriefing folks that are in the
military and other American citizens about their experiences and
travels overseas.
Mr. Shays. What does not seem logical to me is it does not seem
intelligent. You go to your best source and then you are able to go
to other sources, having gotten a good basis or foundation on which
to then proceed to get more information.
I'm very willing to go back to your first point until we cover this.
Mr. Sanders. May I jump in?
Mr. Shays. Yes, Mr. Sanders.
Mr. Sanders. Obviously, the implication of what you are saying
is very serious. In essence, you are suggesting that there is a major
cover-up, that there is a lot of information out there that high-
ranking officials in the CIA, and I gather the DOD, understood
about the exposure of our troops to chemical agents. Could you
speculate for us, give us your reasoning, as to why in fact this in-
formation was not made available?
Mr. Eddington. This is one man's opinion.
Mr. Sanders. One man's opinion, surely.
Mr. Eddington. We had that caveat — it is my view that the De-
partment of Defense, this administration, and if it were still in
power, the Bush administration, would not want to deal with this
issue because it is going to cost a lot of money. Let's face it, if
you've got at least 250,000 sick vets, and that is my personal esti-
mate
Mr. Sanders. You think literally half of the men and women
over there?
Mr. Eddington. I believe so, based on their locations, because we
have chemical agent detections, some of which you have indicated
here on the map, which run all the way from north central Saudi
Arabia all the way down to the Saudi port of Jubail. These detec-
tions were taking place during the entire 6-week period of the war.
You are talking about a massive exposure scenario. So there is the
medical cost of dealing with it.
But there are some other major issues that I think the Depart-
ment of Defense does not want to have to acknowledge. That is the
ve.ry real vulnerability of our nuclear, biological, chemical defense
equipment. In the course of my research I learned that the gas
masks that most of our forces were wearing, the M-17 series pro-
tective masks I'm sure most of us have seen on television, have a
failure rate of 26 percent to 40 percent.
Mr. Sanders. But in fact in the Persian Gulf most of our men
and women were not wearing these masks in the first place, is that
correct?
Mr. Eddington. Unless an alarm had actually been sounded.
But even then, my point here is they would have had even less pro-
tection. The Department of Defense has known about that vulner-
ability and that problem for over a decade.
Mr. Sanders. You are suggesting that the second reason, in ad-
dition to the potentially huge financial expenses, is to not wanting
176
to reveal that if we send to people to war they are really vulner-
able?
Mr. Eddington. That is exactly correct. I think a third reason
that was touched on in the earlier panel, to a degree, is this whole
political implication of the United States having supplied Iraq with
so much in the way of dual use technology during the 1980's that
ultimately came back in the form of weapons that may have been
used against them.
Mr. Sanders. If your thesis is correct, are you suggesting, in a
sense, that American technology supplied the precursor, is the
word, for the assault on American troops?
Mr. Eddington. And other organisms. I learned in the last 2
weeks in fact that the Centers for Disease Control did not provide
the Senate Banking Committee with a complete list of all the po-
tential pathogens that were supplied to Iraq during the 1980's.
They revealed this to a researcher, Dr. Leonard Cole at Rutgers,
in 1995. The CDC apparently sent 80 plus samples.
Mr. Sanders. What you are suggesting is that the third reason
is it would have been very embarrassing, in fact having given Sad-
dam Hussein all of this stuff, to get that back
Mr. Eddington. That's correct.
Mr. Sanders. Let me change focus, if I might, and ask if you
have any information that we might not be familiar with in this
area. As you know, there is a debate taking place about the poten-
tial health problems associated with low-grade exposure to chemi-
cal agents. The Pentagon has insisted for a period of time that if
one does not get an acute reaction, an immediate reaction, then
there is probably not going to be a problem. That is the theory that
they have been operating under. There is other scientific evidence
that suggests otherwise, that in fact you may end up having a long-
term illness without receiving immediate acute effects.
Do you have any thoughts on that?
Mr. Eddington. I want to apologize to the Chair for the use of
that initial report from Sergeant Morrissey. I did not intend for
that to take us off track here. But I have included this specific doc-
ument because it speaks directly to the issue that Representative
Sanders is talking about.
This particular document, which every unit or every member of
Morrissey's unit was forced to sign in 1990, was classified secret.
It deals with this entire issue of potential effects of being exposed
to nerve agents, both acutely and at low levels.
Let me just read once again this paragraph No. 4: "Signs and
symptoms of chronic low-dose exposure: Memory loss, decreased
alertness, decreased problem-solving ability, and language prob-
lems are suspected but have not been proven in scientific study.
The only proven effect of long-term exposure is EEG or brain wave
changes without clinical significance."
The purpose or the point of this is to show that the Department
of Defense suspected, suspected that low-level exposure could cause
these very kinds of problems, to include birth defects, which is cov-
ered in paragraph 5 here. So they knew.
Mr. Sanders. What was the date we are talking about with this
statement, this information?
177
Mr. EDDINGTON. Mr. Morrissey signed this statement on January
19, 1990, a full year before Desert Storm.
Mr. Sanders. So your point would be that if somebody from the
DOD said, "Our belief is that low level of exposure does not cause
a problem," you are suggesting that
Mr. EDDINGTON. They lied.
Mr. Sanders. Before the war they had evidence to indicate the
opposite?
Mr. EDDINGTON. In my opinion they lied. I spent 11 years in the
Army Reserve and National Guard. I have never seen a document
like this. You classify something like this and you classify medical
records secret, when clearly you are telling people that they could
suffer long-term effects, serious long-term effects, from chronic low-
level exposures?
The notion that the Department of Defense did not know is a
fraud. It is a complete fraud. This document makes it very clear
that they understood the risks these people were facing.
Mr. Sanders. I'm sorry to ask you to repeat, but the date on this
document is before the war
Mr. Eddington. 1-19-90, which would translate to January 19,
1990, which is a full year before.
Mr. Sanders. You are referring to point No. 4, signs and symp-
toms of chronic low-dose exposure?
Mr. EDDINGTON. That is correct, and also paragraph 5, which
deals with the issue of birth defects, possible birth defect problems
as a result of exposure to organophosphate compounds.
Mr. Sanders. You are suggesting that this document directly
contradicts the Pentagon's position that they believe that low-level
exposure might not cause a problem?
Mr. Eddington. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Mr. SANDERS. Thanks very much.
Mr. Shays. We wrote Mr. Deutsch July 2, 1996, in regards to
Gulf war illnesses. We got back a response. On page 3, he said,
"We agree that the question of exposure is particularly important."
This is chemical exposure. "For this reason, amidst growing con-
cern and debate over whether U.S. troops have been exposed to
chemical weapons or biological weapons agents, in March 1995 the
acting DCI, Admiral Studeman, directed the CIA to perform a com-
petence review of all relevant intelligence information. Our study
concluded no chemical weapons or biological agents were used by
the Iraqis, and facilities now known to contain biological weapon
agents were not bombed."
Under what basis could he have made that statement? What
data would he have had, would the Director of the CIA have had
to have made such a sweeping statement, in your judgment?
Mr. Eddington. He would have had no basis whatsoever to
make that statement, on the basis of the information that I had in
my possession and on the basis of the information that has subse-
quently been declassified up to this point and provided to the pub-
lic.
Mr. Shays. What would he have pointed to? If he were in the
room now, what would he have said was the basis for it, in your
judgment?
178
Mr. Eddington. I really can't speak to that, Mr. Chairman. To
me this is a very, very obvious problem, a very obvious cir-
cumstance. The intelligence information and the information com-
ing from the people in the theater that we heard just earlier today
was quite clear: The munitions were present, they were forward de-
ployed to the lowest unit level, they were in Kuwait as well as Iraq.
Contrary to what the CIA maintains today, these chemical weapons
were in Kuwait. The evidence is overwhelming that they were in
Kuwait. So I have no idea what would cause Dr. Deutsch to make
that kind of a sweeping statement.
Mr. Shays. See, that is one of the points we wanted to establish
through testimony. My only reason for wanting you to address this
issue first was that the DOD and the CIA have made it very clear
there was no — first, no offensive use of weapons. Mr. Deutsch was
actually on a major TV network saying there was no known offen-
sive use of chemical weapons, at the very time that we had known
that there was defensive exposure by our blowing up Khamisiyah,
just as one. And when we got the CIA employee, spokesperson, to
come to our third hearing, I believe, fourth hearing, when she had
made the comment that they had not interviewed one American
soldier, basically I was led to believe that these statements of no
offensive use — why should I have any more confidence in their
statement, no offensive use is known, or what took place, when
they said no defensive and we know that is blatantly false? So they
don't have much credibility with us.
You obviously have left for a variety of reasons from the CIA,
and I gather your basic testimony is that they didn't — let me put
it this way. Is it your testimony that the CIA really did not, to the
best of your knowledge, conduct any thorough research on offensive
or defensive potential exposure, and that you felt that their failure
to do it caused you to want to step into this void, and that in the
process of your stepping into this void, you found that they were
not listening to you, and so you ended up deciding to leave? Is that
correct?
Mr. Eddington. That is essentially accurate. We had a couple of
things that were operating here. At the analytical level, we were
basically telling people who had put their name on analyses that
they were wrong, that these events occurred, and that, moreover,
they had been lied to by the Department of Defense.
Mr. Shays. Right.
Mr. Eddington. So we weren't winning any friends and influenc-
ing any people by doing that.
At the managerial level, I know from conversations that I had
with managers who were close to me that they were terrified at the
managerial level of having to try to deal with this. They did not
want to have to confront the Department of Defense.
It was easy for me to understand why. General Schwartzkopf
came out in June 1991 and testified before Congress that the CIA
did nothing for him during the Persian Gulf war. The CIA came
in for tremendous criticism. So for the last 5V2 years, the CIA has
spent a tremendous amount of time and money trying to ingratiate
itself with the Department of Defense and make itself indispen-
sable to DOD. Thousands of military visitors pass through the CIA
every year. An entire office has been set up, a huge office, to coordi-
179
nate support to the military. So here my wife and I walk in and
tell them that their greatest customer is a liar, and that tens of
thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of American troops have
been exposed. Is that a message that is going to be well received
by a conservative, stiff bureaucracy like the CIA? No, it is not.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Sanders.
Mr. Sanders. Help me out again, here. The document we were
looking at, that we talked about the impact of low-level exposure,
and that was signed by the gentleman who acknowledged reading
it, Mr. Morrissey, and also it has the author of the document, Rich-
ard W. Kramp, M.D., and another name, "Major", which is black-
ened out — help me out here in understanding to whom this docu-
ment was given. How many documents were given out? Who re-
ceived this?
Mr. EDDINGTON. You are talking about a unit with approximately
500 personnel in it, and every member of this unit was not only
forced to sign this document, but their medical records were also
classified secret. Dr. Kramp, who apparently was the attending
physician who signed this particular statement, with Sergeant
Morrissey would have been involved in monitoring these personnel
for any kind of signs and symptoms of exposure to chemical agents.
Mr. Sanders. To the best of your knowledge, there were 500 peo-
ple asked to sign this?
Mr. EDDINGTON. That was Sergeant Morrisse/s comment to me
in Seattle about 3 weeks ago, yes.
Mr. Shays. I would like to just end with that document, and
have you spend 5 minutes going through this again. I will try to
pay closer attention.
What you started out with, you can start all over again.
Mr. Eddington. I could be much briefer than that. This docu-
ment, to my mind, clearly indicates that the Department
Mr. Shays. Identify the document.
Mr. EDDINGTON. The document itself is entitled "General Infor-
mation, Nerve Agent Intoxication and Treatment." According to
Sergeant Morrissey, every member of his unit was forced to sign
this particular document in the 1989-1990 period. This document
clearly indicates, to my mind, that the Department of Defense
knew that low-level exposure to these particular agents was a po-
tential health risk.
Mr. Sanders. Mr. Eddington, if I might again, what was unique
about this particular unit that they were asked to sign this, this
unit?
Mr. Eddington. This document was passed out to personnel of
the 330th Ordnance Company, which was assigned to the 59th
Ordnance Brigade in Germany. Now, that brigade had the respon-
sibility for guarding over 170,000 chemical nerve agent munitions,
American chemical nerve agent munitions.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you. Sorry.
Mr. Eddington. That is fine. The document — and again, I have
never seen anything like this. In the 11 years I spent in the mili-
tary I never saw a document like this, a document that clearly tells
the person who is signing it that you may experience long-term,
perhaps lifelong, problems as a result of being in close proximity
to these agents. It goes against everything the Department of De-
180
fense has claimed for the last 5 years, that they had no idea that
low-level exposures would be a potential problem. That is the sig-
nificance of the document. That is the significance of the document.
That is why I wanted to bring it to the committee's attention, be-
cause this clearly has implications as they apply to the vets, Gulf
war vets.
Mr. Shays. I think it has tremendous implications. I appreciate
you bringing it before the committee.
I guess for me it is a no-brainer, that — this is where my civilian
world has more meaning to me than really what we are doing in
terms of this investigation; in other words, I spent 13 years as a
State representative dealing with chemical exposure in an environ-
mental way. We pass State laws that require people to be very
careful how they handle certain chemicals, because even the small-
est dosage we felt over time would cause serious health problems
and maybe even result in death. So the civilian world was way over
here, and it strikes me that therefore I have pretty much dis-
counted the excuses of the military when they said that there is,
you know, no threat from low-level exposure to chemicals. Why in
the real world of daily living do we monitor and fine and sue and
do a whole host of things to individuals who handle or mishandle
chemicals, and yet we act like there wouldn't be a problem to the
military for their exposure to similar chemicals? So for me, I don't
feel I need a lot of military studies to have documented what we
already know in the real world of public life, in civilian life.
The fact that they actually had potential studies detection when
they denied it obviously calls — questions their own ethics and their
own credibility. Frankly, the VA, DOD, and the CIA have very lit-
tle credibility as it relates to any issue dealing with the Gulf war
illnesses. That is why I will say to you that we are determined that
this committee have all three parties participate in this effort, be-
cause ultimately, they are going to be the solution.
Having said that, given the plea of the father, Mr. Hebert, ulti-
mately he wants his son and other sons like his son treated and
cared for. The overall need is to deal with a proper diagnosis, treat-
ment, and fair compensation. I have said to the DOD and the CIA,
I am less, far less concerned about placing blame, because I feel if
they think that is my biggest concern, which it isn't, then they are
not going to be coming as eagerly and as willingly with information
I think they have that can move us along a lot more quickly.
So my message is, to the CIA and to the DOD, I care less about
focusing responsibility on who is to blame, and I think Congress
does focus less concern on that, and ultimately just give us the in-
formation that can help us heal our soldiers.
Your testimony has been helpful to this committee. I think that
you have a lot of information that is probably even difficult for you
to decide what to disseminate, but we need little pieces, and ulti-
mately we will get to the whole.
Do you have any last comments?
Mr. Sanders. Mr. Chairman, I like the way that you ended the
last panel. Let me ask Mr. Eddington that: Are there questions
that we have not asked you that you wish we had, that you would
like to ask yourself and then give us that answer?
181
Mr. EDDINGTON. Mr. Sanders, I believe that one question that
should be asked, not just by this committee but by several commit-
tees, is why is it that John Deutsch and Nora Slatkin attempted
to prevent the release and attempted in fact to reclassify several
hundred documents that had to do with this very issue? Why did
they do that? What was their motivation for removing over 300
documents from the Internet that had been properly declassified by
competent authority, the Department of Defense, a decision that
forced me to file suit in order to get those documents declassified?
Why? What was so damaging about those documents?
What was damaging about the documents was that they totally
invalidated the DOD-CIA position that there were no chemical mu-
nitions deployed in Kuwait and southeastern Iraq, southeast of
Khamisiyah. So that is an issue that I really feel needs to be raised
vigorously.
Mr. Sanders. Let me just ask you a final question. Obviously the
main concern that all of us have is doing the best that we can for
the men and women who are affected by the various illnesses asso-
ciated with the Persian Gulf syndrome. Do you have any informa-
tion, any thoughts as to whether or not the VA and our hospitals
and our doctors are doing as good as they might?
Mr. Eddington. It is very difficult for them to do as good as they
might, given the fact that they don't have complete data.
Mr. Sanders. The lack of this information makes it very difficult
for them to do their job, is that what you are saying?
Mr. Eddington. Particularly as it pertains to this potential bio-
logical exposure issue. As previous witnesses have testified, the
United States had no effective biological agent detection capability
in the Gulf. We know Iraq had in its inventory and had weaponized
things such as anthrax, and botulinum toxoid. Aflatoxin has been
mentioned. The Iraqis may have been working on forms of myco-
toxins that have not been previously disclosed or discussed in any
great detail.
Mr. Sanders. Are you suggesting some of those biological agents
may have been used?
Mr. Eddington. I believe that that did happen at the Saudi port
of JuBail, yes. I do believe it did. Because if you look at the specific
descriptions that the Seabees who were stationed there give in the
Senate Banking Committee investigations May 25th report, the
signs and symptoms they report are largely consistent with expo-
sure to tricothecene mycotoxin, T-2 mycotoxins, more commonly
known in the press as "yellow rain."
There may also have been a chemical agent involved in that as
well, a mixed agent attack, if you will, since we know some of the
Seabees got positive 256 — M 256 kit test for a chemical blister
agent. But the overall symptomotologies being described by those
Seabees, in my opinion, are consistent with exposure to some kind
of mycotoxin.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. Just another area that I just need a very quick re-
sponse. To the best of your knowledge, do we have any way of de-
termining exposure to biological agents, and do you have any infor-
mation about biological agents potentially being used or being
used?
182
Mr. Eddington. In the discussion that I had with Mr. Sanders
just a moment ago, I made note of the fact that it is my opinion
that a form of mycotoxin was probably employed against the Saudi
port of JuBail on the 19th of January 1991. As far as the protocols
for testing, that is some way outside the range of my medical
knowledge. That would be a question for a toxicologist.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. While you were giving the answer, I was
asking a question.
Mr. Eddington. Understood.
Mr. Shays. The bottom line, we have tried to deal with three
"nos" that DOD and VA and others have been espousing: that there
is no credible detections, no exposures, and therefore, no provable
health consequences. We do think there are credible detections and
we do think that the exposures are real, and our hearing tomorrow
is going to be how the VA is responding to these credible detections
and credible exposures, how they are changing their protocol, and
how they are now going to respond in a more effective way to the
DOD. That will be part of what we cover tomorrow.
I appreciate your testimony before this committee, and before we
adjourn, I would like to thank our two court reporters, Leanne
Dotson and Bill Odom, and Amy Davenport from the full commit-
tee, and Bob Newman and Tom Costa and Cheryl Phelps for their
work, as well.
This is a process we are going to continue, and we are just going
to keep applying more and more pressure until we get the right an-
swers. Thank you very much.
With that, the hearing is adjourned for today.
[Whereupon, at 4:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
PERSIAN GULF VETERANS' ILLNESSES: THE
IMPACT OF CHEMICAL EXPOSURE DISCLO-
SURES ON VA HEALTH CARE
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1996
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Human Resources and
Intergovernmental Relations,
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Davis, Towns, and Sanders.
Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and counsel;
Robert Newman, professional staff member; Thomas M. Costa,
clerk; and Cheryl Phelps, minority professional staff.
Mr. Shays. I would like to call this hearing to order, the Sub-
committee on Human Resources, the subcommittee of the Govern-
ment Reform and Oversight Committee.
Recent revelations about the detection of chemical warfare
agents in the Persian Gulf war theater challenge widely held con-
clusions about the effectiveness of U.S. Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical, called NBC, defense doctrine. Throughout Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, thousands, thousands of chemical
alarms were routinely dismissed.
Detections of chemical nerve agents in a combat theater should
trigger protective countermeasures and decontamination proce-
dures. But in the Gulf war, chemical alarms only signaled the be-
ginning of the denials and cover-ups.
When sensitive alarms are ignored, U.S. troops are vulnerable to
low-level toxic contamination.
The recent disclosures also undermine the credibility of the De-
partment of Defense, DOD, which for more than 5 years has un-
equivocally denied even the possibility of troop exposures to chemi-
cal nerve agents.
Most importantly, for the sake of veterans and their families,
these admissions compel a complete re-evaluation of all policies
and medical protocols built on the shifting sands of Pentagon deni-
als.
On October 3, the subcommittee wrote to the Department of Vet-
erans Affairs, the VA, asking how Gulf war research efforts, health
care and compensation procedures would be changed to reflect the
(183)
184
dramatic new realities of probable chemical exposures to a great
many veterans.
We did so because at our September 19th hearing, Dr. Frances
Murphy, Director of the VA Environmental Health Service, con-
ceded in testimony that the Gulf war research agenda in 1995
placed a low priority on low-level chemical agent exposure studies,
"because military and intelligence sources had stated that U.S.
troops had not been exposed to chemical agents."
That admission raised a number of questions about the extent to
which VA's approach to Gulf war veterans' issues might be captive
to the dictates of Pentagon doctrine. Dr. Stephen Joseph, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, expressed part of that doc-
trine in testimony before this subcommittee on June 25, 1996,
when he said that, "chronic symptoms or physical manifestations
do not later develop among persons exposed to low levels of chemi-
cal nerve agents who did not first exhibit acute symptoms of tox-
icity."
Having already learned that vital research had been retarded by
adherence to DOD's unsubstantiated conclusions about the exist-
ence and effects of chemical warfare exposures, the subcommittee
was concerned that the same myopia might have infected VA
health screening and treatment policies.
Veterans have consistently told this committee, VA health care
systems seem predisposed toward superficial diagnosis that do not
explain the full range of symptoms presented. Others note a tend-
ency to diagnose unexplained symptoms broadly as somataform dis-
orders, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, PTSD, or other psycho-
logical causes.
The VA says it has always remained open to the possibility that
toxic exposures play a role in the causation of Persian Gulf war
veterans' illnesses. Yet it wasn't until October 1995, that the VA's
Persian Gulf Registry Code Sheet, the basic screening tool used to
evaluate the health of a veteran, contained specific questions about
chemical alarms, chemical nerve agent exposures, or other specific
toxins.
From 1991 to 1995, 53,000 Gulf war veterans were diagnosed
using the less specific screening protocol. Almost 2,000 of those vet-
erans were in the vicinity of the Khamisiyah detonations in March
1991. Had the VA been more open then to capturing the data on
possible chemical exposures, we might have in hand today clinical
data that could yield long sought answers and save lives.
Instead, research on the long-term effects of low-level exposures
is just beginning — I find it incredible, just beginning — and the VA
and the DOD Gulf war case assessment protocols are undergoing
both internal and external reviews to determine how they might
better capture clinically useful data.
In a previous hearing, the VA's Gulf War Health Registry pro-
gram was described as, "a very crude health surveillance tool." Our
question today is just how crude that system must remain and how
it might be refined to reflect what the Pentagon only recently and
reluctantly conceded, that what veterans have known all along,
what veterans have known all along about chemical detections,
low-level nerve agent exposures and possible subsequent chronic
health effects.
185
This committee welcomes the testimony of all of our witnesses
today and we look forward to this hearing very much.
Mr. Sanders.
Mr. Sanders. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As you cer-
tainly know, the evidence that troops in the Gulf were exposed to
chemical agents is growing stronger every day, and that is what
yesterday's hearing was about.
Tragically, it took the Pentagon 5 years, 5 years, to finally admit
to the possibility that Americans serving in the Gulf might have
been exposed to chemical agents. And yesterday we heard from wit-
nesses who said that not only might American soldiers have been
exposed to chemical agents after the war, in terms of the destruc-
tion of Iraqi munition depos, but there was a chance that our sol-
diers were exposed to chemical agents during the war.
Although we are unsure whether these possible exposures play
a part in the so-called Gulf war syndrome, the Veterans Adminis-
tration and others involved in treating these men and women need
to take into account the very real possibility of chemical exposures
when diagnosing and treating their injuries.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding this hearing
which provides an opportunity to identify some of the problems
that veterans encounter with regard to the diagnosis and treatment
of their symptoms and to find out what, if anything, the VA has
done to correct these longstanding problems.
I am particularly concerned that there has been an inadequate
effort to record the veterans' account of possible exposure to chemi-
cal and biological agents. One would have thought those would be
the first people we would be going to. Over 5 years have passed
and it doesn't look like a comprehensive research program is in
place to determine the cause of the Gulf war syndrome, and I think
one of the tragedies in this whole situation is that while nobody
claims to know the causes of all of the health problems associated
with the men and women who served in the Gulf, it appears to me,
not being an expert in this area, but it does appear to me that we
have wasted 5 years in allowing our physicians and our medical re-
searchers the opportunity to learn more about the problem.
If we go into a doctor's office, any sensible doctor wants to know
the reasons, what we have been exposed to, why we might be sick.
Five years have come and gone and our medical researchers and
the scientists of this country were not allowed to delve and to learn
about the possibility of chemical exposure on the part of our veter-
ans.
I also, as I am sure you do, Mr. Chairman, want to make certain
that veterans receive adequate treatment for their symptoms,
whatever the cause may be, whatever the cause may be.
I am distressed about accounts of veterans being told that it is
all in their head, before adequate study of chemical exposure has
been completed. Now that we have ample evidence of the possibil-
ity of chemical exposure, I think it is time that the VA and others
put this information to good use. So we will be expecting some real
research to move along this line.
In yesterday's hearing, we were given a document that suggested
that the Department of Defense expected low-level exposure to
chemical agents may cause long-term physical problems. I urge the
186
VA to adopt these same suspicions and incorporate them into their
protocol. Otherwise our veterans might not be receiving adequate
diagnosis and treatment.
I am also concerned that the VA has the funds necessary to ade-
quately diagnose and treat veterans complaining of Gulf war syn-
drome. As I am sure everybody knows, there are some people who
suspect that the reason that the Pentagon has not been more forth-
coming on this issue is that it would open a financial can of worms,
resulting in billions of dollars of additional compensation of health
care treatment.
Certainly, certainly, that cannot be a reason not to go forward.
When men and women put their lives on the line, they are entitled
to the best treatment this country can offer and fair compensation.
I think we all want to make certain that the VA has the necessary
funds to do its job and that's an issue that I hope we will be delv-
ing into today.
Thank you very, very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Sanders. I appreciate the support
that you have provided this committee, as well as your colleagues.
The committee now will hear testimony from our first panel. We
have three panels today. We only have two who are here, Julia
Dyckman, who was a Persian Gulf war veteran and registered
nurse, and Robert Larrisey, who is a Persian Gulf war veteran.
We also have testimony from Tom Barnes, who was to testify,
again a Persian Gulf war veteran. He is back in the hospital, so
he will not be here.
If I could, I would invite Julia Dyckman to come and stand be-
fore the table and Robert Larrisey as well and we will swear you
both in.
[Witnesses sworn].
Mr. Shays. For the record, both of our witnesses have responded
in the affirmative. You may sit down. Thank you.
To get a little housekeeping out of the way, I ask unanimous con-
sent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place
any opening statement in the record and that the record remains
open for 3 days for that purpose.
Without objection, so ordered. And also ask unanimous consent
that our witnesses be permitted to include their written statements
in the record and, as I mentioned, Mr. Barnes' statement was sub-
mitted and it will be in the record without objection.
We will start with you, Ms. Dyckman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Edolphus Towns follows:]
187
OPENING STATEMENT OF REP. ED TOWNS
BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
HUMAN RESOURCES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
■THE IMPACT OF CHEMICAL EXPOSURE DISCLOSURES ON
VA HEALTH CARE"
December 11, 1996
MR. CHAIRMAN, THANK YOU FOR CONVENING THIS SDCTH
HEARING EXAMINING ISSUES RELATED TO DISEASES SUFFERED BY
SOME GULF WAR VETERANS AND THEIR FAMILIES. TESTIMONY
RECEIVED IN YESTERDAY'S HEARING ADDRESSED THE PENTAGON'S
ABYSMAL MANAGEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ON U.S. TROOP EXPOSURE
TO CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. TODAY WE WILL CONSIDER
THE IMPACT OF DOD'S REVISED CONCLUSIONS THAT 20,000 TROOPS
WERE "PRESUMED EXPOSED" ON MEDICAL PROTOCOLS AT THE
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS.
I AM CONVINCED THAT OUR SOLDIERS WERE EXPOSED TO TOXIC
AGENTS DURING THEIR SERVICE IN THE PERSIAN GULF. AND I CANNOT
IGNORE THE COMPELLING EVIDENCE THAT THE NUMEROUS DISEASES
AND SYMPTOMS THAT SOME SOLDIERS ARE EXPERIENCING ARE
RELATED TO THAT EXPOSURE. ALSO, BECAUSE THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE REPEATEDLY DENIED THAT TOXIC EXPOSURES OCCURRED,
QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN RAISED THAT PERHAPS THE AGENCY WITH
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CARING FOR SICK VETERANS GAVE INSUFFICIENT
CONSIDERATION TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT A LINK EXISTED BETWEEN
EXPOSURE AND ILLNESS.
I AM DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE VA'S DIAGNOSTIC,
TREATMENT, AND COMPENSATION POLICIES REGARDING SICK GULF
VETS ARE BASED ON DOD'S ERRONEOUS PREMISE OF NO LOW LEVEL
CHEMICAL EXPOSURES. IF THIS IS THE CASE, THEN IT IS PROBABLE
THAT THOSE POLICIES ARE INAPPROPRIATE; AND IT IS CERTAINLY
PROBABLE THAT SICK GULF VETERANS AND THEIR FAMILIES HAVE
BEEN RECEIVING INAPPROPRIATE AND INSUFFICIENT CARE AND
COMPENSATION.
188
I LOOK FORWARD TO THE TESTIMONY OF DR. MATHER, THE VA'S
CHIEF PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS OFFICER, AND
VA DOCTORS JACKSON AND GORDON. I WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY
TO BE REASSURED THAT MY CONCERNS ARE MISPLACED. I AM
INTERESTED IN HOW THE VA'S POLICIES REGARDING TOXICOLOGICAL
RESEARCH, CLINICAL CARE, AND COMPENSATION OF GULF VETS HAVE
EVOLVED TO REFLECT CURRENT KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE AND
EXTENT OF TOXIC EXPOSURES.
I ALSO WELCOME THE VIEWS OF OUR VETERANS. I THANK THEM
FOR THEIR PRESENCE BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE, AS WELL AS FOR
THEIR SERVICE TO OUR COUNTRY.
FINALLY, MR. CHAIRMAN, I COMMEND YOUR DILIGENCE AND
CONTINUED INTEREST IN THIS CRITICAL ISSUE. I LOOK FORWARD TO
WORKING CLOSELY WITH YOU AS WE PURSUE THIS ISSUE IN THE 105TH
CONGRESS.
189
STATEMENT OF JULIA DYCKMAN, PERSIAN GULF WAR
VETERAN AND REGISTERED NURSE
Ms. Dyckman. My name is Julia Dyckman and I am a Persian
Gulf veteran. I would like to graciously thank the subcommittee for
allowing me to voice my concerns on the Veterans Administration
system. I would also like to describe my quest to obtain treatment
for myself and others noted through my own personal experiences
with the system.
At the time of the Persian Gulf war, I was a Commander in the
Naval Reserve who was activated January 16, 1991, to serve at
Combat Zone Fleet Hospital 15. Fleet Hospital 15 was a 500-bed
hospital with 948 personnel, including the construction battalion
units, which are the Seabees.
It was assembled at a site west of Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, and
was operational within 12 days of arriving in theater. Patient care
consisted of direct front-line casualties, patients from second eche-
lon facilities and walk-in patients. In addition, we handled sick call
for our own personnel.
The environmental conditions that existed at the hospital site
were: we had black skies with clearing at the horizon; rain some-
times consisting of oil droplets; mysterious clouds passing directly
overhead; occasional ammonia smells and SCUD attacks, five sepa-
rate times from February 1st to February 26, 1991 with a SCUD
missile blowing up directly overhead.
My own medical problems in Saudia Arabia, which were docu-
mented in my military health record, consisted of rashes, open blis-
ters on my right foot, flu symptoms, bronchitis, gastritis, rapid
heart rate and high blood pressure. I had a complete military phys-
ical when mobilized and was in excellent health before leaving the
United States.
We also handled sick call for our own personnel and we also saw
the following medical conditions that were found in our own per-
sonnel: Respiratory problems, unexplained fevers, vomiting and di-
arrhea, various rashes and numerous reactions to immunizations,
or secret shots, unexplained stomach and abdominal pains and car-
diac problems.
Now, you have my report, and it is pretty extensive, with how
I got back to the United States and how we were treated. So I
would like to basically focus on the Veterans Administration.
It has been a real problem getting care and being treated as
someone who has an illness. I will go on to what the main problem
is with even treatment and diagnosis and, also the disability and
claims procedures. Disability and claims procedures are com-
plicated and time-consuming.
In order to obtain VA treatment for Persian Gulf illness, you first
have to have a service-connected illness or injury, which is difficult
to prove even when you are treated in theater. Also, the VA only
considers military and VA medical records in the review for service
connection, excluding sometimes expert civilian reports. I had a
complete workup at NIH which documented autonomic nervous
system damage, which was rejected by the VA. Additionally, they
only use selective parts of records that agree with the VA and dis-
regard any positive findings. As an example, I was turned down for
service connection for heart palpitation, yet I had 10 entries in my
190
military medical record for heart palpitations while on active serv-
ice. After 4 years and the VA's own diagnosis of Persian Gulf Syn-
drome, which I got at the VA Center in Washington, I received 30
percent disability for PTSD. In 1996, it was finally increased to 80
percent for chronic fatigue. Persian Gulf syndrome is not a recog-
nized illness. According to VA, I am tired and have a mental prob-
lem.
Fellow Persian Gulf war veterans are manifesting chronic medi-
cal problems which range from severe joint pains, lung lesions, eye
problems, chronic fatigue, diarrhea problems, to carpal tunnel syn-
drome and even cancer. The problems even extend to family mem-
bers. Treatment has been inappropriate and ineffective to this
time. I have always supported the concept of health promotion and
early detection of disease, which the VA is not set up to do. Some-
thing happened to us and other veterans in the Persian Gulf and
I want to know the cause of these problems.
The VA needs to develop proper tests to recognize unique Persian
Gulf symptoms. Current testing for the Persian Gulf Register is
merely routine and does not detect Persian Gulf illness.
We need to modify the entrance procedure into the VA's system
for Persian Gulf illness. The current procedures are based around
submitting a claim which denies most of the illnesses of the Per-
sian Gulf war. Documentation in the Persian Gulf area was dif-
ficult, even when early symptoms were present.
When later symptoms are present, it's almost impossible to have
them recognized by the VA. There's the — you need to change the
2-year limit of at least 10 percent disability. Reporting was dif-
ficult, but symptoms are also sometimes very benign at the begin-
ning, and even getting them into any kind of record or even any
kind of civilian treatment is very difficult. This limit is unrealistic
due to the specific nature of Persian Gulf illness.
Strongly use the civilian medical documentation in considering
service-connected claims. Very often, civilian medical tests are posi-
tive and the VA tests are negative, casting doubt sometimes on the
validity of VA tests.
Stop requiring veterans to continually prove that they are ill.
Self-reporting is ignored and a psychiatric diagnosis is often given.
We also have a problem with the idea that some Persian Gulf vets
look good, but that doesn't explain that they are in constant pain
or that they have diarrhea or vomiting every time they eat. So they
often go on the appearance until you are at the point where you
are emaciated or you can't speak.
Quit ignoring the reality of Persian Gulf illness. When VA doc-
tors show a positive response to Persian Gulf illness, they are
sometimes eliminated from the system, which happened in the VA
medical center in Lebanon.
You have got to allow for a selection of physicians. The VA center
in Lebanon has a 600 Persian Gulf war patient population, yet
physicians are being cut. This additionally limits access to care and
diagnosis. You sometimes have to wait 6 months, 8 months, a year,
to even be seen for any type of registry evaluation, which is then
very cursory at the most.
You need to include spouses and family in the care and diagnosis
of Persian Gulf illness since this is a family encompassing illness.
191
Realize that when positive test results do occur, that they should
have effect on VA treatment or diagnosis, and a lot of times they
are ignored.
Utilize newly breaking information on possible causes of Persian
Gulf illness and modify the testing, diagnosis and care accordingly,
which was demonstrated by yesterday's testimony.
When the Pentagon finally realized — or finally admits to what
we were exposed to, this should be taken into consideration.
You might ask, what is it like to be a Persian Gulf war veteran
after almost 6 years? Each day starts with uncertainty. When you
eat, you are constantly sick and have intermittent diarrhea. Mobil-
ity is difficult due to swollen joints and muscle aches. Severe head-
aches are intermittent. Sometimes you forget what you are doing
and what you are going to do. Pain and fatigue are your constant
companions. To complete your day, you are forced to deal with con-
stant denial from the Pentagon that nothing happened during the
Persian Gulf war. These statements confuse medical providers who
then doubt your credibility. What is needed is recognition, though
not coded by the CDC, that Persian Gulf illness is a combination
of unique symptoms and outcomes.
Right now, the VA is limited to giving you your major diagnosis,
and the major diagnosis has to fall in with one of the recognized
illnesses. So if your primary problem is headaches, you get a diag-
nosis of headaches. You have to realize that the syndrome is a
unique illness.
This is why specific protocols need to be run before the VA says
that this illness doesn't exist or is all in your head. The needed
testing must include brain MRIs, full body MRIs, CAT scans, ex-
tensive non-routine blood tests, EGDs and colonoscopies. They
must be protocol tests, not a cursory visual examination. The cost
may be high but the benefits to the individual veteran and the
country will be immeasurable.
Proper diagnosis and treatment would improve the quality of life
and productivity of current Persian Gulf war veterans and their
families, as well as ensure a less damaged future generation.
Monetary compensation does not replace good health. And about
the monetary compensation, it seems that the monetary — people go
for monetary compensation with the idea that it will force possibly
the government to realize that they have a major medical problem.
If they are forced to pay, then hopefully they will be forced to
form — to at least find a cure or improve the quality of life that the
compensation won't be needed.
Veterans desire to improve their health so they can be more pro-
ductive citizens who have served their country well.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dyckman follows:]
192
Presentation by
Julia Y. Dyckman, RN, MPH, Capt USN (TDRL)
before the
Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee
December 11, 1996
BACKGROUND AND SAUDI ARABIA
My name is Julia Dyckman, I am a Persian Gulf veteran. I am a naval reservist
who was activated January 16, 1991 to serve at Combat Zone Fleet Hospital 15. Fleet
Hospital 1 5 was a 500 bed hospital with 948 personnel including the construction
battalion units. The hospital was forward deployed to the "least developed" hospital site
in-theater. It was assembled at a site west of Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia and was
operational within 1 2 days of arriving in-theater. We took pride in our readiness to serve
as the most forward of the forward deployed fleet hospitals.
During our deployment from January 30 to April 15, 1991, we took care of
approximately 8,21 1 out-patients, and 697 in-patients and had 90 combat admissions.
I was one of four department heads under the Director of Nursing. I was
responsible for the Casualty Receiving area (emergency room) and Specialty Treatment
(out-patient clinics). I was also responsible for the nurses and corps personnel at the
Casualty Clearing Company at the Al Jubayl airport. Hence I was responsible for
approximately 15 nurses and 40 corps personnel. My duties consisted of 12 hour shifts
that included such things as supervision, direct patient care, data collection, general
housekeeping, etc. (Over 8,000 Medical Encounter Data Sheets (MEDS) were filled out
and submitted to Bill Pugh at the Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, CA. These
MEDS came from my own departments). During the initial hospital construction, my
duties also consisted of tent and facility assembly, unpacking crates, and equipment
installation all of which occurred in direct contact with sand. My duties also required
travel to the Casualty clearing company and assisting in discharge physicals at Camp 53,
south of Al Jubayl.. These duties included travel to other areas in Saudi Arabia, camps
around Al Jubayl, and other fleet hospitals including Bahrain. Some of our personnel
traveled into Kuwait City and other areas of the Persian Gulf. The messing and berthing
facilities were tents with concrete floors. Travel on the site was by foot through both
packed and ankle deep loose sand.
Patient Care consisted of direct front-line casualties, patients from second echelon
facilities and walk-in patients. In addition, we handled sick call for our own personnel.
The following medical conditions were reported by and treated by our own personnel:
• Respiratory problems;
• Unexplained fevers;
• Vomiting and diarrhea;
• Various rashes;
• Numerous reactions to immunizations (secret shots); (a number of
personnel had swollen arms, local reactions and systemic reactions)
1
193
• Unexplained stomach and abdominal pains;
• Cardiac problems.
Environmental conditions that existed at the hospital site were:
• Black skies with clearing at the horizon;
• Rain sometimes consisting of oil droplets;
• Mysterious clouds passing directly overhead;
• Occasional ammonia smells;
• Scud attacks (5 separate times from Feb 1 to Feb 26, 1991)
• Scud missile blowing up directly overhead.
My own medical problems in Saudi Arabia (documented in my Military Health
Record) consisted of:
Rashes;
Open blisters on my right foot (See photo);
Flu symptoms;
Bronchitis;
Stomach problems (gastritis);
Rapid heart rate;
High blood pressure (blood pressure had been under control before arrival
in Saudi Arabia).
Situations that existed that may explain medical problems that were reported and
the difficulty in documentation of peoples' illnesses.
• The site was probably contaminated either by pesticides, or possible
chemical/ biological agents before arrival as well as during occupancy of
the fleet hospital.
• Patients arriving from the war front were possibly contaminated without
our knowledge and thereby spread contamination to us.
• Possibly contaminated Iraqi and US tanks were staged and cleaned near
the fleet hospital.
• Chemical protection gear was not readily available nor was any
notification of possible contaminants ever received.
• Initial foot blisters could have been caused by "dusty"mustard or other
agents.
• Other personnel experienced similar symptoms as mine resulting in
multiple system illnesses.
• Over 50% of personnel receiving "secret" shots experienced reactions to
them.
• Discharge physicals were inadequate.
Before departure from Saudi Arabia I received a puncture wound from an
unknown source in my left instep. (See Attachment 1, Record of Treatment while on
194
Active Duty). Please note that even with our medical problems, we all continued to work
our shifts and provide good medical and nursing care.
RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES
Upon my return to the United States, (after packing up, plane travel, refueling
delays, e.g. over 32 hours of travel) we had only a short rest time until we signed
discharge paperwork. Many personnel still had unresolved medical problems and voiced
concerns but were told that they had 90 days in which to report to an active duty medical
facility for treatment. Also many personnel felt that once they left the sand, that rest and
a change in environment would eliminate any medical conditions. We soon found out
that we were ineligible for active duty care and registering of complaints could result in
release from the reserves as " Not Physically Qualified ." It was nearly impossible to
come back on active duty to resolve medical complaints. In my case, I volunteered to
assist in "Welcoming back" reservists through the RESTAR program. This program
required that I be placed on Active Duty for Training (ADT) and consisted of
interviewing returning Persian Gulf veterans. Many personnel voiced concerns over long
term health effects, current health conditions, and numerous pay and family situations.
During this time my health continued to deteriorate. I could not be released from ADT
and the Navy was forced to return me to Active Duty. The following problems started to
occur as I began reporting Persian Gulf veterans medical concerns and trying to seek my
own treatment.
• I continued to work on the RESTAR project which required extensive
travel even though I had difficulty walking;
• Records of interviews I conducted were eventually discarded, supposedly
because a new survey was being developed (I never received a new
survey);
• The Readiness Commander did not like the results of my interviews. He
interfered with my medical care, and eventually was instrumental in
removing me from pay status for over 16 months (I mention this because it
involves interference with proper documentation of immediate medical
problems experienced by returning Persian Gulf vets and shows what
could happen when they were reported illnesses);
• I was released from active duty even though my medical problems were
not resolved but they were "considered" improving.
• Returning Saudi Veterans noted that:
reporting of symptoms was difficult,
could result in retribution (loss of pay or discharge),
active duty care was not readily available due to rapid
outprocessing,
they were ineligible for active duty care after outprocessing
even while remaining in a drill status,
195
recognition of service connection could result in a loss of
civilian insurance,
as medical personnel , PTSD or physical impairment could
jeopardize licensing or credibility,
For most Persian Gulf reservists, the only avenue available for medical
care was civilian or possibly the Veterans Administration (VA). Some
veterans were too ill to hold down a job and therefore had NO medical
insurance to cover civilian care.
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION CLINICS AND HOSPITALS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
Since I was ineligible for treatment from the active duty military (at that time), the
only recourse was civilian or the VA. Since I am a Vietnam veteran and have a service
connected disability, zero compensation (varicose veins), access to VA care was available
to some extent. There was no Persian Gulf Registry in effect or available in 1991.
This is the list of medical concerns I had at the time I returned from the Persian
Gulf and therefore I sought care at the VA:
Hearing loss;
Bronchitis;
Chronic cough;
Hypertension;
Rash on the right foot;
Bilateral foot pain;
Stomach ulcer;
Occasional to frequent diarrhea;
Headaches;
Joint pains:
Abdominal pain.
PROBLEMS WITH VETERANS ADMINISTRATION TREATMENT
I. Initial Care
I presented myself to the VA for treatment: (See VA Medical Records)
At the VA Outpatient Clinic in Harrisburg (August 1991) I was seen for:
• "Feet" problems;
• Diagnosed Gout (although Gout test was negative);
• Offered treatment of Tylenol (500 tablets given);
• Told that "nothing is wrong with you, get it through your head!"
196
• I requested a referral to the VA Medical Center Lebanon because I
thought they would have some protocol to deal with Persian Gulf veterans.
At the VAMC Lebanon (starting in September 1991), I was seen in
multiple clinics for compensation exams and evaluations. In order to be seen for
my problems, I had to fill out a VA Disability Compensation Claim. If I did not
claim a disability, I would be seen for a non-service connected illness and my
medical insurance would be charged. No Persian Gulf protocol existed at this
time. The clinics were:
• Infectious Disease - diagnosis of bad footwear even though I had uniform
shoes on; accused of imaginary rashes and inquiring about PTSD;
treatment suggested was to participate in a good exercise program;
• Podiatry - evaluated for a foot problem; advised to use foot inserts but was
told I was not eligible because I did not have a 30% service connected
disability. Black foreign material was being extracted from my right foot.
No diagnosis was made;
• Internal Medicine - abnormal liver scan by ultra sound, but told I didn't
have a liver problem. Again advised exercise program and iow fat diet;
• Rheumatology - noted that I had pain and swelling and abnormalities but
was unsure of any appropriate treatment because of stomach problems,
pain medication and anti-infiammatories were not advised;
• Hematology - prolonged bleeding time noted but the reason was unknown.
No treatment was suggested;
• Neurological testing - revealed slight neuropathy, cause unknown. Only
being evaluated not treated.
For over two and one-half years I was shuffled from one clinic to another each
investigating a different body system. No coordinated treatment or diagnostic effort was
ever experienced. I was so frustrated that I went to the VA patient advocate and asked to
be sent to a VA Persian Gulf center for testing, evaluation and treatment. I had heard
about the Persian Gulf Registry at this time and asked to be included. A physical
examination was performed by VAMC Lebanon (See exam October 15, 1993 in VA
Medical Records). A summary letter was provided to me (See Attachment 2, Letter from
VAMC Lebanon of October 19, 1993). The letter stated "It is unclear if your health
problems are related to your Persian Gulf service". Another comment on the summary is
that no lab test results are reported. I went to the Persian Gulf Referral Center, V A
Medical Center, Washington DC on October 27, 1993.
II. Testing Procedures
A. At VAMC Lebanon, no obvious Persian Gulf testing protocol was used before
going to the VAMC Washington. However, at the VAMC Washington, I was
given a list of Persian Gulf Veteran screening evaluation procedures (See
197
Attachment 3, Screening Evaluation). Not all tests and procedures were
performed. However, I did receive a diagnosis of "Persian Gulf war
syndrome" at the completion of my stay at the V AMC Washington. I was
referred back to VAMC Lebanon with no treatment plan in place.
B. On returning to VAMC Lebanon, it was arranged that I would be followed by
the Chief of Medical Service. At this time I had a service connection for
bilateral foot condition that was considered 0% disabling with no disability
compensation (See Section for more details on the compensation system). At
the VAMC Lebanon, I was sent from clinic to clinic with no coordinated
treatment plan or diagnosis (See VA Medical Records). This scenario had
continued up to date. (SO FRUSTRATING!)
III. Documentation and Record Keeping
It has been a problem with records for disability claims and VAMC Washington
Persian Gulf Evaluation results.
A. Discharge Summary (See Attachment 4) and Evaluation Results from the
VAMC Washington was lost to the VA system. I had to resort to
Congressional intervention to find the records (See Attachment 5).
B. My Case File (C-file) at VAMC Lebanon was lost in an abandoned desk for 2
years (See complaint letter in VA Correspondence dated July 30, 1995).
IV. Disability & Claims Procedures
Disability and claims procedures are complicated and time consuming. In order
to obtain VA treatment for Persian Gulf illness, you have to first have a service connected
illness or injury (which is difficult to prove even when you were treated in-theater). Also,
the VA only considers military and VA medical records in their review for service
connection excluding expert civilian records. Additionally, they only use selected parts
of records that agree with the VA and disregard any positive findings. As an example, I
was turned down for service connection for heart palpitations, yet I had ten entries in my
military medical record for heart palpitations while on Active service (See my rebuttal
letter of December 13, 1995, contained in VA Correspondence, for other obvious
examples).
V. Follow Up Care
Fellow Persian Gulf war veterans are manifesting chronic medical problems
which range from severe joint pains, lung lesions, eye problems, chronic fatigue, diarrhea
problems, to carpal tunnel syndrome and even cancer. The problems even extend to
family members. Treatment has been inappropriate and ineffective to this time. I have
always supported the concept of health promotion and early detection of disease which
198
the VA is not set up to do. Something happened to me and other veterans in the Persian
Gulf and I want to know the causes of these problems.
The VA needs to:
• develop proper tests to recognize unique Persian Gulf symptoms. Current testing
for the Persian Gulf Registry is merely routine and does not detect Persian Gulf
illness.
• modify the entrance procedures into the VA system for Persian Gulf illness. The
current procedures are based around submitting a claim, which denies most
illnesses of the Persian Gulf war. Documentation in the Persian Gulf area was
difficult even when early symptoms presented.
• change the two year limit of at least 10% disability. This limit is unrealistic due
to the specific nature of Persian Gulf illness. Symptoms may me mild at first but
then progress.
• strongly use the civilian medical documentation in considering service connected
claims. Very often civilian medical tests are positive and the VA tests are
negative, casting doubt on the validity of the VA tests.
• stop requiring veterans to continually prove they are ill. Self reporting is ignored
and a psychiatric diagnosis is often given.
• modify their patient practices so that when medical problems occur, a veteran can
obtain a clinic appointment quickly, not in several months.
• quit ignoring the reality of Persian Gulf illness. When V A doctors show a
positive response to Persian Gulf illness, they are eliminated.
• allow a selection of physicians. VAMC Lebanon has a 600 Persian Gulf war
patient population yet physicians are being cut. This additionally limits access to
care and diagnosis.
• include spouses and family in the care and diagnosis of Persian Gulf illness since
this is a family encompassing illness.
• realize that when positive test results do occur that this has NO effect on VA
treatment or diagnosis.
• utilize newly breaking information on possible causes of Persian Gulf illness and
modify their testing, diagnosis and care accordingly.
You might ask what it is like to be a Persian Gulf war veteran after almost 6 years.
Each day starts with uncertainty. When you eat you are constantly sick and have
intermittent diarrhea. Mobility is difficult due to swollen joints and muscle aches.
Severe headaches are intermittent Sometimes you forget what you are doing and what
you were going to do. Pain and fatigue are constant companions. To complete your day
you are forced to deal with constant denials from the Pentagon that "nothing happened"
during the Persian Gulf war. These statements confuse medical providers who then doubt
your credibility. What is needed is recognition that, though not coded by the CDC,
Persian Gulf war illness is a combination of unique symptoms and outcomes. This is
why specific protocols need to be run before the VA says that this illness "doesn't exist"
or is "all in your head".
199
The needed testing MUST include:
• brain MRIs
• full body MRIs
• CAT scans
• extensive non-routine blood studies
• EGDs and colonoscopies
These must be protocol(ed) tests, not just a cursory visual examination. The costs
may be high but the benefits to the individual veteran and the country would be
immeasurable. Proper diagnosis and treatment would improve the quality of life and
productivity of current Persian Gulf war veterans and their families as well as insure a
less damaged future generation. Monetary compensation does not replace good health.
Veterans desire to improve their health so that they can be more productive citizens who
have served their country well.
200
Record of Treatment While on Active Duty
Captain Julia Y. Dyckman, NC, USNR
162-36-8251
NOTE: This information is extracted from Navy Medical Records
16 Jan 1991 Mustered as physically qualified.
30 Jan 1991 Arrived in Saudi Arabia
08 Feb 1991 Erythenia Multiform - possible drug reaction to diazide.
Several days of papules, right foot. Told to stop blood
pressure medicine for possible allergy.
19 Feb 1991 Blood pressure monitoring due to possible allergy. Still have
skin eruption, right foot. BP 1 18/92.
25 Feb 1991 Reaction to Anthrax Vaccine #2 given on 22 Feb 199 1 .
Reaction of chills, muscle pain - IMP - Local and mild system
reaction to vaccine. BP 140/94, P 98.
27 Feb 1991 Seen for Flu, head, nose throat. Prescription for Tenormin.
No Tenormin in pharmacy, medication changed to Vasotec.
BP 136/100, P 98.
01 Mar 1991 Seen for right foot problem.
05 Mar 1991 Seen in Dermatology. D/C Gris Pen because of stomach
upset
1 3 Mar 1991 Seen for earache. P 96.
19 Mar 1991 Treated for bronchitis and stomach problem. (Noted occ
bronchiti and wheezes in lung. Nausea - gastritis.)
26 Mar 1991 Prior to departure from Saudi Arabia, experienced pain in left
foot Discussed with podiatrist but was not written down
since health record was packed on the airplane.
201
01 Apr 1991 Seen at Mechanicsburg Branch Clinic for respiratory
problems. Pharyngitis, sinusitis, cough. Started on
Amoxicillin X 10 days. Hearing test done (see results). BP
128/92, PI 00.
06 Apr 1991 Seen in Harrisburg N&MC Reserve Center for left foot pain.
Not Physically Qualified for Physical Readiness Test (PRT).
Qualified to begin Active Duty for Training (ADT) except
for the noted foot problem.
08 Apr 1991 Seen in Medical Clinic, Philadelphia, Pa. "Attempt" to
remove foreign body from left foot. P 100.
15 Apr 1991 Seen in Mechanicsburg Branch Clinic, referred to surgery
clinic. Removed material from left foot. T 99.1, P 92.
16 Apr 1991 Cancelled ADT - remained on Active Duty due to medical
problems (Confimed by message from Bureau of Naval
Personnel)
Seen in Surgery Clinic, Philadelphia Naval Hospital, for foot
problem. Told to stay off foot as much as possible.
26 Apr 1991 Seen in Mechanicsburg Branch Clinic for foot problem and
flu symptoms. Referred to Internal Medicine Clinic. P 102, T
99.1.
30 Apr 1991 Seen in Internal Medicine Clinic, Philadelphia Naval
Hospital, for cough, night sweats, flu symptoms.
01 May 1991 Seen in Orthopedic Clinic, Philadelphia Naval Hospital,
referred for bone scan.
01 May 1991 Seen in Internal Medicine Clinic, Philadelphia Naval
Hospital, for cough BP checked, possible infection?. Advised
to return in 1-2 weeks.
07 May 1991 Philadelphia Naval Hospital . BP 144/1 12, BP 132/96, BP
1 32/94 - emotional distress.
08 May 1991 Seen in Emergency Room, Philadelphia Naval Hospital, for
upset stomach, chills. P 109.
202
08 May 1991 Seen in Internal Medicine Clinic, Philadelphia Naval •
Hospital, for abdominal pain, persistent cough, palpitations,
and diarrhea. UGI requested by clinic.
10 May 1991 BP 130/84, P 100 - Results of UGI - reflux noted...IMP
gastroesophageal reflux .... superficial gastric ulcer.
13 May 1991 Internal Medicine Clinic, Philadelphia Naval Hospital, BP
122/82. Meds: Tagament - for ulcer, and Tenormin - for blood
pressure.
13 May 1991 Orthopedic Clinic, Philadelphia Naval Hospital, appointment
for bone scan. General Surgery Clinic, assigned light duty by
Dr.Thorp per memorandum.
14 May 1991 Surgical Clinic, Philadelphia Naval Hospital.
15 May 1991 Bone scan performed - no evidence of osteomyelitis.
16 May 1991 Internal Medicine Clinic, Philadelphia Naval Hospital, still
have cough, LLQ pain, nausea.
16 May 1991 Orthopedics Clinic, Philadelphia Naval Hospital, discharged
from Active Duty on medications: Tagament for possible
ulcer, Tenormin for high blood pressure. Still have mild left
foot pain, decreased sensation.
203
Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center
1700 South Lincoln Avenue
Lebanon, PA 17042
Ms. Julia Y. Dyckman
1505 Pine Hollow Road
Harrisburg, PA. 17109
Dear Ms. Dyckman:
October 19, 1993
In l^dy Rtfa To 595/111
We sincerely appreciate your recent participation in the Veterans Administration's Persian Gulf
Registry. This effort assists us in order to better serve veterans, such as yourself, who are
concerned about health problems which may have resulted from service in the Persian Gulf.
Your examinations indicate that your medical problems include:
1. Positive PPD TB skin test (1967), treated with INH and PAS.
2. Hypertension (1988), on treatment; history of palpitations and sinus tachycardia ('91).
3. Irritable Bowel Syndrome and Lactose Intolerance (1974)
4. Gastric polypectomies and peptic ulcer disease on UGIS, Phila., 1990 -91.
5. Four C-sections, Gravida 5, Para 4. Family history of diabetes, CVA, and hemophilia
(brother).
6. Chronic polymyalgias and polyarthralgias (muscle and joint pains), left knee> R knee and
both feet, February 1991 to present.
7. Podiatric surgeries to left foot, 1991, with inflamed foot bunions (1993).
8. History of right foot, internal arch, skin ulcers and sores, 1991.
9. Fevers, chills, and chronic bronchitis, 1991 - 1992, resolved.
10. Lower abdominal cramps, pain, and diarrhea, Persian Gulf, 1991, resolved.
1 1 . Herpes simplex labialis fever blisters (childhood to 1 993)
12. Skin folliculitis with ulceration over left breast, September 1993.
13. 170 pounds weight, hypertriglyceridemia (199, 6-30-93) and borderline high cholesterol
(250, 7-16-93).
It is unclear if your health problems are related to your Persian Gulf service. Should your
symptoms not subside or should you have any further medical questions, please do not hesitate
to contact your closest VA or write to the Persian Gulf Coordinator at the Lebanon VA Medical
Center, Medical Service (111), Lebanon, PA 17042. Please remember that this examination does
not automatically initiate a claim for VA benefits. If you wish to file a claim for compensation
and establish possible service connection, please contact your nearest VA Regional Office. If
you need any further assistance, you may contact a Veterans Benefits Counselor by calling the
VA toll-tree telephone number (1-800-827-1000).
204
The results of your examination will be maintained by the Lebanon VA and will be available for
future use as needed. Again, your participation in the registry is appreciated.
Sincerely, n
Katherine Murray Leisure, M.D.
Persian Gulf Coordinator
205
PERSIAN GOLF VETERAN SCREENING EVALUATION
REFERRAL CENTER, WASHINGTON
LABORATORY TESTING:
^CBC y
VCD4/CD8 RATIO •/
,/SED RATE ' .
J C-REACTIVE PROTEIN '
/RHEUMATOID FACTOR ■/
yFANA v
./SERUM IMMUNOGLOBULINS
-"LIVER FUNCTION TESTS S
•^cpk y
^THYROID FUNCTION TESTS
./B12 AND (FOLATE 5
i/VDRL S^"
SUCKS. TITERS ■/
HIV TESTING
■^HTLV-l TITER
Hepatitis b serology ^
stool for o&p , \
./serology for brucellosis^ qafeverr leishmaniasis", sandfly fever
/blood films - thick and thin\/
^urinalysis /
/urine heavy metals
JCXR
PPD
CONSULTS;
PSYCHIATRY :
NEUROLOGY:
STRUCTURED CLINICAL INTERVIEW FOR DSMIII-R(SCID
BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY
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SCREENING EXAM
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206
PERSIAN GULF VETERAN
SPECIAL EXAMINATIONS
REFERRAL CENTER, WASHINGTON
V
DIARRHEA
GI CONSULT
STOOL FOR OiP
STOOL LEUKOCYTES
STOOL CULTURE
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ABDOMINAL PAIN
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CT ABDOMEN
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207
Julia Dyckman
162 36 8251
SCHEDULED ACTIVITIES
October 27
preadmission testing
October 28
10:00 Pulmonary Function Tests, 4A129
October 29
November 1
09:00 EEG, 3A112
Polysomnography, 3A112
November 2
Polysomnography, continues
November 3
0900 EMG, GC208
1000 Neuropsychological Testing, 2A127
November 4
08:00 Colonoscopy, EGD
208
WASHINGTON VAMC
01/31/94 09:07 Page: 1
PATIENT NAME
DYCKMAN, JULIA
| AGE | SEX | RACE | SSN | CLAIM NUMBER
I 47 j F | | 162-36-82S1 | 28056224
ADM DATE | DISC DATE
OCT 27, 1993 | NOV S, 1993
| TYPE OF RELEASE | INP | ABS 1 WARD NO
j NON-SERV (OPT-NSC) | 9 | | 4ES MED
DICTATION DATE: NOV 3, 1993 TRANSCRIPTION DATE: NOV 8, 1993
TRANSCRIPTIONIST: O' CONNELL, BRIAN, .,- _ r.- , 5 . . . . , , _„
ADMISSION DIAGNOSES: { L,%(J*^^t^ ' S ^' ^ ' t '^^^^^ ■ «C
'""</ ^-v 7 Luto^i^r/"**''' ■ /;.-': i:^JAN 2 6 1994
1. Irritable bowel syndrome. O O 7 / fflh , ItQ.Ufi -, jj-- v "
2. Persian Gulf war syndrome (J^i u jJ r Qu.lI /"W-'"' „J, « " ,&: ? <#- \ >^ I.
DISCHARGE DIAGNOSES: C,lJ^,a 7*'~yl "Clsi I
Ixtjurx. Ucfr 7/°"'
fibl fa* - 111- ° C'l"* 9 **^ . , ML "/
1. Irritable bowel syndrome. ., ^ UrniTf~- '' 'r*i A?
2. Persian Gulf war syndrome. f!/faif\** , \ ru '* 94.3''
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: The patient is a 47-year-old white
female with a past medical history significant for hypertension
and irritable bowel syndrome, who complains of intermittent
diarrhea, arthralgias, chronic fatigue, and symptoms of pain and
rash on the feet for approximately two years. The patient
reports that her symptoms started during the Persian Gulf war.
She had a skin rash which was noted on the bottom of her left
foot. The patient also noted that she had some ulcers on the
feet which healed later. The patient has had intermittent pain
and burning of the feet after healing of the ulcers. The patient
states that she was bitten by something during the war and as per
inspection from the physicians in the Persian Gulf, it was
ascertained that this could be insect versus animal embedded in
that foot and the area of skin was removed, however it was not
analyzed pathologically. The patient has an irritable bowel
syndrome and diarrhea off and on since her Vietnam war days, and
the patient states that her stools are soft, watery, but without
blood or mucus. The patient also has no history of melena.
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: The patient also has known hypertension
since 1989; she was on Dyazide and Tenormin, however status post
rash on her foot during the Persian Gulf war it was assessed that
this might be due to the Dyazide, so the patient's Dyazide was
discontinued. Also, the patient had hearing loss due to exposure
to noise from generators but she recovered from this.
REVIEW OF SYSTEMS: The patient also complains of easily
bruising x 2 to 3 months, joint pains since the Persian Gulf war,
also reports palpitations since the Persian Gulf war, and
secondary to palpitations the patient was placed on Verapamil.
OCCUPATION: The patient worked as a reserve for the
military in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf wars.
SOCIAL HISTORY: The patient is a non-smoker and drinks
only socially.
PATIENT: DYCKMAN, JULIA 162-36-82S1
VA FORM 10-1000 DISCHARGE SUMMARY CHART COPY
209
WASHINGTON VAMC
01/31/94 09:07 Page: 2
PATIENT NAME
DYCKMAN , JULIA
| AGE | SEX | RACE | SSN | CLAIM NUMBER
j 47 j F | | 162-36-8251 j 28056224
ADM DATE | DISC DATE
OCT 27, 1993 j NOV 5, 1993
TYPE OF RELEASE | INP | ABS | WARD NO
NON-SERV (OPT-NSC) | 9 | | 4ES MED
FAMILY HISTORY: There is no history of significant
diseases in the family.
HOSPITALIZATIONS: The patient was admitted five times
before the Persian Gulf war for delivery of children, one
stillbirth. After the gulf war the patient had one admission to
the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Lebanon. •'
DRUGS/ALLERGIES: The patient is allergic to Erythromycin,
Xylocaine, and Methergine.
ADMISSION MEDICATIONS: Verapamil-SR 240 mg P.O. q.d.
PERTINENT MILITARY
HISTORY: As stated in patient's previous
occupat ion .
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: The patient had a pulse of 102, blood
pressure 150/92, temperature 98.5, respirations 22. The patient
was a moderately well -developed white female who was well
nourished and in good health, and in no acute distress. HEENT:
The patient had no pallor. The pupils were equal and reactive to
light. Extraocular motions were intact. There was no
conjunctival congestion or injection. The skin had no pallor,
jaundice, cyanosis or clubbing. Neck: Revealed no jugular venous
distention or bruits, no thyromegaly . Breasts: Showed no masses.
The patient had no lymphadenopathy . Chest: Showed the lungs to
be clear to auscultation. Vascular: There are positive
peripheral pulses, symmetrical bilaterally. Heart: Positive SI
and S2, no S3 or S4, no murmurs, rubs or gallops. However, the
patient was tachycardic on examination. Abdomen: The patient had
an obese abdomen with a liver span of 9 cm. Nonpalpable
organomegaly and positive bowel sounds. Rectal: Negative.
External genitalia: Intact. The patient did not have any pain on
range of motion of her extremities. The patient had a full range
of motion. During her neurologic examination the patient's
cranial nerves II-XII were intact. Muscle strength was S/5 in
all extremities. Sensation was intact bilaterally. Reflexes
were +2 throughout. The patient had no cerebellar signs. The
patient was able to complete dysdiadochokinesis and
finger-to-nose without difficulty.
MENTAL STATUS EXAMINATION: The patient was alert and oriented
x 3 and had no difficulty with thought process or mentation.
HOSPITAL COURSE: During her hospitalization the patient
was scheduled for numerous tests to assess Persian Gulf war
syndrome. Pulmonary function tests, electroencephalogram and
sleep studies to rule out any neurologic difficulty and
concentration, and electromyographic study to assess muscle aches
and numbness, neuropsychological testing, colonoscopy,
esophagogastroduodenoscopy with biopsy for diarrhea and abdominal
pain and for fatigue, Epstein-Barr virus serology with IgG, EVNA,
PATIENT: DYCKMAN, JULIA 162-36-8251
VA FORM 10-1000 DISCHARGE SUMMARY CHART COPY
210
WASHINGTON VAMC
01/31/94 09:07 Page: 3
PATIENT NAME
DYCKMAN, JULIA
| AGE | SEX | RACE | SSN | CLAIM NUMBER
1 47 j F | j 162-36-8251 j 28056224
ADM DATE | DISC DATE
OCT 27, 1993 | NOV 5, 1993
| TYPE OF RELEASE | INP | ABS | WARD NO
j NON-SERV (OPT-NSC) j 9 j j 4ES MED
DCNA, etc. were obtained. Other laboratories which were drawn on
admission were a complete blood count, CD4/CDA ratio,
sedimentation rate, C-reactive protein, rheumatoid factor, serum
IgG, liver function tests, CPK, TFT, B12, folate, VDRL, Lyme
titers, human immunodeficiency virus and HTLV-I, hepatitis B
serology, stool for ova and parasites, blood stains, thick and
thin smears, urinalysis and urine heavy metals, and chest x-ray. <(
To assess the patient's joint pain, a rheumatology consultation
was obtained. For the skin rash dermatology was consulted and
psychiatry was consulted for neurologic testing. The patient
also had a malaria smear.
During her hospital stay the patient had no complications and
underwent the above procedures. The results of the studies,
however will be completed approximately one week post discharge.
However, the patient" did have results from her laboratory studies
and her gastrointestinal work up which I will state here.
The patient's admission laboratories were as follows: The
patient had a sedimentation rate of 21, white blood cell count
6.7, hemoglobin 13.4, hematocrit 40.1^ MCV 85, platelets 362, RDW
14, 65 segs, 24 lymphs, 8 monocytes, 2 eosinophils, and 1
basophil. The patient also had a urinalysis which was negative;
completed on 10/27/93. Subsequent follow-up laboratories were
also negative. However, on 10/27/93, the patient had a Chem-7
with a sodium 139, potassium 4.2, chloride 103, C02 17,
phosphorus 2.6, protein 8.2, calcium 9.8, albumin 4.7, alkaline
phosphatase 86, AST 21. The patient had a CK of 62, total
bilirubin 0.7, direct bilirubin 0.1, and magnesium 2.1. The
patient had an RPR which was negative. The patient had a CD4
count which was absolute range 753, CDA count 210, white blood
cells 7,300, CD19 561. The patient also had a C-reactive protein
of 0.63 which was high and IgG of 2120, IgA 320 and IgM 141. The
patient also had other studies which will be mentioned.
During her hospital stay the patient was seen by the rheumatology
service for aching joint complaints. The patient was seen and
told to follow up in the rheumatology clinic. The patient also
received a podiatry consult for insoles in her shoes, and the
patient will follow up on the Wednesday after discharge for
follow up. At that time the patient will discuss laboratory
results with Dr. Murphy.
The patient was discharged in stable condition.
VW/bm/J:2159/E4800
PATIENT: D YCKMAN , JUL I A 162-36-8251
VA FORM 10-1000 DISCHARGE SUMMARY CHART COPY
211
WASHINGTON VAMC
01/31/94 09:07 Page: 4
PATIENT NAME
DYCKMAN, JULIA
| AGE | SEX | RACE | SSN | CLAIM NUMBER
| 47 j F j | 162-36-8251 | 28056224
ADM DATE
OCT 27, 1993 j
DISC DATE
NOV 5. 1993
| TYPE OF RELEASE | INP | ABS | WARD NO
NON-SERV (OPT-NSC) j 9 | | 4ES MED
SIGNATURE PHYSICIAN/DENTIST SIGNATURE APPROVING PHYSICIAN/DENTIST
/es/ P. K. ROHATGI /es/ P. K. ROHATGI
for CHRISTINE POINDEXTER P. K. ROHATGI
PATIENT: DYCKMAN , JULIA 162-36-8251
VA FORM 10-1000 DISCHARGE SUMMARY CHART COP
212
Chronology of Records Retrieval
1 1/5/93
Discharge for VA Center in Washington, signed Release of
Information form
1/13/94 Called Dr. Murphy, informed her that NO records had been received
1/14/94 Sent letter to VA Center in Washington again requesting records.
1/26/94 Called VA Center in Washington talked to Esther Cooper, was told
to talk to Medical Legal Unit for records. Called Medical Legal Unit
they said it would be looked into.
2/10/94 Checked with VA in Lebanon, record not received.
2/15/94 (About) Julie received call from Gloria at VA, Washington, record
was being sent.
2/16/94 Julie called Gloria about records.
2/22/94 (About) Partial record received from Washington.
3/2/94 (About) Dr. Murphy called, told her about record problems. Dr.
Murphy called Julie to ask her to speak at the Workshop in April
3/9/94 (About) Julie received a memo from VA, Lebanon that her record
had been sent to Fayetteville, NC.
3/14/94 Called VA Center, Fayetteville, NC. They said they didn't have the
record, they had received it and returned it to Washington, D.C. last
week.
3/19/94 Registered complaint with Rep. Gekas office regarding VA records.
3/21/94 Rep. Gekas' office (Tom Templeton) called regarding records
status.
4/6/94 Dr. Murphy called Julie upset that a reporter was at the VA asking
questions about her records. Julie stated that the records were still
incomplete e.g. EMG, nueropsychology tests, biopsy, etc.
Varec2.doc
04/22/94
213
4/12/94 Esther Cooper, VA Wash, called, said records would be faxed this
day to VA, Lebanon.
4/1 3/94 VA, Lebanon, Ralph Poole, called and said FAX received, he would
send a copy to Julie.
4/1 5/94 Copy of records from VA, Lebanon received, still missing some lab
tests, e.g. Heavy Metals, and also EMG results.
4/1 5/94 Dr. Murphy returned call, she said she would ensure that hard copy
of EMG report would be sent to Julie. She also said that she would
attempt to get a Primary Care Physician assigned at VA, Lebanon.
4/20/94 Called Dr. Murphy, left message to call.
4/21/94 Hard copy of EMG report received from VA, Wash, by overnight
mail.
4/22/94 Called Dr. Murphy at 12:30. She asked about receipt of EMG
report. She stated that she had tried to call several times over the last
two days. Asked about Julie's urinary heavy metals test. She said
she will personsally review Julie's entire record and ensure that it is
verified. Will get copies for Julie of anything missing and provide
on Wednesday. She asked about Julie's talk and stressed that she
should talk about her exposures, experience in Gulf and symptoms.
She also said it was important that the panel had a hard copy of her
talk.
Varec2.doc
04/22/94
214
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Ms. Dyckman.
Mr. Larrisey. Don't move that mike, sir. It's the one on the stem
that projects. You are fine.
Mr. Larrisey. Is it on?
Mr. Shays. Yes. I think it is on.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT LARRISEY, PERSIAN GULF WAR
VETERAN
Mr. Larrisey. First, I would like to thank the committee for
their interest and concern.
Mr. Shays. I am going to ask you, though, to move the mike
more in front of you. Yes. That's better. That's great. Thank you.
Mr. Larrisey. My name is Robert Larrisey. I served with the
U.S. Air Force in a country called Oman. I was ordered from my
home in January 1991 and returned home on April 28, 1991. I was
released from active duty on June 22, 1991.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Larrisey, I am sorry to interrupt you. I am going
to have you put the mike straight on. You have got it. That's per-
fect.
Mr. Larrisey. I was stationed 60 miles from the ocean. As the
ships were unloaded, truck containers of munitions were brought
and stored for transport up north at our base. I did notice, when
the radio, TV and VCRs were on, all the transmissions were inter-
fered with by microwave blips every 3 seconds, for about 129 days.
I was treated in-country on January 25, 1991, for head conges-
tion, runny nose, sore throat, earache, and occasional cough-up of
dark brown sputum. I really did not feel well after that and on
February 17, 1991, I was treated in-country for nausea, diarrhea,
weakness, light-headedness. I felt very cold and fatigued all the
time. I was diagnosed by the Air Force doctor as a mild viral
gasteronitis.
I do remember taking some white malaria pills as we ran out of
the pink ones at the time during February, only once a week. Re-
peated efforts to obtain the names of the pills from the 913th has
produced no information.
I came home and underwent medical care privately for blurry vi-
sion, frequent urination, diarrhea, chills, skin rash, foot problems,
thinning hair, dizziness, earache, not feeling very well.
I became disabled in August 1993. I lost a 32-year career in the
Air Force. I also lost a long-overdue promotion to E-7.
Today, I still suffer from occasional headaches, shortness of
breath on exertion, left leg gets numb while standing, skin rash,
fatigue, diarrhea, awaken feeling tired, worn out, memory loss and
impaired cognitive skills.
I am still under close medical supervision for my disease process,
although some days I feel better than others.
I have received no medical care from the Department of Veterans
Affairs, only three compensation and pension physicals and two
syphilis tests.
In August 1993, a public relations officer at the Philadelphia
VAMC said, "He is not entitled to free medical care from the Veter-
ans Administration unless he is discharged with a service-related
disability."
215
Public Affairs officers at the Air Force Reserve said, "Someone on
active duty is supposed to be treated by the VA. He has the right
in going to the VA." The VA said, "The VA does not treat active
duty personnel or active duty reservists. That is the DOD's respon-
sibility."
From June 1992 to April 1993, I was treated at the VA for post
adjustment counseling. Instead of helping, it drove us to the brink
of separation three times. We terminated these sessions and sought
private counseling.
On October 20, 1992, I was seen by a doctor at the Philadelphia
VAMC for the first Persian Gulf examination. The following tests
were ordered: CBC, urine analysis and chest x-ray. The doctor
asked at the end of page 1, do you drink or smoke? My answer was,
no. He turned the page and asked, do I drink or smoke?
In August 1994, I was advised that the original protocol physical
was lost. A doctor at the Philadelphia VAMC during the second
Persian Gulf registry physical copied all my private and environ-
mental testings for the record. He ordered a cardiogram, chest x-
ray, PT and an APTT, Lyme Disease, Chem 7, liver function test,
urinalysis, immunoglobulins, CBC profile, plus a referral to the al-
lergist and immunology specialist at the university.
A pulmonary function test was ordered but not done until June
1995. The VA has failed to do the following testings: PET scan of
the brain, ultrasound of the spleen, brain imaging and a spect
brain scan. The VA also failed to do any cadmium or lead testings.
On June 19, 1995, I was seen by the VA doctor at the Philadel-
phia VAMC for a second compensation and pension physical exam-
ination. The doctor asked, "about the possibility of human
immunodeficiency virus infection and/or syphilis as a cause for his
symptoms. Veteran tells me that his life-style is such that to pre-
clude those disorders."
The doctor orders an RPR blood test for syphilis. He also dupli-
cates a test for hepatitis B and C, a P-7 blood profile for albumin
and calcium; a 24-hour urine test for uric acid, as well as
metanephines. I do not have swollen red toes. I do not show pro-
fuse sweating at rest. I do not have rapid irregular heartbeat. I do
not have an irregular blood pressure. I do not have a tumor on my
adrenal gland. I did not show any symptoms to warrant such a line
of testing.
A pulmonary function test was ordered. The technician said
there was only air exchange slightly off, but not to be concerned
about it. The doctor said, "moderately severe diffusion abnormal-
ity." Since June 12, 1995, there has never been a referral to see
any specialist.
On May 21, 1996, I was seen by the Wilmington VAMC for a
third compensation and pension physical, for memory loss. Mild
sinus inflammatory disease was noted on the MRI. To date, no re-
ferrals have ever been suggested.
My appointment was interrupted by two male visitors. This doc-
tor reported, "magnesium levels were reported outside two stand-
ard deviations." Lead and cadmium, toxic levels have been well
documented in my file. Magnesium never has been an issue.
This doctor became unprofessional and abusive toward my wife.
This doctor told my wife, if you cannot put up with him, leave him.
216
She repeated this twice on this appointment. This incident was re-
ported to the Wilmington VAMC.
I always check with my wife, because I am unable to remember
lines of testings that have been done over the last 6 years. This
doctor said, "my wife intimidates me." My wife has stood by me
during Desert Storm and my illness. She has gotten my claim from
the dead file at the VA, and where it is now. How dare this sorry
excuse.
In the doctor's own words, she said, "she was out of her profes-
sion by telling my wife to leave me," thus making me feel unworthy
and useless.
Her line of testings consisted of thyroid function, CBC, ANA,
SPEP, P-7. Her remark was, "syphilis or HIV can cause dementia."
She was told past RPR and HIV tests were negative. She dupli-
cated the Lyme test as well as another RPR test for syphilis. These
doctors must be unaware that PTSD cannot be introduced when
there is a proven diagnosis.
Her summary report, "I also recommend formal psychiatric eval-
uation for the purpose of diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress Dis-
order and determining whether the stress was solely from serving
in the Persian Gulf or also solely from having to return home to
an unsupportive environment."
In March or April 1996, I was pending admission to the
DC VAMC. This admission was by the Philadelphia VAMC doctor
who had not seen me since August 1994. My wife was able to over-
turn this decision. DCVAMC told me to arrive at 2 p.m.; Philadel-
phia VAMC told me to arrive at 11 a.m.
My claim is sitting in the office of Dr. Frances Murphy. I test
very high in cadmium and lead. I also have had several reactions
to chemicals, to benzene, rustoleum, newsprint and several un-
known chemicals.
Dr. Murphy said that on multiple chemical sensitivity on May
15, 1995, "In summary, the medical records provide clear docu-
mentations of symptoms which started during the veteran's service
in the Persian Gulf. No medically accepted diagnosis has been es-
tablished to date which explains the symptoms other than skin
rash and warts. MCS does not constitute diagnosis for purposes of
service connection under 38 CFR 3-317. Further evaluation, simi-
lar to VA uniform case assessment protocol recommended to rule
out a diagnosis of potentially treatable medical condition, condi-
tions."
Both Wilmington VAMC and Philadelphia VAMC have conducted
tests for syphilis. It does remain a mystery to me how the claim
pending for 5Vb years can possibly be treated on syphilis tests.
Dr. Susan Mather is circulating a questionnaire for the Gulf Reg-
ister participants, after a listing of some 48 symptoms with a mild
to severe reaction. "Severe reaction is sufficient to seek medical ad-
vice, take prescription drugs, lose work or limit routine activities."
Question 12-G, page 11, reads, "Of the current symptoms you
marked in item 12, which one do you consider the most severe?"
There is no place to mark all there are, only a number system from
to 4 and to 9.
I have had moneys stolen from my income tax check by the VA,
recovered by Congressman Andrews.
217
I was turned over for collection by the university for $1,900 be-
cause VA doctors failed to get a voucher to pay my lab charges.
That was resolved IY2 years later.
A Philadelphia VAMC doctor was going to admit me to the
DCVAMC after not seeing me for 18 months for unknown reasons.
It is my wife who stood up for my rights when the ACLU would
not get involved.
A Woman's Place, and a Woman's Shelter, agrees that the Wil-
mington VAMC doctor suffer from a syndrome called abuse of
power. Lawyers, who have reviewed this, agree this behavior is de-
plorable and feel that if they — and feel that if they file in Federal
Court, they will be — the judge would laugh them out of court.
Mr. Shays. Are we all set, Mr. Larrisey?
Mr. Larrisey. I thank you again.
Mr. Shays. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Larrisey. I am finished.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Sanders.
Mr. Sanders. I am going to have to run in a moment and then
I will be back. First, I want to thank both of you for your testimony
and that was not necessarily the easiest thing in the world and we
appreciate your remarks and thank you.
I am gathering from what both of you said that you were less
than enthusiastic about the kind of treatment that you received at
the VA. Let me start off with a very simple question, and I have
a feeling that I know what the answer may be and I am not going
to be happy to hear it, but I want to hear it.
If somebody were to give you a card right now and say, no, you
don't have to go to the VA, you can go to any hospital that you
want, what would you do with that card? Ms. Dyckman.
Ms. Dyckman. I certainly wouldn't go to the VA.
Mr. Sanders. You would not go to the VA?
Ms. Dyckman. I would not go to the VA.
Mr. Sanders. Mr. Larrisey.
Mr. Larrisey. I wouldn't go. And I say that and I haven't been.
Mr. Sanders. I say that sadly because we want our VA to be the
best in the country and the door to be open to veterans who de-
serve that kind of treatment.
Ms. Dyckman. Can I just add one thing?
Mr. Sanders. Yes.
Ms. Dyckman. I am not condemning individual doctors.
Mr. Sanders. Right.
Ms. Dyckman. Individual doctors try to work within the system,
and there are good ones and there are bad ones. What has hap-
pened with the VA system has been a series of paperwork to get
into the system, and then justification and then an overall attitude
that this is not a real illness. And so when you have that general
attitude at the beginning and then it is actually forced on individ-
ual doctors, that's where we have the problem.
But there are some good doctors.
Mr. Sanders. We know that. We know there are some enor-
mously dedicated not only doctors, but nurses and staff in general
and we are proud of them.
Let me ask you, yesterday as you may know, we had 4 hours of
testimony relating to the possible exposure of our troops to chemi-
218
cal agents, and our concern that we will be addressing with the VA
later is whether or not that reality has been incorporated into their
protocol.
What is your sense about that? Do you think that that is an
issue that the VA is looking into adequately?
Yes, Ms. Dyckman. And, Mr. Larrisey, please jump in when you
feel appropriate.
Mr. Larrisey. I didn't quite get the whole question.
Mr. Sanders. My question is yesterday we heard a whole lot of
testimony and I think there is an increasing belief that some of our
soldiers may have been exposed to low-level chemical agents, and
a concern that we have had is that the VA has not looked into that
possibility as a cause of some
Mr. Larrisey. I agree.
Mr. Sanders. Is that your feeling?
Mr. Larrisey. That's my concern, yes.
Mr. Sanders. Yes. Ms. Dyckman.
Ms. Dyckman. I think from the situation that existed at the
time, the possibility of chemical agents was very strong, whether
they are low levels or high levels.
The delivery system, the environment, they are all factors that
also play a part in the illness. I feel that chemicals were used,
where they were produced, who knows where or how they were de-
livered, it doesn't make any matter. But there were a varied num-
ber of chemicals and then there were also other factors that maybe
made the chemicals more potent or whatever but chemicals were
there, but it's not the only factor.
Mr. Sanders. Sure, right.
Mr. Larrisey. That's not the only thing they should be looking
at.
Mr. Sanders. Right. Ms. Dyckman, you testified that reporting
of service-related symptoms could result in retribution and loss of
VA benefits. On the other hand, recognition of service connection
can result in a loss of civilian insurance. Thus, Gulf war veterans
can be caught in a catch-22 where they can't get health care be-
cause they can't access health care for problems that may be attrib-
utable to exposures. Is that a legitimate concern?
Ms. Dyckman. What happens is, first of all, if you have a medi-
cal condition related to a war injury, civilian insurances can deny
you care if it is war-related.
Mr. Sanders. What, they will tell you to go to the VA?
Ms. Dyckman. They will tell you to go to the VA or they can
deny your claim.
Certain jobs even have been known to not hire Persian Gulf vets
because of the potential of high insurance claims. The other prob-
lem is, when you are really ill, you can't work and so you have no
coverage. So what's left to you is VA or active duty care. And since,
as a reservist, you are not considered entitled to active duty care,
your only resource is then VA. But then VA ties in the care being
related to service-connection.
If it is not service-connected, they will not pay for your treat-
ment. So it gets down to you go for a Persian Gulf Registry exam-
ination. At that point, you are not considered service-connected.
You are only going for the Registry exam. So what happens is, they
219
submit the bills to your civilian insurance company, or you are pre-
sented with the bills.
So then they say, well, now we know you are a Persian Gulf vet.
This occurred on active duty; you are not entitled to claims.
Mr. Sanders. You are in a real catch-22 then.
Ms. Dyckman. We are in a catch-22.
Mr. Sanders. Mr. Larrisey, I think you referred to that as well,
didn't you?
Mr. Larrisey. Yes.
Mr. Sanders. Is there anything you want to add?
Mr. Larrisey. If you are on active duty, you are not eligible. If
you are — you have to prove that you have a service-connection dis-
ability.
Mr. Sanders. I think this gets back to the point you made, Ms.
Dyckman, is I gather that there is a whole lot of bureaucracy and
paperwork that is, I gather, a significant source of frustration to
the veterans?
Ms. Dyckman. It is a justification to use that system. What you
are entitled to, there are too many — too many stipulations that
tries to get you not available to that.
Mr. Sanders. The catch-22 there is, my guess is — and we will
hear from the VA folks later — is that they don't have enough
money to do perhaps all that they want to do. They have to screen
out people, make it harder for people to use the facility. They don't
have money to treat people and you have the catch-22 which I
think we should address in another way.
Ms. Dyckman. You get the feeling, first of all, VA is saying
that — you have a 600 population. We can't afford all of these peo-
ple. You almost feel that they would sooner not see you.
Mr. Sanders. Right.
Ms. Dyckman. And so, therefore, you are not ill. If you look at
me, no, I don't look ill. So therefore, what happens is, you know,
we don't want you. So they put — it is almost like they put up bar-
riers, whether or not they are forced to do it.
Mr. Sanders. The answer is they may be doing that. They will
tell us they don't have enough money to treat everybody. Therefore
they are only going to treat what they consider to be the most ex-
treme cases. What your perception is is probably quite right.
Ms. Dyckman. That's true.
Mr. Sanders. That's the vicious circle about whether or not they
are adequately funded, and that's another issue we are going to
have to deal with.
Ms. Dyckman. The other issue, which I mention in my paper, is
when you come out with these illnesses, then that jeopardizes your
standing with Reserve, because in Reserves you now have to be
physically qualified. You have got problems? No, I am sorry, you
are not physically qualified anymore.
Mr. Sanders. Does that lead some people to be less than up front
about their physical problems?
Ms. Dyckman. Sure. And the other problem, which is, you are
not physically qualified; you now lose that job, which — and then
you also lose the time you spent in that job because you are not
retired — you are not entitled to retirement until you spend 20 good
years. And as a reservist, you are not entitled as a drilling reserv-
220
ist to be seen in a military hospital. The only time you can be seen
is if you were injured while on active duty. Otherwise, you are not
entitled to it.
The other problem is with the PTSD diagnosis, especially for pro-
fessional people. You can have a PTSD diagnosis, you are now af-
fecting my credibility as a physician, as a nurse. And I am telling
you, I have short-term memory loss!
Mr. Sanders. OK. Please excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I am going
to have to run. I will be back in a little while.
Mr. Shays. I would like, Ms. Dyckman, how long were you in the
Persian Gulf?
Ms. Dyckman. I was only there 2 months, 2V2 months.
Mr. Shays. And your location again?
Ms. Dyckman. We were in Al Jubayl. We were located in the
Sand toward the interior. There were two fleet hospitals, Fleet
Hospital 5, which was on the port and Fleet Hospital 15, which
was in the Sand.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Larrisey, how many months were you there?
Mr. Larrisey. I would say 3 months.
Mr. Shays. Three months. From when to when?
Mr. Larrisey. Let me see. When the war broke out?
I arrived in January 1991 to April 28, 1991. I was over in-coun-
try.
Mr. Shays. You went in with your unit, and you left with your
unit?
Mr. Larrisey. Yes.
Mr. Shays. The same with you, Ms. Dyckman?
Ms. Dyckman. Yes. Some of us, some of the Seabees came in the
advance party. They were the group that were going to set up the
hospital or prepare the area. That is when they had that SCUD
missile attack that was confirmed as a chemical. We went there
but we were then locate
Mr. Shays. Confirmed by whom as chemical? That is when they
had the SCUD missile confirmed by whom
Ms. Dyckman. Most of the reports say recognizable possible
chemical exposure.
Mr. Shays. Potential, possible, is not confirmed. We would love
to have people acknowledged, confirmed.
Ms. Dyckman. This was from most of the reports from Senator
Riegle's committee.
Mr. Shays. There was not, fortunately, a lot of need for your
services in the Persian Gulf; is that correct?
Ms. Dyckman. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. So you were able to leave sooner than was antici-
pated?
Ms. Dyckman. The hospitals right after the war started to be
taken down. Ours was the last one to be taken down, but we sent
some of our personnel out earlier than the final ones because they
had to pack up the hospital again and put it back in the containers.
Mr. Shays. I didn't quite grasp when you became ill; while you
were in the Persian Gulf or after you left?
Ms. Dyckman. I was sick while I was there, and that was dem-
onstrated by the rashes. I had open sores, and those things were
documented in my medical record while in theater.
221
Mr. Shays. Mr. Larrisey, when did you begin to feel sick?
Mr. Larrisey. I said in my report. A few weeks after I was there.
Mr. Shays. So both of you while you were there?
Mr. Larrisey. Right.
Mr. Shays. Did both of you have physicals before you went to the
Persian Gulf? You were a full-time, in active service. Ms. Dyckman,
you were a Reservist going to the Persian Gulf. Did you have a
physical before you went?
Ms. Dyckman. Yes. We usually have yearly physicals anyway.
Mr. Shays. Not everyone who went had physicals. It was helpful
to establish who went there well. So you were well, you had no
physical problems when you went to the Persian Gulf?
Ms. Dyckman. That is correct, and that is in my record.
Mr. Shays. And you, Mr. Larrisey?
Mr. Larrisey. I was fully qualified worldwide before I went over.
Mr. Shays. One of the points that I would like you to elaborate
a little, Ms. Dyckman, you said you had tests by NIH?
Ms. Dyckman. Yes.
Mr. Shays. You were saying that basically the information the
tests had shown that were done there were discounted by the VA
as just a general rule, or they just disputed what NIH said?
Ms. Dyckman. Yes. In some of the supporting documents I have
letters given by VA why it was excluded. They are still now recon-
sidering it. The way I was sent to NIH
Mr. Shays. I want to establish first whether your statement is
that as a general rule they just dismiss it or in your specific case
they dismissed it.
Ms. Dyckman. It is according to the disability center in Philadel-
phia, and the explanations of why they dismissed almost all the
symptoms is included in the letter. In my experience with other
Persian Gulf veterans the same condition arises. If you get an out-
side consultant they don't usually consider it, and most of the peo-
ple that I have known, it is not considered.
Mr. Shays. So your contention would be if you go to outside
sources and then present that to the VA, the VA is going to ignore
it?
Ms. Dyckman. That is what the experience has been.
Mr. Shays. For you, and you would contend for others as well?
Ms. Dyckman. Yes.
Mr. Shays. You were going to start to make a point, why you
went to NIH
Ms. Dyckman. When I got the diagnosis from the VA Medical
Center in Washington is when the CCEP program came into exist-
ence, which is the active duty one. So I signed up for that one, too,
because I basically think it is also an active duty problem.
It was Bethesda who referred me to NIH. It was not the VA. So
Bethesda referred me there, I had the complete workup and the re-
sults came back. The active duty military did consider those results
as valid results, they sent me there, but the VA did not.
Mr. Shays. The active military felt it was valid, but the VA did
not?
Ms. Dyckman. That is right.
222
Mr. Shays. When you had interaction, both of you, with VA doc-
tors, did you feel the doctors that were looking at you had the ex-
pertise to properly evaluate your symptoms?
Mr. Larrisey. Are you asking me?
Mr. Shays. Both.
Mr. Larrisey. The doctors I have seen looked like they were re-
tired physicians that were out of touch, some of them.
Mr. Shays. So whether or not your analysis is right, you didn't
have much confidence in them?
Mr. Larrisey. No not very much.
Ms. Dyckman. Like I said before, you got good and bad doctors.
The general attitude is this thing doesn't exist, so when you go in
to a doctor the greatest majority don't believe you to begin with.
There were only very few that did, and only through demanding
that you actually go to a patient advocate and standing up for my
own rights is how I got to a VA center, when there, at least at the
Washington VA Center, they had some type of specific protocol to
follow.
Mr. Shays. Help the VA out a bit here, and help DOD. Clearly
some people who were well went to the Persian Gulf, when they
came home they became sick, they may not have become sick be-
cause of their experience in the VA. Statistics will tell us that a
certain number of people become ill.
How do you think we are able, what would be the process for us
to begin to be able to separate those who became ill not as a result
of their service but for other reasons, and those who sincerely have
become ill because of their service? Help the VA out, as a nurse
and obviously as someone who considers themselves a victim; how
would you help the VA out?
Ms. Dyckman. There are positive tests. The tests that I submit-
ted in the documentation, they were positive tests for those specific
conditions.
What is unique about Persian Gulf and what you find in most
Persian Gulf veterans is that it is a combination. There are specific
combinations which you don't find in most of the general popu-
lation. You don't find, like if you have ALS, that you have also all
the other things that the Persian Gulf veterans have.
So it is the combination of symptoms that makes it a unique syn-
drome. When a person presents with it, you take it as a whole body
system reaction, and these are specific to either chemicals or to
whatever it is, whether immunizations or what. But that is a
unique thing with the Persian Gulf. Most of the population, yes,
you are going to have people that have ALS, not people that had
the same background, that had the same possible exposures, and
then get that illness and usually the combination of the symptoms.
Mr. Shays. The biggest failure of the VA would be what, in your
opinion?
Ms. Dyckman. The biggest failure of the VA, first, is recognizing
that this is a unique syndrome because it is a combination of
chemicals or whatever. They have to recognize that it is a medical
condition and not only a psychological or even a psychological; it
is a medical condition.
They have to, then, and this is part of the Pentagon, have to take
into account what were the exposures and then study the inter-
223
actions. But they have to believe the Persian Gulf veteran in the
first place, and that is not — it is like you have to have a recognition
that this is real, and at this point they still do not believe that it
is real.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Larrisey.
Mr. Larrisey. I believe they ought to set up a protocol and have
case studies or whatever to find out exactly what is occurring to
each veteran that is in common with each other.
Mr. Shays. Before we end this panel, do either of you have any-
thing else you would like to say?
Mr. Larrisey. I would just like to thank you for the opportunity
to present my case.
Ms. Dyckman. I would like to thank you for the opportunity, but
I also hope that after all these hearings that people start to believe
us. You look at what would be where you simply have paraded vet-
erans in front of committees, we have had birth defects, and we
look at the person who is almost at death's door, and the problem
is 5 years have gone by. Do we all have to die first before you be-
lieve us, that we are suffering?
And a lot of Persian Gulf veterans are suffering, and what we
end up doing is dealing with a system, both Federal and VA, that
doesn't believe us. And you have to now say it is real and get on
with treating us. I am tired of studies. The studies are only still
trying to prove that a chemical existed.
It is late. People are getting worse. There has to be early detec-
tion. What would have happened with the early detection of the
cancers? We need to save people now instead of letting them go
downhill.
Mr. Shays. That is a very fair request. I think the reason why
we have individuals like you start out every hearing is to try to
bring some reality to what we are doing.
This is the sixth hearing the committee has had. When we start-
ed out the DOD denied there were any credible detections of chemi-
cals, for instance, denied there were any credible exposures, and
denied having any credible health effects as a result. I think that
we have made some headway in overcoming the first two basic de-
nials. We still have the third.
Our primary concern is not finding blame. The primary concern
is trying to adequately diagnose and adequately treat and fairly
compensate our veterans, and it has taken 5 years too long. I think
we are very close to having some resolution.
Ms. Dyckman. Can I just say I don't have any problems with the
committees. I think they have been excellent because otherwise it
would have been a dead issue. The committees, though, have to go
a bit further, and in that they also have to address the prevention
of other, God forbid, wars with the same type of scenarios, and see
what happened in the running of the government and how much
was covered up.
Mr. Shays. I feel a little almost overwhelmed because we are get-
ting into more than one issue. There is no one illness but many.
It is a combination of a lot of factors.
In one of our hearings it was suggested by someone who deals
with low-level exposures in what I call the real world of daily liv-
ing, and suggested that the pills that our soldiers took, were meant
224
to kind of give them some immunity to exposure to chemicals, may
have in effect disguised their true exposure to chemicals, which is
a possibility. We have had a whole host of different factors that
people have suggested.
The one thing that is very difficult for us, though, to accept even
on the surface is the continual denial of DOD, one, that there was
exposure to chemicals and, two, that there was exposure. When you
have two of the primary leaders of that effort say that alarms were
going off continually but we discounted them because nobody was
dying, and yet in my own environment, in my work that I have
been involved in, we are very strict on how people treat chemicals
in daily living. We don't allow them to be exposed because we know
low-level exposure to chemicals can cause serious illness.
To me it stares us in the face, and yet only now is the VA begin-
ning to look at that, and I can't for the life of me understand it.
And I can't understand why the DOD would have to have studies
done to prove that nerve agent, minimal, or blister gas of some
form at low level would cause harm, when we know chemicals here
in the United States at low-level exposure cause tremendous harm.
So I am having a hard time wrestling with that.
So I share your concern, obviously. I do think that we are very
close to seeing some major changes in attitude on the part of the
DOD and the VA, and we are going to keep at it, and you are going
to help us help them see the light. I thank you both for coming.
Ms. Dyckman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Larrisey. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. We are going to have an, unfortunately, a 5-minute
break, no longer.
[Recess.]
Mr. Shays. The hearing will come to order. We will call Dr.
Susan Mather, the chief public health and environmental hazards
officer of the VA, accompanied by Dr. Francis Murphy, director of
the Environmental Agents Service.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. For the record, both witnesses are primary witnesses,
Dr. Murphy as well. You don't have a statement?
Dr. Murphy. I do not.
Mr. Shays. We appreciate your being here. I understand, Dr.
Mather, that you were here yesterday, and I want the record to
note that the committee appreciates your being here listening to
the testimony, taking this issue so seriously. You didn't have to be
here, and I thank you for being here. I invite you to give your testi-
mony. You don't have a time restraint on your testimony. It is im-
portant we hear it as you would like to give it.
STATEMENTS OF SUSAN H. MATHER, M.D., CHIEF PUBLIC
HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS OFFICER, VETER-
ANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF VETER-
ANS AFFAIRS; AND FRANCIS MURPHY, M.D., DIRECTOR, EN-
VIRONMENTAL AGENTS SERVICE
Dr. Mather. I will try to be as brief as possible. Mr. Chairman,
thank you for this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee
today to update you on clinical programs and research develop-
225
ments related to Persian Gulf veterans, particularly as they relate
to possible exposure to chemical warfare agents.
Persian Gulf veterans, in response to their needs, the Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs immediately began development of its
Persian Gulf health care programs. The first component of the com-
prehensive programs was the Persian Gulf Registry Health Exam-
ination Program, developed in 1991 and implemented in 1992.
Since the initiation of that clinical examination program, the De-
partment has continuously improved and expanded its Persian Gulf
programs to encompass a comprehensive four-pronged approach to
Persian Gulf veterans' concerns, addressing relevant medical care,
research, compensation, and outreach and education.
VA provides Persian Gulf Registry Health Examinations, referral
center evaluations, readjustment and sexual trauma counseling,
and special eligibility for health care to Persian Gulf war veterans.
To date more than 62,000 Persian Gulf war veterans have com-
pleted registry examinations, almost 187,000 have been seen in VA
ambulatory care clinics, and more than 18,200 have been hospital-
ized at VA medical facilities.
We assert that the record clearly demonstrates the Department
has always remained open to the possibility that Persian Gulf war
veterans were potentially exposed to a wide variety of hazardous
agents, including chemical warfare agents. Three years prior to the
DOD announcement in June regarding demolitions in Khamisiyah,
VA designed its clinical uniform case assessment protocol to detect
clinical signs and symptoms related to possible neurotoxic expo-
sures. Neurologic examinations and cognitive testing were part of
the earliest versions of this protocol.
As a consequence, VA diagnostic protocols continue to serve as
a valid set of clinical guidelines. These protocols received positive
reviews by highly respected physicians and scientists in the past
and will be reviewed again by a newly constituted Institute of Med-
icine Committee.
At this time there is, unfortunately, no specific diagnostic bio-
marker for chemical warfare agent exposure. Therefore, no test can
be added to the protocol which will confirm for individual veterans
that they were exposed to these toxins during their service in the
Gulf.
VA has recently been asked by members of this subcommittee
whether we listened to veterans who reported their belief that they
had been exposed to chemical warfare agents. The answer defi-
nitely is yes.
For instance, members of a Naval Reserve Seabee unit from Ala-
bama, Tennessee, North Carolina and Georgia reported suffering
adverse health effects which they and their physician, Dr. Jackson,
who is here today, attributed to exposure to low-level chemical war-
fare agents. In response, VA established a pilot medical program
at the Birmingham VA Medical Center to evaluate their health sta-
tus.
As part of this special health care program, more than 100 veter-
ans have been evaluated. Fifty-five Persian Gulf war veterans com-
plaining of cognitive problems underwent extensive neuro-
psychological testing and clinical evaluations. These evaluations
226
did not reveal the pattern of neurologic abnormalities associated
with neurotoxin exposure.
In addition to our clinical programs, VA research programs relat-
ed to Persian Gulf veterans' illnesses include more than 30 individ-
ual projects being carried out nationwide by VA and university-af-
filiated investigators. One recent important research publication
was in direct response to concerns that veterans of the war had a
higher expected risk of dying after service in the Persian Gulf.
In 1994, the VA Environmental Epidemiology Service began a
mortality study of Gulf war veterans which has now been pub-
lished in the New England Journal of Medicine. The study included
all deaths occurring between May 1991 and September 1993. This
was the maximum period for which complete validated mortality
information was available in 1994.
The study showed a small but statistically significant increased
risk of death from all causes in Persian Gulf veterans. However,
when cause-specific mortality was evaluated, the increased risk of
death has been shown to be attributable to external causes such as
accidents, and including motor vehicle accidents. There was no in-
creased risk of death from medical diseases, suicide or homicide,
cancers, circulatory diseases or infectious diseases, categories
which have been identified as conditions of particular concern to
Gulf war veterans and their families.
The result should not be misconstrued, however, to mean that
Gulf war veterans' health concerns and symptoms can be dis-
missed. Our health care programs have identified a number of Per-
sian Gulf veterans who are suffering multisystem complaints, ill-
nesses and disabilities. These illnesses are real and will continue
to be treated at VA medical facilities nationwide.
VA is committed to pursuing research studies on non-life threat-
ening diseases which result in illness in Persian Gulf veterans, to
the support of a long-term mortality study, and to investigate the
underlying cause or causes for the increased risk of death from ex-
ternal causes. A report of the current federally sponsored research
projects is included in the annual report to Congress.
In addition, the Persian Gulf War Veterans' Coordinating Board
completed work on a call for proposals on epidemiologic and basic
science projects on long-term health effects of low-level chemical
warfare nerve agent exposures. Both government and nongovern-
ment researchers have been invited to submit proposals, and this
call for proposals was published yesterday.
Finally, there have been several media reports indicating that
VA was discharging physicians on the basis of their comments and/
or activities relating to Persian Gulf war veterans. These allega-
tions are simply incorrect. We have discussed this issue with staff
of the subcommittee and will be pleased to continue such discus-
sions.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Veterans Health Administra-
tion has been undergoing reorganization and integration of facili-
ties, and that has resulted in the need to reduce staff. Any staff
reductions which have or will take place are based on an assess-
ment of staffing requirements and are categorically unrelated to
any statements or activities of our employees concerning Persian
Gulf war veterans.
227
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my statement, and we
would be happy to address your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Mather follows:]
228
STATEMENT OF
SUSAN H. MATHER, M.D., M.P.H.
CHIEF PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS OFFICER
VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAERS
BEFORE THE
HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS
DECEMBER 11, 1996
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee today to update you
on clinical programs and research developments related to Persian Gulf War veterans, particularly
as they relate to possible exposure to chemical warfare agents.
First, I'd like to provide some background information, then I'll discuss how VA has dealt
with the issue of possible exposure to chemical warfare agents.
The United States military deployed almost 700,000 men and women to the Persian Gulf
during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Shortly after returning from the Persian Gulf
War veterans began to report a variety of symptoms and illnesses. In response to the needs of
these wartime veterans, the Department of Veterans Affairs immediately began development of its
229
Persian Gulf health care programs. The first component of the comprehensive programs was the
Persian Gulf Registry health examination program, developed in 1991 and implemented in 1992.
Since the initiation of that clinical examination program, the Department has continuously
improved and expanded its Persian Gulf programs to encompass a comprehensive four-pronged
approach to PGW veterans' programs, addressing relevant medical care, research, compensation,
and outreach and education.
VA provides Persian Gulf Registry Health Examinations, Referral Center evaluations,
readjustment and sexual trauma counseling, and special eligibility for health care to Persian Gulf
War veterans. To date, more than 62,000 Persian Gulf War veterans have completed Registry
examinations, almost 187,000 have been seen in VA ambulatory care clinics, and more than
18,200 have been hospitalized at VA medical facilities.
Persian Gulf veterans participating in the Registry examination have commonly reported
that they suffer from a diverse group of symptoms including fatigue, skin rash, headache, muscle
and joint pain, memory problems, shortness of breath, sleep disturbances, gastrointestinal
symptoms, and chest pain. Of note, 12% of the Registry participants had no current health
complaints but wished to participate in the examination because they were concerned about their
future health as a consequence of their service in the Persian Gulf War. This program was
established to assist veterans' entry into the continuum of VA health care. All Persian Gulf War
veterans, symptomatic or asymptomatic, are encouraged to avail themselves of the Registry
examination program.
We, at VA feel that the record clearly demonstrates the Department has always remained
open to the possibility that Persian Gulf War veterans were potentially exposed to a wide variety
230
of hazardous agents while serving in the Southwest Asia theater of operations, including chemical
warfare agents. Three years prior to the DoD announcement on June 21, 1996 regarding
demolitions at Khamisiyah, VA designed its clinical uniform case assessment protocol to detect
clinical signs and symptoms related to possible neurotoxic exposures. Neurologic examinations
and cognitive testing were part of the earliest versions of this protocol. As a consequence, VA
diagnostic protocols continue to serve as a valid set of clinical guidelines for initial screening
examinations (Phase I) and more comprehensive evaluations of difficult to diagnose cases (Phase
II). These protocols received positive reviews by highly respected physicians and scientists in the
past and will be reviewed again by a newly constituted Institute of Medicine Committee under VA
contract in early 1997. To date, no specific diagnostic biomarker exists for chemical warfare
agent exposures that occurred years ago; therefore no test can be added to the protocol which
will confirm for individual veterans whether they were exposed to these toxins during their service
in the Gulf.
VA has recently been asked by members of this Subcommittee whether we listened to
veterans who reported their belief that they had been exposed to chemical warfare agents during
their Persian Gulf service. We believe that there is clear evidence that VA officials did listen to
those veterans and did take appropriate action to investigate their concerns. For instance,
members of a Navy Reserve Construction Battalion unit from Alabama, Tennessee, North
Carolina, and Georgia reported suffering adverse health effects, which they attributed to exposure
to low-level chemical warfare during their Persian Gulf War service. In response, VA established
a pilot medical program at the Birmingham VA Medical Center to evaluate their health status. As
part of this special health care program, more than 100 veterans were evaluated. Included in this
231
group were 55 Persian Gulf War veterans complaining of cognitive problems who underwent
extensive (7-8 hours) neuropsychological testing and clinical evaluations. These evaluations did
not reveal the pattern of neurologic abnormalities typically associated with neurotoxin exposure
In the past, Members of Congress, veterans groups, and the media have frequently asked
VA to provide definitive answers regarding the health of Persian Gulf veterans using clinical and
administrative databases. It should be remembered that the Registry and other examination
program data are provided through medical records of self-selected individuals who have sought
health care in federal programs and are not likely to be reflective of the entire population of
Persian Gulf War veterans. In order to draw definitive conclusions about the health status of the
veterans, a carefully designed and well-executed research program is necessary. VA has already
laid the foundation for such a research program. VA is also developing a structured research
portfolio to address the most important Gulf-related medical and scientific issues. We continue to
search for answers and to expand our understanding of the illnesses of Persian Gulf veterans.
While scientific answers are being sought, VA also continues to provide all needed health care
services to reduce their suffering and compensation for their disabilities resulting from their
undiagnosed illnesses.
VA's research programs related to Persian Gulf veterans' illnesses include more than 30
individual projects being carried out nationwide by VA and University-affiliated investigators.
One recent important research publication has received considerable media attention, and I would
like to discuss it here today. For many months now veterans have voiced their concerns that they
and their colleagues who served in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm had a higher than
expected risk of dying after their service in the Gulf War. VA listened to these veterans concerns
232
and began a study to provide a scientific answer to the questions raised by Gulf War veterans
about life-threatening illnesses. In 1994, the VA Environmental Epidemiology Service began a
mortality study of Gulf War veterans. That study was carried out by Dr. Han Kang and Tim
Bullman and has been published in a recent issue of
The New England Journal of Medicine.
This research studied all 695,000 U.S. military personnel who served in the Persian Gulf
between August 1990 and April 1991. A randomly selected group of more than 746,000 military
personnel representing approximately half of all non-deployed military personnel during this time
period was identified for comparison.
The study included all deaths occurring between May 1991 and September 1993. This
was the maximum period for which complete, validated mortality information was available in
1994. The investigation demonstrated several important findings. First, in the cohort of 695,000
Gulf War veterans 1765 deaths occurred while among the 746,000 Gulf era controls, 1729 died.
Calculations of adjusted death rates from these figures after controlling for potential confounding
factors (such as age, sex, race and military variables) show a small (9%; RR=1.09, 95%CI= 1.01-
1.16), but statistically significant, increase in risk of death from all causes in Persian Gulf veterans
However, when cause-specific mortality is evaluated, the increased risk of death has been shown
to be attributable to external causes (RR=1.17, 95% CI = 1.08-1.27; 1317 deaths observed vs.
1 126 expected) such as accidents including motor vehicle accidents.
Secondly, there was no increased risk of death from medical diseases, suicide or
homicides among Gulf War veterans. This included cause-specific mortality for cancers,
233
circulatory diseases, and infectious diseases. These are disease categories which have been
identified as conditions of particular concern to Gulf War veterans and their families.
Third, there were important gender-specific difference in deaths. In men, the risk of death
due to medical diseases was lower among Gulf War veterans than among controls. Like their
male colleagues, women veterans of the Gulf War had a significant increase in deaths from
external causes, including accidental deaths. In contrast to men, death due to motor vehicle
accidents, suicides and homicide were all elevated but did not reach statistical significance. In
addition, adjusted risk of death from all external causes was much higher among women than
among men who served in the Gulf War (1.78 vs. 1.17). The death rates for medical disease-
related causes were essentially the same for men and women serving in Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm (0.89 vs. 0.87).
Lastly, when compared to the entire population of the United States, Gulf War veterans
and non-Gulf War veterans both had significantly lower cause-specific mortality ratios for medical
causes. Deaths among veterans occurred at a rate no more than half the rate of death expected in
the general population. This lower mortality should not be surprising since military members
undergo induction physical screening, are required to meet stringent physical fitness standards to
remain in the military, and have better access to health care than the general population.
While this mortality study provides very important new evidence that Gulf War veterans as
a group are not suffering from an increased risk of life-threatening illnesses, the results should not
be misconstrued to mean that Gulf War veterans' health concerns and symptoms can be
dismissed. Our health care programs have identified a number of Persian Gulf veterans who are
234
suffering from multisystem complaints, illnesses and disability. These illnesses are real and will
continue to be treated at VA medical facilities nationwide. The mortality study published in
The New England Journal of Medicine should be reassuring in that it demonstrates that Gulf War
veterans were not at higher risk of death from medical diseases during the two-year study period.
VA is committed to pursuing research studies on non-life threatening diseases which result in
morbidity or illness in Persian Gulf veterans, to support of long-term mortality studies which
could identify increased mortality among Gulf War veterans due to medical conditions with a
longer latency period (e.g. cancers) and to investigating the underlying cause or causes for the
increased risk of death from external causes which was identified in the current research report
study. A report of the current federally-sponsored research projects is included in the Annual
Report to Congress: Federally Sponsored Research on Persian Gulf Veterans' Illnesses for 1995.
In addition, the Persian Gulf War Veterans' Coordinating Board, comprised of members
from the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services and Veterans Affairs, has recently
completed work on a call for proposals on epidemiologic and basic science projects related to the
long-term health effects of low-level chemical warfare nerve agent exposures. Both government
and non-government researchers will be invited to submit proposals.
In conclusion, there have been several media reports indicating that VA was discharging
physicians on the basis of their comments and/or activities relating to Persian Gulf War veterans.
These allegations are incorrect. We have discussed this issue with staff of the subcommittee and
will be pleased to continue such discussions. As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Veterans Health
Administration has been undergoing reorganizations and integration of facilities and this has
resulted in the need to reduce staff. Any staff reductions which have, or will take place, are based
235
on an assessment of staffing requirements and are cate gorically unrelated to any statements or
activities by our employees concerning Persian Gulf War veterans.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We would be happy to address any questions.
236
Attachment to Dr. Mather's Statement of 12/11/96
.1 Articles
MORTALITY AMONG U.S. VETERANS OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
Han K. Kang, Dr.P.H.. and Tim A. Buuman, M.S.
Abstract
Background Sinca the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War,
there has been persistent concern that U.S. war vet-
erans may have had adverse health consequences,
including higher-than-normal mortality.
Methods We conducted a retrospective cohort
study of postwar mortality according to cause among
695.516 Gulf War veterans and 746,291 other veter-
ans. The follow-up continued through September
1993. A stratified, multivariate analysis (with Cox pro-
portional-hazards models) controlled for branch of
service, type of unit, age, sex, and race in comparing
the two groups. We used standardized mortality ra-
tios to compare the groups of veterans with the gen-
eral population of the United States.
Results Among the Gulf War veterans, there was
a small but significant excess of deaths as compared
with the veterans who did not serve in the Persian
Gulf (adjusted rate ratio, 1 .09; 95 percent confidence
interval, 1.01 to 1.16). The excess deaths were mainly
caused by accidents (1.25; 1.13 to 1.39) rather than
disease (0.88; 0.77 to 1.02). The corresponding rate
ratios among 49,919 female veterans of the Gulf War
were 1.32 (0.95 to 1.83) for death from all causes, 1.83
(1.02 to 3.28) for accidental death, and 0.89 (0.45 to
1.78) for death from disease. In both groups of veter-
ans the mortality rates were significantly lower over-
all than those in the general population. The adjusted
standardized mortality ratios were 0.44 (95 percent
confidence interval, 0.42 to 0.47) for Gulf War veter-
ans and 0.38 (0.36 to 0.40) for other veterans.
Conclusions Among veterans of the Persian Gulf
War, there was a significantly higher mortality rate
than among veterans deployed elsewhere, but most
of the increase was due to accidents rather than dis-
ease, a finding consistent with patterns of postwar
mortality among veterans of previous wars. (N Engl
J Med 1996;335:1498-504.)
©1996. Massachusetts Medical Society.
THERE is persistent concern in the United
States that veterans of the Persian Gulf War
may have had a higher rate of postwar
mortality than other veterans and that cer-
tain causes of death may have been especially fre-
quent. 1 - 2 Excess numbers of deaths from cardiovas-
cular disease and even from malignant neoplasms
have been mentioned often in the news media and
in one scientific journal. 1
Some 700,000 U.S. troops were deployed in the
Persian Gulf area between August 1990 and the end
of Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Among the po-
tential health risks associated with military service
during that conflict, infectious diseases, oil-well fires
and hazards associated with other petroleum prod-
ucts, insecticides and pesticides, sand particles, the
possible use of chemical and biologic warfare agents,
anti-nerve gas agents, and multiple vaccinations have
often been suggested as putative risk factors. 1 -' Fur-
thermore, the psychological stress involved in de-
ployment to the Persian Gulf and exposure to com-
bat has been well documented."
On the basis of previous studies, we expected that
veterans of the Gulf War would have increased mor-
tality due to external causes, including motor vehicle
accidents and accidents of other types, suicide, and
homicide. Among Vietnam veterans, an elevated risk
of traumatic deaths, including deaths due to motor
vehicle accidents, has been often reported.'-"'
We conducted a retrospective cohort study of mor-
tality in which we compared the postwar mortality
of Gulf War veterans with that of veterans from the
era of the Gulf War who did not serve in that con-
flict. This study complements the study by the De-
partment of Defense of non-battle-related deaths
among Gulf War troops who remained on active
duty."
METHODS
Study Subjects
The study subjects were all 695,516 military personnel who
served in the Persian Gulf from August 1990 to Apnl 1991
("Gulf War veterans"). They were identified rrom a roster provid-
ed by the Defense Manpower Data Center. A control group oi
746,291 military personnel consisted of a stratified random sam-
ple of approximately half of all personnel on active duty, in the
National Guard, and in the military reserves who served from
September 1990 to Apnl 1991 but did not go to the Persian
Gulf The number of controls and the number of Gulf War vet-
erans in each type of unit in each branch of the armed forces were
approximately equal. In the case of controls serving in reserve and
National Guard units, equal numbers were selected from units
From the Dcpirrmcm ol Vcrcrans Affairs, Environmental Epnicmiolngv
Service 1 135), 1120 20th St.. NW, Washington. DC 20OJ6- 3406. where
repnnt requests .huulj be addressed to Dr. Kang.
Reprinted from The New England Journal of Medicine
335:1498-1504 (November 14), 1996
237
MORTALITY AMONG U.S. VETERANS OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
that were activated but sent to places other than the Persian Gulf
area and units that were not activated at all. Personnel sent to the
Persian Gulf area after the war were not included in the control
group.
Available demographic information and data on military service
included the veteran's date of birth, race, sex, military rank,
branch of service, and deployment date, and the type of unit (ac-
c, or National Guard).
Determination of Vital Status and Collection of
Death Certificates
We determined the vital status of each Gulf War veteran from
the date the veteran left the Persian Gulf area. The follow-up of
controls began on May 1, 1991. The follow-up period ended ci-
ther on the veteran's date of death or on September 30, 1993,
whichever came first. (The reporting of vital status after that date
was expected to be incomplete in the national data bases available
for matching in May 1994.) Vital status was determined with a
data base of the Department of Veterans Affairs known as the
Beneficiary Identification and Records Locator Subsystem (BIRLS).
Veterans were also matched against a file of deaths reported to the
Social Security Administration. In a recent study of 4300 deaths
of veterans ascertained independently from states, the Veterans
Affairs BIRLS data base, used in conjunction with the Social Se-
curity Administration file, reported 97 percent of deaths of Viet-
nam-era veterans. 12
Death certificates were requested first from the Veterans Affairs
regional offices and the Federal Records Centers identified in the
BIRLS data base. Death certificates not found at these locations
were requested from state vital-statistics offices. Causes of death
were coded by a qualified nosologist who used the International
Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision (ICD-9), without knowing
the subject's deployment status. 1 '
The degree of completeness of the combined data sources (the
BIRLS data base and the files of the Social Security Administra-
tion) used in the determination of vital status was evaluated by
matching a random sample of 1 5,000 Gulf War veterans and
1 5,000 other veterans with the National Death Index, which in-
cludes all deaths reported to the National Center for Health Sta-
tistics by state vital-statistics offices, beginning in 1979.
Statistical Analysis
The data were analyzed in three stages. In stage 1, for each Gulf
War veteran the number of person-years at risk of dying were
counted from the date the veteran left the Persian Gulf area to
the veteran's date of death or September 30, 1993. For the con-
trols, this period at risk began on May 1, 1991. The relative fre-
quency of death overall, as well as death due to specific causes,
was compared between the Gulf War veterans and the controls on
the basis of the number of person-years at risk. Unadjusted rate
ratios were calculated from the crude death rates.
In stage 2, the Cox proportional-hazards model was used to ac-
count for possible confounding and the effect of selected covari-
ates on the risk of a veteran's dying from a specific cause, accord-
ing to the time since that veteran's entry into the cohort. 14 The
covariates considered in the model included age at the start of fol-
low-up, race, sex, service branch, and type of unit.
In stage 3, the cause-specific mortality of Gulf War veterans and
other veterans was compared with the number of deaths expected
in the overall US. population after adjustment for age, sex, race,
and year of death. The results were expressed as standardized mor-
tality ratios ls expressing the ratio of observed deaths among vet-
erans to the expected number of deaths in the general population.
RESULTS
Characteristics of the Two Groups
The demographic and military characteristics of
the Gulf War veterans were similar to those of the
controls with the exception of the year of birth, sex,
and type of unit (Table 1). The Gulf War veterans
were slightly younger than the controls (age in May
1991, 28.4 vs. 30.2 years), included more troops
serving in active units, and included fewer women
(7.2 percent vs. 13.3 percent). Among reservists and
members of the National Guard who did not take
part in the Gulf War, the characteristics of 106,840
veterans who were mobilized and 1 1 5,478 veterans
who were not were similar.
Among the 695,516 Gulf War veterans, 1765 died,
and death c 
